Abhidharma-dīpa-Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti.


[ Part I  INTRODUCTION ]

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School of Oriental and African Studies University of London 1958
ABSTRACT

The thesis consists of two parts: Introduction (Part I) and the Text (Part II).

Part II contains a critical edition of the Abhidharma-dīpa (with its commentary called the Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti) based on the photographs brought by Pandit Rāhula Śāṃkritīyānā of a MS. discovered in Tibet in 1937.

This hitherto unknown work belongs to the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika school and is written on the model and in refutation of the Abhidharma-kośa (and the Bhāṣya) of Vasubandhu.

It has the distinction of being the only work written against Vasubandhu the Kośakāra that has survived in its original form, and thus has a unique value in furnishing us with the orthodox Vaibhāṣika reactions to the Abhidharma-kośa and the Bhāṣya.

Part I - INTRODUCTION

The first chapter contains a brief description of the MS., notes on the correspondence between the kārikās of the Abhidharma-dīpa and the Abhidharma-kośa, and also a brief summary of the contents of the Abhidharma-dīpa and its Vṛtti.

The second chapter deals with the meaning and interpretation of the terms Sūtra and Abhidharma. An attempt has been made to trace the beginning of the Abhidharma to the Sūtras, particularly to those which deal with the thirty-seven bodhipākṣika-dharmas. It also contains a comparison of several Mātrakā lists showing the identity of the subject-matter of the
Abhidhāma of all Abhidharmika schools.

The third chapter deals with the divergence between the Sautrāntika and the Abhidharmika interpretations of the main items of the Abhidhāma, as they are found in the Pali commentaries, particularly in the Vibhanga-Atthakathā, and in the Abhidhāma-Kośa-Bhāṣya.

The fourth chapter deals with thirteen major controversies between the Sautrāntika Kośakāra and the Vaibhāṣika Dīpakāra (the author of the Abhidhāma-dīpa). An attempt has been made to trace the origin of these controversies to the Pali Scriptures and to their Atthakathās.

The last chapter deals with the problem of the date and authorship of the Text.

Additional notes:

i) The system of transcription used is that of the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Patna, in which the Abhidhāma-dīpa is to be published. The following diacritical marks may be noted.

\[ \text{ri} = \text{ṛ} \quad \text{cha} = \text{ṭ} \quad \text{chha} = \text{ṛ} \]
\[ \text{ṣa} = \text{ṣ} \quad \text{sha} = \text{ṣ} \]

ii) Notes on the restorations and corrections to the Text are given on page 268 of the Introduction.

iii) Bound at the end of this volume is my article 'On the theory of two Vasubandhus' which forms a subsidiary paper to this thesis.
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ABBREVIATIONS

(For details see Bibliography)

A. in combination with a title letter (e.g. MA.) = Atthakathā (on M.) (All references are to the Pali Text Society editions, unless otherwise stated).

Aaa. Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka.

Aam. Abhidharmāṃrita.

Ad or Dīpa Abhidharmā-ḍīpa (the kārikā text).

Adv. or Vṛtti. Vibhāṣāprabhā-vṛtti (the commentary on Ad).

Ak. or Kośa Abhidharmā-kośa (kārikā text as given in the edition of P. Pradhan. See Introduction p.6, n.3.)

Akb. or Bhāṣya Abhidharmā-kośa-Bhāṣya (P. Pradhan's edition. Ibid.)


AmT. Abhidharmā-mūla-Tīkā.

Aṅg. or A. Aṅguttara-nikāya.

Asm. Abhidharmasamuchchaya.

A. saṅgho Abhidhammatthasangaho.

A. vibhāvinīf Abhidhematthavibhāvinīf.

BESD Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary.

B. Paññikā Bodhicharyavatāra-Paññikā.

BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.
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<tr>
<td>Dīgha</td>
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<td>DEFPN.</td>
<td>Dictionary of the Pali Proper names.</td>
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<td>Kv.</td>
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<td>LVPak.</td>
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<td>Netti.</td>
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<td>PTS.</td>
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* References are to chapters and kārikās, unless otherwise stated.
Vbh. Vibhanga.
Vm. Visuddhimagga.
VmT. Visuddhimagga-Tktf.
I. SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS
OF THE ABHIDHARMA-DIPA.

The palm-leaf manuscript of the Abhidharma-dīpa was discovered in Tibet by Pandit Rāhula Sānkṛityāyana in the year 1937. He brought the photographs of this manuscript, which are preserved in the K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna. As the original MS. is not available to us, our only guide about it are the notes made by the discoverer. In his article 'Second search of Sanskrit Palm-leaf MSS. in Tibet',¹ he notes the following details: "Discovered in Shalu monastery, Abhidharma-pradīpa, Sāradā script, size 22" x 2", leaves 63, 9 lines in each side of leaf, incomplete. Begins - 'svasti, namah sarvajñāya / yo dukhahetu vyūpa- sāntimārgam / ....' From leaves 1 to 150, following 84 are missing: 2-30, 40, 46, 48, 50-52, 54-81, 83-90, 119-125, 127-129, 131-133, 138, 140, 145, 147, 149. Every chapter has four pādas. The third pāda of the eighth (perhaps the last) ends at 150b. The whole book contained not more than 160 leaves ...."

The numbers of the missing leaves as well as the title of the book given by the discoverer need correction. After arranging the leaves in proper order, we find the following 83 folios missing: 2-30, 40, 46, 48, 52-79, 81-90, 118-125, 127, 129, 131-3, 138, 140, 145 and 147. The last folio is numbered 150. Thus out of 150, only 62 folios have come down to us.

¹. JBOB, XXIII, 1, 1937, p.35.
The name of the MS. given on the label of the photographs is Abhidharmā-pradīpa. However, the MS. contains two works, viz., the metrical Abhidharmā-dīpa and a prose commentary on it known as the Vibhāṣāprabhā-vṛtti. The original work is called Abhidharmā-dīpa.¹ The author of this is referred to as Dīpakāra.² At the end of each chapter (Adhyāya) and sub-chapter (pāda) the work is called Abhidharmā-dīpa.³ But in two places (p.347 and p.429) it is called Abhidharmā-pradīpa, which may be an unauthorized improvement by the scribe. We shall, therefore, call the work Abhidharmā-dīpa and not pradīpa.

The kārikā text, namely the Abhidharmā-dīpa closely follows, both in the contents and in presentation, its counterpart, the Abhidharmā-kośa⁴ of Vasubandhu. The latter divides his work into eight Kośa-sthānas and adds a ninth Kośa-sthāna, viz., the Puṅgala-nirdeśa, more or less as an appendix. The Abhidharmā-dīpa, too, is divided in eight chapters called Adhyāyas, but unlike the Kośa, it subdivides each Adhyāya into four pādas. As the MS. discovered is incomplete, we are not certain whether the Dīpa too had a ninth Adhyāya corresponding to the IX Kośa-sthāna. Most probably the Dīpa had not, for it is not referred to anywhere, even in the relevant parts of the work.

1. See Ad. kārikā l.
4. Henceforth called Kośa or Ak.
5. Henceforth called Dīpa or Ad.
The eight Adhyāyas deal with the following topics in the same order as in the Koṣa:-

I    Skandha-āyatana-dhātu.
II   Indriya.
III  Loka-dhātu.
IV    Karma.
V    Anuśaya.
VI   Mārga.
VII  Jñāna.
VIII Samādhi.

The Adhyāyas in the Dīpa are not named in the manuscript, but merely numbered. The seventh Adhyāya, however, is named at the end of its fourth pada as Jñānavibhāga.

The number of the kārikās found in the Dīpa extant is 597. Of these 11 kārikās have lost either the first two (a and b) or last two (c and d) quarters as they come either at the end or the beginning of the lost folios. Two kārikās have a line missing, probably due to the inadvertence of the scribe.

The distribution of the kārikās in each Adhyāya cannot be ascertained with certainty as most of them have lost certain portions. The fourth pada of the II Adhyāya (dealing with hetu, pratyaya and phala),

1. 87, 129, 130, 158, 383, 396, 425, 437, 481, 488, 547.
2. 93 and 192.
and the first three pādās of the III Adhyāya (dealing with pratītya-samutpāda) are entirely lost. Major portions of the first pāda of the I Adhyāya (29 folios), first pāda of the IV Adhyāya, fourth pāda of the V Adhyāya (7 folios) and the third pāda of the VI Adhyāya (3 folios) and several small portions of the last two Adhyāyas are also lost. As it is, we find the following number of kārikās in each Adhyāya:—

| I   | 71 |
| II  | 78 |
| III | 4 |
| IV  | 105 |
| V   | 125 |
| VI  | 92 |
| VII | 58 |
| VIII| 64 |
| Total | 597 |

Since our extant work is just a little more than one-third of the original, it will be reasonable to presume that the entire kārikā text consisted of at least 1200 verses, covering almost the same topics that are dealt with in the Kośa, which consists of only 600 kārikās (excluding the thirteen kārikās of the IX Kośa-sṭhāṇa).

A large number of kārikās of the Dīpa correspond, almost one for one and sometimes word for word, to the kārikās of the Kośa as will be evident from the comparisons given in the footnotes to the text. The table given at the end of this introduction will show that a majority of the kārikās of the Dīpa find their parallels in the Kośa.

2. See Appendix I.
This correspondence between the karikas of Dīpa and Kośa is very striking. Out of the 597 karikas of the Dīpa, not less than 300 have their parallels in the Kośa. Except in a few cases (which are noted in the footnotes to the Text), they are presented in a consecutive order. It is possible to determine the subject matter of the lost folios of the Dīpa by referring to the corresponding Kośa. Even in phraseology, they appear almost as imitations of the Kośa. This may be partly due to the common subject matter. But on the whole, one is led to the impression that the Dipakāra had the Kośa-karikas as models for his composition.

The karikas of the Kośa are brief and compressing many points in single verses. Hence we see the Kośa-Bhāshya breaking the karikas in small pieces for commentary. The karikas of the Dīpa are usually divided only in two parts.

The number of karikas in the Dīpa is larger than in the Kośa, This is firstly due to the new topics introduced by the Dipakāra and secondly due to a detailed exposition of those topics which are briefly discussed in the Kośa. About fifty karikas are devoted to topics which do not occur in the Kośa. About eighty karikas are devoted to the topics which are treated only in the six karikas in the Kośa. It should, however, be noted that the majority of the karikas of the second kind

2. E.g., karikas 101-108 = Ak. II.21.
   300-324 = Ak. V.26, 27.
   332-355 = Ak. V.51.
   397-420 = Ak. VI.18-19.
contains, in most cases, only such details as are given in the Koša-
Bhāṣṭya.

The commentary on the Dīpa, the Viśhāṣṭā-prabhā-Vṛitti, is also
Bhāṣṭya.

The commentary on the Dīpa, the Viśhāṣṭā-prabhā-Vṛitti, is also
written more or less on the pattern of the Abhidharma-kosa-Bhāṣṭya of
Vasubandhu. Nevertheless, it is only in the Vṛitti that we
meet severe criticism directed against the Kośakāra. It will be proved
in a subsequent chapter that this commentary is written solely for
presenting the orthodox Viśhāṣṭika viewpoint, encountering the criticisms
levelled against it by the Kośakāra in his Bhāṣṭya. We may here note
that although criticising it, the Vṛitti, in most parts, is an imitation
of the Bhāṣṭya and differs only in those places where it either deals
with new topics or deals in detail with those which are given in brief in
the Bhāṣṭya. We have indicated in the footnotes to the Text, the passages
common to the Bhāṣṭya. There are about fifty such large passages (the

1. Henceforth called Vṛitti or Adv.
2. Henceforth called Bhāṣṭya or Abk.
3. This work has hitherto been known to us through the L'Abhidharma Kośa
de Vasubandhu of Louis de la Vallée Poussin, who translated it from the
Chinese and Tibetan translations. Fortunately, the original Sanskrit MS.
of this work was also discovered by Pandit Rāhul in Tibet in 1937. This
has now been edited by Professor Prahlad Pradhan and awaits publication in
the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Patna. I am deeply grateful to
Professor Pradhan for giving me access to his press-copy of this MS. I
am also indebted to Professor A.S. Altekar, the General Editor of the
Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, for his kind permission to quote and print
passages from the above work in my edition of the Dīpa.
smaller ones are not noted) which are more or less identical with the Bhāshya. Of these about twelve passages are quotations from other works (mostly Sūtras, the Prajñāapti and the Jñānaprasthāna) common to both.

Four passages deal with the chatushkotikas⁠¹, which also appear to be borrowed by both from some common Abhidharma source. Two passages are mentioned as quotations from the Bhāshya itself as providing the pūrva-paksha.³ The remaining 32 passages are directly borrowed from the Bhāshya without any acknowledgement. Of these a large number are identical and a few substantially agree with the Bhāshya. The entire Vṛitti on the kārikās 17a, 185, 204cd, 209, 261 and 350 of Dīpa may specially be noted as it is identical with its corresponding Bhāshya.

Keeping in view this primary relation of the Dīpa and its Vṛitti with the Koda and its Bhāshya respectively, we may proceed to give in brief the contents of the work. In doing this we will be taking notice only of the more important topics and particularly of those which are either controversial or are not treated in the Bhāshya.

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I Adhyāya

[Kārikā 1]

The MS. opens with a salutation to the omniscient. The first kārikā declares that the author will compose a śāstra known as the Abhidharma-dīpa. The Vṛtti on this contains a brief survey of the Four Noble Truths, which constitute the central teachings of the Buddha. An etymological discussion of the term Buddha is given to show that he knows all (sarvam, i.e., the twelve āyatanas).

Here the Text is very seriously interrupted as not less than 29 folios, containing a major portion of the first and the second pāda are lost. These lost folios might have contained a very useful discussion on the meaning of the Abhidharma and a detailed scheme of the Dharmas set out in their traditional divisions of asaṃskṛita and saṃskṛita and the latter in the five skandhas, further divided into the seventy-two categories of the Vaibhāṣika. This is evident from a subsequent statement: vyākhyātāh ashtau padārthāḥ, saṃskṛtāḥ pañccha, trayaḥ chāsaṃskṛtāḥ.

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1. 75 Dharmas

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<td>(11)</td>
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<th>Rūpa</th>
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<th>Akāśa</th>
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<th>Apratisamkhyā-nirodha</th>
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<td>(11)</td>
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The only point to note here is that the *Vritti* contains a criticism, in this connection, of the Vaiśeṣika padārthas and the Sāṃkhya prakṛiti, topics which are not referred to in the *Bhāṣya*.

The *Vritti* now deals with the āyatana and dhātu-vyavastha. The meanings of these two terms are given in almost the same words as in the *Bhāṣya*. More detailed information is given about the manodhātu and its relation to other viśeṣadhātus. Two ābhidharmika terms, viz., saṁgraha (collection) and saṁprayoga (association) are explained in order to extend the scope of such terms as skandha, āyatana and dhātu to cover many categories which occur in the Sūtras but are not tabulated in the Abhidharma. The traditional list of the 80,000 dharma-skandhas (aggregates of the preachings of the Doctrine) is referred to with various interpretations of this word. The Kośakāra and the Dipakāra agree that this number corresponds to the 80,000 kinds of people, differing on account of their charita (nature) for whom the Buddha has preached the law suitable to each one of them.
The meaning of the term pratigha is given in a passage which is borrowed from the Bhāshya, including a quotation from Kumārīkāta.

[Kārikā 18]

While dealing with the distribution of the eighteen dhātus in the three spheres of existence, (kāma-rūpa-arūpa), the Vṛttī, unlike the Bhāshya, merely mentions that the beings of the rūpa-loka do not possess four dhātus, viz., gandha, rasa, ghrāpa-vijñāna and jīhvā-vijñāna. This Vaibhāṣhika theory shared also by the Theravādins is very pointedly criticised by the Kośakāra in the Bhāshya.

[Kārikā 19]

While defining the term sāsrava, the Vṛttī refers to the Kośakāra and criticises his definition of this term. According to the Kośakāra, the dharmas included in the first and second Truths are sāsrava, because sārvas (influxes) coincide with and reside (anusagāta) in them. The Vṛttī shows that this is a wrong derivation.

[Kārikā 20]

The next notable topic in this pāda is of vitarka and vichāra. The Vaibhāṣhikas maintain that there is some kind of sensation (vitarka) and discursive thought (vichāra) in every moment of consciousness. The vikalpa is of three kinds: svabhāva-vikalpa (pure sensation), abhinirūpāṇa-vikalpa (investigatory sensation), and anusmaraṇa-vikalpa (recollecting sensation). The Kośakāra mentions these three, but as Yasōmitra points
out, does not approve of these distinctions. He further identifies the svabhāva-vikalpa with vitarka. According to the Vaibhāshikas, this svabhāva-vikalpa alone is found in the five kinds of sense consciousness. These, therefore, are treated as avikalpaka or not having any active sensation.

[Kārikās 21-34]

The Kośakāra, in dealing with this topic, leaves out many details which are only to be found in the Vṛitti. The Vṛitti here has 14 kārikās (21-34) dealing with the various kinds of vikalpas obtained in various states of mind, and the possibility of memory (smṛiti) in the absence of a permanent entity or soul.

[Kārikā 44]

The fourth pada opens with a long criticism of the Kośakāra's views on the theory of cognition. The controversy relates to the process of cognition, i.e. whether it is the consciousness or the organ of sense that comprehends the object. The Vṛitti takes up the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāshika viewpoint, following an āgama passage, that it is primarily the sense organ that comprehends and not the consciousness. The Vṛitti closes this controversy with a severe condemnation of the Kośakāra for his ignorance of the Abhidharma and for his leanings towards the Mahāyāna (Vijñāna-vāda).

1. [tri-vidhaḥ kila vikalpa] iti. kila-sabdaḥ paramata-dyotanārthāḥ svabhīpraṣās tu chetanā-prajñā-viśesha eva vitarka iti na svabhāva-vikalpo'nayo dharmo'ṣṭītī.

Sāky. p. 64.
At the end of this pada we find a very bold line indicting the Kośakāra for his omission of an important topic. It reads: "Now this topic, constituting the very essence of the Abhidharma, forgotten by the Kośakāra, should be explained." The Vṛtti in 14 kārikās (58-71) gives various details about the cessation of dhātus through various stages of the anāsrava mārga.

II Adhyāya

The second Adhyāya deals with the division of the dharmas into 22 indriyas. By indriya is meant aśvarya (supremacy). The twenty-two indriyas have supremacy over their respective functions. The Vṛtti quotes a passage containing the view of the paurāṇa-āchāryas (which also occurs in the Bhāshya but not so acknowledged), attributing several functions to the five organs - the first five indriyas. The Kośakāra, however, holds that the sense organs have supremacy only over the knowledge of their respective objects, e.g., the organ of eye has supremacy over the action of seeing the matter. This, says the Vṛtti, is not a novel theory. Indeed, it is a Vaibhāshika view, and by saying so, the Kośakāra has indirectly accepted the Vaibhāshika contention that the eye comprehends and not the eye-consciousness.

The Vṛtti next refers to a very important theory of the Dārśāntika (i.e. the Sautrāntika), according to whom, no direct
perception is possible. It is his contention that perception is not possible, since the object, the sense organ and the cognition are all momentary. This leads to the famous theory of bāhyānumeyavāda closely resembling Locke's doctrine of Representative Perception, attributed to the Sautrāntika in later works like Sarvadarśanasamgraha. The Vṛtti, however, does not enter into any criticism of this Sautrāntika position.

[Kārikās 80-87]

If the meaning of indriya is supremacy, why only twenty-two indriyas? There are various dharmas, e.g., saṃjñā, chetana, etc., which also have supremacy over different mental states. This question is discussed in five kārikās (81-85). It may be noted that the Bhāṣya too deals with this topic, but instead chooses other examples, e.g., vāk, pāṇi, pāda, etc.

[Kārikās 89-90]

The only other notable point in this pāda is a controversy about five indriyas, viz., śrāddhā, smṛti, etc. The controversy is whether these five are sāsrava (defiled) or anāsrava (undefiled) or both. Here the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra hold identical views that they are sāsravānāsrava. In this connection, the Vṛtti borrows a whole passage from the Bhāṣya without any acknowledgement.

[Kārikās 92-111]

The second pāda of this Adhyāya is very short. It is devoted to various minor details about the indriyas. It also contains a short but
important reference to the atomic theory of the Vaibhāshika and a criticism of the Kośakāra's definition of paramāṇu.

[Kārikā 112-115]

The third pāda contains a long discussion on the 46 chaītta dharmas and the 14 chītta-viprayukta-saṃskāras. The former are divided into the following six categories:

- 10 chītta-mahā-bhauma
- 10 kusala-mahā-bhauma
- 6 klesa-mahā-bhauma
- 2 akuśala-mahā-bhauma
- 10 parittaklesa-mahā-bhauma
- and 3 aniyata

46

The Vṛtti gives definitions of these dharmas.

[Kārikā 116-120]

The Vṛtti here contains a criticism of Bhadanta Buddhadeva's view that the chītta and chaītasikas are not different dharmas. Buddhadeva also holds that the bhūta-rūpa and the bhautika-rūpa (primary and derived matter) are not different. The Vṛtti makes a reference to its arguments contained in a previous chapter - bhūta-bhautikā nyatva-chinta. This, however, belongs to some lost portions of the I Adhyāya. The Kośakāra deals with this in the I Kośasthāna while discussing the bhūta and bhautika dhātus. The Kośakāra, the Dīpakāra and the Theravadins hold
identical views on this point.

[Kārikā 123]

Of the aniyata (miscellaneous) chaitasikas, the Vṛitti deals in detail only with the vitarka and vichāra. This is one of the major controversial points found in the Abhidharma literature. The vitarka and vichāra are characterised as coarser (audārika) and refined (sūkṣma) sensations simultaneously operating in all kinds of the kāmāvachāra consciousness. Since these two partake of two opposite natures (audārika and sūkṣma), the Kośakāra maintains that these two cannot cooperate in one and the same moment of consciousness. The Vṛitti strongly criticises this unorthodox contention of the Kośakāra. It may be noted that the views expressed in the Vṛitti are identical with the views of Saṅghabhadra, a celebrated Vaibhāṣika contemporary of Vasubandhu.

[Kārikās 126-149]

The rest of the II Adhyāya is devoted to the discussion or rather the defence of the viprayukta-saṃskāras, accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas but strongly criticised by the Kośakāra and rejected by the Sautrāntikas. There are thirteen such saṃskāras which cannot be included among material or mental groups. The Kośakāra argues that these saṃskāras have no independent nature or function, nor are they preached by the Buddha. The Vṛitti provides an answer to this criticism. It is its claim that only such great Buddhists as (ārya) Maitreya or (sthavira) Vasumitra or (āchārya) Aśvaghosha can comprehend the teachings of the Buddha and not
those infants who are ignorant of the Abhidharma.

Much of this valuable discussion on the first two samskāras, viz., prāpti and aprāpti is lost.

The third samskāra known as sabhāgata, a force producing generality, is defended against the criticism of the Kośakāra, who holds it to be identical with the realistic generality (sāmānya) of the Vaiśesika.

The next two samskāras, viz., āsāṃjñika and the nirodha-samāpatti (forces stopping the functions of consciousness in the realms of unconscious trance) are dealt with in the traditional way. Here too, the Vṛtti launches a strong criticism of the Kośakāra for his 'unbuddhistic' (abauddhiya) theory that these states of trances are not unconscious (achittika) but are conscious (sachittika). This valuable criticism is unfortunately interrupted as one folio containing it is lost.

The next samskāra is jñīvita, the force of life-duration. The Vaibhāshika holds that it is this samskāra which (as determined by the previous karmas), at the time of conception, is instrumental in determining the life-duration (sthitihetuḥ). The Kośakāra holds that if the karma determines the duration, the function of the jñīvita is superfluous and hence no reality. The Vṛtti puts forward arguments to prove that the jñīvita is a dravya, a real element.

The Vṛtti here introduces a very interesting controversy regarding the nature of any possible prolongation of life by yogic powers. According to the Vaibhāshika theory, such a thing is contrary to the laws
of karma. The life span (jīvita) is a result of karma (vipākajā), which does not admit any prolongation by samādhi.

This controversy arises from the well known legend of the Buddha's declaration that he could, on account of his mastery over the four paths to riddhi live in the same birth for a kalpa or a kalpāvāsēsha.

The Kośakāra fully deals with this controversy while dealing with a topic: kati indriyāpi vipākajā. There the Kośakāra maintains, contrary to the accepted Vaibhāshika theory, that in the case of such prolongation of life by the Buddha (or any other arhat), the yogic powers supersede the karma and produce a new life. It is, therefore, a life which is samādhija (born of samādhi) and not vipākajā (a result of karma).

This view of the Kośakāra is censured by the Vṛitti as uninformed, contrary to the words of the Buddha and unworthy of any criticism. The accusation is even made that the Kośakāra had accepted the Vaitulika-śāstra and had so entered the portals of Mahāyāna.

The Vṛitti next deals with the four saṃskāras known as the saṃskṛita-lakṣaṇas or the phenomenalising characteristics of all phenomena. They are: jāti (origin), sthiti (subsistence), jarā (decay) and nāśa (extinction). The Vaibhāshikas, on the basis of a sūtra, conceive that every phenomenal element in its each momentary existence is simultaneously affected by all these four saṃskāras.

The Sautrāntikas hold that as these four saṃskāras have natures opposed to each other, they cannot simultaneously function on a momentary thing. They point out that these four lakṣaṇas have no reality as they
were spoken of by the Buddha only with reference to the series of moments (pravāha) and not to the kshaṇa (moment).

The Kosākāra openly favours this Sautrāntika view in the Bhāshya. The Vṛtti criticises this 'nāstikapaksha' adopted by the Kosākāra. The last three sāṃskāras, viz., nāma-kāya, pada-kāya and vyakti-kāya (sāṃskāras which impart significance to words, sentences and articulate sounds respectively) are discussed in detail in the Vṛtti. The Sautrāntikas maintain that since these sāṃskāras are not different from vāk-sābda, i.e., the sound of speech produced from the atoms of sound, it is not necessary to invent such new sāṃskāras outside the group of Matter.

The Kosākāra favours this view and ridicules the Viśābhāshika doctrine of the chitta-viprayukta-sāṃskāra. The Vṛtti contains an answer to his arguments. It also criticises the Mīmāṃsaka, Vaiyākaraṇa and Vaiśeṣika theories of śabda. The Bhāshya does not refer to the views of these three schools.

The third pada comes to an end with the discussion on the viprayukta-sāṃskāras. The fourth pada, containing a discussion on betu, pratyāya and phala is entirely lost.

III Adhyāya

[Kārikā 150-153]

The first three pādas of this Adhyāya, dealing with cosmology are entirely lost. Only one topic of the dissolution (samvartani) of the
The IV Adhyāya deals with the doctrine of karma. The Vṛitti opens the first pāda with a criticism of the īśvara-kāraṇa-vāda in more detail than the Bhāṣya. The karma is divided into its traditional three types: physical, vocal and mental. The first two are further divided as vijñapti ('manifest act') and avijñapti ('unmanifest act'). These two Vaibhāṣika conceptions, rejected by the Sautrāntika school, are very pointedly criticised by the Kośakāra in the Bhāṣya. Unfortunately, the Vṛitti here is interrupted as several of its folios are lost.

The beginning portion of the second pāda is also lost. The Vṛitti here deals with further details of karma. The karma is of three kinds: saṁvara karma (act of abstention from evils), asaṁvara karma (act of indulgence in evils) and naiva-saṁvara-nāsaṁvara-karma (absence from the first two kinds of karma). Of these the first is again divided into three: prātimoksha-saṁvara, dhyāna-saṁvara and anāsrava saṁvara.

Of these, the prātimoksha-saṁvara is dealt with in detail. The
Vritti contains an answer to a criticism from the Kośakāra regarding the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣika definitions of the upāsaka and bhikṣu.

[Kārikās 170-187]

The remaining portion of this pāda is devoted to the treatment of various kinds of karma divided in several groups of triads. Here too, the Vritti closely follows the Bhāṣya and borrows several portions from the latter.

[Kārikā 188]

The only other notable point in this pāda is a reference to a Dārshāntika view. The Dārshāntika maintains, on the basis of a sūtra passage, that the kleśas known as abhidhyā (covetousness), vyāpāda (ill will) and mithyādṛṣṭi are of the nature of karma. The Vritti considers this a wrong view since it results in the identity of karma and kleśa. The Dārshāntika is here called 'Sthitibhāgiya', a term not used either by the Kośakāra or by Yaśomitra. The Vritti criticises the Kośakāra for adopting this heretic view, which is contrary to the Abhidharma.

[Kārikās 190-198]

The third pāda is devoted to a discussion on the ten karmāpathas (the ways of acting). The Vritti gives their definitions, stages of completion and various other details. In this connection it refers to the Pārasikas who consider it religious to kill their parents and also indulge in illegitimate relationship with their mothers. The Brāhmaṇas are
accused of justifying their plunders and the Vedas are condemned as irrelevant talks. The Jains (nagāṭa) are criticised for their wrong conception of hīṃsa. It may be noted that this whole criticism is much in the same words as in the Bhāṣya. The Vṛitti, however, contains a longer examination of the yājñika conception of the sacrificial hīṃsa.

[Kārikā 199]

The next notable point is a controversy about the destruction of the kuśala-mūla (the basis or roots of goodness). The Kośakāra gives several details about the manner in which the kuśala-mūlas are completely annihilated by the power of wrong views (mithyā-đrishti). It is a Vaibhāṣīka doctrine that every person is endowed with some kind of kuśala-mūla but this can be completely annihilated without any residue by the evil powers of mithyā-đrishti. The Kośakāra, however, maintains that the elements of kuśala are never entirely lost, but persist in the form of subtle seeds even in the akūśala state of mind. The Vṛitti quotes this view of the Kośakāra and puts forward the arguments of Dipakāra supported by the Āgama.

[Kārikās 200-222]

The remaining portion of this pāda is devoted to other details of the karma-pathas, more or less on the same pattern as the Bhāṣya. At the end of this pāda we find a new topic, viz., the karma-svakaṭā, not mentioned in the Bhāṣya. The latter, however, contains discussions on tripi śvarapāni (three obstructions) and five ānantaryā-karmas (conducts
that find retribution without delay). These topics are not found in the Vritti.

[Kārikā 223-230]

The fourth pāda is solely devoted to a full discussion of the bodhisattva doctrine. The Pāli Abhidharma works do not even mention this topic. Even the Visuddhimagga makes just a stray reference to the bodhisatta-sīla. The Bhāshya deals with this, but only incidentally and devotes only four kārikās (Ak. IV. 108-111). The Vritti, therefore, is our only Abhidharma source for the Hinayānist interpretation of this important topic.

The Vritti contains a long description of the determination of the bodhisattva to help the world by cultivating the bodhi-chitta and the pāramitās. This is given in a very ornate style, unusual in Abhidharma works, reminding us of similar passages in the Saddharma-pundarika or the Śikṣā-samuchchaya. Conditions attending the first moment of the bodhi-chitta and the acquisition of other excellences are given in detail. The Vritti enumerates the thirtytwo maha-puruasha-lakshanas (marks of a great man) and the eighty anuvyakhjanas (the secondary marks) in conformity with their traditional lists. The Bhāshya omits this enumeration, but instead enumerates the names of the sixty sthānāntaras, constituting a kalpa, which are not given in the Vritti.

[Kārikā 231]

Only four pāramitās (viz., dāna, śīla, vīrya and prajñā), as
against the traditional six or ten, are mentioned in the Vṛitti. The Vṛitti informs us that the Vaibhāṣikas do not consider the kṣānti and dhyāna as separate pāramitās but include them in the śīla and prajñā respectively. The vinayadhara-Vaibhāṣikas, it says, read only four pāramitās in the Vinaya. Neither of these views are mentioned in the Bhāṣya.

[Kārikā: 232-235]

Here the Vṛitti introduces a very important controversy, unnoticed by the Kośakāra. It is claimed by some (Mahāyāṇists) that the bodhisattvāmārga is not preached in the three Pīṭakas. The Dīpakāra takes up this challenge and argues that all the essential points (even including the thirty-seven bodhipākṣhika dharmas) of the bodhisattva path are preached in the Sūtras, and the pāramitās are mentioned in the Vinaya. It is, therefore, a great heresy to suggest that this doctrine is alien to the Pīṭakas. Since there are several Sūtras and Pīṭakas, the Vṛitti makes it clear that only those words of the Buddha are authentic which are included in the Four Āgamas by the elder councillors like Mahākāśyapa and Ānanda.

[Kārikā: 239-241]

This leads us to a still more controversial topic of the phalabheda. If the bodhi-mārga is not different from the Pīṭaka-preachings, how do we account for the difference in the accomplishments of a śrāvaka, a pratyekabuddha and a Buddha? The Vṛitti very consistently
maintains that the entire preaching of the Lord, which is to be traced to the three Pitakas, points to the two kinds of Deliverance, viz., chetovimukti and prajñā-vimukti. Both these are equally attained by the śrāvaka, pratyekābuddha and the Buddha. The difference, therefore, is not in their Deliverance but only in their phenomenal excellences of equipments, faculties and aspirations.

V. Adhyāya

[kārikā 259-261]

The fifth Adhyāya is devoted to the exposition of the anuśayas and other minor kleśas. The Sūtras speak of the six basic anuśayas, viz., rāga (bias of passion), pratigha (illwill), moha (infatuation), mana (pride), vichikitsā (doubt) and drishti (wrong views). In Abhidharma these are further divided into ninety-eight. As Yaśomitra points out, the different schools attach different meanings to this term. The Vaibhāshikas maintain that the anuśaya means paryavasthāna, the Vātsiputriyas hold it to be prāpti, and the Sautrāntikas consider it a bija. The Kośakāra examines the first two views and openly favours the Sautrāntika theory of bija. The Vṛitti borrows that part of the Bhāṣyā which criticises the Vātsiputriya, but strongly criticises the Kośakāra for his Sautrāntika bias. The Vṛitti is brief here, as it says, it has discussed this topic in the Karma-chintā (the IV Adhyāya) and also in a work known as Tattva-saptati. This work is unknown to us. It may quite well be an
independent work of the Dīpakāra, written on the model of the Paramārtha-
saptati of Vasubandhu.

[Kārikā 271]
A controversy about a drishti known as the śilavrata—paramarsha
(grasping after works and rites) should be noted here. There are various
views about the way this drishti is destroyed. The Kośakāra strongly
criticises the Vaibhāṣika theory that this drishti is removed by insight
into the Second Truth (samudaya-darsāna). The Vṛtti upholds the orthodox
Vaibhāṣika viewpoint shared by Āchārya Saṃghabhadra.

[Kārikā 272-288]
The rest of the first pāda deals with several details about the
ninety-eight divisions of the anuśaaya.

[Kārikā 289-324]
The second pāda of this Adhyāya constitutes by far the most
important part of the whole work. The fundamental principle of the
Sarvāstivāda school, namely, the reality of the past and future elements,
is discussed here in opposition to the Sautrāntika arguments forwarded
by the Kośakāra in the fifth Koṇasthāna of his Bhashya. We are familiar
with this controversy through the pioneer works of Steherbatsky and
Poussin. The Dīpakāra takes up each argument of the Kośakāra,
reinterprets the relevant sūtras put forward by the Sautrāntikas and
establishes, with considerable success, the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the
Sarvāstivāda.
Both the Bhāshya and the Vrtti quote in this connection the four theories advocated by Dharmatrāta, Ghoshaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. But there are a few important points found only in the Vrtti. The latter refers to the schools of Dārśṇāntika, Vaitulika and Paudgalika and equates them respectively with the Lokāyatika, Vaiśāśika and Nāgājña (Jaina) schools. The Vrtti quotes Kumāralāta’s view supporting the Vaibhāshika view-point. It also examines the doctrine of Śūnyavāda, the paripaśnavāda of Sāṃkhya, the avayavivāda of Vaiseshika and contains a valuable reference to the trisvabhāva-vāda of the Kośakāra who is described as a Māhyānānist fallen from the Sarvāstivāda.

[Kārikā 325-359]

The rest of this pāda deals with different anusayas obtaining in different states of mind. The Kośakāra is very brief and explains this point by way of an illustration of the sukhandriya. The Dīpa devotes twenty-five kārikās to this topic.

[Kārikā 360-370]

The third pāda is devoted to the exposition of other kleśas grouped as āsrava, ogha, yoga, upādāna, saṃyojana, bandhana and grantha. The Vrtti here differs very little from the corresponding Bhāshya.

[Kārikā 371-383]

The upakleśas or minor kleśas collected in the Kauḍraka-vastu (corresponding to the Pali Khuddaka-vattthu-vibhanga) are dealt with in detail in the Vrtti. The Bhāshya is very brief and mentions only three upakleśas.
The last portions of this pāda and the entire fourth pāda, containing details on the kleśa-prahāṇa and kleśa-parijñā are lost.

VI Adhyāya

This Adhyāya deals with the ārya-mārga or the stages leading to arhatship. A large portion of this Adhyāya, consisting of about seven folios, is lost.

[Kārikās 384-390]

The first pāda contains discussion on the dārśana and bhāvanā-mārga. In this connection the practices of the four smṛityupasthānas (or application of mindfulness on the nature of the body, feelings, mind and dharmas) are explained in detail as they alone bring the annihilation of the impurities (kleśa-kshaya). Of these the last, viz., the dharma-smṛityupasthāna is equivalent to vipaśyanā, the analytical insight into the law of pratītya-samutpāda, the central teaching of the Buddha. It is called here 'dharma-mudrā' and is identical with the term 'śūnya'.

The Vṛitti, however, deems it necessary to delimit the meaning of this term against the absolutist interpretations and explains that the saṃskāras are not devoid of svabhāva (own nature) but are only anātma, i.e., devoid of a substance. The Bhāṣya does not contain this comment.

[Kārikās 393-438]

The practice of the smṛityupasthānas is conducive to the attainment of the first four stages in the dārśana-mārga. They are known
as ūṣhma, mūrdha, kshānti and laukikāgradharma. The first is the 'fire' of intuition producing the pacification (sāma) of mind. The second is called mūrdha (superior) as it enfeebles the power of mithyādrishti and thereby consolidates the kuśalamūlas. The third is called kshānti where the aspirant achieves unassailable faith in the 'triple gems'. The fourth stage is 'supreme phenomenal existence', so called because it is a turning-point in the career of the aspirant. This stage is comparable to the gotrabhū-chitta of the Pali Abhidharma. This stage is followed by fifteen moments of insight into the Four Truths and culminates in the darga-marga known as srota-āpatti or the entering upon the Noble Path. Various details concerning these stages and controversies relating them are given in the Vṛitti. The remaining three stages, viz., that of the sakridāgāmin, anāgamin, and the arhat, belonging to the bhāvanāmārga are also dealt with in the third pāda, a major portion of which is lost.

[Kārika 439-475]

The fourth pāda contains an exposition of several kinds of mārgas and pratipats (modes of progress) spoken in the Sūtras. A large portion is devoted to the thirty-seven bodhipakshya-dharmas covering all the essential factors leading to the bodhi. Bodhi, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, constitutes the two illuminations, viz., the kshaya-jñāna and anutpāda-jñāna, terms which we repeatedly meet in the following Pali passage: 'khiṃ pa me jāti ... nāparam itthattāya'. This bodhi, says the Vṛitti, is of three kinds, viz., buddhabodhi, pratyeka-buddhabodhi and
śrāvaka-bodhi, giving rise to the concepts of Three Yānas, differing not in kind but only in the degrees of practice of the thirty-seven bodhipakṣya-dharmas. These dharmas are then explained in detail in the traditional manner. The only notable point is that the Vṛitti, as in the case of the indriyas, devotes seven kārikās to explaining the reason for not including several dharmas under the bodhipakṣya. This topic is not found in the Bhāṣya.

VII Adhyāya

[Kārikās 476-492]

The Lord has said that this spiritual discipline (mārga) consists of three skandhas (aggregates). 'The śīla-skandha', says the Vṛitti, 'is explained in the Karmadhyāya (i.e. the IV Chapter), the samādhi-skandha will be explained in the VIII Adhyāya, the prajñā-skandha should now be explained'.

The treatment of the prajñā is more or less on the lines of the Pali Nānavibhanga. The Pali works are more elaborate and enumerate a large number of jñānas but the Sanskrit Abhidharma works (including the Bhāṣya and the Vṛitti) deal only with ten kinds, viz., dharma, anvaya, saṃvṛiti, para-chitta, duḥkha, samudaya, nirodha, mārga, kshaya and anutpāda-jñāna. A large portion of the Vṛitti dealing with these and controversies relating to them is lost.

[Kārikās 493-495]

The third pāda of this Adhyāya is devoted to the exposition of
the eighteen extra-ordinary qualities (asadharanāḥ dharmaḥ) of the Buddha. They are ten powers (bala), four confidences (vaśāradya), three applications of mindfulness (smṛityupasthūnas), and great compassion (māhā karuṇā). These qualities appear only in the Buddha on his attainment of the bodhi, i.e., the kshayajñāna.

The treatment of this topic is not much different from the Bhāshya. We may, however, note that a Mahāyānist term sarvākārajayatṛa is mentioned in the Vṛitti in its description of the sarvatra-gāmini pratipat-jñānabala. Its definition of the term dhātu (in the nāṃdhātubala) is identical with Saṃghabhadra's definition quoted by Yaśomitra.

The fourth pāda deals with jñānas which are not exclusive to the Buddha. They are six abhijñās, three vidyās, three prātiḥāryas and such other intellectual powers obtained by yōgic practices. The only notable point here is the view of the Dīpakāra about the three vidyās which is identical with Saṃghabhadra's view, quoted and accepted by Yaśomitra.

VIII Adhyāya

This last Adhyāya deals with śamatha or samādhi. Details about
the three kinds of dhyānas (sāsrava, suddha, anāsrava) and the five āṅgas (vitarka, vichāra, prīti, sukha, upekṣa) are given in the first pāda. Various controversies on the nature and number of the five āṅgas, contained in the Bhāshya, are lost in the Vṛttī.

[Kārikaś 547-554]

The second pāda contains controversies on ānejya (unshakable) and four arūpadhyānas. The Vṛttī here is rather brief compared to the Bhāshya. The last portions of the second pāda, containing controversies on the dhyānāntaras is lost.

[Kārikaś 554-563]

The third pāda contains brief criticisms of the Brahmanical conceptions of dhyāta, dhyāna and dhyeya, and also of the controversy over karmamārga and jñānāmārga. It also contains a criticism of the Vedic mantras. The Vṛttī in this connection mentions the mantras of Pārasīka, Śabara and Kāpālika and criticises the casteism of the Brāhmaṇas. These points are not found in the Bhāshya.

[Kārikaś 588-597]

Now we come to the last folio of our incomplete manuscript. This folio contains a brief discussion on the four apramāṇas (boundless states, also known as brahma-vihāras) eight vimokshas (deliverances) and eight abhibhāvyatanas (stages of mastery) in the same order as in the Bhāshya. The Bhāshya after this deals (in three kārikās = Akṣ. VIII. 36-38) with the ten kṛitsna-āyatanas. This is followed by five concluding
verses in which the Kośakāra says that he has composed this Abhidharma-
śāstra conforming to the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣika school in order to save the
Lord's dispensation from growing dissensions and ignorant heretics.

Most probably the Dīpa too came to a close after a few additional
verses. It is most unfortunate that we should have lost the last folio
which might have given us the name of the author and also a statement of
the circumstances that led to the composition of this important work.

1. Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣika-nīti-siddhāṇa prāya mayā'yaṁ kathito'bhidharmāḥ/
   Ak. VIII. 40ab.
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SŪTRA AND ABHIDHARMA.

This brief sketch of the Dipa and its Vṛitti reflects predominantly the Vaibhāṣika attempt to correct the Kośakāra of his Sautrāntika bias. It is, in a way, a record of the dispute between the Sautrāntika and the Abhidharmika on the interpretation of the 'Sūtras' of the Buddha. Before dealing with the specific differences between the two schools, we may here trace the meaning and interrelation of the terms Sūtra and Abhidharma as seen by these schools.

The earliest canonical reference to the term sūtra is found in the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta. It is said there that the Buddha on the eve of his parinirvāṇa laid down the following four 'Great Authorities':

"In the first place Brethren, a bhikkhu may say thus: From the mouth of the exalted one himself have I heard, from his own mouth have I received it. This is the Dhamma (Doctrine), this is the Vinaya (Law), this is the teaching of the Master. The word spoken, ... should neither be received with praise, nor treated with scorn ... but every word and syllable should be fully understood and then put beside the Suttas and compared with the Vinaya. If when so compared they do not harmonize with the Suttas and do not fit in with the rules of the order, then you may come to the conclusion: 'verily, this is not the word of the exalted one, and has been

1. The term sutta occurs several times in the Nikāyas. In the Majjhima (I.133, III.115) and in the Aṅg (II.7, II.103, II.178, III.86, III.177, III.361) it is mentioned as one of the angas of the traditional 'navaṅga-satthusāsana'. The term suttanta occurs in the Samyutta (II.267) and Aṅg (I.60, I.72, II.247, III.107, III.178), but not in the sense of a particular collection of the words of Buddha.
wrongly grasped by that brother.' Therefore, Brethren, you should reject it. But if they harmonize with the Suttas and fit in with the Vinaya, then you may come to the conclusion: Verily this is the word of the exalted one and has been well grasped by that brother.¹ etc.

This passage, occurring in one of the most important and widely respected sūtras, is very interesting for the history of the authenticity of several Buddhist scriptures handed down to us. It anticipates, even during the lifetime of the Buddha the existence of several different versions² and at least one authorized version of the Sutta and Vinaya collections. It is possible that this particular authorized version was accepted as the only authentic one in the First Council of Rājagriha, held immediately after the passing away of the Buddha. The omission of the term Abhidharma in this passage, in spite of its occurrence in several other suttas, points to a later period for the composition of the Abhidharma texts, traditionally claimed as the word of the Buddha. The passage itself is silent on the meaning of the terms sutta and vinaya, but from the context we can assume that they are used here to indicate the collections of the dhamma and vinaya³ preachings of the Buddha.

The exact meaning of these two terms, viz., sutta and vinaya, was still a controversial point even during the time of Buddhaghosa.

2. Not of the written words but of the words heard by his direct disciples as, for instance, shown in the Chullavagga: Ṭyaśmantam Purāṇaṁ therā bhikkuḥ etadavocuhū. 'therehi, āsūsu Purāṇa, dhammo cha saṅghito... upēhi taṁ saṅghitīṁ ti.' Ṭusāṅgītāvuso therehi dhammo cha vinayo cha, api cha yatheva mayā Bhagavato sammukha suṭṭaṁ sammukha paṭiggaṁ tathēvaṁ dhāressāṁ ti.' Vinaya, Vol.II, p.290.
3. For a difference between these two terms, see Oldenberg's Introduction to Vinaya Piṭakāṁ, I. pp.X-XIV.
In his commentary on this passage, Buddhaghosa records several views on what constituted the sutta and vinaya:

1. Here the 'sutta' means Vinaya, as is said: 'where was this prohibited? At Sāvatthī in the Sutta-vibhanga.' 'Vinaya' means Khandhakas, as is said: 'In Kosambi, on the transgression of the Vinaya'. But this explanation does not cover the entire Vinaya-piṭaka.¹

2. Or 'sutta' means Ubhato-vibhanga, whereas 'vinaya' means Khandhakas and Parivāra. In this view the entire Vinayapiṭaka is included (but not others).²

3. Or 'sutta' means Sutta-piṭaka and 'vinaya' means the Vinaya-piṭaka. But here only two piṭakas are covered (not the third, i.e. the Abhidhamma).³

4. Or 'sutta' means the Sutta-piṭaka and the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, and 'vinaya' means the Vinaya-piṭaka.

Even this explanation is not satisfactory as there are many works which are not included in 'sutta', e.g. Jātaka, Niddesa, etc. (all books of the Khuddaka-nikāya).⁴

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2. Ubhato-vibhango pana 'suttam', Khandhaka-Parivārā 'vinayo' ti: evam Vinaya-piṭakaṁ pariṣṭiyati. Ibid.
3. atha va Sutta-piṭakaṁ 'suttam', Vinaya-piṭakaṁ 'vinayo' ti: evam dve yeva piṭakāni pariṣṭiyanti. Ibid.
5. Sudinnathera, however, says: "There is not a word of the Buddha which is not sutta. 'Sutta' means three Piṭakas. 'vinaya' is (only mentioned separately as) a means (of subduing passions)." And to illustrate this he puts forth the following sutta:— "Those things of which you know thus: these things lead to passion, not to release therefrom, these to bondage ... these to luxury not to frugality, of these things hold definitely: This is not dhamma; this is not vinaya, this is not the word of the Teacher."

"But as to those things, O Gotami, which you know lead to dispassion, to release from bondage, to the dispersion of rebirth, to wanting little, to contentment, to solitude, to exertion and to frugality (and in no case to their opposites), be assured that they are dhamma, the vinaya and the word of the Teacher."²

"Therefore", concludes Buddhaghosa, "'sutta' means the three Piṭakas; 'vinaya' means all that is conducive to the subduing of passion ... But those words which do not occur in the tradition of the suttas but appear only in the apocryphal Vessantara, Ummagga, and Vinaya and the Vedalla-piṭakas, or in one of these ... they are to be considered as not

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the words of the Teacher ... "

One can see in these explanations an attempt to extend the meaning of these terms and particularly that of suutta. First it is held to mean only a single Vinaya text, viz. the Suttavibhanga, then a larger Vinaya text, the Ubhato-vibhanga. Next it is made to include not the Vinaya texts, but the entire Sutta-piṭaka. Then it is made to include both the Sutta and Abhidhamma Piṭakas, and finally not only all the three piṭakas, but also anything that may be conducive to a holy life.

The purpose of this extension evidently appears to include the Abhidharma (and also the Khuddakanikāya) which is not specifically mentioned in the passage dealing with the mahāpadesas. The commentators are determined to include it and end in giving a very wide and general meaning to the term suutta, thereby making it comprehensive enough to include all good words.

The Sarvāstivaṅgī version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra also contains the mahāpadesas. They are identical with the Pali passage, except for one more significant phrase - "dhammatām cha vilomayanti". 2

The term dharmatā is quite well known to the Pali scriptures.  
It is, therefore, difficult to account for the omission of this term in the 
Pali version.  In the absence of any commentary on the Sanskrit 
Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, we have no precise information on how the 
Sarvāstivādins understood these terms.  Fortunately, our Vṛtti gives 
some explanation of the term sūtra.  It says: only that sūtra is to be 
accepted which was spoken by the Buddha, collected in the four āgamas by 
the elder councillors Mahākāśyapa and Ānanda, and which is contained in the 
Uddānagāthās (summary verses).  This explanation helps us to identify 
the term sūtra with the four āgamas, viz. the Dirghāgama, the Madhyamāgama, 
the Saṃyuktāgama and the Ekottarāgama, corresponding to the first four 
Nikāyas of the Pali canon.  The Abhidharma pīṭaka and the Kshudrakaṇikāya 
(Pali Khuddakaṇikāya) are not included here in the term sūtra, pointing 
again to their late acceptance as canonical works.  Incidentally, it may 
be noted that in the nikāya classification, Abhidhamma Pīṭaka is included 
by Theravādins in the Khuddaka-nikāya.  

1. We find such expressions as dharmatā esa bhikkhave yaṁ sīlavato ... 
avipassīsāro uppaṇjati (Ang. V.p.2), Bhagavā paṭipanno ... kalyāṇa- 
-dhammaṁ ... kusaladhammatāya (Ang. V.p.66), esa Buddhāna dhammatā 
(Saṁyutta, I.p.140), samkhārāṁ khayadhammatāṁ vayadhhammatāṁ ... 
viparipāmadhammatāṁ nissāya bhūṣitaṁ ... (Saṁyutta, IV.p.216) etc. 
2. yat khalu sūtraṁ bhagavatā Buddhena bhāṣitāṁ tach caturśvā āgamaṁ 
hūṣitaṁ Mahākāśyapa-sthavira-Ānanda-dibhiḥ saṅgītikarṣṭribhiḥ Uddāna-
3. On the uddāna-gāthās, see Adv. p.197, n.6.  cf. Pali uddāna-saṅgaha 
compiled by saṅgītikāras.  See Dhs A. I.68. 
4. katam o jhuddaka-nikāyo? sakalam Vinaya-piṭakām, Abhidhamma-piṭakām, 
Khuddakapāṭha-Dhammapadaṁyo cha puṣṭe dasaita pañcchadasappabhedat; 
term sutta appears more accurate and nearer to the original meaning of that term, compared to the several meanings given by Buddhaghosa.

The term 'dharmatā' found in the Sanskrit version of the Mahāpadesas is also at a later period accepted by the Theravāda school. The Nettipakarana, a non-canonical Pali work ascribed by tradition to Mahākachchāha (a direct disciple of the Buddha), contains the term dhammatā along with sutta and vinaya. The meaning of these terms given in this work differs from the traditional Atthakathās. Its version of the Mahāpadesas reads: "...those words and syllables should be put beside the suuttas, compared with the vinaya and put alongside the dhammatā.

With which sutta are they to be put aside? With the Four Noble Truths.

With which vinaya are they to be compared? With the pacification of passion, illwill and infatuation.

In which dhammatā are they to be tested? In the doctrine of paṭichcha-samuppāda?

This explanation is remarkable in that these three terms are not identified with any Piṭakas, but only with the general preaching of the Buddha.

1. In the Burmese tradition this book is included in the Khuddaka-nikāya. See Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, p. 77, n. 3.
Dhammapāla (5th century A.D.) in his commentary on the Nettipakarana, however, reasserts the āṭṭhakathā meaning of the term sutta. He says: "Since there is not a single word of the Buddha devoid of (the preaching of) Truth, it is said here that sutta means the Four Noble Truths. The Āṭṭhakathās, however, say that sutta means three Piṭakas. There is no contradiction in these two meanings."¹

Despite the differences on the meaning of the term sutta, the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins considered this mahāpadeśa as a characteristic mark (lakshana) of the words of Buddha. Our Vṛtti twice quotes this mahāpadeśa to refute views conforming to the Vaitulika-śāstra.²

But the Mahāyānists, against whom this mahāpadeśa was quoted by the Hinayāna schools, never accepted it as an Authority or a standard for judging the authenticity of a particular version of the Buddha-vachana. They had a distinct disadvantage. Though they claimed that their scriptures originated from the Buddha, they could not by the very nature of their teachings, name any śrāvakas like Mahakāśyapa or Ananda as their compilers. Bu-ston in his account of the rehearsal of the Mahāyānistic scripture says:³ "Manjuśrī rehearsed the Abhidharma, Maitreya - the Vinaya, and Vajrapāṇi - the Sūtras. It is said moreover in the Tarkajvalā -

The Mahāyānistic scripture is the work of the Buddha. The chief compilers of it were Samantabhadra, Mañjuśrī, The Lord of the secret charms (= Vajrapāṇī), Maitreya and others. The śrāvakas were not the chief compilers of our (Mahāyānist) canon, since the latter is not accessible to them."

This Mahāyānistic tradition appears to be very old. Bu-ston supports it by a passage from Haribhadra's Abhisamayālāṅkāra-Āloka. Haribhadra in this work gives a view of the purvāchāryyas to the effect that Vajrapāṇī is the compiler of the teachings of not only the Śākyamuni, but also of all the Thousand Buddhas (that are to arise in the bhadra-kalpa.) Haribhadra further repudiates the Hinayānist claim of authenticity by pointing out the invalidity of their mahāpadeśas. While commenting on a word 'moha-purushā', he says: "'infatuated', on account of not comprehending the nature of the Mother (the Prajñā-paraṃita), due to their belief that only that is a word of the Buddha which compares with the sūtra, fits in the vinaya and conforms to the dharmatā. It may be argued that such persons are really not ignorant, since they reject the Mahāyāna on account of its non-occurrence in the limited number of the sūtras of their School, because it does not fit in their Vinaya and because it goes against their socalled dharmatā of the pudgala-nairatmya (the unreality of the individual Ego). But this is not proper, for in that case the Muktaka-sūtras, which are not read in the Sūtrānta-piṭakas,

1. Ibid. p. p.
may well be treated as not the words of the Buddha. Similarly, there is no concordance between different versions of the Sūtra and Vinaya Piṭakas. The dharmatā established in one school is not identical with that of the other schools. With the eighteen different schools and their separate versions of the three Piṭakas, it is improper to hold the Mahāpadeśa as a standard for judging the authenticity of the words of the Buddha.”

The same view is held by Sāntideva, the author of the Bodhi-
charāvatāra. Prajñākaramati, in his Pañjika on this work goes a step further. He rejects the Buddha-vachana-lakṣhaṇa propounded by the Hīnayāna schools and puts forward his valid definition: “This then is the universal characteristic of the Buddha-vachana as preached in the Adhyātā-saṃchodana-sūtra: "Moreover, O Maitreya, by four causes the word of the Buddhas may be recognised. What four? (1) O Maitreya, it refers to truth, not to untruth; (2) to the doctrine, not to the non-doctrine; (3) it lessens sin, not increases it; (4) it shows the advantages of Nirvāṇa, does not indicate those of continued rebirth, ... When someone, O Maitreya, utters or shall utter a word endowed with these four qualities, the believing young men and women will produce the idea of Buddha, of Master; they will hear this Law as he preaches. Why? Anything, Maitreya, that is well said is a word of Buddha.”

This passage reminds us of the Buddha’s preaching to Gotama

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quoted above. The Hīnayānīstic attitude towards the Buddha-vachana is well summed up in Emperor Aśoka's famous line: "whatever is spoken by the Buddha is well spoken."¹ In Mahāyāna it is reversed. All good words become the words of Buddha.

Among the schools of Hīnayāna, the disagreement is mostly on the interpretation and not on the validity of a particular sūtra. The Kathavatthu, for instance, which records as many as 217 points of controversy, is solely devoted to a Theravādin interpretation of 187 suttas; which were also accepted by its rivals. Even the Kośakāra and the Dipakāra, representing the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāšika schools respectively, differ, on almost all major occasions, only on the interpretations of the 'sūtras' and not on the authenticity of any particular sūtra. This may be illustrated by their debate on the doctrine of sarvāsti-vāda itself. Not less than ten sūtra passages² are put forward by both contending parties, each interpreting them in his own way. The contention for the authenticity of a particular sūtra is generally to be found only in the Mahāyāna works as we have seen from the works of Haribhadra and Śaṅvideva.

In spite of these different versions and standards, interpretations and doctrines, all the Buddhist schools, both Hīnayāna and

¹. kechi bhaṁte bhagavatā Buddhena bhāsīte save se subhāśite va. Edicts of Aśoka, p.82 (Adyar edition 1951).
². The tradition, however, claims that the original Kathavatthu, as accepted in the III Council, was elaborated by Moggaliputta to the extent of the Dīgha-nikāya, bringing together five hundred orthodox and five hundred heterodox suttas:— Kathavatthupakkaraṇam nāma. taṁ sakavāde pañcha sutta-satāṁ parāvāde pañcā ti suttasahassāṁ samodhanetvā vibhattakaṁ taṁ vāchanakṣa-maggato iññī pothake likhiṁ aghanetvā saṁgiti-āropita-nayena Dīgha-nikāyappamāṇam. Dhs A. I. 15.
Mahāyāna, held some common, indisputable teaching of the Buddha. It was
this common heritage that held these schools together through centuries of
discord and dissensions. The origin of Abhidharma is to be found in the
beginnings of the attempts of the earliest Buddhists to find such a common
teaching.

The tendency of the sāṅgha to split into various groups is
manifest even during the lifetime of the Buddha. In the earlier stages
the differences over the laws of Vinaya divided the fraternity. The Vinaya
texts are full of stories, invented as well as real, of monks and groups
who gave occasion for the institution of several major and minor rules of
the Pātimokkha. But the differences over the Vinaya were not considered
as harmful as disagreement on the doctrines of the Buddha. During the
latter part of the Buddha’s life, together with the rise of Devadatta as a
rival, we see a kind of fear among the elders that the unity of the Sāṅgha
may not survive the death of the Master.

Several suttas of the Pali canon bear witness to such a fear and
to a consequent attempt to preserve the doctrinal unity by putting his
more important doctrines in one collection.

In this connection, the Pāsādika sutta, the Sāmagāma sutta and
the Sāṅgīti suttanta may be noted as of particular interest. The death
of the Jain leader Nāṭhaputta Nigantha and a subsequent division in his
sāṅgha form the occasion for these three suttas.

It is said in the introduction (nidāna) to the Pāsādika sutta:

"while the Lord was staying among the Sākyans, Nāthaputta the Nigantha had died recently at Pāvā. At his death the Niganthas became disunited and divided into two parties, in mutual strife and conflict, quarrelling... with each other... - thou dost not understand this doctrine (dhamma) and discipline (vinaya) but I do understand it. Thou art in the wrong; I am in the right!... Thou sayest last what should be said first, and first what ought to come last!... Truly the Niganthas... were out methinks to kill. Even the lay disciples... showed themselves shocked... so badly was their doctrine and discipline set forth and imparted... and now wrecked as it was... without a protector."¹

Now Chunda the novice who had seen this, visited Ananda at Sāmagāma and reported it to him. And Ananda said "Friend, this is a worthy subject to bring before the exalted one". They went to the Lord and reported the episode. The Buddha was not surprised to learn the happening. He gives a long discourse on the nature of a perfect Teacher, on the conditions of a perfect religion and claims that his is the perfect saṅgha and the exalted Law. He then sums up his teachings and exhorts the saṅgha in the following words: "Wherefore, Chunda, do ye, to whom I have made known the truths that I have perceived, come together in company

¹ tena kho pana samayena Nigantho Nāthaputto Pāvāyaṁ adhuna kālakato hoti. tassa kālakiriyāya bhinnā Niganthā dvedhikajātā... aṁamanīṁ mukha-sattīṁ viṭūddantā viharanti - 'nā tvaṁ imaṁ dhamma-vinayaṁ ājānāsi,... "vadho yeva kho maṁśe Niganthesu Nāthaputtīyesu vattati" Ye pi... sāvakaṁ gihī odāta-vasañā, te pi... nibbimarūpa... yathā taṁ durakkhāte dhamma-vinaye... bhinnā-thūpe appatisaraṁ. Dīgha, III. pp.117-8.
and rehearse all of you together those doctrines not over them, but compare meaning with meaning, and phrase with phrase, in order that this pure religion may last long and be perpetuated, in order that it may continue to be for the good and happiness ... and the weal of devas and men!'

"Which then, Chunda, are the truths which, when I had perceived I made known to you ... ?

They are these - the Four Onsets of Mindfulness, the Four Supreme Efforts, the Four Patha to Efficacy, the Five Powers, the Five Forces, the Seven Factors of Enlightenment, the Ariyan Eightfold Path. These o Chunda, are the truths ...

This sum-total of his preachings is followed by a discourse on the principles and applications, on the same lines as the mahāpadesas, though this time without referring to the terms sutta and vinaya. The sutta ends with a discourse on the infallible nature of an arhat and on the ways to meet criticisms of heretics against his doctrine and discipline. The whole trend of this sutta is to collect the supreme teachings reassuring the saṅgha of their unity and infallibility in contrast to other schools of heretics.

1. tasmāt iha Chunda ye vō mayā dhammā abhiffā desitā, tattha sabbeh'eva saṅgamma saṅgamma aththa aththa vyaṣjanena vyaṣjanaṁ saṅgyitabbaṁ na vivaditabbaṁ, yathayidham brahmachariyaṁ addhanayaṁ assa chiratthitikam, tadd assa bahujanahitya ... sukhāya deva-menussānam. Dīgha, III. p.127.

2. katame cha te Chunda mayā dhammā abhiffā desitā ... seyyathidham chattāro satiṣṭhānā, chattāro sammappadhānā, chattāro iddhipāda, pañc' indriyāni, pañc'ha balāni, satta bojjhangā, ariyo atthangikō maggo. Ime kho te Chunda dhammā ... Ibīd.

For a full exposition of these thirty-seven items, see The Dialogues of Buddha, II. pp.128-130, notes. Vide Adv. pp.356-362.
The Sāmaññaga-sutta also begins with the same episode of the Nīganṭha Nāṭhaputta's death. Here Ānanda relates this to the Buddha adding his hope that when the Lord dies, no 'similar' quarrels will arise in the saṅgha, to the grief and sorrow of gods and men.\(^1\)

The reply of the Buddha on this occasion is worth noting here. He repeats the dhammas preached in the last sutta and asks: "What think you Ānanda? Do you observe even a couple of Bhikkhus at variance about the truths which, when I had perceived, I made known to you ... to wit, the Four Onsets of Mindfulness ... the Ariyan Eightfold Path?"\(^2\)

"No Sir. But those who are about the Lord might, at his death, stir up quarrels in the saṅgha respecting the rigours of the regimen or of the code. Such quarrels would make for the grief and sorrow of the gods and men."\(^3\)

"Of little concern, Ānanda, are quarrels respecting rigours of regimen or of the code, it is possible quarrels in the confraternity about the Path or the course of training which really matter."\(^4\) Here we can

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1. tassa mayham bhante evaṃ hoti: mā heva Bhagavato achchayena saṅgha vivādo uppaṭṭi, so vivādo bhujjanāhitaya ... dukkhaṃya devam avuccaṃ dhanassaṃ ti. Majjhima, II, p.245.

2. tam kiṃ mahaṃ Ananda? ye vo māya dhamma abhippaṭita, seyyathi dhamma sattāro satipatthāna ... ariyo atṭhāngiko maggo - passasi no tvaṃ, Ānanda imesu dhammesu āve pi bhikkhū mānavāde ti ...? Majjhima, II, p.245.


4. ye cha kho, bhante, puggala Bhagavantaṃ patissayamanarūpā viharanti, te Bhagavato achchayena saṅgha vivādaṃ janeyyam ajjhājive vā adhipatimokkhe vā so'ssa vivādo ... dukkhaṃya ... Ibid.
discern the rise of Abhidharma, the supreme Doctrine of the Buddha. The statement that there are no two opinions on the thirty-seven items, raises the latter to a higher degree and can be called the central and universally accepted preaching of the Buddha. The differences rising out of the Vinaya are not ruled out, but they are not exaggerated. No particular sutta is mentioned as the supreme, but only the sum total of all the teachings put into an aggregate later known as the bodhipakkhiyā dhammā. It is the burden of a large number of suttas in the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas. It constitutes one of his last preachings to the congregation, following the declaration of his intention of entering into parinirvāṇa.

The Milindapañha almost makes a generalisation by saying that all tathāgatas, when they preach, preach these thirty-seven (bodhipakkhiya) dhammas. It is said in the Saddharma-pundarika that the career of a bodhisattva is completed by practising these dhammas. Almost all major works on Buddhism, both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, contain this list. This, therefore, was the supreme dharma, acceptable to all. It marks the beginning of the Abhidharma.

This can be corroborated by many suttas, particularly by the Kinti sutta, where these thirty-seven dhammas are identified with the term abhidhamma. The following discourse may be noted: "What think ye of me Brethren? Is it to get robes or alms, is it to get lodging or to secure

1. Tasmañha bhikkhave ye vo dhamma mayā abhiññāya desita, te vo sādhukaṃ uggahetvā āsavitabbā bhavetabbā bahulikaṭṭabbā ... sayyathidham chattaro satipaṭṭhāna ... atthaṅgiko māggo ... Dīgha, II, p. 127.
3. Ibid.
some future or other hereafter that the recluse Gotama preaches his doctrine?

No Sir...

Well then, Almsmen, you must school yourselves in the higher lore which I taught you to wit, the four Onsets of Mindfulness ... the Ariyan eightfold Path.

In this higher lore you must school yourselves in unity and harmony without strife. So schooling yourselves, you may find two Bhikkhus maintaining divergent views on the Abhidhamma."¹

The commentary on this passage says: "In the abhidhamma means in the supreme dhammas, in these thirty-seven bodhipakkhiya dhammas² (qualities or items constituting or contributing to bodhi)."

The term 'bodhipakkhiya dhamma' appears only in a few places in the older Nikāyas. In the Āṅg. N. it is mentioned without indication of the scope of the term.³ In the Saṃyutta N. it is applied to the five indriyas (saddhā ... paññā).⁴

The term occurs in the Aggañña-sutta, where it consists of seven dhammas only.⁵ It occurs twice in the Vibhanga, and there too it consists

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1. kinti vo bhikkhave, mayi hoti? chīvarahetu vā samāno Gotamo dhammā deseti ... tasmātiha, bhikkhave, ye vo mayā dhammā abhiññā desita, seyyathīdham: chattāro satipaṭṭhānā, ... ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, - tattha sabbehe'va samaggehi sammodamānehi avivadāmānehi sikkhitabbam; tesaṁ cha vo, bhikkhave, samaggānaṁ ... sikkhattāṁ, siyāsau dve bhikkhū abhidhamme nānāvādā. Majjhima, II. pp.238-9.
3. Āṅg. III, 70, 300.
of the seven bojjhaṅgas. In the same book, the thirty-seven items are called saddhamma. In the Jātakatthakathā these thirty-seven are called both saddhamma and bodhipakkhiyā dhamma. The Visuddhimagga enumerates the thirty-seven dhammas as bodhipakkhiyā and discusses them in detail. The Nettipakarapa once speaks of thirty-seven and in other place adds seven sammās to the thirty-seven, bringing the number of the bodhipakkhiyās to forty-three.

The same thirty-seven items, called bodhipakṣhyā or bodhipakṣhikā dharmāṃ, are also found in most of the Buddhist Sanskrit scriptures. It is possible that the seven bojjhaṅgas formed the nucleus of this collection, to which were added other dhammas. The overlapping character of several items - e.g., the five balas again grouped under the five indriyas - was recognized by the commentators. Consequently we find both in the Kosā and in Dīpa, as well as in the Abhidhammattha-saṅgahā of Anuruddha, an attempt to delimit the term to contain only ten, eleven or fourteen dhammas.

This tendency to collect the most repeated and advanced teachings of the Buddha and group them in several clusters is common to many suttas of all five Nikāyas.

1. Vbh. pp. 244 and 249.
2. Ibid. p. 372.
8. For a complete list, see BhSD, p. 402b.
1. The Mahāsatipāṭhāna-sutta is a long discourse on the four satipāṭhānas and four āriya-sāchchinas.

2. The Mahānidāna-sutta is devoted to a long discussion on the twelve ānągas of the paṭichcha-samuppāda.

3. The Chhachhakka-sutta is purely catechetical in that it deals with six groups of sixes (chakkhas).

4. The Bahudhātuka-sutta is composed solely to collect all 'dhātus' scattered in various suttas. Instead of the usual eighteen, we here find an enumeration of forty-one dhātus. The same sutta also contains a list of twelve āyatanas and the twelve ānągas of the paṭichchasamuppāda. This sutta does not contain anything spectacular in the way of doctrine. But the collection of all dhātus in one sutta must have been in some sense a novel thing, to entitle it to be variously called 'the Mirror of the Doctrine', 'the Drum of Deathlessness', or 'Victory in the Fight'.

5. The Mahāsukuludāyi-sutta contains a larger number of items. In addition to the traditional thirty-seven items, there are mentioned eight vimokkhas, eight abhibhāyatanas, ten kasiṇāyatanas, four jhānas and six abhisamāyas. These topics are found fully discussed in all Abhidharma works.

6. A whole series of suttas with the appellation 'vibhanga' are

found in the Vibhangavagga of the Majjhima-nikāya. They are (1) Chūllakamma-
vibhanga, (2) Mahākamma-vibhanga, (3) Saḷlyatana-vibhanga, (4) Uddesa-
vibhanga, (5) Araṇā-vibhanga, (6) Dhatu-vibhanga, (7) Sachchāyāvibhanga, and
(8) Dakkhinā-vibhanga.

The term vibhanga is significant. It means distribution, division or classification. It also means expansion (of a meaning), i.e. a commentary. Vibhanga is also a name of the second Abhidharma Book, which is more or less a continuation and expansion of the dhammas collected in the Dhamma-sangani. These two Abhidhammikā functions, namely the collection and expansion, characterise these vibhanga-suttaś and mark the second stage in the development of the Abhidharma.

The Chūlla and Mahā-kamma-vibhanga-suttaś contain small lists of kammās. Their Sanskrit version, the Mahākarma-vibhanga gives a list (uddeśa) of seventy-three items (twenty-two ones and fifty-one fours -chatuṣṭhikās), followed by brief explanations of each item. The Karma-
vibhangopadeśa, a work related to the Mahākarma-vibhanga, contains a significant statement that some other schools read the Karma-vibhanga in their Abhidharma-saṁyuktas.

The Dakkhinā-vibhanga-sutta contains a list of fourteen grades of donations and four degrees of purity in donations.

The Salāyatana-vibhanga-sutta, like the Sanskrit Mahākarma-vibhanga, begins with a short summary of its contents (uddesa): "Six internal senses, six sets of external sense-objects, six groups of consciousness, six groups of contacts, etc. - such is the summary of the classification of sense relations." This summary is then expanded almost on the pattern of the Vibhanga.

The Uddesa-vibhanga-sutta (A Summary Expanded) differs slightly from the above one. In this sutta the Buddha makes a statement on the non-arising of dukkha and withdraws to his vihāra. The monks approach Mahākaccāna and request him to expound the cryptic saying of the Master. At the end the Buddha commends Mahākaccāna for his 'vibhanga' and says that if the monks had asked him, he too would have explained it as the Thera did.

The Arapa-vibhanga-sutta also contains its uddesa and deals with the eightfold Aryan Path and several other items. The Dhātu-vibhanga-sutta is a long discourse on various sets of the six dhātus, followed by a detailed exposition of each term, almost in the manner of a commentary. The Sachcha-vibhanga-sutta begins with a brief reference by the Buddha to his dhamma-chakka-pravattana and a synopsis of the Four Noble Truths. He then praises Sāriputta as the one who is able to announce, teach, unfold

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1. cha ajjhattikāni āyatānāni veditabbāni, cha bhāhriṇāni āyatānāni veditabbāni ... etc. ayaṁ uddeso Salāyatanavibhangassassa. Majjhima, sutta 137, (III. p.216.)
2. tesam no, bhante, āyasmā Mahākaccāna āmehi sākārehi āmehi padehi āmehi byañjanehi attho vibhatto ti.
   pandito, bhikkhave, Mahā-Kaccāno; ... mañche 'pi tumhe, ... etam attham peṭi-puccheyyaṁtha, aham 'pi tam evaṁ evaṁ tyākareyyaṁ, yathā tam Mahā-kaccānaṁ byākataṁ. eso dhetassa attho evaṁ cha nam dharethāti. Majjhima, sutta 138 (III. p.229).
and manifest the Four Truths in all their details. When he withdraws from
the assembly, Sāriputta proceeds with his exposition. The whole sutta is
repeated in the Suttanta-bhājaniya section of the Sačchā-vibhanga. The
only word that does not occur in the latter is 'Āvuso'. The omission of
such words renders the Abhidharma works more impersonal and unconventional,
giving them an appearance of formulas rather than Dialogues.

Several suttas of the Saṁyutta-nikāya can also be called pure
abhidhammas. The Nidāna-saṁyutta² has several suttas dealing only with
the paṭṭichchasamuppāda. The Dhātu-saṁyutta³ deals with all kinds of
dhātus and gives their traditional definitions. The Khandha-saṁyutta⁴
contains details of all khandhas. The Saḷāyatanas-aṁyutta⁵ and particularly
the Saṭṭhi-peyyala deal with āyatanas, with the triple doctrine (anichcha,
dukkha, anattā) applied to them. The Sāriputta and the Moggallāna-
saṁyuttas⁶ are long discourses on the rūpa and arūpa-dhyānas, given in the
stereotyped formulas repeated all over the Nikāyas. The Asaṁkhata-
saṁyutta⁷ deals with nirvāṇa. The last Book of the Saṁyutta-nikāya, viz.
the Mahāvagga, deals with magga, i.e. the thirty-seven (bodhipakkhiya)
dhammas. There are seven separate saṁyuttas dealing with the seven main
items of these bodhipakkhiyas.⁹

1. Sāriputta, bhikkhave, pahoti chattāri ariyasacchāni vitthārena
   ācikkhitum desetum paṭṭhamapetum paṭṭhapetum vivaritum vibhajitum uttānikātum
4. S.IV. pp.359-373. 8. S.IV. pp.235-240. 9. See Magga-saṁyutta (XL), Bojjhanga-saṁyutta (XLVI), Satipaṭṭhāna-
saṁyutta (XLVII), Indriya-saṁyutta (XLVIII), Sammappadhāna-saṁyutta (XLIX),
   Bala-saṁyutta (L), and Iddhipāda-saṁyutta (LI). (S.V. pp.1-290).
The Aṅg-nikāya, due to its method of numerical order comes much closer to the books of Abhidhamma. The dhammas scattered all over the other Nikāyas find repetition here in an artificial group of numbers. Two books of the Khuddaka-nikāya, viz. the Uddesa and the Paṭisambhidā-magga are pure Abhidhamma works, though grouped in the Sutta-Piṭaka. Of these, the Paṭisambhidā-magga is attributed by tradition not to the Buddha but to Sāriputta. It is said in its commentary that this work was preached by Sāriputta to Ananda, who recited it before the I Council.

This review shows us the tendency of certain suttas of all the Nikāyas towards collecting and classifying, and at times elaborating the advanced teachings of the Buddha. Several of these Suttas are not the direct words of the Buddha, but elaborations by his chief disciples like Sāriputta and Moggallāna on an uddesa or synopsis laid down by the Buddha. These categories or dhammas can be summed up in such oft-repeated technical terms as khandha, dhātu, āyatana, indriya, saḷākhā, paṭichcha-samaṇṇā, kamma, kilesa, magga, the items of the thirty-seven bodhipakkhiya-dhammas, jhāna, the eight vimokkhas, eight abhībhāyatanas, ten kasiṇas, saṁbhās, etc. The collective name for all these dhammas is 'abhidhamma', as they are 'abhi-vissāṭṭha dhammā'. The contents of all the major works on Abhidhamma, including the Kośa and Dīpa, do not, in essence, differ from these few topics, scattered here and there throughout the Sutta-piṭaka.

1. tād etāṁ Paṭisambhidāmaggoṁ pakkaraṇam ... satthukappena ... Dhamma-
Senāpatisaṁ āyasmattā Sāriputta-ttherena bhāsitāṁ sutvā āyasmattā Anandena
paṭhama-saṅgītikāle yathāsutaṁ eva saṅgītīṁ āropitāṁ. Paṭisambhidāmagga A,
p.9.

2. For instance, the Saḷākhā-vibhangasutta and the Uddesa-vibhangasutta.
Now we turn to the Sāṅglobhi suttanta, which marks a definite start of the Abhidhamma literature proper, in the Sutta-piṭaka. This sutta also opens with an account of the Nigantha Nāṭhaputta's death.

This time Chunda or Ananda do not report it to the Buddha, but Sāriputta himself relates it to the samgha, in the presence of the Master: "The Nigantha Nāṭhaputta, friends, has just died at Pava. Since his death the Niganthas have become divided and have fallen into opposite parties and into strife ... But to us, friends, the Norm has been well set forth and imparted by the Exalted One. It is effectual for guidance, conducive to self-mastery and is imparted by one perfectly enlightened. Herein there should be a chanting by all in concord, not a wrangling, that this holy life may persist and be long maintained. That may be for the welfare and happiness ... of devas and of men."

This historical introduction is followed by a long list of 227 kinds of dhammas presented in the numerical order of ones, pairs, triads, etc. up to tens, covering 903 dhammas in all. At the end of each numerical section is repeated, the exhortation to 'chant in concord' and not to wrangle.

The last sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya, viz. the Dasuttara-sutta also follows the same pattern. But it has no story to tell. It opens with a declaration by Sāriputta that he will propound the groups one to

1. Nigantho āvuso Nātha-putto ... kālakato. tassa kālakiriya bhinnā Nigantha ... ayaṃ kho pan'āvuso ahmākatā Bhagavatā dhammo svākkhātā ... atthi kho āvuso tena Bhagavatā eko dhammo sammād-ākkhātā. tattha sabbe eva sangāyitabbaṃ na vivaditabbaṃ ... Dīgha, XXXIII.7 (III. pp.210-211).
The division of the dhammas here is made not only on their numerical order but also in consideration of their nature. All dhammas are included in one or other of the following groups: dhammas that help much (bahukāra), are to be developed (bhāvetabba), are to be understood (parimānīyā), that bring disaster (hānabhāgīya), that lead to distinction (visesabhāgīya), that are hard to penetrate (duptivijjha), that are to be brought to pass (uppādetabba), are to be thoroughly learnt (abhinīyā), and finally, that are to be realized (sachchhikātabba). Each numerical section is divided into these ten heads.

These two suttas can very fairly be compared with the Mātikās of the Abhidhamma, given in the beginning of the Dhamma-sangārī. In fact, the Suttanta-mātikā given there is almost identical with the dukas (pairs) occurring in the Saṅgīti-suttanta. The former gives forty-two pairs of which thirty-two are the same as in the latter. Several items of the tika-mātikā also are common with the tika-dhammas of both the Saṅgīti and the Dasuttara suttantas.

The abhidharmikā character of these two suttas was long ago noted by T.W. Rhys Davids in his translation of the Dīgha-nikāya: "All that we know is that each of them forms a sort of thematic index to the doctrines scattered through the Four Nikāyas ... In the two features they have in common, of catechism as a monologue by the catechumen; and of the absence of narrative, this further interest attaches to these last suttantas, that they become practically Abhidhamma rather than Sutta Pīṭaka."

1. Dialogues of the Buddha, III. p.199.
This observation is further confirmed by the fact that the Sangītī-sutta-ta happens to be one of the seven Abhidharma works of the Sarvāstivāda school. This work is there known as Sangītī-paryāya, now preserved only in its Chinese and Tibetan translations. The researches of J. Takakusu¹ have revealed that the Chinese translation of this work attributes this sūtra to Sāriputra² and contains the same episode of Nīgaṇṭha Nāṭhaputta's death, which hastened Sāriputra (or the compilers of this sūtra) to draw up a summary of the Doctrines, which subsequently came to be called the Abhidharma.

So far we have seen the Abhidhamma in its one aspect, viz. the visiṭṭhā dhamma. The abhidhamma in the Sutta-piṭaka mainly consists of the collection of dhammas in different groups as khandha, āyatana, dhātu, indriya, saṃcchara, paṭichchha-samuppāda, jhāna, magga, etc. Another aspect consists in the minute analysis of these dhammas into various units. The method of the Buddha's preaching is characteristically analytical. His first sermon, the Dhamma-chakka-ppavattana, is followed by a preaching solely devoted to an analysis of Personality into the five aggregates (khandhas) and the latter again in their various triple aspects as past, future, and present; and dual aspects as personal and external, gross and subtle, low and exalted, far and near.³ The bodhi of the Buddha also

1. 'On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins', JPTS, 1905, pp. 100-103.
2. In the Tibetan tradition it is attributed to Mahākapphipa. Ibid.
3. yam kīfichi rūpāṃ atitānāgata-pachchuppannaṃ ajjhattāṃ va bhāiddhā va olārikaṃ va sukhumāṃ va hinām vā paṇītaṃ vā yam dūre vā santāke vā, sabbaṃ rūpaṃ ... Vin. I. p. 14.
consists of his knowledge of the doctrine of paṭichcha-samuppāda, which again is an analysis of the series of causes of the cycle of birth and death. From this analytical and critical consciousness arise his unique doctrines of anityavāda (momentariness), anatmavāda (impersonality) and śūnyavāda (unsubstantiality), which distinguish Buddhism from other Indian schools of thought. The preaching of these unique doctrines is called his sāmukkaṁsikā dhamma-desanā (exalted sermon) as opposed to his anupubbikā dhamma-desanā (graduated sermon) of charity and morals. It is the knowledge of these higher dhammas (Doctrines) described as profound, subtle, difficult to comprehend, transcending mere speculation, capable of being known only by the wise, which he claims as the result of his attaining the supreme enlightenment (samyak sambodhi).

This analysis of the dhammas is another aspect of Abhidhamma.

It is said in the Vinayapiṭaka that a monk who is incapable of instructing abhidhamma and abhivinaya must not take part in ordaining a disciple.¹ Commenting on these two terms, Buddhaghosa says: "Abhidhamma means dividing (the dhammas) as mind and matter. Abhivinaya means the entire Vinayapiṭaka."²

This piece of commentary is valuable for defining in brief the function and method of Abhidhamma. The contents of this term are shown

1. ... Bhagavā ānupubbikathāṁ kathesi - seyyathidaṁ, dānakatthāṁ, silakatthāṁ, saggakatthāṁ ... yadhāannabinī - ... pasanna-chittāṁ, atha yā Buddhānaṁ sāmukkaṁsikā dhamma-desanā tam pakāsesi - dukkham samudayaṁ nirodhāṁ maggam ... Vinay. I, p.15.
2. bhikkhuṁ na upasampadetabbam ... na paṭibalo hoti abhidhamme vinetūṁ abhivinaye vinetūṁ. Vinaya. I, p.64.
by taking it to mean the 'visiṣṭha dhamma'. Its analytical method and its specialised field of operation are shown by its description as 'nāma-rūpa-parichchheda'. It is parichchheda, i.e., division, classification or analysis which characterises the method of abhidhamma. It is not sīla or samādhi as in the general dhamma preachings, nor āpatti and anāpatti as in the Vinaya preachings, but nāma and rūpa that constitute the basic sphere of abhidhamma.

The Sarvāstivādins also attribute the same function to abhidharma. Vasubandhu defines it as amalā prajñā - the pure wisdom - and interprets it as dharma-pravichaya, analysis of dharmas as sāsrava and anāsrava, etc. This is the real Abhidharma: the term is only secondarily applied to the Abhidharma-sāstas, as the latter are helpful in attaining the prajñā.

The bodhi of the Buddha consists of this dharma-pravichaya or the nāma-rūpa-parichchheda, which is fully elaborated in the Abhidharma. It is to impart this that he preaches Abhidharma to his disciples. It is not only a means to attain nirvāṇa, but also an end, indeed arhatship itself.

Commenting on the term 'abhidhamma' in the Saṁgīti-suttanta:

1. Prajñā'malā sānucha'ra'bhidharmah. Ak. I. 2ab. - tatra prajñā dharmapravichayaḥ, amaleti anāsravā. ... eṣa tāvat pāramārthiko bhidharmah ... sāṅketaṃ tu ... yacyaḥ cha sāstrāṃ asyaḥ prāpty artham anāsravāyaḥ prajñāyaḥ tad āpy abhidharmah. Akb. I. 2ab.
2. ayaḥ abhidhammo nāma keṇa pabhāvito? kattha adhigato? ... bodhi-abhinīhāra-saddhāya pabhāvito ... kattha adhigato ti Bodhi-mūle. Dhs A. I. 78-79.
3. tasya pravichhayasya arthe sāstrā kila Buddhena abhidharma uktāḥ. na hi vinā abhidharmopadeśaṃ sisyāḥ sākto dharmān pravichetum iti ... Akb. I. 3.
4. bhikkhu dhammakāmo hoti, ... abhidhamme abhinivaye uḷārapāmujjo ... ayaṃ pi dhammo nātha-karaṇo. Dīgha, III. p.267.
Buddhaghosa says: 'abhidhamma' means the Seven Books of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka ... or 'abhidhamma' means the Supermundane Path and Fruits.

The analysis of nāma and rūpa and particularly of nāma, i.e. the mind and mental dhammas, dominate the entire preachings of the Buddha. The doctrines of karma, rebirth and salvation are all explained on the basis of the analysis of the mind in its good, bad and indeterminate states. His oft-quoted saying "Beings suffer on account of the impure mind; they are freed by the purification of the mind" can be pointed to as a good example of this analysis. A study of the mind and its functions with reference to its different objects in various states of existence, a minute observation of the various kinds of feelings, volitions and other concomitants that associate with those states and an analysis of the complex network of causes that lead to such combinations are to be found in various suttas, in several repeatedly occurring passages that deal with jhānas, paṭipadās, abhiññās and the bodhipakkhiya-dhammas. The analysis of the matter is also given in the suttas to the extent that is necessary to understand the role it plays as an object of the mind and also to comprehend its mysterious co-operation with the mind in giving effect to a corporeal life. A large number of suttas emphasize the need of this analytical consciousness. We may particularly note here the Satipāṭṭhāna sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya.

The practice of the contemplation of the nature of body (kāya), feelings (vedanā), mind (chitta) and dhammas is spoken by the Buddha as the one and

1. 'abhidhamme abhivinaye' ti ... 'abhidhammo' ti satta-pakaranāni ... athavā ... maggaphalāni abhidhammo. Dīgha A. III. p.1047.
only way leading to the purification of beings and the realization of
nibbāna.

We have noted above the attempts by the Elders towards collecting
the visitthā dhamma in several groups. At a later time, we find works
like the Khuddaka-pātha, containing lists enumerating the three sarapas,
sikkhāpadas, kammaṭṭhānas and such other items useful for novices. It is
possible that several units into which these dhammas were further analysed
by the Buddha, were also tabulated (quite possibly with the approval of
the Master) by elders like Sāriputta, Moggallāna or MahaKachchhāyana, famous
for their ability to expound the words of the Buddha, for the benefit of
monks engaged in higher studies of the dhammas. Such tabulations called
Mātikās, were certainly known to the early Buddhists. It is said in the
Gulissāni sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya that a bhikkhu living in forests
should apply himself to abhidhamma and abhivinaya. The commentary on this
passage says: "He should apply himself to the study of the Abhidhamma-
Piṭaka and the VinayaPiṭaka, together with their Commentaries. As regards
the Abhidhamma, he should at least know the Duka and Tika Mātikās together
with the Dhamma-hadaya-vibhanga (last chapter of the Vibhanga). As regards
the VinayaPiṭaka, he must at least learn the two Pātimokkhas."

2. araṇīkānouvuso bhikkhunā abhidhamme abhivinaye yogo karapīyo.
Majjhima I. p.472.
3. Abhidhamma-piṭake cheva Vinaya-piṭake cha Paḷivasena Atṭhakathāvasena
cha yogo karapīyo. sabbatimena hi pārichchodena Abhidhamme duka-tika-
Mātikāni saddhān Dhamma-hadaya-Vibhangaṁ vinā na vattati. Vinaye ... ṛve
Leaving aside this commentorial identification of the term abhidhamma with the Abhidhamma-piṭaka as merely traditional, we may note its emphasis on the two Mātikās.

The Mātikās are tabulations of the topics of Abhidhamma given in the Dhammasangāpi, the first book of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. There are two Mātikās given at the beginning of this book, viz. the Tikā-mātikā, and the Dukkha-mātikā.

The first, viz., the Tikā-mātikā consists of twenty-two triads headed by the triplet of dhammas that are good (kusala), bad (akusala) and indeterminate (abhākata). The arrangement of these triplets is on the principle of grouping the dhammas in three mutually exclusive sets which, when put together, in some cases comprehend all nāma dhammas and in others comprehend both the nāma and rūpa dhammas. Six of these twenty-two triplets (Nos. 2, 7, 13, 16, 19 and 21) cover only the nāma. These deal with different states of chitta and chetasikas in their relation to the three kinds of feelings (No. 2), five āṅgas of the jhāna (No. 3), and lastly with reference to their several kinds of objects (Nos. 12, 16, 19 and 21). The remaining sixteen triplets cover the entire range of phenomena, i.e. the nāma and rūpa. An inspection of these sixteen triplets reveals that they cover not only the phenomena, but also the nibbāna, called asamkhata dhatu (the Uncompounded element), which is included in the nāma. It is excluded

1. Edited by P.V. Bapat, Pōna, 1940.
2. vedanākkhandho ... viññānakkkhandho, asamkhata cha dhātu, idām vuchchati nāma. Dhs. 1309.
from three triplets viz., (i) the dhammas arisen-not arisen-bound to arise; (ii) states that are past-present-future; and (iii) dhammas that are personal-external-both, as it transceeds the conceptions of time, origin and relation. It is included in the third member of the remaining thirteen triplets and shares nine items common to the rūpa khandha.

The second mātikā namely the Duka-mātikā is divided into two - Abhidhamma-mātikā and Suttanta-mātikā. The former consists of one hundred pairs collected in thirteen groups. Ten of these groups are called 'clusters' (gochchakas). They deal with ten kinds of corruptions and dhammas that enter into various relationships with them. The remaining three groups, called Gandhānte-duka (Short Intermediate set of seven pairs), Mahantara-duka (Great Intermediate set of fourteen pairs) and Pitthiduka (Supplementary set of eighteen pairs) treat of miscellaneous pairs of dhammas. A large number of pairs of the Mahantara-duka deal with the mutual relation of chitta and chetasikas. The first nine of the eighteen pairs of the Pitthiduka are borrowed from the Tīka-mātikā. This last duka closes with the pair of dhammas which are sarāpa and araṇa. Although the gochchakas occupy a large portion of these dukas, the remaining three groups appear to be older. The latter contain several items common to the māṭrikās of the Sanskrit Abhidharma. The gochchakas are found only in the Pali Abhidhamma.

1. uppanā-anuppanā-uppādino (No. 17), atītā-anāgatā-pachchuppanā (No. 18), aṭṭhakathā-bahiddhā-ajjhattabahiddhā (No. 20).
2. 1 (c), 3 (c), 6 (c), 8 (c), 9 (c), 10 (c), 11 (c), 15 (c) and 22 (c).
3. hetu, āsava, saññiyojana, gantha, ogha, yoga, nīvaraṇa, paramāsā, upādana and kilesa.
The second division of the Duka-matikā is called Suttanta-matikā. It contains a list of forty-two pairs, mostly of miscellaneous nature and dealing more with dhammas related to sīla, samādhi and diṭṭhi than with nāma and rūpa as in the Abhidhamma Matikā. We have already noted that thirty-two of its forty-two pairs are identical with the duka-dhammas given in the Saṅgīti-suttanta of the Dīgha-nikāya. It may well be that it is called Suttanta-matikā because it was directly borrowed from the Saṅgīti-suttanta. It is not commented upon in the Atthuddhāra-kanda of the Dhāmasangāpi and receives but scant attention from the author of Atthasālinī. It appears that this whole list was at some later time added to the Matikā list. This is confirmed by tradition. The Atthasālinī says that only the twenty-two tikas and hundred dukas were the directly spoken words of the Buddha. As regards the Suttanta-matikā it says: "They originated with Sāriputta, having been laid down and taught by him. But he did not lay them down through his own exalted knowledge. They have been gathered from the Eka-nipāta, Duka-nipāta, the Saṅgīti and Dassuttara suttantas, in order to help students of Abhidhamma in their study of the Suttantas."

No corresponding mātrikās of the Yogāchāra and the Sarvāstivāda schools have come down to us. But it is possible to reconstruct such a list on the basis of the items dealt with in their Abhidharma works.

The Abhidharma-samuchchaya of Asanga (representing the Yogāchāra school), the Kośa-Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu and the present work Dīpa (with its Vṛtti), contain an almost identical set of pairs and triads corresponding to the Mātikās of the Theravāda school.

The Abhidharma-samuchchaya of Asanga deals with a large number of dharmas in its first chapter devoted to a study of skandha–ayatana–dhatu (tri-dharma-parichchheda). Its method, like other Abhidharma works, is catechetical. After putting a question like "kathaṃ dravyamāt, kati dravyamānti, kim artham dravya-parikṣā?", it gives an answer to these questions in the manner of the Nikkhepa-kanda of the Dhammasangani. The dharmas in the Abhidharma-samuchchaya are presented in the following order:-

1 (a) dravyamāt  (b) prajñāptimāt
2 (a) samvipitisat (b) paramārthasat
3 (a) jñeyam     (b) vijñeyam
4 (a) rūpi       (b) arūpi      [33]
5 (a) sanidrāsanam (b) anidrāsanam [31]
6 (a) sapratigham (b) apratigham  [32]
7 (a) sāsravam    (b) anāsravam   [37]
8 (a) sarapam     (b) arapam      [122]
9 (a) sāmisham   (b) nirāmisham
10 (a) gṛdhaśritam (b) naishkramyāśritam
11 (a) samskṛtam (b) asamskṛtam [30]

1. These numbers in the square brackets refer to the number of corresponding items of the Pali mātikā given in the Dhammasangani (Poona edition).
12 (a) laukikam  (b) lokottaram  [34]
13 (a) utpannam  (b) anutpannam  [17]
14 (a) grāhakam  (b) grāhyam  [77]
15 (a) bahirmukham  (b) antarmukham
16 (a) kliṣṭam  (b) akliṣṭam  [99]

These sixteen pairs are followed by the following five triads:

17 (a) atītam  (b) anāgatam  (c) pratyutpannam  [18]
18 (a) kuśalam  (b) akuśalam  (c) avyākṛtīm  [1]
19 (a) kāma-pratisamyuktam  (b) rūpa  (c) ārūpya  [115–7]
20 (a) saiksham  (b) aṣaiksham  (c) naiva-ṣaikshanaṣaiksham  [11]
21 (a) darsana-prahātvam  (b) bhāvanā  (c) aprahātavyam  [9]

These triads are interrupted by a long discussion on pratītya-sam-uptpāda and pratiyayās. Lastly the following pairs are enumerated:

22 (a) sabhāgam  (b) tatsabhāgam
23 (a) savipākam  (b) avipākam  [3]
24 (a) sottaram  (b) anuttaram  [121]

We can see from this list that the Abhidharma-samuchchaya deals with nineteen pairs and five triads. Of these, twelve pairs and all triads have their parallels in the Pali Mātikās.

Same method is followed in the Kośa (and Bhāṣya). In its first Kośa-sthāna (dealing with skandha-āyatana-dhātu), dharmas are presented in the following order:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>sāsrava</td>
<td>anāsrava</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>sanāskṛita</td>
<td>asanāskṛita</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>sanidarsana</td>
<td>anidarsana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>sapratigha</td>
<td>apratigha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>kuśala</td>
<td>akuśala</td>
<td>avyākṛita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>kāmadhātupratisamuykta</td>
<td>rūpa</td>
<td>ārūpya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>savitarka-vichāra</td>
<td>vichāra-mātra</td>
<td>avitarka-avichāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>sālambana</td>
<td>anālambana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>upātta</td>
<td>anupātta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>bhūta</td>
<td>bhautika</td>
<td>nobhaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>samchita</td>
<td>asamchita</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>vipākaja</td>
<td>aupačayika</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>adhyātma</td>
<td>bānya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>sabhāga</td>
<td>tatsabhāga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>darśana-heyā</td>
<td>bhāvanā-heyā</td>
<td>aheyā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>dṛishti</td>
<td>na dṛishti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>dānaka</td>
<td>dānya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>tulya</td>
<td>tolayitṛi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the III Kosāsthāna, the indriyas are divided only in four triads (the same as Nos. 5, 6, 15, and one more, i.e. No. 19)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>sāsrava</td>
<td>anāsrava</td>
<td>ubhaya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and two pairs:
Thus in the Kośa we find six triads and fifteen pairs. Of these four triads and eight pairs have their parallels in the Pali Mātikās.

Almost the same pairs and triads are given, in the same order, in the Dīpa and its Vritti. For both the Bhāshya and the Vritti, the main purpose is to deal with the dharmas in accordance with these mātrikās. All discussions on the doctrine valuable as they are from our point of view are treated as incidental. Thus, for instance, the third pada of the I Adhyāya of Dīpa begins: "Now this should be said. Of these eighteen dhātus, how many are sanidarsana, how many anidarsana? How many sapratigha, how many apratigha? How many vyākrita, how many avyākṛita?"

After dealing with these and a few more pairs, the Vritti discusses a topic unrelated to them. It is that of sāmṛiti (memory). At the end of this discussion, the Vritti says "gatam etad aupodghatikam prakaranam prakritam evābhidhīvatām". Then follows a discussion on several other pairs like sālambana and anālambana, upātta and anupātta, etc.¹

This account of the four major works on Abhidharma shows that the Yogāchāra and the Sarvāstivāda schools too had Mātrikās, similar to the Pali Mātikās. The numbers of items of both pairs and triads varied in each school. It is probable that originally the mātikā list consisted of

a few items, only of those which are included in all these four Abhidharma works. The following table shows the number of items treated in the following three schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Theravāda (Dhammasangāpi)</th>
<th>Yogāchāra (Abhidharma-samuchchaya)</th>
<th>Vaibhāṣika (Kośa)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Triads</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairs</td>
<td>100 (Excluding the Suttanta-māṭikā)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the overlapping character of the several pairs and triads in the Pali Māṭikās, it appears to us that the Vaibhāṣika list is more original and has suffered less additions. The Yogāchāra list is also nearer to the Vaibhāṣika list than to the Pali Māṭikās. Though as many as twenty-three triads and a hundred pairs are given in the Pali Māṭikās, it should be noted that only the first triad, namely the kusala tika, has been fully expanded in the Dhammasangāpi. The entire Chittupāda-kāṇḍa and even the Rūpa-kāṇḍa (which is covered by the term abyākatā dhammā) deal with the mind and matter, only with reference to the first tika. The Rūpa-kāṇḍa has its own Māṭikā, which consists not only of pairs and triads,
but also of fours, fives, etc., up to tens, like the collection of dhammas in the Sangīti-sutta. The remaining twenty-two tikas and the entire duka-mātikā are briefly explained in the nikkhepa-kapā, which is a sort of commentary on the Matikās.

Whatever the original contents of the mātikās may have been, there is no doubt that it formed the nucleus of the Abhidhamma literature, both Pali and Sanskrit. The Dhammasangani and Vibhaṅga, particularly, deal with the dhammas on the lines indicated by the Mātikās. The Sanskrit Aññadharma works have not come down to us in their original form. But from the above analysis of the later Abhidharma works like Asm., Asm., Kośa and Dīpa, it is certain that the original works too had mātikās as their basis. In the old canonical Pali literature the term mātikā takes place of Abhidharma. It occurs once in the Vinaya-piṭaka and once in the Āṅg. nikāya. An expert in the mātikās is called mātikādharā. The latter term always occurs with the other two, viz., dhammadharā and vinayadharā, pointing to the existence of mātikās as a separate collection of the words of Buddha. The term is known to the Vinaya of the Mūla-Sarvāstivādins and to the Divyāvadāna, where also it is placed side by side with sūtra and vinaya.

The Mātikās are to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka what Pātimokkha rules are

1. tesa dvāvīsatī tikā sataṁ dukā ti ayam ānācaha bhāsita ... sattannam        pākarāpanāṁ mātikā nāma. Dhs A. I.18.
4. sūtrasya vinayasaya mātikādāpy. p.18.
to the vinaya. They are foundations for the super-structures of the Abhidhamma texts (excluding the later Puggala-pankhatti and Kathavatthu) and the Suttavibhanga. The laying down of both is considered by the tradition as an exclusive privilege of the Buddha and not of his disciples. Hence follows the claim that even the works built on them are words of the Buddha. The commentators are well aware of the fact that several suttas preached by Ananda, Moggalana, Mahakachchana and Sāriputta are included in the canon as the word of the Buddha. 1 Atthasālinī quotes the Madhupindika-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya to show that although that was preached by Mahakachchana, he had done so on the basis of the synopsis given by the Master and hence it is a Buddha-vachana. We have noted above several suttas which are only expansions by the theras of the uddesas and certain cryptic sayings of the Buddha. The commentators do not pretend that the Kathavatthu was preached by the Buddha. They attribute it to Tissa-Moggaliputta. But they do claim that the mātikā of that work was laid down by the Master. 2

The tradition is that the Buddha preached the Abhidhamma first to his mother during his sojourn for three months in the Tāvatimsa heaven. Atthasālinī, however, wisely adds that he used to leave a "nimmita-Buddha" in heaven and return daily to the human world to fetch his alms. Sāriputta used to approach him then, learn the Abhidhamma from him and preach it to other monks. This story further confirms the part played by Sāriputta in

expounding the Abhidhamma. It is stated in the same commentary that "the
textual order of the Abhidhamma originated with Sāriputta. The numerical
series in the Patṭhāna were also determined by him."  

If the monks received the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka from Sāriputta (and
not from the Buddha) a question is rightly asked "Well, in that case
Sāriputta is the first Abhidhammika?". The answer of Āṭṭhasālinī is
"No. The Buddha is the first Abhidhammika. It was he who penetrated it
under the Bo-tree".  

These accounts show, in spite of this determination to make the
Buddha the sole author of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, that the commentators agree
to a great extent that the books of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka were propounded
by the Elders, albeit on the basis of the Master’s preachings, and not
entirely by the Buddha himself.

A somewhat similar view is shared by the Sarvāstivādins, who also
possess a separate Abhidharma Piṭaka, consisting of seven 'Śāstras'. They
too claim that the Abhidharma Piṭaka is preached by the Buddha. Commenting
on this claim, Yasomitra (a Sautrāntika) says, "This is a view of the
Abhidharmikas (not of us who are Sautrāntikas). Indeed, we are told that
the Abhidharma Śāstras actually have individual authors, namely:-  

Arya Kātyāyanīputra of the Jīmānapraśthāṇa, Sthavira Vasumitra of the Prakaraṇapāda

1. Abhidhamme vāchanāmago nāma Sāriputta-thera-ppabhavo. Mahāpαkaraṇe
gāpanavāro pi thereneva ṭhapito. Ibīd. I. 43.
2. evaṃ sante thero cha paṭhamataram Abhidhammiko hoti ti? na hoti.
samma-sambuddho cha paṭhamataram Abhidhammiko hoti. so hi tam Mahābodhi-
pallanke nisīditvā paṭīvijjhi. Dhs A. I. 44.
Sthavira Devaśārman of the Vijñānakāya, Ārya Śāriputra of the Dharma-
skandha, Ārya Maudgalyāyana of the Prajñāpti-sāstra, and Mahākausūthila
of the Saṅgītipāryāya.¹

Commenting further on the differences between the Sautrāntikas
and Vaibhāshikas on the authenticity of the Abhidharma canon, Yaśomitra
says: "What is meant by the term Sautrāntika?" "Those who hold the
sūtras as authentic and not the sāstras, are called Sautrāntika." "If
they do not accept the sāstras as authentic, how do they explain the
division of the canon in the three Pīṭakas? Is it not a fact that the
sūtras know the term 'Abhidharma Pīṭaka', as for instance in an expression
'a tripiṭaka monk'?" That does not matter. For a certain kind of
Sūtras themselves, dealing with the determination of meanings and
characteristics of dharmas are called Abhidharma."²

"In order to dispel a possible confusion arising from this view,
the Vaibhāshikas maintain that the Abhidharma-Pīṭaka, which deals with the
nature of the characteristics of elements and belongs to the Upadesa class,
was preached by the Buddha to his disciples, and remains scattered here and
there. Just as Dharmatrāta compiled several udānas of the Master (like
"Impermanent are indeed the compounded elements") in a work like
Udānavarga, similarly, the Elders Kātyāyaniputra and others collected the

1. katham nāma dharma-pravichayaḥ syād ity [abhidharma upadhishtah śāstrā
Buddhena / ata eva ... uditah kila ... ] kila-sabdaḥ parābhīprāyaṁ dyotayati.
abhidharmikāṃ etan metan. na tv asmākāḥ Sautrāntikānām iti bhāvah.
śrīyante hy Abhidharma-śāstrāpāṁ kartāraḥ. tathā Jñānaprasthānasya
ārya-Kātyāyaniputraḥ kartā ... Saṅgītipāryāyasya Mahākausūthilaḥ ... Sakv. p. 11.
2. kah Sautrāntīkārthā? ye sūtra-prāmāṇikā na śāstra-prāmāṇikāḥ te
Sautrāntikāḥ. yadi na śāstra-prāmāṇikāḥ kathāṁ pīṭaka-traya-
vyavasthāḥ? sūtra-pīṭako vinaya-pīṭako 'bhidharmāpiṭaka iti? sūtre'pi hy
abhidharma-pīṭakah pāthaye. tri-pīṭako bhikshu iti? naisha doshaḥ,
sūtra-viśeṣā eva hy artha-vinirūpāyāḥ bhidharmā-samjñān yeshu dharmā-
lakṣaṇām varṇyate ... Ibid.
Abhidharma together in these sūtras.¹

These comments of Yasomitra are helpful in understanding the main differences between the Abhidharmikas and the Sautrāntikas on the authenticity of the Abhidharma. The Sautrāntikas, too, recognise a class of literature grouped under the term Abhidharma-pitaka, but maintain that it is scattered in the Sūtra-pitaka itself. The Abhidharma of the Abhidharmikas, however, consists of a separate collection, claimed as a word of the Buddha. This Abhidharma is, for the Sautrāntikas, a work of sūtras or śāhāyas, and hence not canonical.²

A similar view is attributed to a heterodox Buddhist in the following account of the Atthasālini: Thus as rehearsed at the (First) Council, the Abhidhamma is a Pitaka by Pitaka classification, Khuddaka-nikāya by Nikāya classification, Veyyākaraṇa by Part classification...

One of those Bhikkhus who studies the Abhidhamma, once sat in the midst of bhikkhus ... and quoting a sutta from the Abhidhamma taught the dhamma thus:

'The aggregate of matter is immoral; of the four (mental) aggregates some are moral, some immoral, and some immoral.'³ A bhikkhu, seated there, asked 'Preacher, you quote a long text (sutta) ..., what sutta is it?'

---

³ evam saṅgīte panettha ayaṃ abhidhammo pītakato Abhidhamma-pītakam nikāyato Khuddakanikāya, aṅgato Veyyākaraṇam ... pubbe eko bhikkhu Abhidhammato suttam āharitvā dharmam kathento 'rūpakkhando abīkakato, chattāro khandhā siyā kusala siyā akusala siyā abīkakato ....' Dhs.A I. 69.
'Abhidhamma sutta, brother.' 'Why do you quote the Abhidhamma sutta? Does it not behove you to quote other suttas spoken by the Buddha?' 'Brother, by whom was the Abhidhamma taught?' 'Not by the Buddha.'

The Atthasaññinī, in the manner of the Vaibhāshika, confronts this heterodox Buddhist with the occurrence of the term abhidhamma in the following passages of the Vinaya and Sutta-piṭakas:

i) 'No offence if, not desiring to disparage, he speaks, saying 'Look here, do you master Suttantas or Gāthās or Abhidhamma and afterwards you will master Vinaya'.

ii) 'If having asked for leave in regard to Suttanta, she asks about Vinaya or about Abhidhamma, there is an offence of expiation.'

iii) 'Here, o brother Sāriputta, two bhikkhus converse on the discourse on Abhidhamma, they ask questions to each other...

As regards the term abhidhamma in the first Vinaya passage, Oldenberg long ago noted that it could not mean the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, but only such works as the Paṭisambhidā-magga, which are similar in character to the Abhidhamma. With reference to the second passage, where the term

1. 'kim suttaṁ nāmetaṁ ti 'āha. 'abhidhamma-suttaṁ nāma āvuso ti.'
2. vide supra, p.74.
3. tattha anāpatti, na vivammetu-kāmo ingha tāva suttaṁ viṁśatasya va gāthāyo va paryāpunassu, pachchhā pi vinayām paryāpuniṣasi ... Vinay IV. p.144.
4. suttaṁ viṁśatām kārāpetvā abhidhammaṁ viṁśatām vinayām viṁśatām puchchhāti, abhidhamme okāsām kārāpetvā suttaṁ viṁśatām vinayaṁ ... Vinay IV. p.344.
5. idhāvuso Sāriputta, dvā bhikkhū abhidhammabhikṣuṁ kathenti, te abhiggataṁ pahāṇi puchchhāti ... Majjhima I. p.218.
abhidhamma could mean the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, Oldenberg, followed to some extent by Horner, considers it an interpolation.

The term 'abhidhamma-kathā' occurring in the Majjhimanikāya, is not commented upon in the Āṭṭhakathā. The same term occurs twice in the Aṅg. nikāya, where it is taken by the commentary to mean 'uttama-dhamma-kathā'. This argument of the Āṭṭhasālinī, therefore, is not conclusive to prove the authenticity of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

On the contrary, the Sautrāṅsika view, which recognises the abhidharma independent of the Abhidharma Piṭaka, is supported by a large number of sūtras in the Sūtra Piṭaka and by the absence of any mention of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka in the mahāpadesa preaching and in the traditional account of the First Council given in the Chullavagga and other Northern Buddhist chronicles.

The Pali commentators were certainly aware of the late composition of the Abhidharma-piṭaka. This is apparent from their attempt to call it 'abhidhamma-sutta', and their determination to invent alternative introductions (nīdānas) for these 'suttas'. In the Sarvāstivāda tradition, however, the Abhidharma-piṭaka is known as sāstra (treatise) clearly showing

1. Vinaya, Intro., p.XII, n.2.
2. Book of the Discipline, part III, Intro., XIV.
5. See Rockhill's The Life of the Buddha (p.160), where Mahākāśyapa is said to have recited the Mātrikā, and not the Abhidharma-piṭaka.
6. See Dhs A. I. 73-77.
its distinction from the 'sūtra'. The Sautrāntikas recognised only the Sūtras as canonical and whenever there was conflict between the sūtra and the śāstra, adhered to the Master's advice in the Mahāpadesa preaching. 'Monks, you ought to take refuge in the Sūtrāntas and not in individuals.' Curiously enough, this line is not found in the Pali version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra.

The Sautrāntikas, on account of their adherence to the Sūtrānta in preference to the Abhidharma, claimed not Śāriputra or Mahākāśyapa, but Ananda as their main preceptor. In the Vinaya-piṭaka we find a group of monks called Suttantikas (versed in Suttas), always appearing side by side with vinayadhāras and dhammakathikas. It is possible that they remained devoted to Ananda, zealously learnt the suttas in their original version, and claimed to preserve the original meanings of them against the 'unauthentic' interpretations of other elders and heretics.

But the Sautrāntikas (Pali Suttantika) as a separate school appear very late in the history of Buddhist church. Both the Pali and Sanskrit accounts place the Sautrāntika school at the end of the traditional eighteen Nikāyas. Buddhaghosa calls it Suttavāda, a branch of the

3. See VinayaI. 169; II. 75, 161; III. 159; IV. 67.
Sankantivāda. The latter branched off from the Kassapikas, a sub-section of the Sarvastivāda school.

The Sanskrit account given by Vasumitra agrees with the Pali account. Here also the Sautrāntika is a branch of the Sarvastivāda school and is the last of the eighteen Nikāyas. Vasumitra, however, identifies the Sautrāntika with the Saṃkrāntivāda. Bhāyā's account makes no mention of the Sautrāntika school, but takes the Saṃkrāntivāda as a branch of the Sarvastivāda school.

As in the case of several other schools, no work belonging to the Sautrāntikas has come down to us. Therefore, our knowledge of their doctrines is derived solely from other sources. The Kathāvatthu makes no reference to their doctrines. Vasumitra attributes five original doctrines to this school, all dealing with saṃkrānti or santāna, which correspond to the doctrine of bīja (seed) attributed to them in the Bhāshya, Vṛtti and the Sphutārthā of Yaśomitra.

The Sarvadaraṇa-saṁgraha of Mādhava attributes to them the doctrine of bāhyānumeyā-vāda, which revolutionised the theory of perception and foreshadowed the beginnings of Buddhist Logic.

Though the Sautrāntikas existed since the time of the Buddha and survived as an influential school till the later phases of Buddhism, their

major activities are to be seen only after the full ascendency of the Vaibhāṣhika school. Backing their arguments with the Sūtra preachings, they arose chiefly in revolt against the Realism (dravyavāda) of the Abhidharmikas and paved the way for the emergence of the Idealistic Mahāyāna schools and particularly that of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism.

What are the particular Abhidharmika points that the Sautrāntikas thought contrary to the sūtra-preachings of the Buddha? An answer to this question can be found in a close comparison of the Sūtras with the Abhidharma, works of both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools. Of these, only the Pali Abhidhamma works, together with their commentaries, have come down to us. The entire Abhidharma Piṭaka of the Sarvāstivādins, together with the Mahāvibhāṣā, is lost in its original form and is preserved only in the Chinese and Tibetan translations. The few works of this school available to us, therefore, are the later works of Ghoshaka, Vasubandhu and Yasomitra, and our Dīpa with its Vyākhyā.
Both in the Pali and Sanskrit traditions the Abhidharma is grouped under a sub-section called Vyākaraṇa, meaning exposition. But with the growth of the doctrine of bodhisattva, this term came to be used for prophecies or revelations. The Asm. defines the term as a class of literature which contains the prophecies concerning the deaths or births of śrāvakas, or that which explains the import of the Sūtras. In the course of time, the second function of the term Vyākaraṇa was transferred to a new aṅga called Upadeśa. Asm. defines it as that which demonstrates the essence of all elements of existence in its true form. It further adds that the upadeśa class as a whole forms the Abhidharma code of both the Hinayāna and Mahāyāna. Asanga further defines the Abhidharma as that by which the meanings of the Sūtras is best understood. These explanations emphasize the relation of the Abhidharma to the Sūtras. The latter is to be understood through the former, which alone gives the absolute meanings of the dharmas. The Atthasālinī opens with a statement that the Abhidharma exceeds and is distinguished from the dhamma (i.e. the Suttas). It says that in the Suttanta, the five aggregates (and similarly the twelve

Ayatanas, eighteen dhātus, four truths, twenty-two indriyas, etc.) are classified partially and not fully. In the Abhidhamma they are classified fully by the methods of the Sutta-classification, Abhidhamma classification and catechism. It further states that the Suttas speak of conventional truths with reference to circumstances and with a view of refuting the heretical views, whereas the Abhidhamma deals with reference to states, and aims at the analysis of mind and matter.

A somewhat similar distinction is drawn by the Dipa. Whenever a discrepancy is found between the Sūtra and the Abhidharma, the Dipa holds that the statement of the Sūtra is, in some cases abhiprayika (explanatory) and in some cases aupachārika (conventional), whereas the Abhidharma statement is lakshanīka or definitive, and hence valid.

This distinction between the Sūtra and Abhidharma is clearly presented in the Vibhanga-ppakaraṇa and vividly explained in its commentary by Buddhaghosa. The Vibhanga is the second book of the Abhidhamma-pitaka. It is devoted to an exhaustive investigation of the dharmas grouped in the style of Abhidharma. It consists of a series of eighteen independent treatises or Vibhantas called Khandha, Ayatana, Dhātu, Sachcha, Indriya, Pachchayākāra, Satipaṭṭhāna, Sammappadhāna, Iddhipāda, Bojjhanga.

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1. Suttantam hi patvā pañchakkhandhā ekadesevā vibhattā, na nippadesena; abhidhammaḥ patvā pana suttantabhajaniya-abhidhamma bhajaniya-pañña-puchchhukaranayanāṃ vasena nippadesato vibhattā. I. 3.
2. Suttantapiṭakaḥ hi ... vohārabāhullato desitattā vohāradesanā; Abhidhammapiṭakām ... paramatthadesanā ti vuchchati ... Ibid. I. 52.
3. The term lakshanīka should be derived from lakṣaṇa (definition), and not from lakṣanā (figurative sense of a word).
5. For a brief summary of this work see Nyanatiloka's Guide through the Abhidhamma-pitaka, pp. 17-28.
Magga°, Jhāna°, Appamañña°, Sikkhāpada°, Pañ Siberia°, Nāpa°, Khuddaka-
vatthu°, and Dhamma-hadaya°. Of these, thirteen Vibhangas consist of three
parts: the Suttanta-bhajaniya, the Abhidhamma-bhajaniya, and Pañhā-
puchchhaka, i.e., a summary of the topic by way of questions and answers
with reference to the one hundred and twenty-two headings of the Mātikā-
list. The Indriya and the Sikkhāpada Vibhangas have no Sutta explanation.
The last three Vibhangas appear to form a separate unit. Of these the Nāpa
and the Khuddaka-vatthu Vibhangas have their own Mātikās and are presented
in a numerical order. The last Vibhanga is a kind of summary of all the
topics and has suffered a great deal of addition of non-Abhidharmika
speculations.

The division of the Vibhanga into Suttanta-bhajaniya¹ and
Abhidhamma-bhajaniya² is significant. In the former, the dhammas are
presented as they occur in the Suttas. Sometimes a brief commentary is
also given here on the Sutta formulas. Thus, for instance, in the Sb.
of the Khandha-vibhanga, the five skandhas are presented in a manner of the
Anattapariyāya-sutta³ where these are called past, present or future,
personal or external, gross or subtle, low or lofty, far or near. These
terms are not explained in the Suttas. A question, for instance, may
arise regarding the nature of a gross or subtle nāma-khandha, or about the
precise meaning of the term atīta. These explanations are given in the

1. Henceforth referred to as Sb.
2. Henceforth referred to as Ab.
3. For a comparative study of the skandha, āyatana and dhātu classifications in the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda and Yogāchāra schools, see Manual of Burddhist Philosophy, by McGovern, pp.81-162.
4. v. supra, p.58, n.3.
Sb. and expanded in the Commentary. It is said here that an akusala-vedana is gross compared to a kusala-vedana. The latter is subtle compared to the former. Buddhaghosa gives several conflicting views on these explanations. According to Tipitaka-Chulagatthera this division should not be applied to akusala-vedana as all akusala-vedanas are only gross. Similarly all lokuttara-vedanas are only subtle and hence there also this division is not to be applied. Tipitaka-Chulabhyatthera quotes a sutta and proves that this division can be applied to all kinds of feelings.

Buddhaghosa sums up by saying that an akusala-vedana yielding more vipaka is gross compared to a similar vedana yielding less vipaka. The rule is reversed in the case of kusala. Here a kusala-vedana yielding less vipaka is gross compared to a similar vedana yielding more vipaka. Several controversies on this topic are preserved in the Bhāṣya. The gross and subtle rūpa are explained in both schools as sapratigha and apratigha.

But in the case of nāma-skandhas, where the concepts of gross or subtle are out of place, the explanations are different. The Vibhāṣikas explain that in the case of nāma-skandhas those which have the five organs as their base are gross; the mind-consciousness and its concomitants are subtle, or alternatively, the kāmavachara nāma-skandhas are gross compared to the

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1. akusalam viññāpana ṭoḷārikā; kusalāvyākatā viññāpana sukhumā ... Vbh.p.10.
2. Tipitaka-Chulagatthera panāha: "akusale ṭoḷārika-sukhumatā nāma na uddharitabbā. tam hi ekanta-ṭoḷārikam eva. lokuttarepi, ... tam hi ekantam sukhumam ti ..." Vbh A. p. 15.
3. Tipitaka-Chulabhyatthera panāha: "... saṃsambuddhena pana lokuttarepi ṭoḷārika-sukhumatā uddharita" ti ... vatvā suttam əhāri ... Ibid.
4. sankhepato akusalam patvā yam vipākaṁ bahum deti sā ṭoḷārika, yā appam sā sukhuma, kusalam patvā pana appavipāka ṭoḷārika, bahuvipāka sukhumā. Ibid.
4. See Vm. XIV. 73.
rūpāvacara skandhas, etc. The latter explanation agrees with the Pali Abhidhamma.

As regards the term atīta and its precise meaning, the Āṭṭhakathā says that this term may refer to past in general (addhāna) or to a particular unit consisting of a series of moments (santati) or to a certain period (samaya) or only to a single moment (khaṇa). The first three meanings are obtained in a conventional preaching, i.e., in the Suttas. In the Abhidhamma, however, only the last explanation is valid as it is a 'paramattha-desana'.

The abhidhamma treatment of the same topic, therefore, differs from the simpler and shorter sutta exposition. Here the five khandhas are in the manner of the Dhammasangapi, subjected to a minute analysis of their relations and functions in a momentary existence. They are presented here in several long categories grouped in their ascending numerical order combined with each heading of the 122 Mātikā list.

In the Āyatana-vibhanga, the Sb. is very short. The twelve āyatanas are enumerated and described in a single line as impermanent, miserable, non-ego and subject to change. No further details or even definitions of the āyatanas are given, as it is not customary for the

1. [ayaṃ tu viśesho] vedanādīnaṃ. [audārikam pañcchendriyāśrayam] vedanādī-
chatuskham, amūrtatvat svagatam audārikatvaṃ naṣṭi. [sūkshmaṃ mānasam] 
āśrayasyāpy amūrtatvāt. [bhūmito va] ti audārikaṃ sūkshmaḥ cha vedanādīnām
audārikī kāmāvchari āśrayanā. sūkshmaḥ prathama-dhyāna-bhūmikā . . . sak. p.44.
2. idam pana atītānāgata-pachchuppamām nāma . . . suttantrapariyāye bhavena
parichchhinām . . . abhidhammaniddee pana khepena parichchhinām . . . aparā
nayo, idam hi rūpaṃ adbhāna-santati-samaya-khapa-vasena chatuskha atītanāma naṁ
hoti . . . adbhānavasena tāva ekassa ekasmim bhave patisandhito pubbe atītan;
. . . ettha cha khapaṅkathā va nippariyāyā; sesā sappariyāyā, tāsu
3. chakkhum anichchohām dukkham anattā vipariṇāmadhammaṃ, rūpā anichchohām
. . . etc. Vbh. p.70.
Sūtras to furnish them. The Ab. is more exhaustive. Here the twelve āyatanas are defined and presented in full detail. The term dhammāyatana, for instance, is nowhere fully explained in the Suttas. It is a name given to dhammas which are exclusively the objects of mind. They are five: vedaṇā, chetana, saṃkṣāra, saṃkhāra, anidassana-appaṭīgha rūpa and asaṃkhata dhatu ( = nirvāṇa). Of these the last two items are variously explained in different schools. The Theravādins and the Sautrāntikas do not recognise a kind of matter called avijñāpti, but the Vaibhāshikas maintain its existence by referring to the term 'anidarsana-appratīgha-rūpa'.

The skandha division does not include the nirvāṇa but in the āyatana classification even that non-phenomenal element is included. The Theravādins and the Vaibhāshikas hold it a positive element, whereas the Sautrāntikas, on the authority of several sūtras, maintain that it is only a name for the 'cessation' of passions. Both the Vibhanga-āṭṭhakathā and Bhāṣya contain long controversies on this topic. It is quite possible that this was a later development introduced by the Abhidharma school.

The Sb. of the Dhatu-vibhanga points to an important phase in the development of the dhatu classification. Three different sets of six dhatus are enumerated here. The first six consist of the elements of solid, liquid, heat, motion, space and consciousness. These are explained here as in the Rāhulovāda Sutta. The second six consist of five kinds of

1. vītpaṭāpavādī panāha. paṭiyokkam nibbanam nāma naththi kilesakkhayo va nibbānām ti ... Vbh A. pp.551-4.
2. See LWPAK. II. 55d.
feelings with ignorance as the sixth element. The third six consists of three kinds of wrong thoughts and their three opposites.

It may be noted here that the oft-repeated formula of the eighteen dhātus is not given under the suttanta explanation, despite the fact that it occurs in the Bahudhātukasutta. Instead, it is found enumerated in the Ab. Such a discrimination in the treatment of these two sets points to a possibility of a later origin of the Bahudhātukasutta. We have already noted the Ābhidharmika character of this sutta.¹ The first set of six dhātus is most certainly the older one. It is repeated several times (even in the Bahudhātukasutta) in the suttas. In the Kośa and the Dipa they are called maula or basic elements as they constitute a personality. Buddhaghosa is not unaware of the precedence given to these six dhātus over the traditional eighteen. He says that they are virtually included in these six.² This, however, appears to be an attempt by the Ābhidharmikas to make their dhātu enumeration conform to the older sūtra formulas.

In the Ab. the eighteen psycho-physical elements are explained in full detail. The six organs, their corresponding six objects, and the resultant six kinds of consciousness constitute the Ābhidharmika dhātu classification. This is, no doubt, highly useful and scientific. It explains the Buddhist doctrine of perception and serves as a basis for the formation of the doctrine of chitta-vīthi, a unique theory of the Theravāda aṭṭhakathās. As pointed out by Ven. Nyānatiloka, a beginning of this

1. v. supra, p. 51.
3. iti imāsu chasu dhātusu pariṇāmitesu aṭṭhārasadhātuyo pariṇāhitā va honti, kathāṁ? ... Vbh A p. 72.
doctrine is suggested in this Dhātu-vibhanga.  

The Atthakathā gives several details on the meaning, scope, number and sequence of the dhātus. Different sets of dhātus are spoken of in the suttas. Buddhaghosa collects them all together and tries to show that all these (they number 35) are included in the traditional eighteen. There seems to be no unanimity on the meaning and nature of a few of these dhātus. For instance, the saṃsā-vedayita-nirodha-dhātu is once described as a non-entity (since it is only a name given to the suppression of saṃsā and vedanā), and again as a kind of kāma or dhammadhātu. It may be noted that the former explanation agrees with the Saṅgrāntikas who also call it a mere notion, a praṇāpti-dharma. The Yogāchāras and the Vaibhāshikas, however, enumerate this dhātu as a positive element in their list of the chitta-viprayukta-saṁskāras.

In the Sb. of the Sachcha-vibhanga, the Four Noble Truths are given in the same words as in the Mahāsatipāṭhānasutta. In the Ab. the same topic is presented with a few significant changes. Here the term ariya (noble) is dropped in order to extend the scope of the second Truth, viz., the samudaya. In the Suttas the samudaya is described as tānha. In the Abhidhamma all kilesas form the samudaya. In the Asm. also the

1. A few links of this chittavīthī may be noticed in the following definition of the manovipassāna-dhātu:- "chakkhu-vipassāna-dhātu uppajjivā niruddha-samanantarā uppaṭṭi manodhātu, manodhātuyā pa uppaṭṭivā niruddha-samanantarā uppaṭṭi chittaṃ ... tajjā manovipassānadhātu ..." Vbh. pp. 89-90.
samudaya is described as klesa and karma. It is said there that the Sutra-
description only emphasizes the universality and predominant importance of
the trishna. Consequently, the third Truth is described not as tapaha-
nirodha (as in the Suttas) but as asesa-klesa-nirodha. The Asm. too
describes it as sasravapam dharmapam nirodham. In the Suttas the magga-
sachcha is described as the Noble Eightfold Path. In the Ab. this Path
is described exclusively in association with the lokuttara (super-mundane)
states of mind and hence only five aṅgas are spoken of. In the Suttas the
dukkha-sachcha is always presented first. In the Abhidhamma, however, the
samudaya-sachcha is named in the first place.

The theory of Two Truths, viz., the samvrti and paramārtha which
dominates the Idealistic schools of Buddhism, is not referred to in the
Pali Abhidhamma Pitaka. But the Asm. explains it with reference to the
Sutra-description of the dūhkha-satya. In the Suttas it is described as
birth, decay, death, etc., and also as the five upādāna-skandhas. The Asm.
says of this that the latter description is according to the paramārtha-
satya, the former description is a matter of samvrtisatya.

It is interesting to note that there is no Sb. in the Indriya-
vibhanga. This treatise opens with an Ab. Buddhaghosa explains that the
twenty-two indriyas do not occur in their traditional order in any Sutta.

Certain items of these occur here and there, but their arrangement in the

1. samudaya-satyam katamat? klesan klesah dipateya cha karma. pradhanyan-
nirdešastu Bhagavāta trishna ... nirdishta. p.43.
2. jātir dukkham yāvat yadapicchhāna labhate tadapi dukkham iti
samvrti-satyena dukkham, yaduktaṁ saṁkshiptena pañcchopādāna-skandhaṁ dukkham
iti paramārthena dukkham. p.38.
3. idha suttanta-bhājaniyāṁ nāma na gahitaṁ kasmā? suttante imāya
paṭipātiya ... aniñīgamati. suttanāsmin hi katthachi ēve ... tiṇi ...
given order is found only in the Abhidhama. Yasomitra, however, quotes a Sutra passage enumerating the twenty-two indriyas in the same order as in the Abhidhama. In view of the above evidence of Buddhagosa it will not be unfair to treat this particular Vaibhāshika sūtra as of late origin, composed by the Abhidharmikas to give credence to their enumerations.

It may also be noted that the last three ultramundane faculties are only suggested and not expressly mentioned in the suttas. Nor is there uniformity regarding the order of these twenty-two indriyas. Yasomitra states that certain abhidharmikas place manas-indriya after the jīvitendriya. The Asm. does not enumerate any of these indriyas but gives a separate list drawn from the skandha-āyatana-dhatu classifications. It appears that the indriya classification was not considered of any great importance in the Sūtras. It was formulated in the period of Abhidharma and received full attention only in the commentaries, both Pali and Sanskrit.

The next Vibhanga called Paṭchhayākāra (a treatise on the modes of 'conditionality') deals with the doctrine of paṭichchāsaṃuppāda (dependent origination). The Sb. is simple. Here the twelve āṅgas of the paṭichchāsaṃuppāda (avijjā to upāyāsa) are enumerated and explained in the manner of the Nidāna-saṁyutta. The Ab. is, however, repetitive, tedious and complex. Here the twelve āṅgas in their natural (anuloma) and

1. [dvāvimśatindriyāny uktaṁ sūtra] iti. atha kho jātiśrupo brāhmaṇo yena Bhagavāṁs tena ... kati bho Gautama indriyāpi ... dvāvimśatir imāni brāhmaṇa indriyāpi ... Saky. p. 90.
3. As Ven. Nyanatiloka says: "... all the different phenomena are so tediously explained, that, if unabridged and not leaving out any repetition, the explanations alone would already fill nearly 2,000 pp." loc. cit. p. 25.
reverse (paṭiloma) order are combined with the formula of the modes of 'conditionality' (paṭichchāya), and presented, each time with slight but important changes, in relation to their operation through various (kusala, akusala, ayyākata, etc.) momentary states of consciousness. It is said in the Aṭṭhakathā that the paṭichcha-samuppāda is preached in the Suttas with reference to a life-time, whereas in the Abhidhamma it is preached with reference to a single moment. Consequently we find certain significant changes in the abhidharma formula of the paṭichcha-samuppāda. In the suttas it is 'avijjā paṭichchāya saṅkhārā' - plural. In the Abhidhamma-bhājaniya it is saṅkhāro - singular. Similarly in the Suttas the fifth link is called saḷāyatana (six āyatanas), whereas in the Abhidhamma it is called chhaṭṭhāyatana (sixth āyatana, i.e., the mind). This is because in one single moment there is no possibility of more than one saṅkhāra or one āyatana. In the Suttas the third link is called nāma-rūpa (mind and matter), whereas in the Abhidhamma it is only nāma. It is explained that the abhidharmika formula is universal, applicable to all existences. In the arūpa-loka there is no matter and hence the term nāma-rūpa would not apply to it. Similarly, the last five words (soka, parideva, dukkha, domanassa, upāyāsa) of the sutta formula are dropped out in the abhidhamma as these are not in operation simultaneously in a single moment. 

1. ... suttanta-bhājaniye ... pachchayakāram nānā-chittavasena dassetvā ... abhidhamma-bhājaniyavasena eka-chitta-khanikām ... Vbh A. p.199.
3. chhaṭṭhāyatanam ti ekam mandyatanāmeva āha. Ibid.
4. sabbaṭṭhāna-sādhāranato cha ... nāmam tveva vuttam. Ibid.
5. sokādayo pana yasmā sabbe eka-chittakkhane na sambhavanti ... Ibid.
The Bhāshya also contains similar observations on the pāṭichcha-samuppāda. It is said there that this formula can be viewed in four ways. It is applicable to a moment (kṣaṇīka) or many moments i.e. three existences (prākarṣhika). Its links can be viewed only as a relation of the moments of cause and effect (sāṃbandhika) or as different states of the five skandhas (āvasthika).

The Vaibhāšikas maintain that the Sūtra formula is āvasthika. It is only another name given to twelve different states of the five skandhas in their abhidharma work called Prakārana, however, it is said that all phenomenal dharmas are pratītya-samutpāda. The Vaibhāšika points out that the Sūtra preaching is only explanatory, whereas the Abhidharma preaching is definitive. According to the Sūtra, the pratītya-samutpāda is āvasthika, prākarṣhika and sattvākhyā (deals with a personality), whereas according to the Abhidharma it is kṣaṇīka, sāṃbandhika and sattvāsattvākhyā (deals with both beings and non-beings). This explanation agrees with the Theravādin explanation given by Buddhaghosa.

In the Āṭṭhakathā, the meaning of the term avijjā and its place in the whole link is discussed in detail. According to the Sūtras, avijjā is ignorance of the Four Noble Truths, whereas according to the Abhidhamma, it is ignorance of not only the Four Truths but of the past, of the future,

of both, and of the law of causality. In short it is ignorance and as such only the absence of knowledge, and hence is described as moha. This view agrees with the Sautrāntikas who also hold it to be only an absence (abhāva) of vidyā or prajñā. The Vaibhāshikas, however, maintain that avidyā is not just an abhāva but a positive element, and cannot be included in any other dharmas. The Bhāshya discusses this point in detail and examines the views of Bhadanta Śrīlāta and Dharmatrāta.

Avidyā heads the formula of the chain of the pratitya-samutpāda.

A question arises whether the avidyā itself has a cause or is of fortuitous origin? The Aṭṭhakathā raises this point and quotes Sūtra passages to show that even avidyā is subject to the same law. It is produced by āsavas.

This point is discussed at great length in the Bhāshya. Vasubandhu examines two Sūtras where avidyā is said to be the effect as well as the cause of ayoniśo-manaskāra, criticises the views of the older Vasubandhu and Bhadanta-Śrīlāta, and gives his own view.

1. avijjā ti suttantapariyāyena dukkhādisu chatusu ṭhānesu abhāvam, abhidhamma-pariyāyena puhntādhi saddhiṁ aṭṭhasu ... Vm. XVII. 58.
2. abhāvam ... mohio akusalamūlaṁ ayaṁ vuchchati avijjā. Vbh. p. 144.
3. See IUPAK. III. 28cd.
4. vidyā-vipaksho dharmo'nyo 'vidyā 'mitrāninitādivat/ Ak. III. 28ab.
5. [yo'pi manyate sarva-klesa avidyē] ti. bhadanta-Śrīlātaḥ ... Sakv. p. 302
6. Ibid.
8. [ayoniśo-manaskāra-hetuka-vidyokta sūtrāntara] iti. Sahe-tuspratayasanidānāsūtre ... [avidyā hetukaś chāyoniśo-manaskāra] iti sūtrāntara ukta ityadikritam. ... na chānavasthā prasamgo' vidyā-hetukatvād ayoniśo-manaskārasya. ity [apara] iti. sthavir o Vasubandhū acharya-Manorethopādyāya evam āha ... anyāḥ punar āne] ti bhadanta Śrīlātaḥ ... [achodyam eva tv etad] iti ... Acharyaḥ sva-matam āha ... Sakv. pp. 288-91.
The second link, viz. the saṅkhāra [karma formation] is variously described in the Suttas. In some places like the Parivīmaṃsanasutta, it is described as meritorious, unmeritorious and imperturbable volitions. In the Vibhangasutta or the Sammādīṭṭhisutta it is explained as volitions manifested in bodily, verbal and mental actions. But these two meanings are put together only in the Abhidhamma explanation of the term. Commenting on this Buddhaghosa says: "Well, this Abhidhamma is not of recent composition, nor is it spoken by heretic sages or disciples or gods. It is a word of the Omniscient. The two interpretations are put together to show the identity of the treatment of this topic in the Sutta and Abhidhamma."

This explanation reflects the anxiety of the Abhidharmikas to make their treatment conform to the Sūtra preachings. It also reveals that the Abhidhamma not only collects the dhammas scattered in the Sūtras, but also compiles several Sūtras on a given topic. This can be illustrated by one more example. In the Ab. in one place the formula of the paṭichchāsaṃuppāda is presented with only eleven aṅgas by the exclusion of the term saḷāyatana. The Aṭṭhakathā explains that this is done to accommodate the enumerations given in the Mahāniddānasutta.

1. Saṃyutta, II. pp. 80. ff.
5. kāya-vachī-chittasankhāra.
The third link viññāna is explained in the Sb. as six viññānas (chakkhu to mano) as in the Vibhangasutta. In the Mahānidānasutta, however, the viññāna is spoken of as descending into the womb of the mother, suggesting that the term referred only to the rebirth consciousness (pātisandhi chitta), which can only be the last, viz., the manoviññāna. In the Abhidhamma, the more comprehensive meaning is accepted so as to embrace all states of consciousness. The Aṭṭhakathā division of the chittavīthi (process of consciousness) into pavatti and pātisandhi is based on the recognition of these two Sutta explanations of the term viññāna. The pātisandhi process explains the moment of rebirth. The pavatti process is employed to explain the functions of the consciousness in all other moments.

It is possible that the Sūtra meaning of the term viññāna (in this formula) was confined only to the moment of rebirth, as the formula was primarily intended to explain the phenomena of rebirth in the absence of an abiding ātman. The other meaning, viz., the six viññānas, although occurring in the Vibhangasutta of the Saṃyuttanikāya, is most probably a later addition introduced by the Abhidharmikas. This becomes evident from the attempt of the Vaibhāṣikas to apply this term not only to the moment of rebirth consciousness, but also to a long preceding period called antarābhava (intermediate existence), where alone the six viññānas could be understood to function.

2. vide Adv. p.46, n.3.
3. yadi saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ antarābhava-pratisandhi-chittam upādāya yāvad upapattikshaṇah sarvā̱̄sva viññāna-saṅtatiḥ shappāṃ viññāna-kāyaṇām saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ viññānam abhipretam [tad upapannā bhavati]. ... anyathā hi ... pratisandhā-chittam evābhīpṛetam syāt. atra shad viññānakāyā iti noktaṃ syāt. evam tu vaktavyam syāt. viññānam katam? manoviññānam iti ... Sakv. p.299.
The fourth link is nāma-rūpa. Of these two, the nāma is explained in the Suttas (e.g. the Vibhangasutta) as vedanā, saññā, chetanā, phassa and manasikāra. In the Abhidhamma, however, the last three terms are replaced by one comprehensive term, viz., the saṅkhāra-khandha. Usually nāma means the four non-material aggregates. The Bhāshya explains it as 'nāmatv arūpapā skandhā'. But in the Pali Abhidhamma, the term nāma (in the formula) excludes the viññāpa-khandha as the latter is represented by the third link. The causal relation between mind and matter is discussed in detail in the Aṭṭhakathā and also in the Visuddhimagga. The Bhāshya refers to this topic while dealing with the problem of the existence of rūpa in the arūpa-loka. The Vaibhāshikas, in common with the Theravadins hold that there is no rūpa in the arūpa-loka. If an arūpa-being after his death is reborn in a kāma-loka, his material body is produced solely by the mind. This theory contains the germs of the Vijnānavāda, where matter is described as a manifestation of mind.

As noted above, the fifth link, viz., the citta-vinnayatana is, in the Abhidhamma, replaced by the term citta-vinnayatana (the sixth, i.e., the mind).

The next link called phassa is described in the Sb. as six kinds of contacts (chakku to mano-samphassa) as given in the Vibhangasutta. In the Ab. it is described in the manner of the Dhammasangani: "contact which is touching, the being brought into contact ..." The term, however, is defined in the Madhupindikasutta as the coming together of three (i.e.,

1. Saṃyutta, II. p. 2.
2. yo ... phasso phusana samphusaṇā samphusitattam ... Dhs. I. 2.
the organ, the object and the consciousness. Here the phassa is a name given to the mere contact of the trio and not to a separate chetasika dhamma. The Sauterntikas also quote a similar sutra and hold sparsa to be mere contact. According to them the sparsa is contact, i.e. coming together of the trio in a causal relationship. In the Abhidharna, however, the sparsa is considered a separate dharma resulting from this contact. The Vaibhavikas hold this view on the authority of the Shaatsuṭkasutra, where the sparsa is enumerated in addition to the indriya, artha and vijñana. This sutra corresponds to the Pali Chha-chhakkasutta, the Abhidharmika nature of which is already noted. Buddhaghosa too describes phassa as (sensorial or mental) impression resulting from the contact of the trio.

The Yogācāra tradition also holds the sparsa as a distinct dharma. The Asma defines it as that which determines the changes in the organs on account of the contact of the trio. Thus we see that in all Abhidharna schools the sparsa is treated as a distinct dharma, although the Sutras speak of it as mere 'contact'. Vasubandhu says that certain schools read the sutra differently as 'sangateh' instead of 'sangatih', which too appears to be an Abhidharmika modification of the sutra passage.

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1. chakkhuh-ch'āvuso paṭichcha rūpe cha uppaajjati chakkhuvinīṭapam, tippam sangati phasso ... Majjhima, I. p.111.
2. kechiddhi sakrin nipātam eva sparsā vyāchakshate sūtram chātra jhāpakam ānayanti "iti ya eśām tryayānām dharmāpān sangatiḥ sannipatāḥ samavayaḥ sa sparsa iti" Akb. III. 30 b.
3. cf. sarpasah sāt sannipatājan/ Ak. II. 30 b.
5. vide supra, p. 51.
6. tika-sannipatāssas attano kārapassa vasena paveditattā sannipata-pachoḥapāṭhano... Vm. XIV 134.
8. ye punah sannipatad anyāṁ sparsaṁ āhussa ta etat sūtraṁ kathāṁ pariḥaranti "iti ya eśām tryayānām sangatiḥ sannipatāḥ... sa sparsa" iti na vai yam paṭhanti kim tarhi? sangateh sannipatāt samavayād iti paṭhanti kārene vā kāryopachārō'yan iti bruvanti. Akb. III 30 ab. See LVPAK. III-30 ab.
The next link is called vedanā (feeling). In the Sb., the vedanā is explained with reference to the six organs through which it is generated (e.g. chakkhusamphassajā vedanā, etc.). In the Ab. it is explained with reference to its qualities as pleasant, unpleasant, etc., as they are obtained in the eighty-nine kinds of the consciousness.

In both the Pali and Sanskrit Abhidharma, the sparsa and vedanā are treated as mahābhaumika dharmas. They occur simultaneously in all states of consciousness. In the pratitya-samutpāda formula, however, the vedanā is placed after sparsa, as the latter is the cause of the former. As the cause must precede the effect, the Sautrāntikas hold that on account of their causal relation they cannot operate simultaneously. The Vaibhāshikas, however, hold that the sparsa and vedanā are co-nascent. They quote a sutra in which these two dharmas are spoken of as being sahajāta. The Sautrāntikas take the term sahajāta to mean samanantara. Although the Pali Abhidhamma holds them 'sahajāta', the Suttas seem to support the Sautrāntika view.

The remaining links of the formula of the paṭichchāsāmuppāda (taṅkha, upadāna, etc.), with the exception of bhava, are treated almost identically in the Sb. and Ab. In the Suttas, the bhava (process of

1. sparsād uttarakālam vedanety apare ... Akb. III 31 cd. See LVPAK. III.31 cd.
2. atha kim sparsād uttarakālam vedanā bhavaty dhosvit samāna-kālam? samānakālam iti Vaibhāshikāḥ anyonyam saha-bhū-hetutvāt. Ibid.
3. sūtraṁ parihāryam "chakshuḥpratītya ... trayāṇām sannipataṁ sparsaṁ sahajāta vedanā sahajā sahythā chetanā ..." Ibid.
4. samanantare pi ch'āyaṁ saha sabdo drishtaḥ. Ibid.
5. cf. tippayam sangati phasso, phassapachchaya vedanā ... Majjhima I, p.111
Becoming) is explained with reference to the three spheres of rebirth, viz. kāma, rupa and arūpa bhavas. In the Abhidhamma, however, the bhava is divided into kamma-bhava (karma-process) and the resultant uppatṭibhava (Rebirth Process). The former is identical with the second link, viz. saṅkhāra. The uppatṭi-bhava is explained with reference to the nine kinds of spheres in which a being may be born.

This division of the bhava into kamma and uppatṭi is found solely in the Abhidhamma. This was probably introduced to explain the rebirth in a future life. The second link saṅkhāra belongs to a past birth and produces rebirth here. The kammabhava is the accumulation of the rebirth-producing karma which determines the sphere of rebirth (uppatṭi-bhava) and conditions the jāti, i.e., new birth.

The Patichcha-samuppāda-vibhanga is followed by a series of five Vibhangas dealing with the items of the thirty-seven bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas. They are Satipaṭṭhāna-vibhanga, Sammappadhāna, Iddhipāda, Bojjhanga and Magga-vibhanga. Only two groups (indriya and balā) consisting of ten dhammas (viz. saddhā, viriya, sati, samādhi and pāñcā counted as indriya as well as balā) are not separately treated here as they are already dealt with in the Indriya-vibhanga.

The Sb. of these five vibhangas closely follow the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna-sutta and read alike commentaries on the latter. The satipaṭṭhāna-formula, for instance, is directly borrowed without any change. The formula begins as: idha bhikkhu nājjhattām kāye ... etc. The mention of the term bhikkhu

in a preaching given to the gods has not escaped the notice of the commentator. Buddhaghosa says: Although the Lord spoke this in the world of gods and no monk was present there, the term bhikkhu is used to show that only monks practise the four satipaṭṭhānas. A question is naturally asked whether bhikkhus alone could practise them? Buddhaghosa concedes that even gods can practise them. He broadens the meaning of the term bhikkhu and says that whosoever practises them is a bhikkhu, no matter whether a woman or a god. This explanation once more demonstrates the determination of the commentators to prove the authenticity of the Abhidharma and the legends connected with its origin.

The Abh. of these five vibhangas do not much differ from the suttanta-explanations. The same topics are presented here with reference to the supra-mundane (lokuttara) consciousness and in connection with various kinds of samādhis and paṭipadās. Consequently, there are a few changes, for instance, the enumeration of only five aṅgas of the magga instead of the traditional eight. In the Maggavibhanga, the magga is treated in the same manner as in the Sachcha-vibhanga. Here also the term ariya is dropped. Such changes appearing in the Abhidhamma must have been repugnant to the followers of Sūtras. Such changes might well have given rise to new doctrines unacceptable even to the Abhidhamikas. Even the commentator Buddhaghosa appears very uneasy about such changes. In his

1. [idha bhikkhū] ti, ettha kīphen'pi bhagavata devaloke nisāditi ayaṁ Satipaṭṭhāna-vibhango kathito. eka-bhikkhūpi tattha bhagavato saṁtike nisinnā nāma natthīti, evaṁ sānte pi yasmā ime ... bhikkhū bhāveni ... paṭipattiya vā bhikkhuḥ bhāvadassanato evāmāha. yo hi imaṁ paṭipattiṁ paṭipejjati so bhikkhu nāma hoti ti, paṭipannako hi devo vā hotu ... Vbh A. p.216.
commentary on the Sachcha-vibhanga he explains the Ābhidharmika formula of the pāṇichāṇḍika magga by quoting a Sūtra passage. But in his commentary on the same formula in the Magga-Vibhanga he attributes the pāṇichāṇḍika-magga-vāda to a vitanda-vādins and controverts his view by quoting a different Sutta.

The Sb. of the Jhāna vibhanga contains a word for word commentary on a short but comprehensive māṭikā comprising the gradual stages of attaining the trances leading up to the last arūpa jhāna.

In the Ab. the formula of the four rūpa and four arūpa jhānas are enumerated in the same words as in the Suttas, but with an emphasis on their āṅgas, viz. vitakka, vichāra, pīti, sukhā and upekkhā. This formula is further repeated with reference to the objects of trance, e.g. the pathavi kasina, and also with reference to the four kinds of the lokuttara consciousness. In the Suttas only four rūpa jhānas are enumerated. In the Abhidhamma, however, five jhānas are described by adding one more trance, where vichāra alone persists independent of the vitakka. The relation of these two opposite dharmas (viz. the vitarka and vichāra) and the possibility of their co-operation in a single moment is discussed at great length in the Atthakathās, the Visuddhi magga, Milindapaṇḍita, Bhāshya and the Vṛitti.

1. yasmā pana na kevalam atthangiko maggo vo paṭipadā "pubbe va kho panassa kāyakamām vachikamām ajīvo parisuddhino hoti"tī vachanato... pāṇichāṇḍiko pi maggo desito... taṁ nayaṁ dassetoṁ pāṇichāṅgikavāro pi niddittho Vbh A.p. 123.

2. pāṇichāṅgiko-vāre pi atthangiko ti avutte pi atthaṅgiko eva ti veditabbo. lokuttaramaggo hi pāṇichāṅgiko nāma nattthi ayaṇettha āchariyānaṁ samatthakathā; vitandavādhi pahana:"lokuttara-maggo atthaṅgiko nāma nattthi pāṇichāṅgiko yeva hoti" ti... tassa... uparippanasato suttān āharitabbaṁ... idāṁ te suttān akāmakassa lokuttara-maggo atthaṅgiko ti dīpeti.... Ibid p. 319. See DhsA III. 478-482.
The next Vibhanga deals with the four appamāṇas (skt. apramāṇa—unbounded status) or brahma-vihāras as they are called in the Suttas. The term appamāṇa appears to be an Abhidharmika term replacing the more conventional brahma-vihāra. In the Sangītisutta the latter term is dropped in favour of the former. In the Vibhanga it is not even mentioned. The Atthasālīnī notes it and says that in the Vibhanga the ārāmaṇas (objects) of these meditations are emphasized and hence they are called appamāṇa.

The Sb. of this vibhanga reads like a commentary on the Sutta formula of the four brahma-vihāras found in the Tevijja and other suttas. In the Ab. they are demonstrated only by the four rūpa-jhānas, suggesting thereby that they are not obtained in the arūpa or lokuttara jhānas.

The Sikkhāpada-vibhanga has no Sb., although, as a matter of fact, the sikkhāpadas (observances) can more suitably be included in the Suttas than in the Abhidhamma. Only five observances common to both the laity and a monk are treated here. They are not explained here as in the Suttas but as in the Dhammasangani. It is demonstrated here that the observances manifest themselves only in the eight kāmavacchara kusala states. In the Suttas the 'vīramāṇa' is explained as abstaining from a particular act such as violence or theft, whereas in the Abhidhamma it consists in abstaining from 'states of volition' (chetanā). Thus indirectly, this treatise deals with the nature of karma and corresponds to the Karmādhyāya of the Vṛitti.

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The next vibhanga deals with four kinds of paṭisambhidās (faculties of analysis) viz. attha, dhamma, nirutti and paṭibhāna. The derivation of the term paṭisambhidā is doubtful, since in the Skt. tradition it is called pratisamvit. There also the same four kinds are enumerated, but the order of the first two is reversed.

Although the Sb. of this vibhanga gives several meanings of the four paṭisambhidās, it should be noted that neither the term nor the four kinds occur in the early Nikāyas. They are found only in the Ang. nikāya, and there too they are not explained. The so-called Sb, therefore, is derived from the Paṭisambhidā-magga, an abhidhamma work (attributed to Sāriputta) included in the Sutta-piṭaka. The Ab. is also drawn from the same source, and hence differs very little from the Sb.

The traditional meaning of these four terms, and particularly that of the first two, viz. the attha and dhamma are given in detail by Mrs. Rhys Davids in her translation of the Kathāvatthu, where she also gives views of Dr. Ledi Sadaw on this subject. But the differences between the sūtra and abhidharma meanings of these terms is not clear from this exposition. With the help of the Vaibhāshika interpretations, it is now possible to arrive at a plausible sūtra meaning.

The four paṭisambhidās in all probability stand for four branches of textual analysis. Dhamma meant the navāṇa preachings i.e. the terms, and attha their verbal meanings. Nirutti meant derivations of the terms or definitions, and paṭibhāna meant a specialised skill in all these in

in addition to a mastery in the art of composition, preaching and disputation.

In the Sb. however, several meanings are given to the first two viz. the attha and dhamma. Attha means dukkha, dukkha-nirodha, phala and finally the meanings of any speech, particularly that of the navânga preaching. Dhamma means dukkha-samudaya, dukkha-nirodha-gâmîni-pâtipada, hetu and the contents of the navânga preaching. In short the attha and dhamma stand for the four Truths and also for the meanings and contents of the Scriptures. This latter meaning is completely dropped in the Ab. of this topic. Here the first three meanings alone are repeated and demonstrated by applying these terms to the mental concomitants of a given state of consciousness. Thus, for instance, the chetasika dhammas of a kusala chitta are called dhammâ (samudaya = phenomena capable of yielding vipâka). An analytical knowledge of these dhammas is called dhamma-pâtisambhidå. The vipâka (or resultant) dhammas of these mental concomitants are called attha and their knowledge is called attha-pâtisambhidå. Thus the dhamma and attha are here taken solely in the sense of hetu and phala. In consistancy with this interpretation, only three pâtisambhidås are enumerated in illustrating the vipâka and kiriya chittas.

These two kinds of chittas are not causes (= samudaya dhammā) of a new vipāka. Hence the dhamma-patisambhidā is not possible in their case. Consequently, only three patisambhidās could be enumerated here. It may also be noted that in the Ab. the order of the attha and dhamma is reversed, so as to make them stand for hetu and phala, and by extension, to represent the samudaya and dukkha-sachcha. This coincides with the treatment of the four trthas in the Ab. of the Sachcha-vibhanga, where also the samudaya-sachcha is placed first, instead of the traditional dukkha-sachcha.

While employing the formula of patisambhidās to represent the doctrine of Truths, the Ab. completely leaves out the more conventional, and perhaps the original, meaning of the dhamma and attha, viz. the navāṅga scriptures and their meanings.

In the Aṅg. Nikāya, in one place, Sāriputta claims that he has mastered the four patisambhidās even when he was ordained only a fortnight, and that he explains it in various ways. Although the terms attha and dhamma are not explained here, they appear more likely to refer to the expounding of scriptures than to the doctrine of four Truths.

This conjecture is strengthened by his demonstration of the patisambhidās in the Patisambhidāmagga. In a chapter dealing exclusively with this topic, the Dhammachakkappavattanasutta is fully quoted, followed by an application of the four kinds of patisambhidās. A sentence like the

1. addhamāsūpasamparnena me āvuso attha .... dhamma ... nirutti.... paṭibhānapatīsisambhidā suchchhikatā. taṁ aham aneka-pariyāyena āchikkhāmi.... Aṅg. II. p.160.
following is selected: "idam dukkham ariyasachchanti pubbe
ananussutesu dhammesu chakkhum udapădi, māna..., pañña..., vijjā..., āloko udapădi". This is followed by explanations of the terms chakkhu, māna, etc. e.g. chakkhum udapădi tassa dhamma samtechina. It is then explained that the chakkhu, māna, pañña, vijjā and ākola are dhammas; they are the objects of the dhamma-pāṭisambhidā. The dhamma-saṭṭha, maṇṇa, pañjanaṭṭha, paṭivedhaṭṭha, obhāsatha - these are atthas and are objects of the atthapaṭisambhidā. The five dhammas and the five atthas become the object of nirutti; knowledge of these ten derivations is nirutti-pāṭisambhidā. Knowledge of the five dhammas, five atthas, and ten niruttis make twenty pāṭibhāna-pāṭisambhidās.

The same formula is applied to parimēya and parimēta formulas of the dukkha-sachcha. This gives fifteen dhammas (terms), fifteen atthas, thirty niruttis and sixty pāṭibhānas. A similar number is obtained in the case of remaining three Truths. Thus, according to this calculations, the discourse on the four Truths in their ti-parivaṭṭa-dvādas-ākāra formula has 60 dhammas, 60 atthas, 120 niruttis and 240 pāṭibhānas.

Similar calculations are given for the formulas of satipaṭṭhāna,
sammappadhāna, etc. bringing the total of dhammas (terms) treated in the Paṭisambhidā-kathā to a number of 850. It is clear from this illustration that according to the Paṭisambhidā-magga, the dhamma in the paṭisambhidā formula stands for 'terms' and attha for 'meanings'.

1. chatūsu ariyasachchesu saṭṭhi dhammā, saṭṭhi atthā, visati niruttīyo, chattarīsaṭṭhi cha dve cha maṇṇasatāni._Rbid._ p. 152.

2. _Rbid._ p. 158.
Such a collection of dharmas (or terms) might well have received the designation 'dharma-skandha' or aggregates of dharmas. The Pali tradition speaks of 84,000 dhammakkhandhas learnt by Ānanda. It is said that of these he learnt 2,000 from Sāriputta, and the rest from the Buddha himself. The *Atthasālinī* explains that a sutta containing one theme constitutes a dhamma-khandha. In verses each query asked forms a skandha, and each answer forms another. In the Abhidhamma each duka or tika classification, as well as each classification of states of consciousness, forms a dhamma-khandha. In the Vinaya the subjects, tables of contents, classification of terms etc. are considered as separate dhamma-khandhas.

The Vaibhāšikas speak of 80,000 dharma-skandhas. But there is no unanimity on what constitutes a dharma-skandha. Some āchāryās hold that the term refers to an Abhidharma text called by that name. But this is said to contain only 6,000. Some hold that the term refers to discourses on such topics as skandha, āyatana, dhātu, pratītya-samutpāda etc. The Dīpākāra holds that there are 80,000 kinds of people for whom the Buddha preaches dharma suitable to each one of them.

All these explanations tend to give an impression that the original meaning of this term might have been something like a unit of a text commented upon, which comes very near to the 'dhamma' in the formula of the Patissambhidā.

This is supported by the evidence of the Vaibhāšika and

Yogāchāra interpretations of these terms. In both schools the dharma precedes the artha pratisamvit. Yaśōmitra is aware of the several meanings of the term dharma but specifically states that in the present context it means the Scriptures. The Vṛtti explains it as the contents of the dvādaśaṅga-pravachana corresponding to the navaṅga-satthu-sāsana. The Asm. too explains the term as sarva-dharma-paryāya. The artha in all these schools means the meaning or purport of the Scriptures.

The Vaibhāshika and the Yogāchāra schools thus take the dharma and artha exclusively in the sense of the knowledge of Scriptures and their meanings. This, therefore, appears to be the original or the sūtra meaning of these terms. The other meanings such as hetu and phala are found only in the Pali Abhidhamma.

The nirutti paṭisasambhidā is explained as knowledge of the etymological meanings of the terms (dhamma) and their interpretations (attha). It is also a knowledge of languages, particularly that of the Māgadhī, claimed to be the origin of all languages. A person endowed with this knowledge may also be an expert in grammar, but the Pali commentators do not hold it essential. The Vṛtti, however, states that the nirukti-pratiṣamvit is an unfailing knowledge of rūpa, dravya, liṅga, saṅkhya, śādhanā, kriyā, kāla and purusha of the terms occurring in the scriptures.

1. (dharma-pratisamvid) iti. iha deśana dharmah-anekārtha hi dharmasabdaḥ...
   ...Sakv. p. 652.
3. Asm. p. 96.
5. Paṭisasambhidā A.I. p. 5.
6. Ibid.
The paṭibhāna paṭisambhidā is also associated with speech. In the suttas it is used to denote fluency in expression or 'rhetorical gifts'. In the Abhidhamma, however, it means knowledge of the knowledge of dharma, artha and nirukti. The Vṛtti also explains it as an unfailling knowledge of the first three pratisamkṛitis and also an excellence in controlling the meditations. But since hetuvidyā or logic is considered a prerequisite of this pratisamkṛita, it is possible that paṭibhāna referred to a gift of speech, particularly in debates over the Doctrine.

Various details regarding the attainment of these four paṭisambhidās or the branches of textual analysis are given in the Atthaṅkathās, in the Visuddhi-magga and in the Bhāshya. Attainment of arhatship, study of scriptures, hearing of the Doctrine, discussion, are enumerated as necessary for attaining them. Yasomitra says that knowledge of ganita (arithmetic), Buddha-vachana (scriptures), śabda-vidyā (grammar) and hetu-vidyā (logic) are respectively the prerequisites for attaining the four pratisamkṛitas. The Vaibhāshikas, however, hold the scriptures as the most important of all these.

From this it is clear that the paṭisambhidās have little connection with the super-mundane path. They are not attained by any traditional dhāyanas but by the study of scriptures and sciences useful in textual exegesis. It is a method adopted by the Abhidharma piṭaka and the Atthaṅkathās to explain the Suttas. The texts like Dhammasangani

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Vibhanga, their Āṭṭhakathās, Milinda-pañha, Visuddhimagga, the Asm. Bhāshya and Vṛitti reveal an intensive and sustained application of their authors towards collecting the dharmas (terms) and explaining them by giving their derivations. In doing this they have taken recourse to all kinds of etymologies, which often appear far fetched and at times even incorrect. Usually each term is explained with regard to its characteristics or lakṣaṇa. But in some cases, and particularly in dealing with a series of dharmas constituting a topic, they are explained with reference to their classification, derivations, characteristics, functions, modes of manifestation, proximate cause, meaning or a selected meaning (among several possible meanings), propriety of number, sequence, application to mundane or super-mundane consciousness, contents, analogies, set of four alternative propositions, śūnyatā, and finally with reference to their mode of grouping as similar and dissimilar.

This method of textual analysis helped the commentators to attempt a concordance of diverse Sūtras spoken in different contexts and thus to present a consistent and coherent interpretation of the scriptures. This is called abhisamādhi. The Asm repeatedly quotes conflicting Sūtras and tries to reconcile their meanings. This proficiency in discovering the hidden meanings and giving a correct interpretation of the Sūtras is held to result from a proper knowledge of the abhidharma.

1. A word like arahā, for instance, is derived from āraka, hata-ari, ārā, raho and finally from the root araha (Skt. अरह). (See Vm.VII.4.). A word like macchhhariya (mātsarya), for instance, is derived from achchhariya (āścharya) and explained as mā idam achchhriyam aññesam hotu ti. See Adv. p. 309, n. 6.
2. See Vm.XVI, 14.
In doing this, the commentators are guided by the consideration of the Doctrine. We have seen how the Abhidharma is claimed to be an absolute preaching in opposition to the conventional preaching of the Sūtras. The same test is applied in judging the value of two or more conflicting Sūtras. Already in the Ang. nikāya, we find a distinction drawn between neyattha (neyārtha) and nītattha (nītārtha) suttas. A person claiming a neyattha sutta as nītattha is said to be falsely accusing the tathāgata. The commentary on these two words says that the suttas like "ekā puggalo...dve puggalā" etc., are neyattha, i.e. of secondary import, since they need to be explained further, in the light of the anattavāda, that in reality there is no personality. But suttas like 'anichcha-dukkha-anattā' are nītattha, i.e. of ultimate import, because the meaning of these is clear, well established and absolute. The entire Kathāvatthu may be taken as a demonstration of the application of this test to the sūtras put forward by the opponents. The first Puggala-kathā, for instance, is devoted to showing the 'nītārtha' of the sūtra term puggala to the Sammitiya. In discussing the topic of perception, the Mahāsāṅghikas on the basis of a sutta "chakkhunā rūpām disvā" claim that the eye sees the object. The Theravādin maintains that here the text is not to be taken literally. The usages of language should not be treated as doctrine. The Sautrāntika too maintains

1. For a complete and illuminating discussion of these terms in Pali and BHS., see LVPAK, II, pp. 246-8. For their application in the Mādhyamika, see The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 254-5.
2. Dve'me bhikkhave tathāgatāṁ abbhāchikkhanti; yo cha neyyatthāṁ suttantaṁ nītattho suttanto ti dīpeti... Ang. I. p. 60.
the same argument against the Vaibhāśika by reminding him that one should not run after worldly beliefs and usages of language.

The foregoing study of the Vibhanga-pakarana amply justifies the claim that the sūtras are to be understood through the Abhidharma. It also reveals the Ābhidharmika approach to Sūtras and the Abhidharma. The Sūtras are conventional, partial, explanatory, and at times of secondary import. The Abhidharma is absolute, comprehensive, definitive and of primary import. The subject matter of both is the same, viz. the dharmas called variously as skandha, āyatana, dhātu, etc. but the Sūtras deal with these as components of a personality, i.e. with reference to a life-time, whereas the Abhidharma deals with them as unique dharmas of momentary existence. The pivotal doctrine of Buddhism, viz. anātmavāda, although it pervades the whole range of Sūtras, is deepened, emphasized and fully demonstrated only in the Abhidharma. But this could hardly have led even the early Sautrāntikas to oppose the Abhidharma, for they too were, unlike the Sammitiyas, equally committed to this doctrine. Their main contention must have been against the manner in which their opponents sought to establish it. The Ābhidharmikas not only claimed authenticity for their own Abhidharma works but also superiority over the Sūtras - the words of the Buddha, and consequently over the Sautrāntikas. They claimed for their works the exclusive title of 'paramārtha deśanā', relegating the Sūtras to


2. abhidhammikā bhikkhū yeva hi kira dhamma-kathikā nāma, avasesā dhammaḥ kathentāpi na dhamma-kathikā... tasmā abhidhammiko bhikkhu... kira ekanta-dhamma-kathiko nāma ti. Dhs A. I. 72.
the realm of vyavahāra. They accepted the Sūtra formulas of the dharmas but presented them with significant changes, as for instance the pañcchaṅgika magga, the ekādasaṅgika-paṭichchaśamuppāda or the pañcchaka-jhāna. In the interpretation of formulas they made additions of dharmas which were most probably not warranted by the Sūtras. For instance, the inclusion of the asaṅkhatā dhātu in the nāma-khandha and in the dharmāyatana. They extended the scope of terms as for instance of the viññāna or sparśa in the paṭichchaśamuppāda formula, or of the dhamma and attha in the formula of patisambhidās. They invented new dharmas as, for instance, the hadaya-vatthu or such kinds of the rūpa-skandha as lahutā, mudutā etc., or the three super-mundane indriyas, not treated in the Suttas. The Suttas speak of only six kinds of viññānas. The 89 classes of viññānas (as illustrated in the Dhammasangani are found only in the Abhidhamma. The Suttas describe the saṅkhāra-khandha as six kinds of chetanā, but the Abhidhamma enumerates fifty dhammas under the term saṅkhāra. The classification of these saṅkhāras into sabbha-chitta-sādhāraṇa and such other groups is also found only in the Abhidharma, and especially in the Commentaries. The theory of chitta-vīthi suggested in the Vibhanga was also fully developed only in the Āṭṭhakathās. These new formulas, novel interpretations and later additions introduced by the Abhidharmikas might have been unwelcome to the early Sautrāntikas, the contemporaries of the Pali Abhidhamma.

This is proved by their sustained opposition to the inflated list of categories formulated by the Vaibhāshika school. The Theravadins had included only the chañdasaṅkha dharmas in the saṅskāra skandha, but the
Vaibhāshikas added thirteen new dharmas called chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra.

Indeed, a majority of the controversies raised in the Bhashya and the Vritti deal with these saṃskāras which the Sautrāntikas treated as mere notions (prajñaptimātra). They reduced the 46 saṃskāras of the Vaibhāshika to a number of twenty, consisting of ten kuśala and ten akuśala chetanās, more agreeing with the Sūtra meaning of the saṃskāra-skandha. Even the Abhidharmika division of the saṃskāras as maha-bhumika etc., was not recognised by them. They discarded this grouping when it went against the sūtras as is shown by their insistence on treating the sparśa and vedanā (two maha-bhaumika dharmas) as cause and effect, and hence not operating simultaneously in one moment.

In the Theravāda Abhidharma nirvāṇa alone is called asaṃskrita-dharma. The Vaibhāshikās enumerated one more, viz. ākāśa.

They also maintained the reality of past and future dharmas. The Sautrāntika, on the basis of a sūtra, rejected all these as prajñaptimātra and relegated them to the position of the pudgala. By his bold advocacy of the theory of prajñapti and its extension to a majority of reals (dravya) including the asaṃskrita dharmas of the Abhidharmika, the Sautrāntika not only asserted his critical spirit but also established the superiority of the Sūtras over the Abhidharma. From this theory flowed his doctrine of vikalpa (conceptual construction), his theory of perception and lastly the revolutionary theory of

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1. For the dharmas enumerated by the Sautrāntikas, see Appendix D of the Śālambana-parīkṣā.

2. "panchemaṁ bhikšhavaḥ saṁśīśa-mātraṁ pratiśīśa-mātraṁ vyavahāra-mātraṁ saṁvriti-mātraṁ yad utātita 'dhyānāgato' dhyākāśaṁ nirvāpaṁ pudgalaś cheti", quoted in the Madhyamika-kārikā-Vritti by Chandralekhi, p. 393. For details see The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 82.
bāhyānumeyavāda, which was but one step towards the more critical subjective idealism of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism.
IV. SOME MAJOR CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN THE KOŚA KĀRA AND THE DĪPA KĀRA.

This struggle, stretching through several centuries of the history of Buddhism, between the Sautrāntika and the Abhidharmika reaches its culmination in the Kośa-Bhāṣya and the Dīpa-Vṛtti. The Dhammasangani, Vibhanga and their Āṭṭhakathās reveal only the beginnings of these differences. It is not possible to say to what extent the seven Abhidharma Śāstras of the Sarvāstivāda school opposed the Sautrāntika doctrines. Their compilation perhaps led to the emergence of the Sautrāntika as a distinct school. But it is certain that the Mahā-Vibhāṣā the encyclopaedic commentary on the Jñāna-prasthāna which gave rise to the Vaibhāṣikā school, contained opinions of several contemporary Sautrāntika āchāryas, notably of Kumāralāta, Srīlāta, Dharmatrāta and "Bhadanta".

The name Sautrāntika, however, occurs only once in the 2 Mahāvibhāṣā. Instead, we find scores of references to Dārṣṭāntikas, whom Yāsāmitra describes as a section of the Sautrāntika school. Kumāralāta is generally held to be the founder of this school. It is suggested that his followers were called dārṣṭāntika after his 

Dārṣṭānta-pāṇktī. J. Przyłuski connects the word dārṣṭānta to dārṣṭi (Pali dīthi) in opposition to sūtra (śruti) and maintains that the word Dārṣṭāntika was applied to the Sautrāntikas by the Vaibhāṣikas, as did

2. See LVPAK, Introduction, p. LI. II.
4. See LVPAK. Introduction, p. LI. II.
the Mahāyānists use the deprecatory term Hinayāna to their opponents. In
the Vṛtti too they are called 'sthiti-bhāgiya' and further abused as a
kind of Śākyas having a dog's tail. The term sthiti-bhāgiya perhaps
alludes to the Sautrāntika theory of saṁkrānti, santāna or bija,
severely criticised in the Vṛtti and also in the works of the Vaibhāṣika
āchārya Saṁghabhadra.

Although these two words, viz. the Dārshtāntika and Sautrāntika
are used separately in the Bhāshya, in the Vṛtti they are almost used as
synonyms. Several Sautrāntika views appearing in the Bhāshya are
attributed to the Dārshtāntika in the Vṛtti. It is, therefore, to be
presumed that at the time of the Vṛtti these two names were treated as
almost identical, referring to one and the same school.

Although the Sautrāntikas or the Dārshtāntikas like Kumāralāta
and Śrīlāta played a major role in the period of the Mahā-vibhāṣā,
their activities appear to be directed only towards evolving their
doctrines side by side with the Vaibhāṣikas, or towards submitting
alternative interpretations of the sūtras quoted by the Abhidharmikas, as
is evident from the Sphutārthā of Yaśomitra. They are not yet hostile
to the Vaibhāṣika; the Vṛtti quotes Kumāralāta as an authority and
seeks to support even the doctrine of three times (adhva-traya) by his
drishtānta of the motes in the sunlight.

3. The Mahāvibhāṣā also attributes several Sautrāntika views to the
Dārshtāntika. See LVPak. Introduction, pp. L II-LV.
The Sautrāntikas found their chief exponents in the persons of Vasubandhu the author of the celebrated Abhidharma-Kośa-Bhāṣya, and his competent commentator Yaśomitra, the author of the Sphutārthā-Abhidharma-Kośa-Vyākhyā. Vasubandhu stands in a supreme position among the later Buddhist teachers. A sautrāntika by conviction he wrote a compendium on the Abhidharma and finally emerged as a great exponent of the Vijnānavāda Buddhism.

Although he claimed that the Kośa was composed in conformity with the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣika school, his Bhāṣya reveals that his real affiliation was with the Sautrāntika. He often uses the adverb 'kīla' to show his disagreement with the Vaibhāṣika view. On almost all controversial points between the two, he openly favours the Sautrāntika viewpoint. In his characteristically powerful style, Vasubandhu critically examined the dravya-vāda of the Vaibhāṣikas, accused them of being literalists, ridiculed their dogmatism, and compared them with such heretical schools as the Śāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas. Yaśomitra rightly observes that Vasubandhu belongs to the Sautrāntika school.

These Sautrāntika leanings of Vasubandhu, professedly in a work

1. Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣika-nīti-siddhāḥ prāyo māyā'yaṁ kathito 'bhidyamaham'
   Ak. VIII. 40 ab.
2. [tad dheto uditā kilāisha śāstra] kilēti kilā-sabāh parabhīpraśan
3. e.g. evaṁ tu sādhu yathā Sautrāntikānāṁ... Akb. V. 2a.
4. e.g. vyavahārārtham upachāraṁ kriyante... Akb. I. 42. tad etam ākāśam pātyata iti Sautrāntikāp... Akb. II. 46 ab.
5. [. . .saraddhānīyam esho rtho nānumāniyāḥ... ] iti Vaibhāṣikān evaṁ chodayanti.
   Sāky. p. 125. dravyam eva tu Vaibhāṣikān... varpayanti. kim kāraṇam ēśa
   nāḥ siddhānta iti. Akb. II. 36. bod... na hi sarvādhaṁ ēśa-karagamā bhava
   nīti... Akb. II. 47 ab.
6. Vaiśeṣikās chaivaṁ dyotītā bhavanti... Akb. II. 41 a. Vārshyaganyavādaś
cāivaṁ dyotītā bhaveti... Akb. V. 27 c.
dealing with Abhidharma, brought hostile reactions from his contemporary orthodox Vaibhāshikas. Paramārtha, in his 'Life of Vasubandhu' relates that Saṃghabhadrā, an eminent orthodox Vaibhāshika composed two works in refutation of the Bhāshya. In the first work entitled 'Conformity of the Truth' ('Nyāyānusāra'), he refuted the Bhāshya in favour of the Vibhāṣa. Yaśomitra in his Sphutārtha quotes several long passages from this work and at times refutes them in favour of the Bhāshya. This work is not referred to in the Vṛtti. But as will be seen from the comparisons given in the footnotes to our Text, the Vṛtti is in agreement with the views of Saṃghabhadrā, particularly on such topics as vitarka-vichāra, prāpti, kārītra etc., which will be discussed in following pages.

The other work called "Samayaprādīpikā" is an abridged version of

Le premier, dont le titre est transcrit en chinois Abhidharmanyāyā-
nusārasastra - peut-être mieux Nyāyānusāro nāma Abhidharmasāstram - est un commentaire qui reproduit sans modifications les kārikās de l'Abhidharmakośa. Mais ce commentaire critique les kārikās qui exposent la doctrine Vaibhāṣikā en la notant par le mot kila qui signifie "au dire de l'école"; il réfute le Bhāṣya, auto-commentaire de Vasubandhu, quand celui-ci expose des vues opposées à celles des Vaibhāṣikas, le corrige quand il attribue aux Vaibhāṣikas des vues qui ne sont pas les leurs". LVPAk, Introduction, p. XXII.
3. See Sakv. Index (Proper Nouns), where 35 entries are made under Saṃghabhadrā.
Although written in refutation of the Bhāshya, these two works of Saṅghabhādra are, in a sense, commentaries on the Kośa. The kārikās of the Kośa were taken as a basis, except for a minor change in a few places, for explaining the orthodox Vaibhāshika viewpoint. As Takakusu points out "Vasubandhu's Kośa-kārikā itself, being a summary of the Vaibhāshika doctrines, was not objectionable to any followers of that system; the only objection being directed to the prose exposition (Bhāshya) of the Kośa, in which some doctrines of the Sautrāntikas are found incorporated. This being the case Saṅghabhādra cites freely the kārikā of his opponent, and explains them according to the orthodox views of his school". 

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1. "Le titre du second traité n'est pas complètement transcrit:
Abhidharmasamaya-hsien-śāstra ou Abhidharmasamaya-koang-śāstra. J.
Takakusu propose Abhidharmasamayapradipikāśāstra, ce qui n'est pas mauvais; cependant pradīpā, lampe, est toujours teng, et on a pour hsien les équivalents prakāśa et dyotana.

C'est un extrait du Nyāyānusāra, dont toute polémique est exclue et qui est donc un simple exposé du système (samaya) de l'Abhidharma. Il diffère du Nyāyānusāra par la présence d'une assez longue introduction, sept stances et prose, et encore par la manière dont il traite les kārikās de Vasubandhu: ces kārikās sont ou supprimées (ii, 2-3) ou corrigées (i, 11, 14) lorsqu'elles expriment des doctrines fausses ou lorsqu'elles mettent en suspicion des doctrines vraies par l'addition du mot kīla". LVPAk. Introduction, p. XXII.

2. JPTS, 1905, p. 135.
These two works of Saṃghabhadra afford a striking parallel to our Dīpa (and its Vṛtti). All the three works belong to the Kāshmirī-Vaiśānīka school. They are hostile to the Kośakāra, and are primarily written to refute the Sautrāntika views upheld in the Bhāshya. In their contents and their presentation they take the Kośa as their model and retain those parts of the Bhāshya which are not objectionable to them. They hold identical views on almost all controversial points. Their main difference, however, lies in the fact that the works of Saṃghabhadra are based on the kārikās of the Kośa, whereas the Dīpa has its own kārikās, notwithstanding their correspondence to the Kośa.

Neither the "Nyāyānusāra" (except for the extracts quoted in the Sakv.), nor the "Samaya-pradīpikā" have come down to us in their original form. They are available only in Chinese Translations. Nor are we aware of any other work written against the Kośakāra. The Dīpa, therefore, notwithstanding its fragmentary character, has a unique value in furnishing us with the orthodox Vaiśānīka reactions to the Bhāshya.

The extant Vṛtti contains the following sixteen hostile references to the Kośakāra:

(1) Kośakāras tvāna - anuśayānuśayanāt sāsravāḥ. tad etad abrahma. (p. 18).

(2) tatra yad uktām Kośakārena ' kim idam ākāśam khādyate, sāmagryām hi satyām dṛśītaṁ ity upachāraḥ pravartate. tatra kaḥ paśyatī ti. tad atra tena bhadantena sāmagryahga-kriyā [paharanam ?] kriyate. Abhidharmā-sammmoha-sthānenātmāpy ankito bhavaty ayoga-śūnyā- -prapātābhimukhyatvam pradarśitam iti. (p. 33).
(3) Kośakṛid āchashta - na hy atra kifchit phalam utprekṣhyate iti. tam pratīdām phalam ēdarśyate. (p. 37).

(4) idam idānim abhidharma-sarvasvaṁ Kośakāraṁ-smr̥ti-gocharatītam vaktavyam. (p. 40).

(5) Kośakārādayaḥ punar ṣuhu - 'svārthopalabdhāv eva chakshurādināṁ pañchāṇāṁ adhipatyam'. tad etad Vaibhašhiṣṭyam eva kifchid grīhītām nātra kifchid Kośakārakasya svaka-darśanam. (p. 47).

(6) Kośakāras tvāha - 'sarvaśūkṣhshmo rūpa-sāmghātaḥ paramāṇur' iti. tena sāmghāta-vyatiriktaṁ rūpam anyad vaktavyam. (p. 65).

(7) tad idam ati-sāhasam vartate yad viruddhayer api dvayor dharmayor ekatāra chitte samavādhanāṁ pratijñāyate.... iti Kośakārāḥ.... tad idam andha-vilāsini-kaṭaksha-guṇotkārtana-kalpaṁ chodyam ārabhyate. (pp. 81-3).


(9) atra punah Kośakārāḥ pratijñānīte - 'sachittikeyaṁ samāpattīḥ' iti... tad etad abaudhīyam. (pp. 93-5).

(10). 'samādhī-balena karmaśaṁ jīvitavhedāṁ nirvartayuḥ samākāraṁ śhish- thānjam, āyur na vipākah' iti Kośakārāḥ tatra kim uttaram iti ? na tatrabadāyam uttaram vaktavyam...tasmād Vairūlikā-sāstra-praveśa-dvāram ārabdham tena bhadantey adhyupekṣhyam etat (pp. 98-101).

(11) tasmāt pūrvokta-lakṣhaṇa eva bhikṣhura yathāha Kośakārāḥ. (p.133).

(12) abhidhyādaya eva karna-svabhāvānīti 2thiti-bhāgīyāḥ... Kośakārāḥ 'ko 'tra dosah ? '.... Sāmkhyāya - darśanam abhyupagataṁ sāyāt. (p. 149).
(13) 'sūkṣmaṁ kuśala-dharma-bījaṁ tasmīnna akuśale chetasy avasthitam yataḥ punah .... kuśalam chittam utpadyate' iti Kośakāraḥ.
yuktaśāgama-virodhat tan na iti Dipakāraḥ. (pp. 168-9).

(14) 'evaṁ tu sādhu yathā Dārṣṭāntikānām' iti Kośakāraḥ.... tad etad Sautrāntikair antargataṁ Buddha-vachana-niti-śravana-kausidyam āvirbhāvyate. (p. 222).

(15) tad atra Kośakāraḥ praśnayati - ' ko vighnāḥ' ... tatra vayaṁ pratīvadmaḥ - ... 'durboḍhā khalu dharmatā'. (p. 279).

(16) atra Sarvāstivāda-vābhrashtīr Vaituliko nirāha vayaṁ api trīn svabhāvān parikalpayishyāmah.... ity etad apram adhya-samohāḥ-kanā-thānāṁ Kośakārakasyeti. (p. 282).

Of these Nos. 3 and 4 refer to omissions of certain topics by the Kośakāra in his Bhāṣya. Nos. 2 and 5 deal with certain aspects of the Sautrāntika theory of perception. No. 6 deals with the Kośakāra's definition of paramānu. No. 7 refers to a controversy about the co-operation of vītarka and vīchāra in a single moment of consciousness. Nos. 8, 9 and 10 deal with certain items of the much debated Vaibhāṣika categories called chittaviprāyukata-sāṃskāra. Nos. 11 and 12 deal with certain aspects of karma. Nos. 13 and 14 have a bearing on the Sautrāntika theory of bija. The last two references, Nos. 15 and 16 deal with the fundamental Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the reality of three Times, i.e. the 'Sarvē-asti-vāda'. In the following pages we propose to deal in brief with these controversies in the light of the Bhāṣya and the Vṛtti.
1. **THEORY OF COGNITION.**

While dealing with a topic 'kati drishtiḥ, kati na drishtiḥ ?', the Dīpa says that there are eight kinds of drishtiḥ, viz. the five wrong views and three right views. In addition to these the organ of eye is also called drishtiḥ on account of its function of seeing its object. A question then is raised whether vijñāna should also be included under this term. The Vritti points out that the function of apprehension (darśana) cannot be primarily attributed to vijñāna. Four things can be said to perform the function of seeing. The eye or the eye-consciousness, or the prajñā (one of the eight drishtiḥs accompanying all states of consciousness), or finally the totality of all these and such other causes as the light, etc.

Of these, the eye alone, independent of the vijñāna, cannot be said to apprehend, for at the same time other organs also will similarly be doing their actions (hearing, smelling, etc.) and this will result in a simultaneous activity of all sense organs in a single moment. The eye-consciousness alone cannot be said to 'apprehend', for being independent of the eye, it may 'see' even things screened from view. Furthermore, if the vijñāna 'sees' (paśyati) the object, who else does the function of knowing (vijīnāti) it? The prajñā too cannot see, as it is a mental concomitant common to all states of consciousness. The last, viz. the totality of causes is only a notion, since it is not different from the factors of perception examined above.

2. Ibid.
3. These are the views held by different schools. See LVPĀk, Vol. I, p. 82. Vide Adv. p. 32, n. 1.
After showing the invalidity of these four views, the Dīpakaṇā sets forth the Kāśmīra-Vaihāṣhika theory: "The eye apprehends and the consciousness knows (its object). There is a great difference between these two on account of their different functions, viz., the apprehension and comprehension.

The substance called eye is of the nature of that which sees (a 'seer'). In it is produced an action of seeing when its power is awakened on account of the emergence of the totality of its causes and conditions. The eye does not apprehend independent of the viṣṭhāna, nor does the eye-consciousness know the object unsupported by the active eye. The eye, as well as the eye-consciousness, with the help of such accessories as the light, etc. co-operate simultaneously towards bringing the perception of a given object. All these things happen in a single moment. The object, the eye, the eye-consciousness and the light, all manifest their power, i.e., become active and flash forth simultaneously. The object appears, the eye sees and the eye-consciousness knows it. This is called the direct knowledge of an object.

Therefore, although there are several conditions, still, since the condition of eye is prominent, it is said that the eye sees. The prominence of the eye is evident, since the clearer the eye-sight, the

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1. Ad. kārikā 44.
4. yugapad ekasmin viśhaye vṛtti-lābho bhavati. Ibid.
5. ta ete viṣṭhāna-chakshu-rūpādayah svā-hetu-sāmagri-prabodhita-śaktayah... yugapat... vṛttim pratipadyanta iti.... Ibid.
clearer the perception. It is, therefore, well said "(In fact) the eye sees, but we use such (metaphorical) expressions: 'the consciousness sees'.

This, in short, is the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣika theory of perception. A few significant points of this theory may be noted here: (1) The chakṣu is called a substance (dravya). It is compared to a seer (drashti). It is said to possess a certain power (śakti) - its own nature. (2) This power is made manifest by certain causes which makes the substance active. (3) The perception is said to take place in a single moment, as the object, the organ and the (eye-) consciousness are made to operate simultaneously, without explaining the causal relation that must exist between the object and the consciousness.

The Kośakāra in his Bhāṣya examines this Vaibhāṣika theory. He points out that, in this particular context, there is no real difference between 'seeing' and 'knowing', although we have such usages as the eye 'sees' or the mind 'knows'. The Vaibhāṣika seeks to support his point by referring to a sūtra: 'chakṣushā rūpāni drishtvā'. The Kośakāra maintains that this should not be taken literally. We do use such expressions as 'the cots cry', when in fact we mean the children (in the cots) cry. Similarly, the organ of eye is a seat or a door (dvāra) through which the consciousness 'sees' an object, although we say the eye 'sees'.

1. Ibid. p. 33.
2. This controversy is recorded in the Kathāvatthu, where the Mahāsaṅghika too quotes this sūtra. The Theravādin's interpretation is identical with that of the Kośakāra. Buddhaghosa in his Vm. clearly states that it is chakkhuvīmāna which 'sees' the rūpa and not the chakkhu. See Adv. p. 33, n. 1.
But even the expression 'consciousness knows' is not to be taken literally, since there is no consciousness apart from knowing. The knowledge does not grasp, the eye does not see, the object does not offer itself to both. All dharmas being momentary are incapable of any activity; what we call action is nothing more than their coming into existence in a sequence determined by the law of pratitya-samutpāda. There is neither an actor, nor an action apart from the mere flash of dharmas.

After showing the real meaning of the sūtra, the Košakāra turns his polemic against the 'dravyavāda' of the Vaibhāshika. The use of such words as dravya, kartrī, śakti and kriyā by the latter echoed the views of the heretical Pudgalavādin, who also maintained the reality of an 'actor' doing an action. The Vaibhāshika, however, uses these terms to show the reality of his 'dravya' in the three times. The Košakāra points out that this 'kartrī-kriyā-bhedā' is repugnant to the spirit of Buddhism and puts the following words in the mouth of the Sautrāntika: "What is this chewing of the empty space? A visual consciousness arises conditioned by the organ of vision and the object. Here who sees and who is seen? There is nothing else but the elementary factors appearing as cause and effect. In usage, however, such expressions are employed 'the eye sees' or 'consciousness knows'. One should not attach any importance to such expressions. Indeed the Buddha has declared 'do not stick to the expressions used by common people, do not run after the

1. cf. kṣnihīkān sarva-sāṃskārā asthirānām kutah kriyā/ bhūtir yai 'shām kriyā sai' va kārakaṁ sai-va chochāyate/ Quoted in the Tattvāsāṅgāraha-pañjikā, p.11. See Buddhist Doctrine of Flux, pp. 71 ff.
worldly terms". The Kāśmira Vaibhāshikas, however, hold "the eye sees, the ear hears, the nose smells, the tongue tastes, the body feels and the intellect knows".

The Dipakāra notes these provoking words of the Kośakāra (identified with the Sautrāntika) which repudiated the Sarvāstivādin's theory of kārita (vyāpāra = activity of a dravya) and condemned the Vaibhāshika as a literalist. He brings an accusation against the Kośakāra of not only showing his ignorance of the Abhidharma but also of heading for the precipice of ayoga-śūnyatā. The term ayoga-śūnyata, as will be discussed below, refers to a Mahāyāna doctrine attributed by the Vritti to a Vaināśika school which repudiated the reality of not only the past and future but also of the present.

This Vaibhāshika theory, i.e. 'the eye sees' etc. is again alluded to in the Vritti in discussion on the ādhipatyā of the indriyas. The Dipakāra holds that the five sense organs have supremacy over the action of illuminating their own objects, as for instance, the eye 'perceives' a path as even or uneven. The Vritti also quotes a view of the Elder āchāryas who consider that the five organs have domination over the following four actions: 1) In making the body beautiful, 2) in withdrawing

1. Vide Adv. p. 33, n. 2. For a brief summary of this controversy, see The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 61-2.
2. Abhidharmasamucchākasthānemātmapy ankito bhavaty ayoga-śūnyatā-
the body from undesirable objects, 3) in the production of their corresponding vijñānas, 4) and in being a special cause of such actions as dārśana, śravaṇa, etc.

The Kośakāra also quotes this view of the Elder āchāryas and criticises it from the Sautrāntika view-point. The latter maintains that the withdrawing of the body is a function of the vijñāna and not of the organs. As regards the actions like dārśana or śravaṇa, they are identical with vijñāna. It is, therefore, wrong to attribute these functions to the sense organs. The ādhipatya of the sense organs (says the Sautrāntika) consists only in perceiving (upalabdhi) their respective objects.

It may be noted that this view of the Sautrāntika (i.e. the Kośakāra) is not different from the view of the Vaibhāshika Dīpakāra. The former describes it as svārthopalabdhi, the latter calls it svārthvyakti. This identity gives a further occasion for a criticism of the Kośakāra. The Dīpa accuses him of claiming to be a 'panḍita'. The Vṛitti comments that this view of the Kośakāra is borrowed from the Vaibhāshika. Nothing new is said; the Vaibhāshikas themselves have held this view.

The causal relation between the object and the consciousness forms one of the most intricate problems that confront the Buddhist theory of perception. The Buddhist is committed to a doctrine of radical momentariness of all things, both mind and matter. According to him all

dharmas are particular, unique and momentary. A perception involves the participation of at least three things, viz. an object, an organ of sense and a consciousness. It is said in the sūtras that a visual perception arises, conditioned by an organ of vision and its object – a rūpa. Since all these are momentary, it is difficult to establish a relation between them. Causality demands a temporal sequence. A cause must precede the effect.

The object according to the Buddhist is a cause (ālambana-pratyaya) of its knowledge. Being a cause it must be antecedent to its cognition. The two cannot arise simultaneously and yet stand as cause and effect. But being momentary the object ceases before its cognition can be produced. A perception of a momentary object is therefore an impossibility.

This is well summed up in the following objection raised by the Dārśaṅktika: "The organs and the objects of the five sense-consciousness, being causes of the latter, belong to a past moment. When the object (rūpa) and the eye exist, the visual-consciousness is non-existing. When the visual consciousness exists, the eye and the object (rūpa) are not existing. In the absence of their duration in the moment of the (visual) consciousness there is no possibility of the cognition of the object". "Therefore", concludes the Dārśaṅktika, "all (sense) perceptions are indirect".

1. See The Buddhist Doctrine of Universal Flux, pp. 76 ff.
The object must precede and endure if it is to be available to its cognition. But this goes against the doctrine of momentariness. The Theravādin gets rid of this difficulty by partially abandoning the theory of momentariness. According to him a 'mind moment' (chittakkhaṇa) consists of three ultimate moments, viz. the moments of origin, duration and death. The whole process of cognition (chitta-vīthi) takes seventeen such chittakkhaṇas. The number seventeen would appear arbitrary, but according to the Theravādin it corresponds to the life of a material object. One object-moment (rūpakkhana) is equivalent to seventeen mind-moments. The matter is born in the first moment, endures for fifteen moments and perishes in the seventeenth moment. It cannot become an object in its first (i.e. origin) moment, but can become one from its second moment onwards. This theory apparently makes the object precede as well as endure a whole process of its cognition. This is indeed a very ingenious explanation. Both the object and the cognition are called khanika (momentary), but the speed of the perishing of the object is slowed down 17 times. Here we have a theory of two kinds of moments, put forth for the sake of convenience, regardless of the fundamental Buddhist hypothesis of universal impermanence.

This theory of the Theravādins is shared by the Sammitiya. The

2. tāni pana sattarasa chittakkhaṇāṇāti rūpa-dhammānaṁ āyu. Ibid.
3. eka-chittakkhaṇāṭṭāṇi va bhau-chittakkhaṇāṭṭāṇi va thitippattāneva pañchāraṇmaṇāṇi pañcha-dvārā apathamāgachchhanti. Ibid.
latter also maintains that the mind and mental concomitants are momentary but that matter endures for a longer time.

The Kathāvatthu records a controversy on this assumption of two kinds of impermanence. The Pubba-seliyas and the Aparaseliyas hold that since all conditioned things are impermanent they must endure but one chitta moment. Having accepted the law of universal impermanence it is illogical to hold that one thing ceases quickly and another after an interval. The Theravādin points out that if it were not so, the organ of eye and the (resultant) visual consciousness would be sahajāta (born together). This will be contrary to the Scriptures where it is said: "If the organ of sight within be intact, the object without come into focus, and there be a coordinated application of mind resulting therefrom, then a corresponding state of cognition is manifested".

In his attempt to make the cause precede the result, the Theravādin abandons the theory of universal momentariness. The Vaibhāshika takes an opposite course. He adheres to the doctrine of universal momentariness but admits the co-existence (sa ha-bhāva) of the object and its cognition by discarding a temporal sequence between the two. He maintains that there is a peculiar relation called sahabhū-hetu between the object, organ and the cognition. All these rise simultaneously and yet operate as cause and effect like the lamp and its light or the sprout and its shadow. The objection that a causal relation demands temporal

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1. ārya-Sammatiyaḥ...kālāntarāvasthāyī hi tasya rūpaṁ chitta-chaittānāṁ kshanikatvām. Sakv. p. 179.
4. Ibid.
sequence does not frighten the Vaibhāšika. According to him a causal
relation consists in the invariable concomitance of two things. Since
there is this relation between the object (and organ) and its cognition,
these are related as cause and effect.

But if the object, organ and the consciousness operate
simultaneously, it is difficult to see why the knowledge is determined by
the object and not by the eye. It may determine its character even
without the object. The Vaibhāšika here takes recourse to a theory of
'co-ordination', called sārūpya. According to this theory "there is
between two of them - consciousness and object - a special relation called
sārūpya, a relation which makes it possible that the complex phenomenon -
the resulting cognition - is a cognition of colour and not of the visual
sense".

The Sautrāntika accepts the relation of sārūpya ('co-ordination')
between the subject and object, but criticises the sābhāgahetu or the
simultaneity of the cause and effect. He examines the examples of lamp
and light and points out that the lamp is not the cause of light. Both
are results of a separate cause belonging to a past moment. The problem
of perception thus remains unsolved on account of the uncompromising
nature of the doctrine of momentariness and the theory of causation.

The Sautrāntika theory of perception is not explained in the

2. The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 56. See Stcherbatsky's notes
there on further developments of the theory of sārūpya in the works of
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Also see his Buddhist Logic, Vol. II pp.
40 ff and S. Mookerjee's The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux,
pp. 337-45.
Dipa or in the Kośa. But we can gather it from later works like the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakirti, its Tilka by Dharmottara, the Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita, the Paññika on it by Kamalāśīla, and finally from the Sarva-dārśana-saṅgraha of Mādhava.

The Saurāntika is called a sākāra-jñāna-vādin. According to him the subject is, like a mirror, capable of receiving an impress of the likeness of its object. What is directly known in the cognition (which is 'self-revealing' sva-samvedaka) is this representation of the object and not the object itself. The object is only inferred to be existing as it corresponds to the impression perceived. This theory is known as bāhyārthānumeyavāda, the theory of the inferrability of the external object.

This is well explained in the Sarva-dārśana-saṅgraha. In his reply to an objection of the pūrva-paksha (Vijñānavādin) that a past object cannot be grasped by knowledge, the Saurāntika says that the object which has come into contact with an organ has a power of leaving its image on the following resultant knowledge, whereby the object is inferred. This peculiar efficiency of the sense-object determines the causal relation between the object and its cognition. The external object is only inferred as for instance, good feeding is inferred from a well-nourished appearance or affection is inferred from flurried movements.¹

¹. nanu jñānād bhinnakālasyārthaṣṭaya gṛāhyatvam anupapannam iti chettad anupapannam. indriya-sannikriṣṭasya vishayasyotpāde jñāne svākāra-samarpakātayā samarpitena chākāreṇa tasyārthasyānumeyatopapatteḥ... “bhinnakālam kathām gṛāhāṃ iti chet gṛāhāṃ viduḥ/hetutvam eva cha vyakṣer jñānakārapaṇakṣhamam//”... yathā pushtyā bhoojanam anumīyate... tathā jñānakāreṇa jñānam anumeyam. Sarva-dārśana-saṅgraha, p.36.
The Sautrāntika by his theory of sākāra-jñāna-vāda (Representative Perception) paved the way for the emergence of the idealist Vijnānavāda. The external object was pushed into the background by maintaining that what was directly perceived was the content of knowledge and not the object. The object being always inferred, the content alone became real to the knowledge. The Vijnānavādin goes a step further and maintains that the objects are mere ideal projections, ideas alone are real.

The Dīpakāra does not enter into a full criticism of this Sautrāntika theory of perception. He only points out that in the absence of a direct perception (pratyaksha) of the external objects, even the other two means of proper knowledge – the anumāna (inference) and the scriptures (āgama), are not possible, as the latter are dependent on the direct perception.

2. **THEORY OF PARAMĀNUS.**

The next controversy between the Dīpakāra and the Kośakāra is related to a definition of paramānu. According to the Vaibhāṣika there are two kinds of paramānus, viz. dravya-paramānu and saṃghāta-paramānu. The former is called sarva-sūkṣma or the most subtle part of matter which cannot be split further. It is of fourteen kinds: the four mahābhūtas (elements of earth, water, fire and air) and one element of each of the five sense organs and their corresponding five objects. An agglomeration of

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1. See The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 82.
these dravya-paramāṇus receives the name saṃghāta-paramāṇu.

The constituents of this saṃghāta-paramāṇu vary according to the planes of existence. In the kāma-loka, it consists of at least eight dravya-paramāṇus, viz. the four mahābhūtas and the four derived matters (viz. rūpa, gandha, rasa and sprashtavya). When sound is to be produced, the number is nine, due to the addition of the sound element. When this saṃghāta is organic, then the element of kāya-indriya is added to these nine. When this saṃghāta has other indriyas like the eye, ear, nose, tongue, then one each of these elements is added to the above nine.

It is a Vaibhāshika theory that the elements of gandha and rasa are not found in the rūpa-loka. The smallest saṃghāta-paramāṇu of the rūpa-loka, therefore, consists of only six dravya-paramāṇus (the four mahābhūtas and the elements of rūpa and sprashtavya). This number is increased by the addition of the elements of sound (śabda) and the five indriyas, as in the case of the kāma-loka.

Thus according to the Vaibhāshika a dravya-paramāṇu is called 'sarva-sūkshma'. A saṃghāta-paramāṇu is an aggregate of several such (sarva-sūkshma) dravyas. The Kośakāra, however, defines a paramāṇu as the minutest (sarvasūkshma) aggregate of matter. The implicit contradiction between this definition and the usual one has not escaped the notice of his commentator. Yaśomitra explains that the 'paramāṇu' in this definition refers to a saṃghāta-paramāṇu and not to the dravya-paramāṇu, as the latter

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1. sarva-sūkshmo hi rūpa-saṃghātaḥ paramāṇur ity uchyate. yato nānyatara vijhāyeta. Akb. II. 22ab.
is devoid of any parts and, therefore, cannot be called an aggregate.

The Košakāra is silent on the subject of the dravya-paramāṇu. The Dīpakāra takes note of this omission on the part of the Košakāra, which implicitly suggests that there are in reality only saṃghāta-paramāṇus and no dravya-paramāṇus that produce a saṃghāta.

The Košakāra critically examines the reality of the dravya-paramāṇu in his discussion on the nature of the rūpa-skandha. The rūpa is characterised by rūpaṇa, i.e. resistance or obstruction. A question is raised about the possibility of a dravya-paramāṇu resisting (or coming into contact with) other similar paramāṇus. It can touch other paramāṇus either wholly or by parts. If wholly, then both paramāṇus will occupy but one space and, therefore, the whole aggregate will still remain a single dravya-paramāṇu. If by parts, then this will involve the divisibility (sāvayavatva) of the dravya-paramāṇu which is held to be part-less. Thus in neither way is rūpaṇa possible without involving a contradictory conclusion.

The Vaibhāṣika gets rid of this difficulty by postulating a theory that a dravya-paramāṇu (sarva-sūkṣma) does not exist by itself, but always remains in an aggregated form (saṃghāta) from which it cannot be disassociated (avinirbhāga). Although it is not individually capable of

3. dravya-paramāṇu-rūpāṁ na rūpaṁ prāpnoti. kasmāt? arūpānāt. niravayavatve sati arūpānāt...Sakv. p. 34.
rupana (resistance), it is capable of it in an aggregated (sanghata) form.

Hence all rupa is characterised by rupana.

The fallacy in this assumption is pointed out by the Kosakara. He says that a sanghata (aggregate) is not different from its constituents (dravya-paramanu). Hence it cannot have the quality of rupana which is lacking in these constituents. Thus either one abandons the rupana-lakshana of matter or accepts the savayavatva of the dravya-paramanu. The Kosakara accepts the latter position and strives to disprove the theory of paramanu.

It may be noted that these arguments of the Kosakara are identical with the arguments put forward by the Vijnanavadin Vasubandhu in his Vimsika-bhashya. There also the Kasthara Vaibhashika is confronted with a similar question on the relation between the paramanus.


and their aggregates (saṃghāta).

The Vaibhāṣīka fails to solve this riddle and maintains, in his usual dogmatic manner, that it is in the nature of the things (dharmata), that the dravya-paramāṇus are devoid of parts, yet always exist in an aggregate form, and thus are capable of rūpaṇa.

In conformity with this Vaibhāṣīka theory, the Dipakāra points out the omission by the Kośakāra. He says 'The Kośakāra (who has defined only a saṃghāta-paramāṇu) ought to have pointed out the other rūpa (i.e. draya-paramāṇu) which is not an aggregate (saṃghāta). For, if there is no such (non-aggregate) rūpa, then there is not any aggregate (saṃghāta) (possible). Therefore, it is proved that the sarvasūkṣma is (a dravya), which is a paramāṇu of matter'.

His own definition of the (dravya) paramāṇu is as follows:

1. ..... yasmat paramāṇur ekaṁ dravyam na sidhyati. katham na	sidhyati ? yasmat

   shatkena yugapad yogat paramānōh shad aṁśata /
   shannāṁ samāna-deśītvat pipāḥ syād anu-mātrakah //

   ...... naiva hi paramāṇavah saṁyujyante, nirāvayavatvāt. mā bhūd esha
dosha-prasāṃgah saṁhatās tu parasparāh saṁyujyante iti Kāśmīra-
-Vaibhāṣīkā. ta idam prasāṭavyāḥ. yaḥ paramāpūnāṁ saṁghāto na sa
tebhyo'rthāntaram iti.

   Paramāṇor asaṁyoge tat saṁghato'sti kasya sah /
   na cha naवayavatvena tat saṁyogo no sidhyati //


2. Kośakāras tv aha - 'sarva-sūkṣmo rūpa-saṃghātah paramāṇuh' iti. tena
dsāmghāta-vyatiriktaṁ rūpam anyad vaktavyam. yadi nāsti saṁghāto'pi

Perhaps there is a need to add 'dravyam' after sarva-sūkṣmaṁ in the above passage.
"A (dravya)paramāṇu is a final division of that aggregate (i.e. saṃghāta) which is a substratum of the resisting Matter. It is known as the 'most subtle'. (In the kāma-loka) it abides in a state of invariable association with four mahābhūtas and three upādāya (derived) rūpas, or with three mahābhūtas and four upādāya rūpas (as the case may be)."

This definition of the (dravya) paramāṇu agrees with the one given by the orthodox Vaibhāshika Saṃghabhadra (as quoted by Poussin): "Among the rūpas susceptible of resistance, the most subtle part which cannot be split further is called paramāṇu; that is to say, the paramāṇu cannot be divided into several by another rūpa, by thought. That is what is said to be the smallest rūpa as it has no parts, it is given the name of 'smallest'. In the same way as a kṣaṇa is called the smallest time and cannot be divided into half kṣaṇas."

The Kośakāra, in this context, examines the so-called dravya-paramāṇus of the Vaibhāshika. A saṃghāta-paramāṇu consists of at least eight dravyas. Of these four are the mahābhūtas and four derived elements, viz. rūpa, gandha, rasa and sprashtavya. But even the four derived elements are, according to the Vaibhāshika, each made up of four mahābhūtas. Thus a saṃghāta-paramāṇu (of eight) really consists of twenty dravyas. The Kośakāra here points out that the original number of eight is, therefore, wrong. The Vaibhāshika says that of these the four

mahābhūtas are real dravya (dravyameva dravyam) as they are substratum of the four derived elements, which are to be called āyatana-dravya.

The four mahābhūtas have a distinct nature (jāti) of their own, such as solidity, etc. They remain the same whether they support one or the other kind of the derived matter. They are, therefore, dravyas in a real sense. The derived matter is called āyatana-dravya, as it is the basis of recognisable things as pot, cloth, etc. The Kośakāra dismisses the whole theory by saying "Why use the word dravya in two different ways? Words give way to whim but we must examine the meaning".

The Dīpakāra takes note of this hostile criticism of the Kośakāra. He repeats the same reply of the Vaibhāṣika and says that the Kośakāra misses the whole point on account of his ignorance of the intention behind calling one dravya-paramānu dravya and another āyatana.

3. VITARKA AND VICHĀRA.

The next controversy between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra is about the simultaneous co-operation of two opposite dharmas in a single moment of consciousness.

We have seen above a predominant tendency of the Abhidharma Pīṭaka towards a minute analysis of the mind and mental concomitants (chaittā). The latter consists of three skandhas, viz. vedanā, saṃjñā, and saṃskāra. Of these the last is more complex as it covers a vast field of several constituents of consciousness recognised as ultimate real

elements by all Abhidharmika schools. A major part of the Dhammasangani
is devoted to an enumeration of saṃskāras that associate with each of
the 89 kinds of consciousness. The first kāmavācara-kusala-chitta,
for instance, is said to be accompanied by not less than 54 regular and nine
supplementary (yevāpanaka) saṃskāras. A large number of factors in such
lists are synonyms. A factor called patihā, for instance, is variously
enumerated as patindriya, patā-bala, sammāditthi, amoha, sampajāna and
vipassanā. The commentators are not unaware of the overlapping character
of these factors. The Atthasālinī puts into the mouth of a critic the
comment: 'It is a disconnected exposition, disorderly like booty carried
away by thieves...it is done without an understanding of the matter'.
Although the Atthasālinī tries to justify this inflated list, the
neo-Theravādins like Buddhaghosa and Anuruddha brought the number of real
saṃskāras to fifty by removing the repetitions and attributing several
functions to a large number of factors. The groupings of these
saṃskāras as universal (sabba-chitta-sādharaṇa) and particular, etc., are
also found only in the later works like the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha. This
division of saṃskāras in such groups not only necessitated detailed
definitions of them but also an explanation of their relation to each other.

The Atthasālinī and the Visuddhimagga offer good definitions of

1. "ettha apubbam nāma natthi... ananusandhịka kathā upptipatiya cherehi
abhata-bhanda-sadisa...ajāvitvā kathitạti... Dhsā. III. 263.
2. For a critical study of the classification of these factors, see
Abhidhamma Studies by Bhikkhu Nyānapāṇīka.
3. For a comparative study of these divisions in the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda
and Yogāchāra schools, see McGovern's Manual of Buddhist Philosophy,
these dharmas but are rather laconic in dealing with their mutual relation. The latter task is more seriously taken up during the time of the Mahā-vibhāṣa, and is carried further by the Kośakāra in his Bhāṣya.

While dealing with a definition of upekkhā (a factor belonging to vedanā skandha), the Kośakāra compares it with manaskāra (a factor of the saṃskāra-skandha) and raises an objection to the Vaibhāṣika theory of the simultaneous co-operation of these two dharmas in a single moment of consciousness.

Manaskāra is defined as an 'effort' (ābhoga) of mind in bending itself towards the object. Upekkhā is defined as a lack of effort (anābhoga) which is the equanimity of mind. Since these two dharmas partake of two opposite natures, they cannot operate simultaneously, as for instance, sukhā and duḥkha. The Vaibhāṣika replies that it is difficult to know the subtle differences of these dharmas. But the critical Kośakāra points to his subsequent examination of a similar problem regarding two (apparently) incompatible saṃskāras, viz. vitarka and vichāra, and says that the same conclusion should be applied in the case of upekkhā and manaskāra.

In the Pali suttas the term vitakka is often used to denote a certain preoccupation of mind, a particular kind of thought, as for instance, kāma-vitakka, vyāpāda-vitakka, vihiṃsā-vitakka (sensual, malign and cruel thought) and their opposites: nekkhamā, avyāpāda, and avihiṃsā vitakka. In this particular sense the vitakka is a synonym of michohhā-saṅkappa.

2. Ibid., p. 72, n. 2.
('wrong thoughts or intentions) and sāma-saṅkappa (right thoughts or intentions). In the formulas of jhāna, the vitakka is often combined with vichāra, where they mean respectively the initial and the sustained application of mind on the object. They are also said to provoke speech suggesting thereby that every speech is preceded by a certain examination and judgment. In Āṭṭhasālini these two terms are explained at great length. The vitakka is described as āhāna (‘prescinding’ of mind). It lifts the consciousness onto the object. By it the mind strikes at (āhanana) and around the object. Vichāra is the discursive work of the mind upon or traversing (anusaṅchara) of the object. Threshing out (or contemplation-anumājana) of the object is its characteristic. In the Milinda-pañha, vitakka is called appanā (‘application’). It is again called akotana (‘knocking’) and compared with the initial stroke on a drum. The vichāra is compared to the after reverberation and continuous emission of sound.

The commentators explain these two factors by the help of various similes. The vitakka is compared to the striking of a bell, the vichāra is compared to the consequent reverberation. The vitakka is again compared to the flapping of the wings of a bird about to fly up in the air and the vichāra is compared to the gliding movement of the wings of that bird in the sky. Or again the vitakka is like the thorn fixed in the middle in making a circle and vichāra is like the revolving thorn outside.

From these explanations it is evident that the vitarka is an

2. See DhsA. III. 198-201.
4. Dhs A. III. 200-1; Vm. IV. 88-92.
initial application of mind on the object and the vichāra is a subsequent sustained application. The former is said to possess 'vibration (vipphārava) or a mental thrill and therefore called oṭārika (gross). The latter is of a calmer nature and hence called sūkṣma.

Thus these two dharmas partake of two opposite characteristics, viz. audārika and sūkṣma. Yet they are held, both in the Theravāda and the Vaibhāṣika schools, to operate simultaneously in all kinds of kāmavāchāra consciousness and also in the first rūpa-dhyāna.

The Vṛitti describes the vitarka as having the characteristic of grossness (audārya) of mind. It is a synonym for samkalpa. It contains a 'rudimentary synthesis' (vikalpa) of the differentiators of objects (vishaya-nimitta) that produce it. Its activity is stimulated by the wind of ideas. It is a cause of the manifestation of the five gross sense-cognitions. The vichāra is of the characteristic of subtlety (saukshmya) of mind. It is conducive to the manifestation of the mind-consciousness. Both these dharmas invariably operate in all kinds of

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3. Vishaya-nimitta-prakāra-vikalpa. The term vikalpa in this passage refers to svabhāva-vikalpa. The Vaibhāṣikas assume three kinds of vikalpas, viz. svabhāva, abhinirūpana and anusmaraṇa. All these are present in the mano-vijñāna, but only the former is found in the five sense-cognitions. The Vaibhāṣika holds that this svabhāva-vikalpa, i.e. a rudimentary synthesis, is inherent in all kinds of consciousness. The Kośakāra does not recognise the svabhāva-vikalpa, as according to him it is not different from vitarka: na svabhāva-vikalpo' nyo dharmo'stīti [svabhāva-vikalpo vitarkah] Sakv. p. 64. See Adv. p. 19 notes, and The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 105. For a difference between the Vaibhāṣika vikalpa and the term vikalpa used in Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu, see Stcherbatsky's Buddhist Logic, Vol. II p. 20, notes.
4. saṁjñā-pavānodhata-vṛitti.
the kāmāvachara-consciousness.

Thus here too the vitarka and vichāra are described as sthūla and sūkshma respectively. The Kośakāra raises an objection to the Vaibhāṣika theory of their simultaneous operation.

After quoting and criticising several views on this controversy from the Mahā-Vibhaṭṭa, the Kośakāra explains the Sautrāntika view.

According to the latter, the vitarka and vichāra are two different names given to gross and subtle states of saṃskāras that produce corresponding gross or subtle speech (vāksamutṭhāpaka), and therefore, cannot operate together. The Kośakāra, in consistency with this view, says that they do not operate simultaneously, but only alternatively, each to the exclusion of the other. As regards the scriptures which clearly speak of the first rūpa-dhyāna having both these factors, he maintains that here the two factors are to be taken to belong to the same plane (bhūmitah) and not to the same moment (na kṣanataḥ). The first dhyāna appears now with vitarka and now with vichāra, but cannot have both āṅgas together.

The Dipakāra reproduces this controversy from the Bhāṣya, severely criticizes the Kośakāra for his heterodox theory, and puts forth the Vaibhāṣika view-point. The Vaibhāṣikas, he says, assert only the co-existence of the vitarka and vichāra in one moment of consciousness, and not their simultaneous activity. These dharmas are comparable to

1. Vide Adv. p. 82.
2. Ibid. p. 81, notes.
vidyā and avidyā or doubt and decision, which also co-exist but do not manifest together.

It may be noted that this view of the Dipakāra is identical with the view of Samghabhadra, quoted and criticized by Yaśomitra. Samghabhadra too maintains that the vitarka and vīchāra are associated with each thought, but do not reveal themselves by their action (udbhūta-vṛtti) at the same time. His examples are, however, different from that of the Dipakāra. He compares these two dharmas with rāga and moha, which are always co-existent but only one of them is active at one time.

Yaśomitra, who favours the view of the Kośakāra, finds Samghabhadra's explanation unconvincing. He says that he too accepts the principle that a certain factor of an aggregate alone manifests itself in a given condition, and not the other. But this does not apply in the case of the vitarka and vīchāra as their characteristics are not fully differentiated. The Vaibhāshika contention that they possess independent characteristics, viz. grossness and subtleness, is invalid, since these two do not establish any specific difference (jāti-bheda) but only a difference of degrees of a single factor. In short, the vitarka and vīchāra are not two different dharmas but only different states of a single dharma.

From this controversy it appears that originally the Vaibhāshikas, like the Theravādins, held these two factors to be simultaneously active, but modified their view under the influence of the criticism of the

2. Ibid.
Kośakāra. The explanation given by Saṁghabhadra that they co-exist, but do not become active together is consistent with the doctrine of sarvāstivāda, according to which, all dharmas, irrespective of their mutual opposition, always remain in existence (sarvādā asti) but become active only under certain circumstances. Saṁghabhadra chooses two complementary factors like rāga and moha as his example. But from the Sarvāstivādin's point of view even vidyā and avidyā, or saṁsāya, and nirñaya can 'co-exist'. These examples given by the Dīpakāra, therefore, show his conviction in the specific difference (jāti-bheda) between the vitarka and vichāra and his attempt to accommodate them in a single moment of consciousness, in the framework of the sarvāstivāda.

Further speculations on the nature of these two dharmas are recorded in the Asm. of Asanga, in the Pañcika-skandhaka of Vasubandhu, and in Sthiramati's Bhāṣya on the Triṃśikā of Vasubandhu. These are almost identical with the views of the old Masters (pūrvāchārya) quoted by Yaśomitra: What is vitarka? A mental murmur of enquiry (paryeshaṇa manojavaṇa), which rests on the support of volition (chetanā) or speculative knowledge (prajñā), according as it does not or does include deduction (abhyūha). It is the gross state of mind. What is vichāra? A mental murmur of judgment (pratyavekṣaṇa) which rests on the volition, etc. (as above). That is the subtleness of mind. Here the vitarka refers to the state of enquiry of mind and vichāra to the state of judgment. Sthiramati explains the terms sthūlatā and sūkṣmatā:

1. See Sakv. p. 64.
Vitarka is sthūla as it seeks only the object (vastumātra-paryesahanda-skāratvāt). Vichāra is sukhaṁ as it knows that object as 'this is that' (evaṁ tad iti pūrvadhigata-nirūpanāt).

From this explanation we can conclude that the Yogāchāra and the Vijnānavādins accepted a specific difference between these two dharmas by attributing to them respectively the functions of enquiry and judgment which can appear only successively and not simultaneously.

4. CHITTA-VIPRAYUKTA-SAŃSKĀRA.

After dealing with the vitarka and vichāra, the Kośakāra turns his polemic against a whole body of dharmas, grouped by the Vaibhāshikas under the name of chittra-viprayukta-saṁskāra.

In early Buddhism, saṁskāra is described by a solitary term, chetana or volition. The saṁskāra skandha consists of six volitions corresponding to the six sense objects. But as the Abhidharmikas analysed the mental factors and differentiated their characteristics, they formulated long lists of dharmas which had to be accommodated in the traditional formula of the five skandhas. Instead of postulating new skandhas, they included these new dharmas in the saṁskāra skandha.

This addition of new dharmas in the group of chaitta is justified by showing a functional co-ordination (samprayoga) between them and the chitta. The A. saṅghaḥ speaks of three kinds of uniformities that exist between a chitta and 52 kinds of chetasikas (one vedanā, one saññā, 1. Vide Adv. p. 81, notes.
and fifty samškaras). They arise and disappear in one time, have the same object and depend on the same base. The Vaibhāshikas also speak of five kinds of samatā (uniformity). There is between the chitta and chaitta uniformity as regards time, basis, objects, essential qualities and function.

Both the Theravādins and the Vaibhāshikas arrived at almost identical lists of these samškaras. The former enumerated 59, and the latter had 44 samškaras. In the formulation of these samškaras, the early Buddhists appear to have been influenced by the Yoga school, which also analysed various states of mind with reference to several chitta-bhūmis, samādhis, riddhis and dhyānas with their attendant yogāṅgas or the means of yoga. In course of time, the Abhidharmikas, and particularly the Vaibhāshikas seem to have been much influenced by their contemporary realists like the Sāṁkhya, Vaisheshika, and Mīmāṁsaka schools.

Over a long period and particularly during the time of the Mahāvibhāṣa, the Abhidharmikas were engaged in studying and criticising the doctrines of these rival schools. Aśvaghoṣa's poems reveal a profound study of the Sāṁkhya system. Vasumitra, a leading Vaiśeṣika-śāstrin is extolled by the Vṛitti as the one who refuted the theory of 25 tattvas (of the Sāṁkhya) and demolished the (Vaiśeṣika) doctrine of the

1. ekuppāda-nirodhā cha ekālambana-vatthukā / chetottā dvipaṁśa dhammā chetasikā matā // A. sangahō, II. 1.
3. See Poussin's article 'Le Boudhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali', MCB, V, 223 ff.
atomic structure of the cosmos. We learn from Paramārtha's "Life of Vasubandhu" that a Sāṃkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin defeated Buddhamitra, the teacher of Vasubandhu, in a debate, whereupon the latter composed the Paramārthasaptatikā in refutation of the Sāṃkhya. The Bhāṣya as well as the Vṛtti contains several criticisms of the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeshika theories.

A result of these criticisms and counter-criticisms was the acceptance of not only new theories but also of new dharmas and novel terms in the Vaibhāṣika school. The doctrine of the sarvāstivāda bears a close resemblance to the satkāryavāda. The four traditional explanations of the sarvāstivāda can be treated as interpretations of the parināmavāda of the Sāṃkhya. The atomic theory of the Vaiśeshika too played a great part in formulating the Vaibhāṣika theory of the dravya and samghāta paramāṇas. The seven categories of the Vaiśeshika greatly influenced the Vaibhāṣika analysis of the nāme-rūpa and even their theory of dharma. On account of their fundamental thesis of anatmavāda (non-substantialism), the Buddhists did not recognise the Vaiśeshika distinction of padārthas as dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karma (action), etc., but reduced all things to the status of dharmas, i.e. unique, momentary ultimate elements. It is, therefore, not surprising to

find that the term dravya is conspicuous by its absence in the Pali suttas and even in the Abhidhamma. In the Vaibhāṣika school, however, it almost replaces the Buddhist term dharma. Here all real dharmas are called dravya. Of the nine dravyas of the Vaiśeṣika, only five, viz. substances of earth, water, fire, air and mind have their corresponding dharmas in the Theravāda Buddhism. The ākāśa was recognised by them only as a kind of matter (ākāsa-dhātu = parichcheda-rūpa), and not as a mahābhūta. In the Vaibhāṣika school the four mahābhūtas came to be regarded as dravya-paramāṇus, as indivisible as the atoms of the Vaiśeṣika. The ākāsadhātu of the Theravāda was raised here to the status of an asaṃskṛta dharma, and made a nītya-dravya as in the Vaiśeṣika school. Of the remaining three dravyas of the Vaiśeṣika, viz. kāla, dīk and ātman, the first two were recognised by the Yogāchāras as prajñāpti dharmas. Thus with the sole exception of the ātman, all the Vaiśeṣika dravyas came to be recognised in the later Abhidharmika schools.

As in the case of the term dravya (substance), the term gupa (quality) also is not found (in its technical sense) in the Theravāda canon. But one can detect an influence of the Vaiśeṣika theory of gupa and dravya in their enumeration of the derived matter (upādāya rūpa).

The Visuddhimagga enumerates the following 24 kinds of derived matter: chakkhu, sotā, ghāṇa, jivhā, kāya; rūpa, saddā, gandha, rasa;

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1. The word gupa occurs in the Pali scriptures only in the sense of a string, a cord or a strand (as in the case of pañcika kāmagupa). It is sometimes used to mean a virtue but never in its technical sense of a quality as in the Vaiśeṣika or the Jaina schools.
According to the Theravādins, all these 24 upādāya rūpas are 'dhammas' and hence ought to be recognised as ultimate elements. But a large number of these can be treated rather as aspects, modes or qualities than as separate entities. This is borne out by the commentarial description of some of these dhammas and a distinction drawn between the nipphanna and anipphanna rūpa. Thus, for instance, the ākāsa-dhātu (element of space = vacuum) is called parichcheda-rūpa ('material quality of limitation'). The two vinnattis (intimation by body and speech) together with the lahutā, mudutā and kammaṁmatā (lightness, pliancy and adaptability of matter) are called vikāra-rūpas, i.e. material qualities signifying special conditions. The upachaya, santati, jara and anichchata (i.e. the integration, continuance, decay and impermanence of matter) are called lakkhana rūpa i.e. the characteristics of matter. These ten kinds of rūpa are called anipphanna in order to distinguish them from the remaining 14 rūpas (and the four mahābhūtas) which are called nipphanna-rūpa.

1. Of these only 23 are enumerated in the Dhammasangani. The hadaya-vatthu is a later addition by the commentators. See DhsA. IV. 112.
2. Also termed as parinipphanna and aparinipphanna in the DhsA. IV. 119.
explains the nipphanna rūpas as those which 'transcend limits, change and characteristics and which are to be seized in their intrinsic nature (sabhāva). The anipphannas are contrary there to. The Visuddhamagga-Tika explains further that the nipphanna-rūpas have their own nature (svabhāva), whereas the anipphannas are devoid of them and are known only by relating them to the svabhāva-rūpas. The anipphanna rūpas are nowhere in the suttas enumerated as rūpa-dhammas. Their inclusion in the Abhidhamma suggests an influence of the Vaiśeṣika school. It is certain that the commentators knew the theory of guṇa. Buddhaghosa criticises a (Vaiśeṣika) theory according to which the rūpa and gandha are qualities of teja and prithivi, respectively. The words nipphanna-rūpa and anipphanna-rūpa do not occur in the canon. They are found only in the Āṭṭhakathās. It is, therefore, possible that the commentators introduced this division in order to separate the 'real'

1. aṭṭhārasavidham rūpeṇa parichcheda-vikāra-lakkhapabhaṇṃ atikkamitvā sabhāvenevā pariggahetabbato nipphannaḥ, sesaṃ tabbiparītātāya anipphannaḥ. Vm. XIV. 73.
   These two terms are usually translated as 'predetermined and unpredicted' (by kamma, chitta, utu or āhāra). See Compendium of Philosophy, p. 157, n. 6; Points of Controversy, p. 261, n. 6.


3. kechi panetttha, tejādhīnaṃ gupehi rūpādhi anugahyabhāvato ti kāraṇaṃ vadanti ..... Vm. XIV. 43.
upādāya rūpas from 'qualities', which in the later Sautrāntika terms could be designated as mere prajñāpāti (nominal) dharmas.

A few of the so-called nipphanna rūpas can also be placed in the category of the anipphanna. The jīvindriya, for instance, does not consist of a separate rūpa, but only a name given to the life of matter. The itthindriya and purisindriya, two 'material qualities of sex' can be treated as different aspects of the kāya. The last nipphanna-rūpa, called kabālikāro anāro (edible food) is also not a separate entity but only a name given to the material quality of nutrition.

Thus out of the 24 kinds of upādāya rūpas, only nine, viz. the five sense organs and four sense objects (The phoṭṭhabba - touch object - being included in the mahābhūtas) can be considered as dharmas having intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and, therefore real. As a matter of fact, these ten are identical with the ten of the eleven dharmas enumerated in both the Vaibhāṣika and the Yogācāra lists of the rūpa-dharma.

1. This is further confirmed by the commentarial description of the nipphanna and anipphanna rūpas. The nipphanna-rūpas alone are called rūpa-rūpa, i.e. matter having the characteristic of rūpama.-nipphannarūpaṃ panettha rūpa-rūpaṃ nāma. Vm. XIV. 77. yadettha... nipphannaṁ ti vuttaṁ rūpaṁ, tadeva rūpa-lakkhana-yogato rūpaṁ-rupanāṁ rūpaṁ, taṁ etassa atthi ti...yadi evam akāśadhātu-ādiṁañ kathāṁ rūpabhāvo ti ? nipphanna-rūpassa parichchheda-vikāra-lakkhanabhāvato taggatikamevāti. Vm T. p. 460.

2. The Vaibhāṣikas include these two indriyas in the kāyendriya-kāyendriya-pradeśa eva hi kaśchit strī-parushendriyākhyāṁ labhate... Adv. p. 44.

3. The Sautrāntikas go still further and enumerate only the four mahābhūtas and the four objects (rūpa, gandha, rasa and spraśtaṇya) as real rūpa-dharmas. See Alambana-parikṣā, Appendix D. p. 116.

4. The Vaibhāṣikas enumerate one more rūpa, viz. avijñāpāti (unmanifested matter) which the Yogācārinś include in their 11th category of rūpa, called dharma-dhātu-parīṣṭapanna (matter included under dharmadhātu). For details, see Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 118 ff.
Although the Vaibhāṣikas did not enumerate the 'qualities' of rūpa in the rūpa-dharma, they certainly knew some of them. They recognised, for instance, the four lakṣāṇas, which were proclaimed in the sūtras as being universal characteristics of not only the rūpa but of all phenomenal elements. These were not enumerated as separate dharmas in the traditional formula of the five skandhas. If a large number of new chaitasikas could be added under the saṃskāra skanda, there was no reason why these four lakṣāṇas could also not be accommodated under that heading, particularly when these were specifically called 'saṃskṛita-lakṣāṇas' by the sūtra. But these lakṣāṇas were not exclusively chaitasika, and could not, therefore, be treated as purely mental factors, in as much as they covered even the rūpa-skandha. The origin of a novel category called the (rūpa-)chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāra is perhaps to be traced to an attempt to include the lakṣāṇas and such other aspects or qualities in the traditional formula of the pāñcakaṇḍha.

The term chitta-vippayutta (disconnected with thought) is known to the Dhammasangani. But there it refers only to the rūpa-khandha and nibbāna. It is not recognised as a separate category as in the Vaibhāṣika school. The Kathāvatthu contains a controversy where the opponent holds that the pariyuttānas (outbursts of anuṣayas) are chitta-vippayutta dhammas. Buddhaghosa attributes this view to the

1. Yaśomitra explains this term fully. These dharmas are disassociated from the chitta but are more akin to it than to the rūpa-skandha. Hence they are included in the nāma-skandha. The term viprayukta is used for excluding the chaittas which are samprayukta. The term saṃskāra is used to exclude the asaṃskritā dharmas. Thus the viprayukta saṃskāras are distinct from the rūpa, chitta, chaitta and asaṃskritā dharmas. Vide Adv. p. 85, note.
2. sabbām cha rūpaṁ, asaṃkmatā cha dhātu, ime dhammā chitta-vippayutta. Dhs. 1192.
Andhakas. In his commentary on another controversy on the anusayas, he says that the Andhakas, Uttarapathakas, Mahāsāṅghikas and Sammitiyas hold that the anusayas are chitavaippayutta. According to Yasomitra, the Vatsiputriyas also maintained the same view. The jivitindriya was also, according to Buddhaghosa, considered as a chitavaippayutta dhamma by Pubba-seliyas and Sammitiyas. The Yogācāra school of Asanga not only accepted this new category but added several dhammas of its own under that heading. Thus the category of the chitavaippayukta-sāmskāra was not necessarily a Vaibhāshašika invention; it was known as early as the time of the Kathāvatthu and was accepted by several major and minor schools.

There is no unanimity among different schools regarding the number of sāmskāras that were enumerated under this category. The lists of only two schools, viz. the Vaibhāshaśika and the Yogācāra, have come down to us. Of the former, two lists are known. The older one is given in the Asm. of Ghoshaka, and the later ones are given in the Bhāṣya and the Vṛtti. The Yogācāra list is found in the Asm. of Asanga.

Ghoshaka enumerates the following 17 sāmskāras:— (1) pṛāptih
(2) asāmājñi-samāpattiḥ (3) nirodha-samāpattiḥ (4) asāmājñi-āyatanam
(5) jīvitendriyam (6) nīkā-sabbhāgataḥ (7) sthāna-pṛāptih (8) vastu-pṛāptih
(9) āyatana-pṛāptih (10) jātih (11) jāra (12) sthitih (13) anityatā

1. Ibid.
(14) nāma-kāyah  (15) padākāyah  (16) vyākhyana-kāyah  (17) prithagjanātvam.

Asanga in his Asm. drops Nos. 7, 8 and 9 of the above list and adds the following nine, bringing his total to 23: (1) pravṛttiḥ
(2) pratiniyamaḥ  (3) yogah  (4) javah  (5) anukramaḥ  (6) kālah  (7) deśah
(8) saṁkhya  and (9) sāmagraī.

The Kośa and the Dhāpa closely follow the list of Ghoshaka. They enumerate only 13, dropping Nos. 2, 7, 8, 9 and 17 from his list, and adding one more item called aprāpti. The last 9 saṁskāras of the Yogāchāra list are omitted by them. Of these three, Ghoshaka’s list is undoubtedly the oldest as he represents the period of the Mahā-vibhāṣa.
The Yogāchārins seem to have modified his list by including Nos. 7, 8 and 9 in No. 1 = (prāpti). The Neo-Vaibhāṣikas like the Kośakāra modified it still further by including No. 2 in No. 4. They replaced the prithagjanatva (No. 17) by their new dharma, viz. aprāpti, since the former is only an alābha (non obtainment) of āryamārga.

At least five items of these lists, viz. the four lakṣaṇas and the jīvitendriya, have corresponding dharmas in the upādāya-rūpa of the Theravāda. But the Theravādins enumerated the lakṣaṇas as 2 'qualities' devoid of saṁskṛta-lakṣaṇas like the Vaiśeshika gunas which are agujavat. The Vaibhāṣikas enumerated them as 'dravya', i.e. having intrinsic nature, abiding in the three times and causing the origination, subsistence, decay and extinction of all phenomenal existence.

A logical conclusion of such a step was to postulate upa-lakṣaṇas

1. Asm. p. 10.
2. uppaḍādayo saṁkhata-lakkhanā nāma.. lakkhanam na sankhataṁ sankhataṁ na lakkhanam... Vide Adv. p. 104, n. 2.
(secondary characteristics) like jāti-jāti, sthiti-sthiti etc. to these lakshanaś which was ridiculed by the Sautrāntikas as absurd and involving the fallacy of an infinite regress.

The same rule is applied in the case of the first two samskāraś, viz. the prāpti and aprāpti. The former is a samskāra ('force') which controls the collection or obtainment of certain dharmas in a given santāna (stream of life), as for instance, in the case of an arhat there is a prāpti of āsaiksha dharmas. The aprāpti is a 'force' which prevents this prāpti, as for instance, in the case of a prithagjana, there is a non-collection of the ārya-dharmas. As in the case of the lakshanaś the Vaibhāśika here postulates such additional dharmas as prāpti-prāpti and aprāpti-aprāpti for explaining the obtainment of the prāpti and the prevention of aprāpti, respectively, again exposing his theory to the fallacy of regress.

One can detect an influence of the Vaiśēshika in this 'dravya-vāda' of the Vaibhāśika. This influence is unmistakably seen in a few other samskāraś of this list. The Vaiśēshika category of sāmānya (generality), for instance, is unknown to the Pali canon. The Buddhists being pluralists, non-substantialists and vibhajya-vādins always tended to oppose the reality of sāmānya, as the latter was a stepping stone towards a unity, a substance or even to the theory of brahman of the Advaita school. Their formulas of the skandha, āyatana,

1. jāti-jāty ādayas teṣāmān te'shṭa-dharmaika-vṛittayaḥ
   Ak. II. 46 ab.
dhātu, etc. were primarily aimed at removing false notions of unity
(ekatva-grāma). In the later works on Buddhist logic the sāmāṇya is
unanimously described as a mere conceptual construction (vikalpa) imposed
on the discrete, unique and momentary dharmas, and hence unreal. But
this sāmāṇya creeps up, in the Vaibhāśika category of the viprayukta,
under the guise of sabhāgata. Like the parā-sattā and the aparā-sattā
of the Vaiśēshika, the Vaibhāśika, sabhāgata is also divided into
sattva-sabhāgata (which is common to all beings - abhimā) and dharma-
sabhāgata (which is found in smaller groups like men, women, layman,
monk, etc.)

The Sautrāntika Kośakāra rightly observes that in recognising
the sabhāgata as a 'dravya', distinct from the skandha, āyatana or dhātu
(which constitute a sattva or a dharma), the Vaibhāśika has only
supported the Vaiśēshika category of sāmāṇya. The Vaibhāśika seeks to
support his sabhāgata by a sūtra passage where the word nikāya-sabhāga
is mentioned, and asks for an explanation of the notion of generality.
The Sautrāntika points out that the sūtra does not warrant any recognition
of the sabhāgata as a distinct dravya. The generality is only a notion
(prajñāpti) and not a real dharma. "And if all notions were to be treated
as real", continues the Kośakāra, "why not assume distinct dharmas for the
notions of number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction,

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1. buddhyatva-grāham nivartayanti, pindaikātma-grāham nivartayanti....
2. See Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, Chapter VI.
remoteness, nearness, etc., which are treated as realities by the heretic schools? Indeed, the last nine viprayukta saṃskāras of the Yogāchāra list seem to represent these notions treated as reals in the Vaiśeshika school. Of these nine, the following six, viz. the pravṛtti, java, kāla, deśa, saṃkhya and sāmagrī correspond respectively to the pravṛtti (a kind of prayatna), vega (a kind of saṃskāra), kāla (a dravya), dik (a dravya), saṃkhya (a guna) and saṃyoga (a guna). The anukrama can be taken to correspond to the paratva and aparatva, two gunas of the Vaiśeshika. The only two, viz. the pratiniyama (manifoldness) and yoga (conformity of hetu and phala) have no corresponding reals in the Vaiśeshika list.

The acceptance of these Vaiśeshika reals exclusively by the Yogāchāras did not, however, make them realists like the Vaibhāshika. Unlike the latter, they treated all viprayukta-saṃskāras as mere notions (prajñāpāti). And in the case of the last nine saṃskāras, which directly correspond to the Vaiśeshika padārthas, they interpreted them merely as different names of the hetu-phala.

The Sautrāntikas also recognise these notions, but severely oppose the Vaibhāshikas for accepting them as dravya-dharmas or reals. They point out that the so-called viprayukta-saṃskāras have neither own nature (sva-bhāva), nor exclusive functions, nor are they preached in

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1. saṃkhya-parimāṇa-prithaktva-saṃyoga-vibhāga-paratvāparatva-sattādayo'pi tirthakara-parikalpītā abhyupagantavyā eka-dvi-mahād-aṇu-prithak-
   saṃyukta-viyukta-parāpara-sad-ādi-buddhi-siddhy artham. Ābh. II. 46 ab.
   See LVPak. II. 46 ab, and Sakv. p. 180.
2. hetuphalā-nānatve pratiniyama iti prajñāpātiḥ. hetuphalanurūpye yoga iti
   prajñāpātiḥ. Ābh. p. 11.
3. e.g. kālaḥ katamah? hetuphalā-prabandha-pravṛttau kāla iti prajñāpātiḥ-
   deśah katamah? daśasu dikṣu hetuphalā eva deśa iti prajñāpātiḥ.
   Ābh. p. 11.
the sūtras. The II kośasthāna of the Bhāṣya contains long and lively controversies between the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika on the validity of each and every item of the viprayukta-saṃskāra. The Kośakāra examines the scriptures quoted by the Vaibhāṣika, analyses their arguments, ridicules their dogmatic realism and finally accuses them of supporting the heretic schools.

A counter attack to this polemic of the Kośakāra has survived in our Vṛitti. The Dīpakāra indirectly refers to the Kośakāra as an infant, ignorant of the Abhidharma and boldly declares that he will prove the sva-bhāvas of these saṃskāras, and will also quote sūtras in his favour.

Unfortunately, a large number of folios containing these lively controversies are lost. Discussions on prāpti and aprāpti are entirely lost. The controversies on the nirodha-samāpatti are severely interrupted, since only a prima facie argument has survived which contains a view of the Kośakāra condemned as 'unbuddhistic' by the Vṛitti. The treatment of sabhāgata and āsamjñika is almost identical with the Vaibhāṣika explanations of these saṃskāras in the Bhāṣya. The Vṛitti here borrows several passages from the latter. The Dīpakāra does not advance any new arguments but contents himself with a remark that the Kośakāra in comparing the sabhāgata with the Vaiśeṣika sāmānya has only made a futile attempt to see a similarity of the kind which we find obtaining between pāyasa (milk-porridge) and vāyasa (a crow).

1. LVPAk. II. 35-48.
2. stānandhaya-buddhinām abhidharmā-paroksha-māti-vṛittinām...Adv. p. 86.
3. yad api Buddhā-vachane na pāthyanta iti. tatrāpi sārvajñānāṃ vачanaṃ vyāharisyate. Ibid.
The only important discussions available to us, therefore, are on the jīvitendriya, the four lakshanas and the last three sāṃskāras called nāma-kāya, pada-kāya and vyāñjana-kāya. Even in the case of these topics, the Vaibhāshika arguments of the Dīpakāra are not different from those given in the Bhāṣya, which are well known through Foussin's L'Abhidharma-kośa and Stcherbatsky's The Central Conception of Buddhism. We, therefore, shall concentrate here only on certain aspects of these controversies which are found only in our Vṛttī.

5. JĪVITENDRIYA.

Although the term jīvita is known to the Pali suttas, the technical term jīvitendriya is mostly found in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. In the suttas the term āyu is more commonly used in the sense of a principle signifying life-duration. The Mahāvedalla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya contains a conversation between Mahākotthita and Sāriputta on the mutual relation of the mind and mental concomitants. In this connection a question is asked on the basis of stability of the five indriyas. Sāriputta replies that their stability is on account of āyu. The latter, he says, depends on usmā (ūsmā—five generated by karma). Since usmā is also a part of the body, the āyu and usmā are interdependent like the flame and the light of a lamp. The light is seen by the help of flame, but the flame is seen on account of the light. As yet there is no indication

1. imāni kho āvuso paṭich'indriyāni āyuḥ paṭichcha tiṭṭhati... āyu usmāṁ paṭichcha tiṭṭhati... usmā āyuḥ paṭichcha tiṭṭhati... seyyathāpi... achchim paṭichcha abha paññayati, abhaṁ paṭichcha achchi paññayati... Majjhima, I. p. 295.
here to show the place of āyu in the traditional formula of the five khandhas. Perhaps to elucidate this point a further question is raised whether the āyusāṅkhāras (constituents of life) are identical with feelings (i.e., vedanā). Sāriputta says that they are not identical, for, if they were, a person undergoing the trance called saṁmā-vedayita-nirodha will not rise again from that trance. It may be recalled here that according to the Theravādins, the four nāma-skandhas always rise and disappear in one time. The nirodha (cessation) of vedanā and saṁmā would, therefore, automatically mean nirodha of all the four. Consequently, if āyu is identical with any of them, it will also cease to be, resulting in the death of the yogin. Sāriputta further explains that when a person dies, three things abandon him, viz. the āyu, the usmā and the mind (vīmāna). In the case of a person who has undergone the above samādhi the āyu and usmā still exist. It appears from this passage that the sutta recognises āyu as a factor which stabilises the five indriyas, but does not include it in any of the nāma-khandhas. Its inclusion in the latter group would also go against the recognition of an existence called asaṁmā-bhava which consists of only the rūpa-khandha. Nor could it be included in the rūpa-khandha, for in the arūpa-loka, in the absence of any rūpa, its operation will be impossible. Various speculations regarding

1. te cha āvuso āyusāṅkhārā abhavīsu te vedaniyā dhammā, na-y-idaṁ saṁmā-vedayita-nirodham samāpattassa bhikkhuno vutṭhānam paṁmāyetha. Ibid.
2. yada kho āvuso imaṁ kāyaṁ tayo dhammā jahanti : āyu usmā cha vīmānaṁ, athāyaṁ kāyo ujjhito avakkhitto seti yathā katthām achetanām ti... yvāyaṁ... meto... yo chāyaṁ... saṁmā-vedayita-nirodham samāpanno, imesam kiṁ nānākaranām ti ? yvāyaṁ meto... tassa... āyu parikkhino, usmā vūpasanta... yvāyaṁ... samāpanno tassa... āyu aparikkhino, usmā avūpasanta... Ibid. p. 296. vide Adv. p. 98, n. 1.
its inclusion in the formula of the five skandhas can be traced to the above sutta and to the problems that arise on account of recognising these two existences, one wholly material and another wholly mental.

The Theravādins solved this problem by postulating two jīvitendriyas (i.e. āyu), one physical (rūpa) and another mental (arūpa). Their Abhidhamma includes the former in the upādāya-rūpas, and the latter in the saṃkhāra-khandha. The beings of the asāṅga-bhava and the arūpa-bhava live their life-span on account of these two dharmas, respectively. The beings of other existences possess both kinds of the jīvitendriya.

The Theravādin enumeration of āyu in the rūpa-khandha looks rather far-fetched. The sutta quoted above specifically raises the whole problem with reference to five indriyas, i.e. the five senses, and not matter in general. Death there spoken of refers not to a corpse but to a personality, i.e. a being led by his karma in different destinies (gati) or existences (nikāya-sabhāga) such as naraka (hell), tiryagīcha (animal), preta (spirit), manushya (human) and deva (god). The āyuḥ thus was directly related to karma or chetanā and not the rūpa-skandha. This seems to be the main reason for a criticism of the rūpa-jīvitendriya by Pubbaseliyas and Sammitiyas recorded in the Kathāvatthu. They held that the jīvitendriya was essentially an arūpa-dharma. But these schools, as well as the Vaibhāshikas were equally committed to the theories of the asāṅga and arūpa-bhavas, and hence could not include the jīvitendriya in

1. katamaṁ taṁ rūpaṁ jīvitindriyam ? yo tesam rūpinaṁ dharmānaṁ āyu ṭhiti... jīvitaṁ... Dhamma. 635.
   ... yo tesam arūpinaṁ dharmānaṁ āyu, ṭhiti... jīvitaṁ. Ibid. 19.
the nāma-skandha. They, therefore, included it in their viprayukta category, distinct from both the chitta and rūpa.

This conjecture is supported by the Vaibhāṣika description of this dharma. The Vṛtāti defines it as a (cause of) subsistence (sthiti) of the vital fire (ūshma) and mind (vijñāna). It is a basis for notions of different existences like human, animal, divine etc. on account of its nature of being a result of the past karma. The Abhidharma describes it as a force of life-duration in all the three existences (vis. the kāma, rūpa and arūpa worlds). The Vṛtāti, in conformity with this Abhidharma says that there is no faculty other than the jīvita, which is born of karma, covers all the three worlds, exists uninterrupted from the moment of birth, and thus becomes a basis for the notions of a particular destiny. The Vṛtāti further quotes a scripture: 'when the āyuh, the āushma and vijñāna abandon this body, then (a person) lies discarded like a piece of wood devoid of consciousness!.

But if the āyuh were to be always associated with the āushma (matter) and vijñāna (mind), then it would not operate respectively in the arūpa-bhava and in the asamjñā-bhava. Therefore, the Vṛtāti says that the āyuh in the kāmadhātu is always accompanied by the sense of touch, the āushma and vijñāna. It is not essential to have all the five senses for its operation. In the rūpa-dhātu which includes the asamjñā-bhava, the āyuh is always accompanied by the five senses, but not necessarily by mind.

In the arūpa-dhātu it is accompanied only by vijñāna, with the exception of the nirodha-samāpatti (where even vijñāna is brought to a cessation).

The Sautrāntika objection to this theory (as contained in the Bhāshya) is that if a separate dharma like āyuh is necessary to sustain the ūśma and vijñāna, then the āyuh itself will need to be sustained by another āyuh. The Vaibhāshika, in conformity with the above sutta says that the āyuh, ūśma and vijñāna are interdependent. This gives rise to another problem as to which of these precedes the other two. The Vaibhāshika, therefore, says that karma produces and sustains the āyuh. The Sautrāntika rightly argues that the karma alone should be efficient to sustain both the ūśma and vijñāna. There is no need to postulate a life-sustainer like āyuh. Moreover, the āyuh is a mere notion. Just as the destiny of an arrow and the time it will take to reach its destination are determined at the moment of its shooting, similarly the karmas of an individual, at the moment of a rebirth, fix the destiny (nikāya-sabhāga) and the duration of the santāna of the five skandhas. Therefore, concludes the Sautrāntika, the āyuh postulated by the Vaibhāshikas is merely a notion and not a dharma separate from the santati.

The Dipakāra does not take note of these arguments but asserts his position by saying that the jīvitendriya, being a basis of the notion of a destiny, is a dravya, a real dharma. Otherwise, he says what could

1. LVPāk. II. 45 ab.
2. na hi nāstīti brahma na tu dravyāntaram. Vide Adv. p. 98, n. 3.
3. Ibid.
prevent the death of a person who undergoes the nirodha-samāpatti or the asamjñi-samāpatti? Both are devoid of consciousness and hence require some real dharma which will be instrumental in the life-duration of these two states. That dharma is the jīvitendriya. These Vaibhāshika arguments are, however, unconvincing to the Sautrāntika Kośakāra, for whom both samāpattis are conscious (sachittika), and which, therefore, do not require a separate dharma for sustaining the life-stream during that state.

Whether the āyuḥ was accepted as a dravya or as a mere prajñāpti-dharma, both the Vaibhāshikas and the Sautrāntikas (together with the Theravādins) agreed that it was a vipāka, i.e. a result of some past karma. Being a vipāka, and being co-nascent with birth and co-terminus with death, it functioned automatically, independent of any new karma. If a life-span (āyuḥ) was fixed it could neither be prolonged at will, nor could it be replaced by a new life-span to sustain the same santati. This unanimously accepted theory of āyuḥ, however, went against an equally well founded belief in the Buddha’s power of prolonging his life-span for an indefinite period.

Various controversies relating this belief and its bearing on the theory of karma are preserved in the Pali commentaries, the Bhāshya and our Vṛitti. The Kośakāra deals in detail with this problem and advances certain unorthodox solutions to this riddle. The Dīpakāra examines his arguments, declares them to be invalid and accuses the Kośakāra of entering the portals of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

1. Adv. p. 93. See LVPAk. II. 44.
An account of the last days of the Buddha is preserved to us in the Pali and Sanskrit versions of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. In both accounts it is said that the Buddha was eighty years old when he attained parinirvāṇa. It is also said that three months prior to his death, he was overcome by a severe illness which he bore with great composure. Immediately after his recovery, during his sojourn in Vaiśālī, in the Chāpāla shrine, he declared to his intimate attendant, "whosoever, Ananda, has developed, practised... and ascended to the very heights of the four paths to riddhi,..... he, should he desire it, could remain in the same birth for an aeon (kalpa) or more than a kalpa (kappāvasesaṃ). Now the Tathāgata has thoroughly practised them and he could, therefore, should he desire it, live on yet for an aeon or for more than an aeon".

This was indeed a hint to Ananda that he should beg the Lord to remain during the aeon. But we are told that as the heart of Ananda was possessed by the Evil Mara, he did not beg the Lord to exercise this power. The Buddha then repeated his declaration twice in vain and asked Ananda to leave him alone. In the meantime, the Mara appeared and reminded the Lord that it was time for the latter to attain parinirvāṇa. The Buddha promised that after a period of three months he would pass away. After the

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1. For other traditions on this point, see Obermiller's *History of Buddhism* by Buston, II, p. 70.
2. Will (cīhanda), effort (vīrya), thought (chitta) and investigation (vīmāṇa), each united to earnest thought. Vide Adv. p. 359.
3. The Pali English Dictionary (PIS ed.) takes the word kappāvasesaṃ to mean 'for the rest of the kappa'. But as Professor Edgerton has shown, this word probably means 'more than a kalpa'. See RHSD. p. 173.
departure of the rejoicing Māra, it is said, the Buddha deliberately and consciously rejected the rest of his natural term of life.

This account is given in identical terms in both the Pali and Sanskrit versions of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra. The Sanskrit version has a few more points of interest. It is said there that before rejecting the āyuh-saṃskāra (the force of life-duration), the Lord thought that there were only two persons, viz., Supriya the King of Gandharvas and Subhadra the parivṛṣṭuka, who would be taught by the Buddha himself at their attaining maturity of insight within a period of three months. Thinking thus, the Lord attained that kind of samādhi, by which he "created" the forces of jīvita (new prolonged life) and rejected the forces of āyuh (the existing life-span).

The Sarvāstivādins, on the basis of this, hold that the life of three months was indeed an extension of life. He prolonged his life for only this short period: there was no purpose in prolonging it further, as the two new converts mentioned above would have become his disciples by that time. Further the Buddha did this to show his control over the forces of life and death.

This episode in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra became a centre of several controversies among the Buddhists. The Theravādins and the

2. There is no mention of Supriya in the Pali version.
3. Both versions contain an identical account of the conversion of this parivṛṣṭuka.
5. maraṇa-vaśītva-jañāpanarthaṁ... traināsyamēva nordhāvam... vineyakāryābhāvat .... Sakv. p. 105.
Sarvāstivādins agreed on the various miraculous powers of the Buddha. The prolongation of the life-span was indeed a splendid miracle which they would have gladly conceded to him. But when the Atthakathā-kāras and the Vibhāṣā-sāstrins set about explaining this sūtra-passage, they were confronted with the theory that the āyuh is a vipāka. The main question was how to account for the new life and how to reconcile it with the accepted theories of the laws of karma? If the phenomenon of life-prolongation is accepted, we have to account for a new ‘force’ of life (āyuh-saṁskāra). This, as suggested by the Buddha’s declaration, is possible by assuming that the riddhi or the yogic potency produces such new āyu. Thus we find two kinds of life, the original one generated by karma and the other by yogic powers.

The Theravādins, despite the above mentioned declaration of the Buddha in their sūtra, did not accept the theory of generating a new life by yogic practices. Consequently, they were not able to reconcile the text with their accepted theories of karma. They retained the passage, but gave it an interpretation to suit these theories. According to them the ‘kappa’ in this passage never meant a mahākappa, i.e., an aeon, but an āyukappa, i.e., the duration of a man’s life. Now the āyukappa is what people consider as the normal life-span of a human being. It is, as the Buddha himself said, (in a different context), "a hundred years, less or more". Since the Buddha had reached the normal limit, he did live for a

This indeed was a very poor explanation. The Theravādins were aware of the doctrinal difficulties involved in this belief. Indeed, in the Kathāvatthu, where for the first time we meet with this controversy, the Theravādin argues against the Mahāsāṅghika's claim that the Buddha could have lived for a mahākalpa. The main argument is whether the new life-span (āyuh), the new destiny (gati), the acquisition of a new individuality is a thing of magic potency. This the Mahāsāṅghika cannot affirm, for he is committed to the theory that the āyuh is a karma-viśāka and not a result of magic potency.

Buddhaghosa, in his commentary on this controversy, maintains that the kappa here meant only āyukappa. He further explains that a person like Buddha, or any one having mastery over the riddhipādas, can avert any obstructions to life, whereas others are not capable of this. When, therefore, the Buddha claimed that he could live for a kappa, what he really meant was that he had powers to avert any premature death.

We may note here that as yet there is no suggestion in the Pāli works that the Buddha extended his life even for a short period of three months. It was a modified belief of the Sarvāstivādins. The Milindapañha accepts this Sarvāstivādin theory and maintains that the Buddha did extend his life for a period of three months and could have lived for a kalpa, if only he had any desire for the worldly life. While maintaining this,

1. iddhibalena saṁannāgato kappaṁ titṭheyyā'ṭi ? āmantā. iddhimayiko so āyū, ... sa gati... so attabhāvapāṭilabho ti ? na hevaṁ vattabbe.... Kv. XI. 5.
the author of the *Milindapañha* most inconsistently explains that the kappa here means only āyukappa and not the mahākappa.

These explanations did not satisfy any one, least of all the Theravādins. In the commentary on the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*, Buddhaghosa gives the view of one elder, Mahāsiṅhāthera. This Thera maintained that the Buddha did mean to live for an aeon by the powers of his magic gift. But he did not live because the physical body is subject to the laws of old age and the Buddhas pass away without showing any severe effects of it. Moreover, all his chief disciples would have attained nirvāṇa by that time and the Buddha living to the end of the kalpa would have been left with a poor following of novices. Buddhaghosa dismisses this view without any comment and expressly states that according to the *Atthakathās*, the kappa here means only the āyukappa and not the mahākappa.

These explanations of the *Atthakathās* do not seem to take notice of another Vinaya passage of the Theravādins. In the *Chullavagga*, in the section dealing with the first council held under the presidency of Mahākassappa, Ananda is censured for his failure to request the Buddha to live for a kappa or kappāvasesa. Surely if kappa meant only an āyukappa, and if the power of the Buddha was only limited to avert any premature death, there was no point in censuring Ananda for his absentmindedness.

1. "kappāvasesam vā" ti temāsaparichchhado cha bhanito/ so cha pana kappo āyukappo vuchchatī... vijjati ca taṁ mahārāja iddhibalāṁ bhagavato... anatthiko mahārāja bhagavā sabbabhavehi... Milindapañha, pp. 141-2.
3. The commentary on this section of the *Chullavagga* makes no reference to this point.
The Pali commentaries are silent on the manner in which the prolongation and the rejection of the āyuh is accomplished. This topic is fully discussed in the works of the Sarvāstivāda School. The Bhāshya gives several Vaibhāśika views on this topic. According to the Vibhāśa-Śāstra, karma is of two kinds. One is known as āyur-vipāka-karma, i.e., the karma which at the moment of conception determines the life-span. The other kind is bhoga-vipāka-karma. This is a sum total of all past karmas, accumulated in the series of consciousness, which continuously yields its fruits (other than āyuh) during the phenomenal existence. A human arhat, having full mastery over the riddhipādas, can, by his strong resolution, transform the bhoga-vipāka karma into an āyur-vipāka-karma. This transformed karma then produces the new āyuh. If he wishes to reject his already established life-span (āyuh-saṁskāra), he transforms his āyur-vipāka-karma into the bhoga-vipāka.

This explanation is not satisfactory because at the time when the āyuh is rejected, the āyur-vipāka-karma is no longer potentially existent, for it has already yielded its fruit. Therefore, some āchāryas hold a different view. According to them, the karmas of the past birth, as yet unripe, are ripened and made to yield their fruit by the power of meditation. But the difficulty here is that in the case of an arhat, there is no possibility of any new potential āyur-vipāka-karma, since at the attainment of the arhatship, he has brought an end to all new births. In all these explanations we can see a sustained but unsuccessful attempt to

relate the new (i.e., the prolonged) āyuḥ to some form of karma.

Ghoshaka goes a step further. He holds that an altogether new body consisting of the material elements (mahābhūtāni) of the rūpavachara world is produced by the yogic powers. This body is capable of living for a kalpa. One can see here a veiled reference to the nīrmāṇa-kāya or the Assumed body of the Buddha. But it is not explained here how such a body can continue to exist when the original body would cease at the end of the āyuḥ.

The Kośakāra, after giving these views, gives his own. He says that such an arhat has such yogic potency that he can cut short or put aside the life-span cast by the past karma and produce a new life-span by the sole power of his meditation. Consequently, this new force of life-span would be a result of samādhi and not of karma.

This view takes us back to the controversy raised in the Kathāvatthu. The view of the Kośakāra is identical with the Mahāsāṃghika view condemned by the Theravādins as contrary to the laws of karma.

The Dīpakaṅka does not go into the details of this whole controversy, but only notes this unorthodox view of the Kośakāra. The latter's view he says, "does not conform to the Sūtras, nor is it to be seen in the Vinaya. Moreover, it goes against the law. Therefore, like the words of an ignorant person, this view deserves no consideration'.

1. evaṁ tu bhavitavyaṁ... pūrva-karmajāṁ cha sthitikālāvedham indriya-

   -mahābhūtānāṁ vyāvartayanty apūrvaṁ cha samādhijam āvedham ākshipanti...

   See Adv. p. 98, n. 4

"And how does it not correspond to the Sūtra or the Vinaya?

It is said in the Sūtra: 'It is impossible that one might by strenuous effort or violence ripen what is unripe, or change the course of that which is already ripened'. It is said in the Vinaya also 'The three kinds of karmas, the result of which must be experienced (niyata-vedāṇīya), cannot be set aside even by gods'. In the Abhidharma too, boundless life-spans are not accepted. Thus on account of its departure from scriptures, the Kośakāra's view does not merit any consideration".

"Moreover, if the Lord, by the powers of meditation could at will produce a new personality endowed with consciousness and living organs, or by his yogic powers could cast a new life-span which was not fixed by his past karmas, then indeed, the Buddha is made here a Nārāyana, on account of creating a new being. Moreover, he may never attain the parinirvāṇa, such is his compassion. He might as well remain alive to resolve all doubtful points that divide his dispensation. Therefore, this view deserves no consideration, as the Kośakāra here has begun entering the portals of the Vaitulika-Śāstra!"

This criticism is very significant. It reaffirms the doctrines of karma and āyuḥ, and rejects the Buddha's power over these universal laws. It anticipates the development of the avatāra-vāda in the Mahāyāna Buddhism and reasserts the Hinayāna theory of the human Buddha. By referring to the Vaitulika-Śāstra it also points to the Mahāyānistic origins of the belief in the Buddha's power of prolonging his life-span.

1. vide Adv. p. 141.
By the term Vaitulika, the Dīpākāra may be referring to a school known by that name or the Mahāyāna in general. In a subsequent place, he identifies the Vaitulika with the Vaināśika. The Vaitulikas are known to have professed a 'Docetic' heresy that the Buddha did not live in the world of mankind but visited this world only in a shape specially created. This view of the super-human Buddha was also shared by the Lokottaravādins, a branch of the Mahāsāṅghikas. We have already seen that the Kathāvatthu attributes the belief in the Buddha's power of prolonging the life-span to the Mahāsāṅghika. The Mahāvastu, a Vinaya text of the Lokottaravādin Mahāsāṅghika, specifically states that the Buddhas are not subject to the effects of old age. Nor are they subject to the laws of karma. The following verse seems to refer to the belief in the Buddha's power of life prolongation and yet his passing away as a human being:

prabhūṣcha karma vārayituṁ karmam deśayanti cha jīnā/
aśvaryaṁ vinigūhanti eshā lokānuvartanā/  

The Pali commentators and the Vibhāsha-śāstrins had precisely to account for the laws of karma which even the Buddhas could not escape. Hence their feeble argument that the Buddha wished to pass away while his body was still unaffected by old age. The Lokottaravādins placed the Buddha above the laws of karma and thus paved the way for the Mahāyānistic doctrine of a Transcendent Buddha.

1. vide Adv. p. 258.
4. ‘Although they could suppress the working of karma, the conquerors let it become manifest and conceal their sovereign power. This is mere conformity with the world.’ (Trans. by J.J. Jones, The Mahāvastu, Vol. I, p. 133).
Once the supremacy of the Buddha over the laws of karma was accepted, there remained no great difficulty in assuming a limitless life for the Buddha. The Sukhāvatī-vyūha opens with a similar and this time a far bolder declaration of the Buddha. "Should he desire, O Ananda, the Buddha can live on a single morsel for one kalpa, or even a hundred, a thousand ... or even millions of kalpas, or even beyond that and still his faculties will not diminish, nor will his complexion show any decay."

The Sukhāvatīvyūha was indeed devoted solely to the glorification of the Buddha of immeasurable life.

If the phenomena of life-prolongation was a Vaitulika theory, and, therefore, unacceptable to the Dīpakāra, how do we account for its occurrence in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra? Unfortunately, the Dīpakāra is silent on this point. He neither refers to the sūtra, nor gives any alternative interpretations as are found in the Pali Āṭṭhakathās. Most probably he dealt with this topic on an earlier occasion, while dealing with a topic "kati indriyāṇī vipakaḥ" (where the Kośakāra also treats this controversy) which, however, is lost to us. Considering his usual affiliations to the orthodox Vaibhāshika views we may hazard a conjecture that the Dīpakāra favoured one or other of the views of the Vibhāsha-śāstrins collected in the Mahā-vibhāṣaḥ and quoted in the Bhāshya.

2. vide Adv. p. 52, n. 4.
The next four viprayukta-saṃskāras viz. jātī (origination), sthiti (subsistence), jarā (decay) and anityatā (extinction), are called saṃskṛita-lakṣaṇas or phenomenalising characteristics of all phenomena. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, these four simultaneously exercise their power on all phenomena causing the origination, etc. of the latter. They further maintain that these four lakṣaṇas are as real as the dharmas which they characterise. Consequently, they are also characterised by secondary characteristics (upa-lakṣaṇas) like jātī-jātī, etc. They seek to prove the reality of these four lakṣaṇas by the support of a sūtra which says "of the saṃskṛita there is known the origin (utpāda), cessation (vyaya) and change of state (sthityanyathātva).

The Saunāntika Kośakāra examines these lakṣaṇas at great length. His main arguments against their acceptance as real dharmas, distinct from the phenomena, are: 1) They cannot simultaneously work upon a momentary (kshanīka) dharma; 2) The theory of upa-lakṣaṇas results in the fallacy of regress; 3) The term saṃskṛita in the sūtra quoted by the Vaibhāṣikas does not refer to a momentary dharma but to a series of them (pravāha). The series or stream itself is called subsistence (sthiti), its origin is called jātī, its cessation is vyaya, and the difference in its preceding and succeeding moments is called sthityanyathātva. Therefore, concludes

the Sautrāntika, the words like jāti etc, have no corresponding realities: they are only names, like the word pravāha (series). The saṃskṛita is defined by the Lord in a different sūtra: "Phenomenon is that which becomes having not been before, having once become it does not become again, and it is the series of which it forms a part which is called subsistence and which changes its state".

The Dīpākāra does not attempt a reply to these criticisms of the Kośakāra. He briefly deals with this topic concentrating only on two points, viz. the reality of jara (decay) and vinaśa (extinction).

The sūtra quoted by the Vaibhāshikas speaks of only three lakṣaṇas, viz. utpāda, vyaya and sthityanyathātva. In their Abhidharma, however, four are enumerated: jāti, sthiti, jara and anityatā. Of these the first and last are identical with utpāda and vyaya. The sūtra term sthityanyathātva is differently explained in different schools. The Theravādins interpret it as jara. They do not recognise the sthiti as a separate lakṣaṇa. Although it is represented in their upadhiyārūpas as (rūpasa)santati, the Dhammasaṅgani as well as the Visuddhimagga treat the latter term as a synonym of jāti (i.e. upechaya).

The Vaibhāshikas recognise both sthiti and jara. They, therefore, interpret the term sthityanyathātva differently. The Bhāshya gives two views. Some ācāryas hold that the term sthityanyathātva means jara

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1. "saṃskṛitaḥ nāma yad abhūtvā bhavati, bhūtvā cha punar na bhavati, yaś chāya sthiti-saṃjñākaḥ prabandhaḥ so 'nyathā chāryathā cha bhavati", iti kim atra dravyāntarair jātyādibhiḥ. ... Ibid.
2. uppādo ti jāti, vayo ti bheda, ṭhitassa anamathattam nāma jara. Āṇga. II p
3. āchaya-lakkhana rūpasa upachayo, ... pavatti-lakkhana rūpasa santati, ubhyampetaṁ jāti-rūpassevādhivachanaṁ ... Vm XIV. 66. See Dhs. 643.
only and not sthiti. The sūtra is only explanatory, and hence speaks only
of jāti, jara and nāśa, whereas the Abhidharma is definitive and hence
speaks of four. The sūtra does not refer to sthiti, because the Lord
wanted to cause distress about the phenomena in the minds of his disciples.
Moreover, sthiti (albeit not as a saṃskāra) is found even in the asaṃskṛita
dharmas which are held to be eternal. In order to dispel any confusion
between the saṃskṛita and asaṃskṛita, the sūtra speaks of only three.
Other āchāryas, however, maintain that the term sthityanyathātva includes
both sthiti and jara. These two dharmas are like the goddesses of good
luck and bad luck. The Lord combined jara with sthiti in order to cause
detachment from the phenomenal world.

This second view alone is given by the Dīpakāra. He maintains
that if a dharma were to be devoid of sthiti (subsistence), then it would
be incapable of yielding any fruit, i.e. performing any action. Consequently,
it would not be a real dharma. But mere sthiti without jara will also not
be desirable. For in that case the dharma will go on performing more than
one action and will never cease to be. Therefore, it is to be inferred
that there is a force like jara (decay) which reduces its strength
(śakti-hāni) and hands it over to the last force, viz. anityatā, which
brings an extinction of the dharma.

The Saumrāntika takes strong exception to this Vaibhāshika theory
of śakti-hāni. He points out that the change of a subsisting dharma into
a decaying dharma corresponds to the parināma-vāda of the Sāṃkhya, where

also a substance (dharmin or dravya) changes its aspects or qualities (dharma) without losing its identity.

The reply of the Dīpakāra to this criticism is brief. He says that according to the Sāmkhya, when that which is characterised (dharmin, i.e. a substance), while remaining permanent, gives up one characteristic (or aspect = dharma) and assumes another, both these characteristics being identical (svātmabhūta) with the characterised this is parināma.

According to the Vaibhāṣika, however, a characterised (dharmin, i.e. a dravya) is different from the characteristic (dharma), (in this case) jara.

Although brief, this statement of the Dīpakāra is significant. His definition of the Sāmkhya parināma corresponds to the one given by Vyāsa 2 in his Yoga-sūtra-Bhāṣya. Commenting on a sūtra dealing with three kinds of mutations (parināma) viz. dharma (of external aspects) lakṣhaṇa (of time-variation), and avasthā (of intensity), Vyāsa defines a parināma in the following words: 'What is a mutation? It is the rise of another external-aspect (dharma) in an abiding substance after an earlier external-aspect has come to end'.

It may be noted that these two definitions of the Sāmkhya parināma are almost identical, with the significant exception of the term svātmabhūta found only in the Vṛtti. The Dīpakāra uses this term to show that in the

Sāmkhya theory the dharmas and the dharmaṇi are identical. This idea is also clearly enunciated by Vyāsa. After declaring that the three-fold mutation is in reality one mutation, Vyāsa says "the external aspect (dharma, etc.) is nothing more than the substance itself".

Commenting on this, Vāchaspti Miśra says that the three-fold mutation is based on the distinction between the substance and the external-aspects (dharma) etc. But as referring to the lack of distinction between them it is said that in the strict sense the external-aspects (dharma etc.) are nothing more than the substance (dharmaṇi) itself. From this it is evident that the Sāmkhya recognises the identity as well as difference between the dharma and dharmaṇi. Vyāsa further examines an objection of an opponent who like the Dīpakāra, alleges absolute identity between the dharma and dharmaṇi. Vāchaspti Miśra refers to this opponent as a Buddhist. The latter have always maintained that the satkāryavāda results in the identity of cause and effect and consequently in the denial of any action or change. The Dīpakāra here represents this Buddhist thought.

The parallel development of almost identical speculations regarding the nature of a substance and its change in the Sāmkhya-Yoga

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1. paramārthatas tv eka eva pariṇāmo dharmaḥ svarūpa-matro hi dharmah...Ibid.
2. so 'yam evamvidho bhūtendriyapharipāmo dharmano dharma-lakshanaśvastha-bhedaṃ śīrtya veditavyah. abhedam śīrtya śāh [paramārthatas tv iti] tu śabdo bhedav-pakshād viśinashtī pāramārthikatvamasya jñāpyte... Tattva-Vaisāradī, III. 13. (*See Pāṭalajalasūtrāni, Bombay Sanskrit Series XVI*).
3. nanu dharminām dharmānāh abhinnaevatvavah dharmāno 'dhvanam cha bhide dharminā 'nanyatvena' dharmenāpiḥa dharmīvad bhavitavyam ity ata śāh...ekāntavādinā buddhām utthāpayati. Ibid.
and the Vaibhāshika schools have already been noted by many scholars, notably Poussin and Stcherbatsky. The Sāmkhya admits one everlasting reality (dravya) along with its momentary manifestations. The Vaibhāshika admits reality of several distinct elements (dravya) potentially existing in past as well as future, but manifesting only in their efficiency moments, i.e. the present. The four traditional Vaibhāshika explanations on the relation between a substance and its manifestations given by Dharmatṛata, Ghoshaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva have all been incorporated and harmonised by Vyāsa in his Yoga-Bhāṣya. The reality of the past and future is also proved in almost identical words in both the schools. Both admit that the mutations are not occasional, but perpetual. But whereas the Sāmkhya holds it as the very nature of the substance to undergo these mutations, the Vaibhāshikas hold that there are external forces like the saṃskṛita lakṣaṇas, which bring about a mutation in the substance. The statement of the Dīpakāra that the Vaibhāshika dharma (jara) is distinct from the dharmin (i.e. a saṃskṛita dharma), and hence his position is different from the Sāmkhya, confirms Stcherbatsky's observation that "when accused of drifting into Sāmkhya, the Sarvāstivādins justified themselves by pointing to these momentary forces, which saved the Buddhist principle of detached entities."

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2. The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 27, 47 notes.
3. See III. 13 and 15.
4. guna-svābhāvyam tu pravṛttikāraṇam uktam gunānām iti. Ibid. III. 13.
5. The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 45.
The Dīpakāra's use of such terms as dharmin and dharma respectively for a (saṃskṛta) dharma and (saṃskṛta) lakṣaṇa is also equally significant. It confirms our earlier hypothesis that the category of the viprayukta-saṃskāras was designed to accommodate 'qualities' or guṇas that qualified the substances (dravyas), i.e. non-viprayukta-dharmas. Had they been treated only as 'qualities' and, therefore, as mere names given to different aspects of a real dharma, the Sautrāntikas would have admitted them as prājñapti-dharma. The Vaibhāshikas, however, did not stop only at enumerating different 'qualities', but proceeded to make them reals and ended in treating them as dravyas or substances.

The contention of the Dīpakāra that without a reduction of its strength (śakti-hāni) caused by jāra, a dharma will not be affected by vināśa (destruction) leads to another Vaibhāshika theory that vināśa of a dharma is caused (saheṭuka) and not inherent in it.

The Kośakāra deals with this topic in detail while explaining the momentary nature of all phenomena. The Sautrāntika maintains that destruction is not caused. It is an inherent nature of a phenomena to perish the moment it flashes into existence. It does not depend on any external agency to bring about its destruction. For, if a dharma were not to perish immediately and spontaneously after its birth, it might never perish, even afterwards. The Vaibhāshika contention that it perishes on account of becoming different (anyathābhūta) by the loss of its power

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1. LVPak, IV. 2 d; 3a. For full details and other references on this controversy see MCB, V. pp. 148-158. (1936-37).
(śakti-hāni) is wrong. For it is a contradiction to say that (a momentary thing) becomes different. A thing cannot be itself and yet appear different from itself. Therefore, destruction is uncaused. Moreover, vināśa is merely an absence (abhāva). An absence is not a reality, and being unreal it has no function to perform.

The Dīpakāra points out that this Sautrāntika position is not supported either by scriptures or by reason: Destruction of a thing is caused, because it depends on the origination of that thing. It conforms to the law that 'being this, this becomes'. If it were to operate without a cause, it will always exist, and consequently there will be no origination of any dharma.

Nor is destruction a mere non-existence. For, the Vaibhāshikas do not say that a substance is destroyed. It is only the efficiency (kāritra) of a substance that is destroyed by vināśa. 'What we call destruction', says the Dīpakāra, 'is the non-arising of a (new) activity (in a substance) when its efficiency is confronted by an opposite condition. Therefore, vināśa does not mean merely a non-existence (of a substance). Moreover, existence and non-existence are contingent upon each other. Denial of one means denial of another. If destruction is to be treated as uncaused, origination too will have to be treated similarly. The reasons for holding the origination as caused also obtain in the case of destruction. Hence vināśa is sahetuka. After advancing these arguments the Dīpakāra quotes the scriptures that support the

Vaibhāṣika view: The Lord has said "one must strive hard to destroy bad states that have arisen". "Here a person becomes a killer of life". "There are three periodical dissolutions by which the world is destroyed". Finally it is said "depending on birth, there arise decay and death".

It may be noted that these arguments of the Dipakāra are almost identical with the traditional orthodox Vaibhāṣika views of Āchārya Saṃghabhadra. The central problem of this controversy rests, perhaps, on the meaning of a kṣaṇa and the simultaneous operation of these four incompatible lakṣanās on a kṣaṇika dharma. For the Sautrāntika, a kṣaṇa means a moment. For the Vaibhāṣika, however, it means that time which all the four functions, viz. origination, subsistence, decay and destruction take for their accomplishment. Thus a kṣaṇa of the Vaibhāṣika corresponds to a chittakkṣaṇa (mind-moment) of the Theravādins, which is really not a kṣaṇa but a unit of three moments. The Dipakāra does not fully discuss this problem, but from his other arguments on the reality of the lakṣanās, we can infer that he also subscribed to the same Vaibhāṣika concept of kṣaṇa.

8. NĀMA-PADA- VYAñJANA-KAYAS.

The viprayukta-saṃskāras that have been discussed above show a considerable influence of the Sāmkhya-yoga and the Vaiśeṣika schools on
the Vaibhāshikas. The last three viprayuktas, viz. nāma-kāya, pada-kāya and vyayājana-kāya, saṃskāras that impart significance to words, sentences and letters respectively, show in their formulation a certain influence of the Māṁśaka school and the Pātañjala school of Grammar.

The Pali scriptures make only incidental references to the problem of words and their meanings. The Kathāvatthu records no controversy on this theme. No Buddhist work prior to the Bhāshya takes any serious note of this problem. Indeed, the Bhāshya alone can be named as our earliest source for knowing the Buddhist theory of words. It is probable that the Buddhists made their entry in this field under the influence of their contemporary Māṁsakas and Vaiyākaranas, who had developed their theories of eternal words and of sīhāṭa.

For the Māṁsakas, the problem of words and meanings was of primary importance, as all their metaphysical and ritual speculations were based on the doctrine of the validity of the Vedas. They, therefore, developed the doctrine of eternal words and their natural (autpattika) meanings. As in the case of the Māṁsakas, the Vaibhāshika theories of words and their meanings can also be traced primarily to their speculations on the nature of the words of Buddha.

This can be seen from a controversy between the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāshika on the inclusion of the words of the Buddha in the formula of the five skandhas. As a matter of fact, both these schools agreed that the words (which consisted of sounds - śabda) were made up of sound-atoms (śabda-paramāṇu) reposing on the eight dravya-paramāṇus.
It was, therefore, only logical to treat all sounds (vāk) (and therefore all words) as material, and hence include them in the rūpa-skandha.

Contrary to this Sautrāntika position, the Vaibhāshikas maintained that the words of the Buddha are not of the nature of vāk (verbal sound) but are of the nature of nāma (non-material). The Vṛtti quotes a scripture on this controversy: "While the Lord lived, his words are of the nature of speech (vāk) as well as of the nature of nāma respectively in a secondary and primary sense. After his parinirvāṇa, however, his words are only of the nature of nāma and not of vāk. For, the Lord of the sages had a 'heavenly sound' incomparable with any mundane speech".

Commenting on this controversy Yaśomitra says that according to the Sautrāntikas, the Buddha-vachana is of the nature of vocal expression (vāg vijñapti) and hence is included in the rūpa-skandha. Those who maintain the category of the viprayukta-saṃskāras, include the Buddha-vachana in the saṃskāra-skandha. The Ābhidharmikas, however, accept both these views.

In elaboration of his last statement that the Ābhidharmikas accept both views, Yaśomitra quotes two passages from the Jñāna-prasthāna: "What is a Buddha-vachana? The speech, speaking, talk, voice, utterance, range of speech, sound of speech, action of speech, vocal expression of the Tathāgata is Buddha-vachana". According to this view the Buddha-vachana

is merely a vāk-vijñapti, i.e. verbal expression, which is identical with
the 'vāchā' of the Theravādins, also defined in similar terms.

This view, Yaśomitra says, is immediately followed by another
view (supporting the Vaibhāshika theory of nāma-pada-vyāfijana-kāyās):

"What is this dharma called Buddha-vachana? The arrangement in regular
order, the establishment in regular order, the uniting in regular order
of the nāma-kāya, pada-kāya and the vyāfijana-kāya (is called Buddha-vachana)."

This latter view is accepted by the Vaibhāshikas. This
passage suggests that the Buddha-vachanas are not verbal sounds but some
other non-material dharmas put into order.

Yaśomitra does not name the Abhidharmikas who accepted both these
views. Apart from the Bhāshya (representing the Neo-Vaibhāshikas) the
Aam. of Ghoshaka and the Aam. of Asanga (Yāgāchāra school) also enumerate
the nāma-pada-vyāfijana-kāyās in their viprayukta category. But their
definitions are different from those of the Vaibhāshikas. Ghoshaka defines
nāma-kāya as meaningful letters, the pada-kāya as naming a thing by
aggregate of padas and the vyāfijana-kāya as collection of letters.

Asanga's definitions of the first two sāṃskāras are altogether different.
He says that when the own-natures of dharmas are designated or named there

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1. yā... vāchā girā byappatho udīranaṁ ghoso ghosakamman vāchā vachībheda,
   ayaṁ vuchchhati vāchā... Dks. 637;
2. punas tatraivaṁantaram uktam Buddha-vachanaṁ nāma ka esha dharmaṁ?
   nāma-kāya-pada-kāya-vyāfijana-kāyanām yā anupūrva-rachanaṁ anupūrva-sthāpanā
   anupūrva-samāyoga iti. Saky. p. 52;
3. sārthakāksharāni nāma-kāyāḥ, pada-samuchchayena vastv abhidhānaṁ padakāyāḥ
   vipulasamuchchāyāḥ (= varmā-samāmāyāḥ) vyāfijana-kāyāḥ. Aam. p. 130.
   (It may be noted that this text is reconstructed from the Chinese
   translation).
is a notion called nāma-kāya. When the peculiarities (or details) of dharmas are designated there is a notion called pada-kāya. Vyākhyā-kāya is a notion for letters which are the support for the nāma-kāya and the pada-kāya. The same definitions are given in Haribhadra's Āa and the Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi of Hsuan-Tszang, suggesting that neither the Yogāchārins, nor the Vīmaṇavādins interpreted these terms in the sense in which they are understood in the Vaiṣhāṣika school. By Abhidharmikas, therefore, Yāsomitra, seems to refer to certain Vaiṣhāṣikas like our Dīpankāra who favoured the view that while the Buddha lived, his vāchanas are of the nature of nāma as well as of vāk (albeit in a secondary sense) but after his death, they are only of nāma-svabhāva.

The Koṭakāra deals with these sāṃskāras rather briefly, concentrating more on their refutation and less on their explanation. We may here summarise the Vaiṣhāṣika position and the Sautrāntika refutation of this topic as contained in the Bhāṣya.

The Vaiṣhāṣika maintains that verbal sound alone is not capable of conveying any meaning. A verbal sound (vāk) operates on the nāman, and the latter conveys the meaning. Thus it is the nāman which gives significance to a word, which is purely material. This nāman is a viprayuktā sāṃskāra. In support of this theory, the Vaiṣhāṣika quotes a scripture which says that 'a stanza rests on nāman'.

1. dharmānāṃ svabhāvādhivaḥchane nāma-kāyā iti prajñaptih. dharmānāṃ viśeṣādhivaḥchane pada-kāyā iti prajñaptih. tadabhayaśrayesu aksharesu vyākhyā-kāyā iti prajñaptih. Āsa. p. I⅔
2. See Āa. p.⅔.
5. 'nāma-sanniśritā gāthā'.
The Sautrāntika maintains that the nāma-kāyas do not play any part in conveying a meaning. It is true that all sounds or sounds alone (ghosha-mātra) do not convey a meaning. But verbal sounds (vāk) which are agreed upon by convention to mean a particular thing (krita-saṅketa) do convey their meanings. Since such a saṅketa is essential even in the assumption of the nāma-kāya, the latter is redundant and hence useless.

Moreover, the Vaibhāshika theory that a nāman is operated on by verbal sounds (vāk) does not stand any scrutiny. For, if nāman is an entity, a real dharma, it can be produced nor revealed bit by bit by the verbal sounds, which come into existence only in series. Nor can it be said that it is produced or revealed only by the last sound, for in that case it should be sufficient to hear only the last sound in order to understand its artha.

If in order to avoid this dilemma the Vaibhāshika thinks that, after the manner of a viprayukta like jāti, the nāman is also born with its object (artha-sahaja), then it would mean that there are no actual nāma-kāyas conveying past or future objects, or the asaṃskṛita dharmas which are not born.

Moreover to admit an entity in itself, called nāman (a word) or pada (a sentence) is a wholly superfluous hypothesis. We might as well argue that there exists distinct from ants a thing called 'line of ants'. One can understand the letters (vyākṣa) being considered as reals but it is absurd to treat their arrangements in an order like word or sentence

1. Compare with the Pali 'opapātika nāmapaṭṭattī' and the 'apauruṣaheya nāma-kāyas' described by the Dīpakāra. Vide infra, pp. 197 and 208.
As regards the scripture quoted by the Vaibhāshikas, the Saṃśkāra point out that the 'nāman' there means words on which men have agreed that they mean a certain thing. It does not refer to any additional saṃskāra as is postulated by the Vaibhāshikas.

It is interesting to note that the scripture quoted by the Vaibhāshika also occurs in the Pali Sagātha-vagga of the Saṃyutta-nikāya. It deals with the composition of gāthās. To a question as to what is the origin and foundation of a verse, the Buddha says that letters are their origin and nāmas are their foundation. Commenting on this, Buddhaghosa says that letters (akkhara) produce a pada, padas produce a gāthā, and the gāthā conveys a meaning. As regards the term nāma, he says that it means names, such as ocean, earth, etc., which are designations of certain concepts. From this it is clear that for the Theravādins the nāma is not a saṃskāra. But Buddhaghosa's explanation of nāma agrees with the Vaibhāshika definition: "nāma-paryāyāḥ saṅjñā-karanaṁ yathā ghaṭa iti".

The Vaibhāshika takes the term pada as a synonym of a sentence (pada-paryāyo vākyam). This rather unusual meaning of the term pada can also be traced to Pali. In the suttas this term is often used in the sense

1. chhando nidānaṁ gāthānaṁ akkharā tāsaṁ viyāfjanaṁ / nāma-samnissitā gāthā kavi gāthānahi sasayo ti // S. I. 38.
3. nāma-samnissitā ti samuddādi-paññatti-nissitā. gāthā ārabhanto hi samuddāṁ vā paṭhavinī vā yaṁ kīfichi nāmaṁ nissayitvā va ārabhāti. Ibid.
of a sentence or a refrain of a verse or a line of a verse. In the scripture quoted above dealing with gāthā, the term pada is not used. But the commentary says that 'akkharaṃ padaṃ janeti'. Since nāma refers to a word, it is probable that by padaṃ here is understood a sentence (pāda) or a line of a gāthā. This seems to be the original meaning of the term pada in the expression 'pada-kāya'. But a line of a verse may not necessarily be a complete sentence. Perhaps to make it conform to the Grammarians' definition of a sentence that the Bhāṣya defines the term pada as 'that by which meaning is complete', and quotes a line (anityā vata saṃskāraḥ) of a verse as an illustration. The Vṛtti also calls pada a synonym of vakya and quotes further an Abhidharmika view: "A pada (sentence) is a collection of significant words (pada) which fulfil the intended meaning".

The Vaibhāṣikas are not unaware of the fact that the term pada according to the Grammarians meant a word. In the Abhidharmika view quoted above, pada is used side by side in both these meanings. Yaśomitra also quotes the Grammarians' definition "sup-tiṅ-antaḥ padam". The Theravādins also know this meaning as is evident from such expressions as padaso (word by word), padattho (meaning of a word), etc. The term vyākyana

1. e.g. ekena padaṇa sabbo attho vutto. S.II. p. 36. - ekena padenā ti 'phassa-pachchayā dukkhaḥ' ti iminā ekena padaṇa. S.AI p. 57. Also see S.IV. p. 379.
2. vakyaḥ padaṇa yāvatārtha-parisamāptih. Akb. II. 47 ab.
is also interpreted by the Theravādins as letters (akkhara) apparently
including both the vowels and the consonants. Commenting on a sutta
where vānna and byāñjana occur together, Buddhaghosa says that these two
terms are identical, and that the latter term could also mean only certain
vānas, (i.e. consonants).

Thus it is clear that there was a pre-Vaibhāshika tradition for
the use of the terms nāma, pada and vyāñjana in the sense of word, sentence
and letter, respectively. Stcherbatsky's observation, therefore, that
this is "a case exhibiting clearly the desire to have a terminology of
one's own" overlooks the tradition noticed above.

Nor is this tradition limited only to a common use of these terms.
One can even detect a certain correspondence between this Vaibhāshika
samāskāra called nāma-kāya and a Theravādin dharma called nāma-paffatti,
recognised more or less as an independent category by later Theravādins
like Anuruddha.

The term paffatti occurs several times in the Suttas, always
referring to designations or concepts recognised as unreal in themselves,
nevertheless used in common worldly parlance. In the Phoṭṭhapāda-sutta,
for instance, the Buddha while speaking on various speculations on the
nature of self, says that a word like atta-patilabhha, or expressions like
past, present, future or milk, curds, butter, ghee etc. which he used in

1. tattha aparimānaṃ vannā aparimānaḥ byāñjanaḥ. S. V. p. 430. - aparimānaḥ
vannā ti appamāṇo akkharāni, byāñjana ti tesāṃ yeva vevachanaṃ;
vannanāḥ vā ekadeso... S. A. III. p. 298.
his discussion, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in common use in the world. The Tathāgata although makes use of these, is not led astray by them (i.e. knows them as unreal).

The Suttas do not contain further elaborations on the theme of pāṭīta. But the Abhidhamma-pitaka and the Āṭṭhakathās offer several important speculations on the nature, scope, origin and cognition of the pāṭīta, and treat it almost as a separate category like the nāma and rūpa. The Puggla-pāṭīta, for instance, is, as the name itself suggests, solely devoted to a description of various concepts arising about a central concept (pāṭīta) called a personality (puggla).

The Suttanta-mātikā contains three pairs (dukas) dealing with dharmas respectively called adhivācana, nirutti and pāṭīta, and the dharmas that are made known by them. Defining a dhamma which is pāṭīta, the Dhammasangani says: "that which is an appellation, that which is a designation, an expression, a current term, a name, a denomination, the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinctive mark, a phrasing on this or that dhamma is a dhamma called pāṭīta. All dharmas are capable of being expressed. The other two terms, viz. adhivachana and nirutti are described in identical terms.

Commenting on these dukas, the Atthasalini dwells at length on

3. yaśaṃ tesām dhammānaṃ samkhā samāna pāṭītiyo vohāra nāmaṃ nāmakammam nāmadheyyaṃ nirutti byañjanam abhilāpo, ime dhamma pāṭītiyo. sabbe' va dhamma pāṭītiyo-pathā. Dhs. 1308.
one term, viz. the nāma[-pamatti]. Nāma (name) is fourfold: that given on a special occasion, that given in virtue of a personal quality, that given by parents and that which has spontaneously arisen (opapātika-nāma). Of these the last is more significant, as it points to a belief that certain names are eternal. In those cases where a former concept tallies with a later concept, a former current term with a later one, e.g. the moon in a previous cycle is [what we now call] moon, this name is called opapātika-nāma. It is suggested here that there are things which are not named by others, but name themselves, or are born with their names. The four (arūpa) khandhas are called nāma, because they make their own name as they arise. When they arise their name also arises. No one names vedanā, saying 'Be thou called vedanā'. A vedanā, whether it is past, present or future, it is always called vedanā. This theory of the opapātika-nāma reminds us of the Vaibhāśika theory that the nāma-kāyas are artha-sahaja (born with meanings) and also corresponds, as will be seen below, to what the Dipakāra calls 'apaurusheya nāma-kāyas' conveying such dharmas as the skandha, āyatana and dhātu.

Finally on the scope of this nāma-pamatti, the Atthasālinī says that this is a unique dharma which covers all dharmas, all dharmas come under its scope. The nāma-pamatti is applicable to dharmas of all the

1. yā pana purima-pamattiyaṁ patati, purima-vohāro pachchima-vohāro patati, seyyathidham purima-kappe chando chando yeva nāma, etarhī chando yeva...idam opapātika-nāmaṁ. DhaA.V. 113.
2. chattāro tāva khandhā nāma-karaṇatthena nāmaṁ vedanādayo hi...attano nāmaṁ karomā va uppajjanti. tesu uppannesu tesam nāmaṁ uppannAMeva hoti...vedanāya uppannāya 'tvam vedanā nāma hohi' ti nāma-gahana-kicchchaṁ natthi. atīte pi vedanā vedanā yeva,...anāgate pi, pachchuppanne pi. DhaA.V.115.
three spheres. There is no being, nor thing that may not be called by a name.

The paññatti discussed above refers only to the nāma-paññatti or names. There is another kind of paññatti, called attha-panñatti, which can be roughly translated as 'ideas' or 'concepts' or 'reflexes' (nimitta). The Theravādins recognise several kinds of ideas. There are ideas such as 'land', 'mountain' and the like referring to certain physical changes in nature; or ideas like 'man', 'woman', 'individual', referring to the fivefold set of aggregates; there are ideas of locality, time and the like, derived from the revolutions of the moon, etc. These ideas are not real dharmas. Nevertheless, they become objects of knowledge. As Anuruddha says, "they shadow forth the meanings [of things] and become objects of thought genesis [as our ideas]". This idea is designated as attha-panñatti. It is called paññatti, because it is made known (paññāpiyattā paññatti) by the nāma-panñatti. The names (nāmas) are called nāma-panñatti, because they make the ideas known (paññāpanato paññatti). Thus the term paññatti includes both names and ideas.

Although its unreality was not lost sight of, the Theravādins on account of their recognition of the paññatti as an object of mind, had to show its place in the traditional formula of the five skandhas. They had
to classify it either as nāma or rūpa, saṁskṛita or asaṁskṛita, traiкалika
(belonging to three times) or kāla-vimukta (transcending the time). A
few speculations on this problem are found in the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha
and its commentaries.

Anuruddha classifies all dhammas into three categories, viz.,
rūpa, nāma and paññatti. Of these the first includes matter, the second
includes chitta, chetasikas and nibbāna. The last includes names and
ideas (i.e. nāma and attha-pannatti). He describes pannatti as a saṁkhata
dhamma since it is also produced by a cause viz. by a certain worldly
convention that a particular name refers to particular object (loka-saṅketa).
Nevertheless, it is unreal, and hence cannot be predicated as past, present
or future. Therefore it is called kāvyimutta.

After dealing with the nature of pannatti, Anuruddha explains
the thought process involved in its cognition leading to an understanding
of the thing meant (attha). Following, i.e. making its object a vocal
sound (vachī-ghosa) there arises a thought process called śrotra-vijñāna
(auditory consciousness). In a subsequent thought process the verbal
sound heard gives rise in mind (manodvāra) to a corresponding nāma-pannatti.
This is grasped in a subsequent process by a mind-consciousness

1. iti tekaḷikā dhammā kālamuttā cha sambhevā /
   ajjhattanā cha bahiddhā cha saṁkheta-saṁkheta tathā /
   pannatti-nāma-rūpānam vasena tividhā thitā / A. saṅgaha. VIII. 31.
2. sayaṁ pannatti vimmeyyā loka-saṅketa-nimmitā   Ibid. VIII. 36.
3. vachī-ghoṣānusārena sota-vinnāpā-vīthiṣa /
   pavattānantarupamā-manodvārasa gocarā //
   attha yassānuśārena vinnāyanti tato paraṁ
   sayaṁ pannatti vimmeyyā loka-saṅketa-nimmitā // A. saṅgaha VIII. 36.
( mano-vimañña-vithi ) which is already conversant with the saṅketa between this nāma-paññatti and the particular object it is conventionally taken to convey. When this mind consciousness thinks on this saṅketa there follows the cognition of the object i.e. the thing meant ( artha).

The nāma-paññatti of the Theravādins offers several points of comparison with the nāma-kāya of the Vaibhāshikas. Both these dharmas are different from verbal sounds ( vāk-sabda or vachī-ghosa). Both are dependent on the verbal-sounds for their origin. Both follow a verbal sound perceived by a hearer. Both serve the purpose of conveying a meaning ( artha) by the help of saṅketa. The nāma-paññatti is enumerated as a separate category distinct from the nāma and rūpa. The nāma-kāyas also belong to the viprayuktaas, different from the nāma and rūpa. But whereas the Theravādins recognise the nāma-paññatti as unreal and, therefore, a prajñapti-dharma, the Vaibhāshikas treat the nāma-kāyas as a real dravya-dharma.

Although the Theravādins hold that vachīghosa gives rise to a nāma-paññatti, they do not offer any explanation on the difficulties involved in this operation. Nor do they show any acquaintance with the controversies that took place on this problem between the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāshika or between the sphoṭavādins and their opponents. The Sautrāntikas were certainly acquainted with certain aspects of these controversies as can be seen from the Kośakāra’s arguments against the

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1. nāma-chintanākārappavattassa manodvārikavimañña-santānassa idamīdissassa atthassa nāmaṁ ti pubbe yeva gahita saṅketopaññissayassa......

A. Vibhūvinītīka, VIII. 36.
revelation of the nāman by series of vocal sounds - arguments which are not
different from those of the Mimāṃsakas and others against the theory of the
revelation of sphoṭa by dhvani. But neither the Kośakāra nor his
commentator Yaśomitra makes any reference to the Mimāṃsakas or the
sphoṭavādins. Both are content only with a brief refutation of the
Vaibhāṣīka. The Dīpakāra's treatment of this topic is more comprehensive.

He refutes the Sautrāntika position, makes pointed reference to the theories
of (verbal) sounds held by the Mimāṃsaka and Viśeshika, and briefly
examines the sphoṭa theory of the Grammarians.

After briefly stating the Sautrāntika argument that the
nāma-kāyas etc. are not different from the verbal sounds (vāk-śabda) and,
therefore, are unreal, the Dīpakāra sets forth the Vaibhāṣīka theory of
these saṃskāras. A verbal sound (vāk-śabda), he says, is synonymous
with speech (vāk), utterance (gīh), and is, therefore, included in the
rūpaskandha. The nāma-kāya, etc. are viprayukta saṃskāras, and hence
included in the saṃskāra-skandha. The nāma-kāyas etc. are dependent for
their origin on the verbal sound and manifest the meaning which is dependent
on the utterance (or the individual word-shape) and thus are representative
of the thing meant (artha) as in the case of (the content) of a
knowledge. Just as the five sense cognitions are dependent on their
corresponding five objects, similarly the nāma-kāyas, etc. are dependent for

1. See Sābara-bhāṣya, I. 1.5 and Sloka-vārtika, sphoṭavāda.
their origin on the verbal sound. It is said, therefore, "A verbal sound (vāk) operates on the nāman, the nāman expresses the object (artha)".

Here the Sautrāntika raises the following objection: you say that along with the speech-sound the letters (like ka, cha, ta, ta, pa, etc.) are produced, by the speech the nāmakāyas are brought into operation. This being the case, the speech, following as it does each letter in turn, is subject to divisibility. Therefore, there can be no such thing as a nāma-kāya as a meaning conveyor (abhidhāna). (Since for this purpose a unitary entity is required).

The Dīpakāra rejects this argument saying that when the aggregate of the sound parts are perceived, there is a possibility of its (nāma-kāyas) having the capacity of being a meaning-bearer. Moreover, its existence is evident from its activity. Its activity is conveying its meaning. It conveys its own meaning, since the relation between nāman, and meaning is not created by any person (apurusheyyatvāt).

The Sautrāntika here brings forward the theory of saṅketa. He says that the nāman, etc. are not different from the verbal speech. The verbal sound alone acting itself (kritāvadhiḥ) as the factor which gives rise to the cognition of the object, conveys the meaning to the listener when its constituent parts are grasped as a unit by memory. Why, therefore, postulate these separate nāman, etc.

The Dīpakāra points out that the verbal sounds, being atomic are

1. vāti nāmāḥ pravartate, nāmārthāṁ dyotayati. Ibid.
not capable of revealing the artha. A (verbal) sound being a collection of atoms can bring to light only those objects with which it has come into contact, like a lamp. Things which are not born or which are destroyed or are inaccessible (to senses, like heaven etc.) are not reached by sound. Naturally, therefore, a sound cannot convey these objects.

Moreover, the sounds cannot convey a meaning either serially or simultaneously. The stems of balwaja grass, for instance, which are individually incapable of being used in the action of dragging a piece of wood, become capable when they are put together and remain in the form of a rope. But the words of a sentence which consist of atoms of sound, and which come into existence in series, are merely conceptual unities (samudāya-sāmkshepadh) of the constituent parts which are received by the mind. They are, therefore, incapable each part individually (of conveying the meaning), nor do they convey it if taken together, since they cannot stand in unity like the balwaja grass. Thus it is proved that the sounds do not convey, the meaning either serially or simultaneously.

Moreover, as in the case of a lamp, there is no relationship of revealed - revealer between the sounds and meanings, (artha). Thus people who wish to see a pot take a lamp which has the capacity of revealing a pot and other things as well; and there are no speech sounds which have the predetermined activity of revealing (or acting) on any meaning taken astrandum by some particular relationship.

Nor is this particular relationship viz. of revealed - revealer appropriate in the case of the thing meant and a sound. For, the sounds do not convey that which is not agreed upon by convention to mean a particular thing.
Even if we accept the theory of saṅketa obtaining between a sound and artha, such a sound is still subject to the argument of seriality. If it is said that the memory of each sound conveys the meaning, then also it is subject to the same fault. And if it is maintained that the trace (saṃskāra) left by the sounds in the mind conveys the meaning, then also we deny it as it is not proved.

The Dīpakāra further elaborates the atomic nature of sounds. He says that sound (ghosha) cannot be a unity as it consists of several paramāṇus. It is accepted that the diphthongs e and ai are produced in the throat and palate. But it is not correct to say that a sound consisting of only one atom operates in two different places. But this is possible in the case of aggregates of atoms. Even then the atoms cannot convey a meaning individually, for their individual existence cannot be proved. Nor can they do so in a collection (saṃghāta). For a saṃghāta does not exist in reality apart from its constituent parts.

After showing thus that verbal sounds alone cannot convey a meaning, the Dīpakāra sums up his position. "The correct form of exposition", he says, "is that the letters which are past with reference to the last letter are grasped by a (single) mental effort (mano-buddhi) and then

1. saṃskāra iti chet... Adv. p. 111. This appears to be an allusion to the Mīmāṃsaka theory: 'purvavarna-janita-saṃskāra-sahito 'ntyo varṇah pratyāyakah iti. Sābara-bhāṣya, I. 1. 5.
2. Adv. p. 111 (on ka. 145 ab). The Vṛtti here should be corrected as following: "edaitau kaṁtha-tālavyau " iti pratiṣṭhāyate. na chaika-svān-(nu-)vachanasya... etc.
3. atita-varṇa-samudāyastv antya-varṇāpekṣha mano-buddhyopāgrihita-svarūpah sambandhīṇy arthe buddhim utpādayan pratyāyaratīti yuktā-rūpe vyapadeśāḥ. Adv. p. 112. It is curious to note that there is no reference to the nāma-kāya in this statement. Read without the context this line would appear to conform to the Sautrāntika view. Probably the term 'buddhi' should here be understood as a concept i.e. nīmitta, another name for the nāma (Vide infra, p. 206 n.1.) which directs the mind towards the artha.
cause to arise the mental concept (buddhi) as directed towards the relevant meaning and thus (only in this fashion) convey the meaning”.

As regards a common belief that a (verbal-) sound conveys a meaning, the Dipakāra says that this belief does not correspond to facts. “In fact the speech (vak) operates on the nāma, i.e. it expresses or speaks the nāma, i.e. it gives voice to it. The nāma brings to light the artha. Thus the speech passing over each letter in order, speaking or giving voice to the nāma and at the same time giving rise to (the perception of) its own form, but existing only in the form of series, is said to reveal the artha only by a process of metaphorical transfer. The meaning is not expressed or brought to light by the sound”.

This exposition of the nāma-kāya offers several points of comparison with the sphoṭa theory of early Grammarians. Sphoṭa is defined as “the abiding word, distinct from the letters and revealed by them, which is the conveyor of the meaning”. The nāma-kāya is also distinct from letters (i.e. sound), is revealed by them, and is claimed as the conveyor of meanings. The Vaibhāṣika argument that sounds on account of their seriality cannot convey a meaning, is identical with the argument of the sphoṭavādins against the Naiyāyikas who, like the Sautrāntika, maintained that verbal sounds (with the help of saṅketa) convey the artha. But whereas the sphoṭa is called a śabda and described as one and eternal, the

3. Ibid.
nāma-kāyas are nowhere designated as śabda and are declared to be many and non-eternal.

The Dipakāra does not appear to be unaware of this similarity. As if anticipating an attack from the Sautrāntikas on this account, he raises a question whether the nāma-kāya etc. are nitya or anitya. Such a question is indeed unnecessary, for the nāma-kāya is a saṃskāra, and consequently anitya. The question raised, therefore, suggests that a similarity between the sphota and nāma-kāya was present to the mind of the Dipakāra. He is, therefore, unduly emphatic when he says that the nāmakāyas are anitya, as they depend for their function on such causes as ghosha (sound) etc.

Nor does he recognize the theory of sphota. He examines a statement of Patañjali that sphota (the unchanging substratum) is the word, the sound is merely an attribute of the word. ("śphotah śabdo dhvaniḥ śabda-guṇah"). The Dipakāra does not admit any difference between a substratum and an attribute, and, therefore, says that these two being identical, even the sound (dhvani) will become eternal. For him dhvani, śabda and sphota are all synonyms like hasta, kara and pāni etc. The sphota being thus identical with verbal sound is subject to the same fault of seriality and therefore incapable of conveying the artha.

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1. It is precisely on this ground that Sāntarakṣita refutes the Vaibhāṣika theory of nāma-kāya; "yo'pi Vaibhāṣikāḥ śabda-viśayāṁ nāmākhyāṁ nimitta-khyāṁ chārtva-chīlarūpam viprayuktāṁ saṃskāram ichchhati, td apy etemaiva duśhitāṁ drashtavyam, tathā hi - tan nāmādī yadi kshanikaṁ tada anvaya-yaogah, akshanikatve kramijfānānapatpan. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjika, kā. 908. See Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p. 115.
He further confirms his rejection of the theory of sphaṭa by openly favouring a view, which Patañjali calls naive, that śabda is dhvani. Patañjali in his Mahābhāṣya gives two views on the nature of a word (śabda): (i) A word is that by means of which, when uttered (yenochcharitena), there arises an understanding of the thing meant, (ii) or a word is a sound capable of conveying a meaning (pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ).

The expression 'yenochcharitena' is traditionally held to refer to sphaṭa. The Dīpakāra does not refer to this view, but quotes the second view showing his preference for it. But this second view equally goes against his theory of nāma-kāya. He, therefore, says that the nāma etc. are different from the dhvani (i.e. from the śabda), (because) they are 'sarvārthavishaya'.

The significance of this statement seems to be that whereas a sound refers to a particular thing, the nāmakāya as a samskāra is capable of conveying all meanings. Taken as a dharma, this expression corresponds to what the Theravādins called 'sabbe dhammā paññatti-pathā' or with the statement of the Atthasālinī that "ayam hi nāma-paññatti eka-dhammo sabbesu chatubhūmika-dhammesu nipatati".

The sphaṭa theory referred to by the Dīpakāra shows his acquaintance only with the Patañjala school of Grammar. He does not refer to the later developments of this theory as contained in the Vākyapadīya

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2. On the validity of this tradition, see J. Brough's article 'Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians' in the Transactions of the Philological Society, 1951, pp. 27-46.
3. tasmāt pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ, tataḥ chānye nāmādayah sarvārtha-vishayā iti sthāpanā. Adv. p. 113."
of Bhartrihari. While dealing with the nature of sounds, he says that the Vaiyakaranas (together with the Mīmāṃsakas) do not recognize the atomic nature of sounds, and proceeds to show that the sounds are atomic, because they possess resistance. The Vākyapadīya refers to a view that some consider words (śabda) as consisting of atoms. It is possible that the Dīpakāra was not aware of this view, or did not consider it an authoritative view of the Grammarians.

As seen above, the sphoṭavādins understand the term 'śabda' in the sense of sphaṭa and not in the ordinary sense of a sound. This śabda, therefore, is not perceived by ears but only by mind. The Dīpakāra makes play with the ambiguity of this term and ridicules the Grammarians for maintaining a view that śabda (sound) is perceived by mind.

The Dīpakāra further gives some more details about the nāma-kāyas etc. The nāma-kāyas are two fold: Those which have a determined meaning, and those which do not (in themselves) mean any particular thing (yadrichchhika). The farmer is again divided into two kinds: apaurusheya (not created by any person) and laukika (mundane). The nāmakāyas which convey the dhātu, āyatana and skandhas are apaurusheya. They are primarily perceived only by the Buddha. It is therefore said "the nāma-pada-vyāfjana-kāyas appear when the tathāgatas appear (in the world)".

The laukika (worldly) nāma-kāyas are two fold: those which convey a particular thing, and those which are (yādrichchhika). Of these, the apaurusheya as well as the niyata-laukika nāmakāyas convey only those meanings for which there exists a sanketa.

The use of the term apaurusheya for the nāmakāyas which convey the Buddhist categories of dharma is significant. It reminds us of the opapātika nāma of the Theravādins and shows a direct influence of the Mīmāṁsaka. For the latter, the Vedas are apaurusheya and eternal. For the Vaibhāshika, the Buddha-vachanas (i.e. nāma-kāyas) are apaurusheya, but not eternal.

It appears from the above discussion that the Vaibhāshika theory of the nāma-kāyas was a continuation and a development of an earlier tradition represented in the form of nāma-paṁmati in the Pali Abhidharma and Atthakathās. As in the case of many other prajñāpti-dharmas, the nāma-kāyas, etc., also came to be recognised by the Vaibhāshikas as dravya-dharmas, and thus found a place in the viprayukta category. The lack of speculation on the nature of the Buddha-vachana in the Pali tradition and its presence in the Vaibhāshika school suggests that this was a later development brought about by a certain influence of other schools, particularly the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vaiyākaranas, who, although for different reasons, had a primary interest in the problem of words and their meanings. The Vaibhāshikas seem to have benefitted from the arguments of the early sphoṭavādin Grammarians. But the Mīmāṁsakas seem to have exercised a far greater influence on them as is evident from the use of such expressions as apaurusheya for denoting the Buddha-vachana.
The controversies discussed above occur in the first two Adhyāyas of the Dīpa, as they are related to an examination of the Vaibhāṣikā dharmas in general and the viprayukta-saṁskāras in particular. The third Adhyāya of Dīpa is almost entirely lost. The fourth adhyāya, dealing with karma, contains a major controversy on the Sautrāntika theory of bhāja, and also a brief refutation of the Kosakāra's views on the nature of a pārājika ('defeated') bhikṣu, and on manas-karma (mental action).

After dealing with the ways by which a person can obtain discipline (saṁvara) leading to his ordination as a bhikṣu (upasampadā according to the laws of Vinaya), the Kosakāra explains the causes that bring a fall of such a bhikṣu from the prātimoksha-saṁvara.

Four causes are accepted by almost all schools: A declaration by a bhikṣu, made according to the laws of Vinaya, that he is discarding the discipline (śikṣā-nikshepaṇa); his death; his change of sex; and annihilation of his roots of good (kuśala-mūla).

In addition to these four, the Sautrāntikas maintain that a bhikṣu loses his prātimoksha-saṁvara when he commits one of the four cardinal transgressions called patanīyās (Pali pārājika), and thus ceases

to be a bhikshu.

The Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣikas do not accept this view. According to them such a 'defeated' person (pāraṇjika) is still a bhikshu, because he has transgressed only against a part of his whole discipline (kritaṃsāmvara). When he fully observes his precepts, he is called śilavān. When he breaks any part of it he is called duh-śīla. In both states he remains a bhikshu. A duh-śīla is restored to his former state by duly confessing his transgression before the saṃgha, just as a person in debt obtains his freedom on repaying the debt. In support of his argument the Vaibhāṣika quotes a scripture which says: "Should a duh-śīla bhikshu teach a nun, he commits a saṃghāvaśesha (Pali saṃghādisesa) offence". The Vaibhāṣika points out that the term 'duh-śīla' in this passage means a person who has committed a pāraṇjika. How could he be said to have committed a saṃghāvaśesha if he were not a bhikshu?

The Sautrāntika does not agree with this Vaibhāṣika interpretation of the term duh-śīla. He points out another scripture where a pāraṇjika is compared to a palmyra palm cut off at the crown, and thus is incapable of growing again. It is also said in the same passage that "a pāraṇjika becomes a non-mendicant, ceases to be a son of a Sākya, and perishes from his

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1. Ibid. note 4.
2. duh-śīlaś ched bhikshuhr bhikshunīṃ anuśāsti saṃghāvaśesham āpadyate...
   This rule does not occur in the Pali Pātimokkha. Instead, a minor (pāchittiya = expiation) rule is laid down that a monk, who, without the consent of the saṃgha, exhorts nuns is guilty of a pāchittiya; yo pana bhikkhu asammato bhikkhuniyo ovadeyya, pāchittiyaṃ. (No. 21). (Vin. IV. p. 51).
monkhood". The Sautrāntika rightly asks "which kind of monkhood perishes when one becomes a pārañjika?".

The Vaibhāshika does not repudiate these scriptures, but says that a pārañjika monk ceases to be a 'paramārtha-bhikṣu' (i.e. a bhikṣu in the highest sense).

The Kośakāra examines the meaning of the term bhikṣu. The Vinaya, he says, enumerates five kinds of bhikṣus: (i) a bhikṣu who is not initiated, (ii) an immoral bhikṣu, (iii) a bhikṣu because he begs, (iv) a bhikṣu because he has brought an end to his passions (i.e. an arhat), (v) a bhikṣu on whom is conferred the upasampadā through a Vinaya procedure called jñāpti-chaturthaka-karma. The Vinaya specifically states that with regard to the application of the codes of Vinaya, a bhikṣu is the one who is duly initiated. When, therefore, the Vinaya says that a monk perishes from his monkhood it means he loses his initiation; it could not mean he ceases to be a 'paramārtha-bhikṣu' (i.e. an arhat). For surely, a person could not perish from a state which he has not yet attained. The Kośakāra, therefore, accuses the Vaibhāshika of wilfully distorting the meaning of the scriptures to suit his theory.

5. idam ati-sāhasam vartate ... yat bhagavatā nītārthām pumār anyathā nīyate ..., Vide Adv. p.133, n.5.
The Bhāshya does not fully explain the Vaibhāshika meaning of the term 'paramārtha-bhikshutva', or their interpretation of the scripture which says that a pārajika becomes a non-mendicant, ceases to be a son of a Śākyya, etc.

The Dipakāra gives an indication of the Vaibhāshika standpoint on this controversy. Unfortunately a large part of the text which contained this controversy is lost. Only a definition of a paramārtha-bhikshu and a reference to the Kośakāra's view have survived in the extant Dipa. The Dipakāra defines a paramārtha-bhikshu as the one who is endowed with śīla (i.e. samvara) as well as with right view-point (dṛishṭi). One who is endowed with only one of these, is a bhikshu only by convention (or in a subordinate sense - samvṛitya bhikshuḥ), one who is devoid of both is not a bhikshu at all.

As regards the scripture which says that a pārajika becomes a non-mendicant, etc., the Dipakāra says that the scripture here should not be taken literally. The Lord uses these expressions to censure those disciples who indulge in bad conduct, and to ensure the stability of the Order. He has used similar expressions with regard to those monks who are envious, crooked, etc. It is said "If a monk be envious, jealous, wicked, crooked, holder of a wrong view, comparable to a tree the inside of

2. "śāsana-sthity-arthaṁ durvṛutta-vineyā-vasādānārtham. p.133. cf. saṁgha-sutthutāya ... dummaṁkānaṁ puggalānaṁ niggahāya ... Vinayā, III.1, p.21.
which is rotten, such an evil bhikshu should be expelled". It is well recognised that one is not expelled from the order for only entertaining such mental evils. The same rule also applies in the case of the above scripture which says that a pārajika ceases to be a monk. It should not be taken literally.

Whether judged by the laws of Vinaya or by practice (as prevalent in the Theravāda tradition), the Vaibhāshika contention that a pārajika bhikshu retains his monkhood is both illegal and unusual. The Vinaya passages quoted by the Sautrāntika are also found in identical words in the Theravāda canon. The Aṭṭhakathā interpretations of these scriptures, of the term bhikshu, and of the simile of the palmyra palm also agree with the Sautrāntika standpoint. Even today, in the Singhalese saṅgha, a 'defeated' monk is treated as an outsider, after being duly expelled by the saṅgha through a Vinaya act called ukkhepaniya-kamma. The saṅgha has no authority, however, to disrobe such a monk; he may continue to live in the vihāras, but is not entitled to any rights or privileges, which only an initiated monk can enjoy. He is treated, more or less, as a theyya-saṅvāsaka (one who lives clandestinely with the bhikshus), and is never readmitted to the saṅgha. For all outward appearances, he may still remain a bhikshu, but in reality he has lost his bhikshuhood.

It is doubtful if the Vaibhāshika is claiming only such a nominal monkhood for a monk guilty of a pārajika offence. It appears from the

explanation of the Dīpakāra that a pārājika was not really treated as a
non-ascetic, but only as an immoral monk, comparable to a person guilty of
a saṃghāvaśesha offence. Thus according to the Vaibhāṣikas, a pārājika
monk, after duly confessing his guilt, can retain his bhikshuhood (i.e.
upasampadā) in a legal Vinaya sense. Consequently, he does not forfeit
the prātimoksha-samvara which he receives at the time of his upasampadā.
This indeed is a grave departure from the traditional Vinaya laws accepted
by both the Theravādin and the Sautrāntika schools.

The real controversy between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra,
therefore, seems to be on the effectiveness of a pārājika offence in
bringing to an end the prātimoksha-samvara, quite independently of a
voluntary disavowal of the latter by the offender (i.e. a monk guilty of
a pārājika offence).

The prātimoksha-samvara, on undertaking of which a person becomes
a bhikshu, is a kind of volition (chetanā) and, therefore, is called karma.
This volition is made known by a vocal expression called saṃādāna-vijñapti
(expression of an assumption of moral duties). This expression lasts only
a moment. But according to the Vaibhāṣika, it produces a kind of a subtle
matter called avijñapti which remains in the santati of a bhikshu until
it is destroyed by his death, or by the rise of an opposite vijñapti, called
saṃādāna-viruddha-vijñapti.

The latter is a result of a new volition by which a monk wants to
discard his previously assumed prātimoksha-samvara. When this volition is

de l’Acte de Vasubandhu Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa’, MCB, IV, 1936, pp. 156 ff;
pp. 222 ff.
duly expressed by a speech, in the presence of a competent authority, the bhikshu is said to have given up his discipline (śikṣā-nikshepa) and consequently to have become a non-ascetic. A bhikshu might commit a pārājika offence, and the saṅgha may expel him from the order. But as long as the offender does not voluntarily discard or renounce the prātimoksha-sāmvara, he would still be in a possession of it, and thus would retain his bhikshuhood.

The Vaibhāṣika contention that even a pārājika bhikshu retains his prātimoksha-sāmvara is perhaps to be understood in some such manner. It may also be recalled that he recognises the 'śikṣā-nikshepa' as a cause for the loss of the bhikshuhood. Our conjecture is strengthened by an argument of the Vaibhāṣika given in the Bhāṣya. He asks that if a pārājika is not a monk, why is he not readmitted to the saṅgha? The Vaibhāṣika implies by this question that a readmission of a pārājika is unnecessary, because he has not lost his prātimoksha-sāmvara. The Kośakāra refutes this implication by saying that a pārājika ceases to be a bhikshu. He is not re-admitted because he is unfit for keeping the discipline, and not because of the causality that he has not actually lost his bhikshuhood.

The Theravādins also do not re-admit a pārājika to the order of monks. The Sutta-vibhangā gives two rules on this point. It is said

there that a large number of Vajjiputtakas monks not having (previously) renounced their discipline (sikkhaṁ appachchakkhāya - cf. sīkṣā-nikshepāpa) indulged in sexual intercourse (i.e. were guilty of a pārājika offence). In course of time they approached Ananda with a request that they might be once more given the pabbajjā ordination and the upasampadā ordination, since they did not abuse the Buddha, dhamma or the saṅgha, but wished to live a holy life. The Buddha did not agree to this: "It is impossible that the Tathāgata should abolish the teaching on defeat (pārājika) ... because of the deeds of the Vajjiputtakas." He then laid down the following rules: "Monks, whatever monk should come, without having disavowed the training, ... and indulge in sexual intercourse, he should not receive the upasampadā ordination. But monks, if one comes, disavowing the training, yet indulging in sexual intercourse, he should receive the upasampadā ordination."

The discrimination made between these two kinds of persons is significant. The former is not only guilty of a sinful act but also is a grave offender against the laws of Vinaya. Hence he is considered unfit to live a holy life. The latter is a sinner, but not an offender, since he had voluntarily renounced his precepts, and hence is not a pārājika in the Vinaya law. He is re-admitted and may even obtain the upasampadā ordination. It is understood here that a pārājika has not need to renounce formally his submission to the Vinaya laws, as he will automatically and entirely perish from his prātimoksha-samvara at the time of his committing a pārājika offence.

The Vaibhāṣikas do not seem to agree with this view. They seem to consider the voluntary renunciation on the part of a pārājika as a necessary step leading to his loss of bhikshuhood. Until he does that he may still possess a desire to live a holy life and may even be endowed with a right view (sad-dṛṣṭi) which may entitle him to a nominal bhikshuhood, (sāmvriti-bhikshu-bhāva) as we can deduce from the explanation given by the Dipakāra.

10. MANAS-KARMA

The next controversy between the Kośakāra and the Dipakāra is on the interpretation of a sūtra dealing with manas-karma (mental actions).

Three kinds of purely mental (evil) actions are spoken of in the sūtras. The Saṁchetaniya-sūtra, for instance, says: "How are the three kinds of volitional acts committed through mind? Here monks, one becomes covetous (abhidhyālū), full of ill-will (vyāpama-chitta) and holder of a wrong-view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi)." According to this sūtra, the abhidhyā, vyāpāda and mithyā-dṛṣṭi are purely mental acts. Since the Lord has said that karma is volition, the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain that these three being mental actions are identical with volitions (chetana).

The Vaibhāṣikas do not agree with this Dārṣṭāntika view. According

1. A change of sex or a complete annihilation of the roots of good (Kuśala-mūla-samuchchheda - on account of holding a very grave mithyā-dṛṣṭi) may be considered as exceptions to this rule. These are supposed to cut at the roots of the prātimoksha-samvara. The Sautrāntikas and the Theravadins place the pārājika offence on the same level as these two, but the Kaśmira-Vaibhāṣikas seem to treat it as less severe than the Kuśala-mūla-samuchchheda. See 'Change of sex in Buddhist Literature' by P.V. Bapat in the Dr. S.K. Belvalkar Felicitation Volume, Delhi, 1957, pp. 209-15.


to them the abhidhyā, vyāpāda and mithyā-ḍrishti are passions (kleśas) that produce an evil volition (karma), and not actions by themselves. They are not manas-karma (mental actions) but only mano-duścharita. In the sūtra these three are identified with chetanas because the latter arises through them.

The Kosaṅkara, as usual, favours the Dārshāntika viewpoint. The Dīpakāra asserts the Vaibhāṣika position without advancing any new arguments in his favour, and criticises the Kosaṅkara for favouring the Dārshāntika interpretation of the Saṅchetaniya-sūtra.

The reason for the Vaibhāṣika treatment of abhidhyā, vyāpāda and mithyā-ḍrishti as passions distinct from volitions is perhaps to be found in the Abhidharmika theory that two volitions (chetanas) cannot operate in one moment. According to the Abhidharma all evil volitions (like killing, theft, etc.) are prompted and sustained by one of the three, abhidhyā, vyāpāda or mithyā-ḍrishti. In the case of an evil act like prāpātīpatā, for instance, one of these three produces a vadhaka-chetana (a volition to kill) which is essentially accompanied, till the accomplishment of the act of killing, by vyāpāda (ill will). If vyāpāda is also treated as a chetana then there will be two volitions (vyāpāda and vadhaka-chetana) operating in one moment. The Vaibhāṣika, therefore, maintains that these three are to be treated as kleśas (passions) and not as volitions (karma).

3. Ibid.
The Pali commentators also seem to recognise a similar theory. The Atthasālīni states that of the ten evil karmas (viz. *prāpātipāta* etc.) the first seven are *chetanā-dhamma* (i.e. identical with volition), whereas the last three, viz. *abhiṣiḥha, byāpāda* and *michchhādiṭṭhi* are *chetanā-sampayutta dhamma* (i.e. factors associated with the first seven volitions).\(^1\)

In the Bhāṣya the Kosakara attributes the view of the volitional nature of these three dharmas to the Dārṣṭāntika. The Dipakara, however, attributes it to a kind of Śākyans (i.e. Buddhists) called 'sthitibhāgiya' whom he abuses as 'śva-lāṅgulika' (having a dog's tail).\(^2\) The significance of this abuse is not clear. It is common to compare an incurable person to a dog's tail. For instance, in the *Pañcha-tantra* it is said that it is as difficult to reform a rascal as it is to take the kink from a dog's tail.\(^3\)

By calling them śva-lāṅgulika the Dipakara also seems to be abusing the Dārṣṭāntikas (i.e. the Sautrāntikas) for their persistence in maintaining views repugnant to the Abhidharma. In a subsequent place the Dipakara again rebukes them for their habit of repeatedly bringing forth (apparently inconsistent) sūtras against the Vaibhāṣika.\(^4\)

1. satta chetanā dhamma honti, abhijjhādayo tayo chetanā-sampayutta.
2. sthitibhāgiyaḥ nāma śākyah sva(sva)lāṅgulika-dvitiya-nāmānaḥ. te khālvaḥ abhidhyādīṁi manasa-karma-svabhāvānaṁ chhanti. 
3. durjanaḥ prakṛitiṁ yati seyyamāno'pi yatnataḥ/ svedanābhayaṁjanopayaiḥ śva-puṣchham iva nāmitam//
4. utkottaro hy esah vādah. kim tīla-pījakaṁ punar dvartase? 

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\(^1\) Dhs. A. III, 158. vide Adv. p. 149, notes.
\(^3\) durjanaḥ prakṛitiṁ yati seyyamāno'pi yatnataḥ/ svedanābhayaṁjanopayaiḥ śva-puṣchham iva nāmitam//
The term sthitibhāgīya is not used, either by the Kosakāra or by Yasomitra to indicate the Dārshāntika. This term usually occurs with other three terms, viz., hānabhāgīya, viśeṣabhāgīya and nirvedabhāgīya, where it means 'that which is conducive to enduring or lasting', of a particular state of mind. This meaning does not seem to be intended here. The word sthiti in this term most probably means pravāha or santati. We have seen above that the Sautrāntikas do not recognise sthiti (subsistence) as a separate saṃ- skrita-lakṣaṇa, because they consider that it is a name given to the series of momentary dharmas (santati). By sthitibhāgīya, therefore, the Dipakāra means one who belongs to or is heading for the (theory of) santati, a term which a Vaibhāṣika could use as an abuse to the Sautrāntika. But the use of the term sthitibhāgīya need not be taken as purely abusive. We learn from other sources that the Sautrāntika school was also known by two other names, viz., Santanavāda and Saṅkrāntivāda. Vasumitra in his Samaya-bhedoparachana-chakra² attributes the following three doctrines to this school:- "(i) The skandhas transmigrate from one world to the other: hence the name Saṅkrāntivāda. (ii) There are the mūlāntika-skandhas and also ekara-skandhas. (iii) An average man (prithagjana) also possesses the potentiality of becoming a Buddha (lit. in the state of average man there are also divine things, āryadharma)."

Elucidating these doctrines and particularly the term skandha,

J. Masuda says that a commentary on Vasumitra's work, called 'Shu-chi interprets,' the term skandha as bijas. The eka-rasa-skandhas are interpreted as bijas of one taste, which continue to exist from the time immemorial without changing their nature. The ārya-dharmas stated in the last doctrine are interpreted as anāsrava-bijas.

Very little is known about these Sautrāntika doctrines or about their theory of sahākṛanti. The term sthitibhāgīya used for the Dārśāntika (i.e., the Sautrāntika) in the vritti may refer not only to an ordinary santati but to the santati of the bijas or seeds of good and evil which form the next point of issue between the Kośakāra and the Dipakāra.

11. ANUSAYA

We have seen above an Abhidharmika distinction between a volition (karma) and a passion (kleśa). The kleśas are like roots which produce as well as sustain an evil volition. Abhidhyā, vyāpāda and mithyā-dṛṣṭi are not called roots but are recognised as intensive states of three roots of evil (akoṣala-mūla) viz. lobha, dvesha and moha respectively. All evil volitions are essentially rooted and spring from one or the other of these three basic passions (mūla-kleśa).

Corresponding to these three roots of evil, the Buddhists recognise three roots of good (volitions) viz., alobha, advesha and amoha. All good

1. J. Masuda, Asia Major, 2, 1925, pp. 67-9, notes. Also see Lamotte, MCB IV (1936) pp. 163 ff.
volitions spring from these three kuśala-mūlas, the intensive states of which are called anabhidhyā, avyāpāda and samyak-dṛishti respectively. Thus the kuśala-mūlas and the akuśala-mūlas are incompatible in nature and exclude each other in their operation in a single moment.

Whereas their intensified states can be overcome by the attainment of the first three lokottara paths, the basic passions (akuśala-mūlas) are not completely annihilated until one attains arhatship. A srota-śpanna, for instance, overcomes mithyā-dṛishti, but still possesses its root, viz., moha. A sakṛidāgāmin overcomes grosser forms of vyāpāda but still possess its root, viz., dvesha. An anāgāmin completely overcomes vyāpāda but he is not free from the akuśala-mūlas. Only an arhat brings an end to these roots of all evil volitions.

If the akuśala-mūlas are not annihilated till the attainment of arhatship and if they are incompatible with the kuśala-mūlas, how are we to explain the operation of kuśala-mūlas or of kuśala volitions in a mundane (laukika) existence? Being incompatible they cannot operate simultaneously. Nor can they operate successively, for succession demands a certain element of homogeneity between the preceding and succeeding moments. If a kuśala chitta were to follow an akuśala chitta, then it will depend for its nature on a heterogeneous cause. It will amount to an admission of an unacceptable position that good springs out of evil or vice versa.

The Theravādins avoid this dilemma by postulating a theory that the akuśala and kuśala chittas never follow each other without an intervening
avayākṛita (indeterminate, i.e., vipāka) chitta. An akuśala chitta-vīthi can be succeeded by a kuśala chitta-vīthi only after an intervention of a bhavaṅga-chitta, which is necessarily a vipāka-chitta.

The Vaibhāshikas seek to avoid this difficulty by postulating a chitta-viprayukta saṃskāra called prāpti, a force which controls the collection of a particular kind of elements, and another saṃskāra called aprāpti which prevents such a collection. Thus, for instance, when an akuśala chitta is followed by a kuśala chitta the latter is brought into operation by prāpti of the kuśala dharmas which is at the same time assisted by the aprāpti which prevents the rise of akuśala-dharmas.

The Sautrāntikas reject both these theories. They do not accept the theory of the Theravādins, presumably on the grounds that an avayākṛita chitta is not more helpful than the akuśala-chitta, in as much as both are equally inefficient to produce a kuśala-chitta. They reject the Vaibhāshika dharmas called prāpti and aprāpti on the grounds that these in turn need to be produced by another prāpti and aprāpti, a position which leads only to an infinite regress.

The Sautrāntikas explain the operation of kuśala and akuśala dharmas by postulating a theory of seeds. There are three kinds of seeds: seeds of evil and seeds of good, and those which are indeterminate. The seeds of evil (akuśala-bija) are called anusaya; the seeds of good are called kuśala-dharma-bija. Before we proceed to an examination of the latter we shall note here views of several Buddhist schools on the nature of the anusayas, a topic which holds a clue for the theory of seeds.
The Pali scriptures as well as commentaries contain several references to and controversies on the anusayas. The term anusaya is derived from śī (śaya) to lie, and means 'to live along with' or 'to cling to'. It is always used in the sense of a bias, a proclivity, a persistence of a dormant or latent disposition of mind leading to all kinds of evil volitions. Buddhaghosa says that a passion is called anusaya because of its pertinacity. It ever and again tends to become the condition to the arising of ever new passions. The Kosakāra calls it the root of existence.

The Vṛtti describes it as that which follows through the series of mind. Seven such evil pre-dispositions are enumerated in the scriptures. They are kāma-rāga, pratigha, dṛishti, vichikitsā, māna, bhava-rāga and avidyā.

The three akuśala-mūlas as well as their accessory klesas are included in these seven anusayas.

The outbursts of these dormant passions are called pariyuṭṭhāna (skt. paryavasthāna). There are seven pariyuṭṭhānas corresponding to the seven anusayas, bearing the same names. In the Vaibhāṣika tradition different klesas are enumerated under the paryavasthāna. The Vṛtti enumerates ten, viz., mṛaksha, irśya, ahrī, anapatrāpya, styāna, mādha, audhitya, krodha, mātsarya and kaukṛitya. But this seems to be an Abhidharmika tradition. The Sautrāntikas do not treat these ten as paryavasthāna. They agree with the Theravādin tradition (based on sūtra) in treating the paryavasthāna as outbursts of the latent anusayas.

1. Vm. XXII, 60.
2. mūlaṁ bhavasyānuśayaḥ. Ak. V. 1.
The relation between an anusaya and a pariyutthāna is made clear in the Mahā-Mālunīka-sutta. This sutta deals with saṃyojanas (bonds or fetters) like kāma-chchhanda, vyāpāda, vichikitsā, etc., which chain all beings to the lower life. It is said there that heretic ascetics used to ridicule this theory of saṃyojanas by saying "An infant is not conscious of lusts of the flesh (kāma), much less can passion (kāma-chchanda) arise within it, its sensual propensities (kāma-rāgo), being latent only (anuseti)".  

The implication of this criticism is not clear. According to the Aṭṭhakathā these ascetics believed that a person is associated with passions (kilesa) only when they operate or beset him but at other times he is disassociated from passions. Apparently the heretics believed that an infant is free from kilesas (passions).

The Buddhists do not accept this position. According to them even an infant is in possession of kilesas, because the latter are present in him in their dormant state (anusaya) and become active when there arise suitable conditions for their operation (pariyutthāna). This implies that when the passions are not operating they always remain in a dormant state. If they are always present in mind then the latter is always akuśala, for a kuśala can neither co-exist nor operate simultaneously with an akuśala. Consequently, there will be no kuśala chitta as long as the latent passions

2. dāharassā hi ... kumārassā mandassa ... kāmā ti pi na hoti, kuto pan' assa uppjissati kāmesu kāma-chchhando; anuseti tv-ev'assa kāmarāgānusayo. Ibid.
3. ayaṁ hi tassa laddhi samudāchārakkhaṇe yeva kilesehi saṁyutto nāma hoti. itarasmīṁ khāṇe asaṁyutto ti ... Majjhima A, III. p.144.
are not removed, and they will not be removed without a kusala chitta.

Different solutions are put forward by different schools to this problem. The Theravādzins (despite their objection to the heretical view noted above) and the Vaibhāṣikas denied the existence of anusayas apart from the paryavasthānas. According to them a mind is kusala only when passions are in operation. There is no such thing as purely latent passions. The Vātsyāpatriyas maintained a difference between the anusayas and paryavasthānas. But they said that the anusayas are chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāras, and hence could co-exist with kusala-dharmas. But paryavasthānas are chitta-samprayukta-saṃskāras and therefore cannot operate with kusala dharmas. They include the anusayas in prāpti, a viprayukta-saṃskāra of the Vaibhāṣika list.

The Sautrāntikas maintained that the anusayas as well as the kusala elements (bijas) co-exist side by side in the form of subtle seeds, but only one of them operates at one time. When the anusayas operate (i.e., become paryavasthānas), the mind is kusala. When the seeds of kusala operate the mind is kusala.

All these views are well represented in a controversy on the meaning of a sūtra passage preserved in the Bhāṣya, the Vṛtti and also in the Aṭṭhakathās. A question is raised whether a term like rāgānuṣaya should be taken as a karma-dhāraya or as a genitive tatpurusha-compound. The former (i.e., rāga eva anusayaḥ) goes against a sūtra passage which says:

"Here a person has a mind beset and obsessed (paryavasthita) by no sensuality (kāma-rāga); he knows the real escape therefrom; this obsession of sensuality (kāma-rāga-paryavasthāna) if vigourously combated is destroyed together with its propensities thereto (sānusayām prahīyate)."¹

By using the term sānusayam the Sūtra makes it clear that paryavasthāna and anuśaya are not identical. The Vātspīputrīya here suggests that the term sānusayam means ‘together with anuśaya, i.e., a viprayukta-saṃskāra called prāpti.’ But this contention goes against Abhidharma where it is said that the rāgānusāya is associated with three kinds of feelings. Prāpti being a viprayukta cannot associate with a chaitasika. Therefore, anuśaya cannot be a viprayukta.²

Faced with this dilemma the Vaibhāshika, regardless of the sūtra, states that the term rāgānusāya should be taken as a karma-dhāraya compound. He resolves the sūtra opposition by interpreting the term sānusāya as sānubandha, i.e., together with its power of producing a new kleśa. He also gives an alternative suggestion that the sūtra identifies anuśaya with prāpti only figuratively; the Abhidharma is definitive when it says that rāga (paryavasthāna) is (identical with) anuśaya.³

The Theravādins also identify pariyūṭthāna with anuśaya.

Commenting on the sūtra words 'sānusayo pahīyati', Buddhaghosa observes that some people on the basis of this expression maintain that the saṃyojanas

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2. Ibid. n. 4.
(here identified with pariyuttañas) are different from anusaya. They should be refuted, he says, by the simile of a person sleeping with his head covered. The person is not different from (his) head. 1 Buddhaghosa takes note of an objection that if saṃyojanaś and anusayaś are identical then the Buddha’s criticism of the heretic ascetics (for holding the view that an infant has no passions) is meaningless. 2 Buddhaghosa does not give any convincing answer to this criticism but asserts his position by repeating that the same passion is called saṃyojana because it binds, and is also called anusaya because it is not renounced (appahīna). 3

The Kathāvatthu records several controversies on the anusayas.

The Andhakas held that the anusayaś are different from pariyutta. 4 The Mahāsāṅghikas and the Sammitiyas maintained that the anusayaś are indeterminate (abyākata), without good or bad roots (ahetukā) and therefore chitta-vippayutta. 5 The arguments of these schools is the same as noted above that if the anusayaś are akuśaśala and chitta-samprayukta there will never be an occasion for the rise of kuśaśala consciousness. 6

Buddhaghosa’s reply to these schools is the same that the anusayaś are identical with pariyuttaṅgas. He once more returns to this topic in his commentary on the Yamaka. There also he repeats the same arguments

1. Vide Adv. p. 221, n. 3.
2. athā pi siyā yadi tadeva saṃyojanaś so anusayo evaṁ sante Bhagavatā ...
3. so eva kileso bandhanatṭhena saṃyojanaś appahīnaṭṭhena anusayo ti...
6. putthujjano kusalaṭṭhake chitte pavaṭṭamāne 'sānusayo' ti vattabbo ti?

Ibid.
and adds that these passions are called anusaya not because they are
different from pariyuṭṭhāna but because they are strong passions (thāmagata-
kilesa) and because they arise on obtaining suitable conditions for their
operation (anusetīti anurūpam kāraṇam labhitvā uppañjantīti ...).

It is clear from these discussions that the Theravādin as well as
the Vaibhāṣīka interpretation of the term sānuṣaya, and the subsequent
identification of the anuṣayas with paryavasthāna are contrary to the sūtra
quoted above. They show a determined effort to uphold the Abhidharma in
preference to the Sūtra. The Sautrāntika takes strong exception to the
Abhidharmika theories and puts forth his theory of bija. He says that the
word rāgānuṣaya should be taken as a genitive tatpurusha, i.e., anuṣaya of
rāga. Asked further if this anuṣaya is a samprayukta or a viprayukta, the
Sautrāntika says that it is neither, because it is not a separate dravya
(reality). When a kleśa (like rāga) is dormant, it is called anuṣaya.
When it is awakened, it is called paryavasthāna. When it is dormant it does
not appear but persists in the form of a seed. This form of seed is
nothing else but an inherent power of mind to produce a (new) passion which
is itself born of a past passion. It is comparable to an inherent power of
yielding rice found in a sprout which is also born of rice.

2. na chānuṣayaḥ samprayukto na viprayuktāḥ, tasya adrvyāntaratvāt.
   Adv. p. 222.
3. suptō hi kleśa 'nuṣaya ity uchyate. prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam.
   Adv. p. 222. This statement supports the Theravādin tradition where the same
   kleśas are enumerated under anuṣaya and pariyuṭṭhāna.
4. kā cha tasya prasuptih? asamukhiḥbhūtasya bijabhāvānubandhah. ko
The Kośakāra openly favours this Sautrāntika theory of bija (attributed in the Vṛitti to the Dārśñäntika) in his Bhāṣya. The Dīpakāra borrows this whole controversy from the latter and remarks that he will expose this indolence of the Sautrāntika Kośakāra in properly grasping the words of the Buddha. He refers to his other work called Tattva-saptati where he says he has fully dealt with this topic, and adds that the bija imagined by the Sautrāntika, which is described as a mere power (ākānti) or application (bhāvanā) or impression (vāsanā) of mind cannot stand any scrutiny. For this bija could either be identical with or different from the mind. If the former, there is no point in speaking about it. If the latter, then it must be a samprayukta (associated) or viprayukta element, a position unacceptable to the Sautrāntika. If it is maintained that the bija is neither identical with, nor different from the mind, and thus conforms to a middle course, then also it is denied, for such a middle course is impossible in the case of a bija which is an unreality like a stick made of sky-flowers.

These brief arguments of the Dīpakāra are identical with Saṃghbhādāra's criticism against the theory of bija. We have noted above a Vaibhāṣika theory that a viprayukta saṃskāra called prāpti brings into operation a particular set of dharmas (to the exclusion of others) in a given moment, and thus determines the nature of a santati either as impure (akuśala) or pure (kuśala). While dealing with this topic, the Kośakāra refutes the Vaibhāṣika on the grounds that the seeds (bijas) of kuśala or

akūśala accumulated in a santati determine a character of the latter. He defines the bija as nāmārūpa, i.e. the complex of the five skandhas\(^1\) capable of producing a fruit either immediately or mediately by means of a parināma-viśeṣha of the santati.\(^2\)

This theory of bija advocated by the Kośakāra is subjected to a severe criticism in the 'Nyāyānusāra' of Saṃghabhadra. Yaśomitra quotes a fairly long passage from the latter and defends the Sautrāntika position.\(^3\) Saṃghabhadra's main criticism of the theory of bija (i.e. sāktya-viśeṣha) is that it could be either different from or identical with the mind. If it is a separate entity, then it is prāpti, for the dispute then is only on naming it. If, however, it is identical with mind, then it will result in the fault of mixture or confusion (saṅkarya-dosha) of good and bad seeds. For surely the Sautrāntika will admit that a mind possesses seeds of both the good (kuśala) as well as bad (akuśala), of sāsrava as well as anāsrava elements. If they all are accumulated in one chitta what is there to determine the nature of a particular chitta as kuśala or akuśala or avyākṛita? Yaśomitra's reply to this criticism is that the saṅkarya-dosha would arise only if the bijas were to be identical with the mind. But we maintain, he says, that a bija is neither identical with, nor different from the mind, because a bija is not a separate entity (dravya) but only a prajñāpatti (nominal) dharma.

Yaśomitra further states that even if a bija is considered

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1. LVPAK. II. 36 od.
2. [kīṁ punar idaṁ bijaṁ nāmeti] ... [yan nāma-rūpaṁ phalotpattau samartham ... sākṣhād ... pāramparayaṁ eva] Sakv. pp.147-8.
identical with chitta it will not involve any fallacy. When, for instance, a kuśala chitta is produced, it deposits its seeds in its immediately succeeding chitta. If the seeds deposited are strong (kārapa-viśesha) then the succeeding chitta also becomes kuśala. But if the succeeding chitta has stronger akuśala seeds it remains akuśala. The kuśala seeds deposited in an akuśala chitta do not themselves become akuśala, for every preceding chitta does leave a certain impression (bhāvanā) or a perfume (vāsanā) of its nature on the succeeding chitta. This impression which is capable of producing similar chittas immediately or in future is called bija, śakti or vāsanā. These are all synonyms.

Even the Vaibhāṣikas, he says, will have to resort to some such theory to explain the phenomena of succession of two heterogeneous chittas. They also believe that an akuśala can be succeeded by a kuśala. Do the Vaibhāṣikas here agree that the kuśala is produced by an akuśala? If they do not agree then they deny samanantara-pratyaya. If they agree then they must explain what kind of power (śakti) it is that produced a kuśala chitta? If this power is akuśala it cannot produce kuśala. If it is kuśala then it cannot remain in an akuśala chitta. It is, therefore, wrong of the Vaibhāṣikas to accuse us of maintaining that an akuśala seed would become the cause of kuśala chitta. We never maintained that a kuśala seed deposited in an akuśala chitta transforms the latter. What we maintain is that this kuśala seed remains there and produces either immediately or in

1. bhavatām api Vaibhāṣikānām idām chintyate .... Ibid.
succession a corresponding kusala chitta. This power of producing a new chitta is what we call a bija. It is not an independent entity but only a nominal thing (prajñaptimātra).

It appears from Yasomitra's explanation that the theory of bija was employed by the Sautrāntika primarily to replace the Vaibhāshika dharma called prāpti in explaining the phenomena of immediate succession (samanantarotpāda) between two chittas of heterogenous nature, and secondarily to reconcile the abiding nature of santati with the momentary flashes of dharma. Their theory that the bijas are neither identical with nor different from the mind bears a close resemblance to the Vātsiputriya theory of pudgala which is also described as neither different from, nor identical with the five skandhas. But whereas the Vātsiputriya claims reality for his pudgala, the Sautrāntika insists on the nominality (prajñaptimātra) of the bijas and thus escapes the condemnation which he inflicts on the former for maintaining a heresy. On the other hand his theory that the mind is a depository of good and bad seeds capable of yielding new seeds in the series of mind foreshadows the theory of ālaya-vijñāna (also called mūla or bija-vijñāna) of the Viññānavāda Buddhism.

Although the Theravādins do not recognise this Sautrāntika theory of bija, there is substantial evidence pointing to its origin in the suttas. The Ang. nikāya contains a long sutta dealing with the operation of kuśala and akusala-mūlas in six kinds of persons. In the case of the first three of these persons a comparison is made with good or bad seed (bijā) sown in a fertile or stony field. In the case of the first person, for instance, it is said:— "There is a person endowed with kuśala as well as akusala dhammas. In course of time his kuśala dhammas disappear, and akusala dhammas appear. But since his kuśala-mūlas are not completely annihilated, new kuśala dhammas appear from that (unannihilated) kuśala-mūla. Thus this person becomes in future one who does not fall (from the holy life). His kuśala is comparable to whole seeds (akhapṣa bija) sown in a cultivated fertile field, capable of yielding abundant fruits."

We may note here a few significant points of this sutta:

(1) There are kuśala and akusala dhammas in a pūdga, i.e., a santati of the five skandhas. (2) When the kuśala dhammas appear the akusala dhammas disappear (and vice versa) i.e., they do not operate together. (3) The disappearance of an element is not its annihilation. It remains in the santati in the form of mūla (root) from which in a future time there arise

2. "Imassa kho puggalassa vijjamāna kuśala pī dhammā akusalā pī dhammā ... imassa kho puggalassa kuśala dhammā antarahiṣṭa, akusalā dhammā samukhibhūṭa, atthi cha khvassa kusalamūlaṃ asamuchchhimām, tammas tassa kuśala kuśalāṃ pāṭubhavissati. evamayaṃ puggalo āyatim aparīhānadhammo bhavissati." Ibid.
corresponding new kuśala or akusala chittas. (4) It is this mūla which
determines the nature of a santati as parihāṇa-dharma or aparihāṇa-dharma.
(5) This mūla is compared to a good or bad seed according to its having the
nature of kuśala or akusala.

All these points are favourable to the Sautrāntika theory of bija. They support his contention that the kuśala and akusala co-exist in the form
of seeds which give rise in a subsequent time to their corresponding kuśala
or akusala thoughts, and thus determine the nature of a particular santati
as subject to decay or subject to growth.

The Vaibhāṣikas also read this sūtra in their scriptures. But
they maintain that it refers not to the theory of bija but to their theory
of prāpti. When, therefore, the sūtra says that a person is samanvāgata
(endowed) with kuśala and akusala dharmas, it means that he has the prāpti
of these dharmas. According to them samanvāgama and prāpti are synonyms.
A person cannot be endowed with kuśala and akusala in one moment, because
these two are samprayukta dharmas. But their prāpti being viprayukta can
coeexist and thus cause the rise of kuśala and akusala dharmas in favourable
circumstances.

In support of this contention the Vaibhāṣika quotes the following
passage from the same sūtra: "A person is endowed with kuśala as well as
akusala dharmas. His kuśala dharmas disappear and akusala dharmas appear.
But there is in him the root (mūla) of kuśala not destroyed. Even this

1. "samanvāgata 'yaṁ purushah kuśalair api dharmair akusalair api
dharmaṁ" Quoted in Adv. p.166.
kuśala-mūla is in course of time completely annihilated, whereupon he comes
to be designated as a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla."

Here arises a problem regarding the rise of a new kuśala-chitta
in the santati of such a person. Vaibhāṣika solves it by postulating
the theory of prāpti which ushers in a new kuśala chitta independently of
the seeds of kuśala. But according to the Sautrāntika a kuśala chitta can
arise only out of its seeds. In the absence of the latter, therefore, a
samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla will have no possibility of having a kuśala chitta.
Consequently he will be doomed to have only akuśala chittas till eternity.

Indeed the Theravādins, on account of their rule that a kuśala
cannot succeed an akuśala, and because of their nonrecognition of the theory
of prāpti, arrived precisely at such a fateful conclusion. They maintained
that a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla was incapable of producing a kuśala chitta,
and sought to support this theory by the following scripture: "Take the
\textit{case, bhikkhus, of a person who is possessed with entirely black akuśala
states (ekanta-kālakahehi akusala-dharmehi), he it is who once immersed, is
immersed for ever."\textsuperscript{2} Commenting on this, Buddhaghosa says: "The term
ekanta-kālaka means those grave wrong-views (mīchchā-dīṭṭhi) which deny the

\begin{enumerate}
\item samanvāgato 'yaṁ pudgalalā kuśalalā api dhammār api dharmaṁ
\quad te 'syā pudgalasya kuśalaṁ dharmaṁ antarādāyanti...
\quad asti chāṣya kuśalaṁ
\quad mūlām...
\quad anupachchhinnam...
\quad tad api apaneṇa samayena sarveṇa sarvām
\quad samuchchhetsyate yasya samuchchhedat samuchchhinna-kuśalaṁ
\quad mūla iti samcyām
gamisyati...\textit{ Adv. p.166.}
\item idha bhikkhave ekachcho puggalo samanvāgato hoti ekanta-kālakahehi
\quad akusalehi dharmehi, so sakīṁ nimuggo nimuggo va hoti.\textit{ P. Paṇṇatti, VII. 1.}
\end{enumerate}
result of Karma - natthikavāda, ahetukavāda and akiriyavāda. A person like Makkhali Gosāla who is possessed with these grave wrong views becomes the food of the fire of lower and lower hells. For such a person there is no emergence from worldly existence.¹

But neither of these alternatives (viz. of prāpti and of eternal doom) are acceptable to the Sautrāntika. The Kośakāra here puts forth a bold and original solution to this problem. He says that we should distinguish between two kinds of kuśala dharmas. There are some kuśala dharmas which are inmate, which do not presuppose any effort (ayatnabhāvi) but are always present in any given condition (upapatti-lābhika). Then there are other kinds of kuśala dharmas which are obtained only by effort or practice of meditations (prāyogika).² The former, i.e., the inmate kuśala dharmas are never completely annihilated. When a person on account of holding a grave mithyādṛśaṁti becomes samuchchhinna-kuśala-śāla, he destroys only his prāyogika kuśala-śālas. His inmate kuśala-dharmas remain in the form of bijas intact in his santati³ from which arise new kuśala dharmas in a favourable condition.

The statement of the Kośakāra that even a samuchchhinna-kuśala-śāla possesses a subtle element of kuśala is not free from contradiction. The Bhāṣṭya does not contain any criticism of this incompatible position.

1. ... evam puggalo ... nimuggo va hoti. etassa hi puma bhavato vutthānam nāma natthiti vadanti. Makkhaligosālādayo viya hettha hettha narakaggīnaṁ yeva āhāra honti. P. Pahāṣatti A. VII. 1. vide Adv. p.169, notes.
Even Yasomitra who defends the theory of bija against a criticism from Samghabhaddra is silent on this contradictory statement of the Kośakāra. Fortunately, a brief criticism of this major controversy has survived in our Vṛitti. The Dīpakāra gives the meaning of the term samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla as understood in the Vaibhāshika tradition, and criticises the theory of bija as propounded by the Kośakāra.

According to the Vaibhāshikas, the mithyādṛishṭi and the kuśala-mūlas essentially consists of three basic grades, viz., mrīdu (subtle or slight), madhya (of medium nature) and adhimātra (extreme). Each of these three grades are further divided into these three, e.g., mrīdu-mrīdu...... adhimātra-adhimātra.

The kuśala-mūlas pertaining to the arūpāvachara and the rūpāvachara are destroyed by the mrīdu and madhya mithyādṛishṭis.1 The adhimātra mithyādṛishṭi destroys the prāyogika-kuśala-mūlas pertaining to the kāma-world, leaving in such a person only the innate or the upapattilābhika roots of good. But when a person (like Maskarī Gosālīputra for instance) comes to hold such extremely grave (adhimātra-adhimātra) wrong views as nāstikavāda, ahetukavāda or akriyavāda, then he destroys even these innate and the most subtle (upapatti-lābhika) kuśala-mūlas pertaining to the kāmaloka, whereupon he is called a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla.

After stating this Vaibhāshika theory of the loss of kuśala dharmas the Dīpakāra turns to the kośakāra's definition of a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla.

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1. The Kośakāra gives several views on the manner in which the kuśala-mūlas are destroyed. vide Adv. p.167, n.1. See LVPAk. IV. 79 ab.
kusala-mūla. This he condemns as contrary to the scriptures where it is specifically stated that the kuśala-mūlas are completely annihilated (sarveṣaṃ sarvaṃ samuchchhetsaye. c.f. sabbena sabbāṃ samugghataṃ gachchhati). He then criticises the theory of bija with the argument that the kuśala and akuśala being incompatible like light and darkness cannot coexist at one time. Even if they coexist in the case of a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla, the kuśala elements are entirely lost. How can a new kuśala arise in this person? If it arises from the akuśala then one may as well argue that rice is obtained from barley seeds or that nityādṛiṣṭi is produced by right thinking. Thus the Kośakāra's theory of bija and the consequent wrong definition of a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla do not stand the test of either the scriptures or of reasoning.

The Kośakāra's definition of the term samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla is identical with the Yogāchāra definition of this term. In the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālāmkkāra only the imminent liberation of a samuchchhinna-kuśala-mūla is denied. This suggests that he may attain parinirvāpa in distant future. This would mean that according to the Yogāchāras such a person is not completely devoid of a kuśala-mūla. The contention of the Kośakāra that the innate kuśalamūlas are never entirely destroyed marks a still further departure from the orthodox Hinayāna. It implies that unlike the akuśala-bijas which are completely annihilated, the elements of kuśala persist throughout the series of existence. This is a characteristically Mahāyānīs

view in as much as it holds an assurance of liberation even for a person like Maskari Gosalkiputra who comes to hold the gravest of wrong views.

The Koṣakāra does not give further details of this incorruptible element of kuśala. Unlike the elements of akuśala which are only sāsrava, the kuśala elements are of two kinds, viz., sāsrava and anāsrava. The former pertains to the (kuśala) kāma, rūpa and arūpa bhavas. The anāsrava kuśalas are those which produce the lokottara (super-mundane) states like arhatship or Buddhahood. Is it possible that the incorruptible kuśala-bīja spoken of by the Koṣakāra represents the anāsrava-kuśala-bīja leading to nirvāṇa? We have noted above the Sautrāntika doctrines of 'eka-rasa-skandha', 'ārya-dharma' and the 'paramārtha-pudgala'. All these are described as existing from time immemorial without changing their nature, transmigrating from one birth to another. In the Śhu-chi they are interpreted as 'extremely subtle and incomprehensible bija'.¹ The kuśala-dharma-bīja propounded by the Koṣakāra, which is also described as subtle (sūkṣma) and incorruptible (na samudghāto), offers a striking resemblance to the eka-rasa-skandha, the ārya-dharma and the paramārtha-pudgala. None of these could mean a sāsrava-kuśala-bīja, for the latter is as much subject to destruction as are the akuśala-bījas. The sūkṣma-kuśala-dharma-bīja of the Sautrāntika, therefore, should be understood as an anāsrava-kuśala-bīja, variously called as nirvedha-bhāgīya, or moksha-bhāgīya kuśala leading to parinirvāṇa.

This conjecture is strengthened by the occurrence of such terms as

¹. Vide supra, pp. 221-2.
moksha-bija in the Sanskrit Buddhist scriptures. Of the ten extraordinary powers (asadharapa-dharma) of the Buddha\(^1\) one is his power of fathoming the innate capacities of all beings for liberation. Illustrating this power, Yasomitra quotes the case of a person desirous of obtaining the pravrajyā ordination. It is said that this person approached Śāriputra, but the latter could not see any roots of kuśala-mūla leading to liberation in him (mokshabhāgiya-kuśala-mūla), and, therefore refused to admit him to the order. The Buddha, however, noticed it and said:—

\[
\text{moksha-
bi
}jām
\text{ahaṃ hy asya susūkṣhman upalakshaye/}
\text{dhaṭu-paśhapa-vivare nilīnām i
va kāñchenām/}^2
\]

(I see his extremely subtle seed of salvation like a seam of gold hidden in metal-bearing rock.)

The use of the term moksha-bija and of the simile of hidden gold are of great significance. The simile of gold aptly describes an incorruptible element. The moksha-bija thus described as extremely subtle (susūkṣma) and incorruptible seems to be identical with the sūkṣma-kuśaladharma-bija propounded by the Kośakāra. Even the word dhaṭu used in the above verse is significant. This word also occurs in the term nānā-dhaṭu-jñāna-bala (Pali aneka-dhaṭu-nānā-dhaṭu-lakṣaṇa pajānāti) where it is understood as vāsanā ṣāśaya or a gotra.\(^3\) The sarvākāraṇijñāta of the Buddha

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2. Sakv. p. 644. Vide Adv. p. 388, n. 2. See LVPAk. II. 30 od; Sūtraṭalāṃkāra d'Āṣvagoṣha (Huber's translation), p. 283. This story occurs in the Mahāvagga, (Vinaya, I, p. 55) and the Dhammapada A. VI. 1 (Rādhatherravatthu). In the Pali versions, however, Śāriputta ordains this person after recalling his charity of offering a spoomful of alms.
consists in knowing the gotra of all beings. The doctrine of gotra forms the starting point of Mahāyāna. It determines the family of a person as belonging to the community of a śrāvaka, pratyeka-buddha or a Buddha.

Yaśomitra describes this gotra as bija, which could only be the moksha-bija concealed in the midst of other dhātus or bijas such as of akuśala and of śāsrava-kusāla.

The theory of an innate, indestructible and pure (anāsṛava) element existing in the midst of destructible, phenomenal and impure elements shows an affinity with the Mahāyāna doctrine of prakṛiti-prabhāsvara-chitta, according to which mind is essentially and originally pure but becomes impure by only adventitious afflictions. This prakṛiti-prabhāsvarachitta is further described as identical with the dharma-tā, tathātā and, therefore, with dharma-kāya of the Buddha.

The theory of a prabhāsvara-chitta is not unknown to the Pāli scriptures. It is said in the Aṅg. nikāya: "pabhas samītā bhiṣikkhave chittaṃ, tāṃ cha kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭham" and "... āgantu-kehi upakkilesehi vippamuttam". But the Theravadins interpret it as a bhavanga-chitta, i.e., a paṭisaṃdhi chitta causing a rebirth. Now a paṭisaṃdhi-chitta can either be a kusala-vipāka or an akusala-vipāka-chitta,

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2. mātāṁ cha chittaṁ prakṛiti-prabhāsvarāṁ sādā tā āgantuka-dosha-duṣhitam na dharma-tā-chittam pite 'nya-chetasaḥ prabhāsvaratvāṃ prakṛtītum Mahāyāna-śrūtāleśākara, XIII. 19. vidhiyate//


accompanied by the kusala-(vipāka)-mālas like alobha, adosa or amoha or akusala-vipāka-mālas like lobha-dosa-moha. But according to the Theravādin Abhidhamma only the kusala-vipāka chittas are sahetuka, i.e., have the mālas. The akusala-vipāka-chitta is considered to be ahetuka, i.e., devoid of any mālas. No reason for such a discrimination is given either in the Aṭṭhakathās or in the later Tīkās. Dharmanand Kosambi, who noted this, explains that the akusala-vipāka-chitta is considered ahetuka because the akusala-mālas do not strengthen each other. The real reason for such a discrimination is, perhaps, to be found in the Theravādin interpretation of the pabhassarāchitta, as a bhavanga-chitta. They must have thought that a pabhassara-chitta can have the kusala-mālas (which are pure) but cannot possess the akusala-mālas, and hence formulated a rule that the akusala-vipāka-chitta is ahetuka.

2. See A. saṅgaho, Navanītā-ṭīkā (Benaras 1941) I. 8; V.10.
The last controversy between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra is on sarvāstivāda, a fundamental principle of the Vaibhāshika school. The Kośakāra's arguments against this Vaibhāshika doctrine as contained in his Bhāṣya are well known through the pioneer works of Stcherbatsky and Poussin. An elaborate Vaibhāshika reply to these arguments of the Kośakāra as contained in the 'Shun-chêng-li-lun' ('Nyāyānusāra') of Saṅghabhadra is also available to us in Poussin's other monumental work called 'Sarvāstivāda'. The Dīpakāra's treatment of this topic is essentially not different from that of Saṅghabhadra. But, unlike the latter, it is brief and appears like a restatement of the Vaibhāshika position given in the Bhāṣya. The same scriptures are quoted and the same arguments are advanced by the Dīpakāra. We shall, therefore, here summarise these arguments in brief and note such points that occur only in our Vṛitti.

The Dīpakāra opens his exposition by stating the four traditional theories on the sarvāstivāda, viz., bhāvanyathātva (change of existence), lakṣaṇanyathātva (change in the aspect), avasthānyathātva (change of condition) and anyathānyathātva (= apeksha = contingency) advocated respectively by Dharmatrāta, Ghoshaka, Vasumitra and Buddhadeva. Of these, he says, Vasumitra's view is authentic because it explains the doctrine of

1. The central conception of Buddhism, pp. 76-91.
3. MCE. V. (1937) pp. 1-157. Poussin here gives a complete bibliography on this controversy (pp. 7-8).
three times with the theory of kārītra (activity).

He then advances the traditional four arguments in support of the doctrine of three times or 'universal existence': (1) The reality of past and future dharmas is spoken of in the scriptures; (2) There can be no production of a result without an abiding past deed; (3) A perception depends on two things, viz. an object and a base; (4) There can be no cognition without an object.

After quoting several sūtras (also quoted by the Vaibhāshika in the Bhāṣya) in his support, the Dīpakāra takes note of a counter-sūtra advanced by the Sautrāntika. The latter maintains that a dharma cannot exist in past and future, because it is said in the Pāṣmārtha-śūnyatā-sūtra: "When the organ of vision (eye) is produced, it does not come from some other place; when it disappears, it is not going to be stored up in another place. (Consequently) a thing becomes having not been before; having become it ceases to be."¹

This sūtra, says the Dīpakāra, was spoken of by the Buddha to refute the Vedic and the Sāṃkhya doctrines of eternal substance. It is said, for instance, in the Veda (i.e. Upanishād): "When a person dies his eye returns to the sun from which it had originated, the ear to earth, the tongue to water, the body to air and the mind to the moon."² The Sāṃkhya also maintain that an eye rises from the prakṛiti and merges back into the prakṛiti. It was in refutation of these theories that the Lord said:

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2. Ibid.
"When the eye is produced it does not come from somewhere, etc.". The Lord wanted to show that the material elements of past and future have no location in space and, therefore, there is no coming and going of these elements (in a pre-destined direction). He further wanted to refute the Sāṃkyas maintain that the prakṛti: which is one and eternal, manifests itself as different effects by undergoing changes of its own aspects. The real purport of this sūtra is that the eye having not performed its action (in the past), becomes active (in the present). Having once been active, it abandons its activity, and thus disappears in an inactive state (called future). The Sautrāntikas, however, not knowing the true meaning of this sūtra, repeatedly rise against us like an ill-subdued ghost, only to ruin their own position.

The observation of the Dipakāra that this sūtra was directed against the Vedic and the Sāṃkyas is significant. There is nothing improbable in such an assertion, for the theory of an eternal substance was chiefly advocated by these two pre-Buddhist schools. Although this explanation does not help the Vaibhāṣikas, it certainly shows, even on the part of the early Buddhists, an understanding of the historical background in which the Buddha propounded his teachings.

The second argument of the Vaibhāṣika is that the reality of a past dharma is proved by the doctrines of karma and karma-phala. If the past deeds were not to exist there will be no results which can appear only

in a future time. The Sautrāntika solves this problem by postulating his theory of bija. The Dipakāra does not enter into a detailed criticism of this theory but reminds the Kośakāra that this theory has been properly refuted (in his discussion of the kusala-dharma-bija).

The third Vaibhāšika argument is based on the theory that cognition depends on two things, viz., an object and a base. The past and future objects must be real, for otherwise there could not arise cognitions corresponding to these objects. The Sautrāntika objection is that if every object of cognition were to be real, one may as well argue that even unreal things like a pudgala and a hare's horn are real and existing because they too become objects of our cognition.

The Dipakāra here points out that one should make a certain distinction between real and unreal objects. There are dharmas, termed as skandha, āyatana or dhātu which on account of having their own eternal natures are called real in an absolute sense (paramārtha-sat). There are objects such as a house, a pot or a personality (pudgala) which are results of mental constructions imposed on the paramārtha dharmas. These objects exist only in a relative sense, and therefore are relatively real (saṃvṛiti-sat). There are also things like earth which are real in an absolute as well as relative sense. Finally there are notions born of contingency of relationships like father and son or teacher and pupil.

2. paramārthena yan nityah svabhāvena saṁgrihītaḥ na kadāchit svam ātmānāḥ jahāti ... Adv. p.263.
When we maintain that all objects are real and existing, we bear in mind this distinction between real and nominal (or relatively real) objects. We follow a middle course (madhyāma pratipat) and maintain that dharmas are sūnya as well as aśūnya. They are sūnya because they are devoid of such misconceived things as pudgala (personality), ālayavijñāna and abhūta-parikalpa. They are aśūnya because they possess individual as well as general characteristics. Thus we steer clear of the two extremes of eternalism (asti = aśūnya) and annihilationism (nāsti = sūnya), and follow a middle path preached by the Buddha, and declare that the dharmas described as skandha, āyatana or dhātu, whether past or future, are as real as they are when they are present.

The middle path described by the Dīpaṅkara is not new. It is a reassertion of the pudgala-sūnyatā advocated by the Hinayāna schools. Although the main attack on the sarvāstivāda comes from the Sautrāntika Kośakara, the Dīpaṅkara’s reference to the ālaya-vijñāna and to the abhūta-parikalpa unmistakably shows that his real opponents were Yogāchāra-Vijñānavādins who not only rejected the reality of past and future objects

2. This refers to the Yogāchāra theory of an imputed or illusory aspect of appearance. The entire world of objects is according to this school based on consciousness, and hence is unreal. The term abhūta-parikalpa occurs several times in the Lankavatāra-sūtra: ... skandha api Mahāmāte sva-saṃnāya-lakṣhapā-virahitā abhūta-parikalpa-lakṣhapā-vichitra-prabhāvītā bālair vikalpyante na tv āryaih. p.69. abhūta-parikalpita-svabhāva-vikalpitatvān Mahāmāte anutpannāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ. p.62. This thought is fully developed in the Madhyāntavibhāga-sūtra of Asanga: abhūta-parikalpo’sti dvayaṁ tatra na vidyate/ kā. l. 1.
but even the distinction between a subject and object.

Indeed the Sautrāntika employs his argument of an unreal object (asad-ālambana) only as a prelude to his real theory of an objectless cognition. The objects like the five skandhas or the twelve āyatanas are real. The constructions like a pudgala, a house or a pot may be relatively real. But these do not exhaust the world of objects. One may even have a cognition of an absence (abhāva) or a negation (pratishedha) of a sixth skandha, a thirteenth āyatana, or even of a hare's horn. This would mean that bhāva as well as abhāva can become objects. Since abhāva is not a thing, it follows that cognition can take place even without an object. The Sautrāntika, therefore, concludes that the cognitions of past and future objects are to be explained as cognitions without corresponding objects.

The Dīpakāra notes this argument and explains the nature of a negation. A negation, he says, does not negate an existing (sat) nor a non-existing (asat) thing. It does not negate a sat. For, if it could, then the kings would have destroyed their enemies by merely denying their existence. Nor does it negate an asat, for that would result only in (an affirmation of) an existence. The negation therefore negates only a known relation. When, for instance, a person says 'there is no hare's horn', he is aware of a certain relation existing between a cow and its horn. He is therefore, not negating a non-existing hare's horn but only an existence (in the hare) of this relation found between a cow and its horn. It is,

therefore, wrong to say that a negation has an abhāva as its object. All objects are bhāva (existing) and all cognitions have bhāva as their objects.

Moreover, the existence of a dharma in its past condition is proved by the expression 'jāyate' (is born). The five modifications of a dharma, viz., being (asti), changing (viparipamate), growth (vardhate), decay (kshīyate) and decease (vinaāyati) anticipate the prior existence of a real subject (kartā) who undergoes these modifications. Similarly the modification called birth (jāyate) anticipates the existence of a subject which is born. A thing cannot be born out of nothing. Even the root ja (to be born) implies this meaning. When we say a child is born we mean that it has come out of its mother's womb; it does not mean it comes into existence at the moment of its birth. It was existing but was not born. Similarly a dharma exists in past condition but assumes a present condition and passes into a future condition. The conditions change but the dharma survives these changes.

The Sāutrāntika does not accept this difference between an actor and an act, and says that in reality there are only causes capable of producing an effect, which we metaphorically call an actor (kartṛi). The Dīpakāra's reply to this objection is that the Sautrāntika cannot defend even the existence of causes or their capacity to produce an effect. According to the Sautrāntika, a destruction is inherent in every dharma.

3. kārāṇa-śaktishu-nirūtyakajāni-kartṛ-upachāraḥ pravartate. Ibid.
Consequently, a dharma can neither be born, nor subsist, nor produce an effect. How does he then account either for a cause or for an effect? A causal relation is possible only between two existing dharmas (like past and present and present and future), and not between two unreal or between a real and an unreal.

This discussion on the reality of pratyayas (causes) brings the Dīpakāra to a criticism of the Vaitulika, also called vaināśika (annihilationist) on account of his rejection of the reality of not only the past and future but also of the present dharmas. It is his contention that a saṃskṛta dharma, being a result of pratyayas is devoid of an inherent nature, and, therefore, of a reality. Such a dharma cannot subsist either wholly or in parts in its causes, nor can it subsist anywhere else. That which is not found to subsist anywhere is devoid of its own nature. All dharmas, therefore, are illusory and empty like a circle of fire (alāta-chakra).

The Vaitulika view given above is identical with the शुन्यवाद of the Mādhyamika. The arguments of the Vaitulika correspond to Nāgārjuna's polemic against the reality of pratyayas and saṃskṛta dharmas as contained in his Mādhyamika-kārikās. This is further confirmed by the Dīpakāra's description of the Vaitulika as a vaināśika (annihilationist) and ayoga-śūnyatā-vādin.

4. See Pratyaya-parīkṣā, Saṃskṛta-parīkṣā and Māla-parīkṣā. See The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, pp. 166 ff.
The term ayoga-śūnyatā is not found in the traditional lists of 18, 19 or 20 kinds of śūnyatās, or in the Mādhyamika or the Yogāchāra treatises. It is found only in our Vṛtti, where it is once attributed to the Vaitulika and once to the Kośakāra. We have noted above an accusation brought against the Kośakāra of heading for the precipice of ayoga-śūnyatā. The Kośakāra had favoured a Sautrāntika view that "there is no such thing as a seer or a seen. There are only dharmas called cause and effect which in reality are free from any activity". The term ayoga-śūnyatā refers there to this theory of nirvāṇa-dharma-mātratā which effectually denied the theory of pratyayas and of their interdependent activities. The same idea is developed in the śūnyavāda of the Mādhyamika which maintains that dharmas (both pratyaya and phala) are devoid of any activity because they are devoid of an inherent nature. This theory is also found in the Yogāchāra-Vijñānavāda school. The Lankāvatāra-sūtra, for instance, says that bodhisattvas by their (descent) penetration of the doctrine of pure mind and by being free from (the thought of) the relation of production and action (utpāda-kriyā-yoga-virahitāp) attain the body of the Buddha. The term utpāda-kriyā-yoga is followed by a similar phrase, viz., 'hetu-pratyaya-kriyā-yoga'. It seems certain that the term yoga is used here

1. See The central Philosophy of Buddhism, Appendix.
3. sva-chitta-nirābhāsa-mātrāvatāreṇa ... utpāda-kriyā-yoga-virahitāp ... tathāgata-kāya ... pratilapsyante. Lankāvatāra-sūtra, p.42.
4. tasmāt tarhi ... bodhisattvaiḥ ... skandha-dhātvāyatamāchitta -hetu-pratyaya-kriyāyogotpāda-sthitibhanga-vikalpa-prapañcha-rahitair bhavitavyam. Ibid. p.43.

The term yoga in this passage could hardly mean 'discipline' as it is translated by Dr. D.T. Suzuki in his Studies in the Lankāvatārasūtra, (1930), p.98.
for the causal relation between a pratyaya and pratyaya-samutpanna. The
denial of which is ayoga. The term ayoga-śūnyatā can, therefore, be
understood as ayoga-eva śūnyatā, and thus can refer to the śūnyavāda of
both the Mādhyamika and Vijnānavāda Buddhism.

The Dīpakāra dismisses this as a piece of dialectic hardly to be
taken seriously (brahmodyam etat). Since, he says, this polemic is
applicable only to those dharmas which are produced by pratyayas. A
thing like a forest, for instance, exists only in a conventional sense,
because it is produced by a multitude of causes. But the dharmas like the
skandha and āyatana have their innate eternal natures, which are not
produced by any pratyayas. The pratyayas produce only different condition
powers, forms and actions in these self-existing dharmas. Consequently,
the dharmas are real in an absolute sense, whereas the conditions like
past, present and future are temporary, produced by causes, and, therefore,
are relatively real. A dharma is like a crown prince. The pratyayas are
like his ministers. The ministers do not produce a new person when they
anoint him as a king, but only confer the royalty on him at a particular
time. Similarly a dharma exists at all times but becomes present, i.e.,
active when it is assisted by the totality of causes and conditions. The
Dīpakāra further supports this theory by quoting Kumāralāta's example of

2. na khalu dravya-svabhāvāstītveṁ prati kīfiḥid upakāraṁ kurvanti, na chu
   svabhāvasya-āpekṣya prajñāpīṭh. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
motes in the sunlight. The motes exist everywhere but only those are visible which are in the sunlight. Others are known only by inference. Similarly a dharma exists in present as well as past and future times. But only its present condition is visible, the other conditions are inferable.

Confronted with a quotation from a Dārshāntika teacher like Kumāralāta, the Sautrāntika amends his position and says that he does not dismiss the past and future dharmas as totally non-existing. They exist in a conventional sense as relatively real dharmas but they do not exist as dravya, as absolute reals.

The Dīpakāra does not accept even this amended position. He says that such a theory will hold good only if one can prove the reality of present on which one can base the relative reality of the past and future. A prajñāpatti-dharma cannot exist without a reference to some paramārtha-dharma. The reality of present cannot be established without the reality of past, for it will involve the production of something out of nothing, a thesis which has been properly refuted (in the discussion on the Paramārtha-śūnyatā-sūtra).

The Kośakāra here points out the absurdity in the Vaiśānaka contention that a dharma exists in three times but is endowed with activity (kārita) only on obtaining the totality of conditions (pratyaya-sāmagri). For surely, he says, even the pratyayas are dharmas, and must be considered

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1. raśmigatasya tu darśanam asya trute raśmipārāvagātv anumeyāh. Ibid. The text here should be corrected: read truteyāḥ and trute instead of tutayah and tute. (p. 277).
2. dravyatmanā na vidyate, prajñāpatty-ātamanā tu sad iti. p. 278.
as always existing. It is wrong, therefore, to say that a dharma is past
when it has ceased to be active, is present when it is active, and is future
when it is not endowed with activity. Moreover, what is this kārita? is
it identical with or different from the dharma? If it is identical then it
is always existing. Consequently there will be no distinction of times.
If it is different, then it becomes a separate dharma and thus will require
an explanation in its turn. If it requires another kārita then the whole
process will result in an infinite regress. Thus the Vaibhāṣika contentio
of the sarvāstivāda is untenable whether judged by scriptures or by reason.
Nevertheless, the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that the past and future exist
because the nature of dharmas (dharmatā) is deep; it cannot be explained.

The Kośakāra gives these arguments in a kārikā consisting of
questions and answers. The Dīpakāra also imitates this style and refutes
the Kośakāra. Read together these two kārikās appear like argumentations
between two rivals engaged in a debate. After reminding the Kośakāra that
the depth of the words of the Buddha cannot be understood by mere
speculation, the Dīpakāra sets forth the nature of kārita (activity). The
projection of a result (phalākṣeṣpa) by a dharma endowed with a potency
gained by the totality of internal and external conditions is called kārita.
Since this happens only when a (future) dharma arrives in its present state,
its activity in the present moment is called kārita.

The Dīpakāra's definition of kārita is identical with

2. Ad. kārikā 320.
3. Ad. kārikā 321.
Samghabhadra's definition quoted in the Tattva-saṅgraha-Pañjikā.  The latter contains an elaborate examination of the doctrine of sarvāstivāda. The main arguments given there are not different from those found in the Bhāshya. But it contains a detailed exposition of kārita particularly on its relation to a dharma. The Dipakāra says that kārita is not different from a dharma, but does not meet the questions of the Kosakāra on the problems arising out of this position. Samghabhadra, however, gives the following explanation: kārita is not different from the dharma, as it is not found to have any nature apart from that. Nor is it the dharma only; because even though it forms its very nature, it is non-existent at some times (i.e. in past and future). It is, therefore, like santati which is neither identical with nor different from the individual units of the five skandhas. Nor can it be said that it does not exist because its effects are found to exist. But it is not a dharma, for in that case even a single moment will be called a santati. The same arguments apply to the existence of a kārita. For it has been said: It is admitted that there are effects of the santati, and yet the santati, as such, is nowhere existent (by itself, apart from the entity); similar should be understood to be the case with kārita bringing about difference of times (states).

1. dharmānāḥ kāritram uchyate phalākshepa-śaktiḥ ... kā. 1793.
2. See tṛaikālya-parīkṣāḥ (kā. 1786–1856).
4. na kāritram dharmaḥ anyat, tad vyatirekena svabhāvānu-palabdheḥ, nāpi dharma-mātraḥ, svabhāvāstitvapeti kadācid abhāvāt ... Tattva-saṅgraha- pañjikā, kā. 1806.
5. santati-kāryam cheshṭaṁ, na vidyate śāpi santatiḥ kāchit/ tad-vad avagachchha yuktyā kāritrepādhva-sāmsiddhim/

Ibid.
It appears from this explanation that the neo-Vaibhāṣikas, under the influence of the criticism of the Kośakāra considerably modified their theory of kārttṛa, and thus compromised their position on the reality of the past and future dārmās. By comparing kārttṛa with sāntati Samghabhadrā virtually reduces the reality of the past and future dārmās, and thus relegated them to the status of a prajñāpāramitā-dārmā like pūdgala. The Dipakāra, however, does not show any acquaintance with this development. He follows in his usual dogmatic manner a more orthodox position on the sarvāstivāda.

Having thus examined the arguments of the Sautrāntika Kośakāra, and having criticised the views of the vaināśika (Śūnyavādin) Vaitulika, the Dipakāra once more turns to the Kośakāra. "The Vaitulika, apostate from the Sarvāstivāda, says: 'We too advocate (imagine) three svabhāvas.' To him we should reply: the world is full of such illusions which please only fools ... these three svabhāvas imagined by you have been already rejected. Such other illusions should also be thrown away. This is one more occasion where the Kośakāra shows his ignorance of (the doctrine of) Time."  

The term Vaitulika in this passage most certainly refers to the Vijñānavādin Kośakāra who formulated the theory of three svabhāvas, viz. parikalpita, paratantra and parinishpanna. This doctrine found in the Lankāvatāra-sūtra and in the works of Maitreya and Asanga is fully developed:

2. ity etad aparām adhva-samohānkanāstham Kośakāra-kasyeti. Ibid.
by Vasubandhu in his Tri-svabhāva-nirdeśa. The Dipakāra's accusation that the Kośakāra is heading for the precipice of ayoga-sūnyatā, his criticism that the Kośakāra is entering the portals of the Vaśīṭulika scriptures and finally his statement that the Kośakāra having deviated from Sarvāstivāda advocates the doctrine of tri-svabhāva, confirms the traditional account preserved in Paramārtha's 'Life of Vasubandhu' that the Kośakāra Vasubandhu was converted to Mahāyāna and became a leading exponent of the Vijñānavāda Buddhism.

1. On a controversy on the validity of this tradition, see my article 'On the theory of two Vasubandhus' ESOAS, 1958, xxii/1, pp.48-53, which contains a criticism of Professor Frauwaller's theory that the Kośakāra Vasubandhu and the Vijñānavādin Vasubandhu are two different persons. See Frauwaller's On the date of the Buddhist master of the Law Vasubandhu, Serie Orientale Roma III, Roma, 1951.
V. DATE AND AUTHORSHIP

The controversies between the Dipakāra and the Kośakāra discussed in the foregoing chapter lead one to believe that the Dipa and the Vṛtti were written primarily with the ambition of presenting a rival treatise to the celebrated Kośa and the Bhāṣya, and at the same time with the aim of refuting the views of the Sautrāntika Kośakāra leaning more and more towards Mahāyāṇa. The Dipakāra’s declaration that he will propound the essence of Abhidharma forgotten by the Kośakāra, his description of the latter as an apostate from the Sarvāstivāda, his condemnation of him as a conceited person (pandita-mānîn)¹ ignorant of the Abhidharma (abhidharma-paroksha-mati-vṛttināṁ)² betray a certain rivalry entertained by him towards Vasubandhu the Kośakāra. By calling the latter’s views unbuddhistic (abaudhhyā) based on the Vaitulika scriptures leading to the doctrine of ayoga-sūnyatā, he seems to persuade us over and again that the Kośa is not an authentic Vaibhāṣika treatise but only a mouth-piece of the Mahāyānist Vasubandhu disguised as a Vaibhāṣika āchārya.

Unfortunately, the name of this rival has not survived either in the Dipa or in the Vṛtti. In the Vṛtti he is merely called Dipakāra as Vasubandhu is called Kośakāra. He is a Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika as is evident from his criticism of the Bahirdeśīyaka view of the four avyākṛita-mālas in preference to the theory of three held by the Kāśmīra school.³ He is an orthodox Vaibhāṣika. Many of his views are identical with those of

Samghabhadra, and in some cases they are expressed in almost identical terms. We have noted this identity in our discussion on the definition of a dravya-paramāpu, on the mutual relation between the vitarka and vichāra, on the reality of the chitta-viprayukta-saṃskāras like prāpti and sabhāgata, on the theory of bija and on the nature of kārītra. This identity can also be noted in their definitions of the terms like māda, dhātu, and their views on the function of three vidyās and on the relation between riddhi and samādhi. Despite this identity of views, the Dipakāra makes no direct or indirect reference to Samghabhadra or to the latter's famous works, viz. the "Nyāyānusāra" and the "Samaya-pradīpikā".

The Buddhist Āchāryas referred to by him, viz. (ārya) Maitreyya, (āchārya) Āśvaghoṣha, (bhadanta) Kumārālāta, Vasumitra, Ghoshaka, Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva, and the non-Buddhist Āchāryas, viz. Kapila, Akshapāda, Ulūka, Kapāda, Vyāsa, Vṛṣabha and Vindhyavāsin, all belong to a period prior to the compilation of the Kośa.

Our main sources for the knowledge of the Dipakāra, therefore, are all external. But even these are disappointing, because, to the best of our knowledge, neither the Dīpa nor the Vṛtti seem to have been known to the contemporaries or to the successors of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu.

Tradition as preserved in Paramārtha's 'Life of Vasubandhu' knows of only

1. Vide supra, p.140. 2. Ibid. p.147.
one (Vaibhāshika) rival to the Kośakāra, viz. Saṃghabhadra, and attributes him only two works, viz. the "Nyāyānusāra" and the "Samayapradīpikā", which are commentaries on the Kośa, and not entirely independent works like our Dīpa. Yāsomitra who quotes large passages from the "Nyāyānusāra" and criticises the views of Saṃghabhadra (and also several other ācāryas like Anantavarman, Guṇamati, Devaśarman, Rāma, etc.) makes not a single reference either to the Dīpakāra or to the Dīpa, Vṛitti and to the Tattva-saptati which as noted above was also a work by the author of the Vṛitti. Neither the works of the post-Vasubandhu ācāryas like Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Sañtārakshita and Kamalaśīla (which contain an occasional criticisms of the Vaibhāshika), nor the works of the Chinese historians like Hsuan Tsang or the Tibetan historians like Tārāmātha and Buston, nor the extant collections of the Chinese and Tibetan Tripitaka show any acquaintance with these three works or with the name Dīpakāra.

It is not possible, in these circumstances, to arrive at any decisive conclusions on the authorship of the Dīpa, and consequently of the Vṛitti. For, as in the case of the Kośa and the Bhāshya, the Dīpa and the Vṛitti too appear to be the works of one and the same author. The Kārikā text (Dīpa) as well as the Vṛitti are both critical of the Kośakāra. The former refers to him only indirectly by calling him 'pandita-mānīnī', and by referring to the theory of tri-svabhāva as an imagination capable of pleasing only fools. The Vṛitti makes direct references to the Kośakāra. The Vṛitti on the kārikā consisting of questions and answers:

1. Vide supra, p.119, n.2.
2. svārtha-vijñāna evānya ānuḥ pandita-mānīnāḥ / Ad. ka. 77 od.
3. parikalpa-jagad vyāptaḥ mūrkha-chittānurāṇjībhiḥ / Ad. ka. 324 ab
on the sarvāstivāda\(^1\) (between the Kośakāra and the Dīpakāra) amply proves the identity of the author\(^2\) of the Dīpa and the Vṛitti. The author of the Vṛitti, commenting on the answer part of this kārikā refers to himself in the first person, e.g., \(\text{vayam brūmah, vayam āchakshmah and vayam prativadhah.}\)

In the absence of positive evidence we are left with only conjecture regarding the identification of the Dīpakāra. It is very tempting to identify him with Saṅghabhadra. Both belong to the orthodox Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika school. Both hold identical views on almost all controversial points between the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika. Both were rivals of the Kośakāra, and composed their works in refutation of the latter. Nevertheless, it is most unlikely that Saṅghabhadra could have been the author of the Dīpa. Having composed two major works (viz. the 'Nyāyānusāra' and the 'Samaya-pradīpikā') against the Bhāṣya, he could hardly have ventured on a third work. The tradition would have known it. The Vṛitti, instead of referring to the Tattva-saptati (or in addition to it) would have referred to either or one of his better known works. It is

\(^1\) ko vigdhno 'ūga-vaikalyam na tat sarvāstītā sadā /
    tat kathāṃ ārūyataṁ sadbhyāḥ durbodhā khalu dharmatā // Ad. kā. 320.

\(^2\) Adv. pp.279-80. Also: mama tu chandra-koti-prakāśa-lakṣaṇo
drīshtānto vidyate — ... (p.274), vayaṁ tu pāsyāmah ... (p.295), vayaṁ
brūmah (p.303). All these three statements are followed by kārikās of
the Dīpa. It is true that sometimes Vṛitti describes certain views as
the views of the āchārya (i.e. the Dīpakāra) e.g. ity āchāryakam (p.11) and
āchāryāpām abhimateti (p.295). But it is a common practice to refer to
oneself in the third person, particularly in the commentaries. The
Kośakāra even refers to himself as 'apara'. Vide Adv. p.81, n.4.
therefore, more likely that the Dīpa was a work of one of Saṃghabhadra's followers who carried on the tradition of his opposition to the Kośakāra.

In this connection, Hsuan Tsang's account of Āchārya Vimalamitra, a disciple of Saṃghabhadra, is of great significance. After relating the disputes between the Kośakāra (Vasubandhu) and Saṃghabhadra, Hsuan Tsang gives the following account of Āchārya Vimalamitra:

"Saṃghabhadra having died, they burnt his body and collected his bones, and in a stūpa attached to the Saṃghārāma, 200 paces or so to the north-west, in a wood of Āmra trees, they are yet visible.

"Beside the Āmra wood is a stūpa in which are relics of the bequeathed body of the master of śāstras Vimala-mitra (pi-mo-lo-mi-to-lo) [wou hau yau]. This master of the śāstras was a man of Kāśmīr. He became a disciple and attached himself to the Sarvāstivāda school. He had read a multitude of sūtras and investigated various śāstras; he travelled through the five Indies and made himself acquainted with the mysterious literature of the three Piṭakas. Having established a name and accomplished his work, being about to retire to his own country, on his way he passed near the stūpa of Saṃghabhadra, the master of śāstras. Putting his hand (on it), he sighed and said, 'This master was truly distinguished, his views pure and eminent. After having spread abroad the great principles (of his faith), he purposed to overthrow those of other schools and lay firmly the fabric of his own. Why then should his fame be not eternal? I, Vimalamitra, foolish

though I am, have received at various times the knowledge of the deep principles of his departed wisdom; his distinguished qualities have been cherished through successive generations. Vasubandhu, though dead yet lives in the tradition of the school. That which I know so perfectly (ought to be preserved). I will write, then, such śāstras as will cause the learned men of Jambudvīpa to forget the name of the Great Vehicle and destroy the fame of Vasubandhu. This will be an immortal work, and will be the accomplishment of my long-meditated design.'

"Having finished these words, his mind became confused and wild; his boastful tongue heavily protruded, whilst the hot blood flowed forth. Knowing that his end was approaching, he wrote the following letter to signify his repentance:—'The doctrines of the Great Vehicle ... contain the final principles ... I foolishly dared to attack its distinguished teachers. The reward of my works is plain to all. It is for this I die ...' Then the great earth shook again as he gave up life. In the place where he died the earth opened, and there was produced a great ditch. His disciples burnt his body, collected his bones, and raised over them (a stūpa).

"At this time there was an Arhat who, having witnessed his death, sighed and exclaimed, '... Today this master of śāstras yielding to his feelings and maintaining his own views, abusing the Great Vehicle has fallen into the deepest hell (Avfchi)!'"

The account given above has several points of interest in our task of identifying the Dīpakāra. Vimalamitra is said to be a Kāśmīrian,
a sarvāstivādin, a master of śāstras (i.e. Abhidharma), who entertains an ambition to destroy the fame of Vasubandhu in favour of his (distant) teacher Saṅghabhadra. All these points are favourable in identifying him with the Dipakāra. It is true that the account says nothing about his works. But this must have been forgotten by the Mahāyānists in their zeal condemning him for entertaining an ambition against Vasubandhu.

Indeed, the latter part of Hsüan-tsang's account looks more like a fiction than like a history. It may well be that Vimalamitra repented his ill will towards Vasubandhu. But the account of the manner in which he meets his death, particularly the vomiting of hot blood, and his descent in the 'deepest hell' may be taken as a Mahāyānist way of denouncing their opponents. The fact that a stūpa was built over him and that his relics were enshrined near those of Saṅghabhadra is sufficient to point out some eminent part played by this āchārya in upholding the orthodox Vaibhāṣika tenets as outlined by Saṅghabhadra. He may well have been our Dipakāra whose works were forgotten in course of time partly, perhaps, in favour of Saṅghabhadra’s monumental and more authoritative works against the Koṣakāra.

The identification of the Dipakāra with Vimalamitra could also be helpful in determining an approximate date of the Dīpa. Vimalamitra is not a contemporary either of the Koṣakāra or of Saṅghabhadra, as he says

1. In the Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (by Prof. H. II and others, Tōhoku Imperial University, Japan 1934) several works on dhārayās (see Nos. 2092, 2681, 3112, 3814, etc.) are attributed to one Vimalamitra. But it is hardly possible that this person could have been the āchārya Vimalamitra referred to by Hsüan-Tsang.

that the latter's "qualities have been cherished through successive generations". It is not possible to determine the generations that separated Saṅghabhadrā from Vimalamitra. But these could not have been many, for the memories of the dispute between the Kośakāra and Saṅghabhadrā are still fresh in the minds of (the generation of) Vimalamitra. Moreover he must have flourished much earlier than Hsüan Tsang's visit to India, i.e. 629 A.D. The lower and upper limits of the date of Vimalamitra can thus be fixed between the dates of the Kośakāra and of Hsüan-Tsang.

The date of (the Kośakāra) Vasubandhu is yet uncertain. Some place him in the middle of the fourth century and some in the fifth century A.D. But whether he is placed in the fourth or in the fifth century, it is unlikely that Vimalamitra can be placed beyond a hundred years after the Kośakāra's death. The approximate date of Vimalamitra could thus be somewhere between 450 to 550 A.D. or even much earlier.

The same date can hold good for the composition of the Dīpa. As we have noted above, all the āchāryas referred to by the Dīpakāra belong to a pre-Kośakāra period. No new doctrinal developments such as are found in the works of the post-Vasubandhu period are recorded in the Vṛttī. Indeed, the Dīpakāra's criticism of the Kośakāra, and particularly his argumentations in the defence of the sarvāstivāda give an impression of

1. Professor E. Frauwallner has given a complete bibliography on this problem in his monograph On the date of the Buddhist master of law Vasubandhu (Serie Orientale Roma, III) Roma, 1951. Also see my article 'On the theory of two Vasubandhus' in the BSQAS, 1958, xxi/1, pp.48-53.
their being contemporaries. We have no means of establishing any precise date, but one thing looks certain, that the date of the Dipa could hardly be extended beyond a hundred years (or a few generations) after the Koda†a, a date which we have assigned to Śchārya Vimalamitra.

Restorations and Emendations

The MS. is fairly correct and needed very little correction. In doubtful places and where the MS. was erased or broken, and where the photographs were not clear, we have restored the text with the help of the Sakv. and the press-copy of Professor Pradhan’s edition of the Bhāṣṭya. All these restorations are given in square brackets. A few letters (two or three) of the first line of a large number of folios are lost under the drawing pins used by the photographer in pinning the palm-leaves. The restorations of these letters are also given in square brackets.

The emendations are given in round brackets. The majority of these emendations consist of a change of the letter pa into na or vice versa. The rules of cerebralization of na are not generally observed. We may note here a few cases of such irregularity:

1. Vide supra, p. 6, n. 3.
2. The numbers preceding the folio numbers given in square brackets refer to the card-boards on which these photographs were placed. Thus for instance [I.B.1.] refers to the reverse side of the first photograph on the first card-board. The numbers (1 to 9) given in small round brackets indicate the beginning of a new line of a folio.
A) Words where the dental na is used instead of cerebral pa:-
apramāna (p.287), aprahīna (p.238), abhinishkramana (p.274), ēvenika (p.80)
Airāvana (p.389), kriyamāna\(^1\) (p.69), gauna (p.367), Nārāyana (pp.14, 101),
nirvāna (p.364), paramānu (p.65), prahāna\(^2\) (p.238), prahīna (p.28),
lakshana (p.417), lavana (p.77), vakshyamāna (p.193), śonita (p.274),
ārāmanera (p.130), ārāmanyaphala (p.57), etc.

B) Words where cerebral pa is used instead of dental na:-
apārya (p.89), apāsrava (p.365), abhilapāpa (p.20), kīrtapa (p.83),
gagapa (p.13), piśraya (p.12), pishyandaphala (p.177), pirodha (p.289),
nirvāna (p.136), darshapa, daurmapasyā\(^1\) nirvartapa (p.136), paripirvāna
(p.339), paripirvīvita (p.426), pāna (pp.12, 128), pravartapa (p.50),
mahāyāna (p.358), yopiśo manasikāra (p.296), rachana (p.192), vivarjana
(p.46), śravakayāna (p.358), hīna (p.384), etc.

Similar irregularities are found in the case inflexions:

1) Nominative case - trīni (p.23), āravyāni (p.405), nāmāpi (p.210),
balāni (p.357), mauneyāpi (p.150), viśishtāpi (p.45), sarvāni (p.54), etc.

2) Instrumental case - atyayena (p.132), aśaikshena (p.23), upachayena
(p.374), kramena (p.23), parivartinā (p.412), pratyayena (p.412), mārgena
(p.57) and samgrahena (p.8), etc.

3) Genitive case - indriyānām (pp.6, 34, etc.), kāryānām (p.38),
Kauravānām (p.91), pramukhānām (p.86), mūrtānām (p.15), yogipām (p.20)
and shannām (p.213), etc.

1. Also kriyamāna (p.259).
2. Also prahāna (pp.146-7).
3. Also prahīna (p.147).
4. These two words are always spelt in this way.
5. Also balāni (p.358).
6. Also mārgena (pp.58, 59).
It can be seen from these examples that there is a tendency to cerebralise the na when it is in the proximity of ra. This tendency can be fully observed in the combinations like anayor pāsti (p.344), ādibhir pāmabhiḥ (p.38), chatvāro pīkāyāḥ (p.288), chittayor aṣṭatarat (p.4), trayor aṇiyamah (p.40), pūmar etc. (p.40), viśuddhir aṇāsravaiḥ (p.49), etc., and compounds like chānūra-pārāyapa (p.389), dūṣṭa-pīgraḥa (p.154), dharma-pīrvachana (p.44), vairā-pīryātana (p.154), svara-pīrgosha (p.189), etc.

It is not possible to decide whether these irregularities are to be attributed to the Dipakāra or to the scribe of our MS. Judging by the chaste and cultured language of our text and the knowledge of the Sanskrit Grammar it exhibits in its discussions of the formation of several terms, it seems unlikely that the Dipakāra would commit such inconsistent violation of the rules of grammar. These irregularities are more probably the result of a faulty MS. tradition, possibly due to the scribe or scribes following the dialectal peculiarities of their native land.

APPENDIX

A table showing correspondence between the kārikās of the Dīpa and the Kośa. Numbers on the left refer to the kārikās of the Dīpa, and on the right refer to the kārikās of the Kośa. (Pradhan's edition - v. supra p.6, n.3.)

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CORRECTIONS

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(Reprinted from the *BSOAS*, 1958, *xxi/1.* )
ON THE THEORY OF TWO VASUBANDHUS

By Padmanabh S. Jaini

SINCE the publication of Professor J. Takakusu’s ‘Life of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha’ in the year 1904, several scholars have made attempts to determine the date and works of Vasubandhu. The problem is beset with several difficulties. Tradition gives three dates (A.N. 900, 1000, and 1100) based on different reckonings of the Nirvāṇa era. Vasubandhu, himself a Sautrāntika, is the author of the celebrated Vaibhāṣika work, viz., the Abhidharma-kosa (and its Bhāṣya), and is at the same time credited with the authorship of several major works of the Vijñānavāda school. The problem is rendered more complex by the mention in Yasomitra’s Sphutarthā Abhidharma-kosa-vidhyā of an elder (Vṛddhacārya) Vasubandhu, leading to a recent theory of two Vasubandhus advocated by Professor E. Frauwallner.

Paramārtha gives two dates for Vasubandhu. In his ‘Life of Vasubandhu’ he gives A.N. 1100, and in his commentary on the Madhyānta-vibhāga (of Maitreya) he gives A.N. 500. Takakusu favoured A.N. 1100 and proposed A.D. 420–500 as the period of Vasubandhu. In 1911, P. N. Péri, after a thorough investigation of all available materials on the subject, proposed A.D. 350. Over a period several scholars, notably Professor Kimura, G. Ono, U. Woghihara, H. Ui, and many others, contributed their views on this topic, which were summed up in 1929 by J. Takakusu, who again tried to establish his previously proposed date of the fifth century A.D. Since then the problem received little attention until in 1951 Professor Frauwallner published his monograph on Vasubandhu.

Professor E. Frauwallner’s views can be briefly stated as follows:

1. Of the three dates current in tradition, the first, viz. the A.N. 900, points to a time prior to A.D. 400, the last two, viz. the A.N. 1000 and 1100, refer to one and the same date, viz. the fifth century A.D. Thus there are only two dates for Vasubandhu.

2. These two dates refer not to one but to two persons bearing the same name. One Vasubandhu (the elder—fourth century A.D.) is the Vṛddhacārya Vasubandhu mentioned in the Vāyūhā of Yaśomitra, and the other Vasubandhu (the younger—fifth century A.D.) is the author of the Abhidharma-kosa.

1 This paper was read before the XXIVth International Congress of Orientalists, Munich, 1957.
3 ‘À propos de la date de Vasubandhu’, BÉFEO, xi, 1911, 339–90.
5 On the date of the Buddhist master of the law Vasubandhu (Serie Orientale Roma, vi), Roma, 1951.
3. Paramārtha in his ‘Life of Vasubandhu’ confuses these two and hence the difficulty of determining the date of Vasubandhu.

4. This biography can be divided into three distinct parts:

(i) Legend of the name of Vasubandhu’s native city Puruṣapura, his father, the Brāhmin Kauśika, and of the three sons Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Viśrṣīvatsa.

(ii) Account of the council in Kāśmīr, arrival of the Sāṅkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin, and defeat of Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu’s composition of the Paramārthasaptatikā in refutation of Vindhyavāsin. The composition of the Abhidharma-kośa. Saṃghabhadra’s challenge to Vasubandhu for a disputation, declined by the latter on account of his old age.

(iii) Asaṅga’s conversion of Vasubandhu to Mahāyāna. Vasubandhu’s Mahāyāna works and death.

Of these the first and last sections deal with Vasubandhu the elder, the second part deals with Vasubandhu the younger.

5. From this it follows that Vasubandhu (elder) the brother of Asaṅga is not the Kośakāra Vasubandhu (younger). It is the elder Vasubandhu who was converted from Sarvāstivāda to Mahāyāna by Asaṅga. This is supported by Chi-Tsang’s commentary on the Śatasāstra, where (this elder) Vasubandhu is said to have composed 500 Mahāyāna works (in addition to 500 Hinayāna works composed by him prior to his conversion) and hence given the nickname of ‘Master of the Thousand Manuals’.

The younger Vasubandhu, the author of the Paramārthasaptatikā and the Abhidharma-kośa, belonged to the Sarvāstivāda school, but leaned more and more towards the Sautrāntika school.

This in brief is a summary of Professor Frauwallner’s thesis. The conclusion that would logically follow from his thesis is that the Kośakāra Vasubandhu was not a Mahāyānist and consequently, not the author of the Viśrṣīnavāda works credited to him. These would necessarily have to be the works of the elder Vasubandhu, the brother of Asaṅga. But Professor Frauwallner avoids such conclusions by stating that the accounts of the life of Vasubandhu ‘either do not give any information at all about these works, or mention them in passages where the two Vasubandhus are confused with each other’ (p. 56).

In this paper I propose to present some new evidence that throws some doubt on Professor Frauwallner’s thesis and confirms the older and universal tradition about the conversion of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu to Mahāyāna, and his authorship of at least one work belonging to the Viśrṣīnavāda school.

My evidence is based on the manuscript of the Abhidharma-dīpa (together

1 In his recent work Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (1956), Professor Frauwallner includes the Viśrṣīvatikā and the Trimsākā vijñaptimātraksiddhi under the heading of ‘Vasubandhu der Ältere’, but is still hesitant about the ascription of these works: ‘Meiner Ansicht nach ist Vasubandhu der Jüngere ihr Verfasser, doch kann diese schwierige Frage hier nicht weiter erörtert werden’ (p. 351).
with a commentary—the Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti), discovered in the Śhālu monastery in Tibet by Pandit Rāhula Sānkṛtyāyana in the year 1937. He brought back photographs of this work, which are treasured in the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute of Patna.¹

The MS discovered is incomplete. The last folio is numbered 150. The whole work might not have contained more than 160 folios. Of these, only 62 have been found. It contains two works, viz. the kārikā text (the Abhidharma-dīpa ²) and a prose commentary (the Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti ³). The work belongs to the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika school and appears, from internal evidence, to have been written either during or immediately after the time of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu. The name of the author is not mentioned in the work, but it is my conjecture that it was written by a rival of Vasubandhu, either Saṅghabhadra or one of his disciples.

The Dīpa and also its commentary (the Vṛtti) closely follow both in contents and in presentation, their counterparts, viz. the Abhidharma-kośa ⁴ and its commentary (the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya ⁵) of Vasubandhu. Of the 597 kārikās of the extant Dīpa, more than 300 have their parallels in the Kośa, and in many cases appear to be imitations of the latter. The Vṛtti has about 50 large passages almost identical with the Bhāṣya, 32 of which are directly borrowed from the latter. Thus to a large extent, the Dīpa and the Vṛtti are written in imitation of the Kośa and the Bhāṣya.

But what is more interesting to us is the fact that the extant Vṛtti contains 17 hostile references to the Kośakāra (without mentioning the name Vasubandhu) criticizing his Sautrāntika views and at times accusing him of entering the portals of Mahāyāna Buddhism. I quote here a few such passages from the Vṛtti:

(i) Idam idānim abhidharma-sarvasvam Kośakāraka-smṛti-gocarāśitam vaktavyam. (Fol. 37b.⁶)
(ii) Kośakāras tv aha—sarva-sūkṣmo rūpa-saṅghātaḥ paramāṇuḥ ’iti. Tena saṅghātaḥ-vyātiriktaṃ rūpam anyad vaktavyam . . . (Fol. 43b.⁷)
(iii) Siddhā sahāgaṅaḥ. Kośakāraḥ punas tāṃ Vaiśeṣika-parikalpita-jāti-padārthaṇa samīkṣurvan vyaktam pāyasa-vāyasayor varṇa-sādharṇyam paśyati. (Fol. 47a.⁸)
(iv) Atra punah Kośakāraḥ pratijñāte—sacittikeyam samāpattiḥ ’iti . . . Ted etad abāuddhiyam. (Fol. 47b.⁹)

¹ I am grateful to the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute for entrusting me with the work of editing this MS. It will soon be published in the Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Patna.
² Henceforth called Dīpa.
³ Henceforth called Vṛtti.
⁴ Henceforth called Kośa.
⁵ Henceforth called Bhāṣya.
⁶ In this bold line the Vṛtti criticizes the Kośakāra for his omission of a topic dealing with cessation of dhītis through various stages of anāsrava-mārga.
⁸ See L’Abhidharma-kośa, chapter 11, kā. 41a, and Vṛkṣa’s Sphutārthā Abhidharma-kośa vyākhyā, pp. 157–9.
⁹ See L’Abhidharma-kośa, chapter 11, kā. 44d, and Vṛkṣa’s Sphutārthā Abhidharma-kośa vyākhyā, p. 169.
In these passages the Kośakara is criticized for his Sautrāntika views on the theory of atoms and the three citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras, viz. sabhāgata, nirodha-samāpatti, and āyu. We may particularly note the last passage where the Kośakara is said to have begun entering the portals of the Vaitulika-śāstra. The term Vaitulika-śāstra clearly refers to Mahāyāna scriptures. Asaṅga in his Abhidharma-samuccaya identifies vaitulya with vaipulya and explains the latter term as Bodhisattva-pitaka, which undoubtedly belongs to Mahāyāna.

This is the first allusion to the Kośakara's leanings not only towards Sautrāntika but also towards Mahāyāna Buddhism.

While dealing with a controversial question related to perception (whether the eye sees an object or the mind sees it) the Vṛtti quotes the following passage from the Kośa-bhaṣya and says:


The view of the Kośakara quoted by our Vṛtti is what the Kośa gives as a Sautrāntika view. In the Vṛtti the Kośakara is identified with the Sautrāntika. He is censured for his ignorance of Abhidharma and also accused of heading for the precipice of ayoga-śūnyatā.

The term ayoga-śūnyatā should put at rest any doubt about the real affiliations of the Kośakara. The term certainly refers to a Mahāyāna doctrine.

In the fifth Adhyāya of the Dīpa, a fundamental principle of the Sarvāstivāda school, viz. the reality of the past and future elements, is discussed in opposition to the Sautrāntika arguments advanced by the Kośakara in the fifth Kośa-sthāna of his Bhāṣya. After dealing with the Sautrāntika, the Vṛtti criticizes the Vaitulika. He is described as ayoga-śūnyatā-vādin maintaining

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1 See L'Abhidharma-kośa, chapter ii, kā. 10a, and Vyākhyā, p. 104.
3 cf. ‘Opinion du Sautrāntika. — Quelle discussion dans le vide ! Le Sūtra enseigne : “En raison de l’organe de la vue et des visibles naît la connaissance visuelle ” : il n’y a là ni un organe qui voit, ni un visible qui est vu ; il n’y a là aucune action de voir, aucun agent qui voit ; ce n’est que jeu de causes et effets. En vue de la pratique, on parle à son gré, métaphoriquement, de ce processus ; “ L’œil voit ; la connaissance discerne ”. Mais il ne faut pas se prendre à ces métaphores. Bhagavat l’a dit : il ne faut pas se prendre aux manières de dire populaires, il ne faut pas prendre au sérieux les expressions en usage dans le monde’. L’Abhidharma-kośa, chapter i, kā. 42.
4 See L’Abhidharma-kośa, chapter v, kā. 17–19.
that nothing (i.e. the past, present, and future) exists,¹ and is, therefore, condemned as an annihilationist (vaināśika).²

The main Vaitulika doctrine criticized in the Vṛtti is the nih-svabhāva-vāda,³ which is common to both the Yogācara and the Mādhyamika schools. Both these schools are śānyavādīns in a real sense and would appear, to that extent, as Vaināśikas to a Realist Vaibhāṣika.

The term ayoga-śānyatā is not found in the traditional lists of 18, 19, or 20 kinds of śānyatās ⁴ or in the Mādhyamika or the Yogācara treatises. The Vṛtti does not explain the term. If this vāda could mean the doctrine of non-applicability of all predications, especially of ātman and dharmas (ātma-dharmopacāraḥ),⁵ then it would be equivalent to the nih-svabhāva-vāda, accepted by both the Mādhyamika and the Yogācara schools.

The passages quoted above from the Vṛtti indicate, in the view of the Vaibhāṣika, that the Kośakāra, even in the Kośa-bhāṣya, shows signs of more and more leanings towards Mahāyāna Buddhism. This in itself does not prove his conversion to Mahāyāna, but certainly indicates his inclination towards it. In the light of these findings we may now turn to further evidence which seems to anticipate his conversion and confirm his authorship of a Mahāyāna work.

After dealing with the nih-svabhāva-vāda of the Vaitulika, the Vṛtti again turns to the Kośakāra and says: 'The Vaitulika, apostate from the Sarvāstivāda, says: „We too advocate (imagine) three svabhāvas“. To him we should reply: “The world is full of such illusions which please only fools. Rare are those imaginations that catch the hearts of the learned”. These three svabhāvas imagined by you have been already rejected. Such other illusions should also be thrown away. This is one more occasion where the Kośakāra shows his ignorance of (the doctrine of) Time.’⁶

Three significant statements in this criticism may be noted: (i) The

¹ Tatra Sarvāstivādasyādha-vrayam asti . . . Vibhajyāvādinas tu, Dārṣṭāntikasya ca pradeśo vartamānādha-samjñajakāḥ. Vaitulikasyāyoga-śānyatā-vādinaḥ sarvam nāstiti. . . (Fol. 108a.)
² Yaḥ Sarvāstivāda-kāśyapaḥ . . . sātādhiḥ. Tad anye Dārṣṭāntika-Vaitulika-Paudgalikāḥ . . . Lokāyatika-Vaināśika-Naṇṭa-pakṣe prakṣepatavyāḥ. (Fol. 108a.)
³ Vaitulikāḥ kalpayati—
Yat pratītya-samutpānam
tat svabhāvān na vidyate/
Yat khalu nihsvabhāvam nirūtmaṁ hetāṁ pratītya jāyate tasya khalu svabhāvo nāsti . . . Tasmād alāta-caṅkramaṁ nihsvabhāvatāt sarva-dharmā nirūtmaṁ iti. Tum pratītya apadhiyate. . . (Fol. 111a.)
⁴ See Professor T. R. V. Murti’s The central philosophy of Buddhism, Appendix.
⁵ I am indebted to Professor T. R. V. Murti for suggesting this interpretation of the term ayoga-śānyatā.
⁶ Atra Sarvāstivāda-vibhaṅgitar Vaituliko nirāha—vayam api trīṁ svabhāvān parikalpayāsyāmāḥ.
Tasmai pratītya-samutpānam
Parikalpaṁ Jagad vyāptam
mārka-cītānuraṇājībhīḥ/
Yas tu vidyān-mano-grāhī
parikalpāṁ sa durlabhah/
Te kalve ete bharatikalpāṁ tryga-svabhāvāḥ purvam eva pratītyāḥ. Evam anye’ py asat-parikalpāḥ
pratītyātavyāḥ. Ity etad aparām adhīna-samānābhānā-sāhānaṁ Kośakāraṁ-aṣṭi. (Fol. 112a.)
ON THE THEORY OF TWO VASUBANDHUS

Vaitulika is called here *sarvāstivāda-vibhāṣṭiḥ* (one who has deviated from the *Sarvāstivāda*).

(ii) A reference is made to the doctrine of *tri-svabhāva-vāda*.

(iii) A reference is made to the Kośakāra in a manner which shows his responsibility in the formulation of this doctrine.

Of these, the last two statements most probably refer to the *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*,¹ a work of the Yogacāra-Vijñānavāda school, credited by tradition to Vasubandhu. It consists of 38 kārikās and marks the culminating point of the development of this doctrine found in the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* and in the works of Maitreya and Asaṅga,² the chief founders of the Yogacāra school. The first statement saying that the Vaitulika deviated from the *Sarvāstivāda*, may be a general statement, referring only to the belief of the Vaibhāṣikā that the Vaitulika branched off from the more orthodox Sarvāstivāda school. But read in the context of the above passage, it appears certain that the *Vṛtti* is alluding to the conversion of the Kośakāra to Mahāyāna Buddhism.

This in brief is our main evidence confirming Paramārtha’s account of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu’s conversion to Mahāyāna and his authorship of several Mahāyāna works. It does not contradict the fact of two (one elder and the other younger) Vasubandhus. The Vṛddhācārya Vasubandhu certainly existed, as is clear from the statements of Yaśomitra. He may well have been the author of a commentary to the *Abhidharma-sūtra* of Dharma-śrī and also author of many Mahāyāna works.

But we certainly are not justified, in the light of the evidence of the *Dīpa*, in limiting the activities of the younger Vasubandhu to Hīnayāna alone, in crediting him only with the authorship of the *Kośa* and thus relating the last part of Paramārtha’s biography to the life of Vasubandhu the elder. The date of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu and his relation to Asaṅga, however, still remains unsettled. But the confirmation of his authorship of the *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa* might well lead us to accept the tradition preserved in Paramārtha’s ‘Life of Vasubandhu’.

¹ Sanskrit text and Tibetan version edited by Sujitkumar Mukhopādhyāya, Visvabharati, 1939.

² See parallel passages collected by S. Mukhopādhyāya in the *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*.