THE MYSTICISM OF ḤAMZAH FANṢŪRĪ

by

Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, M.A. (McGill)

Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of London
School of Oriental and African Studies
May 1966
ABSTRACT

This thesis is presented in two Parts: Part I forms the full exposition of the mysticism of Ḥamzah Fansūrī, a Malay Sūfī of the 16th century who lived in Barus in North Sumatra; Part II contains his three extant prose works edited in romanised Malay and translated into English; both the edition and the translation are annotated.

A general picture of the spiritual climate of the period in which Ḥamzah lived, together with a brief biographical sketch attempting to establish his place of birth and the span of the period in which he lived – both of them problematic questions – is presented in the first chapter. Then in the second chapter allegations concerning the "heresy" in his ideas levelled against him by Nūru’l-Dīn al-Rahīrī of Gujerat, who was in Acheh in North Sumatra in 1637, are critically examined. A conclusion that the allegations were unfounded is submitted. Chapter three deals with Ḥamzah's mystical doctrines in the domains of ontology, cosmology and psychology. Similarities with the doctrines of Ibnu’l-'Arabī and 'Abdu’l-Karīm al-Jīlī are noted. Chapters four and five introduce methodological concepts in a modern semantic analysis which is employed to ascertain the meanings of important concepts in Ḥamzah's mystical system. These concepts – the Divine Will, Being, Existence,
the Self – are couched in Malay, and comparison with Arabic, Greek, Persian and Sanskrit terms with a view to establishing equivalents is attempted. In the conclusion Ḥamzah's contributions in Malay classical literature, both in the field of poetry as well as that of rational inquiry is stated. It is further suggested that Ḥamzah was the first man to set down in Malay the Ṣūfī doctrines; that he was the first man to produce systematic speculative writing in Malay. A theory on the islamization process in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, in which it is suggested Ḥamzah played an important and hitherto undiscovered role, is also presented.

The Appendices contain material already given in the table of contents. The most important material there is the Index of the Semantic Vocabulary of Ḥamzah's mystical system, which supports everything that has been said with reference to the concepts in Ḥamzah's teachings – in particular with concepts explained in Chapters four and five.
TO MY MOTHER

الجنة تحت أقدامي، والحمد لله.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks are due to Mr. E.C.G. Barrett, Lecturer in Malay, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and to Dr. M. Lings, Assistant Keeper of Oriental Manuscripts and Prints, the British Museum, London, for their supervision which they rendered with care and attention; to Dr. R. Roolvink, Assistant Curator of the Bibliotheca Academiae Lugduno-Batava, Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden, for his co-operation and permission in getting some of the Malay and Javanese texts, which form the subject of this thesis, photographed for my use.

My thanks are also due to the Asia Foundation, Kuala Lumpur, Malaya, for financial assistance rendered in 1963 and 1966; to the British Council: the Visitors Department in London and the Office in Kuala Lumpur, Malaya, for financial assistance rendered in 1963 and 1966; to the Government of the State of Johore, Malaya, for financial assistance rendered in 1964; and to the Central Research Fund, University of London, for a research grant in connection with research in Leiden in 1963.

Last but not least, my grateful thanks are due to
my wife, Maureen, whose perseverance, patience, courage and cheerfulness in the midst of the most trying circumstances, have been a great source of encouragement in the fulfilment of this thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## PART I
A comprehensive and detailed account of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī's mystical ideas and teachings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER I: Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER II: Ḥamzah contested by Nūru’l-Dīn al-Rānīrī</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER III: Ḥamzah’s metaphysics and teachings:</strong></td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Aspects of Oneness</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) The world of created things</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Creation and the doctrine of perpetual creation</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) The Fixed Essences (al-a'yānu'l-thābitah)</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) The Spirit (Nyawa: al-rūḥ) and the Soul (or Self (Diri: al-nafs))</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) The Divine Attributes (al-ṣifāt).</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) The meaning of 'extinction' (fanā'), and its relation to gnosis (ma'rifah) and freedom (ikhtiyār)</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER IV: Hamzah's concept of the Divine Will (irādah) as demonstrated in his application of the Malay word hendak - a semantic analysis:

(a) Conceptual structure of the word hendak.......................... 188
(b) Derivatives and their conceptual structures....................... 199
(c) Conceptual distinction between hendak and mahu................ 211
(d) Hamzah's concept of the irādah................................. 214

CHAPTER V: Key words in Hamzah's mystical system - a semantic analysis: 238

CHAPTER VI: Conclusion............................................. 295

PART II
An annotated romanized Malay edition of Hamzah's three prose works and an annotated English translation of the texts.

INTRODUCTION......................................................... 340
CHAPTER VII: Asrāru’l-'Arifīn...................................... 382
CHAPTER VIII: Sharābu’l-'Āshiqīn.............................. 474
CHAPTER IX: Al-Muntahī........................................... 520
CHAPTER X: The Secrets of the Gnostics......................... 564
CHAPTER XI: The Drink of Lovers.................................. 683
CHAPTER XII: The Adept........................................... 742
## APPENDICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART I
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to give an expository account, comprehensive and detailed, of the mystical ideas and teachings of Ḥamzah Fānṣūrī. Although parts of this Malay Sūfī's ideas and teachings have been commented upon by several Dutch and British scholars in various ways and different contexts, their comments have been selective, brief and extremely limited in scope. Of these comments, one deserving mention as being above the others is perhaps that of Hendrik Kraemer of Amsterdam.¹ But even this account is very sketchy, and Kraemer's book is not meant to deal exclusively with Ḥamzah's mystical ideas and teachings, but with a general account, as far as North Sumatra is concerned, of the mysticism that prevailed there in the first half of the seventeenth century.² The subject proposed in this thesis has not been attempted before.

The method by which I propose to pursue this subject is twofold. In the first instance the usual methods of commentary will be applied. The basis from which Ḥamzah's mysticism is deduced will be his three prose works and

---

¹ In his doctoral dissertation presented to the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy, University of Leiden, 1921, entitled Een Javaansche Primbon uit de Zestiende Eeuw.
² See Kraemer, op. cit., pp. 21ff. For comments on the contents of Ḥamzah's prose works (notes 4 and 5 below) see ibid., pp. 34-46.
selections from his verses. The three prose works are the Asrārū'l-'Arifīn, the Sharābu'l-'Ashiqīn, and the Muntahī. So far as I know, these are the only prose works of Hamzah still in the original Malay. I also use verses from his various Sha'irs dealing with the nature of Unification (tawhīd), Gnosis (ma'rifah) and the Science of the Path (ilmu'l-sulūk); the Sha'īr Perahu and the Sha'īr Dagang.

My method of commentary, in which explanation of the mystic's ideas and teachings is largely guided by comparisons with similar ideas and teachings found in the writings of earlier mystics - perhaps even linking them as sources of origin - is a method that is generally employed in such expositions. But such a method by itself cannot necessarily claim

3. My annotated romanized Malay edition of these three prose works appears in Chapters VII, VIII and IX. My annotated English translation of the works appears in Chapters X, XI and XII. An annotated romanized Malay edition of the writings of Hamzah Fansūrī, in which is included a large selection of his verses and two of his prose works has been presented by Doorenbos. But for all this see below, pp. 340-363.


7. Sha'īr is the Malayanized form of the Arabic Shīr.


10. A fragment from 3374. Hereafter cited as Sha'īr Dagang.
guarantee against the commentator's reading too much into what the text says, or too little, or inserting his own ideas in place or absence of those given in the texts. Objectivity in the interpretation of the texts — and therefore the ideas — is not guaranteed. For this reason I am introducing, as part of my method, a general linguistic and semantic approach. To the best of my knowledge this latter method, in the manner in which I am applying it here, has not been applied before in any study of Malay (Indonesian) mysticism. By means of this method of approach it becomes possible to discover the conceptual system of Hamzah's mysticism not merely as its component parts, but as a whole. Selection of

key words in the vocabulary of ٌHamzah's mystical system, and analysis of their underlying concepts and relations with one another become a matter of prime importance in such a study as this. With respect to this, there is no systematic method of selection of key words. But neither is selection done arbitrarily, if 'arbitrary' is to imply lack of discrimination. A selection of key words as intended here must presuppose full knowledge of the language, full comprehension of the meaning structure and full participation in the linguistic consciousness. In dealing with mystical literature such as this, where the author was not only a Sūfī, but a Sūfī poet as well— the best and greatest representative of Malay Sūfism — it is not sufficient merely to expound its concepts and to describe its history. Indeed, one must plunge into the depths of its emotional currents, be at one with its sentiments, feel one's way into its symbols. Only after having imbued oneself in these can one seek to impart a scientific exposition. In this the motto should be not merely scholarship, but life as well.

I have referred to selection of key words in the vocabulary of ٌHamzah's mystical system. By vocabulary I mean the semantic sense of the term, not a mere gathering together of words — unorganized, except perhaps in alphabetical form used in dictionaries; I mean an organized, systematic gestalt, an arrangement in meaningful pattern. In this sense, then, a
vocabulary is not single or homogeneous, but has its own sphere of conceptualization, a network interrelated. In Ḥamzah's system the vocabulary employed does not mainly consist of new words; they are Malay words that were all existing even perhaps in pre-Islamic times. But it will be demonstrated that the conceptual network imposed upon these already existing words is new and significant. It is part of the aim of this thesis to discover how in Ḥamzah's system the vocabularies and sub-vocabularies are used and organized.

This method will show that, since words do not reveal the objective reality of the things described, but rather concepts of them, what is important is to comprehend the meanings of words not standing alone, but within their particular fields. Furthermore it will show that meanings of words are affected by the whole system. Part of the study is to make a distinction between what words in Ḥamzah's system have basic meanings and what have relational meanings. This bears a close relationship with the distinction between context and semantic field. In Ḥamzah - as we shall see - certain words which may be regarded as basic, have acquired relational meanings, and as such they became important 'technical' terms in his system. One of Rānīrī's main pitfalls in his comprehension of Ḥamzah's mysticism is precisely failure to distinguish the difference between these distinctions. As the results of this method will appear in Chapters
III, IV and V, I trust that it needs no further elaboration here.

I have mentioned my method as being twofold, and that in the first instance the method of commentary will be applied to primary sources. That these sources are authentic is for me beyond doubt. I suggest three main proofs of their authenticity. The first is the fact that Rānīrī, Ḥamzah's vehement denouncer, had quoted them, in some cases verbatim, in others paraphrased or summarized. The second is the fact that the texts reveal the author to have mastery over the subject, and this mastery is revealed not in the subject matter of the texts, but in the manner the texts present the subject matter. In the period contemporaneous with Ḥamzah — and I would go so far as to suggest that even in the periods before and after Ḥamzah — we are unable to find any other mystical writing in Malay that can be attributed to any Malay mystic, whose style in prose as well as in poetry reaches the stature achieved by Ḥamzah. With the exception perhaps of Shamsu’l-Ḍīn of Pasai, mystical writing in Malay, during the period following Ḥamzah's, is rigid, awkward, unintelligible to the uninitiated as the subject matter is usually couched in a language that is forced into an Arabic crucible. These indications reveal that the authors of these works were not masters, either of their subject matter or of their language. But in Ḥamzah's works the texts reveal a language that flows
effortlessly, in prose as well as in poetry; a succinct demonstration that the author, having instilled into his mind and heart the mystical doctrines he learnt in a foreign tongue, and having imbued himself completely with those doctrines, translated his thoughts into his native tongue of which he was a unique master. In the period before Ḥamzah, we know of no instances of Malay writings such as Ḥamzah's; and in the period following that of Ḥamzah, the only notable authors who wrote on mysticism in good Malay were Shamsu'1-Dīn of Pasai, Rānīrī and 'Abdu'l-Ra’ūf of Singkel. It is true that even in Ḥamzah there are instances when the language is employed rather awkwardly, but it must be pointed out that such instances only occur in translations of some Quranic texts, Ḥadīths, or passages in Arabic or Persian from some Sūfī poets and writers on doctrine. These instances are insignificant as they are not many. Furthermore, it is understandable that this should happen, especially where Quranic texts are involved, as even to this day extreme caution is exercised in translation, so that the results become literal in an exaggerated sense, for fear lest the original meanings be lost. The third main proof of the authenticity of the texts, which to my mind is the best proof of this kind and the most indisputable, is the proof resulting from the semantic approach already outlined. Words in a system of this nature do not scramble by themselves Munchausen-like to form a
semantic vocabulary, to associate purposefully with one another in meaningful patterns forming semantic fields of their own. Behind the conceptual structure prevailing as a whole throughout the system, we cannot help but conclude that its author knew exactly what he was writing about and how to express it.
CHAPTER I

HAMZAH FANSUR

Neither the date nor the place of Hamzah Fansuri's birth has been established, and the span of the period in which he lived and flourished is still a problematic question. There are no known records, or even chronograms and other such literary devices that enable us to determine Hamzah's date of birth. As regards the place where he was born, this has been discussed by several scholars in the past, and almost all seem to have taken it for granted that he was born in Barus, a place situated on the east coast of North Sumatra. Barus is identical with Fansur, an earlier Arabic name for the same place, and the fact that Fansuri (of Fansur) is part of Hamzah's name has no doubt given rise to the belief that he was born there. This question now seems to have been a closed matter, and it has never been reopened. Yet it seems to me that from Hamzah's own verses there is enough indication to make one doubt even this, and to urge one once again to review the question of his place of birth as problematic, and to forward a more satisfactory solution. In what follows presently, I propose to present this more satisfactory solution, and in so doing to try to establish the fact.

In his verses Hamzah always refers to himself as
from both Barus and Shahr Nawī in Siam. 12 These two places must have been of such significance to Ḥamzah that he should attach himself to them in a manner — it would seem — that his readers and posterity might be duly reminded of their importance in his life. He had visited various places more well known, in the Middle East, in the Malay Peninsula, in Java — including centres of religion and of learning — and yet he did not choose to call himself after any of them. In the Sharābu’l-‘Ashiqīn, Ḥamzah refers to himself as al-Mudunayn (of the two cities), 13 which according to Doorenbos might have been a mistake for al-Ḥaramayn (of the two holy cities), 14 referring to Makkah and Madīnah, both of which Ḥamzah had visited. But the fact that Ḥamzah had been to these two holy

12. Shahr Nawī (or Shahr-i-Naw) is the Persian for New Town. Formerly known as Ayut'īa, it was founded in 1350. The master navigator (mu'allim) Shihābu’l-Dīn Ahmad ibn Mājid, in his navigational tract entitled Ḥawwiyat al-ikhtīsār fī 'ilm al-biḥār (dated 1462), mentioned Shahr Nawī in the section on sea routes of China. Several other navigational tracts were written by the master navigator Sulaymān bin Ahmad al-Mahrī who died before 1553. Two of these, the 'Umdat al-mahriyyah fī dabṭ 'ilm al-bahriyyah and the Kitāb al-minhāj al-fākhīr fī 'ilm al-baḥr al-zākhīr, contain directions for mariners coasting the Malay Peninsula and also mention Shahr Nawī. Until as late as 1740 Shahr Nawī still appeared on early European maps under the form Sornau. (See Wheatly, P., The Golden Khersonese, Kuala Lumpur, 1961, pp.233–243). Shahr Nawī is also mentioned in the Matla’u’l-Sa’dayn of ‘Abdu’l-Razzāq of Samarqand (see Browne, E.G., A literary history of Persia, Cambridge, 1956, 4 vols., vol.III, p.398. Also pp.428–430.) Hereafter cited as Literary history of Persia.

13. See my edition, last page of the treatise. See also 7291, p.110.

cities does not entitle him to adopt the sobriquet of al-Haramayn. Doorenbos is clearly incorrect in his conjecture, for to my mind al-Mudunayn (it should in fact read al-Madinatayn) is correct, referring not to Makkah and Madinah, but to Barus and Shahr Nawâ. That one should link one's name to that of a place is a tradition that is widely known, and the name of the place thus linked is usually one's birthplace. Hence Shabistârî, Jâmî, Baghdadî, Shirazi, Bistâmi, Jilâni and a host of others made famous by the Sufis who were born there. Obviously then, either Barus or Shahr Nawâ is Ḥamzah's birthplace. But which?

Barus has been famous for its camphor. In earlier times the Chinese referred to this place as Pin-su, or Pan-ts'ūt in Cantonese, which form represented the sound Pansor or Pansur. The mediaeval Arabs and European writers referred to Pansor or Pansur as Fansûr or Fansur. The name Barus was used by later writers to distinguish its main product, camphor, from that of Japan. Camphor is a substance found in a species of pine-like trees. The best quality resembles crystal, but there are others that are flaky, balmy and greasy depending upon the species of the trees and the places where they are grown. Usually it is obtained by

splitting open the heart of the tree.\(^17\) It is important to know something about camphor as such knowledge throws some light upon a number of Ḥamzah's verses where he speaks about himself. In the first two lines of a verse he says:

\[
\text{Ḥamzah Fānsūrī dinegeri Melayu,}
\]
\[
\text{Tempatnya kāpūr didalam kayu . . . .}\(^{18}\)
\]

Here he is simply saying that in the "land of the Malays" (referring to Sumatra) his dwelling place is in Barus, where "camphor [is found] in the wood." Another verse begins:

\[
\text{Ḥamzah nin așalnya Fānsūrī . . . .}\(^{19}\)
\]

revealing the fact that he is originally of Fānsūr (Barus). But note that in both these two verses the words tempat and așal merely mean a place of origin; and origin can mean not necessarily that he was born there, but that his family came from there, that his relatives and his ancestors came from Barus, that he himself might not have been born there. But it may be argued that in another verse he seems to give the impression that he was born in Barus:

\[
\text{Ḥamzah Shahr Nawī terlalu hapus,}
\]
\[
\text{Seperti kayu sekalian hangus;}
\]
\[
\text{Așalnya Laut tiada berharus;}
\]
\[
\text{Menjadi kāpūr didalam Barus.}\(^{20}\)
\]

Literally: Ḥamzah of Shahr-i-Naw is truly effaced.
Like wood, all burnt to cinders;
His origin is the Ocean without currents,
He became camphor in Barus.

\(^{17}\) 3374, pp. 193-194, notes 1 and 2.
\(^{18}\) 2016, p. 71.
\(^{19}\) 3374, p. 13.
\(^{20}\) 2016, p. 89.
The first two lines give a striking analogy: the wood or tree is like his human existence, possessed of a form (jasad); when it burns away in intoxication for love of the One ('ishq) - like the tree reduced to ashes - it is annihilated (fanā'); and just as the camphor is all that now remains of the tree, so he regains his spiritual existence in God (baqā'). The third line completes the picture: in this state of mystical annihilation, he returns to his origin as a drop returns to the Ocean of Absolute Being. The last line is problematic, for at first sight it seems to mean that Ḥamzah was individualized as external existence (menjadi kāpur), that is, born, in Barus. But upon closer scrutiny this notion is far from true. What does menjadi kāpur mean? The last two lines of yet another verse furnish us with a clue:

Ḥamzah gharīb Unggas Quddusī
dī'ī
Ākan rumahnya Bayt al-Ma'mūrī
Kursinya sekalian kāpurī
Dinegeri Fansūrī mina'1-ashjārī.21

Ḥamzah the stranger is [in reality] the Holy Bird,
His 'house' is the Bayt al-Ma'mūr [i.e. the heart],
His kursī is all camphor,
In the land of Fansūr [extracted] from trees.

Here it is revealed that menjadi kāpur means to be in the station of the kursī, and this can mean two things. The first meaning is a general one in which kursī means seat. In this case all that Ḥamzah is saying is that Barus is the seat of

---

21. Ibid., p. 54.
his activity, of his whole life. This is the same as saying that Barus is his dwelling place. The second meaning has a mystical connotation and in order to interpret this a little digression is necessary to explain the relevant part of the Ṣūfī cosmology. In Islamic eschatology the Kursî is the Footstool under the Divine Throne (al-'Arsh). According to Ibn 'Arabî and other Ṣūfîs, and to Jîlî in particular, the manner in which God creates His creation is that first the creatures are individualized in the Divine Knowledge (ʾilm) in a transcendental manner without any differentiation. They are then made to exist synthetically and virtually in the 'Arsh, and are manifested analytically as potential existents in the Kursî. All these individualizations occur spiritually and the creatures have not yet received the name "creation", for they are not yet separate, as it were, from the Divine Essence (Dhāt). The first objective individualization occurs in the Highest Pen (al-Qalamul-ʿAlā), and here the Creator and the creatures become distinguished. The Pen "imprints" the creatures' forms of existence on the Guarded Tablet (al-Lawhuʾl-Mahfūẓ) as the mind, so to speak, imprints ideas on the soul. So then, to apply this idea to menjadi kāpur didalam Barus, the line does not convey the meaning that


23. See Asrâr, p.34.
Hamzah was born in Barus, rather - taking the similitude of the camphor in the tree - it refers to Ibnul-'Arabi's doctrine of original potentialities (isti'dad asli) which Hamzah endorses. In this case it means that it was of Hamzah's potential nature (i.e. when he was in the state of the kursi) to be a Malay of Barus, irrespective of where he would be born. This mystical interpretation fits in well with the preceding lines of the verse as it then means that he mystically attains to his original state in Barus. But if we are to apply a more mundane interpretation, then it would even be possible to imagine that Hamzah was conceived by his mother in Barus! In this case we must accept it as most probable that his mother, perhaps together with his father, left Barus for a time and gave birth to him elsewhere, returning to Barus when he was still an infant. Or having been born in the foreign place, Hamzah remained in that place, returning to Barus after the death of his parents.

Seen in this light, the significance of Shahr Nawī is clearly revealed. In the first two lines of this verse:

Hamzah nin ašalinya Fansūrī,
Mendapat wujud ditanah Shahr Nawī ...  24

Hamzah is originally of Fansūr,
He acquired his existence in the land of Shahr-i-Nawī ...  

Hamzah is telling us that originally he was of Barus, but that he acquired his existence in Shahr Nawī. The word

existence (wujūd), generally speaking, refers either to the state of being, or existing, pertaining to non-beings - in which case it exists only in thought; or it refers to Real Being, pertaining to the Self-existent Essence of God. In the sense in which Ḥamzah uses this word in the above quotation, he is referring to his own existence, not to a mystical state, and this means that he acquires his human form and qualities. This can mean none other than reference to his birth into this world. Two other verses support this conclusion:

Ḥamzah Shahr Nawī terlalu hapus,
Seperti kayu sekalian hangus;

This is the first two lines of the verse already quoted in connection with the analogy of the camphor in the tree. Now if we take aside the expressions terlalu hapus (truly effaced) and sekalian hangus (all burnt to cinders), we get Ḥamzah Shahr Nawī ... seperti kayu (like wood) ... emphasising the physical Ḥamzah. Bearing this in mind let us move on to the next verse which begins:

Ḥamzah Shahr Nawī zāhirnya Jāwī ... 25

Ḥamzah of Shahr-i-Naw is born [also: 'has the appearance of'] a Malay ...

There is no need to go further. Apart from the fact that he tells us he was born a Malay, we must not consider it a mere coincidence that he connects his birth (zāhirnya) with Shahr Nawī by mentioning Shahr Nawī along with zāhir. In this

25. Loc. cit.
and in the quotation immediately preceding it, both referring
to Ḥamzah as a physical entity (ẓāhirya Jawī and seperti
kayu) Ḥamzah, I suggest, purposefully links himself with
Shahr Nawī and not with Barus - another strong indication
that he was in fact born in Shahr Nawī.

Having begun this chapter on the question of Ḥamzah's
place of birth, it is appropriate that I should now attempt
to present a worthwhile sketch of Ḥamzah's life and times, as
far as it is possible from the scanty bits and pieces of
information gleaned again solely from his verses. As far as
I know, whatever information of this sort that exists is
exceedingly scanty. What I shall attempt here will be full of
gaps impossible to bridge on account of the absence of
recorded facts; nevertheless, it is hoped that it will throw
some light upon several important points hitherto unknown in
the study of Ḥamzah's teachings and ideas.

To begin with, if we are to accept his Sha'ir Dagang\textsuperscript{26}
as part of an early autobiography, such writing being not
uncommon among Sūfī poets,\textsuperscript{27} then it seems that his parents
died when he was still young, leaving him in straitened
circumstances which eventually forced him to lead the wander­
ing life of a trader in many lands. During this period of
travelling he must have made his acquaintance with Sūfism

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp.18-25. Dagang conveys both meanings of
'trader' and 'traveller'.

\textsuperscript{27} Take, for example, Sa'dī. Literary history of Persia, II,
pp. 526ff.
into which he finally became fully initiated. From the life of a wandering trader Ħamzah now passed onto the life of a wandering mystic learned in the doctrines of the Șurîs. He had travelled in the Middle East and in Java. He had been in Siam and in Malaya. He tells us that, notwithstanding the fact that he had journeyed far and wide in quest of God — his travels extended from Makkah to Kudus — he finally discovered God within his self:

28

\[ \text{H}\text{amzah F}\text{ang}\text{ür}i \text{ didalam Makkah} \]
\[ \text{Menchari T}\text{uhan di Baytu'}l-Ka'bah; } \]
\[ \text{D}\text{[ar]}l\text{i Barus ke Kudus terlalu} \text{payah, } \]
\[ \text{Ākhirnya dapat didalam rumah.} \]

\[ \text{H}\text{amzah F}\text{ang}\text{ür}i \text{ in Makkah} \]
\[ \text{Searches for God in the House of the Ka'bah; } \]
\[ \text{From Barus to Kudus he wearily goes } \]
\[ \text{At last he finds [Him] in his house. } \]

Ḥamzah spoke and wrote fluently Malay and apparently also Arabic and Persian, and perhaps other languages of the Indonesian Archipelago. Dutch scholars who have touched upon matters relating to Ḥamzah have considered the question as to

28. Doorenbos thinks that didalam rumah refers to Barus (see Doorenbos, p.1), but I think his guess is incorrect. In this case rumah refers to the self, and this interpretation is more in line with the spirit of the verse. Generally the Șurîs use the word dar (house or mansion) to refer to the self. See for example Sa'du'l-Din Mahmūd Shabistari's Gulshan-i-Râž (The Mystic Rose Garden), the Persian text, with an English translation and notes, chiefly from the commentary of Muhammad bin Yahya Lahiji, by E.H. Whinfield. London, 1880, pp.68 and 76. The Gulshan-i-Râž will hereafter be cited as Shabistari. See also Jalalu'l-Dîn Rûmî's Mathnawi, edited from the oldest manuscripts available, with critical notes, translation, and commentary, by R.A. Nicholson. London, 1926 (4 Books in 2 vols.), Book IV 1358. This work will hereafter be cited as Mathnawi.

29. 2016, p.76.
where he learned his Persian a very puzzling one indeed, for as far as is known, there has been no indication to show that he had ever been to Persia. In view of his close connection with Shahr Nawī, a name which must be regarded as a 'witness term' reflecting Persian predominance in the Muslim population there, the puzzle can now be unravelled. The fact that Ḥamzah lived in Shahr Nawī for a considerable period means that there was a sizeable Muslim population there. As I have suggested above, the Persians predominated in the composition of that Muslim population — otherwise why would the place be known to the Muslims under a Persian name? Another significant fact is the possibility that there existed in Persia a town bearing the same name of 'New Town'. In one of the verses in the Ta'rikh-i-Guzīda, composed in 1330 by a Persian historian Ḥamdū'LLāh Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, there occur these lines:

Chū majdu'1-Mulk az taqdīr Īzid
Shahādat yāft dar sahrā Naw Shahr
Bigašdi Śāhibi Dīwān Muḥammad
Ki dastūri mamālik būd dar dahr ... 32

31. Ibid., p.87.
32. Ibid., p.30. The text is in Arabic script. The transliteration is mine. Browne's English translation on p.31:
Since Majdu'1-Mulk, by God-sent destiny,
A martyr in Naw Shahr's plain did die,
By the Śāhib-Dīwān Muḥammad's spite,
Who ruled the land with unrestricted might ...
Naw Shahr was a town situated not far from Maragha in the province of Idharbâyjân. As I have noted earlier, Shahr Nawī was known to the Persians and one of their historians made mention of it along with others as an important trading centre.33 Not only was Shahr Nawī famous to the Muslims under a Persian name, but it was also known among Europeans in its Persian form appearing in various Europeanized versions for until as late as 1740.34 It should not be surprising, therefore, if ʻHamzah should have learned his Persian in Shahr Nawī from the Persians.35

The knowledge of Arabic and Persian and his particular bent of mind and poetic talents opened for him the threshold of Šūfism in a manner never before - or perhaps even after - experienced by any other Malay. ʻHamzah can with justification, boast:

ʻHamzah miskin orang 'uryanî,
Seperti Ismā'îl menjadi qurbânî;
Bukannya 'Ajami lagi 'Arabi -
Senantiasa wasîl dengan Yang Bāqî. 36

ʻHamzah the poor is a 'naked' person.
Like Ismā'îl he becomes a sacrifice;
He is not a Persian, nor is he an Arab -
But he is constantly united with the Enduring One.

33. See above, note 12; Literary history of Persia, III, p.398.
36. 3374, p.12.
In another verse he reveals that he belonged to the Qādiriyyah Order:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Hāmzah} & \text{ is originally of Ban§ur}, \\
\text{He acquired his existence in the land of Shahr-i-Naw;} \\
\text{He achieved his lofty spiritual knowledge from } \text{'Abdu'l-Qādir Sayyid of Jīlān.}
\end{align*}\]

It seems to me that during his travels Hāmzah visited Baghdād, the great centre of the Qādiriyyah Order, where \text{'Abdu'l-Qādir} was and still is regarded as the patron saint. There he obtained his bay'ah\(^{38}\) and perhaps his ijāzah from the Shaykh of the Qādirīs:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{The Shaykh ofFansūr is most lofty [in learning]} \\
\text{He attained to his spiritual knowledge in the land of Baghdād ...}
\end{align*}\]

and he reports that this Shaykh of the Qādirīs was also called \text{'Abdu'l-Qādir} after the founder:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Hāmzah} & \text{his knowledge [learning] is clearly manifest,} \\
\text{His teacher was Shaykh } \text{'Abdu'l-Qādir ...}
\end{align*}\]

37. Ibid., p.13; 2016, p.53.
38. For this term see the Encyclopaedia of Islam, edited by M. Th. Houtsma, T.W. Arnold, R. Basset, and R. Hartmann, Leiden, 1913-1938, 4 vols. and supplement, articles Bay'a and Ijāza. The Encyclopaedia of Islam will hereafter be cited as E.I.
40. Ibid., p.47.
But this may not refer to an actual person called by that name who personally taught Ḥamzah; it may well refer to the founder to whom he is linked through the spiritual geneology.

It has been said in the beginning that Ḥamzah's dates of birth and death are unknown and have not yet been established. Since there is, as far as I know, no way of establishing these dates, it would be futile to speculate upon this question. Furthermore this question is, fortunately, of no great importance. But it is important at least to establish the span of period in which he lived and flourished. It appears to me that he lived and flourished in the period preceding and during the reign of Sultān 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh of Acheh (1588-1604), and that he was most likely dead before 1607. My opinion is based upon a short poem by Ḥamzah entitled Ikat-ikatan 'ilmul-nisā': 41 From this poem it is evident that he was ordered by that Sultān to compose the poem - or at least he dedicated the poem to the same Sultān:

Hamba mengikat sha'ir ini
Dibawah ḥaḍrat raja yang wali ...

Your slave composed these verses
By the command [literally : presence] of the saintly king ...

There is no doubt that the "saintly king" referred to in the last line quoted was 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh, who was known

41. Ibid., pp.93-97.
42. Ibid., p.97.
as Shāh 'Ālam,\textsuperscript{43} and who in Achehnese tradition was famous under the title Sayyid al-Mukamal;\textsuperscript{44} for immediately following the above lines he says:

\begin{align*}
Shāh 'Ālam raja yang 'Ādil, \\
Raja qutub sempurna kāmil; \\
Wall Allah sempurna wāsil, \\
Raja 'ārif lagi mukamila.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{align*}

Shāh 'Ālam the just king, 
The Pole whose perfection is complete; 
The saint of God who is eminently united [with God], 
The gnostic king, moreover the most excellent.

The last word in the stanza is read mukammil to fit into the rhyme scheme. The correct form is mukamal and it refers to Sayyid al-Mukamal. But there is still a puzzle, as in the same poem Sultān Iskandar Muda, who reigned from 1607 to 1636, is also mentioned by his title Mahkota 'Ālam.\textsuperscript{46} This would give the impression that Ḥamzah was still alive at least during the early part of Iskandar Muda's reign, for the prince could assume the title only when he has attained to the Sultānate and not before. Such titles were to be used posthumously, but it became a tradition for the Sultāns to assume their respective titles as soon as they were installed as Sultān. However, it seems to me that the line of reasoning


\textsuperscript{44} See Djajadiningrat, R.H., Critisch overzicht van de in Maleisiche werken vervatte gegevens over de gescheidenis van het Soeltanaat van Atjeh, B.K.I., 65, Leiden, 1911, p. 213; also Hikayat Acheh, p. 74.

\textsuperscript{45} 2016, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 96.
accepting that Ḥamzah lived in the early part of Iskandar Muda 's reign, by virtue of the fact that the Sultan's posthumous title is mentioned in this poem, is untenable. Why should Ḥamzah insert Iskandar Muda's royal title when the poem was written for Shāh 'Ālam? Furthermore, Iskandar Muda, at the time the poem was composed, could not have been Sultan and could therefore not have used the title. There seems to be an anachronism here. My solution to this puzzle is that the reference to Mahkota 'Ālam in the poem is a later interpolation. Interpolations of this nature are not unusual in Malay works of historical and cultural significance. The Ḥikāyat Raja-Raja Pasai and the Sejarah Melayu have been subject to interpolations of this nature. Rānīrī's Bustānu’l-Salāṭīn (the author died in 1666) interpolates mention of 'Ināyat Shāh, who reigned in Aceh from 1678 to 1688. 47 Ḥamzah's poem in question may not be excluded from such a possibility in this respect. But a more convincing indication that interpolation has occurred is to study carefully the problematic stanza itself:

Berkatalah faqīr ḍa’īf yang budiman, amat 'ajā'ib maqam diluar pun; fada ia khabar ditanah Jawa, dari Aceh marḥūm Mahkota 'Ālam dihimpunkan] sekalian sharat dinajarkan kepada rasanya yang ni'mat diturunkan ...

47. See Winstedt, R.O.W., A history of classical Malay literature, J.M.B.E.R.A.S., vol.31, pt.3, June 1958, p.120.
48. 2016, p.95. See also Doorenbos, p.68. For this purpose I have used Doorenbos' edition of the passage and have not altered the form in which it is presented. The square brackets are mine. The purpose of my inserting the brackets where they are now will shortly become clear.
It can be seen at once that the whole stanza as it appears in the form presented is nothing but a jumble of incoherent, meaningless phrases having neither relation nor relevance, both in thought and form, to the preceding and succeeding stanzas and to the poem as a whole. But if the words I have enclosed in square brackets were to be removed, and the arrangement of the form slightly rearranged, their meaning, relevance, and relationship to the whole poem is established:

Berkatalah faqir da'if yang budiman,
Amat 'ajā'ib maqām diluarpuan;
Sekalian sharaf dinazarkan
Pada rasanya yang ni'mat diturunkan.

In this reading, not only the form but the spirit it conveys run in conformity with the spirit and tone of the whole poem. From this analysis it may be concluded that - if my judgment is correct - Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī lived and flourished in the period preceding and during the reign of Shāh 'Alam, and that it is unlikely that he lived to witness Iskandar Muda ascend the throne in 1607.

Ḥamzah's writings reveal that he had a masterly grasp of the Arabic and Persian languages apart from his own Malay. In that too is revealed a marked influence of Muḥyī'l-Dīn ibnul-'Arabī, from whom he undoubtedly derived much influence. But influence also from 'Abdu'l-Karīm Jīli - though he did not mention Jīli - is not lacking. He must also have been well acquainted, from what is revealed in his writings, with

49. The text in fact reads dilwar puan and not dilwar pun.
the thoughts of al-Bīṣṭāmī (261/874), al-Baghdādī (298/910), al-Ḥallāj (309/922), al-Ghazzālī (505/1111), Masʿūdī (515/1121 or 525/1131), 'Aṭṭār (616/1229), Rūmī (672/1273), 'Irāqī (658/1298), Saʿdī (682/1291), Shabistari (720/1320), Maghribī (809/1406), Shāh Niʿmatuʾl-Lāh (834/1431), Jāmī (898/1492) - and others not as famous. Quotations from each of these can be found in Ḥamzah's prose works, and ideas from each are clothed - and there are good reasons to believe, for the first time - in the Malay language "in order that those having no knowledge of Arabic or Persian may understand" the Divine mysteries. Ḥamzah was not merely translating what these Sūfīs had written, connecting them together to form an intelligible whole, for he demonstrated in his writings that he had a total grasp of their ideas and put them, for the most part, in his own phraseology. There are of course passages which were translated almost literally, but even here Ḥamzah adds his own modifications to suit his audience, as one example here will suffice:

Jika seorang orang bertanya: "Jikalau Ḥāt Allāh kepada semesta sekalian lengkap, kepada najis dapatkah dikatakan lengkap?" Maka jawāb: "Seperti panas lengkap pada sekalian 'ālam, kepada busuk pun lengkap, kepada baik pun lengkap, kepada jahat pun lengkap, kepada Ka'bah pun lengkap, pada rumah berhala pun lengkap - kepada semesta sekalian pun lengkap; kepada najis tiada ia akan najis; kepada baik tiada ia akan baik; kepada jahat tiada ia akan jahat; daripada Ka'bah tiada ia beroleh kebajikan; daripada rumah berhala

---

50. Sharāb, p.1 of the treatise.
tiada ia beroleh kejahatan. Selang panas lagi demikian, istimewa Allāh Subhānahu wa Ta'ālā, Suchi daripada segala suchi, dimana Ia akan najis dan 'busuk?' Maka fahamkan olehmu kata ini.\textsuperscript{1}

Should someone ask: "If the Essence of Allāh is all-pervasive and immanent in all things, can it be said that it is also immanent in impure and foul things?" Then answer: "In the same way as the sun's light is all pervasive and sheds itself over the impure and the foul, the good and the evil, over the Ka'bah and the idol-worshipper's Temple - over everything: without itself being affected by the impurity and the foulness, the goodness and the evilness of the things it pervades; from the Ka'bah it does not gain goodness, from the Temple it does not acquire evil; so it is even more with respect to Allāh Most Exalted, Who is the Purest of the pure. How can the impure and the foul affect Him?" Comprehend this well.

And this comes from the Lawā'ih,\textsuperscript{52} where Jāmī says:

Although the light of the sun illuminates at once the clean and the unclean, yet it undergoes no modification in the purity of its light; it acquires neither the scent of musk nor the colour of the roses, the reproach of the thorn nor the disgrace of the rugged rock.

When the sun sheds his light for all to share, It shines on foul things equally with fair; Fair things do not augment its radiance, Nor can foul things its purity impair.\textsuperscript{53}

It is significant that Ḥamzah drew his inspiration from the classical Sūfīs whose ideas were still pure, still untainted by degeneration and corruption that were to follow

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., pp.13-14.
\textsuperscript{53} Loc. cit.
after the period of Jāmī in the fifteenth century. In Mamlūk
Egypt the corruption and degeneration in the understanding
of Ṣūfism had set in just before the period of the Ottoman
conquest. In Mughul India Ṣūfism gave way to all kinds of
modifications brought about under the pressure of the
circumstances; its influential "exponents" sought a recon-
ciliation with the Hindu doctrines and with those of the
Vedānta, as was advocated, for example, by Dārā Shikūh, a son
of the Emperor Shāh Jahān. It would seem to me that in
the higher levels of the metaphysical doctrines of the Ṣūfis
and those of the Hindu doctrines according to the Vedānta,
reconciliation was not really a need, as in most cases the
Ṣūfis and the Vedantic philosophers already saw eye to eye
in these matters. The so-called reconciliation sought was
rather of the type to appease the politicians of the day and
the masses - at the level not of the speculative doctrines,
but of the practical ritualistic doctrines. Much asceticism
and forms of yogistic exercises became more and more evident
in the Ṣūfī practices. The exercise of restraining the
breath, for example, crept into a certain system of Qādiriyyah
practice which was not a peculiarity of that Order. Dārā

54. See Arberry, A.J., Ṣūfism, London, 1950, p.120 and his
note 2.
55. See Majmaʿul-Bahrayn, by Dārā Shikūh; text and transla-
tion by Mahfuz-ʿul-Haq, M., Asiatic Society of Bengal,
Calcutta, 1929.
56. See Guénon, R., Introduction to the study of the Hindu
doctrines, London, 1945, and Man and his becoming
according to the Vedānta, London, 1945.
Shikūh himself, who belonged to this Order, engaged assiduously in such practice.⁵⁷ The influence of Indian life in the Indonesian Archipelago, in court as well as in the realm of mystical speculation and practice is quite well known that it needs no further elaboration. It is also well known that in decay Ṣūfism tended to produce various forms of charlatanry, and the credulous masses confounded these with lofty speculation. A scandalous life, impudent actions and unintelligible speech were the means to fame, wealth and power. It would not in the least be a stretch of the imagination to guess that when Ḥamzah returned from his travels and quest for esoteric knowledge to the land of his countrymen, he found these very same abominations rampant in the society of the day. In Acheh in particular, place names and names of objects bear witness to what must have been a 'democratization' of the Ṣūfī doctrines and way of life. The palace of Sultan 'Alā'u'l-Dīn Ri'āyat Shāh (Sayyid al-Mukammal) was called "The Abode of the World" (Dāru'l-Dunyā).⁵⁸ An old seat of the Kingdom was called "The Abode of Perfection" (Dāru'l-Kamāl).⁵⁹ A place in Greater Acheh was called "The Abode of Purity" (Dāru'l-Šafā).⁶⁰ A fort was called "The Town of Seclusion"

---

⁵⁹. Ibid., pp. 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 75, 76, 80, 146.
⁶⁰. Ibid., pp. 25, 26.
An island was called "The Island of Mercy" (Pulau Raḥmat). A plain was called "The Plain of Imagination" (Medan Khayyālī). A bay was called "The Bay of the Threshold of Love" (Teluk 'Ishqīdar). The mouth of a river was called "The Mouth of the Sweetness of Love" (Kuala Merdu 'Ishqī). A river was called "The Abode of Love" (Dāru'ī-'Ishqī). Another river was called "The River of Purity" (Wādī al-Safā). Many other places bore mystical names - even Sultan 'Alā'ūl-Dīn's flagship was called "The Mirror of Purity" (Mīr'ātu'l-Safā). All these witness words reveal much of the spiritual climate of the day. To Ḥamzah, who drew deep draughts from the fountains themselves - not from the rivulets, whose teachings bear no traces of Indian - or even Ḥaḍramī - influences, what he found everywhere about him of the young and old among the devotees of that 'spiritual wine' must have evoked in him supreme contempt:

Segala muda dan sopan,
Segala tua berhuban,
'Uzlatnya berbulan-bulan —
Menchari Tuhan kedalam hutan!

Segala menjadi "Şūfī",
Segala menjadi "Shawqi",
Segala menjadi "Rūḥī" —
Gusar dan masam diatas bumi!

61. Ibid., p. 146.
62. Ibid., pp. 140, 141, 143, 145.
63. Ibid., pp. 164, 167, 168, 173, 174, 182, 185, 228, 229.
64. Ibid., pp. 60, 63.
65. Ibid., p. 28.
66. Ibid., pp. 33, 146, 234.
67. Ibid., p. 147.
68. Ibid., pp. 259, 260, 274.
Segala pandai dan utus;
Segala lapar dan kurus, ...

Every young and well-bred,
Every old and white-haired,
Go forth for months in seclusion -
Searching for God in the wilderness!

Everyone becomes a "Sūfī",
Everyone becomes a "Passionate Lover",
Everyone becomes a "Spirit",
Going about wrathful and sour-faced!

Everyone is "intelligent" and "wise",
Everyone is hungry and thin, ...

Hamzah makes fun of those "Seekers" after Truth whose peculiar practices undoubtedly betray Indian influence:

Sidang "Tālib" kedalam hutan,
Pergi 'uzlat berbulan-bulan,
Dari muda datang berhuban -
Tiada bertemu dengan Tuhan.

Olah riyādat tubuhnya rusak,
Hendak melihat serupa budak,
Menghela nafas kedalam otak -
Supaya minyaknya jangan orak!

Karāmatnya terlalu sangat,
[Suaranya] pun besar amat,
Angan-angannya sekalian larat -
[Sele]makin dapat wāsilnya bangat! ...

'IIlmu Allāh jangan kan gantung,
Diparu-paru dan balik jantung; ...

'IIlmu Ḥaqīqat tiadakan sukār -
Bukan dimata kaupusr-pusar!
Urat pusat kauputar-putar, 70
Olehnya itu Mahbūbmū gusar!

Companies of "Seekers" into the wilderness
Go forth for months in seclusion,
Until the young turned white-haired -
Still they do not meet with God!

69. 2016, p.89.
70. Ibid., pp.73-74.
By ritual exercises their bodies are ruined, 
If you would but see them - they resemble statues -
Drawing the breath into the brain
So that its oil will not congeal!

Their "grace from God" is most extreme, 
Their voices too are very loud, 
Their fancies engulf all -
The more they succeed the more "united" they get!

Knowledge of God you must not place 
In the lungs or behind the heart; ...

Knowledge of the Truth is not really difficult, 
It is not achieved by rolling the eyes! 
You rotate the muscles of the navel - 
That is why your Beloved is wrathful!

And again:

WujūdNya itu suchi dan hening, 
ŚifātNya elok tiada berbanding, 
Bukan dimata, hidung, dan kening. 71
Jangan kau pandang disana pening!

Indah sekali akan yang berkata diri, 
Da'wanya da'im "Sulūkī" dan "Ṣufī"; 
Tanazzul dan taraqiqi belum diketahui - 
Manakah dapat da wānya tinggi? 72

Tuhan kita itu empunya wujūd, 
Diubun-ubun dimanakan qu'ūd? ...

... Diubun-ubun jangan kaucharī ... 73

His Being is pure as limpid water, 
His Attributes are beautiful without compeer, 
He is not in the eyes, the nose, and the brow - 
Don't you gaze there growing giddy!

How grand of those who make personal claims, 
Who constantly claim to be "Travellers" and "Ṣūfīs"; 
Of [the meanings of] 'Descent' and 'Ascent' they have yet no comprehension, 
How can their claims be worthy?

71. Ibid., p.30.
72. Ibid., p.42.
73. 222E*, p.15.
Our Lord is the Possessor of Being, 
How can He be restricted to the crown of the head? ... 

... Do not seek Him in the crown of the head!

Meanwhile, we must imagine that, in this state of affairs, the representatives of 'orthodoxy' - the Doctors of Theology ('Ulāmā) - continued to combat, by means of authoritative writing and polemics, all forms of mysticism that were held in suspicion. In the administrative sphere, where official opposition against the suspect doctrines could be better combated by practical measures, the Judges (sing. Qādī) were constantly vigilant and quick to take action. The Qādī's dominance in these matters can be seen from the implications in several of Ḥamzah's verses.74 In view of the preceding quotations from Ḥamzah, one must interpret that antinomian and dubious forms of mysticism held sway at that time. This being the case, it would follow that even if a true form of Ṣūfism were to exist or to be propagated then, it would still be regarded equally suspect by the 'orthodox' who had been in the habit of encountering pseudo-Ṣūfism everywhere. Hence we must not be surprised, on the contrary, we must understand and sympathize, when many years later we find Nūru'lı-Dīn al-Rānīrī the champion of 'orthodoxy' claiming to speak on behalf of true Ṣūfism and condemning the Ṣūfism of Ḥamzah as if it were immersed in Vedāntic speculations.75

74. See below, pp. 45-47. 
75. This will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
According to my interpretation of the way things happened in this conflict of ideas, Rānīrī, by the time he arrived in Acheh in 1637, had understood Ḥamzah from what he saw of those mystics who claimed, implicitly or explicitly, to be the latter's disciples or followers, who were themselves mistaken in their interpretation of their master's teachings. Of course Rānīrī himself had misunderstood Ḥamzah in many important points, and this lack of comprehension on the part of Ḥamzah's "disciples" or "followers" as well as on Rānīrī's part is due largely to the fact that they did not understand Ḥamzah's terms, which were employed as technical terms, and which were so employed for the first time in the writing of Malay. 76 We must imagine, then, that Ḥamzah in his own country confronted not just one formidable opponent in the way of his ideas and teachings - the 'Ulamā' - but also another perhaps more difficult opponent - those who had stolen the Šūfī's name, who were now masquerading as true Šūfīs. On the one hand Ḥamzah, as may be gleaned from what I have interpreted from his verses, deplored the activities and ideas of the pseudo-mystics, and on the other he equally deplored the treatment meted out against them by the 'orthodox', for, as we well know, such treatment rather than stamp out the cause of the trouble, often perpetuates and increases the trouble and makes martyrs out of charlatans.

76. This will be discussed in Chapters IV and V.
That Ḥamzah deplored the manner in which the 'orthodox' handled religious affairs is perfectly clear. In one verse he exhorts those who would follow the path of true Ṣūfism not to be deterred by the wrath of the Qāḍī, so that they might attain to the object of their sublime research:

\[
\text{Jangan kautakutkan gusar Qāḍī,} \\
\text{Mangkanya dapat da'wamu'āli} \ldots .77
\]

Don't you be afraid of the wrath of the Judge Then can your claim be truly lofty ... 

In one of his verses in which, for the benefit of the public ('awāmm), he explains the meaning of mystical 'nakedness' (‘ūryān) - the stripping off of all sensual passions from the body78 - he warns them not to extend this meaning to physical nakedness which the Qāḍī condemns:

\[
\text{Wa 'ārū ajsādakum - jika hendak kauchari,} \\
\text{Jangan pada ‘ūryān dihukumkan Qāḍī.} \ldots .79
\]

"Strip your bodies naked" - if you want to find out [the meaning], Don't understand it as the nakedness condemned by the Judge.

This verse is also to be interpreted as showing Ḥamzah's contempt for the Qāḍī, who is seen as incapable of understanding what mystical nakedness means and who only knows and understands physical nakedness. In the same taunting strain he tells the Qāḍī, in another verse, that the drink he is celebrating is the clear and pure vintage whose intoxicating

77. 2016, p.81.  
79. 3374, p.15.
potency causes the inebriant to be at one with the eternal Beloved:

Khabarkan ini pada Mawlana Qādī:
Shurbat nin hening warnanya ṣafi;
Barang yang meminum dia mabok dan ṣāfī
Mendapat Maḥbūb yang bernama Bāqī.

Tell this to our master the Judge:
The colour of this pure drink is clear;
Whosoever drinks it is intoxicated and annihilated
And he wins the Beloved Who is called the Enduring One.

And to add further insult he goads the Qādī to acquaint his unaccustomed palate with it:

Minuman itu terlalu ṣāfī,
Yogyakan shurbat Mawlana Qādī ...

This drink is most pure
It ought to be the drink of our master the Judge ...

The Qādī became for Ḥamzah an object of ridicule, and the most biting ridicule, in which, having quoted the Qur’ānic passage about God being nearer to man than his neck veins, he feigns wonderment at the ill luck of the Qādī in not profiting by this Divine proximity:

Subḥānā itulah terlalu ṣāfī,
Daripada ḥabli’l-warīḍ Ia qarīb;
Indah sekali Qādī dan Khaṭīb -
Demikian hampir tiada beroleh naṣīb! 82

"Glory be to me!" - it is such a wonder,
'He is nearer than the jugular veins';
How amazing that the Judge and the Preacher [of sermons]
Should be so close - and yet so luckless!

80. 2016, p. 75.
81. Ibid., p. 71.
82. 3374, p. 14.
Against the 'Ulamā' Ḥamzah's polemics revolve, as we shall see in the succeeding chapters, around the central argument about the creation of the world. But apart from this there are verses which reveal that Ḥamzah incites the people not to practise blind faith in religious matters and follow without question what the 'Ulamā' tell them (taqlīd):

Aho segala kita bernama 'Abīd! Sembahyang dan shahādat jangan kautaqlid ... 83

O we all who are called Slaves of God! Do not pray and make your confession of faith blindly ...

This verse can be taken in two senses; the first is that Ḥamzah does not criticize the 'Ulamā', but warns the people not to pray and pronounce the confession of faith without knowing what the prayers and the confession mean; 84 but the second sense is the one I have shown above, in which the 'Ulamā' are implicated. 85

Apart from the fact that Ḥamzah puts himself in a difficult situation by antagonizing two groups of opponents, he also seeks to quarrel with yet a third group - the rich and the powerful, by which I take it to mean the aristocracy including even the Sultan himself. Of the rich and the powerful Ḥamzah says that they are not to be trusted with true friendship:

---

83. 2016, p.41.
84. Op. how taqlīd is used in ibid., p.28.
85. Ḥamzah also directs his attacks against well known fiqh books such as the Kitāb Mahallī and the Kitāb Muḥarrar (2016, pp.32, 35).
Jikalau bersahabat dengan yang kaya
Akhirnya engkau jadi binasa.

If you make companions of the rich
In the end you will be destroyed.

and that their Islam is merely nominal:

Igrārnq tiada ditaşđqkannya,
Kerana tiada dengan sebaiknya ...

Their verbal profession of faith is not
accompanied by belief,
Because they do so not with a pure intention ...

Like a true Sūfī, Ḥamzah denounces the divisions of master
and slave in society as contrary to the teachings of the
Prophet:

Aho segala kamu anak 'ālim!
Jangan bersahabat dengan yang zālim;
Kerana Rasulullāh sempurna ḥākim
Melarangkan kita sekalian khādim.

O you all learned men!
Do not take the unjust as companions;
For the Messenger of God who
is the perfect Judge
Has forbidden us all to be slaves [of the
unjust].

No doubt the orang zālim referred to above is aimed at the
master class. At a time when kings and princes held sway
over the lives of the people, it is a man of courage who
would forbid his followers to bow down to them or to curry
their favour:

Aho segala kamu yang menjadi faqīr!
Jangan bersahabat dengan raja dan amīr;
Kerana Rasulullāh bashīr dan nāqīs
Melarangkan kita saghir dan kabīr.

86. 3374, p.19.
87. loc. cit.
89. Ibid., p.39.
O you all who have become poor!
Do not take kings and princes as companions;
For the Messenger of God who brings glad tidings and [preaches] equality
Has forbidden us divisions into small [low] and big [high].

Such is Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī.

From this brief sketch about Ḥamzah and his times which I have constructed out of the scanty bits and pieces of insights based solely upon his verses, many things are implied which are of the utmost historical significance in the study of Ḥamzah's ideas and personality. From now on we must see Ḥamzah not as the exponent of the pedestrian brand of the Wujūdiyyah mysticism, 90 nor of the antinomian brand to which he has been consigned by those who opposed or failed to understand him. We must see him instead as a spiritual reformer; one who exhorts his fellows not to believe merely in the letter, but to have knowledge and understanding also of the spirit; to love God truly; to abandon superstition and to establish reason. His constant appeal is to the use of the intellect, for man is a noble creature and must first know himself in order to know his Creator and his lofty origin, and thence to true faith culminating in Divine love. He combines in his teachings both the asceticism and fervent ardour of the early Ṣūfīs and the metaphysics and theosophy that characterize the Ṣūfism of Tbnū‘l-‘Arabī. In the light of what has been said we must

90. See note 129.
interpret the fact that Hamzah's name has been left out of the official chronicles, even during his lifetime, not to Hamzah's absence from the land due to his travels, but rather to his antagonism of the three groups mentioned and to his resulting unpopularity in the circle of the powers that be. Hamzah was ignored. Even the Hikayat Acheh that records contemporaneous events does not make mention of Hamzah - it were as though he never existed! He became known only posthumously as his influence, or influence attributed to him, made itself left with increasing persistence. Even the 'orthodox' 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf of Singkel (c. 1620- c. 1693)\textsuperscript{91} seeks eagerly to associate himself with Hamzah by publicizing the identity of their place of origin\textsuperscript{92} as though to impress upon his readers' minds that he too ought to be as popular.

One must not merely guess that many a pedestrian mystic quoted Hamzah as though he were his follower, proclaiming the high worth of his teachings. It is not surprising if the so-called disciples or followers of Hamzah whom Râni later denounced and condemned were precisely from this group who made use of Hamzah's fame and learning by quoting him and


\textsuperscript{92} 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf in his Malay translation and commentary of the Qur'an based on that of al-Baydawi's refers to himself as a man of Fansur (al-Fansuri). In a manuscript in the Marsden Collection emphasis is laid on the fact that 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf was "of the same race as Hamzah of Barus" - cf. Winstedt, R.O., The Malays, a cultural history, London, 1956, p. 35.
pretending to comment upon his ideas and teachings. One example will suffice to demonstrate my point.

In the Marsden Collection there appear several passages of anonymous authorship purporting to expound certain mystical doctrines. The ones that are relevant in the pursuance of my aim quote four of Ḥamzah's verses in support of what is expounded, thus giving the impression - no doubt purposely - not only that the author was a follower of Ḥamzah, but that what he expounded is Ḥamzah's teachings and that Ḥamzah himself would have endorsed it. One passage begins by explaining the meaning of the well-known Prophetic Tradition that "whosoever knows his self knows his Lord", and this because "wujūd Tuhannya dengan wujūd dirinya ini esa jua" -"the Being of his Lord and the being of his self is one and the same." To know oneself means to know one's inward Self in the state of the "treasure hidden" in God's Knowledge. The formula is that when this inward Self is that which is the known (ma'ālūm) in God's Knowledge (Ilmu) - and the known is not separate from His Knowledge - it follows that, since His Knowledge is not separate from His Being (wujūd), the Self (by implication) is not separate from His

94. 11648, pp. 95, 96, 108-119.
95. There might well be more than one author.
96. 11648, p.108.
Being: 97

The true significance of knowing one's self is to know one's self as existing in God's Knowledge, i.e. to know one's self as an object of His Knowledge. When one has realized one's self to be the object of God's Knowledge - and the object of God's Knowledge is eternally at one with His Knowledge and His Knowledge is eternally at one with His Being - then one has certainly grasped the relationship with God and understands one's oneness with God, the Glorious and Exalted. 98

To know what has been explained, and to know that one's outward self returns to one's inward Self - this is to attain gnosis (ma'rifat). 99 When it is said that one's outward self returns to one's inward Self it means that the outward self originates in and comes from the inward Self. But in reality there is no such thing as "coming" and "returning". What is meant by "coming" is from the overflow

---

97. Johns has written a doctoral dissertation, submitted to the University of London, which deals with an anonymous collection of 17th century tracts on Malay Sufism and which was subsequently published. (Johns, A.H., Malay Sufism as illustrated in an anonymous collection of 17th century tracts, J.M.B.R.A.S., vol.30, pt. 2, 1957). The passage which I have summarized and translated above, and the ones which I am referring to in note 94 are also included in John's dissertation (pp.56-57). But Johns' work is full of errors of all kinds and must be read in conjunction with Professor Dr. G.W.J. Drewes' review of the book, in which some of the errors are exposed, which appears in the Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Deel 115, 3e Afl, The Hague, 1959, pp.281-304.

98. See Appendix I, (i). Cf. Asrār, p.33; Ḩisnānū'1-Kāmil I, p.60; Ṣūfī Studies p.128.

99. 11648, pp.III-112.
of the Absolute Being (\textit{wujūd mahd}) upon this World of Possibilities (\textit{'ālam mumkināt}). The Possible Beings (\textit{wujūd mumkināt}) that comprise the World of Possibilities are the Theatre of Manifestation (\textit{mazhar}) of the Truth (God), Who is the only Being that exists. The existence of the Many, its manifold attributes and acts, all these are nothing but the manifestation of the One and Its Attributes and Acts which are not distinct from Itself.\textsuperscript{101} So far so good. Then the teachings in the passage conclude:

Whosoever comprehends what has been said, he will certainly know that his coming is from God and, likewise, his return is to Him; and he will certainly know that the being (\textit{wujūd}) of his outward self is none other than the Being of God, in which [His] Attribute of Knowledge subsists. [This is so because] in His Attribute of Knowledge that which is known to Him subsists. Hence Man's outward attributes are none other than his inward attributes, his outward acts are none other than his inward acts, for indeed the outward manifest (\textit{menyatakan}) his inward attributes. This being the case, Man's being, his attributes and his acts are indeed the same as the Being of God the Glorious and Exalted ...\textsuperscript{102}

\textit{Non sequitur!} The argument in all the passages summarized and quoted - with the final conclusion formulated in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100} \textit{Limpah} means profusion, abundance, bounty, and in this case can even mean mercy. But the sense in which it is used here seems to me to be the equivalent of Ibn\'l-'Arabi\'s \textit{fayd}, i.e. overflow.
\item \textsuperscript{101} 11648, pp.113-117, 95, 96.
\item \textsuperscript{102} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.117-119. For my romanized Malay transcription of all the passages treated here, see below Appendix I, (iii).
\end{itemize}
above quotation— is this: Since man's outward self is at one with and the same as his inward self because the former self is the manifestation of the latter self, and since his inward self is that which God knows and that which God knows is eternally at one with His Knowledge which is eternally at one with God, therefore man's outward self is the same as the Being of God. The anonymous author here, like many other "advanced mystic" or "adept" of his day, has not succeeded in balancing himself upon the edge of the pantheistic abyss into which Ḥamzah did not fall. In the first instance, Ḥamzah never advocated the idea that because man's outward self is the manifestation of his inward self, the two are therefore identical. In Ḥamzah the inward self would correspond with the higher, spiritual self, and the outward self with the lower, sensual self. The two are never conceived as identical. The word nafsahu in man 'arafa nafsahu ... refers to the inward self, and this does not refer in any way to sensual qualities:

Hai Ta'lib! mengetahui man 'arafa nafsahu bukan mengenal jantung dan paru-paru, dan bukan mengenal kaki dan tangan. Ma'na man 'arafa nafsahu [itu-ialah] adanya dengan Ada Tuhannya esa jua.¹⁰³

Note that what Ḥamzah speaks of as ada (existence) appears in an altered form in our author's version of the same discussion as wujūd (being).¹⁰⁴ It is also extremely important

¹⁰³. Ḥamzah in Muntahī, p.117.
¹⁰⁴. See above, p.51 and note 96.
to note that Ṛānīrī, refuting this same passage of Ḥamzah, though he quoted verbatim,105 did not grasp the distinction Ḥamzah makes between ada and wujūd which are extremely important key words in Ḥamzah's system. However, I am reserving my discussion and elucidation of this to its proper context in another chapter. Suffice it to point out here that the meanings they convey are by no means identical. Further, what does Ḥamzah mean by the word diri (self) used in the context we are discussing?

Erti "mengenal Tuhannya" dan "mengenal dirinya" ya'nī diri kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan [itu] dirinya ...

The inward, higher spiritual self (diri) is the Self (diri) of the Hidden Treasure (kanzan makhfiyyan) in God's Knowledge. By the Hidden Treasure is meant the Potentialities of the Known (isti'dād ma'lūmāt) in God's Knowledge, and the Self of the Hidden Treasure is the Predispositions of the Divine Essence (shu'ūn Dhāt).107 Now man's inward, higher spiritual self in the sense meant here is not something individualized, to which names and attributes are given, it is not a thing

105. Tibyān fī Ma'rifati'l-Adyān, Cod. or. 3291, Leiden, p.98. For my romanized Malay transliteration of passages from the above mentioned treatise of Ṛānīrī, in which the author claims to expose Ḥamzah's heresies, including the passage referred to in this note, see below, Appendix II. This work will hereafter be cited as Tibyān.


107. The Hidden Treasure is also referred to as the Inmost Self or Secret (Rahasia : sirr) of the Essence: the Divine Consciousness. See note,375 and pp.145-151.
created as it is not yet separate from the Divine Essence. But the outward, lower sensual self (also *diri*) is already separated from the Divine Essence, it has already come under the sway of the Creative Word *Kun* and is therefore a thing created.¹⁰⁸ The outward self never can be, and is never mentioned by Ḥamzah ever to be, the same as the Being of God, which our anonymous author here asserts. The word *diri* as used by Ḥamzah is also a very important key word in his conceptual system, and this will be treated in detail, as I have promised, in a separate chapter together with other important key words.

A most important point to note is that our anonymous author, in quoting Ḥamzah to support what he expounded, quotes only his poetry, not his prose.¹⁰⁹ Now to adduce authority in support of the high worth of one's teaching by "scattering in"a few lines of poetry is a method very highly susceptible to false representations as it gives the anonymous author free rein to insert his own ideas and to claim them to be the same as what is conveyed in the poems. Only if one is fully conversant with Ḥamzah's ideas as a whole covering the entire range of his works can one be entitled to attempt such a thing. If we but study Ḥamzah's own line-by-line commentary on his fifteen verses,¹¹⁰ we can see clearly

¹⁰⁸. See, for an example of what I have summarized here, *Asrar*, pp. 29-30, 34-37; and *Sharāb*, pp. 15-19.
¹⁰⁹. See below, Appendix I, (i) (II).
¹¹⁰. See *Asrar*, pp. 17-20, if.
that each line leaves much unsaid and without the help of the commentary it would be impossible to reproduce the author's thoughts conveyed in them. It can be seen how unreliable it is merely to quote poetry - especially this kind of poetry. But although our anonymous author quotes Ḥamzah's poetry, I suspect that the entire substance of what he expounds is all derived from Ḥamzah's *Muntahī*, in which the same Prophetic Traditions and Qur'ānic passages are treated.¹¹¹ In my opinion the *Muntahī* taken by itself by one who is uninitiated is not a good representation of Ḥamzah's mystical ideas; on the contrary, if not read in conjunction with his two other prose works already mentioned, it will certainly convey misleading interpretations and give the impression that the writer was indeed a heretic. If one reads through the *Muntahī* it would give one the impression that the treatise was hastily written - ideas on the mystery of the gnosis of God were crammed into an impossible nutshell. It were as though the *Muntahī* was meant for the highly advanced mystic, the adept, never to be divulged to profane ears. In fact it was so intended, as the very title "The Adept" (al-*Muntahī*) indicates.¹¹² To give a configuration of Ḥamzah's ideas from this one treatise is - in a certain sense - like giving a configuration of Ghazzālī's ideas from

¹¹² See the Introduction to pt. II, below, p. 368.
the Mishkāt al-Anwār. This is precisely what Rānīrī has done to Ḥamzah. In refuting Ḥamzah, Rānīrī quoted him almost entirely from the Muntahi. From the order in which Rānīrī quotes Ḥamzah he evidently read the treatise from beginning to end, methodically putting aside each point from the first to the last page. But the Muntahi is a treatise not so much of discourse, but one of quotations, and as such, Rānīrī, in concentrating his refutation upon them is merely leading himself to false conclusions, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

HAMZAH CONTESTED BY NURUL’L-DIN AL-RANIRI

Raniri's refutation of Hamzah's teachings and ideas which he considers "heretical" and which he uses as evidence for branding Hamzah with infidelity is based upon several points. These points he has selected in a manner calculated to expose and condemn the "heresies" which to him are scattered in Hamzah's writings disguised, so to speak, in the garb of true Sufism. In these points of Raniri's criticism, we will be able to obtain an idea of the manner in which he represents Hamzah's ideas and teachings, as well as the way in which - to achieve maximum credence from his audience - he couches his attacks. The points may be summarized thus:

a) That Hamzah's ideas regarding God, the World, Man and the relationship between them, in short, Reality, are identical - to mention some - with those of the Philosophers, the Zoroastrians, the Metempsychosists, the Incarnationists, the Brahmins.

b) That Hamzah's belief is pantheistic in the sense that God's essence is completely immanent in the World; that God permeates everything that is seen.

c) That, like the Philosophers, Hamzah believes that God is Simple Being.

d) That Hamzah, like the Qadariyyah and the Mu'tazilah, believes the Qur'an to be created.
e) That, like the Philosophers, Ḥamzah believes in the eternity of the World.

We shall go over all these points in detail, quoting Rānīrī at length where he quotes Ḥamzah and comparing the quotations with the original to evaluate the true worth of these charges. This is important not only from the point of view of a critical study of Rānīrī and his ideas, but also from that of elucidation of Ḥamzah's ideas. It will be an apt introduction to the next chapter in which his mysticism will be discussed in greater detail. In comparing Rānīrī's quotations of Ḥamzah with the original I mean not always that the quotations are verbatim, for in several instances Rānīrī does not indicate where he quoted from. But failing verbatim quotations I have traced and shall present passages which I am certain, from the point of view of the subject matter, are the ones referred to by Rānīrī. Further proof of this is not necessary here as the matter will become self-evident as we go along.

Speaking of a sect of the Zoroastrians, Rānīrī says:

The third sect of the Zoroastrians 114 is called the Sumaniyyah. 115 They worship all kinds of light; the sun, the moon, the stars, fire and the like. They say that all light

---

114. For the Majūsī, see E.I. article Majūs.
originated from one light [i.e. source] even before God created creation (i.e. the Throne, the Tablet, and the Seven Layers of Heaven). When God Most Exalted created these things, all light became separated from their source; that is, it is so only to outward perception, for in reality all light is one - and that is the Light of God. Such is the belief of Ḥamzah Fānsūrī. He says, in the book Asrāru’l-'Arifīn, that the first light to separate from the Essence of God is the Light of Muḥammad. 116 From this saying [it is clear that] he tends towards the Tanāsukhiyyah school. 117 Furthermore, it amounts to the same thing as what the Falāṣifah 118 say; that the Truth Most Exalted is Simple Monad [or Simple Atom, or Simple Being]. And this is also the belief of the Wathaniyyah from among the Barā'īmah, and the Samiyyah who inhabit the land of Tibet. The same is true also of the Ḥulūliyyah, who dwell in the land of Halwāniyyah and the continent of India. Such is their belief.

Notice how, in the passages quoted, Rānīrī connects Ḥamzah with the various groups mentioned. In fact these expertly woven connections are all of them questionable - even false - except perhaps in the case of the connection with the Philosophers. But even in this latter case, we should not be led to believe in the kind of connection Rānīrī creates for us. What Ḥamzah actually says on the point in dispute is:

Between Knower and known, that is when the Light of Muhammad first separates from the Essence of God. One expression is that it is called the Relational Spirit; another

117. For this school, see E.I. article Tanāsukh.
118. Falāṣifah i.e. Philosophers, usually refers to Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), al-Farābī, al-Kindī and Ibn Rushd (Averroes).
119. Tibyan, pp. 17-18. For my romanized Malay transcription of the text, see Appendix II, (i).
is the Universal Intellect; another is Light; another is the Most Exalted Pen; and another is the Tablet. . . Because Knowledge is living, it is called Spirit; because by Knowledge the things known are manifest it is called Light; because Knowledge patterns the ideas of the things known it is called Intellect; because in Knowledge is inscribed the forms of the things known it is called Tablet; because Knowledge becomes letters of the things known it is called Pen . . .

Now what Ḥamzah is saying here is the well-known Ṣūfī doctrine which Ibnu'l-ʿArabi, Jīlī and other famous and sanctified Ṣūfīs also hold. It is strange that Rānīrī should single out Ḥamzah and accuse him of "heresy" for holding a doctrine which he learnt, most of all, from Ibnu'l-ʿArabi and Jīlī whose names Rānīrī mentions reverently. Ḥamzah does not distort the teachings of his masters, so that Rānīrī cannot accuse him of this in order that he may interpret the teachings of these Ṣūfī masters according to his own "orthodox" brand. Rather it would seem that it is Rānīrī who distorts the teachings of the Ṣūfī masters to suit his own ideas. What Rānīrī wants to convey in the passage quoted is not that part of the point which deals with this particular aspect of the Ṣūfī doctrine (i.e. the idea of Nūr Muḥammad), but that he wants to focus the attention of his readers on the point that Ḥamzah, like the Zoroastrians, worships light. Rānīrī wishes to convey to his readers the notion that the word 'light' used by Ḥamzah is meant not in the metaphorical,

120. Asrar, p.41.
but in the real sense. In fact Ṣāmīr even resorts to the use of the word 'fire' (-api) so as to make his intention clear. In fact from Ḥāmzah's passage quoted, there is no implication whatsoever in connection with the Zoroastrian belief in the worshipping of light or fire. This word 'fire' he uses again in another passage where he elucidates the salient features of the doctrines of the Tanāsukhiyyah school to which Ḥāmzah has already been assigned. Note in this passage that the meaning of the word 'fire' is taken in the real sense:

They [i.e. the Tanāsukhiyyah school] say that all spirits and every single thing are parts of God by virtue of His doing and creating them all. His doing and the like come from [i.e. have their origin in] fire and return to it. This is the strayed opinion of Ḥāmzah Fanṣūrī and Shamsu'il-Dīn al-Sumatrānī. Some of the Tanāsukhiyyah say that the Production (takwīn) and the Producer (mukawwān), the Doer (fā'īl) and the Thing Done (maf'ūl), are identical. Likewise in the opinion of Ḥāmzah Fanṣūrī and Shamsu'il-Dīn al-Sumatrānī; they really adhere to the true meaning of what the Tanāsukhiyyah believe: that God in His Essence is incarnate (ḥulūl) in every thing that is seen.

121. Died 1630. For this mystic see van Nieuwenhuijze, C.A.O., Samsu'il-Dīn van Pasai (diss.) Leiden, 1945.
122. The text reads mukawwān (see Appendix II, (ii)). Al-Āsh'arī too seems to have identified the two. See McCarthy, R.J., The theology of al-Āsh'arī, Beyrouth, 1953, p.168. This work contains al-Āsh'arī's Kitābu'l-Luma' and Risālatu'l-Istihṣāni'l-Khawdi fi 'ilmī'l-Kalam (Arabic texts and annotated translations), and relevant Appendices. Hereafter cited as al-Āsh'arī.
In this passage, apart from the point mentioned, Ḥamzah is accused of adhering to the real meaning of what the Tanāsukhiyyah believe; that is, the diffusion and distribution of the Divine Spirit among the beings of the World. Rānīrī here accuses Ḥamzah of pantheism. But what kind of pantheism? "There is a form of pantheism which, starting from the assumption that God is an absolute, infinite and eternal being, who is the source and ultimate ground of all that is, was, and will be, gradually assumes a form of acosmism according to which the Phenomenal World is but a passing shadow of the Reality which lies behind it."¹²⁴ Then there is another form of pantheism which asserts that the Essence of God or the Absolute is completely immanent in the World; God, so to speak, exhausts Himself in the World, so that transcendence is denied Him. It is to this somewhat crude type of pantheism - the extreme type - that Rānīrī refers in his accusation of Ḥamzah's conception of the relationship between God and the World. But this accusation is false. Had Rānīrī read Ḥamzah carefully and understood what he read, then he would know that it is absurd to label Ḥamzah's system as pantheistic in the sense he means. It has been said that in any pantheistic doctrine either God is bound to suffer in the sense that He is a fabrication of the human mind - that

---

only the Phenomenal World is real, or that the Universe suffers in the sense that it is mere illusion - that God alone is the Real Being. Ḥamzah - if we can call this Sufi system 'pantheistic' - certainly holds the latter view, although Rānirī would have us believe that he holds the former. Like Ḥbnu'l-'Arabī, Ḥamzah conceives Reality as having both aspects of transcendence (tanzīh) and immanence (tashbīh), and takes care to assert repeatedly that God is not everything and all things in the sense of being an aggregation of existents, for in the Sufi doctrine of wahdatu'l-wujūd, or 'Unity of Existence', there is no such thing as "aggregation of existents" as God is the only Existent. It must be pointed out that the very label 'pantheism', used by many western orientalists to describe this Sufi doctrine, is very misleading. If this doctrine can be labelled by a mere word, the word familiar to the western mode of thinking that best describes it is perhaps

126. 2016, pp. 27-30. For a romanized transcription of the verses, see Appendix V, (ii).
127. The term 'pantheism' used to describe this Sufi doctrine is not only misleading, but erroneous. Nicholson has given an illuminating account of this in his three lectures delivered in the University of London, subsequently published as The idea of personality in Sufism, Cambridge, 1923 (see pp. 21, 22, 27, 31, 52, 73. See also Whinfield's introduction to Shabistāri (p. viii); and further Burckhardt, T., An introduction to the Sufi doctrines, Lahore, 1959, pp. 22-25; and Lings, M., A Moslem saint of the twentieth century, London, 1961, pp. 125-126, note 3. Burckhardt's work will hereafter be cited as Burckhardt; Lings' work will hereafter be cited as Lings.
panentheism. Rānīrī's attacks on Ḥamzah's 'pantheism' is nothing but his own fallacy of jumping to conclusions in identifying what Ḥamzah means metaphorically with what Ḥamzah considers to be real. In this way it is the metaphors that are attacked, and the picture of the real caricatured.

Rānīrī makes mention of Ḥamzah's book entitled Muntahi from which he deduces evidence to denounce the author as belonging to the false brand of the Wujūdiyyah:

Now I shall expose to you some of the beliefs of the false Wujūdiyyah, that is, the Wujūdiyyah of Ḥamzah Fāṣūrī and Shamsu'll-Dīn al-Sumatranī and all those who follow them both. Ḥamzah Fāṣūrī, in his book called Muntahi, in explaining the saying of the Prophet: "Man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu" "Whosoever knows his self knows his Lord" — says that:

"... the meaning of knowing one's Lord and knowing one's self is [this:] that the Self of the Hidden Treasure is none other than one's self, and every thing is in God's Knowledge; like the seed and the tree; the tree resides in its completeness within the seed."

It is clear from this saying of that [false] Wujūdiyyah that the World together with all

128. Nicholson, op.cit., p.27.
129. Wujūdiyyah refers to those who hold the doctrine of wahdatu'l-wujūd, or Unity of Existence. There are two groups of the Wujūdiyyah. The one is the true (i.e. muwahhidah) Wujūdiyyah, and the other the false (i.e. deviating or mulhidah) Wujūdiyyah. See for this Rānīrī's Hujjatu'l-Siddiq Il dar'i'il-Zindiq, Maxwell Collections, text no.95, Royal Asiatic Society, London, pp.9-24. Hereafter cited as Hujjat.
its parts actually resides, existing in its completeness in the Truth Most Exalted.
The World proceeds from Him like the tree proceeding from the seed. Such belief is infidelity. 130

Rānīrī's charge here is formulated in the last sentence—the implication being that Ḥamzah holds the World to proceed from God out of its own necessity without any act of willing on God's part. This is the doctrine of the Philosophers which al-Ghazzālī so vehemently rejects. 131 It will be noticed that Rānīrī formulates his refutations on the basis, as he so often does, of identifying his victim's analogies with the latter's conceptions. Here he identifies Ḥamzah's analogy with what Ḥamzah actually conceives. The meaning conveyed in this analogy of the seed and the tree is not what Rānīrī implies. What Ḥamzah means to convey is precisely the opposite of what the Philosophers believe, for by this analogy he is actually revealing what he understands by God's creative will (irādah). Rānīrī has quoted the passage from the Muntahi faithfully, although there it serves a different context. In that context the key words ada (to be, to exist, existence) and diri (self) plays a very important part. But I shall reserve their treatment to Chapter V, where

130. Tībyān, p.97. See also Muntahi, p.111; Appendix II, (iii).
131. See al-Gazzālī's Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, translated by S.A. Kamali, Lahore, 1958, the Third Discussion, entitled: The demonstration of their confusion in saying that God is the agent and maker of the world and that the world is His product and act, etc. This work will hereafter be cited as Tahāfut.
these key words and others are discussed. The meaning of the analogy of the seed and the tree is to be found not in the Muntahī, but in the Asrār where, speaking of what he understands by God's creative will, Ḥamzah says that it is

... Willing the potentialities in His Knowledge to become the World. As the Holy Tradition says: "I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known" - that is, the World together with all its potentialities in His Knowledge is related within it [i.e. His Knowledge] as the hidden treasure about to bring forth the things known from within His Knowledge. Thus it says: "I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known." The treasure [i.e. as a whole] is likened to a tree within its seed. The seed is the treasure, the tree within it is the content of the treasure; hidden in its completeness: its roots, trunk, branches, boughs, twigs, leaves, flowers, fruits - all complete within the seed. The seed wants to bring forth the growth of the tree within itself on a field of vast expanse. The seed says: "I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known." All this is an allusion to [God's act of] willing. Further, God the Most Exalted, says:

Verily His command is, when He is in the state of willing a thing, to say to it "Be thou!" - and it becomes.  

This too is an allusion to [God's act of] willing.

Ḥamzah's concept of the irādah need not deter us here as it is discussed at length in another chapter. Suffice it to say, however, that it is not the same as what the Philosophers believe. Ṣanīrī then goes on to say:

132. Qur'ān, 36:82.
133. Asrār, pp. 29-30.
134. Ṣanīrī gives an outline of what the Philosophers believe in Ḥujjah, pp. 7-8; consult in conjunction with the reference in note 131.
Furthermore, he says:

"Do not relate [yourself with] God as wet cloth with water, for cloth is distinct from water. God, Glorious and Exalted, is far above such similitudes! But if [the relationship is] likened to [that of] the sea and its waves, then it is admissible. You must not let yourself be veiled [from Him] by all the forms that resemble His Self, for all forms are as veils to God. But [you are] together with the eternal sea, i.e. that eternal sea, when it heaves, it is called by the name 'waves' — but in reality it is the sea, for the waves and the sea are not two things, but one and the same."

It is clear from this that the Being (wujūd) of God and the being of the creatures are one. Such belief is infidelity.

This quotation by Rānīrī is not altogether a faithful one, as in Ḥamzah a large part of the passage consists of quotations from other poets:

But you must not see [the relationship between God and yourself] as [that which is] likened to [the condition of] wet cloth, for the cloth is distinct from the water that permeates it. God, Glorious and Exalted, is most pure from such a similitude! But if [the relationship is] likened to the sea and its waves, then it is admissible. As the verse says:

"The sea is the sea, as it was before,
The 'new' are waves and rivers;
Let not forms that resemble them veil thee,
For the shapes they form are but veils."

But [the waves] are together with the eternal sea. As the distich says:

The sea is eternal; when it heaves
It is then called by the name 'waves' ..."
But its real essence (haqiqatnya) is the sea, for sea and waves are not two [entities], but one and the same.  

Nevertheless it must be conceded that Rānīrī has brought out the spirit conveyed in the passage more or less faithfully. But Rānīrī's conclusion, drawn from this passage - that the Being of God and that of His creatures are one - is false. This will be made clear, when we come to discussing the concept wujūd in Ḥamzah's system, in Chapter V. Strangely, in this passage, Rānīrī passes over the analogy of the wet cloth which is in fact very significant in throwing light upon Ḥamzah's denial of the doctrines of ḥulūl (incarnation) and ittiḥād (union) - the very things Rānīrī accuses Ḥamzah of.  

Rānīrī continues:

Furthermore, he says:

"The analogy is like the sun with its light and its heat; their names are three, their forms are three, but in reality they are one."  

This belief is like that of the Christians

137. Tibyān, pp.26-27, 100.  
138. "... but in reality they are one." Rānīrī quotes Ḥamzah verbatim here. I have rendered the above phrase from: "... [tetapi] haqiqatnya suatu jua." From the point of view of the context of Rānīrī's passage I have rendered haqiqatnya as in reality because this is the meaning he chooses to understand. But if I were translating Ḥamzah, I would render the phrase: "... but their real essence is one." - which conveys a different sense than what Rānīrī imputes. Pada haqiqatnya means in reality, but haqiqatnya means its (or their) real essence. Rānīrī is guilty of word-twisting here!
[who believe] that Being is three; the first the Being of the Father, the second the Being of the Mother and the third the Being of the Son—though three names, yet they are in reality One Being. O all ye who have faith!—see such belief and utterances which are downright infidelity, like the belief of the Philosophers mentioned previously.139

That Ḥamzah should employ his kind of analogy involving the number three is unfortunate as it allows Ṣnīrī to pounce upon this and to construe and insinuate its identity with the doctrine of the Christian Trinity. But it is clear that Ḥamzah does not mean such a thing! Furthermore in Ṣnīrī's attack he himself says that the Christian Trinity involves three beings, whereas in Ḥamzah's analogy the notion of three beings is entirely excluded—there is only One Being.

Ṣnīrī continues:

He says further:

"O Seeker, to understand [the meaning of] 'whosoever knows his self knows his Lord' is not to know the heart and lungs, or the limbs. The meaning of 'whosoever knows his self knows his Lord' is [to know] that his existence and the existence of his Lord is one.'

Such belief is infidelity, for it represents the Truth Most Exalted as being one (united) with [ittiḥād] the creatures. Pure is the Most High Truth from such saying of that infidel!140

Again, Ṣnīrī has misconstrued Ḥamzah, and this is due to Ṣnīrī's misconception of the term ada (to be, exist,

139. Tibyān, p.98. See also Muntahī, p.112; Appendix II, (v).
140. Tibyān, p.98. See also Muntahī, p.117; Appendix II, (vi).
existence) used here by Ḥamzah. We shall see in Chapter V that the relational meaning of this term does not apply to the existence of creatures, but rather to the fixed essences (al-/a'yānu'il-thābitah) which, still in the Divine Knowledge, are modes or predispositions (shu'ūn) of His Being. The question of ittiḥād, then, does not arise when seen in this interpretation which is what Ḥamzah means to convey. Ṣanīrī goes on to say:

And he says further:

"The analogy is like rain water in a plant. The water permeates the entire plant. Varied are its taste: in lemon, sour; in sugar-cane, sweet; in the mumba plant, 141 bitter; each conveying its own taste. But their real essence is water."

Such a belief is infidelity, for he believes that the Truth Most Exalted permeates the creatures just as water permeates earth. 142 Pure is the Most Exalted Truth from the saying of that infidel! 143

As before, Ṣanīrī here identifies the analogy employed with the meaning intended, and he charges Ḥamzah with crude pantheism. But the context in which the passage occurs does not admit of such a charge. It must be pointed out that Ṣanīrī passes silently over the passages preceding the one he quoted. These passages are in fact meant to explain the

---


142. This is not true. This point Ḥamzah conclusively denies in a passage already quoted on pp. 69-70, above.

143. Tibyān, pp.98-99. See also Muntahī, p.119; Appendix II, (vii).
meaning of what Ḥamzah means by "the meaning of 'whosoever knows his self knows his Lord' is [to know] that his existence and the existence of his Lord is one".\textsuperscript{144} To explain the meaning of "his existence and the existence of his Lord is one" Ḥamzah quotes Junayd, 'Irāqī, Ṣbnūl-'Arabī, again Junayd, the Qur'ān - all to the effect that God's existence is everywhere, and because His existence is everywhere it is concealed, giving existence to all things. Since we do not possess real existence, deriving what existence we possess from God, our existence is in reality God's existence. Ḥamzah then quotes Jāmī:

In neighbour, friend, companion, Him we see,  
In beggar's rags or robes of royalty;  
In Union's cell or in Distraction's haunts,  
There's none but He - by God, there's none but He.\textsuperscript{145}

This verse concludes Jāmī's \textit{Flash XXII}, where he says:

The substance of each individual thing may be described either as the epiphany of Very Being in the 'intelligible world', according to the particular facet whereof such thing is the monstrance, or as Very Being Himself made manifest immediately, \textsuperscript{147} in the same intelligible world and according to the same facets. Consequently, each existing thing is either an epiphany of Very Being with the colour imparted to its exterior by the particular properties of its substance, or the Very Being

\textsuperscript{144} See above p.71 (passage preceding the one in question).  
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Lawa'ih}, p.38; \textit{Muntahi}, pp.118-119.  
\textsuperscript{146} "Epiphany of Very Being" is Whinfield's rendering of \textit{ta'ayyun-}\textsuperscript{1} \textit{wujud}, i.e. the Determination of Absolute Being.  
\textsuperscript{147} "Very Being Himself made manifest immediately" is Whinfield's rendering of \textit{wujud-}\textsuperscript{i-muta'ayyin}, i.e. the Being of the Determine One. For notes 146 and 147, cf. \textit{ibid.}, p.37, notes 4 and 5.
Himself immediately made manifest with the same colouring.

The real substance of everything always abides, though concealed in the inner depths of the Very Being, while its sensible properties are manifest to outward sense. For it is impossible that the Divine 'Ideas' in the intelligible world should be susceptible of evanescence, as that would involve atheism. [God is too exalted for such evanescence to be ascribed to His 'Ideas'.]

We are the facets and the modes of Being Evolved from Mind - yea, accidents of Being, We're hidden in the cloak of non-existence, But yet reflected in the glass of Being. Consequently, everything is in reality and in fact either Being made manifest or an accident of Being thus manifested. The manifested accident is a quality of the manifested Being, and though in idea the quality is different from the thing qualified, yet in fact it is identical with it. Notwithstanding the difference in idea, the identity in fact justifies the attribution.

The substance of all this is clearly embodied in Ḥamzah's analogy of the rain water and the plant, the full sense of which is given not in the Muntahī, but in the Asrār:

Know, that [by God] creating His creatures day and night is meant His effects (athār) that are called existence (wujud), for they become the existence of the creatures. Just as in the case of earth; without rain how can plants grow? The earth is likened to God's knowledge, rain is existence, the plants are the creatures.

149. Ibid., pp. 37-38 - followed by the verse in Ḥamzah's quotation.
150. Creating His creatures day and night is the third line of the verse:

Chahaya āthār-Nya tiadakan padam; Memberikan wujūd pada sekalian ī’ālam; Menjadikan makhluq siang dan malam, Ilā abadi’l-ābād tiadakan karam.

Asrār, p. 19.
The earth is, in itself, earth and rain is, in itself, water. When [they] commingle, the plants begin to grow. The plants that grow out of earth and water are determined by the law of potentiality (isti'dād): some grow becoming bitter, some sweet, some tart; some grow becoming green, some red, some white, some black. Colour and all taste become according to their original potentialities. The water remains water, the earth remains earth, and the plants grow out of water and earth, but their forms and colours are determined by their potentialities ...

This analogy is applied to the World: originating from existence there come forth day and night, the heavens and the earth, the Throne (ʿarsh) and the Footstool (kursī). Heaven and Hell, the believer and the unbeliever, the good and the evil - [all] by virtue of their respective potentialities. The Essence (dhat) of God is most pure. The creatures are many and have contraries, because His attributes are many, His acts are many, His effects are many, for the potentialities of the creatures are in His attributes. Works that are good come from His attribute of Beauty (jamāl), works that are evil come from His attribute of Majesty (jalāl). The origin of Beauty and Majesty is from Being (wujūd), and Being is from Essence. In reality all [come to be] because of Him; but for Him this World has no existence, for 'there is none like unto Him.'

That this passage gives the meaning of the one in the Muntahī there is no doubt. Even the Quranic passage quoted in both passages are identical.  

152. Asrar, pp. 52-54.  
153. Qur'ān, 13:4:  ... Yusqā bimā'in wāḥidin wa nufaḍḍilu ba'dāhā 'alā ba'din fi'll-ukuli.  ... they are watered with one water; and We make some of them to excel others in fruit.
Furthermore he says:

"I see God in my being through His Being. My being is His Being. I see through His sight."

Such belief is infidelity, for he makes one his being and attributes - both of which are produced (hadith) - with the Being and Attributes of God which are eternal.\(^{154}\)

In this passage Rānīrī is not faithful in quoting Ḥamzah. The sayings Rānīrī attributes to Ḥamzah actually are not Ḥamzah's but a quotation from Shāh Ni'matu'LLāh.\(^{155}\) Further, Rānīrī's version of the Shāh Ni'matu'LLāh quotation is corrupt. Ḥamzah, quoting Shāh Ni'matu'LLāh, says in fact:

"I see God in my being [or essence] with His sight. My being [or essence] is His Being [or Essence] ..."

The meaning underlying this idea is quite clearly orthodox and asserted by all true Sūfīs. The 'I' that 'see' God is not the 'I' of the creature, that is, the outward self. It refers to the inward self that 'sees' with the eye of the inner perception. Hence this 'seeing' is referred to as 'seeing' with God's sight. In reality it is God that sees, and Himself that He sees, for the inward self is none other than He. This is so because, according to this esoteric doctrine, the inward self has still not yet received the name "creation", for it is not yet separate, as it were, from the

\(^{154}\) Tīyān, p.99; Appendix II, (viii).

\(^{155}\) Cf. Literary history of Persia, III, pp.463-473.

Shāh Ni'matu'LLāh wrote in Persian, but the quotation is in Arabic.

\(^{156}\) Note that Rānīrī's quotation is incorrect: "I see God in my being [or essence] through His Being [or Essence]."
Divine Essence.\textsuperscript{157} There is, in this doctrine, therefore no question of identifying the 'being' of the creatures with that of God as Rānīrī makes it out to be. In Jāmī's Flash XXV this very same idea is expressed thus:

Rase the words 'this' and 'that'; duality Denotes estrangement and repugnancy; In all this fair and faultless universe Naught but one Substance and one Essence see.\textsuperscript{158}

Now Rānīrī knows Flash XXV very well, for without including the above quatrain he quotes it approvingly in his Jawāhiru'1-'Ulūm fī Kashfi'1-Ma'ālūm:\textsuperscript{159}

And furthermore, Shaykh Nūru'1-Dīn [36] 'Abdu'l-Rahmān Jāmī (may God sanctify his secret!), in his treatise Lawā'iḥ, says:

"The reality of Realities - that is, the Being of the Truth Most Exalted - is the Reality of all things. With regard to His Essence, He is One in Himself, and Unique, so that plurality cannot enter into Him; but by His multiple revelations and numerous determinations He is [sometimes] presented under the form of multiplicity (that is, plurality is ascribed only to His revelations and determinations)\textsuperscript{160} which are of substantial independent entities [ḥaqā'iq-i-jawhariyyah-i-matbūl'], and [at other times] under the form of accidental and dependent entities [ḥaqā'iq-i-aradiyyah-i-ṭabi'ah]. (The Essence of the Truth Most Exalted is then One and there is no multiplicity or plurality in It, multiplicity and plurality being only in the substantial and accidental entities that are visible).

This Unique Essence of God, viewed as absolute and void of all determinations and

\textsuperscript{157} See above, p. 24 and below, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{158} Lawā'iḥ, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{159} Ms. Marsden Collection, no. 12151, Library, S.O.A.S. University of London, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{160} Words in brackets are Rānīrī's comments inserted in the text."
limitations is called the 'Truth'; and viewed in Its aspect of being clothed by multiplicity and plurality that are visible, it is the whole created universe. Therefore the universe is the outward visible expression of the Truth Most exalted (that is, Its theatre of manifestation), and the Truth Most Exalted is the inner unseen reality of the universe (that is, It manifests the universe). The universe before it was made manifest to outward view was identical with the Truth Most Exalted (that is, it was That which is known to Him, for Him and in Him); and the Truth Most Exalted after the universe was made manifest is identical with the universe (that is, It manifests the universe). It becomes clear then that in reality the Truth Most Exalted alone is the One Real Being (and all that which is other than God never attains to real being, but are merely metaphorical being and [that of a] shadow). His manifestation [in the sensible world] and His concealment [in the Divine Mind], his priority and His posteriority [in point of time], are all merely His relations and His aspects. 'It is He Who is the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden.'

If Rānīrī could approve, as he does in this quotation, that the Unique Essence, "viewed in Its aspect of being clothed by multiplicity and plurality which are visible, is the whole created universe, "it is inconsistent of him not to agree with Shāh Ni'matu'Llāh and Hāmzah. Despite Rānīrī's attempts at interpreting Jāmī cautiously in his interspersed comments at crucial points of Jāmī's text, he has not succeeded in altering Jāmī's meaning to that which he apparently wants to convey. Again, quoting from the Muntahī, Rānīrī accuses Hāmzah of identifying the Creator with the

---
161. Lawā'īh, pp.41-42. See Appendix III.
creatures thus:

And furthermore he says, in interpreting the words of God: 'Every moment He is in some state' - that it means that "He in His manifestation is many and is subject to change, for He is the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden. By this it means that His Firstness is unknown, His Lastness is endless, His Manifestation is so clearly evident to perception and His Hiddenness is unknowable. He looks upon Himself through Himself, and sees Himself with His Essence, His Attributes, His Acts and His Effects. Although [these are] four in name, in reality [they are] one." Such belief is infidelity, for the Creator and the creatures are identified as being one.

This point is explained by Ḥamzah in at least two places. In one he says that everywhere in the world His Effects are manifest. It is these Effects that "give existence" to the world. Everything in the world are predispositions of His Being. By predispositions Ḥamzah means states of activity (kelakuan), so that the passage: 'Every moment He is in some state' is interpreted by him to mean that:

All forms are His Forms, all colours are His Colours, all sounds are His Sounds, for 'there is none like unto Him.'

Here Ḥamzah is expressing the idea that God, although 'immanent' in everything, is nevertheless 'transcendent' because He is above limitation and individualization. This is of course Ḥubbīl-'Arabī's concept of 'transcendence.'

163. Tīyān, pp.99-100. See Muntahā, p.121; Appendix II,(ix).
164. Asrar, pp.52-53.
165. Ibid., p.59.
166. 'Affīfi, p.19.
which, according to 'Affîfî's analysis which I quote below, is fundamentally of two different kinds:

1. That which belongs to the divine Essence per se and a se - the absolute simplicity and unity of the One - the state of the Ahadiyyah.

2. Transcendence asserted by the intellect, which must be always coupled with immanence and which may assume the following forms:
   (a) God may be called transcendent in the sense of being absolute; or,
   (b) He may be called transcendent in the sense of being a necessary being, self-begotten, self-caused, etc., in contradistinction to the contingent, created or caused beings of the Phenomenal World; or
   (c) He may be called transcendent in the sense that He is unknowable and incommunicable and beyond reproach.

In another place Hamzah speaks of the same idea thus:

According to the People of the Path, God is Eternal and Knower. Since He is the Knower, the Known is in His Knowledge, that is to say: we see that the things He creates, 'before' or 'after', are all of them from the Known. If such is the case, then it is from being that He creates them, not from absolute nothingness, for what is called "existence" is the Being of the Predispositions. As God says: 'Every moment He is in some state, 'O Seeker, because God's existential condition is like a limitless ocean. The World in its entirety is like a tiny speck of foam within it, and what avails one man to be in this tiny speck of foam? That is, it is none but as God says: 'Everything in it [i.e. the created Universe] perishes, and there remains the Face of thy Lord, the Lord of Majesty and Bounty. 'O Seeker! this world is but a wave, God's existential

condition is the sea; though wave is not the same as sea, in reality it is not distinct from the sea. 

Rānīrī continues:

And furthermore he says that "outwardly man is creature but in reality he is God." This is the belief of the Incarnationists (Ittihādiyyah).

And furthermore he says that "in reality that which is manifested and the theatre of manifestation are one and the same. "These words reveal the first step in knowing and understanding gnosis. The highest stage of gnosis is [arrived at when the gnostic attains to the final degree of Poverty:] that "perfect poverty is God indeed." What does this mean? "As the ocean, its waves and the wind; when the wind blows the waves appear from the ocean; when the wind subsides the waves return to their origin [i.e. the ocean]. This is the meaning of [the text:] 'return thou to thy origin!' Such belief is infidelity, for its being erroneous is most clearly evident.

And furthermore he says that the analogy between the creature and the Creator is "like that of the seed and the tree contained within it; although from the point of view of outward manifestation they are seen as two [entities], their reality is one. For this reason Mansūr al-Ḥallāj says: "I am the Truth!", and some others say: "I am God!"

169. Sharāb, p.18.
170. Not in the Muntahi. Hamzah does not say this.
171. Tibyān, p.100; Appendix II, (x).
174. Tibyān, p.100; Appendix II, (x).
since their unseen reality [essence] is seen by them. Further, the meaning of "when poverty is perfect, it is indeed God" is that there is none like unto poverty." Such belief is infidelity, for [101] its being erroneous is most clearly evident. 173

But, again, the accusation of error which Rānīrī levels at Ḥamzah here is unfounded. The falsehood in the charge that Ḥamzah adheres to the doctrine of incarnation has already been pointed out. 176 As to Ḥamzah's contention that "that which is manifested and the theatre of manifestation are one and the same," and that "perfect poverty is God indeed," Rānīrī ought not to have hastily condemned this if he did really represent the standpoint of the true Ṣūfīs (Wujūdiyyah Muwahhidah), 177 for what Ḥamzah affirms is indeed the view of all advanced Ṣūfīs. Jāmī, in commenting on the view of the Ṣūfīs on this point, says that:

"When one thing is manifested in another the thing manifested is different from the thing which is the theatre of the manifestation — i.e. the thing manifested is one thing and its theatre another. Moreover, that which is

175. Tībān, p.101; Appendix II, (xi).
176. See above, p. 70. Ḥamzah's rejection of the doctrine of incarnation, is so evident in his mysticism that it is surprising how Rānīrī could have been blind to this. Moreover, in several Sha'īrs Ḥamzah clearly reveals his rejection of the doctrine:

Aho segala kita yang ummat Rasūl!
Tuntut 'ilmu 'aqqīqat al-wusūl,
Kerana 'ilmu itu pada Allāh qabūl,
I'tiqādu jangan ittiḥād dan hulūl. (2016, p.67)

Again: "Man 'arafa nafsahu ... sabda Baginda Rasul Fa qad 'arafa rabbahu" tiada dengan hulūl. (2016, p.52)

177. Raniri's term, cf. above, note 129.
manifested in the theatre is the image or form of the thing manifested, not its reality or essence. But the case of the Very Being, the Absolute, is an exception, all whose manifestations are identical with the theatres wherein they are manifested, and in all such theatres He is manifested in His own essence...

The "Truth", the Very Being, along with all His modes, His attributes, connexions and relations, which constitute the real existence of all beings, is immanent in the real existence of each being.178

"Poverty" in the saying "perfect poverty is God indeed" means utter self-annihilation; an annihilation of the very state of annihilation (fanā' al-fanā'), so that there remains after such "poverty" nothing but God. On this subject too Jāmī would agree with Ḥamzah:

When poor indeed and dead to self thou'lt need
No visions, knowledge, certitude, or creed;
When self has perished naught but God remains,
For "perfect poverty is God indeed."179

It is clear that Rānīrī, instead of interpreting Ḥamzah in the light of the understanding of true Šūfīs, has underrated Ḥamzah and given a crude and vulgar interpretation - no doubt prompted, apart from his own lack of understanding of the Šūfī doctrines, by the living example of those who claimed to be Ḥamzah's disciples, but who themselves have vulgarized the original teachings through lack of understanding. Finally, concluding his review and criticism of

178. Lawā'īh, p.36. For further elucidation on this point see also pp. 35, 37.
179. Ibid., p.10. This verse is also quoted by Ḥamzah in the Asrār, p.68; and Muntahī (Javanese translation in Cod. Or. 5176(2), p.83.)
Hamzah's Muntahî, Rânîrî says:

And he says further that "according to the expression of the people of Pasai, if one is not kufr, one will not meet with kufu - [that is, by kufr] is meant in Malay "covered": [if one is not covered] one will not meet with kufu', that is to say, "equal." The meaning of equal is "nothing higher than it," meaning one becomes as one was originally when in the state of "I was a hidden treasure." O People of Faith!, consider this heretic (zândîq); he affirms of man equality with the Truth Most Exalted, that is, man is of the same nature as God. Moreover, he knows that from the point of view of outward manifestation, such belief is erroneous, and yet he still believes in this vain belief, saying that such belief is, from the point of view of esoteric knowledge, true understanding of the doctrine of Divine Unity (tawhîd). Such are his views in the book entitled Muntahî.

Rânîrî is guilty of misconception here - or is it perhaps deliberate? Rânîrî says here that Hamzah "knows that from the point of view of outward manifestation (gâhir) the belief that man is God is erroneous." This statement is, of course, true, but that Hamzah believes that man is God from the point of view of outward manifestation - in spite

180. Text: pada bahasa Jâwî ... The word Jâwî as used by the Arabs refers to the Malay people in general, and not to the Javanese unless specified. With reference to writing, Jâwî refers to the Malay-Arabic script, and with reference to language it refers to the Malay language.

181. Text: tiada lagi diatasnya, referring to a nature incomparable. In the Qur'ân God is referred to as lam yakun lahu kufu'an aḥadun (surah 112:4): 'there is none like unto Him'.

182. Muntahî, p.127.

183. Tîbîyân, p.101; Appendix II, (xii).
of the error of such belief - that is a false accusation. The fact in what Ḥamzah believes is that man, from the point of view of inward hiddenness (bāṭin) - and only from this point of view - is indeed God. The real essence of man, as of the universe together with all its parts, is God. This doctrine is accepted by all true Sufis, and it is precisely this that Ḥamzah means in the passage Rānīrī quoted. The meaning of kufr there refers to the state of man in his phenomenal existence. Man is "covered," so to speak, by the veils of phenomena and by his sensual nature - his lower sensual self (nafs). As such he regards himself as existent other than God. Slavehood and Lordship is still his lot.¹⁸⁴ But when he has purged away all the impurities that cover his true nature he will be at one with his original nature (kanzan makhfīyyan: hidden treasure, or ḥurūf ʿāliyyāt lofty letters) as Ideas in the Divine Knowledge. In this state there is no distinction between man and God. This is the state of the Throne ('Arsh) where man has not yet received the name "creation", for he is then not 'separate', as it were, from the Divine Essence (Dhāt).¹⁸⁵ It is with reference to this being "covered" by phenomena and the sensual nature that Ḥamzah quotes Junayd:

¹⁸⁴ See Asrār, pp. 70-72.
¹⁸⁵ See above, p. 24 and references in note 22.
"... Wujūduka dhanbun lā yuqāsū bihi dhanbun akharu."

"Thy existence is a sin with which no sin can be compared."

There is a play on the word kufr, in that apart from the meaning "covered" it also means "incomparable sin". The Sūfīs including Ḥamzah say that man's existence as such constitutes his own "secret polytheism" (shirk al-khafl), for he has made his own existence to be a veil concealing the Truth. But for this veil, the taint of creation, man would be at one with God, referred to in Ḥamzah's passage in question as kufū', and if he were to rend this veil asunder, he would see that he is one with God and never was 'separated'. In the sentence: "If one is not kufr one will not meet with kufū'," the mystery of the meaning revolves around the word "meet". The word "meet" implies involvement between not one but two or more; not unity but duality or plurality. Hence to one who is still "covered" by the veil of his own nature and existence, union with God is still conceived of in terms of "meeting". Such a one is still in the state of duality in relationship with God: the Slave and the Lord. If one is not "covered" there is then no question of "meeting" with

186. Asrār, p.61; Muntahi, p.118. The above saying is that of Rabil'ah al-Adawliyyah; see Lings, pp.137-138.
187. See Asrār, pp.57, 60-62; Muntahi, pp. 117-119.
188. The entire commentary of four verses in Asrār, pp. 57, 60-76, deals among others with this theme. See also ibid., pp. 77-8.
God, for as such one is God. This is the meaning of "if one is not kufur, one will not 'meet' with kufu". The same idea is expressed by Ibnu'l-'Arabî, whom Ḥamzah quotes:

"Al-ma'rifatu hijâbun bayna'l-'ârîf wa'l-ma'rûf." 189

"Knowledge [i.e. gnosis] is a veil between the knower and the known."

and:

"Law lâ'l-ma'âbbatu la'stamarra'l-wisâl." 190

"Were it not for love, 'union' would have been continuous."

and again:

"Al-ma'rifatu hijâbun lahu wa law lâ wujûdu'l-kawmâyn la'zâhara'l-'ayn." 191

"Gnosis is a veil unto Him, and were it not for the existence of the two worlds the Essence would certainly be manifest."

The quotations from Jâmî, 'Irâqî, Shiblî, 'Abbâr, Shâh Ni'matu'Llah and others which precede the passage in question in the Muntahî support my interpretation. The quotations from Bârizî, immediately preceding our problematic passage, lends even more support as it conveys an identical meaning with what I have interpreted:

189. Ibid., p.71.
190. Loc.cit.
191. Muntahî, p.128.
192. The reference here is to Being and Non-Being, Macrocosm and Microcosm.
"Bar dar dāra‘l-fanā’ kardam sujūd 
Sar bar āwardam marā rū‘ī numūd." 194

"I prostrate myself before the Door of the World of Annihilation, 
I raised my head, He showed me His Countenance!"

In my opinion this verse alludes to the episode in 'Atfar's Manṭiq al-Ṭayr, where thirty birds finally succeeded in reaching the "Valley of Annihilation" - none other than the Dār al-Fanā' referred to here. But the birds, by bewailing their condition and thinking themselves annihilated, before the Door of the Simurgh's Palace, revealed that they were still conscious of themselves and hence were not entirely annihilated. For this reason the Chamberlain, who at a propitious moment appeared before them, refused them entry. The birds had come to "meet" the Simurgh, and the Chamberlain's refusal plunged them into a state of utter hopelessness and true annihilation. It was then only, after having tested them, that the Chamberlain opened from their gaze the veils that concealed the new world beyond. Then they were given to understand the true nature of their state. Indeed, Ghazzālī's line immediately preceding Bārizī's verse in the Muntahī 195

194. Ibid., p.127. The translation of the second line of the verse in the text reads: "I raised my head: 'Show me, Lord, Thy Countenance!"

195. Fa‘l-fanā‘u ‘anī‘l-fanā‘ī ghāyata‘l-fanā‘: For annihilation from the very state of annihilation is the final goal of annihilation. Loc. cit.
clearly points to this interpretation.\textsuperscript{196}

Rānīrī's allegation that Ḥamzah adheres to the thesis of the Philosophers that God is Simple Being\textsuperscript{197} may be a reference to Ḥamzah's idea of God as the attributeless Absolute Being which he calls the Dhāt or Huwa.\textsuperscript{198} However, this idea is, for that matter, also that of Ibn-ul-'Arabī, Jīlī, and other Sūfīs.\textsuperscript{199} If it is true that Rānīrī's allegation refers to this idea (which is most likely the case although he does not mention it), then the allegation is false, for the thesis of the Sūfīs on this point\textsuperscript{200} - Ḥamzah included - is that God in His Essence is unknowable and independent of all assertions. The Essence is only known to the Divine Essence. It is in the sense that the Essence, in its bare abstraction, is beyond all knowledge and relations that He is attributeless,\textsuperscript{201} and not that it is impossible for

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{196} I may point out, in passing, that Voorhoeve, in his annotation of the text of Rānīrī's Tibyān (Twee Maleise Geschriften van Nūrūdīn ar-Rānīrī Leiden, 1955) which I have quoted above, has attempted to give an interpretation of Ḥamzah's passage in question, and Rānīrī's criticism of it, in a manner different from the one I suggest here. But in my opinion, however, Voorhoeve has completely missed the point. See Voorhoeve, P., \textit{op.cit.}, p.35.
\item\textsuperscript{197} Tibyān, p.18. For the thesis of the Philosophers that God is Simple Being, see Tahāfut, pp.235-341.
\item\textsuperscript{198} Asrār, p.22.
\item\textsuperscript{199} See the Kitāb al-ta'arruf li madhhab ahl al-taṣawwuf, by Abū Bakr al-Kalābdhī, a tenth century Sūfī of Bukhārā. English translation of the work by A.J. Arberry: The Doctrines of the Sūfis, Cambridge, 1935, See p.17 of Arberry's translation, which will hereafter be cited as Kalābdhī.
\item\textsuperscript{200} Kalābdhī, pp.14-18.
\item\textsuperscript{201} Asrār, pp.23-24.
\end{itemize}
Him to possess attributes since they would be an augmentation of His Essence. The argument of the Philosophers that God is Simple Being has its basis in their arguments against the attributes and the division into genus and specific difference. The thesis of the Sufis on this point, which is also that of Ḥamzah, is not the same as that of the Philosophers, for the Sufis do not uphold the denial of attributes. For Ḥamzah, as for other Sufis, the attributes of God are eternal and are never separate from His Essence – not because God needs them or does things with them, but because they mean the denial of their opposites and of the notion that they exist in themselves and subsist through Him. To some the attributes are neither God nor other than God. To Ḥamzah the attributes are God – or the Essence (Dhat) is the attributes (ṣifāt).

In the following passage Rānīrī accuses Ḥamzah of adhering to Qadarī views. What is interesting to note in this passage, as indeed in some others, is the manner in which he parades the 'heresies' of the Qadarīs before coming to the point: namely their belief that the Qur'ān is created, in which he also condemns Ḥamzah. In this way it would seem to me that he purposely paints the picture of the Qadarīs as

black as possible as prelude to associating Ḥamzah with this picture - a method which in modern times we know so well as the 'smear campaign':

Shahdān. Now the beliefs of the Qadariyyah. 204
They say that God wills and makes as their own [or places the burden of] the actions of His creatures. Hence the creatures are the doers of all [their] actions, although God makes manifest to them the 'do's' and 'don't's'. God in reality then does not, by virtue of His will, and His desire, and His decision, and His power, create the actions of His creatures. Such belief is infidelity, for they affirm that there is an 'other' apart from God who creates acts. Some of them refused to believe that God has attributes. 206 Some of them believe that the Qur'ān is created. 207 Such beliefs are a rejection of the truth, for as the Prophet says: "Whosoever believes that the Qur'ān is created, then he is an unbeliever." Such indeed is the belief of Ḥamzah Pangurī in the book entitled Asrāru'l-ʿArīfīn: he says that the Qur'ān which is conveyed by Gabriel may be regarded as created. 208

In the same vein he associates Ḥamzah with a sect of the Jahmiyyah: 209

The tenth sect of the Jahmiyyah is called the Lafṣiyyah. They believe and say that the one who pronounces and the thing pronounced are one and the same. [By this they mean that] the Qur'ān is God's speech, but the one who pronounces - meaning the speech that is read -

---

204. Cf. Watt, pp. 32-57, 93-129, and see E.I. article Kadariya; al-As'hari, pp. 39, 74-75.
207. Loc. cit.
208. Cf. Asrār, pp. 31-32; Tibyān, pp. 70-71; Appendix II, (xiii).
is not God's speech. This is the belief of Ḥamzah Fansūrī's [brand of] Wujūdiyyah. He says in the book Asrāru'l-'Arifīn that the speech of God conveyed by Gabriel may be regarded as a thing created. Such a belief is infidelity, for God says: 'We have sent down an Arabic Qur'ān conveyed by Gabriel [and] it is not created.'

But what Ḥamzah actually says on this subject is not really similar to what Rānīrī reports:

According to the Mu'tazilah and the Rāfiḍī and the Zindīq, the speech of God is created. According to the sharī'ah, whosoever says that the speech of God is created is an unbeliever—may God preserve us from such! God's speech is as His Essence; eternal, together with the accompanying seven [attributes]. As for the speech of God conveyed by Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad the Messenger of God, which is written in pages, it may be said to be created for the judgment concerning it is that it is already separate—from the point of view of expression—from the Essence. However in reality only God knows.

This passage cannot be regarded as an assertion that the Qur'ān in meaning and conceptual content is created. In two places he says that the Qur'ān as such is not created. Furthermore Rānīrī's authority for denouncing Ḥamzah as an

210. This is Rānīrī's translation and interpretation of the surah quoted. Tibyān, p.77; Appendix II, (xiv).
211. Asrār, pp.31-32.
212. What Ḥamzah is saying is in fact what the later Ash'arīs, in particular al-Maturīdī and his school, also maintain. Cf. Taftāzānī, pp.61-66.
213. 2016. p.56; Asrār, p.47.
infidel which he bases on the Quranic passage is false, for his translation of the text is not correct and his interpretation of it very much stretched to suit his purpose. What the text of the verse reads is actually:

Qur'ān an 'arabiyyan ghayra dhī 'iwajin la'allahum yattaqūn.

An Arabic Qur'ān without any crookedness that they may guard (against evil).

The whole context of the verses in this section of sūrah thirty-nine denotes that the Qur'ān is the guiding light, the perfect Book. Rānīrī goes on further to say in his accusation that Ḥamzah adheres to the teaching of certain sects of the Jahmiyyah, that:

The ninth sect of the Jahmiyyah is called the Zanādiqīyyah. They believe and say that the World is eternal and is also non-existent, whilst God [Who is also eternal] is not non-existent. This is the belief of Ḥamzah Faṣūrī and Shamsu’l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī and all their disciples. Such belief is infidelity, for God says: 'God is the Creator of every thing.' Shahdān. All the Ahlu’l-Sunnah wa’l-Jamā’ah agree in saying that whosoever believes that the non-existent is a thing then he is an unbeliever. They are those who are called the Ashābūl-Hayūlā, meaning those who believe that the Fixed Essences are existent beings.

Here we have a glaring example of Rānīrī's distortion of Ḥamzah's concept of the relationship between God and the Universe, or if not distortion it can only mean his ignorance.

214. 39:22, 23, 27, 28. Nowhere is it said that the Qur'ān as such is "not created".
215. Tibyān, pp. 76-77; Appendix II, (xv).
of the true nature of Ḥamzah's teachings. The belief of the Jahmiyyah to which he refers here, that the World is eternal and is also non-existent, whilst God is eternal but existent, is also the belief of certain Philosophers, Ibn Rushd being one of its famous advocates. But in this belief the assertion is that there are two eternal beings - God and the Universe. God is eternal, but He is without agent or cause; whereas the Universe, being likewise eternal, is with an agent and a cause. This is not what Ḥamzah believes. For Ḥamzah there is only one eternal being. This eternal being he conceives now as God, now the Universe. He draws no distinction between the contingent and the necessary. To him these distinctions are merely mental, not real, for the contingent in reality is the necessary coupled with a non-existent or subjective relation. The Universe, then is not created from nothing, for this would mean, in a sense, that it has acquired existence. But that Rānīrī should assert that Ḥamzah believes the non-existent to be a thing (shay'), and the Fixed Essences (/a'yānu'l-thābitah) to be existent beings in the sense the Materialists understand (i.e. as substantial reality) is absurd. The term shay' has nowhere been used by Ḥamzah in this connection. As for the a'yānu'l-thābitah, the terms Ḥamzah uses to describe them convey

meanings which make it clear to us that he does not conceive the a'yānu'l-thābitah in the superficial sense as a kind of indestructible stuff known to some philosophers as matter.  

From the philosophical point of view, the most serious charge, worthy of further attention, in Rānīrī's points against Ḥamzah is the charge of belief in the eternity of the World, and the logical consequence of denying to God His creative will. Only on the ground that this charge is true can Rānīrī brand Ḥamzah as a zindiq, for taking into consideration Ghazzālī's points in his refutation of the Philosophers, he would have said in this case that only the belief in the eternity of the World should incur upon its believers the branding of infidelity and punishment of death because of its violent opposition to Islām.  

In this chapter I have attempted to expose the true nature of Rānīrī's criticisms of Ḥamzah's teachings and his method of attack, and I have stated that, on the basis of these findings, they are based upon prejudice crowned with ignorance of the true nature of Ḥamzah's mysticism.

In the next two chapters, I shall attempt to explain Ḥamzah's cosmology, his concepts of creation and irādah respectively in connection with his alleged belief in the eternity of the World and the denial of God's creative will.

217. Cf. below, pp. 136-144.
218. Tahāfut, p. 249.
It must be pointed out that from the various quotations from _HANDLE_ which I have given in this chapter, ideas about _HANDLE_ concept of creation and God's creative will can be formed, as some of the passages quoted touch upon this very problem both implicitly and explicitly. But before we go on to this, I would like to return to _HANDLE_ point about _HANDLE_ materialistic pantheism. The fundamental issue which lies at the bottom of _HANDLE_ distortion or misconception is the question of the definition of Being. Let us examine what each of them has to say about this.

According to _HANDLE_:

Being is essence (dhāt), or the constituent determinant of a thing [i.e., quiddity]. This essence is at times perceptible to the eyes in the form of the external World or Universe, and at times not perceptible to the eyes, although it is established by the intellect ('aql) and by religion (shara'), or through mystical revelation or insight (kashf) and direct experience (dhawq). This [essence] is the Being of God.

(Handle endorsement) Rānīrī endorses his agreement with the Mutakallimūn's categorization of being into two classes: Necessary Being and Contingent Being, or Real Being and Non-Being. But he does not appear to accept the Mutakallimūn's concept in toto, for he goes on to give a definition of his own concept of being thus:

---

219. .Handle,  p.3; Appendix IV, (i).
220.  Ibid., p.4.
According to the Mutakallimīn, there are two categories of being: firstly the Being of God, and secondly the being of the Universe or World. God's Being is Necessary Being and is self-existent, and the being of the World is Possible Being; that is, it is created and externalized by God from not-being [or nothingness] ('adam). Furthermore it is dependent for its existence upon God. Thus the two beings are in reality not identical; this is so because the Being of God endures from and to all eternity and is the principle of creation, whereas the being of the Universe is ever new and is created. From their [i.e. the Mutakallimīn] definition it is clear that being is two: the one Real Being, and the other Metaphorical Being. Metaphorical Being belongs to Real Being.

According to our definition being is one; and that is the Essence of God Most Exalted. The Universe is non-existent and is not qualified to be considered as a category of being as it is Absolute Nothingness or Pure Not-Being ('adamu'1-mahd). Thus when the Universe is 'adamu'1-mahd, and the Being of God is Absolute Being (wujud'1-mahd), whence this identity of adamu'1-mahd and wujudu'1-mahd? In truth the Universe is Appearance; depending for its existence upon the Being of God. It is the theatre of manifestation of the One Real Being: the image reflected in the allegorical mirror: God's Being is likened to the looker into the glass, the World is like the form reflected therein. Thus God's Being and the Universe are neither the same nor different, for its identity or non-identity would require two entities existing per se. So when it is only the Being of God that is existent, and the Universe is non-existent, there is then no possibility for comparison. That is why we say that the Being of God and the Universe is one. Even though to outward perception the Universe exists, existence cannot be attributed to it for in itself it does not possess real being.

221. Ibid., p.3; Appendix IV, (ii).
Ranîrî concludes that the Sufîs' concept of being and that of the Mutakallimûn are in reality identical.\textsuperscript{223} This means that since he has already endorsed the Mutakallimûn's concept, he is equally endorsing the Sufîs' concept which he defines thus:

The Sufîs too based their view upon the rational faculties and Tradition, but they added to this also mystical revelation or insight (kashf), and direct experience (dhawq). They saw with the eyes of the internal perception and experienced the existence of only One Real Being — and that is Allâh — Who is imperceptible to the eyes in this World, for that which is perceptible [to the eyes] does not possess real being as does Allâh. God's Being is Real Being and Absolute, and the being of the Universe is metaphorical and [a thing] determined; it is the shadow of God's Being. Of this shadow existence cannot be predicated; nor can absoluteness be attributed to this nothingness, for if it exists, then it would mean that the Universe is identical with God; and if its nothingness were absolute then it would mean that the Universe is nothing whatsoever. Yet the Universe is perceptible; so it is clear that the Universe is a manifestation of the Being of the Truth Most Exalted. The relationship between God and the Universe then is neither that of identity nor that of non-identity, for the Universe is a manifestation of, and belongs to God.\textsuperscript{224}

Having seen Ranîrî's version of the Mutakallimûn's and Sufîs' concepts of being, and taking note that he endorses both, it is most inconsistent for him, in his own concept of being, to assert that the Universe cannot be "considered as a category of being" on the grounds that it is "Absolute

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid., pp.6-7.
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid., p.6. Appendix IV, (iv).
"Nothingness" or "Pure Not-Being", for such a concept of Universe is held neither by the Mutakallimūn nor by the Ṣūfīs. The mumkin'1-wujūd of the Mutakallimūn is not equivalent to the 'adamu'l-maḥd of Rānīrī, for by this they mean a being which is logically possible; and for them everything is logically possible except the logically impossible. The term is regarded as synonymous with jā'izu'l-wujūd (Contingent Being). Rānīrī's meaning of the term 'adamu'l-maḥd comes under the category of impossible being - that is a being that has no existence in any category of being. Rānīrī therefore contradicts himself when he says that the World, already defined by him as "Pure Not-Being" is also the "theatre of manifestation of the One Real Being." He does not seem to be aware of this contradiction. As for the Ṣūfīs' concept of the World, Rānīrī himself says that they do not conceive the World to be Pure Not-Being ('adamu mutlaq = 'adamu'l-maḥd); it is not absolute nothingness as Rānīrī believes, for if its nothingness were absolute, then it would not exist at all for God to manifest Himself. Furthermore Rānīrī says that the being of the World is neither identical nor non-identical with that of God. This implies that the World somehow exists and is not entirely Pure Not-Being, for if it does not exist (being Pure Not-Being) then even the allusion to its being neither identical nor non-identical with God is inapplicable. Thus in spite of
his emphasis on absolute negation of comparison between God and the World, Rānīrī in fact makes the comparison.

In the case of Ḥamzah the question of comparison does not arise for he draws no distinction between the contingent and the necessary. Rānīrī, on the other hand, makes a real distinction between God's Being and that of the World, whereas for Ḥamzah the distinction which Rānīrī considers real is merely mental: the being of the World is imaginary (waḥmī); it is in reality God's Being plus a non-existent subjective relation. In this sense Ḥamzah's is a truer interpretation of the Ṣūfī concept of the World. Thus he says:

The Essence of God and His Being is one;  
His Being and the being of the Universe is one;  
the being of the Universe and the Universe is one; the like of which is, as it were, its [i.e. the sun's] light; different only in name but not in truth. To external perception it is one; to the eye of the internal perception it is also one. So is the being of the Universe in relation to God's Being - it is one; for the Universe considered independently does not exist. Although outwardly it exists it is [nothing] but Appearance and not Reality; like the image [reflected] in the mirror, though possessing form, does not possess real being.

A comparison of Ḥamzah's definition of being with that of Rānīrī reveals that there is no real distinction between the real content of what they conceive as being. Differences between what they say are those of expression. Ḥamzah as a Ṣūfī begins his definition or conceives being from the point

of view of the Absolute, whereas Rānīrī, whom I consider not as a Sūfī but as a representative of religious officialdom, begins his definition from the relative point of view. The conclusion arrived at by both is identical: that there is only One Real Being. However, Rānīrī seems to have interpreted Ḥamzah's conception of the relationship between God and the Universe as one which resembles that of the heretical Wujūdiyyah which he explains thus:

According to the heretical Wujūdiyyah, being is one; and that is the Being of God. This Unique Being of God does not exist by Itself by which It can be distinguished save in relation to the creatures. Hence the creatures are God's Being and the Being of God is the being of the creatures. The World is then God, and God is the World. In this way they affirm that the Being of God Who is Unique is completely immanent in the being of all the creatures, and they say that nothing exists but God.226

But what Ḥamzah means when he says that "the Essence of God and His Being is one; His Being and the being of the Universe is one, etc." is not that there are two entities existing per se identified as one as Rānīrī believes. In Ḥamzah's definition, apart from God's Being which is also that of His Essence, all other similar terms such as the 'being' of the Universe, and so forth, are to be taken in the metaphorical sense. Ḥamzah himself gives us his explanation on this point:

According to the 'Ulama' of the Prescribed Law, the judgment concerning the Essence of God and His Being is that they are two; [similarly],

226. Hujjah, pp. 9-10; Appendix IV, (v).
the being of Knowledge and Knower are two; the being of the Universe and the Universe are two; the being of the Universe is different from the Being of God. The Essence of God and His Being is like the sun and its light; although they are one to external and internal perception, the judgment is that they are two; the sun is different from its light.

As to the Universe, the reason why it is said that its being is different [from that of God], is because the Universe is like the moon deriving its light from the sun. This is the reason why the 'Ulamā' say: "The being of the Universe is different from the Being of God. God's Being and His Essence are different."

The People of the Path say: "If this is the case, then God can be referred to as being 'outside' or 'in' [the Universe]; or 'near' the Universe or 'far' from it." To us, the Essence of God and His Being is one; His Being and the being of the Universe is one ...

In reality the 'Ulamā' and the People of the Path are in complete agreement with respect to the Essence. Although the Essence can be expressed in words, in reality expression falls short of the truth, for It is not 'above', It is not 'below', It is not 'before', It is not 'after', It is not to 'the right', It is not to 'the left', It is not 'far', It is not 'separate', It is not 'joining' [It is] without 'how' or 'what'; without 'whither' [i.e. being at a place], without 'where' [i.e. being to a place], without 'now', without a 'twinkling of an eye', without 'instant', without 'time'; It does not 'become', nor is It 'becoming'; It is not a 'place' nor has It a 'place', as the Messenger of God says: "There 'was' only God, no thing ['was'] with Him." Shaykh Junayd al-Baghdādī (God's mercy be upon him!) says: "He is now as He was then." God says: 'Glory be to God! Who cannot be described'; and God says further: 'There is no thing like unto Him' [the interpretation of] which means: not one single thing which we discuss with our hearts and

227. See above, p.100.
with our knowledge attains to knowledge of Him. Our knowledge is not [of] the Essence; [it is of] the Existence of the Essence and Its Modes. This is why the People of the Path say: "The Essence and Its Existence is one, but in reality none may reach the Essence. Let alone the general masses [of the Faithful], even the Saints, Prophets, and Archangels may not reach It.

The cardinal point about the distinction between the heretical and the true Wujūdiyyah is, as Ṣārīrī rightly explains, that with the former, though they too assert that there is only one being which is the Being of God, "this Absolute Being of God does not exist by Itself by which It can be distinguished save in relation to the creatures." What Ḫamzāh says in the passage quoted is self-evident in denouncing such a belief. Ḫamzāh clearly says that God is Self-subsistent; that He is logically prior to all other beings, which means that His existence is not determined by His relation to the creatures.

Another important point in connection with this problem is the identification of essence and existence as one and the same thing. Ṣārīrī says:

It is clear that according to the definition of the Sufis, existence and real essence are, in point of meaning, one and

---

229. Ṣārīr, pp. 25-27. This passage conveys a striking resemblance with one found in the opening pages of the Kitāb’l-Ajwibah of ‘Abdu’Llāh al-Balyanī, a younger contemporary of ibnu’l-‘Arabī. This work is also known under the titles of Risālatu’l-Abadiyyah and Kitābu’l-Alif, Alif, and in some manuscripts is ascribed to ibnu’l-‘Arabī. An English translation of the work is given by H. Weir in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1901.
the same; and that is the Essence of God. The meaning of the Sūfīs' definition of the real essence [of a thing] is that: 'Essence is what makes a thing what it is' - that is - the thing from which a thing becomes; and this 'thing' [or essence] is reality. As for example, the reality [or essence] of the pot is the wheel, and the reality [or essence] of the boat is its maker. According to the definition of the Logicians: 'Essence is what makes a thing what it is as rationality is to man' - that is - the essence of man is his rationality. It is evident that the meaning of the Logicians' definition [of the term essence] is quiddity. The differences between the endeavours of the Mutakallimūn and the Sūfīs in their affirmation of God's Being and that of the Universe, are differences in expression, not in meaning; as people say 'fifteen' and 'twenty minus five'. The meaning is identical though the expression is not.

All that Rānīrī says here is confused and his conclusion is false. In the first instance Rānīrī makes an effort to reconcile the Mutakallimūn's definition of essence with that of the Sūfīs by incorporating both, the premises of the former and the conclusion of the latter, into an amalgam. The Mutakallimūn would in fact define essence thus:

The real essence (al-haqīqatu) of a thing and its quiddity (al-mahiyyatu) are that which constitutes the identity of a thing (mā bihi'l-shai'u huwa huwa), as is exemplified by the application of the term "rational (nātīq) animal" to man in contrast to the application of the terms "laughing animal" and "writing animal"; in which case it is possible to conceive of man as not being described by the terms "laughing" and "writing", inasmuch as they [laughing and writing] are

230. I would have thought, in order to be consistent, that the reality of the pot should be the Potter, not the wheel!

231. Ḥujjah, pp.6-7; Appendix IV, (vi).
accidents. And it may be said further that that which constitutes the identity of a thing is, with respect to its being individ­ualized, it is a certain particular thing (huwiyyah), but without respect to either of these it is a quiddity.

From this it is clear that according to the Mutakallimūn's point of view the real essence of the pot is not the potter, nor that of the boat the maker; but that the real essence of the pot is the clay which is ultimately reducible to particles which cannot be further divided, and the real essence of the boat is the combination of wood and iron and so forth, all of which is also ultimately reducible to their respective atoms. The Mutakallimūn - the later Ash'arīs - conceive the Universe to be a series of accidents created by God, but their theory of the Universe itself is atomistic, as the following passage shows:

According to the Ash'arite school of thinkers, the, the world is compounded of what they call jawāhir - infinitely small parts or atoms which cannot be further divided. Since the creative activity of God is ceaseless the number of the atoms cannot be finite. Fresh atoms are coming

into being every moment, and the universe is therefore constantly growing. As the Qur'ān says: "God adds to His creation what He wills." The essence of the atom is independent of its existence. This means that existence is a quality imposed upon the atom by God. Before receiving this quality the atom lies dormant, as it were, in the creative energy of God, and its existence means nothing more than Divine energy become visible. The atom in its essence therefore has no magnitude; it has its position which does not involve space. It is by their aggregation that atoms become extended and generate space.

It is clear here that the Mutakallimūn assert that the atom in its essential nature is independent of its existence, although it will remain as such only as long as the accidents occur. If God ceases to create the accidents, the atoms will cease to exist as such. From this two propositions arise: firstly, as a result of the accidents which are perpetually changed and renewed, nothing has a stable nature; secondly, atoms exist independently in order that the accidents may act upon them. The Šūfīs wholeheartedly accepted the first proposition, but they violently disagreed, on the other hand, with the Mutakallimūn's assertion that numerous substances - atoms - exist independently upon which the accidents depend. The Mutakallimūn have defined an accident as a being which is not independent and self-existent, but depends for its existence on other accidents, or on essence or substance. The

233. Iqbal, M., Six lectures on the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, Lahore, 1930, p.95. Cf.also Taftāzānī, p.xxv.
Sufis, however, believe that the Mutakallimun's theory of accidents is contradictory, for while asserting that accidents depend upon the atoms in order to occur, they have failed, according to the Sufis, to see that the atoms, which they have put into the category of essence, will cease to exist if the accidents cease to exist. Thus both are in reality interdependent, and since the atoms themselves are continuously prevailed upon by the accidents, it can be said that there never was a time when the atoms are free of accidents. From the point of view of the Sufis, nothing exists per se, other than the One Real Being, underlying all existence. According to Jamâ, the accidents do not pertain to the atoms, but to a "single substance" – the Reality upon which depends all existence and which is the cause of all existence:

They [i.e., the Mutakallimun] have not grasped the fact that the universe, together with all its parts, is nothing but a number of accidents, ever changing and being renewed at every breath, and linked together in a single substance, and at each instant disappearing and being replaced by a similar set. In consequence of this rapid succession, the spectator is deceived into the belief that the universe is a permanent existence. The Ash'aris themselves declare this when expounding the succession of accidents in their substances as involving continuous substitution of accidents, in such wise that the substances are never left wholly void of accidents similar to those which have preceded them.

The "single substance" Jāmī speaks of is God Who reveals Himself, but never during two consecutive moments, in the myriad forms of the various grades of being making them manifest to the senses. The Truth (al-Ḥaqiq), or God, is not to be identified with these variegated forms of phenomena that make up the universe of change. It is that all-pervasive, all-persistent essence of these myriad grades of being. Here then we come to the Sūfīs' definition of essence. Jāmī says:

When one defines man as a "rational animal"; and animal as a "growing and sentient body, possessed of the faculty of voluntary movement"; and body as "a substance possessing three dimensions"; and substance as an "entity which exists per se and is not inherent in any other subject"; and entity as "an essence possessed of reality and necessary being"—all the terms used in this definition come under the category of "accidents", except this vague essence which is discerned behind these terms. For "rational" signifies an essence endowed with reason; "that which is growing" signifies an essence endowed with the faculty of growth; and so on. 235

Jāmī goes on to affirm that this vague essence is in fact the Truth, the Very Being—God.

To return to Rānīrī, it should be clear by now that his assertion that the differences of the Mutakallimūn and that of the Sūfīs in their affirmation of God's Being and that of the Universe are merely those in expression and not in meaning, is false for there is a real difference in what

235. Lawā'īḥ, p.33.
they mean and conceive; and this real difference has its roots in their conception of the nature of the real essence of things. But Rānīrī ignores— or does he not see?—this real distinction between the Mutakallimūn's and Sūfīs' point of view, for in spite of this he says:

All the Sūfīs and the Mutakallimūn are in concerted agreement in asserting that: "The world together with all its parts is nothing but a series of accidents; and that of which they are accidents is God." The meaning of 'accident' in their terminology is: "An accident [is a thing that] does not endure two instants of time." The meaning of 'that upon which the accidents depend' is God's Being, Eternal, Beginningless. He is the self-subsistent One, and He is the One Who gives subsistence to others. Hence the World is not fit to be categorized as 'being'—it is called 'darkness', 'not-being', 'false', 'imagination' and 'mirage'; it is nothing but a shadow.

When that the World is such— that is its existence cannot be categorized as 'being' even though it is perceptible—it cannot then be an other existent apart from God the Exalted. This is the reason why they say that God and the Universe is one. They do not intend it to mean that the World and God are one being and identical. This is why they say that God and the Universe are neither the same nor different, for their identity and non-identity would require two entities existing per se. It [i.e. the Universe] belongs to God.

236. Ṛānīrī's note: The accidents change, come in succession, and disappear. Others like them come and replace them at each breath and instant. Cf. Lawā'īh, p.30.

237. Raniri's note: The reason why the World is not-being [or not-thing] is because it never becomes a real thing at each breath of its appearance, but it is a thing insofar only as God creates it.

238. Ḥujjah, pp.21-22. Appendix IV, (vii).
From all this (1) one cannot help but come to the conclusion that Rānīrī is in fact saying the same thing as what Ḥamzah has more clearly said. It has revealed to us a Rānīrī who is in that difficult situation of wanting to be both a Mutakallim and a Ṣūfī at the same time, and who, deceiving himself into the belief that he has reconciled the two, actually pays his respects to and shows due reverence for the latter.
CHAPTER III
HAMZAH'S METAPHYSICS AND TEACHINGS

Since the attack directed against him by Rānīrī, Ḥamzah has been regarded as a false Šūfī - in fact a 'heretic' (zindiq). But was he what Rānīrī would have us believe of him? In the preceding chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that Rānīrī's accusations of 'heresy' against Ḥamzah were really not founded upon learned and critical analyses of his works; that Rānīrī did not represent his thoughts and teachings faithfully and truly at all. I have also pointed out that the most serious charge that merits attention is ultimately focused upon Ḥamzah's alleged belief in the eternity of the world - together with the logical consequence of that belief, namely: the question as to whether God is the Agent (Rā'il) and Maker (Ṣāni') of the world in the sense al-Ghazzālī means;239 or the world comes into being by virtue of necessity, which would negate the idea that God is its Agent and Maker. Another important charge closely connected with the one mentioned is that of 'pantheism' - a charge to which Šūfism itself has been

subjected by Western orientalists.\textsuperscript{240} In this chapter I propose to give a detailed summary of the salient features of Ḥamzah's mysticism - his metaphysics and teachings - which have a bearing upon the relevant points in question, in this case, the relationship between God and the Universe or World.

(a) \textbf{Aspects of Oneness}

According to Ḥamzah when the Throne ('\textit{Arsh}),\textsuperscript{241} Heaven and Hell, and the entire Universe together with all its parts were yet dormant, concealed in non-existence, the Essence (\textit{Dhāt}) dwelt in solitude without Names and Attributes, signless. This Essence is called \textit{Huwa} (He), and this is Its highest Name.\textsuperscript{242} The Name \textit{Allāh} is the all-embracing Name,\textsuperscript{243} for \textit{Allāh} is the Name in which all Divine Names and Attributes are comprised in the same manner as \textit{Muḥammad} is the name of

\textsuperscript{240} All Western scholars who in some way or other studied Ḥamzah's mysticism have never failed to label it pantheistic.

\textsuperscript{241} Cf. Ibnul-'Arabī's concepts of '\textit{Arsh} in 'Affīfī, pp.63, 66, 82. See also above, p.24.

\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Huwa} as such corresponds to Jill's \textit{al-'Amā}; see Studies, pp.83, 94–95. For an interpretation of \textit{al-'Amā}, see ibid., p.95, note 1.

\textsuperscript{243} Ḥamzah says that the Name Allāh is "a step 'lower in grade' than \textit{Huwa}" (\textit{Asrār}, p.22), but it is important to note that he does not mean by this any humiliation applied to Allāh, since Allāh includes the Essence. What Ḥamzah means is that \textit{Huwa} is the secret of Allāh; the inward aspect of Allāh. See Jill's explanation of this. Insānu'l-Kamil, I, p.97. Furthermore Ḥamzah says that \textit{Huwa} is not an Essential Name (\textit{ism dhatiyyah}), but applied only symbolically as the Essence (\textit{ism ishārah}). See also \textit{Asrār}, p.48.
a person comprising his other names by which he may be called: if he possesses knowledge, he is called knower; if he writes, he is called writer; if he trades, he is called trader - and so on and so on. Thus Allāh, Glorious and Exalted, in virtue of His creating is called Creator (Khāliq); of His providing His creatures is called Provider (Rāziq) - and so forth.244

Now when He exists by Himself as Essence, He is Necessary Being (wājibu‘l-wujūd), for He is Self-Existent and is the Cause of all existence. 'Cause' here should not be understood in the Philosophers' sense of the term, rather in al-Ghazzālī's sense of the term - as a cause in the special sense - that is, that brought about by a willing Agent.245 It is emphasized that He is Necessary Being because He gives existence (memberi wujūd) to the creatures.246 From Ḥamzah's point of view, the Doctors of Theology ('Ulamā') teach that God's Being (Existence) and His Essence are two different entities, just as - according to Ḥamzah - they also assert that Knowledge and Knower are not identical. Similarly the Doctors of Theology maintain that the Being of God and the being of the Universe are not one and the same. They demonstrate their assertion by employing the metaphor of the sun and its light which, though to internal and external

245. Consult Chapter IV.
perception are one and the same thing, nevertheless remain two different things in reality. Ḥamzah argues that if this were so, then it could be said of God that He is 'situated' in a spatio-temporal system with respect to the Universe - which is absurd. For Ḥamzah the 'relationship' between God and the Universe is merely metaphorical. Since God alone is the only Reality, how can there be a relationship? But God is not identical with the Universe. We predicate of Him transcendence (tanzīh) and immanence (tashībīh) in respect of the predispositions (shu'ūn) we attribute to His Being. The Universe is a reflection of the predispositions of His Being - it is the effects (āthār) of His creative activity (shu'ūn). Hence it is said that:

That which we perceive, whether outwardly or inwardly, all disappear - they are as waves. The ocean is not 'separate' from its waves, and the waves are not 'separate' from the ocean. In like manner God, Glorious and Most Exalted is not 'separate' from the World. But He is neither 'in' the world nor 'outside' it; neither 'above' nor 'below' it; neither to the 'right' nor to the 'left' of it; neither in 'front' of nor 'behind' it; neither 'separate' from nor 'joined' to it ... Ḥamzah maintains that the endeavours of the Doctors of Theology to expound the relationship between God and the Universe in the metaphorical terms they adopt, is fraught with imperfections and may lead to absurd conclusions, for

248. Ibid., p. 55.
analogy cannot reach the Pure Essence. He emphasizes that the views of the Doctors of Theology with regard to this problem and those of the People of the Path (Ahlu’l-Sulûk), to which he subscribes, are in fact identical. 249 In Itself the Essence is transcendent:

The Essence, although It can be conceived in terms of symbolical expression is, in Its innermost nature, beyond knowledge, for It cannot be conceived. Although It is One, there is no oneness [to Its Oneness]; and although It is Single, there is no singleness [to Its Singleness]. We predicate of It attributes, essence and names merely as symbolical expressions. 250

What Ḥamzah means to say is not different from what Ḥibnu’l-’Arabī means when he says:

Sublimity (‘uluww) 251 belongs to God alone. The essences (a’yān) of things are in themselves non-existent, deriving what existence they possess from God, Who is the real substance (‘ayn) of all that exists. Plurality consists of relations (nisāb), which are non-existent things. There is really nothing except the Essence, and this is sublime (transcendent) for itself, not in relation anything, but we predicate of the One Substance a relative sublimity (transcendence) in respect of the modes of being attributed to it: hence we say God is (huwa) and is not (lā huwa). 252

Following Ḥibnu’l-’Arabī and Jīlī’s more systematic scheme

249. Loc. cit.
250. Ibid., pp.48-49; also pp. 26-27.
251. Note the identity in Ḥibnu’l-’Arabī’s ‘uluww and Ḥamzah’s ’aliyy which the latter used as heading for the passage just quoted (Aṣrār, p.48).
252. Studies, p.152.
of the process of "self-diremption" ascribed to the Absolute, Ḥamzah says:

Know that the Innermost Essence of the Truth, Glorious and Exalted is called by the People of the Path 'indeterminacy' (lā ta'ayyun). It is called indeterminacy because our intelligence and skill in verbal exposition, knowledge (ʿilm) and gnosis (maʿrifah), are unable to reach It. Let alone our knowledge and gnosis, even the Prophets and the Saints are struck with awe of It. Hence the Prophet (God bless him and give him peace!) says: "Glory be to Thee! we cannot really know Thee." And the Prophet (God bless him and give him peace!) says further: "Contemplate upon God's creation, and not upon His Essence." This is why the People of the Path call this [Essence] indeterminate, meaning: non-manifest.

The first [stage of] determinacy is four-fold: Knowledge (ʿilm), Being (wujūd), Sight (shuhūd) and Light (nūr). All these four are called the 'first determination' (taʿayyun awwal), for by virtue of Knowledge, the Knower and the Known become manifest; by virtue of Being, That which causes to be and That which becomes are manifest; by virtue of Sight, the Seer and the Seen become manifest; by virtue of Light, the Illuminator and the Illuminated become manifest. All these - the Knower and the Known, the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden - acquire their names in [the stage of] the first determination.  

The Known is called by the People of the Path the Fixed Essences (al-aʿyānuʿl-thābitah). Some call it the Reality of Things (al-haqiqatuʿl-ashyā'), some call it the Cognitive Forms (al-suwaruʿl-ilmīyyah), and others call it the Relational Spirit (ruḥ ʾidāfī). All these are the 'second determination' (taʿayyun-thānī).

---


254. Cf. Lawāʾiḥ, Flash XVI.
The human spirit (rūḥ ḫanṣānī), the animal spirit (rūḥ ḫayawānī) and the vegetal spirit (rūḥ nabātī) are the 'third determination' (taʾayyun thālith).

The 'fourth' and 'fifth' determinations (taʾayyun rābi' and taʾayyun khāmis) are determinations ad infinitum encompassing the realm of physical things in its entirety, comprising the whole universe and all created things [therein].

Determinations never cease to occur and are without limit; but Knowledge, Being, Sight and Light are never separate from them all, for without these four the Possessor of these determinations would find self-determination impossible. This is why the People of the Path say that the being of the entire Universe is the Being of God. The world's being, though perceived as existing, nevertheless does not possess existence for it derives its existence from the Determinate Being (wujūd mutaʾāyyin). Our lack of awareness makes us believe that the world has being.

The first determination may be called both Transcendent One (ahad) or Immanent One (wāḥid). When we regard the Essence by itself, it is called ahad, but when we regard the Essence together with all its Attributes and Names then it is called wāḥid, for ahad is wāḥid [insofar as it] sustains the Universe from its beginning to its end.

Employing poetic imagery, Ḥamzah compares the Pure Essence, dwelling signless without Names or Attributes, to the motionless Ocean of Indeterminacy. The noonday brightness of human intellect is unable to venture into or fathom.

this Ocean — It is even beyond gnosis. The Pure Essence is said to determinate Itself by descents (tanazzulāt) which It accomplishes in six stages (martabat); journeying from and returning to Itself completing a full cycle. The first stage of descent, which corresponds to the first determination, is whereby the Pure Essence becomes individualized, as it were, in the fourfold determinacy which comprises Knowledge, Being, Sight and Light. This individualization is the outward aspect of the Pure Essence and it occurs in the plane of abstract oneness (ahadiyyah). When the Pure Essence or Absolute Being, Who by virtue of Knowledge becomes the Knower, gazes upon His own Perfection, the Ocean (by way of analogy) heaves and waves appear and begin to surge and churn. The waves are not separate from the Ocean in much the same manner as the phenomenon is not separate from the noumenon. These waves are the Fixed Essences which are contained in the Divine Essence where there is no distinction. This stage of the Knower, when God looks upon Himself, is the stage of the Fixed Essences and it is the second descent (determination) occurring in the plane of unity in plurality (wahidiyyah). The third descent (determination) is whereby the Fixed Essences are imbued with the Relational Spirit. The Relational Spirit, which has already been identified with the Fixed Essences, the Reality of Things and the Cognitive Forms,256 is also sometimes

256. See above, p. 116.
identified with the Light of Muḥammad (nūr Muḥammad), the Universal Intellect (al-ʿāql-al-kullī), the Highest Pen (al-qalam al-ʿalā) or the Guarded Tablet (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūz). At this stage the Relational Spirit 'emerges', as it were, from the Divine Essence - the waves of the Ocean subside and evaporate. Here occur particularizations into human, animal and vegetal spirits; and the vapours that gather in the sky forming clouds are allusions to the Pure Potentialities (isti'dād aṣlī) in the Fixed Essences (Relational Spirit) at the point of bursting forth into actuality. The fourth and fifth stages of descents (determinations) are the materialization of spirits into the World of Matter. These descents, in which stages the Relational Spirit (Light of Muḥammad) and the Fixed Essences actualize their Potentialities through the Divine Command: 'Be!', are symbolized in the analogy of the clouds bursting forth into rain; and the reaction to the Divine Command by the Relational Spirit, Fixed Essences and their Potentialities is symbolized by the analogy of rain falling upon the earth where the drops become water flowing in rivers. It is only 'then' - i.e. 'after' the Divine Command - that the Relational

257. Asrār p.41.
258. The reference here is to what some Sūfīs, particularly Jīlī, call Ḥayūla. Jīlī explained what Ḥayūla is in the 57th chapter of his Insānu’l-Kāmil, of which Nicholson has partly translated. See Studies, pp.91-92; also 99, 106, 123.
Spirit (Light of Muhammad) 'separates' from the Divine Essence; the Creator becomes distinguished from the creatures who now receive the name "creation". In the same manner as the souls become reintegrated in the Spirit, so the rivers flow back into the Absolute Ocean which never shrinks or grows vaster, though its waves are ever ebbing and flowing. Thus the cycle is complete.

The following is my outline of ʿAbd al-Qadir ʿAbdu'llah ʿAbdu'llah Hamzah's schema of ontological descent:

A. The Absolute, the Innermost or Unique Essence (Kunhi Dhat, Dhat Semata).
   a) Inward aspect: Huwa, the Name alluding to the Essence without Attributes.
   b) Outward aspect: Allāh, the sum of all Names and Attributes.

B. Absolute Oneness (Ahadiyyat Mutlaq).
   a) Inward aspect: Transcendent One (ahad)
   b) Outward aspect: Immanent One (wahid)

   First descent and fourfold determinacy: Knowledge, Being, Sight, Light. Individualization of creatures in the Divine Knowledge in a transcendental manner without any differentiation. The Fixed Essences, the Relational Spirits, the Reality of Muhammad.

C. Unity in Plurality (wahidiyyah)
   a) The Fixed Essences, also called the Relational Spirit, the Reality of Things, the Cognitive Forms.

Second descent corresponding to second

260. Asrâr, pp.57-58; Sharâb, pp.15-17.
261. ʿAbd al-Qadir ʿAbdu'llah ʿAbdu'llah Hamzah's Allāh here must be regarded as identical with Jili's. See Studies, pp.97-98.
determination and the station of the Throne where the creatures synthetically and virtually exist.

b) The Fixed Essences (Relational Spirit, also called the Light of Muhammad, the Highest Pen, the Guarded Tablet). Third descent (determination) corresponding to the station of the Footstool where the creatures are manifested analytically as potential existents. (al-α'yānu'l-kharijiyyah)

c) The Highest Pen imprints the creatures' forms of existence on the Guarded Tablet. The Divine Command: 'Be!' Creator and creatures become distinguished. The Light of Muhammad separates from the Divine Essence. Fourth descent (determination).

d) Materialization of spirits into the World of Matter. Fifth descent (determination).

It appears to me doubtful whether one can say with definite certainty thatHAMZAH'S system is identical with the Neo-Platonic system of emanations, for there seems to be some distinction between emanationism and this doctrine of ontological devolution peculiar to the Sūfīs. Even the interpreters of Plotinus are vague about the meaning of 'emanation' in Plotinus, and their interpretations are at variance with one another. In my opinion, it is therefore merely a conjecture to equate the Sūfī ta'ayyun, tanazzul and taraqqī with the Plotinian triad: mone, prōodos and epistrophe,262 for in the system of emanations propounded by

Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists, the emanations emanate in progressive deterioration. They become worse and worse, so to speak, as they emanate away from the Source. Further God, the Source, remains transcendent, as it were, and not present in the emanations that go down in a descending order; the higher creating the lower, and the lower reflecting the being and perfection of the higher. If God were not present in the emanations, the latter would then have acquired independent existence. The Šūfī interpretation of the doctrine subscribed to here by Ḥamzah is that the 'emanations' do not progressively deteriorate as they 'emanate' away from the Source, for God Himself 'descends' with 'them' in a series of descents; and He does so in such a manner that we can ascribe to Him neither transcendence nor immanence with respect to His 'emanations'. In fact there are no emanations in Ḥamzah's system, but only manifestations (tajalliyāt). The 'descent' of the Absolute is nothing but the various ways in which He manifests Himself to us in the course of our knowledge of Him, not in terms of emanations. Another important distinction which seems to exist between the Plotinian doctrine of emanation


264. 'Affīfī, p. 61.
and the Şūfī doctrine of manifestation subscribed to here by Ḥamzah is that in the doctrine of emanation creation is conceived of as a necessity: excluding any voluntary action on the part of the Creator. It would follow then that God is merely the cause of existence inasmuch as the word cause is understood in the Philosophers' sense of the term. The Universe is eternal, in the sense that it had no temporal beginning and will have no temporal ending. According to Ḥamzah, taking his queue from the Şūfīs, creation presupposes voluntary action on the part of the Creator. The Universe as such cannot be said to exist eternally with God, for it has no existence - it is, to use Jāmī's terms, "A series of accidents," and God's dynamic activity annihilates it after duplicating it and creates another anew. Ḥamzah agrees with the Doctors of Theology that the World as such is a thing created and not eternal. This he says clearly:

Actually the Doctors of Theology and the People of the Path agree that the World is created; the judgement being that it is

265. The concept of the Divine Will is vague in Plotinus (see Inge, I, pp. 143-145; II, 112-115. There seems to be no equivalent in Plotinus of the Şūfī concept of the Creative Will (iradah) and the Creative Word (kun).
266. See below, chapter IV.
267. Lawā'ih, pp. 30 foll.
268. Asrār, pp. 98, 102.
something new (ḥādīth), for it comes into existence (muzahir) by virtue of the Divine Command: 'Be!' It must not be said that [the World] is eternal.

(b) The world of created things.

When Ḥamzah says that God's Being and the Being of the Universe are one and the same, he means by 'being' what all Sufis mean according to their doctrine of Oneness of Being (wahdatul-wujud). Awhadu'l-Dīn Kirmānī, a Sufi of the thirteenth century, puts this doctrine in a nutshell when he says:

Absolute Being only wise men call Being, and nought save God exists at all. That which existent but through God became Is NOT in truth, but only IS in name.

'Name' in Sufī terminology may refer either to something existent or non-existential; in the former case it refers to the Essence, that is, Pure Being (God) and also to Being 'joined' to not-being (the world of created things); in the latter case it refers to a non-existent entity like Jīlī's fabulous bird called 'Anqa. The Universe per se is a non-existent entity, and 'name' mentioned in Awhadu'l-Dīn's

269. i.e. temporal, events.
270. Asrar, p. 35.
271. Ibid., p. 25.
273. Cf. Insanu'l-Kāmil I, p. 21; see also Studies, pp. 83, 93. Also mentioned in Hamzah, 2016, p. 56; Shabistari, p. 69.
verse refers to the Universe as such. The Şūfī conception of
the Universe tallied to a certain extent with that of the
Idealists in that the Fixed Essences (al-a'yānu'l-thābitah),
insofar as they are viewed as reflected in the Universal
Intellect (al-'aqlu'l-kullī), are ideas or archetypes which
Plato compares to real objects, in his parable of the cave,
of which only the shadows of the images are perceived.²⁷⁴
The Şūfīs also hold the same view as the Ash'arī Mutakallimūn,
whose conception of the Universe is atomistic, but they
reject the Mutakallimūn assertion that the atom, in its
essential nature, is independent of its existence and there-
fore does not come under the category of accidents.²⁷⁵ The
Universe, then, can be viewed under two aspects: as an empty
name when it is considered per se, but when considered as
not-being 'joined' to Being, it is no mere delusion having
no objective reality underlying it; it is then the Truth
(al-Haqq), in the aspect of God as Creator, Who 'clothes'
Himself, so to speak, with the myriad forms of the various
grades of being making them manifest to the senses. Jāmī
speaks of this 'Truth' as the "single substance",²⁷⁶ the

²⁷⁴. See the Dialogues of Plato, translated by Benjamin
Jowett, Great books of the Western World, 7, Chicago,
1952, the Republic, Book VII. See also Lawā'īh, p.31.
²⁷⁵. See above pp.104-108. For an account of Ash'arī atomism,
see Majīd Fākhry, op.cit., pp.22-48; Studies, p.154.
substratum whereby the accidents, including the atoms of the scholastic theologians, have their *locus*. It is identical with the "essence" of manifestation, not with the manifestation itself. This 'Truth', interpreted as 'God' may not as such (i.e. Creator) be considered to be the 'whole' of God. Now we have used the somewhat paradoxical term 'whole' not because God is composed of parts, but for lack of a better word. To explain we must now digress to focus our attention on certain parts of the Hindu doctrines according to the Vedanta which, though not necessarily identical, may be said to run parallel with the Sūfī doctrine in question. According to the Maitri Upanishad, Ishvara is the principle of all the states of manifestation, both the gross and the subtle. Now this Ishvara may be considered under three principal aspects known as the Trimurti: Brahmā (with an accent to suggest the masculine gender, and without to designate neuter), who is Ishvara as the principle of creation; Vishnu, who is Ishvara as the life-giving and life-preserving principle; and Shiva, who is Ishvara as the principle of transformation. Ishvara in itself, as the Universal Being, is unmanifest although it works in all the states of manifestation in the aspect of

277. Ibid., p.33; cf. above, p. 108.
the Trimurti. In reality Brahmā, Vishnu and Shiva are but the names or aspects of Ishvara, just as Ishvara itself is a name or aspect of Brahma considered as the principle of manifestation. Brahma in Itself is neither manifest nor unmanifest for It is the principle of both. It is unconditioned, undetermined and immutable. Considered in Itself It is the Principle of all principles and is said to be immanent only when viewed under different aspects, otherwise It is transcendent with respect to the manifest or the unmanifest. A passage from the Maitri Upanishad dealing with the nature of Brahma shows that Brahma, dwelling in the gross, the subtle, the unmanifest and the unconditioned states, is said to dwell with one of Its padas ('feet' or 'quarter') in the first three states, and with three of Its padas in the last. According to Jīlī's imagery, the analogy of the relationship between the Universe and God is like that of ice submerged in water. Now the shape, structure and solidity of the ice are, when viewed objectively, non-existent, deriving what existence they possess from the water. Although both are essentially the same, conditionally, i.e. existentially, ice and water are not the same. Neither can it be said, though they be the same essentially, that the whole of the water is contained in the ice, nor that the essence of the

279. Radhakrishnan, op.cit., pp.857-859; the Maitri Upanishad, Ch. VII, ll.
whole is contained in the part. The meaning of the Śūfī 'Truth', then, without implying any limitation to it, depends upon the standpoint from which it is viewed; sometimes it is God when viewed as the principle of all the grades of being and states of manifestation, like Ishvara; sometimes it is God considered as the Absolute, Holy beyond any condition whatever, like Brahma. This is what we mean when we say that the 'Truth' may not be considered to be actually the whole of God, for like Brahma, it possesses 'Names' (asmā') or aspects that operate incessantly in the whole of manifestation:

All gifts soever unto God are due,
Yet special gifts from special "names" ensue;
At every breath one "name" annihilates,
And one creates all outward things anew.  

Jāmī's verse reveals that between "every breath", when one "name annihilates and one creates all outward things anew," there is that 'instant', so to speak, when nothing at all

---

280. Insānu'l-Kāmil, I, p.46. An English translation of the verse in question can be found in Lings, p.182.
281. Lawā'īḥ, p.33.
exists - but God. There is no augmentation of Being at the creation of the Universe, since the Universe is in a perpetual state of annihilation (this state is referred to in Ḥamzah as lenyap; i.e. fanā’). It is alluding to this non-existence of the Universe as such that Ḥamzah quotes: "God was and there was not any thing with Him," and "God is now as He was then."}

282. The whole paragraph above is an incorporation of passages, with and without alteration, from my Some aspects of Sufism as understood and practised among the Malays, Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Singapore, 1963, pp.10-17. Referring to this same doctrine, Martin Lings, in what to my mind is the most lucid and concise interpretation in English, writes:

Creation, which is subject to time and space and non-terrestial modes of duration and extent which the human imagination cannot grasp, is 'then' (with reference to both past and future) and 'there', but it is never truly 'now' and 'here'. The True Present is the prerogative of God Alone, for It is no less than the Eternity and Infinity which transcends, penetrates and embraces all durations and extents, being not only 'before' all beginnings but also 'after' all ends. In It, that is, the Eternal Now and Infinite Here, all that is perishable has 'already' perished; all that is liable to extinction has 'already' been extinguished leaving only God, and it is to this Divine Residue, the Sole Lord of the Present, that the word remaineth refers in the last quoted Qoranic verse." (Lings, pp.121-122).

The last line of the quotation from Lings refers to the verse: All that is therein [i.e. in the created universe] suffereth extinction, and there remaineth the Face of thy Lord in Its Majesty and Bounty. Qur'ān 55:26-27). See also Sharāḥ, p.18; Muntahī, pp.128-129.

283. Asrar, p.26; Muntahī, p.111.
(c) Creation and the doctrine of perpetual creation.

It would appear at first glance that Ḥamzah rejects the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. According to Ḥamzah, if the World were created from nothing, it would mean that the World has 'acquired' existence and exists apart from God. God, then, would be limited in a spatio-temporal system — a view which he dismisses as a metaphysical absurdity. Since all things are from God and must return to Him, it cannot be — so Ḥamzah argues — that God is the nothing they are created from. Ḥamzah says that the Doctors of Theology conceive the Known and its potentialities to be something temporal (*ḥadīth*), created, separated from the Essence, like a building created by the builder. His argument against the Doctors of Theology is that it would follow that if He produced them from nothing, they were logically unknown to Him 'before' He caused them to exist in His Knowledge. The concept of *creatio ex nihilo*, as Ḥamzah understands it, must logically be involved in a notion of time sequence which is unacceptable with respect to God. Jālī would say — and Ḥamzah would agree with him — that between the not-being of things and their existence in His Knowledge, there is no time sequence. God knows them as He knows Himself, but He is

---

284. See below, pp. 133-135.
285. *Asrār*, pp. 37; see also *Tahāfut*, p. 70.
eternal and they are not. According to Ḥamzah, following Ḣamzah, following Ḣamzah, following Ḣamzah, following Ḣamzah, following Ḣamzah, following Ḣamzah, following Ḣamzah, following Ibnu'l-'Arabî, things exist as Ideas in the Mind of God in the form of potentialities lying dormant, as it were, in readiness to leap into life and fulfil the Divine Command. When God says 'Be!' it is to something that He says this, not to nothing. But Ibnu'l-'Arabî's view seems to imply that the world is eternal, a view which logically follows from the notion that God's creative will is determined by the Knower to act as His nature demands; and the nature of His Knowledge - at least according to Ibnu'l-'Arabî - is determined by the objects which He knows. Jīlī rejects Ibnu'l-'Arabî's view because it could lead to a belief that the Divine Knowledge is dependent on what is relative. In point of fact, however, it must be pointed out that the Ṣūfî doctrine, not being a philosophy, views Reality from many standpoints which at times appear to be mutually contradictory but are in fact complementary; and the apparent conflict in the views of Ibnu'l-'Arabî and Jīlī on the Divine Knowledge is in reality illusory. Indeed, by saying that God's Knowledge is determined by the Objects which he knows Ibnu'l-'Arabî means by 'objects' not what is relative, for

287. Cf. Insānu'l-Kāmil, I, p.82; see also p.76; Studies, p.103.
291. Insānu'l-Kāmil, I, p.76.
the 'objects' are none other than the Pure Potentialities or Possibilities (which Ḥamzah calls the ḥis'īlād aslī) contained in the Divine Essence - and these are not something distinct from the Essence, but are in reality identical with It. The apparent duality between Knowledge and its object, then, does not exist. However, Jīlī being more systematic than Ibnul-ʿArabī, is more careful on the question of the relationship between the Knower and the Known, and rejects the latter for the reason stated earlier. In Ḥamzah we find both the views of Ibnul-ʿArabī and Jīlī on this point incorporated, but Ḥamzah approaches Jīlī more than Ibnul-ʿArabī here, for if we examine the scheme of ontological descent of the Absolute Being as he conceives it, we will find that he not only implies but clearly indicates that the judgment that God exists in Himself (the stage of ʿala ta'āyyun which he calls Huwa corresponding to Jīlī's al-ʿAma) is logically prior to the judgment that things exist in His Knowledge:

The Essence is Unique, without attributes - this is the First. When He gazes upon Himself He sees Himself with all His Predispositions. At that 'instant' the Seer becomes the Knower, the Seen becomes the Known, Seeing becomes Knowledge. 292

In this case, as Jīlī points out:

... The former judgment involves the non-existence of things and the existence of God alone. God brought things from not-being into being and caused them to exist in His Knowledge,

292. Asrār, p.28.
then He brought them forth from His Knowledge and caused them to exist externally.  

From this it should be clear that Hamzah's rejection of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in the sense he means is not an affirmation of the doctrine of the eternity of the World. What he means to expose in rejecting that doctrine is the error of conceiving the notion of the priority of time, instead of logic, in the concept of creation. He is consistent enough in his exposition of the doctrine that God is Eternal, that He is at one with His seven principal Attributes of Life, Knowledge, Will, Power, Speech, Hearing and Sight. Other Attributes such as those of the Creator, Provider, and so on, become manifest only at the instance of the Divine Command. When God commands the Potentialities of the Known (isti'dad ma'lumät) to come into being they come into being (i.e. actualize as external existence: wujūd khārijīj) in a state of complete perfection, for if they are not perfect the implication is that there is some flaw in God's Knowledge and that His Creative Activity would then have been in vain.  

The Arabic word khalalqa, denoting the action of 'creating', means "assigning to each thing its proper measure", and this action, the result of the Divine Will (irādat), is governed not by caprice or chaos, but by

293. Cf. Studies, p.103; Insānu'l-Kāmil, I, p.82; see also p.76; Asrār, p.45.
294. Ibid., pp.31, 34; Sharāb, Ch.VI.
wisdom and order. In Ḥamzah the word he uses for translating khalaqa is menjadikan and he gives this word exactly the same meaning as the Arabic so that as a semantic vocabulary in his system, the word becomes a vital concept in the understanding of his metaphysics. There are, then, broadly speaking, two categories of creation:

(1) Creation as the 'drawing forth' of Possibilities in dwelling in the Divine Essence. 'Before' the Possibilities are 'drawn out' they are not distinct things in the Divine Essence and as such are not existing (mawjud), for existence implies that there already occurs a distinction of Knower from Known, which takes place in the first determination. It is only with reference to the state of the Divine Essence as the Non-Manifest i.e. Indeterminate (lā ta'ayyun) that the metaphysical meaning of 'nothingness' (udum) can be ascribed, and it is with reference to this action of creating only can it be said that the Creator creates from 'nothing'. Creation in this sense is not properly speaking 'creation', for although the Possibilities indwelling in the Divine Essence are 'now' deployed in a relative mode,

296. Cf., below, chapter V.
297. See above, pp.116-117.
298. See Ḥamzah's verses on the Fixed Essences (al-a'yānu'l-thābitah) in Appendix V, (i).
299. I.e., it is not khalaqa, but ījād or abraza.
the Creative Word 'Be!' has not yet been 'pronounced' upon them and as such they are neither created nor uncreated as they are Predispositions (shu'ūn) of the Divine Essence.  

(2) Creation as the actualization of the Possibilities (al-ā'yānu‘l-thābitah) as external existence.  

The Possibilities come under the sway of the Creative Word that commands them to come forth 'externally' into the World of Matter when they appear as creatures (sing. makhluq) both spiritually and materially.

God's Mercy (raḥmat) first brought the Universe into existence from Himself, and in virtue of His Name Most Compassionate (al-Rahmān) He exists in all things that He brought into being:

Al-Rahmān is [the Name] by which He first bestows His Mercy upon the World - that is, that He creates all, as God Most Exalted says:

Waṣi‘ta kullā shay‘in raḥmatan wa ilman — that is: [O my Lord] Thou embraces all things in Mercy and Knowledge. Hence Raḥmān is the Lord of Mercy and bestows existence upon the Universe together with all its parts. Since He gives existence to the Universe together with all its parts He is called Raḥmān.

The Universe - Creation - considered as not-being 'joined' to Being is not an illusion, for as such it is none other

---

300. Aṣrār, pp.34-35; Sharāb, p.18.  
301. i.e., Khalaqa.  
302. Cf. above, p.121.  
305. Cf. above, p.121.
than the Effects (āthār) of God's Creative Activity (shu'ūn) made manifest to the senses; and these Effects are constantly changing, each being annihilated and replaced by a similar set much in the same manner as waves are constantly made to appear and disappear on the ocean's face by the unseen forces that work in nature. It is with reference to this dynamic Creative Activity that Ḥamzah often quotes the Quranic passage: Every moment He is in some state [of activity]. The dynamic Creative Activity flows from the Divine Names that operate incessantly in the Divine Act of Self revelation (tajallī). Another reference to the Divine Creative Activity is the allusion to the 'Breath' of the Most Compassionate (al-nafas al-Rahmān) at each instance of which "one Name annihilates and one creates all outward things anew."

(d) The Fixed Essences (al-a'yānu'l-thābitah)

The Fixed Essences or Prototypes, Archetypes, Essences of Things have been mentioned under different names depending upon the point of view from which they are regarded. Ḥamzah also calls them the Reality of Things, the

306. Asrār, p.49.
307. Ibid., p.58; Sharāb, pp.18, 20.
Cognitive Forms or Divine 'Ideas', the Universal Intellect; and he seems to have identified them with the Relational Spirit, the Light of Muhammad, the Most Exalted Pen, the Guarded Tablet. 311 From one of his verses on the Fixed Essences 312 an outline of their nature can be set forth thus: (1) When 'Seeing' occurs (implied by the word muqābalah) and Seer and 'Seen' become manifest (in the first determination) the Fixed Essences are Predispositions in the Divine Essence (shuʿūn dhātiyyah). They are not to be considered as Intelligible Being (wujud 'ilmiyyah) for this would imply that the Fixed Essences possess a separate existence from the Essence.

(2) When intelligible particularization (tafṣīl 'ilmī) occurs in the Divine Knowledge, the Fixed Essences are Ideas, i.e. formal in nature (ṣuwarī) and does not possess an inspirational attribute (ṣifat waḥyī). By 'inspiration' my guess is that it refers to the Spirit. Ibnu'l-'Arabī in his Futuḥātu'l-Makkiyyah (Makkan Revelations), discoursing on Inspiration, says that when God speaks through inspiration it is like a chain on a stone struck by the angels. The analogy of iron clashing against stone to produce a spark refers to the manifestation of the Holy Spirit (al-ruḥ al-qudus) which occurs when God's Attributes of Majesty and Beauty clashed.

311. See above, pp. 116; 118.
312. 2016., pp.33-35; Appendix V, (i).
and manifested the Holy Spirit. Further, the Qur'ān reveals that inspiration has content, such as knowledge ('ilm), wisdom (qiṣmah), guidance (hudā), healing (shifā'), light (nūr). It seems clear to me that an inspirational attribute implies a spiritual and not ideational nature. It follows that in this context the Fixed Essences are of the nature of Ideas not yet imbued, as it were, with the Relational Spirit.

(3) When the Fixed Essences are the Things Known (ma'lūmāt), i.e. 'Objects' of the Divine Knowledge, they are Possible Quiddities (māhiyyāt al-mumkināt) and not impossibilities (mustaḥilāt).

(4) When they are preceded by something (masbūq) the Fixed Essences are creatures (makhlūq) and not the Beloved (ma'shūq). Being preceded implies a 'separate' existence from the Essence (Divine Knowledge) and this can only mean that when set against Real Being which logically precedes the Fixed Essences, they are then regarded as creatures. Being preceded may also refer to the objective individualization which occurs to the Fixed Essences in the Most Exalted

313. Cf. the reference to the origin of the Holy Spirit by an anonymous Malay commentator in 1164-8, pp.165-167. See also Shabistārī, p.44, where the same analogy of fire in flint and steel is employed to illustrate the spiritual faculty in man.

315. Ibid., 17:39.
316. Ibid., 45:11.
317. Ibid., 41:44.
Pen where Creator and creatures become distinguished. On this plane which corresponds to the third descent or determination of Absolute Being the Fixed Essences are regarded, insofar as they are the hidden reality of the external world, as the Exterior Essences (al-a'yānu'l-khārijīyyah). It is now clear why the Fixed Essences considered as creatures are not identical with the Beloved for the symbolical expression 'Beloved' refers to the Divine Knowledge ('ilm) in the first determination.

(5) When they are referred to as Lofty Letters (ḥurūf 'āliyyat) the Fixed Essences represent a Mirror (mir'āt) and they are not to be considered as not-being ('adamiyyat). Some Ṣūfīs, Shabistārī among them, consider not-being to be the mirror of Absolute Being, and others like Jāmī invertes the metaphor and makes Absolute Being the mirror in which not-being is reflected. There is in fact no contradiction here. We must conceive the mirror to be a double-faced mirror; the front of the mirror faces, as it were, the Divine Names and as such the mirror itself is not-being reflecting Absolute Being, and the back of the mirror, facing the Exterior Essences, catches the reflection of not-being

319. Cf. 2016, p.27.
320. Cf. 11648, pp.140-143.
and as such the mirror is regarded as Absolute Being.\textsuperscript{323} On the plane on which the Fixed Essences are regarded as a Mirror, which corresponds to the third determination, they are both created as well as uncreated according to the point of view from which they are regarded. The analogy of the Fixed Essences as Lofty Letters is found in Ibn\'ul-\'Arabî's verse which Hamzah quotes.\textsuperscript{324}

(6) When the Fixed Essences are considered as inseparable (mutalāzim) from the Essence they are the World (\textit{\textsuperscript{'}ālam}) and not not-being (\textit{\textsuperscript{'}adam}). It is obvious that by World is meant the Real World, i.e. the intelligible world apprehended only by the Intellect as opposed to the sensible world of phenomena apprehended by the senses.

(7) When the Fixed Essences are considered as being first manifested in a continuous state (mutalāhq), they are called the Lover (\textit{'āshiq}) and not the Creator (\textit{khāliq}). The continuity mentioned here is a reference to the Pure Act of Self-revelation of the Essence to Itself in which the Absolute Being sees Himself in one continuous and eternal Vision at once as Seer (Knower), Seeing (Knowledge) and Seen (Known). This occurs in the first determination. Now we have pointed out earlier that Knowledge corresponds to the Beloved,\textsuperscript{325} and this is so because the Beloved is the

\textsuperscript{323} See 11648, pp. 240-243.
\textsuperscript{324} \textit{Asrār}, pp. 36-37; cf. also \textit{ibid.}, pp. 41-42; \textit{Muntahi}, p. 117.
\textsuperscript{325} See above, p. 139, (4).
relational being that relates Love (i.e. the Divine Essence) to the Lover. Through the Beloved (Knowledge) the forms of the Fixed Essences are revealed in the Lover. Quoting 'Irāqī's Lamʿat, Ḥamzah says that all three Beloved, Love and Lover are in fact one and the same. The Lover is called such because it lacks existence but yearns for it as alluded to in the much quoted Holy Tradition: 'I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known; so I created creation that I might be known'. Viewed from this standpoint it is easy to see how the Fixed Essences are not called Creator, for Creator is one of the Names that has its logical descent from Love (Seer, Knower).

(8) When individualization has occurred (termaqṣūm) in the Fixed Essences they are considered as the Known (maʿlūm) and not the Non-existent (maʿdūm). By the Non-existent the Sūfīs usually refer to the Innermost Essence in the state of non-manifestation. The Essence is unconditioned and undetermined and even existence or being cannot be predicated of it. The Fixed Essences are referred to here as the Known to show that a distinction from the Knower has already occurred in the first determination and as such 'existence' can be predicated of them.

327. Cf. Asrār, p.29; Sharāb, p.2; Muntahī, p.111.
328. See Īnsānu'1-Kāmil, I, pp.21-22; Studies, pp.83,150.
(9) When the Fixed Essences are first said to be 'present' (ḥādir), i.e. when the Creator is distinguished from the creatures and the creatures are regarded as being 'present' before the Creator (the reference here is to the third determination), they are considered as the passive principle (faqīr: literally the 'Poor'; lacking in being, the slave as opposed to the Lord) and not the active principle (amīr: the Lord, the One Who orders or commands), the Command in this case being the Creative Word 'Be!' (kun). 330

(10) The Fixed Essences, inasmuch as they exist (mawjūd) - i.e. as Ideas in the Divine Knowledge - are to be categorized as Contingent Being (jā'izul-wujūd) and not as Impossible Being (muntani'u'l-wujūd), for the impossible cannot come into being - even in God's Knowledge.

(11) When they are considered as a whole (mujmāli) the Fixed Essences are the latent Modes of Being (shu'un thubūtī) and not of the nature of pure not-being ('adam mabūl) or absolute nothingness. They are the Theatre of Manifestation of the One Real Being and as such they logically cannot be pure not-being which comes under the category of impossible being - that is, a being that has no existence in any category of being. 331

330. Cf. above, p. 121; also 2016, p. 30. This last note reference must be understood in conjunction with (7) in pp. 140-141, above.
331. For a discussion on the 'adamul-mahd, see above, pp. 96-100. Ḥamzah makes mention here of the Mu'tazilah as holding the view that pure nothingness is an entity. Cf. Tahafut al-Tahafut, p. 61.
(12) When they are regarded as a Mirror the Fixed Essences are Possible Not-Being (ʼadəm mumkin) and they are not static not-being (ʼadəm sākin), i.e. a kind of receptacle for forms to exist. The Fixed Essences have already been represented as a Mirror in (5) when they are referred to as Lofty Letters. The Mirror has a double face and in the case in which they are referred to in (5) we must imagine the Fixed Essences as the front of the Mirror which faces the Divine Names wherein the Lofty Letters, which are a symbolic allusion to the Predispositions in the Essence, are reflected. The Fixed Essences there are represented as reflecting Absolute Being and as such that reflection is not not-being. But in this case here we must imagine the Fixed Essences as the back of the Mirror which faces the Exterior Essences. Here they reflect not-being. Conceived as a double-faced mirror, it is logically valid to say that the Fixed Essences are Being on the one hand and Not-Being on the other, depending again upon the point of view from which they are regarded. Hamzah goes on to say that Possible Not-Being has its origin in the Non-Existent (ma'dūm), i.e. the Essence in the grade of the non-manifest (lā ta'ayyun), inconceivable, ineffable.

332. I am unable to identify what ʼadəm sākin is although I am tempted to see some resemblance with the Plotinian stasis, or most probably hyb.
To sum up, the Fixed Essences are first Pure Possibilities (isti'dad aslī) indwelling in the Divine Essence and identical with It. They are Predispositions in the Essence. When the Essence reveals Itself to Itself in one eternal and everlasting manifestation which never repeats itself, the Fixed Essences receive this manifestation on the plane of unity in plurality (wāhidiyyah), i.e. in the Divine Knowledge, and there they always abide as Ideas reflected in the Universal Intellect. In themselves – i.e. considered as other than the Essence – the Fixed Essences are not existing entities; it is only their relative modalities that are manifested in the Universe, and even these, when compared to the Fixed Essences themselves, never so much as attain to a "smell" of the latter, nor do these relative modalities 'come out' (tiada berpindah and tiada dipindahkan) i.e. become actually separate from the Fixed Essences. The complement of the Fixed Essences is the Spirit.

335. Cf. Lawā'ih, Flash XXII.
336. Jāmī's expression, ibid., p.35.
337. See the reference to ʻIbnul-ʻArabī's verse about the Lofty Letters in Aṣrār, pp.36-37.
338. What has been said about the Fixed Essences would suffice us to conclude that Ḥamzah, in conformity with the teachings of the Sūfīs, never held the belief in the eternity of the world as Rānīrī holds him out to be. The World is not even the a'yānu'l-thābitah.
(e) The Spirit (Nyawa: al-Ruh, and the Soul or Self (Diri: al-Nafs).

The Spirit, like the Fixed Essences, has many names according to the aspect in which it is envisaged. In the saying of the Prophet, it is said that "the first thing God created is the Spirit." 339 Hamzah identifies this Spirit with the Light (al-Nur), 340 the Intellect (al-'Aql) 341 and the Pen (al-Qalam) 342 as each of these is also referred to in the same saying of the Prophet as the first thing God created. 343 The Spirit is the Divine Consciousness (sirr Allah) 344 and pertains to the Divine Knowledge, for it is because the Divine Knowledge is living that it is called Spirit; because the Divine Knowledge visualizes the things known it is called Light; because the Divine Knowledge patterns the ideas of the things known it is called Intellect; because the Divine Knowledge is the forms of the things

341. The First Intellect (al-'Aql al-Awwal) is meant here, not the Universal Intellect (al-'Aql al-Kulli) - cf. Studies, pp. 116-117 and notes 1-4 on p.117.
343. Asrar, p.41.
344. Cf. 2016, p.73; Asrar, pp.56-57.
Known it is called Pen. The Divine Knowledge is also called the Tablet (al-Lawḥ) because it receives the imprints of the forms of the things known.\textsuperscript{345} It is also called the Reality or Idea of Muḥammad (Ḥaqīqat Muḥammad) which in turn is called the Light of Muḥammad (Nūr Muḥammad) of which God says in the Holy Tradition: Were it not for you I would not have created the Heavens.\textsuperscript{346} The Spirit is also called by Ḥamzah the Relational Spirit (Rūḥ Iḍāfī), another name for Jīlī's Holy Spirit (Rūḥ al-Qudus).\textsuperscript{347}

Three different orders of the Spirit can be distinguished in Ḥamzah's system, and this is in keeping with the Šūfī doctrine of the Spirit particularly as expounded by Jīlī. But the distinction between the three different orders of the Spirit is merely mental, not real. In reality there is but one Spirit which viewed in its relation to God is uncreated and viewed in its relation to Man is created. The Spirit referred to under different names mentioned earlier such as Light, Intellect, Pen, etc.,\textsuperscript{348} and under the guise of these different names is created, but created only in the special sense, that is, as being derived from the Spirit of

\textsuperscript{345} The Guarded Tablet corresponds to the Universal Soul (al-Nafs al-Kulliyah). The term 'form' used above does not mean form that limits, it means rather 'formative' essence.
\textsuperscript{346} Cf. Asrār, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{348} See above, pp. 116, 118; 145.
God (Rūh Allāh), which is uncreated, and not necessarily as coming in the ontological level below the Creative Word 'Be!'. In the saying of the Prophet: "The Spirit is created two thousand years before the body," the word 'created' means to be made manifest (zāhir), and here Ḥamzah identifies the Spirit with the Command (titah: amr) of God: al-rūh min amrī rabbi - the Spirit is of the Command of my Lord. The word min can be interpreted in two ways; it either means 'of' or 'from'. When it is interpreted as 'of' it denotes identity as in the case of the Spirit being of the same nature as the Command; when it is interpreted as 'from' it denotes proceeding from as in the case of the Spirit proceeding from the Command of God. In the latter sense the Spirit is created, meaning it has come in the ontological level below the Creative Word; whereas in the former sense the Spirit is uncreated, being in the ontological level above the Creative Word. This is what Ḥamzah means when he says that the Spirit is neither creator, i.e., uncreated (khāliq) nor creatures, i.e., created (makhluq).

I have said earlier, in respect of the concept of creation

349. See Qurʾān 15:29; 38:72. Cf. 2016, pp.73, 87. See Appendix IV, (iv), (e).
351. Loc. cit.
352. Qurʾān 17:85.
353. See the discussion in Asrār, pp.34-35.
354. Asrār, pp.34-35.
and the doctrine of perpetual creation, that the action of creating, insofar as it is denoted by the Arabic words abraza and Ijād, and the root word khalaqa as interpreted by the Sūfis, conveys two possible meanings:

(1) the 'drawing forth' (abraza) of Possibilities dwelling without any distinction in the Divine Essence, and the production (Ijād) of these Possibilities;

(2) their actualization as external existence (khalaqa).

This cosmogony when transposed to the order of the Spirit corresponds in the case of (1) to the 'drawing forth' or manifestation of the Spirit (Relational Spirit: rūḥ idāfī) from the Holy Spirit or the Spirit of God (rūḥ Allāh); in the case of (2) it corresponds to the projection of the manifested Spirit and its particularization into human, animal and vegetal spirits. The former in the cosmogonical order can be envisaged as logically preceding the latter.

In the case of the Spirit sometimes identified as being of the same nature as the Divine Command or Creative Word (al-Amr) and sometimes as proceeding from the Divine Command, its being uncreated or created depends upon the point of view from which it is envisaged. In this respect it corresponds to the Fixed Essences considered as a double faced Mirror explained earlier; 356 here the human, animal and vegetal spirits correspond to the exterior essences

356. See above, p. 139, (5).
Both - the spirits and the exterior essences - have their 'locus' as it were in the third determination. The schema of the Spirit is as follows:

A. The Divine or Holy Spirit
   (Rūḥ Allah, Rūḥ al-Qudus)

B. The Relational Spirit
   (Rūḥ Idāfī)

C1. The Creative Word
    (al-Amr)

C2. The Human, Animal and Vegetal Spirits
    (Rūḥ Insānī, Rūḥ Īyāwānī, Rūḥ Nabātī).

B and C1 are, in relation to A, 'created' i.e. manifested as 'modes' of the Divine Spirit, but in relation to C2 are uncreated. C2 is created; it comes in the ontological level below the Creative Word.

In his verses, Ḥāmzah conceives of the Spirit symbolically as the Luminous Bird (Unggas Nūrī), the White (i.e. Pure) Bird (Unggas Pingai), the Naked (i.e. bare of all relations and qualities) Bird (Tāyr al-'Uryān), and the Unique Fish (Ikan Tunggal). The fish as a symbol of the Spirit is not as universal as the bird. The key to this symbolism lies in the Arabic word for fish: nūn. Nūn

---

357. See 2016, p.27; Sharāb, p.15.
358. 2016, p.71; Appendix V, (iv), (d) below.
359. Ibid., pp.72-73; Appendix V, (iv), (e) below.
360. Ibid., pp.68, 70; Appendix V, (iv), (b), (c) below.
361. Ibid., p.86. Appendix V, (iv), (f) below.
is also an abbreviated letter in the Qur'ān, symbolizing the Divine Knowledge. The symbolism of fish in ʿAmzah in this case must be understood to refer to the Spirit conceived as the Tablet or Universal Soul. Now the Tablet, which ʿAmzah identifies as another aspect of the Spirit, is also generally known among some Sufis including Jīlī as the Universal Soul (al-Nafs al-Kullīyyah). In fact, Jīlī himself employs the same symbolism of fish (ḥūt) for the Tablet. The Tablet or Universal Soul is the Primary Substance, necessarily beyond form, corresponding to what Jīlī calls hayūla derived from the Greek hylē and understood according to the Plotinian concept of Matter. It is the complement of the Spirit and is to the Spirit as substance is to essence. In the same manner as the Spirit and the Fixed Essences, the Soul, which also corresponds to the

362. 68:1.
364. See above, notes 342, 345.
365. Asrār, p.41.
367. Ibid., p.9.
369. There is a concise and illuminating account of the Spirit in Burckhardt, pp.80-85.
Psyche of Plotinus, can be envisaged at different levels in the hierarchy of existence, and this can cause one to be misled into thinking that one Sufi writer contradicts another or even that different expositions by the same author are contradictory when the fact is to the contrary. Viewed in its true nature, the Soul (Nafs) and Spirit (Ruh) are one and identical with the Essence (Dhat). In the verses: Every thing is subject to perishing except His Face and Every thing in it [i.e. the world of created things] suffers extinction and there remains the Face of your Lord ...

Hamzah, like Ibnu'l-'Arabi and Jili, identifies Face (wajh) as Essence (Dhat). This is so because the Wajh is the Self (Nafs) or Individuality (Huwiyyah) of the Essence.

It is also described by Hamzah as the inmost Self (Diri,

---

370. For a full account of the Psyche, see Inge I, pp.200 foll.
373. Ibid., 55:27.
374. On every occasion these two verses occur in the work of Hamzah; the word wajh is consistently interpreted as Dhat; Asrar; Sharab; Muntahi; 2016; 3374; 3372; passim.
375. Huwa denotes the Essence stripped of all attributes and dwelling in Its Inmost Self indicated by the word Huwiyyah. It is also the Inmost Consciousness (sirr) of God. This is also referred to by Sufis symbolically as the Hidden Treasure (kanzan makhfiyyan) and is none other than the Self (Nafs, in Hamzah: Diri) of God.

Cf. Asrar, p.22; Sharab, p.2; 2016, 35-37, 53-54, 58-59, 70-71, 82-83; Muntahi, p.111; Insanu'l-Kamil I, pp.97-98.
152

i.e. Nafs, Huwiyyah) of Man\(^376\) and inasmuch as the real essence of a thing is its 'Self', existence is constituted by the Self of God.\(^377\)

As in the case of Ṣūfīs generally, Ḥamzah distinguishes sharply between the Soul considered as man's appetitive or sensual 'self' and the Spirit, but the Soul regarded as the spiritual self of man is ultimately not distinct from the Spirit.\(^378\) In the Qur'ān, man's sensual self is expressed as \(\text{al-nafsu'l-ammārah}\)\(^379\) (the soul which commands to do evil - the carnal soul) and \(\text{al-nafsu'l-lawwāmah}\)\(^380\) (the soul which blames itself - the soul aware of its own imperfections). The reproachful (lawwāmah) soul is so called because it is still engaged in the struggle with the passions. After these passions have been vanquished, the soul is at peace and in certainty (yaqīn). In this condition the soul is regarded as man's spiritual self which is expressed in the Qur'ān as \(\text{al-nafsu'l-muṭma'īnāh}\)\(^381\) and Ḥamzah calls this the soul that has returned to its fount of origin - that is, it has become reintegrated in the Spirit.\(^382\)

\(^376\). This refers to the self mentioned in the saying of the Prophet: "Whosoever knows his self knows his Lord." Cf. Muntahi, p.111.

\(^377\). Asrār; Sharāb (esp. pp.10, 17-18); Muntahi, passim.

\(^378\). Qur'ān, 12:53.

\(^379\). Qur'ān, 75:2.

\(^380\). Qur'ān, 89:27.

\(^381\). Qur'ān, 89:27-28; cf. Rumi, Mathnawi. 1, 566.
Sufi psychology the three souls mentioned are known as (i) the animal or sensual; (ii) the intelligential (discursive reason); (iii) the transcendental (Universal Intellect) respectively. The Soul is immortal, and the saying of the Prophet: "Die before you die" refers to the vanquishment of the first two souls which are 'modes' of the Soul, in relation to which they are unreal, and attainment of the third soul to its original and true nature.

The Spirit includes all the Divine Knowledge concerning created beings. Ţamzah also calls it the Reality or Idea of Muḥammad (Maqīgat Muḥammad), which is identical with the First Intellect (al-'Aql al-Awwal), the analogue of the Logos. God says in the Holy Tradition: I created Creation for thy sake and thee I created for My sake.

---

383. Ṣlīlī says that the soul is mentioned under five names: al-nafsu'l-haywāniyyah; al-nafsu'l-ammarah; al-nafsu'l-mulhimah; al-nafsu'l-Iawwāmah; and al-nafsu'l-mutma'innah respectively. (Insānu'l-Kāmil, II, pp.70-71).

384. Sharāb, p.17.

385. The meaning of 'death' in the above saying is synonymous with extinction of the self (fana'). In the Muntahī, Ţamzah deals exclusively with this theme revolving around the saying of the Prophet: "Whosoever knows his self knows his Lord." Cf. 2016, pp.53-54.

386. Asrār, p.43.


388. Quoted in the Asrār, p.42.
and this means that everything comes into being from the Light of Muḥammad which comes into being from the Divine Essence. Were it not for this Divine Knowledge, God would not be outwardly manifest, and were it not for the Knower Muḥammad as the Logos would not become manifest. "I was a prophet when Adam was between water and clay"; "Adam is the father of the flesh and I am the father of the spirits"; "I am from God and the Faithful are from me"; "I am from God and the World is from me"; "I am from the Light of God and the World is from my light." Muḥammad as the Logos is the first created of God and is the Unique Prototype of all created beings. He is the Universal Man (Orang Kāmil: al-Insān al-Kāmil). Hamzah implies that he uses the term orang kāmil in two different senses: to refer to the Universal Man as noted above, or to the Perfect Man, that is, the saint who has entered fully into the state of extinction (fanā‘) and has gained subsistence in God (baqā‘). This dual meaning attached to the idea of the Universal or Perfect

389. The word 'from' here and in the Sayings that follow, may be also interpreted as 'of'; cf. above, p. 147.
392. In 2016, pp. 35, 71, 75, 79, 81; 3374, p. 12, the word kāmil refers to one who has attained to union with God; however, in ibid., pp. 71-72, the word kāmil refers to the Universal Man. Cf. also ibid., 65-66 (the reference to Qur’ān 55:19-20; 53:9) and Asrār, pp. 40-41. For an explanation of this dual meaning attached to the term Insān al-Kāmil, see Burckhardt, pp. 86-92.
Man corresponds to Man conceived as the macrocosm ('Ālam kabīr) and microcosm ('Ālam saghīr) respectively.\(^{393}\) God as the Absolute realizes Himself in Man whom He created in His own image, the image of the Merciful,\(^ {394}\) and He returns to Himself through the medium of Man. The Perfect Man, reflecting and uniting the Divine Attributes, is he in whom God and Man become one.\(^ {395}\) Outwardly, then, Man is regarded as a

---

393. Asrār, p.47. 'Irāqī eloquently sums up Ibnu'l-'Arabī's conception of Man: 'Though Form,' he said, 'proclaims me Adam's son, /My true degree a higher place hath won. When in the glass of Beauty I behold, The Universe my image doth enfold: In Heaven's Sun behold me manifest - Each tiny molecule doth me attest My Essence true all holy Spirits prove, And in my Shape all human Forms do move. Ocean's a drop from my pervading Sea, Light but a flash of my vast Brilliancy: From Throne to Carpet, all that is doth seem Naught but a Mote that rides the sunlit Beam. When Being's Veil of Attributes is shed, My Splendour o'er a lustrous World is spread ...' (Lama'āt, p.327. The English translation is by A.J. Arberry, Sufism, pp.102-103).

394. Sharāb, pp.18-19; Asrār, p.47.

395. Cf. JIHI: "Man is the link between God and Nature. Every man is a copy of God in His perfection; none is without the power to become a perfect man. It is the Holy Spirit which witnesses to man's innate perfection, the spirit is man's real nature and within him is the secret shrine of the Divine Spirit. As God has descended into man, so man must ascend to God, and in the Perfect Man - the true saint, the Absolute Being, which has descended from its Absoluteness, returns again unto itself." (Insānu'l-Kamil II, p.46(1986) the translation is by Margaret Smith, Readings from the mystics of Islam, London, 1950, p.119 (132).
microcosm, but regarded essentially (i.e. in his inward nature as the Universal Man - the Reality or Idea of Muhammad) he is the origin and final cause of creation which was brought into existence for his sake and through whom the purpose of creation is fulfilled. 396

(f) The Divine Attributes and Names

Ḥamzah, again following Jilī and Ibnul-'Arabī, controverts the view of the Doctors of Theology that the Attributes are neither the Essence nor other than the Essence. 397 Ḥamzah maintains that the Attributes are ultimately identical with the Essence. It is only out of human necessity - for convenience of understanding - that a distinction is made between the Attributes and the Essence accompanied, as it were, by division and plurality, but in reality the Attributes are the Essence manifesting Itself.

397. Sīfātu'Llâh laysat'aynâ'ī-dhât wa lâ ghayra siwâhu ... Sharâb, p.19; Asrâr, p.24; also Taftâzânî, pp.49, 51-55. It seems that some early Ṣūfīs also hold the view that the Attributes are neither the Essence nor other than the Essence - cf. Kalâbâdhî, ch. VI.
under the aspect of 'externality'.

There are seven principal Attributes whose logical order Ḥamzah gives as
(i) Life; (ii) Knowledge; (iii) Will; (iv) Power; (v) Speech;
(vi) Hearing; (vii) Sight).

It has been pointed out earlier that Ḥamzah incorporates the views of Ibnü'l-'Arabî and Jîlî on the concept of the Divine Knowledge but that in his exposition he comes closer to Jîlî than to Ibnü'l-'Arabî.

It is also significant that Ḥamzah approaches Jîlî in his concept of God's Power (qudrâh). According to Ibnü'l-'Arabî, as reported by Jîlî, God's knowledge is determined by the things He knows as, by way of analogy, the condition of

398. Cf. Asrâr, pp.24, 49 and passim; Sharâb, passim; 2016, pp.84-85. Pure being, as such, (writes Nicholson commenting on Jîlî), has neither name nor attribute; only when it gradually descends from its absoluteness and enters the realm of manifestation, do names and attributes appear imprinted on it. The sum of these attributes is the universe, which is "phenomenal" only in the sense that it shows reality under the form of externality. Although, from this standpoint, the distinction of essence and attribute must be admitted, the two are ultimately one, like water and ice [see above, pp. 127, fsl]. The so-called phenomenal world - the world of attributes - is no illusion: it really exists as the self-revelation or other self of the Absolute. In denying any real difference between essence and attribute, Jîlî makes Being identical with Thought. The world expresses God's idea of Himself ... (Studies, p.83).

399. Cf. Asrâr, pp.23-24, 27-34; Sharâb, p.19; for a discussion on the concept of Divine Knowledge held by Ḥamzah in relation to those of Ibnü'l-'Arabî and Jîlî, see above, pp.130-133.

400. See above, p. 132.

401. İnsanü'l-Kâmîl, I, p.76.
the sea is determined by the waves. But Ḥamzah says that the things He knows exist because of His knowledge of them - the condition of the waves is determined by the sea. God's knowledge of things is not derived from the necessity of their natures - rather it is His knowing them that caused them to be objects of His Knowledge. The judgment that God has knowledge of things presupposes His possession of the power to have knowledge and exercise His Creative Word upon the things known, decreeing that every individual thing should be what its nature required it to be. In saying that God decrees every individual thing should be what its nature required it to be, Ḥamzah follows Ḥibnu'l-'Arabī, and it must be understood that the true nature of every individual thing is none other than its Pure Potentiality (pl.: ʾistiʿdād ʾaslī) dwelling in the Divine Essence. The nature of every individual thing is determined by its predetermined capacity or potentiality. If God's Will and Power must work in accordance with this Law of Potentiality, does it not therefore imply that Will and Power are really denied Him? Ḥamzah's answer to this problem is an emphatic no. He says that, in interpreting the Quranic passage:

402. Asrār, pp. 36, 43.
403. Ibid., p. 31; cf. Insānu'l-Kāmil I, pp. 82-83; also Studies, pp. 101-103, 149-161.
And if Allah please He would certainly make you a single nation, but He causes to err whom He pleases and guides whom He pleases.

God has the power to will what may seem contrary to the Law of Potentiality,⁴⁰⁵ but God does not wish to exercise this power in order to preserve His Justice and Perfection.⁴⁰⁶ Ḥamzah's understanding of what the Doctors of Theology mean when they say that God is All-Powerful is that nothing is impossible for God to do. To Ḥamzah, the impossible cannot be done by God for the simple reason that it is irrational to affirm such a thing.⁴⁰⁷ Ḥamzah's stand in the well-known controversy about God's Attribute of Speech has already been indicated.⁴⁰⁸ As to the Attribute of Hearing, Ḥamzah maintains, following Ibnu'l-'Arabī,⁴⁰⁹ that it is closely related to Knowing on the authority of the Quranic verse:

404. Qur'ān 16:93.
405. Asrār, pp.45-46; Sharāb, pp.20 foll.
406. Sharāb, pp.22-23; Ibnu'l-'Arabī is of the same opinion — see Studies, p.151.
407. In order to give a clearer picture of Ḥamzah's concept of power and will (irādah), I propose in the next chapter to embark upon the subject following a semantic approach. This is, I think, important, for by revealing the nature of the conceptual structures of the words he uses in connection with the qudrah and the irādah, we will arrive at knowing exactly what Ḥamzah has in mind, without falling into the tantalizing possibility of reading our own interpretations into what he says. This approach is only a scientific device to confirm what we already know.
408. Cf. above, pp.91-93.
409. Cf. 'Affīlī, pp.43-44.
He is the All-Knowing. God as the All-Knowing reveals Himself to Himself and He sees the Pure Potentialities within His Knowledge. It is the eternal 'voice' (suara) or 'speech' (perkataan) of the Pure Potentialities that is heard by God the Knower. Similarly in the verse:

> And He giveth you Of all that ye ask for

the asking refers to the 'asking' of the Pure Potentialities. Seeing and Speaking is explained in a similar way.

As the seven principal Attributes are ultimately identical with the Essence, they are eternal. They are the sum of all other Attributes which become manifest only at the instance of the Divine Command. Jili's fourfold division of the Divine Natures and Attributes, i.e.:

(1) Attributes of the Essence, e.g. Allāh, the Transcendent One (al-šād), the Immanent One (al-wāhid), the Living One (al-bāyy), the Light (al-nūr).

(2) Attributes of Majesty (al-jālāl), i.e. the Almighty (al-'azīz), the Irresistible (al-qahhar), the One who Subdues (al-mudhīl);

411. The Pure Potentialities are another aspect of Himself - i.e. He revealed Himself to Himself in the intelligible forms of the Many.
412. Asrar, p.32.
413. Qur'ān 14:34.
415. Ibid., pp.27-29, 32-33.
416. Ibid., p.34.
Attributes of Perfection (al-kamāl), e.g. the Compassionate One (al-rāhmān), the Wise One (al-ḥakīm), the First (al-āwāl) and the Last (al-ākhir), the Outwardly Manifest (al-zāhir) and the Inwardly Hidden (al-bāṭīn), the All-Embracing One (al-muhāfīẓ);

Attributes of Beauty (al-jamāl), e.g. the Knowing One (al-'alīm), the Merciful One (al-rahīm), the Creator (Fashioner of the Universe: al-bārī'), the One who gives Strength (al-mu'izz), the Gracious One (al-laṭīf).

is also evident in Ḥamzah. The Attributes - it has been stated earlier - are the Essence manifesting itself under the aspect of 'externality'. The Essence, in one or other of Its infinite aspects, manifests Itself in the 'form' of Divine Names. Attributes are therefore Divine Names manifested in the external world. There are two aspects of the Divine Names, the one opposed to the other, under the general heading of Beauty (jamāl) and Majesty (jalāl) and governed by Perfection (kamāl). Each Name produces an effect (athar) and all the Names are

... in continuous operation, and no cessation of such operation is possible for any of them. Thus, when one of the contingent substances [ḥaqā'iq i-imkāniyyah],

through the concurrence of the requisite conditions, and the absence of opposing conditions, becomes capable of receiving the Very Being, the mercy of the Compassionate One [raḥmat-i-raḥmāniyyah] takes possession of it, and the Very Being is 'infused' [ifāzāt] into it; and the Very Being thus 'externalized' through being 'clothed' with the effects [ḥathār] and properties of such substances, presents Himself under the 'form' of a particular determination [ta'ayyun-i-khāṣṣ], and reveals Himself [mutājallī] under the guise of this determination. Afterwards, by the operation of the irresistible Oneness [qahr-i-ahadiyyah] which requires the annihilation of all determinations and all semblances of multiplicity, this same substance is stripped of these determinations. At the very moment that it is thus stripped, this same substance is reclothed with another particular determination, resembling the preceding one, through the operation of the mercy of the Compassionate One. The next moment this determination is annihilated by operation of the irresistible Oneness and another determination is formed by the mercy of the Compassionate One; and so on for as long as God wills. Thus, it never happens that the Very Being is revealed for two successive moments under the guise of the same determination. At every moment one universe is annihilated and another similar to it takes its place.420

The Divine Name Most Compassionate (al- Raḥmān), through which God out of His mercy (raḥmat) first brought forth the universe,421 embraces all things. In the Divine Act of

420. Jāmī's commentary of Ibnu'l-'Arabī's al-Fass al-Shu'aibiyah (Fusūṣu'l-Hikam) in the Lawā'ih, pp. 32-33. The English translation is by Whinfield. I have taken the liberty to modify the translation a little. Cf. also above, pp. 116-121, 123.

Self-revelation (tajallī) His particularizations (takhīs) embraces all; the Beautiful as well as the Majestic, good and evil, the believer and the unbeliever. Hence Raḥmān is also the sum of His Majesty (jalāl) in contradistinction with His Name Most Merciful (al-Rahīm) through which He is particularized only in all that is Beautiful and good, particularly in prophets, saints and the righteous. 422

(g) The meaning of 'extinction (fanā') and its relation to gnosis (ma'rifah) and freedom (ikhtiyār):

Generally speaking, fanā' in Ḥamzah's mysticism may be conceived as either metaphysical (macrocosmic) or mystical (microcosmic). Metaphysically the universe as such is in a perpetual state of fanā' summed up in the saying: "God was and there was not anything with Him; He is now as He was then" 423 and in the Qur'ān: Everything in it [i.e. the universe] perishes and there remains the Face of your Lord ... 424 Now man as such is also in a perpetual state of fanā' - but he does not realize it due to the veil (hijāb) of consciousness set up by the carnal self (diri) between it and his true Self. The extinction of this consciousness of the carnal self is the fanā' referred to as mystical.

422. Asrār, p.40.
423. Ibid., p.26; Muntahī, p.111; cf. also above, p. 129.
Whether metaphysical or mystical *fana*’ means "to annihilate all that is other than God" (melenyapkan segala ghayr Allah). It follows from this concept of extinction that the Sufi term 'union' (wasl -in Ḥamzah: bertemu) is simply a symbolical expression ('ibārat) whose meaning excludes the notion of the Sufi in the state of *fana*’ becoming one with God. Union alludes to the Sufi's realization, when his illusory self has passed away, that he in his true Self has been, is and will always continue to be 'one with' God — or rather he is God, since God reveals Himself only to Himself. The manner in which *fana*’ comes about is described by Jīlī thus:

When God desires to reveal Himself to a man by means of any Name or Attribute, He causes the man to pass away (*fana*’) and makes him naught and deprives him of his (individual) existence; and when the human light is extinguished and the creaturely spirit passes away, God puts in the man's body, without incarnation (ḥulūl), a spiritual substance, which is of God's essence and is neither separate from God nor joined to man, in exchange for what He deprived him of; which substance is named the Holy Spirit (rūḥu’l-quḍus). And when God puts instead of the man a spirit of His own essence,

---

426. *Ibid.*; pp.69,70,78.
428. The concept of unity without incarnation in the relationship between God and the World (and Man) is clearly emphasized in Ḥamzah's writings, particularly for example in *Sharāb*, pp.13-14 (cf. above, p.37).
the revelation is made to that spirit. God is never revealed except to Himself, but we call that Divine spirit "a man" in respect of its being instead of the man. In reality there is neither "slave" nor "Lord", since these are correlated terms. When the "slave" is annulled, the "Lord" is necessarily annulled and nothing remains but God alone. 429

It can be seen from the above passage, which fits perfectly with ʻHamzah's concept of fanā', that fanā' is very closely connected with ma'rifah (gnosis). In Sūfīsm, as is well known, there exists a clear distinction between the concepts of ma'rifah and 'ilm (knowledge). The former, as can be deduced from the above quoted passage, includes in its meaning structure the notion of participation in God's knowledge of things, whereas the latter in the human context 430 means simply knowledge by inference. In ʻHamzah this clear-cut distinction between gnosis and knowledge is vividly stressed in his consistent use of the Malay words kenal to translate ma'rifah and tahu to translate 'ilm throughout his writings. I should also add that in ʻHamzah the words kenal and tahu in the mystical context are from the semantic point of view transparent words conceptually identical with ma'rifah and 'ilm respectively. The 'Object'  

429. Insānu'l-Kāmil I, p.62. The English translation is by Nicholson (Studies, p.128). Ėp. ʻHamzah in Asrār, p.67. 430. It is obvious that in the Divine context 'ilm cannot be knowledge by inference. Gnosis should also be understood in the human context, for what for man is gnosis is for God Knowledge.
of gnosis is not really the Allah conceived as the highest manifestation of the Essence, the sum of all Names and Attributes enthroned in the seat of the Absolute; it is rather the Allah conceived as the Lord (Al-Rabb) Who is worshipped (Tuhan). The Holy Essence is beyond gnosis. The very important concept closely linked with the meaning of gnosis is that of nearness to God (qurb - in Ḥamzah: hampir). Ḥamzah distinguishes between four types of nearness:

i) nearness in point of time (zamān): we are nearer to Muhammad than to Jesus;

ii) nearness in point of place (makan): we are nearer to the moon than to the Pleiades;

iii) nearness in respect of qualities (sifāt): Abū Yazīd al-Bīstāmī was nearer than 'Utbah and Shaybah to the Prophet in respect of his qualities, although 'Utbah and Shaybah were nearer to the Prophet in point of time and place.

iv) nearness to God.

This last type of nearness cannot be described and comprehended in the ordinary sense; it is the type of nearness that can be known only through gnosis. It is the nearness

431. A typical example in which this doctrine is clearly outlined is the often quoted saying of the Prophet: "Man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu": "Whosoever knows his self knows his Lord."

432. Asrār, pp.26-27; Sharāb, p.14. This is not necessarily contradicted by what is said in p.165, above: "God is never revealed except to Himself," for as the Prophet said: "Glory to Thee! we cannot really know Thee", and ibnu'l-'Arabi said: Gnosis is a veil between the knower and the known." See also above, note 430.

433. For a discussion on the concept of nearness, see the chapter on gnosis in the Sharāb, pp.11-14.
described in the Qur'ān as 'a distance of two bow-lengths or even nearer' (qāba qawsayni aw adnā),\(^{434}\) alluding to the first of two visions of the Truth which the Prophet had during the Night Journey (isrā').\(^{435}\) The Šūfīs usually interpret the two bow-lengths to mean two bows whose ends meet thus forming a circle symbolizing the circle of mystical union (wasl: bertemu). In this sense 'nearness' also means the nearness of 'union'.\(^{436}\) Since the Essence of God and His Knowledge embraces every thing, God is near to all His creatures irrespective of whether they are believers or infidels, good or evil; but He is particularly near — in the mystical sense here meant — only to the prophets, saints and

---

434. Qur'ān 53:9. See also in Šamzah's verses 2016, pp.65-68, (Appendix V (v)).
435. Šamzah's treatise entitled Muntahi deals mainly with the subject of gnosis. The title of the treatise refers to the second vision of the Truth which the Prophet had during the Night Journey near the Lote Tree of the Uttermost End (sidratul-muntaha: Qur'ān 53:14-18). For my interpretation of the title of the treatise, see below, pp.365-369. A very important and relevant commentary on the Surah of the Qur'ān referred to here is given in Shaykh Ahmad al-'Alawi's Lubab al-'Ilm fi Sūrat Wa'l-Najm discussed in Lings, pp.171-175.
436. In 2016, p.66, Šamzah says [literally]:
   The people of qaba qawsayn are as in an enclosure
   The string dividing it [i.e. the enclosure] is not mere thread
   That which spans across [the enclosure] is called a barrier
   Thou must see that the three of them are one.
   The circle of the two bow-lengths is also well-known in the writings of Šamsu'l-Din of Šasai and some 17th century tracts on mysticism. See also Asrār, p.40.
the righteous among the believers. In other words, nearness to God can only be applicable to those who have reached the station of mystical poverty (faqr) or slavehood (‘ubūdiyyah). Although it is nowhere explicitly stated in Ḥamzah’s writings, it is clearly implicit in them all—particularly in the Muntahī—that he upholds the doctrine that the finality of gnosis is attained not in the state of complete fanā', but in that in which the individuality still persists—there is still consciousness of self, so that the inward eye of the heart (fu‘ād) is coordinated harmoniously with the outward eye such as the experience the Prophet had in his second vision near the Lote Tree of the Uttermost End. Complete fanā', or fanā’ in the Divine

437. Sharāb, pp. 13-14. This presence of God in all creation and His particular presence in some of his creatures only is also manifest in the roles of the Divine Names Rahman and Rahim. See Asrār, p. 40.
438. See above, p. 83, the reference to ‘poverty’ and references in note, 179.
439. The 'ābid is he who has attained to the station of al-nafsu’l-mu’tma’inmah (Qur’ān 89:27), see above, pp. 152-153.
440. See above, note 435. The concept of gnosis necessarily implies the persistence of some kind of consciousness of individuality in the man who experiences it (see above, note 430), and seems to me to exclude the notion of complete fanā’. Whether gnosis is a station (maqām) or a state (hal) it is difficult to draw a clear line. It seems to mark a transition complete from station to state. The distinction between station and state has been clearly drawn by the early Sufī writers on doctrine such as Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (d. 378/988 - Kitāb al-Luma’ fi’l-Taṣawwuf, edited by R.A. Nicholson, London, 1963, and Abū’l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072 - Risālah, a skeleton analysis of which appears in Ṣufism, pp. 74-79.
Essence, which the Prophet experienced in his first vision, is attained only after successive stages of fanā' from the Divine Effects (āthār), Actions (af'āl), Names (asmā'), and Attributes (ṣifāt). 441 Ḥamzah is here summarizing briefly Ḥallī's systematic account of the mystical ascent or return to the Absolute. 442

One of the most important concepts closely connected with fanā' and, from a philosophical point of view, with the problem of ethics and morality is that of human freedom (ikhtiyār). If man as such and the external world that confronts him are viewed metaphysically as being in a perpetual state of fanā', then all acts including human action are in reality metaphorical. Action implies that it proceeds from an agent who wills and has knowledge of the thing willed, and this Ghazzālian concept of agent is explained thus:

... If we assume an event which is based on two facts, the one voluntary and the other involuntary, the mind relates the act to the voluntary fact. Language expresses itself in the same way, for if a man were to throw another into the fire and kill him, it is the man who would be called his killer, not the fire. If, however, the term were used in the same sense of the voluntary and the non-voluntary, why should the killer be related to the voluntary, by language,

441. Ḥarār, pp.72-73.
442. Ḥarār, pp.66-75; Insānu’l-Kāmil I, pp.56-73; Studies, pp.125-130.
usage, and reason, although the fire was the proximate cause of the killing, and the man who threw the other into the fire did nothing but bring man and fire together? Since, however, the bringing together is a voluntary act and the influence of the fire non-voluntary, the man is called a killer and the fire only metaphorically so. This proves that the word 'agent' is used of one whose act proceeds from his will ...

Now Ḥamzah's concept of agent and will is similar to what al-Ghazzālī has explained:

... Take the example of an ironsmith. He has with him a piece of iron, a heritage from his ancestors. The potentiality of the iron is that it is suitable for fashioning into a keris. He perceives with his knowledge that the iron is suitable for fashioning into a keris and so he forges it into a keris. Having forged it into a keris, he then uses it. After a time he stabs a person with the keris. The act proceeds from the wielder of the keris, and not from the keris. From the beginning to the end [of the event] the act proceeds from the wielder of the keris, not from the keris ...

The concept of agent and action held by al-Ghazzālī and Ḥamzah is identical, but al-Ghazzālī's analogy aimed at refuting the philosophers serves a philosophical context where man as such is regarded as real and his actions refer to realities; whereas Ḥamzah's analogy serves a metaphysical context where man as such and the external world around him

443. Tahāfut, p.67; Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p.95.
444. A Malay dagger.
445. Asrār, p.46.
are in a perpetual state of *fana*¹, and his actions are therefore metaphorical. Man, in Ḥamzah's analogy, is the *keris* whose 'action' does not proceed from will, choice, and knowledge of the thing willed. Like the fire's 'action', that of the *keris* is non-voluntary. God is the wielder of the *keris*, the true Agent of Whom alone can action in the true sense of the word be predicated.⁴⁴⁶ He is like the Khayyāmian Player in the chess game of existence, mankind the impotent pieces He moves and checks and slays.⁴⁴⁷ Man is what he is according to his predetermined capacity as subsisting in God's Knowledge.⁴⁴⁸ In other words, the ground of determination of the will in man lies in his Pure Potentiality (pl. isti'dād ašālī) which in virtue of its subsisting in God's Knowledge is not distinct from God Himself. Hence God - or from man's point of view his true Self - is the Agent of his actions. It follows from this that it is only when man's lower self has been successfully effaced and his true Self realized that he can properly speaking be said to possess freedom, for he is then his Lord. It is unfortunate that many scholars of Ṣūfism, particularly the Western orientalists, have tended to regard the Ṣūfī account of the vexed question of determination and freedom in a rather naive manner, posing philosophical problems and exposing

---

⁴⁴⁶. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
⁴⁴⁷. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
⁴⁴⁸. Ibid., pp. 35-39.
contradictions out of the formulation of Sufī concepts which they themselves have constructed. Having decided that to their minds the Sufī solution to the problem is "unsatisfactory" and its "paradoxes more glaring", they would then pose the rhetorical question: "How can moral obligation have a place in such a system? Who is morally responsible and before whom is anybody responsible when the 'judge' and the 'judged' are one?" They ought to realize that, from the Sufī point of view, if they persist in applying philosophical concepts which seem to recall Zeno and Epictetus, they would never arrive at a "satisfactory" solution to the problem. In any case, the philosophical glass through which they hope to see the Truth inevitably causes them - to use the words of Rūmī - to "see double"; hence, for them the 'paradoxes' are 'more glaring'. However, speaking from a strictly philosophical point of view, it seems to me obvious that they are not Kantians, for had they been they would have seen that one of the most profound concepts of freedom and its relation to morality Western philosophy has ever produced, formulated in Kant's second Critique, is perhaps the most relevant to the Sufī interpretation to the problem. Owing to the great importance attached to this problem and

449. 'Affīfī, here ('Affīfī, p.153), raises the same objection as that raised by the orientalist I have alluded to. His treatment of Ibnul-'Arabī seems to me irreverent and naive.
to the need to understand Համզահ's conception of freedom and its relation to morality, which is in fact a very sketchy summary of Իբնուլ-Արաբի's and Ջիլի's ideas, I consider it worthwhile to give here a brief analytical summary of Kant's conception of freedom, if only to point out parallels in the Sufi conception of freedom and to show that the "solution" is not so simple that philosophers could hope for a "satisfactory" account, unconfused by "glaring paradoxes".

In Kant, pure reason and practical reason are aspects of one and the same reason. Each aspect has its particular domain or field of reference. The theoretical use of reason concerned with objects of the merely cognitive faculty and its practical use deals with the grounds determining the will. A clear distinction is drawn between two types of will: the empirical and the transcendental, each corresponding to the doctrines of happiness and morality respectively. Will and action that are directed to particular objects and relations of experience are determined by practical motives (practical precepts, maxims). The transcendental will, that is, will viewed in the aspect of pure practical reason, is

450. "The categories as yielding knowledge of things, have no kind of application, save only in regard to things which may be objects of possible experience." (Critique of pure reason, translated by N.K. Smith, Macmillan, London, 1961, p.162).

not determined by empirical motives, but by itself. This will must necessarily be directed towards something other than natural impulses and this 'something' is duty.\textsuperscript{452} The good or virtuous action is therefore that which conforms to the good will – the will determined by the sense of duty. Such a will refers not to actions together with their external consequences, rather to disposition. Morality is then the disposition conformable to duty. That there is such a thing as an \textit{a priori} command of duty is proven by the very nature of the two types of will; the empirical being heteronomous and the transcendental autonomous. Necessity is attached to the moral law and it is this quality that makes it a command - a categorical imperative.\textsuperscript{453} The categorical imperatives demand of one to act according to maxims that can be adapted for a universal legislation for all beings who will rationally.\textsuperscript{454} From this it follows that the self-determination of the rational or transcendental will is the supreme prerequisite of morality. By self determination is meant the power to begin a series of the conditioned, and

\begin{itemize}
\item 452. \textit{Practical reason}, pp.32-33.
\item 453. \textit{Ibid.}, pp.18-19, 32-33.
\item 454. \textit{Ibid.}, p.30: \ldots Act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law. \textit{Cf.} pp. 30-31.
\end{itemize}
this power, with reference to the will, is called freedom.\footnote{455}

Freedom is established not by theoretical (pure) reason,\footnote{456} but by a postulate of practical reason. Freedom is possibility which in its final form is developed into an object of faith. This faith is universally and necessarily valid in the domain of the supersensible in the same manner as the principles of the understanding are valid in the realm of the sensible world.\footnote{457} The will may be subject to laws of a system of nature (as in the case of the empirical), or it may, on the

\footnotetext{455}{The existence of such a power Kant establishes thus:

Since the mere form of a law can be thought only by reason and is consequently not an object of the senses and therefore does not belong among appearances, the conception of this form as the determining ground of the will is distinct from all determining grounds of events according to the law of causality, for these grounds must themselves be appearances. Now, as no determining ground of the will except the universal legislative form can serve as a law for it, such a will must be conceived as wholly independent of the natural law of appearances in their mutual relations, i.e. the law of causality. Such independence is called freedom in the strictest, i.e. transcendental, sense. Therefore, a will to which only the legislative form of the maxim can serve as a law is a free will.\footnote{Ibid., p.28.}

456. Since theoretical reason is concerned merely with things which may be objects of possible experience. See above, note 450.

457. It is in connection with this necessary and universal belief that freedom does occur, and must continue to occur, that Kant alludes to when he says that the reality of freedom is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason. (Ibid., p.3).}
other hand, subject a system of nature to it (as in the case of the transcendental). In the case of the former, the objects must be the cause of the conceptions which determine the will, whereas in the case of the latter, the will is the cause of the objects. To assert that causality as freedom, which pertains to man as noumenon, can be united with causality as natural necessity, which pertains to man as an existent determined in a spatio-temporal order, is contradictory, for in the case of causality as natural necessity, every event and action which occurs at a certain point of time is necessary under what preceded it. In this order of nature, all actions are never free even if such actions are assumed to be independent of any external cause and have their determining grounds within one's self. Hence, causality as freedom must never be attributed to man as phenomenon, for if it were, it would then be mere subservience to haphazard chance, and its concept as causality would contain no meaning and would indeed be an impossible one. Since both these mutually incompatible concepts are united in one being and in the same action of that being, Kant's solution to the

458. Ibid., p. 46.
problem posed⁴⁵⁹ is that the necessity of the causality determined in a spatio-temporal order lies not within or without the subject, or that if it lies within the subject it originates in the instinct or in ideas, for were this so then one would still have to admit that since instinct and ideas themselves are part of the spatio-temporal order, all determinations arising from them would still be under the inexorable law of natural necessity.⁴⁶⁰ Although the acting subject as phenomenon is always determined in his actions by natural necessity, he at the same time, as noumenon, feels that natural necessity does not touch him, and that

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 99. This is the second of the two points of weighty criticism levelled against the first Critique which Kant sets out to clarify in the second Critique. These are:

1) The reality of the categories as applied to noumena, which is denied in theoretical knowledge but affirmed in practical;

2) The paradoxical demand to regard one's self, as subject to freedom, as noumenon, and yet from the point of view of nature to think of one's self as phenomenon in one's own empirical consciousness.

⁴⁶⁰ Kant dismisses as illusory the psychological theory of motivation as an inner force of the acting rational being as such actions, caused by the association of ideas, would still imply natural necessity, and they therefore exclude the possibility of freedom. It would follow that morality is nothing but a contrivance of our own deception since morality gives purpose to our actions and implies responsibility in actions. The sense of responsibility is absent in the psychological theory, and this very absence is the indicator of its own contradiction, for psychologically the sense of responsibility is very real and manifests itself in the conscience. Ibid., pp. 101ff. Cf. also p. 96.
the laws which determine his existence are legislated by him through reason. In this existence his will soars freely unfettered by time, and every changing act of willing or determination of his existence is felt as a result - an effect, not a cause - of his causality as a noumenon. Here, then, he imputes to himself as noumenon the evil actions he does as phenomenon, for he could have prevented their occurrence in spite of the determinations of the past and of the knowledge that natural necessity had decreed their coming to pass. He feels himself to be the cause, in his consciousness as a thing-in-itself, of every action he does, and the entire past history which determines it, for it is he as noumenon who moulds his own character and all its creations. The solution is then to assert that man has a dual nature, each corresponding to the two types of will and to noumenon and phenomenon; a denial of this assertion would be a self-contradiction of reason itself. But there is yet a difficult problem in connection with this idea of

461. The union of causality as freedom with causality as the mechanism of nature, the first being given through the moral law and the latter through natural law, and both related to the same subject, man, is impossible unless man is conceived by pure consciousness as a being in itself in relation to the former, but by empirical reason as appearance in relation to the latter. Otherwise, the self-contradiction of reason is unavoidable - Ibid., p.6, note 3. The self-contradiction of reason Kant speaks of here is further explained in the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason. See Ibid., pp.97-99.
freedom in the sense of a natural mechanism to which a temporal being is subjected: the connection between God the First Cause and man. Since God is the cause of everything and man depends upon Him absolutely for his existence, is it not true to conclude that man's actions too are therefore determined by something outside his power? The crux of the matter here again lies in the dichotomy of man's nature, and in the nature of the noumenal and phenomenal worlds to which it corresponds. Space and time, which are attributes of the existence of phenomena and appearances, are not attributes of the existence of God or the existence of noumena and things-in-themselves. God is not the cause of man's actions in the spatio-temporal order, nor is He the creator of appearances. When we say God is creator, we must mean that He is creator of noumena and things-in-themselves. It is the thing -in-itself in man that, in his existence as appearance, creates his actions. However, it is precisely at this point in Kant's conception of freedom that he is at his weakest, for in reality he has not really solved the enigma of the relationship between God and man, and the extent of man's freedom in such a relationship. Indeed, the contradiction in Kant's conception of freedom with reference to the relationship between God and man becomes apparent when his conception of morality, which is closely connected with the concept of freedom is summoned forth for scrutiny.
By means of his conception of the *Summum Bonum* or Highest Good⁴⁶² Kant proceeds to bring closer to a *firmer* and more elaborate bond the compulsory relationship between the moral and the sensuous worlds. The transcendental will or ethical will, which has itself as the determining ground of action (categorical imperatives), sets as its end virtue; the empirical will or sensuous will, determined by empirical motives (hypothetical imperatives), sets as its end happiness. The ends of virtue and happiness fit into each of man's dual nature of noumenon and phenomenon respectively. The Highest Good in man, or that which man must endeavour to attain, is a union of virtue and happiness. The relationship between the objects of the ethical and sensuous will (i.e. virtue and happiness) is not one of end to means, and it must be emphasized that the sensuous will, upon whose principles happiness depends, can never be made a condition, no matter how indirectly, of the ethical principle, for this would annihilate the very idea of morality.⁴⁶³ The concept of the

---

⁴⁶³ An antinomy arises in practical reason, similar to the conflict between natural necessity and freedom in the causation of events in the world found in the antinomy of pure speculative reason (*ibid.*, pp.117-118) but Kant resolves this by pointing out that man has a dual nature and that he, as noumenon, possesses the transcendental (ethical) will making it not improbable for that will to create a relation with the empirical (sensuous) will that causes happiness to be an effect in the phenomenal world. But the relation created by the transcendental will is an indirect one; it is one in which the divine hand takes part (*ibid.*, p.119).
Highest Good presumes that the world of sense alone cannot be sufficient to the Highest Good. If man were to have an ethical consciousness, then faith must soar beyond the empirical realm - and even beyond nature itself - into the supersensuous. The Highest Good "is the necessarily highest end of a morally determined will and a true object thereof," yet this morally determined will (the transcendental will) does not in reality have itself as the determining ground of action, for in the case of the attainment of the Highest Good it has its determining ground in God.\(^4\)464\) The extent of man's freedom is meant, in the strictest sense, the power of the will alone to determine itself\(^4\)465 then surely in this case that is not true. How, then, in the case of the Highest Good, can the denial be fully affirmed of the assertion that since God is the cause of everything and man depends upon Him absolutely for his existence, man's actions are determined by something beyond his power? Alluding to the problem of freedom and morality and its connection with the relationship between God and man, Kant himself is forced to admit that:

> The solution which is given here to the difficulty will be said to have so much difficulty in it, however, that it is hardly susceptible of a lucid interpretation. But is any other solution, which anyone has attempted or may attempt, any easier or more comprehensible?\(^4\)466

\(^4\)464. See above, note, 463.
\(^4\)465. Practical Reason, p.28.
\(^4\)466. Ibid., p.106.
To return now to the Šüfīs and to Īmzah. Regarded from a strictly Šüfī point of view, Kant's difficulty lies in his obstinate refusal to "see" what Shabistari would say "only One," and in his persistence in "seeing double." Kant affirms a kind of dualism of noumena on the one hand and God on the other, which he so conceives in order to save human freedom and explain away the doctrine of morality. For the Šüfīs, the question of human freedom is a pseudo-problem and, so long as the dualism of man as 'noumenon' and God is clung to tenaciously, the question can never be "satisfactorily" resolved. Among the Western philosophers, one who would approximate the Šüfī view in this matter is Spinoza, who explains this root of the greatest errors in philosophy as lying in our anthropocentric vision of nature and reality.467 While that there is some semblance of correspondence in Kant's concept of appearance (phenomenon) and reality (noumenon) with Īmzah's concept of Divine Effects (āthār) - that is, external exist/(wujūd khāriji) - and real existence (wujūd ḥaqiqī) respectively, each corresponding to the two natures of man, yet the Šüfī concept of appearance and reality would correspond more again with Spinoza's concept of the natura Naturata and the natura Naturans.468 The Šüfīs

would never predicate of the noumena an existence independent of God and it follows therefore that for them the Kantian transcendental will which has its determining ground in the realm of noumena must be attributed to God alone. All action, whether in the phenomenal or noumenal worlds, whether resulting from the instinct or the so-called will, come to pass only through God's Will. The true religion, that is, Islām, is subservience to this Will of God, which can be perfectly realized only when man has succeeded in effacing his sensual self to gain the higher Selfhood. It would follow from this that freedom, as according to Spinoza, is knowledge, or rather in the Sūfī understanding of it, it is gnosis. It has been said earlier that man is what he is according to his predetermined capacity as subsisting in God's Knowledge and that the ground of determination of the will lies in his Pure Potentiality (pl. isti'dād aslī) which in virtue of its subsisting in God's Knowledge is not distinct from God Himself. The Will of God and this Law of Potentiality is one and the same reality diversely phrased.

469. Ḥamzah in support of this doctrine, quotes Qur'ān, 2:186; 4:78; 8:17; 37:96; 48:10; 50:16; etc.; the saying of the Prophet that not one single atom moves except by God's permission; the injunction of the Prescribed Law that good and evil are from God. See, for example, Asrār, p.44; Sharāb, p.22.

A man is good or evil according to whether his Pure Potentiality proceeds from the Divine Attributes of Beauty (jamāl) or Majesty (jalāl) respectively. From the point of view of reality, however, there is no such a thing as absolute evil since the real nature of every thing is not distinct from God, and God is good and inclines to goodness. The question of moral responsibility in this world and of future reward and punishment is very closely connected with belief in the possibility of human freedom as faith (īmān), and this faith, apart from assuming that man has the capacity to obey or disobey the Divine Command embodied in the religious law (shari'ah), means also faith in the existence of the afterlife as revealed in the religious law. In spite of his knowing that this world and the next possess no real existence in relation to God, man must still have faith in their existence, for this is the basis of morality.

471. Sharāb, pp.21-22. See also above, pp. 160-163.
473. See Asrār, pp. 51-52; Sharāb, p. 23. It seems to me that the connection between freedom and faith in the Kantian sense and Kant's philosophy of the 'as if' (als ob) upon which he bases his doctrine of morality, echoes to a certain extent what the Sufis have in mind. See Practical reason, pp. 28-42. Gamzah does not make a clear distinction between the Divine uncreated will (mashi'ah), which decrees nothing that does not come to pass, and the Divine command (amr), which is the religious law as Ibnu'l-'Arabi had done. Disobedience to the religious law is what we call 'sin'. The Divine
will cannot be disobeyed:

In reality the Divine will decrees only the coming into existence of the act itself and is not directed towards the agent in whom the act is manifested. That the act should not occur is impossible, but in the individual who is its locus (i.e., the particular agent) it is sometimes named "obedience to the Divine Command" and sometimes "disobedience to the Divine Command," and is followed by praise or blame accordingly. (Studies, p.158)

Reward and punishment in the future life may be regarded as effects of obedience or disobedience to the Divine Command but the more profound view is that God Himself feels the pleasure or pain (op. cit., p.158 and note 5). See also Mathnawi III, 1362. The power or capacity in man to obey or disobey the Divine command has also been discussed from a theological point of view by al-Ash'arî in his Kitāb al-Luma', chapter 6 (al-Ash'arî, pp.76-96). A most recent study on the concept of belief in Islamic theology: Izutsu, T., The concept of belief in Islamic theology, Tokyo, 1965.
CHAPTER IV

HAMZAH'S CONCEPT OF THE DIVINE WILL (IRĀDAH) AS DEMONSTRATED
IN HIS APPLICATION OF THE MALAY WORD HENDAK.

Before we embark upon the subject of this chapter, it is necessary to make a preliminary analysis of the word hendak in order to ascertain the dominant elements in the conceptual structure of that word. This preliminary analysis is based upon a thorough study of the various contexts in which the word hendak appears in its several linguistic forms in literary works covering a period from the time of Ḥamzah and earlier to that of 'Abdu’-Ilāh Munshī and the present day, and in the spoken language of today. In that part of the period not contemporaneous with modern times, I have consulted literary works of varied nature and topic: the writings of Ḥamzah, Shamsu’l-Dīn of Pasai, Rānīrī, 'Abdu’l-Ra’ūf of Singkılı and some seventeenth century tracts on Ṣūfism; the Sejarah Melayu; Hikayat Acheh, Hikayat Hang Tuah; some eighteenth century manuscripts on Ṣūfism from Acheh, Riau and Trengganu; the Hikayat Pelayaran series of Abdu’-Ilāh; in contemporary times, I have consulted the writings of the Angkatan' 45 of Indonesia. On the spoken language, I have relied on my own knowledge of the language as it is spoken in Malaya, with particular reference to Johore, and in Indonesia.
On the basis of this 'sample' study of the meaning of *hendak* as it appears in its several linguistic forms in literary works of varied nature and topic covering a period of five hundred years, I have reasons to come to the conclusion that the word has undergone very little semantic change. On the other hand, the word *mahu*, which bears a close connection in meaning with the word *hendak*, has undergone considerable semantic change. In the early writings, *mahu* appears less than *hendak*, and generally mostly in the negative form preceded by the word of negation *tidak*. Further, the verbal noun *kemahuan* does not occur then. This form is in my opinion the product of modern times dominated by Western concepts of will as response to man-made or man-induced challenges. It is particularly evident in the Indonesian *weltanschauung* more than in the Malayan and this may be attributed to the fact that Indonesia has maintained longer cultural contact with the West than has Malaya.

Certain important and relevant methodological concepts that I have brought to bear on this study of the conceptual structures of *hendak* and *mahu* are outlined in the next chapter and need not deter us here. In analyzing the meaning of the word *hendak* as it is applied in sentences in various ways, the conceptual pictures the mind sees are the models
of the realities described.

(a) The conceptual structure of hendak.

The word hendak as a verb considered by itself without affixes conveys meanings such as to wish, or to

\[474\]


\[475\]

E.g. Raja Kida Hindi speaks to his Prime Minister about his daughter Shahru'1-Bariyyah:

Ketahui olehmu, bahwa aku memanggil engkau ini, aku hendak bertanyakan bichara kepadamu: bahwa anakku yang tiada taranya seorangpun anak raja-raja pada zaman ini, itulah hendak aku persembahkan kepada raja Iskandar.

Literally:

Know that I now summon you to draw near to me [because] I wish to discuss with you a certain question: that my daughter, who has no equal among the daughters of the kings of this age, she it is whom I wish to present to Alexander.

Sejarah Melayu, ed. T.D. Situmorang and Prof. Dr. A. Teeuw, Djakarta, 1958, p.5. This edition of the Sejarah Melayu is taken from 'Abdu'LLah's text. According to Winstedt (Historians of Southeast Asia, London, 1962, p.24), the Sejarah Melayu is written between the end of the 15th century and the beginning of the 16th century. The author apparently knew Sanskrit, Tamil, Persian and
Arabic, some Chinese, Portuguese and Siamese. The author was not only a medieval scholar, but also a literary artist as well, and one who was familiar with his times and cultural environment. Hereafter cited as Sejarah Melayu.

476. E.g. Tun Teja asks the ladies of Melaka:
Hendak kemana tuan-tuan sekalian ini?
Literally:
Where do you all want to go?

Hikayat Hang Tuah, ed. Dinas Penerbitan Balai Pustaka, Djakarta, 1956, p.219. This is one of the most important and widely read works in Malay literature. It was written about the 17th century (an exact date is not found), and it tells of the heroic exploits of Hang Tuah, the Malay Laksamana (admiral) of Melaka. Most of the stories connected with Hang Tuah are quite legendary. According to the Hikayat, Hang Tuah was a contemporary of Gajah Mada, the famous Mapatih (chief minister of Majapahit (14th century). Hereafter cited as Hang Tuah.

477. E.g. Maka kira-kira pukul empat petang keluarlah hendak berlayar.
Literally:
At about four o'clock in the evening [we] set out intending to sail.
And:
Maka sebentar itu juga datanglah sebuah sampan hilir dari sungai, ada tujuh-delapan orang-orang raja hendak menyambut perahu saya itu.
Literally:
At the same time a sampan arrived coming downstream from the river with seven or eight of the Raja's men [who came] for the purpose of welcoming my boat.

Hikayat Pelayaran Abdullah (Dari Singapura ke Kelantan), Press of the Am. Miss. Singapore, 1838, pp.16 and 63 respectively. The author 'Abdu'Llah bin 'Abdu'l-Qadir Munshi (1796-1854) was of Arab-Indian descent and is regarded as the father of modern Malay literature. Hereafter cited as Hikayat Abdullah.
there definitely is a consistent sense of will underlying its conceptual structure. It is also clear that the word *hendak* has a limited field of application. In its concrete sense it is applicable only to the animate and not to the inanimate. Animals too are assumed to possess wish, want, intention and purpose, but whenever the word *hendak* is applied to inanimate things, then the meanings it conveys are meant to be interpreted metaphorically. That the word *hendak* should have been used to describe inanimate phenomena could be interpreted as an indication of its being a witness word reflecting the ancient vision of an animistic universe of the Malay-speaking peoples. In the realm of the animate, a different conceptual pattern is implied in the application of the word to human beings compared with its application to animals. When used to describe animal behaviour the word *hendak* always impresses upon the mind a mental picture of the subject dominating the situation described. A possible explanation of this phenomenon may be that it is the peculiar behaviour of the animal visible to the human being who describes it as *hendak* that determines the dominating impression of the subject (the animal) upon the mind of the human being when he is describing the phenomenon. This pattern of the subject dominating the impression in the mind is not necessarily always the case in the application of the word *hendak* to describe human behaviour, and in this I think
lies the clue significant in making a distinction - as far as it is conveyed in the conceptual structure of the word hendak\textsuperscript{478} - between human and animal will. It has already been said that when the word hendak is used to describe animal behaviour, the subject described dominates the impression in the mind. The same conceptual pattern of the subject dominating our mental impression is also present in the application of the verb hendakkan (i.e. hendak + akan) to describe both human and animal behaviour. The reason why this is so seems to me to be the same as that already stated: the peculiar visible or discernible behaviour of the subject, whether human or animal, determines that the subject dominates the mental impression. Hendakkan when applied to human beings implies a desire that seems to arise out of natural instinctive behaviour rather than will. In both these cases of the application of hendak and hendakkan to the animal and human worlds, another important point to note is that the duration of the experience of hendak or hendakkan is discontinuous and, as it were, short. From the point of view of Malay linguistic consciousness, the words hendak and hendakkan reflect experiences that may not

\textsuperscript{478} I understand here by the concept of meaning nothing but a particularization of the mode of seeing or experience. On the concept 'seeing', see Philosophical investigations, II, XI.
necessarily be properly conceived as will—they rather reflect experiences that border upon instinctive behaviour. It is in the application of the verb hendakkan that, properly speaking, man approaches animal experience and behaviour. Such a verb, I have found, has never been applied to God for it is clearly debasing and philosophically absurd. I have already stated that in its application to human beings the word hendak may not necessarily impress upon the mind the subject dominating the situation. In clarifying the distinction between hendak (SD) and hendak (OD) when the word is applied as a verb denoting human action, the following simple example will serve well. The sentence in English: 'Where are you going?' is to be translated into Malay as: 'Engkau hendak kemana?' which literally conveys the meaning: 'Where do you want to go?' or 'Where are you wanting to go?' When the situation revealed in the sentence is analyzed it will be found that to the analyst the object of the action of the one who is asked the question is dominant in the mind; it may be the market, a wedding party, the school and many other alternatives, vague as they

479. (SD) denotes impression of the subject dominating the mind; (OD) denotes impression of the object dominating the mind. For convenience and to avoid awkward repetition, these symbols will hereafter be applied in the analysis.

480. This question where hendak appears is of the same category as the one in note 476.
may be. The one who is asked the question is thrust into the background. The logical explanation of this phenomenon seems to me to be the assumption that the one who is asked the question had taken a decision on a particular course of action, and further, this implies a capacity to exercise choice and knowledge of that for which the action is done. It is this conceptual element of choice and knowledge that is responsible for creating a (OD) impression in the mind, for were this not so, there would be no sense in asking the question. At the same time, it is also expectation of a revelation from the one who is asked the question concerning the object of his action that makes the (OD) impression in the mind. But of course the same sentence may also produce a (SD) impression, depending upon how it is said and upon the circumstances preceding the saying of it. If the word following hendak (i.e. kemana in this case) is emphasized, then it is no longer a simple question but a rhetorical one, meaning: 'Where can you go [now]?' implying a kind of challenge to one to whom it is directed. It were as though the one to whom the question is asked has been forced into a situation - natural or artificial - where the courses of action were extremely limited, and the time to decide which course to take short. There is a sense of urgency. Unlike the (OD) situation, here a decision is demanded without the subject being aware of the situation beforehand: a
problematic situation is experienced and its solution is demanded there and then. Furthermore, the intensity of the subject's action is greater than in the (OD) case, and it is this expected intensity of action on the part of the subject that creates the (SD) pattern in the mental picture of the situation. Although in both cases of the application of hendak (OD) or (SD) the existence of knowledge and choice is presupposed, yet in the latter case both knowledge and choice are greatly reduced, revealing a pattern of action based more upon instinct rather than will. So far, we have dealt with two categories of hendak: the (OD) and (SD) categories. There is yet another category which I will call the (ED) category. By (ED) I mean the application of hendak to both the animate and inanimate worlds where the event dominates the mental impression of the picture of the situation described. My first conclusion in the analysis of hendak (ED) is that the (ED) pattern is only found to be absolute in the inanimate realm. In the realm of the animate, the (ED) pattern may be found. From a philosophical as well as semantical point of view, it is important to discover why the (ED) pattern is created whenever hendak is applied to inanimate objects and in some cases also to the animate, since such a discovery would enable us to establish rules regarding the application of the word hendak and thereby to piece together the elements that make up the conceptual
structure of that word. In the sentences: 'Gunung itu hendak meletup;' and 'Pohon itu hendak tumbang,' hendak is to be understood as conveying, in English, the meaning is about to: 'The mountain (volcano) is about to burst (erupt);' 'The tree is about to topple (fall). The dominant impression in the mind is not the mountain or the tree, but rather the event of bursting or erupting, or of toppling or falling, and the imminence of the event. The mountain or tree is not only conceived of as the locus of the event, but also the recipient of action from outside. Hence the hendak does not really belong to the mountain or tree; they merely receive and cannot avoid or choose to delay, or cause to start or prevent the inexorable force of an external phenomenon. It is with reference to this that I mean when I say that whenever hendak is applied to the inanimate, the meanings it conveys are metaphorical. The (ED) pattern is not quite identical when hendak is applied to the animate, whether it be animal or man; and it is important to note that what causes this non-identity in conceptual pattern is precisely the fact that the metaphorical element is absent in the animate, implying the existence of the capacity to start, delay, choose to avoid, or prevent the series of events that lead to the (ED) pattern of hendak in the animate. In respect of the action of the event as being of an external
nature, it is common to both animate and inanimate hendak (ED). An example of the hendak (ED) animate type can be analysed in the sentence: 'Orang itu hendak kena pukul' (the word orang here may be replaced by kuching: cat): 'That person is asking for a beating.' The word pukul, to beat, in the sentence is stressed and we have a hendak (SD) pattern. The person's action must be such that he or she warrants a beating. The person may be alone but visible to one who makes the sentence, or the person may be in the company of another or others also visible to the one who makes the sentence. But the (SD) pattern is changed to (ED) if the word pukul is not stressed, for the picture presented cannot possibly show the person and his action alone, as it can in the (SD) pattern, but must necessarily show the person in the company of another or others. What changes the (SD) pattern to (ED) is the fact that the other person or persons in the subject's company is about to beat him in consequence of his action or behaviour. But, unlike events of this nature in the inanimate worlds, here it is implied that the person (or animal) has the capacity, now that the event has occurred, to avoid the action that comes from an external source or to escape from it.

At this stage it becomes possible to define consistent rules governing the concept hendak considered as a verb, and to isolate the various elements that make up its
conceptual pattern in the form of propositions set forth below.

1) The verb hendak operates in a field of application comprising the animate and the inanimate realms, but whenever it is applied to the inanimate realm, its meaning is to be interpreted as metaphorical, and not concrete, i.e. real.

2) In its application in the inanimate realm, the conceptual picture it presents impresses upon the mind as dominant always the event described and not otherwise.

3) In the (ED) pattern in the inanimate realm, the action to which the verb hendak refers comes from an external source, and not from the subject, although the subject is the locus of the action. In relation to the action, the subject is powerless.

4) In the (ED) pattern in the realm of the animate, proposition (3) is applicable, but it must be added that the subject may indirectly be the cause of the action which produces the event. Furthermore, the existence of a capacity or power to start, delay, avoid or prevent the series of events that lead to the event is implied in the subject.

5) Although hendak conveys the same meaning in its application to human beings and animals that comprise the realm of the animate, yet for animals alone is the (SD) pattern absolute in the same way as the (ED) pattern is
absolute only for the inanimate. For human beings, the picture may present (ED), (SD) or (OD) patterns.

6) The (OD) pattern implies only the action of "normal" human beings, i.e. those in full possession of their intellectual faculties. 481

7) The application of hendakkan to both human beings and animals always produce the (SD) pattern. Hendakkan cannot be applied to the inanimate unless metaphorically.

When the enclitic particle lah is used: hendaklah (verb), then it gives emphasis to hendak and its meanings are it is desired, 482 should, 483 must 484. In this sense,

481. Human beings such as children, the infirm or feeble-minded, the insane - in fact all those who can be considered as not yet or no longer in full possession of their intellectual faculties, are not considered in this analysis, as it would not in the least alter the present conclusion whether or not they are considered.

482. E.g.: "Adapun anak kita ini lagi budak, jika ada salah dan bebal perbaiki; jika ia jahat hendaklah diantarkan kembali kepada kita." Literally: "This our son is yet a child, if he does wrong and is feeble-minded, improve him; if he is bad, it is desired that he be sent back to us." Here the Raja Sang Purba entrusts his son Sang Jaya Nantaka, who is his heir, to the tutelage of the Bendahara and Temenggung. Hikayat Hang Tuah, p.67.

483. E.g.: "Sesungguhnya hendaklah kita pun mengambil ibernat daripada hikayat itu adanya." Literally: "Verily we too should take [heed of] the parable from the story." The story referred to is that of the monkey and the weaver-bird. The monkey takes shelter from a storm under the weaver-bird's nest. The weaver-bird reproaches the monkey for being lazy not to build his own shelter. The monkey gets angry and tears the weaver-bird's nest to shreds. The parable teaches that it is vain to 'throw pearls to swine.' Hikayat Abdullah, p.12.

484. E.g.: Mengumpat dan memuji hendaklah pikir, Disitulah banyak orang yang tergelincir. Literally: [If you indulge in] malicious gossip and praise you must first think, That is where many people slip and fall. Puisi Lama, S. Takdir Alisjahbana, Djakarta, 1954, p.80.
hendaklah is limited in its field of application only to human beings and it presupposes the existence in human society of ethical, intellectual and social orders. Hendak applied with the addition of the pronominal nya: hendaknya, limits the field of application still further and refers only to human intellectual activity having to do with logical analysis. This is generally found in written language:

"Adapun kata Ahlu'1-Sulûk ma'nâ 'lu' mawjûd, hendaknya hadîr maka harus dikatakan 'lu' kerana 'lu' itu isharat kepada suatu yang mawjûd":

"According to the People of the Path, 'thou' refers to something existing, it must necessarily be present [to God]; for it to be referred to as 'thou,' for 'thou' refers to something existing."

(b) Derivatives and their conceptual structures.

Derivatives of hendak are formed by means of affixes such as kan, i (suffix), ke, meng (prefix); and compound affixes such as ber + ke (prefix), se + ke (prefix), di + ke (prefix) ending with the suffix i. In the case of the suffix kan there is no reason to doubt that it originally was derived from akan which conveys a variety of meanings such as - if applied as a preposition - towards, as for,
concerning, in order to, about; and - if applied as an auxiliary - shall, will. The suffix kan as it is applied to hendak denotes direction towards the object of hendak. Hendakkan means desire towards or for something. Take the following example: "Jikalau sungguh tuanhamba hendakkan hamba ...": "If my Lord truly has desire for me ..." which can simply be translated as "If you truly love me ..." We must imagine here one person (whatever the sex may be) saying this to another (who may even be of the same sex). But for the sake of convenience let us imagine that it is a woman who is saying this to a man who desires or loves her. It may be possible that only the man is active in his desire or love for the woman. She is the passive object. She may not even love or desire him. The direction of the love or desire relationship is then one-way - it is not a mutual relationship. It is implied that the man's desire for the woman is experienced at that time when the woman is in his presence (although this is not a necessary condition, for the object desired may be absent from the desiring subject). It is further implied that the woman is brought or brings herself to the man rather than the man going to her:

[s] (man) ———— [o] (woman) ———

487. This pattern is of course not always necessarily so. 488. See for example the case of the Princess of Gunung Ledang shown above, p. 201.
A clearer illustration of this conceptual pattern of the verb hendakkan can be seen in the Princess of Gunung Ledang's reply to Sultan Mahmud's representatives who came to convey to the princess the Sultan's proposal of marriage: "Jikalau Raja Melaka hendakkan aku, perbuatkan aku jembatan emas satu, dari Melaka datang ke Gunung Ledang ini; ..." 489: "If the Raja of Melaka has desire for me, [let him] build for me a golden bridge and a bridge of silver that span from Melaka to Gunung Ledang; ..." The correlate of the verb hendakkan is the verb kehendaki. In kehendaki, meaning desire towards or for something, the object desired is either absent or vague to the desiring subject and the prefix i implies in the case of this word that the subject looks for the object desired (if it is absent) or seeks clarification about the object desired (if it is vague):

\[ [s] \quad \rightarrow \quad [c] \]

As an example, take the following words of Sultan Mahmud when he addresses his dignitaries: "Jikalau beristeri sama anak raja-raja ini, adalah raja-raja lain pun demikian juga; yang kita kehendaki barang yang tiada pada raja-raja lain, itulah hendak kita peristeri. Akan sekarang kita hendak meminang puteri Gunung Ledang; Laksamana dan Sang Setia kita

489. Sejarah Melayu, p. 236.
"If I marry a daughter of these Rajas, other Rajas have the same [choice of wives]; she whom I desire should be one who is not to be found with other Rajas, such is the one whom we wish to take to wife. We now wish to ask for the hand of the Princess of Gunung Ledang; the Laksamana and Sang Setia we command [to carry out our proposal]." The Sultan's wife is dead and he is planning to marry again. The object of his desire is the fabulous Princess of Gunung Ledang. The fact that he speaks of the Princess shows that he must have contemplated the idea of marrying her for some time. He is now hoping to win the object of his desire, and if he were to win her, he would cherish her thereafter. The desire is continuous. It goes forth from the subject (Sultan) to the object (Princess). The Princess' reply to the official proposal conveyed by the Sultan's representatives makes use of the verb hendakkan. She is the passive object. She does not, in this case, seem to betray any desire for the Sultan—she may not even love him. She has to bring herself or be brought to the Sultan. In fact she will give herself up only if certain conditions are fulfilled. Another important factor in the conceptual distinction between the verbs kehendaki and hendakkan is the distinction in duration. Kehendaki conveys the sense of a continuous desire, hoped

490. Ibid., p. 234.
491. See above, p. 201.
for before achieving the object and cherished after it has been achieved. Hendakkan conveys the sense of a desire experienced in a brief span of time,⁴⁹² and although it may be rekindled it nevertheless is discontinuous.

When the prefix di is applied to kehendaki, the basic conceptual pattern of kehendaki does not undergo any change⁴⁹³ except when dikehendaki is applied in the sense of conveying the meaning similar to the passive participle of the fourth form of the Arabic verb arāda (root: rād [rwd]): murād when defining meaning. In this sense, dikehendaki is closely connected with hendaknnya.⁴⁹⁴ An example of the manner in which murād is applied can be taken from Rānīrī's Ḥujjah: "Maka murād daripada ḥaqīqat pada iṣṭīlah Ahlu'l-Šūfī itu aiatu: ..."⁴⁹⁵ "The [meaning] intended in the Šūfīs' definition of the real essence [of a thing] is: ..." It is in this sense also that dikehendaki is applied by Kemas Fakhrū'l-Dīn of Palembang in his Malay abridgement of a mystical work by Ibn Raslān of Damascus: "Dan adalah ketiga itu, dikehendaki dengan kata mereka itu setengah orang yang 'ārif, memandang segala makhlūq tiada perbuatan bagi mereka itu."⁴⁹⁶ "[The meaning implied in] these three [types of

⁴⁹² See above, p. 191.
⁴⁹³ E.g. "Patik sekalian sembilan orang ini semuanya patut jadi Bendahara, barang siapa yang dikehendaki duli Yang Dipertuan itulah jadi Bendahara." "The nine of us here are all worthy of becoming Bendarara, Whosoever the Yang Dipertuan desires shall become Bendarara." Sejarah Melayu, p. 225.
⁴⁹⁴ See above, p. 199.
⁴⁹⁵ Page 7.
⁴⁹⁶ Kitāb Mukhtāṣar (Leiden, Cod. Or. 1712), p. 38.
fanā’], as intended in the sayings of some of the gnostics, is to regard all creatures as possessing no act of their own."

Another derivative of hendak that can be classed with hendaknya in the sense of having to do with logical analysis is menghendaki (this word is always applied with the suffix i), meaning requiring, would require, wanting: "Maka wujūd Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan 'Ālam berlainan pun tiada dan bersuatu pun tiada, kerana berlainannya dan bersuatu itu menghendaki dua wujūd mustaqill sendirinya."497 "Thus the Being of the Truth Most Exalted and that of the World are neither the same nor different, for its identity or non-identity would require two entities existing per se." What is important to note in the conceptual pattern of menghendaki is the element of 'lacking' inherent in the subject of hendak.

With reference to the Divine Will as conceived according to the conceptual pattern couched in the concept of hendak, the most important are kehendak (hendak + prefix ke), berkehendak (hendak + compound prefix ber + ke) and sekehendak (hendak + compound prefix se + ke). Kehendak means wish, will, desire, and it is not applied to animals unless metaphorically (the same applies to the other two

497. Ḥujjah, p.4.
words in this class). The fact that it is not applicable to animals seems to me to demonstrate that semantically it is conceived that there exists in man a power or capacity of willing that does not exist in animals. But before we go on I wish to point out another use of kehendak which is rather rare, and this is its use in the sense of murād mentioned earlier. 498 Here is an example: "Maka kehendak fayḍ pada kata Ahlu’Llāh itu dua martabat:..." 499 "The [meaning] intended by [the term] fayḍ according to the People of God is that it has two grades: ..." In this sense, kehendak belongs to the same class as dikehendaki 500 and is closely connected with hendaknya 501 and menghendaki. 502 Kehendak can also mean purpose: "Perahu dari mana datang ini dan siapa nama panglimanya, apa kehendak datang ini?": 503 "Boats coming from where are these and what is the name of their commander, what is the purpose of this coming?" As I have demonstrated in the analysis of the conceptual patterns of hendak as it is applied in the animate and inanimate realms, the consistent occurrence of (ED), (SD) or (OD) patterns in

498. See above, p. 203.
499. 11648, p. 294.
500. See above, p. 203.
501. See above, p. 199.
502. See above, p. 204.
503. Hikayat Hang Tuah, p. 382. Strange boats are approaching Melaka. The people sound the alarm and make preparations for defense against what they think is an invasion. The fleet turns out to be a goodwill mission from India. The application of kehendak here gives the (OD) pattern in the mind.
definite contexts of the application of Hendak with reference to man indicates the fact that in man alone is the concept of will fully developed, and this concept of will includes in its meaning structure the elements of choice and knowledge of the object of will. As we proceed with the analysis, it will be discovered that this knowledge is in turn governed by wisdom. Will in the sense that it is volition having its determining ground within itself in the manner shown above is denoted in Malay by the word kehendak. Of all the derivatives of hendak, kehendak alone is the logical word denoting the concept of will. Kehendak may produce the (OD) pattern: "Apa kehendak tuanhamba sekalian pintalah pada kita: jikalau apa sekali pun tiada kita tahani." 504: "Whatever my lords wish, please ask from us: even if it be anything, we will not deny you"; or the (SD) pattern: "Laksamana tiada, itulah maka berani Hang Jebat melakukan berat ringan barang kehendaknya didalam istana Raja ini, kerana dilihatnya tiada siapa yang melebihi dia." 505: "The Laksamana is absent, that is why Hang Jebat dares to make heavy or light whatever he desires in the Raja's palace, for he sees that there is none who surpasses him [in power]." In the above passage, the subject is dominant in the mind because he is conceived as the doer of whatever

504. Sejarah Melayu, p.213.
he desires. There is an implication that his actions are determined by a power not governed by wisdom and discretion and this is caused by the word *barang* (i.e. whatever) which immediately precedes *kehendak*. In fact, whenever the word *barang* or words conveying the same sense as *barang* precedes *kehendak* as in the example above, the conceptual pattern of will and power without wisdom and justice - i.e. tyrannical, capricious or despotic power - is always dominant. The same conceptual pattern is dominant in the structure of *sekehendak* which is synonymous with *barang kehendak*, though the former is more emphatic in stressing unrestricted power. *Sekehendak* always takes the pronominal *nya*. A very important distinction between the conceptual structures of the word *sekehendak* and the word *hendak* and its other derivatives is this emphasis on spontaneous, blind unconscious will conveyed in *sekehendak* which is not conveyed in all other derivatives of *hendak*. The following quotation from 'Abdu'Llāh will illustrate my point: "Maka adalah diluluskan Allāh akan seorang mengambil harta seorang dengan tiada relanya? - atau seorang mengambil anak isteri seorang dengan kekerasannya? - atau seorang membunuh akan seorang dengan tiada sebenarnya? - atau seorang membuat barang sekehendak hatinya atas hamba Allāh sebab ia raja?"506: "Would [you think that] it be

tolerated by God for one person to take the wealth of another without the other's consent? - or for one to take by force the wife and children of another? - or one killing another without just cause? - or one doing whatever his heart desires upon a servant of God [simply] because he is king?" Upon his return to Singapore from his voyage to Kelantan, 'Abdu’Llāh felt very much distressed at what he saw in Pahang and Kelantan. In Kelantan the Rajas were then fighting among themselves for the throne. 'Abdu’Llāh particularly blamed the Rajas for their selfish attitude towards life. Their greed knew no bounds with respect to consideration for others, and in this respect their behaviour was incredibly capricious. The word sekehendak describes the character of one to whom it is applied and reveals its true meaning. I have already stated that sekehendak is synonymous with barang kehendak. The word barang may also be used to precede sekehendak, as in the above example, to give further emphasis to the randomness of the volitive movement. Indeed, it is obvious that the prefix se in sekehendak is an abbreviation of the word sebarang, meaning 'whatever'. In its usage with kehendak, the prefix se implies random desire, in which the notion of discretion and wisdom is absent.

The prefix ber conveys the idea of having some thing (both tangible or intangible) on or in one, or some act (behavioural, volitional, emotional) in one, and in the
case of the latter, depending upon whether the word to which it is prefixed is a one-person relation word (i.e. lari: run) or a two-person relation word (i.e. chakap: converse), the act may be said to be either reflexive or reciprocal. Now the word kehendak may be both a one-person relation or two-person relation word depending upon the actual context: it may mean a one-way desire for something tangible or abstract as in the following example: "Maka jikalau kiranya raja-raja yang bijaksana dan yang bangsawan yang berkehendak keamanan dunia akhirat itu ..."507: "Thus if it is true that the Rajas who are wise and noble and who have desire for success in this world and the next ..."; or it may mean a two-way reciprocal desire in the sense of passionate love between two persons: 'Mereka berkehendak' - 'They love (each other)'.

Further, in the case of berkehendak, apart from the fundamental element of 'having' conveyed in the prefix ber as explained above, the ber also denotes a state of activity, so that berkehendak can mean having a desire or being in the state of desiring, and when it means the latter, there is a possibility that the desire is reciprocal attraction occurring between the same level of being (humans).

507. Ibid., p. 45. In this case the (OD) pattern is given; otherwise, the pattern given will be (SD). See also Kitāb Mukhtāṣar, pp. 60-61.
On the basis of the conclusions drawn in the foregoing analysis, it is now possible to give diagrammatic schemata of **hendak**, shown below: 508

**FIG. I.**

![Diagram of Hendak schematic for animate and inanimate categories](image)

**FIG. II.**

![Diagram of Hendak schematic with abbreviations](image)

---

508. In Figs. I and II, the abbreviations in brackets such as (ED), (SD) and (OD) have been explained. In Fig. II, the abbreviations in brackets (E) denotes meanings pertaining to ethical codes of behaviour; (L) denotes meanings pertaining to logical analysis; (M) pertains to meaning. Capital letters in both Figs. I and II stand for abbreviations of hendak and its derivatives: HK = Hendakkah; HL = Hendaklah; HN = Hendaknya; MHI = Menghendaki; KH = Kehendak; SKH = Sekkehendak; BKH = Berkehendak; KHI = Kehendaki; DKHI = Dikehendaki. Note that **Kehendak** is the central concept.
(c) Conceptual distinction between hendak and mahu.

In order to comprehend completely the meaning underlying hendak, it is important that it should be compared and contrasted with another word whose meaning seems linguistically to be identical, but to be in fact not so. The word mahu also means want, desire, wish, but the fundamental concept underlying mahu is not — as in the case of hendak — that of voluntary action arising out of knowledge and choice: what we call will. On the contrary, the action in mahu may not be said to be voluntary in the sense that it is free from direct outside influence, although the action conveyed by mahu may arise out of knowledge of what is desired, wished, or wanted. It is not voluntary in the sense I mean because what is wanted or not wanted in mahu is always determined by a direct proposition. Hence mahu means not really want, desire, or wish; rather accept, consent, or reject, refuse, whether it be positive or negative as the case may be. It implies not will, but determination; and even choice, in mahu is determined by the direct proposition, and hence of a more restricted kind than is the case with hendak. What I have stated can be demonstrated in the following simple illustration. Supposing I say: "Kuching itu tidak mahu makan" — "That cat does not want to eat", it is presupposed that the cat has been offered food. The cat's
action is therefore really determined by two factors: (i) the offer, which starts the cat's action, and (ii) a certain physical condition, like for example, not feeling hungry, which terminates the cat's action. If I apply the word hendak instead of mahu in the above sentence, then the picture that I must conceive in my mind reveals that the food has not been offered to the cat. The situation conceived would be something like this: the cat is not in the picture. I 'see' a plate of food in what is to be the 'stage' where the action is to be played. The cat appears in the picture and sees the plate of food. He approaches and, having sniffed it, turns away and ignores the food. I who see this would describe the cat's decision not to take the food as 'tidak hendak makan'. Although, as I have stated earlier, animal will as conceived in the concept of hendak borders upon instinct, it can at least be shown that in this case, where hendak is applied instead of mahu, the cat's action is determined not by two factors but by only one factor: a certain physical condition which determines the cat's choice (as in (ii) above). The example I have given is the application of mahu in the negative form preceded by the word tidak. It is also a fact significant in bringing out more vividly the meaning of mahu that mahu is

509. See above, pp. 190 - 192.
found used mainly in the negative form. In its positive (affirmative) form, the meaning structure undergoes no changes; if I say: "Kuching itu mahu makan" - "That cat wants to eat", then it is still presupposed that the cat has been offered food and accepts it. In other words, the word 'want' translating mahu here means really 'agree' - the cat agrees to my offer (proposition) to eat.\(^510\) Mahu is restricted in its field of application in the non-metaphorical sense only to the animate realm.

In early Malay writings, mahu was not frequently used, and if found appeared mainly in the negative form. Even in the writings of the comparatively modern 'Abdu'Llāh Munshī the last remark in the preceding sentence holds true. Furthermore, the noun form kemahuan is not found until only in contemporary times and this phenomenon seems to be the result of influences stemming from Western concepts of will as response to man-made or man-induced challenges.\(^511\) This conclusion is not unfounded, especially when we consider the meaning underlying the concept of mahu. It is mahu and not hendak that has now logically developed into the modern Malay concept of human will conceived as initiative to accept

\(^510\) For further verification of my conclusion regarding 21, 33, 35, 107, 111, 125, 155; cp. ibid., p.15; Hikayat Hang Tuah, p.319; Sejarah Melayu, p.305.

\(^511\) See above, pp. 187, 211 foll.
and overcome challenges generally of an outside nature and origin. It can also now be understood why mahu has never been applied to denote Divine Volition, and the absurdity of such an application from a philosophical point of view is generally recognized though not always comprehended in the Malay linguistic consciousness.

(d) Ḥamzah's concept of the Divine Will (irādah).

One of the most serious charges levelled against Ḥamzah by Rānīrī is that of his alleged adherence to the belief of the Philosophers in the doctrine of the eternity of the world. It is one of the most serious charges because the belief in this doctrine necessarily implies the logical conclusion of denying God His Creative Will and Power. This belief alone would inevitably entail expulsion from membership of the Muslim Community and rejection of faith in İslām, as it violates one of the cardinal doctrines of İslām. Rānīrī's brief summary of the salient points of the Philosophers' belief in the eternity of the world, undoubt- edly paraphrased from Ghazzālī's Tahāfut, is given thus:

According to the Philosophers, the Being of God and the World are both eternal, for [8] it [i.e. the World together with all its parts] emanates from the Being of God of its own accord, and not due to the Will of the Truth Most Exalted, in the same manner as
the sun's light emanates\textsuperscript{512} from the sun's essence. The sun has no power to withhold its light; so long as the sun exists its light will exist. Hence in the like manner, so long as God's Essence exists so will the World exist, neither separate nor existing per se apart from the Divine Essence from and to all eternity in absolute communion. Furthermore, they say that God Most Exalted has no power over all [that which emanates from Him], and that He has no power to create anything other than and apart from that which has emanated from Him. He has no power to change the World that already is.\textsuperscript{513}

As I have said in the beginning of this chapter, a semantic analysis of the conceptual structures of the words \textit{hendak} and its derivatives must first be carried out before an understanding of Ḥamzah's concepts of the Divine Will and Power can be fully realized, for \textit{hendak} and its derivatives comprise the only logical recipient of the above concepts acquired in the Malay language. It is not surprising that it should have been \textit{hendak} together with its derivatives that have been suitably applied to contain, more or less transparently, concepts couched in the fourth form of the Arabic verb \textit{arāda}, its verbal noun \textit{irādah} and its active and passive participles \textit{murid} and \textit{murād} respectively. In Ḥamzah, \textit{hendak} and its derivatives have also been applied to mean the Arabic \textit{shā'a}, and the Persian \textit{khwast}, the latter

\textsuperscript{512} Rānīrī's note: The World emanates from the Essence of its own free will without being willed into existence by God.

\textsuperscript{513} \\ \textit{Hujjah}, pp.7-8. See Appendix IV, (viii).
indeed corresponding to the former. In fact Ibn Sīna, followed later by Naṣīr-i-Khusraw, used khwast as a Persian philosophical term corresponding to the Arabic īradah.\textsuperscript{514} It is clear that kehendak as a verbal noun must be treated as a philosophical term corresponding to the Arabic īradah and mashī'ah and the Persian khwast, particularly in the writings of Ḥamzah. Although, as I have mentioned in the preceding chapter,\textsuperscript{515} Ḥamzah does not appear to make any clear distinction between mashī'ah and amr which proceeds logically from īradah, yet it is quite clear that the word kehendak in Ḥamzah logically develops to mean mashī'ah and it is interchangeably applied to mean īradah as well, depending upon the context.

In Ḥamzah, the word hendak is used in three different ways: to imply an ethical code of behaviour (hendaklah); to show necessary logical connection between concepts (hendaknya); and to mean will. It is in the last mentioned usage that this chapter will deal with henceforth. The word hendak is used to mean īzm,\textsuperscript{516} a Persian word (verbal noun) of Arabic derivation meaning, among other possible meanings, settled purpose, firm resolve, determination to accomplish an undertaking. In the context in which

\textsuperscript{515} See above, p.184.
\textsuperscript{516} Asrar, pp.28-29.
it appears in the quotation from Maghribī, it means the mystic's firm resolve to set out on a mystical journey. 'Azm can also refer to the Divine Purpose. In a commentary on Ibnu'l-'Arabi's verse about the Lofty Letters (ḥurūf 'āliyāt), hendak is used to describe the volitive movement (gerak) of the Pure Potentialities in the Divine Knowledge.517 A similar use of hendak appears with reference to the Fixed Essences (al-aʾyānu'l-thābitah).518 In both cases the use of hendak refers to the desire for manifestation of the Pure Potentialities of the Fixed Essences in the ontological order above the Creative Word: "Kun!" ("Be!"), where no distinction is conceived between them and the Essence. In surah 16:93 of the Qurʾān: Wa law shā'a'Llāhu laja'alakum ummatan wāhidatan ... If God so willed He could make you one people ... the word shā'a is translated as hendak,519 and it clearly refers to the Divine Desire (Decree) (mashī'ah) determining the creature to be what its nature required it to be. There exists a logical connection between hendak as shā'a and hendak as gerak referred to above as the volitive movement of the Pure Potentialities of the Fixed Essences in the Divine Essence.

517. Ibid., p.37.
518. Sharāb, p.16.
519. Aṣrār, p.46.
The words dikehendaki\(^{520}\) and menghendaki occur only once in Ḥamzah's writings; in both cases they refer to man. The scarcity of these words in Ḥamzah's system is most significant: these words cannot be applied to God for in both cases they convey meanings denoting insufficiency in certain qualities.\(^{521}\)

It is also most significant that Ḥamzah denies the application of the word sekehendak with reference to the Divine Will. This is because he conceives the Divine Will to be an act of wisdom and not that of a capricious tyrant. Ḥamzah's polemic against the Doctors of Theology on this point is why call God just if He "does whatever He desires" (berbuat barang sekehendakNya)?\(^{522}\) The Doctors of Theology answer:

The analogy is like one who owns many goats; some are slaughtered by him, then skinned, then boiled, then roasted and pierced with skewers. It is he who owns them - [and they are] not the possession of other people. If [they are] other people's possession [and they] are slaughtered by him, then unjust is the verdict [against him].\(^{523}\)

This answer of the Doctors of Theology is in keeping with

---

\(^{520}\) This word is used to translate the Persian khwāst.

\(^{521}\) Dikehendaki implies that the object desired is either absent or vague to the desiring subject; menghendaki implies a need in virtue of what is lacking. See above, pp. 201-204.

\(^{522}\) Sharāb, p. 20.

\(^{523}\) Ibid., p. 21.
that of al-Ash'ari²⁴ and betrays that their conception of sekehendak is that the doing of whatever one pleases is justified on the condition that what one does at will one does to one's own. Logically they assert that sekehdaknya means the subject doing what he desires to the object which belongs to him. Whether the object is a willing or unwilling recipient of the subject's action is not discussed. But compare this concept of sekehendak with that of 'Abdu'Llāh in his application of sekehdak when he describes the character of the Malay Rajas.²⁵ There sekehendak conveys the meaning that if a person takes the wealth of another without the other's consent, or takes by force the wife and children of another, or takes the life of another without just cause, then he is committing a wrongful and unjust action – but only if he takes without consent, or by force, or without just cause. Supposing he takes another's wealth with the owner's consent, another's wife and children not by force, another person's life with just cause, then the word sekehendak will not be applicable to describe his action. 'Abdu'Llāh means, in the passage referred to, that it is not good and just even for a king, because he is king, to impose upon his people whatever his heart desires. Here is revealed

²⁴ Al-Ash'ari, (Kitāb al-Luma'), chapter on 'Discussion of the imputation of justice and injustice to God', especially p.99, para. 170.
²⁵ See above, pp.207-208.
another element in the conceptual structure of sekehendak in addition to what has already been explained. The Doctors of Theology conceive that sekehendak means the doing of whatever one pleases to one's own possessions. 'Abdu'Llāh's passage reveals that if one's own possessions are the willing objects of one's desire, then logically sekehendak cannot be applied to one; it is only if the object of one's desire are the unwilling recipients of one's action that sekehendak can be applied to one, for it is the very essence of the concept of sekehendak to include within its meaning structure the sense of force, of capricious imposition. Sekehendak is then the imposition of one's blind will upon the will (kehendak) of others.

From the point of view of semantics, Ḥamzah's application of the word sekehendak reveals that he understood its meaning far more precisely than the Doctors of Theology. Since the fundamental elements in the concept of sekehendak are opposed to the idea of justice and knowledge, it is most logical that in his system Ḥamzah never applied the word to describe either the Divine Power (qudrah), Will (irādah) or Desire (mashī'ah) which decrees nothing that does not come to pass, for such an application would inevitably convey the idea that God is unjust because it would mean that He

526. See above, pp. 206-208.
purposely allows the otherwise unwilling unbelievers to disbelieve, punishing them with Hell for their disbelief.\textsuperscript{527} Ğamzah conceives God to act not as He pleases in the sekehendak\textsuperscript{N}ya sense, rather God acts in conformity with (muwāfaqat) the Pure Potentialities (isti'dād āslī) in His Knowledge. From His Attribute of Beauty (jamāl) is created the believer, from That of His Majesty (jalāl) the unbeliever, each according to his potential nature. The believer believes and the unbeliever disbelieves not because God pleases that they be so, but because of their very natures, and because of their very natures too each will ultimately return to his fount of origin.\textsuperscript{528} The Doctors of Theology, refuting this view, would say that if this be the case, then God's Will and Power would merely be empty names, for things come into being by virtue of their potential natures and not by virtue of the Divine Will and Power.\textsuperscript{529} Ğamzah rejects this refutation by affirming that God has Will and Power but that His Will and Power works in conformity with knowledge of the things willed.\textsuperscript{530} The things willed are not nothing (as the Doctors of Theology who hold the doctrine of creation ex nihilo assert), neither are they entities possessed of independent existence "apart" from God; they are the Fixed

\textsuperscript{527} Sharāb, pp.20-21.  
\textsuperscript{528} Ibid., pp.21-22.  
\textsuperscript{529} Ibid., p.22.  
\textsuperscript{530} Loc. cit.
Essences (al-a'yān'u'l-thābitah), the Pure Potentialities (isti'dād aslī), the Reality of Things (al-ḥaqīqatu'l-ashyāʾ), the Cognitive Forms (al-šuwaru'l-'ilmīyyah), or Divine Ideas, the Universal Intellect (al-'aqlu'l-kullī). \(^{531}\) Were it not for God's Power bringing them forth from Non-Existence (ma'dūm) they would never exist as such; \(^{532}\) and unless God wills their projection to appear as 'temporal' existence according to what their natures determine, they cannot exist as 'temporal' existence. God wills them as 'noumena' to project themselves as 'phenomena' through the Divine Command (amr) 'Be!'. What 'comes forth' as the result of the Divine Command is what we call creation, \(^{533}\) or the external world together with all its parts. What still lie dormant, as it were, in the Divine Knowledge, ready to leap into 'being' at His Command, are neither created nor uncreated, for they are Modes or Predispositions of the Divine Essence (shuʿūn Dhat). In this way Ḥamzah denies both the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and that of the coexistence of the World with God. God is logically prior to His creation and in this sense creation has a 'beginning' and comes into being by virtue of God's Creative Command. It is this Creative Command that is

531. For an explanation of the Fixed Essences, see above, pp. 136 - 144.
532. See above, pp. 134 - 135; 143.
533. See above, pp. 133 - 135. The second of the two categories of creation is here meant.
534. Asrar, pp. 34 - 35.
God's Act of willing. When God wills a thing to come into being, it comes into being complete and perfect, for if it does not come into being complete and perfect it would logically mean that God still has to make it complete and perfect, and this in turn implies that God wills without prior knowledge of the thing willed, which is absurd.535

It has been said earlier that Ŧamzah denies the application of the word sekehendak to denote the Divine Will or Volition, and that this is so by virtue of the fact that the word conveys a definite meaning of unrestricted, blind desire (power, will) which excludes the notion of knowledge, justice and wisdom. There are, however, two occasions in Ŧamzah's writings where the application of sekehendak and barang kehendak (synonymous with sekehendak) occur, and in both cases they seem at first glance to denote the Divine Will and Desire:

(i) Adapun kepada Ahlu'l-'Usshāq sekalian hijāb dan quyyūd dih akannya. Perbuatan itu bukan ia meniyyatkan sekehendak Allah ...536
But to the Lovers all these537 are veils and restrictions unto the Self. Action that refers to these does not realize whatever God desires ...

536. Asrār, p. 64.
537. 'These' refers to clothing, cultivation of land, having a family.
and

(ii) Adapun akan orang Ahlu'l-Sulūk, da'īm menyerahkan diri kepada Tuhannya. Barang kehendak Tuhannya ia rādī; jika sakit atau miskin, atau lain mithalnya itu - sekalian ia rādī.

The People of the Path constantly surrender themselves to their Lord. They consent wholeheartedly to whatever their Lord's desire may be; whether it be sickness or poverty or other conditions such as these - to all these they willingly give their consent.

It can be seen at once from the contexts that the application of both sekehendak (i) and barang kehendak (ii) does not really denote the Divine Will or Desire, rather only metaphorically so. The emphases in both cases: "whatever God desires" and "whatever their Lord's desire" refer not to God, but to the spiritual attitude of the Ṣūfīs who have reached the stations of 'love' (maḥabbah) and complete 'trust in God' (tawakkul) from which 'satisfaction' (riḍā) develops. In other words, such Ṣūfīs have attained to certain stations in their mystical journey in which selfishness is completely eradicated; in which their spiritual attitude makes them feel that even if God were to do whatever He pleases with them, they would gladly acquiesce.

It is very important at this stage to note the

538. Asrār, p.70.
539. Op. Kitāb Mukhtasar, p.52, the same meaning of barang kehendak occurs.
significance of Ḥamzah's consistency in translating the fourth form of the Arabic verb arāda as berkehendak.⁵⁴⁰ This is of course consistent with his cosmology. Although berkehendak is mainly used to translate arāda, it is also used to translate the active participle of arāda: murīd,⁵⁴¹ and the verb shā'ā,⁵⁴² but only once in each case. Berkehendak applied here to God's act of willing is an extremely powerful expression. God is conceived as willing a thing - that is, the potentiality (pl. isti'dād) of a thing which is still not 'separate' from the Essence - intending what it shall become in such a manner that at His Command it 'projects' itself, as it were, and becomes 'externalized' as part of creation.⁵⁴³ The thing willed is 'present' and known to God 'before' His Command acts upon it and transforms it into 'external being'. This is so because the thing willed belongs to the Divine Ideas; it is a Predisposition or 'Mode' of God. God the Knower sees Himself as the Known with all His 'Modes' and Predispositions.

⁵⁴⁰ Asrār, pp. 30, 32, 35; Sharāb, p. 17.
⁵⁴¹ Asrār, p. 29.
⁵⁴² Muntahi, p. 121. But see below, pp. 229-230.
⁵⁴³ Jīlī defines the Will (irādah) of God as "His particularization (takhsīs) of the objects of His Knowledge by existence (wujūd), according to the requirements of His knowledge." Insānū'l-Kāmil, I, p. 80. The English translation of the definition is by Nicholson, see Studies, p. 102.
He 'hears' the potentialities of the Known desiring to be manifested. In this sense, berkehendak denotes a mutual relationship as that between lovers. Hence the Holy Tradition: 'I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known, so I created creation that I might be known.'

Furthermore, since berkehendak contains within its meaning structure the element of love, it must be understood as no mere coincidence that Ḥamzah uses it in the above manner.

But the important concept here is that berkehendak conveys the idea that God directs His Will towards 'something' that is known and present to Him; and the thing known and present (ḥādir) - a Mode of God - reciprocates God's desire for it to come into being by desiring to come into being according to its inherent nature. A comparison between Ḥamzah's translation and that of 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf of Singkel of the same

544. Asrār, pp. 29-30, 32-33. See also above, pp. 140-141 (7).
545. Jīlī, enumerating nine phases of Will (irādah), says that the last phase is the highest and purest love ('ishq). See Insānu'ī-Kāmil, I, pp. 80-81. See also Studies, pp. 102, 80, and note 3 on p. 80.
546. 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf (c. 1620-1693) was regarded as one of the most eminent Šūfis of Acheh and the rest of the Malay-speaking world. But he was more of a religious teacher and an 'Alīm rather than a Šūfī in the sense Ḥamzah was. Though he did not appear to join openly in the polemic against Ḥamzah begun by Rānīrī, he seemed to support Rānīrī's views. For more about 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf, see also Rinkes, D.A., Abdoerracef van Singkel, (diss.), Freisland, 1909. For a short account about 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf see E.I., new ed., Leiden, 1960, p. 88.
Quranic passage is most revealing:

\[
\text{Innama amruhu idhā arāda shay'ān an yaqūla lāhu kūn fa yakūn.}^{547}
\]

Hamzah's translation:

Bahwasanya barang titahNya, tatakala berkehendak kepada suatu, bahwa berkata baginya: "Jadi lu!" - menjadi.\(^{548}\)

'Abdu'l-Ra'uf's translation:

Hanya sanya pekerjaanNya, apabila dikehendakiNya menjadikan suatu, bahwa dikatakan baginya: "Ada engkau!" - maka ada suatu itu.\(^{549}\)

'Abdu'l-Ra'uf's translation of arāda as dikehendaki deprives much of the emphasis on the factitive or causative nature of the action or will which it denotes. Furthermore, his use of dikehendaki here reveals his conception of the doctrine of creation as ex nihilo. In the verb kehendaki, the object desired is absent or vague to the desiring subject. The i implies that the object desired is sought after by the subject. Thus in making use of dikehendaki to translate arāda, 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf expresses the idea that the thing

---

547. 36:82.
548. Āsrār, p.30.
549. This is from 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf's Malay translation and commentary of the Qur'ān based on that of al-Baydāwī. I am quoting the 4th ed. published in Cairo in 1901, vol.2, p.46. 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf's complete translation of the Qur'ān into Malay with commentary is, I think, the first of its kind to be done in the Malay-speaking world.
willed or desired is not present to God, or that God creates from nothing. The implications brought forward by this explanation are not only made more plausible, but indeed affirmed by virtue of the fact that 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf translates the imperative *kun* as *ada*. Now Ḥamzah never uses the word *ada* as an imperative, and its usage as such is very rare, 'Ada!' in this context means 'exist!' or 'be!' in the sense of coming into being or appearing out of nothing; the word conveys the idea very much like that of a magician conjuring something to appear out of 'thin air' where it was not there before. Ḥamzah translates the imperative *kun* as 'jadi!', which means 'be!' in the sense of harmonious becoming. The imperative 'jadi!' implies that the object towards which it is directed already exists, but in a latent state, pregnant as it were with potentialities which at the Command 'Be!' proceed to come into being harmoniously. Jadi, then, refers to something already existing, whereas *ada* conveys the meaning of making something appear when it was not there before. The same goes for the word *titah* by which Ḥamzah translates *amr*, meaning command. Titah implies the existence

550. Compare further both Ḥamzah and 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf in their translation of Qur'an 16:40 where the concepts I have analysed reveal the consistent systems in Ḥamzah and 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf. See Asrar, p.32, and 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf, *op.cit.*, vol.1, p.272.
of its object, whereas the word pekerjaan by which 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf translates amr means work and does not convey the implication of the prior existence of the object of amr.

In the light of the above analysis, a modern translation of the same ayat by Mahmūd Yunus of Padang551 clearly reveals great confusion in that the concepts hendak ada and jadi are haphazardly applied without consistency or regard for any systematic doctrine such as that of the creation ex nihilo ('Abdu'l-Ra'uf) or its opposite (Hāmzah);

Hanya urusan (perintah) Allah itu, bila
Ia menghendaki mengadakan satu, Ia berkata:
Jadilah engkau! Lalu terjadilah ia.552

Menghendaki implies a lack of or need for something,553 and it is absurd to conceive God as lacking or needing something. Mengadakan implies creation from nothing, but the use of jadi as an imperative, although correct, is not consistent with mengadakan.

Closely connected with berkehendak, which in Hāmzah's system clearly denotes the irādah rather than the mashī'ah, is the concept kehendak which denotes the mashī'ah. Yet the use of berkehendak to refer to the irādah and kehendak to refer to the mashī'ah is not absolute and

553. See above, p. 204.
mutually excluding in both cases. In the same manner that berkehendak on one occasion is used to translate shā'a, so is kehendak, also on one occasion, used to translate irādah. But it is important to note that in both cases of the exception to the rule berkehendak (shā'a) and kehendak (irādah) refer to human desire and will and not to Divine Desire and Will. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that berkehendak and kehendak each logically develops to mean the concept of irādah and that of mashī'ah respectively. In Ḥamzah's system, the Divine kehendak is applied to translate idhn, gerak, shā'a, khwast. All these words correspond to shā'a and they denote the mashī'ah. The Malay word gerak meaning volitive movement, is used to translate the word idhn. The Divine uncreated Will (mashī'ah) decrees nothing that does not come to pass. Both good (khayr) and evil (sharr) which are effects of the

554. Muntahī, p.126.
555. Asrār, p.44; Sharāb, p.22.
556. Muntahī, p.120.
557. Asrār, p.46.
559. Ibid., p.120. Ibn Ḥazm, discussing the creation of faith (Imān) in his work Al-Fīsāl fī'l-Milal wa'l-Ahwā wa'l-Nihāl, 2v., Cairo, 1317-1321, pt.IV, pp.138-139, identifies idhn as God's mashī'ah on the basis of his interpretation of Sūrah 10:100. The same identification is made by al-Bayādī the Ḥanafi-Māturīdī theologian. Cf. Izutsu, T., The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology, Tokyo, 1965, pp.215; 223.
Divine Names Beauty (jayamál) and Majesty (jalāl) are 'present' (hadīr) to God in the form of Pure Potentialities (isti'dād āslī). They are the 'objects' of the mashī'ah which is governed by Perfection (kamāl) and Wisdom (hikmat), thus denoting a kind of equilibrium of qualities in the Divine Nature. It is with reference to the mashī'ah that ʿAmzah translates (or rather interprets according to the Sufi point of view) verse 16:93 of the Qur'ān thus:

Jika hendak menjadikan kamu ummat suatu, dapat; tetapi menyesatkan dengan kehendakNya, menunjukkan jalan yang betul dengan kehendakNya.

562. Ibid., p.46:

Wa law shā'a'Llahu laja'alakum ummatan wāḥidatān wa lākin yudillu man yashā'u wa yahdī man yashā'u.

Compare with 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf's rendering:
Dan jikalau dikehendaki Allāh Ta'alā, nischaya dijadikan kamu orang satu agama; tetapi disesatkan Allāh Ta'alā akan barangsiapa yang dikehendakiNya, dan ditunjukNya akan barangsiapa yang dikehendakiNya. (op.cit., vol.I, p.279).

and that of Maḥmūd Yūnus:
Sekiranya Allah menghendaki, nischaya dijadikanNya kamu menjadi satu ummat; Tetapi Dia menyesatkan orang yang dikehendakiNya, dan menunjuk orang yang dikehendakiNya. (op.cit., p.230).
The meaning that Ḥamzah wants to convey in his rendering of the above-mentioned verse, based upon the concepts underlying the key words he uses (hendak, menjadikan, kehendak), is this:

If God had wished to create you [who are present to Him as objects of His knowledge] into a single people [having one faith], He would have done so; but He causes you to go astray by His Desire (mashī'ah), and He causes you to be guided on the right path by His Desire (mashī'ah).

Since the mashī'ah is governed by Wisdom and Perfection, it means therefore that God cannot will what is logically impossible, and this brings us to another concept — that of Divine Power or qudrah (kuasa). Power is defined by Jilī as the bringing of the non-existent into existence (al-bārizah) or the production from non-existence (Ijād).

In Ḥamzah the same concept of Power is evident. The Essence gazes upon Itself and sees Itself together with all the

563. Like the Philosophers, to whose views on this point even al-Ghazzālī concedes (see Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, pp. 328-329), Ḥamzah asserts that God cannot will what is logically impossible. See also Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, notes, p. 40. 53. I. Ḥabīb b. Ḥarīmī in his Fīṣīḥāt-l-Ḥikām (Cairo, 1321, pp. 75-76) comes to the same conclusion in his interpretation of Sūrah 6:149: Fa law shā'ā lahaddakum ajma'īn: Had God willed, He would have guided you all aright. See also Studies, p. 151. However, in contrast with the Philosophers, and like al-Ghazzālī, Ḥamzah — and for that matter the Sūfīs — accepts this without denying God infinite possibility for exercising His Power.

564. Insānu'l-Kāmil, I, p. 82: Fa'l-qudratu hiya guwawatu'l-bārizatu li'l-mawjūdātī mina'l-'adam ... Wa'l-qudratu 'indanā ijādu'l-ma'dūm ...
Predispositions within Itself. It is Power that gives It the capacity to see Itself and the Known in Its Knowledge. The Act of 'seeing' here corresponds to that of producing (Ijād) or bringing forth (bārizah) in Jilī. The notion that God first draws forth existence from the non-existent and causes it to be in His Knowledge is denoted in Ḥamzah by the word mengadakan. From ada, that is from being or existing in His Knowledge. God then brings it forth as 'external' existence, and this notion is denoted by the word menjadikan.

566. Ibid., p.31: Jikalau tiada Kuasa, manakan dapat memandang DiriNya pandang ma'lūmāt yang dalam 'ilmuNya?
567. Mengadakan means to cause to exist. The stem word ada implies that the existence caused is from non-existence. The word mengadakan occurs in a context describing creation (see above, pp.134-135 (1)), and God in the act of creation referred to is described as sempurna mengadakan. See Asrār, p.38; also above, pp.132-133, and below, p.287-289.
568. Asrār, p.52: Menjadikan makhluq siang dan malam, and passim. Cf. Insānu’l-Kāmil, I, p.83: Thumma abrazahā mina’l-‘alami’l-‘ilmīy ilā’l-‘alami’l-‘ayniy biqudratihi wa Ijāduhu li’l-makhluqāti Ijādan mina’l-‘adami ilā’l-‘ilmī ilā’l-‘ayni ... In Sharāb, p.17: Yang tiada itu tiada dapat menjadí ada; ... the word tiada (non-existent) refers to nihilo in the sense understood by the upholders of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, and not to the Non-Existent, (ma’dum) referring to the Essence. Here Ḥamzah follows Ibnul’-Arabi, whom Jilī quotes (Insānu’l-Kāmil, I, p.82): Inna’Ilāha lam yakhluqu’l-ashyā’a mina’l-‘adam. See also Studies, p.103 and consult further in this connection, above, pp.130-132.
The assertion that God cannot will what is logically impossible is not an assertion that God is not All-Powerful. It is an assertion that God's Power is not capricious, tyrannical or chaotic:

Another analogy is, like the king who is complete in power. [Let us say that] he can effect changes in his power: he can transform the elephant into a horse, or the horse into an elephant; or the goat into a dog, or the dog into a goat. But he does not want to effect changes in his power [in the manner described], since if he effects such changes, his perfection is destroyed.

What is implied here is that if we discard the notion of a necessary causal sequence and attribute everything to the Creator's caprice, then the configurations of things would cease to exist in the sense that they would not possess recognizable natures; knowledge would possess no meaning. Furthermore, if the Creator transforms elephants into horses and goats into dogs, then it would mean, unless it is His caprice, that the Creator has not created something

569. Sharāb, pp. 22-23.
570. The word kekayaan, as used by Hamzah (literally: wealth) seems to me to correspond with the Arabic  ghana’, and in the context above, it means capability, or better, power.
perfect in the first instance and that what He created is in need of perfection - an admission of lack of knowledge and wisdom on the Creator's part. Supposing the king in Hamzah's analogy effects the transformations mentioned; can his will in doing so be properly called will? The passage quoted shows that it cannot, for the word mahu implies that the king has been challenged to display his power. If he wills the transformations, then although his will works in conformity with his knowledge of the things willed, it is not based upon his choice; for here the challenge has determined his choice. Furthermore his will, determined by the challenge, is not governed by wisdom since what he has been challenged to will is logically impossible.

Finally, it is consistent with the cosmological and ontological pattern set forth in Hamzah's mysticism that the key word kehendak, when applied to human will and desire in relation to the Divine, does not convey a real meaning, but a metaphorical one, since man as 'phenomena' does not have himself as the determining ground of his will. Man's

---

571. Asrār, pp. 31, 34, 37, 39; Sharāb, p. 23.
572. On the meaning structure of mahu as distinguished from that of hendak, see above, pp. 211-214. In his writings, Hamzah uses mahu only on two occasions: in the passage quoted above and in Asrār, p. 73.
573. Ibid., pp. 76-77; cf. above, pp. 211-214. The Kitab Mukhtasar (see above, p. 203, note 496) which deals at length about man's dual nature, says: "Tiada yang hendak melainkan Allāh" - "None wills except God" (p. 38).
kehendak is a veil (ḥijāb), since its illusory nature distracts him from higher Selfhood; it is will or desire belonging to diri, the lower self (nafs). In the mystical context, kehendak with reference to man means exactly the Arabic hawā, as is shown also in Ḥamzah's translation of Surah 53:3:

Wa mā yantīqu 'anī'l-hawā ...

Tiada Nabī Allāh itu berkata daripada kehendak hatinya ...

The true object of man's kehendak is God alone, and in this case the kehendak refers to man as 'noumena', the Diri or higher Self. For God alone to be the Object of man's kehendak, it is necessary that complete surrender of the lower self (diri) to God (tawakkal: menyerahkan diri), disentanglement (tajrīd: tinggal) from the desires of the lower self, isolation (tafrīd: tunggal) in God, and love

574. Āsrār, p. 64.
575. Sharāb, pp. 3-4. 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf translates hawā as hawa nafsu, i.e. the desires of the self (al-nafsu'l-ammārah). In the Kitāb Mukhtasar, hawā is kehendak yang rendah (or hina), i.e. the lowly passions or desires (pp. 72-73).
(ishq: berahi) of God be involved. 576

576. See the last chapter of the Sharāb. It seems to me that, from a philosophical point of view, it is not altogether irrelevant to compare the two aspects of kehendak in man with the Kantian empirical and transcendental will; the former empirically determined and setting as its end happiness, and the latter having its determining ground within its self and setting as its end virtue. The necessarily highest end of the transcendental will, however, and its true object, is the Highest Good. Up to a certain point there is a correspondence between the mystical and the philosophical standpoint regarding the problem of the nature of man and his will; but while the mystic resolves the problem by eradicating dualism, the philosopher maintains dualism throughout. See above, pp.
CHAPTER V

KEY WORDS IN ḤAMZAH'S MYSTICAL SYSTEM

The last chapter has dealt somewhat elaborately with an exposition of Ḥamzah's concept of the Divine Will (irādah) following a semantic approach: an analysis revolving around the conceptual structure of the Malay word hendak. My task here will be to deal with concepts underlying other 'key' words in Ḥamzah's mystical system. I understand key words to be a product of the crystallization of the major mystical concepts in Ḥamzah's system, and his system is none other than his weltanschauung - his vision of God, Man and Universe, that is, Reality. The structure of the World of Being and the major constituents of that World are reflected and crystallized in the key words. The system, then, is a kind of ontology. The key words together form what I call Ḥamzah's semantic 'vocabulary'. For the purpose now at hand it is not necessary to examine the concepts underlying every word in the semantic vocabulary. It will be sufficient to examine only the major key words, semantic 'fields' and 'focus' words in that vocabulary, for since the vocabulary is composed of interrelated and interdependent words, those words here unexplained can easily explain themselves. But

---

577. An index of Ḥamzah's semantic vocabulary, alphabetically arranged and semantically classified, is given in Appendix VII.
first I must explain and clarify the technical terms that have been introduced above, as they are very important methodological concepts which prove to be of great utility in a study such as outlined in this chapter. 578

By semantic vocabulary, I understand not a mere gathering together of words, but a systematic gestalt - an arrangement in meaningful pattern. It would appear at first that all one has to do is to isolate what to one are important words as in an ordinary index. The problem is not so simple. The words isolated - in this case from Ḥamzah's writings - must also be words that are closely interrelated and interdependent and derive their meanings from the entire system of relations. The word ada for example, meaning 'to be' or 'existence' is a word that has existed in the Malay language certainly since before the Islamic or even Hindu periods. It is a pure Malay word and its use at least in pre-Islamic times seems to have been limited to a particular

578. For the methodological concepts, I am greatly indebted to Professor Toshihiko Izutsu of Keio University, Tokyo, whose course of lectures at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, in the springs of 1962 and 1963 has been of great benefit to me. These lectures have subsequently been expanded and published by the Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, Tokyo, 1964 under the title God and man in the Koran. Chapters I and II are relevant to the present study. Professor Izutsu's book will hereafter be cited as Izutsu.
category of being or existence. But Hamzah's use of it - as I will later demonstrate - has given new meanings which reveals no mere change in the Malay conception of the nature of being or existence, but a change, at once drastic and radical, in the whole conceptual system purporting to give a vision of the Universe. The vocabulary, then, has its own sphere of conceptualization, a network interrelated. The vocabulary is comprised of words that have significance in contributing to the overall picture of the author's vision of Reality. These words are like individual pieces of a jigsaw puzzle; each one contributing a particular aspect of the picture as a whole, and doing so only when each is set in relation to the others. Within the vocabulary, there are what is known as semantic fields or conceptual spheres which necessarily overlap with each other being, like the key words of which they are comprised, interrelated and interdependent. If a semantic field is large enough, it may be called a sub-vocabulary. A semantic field is comprised of key words clustering around a particular key word, and this key word may also be a focus word in that particular semantic field, although it may not necessarily be a focus word in other semantic fields in the same vocabulary. A key word is called a focus word if its semantic field is clearly defined and stands out above the others as an important field closely
connected with the central concept of the entire vocabulary. In this sense, the concept of the focus word corresponds to the Aristotelian concept of the arché.\(^{579}\) An illustration of what has been said so far can be given in the following example taken from Šamzah's vocabulary where concepts do not stand alone, but are interrelated, ordered and systematized as gestalten. A group of key words such as haps, lenyap, tiada (meaning fana': mystical extinction or passing away); bertemu (meaning wasl: mystical union); berahi (meaning 'ishq: mystical love of God); dinding (meaning hijāb: veil separating appearance from reality or phenomena from noumena); diri (meaning nafs: the Self); sembah (meaning to worship, from the Arabic root 'abada); Tuhan (meaning rabb: Lord); haqīqat\(^{580}\) (meaning reality); kekal (meaning baqā': subsistence in God); nyata (meaning yaqīn: certainty [achieved through illumination]) - all cluster around the semantic field of the key word kenal (meaning ma'rifah: gnosis):–

---


580. The closest Malay equivalent of haqīqat is derived from the Malay word benar. But the form kebenaran as a translation of the word haqīqat is not found in Šamzah. He prefers to use the Arabic word, which seems to reveal that the word haqīqat has by then been accepted as a Malay word commonly used.
The key word *kenal* in the above example may also be regarded as a focus word, as the concept of gnosis (*ma'rifah*) is one of the most important concepts in Hamzah's system. Be that as it may, the key word *kenal*, in another semantic field, may only be one of the key words of relative importance as, for example, in the semantic fields of *Tuhan* (Lord), *Diri* (the Self) and *Haqiqat* (Reality) which in the above illustration appear as key words. It clearly shows too that the semantic fields of *Tuhan*, *Diri*, *Haqiqat* and *Kenal* overlap each other. In the semantic vocabulary, there is no semantic field that stands alone unrelated, as it were, to the other semantic fields within it. It is also this interrelation
that ultimately makes the semantic vocabulary an integrated whole. In the above example, the semantic field of kenal, apart from overlapping with those of Tuhan, Diri and Ḥaqiqat, is also closely related with the semantic field of the focus word ʿālam (the World or Universe) around which cluster the key words dinding, lenyap, tiada, hapus, etc.; the four key words being also key words in the semantic field of kenal. Each semantic field, then, represents a relatively independent conceptual sphere.

Closely connected with the concepts or the semantic vocabulary, semantic fields, focus words and key words is the concept of 'basic' and 'relational' meanings. Words do not reveal the objective reality of the things described, but rather concepts of them. What is important is therefore to comprehend the meanings of words not standing alone, but within their particular fields since the meanings of words are affected by the whole system. To take a simple example from Ḥamzah, consider the Malay word titah which in the Malay language means simply a command. This command is generally that of a person set up in a position of assumed

581. See Ogden and Richards, _The meaning of meaning_, London, 1923, Chapter I.
582. See, for example, in Izutsu, pp.19-20, where the meaning of the Arabic word yawn (day) is affected by the Quranic eschatological field comprised of the key words qiymah (resurrection), dīn (Judgement), baʾth (raising), hisāb (reckoning), etc.
divinity and charismatic authority such as a king according to the Malay concept of kingship particularly in pre-Islamic times. It is directed generally to his subjects who are merely human beings. Although the king is as much a human being as any other - and we may say that the word titah operates in the sphere of the same level of being - there is yet a clear hint that the word when given comes from 'above', not merely in the sense of a position or charismatic authority, but a position of divinity as well. The semantic field of the word titah taken in its original Malay form, that is, its basic meaning, would include such key words as raja (king), dewa (god), hamba (slave, i.e. subject), manusia (man), durhaka (treason), setia (loyal), kuasa (power), etc. In this sense, Hamzah's use of the word titah to translate the Arabic amr (command) of the Quranic Allah seems to have been a fitting choice as far as the vocabulary of the Malay language goes, although it is most important to note that when Hamzah does so he has already caused an alteration in the basic meaning of the word and has given a new meaning to it - a relational meaning. The relational meaning of the word titah has an entirely different semantic field than its basic meaning, and it reveals a drastic change affecting the Malay cultural context as adumbrated in the basic meaning of titah. In its relational meaning, the semantic field of the word titah would include such key words as Allah (God),
manusia (meaning in the Quranic context insān: man), kuasa (meaning in the Quranic context qudrah: power), Qur’ān, pesuruh (in the Quranic context rasūl: messenger), nābī (prophet), tanzīl (sending down [of revelation]), wahy (revelation), sembahyang (in the Quranic context ṣalāt: prayers), hamba (in the Quranic context 'abd: slave [of God], etc. It may be noticed that in the semantic fields of basic titah and relational titah, there are key words such as manusia, kuasa, hamba, and possibly even pesuruh, and sembahyang, which are common to both fields. One may be prompted to see in this presence of common words in the two semantic fields an overlapping of the two and a direct relationship between the one field and the other. But this would in fact be illusory as the key words in question would also acquire relational meanings in the semantic field of relational titah governed, as it were, by the influence of the Quranic context which contradicts the Malay cultural context reflected and crystallized in the semantic field of basic titah. Furthermore, apart from its relational meaning in the Quranic context, the key word titah in Ḥamzah has another relational meaning which may even be regarded as a technical term. This relational meaning is derived from the mystical context, where titah is identified as the Creative Word "Bel" (Kun), as an aspect of the Holy Spirit (rūḥ). This particular mystical context may in turn be subdivided
into ontological, cosmogonical, cosmological and psychological contexts. Here the semantic field of titah includes such key words as nyawa (meaning rūḥ: spirit; also meaning nafs: soul), diri (meaning nafs: soul), jadi (derived from the Arabic root kwn, also from the imperative kun: to be), menjadikan (meaning khalaqa: to create), ada (meaning mawjūd: existing), berkehendak (meaning murīd: willing), nyata (meaning ẓāhir: manifest), nyawa berchampur (meaning rūḥ ẓafī: relational spirit), chahaya [Muḥammad] (meaning nūr [Muḥammad]: Light [of Muḥammad]), khāliq (creator), makhluq (created), Dhāt (Essence), 'ilmu (knowledge [Divine]), ma'lūm (known), Ḥaqīqat Muḥammad (Reality or Idea of Muḥammad), 'Aql ([the First] Intellect), Qalam (Pen), etc. 584

It is important, now that I have used the word 'context' in connection with relational meaning, to make a distinction between what I understand by context in its relation to semantic field. Although the concepts of context and semantic field bear a close relationship with one another and with the concept of relational meaning, they are by no means identical in meaning. Context is preparatory - it precedes the semantic field. Semantic field is the product

583. Usually, however, Ḥamzah means by nyawa: spirit (rūḥ) - although he once means by it the soul (nafs). The soul in Ḥamzah is usually referred to simply as diri or nafs. 584. Consult above, pp. 146-156.
of context. But not all context produces a semantic field.
Consider, for example, the statement: 'There is a piano in the kitchen'. Contextually this is admissable as it describes a fact. But 'piano' and 'kitchen' do not produce any semantic field. There is no semantic value in their combination, no relational meaning. The nature and purpose of the kitchen is at variance with those of the piano. But if instead of piano we have 'knife', 'pot', 'spices', 'oven', etc., then a semantic field is produced as the objects denoted by those words are relational to cooking and general culinary activity. The association of words such as in this case 'knife', 'pot', 'spices', 'oven' and the key word 'kitchen' is a semantic field.

It will now become clear, with regard to my previous references about interpretations of the key words wujūd, ada, and diri in Šamzah's mystical system given by Rānīrī and Šamzah's assumed 'follower', that they have confused their interpretations between basic and relational meanings, which led to further confusion in contexts and semantic fields. In Šamzah's context, all those key words belong to semantic fields pertaining to the ontological level above the Creative Word Kun, whereas their interpretations have effected a transference of semantic fields to those pertaining

585. See above, pp. 70, 72, 81, 84 - 87.
to the ontological level below the Creative Word. It is most important to note that the words that have played such a controversial role are not merely key words—they are also focus words, not only of individual or particular semantic fields, but of all the semantic fields in Ḥamzah's system.

All the key words in Ḥamzah's semantic vocabulary revolve around three major focus words: wujūd, ḍaʾī, and dirī, which together form the central concept in his mystical system. This central concept is that of the Absolute Being (Ḍhāt). From a philosophical point of view wujūd, denoting as it does an abstract concept of Being, pertains more to ontology; ḍaʾī to cosmology; and dirī to psychology, although in fact these divisions are never absolute and in the final analysis they overlap and merge as a single concept.

I Wujūd.586

No word presented itself in the Malay language, during the period of cultural change in the history of the Malay initiated by the coming of Islām among them, as an equivalent of the abstract concept of Being denoted by

586. On the genesis of the word wujūd as an abstract philosophical term approximating the Greek concept of being set forth briefly below, I am indebted to Professor Izutsu (see Izutsu, pp.71-72), and to Doctor Soheil Afnan (op.cit., pp.29ffoll.), also to Mlle. A.M. Goichon's Philosophie d'Avicenne et son influence en Europe médiévale, Paris, 1951, chapter II.
the Arabic wujūd. As a result of this, Malay Şūfī writers and translators, and writers and translators of other Muslim religious and scholastic works, all of which mainly appeared in great quantity in the 16th and 17th centuries in the Malay Archipelago, have kept the word wujūd untranslated, and have adopted it into the vocabulary of the Malay language. The resemblance between the Arabic and Malay languages, with respect to the cultural development having to do with a philosophical concept of being, is indeed remarkable. When Greek philosophy first made its influence felt among the Muslims, they were confronted with the problem of formulating a philosophical vocabulary to translate the Greek concepts. One of the major problems was the absence in Arabic of the copula; the auxiliary verb 'to be', corresponding to the Greek to einai, does not exist in Arabic. The translators of the Greek philosophical works had chosen the use of the verb wajada, a root word from whose passive sense wujida the abstract noun wujūd is derived.⁵⁸⁷ Although the Translators as well as the Muslim philosophers were well aware that it was not the exact equivalent, the word wujūd, as an abstract philosophical term, was used and gradually came to be established by the Muslim philosophers as the equivalent of the Greek abstract

⁵⁸⁷ Wajada: to find; wujida: to be found; wujūd: being found.
concept of being couched in the Greek to einai. Many words offered themselves as candidates to become the Arabic equivalent of the Greek to einai, but finally apparently only two were considered seriously: wujūd and kawn (from the root kwn [kāna]), and the former was preferred for two main reasons: (i) that the sense of something 'being found' couched in the concept wujūd, implying contingency, conveys a close correspondence with the meaning of to einai; (ii) that kana conveys more the sense of 'becoming' as understood according to the Greek genesis. With reference to the Malay language, the absence of the copula, as in the case of the Arabic language, is also a fact: there is no auxiliary verb 'to be'. Although the Muslim thought that presented itself to the Malay mind was not always couched in the philosophical vocabulary, but rather more in the theological vocabulary of the rationalist Mutakallimūn and the mystical vocabulary of the Şūfī metaphysicians, yet the last

588. Al-Farābī mentions such verbs as kāna, sāra, aṣbaḥa, amsa, ẓalla, but prefers wajada (Afnan, pp. 29-30); the words huwiyyah, aysiyyah amniyyah, kaynūnah, ithbāt and wujūd have been used to translate to einai (ibid., p. 89.).


590. The best examples of works in Malay containing definitive expositions of Mutakallimūn concepts are those written by Rānīrī. The Hujjah is a good example of the type of writing stated. See my Rānīrī and the Wujūdiyyah of 17th Century Aceh, now in print and published by the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Malayan Branch, Monograph 4915.
two groups were profoundly influenced by philosophical speculations and employed philosophical terminologies in their writings. But the absence of an abstract concept of Being in the Malay language did not seem to present the writers and translators of the philosophical, theological and mystical works much difficulty for they simply adopted words such as wujūd and a great many others as loan words into the Malay vocabulary. In the case of the concept wujūd, two words may be considered as the logical candidates to denote it: the words jadi and ada, both of which convey the meaning 'to be'. But then jadi is a verb, and ada is a substantive; and in any case jadi, though a verb, cannot convey the meaning of wujūd or to einai, as the dominant sense in the meaning of jadi is 'becoming' rather than 'being'. In fact in the writings of Ţamzah jādi used as an imperative translates the Arabic kun; and menjādi conveying the idea of 'becoming' translates yakīnu; menjadikan, kujadikan and yang dijedikan translate khalaga, khalagtu, and khalq respectively, so that the logical development of jadi is to make it the equivalent of the Arabic kawn. In the case of the word ada, it takes the function of the Arabic kāna, and this is manifested in the writings of Ţamzah. Apart from that ada in fact means mawjūd, the passive participle of the verb wujida, rather than wujūd: it means 'existent' rather than 'being', and in this respect jadi also refers to
existence and not to being. Because mawjūd as a philosophical terminology was rather confusing in that it continued to be understood in its basic sense of 'something found' instead of 'something that exists' or 'individual substance' in the Aristotelian sense (to on), the abstract noun huwiyyah, meaning 'heness' or 'itness' (from the pronoun huwa meaning 'he' or 'it'), came into use. It is difficult to state precisely whether ada was also understood in the sense of huwiyyah, but some of the uses of ada in the writings of Rānīrī and especially Ḥamzah point towards huwiyyah, and depending upon actual context, also point towards māhiyyah, another philosophical term corresponding to the Greek to ti en einai meaning 'that by virtue of which a thing has its determinate nature'. It means also

591. Mawjūd itself, as a philosophical terminology became problematic as it conveyed the original connotation of 'something found' (cf. Izutsu, p.72), hence Ibn Rushd (Averroes) pointed out the confusion that arose regarding its use (cf. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p.224, and Notes, p.131). The distinction between 'being' as a substantive and 'being' as a verb is not made clear by Aristotle. If 'being's is taken as a verb as Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) had done, then the substantive form is an accident of the verb form and it means 'existence' (see Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p.179, and Notes, pp.110-111).

592. See above, note 591; also Afnān, pp.121-124; Goichon, op.cit., p.78.
quiddity or 'whatness'. The question as to why either of the words ada or jadi has not been applied and accepted as the equivalent of the precise and abstract concept of being denoted by the word *wujūd* is perhaps because the words are far too non-abstract in their connotations and they refer generally to material existence. The very fact that the words *ada*, *jadi*, *diri*, and even *wujūd* have been the source of controversial polemics and misunderstanding which resulted in charges of *zandaqa* (heresy) and condemnations of death reveals beyond doubt that the basic meanings of *ada*, *jadi* and *diri* have continued to hold sway in the minds of the Malays. The writers and translators of the philosophical, theological and mystical works, aware of this difficulty have identified them with other terms. It must be noted that the word *ada* as used by *Rānīrī* above and in *Hamzah's* writings has been applied in a relational sense. Even to this day, for example, *keadaan* does not mean being, or constituent determinant of a thing, or the reality or inmost self of a thing, but it means 'the condition of a thing' or 'state of affairs'. With reference to the above exposition on *jadi* and *ada* in relation to *wujūd*, please consult the relevant references in the Index of semantic vocabulary in Appendix VII.

593. See *ibid.*, pp.117-121; in the *Hujjah* (p.3) *Rānīrī*, defining *being* (*wujūd*) says that it is identical with *essence* (*dhāt*), and that essence in turn means 'the constituent determinant (*keadaan*) of a thing (*shayy*)' and by *keadaan* he also means the inmost self (*diri*) (see his note on the margin of the page). The term *diri* can also be taken to mean quiddity. *Rānīrī* goes on to state that this *dhāt*, or *keadaan* of a thing, or *diri* of a thing, is none other than the being of God. *Hamzah* too identifies *diri* with *ada* in some contexts, and in some he identifies *ada* with 'ayn. In the writings of *Hamzah*, there occur instances in which *ada* seems to have been identified as *wujūd* in the sense of *to einai*. It must be noted that the word *ada* as used by *Rānīrī* above and in *Hamzah's* writings has been applied in a relational sense. Even to this day, for example, *keadaan* does not mean being, or constituent determinant of a thing, or the reality or inmost self of a thing, but it means 'the condition of a thing' or 'state of affairs'. With reference to the above exposition on *jadi* and *ada* in relation to *wujūd*, please consult the relevant references in the Index of semantic vocabulary in Appendix VII.
regarding basic meanings, decided quite logically, though not necessarily conscious of the fact, to use the original Arabic words in order to avoid confusion in meaning.

The theologians, the Mu'tazilah, the philosophers— in particular Ibn Sīnā—and the Mutakallimūn have made a distinction between possible being (mumkinu'l-wujūd) and necessary being (wājibu'l-wujūd). Furthermore, the concept of wujūd including within its meaning the sense of contingency would result in confusion when applied to God's Being. It was necessary therefore that God's Being should be conceived as Necessary Being. Al-Ghazzālī revealed the confusion that arose among the philosophers resulting from their concept of the Necessary Being and pointed out that God's Being should be conceived as Necessary in the "causeless" sense, and that the necessity of His Being rests with His Essence with which His Being is identical. The Sufīs also affirm

594. Ibn Rushd credited Ibn Sīnā as the first man to bring into philosophy the proof of the impossibility of an infinite causal series, and this in turn led to the logical assumption of the dichotomy of being into possible and necessary (cf. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p.163). See also Arberry, A.J., Avicenna on theology, London, 1951, pp.25-32.

as self-evident the dichotomy of being into possible and necessary and they further affirm that the Being of God is identical with His Essence. In Ḥamzah this is expressed thus:

Our Lord is the Possessor of the Essence (Dhāt). That is to say, [the Essence is] Unique (Semata), without Attributes. According to one expression, the Doctors of Theology call It Necessary Being because It is Self-Existent and does not exist through another. For this reason the Doctors of Theology call It Necessary Being. The People of the Path say that It is indeed Self-Existent, but It also gives existence (memberi wujūd) to the World together with all its parts. It is called [by the People of the Path] Necessary Being because Being (wujūd) and Essence are one.

According to Ḥamzah, Necessary Being is the Self-subsistent Essence considered as attributeless; It is the Reality underlying all and giving existence to all; the Absolute (Muṭlaq); the Plotinian First (Yang Pertama); the Transcendent One (Aḥad). In fact this Necessary Being is above Being and all relations to beings. An important exposition must be made on one key word that appears in the passage quoted above, since this key word has a close semantic relation with wujūd. This key word is the Malay semata, and what I wish to reveal is the remarkable manner in which

596. Asrar, pp.24-25.
597. Ibid., p.22; also Windelband, p.244, and the reference to Plotinus in note 595 above. Plotinus also refers to this 'First' as the 'One', Who precedes all thought and being (Ennead VIII, 8, op.cit., p.346).
Hamzah imposes upon it a transparent role of being the exact equivalent of the Arabic 'ayn. The highly synthetic 'ayn means 'eye', 'fountain' or 'spring', 'self', 'origin', the 'quintessence' of a thing. As 'essence' or 'being' it generally refers in Sufi thought to the Divine Essence. Now the word mata also means 'eye', and undoubtedly due to the semantic influence of the Arabic 'ayn - it came to this day to be used also to mean 'spring': mata air, literally the 'eye of the water'; the word mata in this case implying the meaning 'source' or 'origin'. But mata to mean 'very essence', 'being', or 'identity' - if not found only in Hamzah's writings - is certainly perhaps first used with that connotation by Hamzah. The following two are examples among several:

(a) Al-'aynu wahidatun wa'1-hukmu mukhtalifun ...  
Yang semata itu esa juga; bermula; 
hukum jalannya berlain-lain ...  

599. Semata is derived from the word mata. In the form with the prefix se, semata is generally found in the repetitive form: semata-mata conveying a basic meaning synonymous with hanya: 'only', 'solely'. Its usage in Hamzah's relational sense is not found unless in Sufi writings, and this was most probably through his influence.

600. In the Brhad-aranyaka Upanishad, IV.4.9, samata means identity or equality (Radhakrishnan, op.cit., p.275). But samata does not seem to be the equivalent of 'ayn as Hamzah's semata is used.

601. Lama'at, p.341.
602. Asrar, p.43.
(b) Ra’aytu rabbi bi 'ayni
Kulihat Tuhanku dengan mata Tuhanku.

In (a) semata translates 'ayn meaning 'essence' or 'being': "The essence (or being) is one, but its ways are many ..."

The Arabic article al- is often in Jamzah translated as yang, as in the case of (a). In (b) there is a play of meaning in the Arabic: the 'ayn is intended to mean both 'eye' and 'being', and this is so according to the mystical context. The Malay mata in (b) is also intended to mean both 'eye' and 'being'. That there is no doubt that in Jamzah semata means the 'being' or 'essence' of something and in particular refers to essential nature can further be attested by another example:

---

603. Doorenbos' reading, 'aynay: 'two eyes' is based on the incorrect texts (Asrar, p.68 and Sharab [Cod. Or. 7291 II], p.92). See Doorenbos, pp.164, 186. On the correct reading given above, see the original referred to in note 604 below.

604. Lasmat, p.335.

605. Asrar, p.68; Sharab, p.10.

606. Hence yang mengenal, for example, does not mean 'he who has gnosis', but 'gnosis'. The words translate al-ma'rifah (see Asrar, p.71: Yang mengenal dinding antara ... etc.)

607. An excellent example of the play of meaning in the usage of the word 'ayn in the mystical context is Shāh Ni'matu'LLāh's du bayt quoted by Jamzah on p.120 of the Muntahi. The first bayt will suffice;

Ra'aytu'LLāha fi 'ayni bi 'aynihi
Wa 'ayni 'aynuhu fa'ngur bi 'aynihi ...

I see God in my being with His Sight;
My being is His Being – see with His Sight ...
(c) Adapun air serupa, sematanya air; tanah pun serupa, sematanya tanah. 608

As to water, it remains the same, it is essentially water; earth too remains the same; it is essentially earth.

In the same context, another example - it is important to note - reveals the close semantic connection between semata and sendiri:

(d) Adapun bumi, tanah sendirinya; hujan pun air jua sendirinya. 609

As to the earth, it is in itself earth; rain too is in itself nothing but water.

The close semantic connection between diri and ada, and between ada and 'ayn has already been noted; 610 in these examples that I have quoted, the close semantic connection between 'ayn and semata, and between semata and diri is established, and the conclusion that can be drawn from this remarkable fact is that semata, ada, diri, and 'ayn are all altogether identical with dhāt; they all meet in identity in the concept dhāt although their application in different contexts reveals meanings that are not exactly identical.

This is quite logical, for in different contexts they refer conceptually to different 'modes' or predispositions inherent in dhāt.

608. Asrār, p.53.
609. Ibid., p.52.
610. See above, note 593.
Being (wujūd), properly speaking, does not mean Essence, if Being is considered as one of the 'Modes' or Predispositions inherent in the Essence. The Unique Essence is beyond Being, for the latter is the first determination (ta'ayyun) of the former and one of the four hypostases by which the Unique Essence determines Itself through all Its stages of determination. Through Being as such, the Creator conceived as He Who 'draws forth' Possibilities from His Essence (Yang Mengadakan) and creation conceived as the deployment of the Possibilities in a relative mode (yang diadakan) are made manifest (nyata). A clue to

611. The second form of the verb 'ayn (‘īna) from which 'ayn is derived. The term ta'ayyun is translated by Hamzah as nyata. In view of the identity of 'ayn with ada, it is clear that nyata, whose basic meaning is 'to be clear' or 'clarified', must be considered as an important key word in the semantic field of ada. Nyata is all the more important because the noun form kenyataan translates tajallī which in Sufi thought means 'the manifestation of Being of God in the theatre of manifestation (mazhar: the World)'.

612. The term hypostases should not be understood as Person in the sense of the Christian theological connotation. As meaning 'singular substance', a materialistic interpretation should be avoided. It seems to me also that the fourfold first determination of the Unique Essence here meant can be conceived as arches in the ancient philosophers' sense of the term (cf. note 579 above and also Windelband, pp. 51-47), but again without materialistic connotations.

613. Sharab, p.15.
614. Ibid., p.16.
615. Consult above, pp. 134-135 (1).
616. See Sharab, p.15: Kerana Wujūd maka Yang Mengadakan dan yang diadakan nyata. This is a very important passage in Hamzah's ontological system and it will be treated properly in due course.
the conception of the nature of wujūd is given by Ḥamzah on page 52 of the Asrār:

The analogy is like clay (tanah) fashioned into drinking vessels, or cooking pots, or water jars, or earthen containers; the clay is the original being (agal wujūd) of all the earthen vessels. Without the clay, how can the drinking vessel and the cooking pot acquire existence (wujūd)? From the point of view of external law (shari'ah) the being of the drinking vessel is other than the being of the clay. From the point of view of inner reality (haqiqat) being refers to [the clay]; earthenware vessels are without being, the clay alone [has being] for all the forms (rupa) are illusory (wahmī) and not real (haqīqī).

In one of his verses, Ḥamzah conceives of Being as having three planes, each corresponding to the first, second and third determinations of the Essence. The first is called the plane of undifferentiated unity (wujūd jam'ī), wherein the Relational Spirit (rub ḥaqiqī) is manifested, and the creatures individualized as a unity without any differentia-
tion – as a 'general concept' (ijmālī), as it were – in the

616. Here the word asal means, apart from 'original', also 'pure' being or true 'cause' of being.
617. When the term shari'ah is used in a context in contrast with the term haqiqat as in the above case, it conveys the meaning 'exoteric' in contrast with 'esoteric'; 'appearance' or 'phenomenon' in contrast with 'reality' or 'noumenon', etc.
618. In Ḥamzah's writings, rupa means either surah: form; or shakl: shape or the ordinary sense of form, both of which it translates. Shakl has been used by the Philosophers to translate the Greek morphe (see Afnān, op.cit., pp.107-108). In the context above, 'form' means shakl since it refers to the shapes of the earthenware vessels.
619. See also Asrār, pp.43-44.
620. 2016, p.27. See Appendix V, (ii).
Divine Knowledge. The Idea or Reality of Muḥammad (ḥaqīqat Muḥammad) refers to this plane of existence. The second is called the plane of synthetical existence (wujūd tamyīzī), wherein the creatures are brought into existence synthetically. Here all spirits are manifested and the Idea or Reality of Man (ḥaqīqat insānī) refers to this plane of existence. The third is called the plane of analytical existence (wujūd mufassalī), wherein the creatures are made to exist analytically as potential existence, or 'exterior essences' (a'yān khārījiyyah). Being quā Being as understood in the analogy of the clay and the earthenware vessels, is Universal Substance; it is the abiding and immutable 'ground' of all existence. Conceived as one of the planes of Being it is, as it were, a 'mode' of Being: it is Existence. In these verses Ḥamzah does not make any references to the fourth and fifth determinations of the Essence that would correspond to particular planes of Being in the same manner the first three did. It is obvious, however, that since the fourth and fifth determinations pertain to the

621. Cf. above, pp. 24; 120-121.
622. Expressed also in one of his verses (2016, p.30):

WujūdNya itu upama dā'irah yang buntar
Nantiasa tetap, tiada berkisar;
KelakuanNya jua yang bertukar-tukar,
Mengenal Dia terlalu sukar.

world of forms, both psychic and corporeal, they would correspond with planes of Being that could be called external existence (wujūd khārījī), a term which Rānīrī has used to that effect. All the planes of Being mentioned also correspond to the schematic stratification or categorization (ṭabāqāt) of the mystical worlds ('ālam) ranging 'between' and including the two opposite domains: the Unseen, i.e. Intelligible World ('ālam ghayb) and the Phenomenal World ('ālam shahādah). It is also quite evident that this division of Being in its existential modes into the purely

624. Hujjah, p. 3.
625. Between the two opposite domains there 'lie' the World of Omnipotence ('ālam jabarūt), the world of pure spirits; the World of Dominion ('ālam malakūt), the world of the soul; the World of Similitude or Analogy ('ālam mithāl), the world of forms both psychic and corporeal. Transposed upon the planes of Being the Worlds of Omnipotence, Dominion and Similitude would correspond to the first three planes; the Worlds of Similitude and Phenomena would correspond to the last two planes. Other terms have been used to denote the various mystical worlds such as the World of Unity ('ālam jamīl) referring to the World of Omnipotence; the World of Pure Spirits ('ālam arwāh) and the World of Imagination ('ālam khiyāl) referring to the World of Dominion; the World of Man ('ālam insānī), the World of the Kingdom ('ālam mulkī), the World of Forms ('ālam guwarī), the Physical or Corporeal World ('ālam jismānī) referring to the Phenomenal World. There are also terms to denote the natures, or rather aspects, of the mystical worlds in their definite classes like, for example, the World of Divinity ('ālam lāhūt) and the World of Humanity ('ālam nasūt), referring to the worlds in the first three and last two determinations respectively. Cf. 2016, pp. 43, 44, 67, 69, 71, 73.
intelligible - a combination of the intellectual and the spiritual - on the one hand, manifested in the first three determinations of the Essence; and the formal manifestation as a whole, including both the psychic and the corporeal, in the last two of the five determinations on the other hand, naturally leads to the logical assumption of the dichotomy of Being as Real (naqîqî) in the case of the former category, and Illusory (wahmî) in the case of the latter category. So far, the nature of wujûd as understood by Ḥamzah can be represented in the following schema:


627. The Roman numerals in the schema represent the five stages of determination of the Essence. Compare with the schema of the ontological descent of Absolute Being on p.120 above.
There is, then, only one Being, the rest are existential modes of the same Being. From the above schema, it is at once seen that the existential modes of Being range themselves under four and not five classes: (a), (b), (c), and (d) plus (e). The reality of each particular class of existential mode is relative to that which logically preceded it; the higher ontological order is considered real

---

628. In the Greek to einai, as in the Arabic wujūd particularly in the mystical context, apart from meaning 'Being' it also means 'Reality' (Cf. Windelband, p.38, note 1).

629. By 'relative' is also meant 'subjective'. Since there is only One Real Being, the existential modes are— to the mystic - as 'veils' concealing the One Reality, and as the mystic passes on (fana') from stage to stage, the 'veils' fall away so that ultimately he is veiled only by the One Reality (Dhāt).
in relation to the one immediately below it. The four classes of existence correspond each to one of the four 'veils' (ḥijāb) which conceal the Essence: the Divine 
Attributes (ṣifāt (a)); the Divine Names (asma' (b)); the 
Divine Acts (aʃ'āl (e)); and the Divine Effects (aṭhār (d) 
plus (e)). The term wujūd, when used with reference to 
the world, means aṭhār (effects):

630. One is tempted to see in this another version of the 
Plotinian theory of emanation, but see above, pp.
Plotinus in contrast with the relevant Sūfī doctrine 
seems to bestow creative powers to his emanations of 
the First, the Origin, the Good, the One. The separation 
of Soul (Psyche) is, for Plotinus, self-willed, whereas 
for the Sūfis generally it is simply an Act of God. See 
Ali Hassan Abdel-Kader’s The life, personality and 

631. Ţamzah says:
When one has achieved extinction (faṇā')
from His Effects, and His Acts, and His Names, and 
His Attributes, then one can be united (bertemu) 
with the Essence; for His Effects are as veils 
unto His Acts; His Acts are as veils unto His 
Names; His Names are as veils unto His Attributes; 
and His Attributes are as veils unto His Essence. 
All these [i.e. Effects, Acts, Names and Attributes] 
are but His Predispositions (kelakuan).
Asrar, p.72. See also ibid., p.73. The word kelakuan 
in Ţamzah translates the Arabic shā'n (pl. shu'ūn) and 
is described as the keadaan (existential mode) of the 
Essence. The Divine Names the First (al-Awwal), the 
Last (al-akhir), the Outwardly Manifest (al-Zahir), 
the Inwardly Hidden (al-Batin) play an important role 
in this fourfold aspect of Being. See Asrar, pp.28, 52. 
Shaykh al-'Alawī's formulations of the doctrine of 
Oneness of Being is most relevant - see Lings, pp.131-
147.
... His Effects (athārNya) are most clearly manifested (nyata) upon the whole world, and not hidden, for they [i.e. the Effects] exist (wujūd) through the Mercy (rahmat) of the Compassionate One (al-Rahmān), and give existence (wujūd) to the entire world. Were it not for that existence (wujūd) [i.e. the existence of Mercy of the Compassionate One], how can Effects be derived? Since the effects upon the whole world are His Effects, [the world] thereby derives existence (wujūd). Rahmān is a Divine Name. Each Divine Name presupposes the hidden existence of the Quality or Attribute which it describes in the Divine Essence. Hence before the Essence can be called by the Name Rahmān, the Quality rahmat must first exist in the Essence. Thus the Name depends upon the Qualities or Attributes, in the same manner that the Divine Effects depend upon the Divine Names, for each Divine Name displays its Effects upon the world through a continuous series of manifestations (kenyataan: tajalliyāt). The world is His Manifestation (kenyataanNya), for God, the Glorious and Exalted, Has Essence, Attributes, [Names], Acts, and Effects are continuously manifest (nyata).

... His Effects (bekasNya) flow (lalu) like the waters of the river flowing without cessation, without end... 'Every day He is in a State of Activity (kelakuan: sha’n) [Qur’ān 55:29].
existence (wujud) of the world — as the passage above says — is the effects (āthār) of the Divine manifestations. To endow existence (memberi wujud) is synonymous with to bestow Mercy (memberi rahmat), and this means to create (menjadikan). It is upon the doctrine of the role of the Divine Attributes and Names, and the incessant operation of the latter through series of manifestations that the doctrine of perpetual creation in Sufi cosmology is based.

The analogy of the clay and the earthenware vessels purporting to demonstrate the nature of wujud may be considered as static rather than dynamic. But this analogy

635. I.e. khalaga. Ibid., p.40; Adapun al-Rahmān pertama memberi rahmat bagi semesta sekalian 'ālam; ya'nī menjadikan semesta sekalian ... Rahmān empunya rahmat memberikan wujud pada semesta sekalian 'ālam ... See above, p.135. It is significant that menjadikan is used instead of mengadakan.


637. Cf. above, pp.130–136. This doctrine is clearly and briefly outlined in Jāmi's commentary of the Fusūsu‘l-Hikam of Ḳbu‘l-'Arabī, the Lawā‘ih. See above, pp.107; 129, 161–162; and 165–166, where some relevant passages from the Lawā‘ih are quoted. The atomistic theory of the Muslim scholastic theologians (al-Ash'arī and the Mutakallimūn) pertaining to substance (atoms) and accidents greatly influenced the Sufi cosmology, though the Sufis modified the theologians' theory of substance (atoms) and classified substance (atoms) as accidents along with the others. For the theologians' theory of atoms and accidents, see chapter I of Fakhry, op. cit., Elder's introduction to Taftazānī gives an outline of the theory (pp. xxv–xxvi).
is merely intended to express the essential Unity of things, and solely for that purpose the simple static picture is quite acceptable. In all of Ḥamzah's writings that have come down to us, many kinds of analogies (sing: 'ibārat; mathal) have been employed to describe the concept of Oneness of Being (wahdatu'l-wujud), for example: the clay and the earthenware vessels; the cotton and the cloth; the sun and the reflection (and its light); rain, earth, and plants (connected with the concept of the Pure Potentialities.

638. The same kind of analogy has been used by Hindu mystics who adhere to the doctrine of non-duality (advaita), but those who make use of analogies - of any analogy for that matter - in their attempt to describe God are well aware of the inadequacy of the picture presented. Moreover, as Burckhardt says, the very self-evident nature of the inadequacy of any analogy purporting to describe God renders the analogy harmless by making people understand it merely as a symbolic allusion and nothing more. It is true that sometimes the analogy employed can have considerable influence in determining the conception envisaged. This is indeed the case with Plotinus and his analogy of light (cf. Windelband, p.245). In the case of the Šūfīs generally, who uphold the doctrine of Oneness of Being, among them Ibnu'l-'Arabī, 'Irāqī, Shabistārī, Jāmī, Jīlī, the analogy that they have favoured most for its aptness and conformity with their conception of Being seems to be that of the fathomless ocean and the waves. The same conclusion is certainly true for Ḥamzah. But to speak of the determining influence of this analogy in their conception of Being is not worthwhile, for they and Šūfīs generally constantly remind themselves, in the last analysis, of such Quranic passages as Subhāna'LLāh 'ammā yasīfūn; Layṣa kamithlihi shay', etc. which they insert in significant places in their writings.
(isti'dād ašlī); the wine and the cup (glass); the ocean and the waves. They have each been employed according to the context and intention of the discourse. But the analogy which has the most persistent influence, whose application is again and again resorted to by Ḥamzah, is the analogy of the fathomless ocean and the waves. Indeed, this analogy has been the favourite of Ṣūfīs generally in their attempt to describe their conception of Being. Ḥamzah in the Asrār alone occupies himself with at least no less than two of his fifteen bayts in elaborating upon this analogy. Of all the analogies employed, that of the fathomless ocean and

---

639. Asrār, pp. 54-60.
640. One interesting analogy in the Muntahī, p. 114, employed to interpret the meaning of 'Wheresoever you turn there is the Face of God' is that of milk and butter (or clarified butter): 'Tamthil seperti susu dan minyak sapi; namanya dua, haqiqatnya suatu jua. Kesudahannya susu lenyap [apabila di] putar - minyak jua kekal sendirinya.' 'The analogy is like milk and butter; their names are two, but their real essence is one. Ultimately the milk disappears [when it is] churned - butter alone remains.' This seems to hark back to well-known Sanscrit texts, for example, Sri Krishna says to Arjuna: 'I am the melted butter' (Bhagavadgītā, IX: 16, translated with introduction and notes by E.J. Thomas, London, 1948, p. 74). In the Arjuna Wiwaha, one of the most famous poems of Old Javanese literature, the same analogy is found in canto 10, stanza 1, the last two lines:

sang mir agni sakeng taken kadi miňak sakeng dadhi kita,
sang sākṣat metu yan hana wwang amuter tutur pinahayu.

You are the honoured one with the aspect of

fire that comes
the waves alone seem the most apt and complete in describing
the Ṣūfī conception of Being. It alone conveys not only the
sense of transcendence (tanzîn) and immanence (tashbîn), but
also a synthesis of both. Moreover, of the analogies
employed, it is the only one that evokes in the mind a
picture that is not static, but dynamic; and this dynamism
is in perfect conformity with the related concepts of the
perpetual activity of the Divine Names in a series of mani-
festations (kenyataan); the Predispositions in the Divine
Essence (kelakuan); and the continuous annihilation (lenyap)
and rehabilitation (kekal) of the existential modes of Being
(keadaan). The ocean is described as fathomless ('amlîq) to
symbolize the unknowable, ineffable Essence (kunhi Dhat).
Without the emphasis on the sense of profound depth, how-
ever, the ocean in its totality symbolizes the Essence. The
active, potential modes or predispositions (keadaan) in the
ocean symbolize the Predispositions in the Essence (keadaan
* out of wood, like butter that comes out of
* buttermilk are you,
* the honoured one who clearly appears as soon
* as there
* are people revolving in their minds the lore,
* well attended to.

(Quoted from the romanized edition with Dutch transla-
tion by R. Ng. Poerbatjaraka (Lesya), B.K.I. 82, 1926,
pp.181-305. The canto and stanza quoted above are on
p.207; the Dutch translation is on pp.252-263. The
amended English translation of the canto and stanza
quoted is by T.G. Th. Pigeaud, and appears in his Java
in the 14th century, The Hague, 1962, 5 vols., vol.4,
pp.6-7).
Dhat). The billows (halun) symbolize the being (keadaan) of the world, and the waves (ombak) symbolize the forms (rupa) of the phenomenal world. The colour (warna) of the waves symbolizes the visible and knowable qualities. The bubbles of foam (buih) symbolize man.

641. It is important to note, as in this case, that keadaan is employed as synonymous with kelakuan (shu‘un).

642. By 'being' (keadaan) in this context is meant the immediate ground of the existence of the world; this ground has merely a relative reality, for the real ground of all existence is Being (wujud). Therefore, in the sense above, keadaan means 'ayn. For an example in which keadaan means 'ayn, see Muntahi, p.120:

Kulihat Allah pada keadaanku ('aynī) dengen penglihatNya;
Bermula: keadaanku itu keadaanNya ('aynuhu) ...

See above, note 607. Keadaan, then, is closely connected semantically with semata. See above, pp.238-241.

643. Cp. Lawā'īh, p.31, the first two rubā‘īs on the page; and p.35, the last rubā‘ī on the page.

644. In Ḥamzah, warna translates the Arabic lawn and the Persian rang. In the latter case, there seems to be direct influence from Jāmī whom Ḥamzah frequently quotes. See, for example, Muntahi, p.122; and Lawā'īh, p.13, the second rubā‘ī on the page. Cf. also Qurān, 2:138: Wa man ahsanu mina‘llahi sibghatan: And who can dye so well as God? (Jāmī). In 'Abdu‘llāh Yusuf Ali's translation (Lahore, 1 vol.), p.56 and notes 137-138. The Persian rang is from the Sanscrit rangga and not varna.

645. The form of the bubble (man) is twofold: gross (kathīf: keras), and subtle (latīf: lembut or lemah) - cf. Asrār, pp.77-78. This seems identical with the Vedantic distinction between the sukshma-sharīrā or linga-sharīrā (subtle form) and the sthūla-sharīrā (gross form), which constitutes the fourth and fifth 'envelopes' (koshas) of the Self (Purusha or Ātma manifesting itself as jīvatma in the living form of the individual being).
Transposed into the order of the Divine Names, the ocean symbolizes the Knower (al-'Alim), and the billows, being the Effects (āthār) of the Name 'Alim, symbolize the known (al-ma'lūm). The Predispositions in the Essence symbolize the Divine Name al-Qāsim (One Who Distributes, Apportions or Allocates), and the waves are the Effects of that Name and hence are called al-maqsūm (the distributed, apportioned or allocated). The tempest (tūfān) symbolizes the Name al-Hākim (One Who governs and decides), Whose rule and

---

See René Guénon's Man and his becoming, London, 1945, chapter IX. Relevant references mentioned in Guénon's footnotes may be consulted in Radhakrishnan's The principal Upanishads. Kraemer also holds the same view - cf. Kraemer, op. cit., p.89.

646. The analogy is further developed logically to include vapours, clouds, raindrops, rivers, etc. See above, pp.104-106.

647. The 'division' or 'allocation' done by al-Qāsim corresponds to creating in the sense of 'drawing forth' (mengeluarkan) of the Pure Possibilities (kelengkapan: isti'dad asli) in the Divine Essence (see above, pp.134-135; 147 - 148). The concept of creating, as has previously been pointed out (above, pp.134; 148) conveys two possible meanings corresponding to mengadakan (i.e. mengeluarkan), and menjadikan - cf. above, p.251), and the latter means further assigning to each thing its proper measure': Maqsūm corresponds to creation in both the mengadakan and the menjadikan senses. Moreover, the 'division' or 'allocation' is done harmoniously as it is governed by Divine wisdom (hikmat). Hence the reference to al-Hākim in the sentence following implies that the 'governing' and 'deciding' is wisely done, for both hākim and hikmat are derived from the same root hākama. Cf. Asrar, pp. 38-39.
decision holds sway over His Predispositions (kelakuan: shu'ūn), and hence the Predispositions in the Divine Essence are called al-mahkūm (the governed). The tempest which is called al-Ḥākim also alludes symbolically to the Creative Command 'Be!' 648

From the foregoing analysis of Ḥamzah's concept of wujūd, a definite conclusion about what wujūd denotes in his writings can now be established. Wujūd denotes three possible concepts in Ḥamzah; (i) as the second of the fourfold hypostasis of the Essence, it denotes the Universal Substance to which Ǧāmī refers as the 'Single Substance',649 and which I have designated simply as Being; (ii) it denotes the existential modes of Being, meaning Existence; this Existence is dynamic as it is none other than Divine Creative Activity (shu'ūn, ta'ayyunāt, tajalliyāt, āṯār) which is referred to as Real or True Existence (wujūd ḥaqiqī);650 (iii) it denotes existence that is metaphorical or illusory (wahmī). In the sub-vocabulary of wujūd, the most immediate or major key words that cluster around wujūd can be diagrammatically

648. Asrār, pp. 54-55; 57-59; 77-79.
649. i.e.: 'ayn wahid. See Lawā'īn, Flash XXVI.
650. It is Real or True only because it is the reality or true essence of metaphorical or illusory existence. When set against Being qua Being, however, it cannot be regarded as having independent reality or truth, for its reality or true essence in turn is nothing but Being.
shown thus:

651. Reading clockwise, the Arabic equivalents of the major key words in the sub-vocabulary of wujūd are as follows: Semata ('Ayn); Keadaan ('Ayn, Shu'ūn); Mengadakan (synonymous with Mengeluarkan: abraza-Ijād in the sense of 'drawing forth' from 'Nothing'); Diadakan (passive form of mengadakan); Ada ('Ayn, majūd, huwiyah, māhiyyah); Bekas (Āthār); Kelakuan (Shu'ūn - see keadaan); Sendiri (synonymous with semata: 'Ayn); Diri ('Ayn, Huwiyah); Menjadikan (khalaq in the sense of 'actualization as external existence'); Dijadikan (passive form of menjadikan); Menjadi (Kawn); Jadi (Kun); Nyata (Ta'āyyun, it also conveys the basic meaning of mubīn); Kenyataan (Tajallī - see nyata); Kelengkapan (Istīdād aslī); Lengkap (Muhīt - see Kelengkapan; lengkap is also used synonymously with pənəh or pejal which translates şamad).
II Ada.

In Malay the meaning of ada has a very close semantic relationship with the Malay word isi, and this can be established by the fact that in the Malay (Austronesian) family of languages the two words ada and isi have been interchangeably used to mean the same thing, namely: existence. For example, in Malay, Toba-Batak, Javanese, isi means 'content'; in Tagalog isi means 'occupation' (of space or place); in Ngaju-Dayak isi means 'flesh' or 'meat' (the same meaning is also conveyed in Malay); in Hova isi means 'existence'; 652 In Malagasy isy means 'existence'; 653 and in Mantra issi means 'existence'. 654 In Hova, Malagasy and Mantra, the meaning of isi as 'existence' is synonymous with the Malay ada. The word isi in Malay conveys basically the meaning 'content'. Other meanings such as 'flesh', 'meat', 'to fill' or 'occupation' of space or place refer to the basic meaning of 'content'. An important element in the conceptual structure of isi in Malay is that the 'content'

652. Cf. Dempwolff, O., Vergleichende Lautlehre des Austro-
meant is of a corporeal, tangible or material nature as opposed to the abstract. In the case of ada, it conveys basically the meaning 'to be' or 'existing' in the sense of the basic Arabic mawjūd; it conveys the sense of some thing existing. Another basic meaning of ada in Malay is 'to have', and in this sense it is closely related semantically with one of the meanings conveyed by the Malay prefix ber. But the basic meaning 'to have' is, so to speak, secondary to the basic meaning 'to be', since in the final analysis the former meaning implies necessarily the existence of the latter. The concept of existing conveyed by ada, like that of content conveyed by isi, refers to material, tangible or corporeal existence. Bearing in mind the close semantic relationship between ada and isi, the word ada considered as reflecting the Old Malay vision of being resembles the Parmenidean corporeality (to πλεον) filling space, i.e. "the full". This space filling is being; it is all that 'is', and all that 'is' not is empty space (to κενόν).

655. See above, pp. 208-209. An example of what I intend to convey here is the usage of ber and ada in the following way: 'Orang itu berharta' and 'Orang itu ada harta', both conveying the meaning 'That person has wealth'. But in another example: 'Orang itu berkemeja putih' and 'Orang itu ada kemeja putih', the meaning is not exactly the same, for the former means that the person actually has a white shirt on, whereas the latter simply says that the person has a white shirt.

656. Windelband, p. 37. According to Zeller Parmenides' concept of to kenon is derived from part of the Pythagorean doctrine, namely that which they called the 'unlimited' or apeiron (Zeller, pp. 36, 49).
Malay the word tiada (tidak + ada: 'no thing' or 'not existing') corresponds to the Parmenidean to kenon and to me on. But the resemblance between the Malay ada and the Parmenidean to pleon is limited only to the first part of the Parmenidean conception of being, and does not resemble Parmenides' philosophical abstractions all the way.

The development towards philosophical abstractions in the Malay conception of being or existence, as reflected in the Malay language, is first found in the writings of Šamzah. Indeed, they are the earliest evidence I have come across in which the usage of ada reveals a semantic change reflecting a new world view - a Šufi world view, which though no doubt introduced with the coming of Islām, achieved its full definitive and systematic Malay expression in them. All subsequent Malay Šufi literature and their Javanese versions and equivalents have been profoundly influenced by the new meanings Šamzah unfolded in such well known words as semata, which has already been treated, and ada, tahu and kenal; jadi, titah, diri, etc.

Several different meanings are conveyed, apart from the basic meaning of ada defined above, in Šamzah's usage of

657. For Parmenides, non-being, or to me on means, accordingly, to kenon, i.e. empty space. The Malay ada and tiada corresponds to the Javanese hana and tan hana respectively.
The first important point to note is that ada in Ŧamzah's writings generally translates the Arabic kāna; and this is found consistently not only in the form kāna, but also in its conjugated forms such as kuntu, kuntum, kunnā, yakun and takun, with the exception of the imperative form kun and the form yakūn which are translated as jadi and menjadi respectively for cosmological reasons I have already explained in several places. The usage in Malay literature generally of adapun to begin paragraphs or sentences seems definitely to be the result of the influence of the Arabic kāna, which is also used in that way, and the same can be said of the literary Malay adalah and adanya. Since there is every reason to conclude that the earliest Malay Ŧūfī writings, or for that matter, systematic (i.e. rational and intellectual) Malay writings of any kind, are those of Ŧamzah, there seems to be no doubt that a great deal of influence in the origin of such usage in Malay literature can be traced to Ŧamzah. Sometimes, when kāna refers to the past, the translation ada is preceded by the word dahulu ('before' or 'was'). But in spite of this ada does not mean kawn, whose equivalent

658. See below, p. 297 fīll.
is in fact jadi, 659 being the 'result', as it were, of the Creative Kun. Ada in Ḥamzah is yang dijadikan (i.e. kejadian). Ada is mawjūd; but mawjūd, as can be seen in the passages quoted below, is understood in two different senses: (i) as being outwardly manifest (zāhir), in which case it refers to the phenomenal world, and even then it is not the equivalent of the basic Arabic mawjūd, but rather the relational metaphysical mawjūd which includes within its meaning, when it refers to the phenomenal world, a world of constant annihilation and rehabilitation; illusory when viewed in the sense of the former, real when viewed in the sense of the latter; (ii) as being inwardly hidden (bātin), in which case it refers to the permanent and transcendent principle underlying (i), i.e. God:

... the meaning conveyed by 'to it' [i.e. lahu] refers to something existing (mawjūd), that is, it is present (hādir) [to God]. Hence it is admissible [for Him] to say 'to it', for 'to it' is an allusion referring to something existing (mawjūd). Were it not existing (tiada mawjūd), God the Glorious

659. See above, pp. 250-252. According to the Mutakallimūn kawn means 'coming into being' (genesis). It is a category of place ('ayn); it is the obtaining of a boundary (i.e. of jawhar: atom) or existence. There are four species of kawn: motion, (al-harakah), rest (al-sukūn), being separated into parts (al-iṭīraq), and an aggregation of the parts (al-ijtima'). Cf. Taftazānī, pp. 28-35.

660. See above, p. 251. The word kejadian is my own, and in the sense meant is not found in Ḥamzah.
and Most Exalted would not refer to it as 'to it'...

... although outwardly (pada zahirnya) it is not existing, inwardly (pada batinnya) it is existing (mawjūd); it is existing (ada), like the three in our analogy; though it has not yet emerged from within the seed, the judgement is that it exists (ada) within the seed — there can be no further doubt.

As to the world, although it is existing (mawjūd) it is yet nothing but the shadow of the Known [in God's Knowledge]. Whatever the content of the Known, is here seen, ...

I am the Existent One (al-mawjūd), seek Me and you will find Me ... In the case of ada understood as the 'outwardly existing', it conveys both its basic and relational meanings, but in the case of ada as the 'inwardly existing' it conveys the relational meaning, which in turn is understood in two senses: (i) as individual substance or huwiyyah (the Aristotelian to on); and (ii) as quiddity or māhiyyah (the Greek to ti en einai). It must be noted that a study of the

661. ʻAmzah's interpretation of Qur'ān 36:82
Verily His Command is, when He is in the state of desiring a thing, to say to it (lahū): 'Be thou!' — and it becomes.
See Asrār, p.30. I have translated the above Quranic passage from ʻAmzah's Malay translation of it. See also Sharāb, pp.17-18.

662. Ibid., pp.30-31. This also alludes to the 'Hidden Treasure'.

663. Ibid., p.32.

664. Ibid., p.50. ʻAmzah attributes to the Psalms (al-Zabūr): Ana’l-mawjūd fa’ṭlubnī tajidnī ...
works of the Muslim Philosophers and Translators reveals that to ti en einai was not the only Greek equivalent for māhiyyah. In fact no definite Greek equivalent is found. It was believed that another word, mā'īyyah, was an early form for māhiyyah, and the basis for this belief is that both forms were used interchangeably by al-Kindī. According to Mlle. Goichon quoting Taḥānawi in support of her view, māhiyyah was coined as a compound of the Arabic words mā (what) and hiya (it [is], feminine form of huwa). In view of this theory, an important ḥadīth quoted by Ḥamzah indicates ada to mean māhiyyah:

Allāhuma arīnī'l-ashyā'a kamā hiya.
Ya Tuhanku, perlihatkau padaku sekalian seperti ada nya. 666

We know here that ada means māhiyyah not only because the words ma hiya is translated as adanya, but also because according to the context ma hiya means the real essence (haqīqat) of things. Ḥamzah compares "seeing things as they really are" with knowing the self (diri) through gnosis (mengenal), for things as they really are and the self as it really is are the same when seen in this way. 667

665. See Afnan, pp.117-120.
666. Asrar, p.61.
667. Loc.cit. The Malay word Ḥamzah used here is pandang, meaning 'to see', used interchangeably by Ḥamzah as the equivalent of the Arabic ra'a and shuhud. Shuhud is defined by Ḥamzah as "seeing the Truth by means of the Truth" : Erti shuhud itulah melihat Haqq dengan Ḥaqq (2016, p.45). The Malay words lihat (melihat), and tilik (menilik) have also been used synonymously with pandang (memandang). Lihat and tilik is the equivalent of the Arabic nazar.
Therefore ada is synonymous with diri here, in the same manner as ada understood as mahiyyah is, in this context synonymous with huwiyyah. That ada is synonymous with diri is very clearly stated in the Muntahi, and as such it is identified as the Divine Huwiyyah (Ada) which, regarded in relation to the creatures is Absolute (mutlaq):

All forms that can be seen and apprehended by the intellect and gnosis are restrictions (quyūd). Since the Essence of God is Absolute, It is not to be found in our forms; and the forms of the world in its entirety, the outwardly manifest and the inwardly hidden, are other than the Unique Essence. That is Absolute. When we cast away all restrictions with our vision and in our discourse, then only can we be united with the Absolute, meaning: the Being (Ada, i.e. Individuality) Who is Most Pure, beyond form.

In this sense too Ada is synonymous with the Essence (Dhāt), often referred to as the Face of God (wajhu’LLāh) as in the Quranic passages: Fa aynama tuwallu fa thamma wajhu’LLāh

---

668. Cp. the Mutakallimūn's definition of the real essence (al-ha[qīqa]h) of a thing, in which ha[qīqa]h, mahiyyah and huwiyyah are the same, i.e. 'that which constitutes the identity of a thing'; but viewed in different aspects are either a real essence (ha[qīqa]h), a certain particular thing (huwiyyah), or a quiddity (mahiyyah). Taftazānī, p.11, quoted above, pp.

669. Page 117: The meaning of "Man 'arafa nafsahu ...": his being (adānya) and the Being of his Lord (Ada Tuhannya) is one.

Ibid., p.111: The meaning of knowing one's Lord and knowing oneself is this: the Self (Diri) of 'I was a Hidden Treasure' is his self.

670. I.e. impediments that conceal the Essence making 'union' with It impossible.

It is now possible to conclude that in Hamzah there are seven different uses of the word ada in the relational sense, each defining a particular concept of Being; and yet these particular concepts are at times regarded as identical in certain contexts, i.e. the ontological, cosmological and psychological contexts, all three of which are included in the metaphysical (macrocosmic) and mystical (microcosmic) domains. These different uses are:

(1) Ada conveying the concept mawjūd, which has already been said as being understood in two different senses:

(i) the outwardly manifest (zāhir), i.e. corporeal existence. But this corporeal existence must not be understood in the sense of the Parmenidean to pleon, which is the meaning of ada in its basic sense, conveying the vision of a 'block universe' filling space; rather it is a somewhat Heraclitean vision of the universe that is conveyed, a dynamic, 'atomic' universe of constant flux; (ii) the inwardly hidden (bātin), i.e. the Reality underlying (i), and this is necessarily beyond form and immutable:

672. Sharāb, p.10; Muntahī, p.114.
673. Sharāb, p.17.
674. See above, p.248.
(2) Ada conveying the concept māhiyyah, which viewed from one standpoint is none other than mawjūd in (1),(ii); it is quiddity, which can sometimes be the equivalent of the Greek to ti einai, the Universal Substance;

(3) Ada conveying the concept huwiyyah, the Aristotelian to on or Individual Substance; it is also understood as meaning the Divine Individuality (Huwiyyah), and as such it comes under (7), below.

(4) Ada conveying the concept nafs, the Soul (nyawa), which can be regarded as the Universal Soul, corresponding with the Plotinian psychē, or the Individual Soul or Self. Both the Soul or Self are called diri in Ḥamzah, and they resemble māhiyyah and huwiyyah respectively and are closely connected with the concept of the Divine Consciousness (sīrr: rahasia);

(5) Ada conveying the concept 'ayn, the being or essence of things which is the immediate ground of existence of things corresponding with Jāmī's Single Substance ('ayn wāhid);

(6) Ada conveying the concept mutlaq, the Absolute;

(7) Ada conveying the concept Dhat, the Essence:

675. See above, p. 246, note, 583.
'Everything perishes but His Essence': that is, His Ada, That forever is (ada); that which is other than It forever 'is' not (tiada ada), for to the People of the Path, that which 'is' (ada) becomes existing (ada: mawjūd), that which 'is' not cannot become existing.

Here at last Ḥamzah identifies ada as the abstract concept of Being qua Being (wujūd). In the development of the assimilation of Muslim philosophical terminologies, the relational use of ada in the writings of Ḥamzah is to be regarded as the supreme achievement in Malay mystical literature. Subsequent Malay Šūfī writers and their equivalents among the Javanese have been profoundly influenced by the introduction of new philosophical concepts in Ḥamzah's pioneering works, but they never seemed to carry the intellectual development further ahead. I will attempt to clarify what I believe to be the reasons for this in the next chapter.

In the course of my analysis of the concept of wujūd, I have already touched upon the concept of keadaan in various places. There is no need to elaborate any further here, as a conclusion can be drawn with regard to keadaan in the light of what has been said so far. Keadaan is understood in two different senses. The first sense, which bears a considerable affinity with the basic sense of

676. Sharāb, p.17.
'condition' of a thing, or 'state' of affairs, is that which refers to existential condition or mode, and not to being or essence. This is why keadaan is very closely connected and often refers to the concepts of kelakuan, i.e. the Divine State of Activity; kenyataan, i.e. the Divine Manifestations, continuous and never repeating themselves (tajalliyat), which is closely related to the concept of the Determinations of the Essence (ta'ayyunat). Bearing in mind the proximity between the concepts of keadaan and ta'ayyunat, it is logical that keadaan, in Ḥamzah, also means 'ayn, i.e. being or essence. This second sense in which keadaan is understood can be clearly distinguished from the first if it were written as ke"ada"an as distinct from keadaan.

In one relevant context Ḥamzah, defining ada, says that ..."what is called ada is the being of His Predispositions (wujūd shu‘unNya)."677 By 'being' here is meant Jāmi's 'ayn wāhid as stated in (5).678 Ke"ada"an refers to this, and even in Rānīrī we find him identifying wujūd with Dhāt, with ke"ada"an, with diri.679 The distinction between keadaan and ke"ada"an seems to be that the former implies dynamism and contingency whereas the latter implies immutability and necessity.

677. Sharāb, p.18: ... yang dinamai ada itu wujūd shu‘unNya.
678. See above, p. 284.
679. See above, note, 593.
One of the most important cosmological concepts in Ḥamzah is that of mengadakan, which is inextricably linked with the concept of tiada. In order to clarify the former I will begin with an analysis of the latter. Tiada in Ḥamzah conveys three different meanings. In the cosmological context it means 'nothing' or 'nihil'. To translate it as 'non-existence' in that context may not necessarily be precise for non-existence can imply the possibility of being. It means, in fact, the Parmenidean to kenon or to me on, the non-being which is empty space. This is the basic meaning of tiada, and it plays a major role in Ḥamzah's polemics against the Doctors of Theology on the subject of creation from nothing. Since ada always implies tiada, Ḥamzah never uses ada as an imperative to be the equivalent of the Creative Word Kun, for this would mean that what is commanded to 'be' (ada) comes from nothing (tiada). Hence Ḥamzah uses jadi as the equivalent of the imperative kun.

680. This is so because the basic meaning of ada denotes some thing contained in something else, i.e. space or place. Before the thing becomes contained in the space or place, i.e. before it fills the space, the space or place is 'empty', i.e. the space contains nothing. Thus before ada can occur tiada is logically necessary. It is this basic concept of ada as isi which in the Malay linguistic consciousness brings immediately to the mind the picture of something suddenly appearing out of nothing when the word ada is used as an imperative in the sense pertaining to the doctrine of creation mentioned above. See above, pp. 275-277.
for *jadi* always implies *ada*, so that what comes into existence (*jadi*) comes into existence from something existing (*ada*) and not from nothing (*tiada*). In the ontological context *tiada* does not mean nothing as it does in the cosmological context; it means 'non-being', but not equivalent with the Parmenidean *to me on*, for in the ontological context what is *tiada* is at the same time *ada*. For example, the world is *ada*, yet at the same time *tiada*, i.e. non-being (*'adam*). Finally we have *tiada* in the psychological context meaning *lenyap* or *hapus*, i.e. *fanā* or self-extinction, and by extinction is not meant 'becoming nothing' in the sense of being reduced to empty space. It denotes entrance into the mystical (microcosmic) domain whereby the self that is outwardly manifest 'perceives' its *ada* as such to be in fact *tiada*, and whereby it 'apprehends' the external world, from the point of view of the metaphysical (macrocosmic) domain, to be in reality *tiada*.

Bearing in mind that *ada* always implies, or rather, presupposes *tiada*, when Ḥamzah uses the term *mengadakan* he means 'to bring forth' implying that what is brought forth is brought forth from Nothing. This notion of 'bringing forth' is in fact confirmed in its definition by his use of the term *mengeluarkan* (to draw out) as synonymous with *mengadakan*. But the implication of bringing forth from

681. See Asrār, p.38.
nothing inherent in the very concept of \textit{ada} in this case does not mean nothing as \textit{nihil}; it means the Non-Existent, referring to the Unique Essence.\footnote{682} Ḥamzah does not anywhere use \textit{tiada} to translate the Non-Existent I mean, but he calls this Non-Existent \textit{ma'ādūm}.\footnote{683} \textit{Mengadakan} and \textit{mengeluarkan} in Ḥamzah then means \textit{abraza} and \textit{Ijad} respectively in the sense Jīlī uses those terms.\footnote{684} The whole outline of the cosmology envisaged in Ḥamzah's system is reflected in these terms, and can be summarized in the following formula:

\begin{align*}
\text{I} & \quad \text{\textit{Ma'ādūm} } \rightarrow \text{\textit{mengadakan} + \textit{mengeluarkan} = \textit{ada};} \\
\text{II} & \quad \text{\textit{menjadikan} (\textit{jadi} = \textit{kun}) = \textit{menjadi} (\textit{yakūn}) = \textit{kawn}}
\end{align*}

\footnote{682. Frithjof Schuon explains clearly what I wish to refer to when he says:}

\begin{quote}
God is not 'in existence' - He is beyond Existence - but He can be said to be 'not inexistent' if one is concerned to underline the evident fact that He is 'real' without being 'existent'. In no case can it be said of God that He is 'inexistent'; He is 'non-inexistent' inasmuch as He does not depend on the existential domain, but 'non-inexistent' inasmuch as His transcendence evidently could not involve any privation.
\end{quote}

\footnote{(\textit{Understanding Islam}, translated by D.M. Matheson, London, 1933, p.157, note 2).}

\footnote{683. See above, p.143.}

\footnote{684. See above, notes, 564 and 568.}
In the sub-vocabulary of *ada* the most immediate or major key words that cluster around *ada* can be diagrammatically shown thus:

![Diagram of Arabic key words]

III Dirī.

The basic meaning of dirī in Malay refers to both the visible being and the human individuality or ego of which such attributes pertaining to forms (shapes, i.e. rupa), knowable and visible qualities (i.e. 'colours': warna), and names (nama) are predicated. This basic concept of dirī is found in Ḥamzah in contexts pertaining to fanā' in the mystical (microcosmic) domain. In other contexts - in particular the ontological context - dirī does not refer to the visible human being or to the human individuality or ego at all, but rather to the Self (Ada); and this Self is none other than the Divine Individuality (Huwiyyah : Ada), the Divine Consciousness (Sirr: Rahasia), the Very Essence Itself (Dhāt). The Self is also spoken of as the Soul (al-Nafs), which refers to the Divine Consciousness. The Self is the superior 'part' of the human individuality or ego. It is the transcendent and permanent principle of which the ego (dirī) is merely one of Its many and different states of manifestations. The ego, then, is but a transient and contingent modification of the Self, which modification does not effect the Self, for It can never be individualized. The Self cannot be other than Its 686.

686. The ego as such (i.e. dirī yang zāhir) can never be identified with the Self, contrary to what our anonymous "follower" of Ḥamzah maintains (see above, pp. ).
It were individualized as an ego. The Self may be envisaged as the Universal Soul (al-nafsu'l-kulliyyah). The Self and the Universal Soul understood here are the same thing diversely phrased, and they are so phrased so that an important distinction may be made of two aspects of the same thing. The Universal Soul is the Self when considered in relation to the world and all created things. The Self qua Self is beyond relations whatsoever. It is of the concept of Diri as the Universal Soul that Ḥamzah alludes to when he says:

... when they cast their vision 'outside' their selves (dirinya), whatever they see, it is their Self (Dirinya) that they see; whatever they contemplate, it is their Self that they contemplate; for to the People of the Truth, the world and their Self are one and the same, and not two or three. ...

... the People of the Truth say that all creatures are none other than our Self; all human beings are our brothers ...

687. Hence Ḥamzah repeatedly says, in the same manner as true Ṣūfīs would say, that the Self is only apprehended and known by the Self alone; and this happens only when the ego has been utterly effaced, for the ego, being a creature (makhluq), is a veil concealing the Self from itself. E.g.:

The attribute related (nisbah) of the Truth Most Exalted is not the attribute related of ourselves, and this is so because we see with a veiled seeing. As the Message of God (God bless him and give him peace!) says: "Whosoever knows his self knows his Lord" - and this [i.e. knowing] must be understood as a symbolic allusion (ishārah). In reality He is the One Who is known and He is the One Who knows. (Muntahlī, p.116)

See further, Aṣrār, pp. 33, 48, 50-51, 55, 57; Sharāb, p.9.
688. Sharāb, p.10.
689. Loc. cit.
... for the meaning of 'wheresoever you turn there is the Face of God' is exceedingly clear to them.\(^{690}\)

The Universal Soul (Diri) which in the ontological context is referred to as Ada (i.e. Dhāt, Sirr, Nafs and Huwiyyah), when transposed into the cosmological context is also designated as Ada, but refers both to the Universal Substance (Māhiyyah), and to the Individual Substance (Huwiyyah).\(^{691}\)

The schema of Diri corresponds with that of the Spirit: \(^{692}\)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{A.} \\
\text{Diri : } \text{Dhāt, Nafs, Sirr, Huwiyyah} \\
\hline
\text{B.} \\
\text{Adā : } \text{Māhiyyah} \\
\hline
\text{C 1.} \\
\text{Adā : Huwiyyah} \\
\hline
\text{C 2.} \\
\text{ada : Insān}
\end{array}
\]

\(^{690}\) Ibid., p.11.

\(^{691}\) Compare with the section on the Spirit in Chapter III, (e), pp. 145 - 156. The distinction between three different orders of the Spirit mentioned on p.146 above, also applies to the Soul. In order to avoid confusion, it must be reminded that the term Huwiyyah which is mentioned twice in the above sentence, refers in the first case to the Divine Individuality, and in the second case to the Individual Substance (to on). See Taftāzānī, p.11, quoted above, pp.104 - 105.

\(^{692}\) See above, p.149.
In the sub-vocabulary of diri the most immediate or major key words that cluster around diri can be diagrammatically shown thus:

---

693. The English and Malay equivalents of the Arabic major key words, reading clockwise from Dhat (Essence), are: Wujud (Being, Existence); Mahiyyah (Universal Substance: Ada); Batin (Inwardly Hidden: Terbuni); Sirr (Divine Consciousness: Ada); Latif (Subtle: Lembut); Ruh (Spirit: Nyawa); Insan (Man: Manusia); Huwiyyah (Divine Individuality: Ada); Huwiyyah (Individual Substance: Ada); 'Ayn (Being, Essence: Ada); 'Alam (World); Nafs (Soul, Self: Diri); Zahir (Outwardly Manifest: Nyata); Fana' (Annihilation. Extinction: Hapus, Lenyap); Kathif (Gross: Kasar; Latif is also Halus, Lemah); Baqa' (Abiding: Kekal).
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Whosoever is able to understand his books
He it is who knows the sources of Ḥamzah's learning.

According to al-Qushayrī, an eleventh century Šūfī who wrote on the Šūfī doctrines, the Khurāsānī and 'Irāqī Šūfīs disagreed on the concept of ridā (satisfaction in God); the former, saying that it was a progression from the culmination of the station of tawakkul (trust in God), declared ridā to be a mystical station (maqām), while the latter held to the view that it was a mystical state (ḥāl). Although this point of disagreement between early Šūfīs centuries before Ḥamzah may be regarded as of relatively minor importance, it may yet prove to be of some significance to mention that on the basis of this information we are able to say that Ḥamzah's concept of ridā agrees with the Khurāsānī school of Šufīs. From the names of the

694. 2016, p. 91; Barangsiapa mendapat mengetahui kitābnya, Ialah tahu akan asal ilmunya.

695. Al-Risālatu ’l-Qushayriyyah fī ’Ilmi ’l-Taṣawwuf, accompanied on the margin by notes selected from Zakariyya al-Anṣārī's commentary, Cairo, 1900, p. 105. See also above, note 440.

696. This conclusion is deduced from Ḥamzah's application of the term rādī in his writings, and of his interpretation of Qur'ān, 89:27:30:

Ya ayyatuḥā ’l-nafs ’l-muṭma ’innatu irji’ī ilā rabbiki rādiyatan mardīyyah.
Ο soul that are at rest, return to your Lord, well-pleased, well-pleasing.

Other indications that throw light on Ḥamzah's concept of ridā are his concepts of tawakkul (menyerahkan diri), faqīr and 'abīd. See e.g. Sharāb, pp. 6-7, 57; Muntahī, pp. 125 foll.; 2016, pp. 41-42.
classical Sufis whom he quotes in many places throughout his writings we know that every single one of them were famous Persian and Arab Sufis, the former predominating. The only exception to this was Nasimi, the famous Turkish Hurufi poet who was greatly influenced by the teachings of al-Hallaj. Of significance too is Hamzah's mention of 'Ali Abul-Wafa, for he was a disciple of the great Arab Sufi poet 'Umar ibnu'l-Fariq, to whom, then, Hamzah is linked at least spiritually. The names of all the Sufis mentioned by Hamzah belong to the school of Sufis well known for their adherence to the doctrine of wahdatul-wujud (Oneness of Being); Sufis whom Rаниrî would refer to as the Muwahhidûn.

According to Rаниrî speaking of the Wujudiyyah:

The Wujudiyyah are of two groups: the one, the Wujudiyyah who truly affirm the Unity of God (muwahhidah); and the other, the Wujudiyyah who deviate from the truth (mulhidah)...
The Wujudiyyah who truly affirm the Unity of God are all the Sufis (may God count us among them!), and the Wujudiyyah who deviate from the truth are all the Zindiqs (may God preserve us from them!). The reason why the Wujudiyyah are called wujudiyyah is because in their discourses, utterances and belief, they dwell upon the Being (wujud) of God.

Let me now elucidate the beliefs of both the groups of the Wujudiyyah in order that I may draw distinction between them. According to the Wujudiyyah who deviate from the truth, being is one, and that is the Being of God. This Unique Being of God does not exist by Itself by which It can be distinguished save in relation to the creatures. The world is then God, and God is the world. In this way they affirm that the Being of God Who is
Unique is completely immanent in the being of the creatures, and they say that nothing exists but God. Furthermore they believe the formula: 'there is no god but God' to mean: 'there is no being in me save God's Being.' They desire its meaning to be: 'there is no being in me save God's Being which is this being of mine.' They further say that: 'we are of the same kind and being as God.' And they say further that the Essence of God Most Exalted can be known, and that His Qualities and Dimensions are clearly visible by virtue of His external existence in time and space. Indeed, these are utterances and belief of those who are manifestly infidels.

From the foregoing detailed and comprehensive exposition of the mysticism of Ḥamzah, there is overwhelming proof that Ḥamzah belongs to the Wujūdiyyah who truly affirm the Unity of God in the manner of the classical Ṣūfīs, and not to the deviating group that Rāniḍī has consigned him. This conclusion should now be unanimous and indisputable, and nothing further about this is to be said.

Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī must be regarded as the first man to set in Malay all the fundamental aspects of the Ṣūfī.

697. Italics mine. The reference Rāniḍī makes here is to the claim that the Self is identical with the human individuality or ego, which claim is, of course, rejected by true Ṣūfīs.

698. The word 'known' here does not refer to kenal, i.e. gnosis, but tahu, i.e. discursive knowledge, knowledge by inference (text: diketahui).

699. Rāniḍī's note: I.e. by Qualities (kayfiyyat) is meant colour, taste and smell, heat and cold, wetness and dryness, and such things that are the attributes of bodies.

700. Rāniḍī's note: I.e. by Dimensions (kammiyyat) is meant largeness and smallness, length and breadth, depth and weight, and so on.

701. Ḥujjāh, pp. 9-10. See Appendix IV, (ix).
doctrines, and his writings must be regarded as the earliest of the kind in Malay, and, for that matter, in any other languages of the Malaysian Archipelago. I would go so far as to suggest that as far as systematic, i.e. logically consistent and intellectual, writing in Malay is concerned the suggestion that his writings are the earliest should not be taken as covering only the field of Malay mystical literature, but also the field of Malay literature in general: in the entire field of Malay literature before Ḥamzah we know of the existence of no comparable work, and whatever we know tend to suggest that there was in fact none. With regard to mystical works we know that mention has been made of earlier ones, such as the Durru'ŭl-Mangūm (String of Pearls) in the Sejarah Melayu,\(^{702}\) and Al-Sayfu'ŭl-Qāti' (The Sharp Sword) in the Bustānu'ŭl-Salāṭīn of Rānīrī,\(^{703}\) but there is enough evidence to show that these works were not written in the Malay language. When the Durru'ŭl-Mangūm was received in Malacca, it was sent to Pasai to be interpreted, not translated, as the story in the Sejarah Melayu clearly shows. There are in fact no records whatever that show the evidence of Malay mystical works earlier than those of Ḥamzah, and this is not all - there are even no records that show the possible existence of such works. The argument may be put

\(^{702}\) Chapter XX in 'Abdu'LLāH's text.
that the fact that there are no known records showing the existence of Malay mystical works earlier than Ḥamzah's does not necessarily mean that it is a fact no earlier works existed. Such argument has thrown many into the stagnancy of doubt! Doubt in itself is permissible particularly in historical writing; as prudence it is wisdom. But there are two kinds of doubt: reasonable doubt and unreasonable doubt. It is the latter kind of doubt that I have referred to as stagnant. The argument is not valid because the doubt entertained is not supported by reasonable evidence. In fact the above argument can be said to be so problematic that every known evidence shows it to be unreasonable, for if the doubt were indeed reasonable then there would be no difficulty in answering the following questions, for example:

(i) If earlier works existed, why have they not been preserved as other earlier non-mystical works have been preserved? To simply say that they could have been "lost" is like invoking the deus ex machina shibboleth of some early theologians.

(ii) In comparison with epic, romantic and semi-historical works, would not the mystical works have been regarded as more important, particularly in the interest of Muslim missionary activity, to preserve? - like those of Ḥamzah and Shamsu’l-Dīn, in spite of the fact that they have been made into bonfires.
(iii) Does not the fact that, in spite of some mystical works being consigned to the flames, copies of their texts have been preserved demonstrate that they were important enough to preserve?

(iv) If there have in fact been earlier works, whether they were of the "heretical" or "orthodox" category, and they were subsequently lost, why have their titles, at least, not been recorded by later writers who were indeed in the habit of mentioning such titles, like the titles of lost works mentioned by Rânîrî?

(v) Why would not the Malays themselves preserve Malay works which they could understand better than Arabic and Persian? - the Malays who in fact have demonstrated well in their subsequent history - indeed right up to modern times - how carefully they have preserved such works as best they could.

It will be found that the more such questions are put the more will it be realized that the only solution for those who adhere to the above argument is to maintain that the earlier works were completely lost even beyond recall. But to maintain such a stand is unreasonable because, apart from the fact that from what is known in the history of the Malays we find no credible evidence for the possibility of arriving at the above solution, to do so would mean to stop further historical enquiry into the subject! To those who may use
such an argument it will be worth their while to remember
the apt expression of Ḥamzah: "doubt is a veil concealing
the Truth". The truth is that, in this case, there were no
earlier Malay mystical works, for there can be no reasonable
doubt to contradict this conclusion. Now let us consider,
for example, this remarkable statement on the first page of
the Sharāb:

Know that this insignificant one, this
poor one, Ḥamzah Fāngūrī, wishes to make known
to you in the Malay language - God willing -
the way to God, the Glorious, Most Exalted,
and the gnosis of God, in order that all
servants of God who do not understand Arabic
and Persian may discourse upon it.

The fact that Ḥamzah says he writes the book in Malay so
that those (i.e., Malay Muslims and those who know Malay)
who do not understand Arabic and Persian may be able to
discourse upon the subject seems to me to show clearly that
before Ḥamzah wrote such a book, all known books on the
subject were written in Arabic and Persian. Furthermore
this opening statement implies that the Sharāb is Ḥamzah's
first complete prose work, and that the ʿAṣrār and the
Muntahā and others - if any - are later ones. This implication
is substantiated by the very content, the subject
matter of the book itself, which is of an introductory
nature. It begins with the basic exposition on the nature of
the Sharīʿat (Religious Law), its distinction and, at the
same time, identity with Ṭarīqat (the Ṣūfī Path), Ḥaqīqat
(Truth) and Ma'rifat (Gnosis); a brief summary of the doctrines of the Tajalliyat (Divine Manifestations) and the Şifat (Divine Attributes); and finally concluding with a concise exposition on 'ishq (love of God) and shukr (thankfulness to God). The exhortation in the preface to find an accomplished teacher, to seek knowledge and to know true religion; the emphasis on the indispensability of the Sharī'at, and the warning in the conclusion not to abuse the ecstatic utterances of true Şūfīs by pretending to experience mystical ecstasy - all these reveal the introductory function of the Sharāb. Ḥamzah himself says that the book is a summarized form and a concise exposition of the fundamental points discussed. In comparison, the Asrār, written somewhat on the rough model of Ibnu'l-'Arabī's Tarjumān al-Ashwāq, 'Irāqī's Lema'āt and Jāmī's Lawā'ih, cannot be considered as introductory in nature, except in the sense that it is an introduction to his bayts (verses), and the manner in which they are to be interpreted and understood. The opening lines of the Asrār begin with a hint of controversy centered around the concept of creation; it repeats some of the more difficult concepts mentioned in the Sharāb, such as those pertaining to cosmology and ontology, and it concludes again with an exhortation not to wander away from the enclosure of the Sharī'at. As regards the Muntahī, it is an advanced work meant for the adept, and therefore most probably a
much later product of Ḥamzah's literary efforts.

To return to the suggestion put forward here that the Sharāb is the earliest book on Ṣūfism in Malay, and the earliest complete prose work of Ḥamzah, we must visualize the spiritual climate preceding the writing of the Sharāb - on the basis of what is implied in the Sharāb itself - to be most confused and unhealthy. It is only in this context, it seems to me, that the following quotation and all its implications are to be understood:

...Then Ḥamzah Fansūrī in the land of Aceh composed a book entitled Drink of Lovers (Sharābu’l-’Ashiqīn). In it are manifested teachings (literally 'words': perkataan) on the doctrine of Oneness of Being (waḥdatu’l-wujūd). He made symbolic allusions pertaining to the relationship between God Most Exalted and the creatures, such as the analogy of the name ‘cotton' and the cloth; and the sun and its reflection; and the waves and the ocean; and the earthenware vessels and the clay. Then this knowledge entered into the breasts of the dull-witted, and it became as it were poison most venomous, and they refused to let go of their hold on it. God alone knows best! 704

704. See Doorenbos, p.222, note 1, where this passage is quoted. But in Doorenbos it serves a different purpose. The passage runs:

...Kemudian dikarang pula oleh Ḥamzah Fansūrī didalam negeri Aceh suatu kitāb yang bernama Sharābu’l-’Āshiqīn. Dalamnya zāhir perkataan waḥdatu’l-wujūd. Maka di‘ibārātkannya Allāh Ta‘ālā dengan makhluq seperti nama kapas dengan kain; dan seupama matahari dengan bayangan-yalah; dan upama ombak dengan laut; dan upama kendi dengan tanah. Maka masuk'ilμu ini kedalam dada orang dūngu, jadilah ia rachun yang amat
It must be noted, as Winstedt has pointed out on the authority of the Sejarah Melayu, that the most learned of Malacca Malays knew only Arabic grammar and a little jurisprudence at the end of the fifteenth century. It is reasonable to assume that the same could be said of the Malays of Acheh, although there - in particular Pasai - the interpreters of religion, law and mysticism flourished. But who were these interpreters? Hamzah's attacks against certain jurists (sing. faqih) and their works on jurisprudence (fiqh) couched in his verses imply that the jurists had been interpreting Sufism, and that their interpretations were not as profound as it would have been had it been done by Sufis themselves. We must assume therefore that by the

bisa, tiadalah ia mahu melepaskan dia. Wa’Llahu a’lam!

This quotation serves well to add further proof to my point mentioned in several places in this thesis that many claimed to be Hamzah's "followers" who were in fact misrepresenting Hamzah's actual teachings. Hamzah reiterates with much emphasis on what must be understood in his Asrar Muntahî and Sha’irs.

705 Winstedt, _op. cit._, p. 112.

706 See e.g. 2016, pp. 33-34; ref. well known fiqh books: Mahalli and Mubarrar, see Juynboll, Th.W., _Handleiding tot de kennis van de Mohammedaansche Wet_, Leiden, 1930, pp. 9, 374, and 379. Ghazzali, it is true, stressed the importance and necessity for every good Muslim to study jurisprudence, the science of the origins of Muslim law (usûl) and mysticism (Tašawwuf), the last being the spiritual element that unites the former two into a harmonious system. But he was one of very few Sufis who harmoniously united within his person not only the three accomplishments, but theology and philosophy as well. Indeed the jurists in Acheh cannot be compared with him. Hamzah, it must be emphasized, was not attacking jurisprudence, but jurists who taught mysticism without having a profound grasp of the knowledge. See, e.g. 2016, p. 32.
time Ḥamzah began writing his mystical works, there was a great need to understand Ṣūfism, which cannot be grasped simply by understanding Arabic grammar and a little jurisprudence. The time, then, was "ripe", as it were, for Malay expositions on Ṣūfism to appear, and the person to do just that was available. That there was such a need, there can be no doubt. Rānīrī himself many years later was asked by some of his "influential friends", presumably in the court of Acheh, to clarify some of the most fundamental concepts in Ṣūfism in Malay. But it is also revealed in the anonymous passage just quoted that expositions in the indigenous language (Malay), particularly when it is the first of its kind, and when the words and terminologies used convey relational meanings and new concepts, are apt to be misunderstood, and will not all be understood merely through the process of many readings and the impressions of many decades, for even in Rānīrī's time he still had to clarify what Ḥamzah had been clarifying, this time through a different method of approach - a method of approach more in line with that of the scholastic theologians.

In the Bustānu‘l-Salāṭīn, Rānīrī mentions the arrival in Acheh of two pundits from Makkah in 1582, who attempted to define the nature of the Fixed Essences

707. Ḥujjah, p.3.
One of these was Abū'1-Khayr ibnu'l-Ḥajar, the author of Al-Sayfu'l-Qāṭi' previously mentioned, and the other a man of Yaman. Now in one of his important verses on the same subject of the Fixed Essences, Ḥamzah writes as though he is refuting someone; contradicting and even ridiculing certain views on the Fixed Essences that must have been discussed before he wrote those verses. In view of Rānīrī's mention of the debate between the two pundits mentioned above, there is every possibility that Ḥamzah in his verses on the Fixed Essences is refuting the views of Abū'1-Khayr ibnu'l-Ḥajar in Al-Sayfu'l-Qāṭi', or the views maintained in the debate between ibnu'l-Ḥajar and Muhammād al-Yamanī. If this is true, then that particular set of verses is written by Ḥamzah some time in or shortly after 1582.

709. 2016, pp.33-35. Appendix V, (i). A full expository treatment of these verses has been given above, pp.136-143.
710. It must be noted that Ḥamzah's refutation could also have been directed against views put forward by Rānīrī's uncle, who was in Acheh between 1580 and 1583 teaching logic, rhetoric, ethics and jurisprudence, and who, dismayed that he could not generate interest in these subjects journeyed to Makkah to study Ṣūfism, returning to Acheh a few years later to teach mysticism. This seems very probable and, moreover, would explain considerably Rānīrī's chief motive for attacking Ḥamzah the way he did.
It seems to me, on the basis of my opinion about the *Asrār* being an introduction to Ẓamzah's verses and to the manner in which they are to be interpreted and understood, that the verses as a whole or a large portion of it, particularly those dealing with "an exposition of the Science of the Path and the Doctrine of Divine Unity", 711 are written after the *Asrār* and possibly also after the *Muntahī*.

Another remarkable thing, aside from the evidence in the opening lines of the *Sharāb* suggesting that Ẓamzah's prose works are the earliest Malay texts on Sūfism, expounding for the first time the Sūfī doctrines in systematic and definitive expression, is the fact that Ẓamzah's texts remain the best and most lucid texts on the subject. It is indeed astonishing that this fact has not been given due notice and attention. 712

711. *Sha'ir Jawi fi bayān 'Ilmi'l-Sulūk wa'l-Tawhīd.*

712. The works of Ẓamzah have been referred to in the past as being saturated with Arabic words rendering them unintelligible. Anyone who would now study Ẓamzah's works again will agree with me that his Malay is indeed very intelligible and closely resembles modern Malay! The so-called unintelligibility of expression, for those who find it so, in Ẓamzah has for the most part been largely due to: (1) not being sufficiently acquainted with the religion of Islam, particularly with the doctrines of the Sūfīs; (ii) generalizations based upon conclusions drawn from studies of merely lesser works in which so-called Arabic influence predominates; (iii) the manner in which Ẓamzah's writings have been presented which renders the works well-nigh incomprehensible to the layman. The Arabic words found in them are necessary, for in the event of the introduction of a new weltanschauung there will always be the adoption of
From the point of view of Malay literature in general, in addition to the introduction of new technical terms and concepts in the Malay language having to do with philosophy and metaphysics, there is enough evidence that Hamzah introduced new forms of poetry into the Malay language. I am speaking of the rubā'ī and the sha'īr. In the preface to his Ṭasār, introducing his verses and their commentaries, Hamzah explains:

However, before you meet with one whose gnosis is perfect, consider these fifteen bayts. These [fifteen bayts] are [composed of] a verse of four lines to each bayt. Should you fail to comprehend the meaning of these fifteen verses, consult their commentaries ...

new words and the assimilation of new meanings by old words - and these are neither "murder" nor "mutilation"; on the contrary, they denote enrichment and the widening of scope in language. This very same phenomenon of the "murder" and "mutilation" of the Malay language - this time, in Malaya for example, through the influence of English - is taking place again, and the causes must be attributed not to English (in modern times) nor to Arabic (in earlier times), but to the authors and writers whose mastery of their own language and the languages they translate - whether it be the words or the ideas - and whose mastery of the subjects they write are very much in need of improvement. With respect to studies pertaining to the influence of Arabic upon Malay, and Malay literature, it seems to me that no reliable conclusions can be drawn from studies of lesser works whose very unintelligibility resulting from awkward arrangement of expression reveals that they were the works of those who had neither the mastery of the Malay and Arabic languages nor the total grasp of the subject matter they translated. More benefit could perhaps be derived from studies of consistent, intelligent and systematic works like those of Hamzah, Rānîrī and Shamsu’l-Dīn, by means of a semantic method of analysis such as introduced in this thesis.
It is clear that the term *bayt* was already understood by the time Ḥamzah writes his verses in the *Asrār*, otherwise he will obviously have to explain the meaning of *bayt*. But the term *bayt*, as it must have been understood then, means a half verse – a verse of two hemistichs (*miṣrā'), as this was and still is the meaning generally understood in Arabic and Persian prosody. Ḥamzah refers to the verses in the *Asrār* as couched in the form of the *rubā'ī*, a verse form of Persian origin. Yet in fact a *rubā'ī* is composed of two *bayts*, as the Persian name for it shows: *dū bayt*, and not one *bayt* as Ḥamzah says. However, Ḥamzah here obviously means by *rubā'ī* verses composed of four lines, and thus he says so in order not to confuse his readers who were accustomed to understand *bayt* as meaning two hemistichs, which written in Malay would correspond to two lines. This definition by Ḥamzah of his own *bayt* to mean a verse of four lines suggest that Ḥamzah is introducing something new to his Malay readers. Ḥamzah also calls his verses *sha'irs*, and his *sha'irs* are in

---

713. Hence the confusion in Wilkinson's Dictionary on the definition of *bayt*. The many meanings of *bayt* in Malay literature, I suggest, was partly caused by Ḥamzah's unconventional use of it. As is shown above, Ḥamzah already defines his *bayt* as a *rubā'ī*, and this *rubā'ī*, in turn is none other than his *sha'ir*.

714. See 2016, p.91:

> Asrāru'l-'Ārifīn pun perbuatnya
> Rubā' al-Muḍqqqiğīn nama *baytnya*. 
fact composed of units of verses of four lines (bayts). The rhyme scheme is always AAAA. In the true rubā'I the rhyme scheme is generally AABA, although AAAA is permissible. The choice of the rubā'I to convey his mystical poems is undoubtedly influenced by the works of the Persian Sūfī poets who have been making extensive use of it as Shāh Ni'matu'll-Lāh and Jāmī, for example, both of whom Ḥamzah quotes. In view of the predominantly Persian influence in the writings of Ḥamzah; his mysticism, his sources, his verse form—his intimate connection with Shahr-i-Naw, where I have suggested he was born, and where Persians predominated among the Muslim population, makes very clear now what was once obscure.

The Ashrafi dinār was struck in Mamluk Egypt by order of al-Malik al-Ashraf Barsbāy on December 28, 1425. It was of the finest gold and remained throughout the century the preferred gold coin in trade. Its quality was so well-established that the word dinār without qualifying adjective meant the Ashrafi dinār, and Ashrafi alternates with dinār in quotations as the term for gold. After the Ashrafi had been introduced to Persia, the name Ashrafi became the usual term for the native Persian gold coin. Ḥamzah's familiarity with the Ashrafi could not have been obtained from Acheh, where by Ḥamzah's time the Egyptian Ashrafi would presumably no longer be known or used in trade. His familiarity with the Ashrafi could only have been derived, it would seem, from Persians who used Persian Ashrafs in their trade at Shahr-i-Naw. This evidence substantiates further my point about Persians predominating the Muslim population in Shahr-i-Naw (see above, pp. 29-30), and reveals that Muslim trade there was most probably in the hands of the Persians. For more information on the
This study on the mysticism of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, which inevitably involves the study of other writings in Malay on Ṣūfīsm; and the discoveries made resulting from close comparisons with the concepts and philosophical and mystical terminologies of classical Ṣūfīs, of the Muslim philosophers and scholastic theologians, in particular the Mutakallimūn, supported by the application of methodological concepts in a modern semantic analysis, have opened before our vision other horizons intimately connected with the historical problem of islamization of the Malays and with a more accurate cultural assessment of the impact and influence of the Islamic weltanschauung upon that which was radically different. Throughout this study we are led to see that the fundamental problem was to transform the Malay world view into that of Islām, as understood particularly by the Ṣūfīs. This world view centered around the conception of being. The whole vista of intellectual and spiritual activity which seemed to galvanize the Malays beginning perhaps from the fifteenth and carried on through the seventeenth centuries can be said to be embodied in the works of their greatest intellectual representative: Ḥamzah Ashrafī dīnār, see Popper, W., Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957, pp.49-50. See also Rabino di Borgomale, H.L., Coins, Medals and Seals of the Shahs of Iran, Hertford, 1945, p.14.
Fanṣūrī. In order to visualize how he fits into this important phase - perhaps the most important - of the islamization process I would like to put forward the general outlines of a theory of the islamization process in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago based on every relevant fact and idea stated, referred to and implied in this study. Before this can be done, however, it is necessary that some coherent background, even if only a skeleton survey of the pre-Islamic cultural background, pertaining to matters relevant to the conception of being, will first have to be attempted.

At the outset I declare my agreement with van Leur that Hinduism, as the Malay-Indonesian peoples practised it, was merely a superstructure maintained by the ruling group above an indifferent community. The Malay-Indonesian community's participation in Hinduism was a necessary influence from above; the religion was imposed upon the community by the authority of the ruling group. The Malay-Indonesian society was therefore not a Hinduized society; rather the Malay-Indonesian ruling groups were legitimated sacrally by an Indian hierocracy.716

716. Consult van Leur, J.C., Indonesian Trade and Society, The Hague, 1955, pp.89-110. The same conclusion can be said of the Malay-Indonesian community's participation in Buddhism, particularly as manifested in Java.
Both Hinduism and Buddhism have been clothed in the garment of symbolic forms that tend to be more anthropomorphic than abstract; and this is true indeed not through any lack of profound philosophy, but, it seems to me, to the proneness to underline the aesthetical rather than the intellectual elements of philosophy in religion. This clearly defined characteristic of these great religions happens to coincide with what appears to be the dominant natural tendency in the Malay-Indonesian world view, for in their active, selective assimilation of Hinduism and Buddhism on their own initiative, they appear to have ignored the profundities of Hindu-Buddhist philosophy and metaphysics in favour of what was less complicated and more readily acceptable to their own world view. What philosophy they took they

717. My conclusion on the tendency for the Malay-Indonesian world view to underline the aesthetical rather than the intellectual elements of philosophy is derived from a comparative study of the non-Islamic and Islamic classical literature, from general observation and from knowledge obtained from works of scholarship on relevant subjects. This view seems confirmed by the works of the modern Indonesian literatus Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, whose more extensive scope, but different method of approach is given in his recently published works: Values as integrating forces in Personality, Society and Culture, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1966; and Indonesia's social and cultural revolution, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1966, chapter on 'The Prolificness of the Arts'.
transformed into art at the expense of the rational and intellectual elements. It is significant, with respect to Hinduism, that the religion as was popularly understood seemed to have radiated not necessarily from direct Upanishadic sources, but more from the artistic formulations depicted in the \textit{Mahābhārata} and \textit{Bhagavad-gītā}, which in comparison with expository works on Vedantic doctrines, have been copiously translated first into Javanese and then from the Javanese into Malay.\footnote{As far as I know there has been no Javanese translation of the Upanishads, or even full expository translations of the Hindu doctrines according to the Vedānta, in spite of centuries of Indian-Hindu influence. Neither has there been, as far as I know, any translations of works of Buddhist theology and philosophy in Malay. The Qur'ān, however, has been fully translated with commentary in Malay in the second half of the seventeenth century.} The original \textit{Mahābhārata} and \textit{Bhagavad-gītā}, particularly the latter, are by no means merely epical, romantical, or mythological in character - but in the translations it was these aspects that were emphasized. In Hindu-Javanese and Hindu-Malay literature, it would be no exaggeration to say that epics, romances and mythologies predominated whatever else there were and apparently the number of copies was determined by its popularity in court, which usually chose in favour of the epics, romances and mythologies. To cite one significant
example, Prapañca's works, which were mostly of erudition rather than effusions of the poetical spirit, were criticized by the female critics at court so that even his most famous work, the *Nāgara Kertāgama*, has come down to posterity in one manuscript.719 Although it may be conceded that Old Javanese literature embodied much that was philosophical such as, to mention one example out of the few, the *Arjuna Wiwāha* of Mpu Kanwa, written over three centuries before the *Nāgara Kertāgama*, yet most were in poetic form, as is the case with the *Arjuna Wiwāha*, lacking exposition and commentary, so that they were not really meant for the general public.720 For this latter group, the philosophical-mystical world view envisaged by the poets of Old Javanese literature was intended for the court - of king Airlangga. After Islamization spiritual refinement and knowledge was shared with the people; the intellectual and rational impetus conveyed by Sufi and Mutakallimi literature was not only meant for the courts, but perhaps more so for the people in general. The existence of numerous copies of treatises on metaphysical topics expounding a cosmology and ontology that can be traced back to well known classical Sufis, Mutakallimun, Falasifah, and further back to Plotinus, Aristotle and Plato demonstrate that Islamic-Malay literature was neither the preserve of the courts nor determined by their values, but was more democratic than the past in the selection of its audience and readers. Furthermore the above mentioned type of Islamic-Malay literature was neither meant nor used in any way for court rituals or sacrificial purposes, but for the consolidation of Islamization in its process of conversion of the spirit which is outlined in the next few pages.

720. The *Arjuna Wiwaha* was again meant for the court - of king Airlangga. After Islamization spiritual refinement and knowledge was shared with the people; the intellectual and rational impetus conveyed by Sufi and Mutakallimi literature was not only meant for the courts, but perhaps more so for the people in general. The existence of numerous copies of treatises on metaphysical topics expounding a cosmology and ontology that can be traced back to well known classical Sufis, Mutakallimun, Falasifah, and further back to Plotinus, Aristotle and Plato demonstrate that Islamic-Malay literature was neither the preserve of the courts nor determined by their values, but was more democratic than the past in the selection of its audience and readers. Furthermore the above mentioned type of Islamic-Malay literature was neither meant nor used in any way for court rituals or sacrificial purposes, but for the consolidation of Islamization in its process of conversion of the spirit which is outlined in the next few pages.
was glimpsed in the wayang (theatres); filtered, as it were, again through the medium of art. No doubt the doctrine of the Atman as propounded in the Bhagavad-gītā was known, and made to run through the veins of Hindu-Javanese and Hindu-Malay literature, but it is still to be argued whether there was anything really deep, in the sense in which it is understood in the Hindu doctrines. No one can be certain - for so far there has been no sure scientific way of ascertaining - that the philosophical and mystical elements of Upanishadic Hinduism that trickled through the sieve of art into Javanese-Malay literature before Islām were understood by the Javanese-Malay interpreters and their public in the same sense in which they were understood by the Hindu sages. The doctrine of the Atman interpreted as the Brahman "lodged within" the individual being was more likely taken in the literal sense - particularly by the people in general - for in this sense it would be more congenial to the autochthonous world view of the Hindu-Javanese-Malay in which animism continued to dominate.

721. In The Romance of Amir Hamza in Java (Bingkisan Budi, Leiden, 1950, pp.235-240), Th. Pigeaud makes this interesting remark: "Almost all myths, history, stories and tales written in Javanese have been turned, at one time or another, into plays for the various kinds of theatre or theatrical dancing in which the Javanese excel." - p.236.
The same could be said of Buddhism in its contact with the Malay-Indonesian peoples. For many centuries, from the sixth to the eleventh centuries, Sumatra seemed to have been a great centre of Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy. Yet the influence of the Buddhist clergy in Sumatra did not seem to have made any impression in the realm of philosophy - but again in that of art. It is significant that this artistic manifestation should have occurred in Java in the form of the great Borobudur, the Chandi Mendut and the Chandi Sewu complex. We are told in the late sixth century of the existence of one thousand Buddhist monks in Sumatra, where Buddhist philosophy and theology flourished; of the venerable Atisha, the great reformer of Buddhism in Tibet, who had sat at the feet of Dharmakirti, high priest of the Buddhist clergy in Sumatra in the early eleventh century. Considering the powerful influence of the Sumatran Buddhist clergy in being able to produce or train from among them one who would rise to the eminence of a reformer in a distant land, it seems strange and surprising that Buddhist philosophy did not seem to spread its influence in Sumatra itself. Was it perhaps that Buddhism, not being a missionary religion charged with an expansive missionary movement, was not really interested in imparting a new world view to the Sumatrans themselves? Or was it that the Buddhist clergy were not mainly composed of indigenous people, but of people from
Bengal who came to Sumatra to find peace and seclusion for the purpose of meditation; who regarding Sumatra as a retreat shut themselves in their monastery oblivious of the outside world around them? We have no firm evidence of the Malay language ever being used to convey Buddhist theology and philosophy, even in the sense in which the Javanese language has been used in connection with Hinduism. Could it have been that the Malay language was then not yet developed as a medium for philosophical concepts and ideas? Neither the Hindu-Malay nor the Buddhist-Malay, as far as we know, have produced any thinker or philosopher of note.

The reputation spread abroad of the Malay-Indonesian peoples – particularly in Java – as being refiners of great cultures, who excelled in syncretizing the great pre-Islamic religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, in the sense of fusing and blending them, has no firm basis. If Kertanāgara practised the Siva-Buddha cult and finally assumed divinity as a Buddha-Bhairava in 1275, this does not necessarily reveal the possibility of fusion between Sivaite Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism. It would simply reveal that the king, being ruler of both Hindus and Buddhists, would logically unite within his person the divinity worshipped by both religious groups in order to enhance his charismatic sway over the people. As Rassers and others have pointed out, the term 'syncretism' must be regarded with
some degree of caution in this respect; perhaps 'parallelism' would better describe the fact, and this is clearly brought forth in the significance of the story of Gagang-aking and Bubukshah. 722

Unlike Hinduism and Buddhism, Islam is traditionally linked with the West. It carried on the traditions of Judaism and Christianity, and by the time it came to the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, it brought with it also important elements of Greek philosophy such as conveyed by Plato, Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists. Apart from these elements of Greek philosophy it brought with it also its own contribution to philosophy - the elaborate theory of atoms, accidents and substance of the Mu'tazilah, al-Ash'ari and the later Mutakallimun. 723 The islamization of the Malay-Indonesian

723. Western scholars, with the exception of perhaps certain Western orientalists, have tried to ignore this genuinely Islamic contribution to philosophy, maybe due to too much indulgence in Maimonides who reported that everything the Muslims, Mu'tazilis and Ash'aris have professed concerning these subjects, have been borrowed from the Greeks and Syrians (The Guide of the Perplexed, Chicago, 1963, 1.71[p.177]). Maimonides' remark is rather sweeping and is still a debatable point. While it is true that some Greek and Syrian thinkers have challenged Aristotelianism, and have held atomistic theories of nature, it cannot be said that theirs were fully developed into well-defined systems as the elaborate Mutakallimun theory was. Furthermore the Muslims were not merely Translators of the Greeks. Their philosophy centered around concepts mainly influenced by the Quranic world view. This world view is non-Aristotelian in nature - it is a world view that Korzybski would perhaps define as "non-elemental" as against the "elemental" world view of Aristotelianism.
Archipelago should therefore not be compared, it seems to me, with the earlier hinduization, as has been traditionally done.\textsuperscript{724} It would be more relevant to compare the islamization process with Western elements, and to a certain extent with the influence of the impact of Islām upon Europe in the Middle Ages in the manner Pirenne has shown;\textsuperscript{725} for in several respects certain factors were similar, primarily the introduction of rational and intellectual elements whose profound effect, generally revealed in the language in which these elements are couched, was to introduce a world view aimed not so much at the conversion of the 'body', so to speak, but more so the conversion of the spirit. From the point of view of cultural history it would also be relevant to compare the impact of the Islamic weltanschauung upon the Malay-Indonesian world view, with that of Islām - in particular the Qur'ān - upon the Arabs, their language and the revolutionary changes that have been reflected in it as manifested, for example, in comparative studies of the Jāhiliyyah and Islamic world views.\textsuperscript{726}

\textsuperscript{724} The best example is Schrieke, B., Indonesian Sociological Studies, the Hague, (2 vols.), 1955-1957, see relevant sections on the penetration of Islam in the Archipelago and Appendix II of vol.2.

\textsuperscript{725} Pirenne, H., Muhammad and Charlemagne, translated by B. Miall, London, 1940, chapter I, part II.

\textsuperscript{726} The most lucid accounts and the most recent and new in their methodological approach, in my opinion, are the comparative studies of Professor T. Izutsu of Keio University, Tokyo. For some of his relevant works and other relevant references, see above, notes, 11, 578.
Islam came to the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. I suggest, not as one identical historical process which merely gained momentum throughout several centuries. The islamization process, from the evidence we have of religious and mystical literature, must be seen, it seems to me, as proceeding according to three phases which may briefly and generally be clearly distinguished as follows:

(i) the conversion of the Malay-Indonesians in which jurisprudence (fiqh) played the major role of interpreting the religious law (shari'ah). In this first phase of the process one can generally say that it was a conversion of the 'body'. By conversion of the 'body' I mean acceptance of the religion by strength of faith not necessarily accompanied by an understanding of the rational and intellectual implications such acceptance entailed. It is possible to conceive, therefore, that in this first phase of the islamization process many fundamental concepts connected with the central Islamic concept of the Divine Unity were still vague in the minds of the Malay-Indonesians; and they were understood in an opaque sense, some of their old concepts overlapping and clouding or confusing new ones.

(ii) the continuation of the process described in (i), but in this phase the major role of interpreting the religious law have passed on to mysticism (tasawwuf) and other rational and intellectual elements such as dialectics (kalām)
and theology. In this phase Ṣūfism and Ṣūfī writings primarily, and the writings of the Muṭakallimūn played the dominant role, and the aim was the conversion of the spirit. By this I mean that the fundamental concepts introduced in the Islamic weltanschauung, some of which were still understood in the opaque sense influenced, as it were, by the old weltanschauung, were expounded and defined so that they could be understood in both the transparent and semi-transparent senses.⁷²⁷

(iii) continuation of (i) and the consummation of (ii), which has been largely successful. What is important is not so much to discover the possibility that the islamization process underwent three distinct but not separate phases generally from the beginning of the advent of Islām in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago to the present day, for it ought to have been obvious that the more mystical philosophical and theological elements in religion should usually be preceded by general acceptance of the religion on the basis of faith (I mean by faith both its aspects of Īmān and islām), and the external expression of this faith by works (ʿamal), fortified by a firm foundation of law. What is indeed more

⁷²⁷ In case the meanings of the semantic terminologies I have used here, such as opaque, transparent and semi-transparent, are not self-explanatory, please consult relevant explanations in Ullman's and Izutsu's works cited in note, 11 above.
important is to discover in what periods of history these phases became noticeable as such, so that a particular period can be distinguished from another, for such a discovery would throw considerable light on the history of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago itself. Provided we understand - as I have noted above - that the phases are not separate in the sense that one ceased at the emergence of the other, I suggest that the first phase, became more noticeable perhaps from the twelfth century, when historical evidence so far imply the existence of large numbers of Muslims in the Archipelago and the beginnings of Malay Muslim kingdoms, and dominated the process of islamization up to the fifteenth century, when the second phase noticeably began to take over. The second phase continued to dominate the process up to about the end of the eighteenth century. The evidence that I wish to marshal in support of this theory are mainly derived from a study of the mystical and religious literature - the best examples of which are the works of Ḥamzah here presented - since these are to my mind the most convincing and indeed the most relevant to any study of the process of Islamization.

As far as we know, going back from the fifteenth century, it was the fifteenth century - the first half of the century, to be precise - and the centuries before that, that revealed a predominance of works on Muslim Law and the
high positions occupied by jurists (fuqahāʾ) in the courts of the Malay kingdoms. In this period there was hardly any mention of Šūfīs at court, or of Šūfī works or discussions on mysticism on the scale that was to come. The Hikâyat Raja-Raja Pasai, the oldest extant Malay chronicle, mentions again jurists - Sayyids from Persia - who lived in the court of al-Malik al-Zāhir in the first half of the fourteenth century in the capacity of religious advisors to the Sultān and his sons. These were possibly the jurists Ibn Battūtah mentioned he met when he visited the Sultān's court in 1345-1346. Although even then Ibn Battūtah reported that the Sultān was a lover of religious debates and discourses, and had himself surrounded by Ulamāʾ and Fuqahāʾ, it is possible to assume that debates on mysticism and philosophy centering around the fundamental conception of being were not discussed, or if discussed, were not conducted in masterly style, as later was to happen. The first mention of a serious Šūfī work, the Durruʾl-Manzūm of Shaykh Abū Ishāq, a Šūfī of Makkah - which has been mentioned

---

728. For the extent and nature of these works on Muslim Law, see for example, Juynboll's work cited in note 706 above.

729. The Hikâyat Raja-Raja Pasai is said to have been written between 1350 and before 1524. The version I am quoting belongs to Raffles Ms. no.67. Catalogue of the R.A.S. London, romanized by J.P. Mead in the J.R.A.S.S.B., March, 1914, pp.17 foll.

previously - was during the reign of Sultan Mansur Shah of Malacca in 1459. It was after this period that more and more emphasis on mysticism became noticeable. But, as Hamzah revealed in his verses I mentioned and quoted in several places, it was again jurists, or in any case men who were not thoroughly grounded in mysticism, who attempted to discuss and expound Sufi concepts that increasingly and persistently demanded exposition. Pundits arrived from Makkah to debate and write about the Fixed Essences, and it is significant to note that when Rani's uncle arrived in Aceh expecting to teach logic, rhetoric, ethics and jurisprudence in 1580 - presumably on the assumption of his knowledge of the practice in the past - he had to be disappointed, and had speedily to acquire knowledge in mysticism in Makkah before he could return to meet the popular demand. 731 This was the period Hamzah wrote followed by Shamsu'l-Din of Pasai, who - it is significant - even became Shaykhu'l-Islam of the kingdom of Aceh. This was the period of the first Malay written expositions of the Sufi doctrines began by Hamzah and carried on assiduously by Shamsu'l-Din and Rani. This was the period that Rani found fit to translate into Malay - among others - the famous Sharh al-'Aqaid al-Nasafiyyah compiled by al-Taftazani. This was the period of the first complete

731. See above, pp. 305-306.
Malay translation and commentary of the Qur’an done by 'Abdu’l-Ra’uf of Singkel after al-Baydawi’s famous work. This was in fact the period of the prolificness of Malay writings on Sufism and rational theology. After 'Abdu’l-Ra’uf, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, this prolificness decreased, and although works on Sufism continued to be translated, paraphrased and summarized right up to the nineteenth century, the second phase of the islamization process has passed, for the conversion of the spirit has to a considerable extent been accomplished and consolidated. What I mean when I said that perhaps the most important period in the process of islamization was the second phase is precisely this: that in the second phase Sufi metaphysics predominated the interpretation and consolidation of Islam; that it was through Sufism that the highly intellectual and rationalistic religious spirit entered the receptive minds of the people, effecting a rise of rationalism and intellectualism not manifested in pre-Islamic times; that this emergence of rationalism and intellectualism can be viewed as the powerful spirit that set in motion the process of revolutionizing the Malay-Indonesian world view, turning it away from a crumbling world of mythology, which can be compared with the Greek world in the Olympian era, to the world of intelligence, reason and order; that it emphasized the belief in a God whose Power is governed by Wisdom, whose
Creative Will works in accordance with Reason; that it emphasized Man as the epitome of Creation, whose very essence is rationality which is the connecting link between him and Reality; that, finally - to use a pregnant remark - it prepared the Malay-Indonesians, in a sense, for the modern world to come.

The most remarkable thing during this second phase of the islamization process was the emphasis laid on one identical factor throughout, which reveals that this factor was regarded as of utmost importance due to its fundamental nature - and this is the conception of being. From the time immediately preceding that of Ḥamzah up to Rānīrī's time all the major debates, discourses and writings we know of revolved around this concept. The significance of this seems to me clear, in that here we have the first real coming to grips with the fundamental problem that must have plagued the Malay-Indonesian Muslims since the coming of Islām until then: the problem of the relationship between God, Man and the World, the solution to which will have been none other than the answer to the perplexing question: 'What is being?'. That the conception of being was a problem was due to the definite existence of conflicting notions about it, and these conflicting notions arose because the Malay-Indonesians were now Muslims and the old conception of being clashed with the new. Such a problem did not apparently exist in Hindu-
Buddhist times for Hinduism and Buddhism did not demand the conversion of the spirit, or perhaps they were interpreted in such a manner as to render non-existent the problem of the conception of being. As far as Hinduism and Buddhism were concerned, the manner in which they were interpreted, where the conception of being was concerned, was to identify it with their own world view which was basically dominated by the notion of corporeality filling space, being 'contained' in something. This somewhat Parmenidean conception of being was congenial to the animistic notions held by them, for even their spirits were indeed in some sense non-abstract, subjected as they were to 'being contained in' some thing. This basic definition, loose as it may be, of the old Malay-Indonesian vision of being, seems to me quite accurate; for not only is it substantiated by the literature and the vestiges of ancient practices we still observe today, but more important perhaps, by the testimony of the basic concepts underlying such key words as ada, tiada, isi, diri and jadi. It would therefore not be surprising if the Hindu-Malay or Javanese were to have understood the concept of the Atman as the Brahman "lodged within" the individual being in the strictly literal sense, for it was in this same sense that some Muslim Malays and Javanese understood the

732. See above, chapter V.
concept of the Self (diri: nafs) as the God 'in' Man. 733

733. On a study of the Javanese Suluk literature see Zoetmulder, P.J. *Pantheisme en Monisme in de Javaansche Soeloek Litteratuur* (diss.), Nijmegen, 1935. Zoetmulder mentions that the doctrine of the God in Man, which in Sufism is the doctrine of the sirr, corresponds to the Hindu doctrine of the Atman. In Javanese Suluk literature this doctrine is designated as (a) rasa (essence, taste, etc.); (b) rahasia (secret, mystery); (c) urip (life); and (d) suksma (the immaterial soul), with (a) and (b); (e) and (d) each running together (see pp. 420–421). It must be noted, it seems to me, that if in Javanese Sufi literature it is found that terms referring to the Hindu doctrines according to the Vedanta have been employed in the correct sense, this fact might not necessarily indicate that the doctrine of the Atman, for example, was understood in the Hindu period in the correct, original sense; for it could well have been Islamic influence (through the Sufi interpretation of the relevant Hindu doctrines) that have contributed such interpretations. It is well known that the Sufis on the whole saw eye to eye with the Hindu Sages in these matters. The coming of Islam to Java, then, could also be conceived as effecting a corrective influence in the interpretation of the Hindu doctrines carried out through the medium of Sufi literature. Following this very important point, it could be conceived as more likely that the 'conflict' which most scholars on the subject think they see between Islam and Javanese Hinduism, as manifested in Javanese Sufi writings which — they say — were deliberately and consciously made to hark back to the old Hinduism thus indicating Javanese resentment towards Islamic encroachment, does not really indicate conflict, but an ingenious missionary technique devised to bring the Javanese around to the Islamic (Sufi) point of view. Ingenious Muslim missionary techniques making use of what would be regarded as familiar mediums, closely and intimately linked with old concepts and old Weltanschauung, seems to have been resorted to by Muslim missionaries in Java in the past. One that is a well-known fact was Suan Kalijaga's use of the wayang to spread Islam in Java.
Hamzah's writings, especially his verses, without doubt reveal that many have interpreted the doctrine of the Self (diri: nafs) in the sense of the indwelling of God in the human individuality or ego (diri yang zahir) - so that God is 'contained in' man, or that He 'fills' man, a notion closely connected with the doctrine of incarnation (hulul) condemned by the Sufis.\(^{734}\) Raniri's attacks against the Deviating Wujūdiyyah centered around the same issue. The root of this problem was precisely the opaque manner in which the old pre-Islamic Malay-Indonesian conception of being as couched in the word ada viewed the new Islamic conception of being. The first time in Malay writings we find ada applied relationally to convey transparent and semi-transparent meanings in the context of the Islamic conception of being, is in the writings of Hamzah.\(^{735}\) It indicates a conscious

\(^{734}\) On his verses showing the practice of some people being influenced by the old conception of being, see above, pp. 41-43.

Another example from 2016, p. 56:

DhatNya itu tiada berkiri-kanan.
ZahirNya dā'im tiada berkesudahan,
Tiada bersifat belakang dan hadapan.
Manakan dapat manzil Nya kau adakan?

His Essence has no 'left' or 'right',
His being manifest is always, without end,
His Nature does not have a 'back' or a 'front'
How can you ascribe existence of place to Him?

For the profane type of the doctrine of the Self, see above, pp. 51-56.

\(^{735}\) See above, pp. 275-290.
attempt on Ḥamzah's part to include within its basic meaning new concepts that would gradually effect the desired semantic change according to the influence of the Islamic mystical context, but such a development apparently never took place, even though to a certain extent Ḥamzah's successors used ada in their writings in his relational sense. By the time Rāri wrote and after his time we find less and less of the use of ada in Ḥamzah's sense, and the reason for this seems to me clearly because ada is a word that would always be susceptible of opaque connotation and for this reason it would be dangerous to establish its use as a mystical term, particularly having to do with God's Being. The same kind of problem existed in Muslim philosophy in connection with the word mawjūd, until finally the philosophers had to introduce a new word huwīyyah, so that they could rely on the accuracy of what they intend to mean.736 In the case of Malay mystical literature, the word wujūd became established to mean being in the abstract sense, and it was assimilated and adopted into the Malay-Javanese mystical vocabulary. The history of the term wujūd and its intimate connection with Muslim philosophical and mystical vocabularies, and its foreign (Arabic) origin were sufficient enough to guard it against being understood in the same sense as ada, and ada — in spite

736. See above, p. 252.
of the abstract uses to which it had been put by the Sufis - continued to this day to convey the old basic meaning.

One of the most important single cultural phenomenon directly caused by the influence of Islamic culture, and especially this second phase of the islamization process, was the spread and development of the Malay language as a vehicle, not only for epic, romantic and historical literature, but even more so for philosophical discourse. The use of Malay as the language of Islamic philosophical literature in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago enriched its vocabulary and technical terminology considerably and was one of the paramount factors that displaced the hegemony of Javanese. It is important to note that the stories in the Mahabharata epic and many others of Hindu origin were translated into Malay from the Javanese. The latter’s influence on Hindu-Malay literature was predominant. But a preponderant number of Islamic philosophical writings in Javanese are of Malay influence, and there is indeed a large number of Javanese translations from the Malay - such as for example some of the works of Hamzah - whereas there is hardly any from the Javanese into Malay. Connected closely with this phenomenon another important point is that with the coming of Islām, it was the Malay kingdoms as opposed to the Javanese (i.e. Sumatra represented by Pasai and Acheh, and the Malay Peninsula represented by Malacca) that played the dominant
role in the spread of Islam and Islamic theology and philosophy (mysticism) in Java and the whole of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. In the spread of the Malay language used as a medium for religious, philosophical and mystical literature, there seems to be no doubt that Pasai played the dominant role. Such was Pasai's role even at the height of Malacca's glory, for it appeared to be the custom in Malacca to refer the above types of literature to Pasai for authoritative interpretation. \(^{737}\) Hamzah himself, when referring to the Malay language, speaks of the language of Pasai; and apparently 'Abdu'l-Ra'uf of Singkel, the earliest translator of the Qur'an in Malay, considered good Malay to be Pasai Malay.

As I have indicated earlier, this theory of the periodization of the Islamization process has an important bearing upon any theory of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago. Several theories of the Islamization of the Archipelago have been put forward, notably by Schrieke and van Leur in their works cited. Detailed criticism of their theories, however, is best done elsewhere, but two important points will have to be made here as they are directly connected with several points stated in the preceding pages of this chapter. These points indicate rejection

\(^{737}\) See Sejarah Melayu, Chapter XX.
\(^{738}\) For Hamzah's reference, see Muntahi, p.127; Winstedt (op.cit., p.113) notes that in a Batavian manuscript of his Mir'at al-Tullāb, 'Abdu'l-Ra'ūf in the preface states that not being adept at Malay he got the help of two experts to write the treatise in the language of Pasai.
of two important and generally accepted notions about the Islamization of the Archipelago: the first is Schrieke's theory that the intensification of Muslim missionary activity was due to a "race" with Christianity at the coming of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century; the second is the generally accepted idea that India and Indians played the major role in bringing Islam to the Archipelago. The basis of Schrieke's theory is the observation that considering the probability that Arab settlements had been established on the coastal regions of Sumatra as early as 674 and 878; in Java in 1082; in Champa in 1039; in the Malay Peninsula in 878 and in 1302, we discern little missionary activity when compared with the spread of missionary activity among the Muslims at the end of the thirteenth century, which in the fourteenth century increased in momentum, dominating the entire Archipelago in the fifteenth century. Schrieke concluded that this was due to the coming of the Portuguese who brought Christianity along with them. There was a "race" with Christianity. Aside from the fact that Muslim missionary activity had begun its intensification, almost a century before the Portuguese and Christianity appeared on the scene, spreading Islam to many parts of the Archipelago, Malacca, which the Portuguese captured in 1511, had long been the headquarters for the Muslim missionary invasion of Java. Hence the saying: 'Java was converted in Malacca'. Further-
more, Christian missionary activity - when it came - could hardly be said to have constituted a serious rival for a "race" to occur. While we concede that the appearance of the Portuguese and Christianity in the Archipelago must have had some effect on the historical process of the spread of Islām, we maintain that their role had been magnified at the expense of other more important factors. Now the second phase of the theory of the process of islamization suggested here, which was perhaps the most important phase, coincided with the period Schrieke observed as the period of intensification of Muslim missionary activity. Would not this second phase of the islamization process as outlined here and the complementary role of Malacca as the headquarters for the missionary invasion of Java be more relevant than the Portuguese and Christian factor in directly influencing the intensification of Muslim missionary activity in the entire Archipelago? On the role of India and Indians in the spread of Islām in the Archipelago - this too has been magnified. The evidence of written sources such as the religious, legal and mystical literature point to the Middle East as the major spiritual influence. The sources of those works were either Arab or Persian, hardly Indian. Known early missionaries too were Arabs and Persians. India was the springboard for the Middle-Eastern missionaries, large numbers of which came from the Ḫaḍramawt in South Arabia, as indicated by their
families who to this day have settled in Sumatra, Malaya and Java. Even missionaries who came from India direct, like Rānīrī, did not reflect the Indian milieu, but rather that of the Middle East (of Ḥadramawt in Rānīrī's case). Mystical polemics in India like those of Aḥmad Fārūqī Sirhindī and Shāh Wālīyyu’l-lāh did not leave traces in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, nor were there any traces in connection with Akbar's Dīn-i-Ilāhī, or other peculiarities of 'Indian Islām' found in the Archipelago, which one would generally expect to find if indeed Islām had come from India conveyed by Indians. Some of the so-called Indian influences could well have been the vestiges of the old contact with India and with Hinduism and Buddhism still to be found after Islamization.

It was most likely this type of Indian influence that I have referred to in p. 41, above. But even if the Indian influence described there came from Islamic India, that would not have made much difference to the above contention that the role of India and Indians in connection with Islamization of the Archipelago has been unduly magnified.
even if some of them might have been written in India. Apart from the works of Ṛṇīrī, who quotes always non-Indian authors and sources, another Indian work known in Acheh at the time was *Al-Tuhfah al-Mursalah ilā’l-Nabi* by Fadlu’Ilāh al-Burhānpūrī who, like Ṛṇīrī, also did not reflect the Indian milieu.  

With the exception of Acheh, all other areas in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago were converted to Islam during the second phase of the islamization process in which mysticism predominated. This accounts for the notion, among others, that Sūfīs were the disseminators of Islam in the Archipelago, and that Acheh, compared with the other areas, appears more consolidated in Islam. That Acheh appears more consolidated in Islam particularly in comparison with Java seems to me not only because it was the first part of the

740. The doctrine of the seven grades mentioned in the Tuhfah, which was not necessarily developed in this treatise, seems to me to be a 'clarified' version of the Sūfī doctrine of the stages of determination of Absolute Being. In Ḥamzah's schema of ontological descent the first, second and third determinations are uncreated, the third determination having the double aspect of being uncreated or created depending upon the point of view from which it is envisaged. In the Tuhfah only the first and second determinations are uncreated - the rest are created. This simplifies the problematic third determination, and makes the distinction between God and Man more clearly. It is most significant that the Tuhfah should appear in Acheh during the second phase of the islamization process when the consolidation of the conversion of the spirit was at hand, for it would certainly help clarify the conception of being which was the crux of the problem of conversion of the spirit. See further, above, pp. 120-121; 139-140(5); 143; 260-265. The Tuhfah has been translated into Malay and Javanese.
Archipelago to receive Islam long before the others, but also to experience the dominant role of jurisprudence in the first phase of the islamization process. The dominance of jurisprudence and jurists in Aceh during the first phase does not, however, preclude Sufis from being the disseminators of Islam from the very beginning and during the first phase itself, for the characteristics of the first and early propagators of Islam - from what we know in available sources - reveal traits peculiar to Sufis.
PART II
INTRODUCTION

The only romanized Malay edition of the known works of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī to be published to date appeared in 1933. It had been prepared by Johan Doorenbos of Holland as a doctoral dissertation to satisfy the requirements of the University of Leiden. The works presented are various mystical verses taken from manuscripts in the Leiden University Library, and a fragment from van de Wall's Collection. Also included in the edition are two prose works of Ḥamzah: the Asrāru'l-'Ārifīn and the Sharābu'l-'Ashiqīn (also called Zīnatu'l-Muwaḥhidīn and Asrāru'l-'Ashiqīn). Both were taken from manuscripts belonging to the Snouck Hurgronje Collections.

Another version of the Sharābu'l-'Ashiqīn is the Banten version found in Cod. Or. 2016, but although Doorenbos has made use of this version in conjunction with his work on the Sharābu'l-'Ashiqīn in Cod. Or. 7291 (II), he has not given us the full text of this manuscript. The edition of all these works of Ḥamzah, both the verse and the prose, has been briefly annotated.

In fairness to Doorenbos, we must concede that he is to be applauded for his painstaking efforts in bringing these

741. 3374, 3372, 2016 and 7291.
742. No. 32.
743. 7291 (I) and (II).
744. see further below, pp. 361-363.
very important works to light. But we must also give due criticism. Although there is ample evidence to show that Doorenbos has availed himself of the knowledge, or assistance as the case may be, of scholars such as Hurgronje, Kraemer, Kramers, Rinkes, van Ronkel and Drewes — all of whom have made their impressions on Indonesian Studies — there is yet more evidence to reveal that Doorenbos was not sufficiently familiar with the structure of the Malay language in general, and Hamzah's individual use of it in particular, to be in a position to fulfill his task satisfactorily. This judgment is based upon scrutiny of his edition which, in certain respects, reveals much to be desired and in others to be fraught with telling errors both trivial and grave.

With respect to the prose works, it is no mere exaggeration to say that almost every page needs considerable improvement in the arrangement of sentence structure and the proper distribution of punctuation symbols — the better to bring forth the style and meanings of the texts. With respect to the edition of the verses, however, it must be conceded that Doorenbos fared better.

In dealing with the edition of works in mystical

745. Drewes, G.W.J., has reviewed Doorenbos' work in the Tijdschrift, part LXXIII, 1933, pp. 391-398. The following comments on Doorenbos' work are by no means exhaustive, and they are based on a different approach from that of Drewes.
literature, particularly when the author himself was a mystic and, in the unique case of Ḥamzah, was employing his language as a medium for philosophical and mystical ideas certainly never before employed in that manner and for that purpose, one cannot adequately emphasize the need for careful and conscientious treatment of the works. Once the sentence structure in an edition is not correctly constructed, or the punctuation symbols not properly distributed, then the meaning structure collapses; the semantic vocabulary of the system of thought no longer presents itself as a coherent and consistent configuration. Of this very important point Ḥamzah himself was very much aware, and he took pains to caution those who would transcribe or make copies of his works (and here I would include editors as well):

> Whosoever transcribes [or make copies of] this book, let him verify them twice or thrice so that the letters and the sentences may not exceed or fall short [of my intentions]. Should they exceed or fall short, then the meanings perish.

Although the errors in Doorenbos' edition of the

---

746. Ḥamzah here refers to his book the Sharābuʿl-Āshiqīn. But this warning must surely be intended for his other prose works as well.

747. 2016, last page of the Sharāb. The Sharāb, as I have suggested, is the first book Ḥamzah wrote (see above, pp. 301, 303) and it would be most reasonable for him to warn future scribes to copy correctly, since he would be very anxious to see that what he says in the book is understood the way he intended.
prose works of Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī may all stem from lack of satisfactory knowledge of the language, they can all be classified under four distinct categories.

In the first category are errors in simple punctuation which, however, do not necessarily alter the spirit and intent of the texts, but which are not in conformity with proper Malay. To this category belong errors which I have referred to as being found in every page. By virtue of their triviality, we may dispense with a detailed exposition of these errors, and content ourselves only with examples of a few.

On pages 33-34 of the Asrār: 748

Adapun Allah qadīm dengan ketujuh ṣifatnya tiadakan lenyap baṣīrnya kerana namanya (wa huwa s samī'u-1 baṣīrū). Lagi firman Allah (wa llahu bi ma ta'malūna baṣīrūn) ya'ni: barang diperbuat mereka itu A. T. melihat, kerana ṣīfāt ketujuhnya ini [34] qadīm; bukan ḥayy ada, 'ilmu tiada atau 'ilmu ada, irādat tiada atau irādat ada, quḍrat tiada atau quḍrat ada, kalām tiada atau kalām ada, samī' tiada atau samī' ada, baṣīr tiada atau suatu dahulu atau suatu kemudian atau suatu lama atau suatu baharu; tiada demikian adanya. 749

The correct form should be:

Adapun [apabila] Allah Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā qadīm dengan ketujuh ṣifātNya, tiadakan lenyap BaṣīrNya, kerana NamaNya wa huwa'l-samī'u'l-baṣīr.

---

748. Page number refers to page number in the manuscripts, i.e. 7291 (I) and 7291 (II).
749. Doorenbos, p.135.
Lagi firman Allah Subhānahu wa Ta'āla:
Wa'Llāhu bi mā ta'maluna baṣīr - ya'ni: Barang [sesuatu yang] diperbuat mereka itu Allah Ta'ālā melihat. - kerana Ṣifāt ketujuhnya ini [34] qadim; bukan Hayy ada, 'Ilmu tiada; atau 'Ilmu ada, Irādat tiada; atau Irādat ada, Qudrat tiada; atau Qudrat ada, Kalām tiada; atau Kalām ada, Samī' tiada; atau Samī' ada Baṣīr tiada; atau suatu dahulu atau suatu kemudian; atau suatu lama atau suatu baharu - tiada demikina adanya.

On page 47, a passage is presented thus:

Kata ahl as sulūk: pada ḥaqīqat semesta sekalian makhluqat ya'ni pada 'arsh ḥukumnya tiada demikian takḥṣīṣ tempat akan A.T.; jika demikian takḥṣīṣ tempat, ...750 maka dikatakan jalāl sebab perhimpunan segala wujūd daripada rahmatnya qadim [48]. 751

The correct form is:


On page 52:

Ta'ālam memberikan wujūd pada sekalian 'Ālam, ya'ni: āthārnya itu pada sekalian 'Ālam terlalu nyata, tiada terbuni, kerana ia wujūd daripada rahmat Raḥmān lagi memberikan wujūd akan sekalian 'Ālam;

750. Here Doorenbos omitted the word adapun, which follows, because he could not make head or tail of it if it were inserted in its place.
751. Doorenbos, pp.146-147.
752. Jika demikian takḥṣīṣ tempat adapun, then, simply means: sekalipun ada ditakḥṣīṣkan tempat kepadaNya seperti demikian.
tiada wujud itu, dimanakan beroleh athár kerana athár sekalian 'ālam daripada athārnya jua, maka beroleh wujud seperti tanah diperbuat akan dia atau periuk atau buyung atau tempat tanah; itulah asal wujud sekalian bajan itu.

But this should read:


This is in fact a very important passage, for it contains a definition of existence and of the essences of things. As such, therefore, proper treatment on passages such as this must be emphasized. On page 66:

Adapun akan makan, sama tiada makan; sama duduk dengan orang [sama tiada duduk dengan orang]; sama berkata-[kata], sama diam; sama dalam hutan, sama dalam negeri; semesta sekalian tiada hijāb padanya.

---

753. Doorenbos, p.150.
754. 'Ia refers to AthārNya.
755. 'Ia wujud daripada rahmat Rahman is to be translated as: they exist through the Mercy of the Compassionate One.
756. Doorenbos is mistaken in reading this as akan dia. The same applies to page 43 (Doorenbos, p.143).
757. Tempat here means: containers.
758. See above, p. 266.
759. Doorenbos, p.162.
But this should read:


On page 92 of the Sharāb:

Adapun ahl al haqīqah ... jika makan-makan dengan dirinya, jika duduk-duduk dengan dirinya, jika tidur-tidur dengan dirinya, jika jaga-jaga dengan dirinya, jika berjalan-jalan dengan dirinya; tiada ia lupa akan dirinya kerana ...

This should read:

Adapun Ahlu'l-Ḥaqīqah ... jika makan, makan dengan dirinya; jika duduk, duduk dengan dirinya; jika tidur, tidur dengan dirinya; jika jaga, jaga dengan dirinya; jika berjalan, [ber]jalan dengan dirinya - tiada ia lupa akan dirinya, kerana ...

On page 102:

Adapun Dhāt Allah, lengkap kepada jamāl pun serta, [lengkap] kepada jalāl pun serta, kerana jalāl dan jamāl șifātnya juga; ada kalanya daripada jamal menjadi jalāl; ...

Which should read:

Adapun Dhāt Allāh lengkap; kepada Jamāl pun serta, kepada Jalāl pun serta, kerana Jalāl dan Jamāl ȘifātNya juga; Ada kalanya daripada Jamāl menjadi Jalāl; ...

760. Ibid., p.186. It is the Sharāb in 7291 (II) that is referred to here.
761. Ibid., p.197.
One more example on pp. 103-104;

Adapun Dhāt Allāh qadīm, istī'ādād makhluqāt sekalian yang dalam 'ilmunyya pun qadīm; barang dijadikan A.T. muwafaqat dengan isti'ādād itu jua, kerana isti'ādād sekalian islām daripada jamāl, isti'ādād kāfir daripada jalāl, kerana jamāl sebagai laṭīf, jalāl sebagai qahhār, maka dikeluarkan ASPATH dengan af'ālnyya daripada laṭīf - 'azīz; daripada qahhār - dhalīl [104] kerana nāmanya al Mu'izz, al Mudhill, maka dimasukkan nyya mereka itu kedalam shurga dan kedalam neraka dengan isti'ādād mereka itu jua kerana shurga daripada laṭīf neraka daripada qahhār, maka dipulangkan ...

Which should read:

Adapun Dhāt Allāh qadīm; istī'ādād makhluqāt sekalian yang dalam 'IlmuNyya pun qadīm. Barang dijadikan Allāh Ta'ālā muwafaqat dengan isti'ādād itu jua. Kerana isti'ādād sekalian islām daripada Jamāl, isti'ādād kāfir daripada Jalāl - kerana Jamāl sebagai Laṭīf, Jalāl sebagai Qahhār - maka dikeluarkan Allāh Subhānhahu wa Ta'ālā dengan Af'ālnyya daripada Laṭīf, 'Azīz; daripada Qahhār, Dhalīl [104]. Kerana NāmNyya Al-Mu'izz [dan] Al-Mudhill, maka dimasukkanNyya mereka itu kedalam shurga dan kedalam neraka dengan isti'ādād mereka itu jua, kerana shurga daripada Laṭīf, neraka daripada Qahhār. Maka dipulangkan ...

In the second category are errors both in presenting quotations in Arabic, and in allowing errors in the texts themselves to pass uncorrected. It is true that in certain cases this class of errors is not grave, but it serves well to reveal either the editor's carelessness or lack of knowledge of the materials he handled. It further

762. Ibid., p.198.
reveals that the editor had no grasp of the meanings of individual words. On page 16 of the Asrār, Doorenbos did not understand the meaning of the word sechawang in the sentence: 

Adapun ini empat sechawang pada sebuah bayt.

The word chawang is actually chabang, meaning branch, bough, fork of road, etc. Chawang (spelled with a w instead of a b) is used more frequently in Sundanese, and in a limited sense only in Malay. Sechawang as it is used in the above sentence would never appear in that construction in modern Malay, where the word will be replaced by serangkai, meaning bunch, cluster, collection, etc. The sentence, then, in modern Malay would be 

Adapun ini empat serangkai pada sebuah bayt.

All that Ḥamzah is saying here is simply that his verses of fifteen bayts consist of four lines to a bayt. A bayt, according to Ḥamzah's use of the term, is a verse consisting of four lines. It is precisely this failing to understand the meaning of sechawang that made Doorenbos fail to realize that five verses are in fact not part of Ḥamzah's fifteen bayts. Since Ḥamzah gives a commentary on each line of his fifteen verses, one can be led to discover easily that the verses not commented upon do not form part of the whole i.e. they do not belong to the Asrār. Doorenbos knew that

---

763. Ibid., p.120.
764. These are the second and third verses on p.17 Doorenbos, p.121), and the last three verses on p.20 Doorenbos, pp.123-124.
the verses have not been commented upon, but he did not know that they do not belong to the group of fifteen bayts. These verses have apparently wandered, thanks to the random hand of the scribe, from elsewhere. Indeed, may one not say that these too are zwervende verzen?

On page 32 of the Asrār, Doorenbos rendered the following passage thus:

\[
\text{Apabila bertukar, nāqiṣ hukumnya qudrat yang sedia itu ya'ni belum sempurna maka hendak diperbaiknya sekali lagi jikalau sudah dari (?) sana permai tiada... dan...; 768 sebab inillah maka pada hukum shari'at kalām tiada makhluq.}\]

This should be corrected to:

\[
\text{Apabila bertukar, nāqiṣ hukumnya qudrat yang sedia itu; ya'ni belum sempurna maka hendak diperbaiknya sekali lagi. Jikalau sudah dari sana permai tiada harus [diperbaikinya lagi].}\]

766. The last verse on p.20 belongs to the set on p.79 of 2016. The verse third from the last on p.20 belongs to the set on p.12 of 3374. The first two lines of the third verse on p.17 belong to the first two lines of the second verse on p.12 of 3374 and the last two lines of the same verse on p.17 belong to the last two lines of the verse on p.20. See also for these Doorenbos, pp.124, 48, 123, 104, 121, 104, 121, 124 respectively.
767. Doorenbos, p.133, note 3 omits hrs which follows. My answer is that hrs is harus.
768. Doorenbos could not read what follows here. See below my note 770.
769. Doorenbos, p.133.
... dan suara kita. 770
Sebab inilah maka pada hukum sharif'at Kalam tiada makhlūq.

On page 36:
Adapun kepada 'ulamā': ma'lūm juga menurutkan 'ilmu kerana kepada 'ulamā isti'dād aṣlā tiada masuk bilang; apa kehendak 'ālam timbul seperti rupa kehendaknya itu? 771

The word 'Ālam in the above sentence is obviously wrong and should be replaced with 'ālim. Furthermore, the sentence should end, in place of the question mark, with a full stop.

On page 48:
Adapun firman A.T. (fa subhāna lladhī bi yadihi malakūtu kulli shay'in wa ilayhi turja'ūna) ya'ni: maka mahasuci Tuhan isitū dengan tangan ḥaqīqat sekalian; bermula: kepadanya jua pulang. 772

This should read:
Adapun firman Allāh Ta'ālā:
Fa subhāna'l-ladhī bi yadihi malakūtu kulli shay'in wa ilayhi turja'ūna -

770. The text reads: swrkit. My reading: suara kita is relevant and quite correct. This makes these three words the last part of a sentence, and this sentence should belong to the following paragraph which - as Doorenbos rightly pointed out (p. 133, note 5) - forms part of the commentary on the Kalamu'llāh. My reason for including the three words (dan suara kita) as part of the discussion on the Speech of God is based on the word suara, meaning in this case [our] voice, which is relevant to the discussion mentioned. See Taftāzānī, ch.VI on 'Speech of God'.

771. Doorenbos, p.137.
772. Ibid., p.147.
ya'ni: Maka mahasuchi Tuhan - Ia itu dengan tangan[Nya] [memegang] ḥaqīqat sekalian! Bermula: kepadaNya jua [kamu akan di] pulang [kan].

On pages 89–90 of the Sharāb:

Adapun kepada ḥaqīqat: jangan mintak sekali-kali kerana kepada ahl al ḥaqīqah [90] rezeqi kita telah tersurat pada lauḥ mahfūz, dan sudah terbahagi yang akan banyak, yang akan sedikit; tiadakan lebih dan tiadakan kurang.773

Which should read:

Adapun kepada ḥaqīqat, jangan mintak sekali-kali, kerana kepada Ahlu'l-Ḥaqīqah [90] rizqi kita telah tersurat pada Lawḥ Mahfūz, dan sudah terbahagi; yang akan banyak, banyak; yang akan sedikit, sedikit; tiadakan tebih dan tiadakan kurang.

On page 90:

Lagi seperkara, A.T. tahu akan lapar kita dan dahaga kita, kenapa kita mengadukan ḥal kepada lain? Oleh raḍi akan kenyang dan tiada raḍi akan lapar, kerana sabda rasūl Allah (man lam yarḍa bi qaḍā'i wa lam yaṣbir 'alā bala'ī wa lam yashkur 'alā ni'amī fa lyakhruj min tāḥti s sama'i wa min faqw al arḍī fa l yatlub rabban siwā'i) ya'ni: barang siapa tiada raḍi akan barang kubahagikan dan tiada sabar atas ku ... 774 dan tiada shukur ...

And this should read:

Lagi seperkara, Allāh Ta'ālā tahu akan lapar dan dahaga kita. Kenapa kita mengadukan

773. Ibid., p.184.
774. The word which Doorenbos could not read here is kṭqk, and this is in fact kutukku which translates balā'ī.
775. Doorenbos, p.184.
hal kepada lain? [Se]olah-olah rādī akan kenyang
dan tiada rādī akan lapar! Kerana [ini] firman
Allāh [dalam Ḥadīth Qudsi?] : Man lam yarḍa
bi qadāʾī wa lam yaṣbir 'alā balāʾī wa lam
yashkur 'alā niʿamī faʿl-yakhruj min taḥtiʿl-
samāʾī wa min fawqiʿl-arḍī faʿl-yāṭlub
rabban siwāʾī - yaʿni: Barangsiapa
tiada rādī akan barang Kubahagikan, dan
tiada ṣabar atas kutukku, dan tiada shukur ...

On page 105:

... tetapi tiada ia mahu mengubah dia kerana
apabila ia mengubah dia, binasa kamālnya yang
sedia dioleh-oleh belum kamāl baharu
hendak mengadakan kamālnya dan kebesarannya
juā. 776

This should read:

... Tetapi tiada ia mahu mengubah dia kerana
apabila ia mengubah dia binasa kamālnya.
Yang sedia seolah-olah belum kamāl-baharu
hendak mengadakan kamālnya dan kebesarannya jua.

In the third category are errors in and resulting
from the transcription of certain individual words that are
in fact key words in Ḥamzah's system. This is a very import-
ant class of errors, as such errors influence our conception
of the author's ideas. I have already demonstrated the para-
mount importance of the concept ada in Ḥamzah's system, and
of the necessity of understanding its meaning and conceptual
structures. 777 Yet it is precisely a lack of understanding
of this important fact that made Doorenbos transcribe Adam
for what should in fact read adamu in this important passage
on page 73 of the Asrār:

776. Ibid., p.200.
777. See above, pp. 275-290.
maka dapat Adam ini fanā, hendak[nya]:
maka dapat bertemu dengan Tuhannya.
Fa'ilam tidakkah dapat Adamu kauhapus,
y'a'ni: jika belum fanā daripada ribu dan
ratus, dimanakan dapat Adam kauhapus?

This conveys the meaning, when translated into English:

- then can Adam be annihilated; the
desired [meaning] is: then he can meet his Lord.
Know [that by] 'Adam you cannot annihilate'
is meant that if Adam is not yet extinct from
hundreds and thousands, how can he be annihilated?

And this is most certainly not correct! This passage should
in fact read:

- [demikian] dapat adamu ini fanā'. Hendak[nya]:
maka [dia] dapat bertemu dengan Tuhannya.
Fa'ilam - Tiadakan dapat adamu kauhapus.
Ya'nā jika belum fanā' daripada ribu dan ratus,
dimanakan dapat adamu hapuss?

and the translation in English is:

- [When you are such, then] can your existence
be effaced.
The desired meaning is: then he can meet his Lord.
Know [that by] You will never be able to annihilate
your existence is meant that if you are not yet
extinct from hundreds and thousands, how can
your existence be annihilated?

The term ada here means existence of self as the lower
self or ego, not existence of self as the higher Self. The
subtle distinctions between the various concepts of Exist­
ence and of the Self has already been discussed. 778

779. He and his refer not to Adam but to the one whose
existence has been effaced.
780. See above, pp. 291-294.
Finally, in the fourth category are errors in transcription of individual words, in punctuation and in the arrangement of sentence structure which are grave in that they alter the meanings, the spirit and intent, of the texts. We shall deal with this in a somewhat detailed manner. On pages 23-24 of the Asrār, Doorenbos rendered the following passage thus:

Fa'ilam dengan ketujuh ṣifāt bersama-sama, ya'ni: tiada bercherai dengan ketujuh sifātnya; sungguh dikata Dhāt, Allah yang pertama tetapi 'ibarat mushkil, ya'ni [24] jadi ia bercherai dengan ketujuh ṣifātnya, naqīṣ ḥukumnya.

The above passage when translated into English conveys this meaning:

Know [that by the line] 'Is One with His seven Attributes' is meant that [He] is not separate from His seven Attributes; even if [He is] called Essence. Allāh is the first, but expression becomes difficult, that is, [24] He becomes separate from His seven attributes - then [He is] insufficient.

Now the main point of error here is the full stop after the word Dhāt, and this changes the meaning. What Ḥamzah considers mushkil here is the allusion to pertama, not to Allāh. In fact by arranging the sentence in the manner he did, Doorenbos now makes Ḥamzah contradict himself in saying that Allāh is the First. If we but take a glance at a preceding passage in which Ḥamzah comments on the meaning of what is

781. Doorenbos, p.126.
the First,\textsuperscript{782} then we will see at once that the First is the Essence Unique, devoid of Attributes. The symbolic Name Huwa is an allusion to this Unique Essence. But Allah is the Name of the Essence together with Attributes. It is the sum of all Names. Clearly, therefore, to return to the passage in question, the First to which Ḥamzah refers is not Allah but Dhat Allah. So, then, the passage should read:

\begin{quote}
 Fa'lam - Dengan ketujuh Sifāt bersama-sama.

Ya'ni tiada bercherai dengan ketujuh SifātNya sungguh [pun] dikata Dhat Allah yang Pertama.

Tetapi 'ibarat mushkil; ya'ni [24] jadi Ia bercherai dengan ketujuh SifātNya - naïqis ḥukumnya.
\end{quote}

Know [that by the line] Is One with His seven Attributes is meant that [He] is not separate from His seven Attributes even though it is said that the Essence of God is the First. But [here] expression becomes difficult; that is,\textsuperscript{[24]} [if we say that the Essence is the First, it conveys the impression as though] He is separate from His seven Attributes - and this makes Him logically insufficient.

On page 25:

\begin{quote}
 Adapun kepada 'ulamā sharī'at: ... wujūd Allah dengan Dhat Allah

mithl matahari dengan chahayanya; sungguh pun esa, pada penglihat mata dan penglihat hati, dua ḥukumnya; matahari lain, chahayanya lain.
\end{quote}

This means:

According to the Doctors of Theology ... God's Being and His Essence is like the sun

\textsuperscript{782} See Asrār, p.22; Doorenbos, p.125.

\textsuperscript{783} Doorenbos, pp.127-128.
and its light; though one and the same, to
outward and inward perception they are two
[things]: the sun is other than its light.

And this is exactly the opposite of what the 'Ulamā' say,
for they would never admit that the sun and its light are
one and the same, and that it appears to be two things only
when viewed with the eyes of internal and external perception.

What Ḥamzah reports of the 'Ulamā' s stand on this point is
that to them the sun and its light (God and His Essence) are
in fact two things; they appear to be one only because of an
illusion on our part. The passage should read:

Adapun kepada 'Ulamā' shari'at ... wujūd
Allāh dengan Dhāt Allāh mithal matahari
dengan chaha yanya; sungguh pun esa pada
penglihat mata dan penglihat hati, [pada haqīqatnya]
dua ḥukumnya: matahari lain, chahayanya lain.

According to the Doctors of Theology ... God's
Being and His Essence is like the sun and its
light; although they appear as one and the same
[thing] to external and internal perception, they
are in fact two [things]: the sun is other than
its light.

From this it can be seen how one comma placed after the word
esa can wreak havoc to the meaning intended! In another
passage, it is the omission of a full stop that makes Ḥamzah
spurn the shari'at:

Adapun madhhab Mu'tazilah dan Rāfiqī
dan zindiq, kalam Allah makhluq
pada ḥukum shari'atnya; barangsiapa
mengatakan kalam Allah makhluq, kāfir
- na'ūdhubi llāhi minhu!

784. P.31; ibid., p.133.
Which in English means:

To the schools of the Mu'tazilah, the Rāfiqī and the Zindiq, God's Speech is created according to the sharī'ah. Whosoever says that God's Speech is created is an unbeliever - may God preserve us from him!

But this should in fact be:

Adapun [kepada] madhhab Mu'tazilah dan Rāfiqī dan Zindiq, Kalām Allāh makhlūq. Pada hukum sharī'atnya, barangsiapa mengatakan Kalām Allāh makhlūq, kāfir - na'ūduhu bi'Llāhi minhu!

To the schools of the Mu'tazilah, the Rāfiqī and the Zindiq, God's Speech is created. According to the sharī'ah, whosoever says that God's Speech is created is an unbeliever - may God preserve us from him!

In another passage, the misplacement of a full stop makes Ḥamzah demand the impossible of the votaries of the Ṭariqat who are already burdened with injunctions to

... mengurangi makan minum dan mengurangi tidur dan mengurangi berkata-kata dan jauh daripada orang banyak dan daripada sekalian perbuatan. Ini Ṭariqat namanya, tiada lain daripada Ḥaqīqat; ... 

In English this means:

... lessen food and drink, and sleep, and conversation; and to keep distance from the crowd and from all action. This is called Ṭariqat, [and it is] not different from Ḥaqīqat; ...

Surely Ḥamzah is not advocating that Ṭariqat means the cessation of all action! The full stop should be inserted

785. Ibid., p.183.
786. Italics mine.
after the word *ini*, not before, so that now we get the true sense:

... lessen food and drink, and sleep and conversation; and to keep a distance from the crowd and from every such action. It is called *Tarīqat* [and it is] not different from *Haqīqat* ...

Consider this passage on page 98:

... kerana kepada ahl as sulūk:
yang ada jua, menjadi; ada yang
tiada itu, tiada dapat menjadi ada.787

which means:

... for to the People of the Path that which exists becomes; the existence of that which is non-existent, cannot become existent.

How can that which is non-existent, and cannot ever become existent, exist! The passage must read:

... kerana kepada Ahlu’l-Sulūk
yang ada jua menjadi ada; yang
tiada itu tiada dapat menjadi ada.

... for to the People of the Path it is only that which exists that becomes existent; that which is non-existent cannot become existent.

Finally, there occurs on pages 27-28 this interesting error:

Adapun maka dikatakan 'ilmu pertama
nyata daripada segala nyata, kerana tatakala
(lā ilāha S.W.T.) menilik dirinya dengan
'ilmunya maka jadi tiga, bergelar:' *ilmu,
'ālim, ma'lūm; yang menilik bernama 'ālim,
yang ditilik bernama ma'lūm, tilik-menilik
bernama 'ilmu. Ketiganya esa juga, namanya
berlain-lainan tetapi kerana 'ilmu juga [28]

788. The text has *bergelarnya*. 
The reason why Knowledge is said to be the first among the manifest is because when God the Glorious and Exalted gazes upon Himself with His Knowledge [He] becomes three, called: Knowledge, Knower and Known; the Seer is called the Knower; the Seen is called the Known; Seeing is called Knowledge. The three are one and the same, but the names are different, for by virtue of Knowledge [28] the Knower and the Known acquire names and manifestation, the Lord becomes apparent to His servants, His servants too become apparent to their Lord; this is why Knowledge is said to be the First among the manifest. Since the Essence is ever contemplating Itself, Knower is seen, Knowledge is seen and the Known is seen. The Essence is without Attributes, that is the first. When It gazes upon Itself It sees Itself together with all Its Predispositions. For all the Three, the Seer is called Knower, the Seen is called Known, Seeing is called Knowledge.

The explanation that Hamzah intends here is the reason for asserting that God’s Knowledge is logically the first among His Attributes. This reason is based on the postulate that God in His Essence is ever contemplating Himself. As a

789. Doorenbos, p.130.
790. The Italics are mine to indicate the point in question.
logical result of this, His Knowledge becomes manifest to Himself and consequently also the Known becomes the content of His Knowledge. Logically, therefore, there ought first to be the Knower, then Knowledge, and then the Known (which is in fact so written in the manuscript) and not, as Doorenbos has it, Knowledge-Knower-Known. The reason why Knowledge is the first Attribute is not because the Lord becomes manifest to His servants vice-versa, which is what Doorenbos makes out, for the reason for that is precisely because of Knowledge. The reason why Knowledge is the first Attribute is because the Essence is ever contemplating Itself, which produces Knowledge. Furthermore, the word ketiga, meaning three, in the last sentence of Doorenbos' passage is erroneous and would even tend to give an impression that the Divine Being has metamorphosed into a Trinity. This word should in fact read ketika meaning 'instant'. The whole passage should read:


The reason why Knowledge is said to be the first among the manifest is because when God the Glorious and Exalted gazes upon Himself with His Knowledge, He becomes three [Names]; Knower, Knowledge, Known. The Seer is called the Knower, the Seen is called the Known, Seeing is called Knowledge. All three are in fact one and the same, only its names are different, for it is by virtue of Knowledge that the Knower and the Known acquire names and manifestation. The Lord then becomes apparent to His servants and His servants then become apparent to their Lord.

Because of this, it is therefore said that Knowledge is the first among all that is manifest, for the Essence is ever contemplating Itself; Knower, Knowledge and Known are seen. The Essence is Absolute, without Attributes; That is the First. When It gazes upon Itself It sees Itself together with all Its Predispositions. At that 'instant', the Seer is called the Knower, the Seen is called the Known, Seeing is called Knowledge.

Since what is aimed at here is not a complete and detailed review or criticism of Doorenbos' work, the preceding exposition thus far will suffice to prove the validity of my judgement regarding the editor's knowledge and understanding of the Malay language. Notwithstanding this, there is yet one more important criticism that I have to make on

791. The word 'this' here refers not to the preceding sentence, but to the notion that "it is by virtue of Knowledge that the Knower and the Known acquire names and manifestation."
Doorenbos' edition, and this is with respect to his edition of the Zinatu'l-Muwaḥhidin (Sharābu'l-'Ašíqīn).

It has been mentioned at the beginning of this introduction that there is another Malay version of the same work known as the Banten version (Cod. Or. 2016). This version belonged at one time to the Sultan Abū'l-Maḥāsin Zaynu'l-'Abīdīn of Banten (1690-1733), and the copying of this text was completed in November 1704. To the best of my knowledge, with the exception of the Aceh version in number 66 of Snouck Hurgronje's collections (Cod. Or. 7291 II), no other Malay version of this work exists.

It seems to me strange that in selecting the text for his edition, Doorenbos did not choose the Banten text, preferring instead the Aceh text. No reason was given for this preference. I remark that it seems strange because the Aceh text, in comparison with the Banten text, is by far the inferior; and this for two very glaring characteristics. First, the Aceh text contains more corrupt words and, although the script is clear and legible enough, it is often beset with faulty diacritical signs, or the lack of these signs. Furthermore, the entire text is not vocalized. No doubt both diacritical and vowel signs may not necessarily

792. See 2016, p.8. Doorenbos also states this (p.3).
793. A.H. 1116 = November 1704.
794. I shall hereafter refer to this version as the Aceh text.
be a serious consideration. But I wish to point out that in this case it becomes important simply because Ḥamzah has specifically emphasized that this should be done by future scribes who wish to copy the book795 — and this is an indication that the text has not respected Ḥamzah's consideration. Consequently — if one may speak on behalf of Ḥamzah — he himself would have regarded this text unfavourably. Second, and this is more serious — there are many lacunae in the Acheh text which can only be filled by the Banten text. In one case in particular there is a gap of two pages, or slightly more, in the Acheh text and this has to be filled by the Banten text! The Banten text is therefore far superior to the Acheh text. It has far less mistakes in the script, the diacritical signs are more correctly given and the whole text is vocalized. In this and in its contents the Banten text respects Ḥamzah's injunction. Since in presenting an edition of Ḥamzah's works one should represent him in his best texts, I therefore see no reason why Ḥamzah should be denied this right and be presented instead through a patched-up inferior text.

In this part of my work, I present an annotated, romanized Malay edition of three prose works by Ḥamzah which

795. See the last page of the Sharāb, and see further above, p. 342.
may well be his only prose works. These are the Asrāru’l-’Arifīn, the Sharābu’l-’Ashiqīn and the Muntahī. As regards the Asrāru’l-’Arifīn, the Acheh text, as far as I know, is the only one extant. The Banten text of the Sharābu’l-’Ashiqīn – with the exception of the Zīnātu’l-Muwāḥhidīn – is also the only one of its kind in Malay. There is a fragment of the Muntahī in Malay contained in fourteen pages of manuscript corresponding to eight pages of the complete version. The text of the fragment is badly written and omits several quotations found in the complete version. Apart from this fragment, there are two Javanese translations of the Muntahī. Of these two,

796. His verses mention titles of what appear to be other prose works written by him: the Miftah al-Asrār (2016, p.28) and the Sayf al-Rijāl (2016, p.91); and some verses entitled the Rubā’ al-Muḥaqiqīn. However, these titles may well refer to works already identified, and the Rubā’ al-Muḥaqiqīn seems to me beyond doubt to refer to the verse form of the Fifteen Verses of the Asrār:

Asrāru’l-’Arifīn pun perbuatnya
Rubā’ al-Muḥaqiqīn nama baytnya.
(2016, p.91; see also Asrār, pp.17-20). In any case, the prose works referred to in this note have so far not been found.

797. 7291 (1).
798. 2016.
799. 7291 (3).
800. 7291 (2).
801. Cod. Or. 1952 (pp.1-14).
803. Cod. Or. 5716 (2), pp. 51-100; and Cod. Or. 7736 (1), pp.1-78. Hereafter cited as 5716 (2) and 7736 (1) respectively.
is the better text. Although the first fourteen pages of the text are marred by holes, the text is clear and, it would seem, faithfully duplicates the original Malay. With the exception of quotations from Arabic and Persian sources (not always rendered correctly), the text itself is not vocalized. 7736 (1) contains more textual errors than 5716 (2). With the exception of twenty-three pages toward the end of the manuscript, the text is completely vocalized.

In addition to the annotated romanized Malay edition of the three prose works of Ḥamzah described in the above paragraph, I also present an annotated English translation of the text of these three works. In attempting to give as faithful a translation as possible, I have translated the texts literally. The Muntahī, though the shortest of the three, is the least 'systematic', containing, as it were, the very essence of Ḥamzah's mystical teachings set down in concentrated form. It seems to me to be the most problematic of the three texts and a somewhat clarified explanation on two important points regarding the treatise will have to be set down here.

The first point is the problem of the title which lends itself to two possible translations depending upon the reading of the last vowel of the word مَنْنَ تَأْخَر حَأْرَ یَأْ."
i.e. should it read Muntahā or Muntahā? The former reading means the Uttermost End, referring to the Lote Tree in the highest Heaven which Muhammad saw on his Night Journey (miʿrāj). The Night Journey is of great significance in Sufism as it was then that the Prophet had two visions of the Truth; one with the outward (zāhir) eye and one with the inward (bāṭin) eye. The vision of the Lote Tree marks the highest degree of gnosis (maʿrifah). In his commentary on the Chapter of the Star, the Shaykh Ahmad al-'Alawi, a Sufi of Morocco (d. 1934) says:

This vision [i.e. the vision of the Lote Tree] was with the eye of the senses, whereas the previous one had been with the eye of the intelligence. Now the genitive after Lote Tree is possessive, and what is meant is the Lote Tree of Him at whom all things reach their end. Verily thy Lord is the Uttermost End. The Lote Tree here signifieth the whole of manifestation which growtheth out from its root in Him. Thus is it also named the Tree of the Universe.

This vision was more excellent than that which preceded it in virtue of its union of separate elements and its integration of widely scattered fragments. Thus He said: Even here is the Garden of Ultimate Refuge, meaning that the Lote Tree marketh a finality of Gnosis, and that he who attaineth unto this point is enshrouded by the Lights of the Divine Presence—nay, the whole world is enshrouded, so that he seeth naught without seeing therein God. This is explained in the words When there enshrouded the

807. See ibid., 53:6-12.
808. Ibid., 53:42.
809. Ibid., 53:15.
Lote Tree That which enshroudeth, that is, when it was enfolded and covered by the all-enshrouding Lights of the Divinity, so that the whole hierarchy of created beings disappeared, the majestic and the lowly, in the manifestation of the Lights of the Names and Qualities.

God is the Light of the Heavens and the earth.

It was through the appearance of These, which is referred to in the words at another revelation, that Muhammad attained unto more through the vision of the outward eye than through the vision of the Heart alone. His outward eye was at its vision one with his inward eye, and therefore did God praise him with the words, His eye wavered not, nor did it transgress, that is, the outward eye wavered not from what the inward eye beheld, nor did it transgress by going beyond the bounds and turning its attention away from that wherein the Truth manifested Himself unto him, but it kept its gaze upon Him in each several thing ...

Now the Truth is not to be seen by any outward eyes whatsoever except there sight be inverted and have taken on the function of the inward eye, even as the sight of Muhammad's outward eye had been inverted and become one with his inward eye ... his other-worldly sight was united with his earthly sight so that with the former he beheld the Inward Aspect of the Truth in respect of His Name the Inwardly Hidden, and with the latter he beheld the Outward Aspect of the Truth in respect of His Name the Outwardly Manifest ...

The Heart's vision was hierarchically nearer to the Truth than was the vision of the outward eye, which could never have achieved the union of separate elements and the integration of widely scattered fragments if the universe had not been enshrouded by the all-enshrouding Lights of Unification which are lit from the tree of wheresoe'er ye turn there is the Face of God.

Whoso attaineth unto This hath reached

---

810. Ibid., 53:16.
811. Ibid., 24:35.
812. Ibid., 53:13.
813. Ibid., 53:17.
814. Ibid., 2:115; see also 24:35; the 'tree' referred to here is the tree of God's Light that is neither of the East nor of the West (the tree of wheresoe'er ye turn) meaning the tree of Gnosis.
an End beyond which there is no passing, and Muhammad's attainment thereunto is indicated in the words Verily he beheld, of all the Signs of his Lord, the Greatest. We know from this last word that the Sign in question was not of the category of created beings nor yet of the Manifestations of the Names and Qualities, but it can have been no less than the direct vision of the Lights of the Holy Essence.

These passages from the Shaykh Ahmad al-'Alawi's commentary on the verses in the Chapter of the Star may well serve as an apt summary of Ḥamzah's Muntahī as that treatise deals precisely with an exposition on the nature of Gnosis. The word Muntahī is certainly very relevant to the subject of the treatise, yet I would not prefer it to the word Muntahī as befitting its title. Al-Muntahī means The Adept, and it appears to be a Persian form derived from the Arabic muntahī. The word muntahī appears once in Ḥamzah's prose, and I read the final vowel with an ī as the word refers to a person: Adapun akan orang muntahī ... i.e. As to the adept ... In one of his verses rhyming in the vowel ī, Ḥamzah refers once to his treatise entitled Muntahī.

815. Ibid., 53:18.
816. Lubab al-'Ilm fī Sūrat Wa’l-Najm, pp.8-10. The English translation is by Martin Lings; see Lings, pp.173-175.
818. Asrār, p.73.
819. 2016, p.91:
Riwayat ini daripada Shaykh al-Fāsūrī
Menunjuki kita sekalian mubtadī
Bukan baharu sekarang tegal kuchari
Daripada Ṣayfu’l-Rijāl dan Muntahī.
and one of the Javanese translations gives the title with two dots below the final vowel indicating ی.\(^{820}\) In spite of the fact that the text of Hamzah's prose and verses are not vocalized, the contents of the treatise in question and the evidence of what has been demonstrated above establish beyond doubt that the title should read بُنْتَحَلٍ, although it must be emphasized that بُنْتَحَلٍ bears a close semantic relationship with بُنْتَاحَ and the Prophet's Night Journey. Indeed, the title بُنْتَحَلٍ is applied originally to the Prophet.\(^{821}\)

The second point concerns a considerable gap occurring in the text of the بُنْتَحَلٍ. Fortunately, this gap can be filled by one of the Javanese translations.\(^{822}\) The Javanese text indicates that the gap covers the space of six pages\(^{823}\) and reveals further that the missing part in the Malay text is not one of great importance that throws any new light or adds new information on the subject as already contained in the text. For this reason, it is sufficient merely to give here a gist of what is discussed in the gap. The discussion continues from the preceding pages of the text on an exposition of the esoteric meaning of the saying of the Prophet: "Whosoever knows his self

\(^{820}\) 5716 (2), p.100.
\(^{822}\) 5716 (2).
\(^{823}\) Ibid., pp.79-84.
knows his Lord." There follows a quotation in Arabic verse from an unidentified source:

Wa tabdū bi na'ṭi'l-'izzī 

Wa anta 'alāl-taḥāqūqī tilka'l-maṣāḥīrū

Fa dhālika 

Wa law la āhā́bū'l-kawnī lam yakūn

Fa lasta bi saqīl-frubbi bal anta sākīrū

Wa 'ankan ḥadīthu'l-ḥubbī yurwā ilā'l-wara

Wa minka'l-tajallī mursalun mutawātīrū.

My literal rendering of this verse is:

By the attribute of Glory You appear in every theatre of manifestation,
And You are in truth these manifestations. That is so because of the Eye of the Unseen, for I have no veil
And my sight is to Beauty exposed.
Were it not for the Veil of Existence You would not be Outwardly Manifest,
You are indeed not the Cupbearer of the Wine of Love, but the Inebriate.
It is concerning You that the Tale of Love is told to the world,
And from You are transmitted revelations successive.

824. The text is obscure here. Dr. W. Arafat of the Department of the Middle East, School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, suggests the reading: Wa tabdū banātu'l-'izzī ... (see note, 830).

825. Text has: dhakā.

826. Text corrupt: ni.

827. Text has: tarfiyyūn.

828. Text has: lam yakun, but in the jussive mood, the final radical is dropped.

829. 5716 (2), p.74.

830. Following Dr. Arafat's reading, this line would read: The Daughters of Glory appear in every theatre of manifestation.

831. i.e. That is so because it is the Eye of the Unseen that sees the truth.
The meaning intended is that the One Real Being not only appears in every theatre of manifestation but that He is also identical with the theatres in which He is manifested. The Sufi knows that this is true because of direct experience (kashf) in that he has passed away and hence he is no longer obstructed by the veil of self so that he now sees with the Eye of the Unseen (i.e. God) - or rather it is the Unseen Who sees Himself through him. Existence as such is as a mirror, possessing no real being in itself and hence a veil unto the Real, but it is nonetheless a mirror reflecting Real Being and making Him apparent - He is at once Love, Lover and Beloved and hence all Converse of love points to Him. Up to this point, the Diwan of Maghribi gives identical thought and meaning:

O Thou in whose life-giving Face all the Universe is manifest,
And O Thou whose Countenance is apparent in the Mirror of the Universe!
Since the Darling of Thy Beauty looked in the Mirror And saw the reflection of his face, he became wild and mad [with love],
Every instant Thy Countenance displays the beauty of its features
To its own eyes, in a hundred fair vestments.
It looked forth from lovers' eyes So that it beheld Its beauty in the faces of Idols.
Thy Face wrought a Mirror for Its self-display, And called that Mirror 'Adam and Eve'.

833. See the Lam'at I of 'Iraqi (Lama'at, pp.327-330). The English translation is given by Browne, Literary history of Persia, III, pp.133-139.
He beheld the Beauty of His Face in every face through him, 
Therefore hath he become the Mirror of all the Names.
O Thou whose Beauty hath shone forth to Thine own eyes,
And who hast plainly seen Thy Face in Thy own eyes,
Since Thou art at once the Seer and the Seen, there is none other than Thee ... 834

The last line of the quotation in the Muntahī refers to the doctrine of perpetual creation, which is based upon the well-known verses in the Chapter of the Most Compassionate. 835

He who allows his Self to be veiled, with the resulting inability to 'see' the Truth with His Sight, is then considered to have suffered a great loss, as the next quotation in the text conveys:

\[
\text{Fa man a'rawa 'anka mushāhidan siwāka fa dhākā'1- 'abdu wa'llāhi khasirun.} \quad 836
\]

Whosoever turns away from You, being a seer only of that which is other than You, that slave, by God, is lost!

There follows a quotation from Uways al-Qaranī to the effect that "When poverty is perfect it is indeed God" (Idhā tamma'l-faqru fa huwa'llāh). 837 'Poverty' here means complete fanā', that is, fanā' from the very state of fanā'; the state of the soul reintegrated in the Spirit, described as 'returning' to its original nature (irji'ilā aslihi). 838

834. See Literary history of Persia, III, pp. 334-335.
835. Qur'an 55:26, 27, 29; see also above, pp. 130-136
836. 5716 (2), p. 80.
837. ibid., p. 81.
838. Loc. cit. The reference here is to the Qur'an 89:28; cf. above, pp. 152-153.
state is further described in the Persian quotation from the author of the Sawāniḥ, 839 ʿAlīmad al-Ghazālī:

Shakhsi didām nashastāh 840 bar khashk zamīn 841  
Nah kufr nah islām u nah dunyā u nah dīn  
Nah haqq [nah] haqīqat nah tarīqat nah yāqīn  
An dar dū jihān kīrā buwad hay āfīn? 842

I saw a man sitting on a barren floor [having]  
Neither unbelief nor belief; neither world nor religion;  
Neither Truth nor Reality; neither the Sufi path nor certainty.

Who in the two worlds will have such a way of life?

By the two worlds is meant not only this world and the Hereafter, but also the mystical microcosm (ʿālam ṣaghīr) and macrocosm (ʿālam kabīr). The faqīr is he who has passed away from the existence of the two worlds (kawnayn) that are veils concealing the Essence. 843 If the faqīr is still conscious of God as the Lord Who is worshipped, then his poverty is not complete as his consciousness betrays that the duality between slave and Lord is still maintained by him. For this reason, Bā Yazīd says:

839. A treatise on Love, the Lover, and the Beloved.
840. Text reads: nashashtah.
841. Text corrupt: zabayn.
842. 5716 (2), pp. 81–82.
843. Cf. Ibn ʿArabī: "... were it not for the existence of the two worlds, the Essence would certainly be manifest." (Muntahī, p. 128); also Lamʿat, Lamʿat XX, p. 352: [al-faqīr] suwadhū ʿīl-ḥaṣīfī fi ʾl-darayn - The faqīr is he whose face is blackened in both worlds. Also cited in Muntahī, p. 125.
Repentance of the people is from their sins; my repentance is from saying 'There is no god but God'.

and Shiblī says:

Man 'arafa'Llāh mā qāla'Llāh wa man qāla 'Llāh mā 'arafa'Llāh. 845

Whosoever knows God does not say Allāh; whosoever says Allāh does not know God.

This can be compared with the following verses from Maghribī's Diwan where he says:

Cease, O my son, from denial and affirmation
Talk not of 'except' and 'no'!
If they bid thee lay down thy life,
Go, lay down thy life, and talk not!
Until thou knowest who 'I' and 'We';
Be silent! talk not of 'I' and 'We'! 847

When one is still conscious of one's own existence, one can never become a complete faqīr for "existence is a sin with which no other sin can be compared." 848

After the quotations from Bā Yazīd and Shiblī there follows Jāmī's rubā‘ī:

Ārrā ki fana‘ shewa u faqr ā‘īn ast
Nah kashf u yaqīn nah ma‘rifat nah dīn ast

844. 5716 (2), p.82.
845. Loc. cit.
846. Denial (nafī, i.e. lā: 'no') and affirmation (ithbāt, i.e. ills: 'except'). Maghribī here refers to the first part of the shahadat: La ilāha illā’Llāh: There is no god except God.
848. See Asrar, p.61; Muntahī, p.118; and above, pp.86-69.
Raftū zī miyasān hamān khudā mānd khudā
Al-faqru idhā tamma huwa’Allāh in ast. 849

Whinfield’s translation of this rubā’ī is:

When poor indeed and dead to self thou’lt need
No visions, knowledge, certitude, or creed;
When self has perished naught but God remains,
For "Perfect poverty is God indeed." 850

The meaning intended in this rubā’ī, in the light of the
foregoing exposition, is self-explanatory. The state of the
faqīr who has achieved complete poverty is further vividly
illustrated in the following analogy conveyed in ’Irāqī’s
verse in the Fourth Ḥam’sat:

Zaharat shamsuḥā 851 fa ḡibtu fīḥā
Fa idhā ashragat fa dhāka shuruqī. 852

Her sun appeared and I am lost in her;
When she rises, that is also my rising.

"That is also my rising" means my "going forth" (khurūjī)853
from the shell of self to attain to higher Selfhood. For the
Ṣūfī who travels along the path of poverty, he will ultimately

849. 5176 (2), p.83. The text is not free from errors. See
Lawā’ih, p.13 of the Persian text.
850. Lawā’ih, p.10.
851. Text reads shamsun.
852. For ashragat and shuruqī the text has ashrafat and
shuruqī. The root sharaqa in this case is more appro-
riate in describing the rising of the sun, which is the
metaphor used in the above verse. See 5176 (2), p.83.
853. Loc.cit. This word is written on the margin of the
text explaining the intended meaning of the last word
in the verse - (i.e. shuruqī).
discover that the final stage of his progress is obstructed by the veil of knowledge (both 'ilm and ma'refah: gnosis). So, at that point, for him "knowledge is the greatest veil (Al-‘ilmu hu’jābu’l-akbar)." He should strive on to achieve the state described earlier by Ahmad al-Ghazālī, for the true faqīr is he to whom there is neither Lord nor slave (al-faqīru lā rabban lahu wa lā 'abdan lahu). He is like a wave which when the breezes cease to blow subsides and is lost in the ocean. He is then said to "stand in no need of God" (al-faqīru lā yahtāju ilā'Ilāh), for he is God—or rather he has passed away and there is only God. In a narrative attributed to Abū Yazīd al-Bistāmī, whose name has been closely linked with this concept of fanā', the same spirit is conveyed:

Once He raised me up and stationed me before Him, and said to me, 'O Abū Yazīd, truly my creation desire to see thee.' I said, 'Adorn me in Thy Unity, and clothe me in Thy Selfhood, and raise me up to Thy Oneness, so that when Thy creation see me they will say, We have seen Thee: and Thou wilt be That, and I shall not be there at all.'

854. Ibid., p.84. Cf. Ibnu'l-'Arabī: "Knowledge [i.e. gnosis: ma'refah] is a veil between the Knower and the Known." (Asrār, p.71). See also Muntahā, p.128.
855. See above, p. 373.
857. 5716 (2), p.84; Lamāt, Lam'at XX, p.352.
Finally, the last quotation which ends the lacuna comes again from 'Irāqī's Liμa'at:

Raqqu'l-zujāju wa rāgati'l-khamru
Fa tashābahā wa tashakala'1-amru
Fa ka'annamā khamrun wa lā qadahu
Wa ka'annamā qadahun wa lā khamru. 859

The glass is fine and the wine is clear,
Their resemblance is indistinguishable;
As if it were wine without a cup,
And as if it were a cup without wine.

This same verse appears in Ghazālī's Mishkāt al-Anwār 860 and also, in a Persian version, in the first strophe in one of 'Irāqī's tarjī'bands. 861 Shāh Ni'matu'Llāh, in one of his verses in his Dīwān, conveys a similar spirit. 862 The meaning of the verse speaks for itself.

With this reproduction of the quotations missing in the original version of the Muntahī and my interpretation of the meanings they convey based upon the little that may be gleaned from the sketchy comments in the Javanese text, the Muntahī that I now present may be regarded as complete.

The system of transliteration of Arabic characters that I adopt throughout the edition and the work as a whole is as follows:

859. 5716 (2), pp. 84-85; Lam'at V, p. 335.
860. Edited by Abū'l-'Alā 'Afīfī, Arabic text (al-Maktabatu'l-'Arabiyyah), Cairo, 1964, p. 57.
861. A kind of verse in which the same line recurs at stated intervals.
(a) Consonants:

- ا (hamzah)
- 1 (alif)
- ب (ba')
- ت (ta')
- ث (thā')
- ج (jīm)
- ح (ha')
- خ (khā')
- د (dāl)
- ذ (dhāl)
- ر (rā')
- ز (zay)
- س (sin)
- ش (shīn)
- ص (sad)
- ض (dād)
- ط (tā')
- ز (zā')
- أ (āyn)
- غ (ghayn)
- ف (fā')
- ق (gāf)
- ك (kāf)
- ل (lam)
(b) **Long vowels:**

- \( \bar{e} \) or \( \bar{u} \) = ā
- \( \ddot{e} \) = ī
- \( \ddot{u} \)

(c) **Short vowels:**

- \( \acute{e} \) = a
- \( \acute{i} \) = i
- \( \acute{u} \)

(d) **Diphthongs:**

- \( \acute{e} \acute{i} \) = āy
- \( \ddot{e} \ddot{i} \) = iyy
- \( \ddot{a} \ddot{u} \) = aw
- \( \ddot{u} \ddot{w} \) = uww

(e) **Others:**

- \( \breve{o} \) = ah (as in ma'rifah) and at (as in ma'rifatu)
- \( \breve{a} \) = al-, or 'l-
Throughout this work the system of romanized Malay spelling is not the same as that still officially used by the Government and in Malay schools and textbooks in Malaya. I am following closely - though not exactly - the system adopted by the Kongres Bahasa dan Persuratan Melayu III (Singapore, 1956). In this system, the pepet sign (') and hyphens (except in cases of repetition of words usually denoting plurals and emphases) are dropped out, and the spelling is made phonetic. Thus, for example, sa-suatu is spelled sesuatu; di-peroleh-nya is spelled diperolehnya - and so on.

In both the romanized Malay edition and the English translation of the texts, numerals without brackets are my notes continued in the usual order from the preceding chapters; numerals in square brackets ([1]) indicate paging of the manuscripts; numerals in brackets on the left-hand margin of the text indicate numbering of texts and translation for the purpose of identification; a word or words in square brackets ([one]) denotes conjecture; a letter or letters in square brackets ([o]) indicates missing letters. The archaic forms of spelling of both Malay and Sanscrit words occurring in the texts are spelled as they appear in the texts. Hence, terbunyi (tersembunyi); menengar (mendengar); berajar (belajar); buddi (budi); shiksa (siksa), etc. Arabic words occurring in the Malay texts, and words of
Arabic origin which have become common Malay usage are spelled according to the Arabic form following the system of transliteration of Arabic characters here adopted. Thus words now regarded as part of common Malay usage such as kaum, maksud, alam, dunia, are romanized with the addition of diacritical signs to indicate their original Arabic derivation as qawn, maqṣūd, 'Ālam, and dūnyā.
CHAPTER VII

ASRĀRU’L-’ARIFĪN

karangan

Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī

[Naskhah Leiden, no. 7291 (I)]

[16] Bismi’LLāhi’l-Rahmānī’l-Raḥīm

Al-hamdu li’LLāhi’l-ladī’ sharaḥa
ṣudūra’l-’arifīn bi ma’fatiḥi wujūdihī 863
wa zayyana qulūbahum 865 bi asrarīhīn
[wa] nāwara arwāhahum bi ma’ārifi
shuhūdihī wa zahhara nufūsahum bi
nūrī ‘ishqīhī. Afdalu’l-ṣalāt
wa akmalu’l-tahiyat ‘ala sayyidīnā
Muḥammad saḥībi’l-hawdi’l-mawrūd
wa’l-maqāmi’l-muḥammadī’l-mahmūd
wa ‘alā alīhi wa saḥbihi ajma‘īn wa’l-
ḥamdu li’LLāhi rabbi’l-‘ālāmin.

(1) Ketahui, hai segala kamu anak Ādām yang islām, bahwa
Allāh Subhānahu wa Ta‘ālā menjadikan kita; daripada tiada
bernama 867 diberiNya 868 nama, dan daripada tiada berupa

863. The text has the Malay form of the word wujūd, i.e.: ujud, spelled awjūd. This form of the word is frequently found in the text.

864. The text is incorrect: qulūubahum.

865. Text incorrect: asrarīhim.

866. Text here garbled.

867. The text reads: ... daripada tiada (diadakannya, dan daripada tiada) bernama ..., etc. The words I have put in brackets are to my mind a later interpolation and do not belong to Ḥamzah's text, since if read thus then Ḥamzah's entire mystical system collapses, and they contradict Ḥamzah's persistent idea that the world is not created ex nihilo. See, for examples, pp. 29-31; 34-38; and Sharāb., pp. 98-100. The reading of the text as I have arranged above seems to me to be correct and consistent with Ḥamzah's mystical system. Doorenbos explains this apparent contradiction in Ḥamzah's system by saying that the contradictory words are homilitic in
diberi berupa; lengkap dengan telinga, dengan hati, dengan nyawa, dengan budi. Yogy a kita chari Tuhan kita itu supaya kita kenal dengan ma’rifat kita, atau dengan khidmat kita kepada guru yang sempurna mengenal Dia, supaya jangan taqṣīr kita.


purpose (see Doorenbos, p.205). But I reject this explanation as the homilitic part of the treatise is actually the beginning written in Arabic. The homily is indeed generally written in the beginning in Arabic in all such treatises. In my opinion, the problematic words could only be explained away as a later interpolation by a copyist who thought it fit to insert the words to satisfy the ‘Ulama’, not realizing, perhaps, that in doing so he rendered the entire system self-contradictory.

868. Text repetitive.
869. Text has diterungka.
870. ... lihat pada sharahnya pulang ... i.e.: pulang pula pada sharahnya. Pulang: return, retrace, in this context it conveys the meaning: consult, look again. I think that the use of the word pulang in this sense is derived from the Arabic usage of the word raja’a, meaning to return. See, for example, the way in which this word is applied in the Qur’ān: Mā tārā  fi khalqi’l-raḥmānī min tāfawutin, fa’rjī/i’l-basara hal tārā min futūrin. (67:3). See also Qur’an 67:4 where the way in which raja’a is applied supports my opinion.
(3) Shahdān.871 Tiada berapa lagi kurangnya. Adapun jikalau bertemu dengan kurangnya, digenapi; jika bertemu dengan salahnya, diperbenari; jika bertemu dengan penggal pada bahasa atau pada hurufnya lebih - kurang, [17] diperbaiki - jangan di'aybkan - kerana manusia terbanyak lupa dan lalai,872 seperti sabda Rasūlu'llāh (ṣallā'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Al-insānū murakkaban 'alā'1-nisyān."

ya'ni:
"Manusia itu terkendaraan atas lupa." kerana manusia itu penuh dengan 'aybnya. Melainkan Allāh Subhanahu wa Ta'ālā jua yang tiada ber'aybNya!

(4) Bāb pada menyatakan ma'rifat Allāh Ta'āla serta SīfātNya873 dan Asmā'Nya.874

Aho segala kita yang menyembah 'kan Nama Yogya diketahui apa Yang Pertama Kerana Tuhan kita yang Sedia Lama Dengan ketujuh Sīfāt bersama-sama.875

871. The use of shahdān before beginning sentences is very common in classical Malay literature. It is most probably an abbreviation of shahida anna; he testifies that ... Cf. also Wilkinson, p.434.

872. Text has repetitive form: lalai-lalai.

873. Text is incorrect: sīfātNya.

874. The text is repetitive.

875. Following this verse are two verses:

Kunjung-kunjung di bukit yang mahatinggi
Kolam sebukah dibawahnya
Wajib insan mengenal diri
Sīfāt Allāh pada tubuhnya.

Nūrāni ḥaqiqat khatam
Supaya terang laut yang mahadalam
Berhenti angin ombak pun padam
Menjadi sultan kedua 'alam.

These are wandering verses that have somehow found their way here. For my explanation of this, see my Introduction, p.348, and the notes 764-766. In the present edition I am excluding such wandering verses from the main body of the text.
[18] Tuhan kita [itu yang] Empunya Daät
Awwalnya Ḥayy pertama bilang Sifat
Keduanya 'Ilmu dan Rupa Ma'lıımät
Ketiga Murid 'kan sekalian Iradät.
Keempat Qădîr 877 dengan QudratNyä tamäm
Kelimanya Sifat 878 bernama Kalâm
Keenamnya Samî' dengan AdaNyä dawâm
Ketujuhnya Baṣîr akan ġalal dan ḫarâm.

Ketujuhnya itu adanya qadîm
Akan i[s]ti'īdād [‘ā]lamın sempurna 'Alîm
Kerana Sifat 879 ini dengan Kâmāl al-Ḥâkîm
Bernama Bismî’Ilâhî’l-Râḥîmî’l-Râḥîm.

'Ilmu ini Ḥaqiqat Muḥammad al-Nâbî
Menurutkan Ma'lıım dengan lengkapnya qawî
Daripada Ḥaqiqatnya itu jâhil dan wali
Beroleh i'tibârnya dengan sekalian peri. 881

Tuhan kita itu empunya Kâmâl 882
didâlam 'IlmuNyä tiada panah zawâl
Râḥîm dalamnya perhimpunan Jalâl

Tuhan kita itu yang bernama 'Aliyy
Dengan sekalian SifatNyä 883 segantiasa bâqî
'Alâ jamî'l-‘alamın AthârNyä  jâdi
Daripada sittu jihat - sebab inilah khâlî. 885

876. Text is corrupt: ṣifât.
877. Text has: qădîr - A Malay form of spelling; the ṭâ taking the function of the kasrah.
878. Text incorrect: ṣifât.
879. Text incorrect: ṣifât.
880. Here follow five lines in the text which have been crossed off by the scribe as mistakes.
881. Following peri are three words: ishârât dengan 'îbârât which are corrupt, as they are out of context in both this verse and the one immediately following. Probably ishârât and 'îbârât are alternatives for i'tibâr occurring in the last line of the verse.
882. I.e., Minangkabau form of the Malay word pernah.
884. Text incorrect: athârNyä.
885. Text has: sebab inilah tiada khâlî. Tiada is not meant. See the reading in the commentary on pp. 50-51 of the text.
Chahya ĀthārNya tia'dakan padam
Memberikan wujūd pada sekalian 'alam
Menjadikan makhluq siang dan malam
Tlā [ābādi]'l-Ābād tiada'kan karam.

Tuhan kita itu seperti bahr al-'āmiq
Ombaknya penuh pada sekalian tāriq
'Ākhir kedalamnya jua ombaknya gharīq.

Lautnya 'Ālim halunnya Ma'lūm
Keadaannya Qasim ombaknya Maqsūm
Tūfānnya Hākim shū'ūnnya Maḥkum
Pada sekalian 'ālamīn inilah rusūm.

Jikalau sini kamu tahu akan wujūd
Itulah tempat kamu shuhud
Buangkan rupamu* daripada sekalian qu'yūd
Supaya dapat kedalam Diri qu'ūd. 890

[Pada wujūd Allah] itulah yogya kau qā'im
Buangkan rupa dan namamu dā'im
Nafikan rasamu daripada makhdūm dan khādīm
Supaya sampai kepada 'Amal yang Khātīm.

Jika engkau belum tetap seperti batu 892
Ḥukum dua [lagi] khādīm dan ratu
Setelah lupa engkau daripada emas dan matu
Mangkanya dapat menjadi satu. [20]

887. Text has: Bernama, but Menjadikan is correct. See the reading in the commentary on p. 51 of the text.
888. Text has: kamunya. Cf. commentary on p. 60 of the text.
889. Text has: rupanya. Rupamu is the correct reading. See the commentary on p. 62 of the text.
890. The text reads: kedalamnya bersujūd. I am following the reading in the commentary on p. 63, which is the correct one, as the commentary begins with an explanation of the meaning of the word qu'ūd, and not sujūd.
891. See the commentary on p. 65 of the text.
892. Text is corrupt: nyatanya. See the commentary on p. 68 of the text.
893. Khādīm dan ratu: text is corrupt; it has adm dan art. I agree with Professor van Ronkel's rendering to khādīm dan ratu as being in conformity with the meaning intended. See Doorenbos, pp. 123, note 5, and 155, note 2.
894. Text has batu, but see the commentary on p. 70 of the text.
Jika belum fanā' daripada ribu dan ratus
Tiada'kan dapat adamu kau hapus
Nafikan rasamu itu daripada kasar dan halus
Supaya dapat barang katamu harus.

Hamzah Fansūrī sungguh pun da'If
Haqiqatnya hampir pada Dhāt al-Sharīf
Sungguh pun habab rupanya kathīf
Wāṣilnya dā'im dengan bahr al-laṭīf.

Inilah Bayt Lima Belas. Dengarkan pula pada 'ibārat sharah pulang.

(5) Aho segala kita [yang] menyembah ['kan] Nama
Yogya [ditahului apa Yang Pertama] ...

Ya'ni Nama Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā, kerana pada ḥukum
sharī'at barangsiapa menguchap lā ilāha illā'Ilāh Muḥammadun

895. Text has jika preceded by ya'ni.
896. Text has the plural form of habbah: habbat, meaning beads, granules, pustules, e.g. trivialities. Habab means blister; in the text: bubble.
897. This is the last of the 15 verses. But there follow in the text 3 more wandering verses:

Hamzah Fansūrī orang 'uryānī (text corrupt: for 'uryānī it has yang ghana or ghāni)
Seperti Ismā'īl jadi qurbānī (text corrupt: khurban)
Bukannya 'Ajāmi (text: 'Ajimī) lagi 'Arabi
Senantiasa fanā' (text: fahna: Achehnese form) dengan Yang Bāqi

Hamzah miskin, tiadakan kaya
Dimana'kan sampai kepada Tuhan yang Qabhār
(text has Qahar)
Seperti Muḥammad (pada Tunan yang lokal) Sayyidu'l-
(text has Qahar) Anbiya'
Sampai kepada Jalīl al-Akbar.

Hamzah Fansūrī terlalu karam
Didalam laut yang mahadalam
Berhenti angin ombak pun padam
Menjadi Sultan (text corrupt: shlatān) daripada kedua 'alam.

Rasūlu'LLāh dengan lidahnya islām ṭukumnya. Pada hatinya? wa'Lláhu a'lam! Seperti sabda Nabī (ṣalla'Lláhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man qāla lā ilāha illā'Lláh dakhala'1-jannah."

ya'ni:

"Barangsiapa mengucap lā ilāha illā'Lláh masuk shurga (terlalu mudah)" [21]

Dan lagi sabda Rasūlu'LLāh (ṣalla'L-Lāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man qāla lā ilāha illā'Lláh khāliṣan muḥkliṣan dakhala'1-jannah."

ya'ni:

"Barangsiapa mengucap lā ilāha illā'Lláh dengan suchi hatinya masuk shurga."


899. Maka here conveys the meaning agar, supaya: in order that, so that.
900. Juga here conveys the meaning pun: also, just (as).
901. Text has berlihatnya.
dinamai Allāh, kerana firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

\[
\text{Man kāna fī hādhihi a'mā fahuwa fī'1-'ākhirati a'mā wa adallu sabīlan.} 
\]

ya'ni:

Barangsiapa tiada mengenal Allāh disini di'ākhirat pun tiada dikenal [dan lebih jauh ia dari jalan yangbenar].


"Wa' bud rabbaka ka'annaka tarāhu ..."

ya'ni:

"Sembah Tuhanmu seperti kau lihat Ia ... ('ibārat ini kepada orang [yang] mengenal Allāh dapat [22] dikata).

... Fa'in lam takun tarāhu fa'innahu yarāka."

ya'ni:

... Jika tiada engkau melihat Dia, bahwa Ia melihat dikau."

902. Text has kerananya. to convey the meaning oleh kerana.
903. Text is incorrect: aw.
904. Qur'ān, 17:72.
("ibārat ini kepada orang [yang] mengetahui Allah dapat dikata).

Lagi firmān Allah Ta'ālā:

Wa' bud rabbaka ḫattā ya'tiyaka'l-yaqīn. 905

ya'nī:

Sembah Tuhanmu hingga memberi dikau nyata (ya'nī nyata: tiada shakk dalamnya).

Inilah ma'nā' ... menyembah Nama'.

(6) Fa'lam 906 – Yogya diketahui apa Yang Pertama.


906. Fa'lam: Beginning a paragraph, meaning: Know (that by) ... followed by the explanation ... (we mean) ... etc.
909. Doorenbos, perhaps on the authority of Wilkinson, reads utas – a spelling found in dictionaries. I think utas is not the correct spelling. In Ḥamzah's verses this word has appeared in ones rhyming in Us. The correct spelling should therefore be utus and not utas (see, e.g. 2016, p.89 - the verse is quoted on p.41, above). See also T. Iskandar's article: Utus atau Utas? in Sari Bahasa, Majallah Bulanan Dewan Bahasa, Jilid IX, bilāngan 2, pp.77-78, Kuala Lumpur, February, 1965, which supports my reading.

(7) Fa'ilam - Kerana Tuhan kita yang Sedia Lama.


---

910. OlehNya conveys the meaning: oleh kerana Ta, oleh sebab Ta.
911. Original Arabic: barī'.
912. Text: ditengah.
913. Text: dikiri.
tiada kanan, tiada atas dan tiada bawahnya. Inilah ma'na Qadīm Sedia. Jika ditamthilkan [seperti] dā'irah pun dapat, kerana dā'irah tiada berawwal [dan] tiada berakhīr: jika awwal, dikatakan akhīr pun dapat; jika akhīr, dikatakan awwal pun dapat. Yogya diketahui Qadīm Allāh Subḥanahu wa Ta'ālā dengan sempurna kenal. Inilah ma'na Qadīm Sedia Lama. Betapa dapat bertemu dengan ma'rifat Allāh Ta'ālā jika tiada tahu akan QadīmNya Sedia?

(8) Fa'lam - Dengan ketujuh Šifāt bersama-sama.


914. Text:  keatas.
915. Text:  dibawah.
916. In the text, the scribe has crossed off the words beginning with: ... jika awwal, dikatakan akhīr pun dapat ... etc. due to a mistake, but he corrects them as it appears above.
917. Text has: Maka, but the meaning intended is better conveyed by Betapa, i.e. rhetorical 'how?'.
918. Text has: maka, but what is intended is the meaning conveyed by jika, i.e. if.
919. Text has incorrect form: kalām. Mutakallim is the active participle of the noun kalām.

(9) Fa'īlam - Tuhan kita yang Empunya Dhāt.

Ya'ni Semata, tiada dengan Şifāt. Pada suatu 'ibārat Wājibu'l-Wujūd dinamai 'Ulamā', kerana Ia qā'im dengan SendiriNya, tiada dengan [lain]. Sebab ini maka dinamai 'Ulamā' Wājibu'l-Wujūd. Maka kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk sungguh pun Ia qā'im SendiriNya, tetapi Ia memberi wujūd akan

920. Text incorrect: ašli.
921. Text: Ḥayy.
923. Text: Qādir.
924. Text: Mutakallim.
925. Text: Samī'.
926. Text: Baṣīr. Word following baṣīr in the text: a-namanya, is corrupt.
927. Text ambiguous: segala or sekalian. But I prefer segala as it is an unqualified judgment. In fact segala is used in this context before. See above, p.22.
sekalian 'ālam. Maka dinamai Wajibu'l-Wujūd kerana Wujūd
dengan Dhāt esa ḥukumnya. Adapun kepada 'Ulamā' shari'at
Dhāt Allāh dengan Wujūd Allāh dua ḥukumnya; wujūd 'Ilmu928
dengan 'Ālim dua ḥukumnya; wujūd 'ālam dengan 'ālam dua
hukumnya; wujūd 'ālam lain, Wujūd Allāh lain. Adapun Wujūd
Allāh dengan Dhāt Allāh mithal matahari dengan chahayanya;
sungguh pun esa pada penglihat mata dan penglihat hati,
[pada ḥaqīqatnya] dua ḥukumnya: matahari lain, chahayanya
lain. Adapun 'ālam, maka dikatakan wujūdnya lain kerana 'ālam
seperti bulan beroleh chahaya daripada matahari. Sebab inilah
maka dikatakan 'Ulamā wujūd 'ālam lain daripada Wujūd Allāh,
Wujūd Allāh dengan Dhāt Allāh lain. Maka kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk
jika demikian Allāh Ta'ālā diluar 'ālam atau dalam 'ālam
dapat dikata; atau hampir kepada 'ālam atau jauh dari-
pada 'ālam dapat dikata. Pada kami Dhāt Allāh dengan Wujūd
Allāh esa ḥukumnya; Wujūd Allāh dengan wujūd 'ālam esa;
wujūd 'ālam dengan 'ālam esa ḥukumnya. Seperti chahayanya,929
namanya jua lain, pada ḥaqīqatnya tiada lain. Pada penglihat
mata esa, pada penglihat hati pun esa. Wujūd 'ālam pun
demikian lagi dengan Wujūd Allāh - esa; kerana 'ālam tiada
berwujūd sendirinya. Sungguh pun pada zāhirnya ada ia ber-
wujūd, tetapi wahmī juga, bukan wujūd ḥaqīqī; seperti bayang-
bayang dalam chermin, [26] rupanya ada ḥaqīqatnya tiada.

928. Text has: 'ilmū, which is incorrect.
929. The nya refers to matahari.
Adapun ittifāq 'Ulamā' dengan Ahlu'1-Sulūk pada Dhāt: Semata. Sungguh pun Dhāt dapat di'ibāratkan, tetapi tiada lulus pada 'ibārat kerana [tiada] diatas akan Dia, tiada dibawah akan Dia, tiada dahulu akan Dia, tiada kemudian akan Dia, tiada kanan akan Dia, tiada kiri akan Dia, tiada jauh akan Dia, tiada hampir akan Dia, tiada diluar akan Dia, tiada didalam akan Dia, tiada bercherai akan Dia, tiada bertemu akan Dia - tiada dengan betapanya;\textsuperscript{930} dan tiada [di]mana dan tiada kemana, dan tiada sekarang dan tiada sekejap mata, dan tiada ketika dan tiada masa; tiada Ia jadi dan tiada [Ia] menjadi, tiada Ia tempat dan tiada Ia bertempat. Seperti sabda Rasūlu'Llāh (salla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Kana'Llāhu wa lā shay'a\textsuperscript{931} ma'ahu."

ya'ni:

"Dahulu Allāh, [dan] tiada suatu sertaNya pun."

Kata Shaykh Junayd Baghdādī\textsuperscript{932} (rahmatu'Llāhi ['alayhi]!):

"[Huwa]'l-'āna kamā kāna."

\textsuperscript{930} Tiada dengan betapanya is a literal translation of the Arabic bila kayfa, a theological term meaning: without 'how?'. This term came into prominence due to its use by Ibn Ḥanbal, the founder of the Ḥanbalī school (madhhab), and al-Ash'ārī, the theologian. See, for example, Wensinck, A.J., The Muslim creed, Cambridge, University Press, 1932, pp.86, 116, 190 note 2, 207, 238. Hereafter cited as Wensinck; and al-Ash'ārī, pp.24, 257. See also below, p. 535, note 1502.

\textsuperscript{931} Text incorrect: shay'in.

\textsuperscript{932} Text incorrect: Baghdad.
ya'ni:

"[Ia] sekarang pun seperti dahulu juga."

Firmān Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā:

Subḥāna'Llāhi 'ammā yasifūn. 934

ya'ni:

Mahasuchi Allāh tiada dapat diperikan.

Lagi firmān935 Allāh Ta'ālā:

Leysa kamithlihi shay'un. 936

ya'ni:

Tiada suatu pun (barang yang kita bicharakan dengan hati kita, atau dengan ma'rifat kita) sudah-sudah [i.e. sama-sama].


(10) Fa'īlam - Awwalnya Ḥayy pertama bilang Šifāt.

Ya'ni Ḥayy [itu iaitu] Hidup. Maka Ḥayy pertama dikatakan kerana jika tiada Ḥayy sekalian Šifāt ini tiada berkawn. Laginya938 firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

933. Text has: Sabda.
936. Text has: Sabda.
938. Text incorrect: 'awam.
939. Laginya conveys the meaning: lagi pula.
Allāhu lā ilāha illā huwa’l-ḥayyu’l-qayyūm. 939

ya'ni:

Bahwa Allāh Ta’ālā esa, tiada Tuhan lain melainkan Ia, Hidup, memegangkan sekalian.

Lagi firmān [Allāh] Ta’āla:

Huwa’l-ḥayyu lā ilāha illā huwa. 940

ya'ni:

Ia itu Hidup, tiada Tuhan lain melainkan Ia jua.

Adapun maka Ḥayy didahulukan daripada sekalian Sifāt ya'ni 941 - seperti seorang orang - jika tiada Ḥayy, mati hukumnya. Apabila mati hukumnya 'alīm 942 pun tiada akan dia, murīd pun tiada akan dia, qādir 943 pun tiada akan dia, mutakallim 944 pun tiada akan dia, samī' pun tiada akan dia, başīr pun tiada akan dia. Sebab inilah maka Ḥayy didahulu[kan] daripada sekalian Sifāt bersama-sama. Inilah ma'ni 'Ḥayy pertama bilang Sifāt.' 945

(11) Fa’īlam - Keduanya 'Ilmu dan Rupa Ma'lūmāt.

Ya'ni Tahu, kerana 'Ilmu itu pertama nyata daripada sekalian nyata. Adapun maka dikatakan 'Ilmu pertama

939. Qur'ān, 2:255.
941. Ya'ni here means oleh sebab.
943. Text has: qudrat, but qādir is consistent with the form here used.
944. Text has: kālam, but mutakallim is consistent with the form here used.
945. Text has: SifātNya.

946. The text is repetitive here.
947. Text incorrect: su'unNya.
948. Text: tilik.
949. Text has: ditilikNya, but surely this is incorrect, for it is the Seer (Yang Menilik) who is Hidden (Bāṭin) and the Seen (Yang Ditilik) Manifest (Zāhir).
950. Text: sabda.
Huwa’l-awwalu wa’l-’akhiru wa’l-zāhiru wa’l-bātīnu wa huwa bikulli shay’in ‘alīm. 951

Ya’nī:

Ia jua Yang Dahulu, Ia jua Yang Kemudian; Ia Yang Nyata, Ia Terbunyi; Ia tahu pada segala suatu.

Lagi kata Lam’āt: 952

Ma’shūq [u] ’ishq [u] ’āshiq 953 har[sīh] 954 yakyast İnjā 955
Chūn wasl dar na-gunjad hijrān chi kār dārad? 956

ya’nī:

"Yang Diberahikan dan Berahi dan Yang Berahi ketiganya esa juga; Sini apabila bertemu tiada lulus bercherai dan dimanakan ada?"

Lagi kata Shaykh Muhammad Maghribī (raḥmatu’l-Llahi ‘alayhi): 957

"Chūn ’azm tamāshā-i-jihān kad zi khalwat [29] Āmad betamāshā-i-jihān ’ayn jihān shud ..."

ya’nī:

"Tatakala berbichara hendak melihat ’ālam daripada rumah yang sunyi Datang melihat rupa ’ālam, menjadi semata ’ālam..."

951. Qur’ān, 57:3.
952. This is the singular form of Lama’āt, referring to ’Iraqī’s famous poem. See Literary History of Persia, III, pp. 124—139. Also see below, p. 549.
954. Text corrupt: r-lā.
955. Text incorrect: İnjū.
956. The Malay text is corrupt. See ’Iraqī’s Lama’āt, Lam’āt III, p. 331.
"Har naqsh ki ī khwast badān naqsh barāmad
Pūshid hamān naqsh badān ī naqsh 'iyān shud."

"Barang-barang tulis yang dikehendakinya dengan
tulis itu datang
Tertutup dengan tulis itu juga nyata [ke]lihatan."

Kerana ini maka kata 'Alī (ra'diya'Llāhu ['anhu]) berkata:
"Lā a'budu rabban lam arahū."

ya'nī:
"Tiada kusembah Tuhan jika tiada kulihat."

Lagi kata 'Alī (ra'diya'Llāhu 'anhu):
"Mā ra'a'yatu shay'an ilā wa ra'a'yatu'Llāh fīhi."

ya'nī:
"Tiada kulihat suatu melainkan Allāh dalamnya."

Inilah ma'nā 'Ilmu pertama nyata daripada segala nyata.

(12) Fa'lam - Ketiganya Murīd akan sekalian Irādat.

Ya'nī Murīd [itu iaitu] Berkehendak kepada isti'dād yang dalam 'IlmuNya kepada 957 'ālam ini. Seperti kata Ḥadīth Qudsī:

"Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa aḥbabtu an u'rāfa."

ya'nī:
"Aku perbendaharaan yang terbunyi,
ma'ka kukasih bahwa aku dikenal."

Ya'nī 'Ālam dengan isti'dādnnya sekalian yang didalam 'IlmuNya

———

957. Berkehendak kepada isti'dād ... kepada 'ālam - the
latter kepada conveys the meaning: supaya menjadi.
958. Text has: dikenalnya.
itulah maka\textsuperscript{959} dinisbatkan dalamnya kepada perbendaharaan yang terbunyi hendak mengeluarkan ma'\textlum\text{\textat} dari dalam 'IlmuNya. Maka bersabda: "Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan [fa a\textbhabbtu\textan u'\textrafa]." Adapun tamthil\textsuperscript{960} perbendaharaan itu seperti puhun kayu; sipuhun dalam bijinya. Biji itu perbedaharaan. [30] Puhun kayu yang dalamnya itu isi perbendaharaan, terbunyi dengan lengkapnya: akarnya, dengan batangnya, dengan chabangnya, dengan dahannya, dengan rantingnya, dengan daunnya, dengan bunganya, dengan buahnya - sekalian lengkap didalam biji sebiji itu. Maka biji itu hendak mengeluarkan tumbuh puhun kayu itu daripada dirinya ditengah padang yang mahaluas. Maka biji itu berkata: "Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa a\textbhabbtu an u'\textrafa" - ya'\textn\texti sekalian kata ini isharat kepada Berkehendak juga. Dan lagi firman\textsuperscript{961} All\textl\textah Ta'\textal\texta:

\begin{align*}
\text{Innam\texta amruhu idh\textaaa r\textad\texta shay'an an ya\textqula l\textahu kun fa y\textakun}.
\end{align*}

ya'\textn\texti:

Bahwasanya barang titahNya, tatakala berkehendak kepada [se]suatu, bahwakan berkata baginya: "Jadi kau!"\textsuperscript{963} menjadi.

\textsuperscript{959} Maka here conveys the meaning: yang \textdi.

\textsuperscript{960} Text incorrect: shamthil.

\textsuperscript{961} Text has: sabda.

\textsuperscript{962} Qur'\textan 36:82.

\textsuperscript{963} Text has: lu, and Doorenbos renders this command "Jadi lu!" But the word lu is highly unlikely. My opinion is that the text is corrupt and the word should read kau.

(13) Fa'lam - Keempat Qādir dengan QudratNya tamām.

Ya'nī Kuasa; jika tiada kuasa lemah ḥukumnya. Akan Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā tiada lemah. [Ia] kuasa menjadikan dan meminasakan dan menghidupkan dan mematikan; pada mencher-aikan dan [mem]pertemukan, pada mengambil dan memberi - banyak lagi mithalnya yang tiada tersebut. Jikalau tiada tiada-


958. Meaning; ... memandang DiriNya serta ma'lūmāt yang dalam 'IlmuNya. i.e.: memandang DiriNya dengan pandangan kepada ma'lūmāt ...

968. Text has: ma'lūmāt ini.
970. Text has: terhukumnya - nya here conveys the meaning: oleh.
971. This is the last part of a sentence belonging to the commentary on the Kalāmu'Ilāh. See my Introduction, p.350 note 770.
972. Text incorrect: Zindīq.
dikatakan makhlūq kerana ḥukumnya sudah bercherai dengan Dhāt pada 'ibārat. Adapun kepada ḥaqiqinya, wa'Llāhu a'lam bi'l-sawāb!

Qāla'Llāhu Ta'āla:

Innama qawlunā li shay'in idhā aradnā an naqula lahu kun fa yakūn. 973

ya'nī:

Bahwa sesungguhnya barang janji Kami akan suatu, tatakala kehendak Kami akan dia, bahwakan berkata baginya: "Jadi kau!" -- menjadi.

Ini pun Kata Qadīm dengan kata ishārat juga, bukan dengan lidah dengan suara. Jikalau dengan lidah dan suara, dapat dikatakan makhlūq. Kerana Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā mahasuchi, KalāmNya pun mahasuchi daripada lidah dan suara! 974

(15) Fa'lam - Keenamnya Samā' dengan AdaNya dawām.

Ya'nī 975 Menengar. Jika tiada berpenegar tuli ḥukumnya. Tetapi menengar dengan telinga [itu hanya] 'ibārat, kerana Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā tiada bertelinga seperti telinga makhlūq. Adapun yang didengarNya sana "suara" isti'dād 976 ma'lūmāt yang didalam 'IlmuNya senantiasa adanya. Inilah maka bernama wa huwa'l-samā'u'l-'alīm, 977 kerana

973. Qur'ān, 16:40.
974. Text follows with the word: suchi.
975. Text: Ya'nīnya.
976. Repetition of last part of isti'dād in text.
Sami' [dan] 'Alîm sedia qadîm sama-sama dengan Dhât. Sungguh pun ishârat pada sami'a'LLâh li man ħamidâh; [itu hanya] 'ibarat juga, tiada\textsuperscript{978} dengan telinga seperti telinga makhlûqât. Qâla'LLâhu Ta'âlâ:

\textit{Wa âtâkum min kulli mā sa'alumûhu.}\textsuperscript{979}

\textit{ya'ni:}

Kuberi akan kamu daripada sekalian yang kamu pinta.

Kata Ahlu'l-Sulûk pinta ini pinta isti'dâd âsâlî, bukan pinta sekarang. Maka DengarNya Allâh Subhânahu wa Ta'âlâ dengan telinga [33] 'ibârat daripada\textsuperscript{980} ma'lûmât yang sedia sertaNya. Pinta ma'lûmât pun dengan ishârat, memberi ma'lûmât pun dengan 'ibârat. Jika tiada demikian, tiada penengar qadîm. Apabila tiada penengar qadîm, nāqîṣ hukumnya.

(16) \textit{Fa'lam - Ketujuh Başîr akan ḥalâl dan ḥarâm.}


\textsuperscript{978} Text repetitive.
\textsuperscript{979} Qur'ān, 14:34.
\textsuperscript{980} Daripada refers to DengarNya.
Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā suchi daripada sekalian makhlūqāt, PenglihatNya pun mahasuchi. Aşal perkataan 'IlmuNya pun qadīm, ma'lūmātNya tiada bercherai dengan 'IlmuNya. Apabila ma'lūmātNya tiada bercherai dengan 'IlmuNya nischaya [Ta] senantiasa melihat [dia] dengan Penglihat yang qadīm. Jikalau ma'lūmāt yang didalam 'IlmuNya tiada mawjūd, tiada 'Ālim NamaNya; BaşirNya pun lenyap. Adapun [apabila] Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā Qadīm dengan ketujuh ŞifātNya, tiadakan lenyap BasirNya, kerana NamaNya wa huwa'l-samī'u'l-başīr. Lagi firman Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā:

Wa'Llāhu bi mā ta'malūna başīr. ya'nī:

Barang [sesuatu yang] diperbuat mereka itu kerana Şifāt ketujuhnya ini [34] qadīm; bukan Ḥayāt ada 'Ilmu tiada; atau 'Ilmu ada Irādat tiada; atau Irādat ada Qudrat tiada; atau Qudrat ada Kalām tiada; atau Kalām ada Samī' tiada; atau Samī' ada Başar tiada; atau suatu dahulu atau suatu kemudian; atau suatu lama atau suatu baharu - tiada demikian adanya. Barangsiapa i'tiqādnya demikian, ḍalālāt ḥukumnya.

(17) Fa'lam - Ketujuhnya inilah adanya qadīm.

Ya'nī dengan ketujuh Şifāt yang sudah dikatakan

981. Qurʾān, 42:11.
983. Qurʾān, 2:265; 3:152; 8:72; 57:4; 60:3; 64:2.
984. Text incorrect: şalālāt.

985. Text incorrect: Khāliq.
986. Text incorrect: Rāziq.
987. Text redundant: dan wa Yumīṭu.
988. Text: bersabda.
989. Text awkward: dengan sekalia Ia berbuat ["Jadi] kau!", permai...
"Khuliqa’l-rūhu qabla’l-jasadi bi alfayn."

ya’ni:

"Zāhir nyawa dahulu daripada tubuh dua ribu tahun."

Kata Ahlu’l-Sulūk nyawa amr Allāh itu belum datang kebawah qawl "kun!" (fa yakūn). Seperti firmān Allāh Ta’ālā:

Innāma amruhu idhā arāda shay’an an yaquūla lahu kun fayakūn. 990

ya’ni:

Bahwa sanya barang titahNya, tatakala berkehendak akan suatu, bahwakan berkata baginya: "Jadi kau!" - menjadi.

Kata Ahlu’l-Sulūk titah diatas "Jadi kau!" (menjadi), apabila diatas "Jadi kau!" (menjadi) Khāliq 991 pun ia tiada, makhlūq pum ia tiada. Seperti firmān 992 Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta’ālā:

Wa yas’alūnaka ‘ani’l-rūḥi quli’l-rūbi min amri rabī’ wa mā ātītum mina’l-’ilmī illā qalīlan. 993

ya’ni:

Bertanya orang kepada[mu] (Muḥammad) daripada aṣal nyawa. Katakana (yā Muḥammad): yang nyawa daripada titah Tuḥanku. Bermula; tiada diberi akan kamu ‘ilmu melainkan sedikit ( - mana kamu[a]kan tahu kepada nyawa?).

990. Qur’ān, 36:82.
991. Text incorrect: Khaliq.
Kerana ini maka kata Ahlu’l-Sulūk Khāliq⁹⁹⁴ pun ia tiada makhlūq pun ia tiada - kerana [ia] titah Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta’ālā. Adapun ittifaq ‘Ulamā’ dan Ahlu’l-Sulūk: 'ālam sekalian makhlūq; hukumnya ḥadīth, kerana ia muqāhir dibawah qawl "kun!" (fa yakūn) - jangan dikatakan qadīm.

(18) Fa’lam - Akan isti’dād ‘ālamīn sempurna ‘Alīm.


---

⁹⁹⁴. Text incorrect: Khāliq.
⁹⁹⁵. Yang terlalu tahu is the rendering of ‘Alīm: Omniscient.
⁹⁹⁷. Text: sabda.
Wa mā minnā illā lahu maqāmūn ma'lūm. 998

ya'nī:


Lagi kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk isti'dād itu Shu'ūn Dhāt juga, belum bercherai dengan Dhāt, sedia sentosha dalam Dhāt pada 'ibārat ini. Adapun pada ḥaqīqat[nya] semata dengan Dhāt juga, seperti kata Shaykh Muḥyī'1-Dīn ibnu'l-'Arabī (raḍiyā'LLāhu 'anhu!):

"Kunna hurūfān 'āliyātan lam nu[n]qal
Muta'alliqātīn bi'l-dāri999 'alā'1-qulal ..."

Ya'nī:

"Dahulu ada kami ḥurūf yang mahatinggi tiada dipindahkan, Tergantung dengan istananya diatas puchak gunung ...

... Kuntu anā [anta] fīhi wa nāḥnu anta wa anta huwa ..."

Ya'nī:

... Aku engkau dalamnya (ya'nī dalam pul[n]chak gunung [37] itu), dan kami sekalian engkau, dan engkau Ia ...

... Fa'l-kullu fī huwa huwa fā's'al 'an man waṣal."

... Bermula: Sekalian dalam Ia, Ia-maka bertanya[lah] engkau kepada barangsiapa yang waṣal."

Adapun kata Shaykh Muḥyī'1-Dīn [ibnu]1-'Arabī ishārat kepada

999. Text incorrect: bidari.
isti'dād aslī itu juga. Seperti sepunuh kayu dalam bijinya sedia ada serta dengan biji itu, belum berpindah dan tiada dipindahkan, kerana belum bercherai dengan biji itu. Apabila bergerak daripada tempatnya hendak keluar, maka berpindah namanya dan dipindahkan daripada tempatnya. Dan [demikian lagi dengan isti'dād aslī, apabila bergerak dipindahkan daripada tempatnya, dan] 'IlmuNya dan IrādatNya dengan KalāmNya dengan Sami'Nya dengan BaşarNya - sekalian bergerak sama-sama, ilā abādīl-ābād. 1000 Kepada 'Ulamā' ma'llūmāt dengan isti'dādnya itu ḥādīth dan berpindah dan dijadikan seperti tukang atau utus hendak berbuat rumah. Bicharanya itu dengan isti'dād ma'llūmātnya. Maka diperbuat sebuah rumah. Rumah itu makhlūq, rupa rumah yang dalam bicharanya itu pun makhlūq; ḥādīth keduanya. Kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk apabila demikian pada Qadīm Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā tiada dengan 'IlmuNya lagi - lagi baharu berbichara hendak menjadikan islām dan kāfir 1001 sāliḥ dan fāsiq. Apabila demikian, sungguh pun Qadīm, tiada dengan IlmuNya, bebal hukumnya; sungguh pun Raja, tiada dengan tenteranya, lemah ḥukumnya; sungguh pun Berpengetahuan, tiada berkelengkapan, segan 1002 ḥukumnya; sungguh pun 'Adil, zālim ḥukumnya. [38] Apabila [baharu saja] hendak berbichara, bebal ḥukumnya; apabila tiada kekayaan

1000. Text incorrect: illā bada illā bādhinya.
1001. Text has: kāfir dan islām; I have reversed the order for the sake of consistency.
1002. Segan: To be hesitant - a sluggard. Segan is a defective attribute and can therefore never be applied to God.

(19) Fa'lam - Kerana Sifat ini dengan Kamāl al-Ḥakīm.
Ya'nī sempurna mengadakan [dengan] Ḥikmat. Maka dikatakan sempurna mengadakan [dengan] Ḥikmat kerana utus mengenakan semesta sekalian pada tempatnya; ya'nī menge-

1003. Text repetitive.
1004. I.e.: Achehnese form for mata kail.
1005. Text: kamal.
luarkan ma'lūmāt daripada 'IlmuNya [dengan] tiada [39] bertukar. Aṣal langit dijadikanNya langit; aṣal bumi dijadikanNya [bumi]; aṣal 'arsh dijadikanNya 'arsh; aṣalnya kursī dijadikanNya kursī; aṣal laut dijadikanNya laut; aṣal darat dijadikanNya darat - ya'ni menjadikan semesta sekalian ini dengan ḤikmatNya dan dengan Ḥukum1006 Isti'dād yang sedia itu juga. Maka sempurna [Ia] bernama wa huwa'l-

1006. Text: hukumnya.
1008. Text: sudah lagi. Lagi here conveys the meaning: dari aṣalnya.
dengan sempurnanya, tiada bertukar, kerana Nama-Nya wa huwa’l-
‘azīzu’l-ḥakīm. 1009

(20) Fa‘lam - Bernama Bismi’Llāhi’l-Rahmāni’l-Raḥīm.

Ya’ni kerana Șifāt yang termazkūr 1010 [40] ini maka
[Ita] bernama Bismi’Llāhi’l-Rahmāni’l-Raḥīm. Adapun suatu
ma’nā, kepada Sharī’at, Bismi’Llāh ya’ni: Dengan Nama Allāh:
adapun al-Rahmān ya’ni: Yang Mahamurah (dalam dunyā); adapun
suatu ma’nā, kepada ֶYa‘qīqat, Bismi’Llāh [itu] Nama Dhāt,
perhimpunan segala Nama seperti sudah termaz kūr; adapun
al-Raḥmān [itu] pertama memberi Raḥmat bagi semesta sekalian
‘ālam - ya’ni menjadikan semesta sekalian, seperti firman 1011
Allāh Ta‘ālā:

Wasi’ta kulla shay’in raḥmatan wa ‘ilman. 1012

ya’ni:

[Wahai Tuhanku,] Kauluaskan [pada] semesta
sekalian Raḥmat dan pengetahuan.

Itulah Raḥmān empunya Raḥmat memberikan wujūd pada semesta
sekalian ‘ālam. Olehnya memberikan wujūd akan semesta
sekalian ‘ālam maka bernama Raḥmān. Islām dan kāfir, 1013
shurga dan neraka, ḥalāl dan ḥarām, baik dan jahat daripada

1010. Text incorrect: termazkūr.
1011. Text: sabda.
1013. Text: kāfir dan islām. I have reversed the order for
the sake of consistency.

Bismi'Llāhi’l-Raḥmān’l-Raḥīm.

(21)   Fa'lam - 'Ilmu itu Ḥaqīqat Muḥammad al-Nabi.
Tatakala digahirtikan ketengah padang
Nyatalah 'ishq yang dalam kandang
Disanalah ḥukum pandang-memandang
Berahi dan dendam tiada bersedang.

Dua qaws suatu kandang
Barzakh diantaranya pula [41] terbentang
Harus rā’iukan ini orang
Upama tamthīl besi dan pedang. 1015

Ya'nī 'Ilmu yang melihat ma'lūmāt itu Ḥaqīqat Muḥammad (ṣalla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!). Antara' 1016 'Ālim dan Ma'lūm itulah aṣal Chahaya Muḥammad (ṣalla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!) pertama bercherai daripada Dhāt. Adapun pada satu 'ibārat itulah bernama Rūḥ Ḫāfī; ya'nī Nyawa Berchampur;
dan pada suatu "ibārat 'Aqīl al-Kullī namanya, [ya'nī]
Perhimpunan segala Buddī; dan pada suatu 'ibārat Nūr namanya,
ya'nī Chahaya; [dan] pada suatu 'ibārat Qalam al-'Ālā

1014. Text has: rā'īkah.
1015. I suspect that these two quatrains are also wandering quatrains - inserted here mainly as an embellishment to the commentary. But see below, p. 606 for a fuller explanation.
1016. Text repetitive.
namanya, ya'ni Qalam yang Mahatinggi; dan pada suatu 'ibārat Lawḥ namanya, ya'ni Papan tempat Menyurat. Kerana itulah maka sabda Rasūlu'LLāh (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Awwal mā khalaqa'LLāhu Ta'ālā'1-rūḥ."

awwal mā khalaqa'LLāhu Ta'ālā'1-nūr
awwal mā khalaqa'LLāhu Ta'ālā'1-'aql
awwal mā khalaqa'LLāhu Ta'ālā'1-qalam."

ya'ni maka sebab Nabī (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!) mengatakan sekalian awwal [itu ialah] kerana 'Ilmu hidup dinamai Rūḥ; kerana 'Ilmu itu ma'lūmāt kelihatan dinamai Nūr; kerana 'Ilmu itu menchawakan segala ma'lūmāt dinamainya 'Aql; kerana 'Ilmu itu tasurat rupa ma'lūmāt dinamai Lawḥ; kerana 'Ilmu itu menjadi ṣurūf sekalian ma'lūmāt dinamai Qalam - kerana itulah maka sabda Rasūlu'LLāh (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Awwal mā khalaqa'1-Lāhu Ta'ālā'1-rūḥ.

dan awwal mā khalaqa'1-Lāhu Ta'ālā'1-nūr -
kerana Rūḥ dan Nūr [42] itulah maka ma'lūmāt jadi. Seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā [didalam Ḥadīth Qudsī]:

Law lāka lamā khalaqtu'1-aflāk."

1017. Text: ... Ta'ālā rūḥ.
1018. Text: ... Ta'ālā nūrī.
1019. Text: ... Ta'ālā'aql.
1020. Text: ... Ta'ālā qalam.
1021. Text corrupt: ... khalaqtu alā aflāk.
ja'ni:

Jikalau tiada engkau tiadakan Kujadikan ketujuh langit dan ketujuh bumi (dan semesta sekalian Kujadikan daripada Chahaya Muhammed juga).

Jika tiada Chahaya Muhammad itu tiada akan jadi semesta sekalian. Dan lagi firmân Allah Ta'âlâ [didalam Hadîth Qudsî]:

Khalaqtu'll-kulla li ajlika wa khalaqtuka li ajsî.

ja'ni:

Kujadikan semesta sekalian keranamu; engkau [Ku]jadi[kan] keranaKu (ja'ni semesta sekalian jadi daripada Chahaya Muhammad; yang Chahaya itu jadi daripada Dhât Allah).

Jika tiada dengan 'Ilmu itu, Allah Sub'hânahu wa Ta'âlâ tiadakan zâhir; [dan] tiada 'Âlim, [Chahaya] Muhammed tiada akan zâhir. Seperti sabda Rasûlu'Llâh (salla'Llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Kuntu nabiyyan wa Âdama bayna'l-mâ'i wa'l-ţîn."

ja'ni:

"Ada aku terlebih dahulu sebagai Nabi tatakala Adam masih lagi diantara air dan tanah." 1022

1022. Text is rather awkward:
"Adaku dahulu, dahulu Nabi tatakala itu Adam lagi antara air dan tanah."
Hadîth ini ishârat kepada air jua,\textsuperscript{1023} kerana Adam dan semesta sekalian jadi daripada Chahaya itu jua. Chahaya 'Ilmu itu\textsuperscript{1024} Ma'lûm. Lagi sabda Rasûl'Llâh (salla'Llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Adamu abû'l-bashari wa anâ
abû'l-arwâh."

ya'ni:

"Adam bapa segala tubuh [dan] aku\textsuperscript{1025} bapa segala nyawa." (ya'ni yang dikatakan Nabi (salla'Llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!): "Awwal mä khalâqa'L-lâhu Ta'âlâ'l-rûh ... pada hukumnya\textsuperscript{1026} nyawa itulah Muhammad (salla'Llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!). [Lagi sabda Nabi (salla'Llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):] "Anâ mina'Llâhi wa'l-mu'minûna minnî" - ya'ni: "Aku daripada Allâh dan segala Mu'min [43] daripadaku.")

Lagi sabda Nabi (salla'Llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Anâ mina'Llâhi wa'l-âlamu minnî."

ya'ni:

"Aku daripada Allâh dan sekalian 'âlam daripadaku."

Lagi sabda Nabi (salla'Llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Anâ min nûrî'Llâhi wa'l-mu'minûna\textsuperscript{1027} min nûrî."

\textsuperscript{1023} See text, pp.57-58.
\textsuperscript{1024} Text: itu 'ilmu.
\textsuperscript{1025} Text has: Muhammmad.
\textsuperscript{1026} Text is garbled: ... pada hukumnya pada hukum nyawa ... etc.
\textsuperscript{1027} Text has 'âlamu, but this is inconsistent with the Malay translations.
ya'ni:

"Aku daripada Chahaya Allah. Bermula: segala mu'min daripada chahayaku.

Kerana sekalian kata ini maka dikatakan 'Ilmu Ḥaqīqat Muhammad [al-Nabī].

(22) Fa'lam - Menurutkan Ma'lūm dengan lengkap[nya] gawl.

Ya'ni memberi Chahaya akan Ma'lūm. Jika tiada 'Ilmu, Ma'lūm tiada dapat keluar daripada isti'dād aṣlī. Kerana itu maka dikatakan menurutkan Ma'lūm. Mithal laut; jika tiada laut ombak pun tiada akan timbul; demikian lagi rupa ma'lūmāt timbul daripada 'Ilmu. Kerana ini maka pada ḥukum shari'at Ma'lūm menurutkan 'Ilmu, kerana jika tiada 'Ilmu tiada kelihatan ma'lūmāt. Dan pada suatu 'ibārat mereka itu sekalian daripada Chahaya Esa itu juga, seperti kata Lam'at:

"Al-'aynu waḥidatun wa'l-hukmu mukhtalifun wa dhāka sirran li ahli'l-ilmī yankashifun."

ya'ni:


Ya'ni seperti tanah; dijadikannya berbagai-bagai akan dia; adakan buyung, adakan periuk - aṣalnya tanah sebangsa

1028. Text incorrect: waḥidun.
1029. Text incorrect: last radical should be written with an alif in the accusative case.
1030. Text Incorrect: 'ilmu.
1031. Text incorrect: munkasifun. See Lam'at XI, Lama'at, p.341.


Falaham - Tuhan kita itu yang empunya Kamāl.


"Khayrihi wa sharrihi mina'Llāhi Ta'ālā."
y'a'ni:

"Baik dan jahat daripada Allāh Ta'ālā."

Barangsiapa tiada membawa īmān demikian [ia itu] kāfir -
na'ūdhu bi'Llāhi minhā! Firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

Qul kullun min 'indī'Llāh. 1033

ya'ni:

Katakan olehmu (yā Muḥammad), semesta sekalai daripada Allāh Ta'ālā. Seperti firman Allāh Ta'ālā:

1032. Text has: bajan, but this refers to a particular type of pan, i.e. frying pan. I prefer bejana as this refers to any vessel, which is consistent with the description given in the preceding sentence.

1033. Qur'ān, 4:77.
Wa'Llāhu khalāqakum wa mā ta'malūn.\textsuperscript{1034}

[yà'nī]:

Bermula: Allah menjadikan kamu dan segala perbuatan kamu.

Lagi firman Allah Ta'ālā:

Wa lā ḥawla wa lā quwwata illā bi'Llāhi'l-
'aliyyai'l-'azīm.\textsuperscript{1035}

[yà'nī:]

Bermula: Tiada mengeliling\textsuperscript{1036} dan tiada kuasa melainkan dengan Allah yang Mahatinggi dan Mahabesar juga.

Seperti sabda Nabi (ṣalla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Lā tatharraka dharratun illā bi idhni'Ilāh."

ya'nī:

"Tiada bergerak suatu dharrat jua pun melainkan dengan firman Allah - kehendak Allah."

Dalam ūkum shari'at, sungguh pun daripada Allah baik dan jahat, tetapi Allah Ta'ālā raḍī kepada yang baik, tiada raḍī [45] kepada [yang] jahat. Adapun pada kata ini terlalu mushkil, tiada terbichara oleh\textsuperscript{1037} Ahlu'l-Sulūk kerana Jalāl pun SifatNya, Jamāl pun SifatNya, betapa maka tiada raḍī kepada SifatNya? Dan adapun jika dibawa kepada isti'dād ašlī dapat, kerana keduanya ḥādir\textsuperscript{1038} disana. Sungguh pun Ia

\textsuperscript{1034} Qur'ān, 37:96.
\textsuperscript{1035} Qur'ān, 18:40.
\textsuperscript{1036} An example of an extremely literal translation from the Arabic: ḥawla.
\textsuperscript{1037} Text: olehnya.
\textsuperscript{1038} Text corrupt: ḥādir.
mengeluarkan keduanya disana, tetapi pada yang baik raḍī, kepada [yang] jahat tiada raḍī. Tetapi su’āl [ini su’āl] bāqī!

(24) Fa‘lām - Didalam 'IlmuNya itu tiada panah zawāl.


1039. Text: raḍīnya.
1040. Text incorrect: zawāl.
1041. The text is corrupt.
1042. The text is corrupt.
Wa law shā'a'Llāhu laja'alukum ummatan
[46] wāhidatan wa lākin yudillu man yashā'u
wa yahdi man yashā' ya'ni:

Jika hendak menjadikan kamu ummat suatu dapat, tetapi menyesatkan dengan kehendakNya, menunjukkan jalan yang betul dengan kehendakNya.


1043. Qur'ān, 16:93.
1044. The text is corrupt.
1045. Daripada here conveys the meaning: Oleh kerana.
1046. Text: ikhtiyārnyā.
1047. Text garbled: tuan dengan keris.
1048. Text repetitive: tiada tiada.
didalam 'IlmuNya - ya'ni didalam 'Ilmu Allāh - tiada panah zawāl. 1050

(25) Fa'lam - Rahmān dalamnya perhimpunan Jalāl.

Ya'ni Rahmān, empunya Raḥmat yang dahulu [telah dinyatakan], 1051 tatakala memberi wujūd 1052 akan semesta sekalian 'ālam dengan Kamāl tiada bercherai. Seperti firmān Allāh Taʿālā:

Al-Rahmān
'Allama'l-Qur'ān
Khalaqa'l-insān
'Allamahu'l-bayān. 1053

ya'ni:

Rahman itu / Yang mengajar [47] Qur'ān,
(kalām Allāh yang qādīm, dengan ishārat). / Khalaqa'l-insān - ya'ni Menjadikan insān (dengan Raḥmat yang qādīm) / Maka diajarinya semesta sekalian yang kelihatan.

Adapun suatu Ḥadīth lagi sabda Nabī (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Lā tasubbū'l-riyāhā 1054 innahā min nafsi 1055 'l-Rahmān." 1056

1050. Text incorrect: zawal.
1051. See above, p. 40 of the text.
1052. Text has Malay form: ujūd.
1054. Text incorrect: riyāhī.
ya'ni:
"Jangan kamu menyumpah angin, bahwa-
sanya ia daripada nafas Rahmān."

Ishārat disini sedikit [tetapi] ma'nanya banyak. Suatu
ma'nanya: ia banyak fa'idahnya. 1057 Lagi sabda Nabī
(salla'llāhu 'alāhi wa sallama!):

"Inna'llāha khalaqa Ādama 'alā
surati'l-Rahmān."

ya'ni:

"Bahwasanya Allāh Ta'ālā menjadikan
Ādaman atas rupa Rahmān."

Maka ditakhgīšan 1058 Allāh Subhānahu wa Ta'ālā atas Rupa
Rahmān itu [iaitu] tiada bercherai dengan Nama Allāh Ta'ālā
(ya'ni Rahmān itulah wujūd 1059 semesta sekalian 'ālam).
Adapun suatu 'ibārat, Ādam pun suatu 'ālam lagi; pada
Sharī'at 'ālam ṣaghīr, pada Ḥaqīqat 'ālam kabīr. Seperti
fīrmān [Allāh] Ta'ālā:

Al-Rahmānu 'alā'1-1'arshī' stawā. 1060

ya'ni:

Rahmān diatas 'arsh sama.

Barangsiapa 1061 tiada fikir akan āyat ini [ia itu] kufr,
karena disini banyak dalīl mutashābihāt. 1062 Kata Ahlu'l-

1057. Text incorrect: fa'īdāh.
1058. Text incorrect: ditakhGIS akan.
1061. Barangsiapa in text preceded by ya'ni.
1062. Text incorrect: mutashābihāt.

(26) Fa’lam - Berserta dengan Raḥîm pada sekalial jamâl.


Sekalian ini daripada jamâl ḥukumnya. Adapun firmân Allah Ta’âlâ:

Fa subhâna’l-ladhî biyadîhi malakûtu kulli shay’in wa ilayhi turna’ûn.1065

ya’ni:

Maka mahasuchi Tuhan Ia itu dengan tangan[Nya] [memegang] ḥaqîqat sekalial!

Bermula: kepadaNya jua [kamu akan di] pulang[ikan].

Lagi firmân Allah Ta’âlâ:

Khalaqtu bi yadayya.1066

ya’ni:

Kujadikan [dengan] kedua tanganKu.

1064. ... jika demikian takhshîs tempat adapun, i.e. sekalipun ada ditakhshîaskan tempat seperti demikian.
1065. Qur’ân 23:89.
1066. Qur’ân 38:75.

(27) Fa'lam - Tuhan kita itu bernama 'Alīyy.


1067. Text corrupt: berbangan.
1068. Text incorrect: Sifat.
1069. Text incorrect: Raḥīm.
1070. See Qur'ān, Surah 87.
1071. Text: sekalian, but sekian appropriate.
1072. Text corrupt: dibawah.
(28) Fa'lam - Dengan sekalian Sifat[Nya] nantiasa bāqī. 

(29) Fa'lam - 'Ala jamī'i'l-ālamīn AthārNya jadi.
Ya'ni diatas segala ālam BekasNya lalu; seperti air sungai lalu tiada berkeputusan [dan] tiada berkesudahan. Seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

Kulla yawmin huwa fī shā'n. 

ya'ni:

Pada segala hari Ia itu dalam kelakuanNya.
Kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk ma'ni 'hari' [itu] 'sekejap mata, 'kerana pada Allāh hari tiada. Lagi firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

Allāhu nūru'l-samāwātī wa'l-arḍī mathalu nurihi ...

ya'ni:

Allāh jua yang menerang ChahayaNya ketujuh langit dan ketujuh bumi Seperti ChahayaNya ...
Kata Ahlu'1-Suluk 'alam ini kenyataanNya jua, kerana [Allāh] Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā dengan DhātNya, dengan ȘifātNya, dengan Af'ālNya, 1076 dengan AthārNya 1077 nantiasa nyata [50]. Sebab ini maka kata Abū Bakr al-Şiddīq 1078 (ra'īya'Allāhu 'anhu!):

"Mā ra'aytu shay'an illā wa ra'aytu'Allāha qablāhu."

ya'ni:

"Tiada kuluihat suatu melainkan kuluihat Allāh dahulunya."

Kata 'Umar (ra'īya'Allāhu 'anhu!):

"Mā ra'aytu shay'an illā wa ra'aytu'Allāha ba'dahu."

[ya'ni:]

"Tiada kuluihat suatu melainkan kuluihat Allāh kemudian[nya]."

Kata 'Uthmān (ra'īya'Allāhu 'anhu!):

"Mā ra'aytu shay'an illā wa ra'aytu'Allāha ma'ahu."

ya'ni:

"Tiada kuluihat suatu melainkan kuluihat Allāh sertanya."

Kata 'Alī (ra'īya'Allāhu 'anhu!):

"Mā ra'aytu shay'an illā wa ra'aytu'Allāha rīhī."

ya'ni:

"Tiada kuluihat suatu melainkan kuluihat Allāh dalamnya."

1078. Abū Bakrini'l-Siddīq is written in the text vocalized with a nun in Bakrini.
Keempatnya 'ulyā ma'rifat mereka itu, kerana firman Allāh Ta'ālā:

Fa aynāmā tuwallū fa thammā wajhu'Ilāh. ya'nī:

Barang kemana kamu hadapkan muka kamu disana [wajhu'Ilāh] (ertinya DhātNya) — [bukan dimaqṣūdkan] muka [seperti muka makhlūq]; ya'nī Dhāt Allāh Ta'āla tiada bermuka, DhātNya jua yang lengkap kepada semesta sekalian. Seperti firman Allāh Ta'ālā dalam Zabūr:

Anā'l-mawjūdī fa'tlubnī tajidnī
fa'in ta'tluba siwā'ī lam tajidnī.

ya'nī:

Aku mawjūd, yang kamu tuntut kamu peroleh,
jikalau kamu tuntut lain daripadaKu tiada
Aku engkau peroleh.

Inilah ĀthārNya pada sekalian 'Ālam.

(30) Fa'ālam — Daripada sittu jihāt, sebab inilah, khālī.

Ya'nī [daripada] enam hadapan khālī. Maka dikatakan khālī [kerana] jikalau dikatakan diatas, dibawah Ia; jikalau dikatakan dibawah, diatas Ia; jikalau dikatakan dikiri,
dikanan Ia; jikalau dikatakan dikanan, dikiri Ia; jikalau [51] dikatakan dari hadapan, dari belakang Ia; jikalau

1079. Text incorrect: fa samma.
1080. Qur'an, 2:115.
1081. Text incorrect: mawjūdī.
1082. Text incorrect: ta'tlub.
1083. Text incorrect; in the singular form: athārNya, should be in the plural.
dikatakan dari belakang, dari hadapan Ia, kerana bahwa sanya

firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

Qul huwa' Llāhu aḥad
Allāhu'l-ṣamad
Lam yakid wa lam yūlād
wa lam yakun lahu kuf'ān aḥad. 1084

ya'ni:

Katakan olehmu (ya Muḥammad)
bahwasanya Allāh Ta'ālā Esa;
Lagi Tuhan yang penuh (pada suatu
ma'na: pejal; suatu ma'na: lengkap).
Tiada beranak dan tiada diperanakkan,
Dan tiada bagiNya sama suatu pun.

Apabila SifātNya demikian, nischaya tiada jihāt akan Dia.

Dan lagi seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

... Thalāthatin illā huwa rābi'uḥum 1085 wa lā
khamsatin illā huwa sadisuhum
wa lā adnā min dhālika wa lā akthara
illā huwa ma'ahum. 1086

ya'ni:

Jikalau orang tiga orang, melainkan Ia
jua yang keempatnya dengan mereka itu,
bermula: jikalau orang lima orang, melainkan
Ia jua yang keenamnya dengan mereka itu;
tiada kurang, tiada lebih, melainkan Ia
jua serta mereka itu sekalian.

1084. Qur'ān, surah 112.
1085. Text incorrectly: rabi'uḥum.
Kata itupun isharat kepada Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ālā tiada berjihāt dan tiada bertempat. 'Ibārat ini sungguh pun sedikit, ma'nānya banyak. Wā'Llāhu a'lam!


(32) Fa'lam - Memberikan wujūd pada sekalian 'ālam. Ya'nī ĀthārNya itu pada sekalian 'ālam terlalu nyata, tiada terbunyi, kerana ia wujūd daripada Rahmat Rahmān, lagi memberikan wujūd akan sekalian 'ālam. [Jika] tiada wujūd itu, dimana akan beroleh āthār? Kerana āthār

1087. Text incorrect: atharNya.
1088. I.e., terbunyi.
1089. Text incorrect: athar.
1090. Text incorrect: atharNya.
1091. Text incorrect: athar.

(33) Fa'ilam - Menjadikan makhlūq siang dan malam.


1092. Text incorrect: atharNya.
1093. Text: bajan.
1094. Text incorrect: atharNya.
1095. Text repetitive: air-air.
setengah tumbuh menjadi hitam. Warna dengan sekalian rasa [menjadi] dengan [ḥukum] isti'dād āşlī juga. Adapun air, serupa air sematanya; tanah pun serupa sematanya tanah. Kayu-kayuan itu tumbuh daripada air dan tanah juga, tetapi rupanya dan warnanya menurut isti'dādnya juga. Seperti firman Allah Ta'ālā:

Yusqā bi mā'in wāḥidin wa nufaḍḍilu ba'daha 'ala ba'din fi'l-ukul.

ya'nī:

Kami beri air daripada suatu sir. Bermula: kami lebihkan setengahnya atas setengahnya dalam rasa segala makanan.


1096. Text incorrect: nusqā.
1098. Text has: kāfir dan islām. I have reversed the order for consistency.
1099. Text incorrect: sifatNya.
1101. Text incorrect: atharNya.
1102. Text incorrect: sifat.

(34) Fa'lam - Ilā abadī'l-ābād tiadakan karam. Ya'nī kekayaan Allāh nantiasa tiada akan lenyap daripada ma'lūmat datang kedunyā, dari dunyā datang keakhirat, daripada ākhirat datang kepada tiada berkesudahan. Yang isi shurga pun tiada akan lenyap tiada berkesudahan, yang isi neraka pun [tiada akan lenyap] tiada berkesudahan. Seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

Jaza'uhum 'inda rabbihim jannātu
'adin tajrī min tahtiha'l-anhāru khālidīna fīhā abadān.

ya'nī:

Dibalaskan merekaitu (yang islām) daripada Tuhan mereka itu: tempatnya shurga, lalu dibawahnya sungai, masuk mereka itu [ke]dalamnya kekal.

1103. Text corrupt: ḫalāl.
1104. Qur'ān, 6:163.
1105. Text corrupt: 'ālam.
1106. Text has: padam.
1107. Text incorrect: jannātin.
Lagi firman Allah Ta'ālā:

_Inna'l-ladhīna kafarū wa žalāmū lam yakuni'Allāhu liyaghfira lahum wa la liyahdiyahun tarīqan illā tarīqa jahannama khālidīna fīhā abadan._

_1109 ya'nī:_


_Inilah ma'nā ilā abadī'ābād tiadakan karam._

(35) _Fa'lam -_ Tuhan kita itu seperti Bahr al-'Āmīq.

_Ya'nī Dhāt Allāh ditamthilkan seperti Laut yang Dalam, kerana kunhi Dhāt itu tiada masuk kepada bichara._

Keadaan Nya juga [yang] ditamthilkan seperti Laut yang Amat Dalam itu. Makasabda Nabi (ṣalla'Allāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Subhānaka ma' arafnāka ḥaqqa ma'rīfatika._

_1111 ya'nī:_

"Mahasuchi [55] Engkau! - tiada kukenal Engkau dengan sempurna kenal (ya'n i kunhi Dhāt itu tiada dapat dikenal)."

_Kerannya jua di'ibāratkan seperti laut yang tiada berhingga dan tiada berkesudahan._ Jika ada akan Dia hingga

1109. Same as in note 1108 above. Qur'ān 4:168.
1110. Text incorrect: Dhat.
1111. Meaning: Oleh kerana itu.
dan kesudahan, atau awwal dan ākhir, akan makhlūq jua - akan Allah Subhānahu wa Ta'ālā tiada ŠifātNya demikian.

(36) Fa'lam - Ombaknya penuh pada sekalian ṭarīq.


"Deryā kuhan chū bar zand mawjī nū
Mawjīsh khwānand[1114] [u] dar ḥaqīqat daryāst."[1115]

ya'ni:

"Laut sedia; apabila berpalu menjadi ombak baharu. Dikata orang "ombak", tetapi pada ḥaqīqat laut jua - kerana laut dengan ombak tiadanya bercherai. Dan lagi kata sha'ir Lam'at:

1112. Text repetitive: dan tiada.
1113. Text: dihampir.
1114. Text corrupt: hwanad.
1115. Lam'at, Lam'at, III, p.332.
"Khalawtu\textsuperscript{1116} bi man ahwā\textsuperscript{1117} fa \textit{lam} yaku\textsuperscript{1118} \textit{ghayrunā} \textit{Wa law kānā ghayrī lam yāsiḥ̱h} \textit{wujūduhā}.\textsuperscript{1119}

\textit{ya'ni:}

"Khalwatlah aku dengan \textsuperscript{[56]} kekasihku maka tiada kulihat lain daripada aku. [Jika kulihat lain daripadaku, wujūdnya tiada \textit{ṣāḥīh} ...]"

Kata \textit{Lam'at}:

"Raqqu'\textsuperscript{1120} l-zujāju wa r[ā]qati\textsuperscript{1121} l-khamru Fa tashābahā fa \textit{tashākala}\textsuperscript{1120} l-amru Fa ka'\textsuperscript{1121} annanā khamr[un] wa lā qadahu Wa ka'\textsuperscript{1121} annanā qadah[un] wa lā khamru.\textsuperscript{1121}

\textit{ya'ni:}

"Naqsh\textsuperscript{1122} kacha dan hening minuman Maka sebagai keduanya dan serupa \textit{ḥukumnya} Maka seperti minuman [\textit{bukan piālà}; Dan seperti piala \textit{bukan minuman}.]"

Inilah \textit{ma'ni} ombak-ombaknya penuh pada sekalian \textit{ṭarīq}.

(37) \textit{Fa'lam} - Laut dan ombak keduanya \textit{rafiq}.

\textit{Ya'ni} laut dan ombak keduanya bertaulan; mithal hamba dengan Tuhan, 'āshiq dan ma'\textit{shūq}. Seperti firman \textit{Allāh Ta'ālā}:

\textit{Ta'ālā:}

\textit{1116. Text corrupt: khalawat.}  
\textit{1117. Text incorrect: ahwayā.}  
\textit{1118. Text corrupt: yakul.}  
\textit{1119. Text incorrect: wujūdanā. \textit{Lama'āt, Lam'at, XII, p.342.}}  
\textit{1120. Text corrupt: fa ta'kul.}  
\textit{1121. \textit{Lama'āt, Lam'at, V, p.335.}}  
\textit{1122. Text has: naqsh. But this is meaningless. Obviously naqsh: form.}
Inna’l-ladhīna yūbāyi’ūnaka innamā yūbāy‘ūna’Llāh ... 1123

ya’ni:

Bahwasanya merekaitu yang berjabat tangan dengan dikau, tiada mereka itu [berjabat tangan] melainkan Allāh Ta’ālá jua yang menjabat tangan [mereka] itu ...

Yadu’Llāhi fawqa aydīhim. 1124

ya’ni:

Tangan Allāh diatas tangan mereka itu.

Lagi firmān Allāh Ta’ālā:

Fa lām taqτulūhum wa lā kinna’Llāh qatalahum wa mā ramayta idh ramayta wa lā kinna’Llāha ramā. 1125

ya’ni:


Lagi firmān Allāh Ta’ālā:

Wa huwa ma’akum aynama kuntum. 1126

ya’ni:

Ia itu serta kamu barang dimana ada kamu.

1125. Qur’ān, 8:17.
Lagi firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

Wa nahnu aqrabu ilayhi min ḥabli'l-warīd.1127

ya'nī:

Kami [terlebih] hampir kepadanya daripada urat leher yang keduanya.

Lagi firmān Allāh Ta'ālā [didalam Hadīth Qudsī]:

Al-insānu sirrī wa ānā sirruhu.

ya'nī:

Yang [57] manusia itu rahasia Aku dan Aku pun rahasianya.

Kerana [ini maka] sabda Nabī (salla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu".

ya'nī:

"Barangsiapa mengenal dirinya bahwasanya mengenal Tuhannya" — kerana Tuhannya dengan dia tiada bercherai. Seperti laut dengan ombak itu tiada bercherai, demikian lagi [Tuhan dengan hambaNya tiada bercherai]. Inilah ma'nā laut dan ombak keduanya rafi'īq.

(38) Fa'lam - Ākhīr kedalamnya jua ombaknya gharīq.

Ya'nī ombak kedalam laut jua teng[ge]lam. Datangnya ombak pun daripada laut, pulangnya pun kepada laut jua.

Inilah ma'nā irji'i ilā ašlih — seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

1128. Text has: Aku, but the honourific Kami is correct, being the translation for nahnu.
Irji'ī ilā rabbīki rādiyatan mardiyyah. ya'nī:

Pulang [kamu] kepada Tuhanmu, rādi kau akan dikau.


(39) Fa'īlam - Lautnya 'Ālim halunnya Ma'lūm.

Ya'nī laut yang sudah dikatakan diatas itulah maka dinisbatkan kepada 'Ālim, supaya dapat tamthīl 'Ālim dan Ma'lūm oleh ṭālib. Kerana yang dinamai laut itu air, apabila laut itu timbul bernama halun; apabila naik berhimpun diudara bernama awan; apabila [jatuh ber] titik dari udara bernama hujan; apabila hilir dibumi bernama sungai; apabila pulang kelaut laut ḥukumnya. Adapun halun, maka ditamthīlkan Ma'lūm kerana halun daripada laut - tetapi tiada lain daripada laut. Demikian lagi 'Ālim tiada bercherai dengan Ma'lūm, Ma'lūm tiada bercherai dengan 'Ālim. Jikalau 'Ālim tiada berma'lūm, tiada 'Ālim; hukumnya tiada

1129. Text incorrect: rādiyatan.
1131. Text corrupt: pulu.
1132. Text: bernamanya.

(40) Fa'lam - Keadaannya Qāsim ombaknya Maqsūm.


(41) Fa'lam - Ţufānnya Ḥākim, shu'ūnnya¹¹³⁶ Maḥkūm.

Ya'ni [59] Ŧufānnya tamthil daripada [titah] "Kun!" (fa yakūn) kepada zuhūrNya dengan ṢifātNya dan ṢamāNya;

¹¹³³. Repetition of the phrase in the text.
¹¹³⁴. Text has: laut itu, but to be consistent with the line of the quatrains interpreted, this should read lautnya.
¹¹³⁵. Text: keadaannya.
¹¹³⁶. Text corrupt: shi'unnya.

(42) Fa'ilam - Pada sekalian 'ālamīn inilah rusūm.

Ya'nī pada sekalian 'ālamīn ini ughahari. Daripada awwalnya datang kepada ākhirnya, daripada bāṭinnya datang kepada zāhirnya, [sekalian ini] senantiasa shu'ūnNya.1142

1138. Text has: athar-atharNya.
1140. This is the logical sequence following the part of the sentence preceding it.
1141. Text corrupt: shi'unNya.
1142. Text corrupt: shi'unNya.

Kulla yawmin huwa fī shā'īn. 1143
ya'ni:

Pada segala hari Ia itu dalam kelakuanNya. Segala rupa, rupaNya; segala warna, warnaNya; segala bunyi, bunyiNya, kerana Ia wahdahu lā sharīka lahu. 1144 Jikalau [60] [dikatakan] ada [yang] lain daripadaNya, shirk dengan gulm țukumnya. Kerana ini 1146 maka segala 'Ushaq yang berma' rifat sempurna berkata:

"Kulihat Tuhanku dengan mata Tuhanku." 1147

Kata Shaykh Mas'ūd (rahmatu'LLāhi 'alayhi!):

"Akulah kāfir yang sedia!"

Kata Sayyid Nāsimī: 1148

"Innī anā'LLāh"

ya'ni:

"Bahwasanya aku Tuhan!"

Kata Shaykh Junayd Baghdādī 1149 (rahmatu'LLāhi 'alayhi!):

1144. Qur'ān, 6:163.
1145. Text: gulm itu.
1146. Text: Kerana Ia.
1148. Text incorrect. This refers to Nasimi, the Turkish Ḥurūfī poet. See Muntahī, p.115.
1149. Text incorrect; Baghdādī.
"Laysa fī jubbatī siwā'Llāh"

ya'nī:

"Tiada didalam jubbahku ini lain daripada Allāh!"

Kata Sultānu'l-'Ariffin Bā Yaz[īd] Bīstāmī (raḥmatu'Llāhi 'alayhi!):

"Subbānī mā a'zama shā'īnī."

ya'nī:

"Mahasuchi aku! (dan) mahabesar kelakuanku!"

Banyak lagi Masha'ikh yang berkata [demikian] tiada tersebut. Adapun mereka itu sekalial berkata demikian kerana ma'rīfat mereka itu sempurna. Jangan kita yang tiada berma'rīfat berkata demikian - jangan kita turut-turutan, maka dikurnikan pendita, [yang menghukumkan demikian] supaya jangan segala yang jāhil yang tiada berma'rīfat mengatakan demikian, kerana ma'rīfat itu terlalu mushkil. Barangsiapa belum sempurna berma'rīfat dan berahi seperti mereka itu, jika ia berkata seperti mereka itu, kāfir ḥukumnya. Inilah ma'nā pada sekalial 'ālamīn inilah rusūm.¹¹⁵¹

(43) Fa'lam - Jikalau sini kamu tahu akan wujūd.

Ya'nī wujūd yang dikata[kan] pada awwalnya kitāb ini datang¹¹⁵² kepada ākhiriya. Wujūd itu yogya diketahui

¹¹⁵⁰. Maka here conveys the meaning: sehingga.
¹¹⁵¹. Text corrupt: rāsūm.
¹¹⁵². Datang here, as frequently elsewhere, conveys the meaning: sampai.
dengan ma'rifat, kerana wujud itu bukan wujud kita. Daripada bebal kita jua kita sangka [wujud itu] wujud kita.

Sebab ini [61] maka kata Ahlu'1-Sulûk:

\[ \text{'Wujûduka dhanbun}^{1153} \text{ la yuqasu bihi dhanbun}^{1154} [\text{akharu.}]^{1155} \]

ya'ni:


\[1153. \text{Text incorrect: dhanbun.} \]
\[1154. \text{Text incorrect: dhanbun.} \]
\[1155. \text{See Kashf al-Mahjûb, p.297.} \]
\[1156. \text{Nin, i.e. ini.} \]
"Allāhumma arīnī1157. Text has: arīnā. 1 l-ashyā'a kamā hiya."

ya'ni:

"Ya Tuhanku, perlihatkan padaku sekalian seperti adanya."


Wa idhā sa'alaka 'ibādi1158. Text incorrect: 'ibādi. 1 lannī fa'innī qarīb.1159

ya'ni:

Apabila bertanya bambaku kepadaKu,1160 bahwa Aku [sesungguhnya] bampir*

Tetapi akan hampirNya itu yogya diketahui. Lagi firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

Wa'Llāhu bi kulli shay'in muḥīt.1161

ya'ni:

Allāh Ta'ālā dengan semesta sekalian lengkap.

Lagi kata Shaykh Junayd (raḥmatu'Llāhi 'alayhi!):

"Lawmu'l-mā'i lawnu1162 [62] inā'ihi."

1157. Text has: arīnā.
1158. Text incorrect: 'ibādi.
1159. Qur'ān, 2:186.
1160. KepadaKu translates 'annī, hence it means 'concerning Me'.
1161. Qur'ān, 41:54.
1162. Text: wa lawnu.
ya’ni:

"Warna air warna bejananya jua."


...Likay lā ta’saw ‘alā mà ātākum wa la tafraḥū bi mà atākum.

1163. Text: ujūd.
1164. Text: hatinya.
ya'ni:

... [Supaya] jangan kamu berchinta akan barang yang luput daripada kamu dan jangan sukachita kamu kepada barang yang datang kepada kamu.


(46) Fa'lam - Supaya dapat kedalam Diri qu'ūd.

Ya'ni qu'ūd [itu iaitu] duduk (kedalam Diri). Ya'ni jangan jauh menchari daripada Diri, kerana firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

Wa fī anfusikum afalā tubṣirūn. 1167

ya'ni:

Bermula: didalam Diri kamu - tiadakah kamu lihat?

Dan lagi sabda Nabi (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu."

ya'ni:

Barangsiapa mengenal Dirinya maka sanya mengenal Tuhannya."

1166. Text has: yogya. But here kepada is appropriate as a translation of the Arabic bi.

Fa tawakkalū in kuntum mu'mīnīn. 1170

ya'ni:


"Al-faqîru lâ yahtāju ilâ'Ilâh." 1172

1168. Text incorrect: ḥaram.
1169. Text has the Achenese form: pahna.
1171. Text incorrect: 'Ussag,
1172. Lam'at, Lam'at, XX, p.352.
ya'ni:

"Faqīr itu tiada muhtāj [kepada Allāh]."


1173. Text incorrect: mukhtāj.
1174. Text incorrect: mukhtāj.
1175. Text incorrect: hārām.
1176. Text: hāyāt.
1177. Text corrupt: quyūm.
1178. Text incorrect: hārām.
1179. Text repetitive: ia ia.
1180. Text incorrect: hārām.
1181. Repetition of the phrase in the text: sediakala ia memakan [yang] hārām, 'āsi hukumnya.

(47) Faʿlam - Pada wujūd Allāh itulah yogya kau qāʾim.
Yaʾnī pada wujūd Allāh itulah yogya kau pandang dengan maʾrifat yang sempurna. Jangan lupa pada sembahyang dan puasa dan berjalan dan berdiri dan duduk dan berbaring, kerana firmān Allāh Taʾālā ini:

Waʾdhkur rabbaka fī nafsika tāḍarruʿan
wakhifatan 1184 wa dūnaʾl-jahri minaʾl-
gawli biʾl-ghuduwwi waʾl-āsāli wa lā
takun minaʾl-ghāfilīn. 1185

yaʾnī:

Sebut Tuhanmu didalam dirimu, melemahkan diri dan dalam hati takut, dan lain daripada nyaring 1186 [suara], dan kata dengan pagi dan petang, dan jangan kau jadi 1187 daripada orang yang lupa (yaʾnī jangan kamu lupa pada segala kelakuan kamu, seperti firmān Allāh Taʾālā: wa huwa maʾakum aynama kuntum. 1188

1182. Text has: kerena pada ḥukum ia dalam sembahyang dan diam. But this is senseless in the above context. Dan diam at the end of the sentence should read: yang daʾim.
1183. Text corrupt: quyūd.
1184. Text incorrect: khafītan.
1185. Qurʾān, 7:205.
1186. Text corrupt: baringnya.
1187. Text: jadikan.

(48) Fa'lam - Buangkan namamu dan rupamu dā'īm.

1189. Text: semetaran, or sementaranya.
1190. Text: nenggeri or nangroe: Achehnese form.
1191. Text: beristeri dapat.
1192. Text: berupanya.

(49) Fa'lam – Nafikan rasamu daripada makhḍūm dan [67] khādīm.

Ya'ni fanākan dirimu daripada yang menyembah dan yang disembah. Apabila ada lagi [yang] menyembah dan yang disembah [maka masih] menjadi dua, belum menjadi esa ḥukumnya. 1193 Seperti kata Ahlu’l-Sulūk:

'Man 'abada’l-isma dūna’l-ma’nā
gagad kafara ...'

ya'ni:

'Barangsiapa menyembah nama tiada dengan ertinya, maka bahwa sanya [telah] kāfir[lah ia] ...'

'Wa man 'abada’l-ma’nā dūna’l-isma
fahuwa mushrik ...'

ya'ni:

'Barangsiapa menyembah erti tiada dengan nama, maka ia itu menduakan ...'

1193. The text is garbled: Apabila ada lagi menyembah menjadi duanya yang disembah, belum menjadi esa ḥukumnya.
'Wa man 'abada'l-isma wa'l-ma'nā fahuwa munāfiq...'

ya'nī:

'Barangsiapa menyembah nama dan erti (nama), maka ia itu munāfiq...'

'Wa man tāraka'l-isma wa'l-ma'nā fahuwa mu'mīnun ḥaqqan.'

ya'nī:

'Barangsiapa meninggal[kan] nama dan erti (nama), maka ia mu'min yang sebenar-benarnya.'


"'Araftu rabbī bi rabbī."

ya'nī:

"Kukenal Tuhanku dengan [68] Tuhanku."

1194. Text: fanānya.
Lagi kata Lam'at:

"Lā yarā'ī-Lāha ghayra'Llāh."

ya'ni:

"Tiada [melihat] Allāh melainkan Allāh."

Kata Lam'at:

"Ma 'arafa'ī-Lāha ghayra'Llāhi."

ya'ni:

"Tiada mengenal Allāh lain daripada Allāh."

Kata Lam'at:

"Ra'aytu rabbī bi 'ayni rabbī."

ya'ni:

"Kulihat Tuhanku dengan mata Tuhanku."


(50) Fa'lam - Supaya sampai kepada 'Amal yang Khātim.

Ya'ni apabila fanā' maka beroleh perbuatan yang sedia. Seperti kata Uways al-Qarani dalam bahasa Farsi:

"Inrā ki fanā' shewa u faqr [ā In] ast ..."
"Mereka yang lenyap daripada permainan faqir ..."

Nah kashf [nah] yaqin nah ma'rifat nah dün ast ...

tienda kashf dan tiada yaqin dan tiada ma'rifat dan tiada ugama akan dia.

raft ī zi miyān hamīn khudā "mānd khudā"

lenyap ia ditengah-tengah - hanya Allah jua tinggal ..." al-faqru idhā tamma huwa‘Ilāhu [in ast].

apabila sempurna faqir -- sudahlah ma'rifatnya -- [maka] ia itu Allah."

Inilah lagi sabda Nabī (ṣalla‘Ilāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!): "Al-faqru fakhri wa bihi iftakharī."
"Faqir itu [kemuliaanku dan dengannya] kumuliakan."

Adapun kepada shari'at yang faqir\textsuperscript{1210} itu tiada mālik dinamai. Adapun kepada Ahlu'l-Sulūk yang dinamai faqir [itu] Ahlu'l-Ma'rīfah. Apabila sempurna ma'rīfatnya - tiada melihat dirinya lagi - faqīrīlah ḥukumnya. Inilah ma'nā [supaya sampai kepada] 'Amal yang Khātim.

(51) Fa'lam - Jika [engkau] belum tetap seperti batu.

[69] Ya'nī jangan bergerak; ḍirīrannya pun jangan bergerak. Apabila seperti batu maka wāṣīllah\textsuperscript{1211} ḥukumnya pada 'ibārat, tetapi kepada ḥaqīqat sedia wāṣīl. Jika ia tiada memuji Allāh pada ḍirīrannya, pada bāṭinnya [ia] memuji Allāh, kerana pada Ahlu'l-Sulūk segala ashyā' bernyawa dan berbudi dan berma'rīfat.\textsuperscript{1212} Jikalau ashyā' tiada berma'rīfat dimana ia akan memuji Allāh? - kerana firmān Allāh dalam Qur'ān demikian bunyinya:

\textit{Tusabbihu lahu'l-samāwātu[l-sab'u] wa'l-arḍu wa man fīhimna ...}\textsuperscript{1213}

ya'nī:

Memuji Allāh bagiNya isi langit ketujuh[nya] dan bumi (ketujuh[nya]) dan barang yang dalarnya ...
Wa 'in min shay'in illā yusabbihu bihamdihi wa lākin lā tafqahūna tasbīḥahum.  

ya'ni:

Bahwa daripada segala sesuatu melainkan menguchap ta[s]bīḥ memuji Dia, tetapi tiada kamu paham pada tasbīḥ mereka itu

Lagi firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

'Alam tara anna'LLāha yasjudu lahu man rī'īlamawati wa [man rī']l-arḍī wa'īl-shamsu wa'īl-qamaru wa'īl-nujūmu wa'īl-jibālu wa'īl-shajaru wa'd-dawābbu wa kathirun mina'īl-nās.

ya'ni:

Tiadakah kamu lihat bahwa Allāh Ta'ālā [itu] bagiNya jua disembah barang didalam ketujuh langit dan ketujuh bumi dan matalahari dan bulan dan segala bintang, dan segala batak dan segala puhun kayu-kayuan dan segala binatang dan kebanyakan daripada manusia?

Semesta sekalian ashya' menguchap tasbīḥ dan memuji dan menyembah [akan Allāh]. Apabila kita tetap seperti batu, sekalian anggaute kita menyembah Allāh seperti ḥukum dalīl Qur'ān ini.

1214. Text incorrect: yafqahū.
1215. Qur'ān, 17:44.
1216. Text incorrect: mā.
1217. Text corrupt: wa rī'īlamawatu.
1219. Text incorrect: ashya.
1220. After this word text has: sekalian - corrupt.
(52) Fa'lam — Ḥukum dua lagi: khādim dan ratu.\textsuperscript{1221}


(53) Fa'lam — Setelah lupa engkau daripada emas dan matu.

Ya'ni tamthil emas [itu iaitu] Tuhan, dan matu [itu iaitu] hamba. Kerana pada penglihat emas lain, matu lain,

\textsuperscript{1221} See note 893.
\textsuperscript{1222} Text repetitive.
\textsuperscript{1223} Text: dan yang.

"Al-ma’rifatu bijābun baynال-’ārifi wa’ل-]ma’raf." Ertinya ya’ni:

"Mengenal dinding antara [yang mengenal dan] yang dikenal."

Lagi kata Shaykh Muḥyī ’l-Dīn:

"Law la’l-maḥabbatu la’stamarra’l-waṣāl." ya’ni:

"Jika tiada mengasih, nischaya senantiasa waṣāl" (kerana mengasih dinding antara yang dikasih).

Kata ini ishārat kepada fanā‘ daripada emas dan matu juga. Apabila fanā‘ daripada emas dan matu, maka dapat menjadi satu - ya’ni esa.

1224. Lagi here means masih.
1225. Repetition of the last sentence and the one preceding follows here in the text.
1226. I.e. diketahuinya olehnya.
(54) Fa'lam - Mangkanya dapat menjadi satu.


"Ay murgh sahar 'ishq zi parwānah [72] beyāmūz...

ya'ni:

"Hai burung dinihari! berahi pada waktu sahar kepada kaluh-kaluh pergi berajar ..."

Kān sūkhtrā jān shud wa āwāz neyāmad ...

ya'ni:

Yang sudah tertunu itu menjadi nyawa tiada bunyinya datang ...

In muddā'īyyān dar ṭalabsh bekhabar ānand ...

ya'ni:

Segala yang mengaku dalam menuntut dia, tiada mereka itu khabar akan dia ...

Kānra ki khabar shud khabarsbān zi neyāmad."

1227. I.e. keruh-keruh.
1228. Text lupanya, should read: lupa ia.
1229. I have checked Hamzah's quotation with the original. Hamzah's text has: beyamad.
1230. Hamzah's text is corrupt.
1231. Text has: terbuni, but this is corrupt as tertunu translates sukht.
1232. Hamzah's text is not clear.
1233. Hamzah's text has: lih.
1234. Hamzah's text has: 682.
1235. See below, p. 667.
ya'ni:

Bahwa ia itu yang beroleh berita, beritanya tiada lagi datang."

Akan matu pun demikian; apabila ia fanā' didalam emas, akan emas tiada ia tahu, akan matu pun demikina, tiada ia tahu.

Inilah ma'nā 'mangkanya dapat menjadi satu.'

(55) Fa'lam - Jika belum fanā' daripada ribu dan ratus.


'Hijabu"1240 l-dhāti bi'l-sifāt [73]

1236. Text incorrect: athārNya.
1237. Text incorrect: āfālNya.
1238. Text incorrect: āfālNya.
1239. Text incorrect: āfālNya.
1240. In the text the word hijab in this quotation is written ḍajāb. But it is the noun of ḍajāb that is intended here.
hijābu'l-sifāti bi'l-asma
hijābu'l-asma'i bi'l-af'āl
hijābu'l-af'āli bi'l-āthār.'

ya'nī:

'Dinding Dhāt itu sifāt;
 dinding 'sifāt itu asma',\textsuperscript{1241}
dinding asma' itu af'al',\textsuperscript{1242}
dinding af'āl itu āthār.'

Adapun suatu ma'nā fanā' [itu iaitu] tanggal; tanggal
daripada ribu dan ratus, dan anak-isteri, dan arta dan
kekayan, dan ṣuḥbat dan kekasih, dan pakain yang baik dan
kebesaran dan hendak menjadi Shaykh dan karāmat dan kasih
akan riyā dan 'ajab daripada ribu dan ratus - [demikian]
dapat adamu ini fanā'. Hendak[nya]: maka di[a] dapat bertemu
dengan Tuhannya.

(56) Fa'lam - Tiadakan [dapat adamu]kau hhapus.

Ya'nī jika belum\textsuperscript{1243} fanā' daripada ribu dan ratus,
dimanakan dapat adamu hapus? - kerana 'ibārat hapus' [itu
iaitu] fanā' daripada sekalian 'ālam dan kebesaran dan
anak-isteri. Selang [kepada] dirinya lagi hapus, istimewa\textsuperscript{1244}
[kepada] 'ālam\textsuperscript{1245} dan kebesaran dan anak-isteri. Tetapi
da menuntut ia juga, tiada kepada menahani.
Sungguh pun beranak-isteri, sediakala hapus jua. Adapun akan

\textsuperscript{1241}. Text incorrect: af'al.
\textsuperscript{1242}. Text has: āthār.Nya.
\textsuperscript{1243}. Text repetitive.
\textsuperscript{1244}. Istimewa here conveys the meaning: apalagi.
\textsuperscript{1245}. Text repetitive.
orang muntahi, sediakala hapas jua muntahi. Bukan yang hapas [itu] junun, atau 'uryan, atau tiada makan, atau tiada tidur, atau tiada [mandi] junūb, atau berchamping, atau tiada mahu sembahyang. Jikalau diikut [yang] demikian itu, ḥijāb [ḥukumnya]. Adapun ma'nā hapas [itu iaitu] makan sama, tiada makan [74] sama; 'uryan sama, berkain sama; shurga sama, neraka sama; sungguh pun ia berbuat 'ibādat tetapi tiada ia ingin akan shurga dan tiada ia takut akan neraka, ya'ni taslīm — seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

\[
\text{Inna'ī-dīnā 'inda'Llāhi'l-islām.}
\]

ya'ni:

Bahwa yang agama itu pada Allāh agama Islam ([ya'ni] menyerahkan dirinya).

Kerana dirinya itu bukan Dirinya, yogyalah diserahkan kepada Yang Empunya Diri, maka dapat hapas daripada dirinya.

(57) \text{Fa'īlam — Nafīkān dirimu daripada kasar dan halus.}

Ya'ni [nafīkān dirimu] daripada badan dan nyawa; suatu ma'nā: daripada baik dan jahat; suatu ma'nā: daripada kedua 'ālam; suatu ma'nā: daripada islām dan kāfir; suatu ma'nā: daripada zāhir dan bātīn.\text{1247} Sekalian itu yogya dinafīkan, maka dapat bertemu dengan Dhāt Allāh, kerana pada sekalian itu bukan Dhāt. Apabila hapus menafīkān semesta sekalian yang kasar dan halus, maka dapat bertemu dengan

\text{1246. Qur'ān, 3:19.}
\text{1247. Text: bātīn.}

"Ḥijābu'Llāhi sab'īna alfan 1248
mina'l-nuri wa sab'īna alfan 1249
mina'l-zulumāt."

ya'ni:

"Dinding antara Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā tujuh puluh ribu dinding daripada chahaya [75] dan tujuh puluh ribu dinding [daripada] kelam."

Itulah dinding yang kepada kasar dan kepada halus.

(58) Fa'lam - Supaya dapat barang katamu harus.

Ya'ni seperti kata Shaykh Junayd 1250 Baghdādī (rahmatu'Llāhi 'alayhi!):

"Laysa fī jubbati siwā 1251 'Llāh."

[dan] seperti kata Shaykh Bā Yazīd:

"Subḥānī ma a'zama shā'ni"

atau seperti kata Manṣūr Ḥallāj: 1253

"Anā'1-Haqq."

1248. Text incorrect: alfin.
1249. Text incorrect: alfin.
1250. Text corrupt: Junaydī.
1251. Text incorrect: siwā.
1252. Text incorrect: Khallāj.
kerana mereka itu sempurna \textsuperscript{1253} ma’rifatnya. Tiada mereka itu melihat kasar dan halus melainkan Dhāt Semata jua. Barang kata mereka itu harus. Adapun kita, jika belum beroleh ma’rifat yang sempurna seperti ma’rifat mereka itu, atau belum hapus daripada kasar dan halus, jangan barang kata [seperti ini] dikatakan; [nischaya] khilāf sharī'at, kerana jalan word jauh is intended\textsuperscript{1254} - terlalu suci. Adapun jalan haqiqat, sungguh pun hampir, maranya banyak. Jangan kita meninggalkan sembahyang dan jangan meninggalkan sharī’at, kerana sharī’at dengan haqīqat\textsuperscript{1255} esa jua. Barang-siapa belum mabok atau belum māḥw atau belum junūn datang daripada Allāh, jikalau meninggal[kan] sembahyang dan puasa dan makan harām,\textsuperscript{1256} fāsiq dan ‘āṣīlah mereka itu ḫukumnya.

\textsuperscript{1258} Ya’ni\textsuperscript{1258} [76] sungguh pun da’īf, terlalu yaqīn, bukan bermain sia-sia; sungguh pun\textsuperscript{1259} lemah pada semesta; bukan bermain sia-sia; sungguh pun\textsuperscript{1259} lemah pada semesta

\textsuperscript{1253} Text repetitive.
\textsuperscript{1254} The meaning intended is not conveyed by this word. The word jauh is intended.
\textsuperscript{1255} Text: haqīqatnya.
\textsuperscript{1256} Text incorrect: harām.
\textsuperscript{1257} Text repetitive.
\textsuperscript{1258} Following Ya’ni the text is garbled and corrupt:
\textsuperscript{1259} Sungguh pun here means walau pun.
sekalian kerjanya, mithal berbuat 'ibādat dan riyaḍat dan 'uzlat dan qanā'at dan tark al-dunyā; dan lemah pada 'ilmunya dan ma'rifatnya. Seperti firman Allah Ta'ālā:

\[\text{Wa mā āṭītūn mina'l-īlmi ʿillā qalīlān.}\]

ya'ni:

Tiada Kuberikan kamu daripada 'ilmu melainkan sedikit jua.

Mānakan dapat mengenal Allāh dengan sempurna kenal? Selang Rasūlu'LLāh (salla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!) lagi bersabda demikian bunyinya:

"Subḥānaka mā 'arafnāka ṭaqqa ma'rīfatika."

ya'ni:

"Mahasuchi Engkau! - tiada [ku]kenal Engkau sebenar-menbenar mengenal Dikau."


1260. Text has: pada.
1261. Text repetitive.
1262. Text incorrect: utītum.
1263. Qur'ān, 17:85.
1264. Istimewa here means apalagi.
1265. Text incorrect: atharNya.
Fa'lam - Ḥaqīqatnya hampir kepada Dhāt al-Sharīf.


1266. Text corrupt: gūd.
1267. Text corrupt: berhentiya.
1268. Makashere means sehingga.
1269. Text: adanya.
1270. Text repetitive beginning from the word kerana.
(61) Fa'ilam - Sungguh pun ḫaḥab\textsuperscript{1271} rupanya kathīf.
Ya'nī ḫaḥab\textsuperscript{1272} [itu iaitu] buih; rupanya keras [tetapi] kerana asalnya air hukumnya lembut jua. Apabila timbul, menjadi keras ḥukumnya, kerana pada 'ibārat [buih] lain daripada air - ya'nī air laṭīf, buih kathīf. Adapun kepada ḥaqīqat [buih] tiada lain daripada air. Kerana ini maka dikatakan buih kathīf: sebab ia berupa dan bernama lain daripada air.\textsuperscript{1273} Tetapi kepada ḥaqīqat tiada ia berupa dan tiada ia berwujud; dan bernamanya itu wahmi\textsuperscript{1274} juga, tiada ḥaqīqī, kerana ia dā'im fanā' didalam air. Adapun qudratnya dan irādatnya dan penengarnya dan penglihatnya [78] dan budinya [dan] ma'rifatnya yang kita lihat daripadanya, [sebenarnya] tiada daripadanya, [akan tetapi] daripada air jua. Inilah ma'nā sungguh pun ḫaḥab\textsuperscript{1275} rupanya kathīf.

(62) Fa'ilam - Wāsīlnya dā'im dengan Bahr al-Laṭīf.
Ya'nī laṭīf [itu iaitu] lemah; senantiasa buih wāsīl\textsuperscript{1276} dengan air, kerana air lembut buih keras. Apabila buih pechah, kembali kepada air. Sebab ini maka dikatakan buih wāsīl dengan air. Adapun kepada suatu 'ibārat Ahlu'l-Sulūk wāsīl\textsuperscript{1277} tiada; sungguh pun wāsīl dikata[kan] [tetapi

\textsuperscript{1271} Text incorrect: ḫaḥab.
\textsuperscript{1272} Text incorrect: ḫaḥab.
\textsuperscript{1273} Text repetitive.
\textsuperscript{1274} Text incorrect: wahmi.
\textsuperscript{1275} Text incorrect: ḫaḥab.
\textsuperscript{1276} Text: wāsīl.
\textsuperscript{1277} Text: wāsīl.

1278. Text incorrect: ḥalālat.
1279. Text incorrect: istidāraj.

1280. Text: mu'jizat.
1281. Text: karāmat.
1283. Text: ma'rīfatnya.
1284. Text incorrect: Khilaf.

Wa salla'Llāhu 'alā khayri khalqihi Muḥammad wa alihi wa šābbihi ajma'īn wa'l-ḥamdu li'Llāhi rabbi'l-ʿālamīn.

Bahwa ini kitāb Asrāru'l-'Ārifīn fī bayān 'ilmī'l-Sulūk wa'l-Tawhīd Tamma bi'l-khayr. ʿĀmin.

1285. In text the word pada precedes karāmat.
1286. La juga means sama juga, i.e. identical.
1287. The complete title of the Asrāru'l-'Ārifīn.
CHAPTER VIII

Sharābu’l-'Āshiqīn
karangan Ḥamzah Fāsūrī

[Naskhah Leiden, no. 2016]

[1] Bismi’llāhi’l-raḥmani’l-raḥīm
Al-ḥamdu li’l-lāhi rabbi’l-‘ālamīn
wa’l-‘aqibatū li’l-muttaqīn
wa’l-salatū wa’l-salamū ‘ala
rasūlihi Muḥammadin wa ‘alā
‘ālihi wa aṣhābihi ajma’īn.

(1) Ketahui bahwa faqīr qa’īf Ḥamzah Fāsūrī hendak menyatakan jalan kepada Allāh Subhānahu wa Ta’ālā dan ma’rifat Allāh dengan bahasa Jāwī dalam kitāb ini - inshā Allāh - supaya segala hamba Allāh yang tiada tahu akan bahasa 'Arab dan bahasa Fārisi supaya1288 dapat memicharakan dia.


(3) Adapun ma’rifat Allāh terlalu mushkil. Jika tiada guru yang sempurna dan murīd yang bijakshana, tiada terbicharakan,

1288. The word supaya here seems redundant.
1289. This word here also seems redundant.
kerana ma’rifat Allāh rahasia Nabi (ṣalla’Llāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam!). Tetapi barang kuasa kita yogya kita tuntut, seperti sabda Rasūlu’Llāh (ṣalla’Llāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam!):

"Ma’ alaba shay’an jiddan wajada"

ya’ni:

"Barangsiapa menuntut sesuatu padahal disungguh-sungguhinya, nischaya diperolehnya."

Dan sabda Rasūlu’Llāh (ṣalla’Llāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam!):

"Talabu’l-’ilma faridatun ’ala kulli muslimin wa muslimatin."

ya’ni:

"Menuntut 'ilmu itu farçu atas segala islām laki-laki dan segala islām perempuan."

Dan sabda Rasūlu’Llāh (ṣalla’Llāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam!):

"Uṭlubu’l- ’ilma wa law kāna bi’l-ṣin."

ya’ni:

"Pergi tuntut olehmu 'ilmu jikalau dibenua China sekalipun."

Dan firmān Allāh Ta’āla:

Wa mā khalagtu’l-jinna wa’l-insa illā li ya‘budūn. [2]

ya’ni:

Tiada Kujadikan jinn dan manuschia melainkan bagi menyembah Daku (ya’ni: mengenal Daku).

1290. I.e. Dengan sungguh-sungguh.
1292. Text incorrect: mustimatin.
Dan firman Allah Ta'ālā pada Ḥadīth Qudsī:

Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa aḥbatu an u'rafā fa khalaqtu'l-khalqa li 'u'rafā 1295 ya'ni:

Dahulu 1296 adalah Aku pada perbenda[ha]raan yang terbunyi, maka Kukasih akan dikenal Daku, maka Kujadikan segala makhlūq supaya dikenal Aku.


Seperti firman Allah:

Lahum qulūbun lā yafqahūna bihā
wa lahum a'yunun lā yubṣirūna bihā
wa lahum ādhanun lā yasmā'ūna bihā
ulā'ika kā'l-an'āmi bal hum adallu
ulā'ika humu'l-ghāfilūn. 1298

1295. Li can also be read as likay in this quotation. Cf. note 1780.
1296. On the margin.
1297. Quwwat from 7291, p.82.
1298. Qur'ān 7:179.
Bermula: bagi mereka itu hati, tiada faham mereka itu dalamnya dengan dia; dan bagi mereka itu mata, tiada mereka itu melihat dengan dia; dan bagi mereka itu telinga, tiada mereka itu menengar dengan dia. Mereka itulah seperti binatang dikita - mereka itu terlalu sesat - mereka itulah yang lupa (akan Tuhannya).

(5) Daripada ayat ini jangan kita ghafil, jangan kita sangka akan kāfir juga ghafil. [Kerana itu] yogya kita kerjakan ṭā'at, dan menchari ma'rifat kepada guru yang sempurna kepada sharī'at dan ṣarīqat dan ḥaqiqat; [3] kerana sharī'at seperti pagar, ṣarīqat seperti rumah, ḥaqiqat seperti isi rumah; jika rumah itu tiada berpagar 'āqibat[nya] isi rumah itu dichuri orang. Ya'nī kepada Allāh, jika tiada dengan sharī'at 'āqibat[nya] diharu Shayṭān. Seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

A lam a'had ilaykum yā banī Ādama an lā ta'budu'l-shayṭāna innahu lakum 'aduwwu 'l-mubīn.  

ya'nī:

Tiadakah Aku berjanji dengan kamu, hai anak Ādam, bahwa jangan kamu menyembah Shayṭān? Bahwa sesungguhnya ia bagi kamu setru terlalu nyata.


1299. Juga here means saja.
1300. Kerana itu from 7291, p.83.
1301. Text has: sabda.
1302. Qur'ān 36:60.
Adapun barangsiapa keluar daripada kandang sharī'at, nischaya dapat [ia] diharu Shayṭān. Adapun barangsiapa menyangka sharī'at kecil, atau menchela dia, kāfir - na'ūdhu bi' Llāhi minhā! - kerana sharī'at tiada bercherai dengan ṭariqat, ṭariqat tiada bercherai dengan ḥaqīqat, ḥaqīqat tiada bercherai dengan ma'rifat. Seperti kapal sebuah; sharī'at seperti lunasnya, ṭariqat seperti papan[nya], ḥaqīqat seperti isinya, ma'rifat akan labanya. Apabila lunas dibuangkan, nischaya kapal itu karam; laba pun lenyap, modal pun lenyap, merugi dikita.1303 Wa'Llāhu a'lam bi'l-ṣawabī

1303. I.e. pada kita. It is not a mistake for dikata, as it frequently occurs in the texts. It seems to me to be an equivalent of the Arabic 'indanā.
Babu'l-awwal fI bayan a'mali'l-sharfrei'at
[Bab yang Pertama
Pada menyatakan Perbuatan Sharfrei'at]

(7) Ketahui bahwa yang dinamai sharfrei'at itu sabda NabI (sallalLahu 'alayhi wa sallam!) menyuruh[kan] kita berbuat baik, melarangkan [kita] berbuat jahat. Seperti sabda NabI (salla'lLahu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Al-sharfrei'atu aqwali."
[ya'nI:]

"Yang sharfrei'at [itu] kataku."

Adapun kata NabI (salla'Llahu 'alayhi wa sallam!) daripada Allah juga; seperti dalil Qur'an bukan daripada kehendak hatinya berkata. Seperti firman Allah Ta'ala:

Wa ma yanitiq 'ani'l-hawa in huwa illa wahyun [4] yuhs. ya'nI:

Tiada NabI (salla'Llahu 'alayhi wa sallam!) berkata daripada kehendak hatinya. Bahwa melainkan ia yang diturunkan Allah Ta'ala kepadanya firman.

(8) Adapun NabI (salla'Llahu 'alayhi wa sallam!) mengatakan bahwa Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala esa tiada dua, dan tiada sebagainya, dan tiada bertimbal, dan tiada sekutu dan sebangsa, dan tiada serupa, dan tiada berjihat dan

1304. Cf. 7291, p.84.
1305. Text has: firman.
1306. Text has: sabda.
1307. Qur'an 53:3-4.
tiada bertempat – seperti firman\textsuperscript{1308} Allah Ta'āla:

\begin{quote}
Laysa kamithlihi shay'\textsuperscript{un}.\textsuperscript{1309}
\end{quote}

ya'\textsuperscript{nī}:

\begin{quote}
Tiada sebagaiNya suatu pun.
\end{quote}

[Dan Lagi] firman\textsuperscript{1310} Allah Ta'āla:

\begin{quote}
Subhāna'LLāhi 'amma yaṣīfūn.\textsuperscript{1311}
\end{quote}

ya'\textsuperscript{nī}:

Mahasuchi Allah Ta'āla! – tiada dapat diperikan.


(10) Barangsiapa i'tiqādnya sabda Rasūlu'LLāh (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!) tiada sungguh atau perbuatannya tiada benar, kāfīr – nā'ūdhu bi'LLāhi minhā! – kerana Nabī

\textsuperscript{1308} Text has: sabda.
\textsuperscript{1309} Qur'ān 42:11.
\textsuperscript{1310} Text has: sabda.
\textsuperscript{1311} Qur'ān 6:100.

1312. Maka here means: supaya, agar.
1313. Ia refers to Muhammad.
1314. On the margin of the text (translation of the word nāqīs).
1315. Cf. 7291, p.86.
1316. Cf. 7291, p.86.
1317. I.e. arak, Arabic: khamr; cf. 7291, p.86.
(ṣalla'Ilāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!) yogya kita turut supaya dapat kita kedalam ṭarīqat, kerana ṭarīqat tiada lain daripada sharī'at.

(11) Seperti firmān1319 Allāh Ta'ālā:

Qul in kuntum tuhibbūna'Ilāha fa't-tabi'ūnī yuḥbīkkumu'Ilāh.1320

ya'ni:

Katakan [olehnu] (ya Muhammad) jika ada kamu mengasihi Allāh [maka] turut perbuatanku supaya kamu dikasihi Allāh Ta'ālā.

Dan firmān1321 Allāh Ta'ālā:

Mā ātākumu'l-rasūlu fakhudhūhu wa mā nahākum 'anhu fa'1-ntahū.1322

ya'ni:


Kata Shamsu Tabrīz:

"Sharī'at rā muqaddam dāram aknūn Ḥaqqīqat az sharī'at nīst birūn ..."

ya'ni:

"Yang sharī'at itu kudaḥulukan sekarang, Kerana Ḥaqqīqat dan sharī'at tiada berlainan ..."

1319. Text: sabda.
Kasihku dar sharifat rasikhayad
Haqiqat rah bar way khud' gushayad."

ya'ni:

Barangsiapa ia itu kepada sharifat sempurna,
Datang jalan haqiqat kepada orang itu
nischaya memukakan dirinya."

Adapun perkara sharifat banyak, mana dapat sekaliannya
tersebut. Barangsiapa berahi akan Allahu Ta'alaa, yogya
dichari dengan budi pula. 1324 Wa'Llahu a'lam bi'l-sawab!

1323. Text: khub.
1324. Text has the form: pulang.
Babu'l-thani fî bayân a'mâli'l-țariqat
[Bab yang Kedua
Pada menyatakan Perbuatan Ṭariqat]1325

(12) Ketahui bahwa Ṭariqat itu tiada lain daripada ḥaqîqat, kerana Ṭariqat permulaan ḥaqîqat [seperti sharî'at permulaan Ṭariqat pun].1326 Seperti sabda Rasûlu'llâh (salla'llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Al-țariqatu af'âlî." 

ya'nî:

"Yang Ṭariqat itu perbuatanku."

Adapun permulaan Ṭariqat [itu] tawbat, seperti tawbat nasûhan daripada segala dosa yang māqî, kerana firman1327 Allâh Ta'âlâ:

 Ya ayyuhâ'1-ladhînâ āmanû tūbû ilâ'y1-Lâhi tawbatan nasûhan.1328

ya'nî:

Hai segala kamu1329 yang membawa Īmân, tawbatlah kamu kepada Allâh dengan tawbat nasûhan (ya'nî setelah sudah tawbat jangan kembali lagi).

Dan [Lagi] firman1330 Allâh Ta'âlâ:

Inna'llâha yuhabit'ât-tawwâbînâ wa yuhabit'at-mutâtahhirîn.1331

---

1325. Cf. 7291, p.87.
1326. Cf. 7291, p.87.
1330. Text: sabda.
1331. Qur'ân 2:222.
Bahwa sesungguhnya Allāh Ta’ālā kasih akan orang [yang] tawbat, dan kasih akan orang [yang] menyuchikan diri.

(13) Dan [tarīqat itu] tarku’l-dunyā, ya’nī jangan menaruh arta dunyā banyak, lebih daripada [untuk] dimakan dan diperkain, kerana sabda Rasūlu’LLāh (ṣalla’LLāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam!):

"Tarku’l-dunyā ra’su kulli ‘ibādatin ḥubbu’l-dunya ra’su kulli khaṭi’atin."

ya’nī:

"Meninggalkan dunyā kepala segala ‘ibādat kasih akan dunyā kepala segala kejahatan."

Dan [lagi] sabda Rasūlu’LLāh (ṣalla’LLāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam!):

"Kun fī’l-dunyā ka’annaka gharībun aw ‘ābiru sabīlin wa ‘udda nafsaka min aşhābi’l-qubūr."

ya’nī:

"Diam dalam dunyā engkau seperti dagang, atau seperti orang melalui jalan, dan jadikan dirimu [seolah-olah engkau] daripada orang isi qubūr."

Dan [lagi] sabda Rasūlu’LLāh (ṣalla’LLāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man tawakkala ‘alā’LLāhi kafā."

ya’nī:

"Barangsiapa menyerahkan dirinya kepada Allāh padalah."

Erti tawakkal [itu ialah] tiada shakk dalamnya, seperti firmān\textsuperscript{1333} Allah Ta'ālā:

\textit{Fa tawakkalū in kuntum mu'minīn.}\textsuperscript{1334}

ya'ni;


(15) Sekalian perbuatan ini tarīqat namanya, tiada lain daripada ḥaqīqat. Jangan kamu sangka tarīqat ini kecil, kerana tarīqat pakaian Nabī (ṣallā'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!). Barangsiapa mungkir daripada sharī'at dan tarīqat, [ia itu] kāfir - na'ūdhu bi'Llāhi minhā! Adapun barangsiapa mengatakan sharī'at dan tarīqat jalan yang sebenarnya, tetapi tiada

\textsuperscript{1333} Text: sabda.
\textsuperscript{1334} Qur'ān, 5:23.
\textsuperscript{1335} Cf. 7291, p.89.
kuasa mengerjakan dia, tiada ia kafir; 'āsi ḥukumnya
daripada ia tiada kuasa memakai dia.

(16) Adapun mintak makan, kepada sharī'at, jikalau ada
padanya [untuk] pagi dan petang, jika pergi mintak ḥaram
ḥukumnya, kerana sabda Nabī (ṣall'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man sa'ala wa 'indahu mā yughnīhi fa
innama yastakthiru mina' l-nari qālu ya
rasūlu'LLāhi wa mā yughnīhi qāla qadru mā
yaghḍīhi wa ya'shīhi."
y'a:nī:

"Barangsiapa memintak, bermula: [dan ada]
kepadanya barang qadar kayanya, bahwa
sesungguhnya membanyak daripada api
neraka." Maka bertanya suhbat: "Berapa
barang qadar kayanya?" Maka sabda Rasūlu'LLāh:
"Qadar pagi dan petang."

(17) Adapun kepada ṣarīqat, jika tiada dapat berdiri
sembahyang farṣu, maka harus pergi memintak - itu pun jangan
banyak, seqadarmu [8] sekali makan juga. Jika lebih daripada
sekali makan, jangan ditaruh; berikan kepada faqīr. Adapun
kepada Ḥaqīqat, jangan mintak sekali-kali, kerana rizqi kita
tersurat pada Lawḥ al-Maḥfūz, dan sudah terbagi: yang banyak,
banyak; yang sedikit, sedikit - tiadakan lebih dan tiadakan
kurang.

(18) Lagi seperkara, Allāh Ta'ālā tahu akan lapar kita dan
dahaga kita. Kenapa kita mengadu [kan ḥāl]1336 kepada lain?

1336. Cf. 7291, p.90.
Seperkara, [sel]olah-olah rādi akan kenyang, tiada rādi akan lapar! Kerana [ini] firman\textsuperscript{1337} Allah Ta'ālā:

\textit{Man lam yarda bigađā'ī wa lam yasbir 'ala balā'ī wa lam yashkur 'ala ni'matī\textsuperscript{1338} fa'il-yakhruj min tahtīl-sama'ī fa'il-yatlub rabban siwā'ī.}\textsuperscript{1339}

\textit{ya'ni:}

Barangsiapa tiada rādi kepada bahgianKu, dan tiada ia şabar atas kutukKu, dan tiada memuji atas ni'matKu, maka keluarlah dari bawah lengitKu, maka tuntutlah Tuhan yang lain daripadaKu!

(19) Kerana ini maka dilarangkan Ahlu'1-Haqīqah mintak. Adapun kata Ahlu'1-Haqīqah, jika tawakkalnya sempurna, dan rādiinya sempurna, dan memandang pada Lawḥ al-Mahfūz naṣībnya, jika ia mati lapar, matinya mati shahīd ḥukumnya. Adapun perkara tarīqat Muḥammad Rasūlu'LLāh (ṣallā'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!) banyak lagi tiada tersurat. Wa'LLāhu a'lam bi'il-

\textit{ṣawāb!}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1337} Text: sabda.
\item \textsuperscript{1338} In \textit{Z}2\textsuperscript{91}, p.90, the plural form is given: ni'amī.
\item \textsuperscript{1339} I.e. in the Holy Tradition (Ḥadīth Qudsi).\end{itemize}
Babu’l-thālith fī bayān a’māl’l-ḥaqīqat
[Bab yang Ketiga
Pada menyatakan Perbuatan Ḥaqīqat]1340

(20) Ketahui bahwa jalan Ḥaqīqat [itu] jalan Muḥammad Rasūlu’Llāh (ṣalla’Llāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam!) kesudah-sudahan jalannya. Seperti Ḥadīth:

"Al-shāfī’atu aqwālī
wa’l-ṭariqatu af’ālī
wa’l-ḥaqīqatu aqwālī."

ya’ni:

"Yang shāfī’at [itu] kataku,
yang tariqat itu perbuatanku,
yang Ḥaqīqat itu pertingkahku."


(22) Adapun Ahlu’l-Ḥaqīqah dua bahagi. Sebahagi1341 beranak beristeri dan berumah dan bertanaman, tetapi tiada hatinya lekat kepada tanamannya dan pada anak-isterinya dan [kepada]

1340. Cf. 7291, p.90.
1341. Text has: setengah; I have altered to sebahagi for the sake of consistency.
Apabila hatinya tiada lekat kepada sekalian itu, tiada hijāb padanya. Sungguh pun ia beranak beristeri berumah bertanaman, jikalau anak-isterinya mati tiada ia berchinta; jikalau rumahnya dan tanamannya tertunu tiada ia duka; jikalau kerajaan Sulaymān dan [kerajaan] Iskandar diberi Allāh Ta'ālā akan dia pun tiada ia suka, kerana hina dan mulia sama padanya; kaya dan miskin sama padanya; sakit dan nyaman sama padanya - tiada ia melihat dirinya, melainkan Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā juga [dilihatnya], kerana kepada Ahlu'l-Ḥaqīqah wujūd sekalian 'ālam wujūd Allāh; niscaya sekalian daripadaNya.

(23) Adapun Ahlu'l-Ḥaqīqah sebahagi lagi dā'īm menyembah Allāh, dan berahi akan Allāh, dan mengenal Allāh tunggal-tunggal; dan mengenal dirinya, dan meniadakan dirinya dan mengesakan dirinya, dan berkata dengan dirinya dan fanā dalam dirinya dan baqū dengan dirinya dan benchi akan zāhir dirinya dan kasih akan bāṭīn dirinya, dan menchela dirinya dan memuji dirinya; jika makan, makan dengan dirinya, jika duduk, duduk dengan dirinya, jika tidur, tidur [10] dengan dirinya, jika jaga, jaga dengan dirinya, jika berjalan, berjalan dengan dirinya - tiada ia lupa akan dirinya, kerana sabda Rasūlullāh (ṣallallāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

1342. In 7291: mengithbātkan, but the sense conveyed is identical, p.91.
"Man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu".

ya'ni:

"Barangsiapa mengenal dirinya maka sesungguhnya mengenal Tuhannya."

(24) Seperkara lagi, tatakala ia memandang diluar dirinya, barang dilihatnya dirinya juga 1343 dilihatnya; barang dipandangnya dirinya juga dipandangnya, kerana kepada Ahlu'l-Haqiqah 'alam dengan dirinya esa juga, tiada dua-tiga. Apabila 'alam sekalian dengan dirinya esa, nischaya barang dilihatnya dirinya juga dilihatnya. Seperti sabda Rasūlu'LLāh (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Ra'aytu rabbī bi 'ayni rabbī."

ya'ni:

"Kulihat Tuhanku dengan mata rahmat Tuhanku."

Kata Lam'at:

"Lā yarā'LLāha ghayra'LLāha."

ya'ni:

"Tiada melihat Allāh lain daripada Allāh."

Sабda Rasūlu'LLāh (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Ra'aytu rabbī bi rabbī."

ya'ni:

"Kulihat Tuhanku dengan Tuhanku."

1343. The text is corrupt: jika.
1344. The text is incorrect: ghayru.
(25) Maka sabda Nabi (ṣalla’LLāhu ’alayhi wa sallam!) demikian kerana semesta sekalian 'ālam tiada berwujūd. Apabila 'ālam tiada berwujūd, tiada berqudrat dan tiada beraf'āl akan dia. Jika dipalu orang atau dipermaki orang, a felAllāh juga dilihatnya, tiada a felAllāh yang lain dilihatnya; nischaya dirinya, barang dijabatnya, dirinya juga dijabatnya, kerana firman Allāh Ta’ālā:

Fa aynamā tuwallū fa thamma wajhu’LLāh. ya’ni;

Barang kemana kamu hadapkan muka kamu disana ada Allāh.


1345. Text: sabda.
Babu'l-rabi' fī bayān ma'rifati'Llāhi Ta'ālā.
[Bāb yang Keempat
Pada menyatakan Ma'rifat Allāh Ta'ālā]

(27) Ketahui bahwa sabda Nabi (ṣallā'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallām!):  

"Al-ma'rifatu sirrī"

ya'ni:

"Yang ma'rifat itu rahasiaku."

Dan [lagi] sabda Rasūlu'Llāh (ṣallā'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallām!):

"Lā tasīhhu'l-salātu illā bi'l-ma'rifah."

ya'ni:

"Tiada sah sembahyang melainkan dengan ma'rifat."

Ketahui bahwa ittifāq sekalian Anbiyā' dan Awliyā' dan Ḥukamā' dan Ahlu'l-Kalām mengatakan Allāh Subhānahu wa Ta'āla Esa, tiada dua; Qādīm, tiada muḥdath; Khāliq, tiada makhlūq; tiada berupa dan tiada berwarna; Kekal, tiada fanā'; dan tiada bercherai dan tiada bertemu; dan tiada putus dan tiada pesuk; dan [tiada] mithal dan tiada sebangsa/sekutu dan tiada bagaiNya; dan tiada bertempat dan tiada bermasa 1347 dan tiada ākhir - suchi [Ia dari] pada kata ini!

(28) Sekalian Ahlu'l-Sulūk dan Ahlu'l-Kalām dan 'Ulama' muwāfaqat, tetapi terlebih Ahlu'l-Sulūk mengatakan [bawab Ia] tiada berhingga dan berkesudahan. Ma'ni tiada berkesudahan

1347. Text follows with: dan tiada berwarna - tautology.
dan tiada berhingga [itu iaitu] tiada atas akan Dia dan tiada bawah akan Dia, dan tiada kanan [12] akan Dia dan tiada kiri akan Dia, dan tiada hadapan akan Dia dan tiada belakang akan Dia - ya'nî [Ia] suatu wujûd [yang] tiada berenam jihât. Seperti laut yang mahaluas; seperti buah yang kecil [se]biji juga. Sebab ini maka kata Ahlu'l-Sulûk Allâh Subhânahu wa Ta'âlâ samad - kepada semesta sekalian 'âlam ini meliputi. Seperti firmân\textsuperscript{1348} Allâh Ta'âlâ:

\begin{equation}
\text{Innahu bikulli shay'in muhit.}\end{equation}

ya'nî:

Bahwa sesungguhnya Ia itu dengan semesta sekalian meliputi.

(29) Maka kata 'Ulamâ' 'IlmuNya juga [yang] meliputi. Maka kata Ahlu'l-Sulûk DhâtNya pun meliputi, 'IlmuNya pun meliputi semesta sekalian, kerana Ia tiada bercherai dengan 'IlmuNya kerana Allâh Subhânahu wa Ta'âlâ tiada seperti manusia dapat bercherai dengan 'ilmunya.

(30) Seperkara, Allâh Subhânahu wa Ta'âlâ hampir kepada kita dengan DhâtNya dan 'IlmuNya, tetapi terlalu mushkil orang mengetahui hampirNya itu. Adapun ma'nâ hampir empat perkara: seperkara hampir kepada zaman; kedua perkara hampir kepada makân; ketiga perkara hampir kepada şifât; keempat perkara hampir kepada Allâh Ta'âlâ. Tetapi hampir kepada

\textsuperscript{1348}. Text: sabda.
\textsuperscript{1349}. Qur'ân 41:54.

Wa huwa ma'akum aynama kuntum,1353 ya'nī:

la serta kamu barang dimana [ada] kamu.

Dan [lagi] firman1354 Allāh Ta'ālā:

Wa nābnu aqrabu ilayhi min ḥabli'l-warīḍ.1355 ya'nī:

1355. Qur'ān 50:16.
Kami terhampir kepadanya daripada urat leher kedua.

Dan [lagi] firman\textsuperscript{1356} Allah Ta'ālā:

\textit{Wa fī anzusuṣum a fa lā tubṣīrūn.}\textsuperscript{1357}
yā'nī:

Dalam dīrī kamu - tiadakah kamu lihat?

(31) Kerana ini maka kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk [ma'ānī] hampir kepada Allah Ta'ālā [itu] Anbiyā' dan Awliyā' dan Šālihīn dan Mushrīkīn\textsuperscript{1358} dan Kāfīrin\textsuperscript{1359} dan 'Arīṣyīn\textsuperscript{1360} sama dikita Ia hampir. Kepada sekalian makhlūq sama [Ia hampir], tetapi farğu hampirNya kepada Ahlu'l-Ma'rīfah dan 'Ibid terlebih; ya'nī barangsiapa berma'rīfat dan banyak berbuat 'ībādat ia itu hampir ḥuḳumnya; barangsiapa tiada berma'rīfat dan berbuat ma'sīat ia itu jauh, bukan hampir - jauh seperti tamthīl dahulu itu.\textsuperscript{1361} Kata ini mushkil, orang Ahlu'l-Kashf juga mengetahui dia.

(32) Su'al\textsuperscript{1362} [jika] seorang orang bertanya): "jikalau Dhāt Allah kepada semesta sekalian lengkap, kepada najis dapatkah dikatakan lengkap?" Maka jawāb: "Seperti panas\textsuperscript{1363} lengkap kepada sekalian ʿālam, kepada najis pun lengkap,

---

\textsuperscript{1356} Text: sabda.
\textsuperscript{1357} Qur'ān 5:21. The text incorrect: yubsīrūn.
\textsuperscript{1358} Text: mushrīk.
\textsuperscript{1359} Text: kāfīr.
\textsuperscript{1360} Text: ʿāṣī.
\textsuperscript{1361} Cf. above, pp.12-13 of the text, the reference to Utbah and Shaybah.
\textsuperscript{1362} Cf. Ḥujwīrī, Kashf al-Mahjūb, chapter on technical terms.
\textsuperscript{1363} I.e. chahaya.
kepada busuk pun lengkap, kepada baik pun lengkap, kepada jahat pun lengkap, kepada Ka'bah pun lengkap, kepada rumah berhala pun lengkap - kepada sekalian pun sama [lengkap]; kepada najis tiada ia akan najis, kepada busuk tiada ia akan busuk, kepada baik tiada ia akan baik, kepada jahat tiada ia akan jahat; daripada Ka'bah [14] tiada [ia] beroleh kebajikan, daripada rumah berhala tiada ia beroleh kejahatan. Selang panas\textsuperscript{1364} lagi demikian, istimewa [Allāh Subhānahu wa Ta'ālā], Suchi daripada segala suchi, dimana Ia akan najis dan busuk?" \textit{Fa'afham}.\textsuperscript{1365}

(33) \textit{Su'āl}; "Jika Dhāt Allāh kamu kata lengkap kepada semesta sekalian makhluqāt, siapa yang merasai shiksa neraka, siapa yang merasai ni'mat shurga?" \textit{Jawāb}: "Seperti emas dan Ashrafi\textsuperscript{1366} jika ditunu Ashrafi itu, Ashrafi juga yang hangus, emas tiada hangus. Sungguh pun Ashrafi dengan emas tiada bercherai seratus kali atau seribu kali diperbuat, maka [apabila] ditunu, Ashrafi juga yang hangus, emas baqā'; manakan hangus dan manakan lenyap? - kerana Ashrafi seperti makhluqāt, emas seperti Khāliq; makhluq juga yang hangus dan binasa."

Kata itu terlalu mushkil.

\textsuperscript{1364} Cf. note 1363.
\textsuperscript{1365} \textit{I.}\textsuperscript{7291}, p.94, has: Maka fahamkan olehmu kata ini: \textit{i.e. fa’afham}.
\textsuperscript{1366} \textit{Text: Ishrafi}. 
Barang orang tiada lulus disini, yogya kita bicharakan sabda 'Alī ibni Abī Ṭālib (karrama'llāhu wa'jihahu!):

"Ma ra'aytu shay'an illā wa ra'aytu'llāha fīhi."
y'a'nī:

"Tiada kuliihat sesuatu melainkan kuliHat Allah didalamnya."

Dan sabda Rasūlu'Llāh (salla'llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man nażara ilā shay'in wa lam yara'llāha fihi fā huwa baṭilun."

[y'a'nī]:

"Barangsiapa memandang kepada sesuatu, maka tiada ia melihat Allah dalamnya, maka ia itu sia-sia."

(34) Kerana ini maka kata Ahlu'l-Buluk [bahwa Dhāt Allāh] lengkap [kepada semesta sekalian makhluqāt]. Tetapi ittifāq 'Ulamā' dan Ahlu'l-Sulūk dan Ahlu'l-Kalām dan Ḥukamā' mengatakan kunhi Dhāt Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'āla tiada siapa datang kesana. Tetapi 'ibāratNya dapat dikatakan seqadar kuasa kita. Wa'llāhu a'lam bi'l-ṣawāb!

1367. i.e.: Barangsiapa.

"Subḥānaka mā ‘arafnāka ḥaqqa ma‘rifatika."

ya‘nī:

"[Maha] suchi Mu! – tiada kukenal sebenar kenal akan Dikau."

Dan sabda Nabī (salla‘Llāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam!):

"Tafakkarū fī khalqi‘Llāhi 1371 wa lā tafakkarū fī dhāti‘Llāh."

ya‘nī:

"Kamu fikirkan dalam yang dijadikan Allāh; bermula; jangan kamu fikirkan dalam Dhāt Allāh."


1368. Cf. 7291, pp. 95-96.
1370. Bichara: Kālām, in the sense of 'diatetic'.
1371. Text has: Ālā‘i‘Llāhi, but khalqi‘Llāhi is correct. Cf. 7291, p. 96.

(37) Adapun Ma'lim itulah yang dinamai Ahlu'l-Sulūk a'yān thābitah. Setengah menamai dia suwaru' l-ilmiyyah, setengah menamai dia ḥaqīqatu' l-ashya', setengah menamai dia rūḥ iḍāfī. Sekalian ini dinamai ta'ayyun thānī ḥukumnya.

Adapun rūḥ insānī dan rūḥ ḥayawanī dan [rūḥ] nabatī ta'ayyun thālith ḥukumnya.

---

1372. Text has the order reversed, which is logically inconsistent.
1373. Text has: lā ta'ayyun, but this is incorrect according to the context. Cf. 7291, p.96.
1374. Text: dinamai.
1375. 7291 has: suwar 'ilmiyyah, p.96.
1376. Text has: dinamai.
1377. Text: dinamai.
1378. Text incorrect: nabatī.
(38) Adapun ta'ayyun rābi' dan ta'ayyun-khāmis ya'ni [ta'ayyun] jasmānī kepada semesta sekalian makhlūqāt ilā mā lā nihāyata[lahu]1379 ta'ayyun juga namanya.


(40) Adapun ta'ayyun awwal dinamai aḥad pun ia, wāhid pun ia; apabila kita lainkan Dḥat Semata SendiriNya aḥad NamaNya; apabila kita sertakan ẒīfātNya dan 'ibāratNya wāhid NamaNya, kerana aḥad itulah bernama wāhid memegang 'ālam sekalian min awwalihi ilā ākhirihi.1383

(41) Adapun ta'ayyun awwal ini dimithalkan Ahlu'l-Sulūk seperti laut. Apabila laut timbul, ombak namanya - ya'ni apabila 'Ālim memandang Dirinya Ma'lūm jadi daripadaNya.

1379. 7291, p.97: kepada tiada berkesudahan.
1380. I.e.: tiada lagi terḥisābkan ta'ayyun itu. Lagi means here: dapat.
1381. Text incorrect: ta'ayyun.
1382. Text corrupt: 'āqil.
1383. 7291, p.97: daripada pertamanya hingga kesudahannya.
Apabila laut itu melepas nyawa asap namanya - ya'ni dirinya nyawa dengan rūh idāfī kepada a'yān thābitah sekalian.


(42) Seperti firman1386 Allāh Ta'ālā:

Kullu shay'in hālikun illā wajhahu.1387

ya'ni:

Semesta sekalian binasa melainkan DhātNya.

Ya'ni AdaNya itu senantiasa ada, yang lain daripada[Nya] itu senantiasa tiada ada, kerana kepada Ahlu'l-Sulūk yang ada

1384. Cf. 7291, p.98.
1385. Itu refers to the "waves" i.e. the World. The analogy of sea and waves now refers to God and His creation.
1386. Text: sabda.
juga menjadi ada; yang tiada itu tiada [dapat] menjadi ada. Ya'nî Allâh Subhânahu wa Ta'âlî WAJIBU'L-WUJÜD, qâ'îm SendiriNya, tiada dengan lain. MUMKINU'L-WUJÜD qâ'îm dengan Dia. Apabila mumkinu'l-wujüd qâ'îm dengan Dia, hukumnya tiada [ber] wujüd. Kata 'Ulâmâ' 'âlam ini daripada tiada diadakanNya; sudah diadakanNya maka ditiadakanNya. Kata Ahlu'l-Sulûk jika demikian fâsiqlah Allâh Ta'âlî, atau berhingga. Adapun kepada kami yang tiada itu tiada dapat menjadi ada; yang ada itu tiada'kan tiada. Ada kepada-suwarî juga lenyap, kepada ma'nawî tiada lenyap. Seperti upama yang mati; zâhirnya lenyap, kepada bâthinnya tiada lenyap, seperti firman Allâh Ta'âlî:

Wa lâ taqâlu liman yuqtalu fî sabîli'llahî amwatun bal ahyâ'un wa lâkin lâ tash'ûrûn. Ya'nî:

Jangan kamu berkata bagi barangsiapa yang terbunuh dalam jalan Allâh itu mati dûkita [bahkan mereka itu] hidup, tetapi tiada [kamu] sekalian menyadar [akan dia].

(43) Akan semesta sekalian pun demikian; așalnya daripada Allâh, pulangnya pun kepada Allâh - bukan daripada tiada pulang kepada tiada! Seperti firman Allâh Ta'âlî:

1388. Cf. 7291, p. 98.
1391. Text reading: mereka itu.
Innamā amruhu idhā arāda shay'ān an yaqūla lahu kun fa yakūn.¹³⁹³

ya'ni:


Kata Ahlu'l-Sulük ma'nā lahu [itu] ada hendak[nya] maka firman¹³⁹⁴ Allah Ta'ālā lahu. Jika [18] tiada mawjud tiadakan disebut Allah Ta'ālā lahu.¹³⁹⁴ Seperkara pula¹³⁹⁵ kata Ahlu'l-Sulük Allah Ta'ālā Qadīm dan 'Ālim; apabila Ia 'Ālim, Ma'lūm dalam 'IlmuNya ada hendak[nya]. Barang yang dijadikanNya 'dahulu' atau 'kemudiannya' kita lihat sekalian daripada Ma'lūm itu juga. Jikalau demikian, ḥukumnya daripada ada juga diadakanNya, bukan daripada tiada maka diadakanNya, kerana yang dinamai ada itu wujūd Shu'ūnNya juga. Seperti firman¹³⁹⁶ Allah Ta'ālā:

Kullu yawmin huwa fī shā'n.¹³⁹⁷

ya'ni:

Kepada segala hari Ia dalam KelakuanNya juga.

(44) Hai [Ṭalib!], Keadaan Allah Subhānahu wa Ta'ālā seperti laut yang tiada berhingga dan tiada berkesudahan;

¹³⁹³. Qur'ān 36:82.
¹³⁹⁴. Text: sabda.
¹³⁹⁵. Text: pulang.
¹³⁹⁶. Text: sabda.
'alam ini dan semesta sekalian dalam laut itu seperti buih kecil sebiji juga. Manusia seorang dalam buih [itu] akan berapa bahagianya? - ya'ni tiada lagi melainkan seperti firmān Allah Ta'ālā:

\[
\text{Kullu man 'alayhā fān wa yabgā wajhu rabbika dhū’l-jalāli wa'l-ikrām.}
\]

Ya'ni:

Barang segala yang diatas 'ālam nin\(^{1400}\) lenyap; bermula: yang kekal Dhat Tuhan[mu] juga, Yang Empunya Kebesaran dan Kemuliaan.

(45) Hai Tālib!, 'ālam ini seperti ombak, Keadaan Allah Ta'ālā seperti laut; sungguh pun ombak lain daripada laut, kepada ḥaqīqatnya tiada lain daripada laut. Kamā qāla [Rasūlu] 'Llāhi Ta'ālā:\(^{1401}\)

\[
\text{Khalaga Ādama 'ālā ṣūratīhi}
\]

Ya'ni:

Bahwa Allah Ta'ālā menjadikan Ādam atas RupaNya.


---

1398. Text: sabda.
1400. I.e. ini.
1401. Z291, p.100, Seperti sabda Rasūlu'LLāh.
1402. Text has: Berkata.
oleh [para] pandita. Sabda Rasūlu'Llāh (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Inna'LLāhu Ta'ālā [19] khalaqa Ādama 'ālā sûrati'l-rahmān."

ya'ñi:

"Bahwa Allah Ta'ālā menjadikan Adam atas Rupa Raḥmān."

kerana Raḥmān seperti laut, Ādam seperti buih. Sabda Rasūlu'Llāh (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man arofa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu."

ya'ñi:

"Barangsiapa mengenal dirinya, maka sesungguhnya mengenal Tuhannya."

Ḥadīth ini pun ishārat kepada laut dan buih juga. Barangsiapa tahu akan 'ibārat ini, tahu akan tajalliyāt Dhat Ḫaq Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā. Adapun perkataan tajalliyāt banyak lagi tiada tersuratkan. Sekalian yang sudah dikatakan dalam kitāb ini mukhtāṣar juga. Barangsiapa berahi akan Allāh, yogya dichari dengan kebaktian pula.¹⁴⁰³ Wa'LLāhu a'lam bi'1-ṣawāb!

¹⁴⁰³. Text: pulang.
Babu'l-sādis fī bayān ṣifātī['Llāhi]
Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā.

[Bāb yang keenam pada menyatakan
Ṣifāt Allah Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā]

(46) Ketahui bahwa Ṣifāt Allah yang qādir sertaNya tujuh:
suatu Ḥayāt,1404 kedua Ḥilm,1405 ketiga Ḥirādah, keempat
Qudrah 1406 kelima Kalām, keenam Sami',1407 ketujuh Basār.1408
[Allāh itu]1409 qādir dengan Ṣifāt yang ketujuh ini. Adapun
jika Ṣifāt yang ketujuh ini tiada sertaNya, nāqis ḥukumnya,
kerana kepada Ahlu'l-Sulūk Ṣifāt 'ayn Dhāt, seperti Ḥayāt;
Dhāt juga yang bernama Ḥayy, seperti 'Ilm;1411 Dhāt juga,
kerana 'Ilmu, maka bernama 'Ālim, seperti Irādah; Dhāt juga,
erana Irādat, maka bernama Murīd. Dengan sekalian Ṣifāt
pun demikian - ilā mā lā nihayata lahu.1412 Adapun kata
'Ulamā' Ṣifāt 'ayn Dhāt pun tiada, ghayr Dhāt pun tiada;
seperti kata Imām Ghazzālī (radiya'Llāhu 'anhu!):
"Ṣifātu'Llāhi laysat 'ayna'l-dhāti
wa lā ghayra siwāhu dhā'l-infīsāli."
yā'nī:

1404. Text: Ḥayy.
1407. Text: Samī'.
1408. Text: Basīr.
1409. Text: ya'nī.
1410. Text: Ḥayy.
"Sifat Allah tiada 'ayn Dhāt dan
tiada yang lain -[20] daripadaNya
bercherai."

(47) Adapun Sifat Ḫaqq Subḥānahu wa Taʾālā Kamāl. Dibawah
ini Jalāl dan Jamāl, kerana kenyataan semesta sekalian 'ālam
ini dibawah Jalāl dan Jamāl juga. Yaʾnī segala yang baik
daripada Jamāl, segala yang jahat daripada Jalāl; kāfir
daripada Jalāl; islām daripada Jamāl; shurga daripada Jamāl,
nenaka daripada Jalāl; murka daripada Jalāl, ampun daripada
Jamāl.1413

(48) Adapun Dhāt lengkap; kepada Jalāl pun serta, kepada
Jamāl pun serta, kerana Jalāl dan Jamāl SifatNya juga. Ada
kalanya daripada Jamāl menjadi Jalāl; ada kalanya Jalāl
menjadi Jamāl. Adapun Shayṭān dahulu Jamāl, kemudian
menjadi Jalāl.1414 Sifat ini juga yang bertukar. Akan Dhāt
Subḥānahu wa Taʾālā mahasuchi daripada bertukar; seperti air
menjadi ombak, ombak juga bertukar-tukar, akan air tiada
bertukar, senantiasa hening dan suchi, tiada berupa dan
tiada berwarna. Sekalian rupa dan sekalian warna daripada
JalālNya dan JamālNya juga.

1414. Cf. Qurʾān 2:34, 7:11-12, 15:31-37, 17:61, 18 and 50, 20:116. See also the Mathnawi II, pp.356-57; also
Nicholson's The idea of Personality in Ǧūfīsm, (op.cit.),
pp.31-33.

Kata 'Ulama': "Seperti seorang orang berkambing banyak. Setengah disembelihnya, maka dikubaknya, maka diharbusnya, maka ditununya, maka dipachaknya - ia juga yang empunya, bukan benda orang lain. Jika benda orang lain disembelihnya maka ḅālim hukumnya; jika bendanya disembelihnya 

1415. Text: kufr dan īmān. I have reversed the order for the sake of logical consistency.
1416. Cf. 7291, p. 105.
1417. Text corrupt: kiranya.
1418. Text incorrect: abadi.
1419. Text corrupt: tetapi - due to faulty diacritical symbols.

(51) Adapun manusia sekalian dan malā'ikat dan jinn yang disuruhnya Allāh Ta'ālā mereka itu berbuat 'ibādat, sungguh pun mereka itu berbuat 'ibādat, [tetapi] tawfīq daripadaNya, gerak daripadaNya, quwwat daripadaNya, berahi daripadaNya; Kerana dilihatNya isti'dād mereka itu daripada islām [dan ismi] Latīf dan Mu'izz, maka disuruhNya berbuat 'ibādat. Setelah mereka itu berbuat 'ibādat maka dimasukkanNya kedalam

1421. Text: pulang.
1422. Text incorrect: dalīl.
1423. Text: mereka itu.

(52) Sungguh pun sabda Rasūl'Llāh (ṣalla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Lā tataharraka dharratun illā bi idhni'Llāh."

ya'nī:

"Tiada bergerak suatu dharrat pun melainkan dengan kehendak Allah juga."

Dan sabda Rasūlu'Llāh (ṣalla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Khayrihi wa sharrihi mina'Llāhi Ta'ālā."

ya'nī:

"Baik dan jahat daripada Allāh Ta'āla."

Sungguh pun sekalian daripadaNya, tetapi muwāfaqat dengan isti'dād ma'lūmāt yang dalam 'IlmuNya juga, kerana isti'dād ma'lūmāt Shu'ūn DhätNya berbagai-bagai. Tetapi DhätNya tiada berbagai-bagai - mahasuchī daripada sekalian Shu'ūn dan sekalian.

1425. Text incorrect: tataharraka dharratan.


1426. Cf. 7291, p.105.
1427. Cf. 7291, p.105.
1428. Text: dan - but see 7291, p.105.
1429. I.e. sedia.

1430. 7291: Maka fahamkan olehimu perkataan ini!, p.105.
1431. 7291, p.106.
1432. On the margin of the text.
Babu'l-sabi' fi bayan'l-ishqi wa'l-shukr
[Bab yang Ketujuh pada menyatakan Berahi dan Shukur] 1433

(55) Ketahui bahwa pangkat berahi terlalu tinggi daripada segala pangkat, kerana berahi tiada dapat diperbuat melainkan anugeraha Allah Ta'ālā juga. Adapun 'alamat orang berahi, tiada takut akan mati. Apabila [takut ia akan mati, tiada berahi hukumnya, kerana] 1434 kehendak orang berahi [itu mati]. Seperti sabda Rasūlu'llāh (salla'llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man māta mina'l-ishqi fa qad 1435 māta shahīdan."

ya'ni:

"Barangsiapa mati daripada berahinya, maka bahwa sesungguhnya mati shahīd."

Sabda Rasūlu'llāh (salla'llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man 'ashaga wa 'ūshiqa fa māta mina'l-ishqi fa qad māta shahīdan."

ya'ni:

"Barangsiapa berahi dan bersungguh-sungguh diberahikannya, maka mati ia daripada berahi [itu], maka bahwa sesungguhnya mati shahīd."

Dan kata Ahlu'l-Sulūk:

1433. 7291, p.106.
1434. Cf. 7291, p.106.
1435. On the margin of the text.
"Al-'ishqu 'aduwwu'll-'aqli."

ya'ni:

"Yang Berahi itu setru Buddi."\(^{1436}\)

[kerana buddi] hendak hidup, berahi hendak mati; [24] buddi hendak menchari arta banyak-banyak, berahi hendak memuangkan [arta]; buddi hendak menjadi raja dan mentri, berahi hendak menjadi faqīr; buddi hendak nyaman, berahi hendak sakit; buddi hendak mulia, berahi hendak hina; buddi hendak kenyang, berahi hendak lapar; buddi hendak duduk keatas, berahi hendak duduk kebawah — kerana itu dikatakan Ahlu'l-Sulūk: 'Berahi setru Buddi.' Seperti seorang orang hendak melawan seratus [orang]; kata Buddi: Jangan dilawan, engkau seorang lawanmu banyak, manakan dapat kan lawan? Kata Berahi: Seorang pun engkau jangan takut! Seperti firman Allah Ta'ālā:

\[\text{Idhā jā'a ajaluhum lā yasta'khiruna sā'atan wa lā yastagdimūn.}\] \(^{1438}\)

ya'ni:

Apabila datang ajal mereka itu, tiadakan dapat mereka itu kemudian seketika dan tiadakan [dapat] dahulu mereka itu.

---

\(^{1436}\) Budi written in sanscrit form budd[h]i. Repetition of buddi in text.

\(^{1437}\) Text: sabda.

\(^{1438}\) Qur'ān 7:34.
Adapun maka mereka itu hendak mati kerana sabda Rasulu'llâh (salla'llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Al-mawtu jisru'l-habîbî ilâ habîbin.

ya'nis:

"Matî itu iaiitu [sebagai titian yang] menyampaikan kekasih pada kekasih."

Dan lagi sabda Rasûlu'llâh (salla'llâhu 'alayhi wa sallam!)

"Mûtû qabla an tamûtû."

ya'nis:

"Matikan 9dirimu) sementara belum mati."

Dan lagi firman Allah Ta'alâ:

Qul in kânat lakumu'l-dâru'l-âkhiratu 'inda'llâhi khâliçatan min duni'l-nâsi fa tamannû'l-mawta in kuntum sâdîqîn.

ya'nis:

Katakan (ya Muhammad) jikalau ada bagi kamu negeri âkhirat kepada Allah tertentu tiada bagi segala manusia, maka tuntut oleh kamu mati-jikalau ada kamu orang yang betul.

dan mentri; adapun ma’nā tunggal [itu iaitu] tiada berchampur
dengan orang. Ya’ni tajrīd [ialah] tunggal daripada dirinya;
[tajrīd ialah] tunggal dengan Tuhannya - ya’ni menafikan dirinya[dan] mengihbätkan Tuhannya. Ya’ni inilah ḥaqīqat lā ilāha illā’Illāhu wa Ta‘ālā [itu dirinya].1443 Apabila ia
tinggal daripada dirinya, maka tunggal - [ya’ni] apabila ia
tinggal daripada shirk, maka dapat menjadi tunggal. [Setelah
dapat menjadi tunggal]1444 maka ’āshiq dan mabok namanya,
erkana orang berahi yang sudah tunggal daripada dirinya,
akan harimau tiada ia takut - akan [orang] berbuddi takut
[ia akan harimau] - akan gajah tiada ia takut, akan ular
tienda ia takut, akan api tiada ia takut - akan orang1445 berbuddi, ia takut [akan semua ini]. Kerana itu maka kata
Ahlul’Sulūk: 'Buddi setru Berahi.'

(58) Adapun akan [orang] berahi tiada ia takut akan neraka
dan tiada ia ingin akan shurga - Allāh SendiriNya juga
kehendaknya. Apabila šifāt yang demikian ada akan dia berahi
hukumnnya. Jika tiada šifāt demikian akan dia 'āshiq akan nasi
baru - belum 'āshiq akan Allāh Ta‘ālā! Ya’ni selang
nyawanya lagi tiada dikhabarkannya, manakan ingat ia kepada
arta dan nasi?

1442. Text has: melainkan.
1443. Cf. 7291, p.108.
1444. Cf. 7291, p.108.
1445. On the margin of the text.
Adapun akan orang berahi yang tiada dapat menaruh rahasia[nya] - seperti kata Mawlānā Rūm:

"Man khudā am! man khudā am!
man khudā am!"\(^{1446}\)

ya'ni:

"Aku Allāh! Aku Allāh! Aku Allāh!"

itu pun [demikian]. Jangan kita menurut katanya [kerana kita tiada maghlūbu’l-ḥāl].\(^{1447}\) Tetapi jika kita berahi dan mabok - tiada tertaruh rahasia kita lagi - barang kata dikatakan, tiada berdosa. Fa ifham!\(^{1448}\)

Adapun kitāb ini tujuh bāb diperbuat Darwīsh Ḥamzah Permainan Orang Berahi supaya jangan sukar hamba Allāh menchari 'ilmu, kerana dalam kitāb ini 'ilmu dan 'amal baik termadhkūr.

Tiada berapa lagi kurangnya. Tetapi barangsiapa menyamakan dia, yogya diṣahkan dua-tiga kali supaya [jangan] lebih-kurang ḥuruf-ḥurufnya [dan kalāmatnya. Apabila lebih kurang, binasa ma’nānya].\(^{1449}\)

\[Wā’Ilāhu a’lam bi’l-sawāb!
Tamm al-Kitāb.\]

\(^{1446}\). Text has: khudā im!
\(^{1447}\). Cf. 7291, p. 109.
\(^{1448}\). 7291 has: Maka fahamkanlah olehmu!
\(^{1449}\). Cf. 7291, pp. 109–110.
'Alamat tammat menyurat kitāb ini pada bulan Rajab, pada sembilan hari daripadanya, waqţu ḍuḥā, hari Thalāthah Ḥijratu'l-Nabi (ṣalla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!) Seribu Seratus Enam Belas tahun berjalan. Wa'Llāhu a'lam bi'l-ṣawāb!'
CHAPTER IX

Al-Muntahi

karangan

Ḩamzah Fanṣūrī

[Naskhah Leiden no. 7291 (111)]

[110] Bismi 'Llāhi '1-raḥmāni '1-raḥīm.

Al-ḥamdul il-'Llāhi rabbi 'l-'ālāmin

wa 'l- 'aqibatu li '1-muttaqīn

wa 'l-ṣalātu 'ala rasūli[hi] Muḥammadin

wa ālihi ajma 'īn.

(1) Ketahui olehmu, hai Tālib\textsuperscript{1451} bahwa sabda Rasūlu'Llāh (ṣalla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man nazara ita shay'in wa lam yara,\textsuperscript{1452} Llāha fīhi fa huwa bāṭilun."

ya'ni:

"Barangsiapa menilik kepada suatu, jika tiada dilihatnya Allāh dalamnya, maka ia itu sia-sia." [111]

\textsuperscript{1450} Text has duplication of Muḥammad.

\textsuperscript{1451} Text has duplication of Tālib.

\textsuperscript{1452} Text has ya ra ya, but in the jussive mood the final ya is dropped, hence text should read ya ra.
Kata 'Alī (raḍiya'llāhu 'anhu!):

"Mā [ra]‘aytu shay‘an illā wa ra‘aytu'llāha [rīhi]."

ya’nī:

"Tiada kulihat suatu melainkan kulihat Allāh dalamnya."

Sabda Nabī (sall' llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu."

ya’nī:

"Barangsiapa mengenal dirinya maka sanya mengenal Tuhannya."

(2) Erti mengenal Tuhannya dan mengenal dirinya ya’nī:

Diri kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan [itu] dirinya, dan semesta sekalian dalam 'Ilmu Allāh. Seperti sebiji dan puhun; puhunnya dalam sebiji itu, sungguh pun tiada kelihatan, tetapi hukumnya ada dalam biji itu.1453 Kata Shaykh Jun[ay]d (raḍiya'llāhu 'anhu!):

"Kānā'llāhu wa lam yakun ma‘ahu shay‘un [Huwa']l-āna kama kana,"1454

ya’nī:

"Ada Allāh dan tiada ada sertaNya suatu pun. [Ia] sekarang ini seperti AdaNya dahulu itu jua."

Kerana ini maka sabda 'Alī (raḍīya'Llāhu 'anhu!):

"Ma ra'aytu shay'an illā wa ra'aytu'Llāha fīhi.

(3) Tetapi jangan melihat seperti kain basah kerana kain lain, airnya lain. Allāh Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā mahasuchi daripada demikian itu tamthilnya! Tetapi jika ditamthilkannya seperti laut dan ombak, harus - seperti kata sha'ir:

Fa'il-bahru bahrun 'alā mā kāna fi qidamin inna'il-ḥawāditha 1455 amwājun wa anhāru lā yahjibannaka 1456 as[h]kālun tushākiluhā 'an man tashakkala fīhā fahiya 1457 astāru. 1458

ya'nī:

"Yang laut itu laut jua pada sediapertamanya Maka yang baharu itu ombaknya dan sungainya Jangan mend[ind]ing[i] dikau [112] segala rupa yang menyerupai dirinya Kerana dengan segala rupa itu dinding daripadanya."

1455. Text has kāf instead of waw.

1456. The Persian text reads lā yu'jibannaka, but the version Hamzah qotes fits better in the context of this poem.

1457. The text is corrupt: naha.

1458. Cf. Lama'āt, Lam'at III, p. 332. See also Asrār, p. 50.
Tetapi [ombak] berserta dengan laut qadīm. Seperti [kata] miṣrā':

[Daryā kuhan chū bar zand mawjī nū
Mawjish khwānand u dar ḥaqīqat daryāst]

[ya'ni:]
"Laut itu qadīm; apabila berpalu, baharu
ombak namanya dikata.
Tetapi pada ḥaqīqatnya laut jua"

Kerana laut dan ombak osa tiada dua.

Seperti firman Allāh Ta'ālā:

Wa'LLāhu bi kulli shay'in muḥīn.

ya'ni:

Bahwa Allāh Ta'ālā dengan suatu meliput.

Sabda Rasūlu'LLāh (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Anā mina'LLāhi wa'l-'ālamu minnīi."

ya'ni:

"Aku daripada Allāh; sekalian 'ālam daripadaku."

Seperti matahari dengan chahayanya dengan panasnya;
namanya tiga haqīqatnya suatu jua. Seperti ishārat

---


1461. Qur'ān 41:54, but the Qur'ān reads: Alā innahu instead of Wa'LLāhu.
Rasūlu'Llāh (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):  
"Man 'arafa naf'sahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu."

ya'ni:  
"Barangsiapa mengenal dirinya maka sanya mengenal Tuhannya."

(4) Adapun dirinya itu, sungguh [pun] beroleh nama dan rupa jua, ḥaqīqatnya rupanya dan namanya tiada. Seperti bayang-bayang dalam chermin; rupanya dan namanya ada [ḥaqīqatnya tiada]. Seperti sabda Nabi (ṣalla'LLāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):  
"Al-mu'minu mirātu'l-mu'mini."

ya'ni:  
"Yang Mu'min itu chermin samanya mu'min."

Ertinya ya'ni Nama Allāh Mu'min. 1462 Maka hambaNya yang ḥāṣṣ pun namanya mu'min. Jika demikian, sama-sama dengan Tuhannya, kerana hamba tiada bercherai dengan Tuhannya, dan Tuhan pun tiada bercherai dengan hambaNya.  

(5) Seperti firman Allāh Ta'ālā:  
Wa huwa ma'akum aynāma kuntum. 1463

ya'ni:  
Ia itu serta kamu barang dimana ada kamu.

Dan[113] lagi firman Allah Ta'ālā:

Thalāthatin illā huwa rābi'uhum wa lā
khamsatin illā huwa sādisuhum
wa lā adnā min dhālika wa lā akthara illā
huwa ma'ahum.\textsuperscript{1464}

ya'ni:

Jika orang tiga, melainkan Ia jua keempatnya
dengan mereka itu; dan jika ada lima,
melainkan Ia keenam[nya] dengan mereka itu;
dan tiada lebih dan tiada kurang daripada
demikian itu melainkan Ia jua serta mereka itu.

Seperti firman Allah:

\textit{Wa nahnu aqrabu ilayhi min ḥabli'1-warīd.}\textsuperscript{1465}

ya'ni:

Kami\textsuperscript{1466} [terlebih] hampir kepadanya daripada
urat lehernya yang kedua.

(6) Dengarkan,\textsuperscript{1467} hai Tālib! - \textit{wa huwa ma'akum} tiada
diluar dan tiada [di] dalam, dan tiada diatas dan tiada
diatas dan tiada dibawah, dan tiada dikiri dan tiada

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1464} Qur'an 58:7.
\item \textsuperscript{1465} Qur'an 50:15.
\item \textsuperscript{1466} Text incorrect: Aku for nahnu.
\item \textsuperscript{1467} Text corrupt: Dengarkan.
dikanan - [Ia khālī] daripada enam pihak. Seperti firman Allah Ta'ālā:

Wa huwa’l-āwwalu wa’l-ākhiru wa’l-ẓāhiru wa’l-bāṭin

ya’ni:

Ia itu jua yang Dahulu dan Ia jua yang Kemudian dan Ia jua yang Nyata dan Ia jua yang Terbuni


"Man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa‘arafa"

1469. Qur’ān 57:3.
1470. Text has: punnya.
1471. Text has duplication of man.
1472. Text corrupt: qadh.
1473. Text incorrect: 'arāfa.
rabbahu" -
seperti yang tersebut dahulu itu.

(7) Sebermula. Sabda Rasūlu'LLāh itu [114] dengan
di'isḥāratkan jua. Sungguh pun pada Sharī'at rupanya
berbagai-bagai pada Ḥaqīqat esa jua. Seperti kata
sha'ir Lam'at:

"Yārī dāram ki jism u jān sūrat ġust
Chi jism u chi jān jumlah jihān sūrat ġust
Har sūrat khūb u ma'nā pākīzah
Kāndar nazr man āyad ġān sūrat ġust.
"1474

ya'ni:
"Bahwa ada kekasihku, tubuh dan nyawa
rupanya jua,
Apa tubuh, apa nyawa? - sekalian 'ālam pun
rupanya jua;
Segala rupa yang baik dan erti yang suchi
itu pun rupanya jua,
Segala barang yang datang kepada penglihatku1475
itu pun rupanya jua."

---

1474 This rubā'ī is not found in the Malay text. It
comes from Lam'at VIII, Lama'at, p. 338. I would
like to acknowledge Professor A.J. Arberry of
Pembroke College, Cambridge, for his help in
identifying this quatrain.

1475. Text has penglihatamu.
Seperti firman [Allah] Ta'ālā:

_Fa aynamā tuw'allū fa thamma wajhu'Llāh._ 1476

ya'ni:

Barang kemana mukamu kan hadapkan, maka disana ada Dhāt Allāh.


(8) Sekali-kali tiada bertukar, seperti saba 'Rasūlu'-Llāh (ṣalla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man 'arafa nafsahu bi'l-fana'i
fa qad 'arafa rabbahu bi'l-baqā'."

ya'ni:

"Barangsiapa mengenal dirinya [dengan] fanā'nya, bahwa sanya mengenal Tuhan yang baqā'lah dan serta Tuhannya."

Seperti mengetahui ruḥ dengan badān; muḥīṭ pada badān pun tiada, dalam badān pun tiada, luar badān pun tiada. Demikian lagi Tuhan; pada sekalian 'ālam pun tiada, dalam 'ālam pun tiada, diluar 'ālam pun tiada. Seperti permata chinchin dengan chahayanya; dalam


1477. Text reads: susu lenyap, putar pun lenyap - but this makes no sense.
permata pun tiada chahayanya, diluar permata pun
tiada chahayanya.

(9) Kerana ini maka kata 'Alī (raḍiya’Llāhu ‘anhu!):
"Mā ra’aytu shay’an illsā wa ra’aytu’Llāha fīhī."
ya’nī:
"Tiada kulihat suatu melainkan [115] kulihat
Allāh dalamnya."

Maka Mansūr1478 Ḥallāj1479 pun berkata daripada sangat
berahi ini mengatakan:
"Anā’l-Ḥaqā"
ya’nī:
"Akulah yang Sebenarnya!"
Maka kata [Bā] Yazīd pun mengatakan demikian:
"Subhānī mā a’żama shā’nī."
ya’nī:
"Maha suchi aku, dan siapa besar sebagaiiku!"
Maka Shaykh Jun[a]yād Baghdādī pun mengatakan:
"Laysa fī jubbatī siwā’Llāh."
ya’nī:
"Tiada didalam jubbahku ini melainkan Allāh!"

1478. Text duplicates Mansūr.
1479. Text corrupt: Khallāj.
Dan Sayyid Nasīmī¹⁴⁸⁰ pun mengatakan:

"İnî anā'İlāh."

ya'nī:

"Bahwa akulah Allah!"

Dan Mas'ūdī¹⁴⁸¹ pun mengatakan dengan bahasa Farsī:

"Anchih hamān dhāt būd
bāz hamān dhāt shud."

ya'nī:

"Dhāt Allāh yang Qadīm
itulah dhātku sekarang.¹⁴⁸²

Dan kata Mawlānā Rūm:

"İlām nin belum, adaku adalah
İdam pun belum, adaku adalah

Suatu pun belum, adaku berahikan qadīmku jua."¹⁴⁸³

Dan kata Sulṭānu'1-'Ašiqīn¹⁴⁸⁴ Shaykh 'Alī Abū'1-Wafā!

---

¹⁴⁸⁰. Text incorrect: Nasīmī. This refers to the Turkish Ḥurūfī poet who was skinned alive in Aleppo in 1417-8. He was very much influenced by al-Ḥallāj and went about crying: "I am God!" See Gibb, E.J.W., History of Ottoman poetry, I, London, 1900, pp. 336-338.


¹⁴⁸². Text duplicates sekarang.

¹⁴⁸³. I have not been able to trace the original.

¹⁴⁸⁴. Text has: Shultānu'1-'Ašiqīn.
"Kullu'l-wujūdi wujūduhu lā tushrikanna bihi'l-mānah
Fa idhā nazarta lahu bihi fa'sjud hunaka fa lā junah."

ya'nī:

"Segala [wujūd itu] jangan kau sekutukan dengan yang baik;
Apabila kau lihat Nya bagi Nya dengan dia, maka sujūdlah engkau sana tiada berdosha."

Maka kata kitā[b] Gulshan: 1487

"Hai segala islām! jika kau ketahui bahwa berhala apa,
Kau ketahui olehmu hahwa yang jalan itu pada menyembah berhala dikata.
Jika segala kāfir daripada berhalanya itu dalālnya,

Ngapa maka [116] pada agamanya itu jadi sesat: 1488

(10) Sebab demikianlah maka Shaykh 'Aynu'l-Quḍāt menyembah anjing mengatakan: "Hādhā rabbī" - ya'nī: "Inilah


1486. Text has the Malay rendering of wujūd: ujud. This occurs several times in the text.


1488. The Persian text is missing in the Malay text and unintelligible in the Javanese. This comes from the Gulshan-i-Raz. See Shabistari, p. 51 of the Persian text.
Tuhanku!" - kerana anjing tiada dilihatnya, hanya dilihatnya Tuhannya jua dilihatnya. Seperti orang melihat kepada chermin; muka jua yang dilihatnya, chermin ghā'ib daripada penglihatnya kerana 'ālam ini pada penglihatnya seperti bayang jua - rupanya ada ḥaqīqatnya tiada. Nisbat kepada Ḥaqq Ta'ālā tiada nisbat kepada kita adalah kerana kita memandang dengan ǧījāb. Seperti sabda Rasūlu'Llāh (ṣalla'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu"
dengan ishāratkan jua. Pada ḥaqīqatnya dikenal pun Ia, mengenal pun Ia.

(11) Seperti sabda Rasūlu'Llāh (ṣall'Llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

"Man 'arafa'Llāha ṭāla lisānuhu".

ya'nī:

"Barangsiapa mengenal Allāh lanjuti lidahnya."
Pada tatakala mulanya mengetahui man 'arafa nafsahu, setelah sampai kepada fa qad 'arafa rabbahu maka SendiriNya. Maka sabda pula Nabī Allāh:

"Man 'arafa'Llāha kalla lisānu[hu]."

ya' nī:

"Barangsiapa mengenal Allāh kulūlah lidahnya." - erti nya: tempat berkata tiada lagi lulus.
(12) Seperti kata Shaykh Muhyi'l-Din 'Arabi (qaddasa'LLaahu sirrahu!) itu pun isharat kepada "man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu" juga. Sha'ir:

"Al-haqqu 'aynu'l-khalqi in kunta dha'a
Wa'l-khalqu 'aynu'l-haqqi in kunta dha'a
Fa in kunta dha'a 'aynin wa 'aqlin fimā tara
Fa huwa 'aynu shay'in wahidin fihī illā bi'l-shakli.

[117] ya'ni kata Muhyi'l-Din sebenarnya itu keadaan hambaNya:

"Jika ada engkau orang bermata, bermula:
hamba itu kenyataan Tuhan,
Jika ada engkau orang berbudi maka barang segala kau lihat ini keadaanNya;
[Dan jika ada engkau orang bermata dan berbudi,
dalam sesuatu yang kau lihat]
Segala suatu itu dalamNya [melainkan] dengan segala rupa."

1489. Text corrupt: dā.
1490. Text corrupt: dā.
1491. Text corrupt: dā.
1492. I am unable to trace this verse. It probably came from the Diwan of Ibnu'l-'Arabi.
Seperti firman Allah Ta'álä:

Wa huwa ma'akum aynanā kuntum. 1493

ya'ni:

Ia itu serta kamu barang dimana ada kamu.

Lagi perka[ta]nnya Shaykh Muhyi’l-Din ibn 'Arabi(shi'r):

"Kunnā hurūf[an] ʿāliyātin lam nu[n]gal
muta'ālligatin bi’d-dāri 'alā’l-gulal
kuntu anā[anta] fīhi wa nāḥnu anta [wa anta]
huwa fa’l-kullu fī huwa huwa fa’s'al 'an man
wašal. 1494

ya'ni:

"Kamilah ḥurūf yang mahatinggi yang tia[da]
berpindah

Dan yang tergantung dengan istananya diatas

puchak gunung.

Aku 1495 engkau dalamnya dan [kami engkau dan]
engkau Ia

Maka sekalian dalam Itu Ia, maka bertanyalah

engkau kepada barangsiapa yang wašal."

(13) Hai Ṭālib! - mengetahui "Man 'arafa nafsahu bukan


1494. Quoted in the Āsrār, pp. 36-37.

1495. Preceding Aku the text has: engkau dan.
mengenal jantung dan paru-paru, dan bukan mengenal kaki dan tangan. Ma'na "Man 'arafa nafsahu": adanya dengan Ada Tuhannya esa jua. Seperti kata Shaykh [Junayd] Baghdā[dī] (raḥmatu'Īlāḥi 'alayhi!):

"Lawnu'l-mā'i lawnū inā'īhi."¹⁴⁹⁷

ya'ni:

"Warna air warna bejunanya."

Dan seperti kata sha'ir Lam'at:

"Laqad baṭanta¹⁴⁹⁸ fa lam¹⁴⁹⁹ taṭhar li dhī ṣabāṣari

Wa¹⁵⁰⁰ kayfa yudraku man bi'l-'ayni mustatiru¹⁵⁰¹

ya'ni:

"Sungguhnya telah terbunilah Engkau maka tiada dapat dilihat oleh segala mata; Maka betapa dilihat oleh segala mata [118]¹⁵⁰² kerana Ia terdinding dengan adaNya?"

¹⁴⁹⁶. Mengenal duplicated in the text.

¹⁴⁹⁷. The text is corrupt. This passage is also quoted in the Asrār, pp. 61-62. In the Kitāb al-Luma' of Abū Naṣr al-Sarrāj (p. 36), this passage is attributed to Abū Yazīd al-Bistāmī and not to Junayd.

¹⁴⁹⁸. Text incorrect: baṭnanta.

¹⁴⁹⁹. Text corrupt.

¹⁵⁰⁰. Text has: fakayfa.

¹⁵⁰¹. Text has: muntatirun. Lamā'āt, Lam'at XIII, p. 343.

¹⁵⁰². Maka betapa dilihat oleh segala mata duplicated in text.
Lagi kata Shaykh Muhyi'l-Din:

"In ruhtu bi ṭa'abihi lam yangaḍī safari.\[1503\]
In ji'tu [ilā] ḥaḍrihi wahishta fī ḥaḍrī
La anā [a]rāhu wa lā yanfakku min baṣarī
Wa fī ḍamārī wa lā yalgāhu fī 'umrī.

ya'nī:

"Jika pergilah aku memuntut Dia, tiadalah berkesudahan tuntutku
Jika datang aku keḥaḍratNya, Ia liar daripadaku
Tiada aku melihat Dia, Ia tiada jauh daripada penglihatku
Bermula: Ia ada dalamku dan tiada aku bertemu pada se'umurku."

Inilah maka kata Shaykh Jun[ay]d (rahmatu'LLahi 'alayhi!):

"Wujūduka ḍhanbun lā yuqāsu bihi ḍhanbun [ākhāru]".\[1505\]

ya'nī:

"Adamu ini dosha, tiada dosha sebagainya."

\[1503\] Text corrupt: saqarī.
\[1504\] Text corrupt: ḥaṣrihi.
\[1505\] Quoted by Ḥujwīrī in the Kashf al-Mahjūb. See Āsrar, p. 61.
(14) Barangkala engkau pun suatu wujud, Ḥaqq [Ta'ālā] pun suatu wujud, sharīka lahu datang kerana Ḥaqq Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā waḥdahū lā sharīkā lahu1506 - ertinya ya'nī: tiada sekutu baginya; ertinya tiada wujud lain hanya wujud Ḥaqq Ta'ālā juga. Seperti laut dan ombak. Seperti firman Allāh Ta'ālā:

Fa aynāmā tuwallū fa thamma wajhu'LLāh.1507 ya'nī:

[Barang kemana mukamu kau hadapkan, maka disana ada] Dhāt Allāh.

Dan kata Mawlānā 'Abdu'l-Raḥmān Jāmī (raḥmatu'LLāhu 'alayhi!):

Bayt: Ham sāyah u ham nish u ham rāhu hamah āst
[Dar dałāq gāda u [dar] aṭlās shāhi hamah āst]508 Dar anchuman farq nihān [k]hānah u jam'
[hamah āst]

1508. The second line of the verse is missing in the Malay text. This verse comes from the Lawā'īh. But in Whinefield and Qazvīnī's edition and translation, the Persian text does not show this verse. 5716(2), p. 70 gives the verse in full.
Bi'Llāhi hamah āst thumma bi'Llāhi hamah āst. ya'nī:
"Sekampung sekedudukan sekejalanan sekaliannya itu [Ia] jua; Pada telekung segala minta makan dan pada aṭlas segala raja-raja itu pun [119] Ia jua; Pada segala perhimpunan dan percheraian dan rumah yang terbuni dan yang berhimpun itu pun Ia jua, Demi Allāh sekaliannya Ia jua! Maka demi Allāh sekaliannya Ia jua!"

(15) Tamthīl seperti biji sebiji, dalamnya puhun kayu sepuhun dengan selengkapnya. Āsālnya biji itu jua; setelah menjadi kayu biji sebiji itu ghā'ib - kayu jua kelihatan. Warnanya berbagai-bagai, rasanya berbagai, [tetapi] āsālnya sebiji itu jua. Seperti firmān Allāh

1509. See English translation of the text, p.759 ,below.
1510. The text is garbled. Sekejalanan is meant as it is the literal translation of the Persian ham rahu: fellow traveller, occurring in the first line of Jāmī's verse.
1511. Text corrupt. This word translates the Persian dalaq.
Ta'ālā:

... Yusqā¹⁵¹² bi mā'in wāḥidin wa nufaḍḍilu ba'daha 'alā ba'din fi'l-ukūlī.¹⁵¹³

ya'nī:

... Kami tuangkan dengan suatu air dan Kami lebihkan setengah atas setengahnya pada rasa makanan.


(16) Kerana [atas] maẓhar Jalāl dan atas maẓhar Jamāl

¹⁵¹². Text incorrect: nusqā.
¹⁵¹⁴. See Asrār, pp. 52-53.
¹⁵¹⁵. Text duplicates lagi.
tiada [Ia] bercherai, maka Kamāl NamaNya. Nama al-
Mu'izzū 1517 tiada bercherai, Nama al-Laṭīf [dan] al-
Qahhār tiada bercherai. 1518 Dan shirk pun mağharNya
jua. Seperti kata Shāh Ni'matullāh 1519 (gaddasaL-
Llāhu sirrahYa):

[120] "Ra'aytu 1520 Llāha fī 'aynī bi 'aynīhi
Wa 'aynī 'aynuhu 1521 fa'nzur bu'aynīhi
Hābībī 1522 'inda 1523 ghayrī ghayru 'aynī
Wa 'indī 'aynuhu min Ḥaythu 'ayni[hī]." 1524
ya'nī:

"Kulihat Allāh padakeadaanku dengan pengli-
hatNya;
Bermula: keadaanku itu KeadaanNya, maka 1525

1517. Text corrupt.
1518. See Sharāb, pp. 20-23.
1519. Sayyid Ni'matullāh of Kirmān (d. 1431). See
Literary history of Persia, III, pp. 463-473.
1520. Text incorrect: Wa ra'aytu.
1521. Text incorrect: wa 'aynīhi.
has a printing error: the h of ḥabībī is printed
as mīm.
1523. Text incorrect: 'indī.
1524. From the Dū Baytī (Hurf Ya). See Kulliyyāt i
Divan i Shah Ni'matullāh Walī, Persian text,
1525. Maka duplicated in text.
tilik kepadaNya dengan tilik daripadaNya. Kekasihku, pada segala lain daripadaku, lain daripada adaku, Bermula: padaku AdaNya itu dengan keadaanku suatu jua."

Inilah ṣifāt "Man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu" itu pun permulaan jua.

(17) Sebermula. Firmān1527 Allah Ta'ālā:

Wa'Lláhu khalagakum wa mā ta'majūn.1528

ya'nī:

Bahwa Allah Ta'ālā menjadikan kamu dan barang perbuatan kamu.

Dan lagi firmān Allah Ta'ālā:

Mā min dābbatin illā huwa ākhidhun bi nāṣiyatihā inna rabbi 'alā sitātin mustaqīm.1529

ya'nī:

Tiada siapa dapat membawa melainkan Ia jua jua.

1526. Text corrupt: Kekasih kasihku. Kekasihku is the correct translation of Ḩabībī.

1527. Text duplicates firmān.

1528. Qur'ān 37:94.

1529. Qur'ān 11:56.
menghela rambut dahinya. Bahwa Tuhanku Esa jalanNya sebenarnya itupun.

Dan lagi sabda Nabī (ṣalla'LLahu 'alayhi wa sallam!):
"La ḥawla wa la quwwata illā bi'Llāhi ʾl-ʾaliyyiʾl-ʾazīm." 1531

ya'ni:
"Tiada mengeliling, dan tiada quwwat seorang melainkan dengan kuasa Allah yang Mahatinggi dan Mahabesar."

Dan lagi sabda Nabī (ṣalla'LLahu 'alayhi wa sallam!):
"La tatāḥarraka dharratun illā bi idhni 'Llāh."

ya'ni:
"Tiada bergerak suatu dharrat pun melainkan dengan gerak Allah Ta'ālā."

[Dan lagi sabda Nabī (ṣalla'LLahu 'alayhi wa sallam!):

---

1530. Text corrupt.
1531. Qur'ān 18:40.
1532. This is an incorrect translation. It seems that the translation given here is of the preposition ḥawla: around. The noun ḥawl means power; hence the correct translation should be kuasa.
1533. See note 1682.
1534. Text incorrect: dhārnatun.
"Khayrihi wa sharrihi mina'Llahi Ta'ālā."

ya'ni:

"Baik dan jahatnya daripada Allāh Ta'ālā."

Seperti firman Allāh [121] Ta'ālā:

Wa mā tashā'ūna illā an yashā'a'Llāh.1535

ya'ni:

Dan tiada berkehendak mereka itu seorang jua pun melainkan dengan [kehendak] Allāh jua.

(18) Sekalian dalīl1536 dan hadīth ini ishārat kepada man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu jua. Lain daripadanya tiada. Dan kata Shaykh Muḥyī’l-Dīn ibnu'l-'Arabī (qaddasa'Lahu sirra ruḥīhi’l-'azīz!):

Shi'r:

"Fārumun 'ala'l-'ushshāqī1537 an yashhada,1538 l-siwa
Idha kāna waļhu'l-ḥaqiq [bi'l-nūrī]1539 sha'sha'a
Mā dhā aqūlu wa anta waļduka lam yaku

1535. Qur'ān 76: 30; Si: 29.
1536. Text reads incorrectly: dalīl.
1537. Text corrupt: Uṣṣāqi.
1538. Text corrupt: yashhīda.
Aḥadun siwāka fa mā siwāka fa kā'īl-habā."

ya'nī:

"Telah ḥaramlah atas segala yang berahi bahwa memandang lain daripadaNya
Apabila ada keadaan Allāh denganchahyaNya
gilang-gemilang
Barang segala yang kukata dan bahwa Engkau jua Esa, tiada lain
Suatu pun daripadaMu maka sekarang barang lain daripadaMu itu seperti habā adanya."

Seperti firmān Allāh Ta'ālā:

Kullu yawmin huwa fī shā'n.¹⁵⁴⁰

ya'nī:

Pada segala hari Ia itu dalam kelakuanNya.

(19) Ya'ni pada ḥuḥūrnNya berbagai-bagai [akan tetapi Dhāt tiada berbagai-bagai]¹⁵⁴¹ dan tiada berubah,
kerana Ia -

Huwa'īl-'awwalu wa'l-'ākhiru wa'l-
zāhiru wa'l-bātinu¹⁵⁴²

ya'ni:

¹⁵⁴¹. See 5716(2), p. 75.
¹⁵⁴². Qur'ān 57:3.
Ia yang Pertama dan Ia yang Kemudian
dan Ia Nyata dan Ia Terbuni –
AwwalNya tiada ketahuan,\textsuperscript{1543} 'ĀkhīrNya tiada berkesudahan,
żāhīrNya amat terbuni\textsuperscript{1544} dengan bātīnNya tiada kedapatan;
memandang diriNya dengan diriNya, melihat diriNya
[dengan] DhātNya dengan ŠifātNya dengan 'Af'ālNya\textsuperscript{1545}
dengan ĀthārNya.\textsuperscript{1546} Sungguh pun namanya empat pada
qaṯqatnya esa. Seperti kata Shaykh [122] Muḥyī'1-Dīn:
"Tajallī bi dhātīhi fi dhātīhi."
yā'nī:
"Menunjukkan AdaNya bagi AdaNya"
Lagi kata İmām Muḥammad Gazzālī (raḥmatu'LLāhi 'alayhi!):
"Īn 'ālam azūst\textsuperscript{1547} be īst balki hamah īst ..."
yā'nī:
"'Ālam ini daripadaNya dengan Dialah–tetapi–
sekaliannya Ia."
Diikut dari Kīmiyā-i-Sa'ādat:\textsuperscript{1548}

\textsuperscript{1543} Text: ketahui.
\textsuperscript{1544} Text repetitive.
\textsuperscript{1545} Text incorrect: Af'alNya.
\textsuperscript{1546} Text: ĀthārNya.
\textsuperscript{1547} Text: īst. Cf. 5716(2), p. 76.
\textsuperscript{1548} Text: Kāmā-i-Sa'ādat.
"Guft"\textsuperscript{1549} Bā Yazīd: 'Wujūdūnā minhu wa quwwāmunā bihi lā fargun baynī wa bayna rabbī illā bihādhā'ī-martabatayn."\textsuperscript{1550} ya'nī:

"Wujūd kami daripadaNya dan quwwat kami dengan Dia. Tiada bedha antaraku dan antara Tuhanku melainkan dengan du'ā martabat.

Inilah 'ibārat "man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu."


"Idhā tamma'ī-faqrū\textsuperscript{1552} fa huwa'llāhu

\textsuperscript{1549} Text corrupt: kepintu - obviously guft is meant.
\textsuperscript{1550} Cf. Lama'āt, Lam'at XVII, p. 348.
\textsuperscript{1551} See Asrar, pp. 51-52.
\textsuperscript{1552} Text corrupt: atamma'ī-faqiru.
'Ishuhu bi 'Ishi'l-LLāh.'

ya'ñi:

"Apabila sempurnalah faqīr maka ia itu Allāh dan hidupnya dengan hidup Allāh."

Seperti kata Mawlānā 'Abdu'l-Raḥmān Jāmī (rāḥmatu'Llāhi 'alayhi):

[Bas bi rangīst yārī dilkhwāh ay dil Qānī' nashawī barangī nā gāh ay dil
Aṣal īn hamah rangahā azān bīrangīst
Man āhsanū sībghatan mina'Llāhi ay dil].

[ya'ñi:]

"Kepada kekasih yang tiada berwarna itu kau kehendak, hai hati;
Jangan kau padamkan kepada warna mudah-mudahan, hai hati:
Bahwa segala warna daripada tiada berwarna datangnya, hai hati,
'Barangsiapa mengambil warna daripada Allāh itulah terlebih baik,' hai hati?"

(21) Ya'ñi [123] yang aṣalnya itu tiada berwarna dan

1554. See below, note, 1901.
tiada berupa. Segala rupa yang dapat dilihat dan dapat
dibicharakan, sekalian makhlūq jua pada 'ibārat. Barangsiapa menyembah makhlūq, ia itu mushrik; seperti
menyembah orang-orang mati dan manā dan jantung dan
paru-paru - sekalian itu berhala jua ḥukumnya. Barangsiapa menyembah berhala, ia itu kāfir - na'ūdhubi'-
Llāhi minhā! Wa'Llāhu a'lam!
(22) Jika demikian ngapa memandang seperti ombak dan
laut juga dapat? Seperti sha'ir:

"Fa 'awwil 'alayhi lā siwāhu
fa'aynāma tuwallū fa thamma wajhu
'Llāhi laysa mubarga'an."]

1555

...................

1556

(23) ["Raqqu’l-zujāju wa rāqst’l-khamru
Fatashābahā wa tashākula’l-amru
Fa ka’annamā khamrun wa lā qadahu
Fa ka’annamā qadaḥun wa lā khamru."]

ya’nī:

1555. The Malay text is incomplete. Cf. 5716(2), p. 79.
1556. There is a considerable lacuna in the text here. Cf. 5716(2), pp. 79-84. See also above, pp. 369–377.
1557. Not in the text, but see 5716(2), pp. 84-85. See also Lama'āt, Lam'āt V, p. 335.
Naqshkacha dan hening minuman
Maka serupa keduanya dan sebagai pekerjaannya
Maka sanya minuman tiada dengan piala
Dan bahwa piala tiada dengan minuman.
Ya'ni warna kacha dan warna minuman esa ju; warna
minuman dan kacha pun sebagai ju, tiada dapat dilainkan.
Seperti kata Lam'at:
"Al-'aynu wahdojum wa'l-hukmu mukhtalifun
Wa dhaka sirran 1559 li ahli'l-ilmi
yankashifun."1560
Ya'ni:
"Asalnya suatu ju warnanya berbagai-bagai
Rahasia ini bagi orang yang tahu ju dapat
memakai dia."
[Seperti kata mi'ra':
"Ma'shuq u'ishq u'asiq har sih yakyast Injā
Chun wasl dar na-gunjad hijrān chi kār
dārad]1561

1558. See Asrār, p. 56.
1559. Text corrupt: shirrun.
1560. Text incorrect: yankasifun. Lama'āt, the XI
Lam'at, p. 341.
"Berahi dan yang berahi dan yang diberahikan itu ketiganya esa jua,
Sini, apabila pertemuan tiada lulus,
percheraian dimanakan ada?"

Seperti ombak dan laut esa jua, pada ḏāhirnya jua dua,
teta[pi] bertemu pu[n] tiada bercherai pun tiada;

Qāla’l-ghawthu’l-a’zam: Ayyi
Qāla’Llāhu Tulu ‘indaka ya rabbī?
Qāla’Llāhu Ta’ālā: Ṣalātu’l-ladḥī
laysa fihā siwā’I
ghā’ibun ‘anḥā.

ya’nī:
Sembah Ghaouth: "Mana kebaktian
Terlebih kepadaMu yā Tuhanku?"
Firmān Allāh Ta’ālā: Sembahyang
yang tiada dalamnya suatu pun lain
daripadaKu, dan yang menyembah
ghā’ib.

1562. Not in the text. See 5716(2), fol. 69r–69v and
Lama’āt, Lam’āt III, p. 331.
1563. Text incorrect: siwā’I.
Nyatalah [daripada ini bahwa yang] disembah pun Ia jua, yang menyembah pun Haqq. Seperti kata Mashā'–ikh:1564

"Ma'1565 'arafa'LLāhu illā'LLāh
mā ya'lamu'LLāhu illā'LLāh
mā yarā'LLāhu illā'LLāh."

ya'nī:

"Tiada mengenal Allah hanya Allah,
tiada mengetahui Allah hanya Allah,
tiada melihat Allah hanya Allah."

Dan seperti kata Mawlānā 'Abdu'l-Rahmān Jāmī:

Hamchunīn's1566 wāṣil nash[as]tah pesh yārī
mīkunad an1567 hajr nālahāi zār tā shuwad
mahjūb u mahrūm az waṣl wāqif an bar ranj
u malāl.1568

ya'nī:

1564. Text incorrect: mā shaykh.
1565. Text has man.
1566. Text has hū janīn, but see 5716(2) p. 87.
1567. From 5716(2), p. 87; text incomplete.
1568. Text has malāt, or perhaps mala'āt. 5716(2)
p. 87 has malāl, which seems to be the correct reading.
"Orang yang wasal itu seperti orang duduk [kesal]; taulannya dicheriterakannya daripada percheraiannya dan serunya dan tangisnya, sehingga jadi ḫurūm daripada wasal; terhenti olehnya daripada percheraiannya dan daripada penuh dengan dukachitanya."

Dan seperti kata Shibli: hendak[nya] sha'ir:

"Anā kāḍafdaemon yaskunu fī'l-līmi
In hiya [fāhat] malā'at aqāhā
wa in sakatat mā tat mina'l-ghammi."

"Akulah seperti katak diam dalam laut;
jika kubukakan mulutku niscbaya dipenuhi air;
jika aku diam niscbaya matilah aku dalam perchintaanku."

(25) Ishārat daripada Shaykh Saḍū'1-Dīn: 'jika

1569. Text: kisi or lesi (?). As a translation for the Persian pesh it should surely be dihadapan.

1570. Text: corrupt.

1571. Text: sakanat.

1572. See Kalābādhi, p. 139; Lamā'āt, Lam'at XXVIII, p. 361. For the correct reading of the text, see above, p. 772.

1573. Text: Sa'ādu'1-Dīn (i.e. Shabistarī).
lagi dituntut tiada diperoleh; [jika lagi] dipandang tiada dilihat,' kerana fi'il kita itu seperti angin dilaut. Jika berhenti angin maka ombak pulang kepada asalnya. Seperti firman Allah Ta'âlâ:

Yâ ayyatuhâ'l-nafsu'l-mu'tma'innatu ijri'i î ilâ rabbiki râdiyatan mardiyyatan fa'dkhulî fî 'ibâdi wa'dkhulî jannâtî. 1574

ya'nî:

Hai segala kamu bernyawa mu'tma'innah! pulanglah kamu kepada Tuhan kamu râdi kamu akan Dia dan râdi Ia akan kamu. Maka masuklah shurgakü, hai hamba-hambakü!

Ertinya datangnya pun daripada laut, pulangnya pun kepada laut jua.

\[\text{Jannatu'}l-zâhidînâ]^{1575} \text{ hûrun wa quşûrun}
\[\text{Jannatu'}l-'âshiqînâ fî maḥalli kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan} -

ya'nî:

Shurga orang zâhid^{1576} anak bidyadari dan maligai,

---

1575. Text incorrect: zahidîn.
1576. Text corrupt: zahîz.
Shurga o[rang] berahi kepada perbendaraan yang berbuni.

(26) Sanalah tempat diam segala 'Ishiqīn! Berahikan shurga pun tiada, dengan neraka pun tiada takut ia; kerana [pada] orang berahi yang wasal jannat itulah yang dikatakan [dalam āyat] fa'dkhu'llī fī 'ibādī wa'dkhu'llī jannātī.1577 Pulanglah ia kepada tempat kuntu kanzan makhlīyān. Dan seperti kata Ahlu'LLāh;

"Man 'arafa'LLāhu fa huwa mushrikun."

ya'nī:

"Barangsiapa mengenal [LLāh] maka ia itu mushrik."

Itupun ia:1578

"Al-faqīru lā yahtāju1579 ilā'LLāhi."1580

Itupun ia:

"Al-faqīru suwadu'l-wajhi fī'l-dāraynī."

ya'nī:

"Yang faqīr itu hitam mukanya pada kedua negeri."

1577. See above, note 1574.
1578. This translates walahu aydān.
1579. Text has: yakhtāru.
1580. Lama'at, Lam'at XX, p. 352.
1581. Loc. cit.
Itupun ia: sha'ir:

"'anāl-gharīqu [126] bībatī mā lahu tarafun ghibtu fīhi 'ani'l-wijdānī wa'l-'adam."

ya'nī:

"Iku telah karamlah pada laut yang tiada bersisi,
Maka lenyaplah aku dalamnya; daripada "ada" dan "tiada" pun aku tiadalah tahu."

Itupun ia: sha'ir:

"Raddadtānī bayna'l-maniyyati wa'l-muna wa jamā'tanī bayna'l-'ināyati wa'l-'ina wa akhadhā nī[mnī] li dhātika1582 fa'- rtaqītu limustawa lā anta fīhi wa lā1583 anā."

ya'nī:

"Kembalilah aku daripada menuntut dan yang dituntut.
Dan berhimpunlah aku antara yang mengarunia dan [yang] dikarunia,
Dan kembali lah daripada aku bagi adaMu suatulah tiga.

1583. Text: wā illā; wālā from 5716(2), loc. cit.
Tiada Engkau dalamnya dan tiada aku.\textsuperscript{1584}

Lagi kata Shaykh 'Abbār (rādiya'LLāhu 'anhu!):

[Bāz ba'de dar tamāshā ʾṭarab
tan farudandi fārīgh az talab]\textsuperscript{1585}

yaʾnī:

"Daripadanya kembalilah setengah
daripada melihat tamāshā tepuk dan tari:
Nyawanya pun diberi selesailah ia daripada tuntut."

Itupun ia:

[Bayt: waraq shūqī wa qalam bashkun siyahi
zir dam dhar kas hamīn dīn [u] qiṣṣati 'ishq
ūst ki dar daftar nah mīgunjad.\textsuperscript{1586}

yaʾnī]:

Qarṣās pun ditunukan dan qalam pun
dipatahkan dan da'wat pun ditumpahkan
dan nafas pun dihelakan.

Inilah qiṣṣah ragam\textsuperscript{1587} orang berahi baha wa

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1584} Text: tiada aku dalamnya dan tiada engkau. But see the Arabic.
\item \textsuperscript{1585} From 5716(2), p. 91. The Malay text has only the Malay translation.
\item \textsuperscript{1586} From 5716(2), p. 92. Not in the Malay text.
\item \textsuperscript{1587} I.e. dīn: ugama: 'religion' in the sense of (religious) disposition: ragam.
\end{itemize}
dalam daftar tiada lulus.

Ini pun ia:

Kata bayt Shaykh Ni'matu'Llāh:

[Ṭalab afdat irādat wa bila wujūd hijāb ast
Wijdān muḥāl namnāyi waqrub wa khiyal
Huqūr ghurūr nafsah dū dur dū dur.]

ya'ni]:

Tuntut pun setru dan kehendak pun sia-sia
dan wujūd pun jadi dinding tiada dapat
diperoleh menghendaki damping dan
chita yang ḥādir segala ghurūr nafs pun
menjauhkan.

(27) Inilah kesudahan sekalian! Inilah yang dikatakan:
"Fā'1-fanā'u 'ani'1-fanā'i ghayata'1-fanā." [127]
Inilah yang dikatakan 'ālam lāhūt pun dapat,1589 dan
dikatakan waṣal pun dapat dikatakan maḥw pun dapat
dikatakan. Inilah kata Shāh 'Alī Bārizī1590 d[alam
bahasa] Fā[r]sī:

"Bar dar dāra'1-fanā'i kardam sujūd

1588. 5716(2), p. 92.
1589. Dapat duplicated in the text.
1590. 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Bārizī, see Kalābādhi, p. 12.
Sar bar āwardam marā rū'ī numūd. "¹⁵⁹¹

ya'ni:

"Kepada pintu degeri yang fanā' sujūdlah aku Kubukakanlah kepala pertunjukkanlah mukaMu kepadaku!"


(28) Inilah ertinya:

**Idhā tamma’l-faqrū fahuwa’LLāh.**

ertinya:

---

¹⁵⁹¹. The words marā rū'ī are from 5716(20) p. 93. Text has: mara radi.

¹⁵⁹². Cf. above, p. 84 and note 183.

¹⁵⁹³. Text repeats the word didalam after kayu.

¹⁵⁹⁴. 5716(2), p. 94.
Yang faqîr tiada suatu pun akan baginya.

Maka firmân Allâh Ta‘âlâ dalam Hadîth Qudsî:

\[\text{Nawmu’l-faqîru nawmi }\]
\[\text{ukulu’l-faqîru ukulî }\]
\[\text{wa sharabu’l-faqîru sharabî.}\]

\[\text{ya’ni:}\]

Tidur faqîr itu tidurKu, dan
makan faqîr itu makanKu, dan
minum [faqîr] itu minumKu.

Dan lagi firmân Allâh Ta‘âlâ:

\[\text{Al-insânu sirrî wa an[ā] sirruhu }\]
\[\text{wa sifatu[hu].}\] [128]

\[\text{ya’ni:}\]

Yang manushia rahasiaKu dan
Aku rahasianya dan sifatnya.

Kata Uways al-Qarani\textsuperscript{1595}:

"\text{Al-faqîru hayâtu hu bi hayâti’Llâhi }\]
\[\text{wa ’Ishu hu bi ’Ishil[’Llâh].}\]

\[\text{ya’ni:}\]

"Yang faqîr itu hidupnya dengan hidup
Allâh, dan sukanya dengan kesukaan
Allâh."

\[\text{1595. Cf. above note 172. Text has: Uwaysh.}\]
Seperti kata Mashā'ikh hendak[nya]:

"Man arafa'Llāha fa huwa mushrikun
wa man arafa nafsahu fahuwa kāfirun."

ya'nī:

"Barangsiapa mengenal Allah maka ia itu
menyekutukan, dan barangsiapa mengenal
dirinya maka ia itu kāfir."

Seperti kata Shaykh Muhàyyī'l-Dīn ibn 'Arabī:

"Al-ma'rifatu ḥijābun lahu wa law
lā wujūda'l-kawnayni la zahara'l-'aynu."

ya'nī:

"Yang ma'rifat itu dinding; bermula:
baginya jika tiadalah wujūd kedua 'ālam
nischaya nyatalah AdaNya."

(29) Kerana tuntut dan ma'rifat dan 'ishq dan maŷabbat,
sekaliannya itu, pada i'tībār, šifat hamba jua;
jikalau sekalian itu tiadalah padanya, maka lenyaplah
ia. Kerana dhātnya dan šifatnya nisbat kepada Allāh
Subḥānahu wa Ta'ālā jua, jikalau barangkala tiadalah
ia, maka šifat hamba, seperti šifat ombak, pulang kepada
laut. Inilah ma'nā irji'i ilā ašlihi1596 [dan ma'nā
innā li'Llāhi wa innā ilayhi rāji'ūn - ya'nī:]1597


1597. Qurʾān 2:156. Not in the text but in 5716(2),
p. 96.
Bahwa kami daripada Allah dan kepadaNya kami pulang; dan ma'nā kullu shay'īn hālikun illā wajhahu1598 ini pun ia; dan ma'nā kullu man 'alayhā fānin wa yaqūb wajhu rabbika dhū'l-jalāli wa'l-ikrām1599 - ya'nī: Segala sesuatu atas 'alam ini lenyap, dan kekal Dhāt Tuhanmu [129] yang empunya kebesaranNya dan kemuliaanNya - ini pun ia.


1600. In 5716(2) this word is translated as sawījī, p. 98.
1601. 5716(2), loc. cit.
akan fanā'nya itupun - jika diketahuinya - belum bertemu dengan fanā', kerana ia lagi ingat akan fanā'nya. 1602
Itu lagi şifat dua tinggal padanya.

(31) Seperti kata Shaykh 'Atţār:

"Rāhi wişāli dost kase rāygān 1603

nadīd

An kas ki dīdeh har dü jihān dar miyān 1605

nadīd."

ya'ni:

"Jalan orang berahi yang wāsil pada Kekasihnya itu, akan orang itu suatu pun tiadalah dilihatnya;
Segala orang yang melihat dia itu, kedua 'ālan itu pun tiadalah dilihatnya pada antara itu."

Lagi kata Shaykh 'Atţār (rahmatu'LLāhi 'alayhi!):

"Tū [mabāsh] 1606 aslan [kamāl īn [130] ast ubās

__________________________

1602. See above note 195.

1603. Text: rāhī; 5716(2), p. 98 reads as above.

1604. Text: rādi kan; see 5716(2), p. 98.

1605. Text: har dum; see 5716(2), loc. cit.

Tu dū rū kam shor wišāl īn [ast] u bas].\textsuperscript{1607}

ya'mī:

[Jangan ada semata-mata,
inilah saja kamāl;
Jangan bermuka dua, inilah sebenar wišāl"]. -
karena erti wāṣīl bukan dua.

Ya'nī barangkala shakk dan yaqīn tiadalah padanya,
wāṣīllah. Namanya 'ilmu'l-yaqīn, ya'nī mengetahui
dengan yaqīn;\textsuperscript{1608} dan 'aynu'l-yaqīn, [ya'nī] melihat
dengan yaqīn; dan ḥaqqu'l-yaqīn, [ya'nī] sebenar yaqīn\textsuperscript{1609}
yaqīn adanya dengan ada Tuhannya esa juga. Aṣalnya pun
esa, pulang[nya] pun kepada esa juga - ya'nī irji'i ī līlā
ašlihi,\textsuperscript{1610} dan inilah ma'nā idhātamma'l-faqru fa
huwa'LLāh. Wa'LLāhu a'lam bi'l-sawāb!

Tammat al-kitāb [al-musammā
bi'l-muntahi].\textsuperscript{1611} Āmin!

\textsuperscript{1607} Loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{1608} Text: harap (?).
\textsuperscript{1609} Text: hadap (?). See 5716(2), p. 99.
\textsuperscript{1610} Qur'ān 89:28.
\textsuperscript{1611} 5716(2), p. 100.
CHAPTER X

The Secrets of the Gnostics

by

Hamzah Fanṣūrī

[Leiden Text no 7291 (I)]


In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful.

Praise be to God,
Who expands the breasts of the gnostics With the Keys of His Existence;
And adorns their hearts With His Secrets;
And illumines their spirits With the Knowledge of His Vision;
And purifies their souls
With the Light of His Love.

The most excellent of blessings
And the most perfect of salutations be
Upon our lord Muḥammad,
Lord of the Basin of Drink and
Of the Lauded Station,1613
And upon his House
And his Companions all.

Praise be to God,
The Lord of the Worlds.

(1) Know, O sons of Ādam who are Muslims, that God the Glorious and Exalted creates us; from being nameless, He bestows upon us names; and from being formless, He fashions for us a form complete with ears, heart, soul and intellect. It is incumbent upon us to seek our Lord in order that we may know [Him] with our gnosis, or through our service to a

1612. The Basin of the Prophet is one of the eschatological stations in Muslim eschatology, based on the Qur'ān (108:1). See further E.I., article Hawd; al-Ash'arī, pp. 160, 244; Wensinck, pp. 195, 231ff., 258, 268, 274.

1613. The Lauded Station is the station promised by God to Muḥammad. See e.g. Nicholson in Studies, p. 136; Insānu'l-Kamil II, pp. 51-58.

1614. Throughout this study the word Allāh is translated as God.

1615. See note 867
teacher who has perfect gnosis of Him, so that we may not fall short [of our duty].

(2) However, before you meet with one whose gnosis is perfect, consider these fifteen bayts. These [fifteen bayts] are [composed of] a verse of four lines to each bayt. Should you fail to comprehend [the meaning of] these fifteen verses, consult their commentaries, for in the commentaries are made manifest discourses on the gnosis of God. But God knows best!

(3) Shahdān. There is nothing amiss [in this book]. Nevertheless, should you find inadequacies, complete them; should you find errors, correct them; should you meet with mutilations in the language, or in the letters - more or less [17] - improve them [and] do not scorn [the work], for man is beset with

---

1616. I.e. a Spiritual Guide, a Shaykh, or a Murshid (Fr. Pir). This is a prerequisite to entrance into a Ṭariqah. There is a tradition that the seeker must not travel alone - if he has no spiritual guide the Devil is his guide. See Rūmī, Mathnawī, VI, 494.

1617. It is incorrect to consider a bayt a couplet. It is more properly speaking a verse. In the way in which Ḥamzah uses the term here he obviously means a verse composed of four lines to a bayt. See further Browne, Literary history of Persia, vol. II, pp. 24-25ff.

1618. See note 871
forgetfulness and carelessness. As the Messenger of Gof (God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Al-insānu murakkabun 'alā' l-nisyān."

that is:

"Man is composed of forgetfulness" - for man is replete with imperfections. Only God the Glorious and Exalted is free from imperfections!

(4) On an exposition of the gnosis of God Most Exalted, His Attributes and His Names.

O we all who worship the Name!
It is incumbent to know what is First;
For our Lord Who is Eternal
Is One with His seven Attributes. 1620

[18] Our Lord is the Possessor of the Essence.
The first of His Attributes is 'Living',
The second is 'Knowledge and the Forms of the Known,'
The third is 'Willing' all [acts of] the Will.
The fourth is 'Powerful,' with a Power Absolute,
Fifth is the Attribute called 'Speech'
Sixth is 'Hearing', with His Existence endures

1619. The Malay translation: terkendaraan atas for murakkabun 'alā is literal.

1620. Two wandering quatrains follow. See note 875
The seventh is 'Seeing' the permitted and forbidden.

The existence of these seven Attributes is Eternal.

Of the Universal Potentialities He is Omniscient

In virtue of these Attributes, with Wise

Perfection,

He is called 'Most Compassionate' and

'Most Merciful.'

Knowledge is the Reality of Muhammad the Prophet,

Pursuing the Known with Its Omniscience;

From that Reality the sinner and the saint

Derive their forms in all manner of ways.

Our Lord is the Possessor of Perfection

Within His Knowledge never vanishing

In the 'Most Compassionate' is the sum of

Majesty

[19] And upon all Beauty the 'Most Merciful' holds sway.

Our Lord is He Who is called Exalted

With all His Attributes forever abiding

Upon the Universe entire His effects take form

From the six directions - hence He is Alone.¹⁶²¹

The light of His Effects will never die out

Giving existence to the Universe entire

¹⁶²¹. Khālī: alone, free from the limiting nature of dimension.
Creating creation day and night
Forever and ever it will never cease.
Our Lord is like Fathomless Ocean
Whose waves are rolling in every direction
Ocean and waves are both intimate
At last to its depths the waves will sink.
The Ocean is Knower its currents the Known
Its Condition is Qāsim its waves are Maqsūm.
Its tempest is 'governing', its dispositions are 'governed'.
Upon the entire Universe it is these that are featured.

If you really know [the meaning of] existence
It is where you effect true vision
Cast off your form from all restrictions
In order that you may abide in your Self.
Upon God's Existence you must subsist.
Cast off your form and your name constantly
Annihilate your consciousness from Lordship and slavehood.
In order that you may achieve the Act that is Final.
If you are not yet firm as a stone
Duality is still your lot: slave and Lord
When you are no longer conscious of gold and coin,1622

Then indeed you can become one.

1622. See below, note 1753
If you are yet not extinct from hundreds and thousands
You will never be able to annihilate your existence
Make yourself extinct from the gross and the subtle
In order that whatever you say becomes permissible.

Hamzah Fanṣūrī, though he is insignificant
His Reality is close to the Noble Essence
Though but a bubble whose form is gross
His union is constant in the Sea of the Subtle.

These are the fifteen verses. Now look again and listen to their commentaries.

(5) O we all who worship the Name!
It is incumbent [to know what is First]...

That is to say, [by 'name' is meant] the Name of God the Glorious and Exalted, for according to the Prescribed Law (shari'at) whosoever says: 'There is no god but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God' with his tongue, he is a Muslim. But in his heart? - God alone knows best! As the Prophet (God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man qāla lā ilāha illā'Ilāhu dakhala'l-jannah."

that is:
"Whosoever utters: 'There is no god but God' enters into Paradise (with much ease)." [21] Furthermore the Messenger of God (God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man qāla lā ilāha illā'Llāhu khāliṣan mukhliṣan dakhala'l-jannah."

that is:

"Whosoever utters: 'There is no god but God' with a pure heart enters into Paradise."

It is by virtue of the reason that the name and [the] possessor of [the name] is one and the same, when the name is mentioned the one who mentions it and the possessor of the name mentioned feel at one with each other. From the point of view of reality it is incumbent to know the Possessor of the Name in order that [your] islām may be complete. It is just like a person who goes to China and hears the name of the Emperor of China; although he does not meet the Emperor in person, [his] visiting China is complete in all respects and [it were as though] he sees the Emperor. He hears the Emperor's name [mentioned] - and both [seeing and hearing] are accomplished by him. For this reason, from the standpoint of reality, it is incumbent to know and have gnosis of the Name of Him who is called Allāh, for God the Exalted says:
Man kāna fī hādhihi a'mā fahuwa
fi'il-ʾākhirati a'mā wa adallu sabīlan. 1623

that is:

Whosoever is blind in this (world) he will be blind in the Hereafter, [and further away from the path]. 1624

Hence the People of the Path (Ahluʾl-Sulūk) 1625 say, concerning a person who does not know God but who mentions His Name with a pure heart, that that person is a Muslim. The Doctors of Theology ('Ulama') and the People of the Path are agreed [on this point]: that a person who knows God is among the elect; a person who has gnosis of God is among the super-elect, for the person who has gnosis of God is higher [in rank] than the person who knows Him. As the Messenger of God (God bless him and give him peace!): says:

"Wa 'bud rabbaka kaʾannaka tarāhu ..."

1623. Qurʾān 17:72. See also Qurʾān 57:13.

1624. Ḥamzah interprets this verse as:

Whosoever does not know God in this world will not know Him in the Hereafter.

By 'know' Ḥamzah means gnosis: Kenāl.

1625. Literally: People of the Way, i.e. the mystical path. See for the distinction between salikūn and majādhib, Frithjof Shuon's account, op. cit., pp. 26-27, note 2.
"Worship your Lord as if you see Him ...  
(this can be applied with reference to the person who has gnosis of God) [22]  
... Fa'in lam takun tarāhu fa 'innahu yarāka."  

that is:  
... [for] if you do not see Him, He sees you."  
(this can be applied with reference to the person who knows God).  

Further God the Exalted says:  
Wa' bud rabbaka ḫattā ya'tiyaka'1-yaqīn.  

that is:  
Serve your Lord until there comes to you certainty.  
(i.e. [by] certainty [is meant]: that which is devoid of doubt).  

This is the meaning of '... worship the Name'.  

(6) Fa'lam - It is incumbent to know what is first.  

That is to say, when the earth and the heavens, the Throne and the Footstool, Heaven and Hell, were all yet non-existent - when the Universe together with all its parts was yet non-existent - what was the First [Existennt]? The First was the Essence Unique,  

Self-Subsistent, without Attributes and Names - That was the First. The Name of the Essence is He. The meaning [conveyed] by [the Name] He serves as a symbolic allusion to the Name of the Essence without Attributes. The Name Allāh is one degree below the rank of the Name He. But [the Name Allāh] is the sum of all Names. As in the case of one who is named Muḥammad, if he has learning, he is called learned; if he is clever, he is called intelligent; if he trades, he is called trader. All names that come under these names are contained in the name Muḥammad, for Muḥammad is the sum of all these names. In the same manner the Name Allāh Glorious and Exalted is the sum of all Names: by virtue of His creating the creatures He is called Creator; by virtue of His providing His creatures, He is called Provider; by virtue of His fashioning the Universe, He is called Maker; by virtue of His creating with wisdom, He is called Wise. All these Names are contained in the Name Allāh, for Allāh [23]

1628. Cf. Shabistāri:
Each creature has its being
From the One Name,
From which it comes forth,
And to which it returns,
With praises unending.
is the sum of all Names. But [the Name] He is higher in rank than the Name Allah, and [likewise] the Essence is higher in rank than the Name He. Whosoever comprehends the meaning of this, he will comprehend the meaning of 'The First'.

(7) **Fa'lam - For our Lord Who is Eternal.**

That is to say, [He] is Eternal, and His Eternity is timeless and impossible to discourse upon. That is, [He] is Eternal without eternity, [He is] First without firstness, [He is] Eternally Existing. Discourse upon His Eternity is futile except for the discourse of the People of Revelation (Ahlul'1-Kashf). According to the People of Revelation His Eternity may be likened to a round fruit neither bounded by sides nor having a tree; neither having a beginning nor having an end; neither having a centre nor having sides; neither having a front nor having a back; neither having a left to it nor having a right to it; neither having an above nor having a below. This is what is meant by Eternal. It is also possible to liken [His Eternity] to a circle, for the circle has neither beginning nor end: if it is said that it has a beginning, then it can also be said that it has an end; if it is said that it has an end, then it can likewise be said that it has a beginning.
It is incumbent to comprehend the Eternity of God the Glorious and Exalted with perfect gnosis. This is the meaning of 'Eternal'. How can we achieve gnosis of God Most Exalted if we do not comprehend His timeless and spaceless Eternity?

(8) **Fa'lam - Is One with His seven Attributes.**

That is to say, [He] is not separate from His seven Attributes, even though it is said that the Essence of God is The First. But [here] expression becomes difficult; that is, [24] [if we say that the Essence is The First, it conveys the impression as though] It is separate from Its seven Attributes - and this makes Him logically insufficient. According to the Doctors of Theology, God's Attributes are neither His Very Essence nor other than His Essence. According to the People of the Path, the Attributes are His Very Essence. The analogy is that of a person who, by virtue of his knowledge, is called knowing; by virtue of his power, is called powerful, by virtue of his will, is called willing; by virtue of his speech is called speaking; by virtue of his hearing, is called hearing; by virtue of his sight is called

1629. See above, p. 22 of the text.
seeing. It is only expression that makes [the attributes] 'other' than the Pure Essence. The names of the seven Attributes are first, 'Life'; second, 'Knowledge'; third, 'Will'; fourth, 'Power'; fifth, 'Speech'; sixth, 'Hearing'; seventh, 'Sight'. The Essence and these seven Attributes are never separate. There are other Attributes without number, but [all those other Attributes] are contained in the seven Attributes, for these seven Attributes are higher in rank than those other Attributes. Just as the Name Allah is the sum of all names, so the seven Attributes are the sum of all Attributes. When [you] have comprehended the meaning of these seven Attributes, then [you] may know [Him] with perfect knowledge.

(9) Fa'lam - Our Lord is the Possessor of the Essence.

That is to say, the [Essence is] Unique, without Attributes. According to one expression the Doctors of Theology call It Necessary Being because It is Self-Existent and does not exist through another. For this reason the Doctors of Theology call It Necessary Being. The People of the Path say [25] that It is indeed Self-Existent, but It also gives existence to the World together with all its parts.
It is called Necessary Being because Being and Essence are one and the same. According to the Doctors of Theology, the judgment concerning the Essence of God and His Being is that they are two; [similarly] the Being of Knowledge and the Knower are two; the being of the Universe and the Universe are two; the being of the Universe is different from the Being of God. God's Being and His Essence are like the sun and its light; although they appear as one and the same [thing] to external and internal perception, they are in fact two things: the sun is other than its light. As to the Universe, the reason why it is said that its being is different [from the Being of God] is because the universe is like the moon deriving its light from the sun. This is the reason why the Doctors of Theology say that the being of the Universe is different from the Being of God, and that God's Being and His Essence are different [entities]. The People of the Path say that if this is the case, then God can be referred to as being 'outside' or 'in' [the Universe]; or 'near' the Universe or 'far' from it. To us, the Essence of God and His Being is one; His Being and the being of the Universe is one; the being of the Universe and
the Universe is one, the like of which is, as it were, its light; different only in name but not in truth. To external perception it is one; to the eye of the internal perception it is also one. So is the being of the Universe in 'relation' to the Being of God - it is one; for the Universe considered independently does not exist. Although outwardly it exists it is nothing but appearance and not Reality; like the image [reflected] in the mirror, [26] though possessing form, does not possess real being. However, the Doctors of Theology and the People of the Path are in complete agreement with respect to the Essence: that It is Unique. Although the [concept of the] Essence can be expressed in words in reality expression falls short of the truth, for It is not 'above', It is not 'below', It is not 'before', It is not 'after', It is not to 'the right', It is not to 'the left', It is not 'far', It is not 'near', It is not 'outside', It is nor 'in', It is not 'separate', It is not 'joined' - It is without 'how'; It is without 'where' [i.e. being at a place], It is without 'where' [i.e. being

1630. I.e. the sun's.

1631. I.e. the bilā kayfa of the theologians. See above, note 930.
to a place], It is without 'now', It is without a 'twinkling of an eye', without 'instant', without 'time'; It does not 'become', nor is It 'becoming', It is not a 'place', nor has it a 'place'. As the Messenger of God (God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Kāna' Llāhtū wa lā shay'a ma'ahu."

that is:

"There 'was' only God and no thing 'was' with Him."

Shaykh Junayd Baghdādī (God's mercy be upon Him!) says:

"[Huwa]'l-āna kamā kāna."

that is:

"[He] 'is' now as He 'was' then."

God Most Exalted says:

Subhāna' Llāhi 'ammā yaṣifūn.1632

that is:

Glory be to God! Who cannot be described.

God Most Exalted says further:

Laysa kamithlihi shay'un.1633

that is:

1633. Qur'ān, 42:11.
[There is none like unto Him. The interpretation of which means:]
Not one single thing which we discuss with our hearts and with our gnosis attains to knowledge of Him.

Our knowledge is not [of] the Essence; [it is of] the Similitudes of the Essence and Its Modes of Being. This is why the People of the Path say that the Essence and Its Existence is one. But in Its true nature none may reach the Essence, [27] let alone the general masses [of the Faithful], even the Saints, Prophets and Archangels may not reach It.

(10) **Fa'lām** - The first of His Attributes is 'Living'.

That is to say, Ḥayy means 'Living'. The reason why 'Living' is first mentioned is because if [He] is not Living, all the other Attributes will not come into being. Furthermore God Most Exalted says:

\[
\text{Allāhu lā ilāha illā huwa'1-ḥayyu 'l-gāyyūn.} \\
\]

that is:

God! There is no god but He, the Living, the Sustainer (of all).

1634. Qur'ān, 2:255.
God Most Exalted says further:

\[
\text{Huwa' l-bayyu lā ilāha illā huwa.}\]

that is:

He is the Living (God) there is no god but He.

The reason why 'Living' is considered to be [logically] prior to all [other] Attributes is because - in the same manner as a person - if he is not living then he is dead. If he is considered as dead, then he cannot be 'knowing', 'willing', 'powerful', 'speaking', 'hearing', 'seeing'. Hence 'Living' is considered [logically] prior to all the Attributes which exist together [with God]. This is what is meant by 'Living' is the first Attribute.'

(11) \text{Fa'lam - The second is 'Knowledge' and the 'Forms of the Known.'} \text{[It is] to say, [He is] Knowing, for Knowledge is the first among the manifest. The reason why Knowledge is said to be the first among the manifest is because when God the Glorious and Exalted gazes upon Himself with His Knowledge He becomes three [Names]: Knower, Knowledge, and Known. The Seer}

is called the Knower, the Seen is called the Known, Seeing is called Knowledge. All three are in fact one and the same, only its names are different, for it is by virtue of Knowledge [28] that the Knower and the Known acquire names and manifestation. The Lord then becomes apparent to His servants, and His servants then become apparent to their Lord. Because of this it is therefore said that Knowledge is the first among all that is manifest, for the Essence is ever contemplating Itself; Knower, Knowledge and Known are seen. The Essence is Absolute, Unique, without Attributes; That is the First. When It gazes upon Itself, It sees Itself together with all Its Predispositions. At that 'instant', the Seer is called the Knower, the Seen is called the Known, Seeing is called Knowledge. The Essence is concealed within Knower, Known and Knowledge. Hence [God] is called the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden; the Seer is called the First, the Seen is called the Last, the Seen is called the Outwardly Manifest, the Seer is called the Inwardly Hidden.

1636. See above, note 791.
1637. See above, pp. 22-23 of the text.
For this reason God Most Exalted says:

\[
\text{Huwa'1-awwalu wa'1-ākhiru wa'1-zāhiru wa'1-bāṭinu wa huwa bi kulli shay'in 'alīm.}
\]

that is:

He is the First, He is the Last, He is the Outwardly Manifest, He is the Inwardly Hidden, and He is Knower of all things.

Further the Lama'āt says:

"Ma'shuq[u] 'ishq[u] 'āshiq har sīh yakyast In jā Chun wasl dar na-gunjad hijrān chi kār dārad."

that is:

"The Beloved, Love and Lover are all one and the same,
When 'union' is not there, what business is there for separation?

Further Shaykh Muhammad Maghribī (God's mercy be upon him!) says:

"Chūn 'azm tamāshā-i-jihān kad zi khalwat [29] Āmad betamāshā-i-jihān 'ayn jihān shud."

that is:

1638. Qur'ān 57:3.
1639. Lana'āt, Lāmat III, p. 331.
"When he resolved to examine the world, coming from the house of seclusion, He went forth and became the very essence of the world ."

"Har naqsh ki ū khwast badān naqsh baramad Pushid hamān naqsh bad[ān] naqsh 'iyān shud."

that is:

"Whatever painting that is desired by him came in that form, [And he] covered [himself] in the painting which became clearly apparent."

This is why 'Alī (may God be well-pleased with him!) says:

"Lā a'budu rabban lam arahu."

that is:

"I worship not God if I do not 'see' [Him]."

'Alī (may God be well pleased with him!) says further:

"Mā ra'aytu shay'am illā wa ra'aytu 'Llāha fihi."

that is:

"I see nothing but that I 'see' God within it."

This is the meaning of 'Knowledge is the first among the manifest'.

(12) Fa'īlam - The third is Willing all [acts of] the Will.

That is to say, by Willing is meant Willing the
Potentialities in His Knowledge to become the World. As the Holy Tradition says:

\[ \text{Kuntu kanzan makhfiyyan fa aḥbabtu an u'raf ...} \]

that is:

I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known ...

That is: the World together with all its potentialities in His Knowledge is related within it [i.e. His Knowledge] as the hidden treasure about to bring forth the things known in His Knowledge. It then says:

'I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known.'

The treasure [i.e. as a whole] is likened to a tree within its seed. The seed is the treasure, [30] the tree within it is the content of the treasure; hidden in its completeness: its roots, trunk, branches, boughs, twigs, leaves, flowers, fruits - all complete within that single seed. The seed desires to bring forth the growth of the tree within itself on a field of vast expanse. The seed says:

'I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known.'

All this is an allusion to [God's Act of] willing. Further God Most Exalted says:
Innanā amruhu idhā arāda
shay'an yaqūla lāhu kun fa yakūn. 1640

that is:

Verily His command is, when He is in
the state of desiring a thing, to say to it
'Be thou!' - and it becomes.

This too is an allusion to [God's Act of] willing.

The People of the Path say that the meaning con­
veyed by the words 'to it' refers to something existing,
that is, it is present [to God]. Hence it is admissible
[for Him] to say 'to it', for 'to it' is an allusion
[referring to] something existing. Were it not
existing, God the Glorious and Exalted would not
refer to it as 'to it'. This is why the People of
the Path say that the meaning conveyed by the [Command]
"Be!" (to it) is a command [directed towards] the
known that is ever existing in God's Knowledge. But
to the Doctors of Theology the known is non-existing
[in His Knowledge], it is something produced -
[something] newly conceived at the 'moment' when He
contemplates Himself. However, the People of the
Path say that although outwardly the known is not
existing [in God's knowledge] inwardly it is existing;

1640. Qur'ān 36:82.
it is existing like the tree in our analogy [existing within the seed] [31]; though it has not emerged from within the seed, the judgment is that it exists within the seed - there can be no further doubt. If this is not the case [with God] then [His Nature] is logically deficient.

(13) Fa'lam - The fourth is 'Powerful' with a Power Absolute.

That is to say, [He is] Powerful, for if He is not Powerful then, logically, He would be impotent. But [- far from it! -] God the Glorious and Exalted is not impotent. He has the Power to create and destroy, to cause to live and to cause to die, to sever and to join, to take and to give - there are many more examples impossible to mention. If He is not Powerful, how can He contemplate Himself contemplating the Known within His Knowledge? This is [accomplished by none but] He who possesses Power that is eternally with Him.

As to the world, though it is a thing existing, it is [in reality] only the shadow of the known. Whatever is in the known is 'here' seen, for the known is determined by the eternal Power, and [their natures]

cannot be altered by Him. If [their natures] are altered, then [the nature of] that eternal Power is logically imperfect, that is, [whatever He causes to be comes into being in a] still imperfect state and requires once again His improvement. If [it is] already perfect from 'there' \textsuperscript{1642} it is inadmissible [that it should be once again improved upon by Him].

(14) ... and our voice. \textsuperscript{1643} This is the reason why according to the Prescribed Law, the Speech [of God] is not created. According to the schools of the Mu'tazilah, \textsuperscript{1644} the Rāfidi \textsuperscript{1645} and the Zindiq \textsuperscript{1646} God's Speech is created. \textsuperscript{1647} But according to the Prescribed Law whosoever says that God's Speech is created is an unbeliever - may God preserve us from such! God's Speech is as the Essence; It is eternal,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1642} 'There' here refers to the archetypal state.
\item \textsuperscript{1643} See above p. 350 , and note 770.
\item \textsuperscript{1644} See E.I., article Mu'tazila; Taftāzānī, p. 8, note 10, 59f., 62.
\item \textsuperscript{1645} See E.I. article Rawāfid.
\item \textsuperscript{1646} See E.I. article Zindīk, and Lewis, B. Studia Islamica, vol. 1, 1953. Further, see also my Raniri and the Wujudiyyah of 17th Century Aceh, J.M.B.R.L.S., Monograph 4915, Appendix II.
\item \textsuperscript{1647} For this argument see al-Anš'arī, pp. 20-32.
\end{itemize}
together with the seven [Attributes]. But the Speech of God that is conveyed by Gabriel to the Prophet Muḥammad, the Messenger of God (God bless [32] him and give him peace!); that is written on pages, this can be said to be created, for the judgment concerning it is that it has become separated, from the point of view of expression, from the Essence. In its real sense, God alone knows best! God Most Exalted says:

Innama qawluna li shay'in idhā aradnā an naqūla lahu kun fa yakūn. 1648

that is:

Verily Our command to a thing is, when We desire it, to say to it 'Be thou!' - and it becomes.

This [Command] too is an Eternal Speech conveyed not by tongue and voice, but by allusion. If it is conveyed by tongue and voice, then it can be said to be created. Since God the Glorious and Exalted is Most Pure, so is His Speech Most Pure from tongue and voice!

(15) Fa'lan - The sixth is 'Hearing', with His Existence endures.

That is to say, [He is] Hearing, for if He is without Hearing then He is deaf. But He hears with

1648. Qur'ān 16:40.
the ears of symbolical expression, for God the Glorious and Exalted has no ears like the ears of creatures. That which He hears 'there' is the 'voice' [or 'sound'] of the Potentialities of the Known that are ever existing in His Knowledge. For this reason He is called: (He is) 'Hearing' and 'Knowing', for Hearing and Knowing are eternal, together with the Essence. Although it is said that: 'God hears him who praises Him', that is only an expression, and it does not refer to hearing with ears like the ears of creatures. God Most Exalted says:

Wa ātākum min kulli mā sa'al tumūhu. 1650

that is:

We give you all that which you ask.

According to the People of the Path, this asking is the 'asking' of the Pure Potentialities, and not asking in [our] present state of being. Hence God the Glorious and Exalted hears the known, which is co-existent with Him, with the ears [33] of allegory. The known, likewise, 'ask' symbolically, and 'giving'


1650. Qur'ān, 14:34;
to the known is also symbolical. If this is not the case, then [His] Hearing is not eternal, and if [His] Hearing is not eternal, then [logically He is] imperfect.

(16) Fa'ilam - The seventh is 'Seeing' the permitted and forbidden.

That is to say [He is] 'Seeing', for if He is not 'Seeing' then He is blind. God the Glorious and Exalted is eternally seeing Himself and the forms of the known. The permitted and the forbidden in the known are [seen by Him as] existing. But He sees not with eyes like the eyes of creatures; He sees with the eyes of allegory and symbolic expression. Whosoever believes that God the Glorious and Exalted sees with eyes like the eyes of creatures, he is an unbeliever - may God preserve us from such! As God the Glorious and Exalted is Most Pure from all the [qualities of] creatures, His Sight is also Most Pure. The primordial Speech in His Knowledge is eternal; the known to Him are never separate from His Knowledge. When the known to Him are never separate from His Knowledge, He is then ever seeing [them] with an Eternal Vision. If the known within His Knowledge are not existing, the Name Knower cannot be applied
to Him, [and hence] His Seeing too will be void.

Since God the Glorious and Exalted is Eternal together with His seven Attributes, His Seeing can never be void for He is called: (He is) Hearing and Seeing.\textsuperscript{1651}

Furthermore God the Glorious and Exalted says:

\textit{Wa'Llāhu bima ta' malūna baṣīr.}\textsuperscript{1652}

that is:

God is seeing in whatever they do - for [His] seven Attributes are [34] Eternal; and not that there is Living without Knowledge; or Knowledge without Will; or Will without Power; or Power without Speech; or Speech without Hearing; or Hearing without Sight; or one is prior and one is recent - such is not the case. Whosoever believes in this manner, then he is in error.

(17) \textbf{Fa'lam - The existence of these seven Attributes is Eternal}

That is to say, [God,] with the seven Attributes already mentioned in the beginning of this book, these are Eternal. As to the other Attributes, they appear

\textsuperscript{1651} Qur'\textsuperscript{ā}n, 42:11. The close relationship between Knowledge, Hearing and Sight is interpreted according to Ibn\textsuperscript{u}l-'Arabi's interpretation. See Affifi, pp. 43-44.

\textsuperscript{1652} Qur'\textsuperscript{ā}n, 2:265; 3:152; 8:72; 57:4; 60:3; 64:2.
at the instance of the Command: Be! (and it becomes); such as Creator and Provider, Giver of Life and Giver of Death. Attributes such as these are many beyond description and mention. The allusion to the Command; Be! (and it becomes) is that this is God's first Command to the Potentialities of the Known. Everything, with one 'Be thou!' comes into being, complete and perfect. Should He lessen or increase [their perfection] then [His Knowledge] is logically imperfect; that is to say, [it were as though] He has no perfect knowledge of His own Wisdom, for God the Glorious and Exalted is not like Man, who, having completed the making of a thing, would refashion it if it were not perfect. This is not so with God the Glorious and Exalted; with one ['Be] thou!' He causes a thing to be, [and it comes into being,] perfect beyond reproof. Those things that come 'under' the sway of the Creative Word 'Be thou!' (and it becomes) are, from the point of view of expression, created; and those things that are 'above' the Creative Word 'Be thou!' (and it becomes) are called by the People of the Path Predispositions of the Divine Essence.

Such is, for example, the case of the spirit: it is neither uncreated [35] nor created, though indeed the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says in the Tradition:

"Khuliga'l-rūhu qabla'l-jasadi bi alfayn."

that is:

"The spirit is made manifest two thousand years before the body."

The People of the Path say that the spirit that is the Command of God (amr Allah) has not yet come under the sway of the Creative Word 'Be thou!' (and it becomes). As God Most Exalted says:

Innāmā amruhu idhā arāda shay'an an yaqūla lahu kun fa yakūn. 1655

that is:

Verily His Command, when He wills a thing, is to say to it 'Be thou!' - and it becomes.

According to the People of the Path [those things that are] above the Command 'Be thou!' (and it becomes),

1654. Hanzah's rendering of khuliga here is not literal. This is deliberately done as the root word khalaqa is one of the important key words in his cosmology. For an explanation of this, see above, pp. 147-148.

1655. Qur'an 36:82.
when [they are] above the Command 'Be thou!' (and it becomes), are neither uncreated nor created. As God, Glorious and Exalted says:

Wa yas'lūnaka 'ani'l-rūḥi quli'l-rūḥu min amri rabbi wanā utītu mina'l-ilmi illā qalīlān. 1656

that is:

[And] they ask thee (Muḥammad) about the spirit. Say (O Muḥammad): The spirit is of the command of my Lord, and you are given nought of knowledge but a little (—how then can you know about the spirit?).

For this reason the People of the Path say that [it] is neither uncreated nor created, for [it] is of the Command of God, Glorious and Most Exalted. The Doctors of Theology and the People of the Path agree that the World together with all its parts is created — that it is new [i.e. produced], for it comes into outward manifestation by virtue of the Creative Word 'Be thou!' (and it becomes). It must not be said that the World is eternal.

1656. Qurʾān 17:35.
(18) Fa'lam - Of the Universal Potentialities

He is Omniscient.

That is to say, by Potentialities [is meant] His Predispositions that are ever residing in His All-Embracing Knowledge. The Potentialities are the Predispositions [36] that for ever abide in the Knowledge of God Most Exalted. According to the People of the Path, the Potentialities never 'move' [from their original 'position' in the Divine Knowledge], and are not moved by God the Glorious and Most Exalted.1657 That which for ever abide [in the Divine Knowledge] are the Predispositions of the Essence Glorious and Most Exalted - and They are ever abiding in His Knowledge for, according to an analogy of the People of the Path, Knowledge pursues the Known. It is likened to a vast Ocean - it is the Waves that come and go, appear and subside. But according to another analogy, without the Ocean the Waves will not appear. According to this analogy the Waves follow the Ocean, that is, the Known follow Knowledge. According to the Doctors of Theology, the Known follow Knowledge for, to the Doctors of Theology, the Pure

Potentialities do not count [as already existing in the Divine Knowledge]. Whatever the Knower desires appears in the form of that which He desires. According to the People of the Path, the Pure Potentialities exist in His Knowledge. As God Most Exalted says:

\[
Wa mā minnā illā lahu maqāmūn ma’lūn. \]

that is:

[And there is none] of us but has a known place.

Further, the People of the Path say that the Potentialities are the Predispositions of the Essence and are not yet 'separate' from the Essence. They are, according to this analogy, ever dwelling in the Essence. In reality [they are] indeed identical with the Essence, as Shaykh Muḥyī’l-Dīn ibnu’l-‘Arabī (God be well pleased with him!) says:

\[
"Kūnā huwrūfān ‘āliyātīn lam nu[n]qal Muta’alliqātān bi’l-dāri ‘alā’l-qulāl ..."
\]

that is:

"We were Lofty Letters unmoved, Attached to our Abode in the Mountain Peak ... Kuntu anā [anta] fihi wa nāhnu anta wa anta huwa ..."
that is:

I was you within it (that is, within the Mountain [37] Peak), and we all were you, and you were He ...  

Fa’l-kullu fī huwa huwa fa’s’al 'an nan wasal."

that is:

Everything is 'in' He is He's ask of those in union."

What Shaykh Muhyi’l-Dīn ibnu’l-'Arabī says is an allusion to the Pure Potentialities. The analogy is likened to a tree within its seed always existing together with the seed, and it has not moved [from the seed], or is/[from it], for it is not yet 'separate' from the seed. When it moves from its position wishing to come out, it is something that has shifted from its place and is referred to as being moved from its place. [Similarly, in the case of the Pure Potentialities, when They move, They are moved from Their original position], and His Knowledge and His Will and His Speech and His Hearing and His Sight all move together - forever and ever. To the Doctors of Theology, the things known and their Potentialities are something new [i.e. temporal events, produced] and they move [from their original place], and are
created in a fashion somewhat similar to [the act of] a carpenter wishing to build a house. He plans according to the potentialities of the things known to him [in his knowledge]. He then builds the house. The house is a thing created, the form of the house in his mind is also a thing created: both of them are something new [i.e. temporal events, produced]. The People of the Path say that if this were true, the Eternity of God the Glorious and Most Exalted is void of His Knowledge. It were as though He plans to create the believer and the unbeliever, the righteous and the sinful, on the 'spur of the moment'. If this be the case, then though Eternal, His Eternity is void of His Knowledge, and this means that He is ignorant; though King, yet He is without His Armies and this means that He is weak; and even though He has Knowledge, yet He is without Ideas (i.e. Potentialities), and this means that He is dull-witted; though Just, He is yet unjust. [38]

1659. Cf. Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, pp. 77-78; 90; 98-100; and Notes, pp. 58 (78.1.); 64 (90.1.)

1660. The word I have translated as 'dull-witted' here is *seğan* (See above, note 1002 ). *Segan* seems to me to be almost identical with *naqis*. 
If He plans and wills on the 'spur of the moment', it means that He is ignorant; if He possesses no Bounty, and on the 'spur of the moment' only wishes to produce it, then it means that He is poor; if He has Knowledge [but] does not create, then He is hesitant; if He does not already have within Him [i.e. as Potentialities in His Knowledge] the hypocrite and the unbeliever, and He causes one to become an unbeliever, and having caused one to become an unbeliever He then casts him into hell, then He is unjust. God the Glorious and Most Exalted is not like that. If such qualities are present in Him, then His Nature is deficient. Whosoever holds such belief is in error. According to an analogy of the People of the Path the things known to God are eternal, for the Pure Potentialities are indeed the Predispositions of His Essence and they all are Descriptions of none but Him. The Divine Beauty includes Predispositions of all that which is good, and the Divine Majesty includes Predispositions of all that which is evil. But in reality all is good, for all is identical with Him and are His Predispositions. 1661  The analogy

is like that of an arrow; if it is not correctly made
it is of no use to the owner; a fishing hook; if it
is not crooked no fish can be caught; a needle; if
it is not correctly fashioned, it cannot be used for
sewing. Each becomes evil [or good] according
to its use, for both are from the Divine Majesty
and Beauty. This is the meaning of the 'Eternal
Potentialities'.

(19) Fa'lam - In virtue of these Attributes,
with Wise Perfection.

That is to say, [He is] Perfect in creating
(with) Wisdom. [He is] said to be Perfect in creating
(with) Wisdom because He is Wise in assigning every-
things according to its own nature, and this means
that He draws forth the things known in His Knowledge
without [39] [causing them to] change [their respective
natures]. From the original nature of sky, He creates
the sky; from the original nature of earth, He creates
the earth; from the original nature of Throne, He
creates the Throne; from the original nature of
Footstool, He creates the Footstool; from the original
nature of sea, He creates the sea; from the original

1662. Cf. Ibid., III, 1362; II, 2535.
nature of land, He creates the land - that is to say, He creates all these things with His Wisdom and according to the Law of the Eternal Potentialities. Therefore it is fitting that He should have Names such as:

\[ \text{wa huwa'}l-\text{azīzu'}l-hakīn} \]

\text{1663} - He is the Mighty, the Wise. If He changes the respective natures of His creation which already exist [as Potentialities in His Knowledge], He is then not Wise - to subject to caprice [His own] creation which is preexisting [in His Knowledge] - for that which is preexisting [in His Knowledge] is, according to its nature, already perfect. If [His creation is] not complete, or not perfect, then He should improve it, [and this means that] the 'Be thou!' He has been saying since has not yet been perfect and that He wishes to alter it only now. Such [action] is not [ascribable to] perfect Wisdom. For this reason the [potentially] good is assigned to good and the [potentially] evil is assigned to evil. Should He cause the whole World to be created believing without causing some to be created unbelieving, then He is lacking [in Wisdom]; should He create all to be unbeliever without creating

\[ ^{1663} \text{Qur'ān, 14:4}. \]
also believer, then He is lacking [in Wisdom]; should He create Heaven without also creating Hell, then He is lacking [in Wisdom and Power]; and should He create Hell without also creating Heaven, [then He is lacking in Wisdom]. Hence he brings forth with perfection everything to the World from the Potentialities of the things known to Him without causing any change [in their original natures] as His Names are: wa huwa'l-'azîzu'l-hâkin 1665 - He is the Mighty, the Wise. (20) Fa'ilam - He is called 'Most Compassionate' and 'Most Merciful'.

That is to say, by virtue of His Attributes already mentioned, [40] He is called (Bismi'Llâhi) al-Râhîn, al-Ra'îm. An interpretation of this according to the Law (shari'at) is that Bismi'Llâh means: In the Name of God. Al-Râhmân means: the Compassionate (in this World). Al-Ra'îm [means: the] Ever Merciful (in the Hereafter). An interpretation according to the Truth (haqîqat) is that (Bismi) Allâh is the Name of the Essence, the sun

of all Names as already mentioned before. Al-Rahmān is [the Name] by which He first bestows His Mercy upon the World — that is, that He creates all, as God Most Exalted says:

\[\text{Wasi'\text{'}ta kulla shay'in rahmatan wa 'ilman.}\]

that is:

[0 my Lord] Thou embraces all things in Mercy and Knowledge.

Hence Rahmān is the Lord of Mercy and bestows existence upon the World together with all its parts. Since He gives existence to the World together with all its parts He is called Rahmān. The believer and the unbeliever, Heaven and Hell, the permitted and the forbidden, good and evil — [all] derive their existence from the Mercy of the Compassionate One. Hence He is called Compassionate. Rahīn is particularized exclusively only in all that which is good: in the Prophets, Saints, the righteous and all believers. [In Its particularization Rahīn] does not mingle [with all that which is evil], whereas Rahmān mingles, in Its particularization, [with all in general, the

1666. See above, pp. 22-23 of the text.
good as well as the evil]. This is why He is called (Bismi’Lläh) al Rahmân, al-Rahîn.

(21) Fa'lam - Knowledge is the Reality of Muḥammad the Prophet.1668

When to the Field's Centre [that Reality] is made manifest,
Love that was imprisoned is made manifest;
There [the Lover and the Beloved] gaze at Each Other
With passion and desire unassuaged.
Two bows1669 - one Enclosure;
Between Then a Barrier [41] spreads.1670
One should envisage in this
The analogy of steel and the sword's blade.1671
That is to say, the Knowledge that sees the things known is the Reality of Muḥammad (may God bless him and give him peace!). Between the Knower and the Known - that is when the Light of Muḥammad (may God bless him and give him peace!) first 'separates' from the Divine Essence. According to one expression It

1669. See Qur’ān 53:9; also 2016, pp. 65-68.
1670. See Qur’ān 55:20; also 2016, pp. 65-68.
1671. See above, p. 415, note 1015.
is called the Relational Spirit; and according to another It is called the Universal Intellect; and according to another It is called Light; and according to another It is called the Most Exalted Pen; and according to another It is called Tablet. Hence the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Awwal mā khalaqa'Llāhu ta'ālā'-rūḥ
awwal mā khalaqa'Llāhu ta'ālā'-nūr
awwal mā khalaqa'Llāhu ta'ālā'-'aql
awwal mā khalaqa'Llāhu ta'ālā'-qalam."

that is:

["In the beginning God created the Spirit;
In the beginning God created the Light;
In the beginning God created the Intellect;
In the beginning God created the Pen."]

The reason why the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says that all these are prior [to all other creations is this:] that because Knowledge is living, It is called Spirit; because by Knowledge the things known are manifest, It is called Light; because Knowledge patterns the Forms of the things known, It is called Intellect; because in Knowledge

1672. The translation in square brackets is not found in the manuscript. Cf. Insānu‘l-Kāmil II, pp. 8-9; 27 foll.
is inscribed the Forms of the things known, It is
called Tablet; because Knowledge becomes Letters of
the things known, It is called Pen. This is the
reason why the Messenger of God (may God bless him
and give him peace!) says:

"Awwal mā khalaqa'LLāhu ta'ālā'l-rūḥ."
["In the beginning God created the Spirit"]

and

"Awwal mā khalaqa'LLāhu ta'ālā'l-nūr ..."
["In the beginning God created the Light ..."]

for it is because of the Spirit and the Light [42]
that the things known exist. As God Most Exalted
says [in the Holy Tradition]:

Law lāka lanā khalaqtu'l-aflāka.

that is:

But for thee I would not have created
the seven celestial bodies and the seven
terrestrial bodies (and I created all from
the Light of Muḥammad).

Without the Light of Muḥammad the World together with
all its parts would not have existed. Furthermore,
God Most Exalted says [in the Holy Tradition]:

Khalaqtu'l-kulla li ajlika wa khalaqtuka
li ajli.
that is:

I created Creation for thy sake, Thee I create for My sake (that is to say, Creation came into being from the Light of Muhammad; that Light came into being from the Divine Essence).

But for that Knowledge, God the Glorious and Most Exalted would not have been outwardly manifest [and] without the Knower [the Light of] Muhammad would not have been outwardly manifest. As the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Kuntu nabiyyan wa Ḡadma bayna’l-mā’i wa’l-ṭīn."

that is:

"I was a prophet whilst Adam was yet between water and clay."

This Tradition is an allusion to water, for Adam and the entire Creation came into being from that Light. The Light of that Knowledge is the Known. Further, the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Adamu abū’l-bashari wa anā abū’l-arwāhi."

that is:

1674. See text, pp. 57-58, below; and para. (22) immediately following. Cf. Insanu’l-Kāmil II, p. 28: The First Intellect is likened to the sun, Universal Intellect to water irradiated by sunbeams, and ordinary intellect to the light reflected from the water upon a wall.
"Adan is the father of all men and I am the father of all spirits" (that is, what is said by the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) as: 

"Awwal mā khalqā'LLāhu ta'ālā'1-rūp" - 
"In the beginning God created the Spirit ..." is that the spirit is Muḥammad (may God bless him and give him peace!)

[Further, the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:]\(^{1675}\)

"Anā mina'LLāhi wa1-mu1-minūna ninī."  
that is:

"I am from God, and all the Faithful [43] are from me."

Further, the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Anā min nūri'LLāhi wa1-mu1-minūna ninī."  
that is:

"I am from God's Light and all the Faithful are from my Light."

From these sayings are derived [our] view that 'Knowledge is the Reality of Muḥammad [the Prophet]'.

---

\(^{1675}\) The words in square brackets are not found in the text.
That is to say, [Knowledge] gives Light to the Known. Without Knowledge, the Known cannot come forth from the Pure Potentialities [i.e. become actualized as external existence]. This is why it is said that [Knowledge] pursues the Known. Take the sea as an example; without it the waves will not appear. In like manner the forms of the things known appear out of Knowledge. This is why according to the Law, the Known follows\textsuperscript{1677} Knowledge, for without Knowledge the things known will not be visible [to God].

According to one analogy, they all derive their origin from that One Light. As the Lat\textsuperscript{1} at says:

\textbf{1676.} The Malay word used here is \textit{menurutkan}, and I translate this as 'pursuing' here because \textit{Hanzah} means by it 'to follow in the active sense'. This translation is supported by the interpretation. In fact, \textit{Hanzah} also uses \textit{menurutkan} to translate the Arabic \textit{murid}: willing, see above, p. 36 of the text.

\textbf{1677.} In this case, although \textit{menurutkan} is also used, the meaning intended is clearly and simply 'to follow passively', 'to be dependent upon that which is followed', as the text indicates.
The essence is one, the ways are many; and this secret is revealed to the people of Knowledge.

It is as it were clay: the clay is fashioned into many objects, such as water vessels and cooking pots, but [all these objects] derive their essential origin from clay. No matter how varied all these vessels take their form and description, they all derive their origin from clay. In such wise the World, though in form multiple, derives its origin from that Light.

(23) Fa'l-an — Our Lord is the Possessor of Perfection.

That is to say, [He is] Perfect in every way. If there is something lacking in Him, then He is not called Perfect. If He creates the believer and does not create the unbeliever; or He creates the righteous

1678. See Ibrāhīm ibn Shahriyār (Fahkr al-Dīn) called Mulla 'Iraqī, Kullīyyāt, Persian text, ed. with annotation by Sa'id Nafisi, Tihran, 1335/1956, p. 341, the 9th Lan'at. Hereafter and already cited as Lana'āt. See also Muntahi, p. 123.
and does not create the sinful; or He creates Heaven and does not create Hell; or He creates good and does not create evil - [He] is then not Perfect. This is why according to the Law:

Khayrihi wa sharrihi mina'Ilāhi ta'ālā.

that is:

Good and evil are from God Most Exalted. Whosoever does not have faith in this is an unbeliever - may God preserve us from such! God Most Exalted says:

Qul kullun min 'indi'Ilāh.1679

that is:

Say (O Muhammad): Everything is from God Most Exalted.

As God Most Exalted says:

Wa'Llāhu khalagakum wa nā ta'malūn.1680

[that is:]

And God created you and what you make.

Further God Most Exalted says:

Wa la ḥawla wa la quwwata illā bi'Llāhi'l- 'aliyyi'l-'azīn.1681

1679. Qur'ān 4:78.
1681. Qur'ān 18:40.
There is no Majesty and there is no Might save in God, the Glorious the Great.

As the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Lā tataharraka dharratun illā bi idhnī'LLāh."

that is:

"Not one single atom moves except by God's permission."

According to the Law, although good and evil are from God, yet God Most Exalted wills [and approves] only good, and does not will [45] and approve evil. The meaning of these words is most recondite, and it cannot be conceived by the People of the Path, for since Divine Majesty is His Attribute and Divine Beauty is His Attribute, how can He not will and approve His Attributes? But if we consider this in respect of the Pure Potentialities, then it is possible [to grasp the idea], for both of them [i.e. Divine Majesty and Divine Beauty] are present [to Him] there. Although He causes both of them to come

1682. The Malay translation of hawl here is very literal: mongeliling. But mengeliling, meaning 'encircling' does indeed convey the sense of all-encircling might that Hanzah wants to express.
forth, there, He wills and approves only good, and He
does not will and approve evil. But this is an eternal
question!

(24) Fa'lan - Within His Knowledge never vanishing.

That is to say, His Knowledge is never 'separate'
from That which He Knows. If [His Knowledge] is
separate from That which He Knows, then He is not
Perfect, for the things known reflect the quality of
greatness in the Knower. If the Knower is devoid of
the Known, then the greatness and sovereignty of the
Knower is destroyed, for the things known reflect the
greatness and sovereignty of the Knower. According
to one point of view the things known are new [i.e.
produced, temporal events] as they are derived from
Knowledge; and Knowledge is derived from [His Attribute
of] Life; and Life is derived from the Essence; [the
Essence] is 'prior' [in point of logic] to all else.
The judgment concerning the things known, then, is
that they are new [i.e. produced events]. However,
[between the People of the Path and the Doctors of
Theology] there is disagreement concerning freedom
of choice, which according to the Law refers to freedom
of choice of the creatures, [that is, according to
the Law,] that the creatures are given by God freedom
of choice. If he does good he will achieve Heaven;
if he does evil he will acquire Hell - both through
his own freedom of choice. The People of the Path
say that if this were so, then [the doctrine that]
khayrihi wa sharihi mina’Llāhi Ta’ālā - good and
evil are from God Most Exalted - is destroyed.
According to us the creatures have no freedom of
choice. Since they possess no being whatever, they
accordingly possess no freedom of choice. As God
Most Exalted says:

Wa law shā’a’Llāhu laja’alakum umnatan
[46] wahidatan wa laakin yudillu man yashā’u
wa yahdī man yashā’u ... 1683

that is:

And if God please, He would make you
a single nation, but He leaves in error
whom He pleases and guides whom He pleases ...

Since the creatures possess no being how can they
have freedom of choice? Listen to our analogy.
Take the example of an ironsmith. He has with him
a piece of iron, a heritage from his ancestors.
The potentiality of the iron is that it is suitable

1683. Qur’ān 16:93.
for fashioning into a keris. He perceives with his knowledge that the iron is suitable for fashioning into a keris, and so he forges it into a keris. Having forged it into a keris, he then uses it. After a while he stabs a person with the keris. [The act] proceeds from the wielder of the keris, and not from the keris. From the beginning to the end [of the event] the act proceeds from the wielder of the keris. The lord of the keris in fact acts in accordance with the potentialities of the keris (just as a person is caused by Hin to be an unbeliever according to his eternal potentiality, so the act of God the Glorious and Most Exalted works in conformity with that potentiality). To that extent only can we attribute freedom of choice to the creature, for the potentialities of the creatures abide in His Knowledge - that is, they abide in God's Knowledge, never vanishing.

(25) Fa'lan - In the 'Most Compassionate' is the sun of Divine Majesty.

That is to say, Raḥmān, [i.e. the Compassionate One] Who is the Lord of Mercy mentioned

1684. A Malay dagger.
before when giving existence to the World together with all its parts is not 'separate' from the Divine Perfection. As God Most Exalted says:

Al-Rahmān
'Allāma'l-Qur'ān
Khalqa'l-insān
'Allānahu'l-bayān. 1686

that is:

The Compassionate One
Who taught [47] the Qur'ān (God's Eternal Speech through symbolic expression).
He created man (by His Eternal Mercy), Taught him all that which is evident.

There is also a Saying of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!):

"Lā tasubbū'l-riyāḥa innahu min nafasi'l-Rahmān."

that is:

"Do not revile the wind; verily it is of the Breath of the Compassionate One."

The allusion referred to in this [saying] may have only few indications, but the meanings are many. One meaning is that it [i.e. the wind] has many

1685. See below, p. 40 of the text.
beneficial qualities. Further, the Prophet (nay God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Inna'Llāha khalāqa ādāmā 'alā šūrati'l-Rahmān."

that is:

"Verily God created Adan in the image of the Compassionate One."

God the Glorious, Most Exalted is particularized in the Form of the Compassionate One because Rahmān is not 'separate' from the Name of God Most Exalted (that is, Rahmān is the Being of the World). According to one analogy, Adam is also a World; according to the Law he is the microcosm, according to the Truth he is the macrocosm. As God Most Exalted says:

Al-Rahmānu 'alāl-'arshi' stawā. 1687

that is:

The Compassionate One is established on the Throne (of Power).

Whosoever does not ponder over this Qur'ānic verse is [immersed in] infidelity, for therein are many hidden indications. According to the People of the Path, [the verse refers] to the Reality of all creatures

1687. Qur'ān 20:5.
- that is, [the Reality of all creatures] is established on the Throne, although in fact the particularization of location is not applicable to God Most Exalted, even if such a particularization is made. Hence Majesty is attributed to Him because the sun of all existence is derived from His Eternal Mercy. [48]

(26)  

Fa'lan - And upon all Beauty the 'Most Merciful' holds sway.

That is to say, Rahîn is Divino Mercy particularized in all aspects of Beauty, for Beauty is the Attribute of all that is good, [and It is particularized] especially in Prophets, Saints, the Righteous, the Lovers and the Gnostics - and many more examples impossible to mention. All these are derived from Divine Beauty. Is for the saying of God Most Exalted:

Fa subhâna'l-ladhi biyâdihi malakûtu
Kulli shay'in wa ilayhi turja'ûn.  

that is:

So glory be to Him in Whose hand is the Reality of all things! And to Him you will be returned.

and the saying of God Most Exalted:


1689. Hanzah interprets malakûtu literally: kingdom, to mean the haqîqat: reality, of all things.
... Khalaqtu biyadayya. 1690

that is:

... I created [with] both my hands.

[by both His hands] is meant Power and Will, and not hands like the hands of the creature. According to one expression by His two hands is meant Beauty and Majesty; Beauty is likened to the right [hand] and Majesty is likened to the left [hand]. All that is good comes into being from the right [hand; all] that is evil comes into being from the left [hand]. It must not be believed that God Most Exalted has hands, or has a right and a left, for He is far most pure above having hands and having a right and a left. Divine Beauty is from the Attributes of the All-Merciful, but It is not 'separate' from the Eternal, Compassionate One.

(27) Fa'lam - Our Lord is He Who is called Exalted.

That is to say, [by Most High is meant] lofty beyond calculation, beyond temporal measure, for His highest Name is 'He'. The reason why 'He' is said to be Most High is because [He] is the Symbolic Name of the Essence. The Essence, although [49] It can

1690. Qur'an 38:75.
be conceived in terms of symbolical expression is, in Its Innermost Nature, beyond knowledge, for It cannot be conceived. Although It is One, there is no oneness [to Its Oneness], and although It is Single, there is no singleness [to Its Singleness]. We predicate of It Attributes, Essence, and Names merely as symbolical expressions.

(28) Fa'lan - With all His Attributes forever abiding.

That is to say, He is ever at one with His Attributes, forever and ever, without being 'separate' from [His] Attributes. In the same manner that 'before' He was never 'separate' from His Attributes, so 'after' [He] will never be 'separate' from His Attributes. 'Before' or 'after', or one was [with Him] and one is not with Him, or one Attribute was there 'before' and is gone 'after', or 'before' [one Attribute] was not [with Him] and 'after' [It] is with Him - all these belong to [the category of] imperfection. 1691 This is the meaning of ['With all His attributes] forever enduring'.

1691. 'Before' and 'After' here refer to the states of the Essence conceived as indeterminate and determinate respectively. They may also refer to "pre-creation" and "post-creation".
Fa'lan - Upon the Universe entire His effects take form.

That is to say, upon the entire Universe His Effects flow, like the waters of the river flowing without cessation, without end. As God Most Exalted says:

Kulla yawmin huwa fi shā'nin.\(^{1692}\)

that is:

Every day He is in some state (of Activity). The People of the Path say that by 'day' [is meant] 'the twinkling of an eye',\(^{1693}\) for there is no such a thing as 'day' with respect to God. Further God Most Exalted says:

Allahu nūru'l-sanāwātī wa'l-arḍi nathalu nūrihi ...\(^{1694}\)

that is:

God is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The similitude of His Light ...

The People of the Path say that this world is His Manifestation, for God the Glorious and Exalted, His Essence, His Attributes, [His Names,] His Acts

---

1693. See Qur'ān 54:50.
1694. Qur'ān 24:35.
and His Effects are continuously manifest [50].

For this reason ʿAbū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (nay God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Mā raʿaytu shayʿan illā wa raʿaytuʿLlāha qablahu."

that is:

"I see nothing except that I see God before it."

'Umar (may God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Mā raʿaytu shayʿan illā wa raʿaytuʿLlāha baʿdahu."

[that is:]  

"I see nothing except that I see God after it."

'Uthmān (may God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Mā raʿaytu shayʿan illā wa raʿaytuʿLlāha maʿahu."

that is:

"I see nothing except that I see God with it."
'Ali (may God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Mā ra'aytu shay'an illā wa ra'aytu'LLāha fīHi."  

that is:

"I see nothing except that I see God in it."  

These four were uppermost in their gnosis, for God Most Exalted says:

Fa aynamā tuwallū fa thamma wajhu'LLāh.  

that is:

Wherever you turn there is [the Face of God] (meaning: His Essence).

By face [is not meant the face of the creatures;]

that is, the Essence of God Most Exalted is without a face - it is His

Essence that embraces all. As God Most Exalted says in the Book of Psalms:

\[ \text{Anā'l-mawjūdu fa'tlubnī tajidnī fa' in ta'tluba siwā'I lan tijidnī.} \]

that is:

"I am the Existent One, seek Me and you will find Me;
If you seek other than Me, you will not find Me.

This is His Effects upon the entire Universe.

(30) \text{Fa'llan - From six directions, for this reason, He is Alone.}

That is to say, He is not restricted to the six directions. It is said that He is free, [because] if it is said that He is above, He is also below, if it is said that He is below, He is also above; if it is said that He is on the right, He is also on the left; if it is said that He is on the left, He is also on the right; if it is said that He is in front, He is also behind; if it is said that He is behind, He is also in front, for indeed God Most Exalted says:

1696. I have not been able to trace this.
Qul huwa’llâhu a’had
aller hu’l-ṣanad
Lan yâlid wa lan yûlad
Wa lan yakun lahu kufu’an a’had.\textsuperscript{1697}

that is:

Say (0 Mu’ammad): He is God, One.
(Further) He is the Lord Who 'fills' all
another meaning:
'crams into' all; another meaning: All-
Embracing [in His Eternal Plenitude]
He begets not, nor is He begotten;
And there is none like unto Him.

Since such are His Attributes, no spatial categories
can be ascribed to Him. And as God Most Exalted
says further:

\textit{Thalâthatin illâ huwa râbi’uhun}
khansatin illâ huwa sâdisuhun
wa lâ adnâ nin dhâlika wa lâ akthara
illâ huwa na’ahun.\textsuperscript{1698}

that is:

[There is no counsel between] three people
but He is the fourth of then, nor between
five people but He is the sixth of them, nor
between less than that or more but He is
with then ... 

These words are an allusion to God the Glorious and

\textsuperscript{1697. Qur’ân 112: 1-4.}
\textsuperscript{1698. Qur’ân 58:7.}
Most Exalted being free from spatial categories. This analogy, though [seemingly] not much, contains much meaning. But God alone knows best!

(31) Fa'lan - The Light of His Effects will never die out.

That is to say, the Light of His Imprints will never die out. Since God, Glorious and Most Exalted is called [Outwardly Manifest], how can His Outward Manifestation die out [i.e. cease to be], seeing that He is forever not 'separate' from His Attributes? On the Day of Resurrection, although His Outward Manifestation will cease to be, [as far as the present Theatre of Manifestation is concerned], His Outward Manifestation is nevertheless concealed in His Inward Hiddenness, and His Inward Hiddenness is concealed in His Outward Manifestation, for He it is Who is called [52] the First, He it is Who is called the Last; He it is Who is called the Outwardly Manifest, and He it is Who is called the Inwardly Hidden; and this is so because the Effects of His Outward Manifestation in His Inward Hiddenness do not die out, the Effects of His Inward Hiddenness in His Outward Manifestation do not die out; [the Effects of His Firstness in His Lastness do not die out,] the Effects of His
Lastness in His Firstness do not die out.

(32) Fa'lan - Giving existence to the Universe entire.

That is to say, His Effects are most clearly manifested upon the whole world, and not hidden, for they exist through the Mercy of the Compassionate One, and give existence to the entire World. Were it not for that existence [i.e. the existence of Mercy of the Compassionate One], how can Effects be derived? Since the effects upon the whole World are His Effects, [the World] thereby derives existence. The analogy is, as it were, clay fashioned into drinking vessels, or cooking pots, or water jars, or earthen containers; the clay is the original being of all the earthen vessels. Were it not for the clay, how can the drinking vessel and the cooking pot acquire existence? From the point of view of external Law, the being of the drinking vessel is other than the being of the clay. From the point of view of inner Reality being refers to [the clay]; earthen ware vessels are without being, the clay alone [has being] for all the forms are illusory and not real.

1699. See above, note 617.
This is the meaning of 'Giving existence to the entire Universe'.

(33) Fa'lan - Creating creation day and night.

That is to say, it is His Effects that are called 'existence', for [They] become the existence of the creatures. The analogy is, as it were, earth; without rain how can plants grow? The earth is likened to God's Knowledge, rain is existence, the plants are the creatures. The earth is in itself earth, and the rain is in itself water [53]. When they conmingle, the plants begin to grow. The plants that grow out of earth and water are determined by the Law of Potentiality: some grow becoming bitter, some sweet, some tart; some grow becoming green, some red, some white, some black. Colours and all taste [come into being] according to the Law of the Pure Potentialities. The water is in itself water, the earth is in itself earth. The plants grow out of earth and water, but their forms and colours [come into being] in accordance with their potentialities. As God Most Exalted says:

\[\text{Yusqā bi mā'in wāhidin wa nufaddīlu ba'dāhā 'alā ba'dīn fī'l-ukuli.}\]

1700. See above, p. 260.
that is:

... they are watered with one water;
and We make some of them to excell
others (in taste) in food.

This analogy is applied to the World: originating
from existence there come forth day and night, the
heavens and the earth, the Throne and the Footstool,
Heaven and Hell, the believer and the unbeliever,
good and evil - [all] by virtue of their respective
potentialities. The Essence of God is Most Pure.
The creatures are many and have contraries because
His Attributes are many, [His Names are many,] His
Acts are many, His Effects are many, and the poten­
tialities of all creatures are in His Attributes.
Works that are good come from the Attributes of
Divine Beauty, works that are evil come from the
[Attributes of] Divine Majesty. The origin of Divine
Majesty and Divine Beauty is from Being; the origin
of Being [54] is from the Essence. In reality all
[come to be] because of Him; other than He, this
World has no existence whatever for He is One, without
partner. 1702 This is the meaning of ['Creating]

That is to say, God's Plenitude and Self-Sufficiency will never cease [to be reflected] in the things known, [from their archetypal state] to this world; from this world to the hereafter; from the hereafter to Eternity. The dwellers of Paradise will never cease to be, perpetually; the inhabitants of Hell too [will never cease to be,] perpetually. As God Most Exalted says:

Jaza'uhum 'inda rabbihim jannātu 'adnin tajri min taḥtihā'l-anhāru khālidīna fīhā abadan.1703

that is:

Those who believe,) their reward is with their Lord:
Gardens of perpetuity1704 beneath which rivers flow, abiding therein forever.

God Most Exalted says further:

1704. Ḥamzah has for jannātu 'adnin a loose translation: tempatnya shurga: i.e. their Abode is Paradise.
Inna' l-ladhīna kafarū wa ḏalamū lam yakuni' Llāhu liyaghfira lahun wa lā liyahdiyahum tarīqan illā tarīqah jahannama khālidīnā rīhā abadan.\(^{1705}\)

that is:

Verily those who disbelieve and act unjustly, God will never forgive them, nor guide them to a path. Except the path of hell, to abide in it forever.

This is the meaning of 'Forever and ever it will never cease.'

(35) \textit{Fa'lam} - Our Lord is like a Fathomless Ocean. That is to say, God's Essence is likened to a Deep Ocean, for the Innermost Essence cannot enter into conception. It is only Its Predispositions that are likened to this Fathomless Ocean. Hence the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Subhānaka mā 'arafnā ka ḥaqqa ma'rifatika."

that is:

Glory be to [55] Thee, we do not know Thee with true knowledge of Thee!

(that is, the Innermost Essence cannot be known).

\(^{1705}\) Qur'ān 4:168-169.
For this reason [the Innermost Essence] is likened to an Ocean that is Boundless and Fathomless. If it has limits and has depth, or has a beginning and an end, then it is something created; but with respect to God, Glorious and Most Exalted, such things are not among His Attributes.

(36) **Fa'lam - Whose waves are rolling in every direction.**

That is to say, [its waves are rolling] in every direction. That which we perceive, whether outwardly or inwardly, all disappear - they are as waves. The Ocean is not 'separate' from its waves, and the waves too are not 'separate' from the ocean. In like manner God, Glorious and Most Exalted is not 'separate' from the World. But [He] is neither 'in' the World nor 'outside' it; neither 'above' nor 'below' it; neither to the 'right' nor to the 'left' of it; neither in 'front' of nor 'behind' it; neither 'separate' from nor 'joined' to it; neither 'near' to nor 'far' from it. As the Lam'at says:

"Daryā kuhan chū barzand mawjū naw
Mawjish khwānand [u] dar ḥaqīqat daryāst ..."1706

1706. Lama'āt, Lam'at III, p. 332.
that is:

"The sea is always the same, when it heaves, then it becomes waves. People say "waves," but in reality it is the sea ..."

for sea and waves are not 'separate'.

The Lam'at says further:

"Khalawtu bi man ahwā fa lam yaku ghayrunā
Wa law kāna ghayrī lam yasiḥh wujūduḥā."¹⁷⁰⁷

that is:

"I went in seclusion with [56] my beloved and there is none but us; [And if there is other than me, then her existence is inadmissible ...]"

The Lam'at says:

"Ragqu'1-zujāju wa rāqati'l-khamru
Fa tashābahā fa tashākula'l-amru
Fa ka'annamā khamrun wa lā qadahu
Wa ka'annamā qadahun wa lā khamru."¹⁷⁰⁸

that is:

The glass is fine and the wine is clear, their resemblance is indistinguishable; as if it were wine without a cup,

¹⁷⁰⁷. Lam'āt, Lam'āt XII, p. 342.
¹⁷⁰⁸. Lam'āt, Lam'āt V, p. 335.
And as if it wore a cup without wine. This is the meaning of 'Whose waves are rolling in every direction'.

(37) Fa'lam - Ocean and Waves are both intimate. That is to say, the ocean and the waves are both in intimate companionship, such as, for example, slave and Lord, lover and Beloved. As God Most Exalted says:

\[ \text{Inna'}l-ladhina yubāyi'}ūnaka innamā yubāyi'}ūna'}Llāha ... \]

that is:

1709. Cp. Junayd's famous saying: "Lawnu'}l-mā'}i lawnu ina'}ihi" - "The colour of the water is the colour of the vessel containing it." Also Shāh Ni'matu' Llāh:

Know that the Named is one and the Names a hundred thousand,
That Being is one, but its aspects are a hundred thousand.
Its Form is the Glass, and its Meaning the Wine,
Although both are one substance in your eyes.
Perceive in two one unit and two units;
Search it out well for I have told you a good bit.

(Literary history of Persia, III, p. 472).
Verily those who swear allegiance\textsuperscript{1710} to thee they do but swear allegiance to God ...

\textit{Yadu'Llāhi fawqa aydīhim.}\textsuperscript{1711}

that is:

The hand of God is above their hands.

God Most Exalted says further:

\textit{Falam taqtulūhum wa lākinna'Llāha gatalahum wa mā ramayta idh ramayta wa lākinna'Llāha rama'.}\textsuperscript{1712}

that is:

So [you] slew them not, but God slew them, and thou smote not (with thine arrow O Muhammad) [when thou didst smite (the enemy)], but God smote him.

God Most Exalted says further:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{1710.} Hamzah has, for 'swear allegiance', \textit{berjabat tangan:} clasp (their) hands. In the Sufi Orders it is part of the practise for the disciple to take the bay'ah from his Spiritual Guide, after a certain period of training and study, and this takes the form of the clasping of the hand of the Shaykh by the murid as an oath of allegiance to him. The practise has its origin in the practise of the Prophet as revealed in this Qur'ānic verse. See for \textit{bay'ah} E.I. article \textit{Bai'}. Cf. the continuation of this verse quoted by Hamzah.
\item \textbf{1711.} Qur'ān 48:10.
\item \textbf{1712.} Qur'ān 8:17.
\end{itemize}
that is:

He is with you wherever you are.

God Most Exalted says further:

that is:

And We are nearer to him than his neck veins.

God Most Exalted says further [in the Holy Tradition]:

that is:

[57] Man is My secret and I am his Secret.

For this reason the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Whosoever knows his Self knows his Lord" -

for he and his Lord are not 'separate'. In the same manner as the sea and the waves are not 'separate', so [the Lord and His slave are not 'separate']. This is the meaning of 'the 'Ocean and Waves are both intimate'.

1714. Qur'ān 50:16.
(38) Fa'lan - At last to its depths the Waves will sink.

That is to say, the waves subside into the Ocean. The waves come from the ocean, and their return, too, is to the ocean. This is the meaning of [the text]: irji'ī ila aslihi - return thou to thy origin - as said by God Most Exalted:

... irji'ī ila rabbiki raḍiyatan mardiyyah.1715

that is:

... return [thou] to thy Lord well pleased, well pleasing.

The Lovers understand 'return' to mean that when the lover sees his self no more, he 'returns' to the depths of the ocean and 'becomes' the ocean. If he still sees his self, then he is still not returning and he is not yet 'drowned'. In the opinion of Lovers [the state of still seeing their selves] is called "polytheism". This is the meaning of 'At last to its depths the Waves will sink'.

(39) Fa 'lam - The Ocean is Knower, its currents the Known.

That is to say, the ocean already mentioned above

is allegorically likened to the Knower in order that the analogy of the Knower and the Known may be grasped by the seeker. Since what is called 'ocean' is [in fact] water, when the ocean heaves it is called 'currents'; when [the water vapours] rise and gather in the atmosphere they are called 'clouds'; when [the clouds burst and] fall in drops from the atmosphere they are called 'rain'; when [the rains] flow on the earth [58] they are called 'rivers'; when [the rivers] return to the ocean they are the ocean. The currents are likened to the Known because currents come from the ocean, but they are not distinct from the ocean. In like manner the Knower is not 'separate' from the Known, and the Known not 'separate' from the Knower. If Knower is without Known, then logically He is not Knower, [and it follows, therefore, that] He cannot create. Forms and colours come from what is formless and colourless. That which has no form and no colour is the Being of all forms and colours. That which has no form and no colour is the inwardly hidden; that which has form and colour is the outwardly manifest. This is the meaning of 'The Ocean is Knower, its currents the Known.
(40) Fa'lam - Its condition is Qāsim, its waves are Maqsūm.

That is to say, [the meaning] of Qāsim is One Who Divides; Maqsūm are the ones divided. Since God Most Exalted bestows existence upon the Universe together with all its parts, [He] is called One Who Apportions. The World in its entirety is like the waves; its name is the Apportioned, for the waves [appear] out of the existential modes of the ocean. The Existential Modes of God Glorious and Most Exalted are called that of One Who Apportions, the existential modes of the entire Universe [are called] that of the Apportioned. The ocean is likened to the Divine Essence; the existential modes of the ocean are like the Existential Modes of the Divine Essence; the currents are like the existential modes of the World; the waves are like the forms of the World. According to this analogy, the ocean, the water, the waves, the forms of the waves, the colours of the waves, the names of the waves are all one. This is the meaning of 'Its condition is Qāsim, its waves are Maqsūm.'

(41) Fa'lam - Its tempest is 'governing', its dispositions are 'governed'.

That is to say [59] its tempest is an analogy
referring to [His Command] 'Be!' to His Manifestations, and His Attributes, and His Names, and His Acts, and His Effects, and His Knowledge, and His Known, and His Hearing, and His Sight, and His Will, and His Power, and His Speech, and His Irresistability, and His Omnipotence, and His Strength in giving succour and His Might in rendering humble, and His Compassion, and His Infinite Mercy, and His Munificence. One He causes to believe; one He causes to disbelieve; one He causes to be rich; one He causes to be poor; one He allows always to transgress; one He allows always to do good; one He allows always to do evil; one He causes to enter Heaven; one He causes to enter Hell; one He allows to do many devotional acts and then causes him to enter Heaven; [one He allows to commit many sins and then He causes him to enter Hell]; one from the believers He causes to disbelieve; one from the unbelievers He causes to believe. This is the meaning of ['Its tempest is 'governing'] its dispositions are 'governed'.

1716. For paras (40) and (41) above see the interpretation above, pp. 270-273.
Fā'lam - Upon the entire Universe it is these that are featured.

That is to say, upon the entire Universe His Predispositions are featured. From its beginning to its end, from its inner concealment to its external manifestation - [all these] are but His Predispositions. His Predispositions are governed by His Tempest [i.e. His Creative Command,] for the entire World is His Predispositions. The meaning of His "Predispositions" is His "Existential Modes". Everything is forever His Predispositions, dynamic,¹⁷¹⁷ as God Most Exalted says:

Kullū yawmin huwa fī shā'īn.¹⁷¹⁸

[that is:]

Every day He is in some state [of Activity]. All forms are His Forms, all colours His Colours, all sounds His Sounds for He is One, without partner (wahdahu lā sharīka lahu).¹⁷¹⁹ If [60] it is said that there is an 'other' apart from Him, then that would be polytheism and darkness. For this reason all the Lovers who have perfect gnosis say:

---

"I see my Lord with the Eye [of my Lord] Shaykh Mas'ūd (God's Mercy be upon him!) says:
"I have always been an unbeliever!" Sayyid Nasīmī says:
"Innī anā'Llāhu." that is:
"Verily I am God!"
Shaykh Junayd Baghdādī (God's Mercy be upon him!) says:
"Laysa fī jubbatī siwā'Llāh." that is:
"There is nothing in my cloak save God!"
The Sultān of the Gnostics Bā Yazīd Bīstānī (God's Mercy be upon him!) says:
"Subḥānī nā aẓama shā'nī." that is:
"Glory be to me, how great is my state!"
There are many more Shaykhs - impossible to mention them all - who say [such things]. They all say such things because their gnosis is perfect. We who are

1720. Cf. Sharāb, p. 10 and notes 604, 607. Also Muntahi, p. 120.
1722. This is a well-known Sufi denial of self. To believe implies affirmation of duality of believer and believed.
without gnosis must not say such things - we must not imitate [their utterances] to the point that the pundits would declare infidelity upon us - [and they declare such charges] in order that all those who are ignorant, who have no gnosis, will not say such things, for gnosis is most recondite. Whosoever has not yet attained to perfect gnosis and love such as those [Shaykhs], if they say such things as they [i.e. the Shaykhs] say, he is an unbeliever. This is the meaning of 'Upon the entire Universe, it is these that are featured'.

(43) Fa'lam - If you really know [the meaning of] existence.

That is to say, 'Existence' which is referred to from the beginning of this book right to its end. That Existence must be known through gnosis, for that Existence is not our existence. Because of our ignorance we imagine [that Existence] to be our existence. It is for this reason that [61] the People of the Path say:

Wujūduka dhanbun lā yuqāsu
that is:

Your existence is a sin with which no other sin can be compared - for to the People of the Path his illusionary existence is 'secret polytheism'; when he says "your existence" [it were as though] he [to whom existence is predicated] is self-subsistent, and this is indeed secret polytheism: [by this is meant that] if he [affirms that he really] exists, then he [considers himself to] possess existence. This is the meaning of 'If you really know [the meaning] of existence'.

(44) Fa'lam - It is where you effect true vision.

That is to say, by vision is meant "to see".

The existence of this World is but illusory, and you must not cast your sight upon illusory existence.

You must see only the Existence that always is, for the existence of the creatures is derived from His

1723. From a verse quoted by Junayd:

'Idha qultu ma adhabat qalat mujibatan hayatuka dhanbun la yugi asu bihi dhanbun akharu.'

See Kashif al-Mahjub, p. 297. See also Tadhkirat al-Awliya', p. 102. Note 186 above. In this wujud is synonymous with hayat and this is significant in Hamzah's use of the term here.

1724. Pandang, see above, note 667.
Existence. Seeing that the existence of the creatures is derived from His Existence, our existence is His Existence. As the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace) says:

"Allāhumma arīnī 'l-ashyā' a kāmā hiya."

that is:

"O my Lord, reveal to my sight all things as they are."

Now the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) knows of [the existence of] all things, but [he] wishes further to know of the reality of their existence. As [the existence of] things and [the existence of] the self are identical, when you are able to know [the existence of] the self [you will be able to know the reality of the self]. As God Most Exalted says:

\[\text{Wa idhā sa' ala ka 'ibādi 'annī fa' innī qarīb.}^{1725}\]

that is:

And when My servants [ask thee] concerning Me surely I am nigh.

But of His nearness, that must be understood. Further God Most Exalted says:

________________________________________________________________________

648

Wa'llāhu bi kulli shay'in muḥīṭ.\(^{1726}\)

that is:

God surely encompasses all things

Further Shaykh Junayd (may God's mercy be upon him!) says:

"Lawnu' l-mā'i lawnu [62] inā'ihi."\(^{1727}\)

that is:

"The colour of the water is the colour of the vessel containing it."

All these expressions and symbolic allusions must be understood in order that gnosis of God Most Exalted may be achieved. When you have achieved the gnosis of God Most Exalted, then you will be able to see the Original and True Existence, [that is, Existence] that always is, not illusory existence. This is the meaning of 'It is where you effect true vision'.

(45) Fa'ilam - Cast off your form from all restrictions.

That is to say, the meaning of quyūd is 'restrictions'. All forms that can be seen and apprehended by the intellect and gnosis are restrictions. Since

---

1726. Qur'an 41:54.
the Essence of God is Absolute, it is not to be 'found' in our forms; and the forms of the World in its entirety, the outwardly manifest and inwardly hidden, are 'other' than the Unique Essence. That is Absolute. When we cast away all restrictions with our vision and in our conception, then only can we be 'united' with the Absolute, meaning: the Being Who is Most Pure, beyond form.1728 One interpretation of 'restrictions' is that it means worldly wealth and greatness and wife and children. That is to say, 'if you are wealthy do not let your heart cling to worldly wealth and wife and children, as God Most Exalted says:

... Likay lā ta'saw 'alā mā fātakum
wa lā tafrahū bi mā atākum.1729

that is:

... [in order that] you may not grieve for what has escaped you, nor be exultant at what He has given you.

When you are suffering a loss, do not grieve on account of it; when you enjoy abundance, do not rejoice on account of it, even if it should be great, you must

1728. See above, p. 282.
not rejoice on account of it; and should it be insignificant, you must not [63] grieve on account of it; should God bestow upon you health and well-being, do not rejoice in it; should God inflict upon you sickness, do not grieve - all these are but restrictions. When you are far from restrictions, then you will be 'united' with the Absolute. This is the meaning of ['Cast off your form from all] restrictions'.

(46) Fa'lam - In order that you may abide in your Self.

That is to say, the meaning of qu'ūd is to abide (in the Self). This means that you must not seek [God] further than within your Self, for God Most Exalted says:

Wa fī anfusikum a fa lā tubṣirūn.\(^1\)\(^7\)\(^3\)\(^0\)

that is:

And in your Self - do you not see?

Furthermore the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu."

that is:

"Whosoever knows his Self knows his Lord."

\(^1\)\(^7\)\(^3\)\(^0\) Qur'ān 51:21.
When one's Lord is thus known, then one will be able to be indifferent to all else; whether being clothed [or naked], it is the same to him; whether being rich or poor, it is the same to him; whether being great or insignificant, it is the same to him; whether being praised or scorned, it is the same to him; he does not desire heaven nor does he fear hell.

As for the poor who begs for food, according to the Prescribed Law that is lawful inasmuch as it is sufficient to give him strength for a day or two. But if he begs [for food to last him] for the morrow and the day after that, then that is 'polytheism', for [in doing so] he desires to preserve his self.\(^\text{1731}\)

If he behaves in this manner, then he is not yet extinct from his self. All such actions of his are restrictions. As God Most Exalted says:

\[
\text{Fa tawakkalū in kuntum mu'minīn.}\]

that is:

Surrender yourselves to God, if ye be [64] faithful.

However, should sustenance come by itself, that is, what is bestowed upon him by God Most Exalted, then

\(^{1731}\). See above, pp. 57 of the text, para. (38); and 61 para. (43).

\(^{1732}\). Qur'an 5:23.
this should be eaten. If [sustenance] does not come, do not seek it nor beg from creatures. To the Lovers, one should not even ask of God, so that then only can one be released from restrictions. As the Lam'at says:

"Al-faqīru lā yahtāju ilā'Llāh."\(^1\)

that is:

"The poor does not stand in need of God."

[If he stands in need of God], then he is still in the state of duality [i.e. of slave and Lord]; but if he does not stand in need [of God] then he is able to become one [with God]. As regards [the matter of] going about naked, the Doctors of Theology and the People of the Path agree in saying that it is unlawful as the private parts are exposed. Being clothed modestly and cloaked and trousered and being equipped with a beggar's bowl, and sandalled and having cultivation - these according to the Prescribed Law are permissible, and according to the People of the Path are also permissible as they are not restrictions. But to the Lovers all these are veils and restrictions upon the Self. Matters that refer to these things are matters that do not realize (moniyyatkan) whatever

\(^1\) Lama'āt, Lam'at XX, p. 352.
God desires, as one's desires are all of them veils and restrictions. However, the prescribed prayers and fasting, and eating of what is lawful and refraining from what is unlawful - all these are not restrictions, because these are in accordance with God's desire and not with our desire; that is to say, because these are God's Commandments. But whosoever is conscious of cold and warmth, and being well fed and hungry, and being naked and clothed - if he leaves off the prescribed prayers and fasting, if he constantly eats of what is unlawful, the judgment is that he is disobedient [i.e. sinful]. Such a person [65] will not be able to become a saint. However, if he is passionate in his love [of God] and is intoxicated and effaced - he is not conscious of his self - and he leaves off the prescribed prayers and fasting, no blame is upon him, for the judgment concerning such a case is that he is in a state of constant prayer. But if he is not yet intoxicated and effaced - still conscious of his self - and he leaves off the prescribed prayers and fasting, then his doings are veils [concealing the right path], and they are restrictions, and sinful. [He] cannot abide within his Self!
Fa'lam - Upon God's Existence you must subsist.

That is to say, upon God's Existence only must you cast your vision with perfect gnosis. Do not be heedless of prayer and fasting, and walking and standing and sitting and reclining, God Most Exalted says this:

Wa'dhkur rabbaka fi nafsika ta'darru'an wa khifatan wa duna'l-jahri mina'l-qawli bi'l-ghuduwwi wa'1-âsâlî wa 1â takun mina'l-ghâfilîn.\(^{1734}\)

that is:

And mention [i.e. remember] thy Lord within thyself humbly and fearing, and in a voice not loud, in the morning and the evening, and be thou not of the heedless (that is to say, do not be heedless of all your behaviour, as God Most Exalted says: Wa huwa ma'akum aynâmâ kuntum\(^{1735}\) - that is: And He is with you wherever you may be).

Of those who have not yet become perfect and have not yet achieved true gnosis, it is better for them that eat and drink and sleep be lessened, conversation must be lessened, sitting [66] in congregations must

\(^{1734}\) Qur'ân 7:205.
\(^{1735}\) Qur'ân 57:4.
be lessened - in the course of their not yet being perfect and achieving true gnosis. As to whether to eat or not to eat; to sit with people or not to sit with people; to converse or to be silent; to seek the wilderness or the city - all these are not veils to them. Seeing that all these are not veils to them, they can then sleep, and they can sit with people, and they can converse with people, and they can have wife and children; neither more nor less than the doings of the Prophet Muhammad, the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!). This is indeed what is best.

(48) **Fa'lam** - Cast off your name and your form constantly.

That is to say, cast off your name and your form, for you possess no name and form. Your form is but the form of a shadow, and your name is but an appellation. Because of your unawareness you imagine that you possess name and form. The People of the Path say that that which possesses the Name is not your name, and that which possesses the Form is not your form. It is incumbent upon you to fix your vision upon the Possessor of the Form and the Possessor of the Name in order that your name and form may be
cast away. When your name and your form are cast away, then you will be able to be 'united' with the Possessor of the Name and the Possessor of the Form. When you are 'united' with the Possessor of the Name and the Possessor of the Form, then you will be able to be 'united' with Being. When you are 'united' with Being, then you will be able to be 'united' with the Essence. When you are 'united' with the Essence, name and form are both cast off.

(49) Fa'lam - Annihilate your consciousness from Lordship [67] and slavehood.

That is to say, annihilate your self from [consciousness in] the worshipper and the Worshipped. If the worshipper and the Worshipped still exist [in your consciousness] then you are still in [the state of] duality and have not yet become one [with God]. As the People of the Path say:

'Man 'abada'l-ismo dūna'l-ma'nā faqad kafara ...

that is:

'Whosoever worships the name without the meaning, then he has become an infidel ...

1736. The word bertemu: to meet (active sense) actually translates the Arabic wasil.
Wa man 'abada'l-nā dūna'l-isma fahuwa mushrikun ...

that is:

And whosoever worships the meaning without the name, then he is a polytheist ...

Wa man 'abada'l-isma wa'l-ma'nā fahuwa nunāfigun ...

that is:

And whosoever worships the name and the meaning, then he is a hypocrite ...

Wa man taraka'l-isma wa'l-ma'nā fahuwa mu'minum ḥaggān.'

that is:

And whosoever casts away the name and the meaning, then he is a true believer.'

Extinction is, from the point of view of expression, to annihilate all that which is 'other' than God.

If a person is extinct and yet is conscious of his own extinction, he is not yet extinct, for extinction is, from the point of view of expression, [to be extinct from] that which is 'other' than God. 1737

If one is not yet extinct from that which is 'other' than God, one has not yet [arrived at] extinction.

When one is extinct from that which is 'other' than God, then assuredly the worshipper and the Worshipped are annihilated from his consciousness - that is to say, he becomes one [with God] - he becomes non-existent - he is entirely annihilated. One expression is that 'extinction' is 'polytheism' with respect to God Most Exalted, for the lover has no existence. Seeing that he has no existence, he is then [perpetually in] extinction, for in reality He alone is, without any 'other'. As the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"'Araftu rabbi bi rabbi."

that is:

"I know my Lord through [68] my Lord."

Further the Lam'at says:

"Lā yara'LLāha ghayra'LLāh."

that is:

"None sees God but God."

The Lam'at says:

Mā 'arafa'LLāha ghayra'LLāh.

that is:

1738. I.e. tiada. See above, pp. 287-288.
1739. Lam'a'tat, Lam'a'tat IV, p. 333.
1740. Lam'a'tat, loc.cit.
"None knows God but God."

The Lam'at says:

"Ra'aytu rabbī bi 'ayni rabbī."¹⁷⁴¹

That is:

"I see my Lord with the Eye of my Lord."¹⁷⁴²

When he no longer sees that which is other than God, he is then, according to this expression, extinct.

[These words] are most recondite. It is desired that they be understood.

(50) Fa'ilam - In order that you may achieve the Act that is Final.

That is to say, when you are extinct, then you achieve the act that always is. As Uways al-Qarani¹⁷⁴³ says in the Persian language:

"Anrā ki fanā shewa faqrā[In] ast ...

that is:

"They who are extinct in the manner of poverty ...

"Nah kashf [u] yaqūIn nah mar'rifat nah dīn ast ...

¹⁷⁴¹. Lama'āt, Lam'at VI, p. 335.
¹⁷⁴². i.e. "I see my Lord with the Eye [i.e. Essence] of my Lord." There is a play of meaning on the word 'ayn.
¹⁷⁴³. For Uways see Tadhkiratu'l-Awliyā' II, pp. 15 foll.
that is:

Are without insight, and certainty, without gnosis and without religion ...

Raftū zi miyān hamīn khudā nānd khudā

that is:

They are annihilated in the midst of this state [i.e. God] - only God remains ...

Al-faqru  idhā tamma huwa'llāh īn ast. 1744

that is:

When poverty is perfect (i.e. their gnosis is accomplished) it is indeed God."

Here is another saying of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!):

"Al-faqru fakhri wa bihi aftakhiru".

that is:

"Poverty is my pride and in it I take pride."

According to the Prescribed Law, poverty means 'not possessing' [worldly possessions]. According to the People of the Path poverty refers to the People of Gnosis. When such a one is perfect in his gnosis - no longer seeing his self - he is called 'poor'. This is the meaning of ['In order that you may achieve] the Act that is Final'.

1744. See above, pp. 83; 373-375.
(51) Fa'lam - If you are yet not firm as a stone.1745

[69] That is to say, not to move; whether it be outwardly or inwardly, not to move. When you are firm as a stone, then you are 'united' from the point of view of expression, but in reality you are always united. If outwardly it [i.e. the stone] does not praise God, inwardly it praises God, for to the People of the Path, all things possess spirit and intellect and gnosis. If things have no gnosis, how can they praise God? - for such is the word of God in the Qur'ān:

Tusabbihu lahu'l-samāwātu['l-sab'u] wa'l-
ardu wa man fī hinna ... 1746

that is:

The seven heavens and the earth
and those in them declare His glory ...

Wa 'in min shay'īn illā yusabbihū biḥamdīhi
wa lākin lā tafqahūna tasbihāhum.1747

that is:

1745. This seems to refer to a passage in Qur'ān
1746. Qur'ān 17:44.
1747. Loc. cit.
And there is not a single thing but glorifies Him with His praise, but you do not understand their glorification.

Further God Most Exalted says:

'Alan tara anna'LLāha yasjudu lahu man fī'lsamāwātī wa man fī'l-ardī wa'lsḥamsu wa'lsqamaru wa'lsnjūmu wa'lsjībālu wa'lsḥajāru wa'lsdawwābbu wa kathīrun mina'lnās.¹⁷⁴⁸

that is:

Seeest thou not to God makes submission whosoever is in the earth, and the sun and the moon and the stars, and the mountains and the trees, and the animals and many of the people?

All things glorify and praise and make submission to God. When we are firm as a stone, then all our members make submission to God, as is [70] demonstrated in the Qur'ān.

(52) Fa'lam - Duality is still your lot: Slave and Lord.

That is to say, do not worship light; such as

the dew,\textsuperscript{1749} and the sun and the moon and the stars; and [do not worship images] such as idols;\textsuperscript{1750} and do not dwell in the station of the crown of the head, or between the eyebrows, or on the tip of the nose, or in the [physical] heart.\textsuperscript{1751} All these are veils that conceal His Essence. The People of the Path constantly surrender themselves to their Lord. They consent wholeheartedly to whatever their Lord's desire may be, whether it be sickness or poverty or any other thing as the case may be - to all such things they willingly give their consent. From the point of view of the Truth, if there is still lover, then the Beloved is still required; if there is still seeker, the Sought is still required; if there is

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{1749. Dow - embun. Probably mestika embun: petrified dew, is meant here; i.e. a talisman purporting to be made of petrified dew, which in reality is a small globe of very limpid glass. Supernatural and miraculous powers are attributed to it such as, for example, the power to bring the dead to life. See Wilkinson, articles embun and mestika.}
\footnote{1750. Rupa budak - literally: the figure of a child. Probably the word budak (child) refers to small figures kept in houses or roadside 'niches' or 'chapels' such as is common in Hindu-Buddhist practice.}
\footnote{1751. The reference here is to yogistic practice.}
\end{footnotes}
still worshipper, the Worshipped is still required; if there is still thought,\textsuperscript{1752} the Object thought is yet required; if there is still vision, the Object visualized is still required. All these and one's [individual] existence still imply duality not yet become unity. When you have passed away and become firm as a stone, then you are united - that is, one - as when you were in [the state of] 'I was a hidden treasure', or as a bubble in the water before it became bubble. According to this expression it is 'union'. But from the point of view of reality, the water's bubble and the water are not two [entities].

(53) 

\textit{Fa'lan} - When you are no longer conscious of gold and coin.\textsuperscript{1753}

That is to say, the analogy of gold refers to the Lord and coin refers to the slave, for to outward perception gold is other than coin and their names

\textsuperscript{1752} Chita: thought, concentration, feeling, will. See Wilkinson.

\textsuperscript{1753} The word I have translated as coin here is \textit{natu}, which is a variant of \textit{mutu}. It means measure of the purity of gold, which invariably refers to the gold coin, or at any rate to currency, since the purity of gold is measured in terms of currency. Hanzah himself means this. See \textit{Sharāb}, p. 14, para. (33), where gold is compared with the Ashrafi coin.
are not the same. But gold is not separate from coin [and coin] is not separate from gold. When the coin no longer sees itself, surely only gold remains. When gold [71] is seen, the coin disappears to outward perception. When the coin disappears, it is unconscious of 'its self' and 'it' is unconscious of gold. Similarly in the case of one who is annihilated - he no longer knows [of his own annihilation].

This expression is most recondite; discourse upon it slowly and do not be hasty. As Shaykh Muhyi’l-Din ibnu’l-'Arabi (may God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Al-na'rifatu hijābun bayna’l[-ārif wa’l-] na'rūf."

the meaning is:

"Gnosis is a veil between [the knower and] the known."

Shaykh Muhyi’l-Din says further:

"Law lā’l-naḥabbatu la’stamarra’l-wiṣāl."

that is:

"Had it not been for love, indeed union would endure" (for love is a veil between the [lover and the] Beloved).

These words are merely a symbolic allusion referring to extinction from gold and coin. When you are extinct
from gold and coin, then you are able to become united —
that is, one.

(54) \textit{Fa'lan} - \textit{Then indeed you can become one.}

That is to say, when the coin is extinct from
gold and coin, then the coin and gold become one.
If the coin still knows itself: "that I know", then
it cannot yet become one. Like the moth plunging
into fire, if it still knows itself: "that I have
become fire", then it is not yet united with fire.
When it unites with fire it becomes fire. When it
becomes fire, it will forget fire and it will forget
its self.\textsuperscript{1754} As Shaykh Sa'di (God's mercy be upon
him!) says:

\begin{quote}
"Ay murgh sahar 'ishq zi parwānah [72]

teyānūz ..."
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{1754} Hanzah is here referring to 'Attār's famous
story of the moths when illustrating his eluci-
dation of the Seventh Valley - the Valley of
Extinction - in his \textit{Mantiqu'1-Tayr} (See C.S.
Nott's English translation from the French of
Garcin de Tassy, \textit{The conference of the birds},
London, 1961, p. 125). The moths were tormented
by a desire to unite with the candle. One set
off and, having seen the candle, reported what
he saw. Then another went and touched the flame
with the tip of his wings. Finally a third
went and plunged himself into the flame and
became one with the flame. These three degrees
of knowledge correspond with 'ilmu'1-yaqīn,
'aynu'1-yaqīn and haqqu'1-yaqīn respectively.
Sa'di's verse which Hanzah quotes immediately
after also refers to this story of the moths.
that is:

"O bird of dawn! to love the dawn go and learn from the moth ..."

Kān sūkhtrā jān shud wa āwāz neyāmad ...

that is:

That is burnt to spirit without a sound ...

In muddatyyān dar ʿalabsh bi khabar ānand ...

that is:

They who claim to seek it have no knowledge of it ...

Kānnā kih khabar shud khabarshbān zi neyānad."¹⁷⁵⁵

that is:

---

¹⁷⁵⁵. Muṣliḥ ibn ʿAbdī ʿLlāh (Musharrifuʿl-Dīn) called Saʿdī Shirāzī, Gulistān, with marginal notes by Muḥammad Ḥādī ʿAlī (pp. 465-6 missing), Persian text, [Lucknow? n.d.], p. 8. The verse was first translated by E.B. Eastwick, Gulistān of Saʿdī, Hertford, 1852, p. 6:

O bird of morn! love of the moth be taught; Consumed it dies nor utters e'en a cry!
Pretended searchers! of this true love naught Know ye, — who knows tell not their mystery.

R.A. Nicholson, in his Translations of Eastern poetry and prose, Cambridge, 1922, p. 158, translated the same verse thus:

O nightingale, learn of the moth to love, That shrivels in the flame without a sigh. They know not Thee, whom they pretend it of, Who knows indeed, knows naught eternally.
Who has knowledge of it, his knowledge is ever naughted.

It is the same with respect to the coin; when it is annihilated in gold, it knows naught of gold, and similarly, of coin too it knows naught. This is the meaning of 'Then indeed you can become one'.

(55) **Fa'lam - If you are yet not extinct from hundreds and thousands.**

That is to say, the forms of all creatures are referred to as hundreds and thousands. [If] you are not yet [extinct from hundreds and thousands, you will not yet] be united with Him - [that is] to be extinct. Although all are in fact His Predispositions, yet if His Predispositions are not yet extinct from your vision, you will not yet be united with the Essence. When you are extinct from His Effects and His Acts and His Names and His Attributes, then you will be united with the Essence, for His Effects are a veil concealing His Acts; His Acts are a veil concealing His Names; His Names are a veil concealing His Attributes; His Attributes are a veil concealing the Essence. All these are His Predispositions. When you are extinct from His Predispositions, you will be united with the Essence. The Original [Being]
is the Essence - That is One; Its Predispositions are many: hundreds and thousands. When you are extinct from hundreds and thousands, you will be united with Him. As the People of the Path say:

\[\text{Hijābu'l-dhāti bi'l-ṣifāt} \] [73]
\[\text{Hijābu'l-ṣifāt bi'l-asma'} \]
\[\text{Hijābu'l-asma'i bi'l-af'āl} \]
\[\text{Hijābu'l-af'āl bi'l-āthār}.\]

that is:

'The Attributes are a veil concealing the Essence;
The Names are a veil concealing the Attributes;
The Acts are a veil concealing the Names;
The Effects are a veil concealing the Acts.'

One meaning of extinction is disentanglement; disentanglement from hundreds and thousands, and wife and children, and wealth and power, and companions and beloved, and fine apparel and greatness, and the desire to become Shaykh and saint, and the love of hypocrisy, and the wonder at hundreds and thousands - [when you are such, then] can your existence be effaced. The desired meaning is that then only can one achieve

---

1756. Tinggal is tajrīd. See Sharāb, p. 25.
1757. Kekayaan = power. See above, note 570.
union with one's Lord.

(56) **Fa'lan** - You will never be able to annihilate your existence.

That is to say, if you are not yet extinct from hundreds and thousands, how can your existence be annihilated? - for the expression 'annihilated' means extinction from the entire world and greatness and wife and children. Since even [to] his very self he should be extinct, the more so [to] the world and greatness and wife and children. But these expressions do enjoin the quest for them [i.e. the world, etc.], and do not enjoin their denial. Even though one has wife and children one should be constantly in the state of extinction. As for the Adepts, they are perpetually in extinction. He who is extinct is not [one who is in a state of] madness, or who goes about naked, or who does not eat, or does not sleep, or does not perform the major ritual [ablution], or goes about in rags, or refuses to perform prayers. If such [manner of behaviour] is followed, then it is a veil [concealing God]. The meaning of extinction [to him who is extinct is this: whether to eat or

---

1758. See E.I., art. Djanaba.
not to eat [74] it is the same to him; to be naked or to be clothed is the same to him; heaven and hell is the same to him; although he performs acts of devotion yet he does not desire heaven, nor is afraid of hell, that is to say, [he submits with] utter submission – as God Most Exalted says:

\[\text{Inna'\text{'}l-d\text{'}ina 'inda'\text{'}Ll\text{'}ahi'\text{'}l-isl\text{'}am} \]

that is:

The religion with God is Islām ([that is:] to submit oneself).

Since his self is not his Self, it is incumbent that he surrender his self to the Possessor of Self so that he may be extinct from his self.

(57) Fa'lan – Make yourself extinct from the gross and the subtle.

That is to say, [make yourself] extinct from body and spirit; another meaning: from good and evil; another meaning: from both worlds; another meaning: from belief and unbelief; another meaning: from the outward and the inward. All these must be made extinct [from yourself] in order that you may be united with the Essence of God, for the Essence is not to be

found in all these. When you are annihilated and are extinct from the gross and the subtle, then you will be able to unite with the Essence, for the Essence is Most Pure from the gross and the subtle. [The gross and the subtle] are not pure. Things which are not pure are creatures. If all creatures are not yet extinct [from your vision], the Creator cannot be seen [in your vision]. As the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Ḫiǧābu'Llāhi sab'īna alfan mina'l-nūrī wa sab'īna alfan mina'l-ẓulūnāt."

that is:

"Veils concealing God, Glorious and Exalted, are seventy thousand out of light [75] and seventy thousand [out of] darkness." 1760

These are the veils that are in the gross and the subtle.

(58) Fa'lan - In order that whatever you say becomes permissible.

That is to say, as Shaykh Junayd Baghdādī (God's

---

mercy be upon him!) says:

"Laysa fi jubbati siwā'LLāh"\textsuperscript{1761}

[and] as Shaykh Bā Yazīd says:

"Subhānā nā aʿzana shaʿnī"\textsuperscript{1762}

or as Mansūr Ḥallāj says:

"ʾInāʾil-Ḥagg"\textsuperscript{1763}

for their gnosis was perfect. They see not the gross and the subtle, but only the Unique Essence. What they utter is permissible. As for us, if we have not yet attained to perfect gnosis such as their gnosis, or have not yet become extinct from the gross and the subtle, we must not utter such utterances [for assuredly] our observance of the Law will then be in error, for the path of the Law - though devious\textsuperscript{1764} - is most pure. However, the path of the Truth, though direct, has many dangers. We must not leave off prayer and we must not abandon the Law, for the Law and the Truth are one and the same. Those who

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1761} I.e.: "There is nothing in my cloak other than God!"
\item \textsuperscript{1762} I.e.: "Glory be to me, how great is my condition!"
\item \textsuperscript{1763} I.e.: "I am the Creative Truth!"
\item \textsuperscript{1764} See above, note\textsuperscript{1254}.
\end{itemize}
are not yet intoxicated, or not yet effaced, or whom ecstasy from God has not yet possessed, if they leave off prayer and fasting and eat what is unlawful, are deviators [from the Law] and are sinful.

(59) Fa'lam - Ḥamzah Fanṣūrī, though he is insignificant.

That is to say [76], though insignificant, yet he is most certain [in what he says]; not indulging in vain talk, even if he is feeble in all his acts, such as performing devotions, and religious exercises, and seclusion, and practising frugality, and abnegation of the world; or he is feeble in his knowledge and gnosis. As God Most Exalted says:

Wa mā utītum mina' l- 'ilmi illā qalīlān. 1767

that is:

I give you aught of knowledge but a little.

How can he know God with perfect gnosis? Even in the case of the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) he says:

---

1765. Barangsiapa can be translated as: Whosoever is ..., but here I use the plural form to qualify mereka at the end of the sentence.
1766. Sungguh pun = walau pun. See text and note 1259.
1767. Qur'an 17:85.
"Subhānaka ma 'arafnaka ḥaqqa ma'rifatika."
that is:
"Glory be to Thee! we know Thee not with true gnosis" -
what more with us, how can gnosis which excels his 
come upon us? However, to the extent that our capa-
cities permit, which God through His Grace bestows 
upon us, we will strive to seek and to conceive, 
by means of super-illumination, knowledge of His Effects 
and His Acts and His Names and His Attributes. According 
to another meaning, [Ḥamzah] is insignificant because 
he possesses no existence. Since he possesses no 
existence, he is then devoid of attributes and acts. 
This is being insignificant.
(60) Fa'lam - His Reality is close to the Noble 
Essence.
That is to say, even though he is insignificant, 
his Reality is not separate from the Noble Essence, 
for it is that Essence that is the Author of 
[his] motion and tranquility, of [hisl] sitting and 
standing, of [his] sleep and wakefulness, of [his] 
halting and walking; it is He that causes Ḥamzah to

1768. Yang Empunya corresponds to the Arabic șahib: 
possessor, lord, author, etc.
move so that he can move. Had He not caused him to move, Hamzah cannot move, [77] for Hamzah is but a shadow. Had the Possessor of the shadow not caused him to move, how can Hamzah move? Another analogy is the similitude of the chess [pieces]. The wood originates from one tree. Then it is carved into many pieces and is called "king" and "minister"\(^1\) and "elephant"\(^2\) and "steed"\(^3\) and "fortress"\(^4\) and "pawn" - only in name they exist, not in reality. But they are close to the person who carves them and who plays with them, for the hand of that person is perpetually in contact with the chess [pieces], and the chess pieces do not move except with the movement of the player. This is the meaning of 'His reality is close to the Noble Essence'.

\(^1\)\(^1\). i.e.: queen in the European game of chess.  
\(^2\)\(^1\). i.e.: bishop.  
\(^3\)\(^1\). i.e.: knight.  
\(^4\)\(^1\). The persian word \(\text{tir}\) is used here, basically meaning 'arrow'. It also means power or strength and could be conceived therefore as a fortress which in our modern game of chess is the castle or rook. I do not think \(\text{tir}\) is a mistake for \(\text{tayr}\), to refer to the fabulous giant bird known as the Roc; i.e. the rook (from Persian: \(\text{rûkh}\)).
(61) Fa'lam - Though but a bubble whose form is gross.

That is to say, by ḥabab is meant a bubble; its form is gross, but because it has its origin in water it is in fact subtle. When it emerges on the surface it becomes gross, for from the point of view of metaphorical expression, [bubble] is distinct from water - that is, water is subtle, bubble is gross. From the point of view of reality, [bubble] is not distinct from water. For this reason it is said that the bubble is gross: because it has a form and a name other than water. But in reality it has no form and it has no existence, and its having a name is simply imaginary, not real, for it is perpetually effaced in water. As to his power and his will and his hearing and his sight [78] and his intelligence and his gnosis that we see in him, [in reality] these are not from him, [but - in the same manner of the bubble -] from the water. This is the meaning of 'Though but a bubble whose form is gross.'

(62) Fa'lam - His union is constant in the Sea of the Subtle.

That is to say, by latīf is meant the subtle;
the bubble is constantly in the state of union with water, for water is subtle and the bubble gross. When the bubble bursts, it returns to water. For this reason it is said that the bubble is in the state of union with water. According to one expression of the People of the Path, there is no such thing as 'union'; though union is expressed, [it is only] metaphorically so. From the point of view of reality, a state is not called 'union' if it exists between a thing and its dispositions. [Such a state is] not 'union'. Union is expressed metaphorically so that seekers of knowledge may grasp [the meaning intended]; were it not for metaphorical expressions it would be impossible to describe and understand and know it. After you have fulfilled the necessary requirements, it is incumbent upon you to understand and know it [i.e. union], and after that it is incumbent upon you to perform the works required by the Law. Beware that you must not stray outside the enclosure of the Law, for [the Law is like] the outer covering, the Truth [is like] the brain; without the outer covering the brain is destroyed. The illustration is like a coconut with its husk and its shell and its flesh and its oil. The Law is like its husk; the Way
is like its shell; the Truth is like its flesh; Gnosis is like its oil. By virtue of these four the coconut is complete in all respects. If one of them is lacking in it, then it is no longer whole; even if it is planted, without its husk, it will never grow and will ultimately be destroyed.\textsuperscript{1773} In such wise must the seeker after God Most Glorious and Exalted not be separated from the Law and the Way and the Truth and Gnosis so that he be perfect. If he is separated from the Law, he goes astray. Even if he should fly in the air, or walk on water, or eat fire - it is nothing but fraudulent magic, and his path is erroneous. He is not a saint, for in his case his 'miracles' are not miracles - they are called guile; that is to say, the art of persuasion originating from Satan, or from the genie, or from magic, or the wrath of God, Most Exalted, which descends upon him in order that by his 'miracles' he may be led to self-deception, thinking that he is united with God Most Exalted. According to the Doctors of Theology the miracles of the saints who practise the Law are from the grace of God Most Exalted;

\textsuperscript{1773} Compare Shabistari, p. 36 and note 3.
they are called *mu'jizāt* when worked by prophets, *karāmāt* when worked by saints. Both kinds of miracles are not imperfections, nor are they a veil [unto God]. However, to the People of Gnosis and to Lovers miracles are a veil and they are restrictions [unto God] - they are called 'menstruation in man' (*hayd al-rijāl*); for miracles have many dangers and few people escape.

The science of the path is the science of the Prophet Muḥammad the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!). Whosoever practises the science of the path and is in error in his works with respect to the works of the Prophet Muḥammad the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!), he has gone astray - he is not of the People of the Path. But if his gnosis is perfect - for gnosis is [gnosis] of his Lord: that person being intoxicated and effaced, no longer conscious of the Law [80] and the Way and the Truth and Gnosis - then no

1774. Literally this means 'menstruation in the male'. The allusion here is clear enough. In the same manner as husbands regard wives who are in a state of menstruation as impure and avoid sexual union during that period, so God regards miracles as 'impure' and avoid mystical union with men who perform them. Hence on this analogy miracles are 'menstruation'.
blame is upon him [if he errs]. [To him] everything is God's Command, for that person is like the Sulṭān's slave who is [detained] within a fenced enclosure; whatever he does the Sulṭān will not be displeased at him. As for those people who practise the Law and the Way and the Truth and Gnosis in the manner the Prophet Muḥammad the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) had done, they are like a minister who constantly carries out the King's command. Though distant from the King, he is yet [much] greater [in rank] than the person in the fenced enclosure, for the minister is the vicegerent of the King and holds the King's office. If we see in him outwardly no miracles, inwardly he has miracles. We must not think that the Law is insignificant, for God Most Exalted is called both the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden. His Outward Manifestation is His Law; his Inward Hiddenness is His Truth. To the generality of the people there is a distinction between the Law and the Truth. To the People of Gnosis, the Law and the Truth are identical. The Law is protected in the Truth, the Truth is embodied in the Law. When you are at one with the Law, you are at one with the Way; when you are at one with
the Way, you are at one [with] the Truth; when you are at one [with] the Truth, you are at one with Gnosis. But God knows best! The book is completed.

And may God praise His most excellent creation, Muhammad, And his Followers And Companions all! Praise be to God, The Lord of the Worlds.

This book, the Secrets of the Gnostics on an exposition of the Science of the Path and of Divine Unity, is completed in good order. Amen!

1775. The full title of the Asrār.
CHAPTER XI.

The Drink of Lovers

by

Hamzah Fanṣūrī

[Leiden text no 2016]

[Preface]

[1] In the Name of God, the Infinitely Good, the Ever Merciful.
Praise be to God
The Lord of the Worlds,
And ample recompense be
Upon those who are God-fearing;
And salutations and blessings be
Upon His Messenger Muḥammad,
And upon his House
And Companions all.

(1) Know that this insignificant one, this poor one, Hamzah Fanṣūrī, wishes to make known [to you] in the Malay language - God willing - the way to God the Glorious and Most Exalted, and the gnosis of God in order that all servants of God who do not understand 1776. The metaphysical meaning is here given in translating al-Rahman, but 'the Compassionate' is equally acceptable. See Schuon, op. cit. p. 61 and note.
(2) This book is called Sharābu’l-‘Ashiqīn, that is: The Drink of Lovers. Whosoever wishes to quaff the drink of those who are enamoured [of God] may consult this book in order that he may achieve [the Object of his desire], for herein are the utterances of lovers [of God]. However, [in this book the discourse] is summarised, and not given at length.

(3) The gnosis of God is extremely recondite.
Without a teacher who is perfect and a disciple who is wise, gnosis of God can never be apprehended as it is the secret of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!). Nevertheless we must strive as far as our powers permit [to attain to gnosis], for as the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man ālabā shay’ān jiddan wajada"

that is:

"Whosoever seeks a thing with the utmost endeavour will find it."

The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says further:

1777. Hamzah translates Shaykh or Pir (spiritual guide) as guru. Cf. text.
"Talabil-'ilma faridatun 'ala kulli muslimin wa muslimatin."

that is:

"The quest for knowledge is incumbent upon every Muslim, male and female."

The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says further:

"Utlubu'l-'ilma wa law kana bi'l-shin"

that is:

"Seek knowledge even if it be in China."

And God the Exalted says:

Wa mā khalaqtu'l-jinna wa'l-insa illa liya'budun. 1778 [2]

that is:

I have not created the jinn and men except in order that they worship Me (i.e. know Me).

And God the Exalted says further in the Holy Tradition:

1778. Qur'an 51:56.
1779. By 'know' here Ḥamzah means Gnosis (mengenal).
that is:

I was a hidden treasure and I desired to be known, so I created creation in order to be known.

(4) For this reason the People of the Path say that to know God— as far as our powers permit— is as incumbent upon us as it is to worship Him. We must not fall short [of our religious duty], and we must not pursue worldly power and wealth in excess of what is necessary to maintain our physical strength during the day and night, and [we must not] let wife and children distract us beyond measure, nor must we eat and sleep like beasts, for man is to God [a] most lofty [creature]. 1781 Whosoever possesses gnosis and performs many devotional acts, that person is to God [a] lofty [creature]; but whosoever possesses no gnosis and does not perform devotional acts, that

1780. This Holy Tradition is well known among Sufis. See, for example, the Divāni Shamsī-Tabrīz, tr. by R.A. Nicholson, Cambridge, 1898, pp. 207-208.

person is an incomplete [Muslim]. As God says:

\[
\text{Lahum qulûbûn lâ yafqahûna bihā}
\]
\[
\text{wa lahum a'yunum lâ yubṣirûna bihā}
\]
\[
\text{wa lahum ādhānun lâ yasma'ûna bihā}
\]
\[
\text{ulā'ika kā'1-an'āmi bal hum adallu}
\]
\[
\text{ulā'ika humu'1-ghāfilûn.}^{1782}
\]

that is:

They have hearts wherewith they understand not; and they have eyes wherewith they see not; and they have ears wherewith they hear not. They are as cattle; nay, they are more astray. These are the heedless ones (towards their Lord).

(5) We must not be heedless of this Qur'ānic verse, and must not think that only the unbelievers are the heedless ones. Hence we must perform [our devotional acts] faithfully and we must seek [to attain] gnosis from a teacher who is perfect in [his observance of] the Law and the Way, and [who is accomplished in his knowledge of] the Truth; [3] for the Law is like a fence, the Way is like a house, the Truth is like the content of the house; if the house is not fenced its consequence will be that people will steal the content of the House. The meaning is, with respect

---

1782. Qur'ān 7:179.
to [the journey towards] God, that if [the journey] is not undertaken in conjunction with the Law, [we] will be confused by the devil. As God the Exalted says:

A lam a’had ilaykum yā banī Ādama an lā ta’budu’l-shayṭāna innahu lakum ’aduwwu’l-mubīn. 1783

that is:

Did I not charge you, O children of Ādam, that you serve not the devil? Surely he is your open enemy.

(6) Thus it is necessary for us to fence ourselves so that we may not be confused by the devil. Whosoever fences himself with the fence of the Law, he cannot be confused by the devil. But he who strays outside the enclosure of the Law must assuredly be confused by the devil. Whosoever thinks that the Law is insignificant, or scorns it, he becomes an unbeliever - God preserve us from such! - for the Law is not distinct from the Way, the Way is not distinct from the Truth, and the Truth is not distinct from Gnosis. The analogy is that of a ship; the Law is its keel, the Way its planks, the Truth its mer-

1783. Ibid., 36:60.
chandise, Gnosis its gain. When the keel is cast away, the ship will surely sink, its merchandise will perish, and so will its capital investment, and this is a loss. But God knows best!
(7) Know that that which is called the Law is composed of the sayings of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) enjoining us to do good and forbidding us to do evil. As the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Al-sharī'atu aqwālī."

that is:

"The Law is my sayings."

The words of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) are in reality from God, [and the proof of this is] the same as the Qur'ānic proof that the Qur'ān is not a compilation of utterances coming from his own heart's desire. As God the Exalted says:


that is:

Nor does he (the Prophet - may God bless him and give him peace!) speak out of desire.
It is naught but revelation that is revealed -

(8) The Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says that God the Glorious and Exalted is one and not two; that there is none like Him; that [He] has no equal, nor partner; that there is no genus, nor form that can be compared with Him; that [He] is without dimension, nor is [He] subject to dimensions and that [He] has neither a place to be in, nor is there a place in which [He] is - as God the Exalted says:

Laysa kamithlihi shay' un. 1786

that is:

There is none like unto Him.

God the Exalted says further:

Subhāna[hu wa ta'ālā] 1787 ammā yāṣifūn. 1788

that is:

Glory be to God, exalted is He above what they ascribe (to Him).

(9) The Law in particular relates firstly to the confession of the faith, [secondly] to the prescribed prayers, [thirdly] to the tithe, [fourthly] to the

1787. 2016 has Subhāna'LLāh.
1788. Ibid., 6:101; 23:92.
prescribed fasting, [fifthly] if one is amply provided, to the performance of the pilgrimage. All these five [pillars of faith] are the Law of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!). The Law [in general] relates to three things: that which He approves; that which He enjoins; the acts of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!). Another injunction [of the Law] is that we must have faith in the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!), in that he is the Messenger of God the Exalted. Whatever he said is true, whatever he did is right.

(10) Whosoever believes that the words of the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) are false, or that his acts are not right, he is an unbeliever - God preserve us from such! - for God the Exalted created the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) making him excel [His] other creatures. As he excels all creatures his acts must assuredly be right and his words true. Whosoever loves God must follow the manner of acting of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) in order that his love and gnosis may be perfect, for
he was perfect in his love and in his observance of the science of the Way. Whosoever does not follow his acts is deficient [in his faith] and is gone astray [from the right path], for the Law, the Way and the Truth are the adornment of the Prophet. If we neglect any one of the three, then [we are] incomplete [in our faith]. If the Truth is pursued not in conjunction with the Law, then we shall perish. Whosoever performs the prescribed prayers and the prescribed fasting, and eats of what is lawful and refrains from what is unlawful, and who speaks the truth and is not consumed with greed, and who is not envious and does not drink intoxicants, and who does not slander people and shuns backbiting, and who does not commit adultery, and who is not immersed in vice, and who is not hypocritical and arrogant - and many more such as these- he clothes himself in [the garment of] the Law. As this is the manner of acting of Muḥammad the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!), we must follow [his example] in order that we may be accomplished in the Way, for the Way is none other than the Law.

1789. I.e. the Prophet.
(11) As God the Exalted says:

Qul in kuntun tuhibbi‘na‘llāha
fa‘l-ḥabībi‘nī yuhibbikumūllāh. 1790

that is:

Say (O Muḥammad): If you love Allāh
follow me: (in order that) Allāh will
love you.

God the Exalted says further:

Mā ātākumūl-rasūlu fa khudhūhu
wa mā nāhākun ‘anhu fa‘l-nṭābū. 1791

that is:

[And] whatever the Messenger gives you,
accept it, and whatever he forbids you,
abstain therefrom.

Shamsu Tabriz says: 1792

"Shari‘at rā nuqaddam dāram aknūn
Ḥaqīqat az shari‘at nīst birūn ..."

that is:

"I put the Law before me now,
As the Truth and the Law are not distinct ..."

1791. Ibid., 59:7.
1792. For Shamsu Tabriz, see Dīvān Shamsi Tabriz, op. cit., Introduction. Also Browne, Literary history of Persia, vol. II, pp. 515-525. I am unable to trace these couplets in the Dīvān.
"Kasī kū dar sharī'at rāsikh āyad Ḥaqīqat rāh bar way khūd gushāyad." that is:

"Whosoever is perfect in his observance of the Law,
The Truth, revealing itself, will assuredly come to him."

The Law covers many things, [and, such being the case,] how can all of them be [adequately] mentioned? In this book only its salient points are [6] summarized. Whosoever loves God, he must also seek [to know] God through the intelligence. God alone knows best!

1793. Cp. Ḥujwīrī:
"The Law without the Truth is ostentation, and the Truth without the Law is hypocrisy. Their mutual relation may be compared to that of the body and spirit: when the spirit departs from the body, the living body becomes a corpse, and the spirit vanishes like wind. The Muslim profession of faith includes both: the words, 'There is no god but Allāh' are the Truth, and the words, 'Muhammad is the Apostle of Allāh,' are the Law; and anyone who denies the Truth is an infidel, and any one who rejects the Law is a heretic."

(12) Know that the Way is none other than the Truth, for the Way is the starting point of the Truth [just as the Law is the starting point of the Way]. As the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Al-ṭarīqatu afʿālī"

that is:

"The Way is my acts."

The starting point in [the observance of] the Way is repentance such as sincere repentance of past sins, for God the Exalted says:

Yā ayyuḥā'l-ladhīna āmanu tūbū ilā'Llāhi tawbatan naṣūhan. 1794

that is:

O you who believe, turn to Allāh with sincere repentance (that is after having repented [we] must not return [to commit the same sins again]).

God the Exalted says further:

Inna'LLāha yuḥibbu't-tawwābīna wa yuḥibbu'l-mutāṭahhirīn.  

that is:

Surely Allāh loves those who turn much to Him, and He loves those who purify themselves.

(13) [The Way] also [entails] renunciation of the world. By this is meant that we must not hoard worldly wealth more than what is necessary to maintain us in food and clothing, for the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Tarku'l-dunya ra'su kulli 'ibādatin ḥubbu'l-dunya ra'su kulli khaṭī'atīn."

that is:

"Renunciation of the world is the fount of all devotion, love of the world is the fount of all sin."

The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says further:

"Kun ḥī'l-dunyā ka'annaka gharībun aw 'ābiru sabīlīn wa 'udda nafsaka min ʾaṣḥābi'l-qubūr."

that is:

1795. Ibid., 2:222.
"Consider yourself in this world as though you were a stranger, or one who is passing a stage in his travels, and count yourself from amongst the occupants of the grave."

The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says further:

"Ma'n tawakkala 'alā'Ilāhi kafā."\(^{1796}\)

that is:

"Whosoever trusts in God has met all requirements."

By 'trust' is meant having no doubt in the [help of Him Who is] trusted, as God the Exalted says:

Fa tawakkalū in kuntum nu'minīn.\(^{1797}\)

that is:

Trust [7] (in God) if ye be believers.

(14) [The Way] also [entails] a sincere quest for God, companionship of gnostics, obedience to God's commandments, abhorrence of all that is forbidden by God, [the performance of] the customary (sunnah)
prayers, the fixed (rawātib) prayers, the night prayers (tahajjud), the forenoon (duḥā) prayers and the supererogatory (nawāfil) prayers, [each] as our powers permit; the constant glorification and remembrance of God and the reading of the Qur'ān; fasting on the days of the white nights — that is on the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth day of each month — and on Mondays, Thursdays and the day of 'Ashūrā, and in the months of Rajab, Sha'bān and Dhū'l-Hijjah; the lessening of eat and drink [generally], and of converse with people and sleep, the withdrawal from people's company and contentment with oneself.

(15) All these acts are of the Way and are not distinct from the Truth. You must not think that the Way is insignificant, for the Way is the adornment of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!).

1798, 1799, 1800, 1801, 1802, 1803. See Ghazzālī's work on worship in Calverley, E.E., Worship in Islam, (Cairo), London 1957, consult index respectively. Also the articles ṣalāt and ṣawm in the E.I.
1804. 10th Muḥarram, see E.I.
1805. 27th Rajab, the Mi'rāj, see E.I.
1806. E.I., article ṣawm.
1807. Loc. cit.
Whosoever goes astray from the Law and the Way, he is an unbeliever — God preserve us from such! However, whosoever affirms that the Law and the Way are the right path, but fails to observe their performance, he is not an unbeliever, but rather due to his failure to observe their performance — he is one who is disobedient.

(16) Regarding begging for food, according to the Law, if one has enough [food] to sustain one during the morning and evening and, in spite of that, one goes begging, then that is unlawful, for the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

> "Man sa’aāta wa ‘indahu nā yughnīhi fa innamā yastakthuru nina’l-nārī qālū yā rasūlu’Llāhi wa nā yughnīhi qāla qadru nā yaghdīhi wa ya’shīhi."

that is:

> "Whosoever begs whilst he has with him sufficient provision increases the fires of Hell." (The Companions) asked: 'How much is sufficient provision?' The Prophet answered: 'As much as what you can afford for morning and evening.'

(17) According to the Way, if one [is weakened to the extent that one] is unable to stand during the prescribed prayers, then it is permissible to beg for
food - but even in this case one must not take more than what is sufficient [8] for only one meal. If one obtains more than what is sufficient for one meal, one must not keep the food, but must give it away to the poor. However, according to the Truth, we must not, under any circumstances, beg for food, for our sustenance (daily bread) is written on the Guarded Tablet and is already apportioned [each according to his lot]: those whose portion is abundance will have plenty, those whose portion is meagre will have little - [in each case] neither more nor less.

(18) Furthermore another point is that God is cognisant of our hunger and thirst, this being the case why should we complain to others? Another point is that it were as though we consent only to being well fed and not to being hungry, [and this is ungratefulness on our part] - hence God the Exalted says:

Man lam yarəda biqədə'I wa lam yəʃir 'alə balə'I wa lam yəʃkur 'alə ni'natI fa'1-yəkhruj min tahtI samə'I fa'1-yaṭlub rabbən siwa'I. 1808

that is:

1808. See above, note 1339.
Whosoever is not content with My decrees, and is not patient in My trials, and sends not praise for My bounties, then let him get out from under My skies and seek a Lord other than Me!

(19) For this reason the People of the Truth forbid begging. According to the People of the Truth, if one's trust in God is complete, and one's consent [to God's decrees] wholehearted, viewing one's fate as being [already written] on the Guarded Tablet, if one dies of hunger, then one would have died a martyr. The details of the Way of Muḥammad the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) are many, and it is impossible to write on all of them. But God knows best!
(20) Know that the path of Truth is the final path trodden by Muhammad the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace). As the Hadith [says]:

"Al-sharī'atu aqwālī wa'l-ṭarīqatu af'ālī wa'l-haqlqatu ahwālī."

that is:

"The Law is my sayings, the Way is my acts, the Truth is my states."

All these three are practised by the Prophet. [9] whosoever adorns himself with these three, then he is [a] perfect [man].

(21) The first [step] in the works of the People of the Truth is to endeavour to achieve gnosis. If one fails to attain to gnosis then one cannot practise the Truth, for the Truth is the result of gnosis. If one has gnosis, one can practise the Truth.

(22) The People of the Truth are of two groups. The first group marry and have children, houses and cultivation; but their hearts are not preoccupied
with their cultivation, their wives and children, and their houses. When their hearts are not pre-occupied with all these, then to them these [worldly necessities] are not veils [obstructing the Truth from their view]. Even though they have wives and children, houses and cultivation, should their wives and children die, they would not be grieved by their loss; should their houses and cultivation go up in flames, they would not be unhappy; should God bestow upon them the kingdoms of Solomon and Alexander, they would not rejoice; for lowliness and loftiness are to them the same, wealth and poverty are to them the same, illness and health are to them the same -- they no longer see their selves, only God the Glorious and Exalted alone is seen by them, for to the People of the Truth the being of the world is God's Being; everything is indeed from Him.

(23) The other group of the People of the Truth constantly worship God and are consumed with love of God and gnosis of God in His Essential Unity; and [they constantly] know their Self and annihilate their selves, and affirm the oneness of their Self [with God], and converse with their Self, and are annihilated in their Self, and subsist in their Self,
and they abhor the outward manifestation of their Self, and love the inward hiddenness of their Self, and scorn their selves, and praise their Self; if they eat, they eat with their Self; if they sit, they sit with their Self; if they sleep, the sleep [10] with their Self; if they wake, they wake with their Self; if they walk, they walk with their Self - they never forget their Self, for as the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says: "Man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu."

that is:

"Whosoever knows his Self knows his Lord."

(24) Another point is that when they cast their vision 'outside' their selves, whatever they see, it is their Self that they see; whatever they contemplate, it is their Self that they contemplate; for to the People of the Truth the world and their Self are one and the same, and not two or three. When the world in its entirety and their Self are one and the same, whatever they see, it is surely their Self that they see. As the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:
"Ra'aytu rabbi bi 'ayni rabbi" \(^{1809}\)

That is:

"I see my Lord with the Eye of (the Mercy of) my Lord."

The Lam'at says:

"Lā yara'LLāha ghayra'LLāh.\(^{1810}\)"

that is:

"None sees God but God."

The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Ra'aytu rabbi bi rabbī."

that is:

"I see God through God."

(25) The Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says such things because the world together with all its parts has no [real] existence. When the world has no [real] existence is possesses no power and nor act of its own. If they [i.e. the People of the Truth] are beaten or reviled at by people, they see only [that these are] God's Acts and not the acts of people. In regard to themselves, therefore, whatever they grasp, it is their Self that they grasp, for

\(^{1809}\) Cf. L̑am'āt, L̑am'āt VI, p. 335.

\(^{1810}\) L̑am'āt, L̑am'āt IV, p. 333.
as God the Exalted says:

\[ \text{Fa aynama tuwallu fa thamma wajhu'Llahi.} \]

that is:

Wheresoever ye turn there is the face of God.

(26) For this reason the People of the Truth say that all creatures are none other than our Self; all human beings are our brothers. Belief and unbelief, the beloved and the foe, the venomous and the clean, [11] Heaven and Hell, wrath and mercy, good and evil, wealth and poverty, praise and scorn, being well-fed and hungry, insignificance and greatness, death and life, illness and health, right and wrong—all [these] are the same to them, for the meaning of: wheresoever ye turn there is the Face of God has become extremely clear to them. Whosoever comprehends the meaning of wheresoever ye turn there is the Face of God has achieved completeness [in his gnosis], and whatever he sees, the 'Face of God' will be That which he sees. But God knows best!

1811. Qur'an, 2:115.
1812. Face is the literal translation of wajh. Hamzah uses the word ada to translate wajh. The important concept of ada has already been discussed in Chapter V.
(27) Know that the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Al-ma'rifatu sirrī."

that is:

"Gnosis is my secret."

The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says further:

"Lā taṣīhhu'l-ṣalātu illā bi'l-ma'rifah."

that is:

"Prayer is not valid except with knowledge."

Know that all the Prophets, Saints, Philosophers and Scholastic Theologians are all in concerted agreement saying that God is One, and not two; Eternal and not new; Creator and not creation; formless and colourless; Subsisting and not perishing; [He is] not separate from [a thing] nor joined to [a thing]; [He is] not severed from [a thing] nor intermingled [with a thing]; there is no similitude [that can be

1813. Muhdath, i.e. something produced, hence 'new'. 
applied to Him], there is no like nor rival nor partner
[unto Him]; there is no location [applicable to Him],
He is not subject to time and He is without [beginning
or] end - Pure is He from such expressions!

(28) All the People of the Path, Scholastic Theologians
and Doctors of Theology are in agreement [on these
points], but the People of the Path exceed [what
they affirm] by further asserting that He is boundless
and limitless [i.e. Infinite]. By boundless and
limitless is meant that neither 'above' nor 'below'
can be applied to Him; neither 'right' [12] nor
'left' can be applied to Him; neither 'front nor
'behind' can be applied to Him - that is to say, He
is a Being Who is without six directions. [His
Infinity] is like an ocean of vast expanse, like one
tiny fruit [i.e. round object]. For this reason the
People of the Path say that God the Glorious and
Exalted is Self Sufficient in His Eternal Plenitude
(ṣamad)\textsuperscript{1814} - All-Embracing. As God Most Exalted says:

\textsuperscript{1814} Ṣamad also means, as an epithet of God, Lord,
Eternal, Everlasting. But the root word ṣamada
conveys also the meaning: to close, plug, stopper.
Hence Ḫamzah uses the Malay word pejal.
Innahu bi kulli shay'in muhhit.\footnote{1815. Qur'\’\k{a}n 41:54.} that is:

Verily He embraces all things.

(29) The Doctors of Theology say that [by All-Embracing] is meant His Knowledge only that is All-Embracing. But the People of the Path say that both His Essence and His Knowledge is All-Embracing, as He is not separate from His Knowledge, for God the Glorious and Exalted is not like a human being, who can be separated from his knowledge.

(30) Furthermore, God the Glorious and Exalted is, in virtue of His Essence and His Knowledge, near to us, but as to the nature of His nearness, it is too recondite for people to comprehend. There are four meanings applicable to nearness: the first is nearness with respect to time; the second is nearness with respect to place; the third is nearness with respect to attributes (or qualities); the fourth is nearness with respect to God Most Exalted. But [as mentioned before] nearness with respect to God is extremely difficult to comprehend. The nature of nearness with respect to time is, as people say:
'The period of Muḥannad (may God bless him and give him peace!) is nearer to us than the period of Jesus (peace be upon him!). The nature of nearness with respect to place is, as people say: 'The moon is nearer to us than the Pleiades.' The nature of nearness with respect to attributes (or qualities) is, as people say: 'Bā Yazīd (God be well pleased with him!) is nearer to the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) than 'Utbah and Shaybah (curses be upon them!); even though Bā Yazīd [13] is further [from the Prophet with respect to time] than 'Utbah and Shaybah, for Bā Yazīd is nearer the Prophet in virtue of his qualities. But the nearness of God to the world together with all its parts is not similar [to these], even though it is true that God Most Exalted says:

\[ \text{Wa huwa ma'akum aynama kuntum.} \]  
that is:

He is with you wherever you are.

God the Exalted says further:

\[ \text{Wa nahnu agrabu ilayhi min habli'l-waridd.} \]  

---

1816. Ibid., 57:4.
1817. Ibid., 50:16.
that is:

And We are nearer to him than his nock veins.

God the Exalted says further:

Wa fi anfusikum a fa la tubsirün.\textsuperscript{1818}

that is:

[And] in your selves - do you not see?

(31) For this reason the People of the Path say that nearness to God applies equally to Prophets, Saints and the Pious [as well as] to Polytheists, Unbelievers and the Disobedient. He is near to all creatures, but His nearness is conferred exclusively upon the People of Gnosis and upon His Adorer;\textsuperscript{1819} that is, whosoever possesses gnosis and performs much devotional service he is 'near' to God; whosoever possesses no gnosis and commits sins, he is 'far' from God, [he is] not near - far, like the example given before.\textsuperscript{1820} But expression is difficult here, only the People of Revelation comprehend what has been said.

(32) Question (should someone ask): "If the Essence of Allāh is all-pervasive and immanent in all things,

\textsuperscript{1818} Ibid., 51:21.
\textsuperscript{1819} I.e. Worshipper. See above p. 168 and note 439.
\textsuperscript{1820} Cf. above pp. 12-13 of the text.
can it be said that it is also immanent in impure and foul things?" Then answer: "In the same way as [the sun's] light is all-pervasive and sheds itself over the impure and the foul, the good and the evil, over the Kabah and the idol-worshipper's Temple - over everything; without itself being affected by the impurity and the foulness, the goodness and the evilness of the things it pervades; from the Ka'bah it does not gain goodness, from the Temple it does not acquire evil; so it is even more with respect to God the Glorious and Exalted, Who is the Purest of the pure. How can the impure and the foul affect Him?" Comprehend this well.

(33) Question: "If you say that the Essence of God pervades all creatures, who experiences the tortures of Hell and who experiences the delights of Paradise?" Answer: "Just as in the case of gold and the Ashrafī coin; if the coin is burnt, the coin alone is burnt away, not the gold. Even though gold and coin

1822. "Throw pure gold into the fire; If it contains no alloy, what is there to burn?" - Shabistari.
Cf. F. Lederer's Secret Rose Garden, op. cit. p. 42. Also see Lam'at, Lam'at X, p. 340.
are not separate from one another, no matter; if they are refashioned a hundred or a thousand times, yet when they are burnt the coin alone is burnt [and annihilated], the gold remains subsistent; how, then, can it be burnt and annihilated? - for the coin is like the creatures, gold is the Creator; only the creatures are burnt and annihilated." These words are extremely recondite. Whosoever does not grasp the meaning intended, we must [elucidate further and] expound [for him] the saying of 'Abd ibn Abi Talib (may God honour his countenance!):

"Mā ra‘aytu shay‘an illā wa ra‘aytu‘Llāha rāḥi."

that is:

"There is nothing that I see except that I see God within it."

And the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man nażara ilā shay‘in wa lam yara‘Llāha rāhi fahuwa bāṭilun."

that is:

"Whosoever sees a thing and does not see God within it is vain."

(34) For this reason the People of the Path say that the Essence of God embraces all creation. The Doctors
of Theology, the People of the Path, the Scholastic Theologians and the Philosophers are all in agreement in asserting that none may reach the Innermost Essence of God the Glorious and Exalted. However, it is possible to draw analogies concerning It according to our powers [of comprehension]. But God knows best!
Chapter Five

On an exposition of the Manifestation of the Pure Essence of God Most Exalted.

(35) Know that the Innermost Essence of the Truth, Glorious and Exalted is called by [15] the People of the Path 'indeterminacy.' It is called indeterminacy because our intelligence and skill in verbal exposition, knowledge and gnosis, are unable to reach It. Let alone our knowledge and gnosis, even the Prophets and the Saints are struck with awe of It. Hence the Prophet (God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Subhānaka nā 'arafnaka ḥaqqa ma'rifatika."

that is:

"Glory be to Thee! we cannot really know Thee."

And the Prophet (God bless him and give him peace!) says further:

"Tafakkaru fī khalqi'Allāhi wa lā tafakkaru fī dhāti'Allāh."

that is:
"Contemplate upon God's creation,
and not upon God's Essence."

This is why the People of the Path call this [Essence] indeterminate, meaning: non-manifest.

(36) The first [stage of] determinacy is fourfold:
Knowledge, Being, Sight and Light. All these four are called the 'first determination', for by virtue of Knowledge, the Knower and the Known become manifest; by virtue of Being, That which causes to be and That which becomes are manifest; by virtue of Sight, the Seer and the Seen are manifest; by virtue of Light, the Illuminator and the Illuminated are manifest. All these - the Knower and the Known, the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and Inwardly Hidden - acquire their Names in [the stage of] the first determination.

(37) The Known is called by the People of the Path the Fixed Essences. Some call it the Cognitive Forms, some the Reality of Things, and others call It the Relational Spirit. All these are the 'second determination'.

The human spirit, the animal spirit and the vegetal spirit are the 'third determination'.

(38) The 'fourth' and 'fifth' determinations are
determinations ad infinitum, encompassing the realm of physical things in its entirety, comprising the whole Universe and all created things [therein].

(39) Determinations never cease to occur and are without limit; but Knowledge, Being, Sight and Light [16] are never separate from them all, for without these four, the Possessor of these determinations would find Self-Determination impossible. This is why the People of the Path say that the being of the entire Universe is the Being of God. The world's being, though perceived as existing nevertheless does not possess existence, for it derives its existence from the Determinate Being. Our lack of awareness makes us believe that the world has being.

(40) The first determination may be called [both] Transcendent One (ahad) or Immanent One (wahid). When we regard the Essence by Itself it is called Transcendent One, but when we regard the Essence together with all Its Attributes and Names then It is called Immanent One for the Transcendent One is the Immanent One [insofar as It] sustains the Universe from its beginning to its end.

(41) The first determination is likened by the People of the Path to an ocean. When the ocean heaves it is
called 'waves' - that is, when the Knower gazes upon Himself, the Known cones forth from Him. When the ocean blows forth it is called vapours - that is, individual spirits together with the Relational Spirit form in all the Fixed Essences. When the vapours gather in the sky they are called clouds - that is, the Potentialities of Things gathered in the Fixed Essences ready to burst forth. When the clouds burst into drops from the sky it is called rain - that is the Relational Spirit together with the Fixed Essences come forth at the command of the Creative Word "Be!" (and it becomes) taking a variety of forms. When the rain falls on the earth it is called water flowing in rivers - that is, when the Relational Spirit, the Original Potentialities and the Fixed Essences "flow" under [the command of] the Creative Word "Be!" (and it becomes) they are called "rivers" When the rivers flow back to the ocean, they become ocean [once again], but that Ocean is Most Pure. Although the Waves ebb [17] and flow the Ocean does not shrink or grow vaster,\textsuperscript{1823} for It is the Purest of the pure.

\textsuperscript{1823} Cp. Lawā'ih, p. 43.
(42) As God the Exalted says:

\[\text{Kullu shay'in hālikun illā wajhahu.}\]

that is:

Everything perishes except His Face.

That is to say, His Being (Existence), That forever 'is', that which is other than It forever 'is' not, for to the People of the Path it is only that which 'is' that becomes existing; that which is 'is' not cannot become existing. By this is meant that God the Glorious and Exalted is Necessary Being, Self-Subsistent, and does not depend for His Existence upon any other. Possible Being is dependent [for its existence] upon It [i.e. Necessary Being]. Since Possible Being is dependent [for it existence] upon It, it does not exist in reality. The Doctors of Theology say that the World is brought forth into existence by Him from non-existence; after He has brought it forth into existence He then causes its non-existence. The People of the Path say that if this were so then God the Exalted is capricious, or limited [in power]. To us, that which is non-

---

existent can never become existent; [conversely] that which exists will never cease to exist.\textsuperscript{1826}

It is only that existence which is formal [i.e. material] that is annihilated, the ideal [i.e. non-material] is not annihilated. Just as one who is dead; his outward manifestation perishes, but his inward hiddenness does not perish, for as God Most Exalted says:

\textit{Wa lā taqūlu livan yuqtalu fī sabīli'ILLāhi amwātun bal āyahūn wa lākin lā tash'urūn.}\textsuperscript{1827}

that is:

And speak not of those who are slain in Allāh's way as dead. Nay, they are alive, but you perceive not.

(43) Similarly, it is the same with regard to everything; their origin is from God, their return is to God - and not [that their origin is] from non-existence returning to non-existence! As God the Exalted says:

\textit{Innāna anruhu idhā arada shay'ān an yaqūla lahu kun fa yakūn.}\textsuperscript{1828}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1826} Cf. Asrār, p. 16. It is clear that the 'non-existence' meant by the Doctors of Theology here is identical with 'nothing'.
\item \textsuperscript{1827} Qur'ān, 2:154.
\item \textsuperscript{1828} Ibid., 36:82.
\end{itemize}
that is:

Verily His command, when He intends anything, is to say to it "Be thou!" - and it becomes.

According to the People of the Path the meaning conveyed in [the word] lāhu (i.e. to it) presupposes existence of the thing referred to, hence God Most Exalted says lāhu to it. If [18] the thing is non-existent God will not say lāhu to it. Another point is that the People of the Path say that God Most Exalted is Eternal and Knowing; and since He is Knowing, it follows that the Known in His Knowledge must be existent. That which He creates 'before' or 'after', which we see, all come from the Known. This being the case, the [logical] judgment is that He causes a thing's existence from existence, and not that He causes its existence from non-existence, for what we call 'existence' is the being of His Predispositions. As God the Exalted says:

\[
\text{Kullu yawmin huwa fī shānin.} \tag{1830}
\]

that is:

Every moment He is in some state.

---

1829. See above, note 1691.
1830. Ibid., 55:29.
(44) O Seeker!, the Existential Mode of God the Glorious and Exalted is like that of an Infinite Ocean; the Universe together with all its parts within this Ocean is like a tiny bubble. And what is a mere man within that bubble? - nothing!, that is, it is none other than as God Most Exalted says:

\[
\text{Kullu nan 'alayhā fānin}
\text{wa yabqā wajhu rabbika}
\text{dhū'l-jalālī wa'l-ikrānī.}
\]

that is:

Every one on it passes away -
And there endures forever the Face of thy Lord, the Lord of Glory and Honour.

(45) O Seeker!, this world is like a wave, God's Existential Mode is the Ocean, though waves and Ocean are distinct, yet in reality the waves are not distinct from the ocean. It is as God Most Exalted says:

\[
\text{Khalaqa Īdana 'alā suratihi.}
\]

that is:

He created Īdan in His Image.

According to the Doctors of Theology the meaning

---

1832. Ḥanzah translates wajh as Dhāt (Essence).
1833. In the Holy Tradition.
underlying the words 'his image' is that God created Ādān in Īdān's image. However, according to the People of the Path [the meaning underlying those words is that] God created Ādān in the Image of the Creator. But this Tradition is most recondite and the pundits are unable to give a [satisfactory] interpretation of it. The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Inna'Llāhu [19] Ta'ālā khalaga Ādama 'alā ʿurati'l-raḥmāni."

that is:

"God created Ādān in the Image of the Merciful" - 1834

for the Merciful is like the ocean and Ādān a bubble [in Its waves]. The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu."

that is:

"Whosoever knows his Self knows his Lord."

This Tradition is also an allusion to the analogy of the ocean and the bubble. Whosoever comprehends the

meaning of this expression comprehends the Manifestations of the Essence of the Truth, Glorious and Exalted. Discourses on the Manifestations [of God] are many and impossible to set on paper. All that which has been said in this book is merely a summary. Whosoever loves God must seek [Him] also through devotional service. But God alone knows best!
(46) Know that the Attributes of God that are eternally together with Him are seven: the first is Life, the second Knowledge, the third Will, the fourth Power, the fifth Speech, the sixth Hearing, the seventh Sight. God is eternally together with all these seven Attributes. If these seven Attributes are not [eternally] together, then He is deficient, for to the People of the Path the Attributes are the Very Essence. For example, Life: it is the Essence that, [by virtue of Life] is called Living; Knowledge: it is the Essence that, by virtue of Knowledge, is called Knowing; Will: it is the Essence that, by virtue of Will, is called Willing. Similarly with all the Attributes ad infinitum. The Doctors of Theology say that the Attributes are neither the Very Essence nor other than the Essence.

as the Inān al-Ghazzālī (God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Sifatu'Llāhi laysat 'ayna'l-dhāti
wa lā ghayra siwāhu dhā'l-infiṣāl."1836

that is:

"The Attributes of God are neither the Very Essence
Nor [20] other than He endowed with separation."

(47) The Attributes of the Truth Most Glorious and Exalted are Perfect. Under this [Divine Perfection] cone Divine Majesty and Divine Beauty, for the manifestation of the entire Universe comes under Divine Majesty and Divine Beauty. All that which is good cones from the Attributes of Beauty, all

1837. In a m.s. in the British Museum, Arabic Catalogue No. DCCCLXXXI (unnumbered and not entered in the list), Harley Or. 5490, the verse appears in full (pp. 354v.-355r.) as part of a complete work, with commentaries in Persian. There the verse reads:

Şifatu'Llāhi laysat 'ayna dhātin
Wa la ghayran siwāhu dha' infiṣal
Şifatu'l-dhāti wa'l-af'ali furran
Qadinatun nasumatu'l-zawal.

The Attributes of God are neither Very Essence
Nor an other than He endowed with separation. The Attributes of the Essence and of the Acts - all of them - are eternal, preserved from evanescence.
that which is evil comes from the attributes of Majesty; unbelief is from Majesty, belief is from Beauty; Heaven is from Beauty, Hell is from Majesty; wrath is from Majesty, mercy is from Beauty. 1838

(48) The Essence is All-Pervasive; It pervades Majesty [the evil] as well as Beauty [the good], for Majesty and Beauty are Its Attributes. There are occasions when Beauty is transformed into Majesty, and [conversely] Majesty transformed into Beauty. The Devil was first from Beauty but he was later transformed into Majesty. 1839 It is these attributes that change. The Essence Glorious and Exalted is exempt from change; as water becomes waves, it is the waves that change, water remains unchanged, forever clear and pure, formless and colourless. All forms and colours come from His Majesty and His Beauty.

(49) The People of the Path question the Doctors of Theology: "God creates the believer and He also creates the unbeliever; why does He not create them all to be the same? To the believer He bestows faith

and knowledge of HInself, to the unbeliever He gives infidelity and polytheism; after having given then faith and infidelity He then grants Heaven to the believer and Hell to the unbeliever - to both everlasting [reward and punishment]. Since He is called Just, [how is it admissible that He does this?"].

The Doctors of Theology say: "[He does so] because He does whatever He desires." The People of the Path say: "If He does whatever He desires, then He is unjust, for He could have willed that the unbelievers become believers, and yet He causes them to be unbelievers and having caused them to be unbelievers [21] He then casts them into everlasting Hell without any mercy - how then can He be called Just?".

(50) The Doctors of Theology say: "The analogy is like one who owns many goats; some are slaughtered by him, then skinned, then boiled, then roasted and pierced with skewers. It is he who owns them, and they are not the possession of other people. If they are other people's possession, and they are slaughtered by him, then he is unjust; but if he slaughters his own possession he is not unjust." The People of the Path say: "Now listen to our explanation. The Essence of God is Eternal; the Potentialities of all
the creatures in His Knowledge are also eternal. Whatever God the Glorious and Exalted creates He creates in conformity with the [nature of] the Potentialities. Since the Potentialities of all believers come from [His Attributes of] Divine Beauty, the Potentialities of all unbelievers come from [the Attributes of] Divine Majesty - for Beauty represents the Gracious One, and Majesty represents the Irresistible One - hence God the Glorious and Exalted brings forth by His acts from the Gracious One, the strengthened [in faith]; from the Irresistible One, the submissive [to deviation from what is right]. Since His Names are One Who gives Strength and One Who Subdues, He causes them to enter [Heaven and] Hell according to the Law of their Potentialities, for Heaven is from the Gracious One, Hell from the Irresistible One; God returns each to his own place of origin. 1840

(51) As regards man and angels and the jinn whom God commands to perform acts of devotion, although they perform acts of devotion, yet the grace is from Him; the power of volitive movement is from Him;

the strength is from Him and love is from Him. Since He sees that their Potentialities are from belief, and from the Names Gracious One and One Who gives Strength, He commands them to perform acts of devotion. After they have performed acts of devotion He then causes them to enter Heaven. As for those who are unbelievers, He grants them the power to commit sins, to oppose belief; and He puts hatred in their hearts so that they may not have faith. Since He sees that their Potentialities are from the Names [22] Irresistible One and One Who Subdues He commands them to commit acts of sin, and He then causes them to enter Hell. This is what is meant by Just, and this is not injustice, for He does not change their respective destiny.

(52) The Messenger of God (nay God bless him and give him peace!) says rightly:

"لَا تَتَّهْرُرْكَا ذَهَرَتُونَ إِلَّا بِهِدْنِيّ إِلَّهَ" "La tataharraka dharratun illā bi idhni’Ilāh."

that is:

"Not one single atom moves except by God's permission."

And the Messenger of God (nay God bless him and give him peace!) says:
"Khayrihi wa sharrihi nina'llahi Ta'ālā."

that is:

"Its good and its evil are from God."

Though everything is from Him, yet [it comes to pass] in accordance with the nature of the Potentialities of the Known within His Knowledge, for the Potentialities of the Known are the many and variegated Pre-dispositions of His Essence. But His Essence is not many - it is pure from all Predisposition and conception." The Doctors of Theology say: "If this is so then Will and Power are useless, as things come to be by virtue of the Law of their Potentialities, and not by virtue of Will and Power." The People of the Path say: "Will and Power are ever-present - their existence is eternal - but His Will and Power work in accordance with the Potentialities of the Known, for the Potentialities of the Known are His Predispositions. If He changes then then His Greatness perishes, for His Greatness is His Perfection - and this cannot be altered. If He changes [His Greatness] then His Perfection perishes.

(53) The analogy is likened to a person with a beautiful face. He makes alterations upon his beauty by virtue of his will and power; that is, he perfects
his eyebrows, or straightens his nose, or levels his lips— all this he does in accordance with wisdom. If [this is done] without wisdom his perfection is destroyed. Another analogy is like the king who is complete in power. He can effect changes in his power; he can transform the elephant into a horse, or the horse into an elephant; or he can transform the goat into a dog, or the dog into a goat. [23]

But he refuses to effect changes in his power [in the manner described], since if he effects such changes his perfection is destroyed. It were as though what already is is not yet perfect— and only just now that he wills to bring forth his perfection and power. Comprehend this well!"

(54) It is incumbent upon us to have faith in [the existence of] His Predispositions, Attributes, Acts, and allusions referring to Him such as Heaven and Hell, the torment in the grave the tortures of Hell and Reckoning on the Day of Resurrection. Although all these possess no real existence, it is incumbent upon us to have faith in their reality. Whosoever deviates from belief in these, his place is with Majesty and the Irresistible One, and he will reap the punishments, and he becomes an unbeliever— God
preserve us from such! But whosoever has faith in these, he is a believer and his place is with Beauty and the Gracious One and the One Who gives Strength. But God knows best!
(55) Know that Love ranks highest among all the noble ranks, for Love cannot be achieved by personal endeavour except through the grace of God the Exalted. The sign appertaining to those who love is the fearlessness of death. If one fears death then one is not in love, for death is the desire of those who love. As the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man mata mina'l-'ishqi faqad mata shahidan."

that is:

"Whosoever dies of excessive love has died a martyr's death."

The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

1841. Cp. Abū Sa'īd ibn Abī'l-Khayr:
"In search of martyrdom the Ghāzīs go To fight Faith's battles: do they then not know That martyred lovers higher rank, as slain by hand of Friend, and not by hand of Foe?"
"Man 'ashiqa wa 'ushiq fa māta mina'l-Ishqi fa qad māta shahīdan."

that is:

"Whosoever loves passionately and truly and dies of that love, verily he has died a martyr's death."

And the People of the Path say:

"Al-'ishqu 'aduwu'l-'agli".

that is:

"Love is the foe of Reason".  

because reason desires life, love desires death; 

[24] reason desires the hoarding of wealth, love desires the casting away of wealth; reason desires to become king and minister, love desires to become poor; reason desires physical well-being, love desires infirmity; reason desires worldly loftiness, love desires lowliness; reason desires being well fed, love desires hunger; reason desires a high position, love desires a low position – this is the reason why the People of the Path say: 'Love is the foe of Reason.' As in the case of a person who wishes to do battle with a hundred men, reason cautions him: Do

1843. Reason here means discursive knowledge; it does not refer to the intellect.
not fight them, you are one and they are many, how can you fight them?; but Love will urge him: You must not fear anyone! As God the Exalted says:

\[ \text{idhā jā'a ajaluhum lā yasta'khirūna sā'atan wa lā yastaqdimūn.} \]

that is:

And when their term comes, they cannot remain behind the least while, nor can they precede (it).

(56) The reason why they [i.e. the lovers of God] desire death is because the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace) says:

"Al-mawtu jisru’l-ḥabībi ilā ḥabībin."

that is:

"Death is the bridge that unites the lover with the Beloved."

And the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says further:

"Mūtū qabla an tamūtū."

that is:

"Die before you die."

Furthermore God the Exalted says:

---

1844. Qur'ān, 7:34.
Qul in kānat lakumul-dāru'l-ākhiratu
'inda'llāhi khāliṣatan min dūnī'l-nāsi
fa tamannū'l-mawta in kuntum ūṣādiqīn.\footnote{1845}

that is:

Say (O Muḥammad): If the abode of the
Hereafter with Allāh is specially for you
to the exclusion of the people, then request
death if you are truthful.

(57) The meaning of [seeking] death is not committing
suicide with weapon or poison; [25] the meaning of
death here is to surrender one's self absolutely to
God through ṭajrīd and tafrīd. Ṭajrīd and tafrīd
mean 'disentanglement' and 'isolation' respectively -
that is, disentaglement from home, wealth and compan-
ionship with kings and ministers; and isolation from
the company of men. Ṭajrīd is disentanglement from
self and tafrīd is isolation with God - that is, the
negation of self and the affirmation of God. This
is indeed the reality [underlying the meaning] of
[the words]: 'There is no god but God, One, without
partner,'\footnote{1846} for by 'partner' to God the Glorious
and Exalted is precisely meant one's self. When one

\footnote{1845. \textit{Ibid.}, 2:94.}
\footnote{1846. \textit{Qur'ān} 6:163.}
is disentangled from self, one is isolated, and after being isolated one attains to love and intoxication. The lover who has attained isolation from self is not afraid of tigers (one who is under the sway of reason is afraid of tigers), elephants, snakes and the fire (only one who is swayed by reason is afraid of all these). This is why the People of the Path say: 'Reason is the foe of Love.'

(58) One who is enamoured of God does not fear Hell, nor hopes for Paradise. God alone is his sole desire. If one possesses such qualities one is then truly enamoured of God. But if one does not possess such qualities, one is still merely enamoured of rice and not God! One who is enamoured of God is not conscious of his self, how can such a one be conscious of wealth and food?

(59) As for those who could not contain the secret of their love and are wont to burst forth - like the Mawlānā of Rūm who exclaimed:

   For him pure Love is only known
   Who leaves both worlds for God alone.
"Man khudā am! Man khudā am!
    Man khudā am!"

that is:

"I am God! I am God! I am God!" - such exclamations or utterances are provoked by intoxication and not by their hearts' desire. Similarly, it is the same in the case of Shaykh [26] Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj who uttered: "I am the Truth!"

We must not imitate their utterances for we are not in the state of being overwhelmed (by love) [maghlūhu'1-ḥāl]. But if we are truly enamoured and intoxicated - not being able any more to contain our secrets - whatever we say of such utterances will not be sinful. Comprehend this well!

(60) This book of seven chapters is composed by Darwīsh Ḥamzah [Fanṣūrī] as an Adornment for Lovers in order that servants of God may not find difficulty in seeking knowledge, for in this book is elucidated excellent knowledge and works.

(61) There is nothing amiss [in the book]. But whosoever transcribes [or makes copies of] this book,

1848. Darwīsh, Persian for an ascetic Šūfī - one who goes begging from door to door.
1849. Literally: mentioned.
let him verify them twice or thrice, so that the letters and the sentences may not exceed or fall short [of my intentions]. Should they exceed or fall short, then the meanings perish.

God knows best!

Finis

The date of completion of copying this book falls on the forenoon of Tuesday the 9th of Rajab in the Year of the Flight of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) One Thousand One Hundred and Sixteen. God knows best.

1850. This is the note of the copyist, who completed copying the Sharab on the forenoon (duhaa) of 6th November 1704, this being the equivalent Christian date of the Muslim one given above. For the conversion of Muslim and Christian dates consult G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville's useful book *The Muslim and Christian calendars*, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.
CHAPTER XII.

The Adept

by

Hamzah Fanṣūrī

[Leiden Text Cod. Or. 7291 (III)]

[110] In the Name of God, the Infinitely Good, the Ever Merciful.
Praise be to God,
The Lord of the Worlds.
And right recompense be
Upon those who are God-fearing
And salutations be upon His Messenger
Muḥammad,
And his Followers all.

(1) Know, O Seeker, that the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man nazara ilā shay'īn wa lam yara'Llāha fīhi fa huwa bāṭilun."

that is:

"Whosoever sees a thing and does not see God within it, he is worthless." [111]

'Alī (may God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Mā[ra]'aytu shay'an illā wa ra'aytu'Llāha fīhi."

that is:
"I see no thing except that I see God within it."

The Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu."

that is:

"He who knows his self knows his Lord."

(2) The meaning of knowing his Lord and knowing his self is this: the Self of the Hidden Treasure is [none other than] his self, and every thing is in God's Knowledge. Like the seed and the tree; the tree in that one seed, although not seen, yet exists within the seed. Shaykh Jun[ay]d (may God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Kāna'Llāhu wa lam yakun ma'ahu shay'un [Huwa']l-āna kamā kāna."

that is:

"God was, and there was not with Him any thing, [He] is now as He was then."

This is the reason why 'Alī (may God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Mā ra'aytu shay'an illā wa ra'aytu'Llāha fīhi."

(3) But do not see [in this expression something] analogous to wet cloth and water for the cloth is
distinct from the water [saturating it]. God Most Glorious and Exalted is pure from such similitude!

But if [the relationship is] likened to that of the sea and its waves, it is permissible - as the verse says:

"Fa'il-bahru bahrun 'alā mā kāna fī qidami inna'1-hawāditha amwājun wa anhāru lā yaḥjibannaka as[h]ālun tushākiluhā 'an man tashakkala fīhā fahiya astāru."

that is:

"The sea is the sea, as it was before,
The 'new' are waves and rivers;
Let not forms that resemble them veil thee, [112] For the shapes they form are but veils."

But [the waves] exist together with the eternal sea.

As the hemistich [says]:

[Darya kuhan chū bar zand mawjū nu Mawjish khwānand u dar haqīqat daryāst]1852

[that is:]

The sea is eternal; when it heaves
It is called 'waves' - but in reality
they are the sea. -

for sea and waves are one. As God Most Exalted says:

1851. I.e. events; produced; creation.
1852. See text note 1460.
Wa'llāhu bikulli shay'īn muḥīṭ. 1853

that is:

God embraces every thing.

The Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Ana mina'LLāhi wa'l-'Ālamu minnī."

that is:

I am from God; the world is from me."

Like the sun and its light and its heat; their names are three, their reality is one. It is as the symbolic allusion of the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!):

"Man 'arafa nafsahū fa qad 'arafa rabbahū."

that is:

"Whosoever knows his self knows his Lord."

(4) His self, although it has acquired name and form, in its reality has no form and name. It is just as the reflection in the mirror; it has form and name, [but it has no reality]. As the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Al-mu'minu mir'ātu'l-mu'min."

that is:

1853. Qur'ān 41:54.
"The Faithful is a mirror unto the faithful."
The meaning [of Faithful here] refers to God's Name Mu'min. Hence His slave from among the elect is also called Mu'min. Such being the case, he is together with his Lord, for the slave is not separate from his Lord and the Lord is not separate from His slave.

(5) As God Most Exalted says:

Wa huwa ma'akum aynanā kuntum. that is:
He is with you wherever you may be.

And [113] further God Most Exalted says:

Thalāūtattin illā huwa rābi'uhum wa lā khamsatin illā huwa sādisuhum wa lā adnā min dhālika wa lā akthara illā huwa ma'ahum. that is:

[There is no secret counsel between] three but He is the fourth of them, nor between five but He is the sixth of them, nor between less than that nor more but He is with them wheresoever they are.

As God says:

Wa naḥnu agrabu ilayhi nin habli‘l-warīd.\textsuperscript{1857}

that is:

We are nearer to him than his neck veins.

(6) Harken, O Seeker! - He is with you\textsuperscript{1858} [means that He is] neither outside nor inside nor above nor below nor to the left nor to the right - [He is free] from six directions. As God Most Exalted says:

Wa huwa‘l-awwahu wa‘l-akhiru wa‘l-zāhiru wa‘l-bāṭinu.\textsuperscript{1859}

that is:

He is the First and the Last and the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden.

Further, it is like the analogy of a tree - an orange tree or any other tree. Its leaves are different,\textsuperscript{1860} its branches are different, its flowers are different, its fruits are different, its roots are different.

In reality all these are none other than the orange. Though its names and forms and colours are variegated, [its] reality is one. Such being the case, it is most desired that all gnostics know God Most Exalted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1857} Qur‘ān 50:15.
\item \textsuperscript{1858} I.e. Wa huwa ma‘akum ... (Qur‘ān 57:4).
\item \textsuperscript{1859} Qur‘ān 57:3.
\item \textsuperscript{1860} I.e. leaves, branches, flowers, fruits, roots are each of them different in their outward appearances from the other.
\end{itemize}
according to the symbolic allusion of the Messenger of God (God bless him and give him peace!): Man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu as mentioned before.

(7) The saying of the Messenger of God [114] [mentioned before] must be understood as a symbolic expression. Although from the point of view of the Law the forms of phenomena are varied, yet from the point of view of the Truth they are one. As the Lam'at says:

[Yārī dāram ki jism-u-jān şūrat īst
Chi jism u chi jān jumla jīhān şūrat īst
Har şūrat khūb u ma'nah pākīzah
Kandar nazr man āyad ān şūrat īst] 1861

that is:

I have a beloved whose form is body and soul,
What is body, what is soul? - the sum of the world is his form;
All beautiful forms and pure meanings -
All things that come to your sight - these too are none but his form.

As [God] Most Exalted says:

Fa aynamā tuwallū fa thanma wajhu'llāh. 1862

1861. See text note 1474.
that is:

Wheresoever you may turn there is the Essence of God.

The analogy is like milk and butter; their names are two, but their reality is one. In the final analysis the milk disappears [when it is] churned - the butter alone remains.

(8) There is no such thing as transformation, as the Messenger of God (God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man ḍarafa nafsahu bi‘l-fanā‘i fa qad ḍarafa rabbahu bi‘l-baqa‘i."

that is:

"Whosoever knows his self through extinction he then knows his Lord through subsistence in Him (and he is one with his Lord)."

It is just as knowing [the relation between] the spirit and the body; [the spirit] neither pervades the body nor is within the body nor outside the body.

1863. Sekali sekali tiada bertukar. This conveys the meaning that the creature does not undergo a transformation to Creator - there is no transformation of nature. Man as such is Man and God is God; only when Man realizes his true self through gnosis, he then knows that he is one with God.
Such is the case with God; [he is] neither upon the Universe nor within the Universe nor outside the Universe. The analogy is like unto the gem of a ring and its brilliance; its brilliance is neither within the gem nor outside the gem.

(9) Hence 'Alī (may God be well pleased with him!) says:

"Mā ra’aytu shay’an illā wa ra’aytu’Llāha fīhi."

that is:

"I see nothing but that [115] I see God within it."

Mansūr Ḥallāj too, from excessive love, utters:

"Anā’l-Ḥagg!"

that is:

"I am the Truth!"

Bā Yazīd too utters in the same vein:

"Subhānī mā a'zama shā’nī!"

that is:

"Glory be to me - how great is my glory!"

Shaykh Junayd Baghdādī also utters:

"Laysa fī jubbati siwā’Llāh!"

that is:

"There is none in my cloak other than God!"
Sayyid Naṣīrī also utters:

"Innā anā'llāh!"

that is:

"Verily I am God!"

Mas'ūdī also utters in Persian:

"Anchih hamān dhāt būd
bāz hamān dhāt shūd."

that is:

"God's Essence Eternal is my essence now."

And the Mawlawānā of Ṭūn says:

"When the world was not, I was;
When Ādam was not, I was;
When nothing was yet existent, I was,
loving my own eternity."

1864. See text note 1480.
1865. The literal translation of Mas'ūdī's words is this:
"That which was the Very Essence, has now again
become the Very Essence."
1866. The text omits the Persian verse, and I have
not been able to obtain it from the Javanese
text as the text is obscure. I have not been
able to trace the original Persian, but most
probably the verse in question is the same one
rendered by Harland Davis:
"I was on that day when the Names were not,
Nor any sign of existence endowed with name,
By me Names and Named were brought to view
On the day when there was not "I" and "We"!
(The Persian mystics, Jalālu’d-Dīn Rūmī, London,
1907, p. 52).
And the Sultān of the Lovers, Shaykh 'Alī Abu'l-Wafā', 1867 says:

"Kullu'l-wujūdi wujūduhu lā tushrikanna bihi'l-nilāh
Fa idhā nazarta lahu bihi fa'sjud hunāka fa lā junāh

that is:

"Every being is His Being; do not make a partner between Him and the beautiful. If you see Him through Him, then prostrate yourself there and no sin will be upon you." 1868

The Gulshan says:

"O Musulman! if you only knew what idols are, you would assuredly know that the true path is to worship idols. If the Polytheist only knew his idols truly,

1867. A disciple of 'Umar ibnu'l-Fāriq, the renowned Arab mystic poet. See Brockelmann, C., Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, Leiden, 1898-1942, GAL II, 120, and S II, p. 149(11).

1868. I.e. 'If you see Him in the beautiful through His Sight then you may prostrate yourself before the beautiful one and no sin will be upon you for doing so.'
How would he [116] become erroneous in his religion?  

(10) For this reason Shaykh 'Aynu'l-Quṭāt, worshipping a dog, says: "Hādhā rabbī" - that is: "This is my Lord!" - for he does not see the dog, it is only his Lord that he sees. It is just as a person looking into a mirror; only the face reflected therein is seen by him, the mirror vanishes from his sight, for the World [like the mirror] to his sight is like unto a reflection, it possesses form, but has no reality. The attribute related of the Truth Most Exalted is not the attribute related of ourselves because we see [with] a veiled seeing. As the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says: "Man 'arafa nafsahu fa qad 'arafa rabbahu," - and this is to be understood as a symbolic allusion. In reality He is the One Who is Known, and He is the One Who knows.

1869. See Shabistārī, p. 84:  
If the Muslim but knew what is faith,  
He would see that faith is idol-worship.  
If the polytheist only knew what idols are,  
How would he be wrong in his religion?  
The Persian text is on p. 51, lines 5-6.  
(11) As the Messenger of God (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Man 'arafa'LLāha fāla lisanu[hu]."

that is:

"Whosoever knows God his tongue becomes drawn out."

At first one begins by understanding "whosoever knows his self"; after attaining to "knows his Lord," then there is only His Self [and one is not there at all]. The Prophet of God also said:

"Man 'arafa'LLāha kalla lisanu[hu]."

that is:

"Whosoever knows God, his tongue becomes exhausted" (meaning: speech becomes impossible).

(12) Similarly, what Shaykh Muḥyī’l-Dīn 'Arabī (may God sanctify his secret!) says is an allusion to "whosoever knows his self knows his Lord." Verse

"Al-ḥaqqu 'aynu'l-khalqi in kunta dhā 'ayni wa'l-khalqu 'aynu'l-ḥaqiqi in kunta dhā 'aqli wa in kunta dhā 'aynin wa 'aqlin fi mā tarā fa huwa 'aynu shay'in wāḥadīn fīhi illa bi'l-shakli."

[117] that is, the real meaning of what Muḥyī’l-Dīn

1871. i.e. exhausted in its attempt to describe.
says refers to the being of His slave:

"If you have eyes, the creatures (slaves) are God's manifestation;
If you have intelligence, everything you see is God's Being.
[And if you have eyes and intelligence in what you see,
Then He is the Being of one thing in Him, with the exception of forms]. 1872

As God Most Exalted says:

Wa huwa ma'akum aynamā kuntum. 1873

that is:

And He is with you wherever you may be.

Further, the saying of Shaykh Muhyi'l-Din ibn 'Arabi -

Verse:

"Kunnā ḥurūf[an] 'āliyātin lam nu[n]qal
Muta'ālligatin bi'l-dāri 'alā'l-qulal.
Kuntu anā [anta] fīhi wa nāhnu anā [wa anta] huwa

1872. Hanzah here is not translating the verse, but interpreting it. Literally the verse means:
The Truth is the Being of Creation - if you have eyes [to see];
And Creation is the Being of the Truth - if you have intelligence [to perceive].
And if you have eyes and intelligence in what you see,
Then [you will see that] He is the Being of one thing in Him with the exception of forms.

Fa'il-kullu fī huwa huwa fa' s'al 'an nan wasal."

that is:

"We were Lofty Letters unmoved
Attached to our Abode in the Mountain Peak
I was You within It, and We were You, and
You were He

Everything is in 'He is He' - ask of those
in union:"\(^{1874}\)

(13) O Seeker! - to know [the meaning of] "whosoever knows his self ..." is not to know the heart and lungs, and it is not to know the limbs. The meaning of "whosoever knows his self ..." is this: that his being and the Being of his Lord is one and the same. As Shaykh [Junayd] Baghdā[ḍī] (God's mercy be upon him!) says:

"Lawnu'l-mā'i lawnu inā'īhi."\(^{1875}\)

that is:

"The colour of the water is the colour of the vessel containing it."

And it is as the verse in the Lam'at:

"Laqad batanta fa lam tażhar li dhī başari
Wa kayfa yudraku man bi'l-'ayni mustatiru."\(^{1876}\)

\(^{1874}\) Op, Shabistarī, pp. 29-32; 45-47.
\(^{1875}\) Cf. Lam'at, p. 334.
\(^{1876}\) Lam'at, Lam'at XIII, p. 343.
that is:

"Thou art hidden and art not manifest to
those possessed of sight,
And how can He Who is veiled by His Being
[118] be seen?"

Further Shaykh Muḥyī‘l-Dīn says:

"In ruḥtu biṭalabihi lam yanqadi safari
In ji’tu [ilā] ḥaḍrihi wahishta fi ḥaḍrī
Lā anā [a]rāhu wa lā yanfakku min baṣarī
Wa fī ḍamirī wa lā yalqāhu fī ‘umrī."

that is:

"If I go seeking Him my journey would
not end,
If I approach His Presence, He escapes
me;
I see Him not, and yet He is never out
of my sight
And He is in my self, and yet my sight
meets Him not in my life."

For this reason Shaykh Jun[a]y[d (God's mercy be upon
him!) says:

"Wujūduka dhanbun lā yuqāsu bihi dhanbun
[ākharu]."1877

that is:

"Thy existence is a sin with which no sin
can be compared."

(14) When you [still think that you] are one being and the Truth Most Exalted is another being, then it follows that you are a "partner unto Him," for the Truth Most Exalted is "waḥdahu lā sharīka lahu."\textsuperscript{1878} meaning: "there is no partner unto Him" and this means that there is no other Being than That of the Truth Most Exalted, like the analogy of the sea and its waves. As God Most Exalted says:

\begin{quote}
Fa aynamā tuwallū fa thamma wajhu'LLāh.\textsuperscript{1879}
\end{quote}

that is:

[Wheresoever ye turn your face there is] the Essence of God.

And Mawlawī 'Abdu'l-Raḥmān Jāmī (God's mercy be upon him!) says: Verse:

\begin{quote}
"Ham sāyah u ham nishīn u ham rāhu hamāh āst
Dar dalaq gada u[dar]atlas shāhi hamāh āst\textsuperscript{1880}
Dar anchuman farq nihān khānāh u jām'[hamāh āst]
Bi'Llāhi hamāh āst thamma bi'Llāhi hamāh āst.\textsuperscript{1881}
\end{quote}

that is:

\textsuperscript{1878. Qur'ān 6:163.}
\textsuperscript{1879. Qur'ān 2:109.}
\textsuperscript{1880. Not in the text, see text, p. 118, and notes 1508.}
\textsuperscript{1881. Dawā'īh, p. 25. The Persian text is missing.
"In neighbour, friend and travelling companion - all is He,
In the veils of beggars and in the robes of kings - all is He [119],
In union and in separation, in the cell of seclusion and in the house of congregation - all is He,
By God all is He, by God all indeed is He!" 1882

(15) The analogy is like a seed within which is a tree complete. At first there is only that one seed, but after the tree had grown out of it, the seed vanishes - only the tree is seen. [The tree grows] having different colours and is [productive of] varying tastes, yet originally it grows out of that one seed. As God Most Exalted says:

... Yusqā bi mā'īn wāḥidin wa nufuddīlu
ba'dahā 'alā ba'din fi'l-ukuli. 1883

that is:

... they are watered with one water; and We make some of them to excel others in fruit.

The analogy is like rain water in a growth of plant.

1882. For Whinfield's translation of the text see above p. 73, and note 145.
1883. Qur'ān 13:4. See also Āsrār, p. 53(33); Sharāb, p. 16 (40).
It is the water that permeates all and has varying tastes; in lemon, sour; in sugar-cane, sweet; in the mambu plant, bitter; each to its own taste. But the real essence of all these [tastes] is the water. Another analogy is like the sun and its rays. If it shines upon flowers and scandalwood the rays do not partake of the fragrance. If it were to shine upon foul things, the same would be the case. Do not entertain doubt in this matter, for doubt is a veil.

(16) Since He is present both in the theatre of manifestation of Majesty as well as in the theatre of manifestation of Beauty, His Name is then the Perfect One. The Name One Who gives Strength, the Name Graceful One; [the Name One Who Subdues and] the Name Irresistable One each is not separate [from the theatres of manifestation]. "Polytheism" too is a theatre of His manifestation. As Shāh Ni'matu'Llāh (may God sanctify his secret!) says:

[120] Ra'aytu'Llāha fī 'aynī bi 'aynīhi
Wa 'aynī 'aynuhu fā'azur bi 'aynīhi

1884. Cf. Lawā'ih, p. 36. See also above, p. 37. 1885. Polytheism here to be taken in the mystical sense.
That is:

"I see God in my being through His Sight,
My being is His Being, see with His Sight;
My Beloved is, from the point of view of
that which is other than me, is other than
my being,
And from my point of view His Being and
my being are one." 1887

Such, then, the true understanding of "whosoever
knows his self knows his Lord" is the beginning
[of man's ascent to God].

(17) God the Glorious and Exalted says:

Wa'Llāhu khalāqakum wa mā ta'malūn. 1888

That is:

God Glorious and Exalted creates you and
what you do.

God Glorious and Exalted says further:

Mā min dābbatin illā huwa ākhidhun

1886. Shāh Ni'matu'llāh, Dīvān (op. cit.), p. 604.  
In Ḥamzah's texts the last word 'aynihi reads:
'ayni.
1887. The last line of the verse is not translated
literally by Ḥamzah. But the meaning is main-
tained in the manner meant by the author.
bi nāsiyatihā inna rabī‘alā širāṭīn mustaqīm. 1889

that is:

There is no living creature but He grasps it by its forelock. Surely my Lord is on the right path. 1890

Furthermore the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says:

"Lā ḥawla wa lā quwwata illā bi’Llāhi ’l-‘ayliyyi’l-‘ażīm.” 1891

that is:

"There is no majesty and there is no might save in God, the Exalted, the Great." 1892

And the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace!) says further:

"Lā tataḥarraka dharratun illā bi idhni’Ilāh." 1893

that is:

Not one single atom moves except by God's will." 1893

[And the Prophet (may God bless him and give him

1889. Qurʾān 11:56.
1890. For a mystical interpretation of this verse, see Burckhardt, p. 53.
1891. Qurʾān 18:40.
1892. See note 662.
1893. The word gerak: volitive movement, here means will.
peace!]) says further:

"Khayrihi wa sharrihi mina'Ilahi ta'alā."

that is:

"The good and the evil come from God Most Exalted."

As God Most Exalted says:

Wa mā tashā'una illā an yashā'a'llāh. 1894

that is:

And none wills except by God's will.

(18) All these proofs [from the Qur'an and the Traditions serve as symbolic allusions to [the meaning of] "Whosoever knows his self knows his Lord". Apart from this there is no other [symbolic allusion that they refer to]. Shaykh Muḥyī'l-Dīn ibmu'l-ʿArabī (may God sanctify his mighty secret!) says:

Verse:

"Ḥarāmun 'alā'l-ushshāqi an yashhadu'l-siwalū ʿidhā kāna wajhu'l-ḥaqiqi [bi'l-nūri] sha'sha'a mā dhā aqūlu wa anta waḥduka lam yaku aḥadun siwāka fa mā siwāka fa kā'l-habā."

that is:

"It is forbidden to the Lovers to see other than He,

When the Being of the Truth shines with a light resplendent;
What do I say, Thou being One, there is none other than Thee!
And what is other than Thee but are as dust that rise and disappear?"^1\textsuperscript{895}

As God Most Exalted says:

\textit{Kullu yawmin huwa fī shā'\textsuperscript{n}.}^1\textsuperscript{896}

that is:

Every day He is in some state of activity.

(19) That is to say, His external manifestations are many [but the Essence is not many] and is not subject to change, for

\textit{Huwa'\textsuperscript{l}-awwalu wa'\textsuperscript{l}-ākhiru wa'\textsuperscript{l}-zāhiru wa'\textsuperscript{l}-bātinu}.^1\textsuperscript{897}

that is:

He is the First and the Last, the Outwardly Manifest and the Inwardly Hidden

His Firstness is unknown, His Lastness is endless, His Outward Manifestness is most concealed, and His Inward Hiddenness is unattainable; He sees Himself through Himself, He sees Himself through His Essence,

\textsuperscript{1895.} I am unable to trace this. Probably from the \textit{Diwān}.
\textsuperscript{1896.} Qur'\textsuperscript{ān} 55:29.
\textsuperscript{1897.} Qur'\textsuperscript{ān} 57:3.
His attributes, His acts and His Effects. Though in name they are four, yet in reality they are one.

As Shaykh [122] Muḥyī’l-Dīn says:

"Tajallī bi dhātihi fī dhātihi."

that is:

"He reveals Himself through His Essence to His Essence."

Furthermore Imām Muḥammad Ghazzālī (God's mercy be upon him!) says:

"In ālam azūst beūst bal ki hamah āst."

that is:

"The world is from Him, it is of Him - nay, He indeed is all."

Quoted from the Kimiya-i-Sa'ādat;

"Guft Bā Yazīd: "Wujūdunā minhu wa quwwāmuna bihi lā farqun bayañī wa bayna rabbī illā bi hādha’l-martabantayn." 1898

that is: [Bā Yazīd said]:

"Our being is from Him and our power is of Him; there is no distinction between me and my Lord except for these two degrees."

1898. Both this passage and the one immediately preceding come from Ghazzālī's Kimiya-i-Sa'ādat, but I have not succeeded in tracing them. Compare with Ḥūbū Bakr Warraq in Lama'at, p. 348.
Such is the symbolic expression of [the words]:
"Whosoever knows his self knows his Lord."

(20) God, Glorious and Exalted, is without 'place' and without 'similitude'. How can 'place' be ascribed to Him when nothing exists apart from Him? What of 'place', 'similitude', 'colour'?
The slave too must be without 'place', without similitude', without six directions, for the slave's attributes are his Lord's; the desired meaning being that he will then arrive at [the state described as]-

"Idhā tamma'l-faqru fa huwa'LLāhu 'Īshuhu bi 'Īshi'LLāh."1900

that is:

"When poverty is perfect it is God indeed, He [i.e. who is in the state of poverty] lives by God's Life.

As Mawlānā 'Abdu'l-Raḥmān Jāmī (may God's mercy be upon him!) says:

["Bas bī rangīst yārī dilkhwāh ay dil Qāni' nashawī barangī nā gāh ay dil Aṣal in hamah rangahā azān birangīst

1899. I.e. dimensions of space-time: front, behind, above, below, left and right.
Man aḥsanu šibghatan mina'Llāhi ay dil."

that is:

"The Loved One is quite colourless, 0 heart;
Be not engrossed with colours, then, 0 heart;
All colours come from what is colourless,
And 'who can dye so well as God', 0 heart.

(21) That is to say [123] its origin is without colour and without form. All forms that can be perceived and discoursed upon are, from the point of view of analogy, created. Whosoever worships created things such as the dead, semen, the heart and lungs, he is a polytheist for all these are as idols. Whosoever worships idols, he is an unbeliever — may God preserve us from such! But God knows best!

(22) Such being the case, how is it that it is permissible to consider [the relationship between

1902. Colourless: birangi, absence of visible or knowable qualities.
1905. See Kramer (op. cit.) on mani, p. 102; also Wilkinson: manikam.
God and man on the analogy of the sea and its waves?

As the verse says:

Fa 'awwal 'alayhi lā siwāhu fa 'aynamā
tuwallū fa thamma wajhu[Ilāhi laysa
mubarqa'an].

[Rely on Him! there is no other than He.
And wheresoever you turn there is the Face of God unveiled] ...

(23)...

[Raqqu’l-zujāju wa rāgati’l-khamru
Fatashābahā wa tashākula’l-amru
Fa ka’annamā khamrun wa lā qadāhu
Fa ka’annamā qadāhun wa lā khamru].

[that is:

The glass is thin and the wine is clear],
Their resemblance is indistinguishable;
As if it were wine without a cup,
And as if it were a cup without wine.

The meaning is that the colour of the glass and the
colour of the wine is the same thing; similarly the
colour of the wine and the colour of the glass is the

1906. Lacunae follows. See 5716(2), pp. 79-84, and explanation in the Introduction, pp. 369-377 above. The words in square 5716(2)kets are found in the Javanese text.

1907. Not in the text, but in 5716(2), pp. 84-85.
See Lam'aat, Lam'at V, p. 335; Israr, p. 56.

1908. Cf. Israr, p. 56.
same, and they cannot be distinguished. As the Lam'at says:

"'il-'aynu wahidatun wa'l-ḥukmu mukhtalifun
Wa dhāka sirran li ahli'l-'ilmī yankashifun."\(^{1909}\)

that is:

"The essence is one, its colours [i.e. visible and knowable qualities] are many, This secret can be practised only by those who know."\(^{1910}\)

As the distich says:

"Ma'shūq u 'ishq u 'āshiq har sih yakyast
In jā
Chūn waṣal[dar na-gunjad hijrān chi kār
dārad].\(^{1911}\)

that is:

"Beloved and Love and Lover, the three of them are in fact one,
When union is not there, what business is there for separation?"

(24) Why is it that the nature of union and separation is said to require two entities? In point of fact, to the Knower, reality cannot be two. Just as the

1910. Hamzah's translation is not literal, but the meaning is maintained. Literally the second line reads: "And this secret is openly revealed to the People of Knowledge."
1911. See Āsrār, p. 28; Lama'āt, Lam'at II, p. 331.
waves and the ocean are one and the same, it is only to outward perception that they appear as two, but they neither are united nor are they separated; each is neither within nor [124] outside the other.

"Qāla'ī-ghawthu'īl-ā'zām ayyi šalātin afḍalū 'indaka yā rabbī qāla'Llāhu ta'ālā šalatu'īl-ladhī laysa fīhā siwāʾī wa'l-musallī ghā'ibun 'anḥā."

that is:

Said the Great Succor:1912 "Which prayer is most incumbent for You, O my Lord?"
God Most Exalted said: "That prayer in which there is no 'other' than Me and from which the one who prays is completely extinct."1913

It is clear [from this that] the Truth is both the One Who is worshipped and the One Who Worships. As the Doctors among the Ṣūfīs1914 say:

'Mā 'arafa'Llāhu illā'Ilāh

1912. Al-Ghawth al-Ā'zam: the Great Succor is the Ṣūfī title given to Shaykh 'Abdu'l-Qādir al-Jaylānī, the founder of the Qādirīyyah Order (561/1166).
1913. See Ghazzalī on fanā'. Lawā'iḥ, Appendix III. See also Lama'at, p. 342.
1914. Masha'ikh plural of Shaykh: spiritual guide among the Ṣūfīs who were also generally the writers on doctrine.
mā ya'lamu'Llāhu illā'Llah
mā yara'Llāhu illā'Llah.'

that is:

'None has gnosis of God but God
none knows God but God
none sees God but God.'

And it is as Mawlānā 'Abdu'l-Rahmān Jāmī says:

Hamchunin wāṣīl nash[as]tah pech yārī mī
kunad ān hajr nālahāi zār tā shuwad maḥjūb
ū maḥrūm az waṣl wāqīf ān bar ranj u malāl.

that is:

"The person whose is in union is like one
who sits [in sorrow];
he tells his companion about his separation
and his sighs and his tears until he becomes
deprived from union,
he ceases [to be in union] because of his
separation and because of his being full
of grief."1915

It is as Shibli1916 says - verse:

---

1915. The Persian conveys the meaning interpreted by Ḥamzah: "The one who is in union is like one
who sits before a companion lamenting and weeping
about his separation until he becomes veiled and
deprived from union, and remains in separation
bearing the burden of grief and remorse."

1916. Abu Bakr Shibli, the famous pupil of Junayd.
See Tadhkirat, etc.
"Innà1917 kàdafàd'un sàkinàt1918 fì1-làmì in biya [fàhat] mala'ât fàhà1919 aw1920 sakatàt màtât màna1-l-ghàmmì."1921 that is:

"I am like a frog that lives in the sea; if she opens her mouth the water will fill her; and if she shuts her mouth she will die of grief." [125]

(25) The symbolic allusion from Shaykh Sa'du'l-Dîn:1922 'if one still seeks one will not achieve, [and if one still] looks one will not see', is because our endeavour is like the wind at sea. When the wind ceases then the waves return to their origin.1923
As God Most Exalted says:

Ya ayyatuha1-l-nafsu1-mu'tma1-irji1-I ilâ rabbiki ràdiyatan mardîyyatan fa'dkhûlî

1917. The text has: anā.
1918. The text has: yaskunu.
1919. The text is corrupt: aqāhā.
1920. The text has: wa in.
1921. See Lema'āt, Lām'āt XXVIII, p. 361. See also Kalābadhī, p. 139. Arbìr has given an English translation of the verse in Kalābadhī (loc. cit.):

Now praised be God, that like a frog am I Whose sustenance the watery deeps supply It opens its mouth, and straightway it is filled;

It holds its peace, and must in sorrow die.

that is:

O soul that art at rest,
Return to thy Lord, well-pleased, well-pleasing.

So enter among My servants,
And enter My Garden!

The meaning contained herein is that its coming is from the sea, and its return will be also to the sea.

'Jannatu'l-zāhidīna ḥūrun wa qusūrun jannatu'l-'ashiqīna fi māhallī kuntu kanzān makḥfīyyīn.'

that is:

'The Paradise of Ascetics is houris and couches;
the Paradise of Lovers is the state of "I was a hidden treasure"'

(26) Therein is the Abode of Lovers! They neither hope for Heaven nor fear Hell; for to the Lovers who are united [to the Beloved], the word jannat that is mentioned in the verse fa'dkhulī fī 'ibādī wa'dkhulī jannatī refers to the return to the state

1925. 'Its' refers to 'wave' or 'drop' an analogy referring to the soul or self.
of "I was a hidden treasure". Furthermore as the
People of Allāh say:

\[ \text{Man 'arafa'Allāhu fa huwa mushrikun} \]
that is:

Whosoever knows God becomes a polytheist.\textsuperscript{1926}

And again: \textsuperscript{1927}

\[ \text{Al-faqīru lā yaḥtāju'īlā'Allāh.} \]
[that is:

"One in the state of poverty stands in no need of God."]

And again:

\[ \text{Al-faqīru suwadu'1-wajhi fī'l-dārayn.} \]

that is:

"The one who is in the state of poverty, his face is blackened in both worlds."\textsuperscript{1930}

And again - verse:

\[ \text{Anā'1-gharīqu [126] bi bahri mā lahu tarafun Ghibtu fīhi 'ani'1-wijdānī wa'l-'ādan.} \]

\textsuperscript{1926. See below, note 1942.}
\textsuperscript{1927. See text, note 1578 : wa lahu aydān.}
\textsuperscript{1928. See Lama'at, Lam'at XX, p. 352.}
\textsuperscript{1929. Loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{1930. The meaning: the present world and the Hereafter is of no concern to him; God alone is his sole desire. See Lama'at, pp. 352-353, for exposition.}
\textsuperscript{1931. I have not been able to trace this verse.}
that is:

"I am drowned in the sea that has no shore; I disappear in it and am conscious of neither 'being' nor 'non-being'."

And again - verse:

"Raddadtanī bayna’l-maniyyati wa’-munā wa jama’tanī bayna’l-‘ināyati wa’l-‘inā wa akhadhtā nī [minnī] li dhātika fa’rtaqītu limustawā lā anta fīhi wa lā anā."

that is:

I have returned from desiring and the desired Object, And am united from being between the Giver of Grace and the one who is graced, And I have returned from 'me' unto Your Very Essence; the three are one:
There is no 'Thou' in It nor 'I'.

Furthermore Shaykh 'Iṭṭār (may God be well-pleased with him!) says:

[Bāz ba' de dar tamāshā ṭarab
tan farūndandi fārigh az ṭalab] that is:

Some from among them returned, after beholding, leaping for joy; their souls have been given release from seeking.

And again - verse:

1932. I have not been able to trace this verse, but Ḥamzah's interpretation of the verse is clear. Literally the verse means:
You brought me back from between Death and the desired Object,
And You united me [from being] between [Your] Providence and the need for [i.e. submission to] it,
And You took me from myself unto Your Very Essence and I am raised up To Your level; there is no 'Thou' in It nor 'I'.

The first two lines of the verse are the problematic ones as there is a play of meanings in the words maniyyah and muna, and 'ināyah and 'ina, which are derived in each case from the same root. In Ḥamzah's interpretation of the third line where he says "the three are one" he means by "three" Huwa, Anta and Anā: He, Thou and I.

1933. 5716(2), p. 91.
that is:

"The paper is burnt, the pen is broken and
the ink spilled and the breath is drawn out.
Such is the disposition and the tale of the
Lover, which cannot be contained in books."

And again:

(According to Shāh Ni'matu'Ilāh's verse:)
["Talab afdat īrādat wa bilā wujūd ḥijāb ast
wajdān muḥāl namāyi waqrub wa khiyāl
ḥudūr ghurūr nafsah dū dur dū dur."\textsuperscript{1936}]

that is:

Seeking is a foe and desire is vain and
existence becomes a veil, ecstasy [or the
finding of the One] cannot be attained
[if] it requires nearness with an 'other',
and the thought of one who is 'present' -
all these are deceptions of the self and
bring one further away [from the Truth].

(27) Such is the ultimate goal! This is what is

\textsuperscript{1934.} Text corrupt: \textit{shūqi}.
\textsuperscript{1935.} I have not been able to trace this verse.
\textsuperscript{1936.} I have not been able to trace this verse and
it is impossible to reproduce it correctly
here as it is incomplete.
called: "Fa’l-fana’ ani’l-fana’ ghayata’l-fana’."

[137] This goal can be called the World of Divinity, or union, or effacement. Hence Shâh ‘Alî Bârizi

says:

"Bar dar dâr’l-fana’i kardam sujûd
Sar bar āwardam nara rû’î numûd."

that is:

"I prostrate myself before the Door of the World of Annihilation,
I raise my head: 'Show me, Lord, Thy Countenance'."

According to the expression of the people of Pasai:

'If one is not kufr, one will not meet with kufu' -
that is, by kufr is meant in Malay "covered": if one is not covered, one will not "meet" with kufu -
that is to say ["equal"]. The meaning of equal is 'there is nothing higher than it', meaning: one becomes as one was originally, as when in the state of "I was a hidden treasure", together with one's Lord. The analogy is like the seed in which the

1937. "For annihilation from annihilation is the final goal of annihilation" - Ghazzâlî.
1938. See above, note 590.
1939. The Persian of the second line reads: "I raised my head, He showed me His Countenance."
tree resides; although outwardly the tree is not perceived, its reality is one with the seed.\textsuperscript{1940}

For this reason Mansūr [al-Ḥallāj] says: "I am the Truth!" - and some say: "Verily I am God!" for their [phenomenal] self\textsuperscript{1941} is no longer "seen" by them.

(28) This is what is meant by

"\textit{Idhā tammaʾl-faqru fa huwaʾllāh}" meaning:

"When poverty is perfect it is God indeed"

Thus God, Glorious and Exalted says in the Holy Tradition:

\begin{align*}
\text{Nawmuʾl-faqīru nawnī [wa] ukuluʾl-faqīru ukulī} \\
\text{wa sharabuʾl-faqīru sharabī.}
\end{align*}

that is:

The sleep of the poor is My sleep [and] the food of the poor is My food and the drink of the poor is My drink.

And furthermore God Most Exalted says [in the Holy tradition]:

\begin{align*}
\text{al-insānu sirrī wa anā sirruhu wa şifatuhu.}
\end{align*}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1940} Cp. Shabistārī's analogy of the tree, Shabistārī, p. 37.
  \item \textsuperscript{1941} \textit{I.e.} existence (or being; \textit{adanya}).
\end{itemize}
[128] that is:

Man is My secret and I am his Secret and his [true] Nature.

Uways al-Qarani says:

"al-faqiru hayatuhu bi hayati'Illahi wa 'Ishuhu bi 'Ishi['llah]

that is:

The life of the poor is by God's Life and his sustenance is by God's Sustenance.

It is as the saying of all the Shaykhs:

'Man 'arafa'Illahi fahuwa mushrikun wa man 'arafa nafsahu fa huwa kafirun.'

that is:

'Whosoever knows God is a polytheist and whosoever knows his self is an unbeliever.' 1942

As Shaykh Muhyi'd-Din ibn 'Arabi says:

"al-ma'rifatu hijabun lahu wa lawla-wujudu'l-kawnayn lazahara'l-'aynu."

1942. I.e.: he who knows God is a "polytheist" since knowing implies the knower and the Known. Hence ma'rifah is a veil (hijab); he who knows his self is an "unbeliever" because knowing his self to be his Lord, the Slave is non-existent.

1943. The sequence in the text is incorrect: wa lahu lawla. See notes above, pp. 87(192); 166(432).
that is:

"Gnosis is a veil unto Him, and were it not for the existence of the two worlds the Essence would be manifest."

(29) Since seeking and gnosis and passionate love and attachment, all of them, pertain to the creaturely nature, when all these are absent in him, then he is annihilated. Since his essence and his qualities are attributes related only to God Glorious and Exalted, when he is annihilated, slavehood, like the wave, returns to the Sea. This is the meaning of 'Return thou to thy origin!' (irji'I ilā āšlihi);\textsuperscript{1944} [and also the meaning of 'Verily we are from God and surely to Him we will return (innā li'Llāhi wa innā ilayhi rāji'ūn)];\textsuperscript{1945} and the meaning of 'everything perishes except His Face' (kullu shay'in hālikun illā wajhahu)\textsuperscript{1946} is also that; and the meaning of 'kullu man 'alayhā fānin wa yabiqā wajhu rabbika dhū'l-jalālī wa'l-ikrām'\textsuperscript{1947} - that is: Everything in it perishes, and there remains the Essence of they Lord [129]

\textsuperscript{1944} Qur'ān 89:28.
\textsuperscript{1945} Qur'ān 2:156.
\textsuperscript{1946} Qur'ān 28:88.
\textsuperscript{1947} Qur'ān 55:26-27.
the Lord of Majesty and Honour - is also that.

(30) If one is still conscious of one's feeling and thinking and sensuality, then one is still in the dual state, in the same manner as contemplation implies duality: when there is still one who contemplates, what is contemplated must [exist]; in the like manner feeling implies the thing felt and the one who feels; and similarly the one who thinks implies the thing thought. All these are ascribed to a nature in the state of duality, just as the wave as wave and the sea as sea, the wave not yet merged in the sea; [when wave and sea have become one,] there is no "meeting" and there is no "seeing." This is what is meant in the expressions: "When poverty is perfect it is God indeed," and "One in the state of poverty stands in no need of God." What is meant here is nothing but annihilation from the very state of annihilation. But one in the state of annihilation - should one be conscious of it - then one is not yet annihilated, for one is still conscious of one's annihilation. In that case duality still holds sway over him.

(31) As Shaykh Ḥāḍīthār says:
"Rahi wisāli dost kase rāygān nādīd
īn-kas ki ādāh har dū jihān dar nīyān
nādīd."

that is:

"No one has seen the path of union with the Friend for nothing,
He who has seen [that path] has not seen the two worlds between." ¹⁹⁴⁸

Furthermore, Shaykh 'Aṭṭār (God's mercy be upon him!) says:

"Ṭū [mabāsh] ašlān kāmāli īn [130] ast
u bas
Ṭū dū rū kām shor wisāl īn [ast] u bas."

that is:

"Do not be at all - this alone is perfection.
Do not be two-faced - this alone is union." -

for the meaning of "united" excludes the notion of "two". That is to say, when doubt and certainty have vanished from him, then he is 'united'. This is called 'īlnu'l-yaqīn, that is, to know with certainty; and 'aynu'l-yaqīn, that is, to see with certainty; and hāqqu'l-yaqīn, that is, to be truly

¹⁹⁴⁸. I have to thank Professor Arberry of Pembroke College, Cambridge, for his help in clarifying this verse and the one following.
certain - certain that his existence and the
Existence of his Lord is but one. His origin
is one and the same and his return will be to the
One - that is, 'return thou to thy origin' (irji'ila allā uṣlihi); and this is the meaning of "when
poverty is perfect it is God indeed." But God
knows best!

The book [entitled Muntahi] is
completed. Amen!

1949. Cf. 'Atfār and the allegory of the moths,
note. For an illuminating account of
the Sufi concept of certainty, see Sirāj Ed-
1951. 5716(2), p. 100.
Appendix I

Passages of texts quoted in Chapter I from an anonymous Malay work of the 17th. Century (Marsden Collection no. 11648, Library, S.O.A.S., University of London) rendered into romanized Malay.

(i)

[108] Bab ini pada menyatakan peri mengenal Allah dan mengenal diri seperti sabda Rasulullah (salla'llahu 'alayhi wa sallam): "Man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu," erti sty a: "Barangsiapa mengenal dirinya, maka sanya mengenal Tuhannya" - kerana wujud Tuhannya dengan wujud dirinya ini esa juga. Maka erti sebenar-benar pengenal akan diri itu [109] dikenalinya adanya tatakala lagi dalam 'ilmu Allah itu; ya'nî bahwa dikenalnya dirinya ma'lûm Allah yang dalam 'ilmuNya. Apabila dikenalnya dirinya bahwa ia ma'lûm Allah itu - maka ma'lûm Allah itu netiasa wâsîl dengan 'ilmu [Allah], dan 'ilmu Allah itu netiasa wâsîl dengan wujud Allâh - nischaya diperolehnya salah isbat daripada Allah [110] dan dikenalnya jalan keesaannya dengan Allah Subhânahu wa Ta'âlâ. Seperti firmân illâh Ta'âlâ: Wa fî...
afā la tūbsirūn; 1952 ertiinya: Dalam diri kamu jua - maka 'ngapa kamu tiada nelihat Dia? Kata Shaykh Ḥanzah:

Kenali dirimu, hai anak jamu!
Jangan lupa akan diri kamu.
'Ilimu ḥaqiqat yogya kau rau,
Supaya terkenal a'la adamu. 1953

[111] Ya'nī jika denikian, hendaklah bagi barangsiapa menchari 'ilmu ma'rifat Allāh [supaya mengetahui] tetaplah ia dalam sebenar-benar dirinya itu, dan kembali diri yang žāhir ini pun kepada sebenar-benar diri yang bātin itu jua. Kata Shaykh Ḥanzah:

Jika sungguh kamu sekalian ṭālibūn.
Kepada Kuntu Kanzan pergi rāji'ūn.
Dengan ḥaqiqat diri yogya 'āshiqūn -
Inilah ma'na śalātihim da'īnūn. 1954

[112] Maka barangsiapa mengenal Allāh dan mengenal dirinya seperti yang tersebut ini, nischaya orang itulah yang beroleh 'ilmu ma'rifat Allāh yang sempurna turun-temurun daripada Nabī Muḥammad Rasūl'Allāh (ṣalla'llāhu 'alayhi wa sallam!) seperti yang tersebut itu. Wa'llāhu a'lam!

1953. Cf. 3374, p. 11.
(ii)


1957. Ms. pages 96 and 95 should in fact read 115 and 116 respectively. There is an error in the ms. binding which effects the pagination.
Ta'ālā pada kedua 'ālan zāhir [dan] bāṭin ini, kerana bahwa sanya bagi segala 'ālan mungkināt ini, tiada baginya wujūd dan tiada berpenguasa. Maka yang tiada baginya wujūd dan yang tiada [95] berpenguasa itu mustaḥil {1958} adanya dapat berdiri sendirinya, kerana bahwa sanya ia itu sehingga beroleh sambutan jua. Kata Shaykh Ḥamzah:

'Ilnu ini daripada sidang 'allāmah, Dengan rupa diri lawan beramah; Jalan ma'rīfat Allāh akan manah-manah, Barangsiapa menghadap ustādh dinanakan salah?{1959}

(iii)

... [117] Maka barangsiapa mengetahui perkataan yang tersebut ini nischaya diketahuinyalah datangnya daripada Allāh dan kembalinya pun kepadaNya, dan nischaya dikenalnyalah wujūd dirinya [118] yang zāhir ini tiada lain daripada wujūd Allāh yang tetap dengan dia şifat 'ilmu itu. Maka şifat 'ilmuNya itu tetap dengan dia ma'lūmNya yang didalam 'ilmuNya itu. Maka şifātNya yang zāhir ini pun tiada lain daripada şifātNya yang bāṭin itu, dan fi'ilnya yang zāhir ini pun tiada lain daripada

---

fi'ilnya yang batin itu, kerana yang zahir [119] ini pun menyatakan sifatnya yang batin itu juga. Jika demikian, bahwa sanya sewujudlah baginya dan sifatlah ia dan sefi'llah ia dengan Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala, Tuhan yang Mahabesar kebesaranNya, dan yang Mahatinggi ketinggianNya itu. Wa'Llahu a'lam. 1960

Appendix II.

Passages of texts quoted in Chapter II from Ranîrî's *Tibyan fî Ma'rifati'l-Adyan* (Cod. Or. 3291, Library. University of Leiden) rendered into romanized Malay.

(i)


1961. 7291(I).
adalah Ḥaqq Taʿālā itu suatu jawhar yang basīt.
Dan demikian lagi i'tiqād Wathaniyyah yang daripada qaum Barāḥimah dan Saniyyah yang mengediami negeri Tubbat. Dan seperti i'tiqād qaum Ǧulūliyyah yang mengediami negeri Ḥalwāniyyah dan benua Hindūstān. Demikianlah i'tiqād mereka itu.1962

(ii)

1963. The text reads mukawwān.
(iii)


(iv)

Dan lagi pula katanya: "Jangan dinisbatkan

1966. 7291 (III).
...
lihatlah i'tiqād dan perkataan yang semata-mata kufr seperti i'tiqād qawn Falāsifah yang telah tersebut itu.\textsuperscript{1970}

(vi)

Dan lagi katanya: "Hai Ṭālib, mengetahui 'man 'arafa nafsahu faqad 'arafa rabbahu' bukan mengenal jantung dan paru-paru, bukan kaki-tangan. Ma'nā nan 'arafa nafsahu: adanya dan ada Tuhan-nya esa jua." Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr, kerana ittiḥād Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan nakhlūq. Mahasuchi lagi mahatinggi Ḥaqq Ta'ālā daripada kata kāfir yang demikian itu!\textsuperscript{1971}

(vii)

Dan lagi pula katanya tanthīlnya \[99\] seperti air hujan didalam sebuah tanaman. Air itu jua lengkap pada sekalian tanaman itu. [Ber]bagai-bagai rasanya; pada limau masam, pada tebu manis, pada mambu pahit - masing-masing membawa rasanya. Tetapi ḥaqīqatnya air itu jua pada sekalian itu. Maka i'tiqād yang demikian kufr, kerana dii'tiqādkannya nakhlūq dengan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā nesra seperti nesra air dengan bumi.

\textsuperscript{1970}. \textit{Ibid}, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{1971}. \textit{Loc. cit.}
Mahasuchi Ta'ālā daripada kata kāfir itu! 1972
(viii)

(ix)


i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr, kerana dijadikannya Khāliq dengan nakhlūq bersuatu.1976

(x)

Dan lagi pula katanya: "Pada zāhirnya jua makhlūq, tetapi pada ḥaqīqatnya Allāh." Inilah i'tiqād qawm Ittiḥādiyyah.

Dan lagi pula katanya: "Pada ḥaqīqatnya zāhir dengan maţharnya tiada bercherai. Ādapun segala kata itu pun pertama mengetahui ma'rifat Allāh jua. Ādapun kesudah-sudahan ma'rifat itu "tatakala datanglah kepada ḥad faqīr bahwa ialah Allāh". Apa ertinya? Seperti laut dan ombak dan angin tatakala bertiup angin ombak timbul daripadanya; jika barat angin ombak pulang kepada a'şalnya. Inilah ma'na irji'ī ilā ašlihi.1977 Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr, kerana telah nyatalah kesalahannya.1978

(xi)

Dan lagi pula katanya tamthīl nakhlūq dengan Khāliq seperti biji dengan pulun kayu dalamnya; sungguh pun zāhirnya dua kelihatan, ḥaqīqatnya esa jua. Sebab inilah Ḍaṁṣūr Ḥallāj mengatakan "Anā'īl-

“Ahaqq!" setengah mengatakan "'anā'LLāh!", kerana dhātnya tiada kelihatan dilihatnya. Lagi erti "iddā tannā'l-faqru fa huwa'LLāh"1979 erti nya: "faqīr itu tiada sesuatupun baginya." Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr, kerana [101] telah nyatalah bāṭil i'tiqādnya.1980 (xii)


Hai segala Ahlu'l-Imān! - lihatlah kepada Zindīq; dithābitkannya akan Ahaqq Ta'ālā kufu', iaitu: sebangsa, lagi diketahuinya pada zāhirnya bahwa sanya i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr; maka dī'i'tiqādkannya jua i'tiqād yang bāṭil itu serta katanya bahwa i'tiqād yang demikian itu pada 'ilnu bāṭin tawḥīd yang kānil. Demikianlah katanya dalam kitāb Muntahī.1982

1979. See (x) above.
1981. Kupho is the Achehnese form of kufu'.
Shahdân. Lagi pula i'tiqâd qawn Qadariyyah.


1984. The text is corrupt.
dalam kitāb yang bernama Asrāru'l-'Arifīn: katanya Qur'ān yang dibawa Jibrā'īl itu dapat dikata nakhluq.\textsuperscript{1986}

(xiv)

Kesepuluh qawn Jahniyyah [itu] Lafziyyah namanya. Adalah i'tiqād nereka itu dan katanya yang melafazkan dan yang dilafazkan itu sana kedua nya; ya'ni Qur'ān itu kalām Allāh, yang melafazkan - ertinya kalām yang dibacha itu - bukan kalām Allāh. Inilah i'tiqād Wujūdiyyah Ḥanzah Fanṣūrī. Katanya dalam kitāb Asrāru'l-'Arifīn bahwa kalām Allāh yang dibawa Jibrā'īl itu dapat dikata akan dia nakhlūq. Maka i'tiqād yang denikian itu kufr, kerana fīrmān Allāh Ta'ālā: (Innā anzalnāhu) Qur'ānan 'Arabiyyan [ghayra] dhī 'iwajin\textsuperscript{1987} - ya'ni: 'Bahwa sanya Kami turunkan Qur'ān dibawa Jibrā'īl dengan bahasa 'Arab bukannya ia makhlūq.'\textsuperscript{1988}

(xv)

Keses[bl]ilan qawn Jahniyyah [itu] Zanādiqiyyah

\textsuperscript{1986} Tībyān, pp. 70-71.
\textsuperscript{1987} Qur'an 39:28. The words I have put in brackets actually do not appear in the Quranic text. The word in square brackets has been omitted in Ranirī's text.
namanya. Adalah i'tiqād nereka itu dan katanya bahwa 'ālam itu qadīm dan na'dūn itu suatu jua; dan Allāh Ta'ālā tiada ma'dūn. Maka inilah i'tiqād Ḥamzah Fāsūrī dan Shansu'l-Dīn al-Sumatrānī dan segala yang mengikut keduanya. Maka i'tiqād yang demikian itu kufr kerana firman Allāh Ta'ālā: 'Wa'llāhu khāliqu kulli shay'īn'1989 - ya'nī: 'Allāh jua yang menjadikan segala sesuatu.'

Shahdān. Adalah segala Ahlu'l-Sunnah wa'l-Jamā'ah ittifāq mengatakan barangsiapa mengi'tiqādkan bahwa ma'dūm itu suatu shay' maka ia itu kāfir. Mereka itulah yang bernama Aṣḥābu'l-Hayūlā; ertinya, yang mengi'tiqādkan a'yānu'l-thābitah itu ada berwujūd.1990

Appendix III

Passages of texts quoted in Chapter III from Rānīrī's Jawāhir 'l-Úlūm fī Kashfī 'l-Malā'ūn (Marsden Collection no. 12151, Library, S.O.A.S., University of London) rendered into romanized Malay.

Dan lagi pula kata Shaykh Nūru’l-Dīn [36] 'Abdu’l-Rahmān Jāmī (qaddasa’Ilāhu sirrahu!) dalam kitāb Lawā’ih 1991 bahwa:

Ḥaqqatu’l-Ḥaqā’iq itu-iaitu wujūd Ḥaqq Ta’ālā - ialah Ḥaqīqat segala ashyā’. Maka adalah Ia pada ḥadd Dhat Nya Esa, sekali-kali tiada berbilang, tetapi i’tībār segala tajallīNya dan ta’ayyunNya jua berbilang martabatnya (ya’ni tajallīyat dan ta’ayyunāt jua yang berbilang), iaitu daripada segala jawhar yang maṭbū’ dan segala a’rāq yang ṭābi’. (Maka Dhat Ḥaqq Ta’ālā itu Esa jua, sekali-kali tiada berbanyak dan berbilang; hanya sanya yang berbanyak dan berbilang itu segala jawhar dan a’rāq jua - ialah yang ṭelihatan).

Maka Dhat Allāh yang Esa itu, daripada fihaq i’tībār tajarrud dan ilṭāq daripada ta’ayyunāt dan taqayyidāt dinamai Ḥaqq, dan daripada fihaq i’tībār berbilang dan borbanyak segala maṣhar dan ta’ayyunāt

yang kelihatan itu dinanai khalq dan 'ālan. Maka 'ālam itu zāhir Ḥaqq Taʿālā (ya'ni maṣḥarNya) dan Ḥaqq Taʿālā itu bāṭin 'ālan (ya'ni menzāhirkan dia). Maka 'ālam itu, dahulu daripada zāhirnya, 'ayn Ḥaqq Taʿālā (ya'ni ma'lūnNya pada diriNya akan diriNya dalam diriNya), dan Ḥaqq Taʿālā, kemudian daripada zāhir 'ālam itu, 'ayn 'ālam (ya'ni menyatakan 'ālam). Maka nyatalah pada ḥaqiqat Ḥaqq Taʿālā jua yang Esa lagi Wujūd Ḥaqiqī (dan segala mā siwā'LLāh itu sekali-kali tiada berwujūd ḥaqiqī, hanya wujūd majāzī dan ṣillī jua). Maka adalah zuhūr dan buṭūn, awwaliyyat dan 'ākhiriyyat dan segala i'tibārNya bagiNya jua. Ialah Awwal dan 'Ākhir, Zāhir dan Bāṭin.1992

1992. 12151, pp. 35-36; Lawāʾiḥ, pp. 41-42.
Appendix IV

Passages of texts quoted in Chapters II and VI from Rânîrî’s Hujjatu’l-Siddiq li daf’î ’l-Zindiq (Maxwell Collection no. 93, Library, Royal Asiatic Society, London) rendered into romanized Malay.

(i)

Wujûd itu iaitu dhat - ya’ni keadaan sesuatu shay’. Maka dhat itu ada kalanya kelihatan dengan mata kepala seperti ‘alan, dan ada kalanya tiada kelihatan dengan mata kepala, tetapi menyabitkan dia ‘aqîl dan shara’, atau kashf dan dhawq. Ta itulah wujûd Allâh.

1996. Rânîrî’s note: Ya’ni iaitu diperoleh ‘abd daripada segala tajallî Ḥaqq Ta’ālâ; iaitu memushâhadahkan Ḥaqq Ta’ālâ dengan anugerah daripada Ḥaqq Ta’ālâ dan diperoleh ‘abd beberapa asrar, iaitulah fâ’idah tajallî dan kashf.

(ii)

Kata Mutakallimin wujud itu dua perkara: pertama wujud Allah, kedua wujud 'alam. Maka wujud Allah itu wajibu'l-wujud lagi qā'in sendirinya, dan wujud 'alam itu mungkinu'l-wujud - ya'ni: dijadikan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā daripada 'adan kepada wujud khārijī; lagi ia qā'im dengan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā. Maka jadilah ḥaqiqat keduanya berlain-lainan; ya'ni keadaan keduanya itu berlain-lainan kerana Ḥaqq Ta'ālā itu qadin lagi nenjadikan, dan 'alam itu mufadath lagi dijadikan. Maka nyatalah pada istilāḥ mereka itu bahwa wujud itu dua perkara: suatu wujud ḥaqiqi; kedua wujud majāzī. Maka wujud majāzī itu milik bagi wujud ḥaqiqī.1998

(iii)

Adapun pada istilāḥ kami bahwa wujud itu esa jua; iaitulah dhāt Allah Ta'ālā. Dan 'alam itu tiada berwujud dan tiada layak dinamai akan dia dengan nama wujud kerana ia 'adamu'l-mahd. Maka apabila adalah 'alam itu 'adamu'l-mahd dan wujud Ḥaqq Ta'ālā itu wujūdu'l-mahd,1999 maka manatah jadi sewujud 'adamu'l-mahd dengan wujūdu'l-mahd? Hanya sanya adalah 'alam

itu maghar dan zill; milik bagi Ḥaqq Ta'ālā - ya'ni tempat nyata Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dan bayang-bayang seperti upama rupa yang kelihatan dalam chermin bidal tamthīl. Ḥaqq Ta'ālā itu upama yang menilik chermin dan 'ālam itu upama rupa yang kelihatan dalamnya. Maka wujūd Ḥaqq Ta'ālā dengan 'ālam berlainan pun tiada dan bersuatu pun tiada, kerana berlainannya dan bersuatu itu menghendaki dua wujūd mustaqīl sendirinya. Maka apabila adalah wujūd Allāh jua yang esa, dan 'ālam itu tiada berwujud, maka tiada jadi berlain-lainan. Daripada kerana inilah kami kata wujūd Allāh dengan'ālan esa. Jikalau ada 'ālan itu nawjūd kelihatan sekalipun tetapi tiada kebilangan wujūdnya dari kerana ia tiada berwujud haqīqī.

(iv)

Adapun pendapat Ahlu'l-Ṣūfī itu pun dengan dalīl 'aql dan naqīl jua, lagi ditambah pula kashf dan dhawq. Maka ditilik mereka itu dengan nata hatinya dan dirasanya dengan perasaannya bahwa wujūd itu esa jua - iaitulah wujūd Allāh yang tiada kelihatan dengan

2000. The text is corrupt.
2002. Ibid., p. 4.
mata kepada dalam Dāru‘l-Dunyā ini; dan yang kelihatan
dengan mata kepala itu iaitu 'ālan yang tiada berwujūd
seperti wujūd Allah. Maka wujūd 'ālan itu wujūd
majāzi lagi nuqayyad - ḥill - dan milik bagi wujūd
Allāh. Maka akan ḥill itu tiada dapat dikata akan
dia wujūd, dan tiada dapat dikata akan dia 'adam
muṭlaq; dari kerana jika dikata akan dia wujūd,
sekutulah ia dengan wujūd Allāh; dan jika dikata
akan dia 'adan muṭlaq, maka 'adan itu tiada ada
sesuatu shay' jua pun, dan 'ālan itu ada ia kelihatan.
Maka hyatalah 'ālan itu maghar wujūd Ḥaqq Ta‘ālā.
Maka nisbah antara wujūd Allāh dan 'ālan itu bersuatu
pun tiada dan berlainan pun tiada kerana 'ālan itu
maghar dan milik bagi Ḥaqq Ta‘ālā.2004

(v)

Kata Wujūdiyyah yang mulaḥid bahwa wujūd itu esa;
iaitulah wujūd Allāh. Maka wujūd Allāh yang ESA
itu tiada ada ia mawjūd mustaqill sendirinya yang
dapat dibezakan melainkan dalam kandungan sekalian
nakhlūqūt jua. Maka adalah makhlūqūt itu wujūd
Allāh, dan wujūd Allāh itu wujūd nakhlūqūt. Maka
ʿālan itu Allāh dan Allāh itu ʿālan. Bahwa sanya

adalah mereka itu menyabarkan wujud Allah yang Esa itu dalam segala nakhliqāt, serta katanya tiada mawjud hanya Allah. 2005

(vi)


Mantiqiyyin 2008 haqiqat sosuatu shay' itu diri sosuatu shay'. Maka ikhtilaf ikhtiyar Mutakallimin dan Ahlu'l-Sufi pada menyabitkan wujud Allâh dengan wujud 'alam itu ikhtilaf lafzi jua, bukan ma'nawi; seperti kata orang 'lima belas' dengan 'tengah dua puluh'. Maka pada ma'nanya sama jua, dan pada lafaznya berlain-lainan. 2009

(vii)

Maka berhimpunlah 2010 sekalian Ahlu'l-Sufi dan segala Mutakallimin mengatakan: "Al-'alamu bi jamii'i ajza'ihi a'radun wa'l-mu'rudu huwa'llâhu" - ya'ni: "Yang 'alam dengan segala suku-sukunya [itu] beberapa 'araq, dan ma'rûd itu iaitu Qaqq Ta'âlâ." Maka murâd daripada 'araq itu pada istilah mereka itu: "Al- 'araqdu lâ yabqâ zamanâyin" 2011 - ya'ni: "Yang 'araq itu tiada ia kekal pada dua masa." Dan murâd daripada ma'rûd itu iaitu wujud Allâh yang azali lagi abadî. Ialah yang qâ'im sendiriNya dan Ialah

---

2011. Raniri's note on the margin says:
Ya'ni adalah 'araq itu berubah-ubah lagi bergantiganti dan hilang. Maka datang yang ganti sebagainya pada tiap-tiap nafas dan ketika.
yang mengqiyâankan\textsuperscript{2012} bagi lainnya. Maka tiadalah dinamai akan 'ālan itu dengan nama wujūd; hanya sanya adalah dinamai akan dia dengan nama ḥalālat\textsuperscript{2013} dan lâ shay', bâṭil dan khayâlî dan sarâbî dan zîlî jua.

Maka apabila adalah ḥâl 'ālan itu demikian - ya'nî tiadalah kebilangan keadaannya itu jikalau kelihatan pada penglihat mata sekalipun - maka tiadalah menduai wujūd Ḥaqq Ta'âlâ. Sebab inilah kata mereka itu bahwa Ḥaqq Ta'âlâ dengan 'ālan itu esa. Bukan maqṣûd mereka itu bahwa 'ālan\textsuperscript{2014} dengan Ḥaqq Ta'âlâ sewjûd dan bersuatu. Kerana itulah kata mereka itu bahwa Ḥaqq Ta'âlâ dengan 'ālan berlainan pun tiada dan bersuatu pun tiada, kerana berlainannya dan bersuatu itu menghendaki dua wujûd. Hanya sanya adalah ia nilik bagi Ḥaqq Ta'âlâ.\textsuperscript{2015}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2012} Text corrupt: peqiyâankan.
\item \textsuperscript{2013} Text corrupt: ḥalâlat.
\item \textsuperscript{2014} Rânîrî's note on the margin says: Ya'nî sebab dinamai akan 'ālan itu lâ shay' kerana ia tiada shay' ḥaqîqi pada tiap-tiap nafsû'l-amr dirinya, tetapi adalah shay' pada fihaq dijadikan Allâh akan dia.
\item \textsuperscript{2015} Hujjah, pp. 21-22.
\end{itemize}
(viii)

2016. Rānīrī’s note:
Ya'ni, keluar 'Ālan daripada Dhāt dengan kuasa dirinya, tiada dengan dijadikan Ḥaqq Ta'ālā akan dia.

2017. Ḥujjāh, pp. 7-8.
Appendix V

Passages of texts quoted in Chapter III from Ẓanzah’s Sha’irs (Cod. Or. 2016, Cod. Or. 3374, Cod. Or. 3372, Library, University of Leiden) rendered into romanized Malay.

(1)

On the Fixed Essences.

Aho segala kamu yang bernama taulan!
Tuntut ma’rifat pada nongonal a’yan
Kerana disana sekalian 'arifan
Barang katanya setengah dengan firmān.

A’yan thābitah bukankah shu’īn dhātiyyah?
Mengapa pulang dikata wujūd 'ilmīyyah!
Tatakala awwal baharu muqābalah
Olehnya janggal sebab lagi nentah.

A’yan thābitah bukankah šuwarī?
Mengapa pulang dikata sifat wahyī!
Tatakala awwal baharu taqṣīl ‘ilmī
Olehnya janggal tiada mengetahui.

A’yan thābitah bukankah nāhiyyat al-mannākat?
Mengapa pulang dikata mustahilāt!
Tatakala awwal tclah bernama na’lūmāt
Olehnya janggal tiada mendapat.

A’yan thābitah bukankah nakhlūq?
Mengapa pulang dikata na’shūq!
Tatakala awwal baharu nasbūq
Olehnya janggal lalu tafāruq.

A’yan thābitah bukankah nir’āt?
Mengapa pulang dikata ‘adāniyyat!
Tatakala awwal bernama ḥurūf ‘āliyyāt
Olehnya janggal nonjadi ḍalālat.
A'yān thābitah bukankah 'ālan?
Mengapa pulang dikata 'adan!
Tatakala awwal telah sudah mutalāzan
Olehnya janggal ponglihatnya kelan.

A'yān thābitah bukankah 'āshiq?
Mengapa pulang dikata Khāliq!
Tatakala awwal baharu mutalāhiq
Olehnya janggal lalu mufāriq.

A'yān thābitah bukankah na'lūn?
Mengapa pulang dikata na'dūm!
Tatakala awwal baharu tawasāhūn
Olehnya janggal tiada nafhūn.

A'yān thābitah bukankah faqīr?
Mengapa pulang dikata anār!
Tatakala awwal baharu ḥādir
Olehnya janggal nenjadi khāsir.

A'yān thābitah bukankah jā'izul-wujūd?
Mengapa pulang dikata muntani'u'l-wujūd!
Tatakala awwal telah sudah majjūd
Olehnya janggal nonjadi jūjud.

A'yān thābitah bukankah sh'ūn thubūtī?
Mengapa pulang dikata 'adan māhī!
Tatakala awwal sudah mujnūl
Olehnya janggal nenjadi Mu'tazīlī.

A'yān thābitah bukankah 'adan munkin?
Mengapa pulang dikata 'adan sākin!
Tatakala awwal telah nenjadi chermin
Olehnya janggal lalu negerin.

'Adan munkin awwalnya na'dūn
Disana faqīr sekalian antun
Didalan 'ilnū sekaliannya na'lūn
Itulah murad wa huwa na'akun aynanā kuntun 2018

On the Descent of the Absolute

Ta'ayyun uwwal wujud yang jani'i
Pertana disana nyata Ruh Idaf
Senesta 'alan sana lagi ijmnl
Itulah bernana Haqiqat Muhammad al-Nabi.

Ta'ayyun tahn wujud yang tanyizi
Disana terperi sekalian ruhi
Senesta 'alan sana tafsil yang mujmal
Itulah bernama Haqiqat insan.

Ta'ayyun thalith wujud yang mufassal
Itulah anugoraha daripada karunia Ilahi
Senesta 'alan sana tafsil fi'lri
Itulah bernama a'yan khariji.

Rahasia ini yogya diketahui
Pada kita sekalian yang nenuntu
Denikianlah kelakuannya tanazzul dan taraqqi
Dari sanalab kita sekalian menjadi.

Pada kunhinya itu belum bkeretahuan
Denikianlah nartabat asal permulaan
Bernama wahdat tatakala zan'an
Itulah 'Ashiq sifat menyatakan.

Wahdat itulah bernama Kanal Dhati
Menyatakan sana Ruh Muhammad al-Nabi
Tatakala itu bernama Ruh Idafi
Itulah makota Qurayshi dan 'Arabi.

Wahdat itulah sifat yang Keesaan
Menberikan wujud pada sekalian insan
MuhitNya lengkap pada sekalian zan'an
Olehnya itulah tiada Ina bernakan.

Wahdat itulah yang pertana nyata
Didalamnya mawjud sekalian rata
MuhitNya lengkap pada sekalian anggota
Denikianlah umpana chahaya dan pernata.
Waḥdat itulah bernama Kunhi Șifat
Tiada bercheraii dengan șilag Ahadîyyat
Tanâh dan tashbîh disana na'iyyat
Denikianlah sekarang zâhir [28] pada
ta'ayyunât.

Waḥdat itulah bernama bayang-bayang
Disana nyata Wayang dan Dalang
Muḥît Nya lengkap pada sekalian padang
Mushahadat disana jangan kepaling.

Waḥdat itulah yang pertana awwal
Ijnâl dan tafsîl sana mujnal
Muḥît Nya lengkap pada sekalian af'âl
Itulah nartabat usûl dan asâl.

Waḥdat itulah yang pertana tanazzul
Ijnâl dan tafsîl sana naqbul
Muḥît Nya lengkap pada sekalian naf'ûl
Itulah Ḥaqîqat Junjunag Rasûl.

Waḥdat itulah yang pertana tajalli
Tiada bercheraii dengan Wujûd Muṭlaqi
Ijnâl dan tafsîl didalan 'ilni
Itulah nartabat kejadian Rûh ʾIdâfî.

Waḥdat itulah yang pertana taqayyid
Disana idâfat lâm yûlad dan lâm yalîd
Pada sekalian ta'ayyun jangan kau taqlîd
Mangkanya sampai bernama tajrid.

Waḥdat itulah șifat yang talâhuq
Tanâh dan tashbîh sana oluk
Muḥît Nya nyata tatakala nasuk
Itulah pertenuan Khâliq dan Makhlûq.

Waḥdat itulah șifat yang talâzun
Tanâh dan tashbîh sana nalzun
Muḥît Nya longap pada sekalian na'îlûn
Itulah pertenuan Qasîn dan Maqsûn.

Waḍdat itulah ṣifat yang taqārūn
Tanzīḥ dan tashbīḥ sana nāqrūn
Muḥīṭ Nya lengkap pada sekalian nudabbirūn.
Itulah nurad: Wa ṭī anfusikun - a fa la
tubsirūn. 2020

(iii)

On the Compassionate

Tuhan kita yang bernama Qādīn
Pada sekalian nakhlūq terlalu karīn
TandaNya qādir lagi dan ḥakīn
Menjadikan 'ālan daripada al-Raḥnān al-Rahīn.

Rahmān itulah yang bernama sīfāt
Tiada bercherai dengan kunhī Dḥāt
Dḥāt disana perhiupunah sekalian 'ibārāt
Itulah ḥaqīqat yang bernama na'ilūnāt.

Rahmān itulah yang bernama wujūd
Keadaan Tuhan yang sedia na'bud
Kenyataan Islān Naṣrānī dan Yahūd
Dari Rahmān itulah sekalian nāwjūd.

Ma'būd itulah terlalu bāyān
Pada kedua 'ālan kullu yawmīn huwa fi shān2021
Āyat ini daripada Surat al-Raḥnān
Sekalian 'ālan disana ḥayrān.

Ma'būd itulah yang bernama ḥaqīq
Sekalian 'ālan didalarnya ghariq
Olehnya itulah sekalian fārīq
Pada kunhinya itu tiada bērūlāh ṭariq.

Ḥaqīqat itulah terlalu 'ayān
Pada rupa kita sekalian insan
Aynā tuwallū suatu burhān
Ṭa thamma wajhu'Ilāh2022 pada sekalian
nākan.

Insān itu terlalu 'alī
Ḥaqīqatnya Raḥnān yang Maha Bāqī
Ahsanu taqwīnīn2023 itu rabbānī
Akan kenyataan Tuhan yang bernama Subhānī.

Subhānī itulah terlalu 'ajīb
Daripada habīl'īl-warīd2024 pun ia qarīb
Indah sekali qaḍī dan khāṭīb
Demikian haripri tiada beroleh naṣīb.

Aho segala kita yang 'āshiqī
Ingatkan na'nā insānī
Jika sungguh engkau bangsa rūḥānī
Jadikan dirinu akan rupa Sūltānī.

Kenal dirinu hai anak 'ālin!
Supaya engkau nentiasa salin
Dengan dirinu itu yogya kauf qā'in
Itulah ḥaqqiqat salat dan şa'in.

Dirinu itu bernama khalīl
Tiada bercherai denganrabb [al-]Jalīl
Jika na'nā dirinu dapat akan dalīl
Tiada berguna nadhīb dan sabil.

Kullu nan 'alayhā fān2025 āyat min Rabbihī
Menyatakan na'na ḫaṣṣī'ī ilā aṣḥābi2026
Akan insān yang beroleh tawfīqī
Supaya karan didalan sirru sirrihi.

Situlah wujūd sekalian funūn
Tinggallah engkau daripada nāl wa'l-banūn
Engkualah 'āshiq terlalu junūn
Innā li'Llāhī wa innā ilayhi rāji'ūn.2027

2024. Ibid., 50:16.
2026. Ibid., 89:28.
2027. Ibid., 2:156. 3374, pp. 13-14.
(iv)

On the Spirit

(a)

Unggas itu yang anat burjana
Diarmnya nontiasa didalan astana
[39] Tenpatnya bermain dibukit Tür Sinā
Majnūn dan Si Laylā; dalam disana.

Unggas itu bukannya nurī
Berbunyi ia sedekala hari
Bermain tanāshā pada sekalian negeri
Denikianlah nurād al-insānu sirrī.

Unggas itu bukannya balan
Nontiasa borbunyi siang dan nalan
Tenpatnya bermain pada sekalian 'ālan
Disanalah tanāshā melihat ragan.

Unggas itu tahu berkata-kata
Sarangnya dipadang rata
Tenpatnya bermain pada sekelian anggaunata
Ada yang borsalahan, ada yang sekata.

Unggas itu terlalu indah
Olehnya banyak ragan dan ulah
Tenpatnya bermain [didalan] Ka'bah
Pada bukit 'Arafāt kesudahan mushāhadah.

Unggas itu bukannya nerak
Nontiasa bermian didalan shurga
Kenyataan nu'jizattidur dan jaga.
Itulah wujūd nelputi rongga.

Unggas itu terlalu pingai
Nontiasa main dalam naligai
Rupanya elok sempurna bissai
Menyanarkan diri pada sekalian sakai.

Unggas itu bukannya gagak
Bunyinya terlalu sangat galak
Tenpatnya tanāshā pada sekalian awak
Itulah wujūd menyatahan kehendak.
Unggas itu bukannya baya'N
Nentiasa berbunyi pada sekalian a'yan
Tenpatnya tanâska pada sekalian kawan
Itulah wujud menyatakan kolakuan.

Unggas itu bukannya burung
Nentiasa berbunyi didalan tanglung
Tenpatnya tanâska pada sekalian lurung
Itulah wujud menyatakan tulung.

Unggas itu bukannya Baghdâdî
Nentiasa berbunyi didalan jasadi
Tenpatnya tanâska [40] pada sekalian fu'âdî
Itulah wujud menyatakan 'ahdi.

Unggas itu yang weruh angasnu
Nentiasa 'âshiq tiada kala jenu
Menjadi dagung lagi ia janu
Itulah wujud menyatakan 'ilmu. 2028

(b)

Tâyru'l-'ûryânî unggas sulťâni
Bangsanya Nur'î-Rahnâni
Tasbihnya Allâh Subhâni
Gila dan nabok akan Rabbâni.

Unggas itu verlalu pingai
Warnanya terlalu bisai
Runahnya tiada [69] berbidai
Duduknya dâ'in dibalik tirai.

Putihnya terlalu suci
Olehnya itu bernama rûthî
Millatnya terlalu şuîfî
Maşhafnya bersurat Kuffî.

'Arsh Allâh akan pangkalannya
Hâbib Allâh akan taulannya
Bayt Allâh akan sangkarannya
Mengadap Tuhan dengan sopannya.
Sufiinya bukannya kain
Fi'l-Ma'akah da'in bermain
'Ilnunya zahir dan batin
Monyenbah Allah terlalu rajin.

Kitab Allah dipersandangnya
Ghayb Allah akan pandangnya
'Alan Lahut akan kandangnya
Pada da'irah Huwa terapat pandangnya.

Dhikr Allah kiri kannya
Fikir Allah rupa badannya
Shurbat tawhid akan minumnya
Da'in bertemu dengan Tuhannya.

Suluhnya terlalu terang
Harinya tiada berpetang
Jalannya terlalu hening
Barang nendapat dia terlalu menang.

Chahayanya tiada berhā'il
Bayna 'llah dan bayna 'il-'āmil
Sharī'atnya terlalu kanil
Barang yang mungkir menjadi jāhil.

Jika kau dapat aṣal 'ilmunya
Engkaulah yang tertahunya
'Alan nin engkau yang punya
Disana-sini engkau sukunya.

'Ilnunya tiada berbagai-bagai
Farqunya yogya kau pakai
Tinggalkan ibu dan bapai
Monyenbah Tuhan jangan kau lalai.

'Ilnunya 'ilnu yang pertana
Madhabnya nadhab bernana
Chahayanya chahaya yang lana
Kedalan shurga bersana-sana.2029

2029. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
(c)

Tayru'l-urryānī unggas rūḥānī
Didalan kandang ḥaḍrat raḥmānī
Warnanya pingai rupanya šafi
Tempatnya Kursi yang naha ʿālī.

Sungguh pun 'uryān bukan nyा gila
Mengaji Qur'ān dengah tartīla
Tempatnya nandi sungai Salsabīlā
Didalan firdaus ra'su Zanjabīlā.2030

(d)

Unggas nūri așalnya chahaya
Diambiln da'in di Kursi Raja
Daripada nūrinya faqīr dan kaya
Menjadi insān, Tuhan dan saya.

Kuntu kanzan așal sarangnya
'Alan Lahuut nana padangnya
Terlalu Luas dengan lapangnya
Itulah kanzan dengan lawangnya.

'Aqlu'l-Kullī nana bulunya
Qalān al-A'la nana kukunya
Allāh Ta'āla akan gurunya
Oloh ituah tiada jodonya.

Jalāl dan Janāl nana kakinya
Nūru'l-Awwal nana jarinya
Lawīl al-Maḥfūz nana hatinya
Menjadi jawhar dengan šāfinya.

Itulah Aḥnād awwal Nabīnya
Nūr Allāh dengan suhinnya
Sekalian'Ālan panchar daripada nūrinya
Menjadi langit sorta buninya.2031

2030. Ibid., p. 70.
2031. Ibid., p. 71.
(e)

Unggas Pingai terlalu 'āshiq
Dā'in bernain di Kursī Khāliq
Bangsanya Raḥmān yang fa'iq
Menjadi sultān terlalu la'iq.

Unggas itu tahu borkata
Sarangnya dipadang rata
Akan wujūdnya sekalian nata
Mengenal diri terlalu nyata.

Maẓhar Allāh akan rupanya
Asnā' Allāh akan nananya
Malā'ikat akan tenteranya
Akulah wāṣīl akan katanya.

Sayapnya bernana Furqān
Tubuhnya bersurat Qur'ān
Kākinya ḥānnān dan Mannan
Dā'in [73] bertenggcor ditangan Raḥmān.

Rūḥ Allāh akan nyawanya
Sirr Allāh akan angganya
Nūr Allāh nana matanya
Nūr Muḥāmmad dā'in sertanya.

Liqā Allāh nana 'ishqīnya
Ṣawt Allāh akan bunyinya
Raḥmān-Rahīn nana hatinya
Menyenbah Tuhan dengan ṣāfīnya.

Buni-langit akan sangkarannya
Makkah-Madīnah akan pangkalannya
Bayt Allāh nana badannya
Disana bertenu dengan Tuhannya.

Chahayanya seperti suluh
Bunyinya seperti guruh
Matanya lengkap dengan tubuh
Bulunya dā'in sokalian luruh.

Rupanya akan nāḥbūbnya
Lakunya akan nārghūbnya
Bangsanya akan nātābūbnya
Buraq al-Mi'rāj akan narkūbnya.
'Ilmu'1-yaqīn nana 'ilmunya
'Aynu'1-yaqīn ḥāsil tahunya
Haqqu'1-yaqīn akan lakunya
Muḥammad Nabī aṣal gurunya.

Sharī'at akan ripinya
Tariqat akan budinya
Haqiqat akan tirainya
Ma'rifat yang waṣil akan isinya.

'Ālan nāsūt nana hambanya
Perisai nalaqūt akan katanya
Duldul jabarūt nana kudanya
Menyerang lāhūt akan kerjanya.

Dongarkan hai anak jama' nuna
Unggas itu sekalian kanu; 2032

(f)

Ikan Tunggal bermana fādil
Dengan air dā'īn ia waṣil
'Ishqinya terlalul ku-nil.
Didalan Laut tiada bersahil.

Ikan itu terlalul 'alī
[87] Bangsanya Nūr al-Raḥmānī
Angganya rupa insānī
Dā'īn bermain di laut bāqi.

Bisni'Llāh akan nananya
Rūḥ Allāh akan nyawanya
Wajh Allāh akan nukanya
Zāhir dan bāṭin sertanya.

Nūr Allāh nana bapainya
Khalaqat Allāh akau sakainya
Raja Sulaynān akan pawainya
Dā'īn borbunyi dalam balainya.

2032. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
Enpat bangsa akan ibunya
Sunnum bukmun akan tipunya
Kerja Allah yang ditirunya
Mengenal illah dengan bisunya.

Fanā' fī'Llāh akan suchinya
Innī anā'Ilāh akan bunyinya
Menakai dunya akan ruginya
Rā'dikan nati dā'in pujinya.

Tarku'l-dunyā akan labanya
Menuntut dunya akan maranya
'Abdu'l-Wāhid aṣal nananya
Dā'in "Anā'l-Haqq!" akan katanya.

Kerjanya nabok dan 'āshiq
Ilmunya sempurna fā'iq
Menchari air terlalu sadiq
Didalan Laut bernama Khāliq.

Ikan itu terlalu zāhir
Olehnya dā'in didalan air
Sungguh pun ia terlalu hanyir
Wāšilnya dā'in di Laut halir.2034

---

2034. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
On Gnosis

Aho sogala kita ummat Nabī!
Akan na'rifat Allāh yogya diketahui
Korana na'rifat itu pada sekalian wali
Mulianya sangat terlalu qawī.

Ma'rifat itu yang terlalu qabūl
Dengan Mahbūbu dā'īn bombōh wusūl
Pakaian Mahbūb yang bernama Rasūl
Terlalu jauh daripada ḥulūnān jahūl.

Maraja’l-bahrayni yaltaqiyyān
Bayna huna barzakhun la yabghiyān.

Bahrayn itu terlalu 'ajīb
Barzakh diantaranya bi Nūrī’l-Ḥabīb
Olehnya zāhir terlalu qarīb
Kelihatan jauh pada sekalian [66] gharīb.

Bahrayn itulah na’nānya dalan
Menyatakan pertenuan Tuhan dan ‘ālan
Inilah rahasia Nabi yang Khātan
Menyalakan ‘Ashiq tiada ia padan.

Bahrayn itu tiada bertating
Airnya sucbi terlalu bening
Bukan dimata hidung dan kening
Jangan dipandang disana pening!

Erti qāba qawsayni aw adnā
Pertenuan hamba dan Tuhan yang A’lā
Pada na kadhaba’l-fu’ādu na ra’ā
Tiada lagi lain ‘ala na yura.

2037. Ibid., 53:9, 11–12.
Qāba_qawsayni itu suatu tanthil
Ma'nanya 'alī tinbangnya thaqīl
Bahrayn didalamnya sempurna janīl
Orang nongestahui dia terlalu qalīl.

Orang qāba qawsayni itu seperti kandang
Tali diantara bukannya benang
Barzakh nananya disana terbentang
Ketiganya wahid yogya kau pandang.

Tuhan kita itu tiada bermakān
Zāhirnya nyata dengan rupa insān
Man 'araфа nafsahu suatu burhan
Fa qad 'araфа rabbahu terlalu bayan. 2038

2038. 2016, pp. 65-66. See also ibid., pp. 67-68.
Appendix VI

Facsimile of the text of Ḥamzah's Al-Muntahi Cod. Or. 7291 (III), Library, University of Leiden.
كانت على مرضي الله عنه مالى مية سما الإدراك: إنه يعني ما كتبته
سوت ملوك كنفنته الله أن ملس ربي نبي المعلوية وسلم مت
عرف نفسه فقد عرف ربي يعني بسبئشاق مقتل ديرين مرسى مهارلا تزنت
اره مقتل توأمه دان مقتل ديرين يعني درك كفروعه ديرين
دان سبيك سلخين دام الله سيفه سيف دان فوض فرهن في
ايد سيكردن يباد كتبها في فتنتها كoblin وافلام بسيج
كاد يسجد جنف
مرضي الله عنه كان الله ولم يكن معه شيء إلا كان يعني
اد الله عنه
كان يباد اداً سبئه فوه السارين في كنف ادا داهو لابوج
كاري الذي بعلي رضي الله عنه من كنف الله إد سما الإدراك: الله فيه
كانت بقاء مليحته سيفه كأين بابه كما كان لا ين. ابراهيم إد الله
سبيك ومثله في فنوسه دمغ دامك إد ميلين إشا مثال شنات نكرانه
سيف لاو دان ميلك دارس سيفه كأتة تنير بالبر مكر في مالات
في تدم من الكتاتب اد الموال واثناء للستيني إنكسال خطب الله في
في نصها فيها نبياً إنساني يعني ينفي تفلاو رائع لا لازم في
فترات ما كررها رايت اد تبرت دان سوفي في جاف من فدغي ديكور
مسك راقي يغ مهجوم الثاني في رؤية كان لا تظهر سلك راقي إيان دنبلي درفاه تفليح
شنانز لبرلبي جور دين لا تظهر سلك
أعمال بنقل بياراميرغهان دكان شنانز قد حقيقة تلآفة جو كنرلاو دان
ملاصع لافاي من مسلم
وأعمال مني يعني كل درفاه الله سكنه عام درفاه سلك مهابي دافن حييا
دفن قانسنات لون حقيقتنا سلك جوستره اتستار رفول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم آن من الله
والعالم مني يعني كل درفاه الله سكنه عام درفاه سلك مهابي دافن حييا
دفن قانسنات لون حقيقتنا سلك جوستره اتستار رفول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم آن من الله
وكأن مقتل تورفة أدفون ديرباث إيان سكلة برولة نام دان روقي جو
حقينة رافق ن دان نام ب تننان سكل جابه دايم جوم روزان دفان
اسكن سبب نيدي هو موية مرارة المورين يعني يي موريين إيان جورم
 Transparency مؤمن أريت يعني بات البهم مؤمنة مكروا سيف خاص قرب
ثناي مورين جحم مكنين سام سام دين توربة كن دين حب ثناي نمي
دفن توربة دان توربة فور ثناي بربري ين حيا دين حيا سكنه فكان الله
ثناي وحور معكم اتيمانت يعني يليت صرح كام بارقدان دايم دنا
لا أدني من ذلك ولا أكثر إلا استمتعوا بعيت جلي ورغبة تلململنا أي جبر
كما منفتح دمت مركبة في كل دلائل ململنا كأننا دمت مريقين دار
تقاء لبنا داين داين داين داين داين داين داين داين
فرماه الله وعند أيت الهام من حبل الزلاقة يعني أن همك لREAL مرفق
اورة ليهرت يقلد ودللكن هي طالب وموصعم ثياد دلور دان تياد
دائم دان ثياد ينأس دان ثياد داوي دان ثياد داوي دان ثياد دكان درقد
انم فيت فيت سقين فرماه اللبطنالي هو الأول والآخر والظاهر والثابت
يعني إذا يشت جور فيد داين داين داين داين داين داين داين
اي جوريفين دون تثاني سقين كأي سقوقن تيات ليمور انت
درقد ليمر دونه لا ين عليه لا ين بوعنة لا ين كرت
لين ول سقين إذا ليمر هو سقفكة فوتبثت دان
رواقن دان ورماه بركاك حضيرة أنس جور جاك دلاب دن Vale
سكك عارة مقتل إلىه طال بسقين رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم
نفت علي ربه سقين يفكر بب داين داين داين سبورو كهد رسول الله إيه
دن
دقتی‌ها و دقایقی که در فرآیند قدرت‌های مربوط به برجستگی برایی به طور مطمئن به فراموشی نرسیده بود، جوایزی که از این جهت کسب شده بود، شامل جوامع عالم فومن و سرزمین‌های دیگر، بخش‌هایی از دنیای موجودات را شامل می‌گردیدند. این جوامع، که به طور گسترده‌ای در جهان فنیابه، پیامدهایی از جمله حل کردن مشکلات و حفظ دامنه‌های طبیعی را داشتند، به‌طور گسترده‌ای در سراسر جهان به‌کار می‌رفتند.

رو به دقت، بدانید که این جوامع، دارای وظایف و روندی خاصی بودند که در هر شرایطی حفظ می‌کردند. این جوامع، به‌طور همزمان با این که در جهان فنیابه، در هر شرایطی حفظ می‌کردند. این جوامع، به‌طور همزمان با این که در جهان فنیابه، در هر شرایطی حفظ می‌کردند.
کلیه دلته دلم، مک منصور منصور خلاف فران بیرکات دوق ساغر برخیانان مشکات انس که به لطف سبز کن مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک مک
فيكمان شافجاك كرم بك دانه عنصبة كل شيخ عين القضاة جميعه أنى مشتاق
كد روبي يعني بأنه لفهد بك كازاجة شيد دليهم عاد دليهم بوذية
جور ليه البعت سنقر فيغير ملك جور قيد ليههم ليروت
خابي دوازن فيليهم بك كارم حليم ابنت فطيهم سنقر بايع جور نبرات
السلطنة نياذ شيبك مهلكا لعيد نسيت كذبك الداله كان
كي المتهي دقع حمباب سنقر سيد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم
فتعت عرق ربه يعني-defense كل جروح سحنان دقن في قرون
فوصي سي سنقر سيد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم لبسه أي يعني
برغسيا دقن له للنبي إبراهيم قد شحالامل مشكور من علي نفسه
سي瞪ني كي فقد عرى ربه من ستبريذ كي كنب قولا نياه
من عرق الله كن لسد جياني برغسيا دقن في قرون كنله ليد هذا رضيت
تمت دربات ياباك لوبي سنقر بات جياني أبي أندي عربه ترضك الله
سومه انصرف اينيا رغبتا من عرق نفسه فقد عرى ربه جور شوير
العلي عين النبأ لكي انتد عيبه الوطأء خير اللي كنكد دعت عاي
كنت دائم وعديل فيها ترى في حر عين شهب، واحد فيه الإبالشائل
السيدة أولمبيا ماداراَان، أي ترضعي هذه إذن اداً كبرية تعرف شيخ سليم الدين

إذ رحت بطلبي لم يخطط شرعان إن جبت حصر وصمت في حضرتي

لا لثورة ولا ينفل من بصرية وفي ضمهم ولا إلهام في عمهم يعينه

جعل شهيلة كل مستبرقها في الله بكرسلاهن تتسكر ككل دجال كحضرة إيا

ليبر رقفاً نياه كير ميليهم دم اني نياه جآ و درف دقي نékه كير برول

إي اودا إبلو دان نياه كير ينكم اسIFIER نعلهدرك كيات ينح جند رحمة عليه

وجوده دق دن لا ينفاس به ذره بنيت ادم اني دوش دن وهب دالو

برشكل تام فو سوات وجود حق فو سوات وجود شريك له دا

كير مكي عفا وفاحي وحذه لا شريك له امرتين بنيت صبرت

فيه ارتب شتا وجود لا لانهات وجود حق نكتال جوسترغ لاع

دان امتفر ساق شرايما اسمتال فامها بئلو شوم وجه الله بنيت داب

الله دان كات مولا تأكد الرحمن عما رحبر الله عليه بين دهاب

وهيم كن وهم روا مراعا لم ينعته في نまずは حاليه وحاج با الله

أوست ذيالة هذه إمك ميم سكينه سكود وكذن سكع تلاه

أي عٍ تمليج سمل منف. كان دان قد اطمسه كل مرجعل ابنه
وردت الله في عيني جميعه وعيني عينيه فأنظر جميعي عني يجري
غير عيني وعيني عنه من حيث عيني يعني كليته الله فيها كلا ديني
خليط بينين. بجموع كأدرك كأدان بكر كدرك كنقط دينين شكل در
فرب غير كجماله كجماله فرسكل لاين درقباك، لاين درقباك كأدرك بروم فدرك
إدراك إدراك كأدرك كل سوتك بحول أنبه صلى صنات من عين نفسه فدوم في
ربه إدراك، فدرك جم سبمور فين ضمان ضمانه البهتى وانهم الله
وماً فيجعود ينعي ببره الله تعالى فيناد يناد كأدرك كان بانه بارك قبرن كأدرك
كل ضمان البهتى. فإن دام تأهلاً خادع بنا سيته ان ربو على ضرط
مستقيم ينعي ببا سياك داقت مبا ومليكت إجر مقلتلا سبت دهتنا
بهر فيهما إسماً ينادي كنبرن كأينون كأدرك كأبد كبجي الله
عليه وسلم لاحول ولا فيع الإياا الله العلي القه المظلم ينعي ببا مقلتلا ك
كأدرك فرع ستور كميلكت كأن كمك كتب أن سيدة الله
لا لان كأبب ضن الله عليها وسلم لا شكل كلا سارن الإياا الله
ينعي ببا برك سوتك كأدرك بكر كأدرك الله تعالى فين ببا كأدرك
من الله تعالى ينعي ببا لان جفث المتور على الله تعالى سكوه فرحان الله
ناعل وما تشاءون فإن شاء الله بعثني داني برليفي في سريرت سويرغ جو
قُرن ممكن دعوت إلى سلكين دايلد دان حيد ين إن انشارة كنت ميت
عرف نفسه فقد مر في بيه جولان دردشتين شداد دان كان شيخ مصي الدتين
عبر قدنس الله سر روعه المغزير شعمرعما علي الحسانئ أن يسيب
يشتهر رعد السرق إذا كان وجه المد شقشفا ماذا أقول وانت وححدم كنت
احتضن كم تما سوك فقط لله يا يهلي كله عرثلة وثب سكيل يفتروه بدوائه
منه لايته جريودات اقبال دانا الله دغي قد مجموعة كيله مباجع بارع سكر
بكر دان بحر تقرر جزارت تيد لاين سوسيين دردشتين مرسسكز رغ با رغ
لاين دردشتين لا سرق حبارات سرق قفان النبي躺在 كمال يوم هوى
في مشان ينعتي قد سكر حراري يا يبند دايم كقولون ينعتي قد ظهرت براكي
دان شاد بويل كارن يا هو الأول والأخرى والظاهر والباطن ينعتي
يا ينفرتام دان شد للدين دان يا پات دان يا تريرت أولي ياد كنهي
اخره شاد بركساهم ظهري ام تشرودون شاد بين باتاش شاد كدات
أخير دردش دشدرش ملدريت دايره دانت داين صدناش كد عن أفعل
دنن ناريت سكك تون شاه مات قد خفيتة أس سرور بات صنعة
حي الربي
بخش‌های مختلف از هر فصل و هر شعبه از طریق مایعات انجام می‌شود و کل مزارع که از همکاری در راهکار پیشرفت کل جامعه استفاده می‌شود.

بنابراین، برای سرگرمی در جامعه و کاهش خطرات جدی، می‌توان به مایعات و تولیدات استفاده کرد.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در تاریخ، این اشکال نمایانگر اهداف جامعه و کاهش خطرات جدی بوده است.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.

در اینجا، هدف از استفاده از مایعات و تولیدات خاصیست که باعث کاهش خطرات جدی و سرگرمی جامعه می‌شود.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
لدينا فون نقاء فالغوت الأعظم في صورة أفضل عنصر في أعمال الله تعالى.

صلوة الذي ليس فيها سونع أو المصلي غملي نحن يعني أنه موطمان

بسبب ترسى أمامنا بالملك مثان الله تعالى كي يقي ود الملك محوا

لأن ذكرنا دين يمبه غملي بتلته كثيرة فورا جريدة مبعث فور

هذا سرعان ما ينشئ من مرفق الله لا يه دايلهم البذال لا الله ماتي الله

الله يعني نيا دعت البحوث الله نيا د متوهدي النصات الله يدام

ميثين البحوث الله دان سرعان كاذ مولانا نتى الرحمن جاذب جوهري

واصل نفتنة ينسى بغيشحب كبر بعض البحبوه دير ساعد معجب وغروم

ارزول واقيف هجران بريج وسلاط يعني ترويج وصل أبت

سترة وري دود كيسه ترشي دير رذانة دير ديرن جرماث دير

سروت ده ناجي بسيط كجذ حروما دروع وصل ترحيه لهمت

درور فربرينغ دان دوز فنه ده دن دكيبان دان سترة ياب سلبي

ختير أنك مخنح بيسكن في اليوم أن هي ملكنا إنا أفسد

حالت من المغيب متنين آكر له تسبرغ كاتب ديم دام لاون تج كثراك موكل

لكي نميجي دفنه إبراجك ديم نمضحي يا مثيله دام قرمنا تكبر.
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
لا يمكنني قراءة النص العربي من الصورة المقدمة.
النیله بعد کتیبه‌ای عالی لاحوت نوزن دامنه داشت، یکی دان کتیب وصل فنون، دان دان کتیب، مصحوب دقت کتیب انجام داده که بعضی نواحی مشهور برای خویش. دقت کتیب در اندازه‌گیری عالی کتاب کتیباً، کتیبی تاده بر لمب دفع کرده، بینی کتیبی بزاس جاو نیک فکنگ کن تناه کتیب رخ نیک تناه دفع کنگر، بینی امر نادیا! کتیب نیک باید بین نیک فکنگ دهول نشکن دامن کتیب زاد استختنیآ سرک دقت نورنچیست صنعت نیست دلم قوسن کای ددم دامن ددم قوسن کای زی دلم سکافنارن، ظاهر تناه نیک فکنگ است. اسر جکبرین نیلمه هر منصوب منفیکان اینالی، که متفکران نالیبه کارن ادین به دیاده دلیبندن کای نیلمه امر ایا ایم الفی در فروالله ازم ایم فقیر دیای سوزنن فردی ایم فقیر دیای سوزنن، فقیر دیای سوزنن دامن حذف دیدن درم الفقیر دیای ایال الفقیر دیای وسیر الفقیر دیای، فقیر دیای ایفل دیماکان دان مک فقیر دیای مکان کور دان نسئی یم، فقیر دیای دان کت فقیران لصقالاریان سرآوان سنمن و صنف مینکورن.
_pages
لا يوجد نص يمكن قراءته بشكل طبيعي من الصورة المقدمة.
الرشاقة فن علم اللينتين بنية مشتركة دين حاري. دان بين اللينتين
ما بين دم اللينتين دم اللينتين كجزء من حاد في آداء دين قبر
أو في إبرام عقد اصل في إ sànار يتكون كتاب
جو بعما إن تجد في القبر
أيجل فن علم الله وايام
بالصور تمت
كتاب
م
Appendix VII

Alphabetical Index of the Semantic Vocabulary in Hamzah's Mystical System.

Note. The following Index is comprehensive, although it is by no means exhaustive. The identification of the key words as such has been made possible through analysis of the semantic fields evident in the prose works here treated, and in comparison with the verses — where the same key words play similar roles — the former have been the basis for the formulation of a semantic 'system' in Hamzah's writings on mysticism. The numerals preceded by the capital letters A, S, M or SH set against each word refer to the page numbers of the various Malay manuscripts: A = Asrār; S = Sharāb; M = Muntahā and SH = Sha'ir(2016).
A

'Abd

A67.

'Abid

S13.

A'bud

A29.

Ada

A18, A20, A22, A23, A25,
A26, A28, A30, A31, A32,
A34, A36, A37, A38, A39,
A42, A45, A46, A47, A49,
A53, A56, A60, A61, A62,
A63, A67, A73;
S2, S5, S7, S10, S13, S16,
S17, S18, S20, S22, S24;
M111, M112, M113, M114,
M115, M117, M118, M120,
M121, M122, M123, M126,
M127, M128, M129.

Adam (tiada)

M126.

Adam (al-Maḥq)

SH35.

Af'āl (perbuatan)

A49, A53, A59, A72,
A73, A76;
S6, S10, S21, S23;
M121.

Aḥad (esa)

A51, S16, M121.

Aḥwāl [sing. ḫāl] (pertingkahah)S8.

Ākhir

A23, A28, A46, A52, A55,
A57, A59, A60;
S11, S113; M121.

A’lam ('ilm)

M124.

'Ālam

A19, A22, A25, A29, A31,
A35, A39, A40, A43, A46,
A47, A49, A50, A52, A53,
A54, A55, A58, A59, A61,
A62, A73, A74;
S9, S10, S13, S16, S18,
S20;
M112, M114, M115, M116,
M122, M127, M128, M129.
'Ālam kabīr

'Ālam ṣaghlīr

'Ālim

'Ālim

'Aliyy

Allāh

Amana (Īmān)

Āra (titah)

Anfus [sing. nafs,] (dirī)

Āqīl (buddī)

'Aqīlu'l-Kullī

Āqwāl [sing. gawl] (Kata)
Arada (berkohendak)  \(\Delta_{30}, \Delta_{35}, S_{17}\).

Aradnā  \(\Delta_{32}\).

'Arafa (mengenal)  \(\Delta_{57}, \Delta_{63}, \Delta_{67}; S_{19}, S_{10}; M_{111}, M_{112}, M_{113}, M_{114}, M_{116}, M_{117}, M_{120}, M_{121}, M_{122}, M_{124}, M_{125}, M_{128}\).

'Arafna  \(\Delta_{54}, S_{15}\).

'Arsh  \(\Delta_{22}, \Delta_{39}, \Delta_{47}, \Delta_{53}\).

Așal  \(\Delta_{33}, \Delta_{35}, \Delta_{39}, \Delta_{41}, \Delta_{43}, \Delta_{44}, \Delta_{52}, \Delta_{53}, \Delta_{62}, \Delta_{72}, \Delta_{77}, S_{17}; M_{119}, M_{123}, M_{125}, M_{130}\).

'Ashaqa  \(S_{23}\).

'Āshiq  \(\Delta_{28}, \Delta_{56}, \Delta_{57}, \Delta_{67}, \Delta_{70}; S_{25}; M_{123}\).

Ašlī  \(\Delta_{24}, \Delta_{32}, \Delta_{36}, \Delta_{37}, \Delta_{38}, \Delta_{43}, \Delta_{45}, \Delta_{53}, \Delta_{57}; M_{128}, M_{130}\).

Asmā'  \(\Delta_{17}, \Delta_{22}, \Delta_{49}, \Delta_{59}, \Delta_{72}, \Delta_{73}, \Delta_{76}\).

Ithār [sing. athar] (bekas)  \(\Delta_{19}, \Delta_{49}, \Delta_{50}, \Delta_{51}, \Delta_{52}, \Delta_{53}, \Delta_{59}, \Delta_{72}, \Delta_{73}, \Delta_{76}; M_{121}\).

Awwal  \(\Delta_{23}, \Delta_{27}, \Delta_{28}, \Delta_{34}, \Delta_{41}, \Delta_{46}, \Delta_{52}, \Delta_{55}, \Delta_{59}, \Delta_{60}; M_{113}, M_{121}\).

'Ayn [pl. a'yūn]  \(\Delta_{24}, \Delta_{29}, \Delta_{43}, \Delta_{68}; S_{10}, S_{19}; M_{116}, M_{117}, M_{120}, M_{123}, M_{128}\).

'Ayn al-Yaqīn  \(M_{130}\).

A'yūn kāriji  \(S_{H27}\).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic Term</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
<th>Reference Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A'yānu'l-thābitah</td>
<td></td>
<td>S15, S16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āzīz</td>
<td></td>
<td>A39, S21, M121.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Āzm</td>
<td></td>
<td>A28.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baqā' (kekal)</td>
<td></td>
<td>S9, S14; M114.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāqī (baqī')</td>
<td></td>
<td>A19, A45, A49.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barzakh</td>
<td></td>
<td>A40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baṣīr</td>
<td></td>
<td>A18, A24, A27, A33, A34, A37, S19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bāṭin</td>
<td></td>
<td>A28, A30, A51, A52, A55, A58, A59, A62, A69, A74, A80; S9, S17; M113, M121.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baṭanta (bāṭin)</td>
<td></td>
<td>M117.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayān (menyatakan)</td>
<td></td>
<td>S3, S6, S8, S11, S14, S19, S23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayyana (nyata)</td>
<td></td>
<td>A46.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekas (āthār)</td>
<td></td>
<td>A49.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berafa'āl</td>
<td></td>
<td>A76, S10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berahi ('ishq)</td>
<td></td>
<td>A28, A40, A60, A63, A65, A72; S1, S4, S6, S9, S19, S21, S23, S24, S25, S26; M115, M121, M123, M125, M126, M129.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berahikan</td>
<td></td>
<td>M115, M125.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berākhīr</td>
<td></td>
<td>A23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berawwal</td>
<td></td>
<td>A23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Word</td>
<td>Page Range</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berbudi</td>
<td>A69, S25, M117.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berikhtiyar</td>
<td>A45.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ber'ilmu</td>
<td>A22.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkawn</td>
<td>A27.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkehendak (arāda)</td>
<td>A29, A30, A35, S17, M121.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berma'lūm</td>
<td>A45, A58.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berma'rifat</td>
<td>A16, A60, A69; S2, S4, S7, S9, S13.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernyawa</td>
<td>A69, M125.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berpengetahuan</td>
<td>A37, A38, A43.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berpenglihat</td>
<td>A33.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berqadrat</td>
<td>A31, S10.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertemu (wāsil)</td>
<td>A26, A28, A55, A62, A63, A66, A71, A72, A73, A74, A80; S11; M118 (yulqā), M123, M127, M129.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berupa</td>
<td>A16, A58, A66, A77; S11, M123.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berṣifāt</td>
<td>A76.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bersuatu</td>
<td>A71.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Buddi ('aqîl)
- 16, 178; S6, S15, S23, S24, S25.

Buka (kashf)
- 43.

Chahaya (nûr)
- 19, 25, 41, 43, 44, 51, 49, 70; S15; M112, M114, M121.

Chahaya Muhammad
- 41, 42.

Dahulu (awwal)
- 28, 45, 49, M113.

Dhat
- 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 45, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 62, 66, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77; S12, S13, S14, S15, S16, S17, S18, S19, S20, S21, S22; M114, M115, M118, M121, M122, M126 (ada), M128.

Diadakan
- S17, S18.

Diberahikan
- 28, S23, M123.

Diislamkan
- 59, S20.

Dijadikan
- 37, 38, 39, 44, 77; S4, S15, S18, S20, S21, S22.

Dikasihi (hubb)
- S5.

Dikehendaki (khwast)
- 29.

Dikeluarkan (kharaja, ūjād)
- S21.

Dikenal
- 21, 29, 55, 63, 71; S2, M116.

Dikenali
- 21.
Diketahui A17, A20, A21, A22, A23, A60, A61, A62, A68, A71; M129.

Dīn (Agama) A68, A74.

Dinafīkan A74.

Dinamai A21, A24, A25, A34, A41, A52, A58, A68, A79; S3, S14, S15, S16, S18.

Dinyatakan A46.

Dinding (hijāb) A71, A72, A73, A74, A75; M112 (aslır), M126, M128.

Diperoleh (wajada) S1.

Dirasa M129.

Diri (nafs) A19, A27, A28, A30, A33, A53, A57, A63, A65, A74; S2, S3, S9, S10, S19; M112, M111, M114, M121, M128.

Diri (nafs) A30, A57, A61, A65, A67, A68, A70, A71, A73, A74; S5, S6, S9, S10, S13, S16, S24, S25; M112.

Disembah A67, A69, A70; M124.

Ditakhşīşkan A40, A47.

Ditiadakan S17.

Dīzāhirkan A40.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Entries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Esa (ahad - Wāhid)</td>
<td>A21, A25, A27, A28, A43, A49, A51, A64, A67, A70, A71, A72, A75; S4, S10, S11; M112, M113, M114, M117, M120, M121, M121, M127, M130.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fān</td>
<td>S18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fana' (lenyap - hapus)</td>
<td>A20, A63, A67, A68, A70, A71, A72, A73, A77; S9, S11; M114, M126, M129.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faqīr</td>
<td>A39, A63, A64, A68; S1, S24; M125, M127, M128, M129.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faqr</td>
<td>A68, M122, M127, M129, M130.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerak (idhn = hendak)</td>
<td>M120.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghayb (lenyap)</td>
<td>M116, M119, M124, M126.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guru</td>
<td>A16, S1, S2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hāba</td>
<td>M121.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habīb (kekasih)</td>
<td>S24, M120.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥadith</td>
<td>A30, A35, A37, A45.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥādir</td>
<td>A45, M126.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ḥaḍrat</td>
<td>M118.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْٰمَامُ</td>
<td>A18, A19, A22, A38, A39, A58, A59.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْٰعْمَامُ</td>
<td>A20, A67, A72, A73, A74, A75, S14.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْٰقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A75, S14, S19, S20, S26, M115, M116, M118, M121, M124, M127.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A18, A20, A21, A25, A26, A36, A38, A40, A47, A48, A54, A55, A67, A69, A70, A61, A75, A76, A77, A78, A79, A80; S2, S3, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S18, S25; M112, M113, M114, M116, M119, M121, M123, M127.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A18, A20, A21, A25, A26, A36, A38, A40, A47, A48, A54, A55, A67, A69, A70, A61, A75, A76, A77, A78, A79, A80; S2, S3, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, S18, S25; M112, M113, M114, M116, M119, M121, M123, M127.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A40, A41, A43.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>S15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>M130.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A67, A76, S15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A25, A32, A52, A77.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A16, A20, A25, A26, A62, A65; S2, S4, S9, S21, M122.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>S3, S25 (h. nafsu).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A44, M120.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A18, A24, A27, A34, A41, S19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بَنِي ٱلْقَلَمُ</td>
<td>A29, A30, A31, A37, A38, A39, A46, A61, A63, A68, A70, A73; S1, S16, S17, S18, S23, S24; M122, M123, M128, M129.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hijāb (dinding)

Hikmat

Hūrūf

Hūrūf (ʿAïlyāt)

Huwa

I

Idhn (firmān = kehendak; gerak) A44, S22, M120.

Ikhtiyār

Ilmu al-Yaqīn

İmān

Insān

Irādah

ʿIlmu

Istiʿdād (aşlī)
Islam (Muslim)

Islam (dīn)

'Ishq

Ism

Ithbāt (mengesakan)

'Ibādat

Jadi

Jadikan

Jabbār

Jalāl

Jamāl

Jān (nyawa)

Kalām

Kamāl

Kāmil
Kāna (dahulu) 126, 136, S24, M111, M121.
Kanz Makhfī 129, 130, M125, M127.
Karīm i59.
Kashf i23, i43, i68.
Kashf al-Kashf i76.
Kasih (ḥubb) S6, S9.
Kekasih S10.
Kata (kalām) i24, i32, S3.
Kawn M128 (kawnayn).
Keadaan i9, i26, i58, i54, i61; S18; M117, M120, M121.
Kebaktian S19, M124.
Kehendak i32, i36, i44, i46, i64, i70; S3, S4, S22, S23, S25; M122, M126.
Kekasih (ḥubb) S24, M114, M120, M122, M129.
Kelengkapan (isti'dād) i35.
Kemudian (ākhīr) i29, i49, M113, M121.
Kenal (ma'rifah) i16, i23, i24, i55, i67, i76; S9, S15 (kenali).
Kekal (baqā') S11, M114, M128.
Kelakuan i38, i49, i59, i60, i72; S18, M121.
Kenyataan i28, i49, S14, S20, M117.
Ketahuan M121.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ketuhui</td>
<td>i16, i36, S1, S2, S3, S6, S8, S11, S14, S19, S23; M110.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khādīm</td>
<td>i19, i67, i70.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalaqa (khalaq̣tu)</td>
<td>i41, i42, i46; S1, S18, S19; M120.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khālī</td>
<td>i19, i50.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khāliq</td>
<td>i22, i34, i35, i74; S11, S14.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalq</td>
<td>S15, M116.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khağṣ</td>
<td>M112.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khidmat</td>
<td>i16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuliqa (zāhir)</td>
<td>i35.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuasa (qudrat)</td>
<td>i31, i44.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kujadikan (khalaq̣tu)</td>
<td>i42, i48, S2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kukenal</td>
<td>i55, i76, S15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kun (jādi)</td>
<td>i30, i32, i34, i59; S16, S17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunhi</td>
<td>i26, i49, i54, i55; S14.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuntu Kanzan</td>
<td>i70, S2, M111.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuntum (ada)</td>
<td>i56; S5, S13, S24; M112, M117.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursî</td>
<td>i22, i39, i53.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusembah</td>
<td>i29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lāhūt</td>
<td>M127.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalu (jādi)</td>
<td>i49.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lāṭīf</td>
<td>S21, S23, M119.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lawḥ (al-Mahfūz)
Lengkap
Lenyap

Mabok (mahw)
Ma'dūm
Maghlūbu'l-Ḥāl
Mahabbah (kasih)
Mahatinggi (alīyy)
Maļkūm
Mahu
Māḥw (mabok)
Makhdūm
Makhlūq (pl. makhlūqāt)

Ma'lūm (pl. ma'lūmāt)
Ma'ļūmāt
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ma'nawi</th>
<th>S17.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manusia</td>
<td>M128.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqām</td>
<td>A70.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maqsūm</td>
<td>A19, A58.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma'rifat</td>
<td>A16, A17, A23, A26, A50, A54, A60, A62, A65, A66, A68, A71, A75, A76, A78, A79, A80; S1, S2, S3, S9, S11, S13, S15, S20; M128.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Martabat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ma'rūf (yang mengenal)</th>
<th>A71.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ma'shūq</td>
<td>A28, A56, A70, M123.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mata ('ayn semata)</td>
<td>A60, A68, S10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawjūd</td>
<td>A31, A33, A50, S18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māghar</td>
<td>M119.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meliputi (mubīt)</td>
<td>S12, M112.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melenyapkan</td>
<td>A67.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengadakan (abraza)</td>
<td>A38, S15, S23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengasih (mahabbah)</td>
<td>A71, S5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menghendaki</td>
<td>M126.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengeliling (ḥawl)</td>
<td>M120.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mengenal

| S16, S21, S24, S57, S63, S68, S71, S76, S78; S2, S9, S10, S19; M111, M113, M114, M116, M117, M124, M125, M128. |
Mengetahui 121, 122, 143, 812, 813; Ml14, Ml16, Ml17, Ml24.

Mengesakan S9.

Mengithbatkan S25.

Mendindingi Ml11.


Menjadikan (khalaga) 116, 119, 122, 131, 137, 139, 140, 144, 147, 152, 154, 158, S18, S19, Ml20.

Menafikan 174, S25.

Menamai S15.

Merasa Ml129.

Merasai S14.

Menunjukkan (tajallī-menyatakan) Ml122.

Menurutkan (murīd) 118, 136, 143.

Menyatakan 117, S1, S3, S6, S8, S11, S14, S19, S23.

Menyekutukan (shirk) Ml128.


Menyerah (tawakkal) S6, S25.

Menyerupai Ml12.
Menżāhirkan

Mubīn

Mugīll

Muhdath

Muḥīṭ

Muʾizz

Mumkin al-wujūd

Muʾmin

Munkashifun (kashf)

Muntahā

Muqābalah

Murīd (irādah)

Mushāhadah (shuhūd)

Mushrik (menduakan)

Mustatir (istār = dinding)

Mutaʾāyyin

Mutakallim

Muṭlaq

Muwāfaqat

Muẓāhir

S3.

A59, S21, S22.

S11.

M114.

A59, S21, S23, M119.

S17.

A67, M112.

M123.

A73.

M129.

A18, A24, A27, A29, S19.

M129.

A57, A67, M123, M125, M128.

M117.

S16.

A24.

A62, A63.

A46, S11, S21, S22.

A35.
Nama (ism - asma')

Nyata

Nyawa (rūh - jān)

Nūr (chahaya)

Nafī (meniadakan S9)

Nafasu'l-Rahmān

Nafs

Nafs al-Muṭma'innah

Pandang (shuhūd)

Pengetahuan ('ilm)

Penglihat (baṣar)

Penengar (sāmi')

Perhimpunan Segala Buddi

Perkataan

Pertama (awwal)

Pertemuan (wusūl)
| Qadīm          | 118, 123, 131, 133, 134, 132, 135, 137, 138, 146, 147, 148; S11, S19, S18, S21, S22; M112, M115. |
| Qadīr          | 118, 131.                                           |
| Ādīr           | 124, 127.                                           |
| Qahhār         | 159, S21, S22, M119.                                |
| Qalām          | 141.                                                |
| Qalām (al-ʿlā) | 141.                                                |
| Qāsim          | 119, 158.                                           |
| Qawl           | 132, 134, 135, S16.                                 |
| Qudrat         | 118, 124, 131, 134, 148, 159, 177, S19, S22.       |
| Quwwat (kuasa) | 144, 163, S21, M120, M122.                         |
| Raḥīm          | 118, 119, 139, 140, 148, 159, S1, M110.            |
| Raḥmān         | 118, 139, 140, 146, 147, 148, 152, 159, S1, S19, M110. |
| Raḥmat         | 140, 147, 148, 152, S10.                           |
| Rahasia (sirr) | 157, S11, S26, M128.                               |
| Rasa           | 119, 153, 166, M119, M123, M129.                   |
| Rāziq          | 134.                                                |
| Rūḥ (pl. arwāḥ - nyawa) | 141, 142, M114, M121.  |
Ruḥ Ḣayarawānī
Ruḥ ʿIdāfī
Ruḥ Insānī
Ruḥ Nabātī
Rupa (ṣūrat)

Rusūm

Ṣalāt (sembahyang)
Ṣamad
Samī'
Satu (ahad - esa)
Sebenarnya (hagg)
Sekehendak
Semata (ʿayn)

Sembah
Sempurna (kāmil)
Sendiri
Serupa
Shā'a (hendak)
Shahīd
Shakk
Shā'u
Sharīka
Sharī'at
Shay' (suatu) [ashyā' pl.]
Shirk
Shirk al-Khafī
Shuhūd
Shuʿūn (sing. shāʾn)
Ṣifāt

A22, A24, A25, A52, A61, A64, A67; S4, S16, S17, S22, S25; M114, M116.
S4, M123.
A45.
M129.
A31, S6, M119, M130.
A75, S18, M115, M121
M118.
A20, A24, A25, A31, A40, A43, A44, A45, A47, A52, A63, A64, A68, A75, A78, A79, A80; S2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7; M114.
A26, A28, A29, A30, A32, A35, A48, A50, A61, A69, A78; S1, S4, S12, S14, S17; M110, M111, M112, M114, M116, M128.
A63, A67, S20, S25, M119.
A61.
A19, A61, A62; S15, M129.
A19, A28, A34, A36, A49, A58, A59, A60, A72, A78; S18, S22, S23.
A17, A18, A19, A22, A23, A24, A27, A33, A34, A38, A45, A48, A49, A51, A55, A59, A53, A72, A73, A76; S12, S16, S19, S20, S23, S25; M121, M122, M123, M127, M128, M129.
Sirāṭ al-Mustaqīm

Sirr (rahasia)

Suatu ('a'yn - shay')

Surat (rupa)

Suwarī

Suwarūl-'Ilmiyyah

T

Ta'ayyuun

Ta'budu

Tafriḍ (tunggal)

Tahu

Tajalliyāt (kenyataan)

Tajrīd (tinggal)

Takhasṣus

Takhṣīṣ

Tanggal

Taqūlu

Tāriqat

Tashā'a (shā'a)

Taslīm (menyerah diri)

Tawakkal (menyerah)

ML 20.

ML 20.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 20.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.

ML 120.
Tawfiq
Terbunyi (bātin or makhfī)
Terdinding
Tiada ('adam)
Tiada nyata
Tinggal (tajrīd)
Titah (amr)
Tuhan (Rabb)

Tuḥibbu
Tunggal (tafrīd)

U
Ugahari (rusūm)
U'rafa
'Ushiqa ('ishq)

W
Waḥdahu
Wāḥid (esa)
Wahmi
Wajada (diperoleh)
Wajh (muka - dhāt)

Wājib u’l-wujūd

Waṣal

Wāṣil

Wijdān (being opposed to not-being ada)

Wiṣāl

Wujūd

Wujūd ḥaqīqī

Yabqā (bāqī) kekal

Ya’budu ('abd)

Yaqīn (nyata)

Yawm (hari – sekejap mata)

Yuḥyī

Yumīt

Ẓahara (nyata)

Ẓāhir

Zuhūr
Cited Bibliography

I Manuscripts

Anonymous: 17th century Malay tracts on Ṣūfism, Marsden Collection no. 11648, Library, S.O.I.S., University of London.


Fakhru'l-Dīn, K: Kitāb Mukhtāsār, Cod. Or. 1712, Library, University of Leiden.

Fāṣūrī, Ǧ: 'Isrā'ru'l-'Irifīn fī ba'yān 'īlm al-Suluk wa'l-Tawhīd, Cod. Or. 7291(I), Library, University of Leiden.

----

Al-Muntahī, Cod. Or. 7291(III), Library, University of Leiden; Javanese translations. Cod. Or. 5716(2) and Cod. Or. 7736; Malay fragment, Cod. Or. 1952, Library, University of Leiden.

----

Sharābu'l-'Ishīqīn, Cod. Or. 2016; another Malay version: Zinatu'l-Muwahhidīn, Cod. Or. 7291(II), Library, University of Leiden.

----

Sha'īr Jāwī fasāl fī ba'yān 'Īlm al-Suluk wa'l-Tawhīd, Cod. Or. 2016; Cod. Or. 3372; Cod. Or. 3374, Library, University of Leiden.

----

Sha'īr Perahu, Cod. Or. 3374, Library, University of Leiden.

----

Sha'īr Dagang, Cod. Or. 3374, Library, University of Leiden.
al-Ghazzālī, M; al-Rānīrī, N: Short poem (untitled) with Persian commentary, attributed by Ḥamzah to al-Ghazzālī, Arabic Catalogue no. DCCCLXXI, unnumbered and not entered in the list, pp. 354v. - 361r., Harley Or. 5490, British Museum, London.


----- Tībyān fī Ma‘rifati’l-Adīyān, Cod. Or. 3291, Library, University of Leiden.

----- Jawāhiru’l-‘Ulūm fī Kashfi’l-Ma‘lūm, Marsden Collection no. 12151, Library, S.O.I.S., University of London.

II Published Works


----- Values as integrating forces in personality, society and culture Kuala Lumpur, 1966.

----- Indonesia's social and cultural revolution, Kuala Lumpur, 1966.
ibnu'l-'Arabī, M:  Fusūsu'l-Hikam, edited by A. 'A. Tififi, Cairo, 1946, 2v. in 1.


al-Baghdādī, A.Q:  al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, translated into English by M. Halkin, Tel Aviv, 1935.


Djajadiningrat, R. H.: Critisch overzicht van de in Maleische werken vervatte gegevens over de gescheidenis van het Soeltanaat van Itjeh, B. K. T. 65, Leiden, 1911.


al-Ghazzālī, M: Kimiyā'i-Sa'ādat, edited by I. Aram, Teheran, 1933-1934, 2v. in 1.

al-Ghazzālī, M: The alchemy of Happiness, translation of eight sections of the Kimiyā'i-Sa'ādat into English by C. Field, London, 1910.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Irāqī, I</td>
<td>Six lectures on the reconstruction of religious thought in Islam, Lahore, 1930.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Irāqī, I</td>
<td>De Hikajat Atjeh, dissertation, the Hague, 1958.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izutsu, T.</td>
<td>The structure of the ethical terms in the Qur'an, Tokyo, 1959.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Irāqī, I</td>
<td>God and man in the Koran, Tokyo, 1964.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Irāqī, I</td>
<td>The concept of belief in Islamic theology, Tokyo, 1965.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jīlī, 'A.K.</td>
<td>ʿIl-Insānu’l-Kāmil, Cairo, 1956, 2 v. in 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juynboll, Th. W</td>
<td>Handleiding tot de kennis van de Mohammedaansche Wet, Leiden, 1930.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korzybski, A.</td>
<td>Science and sanity, Lakeville, 1958.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langer, S.</td>
<td>Philosophy in a new key, Cambridge, 1942.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Leur, J.C.</td>
<td>Indonesian trade and society, the Hague, 1955.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title and Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munshi, 'A.</td>
<td>Hikayat pelayaran 'Abdullah (Dari Singapura ke Kelantan), Singapore, 1838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Translations of Eastern poetry and prose, Cambridge, 1922.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The idea of personality in Sufism, Cambridge, 1923.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Java in the 14th century, the Hague, 1962, 5v., vol. 4.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Poerbatjara, R.Ng: Irjuna Wiwaha, romanized and translated into Dutch by R.Ng Poerbatjara, B.K.I., 82, 1926.

Popper, W: Egypt and Syria under the Circassian Sultans, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957.

al-Qushayrī, A.Q: Risālatu’l-Qushayriyyah, Cairo, 1900.

Rabino di Borgomale, H.L: Coins, Medals and Seals of the Shahs of Iran, Hertford, 1945.


Rassers, W.H: Pañji, the culture hero, the Hague, 1959.


Sa’dī, M: Gulistān, translated into English by E.B. Eastwick, Hertford, 1852.


Schrieke, B.: Indonesian sociological studies, the Hague, 1955-1957, 2v.


al-Sinqili, ʿ. R.: Tafsīr al-Qurʾān, Cairo, 1901, 2v.


Spinoza, B.: Ethics, translated into English by W. H. White and A. A. Stirling, Chicago, 1952.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Yūsuf'īlī, 'A: The Holy Qur'ān, translated into English with texts and notes by 'A. Yūsuf'īlī, Lahore, 1938, 3r.


### III Works of Reference


Brockelman, C: Geschichte der Arabischen litteratur, Leiden, 1898-1942.


