UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

SOAS

THE UMAYYAD CALIPHATE 65-86/684-705

(A POLITICAL STUDY)

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a political study of the Umayyad Caliphate during the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān, 65-86/684-705. The first chapter deals with the political, social and religious background of ʿAbd al-Malik, and relates this to his later policy on becoming caliph.

Chapter II is devoted to the ʿAlid opposition of the period, i.e. the revolt of al-Mukhtar ibn Abī ʿUbaid al-Thaqafī, and its nature, causes and consequences.

The ʿAṣabiyya (tribal feuds), a dominant phenomenon of the Umayyad period, is examined in the third chapter. An attempt is made to throw light on its causes, and on the policies adopted by ʿAbd al-Malik to contain it.

The fourth chapter is concerned with the civil war between ʿAbd al-Malik and Ibn al-Zubair. The underlying factors leading the people of al-Ḥijāz to support Ibn al-Zubair are examined, to elucidate the nature of the Zubairid opposition movement in general.

Chapter V deals with the revolts of Ibn al-Jarūd, and of the Zanj; the insurrection of the Azd in ʿUmaṇ; and the far more dangerous revolt of ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn al-Ashʿath. These revolts are compared to see if they spring from similar discontents, and whether they are in response to the policies of al-Ḥajjāj.
Chapter VI treats the Khārijite movement, which reached its height of activity in this period, in its political aspect, as a source of opposition to 'Abd al-Malik's caliphate. The minor, scattered revolts are described as well as the better-known major Khārijite revolts. This chapter also examines the link between the revolt of Muṭarrif ibn al-Mughīra, and the movement of Shabīb ibn Yazīd and the Khārijites in general.
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<td>AIOC</td>
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<td>AJSL</td>
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CHAPTER VI  

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INTRODUCTION

SURVEY OF THE SOURCES

Since most of the extant sources dealing with our period have come down to us from the time of the 'Abbāsids, those inveterate enemies of the Umayyads, it is extremely difficult to do justice to the Umayyad cause: it gets scarce sympathy from an historical tradition which was the product of the period following their fall from power. Apart from the pious caliph, 'Umar II, all the Umayyads are represented as irreligious and frivolous. The anti-Umayyad historians exploited to the utmost the fact that the Umayyads were the immediate successors of the Orthodox Caliphs, and judged them by the same standards; they disregarded the fact that a vast empire like that of the Umayyads could not be administered by the same primitive methods as in the early years of the Caliphate. 2

However, there are slight traces of a less unsympathetic tradition in the Syrian sources found in Christian writings, 3 as well as in scattered

1. Two books only are said to have come to us from the Umayyad period. The first is called "Kitāb al-Saqīfa", attributed to Salīm ibn Qais (d. 90 A.H.), published by al-Ḥaydariyya Press, Najaf. See N.A. Dāwūd, Nash'at al-Shī'a al-Imāmiyya, pp. 22-23. The second book is "Kitāb al-Zuhd" by Asad ibn Mūsā al-Umawī (d. 133 A.H.). This work is still in manuscript form in Berlin, no. 1553. See Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur, S.I., p. 257, & p. 351; Mackensen, Arabic Books and Libraries in the Umayyad Period, Part I, p. 250, in AJSL, vol. 52, 1936.


narratives in the general histories of Islam. Only by considering these can one attempt to reconstruct a more balanced picture of the Umayyad caliphate under which "Islam had established itself as a universal religion."\(^1\)

For the period under consideration our sources are annals, literature, local histories, geographies, religious literature, coins and inscriptions. In each chapter of this study is provided a comparison of the different narratives with some critical remarks, and attention has been drawn to the fact that the later sources simply repeat and re-edit the information provided by the earlier sources. Their major value is in clarifying points which remain obscure in the earlier sources.\(^2\) There remains only to provide a quick survey of the basic and major sources used in this study, with special emphasis on those not previously accessible to historians of the Umayyad period.

1. **Khalīfa ibn Khayyat**, \(^3\) *Shabāb* (d. 240/854-5), a Basran historian and traditionist. His *Tārīkh* represents the oldest annals of the history of Islam that have survived.\(^4\) It begins with the first year of Hijra and ends with the

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1. E.I., (Umayyads).
3. Two editions of both the *Tārīkh* and the *Tabaqāt* of Khalīfa are available. The first is edited by S. Zakkār and published in Damascus, 1966-7. The second is edited by A. al-'Umarī and published in Najaf and Baghdad, 1967. Being a study of Khalīfa's works as well as editing them, the Iraqi edition is more useful in that it contains an important introduction and valuable notes.
4. Al-'Alī, in his introduction to the *Tārīkh* of Khalīfa, p. 11.
year 230/844-5. Being himself a traditionist as were his father and grandfather, Khalīfa adopted the method of the traditionists in his Tārīkh by quoting a chain of authorities. For the Umayyad period and more especially for the reign of 'Abd al-Malik, Khalīfa quotes a chain of authorities containing among others, 'Awāna ibn al-Ḥakam, Abūl-Yaqqūn, Ibn al-Kalbī, Abū 'Ubaida, al-Madāʾinī, al-ʿAsmaʾī, Ibn ʿAyyāsh and his grandfather, Khalīfa. Some of the narratives in the Tārīkh are, in fact, Umayyad, such as that of al-Muhallab ibn Abī Sufrā, reported on the authority of Ibn ʿAyyāsh, predicting 'Abd al-Malik's future as caliph because of his piety and family connections. 1 While Khalīfa deals very briefly with the Shiʿī revolts during 'Abd al-Malik's reign, such as al-Tawābūn and the movement of al-Mukhtār, 2 he shows great interest in the revolt of Ibn al-ʿAshāth, which he reports on the authority of Abūl-Yaqqūn. 3 The latter is a great sympathiser of the Umayyads. 4 Khalīfa also gives us important information about the revolt of ʿAmr b. Saʿīd al-ʿAshdaq, from which we can learn some of the terms of agreement between him and ʿAbd al-Malik. 5 Moreover,

2. Ibid., I, pp. 258, 259, 260.
3. Ibid., I, pp. 279-290.
5. Tārīkh, I, p. 263.
apart from this moderate Umayyad sympathy revealed in the Tarikh, it is an invaluable source for the lists of governors, Qādis, chief of police and directors of the Dīwāns, with which Khalīfa concludes the account of the reign of each caliph; the list of the Qurra* who participated in the revolt of Ibn al-Ashʿath is also of outstanding value. 1

In his Ṭabaqāt, Khalīfa gives both the patrilineal and matrilineal genealogy of each person, also mentioning his place of residence, his travels, the date of his death, and his participation in the conquests and campaigns, as well as the administrative post he occupied, especially if he was a Qādī or a governor. In addition to this important information, the Ṭabaqāt contains valuable information on the Khīṭāt of al- Baṣra. Thus both the Tarikh and the Ṭabaqāt are indispensible sources for the early history of Islam.

2. Al-Maʿārif by Ibn Qutaiba ʿAbdallah ibn Muslim al-Dīnawarī (d. 276/889). This work has an encyclopaedic character, and contains important information on ʿAbd al-Malik's reign. It provides material on the early life of ʿAbd al-Malik, as well as giving a short account of the major events of his reign. Like Jahshiyyārī, Ibn Qutaiba does not mention his authorities in his account of ʿAbd al-Malik's reign.

1. Ibid., I, pp. 286-288.
3. Abū l-ʿAbbās, Ahmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhūrī (d. 279/892), one of the most useful Arabic historians. His Ansāb al-Aṣḥāf is a rich and valuable source for the history of the Umayyad period: over a third of the manuscript, which contains 1227 folios, is devoted to the Umayyad history, of which 130 folios are concerned with ʿAbd al-Malik, with another sizeable chapter of 40 folios on al-Ḥajjāj. To this should be added the long chapters on Ibn al-Zubair and on al-Muḥtaṣir. What is more important than the length of the chapters is their quality as history: Baladhūrī is one of the few to deal objectively with the Umayyads.

His basic authorities on this period are: Hishām ibn Muḥammad al-Kalbī and his son ʿAbbās, Madaʾinī, Abū Mīkhnaf, ʿAwāna ibn al-Ḥakam and Wāqīdī. The narratives of Abū Mīkhnaf and ʿAwāna are reported by al-Balādhūrī: to have reached him through Hishām ibn al-Kalbī and his son, ʿAbbās. Baladhūrī does not, however, mention Abū Mīkhnaf's sources of information, beyond referring to them by such phrases as ʿudīn or ʿalawī. This shows either that Baladhūrī used the writing of Abū Mīkhnaf directly or via Ibn al-Kalbī, or that the writings of previous historians were well established by Baladhūrī's time.

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1. See the introduction of the Jerusalem edition of Ansāb al-Aṣḥāf, 1936.
2. See Ansāb, V, pp. 188-379 and pp. 204-269.
Concerning 'Awāna's narratives in the Ḍansāb, they can be easily detected by their brief, non-continuous character. Interestingly enough, in dealing with the revolt of 'Amr ibn Sa'īd al-Asḥad, Baladhurī mentions four different narratives but omits that of 'Awāna reported in Ṣabarī. ¹ This was no doubt due to the fact that 'Awāna clearly takes the side of 'Abd al-Malik in this revolt, and his account contains references to the idea of "Jabr". It seems that 'Awāna was not an objective enough source for so conscientious an historian as Baladhurī. ²

The most often quoted authority in al-Ḍansāb for the reign of 'Abd al-Malik is Mada'ini. In contrast to Ṣabarī, who quotes Mada'ini only on events concerning Basra and the Eastern provinces, Baladhurī uses him for many different events in varying places: thus showing Baladhurī's superior wisdom of making greater use of a reliable source.

Next to Mada'ini, Waqidi was the most frequently quoted source used by Baladhurī. Most of the quotations in his name are in the form of short reports. He is a particularly important authority on the fall and death of Ibn al-Zubair. ³ The fact that al-Ḥijāz, the centre of Ibn al-Zubair's activities, was the birth place and home town of Waqidi, is significant in this respect.

¹ Ansāb, IV, ii, pp.138-146.
² Ansāb, V, pp.355-374.
³ Ansāb, V, pp.355-374.
A comparison of Ţabarî's text with the information given by Balâdhurî's Ansâb clearly shows the latter's superiority. Balâdhurî takes pains to give a complete picture of the Khârijite opposition under ʿAbd al-Malik, and pays great attention to the tribal feuds which were a dominating factor of the reign. On the other hand, Ţabarî neglects important events such as the revolt of Ibn al-Jârûd and of the Zanj in Baṣra, and is imprecise on the nature of the revolt of Muṣṭarīf ibn al-Maghîra, among other things.

In his Futûḥ al-Buldân Balâdhurî furnishes indispensable information on the administrative aspects of the conquered provinces, dealing with such issues as taxation, the introduction of Arabic money and of Arabic as an official language throughout the Empire. Moreover, Futûḥ al-Buldân contains scattered historical information which, taken with the administrative accounts, gives a more coherent picture of our period.

4. Al-Akhbâr al-Jiwal, by Ābu Ḥanîfa ʿĀhmad ibn Dâwûd al-Dînawarî (d. 282/895). In his treatment of the Umayyad period, al-Dînawarî devotes most attention to the political and religious movements in the eastern part of the Empire. As far as the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwân is concerned, he concentrates on the revolt of al-Mukhtar, the wars of the Azârîqa and the revolt of Ibn al-Ashâth. He has a strong tendency to exaggerate the role of the mawâlî in the revolt of al-Mukhtar, and he went as far as to represent the war between Muṣʿab ibn al-Zubair

and al-Mukhtār as a war between Arab and Persian. ¹ His pro-mawāli attitude is probably due to both his Persian origins, and to the sources he utilized, which were mainly Persian. ² Similarly, his account of the revolt of Ibn al-Ashʿath is inaccurate and misleading and is unconfirmed by other sources. He believed the revolt to have been started in Kūfa as a result of propaganda by Ibn al-Ashʿath among the Qurrāʾ and religious men. ³ However, some of his work is historically valuable, as for example, his accounts of the revolt of ʿAmr ibn Saʿīd al-Ashdaq, and the Azāirqa. ⁴ These two accounts complement, and are confirmed by, other sources. As a final comment on al-Dīnawarī, I should mention that he has no critical attitude to his sources, ⁵ nor does he name them.

5. ʿAl-Yaʿqūbī, ʿAbd al-Malik to the throne, al-Yaʿqūbī mentions that his two grandfathers were expelled by the

² E.I.², (al-Dīnawarī).
³ See Chapter V, p. 270.
⁵ Ibid., p. 298.
⁶ E.I.¹, (al-Yaʿqūbī).
Prophet,¹ and he also reports the tradition which considered 'Abd al-Malik as much a tyrant as the Pharaoh.² Al-Ya‘qūbī also shows himself strongly against al-Ḥajjāj in describing his policy in both al-Ḥijāz and Iraq.³ Moreover, his pro-'Alid feelings led him to repeat some of the anti-Zubairid tradition, especially when the relationship between Ibn al-Zubair and Ibn al-Ḥanifiyya and Ibn 'Abbās was not cordial.⁴ Another occasion when he was anti-Zubairid was in his reporting of the massacre which Muḥāb inflicted on the Shi‘ī supporters of al-Mukhtar:⁵ he portrays this as “one of the most memorable betrayals of the ‘aman’.”

However, despite his obvious distortions, some of his information is original and valuable: for example, on the underlying economic factors governing the support the Medinese gave to Ibn al-Zubair; the troubles in Khurāsān;⁶ and the lists of governors and theologians he provides at the

¹ Tarīkh, II, p. 320.
² Ibid., p. 336. See Also Mushākalat al-Nās li Zamānīhim, p. 18.
³ Tarīkh, II, pp. 325, 326; Mushākalat al-Nās li Zamānīhim, p. 18.
⁴ Tarīkh, II, pp. 311-313, 320.
⁵ Ibid., p. 315.
⁶ Ibid., pp. 297-8.
⁷ Ibid., pp. 320-324, 330.
end of the account of each caliph. From the list of authorities he gives at the beginning of the second volume of his 
Tarīkh, one can detect that some of them were actually 'Abbāsid. This throws some light on his flattering accounts of Ibn 'Abbas during our period.

6. 

Tarīkh al-Rusul wa'l-Mulūk by Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarî, (d. 310/923), the most detailed and comprehensive collection of narratives on the Caliphate in general. In dealing with the Umayyad period, he concentrates largely on events in Iraq and the eastern provinces, which can be explained by the fact that these areas, being the centre of opposition to the Umayyads, were the scene of the most interesting events: the history of the Umayyads is, in fact, the history of Iraq and the East. As a traditionist, Ṭabarî strongly emphasises his chain of authority, and abstains from criticising their contents. Therefore, some general remarks on Ṭabarî's authorities are of special importance in this connection. For 'Abd al-Malik's reign, Ṭabarî's authorities are: Abū Mīkhnaf, 'Awāna ibn al-Ḥakam, Madā'īnī and Waqidi. The most prominent among them is Abū Mīkhnaf, on whose authority almost all the affairs of Iraq, and more especially

1. Dūrī, Bahth fi Nash'at 'Ilm al-Tarīkh 'Inda'1-'Arab, p. 52.
2. Tarīkh, II, p. 313.
of Kūfa, are reported. On the whole, Abū Mikhaf's narratives are unbiased, although in some of them appears a sympathy for the 'Alids, and for Iraq and Kūfa; and occasionally, he glorifies the Azd, his own tribe.  

While Abū Mikhaf is Ṭabarī's authority on Iraqi affairs, 'Awānā ibn al-Ḥakam was the one on whose authority are reported Umayyad and Syrian affairs. Like Abū Mikhaf's, 'Awānā's narratives are handed down by Hishām ibn al-Kalbī, but Ṭabarī mentions no chain of authority for this. 'Awānā is quoted only four times throughout the period of 'Abd al-Malik's reign, each time for events in Syria, one of them concerned with the inner circles of the Umayyad family. 'Awānā is quoted in dealing with the army sent by Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam (at the end of his reign) under 'Amr b. Sa'd al-Ashdaq against Ibn al-Zubair; the army of Ḥubaish ibn Dulja sent against Hijāz, and finally, the revolt of 'Amr ibn Sa'd al-Ashdaq and his murder by 'Abd al-Malik. Some of 'Awānā's accounts use the concept of "Jabr" (predestination) in public affairs, propagated by the Umayyads. Examples of this are his mention of the wife of Ka'b al-Aḥbār predicting that 'Amr would die; and the story of when 'Amr saw 'Uthmān in a dream, who clothed him in his own shirt.  

3. Tab., II, pp.784-796.
In dealing with events in Basra and Khurasan, Tabari depends exclusively on the narrative of Mada'ini, an indisputed authority on the events in these two areas. Mada'ini's narrative has come down to us most frequently through 'Umar b. Shabba. The latter is, like Mada'ini, a Basran and greatly interested in the history of his native city and of Khurasan.  

1. Mada’ini is a trustworthy man, and “his accuracy has been confirmed by modern investigation.” However, in some of his narratives, such as those on the tribal feud in Khurasan following Yazid’s death, and on Musa ibn ‘Abdallah b. Khazim, he relies noticeably on tribal traditions and legends.

All the quotations from Waqidi, except for one which deals with ‘Abd al-Malik’s attempt to depose his brother ‘Abd al-Aziz from the succession to the throne, are concerned with the affairs of Ibn al-Zubair in al-Hijaz and his brother Mus‘ab in Basra.  

Waqidi’s accounts, generally speaking, are not partisan, but at times he shows Zubairid leanings, such as in the war between Mus‘ab ibn al-Zubair and al-Mukhtar.  

There is,

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3. Tab., II, pp. 1145-1164; 489.
however, no evidence to confirm Ibn al-Nadīm's accusation of 'Alī's partisanship. ¹

7.  Abū Muḥammad, ʿAlī Muhammad ibn Aṭham al-Kūfī al-Kindī (d.314/926), the author of Kitāb al-Futūḥ. ² The first volume of al-Futūḥ, which contains 270 folios, begins with the caliphate of ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān and ends with the revolt of al-Mukhtār ibn Abī ʿUbaid al-Ṭhaqafi 66/685. The second volume consisting of 278 folios, continues the account of al-Mukhtār's revolt and ends with the suppression of Babak's revolt in the reign of al-Muṣṭaṣim 218-227. As it is only available in manuscript ³ and until recently unknown, al-Kūfī's Futūḥ has not been utilized previously in the study of the Umayyad period. Ibn Aṭham's authorities are given in the introductory paragraph to the first volume as Madaʾīnī, Waqīdī, Zuhrī, Abū Mikhnaf and Hishām ibn al-Kalbī, as well as others of lesser importance. ⁴

¹ Fihrist, p. 144; see also introduction to Kitāb al-Maghāzī of al-Waqīdī, Oxford, 1966, p.18.


³ Two editions of this work are in course of preparation, one by Dr. M.A. Shāban and the other by al-Maymanī.

⁴ It is rather difficult to account for the assertion of Professor A.N. Kurat that many of Ibn Aṭham's authorities are unknown. See Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad b. Aṭham al-Kūfī's Kitāb al-Futūḥ and its importance concerning the Arab conquest in central Asia and the Khazārs, p.277, ADTCFD, VII, 1949.
However, Ibn A‘tham combined all these traditions in one single narrative, and for this reason, he did not refer to his authorities in the course of the book.

*Kūfī’s Futūh* is one of the most important sources for the revolt of al-Mukhtar. He shows very clearly that it was the Southern tribes (Yemenites) who played the decisive role in the revolt, rather than the mawāli.¹ His account throws much light on the disputed matter of the relationship between Ibn al-Zubair and al-Mukhtar.² One should point out here that *Al-Futūh* contains no mention whatsoever of the Khashabiyya, the Kaisaniyya and the "Kursī", which were so characteristic of al-Mukhtar's revolt: perhaps this is due to his sympathies towards the 'Alids and al-Mukhtar leading him to "hush up" the discrediting extremist wing of the movement. *Al-Futūh* is also one of the major sources for the history of the Arabs in Khurasan during the reign of 'Abd al-Malik, and provides useful material on such provinces as Armīnya, and on Arab-Byzantine relations, some of which cannot be found in the other sources.³

However, Ibn A‘tham shows a strong ‘Alid bias whenever the ‘Alids are mentioned⁴ in the events of ‘Abd al-Malik’s caliphate.

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1. Kūfī, I, fols. 246a-270b, and II, fols. 1a-29b.
2. Ibid., I, fols. 236b, 261b.
3. Ibid, I, fols. 245b; II, fols. 58a-60b, 72a-b, 116a-129a.
4. Ibid, I, fols. 187b, 190a-b, 193a-b, 204a, 207b, 213b, 220b-221b; II, fols. 12a, 20a, 29b, 31a, 56a-b.
Finally, his accounts reveal rather bitter feelings against al-Ḥajjāj, as well as some measure of glorification of his tribe, Kinda.

8. Abu ʿAbdallah Muḥammad ibn ʿAdbus al-Jahshiyārī (d. 331/942), the author of al-Wuzaraʾ waʾl-Kuttāb. This work, which mainly deals with administrative matters, contains valuable information on political affairs. Its importance for the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik lies not only in the administrative account it provides, but also the information given on ʿAṣabiyya and on the policies of al-Ḥajjāj in Iraq; the latter reveals an anti-Ḥajjāj bias. On the whole, Jahshiyārī's account is brief, and he does not mention his authorities in the period concerned.

9. Al-Masʿūdī, Abuʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusain (d. 345/956), a renowned historian and scholar of the fourth century. Out of the thirty five works which he claimed to have written, only Murūj al-Dhahab and al-Tanbih waʾl-Ishrāf survive. In his Murūj al-Dhahab, he expresses a strong

1. Kūfī, II, fols. 53b-54a, 57b, 113b-115b.
2. Ibid, I, fol. 242b.
5. It is doubtful that the published book entitled Akhbar al-Zamān wa maʿ Abādahūʾl-Ḥadāthān (Cairo 1938) is the same Akhbar al-Zamān as Masʿūdī's: for not only do the contents of this published volume not agree with al-Masʿūdī's references to his own work, but it also differs in its style from Masʿūdī's. Another treatise ascribed to al-Masʿūdī is Ithbāt al-Waqiyya lilʿImām ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, published in Najaf by al-Muktāba al-Murtadawīyya. It is regretted that I was unable to get access to this work. See N. A. Dāwūd, Nashʾat al-Shīʿa al-Imāmiyya, Bibliography.
pro-'Alid sympathy. Masʿūdī's information on the 'Alids is reported on the authority of men with Shi'ite inclinations. Moreover, in his assessment of 'Abd al-Malik's personality, al-Masʿūdī quotes verbatim from al-Yaʿqūbī's essay on the caliph, entitled Mushākalat al-Nās Li zamanihim, without acknowledging his source. In his lengthy chapter on al-Hajjāj, Masʿūdī portrays him most unfavourably; here again, reports on the authority of men like al-Minqārī and ibn ʿĀʾisha, who are known to have had Shi'ite leanings. One can also find in Masʿūdī's Murūj clear anti-Umayyad feelings. Examples of this are when he reports the death of al-Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī, and his account of the battle of al-Ḥarra, and the death of Muʿāwiya II.

Masʿūdī seems to have been interested in anecdotes and legends current at the time, which he reports to us in his Murūj. This, rather than serving "to impair the trustworthiness of the accounts", is more an indication of the social and intellectual life of some of the people of the time.

However, al-Masʿūdī in his Murūj provides us with valuable

4. Ibid., V, pp.326-8, 331-6, 338-9, 343; also pp.290-302.
5. Ibid., V, pp.79-81, 167, 169.
information on al-Mukhtar's relationships with Ibn al-Zubair; with both Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya and Ibn ʿAbbās; and with ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusain. This information, together with that given by Baladhuri, helps us to a better understanding of these otherwise obscure proceedings. Another important point revealed in al-Murūj is the reason for the support given by southern Arabs to Marwān in the battle of Marj Rāḥīṭ, and also the treason of ʿUmair ibn al-Ḥubāb in the battle of Khāzir. This information throws much light on tribal conflicts during the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik Ibn Marwān.

In Masʿūdī's Tanbih, which is a "resumé of his previous works", we find fresh and important information: the date of the battle of Khāzir, Ibn al-ʿAsh'ath's adoption of the titles of al-Qahtānī and Ṣaṣir al-Muʾminīn, the list of the "Kuttab", "Ḥājibāt", and Qādis at the end of the account of each caliph. It is interesting that al-Masʿūdī makes it clear in his Tanbih that he had seen some Umayyad sources, which he criticised as being biased and anti-Ḥāshimite (Tālibids and ʿAbbāsids).

10. Kitāb al-Aghānī by Abuʾl-Faraj al-Islahānī, ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusain (d. 356/966-7), Arab historian, litterateur and poet. Although this work

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2. See Chapter II, p. 74 of this thesis.
5. Ibid., pp. 335, 336.
6. E. I. 2, (Abuʾl-Faraj al-Islahānī.)
primarily deals with the one hundred songs chosen by order of the caliph Harūn al-Rashīd, it gives abundant material on political, administrative and social life in the period concerned. Next to Balādhurī’s Ansāb, Kitāb al-Aghānī is the most important source for the tribal feuds of ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign, which he reports on the authority of al-Madā‘īnī, ‘Umar ibn Shabba and Abū ‘Ubaida. ‘Abd al-Malik’s court life and his attitude towards songs and wine are reported in the Kitāb al-Aghānī. He gives information on political events, such as the war between ‘Abd al-Malik and Muṣ‘ab ibn al-Zubair; and also useful facts on ‘Abd al-Malik’s governors in al-Ḥijāz and Khūrāsān. Abu’l-Faraj very often states his authorities, but as he is a Shi‘ite, some of his accounts should be considered with care, as, for instance, that on ‘Abd al-Malik’s attitude towards singing.

11. The Christian (Syriac) sources. These are all, with the exception of only two, late sources which repeat the accounts of the early Arab historians. Where they do more than repeat, in providing original information,

6. Agh., II, pp. 86-8. On the authenticity of this account, see Chapter I, p. 62, of this thesis.
their work is unreliable as far as the major political events of the time are concerned, since it is the product of "a minority community isolated from the courts of kings and princes" by its political inferiority. Nevertheless, there are areas in which the Christian sources can prove useful, in matters concerning the administration of Christians in the Muslim world, especially their taxation (Jizya and Kharaj); as by-product of this, they give information on the general administrative practices of the caliphate. They are also useful sources for Arab-Byzantine relations. More specially for our period, they are useful in providing a non-hostile view of the Umayyads, to act as corrective to the more biased 'Abbasid sources.

12. Literary Works: the most important of these are the Diwans of poets such as Ibn Qais al-Ruqayyat, A'sha Hamdān, Surāqa al-Bāriqī, al-Akhtal, Jarīr and al-Farazdaq. Next to these Diwans come Naqā'id Jarīr wa'l-
Farazdaq and Naqā'id Jarīr wa'l-Akhtal. These poetical works which are contemporary with the events, are important in that they contain verses relating to many political events, such as the 'Aṣabiyya, the civil war between 'Abd al-Malik and Ibn al-Zubair, the campaign against the Byzantines, the

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Khārijite opposition and the revolt of 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn al-Ash'ath. They can be used to confirm the accounts of the historical sources.

13. **Religious Literature (Heresiography):** most of these books are late and deal mainly with the sects, their origins and development. As most of them are written by Sunnī authors, concerned with the theological aspect of the sects, with examining their heresies and errors: thus they are biased sources. Even those written by Khārijite or Shīʿī authors are prejudiced against any sect other than their own.

However, they do contain sporadic historical information on the Khārijite wars, the origin of various sects such as al-Khashabiyya and al-Kaisāniyya, and their connection with the revolt of al-Mukhtar; they also tell us of the nature of the latter's support in Kūfa. But even so, these heresiographies are often confusing to use, since being late sources, they sometimes muddle the names of persons and places.

14. **Coins and Inscriptions:** the coins are important in providing confirmation for the written sources, as well as new information for the period

in question; for example, that 'Abd al-Malik called himself Khalfatu'llāh
(the caliph of God)\(^1\) on the coins he minted. This information cannot be
found in the written sources. The fact that the Kharijite 'Atiyya ibn
al-Aswad struck coins in Kirmān, is confirmed by the coins that survived
from that year 72/691.\(^2\)

The inscriptions on buildings provide important information on the
date of construction, or restoration and the name of the caliph responsible.
It is from the inscription on the Dome of the Rock that we know that 'Abd
al-Malik was its original builder, since the date of the inscription survived
to prove false the attempt to credit it to the 'Abbāsid caliph al-Ma'mūn.

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1. Curiel, *Arabo-Sassanids Money*, VIII, p.328, \(\text{J} \text{RN}, 6\text{e} \text{series}, 1966\).
CHAPTER I
THE LEGACY OF THE EARLY YEARS

There is much information in the sources, particularly in the late ones, on the early life of 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan; but since much of this information is repeated from legends and myths, it is difficult to form a very satisfactory idea of his personality or of how his early life influenced his later policy on becoming caliph. Yet only by adopting a critical and analytical approach to the sources, is it possible to clarify fact from fiction.

According to one account\(^1\) he was born in the year 23/643; according to another,\(^2\) it was 26/646. As for the month, it is agreed on as being Ramadān, though no exact day is given. His birth-place is mentioned by Khalīfa ibn Khayyat as the house (Dar) of his father Marwan in Medīna.\(^3\) It is said that he was prematurely born, which led some of his critics to give this assertion evil connotations, implying the weakness of

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1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tārīkh, I, p.293; Ansāb, XI, p.264; Tab., II, p.1173 (citing Madā‘ini); Ghurar, fols. 81-82; ‘Iqd, IV, pp.399, 421; ‘Asākir, X, fol. 254a; Tahdīb, IV, p.423 (quoting Khalīfa). However, another account in Tab., I, p.2671, gives the year 22.

2. Sa‘d, V, p.166; Tab., II, p.1173 (citing Waqīdī); Kāmil, IV, p.411; ‘Asākir, X, fol. 254a; Tahdīb, VI, p.423 (quoting Ibn Sa‘d); Suyūṭī, p.143.

3. Tārīkh, I, p.293.
his claim, vis-a-vis his rival, for the Caliphate. His father was the caliph Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam ibn Abī'l-Ĥās ibn Umayya ibn 'Abd Shams ibn 'Abd Manāf ibn Qūṣayy. 2 His mother was 'A'isha bint Mu'āwiya ibn al-Mughṭāra ibn Abī'l-Ĥās ibn Umayya ibn 'Abd Shams ibn 'Abd Manāf. 3 His "Kunya" was Abu'l-Walīd, his favourite son and successor. 4 Since the 'Abbāsid s were the first to adopt regnal titles, 'Abd al-Malik like the rest of the Umayyad caliphs had no title, "Leqab". Some late historians have ascribed the practice to the Umayyad caliphs and even aduced specific titles to them. 5 However, 'Abd al-Malik was called, as a nickname, "the one who squeezes water from a stone".

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1. Bayān, i, p. 177; Absāb, XI, p. 152; Ghurar, fol. 62; 'Iqd, IV, pp. 31-32; Sināʿatāin, pp. 15-16; Khulafāʿ, II, fol. 97b; Asākir, X, fol. 163a; Kāmil, IV, p. 158; Tahdhīb, VI, p. 423; Sunyūṭī, p. 144.


4. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Ṭabaqāt, p. 240; Maʿārif, p. 155; Tab., II, p. 1173; 'Iqd, IV, p. 398; Tanbīh, p. 312; Khulafāʿ, II, fol. 97a; 'Asākir, X, fol. 252b; Kāmil, IV, p. 413; Bidāya, IX, p. 61; Tahdhīb, VI, p. 422.

5. Tanbīh, pp. 335-7; Maʿārif, p. 105; Subḥ, V, p. 477ff.; Ināfa, I, p. 22; Some modern writers have been misled by this point and ascribed to 'Abd al-Malik the title of al-Muwaffaq bi Amir'iḥān. See Abu'l-Naṣr, 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān, p. 252, Beirut, 1962.
(Rashh al-Hajar), on the grounds of his alleged miserliness. 1 There is reason for thinking that such an allegation was unfounded since there was a tendency among Muslim historians to call 'miser', any caliph who, through efficiency, kept a tight rein on expenditure. His son the Caliph Hisham and the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Manṣūr were also called mean where objective sources would describe them as efficient financiers. The generous way in which 'Abd al-Malik rewarded victorious generals returning from campaigns, and patronized poets and religious men, shows that he did not have that aversion to parting with money which is the sign of a mean man. 2 And could it be that 'Abd al-Malik's opponents called him 'miser' to counter his own accusation of Ibn al-Zubair: "he has every qualification for a caliph were it not for his miserliness"? 3

When he was only ten years old he witnessed the storming of the house of the Caliph 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān in Mecca, in which the caliph


2. Sa'd, IV, p. 40, V, p. 171 (citing Wāqidī); pp. 171-2; Mahāsin, pp. 9-10; Ansāb, XI, pp. 167-8 (citing 'Awāna); 'Iqd, I, pp. 294-5; pp. 360-1; Murūj, p. 253, pp. 380-1; Agh., VIII, pp. 29-30 (citing al-Zubair ibn Bakkar); 'Asākir, VII, p. 375.

3. Ansāb, XI, p. 18 (citing Mada'inī); Ya'qūbī, II, p. 327; Ṣab., II, p. 1176.
was killed.\textsuperscript{1} No wonder that this event had a lasting effect on him, as clearly shown in the distrust expressed in his address to the people of Medīna after he became caliph.\textsuperscript{2} This early mistrust was further aggravated by the attitude of the people of Medīna towards the Umayyads in general. In the year 63/682, the Medinese expelled the Umayyads from their city and revolted against the Caliph Yazīd I.\textsuperscript{3} ‘Abd al-Malik lived through this event and was one of those expelled. The Medinese hostile attitude reached its culmination in the support they gave to Ibn al-Zubair against ‘Abd al-Malik himself. Wellhausen\textsuperscript{4} rightly pointed out that ‘Abd al-Malik seems to have borne this history of anti-Umayyad feeling in Medīna in mind in his choice of governors for the city.

When the Caliph ‘Uthmān appointed his father ‘Katib’ in Medīna,

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\textsuperscript{1} Sa‘d, V, p. 166; Bayān, II, p. 171 (citing Madā’īnī); Ansāb, XI, p. 190 (citing Madā’īnī); Ṣab., II, p. 1173 (citing Wāqidi); Būyāy, IX, p. 62.

\textsuperscript{2} Sa‘d, V, p. 172 (citing Wāqidi); Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tarīkh, I, p. 270; Ansāb, XI, pp. 177-8, Ya‘qūbī, II, pp. 326-7; Mūraj, V, pp. 281-2; Agh., IV, p. 53 (citing al-Zubair, ibn Bakkār); Kāmil, IV, p. 317; Būyāy, IX, p. 64.

\textsuperscript{3} Sa‘d, V, p. 166 (citing Wāqidi); Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tarīkh, I, p. 228; Im̄āma, I, pp. 172-3; Ansāb, V, pp. 126-7 (citing Madā’īnī); Ṣab., II, pp. 405-6 (citing Abī Mīkhnaf); Agh., I, pp. 13-4 (citing Madā’īnī); Kāmil, IV, pp. 95-6; pp. 119-20; Būyāy, IX, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{4} The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 215, Calcutta, 1927, and Beirut, 1963.
‘Abd al-Malik acted as his secretary in the Diwan of al-Medîna. 1 As
governor of al-Bahrîn for the Caliph ‘Uthmân, Marwân appointed his son,
‘Abd al-Malik to the governorship of Hajar. 2

Under Mu‘awiyah, ‘Abd al-Malik continued to hold offices. When
Zaid ibn Thâbit died, ‘Abd al-Malik succeeded him as ‘Kâtib’ of the
Diwan of al-Medîna. 3 In the year 42/662, he was at the head of the troops
of Medîna in the caliph’s naval campaign against the Byzantines, in
which he distinguished himself. 4

During the caliphate of Yazîd I, he became more involved in the
politics of the time: in the year 61/680 the Caliph Yazîd I tried to reconcile
Ibn al-Zubair and the people of al-Hijaz by sending a mission headed by
Ibn 'Idâh al-Ash‘ari. In Medîna on their way to Mecca, they met Marwân,

2. Ma‘arif, p. 155; Ansâb, XI, p. 152 (citing Waqidi); Bad‘, VI,
3. Ma‘arif, p. 155; Ansâb, XI, p. 152 (citing Waqidi); Bad‘, VI,
4. Sa‘d, V, p. 166; Khalîfa ibn Khayyât, Tarikh, I, p. 196 (who gives
the year 50); Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam, Futûh Ifriqiya wa‘l-Andalus,
pp. 56–58; Agh., XII, p. 95 (citing ‘Umar b. Shabba); Mu‘jam, III,
pp. 107–8; Ibn al-Abbâr, al-Hullat al-Sayara‘, p. 383; Bidâtayn, IX,
p. 63 (quoting Khaliifa). The date given by Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam and
Ibn al-Abbâr is 34. This seems unconvincing since at this time he
would be only eleven years old.
who sent his two sons 'Abd al-Malik and 'Abd al-'Azīz with them.

'Abd al-Malik and his brother on their father's instructions recited certain verses in front of Ibn al-Zubair encouraging him to be more firm and not to yield to the demands of Yazīd. Marwān was at this time supporting Ibn al-Zubair against Yazīd, not through any genuine friendship, but as an expression of his discontent at Mu'āwiya's introduction of the hereditary principle, so resented by the 'Arabs. When Yazīd's negotiations with Ibn al-Zubair and the people of al-Ḥijāz failed, the Umayyads were expelled from Medina by the rebels; 'Abd al-Malik had to leave the town with his father. On their way, they met the Syrian army which Yazīd had sent against Ibn al-Zubair, under the command of Muslim ibn 'Uqba al-Murri. Marwān and his son 'Abd al-Malik joined the Syrian army and came back to Medina. When Muslim ibn 'Uqba asked for information concerning the position of the town and its defences, 'Abd al-Malik gave him the exact details required, for which he received the admiration and the respect of the leader. This was followed

1. Ṭab., II, pp.397-8 (citing al-Zuhri); Khulafā', II, fol. 88a; Bidāya, VIII, p.212; E.L.2, (al-Ḥarraj). W. Muir says that 'Abd al-Malik accompanied his father Marwān in the negotiations with Ibn al-Zubair in this mission in Mecca; see The Caliphate, p.355 Beirut, 1963. However, it should be remarked here that there is no evidence that Marwān had taken direct part in these negotiations.

2. 'Uyun, I, p.277.

3. Sa'd, V, pp.166-7 (citing Waqīdī); Khaliṣa ibn Khayyāt, Tarīkh, I, p.228; Ansāb, V, pp.126-7 (citing Mādā'īnī); Ṭab., II, pp.405-6 (citing Abū Mikhnaf).

4. Sa'd, V, pp.166-7 (citing Waqīdī); Ṭab., II, pp.410-12 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Khulafā', II, fol. 89a; Kāmil, IV, pp.95-6; Fakhrī, p.112.
by the battle of al-Ḥarra, Dhul-Ḥajja 63/August 683, which ended in a complete defeat for the Medinese.

During the short Caliphate of his father Mūrwan, (64-65/683-684), 'Abd al-Malik held two offices, at least nominally. Al-Madāʾīnī says that he received the governorship of Palestine, but he remained in Damascus, and sent Rawḥ ibn Zūba' al-Judhamī as his deputy there. 1 In the year 65/684, when his father Mrawān left Damascus and went to wrest Egypt from the control of Ibn al-Zubair, 'Abd al-Malik was his deputy in the capital. 2 All these references to his early office-holding suggest that the choice of 'Abd al-Malik to succeed to the caliphate from among his brothers was because of his political ability and his knowledge of state-craft and provincial administration. His gradual advance in holding important posts at quite an early age, by caliphs other than his father, shows this political flair, and his later successes also bear witness to his abilities. During the reigns of Muʿawiya and his son Yazīd, stories about 'Abd al-Malik's likelihood of succession to the throne have been told to us. Most of these stories are either Umayyad propaganda or in the form of myths, found mainly in the late sources; in both cases, their authenticity is suspect. To mention but some, there is a story which makes al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufra predict 'Abd al-Malik's future as caliph because of his piety and family connections. 3

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1. Ansāb, V, pp.149-50.
2. Ibid., V, pp.148-49.
The Caliph 'Uthmān according to another account, is supposed to have put his head cloak (burnuṣ) over the boy's head, saying that he could see Abu'l-'Aṣ reborn in 'Abd al-Malik. Finally, the Caliph Yazīd is recorded as having prophesied that 'Abd al-Malik would be caliph.

In the same way, we also find in the sources statements and sayings telling of 'Abd al-Malik's ability and strong personality. In his list of men claimed by the Umayyads as rare in their "Rā'y" and "Tadbīr" (management), al-Jāḥiz included 'Abd al-Malik. Al-Madā'īnī says that though Muʿāwiya was the more flexible as a politician (ahlam), yet 'Abd al-Malik was the more resolute (ahzam). 'Abd al-Malik is also considered among the three statesmen of the Umayyad dynasty, together with Muʿāwiya and Hishām. However, the proof of 'Abd al-Malik's abilities is not to be found in these stories, but by examining his achievements in the political and administrative fields.

To turn now to 'Abd al-Malik's accession to the throne, one should go back to the circumstances of his father's succession, since these are crucial to an understanding both of 'Abd al-Malik's accession and of such later developments as the revolt of 'Amr ibn Saʿīd al-Ashdaq. Following the

1. Ansāb, V, p.140, (citing 'Awarw).
2. Ibid., XI, pp.161-2 (citing Mada'īnī); Futuḥ, p.35 (citing Mada'īnī); Murūj, V, pp.155-6.
4. 'īqd, IV, p.401.
death of Caliph Yazīd I, and according to the agreement reached at al-
Jābiya between the leaders of the Umayyad family and their supporters,
Marwān was proclaimed caliph on the condition that his successors would
be Khālid ibn Yazīd ibn Muṭawiyā and ‘Amr ibn Sa‘īd al-Ashdaq. 1 After
the battle of Marj Rāḥīṭ (64/683) between Marwān and the supporters of
Ibn al-Zubair, which ended with a complete defeat for the latter, Marwān
realised that he had gained his title by right of conquest. Consequently,
he planned to exclude Khālid and ‘Amr from the succession. Khālid was
as yet too young to be caliph, and Marwān further obstructed his chances
of succession by making a politic marriage with Khālid’s mother. 2 In the
same year he died, at the age of 63, having meanwhile nominated his son
‘Abd al-Malik to succeed him, with his second son ‘Abd al-‘Azīz next in
line of succession; this was in answer to the claims of ‘Amr ibn Sa‘īd that
he would be the next caliph, because of the agreement of al-Jābiya. 3 The
new succession was declared in the year 65/684, and was made effective by
the help of the Kalbite leader Ḥassān ibn Mālik ibn Bahdāl 4 and people paid

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homage to the nominees as such. It seems that Marwan had seen in this agreement the safest way to keep the caliphate in his line and to put an end to the rivalry of the many claimants to the throne among the Umayyads themselves.  

1. He had learned his lesson from what followed the death of Muawiya II.  

2. On the other hand, Amr ibn Sa'id found in it a breach of oath and — as we shall see — rebelled against 'Abd al-Malik.  

3. As for the date of 'Abd al-Malik's succession, it is almost unanimously given as Ramadan 65/April 685.  

4. His death has also been unanimously agreed on as occurring in Shawwal 86/October 705, so that he reigned for twenty one years.

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1. Ansāb, V, pp.149-50 (citing Madā'īnī); Ya'qūbī, II, p.306; Ṭab., II, p.576 (citing 'Awāna); Kāmil, IV, p.156.  
4. Sa'd, V, p.30; Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārikh, I, p.257; Ma'tarīf, p.155; Ansāb, V, p.159 (citing al-Haytham); Ya'qūbī, II, p.321; Ṭab., II, p.577; Ghurar, fol. 79; 'Iqd, IV, p.399; Bāṭīqī, VII, p.39; Mu'āwī, V, p.209; Kāmil, I, pp.48-9; Bad'ī, VI, p.26; Khulafā', II, fol. 97a; Kāmil, IV, p.158; 'Asākir, X, fol. 257; 'Ibrī, p.193; Fakhhrī, p.110; Mukhtasar, I, p.205; Bidāya, VIII, p.260; 'Ināfa', I, p.127; Dhahabī, p.27; Shadharātī, I, p.73. However, Dinawarī mentions the year 66, (Akhbār, p.294); Baladhurī gives Rabī'il (Ansāb, XI, p.151); Ma'sūdī gives Rajab (Tanbih, p.372).  
5. Sa'd, V, pp.174-5 (citing Wāqidi); Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārikh, I, p.293; Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam, op. cit., p.86; Ma'tarīf, p.155; Ansāb, XI, pp.152-264; Dinawarī, p.328; Ya'qūbī, II, p.335; Ṭab., II, p.1172; (citing Wāqidi and Abu Ma'shar), 1173 (citing Madā'īnī); Ghurar, fols. 79-80; 'Iqd, IV, p.420; Tanbih, p.316; Mu'āwī, V, p.210; Kāmil, I, p.58; Bad'ī, VI, p.27; Khulafā', fol. 97b; 'Asākir, X, fols. 257a, 266a; Kāmil, IV, p.411; 'Ibrī, p.194; Mukhtasar, I, p.209; Dhahabī, III, p.236; Bidāya, IX, pp.68-9; 'Ibar, III, p.128; 'Ināfa', I, p.128; Tahdhib, VI, p.423; Suyūtī, p.144; Shadharātī, I, p.97.
It is generally accepted that 'Abd al-Malik during his early life was very pious, indulged little in pleasure, and showed a deep interest in religious studies. In Medina where he was born and reared, there were two intellectual climates. The first was that of Qur'anic study, and more especially, study of the Hadith. The second was the field of poetry, songs and music. He chose the former and thus was educated in a religious atmosphere. Although there is much evidence and information of 'Abd al-Malik's early piety, leaving no doubt that he did display great interest in religion, yet here again one should be aware of myths or propaganda. An example of such is the account in Khalifa ibn Khayyat's Tārikh, on the authority of al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra, (first Zubairid and then Umayyad sympathiser), which depicts 'Abd al-Malik as one of the Qurraʾ (Readers of the Qurʾān). Another is the account of Abu'l-Yaqdan reported by Balādhurī, which says that 'Abd al-Malik took great pains to be sure that the money on his privy purse, used for paying the dowries of his wives, did not come from any corrupt practices or unjust extortion. More reliable seems the account of Ibn Saʿd, that 'Abd al-Malik used to sit with theologians and men of religion who taught him the tradition of the Prophet, though he paid little attention to narrating what he learnt.

1. I, p. 258.
The author of *al-Imāma wa'l Siyāsa* states that 'Abd al-Malik was known to have been truthful, of good reputation, and knowledgeable and strict in his religion. Waqidi regards him as a Muhaddith (Traditionist), on the authority of 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān, Abū Hurairā and Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī. We are also told that prior to his caliphate he was so involved in praying and reciting the Qur'ān in the Mosque of Medina, that he was nicknamed "the pigeon of the mosque" (Ḥamāmat al-Masjid). It is also reported that, because of his piety and scrupulousness, 'Abd al-Malik did not accompany his father in the battle of Marj Rāhīt 64/683. This account is attested by the fact that we do not hear any account of him in this battle, while the name of his brother 'Abd al-'Azīz is occasionally reported. It is against this religious background that one might proceed to examine 'Abd al-Malik's policies after he became caliph.

As is the case with almost all the able and efficient caliphs, the hostile sources tend to under-emphasise 'Abd al-Malik's significant achievements and stress any minor events that they can use to discredit him.

3. Ibid., XI, p.163; 'Iqd, II, p.350; Khulafāʾ, II, fol. 97a; Fakhrī, p.110; Nuwairī, IV, p.115.
He was accused of being a mean, treacherous and blood-thirsty person. Given the fact that his religious background and early piety was well established, no wonder therefore that the sources tried to depict him as having a complete change of face after becoming a caliph, turning his back on his early religious way of life. Modern scholars, such as Wellhausen for example, accept this interpretation; and Wellhausen says "certainly from that time onwards, he subordinated everything to policy..."¹

It is true that 'Abd al-Malik at times was forced to act according to the political situation in which he found himself, and this sometimes seems to conflict with his previous religious ideals, but this must not be overstressed. I shall try here to examine how far 'Abd al-Malik's actions during his caliphate were coloured by his religious background and his continuing religious faith.

A crucial point to be discussed is the siege of Mecca and the storming of al-Ka'ba, because these were used most to discredit him—especially since 'Abd al-Malik himself had previously been so shocked when Mecca was besieged and the Ka'ba was stormed under an earlier caliph.²

2. Sa'd, V, p. 167; Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh I, p. 224; Ansāb, V, p. 360 (citing Wāqidī); XI, p. 43 (citing Wāqidī); p. 164 (citing Madā'inī); Kāmil, IV, p. 95; Fakhrit, p. 110; Suyūtī, p. 145.
There is no doubt that the storming of al-Ka‘ba did take place and that ‘Abd al-Malik did consent to it, but it seems this can still be reconciled to his religious beliefs. Firstly, there is evidence that he was extremely unwilling to send an army to the holy places of Mecca and Medīna. It is reported\(^1\) that when al-Hajjāj ibn Yūsuf al-Thaqafi was dispatched by ‘Abd al-Malik at the head of a Syrian army against ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubair, he made al-Ta‘if and not Mecca his residence, on the caliph’s orders. Al-Baladhuri\(^2\) makes this point even clearer, stating that al-Hajjāj did not approach Medīna nor the road leading to it. He took the way of al-Rabadha on his way to al-Ta‘if. Tabarī says that al-Hajjāj went by the way of Iraq, deliberately avoiding Medīna and the Medīna road. This last piece of information is also repeated by Ibn al-Athīr.\(^4\)

It is also interesting to mention here what instructions ‘Abd al-Malik gave al-Hajjāj on sending him to al-Hijāz to fight ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubair.

According to Baladhuri and Ibn A‘tham,\(^5\) al-Haytham ibn al-Aswad

\(^1\) Imamā, II, p.24; Dīnawarī, p.319; Kūfī, II, fol. 52b; lqd, IX, p.414; Murūj, V, p.254.

\(^2\) Ansāb, V, p.357 (citing Waqidi); XI, p.38 (citing Waqidi).

\(^3\) Jab, II, p.829 (citing Waqidi).

\(^4\) Kāmil, IV, p.284.

al-Nakha'i previously came to 'Abd al-Malik and said, "O commander of the faithful, order this Thaqifite youth (Ghulām) to respect the Ka'ba, not to desecrate its sanctity, nor to touch a single stone of its sacred walls, nor to disturb even the birds that roost there; order him only to block the mountain passes (Shi'āb) and the tunnels (Anfāq) to Mecca, to isolate Ibn al-Zubair until either he dies of hunger or leaves Mecca dethroned".

'Abd al-Malik acted on this advice on his orders to al-Hajjāj, instructing him to avoid the shrine (al-Ḥaram) and to reside in al-Ṭā'if. These instructions show the respect the caliph had for the holy shrine.

This avoidance of the holy places by 'Abd al-Malik's armies has been interpreted as a tactical move, but this view is not borne out by the facts. For 'Abd al-Malik had already sent Tāriq ibn 'Amr and ordered him to station somewhere between Ayla and Wādi'l-Qura, with the instructions to check the activities of Ibn al-Zubair's governors, to protect the land lying between his camp and Syria, and finally, to cope with any situation that might develop. 1 Would it not be more advantageous, from the military point of view, for al-Hajjāj to join Tāriq ibn 'Amr, to re-inforce his army and use Medina as a base from which he could advance against Ibn-al-Zubair? This is almost exactly what happened later, when Tāriq ibn 'Amr was given the orders to enter Medina, to drive out the governor of

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Ibn al-Zubair and to advance from there towards Mecca to join Al-Hijāj.  

The question this provokes is, why 'Abd al-Malik gave such orders a year later when he was not prepared to do so earlier, when it was equally strategic for him to advance from Medīna on Mecca? Could the answer be that 'Abd al-Malik by this time was aware that 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair was exploiting the sanctity of the holy cities for political ends, banking on the fact that 'Abd al-Malik could not attack them without provoking Muslim reaction? And also 'Abd al-Malik realized that 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair's occupation of the holy shrine was threatening to divide the unity of Islam, since 'Abd al-Malik's supporters were prevented from performing pilgrimage, and even more fundamentally, since it is impossible to have two caliphs in Islam. In this light we can say that whereas religious motivations originally prevented 'Abd al-Malik from attacking Medīna or Mecca, eventually they very well have led him on to such an attack.

Turning now to the actual event of the storming of al-Ka'ba, religious motives can even here be traced in 'Abd al-Malik's action. Having reconciled himself to the political and religious necessity of besieging 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair's stronghold, it appears that, in giving his orders, to al-Hajjāj to storm the Ka'ba, he took into consideration that part of the building which was not in existence during the Prophet's lifetime, and

1. Sa'ād, V, p.169 (citing Wāqīdī); Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārikh, I, p.265; Ansāb, V, p.357 (citing Wāqīdī); Xī, p.42 (citing Wāqīdī); Qudārī, I, p.124; Šab., II, p.830 (citing Wāqīdī); Kamīl, IV, pp.284-5.
therefore not traditionally sacred, having been built by his rival Ibn al-
Zubair. Evidence supporting the view that 'Abd al-Malik respected the
original building appears in the account of the fourth century geographer
Muqaddisi, a native of Jerusalem. He reports that "When al-Ḥajjāj
came to Mecca, Ibn al-Zubair took refuge in the shrine (Ḥaram). Con-
sequently, al-Ḥajjāj ordered a catapult to be set up on the mount of Abū
Qubais, which was to storm only that additional part of the shrine which
Ibn al-Zubair had built. The men in charge of the catapult followed this
instruction and stormed that part of the building known as al-Ḥāfīn".
This same information we find in the book of another geographer, Yāqūt, who seems to have received it from Muqaddisi's book; but this, however,
does not reduce the importance of this report, even if it does not confirm
it.

It is very significant that immediately after 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair
was killed, 'Abd al-Malik ordered al-Ḥajjāj to tear down all the innovations
to al-Ka'ba built by Ibn al-Zubair, and to restore the original form of the
building as it stood in the lifetime of the Prophet.

1. Muqaddisi, pp.74-5.
3. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Ṭārīkh, I, p.268; Azraqī, I, p.137; Maʿārif,
p.156; Futūḥ, pp.26-7; Ansāb, XI, pp.67-8 (citing Wāqīāt); Dīnawarī, I, p.296, Yaʿqūbī, II, p.325; Hamadānī, p.20; Aʿlāq, p.30; Ṭabī, II, p.854; Kūn, II, fol. 55b; Murūj, V, pp.192-4; Muṣjam, IV, p.284; Kāmil, IV, p.296; Mirʾāt, VI, fol. 8a;
Mukhtasar, I, p.208; Dhahabi, II, p.365; III, p.115; Bidāya, IX, pp. 2-3; 'Ibar, III, pp.88-9; Muqadima, pp. 623-5.
The poet Jarîr wrote of this:— "You restored the house of God as it was at the time of the Prophet, you corrected what the sons of al-Zubair had corrupted." ¹

Another example of 'Abd al-Malik's care for religion is his action in building the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat al-Ṣakhra). There is no doubt that 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan was its builder, and the attempt to credit it to the 'Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mûn could not disguise this, since the date of erection escaped the alteration; it stands a firm witness to 'Abd al-Malik as its original builder.

According to a statement in Yaʿqûbî's Taʾrîkh, repeated by Satisfied ibn Batrîq, Ibn al-Jawzî and Ibn Kathîr,² the reason for the erection of the Dome of the Rock was 'Abd al-Malik's attempt to keep the Syrians at home in order not to be won by his political rival 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair in Mecca. The latter tried to utilize the obligation of pilgrimage to defame and slander 'Abd al-Malik and the Umayyads. When the people complained at being prevented from performing their religious duty, 'Abd al-Malik invoked the tradition which permits the pilgrimage to the Aqṣâ Mosque, on the authority of al-Zuhîrî. Goldziher ³ accepted this statement, and maintained that all the traditions, whether in favour or not, of

1. Naqqâd, I, p. 486. رجعت لبيتها لله وبهد نيه يو الاساس ما ما النذيب ولا
2. Yaʿqûbî, II, p. 311; Batrîq, VII, p. 39; Mirʾât, VI, fol. 1b; Bidâya, VIII, p. 280.
the religious importance of Jerusalem were no more than weapons in the
war between 'Abd al-Malik and his rival Ibn al-Zubair. Wellhausen
refers to the erection of the Dome of the Rock and says that 'Abd al-
Malik was trying to put Jerusalem in the place of Mecca, a plan he
abandoned as soon as he overcame his rival.¹ Hitti follows the same line
and accepts the view that the aim was to divert the pilgrimage from
Mecca to Jerusalem.² The critical study of Goitein has shown that
Ya'qubī's report is not trustworthy, because of his Shi'ite leanings; and
that the assertion that 'Abd al-Malik tried to divert the pilgrimage from
Mecca to Jerusalem is not supported by third century Muslim historians.³
Furthermore, as proved by J.W. Hirschberg, the traditions concerning
Jerusalem did not originate in 'Abd al-Malik's time, but went back to
an earlier date, since beliefs and legends of the sanctity of Jerusalem were
current among the inhabitants of Palestine and Syria.⁴ Al-Zuhri, on
whose authority 'Abd al-Malik is alleged to have invoked the tradition
permitting pilgrimage to Jerusalem, appears to have been at this time

1. op. cit., p. 214.
3. The Historical Background of the Erection of the Dome of the Rock, p. 104,
JAOS, 70, 1950, idem. Studies in Islamic History and Institutions,
4. The Sources of Muslim Traditions Concerning Jerusalem, p. 317, RO,
XVII, 1953.
very young and unknown to the caliph or to the inhabitants of Syria generally. 1

Since Syria was an ex-Byzantine province, there is no doubt that the Muslims there had seen the imperial Byzantine monuments, for example, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and possibly they were very highly impressed by them. Therefore, the erection of the Dome of the Rock can be interpreted as showing ‘Abd al-Malik's consideration for the feelings of his Syrian subjects and their wish to emulate, to the glory of Islam, the religious monuments they saw around them. 2 That the Dome of the Rock was inspired by religious motives appears to be confirmed by the fact that it continued to be one of the most exalted holy places in Islam after Mecca and Medina, even after ‘Abd al-Malik had overcome his political rival ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubair. In the light of this, it would seem unlikely that ‘Abd al-Malik would ever have thought of substituting Jerusalem for Mecca; since each of them has its special importance in the eyes of Muslims.

Another example of ‘Abd al-Malik trying to extend the glory of Islam through building in Syria is his attempt to add the Church of St. John


in Damascus to the mosque beside it. He failed to achieve this, but the attempt alone gave him the support of the pious men and increased his popularity.

We can also trace religious influence in some aspects of ‘Abd al-Malik’s foreign policy: as soon as he was secure enough at home to turn his attention to an aggressive foreign policy, he continued the previous struggle with the Byzantines, by waging the Jihad against the infidels almost every year. This served the double purpose of, on the one hand fulfilling the most important religious duty of the caliph in the eyes of Muslims and, on the other hand, keeping the Syrian army up to the mark through its continual experience of war.

Baladhuri informs us that ‘Abd al-Malik also wished his sons to be as interested in the Qur’ān and Traditions as he was himself; when he found the tradition of the campaigns of the Prophet in the form of a book in the hands of some of his sons, he ordered it to be burnt and advised his sons to read the Qur’ān, and to know the Sunna of the Prophet in order to act in accordance with it.

Other accounts as well as these show that contrary to his critics’ accusations, he did not lose his interest in religious studies and theological

questions on becoming caliph, nor did he lose contact with theologians and men of religion. He surrounded himself with a group of theologians including such men as Qabīsa ibn Dhu‘aiḥ, Urwa ibn al-Zubair, Raja‘ ibn Ḥaywa, al-Sha‘bī, and others. To those who were outside Damascus in Medina he continued to send handsome presents and gifts. He also carried on a correspondence with al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, a famous theologian of the time, about theological questions, such as free will and predestination. We are also told that in one of ‘Abd al-Malik’s performances of pilgrimage, he sent for the eldest Sheikh from Khuzā‘a, another Sheikh from Quraish and a third from Banū Tamīm, and ordered them to renew the "Anṣāb" of al-Ḥaram, following the practice of the Prophet and his companions, like the caliphs Umar I, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān and Mu‘āwiya I.

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1. Ṭab., I, p. 1104 (citing Waqīdī); p. 1180, 1284, 1634, 1770.
With such accounts, it is obvious that a fair examination of the facts does not reveal 'Abd al-Malik as turning his back on religion when he succeeded to the caliphate.

Other evidence which has been used to support the view of 'Abd al-Malik's volte-face on becoming caliph, are stories of his predilection for wine and songs. It is essential to note here that there is no single reference in the sources which can be taken as indicating that 'Abd al-Malik used to drink and listen to songs before he became caliph. On the other hand, several statements and stories suggest that he developed these habits during his caliphate; but these are contradictory and some of them unreliable.

In a conversation with the famous theologian of Medina, Sa'īd ibn al-Musaiyab, 'Abd al-Malik admitted that he drank wine after he became caliph. This same conversation has also been reported between the caliph and the famous woman theologian Um al-Dardā', whose circle 'Abd al-Malik used to attend even after becoming caliph. It is also reported in the Kitāb al-Aghānī that in talking to the Christian poet al-Akḥṭal, 'Abd al-Malik described the taste and effect of wine to discourage him from drinking it — does this suggest that 'Abd al-Malik knew of its effects from bitter experience —

1. Ansāb, XI, pp. 215-6 (citing Madā'īnī); Iqd, II, p. 351; Nuwairī, IV, p. 115.
2. Asakir, X, fol. 262b; Bidāya, IX, p. 66; Suyūṭī, p. 144.
as N.‘Akel says\(^1\) - or does it simply reflect what he had himself been told by religious teachers in discouraging him from taking wine?

There is evidence of another occasion when the caliph is said not only to have spoken against wine to the Christian poet, but also tried to convince him to give it up by tempting him with a large sum of money.\(^2\) On yet another occasion, he threatened al-Akhtal with the penalty of death, because he asked one of the Palace servants for wine to drink.\(^3\)

From these contradictory reports and statements it is difficult to give a final answer to the question whether ‘Abd al-Malik was a wine drinker or not. It would appear from his own confession, reported by al-Madā‘īnī\(^4\) that ‘Abd al-Malik had tasted wine, but there is no evidence to suggest that he ever made a habit of drinking, or that he drank to excess: for example, no sources mention drinking parties held by him or his drinking companions.\(^5\) It is also apparent from these accounts that if he did drink, he did so privately, while in public he went to great pains to discourage wine and to maintain an orthodox position.


\(^3\) *Agh.*, XI, p.294.

\(^4\) *Ansāb*, XI, pp.215-6.

\(^5\) It is reported in the *Kitāb al-Tāj*, (pp.151-2), that ‘Abd al-Malik used to drink once a month; but since there is no confirmation for this in other sources, it seems difficult to accept it.
Similar contradictory reports circulated about his attitude to songs and musicians. It is reported\(^1\) that on one occasion 'Abdaallah ibn Ja'far ibn Abī Tālib paid a visit to the caliph 'Abd al-Malik, who was at that time suffering from sciatica. To relieve him from this pain, Ibn Ja'far advised the caliph to invite somebody who was gifted in story-telling and literature to amuse him. The caliph refused this advice. The next day Ibn Ja'far came again to see the caliph accompanied by his mawla Budaiḥ the singer, saying that he was a physician. However, Budaiḥ did nothing but sing before the caliph who was so pleased that he rewarded him lavishly. That 'Abd al-Malik was known to disapprove of Ghīna\(^2\) can be seen clearly in the fact that 'Abdallah ibn Ja'far had to pretend that Budaiḥ was a physician and not a singer.\(^2\) But this is contradicted by another story told by al-Madā'īnī, who tells how 'Abd al-Malik once said: "I have never seen this bellied lute (Bufrūṭ) that everybody talks about". This remark provoked two responses in those hearing it:- one group said, "Yes that is true, but he does know the Ṭanbūr", and others said, "He is lying, he has not only seen the Barbuṭ, but he can even play it."\(^3\) Both of these imply that 'Abd al-Malik was fond of music and known by the people to be so.

\(^1\) Agh., XIV, p. 10; Mustadraf, II, p. 295.

\(^2\) 'Akel, op. cit., p. 311.

\(^3\) Ansāb, XI, p. 261.
Another story depicting 'Abd al-Malik as music-lover is from a less reliable source: a story found in the Kitāb al-Ağhānī tells how the fame of Ibn Misjah, a musician living in Mecca in the time of 'Abd al-Malik, spread so rapidly and he became so popular, that the strict Muslims complained to the governor that Ibn Misjah was seducing them by his profane art. When this complaint reached the caliph 'Abd al-Malik, he ordered that Ibn Misjah should be summoned to the capital. On his arrival there we read of him singing many different songs before the caliph. 'Abd al-Malik not only pardoned him but sent him back to Mecca with handsome presents. 1

Following this account of al-Ağhānī, Von Kromer, 2 who seemed to be greatly impressed by it, accepted it as true without trying to examine its reliability. As has been pointed out by N. 'Akel, 3 Duḥmān al-Aṣhqar, on whose authority this story was told, and who claimed to be the governor of Mecca for 'Abd al-Malik, was a "mawlā singer of the late Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid period, and was mentioned as late as the 'Abbāsid caliph al-Mahdī and al-Fadl ibn Yahyā the Barmakide in the eighth century A.D." Therefore, "he most probably was not born when 'Abd al-Malik's reign came to an end." 4

3. op. cit., p.254.
4. Ibid., pp.308-9.
In conclusion, as with the accounts of his wine drinking, it is
difficult to decide between such conflicting accounts, but if one accepts
the view that 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān was a music-lover (and al-
Madā'inī, who argues this, is the most reliable authority), one still finds
it hard to accept Farmer's account that 'Abd al-Malik was a patron of
musicians: "Both Ibn Misjah and Budaiḥ, the best known musicians of the time,
were patronized by him."¹ There is no reason to believe that 'Abd al-Malik
showed an inordinate interest in music, in a way to conflict with his religious
upbringing, or with his position as a sovereign of a Muslim State.

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CHAPTER II
THE 'ALID OPPOSITION
THE REVOLT OF AL-MUKHTAR IBN ABU 'UBAID AL-THAQAFI

One of the most important events of the first century of Islam was the revolt of al-Mukhtār ibn Abī 'Ubaid al-Thaqafi in Kūfa 66/685. It contributed to a large extent to the development of the Shiʿa as a sect and also had its significance in both the political and the social history of the Umayyad period and of Islam in general.

The early Arabic sources are remarkably rich in information about the revolt and the developments which followed it.Ṭabarī provides the fullest account; the narratives of Balādhurī and Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī are almost as full. It is worth mentioning here that these three historians all utilized the earlier histories of Abū Mikhnaf, Madaʿīnī, Ibn al-Kalbī, ʿAwāna ibn al-Ḥakam and Wāqīḍī.Ṭabarī relies almost entirely on the narrative of Abū Mikhnaf, whose importance lies in the fact that he uses the accounts of eye-witnesses such as Ḥamīd ibn Muslim al-Azdī, al-Ṣaḥībī and ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn Alīʾl-Kanūd. On the whole, Abū Mikhnaf, though at times showing an Iraqi (Kūfan) and Shiʿī sympathy, is generally accurate in his information and more reliable than other sources. In contrast, Ibn Aʿtham shows clear pro-ʿAlid sympathies and should therefore be read carefully; he provides us with a means of balancing the other sources. In some respects, such as the beginning of the revolt, he gives a more
detailed account than found elsewhere. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt in his Tārīkh which is very brief on the revolt, shows moderate Umayyad sympathies. Al-Dīnawarī, has his own distinctive approach: his accounts are at times confused and unconfirmed by early sources. He has a tendency to exaggerate: the numbers he gives for those in the armies, the participants in the revolt, and more especially the number of the mawālī, are considerably higher than any other source. On the other hand, some of his information is original. Al-Ya'qūbī’s very brief account of al-Mukhtar’s revolt reveals moderate pro-ʿAlid sympathies. Al-Mubarrad and Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih are both anti-Mukhtar in their writings. With the former, this may be due to Khārijite inclinations and the latter’s antipathy may spring from his close connection with the Umayyad court in Spain. Al-ʿIqd of Ibn Abd Rabbih is more important for its literary than historical qualities, and the information it contains on the social conditions of the mawālī should not be taken at its face value. Al-Masʿūdī’s Murūj reveals a pro-ʿAlid, and at times anti-Umayyad feeling, but on the other hand it provides us with some important dates which are lacking in the other sources. He shows clearly the connection between al-Mukhtar and Muhammad ibn al-Ḥanafīyya. The later historians, such as Ibn al-Athīr and Nuwairī, add little new material; they mostly re-edit and summarize the narratives in Baladhūrī and Tabarī. The Shiʿite biographers, such as Kashshī and Tūsī, provide valuable information about both the doctrine and the personalities of the Shiʿa. They provide a useful Shiʿī background to the
revolt, most useful since the history of al-Mukhtar has come down to us mostly from non-Shi'i sources. Even the eye-witnesses mentioned in Tabari were men who, although formerly allies of al-Mukhtar, deserted him and fought against him. The historical tradition to which we owe our information grew up in Kūfa, especially in the milieu of the Ashraf and therefore is anti-Mukhtar. ¹

Modern scholars differ in their views on al-Mukhtar and the nature of his revolt. Van Gelder ² considers him to be a man of remarkable abilities, but so unscrupulous that he would pursue any means to achieve his goal of seizing political power. Van Vloten ³ says that al-Mukhtar gained the support of the mawālī in Kūfa as a result of sponsoring their claim to equal share in the "Fai'" as the Arabs: this, however, led to a decline in the number of his 'Arab supporters. Wellhausen ⁴ regards al-Mukhtar as the first to work towards the removal of the social differences of his time. He admits that al-Mukhtar exploited the name of Ibn al-Hanafiyya but considers him (al-Mukhtar) as sincere in his ideas and not to be convicted of bad faith. Levi Della Vida ⁵ follows Wellhausen's

¹ E.I. (Al-Mukhtar).
² Muhtar de Falsche Profeet, pp. 142-3, Leiden, 1888.
³ Recherche Sur la Domination Arab, p. 15, Amsterdam, 1894.
⁴ Die Religios-Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, pp. 87-9 and 94-5, Berlin, 1901.
⁵ E.I. (Al-Mukhtar).
argument when he says that al-Mukhtar's exploitation of Ibn al-Hanafiyya's name, and his double-dealing with the Ashraf were "tactical expedients" necessary for the triumph of his cause; and not the product of bad faith. He adds that al-Mukhtar "sincerely believed in his mission and equalitarian ideas about the mawali..." Professor M. Hodgson ¹ regards al-Mukhtar as compromising the Shi'ite movement "with the toleration of such varied elements as 'Arab divination and equality for the mawali". S. Moscati ² considers that al-Mukhtar was an "inspired prophet", and saw the significance of his movement as lying in the more extremist religious cults arising at the time, introducing a new political element, that of the mawali, into the Shi'ite movement. Al-Kharbûtî ³ considers al-Mukhtar as an enthusiastic Shi'ite, and his movement as a real reflection of the social, political and religious conditions prevailing at the time. Finally, Dr. K.A. Fariq thinks that al-Mukhtar was an opportunist and a false prophet. ⁴ The following study is an attempt to a better understanding and assessment of al-Mukhtar's personality and his revolt.

Al-Mukhtar's father was Abu 'Ubaid Mas'udi ibn 'Amr ibn 'Umair ibn 'Awf from the tribe of Thaqîf. His mother was Dawma bint 'Amr ibn Wahb

¹ How Did The Early Shi'a Become Sectarian, p.3, JAOS, 75, 1955.
² Per Una Storia Dell'antica Si'a, pp.256-7, RSO, XXX, 1955.
⁴ The Story of an Arab Diplomat, p.121, SII, no.3, 1966.
ibn Munabbih, another Thaqifite. He was born in the first year of Hijra in Ta'if, 622 A.D. Little is known about his early life; the first important information is that when he was thirteen years old he accompanied his father, an army leader, in the battle of the Bridge. His father lost his life in this battle. Al-Mukhtar's uncle, Sa'd ibn Mas'ud al-Thaqafi, was governor of Madain for the Caliph 'Ali, and we find al-Mukhtar enjoying his uncle's confidence, being entrusted with two important tasks. The first was to act as deputy governor while his uncle left Madain in pursuit of a Kharijite group. The second occasion was when he was entrusted with a sum of money sent by his uncle Sa'd from Madain to the Caliph 'Ali in Kufa.

In his youth, spent in Medina after the death of his father, al-Mukhtar was known to be an 'Alid sympathizer and devoted to the Banu Hashim. Yet there is a story which depicts him as anti-Shi'i ('Uthmanii), based on the advice he gave to his uncle at the time when al-Hasan, son and heir of 'Ali, was carried wounded to Madain. The advice was that al-Hasan be handed over to Mu'awiya.


5. Asakir, XVI, fol.269b ('Abdallah ibn Rabia al-Makhzumii); Dahabi, II, p.380ff. (citing Ibn Sa'd & Waqid'i).
in order to win the latter's favour. His uncle refused this advice and cursed al-Mukhtar. This contradiction has been explained by historians in various ways. Wellhausen avoids the issue: he simply quotes the story without comment in a footnote, and follows it by another story depicting al-Mukhtar as a Shi'i sympathizer refusing to sign the accusation against Ḥujr ibn 'Adî al-Kindî. Dr. Fariq takes the view that al-Mukhtar was an opportunist and "sought to exploit the grave situation". Al-Kharbûly explains al-Mukhtar's advice by saying he was infuriated by al-Hasan's acceptance of a peaceful settlement with Mu'awiya. Historical tradition seems to be in favour of this last conclusion. It is reported by Abû Mîkhnâf and al-Zuhî that when al-Hasan received the homage of the people of Kûfa, he stipulated that they should make peace with whom he chose to have peace, and fight whom he chose to fight; this made them suspect that he was preparing to negotiate with Mu'awiya. These suspicions were confirmed when for two months al-Hasan neither mentioned war against Mu'awiya nor marched

4. op. cit., p.52.
5. Ansâb, fol. 222b (citing Abû Mîkhnâf & 'Awâna); Ṭab., II, p.5 (citing al-Zuhî); Bayâsî, fol. 31b (citing al-Zuhî).
against Syria. It is also reported by al-Balādhurī that al-Ḥasan was harshly criticised by his prominent Shīʿī followers for concluding a settlement with Muʿāwiya. His Shīʿī critics included al-Musayyab ibn Najba al-Fazarī, Sufyān ibn Layl al-Hamdānī, Ḥujr ibn ʿAdī and Sulaimān ibn Kathīr al-Khuzaʿī. Thus the advice given by Al-Mukhtar to his uncle might have been influenced by the same motives, and the realization that al-Ḥasan was not the man of the hour for the Shīʿa. Moreover, if al-Mukhtar intended in giving this advice to his uncle, to go over to the side of Muʿāwiya, he had his opportunity soon afterwards. The advice reached Muʿāwiya's ears and he would doubtless have welcomed al-Mukhtar as an ally; but al-Mukhtar did not defect, which makes it difficult to accept Fariq's conclusion.

Al-Mukhtar continued to show himself as a Shīʿī, or at least anti-Umayyad, until the end of his life. In 51/671, when Ziyād ibn Abīh, the governor of al-Ḵūfa for Muʿāwiya, accused Ḥujr ibn ʿAdī al-Kindī of having attempted to revolt against the caliph, he asked the Āshraf of al-Ḵūfa to sign the accusation as witnesses. While all were keen to do so to show their loyalty to the governor, al-Mukhtar did not commit himself in this affair, managing to

1. Ansāb, fol. 225a; Ṭab., II, p. 9; Imlāʾ, II, p. 64; Nihāya, I, p. 73; Siyār, p. 57.
avoid signing it. 1

Muslim ibn ‘Aqīl, sent by al-Ḥusain ibn ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib as his personal representative to the Shi‘a of Kūfah in 60/679, chose the house of al-Mukhtār as his residence. 2 As a result, al-Mukhtār’s house became the centre of Muslim’s and the Shi‘a’s activities, until the arrival of ‘Ubaidallah ibn Ziyād as governor of Kūfah for the Caliph Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiya. This choice of al-Mukhtār’s house shows that Muslim must have been sure of his attachment to the Shi‘a cause, or at very least, certain that he was anti-Umayyad. Another reason for the choice was that al-Mukhtār was the son-in-law of al-Nu‘mān ibn Bashīr al-Anṣārī, 3 who was still the governor of Kūfah, a fact which enabled the Shi‘a followers to act freely. Had al-Mukhtār really been a ‘Uthmānī, what better opportunity would he have had of jeopardizing the Shi‘a cause by betraying Muslim to the governor?

When Muslim ibn ‘Aqīl was forced to revolt prematurely in 60/679, al-Mukhtār was outside Kūfah in his estate in Khutrāniyya. Being informed of Muslim’s revolt, he hurried back to Kūfah at the head of his mawāli to support

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1. Ansāb, fol. 403a (citing Abū Mukhnaft); Ṭab., II, p.134 (citing Abū Mukhnaft); Aṣh., XVI, p.8 (citing Abū Mukhnaft).
3. Ansāb, fol. 155a; Dinawarī, p.247; Ṭab., II, p.264 (citing Abū Mukhnaft); Irshād, p.207.
him. He arrived too late to assist Muslim, deserted by his followers, and killed by the governor. He was, however, summoned to the governor's presence, and reproached for his implication in the revolt. When al-Mukhtar denied any part in it, the governor struck him in the eye with a stick, and sent him to prison. He remained there until after the battle of Karbala: 10th Muḥarram, 61/10th October, 680, when he was released by the intervention of his brother-in-law 'Abdallah ibn 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb; but he was ordered to leave the city within three days. 2

On the third day after his release, he left Kūfa for al-Ḥijāz; on his way there he met Ibn al-ʿIrq, a mawla of Thaqīf, who asked him what had happened to his eye. Al-Mukhtar told him that 'Ubaidallah ibn Ziyād struck it and swore that he would cut "his fingers, hands and limbs into pieces" as revenge. He confirmed this when Ibn al-ʿIrq doubted it, and then asked him about Ibn al-Zubair. He was told that "Ibn al-Zubair has taken refuge in the sanctity of al-Ḥaram (the shrine of al-Kaʿba)... People say that he receives homage secretly. He will come into the open as soon as he has gathered sufficient followers". Al-Mukhtar replied: "Ibn al-Zubair


is the man of the ‘Arabs; if he follows my plans and listens to my advice, I will be the man to take the responsibility of securing the people’s support for him. Otherwise, well, I am equal to any other ‘Arab. The time of troubles is about to begin; one day you will hear that al-Mukhtar and his followers are seeking revenge against those who slew al-Ḥusain and by God, I shall kill as many as were slain in vengeance of Yahya ibn Zakariyya.

These veiled hints are the first indication of his ambitions for the future. He must have realised that, after the fall of al-Ḥusain, Ibn al-Zubair had become the centre of opposition to the Umayyad rule, since there was no active ‘Alid claimant. This was presumably the reason why al-Mukhtar went to al-Ḥijāz, rather than elsewhere. It would seem that he turned to Ibn al-Zubair not so much for love of his cause, but for a common Umayyad antipathy, combined with his ambition to achieve an important post. His claim that he could secure the support of the people for Ibn al-Zubair was based on the increased anti-Umayyad feeling in Kūfa due to al-Ḥusain’s death: al-Mukhtar knew that this could easily be exploited for Ibn al-Zubair’s cause, or for his own use. To gain such popular support in Iraq (especially in Kūfa), it would be necessary to depict the cause as one of vengeance for al-Ḥusain: such revenge would need the sanction of an ‘Alid, especially ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusain, or Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya.

1. Ansāb, V, pp.215-6; Tab., II, p.524 (citing Abu Mīkhnaf); Kūfī, I, fols. 263a-263b. The name given here is al-Ṣu’qub ibn Zuhair and not Ibn al-‘Irāq.
The sources give accounts of correspondence between al-Mukhtar and both these 'Alid claimants. 'Ali ibn al-Ḥusain was more favourable for al-Mukhtar's purpose, since he was seeking to avenge his father's death. 'Ali at this time was a young man, about 24 years old, and was keeping aloof from politics, perhaps because of witnessing the massacre of his father and his family in the battle of Karbala' 10th Muḥarram, 61/10th October, 680. It was to Ibn al-Ḥanifiyya, however, that the eyes of the Shi'a were turned after the death of al-Ḥusain, for none of the 'Alids of the Fatimid line was of a suitable age. But he also was politically inactive and held strongly to the idea that a sovereign should be unanimously chosen. He showed unwillingness to accept the Caliphate on any other terms. 2 Al-Mukhtar wrote to 'Ali to show his loyalty to him, and asking if he could rally the Kūfans for him. He sent with the letter a large sum of money. 'Ali refused this offer and declared al-Mukhtar to be a liar who was trying to exploit the cause of "Ahl Al-Bait" for his own interests. 3

Having failed to gain the support of 'Ali ibn al-Ḥusain, al-Mukhtar turned to his uncle Muhammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya. Al Mukhtar sent him a letter similar to that he had sent to 'Ali ibn al-Ḥusain and also sent a sum of money.

2. Saʿd, V, pp.66-86.
3. Ansāb, V, p.272 (citing Ahmad ibn Ibrahīm); Murūj, V, p.172.
When news of this reached 'Ali ibn al-Ḥusain he urged his uncle not to accept al-Mukhtar's offer, and to declare him an impostor. The latter, before taking any decision, consulted 'Abdallah ibn 'Abbās, who advised him not to comply with 'Ali's advice, on the grounds that Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya did not know how he would fare with Ibn al-Zubair who had just been recognised as caliph in Mecca. ¹

Since no chronology is given, nor place names, for these two letters, it is impossible to be certain whether they took place before or after al-Mukhtar had arrived in Kūfa. However, judging from the fact that he sent with each letter a large sum of money, one might guess that they were sent after he had gained a source of income, that is, after seizing Kūfa. The fact that al-Mukhtar gained success in Kūfa by using the name of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya can be explained in the light of a meeting which had taken place between them before al-Mukhtar was left Mecca to go to Kūfa. On this occasion al-Mukhtar told Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya that he was going to avenge his relatives and acquire power for him. Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, however, gave al-Mukhtar only a non-committal reply: he neither approved nor disapproved of al-Mukhtar's intention to avenge al-Ḥusain, and only warned him against bloodshed. ² Al-Mukhtar took this attitude as consent, and exploited Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya's name for his own interest in Kūfa: but wishing to gain a more

¹ Ansāb, V, p. 218; Murūj, V, pp. 172-3.
² Ansāb, V, p. 218.
reliable 'Alid recognition, he contacted 'Ali Ibn al-Husain, only to be refused. He therefore wrote to Ibn al-Hanafiyya, but he never succeeded in gaining explicit recognition from him. In the event, the hesitation and political inactivity of Ibn al-Hanafiyya encouraged al-Mukhtar more and more to exploit his name for his own interest.

In Mecca al-Mukhtar went to Ibn al-Zubair who inquired about affairs in Kufa. After giving him full information about the situation there, al-Mukhtar offered his homage to Ibn al-Zubair and said, "Give me your hand and receive my homage, and try to meet my desires." Thus al-Mukhtar's homage was not given unconditionally: he was attempting to exploit Ibn al-Zubair's need for support in order to gain his own ends. But he over-estimated his need; Ibn al-Zubair refused his aid, angry at his indiscretion in speaking of such serious matters in public. Not finding in Mecca what he wanted, al-Mukhtar left for al-Ta'if, his native city, where he remained for a year.

The sources are all silent about his activities during this year in al-Ta'if. Van Gelder presumes that during this time he was in contact with Ibn al-Hanafiyya in Medina. Dr. K. Fariq says that "he made periodical visits to Mecca and Medina and met Ibn al-Hanafiyya and 'Ali Ibn al-Husain to read their minds and win their good-will." But there is no evidence to support either

1. Ansab, V, p. 216; Tab., II, pp. 525-6 (citing Abu Mikhnaif); Kufi, I, fol. 236b.
3. op. cit., p. 29.
of these views. Finally, al-Khabūṭī says that he wanted to escape from Ibn a-Zubair’s observation. It seems likely that al-Mukhtar was watching the political situation from al-Ta’if, and that during this retirement, the political and religious ideas later connected with his name began to take shape.

A year later, al-Mukhtar appeared suddenly in Mecca. By this time, Ibn al-Zubair had been publicly recognized as Caliph, but al-Mukhtar stayed aloof at first. It was through the mediation of ‘Abbas ibn Sahl that a meeting was arranged between the two. Al-Mukhtar paid homage to Ibn al-Zubair on the following conditions: that Ibn al-Zubair consult him in all his decisions, that he give him audience before everybody else, and award him a high post as soon as he had been unanimously recognized as Caliph. Ibn al-Zubair replied that he would receive al-Mukhtar’s homage only in accordance to the Book of God (Qur’an) and the Sunna of the Prophet. Al-Mukhtar refused to give homage on such terms, claiming that Ibn al-Zubair was not treating him with the distinction he deserved. Ibn al-Zubair, on ‘Abbas’ advice, accepted al-Mukhtar’s terms. These serve to demonstrate very clearly his political ambition and also confirm what he had already stated in his first meeting with

1. op. cit., p. 92.
3. Ansāb, V, pp. 216-7; Ṭab., II, p. 526ff. (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kūfī, I, fols. 237a-237b; Bad‘, VI, p. 15.
4. Ansāb, V, pp. 216-7; Ṭab., II, p. 526; Kūfī, I, fols. 237a-237b; Bad‘, VI, p. 15.
Ibn al-Zubair - and even before that, in his conversation with Ibn al-\'Irq. Why was Ibn al-Zubair now prepared to accept al-Mukhtar's terms after refusing them? The answer seems to be that Ibn al-Zubair, realizing al-Mukhtar's ambitions, decided not to risk creating trouble for himself in al-Hijaz or in Iraq by antagonizing him. It may also be that al-Mukhtar, by this time, had become an important man, whose political qualities were indispensable. Or it could have been due to political diplomacy, as a way of flattering 'Abdallah ibn 'Umar, a son-in-law of al-Mukhtar's, whose support Ibn al-Zubair greatly needed.

From this time until the death of Yazid I, 64/683, we find al-Mukhtar closely attached to Ibn al-Zubair. When Yazid I sent a Syrian army against Ibn al-Zubair 64/683, al-Mukhtar distinguished himself in fighting the Syrians and defending the Ka'ba. He remained in Hijaz until the withdrawal of the army at the death of the caliph Yazid in the same year.

Five months passed after the Syrians withdrew from Mecca and still al-Mukhtar waited for Ibn al-Zubair to give him the promised post (probably

1. See pp.72-73.
2. Ansāb, V, pp.195-7 (citing Maghārī); Agh., I, p.12; Sharḥ, I, p.326; XX, p.149 (quoting Agh.); Khurbūtī, op. cit., p.100.
3. Zubairī, p.269; Imāma, II, p.10 (citing Abū Maʿshar); Tab., II, pp.528-9. (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūfī, I, fol. 238b-239a, 239b, 243b; 'Iqd., IV, p.393 (citing Abū Maʿshar); Murūj, V, pp.165-6; Bad', VI, p.15; 'Asākir, XV, fol. 269b (citing 'Abdallah ibn Abī Rabī' a al-Makhzūmī). It is reported (Tab., II, p.529) that during the siege of al-Ka'ba by al-Ḥusayn =
the governorship of Kūfa), with no success. Therefore not prepared to trust Ibn al-Zubair any more, he made up his mind to go to Kūfa. In order to find out about the situation there, he kept asking everybody who came from Kūfa for news. He was informed that the people there had accepted the authority of Ibn al-Zubair, although a considerable number of them were waiting for a man who would rally them in support of their own cause, beyond the simple anti-Umayyad position of Ibn al-Zubair. If they could find such a leader, he could, with their support, rule the whole Islamic world. At this news, al-Mukhtar said, “I am Abū Ishaq. I am their man and no one else.” Therefore, he left Mecca for Kūfa, very cautiously, in order not to arouse the suspicions of Ibn al-Zubair who might prevent him from leaving and hamper his project. Contradicting this, it is reported that al-Mukhtar left Mecca for ibn Numair, al-Mukhtar was fighting with a group of Kharijite who came to Ibn al-Zubair to defend the Ka'ba. It is probably for this reason that he was called a Kharijite (Mubarrad, III, p.264). Dozy in his book Essai Sur L'Islamisme, p.223, Paris, 1879, refers to this, and depicts al-Mukhtar as being a Kharijite. The fact that al-Mukhtar fought with the Kharijites to defend al-Ka'ba does not make him a Kharijite; this becomes very clear when we consider the other elements who participated in the defence of the Ka'ba. In addition to the Kharijites there were the people of Mecca and Medina, and also an Abyssinian group headed by Ibn al-Zubair. If we consider al-Mukhtar a Kharijite on these grounds, we must also regard all these groups, including Ibn al-Zubair, as Kharijites too. The fact that the Kharijites deserted Ibn-al-Zubair, after the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Mecca, reveals the reason why they joined Ibn al-Zubair. Moreover when al-Mukhtar seized Kūfa we neither find him supporting the Kharijite nor being supported by them.

2. Ansāb, V, p.217; Ṭab., II, pp.530-532 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, I, fols. 257a, 257b, 258a.
Kūfa with the permission of Ibn al-Zubair and not on his own accord. He sent him there to rally the people of Kūfa and prepare them for war against the Syrians. This would seem to be unlikely, for if Ibn al-Zubair was confident of al-Mukhtar and ready to offer him such an important post, the latter would not have deserted him, but would continue to be on his side. Dr. K. A. Fariq gives two contradictory accounts, stating that Ibn al-Zubair did not trust al-Mukhtar, this being the reason why he did not give him a post; while at the same time he says that Ibn al-Zubair sent al-Mukhtar to Kūfa "to enlist the support of the Kūfans for the new caliph and rouse them to war against the Syrian army". As we have seen it was now that al-Mukhtar contacted Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya for the first time.

Al-Mukhtar reached Kūfa on Friday 15th Ramaḍān, 64/6th May, 664.

He entered the city passing deliberately through the quarters of the Shi'a, showing himself to be a precursor (Bāshīr) of a new era of prosperity. He saluted every one he met and promised them prosperity and success, inviting them to see him at his house that same evening. Then he went to the mosque and performed his prayer before going home. By announcing predictions of success and prosperity in such a vague way, al-Mukhtar tried to rally to

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2. See p. 75
3. Ṭab., II, p. 509.
himself as many of the Shi'a of Kufa as possible. Even those who were not thinking of associating themselves with him, for one reason or another, would have been curious to know what he had brought them, or for whom he was working, especially in such a troubled period.  

When the Shi'a assembled at al-Mukhtar's house that evening, they told him that the majority of the Shi'a had joined Sulaiman ibn Surad al-Khuza'i who was about to march against 'Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad, to stop his advance on Iraq, and to avenge al-Husain. Then al-Mukhtar, already well-informed about Sulaiman before arriving in Kufa, said that "he had been sent to them by the Mahdi (the rightly-guided one), the son of the Wasi (legatee) Muhammad ibn 'Ali, as his confidant (Amin), minister (Wazir) and officer (Amir), with orders to fight al-Mulhidun, to avenge the Mahdi's family and"

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1. It is reported in Ṭab., II, p.532, on the authority of Abu Mikhnaf, that when al-Mukhtar passed by the quarter of Banu Badda', he met 'Ubaida ibn 'Amr al-Badda' from the Kinda tribe. This man, beside being a brave warrior and a zealous partisan of 'Ali, was known also as a good poet, who indulged in wine to an excess. After saluting him al-Mukhtar conveyed to him the good news of prosperity and success and promised him God's pardon because of his love to 'Ali and his family. 'Ubaida, taking the most hopeful view of al-Mukhtar's announcement, asked for an explanation. But al-Mukhtar asked 'Ubaida to meet him with the other people of his quarter in al-Mukhtar's house that same evening. It seems that al-Mukhtar, realizing the importance of the poet to his cause, made this concession to 'Ubaida.
to defend the weak (Duʿafaʾ)". He also told the Shiʿa that "... Sulaimān is... too old, has had no experience in political matters or in wars."¹

By the weak he meant those who were socially weak, i.e. the slaves, the mawālī and some ʿArabs too, to whom his appeal was directed; perhaps it is for this reason that we find many ʿArabs joining him in his first revolt.

The jurists of later period classified the mawālī into three categories:

mawlā-Rāhīm, that is, a blood relation; mawlā-ʿAtāqa, that is, a freed man, who is often born free but enslaved in war, and through emancipation becomes a mawlā of his former master; finally mawlā al-ʿAqd, that is by kinship. The second and third kind are of interest to us in this study.²

Al-Mukhtar is credited with being the first to develop the idea of Mahdī as a religious Messiah.³ The idea of Mahdī which al-Mukhtar here emphasized, in talking of the weak, was directed at the socially deprived groups, who looked at Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya as their "Saviour", the one to establish a reign of justice. Al-Mukhtar was the first to understand, and to try to remedy, the existing distinctions in social, economic and political rights between ʿArabs


and mawāli. As for the question of whether Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya agreed to be called al-Mahdī, our sources, apart from the report of Ibn Saʿd, are silent. This report says that Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya had no objection to it, but he preferred to be called by his name Muḥammad or his "Kunya" Abuʾl Qāsim. It seems, therefore, that al-Mukhtar applied this title for Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya against the latter's will.

Al Mukhtar found in Sulaimān ibn ʿSurad a great rival, for he was the first to call vengeance for al-Ḥusain; and owing to Sulaimān's age and past, it was difficult for al-Mukhtar to gather the Shiʿa round himself. Nevertheless, he did not yield but carried on with his plans. He began to alienate the Shiʿa from Sulaimān by emphasizing his own mission from Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, and pointing out that Sulaimān was now old and without experience of war. "If they followed Sulaimān, he would kill them and himself." These tactics were successful and as a result, only four thousand out of the sixteen thousand men who paid homage to Sulaimān assembled in his camp prior to his march against Ibn Ziyād. Although both al-Mukhtar and

1. Wellhausen, Die Religions-Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p. 95.
3. Ansāb, V, p. 218; Ṣab., II, pp. 509-510 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Ibn al-Jauzī, Tadhkirat al-Khāwāṣ, p. 283. Sulaimān was an old companion of the Prophet, who after the death of the latter resided in Kūfa and became a champion of 'Alī, accompanying him in nearly all his wars. He was also an influential figure in the Khuzāʿa tribe. See Saʿd, IV, p. 30; Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Ṣabqāt, pp. 107 & 137; Māʿād, fol. 62b; Jamḥarāt, p. 226; Ṣabq, II, p. 359; Ṣabq, II, p. 253; Tahdhib, IV, pp. 200-201; Baghdādī, Tārikh Baghdād, I, p. 200ff.
4. Ansāb, V, p. 208; Ṣab., II, p. 539 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, fols. 256b-259a.
Sulaimān were claiming to avenge al-Ḥusain, yet they were working in
different directions. Because of a tribal relationship between Sulaimān's
followers and the Ashraf of Kūfa, he refused to seize Kūfa and kill those
who participated in the massacre of al-Ḥusain. He claimed that only
Ibn Ziyād and the Syrians were guilty of al-Ḥusain's slaughter. Al-
Mukhtar, on the other hand, was preparing to seize Kūfa, an important
factor in winning some of Sulaimān's supporters to his side.

Al-Mukhtar was, however, unwilling to take any violent action
against Sulaimān, for the majority of the Shi'a were with him. It was
impossible for him to risk arousing the antipathy of the Shi'a, if his scheme
was to be successful. To this one might add that al-Mukhtar was almost
sure of the failure of Sulaimān's movement and therefore left him to face his
end. These tactics paid off, for Sulaimān's failure led the Shi'a to re-
consider al-Mukhtar's offer of leadership, and eventually they turned
towards him.

On the 22nd of Ramadān 64/14th of May 684, only one week after
al-Mukhtar's arrival in Kūfa, 'Abdallāh ibn al-Zubair sent 'Abdallāh ibn
Yazīd al-Khaṭami as Governor to al-Kūfa. With him was Ibrāhīm ibn
Muḥammad ibn Ṭalḥa ibn 'Ubaidallāh, as collector of Kharaj. This however

1. Ansāb, V, p.209 (citing Abū Mīkhnaḥ); Ṭab., II, p.541 (citing Abū
Mīkhnaḥ).
2. Ansāb, V, p.207; Ṭab., II, p.509 (citing Abū Mīkhnaḥ); Kūfī, I,
fol. 258; Kāmil, IV, p.134.
was an unfortunate choice on the part of Ibn al-Zubair, for Ibrāhīm’s father and grandfather had been killed in the battle of the Camel, which made it extremely unlikely that there would be cordial relations between him and the Kūfans. Moreover, the relationship between the Governor and the Kharāj collector was also strained, and in both cases the situation could be exploited by al-Mukhtar.  

After Sulaimān’s departure, al-Mukhtar’s activities aroused the suspicions of the Ashrāf of al-Kūfa, most of whom had participated in the battle of Karbalāʾ, Muḥarram 61/October 680 against al-Ḥusain. They reported him to the governor to warn him against the movement, saying that it was more dangerous than that of Sulaimān; for al-Mukhtar wanted to revolt against the governor in his own city. Consequently, al-Mukhtar was seized and imprisoned, where he remained until the return of the remnant of Sulaimān ibn Ṣurad’s followers from the battle of ‘Ain al-Warda 63/685; Sulaimān had been killed in this battle.

During his imprisonment a committee of five, all of them Yemenites, were acting on his behalf and accepting homage for him.  

1. Ansāb, V, pp. 207-8; Tab., II, p. 515 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, pp. 134-5; Kharbūṭī, op. cit., 140.
3. They were: al-Ṣā‘īb ibn Mālik al-Asḥarī, Yazīd ibn Anas al-Asadi, Ahmar ibn Shumait al-‘Ahmasī, Rifa‘a ibn Shaddād al-Fityānī, and ʿAbdallāh ibn Shaddād al-Jumahī. It is very interesting to point out that all these leaders belong to the Yemenite Tribes alone. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāṭ, Ṣabaqāt, pp. 152-3; Nasab, fol. 58a; Ma‘ad, fol. 50b; Tab., II, p. 601; Jamharat, pp. 182 & 367.
himself was working actively from his confinement proclaiming in rhymed prose propaganda emphasizing that his aim was to kill every tyrant with the help of his followers, whom he called Anṣār (Helpers), in order to regain the unity of the Muslims and to avenge the apostles; and for this end he did not mind death or the loss of worldly glory. ¹ He also wrote to the routed followers of Sulaimān ibn Ṣurad, praising them for their efforts and wishing on them the mercy of God; he said that Sulaimān was not their man but he (al-Mukhtār) was the one sent to be their leader and asked them to be ready and hopeful. He summoned them to the "Book of God", the Sunna of the Prophet and the defence of the weak. ² He was fully aware of what the Shiʿa of his time wanted and he played with their sentiments accordingly, through these announcements.

Al-Mukhtār was released only after the request of his brother-in-law, ʿAbdallah ibn ʿUmar and on the guarantee of ten influential men; he gave a strong religious vow not to engage in any subversive activities against the governor and the collector of the Kharāj as long as they were in power. ³ However, al-Mukhtār was quite prepared to dishonour this vow for the realization of his cause — although in the event he did not need to

¹ Tab., II, p.536; Kāmil, IV, p.143.
² Ansāb, V, p.219; Tab., II, p.569 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, I, fol. 264a.
³ Ansāb, V, p.219; Tab., II, p.600 (citing Abū Mikhnaf).
do so - and laughed at the stupidity of the governor and his associate.

Meanwhile, ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubair, considering the danger of al-Mukhtar and his movement, appointed a new governor for al-Kufa, ‘Abdallah ibn Mut’ti, 27th Ramadan, 65/6th May, 685, and presumably ordered him to be more cautious and prudent than his predecessors.¹ The coming of the new governor enabled al-Mukhtar to act more freely since he has no commitments towards him.

In his first speech Ibn Mut’ti told the Kufans that he would adopt the policy of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab and ‘Uthman ibn Affan and warned them against disunity and creating troubles.² Here again Ibn al-Zubair was unfortunate in choosing this man for the governorship of al-Kufa, the centre of the Shi‘a movement at that time. His speech shows clearly his ignorance of both the political situation and the feelings of the Shi‘a towards ‘Umar and ‘Uthman and their financial policy. The Kufans were looking back to the days of the Caliph ‘Ali, where Kufa was the capital of the Islamic Empire and the place of the central treasury, and their Fai’ was distributed among them.³ No wonder, therefore, that the governor’s

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³ Tab., II, p.603 (citing Abu Mikhnaal); Wellhausen, Die Religions-
    Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p.76.
speech stirred up his audiences who opposed him openly and strongly, so that he was forced to announce at the end of the speech that he would adopt any policy to please them.  

This opposition to the new governor showed clearly the latter's weakness and the attitude of the Shī'a towards Ibn al-Zubair, and also how strong al-Mukhtar and his followers had become.

However, this strength of al-Mukhtar did not escape the shrewd eyes of I'yās ibn Muḍārib al-Ijīlī, who was at the head of the Shurta (police); he warned the governor by informing him that those who opposed him were the followers of al-Mukhtar. He also advised him to imprison al-Mukhtar, for news had come to him that the latter was planning to seize al-Kūfa. Consequently Ibn Mut'ī sent Zā'ida ibn Qudāma al-Thaqafī, a kinsman of al-Mukhtar, and Husain ibn 'Abdallah al-Bursumī from the tribe of Hamdān, to ask al-Mukhtar to come and meet the governor. Zā'ida ibn Qudāma, who was an intimate friend of al-Mukhtar and remained faithful to him even after his death, hinted to al-Mukhtar, by reciting a certain verse from the Qur'ān, not to go. Al-Mukhtar pretended that he was sick and asked the two men to inform the governor of this and apologise on his behalf.

1. Ansāb, V, p.221; Ṭab., II, p.604; Kūfī, I, fol. 264b.
2. Ṭab., II, p.604 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, I, fol. 264b.
3. Ṭab., II, p.604; Kūfī, I, fol. 264b.
At this time al-Mukhtar began to prepare to seize al-Kūfa in Muharram 66/August 685 and sent for his followers to gather in the houses around him. But as he was busy planning, a group of Shī'a among his followers began to suspect his claim of being sent to them by Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya and decided to go to Mecca to question the latter about the authenticity of al-Mukhtar's claim. Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya answered that he wished for God to take his revenge on his enemies, through whatever instrument He liked. 1 The delegation considered this vague and non-committal answer from Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya as permission from them to support al-Mukhtar, on the grounds that if Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya did not approve al-Mukhtar's activity he would have ordered them not to join him.

All this inquiry was taking place without the knowledge of al-Mukhtar. When he learnt of it, he became very worried, fearing that Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya might have given them a reply which would be injurious to his plans. He therefore wished to revolt before the coming of the delegation but was not able to. 2

After a month the delegation came back and told al-Mukhtar that Ibn

1. Ansāb, V, p.222; Yaʾqūbī, II, p.308; Taβ., II, pp.305-6 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūfī, I, fols 265a-265b. The delegation were: 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Shurayh al-Shibāmī, Saʿīd ibn Mungidh al-Thawrī, Siʿr ibn Abī Siʿr al-Ḥanafiyya, al-Aswad ibn Jarād al-Kindī and Qūdāma ibn Mālik al-Jushāmī. Here again all of them were Yemenites.

2. Tab., II, p.608 (citing Abū Mikhnaft).
Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya ordered them to support him. Al-Mukhtar, in relief, summoned the Shi'a for a general meeting at which he announced the approval of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya of his mission. This was confirmed by the head of the delegation and his companions, who delivered speeches on this occasion.  

It cannot be doubted that the favourable reply of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya brought by the delegation enhanced al-Mukhtar's prestige and increased his followers. For it encouraged those who were in doubt of al-Mukhtar's claims to be an agent of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya to come to his camp, or at least to sympathise with him. The celebrated traditionist al-Sha'bi and his father Shurahbil were among those hesitators who responded to al-Mukhtar after this event.  

In order to face the governor Ibn Mut)i and the Ashraf of Kuša, al-Mukhtar had to win the support of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar. The latter was the son of Malik ibn al-Harith al-Ashtar, one of the noblemen of the tribe of al-Nakha from Madhhiij, and a great supporter of ʿAli. Like his father, Ibrahim was a man of great influence among his tribe's members. He was with his father on ʿAli's side in the battle of Šiffin and remained faithful to ʿAli and his family. It is not easy to account for the failure of Ibrahim to

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1. Ansab, V, pp.211-2; Ţab., II, pp.608-609 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfi, I, fol. 265b.

2. Ţab., II, p.609 (citing al-Sha'bi); Kūfi, I, fol. 265b.
associate himself with Sulaimān ibn Ṣurad’s movement or with that of al-Mukhtar at the beginning. Wellhausen suggests that Ibrāhīm “did not believe in Shi’ism as it was at that time.” It is probably because Ibrāhīm did not trust either leader and considered himself at least their equal, if not more competent than both. This view is confirmed by the answer he gave to the followers of al-Mukhtar when they asked him to join the latter’s movement. Al-Mukhtar had sent to him notables of the Shi‘a and influential men among his followers, among whom was the famous al-Sha‘bī and his father. When they asked Ibrāhīm to join them he agreed only if they would place the leadership in his hands. The delegation considered this an impossible demand, since al-Mukhtar had been sent to them by al-Mahdī. But al-Mukhtar, hearing of Ibrāhīm’s terms, wished to make a compromise with him, and could only do so, given his followers’ belief in his mission, in an indirect way. After only three days, he and some of his followers went to Ibrāhīm, bearing a letter purporting to be from Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya to Ibrāhīm. In the letter Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, calling himself al-Mahdī, asked Ibrāhīm to recognize al-Mukhtar and support him. In return, besides God’s reward, Ibrāhīm would have the command of the cavalry

2. *Ansāb*, V, p.222; Dinawari, p.296; Ṭab., II, p.609 (citing Al-Sha‘bī); Kūfī, I, fol. 266a.
and invading armies, and all the lands lying between Kūfa and Syria, which would be conquered by him. If he did not comply with this letter, he would meet a terrible fate. 1

Ibn Sa’d and Dinawari 2, however, give a somewhat different version of this event. They mention only one meeting, in which the letter was presented by al-Mukhtar to Ibrāhīm. Dīnawarī inserts here that the lead seal of the letter was new, as if it had been sealed the night before. They also write that all those with al-Mukhtar bore witness to Ibrāhīm that they saw Ibn al-Hanafiyya writing the letter; and the latter accepted it without any objection. Moreover, in the version of al-Dīnawarī, the beginning of the letter makes no mention of the title Mahḍī. It seems that the detailed accounts of Tabarī and Ibn A’tham 3 are taken from Baladhurī, the more accurate version, since it is more likely that al-Mukhtar would not have written any letter to Ibrāhīm had the latter not refused the first time.

There are many reasons to make us doubt the authenticity of this letter, although Wellhausen 4 has accepted it as genuine. Firstly, there is the offer which Ibn al-Hanafiyya made to Ibrāhīm, giving almost the same terms

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1. Ansāb, V, pp.222-3; Ṭabarī, II, pp.610-11; Kūfī, I, fols. 266a-266b.
2. Sa’d, V, pp.72-3; Dīnawarī, pp.296-7 (citing al-Sha‘bī).
as Ibrahim had demanded for his support to al-Mukhtar. Another factor is the brief span of time which lapsed between the first meeting with Ibrahim and al-Mukhtar’s presentation of the letter. Moreover, the wording of the letter itself was suspicious even to Ibrahim, who asked al-Mukhtar for an explanation; he also made al-Sha‘bi approve the witnesses’ claim that the letter was written by Ibn al-Hanafiyya. The witnesses and al-Mukhtar’s explanation satisfied Ibrahim, and he placed his services in the hands of al-Mukhtar, by attending meetings in the latter’s house.

Al-Mubarrad says that before giving his support to al-Mukhtar Ibrahim wrote to Ibn al-Hanafiyya for his approval, and the latter – as usual – answered him in a vague way, which Ibrahim interpreted as

1. Ansab, V, p.223 (citing al-Sha‘bi); Tab., II, pp.611-12 (citing al-Sha‘bi); Kufi, I, fols. 266a-267b. Dinawari (pp.297-98) reports that al-Sha‘bi wanted to make sure whether the evidence given by witnesses was right or not, and he therefore asked them one by one; they all confirmed that they saw Ibn al-Hanafiyya write the letter. Unsatisfied with this, he went to Abu ’Amra Kaisan. On asking him the same question, he said that he did not see Ibn al-Hanafiyya writing the letter, but they believed al-Mukhtar to be trustworthy. At this, the story says, al-Sha‘bi became sure that the letter was fabricated by al-Mukhtar, and therefore left Kufa for Hijaz, and did not take part in the wars of al-Mukhtar. However, the fact that al-Sha‘bi did not leave Kufa, but remained there until the end of al-Mukhtar, makes us doubt the story, which W. Rajkowski, (Early Shi‘ism in Iraq, p.174, Ph.D. Thesis, London, 1955), accepted as true; while K. Fariq accepted the first part of the story only. See The Story of an Arab Diplomat, p.77, II, III, no.2, 1966.

permission to join al-Mukhtar. It seems difficult to accept this account since it is not confirmed in either the early or the late sources. Moreover, the answer which Ibn al-Hanafiyya is said to have written to Ibrahim is the same as that he gave to the Kufan delegation when they inquired about al-Mukhtar's claim, to represent him, which makes us think that al-Mubarrad had confused the two events.

The date of the revolt had been decided by al-Mukhtar and his followers, as being Thursday 14th Rabii' al-Awwal, 66/Tuesday 19th October 685. Al-Mukhtar's preparations for the revolt again did not escape the eyes of Iyās ibn Mudārib, the police officer of the governor Ibn Muṭṭi', but it seems he did not know the exact date. He advised the governor to send a reliable man to every "Jabbāna" in Kūfah to secure the city; he sent his own son Rāshid ibn Iyās to al-Kūnās, the Hamdān Jabbānāt al-Sūbai', Khath'am Jabbānāt Bishr, Kinda their own Jabbānā, Al-Azd Jabbānāt al-Sā'idiyyīn, Murād their own Jabbānā, Shamir ibn dhul Jawshan Jabbant Salīm and Shabath ibn Rabī' to al-Sabkha. It is only Madhhij and Asad who did not join the forces of the governor; the former, perhaps, because of Ibn al-Ashtar,

1. Ansāb, V, p.223; Tab., II, p.613 (citing Abū Mikhnaif); Kufī, I, fol. 267a; Kāmil, IV, p.178.
while being in the same "Khums" with Madhhij led Asad to take the same position. All these measures were taken on Monday, three days before the exact date of the revolt.

On Tuesday evening 12th Rabi'

الآوَال, 66/17th October, 685, Ibrahim, accompanied by about a hundred of his followers hiding their weapons went, as usual, to al-Mukhtar's house. He made no attempt to avoid the governor's forces, perhaps to show off his bravery. On his way there he met lyas ibn Mu'darib with the Shurta, who tried to prevent him from passing and demanded his surrender to the governor. Ibrahim answered this by killing the police officer, lyas, and his police followers were dispersed. Ibrahim continued to march towards al-Mukhtar's house. There he reported the death to al-Mukhtar and showed him the head of lyas; al-Mukhtar was pleased to hear of it. But this action caused him to declare the revolt one day earlier than planned. Al-Mukhtar informed his followers that the revolt was already starting, by ordering a fire to be lit in the reeds, and by the shouting of the slogan: "Ya Mansur Amit", (يا منصور أمي) and "Ya Li Tharat al-Husain". The fact that al-Mukhtar used as his war-cry "Ya Mansur Amit" is not without significance. Al-Mansur is a messiah awaited by the Yemenites to restore

their power. Since the Yemenites were the dominant element among the supporters of al-Mukhtar, this war-cry was therefore an appeal to their messianic aspirations.

The death of Iyās ibn Mūdārib aroused the Rabī' a tribe and they threatened to avenge him by killing Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ashtar. But it would appear from the verses of Surāqā ibn Mirdās, that the Yemenite tribes were strong enough to protect him.

Al-Mukhtar tried to cause as little blood-shed as possible. This strategy can be seen clearly in his instructions to Ibrāhīm. He ordered him to try his best to bypass the governor's forces, and to fight only when he was attacked. On Wednesday morning 13th Rabi' al-Awwal, 66/18th October, 685, al-Mukhtar with his followers were stationed near "Dair Hind" in the Sabkha. His army contained about five hundred mawālii under their own Amir.

To counter him the governor sent Shabath ibn Rabī' al-Tamīmi with three thousand men to al-Sabkha, and Rāshid ibn Iyās with four thousand

1. Shams, p. 103; Al-Hamdānī, Ikīl, VIII, p. 58.
3. Diwan, pp. 82-3; Ansāb, V, 267 (citing Mada'inī).
5. Ibid., II, pp. 622 & 627 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 3b.
from the Şurţa to Jabbānat Murād. Consequently al-Mukhtar sent İbrahim with nine hundred men to meet Rāshid, Nuʿaim ibn Hubaira with three hundred cavalry men and six hundred infantry against Shabath, and Yazīd ibn Anas with nine hundred men as his vanguard. Shabath's troops began to retreat in front of al-Mukhtar's forces. In order to incite them Shabath shouted "... Why are you fleeing from your slaves?" Hearing this, the soldiers came back and fought hard against the mawālī who were in the army of al-Mukhtar. They put to death any of the mawālī whom they captured while they allowed the 'Arab captives to flee, and therefore al-Mukhtar's army found itself in a difficult position. At this time the governor sent re-enforcements, two thousand under Yazīd ibn al-Ḥārith ibn Rūwaim. Al-Mukhtar's cavalry was under Yazīd ibn Anas, while he himself was leading the infantry.

Meanwhile, İbrahim had defeated Rāshid ibn Iyās and killed him, and then came to the help of al-Mukhtar. This had the effect of encouraging the followers of al-Mukhtar and discouraged those of Shabath. Then the Governor sent Ḥassān ibn Fāʾid ibn Bakr al-Ābsī with about two thousand men to help his troops in preventing İbrahim from reaching al-Mukhtar. But Ḥassān was defeated and İbrahim continued his march. As soon as İbrahim appeared, Shabath's troops began to retreat until they reached ibn Mūṭī', who was in despair after receiving the news of the death of Rāshid ibn Iyās.

1. Tab., II, p.623 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 3b.

2. Tab., II, p.623; Kūfī, II, fol. 3b.
Then the defeated forces gathered again in the Kunāṣa, but were again
defeated by Ibn-Mūta‘ī. The governor and the Aṣhrāf fled to the palace where
they were besieged for three days. On the evening of the third day, Ibn-
Mūta‘ī left the palace and went to the house of Abū Mūsā, al-Ash‘ārī, where
he hid himself, while the Aṣhrāf asked Ibn-Mūta‘ī for “Aman”. They were
granted it and submitted themselves to al-Mukhtar.

Al-Mukhtar spent the night in the palace and next morning ascended
the minbar in the mosque where he delivered a speech, after which he received
the "bai‘ā" from the Aṣhrāf and the others. This "bai‘ā" was based on the Book
of God (Qur‘ān) and the Sunna of the prophet; the revenge of "Ahl al-Bait";
war against "al-Muḥillin" (those who regard the blood of the Prophet's family
as licit, i.e. the Umayyads and their supporters); the defence of the weak;
the war with those who sought war with him, and peace with those who sought
peace with him. 2

Kūfa was a suitable place for a revolt at this time. Its population was
a mixture of different elements: ‘Arabs, mainly from South Arabia, Persians,
Syrians, Nabateans, Christians and Jews. 3 The ‘Arabs also differed among
themselves. While the Tamīm and Ṭay were Beduins, Rābi‘a (Bakr and Asad)
were semi-Beduin and Christian-influenced, while ‘Abd al-Qais were Persian

1. Ansāb, V, pp.226-28; Ṭab., II, pp.625-31 (citing Abū MīkhnaF); Kūfī, II, fols. 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, 5a, 5b and 6a.
2. Ansāb, V, p.228; Ṭab., II, p.633; Kūfī, II, fol. 5b.
influenced. To these differences in culture must be added the differences in creeds. No wonder, therefore, that the population of Kūfa was turbulent, dissatisfied and opposed to the Government and the Ashraf. 2

As for the nature of the support which al-Mukhtar received in Kūfa, at this stage of his revolt it was mainly from the 'Arabs. Members from nearly all the 'Arab tribes of al-Kūfa participated in it. Members of al-Nakha', Hamdān, Banū Nahd, Shākir, Khatṭām, Shībān, Asad, Ḥanīfa, Abī, Wāliba of al-Azd, Muzaina, Bakr and Āḥmas, 3 are said to have been his supporters.

This major 'Arab support was due not only to their Shi'a sentiment but also to their opposition to the Ashraf. It was only a small number of the mawāli who joined al-Mukhtar at this time, only five hundred. 4 This small number of mawāli supporters may have been due to the strong hold of their masters, the Ashraf, upon them. This becomes clear when we consider that their support to al-Mukhtar grew rapidly after the seizure of al-Kūfa and the "bai'a" of the Ashraf. Moreover, they were doubtless encouraged by his success in gaining power. It is not true, though, as Brocklemann 5 has said, that this victory in

3. Ansāb, V, p. 227; Ṭab., II, p. 619ff; Kūfī, II, fols. 2a-5b.
4. Tab., II, p. 627. Their number at this time in Kufa was forty thousand. See Dīnawarī, p. 307.
Kūfa represents the victory of the Persians over the 'Arabs. Even in the later stages of the revolt, al-Mukhtar did not defend the mawāli because they were Persians, but because they had many social grievances (Duʿafāʾ) which al-Mukhtar could rectify to gain their support for his own ends.

Since he took hold of al-Kūfa he tried to reconcile all parties and show justice and peace to everyone. To Ibn Muṭṭiʿ, who was hiding himself, al-Mukhtar sent one hundred thousand dirhams and asked him to leave Kūfa. ¹ This however may have been due to the fact that he was a relative of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, whose son ʿAbdullah was married to Ṣafya, the sister of al-Mukhtar. It is probably to gain the moral support of his brother-in-law, or at least his silence, that al-Mukhtar sent expensive gifts to Ibn ʿUmar. It may be added that Ibn Muṭṭiʿ and al-Mukhtar had been friends during the time that al-Mukhtar was in al-Hijāz.

In the treasury of Kūfa he found nine million dirhams. He gave those who took part in the seizure of the palace five hundred each: they were three thousand, eight hundred men. For six thousand who joined him later, he gave two hundred each. ²

In his attempt to show toleration to all parties, he did not allow his

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1. Ansāb, V, p.228; Dinawarī, p.299; Yaʿqūbī, II, p.308; Ṭab., II, p.633 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 6a (he makes it ten thousand only).
followers to kill anyone. He tried his best to make himself popular to the Ashraf by offering them the most important posts. He appointed 'Abdallāh ibn Kāmil al-Shākirī, as a police officer (ʿAlāʾ Shurtathī), Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar ibn ʿUṯārīd he appointed as governor of Adhrbijān; ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn Saʿīd ibn Qais, governor of Mūṣīl; ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn Saʿīd ibn Masʿūd governor of al-Madāʾin and Jūkī, Qudāma ibn Abī ʿĪsā ibn Rabiʿa al-Naṣrī, a confederate of Thaqīf—governor of Bihqubāḏh al-ʿĀlā; Saʿīd ibn Hudhaifa ibn al-Yamān, governor of Ḥalwān; Ḥabīb ibn Munqidh al-Thawrī, governor of Bihqubāḏh al-Asfal, and Yazīd ibn Najba al-Fazārī, governor of Rāy and Dastihtī. He also gave the Ashraf pre-eminence in his court and even asked Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿath to work as a judge for him.

1. Al-Mundhūr ibn Ḥassān al-Ḍabbī after paying homage to al-Mukhtar, was killed with his son by one of al-Mukhtar's enthusiastic followers on the grounds that he was one of the Jabbarīn (tyrants). When al-Mukhtar heard of this, he very strongly opposed it. See Ansāb, V, p. 228; Tāb., II, p. 633 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).

2. This, however, either did not take place or was of a short duration, for we see him on the 22nd Dhul Ḥajja, 66/20th. July, 686, on the "Rubāʿi" of Hamdān in the army of ʿIbrāhīm ibn al-ʿAshṭār, who went to fight Ibn Ziyād.

3. Ansāb, V, p. 228; Dinawari, p. 300; Tāb., II, p. 634-35. However, the list of Dinawari differs from that of Tābarī in these respects: he gives the governorship of Arjān to Muḥammad ibn ʿUṭhman al-Tamīmī, and makes ʿAbdallāh ibn al-Ḥarīth the governor of Māhin and Hamadān. He mentions the name of ʿIbn Mālik al-Bakrawī as the governor of Ḥalwān and Masbādān, and Zaḥr ibn Qais as the governor of Jūkī.


5. Ansāb, V, p. 229.
Nevertheless, al-Mukhtar also worked to defend the weak, as he had stated in his "baita". According to Islam all Muslims are equal regardless of their nationality or race. In practice, in this period the 'Arabs did not allow the non-'Arab Muslims the rights which Islam granted them. The 'Arabs monopolized the high posts in society, such as the offices of judge, or of leadership in the army or in prayer. They considered only the army and commerce as fit professions for themselves; the mawāli, on the other hand, were mainly engaged in manual labour, in agriculture or industry. Although the mawāli were used as infantry in the army, they were not enrolled on the register (Dīwān), and therefore not usually paid. Even when they were paid, it was at a rate far below that of their 'Arab masters. The social inferiority of the mawāli was regularized by the custom that they should not be addressed by a "Kunya", but by their own name or "Laqab", with a few exceptions. Neither were they allowed to marry 'Arab women, and the children of an 'Arab man and a mawala woman did not receive an equal inheritance to that of the pure-'Arab children; according to the principle of "Kafa'a" the 'Arabs were equal only to the 'Arab

4. 'Iqd, III, p. 413.
and the mawālī to the mawālī. The mawālī must ask their patron's consent before choosing a wife. The exemption from the ‘Aṭā‘, and the inferior social status of the mawālī under the Umayyads, made many of them ready to join any opposition movement against the regime and the ‘Arab sovereignty, in a claim for equality and justice. They, as well as some ‘Arabs, especially those unprivileged ones, not only participated in the Shi‘ī movements but also associated themselves with the Khārijites. Professor al-Durī 3 however, thinks that these examples in our sources which show an inferior social status for the mawālī were the exceptions rather than the rule, and therefore do not represent the reason for their resentment to ‘Arab rule. The real cause in his view was born of an anti-‘Arab, racial pride, in their Persian descend (Shu‘ūbi). While not denying this factor, especially in the ‘Abbasid and later Umayyad periods, it is difficult to see it as the main reason in the period under consideration. The fact that the ‘Arabs did allow the odd mawālī in the dīwāns, and the rare examples of them holding the office of army leader or judge were of a short duration only, and not without opposition on the part of the ‘Arabs. That only a few managed to achieve a high position is clear on the consideration that the number of mawālī in Kūfa was

1. Al-Hindī, Kanz al-Ummāl, VIII, pp. 247-48; Sarakhsī, al-Mabṣūṭ, V, pp. 22-7; also ‘Iqd, III, p. 417; Mubarrad, IV, p. 16; Āgh., XIV, p. 150 (citing al-Zubair ibn Bakkār); Nihāya, III, p. 112.

2. Ansāb, fol. 216; Ya‘qūbī, II, p. 262; Goldziher, op. cit., p. 130.

forty-thousand. 1

These social disabilities had a religious offshoot, very relevant in this context. The almost universal attraction of oppressed peoples to messianic and millenarian ideas 2 operated here also: both 'Arab and non-

'Arab (mawālī) among the unprivileged groups turned to their pre-Islamic beliefs and grafting them on to their new faith, gave rise to the belief in a Māhdi who would "fill the earth with justice and equity as it is now filled with tyranny and oppression". 3 Al-Mukhtar exploited this religious need with

1. The number of the mawālī at the time when Kūfa was built, was four thousand. Prior to the battle of Sīffīn their number increased to eight thousand. During the time of al-Mukhtar and especially before the battle of Jabbānt al-Subai 4, they were forty thousand. See Futūb, p. 279; Dīnawārī, p. 307; Jāb., II, pp. 371-72. There is a chance narrative in Balādhurī (Ansab, fol. 499a, citing Mada'īnī) and repeated by Ibn 'Abd Rabīh (Tāqī, III, p. 314), which makes it possible that for once that Dīnawārī is not exaggerating. The narrative says that the number of the mawālī became so large that it raised the attention of both the caliph Mū'āwiya and his governor Ziyād. The figure must have been of a big proportion of the population, when we consider that the number of the Muqātila in the city was only eighty thousand, according to Jāb., (II, p. 433, citing 'Umar ibn Shabba).


his claims to represent Ibn al-Ḥanifiyya, as the Mahdī; this he backed up by attempting to reform the social situation.

Al-Mukhtar made it legal for the mawā’in to share the fā’r with the ‘Arabs, and to ride on horses; He even appointed a mawla of ‘Uraina, Kaisan, Abū ‘Amra, as the leader of his personal guard. This was possibly because he trusted him more than the others and because he was the most influential of his mawā’in supporters. Al-Mukhtar also declared that any slave who came to him would be free. No wonder, therefore, the number of the mawā’in and slaves among his supporters became very large. After starting as only five hundred at the beginning of the revolt, nearly all of the mawā’in had joined him at the height of his power. Credit must be given to al-Mukhtar for his early understanding that the mawā’in were an important political element in the society. Al-Madâ’ini reports that al-MUGHIRA ibn

1. Tab., II, pp.649 ff. (citing Abū Mikhnaf) & 724; Kufī, II, fols.15b, 18a.
3. Ansāb, V, p.267 (citing Madâ’inî).
4. See p. 99
5. Wellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p.95.
6. Ansāb, V, p.223.
Shu'ba was the first to attract the attention of al-Mukhtar to the Persians' pro-Alid sympathies and to the fact that by addressing them by the name of the family of the Prophet, he could make out of them a great political power.

Why did al-Mukhtar, after proclaiming his desire to revenge the killing of al-Husain, abandon this on achieving power, and instead work to reconcile both the Ashraf and the mawali? It seems that al-Mukhtar was more concerned to achieve a stable state of affairs in the city, than he was to carry out the revenge. For the Syrian army under Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad was advancing towards Musil, and he was threatened by Ibn al-Zubair both from Basra and Hijaz. It would have been political myopia to involve himself in a civil war by attacking the Ashraf, in addition to these outside threats.

There was a contradiction, however, in an attempt to reconcile both the Ashraf and the mawali. By relying on the mawali and considering them as equal to their masters, al-Mukhtar was undermining the whole social structure on which Ashraf domination was based. The vested interests of al-Ashraf were opposed to the mawali's interests and al-Mukhtar could only reconcile the former by betraying the latter and dishonouring his promises. When al-mawali noticed al-Mukhtar trying to reconcile the Ashraf, they resented it, and communicated this to Abu 'Amra Kaisan, their chief and the head of the personal guard of al-Mukhtar, saying, "(al-Mukhtar) is too courteous to the 'Arabs (Ashraf) and see how indifferent he is to us." When this reached al-Mukhtar, he answered, "Tell them not to be upset, for you
belong to me and I to you." Then he recited the following verse from the Qur'ān: "We shall punish the criminals" (1:6). This answer satisfied the mawāli for his hostile intentions to the Ashraf. Al-Mukhtar realized that he could not for long ingratiate himself with both sides. Shabath ibn Rabī communicated the grievances of the Ashraf to al-Mukhtar prior to the battle of Jabbant al-Subai 66/686: the most important of these was that al-Mukhtar had made the mawāli and slaves equal to the Ashraf. When al-Mukhtar replied with the question, that if he gave them back their mawāli and again distributed the fai' among them alone, would they promise to fight Ibn al-Zubair and the Syrians with him, they refused to do so. This indication of the hostility of al-Ashraf towards him confirmed him in his choice of relying on mawāli support, rather than on al-Ashraf. It seems it was the political circumstances which determined al-Mukhtar's choice to take the side of the mawāli, and not any genuine conviction on his part, as Levi Della Vida presumes.

There are two accounts of al-Mukhtar's activities in Basra: the first is that of Baiadhuri, and the second that of Mada'ini in Tabari which

1. Ṭab., II, p.634 (citing Abū Mikhnaf).
2. Ṭab., II, p.650; Kūfī, II, fol. 15b.
4. Ansāb, V, pp.244-45.
5. Ṭab., II, pp.680-83 (citing al-Mada'ini).
is repeated briefly by Ibn a-Thir and Nuwairi. According to Baladhuri, al-Muthanna ibn Mukharriba al-‘Abdi met al-Mukhtar after the return of the Tawwabun from the battle of ‘Ain al-Warda, in Kufa, where he paid homage to him. He told him that he had supporters in Basra, and if al-Mukhtar agreed, he would go there to enroll them for him.

According to Tabari, al-Muthanna himself took part in the battle of ‘Ain al-Warda. When he returned from the battle to Kufa, he found al-Mukhtar in prison, and he paid homage to him there. On al-Mukhtar’s release, he ordered al-Muthanna to go to Basra to rally the people for him. Al-Muthanna’s answer to the call of Sulaiman to participate in the battle, although he arrived too late, is probably the reason for al-Mada’ini saying that he actually fought at ‘Ain al-Warda. Whether it was al-Mukhtar’s or al-Muthanna’s idea that the latter should go to Basra to rally the people, is not an important point, for in either case it was certainly with al-Mukhtar’s approval.

1. Kamil, IV, pp.201-2; Nuwairi, XIX, fols. 25-6.
2. Al-Muthanna ibn Mukharriba al-‘Abdi (from the tribe of ‘Abd al-Qais), was an old partisan of ‘Ali who fought for him in the battle of the Camel and supported him against Mu‘awiya. He also joined the movement of al-Tawwabun, but like the Shii of Mada’in did not reach the battle field in due time. See Ansab, fol. 176a (citing Abu Mikhnaf); fols. 179a, 207b; V, p.211 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Tab., II, p.568 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
Baladhuri then writes that al-Muthanna went to Basra, and took a mosque as the centre of his activities there. Tabari writes that he made his camp near Madinat al-Rizq, a place not mentioned by name in Baladhuri. Both narratives then say that the governor, al-Qubayr, hearing of the subversive activities of al-Muthanna sent against him Abbad ibn al-Husain al-Habshi, a police officer from the tribe of Tamim, with a troop of horsemen. Tabari also states that Abbad was accompanied by Qais ibn al-Haitham, who stationed himself in the Sabkha. In Baladhuri’s account, Abbad was defeated by one of al-Muthanna’s generals. In Tabari, al-Muthanna and most of his followers left their camp and stationed themselves opposite Abbad’s forces. The latter left Qais ibn al-Haitham there, while he and a small group of followers went to Madinat al-Rizq, and managed to place thirty of his men on the roof of the city wall. He ordered them to wait until they heard the shout, “Allahu Akbar”, a sign that battle had begun. Then Abbad returned to al-Sabkha to join Qais ibn al-Haitham, and attacked al-Muthanna. Meanwhile those on the roof of Madinat al-Rizq, hearing the shouting, attacked the remnant of al-Muthanna’s forces there. This led to the defeat and flight of al-Muthanna’s followers both in Sabkha and Madinat al-Rizq.

To return to Baladhuri’s narrative, after Abbad’s defeat, the Governor sent another general against al-Muthanna, al-Ahnaf ibn Qais, the Taminite chief, with men from Mudar, hostile to the tribe of Abd al-Qais, a Yemenite tribe. This action caused tribal rivalries to flare up again, and
the situation became critical when two tribes sided with al-Muthanna; the tribe of Bakr ibn Wa'il led by Malik ibn Misma', and al-Azd led by Ziyad ibn 'Amr al-'Atkî. This support was not because of their sympathy for al-Muthanna's cause but because of tribal passion and the loyalty (Hamīyya) felt by them towards the tribe of 'Abd al-Qais. The 'Abd al-Qais and Bakr were living near to each other in the north of Basra. But Abdallah ibn Mut'i' and 'Amr ibn 'Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Harith ibn Hishām al-Makhzûmî (the two ex-governors of Ibn al-Zubair in Kūfah) intervened as peace makers between the two opposing parties and a settlement was reached, specifying that al-Muthanna should leave Basra and return to Kūfah.

According to Tabari, this settlement was reached as a result of the Governor sending al-'Ahnaf ibn Qais and 'Amr ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Makhzûmî to al-Muthanna, after Ziyad ibn 'Amr al-'Atkî had threatened the governor's forces with attack by the Azd if he did not withdraw from the quarter of 'Abd al-Qais. The government's forces under 'Abbād were advancing on this quarter where al-Muthanna and his followers had taken refuge after their defeat by 'Abbād.

The account of Tabari would seem to be more likely than that of Baladhuri in the matter of whether or not 'Abbād was defeated: al-Muthanna's...
forces were numerically far weaker than the governor's, and the tribes, apart from the small 'Abd al-Qais, were all anti-Shīʿī; which makes Baladhuri's account of 'Abbad's defeat seem suspicious. Moreover, al-Madāʾinī is a reliable authority on matters concerning the region of Başra and the Eastern Provinces,¹ while the narrative of Baladhuri comes to us without any chain of authority.

As for the nature of the support which al-Muthanna found in Başra, it is stated in Baladhuri that when al-Muthanna made the mosque the centre of his activities, the Shīʿa gathered round him.² Tabari, however, says that those who came to him were only his own people from the tribe of 'Abd al-Qais.³ Neither of our sources mention any mawāli support for al-Muthanna's movement: this may be because the 'Arabs had a strong hold on them in Başra.

 Başra in its political attitude was described as 'Uthmānīte, that is, anti-'Alid. This anti-'Alid feeling was made very clear by al-Aḥnaf ibn Qais, the head of the Tamīm tribe, the most influential tribe in Başra. "We have tried Āl Abī Ṭālib, and found that they neither have any experience of government, nor strategy in war. Also it is impossible to get money from them."⁴ This,

¹ E. I. (al-Madāʾinī); J. 'Alī, Mawārid Tarīkh al-Tabarī, p. 157; J. Mil, I, i, 1950.
² Ansāb, V, p. 244.
³ Tab., II, p. 681 (citing Madāʾinī).
⁴ Jahiz, al-'Uthmānīyya, p. 96; Ansāb, fol. 499b (citing Madāʾinī); about al-Aḥnaf ibn Qais and the Umayyads, see Ṭab., II, pp. 96-7.
however, does not mean that the Basrans were pro-Umayyad or even sincerely pro-Zubairid, as Dr. Fariq thinks. It seems that they were ready to give their support to whoever paid the most. Ziyād ibn ʿAmr al-ʿAtkī, the head of the Azd tribe, received a letter from al-Mukhtar promising him a reward in this life and the next if he would support him; Ziyād replied, “We do not fight on credit, but with whoever pays cash.”

When ʿAbd al-Malik paid the Basrans more than Musʿab ibn al-Zubair, they betrayed the latter, the tribes of al-Azd, Bakr ibn Wāṭil and Banū Tamīm going over to ʿAbd al-Malik.

The tribes of Basra at this time, were: Ahl al-ʿĀliya, (among whom was Bahila which was known for its anti-ʿAlid feeling), Tamīm, Bakr ibn Wāṭil, al-Azd and ʿAbd al-Qais. Only the latter, a numerically weak, politically unimportant tribe, was pro-ʿAlid.

Al-Mukhtar endeavoured to seize Basra for many important reasons. By seizing Basra with its dependences, al-Mukhtar would be master of the whole of Iraq and the Eastern Provinces, thus depriving Ibn al-Zubair of the rich resources of the area, and confining him to the poor country of al-Ḥijāz, which could hardly support itself. Egypt had already been lost for Ibn al-Zubair, being controlled by the Umayyads. The conquest of Basra would

1. op. cit., p.50, ʿll, IV, no.1, 1967.
3. Ṭab., II, p.218.
give al-Mukhtar new followers to increase his military forces which might have enabled him to face both Ibn al-Zubair and 'Abd al-Malik. It was a favourable time for an attempt by al-Mukhtar to seize Basra for the city was continually threatened by the Kharijites so that the governor's position there was constantly undermined. Moreover, Ibn al-Zubair was unable to send forces against al-Mukhtar because he was hard-pressed by 'Abd al-Malik, and was preparing to face him. Finally, the seizure of Basra was part of the strategy of al-Mukhtar, for it would be expedient for him to create new difficulties for Ibn al-Zubair, without the necessity of distracting his attention from consolidating his power in Kūfa.

However, he did not succeed: al-Muthanna was driven out of the city along with his followers. But the event was not without significance. It proved to al-Mukhtar that the centre of his power was Kūfa, where the majority of the Shi’a were. It also enabled him to understand the attitude of the tribal chiefs in Basra. It is therefore in this light that we must see the letters al-Mukhtar sent to al-Aḥnaf ibn Qais, Malik ibn Misma, and Ziyād al-ʿAtki, in which he offered them a reward in this world and the next for their support.

In order to pave the way for his complete sovereignty over al-Iraq, it was necessary to avoid open hostility with Ibn al-Zubair. Al-Mukhtar, therefore, entered into a secret diplomatic correspondence with him. First,

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1. Ansāb, V, p.245; Ṭab., II, p.683 (citing Madāʾinī).
al-Mukhtar tried to justify his act of expelling ‘Abdallah ibn Mutī’, by accusing him of working in the interests of ‘Abd al-Malik. He also wrote to Ibn al-Zubair reminding him of the terms on which he paid him homage, saying that he had kept his promises, although Ibn al-Zubair did not. If Ibn al-Zubair still wanted his support, al-Mukhtar was still ready to offer it to him.

Ibn al-Zubair, however, wanted to test the sincerity of al-Mukhtar, so he sent a new governor to al-Kūfa. He was ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn al-Ḥārith ibn Hishām al-Makhzūmī. When the news of this appointment reached al-Mukhtar through one of his spies at Mecca, he sent Za‘ida ibn Qudāma with five hundred cavalry men under the command of Musāfir ibn Sa‘īd al-Na‘ītī, and seventy thousand dirhams, twice what the new governor had spent on his journey. He told Qudāma to order the new governor to take the money and go back to Ibn al-Zubair. If he refused, he was to show him the cavalry and tell him there were another hundred such squadrons in the rear. At first ‘Umar refused to take the money and tried to carry out Ibn al-Zubair’s orders, but when he saw the cavalry, he consented, took the money and went to Basra as Ibn Mutī’ had done.

1. Sa‘d, V, p.110; Ansāb, V, p.266 (citing Mada‘īnī).
3. Ansāb, V, pp.243-44; Tab., II, p.687 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
Political circumstances once again forced al-Mukhtar to act in an underhand way, in asking for the friendship of Ibn al-Zubair and at the same time, trying to undermine the latter's authority. Since he feared that his double-dealing with Ibn al-Zubair would provoke him to send an army from Basra against him, al-Mukhtar tried once again to win Ibn al-Zubair's confidence, especially since he was also threatened with the advance of the Syrian army. 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwnān had sent an army to al-Ḥijāz to liquidate Ibn al-Zubair. Al-Mukhtar tried to exploit this opportunity by writing to Ibn al-Zubair offering him his help against 'Abd al-Malik. Ibn al-Zubair's reply to this was, "If you are loyal to me, then I do not mind your bringing an army to my country. But you should first bring me the homage of the Kūfans. When I receive this, then I shall believe in your loyalty and will refrain from attacking your territory. Send me your army quickly and order it to proceed to Wādī al-Qurā and to fight the army of Ibn Marwnān."1

Al-Mukhtar then sent three thousand men, among whom only seven hundred were Southern 'Arabs, the rest being mawālī, under the command of an 'Arab leader, Shurahbīl ibn Wars, from the tribe of Hamdān, also a Southern tribe.2 He ordered him to proceed to al-Medīna, station himself there, and then to write to al-Mukhtar. Al-Mukhtar intended that when Ibn Wars' army had occupied Medīna, he would then send a governor for the city

2. Tab., II, p. 689 (citing Abū Mikhnaf).
and order Ibn Wars to proceed towards Mecca to lay siege to the city. But Ibn al-Zubair saw through this double-dealing. He sent 'Abbas ibn Sahl ibn Sa'd with two thousand men and ordered him to recruit more men on his way from the Arab tribes dwelling there. He ordered him to annihilate al-Mukhtar's army if they did not comply with his orders. The two armies met at al-Raq'im near Medina. Ibn Sahl asked the commander of al-Mukhtar's army to proceed to Wadi al-Qura to fight the Syrian army. Ibn Wars answered naively that he had been ordered to go first to Medina and then report to his master for further instructions. It seems that Ibn Wars was either completely ignorant of al-Mukhtar's plot, or else that he was not clever enough to act out the deception when faced with Ibn Sahl. In both cases, al-Mukhtar can be blamed for his choice of general. Ibn Wars' answer was enough for 'Abbas ibn Sahl to understand the strategy of al-Mukhtar, and he therefore led a surprise attack on the army of Ibn Wars. Most of the army, and Ibn Wars himself, were killed. Most of those who fled died of thirst or hunger on their way back to Kufa. Following this defeat, al-Mukhtar wrote to Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, saying that he had sent an army to defend him against his enemies and to conquer the countries for him. But the army of al-'Mulhid' ibn al-Zubair had deceived them and taken them by surprise. He asked the permission of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya to send another army to Medina to fight Ibn al-Zubair if he,

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1. Ansāb, V, pp. 246-47; Ṫab., II, pp. 689-91 (citing Abu Mīkhnaf).
Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, would make it clear to the people of Medina that al-Mukhtar was working with his consent. As usual, Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya's reply to al-Mukhtar was cold and non-committal: he said that he did not approve of bloodshed, and advised him to obey God instead of causing war. If he (Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya) did want to fight, he would find the people ready to rally round him without al-Mukhtar's help. This answer certainly disappointed al-Mukhtar, who was hoping to get recognition from Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya to legalize his authority. However, he did not let himself become discouraged by this answer and told the Shi'a that al-Mahdi had asked him to follow a policy which would bring them prosperity and righteousness, and wipe out all treachery and impiety.

Nevertheless, circumstances eventually forced Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya to ask help from al-Mukhtar. When Ibn al-Zubair proclaimed himself Caliph in 64/683, Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya and 'Abdallah ibn 'Abbas, with their followers, refused to pay him homage on the grounds that he had not yet been unanimously recognized as Caliph. For the same reason they did not pay homage to Ibn al-Zubair's rival, 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān. When all attempts to make Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya change his mind failed, Ibn al-Zubair decided to obtain the "bai'a" from him by force. In the year 66/685, Ibn al-Zubair detained Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya and his family, with seventeen men from his supporters among the

1. Ansāb, V, pp.246-47; Tab., II, p.689ff. (citing Abū Mikhna); Kamīl, IV, pp.204-5.
2. Tab., II, p.693.
the notables of al-Kūfa, inside al-Haram and threatened them with death if they did not pay homage within a specified time. ¹

Why did Ibn al-Zubair decide at this time to threaten Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya with death, if he would not pay him homage? It would seem that he was afraid that the people in Hijāz and Iraq would pay homage to Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, especially after success achieved by al-Mukhtar in Kūfa using his name.

Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya sent a letter to al-Mukhtar informing him of the situation and asking his urgent help. Al-Mukhtar was waiting for just such an opportunity and used the request for help as a demonstration of his recognition by Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya. Al-Mukhtar summoned the Shi'a of Kūfa and showed them Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya's letter. He immediately sent four thousand men to rescue him, and to give him a large sum of money. But he was careful this time, and did not let Ibn al-Zubair know of this expedition, to avoid a repetition of the disaster of Ibn Wars, and also to prevent Ibn al-Zubair from killing Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya and his followers before they could be rescued. He wished also to avoid any unnecessary military engagement with Ibn al-Zubair in order to save his strength to meet the Syrians.

¹. Sa’d, V, pp.73-4; Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarīkh, 1, 258 (he gives the year 65/384 and makes the place of detention Shi‘b Banū Ḥāshim); Akhbar, fols. 43b-44a; Ansāb, fols. 261a-261b; Ya‘qūbī, II, pp.311-12; Ṣaf., II, p.693ff. (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūfī, II, fols. 10a-10b; 'Iqd, IV, p.514; Murūj, V, p.179 (citing 'Umar ibn Shabba); Agh., VIII, p.32; Asākir, XV, fol. 369b. (citing Khalīfa).
Wellhausen, 1 arguing exclusively on the evidence that the forces sent by al-Mukhtar to rescue Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya held wooden clubs in their hands on their entry into al-Ḥaram, concludes that they were mawālī, though led by Arabs. But we are told that the holding of wooden clubs instead of swords was according to Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya's instructions, since he would not tolerate the use of weapons in the Holy Shrine. 2 This is supported by the fact that Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya had always spoken against the use of violence, and also that it was only on their entry into al-Ḥaram that they held these wooden clubs. 3 They also carried hidden swords. 4 This however, does not mean that they were all ‘Arabs; it only means that one cannot argue that they were mawālī simply because they carried clubs. More will be said about these clubs in the context of the Khashabiyya.

The first hundred and fifty men who reached Mecca succeeded in saving Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya. But Ibn al-Zubair did not yield until the rest of al-Mukhtar's men reached Mecca. Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya forbade his followers and those who came to his aid, to fight Ibn al-Zubair and distributed the money he had received from al-Mukhtar amongst them. Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya then left

1. Die Religions-Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p.81.
2. Akhbār, fol. 47a; Tab., II, p.694 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūfī, II, fol. 11b; Kāmil, IV, p.207.
3. Saʿd, V, p.78; Ansāb, V, pp.246-47; Tab., II, p.692 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūfī, II, fol. 12a; Kāmil, IV, p.205.
4. Akhbār, fols. 47a, 47b; Tab., II, p.694 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Ansāb, fol. 262a; Kūfī, II, fol. 11b.
Mecca and went to al-Ṭāʾif. It seems that he did not go to Kūfā because he distrusted al-Mukhtar and his ambitions to gain power. It may be that he was afraid to come to Kūfā, since al-Mukhtar, fearing that Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya would arrive and put an end to the activities of his more extreme followers, had spread a rumour around the city that a true Mahḍī could not be harmed if struck with a sword. Besides, it may have been that Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya did not want to incur the hostility of both Ibn al-Zubair and ʿAbd al-Malik, especially since the future of al-Mukhtar was still uncertain. Furthermore, he no doubt suspected the Kūfans’ support after the terrible experiences his father and his brothers had had with them.

After the battle of ʿAin al-Warda 65/684, in which Sulaimān ibn Ṣurād and his Tawwabūn were massacred, ʿUbaydallāh ibn Ziyāḍ continued to march against Iraq. He engaged with Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith al-Kilābī, who was holding al-Jazīra, first against Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam and then against Marwān’s son, ʿAbd al-Malik. After a siege of about a year, Ibn Ziyāḍ failed to conquer al-Jazīra, and marched on towards al-Mūsīl on his way to Kūfā. ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn ʿAṣād ibn Qais al-Hamdānī, the governor of al-Mūsīl, reported this to al-Mukhtar, informing him that, because of his lack of men, he had

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1. ʿAṣād, V, p.74 (citing ʿAṭīyya al-ʿAwfī); Zubairī, pp.43-4 (but he gives the name of ʿUbaydallāh ibn ʿAlī instead of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya); ʿUyun, p.242 (citing al-ʾAsmaʾī); Ansāb, V, pp.269-70 (citing al-ʾAsmaʾī); Bagh., pp.33-4; al-Rāzī, ʾIʿtīqāḍāt Firaqʾī Shīʿa, p. 62; Dhahabi, III, pp.296-97.
left Mūṣil to go to Tahrīt, and was awaiting al-Mukhtar’s orders. On receiving this news, al-Mukhtar sent three thousand cavalrymen, all of them ‘Arabs, under the command of Yazīd ibn Anas al-Asadi. They met the Syrian army on 19th of Dhū‘l-Hijjah, 66/17th of July 686, at dawn about five "farsakhs" from Mūṣil. The result of the battle was victory for Yazīd ibn Anas, despite the fact that he was ill at the time and that his army was half the size of that of the Syrians. However, Yazīd died that evening, after ordering all the Syrians captured in the battle to be killed. His death greatly demoralized his followers, who thought it wise to withdraw because their small number would not be able to stand against the eighty thousand

1. Ansāb, V, p.230; Dīnawārī, p.300 (he gives the army of Yazīd as 20,000). But they withdrew after Yazīd’s death because of their small number, and the fact that Ibn Ziyād sent against them double of their number, makes us discount Dīnawārī’s view. Moreover, apart from the exaggeration in number, his narrative is brief and unconvincing, for he writes that ‘Abd al-Malik fought Yazīd and killed him and his followers, while none of the other sources gives the slightest hint of this. See Tab., II, pp.642-4 (citing ‘Awāna and Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols. 13b-14a, (here the number is given as 4,000 because ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Sa‘īd ibn Qais al-Hamdānī with 1,000 men joined the army of Yazīd.) It is important to point out here that the army of Yazīd consisted only of ‘Arabs without any mawāli. (Kūfī, II, fol. 14a.) The account of Tab., (II, p.647), confirms this, although Wellhausen, referring to it, but misunderstanding the text, writes that the army was mostly mawāli. See Die Religios-Politischen Oppositionen im alten Islam, p.81.
Syrian troops marching against them. ¹

This withdrawal of the Kufan army had a serious reaction in Kufa. Rumours spread that 'Ubaidallah ibn Ziyād had defeated al-Mukhtar's army, killed his leader, Yazīd ibn Anas, and with his huge army was advancing on Kufa. Hearing this, al-Mukhtar ordered his general, Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ashtar, to march against Ibn Ziyād with an army of seven thousand men, and ordered him to join up with the army of Yazīd. ² The situation of al-Mukhtar, with the Syrians advancing against him and a large number of his troops away to fight them, encouraged the Ashrāf to defy him and prepare to overthrow his rule. They condemned al-Mukhtar for appointing himself ruler without their consent, for raising the status of their mawālī by mounting them on horses, giving them salaries and letting them share in their revenues (fai'). ³

Shabath ibn Rabī' al-Tamīmī, a senior tribal chief, was their spokesman, and carried these complaints to al-Mukhtar. The latter promised to remove every grievance brought to his attention. Shabath complained about the slaves who had deserted their masters and joined him, and the mawālī, saying, "You have taken away from us our mawālī whom God conferred upon us as booty with this country, whom we freed hoping for God's reward. But you went far beyond

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1. Ṭab., II, p. 648 (citing Abū Mikhnafer); Kūfī, II, fol. 15a; Kāmil, IV, p. 190.


3. Dīnawārī, p. 306; Ṭab., II, p. 649 (citing Abū Mikhnafer); Kūfī, II, fols. 15a-15b; Kāmil, IV, p. 190.
this, and made them share in our revenues". Al-Mukhtar answered, "If I
give you back your mawālī and distribute the revenue between you alone,
will you then fight with me against the Umayyads and Ibn al-Zubair? Will
you make a solemn agreement to this effect in God's name?"¹ The Ashraf
refused to do this. Al-Dinawarī,² however, has a different account of this
occasion. He says some of the Ashraf met al-Mukhtar and reproached him for
his policy towards the mawālī. Al-Mukhtar answered them, "When I showed
you honour, you became supercilious; and when I made you governors, you
embezzled the revenue. I found these Persians (Ajam) more obedient, loyal
and honest than you." Even allowing for Dinawarī's Persian prejudices, this
account shows al-Mukhtar's opinion of both the mawālī and the Ashraf, while
Tabari’s account indicates the total lack of trust in al-Mukhtar felt by the
Ashraf.

Was al-Mukhtar sincerely prepared to make those concessions to the
Ashraf, in order to get their confidence, and dispense with his faithful mawālī?
It seems that in making this offer, al-Mukhtar was banking on their hostility to
him leading them to refuse. He was using the concessions as an expedient
to appease the Ashraf temporarily, while so many of his troops were away. We
shall see him using the same tactics when the revolt of the Ashraf came into the
open.

1. ¹ Tab., II, p. 650 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūfī, II, fol. 15b; Van Vloten,
op. cit., p. 16.
2. ² Dinawarī, p. 306.
While the Ashraf were speculating on the possibilities of revolting, one of them, 'Abd al-Rahmân ibn Mikhnaf, advised against it at that time, for he said, 'Al-Mukhtar is bound to be overthrown either by the Syrians or the Başrans. Besides, you are disunited, and his side unites the mawālī with many of the 'Arabs. Your mawālī and slaves hate you more than him, and therefore, if you attack al-Mukhtar, you will have to face the bravery of 'Arabs and the hatred of the Persians.' His advice was rejected and eventually he joined them in revolt against al-Mukhtar. His advice, however, does show the presence of many 'Arabs on al-Mukhtar's side.

Following the departure of Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar to fight the Syrian army under 'Ubaidallah ibn Ziyād, the Ashraf rose in arms and occupied the important places in the city. 'Abd al-Rahmân ibn Sa‘īd ibn Qais al-Hamdānī with the tribe of Hamdān occupied Jabbānat al-Subai; Zuhr ibn Qais al-Ju‘fī and Iṣḥāq ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ash‘ath seized Jabbānat Kinda; Ka‘b ibn Abī Ka‘b joined with Bāshīr ibn Jarīr ibn 'Abdallah and the Bajīla to occupy Jabbānat Bishr; 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Mikhnaf occupied Jabbānat Mikhnaf; Shāmir ibn dhū‘l Jawshan occupied Jabbānat banū Sallūl and Shabath ibn Rab‘ī occupied al-Kūnāsā, joined by Mu‘ājir. Hājjār ibn Abjar al-‘Ijli and

1. Tab., II, p.651 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols. 15b-16a; Kāmil, IV, p.191; Nuwairī, XIX, fol. 78.
2. Previous governor of al-Mukhtar in Mūsīl. This explains how strong were the tribal feelings among the 'Arabs of the time.
Yazid ibn al-Ḥārith ibn Rūwaim with the Rabī'a tribe occupied al-Sabkha, and 'Amr ibn al-Hajjāj al-Zubaidi occupied Jabbānāt Murād. To face al-Mukhtar's horsemen, the tribes of Kinda, al-Azd, Bajila, al-Nakha', Khath'am, Qais and Taim al-Rabbāb gathered in Jabbānāt Murād; while Rabī'a and Tamīm gathered in Jabbānāt al-Hashshāshīn. This gathering of the tribes in two places was a favourable opportunity for al-Mukhtar, for it enabled him to concentrate his rather small forces against only two fronts.

Al-Mukhtar succeeded in recalling Ibn al-Ashtar with his forces to Kūfa, but while he awaited his arrival, he spared no effort to reconcile the Āshraf. He sent to them, promising to comply with their wishes. When they demanded his abdication, on the grounds that his claim to represent Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya was false, al-Mukhtar suggested that they should send a deputation to Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya to ask him about this point. By this, he tried to achieve two important things; first, to cause a difference of opinion between them and secondly, it was an attempt to make time until Ibn al-Ashtar arrived. Nevertheless, al-Āshraf did not accept the proposal, and decided to take their chance to get rid of him. On the other hand, al-Mukhtar adopted the strategy

1. Ansāb, V, pp.231-2; Tab., II, pp.651-2 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Kūfī, II, fol. 16a.
3. Tab., II, p.653 (citing Abū Mīkhnaft); Kūfī, II, fols. 16a-16b; Kamīl, IV, pp.192-3; Nuwairī, XIX, fol.18.
of increasing the hatred between the mawālī, (40,000 at this time) and their masters, by telling them that they were fighting for their own cause, identical with his. He told the mawālī that the Ashraf would never have risen in arms against him, had he not adopted their cause and worked to improve their conditions. ¹

Only three days after his departure, Ibrāhīm returned to Kūfa. The next day, Sunday the 24th Dhūl-Hajja 66/22nd July, 686, ² the Ashraf gathered their forces in three places: Mudar was in al-Kunāsa, āhl al-Yemen in Jabbānat al-Subaiā and Rabī‘a in the Sabkha. Al-Mukhtar, aware of tribal rivalries, asked Ibrāhīm to fight Mudar in al-Kunāsa, while he himself went to fight Ahl al-Yemen, for he thought Ibrāhīm might well balk at fighting his own people, the Yemenites. ³

Al-Mukhtar stationed himself near Jabbānat al-Subaiā and sent Aḥmar ibn Shumāṭ; al-Bajjī al-Aḥmasī and ‘Abdallah ibn Kāmil al-Shākirī to Jabbānat al-Subaiā from different directions. He also informed them that Shibām would attack al-Jabbāna from behind. ⁴ Ibrāhīm was able to defeat

¹. Dinawarī, pp. 306-7.
². Wellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Opposition-Parteien im alten Islam, p. 83.
³. Ansāb, V, p. 232; Tab., II, p. 655 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūfī, II, fol. 16b.
⁴. From the Yemenite tribes there were only Hamdān fighting al-Mukhtar, for Madhhi Ibrāhīm’s tribe did not take part on either side, while Shibām was with al-Mukhtar. See Wellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p. 83.
Mudar while Rabia left the battle-field, either because of the defeat of Mudar and al-Yemen or because of their bai'a to al-Mukhtar. Then Ibrahimm came to the rescue of al-Mukhtar, whose forces were in a difficult position.

The rivalry and jealousy between the Ashraf soon came into play, as Ibn Mikhnaif had expected, and contributed to the victory of al-Mukhtar. It is reported by Abi Mikhnaif in Tarbi that when Ahl al-Yemen gathered in Jabbanat al-Subai, they disagreed about who would lead the prayer, for no tribe liked to pray behind a man from another tribe. In the battle of Jabbanat al-Subai, Abdullah ibn Qurad al-Khatami, though he remained faithful to al-Mukhtar, yet he refused to spill the blood of his fellow tribesmen. Moreover, when Abu'l-Qulus and his followers from the tribe of Shibam entered Jabbanat al-Subai shouting, "Ya Li Tharat al-Husain" as their slogan, Yazid ibn 'Umair ibn Dhul Murrân al-Hamdani answered this by shouting, "Ya Li Tharat 'Uthman". This had the effect of rallying the Shi'a among the Ashraf to al-Mukhtar's side. For example, Rifaa ibn Shaddad al-Fityani, who had once been a follower of al-Mukhtar, but who was with the Ashraf in this revolt, on hearing the 'Uthmanite slogan, became extremely angry and said, "I will not fight on the

3. Ibid., II, p.657.
same side as those who seek the vengeance of ‘Uthmān.’ But in the end, his tribal feelings were stronger than his Shī‘ī feelings and he carried on fighting against al-Mukhtar. On the other hand, we find ‘Abd al-Mu‘min, the son of Shabath ibn Rab‘ī, fighting courageously with al-Mukhtar against his father.

At last had come the time to annihilate the killers of al-Husain. In doing so, al-Mukhtar achieved two goals. The first and most important was that he fulfilled his promise to avenge al-Husain, according to which homage had been paid to him. The second was that he inflicted punishment upon those Ashraf who revolted against him after all his attempts to reconcile them had proved abortive. Furthermore, he was encouraged by the remark said to have been made by Ibn al-Hanafiyya criticizing al-Mukhtar: “It is surprising that al-Mukhtar claims to be the avenger of our family and yet the killers of al-Husain are his associates and companions.” Al-Mukhtar killed all those he could find who had taken part in the murder of al-Husain, and tore down the houses of those who managed to flee to Basra. At first, many innocents were attacked either due to personal antagonisms, or because of the hatred felt by

2. Ibid., II, p.654.
3. Ibid., p.667 (citing Abū Mikhnaf).
the mawālī to the Ashraf; but al-Mukhtar took over the supervision of prisoners and killed only those who were truly guilty of al-Husain's death. 1

Whatever his reasons, al-Mukhtar did perform his duty by annihilating the killers of al-Husain, among whom were Shamir ibn Dhu'il-Jawshan, 'Umar ibn Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, 2 and many others. This campaign of revenge had two important consequences. On one hand, ten thousand Ashraf and non-Shi′a Arab leaders managed to escape to Basra, where Mus'ab ibn al-Zubair was the governor for his brother 'Abdallah; these Ashraf played an important part in inciting Mus'ab against al-Mukhtar and was an effective factor in accelerating his death. On the other hand, it increased his popularity among the Shi′a and also pleased Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, whose recognition al-Mukhtar was seeking. 3

A story is reported in many sources 4 but differently phrased, about a poet

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1. Ṣab., II, p.660.

2. It is reported that when al-Mukhtar killed 'Umar ibn Sa'd, he hired female mourners and ordered them to wail at the door of his house, to prepare the public opinion for the next step. Ṣimaṣa, II, p.19; 'Iqd, IV, pp.404-5. If this account is true, it shows how al-Mukhtar used such matters as a means of propaganda. When he razed to the ground the houses of Muhammad ibn al-Ash'ath al-Kindī and of Asma' ibn Kharija al-Fazārī, he used the building materials of the two houses for rebuilding the houses of Muslim ibn 'Aqīl and Ḥujr ibn 'Adī al-Kindī. See Ṣab., II, p.680; Kūfi, II, fols. 12b-13a. Certainly this act was highly appreciated by the Shi′a of his time.


4. Surāqa ibn Mirdas, Diwan, p.74ff.; Ṣaḥāsin, p.128; 'Uyun, p.244-5; Ansāb, V, p.234; Dīnawari, p.309; Ṣab., II, p.663 (citing Abū Mikhnafter); Kūfi, II, fols.17a-17b; 'Iqd, II, pp.170-71; Agh., VIII, pp.31-2; 'Asākir, VI, p.69; Kāmil, IV, pp.196-7.
named Suraqa ibn Mirdas al-Bariqī, who was seized as a prisoner after the battle of Jabbānāt al-Suba‘ī. The story says that when Suraqa was brought to al-Mukhtar, he denied that he was captured by the followers of al-Mukhtar, but by the angels whom he claimed to have seen fighting on white horses at the side of al-Mukhtar. The latter ordered him to announce this publicly from the pulpit. Then al-Mukhtar summoned Suraqa and told him that he knew very well that he had seen nothing and he ordered him to leave Kūfā. Suraqa left for Basra where he composed satirical verses against al-Mukhtar. If this story, which looks like a piece of imaginary literature, is true, it should be considered as one of al-Mukhtar’s expedients to strengthen his cause among his followers, especially the mawālī who were more readily prepared to believe in anything told them by al-Mukhtar.

On the 24th Dhul Hajja, 66/22nd July, 686, two days after he returned from the battle of Jabbānāt al-Suba‘ī, al-Mukhtar despatched Ibrahīm ibn al-Ashtar with an army against ‘Ubaydallah ibn Ziyād, who was now advancing with his army from Mūsīl towards Kūfā. Al-Mukhtar instructed Ibrahīm, saying, “Fear God in all your acts public and private, be quick in your march and attack

1. According to Tāb., (II, p.667), the battle of Jabbānāt al-Suba‘ī was on the 24th Dhul Hajja, 66. On the other hand, he says (p.701), that al-Mukhtar sent Ibrahīm only two days after the battle, that is 26 Dhul Hajja 66. Again (on p.700), he says that Ibrahīm left Kūfā on the 22nd Dhul Hajja. This, however, is corrected by the narrative in Baladhuri (Ansab, V, p.248), where he states clearly that Ibrahīm left Kūfā on the 24th Dhul Hajja 66.

2. The number of his army has been differently given. According to Baladhuri (Ansab, V, p.248), it was of nine thousand men; according to Dīnawārī (p.301),
your enemy on reaching him without delay". Al-Mukhtar also accompanied the army until it reached the Euphrates and promised them victory. The army of Ibrāhīm was predominantly composed from the mawālī, although there were also 'Arabs from the tribes of Madhhij, Kinda, Asad, Tamīm and Hamdān, apart from Tamīm they are all Southern 'Arabs. The two armies met on the river Khāzir about five "farsakhs" from Mūsīl. The date of the battle is given by Ibn Qutaiba and confirmed by al-Dhahabī and Ibn Kathīr, as the 10th Muharram, 67/6th August, 686. The army of al-Mukhtar eventually won a victory over the Syrians, and 'Ubaidallah ibn Ziyād, the one most responsible for al-Husain's murder, al-Husain ibn Numair al-Sakkūnī, Shurahbīl ibn Dhūl Kila and many other Syrian notables, were killed while those who fled were drowned.

Several factors contributed to the victory of Ibrāhīm, though his army was small compared with that of Ibn Ziyād. Apart from Ibrāhīm's bravery and military

1. Tab., II, p.702 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 19a.
2. Dinawarī, p.302; Mubarrad, II, pp.61-2; Tab., II, p.709 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); If the account of Kūfī (II, fol. 19a) is true, the ten thousand cavalry said to have been with Ibrāhīm, were not necessarily all 'Arabs, for al-Mukhtar allowed the mawālī to mount on horses.
3. Ansāb, V, p.248; Tab., II, p.701 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 24a.
genius, there was the religious fanaticism of the Shiʿa face-to-face with Ibn Ziyād, the killer of al-Ḥusain; this fanaticism was enflamed by a speech delivered by Ibrāhīm before the beginning of the battle. Another reason for the victory was the treason of the Qaisites in the army of Ibn Ziyād. It is reported that ʿUmair ibn al-Ḥūbāb al-Sūlamī, who was with the Qaisites on the left wing of Ibn Ziyād's army, visited Ibn al-Ashtar and informed him that because of the battle of Marj Rahīt, they had no love for the Marwānids. Therefore, ʿUmair promised Ibn al-Ashtar to flee when the war began. But the sources do not agree when this treason took place. According to Baladhurī, Ṭabarî, Ibn al-Athīr and Nuwairī, ʿUmair only fled when he saw the Syrian army about to be routed, while at first he fought courageously. Ṭabarî, inserts here that when ʿUmair saw the retreat of the Syrians, he sent a message to Ibrāhīm, "Shall I come to your help now?" Ibrāhīm answered, "Not before the zeal of the Shiʿa against the Syrians has calmed down".

On the other hand, another account in Baladhurī, Dīnawarī, Mubarrad and Masʿūdī report that when the war began ʿUmair shouted "Ya Li Thārāt Marj

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1. Ansāb, V, p.249; Ṭab., II, pp.710, 713 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 25a.
2. Ansāb, V, pp. 248, 268 (citing Madaʿīnī); Dīnawarī, p. 310; Mubarrad, III, p. 268; Ṭab., II, p. 708 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 23b; Murūj, V, p. 223 (he states that ʿUmair was on the right wing and not on the left); Kāmil, IV, p. 215; Nuwairī, XIX, fol. 33.
3. Ansāb, V, pp. 249-50; Ṭab., II, p. 713 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p. 217; Nuwairī, XIX, fol. 34.
4. Ansāb, V, pp. 313-4 (citing ʿAwāna); Dīnawarī, p. 202-3; Mubarrad, III, p. 269; Murūj, V, p. 223.
Rāhiṭ and left the battle field with the Qaisites, and thus gave the battle to the Iraqis. However, Ibn Aṭham has yet another account of this event. He reports that when the two armies camped near each other Ibrahim sent to ʿUmair ibn al-Ḥubāb to come to his side, offering him security "aman" and promising him a reward. Therefore, ʿUmair deserted Ibn Ziyād with one thousand men from his Qaisite kinsmen and their mawālī, joining Ibn al-Ashtar, who warmly welcomed him and distributed money among his followers. Though this account of Ibn Aṭham is not confirmed by any other source, and it is not in itself convincing, yet it agrees with other accounts, confirming that ʿUmair betrayed Ibn Ziyād and helped to bring about the victory of the Iraqis. Moreover, the narrative of Abū Mikhnafl in Baladhuri, Ṭabarī and its repetition by Ibn al-Aṭhir and Nuwairī, represents the Iraqi tradition which tried to show the victory of Ibrahim as being achieved without any outside intervention, especially from the Syrian side. This view could be seen very clearly in the narrative of Madaʿini in Baladhuri, and also the account of Dīnawarī, Mubarrad and Masʿūdī. Furthermore, Baladhuri, Dīnawarī and Ibn al-Aṭhir preserve an important piece of information, which confirms our argument that such treason did take place; it says that after the battle of

2. Ansāb, V, p. 268 (citing Madaʿini); Dīnawarī, pp. 202-3; Mubarrad, III, p. 269; Muruj, V, p. 223.
3. Ansāb, V, p. 251 (citing al-Haytham ibn ʿAdī); Dīnawarī, p. 304; Kāmil, IV, p. 218.
Khāzir, Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ashtar confirmed Zufar ibn al-Hārith as the governor of Qarqisya* and 'Umair ibn al-Hūbāb was appointed as governor of Kāfīr Tūta and Ṣūr ʿĀbdīn. Why should Ibrāhīm make these appointments except as a reward for the help that 'Umair and the Qaisites had rendered him in the battle of Khāzir? Thus from all these arguments it seems impossible to accept Wellhausen's¹ view that there was no treason and, even if there was, it came after the battle had been decided for the Iraqis. Wellhausen is depending here almost exclusively on Ṣabārī and Abū Mikhnaf's narrative, i.e. the Iraqi tradition.

It is reported by al-Mubarrad² that when Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ashtar marched from Kūfa to meet the Syrians, al-Mukhtar walked with him for two "farsakhs". He gave some of his courtiers white doves ordering them to set them free if Ibrāhīm won a victory, and to send them back to him if the battle went the other way. At the same time he told the Shiʿa that God will send them angels in the form of white doves to help them against the Syrians. Dozy³ accepted this story and regarded it as a way in which al-Mukhtar would get information about the result of the battle. Rajkowski⁴ also accepted the story

¹. Die Religios-Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p.84.
but gave it the different explanation of being one of al-Mukhtar's methods of impressing his followers. The story seems to be, as Wellhausen has pointed out, a superstition derived from the story of Suraqa ibn Mirdas. The fact that no confirmation of it has been reported in our sources and that it only occurs, without a chain of authority, in al-Mubarrad, who is known to have had Khārijite inclinations, is enough to make us suspect it.

When al-Mukhtar accompanied Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ashtar on his departure to fight the Syrians, at Dair 'Abd al-Rahmān, they met some enthusiastic Shī'is with an empty chair placed on the back of a grey mule in a very solemn procession, escorted by the sadin (guardian), Ḥawshab al-Bursumī. They were circling it and asking God for victory. This scene, however, caused a reaction from the moderate Shī'a, such as Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ashtar, who disapproved of it. As we shall see later, it was one of the reasons which led him to abandon al-Mukhtar. On the other hand, it added to the zeal of the extremists and gave them courage to meet their Syrian adversaries.

Two narratives tell us of the origin of this Kursī (chair) and its cult.

1. Die Religios-Politischen Opposition-Sparteien im alten Islam, p. 84.
2. See p. 130.
3. Ansāb, V, pp. 247-8; Ṭabar, II, pp. 700-2; Kāmil, IV, p. 212; Nuwairī, XIX, fol. 32; Bidāya, VIII, p. 278.
The one is Abu Mikhnaf’s in Baladhuri and Tabari ¹ which depicts al-Mukhtar as responsible for the presence of the kursi. The second is that of Tufail ibn Ja’da ibn Hubaira in Tabari ² which shows al-Mukhtar only giving his approval to the idea. Both are repeated by Ibn al-Athir and Nuwairi ³. Abu Mikhnaf says that al-Mukhtar asked Al Ja’da ibn Hubaira ⁴ to give him the chair of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. They denied that they had such a chair, but when he insisted on it, they brought him one and claimed that it was the chair of ‘Ali. However, Tufail’s narrative differs in that he says one day he was in need of money and saw a chair with a neighbouring oil dealer. He took it after it had been cleaned. He went to al-Mukhtar and informed him that it was the chair on which his father Ja’da ibn Hubaira used to sit and that once it had belonged to ‘Ali. Al-Mukhtar ordered the chair to be brought and gave Tufail twelve thousand dirhams for it.

The most significant point here is, who were the guardians of the chair? and who were those encircling it in prayer? The answer may help us to trace the origin of this cult. It is reported by Abu Mikhnaf in Tabari ⁵ that the first

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1. Ansāb, V, pp.241-2; Tab., II, p.706.
4. Um Ja’da was Um Hanī’, the sister of ‘Ali ibn Abī Talib.
5. Tab., II, p.607.
sadin of the chair was Musā the son of Abū Musā al-Ashʿarī, and then Ḥawshab al-Bursumī. Both belonged to Yemenite tribes. Those who were surrounding and worshipping the chair were also Yemenites, members of the tribes of Shibām, Nahd, Kharīf and Shakir. The fact that in pre-Islamic times certain South Arabian clans acted as guardians of sanctuaries, and that guardianship passed from generation to generation, and conferred high status (Sharaf) ², explains why all the sadins of the Kursī were South Arabians. Moreover, among all South Arabian tribes the custom of carrying their tribal emblems with them when going to war was very common. For they believed that these emblems would give them victory and thus increase the valour of the warriors. Therefore, on the day of Dhu Qūr we find Banū Bakr ibn Waʿil expressing their joy by walking round the Qubba of Ḥanzala ibn Thaʿlabā before they held their meeting. ³ Thus the chair here acted exactly like a tribal emblem in giving victory and increasing the valour of the warriors. It is also significant that the word "minbar" was borrowed by old Arabic from the Ethiopian by way of South Arabia, and that the first Arabs to whom tradition attributes the use of the "minbar" were Yemenites. ⁴ It is not surprising,

1. Ibid., I, pp.705-6.


therefore, that the victory of Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ashtar made them worship it even more. It is clear, therefore, that the chair was not al-Mukhtar’s idea and in this case, we may prefer the narrative of Ṣufail to that of Abū Mikhnaf.

Nevertheless, the presence of the chair was used by al-M̱ukhtar as a means of getting more support from the extremist Shīʿa and encouraging the warriors. Certainly to them it was a holy chair, since they believed it to be ʿAlī’s, and would give them victory.

A new menace faced al-M̱ukhtar shortly after his victory over the Syrians. This danger came from Basra, where Muṣʿab ibn al-Zubair was governor for his brother ʿAbdallāh. After seizing Kūfa and defeating the Syrians, al-M̱ukhtar had become as formidable a foe of Ibn al-Zubair as ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān. His territories embraced al-Kūfa and its Sawād and also the whole Jazīra. ʿAbd al-Malik kept Syria and Egypt, while Ibn al-Zubair was confined to the poor country of al-Ḥijāz and Basra, and was threatened by both the presence of al-M̱ukhtar in Kūfa and the Kharijites in Persia. The Kūfan refugees in Basra, ten thousand in number, led by Shabath ibn Rabʿī and Muḥammad ibn al-ʿAshʿath al-Kindī played an important role in inciting Muṣʿab against al-M̱ukhtar and urging him to end his activities in Kūfa. But Muṣʿab would not yield to their request unless

2. Dinawarī, p.310.
3. Ansāb, V, pp.251, 270 (citing Madāʾīnī); Dinawarī, pp.310-11; Ṭab., II, p.718 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p.220; Nuwairī, XIX, fol. 36.
al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufra, with the troops of Basra, stopped fighting the Khārijites in al-Ahwāz, Fāris and Kirman, and joined his forces. This was because of al-Muhallab's military competence, and because his troops were composed of the best fighters of Basra. However, al-Muhallab was unwilling to leave his post as the governor of Fārs, or to stop the war against the Khārijites, and only after Muḥammad ibn al-Ashtar dispatched Muḥammad ibn al-Ashtar to him, with the claim that he had come as the messenger of the women and children of the Ashraf, would al-Muhallab agree to join the army of Muḥammad. He appointed his son Yazīd as his deputy in Fārs. The presence of al-Muhallab in this campaign re-enforced the army of Muḥammad with men, money and equipment, military experience and leadership. Muḥammad also was joined by 'Ubaidallah ibn 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭalib for personal reasons. Before leaving Basra, Muḥammad had secretly sent 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Mikhnaft to Kūfa in order to provoke the people against al-Mukhtar. Hearing of Muḥammad's preparations for war, al-Mukhtar delivered a speech in which he promised his followers victory. He followed this by raising an

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1. Ansāb, V, p.252; Dīnawārī, p.310; Ṭab., II, p.719 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūfī, II, fol. 13a.
2. It is said that al-Muhallab concluded a temporary truce with the Khārijite leader Qatīr ibn al-Fuja'a. See Dīnawārī, p.310.
3. Saʿd, V, pp.87-8; Zubairī, pp.43-4; Dīnawārī, p.311 (the name given here is ʿUmar ibn ʿAlī).
army under the command of Aḥmar ibn Shumait. Al-Mukhtar’s army
met the Basrans in al-Madḥar. Al-mawāli in al-Mukhtar’s army
were under the command of Abū ‘Amrā Kaisān, a mawla of ‘Uraīna.
Before the battle had started Abdallah ibn Wahab al-Juṣhamī, who was on
the left wing of Ibn Shumait’s army, (and who, it seems, could not bear to
see the mawāli mounted on horses and wanted to get rid of them as a reprisal
for what they had done against their masters) advised his commander-in-chief
to ask the mawāli to fight on foot on the excuse of their alleged readiness
to flee; the latter followed this advice. Al-Mukhtar’s army suffered a
crushing defeat in the battle and Aḥmar ibn Shumait was killed. Those
who fled were pursued by Muṣ‘ab’s cavalry, especially by the Kufan
refugees who killed everyone they caught, to revenge themselves. Only a

1. The number of Ibn Shumait’s army is given by Baladhurī (Ansāb, V, p.272)
as forty thousand; while Dīnawārī (p.311) makes it sixty thousand; but
Kūfī (II, fol. 28a) says it was only of three thousand.

2. It is reported by Waqīdī in Tab., (II, p.748) that al-Mukhtar told Ibn
Shumait to meet Muṣ‘ab in al-Madḥār, because he had heard that a
Thaqīfīte will gain victory in al-Madḥār. But that Thaqīfīte was al-
Hajjāj and not al-Mukhtar. This anticipatory character of this account
shows that it is of a later fabrication.


4. Tab., II, p.721 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p.221.

5. Although it is not mentioned in our sources, yet it seems that Abū ‘Amra
Kaisān was also killed in this battle, for we do not hear about him after
this defeat in al-Madḥār.
few reached Kūfa and communicated the news of the defeat to al-Mukhtar.
The date of this battle has not been given in our sources: one might assume it to be about the middle of 67/686. ¹

The defeat of al-Mukhtar’s army in al-Madhār had very serious consequences, both on his own part and on that of his followers. When the news of the defeat reached him, he said, "By God the slaves have been killed on an unprecedented scale". He also said on the same occasion, "Death is inevitable and there should be no better death for me than to die fighting like Ibn Shumait". ² This shows how disastrous it was for the morale of al-Mukhtar himself. It also shook to the very foundation the trust of his most sincere followers, i.e., the Persian mawāli to whom he had promised victory. They expressed this distrust by saying, "This time he told lies". ³

Meanwhile, Mus‘ab continued to march on Kūfa. In order to speed up his march, Mus‘ab ordered the infantry, the weak and the provisions to be carried by boats, while the cavalry advanced by land. In order to hamper their march, al-Mukhtar drained the Euphrates and caused its water to go into the neighbouring canals. As a result the Baṣrans’ boats came to a halt. But al-Mukhtar was unable to man the dam for long, so that the Baṣrans soon removed

¹. Wellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p.85.
². Ṭab., II, p.724 (citing Abu Mikhnaq); Kāmil, IV, p.222.
it, and could again continue their journey in their boats.  

After fortifying the mosque and the palace, al-Mukhtar left Kuفا and made his camp at Harūra in order to prevent Muṣʿab and his army from entering the city. He had left 'Abdallāh ibn Shaddād al-Jushāmī as his deputy there. Muṣʿab's army was arranged into five divisions. On the right wing was al-Muhallab, on the left was 'Umar ibn 'Ubaidallāh ibn Maʿmar al-Tamīmī; in command of the cavalry was 'Abbad ibn al-Ḥuṣayn, and of the infantry, Muqāṭil ibn Mismaʿ al-Bakrī; and the Kūfī refugees were under Muḥammad ibn al-ʿAshʿath al-Kindī. To counteract Muṣʿab, al-Mukhtar sent to every tribal "Fifth" of the Basrans, one of his followers from the same tribe. To Bakr ibn Wāʾil, he sent Saʿīd ibn Munqidh, to 'Abd al-Qaʾis he sent 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Shuraiḥ al-Shibāmī; to Ahl al-ʿĀliya he sent 'Abdallāh ibn Jaʿda ibn Hubaira al-Quraishi al-Makhzūmī; to al-Azd he sent Musafir ibn Saʿīd ibn Nimrān al-Nāʼitī; to Banū Tamīm he sent Sulaim ibn Yazīd al-Kindī and to Muḥammad ibn al-ʿAshʿath, he sent al-Saʿīb ibn Mālik al-ʿAshʿari. The two armies soon joined battle, in which Muḥammad ibn al-ʿAshʿath and 'Ubaidallāh ibn ʿĀli were killed. At this point, Muhallab's division joined the battle, attacked al-Mukhtar's army and inflicted defeat on

1. Ansāb, V, p.228; Ṭab., II, p.724; Kūfī, II, fol. 29a.
2. Ṭab., II, p.748 (citing al-Wāqīdī).
it. But al-Mukhtar continued to fight all the night, and only under pressure from his followers did he agree to return to the palace.\(^1\)

Since the battle of Khūzīr, 10th of Muharram 67/6th of August, 686, Ibrahim ibn al-Ashtar had remained in Muṣīl governing Jazīra and its dependences. Why did he remain there when al-Mukhtar was in such straits in Kūfa, and there was so little need for his presence in Muṣīl? Why did not al-Mukhtar ask him to come and join him in the war against Muṣ'abī? Wellhausen,\(^2\) presumes that there were reasons to prevent al-Mukhtar asking the help of Ibn al-Ashtar, or that the latter was not sincere in his adherence to al-Mukhtar. In fact, the relationship between al-Mukhtar and Ibrahim had become cool when, on Ibrahim's departure to flight 'Ubaidallah ibn Ziyād, al-Mukhtar's followers met him with the chair. Ibrahim had expressed his disapproval of this by saying, "O God, do not punish us because of the deeds of the silly among us."\(^3\) But he did not give up his task, perhaps because he was a sincere adherent of the Shi'i cause. He might also have been motivated by a personal ambition, in that he had been

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1. Ansāb, V, p.259; Tab., II, p.726ff. (citing Abū Mikhna). Here again, no date for the battle has been given and all we know is that it took place 67/686; but if we consider the narrative of Waqīdī in Tab., (II, p.748), which says that al-Mukhtar was killed in Ramadān, 67, four months after the battle of Harūrā, the date of the battle should be 15th Jumāda al-Awwal, 67/1st December, 686; Wellhausen, Die Religios-Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p.56.

2. Ibid., p.86.

3. Ansāb, V, p.248; Tab., II, p.702 (citing Abū Mikhna).
promised by Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya supposedly, (in the false letter), the governorship of conquered lands. His ambition was satisfied now that he was governor of Mūsīl and Jazīra; why, therefore, should he be concerned with al-Mukhtar's affairs? That the two were on not very good terms is hinted at by Ṭabarī; all the heads of the tribal quarters deserted Ibrāhīm as soon as he became governor of Mūsīl, since they believed him to be failing in his adherence to the cause of al-Mukhtar. These tribal heads were sent with Aḥmar ibn Shumait to the battle of al-Madhar. 1 When Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿath went as a messenger to al-Muḥallah, to ask him to join Muṣʿab against al-Mukhtar, we are told by Ibn Aṣḥam 2 that he told him, "Al-Mukhtar now stands alone, for Ibn al-Ashtar has deserted him and seized al-Jazīra." The same source says that when al-Mukhtar heard about Muṣʿab's preparations for war, he believed that Muṣʿab had been encouraged to attack, because he knew that Ibn al-Ashtar would no longer come to the assistance of al-Mukhtar. 3 Al-Mukhtar, trying to raise the valour of his followers, made it clear in his speeches that Ibn al-Ashtar was no longer on his side, and asked them to join the army of Ibn Shumait. 4 However, al-Mukhtar was in great need of Ibrāhīm's help and military experience, especially after the defeat of his army

1. Ṭab., II, p.720 (citing Abū Mikhnaft).
2. Kūfī, II, fol. 27b; Bāgh., pp.35-6.
4. Ibid.
in al-Madhār. He wrote several times to him to ask his help, but Ibrāhīm refused. ¹ When the battle of Ḥarūrā' began, al-Mukhtar could only express his deep sorrow and regret at his abandonment by Ibrāhīm. One could mention here that after al-Mukhtar's death, Ibrāhīm made a firm alliance with Muṣ'ab. Muṣ'ab would never have placed his complete confidence in Ibrāhīm, had he not been sure of his indifference to al-Mukhtar's cause. It is probable that if Ibrāhīm had not deserted al-Mukhtar, the outcome of the battles of Madhar and Ḥarūrā' might well have been different.

On the next day, (Thursday), Muṣ'ab and his army continued their march on Kūfa, which they entered from al-Sabakha and laid seige to al-Mukhtar. To prevent provisions reaching the latter and his followers, he sent Ḥabdallah ibn al-Ḥurr al-Ju'fī to Jabbānt al-Sā'idiyīn, and Ḥabd ibn al-Ḥusayn to Jabbānt Kinda; he also ordered al-Muhallab to patrol the road to and from Kūfa. ² These measures prevented al-Mukhtar from getting even drinking water from the Euphrates, so that he was forced to mix honey with the water from the palace wells.

In the palace, with al-Mukhtar, were a large number of mawāli and few 'Arabs. During the seige which lasted, according to Waqīdī ³, four months, or forty days according to Dinawarī ⁴, the 'Arabs deserted al-Mukhtar

1. Ibid., II, fol. 29a.
3. Ṭab., II, p.749.
4. Dinawarī, p.313.
and took refuge with their tribes, while the mawāli remained with him until he was killed. During the seige, however, al-Mukhtar's prestige had fallen and people in Kūfa dared to throw stones and rubbish on his followers.  

The only way they could get supplies was for their wives to bring them, but soon this visiting of wives was stopped. Realizing that the seige would weaken their resistance, al-Mukhtar urged his followers to go out with him and fight until they die or win, but they refused and decided to surrender unconditionally to Muṣ'ab. Therefore, al-Mukhtar and only nineteen followers went out to battle. Al-Mukhtar met his death after having distinguished himself in fighting courageously. It is reported that he said during this last battle before his death, to al-Sā'ib ibn Mālik al-Ash'arī: "I am an Arab. I saw 'Abdallāh ibn al-Zubair seize al-Hijāz, Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam seize Syria, Najda ibn ʿĀmir al-Ḥanāfi (the Khārajite) seize al-Yamāma; so I, inferior to none, seized this region. The only difference is that I revenged the Prophet's family (Ahl al-Bait) while the Arabs forgot it."  

Al-Mukhtar died on the 14th of Ramadān 67/3rd of April, 687, when he was 67 years old.  

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1. Tab., II, p.734 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p.224. 
2. Ansāb, V, p.261; Dinawarī, p.313; Tab., II, p.737 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kuṭī, II, fol. 30b; Kāmil, IV, p.225; Dhahabi, II, p.378. 
3. Tab., II, p.750. It is mentioned in Balādhuri (Ansāb, V, p.264) that al-Mukhtar's death was in 69/688 in the month of Ramadān. According to Fariq (op. cit., p.119, SII, III, no.2, 1966) this date is more likely since al-Mukhtar had fought several wars in distant regions where the means of communication were slow.
All those who were with al-Mukhtar in the palace, said to have been six thousand in number, were killed on the order of Mus‘ab, under pressure from the Kūfan refugees to take revenge for their relatives and kinsmen.¹ This massive slaughter provoked the indignation of pious men² like ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Umar, and many of the people of Kūfa, which could be noticed in the death of Mus‘ab in the battle of Maskin with ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān 72/691. Mus‘ab, however, showed no mercy towards al-Mukhtar’s followers, and killed the two sons of Ḥujr ibn ‘Adi and also the son of Ḥudhaifa ibn al-Yamān.³ He cut off the hand of al-Mukhtar and pinned it to the side of the mosque, an act which certainly enraged not only al-Mukhtar’s family but all those followers who remained faithful to him even after his death.

Following the death of al-Mukhtar, Mus‘ab summoned his two widows, Um Thābit bint Samūra ibn Jundūb al-Fazārī and ‘Amra bint al-Nu‘mān ibn Bāshīr al-Aṣārī, and ordered them to declare that al-Mukhtar was a liar and an imposter. The former yielded reluctantly, while the latter refused and asserted that he was a good Muslim. Mus‘ab imprisoned her and wrote to

1. Ansāb, V, pp.262-3; Dīnawarī, p.315; Ṭab., II, pp.740-1; Kūfī, II, fol. 31a; ‘Asākir, XVI, fol.270b (citing ‘Abdallah ibn Abī Rabī‘a al-Makhzumī); Kāmil, IV, p.225. It is reported also that Mus‘ab intended to kill the mawātī and set the ‘Arabs free. The latter were only seven hundred according to Ibn ‘Asākir (XVI, fol.270b) and two thousand according to Dīnawarī (p.315). See also Ansāb, V, p.263; Ṭab., II, p.749 (citing Wāqidi).
his brother 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair in Mecca, saying that she claimed that al-Mukhtar was a prophet. 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair passed sentence of death on her, but she still refused to recant. The poet 'Umar ibn Abī Rabī'ā al-Makhzumī has expressed how her death shocked the people at that time.

After al-Mukhtar's death, 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair sent his brother 'Urwa to Ibn al-Hanafiyya demanding his homage and threatening him with death should he refuse. 'Urwa gave his brother's message, and then said to Ibn al-Hanafiyya that, "God had killed the imposter al-Mukhtar on whom you were depending". Ibn al-Hanafiyya replied "... By God I did not send al-Mukhtar as my agent nor was he my supporter; he was more intimate with your brother than with me." This account shows that al-Mukhtar had exploited the name of Ibn al-Hanafiyya for his own ends, and that the latter did not approve of his activities.

The interpretation of al-Mukhtar's character given in both the early and late sources, as well as by modern historians, is of a "false prophet", making himself into the agent of al-Mahdi, with connotations of a reflection of the relationship between God and the Prophet, forecasting events to show

1. Ansāb, V, pp.263-4; Dīnawarī, p.315; Tab., II, pp.743-4 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kamīl, IV, p.227. Certainly this act provoked the people of Kūfa even more against Mus'ab, since he had committed a deed which the Prophet had forbidden against the wives of the infidels. 'Iqd, VI, p.118.
2. Ansāb, V, pp.263-4; Dīnawarī, p.315; Tab., II, p.744 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kamīl, IV, p.227.
3. Sa'd, V, pp.77-8; 'Asākir, XV, fol. 273a; Dhahabī, III, p.299.
himself as in touch with the unknown, using rhymed prose to imitate the Qur'an, and arousing and directing religious emotions for his own political ends. His motivations were no higher than political ambition, and he unscrupulously used all means to these ends. My own opinion is that he was a genuine Shi'ī and became impatient with Ibn al-Hanafiyya's inactivity in pursuing the revenge of al-Ḥusain, especially since he could see the political possibilities that the revenge could offer to an ambitious man. He achieved power by calling Ibn al-Hanafiyya al-Mahdī, and this sparked off a wave of religious fanaticism which he had to contain by continuing the religious pretence: for example, his use of rhymed prose, and his forecasts. He used this religious fanaticism both for the ends of his political ambition, and for the end of the revenge of al-Ḥusain. He seemed to have a genuine concern for the social dissabilities of the mawālī, although a part of this would spring from the fact that they were the easiest to arouse in support of his cause, both because of their religious extremism and their social grievances.

Apart from an ephemeral political success, the revolt of al-Mukhtar contributed considerably to the history of the Shi'īa movement; for it was connected with the origin of the Kaisāniyya and the Khāshabiyya sects.

Al-Kaisāniyya derives its name from a man called Kaisān, about whom our authorities are not agreed. It is said that Kaisān the mawlā of 'Alī ibn Abī
Tālib was the founder of the sect, from whom al-Mukhtar took his ideas; it is claimed that Kaisan was with al-Mukhtar in the taking of the revenge of al-Ḥusain. Since this Kaisan, however, was killed in the battle of Siffin 37/657, about thirty years before al-Mukhtar's revolt and the origin of the Kaisaniyya, it is impossible to accept this view. It is probable that by attributing the Kaisaniyya to the mawla of 'Alī, or depicting him as a disciple of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, the intention was to give the sect a strong religious pedigree, since Kaisan would take his knowledge either directly from his master, 'Alī, or indirectly from his son.

Another view holds that the Kaisan after whom the sect was named, was al-Mukhtar himself, who was nicknamed Kaisan, either by 'Alī or by Muhammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya. The sources, however, show only that al-Mukhtar was called "Kāyiṣ" by 'Alī and not Kaisan at all. The claim that the title was conferred on al-Mukhtar by Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya is extremely unlikely, since Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya never trusted him, nor recognized him as working for the "Ahl al-Bait". Therefore, it would seem that al-Mukhtar and Kaisan

1. Nawbakhti, p. 21; Maqālāt, p. 18; Ibn Ḥayyūn, Sharḥ al-Akhbār, fol. 48b; Mafārith, p. 21; Bagh., p. 27; Aḥyān, p. 35; Milal, p. 280; Ḥur, p. 182; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 39a; Muqaddima, p. 351.
2. Tab., I, p. 3293 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kāmil, III, p. 247.
3. Milal, p. 280; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 39a.
4. Ma'ārif, p. 267; Nawbakhti, p. 20; Al-lāqī, p. 218; Maqālāt, p. 18; Murūj, V, p. 180 (citing ʿUmar ibn ʿAbdās); Bagh., p. 27; Nubda min Kitāb al-Tarīkh, fol. 245b; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 39a.
were two different people. ¹

One final explanation for the name Kaisāniyya is given by Ibn Ḥazm and Nashwān al-Ḥimyari, ² who state that the Kaisāniyya were the followers of al-Mukhtār and Kaisān Abū ‘Amra, a mawla of ‘Uрайnā from the tribe of Bajila. This last explanation helps us to clarify the point that, if al-Mukhtār was ever called Kaisān, it was due to the activities of Kaisān Abū ‘Amra, who as the head of al-Mukhtār’s personal guard, threatened the non-Shiʿī and was very influential among his fellow mawalī. It could be that when in later years Kaisān’s activity against the non-Shiʿī were remembered, after the man himself had been forgotten, the word “Kaisāniyya” was used to describe all the activities of that brief spell of al-Mukhtār’s power. This shows how Kaisān and al-Mukhtār became linked names, so that Mukhtariyya and Kaisāniyya became synonymous.

This study is not concerned with the theological aspect of al-Kaisāniyya sect; it is suffice to mention here that the political party which overthrew the Umayyids and established the ‘Abbāsids in power (the Ḥāshimiyya) was a group of the Kaisāniyya, which split into three groups after the death of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya. ³

2. Fiṣal, IV, p. 94; Ḥūr, p. 182; Freidlaender, The Heterodoxies of the Shiʿites in the Presentation of Ibn Ḥazm, p. 34, JAOS, XXIX, 1908.
3. Van Vloten, op. cit., p. 42; E.I. ², (‘Abbāsīd), (Ḥāshimiyya), (Ghulāt).
The name al-Khashabiyya, "club men", was used for the first time to designate those sent by al-Mukhtar from among the people of Kūfa to rescue Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, after being imprisoned by Ibn al-Zubair. They were called so because they held wooden clubs in their hands as weapons. It is said that this was on the instructions of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya to avoid the use of swords in the ḥaram. It is also reported by al-Baladhuri and Ibn al-Athir, on doubtful evidence, that they were called Khashabiyya because they took the wooden clubs which were piled up by Ibn al-Zubair beside the prison in preparation for burning Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya and his followers. The fact that Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya was always against violence and the use of force and that it was only on their entry into al-Ḥaram that they held swords, makes us favour the first interpretation.

Another account has it that it was Ibrāhīm's army that was called Khashabiyya. According to Ibn Qutaiba, Ibn Rusta and Maqdisi, most of Ibrāhīm's army that fought Ibn Ziyād carried wooden arms (khashab), and for

1. Akhbar, fols. 45b, 46a, 47a; Ansāb, V, p.231; Tab., II, p.694 (citing Abū Mikhnaaf); Kāmil, IV, p.207.
2. Akhbar, fol. 47a; Ansāb, V, p.231; fol. 262a; Tab., II, pp.694-5 (citing Abū Mikhnaaf); Kūft, II, fol. 11b; Kāmil, IV, p.207.
3. Ansāb, V, p.231; fol. 262a; Kāmil, IV, p.207.
4. Sa'ed, V, p.78; Ansāb, V, pp.246-7; Tab., II, pp.689-91 (citing Abū Mikhnaaf); Kūft, II, fol.12a; Kāmil, IV, pp.204-5.
5. Ma'ārif, p.267; A'laq, p.218; Bad', V, p.133.
this reason were called Khashabiyya. After al-Mukhtar’s death, al-
Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufra, a general of Muṣʿab ibn al-Zubair, laid seige to
Naṣībīn, where Ibrāhīm al-Ashtar was governor. Abu Qārīb, Yazīd ibn
Abī Ṣakhr and the Khashabiyya were defending the city. Muhallab addressed
the people saying, “Do not be frightened of these men. They are only slaves
with nothing in their hands but sticks.” This shows both that Khashabiyya
was being used as a name for Ibrāhīm’s army, and that this was associated
with the fact that they were mawātī.

These Khashabiyya are not the same as those who rescued Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya
from Ibn al-Zubair. This is made clear by information given in Baladhurī, who relates that the four thousand men who came to Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya’s
rescue, and among whom he distributed the money sent by al-Mukhtar, did
not go back to Kūfa, but remained with him in the Shiʿb of ‘Alī. Even those
few among them who, with the permission of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, went to see
their families and remained in Kūfa until the battle of Jabbanāt al-Suba‘ī,
fought in that battle against al-Mukhtar. It is therefore difficult to imagine
them in the army of Ibn al-Ashtar fighting the Syrians for the sake of al-
Mukhtar; nor would the latter have trusted them any more. This informa-
tion of Baladhurī has been confirmed by Ibn Saʿd’s narrative which says that

2. Akhbār, fol. 47a; Ansāb, fol. 262a.
3. Saʿd, V, p. 76.
in the year 66-67/685-686, Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya and four thousand of the Khashabiyya who were residing in the Shiʿb of Mina performed the pilgrimage. Thus there were two groups of men known as Khashabiyya: the first, the rescuers of Ibn al-Ḥanafiyya, and the second, Ibrāhīm's army. In the first case, the name was simply used as a descriptive name; it seems that it was the second group that developed into a religious sect.

What was the relationship between al-Mukhtar, the Kaisāniyya and the Khashabiyya? Al-Masʿūdī 1 tells us that when al-Mukhtar was fighting Muṣʿab ibn al-Zubair, "he had with him many of the Shiʿa, called Khashabiyya, belonging to the Kaisāniyya." On the authority of al-Zubair ibn Bakkar, al-Īsbahānī 2 says that, "it was Khuyūf al-Asadi who converted Kūthayyir (who was known to be a Kaisāni) 3 to the Khashabiyya." Al-Masʿūdī in al-Tanbih says that when al-Mukhtar was killed and his followers, about six thousand, surrendered unconditionally to Muṣʿab, they were all put to death; these followers were known as Khashabiyya. 4 We are told by al-Ṭabarī and al-Īsbahānī, 5 that Yazīd ibn Ḥusayn al-Khashabi received his

4. Tanbih, pp. 132-133.
5. Ţabarī, II, p. 1798; Agh., VI, p. 139.
name from the fact that he was descended from one of the Khashabiyya of al-Mukhtar. These accounts show that al-Khashabiyya was used as a name for al-Mukhtar's followers, and that either al-Khashabiyya was another name for al-Kaisaniyya or else that one of the sects took over the other, perhaps in a later period, so that the two names were used interchangeably.

As to the reason why Ibrāhīm's followers carried wooden clubs in their hands and not weapons, modern historians disagree. Wellhausen presumes that being mawālī, they were poor and thus could not afford to buy weapons. The fact that it is not true that all the mawālī were poor, nor that all the Khashabiyya were mawālī, makes this presumption inadequate. As has been pointed out by Friedlaender, the name must have had religious implications. It is reported by Ibn Ḥazm that the Rawāfid hold that it was forbidden to use weapons before the speaking Imam (al-Nātiq) came forth. After that, it would be obligatory to draw swords along with him. It may be that the Khashabiyya were motivated by similar doctrinal reasons, since both were extremist Shīʿī sects. This doctrine of using sticks instead of weapons has been ascribed to both Jewish and Christian origins.

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2. Die Religios-Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p.80.
3. op. cit., p.94, JAOS, XXIX, 1908.
4. Fisal, IV, p.171.
5. Friedlaender, op. cit., p.94, JAOS, XXIX, 1908.
Al-Khashabiyya as a name was also given to a group of a Zaidi Shi'a, known as Shurkhabiyya after a certain Shurkhab al-Tabari. This obscure Shurkhab might, as Arendank has suggested, have been the one who played a part in Tabaristan in the time of al-Hasan ibn Zaid.

It is also reported that a group of al-Jahmiyya was called Khashabiyya; they held that God does not speak and that the Qur'an is created.

Finally, it is reported that al-Khashabiyya were called so because they kept the wood on which Zaid ibn 'Ali was crucified. This, however, cannot be true, because the crucifixion of Zaid happened much later, after the death of Ibn 'Umar, on whose authority this story has been reported.

1. Mafatih, p. 21; Adyan, pp. 34-5.
3. Ibn Isfandiyar, (English translation by E. G. Browne), Index.
CHAPTER III

‘ABD AL-MALIK IBN MARWĀN AND THE ‘AṢABIYYA

Tribal feuding existed long before ‘Abd al-Malik's reign began, although it reached a new intensity during his caliphate. Nevertheless, by the end of his reign, outbreaks of raiding and other manifestations of ‘Aṣabiyya were very much in the decline, as a result of the policies pursued by ‘Abd al-Malik towards the tribes.

Feuding broke out in both Syria and al-Jazīra first between the Qais and the Kalb, and later between the Qais and the Taghlib. Khurāsān was also the scene of feuding, starting between Rabī‘a and Muḍar (i.e. Bakr, Tamīm and Qais). Later, the Muḍarites divided, and feuding began between the Tamīm and the Qais. Finally, the Tamīm began to feud among themselves.

Historians hold different views on the origins of the antagonism between the Qais and the Kalb (i.e. the Northern and Southern ‘Arabs). While Dozy\(^1\) thinks that the struggle between the Qais and the Kalb "has existed from time immemorial", Goldziher\(^2\) considers that it derived from the rivalry between the Quraish and the Ansār. Wellhausen\(^3\) stresses the view that the hostility between the Qais and the Kalb "did not exist before the capture of Syria by the Muslims and the immigration thither of the Qais". It seems erroneous

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to connect these feuds with the pre-Islamic ones, for the latter were
between "neighbouring tribes often related to one another". ¹

The development of the tribal feuds in the Umayyad period seems to be due to economic and social factors and goes back to the time of the
Conquest and the settlement of Arab tribes in the conquered lands. Even before the conquest of Syria, there were many Arab tribes living there, most of them Yemenites. They were Ghassān, Tanūkh, Judhām, ‘Āmila, Kalb, Salih, and Bahra‘. In the north of Syria there were Taghlib, Tanūkh, Iyād and al-Nimr ibn Qāṣīt.² Some of these tribes, such as Ghassān, were associated with the Byzantines and even fought against the Arabs with the Byzantines.³ This might have temporarily weakened the Yemenite influence in Syria, yet their prior presence and their numerical strength meant that they soon regained much of their earlier predominance over the other tribes. Their years of contact with the Byzantine Empire had raised their economic standards of living, and culturally and economically they were superior to the new settling ‘Arabs. On the other hand, the conquering Yemenite Arabs felt that the prior occupation of parts of Syria gave them a special interest in the area: when the Caliph ‘Umar I tried to send reinforcements to the Muslim

² Ma’dārif, p.212; Ishāqī, pp. 225, 313-14, 327; Futuh, p.59; Ṭab., I, p.2347; Hamdānī, Ṣifat Jazīrat al-‘Arab, p.129; Agh., XV, p.91; Bakrī, I, pp.50, 86; Jamhārat, p.423; ‘Ibar, II, pp.36-7.
³ Futuh, p.135; Ṭab., I, p.2081 (citing Sa‘īf ibn ‘Umar); E. 1.², (Ghassān).
armies who were carrying out the conquest of Iraq, the Yemenites preferred to go to Syria as "the land of their forefathers." Thus most of the new ‘Arab settlers arriving with the conquests were also Yemenites, thus making it likely that the Southern Arabs would continue to be dominant in Syria even after the conquest. A look at the settlement of tribes in Syria clearly shows this dominance: in Palestine were Lakham, ‘Āmila, Judham and Kalb; in Jordan were Ghassān, Madhhij, Gudā‘a, Hamdān, Kalb and ‘Ik; Ḥūrān and Jūlān contained a mixture of Lakham, Juhaina and Dhūbiyān; while Damascus was also inhabited by Gudā‘a, Ghassān and Ḥīmyar with a small number of Qaisite and Quraishite. Ḥims was predominantly Yemenite in character, where were Kinda, Ṭay, Ḥīmyar, Kalb, Hamdān and a minority of ‘Iyād and Qais. Ḥamāt was inhabited by Yementies too, especially the Tanukh and Bahra’. In the northern region we find Salīḥ, Zubaid, Hamdān, Kinda, and Ṭay, all Yemenite, with a minority of Qais and ‘Iyād. The Qais were in a majority in Qinsrīn and its outskirts, as well as in the Jazīra; as were the Rabī‘a. The Kalb, on the other hand, were the sole occupants of the desert of the Samāwa. The Taghlib were on the Ḫabūr in the Jazīra region.

1. Ṭab., I, pp. 2167-8; 2217-8 (citing Saif ibn ‘Umar).
The campaigns of the conquest led to a new development in the structure of Arabian society: the change from the Bedouin way of life to city-dwelling, as different tribes settled in the cities of the conquered lands. Contrary to one's expectation, that this settlement in the cities would weaken tribal cohesion, and act as a check on the rivalries and jealousies of the different tribes now forced to live together, it did, in fact, increase tribal loyalty. Indeed, the Caliph had military reasons for maintaining tribal loyalties, as they were used to maintain discipline in the lower ranks of the army. The settlement in towns was organised on a tribal basis, each tribe having its own quarter.¹

In Syria, the military settlements and districts of the tribes were called Jund. The tribes were quartered in these Jund, and could be mobilized for seasonal campaigns or for more protracted expeditions. There were at first four Junds in Syria, of Ḥimṣ, Damascus, Jordan and Palestine. Later, the Jund of Qinasrīn is said to have been detached from this organization by the caliph Yazīd.² "The whole army was a mixture of men of various tribes, but in the lower ranks, the soldiers remained grouped in communities of tribal origin".³

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²  E. I.², (Djund).
³  E. I.², (Djaysh).
From the battle of Șiffīn, one can detect the elements of the Syrian army in the early Umayyad period. In that battle the army of Muʿāwiya was composed mainly of Yemenites with a minority of Qaisite but no Rabīʾites. The Yemenites were Ḥimyar, Qudāʿa (Kalb and Tanūkh), Lakham, Judhām, Hamdām, Khathʿam, Ghassān, Madhhib, ‘Ik, Ashʿar, Kinda and Azd. The Qais minority were mainly Hawāzin, Ghāṭafān, Sulaim and Iyād. On the whole, command of the army was in the hands of the Quraish. The religious and political superiority which the Quraish had enjoyed over the other tribes in pre-Islamic times continued in Islamic times due to their special status as the tribe of the Prophet: they held, in fact, almost all the important offices, as commanders of armies and rulers of the ‘Arabs. This helped them to maintain a position above the rivalry of the tribes. The Umayyad and the Quraish, while not unnaturally choosing to rely on the stronger Kalb, nevertheless avoided antagonizing the Qais, with whom they were related by blood-ties.

To return to the tribal organizations of the cities, this served to preserve the tribes as distinctive units and to prevent much inter-tribal mixing. On the other hand, the new closeness of the tribes made friction between them unavoidable, thus causing unrest and feuding.

To examine this specifically in the Syrian context, jealousies were aroused between the dominant Yemeni element, especially the Kalb, with their resentment of the non-Yemenite groups with whom they had to share resources, and the Qais, who envied the Yemeni influence and prosperity.

This jealousy showed itself clearly in the relations between the two parties and the sovereign, i.e. first the governor of Syria and then the Umayyad caliph. Both parties competed with each other to get the favour of the ruler by offering their services to him in return for rewards or appointment to state offices, a rich source of both wealth and influence. The sovereign chose to rely most on the Kalbites, as they were the stronger, a fact which both increased the strength of the Kalbites through government patronage, and caused the Qais to swing into bitter opposition to the government. The Qais found themselves deprived of office and influence, and thus unable to themselves act as a patronage group, which in its turn increased their hostility to the Kalbites. It is in the light of this vicious circle that the relations between the Umayyad caliphs and the tribes should be seen.

The policy of Mu'awiya in Syria follows this pattern, for he favoured the Kalb in order to both secure his own position at home, and to prepare himself to face the Caliph 'Alī Ibn Abī Ṭalib in war. Both he and his son
Yazīd concluded marriage alliances with the Kalbites, which made the Yemenites in general, and the Kalb in particular, the most influential of the tribes in Syria during their reign, and during the short reign of Mu‘āwiya II. It is also reported in the Kitābat Aghānī that at first Mu‘āwiya allotted the ‘Atā’ to the Yemenite tribes alone, thus strengthening the Yemenites to the extent that they threatened the Qais with expulsion from Syria. No other sources confirm this account, but even if it is an exaggeration, it may well have been based on the state of tribal tension at the time.

Conflict in the interests of the two tribes, led the Kalbites (Yemenites) and the Qaisites (Mu‘ārītes) to support opposing political groups. In the period of political trouble that followed the death of the caliph Yazīd I, the support the Yemenites gave to the Umayyads was due to the favourable economic and political position which they had enjoyed under them.

1. Ansāb, IV, ii, p. 61; Tab., II, p. 204; Khulafā’, II, fol. 70b; E. l., (Kais’ Ailān); E. l., (Kalb). These marriage alliances between the Kalb tribe and the Umayyad family date from the time of the caliph cUthmān ibn ‘Affān, who married Nā‘īla bint al-Farāfiṣa, a Kalbite. Ansāb, V, p. 99 (citing Madā’ inī and Abū Mikhnafr), 106; Tab., I, p. 3056.


3. Agh., XVIII, pp. 69-70. Concerning the favour shown by Mu‘āwiya to the Yemenites, see also Naṣr ibn Muzāḥim, op. cit., pp. 492-3.

4. See the notes 1 and 2 on this page.
the other hand, the Qaisites gave their full support to Ibn al-Zubair, less for their love of his cause, then for their hatred to the Kalbites, and the Umayyads who supported them. Mas′ūdī reports that the Yemenites, headed by the Kalbite Hassan ibn Mālik Ibn Bahdal, stipulated, before giving their full support to Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam, that they should be given the same concessions as they enjoyed during the caliphates of Mu′āwiya I, Yazīd I and Mu′āwiya II. These were that two thousand of them should receive two thousand dirhams each annual payment for their support, and if the recipient died, his son or cousin should receive the payment. The Kalbites should be given the front place in the court, and should be consulted in every important matter. To all these terms Marwān gave his consent.

It is also reported by Abū Ja`fr in Ṭabarī, that before al-Ḥusain ibn Numair gave his support to Marwān, he stipulated that he should give al-Balqāʾ to Kinda as a fief. Not unnaturally, therefore, the Qaisite gave their full support in the battle of Marj Rahit (64/683) to Ibn al-Zubair while the Yemenites took the side of Marwān. This battle, however, ended with a crushing defeat for the Qaisites. This defeat at the hands of the Yemenites

2. Ṭab., II, p.487.
4. It is reported that nine thousand Qaisites were killed. This might be an exaggeration, but it does reflect that heavy losses were suffered. Abū Tammām, Naqa’il Jarīr wal Akhtal, p.17; Marzubānī, op. cit., p.227.
was never forgotten by the Qais, and made the conflict between the two
even deeper. This was one reason for the feuds between them in the
reign of 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan, for the Qaisites found in the political
disturbances at the time of his accession an opportunity to revenge themselves.

Tribal conflicts over waterwells and pastureland did not cease with
Islam and continued even during the Umayyad period. A good example
of such conflict can be found in the region of al-Jazīra. The immigration
of Qais at the time of the conquest brought them close to the Taghlib who
were dwelling in Muṣil and the Euphrates basin. As a result, they began
to compete with each other for the most important economic resources,
water wells and pastureland, which was a cause of the feud between them
during the caliphate of 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan. Economic and social
conflicts led to other differences; while the Qais were pro-Zubairids, we find
the Taghlib supporting the Umayyads. It seems that this was the reason for
the Taghlib joining the Yemenites in the battle of Marj Rahit against the

1. Abu Tammān, Naqā' id Jarīr wal Akhtal, pp. 24, 25, 26; Idem,
Hamāsa, I, pp. 71, 317-18; Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, I, pp. 256-57;
Hayawan, III, pp. 422-23; Ansāb, V, pp. 141-2 (citing Abū Mikhnaf);
Tab., II, pp. 462-63; Amidī, pp. 74, 129; Murāj, V, p. 203; Agīr, XVII,
p. 112 (citing Madsīnī); Mu'jam, II, pp. 743-44.

2. E. I. 1, (Kais 'Ailān; E. I. 1, (Taghlib).

3. See below, p. 185 ff.
Qaisites.\(^1\) They probably hoped that the defeat of the Qaisites in this battle would enable them to expel the Qaisites from the region, leaving them free to enjoy its economic advantages. However, despite their defeat, the Qaisites continued to live as neighbours of the Taghlib, thus ensuring the continuation of the tribal conflict.

A third scene of tribal conflict was Khurasan, where it flared up after the death of the caliph Yazid I. We shall have occasion to discuss this later in detail: it is sufficient to mention here that the Rabī‘a were jealous of the extent to which the Mu‘ār were exploiting the resources of Khurasan.\(^2\)

During the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān (65-86), no such tribal feuds as were taking place in al-Jazīra or Khurasan, have been reported to us in Iraq. It seems that the people of both Kūfa and Basra were pre-occupied with fighting the Kharijites \(^3\) (Azāriqa and Shabīb).

Moreover, one must not forget the efforts made by al-Ḥajjāj to suppress the ‘Āṣabiyya among the tribes. The people of Iraq were also busy in the conquest of the Eastern provinces. However, tribal rivalry and jealousy did assert itself in an earlier period. The attempt of al-Muthanna ibn

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2. Futūḥ, p.414; Ansāb, fol. 593a; Tab., II, p.486ff.

Mukharriba al-‘Abdi to seize al-Baṣra for al-Mukhtar, and the revolt of Ibn al-Jārud (where the Qaisite sided with al-Hājjāj), are good examples of conflicts between the tribes. This will be discussed in detail in a later chapter.

The Qaisites were awaiting their opportunity to avenge themselves for their defeat in the battle of Marj Rahiṭ: this came in the battle of Khāzir, 10th Muharram 67/6th August 686, when ‘Umair ibn al-Ḥubāb al-Sulami, who was with the Qaisites on the left wing of the Syrian army, deserted the battlefield as soon as the battle was joined, thus bringing about the victory of the Iraqis. Following this treason, ‘Umair took refuge with the head of the Qaisites, Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith al-Kilābī. The latter had been keeping a strong hold on Ḍaṛṣya against the Umayyads, since the battle of Marj Rahiṭ. From this time onwards began the armed conflict between Qais and Kalb, taking the form of raids. These wars or raids were called Ayyām (days), each of which usually carried the name of the place in which the raid occurred.

Our information about these "days" comes mainly from al-Baladhuri and al-İsbaḥānī in his Aghānī. Ibn al-Athīr mainly repeats the narrative

of al-Balādhurī. He repeats the narrative of al-Madāʾīnī in Ṭabarī when dealing with the feuds in Khurasan, and thus in both cases he adds but little to our knowledge. Al-Ṭabarī, however, provides an important detailed account of the tribal conflicts in Khurasan and the Eastern provinces, which together with that of Ibn Aʾtham, provides us with a full picture of the events in that area. Our second source of information is the poetical works of al-Akhṭal, Qatāmī, Farazdaq and Jarīr, as well as many other poetical and literary works, which confirm the historical tradition that has reached us from the classical sources. Finally, there is another indispensable source of information on these "days", in the books of genealogy (Nasab) of Ibn Ḥabīb, Ibn al-Kalbī, Ibn Duraid, al-Hamdānī, Ibn Ḥazm and al-Samʿānī. Apart from such scattered information as they contain, they are useful in that they show the tribal relationships of the individuals involved in these "days". However, despite the abundance of the material we possess about these "days", it is of a somewhat confused nature and rarely follows a chronological sequence. Yet, by comparing the different narratives and by following the faint clues they contain, one is able to build up a chronology for these events.

We have four narratives which describe the beginning of the feud

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1. Abu ʿUbaida, Naqāʾid Jarīr wal Farazdaq; Abu Tammām, Naqāʾid Jarīr wal-Akhtal; Al-Gurashi, Jamharat Ashʿar al-ʿArab; Ibn Sallām, Tabaqāt al-Shuʿarāʾ; Jahīz, Al-Ḫayawān; Rasʿīl; Al-Bayān wal Ṭabyīn; Amidī, Al-Muʿtālif wal-Mukhtalif...; Marzubānī, Muʾjam al-Shuʿarāʾ; Tawḥīdī, Al-Imtāʾ wal-Muʿānasa; Al-ʿAskarī, Kitāb al-Ṣīnāʾaṭān.
between the Qais and Kalb; two are in Balādhuri\(^1\) and two in the 
Kitāb al-Aghānī.\(^2\) The first account of Balādhuri narrates that when 
the battle of Marj Rāḥīt was over, Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith al-Kilābī fled 
to Qarqīsyā'. He was then joined by 'Umair ibn al-Ḥubāb al-Sulāmī. 
They both began to make raids on the Kalbites and other Yemenites to 
revenge the death of those Qaisites killed in Marj Rāḥīt. Some of the 
Taghlib were with them in these raids, which led the Kalbites to retaliate 
by raiding those Taghlib who were with Zufar. The second narrative of 
Balādhuri has come to us on the authority of Dawūd ibn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd. 
He says that after the battle of Khāzir, 'Umair ibn al-Ḥubāb al-Sulāmī, 
scoffing to join al-Mukhtar, went to Qarqīsyā' to join Zufar ibn al- 
Ḥārith al-Kilābī, where the two began to raid the Kalbites and other 
Yemenites. Owing to the many problems which 'Abd al-Malik faced at 
the time, he was unable to deal with Zufar immediately. Meanwhile, 'Umair 
ibn al-Ḥubāb, not wishing to stay longer with Zufar in Qarqīsyā', asked 'Abd 
al-Malik for Aman. Despite the malice which 'Abd al-Malik bore against 
'Umair for his treason in the battle of Khāzir, he did not refuse to grant 
this request, and 'Umair joined 'Abd al-Malik. However, false rumours 
soon caused 'Abd al-Malik to imprison 'Umair, who however eventually 
managed to escape and went to al-Jazīra. 'Umair took his residence on

2. Agh., XVII, p.111ff.; XX, p.120ff.
the banks of the Bulaikh river, where he was joined by his branch of the Qaisites. He then began to make raids on the Kalb and other Yemenites in the region, and also made enemies of his Taghlibite neighbours by tyrannizing them. This was before 'Abd al-Malik marched to fight first Zufar, and then Mus'ab ibn al-Zubair. Both of these narratives show that the feud between Qais and Kalb was started by the Qaisites. They also agree that Zufar ibn al-Ḥarīth and 'Umair ibn al-Ḥubāb together began to raid the Kalb and other Yemenites from Qarqisya'. However, the first narrative, which comes to us without any chain of authority, makes no mention of the role of 'Umair in the battle of Khāzir, and portrays him as joining Zufar after the battle of Marj Rāhiṭ. Thus it does not follow as closely the sequence of events as the second account, although it does explain how some of the Taghlib took part in the Qaisite raids on the Kalbites. The second narrative is repeated by Ibn al-Athīr. 1

According to the first narrative of the Kitāb al-Aghānī, 2 however, the feud began when Zufar ibn al-Ḥarīth al-Kilābī made a sudden attack on the settlements of the Kalbites in Musaiyakh, killing twenty of their men. When news of this reached Ḥumaid ibn Ḥurairīth ibn Baḥdal al-Kalbī,

2. Agh., XX, pp.120-1.
he retaliated by killing sixty men from Banū Numair, who were living in Tadmur. This slaughter of Banū Numair led Zufar to search out the Kalbites, and kill more than five hundred of them in the "day" known as the "day of al-Ilkīl". Zufar returned safely to Qarqīsyā, where Ḥumaid could not reach him. The second narrative of the Kitāb al-
Aghānī, on the authority of Mada'īnī, says that, following the defeat of the Qaisites in the battle of Marj Rāḥit, Zufar fled to Qarqīsyā, where he was joined by ʿUmair ibn al-Ḥubāb after the death of Ibn Ziyād in the battle of Khāzir. Then ʿUmair began his raids on Kalb, Qudāʿa and other Yemenites. These raids caused the Kalb, led by Ḥumaid ibn Ḥuraith ibn Bahdal, to retaliate, killing a large number of the tribe of Banū Numair in Tadmur.

Thus we see that the Kitāb al-Aghānī's first narrative portrays Zufar, and not ʿUmair, as the one who began the feud. This, however, is not confirmed in any other accounts. On the other hand, the narrative of Mada'īnī in the Kitāb al-Aghānī confirms that of Dāwūd ibn ʿAbd al-
Hāmid in Baladhuri, in that both say it was ʿUmair who started the feud against the Kalb. They also agree that ʿUmair only joined Zufar in Qarqīsyā after the battle of Khāzir. Therefore, it is possible to give

2. Forming his opinion from Kitāb al-Aghānī's narratives, Wellhausen decides that it was Zufar ibn al-Ḥarith who started the feuds, and not ʿUmair ibn al-Ḥubāb. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p.202.
a rough date for the beginning of this feud, from these two accounts. The feud, it seems, did not start before the year 67/686, for this was the year of the battle of Khāzir, the time when 'Umair joined Zufar. Moreover, considering that narrative of Baladhuri which states that 'Umair's raids on the Kalbites were before 'Abd al-Malik had fought either Zufar or Muṣ'ab, it is also possible to conclude that these raids between Kalb and Qais were confined to a period between 67/686 and 70/699, for 'Abd al-Malik fought Zufar and Muṣ'ab in the years 70-72 (699-701). Perhaps this is why Ibn al-Athir\(^1\) gives the year 70/699 as the date of the feud. After the slaughter of the Banū Numair in Tadmur by Ḥumaid ibn Ḥuraith ibn Bahdāl, Zufar ibn al-Ḥarīth killed five hundred Kalbites.\(^2\) However, Ḥumaid attempted to retaliate by following 'Umair when he went to raid the Banū Janāb of the Kalb tribe, but being unable to reach him, he instead attacked a group of Qaisite followers of 'Umair, and put them all to death, except for one who managed to flee and carry the news of this massacre to 'Umair.\(^3\) 'Umair returned to Qarqīṣyā'. The feuds between Qais and Kalb continued and the names of several "days"

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2. Agh., XX, p.121.
are reported to us, such as that of al-Ghwair, al-Faras and Duhman.¹

Owing to these constant raids, the Kalbites left the area affected by the Qasite raids, and emigrated to al-Ghaur in Palestine.² Thus we see that Qais realized their end of achieving unchallenged supremacy in the area.

Following the accession of Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam to the Caliphate 64/684, he sent an army under 'Ubaidallah ibn Ziyād to conquer Kūfa. On his way, Ibn Ziyād tried to liquidate Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith, who, with the Qaisites, had a strong hold on Qarqīsya. After an abortive seige of a year, Ibn Ziyād had to give up this project, and marched on to Kūfa, where he was defeated and killed in the battle of Khāzir, 67/68.³

Being engaged in consolidating his power in Syria, ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān left Zufar and the Qais in Qarqīsya unmolested for a while. However, as soon as he felt secure enough at home, he returned his attention towards Iraq. There was little point in attacking Muḥāb ibn al-Zubair, the governor of Iraq for his brother ‘Abdallah, while Zufar still held Qarqīsya in support of Ibn al-Zubair. Therefore, before advancing against Muḥāb, ‘Abd al-Malik wrote to Aḥān Ibn Abi 'Uqba Ibn Abi Mu‘āīt, his governor of Hims, ordering him to fight Zufar in in Qarqīsya.⁴

¹. Agh., XX, pp. 121-23.
². Ansāb, V, p. 308; Agh., XX, p. 123.
³. See Chapter II, p. 131.
⁴. Ansāb, V, p. 307 (citing al-Haytham); Kāmil, IV, p. 275; 'Ibar, III, p. 81.
Zufar's forces were defeated in this campaign and one of his sons killed, yet he still remained in control of Qarqīsyā'.

Having put down the revolt of 'Amr ibn Sa'id al-Ashdaq in Damascus, 'Abd al-Malik once again marched against Iraq to fight Mus'ab ibn al-Zubair. Before doing so, he made another attempt to end the insurrection of Zufar and the Qaisites in Qarqīsyā'. This task occupied the whole summer of 71-72/691.1 'Abd al-Malik first laid siege to the city of Qarqīsyā' and began to bombard its fortifications by catapults for forty days. Following the advice of the Kalbites, 'Abd al-Malik ordered that only the Yemenites in his army should take part in the battle which followed the siege. This decision, however, worked in the favour of Zufar and his followers who were able to cause 'Abd al-Malik's Yemenites to retreat.2 'Abd al-Malik's army at this time was composed predominantly of Yemenites, especially Kalb, Qudā' and to a lesser extent, Kinda. There were minorities of Qaisites and Quraishites — the latter including the caliph and some 'Umayyad princes.3

Having failed to attain his goal by force, 'Abd al-Malik tried by peaceful means, endeavouring to reconcile Zufar. He wrote to him asking for his obedience, pointing out that the majority of Muslims recognized him

3. Ansāb, V, pp. 301-5, 307 (citing al-Haytham); Kūfī, II, fol. 50a; Kāmil, IV, p. 276; 'Ilbar, III, p. 81-2.
as caliph, and inviting him to do the same. ‘Abd al-Malik promised
him a reward for his acceptance of this offer, and threatened him, should
he refuse it.¹ The messengers of ‘Abd al-Malik were the theologian
Raja’ ibn Haiwa al-Kindī and al-Hağja’ ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi.² However,
Zufar refused this offer; but his son al-Hudhail was not unwilling to
accept it. This convinced ‘Abd al-Malik of the possibility of reaching
a peaceful settlement and led him to order his brother Muḥammad ibn
Marwān to grant Zufar and his son al-Hudhail, Amān (safe conduct) for
themselves and their followers and promise them favour.³ Al-Hudhail
again responded to this offer and managed to persuade his father to accept
it. Zufar agreed on the condition that he would have the choice either of
remaining loyal to Ibn al-Zubayr; or of joining ‘Abd al-Malik.⁴ While
these negotiations were going on, the Kalbites in ‘Abd al-Malik’s army
opposed this agreement between the caliph and their Qaisite adversaries,
and they advised the caliph to refuse Zufar’s terms and instead to continue
the battle. They pointed out that most of the fortifications of the city of

¹ Ansāb, V, p.305.
² The choice of al-Hağja’ ibn Yusuf and Raja’ ibn Haywa as messengers
to Zufar ibn al-Hārith seems to have been a diplomatic one. While
the first was Qaisite like Zufar’s followers, Raja’ was from the
Kinda tribe, to whom Zufar was related, as known to ‘Abd al-Malik.
Ansāb, V, p.303; Kāmil, IV, p.278. One should also note the
important religious status of Raja’.
³ Ansāb, V, p.305.
⁴ Ansāb, V, p.305; Kāmil, IV, p.277; ‘Ibar, III, p.82.
Qarqīsyā’ were already destroyed. At first, ‘Abd al-Malik gave way to this demand of his Kalbite supporters, but eventually he was forced to make peace on Zufar’s terms, seeing that the war was not to be so easily won. This voluntary submission of the Qaisites may have been due to the fact that the future of Ibn al-Zubair was not yet secure, or may have been in response to the generosity of ‘Abd al-Malik’s terms.

The agreement between the caliph and Zufar was made on the following terms: the Caliph granted Amān to Zufar, his son al-Hudhail, and all of their followers. Zufar would bear no responsibility for his insurrection, either for the people killed, or for the money spent in the fighting. Zufar agreed not to make war against ‘Abd al-Malik, but because of his previous homage to Ibn al-Zubair, he would not fight with ‘Abd al-Malik against him. Finally, ‘Abd al-Malik was to give Zufar a sum of money to distribute among his followers. This agreement was sealed by a marriage contract between al-Rabāb, the daughter of Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith, and Maslama, the son of ‘Abd al-Malik. To show his loyalty to the caliph, Zufar ordered his son al-Hudhail to join ‘Abd al-Malik’s army against Mus’ab ibn al-Zubair,

1. Ansāb, V, pp.303-4 (citing Madā’inī); p.305; Kāmil, IV, p.277; ʿIbar, III, p.82.
2. Ansāb, V, p.305; XI, pp.24-5 (citing ‘Awāna); Kūfī, II, fol. 50b; Kāmil, IV, p.277; ʿIbar, III, p.82.
3. Jāḥiz, Rasā’il, (ed. Sandūbī), p.182 (citing Madā’inī); Ansāb, V, Kāmil, IV, p.276; ʿIbar, III, p.82.
because, unlike his father, he had no commitment towards Ibn al-Zubair.  

Meanwhile, the feud between the Taghlib and the Qais started in the Jazīra, which led to a temporary lull in the raids between the Qais and the Kalb there. However, the Qais/Kalb feud broke out in a different area. The raids of Ḥumaid ibn Ḥuraith ibn Bahdal, the sayyid of the Banū Kalb, on the Qaisites in the Jazīra had stirred up the leaders among the Qaisites in Iraq, especially of the Banū Fazāra. Their complaints were carried to ʿAbd al-Mālik ibn Marwān by ʿAbdallah ibn Masʿada al-Fazārī, who refused to dine with the caliph as a protest against the massacre of the Banū Sulaim and the Banū ʿĀmir in the raids of Ḥumaid ibn Ḥuraith ibn Bahdal. When Ḥumaid heard of ʿAbdallah's complaints, he decided to raid the Banū Fazāra, to whom Ibn Masʿada belonged. This decision of Ḥumaid was welcomed by the ʿUmayyad princes whose mothers were Kalbites. These princes were infuriated by the pride their half-brothers with Qaisite mothers took in the Qaisite raids on the Kalbites. Ḥumaid, therefore, did not find it difficult to get a letter of assignment (ʿAhd) in the name of ʿAbd al-Malik commissioning him to collect the Ẓadaqa from the Banū Fazāra. The latter had not yet been involved in the feuds.
possibly because their settlements, (Wādī Rumma in Najd and southern Syria), were far from the Jazīra. After getting a false ‘Aḥd to collect the Ṣadaqa from the Banū Fazāra, Ḥumaid ibn Ḥuraith, accompanied by two hundred cavalry men from his own people, the Kalb, marched on Banū Fazāra. He took them by surprise and killed a large number of them in a place called al-‘Āh. ²

This raid incited the Banū Fazāra to retaliate. Their chiefs, including Asma’ ibn Khārija al-Fazāri and Khālid ibn Dāthar ibn Quraiz, met ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān at al-Nuḥaila after he had defeated Muṣṭab ibn al-Zubair. They raised a strong protest to him about Humaid’s action, and demanded Qawad (that ‘Abd al-Malik should slay Humaid for their revenge). ³ ‘Abd al-Malik, however, found it enough to give the Banū Fazāra money to recompense for the blood of Humaid he had shed. He expressed his opinion by saying, “You were in Fitna (dissension), the equivalent of

according to Abū Tammām (op. cit., I, p. 260), it was Khālid ibn Yazīd ibn Mu‘awiyah who prepared the ‘Aḥd for Ḥumaid. There is also reference to this in Baladhurī’s Ansāb, IV, ii, p. 68. Other sources confirm that Ḥumaid had a false ‘Aḥd, which he acquired as a result of the rivalry between the Umayyad princes, according to their family relation with either the Qais or the Kalb, which leads us to believe that it was Khālid ibn Yazīd, whose mother and grand-mother were Kalbites, who was the most likely to have prepared the false ‘Aḥd for Ḥumaid.

2. Abu Tammām, Ḥamās, I, p. 261; Ansāb, V, p. 309 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Agh., XVII, p. 113 (citing Mada’īnī); Bakrī, I, p. 279; ‘Asākīr, VI, p. 118; Muṣjām, I, p. 739.
3. Qawad and Qīṣās are synonymous, both meaning retaliation. According to Muslim law, Qawad and Qīṣās are applied in cases of killing, called =
Jāhiliyya (pre-Islamic times), and there was no Qawad in Jāiliyya. At first, they refused to accept only money, but came to agree, with the intention of using it to buy military equipment for retaliation. It is possible that Abd al-Malik refused to take severe action against Humaid and the Kalbites, because he feared to provoke against himself this strong and influential tribe and other Yemenites in Syria, especially since 'Abdallāh ibn al-Zubair was still holding strongly in the Hijāz. He may well also have hoped that the money payment would provide a peaceful end to the strife between the two parties at a time when both were equally guilty of the feud.

It is reported that at the time of Humaid's raid, 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn Marwān, whose mother was a Kalbite, was boasting to his brother Bishr ibn Marwān, a son of a Qaisite mother, in the court of 'Abd al-Malik.

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2. Abū Tammām, Hamāsa, I, p.262; Ansāb, V, p.310 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Agh., XVII, p.114 (citing Mada'īnī); 'Asākīr, VI, p.118.
5. Abū Tammām, Hamāsa, I, p.262; Ansāb, V, p.164; Nasab, fol. 12b; Bakrī, I, p.279; Jamharat, p.264; 'Asākīr, III, fol. 177a.
This provoked Bishr, to give money to the Banū Fazāra to help their retaliation. This story shows clearly how the ‘Aṣābiyya asserted itself even among the princes of the ruling dynasty. It was by exploiting this that Ḥumaid ibn Ḥuraith obtained the false ‘Aḥd commissioning him to collect the Ṣadaqa of the Banū Fazāra.² There seems no reason to reject this story, as Wellhausen² does, simply because ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and Bishr, the caliph’s brothers, were the governors of Egypt and Kūfa respectively. This event may well have occurred during a visit to the court, as we know such visits did take place.³

Feeling that they were treated unjustly,⁴ and encouraged by Bishr ibn Marwān, the Banū Fazāra used the money they received to buy military equipment. They then retaliated against the Kalbites (the Banū ‘Ulaïm and Banū ‘Abd Wūdd) in a place called Banāt Gāin, killing a large number of them.⁵

When he heard of this, ‘Abd al-Malik became very angry and ordered al-Ḥājjāj ibn Yūsuf al-Thaqafī, his governor of al-Ḥijāz,⁶ to punish

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1. See p.178 of this thesis.
2. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p.207.
6. According to Madā‘īnī (Agh., XV, II, p.115), this day of Banāt Gāin happened during the governorship of al-Ḥājjāj in Iraq. This, however, =
the Banū Fazāra severely. However, Ḥalḥala ibn Qais and Saʿīd ibn ʿUayna, the two Fazarites chiefly responsible for this feud, averted the disaster from their tribe by giving themselves up voluntarily to al-Hajjāj. He sent them to the caliph. In the court at Damascus, the presence of the two offenders caused a difference of opinion among the Umayyad princes. While those of Kalbite women demanded their execution, the sons of Qaisite mothers demanded that they should pay a money recompense. Eventually, ʿAbd al-Malik gave the two offenders to the Kalbites, who killed them in vengeance for their people.

This did not in any way mean that ʿAbd al-Malik took sides against the Qaisites. It shows only that he tried to be above the parties, and to punish the Banū Fazāra for violating his measures to end the feud.

The dates of the days of al-ʿĀh and Banāt Qain are not given precisely in our sources. However, it is possible to conjecture them from the events of the period. According to Maḍāʾīnī, Humaid's raid on the Banū ʿĀmir and Banū Sulaim (the day of al-ʿĀh) took place before Musā ibn al-Zubair had been killed by ʿAbd al-Malik. This has been confirmed by Ibn al-Kalbī.
Moreover the two sources state clearly that it was after the death of Muṣʿab that the Banū Fazāra complained to ‘Abd al-Malik about Ḥumaid’s raid of the day of al-ʿĀh. This makes it clear that the day of al-ʿĀh could not have occurred after the year 72/691, the year of Muṣʿab’s death. As for the day of Banāt Qain, our sources say that al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf was the governor of al-Ḥijāz when ‘Abd al-Malik ordered him to punish the Banū Fazāra.

Judging from the fact that al-Ḥajjāj was appointed the governor of al-Ḥijāz in the year 73/692 and was only transferred to the governorship of Iraq in the year 75/694, the day of Banāt Qain must have taken place some time between 73/692 and 75/694. Therefore, it would seem that Dozy was wrong in putting the day of Banāt Qain in Muʿāwiya’s time.

As one would expect, the Kalbites who suffered at Banāt Qain were not satisfied by the killing of the two chiefs of the Banū Fazāra. They began to prepare for a fuller retaliation. When news of this reached the ears of ‘Abd al-Malik, he threatened them, saying that “he would kill as many of them as they killed from the Qaisites”. Thus, ‘Abd al-Malik once again showed himself above the parties. This threat seems to have been effective in that we do not hear of any other "days" during ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign, and the day of

1. Ansāb, V, p.311 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Bakrī, I, pp.279-80; ʿAsākir, VI, p.118.
3. Ansāb, V, p.311 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Agh., XVII, p.115 (citing Madaʾīnī).
Banât Qain was the last of the famous "days" between Qais and Kalb.

Despite the fact that they were both Nizarite, the relations between Taghlib and Qais were far from cordial. The feuds between them were almost constant. The exception was when a small group of the Taghlib joined 'Umair ibn al-Hubab in his raids on the Kalbites. But one may assume that on this occasion they were forced to act so, for fear of 'Umair and his Qaisites, in command of the Jazîra at that time.

The campaigns of the conquest which brought the Qaisites into the Jazîra region made them close neighbours of the Banû Taghlib who were already living there. But the Qaisites' maltreatment of their neighbours caused strained relations between the two. The situation deteriorated when 'Umair ibn al-Hubab with the Banû Sulaim settled on the Khabûr river.

The tense situation exploded when a man from Banû al-Harîsh (from the Banû 'Amîr) slaughtered a goat belonging to a Taghlibite woman called Um Dawbal. As a result, her son Dawbal made a raid on the Banû al-Harîsh. The Qaisites' answer to this raid was to kill three men from the Taghlib and to take a number of their camels. In an attempt to put an end to these encroachments some of the Banû Taghlib went to Zufar ibn al-Hâtib al-Kilâbi, the

1. Ansâb, V, pp.308, 313; Agh., XVII, p.112 (citing Madâ'înî); Kâmil, IV, p.254.  
4. Al-Akhtal, Dîwan, pp.35-7; Abû Tammâm, Naqa'id Jarîr wal Akhtal, p.66; Ansâb, V, pp.314ff.; Agh., XX, pp.126ff.
sayyid of the Qais at the time, asking him to return to them their camels,
to pay compensation for the three men killed by the Qaisites, and to ask
‘Umair ibn al-Ḥubāb to leave the region of the Khabūr, for as long as
he stayed there, the feud would continue. While Zufar agreed to the first
two demands, he refused the third one. He tried in vain to convince them
to give up the idea of expelling ‘Umair from the Khabūr region. Meanwhile,
the Taghlib attacked some Qaisite villages near Qarqīsya’, but were
defeated. ʿIyās ibn al-Kharraz, a Taghlibite sharif, sought a peaceful
solution by going to Zufar ibn al-Ḥarīth in Qarqīsya’ to negotiate; however,
he was killed by a fanatic Qaisite. Zufar paid the ransom for this murder
and reconciled his people.

Wellhausen sees in Zufar’s attempts to reconcile the Taghlibites
a move to prevent them going over to the Umayyad side. But the Banū
Taghlib were already described in our sources as pro-Marwānid (Marwāniyya),
and are even said to have fought with Marwān against the Qaisites in the battle
of Marj Rāḥit. It is probable that Zufar was trying either to get Taghlib’s
help against his bitter enemies, the Kalbites, or at least ensure their
neutrality in the conflict with Kalb.

It would seem, however, that ‘Umair did not like this peaceful

2. Ibid., XX, p. 127.
3. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 204.
settlement, and that he hoped to expel the Taghlib from the Jazīra, as he had the Kalbites before. This was no doubt as a reaction to the Taghlib demand for Zufar to force 'Umair to leave the Khabūr region. 'Umair went to Muṣ'ab ibn al-Zubair and told him that he had already forced Quḍā'a to settle in Syria and there only remained the Christian Taghlib in the Jazīra. He asked Muṣ'ab to give him authority over them. Probably he convinced Muṣ'ab that "being Christians, they were under suspicion of sympathy with the Syrians". 'Umair managed to get permission to collect dues from them, but Muṣ'ab only granted this commission subject to the consent of Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith. The latter, being convinced that 'Umair would not treat the Banū Taghlib fairly, but would seize this opportunity to give free reign to his hostility, sent others to the Banū Taghlib ordering them to treat the latter kindly. When the Banū Taghlib refused to pay their dues to these men, Zufar sent them again to inform the Banū Taghlib that they were acting on the orders of Muṣ'ab ibn al-Zubair; they would have to pay the dues or he would fight them. The Taghibites answered this by killing some of Zufar's men. This action infuriated Zufar, and he sent their bitter enemy 'Umair ibn al-Ḥubāb with the Qaisites against them. The Taghlib under

1. See p. 175
3. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 204.
Shu'aib ibn Mulai`, met 'Umair at a place called Māksīn (also called Māks and Khabūr). In this battle the Banū Taghlib suffered a defeat and their leader Shu'aib was killed with a large number of his followers. This battle was the first large scale confrontation between Qais and Taghlib.

Zufar was considerably upset to see the two sons of Nizār fighting each other, while their common enemy, the Kalbites, were left unmolested. On the other hand, 'Abd al-Malik found that this conflict played into his hand, on two accounts: firstly, because it weakened both sides, thus, he hoped, rendering them more amenable to his control in the future; secondly, because it prevented the Qaisites from helping his enemy Muṣ‘ab ibn al-Zubair.

The Taghlib did not let their massacre in the day of Masīn go without revenge. They received re-inforcements from Rabī'a in al-Jazīra and Iraq, especially from al-Nimr ibn Qasīt and Banū Shaibān. They chose as their leader the Taghlibite, Ziyād or Yazīd ibn Huber. Hearing that they were gathered for battle, 'Umair ibn al-Hubāb appealed to the Asad and Tamīm for help, but neither responded. He, therefore, decided to meet them with his own people, the Banū Sulaim in this battle, which was called "Yawm al-

1. Abu Tammām, Naqa'id Jarīr wal Akhtal, pp. 230-1; Ansāb, V, pp. 316-7 Agh., XX, pp. 127-8; Kāmil, IV, p. 255.
2. Abu Tammām, Naqa'id Jarīr wal Akhtal, p. 27; Ansāb, V, p. 320; Agh., XX, p. 127.
4. Nasab, fol. 229b; he called him Ḥanṣala ibn Qais ibn Huber.
Tharthār al-Awwal", the Qaisites suffered a severe defeat in which many of them were killed, while thirty women from the Banū Sulaim had their stomachs opened as a reprisal for the day of Māksīn. ¹

The defeat of the Qaisites in the day of Tharthār al-Awwal was so grave that Zufar ibn al-Ḥarīth, before this time hesitant to involve himself in the feud, came from Qarqīṣyā to help Ṭumair in his retaliation against the Taghlib. These two, with Banū ʿĀmir and Sulaim, met the Taghlib under Ibn Huber again on the Tharthār, which gave its name to the battle, "the day of al-Tharthār al-Thānī". When battle was joined, the Banū ʿĀmir fled but the Banū Sulaim remained firm and were able to inflict a defeat on the Taghlib. ²

However, neither the victory of the Qais nor the defeat of the Taghlib in these two "days" put an end to this feud. We hear of "days" called, al-Fudain, al-Sukair, al-Muʿārik, Lubbā, al-Sharʿabīyya, Balad, and al-Bulaikh. ³ On all of these "days", the Qais were victorious, apart from the indecisive "day of Lubbā", and the "day of al-Sharʿabīyya", which was a victory for the Taghlib.

To break this run of successful Qaisite raids against them, the Taghlib

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drew up forces from both the desert and the towns. As in the "day of al-Tharthar al-Thani", the Qaisites were under both Umair ibn al-Hubab and Zufar ibn al-Harith. The Taghlib, headed by Ibn Huber, met them in al-Hashshak and the bitter fighting lasted for three days. On the third day, Zufar ibn al-Harith with the Banu 'Amir fled to Qarqisya. To justify his defeat, he later claimed that he had heard news that 'Abd al-Malik had marched against him in Qarqisya. Whether this pretext was true or not, Umair met the Taghlib alone; his followers were defeated, and Umair was killed in battle. 1 The Banu Taghlib joyfully sent his head to Damascus as a sign of their loyalty to 'Abd al-Malik, 2 but Zufar ibn al-Harith was moved to sorrow and expressed this in sad verses. 3 As for the date of the battle, according to Khalifa ibn Khayyat and Ibn al-Athir, 4 it was the year 70/689. This date sounds authentic as 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan only in that year felt himself free enough from cares at home to deal with Zufar ibn al-Harith and the Qaisites in Qarqisya. 5

The death of Umair ibn al-Hubab did not go unrevenged. His brother

1. Al-Akht al-Dīwan, pp. 33, 106, 151, 220; Al-Qatami, Dīwan, p. 89ff.; Naqī al-īd, 1, 373, where it is called the "Day of Sinjār"; Abū Tammān, Naqī al-īd Jarir wal-Akht al, pp. 33, 34, 117-18, 160; Ansāb, V, p. 323; Marzubānī, Mu'jam al-Shu'ra', p. 245; Kāmil, IV, p. 258ff.; Bakrī, p. 338 (here it is called the Day of al-Tharthar).

2. Ansāb, V, pp. 325, 327; Kāmil, IV, pp. 259-60.

3. Ansāb, V, p. 325.

4. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tārikh, 1, p. 262 (citing al-Layth); Kāmil, IV, pp. 258-60.
Tamīm ibn al-Ḫubāb came to Zufar ibn al-Ḫārith asking him to take vengeance. Zufar, however, at first was unwilling to undertake this task, but under the persuasion of his son al-Ḫudail, he bound himself to do it. Zufar then left his brother Aws ibn al-Ḫārith as his deputy in Qarqisyā, probably to watch the movements of ‘Abd al-Malik against him. Before Zufar himself advanced against Taghlib, he sent Yazīd ibn Ḥamrān against the Banū Fadukis, killing their men and proscribing their properties. Zufar also sent Muslim ibn Rabī‘a al-‘Uqailī, who surprised a gathering of Taghlib, and killed a number of them. Muslim then marched against the main body of the Taghlib, who were gathered in a place called al-Aqīq in Mūsīl. The Taghlib fled before him, attempting to cross the Tigris. When they reached al-Ḳuḥail, they were followed by Zufar with the Qaisites. The Taghlib suffered a severe defeat; even more of them were drowned in the Tigris in flight, than were killed in the battle. Those who survived went to Lubba, but were followed by al-Ḫudail ibn Zufar, who killed all those except the few who managed to cross the river. 1

In the year 73/692, when ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubair was killed and ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān was recognized as the sole caliph, there was a temporary lull in the feud between Qais and Taghlib. This was mainly

due to the policy of 'Abd al-Malik in keeping in check all parties. However, under this apparent peace, the hostility between them was smouldering and needed only an opportunity to flare up again. Such an occasion arose when the Taghlib poet, al-Akhtal, boasted of the prowess of his clansmen to al-Jahhaf ibn Hukaim al-Sulami, in the court of 'Abd al-Malik. Infuriated by this boast, al-Jahhaf ibn Hukaim contrived to get a letter of assignment ('Ahd) for himself, by which he was appointed to collect tax from Bakr and Taghlib in the region of al-Jazira. Accompanied by a considerable Qaisite cavalry, al-Jahhaf set out for al-Jazira. On his way, he told his followers that his intention was to spill the blood of the Banu Taghlib, and that his 'Ahd was false. He then said, "You have the choice between Hell if you follow me, and disgrace if you do not." They chose to follow him. He surprised the Taghlib at a place called al-Bishr, or al-Rahub, or Mukhashin, and made a fearful massacre among them. A son of al-Akhtal is said to have been killed, and al-Akhtal himself was seized as prisoner, but was set free because they thought he was a slave. On being released, he returned to 'Abd al-Malik


2. Abu Tammam, Naga'id Jarir wal Akhtal, p.229; Agh., XI, p.59 (citing 'Umar ibn Shabba); Bughya, fol. 48.

with the news of this massacre, and asked for his help to punish al-Jahhāf.

Fearing the caliph's punishment, al-Jahhāf fled to the territory of the Byzantines and remained there until the Qaisites managed to persuade 'Abd al-Malik to grant him Amām. ¹

Realizing that if he let this occasion pass without any decisive action, the feud between the two parties would never cease, 'Abd al-Malik tried as much as possible to satisfy both sides. On the one hand, 'Abd al-Malik forced al-Jahhāf to pay money as compensation to the Taghlib for the blood shed in the "day of al-Bishr". On the other, 'Abd al-Malik made his own son al-Walīd, whose mother was a Qaisite (from Banū 'Abs), pay a money recompense to both sides, for all the bloodshed between them before the "day of al-Bishr". ² The choice of al-Walīd for this task was because the Taghlib were the ones who had suffered most in the feud, and moreover, by this device, both sides would feel that they were treated equally, with neither of them having the upper hand as a result of these feuds. However, al-Jahhāf was unable to pay the money set as compensation, for it was well beyond his financial means. In order to honour his promise to the caliph and to save his life, he went to Iraq where al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi was governor. Al-Jahhāf appealed to

¹ Abu Tammām, Naqa'id Jarīr wal Akhtal, p. 229; Ansāb, V, p. 330; Agh., XI, p. 60 (citing 'Umar ibn Shabba); Sinā'at al-rain, p. 87; Kamīl, IV, p. 263; Bughya, fol. 49 (citing Ibn al-Sakīf).
² Abu Tammām, Naqa'id Jarīr wal Akhtal, p. 229; Ansāb, V, p. 330; Bughya, fol. 49 (citing Ibn al-Sakīf).
him for help, as the most influential man among the Qais at the time. After some hesitation, for he did not wish to be accused of spending the money of the Muslims in the interests of his own people, al-Ḥajjāj agreed to help, and gave al-Jaḥḥāf half of his own annual salary. It is clear that in aiding al-Jaḥḥāf financially, al-Ḥajjāj was following the same policy as the caliph himself, in seeking a peaceful end to the tribal feud between Qais and Taghlib.

In the end, al-Jaḥḥāf ibn Ḥukaim and his companions undertook to make a pilgrimage to Mecca in repentance and there to ask God for forgiveness. Thus the feud between Qais and Taghlib came to an end during the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān, as a result of the latter's policy towards the tribes.

The ‘Arab tribes which settled in Khūrāsān after its conquest carried with them their rivalries and jealousy. Rivalry for power was clear from the very beginning among the leaders who participated in the conquest of the country, a good example of which was the rivalry between Qais ibn al-Haitham al-Sulami and his kinsman ‘Abdallah ibn Khāzim al-Sulami.2

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1. Abū Tammām, Naqā'īd Jarīr wal Akhṭal, p. 229-30; Ansāb, V, pp. 329-30; Ṭab, XI, pp. 60 (citing ‘Umar ibn Shabba); Kāmil, IV, p. 263; Bughya, fols. 49-50 (citing Ibn al-Sakīt).
2. Ansāb, fol. 593a; Futūḥ, pp. 408-9; Ṭab, II, pp. 65-6 (citing Madā’i‘ī); ʿAsākir, VIII, pp. 377-8; E.I. 2, (Ibn Khāzim).
The political troubles in Syria and Iraq in the period following the death of the caliph Yazīd I had their repercussions in Khurāsān and other Eastern provinces. The disturbances started first in Sīstān, when the death of Yazīd was followed by a revolt in Kābul. As a result, the governor Yazīd ibn Ziyād was killed and his brother Abū ʿUbaida was taken prisoner. Their brother, Salm ibn Ziyād, then the governor of Khurāsān, sent ʿAlīa ʿAbīl-Khūzāʾī as the new governor of Sīstān. The latter managed to release Abū ʿUbaida by paying a ransom of five thousand dirhams. ¹

The new governor of Sīstān, ʿAlīa, was soon to die, and he appointed as his successor a Bakrite from Banū Yashkur. This appointment infuriated the Muḍarites, who drove the Bakrite from his office, thus causing hostility (ʿĀṣabīyya) to flare up between Rabiʿa and Muḍar. ² This state of affairs encouraged the Zunbīl to exploit the situation. Al-Qubāʾ, Ibn al-Zubair’s governor of Basra, therefore sent ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿĀmir as governor to Sīstān. He fought the Zunbīl and killed him, but was forced by the Tamīmite ʿAbdallāh ibn Nāṣir to leave the country. When, however, Ibn Nāṣir entered the city of Ziranj, he himself was driven out and killed by another Tamīmite, Wakīʾ Ibn Abī al-Aswad, and thus ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz was able to return once more to the city. ⁴

¹. Futūḥ, pp.387-8; Ṣab., II, pp.488-9 (citing Madaʾinī); Kāmil, IV, p.84.
². Futūḥ, p.398; Kāmil, IV, p.84.
³. Zunbīl is a regnal title and not a personal name, the exact form of which is somewhat uncertain. Bosworth, Sīstān Under the Arabs, from the Islamic Conquests to the Rise of the Saffārīds, pp.34-6, Rome, 1968.
⁴. Futūḥ, p.398.
In Khurāsān, the governor, Salm ibn Ziyād, at first tried to keep secret the news of the caliph’s death and those of his brothers in Sīstān and Basra. When he could no longer keep this secret, he asked the Arabs in Khurāsān to pay him homage, until the unity of the Muslims should be restored by the election of a new caliph. They agreed, but soon betrayed their homage, and Salm then found himself forced to leave Khurāsān. Before leaving, he appointed al-Muhallab ibn Abī Šufra as his deputy governor. But the Bakrites found it humiliating to submit to the insignificant Azdite.

Therefore, Sulaimān ibn Marthad al-Bakrī, meeting Salm ibn Ziyād in Sarkhas, forced him to appoint him as governor of Mervarūd, Faryāb, Tāliqān and Jurjān. Salm was also forced to appoint another Bakrite, Aws ibn Tha‘labā, as governor of Herat. Meanwhile, ‘Abdallāh ibn Khāzim al-Sulami, who since an early date had also tried to get the governorship of Khurāsān, met Salm at Nishāpur. Ibn Khāzim asked Salm whom he had appointed as his deputy. When the latter told him, Ibn Khāzim, surprised, answered, “Could you not find a Muḍarite, rather than divide Khurāsān between Bakr ibn Wa‘il and Muzūn ‘Umān’ (Azd)?” He also managed to get from Salm a patent

1. Ansāb, fol. 593b; Futūḥ, p. 413; Ṭāb. II, pp. 488–9 (citing Mada‘īnī).
2. Ṭāb., II, p. 489 (citing Mada‘īnī). Professor S. al-‘Āli considers these appointments as being willingly given by Salm ibn Ziyād to satisfy the tribes in Khurāsān. Isti‘ātan al-‘Arab fī Khurāsān, pp. 48–9, MKAB, III, 1958. While there is no evidence to support this view, it seems more likely that Salm only made these appointments to save his life with no intention of keeping the balance between the tribes.
as governor of Khurāsān, and a subsidy of one hundred thousand dirhams. Then Ibn Khāzīm returned to Merv. ¹ This complicated situation made imminent an outbreak of conflict between Rabīʿa and Muṭar. These reports of Salm's appointments, however, may well be fabrications of a later date, "Tribal traditions trying to legitimize the subsequent actions of their heroes". ²

Finding himself unable to face both Rabīʿa and Muṭar, al-Muḥallab Ibn Abī Ṣufra departed from Merv, leaving a Tamīmite as his deputy, thus adding to the confusion. The weakness shown by al-Muḥallab was due to the fact that the Azdites were few in number in Khurāsān at this time. ³ Al-Muḥallab’s deputy tried to prevent Ibn Khāzīm from entering Merv, but was defeated and died of his wounds in the struggle. ⁴

However, the rivalry between Bakr and Tamīm turned out to favour Ibn Khāzīm. Although he was not Tamīmite, as a Muṭarite he gained the support of Banū Tamīm. The Rabīʿites, however, were not prepared to leave

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1. Ansāb, fol. 593b; Futuḥ, p. 414; Yaʿqūbī, II, p. 323; Ṣab., II, p. 489 (citing Madaʾīnī); Ghurar, fol. 4.


4. Ṣab., II, pp. 490-1 (citing Madaʾīnī).
the Mudarites to exploit Khurasan unopposed, and soon afterwards, fighting started between Ibn Khāzim, supported by Muḍar (Qais and Tamīm) and Sulaimān ibn Marthad with the Rabiʿites (Bakr and other Rabiʿite branches) in Mervarūd. Sulaimān was killed and his followers defeated. Then Ibn Khāzim went to al-Ṭālikān and inflicted another defeat on Bakr, killing 'Arīf ibn Marthad, a brother of Sulaimān, who held the city. The defeated Barkites fled to Herāt, where they joined Aws ibn Ṭha‘labā in the hopes that they could expel Ibn Khāzim and the Muḍar from Khurasān. The Banū Suḥa테 among them were most enthusiastic to this idea, and thus Aws was forced to act against his will.

As in Syria, these tribal rivalries had political implications, in as much as the Mudarites were opposing the direct authority of the Umayyads, preferring the rather loose authority of Ibn al-Zubair; the Rabiʿites, on the other hand, opposed the Zubairids, largely because of their fear and jealousy of the Mudarites.

This conflict between Rabiʿa and Muḍar did not arise without leading some of the Mudarites to seek a peaceful solution; Ibn Khāzim was forced to

1. Futūḥ, p.414.
negotiations with the Rabî'ites. These negotiations failed, since the Rabî'ites were not prepared to accept anything less than the expulsion of Muḍar from Khurāsān. Accordingly, Ibn Khāzim left his son Mūsā in Merv, and marched against them in Herāt. The Rabî'ites fortified themselves by digging a ditch. The fighting between them and Ibn Khāzim continued for about a year. In order to incite the Rabî'ites, Ibn Khāzim said to them, "You have shut yourselves up in your ditch: are you prepared to accept that ditch as your share of Khurāsān?" Enraged by this, they left their strong position, and suffered very heavy losses in lives. Aws ibn Thālabā, who was wounded in this battle, fled to Sīstān to take refuge with the Zunbīl, but died before arriving. These two successive crushing defeats left the Bakrites powerless, and Ibn Khazīm and the Muḍar dominant in Khurāsān. This also had its echo in Basra, for, according to al-Madā'īnī, when the news of it reached Basra, al-Āḥnaf ibn Qais and other Tamīmite chiefs went to Mālik ibn Mīsma', the chief of the Rabî'ī there, to apologize. This move, however, was spoilt by the verbal aggression of one of al-Āḥnaf's colleagues at this meeting. Mālik burnt down the houses of the Tamīmites in

1. Ṣab., II, pp.494-5 (citing Madā'īnī). Here the narrative of Madā'īnī ends, but it is completed by that of Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Khurāsānī.
2. Futūh, pp.414-5; Ṣab., II, pp.491-6. This fighting between Rabî'ī and Muḍar occupied the period 64-65.
Basra as a reprisal for the slaughter of the Bakr in Herat. ¹

The peace in Khurasan was only of a short duration. Hostility soon flared up among the Mudarites themselves, i.e., Qais against Tamim. Our sources are unanimously silent about the reason for this hostility, apart from a chance narrative in Jabari, ² repeated by both Ibn al-Athir and Nuwairi. The narrative says that after Ibn Khazim had used the Tamim to defeat the Rabites and become the sole master of the whole of Khurasan, he neglected them. This negligence could not be other than a reluctance to give them office, or at least, not giving them as much as they expected as their share of the revenue of Khurasan. ³

Ibn Khazim appointed his son Muhammad governor of Herat, and left him for assistants, two Tamimites, Shammas ibn Dathar al-Ubaridi and Bukair ibn Washah, who was head of the Shurta. It seems that beyond this, Ibn Khazim was not prepared to give any concessions to the Banu Tamim, who were not satisfied with these appointments. It was probably for this reason that when Banu Tamim went to Herat, Ibn Khazim wrote to Shammas ibn Dathar and Bukair ibn Washah ordering them to prevent Banu Tamim from entering the city. Shammas refused to obey this order, and joined his people,

¹ Ansab, fol. 496b (citing Mada`in); Tab., II, pp.451-2.
² Tab., II, p.593; Kamil, IV, p.171; Nuwairi, XIX, fol. 52.
while Bukair complied with the order. This difference was due to the personal hostility between Bukair and Shammas. Bukair promised Shammas thirty thousand dirhams for himself, and a thousand for each of the Banū Tamīm if they withdrew. They refused, and entered the city, killing Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah ibn Khāzīm in revenge for two Tamīmites he had killed by lashing. 1

The Banū Tamīm then went to Merv, where they were joined by other Tamīmites, and chose al-Ḥarīsh ibn 'Abdallah al-Qurairī as their leader in the struggle against Ibn Khāzīm. The war between the latter and the Banū Tamīm is said to have lasted for two years. 2 The Tamīmites found themselves unable to overcome Ibn Khāzīm. They therefore adopted the plan of dividing their forces, with one group leaving Merv to entice Ibn Khāzīm to follow them, and thus enabling those who remained in Merv to seize the city. 3 Following this policy, Bahīr ibn Warqa' went to Nishāpur, Shammas to Sīstān, 'Uthmān ibn al-Muḥtafar and Zuhair ibn Dhu′aib al-ʿAdawi to Fartana, and al-Ḥarīsh ibn Hilāl al-Qurairī to Mervvarūd. 4 But this division made it possible for Ibn Khāzīm to defeat them, by attacking one group at a time. He began

1. Futūḥ, p. 415; Tab., II, pp. 496, 593-4 (citing Madāʾini); Ghurar, fol. 4; Kāmil, IV, p. 171; Nuwairī XIX, fols. 52-4.
2. Tab., II, p. 595 (citing Madāʾini); Kāmil, IV, p. 172. This, however, might have included the war against Bakr also. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, pp. 419-20.
4. Tab., II, p. 596, (citing Madāʾini); Kāmil, IV, p. 172; Nuwairī, XIX, fols. 53-4.
with al-Harīš and forced him to leave Khurasan. He then turned to Zuhair and his followers, who surrendered unconditionally. Ibn Khāzīm killed them all in revenge of his son Muḥammad. Finally, he set out to fight Bahīr ibn Warqa' and his followers in Nishāpur.

Before leaving Merv to fight Bahīr, Ibn Khāzīm made Bukair his deputy there, and ordered his son Musā to cross the Cūs and to seek refuge in a fortress, or with a king there. This was because Ibn Khāzīm feared that the Tamīmites might kill Musā as they had killed his brother Muḥammad before.

When Muṣ'ab ibn al-Zubair was killed, 72/691, Ibn Khāzīm was still fighting Bahīr ibn Warqa'. At this time, 'Abd al-Malik wrote to Ibn Khāzīm asking his "bā'ī'a" and promising him in return the governorship of Khurasan for a term of seven years. Ibn Khāzīm, who had secured the country by his own sword, would not accept this offer. He considered it as little more than an insult, and made the messenger eat the letter of 'Abd al-Malik. Wellhausen thinks that the reason for Ibn Khāzīm's refusal to

1. Ṭab., II, p.596; Kāmil, IV, p.172; Nuwairī, XIX, fols. 52-4.
4. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārikh, I, p.296; Futuh, p.415; Ansāb, fol. 593b; Yā'qūbī, II, pp.323-4; Bulūdān, p.81; Ṭab., II, pp.631-2 (citing Madā'īnī), 834-5; Ghurār, fol. 4; Bad'ī, VI, p.27; Kāmil, IV, p.282; Bidāya, VIII, p.325; Ḩībar, III, p.83.
recognize 'Abd al-Malik, was that he wanted to rule independently. However, it is clearly stated in the sources, ¹ that the refusal was because of his "Bai'a" to Ibn al-Zubair.

Failing to obtain Ibn Khazim's homage, 'Abd al-Malik offered the governorship of Khurasan to Bukair ibn Washah, Ibn Khazim's representative. He accepted the offer and called the people to the "Bai'a" of 'Abd al-Malik, with which they willingly complied. This popular willingness to renounce Ibn Khazim sprang from the cruelty and ill-will he had shown to Banu Tamim. ² Ibn Khazim found himself unable to face both Bukair ibn Washah and Bahir ibn Warqa ³ and therefore he decided to join his son Musa in al-Tirmidh. However, he did not succeed in reaching him, for he was overtaken by Bahir and killed, after putting up a stiff resistance, by Waki'i ibn al-Dawraqiyya, in 72/691. ³

The death of Ibn Khazim, however, did not put an end to the feud in Khurasan. A new feud now broke out between the Tamimites themselves. Bukair ibn Washah stole the head of Ibn Khazim from the killer, and sent it to 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan in Damascus. He not only told the caliph that he had killed Ibn Khazim himself, but he also put Bahir, the one really

¹ Yaqubi, II, p. 324; Tab., II, pp. 1145-6; Kamil, IV, p. 402.
² Ansab, fol. 593; Futuh, p. 415-6; Yaqub, II, p. 324; Buldan, p. 81; Tab., II, pp. 832-3 (citing Madain); Asakir, IX, fol. 81b; Kamil, IV, p. 282; Nuwairi, XIX, fol. 70; Dhahabi, III, pp. 111-2; Bidaya, VIII, p. 325; Ibar, III, p. 63; Tahdhib, V, p. 195.
responsible for his death, in prison. This action not only started the rivalry between Bahir and Bukair which continued until the latter’s death, but also had another serious consequence. It severely strained the relations between Banu Muqais ibn ‘Amr and al-Butun, and the Banu ‘Awf ibn Ka‘b and the Abnā‘. The first supported Bahir, while the latter supported Bukair.

The old feud which Khurasan had witnessed since the death of Yazid I, and this new tension between the two Tamīmite branches created a state of affairs at the time so serious that the people of Khurasan were brought to reconsider their position. They realized that such a state of instability would encourage their enemies to attack them. This led them to believe that stability and peace would return to Khurasan, only if they could find a neutral governor, not belonging to any one of the rival groups in Khurasan. Accordingly, they wrote to ‘Abd al-Malik asking him to send a Quraishite governor, who would stand above the envy and rivalry of the tribes. ‘Abd al-Malik then sent them Umayya ibn ‘Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid, in the year 74/693, who was both an Umayyad and a Quraishite. ‘Abd al-Malik instructed him not to take sides in the feud, but to engage the people of Khurasan in the jihad against the Turks; and to take trouble to collect and develop the revenue of the country.

2. Tab., II, p. 680; Jamharat, pp. 207-8; Mir‘at, VI, fol. 8b.
3. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 297; Mughṭālīn, p. 176; Futūḥ, p. 416; Buldan, p. 81; Tab., II, pp. 860-T (citing Mada‘īnī); Ghurair, fol. 5; Mir‘at, VI, fol. 8b; Dahabī, III, p. 117; ‘Ibar, III, pp. 91-2.
Bahir met Umayya on his arrival in Nishapur and tried to incite him against Bukair, without success. Umayya offered the leadership of the Shurta to Bukair. The latter, being ex-governor of Khurasan, felt it beneath him to accept this office. His rival Bahir, however, was prepared to accept the post, probably in the belief that it would help him to execute his plan of vengeance against Bukair. However, Umayya did not remove any of the officials appointed by Bukair. It would appear that he was following instructions from 'Abd al-Malik, to avoid favouring either Bukair or Bahir, but to try to reconcile them both. This was the reason for his appointment in the first place. Moreover, with both Bukair and Bahir in such a strong position, Umayya would have to attempt to win them both to his side if he expected to have any authority in the caliph's name.

Bukair, however, was infuriated by both the appointment of Umayya as governor of Khurasan and by the hostile attitude of Bahir towards him, and he seized his opportunity to act when Umayya set out on one of his campaigns. Being left in Merv as Umayya's deputy, Bukair seized the city. Hearing of this, Umayya hurried back and besieged Bukair for four months. When he found that he was unable to defeat him, for Bukair had secured the money

1. Mughtalīn, p. 176; Tab., II, pp. 860-2 (citing Mada'inī); Kūfī, II, fols. 58a-58b; Ghurar, fol. 6; Mir'āt, VI, fols. 8b-9a; Dhahabī, III, p. 117; Ibar, III, pp. 91-2.

1. Kūfī, I, 58b.
and the men of Merv for himself, Umayya entered into peace negotiations with him. These were welcomed by Bukair, probably because he was not sure of the continuing support of the people of Merv. Bukair and Umayya agreed that Umayya should pay Bukair's debts, give him a large sum of money for himself, and that he should give Bukair a period of forty days to go wherever he wished in Khurasan. ¹ Bukair chose to remain in Merv. This settlement was made in the year 77/696.

'Abd al-Malik, however, became impatient with Umayya's failure to carry out his instructions on appointment, and relieved him of office. The responsibility for the area was given to the capable al-Hajjaj, who appointed al-Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra.

The rivalry between Bukair and Bahir continued, the latter continually warning Umayya against Bukair, until he was eventually convinced that Bukair was conspiring against him. Despite Bukair's denials, Umayya seized him and had him killed by his bitter enemy, Bahir, in the year 77/696. Bahir was convinced that the "Banu Sa'd would never be united while they both lived". ²

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¹ Mughṭālīn, p. 176; Futūh, p. 416; Ya‘qūbī, II, p. 324; Tab., II, pp. 1122-8 (citing Mādā‘īnī); Kūfī, I, fols. 58b-59a; Ghurar, fols. 6-7; Mīr’āt, VI, fol. 26b; Bidāya, IX, p. 21; 'Ibar, III, pp. 101-2.

² Mughṭālīn, p. 177; Ansāb, fol. 315a; Futūh, p. 417; Ya‘qūbī, II, p. 324; Tab., II, pp. 1028-31 (citing Mādā‘īnī); Kūfī, I, fol. 59a; Ghurar, fol. 7; Jamḥarat, p. 207; 'Asākīr, IX, fol. 82a; Kāmil, IV, p. 361; Mīr’āt, VI, fol. 26b; Bidāya, IX, p. 21; 'Ibar, III, p. 102.
Bukair's death, however, did not end the hostility in the Banū Saʿd, to whom both Bahir and Bukair belonged. Four years after the death of Bukair, in 81/700, Bahir was publically assassinated by one of the Banū ʿAwf, ibn ʿAṣāṣa ibn Ḥarb, who shouted, "Ya li tharaṭ Bukair" as he killed him; this took place in the court of al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufra, who was at this time the governor of Khurasān. The assassin was put to death and his people satisfied by the payment of blood money. Thus the feud among the Banū Saʿd came to an end.

During the governorship of al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufra (79/698-82/701) and that of his son Yazīd after him (82/701-85/704), we see the Azd as one of the strong powers in Khurasān, taking their part in all important events. The alliance between al-Azd and Bakr (Rabīʿa) in Basra was also formed in Khurasān. The date of this alliance is not directly given by the sources. Judging from the fact that al-Azd were not strong in Khurasān before the governorship of al-Muhallab, it is unlikely that the Azd/Bakr alliance was formed before 79/698. It was perhaps formed by al-Muhallab's efforts for there is no mention in our sources of this alliance before his time. It is reported in the Kitāb al-Aghānī that during the governorship of al-Muhallab, some dispute

1. Muḥtālīn, p. 179; Ansāb, fol. 503b; Ṭabar., II, pp. 1047-51 (citing ʿAdāʾinī); Jamharat, p. 207; ʿAṣākir, IX, fol. 82a; Kāmil, IV, pp. 367-9; Bidāya, IX, pp. 34-5; ʿIbar, III, p. 103.
3. Ansāb, IV, pp. 105-6 (citing ʿAdāʾinī and Abū ʿUbaida); Naqāʿīd, II, p. 729; Ṭabar., II, p. 446 (citing Abū ʿUbaida).
arose between al-Azd and 'Abd al-Qais. This was expressed by the satiric verses of the poets Ka'b al-Ashqarī and Ziyād al-'Ajam. Al-Muhallab intervened and paid blood money to both sides and thus the dispute was ended. It is also reported by the same source that al-Yemen and Rabī'a were in Ḥilf during the time of al-Muhallab and his son Yazīd. There is also reference to this Ḥilf in the verses of the poet Nahār ibn Tawsī'a al-Tamīmī bewailing al-Muhallab. In a later period, as the revolt of Qutaiba ibn Muslim al-Bāhili (95/714) and that of Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab (101/719), this Ḥilf is also mentioned. However, al-Nuṣṣār seems to have misunderstood the report of Abu 'Ubaida, and decided that this Ḥilf existed in the time of 'Abdallāh ibn Khāzim. But Wāki' ibn Ḥassān al-Ghudānī, to whom Abu 'Ubaida referred, is not the same Wāki' as killed Ibn Khāzim. Ibn Khāzim was killed by Wāki' ibn 'Umair al-Quraiṣī, called Ibn al-Dawraqiyya.

It was expected that 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān would give himself up to the Kalbites and the Yemenites in general, for it was through them that

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1. Ibid., XIII, pp. 59-60.
2. Ṭab., II, p. 1084 (citing Mada'īnī).
his father, and the Umayyads generally, had secured the caliphate. However this was not the case. ‘Abd al-Malik had learnt in the turbulent period before his accession how dangerous tribal feuds could be and he, therefore, tried not to patronize one side against the other. This was a difficult task since the politics of the time depended on understandings with the tribes. Moreover, tribal passion and jealousy (Aṣabiyya) were strong even among the members of the ruling house, which made the task of the caliph more difficult. However, ‘Abd al-Malik showed himself a clever statesman and above parties. Being from the Quraish, the caliph was able to take up a middle position.¹

Having failed to subdue the Qais by force, he reconciled them to him, and when they gave up their opposition to him, he treated them equally with the Kalbites. Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith and his sons al-Ḥudhail and Qawthar, ‘Abdallāh ibn Mas’ada al-Fazārī and other Gaisites were among the most influential men in the court of ‘Abd al-Malik. Even when al-Ḥudhail ibn Zufar deserted the caliph’s army after the reconciliation to join Mas’ab ibn al-Zubair, ‘Abd al-Malik showed him tolerance.²

In order to get the confidence of the Qais and win them more firmly to his side, ‘Abd al-Malik himself married a Qaisite woman, Wallāda of the Banū

¹ Welihausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 211.
² Ansāb, V, p. 350 (citing ‘Awāna); Jahshiyārī, p. 30; Imtā‘, III, pp. 170-1; Jamharat, p. 245; ‘Asakir, V, p. 376; VI, fol. 212a; Kamil, IV, p. 278; ‘Ilbar, III, p. 82.
'Abs, who became the mother of his sons al-Walīd and Sulaimān. 1 He also sealed the treaty between Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith and himself by the marriage of his son Maslama to al-Rabāb, the daughter of Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith. 2 The Kalbites showed their displeasure 3 at this; however, 'Abd al-Malik, in spite of associating himself with the Qais, did not neglect the Kalb, but on the contrary treated both Qais and Kalb equally. To the end of his reign, Yemenites, like Ibn Bahdal, Rawḥ, ibn Zinbā‘, al-‘Ayyāsh ibn Khaythama, Abū Ḥafs al-Shākirī, Ibn al-Zubiqān ibn Azlām, Ma‘yūf al-Ḥujarī, and Ibn Abī ‘Aushn (the latter five from Hamdān) were among his intimate courtiers. 4

This policy of treating tribes equally also showed itself on other occasions: after the day of al-Bishr, 'Abd al-Malik through his son al-Walīd paid money recompense to both sides for the blood-shed before the day of al-Bishr. 5 'Abd al-Malik also put to death two Fazārite chiefs, for their responsibility in the feud of Banāt Qain. 'Abd al-Malik imprisoned Arṭa‘a ibn Suhya al-Murri, for incitement in his poem against the Kalb. 6

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1. Farazdaq, Dīwān, I, p.80; Ansāb, XI, p.172 (citing Abu 'Ubaida); Bughya, fol. 174.
5. See above, p.181
other hand, he imprisoned a number of Yemenite nobles (Wujūh), because of the murder of a Qaisite. He also threatened 'Abd Yasū ibn Ḥarb, the sayyid of Banū Ṭaghlīb, as an attempt to put an end to the feud between Qais and Ṭaghlīb.

In choosing his officials, 'Abd al-Malik, following the normal practise of the time, favoured his relatives. However, he was not the prisoner of his family. Probably he trusted them more than others, because of the nature of the problems he faced at the time of his accession; and as Quraishites, they were able to attain a level of aloofness from tribal frictions, more difficult for other 'Arabs to obtain. Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Malik kept an eye on them and was ready to remove any who showed incompetence; he would replace them by a more capable person, no matter whether he was an Umayyad or not. When Khalid ibn 'Abdallāh ibn Khalid ibn Asīd showed incapability in facing the Khārijite threat and in collecting the Kharāj, he was soon removed from his post as a governor of Basra. 'Abd al-Malik also removed al-Ḥārith ibn Khalid al-Makhzūmī, the governor of Mecca, because he did not perform his duty as a leader of the congregation.

3. *Ansāb*, XI, pp. 266-7 (citing Abū Mikhnaf and 'Awāna), fol. 25b (citing Mādā'īnī); *Iql.,* IV, pp. 23-4; *Tab.*, II, p. 825 (citing Abū Mikhnaf).
we have seen, Umayya ibn 'Abdallah ibn Khalid ibn Asid was appointed to the government of Khurasan in order to keep the balance between the conflicting parties. When Umayya failed to end the feuds and engage the people of Khurasan in the Jihad against the Turks, he was removed from his post and the government was transferred to al-Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra. 1

On the other hand, the death of Bishr ibn Marwan (74/693) left vacant the important post of governor of Iraq. Apart from having strong anti-Umayyad feelings (especially in Kufa), Iraq was constantly menaced by the Kharijites. To this must be added the turbulent and insubordinate nature of the 'Arab tribes there. The governorship of Iraq was therefore the most responsible post in the whole Islamic Empire. On the other hand, the severity with which al-Hajjaj restored the peace in al-Hijaz, and the harsh treatment and discrimination he showed to the people there, made 'Abd al-Malik transfer him to Iraq. 2

1. Ansab, XI, pp. 194-5; (citing Madā‘ini), 310-11 (citing al-Haytham); Futūḥ, p. 399; Tab., II, pp. 1026-29; Kūfī, II, fols. 59a-59b, 72a-72b, 100a-100b; Ghurar, fols. 6-7; 'Iqd, IV, pp. 23-4; Agh., XII, p. 56; Marzubānī, op. cit., pp. 227-8, 230, 265; Kāmil, IV, pp. 299-300; Dḥahābī, III, pp. 125-6; Miles, Two Unpublished Dirhams of 'Abdallah ibn Umayya, p. 156, ANSM, XIV, 1968.

2. Mahāsin, pp. 63-4; Al-Zubair ibn Bakkar, Akhbar al-Muwafaqīyyāt fil Śiyar, fol. 46 (citing 'Awāna); Imāma, II, pp. 25; Ya‘qūbī, II, pp. 326-7; Tab., II, pp. 863-73; Kūfī, II, fol. 69a; 'Iqd, II, pp. 78181; Murūj, V, pp. 290-302; Bad’, VI, p. 27; Tānukhī, al-Mustajād min Fi‘lāt al-Ajwād, pp. 44-6; Jāhīs, Fols. 8b, 9a, 9b (citing Muṣ‘ab al-Zuhāfī); Ghurar, fol. 17; Kāmil, IV, pp. 303-5; Mir‘āt, VI, fols. 8a, 14b, 15a; Bidāya, IX, p. 7; 'Ībar, III, pp. 93-4. However, contrary to the written sources which give the date of Bishr’s death as 74, there is a coin bearing the name of Bishr =
Al-Ḥajjāj has been accused of showing 'Asabiyya to both the Qaisites, and more especially to his own people, the Thaqifites. It is true that he removed many of the previous officials, appointed by Bishr, and replaced them with Thaqifites. In Sistan, he appointed 'Ubaidallah ibn Abī Baka; in Basra, al-Ḥakam ibn Ayyūb and 'Urwa ibn al-Mughīra as his deputy in Baṣra and Kufr; in the Yemen, he appointed his brother Muḥammad, and in Fārs, another Thaqifite, Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim. Nevertheless, there are also examples of his appointment of Yemenites to high office: 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ashtath al-Kindī was his choice as governor of Sistan and as leader of the celebrated army, Jāsh al-Ṭawāris; appointed head of the Shurta was Abu l-ʿAmarṭa (Kinda); and he appointed al-Rabī' ibn Qais (Kinda) as leader of the celebrated army, Jāsh al-Ṭawāris. This numismatic evidence would seem to indicate that Bishr was immediately succeeded by al-Ḥajjāj, thus eliminating Khalīfā 'Abdallah ibn Asīd from the list of governors of Baṣra and Kufr. See Walker, Some New Arab Sassanian Coins, p. 107, NČ, XI, 1962; Miles, A Byzantine Bronze Weight in the Name of Bishr ibn Marwān, pp. 117-8, Arabica, IX, 1962.

1. Khalīfā ibn Khayyāt, Tāʾriḵ, I, p. 386; Ansāb, XI, pp. 310-11 (citing al-Haytham); Tab., II, pp. 1033-4 (citing Abū Mīkhnaḥ); Kūfī, II, fol. 100a; Ghurār, fol. 52; Kāmil, IV, p. 362; Mīrāt, VI, fol. 29a; Wafayāt, II, p. 215.
2. Khalīfā ibn Khayyāt, Tāʾriḵ, I, p. 365; Ansāb, V, p. 179; Tab., II, pp. 872, 979 (citing Abū Mīkhnaḥ), 'Asākir, IV, pp. 389-90; Bidāya, IX, p. 47.
3. Futūḥ, p. 73 (citing Madaʾiʿin); Kūfī, II, fol. 83a.
5. Farazdaq, Dīwān, I, p. 328; Imāma, II, pp. 29-30; Ansāb, XI, p. 319; Yaʾqūbī, II, p. 331; Tab., II, pp. 1044 (citing al-Shābīḥ), 1046; Kūfī, II, fol. 101a; Muruṭ, V, p. 301ff.; Tanbîḥ, p. 314; Ghurār, fol. 53ff.; Badʾ, VI, p. 53; Kāmil, IV, pp. 365-6; Mīrāt, VI, fol. 31b; Bidāya, IX, pp. 31-5; Shadharāt, I, p. 87.
6. Māṭāḏ, fol. 27a; Jamharat, p. 401.
as governor of Fārs, \(^1\) Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Sabra (Nakha′) as governor of Iṣbahān, \(^2\) al-Zubair ibn Khuzaima (Khath'am) as a later governor of Iṣbahān, \(^3\) and ‘Imāra ibn Tamīm (Lakham) as governor of Sistān. \(^4\) Thus it seems that rather than exercising a tribal system of patronage, al-Ḥaḍājā was advancing men on the basis of his trust in them and his belief in their efficiency: it was more a personal system of patronage.

Wellhausen \(^5\) is one who believes al-Ḥaḍājā to have favoured the Qais. He says that al-Ḥaḍājā removed al-Muṭṭadāl ibn al-Muḥallab from Khurāsān because he killed Mūsā ibn ‘Abdallah ibn Khāzim. The latter was a Qaisite who held out for twelve years after the death of his father, in Tirmidh. However, historical tradition is not in favour of this conclusion. Al-Muḥallab ibn Abī Ṣufra was appointed the governor of Khurāsān by al-Ḥaḍājā. \(^6\) Before his death, al-Muḥallab nominated his son Yazīd as his successor. This nomination was approved by al-Ḥaḍājā. \(^7\) If al-Ḥaḍājā had

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1. Maʿad, fol. 27a.
3. Maʿad, fol. 53b.
5. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 429.
6. Ansāb, XI, p. 311 (citing al-Haytham); Futūh, p. 317; Yaʿqūbī, II, p. 330; Buldān, pp. 60, 81; Tabr., II, pp. 1033, 1039, 1047, 1063; Kūfī, II, fol. 90b; Ghurar, fol. 33; Kāmil, IV, p. 362; Mirʾāt, VI, fol. 29a; Ḳūbar, III, p. 103.
7. Futūh, p. 417; Dinawarī, p. 289; Yaʿqūbī, II, p. 330; Buldān, p. 82; Tabr., II, pp. 1083 (citing Mādāʾīnī), 1085; Ghurar, fol. 74; Mirʾāt, VI, fol. 40b.
had any sort of partisanship to his people, he would have chosen a Qaisite governor for this important post; or at least he would not confirm the nomination of al-Muhallab's son Yazīd as his successor. But al-Ḥajjāj only removed Yazīd from Khurāsān after he had been governor there for three years. This removal of Yazīd from Khurāsān was not caused by al-Ḥajjāj's partisanship to the Qais against the Azd, to whom Yazīd belonged; relations between the two had become strained when Yazīd, because of his 'Asābiyya to his people, sent only the Mūdarītī participants in the revolt of Ibn al-Āsh'ath as prisoners to al-Ḥajjāj, setting free all the Yemenites. ¹ Moreover, proud and disobedient to his master as he was, Yazīd was unpopular in Khurāsān, even among his own people, the Azd. ² It is also reported ³ that

1. Ansāb, fols. 19a-19b; Ya'qūbī, II, p. 330; Ṭab., II, pp. 1119-22 (citing Abū 'Ubaida); Kāfī, II, fol. 112b; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 51b.

2. Ṭab., II, pp. 1142-43 (citing Madā'īnī), 1143-44 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī and Abū Mīkhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols. 127b, 128a; Ghurar, fol. 75; Agh., XIII, p. 61; Kāmil, IV, p. 402.

3. Jalīs, fols. 56a-56b; Ghurar, fol. 78. It is also possible that owing to the insurrection of Saīd and Sulaimān, the sons of 'Abbād, with the Azd in 'Umān, al-Ḥajjāj feared Yazīd and he was very cautious in removing him from Khurāsān. See 'Asākir, VI, pp. 167-68; Azkawī, Kashf al-Ghumma al-Jāmiʿī Ahbār al-Umma, fol. 326a-326b. Part of the latter work has been translated into English by E.C. Ross, Calcutta, 1874. The same part has been edited by Hedwig Klein, Hamburg, 1938. The Kashf al-Ghumma was also copied, for the most part literally, by another local historian called Sāfī ibn Rāziq in his work "History of the Imams and Seyyids of 'Umān", translated and edited by G. Badger, printed for the Hakluyt Society, M.DCCCLXXI; English translation, p. 10; Kelin, p. 12.
al-Ḥaḍar removed Yazīd because he was embezzling the treasury of the country. Finally, the hostile tradition, which tries to show al-Ḥaḍar as superstitious, and connects this with the dismissal of Yazīd has so much of the flavour of a legend that it is not worth serious consideration.

In order not to arouse Yazīd's suspicions that he was to be dismissed, al-Ḥaḍar married Yazīd's sister. Another device al-Ḥaḍar employed in this connection was when he asked Yazīd to come to Wasit to discuss an important matter with him, and to leave his weaker brother al-Mufaddal as his deputy governor. After some hesitation, Yazīd submitted to the order of al-Ḥaḍar and left Khurasan to his brother. The latter remained for a few months until Outaiba ibn Muslim al-Bahili came to replace him as governor. Thus we see that the temporary appointment of al-Mufaddal was but a device used by al-Ḥaḍar against Yazīd. It was because al-Ḥaḍar considered Yazīd's position in Khurasan to be not in the interests of the state, that he dismissed him, not because of the ʿAsabiyya. Al-Ḥaḍar must also by this time have realised that his appointment of al-Muhallab and his Azdite supporters had had the effect of driving the Mudar party into such sharp opposition, that it even

1. Tab., II, pp.1143-4 (citing Madāʾīnī); Ghurar, fols. 75-6; Aḥā, IX, pp.55-6; Kāmil, IV, pp.400-1; Mīrāt, VI, fol.52a; Ibar, III, pp.119-20.
3. Yaʿqūbī, II, p.330; Tab., II, p.1141; Kūfī, II, fol. 128b; Ghurar, fols. 76-77; Kāmil, IV, p.401; Mīrāt, VI, fol.52a; Bidāya, IX, p.56; Ibar, III, p.120.
led the Qais to align with the Tamīm. He, therefore, chose another
governor who could be relied on to carry out his policies and yet would
be acceptable to the Muṣār - that is, Qutaiba ibn Muslim.¹

Al-Ḥaḍjaj is also said² to have encouraged the Āṣābiyya among
the tribes by inciting the poets against each other, as for example, in the
satirical battle between Jarīr and al-Farazdaq. The fact that al-Naqīḍ
were composed more for entertainment than for political hostility,³ does not
convince us in favour of al-Nuss's thesis, especially since we know that
Jarīr and al-Farazdaq⁴ enjoyed an intimate friendship.

Finally, it was al-Ḥaḍjaj who imprisoned his brother-in-law, Mālik
ibn Asma' ibn Khārija al-Fazārī, for embezzlement.⁵ Mālik asked his
father, the Sayyid of Fazāra, to use his influence to release him, only to
be met with a refusal because his father dared not petition al-Ḥaḍjaj on such
a matter.⁶ This shows that it was well known that al-Ḥaḍjaj would not respond
to appeals of kinship.

5. Agh., XVI, p. 41; Jalis, fols. 88a-88b.
Al-Hajjāj's system of patronage may well have added to his unpopularity; it would seem more likely that he upset the Qais for failing to exercise his powers of patronage on a solely tribal basis, than that he erred in favouring his own people beyond what was usual at the time. In many ways it seems he was a man one step in advance of his time.

Another characteristic of the policy of 'Abd al-Malik in choosing his governors and officials, was that he mainly employed members of the Northern tribes as governors, while his court officials mostly belonged to the Southern tribes. Out of fifty six officials whom he employed as governors during his regime, only five were from the Northern tribes; 1

1. Hadhif, pp. 3, 171; Sa'd, V, pp. 41, 112-13; Zubairī, pp. 82, 190-1, 313, 328-9; Khālid ibn Khayyāt, Tabaqāt, p. 601; Idem, Ṭārīkh, I, pp. 340, 341, 381-394; Azraqī, II, p. 136; Muhābbar, pp. 23-5, 378; Mughtalīn, pp. 176-7; Munammaq, pp. 501-2; Bayān, I, p. 165; Mahāsin, pp. 63-4; Ma‘ārif, pp. 155, 156; ‘Uyun, p. 207; Imāma, II, p. 25 (citing Abū Ma‘shar), 48-9; Futūḥ, p. 229 (citing Wāqīdī), 332, 339-400, 415-7; Ansāb, V, pp. 79, 120, 160, 162-3, 166, 171 (citing Madā’īnī), 178, 180 (citing Madā’īnī), 346-7 (citing al-Haytham); 351 (citing Abū Mīkhnaf), 354, 373 (citing Wāqīdī), 374; XI, pp. 17-18 (citing al-Haytham), 30-2 (citing Madā’īnī), 68-9, 189 (citing Madā’īnī), 266-7 (citing Abū Mīkhnaf and ‘Awāna), 269-70 (citing Madā’īnī), 310-11 (citing al-Haytham); Ya‘qūbī, II, pp. 324-5, 326-7, 331, 335; Buldān, pp. 60-1, 80-1; Idem, Mushākālat al-Nāṣirī Zamanīhīm, p. 18; Bahshal, Ṭārīkh Wāsit, p. 40 (citing ‘Awāna); Nasab, fols. 3a-3b, 13a, 13b, 15b, 17a-17b, 29a-29b, 173a, 185a; Quṣṭalāt, I, pp. 124, 135, 130; Tāb., II, p. 816-7 (citing Madā’īnī), 818 (citing Madā’īnī), 852, 853-4, 855, 859-63 (citing Madā’īnī), 873, 928 (citing ‘Umar ibn Shabba), 940 (citing Wāqīdī), 1022 ff. (citing Madā’īnī), 1031-32, 1033-5 (citing Abū Mīkhnaf and Madā’īnī), 1039, 1046-7, 1063, 1085, 1127 (citing Wāqīdī), 1171; Kūfī, II, fols. 58a-59b, 66b-69a, 72a-72b; Iqd, II, pp. 78-81; IV, 304; Murūj, V, pp. 266, 290-2; Kindī, I, pp. 48-9, 55, 58; Badr, VI, pp. 25-7; Agh., III, pp. 100 (citing Mu‘āz al-Zubairī), 102-3, 107-8, 110 (citing Madā’īnī), 113; XIII, p. 56;
while fifteen out of twenty court officials were from the Southern tribes. 

This might have been another way of keeping the balance between the two sides.
The success of 'Abd al-Malik's policy towards the tribes can be measured by the fact that the last few years of his reign were free from armed inter-tribal struggle. He was successful in harnessing tribal feeling to the interests of the government, at the same time suppressing its violent manifestations. His successors, however, were less careful in treading this narrow road between the beneficial and disruptive effects of the tribal system, and in later years, the rivalries and antipathies of 'Aṣabiyya again erupted in violent feuds.
The twenty-one years of his reign, ‘Abd al-Malik faced a series of revolts and dissensions, perhaps the most serious of which was the revolt of ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubair, who had proclaimed himself caliph on the death of Yazid I in 64/683. At the height of his power, he controlled al-Hijaz and Iraq, as well as receiving at least nominal recognition from many other provinces of the Empire. ¹ Certainly, not until Ibn al-Zubair's death in the year 73/692, was ‘Abd al-Malik acknowledged as Caliph throughout the Empire.

‘Abd al-Malik, however, was unable to challenge Ibn al-Zubair's sway in Iraq and the East before he had secured his position in Syria itself, the centre of his authority. There, Nāṭil ibn Qais al-Judhami was occupying Palestine in support of ‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubair. ² ‘Abd al-Malik succeeded in liquidating Nāṭil in the battle of Ajnadān. Both Khalīfa ibn

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Khayyat and Mas'udi\(^1\) state that this battle took place in the same year as the battle of Khāzir, in which 'Ubaidallah ibn Ziyād was killed. The date of the battle of Khāzir is given by other sources as 10th Muḥarram, 67/6th August, 686\(^2\), while Khalīfa dates it as 66/685, without specifying the month. These two dates are not necessarily contradictory, for if the battles of Ajnadin and Khāzir took place at the end of the year 66, in the month of Dhul-Ḥaṣaṣ, the difference between Khalīfa's and Mas'udi's dates is as little as ten days, which is not significant.

Another threat to 'Abd al-Malik's position in Syria at this time came from the Byzantine Emperor, who, encouraged by the political confusion of the time, stirred up the Jarājima (Mardaites) against the 'Arabs.\(^3\) According to Baladhuri,\(^4\) a Byzantine cavalry came into the Amanūs district (Lukām) and penetrated as far as Lebanon. This force was joined by a large number of Jarājima, Anbāt (Nabateans) and runaway slaves. The caliph found himself compelled to make a treaty with them, guaranteeing them a weekly payment of one thousand Dīnārs. Then, following the precedent of

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Muʿāwiyya, he offered peace terms to the emperor.

The contents of the treaty between them are preserved only by the Christian sources. According to this treaty, the caliph agreed to pay 365,000 gold pieces, 365 slaves and 365 thoroughbred horses; he had also to surrender half of the tribute from Cyprus, Armenia and Iberia. In return, the emperor Justinian II agreed to withdraw the Mardaites, and he recalled 12,000 of them to be settled in Byzantine territory. It is interesting to note here that the Christian sources reproach the emperor for denuding the frontiers in this way.

Following the account of Baladhuri, after signing the treaty, ʿAbd al-Malik sent one of his trusted men, Suhaim ibn al-Muhajir, to the Byzantine officer commanding the Jarajima. Suhaim succeeded in winning his confidence by pretending to take his part against the caliph. Then Suhaim used his troops, which he had hidden, to make a surprise attack, killing the officer and his Greek followers. As for the Jarajima, they were guaranteed Amān; some went away and settled in the villages of Ḥims and Damascus, while the majority of them went back to the Amanūs; the Anbāt returned to their villages and the slaves to their masters, while

others entered the caliph's service.  

Here again, as in most of the events of this period, no definite date is given for the Mardaites' raids or the treaty. Baladhuri, Theophanes, Constantine Perphygrogentus, Michael the Syrian, Ibn al-'Adīm, Ibn al-'Irī and Dhahabi date them after the death of Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam and the accession of 'Abd al-Malik to the caliphate, in the time of political turmoil. Both Ya'qūbī and Masʿūdī refer to the same date when they place these events along with the rebellion of Nātil ibn Qais in 66/685. Another account without any chain of authority in Tābarī, repeated by Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Kathīr and Ibn al-'Imad, gives the year as 70/689. Finally, another report found in Ibn al-Athīr puts this Byzantine threat in the year 69/688, to coincide with the revolt of 'Amr ibn Saʿīd al-Ashdaq in Damascus. Of all these different dates, it would seem that the period 65-66/684-5 is the most likely, in that troubled period before 'Abd al-Malik secured his succession; the narratives which give other dates are either less detailed and without a chain of authority (Tābarī's) or without confirmation in the early sources (Ibn al-Athīr's).

2. Futūḥ, pp.160-1, 188; Chronographia, 6176; De Administrando Imperio, p.93; Chronique, II, 469; Bughya, fols. 255-6 (quoting Baladhuri); Chronographia, I, p.103; Duwal, I, p.37.
It was these troubles which ‘Abd al-Malik faced at home that prevented him from interfering in the war between Muṣ‘ab ibn al-Zubair and al-Mukhtar ibn Abī ‘Ubad al-Thaqafi in 67/686. Moreover, ‘Abd al-Malik may well have thought it wiser to let his enemies fight each other and so weaken themselves. Wellhausen has argued that the reason for ‘Abd al-Malik’s neutrality in this conflict was due to the famine that struck Syria in 68/687; this, however, is incorrect, since the famine occurred a year after the war between Muṣ‘ab and al-Mukhtar. On the other hand, Muṣ‘ab himself was too busy fighting other enemies, such as the Shi‘a in Kūfa and the Khawārij in Baṣra, to take the offensive against ‘Abd al-Malik. Therefore, any conflict between the two was delayed.

As soon as he was free from troubles at home, ‘Abd al-Malik launched an attack on Muṣ‘ab, advancing until he reached Buṭnān Ḥabīb in the district of Qinaṣrīn, where he made his camp. Muṣ‘ab consequently left Kūfa and made his camp in Bajumairā near Takrit. These choices of camp headquarters were not without significance. Apart from the fact that both were boundary stations on the road from Syria to Iraq, there were other, more important

reasons for their choice: Buṭnān Ḥabīb and the neighbouring Qinasrīn were inhabited by the Banū ʿAbs ibn Baghīd, with whom ʿAbd al-Malik had a marriage alliance. On the other hand, Musʿab may well have chosen Bājumairā on the Euphrates because of its proximity to the Qarqīṣyā area, where Zufar ibn al-Ḥarīth al-Kilābī adhered to him and opposed ʿAbd al-Malik.

The first march of ʿAbd al-Malik against Musʿab was in the summer of 69-70/689. However, ʿAbd al-Malik had to leave Buṭnān and return to Damascus, to deal with the revolt of one of his kinsmen, ʿAmr ibn Saʿīd ibn al-ʿĀṣ, nicknamed al-ʿAshdaq. ʿAmr's revolt was to establish his claim to the caliphate, which had been acknowledged at the treaty of

1. Nasab, fol. 35a; Jamharat, pp. 239-40; Bughya, fol. 471 (quoting Muḥammad ibn Ahmad al-Azdī, al-Nassāba).
2. See Chapter III, pp. 167
3. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarīkh, I, p. 336 (citing al-Layth); Ṣab., II, pp. 783 (citing Wāqia), 784 (citing ʿAwāna); Kāmil, IV, p. 250; Nuwairī, XIX, fols. 89-90; Dhahabī, II, pp. 383-4; Bidāya, VIII, p. 307. As for the account in Ṣab., (II, p. 765), repeated by Ibn al-Athīr, (Kāmil, IV, p. 236), which says that ʿAbd al-Malik and his army camped in Buṭnān Ḥabīb in 68/687, it seems, as Wellhausen justly observed, that "it contradicts the preceding account, that at that year ʿAbd al-Malik did not take the field, because of the famine". The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 188.
al-Jabiyah; Marwan had then broken his faith, by appointing his two sons as his successors. Our information on 'Amr's revolt comes from the narrative of Waqidi in Ibn Sa'd, repeated by Ibn 'Asakir and Dhahabi, the narrative of Abu Mikhnaif in Baladhuri, repeated by Tabari and Ibn al-Athir, and that of 'Awana in Tabari, repeated by Ibn al-Athir, al-Nuwairi, Ibn Kathir and Ibn Khaldun. There are also other accounts which are mainly compilations of these three main narratives. The narratives not only disagree on the date of the revolt, but also emphasise different aspects of it. While 'Awana is interested in the way that 'Amr was killed, Abu Mikhnaif endeavours to explain why 'Amr so easily succeeded in taking Damascus. Waqidi passes over the agreement between 'Abd al-Malik and 'Amr before the latter's submission. It is therefore only by putting all the accounts together that one can form a satisfactory picture of this revolt.

According to Ibn Sa'd, Musab al-Zubairi, Baladhuri, Tabari, Ghurar al Siyar, Ibn 'Abd Rabbih, Ibn 'Asakir, Ibn al-Athir, Nuwairi and Dhahabi, 'Amr ibn Sa'id was with 'Abd al-Malik when he marched from Damascus against Musab ibn al-Zubair in Iraq. On the way there, 'Amr reminded 'Abd al-Malik of Marwan's promise that he should succeed him, and

asked `Abd al-Malik to name him as successor on his own death, in honour of his father's promise. 'Abd al-Malik paid no heed to 'Amr's claim. As a result, 'Amr, accompanied by some of his followers, deserted 'Abd al-Malik's camp at night and went to Damascus.\(^1\) Another account, given by Ya'qubî, Tabari, Ibn al-Athir, Nuwairî, Ibn Kathîr and Ibn Khaldûn,\(^2\) says that the desertion of 'Amr from 'Abd al-Malik's army occurred when the latter was going to fight Zufar ibn al-Ḫarîth al-Kilâbî in Qarqîsyâ, not in his campaign against Muṣ'ab. 'Abd al-Malik besieged 'Amr in Damascus for sixteen days,\(^3\) during which time negotiations and correspondence

1. Sa'd, V, pp. 168-9 (citing Wāqidî); Zubairî, pp. 178-9; Ansâb, IV, ii, pp. 138-40 (citing Abû Mîkhnaf); Tab., II, p. 784; Ghurar, fols. 7-8; 'Iqd, IV, pp. 407-9 (citing Abû Ma'ṣhar); 'Asakir, XIII, fol. 230b (quoting Ibn Sa'd); Kamîl, IV, p. 250; Nuwairî, XIX, fol. 95; Dhahabi, III, pp. 57-9 (quoting Ibn Sa'd).

2. Ya'qubî, II, pp. 321-3; Tab., II, p. 783 (citing 'Awâna); Kamîl, IV, pp. 245-6; Nuwairî, XIX, fols. 89-92; Bidâya, VII, pp. 307-8; 'Ibar, III, pp. 72-5. As for the account which says that 'Abd al-Malik left 'Amr ibn Sa'îd in Damascus as his deputy, when he went to fight Muṣ'ab ibn al-Zubair, this seems unlikely since 'Abd al-Malik knew very well how ambitious his rival was. Their rivalry went back to their early years. 'Imama, II, p. 20 (citing Abû Ma'ṣhar); Tab., II, p. 783 (citing Wāqidî); Murûj, V, pp. 233-5; Marzubanî, op. cit., p. 231; Kamîl, IV, p. 250; E. I. 2 (‘Amr ibn Sa’tîd al-Ashdaq).

3. Sa'd, V, pp. 168-9 (citing Wāqidî) 'Asâkir, XIII, fol. 230b (quoting Ibn Sa'd); Dhahabi, III, pp. 57-9 (quoting Ibn Sa'd). According to Abû Ma'ṣhar ('Imama, II, p. 20), the siege lasted for more than one month.
took place between them, which brought about the submission of 'Amr, and 
'Abd al-Malik re-entered the city. Unfortunately, our sources do not 
preserve for us a complete version of the terms of the agreement between 
'Amr and 'Abd al-Malik. However, the following terms can be gathered 
from the fragments that do occur in the sources:— 'Amr would succeed 'Abd 
al-Malik to the caliphate; 'Amr would be put in charge of the treasury 
and the Diwāns, and would appoint one official for each one appointed by 
'Abd al-Malik; and the caliph would consult 'Amr in all decisions. Such 
a division of responsibility at the head of power was hardly politically feasible, 
and 'Abd al-Malik decided to remove the threat of 'Amr once and for all. 
— according to tradition, 'Amr was invited to the palace and killed by 'Abd 
al-Malik's own hands.

1. Mughṭalīn, p. 205; Bayān, III, pp. 229-30; Ansāb, IV, ii, pp. 138-40 
(citing Abū Mikhnaf); Ya‘qūbī, II, pp. 321-3; Ghurar, fols. 7-8; 
Mūrūj, V, p. 234; 'Asākir, XIII, fol. 230b (quoting Khalīfa); Kāmil, 
IV, p. 246; Nuwaṭīr, XIX, fol. 89ff; Dāhābī, III, pp. 57-9; Bīdāya, 
VIII, pp. 307-8; 311-12; 'Ibar, III, pp. 73-4; Shadhūrāt, I, p. 77.

2. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tarikh, I, p. 263; Mughṭalīn, p. 205; Imāma, II, 
pp. 13-20; Ansāb, IV, ii, p. 138ff. (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Dinawart, 
p. 294; Ya‘qūbī, II, p. 322; 'Ibar, II, pp. 793 (citing 'Awāna), 875 
(citing 'Awāna); Ghurar, fols. 7-8; 'Iqd, I, pp. 92 (citing Mada‘ī inī) 
IV, p. 408 (citing Abū Ma‘shar); Mūrūj, V, pp. 234-5; 'Asākir, XIII, 
fol. 230 (quoting Khalīfa); Kāmil, IV, pp. 245-6; Dāhābī, III, pp. 58-9; 
Bīdāya, VIII, pp. 307-8, 312; Shadhūrāt, I, p. 77.

3. Sa‘d, V, p. 169 (citing Wāqīdī); Zubārī, p. 179; Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, 
Tarikh, I, p. 263; Mughṭalīn, p. 205; Kitāb al-Taj, p. 66; Dinawart, pp. 
294-5; Ya‘qūbī, II, pp. 322-3; 'Ibar, II, p. 891-2 (citing 'Awāna); 
Ghurar, fol. 8-9; 'Iqd, IV, pp. 408-9 (citing Abū Ma‘shar); Mūrūj, V, 
pp. 237-9; 'Asākir, XIII, fols. 227a, 230b (quoting Khalīfa), 230b 
(quoting Ibn Sa‘d); Kāmil, IV, pp. 248-9; Shāhīn, IX, p. 119; Nuwaṭīr, 
XIX, fols. 92-4; Dāhābī, III, pp. 57-9 (quoting Ibn Sa‘d and Khalīfa);
The murder of ‘Amr left a stigma on ’Abd al-Malik’s name, used by the hostile tradition to condemn him, with no consideration of any of his achievements. One can argue, however, that ’Abd al-Malik had some justification for killing ‘Amr. In this troubled time of political confusion, there was no room for ambitious men of the ruling family to put forward claims that undermined the unity of the Umayyad family and the security of the Empire: ‘Amr’s murder was “pour encourager les autres”. Moreover, had ‘Amr lived to succeed in his bid for power, he would surely have had to kill ’Abd al-Malik.

’Abd al-Malik cast ‘Amr’s head to the crowd, together with a large sum of money: the people fell on the money, paying no attention to the severed head. In this way, ’Abd al-Malik succeeded in diverting the attention of the people from the killing of ‘Amr. At the same time, he ordered an announcement to be made. It is reported in the _Imāma wa_ Siyāsā that when the head and the money were thrown to the crowd, one of


2. _Imāma_, II, pp. 21-2 (citing Abū Ma‘ṣhar); Ansāb, IV, ii, p. 139 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Dīnawārī, p. 295; Ya‘qūbī, II, p. 323; Ṭab., II, p. 791 (citing ‘Awānā); Ghurār, fol. 9; ‘Iqd, IV, p. 409 (citing Abū Ma‘ṣhar); Murūj, V, p. 339; Ibn Hamdūn, Tadhkira, I, fol. 66b; Kāmil, IV, pp. 248-50; Nuwairī, XIX, fol. 93; Bidāya, VIII, p. 309; Ḳabar, III, pp. 74-5.

3. _Imāma_, II, pp. 21-2 (citing Abū Ma‘ṣhar).
‘Abd al-Malik’s men made the public announcement, that "Your man was killed by the caliph according to the Qadar of Allah, which no one can prevent," and urged the people to keep quiet, promising them material rewards, to which they agreed. Two important points emerge from this announcement: the first is that the caliph, i.e. the State, held to the doctrine of Qadar (predestination) and used it in the political sphere as a means of silencing opposition to the regime. This point has been made clearly by Ibn Qutaiba, when he described how government officials pointed to the doctrine, in justification for their acts of tyranny. The second important point is that there were a considerable number of people, at least in Damascus, who believed in this Qadar doctrine. Both of these points are borne out by the evidence of a letter sent by ‘Abd al-Malik to al-Hasan ibn Abi1 Hasan al-Province concerning this doctrine.²

Once again we face problems of chronology, for more than one date is given for ‘Amr’s revolt. Tabari, Ibn al-Athir and other late sources give the year 69/688. On the other hand, Khalifa Ibn Khayyat, Ya’qubi, Mas’udi,


3. Tab., II, pp.783 (citing Wāqidi), 783 (citing ‘Awana); ‘Asākir, XIII, fol. 231a (citing Ibn Sallam); Kāmil, IV, p.245; Nuwairī, XIX, fol.89; Dhahabiṣ, III, p.59 (quoting al-Layth); Bīdāya, VIII, p.307; Tahdhīb, VIII, p.38 (citing al-Layth).
Ibn 'Asakir, Ibn al-'Adîm, Dhahabî, Ibn Hajar and Ibn al-Imad, mention the year 70/689. Moreover, a third group of sources place the desertion of 'Amr from 'Abd al-Malik's army in the year 69, and his death in 70. This account seems to be the most convincing, for according to the Muslim calendar, "the turn of the year then fell in the summer", and the military activities, which ceased in winter, would therefore be spread over two Muslim years. Waqidi in Tabari, and 'Awana state that 'Amr left the camp of 'Abd al-Malik and returned to Damascus in 69/688; while Mas'udî specifically states that 'Amr was killed in the year 70. The argument in favour of these events covering a period of two years is strengthened by the consideration that 'Abd al-Malik had reached as far as Buṭnân Ḥabîb in the summer of 69-70/689-690 on his march against Muṣ'ab, before he was forced to return to Damascus to deal with 'Amr's revolt; these journeys would certainly take a considerable time.

The revolt of 'Amr and his death occupied the whole summer, and 'Abd al-Malik spent the rest of the year 70/689 in the capital re-establishing his authority. The next year, 70-71/690, the campaign against Muṣ'ab was

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1. Khalîfa ibn Khayyât, Tarîkh, I, p.263; Ya‘qûbî, II, p.323; Murûj, V, p.233; ‘Asâkir, XIII, fol.230b (quoting Khalîfa); Bughya, fol.256 (quoting Baladhurî); Dhahabî, III, p.58 (quoting Khalîfa); Tahdhib, III, p.38; Shaddârât, I, p.77.

2. Tab., II, p.796 (citing Waqidi); Bidâya, VIII, p.310 (citing Waqidi); Tahdhib, III, p.38.


5. See p. 22, 4.

resumed and Abd al-Malik with his army once again marched as far as Buṭnān Ḥabīb. Muṣʿab was waiting for him in Bājumairā where he had made his camp. Winter came on before the two reached each other and no battle took place, since they both turned back home.¹

However, taking advantage of Muṣʿab's absence from Basra, Abd al-Malik tried to instigate a tribal revolt there in his favour. Our information about this event comes mainly from Abū ‘Ubaida, Mada'īnī and Abū Mikhnaf found in Balādhurī and Ṭabarī. There are only minor differences in these accounts, and on the whole they re-inforce each other. There are another two accounts, one of Wahab ibn Jarīr in Balādhurī, and one of Shaʿbī in al-Futūb of Ibn Aṯīm; these are brief and without details, although they broadly agree with the three accounts before mentioned. Both Ibn al-Aṯīr and Nuwairī, however, had restricted themselves to the account of Madaʿīnī alone.

According to Abū ‘Ubaida, Abū Mikhnaf, Wahab ibn Jarīr and al-Shaʿbī,² Abd al-Malik began by writing to his supporters (shīʿa) in Basra,}

1. Naqaʿīd, II, p.1091; Ansāb, V, p.336 (citing ‘Awāna); Ṭab., II, p.797; Kūfī, II, fol.48a (citing al-Shaʿbī); Aḥb., XVII, p.162 (citing Madaʿīnī); ʿAsākir, XVI, fol.266a (quoting Khalīfa); Muʿjam, I, p.454; Bidāya, VIII, p.315.

2. Naqaʿīd, II, pp.1090-91; Ansāb, IV, ii, pp.155 (citing Abū Mikhnaf), 157 (citing Wahab ibn Jarīr); Kūfī, II, fol.48a (citing al-Shaʿbī).
promising them lavish rewards if they would support his cause against Mus'ab. Finding an encouraging response to this offer, 'Abd al-Malik sent Khalid ibn 'Abdallah ibn Khālid ibn Asīd to seize Basra for him. Mada'ini and Mus'ab al-Zubairī, however, do not mention this correspondence, and they say that Khālid himself suggested to the caliph that he should send him to Basra to seize the town for him, and that 'Abd al-Malik agreed to this. Khālid went to Basra secretly with his mawāfi and retainers, and took refuge with one of the Ashraf of Bahila tribe, probably because of its well-known Umayyad sympathy. However, this man found himself unable to protect Khālid against the forces of the governor and advised him to seek the help of Mālik ibn Mīsma', the head of the Bakr tribe. Mālik was one of those mentioned in other sources, to whom 'Abd al-Malik had written, and he took Khālid into his jiwar (protection). Soon Ziyād ibn 'Amr al-'Atkī, the chief of the Azd, came to their aid, mainly due to the Hilf between Rabi'a and al-Azd. Members of the tribes of Thaqīf, Tamīm, 'Abd al-Qais and Sadūs are also said to have joined the side of Khālid. On the other hand, we find the majority of the Zubairīd

1. Naqā'īd, II, p.749; Zubairī, p.189; Ansāb, IV, ii, p.159; Tab., II, p.798; Kāmil, IV, p.252; Nuwairī, XIX, fol.68.
2. Ansāb, IV, ii, 00.156 (citing Abu Mikhnaf), 159 (citing Mada'īnī); Tab., II, p.798 (citing Mada'īnī); Kāmil, IV, p.252; Nuwairī, XIX, fol.68. It is also reported that Khālid directly went to Mālik ibn Mīsma' and no mention of that Bahilite Sharīf has been given. Naqā'īd, II, p.1061; Zubairī, p.189; Ansāb, IV, ii, p.158.
3. Naqā'īd, II, p.729; Ansāb, IV, ii, pp.105-6 (citing Mada'īnī and Abu 'Ubaida); Tab., II, p.446 (citing Abu 'Ubaida).
4. Farazdaq, Dīwān, II, p.57; Zubairī, p.189; Naqā'īd, II, pp.749-50, 1091-2; Ansāb, IV, ii, pp.156 (citing Abu Mikhnaf), 157-8 (citing =
front was drawn from the Muṣarites, headed by 'Umar ibn 'Ubaiddallah ibn Ma'ṣmar al-Makhzumi, Muṣ'ab's governor of Basra. However, it is clear that the 'Aṣabiyya played only a small role in this rising, since members from the same tribe fought each other on different sides. Abū 'Ubaída and Wahab ibn Jarîr\(^1\) state this clearly. The main reason for the support received by the Umayyad front would appear to be the monetary rewards that they offered their adherents.\(^2\)

The two parties met in a battle in a place called al-Jufra in the district of al-Mirbad, which gave its name to the supporters of Khalid, "Jufriyya". The fighting between them, according to one account,\(^3\) lasted for forty days, according to another,\(^4\) only twenty-four days. Hearing of the battle, Muṣ'ab sent Zuhr ibn Qais al-Jufri, with a thousand horsemen, to help Ibn Ma'ṣmar.\(^5\) 'Abd al-Malik, on the other hand sent 'Ubaiddallah ibn Ziyād ibn Zabiān, whose brother had been killed by Muṣ'ab, with a...

\(^1\) Wahab ibn Jarîr, 160 (citing Maḍā'īnī); Ṭab., II, p. 799 (citing Maḍā'īnī); Bakrī, II, p. 387; Kāmil, IV, p. 252; Nuwairī, XIX, fols. 68-9.


\(^3\) Naqā'id, II, pp. 1091-2; Ansab, IV, ii, p. 158.


\(^5\) Naqā'id, II, p. 1092; who adds another thousand men sent by Muṣ'ab to the help of Ibn Ma'ṣmar; Ansab, IV, ii, p. 161 (citing Maḍā'īnī); Ṭab., II, p. 800 (citing Maḍā'īnī); Kāmil, IV, p. 252; Nuwairī, XIX, fol. 69.
Syrian army to help Khalid, but he arrived too late. Thus the balance of the battle turned to Mus'ab's favour. However, soon the two sides entered into negotiations which resulted in the Aman for Khalid and those who supported him; it was agreed that Khalid should leave Basra, which he did and returned to Damascus, to join 'Abd al-Malik. Fearing Mus'ab's punishment, Malik ibn Mjsma left Basra for al-Yamama after losing one of his eyes in the battle. Mus'ab tried in vain to reach Basra before Khalid and his followers left it. Nevertheless, he inflicted a severe punishment on those who remained in the city.

According to Mada'in and al-Mubarrad, the rising of al-Jufra was in the year 70/689. This date is also given by Abu Mikhnaf in Baladhuri, when he says that it was at the same time as 'Amr ibn Sa'id's revolt in Damascus, i.e. 69-70/689. Wahab ibn Jarir may well be agreeing with them in giving the year 69, for he might, like Abu Mikhnaf, have meant the summer of 69-70/689. However, al-Sam'ani is certainly wrong when he gives the year...
73/692, for Muṣṭāb himself was killed in the year 72/691.

ʿAbd al-Malik spent most of the summer 71-72/691 in subduing the insurrection of Zufar ibn al-Ḥarīth al-Kīlabī and the Qaisites who were holding out in Qarqīsya since the battle of Marj Rāḥit. When he had pacified this area, he marched on Nasibin (Nisibis), where about two thousand of the Khashabiyya, a remnant of al-Mukhtar's followers, were still unsubmitive. On being offered the Aman, they surrendered and were enrolled in the army of the caliph.

Now came the time for the third and last decisive encounter with Muṣṭāb: ʿAbd al-Malik set out with a large army from Damascus and made his camp in Maskin. When Muṣṭāb heard of this advance against him, he left Kūfa to fight ʿAbd al-Malik, stationing himself at Bājumaira. The battle between them took place in Dair al-Jāhīqa, (monastery of Catholics), between Maskin and Bājumaira.

The time preceding the battle was not wasted by ʿAbd al-Malik; he wrote to the tribal chiefs among Muṣṭāb's followers, promising them

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3. Saʿd, V, p.169; (citing Wāqidī); Maʿārif, p.156; Ansāb, V, pp.335 (citing ʿAwāna), 332 (citing Wahāb ibn Jarīr); Dīnawārī, p.316; Ṭab., II, pp.804-5 (citing Wāqidī), 804 (citing Mādāʾ inān); Kūfī, II, fol.50b, where troops from Egypt are said to have been with ʿAbd al-Malik; ʿIqd, IV, p.410; Mūrūj, V, p.242, here also there is mention of Egyptian troops; Tanbīh, p.313; Bad’, VI, p.23; Agh., XVII, pp.161-2 (citing Mādāʾ inān); ʿAsākir, XVI, fol.217a; Kāmil, IV, pp.263-4; Dhahābī, III, p.108; Bidāya, VIII, p.314; ʿIbar, III, p.76.
them governorships and money rewards if they would betray Mus'ab. ¹

Many of the discontented among them had already written to 'Abd al-Malik offering him their support in return for the governorship of Isbahan. ²

Moreover, by killing six thousand men from among the followers of al-Mukhtar, Mus'ab had made enemies, not only of their relatives, but also of most of the Kūfans, who disapproved of this act of savagery. ³ The Basrans also, especially those who had taken part in the rising of al-Jufra, never forgot the humiliating punishment Mus'ab had inflicted on those who had supported Khalid ibn 'Abdallah ibn Asid. ⁴ Therefore, Mus'ab had alienated both peoples by his cruel behaviour. To these factors, one might add the insubordinate nature of the tribesmen in Iraq, and their tradition of frequently shifting their allegiance, which also worked against Mus'ab. Mus'ab seems to have been aware of his isolation and tried to get the loyalty of the Basrans

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3. Ansāb, V, pp. 262-3; Dīnawārī, p. 315; Tab., II, pp. 740-1, 749-50 (citing Mada‘īnī); Kūfī, II, fol. 31a; ‘Asākir, XVI, fol. 27a (citing ‘Abdallah ibn abī Rabī‘a al-Makhzūmī); Kāmil, IV, p. 225; E.I., (Mus‘ab ibn al-Zubair).

4. See p. 234
by giving them the 'Atā' twice a year, but without avail. In vain also were the warnings of al-Ahnaf ibn Qais, the Tamīmite chief, and Qais ibn al-Haytham al-Sulami, not to let the hungry Syrians get into their rich Iraqi land. When Muṣ‘ab asked the Basrans to fight with him against ‘Abd al-Malik and the Syrians, they showed great reluctance and insisted that the Kharijite threat in Basra should be dealt with first. Thus Muṣ‘ab was forced to dispense with a part of his army, in sending al-Muhallab with the best troops of Basra against the Kharijite. Muṣ‘ab showed himself a short sighted leader by not listening to the warning of Ibrāhīm ibn al-Ashtar against the traitor-chiefs, nor did he follow Ibrāhīm’s request not to send him any as reinforcements. Ibrāhīm had given to Muṣ‘ab, unopened, a letter he had received from ‘Abd al-Malik, and told him that all the other leaders had probably received similar letters, but had kept them to themselves. 

1. Ansāb, V, pp.271 (citing Wahab ibn Jarīr), 280; Azmina, II, p.134; Asākir, XVI, fol.271a.
the only chief to remain faithful to Muṣṭṣab until his death at the
beginning of the battle. The names of the treacherous leaders are
preserved to us by al-Balāḏurī, Ṭabarī, and Masʿūdī. 1 It appears
from their names that they were all Kūfans. On the other hand, we find
the Rabiʿites of Baṣra delighted that Muṣṭṣab and his son ʿĪsā were killed
and that they boasted that they were responsible for his death. 2

After the death of ʿIrābī ibn al-Ashtar in the beginning of the
battle, ʿAttāb ibn Warqāʾ, who was on the cavalry of the Kūfans in
Muṣṭṣab’s army, gave way, while the other Kūfan leaders, such as
Qaṭān ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥārithī, with Madḥḥiḥ, Ḥajjār ibn Abjar and
Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn Saʿīd al-Ḥamdānī, refused to obey
Muṣṭṣab’s orders, and left him almost alone in the battle field. 3

Owing to the close friendship between Muṣṭṣab and ʿAbd al-Malik
in their early life, the latter offered to spare Muṣṭṣab’s life and was prepared
to give him the governorship of Iraq, or any other country, in return for his

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1. Aʿṣḥāb Hamdān, Diwān, p. 313; Ansāb, V, pp. 336-9 (citing ʿAwāna),
   440-1 (citing al-Ḥaytham), 344 (citing Madaʾinī); XI, pp. 1-2, 6-9
   (citing al-Ḥaytham), 13-15 (citing Madaʾinī), 21-3; Tab., II, pp. 804,
   806-7 (citing ʿUmar ibn Shabba); Murūj, V, p. 245; Kāmil, IV, p. 266.

2. Aʿṣḥāb Hamdān, Diwān, pp. 314-15; Bakkar, p. 314 (citing Muṣṭṣab al-
   Zubairī); Ansāb, XI, p. 262.

3. Ansāb, V, pp. 331 (citing ʿAwāna), 340-1 (citing al-Ḥaytham); XI,
   pp. 6-7 (citing al-Ḥaytham); Tab., II, pp. 806-7 (citing ʿUmar ibn
   Shabba), ʿIqd, IV, p. 410; Murūj, V, p. 245; Agh., XVII, p. 163
   (citing Madaʾinī); Kāmil, IV, p. 266; Dhahābī, III, p. 109 (quoting
   Ṭabarī); Bidāya, VIII, p. 315; Ḩabar, III, p. 78.
allegiance, but in vain. ‘Abd al-Malik then tried to save the life of Mus‘ab’s son, but without success, and ‘Isa was killed before the eyes of his father. Then Mus‘ab, already bleeding from many arrow shots, was killed by Zā‘ida ibn Qudāma al-Thaqafi, who, when dealing the fatal blow, shouted, “Ya li Thārāt al-Mukhtar”. ‘Ubaydallāh ibn Ziyād ibn Zabīān cut the head from the body and went with it to ‘Abd al-Malik. Thus the death of al-Mukhtar had not been allowed to go unreveled; the death of Mus‘ab shows that al-Mukhtar’s followers did not submit after their leader’s death but continued to work underground, to reappear when they found a favourable opportunity.

The date of the battle of Dair al-Jāthliq between Mus‘ab ibn al-Zubair and ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān was the month of Jumāda I or II.

1. Ḥadhīf, p. 47; Ansāb, V, pp. 339 (citing ‘Awāna), 340; XI, pp. 2-3 (citing ‘Awāna), 7 (citing al-Haytham); Tab., II, pp. 808-9 (citing Mada‘īnī); Amlī, p. 122 (citing Mada‘īnī); Murūj, V, p. 247; Agh., XVII, p. 163 (citing Mada‘īnī); Kamīl, IV, p. 267; Dhahabī, III, p. 109; Bidāya, VIII, p. 315 (citing Mada‘īnī); ‘Ībar, III, p. 78.

2. Sa‘d, V, p. 169 (citing Wāqidī); Imāma, II, p. 23; Ansāb, V, pp. 334 (citing Wahab ibn Jarīr), 340; XI, pp. 5 (citing ‘Awāna), 7 (citing al-Haytham); Dinawarī, p. 319; Ya‘qūbī, II, p. 317; Tab., II, p. 809 (citing Mada‘īnī); ‘Iqd, IV, p. 411; Murūj, V, pp. 248-9; Agh., VII, p. 117 (citing Mada‘īnī); Jamharat, p. 296; ‘Asākir, XVI, fol. 171 (citing al-Sha‘bī); Mus‘jam, IV, p. 530; Kamīl, IV, p. 268; Sharḥ, III, p. 296; Dhahabī, III, p. 110; Bidāya, VIII, p. 316 (citing Mada‘īnī); ‘Ībar, III, pp. 78-9; Shadharat, I, p. 79.
72/691. Wāqidī in Ṭabarī, however, alone among the early authorities, gives the year 71/690. The fact that this date is repeated by other late sources is not evidence that it is correct, for it is likely that they have used Wāqidī’s account as their source. Moreover, there is another account by Wāqidī himself, in Ibn Saʿd’s Tabaqāt and repeated by Ibn ʿAsākir, which gives the year 72/691. Furthermore, the date 72/691 is confirmed by the fact that the victory of ʿAbd al-Malik was followed by the sending of al-Ḥājiǧ against Ibn al-Zubair, which our authorities unanimously agree was in the year 72/691.

1. Saʿd, V, p.136 (citing Wāqidī); Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tāʾīkh, I, pp.264,265; Idem, Tabaqāt, p.603; Maʿārif, p.156, Ansāb, V, pp.286 (citing Madaʾiʿīnī); 342; X, pp.8, 26 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī and Abū Mikhnaf); Dīnawārī, p.319; Yaʿqūbī, II, p.317; Ṭab., II, pp.318 (citing Madaʾiʿīnī), 1466 (citing ʿUmar ibn Shabba and Madaʾiʿīnī); Murūj, V, p.243 ff.; Tanbīh, p.313; Agh., XVII, p.161ff. (citing Madaʾiʿīnī); Āṯār, p.318; ʿAsākir, XVI, fol. 177a (quoting Khalīfa), 264a, 273 (quoting Ibn Saʿd and Wāqidī); Mūṣjam, IV, p.529; Dhahabī, III, pp.108-10, 210; Bidāya, VIII, p.316 (citing Madaʾiʿīnī); Shaddharat, I, p.79.

2. Ṭab., II, p.804ff. (citing Wāqidī).


4. Saʿd, V, p.136 (citing Wāqidī); ʿAsākir, XVI, fol.273 (citing Wāqidī).
Following the victory over Muṣ'ab ibn al-Zubair at Dair al-Jāthliq, 'Abd al-Malik entered Kūfā, where he received the homage of the people, and appointed his officials. He also sent al-Ḥājjāj ibn Yūsuf al-Thaqafi at the head of two thousand Syrians against 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair in Mecca. The choice of al-Ḥājjāj to lead this campaign was because of his strong leadership, as evidenced in the efficiency with which he restored discipline among the mutinous troops of the caliph, when he was in the rearguard in the campaign against Muṣ'ab. Even before that, he had shown unlimited loyalty to 'Abd al-Malik in the negotiations with Zufar ibn al-Ḥārith al-Kīlābī. Al-Ḥājjāj refused to pray with Zufar, because he was a rebel against the caliph.

However, al-Ḥājjāj's army was not the first Syrian army that 'Abd al-Malik had sent against 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair. Going back to the time

1. Sa'īd, V, p. 169 (citing Wāqīdī); Khāṭif ibn Khayyāt; Ţārikh, I, pp. 340-1; Maṣʿūrīf, p. 156; Mārīma, II, pp. 23-4 (the number of the army here is given as 1500); Ansāb, V, pp. 346 (citing al-Haytham), 352, 357 (citing Wāqīdī) and 'Awāna; XI, pp. 17-18 (citing al-Haytham), 39-40 (citing Wāqīdī and 'Awāna); Dīnawarī, p. 319; Yaʿqūbī, II, p. 318 (the number here is 20,000); Tab., II, pp. 839-40 (citing Wāqīdī); Kūfī, II, fols. 52a-52b; Tālīqī, IV, p. 414 (citing Abū Maʿṣhar); Ḳawrūjī, V, p. 259; Bad′, VI, pp. 24-5; Asākir, III, fol. 177a; Kāmil, IV, p. 284; Uṣūd, III, pp. 163-4; Mirʾīṭ, VI, fols. 3a-b (citing Ibn-Ḥabīb); Bughṣa, fol. 39; Ibrī, p. 193; Mukhtasar, I, p. 207; I, p. 207; Dhahabī, III, p. 113 (citing Wāqīdī); Bidayā, VII, p. 325; Ibar, III, p. 85. With this army of al-Ḥājjāj, 'Abd al-Malik is said to have sent Mālik ibn Shurāḥīl al-Khūlānī with three thousand men from Egypt by a sea route. Kindī, I, p. 51; Kūfī, II, fol. 53a.


3. Ansāb, V, p. 305; Tadhkira, I, fol. 78a.
of his succession, 'Abd al-Malik had sent an army of six thousand men under 'Urwa ibn Unaif to al-Ḥijāz, with the orders not to enter Medina, but to make his camp in al-ʿArḍa (اَلْعَرْضَة). This was perhaps to protect Syria from any retaliatory attack from Ibn al-Zubair. When Ibn al-Zubair's governor of Medina, al-Ḥārith ibn Ḥāṭib al-Jumāhī, learnt of the advance of this army, he fled, leaving his office vacant. 'Abd al-Malik's army remained there undisturbed for a month and then went back home, on the caliph's orders.¹

'Abd al-Malik sent another army to al-Ḥijāz, consisting of four thousand men under 'Abd al-Wāḥid ibn al-Ḥakam ibn al-ʿĀṣ. Again, Ibn al-Zubair's governor of Fadak and Khaibar, Sulaimān ibn Khalid al-Zuraqī, fled. He was pursued and killed by a detachment of horsemen under Abuʾl-Qamqām, sent by 'Abd al-Wāḥid ibn al-Ḥakam. However, Ibn al-Zubair's new governor of Medina, Jābir ibn al-Aswad al-Zuhri, retaliated by sending 640 men under Abu Bakr ibn Abī Qais against Abuʾl-Qamqām. They found the latter with his followers in Khaibar, where he was defeated, and thirty of his men taken prisoner, later to be killed.²

Meanwhile, 'Abd al-Malik dispatched Ṭāriq ibn 'Amr with a Syrian

¹ Ansāb, V, p.355 (citing Waqidi); XI, p.34 (citing Waqidi); Kāmil, IV, p.283; Ibar, III, p.84.
² Ansāb, V, p.356 (citing Waqidi); XI, pp.35-6 (citing Waqidi); Kāmil, IV, pp.283-4; Ibar, III, p.84.
army, ordering him to station himself between ʿĀyla and Wādiʾ-ʿUqrā, with instructions to check the activities of Ibn al-Zubair’s governors, to protect the land lying between his camp and Syria, and finally, to cope with any situation that might develop. When he reached the arranged place, Tariq sent some of his horsemen against Abū Bakr in revenge for Abuʾl-Qamqām. They killed Abū Bakr and his followers. Ibn al-Zubair, however, had already written to al-Qubāʾ, his governor of Basra, instructing him to send two thousand men to defend Medina against the Syrians. These reinforcements did not arrive until after the death of Abū Bakr and his followers. They were therefore ordered to go to fight Tariq’s army. The two armies met near Medina in a place called Shabakat al-Dam (شبات الدام), where the Basrans were annihilated. Hearing of this, Ibn al-Zubair wrote to his governor of Medina, ordering a recruitment of two thousand men from the city and its environs to defend their city; he promised to send money for their pay. However, the money for this recruitment was never sent, and it was therefore abolished and called “Fard al-Rīḥ”. Tariq and his army returned to Wādiʾ-ʿUqrā and remained there until they received orders from ʿAbd al-Malik, to join the army of al-Ḥajjāj.

1. Ansāb, V, p.356 (citing Waqidi); X, p.36 (citing Waqidi); ʿAsākir, VII, p.40 (citing Khalīfa); Kāmil, IV, p.284; ʿIbar, III, pp.84-5.

2. Ansāb, V, pp.356-7 (citing Waqidi); X, pp.36-8 (citing Waqidi); ʿAsākir, VII, pp.40-1 (citing Khalīfa and Ibn Saʿd); Kāmil, IV, p.284; ʿIbar, III, p.85.
Al-Hajjāj, obeying 'Abd al-Malik's orders, made his camp at al-Ta'if, from where he made frequent skirmishes against the troops of Ibn al-Zubair, in which al-Hajjāj was almost always victorious. However, when the negotiations with Ibn al-Zubair failed, and realizing that these skirmishes would not lead to a decisive victory, al-Hajjāj wrote to 'Abd al-Malik asking for re-inforcements and for permission to attack Mecca by force. ¹ 'Abd al-Malik granted both requests. The significance of 'Abd al-Malik's original reluctance to allow al-Hajjāj to enter Medina and Mecca, has been discussed in detail in Chapter I. ² At the same time, it was argued that al-Hajjāj showed considerable scrupulousness in his attack on al-Ka'ba. ³ The historical tradition which is hostile to the Umayyads in general and al-Hajjāj in particular, have ignored the fact that it was only the new part of al-Ka'ba that was attacked, and emphasized only that al-Hajjāj and his master, 'Abd al-Malik, violated the sanctity of the holy shrine. However, when, during the storming of al-Ka'ba, a sudden thunderstorm raged and was interpreted by religious men among his followers as a sign of Divine disapproval, al-Hajjāj succeeded in convincing all that it was but a natural

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1. Ansāb, V, pp. 358 (citing 'Awāna), 359 (citing Wāqidi); XI, pp. 40-1, (citing 'Awāna), 42 (citing Wāqidi); Dinawayrī, p. 319; Tab., II, p. 830 (citing Wāqidi); Kūfī, II, fol. 53a; Kāmil, IV, pp. 284-5; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 3b (citing Ibn Ḥabīb); Dhahabī, III, p. 113 (citing Wāqidi); Bidāya, VIII, p. 325; ʿĪbar, III, p. 85.

2. See PP. 50 - 4.

3. Ibid., pp. 52 - 3.
phenomenon, and even that it could be a portent of victory. 1 During
the siege, which started according to Waqidi 2 on the first of Dhul Qu'da,
72/25th March 792, and lasted for over six months, Ibn al-Zubair was hard
pressed by al-Ḥaǧjāǧ, who made a complete blockade of Mecca, preventing
all food and supplies from reaching al-Ḥijāz from outside. 3 As a result of this,
prices in Mecca became inflated, which was aggravated by the avarice of Ibn
al-Zubair. 4 Since al-Ḥaǧjāǧ and his Syrian army were constantly supplied

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1. Ansāb, V, pp.362 (citing ‘Awāna and Madaʾinī), 363 (citing Waqidi); XI, pp.47-8 (citing ‘Awāna), 48 (citing Madaʾinī), 48-9 (citing Waqidi); Yaʿqūbī, II, p.318; Tab., II, pp.844-5 (citing Yaʿqūbī); ‘Asākir, IV, p.50; Kāmil, IV, p.285; Mirʿāb, VI, fol.5a; Dḥahabī, III, p.114 (citing Waqidi); Ibar, III, p.86.


4. Abū Tammām, Ḥamāsa, I, pp.319-20; Maṭārīf, p.99; Imlāma, II, pp.20,23; Ansāb, V, pp.194-5 (citing Madaʾinī), 281 (citing ‘Awāna), 360-1 (citing Waqidi); 361-3 (citing Waqidi and Ibn al-Kalbī), 373; XI, pp.44-6 (citing Waqidi), 46-7 (citing Waqidi and Ibn al-Kalbī), 49 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Dīnawārī, p.314; Yaʿqūbī, II, p.319; Maʿṣūmī, fols. 46b, 76b; Iqd, II, p.96-7 (citing al-Zubair ibn Bakkār), 98; IV, pp.176-7; Murūj, I, pp.174-5; Bāḍ, VI, pp.25, 26; Agh., I, p.9 (citing ʿUmar ibn Shabba); ʿĪravī, IV, p.138 (citing al-Zubair ibn Bakkār); X, pp.165-6; Jāʿīs, fol.160a (citing Madaʾinī); Lṭāʿīf, p.140; Nihāya, I, pp.78, 295-6; III, p.265; Tadhkira, I, fols. 130a, 139b; Kāmil, IV, pp.286, 414; Mirʿāb, VI, fol.4b; Sharḥ, XX, pp.103, 145 (citing Madaʾinī); Fakhrit, p.110; Mīkhtāṣar, I, p.204; Bīdāya, VIII, p.137; Ibar, III, p.68; Khizānā, III, pp.237-8; IV, pp.45-6; Al-Fāḍil fiʾl-Funūn, fol.103b-104a (citing al-Shaḥīṣī).
with all provisions by the caliph, they enjoyed far better conditions than
the troops of Ibn al-Zubair, so that many began to desert Ibn al-Zubair,
especially when al-Hajjaj issued a free pardon for all who joined him. It
is said that ten thousand of Ibn al-Zubair's followers, including two of
his sons, defected to al-Hajjaj.1

Ibn al-Zubair went into the battle-field with greatly depleted forces;
among his loyal supporters was his youngest son. On the 17th Jumada, I
73/18th September 692, Ibn al-Zubair was slain after showing considerable
bravery.2 Other reports give the date as the month of Jumada II, while
al-Busti alone gives the year 72/691.4

At the death of Ibn al-Zubair and the submission of al-Hijaz, the
unity of the Muslims was restored and 'Abd al-Malik was recognized as the
sole caliph. It is for this reason that the year 73/692 was called "the year

1. Ansab, V, pp. 194, 364, 376-7; XI, pp. 45, 51; Tab., II, p. 845;
Kufi, II, fol. 53b; Muruj, V, p. 262; Asakir, VII, p. 415; Kamil,
IV, pp. 286-7; Sharh, XX, pp. 144 (citing Masu'di), 118 (quoting
Tabari); Dhahabi, III, pp. 114-15 (citing Waqidi); Bidaya, VIII, pp. 330,
341.

2. Sa'd, V, pp. 169-70 (citing Waqidi); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarih., I,
p. 343; Idem, Tabagat, p. 31; Mughtarin, p. 25; Ma'arif, p. 156; Inama,
II, p. 25; Ansab, V, p. 368 (citing Waqidi); Qadat, I, p. 142; Tab., II,
pp. 844 (citing Waqidi), 849 (citing Waqidi); Tanbih, pp. 313-14;
'Asakir, VII, pp. 341-2; Inafa, I, p. 130; Dhahab, p. 25; Isaba, II,
p. 759; Tahdhib, V, p. 312; Suyuti, p. 142; Shadharat, I, p. 80.

3. Ansab, XI, p. 25 (citing Waqidi); Dinawar, p. 321; Tab., II, p. 851
(citing Waqidi); Muruj, V, p. 209; Kinda, I, p. 51; Kamil, IV, pp. 289-90;
Usd, III, p. 164; Sharh, XX, p. 104; Mukhtasar, I, p. 207; Dhahabit, III,
p. 75; 'Ibar, III, p. 89; Suyuti, p. 142.

4. Mashahir, p. 30. However, Ibn Atham gives it as 10th Jumada 1, 73,
while another account in Masu'di gives the 14th Jumada 1, 73. Kufi,
II, fol. 55a; Muruj, V, p. 266.
What was the nature of the support which Ibn al-Zubair had received for his movement? To some, he was a champion who would restore the political supremacy of al-Hijaz, lost since the murder of `Uthman. To others, Ibn al-Zubair was the focus of opposition to the Umayyads after the murder of al-Husain ibn `Ali ibn Abi Talib, which left no active `Alid claimant. Ibn al-Zubair was aware of the possibilities in this source of support, as shown in his encouragement to al-Husain to leave al-Hijaz for Kufa; he did not lay claim to the caliphate before the death of al-Husain. This tragic death, he tried to exploit for his own ends, by exposing the harsh treatment that the Umayyads had dealt to the family of the Prophet. Similarly, Ibn al-Zubair laid great stress on the religious aspect of his caliphate. He tried to imitate `Umar I, in carrying the Durra as the emblem of his caliphate, and claimed

3. See Chapter II, p. 73.
4. *Maḥāsin, pp. 152-3 (citing al-Sha`bī); Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, *Tārikh, I, pp. 223-4; *Akhbār, fols. 476-48a (citing al-Sha`bī); *Tab., II, pp. 232-3 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, I, fols. 192a-193b, 207a-207b, 234a; *Sharh, XX, p. 134; *Bidāya, VIII, pp. 189 (citing Abū Mikhnaf), 190.
5. *Akhbār, fol. 47b; *Ansāb, IV, ii, pp. 16-17, fol. 262a; Kūfī, II, fol. 11a.
that he had been appointed by 'Uthmān as his successor in the defence of
the Dār, although there were many other Quraishites and companions of
the Prophet better qualified for this task. He also made capital out of the
Holy city by using it as the headquarters of his movement; he called
himself "Al-‘Āidh" (the one who takes refuge in the Ka'ba). He was
helped in portraying himself in a religious way by the fact of his relation-
ship with the Prophet on both his father's and his mother's side, and by the
belief of the people of Hijāz that the sons of the old companions of the
Prophet were the most eligible for the caliphate.

There were also economic reasons for the support received by Ibn
al-Zubair. The fiscal reforms introduced by Mu‘awiya I made the provinces

1. Al-Jāḥiz, al-Uthmaniyya, p. 223; Ansāb, V, 74, 189-90 (citing
Mada’in); ‘Iqd, IV, p. 418; ‘Asākir, VII, p. 402; ‘Aqīl, VI, fol. 4b;
Sharh, II, p. 166; Bidyāya, VII, 167.
2. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 224; Ṭab., II, p. 222; Murūj, V,
3. Zubairī, pp. 237-9; Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Ṭabaqāt, I, p. 31; Jāḥiz,
al-Uthmaniyya, p. 224; Nasab, fol. 24a-24b; Mashāhīr, p. 30; Ṭalq, p. 12;
Akhbār Isbāhan, I, pp. 46-7; ‘Asākir, VII, pp. 396-7; Usd, III, pp. 161-2;
‘Aqīl, VI, fol. 4a-4b; Ḏahabī, III, p. 167ff.; Isāba, II, p. 75ff.; Ṭahāhib, V,
p. 213; Suyūṭī, pp. 141-2; E. I., 2 (‘Abdallah ibn al-Zubair).
contribute to the expenses of the State. They also laid down the principle that pensions were in return for military service, particularly for the government. This had deprived a considerable number in Ḥijāz of their pay as heirs of the first recipients of pensions, leading many of them to look bitterly on the Umayyads. Moreover, the Umayyads, through their ownership of large estates in Medina, controlled the market in wheat there, which brought upon them the hostility of the people caused by their economic grievances at the high price of essential food stuffs in Medina, as compared to Syria and the rest of the Empire. All these discontents in Medina found a means of expression in the opposition movement of Ibn al-Zubair.

Ibn al-Zubair himself had been ambitious for the caliphate from quite an early date. He was pushed forward towards this aim by the sudden death of Yazīd and the very short reign of his son Muʿāwiya II. But in other ways Ibn al-Zubair showed himself less able as a politician than his rival, Ṭabb al-Malik. A cause such as his needed active propaganda work and a generous distribution of money to rally the people round him and to propagate his claims through the tongues of the poets; however, he was a man very reluctant to part with his money, even when it would pay back

1. Futūḥ, p. 458; Lammens, Le Califat de Yazid 1er, pp. 804-13; Beirut, 1921; E. L. 2, (al-Ḥarra).
2. Imāma, I, p. 169 (citing ‘Abdallah ibn Jaʿfar); Yaʿqub, II, pp. 267-8. These estates are said to have yielded at the time of Muʿāwiya I, 150,000 Wusq of dates and 50,000 Wusq of wheat annually. Al-ʿAlī, Muslim Estates in Ḥijāz in the First Century of Hijra, p. 251, JESHO, II, 1969.
large dividends in terms of support, while 'Abd al-Malik opened his hands to embrace everyone who came to him, showing generosity and forgiveness.

Another reason for the failure of Ibn al-Zubair was that he shut himself up in Mecca. Countering the religious support that this brought him, were the shortcomings of the area as a headquarters; economically, it was a poor district, relying on other provinces for its support, and the population of al-Hijaz were not politically active, preferring a life of pleasure (or in other cases piety) to that of fighting causes. Ibn al-Zubair neglected to make full use of the support he received in other, more favourable areas. For example, he left Mus'ab in Iraq to his own resources, which were quickly exhausted by the fighting against the Kharijites and the Shi'a. Wellhausen considers that Ibn al-Zubair lost a golden opportunity when he refused the offer of al-Husayn ibn Numair that he would secure the bai'a for Ibn al-Zubair in Syria, if he would go there. However, what reason had Ibn al-Zubair to trust this offer of a past enemy who had often fought against him? Even had he trusted Ibn Numair, his chances of a good reception in Syria were not high, as it was the centre of the Umayyads and their supporters. He committed a graver political fault when he failed to ally the opposition in Iraq to himself, so that the energy of his supporters was

1. See p. 236ff.
2. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 200.
exhausted by fighting the Kharijites and the Shi' a there, never leaving him free to face the Umayyads. The support of the Shi' a was lost by his strong anti-'Alid feelings, which dated from his early life; this also aroused opposition to him in his own ranks, among his close supporters. The failure of Ibn al-Zubair's movement owes a great deal to its leader's meanness, and his lack of political ability to make the best use of his chances.

1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 204 (citing Abu 'Ubaida); Akhbār, fols. 47a - 49b (citing Abu Mikhnaf and al-Sha'bī), 51b-52a (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Jahiz, Min Fusul al-Jahiz, fol. 4b-5a; Imāma, II, pp. 47, 55-6, 61, 64, 67, 68; Ansāb, IV, ii, p. 28 (citing al-Haytham); V, p. 372 (citing al-Zuhrī); XI, pp. 65-6 (citing al-Zuhrī); fols. 174a-174b, 178a (citing Abu Mikhnaf), 180a; Kūfī, I, fols. 30a, 31a, 31b, 32b, 36b; Jalīs, fols. 36a-36b; Iqd, IV, pp. 313-14; Murūj, V, pp. 184 (citing 'Umar ibn Shabba), 184-5 (citing 'Umar ibn Shabba), 187-88; Agh., XIII, p. 168; XVI, p. 131 (citing Madā'īnī); Khulafā', II, fols. 201a-201b; Hilya, I, p. 91; 'Asākir, VII, pp. 201-2; Sharb, I, pp. 22-3, 233-4; II, pp. 169-70 (citing al-Zubair ibn Bakkar); VII, pp. 38, 230-1; XIX, pp. 91-2 (quoting Iṣbahānī); XX, pp. 128-30, 134, 138 (quoting Masʿūdī).
CHAPTER V
OTHER OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS

The Revolt of 'Abdallah ibn al-Jarud

In the year 73/694, al-Hajjāj ibn Yusuf al-Thaqafi was transferred from the governorship of al-Hijaz to al-Iraq. 1 The famous inauguration speech in which he proclaimed his policies, showed the Iraqis from the very start that the time of leniency was over. 2 Al-Hajjāj's first and most urgent task in Iraq was the restoration of discipline among the troops of Basra and Kūfa, who, on the death of Bishr ibn Marwān, the previous governor, had deserted the camp of al-Muhallab ibn Abī Šufra in Rāmhurmuz and were wandering in the towns. Al-Muhallab was garrisoned at Rāmhuruz to fight the Khārijites who were threatening Basra. Al-Hajjāj made an announcement that all deserters should return to camp within three days, or else they would be killed and their property laid open to plunder; 3

2. Jumahī, p. 146; Bayān, II, pp. 164-5; Al-Zubair ibn Bakkar, Akhbar al-Muwafaqiyyat fī l-Siyar, fol. 47ff.; Imaāma, II, pp. 25-6 (citing Abū Ma'āshār); Ansāb, XI, pp. 266-7 (citing Abū Mikhnafl and Awāna), 269-70 (citing Mada'inī); 270-3, 274 (citing Mada'inī); Ya'qūbī, II, pp. 326-7; Mubarrad, I, pp. 380-1; III, p. 366; Taḥkira, II, pp. 863-6, 869-70, 870-2 (citing 'Umar ibn Shabba); 'Iqd, IV, p. 124; Murūjī, V, pp. 292-302; Jātīs, fol. 18a (citing al-Shābī); 'Asakir, IV, pp. 52-3; Taḥkira, I, fol. 69a; Kāmil, IV, pp. 303-8; Sharḥ, IV, pp. 181-4; XI, p. 45; Nuwairī, VII, p. 244; Bidāya, IX, pp. 7-8; 'Ibar, III, pp. 93-4.
3. Bayān, II, p. 165; Al-Zubair ibn Bakkar, Akhbar al-Muwafaqiyyat fī l-Siyar, fol. 50; Ansāb, XI, pp. 270 (citing Mada'inī), 274 (citing =
and he kept his word. The soldiers streamed back to their camp and al-
Hajjāj himself supervised the distribution of their pay and accompanied
them as far as Rustuqbad. It was at this time, Ṣaḥbān 75 A.H., that al-
Hajjāj was faced with a very dangerous revolt led by ʿAbdallah ibn al-
Jārūd, the Sayyid of ʿAbd al-Qais.

Thanks to Balādhurī we know much about this revolt. Unfortunately,
the account of Abū Mikhnaṭ in Ṭabarī is no more than a brief notice, which
adds nothing to the account of Balādhurī. Late sources, such as Ibn al-
Athīr, Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Khaldūn, as usual do but repeat the early
sources, in this case the narrative of Balādhurī.

The revolt led by Ibn al-Jārūd started as a dispute over pay. During
the governorship of Mūsā ibn al-Zubair in Baṣrā, the Basrans not only
received their pay (ʿAtā) twice a year, but also were awarded an increase
in pay of one hundred dirhams each. In one of his speeches to the Basrans,

(citing ʿUmar ibn Shabba); Muṣjam, II, p. 134 (citing Ibn al-ʿArabī);
ʿAsākir, VII, fol. 271; Muṣjam, II, p. 834; Kāmil, IV, p. 309; Mirʿat,
VI, fol. 15b; Dhahabī, III, p. 119 (citing Ṭabarī); Ṭabarī, III, p. 95.
al-Ḥajjāj declared that this increase of pay was illegal and that he would permit it no longer. He gave as reason the fact that it had been granted them by Muṣʿab, who was an enemy of the caliph. ¹ Probably the real reason was the need to economise in order to meet the cost of the war against the Khārijites, although he also found it an occasion to demonstrate his loyalty to the caliph against all enemies.

In protest against this declaration, 'Abdallah ibn al-Jārūd said that the increase had been approved by the caliph 'Abd al-Malik himself during the governorship of his brother Bishr in Iraq. But al-Ḥajjāj, seeing this reply as a challenge to his authority, threatened Ibn al-Jārūd with death if he dared to speak again in such a matter. The latter made it clear that he was expressing not only his own personal view, but that of all the people concerned. Realizing the truth of this, al-Ḥajjāj tactfully restrained from mentioning the matter of pay for a while, in order to give himself time to establish himself firmly in the town. However, he did not intend to give up the matter altogether, and only a few months later, he mentioned the reduction again, to be met with the same reply from Ibn al-Jārūd, supported by the Ashraf of the city. ²

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1. Ansāb, XI, p. 280; Ṭabarī, II, p. 874 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Muṣ'jam, II, p. 834; Kāmil, IV, p. 309; Mirʾāt, VI, fol. 15b; Dhahabī, III, p. 119 (quoting Ṭabarī); 'Ībar, III, p. 95.

2. Ansāb, XI, pp. 280-1; Ṭabarī, II, p. 874 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Muṣ'jam, II, p. 834; Kāmil, IV, pp. 309-310; Mirʾāt, VI, fol. 15b; Dhahabī, III, 119 (quoting Ṭabarī); 'Ībar, III, p. 95.
Thus, learning that al-Ḥajjāj had no intention of dropping his plan to reduce their pay, all the tribal chiefs and the most influential men (Wujūh) of Basra made Ibn al-Jarūd their leader. They paid homage to him, pledging to support him in driving al-Ḥajjāj out of the country; they would then write to Ābd al-Malik asking him to appoint a new governor. If he refused, they would denounce him, although they did not expect him to refuse their request, since the Kharijites still formed a constant threat to the authority of the Umayyads in Iraq. ¹ Most enthusiastic among the Wujūh of Basra were the two Tamīmites, al-Hudhail ibn Īmrān al-Burjumī and Ābdallah ibn Hakīm al-Mujāshi.²

From this bai‘a and plan of action, many of the characteristics of the revolt began to emerge: the initial grievance over the threat to their pay acted as a focus for the Iraqi resentment of all the repressive measures initiated by al-Ḥajjāj since his appointment. This protest against the over-activeness of al-Ḥajjāj bore elements of Iraqi dislike of Syrian domination. One can also see traces of current social tensions in this revolt, for example, the ‘Āṣabīyya: the Rabī‘a and their allies al-Azd did not like to submit to the Mudarites represented by al-Ḥajjāj, while the Tamīmites

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¹ Ansāb, XI, p.281; Kamīl, IV, p.309; Mir‘āt, VI, fol.15b; Ībar, III, p.95.
² Arab, p.378; Kahhāla, Mu‘jam Qabā‘il al-‘Arab, I, p.71; III, p.1038; Caskel, op. cit., II, p.111.
showed reluctance in submitting to the Qaisite sway. 1

Hearing of the plans of Ibn al-Jarūd and his followers, al-Hajjāj took precautionary measures. He separated the Akhmas of Basra from the Arba‘ of Kūfa by putting a heavy guard on the roads between them. He also put a guard around the treasury (Bayt al-Mal). 2

After secret preparations, the rebels came into the open (Rabi‘ 11, 76). All the tribes, our authority says, rallied under the flag of Ibn al-Jarūd, while al-Hajjāj was supported only by his intimate friends (Khassatīhī) and his family. By cutting the bridge between the two camps, Ibn al-Jarūd was able to seize al-Hajjāj’s store of weapons which were stored on the other side of the river. However, al-Hajjāj did not surrender, and sent A‘yun, one of his mawālī, to Ibn al-Jarūd ordering him to come before him, or else he would kill him with his family and all his supporters. But both the messenger and his master were humiliated, A‘yun being turned away. 3

Then Ibn al-Jarūd and his followers marched against al-Hajjāj, entered his “Fustāt” and plundered his property. Successful in this, they decided to put off dealing with al-Hajjāj until the next morning.

3. Ansāb, XI, pp. 282–3; Futūḥ, p. 281 (citing Mada‘‘īnī); Kāmil, IV, p. 310; Mir‘at, VI, fol. 15b; ‘Ibar, III, pp. 95–6.
for their intention was not to kill him, but to expel him from the country. For this reason, the Yemenites carried off his first wife, a daughter of al-Nu`mān ibn Bashīr al-Anṣārī, while the Mudarites took with them Um Salama, his second wife.

Being left alone, al-Ḥajjāj became so desperate that he began to think of fleeing the country to save his life. But to his side began to drift the more hesitant of the rebels, those who had probably been forced to join in the rebellion in the first place. Al-Ghādibān ibn al-Qubāʾthārī warned Ibn al-Jārūd not to leave al-Ḥajjāj until morning, pointing out how many had already gone over to his side, and how more might be expected to do so; this warning was ignored. Thus the rebels lost an opportunity, which was to cost them their lives.

The jealousy of the clans made it possible for al-Ḥajjāj to play them off one against the other. It is said that while 'Abdallah ibn al-Jārūd, al-Hudhail ibn ʿImrān al-Burjumī and ʿAbdallah ibn Ḥakīm al-Muṭāshī ṭī were discussing their affairs in a council, ʿAbbād ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Ḥabīṭī came to join them, but they refused to admit him. As a result of this slight, ʿAbbād and one hundred men went over to the side of al-Ḥajjāj. This so raised the latter's morale that he is said to have declared: "Now I do not care if nobody else comes to my side." ʿAbbād's action precipitated other divisions in the

side of the rebels: it was followed by the desertion of Qutaiba ibn Muslim al-Bāhilī and about thirty men from the tribe of Aṣūr, to join al-Ḥajjāj. This was a reflection of 'Asabiyya, for being a Qaisite like al-Ḥajjāj, Qutaiba could not tolerate the latter being left alone with both his life and property exposed to danger. The same motive seems to have led both Sabra ibn 'Alī al-Kilābī and Sa‘īd ibn Aslam ibn Zar‘a al-Kilābī to go over to the side of al-Ḥajjāj. In addition, some of the Azd and Bakr changed to his side. Thus did al-Ḥajjāj succeed in playing the tribes against each other for his own interest.

Feeling himself again strong enough to fight, al-Ḥajjāj joined the rebels in battle. During the fighting, Ibn al-Jarūd fell dead from a chance arrow. His followers were so discouraged that they could not carry on the battle and soon gave way, a fact which gave the victory to al-Ḥajjāj. The latter issued a general pardon (Aman), but which excluded the two chief instigators, al-Hudhail ibn 'Imrān al-Burjumī and 'Abdallah ibn Ḥakīm al-Mūjashi‘ī: both were killed. Their bodies, with that of Ibn al-Jarūd, were crucified, while their heads were sent to the camp of al-Muhallab in Rumāhurmuz to discourage the Kharijites, who had banked on this revolt to

1. Ansāb, XI, pp. 287-8; Kāmil, IV, pp. 311-12; Miṣrāt, VI, fols. 15b-16b; 'Ibar, III, p. 97.
provide them with an opportunity to invade Basra. 1

Settling the affairs in Rustuqābād, al-Hajjāj returned to Basra and wrote to the caliph informing him of the revolt and the steps he had taken to suppress it. 'Abd al-Malik approved of his actions, and praised his loyalty to him. 2 Thus al-Hajjāj put down the first Iraqi revolt against himself and the Umayyad rule, and temporarily restored peace and discipline in the country.

The Revolts of the Zanj

Having put down the revolt of 'Abdallah ibn al-Jārūd, al-Hajjāj found himself confronted with another menace: the insurrection of the Zanj in Basra. 3 They took advantage of the unrest and disorder of the time to ravage and devastate the Euphrates area.

Unfortunately, apart from the brief account in Balādhurī, no other early source says a word of this revolt. Among the late sources, only Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn Khaldūn mention it, only to repeat the narrative of Balādhurī, thus adding nothing to our knowledge. What complicates the issue further is

1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tarīkh, I, p. 347; Muḥabbār, p. 462; Maʿārif, pp. 147-8; Ansāb, XI, pp. 288-9; Maʿad fol. 18b; Nasab, fol. 235b; Tab., II, pp. 373-4 (citing Abū Mīkhnaṭ); Jalīts, fol. 144b; Jamharat, p. 279; ʿAsākir, III, fol. 180a; Muʿjam, II, p. 834; Kāmil, IV, p. 312; ʿIrāqī, VI, fol. 16a; Dhahabī, III, p. 119 (quoting Tabari); Bidayat, IX, p. 10; ʿIbar, III, p. 97.


3. The Zanj were gangs of forced-labourers, mainly drawn from imported negro slaves from the East coast of Africa (hence their name), but
that Baladhuri does not state clearly the reason for this revolt, nor how it was organised. He mentions Ahl al-Kala' and others whom he calls "Bidan" (white people), as joining the revolt but gives no reason why they should do so. Thus, regretfully, one can only present a very incomplete account of the revolt.

Their first insurrection was during the governorship of Mus'ab ibn al-Zubair in Basra. They mutinied and plundered the crops, but Mus'ab was too busy to take effective action against them. After Mus'ab's death, 'Abd al-Malik appointed Khalid ibn Abdallah ibn Astid as governor of Basra. The people complained to the new governor, urging him to put an end to the devastating activities of the slaves. Khalid raised an army against them, but before he could reach them, the Zanj dispersed. However, some of them were seized and sent to the governor, who killed them and crucified their bodies. It has been stated that this event was less a rebellion than a mutiny of gangs consisting of a small number of slaves living the life of robbers.

Despite the severe punishment inflicted on them by Khalid, the slaves revolted again during the governorship of al-Hajjaj, utilizing the confusion that resulted from Ibn al-Jarud's rebellion. However, this time

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1. Ansab, XI, pp.303-4 (citing Rawh ibn 'Abd al-Mu'min); Kamal, IV, p.314; 'Ibar, III, p.98.
their movement reached a new phase. It was no longer a mutiny of robbers, but an organised revolt. In addition to the Zanj (black slaves), other elements rallied themselves under the banner of the leader of the revolt. According to Balādhurī, 1 Ahl al-Kala' and other white people joined them. By Ahl al-Kala' he meant the Zūtī, 2 whom Mada‘īnī describes as those who were in the Ṭufūf area following the Kala'. 3 Some Persian mawālī possibly joined the revolt. The leader of the revolt, a man called Riyāḥ, was given the title of Shir Zanjī, 4 a Persian name which means "the lion of the Zanj". Unfortunately we know nothing of the social or political aims of the Zanj, beyond the safe assumption that they sought to improve their conditions, and doubtless sought freedom; our ignorance of the details of the revolt is the more frustrating since we do know that for a short period its success was not inconsiderable.

Riyāḥ Shir Zanjī made his authority felt all over the Euphrates region and Ubullā, a fact which led Kirrāz ibn Mālik al-Sulāmī, the governor of al-Hajjāj in the region, to flee. Riyāḥ went so far as to call himself the

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1. Ansāb, XI, p. 305.
3. Futūh, p. 373.
4. Ansāb, XI, pp. 304, 305.
"Commander of the Faithful" (Amīr al-Mu’minīn), an indication of his power, or perhaps of his ambitions.

Having suppressed the revolt of Ibn al-Jārūd, al-Ḥajjāj sent an army against Shīr Zanjī and his supporters, under the command of Ḥāfṣ ibn Ziyād ibn ‘Amr al-‘Atkī, whose father Ziyād was the police officer of al-Ḥajjāj. But this army was routed, and its leader Ḥāfṣ killed. Thus was Shīr Zanjī able to defy the government’s forces.

The news of this defeat incensed al-Ḥajjāj and he threatened the Basrans with a very severe punishment if they would not put an end to the insurrection of their slaves and sweepers (Kassaḥīn). Therefore, men from every khums of Basra were recruited to re-inforce the regular Mūqāṭīla. Both were under the command of the defeated governor of Ubulla, Kīrrāz ibn Mālik al-Sulami. After a severe struggle, the Zanj were forced to retreat to the desert of Dawraq. There a decisive battle took place in which the Zanj and their leader were massacred after putting up a brave fight, as indicated by the verses preserved in Baladhurī. This revolt of the Zanj which al-Ḥajjāj succeeded in repressing, seems to have left no mark on the Islamic society of the time. However, it is almost certain that it laid the seed for the later revolt of the slaves in Basra in 255/868, which lasted

3. Ansāb, XI, pp. 305-7 (citing Rawḥ ibn ‘abd al-Mu’min); Kāmil, IV, p. 315; ʿIbar, III, p. 98.
for fourteen years and gave a severe shock to the whole fabric of the
'Abbāsid empire.

The Insurrection of the Azd in 'Uman

Al-Hājjāj had to suppress another insurrection in 'Uman on the
Gulf coast of Arabia, led by the two Adzite brothers, Saʿīd and Sulaimān
the sons of 'Abbād ibn al-Julanda ibn al-Mustaqr. The 'Umanīs felt
their independent position in the Muslim empire to be threatened by the
ergetic policies of al-Hājjāj, directed towards making the caliph's
authority effective throughout the Empire. The civil war between 'Abd al-
Malik and 'Abdallah ibn al-Zubair, together with the remoteness of 'Uman
from the central government, encouraged them to seize this opportunity of
re-asserting the independence they had maintained since the time of the
Prophet. Only by successive military campaigns was al-Hājjāj able to
restore order there.

The imperial historical tradition does not usually concern itself
with minor events in the outlying provinces, and this revolt is dealt
with only summarily by the Arabic sources. Of the early sources, only

1. Miles, The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf, p. 34,
Khalifa ibn Khayyat,\(^1\) mentions it, briefly. The account of Ibn 'Asakir,\(^2\) of the later sources, is not only brief and confused, but is also unreliable, since he tells it more as a fable than as history. However, we are fully informed of the event by the eighteenth-century chronicler, 'Umanī Sirḥān ibn Saʿīd al-Azkawī, in his annals entitled Kashf al-Ghumma,\(^3\) probably based on oral tradition.

No date has been given for the earliest, unsuccessful, campaigns that al-Ḥajjāj sent against Saʿīd and Sulaimān. However, one can conclude from the account of Ibn 'Asakir\(^4\) that it was before the revolt of 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn al-Ash'ath. 'Uman was not only an outlying province but also a mountainous region difficult of access: its western borders were the desert (the empty quarter) which could be used as an escape route in times of emergency. This inaccessibility doubtless accounts for the failure of al-Ḥajjāj's initial campaigns. Not before the rebellion of Ibn al-

2. 'Asākir, IV, pp. 167–68.
3. MS. in the B.M. No. Or. 8076. A part of this work has been translated into English by E. C. Ross, Calcutta, 1874. The same part has been edited by Hedwig Kelin, Hamburg, 1938. The Kashf al-Ghumma was also copied, for the most part literally, by another local historian called Saṭī ibn Rāziq in his work "History of the Imāms and Seyyids of 'Umān", translated and edited by G. Badger, printed for the Hakluyt Society, MDCCCLXXI.
4. 'Asākir, VI, p. 168.
Ash'ath had been crushed did al-Hajjāj have a free hand to deal with 'Umān. Then he despatched a large army under the command of al-Qāsim ibn Sha'wa al-Muzanī, by sea to 'Umān; but the Azdite cavalry, led by Sa'īd and Sulaimān, routed this army and killed its leader al-Qāsim.¹

When this alarming news reached al-Hajjāj, he was incensed and eager for revenge. He kept the Azdite chiefs in Başra under close observation to prevent them aiding the rebels, and raised an army of 40,000 from the Nizarites alone. The command of this army was given to Mujā'ā ibn Sha'wa al-Muzanī, a brother of al-Qāsim, killed in the last campaign. Half of this army took the land route, while the other half was sent by sea. Sulaimān and his Azdite cavalry were able to defeat the land division, who reached 'Umān earlier. Meanwhile, Mujā'ā and the sea army marched on Sa'īd after being informed that he had been left with a small body while his brother, with the rest of their supporters, was fighting the army that had come by land. Realizing that with such a small number of men he could not withstand the large army of Mujā'ā, Sa'īd retreated by night and took refuge in the mountains; but he was pursued and besieged.²

¹. Azkawi, fol.326b; English translation, p.10; Klein, op. cit., pp.11-12; Salīl ibn Rāziq, op. cit., pp.1-2; Miles, op. cit., p.50.
². Azkawi, fol. 327a; English translation, pp.10-11; Klein, op. cit., pp.12-14; Salīl ibn Rāziq, op. cit., pp.2-4; Miles, op. cit., p.52.
When he heard of this, Sulaimān came back to meet Mujā' a in battle, to release his brother. Before this, he had set fire to fifty of Mujā' a's ships, while the rest of the fleet managed to escape to sea. Finding himself unable to cope with Sulaimān, Mujā' a managed to escape with his followers to a place called Jalfār, from where he wrote to al-Hājjāj asking for reinforcements. The latter sent him five thousand Syrians under 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Sulaimān. Perhaps owing to a decrease in their local support, Sa'īd and Sulaimān perceived that they could resist no longer, especially when they heard of these new reinforcements. They fled with their families and property to the land of the Zanj (East African Coast), where they remained to their deaths.

Following their flight, Mujā' a and 'Abd al-Rahmān entered 'Uman where they punished the inhabitants for their support of the rebels. Then al-Hājjāj appointed al-Khayār ibn Sabra al-Mujashi, governor of 'Uman, who remained there until the death of al-Hājjāj, to face no more trouble from the Azd.

The Revolt of 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ash'ath

Far more dangerous than any of the other revolts was the revolt of 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ash'ath, which shook the very foundations of the Umayyad rule.

1. Azkawi, fols. 327a-327b; English translation, p. 11; Klein, op. cit., p. 14; Sāfīl ibn Rāḍiq, op. cit., pp. 4-5; E. I., (Azd); Miles, op. cit., p. 53.
In the year 78/697, after the recovery of Iraq from the Khārijite threat, Khurāsān and Sīstān were added to the governorship of al-Hājjāj. He appointed to govern Khurāsān, al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufra, while to Sīstān he sent ‘Ubaidallah ibn Abī Bakra al-Thaqafi. At that time, the first task of a governor of an outlying province was the "Ghazū", to subject the bordering lands. The undertaking of the "Ghazū" both provided extra revenue for the central government, and was an opportunity to train and discipline the troops. For these reasons, ‘Ubaidallah ibn Abī Bakra undertook a campaign in 79/698 against the King of Kabul and Zābul, the Zunbīl who had been refusing to pay tribute to al-Hājjāj. With the troops of Basra under his command, and Shuraih ibn Hāni’ al-Ḥārithī at the head of the Kūfan troops, Ibn Abī Bakra advanced against the Zunbīl. The latter enticed him far into the country, drawing him into the difficult passes of Kabulstān and then cut him off in the rear. It was only by paying the Zunbīl 500,000 or 700,000 dirhams, by leaving some of his followers, including three of his sons, as hostages, and by promising not to invade his territory as

1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, I, p. 297; Ansāb, XI, p. 311 (citing al-Haytham); Buldān, p. 81; Tab., II, p. 1033 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); ‘Asākir, III, p. 129; Kāmil, IV, p. 362; Minḥāt, VI, fo. 29a; Bidāya, IX, p. 21; ‘Ibar, III, p. 103.

long as he was governor, that Ibn Abī Bakra was able to retreat. Shuraiḥ did not approve of this settlement, finding it humiliating to offer such terms to the enemy. He warned Ibn Abī Bakra that any sum he paid to the Zunbīl would be deducted by al-Ḥajjāj from the ‘Āṭā’ of the troops. A group of the army under Shuraiḥ then took the field against the Zunbīl only to suffer heavy losses in lives and Shuraiḥ himself was killed. 1 ‘Ubaidallah, however, had made peace with the Zunbīl after explaining the resistance of Shuraiḥ as disobedience to his orders. The news of the heavy losses and humiliating defeat infuriated al-Ḥajjāj, who wrote to the caliph asking his permission to take vengeance on the Zunbīl for the Muslims. 2

Receiving the permission of the caliph for his plan, al-Ḥajjāj raised an army from Başra and Kūfa, so numerous and magnificently equipped that it was called the "Peacock army" (Jaysh al-Tawāwīs). 3 The command of this army was given by al-Ḥajjāj to ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Muḥammad ibn

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1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tārīkh, I, p. 275; Futūh, p. 399; Ansāb, pp. 311–7 (citing Madā‘īnī); Tab., II, pp. 1036–38 (citing Abū Mikhnaţ); Kāmil, IV, pp. 363–4; Mir’āt, VI, fols. 31a–31b (citing Madā‘īnī); Dhahabī, III, p. 126 (quoting Khalīfa); concerning these heavy losses see also the Diwān of A‘shā. Hamdān, pp. 317–8.

2. Ansāb, XI, p. 318 (citing Abū Mikhnaţ and ‘Awāna); Tab., II, pp. 1038 (citing Abū Mikhnaţ), 1042–3 (citing Abū Mikhnaţ); Kāmil, IV, pp. 364, 365.

3. Ansāb, XI, pp. 319–20 (citing Abū Mikhnaţ and ‘Awāna); Tab., II, p. 1046; Tanbīh, p. 314; Kāmil, IV, p. 367; Mir’āt, VI, fol. 31b.
al-Ash'ath al-Kindī, a descendant of the pre-Islamic Kings of Kinda.

Conflicting reports are to be found in the sources as to where 'Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash'ath was at the time of his appointment. According to Baladhuri, Tabari, Ibn al-Athir, Ibn Kathir and Ibn Khaldun, 1 he was sent to Kirman to suppress a mutiny of Himyan ibn 'Adi al-Sadusi. 2 Another account in Tabari and Ghurar al-Siyar 3 suggests that he was in Kufa and accompanied the "Peacock army" from there. A third account says that he was fighting the Kharijites. 4 Finally, there is the account of Ibn A'tham 5 which says that Ibn al-Ash'ath was at the head of the "Peacock army" when it left Kufa, and on the march to Sistan, he put down the mutiny of Himyan ibn 'Adi al-Sadusi in Kirman: this last account seems the most convincing way of reconciling the other accounts. 6

2. Himyan ibn 'Adi al-Sadusi was originally sent there to help the governor of Sistan and of Sind, if necessary.
3. Tab., II, p.1044; Ghurar, fol. 53.
6. Mme L. Veccia Vaglieri prefers the first account simply because it is a detailed one. This is perhaps because she had no access to Ibn A'tham's work (al-Futuh). E. I., 2, (Ibn al-Ash'ath).
Our main source is Tabari, who follows almost exclusively the narrative of Abū Mikhnaf, taken from his two books, Kitāb Dair al-Jamājim and Khālid ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn al-Ashʿath and Kitāb Ḥadīth yā ʿHimyarī wa Maqtaʿ ibn al-Ashʿath. Abū Mikhnaf was a Kūfite who died in 157 A.H., and thus was very nearly a contemporary of the revolt. The next of our sources is Baladhuri, who mainly reports the narrative of Mādāʾinī, which is as detailed as that of Abū Mikhnaf, but which suffers from some gaps. However, Ibn Aṭham follows a quite different account which lacks both chronology and consistency, but which agrees almost entirely with the narrative of Ghurār al-Siyar in its main outline. Dinawari, however, as shown by Mme L. Veccia Vaglieri, portrays the revolt as being the result of a religious dispute started by propaganda from Ibn al-Ashʿath, declaring al-Ḥajjāj to be impious; this so stirred the religious men that they started the revolt. Apart from Ibn Kathīr, the late sources add no new information; they re-edit the narratives of the early sources. As for Ibn Kathīr, he is the only one among our authorities to report the narrative of Waqīḍī which gives fresh information here and there. Despite the fact that Waqīḍī’s account confuses the battles of Dair al-Jamājim and Maskin with each other, yet is worthy of consideration.

1. Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, p. 93.
2. op. cit.
There are two varying chronologies of the revolt. One gives the year 81 as the beginning of the revolt, the year 82 for the battles of Basra, Kufa and Maskin, and the year 83 for the battles of Sistan and Khurasan. The other puts the dates a year later, i.e. 82, 83, 84, respectively. Both chronologies are uncertain of the year of Ibn al-Ash'ath's death, except that it was either in 84 or 85. Wellhausen studied this question thoroughly and decided, I think justly, in favour of the first one. In order not to repeat the same argument, as Madame Veccia Vaglieri has done, I shall follow the same chronology as followed by Wellhausen.

In the year 80/699, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash'ath and his army arrived in Sistan, where he made a speech inviting the muqatila there to join his army, which they did. An army from Tabaristan under his brothers al-Gasim and al-Sabbah is also said to have joined him. Hearing of this powerful army sent against him, the Zunbil wrote to Ibn al-Ash'ath apologising for the fate of the army of Ibn Abi Bakra, and offering him a plan for a peaceful

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1. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, pp. 241-2.
2. The coins struck in Fars in the year 81 A.H. support the chronology which regards the beginning of the revolt as 81 A.H. Walker, A Catalogue of the Arab-Sassanian Coins, pp. IXii-IXiv, 117; Bosworth, op. cit., p. 61. However, another piece of numismatic evidence favours the second chronology. Miles, Some New Light on the History of Kirman, pp. 96-8, WCl, 1959.
4. Ansab, XI, pp. 321 (citing Abu Mikhnaq), 322-3 (citing Mada'ini); Tab., II, pp. 1044-5 (citing Abu Mikhnaq); Kamil, IV, p. 366; Mir'at, VI, fol. 31b; 'Ibar, III, p. 105.
settlement. Ibn al-Asfath paid no heed to this and marched against the Zunbil. Hoping that he could trap him in the same way as he had Ibn Abi Bakra, the Zunbil began to entice Ibn al-Asfath far into the country by withdrawing in front of him. But Ibn al-Asfath was aware of this strategy and was too cautious to be so trapped. He established garrisons in every city or fortress he occupied, and assured his lines of communications by linking these places by an organised postal service. After mastering a considerable part of the country and securing valuable spoils, Ibn al-Asfath returned to Bust, postponing the military operations until the next spring (81/700). He thought it wiser to let the soldiers get accustomed to the mountainous area and its severe winter. He wrote to al-Hajja informing him of his success and of the strategy he was employing. But al-Hajja, quick and impatient as he was, wrote to him a series of humiliating and arrogant letters ordering him to advance without delay far into the enemy's territory and to fight him to the death; if he refused, he would give the command to Ibn al-Asfath's brother, and reduce him to the rank of a simple

1. Ansab, XI, pp. 321-2 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); 322-3 (citing Madan'i); Tab., II, p. 1045 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, II, fol. 101b; Kamil, IV, p. 366; Mir'at, VI, fol. 31b; Bidaya, IX, p. 32; 'Ibar, III, p. 105.

2. Ansab, XI, p. 223 (citing Madan'i); Ya'qubi, II, p. 331; Tab., p. 1045-6 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kamil, IV, pp. 373-1; Mir'at, VI, fols. 31b-32a; Bidaya, IX, pp. 32, 35; 'Ibar, p. 105.
Deeply offended by al-Hājjaj's aggressive letters, which depicted him as an inefficient coward, Ibn al-Ash'ath decided to avenge himself. He ordered a meeting of the chiefs among his followers, during which he told them of the orders of al-Hājjaj and revealed his intention to defy him. He pointed out that his own strategy had been approved by all the experienced men among them, and said that he was more concerned for their welfare than al-Hājjaj. Finally, he told them, "I am only one of you: if you want to march, I shall march; if you refuse, I shall refuse." They all shouted, "We will not obey the enemy of God, al-Hājjaj." Another version is given by Baladhurī, Ibn Aṭham and the author of Ghurar al-Siyar, who say that Ibn al-Ash'ath, before holding the meeting, fabricated a letter in which he represented al-Hājjaj as ordering him to depose some chiefs of their posts and kill others, in an attempt to aggravate their hatred and discontent.

In fact, little aggravation was needed: the harsh policies of al-Hājjaj at home, and the prolonged wars in distant lands were enough to lead the

1. Ansāb, XI, pp.323-4 (citing Madaʾīnī); Yaʿqūbī, II, p.331; Tab., II, pp.1052-3 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Tanbih, p.314; Badʾ, VI, p.35; Kāmil, IV, p.317; Mīrʾāt, VI, fols. 32a, 37a-37b; Dhahabī, III, p.128; Bidayā, IX, p.35; Ibar, III, p.106; Perier, Vie d' al-Hājjaj ibn Yūsuf, p.162, Paris, 1904.

2. Ansāb, XI, pp.324-5 (citing Madaʾīnī); Tab., II, pp.1053-4 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūft, II, fols. 101b-102a; Ghurar, fol. 53; Kāmil, IV, p.371; Mīrʾāt, VI, fol.37b; Dhahabī, III, p.128; Bidayā, IX, p.35; Ibar, III, p.106.

3. Ansāb, XI, p.325 (citing Madaʾīnī); Kūft, II, fol.101b; Ghurar, fol.53.
Iraqis to give such a reply to Ibn al-Ash'ath. He need do no more than remind them of their grievances to get their support. Abū al-Ṭufail ‘Āmir ibn Wāthila al-Kinānī was the first to announce the deposition, (Khalī) of al-Ḥajjaṭ; and Abd al-Mu‘min ibn Shbath ibn Rabī‘ al-Tamīmī invited the troops to march on Iraq to expel the hated governor. They swore an oath of allegiance to Ibn al-Ash'ath. It is highly significant that both Abū al-Ṭufail and Abd al-Mu‘min were not only Kūfans, but also former sincere adherents of al-Mukhtar. Thus the first men to declare publicly the revolt were from Kūfa with Shi‘ite inclinations.

In order to be free to carry out this scheme, Ibn al-Ash'ath made peace with the Zunbīl on the following terms: if Ibn al-Ash'ath was victorious, he would grant the Zunbīl an exemption from paying the tribute as long as he was in power; if he were defeated, the Zunbīl would give him refuge. It was advantageous for the Zunbīl to accept this offer, for even in the case of Ibn al-Ash'ath’s defeat, this war with al-Ḥajjaṭ would not only leave the Zunbīl unmolested for a while, but would also weaken al-Ḥajjaṭ and the government of al-Iraq. Before marching on Iraq, Ibn al-Ash'ath also appointed governors for the important towns of Sistan.

1. Ansāb, XI, pp.325–6 (citing Mādā‘īnī); Tab., II, pp.1054–5 (citing Abū Mīkhnaf); Kāmil, IV, pp.371–2; Mīr’āt, VI, fol.37b; Dḥahabī, III, pp.128–9; Futūḥ, p.400; Ya‘qūbī, II, p.332; Tab., II, p.1055 =

2. Ansāb, fol.261a; Tab., II, pp.654, 694 (citing Abū Mīkhnaf).

3. Ansāb, XI, p.327; Futūḥ, p.400; Ya‘qūbī, II, p.332; Tab., II, p.1055 =
such as Bust and Zaranj (81/700).

On the march to Iraq, the poet Aš̄a Hamdān was with Ibn al-Aš̄ath, reciting verses celebrating the occasion. These verses are important in that they reveal a religious conviction behind the revolt, for al-Hājjāj is depicted as of bad faith. Moreover, the verses show clearly that both the Maṣadītes and the Yemenites (Hamdān, Madhhiḥ and Qaḥṭān) allied themselves against al-Hājjāj and his tribe, Thaqīf. This is supported by evidence in al-Farazdaq’s Diwan and Baladhuri. Mme Veccia Vaglieri in writing, “Ibn al-Aš̄ath had put himself at the head of the Kaḥṭānis and Hamdānis against the Maṣadīs and the Thaqafis” has misunderstood these verses of Aš̄a. In fact, the revolt of Ibn al-Aš̄ath was one of the rare occasions where we find the Northern and Southern Arabs standing together against a common foe. It was the first time that the Mudarites found it not unacceptable to follow a Yemenite leader, and in which their Āṣabiyya to their country, Iraq, was stronger than their tribal loyalties.

When Ibn al-Aš̄ath and his rebel army reached Fars, they realised that the deposition of al-Hājjāj could not be separated from a revolt against ʿAbd al-Malik. Consequently, the rebels renounced the latter and paid

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1. Aš̄a Hamdān, Diwan, p. 342; Ṣab., II, p. 1056; Agh., V, p. 159 (citing Mubarrad); Mīr‘at, VI, fol. 37b; Mukhtasar, I, p. 208.
2. Farazdaq, Diwan, I, pp. 239-41; Ansāb, XI, p. 334.
3. E. I., 2, (Ibn al-Aš̄ath). However, Baladhuri reports, on doubtful evidence, that al-Hājjāj killed some Yemenite Syrians who joined Ibn al-Aš̄ath under the impetus of Āṣabiyya. Ansāb, fol. 27b.
homage to Ibn al-Ash'ath, thus leading the revolt into a new phase. They paid homage to Ibn al-Ash'ath in accordance with the "Book of God, the Sunna of the Prophet, the deposition of the Imāms, of error (A'immāt al Dā'āla), and the Jihad against al-Muhillīn". 1 This Bai'a will be discussed later.

Ibn al-Ash'ath is said to have written to al-Muhaulab ibn Abī Šufra inviting him to join the revolt, but he refused and warned Ibn al-Ash'ath not to spill the blood of the Muslims. 2 It is also said that al-Muhaulab wrote to al-Ḥajjāj advising him not to fight the Iraqis before they reached their home, for as soon as they could be with their wives and children again, they would lose interest in revolt. Al-Ḥajjāj, however, did not follow this advice. 3

When the news of the homage paid to Ibn al-Ash'ath reached al-Ḥajjāj, he went to Basra and sent an urgent letter to the caliph asking for Syrian forces; the caliph, equally alarmed by the news, 4 sent him one

1. Ansāb, XI, p. 334; Tab., II, pp. 1057-8 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Tanbīh, p.314; Murūj, V, pp.302-3; Kāmil, IV, p.373; Mir’āt, VI, fol.37b; Bidāya, IX, p.36; Ibar, III, p.107.
2. Ansāb, XI, p.329 (citing Wahab ibn Jarīr), 335-6; Tab., II, pp.1058-9; Kufī, II, fol.102a; Mir’āt, VI, fol.38a; Bidāya, IX, p.36.
3. Ansāb, XI, p.336; Tab., II, p.1059; Kāmil, IV, p.373; Mir’at, VI, fol.38a; Bidāya, IX, p.36; Ibar, III, p.107.
4. On this occasion ʿAbd al-Malik is said to have sought the advice of Khālid ibn Yazīd ibn Mu‘awiya, who told him that he should not worry since the threat had come from Sistan and not from Khūrāsān. Ansāb, XI, p.337; Tab., II, p.1059; Kāmil, IV, p.373; Mir’at, VI, fol.38a; Bidāya, IX, p.36. Professor Bosworth refers to this account and regards =
detachment after the other continually.

It would appear that Ibn al-Ash'ath spent a considerable time in Fārs, for he minted his own dirhams. The first encounter between his army and al-Hajjāj took place on the 10th Dhul Ḥijja, 81/25th January, 701, near Tustar. Al-Hajjāj's forces were defeated, and consequently al-Hajjāj withdrew to Basra; but finding no support there, he left and established himself in al-Zāwiya. During this time, they were hard-pressed by the lack of provisions, which led al-Hajjāj to confiscate the food supplies of the merchants. Meanwhile, Ibn al-Ash'ath entered Basra unchecked, and was it as evidence of a "relative decline, at this time, in terms of military resources and man power, of Sistān as compared with Khurāsān." Sistān Under the Arabs From the Islamic Conquest to the Rise of the Șaffarids, p. 61. However, Ibn Aṭṭāthūm reports this event and says that 'Abd al-Malik sought Khalid's advice, because the latter was well informed of the "days of the people" and the "books of dissention" (Kalonymios). Ibn Aṭṭāthūm also says that 'Abd al-Malik asked Khalid whether it was the time when "the Black Banners" would appear as a sign of the cessation of "Our Mulk". Khalid told him not to worry unless the danger came from the "Bottom of Merv". Kūfī, II, fol. 104b. Very similar to this is the account of the author of Ghurar al-Siyar, fol. 55. The anticipatory character of this account leads us to question its authenticity.


2. Sa'ūd, VII, ii, p. 177 (citing al-Haytham); Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tārikh, I, pp. 362–3 (citing Mada'īnī); Ansāb, XI, p. 341 (citing al-Haytham); Ya'qūbī, II, p. 332; Tab., II, pp. 1050–1 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kūfī, II, fol. 104a; 105b; Ghūrār, fol. 55–6; Tānbīh, pp. 314–5; Bad', VI, p. 36; Kāmil, IV, p. 374; Mir'at, VI, fol. 38a; Dhahabī, III, pp. 226–7; Bidaya, IX, pp. 36–7; 'Ibar, III, p. 107.

met with a very enthusiastic reception, especially by the Qurra',\(^1\) and elderly men. He dug a trench and set up fortifications. After about a month of skirmishes, a battle was joined on 28th Muḥarram, 82/early March 701, in which many Qurra' were killed. Thanks to the perseverance of al-Ḥājaj and the skill of his Syrian leader, Sufyān, Ibn al-Abiad al-Kalbī, he eventually was victorious.\(^2\)

Following this defeat in al-Zāwiya, Ibn al-Ash'ath left Basra and went to Kūfa. With him were his Kūfān soldiers, as well as some cavalry from Basra. In Basra, he left ʿAbd al-Rahmān ibn ʿAbbās al-Ḥāshimi al-Qurashi, who continued the struggle only for a short while, because the majority of the Basrans accepted the Aman of al-Ḥājaj and opened the

1. Literally, the readers of the Qur'ān. Their first appearance is said to have been at the time of Abū Musā al-Ash'ari. They received high payments, regardless of their tribe or their participation in the early conquests. They also gained the financial support of some wealthy men. Thus they held a high status, both religiously and materially. Their number increased steadily and many Ashrāf as well as mawāli joined them. They played a distinctive role in the battle of Siffin; and ten thousand mawāli from among them are said to have joined the Khārijites. Hiliya, V, p. 61; Al-ʿAlī, Al-Tanzimāt al-Ijtimaʿiyya wal latīsādiyya fil Basra fil Qarn al-Awwal al-Hijrī, pp. 44–6.

2. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tārīkh, I pp. 364 (citing Madāʾinī and Abuʿl Yaqdān), 368–70 (citing Abū ʿUbaida); Maṭārif, p. 156; Ansāb, XI, pp. 341–8; Ṣab., II, pp. 1063–66 (citing Abū ʿIlkhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols. 106a–106b; Ghurar, fols. 56–8; Tanbīth, pp. 314–5; Muṣjam, II, p. 911; Kāmil, IV, pp. 374–5; Miṣrīt, VI, fols. 38a–40a; Ṣafādī, al-Wāft bi-l-Wafayat, XVI, fols. 228b–229a; Bidāya, IX, pp. 37–9; Wāqīdī here confuses this battle with that of Dair al-Jamājim; Ibar, III, p. 107.
way for him through the city. As a result, 'Abd al-Rahmān with a small group of followers left Başra and joined their leader in Kūfa. Ibn al-Ash'ath probably chose Kūfa for his next centre because it was his home city, where he could count on the support of his tribe and friends.

However, on his arrival there, he found himself obliged to drive out Māṭar ibn Nājiya al-Tanmī, who had taken hold of the Qāṣr (the government centre) there, after turning out the Syrian garrison left by al-Hajjāj. Māṭar was an officer of al-Hajjāj in al-Madā'in, who took advantage of the troubled situation to seize Kūfa. With the help of Hamdān, kinsmen of Ibn al-Ash'ath, the latter was able to force Māṭar to submit.

The Kūfans received Ibn al-Ash'ath very warmly, and his army was reinforced by many elements who were discontented with the Umayyads.

Meanwhile, al-Hajjāj left Basra to his cousin Ayyūb ibn Abī'l-Hakam ibn 'Aqīl al-Thaqafi, and made his way through the desert to Kūfa. Being harrassed on route by 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn 'Abbas al-Hashimi with a

### References

1. Hadhīf, p. 23; Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, I, p. 365; Ansāb, XI, pp. 248-9, 355 (citing al-Haytham); Ya'qūbī, II, p. 332; Nasab, fol. 11a; Ṭabīb, II, p. 1066 (citing Abū Mikhna), Kūfī, II, fol. 106b; Ghurar, fols. 57-8; Tanbih, p. 315; Bakrī, II, p. 373; Kāmil, IV, p. 375; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 40a; Al-Ṣafadī, op. cit., XVI, fol. 299a; Bīdāya, IX, p. 40; Ibar, III, p. 108.

2. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, I, p. 365 (citing Madā'inī); Ansāb, XI, pp. 353-5, 355 (citing al-Haytham), 356-7 (citing Abū Mikhna); Nasab, fol. 17a; Ṭabīb, II, pp. 1069-71 (citing Abū Mikhna); Kūfī, II, fol. 106b; Jamharat, p. 215; Kāmil, IV, p. 376; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 40a; Bīdāya, IX, p. 40 (citing Waqīt); Ibar, III, p. 108.
detachment of cavalry, al-Ḥajjāj was forced to pitch his camp in
Dair Qarrā; nevertheless, this position facilitated easy communication
with Syria, from where he received constant re-inforcements. Ibn al-
Ash'ath left Kūfah with his enormous army and made his camp in Dair
al-Jamājim (Rabī' I, 82/April, 701). Both sides dug trenches and for
months engaged in indecisive encounters. The more prolonged the war
between al-Ḥajjāj and Ibn al-Ash'ath, the more the caliph, 'Abd al-Malik,
became alarmed. However, on the advice of some Quraishite and Syrian
dignitaries, he decided to negotiate with the rebels in an attempt to find a
peaceful settlement. He therefore sent another Syrian army under the
command of his brother Muḥammad and his son 'Abdallah, charging them to
propose terms to the Iraqis if they would submit. If they refused, the
army and its two leaders were to join al-Ḥajjāj, and be under his command.
These were the terms to be offered to the Iraqis: al-Ḥajjāj was to be removed
from Iraq, their pay ('Atqā) was to be raised to be equal to that of the Syrians,
and Ibn al-Ash'ath was offered the governorship of any town in Iraq he wished
for life. Al-Ḥajjāj tried to dissuade the caliph from offering such terms but

1. His army is said to have numbered 200,000 men, half of them on the
regular pay roll, while the other half were mawāfi. Ṭab., II, p. 1072
(citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p. 377; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 40a.

2. Abū Yusuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, p. 57; Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I,
p. 356; Ansāb, fol. 13b; Ya'qūbī, II, p. 332; Ṭab., II, pp. 1071-3
(citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 107a; Ghurar, fol. 58; Tanbih,
p. 315; Bakrī, II, p. 573; Muṣjam, II, p. 685; Kāmil, IV, p. 377; Mir'āt,
VI, fol. 40a; Bidāya, IX, p. 40 (citing Wāqidi); Ibar, III, p. 108.

3. Ansāb, fol. 16a; Ṭab., II, p. 1063 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol.
107a-107b; Ghurar, fol. 58, here, as in Kūfī, no mention of a pay rise
is given; Kāmil, IV, p. 377; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 40a; Bidāya, IX, p. 41
(citing Wāqidi); Ibar, III, p. 108.
In vain.

In spite of Ibn al-Ash'ath's attempts to persuade the rebels to accept these terms, the Iraqis, hot-headed by temperament, refused and once more denounced the 'bai'a of 'Abd al-Malik. They were banking on the fact that al-Hajjāj and his Syrian troops were suffering from a lack of provisions, but their calculations were mistaken. The Syrians, despite their difficulties, stood firm and as a result, the Iraqis lost their chance to rid themselves of al-Hajjāj and to gain a pay increase.

Consequently, the fighting was resumed and it lasted for one hundred days. The most enthusiastic of Ibn al-Ash'ath's followers were the Qurra' in the fighting against al-Hajjāj; they placed themselves as a separate squadron under Jabala ibn Zahr ibn Qais al-Ju'fi, and showed a remarkable bravery. But their enthusiasm was lost after the death of their leader and they soon dispersed. On Jumāda II, 82/July 701, the decisive battle of Dair al-Jamajim was joined. At first, the Iraqis gained the upper hand but when al-Abrad ibn Qarra al-Tamimi, on the right wing of Ibn al-Ash'ath's army, was unable to withstand the attack of the Syrian Sufyān, ibn al-Abrad al-Kalbi, and therefore gave way, the Iraqis interpreted this as treason, and were so discouraged that they fled. In vain Ibn al-Ash'ath tried to rally them again. Their flight was facilitated by the Aman issued by al-Hajjāj. Ibn al-Ash'ath himself was forced to flee with some of his supporters. He first entered Kūfa, where he took leave of his family, and
then went in the direction of Basra. Meanwhile, al-Hajjaq entered Kufa, where he executed a large number of the captured rebels.\(^1\)

However, the defeat of Ibn al-Ash'ath was not yet completed. Some of his followers with Muhammad ibn Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas took possession of al-Mada'in. But they soon left their position on hearing that al-Hajjaq was advancing against them, and joined their leader in Maskin.\(^2\) At the same time, 'Ubadallah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Samura al-Qurashi succeeded in seizing Basra for Ibn al-Ash'ath.\(^3\) But the latter could not stay long enough in the city and returned to Maskin on the Dujail. Al-Hajjaq spent a month in Kufa, after which he went in pursuit of Ibn al-Ash'ath and his followers. They met in Maskin where a long and severe struggle took place. Finally, in Sha'ban 82/September 701, Ibn al-Ash'ath was defeated decisively and his followers fled across the

\(^1\) Sa'd, VII, ii, p. 177 (citing al-Haytham); Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, i, p. 368; Ansab, fols. 17a-18b (citing Abu al-Mukharrir al-Rasibi); Tab., II, pp. 1086-95 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, II, fols. 107b-108b; Ghurar, fols. 59-60; Tanbih, p. 315; Muruj, V, p. 304; Bad, VI, p. 36; Bakri, II, pp. 573, 574; 593; Mumaj, IV, fols. 652, 685; Kamil, IV, pp. 378-9, 383-6; Mir'at, VI, fols. 40a-40b, 42b-43b (citing al-Haytham), 43b; Dhahabti, III, pp. 227-8, 229; Bidayat, IX, pp. 41-2 (citing Wajidi), 47-8; 'Ibar, III, pp. 109-10; Shadharat, I, I, p. 92. It is said that the Qaisites fought very courageously in the battle against Ibn al-Ash'ath. Jarir, Ditwan, p. 264; Naqashid, I, p. 410.

\(^2\) Ansab, fol. 18a; Tur, II, p. 1098-9 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kufi, II, fol. 109b; Ghurar, fol. 60; Kamil, IV, p. 386; 'Ibar, III, p. 110.

\(^3\) Nasab, fol. 18b; Tur, II, pp. 1098-9 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Jamharat, p. 67; Kamil, IV, p. 386; 'Ibar, III, p. 110.
Dujail river, where many of them were drowned.  

Ibn al-Asḥath and those who survived the battle of Maskin retreated towards Sistān. But a detachment of Syrians under 'Umāra ibn Tamīm al-Lakhamī, accompanied by al-Hājjāj's son, was sent to pursue them. They reached Ibn al-Asḥath at Sūs, where the rebels were defeated and fled to Sābūr. Here Ibn al-Asḥath was joined by the Kurds and with their help was able to defeat the Syrians when they met in battle. However, Ibn al-Asḥath continued his march until he reached Kirmān, and then went on to Sistān. But his governor of Zaranj, a Tamīmite called ʿAbdallah ibn ʿAmīr al-Baʿtar, refused to let him enter the city; while his governor of Bust, ʿIyād ibn Hīmān al-Sadūsī, took him prisoner, hoping thus to get the favour of al-Hājjāj. However, the Zunbīl forced the governor of Bust to free Ibn al-Asḥath and took the latter with him to

1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, I, p.368; Ansāb, fol.18a; Yaʿqūbī, II, pp.332-3; Tāb., II, pp.1099-1101 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols. 109b-110a; Ghurār, fol.61; both the author of this work and Kūfī give the name al-Maftīḥ instead of Maskīn; Tābīh, p.315; Kāmil, IV, pp.386-7; Mīrāt, VI, fol.43 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Ibar, III, pp.110-11. The account found in Tāb., II, pp.1123-5, which makes the defeat of Ibn al-Asḥath a result of the guidance given by a shepherd to the troops of al-Hājjāj, seems unconvincing; for it is neither reported with a chain of authority nor has it any support in other early sources. It is probably, therefore, an anti-Syrian tradition trying to find justification for the defeat of the Iraqis.

2. Ansāb, fol.18a; Maʿad, fols.111a-111b; Ghurār, fols.62-3; Kāmil, IV, p.387; Mīrāt, VI, fol.43b (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Ibar, III, p.111.
Kabul, 1 and showed him great honour. This treatment Ibn al-Ash'ath received from the Zunbīl was due to the agreement between the two some time earlier. 2

Meanwhile, however, 'Ubaidallah ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Samura al-Qurashi and 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Abbās al-Hāshimi, with followers numbering 60,000 Iraqi fugitives, gathered in Sistān. They invited Ibn al-Ash'ath to resume the struggle and he accepted. First they marched against Zaranj, where they took the city and punished the unfaithful governor, 'Abdallah ibn Amīr al-Ba‘ar. At this time, ‘Umara ibn Tamīm and the Syrian army were approaching, and being afraid of the Syrians, Ibn al-Ash'ath's followers forced their leader to enter Khurasan, where Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab was governor. They chose Khurasan thinking that as it was a large country, they would either not be attacked at all, or else would be able to find some place of refuge there where they could maintain themselves until the deaths of al-Hajjāj and 'Abd al-Malik. They also hoped to get the support of the people of Khurasan. In vain did Ibn al-Ash'ath try to convince them that entering Khurāsān would only lead them into the necessity of fighting both Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab and the Syrians. However, at this

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1. Ansāb, fols. 18a-18b; Tab., II, pp.1101-2 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kāft, II, fols.111b-112a; Ghurar, fol.63; Kāmil, IV, p.388; Mīr’āt, VI, fol.43b (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Bīdāya, TX, p.48 (citing Wāqīdī); Ibar, III, pp.111-112.

2. See p. 274.
point, ‘Ubaidallah ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Samura, with two thousand men, deserted and began to urge the others to do likewise. No reason has been given for this move, but presumably Ibn Samura realised that Ibn al-Ash'ath had lost control over his followers and so was no longer fit to lead. This had the result of deciding Ibn al-Ash'ath to rely on the Iraqis no more, because of their disunity and fickleness, and he made his way back to the Zunbil with a remnant of supporters. The rest paid homage to ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn al-'Abbās al-Hashimi and entered Herāt, killing al-Ruqād al-Azdi, an official of Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab. Therefore, Yazīd was forced to retaliate and sent an army under his brother al-Mufaddal, which inflicted a crushing defeat on them. Many, including the leader, fell prisoners. Ibn al-Muhallab, because of his ‘Asabiyya to the Yemenites, released these, and sent the rest of the prisoners to al-Ḥajjaj, 2 who executed a large number of them.

Meanwhile, some five hundred of Ibn al-Ash'ath's followers, under Mawdūd ibn Bishr al-Nadrī, were still holding out in Zaranj, although they

1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, I, pp.367-8; Ansāb, fols.18b-19b; Ṭab., II, pp.1104-10 (citing Abū Makhnaf), however, the narrative of Mada'inī (Ṭab., II, p.110ff.) is somewhat different from that of Abū Makhnaf.; Kūfī, II, 112a; Ghurar, fols. 63-6; Kāmil, IV, pp.388-90; Mirʾat, VI, fol.44a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Bidāya, IX, pp.48-9 (citing Wāqidī); Ibar, III, p.112; Tārīkh-i Sistān, pp.116-7.

2. Ansāb, fols.19a-19b; Ya‘qūbī, II, p.330; Ṭab., II, pp.1120-2 (citing Abū ‘Ubaidā); Kūfī, II, fol.112b; Mirʾat, VI, fol.51b.
eventually submitted when 'Umāra ibn Tamīm granted them Amām (approved by al-Haḍrāj), so becoming master of the whole of Sistan.¹

Now only 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ash'ath himself remained a possible danger to al-Haḍrāj. Al-Haḍrāj, therefore, wrote repeatedly to the Zunbīl, in turn threatening him and offering him inducements, to persuade him to hand over Ibn al-Ash'ath. At last al-Haḍrāj succeeded, by exempting the Zunbīl from the payment of tribute for seven or ten years.²

This agreement was reached in the year 85/700. Our sources give different versions of the death of Ibn al-Ash'ath. He is said to have been killed by the Zunbīl himself,³ or to have died in his bed, of consumption,⁴ and his severed head sent to al-Haḍrāj. Finally, there is the generally accepted account which says that he was put in chains and delivered to 'Umāra ibn Tamīm, who was to take him to al-Haḍrāj. However, on the way to Iraq, he

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1. Ansāb, fol. 19b (citing Madā'inī); Tab., II, pp. 1132-3 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p. 399; Mirʾat, VI, fol. 52b; Ibar, III, p. 116.

2. Ansāb, fols. 20a-20b (citing al-Haytham and Madā'inī); Yaʿqūbī, II, pp. 3334; Tab., II, pp. 1133-3 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols. 112b-113a; Ghurār, fols. 66-70; Tābih, pp. 315-6; Badʾ, VI, pp. 36-7; Kāmil IV, pp. 399-400; Mirʾat, VI, fol. 53a; Mukhtasar, I, p. 208; Bidāya, IX, p. 53; Ibar, III, p. 116.

3. Ansāb, fol. 20a; Tab., II, pp. 1133-4 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p. 399; Bidāya, IX, p. 53; Ibar, III, p. 116; Shādharat, I, p. 94.

4. Ansāb, fol. 20a; Tab., II, p. 1134 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 113a; Kāmil, IV, pp. 399-400; Bidāya, IX, p. 53; Ibar, III, p. 116.
threw himself from a rooftop at Rukkhahaj; and then his head was severed and sent to al-Haijaj.

The revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath has received much attention from modern scholars. Von Kremer, followed by A. Muller and by Van Vloten, links the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath with that of al-Mukhtar, and regards it as another attempt by the mawāli of Basra and Kūfa to obtain economic, social and political rights, as much due to them as to the 'Arab aristocracy, by the teachings of Islam. Wellhausen recognises that the fall of al-Mukhtar did not put an end to the revolt of the mawāli; and that the new measures imposed on the mawāli by al-Haijaj had made things even more difficult for them.

1. Ansāb, fol. 20a (citing al-Haytham), 20a-20b (citing Madāfinī); Yaʿqūbi, II, p.334; Ghurar, fols. 69-70; Tanbīh, pp.315-16; Bad', VI?, pp.36-7; Kāmil, IV, p.400; Tadhkira, I, fol.163b; Mir'āt, VI, fol.53a; Mukhtasar, I, p.208; Duwal, I, p.24; Bidāya, IX, p.53; 'Ibar, III, p.116.


4. La Domination Arab, Le Chi'tisme et les Croyances Messianiques sous la Khalifat des Omayades, pp.17, 26.

5. The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p.245ff; also Lammens, E.I.1, (al-Hadjdjadj ibn Yusuf).

However, he rejects the view that the revolt of Ibn al-\(\text{Ash}\)'ath was a mere continuation of that of al-Mukhtar. The participation of a large number of maw\(\text{al}\) in the later revolt was, in his opinion due to the custom of the time, that they should fight side-by-side with their patrons. They might, he adds, have had their own interests in the revolt, but considers that these were only secondary. Wellhausen also denies that the revolt of Ibn al-\(\text{Ash}\)'ath had any religious motives; and concludes that it was "rather a renewed and desperately powerful attempt of the Iraqis to shake off the Syrian yoke." Professor Bosworth agrees with Wellhausen when he says that the revolt of the "Peacock army" was "basically a reaction of the old Arab aristocracy against the authoritarian rule of the plebian al-\(\text{Hajj\(\text{a}\)}\), and of the Iraqi Arab against Syrian domination."\(^1\) Finally, Mme L. Veccia Vaglieri,\(^2\) while considering Wellhausen's argument, refuses to accept the view that the revolt had no religious motivation. She emphasizes the religious aspect of the revolt in the light of the "vehement participation of the Kurra' in it."

Crucial to the proper understanding of this revolt is to take account of the grievances and causes of all the different elements who took part in it: in the case of the leader, the main cause was the personal insult inflicted by al-\(\text{Hajj\(\text{a}\)}\), but his supporters had each their own reason for joining him. One could define the basic tensions lying beneath the revolt as four: the Iraqi hatred

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1. op. cit., p. 60.
2. E. I.\(^2\), (Ibn al-\(\text{Ash}\)'ath); also E. I.,\(^2\) (al-\(\text{Hadj\(\text{a}\)}\) ibn Yusuf).
of al-Ḥajjāj's attempts to make Syrian rule effective, the inequalities in pay and privilege between Syrians and Iraqis, the Shi'a opposition to the Umayyads, and the social inequalities between 'Arab and mawālī. The mawālī were supported in their struggle for equal rights by the Qurrā', many of whom were mawālī. But to deal first with the leader of the revolt; the Arabic sources stress strongly the alleged mutual personal hatred between Ibn al-
Ash'ath and al-Ḥajjāj. But Mme Vaglieri is right to point out that the relationship between the two had always been friendly, the reason for al-Ḥajjāj giving to Ibn al-
Ash'ath the command of the "peacock army". Moreover, Ibn al-
Ash'ath had been a faithful subordinate to al-Ḥajjāj, obeying him until the year 81/700, when the latter insulted him. Nevertheless, from this time, personal factors were important in providing the immediate cause of the revolt. Once a suitable leader presented himself, the people of Basra and Kūfā were quick to support him in his defiance of al-Ḥajjāj; but for reasons of their own, not because of the original personal insult. One main reason for their

1. Imam, II, pp. 29-30; Ansāb, XI, pp. 319-20; (citing Abū Mikhnafl and 'Awāna), 319 (citing al-Sha'fī); Dinawari, p. 322; Tab., II, pp. 1043-4 (citing Abū Mikhnafl); Kūfī, II, fols. 98b, 99a-99b, 101a; Ghurar, fol. 53; Kāmil, IV, p. 366; Mīrī, VI, fol. 31b; Dhahabi, III, p. 128; Bidāya, IX, pp. 31-2; 'Ibar, II, p. 105.

readiness to support Ibn al-Ash'ath was because al-Hajjāj had sent them
to fight for a long period (Tajmīr) in inhospitable lands far away from their
homes and families; while on the other hand, Syrian troops were not
employed in remote regions, neither did they serve any but short periods.
Whether they did their military service in the cities of Syria or in Iraq, the
Syrians received higher pensions than the Iraqis, despite the latter's harsher
conditions. That this inequality of pay and treatment was an Iraqi grievance
can be seen by the terms offered to the rebels by the caliph.¹

Another clear motive behind the initial support given to Ibn al-
Ash'ath can be seen in the Shi'a inclinations of the two most active
supporters: Abu al-Tufail 'Āmir ibn Wāthila al-Kinānī and 'Abd al-Mu'min
ibn Shabath ibn Rabī' al-Tamīmī.² Both were past followers of al-Mukhtār,
and also both Kūfans from the Northern tribes. This supports what the
poet A'shā Hamdān has said, that the 'Asabiyya was not a motive attracting
adherents to the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath. It would appear that one of the key
initial sources of the militancy of the revolt derived from the Shi'a of Kūfa,
awaiting any opportunity to challenge Umayyad rule.

Underlying the baisa paid to Ibn al-Ash'ath in Sīstān was the Iraqi
hatred of al-Hajjāj and his harsh policies aimed to make the caliph's rule in

1. See p. 280.
2. See p. 274 note (2).
Iraq effective. This bai'a: "to give him support and fight with him until God expels al-Hājjāj, the enemy of God, from Iraq", is almost identical to that paid to Ibn al-Jārūd a few years earlier. In the two revolts, the first target was al-Hājjāj, the main intention, to expel him, rather than any direct renunciation of 'Abd al-Malik. However, by the time of the "bai'a" in Fars a new development has taken place; homage was paid to Ibn al-
Ash'ath "on the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet, to depose the Imāms of Error (A'immat al-Dīṣāla) and to fight against al-Muḥillīn", i.e. the Umayyads. From a revolt against al-Hājjāj and his oppressive policies, the rebels had moved to a revolt against the caliph and the Umayyad rule in general. This development was inherent in the earlier bai'a, since al-Hājjāj had no pretensions to be more than 'Abd al-Malik's officer, and the caliph had always supported his governor's policies.

On Ibn al-Ash'ath's arrival in Basra and Kūfa, he was joined by a new element, very large numbers of Qurra'. The reasons for their adherence to the revolt are many: as other Iraqis, they disliked al-Hājjāj's attempts to strengthen Syrian domination, and their material interests, they felt, were not sufficiently cared for by al-Hājjāj. But other distinctive grievances

1. Ansāb, XI, p. 326 (citing Mada'īnī); Tab., II, p. 1055 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Kāmil, IV, p. 372; Mīr'āt, VI, fol. 37b; Bidāya, IX, p. 36.
2. See p. 255.
3. Ansāb, XI, p. 334; Tab., II, pp. 1057-8 (citing Abū Mikhnaft); Tanbīh, p. 314; Murūj, V, pp. 302-3; Kāmil, IV, p. 373; Mīr'āt, VI, fol. 37b; Bidāya, IX, p. 36; 'Ibar, III, p. 107.
they had as Qurāʾ, religious men: they considered al-Ḥājjāj to be a ruthless and impious man, with religion low on his list of priorities. They were also strong sympathisers of the mawālī, who had received particularly harsh treatment from al-Ḥājjāj. In an effort to restore the finances of Iraq, depleted as a result of the conversion of a great number of the native population to Islam, al-Ḥājjāj had ordered new converts to pay the Jizya, and had, moreover, ordered them to return to their villages.¹ The Qurāʾ supported the mawālī as champions of equal rights for all Muslims, in accordance with the teachings of the Prophet. The Qurāʾ were very effective in rallying the population to join the revolt through their propaganda: they proclaimed the need to fight al-Ḥājjāj and his followers by calling them "Muḥillīn", innovators, who disregarded truth and practised oppression. They also depicted them as neglectful of the prayers, and accused them of persecuting the weak.

The slogan of the Qurāʾ is said to have been, "Ya li Tharāt al-Ṣalāt". They

¹ Ansāb, XI, pp. 336-7 (citing ʿUmar ibn Shabba); Mubarrad, II, pp. 96-7 (he puts this order of al-Ḥājjāj after and not before the revolt of Ibn al-Ashʿath); Ṭāb., II, pp. 1122-3; ʿIqd, III, p. 416 (citing al-Jāhiz); Kāmil, IV, p. 374; ʿIbar, III, p. 107; Von Kramer, Culturgeschichte des Orient (English translation), pp. 201-2; Van Vloten, op. cit., p. 26; Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, p. 280; Al-ʿAlī, Al-Tanzimāt al-ʾIttihādiyya wal Iqtisadiyya Fil Baṣra Fil Qarn al-Awwal al-Hijrī pp. 84-5, 282; Sharīf, Al-ʾSirāʾ Bānī ʿArab wal Mawāḥīḍ, pp. 25-6.
urged the people to fight the Syrians, whose impiety endangered both the religion and the material prosperity of the Iraqis (Dīnuḵum wa Dunyāḵum). They not only preached these doctrines, but were prepared to die for them on the battlefield.

Another, somewhat surprising, element among the supporters of Ibn al-
Ash'ath were the Murji'ā, who had received special favour from the Umayyads, since their doctrine favoured passive support of the ruler, whatever his evils. The Zutt, Asāwira and the Sayābi'ā also joined the revolt with their masters, Banū Tamīm, to be severely punished as a result by al-Hājjāj.

1. Sa'd, VII, ii, p.137; Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, I, pp.371-2; Ansāb, fols.16a, 16b, 17a, 609a (citing Mada'īnī); 612a; Taβ., II, pp.1086-8 (citing Abu Mikhnaf; Kūfī, II, fols.107b, 108a, 108b, 109a; Agh., V, p.153; Hilya, IV, p.379; 'Asākir, IV, fol.124b; Dhahabī, III, p.229; Bidāya, IX, p.40 (citing Wāqīdī).

2. Hur, p.204. It is also said that some Ibaḍī Kharijites of Basra fought al-

3. Futūh, pp.373-4; Al-'Alī, Al-Tanzimāt al-Ijtima'īyya wal Liṭiṣādiyya fil Basra fil Qarn al-Awwal al-Hijrī, p.204. Refering to the punishment inflicted by al-Hājjāj on the rebels who fell into his hands, Mme L. Vaglieri says that al-Hājjāj "spared all the Kurayshis, all the Syrians, and all those belonging to the clans of the 'two tribes' (named in Siffin". To support her argument she refers to a passage in Taβarī (II, 1097), which tells the story that, when al-Hājjāj asked a man from the tribe of Khath'ām to admit that he was an unbeliever since he had not supported al-Hājjāj against Ibn al-Ash'āth, the man refused to do so, and therefore was sentenced to death. He found sympathy among the Qurayshites, the Syrians, and the parties of both Ibn al-Ash'āth's and al-Hājjāj's followers, who mourned the death of such a pious man. Thus it can be seen that this passage in no way supports Mme L. Vaglieri's thesis, and that, therefore, she must have misunderstood the passage.
The strength of the Yemenite influences in the revolt is reflected by Ibn al-Ash'ath's use of the title of Qahtan, the one awaited by the Yemenites to restore them to power. He was also called by the poetess, Bint Sahm, al-Manṣūr 'Abd al-Rahmān; it is also said that he called himself Nasir al-Mu'minin.

Therefore, since the revolt was coloured by the particular grievances and ideas of every contributing group, it is a mistake to attempt to describe the nature of the revolt as though it were homogeneous. Perhaps the only general characteristic among all Ibn al-Ash'ath's followers was a hatred for al-Ḥaḍḍāj and his policy of subjecting Iraq's interests to those of Syria.

One could, indeed, make a general comment on all the revolts dealt with in this chapter (with the exception of the Zanj), that all were provoked by the

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3. Tanbih, p. 314; Bad', II, p. 184; VI, p. 35 (he is called here Nasir Amir al-Mu'minin); Van Vloten, op. cit., p. 61, n. 4.
harshness or tactlessness of al-Hajjāj, so that one might wonder why ʿAbd al-Malik did not save himself a fair amount of trouble by removing al-Hajjāj and appointing in his place a more reasonable man. This, however, would be to miss the point that only a man such as al-Hajjāj could have made the caliph’s rule in Iraq effective. The benefit of al-Hajjāj’s ruthlessness in crushing Iraqi opposition was felt in the years 85-95/704-713 in which Iraq was peaceful and free from troubles.
CHAPTER VI

THE KHĀRIJITE RISINGS

The worst period of Khārijite risings during the Umayyad caliphate occurred in the reign of ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān, who was threatened by them from several fronts. In Yamāma were the Najdāt al-Najdiyya, 1 whose field of activity embraced, in addition to Yamāma, Ḥaḍramut, parts of Yemen, Bahrain, Ta’if and ʿUman. Basra was directly and constantly threatened by the dangerous Azāriqa, 2 who controlled al-Ahwāz, Fārs, Iṣfahān and Kirmān. In Muṣīl and the Jazīrā region were the Ṣufriyya. 3 Finally, there was another Khārijite group in Basra, namely al-Ibāḍiyya, 4 who played a distinctive role in the history of the period, although they did not take arms against the caliph.


2. A Khārijite sect which took its name from its leader Nāfiʿ ibn al-Azraq. He held the doctrine that all his adversaries should be put to death with their wives and children. E. I., (Azāriqa); Watt, Islam and the Integration of Society, pp. 99-100; Idem, Islamic Political Thought, pp. 55-6, Islamic Surveys, 6, Edinburgh, 1968.

3. Followers of Ṣāliḥ ibn Mussarīh, who was succeeded by Shabīb ibn Yazīd ibn Ṣuʿā'im al-Shaibānī, E. I., (Shabīb ibn Yazīd ibn Ṣuʿā'im al-Shaibānī); Watt, Khārijite Thought in The Umayyad Period, p. 222, Dl, XXXBI, 1961.

4. An important branch of the Khārijites, which derived its name from that of its founder ʿAbdallāh ibn Ibdāl al-Murrī al-Tamīmī, E. I., (Al-Ibāḍiyya).
The Kharijites, because they held to the doctrines of equality and the elective caliphate, considered the Umayyads to be usurpers. The political confusion in the period 64-73/683-692, together with the harsh policies of al-Hajjaj in Iraq, were certainly among the reasons encouraging the Kharijites to defy the central government.

It is not the intention of this study to deal with the origin of the Kharijites, nor their doctrines or theological differences: its only concern is the political aspect of the Kharijite risings during 'Abd al-Malik's reign, and how these risings were suppressed.

In the year 65/684, the Kharijites of Yamama, who were from Bakr and, more especially, from Banu Hanifa, chose Abu Talut, Salim, as their leader. This choice was, however, conditional, for they stipulated that should they find a better person, both Abu Talut and the Kharijites would pay homage to the new man. Abu Talut with his followers then seized al-Hasharim, which had originally belonged to Banu Hanifa, but had been confiscated by Muawiyah, who had sent there four thousand slaves, probably to cultivate the land for him. When Abu Talut seized the region, he distributed the slaves among his followers. Meanwhile, one of the Kharijites, Najda ibn 'Amir al-Hanafi, intercepted a caravan coming from Basra to Ibn al-Zubair in Mecca, and brought the spoils to Abu Talut in al-Hasharim, where they were distributed. Najda also advised the Kharijites to continue

to use the slaves to cultivate the land for them. Those actions brought him such distinction that Abu Ḥulūl was deposed and Najda elected as leader in his place and from now on the movement was called after him. Najda was by this time (66/685) only thirty years old. He had already exercised considerable influence in Yamāma, and it is probable that it was only his youth which had before delayed his election as Kharijite caliph.

On assuming the leadership, Najda went to al-Bahrain where he raided the Banū Ka'b ibn Rabī', and in the battle of Dhu'l-Majāz, inflicted a severe defeat on them. In the year 67/686 Najda marched once again on al-Bahrain to subdue the tribes of 'Abd al-Qais who were at this time hostile to the Kharijites. With the help of al-Azd, Najda was able to kill a large number of 'Abd al-Qais and also captured a large number as prisoners in al-Qaṭīf, where he stayed for a while.

The growing strength of Najda in 'Arabia threatened directly the authority of Ibn al-Zubair. Consequently, Hamza ibn 'Abdallah ibn al-

Zubair, who was the governor of Basra for his father, tried to check Najda's influence there. He sent 'Abdallah ibn 'Umair al-Laithī with an army of fourteen thousand against him, but this army was surprised and put to flight (67/686). Following this victory, Najda sent 'Atiyya ibn al-Aswad al-Hanafi to 'Umān where 'Abbād ibn 'Abdallah ibn al-Julanda and his two sons, Sā'id and Sulaimān, were in control. 'Atiyya succeeded in capturing 'Umān and stayed there for a few months, and then left the country in the hands of Abu'l-Qāsim, his deputy. However, Abu'l-Qāsim was killed and Sā'id and Sulaimān, supported by the 'Umanis, once again seized the country. Meanwhile, 'Atiyya ibn al-Aswad fell out with Najda, perhaps because of personal jealousy, and went back to 'Umān. Unable to seize the country, he went to Kirman, where he achieved enough success to enable him to issue his own coins (al-Darahim al-'Atwiyya).


2. See Chapter V, p. 263 ff.


4. According to Baladhuri the reasons for the disagreement between the two were Najda's inequality in distributing the 'Aṭa' and his correspondence with 'Abd al-Malik. Ansāb, XI, p.142.

this success was not long lasting, for he was followed by al-Muhallab’s cavalry. He fled to Sistān and then to Sind, where he was killed in Qindābil. 1

By this time (68/687), Najda had subdued the northern parts of al-Baḥraīn and levied the Ṣadaqa from the Banū Tamīm in Kadima. He also entered Ṣan‘ā‘ where he received the homage of the people and collected the Ṣadaqa from them. To Ḥadramut, Najda sent Abū Fudaik to levy the Ṣadaqa on its people. 2

As a result of these successful campaigns, the influence of Najda in Arabia became even greater than that of Ibn al-Zubair. 3 At this time, Ḥabd al-Malik, with many problems to face at home, was unable to send an army against Najda. Instead he wrote to him, confirming him as a governor of Yamāma and freeing him from all responsibility for the blood he had shed and the money he had seized, on the condition that he would pay him homage. 4 Najda, however, bluntly refused. Ḥabd al-Malik had two objects in mind

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1. Ansāb, XI, p.135; Bagh., p.67; Kāmil, IV, p.167; Nuwairī, XIX, fol.48; Ibar, III, p.314. However, Professor Montgomery Watt, following the account of Ash’arī, makes this agreement as between Ḥāṭiyya ibn al-Aswad and Abū Fudaik. Maqālaṭ, I, p.92; Khārijite Thought in the Umayyad Period, p.219, DI, XXXVI, 1961.


in this correspondence with Najda. Firstly, he hoped to win Najda over to his side or else to keep him quiet for a while; should this fail, he might succeed in causing disagreement between Najda and his followers. As we shall see, ‘Abd al-Malik achieved this last object, causing Najda to be deposed and eventually killed.¹

However, in the pilgrimage of this year (68/687), Najda and about 680 of his followers went to Mecca where they performed their religious pilgrimage independent of both Ibn al-Zubair and ‘Abd al-Malik.² This shows the weakness of Ibn al-Zubair, since he did not dare refuse them permission; it also shows that Najda was equal in power to both the caliph and his rival Ibn al-Zubair. Finishing his pilgrimage, Najda intended to proceed to Medina, but he abandoned this plan because of religious scruples, and went to Ta’if instead.³ On approaching Ta’if, ‘Amir ibn ‘Urwa ibn Mas‘ūd al-Thaqafi met Najda and paid him homage on behalf of himself and the people of Ta’if, thus making it unnecessary for Najda to enter the city. He then went to Tabāla, from where he proceeded to al-Bahrain. Before leaving al-Bahrain, however, he appointed officials.

¹. See p. 304

². Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tarīkh, I, p. 333; Ansāb, XI, p. 137; Jāb., II, pp. 782-3 (citing Wāqidī); Kāmil, IV, pp. 166, 244-5; Nuwairī, XIX, fols. 48, 67; Bidāya, VII, pp. 294-5; ‘Ibar, III, p. 314.

³. It is said that all the Medinese, on hearing that Najda was coming towards them, prepared themselves to fight him; even the most pious and politically inactive, ‘Abdallah ibn ‘Umar ibn al-Khattāb. Ansāb, XI, p. 137; Kāmil, IV, p. 188; Nuwairī, XIX, fol. 48.
Al-Haruq al-Hanafi was made governor of Ta'if, Tabala and al-Surat; and Sa'd al-Talayi' was sent to collect the Sadaqa from Banu Hilal in Najran.

From al-Bahrain, Najda sent orders stopping the Mira (food provisions) for Mecca and Medina. This was another way of defying the authority of Ibn al-Zubair in his own capital. It was only by repeated requests from pious men such as 'Abdallah ibn 'Abbas, appealing to Najda's religious feelings, that the Mira was restored.\(^1\)

Underlying Najda's apparent success were currents already working to undermine him: no sooner had he reached the peak of his power, than he was rapidly to decline. For discontent soon arose among his followers, which first led to his deposition and eventually to his murder in 72/691.

This discontent arose from the perennial problem of Kharijism; the conflict between the believers in a strict adherence to the literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet, and those who believed in the "evolutionary adaptation based on reason and the spirit of Islam".\(^2\) Najda was overthrown by the first group. The sources give as the reasons for their discontent, Najda's correspondence with 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan and his giving to him a grand daughter of 'Uthman ibn 'Affan, seized in one of the raids;\(^3\) Najda's refusal to kill those who followed him only because of

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1. Ansab, IV, pp.139-40; Kamil, IV, pp.168-9; Nuwarith, XIX, fol.49; Ibar, III, p.315.


Taqiyya (prudent fear); his unjust distribution of the Fai' among the troops; 1 his unwillingness to punish one of his distinguished followers because he had drunk wine; 2 and finally, his payment to both Malik ibn Misma 4 and Ubaidallah ibn Ziyad ibn Zabian of ten thousand dirhams each when they fled from Mus'ab ibn al-Zubair to take refuge with him in Yamama. 3

After the deposition of Najda, his followers chose one of the mawali called Thabit al-Tammâr, as his successor. They were soon to realize that they would rather follow an 'Arab than a mawla, proving that their tribal feelings were stronger than their Khârijite doctrine. However, they charged Thabit to choose a new caliph for them, and he chose Abu Fudaik, 'Abdallah ibn Thawr from the Banu Qais ibn Thalaba. 4

Meanwhile, Najda, fearing Abu Fudaik, hid himself in one of the villages of Hajar. When this hiding place was discovered, he took refuge with his cousins, Banu Tamîm. Najda thought by this time to flee and join

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4. Mughtâlîn, p. 179; Ansâb, XI, p. 143; Ya'qûbî, II, pp. 325-6; Maqâlî, I, p. 92; Kâmîl, IV, p. 169; Nuwaïrî, XIX, fol. 49; 'Ibar, III, p. 315. However, according to Baghdâdî and Ibn Abîl-Hâdîd, it was Najda, after his deposition, who chose Abu Fudaik and not Thabit al-Tammâr. Bagh, p. 69; Sharîf, IV, p. 134.
'Abd al-Malik in Damascus, but he was surprised and killed (72/691).

His death did not go unrevenged. One of his followers, called Muslim ibn Jabir al-Ḥanafi, plunged a knife into Abū Fudaid. However, the latter was only wounded, while the assailant was assassinated. Because of this Abū Fudaid left Yamāma, where Banū Ḥanīfa were dominant, and went to al-Bahrain, where he made his head-quarters.

Despite his preoccupations, Musʿab ibn al-Zubair, the governor of Basra for his brother, tried to put an end to the activities of the Kharijites of Yamāma. It seems that he was encouraged by the last dissension among them which had resulted in the murder of Najda and the leadership of Abū Fudaid. He therefore sent a Basran army under Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥman ibn al-Iskaf (72/691) against them; this campaign, however, was a complete failure.

According to Baladhuri, another army under Ziyad ibn al-Qurashi,

1. This reflects the early correspondence between the two. See p. 300.
2. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 338 (the year given here is 70); Ansāb, XI, pp. 144-5; Tab., II, p. 829; Maqālat, I, p. 92; Bagh., p. 69; Milal, p. 215; Kāmil, IV, pp. 169-70; Shariʿa IV, p. 134; Nuwairī, XIX, fols. 49-50; Ḥabar, III, p. 315.
3. Ansāb, XI, p. 147; Idem, fol. 40a (citing Madaʿīnī); Kāmil, IV, p. 170; Nuwairī, XIX, fol. 50.
4. He was by this time threatened by both the Azāriqa and 'Abd al-Malik.
5. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 339 (the year 71 is given here); Ansāb, fol. 40a (citing Madaʿīnī).
6. Ansāb, fol. 40a.
with troops from Basra and Bahrain, marched against Abu Fudaik. But Ziyad was killed with a large number of his army. Thus ended in failure all the attempts of the Zubairids to crush the Kharijites of Yamama. Mus'ab had no more time to deal with Abu Fudaik and his followers, for he was killed in that year, 72/691, in a battle with 'Abd al-Malik.¹

The new governor of Basra, Khalid ibn 'Abdallah ibn Asid, dispatched an army under his brother Umayya against Abu Fudaik, 73/692, but Umayya and his twelve thousand men were ambushed and put to flight.² It was such a humiliating defeat that Umayya had to hide himself from the people, while his brother Khalid wrote to the caliph in an attempt to justify the defeat by blaming the Basrans for not holding firm in the battle-field. Khalid also informed the caliph of the seriousness of the situation, for Basra was threatened by both Abu Fudaik and the Azariqa. It is worth noting here that at this time another brother of Khalid, 'Abd al-'Aziz, was defeated by the Azariqa. Despite their theological differences, both the Azariqa and the Najdat seem to have been co-ordinating, to force the government's troops to fight on two fronts.³

¹. See Chapter IV, p. 239.
². Farazdaq, Diwan, p. 221; Uyun, p. 208; Ansab, fols. 39a-39b (citing Wahab ibn Jarir); 40a-40b (citing Mada'imin); Yahub, II, p. 325; Tab., II, pp. 829, 861; Iqd, I, p. 168; Mujjam, IV, p. 493; Kamil, IV, p. 281; Mir`at, VI, fol. 3a; Dhahabi, III, p. 111; Bidaya, VIII, p. 348 (quoting Tabari); Ibar, III, p. 322; Khizana, IV, p. 40 (quoting Nuwairi).
³. Wellhausen, Die Religios Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p. 38; Qalamawi, Adab al-Khawarij fil `Asr al-Umawi, p. 36; Cairo, 1945.
Owing to this alarming situation, the caliph decided to send another campaign against Abū Fudaik, to which command he chose 'Umar ibn 'Abdallah ibn Ma' mar. The latter only accepted this appointment on the assurance from the caliph that neither his brother Bishr ibn Marwān, the governor of Kūfa, nor Khālid ibn 'Abdallah, the governor of Baṣra, would interfere in the campaign. For he was sure that such interference would take place since his appointment came directly from the caliph. Moreover, in Khālid's case, he would be delighted to see this campaign end with failure to save his brother's reputation. ¹

'Umar left Damascus with Syrian troops for Kūfa, where he recruited about eight thousand men. He placed them under Muḥammad ibn Mūsā ibn Ṭalḥa and ordered them to proceed to Baṣra. 'Umar spent few days in Kūfa and then joined his army. In Baṣra he recruited another ten thousand men under his cousin Mūsā ibn 'Ubaidallah ibn Ma' mar. With this numerous army, 'Umar marched on Abū Fudaik in al-Bahrain. ²

As with almost all other Khārijite leaders, Abū Fudaik was joined by a number of Bedouins (A'rāb), who did not profess Khārijism. ³ It is this

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1. Ansāb, fols. 40b-41a (citing Mada'īnī).
2. Ḥadhīf, p. 78; Ansāb, fol. 39b (citing al-Haytham and Wahab ibn Jarīr), 41a-41b (citing Mada'īnī); Ẓab., II, p. 852; Kāmil, IV, p. 294; Mirʾāt, VI, fol. 3b; Dhahabī, III, pp. 115-16; Ibar, III, p. 322; Khizāna, IV, p. 40 (quoting Nuwairī).
3. Ansāb, fol. 41b.
participation of the Bedouins, together with religious fanaticism, which
gave the Khârijite movement its distinguishing characteristics of deep
tribal and religious fervour.

‘Umar ibn ‘Ubaidallah ibn Ma'mar with his army, said to have
numbered twenty one thousand men, met Abu Fudaik and his followers in al-
Mushshaqqar in al-Bahrain. In the battle, which lasted for five days, the
advantage was first with Abu Fudaik’s army. However, thanks to the courage
and skill of ‘Umar, the situation was reversed, and Abu Fudaik was killed,
his head being sent to the caliph. 1 His followers were pursued and the mawāli
among them were killed, while the ‘Arabs were set free. Thus the Najdāt
were crushed in Arabia, never to rise again.

When ‘Abd al-Malik recovered control of Iraq after the death of Mu‘āb
ibn al-Zubair in the battle of Maskin, 72/691, he found it necessary to take
immediate measures against the Azāriqa. By this time the Azāriqa held
Khuzistān, Fārs and Kirmān, forming a direct menace to Basra and the
surrounding territories. Although al-Muhallab, whom Mu‘āb had sent against
them, achieved no decisive victory over them, he did succeed in driving
them away from Basra. Under ‘Abd al-Malik, al-Muhallab was confirmed in

1. Ḥaḍḥīf, p.78; Ansāb, fols.39a (citing al-Haytham and Wahab ibn Jarīr),
41b-43a (citing Mada‘īnī); Ya‘qūbī, II, p.326; Ṭab., II, pp.852-3;
Bagh., p.70; Milal, p.216; Kāmil, IV, pp.294-5; Mir‘āt, VI, fol.3b;
DhahabT, III, pp.115-16; ‘Ibar, III, p.322; Khizāna, IV, pp.40-1
(quoting Nuwairī).
his post, to fight the Azāriqa. But, nevertheless, the situation did not improve. For ‘Abd al-Malik’s new governor of Baṣra, Khalīd ibn ‘Abdallāh ibn Asīd, out of personal jealousy, decided to fight the Azāriqa himself, disregarding the caliph’s orders. He also paid no heed to the advice of his intimates nor of the people of Baṣra discouraging him. With his army, Khalīd, accompanied by al-Muhallab, met the Azāriqa in al-Ahwāz.

Meanwhile, following the caliph’s order, Bishr ibn Marwān, the governor of Kūfah, re-inforced the army fighting the Azāriqa by Kufan troops under ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ash’ath. Thanks to the caution and advice of al-Muhallab, Khalīd managed to drive the Azāriqa, after forty days of fighting, back to Kirman.  

After this scant success, Khalīd returned to Baṣra leaving his brother ‘Abd al-‘Aẓīz in charge of the war with the Azāriqa, while al-Muhallab was appointed governor of al-Ahwāz. 2 After five months in Kirman, Qāṭrī and his followers came back to Fārs. As a result, ‘Abd al-‘Aẓīz with thirty thousand Basrans met them in a battle in Darābjud. Owing to his lack of experience and military foresight, ‘Abd al-‘Aẓīz was overwhelmingly defeated.

1. Ansāb, fols. 31a-32b (citing Mada’īnī); Mubarrad, III, pp. 347-53; Tiab., II, pp. 824-7 (citing Abū Mikhnafr); Kūfī, II, fols. 60b-61b; Ghurar, fols. 10-11; Kamīl, IV, pp. 280-1; Mir’āt, VI, fol. 3a; Sharḥ, IV, pp. 171-3; ‘Ibar, III, p. 321.

2. According to Abū Mikhnafr, after his success, Khalīd dispatched Dawūd ibn Qādhībām with some cavalry men to follow the Azāriqa. Being informed of this, the caliph ordered Bishr ibn Marwān to send a Kufan army to re-inforce Dawūd’s cavalry. Bishr therefore sent ‘Attāb ibn Warqa’ al-Riyāhī with four thousand Kufans. Both Dawūd and ‘Attāb followed the retreating Azāriqa but without success. Tiab., II, pp. 827-28; Kamīl, IV, p. 281; Mir’āt, VI, fol. 3a.
and his army scattered. This failure to cope with the Kharijite threat cost Khalid his governorship: he was soon removed from his post and Basra was added to the government of Bishr ibn Marwan in Kūfa.

We have two narratives dealing with these events. One is al-Mada'inī's in Baladhuri repeated by al-Mubarrad, and with which both Ibn A' tham and Ibn Abī'l-Ḥadīd are in complete agreement. The second narrative is that of Abū Mikhnaf in Ṭabarî, a detailed narrative, repeated by Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Khaldūn. The narrative of the author of Ghurar al-Siyar is very similar to that of Ibn A' tham. However, the former is less detailed. There is one main difference between the two narratives of Mada'inī and Abū Mikhnaf. Contrary to al-Mada'inī, Abū Mikhnaf dates the campaign of Khalid after that of 'Abd al-Azīz. However, judging from the fact that al-Mada'inī is a more reliable authority on the affairs of Basra and the eastern provinces than Abū Mikhnaf, whose main interest was Kūfa and its affairs, one is inclined to prefer the narrative of al-Mada'inī on this point. Moreover, Mada'inī's account has a confirmation in the narrative of Wahab ibn Jarīr, who agrees with him on this.

1. Ibn Qais al-Ruqayyāf, Diwan, p. 190; Ansāb, fols. 32b-33b (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Mubarrad, III, pp. 353-5; Ṭabarī, II, pp. 822-6 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols. 62a-63b; Ghurar, fol. II; Muṣjam, II, p. 66; Kāmil, IV, pp. 279-80; Mir'āt, VI, fol. 21; Sharḥ, IV, pp. 173-6; 'Ibar, III, p. 320.


The caliph, despite the removal of Khalid, re-appointed al-Muhallab as responsible for fighting the Azāriqa, and gave him a free hand in recruiting troops from Başra. Also on the caliph's orders, Bishr ibn Marwan, the governor of Iraq, sent a Kūfan army under ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Mikhnaf to join al-Muhallab. However, being appointed directly by the caliph, al-Muhallab was independent of Bishr. Realising this, Bishr sought to depose him and turned to Ibn Mikhnaf, ordering him to disobey al-Muhallab. But, being an Azdite like al-Muhallab himself, and wiser than the young inexperienced Bishr, Ibn Mikhnaf considered the interest of his own people and country rather than the personal interest of the governor. He, therefore, did not listen to Bishr’s orders, although he pretended to accept them. Al-Muhallab, with the troops of Başra and Kūfa, was able to push the Azāriqa back, and captured Rām-Hurmūz where he stayed for ten days.

Meanwhile, Bishr ibn Marwan died in Basra. The news of his death gave the turbulent troops of Başra and Kūfa an excuse for leaving their camp: they made their way to their homes, loitering in the cities. Being left

1. Ansāb, fol.34a; Mubarrad, III, pp.362-3; Tab., II, p.855 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols.65a-67a; Ghurar, fol.12; Kāmil, IV, p.297; Mirʾāt, VI, fol.8b; Sharḥ, IV, p.176; Dhahābī, III, pp.116-7 (quoting Tabarī); Bidāya, IX, p.3; ‘Ibar, III, p.322.

2. Imāma, II, p.76-7; Ansāb, fols.34a;34b; Mubarrad, III, pp.362-3; Tab., II, p.826 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p.297; Mirʾāt, VI, fol.6b; Sharḥ, IV, p.180; Bidāya, IX, p.3; ‘Ibar, III, pp.90-1, 323.

3. Ansāb, fol.34b; Mubarrad, III, pp.364-6; Tab., II, pp.857-9 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol.67b; Ghurar, fols.12-13; Kāmil, IV, pp.297-8; Mirʾāt, VI, fol.8b; Sharḥ, IV, pp.180-1; Bidāya, IX, p.3; ‘Ibar, III, pp.91,323-4.
with only small number of his Azdite people, al-Muhallab was forced to the defensive. Thanks to the disagreement which arose among the Azāriqa, al-Muhallab was left unattacked. The situation, however, remained crucial, and needed an energetic and prudent man to restore order among the indisciplined troops of Iraq, and to back al-Muhallab effectively in his campaign against the Azāriqa. As we have seen earlier, 'Abd al-Malik found such a man in al-Ḥajja j, to whom he assigned the governorship of Iraq (75/694).

The presence of al-Ḥajja j, as governor in Iraq, was indeed a turning point in the struggle against the Khārijites in general and the Azāriqa in particular. He not only forced the insubordinate people of Iraq to go back to their camp in Rām-Hurmuz, but also continued to back al-Muhallab until the Azāriqa were completely crushed. In order to strengthen al-Muhallab to face the enemy effectively, al-Ḥajja j assigned to him the Kharaj of all the lands which he would conquer between Fārs and Basra, until the war was over.

With this energetic backing, al-Muhallab was now able to take the offensive, pushing back the Azāriqa to Sābūr. Then he made his camp in Arjān and seized Sardan, a mountainous region which otherwise the Azāriqa

2. See Chapter III, p. 216.
might have used to fortify themselves. From Arjan al-Muhallab moved to Kazrun where he secured his camp from night attacks by digging a ditch round it. By this time the Kufan army under Ibn Mikhnaf had also arrived, but had a separate camp to al-Muhallab's. Ibn Mikhnaf, who had no experience of the method of warfare of the Azariqa, ignored the advice of al-Muhallab and refused to dig a trench around his camp. The Azariqa made a surprise night attack on al-Muhallab's camp, which completely failed because of the ditch. They then turned to Ibn Mikhnaf's camp which, unprotected as it was by a ditch, allowed them to inflict a severe defeat on the Kufans in which many lives were lost, including that of their leader Ibn Mikhnaf (75/695).  

In the next year, 76/696, al-Hajjaj sent 'Attab ibn Warqa' al-Riyahi, the governor of Isbahan, to replace Ibn Mikhnaf as the leader of the Kufan army. However, 'Attab did not stay long as commander, being recalled to Iraq after only eight months (77/697). He was transferred because he was needed in the war against another Kharijite group, Shabib and his followers;
also the relationship between him and al-Muhallab had begun to deteriorate, threatening a tribal conflict between the Tamīm supporting ‘Attāb, and the Azd and Bakr supporting al-Muhallab. It was in the light of this rift that al-Muhallab became keen on strengthening the Hilf between al-Azd and Bakr, of which he had not at first been in favour. After ‘Attāb’s departure, al-Muhallab appointed his own son Ḥabīb to be head of the Kūfan army. They together continued to fight the Azāriqa in Sabūr, and expelled them from Fārs completely. The Azāriqa then went to Kirmān, where they fortified themselves in Jīrūfī.  

Impatient as always, al-Ḥajjāj continued to send reproachful messages and deputations to al-Muhallab. He accused him of deliberately prolonging the war in order to appropriate for himself the Kharāj of the lands under his control. Al-Ḥajjāj urged him to waste no time in exterminating the enemy.  

Because of his distrust of al-Muhallab, al-Ḥajjāj took away from him the control  

1. Ansāb, fol.35b; Mubarrad, III, pp.379-81; Tab., II, pp.872-8 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p.316; Mir’āt, VI, fol.17a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī) Sharḥ, IV, pp.194-6; Bidāya, IX, p.10; ‘Ibar, III, pp.99,324.  

2. Ansāb, fol.36a; Mubarrad, III, p.382; Tab., II, p.1003 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, pp.317,353; Mir’āt, VI, fol.26a; Sharḥ, IV, p.196; ‘Ibar, III, p.99.  

3. ‘Uyun, p.49; Ansāb, fols.34b-35a; 35b (citing Madā‘īnī); Mubarrad, III, pp.368,370,373-4, 377-8,379,385-6; Tab., II, p.1003 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols.72a,72b,73a-75b,77a-80a; Ghurar, fols.19-21, 22-24; ‘Iqd, I, p.145; Agh., XIII, p.60; Kāmil, IV, pp.363-9; Mir’āt, VI, fols.26a-26b; Sharḥ, IV, pp.187,189-92,193-4, 195, 199-200, 219-20 (quoting Iṣbahānī); Nuwairī, VII, p.246-8.
of Fars, as soon as the district was recovered once and for all from the
Azāriqa. It was only on the caliph's orders, that he left the revenue of
special "Kuwar" for al-Muhallab to maintain his army. On the other hand,
al-Muhallab showed tolerance towards the impatient governor, and tried
to explain to him that his strategy was not to risk a battle which would
expose his army to danger, preferring to wait until an opportunity arose
to deal the fatal blow to the enemy. Nevertheless, he did not leave them
completely unmolested, but carried on continuous skirmishes and minor
battles.

Meanwhile, disputes "over matters of state and interpretation of law"
arose among the Azāriqa. These disputes were fomented by al-Muhallab,
who found in them a good opportunity to weaken his enemy. Eventually, these
disputes resulted in the desertion of eight thousand mawālī, under one
of them, 'Abd Rabbih al-Saghīr, from Qatri ibn al-Fujā'ā, with whom were

1. Ansāb, fol. 36b; Mubarrad, III, p. 389; Tab., II, pp. 1003-4 (citing Abū
Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p. 354; Mir'at, VI, fol. 26a; Sharh, IV, p. 201;
'Ībar, III, p. 342.

2. Ansāb, fols. 36a, 36b (citing Ibn al-Kalbī), 37a; Yaʿqūbī, II, p. 329;
Mubarrad, III, pp. 382-3; Tab., II, pp. 1006-7; Kūfī, II, fols. 83b-88a;
Ghurār, fols. 27-30; Maqālat, I, pp. 87-9; Badr, VI, p. 32; Bashār, pp. 65-6;
Kāmil, IV, pp. 354-5; Mir'at, VI, fol. 26b; Sharh, IV, pp. 197-9, 202-3,
204-5; 'Ībar, III, p. 343; I. 'Abbās, Shi' r al-Khawārij, p. 35, Beirut,
1963. However, this large number of mawālī in the ranks of the
Azāriqa might have been due to the fact that their movement flourished
in the Persian provinces of al-Ahwāz, Fars, Isbahan and Kirmān. For,
with its doctrine of equality, the Kharijite movement was the most
attractive movement to them. Thomson, Kharijism and Kharijites, p. 376,
MPV, Princeton, 1933.
the majority of the 'Arabs. Also 'Amru'1-Qanā with a small number of 'Arabs joined 'Abd Rabbih al-Šaghīr. Consequently, al-Hajjāj, since the war was costly both in men and equipment and in loss of revenue from Khāraj-controlled provinces, urged al-Muhallab to seize this opportunity and attack them. However, al-Muhallab did otherwise, for he thought that this attack on them might serve to reunite them. Nevertheless, 'Abd Rabbih al-Šaghīr and his mawālī followers drove Qātrī and his 'Arab supporters out of the city of Jīrufūt and they made their camp outside the city. But they soon realised that it was wiser not to put themselves between two stools, i.e. 'Abd Rabbih and al-Muhallab, and they therefore left Jīrufūt and made for Tabaristān.  

The departure of Qātrī to Tabaristān made it easier for al-Muhallab to deal with the remainder of the Azāriqa under 'Abd Rabbih al-Šaghīr. The latter was soon killed in a battle and his followers dispersed, while some of them were granted Aman by al-Muhallab. The latter returned to Basra where he and his sons and his prominent soldiers were received very warmly


2. Ansāb fols.137b-138a; Ya'qūbī, II, p.329; Mubarrad, III, p.394; Tab., II, p.1007 (citing Abū Mikhnafat); Kūfī, II, fol.85b; Ghurar, fol.28; Bagh., p.66; Mu'jam, II, p.62; Kāmil, IV, p.355; Mīr ʿārī, VI, fol.26b; Sharḥ, IV, p.206; Wafayāt, I, p.301; Bidāya, IX, p.30 (citing Abū Ma'shar and Wāqīḍī); 'Ibar, III, p.343.
by both al-Ḥajjāj and the people (78/692). Thus the war between al-
Muhallab and the Azāriqa, which lasted for three years of al-Ḥajjāj’s
governorship, ended in success.

While al-Muhallab was still fighting ‘Abd Rabbih al-Ṣaghibī and
his followers, he wrote to al-Ḥajjāj about the situation and asked him to send
an army against Qāṭrī ibn al-Fuḥā’a and ‘Ubaida ibn Hīlāl in Ṭabaristān.
Al-Ḥajjāj accordingly sent Sufyān ibn al-Abrad al-Kalbī with a Syrian
army against them. To Sufyān’s aid came a Kufan army under ‘Abd al-Rahmān
ibn al-Ash’ath from Ṭabaristān, as well as Ja’far ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn
Mikhnaf with an army from Rayy. By these combined efforts, Qāṭrī was
killed and his head sent to al-Ḥajjāj. ²

Nevertheless, the Azāriqa were not completely exterminated. For ‘Ubaida
ibn Hīlāl and his followers fortified themselves in a castle in Qūmis. But
Sufyān ibn al-Abrad, who was now in charge of the war against the Azāriqa,
tackled him as soon as he finished with Qāṭrī. He beseiged them for three
months. During this they suffered badly from lack of provisions. Sufyān also
issued ṣaman for those who would lay down their arms and come over to his side.

1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tārīkh, I, p. 356; Ansāb, fols. 37a, 37b (citing al-
Haytham); Dinawari, pp. 266-9; Ya’qūbī, II, p. 329; Mubarrad, III, pp. 394,
396-409; Tab., II, pp. 1007 (citing Abū Mikhnaf), 1033 (citing Abū Mikhnaf);
Kūfī, II, fols. 84a-88b; 89a, 90a-90b; Ghurar, fols. 28-30, 31-3; ‘Iṣq, II, pp. 81-2 (citing Mada’in); Murūj, V, pp. 350-1; Bad’
VI, p. 32; Bagh., p. 66; Kamīl, IV, pp. 355-7; Mir’at, VI, fol. 26b; Sharḥ, IV, pp. 206-16, 220-3; ‘Ibar, III, pp. 343-4.

2. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tārīkh, I, p. 356; Bayān, III, p. 134; Mat‘ārif, p. 181;
Ansāb, fols. 38a-38b; Dinawari, p. 269; Ya’qūbī, II, pp. 329-30; Λ.
While some accepted this offer, others, including 'Ubaida himself, decided to fight and were very easily defeated (78/692). Thus this dangerous Kharijite sect was exterminated. Sufyan, however, remained in Tabaristan until he was recalled to Iraq prior to the battle of Dair al-Jamajim between 'Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ash'ath and al-Hajjaj.

During the time of the war against the Azariqa, another serious Kharijite rebellion occurred in the Jazira region, forming a potential threat to Kufa and its surroundings. This rebellion was led by the Sufrite Salih ibn Musarrij al-Tamimi. However, the movement took its name from that of Shabib ibn Yazid al-Shaibani, one of the most distinguished followers of Salih and was able to defy the government's forces for over a year.

We have two accounts of this event. The first and most detailed one is that of Abu Mikhnaf in Baladhuri and Tabari. The second is that of 'Awana ibn al-Hakam, reported by Baladhuri, Ibn A'tham and the author of Ghurar al-Siyar. While it is interesting to have both the Iraqi and the Syrian accounts,

1. Ansab, fols.38b-39a; Tab., II, pp.1020-1 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfi, II, fols.91a-92a; Ghurar, fols.47-8; Bagh., p.66; Mu'jam, III, p.62; Kamil, pp.358-9; Mir'at, VI, fol.26b; Wafayat, I, p.601; Bidaya, IX, p.30 (citing Abū Ma'shar and Wāqidi); 'Ibar, III, p.344; Shadharat, I, pp.86-7 (quoting Ibn Qutaiba).

2. See Chapter V, p.278
unfortunately 'Awana's account is not only brief, but also inconsistent and lacks chronology. Moreover, it presents a somewhat incomplete picture, since it omits the beginning of the movement by Śāliḥ ibn Musarriḥ. However, the details provided by Abū Mikhnaṭ’s account fit in with and supplement the other historians, such as Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt and ibn Qutaiba. Furthermore, Abū Mikhnaṭ reports his account on the authority of eye-witnesses on both sides; men like al-Muḥallami, Farwa ibn Laqīt, 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Jundub and the Syrian Abū Zaid al-Sakṣakī. For all these reasons, we should place more reliance on the narrative of Abū Mikhnaṭ.

The movement began when Śāliḥ ibn Musarriḥ, the Kharijite leader in Dārā, and about 120 followers rebelled against Muḥammad ibn Marwān, the governor of Muṣīl and Jazīra in Ṣafar, 67/May, 695. They seized some of the Dawāb(animals) belonging to the governor, in Dārā. This was an essential first step, since none of them was mounted. For thirteen days they remained in the area arousing the fear of the people of Dārā, Naṣībin and Sinjār. At first the governor underestimated the importance of this Kharijite band and tried to send 'Adī ibn 'Adī ibn 'Umaira with only five

1. However, Śāliḥ ibn Musarriḥ was not the first Kharijite to revolt in the Jazīra region. His revolt was preceeded by that of Fadāla ibn Sayyār al-Taimī al-Shaibānī, who with his eighteen followers was massacred by the 'Anza tribesmen. The caliph rewarded the latter by letting them settle in the Bāniyāl and assigning 'Aṭā to them. Tab., II, p.893 (citing Abū Mikhnaṭ); Kāmil, IV, p.321; 'Ibar, III, p.326.
hundred men against them. It was only when 'Adî called the attention of
the governor to the fact that they contained the bravest cavalry of the
Rabi'ites, that he agreed to increase this expedition to one thousand
men. However, 'Adî, who was a pious man and therefore hesitant to fight
them, was surprised and put to flight by Sâlih and his followers in a place
called Suq Dhûghân. 1

Following this defeat, Muhammad ibn Marwân reconsidered the situ-
tion and sent two armies against the Sufriyya, each of which contained 1500
men under Khâlid ibn Jaz' al-Sulami and al-Hârith ibn Ja'una al-Murri.'
When hostilities were resumed, the Kharijites found themselves unable to
cope with this overwhelming force, and retreated by night to al-Daskara.
This brought them into conflict with al-Hâjjâj, for al-Daskara was considered
as a Kufan territory. Consequently, al-Hâjjâj dispatched three thousand men
under al-Hârith ibn 'Umaîra al-Hamdâni against them. Al-Hârith and his army
followed them until they met in a battle in al-Mudabbaj, in the Muṣîl region,
where the Kharijites were beaten and their leader Sâlih was killed on 13th
Jumâda 1, 76/3rd September, 695. 2 The seventy men of Sâlih's followers who
survived the battle of al-Mudabbaj, retreated into a stronghold there. But Shabîb

1. Khalîfa ibn Khayyât, Târîkh, I, p.351; Ansâb, fol.44a (citing Abû Mikhnaft);
Tab., II, pp.886-9 (citing Abû Mikhnaft); Kâmîl, IV, pp.318-9; Mir'ât, VI,
fol.21a-21b; Sharh, IV, pp.225-9; Dhahabîr, III, p.121; Bidâya, IX, pp.10-12 (quoting Tabarti); 'Ibar, III, pp.324-5.

2. Khalîfa ibn Khayyât, Târîkh, I, p.351 (here Jumâda II is mentioned); Ansâb,
fol.44a-44b (citing Abû Mikhnaft); Tab., II, pp.889-92 (citing Abû Mikhnaft);
Bagh., p.89; Milal, p.224; Mu'jam, IV, p.448; Kâmîl, IV, pp.319-20;
ibn Yazid al-Shaibani, who now assumed the leadership, succeeded in saving them; for in a night attack he inflicted a defeat on his enemy, and the Sufriyya escaped far from Kufa. This was the beginning of a series of military victories over the troops of al-Hajjaj, which met but rarely with reverses until Shabib's death.

In Mausil, Shabib was joined by Salama ibn Sayyar, and together they raided the tribes of 'Anza and Bani Shaiban, Shabib's own tribe. Meanwhile, al-Hajjaj ordered Sufyān ibn Abi'l-'Aliya al-Khatami, originally sent to Tabaristan, to return to fight Shabib. Al-Hajjaj also ordered Sawra ibn Abjar to take over the army of al-Harith ibn 'Umaira, and join Sufyān in his campaign against Shabib. However, Sufyān and his army met Shabib in Khanaqin before Sawra was able to arrive, where Sufyān was defeated. Then, following the orders of al-Hajjaj, Sawra ibn Abjar with his army joined Shabib.

1. It is said that Sa'lih ibn Musarrih, before his death, ordered his followers to pay homage to Shabib. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tārikh, I, p.351; Ma'arif, p.180; Bagh., p.89; Milal, p.224; Dajabī, III, p.112. However, another account says that Shabib himself, after Sa'lih's death, asked the latter's followers to pay him homage and they agreed to do so. Ansāb, fol.45b (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Tab., II, p.891 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kamāl, IV, p.320; Sharh, IV, p.231; Ibar, III, pp.325-6.
pursued Shabīb. They met in battle in al-Nahrawān, where Sawra was defeated and followed until he reached al-Mada’in. Thanks to local resistance, Shabīb was turned away from al-Mada’in, and the troops of Sawra went back to Kūfa.¹

After these successive defeats, al-Ḥajjāj raised an army of four thousand men under ʿUthmān ibn Saʿīd al-Kindi, nicknamed al-Jazl. Contrary to his predecessors, the latter showed great caution towards Shabīb, being always on the alert and digging trenches to avoid night attacks. For two months no decisive battle issued between the two. The impatient al-Ḥajjāj could wait no longer, and he replaced al-Jazl by Saʿīd ibn al-Mujālid al-Hamdānī. Al-Ḥajjāj ordered the latter to reverse his predecessor’s strategy and to fight Shabīb as soon as he saw him. Following these orders, Saʿīd led his army in pursuit of Shabīb and his followers, until they met in Barāz al-Rūz. A fierce struggle took place which ended in a disaster for al-Ḥajjāj’s army; Saʿīd was killed and his army fled. However, al-Jazl tried to rally them, but he was severely wounded and soon died in al-Mada’in.²

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1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, I, p. 351; Ansāb, fols. 45b-46a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Tāb., II, pp. 893-901 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kamīl, IV, pp. 321-4; Mīr ‘ār, VI, fol. 22a; Sharḥ, IV, pp. 232-6; Dhahabī, III, p. 122; ʿIbar, III, pp. 326-7; E. I. ¹ (Shabīb ibn Yazīd ibn Nuṣāim al-Shaibānī).

2. Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tārīkh, I, p. 351; Ansāb, fol. 46a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Ma‘ād, fols. 28b, 69a; Tāb., II, pp. 202-11 (citing Abū Mikhnaf) 911-15; Kamīl, IV, pp. 324-7; Mīr ‘ār, VI, fols. 22a-22b; Sharḥ, IV, pp. 227-44; Dhahabī, III, p. 122; ʿIbar, III, pp. 327-6.
As a result of this victory, Shabīb marched towards Kūfa routing an army which al-Ḥajjāj sent against him commanded by Suwaid ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Sa‘dī. However, Shabīb did not enter Kūfa but instead went to Adhārbaījan. It seems that Shabīb decided to give his followers a rest and also planned to surprise his enemy. Throughout all his wars with the government he showed himself a master of guerrilla warfare. His small forces helped him to move swiftly, enabling him to surprise his enemies. Moreover, because he was on good terms with the Christian population in the area of his military operations, they helped him to find shelter for his small forces, and also provided him with full information about his enemy’s movement. However, al-Ḥajjāj was relieved to know that Shabīb was far from Kūfa, and he went to Basra. While he was there, he heard that Shabīb was on his way to Kūfa, which news sent him back to Kūfa. He reached there the afternoon of Shabīb’s arrival in the evening of the same day. That night, Shabīb and his two hundred followers entered Kūfa and defied al-Ḥajjāj by thundering with an iron bar on the gate of the Qaṣr (palace) of al-Ḥajjāj, leaving a deep trace on it. They also went to the mosque of Kūfa, killing all those who they found praying there. But in the morning they dispersed. Al-Ḥajjāj then sent Zahr ibn Qais al-Ju‘fī with eighteen hundred

1. E. I., (Shabīb ibn Yazīd ibn Nu‘aim al-Shaibānī).
2. It is said that Shabīb entered Kūfa with his wife Ghazāla, who performed her prayers in the mosque of Kūfa in fulfilment of a vow she had made some time earlier. Khālīfa ibn Khayyāt, Tarīkh, I, p.352; Ma‘ārif, p.181; Ansāb, fols.465 (citing ibn al-Kalbī),48a (citing al-Haytham); Küft, II,Fol.93a; Ghurār, fol.29; Murūj, V,pp320-1, 441;
cavalry men to pursue Shabīb and fight him. At the same time, al-Hājjāj sent Bishr ibn Ghālib al-Asadi with two thousand men; Za‘ida ibn Qudāma al-Thaqafī with two thousand men; Abu‘l-Dharīs, a mawla of Tamīm, with one thousand men; A‘yun, a mawla of Bishr ibn Marwān with one thousand men; and Muḥammad ibn Musā ibn Ṭalḥa with two thousand men. ‘Abd al-Malik appointed the latter to the governorship of Sīstān and made him dependent on al-Hājjāj. Al-Hājjāj had persuaded him that he should not go to Sīstān before fighting Shabīb, to get the merit of defeating or killing him. Al-Hājjāj also made Za‘ida ibn Qudāma the commander-in-chief of these five armies, which were gathered at Rūdbār, about twenty four parasangs from Kūfā. Meanwhile, Shabīb had met Zahr ibn Qais, seriously wounded him and routed his army. Then Shabīb marched against the huge army under Za‘ida ibn Qudāma, killing the latter and defeating his army.1 Despite the urging of his followers, he did not attack Kūfā although it lay open to him by this time, and thus did not take advantage of his victory. Instead he went to Khānjār, where he constituted a direct threat to al-Mada‘īn, the door to Kūfā.

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Again al-Ḥajjāj raised an army under 'Abd al-Rahmān ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ashʿāth and ordered him to fight Shabīb. On the advice of al-Jaḍl, Ibn al-Ashʿāth was always on his guard and entrenched himself at night. Shabīb, failing to surmise this army, tried to draw Ibn al-Ashʿāth into rough and difficult passes and roads to tire him out, so that he could then launch his attack. But Ibn al-Ashʿāth refused to be drawn, although his caution infuriated al-Ḥajjāj, who replaced Ibn al-Ashʿāth by 'Uthmān ibn Qatan al-Ḥarīthī. The new leader was as hasty as his predecessor had been cautious and very soon engaged in a battle with Shabīb on the banks of the river Dujail, Dhul-Ḥajja, 76/March, 696. But here again al-Ḥajjāj's army was defeated and its leader 'Uthmān ibn Qatan killed, while Ibn al-Ashʿāth managed to return to Kūfā with the routed army. ¹

After these brilliant military victories, Shabīb went to the mountains of Bahrūgān where he spent the three months of the summer of 77/696. Here he was joined by many who were dissatisfied with al-Ḥajjāj. ² However, these three months of unofficial truce gave al-Ḥajjāj time to mobilize all those Kūfāns able to fight and in receipt of the 'Aṣa', and also some Basran troops. The

¹ Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 352; Ansāb, fols. 46b-47a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Tab., II, pp. 930-9 (citing Abū Mīkhnaḵf); Khāfīf, I, fol. 92b; Ghurar, fols. 48-9; Bagh., pp. 90; Kāmil, IV, pp. 333-6; Miḥrāb, II, fols. 23b-24a; Sharh, IV, pp. 256-60; Dīhāḥ, II, p. 122; Bidāya, IX, p. 14; 'Ibar, III, pp. 328-32; Shadhrāt, I, pp. 83-4.

² Tab., II, p. 914; (citing Abū Mīkhnaḵf); Kāmil, IV, p. 338; Miḥrāb, VI, fol. 24b; Sharh, IV, pp. 260-1.
number of this army is said to have reached fifty thousand men. Meanwhile, Shabīb marched on al-Madāʾin, where Muṭṭarrif ibn al-Mughīra was governor. The latter was a fanatical Muslim, sympathetic to the Khārijite cause although he was not one of them. When Shabīb approached al-Madāʾin, he kept him for four days in discussions, but without any result. Realising that al-Ḥaḍaj would punish him, Muṭṭarrif evacuated al-Madāʾin and went to the mountains. Thus Shabīb seized the city, a fact which gave him a better strategy for his attack on Kūfā. Meanwhile, al-Ḥaḍaj recalled ʿAttāb ibn Warqaʿ al-Riyāḥi, who was fighting the Azāriqa with al-Muhallab, and gave him the command of the overwhelming army he had raised against Shabīb. ʿAttāb made his camp in Suq Ḥakama not far from Baghdad. Shabīb, however, with only six hundred followers, was able to defeat ʿAttāb's army, and killed ʿAttāb. Al-Ḥaḍaj, however, had already appealed to the caliph for help after the Kūfāns had failed

1. Bidāya, IX, p. 17.
2. See p. 333 ff.
3. See p. 312.
to meet the Kharijite threat. The caliph sent him six thousand Syrians, four thousand under Sufyan ibn al-Abbad al-Kalbi and two thousand under Šahib ibn Šahib ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Ḥakamī.\(^1\)

The death of ‘Attab and the defeat of his army encouraged Šahib to march on Kūfa. On his way there he defeated an army of one thousand men under al-Hārith ibn Mu‘awiya al-Thaqafi. Then Šahib made his camp in one of the Kūfan suburbs, where he built a mosque, showing that he was there for a considerable time. Before the next decisive battle, Šahib was able to kill the mawāli and slaves which al-Ḥajjāj had equipped to defend him. However, al-Ḥajjāj and his Syrian army made their camp in al-Sabkha, and soon a battle was joined. None of the Kūfans who had been in the army of ‘Attab were allowed to participate in this battle, except for Khalid the son of ‘Attab, and Sawra ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Mikhnaif, with a very small number of Kūfans.\(^2\) However, contrary to all previous battles, Šahib was strongly resisted by the Syrians, and began to retreat slowly. Meanwhile, with the permission of al-Ḥajjāj, Khalid ibn ‘Attab and some Kūfans attacked

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1. Ansāb, fol.47a (citing Ibn al-Kalbi); Ṭab., II,p.943 (citing Abu Mikhnaif); Kufi, II, fol.93a; Ghurar, fol.49; Murūj, V, pp.322-3; Kāmil, IV,p.339; Mir‘at, VI, fol.24b; Sharḥ, IV, p.263; Wafayāt, I, p.314; Dhahabī, III,p.123; Bidāya, IX,p.14; ‘Ibar, III, p.334.

2. The narrative of ‘Umar ibn Shabba in Tabari, however, tries to ignore completely the Syrian role in this battle. Ṭab., II, pp.962-9; Wellhausen, Die Religios Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten Islam, p.46.
Shabīb's camp from the rear, killing his wife Ghazala and his brother Masād, and setting fire to the camp. When Shabīb heard of this, he and his followers took to flight followed by al-Hajjāj's army (77/697). 1

Al-Hajjāj sent Habīb ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Hakmi with three thousand Syrians in pursuit of Shabīb. They met in al-Anbār but no decisive battle took place, and Shabīb with his followers retreated to al-Ahwāz and then to Kirmān where they stayed for some time for relief and recovery. 2

Al-Hajjāj dispatched against him in Kirmān, Sufyān ibn al-Abrad al-Kalbī with a Syrian army. Al-Hajjāj also ordered his deputy governor in Basra, al-Hakam ibn Ayyūb al-Thaqafi, to send a Basran army to assist Sufyān. Therefore, Ziyād ibn 'Amr al-Atkī and four thousand Basrans were sent to join Sufyān, but they arrived only after the latter had already engaged Shabīb in battle. On the other hand, Shabīb lost some of his followers who accepted the Amīn of al-Hajjāj. In order to meet Sufyān, Shabīb crossed

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1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh., I, p.354; 'Uyun, p.152 (citing Abu'l Yoqdan); Ansāb, fols.47a-47b (citing Ibn al-Kalbi); Tab., II, pp.955-61 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fols.93b-94a; Ghurar, fols.50-1; Murūj, V, pp.221-2; Kāmil, IV, pp.343-5; Mir'āt, VI, fols.25b-26a; Sharḥ, IV, pp.268-72; Wafayāt, I, p.314; Dahaḥī, III, p.123-4 (citing Abū Mikhnaf) Bidayā, IX, pp.17-19; 'Ilbar, III, pp.336-8; Shadharāt, I, pp.83-4.

2. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh., I, p.354; Ansāb, fol.47b (citing Ibn al-Kalbi); Ya'qūbī, II, p.328 (here as well as in Kūfī and Ghurar, the name 'Alqama ibn 'Abd al-Rahmān is given); Tab., II, pp.969-72 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol.94a; Ghurar, fol.51; Bagh., p.91; Kāmil, IV, pp.345-6; Mir'āt, VI, fol.26a; Sharḥ, IV, pp.272-5; Dahaḥī, III, p.124; 'Ilbar, III, pp.337-8.
the river Duja'il and came to al-Ahwāz, where hostilities began. Once again Shabīb could not meet the strong resistance of the Syrians and began to retreat, crossing back over the river Duja'il. He let all his followers cross first, and while he in the rear was on the bridge, he fell in and was drowned. ¹ This was probably at the end of 77/697.

Different versions exist of the death of Shabīb. According to one account,² while he was crossing his horse's foot went off the bridge, because there was a mare in front of him, thus tossing Shabīb in the river. Another account³ says that when Shabīb was on the bridge, Sufyān ordered the bridge to be cut down, thus causing Shabīb's death. Finally, there is a third account

1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 355; Maṣārif, p. 180; 'Uyun, p. 152 (citing Abu'l-Yaqdān); Ansāb, fols. 47b (citing Ibn al-Kalbī), 48a (citing al-Haytham); Ya'qūbī, II, p. 328; Jab., II, pp. 972-6 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kūfī, II, fol. 94a; Ghurar, fol. 51; Murūj, V, p. 322; Bagh., p. 91; Milal, p. 224; Kamīl, IV, pp. 346-50; Mirāt, VI, fol. 26a; Sharh, IV, pp. 276-78; Wafayāt, I, p. 314; Mukhtasar, I, p. 208; Dhaḥabī, III, pp. 124-5; Bidāya, IX, pp. 19-20 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); 'Ibar, III, pp. 338-40; Shadharāt, I, p. 84; Theophanos, Chronographia, the year 6185.

2. Ansāb, fol. 47b (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Jab., II, p. 974 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Murūj, V, p. 322; Kamīl, IV, p. 349; Sharh, IV, p. 277 (citing Farwa ibn Laqīt); Wafayāt, I, p. 314; Dhaḥabī, III, p. 125 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Bidāya, IX, pp. 19-20 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); 'Ibar, III, pp. 339-40.

3. Ansāb, fols. 47b, 49a (citing al-Haytham); Ya'qūbī, II, p. 328; Kūfī, II, fol. 49a; Ghurar, fol. 51; Bagh., p. 91.
which reports that some of Shabīb’s own followers had already crossed before
Shabīb and that they cut the ropes of the bridge which led to its collapse
and the death of Shabīb. What makes it difficult to decide in favour of
any of these narratives is that, while Abu Mikhnaf implies that the last
account is the right one, Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn Abī’l-Ḥadīd prefer the
first account. However, several reasons make us think that the third account
is the most convincing. Apart from the fact that the first account reads more
as a story than history, the second seems unlikely; for if Sufyān could cut the bridge,
would not it have been wiser to do so when Shabīb had first crossed the River
Dujail, saving himself the difficult task of fighting him? On the other hand,
Shabīb had killed some of his own people (Banū Shaiban) as well as other tribes,
in his raids on those who did not follow him. This seemed enough to turn some of
his followers against him, especially those who did not profess Khārijism as such,
but had joined him out of fear, or to get material benefits as a result of his

1. Ansāb, fols. 47b, 149a; Tab., II, pp. 975-6 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kāmil,
   IV, p. 349; Sharḥ, IV, p. 277; Bidāya, IX, p. 20 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī).
2. Tab., II, p. 976.
4. Wellhausen, Die Religions Politischen Oppositionsparteien im alten
   Islam, p. 47.
5. Ansāb, fols. 47a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī), 49a (citing al-Haytham); Tab., II,
   pp. 895 (citing Abū Mikhnaf), 915-16 (citing Abū Mikhnaf), 941 (citing
   Abū Mikhnaf), 975 (citing Abū Mikhnaf), 976-7 (citing Abū Mikhnaf);
   Kāmil, IV, p. 322; Sharḥ, IV, p. 277; Bidāya, IX, p. 20 (citing Ibn al-Kalbī);
   Ibar, III, p. 326.
brilliant military successes, or else to escape al-Hayjaj’s severe policies. It should be added that disputes arose among his followers and also others felt jealousy towards him. It is reported that in the battle of al-Sabkha, Maṣqala ibn Muḥalhal al-Dābbī with some of his followers deserted Shabīb, because the latter refused to show adherence to Ṣāliḥ ibn Musarrīh. Some of Shabīb’s followers also were dissatisfied with him because at one time he showed mercy to his own people or old friends. Finally, according to al-Haytham ibn ‘Adī, some of his followers accused him of being unjust and in giving a mare to one of his followers. It is very likely, therefore, that Shabīb had met his death at the hands of those malcontents among his followers. The fate of Najda ibn ‘Āmir al-Ḥanafi and that of Qāṭri ibn al-Fuḥā’ confirms this view.

However, Shabīb’s death proved the turning point in the Sufriyya movement: his followers chose al-Buṭain as their leader and continued to defy the

1. Ţab., II, p. 941 (citing Abū Mīkhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p. 338; Mīr’āt, VI, fol. 24b; Sharḥ, IV, pp. 260-1, 274-5; Ībar, III, p. 334.
2. Ţab., II, p. 967 (citing ‘Umar ibn Shabba).
3. Ansāb, fols. 48 (citing al-Haytham), 50a (citing Abū ‘Ubaida); Ţab., II, pp. 927-8, 928 (citing ‘Umar ibn Shabba), 967-9 (citing ‘Umar ibn Shabba), 975 (citing Abū Mīkhnaf); Kāmil, IV, pp. 328, 333, 349; Mīr’āt, VI, fol. 23b; Sharḥ, IV, pp. 252-4.
4. Ansāb, fol. 49a.
5. See pp. 362, 314.
government by seizing the Suq al-Ahwaz, but without great enthusiasm.

Sufyan ibn al-Abd al-Kalbi with his army followed al-Butain and his followers and the two met in a battle; before long the Sufriyya asked Sufyan for Aman in return for their submission, and al-Butain had to flee to save his life. He was soon seized, however, and put to death by an order of al-Hajjaj.  

How had the movement been able to sustain its success for so long? At the height of its power under Shabib, it had never numbered more than a thousand supporters, and normally far fewer. This small army had been able to defy larger forces of the government, partly because of their skill in guerilla warfare, partly because of the help they received from the Christians in the area. But blame must also rest with al-Hajjaj: in his impetuosity, he thought only to send larger and larger armies against them. His thinking remained conventional: he never grasped the principle of adapting his strategy to meet guerrilla tactics. It was not until the arrival of Syrian troops that the Sufriyya began to experience reverses.

Another revolt against al-Hajjaj and the Umayyad rule came from al-Madain, led by Mutarrif ibn al-Mughira ibn Shu'ba al-Thaqafi, the governor of al-Hajjaj there: whether or not it was a Kharijite revolt historians

1. Khalifa ibn Khayyat, Tarih, I, p.355; Ansab, fol.49b (citing Madain).
disagree, but certainly it was associated with the Kharijites.

Our information about this revolt comes from the narrative of Ibn al-Kalbi in Baladhuri and that of Abū Mikhnaf in Tabari. Apart from the details provided by Abū Mikhnaf, which he reports on the authority of al-Nadr ibn Sāliḥ, a friend and a courtier of Muṭarrif, these two accounts are fundamentally the same; which leads to the conclusion that either Ibn al-Kalbi used Abū Mikhnaf's account, or else they both utilized a common source.

Muṭarrif and his two brothers Ḥamza and 'Urwa were considered among the Ashraf of the time and enjoyed a reputation for good conduct. For these reasons, and possibly also because of kinship with al-Ḥajjāj, they received the latter's favour; he appointed Muṭarrif as governor of al-Madāʾin, Ḥamza the governor of Hamadān, and 'Urwa his deputy in Kūfa during his residence in Basra. 1

Thus Muṭarrif was in authority over al-Madāʾin in the year 77/696, while al-Ḥajjāj was busy fighting the Kharijite Shabīb. When Shabīb marched from Satidma towards Kūfa, Muṭarrif wrote to al-Ḥajjāj informing him of his advance and asking for re-inforcements to defend al-Madāʾin.

Al-Ḥajjāj sent him four hundred men under Sabra ibn ʿAbd al-Rahman ibn

1. Ansāb, fol. 29b (citing Ibn al-Kalbi); Tab., II, pp. 979-80 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p. 355; Mirʾāt, VI, fol. 28a; Ibar, III, p. 340.
Mikhnaf and 'Abdallah ibn Kunnaz. By this time Shabib had reached Buhursir where he made his camp. ¹

Mutarrif, realising how close Shabib was, cut down the bridge which connected al-Madain to Buhursir. He also wrote to Shabib asking him to send some trustworthy men among his followers "to examine their understanding of the Qur'an and to inquire about your preaching" (أَنْتَ لَا تَقْرَءُ الْقُرْآنَ وَلَا تَسْمَعُ عَمَلَكِ).² Our sources do not say whether this surprising request sprang from Mutarrif's sympathy to the Kharijite cause, or whether he intended to show them the error of their ways. Shabib agreed and his deputation told Mutarrif that their cause was "the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet; they opposed the appropriation of the Fay', the disregard of the Ḥudūd and the practice of oppression" (كَانَ بِالْهَيْكَانَةِ وَالسُّنَّةِ وَالْمَنْفُوع في النَّفَسَةِ وَالْمَتَجَّهِ لِلْمَيْلِ).³ Mutarrif agreed with all these aims and appeared to have thought of joining them. But he insisted that the caliphate should be an elective office restricted to the Quraishites. He believed that the Quraishite claim to the caliphate would rally the 'Arabs freely under their banner.⁴ Thus both his

¹. Ṭab., II, pp.946-7 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, pp.350-1.
². Ansāb, fol.29b (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Ṭab., II, pp.981-3 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p.352; Ṣirāṭ, IV, fol.28a; 'Ibar, III, p.340.
³. Ṭab., II, p.984 (citing Abu Mikhnaf).
⁴. Ansāb, fol.29a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Ṭab., II, pp.983-4 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p.351; Ṣirāṭ, VI, fol.28a; 'Ibar, III, pp.340-1.
insistence on a Quraishite caliph and his emphasis on an ‘Arab following
separated him from the Kharijites; the latter maintained that the most
distinguished man should be elected caliph, regardless of his family or his
tribal connections. Nor did they care whether their support was from ‘Arab,
maiwla or slave. However, the interest Mutarrif had shown in Kharijism
encouraged Shabib to try again to win him over to his side. He sent some of
his followers to Mutarrif to convince him that Quraish had no better claim to
the caliphate than any other ‘Arab; but without avail. Thus the negotiations
between them, which had lasted for four days, ended without either side having
come to terms.

In the event, al-Hajjaj unintentionally profited from the situation.
For these four days of negotiations prevented Shabib from surprising on their
way to Kufa the Syrian troops which ‘Abd al-Malik had sent to the aid of al-
Hajjaj. Moreover, it gave time for ‘Attab ibn Warqa’ al-Riyahi to reach Kufa
from Kirman. ¹ ‘Attab was to command the army raised by al-Hajjaj against
Shabib. ²

Mutarrif now found himself caught between Shabib and al-Hajjaj;
fearing attack from the former and punishment from the latter, he left al-Madain

¹. Ansab, fol. 35b (citing Madain); Tab., II, p. 947 (citing Abu Mikhnaf);
Sharh, IV, p. 262; Kamil, IV, pp. 340-1.
². See p.
and went to al-Daskara. There, he gathered a council of the prominent men among his followers and for the first time told them of his intention to rebel. He declared the deposition of both al-Ḥajjāj and ‘Ābd al-Malik. He gave his followers the choice of either following him or returning to their city. While some went back, the majority remained with him and swore homage to him according to "The Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet; and the doctrine that the choice of a Quraishite caliph should be decided by a Shūra". Among those who deserted him were Sabra ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Mikhnaf and ‘Abdallāh ibn Kunnāz with their four hundred men, where they took part with the Syrian army in the fighting against Shabīb.  

From al-Daskara, Mūṭarrif went to Hulwān, where Suwaid ibn ‘Ābd al-Rahmān al-Saʿdī was governor for al-Ḥajjāj. To put himself in favour with al-Ḥajjāj, Suwaid went out with a small army against Mūṭarrif. But Suwaid was reluctant to fight Mūṭarrif, perhaps out of sympathy with him, and asked him secretly to leave Hulwān, which the latter did. He went to Hamdān where his brother Ḥamzā was governor. On his way, Mūṭarrif was interrupted by the Kurds, but defeated them in al-Thanya.  

1. Ansāb, fol. 30a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī), Tab., II, pp. 988–9 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, pp. 351–2; Mirʿāt, VI, fol. 28a; ‘Ibar, III, p. 341.  
2. See p. 326  
3. Ansāb, fol. 30a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī), Tab., II, pp. 989–91 (citing Abū Mikhnaf); Kāmil, IV, p. 352; Mirʿāt, VI, fol. 28a; ‘Ibar, III, p. 341.
When Mutarrif approached Hamadān, he sent for his brother, asking his help. The latter, although he would not join him, sent him money and weapons. In order not to harm his brother, Mutarrif did not enter Hamadān, instead making his way to Isbahan where he pitched his camp. By now his followers had increased, for people from al-Rayy and other districts opposing al-Ḥajjāj’s severe policies, joined him. Consequently, al-Barā’ ibn Qabīsa, the governor of Isbahan, wrote for al-Ḥajjāj asking for reinforcements. The latter ordered ‘Adī ibn Wattād, the governor of al-Rayy, to join al-Barā’, and sent other reinforcements to him. Their army, which now numbered six thousand, was placed under the command of ‘Adī ibn Wattād. Al-Ḥajjāj had previously removed Hamza from Hamadān, lest he should join his brother. He chose as the new governor of Hamadān, Qais ibn Sa‘d al-‘līlī, because the latter’s tribe was the most powerful in Hamadān. Soon the two armies joined in battle, and after a severe struggle, Mutarrif was killed and his followers dispersed.¹

Our authorities differ as to the nature of the revolt of Mutarrif. Abu Mikhnaf passes almost completely silent on his motives, without committing himself to any explanation.² According to al-Haytham ibn ‘Adī,³ Mutarrif

1. Ansāb, fols. 30a-30b (citing Ibn al-Kalbī); Tab., II, pp. 992-1000 (citing Abu Mikhnaf); Jamharat, p. 255; Kāmil, IV, pp. 352-3; Mir‘āt, VI, fols. 28a-28b; ‘Ibar, III, pp. 341-2.

2. There is, however, some indication which implies that it was not a Khārijite revolt. Tab., II, pp. 987, 992.

3. Ansāb, fol. 29a.
was "opposing al-Munkar (moral atrocities) and did not go as far as the Kharijites". Baladhuri, however, in assessing Mutarrif's views, states that "some said that Mutarrif held the Kharijite doctrine, but this is false. His views were the same as the Qura'a who revolted with Ibn al Ash'ath".

Similarly, modern historians differ in their opinions on Mutarrif. Weil considers him as a follower of Shabib, while Van Vloten thinks that his revolt could be categorized with those of the Ashraf against the Umayyads. Wellhausen, however, is not explicit about Mutarrif and his views and says that "he had great Kharijite inclinations, but he refused either to be a follower of Shabib or to fight against him". However, neither the contacts which Mutarrif had with Shabib, nor his rigid attacks on the injustice of the caliph and his governors, necessarily make him a Kharijite. For while the Kharijite sects assert strongly that every believer who is morally and religiously irreproachable qualifies for election to the caliphate, "even if he were a black slave", Mutarrif restricted the claim to the Quraishites alone. Moreover, neither the Kharijites nor Mutarrif's own followers referred to him as a Kharijite, nor did he or his followers adopt the common Kharijite slogan.

1. Ansab, fol.30b.


"La Ḥukma illa Li'Llāh". Furthermore, he left behind him no followers preaching a special doctrine. For all these reasons, it seems difficult to depict him as a Khārijite. He was rather a fanatic Muslim who wanted to reject the oppressors of the pious. One therefore can agree with al-Baladhurī that his motivations were no doubt similar to the Qurra’.

His contact with Shabīb may have been an attempt to win him over to his side, since they were both agreed on opposing the existing regime and the brilliant military success of Shabīb may well have encouraged Muṭarrif to seek to gain his support. But failing to do so, he also failed to emulate his success and his revolt was ineffectual and shortlived.

Apart from these major risings, there were also during the reign of ‘Abd al-Malik other sporadic and shortlived Khārijite risings in al-Jazīra, Yamāma, Bahraīn and Baṣra. The suppression of Shabīb’s rebellion did not put an end to the risings in al-Jazīra region. Soon after Shabīb’s death, Abū Ziyād al-Murādī rebelled in Jūkhā. Al-Ḥajjāj sent eight hundred men against him under al-Jarrāḥ ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Hakmī, the governor of Bābil and al-Fallūjatain. It was only after fierce fighting that Abū Ziyād and his followers

1. See Chapter V, pp. 291-2
were massacred. In Jūkha, another Khārijite rising occurred, that of Hudba al-Taṭī with a small group of followers. But Saif ibn Hāni’ was stationed there with his Maslaha for the purpose of quelling Khārijite insurrections, and he succeeded in seizing Hudba and killing him. Another Khārijite rising came from Dārā under Sakīn al-Shaibānī; but he was seized by the cavalry of Muḥammad ibn Marwān and handed over to al-Ḥaqqāj, who consequently executed him. Another Khārijite rising in the Jazīra region was that of Māṭar ibn 'Imrān in Ma'ṣīl, who was also seized by the cavalry of Muḥammad ibn Marwān and handed over to al-Ḥaqqāj. (All Khārijites seized in the Jazīra or in Syria were handed over to al-Ḥaqqāj for execution to prevent them from using these places as "Dār Hīgra"). Finally, there was the rising of al-Khaṭṭār al-Namrī in Rāḍhān. The latter was originally a Christian but converted to Islam and then adopted Khārijism. He met his death at the hands of Saif ibn Hāni’.

One small Khārijite revolt broke out in al-Yamāma in Suq Hajar, that of Abū Ḥāriṣa from the Banū Hanīfa. He was soon killed by the people there.

1. Ansāb, fol. 50b (citing al-Haytham); Ya‘qūbī, II, p. 328.
2. Ansāb, fol. 45a (citing Madaʾīnī).
3. Ibid., fols. 52b (citing Madaʾīnī), 53a (citing Ibn al-Kalbī).
4. Ansāb, fol. 52a (citing al-Haytham). However, according to Madaʾīnī, Māṭar’s rebellion was before that of Ṣāḥīḥ ibn Musarrih. Ansāb, fol. 52a.
5. Ansāb, fol. 51b.
6. Ibid., fol. 52a (citing al-Haytham).
Owing to its distance from the central government, al-Bahrain was also a centre of Kharijite revolts. In the year 78/697, while al-Ḥajjāj was still fighting the Azraqite, Qatīr ibn al-Fujā'a, a Kharijite rebellion broke out in al-Bahrain. The leader of this rising and his followers came from the tribe of ʿAbd al-Qais. The governor, Muḥammad ibn Ṣaʿṣaʿa al-Kilābī, appealed to al-Ḥajjāj for help, but the latter was at this time short of men for the troops of Basra and Kūfa were busy fighting the Azārīqa with al-Muhallab. Al-Ḥajjāj, therefore, asked the caliph to order Ibrāhīm ibn ʿArabī, the governor of al-Yamāma, to assist the governor of al-Bahrain. Ibrāhīm marched on the rebels, defeated them and returned back to al-Yamāma.

In the following year 79/698 al-Rayyān al-Nakri revolted against Muḥammad ibn Ṣaʿṣaʿa al-Kilābī. Al-Rayyān was soon joined by another Kharijite rebel, Maymūn, who came from ʿUmān. Muḥammad ibn Ṣaʿṣaʿa summoned the people of al-Bahrain to fight al-Rayyān and his followers, but the ʿAbd al-Qais, because of their Kharijite sympathy, refused to take part in quelling the rebels. However, Muḥammad sent an army under the Azdite ʿAbdallah ibn ʿAbd al-Malik al-ʿAwdī against al-Rayyān, but it was defeated and the latter killed. Shamed by this defeat, and afraid of the

1. Ibid., fols, 50b-51a (citing Madāʾini).
hostility shown by the ‘Abd al-Qais towards him, Muhammad left al-
Bahrain to save his life. However, by this time a disagreement seems to have
occurred between al-Rayyān and Maymūn, for the latter left al-Bahrain only
forty days after Muhammad’s departure, and returned to ‘Uman. Muhammad,
however, did not take advantage of this to return to the country and exploit
the disagreement among his enemies. On the other hand, when he heard the
news of these alarming events, al-Hājjāj dispatched Yazīd ibn Abī Kabsha
al-Saksākī with twelve thousand Syrians to help Muhammad, but they arrived
after the latter had already left the country. Yazīd and his army met al-
Rayyān with 1500 men in battle, and the latter was killed with a large number
of his followers (80/699). Yazīd had the bodies of al-Rayyān and his followers
crucified, while their heads were sent to al-Hājjāj. The latter imprisoned the
previous governor of al-Bahrain for his cowardice and inefficiency in handling
the situation; he died in prison.

Soon after al-Rayyān’s revolt, Dāwūd ibn Mihrīz from ‘Abd al-Qais
also rebelled. He and his followers first buried the bodies of al-Rayyān and
his followers, assisted by the people of al-Bahrain. Dāwūd, however, made
al-Qātīf his headquarters, and succeeded in putting to flight the first army
sent against him under the police officer of al-Qātīf. He also defeated

1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarīkh, I, pp. 358, 360; Ansāb, fol. 51a
(citing Mādātīnī).
the Azdite ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn al-Nu‘mān al-‘Awdhī, which defeat, however, had the effect of rallying the Azd with the people of al-Qaṭīf against Dāwūd and ‘Abd al-Qais. This alliance defeated Dāwūd and he and his Khārijite supporters were killed. These continuous risings of Khārijites from ‘Abd al-Qais in al-Bahrain led al-Hajjāj to seize some of their chiefs, whom he punished severely by death, amputation and imprisonment.

In Basra, a Khārijite from ‘Abd al-Qais called Abū Ma‘bad al-Shanī rebelled. Abū Ma‘bad came originally from al-Bahrain and chose Mawqū‘, a place in the outskirts of Basra, as his headquarters. He was, however, soon killed by the troops of al-Hakam ibn Ayyūb the governor of Basra. Even the last year of ‘Abd al-Malik’s reign did not pass without a Khārijite rising (86/705), for in this year Dāwūd ibn al-Nu‘mān, another of ‘Abd al-Qais originally from al-Bahrain, rebelled in Basra at Mawqū‘ of Abū Ma‘bad. Dāwūd arrived in Basra with forty men, and was joined there by other Khārijites: he probably chose Mawqū‘ as the centre of his rising, knowing that he could find Khārijite support there. Al-Hajjāj’s deputy governor in Basra, al-Hakam ibn Ayyūb, sent against him ‘Abd al-Malik ibn al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufra. After

1. Ansāb, fol. 51a (citing Madā‘īnī).
2. Ibid., fols. 51a-51b (citing Madā‘īnī).
3. Ansāb, fol. 50b (citing Madā‘īnī); Ya‘qūbī, II, pp. 328-9; Mu‘jam, II, p. 688 (here, he is called Abū Sa‘īd).
putting up strong resistance, Dawūd and his followers, among whom was his
own sister, were killed; this was the last Kharijite rising in the reign of
‘Abd al-Malik. ¹

In sharp contrast to all these battles and rebellions of Kharijites
groups, was the behaviour of the Ibadī Kharijite sect, which enjoyed a
friendly relationship with the caliph from the time of their first leader,
Ibn Ibād, until the death of ‘Abd al-Malik. Ibn Ibād’s successor, Jabir
ibn Zaid, was not only friendly with the caliph, but even with his governor in
Iraq, al-Hajjāj, normally so bitter an enemy to the Kharijites. Jabir is said
to have received a salary from al-Hajjāj. ² It is not enough to explain this
friendship between the caliph and the Ibadī leaders solely in terms of their
Quṣūd (quietism), ³ for the Sufriyya were also among the Qa‘ada, yet they
fought ‘Abd al-Malik repeatedly. But one can find another explanation in the
correspondence which took place between the caliph and ‘Abdallāh ibn Ibād.
The Ibadī chronicles preserve to us two letters of advice Nasā’īh from
‘Abdallāh ibn Ibād to ‘Abd al-Malik. ⁴ The date of these letters is not known,

1. Khalīfa ibn Khayyat, Tarikh, I, p. 348 (he gives the year 75 instead); Ansāb,
fols. 52a-52b (citing Madīnī).
AIUCN, 1954; E. I. ², (Al-Ibadīyya).
3. E. I. ², (Al-Ibadīyya).
4. Siyar, p. 77; Barrādi, pp. 156-7; Siyar al-‘Umaniyya, pp. 445-55.
yet one can conclude that the first letter was written after the year 67/686, for it contains a reference to the defeat of al-Mukhtar by Mus'ab ibn al-Zubair. 1 However, it is obvious that 'Abd al-Malik had taken the initiative in starting the correspondence, since the first letter is a reply of Ibn Ibad to an earlier letter from the caliph, through a certain Sinâh ibn ‘Aṣim. 2 From this, bearing in mind the caliph's letter to Najda ibn 'Āmir, one can trace one of 'Abd al-Malik's methods of dealing with the Kharijites: bribery! Just as Najda was offered the governorship of al-Yamāma, the leader of the Ibāḍī Kharijites was offered a pension; whereas the former refused the bribe, the latter appears to have accepted, as we find al-Ḥājjaj paying Jābir a salary.

'Abd al-Malik's approach was subtle: even if the bribe failed, the correspondence might well serve to divide the leader from his followers by arousing their suspicions (as in Najda's case); or, in the case of the Ibāḍī leader, it served to deepen the difference of opinion between the sect and other Kharijite groups, thus preventing them from uniting to form a common front against the caliph. 'Abd al-Malik's successor, however, appears to have abandoned this policy, and the Ibāḍī sect was to take up the sword against him.

2. Siyar, p.77; Barrādī, pp.156-7; Siyar al-‘Umāniyya, pp.445-55.
‘Abd al-Malik’s success in suppressing all opposition movements by the end of his reign, gave a new political unity to the Empire, which together with his administrative reforms, laid a solid foundation for the more spectacular achievements of his son, al-Walīd, in the expansion of the Islamic Empire.
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