THE EMIRATE OF ALEPPO

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by

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ABSTRACT

The ensuing thesis, which consists of five chapters and an introduction, deals with the history of the emirate of Aleppo during the years 1002-1094.

Within this period the emirate suffered the collapse of the Hamdanid dynasty (founded by Sayf al-Dawla, 945-967), the submission for the first time to a direct Fatimid rule, the establishment of the Mirdasid dynasty, and 'Uqaylid occupation and finally passed under direct Saljuq control.

Although, previous to the Saljuq conquest, the emirate was influenced by the policies of both the Fatimid caliphate and the Byzantine empire, most of that time it was ruled by the Mirdasid dynasty. Sālih b. Mirdas was the founder of this dynasty and after his death three of his sons, Naṣr, Thīmāl and 'Atīya succeeded each other in ruling the emirate.

Maḥmūd b. Naṣr usurped the rulership from his uncle 'Atīya and it was during their struggle for power that some of the Turcomans entered the emirate. When he became Amir, Maḥmūd employed some of the Turcomans in his service, defended Aleppo when the Sultan Alp-Arslan campaigned against it and although his sons Naṣr and afterwards Sābiq succeeded him, the real power lay in the hands of the Turcomans.

The Mirdasid dynasty was tribal, emanating from the Arabic tribe of Kilāb which had migrated to northern Syria in the wake
of the Islamic conquest of the seventh century. The structure of the tribe, its customs and the general behaviour of its tribesmen characterised this dynasty and contributed both to its establishment and collapse. On the other hand the collapse was a direct result of the capture of Aleppo by Muslim b. Quraysh, Amir of the tribe of 'Uqayl and ruler of al-Mosul. His reign, however, was short-lived and the Saljuq conquest followed rapidly. This conquest took place during the sultanate of Malik Shah who appointed Aq-Sunqur as governor and caused profound political, religious and social changes.

The political instability did not end with the appointment of Aq Sunqur whose clash with Tutush, brother of Malik Shah, and struggle for supremacy was the cause of his death.

The rural population of the emirate participated in the political life and this was clearly illustrated by the part played by the Abdath organisation.

Islam, Christianity and Judaism were the religions professed by the population and this has been touched upon in the last chapter of the thesis.

The principal sources upon which this thesis is based have been enumerated and described in the introduction.
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I should also like to express my appreciation for the courtesy of the Management and Staff of the Department of Antiquities in Aleppo and to all other colleagues who have given me all possible assistance.
Information concerning the history of Aleppo during the 11th century emanates from four major sources: local Aleppine, Syrian, the general Muslim Annals and the work of Byzantine chroniclers of the period. In turn, the local Aleppine sources could be divided into four categories; work of the chroniclers, that of the 11th century poets, inscriptions and coins.

The work of the chroniclers is the primary source and during the 11th century there were a number of chroniclers who lived in the emirate of Aleppo. Unfortunately none of their works are, so far, known to have survived except as quotations preserved in the works of later chroniclers.

Abu Ghālib Hammām b. al-Faḍl b. Ja‘far b. al-Muhadhdbhab was the most important chronicler of the 11th century. No biography of him is available but Ibn al-‘Adīm, who quotes a considerable part of his work in his book, Bughyat al-Talab, mentions him among the disciples of the celebrated Abu ’l-‘Alā‘ al-Ma‘arrī (died 449 A.H./1057 A.D.).¹ The quotations from his work made by Ibn al-‘Adīm indicate the calibre of his book. It contains general Islamic annals, mainly concentrated on the events which took place in Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘mān and Aleppo. In the surviving 10 volumes of his book Bughyat al-Talab Ibn al-‘Adīm quotes large and detailed information from Ibn al-Muhadhdbhab’s Tarikh concerning the events occurring

¹ Bughya, A.I., 196r; Ta‘rif, 517.
in Aleppo during the 11th century such as the capture of Aleppo by ǧālīh b. Mirdās, some of the events which occurred during ǧālīh's reign, the reign of Thīmāl b. ǧālīh, his relation with the Fātimid Caliphate and al-Bāṣāṣīrī and Māḥmūd's reign — in particular his relation with the Saljuq Sultan Alp-Arslān.\footnote{Bughya, A.I., 219v-221r; II, 198r; III, 284 r.v.; VI, 102v-103r, 172r, 201r-202v., 246r; it is noteworthy that Ḥāji Khalifa II, 105 mentions Tarikh Ibn al-Muhadhdhab which suggests that this book had survived until a later period.}

Contemporary with Ibn al-Muhadhdhab was the Christian physician ʿAbūʾl-Khayr al-Mubārak b. Sharāra. In addition to being a physician, al-Mubārak was a successful kāṭīb. He lived in his native city of Aleppo until the reign of Ruqāwān b. Tutush (1095-1113 A.D.). He abandoned Aleppo and went to Antioch, thence to Tyre because Ruqāwān tried to force him to adopt Islam and ultimately died in Tyre (circa 490 A.H./1096 A.D.). Al-Mubārak wrote a Tarikh chiefly narrating the events which occurred in his lifetime, particularly those which he witnessed in Aleppo. It would appear that this Tarikh was lost shortly after the death of its author for al-Qīfṭī (died 646 A.H./1248 A.D.) says that he failed to find a copy of it. Al-Qīfṭī, however, mentions that he received from Egypt a badly abridged copy by an unknown Egyptian.\footnote{Al-Qīfṭī, 330-331; Al-Ṭabbākh, I, 42; Al-ʿAʾlam, VI, 149.}
Ibn al-‘Adīm quotes some information concerning the reign of Sābiq b. Maḥmūd, the last Mirdasid Amir from Manṣūr b. Tamīm b. al-Zankal. Manṣūr, who was a poet from Sarmin, witnessed the migration of the Turcomans to Northern Syria. We do not know the date of his death and Ibn al-‘Adīm's quotation from his work does not reveal the nature of this work.4

The Aleppine chroniclers of the 11th century dedicated the bulk of their annals to the history of Aleppo, and three of the 12th century chroniclers wrote a Tarīkh devoted exclusively to the history of Aleppo. They were Ḥamdan b. ‘Abdul-Raḥīm al-‘Aθarībī (died 1147 A.D.), ‘Alī b. ‘Abdu’l-‘Āli b. Abī Jarādah (a relative of Ibn al-‘Adīm, died 1151) and Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-‘Aṣīmī (circa died 1161 A.D.). Only parts of their Tarīkhās of Aleppo survive as quotations, chiefly in the works of Ibn al-‘Adīm.

Ḥamdan was a physician and poet who possessed a good deal of the culture of his time. He, in different periods, served in an administrative capacity to both the Muslim authority of Aleppo (chiefly during Zanki's reign) and the crusaders of Antioch and its surroundings. From Aleppo he was sent by Zankī as an envoy to the crusaders of Antioch, to Egypt, to Damascus and probably to Baghdad. In Cairo he met the Fāṭimid caliph Al-‘Āmir (1101-1130) after having proved that he professed the Shi‘a’Imāmi doctrine and was not one of the Assassins. The life of Ḥamdan provides some very interesting information

4Buḥa, A., II, 165v.-166.; VII, 145r.v.
about the life of the Muslims and the crusaders of Northern Syria and the relation between them during the first half of the 12th century.

The important book written by Ḥamdān was known as Al-Maffwaq. It was devoted to the history of Aleppo and in it Ḥamdān gave special attention to the events which occurred after 490 A.H./1096 A.D. and their connection with the crusaders.\(^5\)

Contemporary with Ḥamdān, was his friend ʿAlī b. ʿAbdūʿl-Lāh b. Abī Jarāda. Like Ḥamdān, ʿAlī was a poet well versed in the knowledge of his time and professing the same Shiʿa Imāmi doctrine.

ʿAlī wrote a book about Muluk ʿulāb (i.e. the sovereigns of Aleppo) from which Ibn al-ʿĀdīm quotes some information concerning the collapse of the Mirdāsid dynasty and the relation between the Muslim Sunnis and Imāmīs of Aleppo during this dynasty.\(^6\)

Contemporary with Ḥamdān and Ibn Abī Jaʿrāda was al-ʿAzīnī who was also a poet and a school master. Al-ʿAzīnī wrote several tarikhāt; one of them was devoted to Aleppo and another was called "Al-Muwassal 'Ālā al-ʿAṣl al-Muʿaggal" which was written as general annals.

\(^5\) Bughya, A., III, 278v-280v; IV, 275v.-280v.; Yaqūt (al-Athārib); Irshād IV, 143; Al-Sakhwā, 628, has mentioned Ḥamdān, but F. Rosental, the editor of al-Sakhwā's book, has mistakenly read the title of Ḥamdān's book as Al-Qut; Tahdhīb, IV, 431-432; H.M.E. 111; Al-Aʿlām, II, 304-305.

\(^6\) Irshād, V, 244-245; VI, 21-24; Al-Kharīdā, II, 224-225; Bughya, A., IV, 277r., 280r.v.; VII, 146 r.v., 196 r.v.; al-Ṭabbākh, IV, 230-231; H.M.E.111.
What might be an abridgment of this has survived in a unique copy (Bayazid Library, Istanbul No. 398). In spite of its brevity the information it contains concerning Aleppo during the 11th century is very valuable. It covers almost all the events which occurred there during that century. Part of al-‘Azimī’s two other books has been cited by Ibn al-‘Adīm. Some of the contents are connected with the reign of Naṣr b. Ṣāliḥ, the reign of Thimāl b. Ṣāliḥ and his relations with the Fāṭimid caliphate, the death of Naṣr b. Maḥmūd, the collapse of the Mirdāsid dynasty and the reign of Aq-Sunqur, the first Saljuq ruler of Aleppo.7

Although some of the 12th century chroniclers compiled books dealing with the history of Aleppo, the greater number of them continued to follow the classic method of writing general annals. Among the latter was Yaḥyā b. ‘Alī al-Tanūkhi, generally known as Ibn Zarayq. He was born on the 18th Shawal, 442 A.H./5th March, 1051 A.D., at Ma‘arrat al-‘Uqmar and probably died in the first decade of the 12th century. As a matter of fact all the above-mentioned chroniclers of the 12th century were born and spent parts of their lives during the 11th century. They are here considered as 12th century chroniclers according to the date of their deaths rather than births.

Ibn Zurayq wrote annals which he devoted chiefly to the history of the Saljuq occupation of Syria and to the crusaders' invasion. Concerning the 11th century, some information connected with the campaign of Alp-Arsalan against Aleppo and the life of Khalaf b. Mula'ib, together with his relation with Aq-Sunqur, has been quoted by Ibn al-'Adim, via Al-Ulaymi, from Ibn Zurayq's tarikh.8

The three Munqidhi amirs and brothers, Usama, (died 1188 A.D.), 'Ali and Munqidh, sons of Murshid, were among the chroniclers of the 12th century. Munqidh wrote annals as a dhayl to Ibn al-Muhadhdhab's tarikh. Ibn al-'Adim quotes part of the annals 483 A.H./1090 A.D., which relate the campaign led in that year by Aq-Sunqur, Buzan, Tutush and Yaghi-Siyan against Khalaf b. Mula'ib.

Like his brother, 'Ali wrote annals which bear his name. Ibn al-'Adim quotes 'Ali's annals of 441 A.H./1049 A.D., 463 A.H./1071 A.D., 468 A.H./1075 A.D., 484 A.H./1091 A.D. and 487 A.H./1094 A.D. which are connected with the reign of Thimāl b. Salih and his relation with the Fātimid caliphate, the campaign of Alp-Arsalan against Aleppo, the death of Nagr b. Mahmūd and the reign of Aq-Sunqur and his relation with Tutush.

Usama wrote several books, some of which have survived and have been printed, and when Ibn al-'Adim cites him in connection with

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8 Al-Kharidah, II, 693; al-Tabbakh, IV, 224-225; Bughya, A., III, 281r.; V, 222v.; H.M.E.111; the Biography of Khalaf b. Mula'ib has been published by B. Lewis in Melanges Fuad Koprülü, Istanbul 1953, pp. 332-336.
the capture of the citadel of Aleppo by the Sultan Malik-Shah
and the life of Khalaf b. Mula'ib, there is no mention of any book
title but that the information was imparted vocally.\(^9\)

Abu Ghālib 'Abdu'l-Wahid b. Mas'ud b. al-Huṣayn appears to
have come from Ma'arra al-Nu'man and he is the author of annals
which bear his name. Ibn al-'Adim cites from these annals, specially
those of 463 A.H./1071 A.D., which were connected with the campaign
of Alp-Arslan against Aleppo. There is no positive indication of the
date of his death since no biography of him is extant.\(^10\)

'Abdu'l-Qāhir b. 'Alawi was also from Ma'arra al-Nu'man. Al-
'Imad al-Igfahānī mentions that he was a poet, held the post of cadi
in Ma'arra Masrin and that in March, 1176 A.D., he met him in Ḥamāh.
Ibn 'Alawi was the author of a book called Nuzhat al-Nāzir wa Rawdat
al-Khaṭīr. Ibn al-'Adim cites some information from this book which
is connected with the reign of Naṣr b. Ṣāliḥ, but he does not re-
veal the nature of the book or its style.\(^11\)

Abu Mansūr Hibatu 'llāh b. Sa'd Allāh b. al-Jabarānī seems to
have been from the city of Aleppo. We do not know the date of his
death, but a son of his named ʿAbd Allāh died in 628 A.H./1031 A.D. Ibn
al-'Adim cites al-Jabarānī when he mentions the death of Aq-Sunqur.

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\(^9\) Bughya, A., II, 205v.-212v.; III, 269v.-271v., 264r.; V,
220v.-221v.; VI, 100r., 146v.-147r., 198v.; al-Kharīdah, I, 498-557.


\(^11\) Bughya, F., 250r.v.; al-Kharīdah, II, 98-100.
He does not give the title of his book, but does however indicate that it was in the form of annals.\textsuperscript{12}

The writing of Tarīkh in Aleppo reached its peak during the 13th century and, at that period, four important chroniclers lived and left for us some valuable Tarīkhs. They were Ibn Abī Tayy (Yahyā b. Ǧamīdāṭ, died 630 A.H./1232-33 A.D.), al-Qiftī (‘Alī-B. Yusuf, died 646 A.H./1248 A.D.), Ibn al-Ḥādīm (‘Umar b. Ǧāmād, died 666 A.H./1267-1268 A.D.) and Ibn Shaddād (Muḥammad b. ‘Alī, died 684 A.H./1285 A.D.).

Ibn Abī Tayy wrote several books, most of which have been lost and do not seem to be connected with the history of Aleppo during the 11th century. Ḥāji Khalīfah has mentioned that Ibn Abī Tayy wrote a book entitled Ma’dīn al-Dhahab, and that this book was devoted to the history of Aleppo. It would appear that even this book was connected with the period following the 11th century. \textit{All} the quotations which have reached us from the works of Ibn Abī Tayy tell us nothing about the 11th century.\textsuperscript{13}

Al-Qiftī, who held the post of vizier in Aleppo, is also the author of several books containing a variety of subjects. He wrote a book called Al-Istīnās fī Akhbar Al-Mirdās. No copy of it is known to be extant and except for what the title indicates, we know

nothing concerning the contents of and the manner in which it was written.

_Ikhbar al-‘Ulama Bi Akhbar al-Hukama_ is the title of one of Al-Qifti's books which has survived in Zawzani's abridgements. In the biography of the Baghdādi Christian physician, Ibn Baṭlān who, in 440 A.H./1048 A.D., visited Aleppo and lived there for a short while, al-Qifti cites the bulk of Ibn Baṭlān's itinerary in which he describes the route from Baghdad to Aleppo and his impression of Aleppo.¹⁴

Ibn al-‘Adīm, the descendant of a very prominent family of Aleppo, was born in Dhu‘l-Hijja, 488 A.H./Dec.1192 A.D. In his autobiography, cited by Yaqut, Ibn al-‘Adīm says that when he was seven years old he was sent to school and at the age of nine he was able to read the Korān. He received a good education and acquired a good portion of the culture of his time. He also received good training in the art of calligraphy and acquired a very fine handwriting. Judging by the surviving ten volumes of _Bugyat al-Talab_, all of which are in his own handwriting, he was one of the best and most accurate copyists in the history of Arabic literature. As a lad of fifteen he visited Jerusalem and Damascus which he again visited when he was eighteen. When he became twenty-eight years old he was given the post of school-master at one of the most important schools in Aleppo. Afterwards, on several occasions he

visited Egypt and Iraq, often as an envoy, for he had become one of the most distinguished persons in Aleppo and occupied the post of vizier there. The riches of private and general libraries in addition to the official records and documents were at his disposal. His journeys enabled him to consult most of the Syrian, Egyptian and Iraqi scholars of the time and to have accession to the libraries of these countries. The accumulated knowledge of his experience is manifested in the book of Bughyat al-Talab. Ibn al-'Adim wrote several books on a variety of subjects, but history was predominant.

Concerning the eleventh century, three of Ibn al-'Adim's books are the bulwark of any attempt at writing any history of this period. They are Bughyat al-Talab, Zubdat al-Halab and al-Inqāf Wa’l-Taḥarrī, and only the text of the second named has reached us complete. The book of Bughyat al-Talab was said to comprise forty volumes, each one of more than three hundred folios. Only ten of them have survived and all, as has been previously mentioned, are in his own handwriting. These ten volumes contain the first and the last volume of the original forty and examination of them reveals Ibn al-'Adim's plan when writing. He first writes about northern Syria from a prestige (Faqā'il) and geographical standpoint and to this end he collected valuable material from almost all the works of the Muslim geographers. Following this Ibn al-'Adim relates the history of the country year by year in
the form of annals. Next follows a biographical dictionary comprising the men of northern Syria and visitors to the country who were distinguished for their religious, cultural and political proficiency.

Some of the later chroniclers state that Ibn al-'Adīm only wrote the first draft of this book and died before he was able to revise and complete it. This, in fact, would seem to be a misunderstanding of Ibn al-'Adīm's methods. The survival of both the first and last volume of the annals prove that Ibn al-'Adīm was able to complete his book before his death. Perhaps the reasons for the misunderstanding were that none of the later chroniclers were able to see more than a part of the book and the blank sheets, which are scattered throughout every volume of the book. Apparently these were left intentionally by Ibn al-'Adīm, for the addition of new material, and in many of these places we find Ibn al-'Adīm's son has added the material which his father was unable to collate. The book of Bughyat al-Talab is a mine of information, not only to the history of Muslim northern Syria but to the entire Muslim world. It contains vital information concerning the life of the inhabitants of the Muslim-Byzantine frontier from which an excellent study could be made. It is impossible to give here a full survey or a description of this book because such a study would be more suitable to a separate thesis, or a complete book rather than a mere introduction or a survey.
The book of *Zubdat al-Halab*, which is an abridgment of the narrative of the book *Bughyat al-Talab*, is one of the main sources of this thesis for it covers its entire period.

The book of *Al-Ingaf Wa'l-Taharri* was written as a biography of the celebrated Abu 'l-'Ala' al-Ma'arrin. It provides some information concerning the reign of Salih Ibn Mirdas and the relation between the Muslims and Christians of Maarrat al-Nu'man.\(^\text{15}\)

Ibn Shaddād is the author of several books among which is *Al-'Aqālīq al-Khatira*: *Fi Dhikr Umarā' al-Shām Wa'l-Jazīra*. In this book all the information which concerns Aleppo is cited by Ibn Shaddād from Ibn al-'Adim's book of *Bughyat al-Talab* and most

\(^{15}\) All the manuscripts of the 10 vols. of *Bughyat al-Talab* are in the libraries of Istanbul; one in Aya-Sofya, No. 3036; eight in Ahmad III, Topkapi Sarayi No. 2925, and one in Fayd-Allah, No. 1404. A copy of the third vol. of that of Ahmad III is in the Nationale Bibliothèque, No. 2138. A bad copy of the eighth is in the British Museum, No. Add. 23,354. I have been informed that there is a volume of the book in the library of the late Dawud Shalabi in al-Mosul. While I was able to obtain microfilm copies of the ten volumes of Istanbul and that of Paris, I failed to do so for that of al-Mosul. All the information I received about it is that this volume is a copy of the first volume of Ahmad III.

The surviving part of *al-Ingāf* was published twice, once in Aleppo in 1925 inside the fourth volume of the book of *'I‘lam al-Mubala' Bi Tarikh Halab al-Shshba* by Muhammad Raghib al-Ṭabbakh, pp. 78-154; and in Cairo in 1944 inside the book of *Ta‘rif al-Qudama* Bi Abī‘l-‘Ala’, pp. 483-578. See *Ishād*, VI, 18-46; *Zubda*, I, 13-79; al-Ṭabbakh, IV, 480-512; *H.M.B.* 111-113; *Al-'I‘lam*, 197; Brock, 1, 404(332); S.I. 568.
of it is geographical. The geographical part of the book of 
Bughyat al-Talab and most of its sources are still available and 
this renders that part of the *A*lāq which concerns northern 
Syria of little importance. 16

The names of Ibn Abi’l-Dam (Ibrāhim b. ‘Abdu’llah, died 642/ 
1244), Ibn al-Athīr al-Ḫalabī (Ismā’il, died 699/1300), Abu’l- 
Fida’ (Ismā’il b. ‘Alī, died 732/1331-32), Ibn al-Wardī (‘Umar, 
died 749/1348), Ibn Wāṣil al-Ḥamawī (Muḥammad b. Sālim, died 697/ 
1297-8), Al-Badr al-‘Aynī (Muḥammad b. Ḥamd, died 855/1451), and 
Muḥammad al-Ḥamawī, author of the book *Al-Tarīkh al-Manṣūrī*, could 
be added to those of the former chroniclers. The information con­ 
cerning the subject of this thesis given in the works of these 
chroniclers is of little value, for it is scanty and chiefly de­ 
pends on Ibn al-Athīr al-Jazārī, whose works will be examined 
later. 17

16 The larger part of *A*lāq was published in Damascus 1953, 
1956. There are several copies of the part concerning Qindsrin 
which is still unpublished, one in the British Museum, Add. 
23,334; one in Topkapi Sarayi, No. R.1564 and another in the 
Vatican Library, No. Arab 730. See also al-Ṭabbākh, I, 50; 
IV, 525; *Al-‘Ijām*, VII, 173; Brock, S.1.883.

17 There are several copies of *Tarīkh Ibn Abīl-Dam*; two in Khuda­ 
bakhsh Library, Nos. 2868 and 2869; another in Alexandria, 
City Council Library, No. 1292b.; still another in the Bodleian 
Library, No. Marsh 60, which I used. There is a Persian trans­ 
lation of the book, a copy of which is in Aya-Sofya Library, 
Nos. 3087 and 3088; see *Al-‘Ijām*, I, 42.

‘Iqd al-Jumān Fī *Tarīkh Ahl al-Zamān* is the title of al-Badr
al-‘Aynī’s book of which I used vol. XI. This is in As’ad
Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd al-ʾAntākī (died circa 458 A.H./1066 A.D.), the 11th century Christian chronicler, could be classified among the northern Syrian chroniclers. Although he was born in Egypt (about 980 A.D.) and spent the first 35–40 years of his life there, the latter and longer period of his life was spent in Antioch. Yaḥya wrote an important Tarikh which has reached us incomplete for, according to al-ʿAzīmī who uses the book, Yaḥya ended his Tarikh with the annals of 458 A.H./1066 A.D. which probably was the year of his death. Valuable information concerning the rise of the Mirdāṣid dynasty and the reign of ʿAlī b. Mirdās, followed by his son Ṣalīḥ b. Mirdās, and their relation with both the Byzantine Empire and the Fāṭimid caliphate is to be found in al-ʾAntākī's Tarikh. 18

Four famous poets lived in the emirate of Aleppo and three of them attended the Mirdāṣid courts. They were Abu ʾl-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī (ʿAbdūʾllah b. Sulaymān al-Tanūkhī, died 449 A.H./1047 A.D.), Ibn Sinān al-Khafājī (ʿAbdūʾllah b. Muḥammad b. Saʿīd, died 466 A.H./1073–74 A.D.), Ibn Abī Ḥasanā (al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbd Allāh, died 457 A.H./1065 A.D.) and Ibn Ḥayyūs (Muḥammad b. Sultān, died 473 A.H./1080 A.D.). The bulk of the work of these poets has

survived and contains valuable information. Save that part which has been provided by the poems of Abu’l-‘Alā’ this information could be considered as official, for the poets often expressed the court's desire and opinion.

From the poetical works of Abu’l-‘Alā’ we are able to glean valuable social and political information. Although Abu’l-‘Alā’ was politically unbiased, his information should be treated with special caution, for his philosophical teaching and views led him to express what he believed should be expressed, rather than a complete and accurate picture. He, however, mentions the rise of the Mirdāsid dynasty, the activities of the tribe of Tayy in Palestine and those of Kilāb in northern Syria, the relation between the Muslims and the Christians of Ma’arrat al-Nu’man, the general behaviour of the people during his time, more particularly that of the rulers, and how deeply his contemporaries were devoted to their own religious beliefs. ¹⁹

In the poems of Ibn Sinān we find some information about the relation between the Mirdāsid and both the Byzantine empire and the Fatimid caliphate for he went to Constantinople as an envoy of the Mirdāsid. ²⁰


²⁰ Ibn Sinān, 17-18, 40, 53.
Ibn Abī-Ḥasanā was specially attached to the court of Thīmāl b. Ǧalīḥ and in his poems there is mention of almost every event of Thīmāl's life and reign, although many of them were not mentioned by the chroniclers.  

The poems of Ibn Ḥayyus have a special value for his early work eulogises al-Dīzbarī, the Fāṭimid governor of Syria and opponent of the Mīrdāsids. Not long after the death of al-Dīzbarī, he came to Aleppo and lived in the Mīrdāsid court. Unlike Ibn Abī-Ḥasanā, who was loyal to the Mīrdāsids, Ibn Ḥayyus was a professional poet. He praised and flattered most those who paid most and defamed their opponents with equal enthusiasm. From his poems which were dedicated to the eulogy of al-Dīzbarī, it is possible to gauge the political situation in all Syria during the years 1023-1042 A.D. In his poem written in Aleppo he depicts the changes in the political scene which resulted from the Turco-Man influx.

Only two inscriptions appear to have survived and they confirm some of the information handed down to us by the chroniclers.

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23 N.Ch. (new series), XIII, 335-338; J.A.O.S., LXXIII, 89-95; R.Ch.E.A., VII: 164; VII, 188.
Three Mirdasid coins are known to be extant and these provide some additional information.

Yet further information may also be obtained from the works of other Syrian chroniclers, mainly from Damascus, such as Ibn al-Qalanisi (Abu Ya’alâ Hamza; died 551 A.H./1150 A.D.), Ibn ‘Asskir (‘Alî-b. al-Hasan, died 571 A.H./1175 A.D.), Abu Shama (Abdu’l Rahman b. Isma‘il, died 665 A.H./1265 A.D.), Ibn Shâkir al-Kutubi (Muhammad, died 764 A.H./1336 A.D.) and Ibn Kathîr (Isma‘il, died 774 A.H./1333 A.D.). The information provided by Ibn al-Qalanisi covers almost all the events which occurred in Aleppo during the 11th century and is of great value, but there appears to be very little of importance in the works of the other chroniclers.24

The works of a number of the Muslim non-Syrian chroniclers provide us with useful and detailed information. These chroniclers could be classified into two major categories: Egyptian, mainly concerned with the history of the Fâtimid caliphate and others, chiefly from Iraq, who wrote general annals of the history of Islam. Among the Egyptians, Al-Musabbihi (Muhammad b. Ubaidu’l-lah, died 1029 A.D.), Ibn Muyassar (Muhammad b. ‘Alî b. Yusuf (died 1278 A.D.) and al-Maqrizi (Ahmad b. ‘Alî, died 845 A.H./1441 A.D.) are the important chroniclers. To them could be

24 Ibn al-Qalanisi, 68-115; H.M.E. 114-115; Al-A’Lâm, II, 308.
added the name of Al-Mu'ayyad al-Din Da'i' al-Du'at (Hibatu'l-Lah b. Musa, died 1078 A.D.) for his autobiography and their works provide detailed information concerning the relation between the Fatimid caliphate and the emirate of Aleppo. In the fragment of Al-Musabbihi's Tarikh there is minute detail of the events connected with the rise of the Mirdasid dynasty and the Fatimid caliphate's reaction towards it.25

In his autobiography, Al-Mu'ayyad al-Din relates what happened in Aleppo during Thimal's reign at the time of al-Basasi's rebellion and the value of his narrative has been discussed in ch. III, pp. 155-160.

In the available part of his book Akhbar Misr Ibn Muyassar gives useful information about the reigns of Thimal b. Sulah and Mahmud b. Naṣr and their relation with the Fatimid caliphate. He also presents important material concerning the Turcoman migration and the Saljuq conquest of northern Syria.26

Although the work of most of the early Egyptian chroniclers has been lost, the core of their information has been preserved by al-Maqrizi in his book of Itti'az al-Hunaf'Bi-Akhbar al-A'immatu'l-Fatimidiyin al-Khulafa'. This book is another of the main sources of this thesis. In many ways it is no less valuable than the book of Zubdat al-Halab, for its content covers in

25 The fragment of al-Musabbihi's Tarikh is in the Escorial Library, No. C. 534, Pt. II. This same copy has been used by al-Maqrizi, as he has stated in own handwriting on its first folio.

26 Ibn Muyassar, II, 3-37.
detail the whole period of this thesis.27

Mention should be made here that some other Egyptian chroni-
clers, such as Ibn Munjib al-Ŝayrafi, author of Al-Ishara ila
man Dāl al-Wizārah; Ibn Aybak al-Dewadārī, author of Al-Durrah
al-Mudi'yaḥ; Akhbar al-Dawlah al-Ŷātimiya and Ibn Taghri
Bardī, author of Al-Nujum al-Ŷāhirā, provide us with some in-
formation.

The part provided by Al-Ŝayrafi is scanty and very brief
and of little importance is the material presented by Ibn Aybak.
There is large and detailed material in the book of Al-Nujum, but
since most of it has been cited from the book of Mir'at al-Zamān
which will be considered later, its importance has been very much
reduced.

Muḥammad b. Abdu'l-Malik al-Hamadānī (died 1127 A.D.),
author of the book 'Inwan al-Sjar, Ibn Abi'1 Hayyā'(was
alive during the 2nd half of the 12th century); Muḥammad b.
Muḥammad al-Isfahānī (contemporary of Ibn Abi'1-Hayyā');
Ibn al-Jawṣī (Abdu'l-Raḥmān b. 'Alī died 1201 A.D.); Ibn al-
Athīr al-Jazarī ('Alī b. Muḥammad, died 1233 A.D.); Sibṭ b. al-
Jawṣī (Yusuf b. Kızağlu, died 1256 A.D.); Ibn al-'Amīd
(Jirjus, died 1273 A.D.); Al-Dhahabi (Muḥammad b. Almād, died
1347 A.D.) and Ibn Khaldūn (Abdu'l Raḥmān b. Muḥammad, died
1405 A.D.) are the chroniclers who wrote general annals in
which they provide interesting and relative material.

27 A fragment of this book was published by Hugo Bunz, Leipzig
Al-Hamadhānī's book did not reach us but Ibn al-‘Adīm made vast use of it. He quotes from it a long and important passage connected with the reign of Aq-Sunqur. 28

Ibn Abī’l Hayyā’ī wrote a Tarīkh which bears his name and in its annals he relates a brief narrative which covers all the events occurring in the emirate of Aleppo during the 11th century. 29

Similar brief accounts are given by Al-İsfahānī in his book Al-Bustān al-Jamī le-Jamī’ Tawārīkh Ahl al-Zaman. 30

In his book of Al-Muntazam, Ibn al-Jawzī provides important information concerning the Saljuqs and their occupation of northern Syria, but he gives scanty information of the previous period. 31

1909 and by the late Dr. Muḥammad Jamāl al-Dīn al-Shayyāl, Cairo, 1948; there is a complete copy of the book in the Library of Ahmad III, Istanbul, No. 3013, of which I obtained a microfilm copy and used. It is now being published in Cairo and one volume of it is out.

28 Bugha, A., III, 268v.-269v.; al-Qiftī, l. 101-111; in volume XII of his book ‘İqd al-Jumān al-Badra l-‘Aynī has copied a large part of al-Hamadhānī’s Tarīkh, all of which is connected with the period following the 11th century. H.M.E. 61-62.

29 A unique manuscript of this book is in al-‘Ahdīmīya Library, Tunisia, No. 4915; see fols. 121v.-134v.

30 See fols. 86r.-92v. A copy of this book is in the Library of Ahmad III, Istanbul, No. 2959, and although its author was known as ‘İmād al-İsfahānī, he is not the same 12th century’s famous chronicler who held the same name and title but was distinguished as al-Kātib.

31 Al-Muntazam, VIII, 12-331; IX, 7-77; H.M.E. 62-63.
In a few successive pages of his book *Al-Kāmil*, Ibn al-Athīr gives what he considered to be a full account of the Mirdāsid dynasty. As a result of this little importance can be attached to this account which is a brief repetition of more reliable material. On the other hand, Ibn al-Athīr provides valuable details when he relates the Turcoman migration, the 'Uqayliyya occupation and the Saljuq conquest of northern Syria. He also relates an interesting narrative in his book *Al-Bāhir fi al-Dawlā al-Atābikiyya* concerning the reign of Aq-Sunqur.\(^{32}\)

Exceedingly important is the book *Mirʾat al-Zamān* by Sibt b. al-Jawzī. It provides valuable detailed narrative covering the whole period of this thesis. The most important part of this book is that which contains the annals of 448-480 A.H./1056-1086 A.D., for here Sibt cites almost the entire book of *Tarīkh Ghars al-Nīma* (Muḥammad b. Hilāl al-Ṣabī, died 1088). Ghars al-Nīma was a prominent personage in Baghdad. He was held in great repute in the Court of the Caliphate and by the Saljuq authority. He was an eye-witness of many of the events which took place in the second half of the 11th century. He had access to official documents and was able to contact many high officials and military leaders of the Saljuqs. He was thus able to obtain first hand information which he has embodied in his *Tarīkh*. The *Tarīkh* of Ghars al-

\(^{32}\) For the account concerning the Mirdāsid dynasty, see *al-Kāmil*, IX, 159-165; see also *Al-Bāhir*, 6-15.
Na'ima', as it appears through the Mir'at, contains the basic information concerning the Turcoman migration and Saljuq conquest of northern Syria. 33

In his book Tarikh al-Muslimin, Ibn al-'Amid enumerates most of the events which occurred in the emirate of Aleppo during the 11th century. He provides no new detail but repeats what the other chroniclers have related.

The information given by al-Dhahabi in his three books: Tarikh al-Islam, Duwal al-Islam and al-'Ibar differs very little from that provided by Ibn al-'Amid. This material has, however, been used and is referred to throughout the thesis.

33 See al-Qifti, 110-111; H.M.B., 61; Al-A'lam, VII, 357.
There are at least two versions of the book of Mir'at al-Zaman and as a result of this not all the surviving copies of it contain Tarikh Ghars al-Ni'mah, but only four - one of which is in the Bibliothèque Nationale, No. Arab 1506, and the rest in Istanbul, Аабад III, 2907 C, Vol. XIII, and Turk-Islam Eserleri Muzesi, Nos. 2134 and 2141. Depending on these four manuscripts, Dr. 'Ali Sevim has selected the events which he considered to be connected with the Saljuqs and published them in Ankara in 1968. In spite of his efforts, Dr. Sevim failed to give a critical edition. It is not for him, as an editor, to decide that an event or passage is connected with the Saljuqs simply because it contains a direct reference to one of them and that another should be omitted because it has not such a reference. The works of the chroniclers cannot be treated and classified as documents in a records office. Dr. Sevim was, on the other hand, unable to read the text accurately, perhaps because of insufficient knowledge of Arabic and also the difficulty of the text and condition of the manuscripts. As a result of this numerous errors have arisen throughout the text. In addition he has not used the phonetic pronunciation of any of the names enumerated in the text, specially those of the Turcomans.
In the book al-‘Ibar wa Diwan al-Mubtada Wa’l-Khabar, Ibn Khaldun briefly dealt with the Mirdasid dynasty — differing very little from Ibn Athir — and the other events occurring in Aleppo during the 11th century. Ibn Khaldun also repeats what the other chroniclers have related and brings no new information.

It is interesting to mention here that very scanty is the information provided by the chroniclers who wrote exclusively about the Saljuqs, such as Al-‘Imād, Al-Iṣfahānī, Ibn Naṣīr and al-Rawandi.34

Michael Psellus is the 11th century Byzantine chronicler who provides us with interesting information concerning the relation between the Mirdasid and the Byzantine empire during the reigns of Romanus III (Argyros 1028-34) and Romanus IV (Diogenes, 1068-71).35

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35 Psellus, 66-70, 351-356.
Chapter I

PERIOD OF TRANSITION

The fall of the Hamdanid dynasty; the first Fatimid occupation

This thesis is mainly concerned with the history of the emirate of Aleppo during the 11th century, particularly that part which marked a turning point in its history (and the history of Syria included with the Islamic world). Since the 7th century and until 1086 A.D., Aleppo was influenced or controlled by the Bedouin Arabs of northern Syria and Upper Mesopotamia. In 1086 Aleppo was captured by the Saljuqs and passed under their direct rule. The Saljuq conquest came at the end of a long struggle for supremacy between the Bedouin Arabs and the nomad Turcoman who migrated into northern Syria before the Saljuq conquest had taken place. This will be discussed later in the fourth chapter of this thesis, but it is interesting to mention here that as soon as, in 1064, the first Turcoman band had entered Aleppo, the political scene underwent a fundamental change and the power of the Bedouin Arabs began to wane. Accordingly the history of Aleppo during the 11th century could be divided into two parts, Arab and Turcoman.

During the first part Aleppo was surrounded by two great powers, those of the Byzantine empire and the Fatimid caliphate, and was influenced by their policies. Before dealing with the
history of this part it would be well to glance briefly at both
the Ḍaṭimid caliphate's and Byzantine empire's policy towards
Aleppo and the nature of its constitution as a state.
a) The Ḍaṭimid caliphate's (in Egypt) policy and interest in
Aleppo sprang from two main conceptions, theoretical and practical;
the theoretical was based on the doctrine of this caliphate which
aimed at the capture of the universe in general and in particular
bringing the Abāsid Caliphate to an end. Aleppo was not only a
part of the universe but "a doorway to Iraq; and if anyone should
capture it, all the countries beyond it would be in his hands".¹
In fact the Ḍaṭimid's policy, though disguised in a doctrinal
form, was merely a continuation of the traditional foreign policy
of independent Egypt towards Syria, of which Aleppo was a part.
Such a policy was the off-spring of the geographical structure of
Egypt which consisted merely of a large plain which had no natur-
al defensive boundaries, thus leaving the country open to easy in-
vasion, particularly from the north, where lies Syria. In order
to prevent this, Egypt captured Syria or part of it and used the
country as a buffer state. Before invaders could reach Egypt,
therefore, they would be met by Egyptian troops away from her
own borders. This same policy, which had been adopted by Egypt
during each period of independance, aroused the desire to acquire

¹Ibn al-Qalānī, 33-34; Ibn Ḥanī, 408.
more territory and led to the establishment of the Egyptian Empire.

The Fatimid Caliphate, who pursued this policy, succeeded in occupying southern Syria (although the South was usually insecure), but failed to dominate the north - save for some short periods - because it was thwarted by several obstacles which were beyond its might to overcome. Among the most serious of these obstacles were the remoteness of Cairo, the Fatimid centre, from Aleppo, the weakness of the Fatimid Caliphate during the eleventh century, the policy of the Byzantine Empire, which - as we shall see - both resented and resisted a Fatimid existence on its immediate borders of Asia Minor, the Aleppines, including the Syrians, hated and rejected the Fatimid rule for many reasons, especially financial, economic and administrative; the nomadic tribes of Syria who retained great and effective power, not only - as Bedouins - rejected the Fatimid rule as a city and centralised domination and continually created trouble and havoc, but were more subtle; they took the opportunity which the situation offered and captured regions and cities and established tribal dynasties; the examples of the tribe of Tayy in Palestine and the tribe of Kilab in northern Syria are striking.

*A brief study of both books Zubdat al-Halab and Dhayl Tarikh Dimashq would be sufficient to prove this.*
Such difficult conditions compelled the Fatimid Caliphate to modify its theoretical policy and arrive at a more realistic and practical one. The death-bed counsel of the celebrated Vizir Ya'qub b. Killis to the Fatimid Caliph Al-‘Aziz (975-996 A.D.) emphasised this moderate and practical policy. He says "Peace let there be with the Byzantines as long as they keep peace with thee; be satisfied by the Hamdanid - ruler of Aleppo - with the reference to you from their pulpits and on their coins; and do not leave Mufarrij b. Daghfal (Amir, tribe of Tayy’) alive when you have the opportunity to do otherwise". Thus the Fatimid Caliphate often tolerated the existence of independent rule in Aleppo but tried not to tolerate that in Palestine because Palestine is in immediate proximity to Egypt.

b) The Byzantine Empire, who captured Aleppo during the 10th century and was able to recapture it, did not try to retain the city or to annex it to its territory. The reasons were that not only that the maintenance was both difficult and costly, but it would appear that the Byzantine Empire preferred to see an independent state in Aleppo. The preservation of semi- or completely independent rule in Aleppo would serve the interest of the Empire more; for such a small and weak State would be useful as a

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3Al-Sayrafi, 23; Al-Nujum, IV, 21; Al-Yafi'i, II, 252-253.
4Zubda, I, 133-140.
buffer, link or bridge to the Muslim world, a free internation-
al market and a deterrent to the fanatical Arabic nomadic tribes
of Syria, checking them from raiding the Byzantine territory.
Taking as example the case of a certain Ahmad b. Al-Husain who,
in 394 A.H./1003 A.D., rose among the Nomads who inhabited the
region of Aleppo. He called for a Holy War against the infidels —
the Byzantines — and styled himself as Al-Asfar Al-Ghazi (a
Messianic name). He caused trouble in the Byzantine land and
the Emperor Basil II was unable to check him; therefore he asked
Lu'lu', the ruler of Aleppo, to find a solution. Lu'lu' in-
vited this Asfar to Aleppo on the pretext of conferring with a
view to co-operation; but when Asfar entered the city he was
immediately arrested and imprisoned in the Citadel of Aleppo.6

The Byzantine Empire often resisted by every means in its
power the annexation of Aleppo to any of the Muslim States; for
Byzantium the loss of Aleppo meant a step towards the loss of
Antioch and other parts of Asia Minor. Evidence of this can
be found in the history of the Macedonian Dynasty, taking for
example the reign of the Emperor Basil II. During his reign

6 Al-Antakî, 186-187; Zubda, I, 196; Al-Bustân, 83r.; Al-Man-
suri, 70r. There is another Asfar who later, in 439/1037,
emerged in upper Mesopotamia and was arrested by Naqr al-
Dawla, the Marwanid ruler of Diyar Bakr; see al-Muntazam,
VIII, 132; Al-'Azimi, 174v; Al-Kamil, IX, 369; Bar
Hebraeus, 205; Ibn Kathir, XI, 56.
the Fāṭimid Caliph Al-ʿAzīz endeavoured to capture Aleppo; he sent one expedition after another to accomplish this, but Aleppo escaped capture because of the resistance of its rulers and peoples who were supported by Byzantine troops and other kinds of assistance. Once in 384 A.H./994 A.D., Aleppo after a long and hard Fāṭimid siege was on the brink of surrender. The Byzantine Governor of Antioch failed to relieve the city. On hearing the news from an Aleppine envoy, the Emperor Basil II who was campaigning against the Bulgars, left the battlefield and came hurrying with a detachment of his army towards Aleppo. Basil travelled three hundred parasangs in sixteen days, reached the region of Aleppo, took the Fāṭimid troops by surprise and rescued the city. His brother and co-Emperor, Constantine, said to him "Take Aleppo and Syria would be easy to possess". Basil refused to do so because he was 'honest and straightforward', as Ibn Al-ʿAdīm alleged.

c) Aleppo's prestige was enhanced after the rise of independent Muslim Egypt by the establishment of the Tulunid Dynasty (868-905 A.D.). Henceforward it lay on the crossroads of the caravan routes which joined the territories of the Egyptian State with those of the Abbāsid Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire. After the establishment of the ʿAndalūsī Dynasty in Aleppo -

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7Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 42-43; Zubda, I, 185-191; Ostrogorsky, 308.
by Sayf Al-Dawla in 945 A.D., Aleppo became a centre dominating parts of upper Syria and Mesopotamia. This establishment brought into being the State of Aleppo which, in the course of time, was accepted as an established fact, thus acquiring some kind of coherence and administrative distinction.

The extent of this State shrank or expanded according to the power and ambition of its ruler together with the political situation in the surrounding countries. The entire State was dependent on its centre - the city of Aleppo - and there is scanty information concerning other parts or cities within the domain. There are greater sources of information concerning the city of Aleppo itself and, in fact, any attempt at a history of the state of Aleppo is actually more relevant to the city itself than to the state. Future reference to Aleppo must comprise the State.

Aleppo had not been ruled by any local (Aleppine) dynasty, but there was always a local body of professional bureaucrats headed by a Vizier. This body was in charge of the State's affairs and held effective power. Before the Saljuq conquest changes in rulers or dynasties left no lasting impression on the State.

There was no Alloppine policy towards either the Byzantine or the Fatimid Caliphate, but there was reaction to the events of the time and the political attitude of individual rulers.
Prior to 1070 A.D. Aleppo suffered a succession of rulers and tribal Amirs. Some of the rulers were appointed by the Fatimid Caliphate, but in spite of their appointment all of them attempted to declare their independence after a short while. The circumstances prevailing in Aleppo and its nearby countries encouraged an attitude of independence.

The Amirs were all members of the Mirdasid dynasty which was established 415 A.H./1024 A.D.; in fact this dynasty was the successor to the Hamdanid dynasty which came to an end in 1002. The period between 1002 and 1024 was a time of transition which ushered in the Mirdasid dynasty.

On the 15th of Safar, 392 A.H./2nd January, 1002 A.D., Abu Al-Fajjā’īl Sa’īd Al-Dawla, the Hamdanid Amir of Aleppo died. His death marked the actual end of the Hamdanid dynasty of Aleppo. During this Amir’s life the real ruler of Aleppo was the Chamberlain Lu’lu’, who was a former page (Ghulām) of Sayf Al-Dawla, the founder of the Hamdanid dynasty of Aleppo, now became the ruler of the State, acting in the name of Sa’īd Al-Dawla’s two children Abu Al-Ḥasan ‘Alī and Abu Al-Ma‘ālī Sharīf. Shortly afterwards he sent these two children to Egypt and declared himself as sole ruler of Aleppo. His son Mansur

8 Zubda, I, 192.

9 Ibid, 190-192; Ibn al-‘Amīd, 511-512; Safādī, II, 83; Munajjim, I, 235v; Uṣūl, XI, 574.
was his assistant and partner.\(^{10}\) Manṣūr and his father tyrannised over the remaining members of the Ḥamdānid dynasty and one of these members, known as Abu 'l-Hayāṣa, brother of Saʿīd Al-Dawla, fled with the help of a Christian Aleppo silk merchant to the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Emperor, Basil II, gave this Amir asylum with the honorary title of "Magister".\(^{11}\)

This Amir was a son-in-law of the Marwānid ruler of Diyar Bakr, Mumahhid Al-Dawla\(^{12}\) (997-1101 A.D.)

At the end of the year 599 A.H./1008 A.D., Lu'lu' died and his son Manṣūr became the sole ruler of Aleppo. Unlike his father, Manṣūr was over-confident, short-sighted, a drunkard, "Oppressor and unjust". Because of this the Aleppines hated him and several of their poets cursed him in their poems.\(^{13}\)

The population of Aleppo, who hated Manṣūr, began to search for a way to get rid of him. As time went by he was heedlessly and arrogantly increasing his oppression. There is no indication concerning the parties, factions or individuals who led the population in an endeavour to end his rule. We only know that the

\(^{10}\) Zubda, I, 195; Al-'Azīmī, 157r.; Al-Antākī, 209-210; Ibn al-'Amīd, 512.

\(^{11}\) For the value of this title, see Cambridge Medieval History, vol. IV, part II, p.20.

\(^{12}\) Zubda, I, 198; Al-Nujūm, IV, 161; Al-Antākī, 209-210.

\(^{13}\) Zubda, I, 198; Al-'Azīmī, 159r; Al-Antākī, 210; Iqd, XI, 554; Munajjim, I, 235v.; Nujūm, IV, 221; Ibn al-'Amīd, 513.
Aleppines found that the restoration of the Ḥamdānīd dynasty would be the best solution. They recalled and emphasised the fact that Mangūr himself was the son of Ḥamdānīd’s slave who had betrayed his masters and who had usurped their rights.¹⁴ For the Aleppines, the alternative was either to bring the two sons of Saʿīd Al-Dawla from Egypt or Abu ʿAl-Hayyja from the Byzantine Empire. None of these Amirs were able to leave either Egypt or Byzantium without permission. Such permission would mean the support and involvement of the State which sponsored the return.

The Aleppines did not apply to Cairo as it was difficult to imagine that the Fātimid Caliph would bless their movement, because Mangūr had built up good relations with the Caliph Al-Ḥakim. In 398 AH/1007 AD—during his father, Luʾluʿ’s life—Mangūr sent his two sons to Cairo where the Caliph Al-Ḥakim conferred on them a large sum of money together with seven villages in Palestine and honoured their father by the title of "Murtaqāʿ al-Dawla" (that is, "the content of the State").¹⁵ Many years before, the Fātimid Caliphate endeavoured to capture Aleppo and to bring the Ḥamdānīd dynasty to an end. Now this dynasty had vanished and Mangūr’s rule had no strong foundation. The time was now ripe for an easy conquest or, with a

¹⁴ Al-ʿAntākī, 210-211; Zubda, I, 199.
¹⁵ Zubda, I, 198.
little patience, Aleppo would itself fall into their hands of its own volition. 16

The other alternative facing the Aleppines, which they took, was to bring Abu al-Hayyā from the Byzantine Empire. The Aleppines also won the support of the tribe of Kilāb which held the greatest power in the State; subsequently they applied to Mumahhid Al-Dawla, the Marwānid ruler of Diyar-Bakr - and Abu Al-Hayyā's father-in-law - who was on good terms with the Byzantine Empire - to assist in effecting his return. Mumahhid Al-Dawla, who held the Byzantine honorary title of "Magister" asked Basil II, the Byzantine Emperor, to permit Abu al-Hayyā to leave Byzantium and resume the dynasty. Mumahhid Al-Dawla told Basil II that the Empire need spend no money as he himself would support his son-in-law and provide his needs. Basil II realised that this procedure would be beneficial to his Empire not only by ending the weak rule of Mangūr but at the same time it would end the Fātimid influence and strengthen that of Byzantium. He gave Abu al-Hayyā freedom to leave Byzantium and to return to Aleppo if he wished, but there is no record under what conditions this permission was granted. In 400 A.H./1009 A.D. Abu al-Hayyā went to Muyyafāriqin where his father-in-law furnished him with a sum of money, how much is not

16See pp. 28-30.
known, and about 200 horsemen. Abu al-Hayyāja wrote to the Chiefs of the Tribe of Kilāb, asking their support and promising large rewards. On his way toward Aleppo a group of the Kilābī, Chiefs and Tribesmen, met him accompanied and promised him their support until his aim was accomplished.

Desperate in the face of this danger, Mangūr rapidly moved. He wrote to the Kilābī Chieftains that he would, if they did not support Abu’l-Hayyāja, share with them the revenue and rulership of the outer regions of Aleppo. At the same time he asked Al-Ḥakim, the Fāṭimid Caliph, for aid promising that he would allow a Fāṭimid Governor to occupy the Citadel of Aleppo. Al-Ḥakim instructed the Cadi and Governor of Tripoli to lead the Fāṭimid troops garrisoned there towards Aleppo to the help of Mangūr. When these troops entered Aleppo Abu ‘l-Hayyāja together with the Tribe of Kilāb, had just reached the outskirts of Aleppo.

The Kilābī tribesmen and Chieftains, as Bedouins had their own standard of loyalty. Often they were willing to serve one man one day and another the next, thinking only of personal advancement and personal gain. On such men Abu ‘l-Hayyāja depended for the success of his campaign. Those Kilābī were secretly agreed to Mangūr's offer and terms and they were ready to betray Abu ‘l-Hayyāja and abandon him at a critical moment. Mangūr asked ‘Ali b. ‘Abi’l-Wāhid b. Ḥaydaraḥ, the Cadi of Tripoli,
who was the leader of the Fāṭimid troops, to inform the Caliph Al-Ḥakim of the situation by letter, to be sent by carrier pigeon. Without waiting for an answer and without knowing anything of Manṣūr's plan and secret agreement with the tribe of Kilāb, Cadi ‘Ali led his troops outside the city of Aleppo towards Abu ’l-Hayyāja's camp. At his approach the Kilābis scattered and betrayed their previous employer who fled towards the Byzantine territory. The Fāṭimid troops, after completely looting Abu ’l-Hayyāja's camp, returned to Aleppo to find Manṣūr rewarding them by shutting the city's gates in their faces.

Disappointed and unable to take Aleppo by force, the Fāṭimid troops retired to Tripoli.

Basil II refused to accept Abu ’l-Hayyāja' in his country again, but Manṣūr - who distrusted the Kilābis - was afraid that Abu ’l-Hayyāja' might make a second attempt, now appealed to the Emperor Basil II to permit, or rather to confine Abu ’l-Hayyāja' in Constantinople. The Emperor accepted the appeal and permitted the unfortunate Amir to return to Constantinople, where he spent the rest of his life. Available sources say nothing of any activity among the Aleppinos at this time.

Al-Ḥakim, the disappointed and angry Caliph, sent fresh troops and despatched with them Abu Al-Ma’talī Sharīf b. Sa‘īd

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17 Al-Antākī, 210-211; Zubda, I, 198-200.
Al-Dawla, who was one of the two Ḥamdānīd Amirs previously exiled to Cairo. In 402 A.H./1011 A.D. this Fāṭimid army reached Maʿarrat Al-Nuʿmān, where it was resisted by the Bedouins (probably of the tribe of Kilāb) who endeavoured to kidnap the young Ḥamdānīd Amir and to sell him to Mangūr b. Luʾluʾ. In the face of this danger the Fāṭimid troops retreated towards Cairo.¹⁸

It would appear that Mangūr was able, after a while, to solve his problems with Al-Ḥakim who, in Ramadan 404 A.H./March 1014 A.D., sent him a diploma confirming his authority in Aleppo.¹⁹ It is noteworthy that Mangūr b. Luʾluʾ was the first ruler of Aleppo who acknowledged the Fāṭimid Caliphate instead of the ‘Abbāsid, but the exact date of this is not known.²⁰

Mangūr who was thus able to solve his problems with both the Byzantine Empire and the Fāṭimid Caliphate, failed to satisfy the Tribe of Kilāb and here his rule was ultimately to collapse. The Kilābī Tribesmen and Chieftains asked Mangūr to fulfil his obligations since they had carried out their part of the secret agreement and the Ḥamdānīd Amir's attempts had failed. Mangūr tried to avoid their demands by procrastination

¹⁸Zubda, I, 200.
¹⁹Ibid., I, 200.
²⁰Ibn Abī’l-Hayṯāʾ, 121v.-122r.; Al-Kāmil, IX, 159; ‘Iqd, XI, 574; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 147; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 544, 580; Munajjim, I, 235v.
and diplomacy. The diplomatic measures were successful when he dealt with the Fāṭimid Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire; but the Bedouins preferred settlement in a practical manner—payment in gold; and neither understood nor trusted diplomacy. When Mangūr paid nothing to the Kilābīs they began to take. They pitched their tents on the immediate outskirts of the city of Aleppo and devastated the region. Their herds grazed in the city gardens, orchards and among the grain-fields. They cut the green trees and used every method to cripple the city and its ruler.

Mangūr, powerless to check them, pretended that he would not only fulfil his previous promises but would like to form a fresh pact and thus permanently settle the dispute. As a sign of good faith he invited the Tribe's Amirs and notable members to a banquet to be held inside the city. The tribe of Kilāb accepted the invitation and a number of its most prominent and other members entered Aleppo. Ibn al-‘Adīm indicates that more than a thousand Kilābī entered the city, but Ibn Sā‘īd Al-Antākī, who seemed to be one of Ibn Al-‘Adīm's sources and who related this event in more detail, reported that the number was about 700. Other chroniclers, such as Ibn Al-Athīr, Al-Badr Al-‘Aynī and Ṭāmād b. Litf-Allāh (Munajjim Bāshi), alleged that not more than 500 Kilābī horsemen entered Aleppo. The account of Al-Antākī is the most acceptable of all these reports.
because he was nearer to the event and well-informed. In addition, Al-‘Azīmī and Ibn Al-‘Adīm, who were fellow citizens of Aleppo and the most authoritative in its history, depended on Al-Antākī for their information. Al-‘Azīmī acknowledged quoting from Al-Antākī, while Ibn ‘Adīm, in spite of his lack of acknowledgment, appears to have quoted Al-Antākī literally. Ibn Al-Athīr, who gave little attention to the event, did not name his sources; but it would seem to be that he was the source of both Al-‘Aynī and Munajjim Bāshi.

To their surprise the Kilābīs, when they entered Maṃsur’s palace, found the gates suddenly closed behind them and Maṃsur with his pages (Ghulāms) welcomed them with their swords. Many Kilābīs were killed and those who were able to escape from the palace failed to get out of the city, for all the city gates were locked. The Kilābīs who escaped death were arrested and fettered then thrown into the prison dungeons of the Citadel. This event took place on the 2nd of Dhī’l-qa‘ada 402 A.H./27th May 1012 A.D. These tactics were used during the Islamic history by several rulers in different countries and times. It will be sufficient to recall the death banquet of the Umayyad given by the Abbasid leader Abdu’l-lāh b. ‘Alī and, the more modern example, the slaughter of the Mamluks by Muḥammad ‘Alī in the Citadel of Cairo.

21 Al-‘Azīmī, 180v.; Zubda, I, 200-201; Al-Antākī, 210-211.
22 Al-Kamīl, IX, 159-160; ‘Iqd, XI, 574-575; Munajjim, I, 235v.
On hearing what had befallen its members, the tribe of Kilāb, under the leadership of one of its Amirs named Muqallid b. Za'ida, moved from the outskirts of Aleppo southward and tried to capture Kafar-Jāb. Upon hearing the news of this movement Mangur b. Lu'lu' moved his captives from the prisons to other places with better conditions, equipment and more humane treatment. He gave special attention to the two brothers of Muqallid, Ḥāmid and Jāmi', but this new attitude did not last long, for Mangur received tidings that the tribe of Kilāb had failed to capture Kafar-Jāb, its leader was killed in the siege and the tribe scattered. The Kilābis were again thrown into the dungeons where they stayed for more than two years. Mangur killed a number of Chieftains, but most of the prisoners lost their lives as a result of the bad conditions of their prisons and the harsh treatment they suffered.

Among the prisoners was Šāliḥ b. Mirdas, an energetic and bold Amir whom Mangur tried to humiliate. He forced him to divorce his wife who was famed for her beauty. Ibn Al-ʿAdim related that her name was Tarūd and that she was mother of ʿĀṭiyya b. Šāliḥ, but Ibn Al-Athīr related that her name was Jābir and she was not only Šāliḥ's wife but his cousin. After the compulsory divorce had taken place, Mangur married her. It is questionable whether Mangur only intended to humiliate Šāliḥ and to enjoy her beauty or whether his object was to link himself with the tribe of
Kilab or with part of it as a means of solving his problems with this tribe and removing the menace of hostility without which he could not retain his rule. It could perhaps be that Mansur desired to achieve all these advantages. The available sources give no direct reference to this matter, but Al-Antakî relates that by threatening death and promising freedom, Mansur induced a number of his Kilabî prisoners to accept him and his impositions. Accordingly, in Shawal 403 A.H./April, 1013 A.D. he released a group of his Kilabî prisoners. We do not know their number or their names, but it seems, however, that they were only a few.

The actions Mansur took against Sa'îh b. Mirdas were unsuccessful and Sa'îh's boldness and resentment increased. On several occasions, when he was drunk, Mansur was going to execute Sa'îh. Sa'îh received a file from an anonymous friend together with a warning of Mansur's intention. Sa'îh made a hole in the wall of his prison and cut one of the two shackles which bound his feet but was unable to cut the other, so he tied the chain round his leg. In the dead of night of the 1st Muḥarram, 405 A.H./3rd July, 1014 A.D. Sa'îh escaped to freedom. The sources tell us that Sa'îh opened a hole in his prison wall then jumped from the citadel wall on to the hill below, hid in a drain-pipe for the night and on the next day reached the camp of his tribe in Marj-Dabiq. It is difficult to accept this version in its entirety. It would require a miracle to be able to jump from the high wall of
the citadel with a shackle, and a chain attached to a heavy block of iron on one leg, without receiving injury and without rousing the attention of the guard. In addition, there was the city wall, with its shut gates and vigilant guard. It would seem more likely that, either by tribe or through friendly arrangement, doors were unlocked for Šāliḥ. We also learn that later Mansūr accused the governor of the citadel of connivance. Be that as it may, we know that by some means Šāliḥ escaped and rejoined his tribe.

Within a few days of his arrival the tribe of Kilāb, encouraged by the escape, assembled and gave Šāliḥ their allegiance. Without delay Šāliḥ led the tribe to lay siege to Aleppo. Skirmishes took place between the two sides and in one of these minor engagements the troops of Mansūr were able to loot part of Šāliḥ's camp and to capture about fifty of the tribe's members. This encouraged Mansūr who summoned all his troops and recruited all the city 'rabble' with large numbers from the Christian and Jewish communities. In the afternoon of the very hot summer's day of Ṣafar 12th, 405 A.H./Friday, 13th August, 1014 A.D., and not far from Aleppo, Mansūr's army engaged the tribe of Kilāb in a decisive battle. The result was that Mansūr's army was completely routed, more than 2,000 Aleppines were slaughtered, and Mansūr himself together with his army's senior commanders, were captured.

When Mansūr led his army, he was accompanied by his two brothers who escaped to Aleppo where, with the help of their
mother, they maintained order in the city and Şaliḫ was unable to capture it. A negotiation for settlement between Şaliḫ and Mangûr, with his brothers, took place where the dignitaries of Aleppo acted as mediators. Before long an agreement was reached whereby Şaliḫ was to release Mangûr and Mangûr, in turn, was to release his Kilâbi prisoners, to give Şaliḫ 50,000 golden dinars, 120 silver Aleppine ratels, 500 dress lengths of various materials, to divorce the two Kilâbi women he had married – Şaliḫ's wife and another lady – to give his daughter to Şaliḫ as his wife and, more important, Şaliḫ would be the partner of Mangûr who would assign to him half the State of Aleppo including Aleppo itself and to acknowledge Şaliḫ as being the supreme Amir who held authority and control over the tribe of Kilâb. Mangûr's mother, wife and sons were put in Şaliḫ's hands as hostages. The significance of this agreement is in the last two conditions and, in spite of Mangûr's unfulfillment of some of the promises he gave, Şaliḫ sustained his authority over the tribe of Kilâb and captured Manbij and Balis (modern Masskanah on the Euphrates). By this, Şaliḫ actually laid the foundation of the Mirdasid dynasty.23

23 Al-Antâkî, 210-213; Zubda, I, 201-207; Ibn Abî Yaqînah, II, 234-235; Bushya, A.S., 467-478; Ibn Abî'1-Hayâja', 121v-122r.v.; Al-Kamîl, IX, 159-161; Al-'Azîmi, 161r.; Ibn al-'Amîd, 512-515; Tqd, XI, 574-576; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 147-148; Ibn Khaldûn, IV, 544-545; Al-Šafâdî, II, 83; Munajjim, I, 235v-236r.
The life and career of Șaliḥ b. Mirdās together with the establishment of the Mirdāsid dynasty will be considered in detail in the following chapter. It is necessary here to note that since 399 A.H./1008 A.D. Șaliḥ was in control of Raḥba (modern Mayadin on the Euphrates), and by gaining Manbij and Balis he secured for himself what was, during the 11th century, the Mesopotamian division of the State of Aleppo. This division was not only fertile but strategically important, with a significant commercial value. Șaliḥ's acquisition put him into direct touch with Iraq, Byzantium and the Fāṭimid Caliphate and was used by him as a base for the capture of Aleppo at a later date. After the establishment of the Mirdāsid dynasty in Aleppo the Mesopotamian division was a place of asylum for the members of this dynasty whenever, during the 11th century, they were obliged to abandon Aleppo; for this region was retained by the Mirdāsids who invariably recaptured Aleppo.

Mangūr fulfilled some of his promises to Șaliḥ, but as on previous occasions he repudiated most of them. He refused the marriage of Șaliḥ to his daughter and the sharing of the State income. As reprisal Șaliḥ invested the city of Aleppo and prevented commerce and provisions from entering it. This action

24 Al-‘Aṣīmī, 153v; Ibn Abī’l Hayyā’, 121v.; Itti‘āz, Annals 399 H; Ibn Junghul, IV, 196r.; Al-Kāmil, IX, 138-139; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 580; Al-Ṣafāḍī, II, 82-83; Munajji, I, 328r.
affected the city and caused hardship to its population and Mangûr was helpless. Mangûr solicited the support of the Byzantine Emperor, Basil II, against what he termed "a Bedouin uprising" which, if not checked, would harm not only Aleppo but the Byzantine Empire. Basil II responded to his request by sending 1,000 Armenian troops. Şâli̇h, however, appealed to the Emperor himself and submitted his case against Mangûr, outlining his treacherous behaviour, and, at the same time he assured the Emperor of his own personal goodwill. According to Al-Antâkî, Basil was convinced and agreed that Şâli̇h's cause was just. He ordered the withdrawal of the Armenian troops thus leaving Mangûr to his fate.²⁵ Despite Al-Antâkî's report it would perhaps be more appropriate to believe that this withdrawal was not the result of conviction but rather because of the Emperor's wish to avoid an open clash with the Bedouin tribes which could only have been detrimental to the Empire. Taking into consideration that, not only Şâli̇h's tribe and property bordered the Byzantine Empire but the fact that the tribe of Numayr, who was of the same origin as the tribe of Kilāb and with whom cordial relations had mostly existed, also bordered the Empire in the regions of Harrān and Edessa. The withdrawal of the Byzantine troops weakened Mangûr's position and strengthened Şâli̇h who sent one of his sons as his

²⁵Al-Antâkî, 212-213.
as his representative to Constantinople to give allegiance to the Emperor.  

The fatal blow to Mansūr's rule came when he disputed with his page (Ghulām) Fāth al-Qalī (i.e. Fath of the Citadel) the governor of Aleppo's Citadel. Mansūr accused Fath of being the source of all his troubles, for by his carelessness or, rather, connivance, Sāliḥ had escaped. He who lacked the power to remove Fath endeavoured - as was his custom - to rid himself of him by other means. On realising his master's intrigue, Fath not only refused to descend and meet him but shut the citadel gate and went into open rebellion against him. At the same time he acknowledged the supremacy of Sāliḥ b. Mirdās and the Fāṭimid Caliph Al-Ḥakīm. This occurred on the night of Saturday, 24th Rajab 406 A.H./7th January 1016 A.D. and took Mansūr by surprise since he thought that Sāliḥ had captured the Citadel. He fled with his sons, brothers and some of his pages and a sum of money towards Antioch. When morning came the news of Mansūr's flight had spread in the city of Aleppo and disorder prevailed. The palace of Mansūr was looted and, what was worse, 80,000 dinars' worth of chattels was lost. But the most disastrous effect was (as Ibn Al-ʿAdīm relates) the loss of 28,000 volumes of manuscripts which were in the library of the palace. Some houses belonging to Christians and Jews were pillaged.

26 Ibid., 213-214.
Several Arabic chroniclers considered that this event marked the end of the Ḥamdānīd dynasty. On the second day of his flight Mansūr reached the city of Antioch, where he took asylum. It was the policy of the Byzantine Empire, as it was also that of the Fāṭimid Caliphate, to give refuge to any ex-ruler of Aleppo who could serve as a political pawn or instrument of blackmail, to be held as a threat against and pressure upon the successive ruler; or as a reserve in time of need.

Some chroniclers reported that Fath's rebellion against his master was originally encouraged - if not arranged - by Al-Ḥakīm, the Fāṭimid Caliph, who had communicated with him. No-one of the chroniclers who were authoritative in the history of Aleppo, such as Al-ʾAntākī, Al-ʿAẓīmī and Ibn Al-ʿAdīm, mentioned such an occurrence. They related that Fath, on the morning of his rebellion, agreed with ʿṢalih b. Mirdās on sharing the State according to ʿṢalih-Mansūr agreement. Fath also sent ʿṢalih the family of Mansūr and ʿṢalih, in turn conveyed this family to Antioch, except Mansūr's daughter whom he kept and married. At the same time, to secure his position, Fath wrote to the Fāṭimid ruler of Afrāmīyā asking his support and inviting him with his troops to Aleppo. The Fāṭimid ruler of Afrāmīyā, Ḥalī b. Ahmad, generally

known as Al-Ḍayf, responded to Fath's request and came to Aleppo with his troops. Afterwards Fath wrote to the Caliph Al-Ḥakim offering allegiance for which Al-Ḥakim thanked him and conferred on him the honorary title of Mubārak Al-Dawla Wa Saʿīdahā (i.e., the State's blessing and happiness). Al-Ḥakim wrote also to Ṣalih b. Mirdas asking him to co-operate with Al-Ḍayf and Fath and conferred on him the title of Asad Al-Dawla (i.e. the lion of the State). In order to gain popular support, Al-Ḥakim remitted several taxes and exempted Aleppo from the payment of a year's tribute. All this took place after the flight of Mangūr.

The chroniclers who reported that a communication between Fath and Al-Ḥakim had taken place before the rebellion were Ibn Al-Āthīr, Al-Badr, Al-ʿAynī, Abuʾl-Fidaʾ, Ibn Khaldūn and Ahmad b. Lutf-Allāh (Munajjin Bāshi). Ibn Al-Āthīr seems to have been the source of all these chroniclers. Ibn Al-Āthīr's account of the history of Aleppo during the 11th century is very brief and complicated, therefore it cannot be relied upon if there were not other chroniclers such as Ibn Al-ʿAdīm to corroborate it.  

The events which took place in Aleppo disturbed the Byzantine Empire and its reaction was to give Mansūr asylum, to assign to him a stipend with a fief close to the border of Aleppo in order

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to keep watch on events there, and, for this purpose, troops of his own were allowed to him. The Emperor "prohibited travel and commerce from all the Byzantine Empire to any part of Syria and Egypt".29 Şaliḥ asked the Emperor Basil II to exempt him and his followers from this restriction and the Emperor acquiesced.30

Şaliḥ was against the Fāṭimid occupation and he warned and inspired Faṭḥ, advising him to get rid of them with his connivance on the basis of partnership where he, Şaliḥ would stay outside the city and Faṭḥ would remain in the citadel. Al-Ḥakim put pressure on Faṭḥ, offering him Sidon, Tyre and Beirut as life iqṭa' together with all the treasures of the citadel of Aleppo if he should relinquish his office. Şaliḥ b. Mirdas, probably with Byzantine encouragement, advised Faṭḥ to refuse the offer and again assured him of his readiness to assist him to expel the Fāṭimid troops. Faṭḥ was inclined to accept Şaliḥ's proposals. The people of Aleppo, who had just got rid of Mansur, who had not forgotten Şaliḥ's blow, and who were enjoying the tax exemption, protested against Faṭḥ's intentions. They assembled at the gate of the citadel and told Faṭḥ that they preferred the rule of the Fāṭimid and had no desire for Bedouin Governorship.

29 Al-Antākī, 214; Zubda, I, 209-210; Al-‘Aṣīmī, 161r.v.
30 Al-Antākī, 214.
This was the first and the last time, as we shall see, that the Aleppines favoured Fatimid rule.

Al-Dayf and his Fatimid troops were unable to calm the city, so he asked the Caliphate for reinforcements. Al-Jākim ordered the rulers of Tripoli and Sidon to reinforce him, which they did. He also asked Ḥassān b. al-Mufarrij, Amir of the tribe of Ṭayy, and Sinān b. ‘Ulaiyān, Amir of the tribe of Kalb, to move towards Aleppo and to be in readiness to support the Fatimid troops there. Ṣāliḥ was now handicapped and Fatḥ was loth to relinquish his post and to go to Tyre.31

On the 2nd Ramadan 407 A.H./3rd February 1017 A.D. the first Fatimid-appointed ruler entered Aleppo. His name was Fatīk and his title Amir Al-Umara ‘Azīz al-Dawla. He was a freed page (Ghulām) of Armenian origin.32 This ruler was ambitious and capable, for before long he had settled all the problems with Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās and persuaded him to send his Mother to live in Aleppo as a sign of their friendship. The available sources give no detail of the kind of settlement made. It would appear that Ṣāliḥ was satisfied and remained contented during the reign of this ruler, which lasted more than five years. The sources speak of no movement by Ṣāliḥ during this period. On the other hand, ‘Azīz al-Dawla was able to satisfy the Byzantine Emperor, Basil II, who

32 Al-Antakī, 216; Zubda, I, 215-216; Al-‘Aqīmī, I, 161v;
removed the commercial blockade and permitted the resumption of communications between Aleppo and Byzantium.

These things, however, annoyed the Caliph Al-Ḥakim, who regarded them as a step towards independence, but he was unable to take any immediate action as there were no Fātimid troops in Aleppo. On assuming his post, 'Azīz Al-Dawla persuaded the leaders of the Fātimid troops that their mission was accomplished and that they should withdraw to their former bases. 'Azīz Al-Dawla not only ignored Al-Ḥakim's reproaches, made no attempt to bring about reconciliation but proclaimed his own independence, striking his own coins and decreeing that his name alone should be mentioned from the pulpits. It is not known exactly at what date this action took place. It was probably in the year 411 A.H./1020 A.D. for an inscription bearing this date, the name of Al-Ḥakim and 'Aziz Al-Dawla was found in Aleppo. To sustain this, the chroniclers relate that in 411 A.H./1020 A.D. Al-Ḥakim prepared an expedition against 'Aziz Al-Dawla and that 'Azīz Al-Dawla called on the Emperor Basil II offering to yield Aleppo to him. When Basil was on his way towards Aleppo, news of Al-Ḥakim's mysterious disappearance reached 'Azīz Al-Dawla. On hearing this news, 'Azīz Al-Dawla sent a communication to the Emperor Basil II informing him that his offer was now invalid and that he no longer required his help and, should he attempt

al-'Amīd, 515; ihtiy' az, Annals, 413H; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 148; 'Iqd, XI, 576-577.
to capture Aleppo by force, hō - 'Aziz Al-Dawla - and the tribe of Kilāb would be his enemies. Basil did not continue his journey towards Aleppo, but diverted his army towards Mināz-Jird.33

The mysterious disappearance of Al-Ḥākim, the Fāṭimid Caliph, and the succession of his young son Al-Zāhir gave confidence to 'Aziz Al-Dawla. This confidence was sustained by the gifts and Robe of Honour he received from the Caliphate at Cairo as a sign of reconciliation and recognition. 'Aziz Al-Dawla, however, was not over-confident, for he did not relax but took the opportunity to strengthen his position in Aleppo. He rebuilt and fortified the Palace at the foot of the Citadel in order to retain contact with it and to avoid any re-occurrence like that which had happened to Mangūr b. Lu’lu’. He also procured a number of pages to be in his service and guard.

These pages lived in the Citadel and their Commander was a certain Badr, Turkish in origin, who at the same time held the post of governor of the Citadel. It would appear that when 'Aziz Al-Dawla placed his trust in this bodyguard of slaves, that he forgot the fact that he was, himself, a slave who had

33Al-ʾAntākī, 216; Zubda, I, 216-219; Al-ʿAzīmī, 161v; Ibn al-ʾAmīd, 515, 520; Ittīʿāz Annals, 413H; R.C.E.A., VI, 164 (No. 2311).
betrayed his master and that a similar fate could overtake him. And so it happened, for in Cairo the young Caliph was not the actual ruler, but the real power was in the hands of Al-Sayidah (i.e. the Mistress), his aunt, who was both subtle and scheming. With gifts and bribes Al-Sayidah induced Badr to betray his master. She promised him 'Azīz Al-Dawla's post if he would find a way to assassinate him. Apparently communications between Badr and Al-Sayidah passed unsuspected by 'Azīz Al-Dawla. It may have been carried by unknown merchants or, more probably, by the envoys who brought the gifts to 'Azīz Al-Dawla, after Al-Zāhir's accession to the Caliphate. It could well have been that the sending of the gifts was a two-edged sword. By this means it would have been possible to bring reconciliation and to find an avenue of treachery.

'Azīz Al-Dawla was a lover of beauty and literature, poetry and philosophy; he had good relations with the celebrated Abu'l-'Alā' Al-Ma'arrī who composed and dedicated several books to him. However, 'Azīz Al-Dawla had other love tendencies, he was extremely fond of one of his pages, an Indian by birth, named Tūzūn. Badr, ever watchful for an opportunity to consummate his intrigue with the Caliphate of Cairo, conceived a way to use Tūzūn. He insinuated the idea into Tuzun's mind that his master was weary of him and desired to be rid of him. Badr told Tuzun that he had averted death from him on several
occasions and that he, Badr, loved him and could not bear to contemplate his death. Trembling with fear, the wretched slave begged Badr for more help and further advice. Badr replied that it was a matter of either their lives or that of "Azīz Al-Dawla. He added: let us kill "Azīz Al-Dawla and succeed him. They decided on this course and awaited a suitable opportunity to carry out their plot. On Friday, 3rd of Rabī‘ Al-Akhir 413 A.H./6th July 1022 A.D., the opportunity arose, for "Azīz Al-Dawla spent that day in hunting. In his absence the plotters planned to kill him in the night after his return. The plan was that Badr should make him drunk and Tuzun should kill him in his bed when "Azīz Al-Dawla, as was his custom would call upon him. In the evening of that day, "Azīz Al-Dawla returned from his hunting, bathed himself, ate and drank, then after a while went to bed and slept. While asleep Tūzūn, who was with him, took "Azīz Al-Dawla's sword and, with one blow, severed his head from his body. Badr, who was waiting and watching, saw the deed was accomplished. He raised a hue and cry which roused all the pages who immediately fell upon the luckless Tūzūn and killed him. This is the only narrative extant concerning "Azīz Al-Dawla's assassination and it is difficult to accept it at its face value. The manner of "Azīz Al-Dawla's assassination is of little matter compared with its consequences.
Badr reported the incident to the Caliphate in Cairo. The Caliphate openly commiserated the death, but rejoiced secretly and applauded Badr for his services. He was, however, appointed by the Caliphate as a successor to 'Azīz Al-Dawla and was given the honorary title of Wafyy Al-Dawla Wa Aminahā (i.e. the State's loyal and faithful). This title indicates not only his guilt but the consent to and participation of the Caliphate in the crime. In fact, it is questionable whether Al-Sayidah actually participated in the plot to kill 'Azīz Al-Dawla, or whether the whole story was merely a reflection of how Al-Hākim, the Fatimid Caliph, met his fate. It is well-known that most of the Arabic Chroniclers alleged that Al-Sayidah conspired in the death of Al-Hākim, her brother, as they also report her part in the plot which killed 'Azīz Al-Dawla. In both cases the story, method and the end of her fellow conspirators are similar. The sources are unable to confirm or disprove either supposition and the matter will remain an enigma unless fresh sources are discovered.

The Caliphate used the appointment of Badr merely as a stop-gap in order to gain time. It would appear that Badr was aware of this for, from a letter sent from the Caliphate to him which Al-Maqrizi quotes, it can be deduced that he was anxious concerning his future and that the letter was sent to restore his confidence in the goodwill of the Caliphate.
towards him. This letter was carried by Al-Ḍayf who, previously, entered Aleppo to assist Fath after his rebellion against his master, Manṣūr b. Luʿluʿ. Al-Ḍayf went into Aleppo and met Badr privately when he was able to persuade him to give up his post. After relinquishing the post which he had held for only 96 days, Badr was arrested and shortly after met his fate.

On Wednesday, 11th Rajab 413 A.H./10th October 1022 A.D., two Fāṭimid Rulers appointed by Cairo, arrived in Aleppo, one for the City and the other for the Citadel. For the City, Ṣafyy Al-Dawla (i.e. the Chosen of the State) Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. Jaʿfar b. Falaḥ, who was a Member of the militant Kutāmi tribe (one of the North African Barbar tribes who accompanied the Fāṭimid conquest of Egypt in 358 A.H./969 A.D.). In the Citadel, Yumn Al-Dawla (i.e. the Auspicious of the State) the eunuch Saʿādat. By this time the Fāṭimid Caliphate had learned its lesson; it did not appoint only one ruler in Aleppo nor make the mistake of making the appointment a long-term one. We do not, therefore, know anything about the reign of these two rulers because, on the 15th Muḥarram 414 A.H./10th April 1023 A.D., Ṣafyy Al-Dawla was dismissed. His replacement was another Kutāmi known as Sanad Al-Dawla (i.e. the Support of the State) Al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. Thuʿban. This new Ruler had previously been the governor of Afāmya. His reign, of which also nothing is known, ended with his death on Thursday, 21st Rābiʿ.
al-Akhīr 415 A.H./2nd July 1024 A.D. which was the result of long illness.

On learning of Sanad al-Dawla's illness the Caliphate in Cairo despatched his brother from Egypt to act on his behalf. The name of this brother was Thu'ban and his title was Sadīd al-Mulk (that is, the right of kingship). He reached Aleppo twenty five days after his brother had died. The Caliphate assigned him to his brother's post and, at the same time, appointed the eunuch Maṣūf, as a new governor for the citadel. The reign of both these rulers who were unpopular was short lived.35 Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās, who was very active at that period, wrested Aleppo from them and founded the Mirdāsid dynasty. Ṣāliḥ, who was Amir of the tribe of Kīlab, the dynasty founded by him in Aleppo was tribal; the rise of the Mirdāsid dynasty and its tribal background will be examined in the following chapter.

Chapter II

THE MIRDASID DYNASTY I

Its Tribal Background; Ṣāliḥ Ibn Mirdas and the Establishment of the Dynasty; the Reign of Naṣr Ibn Ṣāliḥ.

Among the Arabic tribes who migrated to Syria with and after the 7th century's Islamic conquest was a part of the tribe of Kilāb. Kilāb, before the rise of Islam, was one of the large and prominent tribes of the Arabian Peninsula living in the region of the city of Medina. The portion which migrated into Syria settled in the region lying to the west of the upper bank of the Euphrates.¹ From the 7th century and until the end of the 11th, Kilāb played a very important role in the political life of Syria particularly in the northern part of the country: for example, during the Umayyad period, the struggle for the Caliphate after the death of YazīdI (680-683 A.D.). Zufar b. al-Ḥārith Al-Kilābī, with his tribesmen, fought against Marwān b. Al-Ḥakam in the battle of Marj-Rāḥīṭ (64A.H./683 A.D.). Zufar was defeated and fled northward where he established a stronghold in the town of Qarqīṣya. He refused to give allegiance to Marwān, the new Caliph who in turn was unable to force him to do so.²

¹ Subḥ, I, 340; Qalāʿid, 116; Wafāʾ, II, 230.293.
² Khalīfa, I, 326; Tabari, V, 540-542; Ibn ʿAsākir, VI, 211r-212v.
The battle of Marj-Rāḥiṭ was, in fact, a struggle for power between the two Bedouin divisions of Syria. According to the Arab genealogists, the Arabs were the descendants of two great ancestors, 'Adnān - who lived in northern Arabia - and Qaḥṭān - who lived in the south. After the establishment of the Islamic Empire, this (geographical) pedigree was almost the decisive factor in the political division of the Arabic tribes. The two parties who fought against each other in Marj-Rāḥiṭ were southern descendants on the one side and northerners the opposite. Kalb was the prominent tribe among the southerners as, similarly, Kilāb was among the northerners. One significant result of the battle of Marj-Rāḥiṭ was the frustration of the 'Adnāni tribes from occupying southern Syria; consequently Syria became divided into two tribal parts, unintentionally following the same pattern as Arabia, the original homeland. In the course of time this division was consolidated and accepted as an established fact. There is no account of any 'Adnāni tribe settling in southern Syria or, conversely, any Qaḥṭāni settling in the north.

The Kilābī tribesmen considered northern Syria to be their own (Diyār) regions and regarded as an offensive act the northward movement of any tribe of southern Syria. On several occasions during the 11th century the Fatimid Caliphate used the warriors of the tribe of Kalb in its expeditions
against Aleppo. On each of these occasions the tribe of Kilāb interpreted the expedition as a Kalbi intrusion into their own (Diyār) territory and not as a struggle between the Caliphate and the Mirdāsid Amir of Aleppo. This was expressed by Ibn Abī Ḥasanā, the contemporary poet, and was manifested in 452 A.H./1060 A.D. when the Fāṭimid Caliphate attempted to use the tribe of Kalb against Al-Raḥba. 3 Al-Mu‘ayyad Fi‘l-dīn (the Fāṭimid Chief Dā‘ī) realised this and took it into consideration when, in 448 A.H./1056 A.D., he was despatched from Cairo to help Al-Basāsīrī in his rebellion. After Al-Mu‘ayyad reached Damascus, Cairo instructed him to take with him a Kalbi guard when he was required to travel northward. He defied the order and went alone, knowing that if he took a Kalbi guard it would be regarded by the Kilābī tribesmen as an act of aggression and would lead to the failure of his mission. 4 It is out of the scope of this study to discuss the whole history of the tribe of Kilāb. The 10th century is the period which is more directly connected with this thesis, not only because it is closer to the 11th century, but because there was a large new wave of Kilābī migration into Syria during this period. This fresh wave paved the way to the rise and establishment of the Mirdāsid dynasty.

3 Ibn Abī Ḥasanā, I, 159-163; Mīr‘āt, A., Annals, 452 H: see also p.123 of this main chapter.

At the advent of the 10th century, the time of the Qaramiṭa movement and activity, northern Syria and upper Mesopotamia suffered the influx of a new wave of Bedouins. This wave consisted of several tribes of ‘Āmir b. Ṣa‘pa’. They were mainly the tribes of Khafāja, ‘Uqayl, Numayr, Qushayr and Kilāb. After a lapse of several years each of these tribes settled in a special region (Diyār): ‘Uqayl in the province of the city of Al-Mosul; Khafāja, in lower Mesopotamia; Numayr on the Mesopotamian-Byzantine border, particularly in the region of the town of Harrān; Qushayr in the region of Qal‘at-Ja‘bar, and Kilāb in the country round Aleppo, the former region of the tribe.\(^5\)

Before their settlement, and even after, they — in particular Kilāb — supplied the personnel for the Qaramiṭa uprising and activity.\(^6\) This migration brought chaos and disorder into Syria and created the right atmosphere for the rapid emergence and then the disappearance of many adventurers, such as Al-Mutanabbi the poet and Al-Asfar Al-Ghāzi. In Aleppo — after the establishment of the Ḫamdānid dynasty there— Kilāb was involved in the struggle of this dynasty against Byzantium,

\(^5\)Ibn Hawqal, 233; Jamhara, 274-275; Baghya, A.S., 432-434; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 545; Subb, I, 340-343.

\(^6\)For a few examples, see Ibn al-Qalānisi, 1-3; Itti‘āz, Sh., 210, 220.
plunged into every uprising against its rule and also played a
decisive part in the bid for power among the rival Amirs of
this dynasty.⁷

Ibn Al-ʿAdim gives 309 A.H./921 A.D. as the date on which
the tribe of Numayr arrived in Mesopotamia.⁸ He also gives
320 A.H./932 A.D. as the year in which the new Kilābi wave ar-
rived in Syria. He cites from Al-Asadi (see below) that this new
wave was comprised of two Kilābi tribes known as Subayān and
Dhuʿaybah respectively. He goes on to say that in 322 A.H./
933 A.D. these two tribes penetrated into upper Syria; in 325 A.H./
937 A.D. they invaded Maʿarrat Al-Nuʿman, sacked its environments
and captured its ruler together with most of his troops when they
tried to resist them.⁹

For almost two centuries, the 10th and most of the 11th, the
life of northern Syria and upper Mesopotamia, in every aspect
greatly suffered from this new wave of Arab nomads. There was
political instability together with disorder and lack of security.
The tribal life in these regions was changed and the number of

⁷See Miskawīh, II, 214-215; Al-ʿAntākī, 157, 186-187; Ibn al-
Zubda, I, 149-151, 196; Al-Muntaẓam, VIII, 12, 132; Aḥbār.
17r.; Al-Kāmil, IX, 369; Bar Hebraeus, 205; Al-Mansūrī,
70r.; Al-Bustān, 83r.; Mīrʿat, A., Annals 314 H; Ibn Kathīr,
XI, 56.

⁸Bughya, A.S., 484.

⁹Bughya, A.S., 478-480; Bughya, A., I, 92r.-93r.; Zubda, I,
99, 293; Ibn Hayyūs, II, 424.
nomads rapidly increased. At the same time the extent of cultivated land became less while commercial life almost came to a standstill, as Ibn Ḥawqal, an eye witness, reports. He also relates that before the advent of the new migrants most of the tribes in these regions were almost sedentary. They had a few camels and were more closely related to urban life than to the roving life of the nomads. The new Kilābis settled in the same region together with their predecessors. The other tribes settled in Mesopotamia without great difficulty. They exerted pressure on the existing tribes who were mostly sedentary and obliged them to integrate into the rural life of the country or to withdraw to Byzantine territory. Ibn Ḥawqal describes all this; he also speaks of the removal of Banu-Ḥabīb from Mesopotamia to Byzantium which took place at the same time. Ibn Ḥawqal alleges the cause of their removal to be the policy of Sayf Al-Dawla Al-Ḥamdānī. In fact, if Ibn Ḥawqal's personal attitude of hatred towards Sayf Al-Dawla is waived, and the pressure made by the new migrants together with the fact that Sayf Al-Dawla and Banu-Ḥabīb originated from the same tribe of Taghlib are considered, it would then be easy to conceive a more apt reason for the removal rather than the one given by Ibn Ḥawqal. This would be that, after the arrival of the new migrants, Banu-Ḥabīb were driven out of their region and obliged

10 Ibn Ḥawqal, 209-212, 228; Al-İṣṭahri, 43.
to enter Byzantium where they took refuge and adopted Christianity.\footnote{Ibn Hawqal, 209-212, 228.}

Concerning the tribe, or rather the tribes, of Kilāb the new migrants no doubt had had some considerable effect on the life and organisation of the whole body of Kilāb. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to find any reliable information concerning this question. The chroniclers who mention the tribe of Kilāb seldom refer to any branch of the tribe and, in consequence, their information is inadequate for any attempt at discussion of the life and organisation of Kilāb. In his book Bughyat Al-Talab, Ibn Al-‘Adīm writes a special chapter in 24 folios, enumerating the Arabic tribes who inhabited Aleppo. He gives especial attention to the tribe of Kilāb. The disadvantages of the information contained in this chapter are: that it is very complicated, involved and most of it cited from an unknown source. Ibn Al-‘Adīm quotes almost all of his material from a book which was called Diwān Al-Arab Wa Jawharat Al-Adab Wa-‘Idāb Al-Nasab by Muhammad b. Ahmad b. ‘Abdullah Al-Asadi. In spite of being a great chronicler and genealogist nothing certain is known about this author, for no biography of him is extant. The usage of "Saj" in the title of this book indicates that it was written in a later period, 12th century or
after. There are several indications that this Asadi lived during the later 12th and early 13th centuries. He was a disciple of the celebrated Munqidhi Amir Usama b. Murshid (died 1188 A.D.). Ibn al-‘Adim was one of his disciples and in his book Bughya al-Talab he quotes a great deal of information received from him, both orally and from his written works. 12 Although Al-Asadi was alive in the early 13th century all the genealogical material which Ibn al-‘Adim quotes from his book is, as it indicates, local, northern Syrian, and drawn from an early 10th century source. There is no indication of the identity of this 10th century source, but in one place there is mention that its author was giving information in the year 320 A.H./932 A.D., and on another occasion, in 325 A.H./936 A.D., at the time of the arrival of the new migration. 13

After arriving at a more or less conclusive date for this author, it may perhaps be possible to sketch an outline of the organisation of Kilab at the time of the arrival of the new immigrants. Although Al-Asadi's information is very complicated — on the other hand it is valuable material. It would appear that its author was not dependent upon the accounts of the early genealogists, but reported what he witnessed. From this material it

12 Bughya, A., III, 281 r.-v.; V, 221 v.
can be deduced that, in the 10th century, the Kilābīs were formed of four principal divisions. The members of these four divisions were the descendants of four sons of Kilāb, the great ancestor. The names of these sons were Mu'āwiya, 'Abdu'llah, 'Amr and Abu-Bakr. Each division comprised several tribes and large clans, and each tribe consisted of a number of clans of differing size. The descendants of Abu-Bakr formed the largest division; then came Banu 'Amr; and the others were smaller but almost similar in size. After the Islamic conquest of Syria, parts of these four divisions migrated into Syria (this could be termed the first wave). According to Khalīfa b. Khayyāt, there was a fifth division, the descendants of Ja'far b. Kilāb, but Al-Asadī does not mention it which could mean that its members had integrated into urban and rural life of the country. It would appear that prior to the 9th century the 'Amr division was the largest and strongest one. It was always distinguished by its militant and warlike attitude. The fore-mentioned Zufer b. Al-Hārith was from this division. Ibn Al-Qalānisī, who describes how strong it was, relates that in 373 A.H./983 A.D. 500 of its warriors were in the army of Salād. Al-Dawla, the Hamadānid Amir of Aleppo (967-991 A.D.). A tribal unit providing 500 mercenaries was

14 Tabaqāt, 137-138, 776, 820, 824.
obviously a large one. After the 9th century this unit was outnumbered by the division of Abu-Bakr.

From Abu-Bakr came the last wave of migrants, but it would seem that probably a century before there had been another wave of migrants from this same division. This division was formed of three major tribal branches, 'Amr Rabī'ah and 'Auf, sons of Ka'b b. 'Abdu'llah b. Kilāb. Part of 'Auf migrated into Syria after the Islamic conquest and from it came the last (3rd) wave of the 10th century. From 'Amr came a wave of migrants presumably during the 9th century. This could be termed the second wave of the Kilābī migration to Syria. During the 10th century and before the establishment of the Ūmdānīd Dynasty in Aleppo, the Ruler of this city was from this tribal unit. Sālih b. Mirdās, the founder of the Mirdāsid dynasty, was from the 3rd unit of Rabi'ah. Apparently the division and organisation of Kilāb in Syria originally followed the pre-migration tribal pattern. Some changes or developments must have affected this pattern after the migrants' settlement in Syria, and always after the arrival of a new influx. But for the lack of information we cannot ascertain the kinds of changes or how profound they were.

From Al-Asadī's account it can be deduced that in the 10th century, at the time of the arrival of the new migration, most of the Kilābī tribal units were semi-nomads and the tribal
combination was loose. In fact the Kilābi dissolution was one of their characteristics which affected the Mirdāsid dynasty and caused its final collapse. The impact of this dissolution on the Mirdāsid dynasty will be mentioned in the sequence of the history of this dynasty. It is noteworthy that this dissolution was a feature which accompanied the Kilābis in their earlier and later history. Ibn al-‘Adīm alleges that the success of Sayf al-Dawla al-Ḥamdānī in establishing his dynasty in Aleppo was due to the Kilābi tribesmen’s dissolution. In a later period al-‘Umari emphasises that if Bānu Kilāb had united under the leadership of one Amir, no other Arabic tribe would ever be able to encounter them. It would appear that the Kilābis believed that union and order were abnormal and unbearable; while in the time of disorder and dissolution life would be more enjoyable and profitable, for always there would be a large amount of booty. On many occasions and for the sake of booty the Kilābi tribesmen provoked quarrels between the Mirdāsid Amirs.

In the biography of al-‘Aṣar b. Muhārish, a Kilābi "Knight

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16 For al-Asadī’s account see Bughya, A.S., 475-482.
17 Zubda, I, 111.
18 Masālik, IV, 89v.
and poet" of later 10th century, which was quoted by Ibn Al-
‘Adīm, there is some interesting information concerning the life
and character of Kilāb. From it can be deduced that, at that
period, the Kilābī character and life was similar to that of the
pre-Islamic Arab Peninsula nomads which is depicted by the Arabic
literature. There was an everlasting razzia between the Kilābīs
and their neighbouring tribes, for the love of booty and war, or
as an act of reprisal. The fighting on the battlefield was usually
begun as a combat between two horsemen while the main opposing
groups stood watching. Before their fight each combatant would
utter a few lines of 'Rajaz' describing his own valian ce, his feats
with the sharp scimitar, an open challenge to every warrior to come
and meet his fate, and a eulogy of his tribe together with boasting
of his own membership. Often there was no mass engagement but
the death of a famous warrior or leader in the individual combat
usually brought the fighting to an end. After a sudden razzia,
the intruders - if successful - would capture the tribe and its
property, enslave a number of the captives and release some for
high ransom.

The life of the tribe held both romance and leisure and was
not entirely given to hardship. There was love and loyalty but
as in pre- and early Islamic times, when a poet or anyone else
fell in love with a girl from his own tribe or from one of the
neighbouring tribes, the girl would be mentioned in his poem
and thus trouble would follow. At first the two lovers would be prohibited from meeting; then the girl would be forced to submit to a compulsory marriage after her father had refused a request from her lover to be allowed to marry her on the pretext that his poems had already brought disgrace to the honour of the girl and such a marriage would be a stigma to the honour of her family and tribe. Such refusal not only created a dramatic love story but brought about feud between the families concerned and which invariably spread throughout the tribes. In spring time the youth of the tribe spent their time in horse-racing and drinking wine. The drinking was done in either a tavern (ḫanāh) of which many were in the tribal camp and nearby villages, or on the bank of a brook (ghadir).²⁰

It would appear that the Kilābi women, in the main, enjoyed equality with the men and on the whole their life was untrammelled. During the Mirdasid period we read about a number of distinguished women such as Ǧāliḥ's mother and Thīmāl b. Ǧāliḥ's wife. Ǧāliḥ's mother was a wise lady and often gave her son sound political counsel. She was highly esteemed as, for instance, when ʿAzīz al-Dawla wished to manifest his harmony with Ǧāliḥ, asked him to send his mother to live in the city of Aleppo.²¹ Thīmāl's wife was

²¹ Zubdā, I, 218; Al-Kamīl, IX, 160.
known as al-Sayida (i.e. The Lady). She had been his brother's (Naṣr's) wife and the mother of Naṣr's son Maḥmūd. Thīmāl mar-
ried her after the death of his brother and with her help he was able to capture al-Raqqa and Rāfiqa. To consolidate her position she married Thīmāl which gave him the means to re-capture Aleppo. Al-Sayida's name was 'Alawiya, daughter of Waththab, Amir of the tribe of Numayr. In 442 A.H./1050 A.D., Thīmāl sent her to Cairo as envoy to solve his problems with al-Mustanṣir, the Fāṭimid Caliph. Ibn al-'Adim gives a vivid description of her interview with this Caliph. He says that after she had greeted the Caliph courteously he enquired about Thīmāl and the people of Aleppo. She answered: "They will be in grace and blessing if you will grant them peace and protection." The Caliph, who admired her ready wit and manner of expression, asked her "Are you the one who is named 'The Lady'?" She replied "Yes, mistress of my people, but your slave, O Commander of the Believers. May Allah bless you." The Caliph said "God will not disappoint him who entrusts the management of his affairs to you in this mission." Some years later, in 453 A.H./1061 A.D., she was able to bring reconciliation between her brother Māni' b. Waththab, Amir of the tribe of Numayr and her husband Thīmāl b. Ṣāliḥ. Once again, and ten years later, in 463 A.H./1071 A.D., she was able to solve the problems of her son Maḥmūd b. Naṣr, the Amir of Aleppo when the great Saljuq Sultan, Alp-Arslan, besieged the city of Aleppo with
intent to capture it and so put an end to the Mirdasid rulership. In the critical moment she (Al-Sayida) presented herself to the Sultan and managed to persuade him to drop the siege. She not only induced him to meet her son, but in addition to confer on him the robe of honour as a token of recognition of his rulership.  

During the 10th and 11th centuries, the Kilâbî tribesmen were involved in almost every battle which was fought in northern Syria. They were involved either as mercenaries or on the tribe's behalf. As Bedouin mercenaries the Kilâbî tribesmen seldom observed loyalty and paid full duty to no-one. They served those who paid most and often, at a time of crisis, would sell their employer to a higher bidder.  

The 11th century was an epoch which witnessed the highest activity and power of Kilâb and, at the same time, their sudden decline due to the Turcoman migration. In fact there is no detailed information about all the activities undertaken by the Kilâbî tribesmen in this century. In spite of this contemporary literature (poets) give the impression that the activity of these tribesmen occupied the thought of the population of

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23 Al-Andalûs, 210-211; Miskawîn, II, 214-215; Ibn al-Qalanisî, 35-37; Zubda, I, 149-151, 199-200.
northern Syria and effectively influenced their lives. The poems of Abu’l-‘Ala’ al-Ma’arri and Ibn Ḥayyūs reflect this. These two poets mention no other tribal name existing in northern Syria except that of Kilāb. This means that the importance of Kilāb at that time eclipsed all the nomadic tribes of the area. Such a position could not have been won or maintained without the support of a vast number of warriors and it indicates that the tribe of Kilāb was very large. But the question arises here: How large was it? Unfortunately there is no direct information concerning the numerical strength of this tribe. Some incidents which took place during the 11th century or shortly before give a clue to its size. It has been related that in the year 405 A.H./1014 A.D. the Kilābi troops of Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās consisted of 2,000 horsemen. Also in the year 452 A.H./1060 A.D., Maḥmūd b. Nāṣr’s tribal troops who defeated a Fātimid expedition aimed at the capture of Aleppo numbered about 2,000 horsemen. From these two examples it may be deduced that the size of the tribe was not outstandingly large but it would seem that only a part of the Kilābis took action on these two occasions and the whole tribe was, in fact, very large. Ibn al-‘Adīm relates that in the year 468 A.H./1075 A.D. a dispute arose between the sons

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24 Al-Luzūmiyat, I, 149, 162, 266, 281, 283; II, 79, 90, 308, 319; III, 77-78, 204-205, 214; IV, 260, 303; Saqī, 128-129; Ibn Ḥayyūs, I, 5-6, 60-63, 123-128, 355; II, 443-446, 552-554.
25 Al-Kāmil, IX,160.
26 Zubda, I, 278-279.
of Maḥmūd b. Naṣr, Sābiq and Waththāb over the rulership of Aleppo. Sābiq was supported by Turcoman troops and Waththāb by the tribe of Kilāb. Ibn al-ʿAdīm says "And Banu Kilāb were in great multitude; they had never assembled in such great numbers before. It has been said that they were about 70,000 horsemen and infantry". It is difficult to give entire credence to the number quoted by Ibn al-ʿAdīm on this occasion, nor can it be entirely discredited. It at least reflects the immensity of Kilāb.

The Mirdāsids were not the only Emirate family of the tribe of Kilāb, but there were a number of similar families and lesser Amirs. The title of Maḥmūd b. Naṣr was "Sharaf Umaraʾ al-Arab", i.e. the "Honour of the Arab Amirs". As a ruler of Aleppo the Mirdāsid Amir was the supreme Amir of the tribe. It was Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās (as discussed before, ch. I, p. 48) who established this supremacy. During the 11th century the most senior living member among Ṣāliḥ's descendants often held the post of ruler of Aleppo together with supremacy over the other Kilābī Amirs.

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27 Zubda. II, 54-55.


29 Ibn Sinān, 8; Bughya, A., VII, 143r.-144r.; Zubda, I, 202-203, 281-286, 293-294; II, 9, 54-56, 58-61, 88-89; Mirʾāt, A. Annals, 472 H.
Frequently the tribe of Kilāb, who exercised greater influence over the dynasty than the dynasty held authority over, refused to give allegiance to the son of the former Amir if his uncle was still alive. A striking example of this occurred in the case of Thīmāl b. Ṣāliḥ. In 449 A.H./1057 A.D. he was Amir of Aleppo and was obliged to abdicate the Emirate in favour of a Fatimid governor. He went to Cairo and while he was there his nephew Māḥmūd b. Naṣr collected the tribe and deposed the Fatimid ruler, Māḥmūd himself assuming the Emirate. The Caliph in Cairo sent an army against him but it failed in its mission. Annoyed by this, the Caliph ordered Thīmāl to return to Aleppo and to resume the Emirate. After Thīmāl returned Māḥmūd appealed to the tribe against Thīmāl's resumption of the position, putting forward his own claim which he felt to be a just one. His uncle, he said, had proved unworthy of the Emirate and it was he, Māḥmūd, who had been instrumental in restoring the dynasty. He, therefore, considered the Emirate to be his by right of conquest and by heredity from his father, Naṣr. The chiefs of the tribe, however, felt the Emirate could not pass to him during the life of his uncle. Their answer to his appeal and claim was: "Your uncle is the great Sheikh and the Arabs scorn to support the son against the Father". 30

30 Zubda, I, 282.
The nomadic way of life and customs of Kilāb were conspicuous in many aspects of life and rulership of the Mirdāsid dynasty. During the time of this dynasty each of its Amirs who ruled in Aleppo always appeared as a Bedouin Chief rather than as a city ruler. This was depicted by the contemporary poets, and also it was manifested in some of the actions of these Amirs. One of the customs of the Bedouin chiefs was to hold an occasional large banquet. Such a banquet would be given in the Spring, at lambing time or as a circumcision or a wedding feast. During the banquet several kinds of food and sweet would be served.

The principal dish was called Madira. This was prepared from meat and cooked in Yoghourt, then mixed with chunks of bread. Ibn al-ʿAdīm relates that the meat of 750 lambs was cooked for one of the banquets which was given by Thīmāl b. Ṣalih to his tribe. The poet Ibn Ṭabīb ʿAbī Ḥazīna speaks of 50,000 people attending a banquet held by Thīmāl at the celebration of his nephew, Māhmūd b. Naqr's circumcision. In al-Tuhaf Waʾl-Hadāya, the book of the Egyptian 5th/11th century Chronicler al-Rašīd b. al-Zubair we read about similar banquets which were held by other Mirdāsid Amirs such as ʿAṭiyya b. Ṣalih and Māhmūd b. Naqr.32


32 Al-Tuhaf, 106, 109; Ibn Abī Ḥazīna, I, 156-157; Zubda, I, 271-273; it is noteworthy that such banquets are still given by the Chiefs of the Syrian Bedouin tribes where the food and the occasions are almost similar to those of the 11th century.
It is noteworthy that the available information concerning the administration of the Mirdasid dynasty refers to only one new office created after the establishment of this dynasty. The head of this office was known as Sheykh al-Dawla (i.e. the Chief of the State). As in the tribe, the Sheykh was usually second only to the Amir and functioned as his deputy, so it was in the State. Sheykh al-Dawla was the Amir's "trusted confidant and secretary" as Ibn Al-'Adîm describes him. He was also the permanent representative of Aleppo's Amir in every diplomatic mission which was sent to either Cairo or Constantinople. 33

Apparently each of the Kilâbi tribal chiefs was granted an iqṭâ‘ after the establishment of the Mirdâsid dynasty. There is an indirect reference to this by al-Antâkî and for lack of information it is impossible to define this iqṭâ‘ and the conditions under which it was granted. 34

The tribe of Kilâb professed the Shi‘a’. Imâmi doctrine which was, at that time, the form of religion adopted by most of the Muslims of the city of Aleppo. 35 It is not known to what

34 Al-Antâkî, 265-266.
35 This will be discussed in more detail later.
extent the Kilābi tribesmen were attached to this doctrine except that a number of them had Shi‘i names, such as ‘Alī, ‘Ulwan, Hasan, Ja‘far, etc. Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdas was known as Abu ‘Alī and his son Thimal as Abu ‘Ulwan. 36 It is noteworthy that, apart from these religious names which were very few, the names which were used by most of the Kilābis were pure Arabic and not Islamic. There was no-one among the Mirdasids or other outstanding figures among the tribe - to whom there is a reference - whose name has the prefix of “‘Abd”, which is usually attached to one of the "100" Arabic names of "Allāh". Instead we find Thimal, Waththab, Sabiq, Shabib, Muqallid, Mani', Zammā', Thabit, Rafi', etc. 37

The position of the tribe of Kilāb was very much affected by the Turcoman migration, a matter which will be discussed later in the sequence of this migration.

Living with Kilāb were some elements from other tribes, such as Banu-Asad who lived in Ma‘arrat Maṣrin, Jabal al-Sum‘nāq, Nuqrat Ban‘-Asad which lay between Khanāsira and al-‘Abs mountain and, in the vicinity of Wadi Buṣnān as neighbours of Banu-‘Abs, who occupied this valley and a nearby district was known

36 Ibn Abī Ḥāṣīna', I, 5, 8, 13.
37 Ibid., I, 15.
as Ḥiyār Banu’l-qā’qā’. A part of Abs also lived in Ḥadīr Qinnasrīn. It would appear that most of these tribes became absorbed into urban life nevertheless they retained their tribal organisation and traditions. Of similar calibre were Tanūkh of Ma‘arrat al-Numān and Banu Munqidh who inhabited the north-west region of the city of Ḥamāh. Banu Munqidh’s centre was a fortress of Kafar-Ṭab until 473 A.H./1080 A.D. when they occupied the citadel of Shayzar. This tribe was large and strong to an extent which enabled it to play an influential role in the life of the Mīrāṣid dynasty. When in 433 A.H./1041 A.D. Al-Dīzbari, the Fāṭimid ruler of Syria was obliged to abandon Damascus—as it will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter—and tried unsuccessfully to take refuge in Ḥamāh, Muqallid b. Munqidh came from Kafar-Ṭab to his help with 2,000 of his henchmen. This number indicates the extent of power and size of Banu Munqidh. Muqallid’s son ‘Alī, the founder of the Munqidhī rule in Shayzar, was Māḥmūd b. Naṣr’s foster-brother. During the reign of Māḥmūd ‘Alī was prominent and active in both Aleppo and Tripoli. After the death of Māḥmūd he became the outstanding figure in the state of Aleppo. He held the real power there during Naṣr b. Māḥmūd’s reign.


39 Ta‘rīf, 489.

After the death of Nagr it was he who chose Sābiq b. Maḥmud, the last Mirdāsid Amir. During that time he was able to prepare the capture of Shayzar and to play an effective part in bringing the Mirdāsid rule to an end, replacing it by the 'Uqaylid. Later Banu Munqidh acquired great fame during the subsequent struggle of the Muslims against the Crusaders.

"By this time the Governorship of Aleppo by the state of Egypt ended; and it was conquered and ruled by Āl-Salih for 57 years." With these words, when he was enumerating the events of 415 A.H./1024 A.D. Al-‘Aẓīmī, the Aleppine Chronicler, announces the end of the Fāṭimid occupation of Aleppo, which has previously been discussed, and the rise of the Mirdāsid dynasty. This dynasty was founded by Ẓāliḥ b. Mirdās, who invaded Aleppo and captured it from the Fāṭimid Governor. Before discussing the establishment of this dynasty, however, the early life and career of Ẓāliḥ b. Mirdās should be examined. According to the Syrian biographers, Ẓāliḥ was a descendant of the Emirate family of the

42 al-‘Aẓīmī, 165r.
branch of Abdu'llah b. Abi-Bakr b. Kilab (of the tribe of Kilab). Ibn Ḥazm Al-Andalusi relates that Ṣāliḥ was a descendant of the branch of 'Amr b. Kilab. It would be difficult to accept Ibn Ḥazm's information on account of the fact that he lived in Muslim Spain and the Syrian Biographers, such as Ibn Al-‘Adīm and Ibn Khallikan confirm the first account.⁴³ According to Ibn Al-‘Adīm, Ṣāliḥ's family, which was strong and noble, lived and held power in the vicinity of the city of Qinnasrin. Ṣāliḥ's mother was also of noble birth. She was from the chief family of the clan of Zawqal of the tribe of Kilab. Her name was Al-Rābāb, but she was usually known as Al-Zaqqaliyah. The clan of Zawqah inhabited the country which surrounded Aleppo. The date of Ṣāliḥ's birth is not known, nor yet his age when he died, and - a matter of fact - there is no information concerning the age of any of the Mirdāsid Amirs who succeeded Ṣāliḥ.

Until he escaped from the prison in the citadel of Aleppo, Ṣāliḥ was only the Amir of the Kilābis who inhabited the locality of Aleppo; but after he defeated Mansūr b. Lu‘lu‘, as was discussed earlier, he became the supreme Amir of the entire body of the tribe of Kilab.⁴⁴ Even before he became the supreme Amir, Ṣāliḥ

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⁴³ Bughya, A.S., 477; Wafayat, 1, 278-280; Jamhara, 270.
⁴⁴ Bughya, A.S., 468, 476-478.
it would appear that he was the outstanding figure among all the Amirs of the tribe of Kilāb. Unless this was the case, the other Amirs would not have yielded him their obedience. It has been seen how, when Ṣâliḥ was a prisoner in the city of Aleppo, Manṣūr b. Lu’lu’ tried his utmost to humiliate him in particular. Ṣâliḥ was already well-known before his imprisonment and his career did not begin in Aleppo but in Al-Raḥba on the Euphrates (modern Mayadin).

Before 399 A.H./1008 A.D., the Fāṭimid Caliph al-Ḥakīm appointed ʿAlī b. Thīmāl - one of the tribe of Khafāja’s Chieftains - as ruler of Al-Raḥba. Before long ʿAlī was killed by ʿIsā b. Khallāt, one of the tribe of ‘Uqayl’s Chieftains, ‘Isa captured Al-Raḥba, but was unable to hold it for long, as another ‘Uqayli Chief, named Badrān b. Al-Muqallid, wrested the city from him. The Caliph Al-Ḥakīm instructed the Fāṭimid ruler of Damascus to restore Al-Raḥba to Fāṭimid dominion. This ruler executed the order, recaptured Al-Raḥba, appointed a Fāṭimid ruler then retired to Damascus.

Once again the Fāṭimid rule did not last long for a certain Ibn Miḥkān appropriated the power in Al-Raḥba and expelled the Fāṭimid governor. Ibn Miḥkān was a native of Al-Raḥba and probably the Municipal Chief. If it was easy for Ibn Miḥkān to overthrow the Fāṭimid governor and to assume power for himself, it was impossible for him to retain this power without
(foreign) support; for al-Raḥba was amid several powers, each of them wanting to possess it. Ibn Miḥkān called on Ẓaliḥ b. Mirdās and made a deal with him. Ẓaliḥ was to support Ibn Miḥkān and to protect the town, but in exchange for what, the available sources do not tell. Ẓaliḥ did not garrison in the town but remained in his tribal camp. Not before long a dispute arose between him and Ibn Miḥkān and Ẓaliḥ besieged al-Raḥba and tried to take it by force. The dispute was, however, solved and a new bargain was struck. By this new deal, Ẓaliḥ was to marry Ibn Miḥkān's daughter and Ibn Miḥkān to move from al-Raḥba to ʿAnah from where he would rule both towns. After a while the people of ʿAnah rebelled against Ibn Miḥkān and expelled him from their town, whereupon he asked Ẓaliḥ to fulfil their agreement. Ẓaliḥ led a force of his tribesmen to recapture ʿAnah. When he was investing ʿAnah with Ibn Miḥkān, his father-in-law Ẓaliḥ contrived his assassination. After accomplishing this, Ẓaliḥ left ʿAnah and returned to al-Raḥba, which he captured in 399 A.H./1008 A.D. On establishing himself there he acknowledged the suzerainty of the Fātimid Caliph. ⁴⁵

The capture of al-Raḥba was the first step in Ṣāliḥ's career and from which his ambition probably evolved.

We do not know the reason why Ibn Miḥkān chose Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās in preference to one of the other Bedouin chieftains. It may have been because Ṣāliḥ was an outstanding figure in the strong tribe of Kilāb, which, up to the time of Ibn Miḥkān's coup, had not been party to the struggle for al-Raḥba. The existing sources tell of no action undertaken by the tribe of Kilāb to possess al-Raḥba before b. Miḥkān's coup, but this silence does not necessarily mean that no prior action was undertaken. It could well have been that Ṣāliḥ with an early ambition to establish a State and realising the strategic advantage of al-Raḥba found an opportunity to capture it and moved to take it while there were several parties struggling towards the same goal. Therefore it is probable that, from the beginning, Ibn Miḥkān did not invite Ṣāliḥ to support him but rather compromised in a deal with him.

Before going further it is necessary to glance at the strategic value of al-Raḥba. It was the key to Syria and sometimes to Iraq. It was the first caravan stage inside Syria. From thence one could proceed towards Aleppo by following the western bank of the Euphrates, or to Damascus via the Syrian desert. Al-Raḥba, being close to the Syrian Desert, was in constant touch with the nomadic tribes who inhabited this
To the Bedouin tribes who migrated from the south to the north al-Raḥba was the first stage in the capture of northern Syria. Al-Raḥba was an excellent base for these tribes from which to create trouble inside Syria as well as being a place of asylum and market. This was the case until the collapse of the Mirdasid dynasty in 1070 A.D.), when it was substituted by the city of al-Moṣul.

This was a part of the aftermath of the Turcoman migration. These new migrants of the 11th century came from the opposite direction to that of the Arabic tribes. Al-Moṣul was the first stage of the Turcoman migrants towards Aleppo and thence to the whole of Syria. Until the Turcoman migration al-Moṣul was mainly connected with Baghdad. It was a part of Iraq, but afterwards it became a part of Syria and the doorway to capturing it. Perhaps the cases of Muslim b. Quraiysh al-'Uqaylī and later the Zanki dynasty prove this.

The capture of al-Raḥba by Sāliḥ and his establishment there no doubt strengthened his position and enhanced his prestige among his fellow tribesmen. The next episode in Sāliḥ's life, after the capture of al-Raḥba was his imprisonment in Aleppo and the struggle with Mansur b. Lu'lu', which has been previously discussed. After the defeat and abdication of Mansur and during the unstable Fatimid rule which followed, Sāliḥ was able to strengthen the foundation of his State. He had his
his in court and administration. In the year 410 A.H./1019 A.D. the Maʿarri poet Ibn Ḥasanā praised Thīmāl, Sāliḥ's son, and hailed him as Malik (i.e. monarch). The same poet repeated his eulogy in the year 413 A.H./1022 A.D. From the stanzas of poems it can be deduced that there was a (tribal) court; poets presented themselves to praise the Amir or one of his sons. The object of the praise had the Bedouin's virtue of being generous, brave, skilled in fighting and of noble birth. When, in 415 A.H./1025 A.D. - as we shall see - Sāliḥ captured Aleppo, he entrusted the siege of the citadel (i.e. of Aleppo) to his Katib, Sulaymān b. Ṭuq.

The death of the Fāṭimid Caliph al-Hakim together with several other events which weakened the Caliphate, stimulated Sāliḥ to capture Aleppo and other parts of Syria. The instability which was increased in Aleppo after the assassination of 'Aziz al-Dawla created chaos and brought discontent among the population. This discontent which was augmented because of financial and administrative difficulties created the opportunity for Sāliḥ to take the city. The uprising of both the tribe of Ṭayy in Palestine and the tribe of Kalb in the province of

Damascus which the Fatimid Caliphate failed to quench, and their collusion with Ṣāliḥ, supplied the impetus.

Ḥassān b. al-Mufarrij, Amir of the tribe of Ṭayy’ together with Sinān b. ‘Ulaīyan, Amir of the tribe of Kalb, came to Ṣāliḥ’s camp which was in the outskirts of Aleppo. After meeting Ṣāliḥ they formed a pact amongst themselves, thus combining the three major tribes of Syria in an alliance. They agreed to divide Syria among themselves, whereby Palestine would be dominated by the tribe of Ṭayy’; Damascus Province by the tribe of Kalb and Aleppo by the tribe of Kilāb. They aimed to use their combined forces to expel the Fatimids from Syria and to establish three Bedouin States; one for Ṭayy’ in al-Ramlah; one for Kalb in Damascus and one for Kilāb in Aleppo. This was the first and also the last time the Syrian tribes were to form such an alliance, forgetting, for the first time, since the 7th century, their differing origins which had always been, as mentioned before, the basis for their political differences. The two tribes of Kalb and Ṭayy’ were of Yemenite origin and Kilāb of ‘Adnānid descent.

It would appear that this pact was formed in the year 414 A.H./1025 A.D.; but according to Al-Antāḳī what happened in this

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year was the renewal of an old pact previously formed between the three tribes near the end of the reign of al-Ḥākim, or at the commencement of the rule of al-Zāhir. Al-Antākī also reports that when the three tribes entered into their agreement they informed Basil II, the Byzantine Emperor of their intention and asked for his support. He goes on to say that Basil refused their request under the pretext that they were rebelling against their Caliph without just cause. Al-Antākī further relates that the Caliph made a reconciliation with them. Such reconciliation, however, was short-lived because of a new dispute which arose between the Caliph's ruler in Palestine and Ḥāssān b. al-Mufarrīj, Amir of the tribe of Ṭayy', thereupon Ḥāssān renewed his agreement with the tribe of Ḵālīb, whose Amir Sinān b. 'Ulaiyān was his brother-in-law, then Ḥāssān and Sinān went to the region of Aleppo where they met Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās and agreed to cooperate on the basis of their old agreement to divide Syria among themselves.⁴⁹ After they renewed this agreement it would appear that the Emperor Basil II maintained his previous decision; for when, in the following year, 415 A.H./1024 A.D., Ṣāliḥ captured the city of Aleppo and besieged its citadel, he asked the support of the Byzantine governor of Antioch.

⁴⁹ al-ANTAKĪ, 244-245; İTTİ'AZ, Annals 415H; al-MUSABBIHĪ, 265-266.
This governor sent him 300 archers, but when the governor informed the Emperor Basil of his action, Basil not only reproached him, but ordered the immediate withdrawal of the bowmen.\textsuperscript{50} Al-Musabbi\textsuperscript{i} reported that the people of Aleppo thought that S\textsuperscript{i}ali\textsuperscript{I} was working for the Byzantine Empire; for after his forces entered Aleppo they began to destroy the city wall and towers.\textsuperscript{51} In fact this action of destruction was merely tactical. S\textsuperscript{i}ali\textsuperscript{I}'s forces were Bedouins who not only were unaccustomed to the use of siege weapons (for this reason he probably invited the Byzantine bowmen) but disliked long drawn-out fighting. Actually S\textsuperscript{i}ali\textsuperscript{I} captured Aleppo not by force but because the city's population, or rather its A\textsuperscript{d}d\textsuperscript{a}th, opened the gate for him. By remembering this and considering the nature of his forces, and also in case the siege of the citadel would last a long time, or the Aleppines would change their minds and his forces be obliged to withdraw even temporarily - as it happened - it seemed that he ordered the destruction of the wall for easy recapture. The Mird\textsuperscript{a}sids practised this kind of tactic on several occasions as was the case in 441 A.H./1049 A.D. when the F\textsuperscript{a}jamid Caliphate sent an expedition against Aleppo.

\textsuperscript{50} al-A\textsuperscript{N}t\textsuperscript{a}k\textsuperscript{i}, 246-247.

\textsuperscript{51} al-Musabbi\textsuperscript{i}, 269-270; Itti\textsuperscript{a}q\textsuperscript{a}, Annals, 415H.
The Mirdasids destroyed the walls and citadels of both Ḫimṣ and Maʿarrat al-Numān for easy recapture. 52

Before discussing the three tribes' struggle with the Caliphate of Cairo, it is necessary to pause for awhile in order to mention an important event which took place before the establishment - or renewal - of the pact and which could be one of the reasons which encouraged Śāliḥ. It was after the death of al-Ḥakim, the Fatimid Caliph, that his cousin and nominated successor 'Abdu'l Raḥīm b. al-Yas, who was the governor of Damascus, at the time of the death, was arrested and carried to Cairo where he met his fate. 'Abdu'l Raḥīm's eldest son 'Abdu'l-'Azīz with his ('Abdu'l Raḥīm's) nephew Ṭālīʿ b. al-Ṭāyib fled to Śāliḥ's camp. Śāliḥ gave them refuge and they remained in his camp for ten months. During that period the Fatimid Caliphate endeavoured to get them back. Apparently this event affected the relationship between Śāliḥ and the Caliphate and was an encouragement and excuse for him to join the alliance and an incentive to capture Aleppo. 53

The pact gave the three tribes a great military power which the Fatimid Caliphate was unable to challenge. 54 This pact surprised

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52 Bugha, A., VII, 99r.-103r.; Ittīʿāz, Annals, 440H.
53 al-ʾAntāki, 236.
the contemporary population of Syria who were, as Abu'l Alā' ʿl-Maʿarri emphasises, accustomed to seeing the Bedouins prefer their tents and to live in the desert with their herds; to forsake this life and to choose the life of the city and kingship was a new and astonishing experience.\(^{55}\)

Ṣāliḥ was the outstanding figure among the allies, particularly from a military standpoint. This fact was indicated in a letter sent by al-Dizbari, the Fāṭimid leader, to the Caliphate in Cairo.\(^{56}\) Ḥassān managed the communications (foreign affairs) between the allies and the Caliphate. He wrote to the Fāṭimid Caliph telling him that the three tribes movement was not directed against him and that they still and would always acknowledge the suzerainty of the Caliph. The Caliph "should not worry himself about Syria" Ḥassān wrote, for he himself "would manage the affairs of Palestine and would collect the taxes and spend them on his men'. Therefore there would be no need for the Caliphate to send either governor or troops which would be costly. Likewise in Damascus his brother-in-law Sinān b. al-Banna Ṣamām al-Dawla had already established an agreement with its people. Similarly the management of Aleppo

\(^{55}\) al-Luẓūmiyyat, I, 149, 266, 281; II, 207-208; III, 77, 214; Sağıt, 123-129.

\(^{56}\) al-Musabbiḥī, 250; Ittiʿāz, Annals, 415H.
was in the hands of Šāliḥ b. Mirdas Asad al-Dawla. By this the Caliph is relieved of all anxiety concerning the whole of Syria." This insulting and humiliating letter was sent to the Caliph in 414 A.H./1023 A.D. and the incapable Caliph was unable to do anything except to say to the courier "Leave! You have no answer from us!"

It is out of the scope of this thesis to give a full account of the deeds wrought by the allies. The role of Šāliḥ b. Mirdas is our particular concern. In 414 A.H./1023 A.D. and, as it seems, immediately after the formation of the pact Šāliḥ with his tribal forces, moved southward. He co-operated in the defeat of the Fāṭimid troops led by al-Dizbarī and their expulsion from most of Palestine. After that he went with Sinān b. 'Ulaīyan, Amir of the tribe of Kalb, to lay siege on Damascus. Hassan was left in Palestine to chase the defeated Fāṭimid troops.58

In Sha'ban of the same year (Nov. 1023 A.D.) Šāliḥ left the siege of Damascus and returned towards Aleppo. He stationed himself at the gates of Aleppo thinking that the city would surrender to him on his arrival.59 When nothing happened as he

57 al-Musabbiḥi, 250; Itti'āq, Annals, 415H.

58 al-Musabbiḥi, 241-242; Zubda, I, 223-224; al-Antakī, 244-245; Itti'āq, Annals, 415H.

59 al-Musabbiḥi, 242, 249; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 128-129.
he had conceived Šalih moved towards his tribal camp. He mobilised all the warriors of his own tribe and, with re-inforcement from the other Bedouins of the area, led these forces to lay siege on Aleppo in an attempt to capture it. The chroniclers say that Šalih's forces were large but they give no estimate of the numbers. On Sunday, 17th Ramadān 415 A.H./22nd November, 1024 A.D. the siege began and lasted for 56 days; for on Saturday, 13th Dhul-qa'da 415 A.H./18th January, 1025 A.D., one of the city's gates opened and Šalih went in and captured Aleppo. The gate was opened by Šālim b. Mustafād, the leader of the city's Aḥdāth (militia) who was also supported by the majority of the city's population. The immediate reason for Šalih's move was because a quarrel took place between him and the Fātimid governor of the citadel who intended to kill Šalim. Following the city's capture by Šalih, the Fātimid garrison took strong hold in the citadel and the palace which was close to it. Šalih appointed Šālim governor of the city of Aleppo (Ra'īs) and leader (Muqaddam) of the Aḥdāth. He instructed him and his - Šalih's - Katib to carry out the siege of the citadel and the palace, for he left Aleppo and moved southward with part of his troops.

Šalih went to Palestine to reinforce Ḥassān b. al-Mufurrij who was fighting al-Dizbārī, who led a fresh Fāṭimid army. With the aid of Šalih this new army was defeated...
and Ṣāliḥ - on his way back - sacked some of the coastal towns of the Levant. He also captured Hīn Ibn ‘Akkār in the locality of Tripoli, Sidon, Ba’albank, Ḫime and Rafniya. He annexed these towns to his newly established State. 61

During his absence from Aleppo, Sulaymān b. Ṭuq, his kāṭib, with the Kilābi forces and Ṣālim b. Mustafād with his Aḥdāth captured the citadel after a long siege. This occurred on Wednesday, 1st Jumāda al-Ālā, 416 A.H./30th June, 1025 A.D., and was made easier by a quarrel which broke out among the Fāṭimid troops garrisoned there. Even before the fall of the citadel the besiegers were able to destroy the palace and to undermine a trench which led to the well of the citadel and enabled them to block it, thus inflicting the additional hardship of thirst on the besieged. After the fall of the citadel the Fāṭimid garrison, with the exception of the two governors (of the city and the citadel) and the city’s Cadi were allowed to leave Aleppo.

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Although the garrison gained its freedom it suffered the loss of most of its equipment and chattels. When Šāliḥ returned to Aleppo he released the city ex-governor, Thu‘bān b. Muḥammad on an agreed payment, but executed the eunuch Mawguf, the citadel ex-governor, and ordered the burial alive of the city's one-time Cadi. He also released the Fāṭimid Da‘ī who al-_ANTĀKI calls Abu-Hilāl.\(^{62}\) It is noteworthy that al-_ANTĀKI is the only chronicler who mentions this Da‘ī and it is the only time we hear about an Isma‘īlī Da‘ī in Aleppo until the reign of Ruqāwān b. Tutush (1095-1113 A.D.).

In spite of all his activities against the Fāṭimid Caliphate, Šāliḥ did not deny this Caliph suzerainty. After he returned to Aleppo and established himself there, he sent his kātib Sulaymān b. Ṭuq to Cairo whereupon the Caliph, al-Ẓāhir, accepted the Mirdāsid rule, increased the titles of Šāliḥ and sent Robes of Honour and gifts to him and his sons.\(^{63}\)

Šāliḥ struck his own coins and in the only-known two surviving golden dinars dated 417 A.H./1026 A.D. and 419 A.H./1028 A.D. respectively, the name of al-Ẓāhir, the Fāṭimid Caliph,


\(^{63}\) al-_ANTĀKI, 248.
is inscribed beside that of Ǧāliḥ. 64

Although the Fāṭimid Caliphate reluctantly accepted the Mirdasid rule in Aleppo, it entirely rejected the foundation of a similar rule by the tribe of Tayy’ in Palestine. The existence of an independent State in Palestine threatened the survival of the Caliphate itself. 65 The period between 416 A.H./1025 A.D. and 419 A.H./1028 A.D. gave the opportunity to the Fāṭimid Caliphate to prepare fresh troops. This period was also fortunate for this Caliphate for, in 419 A.H./1028 A.D., Sinān b. ‘Uliyān, Amir of the tribe of Kalb, died. His nephew Rāfi’ b. Abi’l-Layyl b. ‘Ula’īyān went to Cairo where the Caliph al-Zahir appointed him as successor to his uncle. He also assigned to him all the iqṭā’ of his deceased uncle. In return the Caliphate was able to win the allegiance of Rāfi’ and his tribe, probably by promises or perhaps by provocation of the ancient feud between Rāfi’ s tribe, who was of Yemenite origin, and Kilab, who was of a different origin, thus weakening the alliance of the three tribes.

Accordingly in Dhu’l al-Qa’da 419 A.H./November 1028 A.D., a new Fāṭimid army led by al-Dīzbarī – which comprised about 7,000 horsemen and infantry – advanced towards Palestine. This army was accompanied by the tribe of Kalb and other Bedouins,

64 N.Ch. (new series), XIII, 335-338; J.A.O.S., LXXIII, 89-91.
65 See al-Musabbiḥī, 241-242; Ḥittān, Annals, 415 H.
mainly from the tribe of Fazāra. During the preparation for the
advance of these forces, Šāliḥ with his Kilābi force went to
Palestine to re-inforce Ḥassān. The first contact between
Šāliḥ and Ḥassān's forces and those of the Fāṭimid and Kalbis
took place in the region of Ghaza. Unable to encounter them, as
it would seem, Šāliḥ and Ḥassān retreated and the advancing forces
followed them. In the Jordan valley, at al-Uqquwānah, not far
from Tabariya and Fīq, the two forces engaged in a decisive battle
which resulted in victory for the Fāṭimid forces and the death
of Šāliḥ together with that of his youngest son. This battle
took place on May 12th (or 25th) 1029 A.D. and the main cause of
the defeat was Ḥassān's flight together with his tribe, thus leaving
Šāliḥ to bear the brunt alone. The reason behind Ḥassān's
flight, whether an act of treachery or cowardice, is not known.
By this victory the Fāṭimid Caliphate restored its authority over
both Palestine and southern Syria, but Aleppo was retained by
Nāṣr and Thīmāl, the sons of Šāliḥ, who escaped from the battle.
This was the most decisive victory ever won by the Fāṭimid Cal-
iphate from the Bedouins of Syria who, especially the tribe of
Ṭayy', were for a long time unable to recover from this shatter-
ing blow.

The heads of Šāliḥ and his son, together with some other
trophies, were sent to Cairo where they were put on display.66

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66 al-Antāḵī, 253; al-Šayrāfī, 37; Ibn al-Qalānīṣī, 71-74; Ibn
Ṣāliḥ's death robbed the Emirate of Aleppo of the towns of Ba'albak, Ḥims, Ṣidon, Rafniya and Ḥimṣ ibn Ἐκκάρ, for subsequent to his death the rulers whom he had placed over these towns abandoned them and they were consequently returned to Fāṣimid dominion. In fact, the real motive behind Ṣāliḥ's capture of these towns is not known. The value of them lay in their strategic position, for they secured for Ṣāliḥ's State not only an outlet to the sea but the caravan route which joined Aleppo with it. The Emirate of Aleppo which dominated part of hinter Syria always needed this sea outlet, chiefly for economic reasons. The natural sea outlet for Aleppo can be found in the coastal region of Antioch, but it was impossible for Ṣāliḥ to acquire it from Byzantium, therefore the alternative lay in the Lebanese Coast. This may perhaps explain the reason why Ṣāliḥ captured these towns. This supposition suggests that there was a plan behind Ṣāliḥ's movement and that it was probably based on the realisation of Aleppo's economic position and role in addition to the need of a sea outlet and the big profit which would thereby accrue.

67 al-‘Antākī, 253; al-‘Aẓīmī, 16r.
The sources give no information concerning the motive which prompted Ṣalih's action. These same sources relate also that Ṣalih was a Bedouin. The lack of information and Ṣalih's origin would prevent the assumption that an economic plan existed behind his action. On the other hand, these sources relate that Ṣalih's Vizir was a Christian named Tādharus (Theodorus?) b. al-Ḥasan. Ibn al-ʿAdim reports that Tādharus had had great influence over Ṣalih and his State and that he was the Commander of the State army and its administrative Chief. Ṣalih and Tādharus accompanied Tādharus in all his campaigns, particularly in the capture of Sidon. He was killed with him on the same day and on the same battlefield. 68 The Christians of Aleppo, who were a large community, managed a large portion of the Emirate's economy (as will be discussed later in more detail). It is conceivable that Tādharus probably inspired Ṣalih who, as a Bedouin, must have had an (instinctive) understanding of finance and commerce, to capture these towns. This matter must, however, remain an assumption because of the lack of information, especially that which concerns the economic situation.

Nothing is known of the impact the establishment of the Mirdasid dynasty made on Aleppo. Similarly nothing is known about the changes, if any, in the administration of the State brought about by Ṣalih. The Christian Chronicler Ibn al-ʿAmīd in his book 69

Tarikh al-Muslimin, subsequent to his account of the capture of Aleppo by Šāliḥ, says "Šāliḥ put in order all the State matters and adopted the way of justice", but how, Ibn al-'Amīd does not relate. At the same time nothing is known about the relation between Šāliḥ and the Byzantine Empire after he captured Aleppo nor anything of the Byzantine re-action.

Some information survives to indicate that Šāliḥ's prestige was considerably enhanced in Syria and Mesopotamia after he became the Amir of Aleppo. His role in southern Syria has already been described. In the north his influence was extended not only over the entire body of the tribe of Kilāb but over some other tribes in Mesopotamia. Taking as an instance the dispute between two of the Chieftains of the tribe of Numayr and Naqr al-Dawla, the Marwānid Ruler of Mayyafarīqin (1011–1061 A.D.) which concerned the rulership of the city of Edessa. When the latter captured it from the two Numayris they appealed to Šāliḥ, who intervened on their behalf and Naqr al-Dawla accordingly yielded the city to them. 70

69 Ibn al-'Amīd, 524.

70 In 422 A.H./1030 A.D., after Šāliḥ's death, the Numayris sold Edessa to the Byzantine Empire, see al-Āntākī, 236; al-Kāmil, IX, 281–282, 331; Bar Hebraeus, 192–193; al-'Azīmī, 167v.; al-Bustān, 86v.; Mirāt, A., Annals, 422H; al-Dhahābī, OR 49; 14r.; al-Mukhtasar, I, 165; the Marwānids of Mayyafarīqin tried to prevent this by attempting to wrest Edessa for themselves. In 1032 A.D. the Byzantine Empire ultimately acquired Edessa and foiled the Marwanids' attempt. In addition to the above mentioned references see Cambridge Med. History, IV, part I, 725, Ostrogorsky, 322.
Some of the chroniclers called Ṣāliḥ Amir Arab al-Shām\(^{71}\) (i.e. the Amir of the Bedouins of Syria), a title of which the value is not known but at least indicates the high position of its holder. Ibn al-ʻAdīm says "In the year 472 A.H./1079-80 A.D. Dawlat \(\text{dynasty}\) of Banu Mirdās vanished. The Emirate of the Arab was retained by Banu Kilāb until the time of the reign of \(\text{the Ayyubid}\) al-Malik al-Zāhir \(\text{L}260-277\ A.D.,\) when the tribe of Ṭayy became more powerful" and usurped the title.\(^{72}\) It is not known whether Ṣāliḥ was the first holder of this title or whether, indeed, it had existed previously. The origin of it is obscure for whether it was created among the tribes of Syria after Islam or whether it existed in Arabia before the rise of Islam and was then carried to Syria after the Islamic conquest of the 7th century is not known. Often we read in some of the Arabic biographies and chronographies "Sayid ahl al-Bādiya", i.e. "The Master of the Desert Dwellers" or "Sayid Qays", i.e., the "Master of the Tribes of Qays"\(^{73}\) etc. Such a description might well be the starting point which, in the course of time, developed

\(^{71}\) Duwal al-Īslām, by al-Dhahabi, B.M.Ms. No. Or 1558, fol. 53r.

\(^{72}\) Bughya, A.S., 478.

\(^{73}\) Ibn ʻAsākir, VI, 211r.-212v.; Jamhara, 267.
to the title of Amir Arab al-Shām. On the other hand, before the Islamic conquest of Syria there was the tribe of Ghassān of which its Amir was the first among the Amirs of the other tribes. Accordingly the title of Amir al-Arab could well be a revival or a continuation of an old tradition which was founded in Syria before the rise of Islam. 74

On the only two dinars so far known to be in existence of Sāliḥ b. Mirdās, the name Thīmāl b. Sāliḥ is inscribed in addition to that of his father and al-Zāhir, the Fatimid Caliph. This inscription indicates that Thīmāl was his father's nominated successor (Wālī al-'Abd). During his father's life and before the capture of Aleppo, Thīmāl used to live in the town of al-Raḥba because his father preferred to live in his tribe's camp which was often in the outskirts of Aleppo. 75 Apparently Thīmāl moved to Aleppo after its capture by his father and lived in its citadel. It is not clear whether or not Thīmāl was with his father at the battle of al-Uqṭawānāh, but it is certain that his brother Nāṣr was there.

Nāṣr was the eldest son of Sāliḥ; he escaped from al-

74 The Byzantine Empire during the reign of Justinian (527-565) created a Ghassānid state under the government of supreme Phylarch, who was nominated by the emperor. This state held some influence over the Bedouin tribes of Syria. See J.B. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire (New York, 1958), II, 91; see also J.A.O.S. LXXV, 205-216.

75 Ibn Abi Ḥāšāna, I, 18-22; 86; Bugārja, F., 128r.-v.; J.A.O.S. LXXII, 89-90; N.Ch. (new series), XIII, 335-338.
Uqhuwāgah to Aleppo where he shared with his brother Thīmāl the rule of the State. As it happened later, Naṣr was discontent with the appointment of his brother and waited for an opportunity to capture the citadel from him and to monopolise the rulership of the State. In 421 A.H./1030 A.D., Naṣr was able to seize the citadel of Aleppo, while his brother Thīmāl was absent from the city. Ibn al-ʿAdim relates that Thīmāl quarreled with his wife who in fury left Aleppo and went to the tribe camp which was, as usual, in the outskirts of the city. To gain reconciliation with her Thīmāl ordered a golden necklace encrusted with gems to be made and he himself took it to the camp. Ibn al-ʿAdim goes on to relate that Naṣr, who was ever watchful - knowing of the departure of his brother - led some of his followers, passed near the citadel as though intending to leave the city; on nearing the citadel gate, which was unsuspectingly open, with sword in hand and closely followed by his men, dashed at the gate and took the citadel by surprise. Ibn al-ʿAdim, when commenting on this event, says "... and since that day a big chain was put in front of the gate of the citadel of Aleppo to prevent any ascending rider from entering it unawares; and ordained that nobody, even the most intimate friend of its ruler, should be allowed to enter it if carrying a sword."

77Zubda, I, 237-238; Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 525, al-ʿAẓīmī, 166r.
This incident brought about a new conception in the style of governorship of the Emirate of Aleppo, which lasted for a long time. Before it took place the rulers of Aleppo lived in a palace in the city while, in the citadel lived a garrison of whom its leader was the governor. Subsequent to Naṣr's coup, the citadel became the residence of the State's ruler. This enhanced the prestige of Aleppo's citadel and brought about the erection of magnificent apartments and reception halls.  

Thimāl's reaction to his brother's coup was to muster the tribe's forces with intent to recapture Aleppo by force. In the face of a Byzantine threat and by the efforts of the tribal Chieftains a reconciliation was reached. Accordingly they agreed to again share the rulership of the State, but this time by dividing it into two parts, Mesopotamian and Syrian. Thimāl was to rule the Mesopotamian part from al-Raṣba and Naṣr to remain in Aleppo from where he was to rule the Syrian division. The Byzantine threat was constituted by the advance towards Aleppo of a huge army headed by the Emperor Romanus III himself.  

Prior to discussion of the reason for and the outcome of the Byzantine expedition, it is noteworthy to mention that Ibn al-ʿAdīm, who relates the above incident, gives also another

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79 al-ʿĀṣimī, 166v.; al-ʿAntākī, 257; Zubda, I, 238-239.
version of the story which appears to have been copied from al-Antākī. Al-Antākī relates that Naḍr made his coup after the failure of the Byzantine expedition and not before. For on hearing the news of the Byzantine advancing army Thimāl and Naḍr removed their families from Aleppo to the tribal camp. Naḍr led the tribal forces to fight the invader and Thimāl remained in Aleppo citadel for the defence of the city. After the defeat of the Byzantine army, Thimāl left Aleppo and went to bring his family back, which gave Naḍr the opportunity to seize the citadel together with the city. This version is more acceptable than the former one on the basis that in spite of the Byzantine defeat in 421 A.H./1030 A.D. and immediately after it, Naḍr sent a communication to Constantinople not only asking for forgiveness but the protection of the Empire. He offered to pay 500,000 dirhams rated at 60 for every dinar as an annual tribute together with the restoration of the 359 A.H./969 A.D. treaty between Aleppo and Byzantium.81 It is abnormal to see a Bedouin Amir of a State offering tribute to the Byzantine Empire without peculiar reasons; thus it can be deduced that Naḍr was obliged to seek the Byzantine protection. This obligation

80 al-Antākī, 257; Zubda, I, 245.

81 al-Antākī, 257, 269-270; al-ʿAṣīmī, 167v.; Zubda, I, 247. For the 359/969 treaty, see Zubda, I, 163-168; al-Antākī, 134; Maʿṣūmī, I. 36.
would be caused by either Fāṭimid threat or Kilābī dissension and threat. There was not any Fāṭimid threat at that time because, after he became the sole ruler in Aleppo, Nagr sent an envoy to Cairo with a large number of gifts which won for him the approval of the Caliph for the time being, at least.\textsuperscript{82} It would appear that Thīmāl, after losing his post, gained the support of the tribe and planned to recapture Aleppo by force. This is perhaps the reason why Nagr sought the protection of the Byzantine Empire.

To avoid a fraternal collision, the tribal chieftains brought about a reconciliation between the brothers and once again the rulership of the State was shared as has already been mentioned.\textsuperscript{83}

The chroniclers give several reasons for the Emperor Romanus III's expedition. Al-Antākī considers it to be an act of punitive reprisal. He relates that, after the death of Śāliḥ, and in the same year 420 A.H./1029 A.D., during the co-rule of Thīmāl and Nagr, the Byzantine governor of Antioch led an expedition against Aleppo without the Emperor's knowledge and permission. The motive behind this campaign was to seize the opportunity

\textsuperscript{82}Zubda, I, 247-248; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 75.

\textsuperscript{83}al-Antākī, 257; al-‘Aṣīmī, 166v.; Zubda, I, 245.
which the death of Ǧaliḫ offered by capturing Aleppo or part of its territory before the Fatimids were able to do so. He assumed that Ǧaliḫ’s sons were incapable of maintaining their father’s estate. The assumption, however, was incorrect and the Byzantine troops were routed by the Kilābī warriors led by Nāṣr and Thīmāl in a surprise attack before they (the invaders) could enter Aleppo territory. According to al-ʾAntāʾī and Ibn al-ʾAdīm, this defeat provoked Romanus III, who dismissed the governor of Antioch and prepared an expedition for punitive reprisal under his personal leadership.84

Ibn al-ʾAdīm gives another version of the expedition. He relates that in retaliation for his brother’s coup, Thīmāl b. Ǧaliḫ summoned the tribal forces with intent to advance on Aleppo in an attempt to recapture it by force. In turn Nāṣr, who was unable to withstand his brother’s threat, called on the Byzantine Emperor to yield Aleppo to him. Romanus III responded and advanced at the head of a huge army towards Aleppo. The Chieftains of the tribe of Kilāb, who recognised the gravity of the situation, managed to bring reconciliation between the two brothers who once again agreed to share the State as has previously been described. Thereupon Nāṣr sent his cousin Muqallid b. Kamīl as an envoy to Romanus III informing him of the reconciliation.

84 al-ʾAntāʾī, 253-254; Ibn al-Qalānīṣī, 75; al-ʾAẓīmī, 166v.; al-Kāmil, IX, 162; Zubda, I, 237, 245; al-Nujūm, IV, 253-254; al-Šafāḍī, II, 84; Munajjim, I, 328r.
and asking him to discontinue his advance, at the same time offering him his allegiance on the basis of the 359 A.H./969 A.D. treaty. Romanus refused the offer, arrested the envoy and proceeded towards Aleppo but with a lower morale. This version is far from being acceptable for no-one among the chroniclers corroborates it, and as was previously discussed, Nagīr's coup took place after Romanus III's campaign and not before.

Michael Psellus, the contemporary official and chronicler, alleges that the expedition was provoked by a merely personal attitude of the Emperor who "setting his heart on military glory prepared for war against the barbarians east and west. Victory over the western barbarians, however easy, seemed no great triumph but an attack on the eastern enemies, he thought, would win him fame. There he could use the resources of his empire on a colossal scale. For these reasons although no real pretext for war existed, he made an unprovoked assault on the Saracens who lived in Coele-Syria, and whose capital was Chalep (Halab = Aleppo)".

In spite of being contemporary, living and working in the Imperial Palace of Constantinople and his "account on Romanus is

85 Zubda, I, 238-239; for the 359 A.H./969 A.D. Treaty, see the above note, 82.
86 Psellus, 66.
Psellus' personal attitude affected his narrative and therefore a cautious approach to his account is advisable. Taking as evidence his absurd description of Romanus III, he says "He had a graceful turn of speech and a majestic utterance. A man of heroic stature, he looked very inch a king". Later Psellus himself says of this man who looked "every inch a king"... "merely he did nothing more than make projects or shall I say built castles in the air and then in actual practice hurled them down again... of the science of war he was completely ignorant and as for the letters his experience was far from profound". This, in spite of "this gentleman nurtured on Greek literature also had some acquaintance with the literary works of the Italians".

What would be more appropriate than all the previously mentioned reasons that Romanus, whose Empire's relations with the Fatimid Caliphate was not good at that time, aimed by his expedition to accomplish what the governor of Antioch failed to carry out? He was anxious lest Salih's sons, after the death of their father, would be incapable of retaining Aleppo and the Fatimid might recapture it. Evidence of this lies in the fact that Mangur b. Lu'lu', the former governor of Aleppo, was among the entourage of

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87 Psellus, 63.
88 Ibid., 63.
89 Ibid., 63-65.
Romanus which rather indicates the intention of Romanus to restore Mangur to his former position. Romanus III sent an envoy to Nagr and Thimāl expressing his anxiety on account, as al-Antākī relates, "of their youthfulness he feared that someone among their enemies, by cunning action, might wrest the city from them, therefore he asked them to yield it to him and he, in turn, would give them in exchange or as a compensation the city together with the sum of money they would suggest". Nagr and Thimāl detained the envoy and sent their cousin Muqallid b. Kāmil with some gifts to meet Romanus and to try to persuade him to return or to change his direction. Muqallid met the Emperor in Antioch which according to al-Antākī, Romanus reached on Monday, 16th Rajab, 421 A.H./20th July, 1030 A.D. Muqallid seems to have been accompanied by a number of assistants. Psellus describes the Aleppo mission meeting with the Emperor Romanus III. He says "They declared that they had not wanted this war, nor had they given him / i.e. Romanus/ any pretext for it. They were standing by the peace terms already concluded and they refused to repudiate the treaty still in force. On the other hand, seeing that he was

90 al-Antākī, 254–255; Zubda, I, 245; Itti‘az, Annals, 427 H.

91 al-Antākī, 255; Zubda, I, 238–245.

92 al-Antākī, 255.
now adopting a policy of threats, and since he persisted in parading his strength, they themselves—if he proved obdurate—would from now on make their own preparations for conflict:

They committed themselves to the fortunes of war".  

Romanus who "had one object only—to draw up his line of battle, to set his men in array against the enemy, to lay ambushes, to go out foraging, to dig trenches, to drain off rivers, to take fortresses" not only refused the Mirdasids' offer but detained Muqallid and advanced towards Aleppo. He was encouraged by the tribe of Ṭayy whose Amir ʿUṣayn b. al-Mufarrij sent several members of his family as envoys to the Emperor urging him to continue his advance and assuring him of their allegiance and promising to fight on his side. Romanus stayed in Antioch for seven days, then departed from it in great pomp. Romanus chose a bad time for his campaign. It was the midsummer, intensely hot, the climate very dry with a consequent lack of water. Such adverse conditions dispirited the invading troops and caused great hardship among them. Not far from the fortress of ʿAzāz and in a barren plain the Byzantine army encamped. As it was their custom,

\[93\] Psellus, 67.

\[94\] Ibid., 67.

\[95\] al-Antākī, 254; Zubdā, I, 238, 245; al-Mukhtṣag, I, 166.
the Byzantines dug round their camp a large and deep trench. 96 In Aleppo, Naqr and Thimal mobilised all the warriors of the tribe of Kilab with reinforcements from the other Bedouins, especially from the tribe of Numayr. They also mustered - under the pretext of holy war - a great number of people from the country surrounding Aleppo and from Aleppo itself. Thimal, with the greater part of the mustered forces, took strong hold in the city and citadel of Aleppo. He removed his family together with that of his brother to the tribal camp. Naqr led the rest of the troops which were horsemen, most of them from the tribe of Kilab, and some from the tribe of Numayr. 97

According to al-Maqrizi, the number of the troops led by Naqr was about 2,000 horsemen, 98 but al-‘Azimi and Ibn al-‘Adim give the number as 923 horsemen. 99 Ibn al-‘Adim gives yet another number of 700, which Ibn Abi’l-Dam confirms 100 while Ibn al-Jawzi gives the peculiar number of 100 horsemen and 1,000 infantry. 101 This estimate by Ibn al-Jawzi is difficult to accept for the description of the fighting which took place between the Arabs and the Byzantines (as will be later discussed) leave no doubt that the Arabs

96 al-Antaki, 256; al-Kamil, IX, 286-287; Zubda, I, 239.
97 al-Antaki, 255; Zubda, I, 240-241; al-‘Azimi, 166v.; Itti‘az, Annals, 421 H.
98 Itti‘az, Annals, 421 H.
were entirely horsemen. In addition, all the chroniclers agree that Nağr's force was comprised only of horsemen. The Muslim chroniclers, while meticulous concerning the number of the Arabic force, appear to give an ambiguous estimate of the Byzantine army. For Ibn al-Muhadhdhab (a native of Ma'arrat al-Nu‘man, an eleventh century chronicler), Ibn al-‘Adîm and Ibn Abi’l-Dam number the Byzantine army at 600,000 warriors; it comprised the kings of Russia and Bulgaria (?) in addition to the Emperor Romanus III. Ibn al-Athîr, Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Maqrizi, Ibn Khaldûn and al-Dhahabî allege that it numbered 300,000.

It is difficult to accept those conflicting and exaggerated estimates, but at the same time there is no doubt that the Byzantine army was by no means small. In fact, it was very large, but most of its troops were irregular for Romanus III thought, as al-Antâkî and Psellus relate, that it was easier to win victory by numbers and pomp than by a regular and disciplined army. Psellus says "the whole Roman army was assembled and organised to fight those Saracens; the ranks were increased and fresh formations devised, while

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100 Zubda, I, 242; Ibn ‘Abi al-Dam, 127v.
101 al-Muntazam, VIII, 50.
1-2 al-Kâmil, IX, 286-287; al-Muntazam, VIII, 50; Ittî‘âz, Annals, 421 H; Ibn Khaldûn, IV, 582-583; Duwal, I, 194.
the mercenaries were welded into one force and new troops conscripted. His (Romanus) plan, it appears was to overwhelm the enemy at the first attack. He thought that if he increased the army beyond its normal strength, or rather if the legion was made more numerous, when he came upon the foe with such masses of soldiers, Romanus and allies, no-one would be able to resist them."\(^{104}\)

Ibn Junghul, a later Islamic chronicler, without naming his sources, alleges that Romanus' army consisted of 100,000 troops. Such a number could not be very far from accurate.\(^{105}\) This army not only lacked experience and discipline but was riddled with conspiracy. A number of its high ranking officers were plotting against the life of the Emperor.\(^{106}\) This army which had encircled its camp with a large ditch for defence purposes found itself trapped in a prison of its own making. The Bedouins' light and flexible cavalry surrounded the Byzantine camp and, by raids and ambushes, they brought horror and created havoc among their enemies.

The Emperor, whose army was hit by thirst and was teeming with rumours of intrigues and disorder, endeavoured to extricate his army. He sent a detachment of it towards the fortress of 'Azāz on a reconnaissance mission. This detachment was routed and most of its members were either killed or captured. On realising

\(^{104}\)Psellus, 67; al-Antaki, 254.

\(^{105}\)Ibn Junghul, IV, 187r.

\(^{106}\)al-Kamil, IX, 286-287; Itti‘az, Annals, 421H; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 582-583; Ibn Junghul, IV, 187r.
the gravity of the situation Romanus decided to retreat and ordered the siege instruments to be burned. The Armenians who were in his army took this as a signal to start pillaging the camp market store. This created tumult inside the camp and the guards, concerned with their personal safety, ceased their vigilance on the trench and began to abandon the camp.

At this critical moment of disorder the Kilābis, with their allied cavalry, led by Nāqr, dashed at the retreating Byzantine camp, took the invaders by surprise and caused their flight. Psellus dramatically depicts the event. He says: "A detachment of barbarian soldiers, all equipped in their own fashion, daring bareback riders..... suddenly they appeared on high ground yelling their war-cries and filling their opponents with consternation at this unexpected sight; they made a tremendous din as their horses charged to the attack. By not keeping in close order they created the illusion of great numbers running about in scattered groups and with no regular formations. This so terrorized the Roman soldiery and spread such panic in this mighty and famous army and so shattered their morale that they ran away dressed just as they were and not a thought did they give to anything but flight. Those who happened to be on horseback wheeled about and made off as fast as they could while the rest did not even wait to mount their horses

107 al-Antākī, 257; Zubda, I, 242-243; Duwal, I, 194; al-Muntazam, VIII, 50; al-Kāmil, IX, 287.
but left them to the first master who claimed them and every man running off or wandering away sought his own safety to the best of his ability. It was an extraordinary sight..... first to feel the effects of the hubbub were the imperial guards. Without so much as a backward glance they deserted their Emperor and fled, indeed if someone had not helped him on to his horse, given him the rein and counselled him to escape, he would have been almost captured himself and made prisoner by the enemy..... The truth is if God had not at that moment restrained the barbarian onrush and He had not inspired them to moderation in the hour of victory, nothing could have saved the Roman army from complete annihilation and the Emperor would have fallen first of all. So the Romans ran off in disorder; meanwhile the enemy as if amazed at the sight of Romans routed and fleeing for no reason, merely stood and watched this outstanding triumph. Later on, after taking a handful of prisoners on the field and those men whom they knew to be of some importance, they told the rest to go free and turned to the foot."108 This humiliating defeat took place a fortnight after the Emperor had left Antioch.109

Psellus' report of this battle is most interesting, describing as it does the tactics employed by the Kilābīs in contrast to

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109 al-Antāki, 257.
the heavy movement of the Byzantine army. These tactics reveal the nomadic character and method of fighting.

The unexpected victory granted the Murdasid and their followers an immense quantity of booty. The Arabic chroniclers describe in detail how great was the volume of this booty which was carried on a train of several hundred mules. First they seized the Imperial tent" says Psellus... "it was filled with necklaces and bracelets and diadems, pearls and precious stones even more costly, all kinds of glorious booty. To count the multitude of these treasures would have been no easy task..."

Although this battle marked the end of a phase of the Arabic-Byzantine relation which was begun in Aleppo by Sayf al-Dawla al-Ḥamdānī (945-967 A.D.) but, in fact, apart from the enormous quantity of booty it had no significant repercussion on Byzantium. The Murdasids, as well as the two Muslim Caliphates of Baghdad and Cairo, were in a position of being incapable of exploiting the victory. On the contrary, shortly afterwards Byzantium was able to avenge its defeat by raiding south-west Syria, by the capture of the celebrated city of Edessa and by the application from Naṣr b. Ṣāliḥ - the victor - for Byzantine pardon and protection and, in

\[110\] al-Kamil, IX, 287; Zubda, I, 242-243; al-Muntazam, VIII, 50; Ibn Abi l-Dam, 127v; Itti’āz, Annals, 421 H; Ibn Junghul, IV, 187r.

\[111\] Psellus, 69.
123.

turn offering to pay 500,000 dirhams as annual tribute. 112

It would appear that Naṣr was obliged to do this for three main reasons; by the dissension among his tribe on account of the coup, by the removal of the tribe of Ṭayy’s together with part of the tribe of Kalb to the country surrounding Aleppo and by his personal fear that Fāṭimid action might be taken against him.

After his defeat Romanus sent a communication to Ḥassān b. Muf-arrij - Amir of the tribe of Ṭayy’ - in accordance with which he and his tribe moved northwards to Aleppo region. Ḥassān was accompanied by a part of the tribe of Kalb, headed by Rāfī’ b. Abī’l-Layyl. According to al-Antakī, these Ṭayy’is and Kalbis were numbered about 20,000, which gave the impression to the Aleppine authorities that Romanus had invited them to fight Aleppo and to expel the tribe of Kilâb from thence. At the same time al-Dizbarī, the Fāṭimid ruler of Damascus, was doing his utmost to win some of the Kilâbī dissenters and widen the breach in the tribe and to make use of them for his own ends. These circumstances compelled Naṣr to seek Byzantine protection by means of which he could escape Ṭayy’i and Kalbi invasion, uphold his own prestige among his tribe and secure his rule against action by al-Dizbarī.

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The Byzantine Emperor proclaimed that Naṣr had become a vassal of Byzantium and that the Empire now was under obligation to support and defend him against aggression. He (the Emperor) also informed the Fāṭimid Caliphate of this fact. This became the main obstacle to the peace negotiations between Byzantium and the Fāṭimid Caliphate which had just commenced. These negotiations were begun in the year following the defeat of Romanus (422 A.H./1031 A.D.) and made no progress for a few years because of the dispute concerning Aleppo. not until both sides had agreed to omit the question of Aleppo from the negotiations were they able to conclude and ratify a ten year Armistice Treaty (a longer commitment is not allowed according to Muslim law) which began in the year of its issue, 427 A.H./1036 A.D. 113

This Treaty affected the position of Naṣr b. Ṣāliḥ and obliged him to give more careful attention to his relationship with the Fāṭimid Caliphate. He could now no longer rely on the support and protection of Byzantium, in fact this Treaty temporarily reduced the political value of Aleppo. It would appear that Byzantium, which by this Treaty, had solved most of its problems with the Fāṭimid Caliphate, lost interest in Aleppo or, at least, no longer deemed it to be of the same political importance. This was manifested by the following events. Some chroniclers

113 al-Antakī, 259-272; Ibn Ḥayyūs, I, 4; al-ʿAẓīmī, 165v.; Ittīfaq, Annals, 422 H and 427 H; Bar Hebraeus, 169.
relate that in 428 A.H./1036 A.D. (shortly after the ratification of the Treaty) there was a rift in Nāṣr's relationship with al-Muṣṭansir, the Fāṭimid Caliph (1036-1094 A.D.). They give no reason for the rift, but they relate that Nāṣr appealed to Michael IV, the Byzantine Emperor, who in turn advised him to endeavour to gain the confidence of al-Muṣṭansir. Ibn al-ʿAdīm says that after the defeat of Romanus III Nāṣr sent an envoy to Cairo with a large quantity of the booty as a gift. This envoy remained in Cairo for a long time. He went there probably in 422 A.H./1030 A.D. during the life of the Caliph al-Zāhir and did not leave till after the death of this Caliph. He returned to Aleppo after the accession of al-Muṣṭansir. The length of time that the envoy spent in Cairo augurs that there was a discord between Nāṣr and the Caliphate. This appears to be the reason why he appealed to the Byzantine Emperor. The nature and cause of the discord is not known; it could have been a continuation of his father's quarrel with the Caliphate. There is no evidence that after the death of his father Nāṣr sent any other envoy to Cairo for conciliation. On the other hand some relate that Nāṣr requested the Caliphate to grant him rulership

114 al-ʿAṣīrī, 169v.; Ittiʿāz, Annals, 428 H.
115 Zubda, I, 247-248; see also Ibn al-Qalānīṣī, 75; Ittiʿāz, Annals, 428 H.
over the region of Ḥims.  

We are not told whether the Caliphate at first refused the request or demanded too high a price thus causing a rift. What would be more probable than that the Fāṭi-mid Caliphate, whose army defeated Naṣr's father, and caused his death, should be discontented with Naṣr's attitude towards Byzantium. It probably felt that he should cease to acknowledge Byzantine suzerainty and stop payment of tribute to it; or it may have been that the Caliphate tried to enforce tribute and acknowledgement of its own supremacy, if not entirely, at least on the same level as that given to Byzantium. There is no evidence that, at that time, or indeed at any other, that Naṣr paid any tribute to Cairo. Al-Maqrīzī says that after the advice of the Byzantine Emperor, Naṣr did win the confidence of al-Mustanṣir and was granted rulership of the region of Ḥims.  

This would, perhaps, mean that after the rift Byzantium mediated between Naṣr and the Caliphate and helped them to reach a compromise in which Naṣr accepted Cairo's conditions, whatever they may have been, and in turn the Caliphate granted him the rulership over the region of Ḥims. Unfortunately none of these probabilities can be ascertained because the chroniclers relate no more than that Naṣr's envoy returned from Cairo to Aleppo bringing to Naṣr some gifts,

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116 al-‘Aṣimi, 169v.; Itti‘az, Annals, 428 H.

117 Itti‘az, Annals, 482H.
Robes of Honour, the Laqab of Mukhtas al-Umara, Khaṣṭu’l-Imām, Shams al-Dawla wal-Majdiḥā, Dhu’l-‘A’zimatayn in addition to his previous title of Shibl al-Dawla and the grant of rulership over the region of Ḥimṣ.\(^{118}\)

This grant, however, did not strengthen Naṣr's position; on the contrary it was in fact the beginning of the end of his rule and brought about his death. This grant was given at the expense of the Faṭimid ruler of Damascus. This ruler was al-Dizbari, the victor over Ṣāliḥ, Naṣr's father. He was angered at what he considered to be an act of conspiracy against him.\(^{119}\)

The life and career of al-Dizbari will be discussed in the coming chapter but it is necessary here to point out that this man was ambitious. After his victory at the battle of Al-Uqbuwanah he had established himself in Damascus. First of all he drove most of the Bedouin tribes from the mainland of southern Syria to either the desert or to Byzantine territory.\(^{120}\) Afterward he was able to win the confidence of some of the Bedouin Chieftains and used them in his warfare.\(^{121}\) In Cairo, Abu’l-Qāsim al-Jarjarā’ī, the

\(^{118}\) Ibn al-Qalānisi, 75; Zubda, I, 248; Itti‘āz, Annals, 428 H.

\(^{119}\) Itti‘āz, Annals, 428 H.

\(^{120}\) Ibn Ḥayyūs, I, 5-6, 60-63, 102-103, 412; II, 378, 416-417, 540-541, 570-575; al-Antaki, 261-262, 265-266, 270; al-Nujūm, V, 34; Itti‘āz, Annals, 422 H.

\(^{121}\) Ibn Ḥayyūs, I, 123-128, 265-266; II, 432; Zubda, I, 250-251.
vizier of the Caliphate, at that period, recognised al-Dizbarî's ambition together with his tendency to independence. Later, as it will be discussed, the vizier was able to bring the rule of al-Dizbarî to an end. Presumably Abu'l-Qasim al-Jarjara'i aimed at this stage to limit the power of al-Dizbarî and not to ruin him. This could be one of the reasons why the Caliphate granted Nagr the rulership of the region of Ḫimṣ. By this a collision between Nagr and al-Dizbarî would be almost certain. Such a collision would not only weaken the power of both sides but would give the Caliphate a pretext and opportunity to interfere and enforce its own conditions.

Events, however, did not coincide with such a supposed plan, for when the inevitable clash took place Nagr lost his life and al-Dizbarî captured Aleppo despite the desire of Abu'l-Qasim al-Jarjara'i, as al-Maqrizi says. 122 The quarrel between Nagr and al-Dizbarî was, according to the chroniclers, created by Ja'far b. Kulayd al-Kutami, the Fāṭimid ruler of Ḫimṣ. Ja'far, who was one of al-Dizbarî's fellow-rulers, was directly affected by the loss of the rulership of Ḫimṣ region. He not only appealed to al-Dizbarî and warned him, but created trouble inside the territory of Aleppo. The old feud between Nagr and al-Dizbarî, the killer of his father - was resurrected. Al-Dizbarî prepared to campaign against Nagr. He mustered all the Fāṭimid troops in Syria together

122 Zubda, I, 259-260.
with many warriors from the tribe of Kalb. His relationship with Kalb was, at that time, good for he had previously, in 426 A.H./ 1035 A.D., married a daughter of its Amir Rafi' b. Abi’l-Layyl. He also won the support of ‘Allâ’â, the son of Hassân b. al-Mufarij, Amir of the tribe of Tayy’, and even enticed a group of the Kilâbis to augment his forces.

Before the advance of these troops, al-Dizbarî informed the Byzantine Empire of his intention and assured it that the Byzantine’s interest in Aleppo would not be affected. According to Ibn al-‘Adîm, al-Dizbarî asked the Byzantine Emperor to permit him to wrest Aleppo from Naqr promising that if he succeeded he would pay the Empire the same amount of tribute which had been paid by Naqr. Ibn al-‘Adîm goes on to say that the Emperor gave the required permission and al-Dizbarî advanced northward.

When Naqr heard the news of the impending campaign he summoned his own troops together with as many warriors from the tribe of Kilâb as he could muster and led them southward. Naqr’s army met with and fought the invaders to the west of Salamiya. His army was defeated and retreated westward to re-form itself. While Naqr was reorganising his troops and recruiting some reinforcements, al-Dizbarî’s army entered the city of Hamâh, sacked it, then advanced towards Naqr. On the 15th of Sha‘bân 428 A.H./ 22nd May, 1038 A.D., or two days before, in the north-west of Hamâh and not too far from it, where lies the village of Lajmîn,
the two armies once again faced each other. They engaged in combat and, during the fighting, Thīmāl b. Ǧāliḥ with his followers fled from the battlefield towards Aleppo thus leaving his brother Naṣr with only a few of his own men to wage the uneven struggle. The place of the battlefield was to the west of Laḫmīn and was known as Tal-Ṭās, and there Naṣr lost his life. Naṣr's head was carried to al-Dīzbarī while his body was sent to Ḫamāh to be displayed on the citadel.¹²³

It would appear that when Thīmāl fled from the battlefield towards Aleppo it was his intention to restore his own position in Aleppo which Naṣr had usurped from him in an almost similar way. Thīmāl, however, was unable to retain Aleppo and the Faṭimid troops entered the city. Thereupon Aleppo once again returned to Faṭimid dominion. This was the significant result of this battle, for it marked the beginning of a new period in the history of Aleppo. This period will be discussed in the following chapter, but it is noteworthy to mention here that the site of this battle emphasised the growing importance of the city of Ḫamāh. This city, which previously was a part of the province of Ǧīmṣ, advanced in the 11th

century to become one of the principal cities of Syria. (In a later century it became the centre of one of the petty Ayyubid States). The main reason for this advance was the strategic position of the city which made it a battleground for the contending rulers of Aleppo and Damascus.

Before ending this chapter, however, another question concerning the reign of Naṣr presents itself. On the only dinar of Naṣr so far known to be extant, we find "the inscription on the obverse field is

اَلْبِيرُ الْمِسْتَدَ / شَباَبٍ الدُّولَةَ The inner margin consists of the complete Shi’ite formula while the outer margin consists of verse 53, chapter 9 of the Qur’an..... On the reverse, the field inscription reads

اَلْبِيرُ الْمِسْتَدَ / أَبُو بَكْرٍ مُحَمَّدَ The inner margin contains the phrase

اللهُ رَبِّيَ عَلَيْهِ الْعَلَامََةَ which is part of the name and title of al-Zahir in Egypt. The outer margin of the reverse of this coin reads

بَعْضُ اللَّهِ صَرَبِيْنِهَا الدِّينَارِ بِحَلِبِ سَنَةٍ سَبِيكَ عَشِيرَةٌ رؤمَائِهِ. Thus we know by the evidence of this coin that Shibl al-Dawla / Naṣr/..... recognised the Fāṭimid al-Zahir as Caliph, that he professed Shi’ah Islam, and that he probably designated Abu-Bakr Muḥammad as Wāli al- ‘Ahd. It is impossible to state categorically that Abu-Bakr Muḥammad was so designated, as there is absolutely no indication of his identity." In the available Arabic sources it is "impossible to discover any individual whose full name contained these three names and who could possibly have been living or of importance",124 in Aleppo, during

124 J.A.O.S., LXXIII, 90-91.
the reign of Nagr. As is mentioned before (p.107) on the two other known Mirdasid coins which were struck by Sāliḥ, Nagr's father, the name of Thīmāl b. Sāliḥ, Nagr's brother, is inscribed in addition to that of his father which indicates that Thīmāl was his father's nominated successor (Wālī al-‘Ahd). It is within reason to suppose that, according to the inscriptions on these two coins, Abu-Bakr Muḥammad, whose name is inscribed on Nagr's dinar, was Nagr's son and Wālī al-‘Ahd. The sources speak of only one son of Nagr, Muḥammad, and mention no other. The Mirdasids were Shi'a; used some Shi'a names, but none of them used the name of Abu-Bakr. No-one of Sāliḥ's sons was named Muḥammad. It could be that this Abu-Bakr Muḥammad was not a member of the Mirdasids, but an Aleppine who held the post of Vizir. No doubt many of the Aleppines were, at that time, called Abu-Bakr Muḥammad. The administration of the Mirdasids was held by Aleppines and we have no complete record of those who worked as Vizir to Nagr b. Sāliḥ or any other Mirdasid Amir. It is conceivable that this Abu-Bakr Muḥammad, whose name is inscribed on Nagr's dinar, held the post of Vizir. This supposition could be disputed by the fact that this Abu-Bakr Muḥammad held the title of Amir which indicates that he was a member of the Mirdasid Emirate family. In fact this is no problem for many people of that period, who were not members of the Mirdasid family nor of any of the Emirate families of the tribe of Kilāb, held the title of Amir. In Būghyat al-Talab,
we read that the poet Ibn Abī ḫaṣīḥa' once praised Naṣr b. Ǧāliḥ who in turn asked the poet what he would like as a reward. The poet said "I wish myself to be an Amir". Accordingly Naṣr granted him the coveted title. In a State where the poets were granted the title of Amir, it is not difficult to conceive that its Vizir also held the same title.

In conclusion, the identity of this Abu-Bakr Muhammad will remain as an enigma unless fresh sources with fresh information are discovered.

125 Bughya, F., 250r.-v.
Chapter III
THE MIRDASID DYNASTY II


Al-Amīr Al-Muzaffar, Amir Al-Juyush, ‘Uddat Al-İmām, Sayf Al-Khilafah ‘Uqūd Al-Dawla, Sharaf Al-Ḥā’ālī, Abu-Manṣur, Anushtākin; these were the titles and name of Al-Dizbarī, the most distinguished Fāṭimid ruler who had ever ruled in Syria. The chroniclers relate that he was a Turk, born in the region of Khuttal beyond the Oxus. As a young lad he had been taken captive and was carried to Kashghar, presumably to be sold, but managed to escape to Bukhārā. In Bukhārā he was recaptured, enslaved and was carried to Baghdad and later to Damascus, where he arrived in 400 A.H./1009 A.D. and was sold to a Fāṭimid officer of Daylamite origin known as Dizbar. From him Anushtākin took his by-name – Al-Dizbarī.

To him Dizbar entrusted the stewardship of his properties. Anushtākin filled this post successfully for three years. His success gained him a reputation and it was the reason which brought about the turning point in his life and career.

In 403 A.H./1012 A.D. his master was obliged to present him to the Fāṭimid Caliph. He was taken to Cairo where he underwent two years' training. After this he was moved to the Palace of Al-Ḥakim, the Fāṭimid Caliph at that time. He served there for one year and during that period won the
confidence of many of the State's leading personalities.

He also gained the confidence of Al-Ḥakim who appointed him "as an officer" in the army.

In 406 A.H./1015 A.D. he went with a Fāṭimid army to Damascus, where he lived in the house of Ḥayyūs which lay in Zuqāq-‘Attāf (Bāb al-Jābiya, probably now known as Al-Khādiriya). While in Damascus, he probably became acquainted with Syria and its politics in which, during the next twenty-seven years, he played a prominent part. As a guest in the house of Ḥayyūs he was introduced to Ḥayyūs' son, Muḥammad, the famous poet of the 11th century who later devoted most of his work to the eulogy of Al-Dīzbarī.¹

Al-Dīzbarī, however, did not remain long in Damascus because he was summoned to return to Egypt.

The chroniclers do not give us the age of Al-Dīzbarī at the time when he was sold in Damascus, neither do they speak of any previous education and training he may have received before he was sold in Damascus, nor of any received after he was sent to Cairo. The chroniclers attribute his rapid success to good fortune and his own ingenuity;² on the other hand they seem to indicate that he was over twenty years of age when he was sold in


Damascus. His relationship with both Abu'l-'Alā Al-Maʿarri and Ibn Ḥayyūs, together with the high standard of Ibn Ḥayyūs' poetical language, suggest that he was well-informed in the knowledge of his age. His victories over the Bedouins of Syria together with his success in subduing the whole of Syria to the Fātimid rule, also the maintenance of that rule for more than ten years, indicate that he had received a good administrative and military training.

The second episode in Al-Dīzbarī's career was his appointment as the ruler of Baʿalbak which he held for about four years. This appointment provided him with the opportunity to establish himself by acquiring a number of Ghulams (i.e. pages) to amass money and to develop his knowledge of Syrian politics and conditions. This last was probably the most important for it had a far-reaching effect on his career and brought him into public notice and also enhanced his prestige.

From Baʿalbeak he was removed to Qaysāriyya where he appears to have remained for a short while. From Qaysāriyya he was promoted to the governorship of Palestine, which he occupied from April 1023 A.D. This new post brought him into direct contact with the Syrian problems and involved him in military action.

His victories over the Bedouins of Syria together with the death

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3 Taʿrif, 48, 108, 533, 566; Ibn Ḥayyūs, I, 29-44.

4 Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 71-72; Ibn Abī'l-Hayyja, 124r; al-Dhahabī, Or 49, 171v.-172r.; ʿIttīʿaz, Annals, 413 H.
of Šāliḥ b. Mirdās and then that of Naqr b. Šāliḥ has already been discussed (Ch. II, pp. 102, 130).

After the death of Naqr his brother Thimāl, who had fled from the battlefield, arrived at Aleppo. He was dispirited and thought that he would be incapable of retaining the city, so left it and went toward Mesopotamia to collect re-inforcements from the Bedouins of the area. He left his cousin Muqallid b. Kāmil as a governor of the Citadel and a certain Khalīfa b. Jābir Al-Kilābī as governor of the city. When Thimāl left Aleppo, he took his family and that of his deceased brother with him. His departure was the signal for an outbreak of disorder which spread into Aleppo. At the same time a part of Al-Dizbarī's army, which was chasing the fugitives of the Mirdāsid army, arrived at the gates of Aleppo and began to besiege the city. The siege, however, did not last long and on Saturday, 14th Ramadan 429 A.H./19th June 1038 A.D., Khalīfa b. Jābir, with the agreement of the Aleppines, opened the city's gates and surrendered it to the Fāṭimid troops. The leader of the Fāṭimid troops, a page of Al-Dizbarī, called Toghān, sent a communication to Al-Dizbarī telling him about the city's surrender. On receiving this news, Al-Dizbarī hurried towards Aleppo which he reached and entered on Tuesday, 22nd of the same month (June 1038 A.D.). In the course of a few days he was able to reach an agreement with Muqallid b. Kāmil, the Mirdāsid governor of the Citadel who accordingly surrendered
the citadel and left Aleppo.

By this once again Aleppo returned to Fāṭimid dominion, and, for the first and last time, the whole of Syria was united under the Governorship of one Fāṭimid ruler, whose centre was Damascus. ⁵

After he took possession of Aleppo al-Dizbarī ordered all the Mirdāsid's soldiers and followers to leave Aleppo. Al-Dizbarī did not stay long in Aleppo, but in the course of the third month after capturing it he returned to Damascus. Before he left he appointed two of his pages (Ghulāms), Fātik and Sabuktegin as rulers of the citadel. He also appointed another page (Ghulām) as ruler of the city. The name of this page was Banjutegin and he was given the title of Raḍī al-Dawla. ⁶ Although he captured Aleppo, al-Dizbarī was not able to get possession of all the Mirdāsid's territory. The Mesopotamian part of the Emirate of Aleppo which consisted of the regions of Bālis, al-Raqqā, al-Rāfiqa and al-Raḥba remained in the hands of Thīmāl b. Ṣāliḥ who made al-Raqqā his centre in order to be as near as possible to Aleppo. ⁷

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⁵Ibn Ḥayyūs, II, 442-446; al-ʿAẓīmī, 169v.; Zubda, I, 255-256; al-Kāmil, IX, 162-163; Ibn al-ʿAmīd, 538; Ibn Khalādūn, IV, 583; Iḥtiāz, Annals, 429H; al-Ṣafādī, II, 84; Ibn Al-Qalānisi, Ibn Abī l-Hayāʾī, and Al-Dhahabī relate another narrative which differs in detail from the one previously mentioned. These chroniclers relate that, after his victory over Naṣr, Al-Dizbarī returned with his army to Damascus where he stayed for a short time, then led another campaign against Aleppo by which he captured it. This narrative is not acceptable for several reasons. The chroniclers who related it were not Aleppines, nor were they
Before he left Aleppo and returned to Damascus, al-Dizbarī received a diploma (Sijill) from Al-Mustansir, the Fatimid Caliph, conferring on him the rulership of Aleppo. This was, in fact, a concession, for the Fatimid authority in Cairo, headed by Abu'l-Qāsim al-Jarjarā'ī, the vizier was against the capture of Aleppo by Al-Dizbarī. Abu'l-Qāsim Al-Jarjarā'ī interpreted the capture of Aleppo not as a restoration of it to the direct Fatimid rule, but as another step towards the loss of the whole of Syria.

While Abu'l-Qāsim al-Jarjarā'ī waited for a suitable pretext and opportunity to bring al-Dizbarī's rule to an end, the latter acted rapidly to strengthen his position and prepared himself for...

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7. al-'Aẓīmi, 169v.; al-Kāmil, IX, 336; Zubda, I, 259; Itti'āz, Annals, 429 H.

independence. He procured a large number of Turkish pages and increased his military power. Meanwhile he married the daughter of a certain Kilābī Amir named Mangūr b. Zughayb. He also gained possession of Qal'at Dawsar (later known as Qal'at-Ja'bar) and made a marriage proposal to Naṣr al-Dawla, the Marwanid ruler of Mayyafārīqīn, that his daughter be betrothed to his (Al-Dizbarī's) son. Furthermore he endeavoured to make his rule acceptable to the population by restoring order and security to Syria.⁹

In Cairo, Abu'l-Qasim al-Jarjara'i, whose state lacked the power to remove Al-Dizbarī by force, contrived to bring his rule to an end by intrigue. In 433 A.H./1041 A.D., a group of the Fātimid troops of Damascus who, as it would appear, did not like Al-Dizbarī's policy of recruiting new troops, went to Cairo and complained to the Vizier about it. Abu'l-Qasim Al-Jarjara'i, who had waited for such an opportunity, told them that his opinion of al-Dizbarī was bad and asked them to return to Damascus. He also advised them to win to their cause as many as possible of the Fātimid troops in Damascus and to wait further instructions. Next, Abu'l-Qasim Al-Jarjara'i wrote to all the rulers of Syrian cities and provinces, emancipating them from obedience to Al-Dizbarī and instructing them to contact

Cairo directly and not via the ruler of Damascus as was the custom. Meanwhile he, in the name of al-Mu'tasim, wrote to Thimāl b. Ẓalih conferring on him the rulership of Aleppo and urging him to recapture it by force.

After this he wrote to Al-Dizbarī instructing him to remove his Kātib Abu Sa'id, and to send him to Cairo for interrogation. In anger and without knowing the details of Abu'l-Qasim Al-Jarjarā'ī's contrivance, Al-Dizbarī not only refused the order but summoned Abu'l-Qasim Al-Jarjarā'ī's representative in Damascus to his presence and ordered his attendants to humiliate and strike him. By this Al-Dizbarī actually proclaimed his independence and during the days that followed he stopped payment of the Fātimid troops and paid only those who were loyal to him and not to the Caliph. This, however, did not pass without retaliation for a great number of the leaders of the troops were in secret agreement with Abu'l-Qasim Al-Jarjarā'ī and went into open rebellion against Al-Dizbarī. Trouble and disorder spread in Damascus and Al-Dizbarī, who failed to quell the rebellion, was obliged to abandon Damascus accompanied by only a few of his own pages.

He tried to take refuge in Ba'albak, but failed and the same thing happened when he reached the city of Hamā. There he was on the brink of losing everything, even his life, but fortunately for him the Munqidhī Amir of Kafar-Ṭāb came to his rescue (see p. 84, Ch. II) and escorted him to Aleppo. During
that period Abu’l-Qasim Al-Jarjarah, in the name of Al-Mustansir, issued several manifestos and Al-Dizbari was proclaimed traitor (Khā'ir), one who had betrayed his master and Caliph and therefore should suffer severe penalty. Al-Dizbari, who was at that time suffering from great physical fatigue, was greatly affected by the accusation and according to the chroniclers he was unable to endure it. Consequently, in the second week of January—probably the 10th—1042 A.D., he collapsed and died. This took place in the citadel of Aleppo only after the short period of about a month and a half, when he had come to it as a refugee. 10

In the month which followed his death, Aleppo was recaptured by Thimal b. Salih (see below) who resumed the Mirdasid rule after an interruption of more than three and a half years. Meanwhile a new Fatimid governor was appointed in Damascus, thus once again the union between northern and southern Syria was abolished.

Although we have no information about domestic life in Aleppo under the rule of Al-Dizbari, it would appear that this

rule was popular. Again there is no information concerning the Byzantine Empire's reaction to Al-Dizbari's occupation of Aleppo. On the whole, save for some minor incidents, which occurred in 432 A.H./1041 A.D. between the Byzantine troops of Antioch and those of Aleppo, it seems that the relation of Al-Dizbari with Byzantium was good. Ibn Abi’l-Dam relates that in 432 A.H./1040 A.D. Al-Dizbari sent provisions to Aleppo by sea. They were transported to the shore of Antioch, then carried on camels' backs - via the city of Antioch - to Aleppo. Although there is no further detail it does, however, suggest that there was cooperation between Al-Dizbari and the Byzantine authority in Antioch. Some other chroniclers relate that after he settled in Al-Raqqa, Thimal b. Šalih appealed to Byzantium for help to restore Aleppo, but Byzantium refused this request and instead asked Thimal to sell the city of Al-Raqqa on the same basis as when, in 422 A.H./1030 A.D. the two Numayri Chieftains sold the cit. of Edessa.

On bearing that Al-Dizbari had been obliged to abandon Damascus and to take refuge in Aleppo Thimal b. Šalih who had just

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11 Ibn Ḥayyūs, I, 165, 173; II, 443; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 78; Zubda, I, 257; Mir’at, Annals, 433 H; al-Nujūm, V, 34.

12 Ibn Ḥayyūs, II, 558-559, 587-589; al-‘Ātimī, 170r.-v.; Zubda, I, 259-259; al-Ḵāmil, IX, 336-337; Ḥittī az, Annals, 432 H.

13 Ibn Abi’l-Dam, 129r.; see also al-Ḵāmil, IX, 336-337.

14 al-Ḵāmil, IX, 336; al-‘Ātimī, 170v.; Zubda, I, 258-259; Ḥittī az, Annals, 432 H; see also note 71, ch. II.
received Abu'l-Qasim Al-Jarjarā'ī's letter (which was signed by the Caliph Al-Mustansir), conferring on him the rulership of Aleppo, mobilised his own tribal forces together with an auxiliary Bedouin force and marched from Al-Raqqa towards Aleppo. Thimāl reached Aleppo after the death of Al-Dizbarī and invested it because Al-Dizbarī's troops, which - according to Ibn Al-'Adīm - were supported by the Aleppines, defied the Caliph's order and refused to surrender the city. By the term 'Aleppines' it would appear that Ibn Al-'Adīm means Aleppo's Āḥdāth (militia) rather than the city's population. In his narrative, Ibn Al-'Adīm goes on to relate that Thimāl failed to take Aleppo by force and was obliged to retreat towards Qinnasrin.

A few days later a quarrel broke out between the 'Aleppines' and Al-Maghariba troops. It can be deduced from Ibn Al-'Adīm's text that the reason for the quarrel was the mastery of Aleppo. The same text indicates that after the death of Al-Dizbarī there were in Aleppo two factions struggling for supremacy; one in the citadel which consisted of Al-Dizbarī's own pages and the other in the city consisting of the Fatimid regular troops (Maghariba) who were garrisoned in Aleppo and the city's Āḥdāth. When the quarrel between the Āḥdāth and the Maghariba broke out, Aleppo had inside it three groups struggling for power. This quarrel eased the task of Thimāl. On the 22nd February, 1041 A.D. the Aleppines opened the city gates and surrendered it to Thimāl.
When this occurred, al-Marghariba took strong hold in the great palace which was beside the citadel while Al-Dizbari's pages remained in the citadel and refused to surrender. Before long Thimâl's forces joined by Aleppo Ahdâth were able to capture the palace but the siege of the citadel lasted for seven months. After he had captured the citadel Thimâl received honorary gifts from the Caliph, Al-Mustangir, in token of approval of the resumption of his rule.  

Subsequent to his capture of the city of Aleppo and while he was besieging its citadel, Thimâl - according to Ibn Al-‘Adîm - sent an envoy to Constantinople to inform the Empress Theodora about what had happened in Aleppo and to appeal for Byzantine support in exchange for his acknowledgement of the Empress' suzerainty. Ibn Al-‘Adîm goes on to relate that the Empress accepted the offer and considered Thimâl as one of her Empire's vassals under the same conditions which had applied to his brother Masr (see p.123, ch. II). Accordingly the Empress granted Thimâl the title of Magister with all its privileges. At the same time and similarly she granted titles of a lesser degree to several members of the Mir-dâsid family including Thimâl's wife. Ibn Al-‘Adîm indicates that Thimâl's reason for this was a suspicion that sooner or later Cairo would change its attitude and take action against him.  

Actually it was not long before a rift occurred between Thimal and Al-Mustansir. The cause of this was Thimal's non-compliance with the conditions stipulated by Cairo. When Thimal was allowed to recapture Aleppo it was under the condition that after capturing it he should send to Cairo all the money Al-Dizbari had left in the citadel of Aleppo and also that he should pay Cairo 20,000 dinars as an annual tribute. The chroniclers relate that, when he died, Al-Dizbari left in the citadel of Aleppo more than 600,000 dinars. Ibn Al-‘Adim speaks of only 200,000 of this sum being sent to Cairo which evidently did not satisfy Al-Mustansir and caused the rift between him and Thimal.

It would appear that Thimal not only refused to send the residue as requested but ceased to pay the annual tribute. Thereupon Al-Mustansir instructed Nasir Al-Dawla Al-Ḥamāni, the ruler of Damascus to lead an expedition against Thimal. Nasir Al-Dawla executed the order and advanced towards Aleppo. His army consisted of the Fāṭimid garrison of Damascus and ʿIyām together with a great number of Bedouin mercenaries, particularly from the tribe of Kalb. On his way towards Aleppo he captured Ḥamāh and Maʿarrat Al-Nuʿman. When he arrived at Aleppo, Thimal together

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Zubda, I, 262-263.
with his tribal forces, supported by many Aleppines, tried to repulse him, but failed. Thimāl was therefore obliged to enter Aleppo and take up a defensive position behind its walls. According to the chroniclers when Naṣir al-Dawla reached Aleppo, he conceived that on his approach the city would surrender to him, but when he found himself faced with Thimāl's resistance, he was obliged to retreat in order to re-organise his army and prepare for siege.

It was in autumn, 1048 A.D., when Naṣir Al-Dawla left the walls of Aleppo and retreated to a village called Ǧildī which was near Aleppo and lay on the bank of the river Quwayq. It would appear that Naṣir Al-Dawla chose this site because it was not far from Aleppo and there was water for his men. The river Quwayq dwindled to a small stream in the summer months and achieved full spate and flooding almost immediately after every sudden heavy rainfall. Naṣir Al-Dawla, who had encamped in close proximity to this stream, did not appear to anticipate any rain. However, this was a miscalculation and, according to Al-Maqrizi, in the night of the 28th October, 1048 A.D., a very heavy rain fell, flooding the river and wreaking disaster upon Naṣir Al-Dawla's forces. On the following morning Naṣir Al-Dawla, whose force had lost much equipment and many members, fled southward to Damascus. By the help of nature and good fortune rather than by the power of arms, Thimāl's reign survived.
Knowing that Al-Mustanṣir would send another expedition, Thīmāl acted promptly and tried to achieve reconciliation with this Caliph. He sent an envoy to Cairo for this purpose and by the help of Hārūn b. Sahl, a prominent Jew of Cairo at that time, who mediated between the Caliph and the envoy, a settlement was almost reached.

After he sent an envoy to Cairo, Thīmāl sent troops to recapture Ma‘arrat Al-Nu‘mān and Ḥamāh. These troops clashed with the Fāṭimid governor of Hīmṣ, defeated his army and killed him. When the news of this incident reached Cairo, the court of which was riddled with intrigue, the Vizier Abū‘l-Barakāt Al-Jarjarā‘ī, who hated and envied the Jew Ibn Sahl, accused him of being a spy to Thīmāl; Abū‘l-Barakāt Al-Jarjarā‘ī told the Caliph that Ibn Sahl’s real purpose was rather to seek revenge for his brother Abū Sa‘d’s (or Sa‘d’s) recent death than to serve the Caliph by acting as mediator. Abū‘l-Barakāt Al-Jarjarā‘ī inferred that, by his pretended mediation, Ibn Sahl was actually assisting Thīmāl. Abū‘l Barakāt Al-Jarjarā‘ī further insinuated that Ibn Sahl wanted to ingratiate himself into Thīmāl’s favour, being desirous to escape to Aleppo.

The outcome of this conspiracy was the arrest of Ibn Sahl and his subsequent death, the dismissal of Thīmāl’s envoy and the preparation for another expedition against Aleppo.  

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17 Ibn Muyassar, II, 3; Ibn al-Qalṣnī, 79; al-‘Aṣimī, 174v.–175r.;
A very large army consisting, according to Ibn Muyassar, of about 30,000 warriors, was prepared to be sent against Aleppo. Al-Mustanṣir appointed the amir Rifq as the leader of this army, governor of Damascus and ruler of Aleppo, if he captured it. The Caliph also conferred on Rifq the laqab of Amir Al-Umara, Al-Muzaffar, Fakhr Al-Mulk, 'Umdat Al-Dawla Wa-Imāduha and he himself went outside the city of Cairo in order to bid him farewell. Moreover this Caliph instructed all the Fatimid governors in all Syria (Bilād Al-Shām) to obey Rifq's instructions.

There is no doubt that Al-Mustanṣir built great hopes on the success of this army but, in spite of all hopes and all the pomp which accompanied the preparation of this expedition, it was from the beginning doomed to failure. This was for several reasons among which was the nature of the army which was not only untrained and undisciplined but consisted of diverse and antagonistic groups such as Maghārība, Mashariqa and negroes ('Abīd); this condition was further deteriorated when the army reached Syria and Rifq found himself obliged to recruit a great number of mercenaries from the Bedouin tribes of Fazara, Kalb and Ṭayy'; Rifq, who was appointed to lead the expedition, was incompetent: he was aged about eighty years and, as it proved, he lacked military
knowledge and, finally, the Mirdasid determination and resistance, which was encouraged by Byzantine interference and aid.

In Aleppo Thimal b. Saliḥ, on hearing the news of the intended expedition, appealed to Byzantium to fulfil its obligation to protect him and, at the same time, sent his cousin Muqallid b. Kamil with Kilābi tribal forces southward. Muqallid went towards Ḥims, captured it and destroyed its citadel and walls then he returned northward to Ḥamāh, repeating the process and afterwards moved to Maʿarrat al-Numān which also suffered the same fate. After accomplishing his task, Muqallid returned to Aleppo and rejoined Thimal. These destructive actions served Thimal well, for he saved all his strength for the defence of Aleppo, thus avoiding the necessity to leave any troops to garrison any of the three cities; it also provided him with the opportunity of later easy recapture.

The Byzantine Emperor, Constantine IX, responded to Thimal’s appeal. He sent an envoy to Cairo asking Al-Mustansir to cancel his intended expedition and induce him to make reconciliation with Thimal. The envoy was also instructed to inform Al-Mustansir that if he refused to accept these proposals, Byzantium would stand by Thimal and help him in his defence. The envoy met Rifq at Al-Ramla, and upon learning the content of his message Rifq sent him to Cairo and himself, together with his expeditionary force, halted at Al-Ramla and waited further instructions from Cairo.
In Cairo, the Vizier Abu’l-Barakat Al-Jarjarā’ī, held the envoy and delayed the answer to his message. Meanwhile Abu’l-Barakat Al-Jarjarā’ī instructed Rifq to resume his advance and to hasten the capture of Aleppo. This Vizier hoped that Aleppo would soon be seized by Rifq and that the accomplished fact would present the answer to Byzantium. It was, however, a miscalculation for events proved otherwise. Rifq's movement was frustrated in Al-Ramla by a part of the tribe of Tayy' who raided the camp of the Fātimid advance army and sacked part of its provision and equipment. Not only did Rifq fail to punish these Bedouins, but was obliged to recruit them into his army in order to avoid similar raids. When he resumed his march towards Damascus he was compelled, for similar reasons, to recruit a great number from the tribes of Kalb and Fazzara.

In Damascus quarrelling and fighting broke out among the diverse groups and tribes of this area and the country surrounding the city suffered from looting and pillaging. After a while the army was able to move northward and, before it reached Aleppo, it stopped at Ḥimṣ and then at Ḥamāh where, in each city, similar events of enforced recruitment and fighting took place. On 22nd Rabi', Al-Awal 441 A.H./24th August 1049 A.D. Rifq's army approached the outskirts of Aleppo almost five months after it had left Cairo. When it arrived at its destination it was in very bad shape.
In Aleppo, Thimal was prepared to defend the city and was supported by his tribe together with the city's population in addition to the backing of Byzantium. When the Byzantine Emperor Constantine IX received no reply to his message and learned that the Fatimid army was continuing its advance towards Aleppo, he sent to Thimal a sum of money - the amount of which is not known - and instructed the Byzantine governor of Antioch to lead his troops towards Aleppo in readiness to interfere in the fighting should it become necessary. In the two days following the arrival of Rifq's army, part of his troops engaged the Aleppines in several skirmishes. During these two days a division of the Kalbi mercenaries defected and joined the Aleppines.

Recognising the gravity of the situation and the sad condition of the army, some of Rifq's officers proposed to him to cease fighting and to withdraw the army a few miles to the south of Aleppo for re-organisation. They also recommended that he should arrest the Kalbi's and Tayyi's chieftains as they were the source of all the disturbances. When Rifq did not accept their counsel the officers suggested that he should reach a reconciliation with Thimal by writing a diploma (sijill) in the name of Al-Mustanqir conferring on him the rulership of Aleppo. Once again Rifq refused to accept the suggestion and many of them, together with their own units, deserted the army and went southward. According to the chroniclers, this coincided with the execution of
Rifq's order to remove the treasure of the army and some of its provision to Ma’arrat-Masrin.

This action, together with the desertions, acted as a signal to the rest of the army to take flight and to the Bedouin mercenaries to commence looting. The incompetent Rifq was unable to restore order and when morning came he was left with only a few soldiers to be attacked by Thimāl's cavalry, who captured him and many of the deserters and brought them back to Aleppo. Rifq was injured in the head and after three days, during which he had lost his reason, he died.

As usual there was a large amount of booty gained by the Aleppines and once again Aleppo escaped capture, and Thimāl's reign had survived, not so much by actual conflict but as a result of good fortune.

The Mirdasid dynasty was far from being strong and, in fact, the Fātimid Caliphate during the 11th century was not strong either. Furthermore, after the death of Al-Dizbarī, it had no-one either capable or strong enough to regain dominion over Aleppo by the use of power, therefore, after the failure of Rifq, Al-Mustanṣir dismissed the Vizier. Abu’l-Barakāt Al-Jarjā’ī, and banished him to the city of Tyre and then received an embassy from Thimāl.

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18 Ibn Abī Hasānān, I, 244-247; Ibn Abī’l-Hayja’, 126r.; Ibn Muyassar, II, 4-5; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 85; Al-Kāmil, IX, 163; Bughya, A., VI, 99r.-103r.; Zubda, I, 265-267; Ḥittāz, Annals, 440-441 H; Khitāz, II, 170; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 148-149; ‘Iṣâd, XI, 578; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 584-585; Al-Nujum, V, 45; Munajjīn, I, 328v.

19 Ibn Muyassar, II, 4-5; Ḥittāz, Annals, 440 H.
This embassy consisted of 'Alī b. Almād b. Al-Aysar, who was Shaykh Al-Dawla at that time (see Ch. II, p. 82), Al-Sayyida, Thimal's wife and their son, Waththāb. Before sending this embassy, and as a gesture of conciliation, Thimal released all the prisoners who had been captured from Rifq's army. Meanwhile, according to al-Maqrīzī, the Kadi of Tyre, 'Alī b. 'Iyyāq, mediated between Thimal and the Caliph and induced the latter to receive the Aleppine embassy. In addition to many valuable gifts, the embassy carried to Cairo the sum of 40,000 dinars in payment of two years' tribute.

It was sent in 442 A.H./1050 A.D. and succeeded in its mission. According to Ibn Al-‘Adim the success was due to the effort of Al-Sayyidah (see Ch. II, p. 76). When the embassy returned, it brought back to Thimal confirmation of his appointment as Amir of Aleppo together with a robe of honour. It, in fact, brought stability to the reign of Thimal and confidence to the hearts of the Aleppines, as Ibn al-‘Adim says.20

This stability lasted until 449 A.H./1057 A.D. when, as a result of Al-Basāsīrī's rebellion, Thimal was obliged to give up the rulership of Aleppo in favour of a Fāṣimid ruler. It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss this rebellion, its cause, detail of the current events and its entire outcome.

20 Ibn Abi Ḫasisānā', I, 253–256; Zubda, I, 267–268; Itti‘āz, Annals, 442 H.
Discussion is here concerned with that part connected with Aleppo. Al-Mu'ayyad fi Al-Din Da'i Al-Du'al has written a full account of the events which occurred in Aleppo during the time of the Basasiri rebellion, and gives a detailed narrative of how Thimal was obliged to abandon Aleppo. In his own peculiar way, Al-Mu'ayyad wrote for only one purpose which was to emphasise that only he was the really active and influential person behind every event which took place, and relates how he miraculously, in his own simple way and humble person, was able to solve every problem. Because of this, caution should be applied before using his narrative.

In 448 A.H./1056 A.D. Al-Mu'ayyad was despatched from Cairo with a large sum of money estimated by Maqrizi to be 2,300,000 dinars. His destination was Aleppo and his mission was to assist Al-Basasiri in his rebellion. In the previous year (447 A.H./1055 A.D.) Al-Basasiri took refuge in the Emirate of Aleppo in the region of Al-Ra'ba after having fled from Baghdad. Al-Mu'ayyad's mission was to go to Al-Ra'ba, meet Al-Basasiri, deliver the money to him and assist him in his rebellion.

After he reached Damascus Al-Mu'ayyad corresponded with Thimal who, after a while, agreed to receive him in his emirate. Thimal met Al-Mu'ayyad at the village of Al-Rastan (on the

21Ibn Muyassar, II, 8; Itti'âz, Annals, 448H.
river Orontes) then accompanied him to Aleppo (see ch. II, p. 64) and from thence to al-Raḥba where he met al-Basāsīrī.

It would appear that Thimāl did not foresee any danger to his reign when he allowed al-Basāsīrī to make the region of al-Raḥba a base for his activities. His reception of al-Muʿayyad whom he escorted to al-Raḥba to join al-Basāsīrī confirm this and explains why he (Thimāl) — as Ibn al-ʿAdim relates — did not allow his Kilābī tribesmen to arrest al-Basāsīrī when he first entered the region of al-Raḥba. Ibn al-ʿAdim does not mention why the Kilābis wanted to arrest al-Basāsīrī, but it is conceivable that they aimed to sell him to Tughril-Beg or to the Caliph of Baghdad rather than that they foresaw any future danger.

When al-Basāsīrī received the money sent to him from Cairo he was able to muster a large army with which he compelled Thimāl to yield to him the town of al-Raḥba which he made the centre of his activities. This occurred in 448 H./1056 A.D. not long after the arrival of al-Muʿayyad and was the first step towards Thimāl's loss of the emirate. Shortly after and under similar pressure Thimāl was obliged to yield al-Raqqa to Māni b. Shahīb b. Wathṭāb, Amir of the tribe of Numayr.

This last event angered the tribe of Kilāb and brought dissension among its members which developed into a split among it, when a quarrel broke out between Thimāl and his brother ʿAtiyya. The quarrel began when the latter seized for himself a
large sum of money sent from Cairo to al-Basāsīrī. This sum was sent to Thimal who in turn asked his brother ‘Aṭiyya to convey it to al-Basāsīrī; instead ‘Aṭiyya kept it for himself. 22 Al-Mu‘ayyad relates that after ‘Aṭiyya had stolen the money he left al-Raḥba for Aleppo. He goes on to say that three leagues before reaching Aleppo he met ‘Aṭiyya and settled the dispute with him. On the next day he (al-Mu‘ayyad) met Thimal, who was resolved to take punitive action against his brother and succeeded in calming him and stopping him from taking any action. Al-Mu‘ayyad comments that he succeeded in avoiding fraternal conflict among the Kilābis, also this served Aleppo — as he says — which escaped the repercussions of such a conflict. 23

After giving an account of this al-Mu‘ayyad relates that al-Basāsīrī, accompanied by Quraysh b. Badrān, Amir of the tribe of ‘Uqayl, together with several of the tribe’s chieftains, followed him and came to the region of Bālis which was two leagues distant from Aleppo. Al-Mu‘ayyad gives as the reason for this movement that al-Basāsīrī appealed to Naṣr al-Dawla, the Marwānid ruler of Mayyāfāriqīn (1011-1061 A.D.) to give him asylum in his country, but when he received no answer he lost patience and moved towards

23 Al-Mu‘ayyad, 170.
Aleppo. 24

On scrutinising this narrative it is apparent that al-Mu'ayyad avoids the issue. The goal of al-Basāsirī was Baghdad and al-Raḥba was the most suitable base for the success of his task. It was not far from Baghdad, near the Syrian desert for refuge in time of need and, still more important, in this desert as in the valley of the Euphrates there were then – as now – numerous Bedouin tribes who were ready, at a price, to provide him with the necessary warriors. To go to the Marwanid State would have meant the loss of all these advantages and quitting the rebellion. It is, therefore, conceivable that al-Basāsirī appealed to the Marwanids purely for assistance and not for refuge as al-Mu'ayyad relates. It is apparent that al-Basāsirī's movement was actuated by other reasons which al-Mu'ayyad circumvents, but which could be deduced from the accounts of some other chroniclers.

Muḥammad b. Hilāl b. al-Šabi’ (i. ʿars al-Nīma) relates that ʿAtiyya (Thimāl's brother) was at that time ruler of the town of Bālis. 25 This proffers a good reason for the movement of al-Basāsirī, especially with the knowledge that the Amir of the tribe of Uqayl together with a number of the tribal chieftains were with

24 Al-Mu’ayyad, 170.
25 Mir‘at, Annals, 449H.
No doubt these chieftains were accompanied by their own fellow-tribesmen which suggests that punitive action was contemplated against 'Atiyya for depriving them of their anticipated money. But here a question arises; why al-Mu'ayyad had previously met 'Atiyya and allayed his anxiety, then met Thimal, calmed him and stopped him from taking any action against his brother? Not long after the arrival of al-Basāṣirī at Balkis Thimal was obliged to abdicate his post in favour of a Fātimid ruler. Perhaps this event suggests the answer to this question.

Al-Maqrīzī, but with insufficient detail, speaks of a secret plan devised by the Vizier al-Y'azūrī to bring the rule of Thimal to an end. It would appear that when al-Mu'ayyad moved from al-Raḥba towards Aleppo, where on his way he met 'Atiyya and Thimal, he aimed to conceal the plan which, if discovered, would certainly unite the quarrelling brothers against the common enemy.

After meeting the two brothers, between whom no reconciliation was made, Thimal returned to Aleppo, the tribe of Kilāb scattered and the way was left open to al-Basāṣirī to advance. Al-Mu'ayyad states that when he entered Aleppo he found that Thimal, angry with his brother 'Atiyya, the dissension of his tribe, the proximity of al-Basāṣirī and his troops, desired to abdicate in favour of a Fātimid ruler. Here, once again, al-Mu'ayyad evades the

26 Itti'az, Annals, 452H.
issue. He tells us that Thīmāl wrote to the Caliph, al-Mustansīr, requesting him to appoint a successor to him in Aleppo and to permit him to retire to Cairo.27

Events, however, were not so simply concluded. In 447 A.H./1055 A.D. the relationship between the Byzantine Empire and the Fatimid Caliphate had deteriorated. Al-Mustansīr, the Fatimid Caliph, sent a large army led by al-Ḥasan b. ‘Alī b. Mulhim to Syria. This army had several skirmishes with the Byzantine forces of Antioch. Thīmāl b. Ṣāliḥ endeavoured unsucessfully to bring reconciliation between the two sides and the Fatimid troops stationed near the Byzantine frontier not far from Aleppo.28

During the year 449 A.H./1057-58 A.D. there was a drought and harvest failed in the emirate of Aleppo. According to al-Dhahabī, this was the main reason for the abdication of Thīmāl.29 Tribal dissension, drought, al-Bāsāṣīrī together with his forces pressing on Aleppo from one side and Ibn Mulhīm, together with his troops from the other side, were the stresses under which Thīmāl lived in 449 A.H./1057-58 A.D. To them can be added the circumstances that Byzantium was, at that time, busy with its own problems, mainly the migration of the Turcomans.

In Cairo the Vizier al-Yaẓūrī seized the awaited opportunity and sent Ibn Ḍaqlīl, the Kadi of Tyre who had previously mediated between Thīmāl and the Caliph al-Mustansīr to induce Thīmāl to

27Al-Mu‘ayyad, 171-172.
28Ibn Muyassar, II, 7-8; Al-‘Azīmī, 178r.; Itti‘az, Annals, 447 H.
Ibn 'Aqil was successful and the rulership of Beirut, Acre and Jubayl were bestowed upon Thimâl. Matters were thus arranged and, on Thursday, 26th Dhu 'l-Qa'da 449 A.H./23rd January 1058 A.D., Thimâl left Aleppo. Al-Hasan b. ‘Ali b. Mulhim, whose laqab was Makîn al-Dawla together with his army entered Aleppo and was appointed ruler. This operation went smoothly without any of the expected trouble from Aleppo Abâdath. It would appear that the rulership of the three towns bestowed upon Thimâl was merely a nominal one, and probably tributary, as Thimâl went direct to Cairo where he was welcomed by al-Mustanṣîr.

On the former occasions, when the Mirdâsidîs lost the city of Aleppo, the Mesopotamian part of their emirate remained under their control. On this occasion only Balîs remained in the hands of ‘Atiyya b. Ṣâliḥ, while al-Raqqa was under the control of the tribe of Numayr and al-Râṣîba was the centre of al-Basâsîrî's activity. This situation handicapped the tribe of Kilâb and prevented it from making any attempt to recapture Aleppo; thus giving Ibn Mulhim, the new Fâtimid ruler, the chance to settle in Aleppo and maintain order with apparently a small number of troops.

This situation remained unchanged until 451 A.H./1059 A.D., when al-Basāsīrī was defeated and killed by Tughrīl-Beg, the Saljuq Sultan. The death of al-Basāsīrī marked a turning-point in the history of Islamic Syria. Since the 7th century and until that time the Arabic tribes were the dominating power in the political life of Syria. From then onwards these tribes lost almost all their power and Syria fell under non-Arabic rule and remained so until the end of the first world war. The history of Islamic Syria can therefore be divided into two epochs, Arabic and non-Arabic; for its particular features the latter, in many ways, could be designated as a period of absolution. This, however, will be partially discussed later in more detail, in the sequence of the Saljuq conquest of Syria.

Returning to the main course of events, we find that the death of al-Basāsīrī provided the opportunity for the tribe of Kilāb to move and recapture Aleppo. After his death 'Aṭiyya b. Šāliḥ marched on al-Rāḥba, captured it in Ṣafar 452 A.H./April 1060 A.D. and seized all that al-Basāsīrī had stored in it of money, equipment and provisions. According to Ibn al-'Adīm, the recapture of al-Rāḥba by 'Aṭiyya stimulated the tribe of Kilāb and encouraged it to attempt to recapture Aleppo. Ibn al-'Adīm says that the Kilābī tribesmen chose Maḥmūd b. Naṣr as a leader because his father Naṣr b. Šāliḥ was an Amir of Aleppo. Ibn al-'Adīm goes on to say that in Jumada al-Aʿlā 452 A.H. /

31 Zubda, I, 274-275; Khīţāṭ, II, 171; Al-Durra, 373.
32 Al-Tuḥaf, 195-196; Zubda, I, 275; Miḥāṯ. A., Anmās.
June 1060 A.D. Mahmūd led his tribal forces in an advance on Aleppo but found himself unable to take it by force and retreated. After Mahmūd's withdrawal, Ibn al-ʿAdīm says that a dispute arose between Ibn Mulhim, the Fāṭimid governor of the city, and the city's Aḥdāth.33

Some other chroniclers, such as Ibn al-ʿĀmīd, Ibn al-ʿAthīr and Ibn Khaldūn, mention this dispute and, together with Ibn al-ʿAdīm, relate that as a result of it, Aleppo's Aḥdāth called on Mahmūd, opened the city's gates and surrendered Aleppo to him. They go on to say that in the beginning of July, 1060 A.D. Mahmūd entered Aleppo and began to siege its citadel in which the Fāṭimid garrison had taken strong defensive possession. These same chroniclers further state that the Fāṭimid troops appealed to the Caliph in Cairo for help and the latter responded by ordering the governor of Damascus to lead a relief army towards Aleppo. This governor executed the order and advanced towards Aleppo. He reached it just over 32 days after Mahmūd had entered it.34

452 H; Al-Ḍahabī, OR 50, 2v.; Duwal, I, 205-206; Al-ʿIbar, D.H., III, 227; Al-Nujum, V, 66; Al-ʿAẓīmī, 179r.; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 90.

33 Zubda, I, 276-277.

34 Ibid., 277-278; Ibn al-ʿĀmīd, 549-550; al-Kāmil, IX, 163-164; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 585; see also Ḥd., XI, 578; al-Ṣafadī, II, 85; Munajjam, I, 328v.; all these latter chroniclers cite their information from Ibn al-ʿAthīr.
It is difficult to credit all the statements made in this narrative. It was 'Atiyya who recaptured al-Raḥba and seized all the stores belonging to al-Basāṣirī. At that time 'Atiyya was the most senior member of the Mirdasid family and now had probably become the most wealthy. For these reasons it is within the range of credibility that the tribe of Kīlab should choose him in preference to his nephew Māmun b. Naṣr, as Ibn al-'Ādīm relates.

It is impossible to imagine that in the space of only 32 days a messenger went from Aleppo to Cairo carrying an appeal for aid, Cairo responded by instructing the governor of Damascus to undertake the duty of relieving Aleppo, this governor formed an army of 10,000 to 15,000 troops and then led it to Aleppo. Even in our modern age, no state, with all modern equipment and swift transport, could accomplish such a feat.

In search for an apt narrative which bears scrutiny we find Sibt b. al-Jawzī cites Muḥammad b. Hilāl al-Ṣabīʿ (Ghars al-Nīma) as relating that when 'Atiyya recaptured al-Raḥba he was afraid that the Saljuq Sultan might take action against him. Because of that he sent one of his followers to Baghdad as his representative, offering his allegiance and asking for title and robe of honour (Khilʿa and Laqab) as recompense for reciting the Khutba in the name of the Caliph of Baghdad and the Saljuq Sultan. The Fatimid governor of Aleppo reported the action of 'Atiyya to the Fatimid authority in Cairo. The Fatimid authority, angered by the
news, instructed the governor of Damascus to lead his troops together with the tribe of Kalb towards al-Raḥba and to endeavour to wrest the city from 'Aṭiyya.

On learning this, the chieftains of the tribe of Kilāb sent a delegation to Aleppo to inform its governor that they considered the movement of the tribe of Kalb from its own Diyār (region) towards the Diyār of Kilāb an act of aggression, not only against 'Aṭiyya but also against the whole tribe of Kilāb. That delegation warned the governor that, if Kalb were not to stop by an order from the Fatimid authority the Kilābi warriors would undertake the duty of defending their own Diyār. Moreover, this delegation promised that if the movement of the tribe of Kalb was restrained, the chieftains of Kilāb would solve the problem of 'Aṭiyya in accordance with the Fatimids' wishes.

The governor of Aleppo replied to the Kilābi delegation that he could do nothing for there was a clear order from Cairo which nobody could question. Thereupon the chieftains of Kilāb called on 'Aṭiyya and chose him as their Amir and leader. After he had been elected 'Aṭiyya led his tribesmen together with an auxiliary force from other Bedouin tribes such as Khafāja and 'Uqayl towards Ḫimṣ - which was at that time in the Diyār of Kalb - captured it, destroyed its walls, sacked it then turned towards Ḫamāh which also suffered the same fate.

While all this was taking place al-Sayida, Maḥmūd b. Naqr's
mother, who was in Aleppo, succeeded in gaining the confidence of some of the city's Aḥdāth. She plotted with these Aḥdāth against the Fāṭimid governor of the city and prepared the way for her son Māḥmūd to take Aleppo. She communicated with Māḥmūd who, on receiving the information, proceeded to Aleppo accompanied by his cousin Māni and some of their Kilābi followers. On arriving at the walls of Aleppo, they found the city's gates open thus enabling them to capture it without any effort. The Fāṭimid garrison, who were taken by surprise, entrenched themselves in the citadel which Māḥmūd immediately began to siege.

The capture of Aleppo by Māḥmūd annoyed his uncle ‘Aṭiyya and split the tribe of Kilāb into two parts. After the desertion of many of his Kilābi followers to Māḥmūd, ‘Aṭiyya was inclined to make reconciliation with the Fāṭimid authority and, after achieving it, withdrew towards al-Raḥba. This gave an opportunity to the Fāṭimid governor of Damascus to advance on Aleppo leading his own troops together with those of the tribe of Kalb. 35

Concerning all the events which occurred afterwards, the chroniclers Ibn. al-Qālanisi, al-‘Aẓīmī, Ibn al-‘Adīm, Ibn al-‘Āmid, Ibn al-‘Athīr, al-Dhahabi and Ibn Khaldun give the same accounts, all of which repeat that of Ghars al-Nīma. They relate that when he was unable to seize the citadel of Aleppo and heard that a Fāṭimid army was advancing northward from Damascus,

35 Mir‘at, A. Annals, 452 H.
Maḥmūd b. Naṣr found it was dangerous to remain in Aleppo so, together with his tribal forces and most of Aleppo's Āḥdāth, left the city and withdrew eastward. When this happened, Ibn Mulhim together with his garrison descended from the citadel to the city, sacked it and killed every member of the Āḥdāth they found there.

Before long, the relief forces, which Ghars al-Ni’ma estimates as 10,000 troops and Ibn al-‘Adīm as 15,000 horsemen, reached Aleppo. When Naṣir al-Dawla al-Ḥamdānī, the leader of these forces, tried to sack Aleppo he was informed that Ibn Mulhim had left nothing for him to sack, therefore Naṣir al-Dawla gave orders that the Aleppines should pay him all he had spent in his campaign. While the money was being collected he led his forces towards the camp of Maḥmūd b. Naṣr. Maḥmūd engaged him in conflict at al-Funaydiq a few miles from Aleppo. As had happened on several previous occasions the Kālbiyān and Ṭayy'is in Naṣir al-Dawla's army abandoned the battlefield while fighting was still in progress and left him with his few regular troops to bear the brunt of it. It was on Wednesday, 30th Rajab, 452 A.H./30th August, 1060 A.D. when the army of Naṣir al-Dawla was routed and he himself was injured and taken prisoner.

On the ensuing days ‘Āṭiyya arrived at Aleppo having been invited by Ibn Mulhim, who had decided to yield the city to him, but in the evening of the same day, ‘Āṭiyya departed from the city because he found himself unable to retain it. It was on Friday, 2nd Sha’bān, 452 A.H./1st September, 1060 A.D. when Maḥmūd b. Naṣr entered Aleppo and not long after Ibn Mulhim surrendered the
citadel to him. Ibn al-'Adim comments on the recapture of Aleppo by Mahmud that it was a very strange circumstance which made Aleppo suffer a succession of three sovereigns in three days. Ibn Mulhim was the last Fatimid governor to rule Aleppo and Nasir al-Dawla led the last Fatimid expedition against it.

In Cairo the Caliph al-Mustanṣir, who was unsatisfied with what had happened in Aleppo, notified Thīmāl b. Ṣāliḥ who was at that time in Cairo, that he could no longer be regarded as the ruler of Beirut, Acre and Jubayl. When Thīmāl protested that the happening in Aleppo was not the fault of him but of the Fatimid governors of Damascus and Aleppo al-Mustanṣir replied to the protest by offering him a sum of money, a new title (laqab) and his support if he cared to return to Aleppo and endeavour to re-establish his sovereignty there.

Thīmāl accepted the offer, left Cairo and returned to Syria. When he reached the city of Ḥimṣ he wrote to his tribe asking for their support. Part of the tribe responded to his call, came to Ḥimṣ and then marched with him northward. In January 1061 A.D. Thīmāl arrived at the walls of Aleppo which he invested. It would seem that the larger part of Kilāb had rallied to his support and because of this Mahmūd took a defensive position. During the siege a group of the Ḥanāṯ dropped one of the city's gates to give entrance to Thīmāl. Some of Thīmāl's men entered, but Mahmūd

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36 Ibn Muyassar, II, 12; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 86-87, 90-91; Ibn Abīl Hayāja', 127v.; Al-'Azīni, 179r.v.; Mir'at, A., Annals, 450, 452 H; Ibn al-'Amid, 550-551; al-Kāmil, IX, 163-164; X, 7; Zubda, I, 278-281; Yaqūt (al-Funaiydīq); Iṣṣī'as, Annals, 452H; al-Mukhtarāz, I, 149; al-Najmā, V, 65; al-Dhahabī, OR 50, 2r.; Duwal, I, 205-206; Al-Ibār, Dh, III, 227; Iqd, XI, 578; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 585; al-Shafādi, II, 85; Munajjīm, I, 328v.
rebuffed them and re-shut the gate.

Majmūd, having few Kīlabī supporters, appealed for help to both the Byzantine Empire and the tribe of Numayr, his mother's tribe. Numayr responded to the appeal and advanced towards Aleppo to relieve Majmūd. The movement of Numayr obliged Thīmal to abandon the siege and to withdraw his forces a few miles from the city. After this Majmūd together with his additional supporters engaged his uncle's forces but was defeated and fled to his previous defensive position inside Aleppo. Majmūd then pleaded his cause with the chieftains of Kīlab (see ch. II, p. 80). The chieftains, while refusing his plea, mediated between him and his uncle and, on Wednesday, 24th Rabī' al-Awal, 453 A.H./18th April, 1061 A.D., an agreement was reached between them. As a result Majmūd agreed to yield Aleppo to his uncle Thīmal in exchange for 50,000 dinars together with 30,000 Makkuks (a measurement used for all cereals) of cereal (Ghallah) as an apparently yearly stipend. On Monday, 23rd April, 1061 A.D. Majmūd surrendered Aleppo and its citadel to his uncle who thus resumed sovereignty of Aleppo for the fourth time. 37

37 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 91; Al-'Azīmī, 179v.–180r.; Ibn al-'Amīd, 551; Bughya, F., 156v.; Zubda, I, 261-262, 285-286; Mir'at, A., Annals, 452H.; Al-Kamīl, IX, 164; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 149; Līṭī az, Annals, 453H.; 'Iqd, XI, 579; Al-Safādī, II, 85-86; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 580; Munajjīmī, 323v.; for the size of the Makkuk, see al-Maqdisī, 181-182; Subh, IV, 118, 216.
Thimāl's reign, this time, did not last long for on 23rd Dhu’l-Qa‘da of the following year, 454 A.H./November 28th 1062 A.D., he died. The significant occurrences during this short period were his clash with Byzantium and his dispute with the Amir of the tribe of Numayr. The dispute with this Amir was over al-Rabba which, it would appear, he tried to wrest from the Mirdasids.

In August 1061 A.D., Thimāl sent his brother ‘Atiyya at the head of an army to maintain it in the domain of his family and ‘Atiyya succeeded in his mission. Afterwards al-Sayida, Thimāl's wife, and Mani' b. Waththab, Amir of the tribe of Numayr's sister, mediated between her husband and her brother and brought reconciliation between them.

The clash with Byzantium occurred in May 1062 A.D., when an Aleppine force led by Thimāl engaged a Byzantine army at the castle of Artah, which lay a few miles to the north of Aleppo. This resulted in the defeat of the Byzantines and was followed in October of the same year by two similar clashes on a smaller scale.

On a previous occasion when he was the sole Emir of Aleppo Thimāl had had good relations with the Byzantine empire to the extent that he was considered by it as a vassal.

38Ibn al-Qalanisī, 91; Al-Kemil, IX, 164; Mir‘at. A., Annals, 454H; Mir‘at, BM, 249r.; Al-ʿAzīmī, 179v.-180r.; Zubda, I, 288; Ḥavādīth, 151r.; Ibn ʿAmīdā, 552; Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 47v.; Al-Tbar, DH, III, 231; ‘Iqd, XI, 579-580; Al-Safādī, II, 86; Munajjin, I, 328v.

39Zubda, I, 286.
The former policy of the Fāṭimid Caliphate and the actions it undertook against the Hārūnids obliged this dynasty to seek Byzantine friendship and protection, but now, when Thīmāl returned to his post it was from Cairo where he had lived for a few years. It would appear that when he was in Cairo, Thīmāl recognised that the Fāṭimid Caliphate was no longer capable of bringing any military pressure to bear upon Aleppo. On the other hand it is probable that he also noticed the trouble created inside Byzantium by the Turcomans and the changes in the balance of power in that area (i.e. the Middle East) after the Saljuqs had taken over Baghdad. These circumstances together with some other happenings were probably the reasons behind Thīmāl's change of attitude towards Byzantium and his clashes with this empire. It would seem that during the struggle between Thīmāl and his nephew Māḥmūd, Byzantium favoured Māḥmūd.

In January 1062 A.D. Byzantium rebuilt a number of castles lying near Aleppo on what might be called the Byzantine–Aleppo frontier. This action angered Thīmāl, who led an army and engaged the Byzantines at Arṭāl as mentioned above. Afterwards a reconciliation was made between Thīmāl and Byzantium after which the latter agreed to destroy the restored castles and to pay Thīmāl an annual sum of money. Later, however, Byzantium violated the agreement by not only stopping the payment but its governor in Antioch directed – or participated – in a plot made by a group of Aleppo's Aḥdāth against Thīmāl's regime. The plot, however,
was discovered and this led to further clashes with Byzantium (as is also mentioned before). Thimal died before the problem was solved. The death of Thimal was followed by a struggle for his succession between his brother 'Atiyya and his nephew Mahmūd b. Nagr. This struggle diverted the Murdasid's attention and that of the Kilābi tribesmen and, for the time being, there were no further clashes with Byzantium.

Before his death Thimal had fallen ill and during his illness he summoned his brother 'Atiyya to Aleppo and appointed him as his successor. After the death of Thimal, 'Atiyya became the Amir of Aleppo. This annoyed Mahmūd b. Nagr who was at that time living in Harran, the centre of the tribe of Numayr. Mahmūd sent 'Atiyya a message repudiating his right to the Emirate of Aleppo. Mahmūd claimed that he himself was the only member of the Mirdasids who had the right to be Thimal's successor. He stated that it was he who had restored Aleppo to the Mirdasid rule when he wrested it

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41 Ibn al-Qalānisī, 91; Zubda, I, 288; Al-Kāmil, IX, 164; Hawadith, 151r.; al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 2r.; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 586; 'Iqd, XI, 580; Al-Ṣafadi, II, 86; Munajjim, I, 328v.
from the Fāṭimids, and when he yielded it to Thīmāl the latter promised to appoint him as his successor. Furthermore, Māḥmūd claimed that Aleppo was the heritage of his father, Nāṣr, and therefore only he had the right to inherit it. The greater number of the Kilābī chieftains approved Māḥmūd's claim and stated their readiness to support him against 'Āṭiyya.

'Āṭiyya does not seem to have commanded the same respect from the tribe as did his brothers Nāṣr and Thīmāl. We have no information concerning the reason for this but perhaps 'Āṭiyya's own character and his mother's compulsory divorce and subsequent marriage (see ch. I, p. 45) were the causes. We do not know whether 'Āṭiyya was born before or after this compulsory marriage, but his name ('Āṭiyya, i.e. The Gift) suggests that the event happened after the marriage and probably cast its shadow over the child.

In Rajab 455 A.H./July 1063 A.D. Māḥmūd led the tribe of Kilāb against Aleppo which he invested in an attempt to capture it and to bring the rule of 'Āṭiyya to an end.

With the death of Thīmāl, the time in which the Kilābī chieftains and tribesmen held the decisive power in the struggle for Aleppo had passed. Immediately after his death a band of Turcomans headed by a chief known as Ibn Khān entered the Emirate of Aleppo. The Turcomans migration through northern Syria together with the Saljuq conquest of Aleppo will be discussed in the following chapter. It is sufficient to mention here that,
from the time the first band of Turcomans entered Aleppo, they became involved in the struggle for its supremacy in which they held the balance of power.

When Mahmūd, who was supported by his tribe, was besieging Aleppo, Ṭiyya called on Ibn Khān to come to Aleppo and to enter his service. Apparently Ṭiyya's action angered Māni' b. Muqallid, a prominent wealthy Kilābī Amir, who had taken no part in the struggle when it began, and caused him to join Mahmūd. During the siege, Māni' was killed and this incident, together with expected Turcoman interference, disheartened Mahmūd and his Kilābī supporters. Therefore when Ṭiyya offered to grant Mahmūd an iqṭā' worth 25,000 dinars if he stopped the siege and withdrew Mahmūd accepted the offer and thus a temporary settlement was achieved.

During the first week of May of the following year 1064 A.D., Mahmūd gained possession of Yamāh and Ma'arrat al-nu'mān together with the fort of Kafar-Ṭāb. He then led the tribe of Kilāb towards Aleppo. Ṭiyya failed to stop the Kilābī advance forces and Aleppo once again became besieged. It was a severe siege which obliged Ṭiyya to appeal to Ibn Khān to come to his aid. Ibn Khān, who was at that time in upper Mesopotamia, responded to Ṭiyya's appeal and came to Aleppo. The arrival of Ibn Khān forced Mahmūd to stop the siege and withdraw.

Afterward, in December of the same year, 1064 A.D., and after long negotiation, a new settlement was reached by which
Marūmīd became the ruler of the region lying in the south of Aleppo, consisting of Ḫamāh, Maʿarrat al-Ḥunmān and Kafar-ṭāb.

When Ibn Khān arrived at Aleppo he entered the city and immediately began to exercise his power over the Emirate. The Aleppines, particularly the Ṭabdāth, did not like the new Turcomans living in Aleppo. The Ṭabdāth were worried because they found themselves gradually losing their traditional influence; similarly Ṭāṭiyya also found himself losing his power as Master of Aleppo. After settling his problems with Maḥmūd, Ṭāṭiyya led Aleppo's Ṭabdāth together with Ibn Khān's followers to raid Byzantine territory. After the raid, when he returned to Aleppo, Ṭāṭiyya unwillingly found himself accompanied by Ibn Khān.

On a night in January 1065 A.D., while Ibn Khān was outside Aleppo, Ṭāṭiyya found an opportunity to get rid of him and his followers. That night Ṭāṭiyya instructed Aleppo's Ṭabdāth to raid the place the Turcomans were occupying. The Ṭabdāth carried out his instructions, seized the arms and horses of the Turcomans, killed a number of them and obliged the rest to flee outside Aleppo. After seeing what had befallen his followers, Ibn Khān led the remnant of his men eastward to Mesopotamia. The Bedouin tribes, who were inhabiting the country surrounding Aleppo, prevented Ibn Khān from reaching Mesopotamia, instead he went towards Sarmin. There he met Maḥmūd b. Naṣr and offered him his service.
This encouraged Mâhîmâd who summoned his Kilâbî tribesmen and marched towards Aleppo. In vain 'Atîyya endeavoured to stop the advancing forces and, once again, Aleppo was under siege. The siege lasted almost three and a half months and when 'Atîyya was unable to resist any longer, he agreed to surrender Aleppo to Mâhîmâd.

Mâhîmâd, who had been encouraged and supported during the siege by both the Byzantine Empire and the Faṭimid Caliphate, entered Aleppo on the 19th August, 1065 A.D., and commenced his second reign.

'Atîyya, however, did not lose everything for when he surrendered Aleppo to Mâhîmâd it was on an agreement to divide the emirate of Aleppo into two parts, Syrian under the rule of Mâhîmâd and Mesopotamia under the rule of 'Atîyya. This agreement was probably based on the Thîmâl-Nâqr precedent of dividing the emirate between them⁴² (see ch. II, p.109).

When Mâhîmâd captured Aleppo Ibn Khân did not enter it because he was afraid of the city's Ahdâth. He went to Iraq and, in the following year, 1066 A.D., he returned to the emirate of Aleppo. When Ibn Khân came back Mâhîmâd conferred on him as an iqṭā' Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘mân. According to Ibn al-‘Adîm, on the 10th September, 1066 A.D. Ibn Khân together with his followers who numbered about 1,000 warriors combining Turcoman, Kurd, Daylan and Uj,

occupied Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man. 43

Ibn Khaṣān and his followers were an effective instrument in Maḥmūd’s hands for strengthening his position and subduing the Bedouins who were living in his emirate. Ibn al-‘Adīm related that in 1067 A.D. Maḥmūd, accompanied by part of the tribe of Kilab together with Ibn Khaṣān and his followers, went southward to the region of Ḫamāḥ where he subdued all the Bedouins who dwelt in that region. In explaining what was happening among the Bedouins of Ḫamāḥ, Ibn al-‘Adīm relates that these Bedouins tried to make trouble between Maḥmūd and his uncle ‘Aṭiyya who was then in the city of Ḫimṣ. 44

The centre of ‘Aṭiyya was al-Raqqa or al-Rahba 45 and Ibn al-‘Adīm does not explain why, in 1067 A.D., ‘Aṭiyya was in Ḫimṣ which was under Fāṭimid rule. The explanation has, however, been given by Ghars al-Ni‘ma Muḥammad and Abu’l-Maḥāsin who relate that in 1067 A.D. al-Mustanṣir the Fāṭimid Caliph wrote to Maḥmūd b. Naṣr demanding that he should send Cairo an annual tribute, make a raid on the Byzantine territory and dismiss from his service Ibn Khaṣān and his followers. These two chroniclers go on to

43 Ibn al-Qalanīṣī, 93; Al-ʿĀṣīmī, 180v.; Zubda, II, 10; Mirʿāt, A., Annals, 457H. Uj is a term by which the inhabitants of the Muslim-Byzantine frontier were called.

44 Zubda, II, 10.

45 Al-Кāmil, IX, 165; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 149; ‘Iqd, XI, 581; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 587; Al-Šafādī, II, 86; Munajjim, I, 328v.
say that Mahmūd replied to al-Mu'tanṣir making it clear that he was not able to fulfil any of the demands. The reasons Mahmūd gave were: i) He had no spare money to pay to Cairo, for during his attempts to capture Aleppo from his uncle ‘Aṭiyya he had spent a large sum of money, most of which he had borrowed and had not yet been able to repay; ii) he was not able to raid Byzantine territory because prior to the capture of Aleppo he had made a friendly agreement with that empire which had lent him a sum of money after he had given his son as a guarantee of repayment and which sum was still outstanding; iii) concerning Ibn Khān and his followers Mahmūd said that he had no power to dismiss them and, in fact, he employed them because it was the only way in which he could avoid the trouble they were able to create and which he was incapable to prevent. Mahmūd ended his reply by saying that if the Caliph wanted to get rid of Ibn Khān he must send an army to undertake his expulsion and he (Maḥmūd) would be ready to give assistance. Upon receipt of this communication, al-Mu'tanṣir wrote to Badr al-Jamālī the Fāṭimid governor of Damascus informing him that Maḥmūd b. Nagr had rebelled against the Fāṭimid Caliphate and contemplated changing allegiance to that of the Caliphate of Baghdad. Al-Mu'tanṣir commanded Badr to march on Aleppo and capture it from Maḥmūd. Badr, incapable of leading such an expedition, instead wrote to ‘Aṭiyya who was in al-Rāḥba, informing him that the Caliph desired him to recapture Aleppo. In the
same letter, Badr advised ʿAṭiyya that he was ready to supply him with all necessary equipment.

On receiving Badr's communication, ʿAṭiyya left al-Raḥba and came to Ūmūr and began to recruit among Kilāb and other Bedouin tribes. News of this reached Maḥmūd who on receiving it marched from Aleppo towards ʿAmmāh in an endeavour to prevent the escalation of ʿAṭiyya's recruitment. ʿAṭiyya and Maḥmūd were once again on the verge of fraternal strife but Ibn ʿAmmār, the cadi and then ruler of Tripoli, mediated between them and succeeded in inducing reconciliation. The reconciliation was based on the reaffirmation of the previous agreement which divided the emirate between them. Ibn ʿAmmār also persuaded both Maḥmūd and ʿAṭiyya to reaffirm their allegiance to al-Mustanṣir.46

There is no information why, in 1067 A.D., a large part of the tribe of Kilāb together with other Bedouin tribes assembled in the region of ʿAmmāh. The normal places of assembly for Kilāb were either in the vicinity of Aleppo and Maʿarrat al-ʿUqayla or in the regions of al-Raqqa and al-Raḥba. Despite this lack of information it is conceivable that these tribes moved southward because of pressure from the Turcomans who were, at that time, penetrating upper Mesopotamia and northern Syria. In upper Mesopotamia, al-Mosul was directly under this pressure and the ʿUqaylī

46Mirʿat, A., Annals, 459H; Al-Nujūm, V, 79.
dynasty, which dominated it, was also affected by it. The tribe of 'Uqayl, headed by Muslim b. Quraysh (1061-1085 A.D.), Amir al-Mosul, was gradually forced to move westwards. During the movement the Mirdasid state was the major obstacle the 'Uqaylids had to overcome.

They began to occupy this state little by little until, as we shall see, they captured Aleppo and brought the Mirdasid dynasty to an end. In 1067 A.D., after 'Atiyya made the reconciliation with his nephew Maḥmūd, he did not return to al-Raḥba, but went to Damascus. In the following year, 1068 A.D., while 'Atiyya was absent, Muslim b. Quraysh marched on al-Raḥba and captured it. Later, in 463 A.H./1070-71 A.D., Muslim was also able to capture al-Raqqa.

Now 'Atiyya, who had lost all his property, went to Byzantium to seek aid after he had unsuccessfully appealed to the Fatimid authority in Damascus. In 1071 A.D., after the battle of Mināzkird, 'Atiyya assisted by the Byzantine troops of Antioch, raided the territory of Aleppo. This raid had no significant issue and after that 'Atiyya went to Constantinople, where he died in July 1073 A.D. 47

Apparently, when Byzantium accepted 'Aṭiyya in its territory, and employed him in action against Aleppo, it aimed at limiting the power of Maḥmūd's Turcoman troops or expelling them from Aleppo. Before the time of Mināz-kīrd and when the Turcomans were penetrating the Byzantine territory of Asia Minor Aleppo was the important centre for their activities. Some of the Turcomans settled in Aleppo itself and took service under Maḥmūd while others regarded Aleppo as a place in which to purchase their provisions and to sell their spoils. The quantity of booty taken by the Turcomans from Byzantium was enormous. Ibn al-'Adīm relates that in the years 459-460 A.H./1066-67 A.D. Turcoman bands pillaged from the region of Antioch about 40,000 buffaloes and countless numbers of other kinds of cattle. Ibn al-'Adīm adds that during these two years about 70,000 people of Byzantine origin were sold as slaves in the market of Aleppo. Ibn al-'Adīm further relates that this was the number recorded in the register of the market tax collector and a considerable number escaped unrecorded, as sales had taken place outside Aleppo. 48

The Byzantine empire, whose head was at that time Romanus Diogenes, endeavoured to secure its frontiers and to stop the Turcomans from penetrating its territory. For this purpose, during the three successive years of 461-464 A.H./1068-1071 A.D. Romanus led three campaigns, the first two of which were directed

against the omirato of Aleppo.

The battle of Minaz-kird, which was the issue of the third campaign and the most important of the three, had a decisive effect not only on Muslim-Byzantine relations, but on the whole of the medieval world. This battle was indirectly connected with Aleppo and this will be mentioned later.

The two campaigns which Diogenes led against Aleppo had no significant results for he only succeeded in capturing the town of Manbij. It is not certain whether the capture of Manbij occurred during the first or the second campaign for the Arabic chroniclers do not give a clear narrative about this. Psellus, who lived through the events, also is not helpful in this respect. Concerning the first campaign he merely says that Diogenes "left the city of Constantinople with all his army and advanced against the barbarians not knowing where he was marching nor what he was going to do. He wandered over the countryside planning to go one way, marching by another, traversing Syria as well as Persia and all the success he met with was to lead his army into the interior, establish his men on some high hill, bring them down again, cut them off in narrow passes and suffer heavy casualties through his manoeuvring. However, he returned still - to all appearances - victorious, neither from the Medes nor from the Persians did he bring us any spoils of war. One thing alone established him that he had marched against his foes."
However, it would seem that the capture of Manbij occurred during the second campaign because the Arabic chroniclers relate that when the city was captured, many of its inhabitants fell into captivity. Such occurrences are confirmed by Psellus who participated in the campaign and relates that "a mere handful of our adversaries were taken prisoner".

From the narratives of the Arabic chroniclers it would appear that during the first campaign Diogenes invaded the emirate of Aleppo from the region of Antioch, captured two or three small Aleppine fortresses and defeated Mahmūd and his Turco-Kilabi army. Diogenes was obliged to withdraw for news reached him that a band of Turcomans led by a Chief known as al-Afsūn captured the Byzantine city of Ammūriya (Amorion) and had advanced towards Constantinople. In the second campaign apparently Diogenes invaded the territory of Aleppo from upper Mesopotamia, captured the town of Manbij, destroyed it, rebuilt its former citadel and garrisoned it. Shortly after he returned to Constantinople because his army was insufficiently provisioned. 49

Diogenes' two campaigns, together with the migration of some Turcoman bands, offered no real threat to the Mirdasid rule in Aleppo. Meanwhile the Fāṭimid Caliphate was too much occupied with its own problems to give any attention to Aleppo and its affairs. These problems were mainly manifested in Nāṣir al-Dawla al-Ḥamdānī's attempt to grasp the power in Cairo and his device to bring the Fāṭimid Caliphate to an end. To further the success of his plan, Nāṣir al-Dawla sent an envoy to Iraq calling upon Alp-Arslan - the Muslim orthodox sultan - to come to Egypt, take over its rule and to bring the Fāṭimid-heretic-caliphate to an end.

Alp Arslan responded to this call, and led his army westward. This movement seriously threatened Maḥmūd's position. For several reasons Alp-Arslan was unable to reach Egypt and not to travel further than the walls of Aleppo. Most of these reasons are not the concern of this thesis, therefore only those which connect with Aleppo will be dealt with. Before doing so, it is necessary to mention that Maḥmūd whose allegiance was to the Fāṭimid Caliphate, realised the change in the balance of power in the Islamic world. As a result of this, in Shawal 462 A.H./1070 A.D. and before the westward movement of Alp-Arslan took place, Maḥmūd had ceased to acknowledge the suzerainty of al-Mustanṣir, the Fāṭimid Caliph. Afterward Maḥmūd sent an envoy to Baghdad to inform the authority there that he had ceased to acknowledge
the suzerainty of al-Mustaṣir and of his intention to acknowledge the supremacy of both al-Qāʾīm, the Abbasid Caliph and Alp Arslan, the Saljuq sultan. The message carried by Māhmūd's envoy was welcomed by the Abbasid authority of Baghdad who sent Naqib al-Nuqaba Ṭarrād al-Zaynī to Aleppo to represent al-Qāʾīm in the ceremony of the first Khutba in the name of that Caliph and to give Māhmūd the Khila which were bestowed on him.

In Aleppo, for religious reasons, Māhmūd's action did not pass without public objection but this matter will be discussed later in the last chapter of this thesis.

On the 14th of Rabiʿ al-Akhir, 463 A.H./19th January, 1071 A.D. Alp Arslan and his army crossed the Euphrates and entered the territory of Aleppo. Before he crossed this river Alp Arslan called on Māhmūd b. Naṣr to come to his presence and pay him homage as all the Mesopotamian amirs and governors had done. Māhmūd refused to obey and Alp Arslan advanced on Aleppo. It took him about two months to reach Aleppo and during that time he sent more than one envoy to Māhmūd who persisted in his refusal to leave Aleppo, therefore Alp Arslan decided to take Aleppo by force and the city, for the first time, went under siege from the Turcomans. Before the siege took place, Māhmūd fortified Aleppo's walls and received reinforcements from all over Syria.

For more than a month Alp Arslan's mighty army failed to capture Aleppo. The chief reasons for this failure were the
obstinate resistance of the city's defenders, Aleppo's strong and well fortified walls and the inefficiency of the Saljuq army at that period in siege warfare. The previous failure of this same army to capture the town of Edessa, after more than a month of siege, provides an example of its inefficiency. During the siege, the Saljuq army made several attempts to storm the city and to breach its walls, but the Aleppines were able to rebuff them. Apparently the morale of the Aleppines during the siege was very high and they were confident inside their defences. The Aleppines expressed that in their arms and their own other special ways.

The strongest tower in the city's walls was known as Burj al-Ghanam and the Saljuq army concentrated on capturing it. The Aleppines not only repulsed the aggressors but taunted them with their own peculiar sense of humour. They took a roll of silk material and bound it round the top of the tower. When Alp Arslan enquired the reason for this, he was told that the "Aleppines were saying in mockery that the stones of the mangonel caused the tower to have a headache, so they put a bandage round it". On hearing this, Alp Arslan became furious and he ordered 30,000 arrows to be distributed among his men in addition to the quantity they already had. On the following morning he led the whole army in an assault on the city. It was a failure and Alp Arslan himself narrowly escaped death, therefore Alp Arslan stopped the attack and summoned to his camp all those chieftains of the tribe
of Kilâb who were in the region of Aleppo. He aimed at appointing one of them as Amir of Aleppo and to authorise him to capture the city from Maḥmūd.

When this was reported to Maḥmūd, who well knew the characteristics of his kinsmen, he realised the danger of such a move. Without loss of time he astutely made a counter-move in an endeavour to achieve a settlement with the Sultan. He wrote to Ay- taşın al-Sulaymānī, one of Alp Arslan's officers, who on several occasions had been sent as an envoy to Maḥmūd. He told him that he would submit to the Sultan's orders. Consequently in the night of the first of Sha'ban, 463 A.H./4th May, 1071 A.D. Maḥmūd, disguised in Turcoman costume and accompanied by his mother al-Sayida secretly left Aleppo and went to the camp of the Sultan. There they met Alp Arslan and achieved an agreement according to which Maḥmūd was to remain in his post. On the following day a ceremony was arranged and publicly Maḥmūd left Aleppo and entered the Sultan's camp where he paid his homage.

To justify his failure in taking Aleppo by force, the Arabic chroniclers allege that Alp Arslan declared that his intention was not to capture Aleppo by force but by his failure to demonstrate its impregnability in the eyes of Byzantium. This is, of course, poor justification and we are not even sure whether Alp Arslan actually said it or whether it was an invention of one of the chroniclers.
There is no detailed information concerning the terms of the Maḥmūd-Alp Arslan agreement. The chroniclers relate that after the settlement, Maḥmūd met the Sultan frequently inside his camp, for there is no indication that Alp Arslan entered the city. Shortly after the settlement the Sultan decided to go back and not to continue his journey towards Egypt.

Before he left, he received a Byzantine envoy who informed him of his Emperor's willingness to relinquish to him several places he had previously captured from the Muslims, but in exchange for what we do not know. Siḥt b. al-Jawzī, who relates this, gives an indication that Alp Arslan agreed to Byzantine terms. After that, Alp Arslan moved back eastward leaving behind him a part of his forces under the leadership of Aytaqīn al-Sulaymānī. The task of al-Sulaymānī was to join his force with that of Maḥmūd and together try to capture Damascus and southern Syria. After he crossed the Euphrates Alp Arslan received the news of a Byzantine army led by the Emperor himself and bound for the conquest of his territory, whereupon he immediately changed direction, led his army to meet that of Byzantium and defeated it at Mināz-kird. Except for the far-reaching effect of this victory, Alp Arslan's expedition would have been a fruitless one.50

A few days after Alp Arslan's departure from Aleppo, Māḥmūd and al-Sulaymānī led their forces southward towards Damascus. They halted at Ba'labak to plan for their campaign. During the halt, Māḥmūd received news that his uncle 'Āṭiyya, assisted by the Byzantine troops of Antioch, had raided the territory of Aleppo. This obliged Māḥmūd to return to Aleppo and to engage the Byzantines in a battle in which he was defeated.

When he was unable to prevent the Byzantines from raiding his territory, Māḥmūd appealed to the Turcoman chiefs who were trying to capture Palestine. With their help Māḥmūd was not only able to prevent the Byzantines from raiding his territory, but also to restore al-Raḥba to his dominion in 465 A.H./1072 A.D. After the recapture of al-Raḥba from the 'Uqaylids of al-Mosul the Turcomans left Māḥmūd and returned towards Palestine after receiving from him a sum of money and a number of horses. This gave the Byzantines an opportunity to resume their raids but, in 466 A.H./1073 A.D., Māḥmūd was able to defeat the Byzantine army of Antioch and afterwards, on 12th December of the same year, to capture one of Antioch's castles known as al-Sin.  

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Bar Hebraeus, 220; Ibn Abīl-Dam, 132v.-133r.; Al-Durrā, 388-392; Al-Bustān, 90r.; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 101; Al-Mukhtāṣar, I, 196; Al-Dhahābī, OR 50, 5v.-6r.; Al-Ibar, Dh., III, 50; Duwal, I, 209-210; Al-Mujām, V, 86-87; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 587; Setton, I, 148, 191.

Ibn Ḥayyūs, II, 511-512; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 106; Al-'Azīmī, 182r.; Zubda, II, 30-32, 42; Mirāt, A., Annals, 464 H.
In Jumada al-Aula of the following year, 467 A.H./January 1075 A.D., Mahmūd died and the cause of his death, according to Ibn al-'Adīm, was ulcers in the gut. In his book Mīrāt al-Zamān, Sibṭ b. al-Jawāzī, when enumerating the events of 467 H, he mentions the death of Mahmūd but without specifying the cause. He gives the same date (Jumada al-Aula) as both Ibn al-'Adīm and Ibn al-Qalānīsī. Oddly enough, when he gives an account of obituaries of the same year, Sibṭ himself says that on Thursday, the 13th of Sha'ban, 467 A.H./3rd April, 1075 A.D. Mahmūd b. Nāṣr died with grief over the death of his favourite girl slave who had preceded him by two days. Abū'l Māḥāsin corroborates this account but apparently his source was Mīrāt al-Zamān for there is a verbatim analogy between his text and that of the Mīrāt. 52

Ibn al-'Adīm relates that when he died Mahmūd left what was worth 1 1/2 million dinars. This was a very large sum of money to be left by a petty amir who ruled over the small emirate of Aleppo in the abnormal time of the Turcoman migration. Apparently most of Mahmūd's wealth was collected by extortion. Ibn al-'Adīm describes Mahmūd as being a good ruler prior to the time of Alp Arslan's
siege of Aleppo. After that he became a greedy and miserly money collector. In the biographies of Zara’ b. Musa, Maḥmūd’s Kātib, and Abu-Bishr al-Ḥalabī, Maḥmūd’s vizier, Ibn al-ʿAdīm gives account of the ways in which Maḥmūd extorted money from the officials of his state. An interesting point emerges from Ibn al-ʿAdīm’s account... When the extortion occurred it was accompanied by court intrigue in a similar manner to the extortions which took place in the courts of almost every Islamic state, particularly during decline periods. 53 It would appear that after the siege of Aleppo by Alp-Arslan, Maḥmūd realised that it would be very difficult for him to maintain his position in the future. This was probably the main reason for the change in his character from generosity to greed.

During the reign of Maḥmūd, some kind of military iqṭā’ was founded in Aleppo. There is insufficient information about this iqṭā’, except that in 458 A.H./1066 A.D. Maḥmūd gave Maʿarrat al-Ḥūlān to the Turcomans who had helped him during his struggle with his uncle ‘Aṭiyya; and that in 1071 A.D. he planned to grant the rule of every castle in his estate to prominent Aleppines under condition that their families should remain in Aleppo as hostages. 54


54 Bughya, AS, 279–280; Zuḥrah, II, 10, 36–40; Al-ʿĀṯār, BM 54v.–56v.
The reign of Maḥmūd marked the decline of the Arabic control over Aleppo and his death the actual end of this control. After his death and for centuries onwards the Turcomans became the real rulers of Aleppo.

It is noteworthy to mention here that the only surviving inscription of the Mirdasid period is that belonging to Maḥmūd. This inscription is chiselled on a stone, sized 51 x 31 cm. It now rests inside the great Mosque of the citadel of Aleppo. It is not known whether this stone was found in the citadel or whether it was brought there. The inscription on it is formed in five lines of Kūfī-Arabic writing, which contain the names and titles of Maḥmūd and bears the date 465 A.H./1072 A.D., and it reads.  

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The text of this inscription was published by J. Sauvaget in Repertoire Chronologique d'Epigraphie Arabe, VII, 189; a word in the text was misunderstood; Al-Hasabayn is read as al-Husayn. Maḥmūd was known as Dhu al-Hasabayn (i.e. the one with two pedigrees) for his father was Kilābi and his mother was from the tribe of Numayr (see Ibn Sinān, 40 and Ibn Ḫayyūs, II, 605).
Chapter IV

THE TURCOMAN MIGRATION AND THE SALJUQ CONQUEST

The Reign of Nağr Ibn Maḥmūd; Sābiq Ibn Maḥmūd and the Fall of the Mirdasid Dynasty; the Turcoman Migration Muslim Ibn Quraysh and the 'Uqaylid Occupation; the Saljuq Conquest and the Reign of Aq-Sunqur.

"When the Great Sultan, Alp-Arslan, crossed the Euphrates ... Al-Faqih Abu-Ja'far said to him 'Sire, see though thank Allah for the grace he hath bestowed upon thee'; the Sultan said 'And what is this grace?' Abu Ja'far replied: 'This river hath not been crossed before by any Turk except as a slave, and to-day thou hast crossed it as a monarch'."

Before his death Maḥmūd b. Nağr nominated Shabīb, his youngest son, as his successor. After his death his will was disregarded, for Shabīb was still young and the outstanding figures of the State, together with the troops did not favour him. They preferred Nağr, Maḥmūd's eldest son and chose him as the new Amir of Aleppo. Nağr commenced his reign by ordering the death of his father's Vizier, 'Alī b. Abi'l-Thurayya. According to Ibn al-'Adīm, Nağr accused 'Alī of having prompted his father not to nominate him as his successor. Ibn al-'Adīm calls 'Alī "al-Qā'id" which indicates

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1 The name of Abu Ja'far was Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Bukhārī and he was Nağr al-Dawla al-Bandāni's envoy to Alp-Arslan; Başhīya, A., III, 282r.; Zubda, II, 20.

2 Ibn al-Qalanī, 108; Al-Muntazam, VIII, 304; Al-Kāmil, IX, 165; X, 10; Zubda, II, 45; Ibn Abī'l Hayāja, 130r.; Al-'Aṣīmī,
that he had some connection with military life. It is probable
that 'Ali served in the troops of the Mirdasid or was perhaps one
of the leaders of Aleppo Abdath. Either post would fit him to
become Mahmūd's Vizier and to participate in the struggle for
succession which followed the death of Mahmūd. 4

Apparently when Naṣr became Amir of Aleppo he was supported
by the Turcomans who were living in the city at that time and
whose Chief was known as Ahmad-Shah. Ibn al-‘Adīm indicates that
Ahmad Shāh was loyal in his service to Naṣr. 5 In 1075 A.D.
Naṣr sent an army led by Ahmad Shāh to restore the town of Manbij
which was under Byzantine control. On the 21st (or 24th) September,
1075 A.D., and after a long siege, the Byzantine garrison sur-
rendered the town to the Aleppine army. 6 Not long after, Atsiz -
the Turcoman Chief - together with his brother Jawlā began to
plunder the southern territory of Aleppo. When Naṣr failed to

182v.; Mir'at, A., Annals, 467H; Hawadith, 154r.; Al- Dhahabi, OR 50, 112r.; Al-Ibar, Dh., III, 266; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 149, 202;
Ibn al-'Amid, 563-565; Al-Kujum, V, 100-101; ‘Iqd, XI, 581;
Al-Safadi, II, 87; Ibn Junghul, IV, 233r.

3Al-'Azim, 182v.; Bughya, A., VIII, 16 r.v.-17r.v.; Zubda, II, 48.

4Bughya, A., VIII, 16r.v.-17 r.v.


5Ibn Hayyūs, I, 205-207; Al-'Azim, 181v., 183r.; Zubda, II, 46-47; Bughya, A., II,165v.; Al-Kamil, X, 69; Mir'at, A.,
Annals, 468H; Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 10r.; Duwal, II, 3; Ibn
prevent them from devastating his emirate by offering them a sum of money, he sent Ahmad-Shah at the head of an army and, after two engagements, Ahmad-Shah succeeded in expelling them.\(^7\)

For some unknown reason Naṣr arrested Ahmad-Shah and imprisoned him in the citadel of Aleppo. This occurred on the 9th May, 1076 A.D., which was the second day of 'Id al-Fitr. Apparently Ahmad-Shah came alone on the morning of that day to the citadel to pay Naṣr the Feast Visit and Naṣr took the opportunity and arrested him. After the arrest Naṣr indulged himself in an orgy of wine which lasted until late in the day. In addition to being irrational, as Ibn al-‘Adîm describes him, and also completely drunk by this time Naṣr rode his horse to Aleppo Ḥadîr. Although the Ḥadîr was part of Aleppo, it lay at that time outside the city's walls and it was here that the Turcoman community was living. According to several chroniclers, when Naṣr went to al-Ḥadîr he aimed to sack its inhabitants and to seize some of their women, for he was heard to say "We want the beautiful faces". One of the Turcoman, who were alarmed by the arrest of their Chief, shot Naṣr with an arrow and caused his death. After he had been killed the Turcoman advanced on Aleppo demanding the release of their leader. The news of the death disturbed the Aleppines who were enjoying the celebration of their feast on a beautiful Spring day, as Ibn al-‘Adîm says. At the news of Naṣr's death, the

\(^7\)Ibn Ḥayûūs, I, 271-273; Zubda, II, 46-48; Mir‘at, A., Annals, 468H.
gates of Aleppo together with that of the citadel were immediately closed. 8

On becoming Amir of Aleppo, Naṣr had entrusted most of the emirate's affairs to his foster-uncle, the Munqidhī Amir, ‘Alī b. Muqallid, who became known as Sadīd al-Mulk. At the same time he ordered the death of ‘Alī b. Abī'l Thurayyā, his father's Vizier. Naṣr had appointed Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Tamīmī, who was known as Abū Naṣr b. al-Naḥḥās, as his Vizier. Both Ibn Muqallid and Ibn al-Naḥḥās shared a common interest in literature which formed a friendship between them and, after Naṣr had been killed, they were able to maintain order in both the city and the citadel. On the evening of that day and only a few hours after Naṣr's death they brought his brother Saḥib to the citadel and acclaimed him as the new Amir. Ibn al-‘Adīm relates that when Saḥib, who was living in the city, was brought to the citadel he too was very drunk. He did not enter the citadel by its gate but was hoisted over its wall by a rope. 9


After he became an Amir, Ṣābiq was advised to release Ḥmad-Shāh from his prison. Immediately Ḥmad-Shāh was released and brought to the presence of Ṣābiq who conferred on him a robe of honour and assured him of his goodwill towards him and his followers. Forthwith Ḥmad-Shāh left the citadel and went to al-Ḥadīr where he met his Turcomans and allayed their anxiety. Ibn al-‘Aḍīm describes Ṣābiq as an inefficient ruler, as a result of which he became a puppet controlled by Ḥmad-Shāh and his Turcomans who began to monopolise the power of the State. This angered the Kīlābī Chieftains who reacted by proclaiming Waththāb b. Māh mùd, Ṣābiq's brother, as their Amir and also caused 'Alī b. Muqallid to abandon Aleppo for Kafar-Ṭāb where he planned for the capture of Shayzār.

The tribe of Kīlāb was mobilised and assembled in the country surrounding Qinnasrin from where it began to invest Aleppo. There were about 70,000 Kīlābī horsemen and infantry (see ch. II, pp. 78-79) as we are informed by Ibn al-‘Aḍīm, who prepared to storm Aleppo. From contemporary verse composed by Ibn Ḥayyus and recited at that time it can be deduced that there was united pressure of Ṣābiq to avoid open conflict with his tribe and to endeavour to seek a peaceful settlement. It was, however, not the incapable Ṣābiq who could initiate a settlement but it was accomplished by Ḥmad-Shāh. He made contact with a Turcoman Chief named Muḥammad b. Dimlāj and asked him to join forces with him. Ibn Dimlāj, who was camping together with his 500 Turcoman horsemen near the Byzantine
frontier, arrived at Aleppo during the first week of June, 1076 A.D. On Wednesday, the 7th July, 1076 A.D., Ahmad-Shah, together with Ibn Dimlaj, led their followers and made a sudden raid on the too-confident Kilabis. The Kilabis, who were taken by surprise, fled without resistance, leaving the Turcomans in possession of all their property. This included a large quantity of chattels, 400,000 sheep and 100,000 camels and a great number of slaves.10 Thirteen days after this event Sabiq had an opportunity to rid himself of Ahmad-Shah and to make reconciliation with his tribe. It arose when Ibn Dimlaj made a banquet, thirteen days after the victory, to which he invited Ahmad-Shah. While the banquet was in progress, Ibn Dimlaj arrested Ahmad-Shah and made him his prisoner. Instead of inciting the followers of Ahmad-Shah to rescue their Chief and providing grounds for the two Turcoman bands to strive against one another and so lose some of their strength, Sabiq paid Ibn Dimlaj a sum of 10,000 dinars together with 20 horses for the ransom of Ahmad-Shah.11

The defeated Waththab b. Mahmud together with some of the Kilabi Chieftains left the region of Aleppo and went to Khurasam where they met the Saljuq Sultan, Malik-Shah. They complained to him and begged his help against Sabiq and Ahmad-Shah. According

10 Ibn Hayyus, II, 482-483, 647; Bughya, A., II, 165v.-166r.; VII, 143r.v.-144r., 147r.v.; Zubda, II, 53-55.

11 Bughya, A., II, 166r.; Zubda, II, 55.
to Ibn al-‘Adîm, Malik-Shâh gave his sympathy to the Kilâbi Chieftains. He conferred on each of them an iqṭâ‘ in Northern Syria. Meanwhile he assigned his brother, Tutush, to Syria with an injunction to assume personal control over it. Tutush moved westward with a small Turcoman army and when he passed Diyar-Bakr, the tribe of Kilâb joined him. On his arrival at the city of Aleppo, Muslim b. Quraysh al-‘Uqaylî together with his army of al-Mosul, on instruction from the Sultan, reluctantly came to his assistance. In Aleppo, when Sâbiq heard the news of Tutush’s campaign he informed Ahmad-Shâh, who was besieging Antioch, and summoned him to return to Aleppo. In 469 A.H./1077 A.D., Ahmad-Shâh had led the troops from Aleppo and marched on Antioch. He besieged it and began to starve its population, but when he received the news of Tutush’s expedition, accepted the Byzantine offer of 5,000 dinars, lifted the siege and went to Aleppo.

In 470 A.H./1077 A.D., Tutush reached Aleppo and began to invest it. Shortly afterwards he lifted the siege and withdrew a few miles from the city. This withdrawal was either tactical or a preparation for a long siege, for it long after Tutush...
returned and resumed the attack. It was a siege which lasted for three months, but it was not particularly effective one because Muslim b. Quraysh did not wish to see the Saljuq conquering Aleppo. During the siege he communicated with Sabiq and encouraged him to hold out. Meanwhile he reproached the Kilābi Chieftains for supporting the alien Turcomans against their own kinsmen. Ahmad-Shah was killed during the siege and this eased the way for Muslim. He was able to persuade the Kilābi Chieftains to desert Tutush and Waththāb and Shabīb to enter Aleppo and join forces with their brother. After accomplishing all this Muslim informed Tutush of his own intended departure. He led his troops via the gate (probably Bab al-Iraq) of Aleppo, halted there and permitted his men to sell the provisions they had to the Aleppo. 14

After the withdrawal of Muslim Tutush continued the siege of Aleppo but apparently before this withdrawal had taken place he sent a messenger to his brother asking for re-inforcements together with implements of siege warfare. On his way towards his territory Muslim met a unit of Ghuzz: troops at Sinjar consisting of 1,000 horsemen carrying with them some siege implements. The leader of

14Ibn al-Qalanisi, 112; Al-‘Azimi, 183v.; Ibn Abi’l-Hayja’, 130r.; Al-Kamil, X, 71; Ibn al-‘Amid, 567-568; Al-Muntazam, VIII, 313; Bughya, A., II, 166r.; VII, 143r.v.-144r.; Zubda, II, 56-58; Mir’at, A., Annals, 471H; Al-Bustan, 91r; Al-Dahabi, 90, 10v.; Al-Durra, 405; Ibn Abi’l-Dam, 134r.; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 203; Ibn Khaldun, IV, 1357; Al-Ṣafadī, II, 123.
this unit was known as "Turcoman" and his destination was Aleppo to reinforce Tutush. When Muslim failed to persuade Turcoman not to continue his journey he communicated with Sābiq and informed him of this reinforcement. With the help of Muslim an army consisting of about 1,000 horsemen and 500 infantry was formed from the tribes of Kilāb. 'Uqayl, Numayr and Qushayr. This tribal army ambushed the Ghuzz reinforcement, routed it and killed most of its men.

When news of this reached Tutush he left the walls of Aleppo and led most of his troops against the tribe of Kilāb. After he had departed the Aleppines came out of their city, sacked all the provisions of Tutush's army and killed some of the men he had left behind him to guard them. It would appear that Tutush was unable to take any punitive action against Kilāb who retreated to the desert; he therefore crossed the Euphrates to plan reprisals against Muslim b. Quraysh. When Tutush learnt that Muslim was in full preparation, he abandoned his plan and went to Diyar-Bakr where he spent the winter.¹⁵

When the winter had passed Tutush returned towards Aleppo with a new plan in a fresh attempt to capture it. His first move was to strip it of all its nearby strategic points, castles and

¹⁵Ibn Hayyūs, I, 52-53; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 112; Zubda, II, 58-62; Bughyā, A., VII, 144r.v.-145r.v.; Mir'āt, A., Annals, 471H.
fortresses. He captured Manbij, Hīṣn al-Fāyā, Hīṣn Bazā'ā and 'Azāz, then turned to Aleppo and aimed at taking it by force. As his army approached the walls it was met by Aleppo troops who, taking it by surprise, rebuffed it. For the time being Tutush did not attempt to capture Aleppo, but went southward where he succeeded in taking possession of Damascus and establishing himself there. 16

In contemporary poetry and accounts by the chroniclers it is clear that the chief motive behind Muslim b. Quraysh's attitude and action in helping the Mirdasids against the Saljuqs was the Arab ties between him and the Mirdasids. In these sources we meet clearly defined groups - the Arabs and Turks, both of whom struggled for supremacy. We also read that "Mulk al-'Arab" in Aleppo needed to be preserved before it should be demolished by the alien Turks.

Ibn al-'Adīm relates that while Tutush was besieging Aleppo, Sabiq wrote to his brothers Shabīb and Waththāb who were co-operating with Tutush against him and said "I am defending your land and authority and if this city [i.e. Aleppo] falls into the possession of Tutush, he will demolish the 'Mulk al-'Arab' [i.e. the rule of the Bedouin Arab]!" The sentiments of this letter were echoed in the poems of Ibn Ḫayyūs and were repeated in another letter written in verse which Sabiq sent to one of the Kilābī Chieftains. In it

16 Ibn al-Qalānīsī, 112; Ibn al-'Amīd, 566-567; Zubda, II, 62-63; Baghya, A., VII, 145r.v.; Al-Ṣūfī, M. 60r.v.
Sabiq urged the Kilābī tribesmen to unite against the alien Turks who were endeavouring to occupy their territory and usurp their authority. Sibû b. al-Jawzî relates that in 1079 Sabiq appealed for help to Muslim b. Quraysh against Tutush pleading that the ties of their Arab blood should oblige him to come to his support. Sibû also cites Ghars al-Ni'ma as relating that, in 1080, during Muslim's attempt to capture the citadel of Aleppo (see below, pp.213-14) he informed the Chieftains of Kilāb that he had come to Aleppo in answer to their request and as fulfilment of his obligation as an Arab to defend their land and property against the Ghuzz. For this, he said, he had spent time, money and effort and the Chieftains agreed that their intentions had been to co-operate in defence of their common cause.

The term "Arab" mentioned in the sources refers only to the Arabic Bedouin tribes of northern Syria and Upper Mesopotamia (as well as the rest of Syria) and not the whole population of the country. At the same time the term "Turks" was used to designate the Turcoman migrants who accompanied the Saljuq conquest of the 11th century. Prior to this conquest Aleppo, al-Mosul, Harran and Qal'it-Ja'bar were controlled by tribal Arabic dynasties from Kilāb, 'Uqayl, Numayr and Qushayr. After years of struggle, as will be discussed in more detail, the migrants succeeded in stripping these dynasties of their power and usurped it for themselves. The struggle was, therefore, merely for power and, save
for occasional participation by the Abūdāth, it was purely a nomadic one. The nature of the Abūdāth will be dealt with in the following chapter, but it is necessary to mention here that although this militant organisation was a civic one, it certainly did not represent the bulk of the population in any city in which it held power. In fact, any participation by the Abūdāth was taken in their own interest which was threatened by the coming of the Turcomans.  

The common danger caused the Arab tribes to join forces to preserve their sovereignty, but why did the Turcoman Abu’l-Šāh, as well as Ibn Khān before him, fight against their kinsmen and support the Mirdāsids? Was the reason self-interest and lust for power or were there more important ones? In an effort to solve this problem, the Turcoman migration to northern Syria which took place before the final Saljuq conquest, should be discussed first.

In 435 A.H./1043 A.D., the city of al-Mogul was raided for the first time by Ghuzz bands. The result of this was immediately reflected in Aleppo and was expressed in the poem of Ibn Abi Ḥāṣā who calls the intruders "al-‘Atrāk" (i.e. The Turks) and relates that these Turks did not dare to raid the territory of Aleppo because

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18 Al-‘Aẓīmi, 172r.; Al-Kāmil, IX, 274-276; Al-Muntazam, VIII, 117; Ibn Abī’l Hayyā, 125v.; Ḥawādith, 142r.; Al-Munsūrī, 72v.; Ibn al-‘Amīd, 540-541; Duwal, I, 199.
they knew beforehand how well this country was defended.\footnote{Ibn Abi Ḥasanā': I, 34, 36.}

According to Ibn al-'Ādīm, it was not until the death of Thīmāl, during the struggle for succession between ‘Atiyya and Māḥmūd, that in 456 A.H./1064 A.D. the first Turcoman band entered Aleppo upon a request for aid by ‘Atiyya. The leader of this band was known as Ibn Khān, a name which indicates the rank of its holder. Ibn al-'Ādīm relates that Ibn Khān was the son of "Malik al-Turk" and that, in anger, he deserted his father and came to the Marwānīd's territory in Upper Mesopotamia. Ibn al-'Ādīm, who does not explain who "Malik al-Turk" was, appears unconsciously to have rendered the term "Ibn Khān" in Arabic form. The information emanating from Arabic sources concerning the origin of Ibn Khān is both obscure and insufficient. From Ibn al-'Ādīm we know that his first name was Ḥarūn and that when he entered Aleppo his followers numbered 1,000 archers. The role played by Ibn Khān in the affairs of Aleppo has been dealt with in the previous chapter and further discussion is unnecessary.

As a result of ‘Atiyya's duplicity, Ibn Khān lost most of his men and when he was obliged to join Māḥmūd against ‘Atiyya, he had but a handful left. Both Al-'Aẓīmī and Ibn al-Qalānīsī relate that after Ibn Khān had joined Māḥmūd both of them went to Tripoli, then returned and began to besiege Aleppo, which siege ended the
rule of 'Atiyya there. We are not informed why Mahmūd and Ibn Khān went to Tripoli, but there is information that when Mahmūd had besieged Aleppo, Ibn Khān had his own Turcoman troops who were the effective force during the siege. This infers that, while in Tripoli with Mahmūd, Ibn Khān was able to raise a Turcoman army. Moreover, this points conclusively to the fact that there were some Turcomans in the region of Tripoli at that time.

The sources especially Mir‘at al-Zaman speak of Turcoman groups known as "al-Nāwikiya", most of whom had migrated to Byzantium, south-western Syria and Palestine. Apparently al-Nāwikiya were the first Turcoman groups to enter Syria and to influence and participate in its affairs. In 1071 A.D. the Chief of the Nāwikiya in south-western Syria was known as "Qurlu" and Ibn al-‘Adim describes him as being the nephew of Ibn Khān. In 1070 A.D. Ibn Khān had left Aleppo and went to Tyre where he entered the service of Ibn ‘Aqīl, its ruler. Not before long, in the same year, and by the contrivance of Ibn ‘Aqīl, Ibn Khān was assassinated by some of his own men. From all of this it could be deduced that Ibn Khān was from al-Nāwikiya and probably was the Chief of all the Nāwikiya who had migrated to Syria. It would appear that the Nāwikiya was not the name of one of the Turcoman tribes, but was a name given to certain bands who had not submitted to the Saljuq Sultan. The greater part of these bands were Turcomans and the rest were of various origins gathered from the remnants of armies.
of the states which were conquered by the Saljuqs. After Maḥmūd's capture of Aleppo from his uncle 'Aṭiyya. (see Ch. III, p. 176) Ibn Khān went to Iraq, perhaps to enlist more of his kinsmen or perhaps to recruit another army for himself. He returned to Aleppo with 1,000 followers of Turcomans, Kurd, Daylam and Uj origin.

Al-Ḍāwūkīya did not pay allegiance to the Saljuq Sultan and it would appear that Ibn Khān left Aleppo before the arrival of Alp-Arsalan, whom he feared. Alp-Arsalan accused Ibn Khān's (?brother) brother of instigating Maḥmūd Ibn Naṣr to resist the Sultan instead of giving him homage. The Turcomans who came to the aid of Maḥmūd against the Byzantines (see Ch. III, pp. 189-190) were from the Ḍāwūkīya and their leader was Qurlū. When Qurlū and his followers (once estimated by Ibn al-ʾAthīr as 12,000 horsemen) left Maḥmūd to return to south-western Syria, Maḥmūd retained 1,000 of these warriors and employed them in his own service. Ahmad-Shāh was probably the leader of these 1,000 warriors and this perhaps explains why he fought against Tūṭūsh and other Turcomans who acknowledged the Sultan.20

Inspite of the fact that the Ḍāwūkīya did not give allegiance to the Saljuq Sultan, they pioneered the Saljuqs' cause and paved the way for their ultimate possession of Syria. From 1070 A.D.

onward a number of Turcoman bands entered Syria. These bands differed from the Nawikiya. They acknowledged the supremacy of the Saljuq Sultan and, therefore, when they entered the country had no need to become mercenaries of any existing states, but behaved as conquerors claiming that they were acting on behalf of the Sultan. Their method of conquest was the destruction of the towns and villages, killing great numbers of the inhabitants and looting everything within reach. Sandaq and Afshin are the names of two of their chieftains which have survived. In 1070 A.D., Sandaq entered Syria from Byzantium and devastated the region between Hims and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. Afshin was before this time, acting inside the Byzantine territory. Both Sandaq and Afshin joined forces with Tutush when he entered Syria and attempted to capture Aleppo. After Tutush had taken possession of Damascus and had killed Atsiz, its first Turcoman (Saljuq) ruler, Afshin apprehensive of what might befall him, deserted Tutush taking with him the larger part of his forces and travelling northward. It may be said that Afshin was the most destructive and cruel chief of all the Turcomans (who entered Syria). Ghar al-Wima and Ibn al-'Adim relate that after deserting Tutush, Afshin and his Turcoman freebooters RAIDed the region of Ba'albak and sacked a number of its villages. From there they proceeded to Rafniya which they reached on the 10th Jumada al-Aula 472 H./8th November,

21 Zubda, II, 11-13, 16; Mirat, Sevin, 137, 138, 144, 146, 149, 197; Al-Muntagam, VIII, 254-255.
22 Ibn Abi’l-Hayja’, 131r; Al-'Agimi, 133v.; Ibn Al-'Amid, 566-567; Al-Kamil, X, 71-72; Ibn Mayassar, II, 26; Zubda, II, 65, Mirat,
1079 A.D. In Rafniya there were, at that time, a group of merchants and a number of caravans loaded with goods en route for Tripoli. Afšīn made a surprise attack on Rafniya, killed some of the merchants and looted everything he found. After spending ten destructive days in Rafniya he went to Shayzar which, due to its impregnable position and the effort of the Munqidhi Amir, 'Alī b. Muqallid, escaped devastation. From Shayzar Afšīn proceeded towards Antioch. The country between Shayzar and Aleppo suffered a worse devastation at his hands than it had suffered since the 7th century. He destroyed every landmark and burned everything which was not portable. Ibn al-'Adīm (who witnessed the Mongol invasion) says that never in its history had this territory suffered such disaster. The aftermath of this destruction was dearth, then famine which drove many to cannibalism. Under these stresses most of the survivors fled from their homes and went to Mesopotamia where they found shelter in the state of Muslim b. Quraysh. Almost a score of years later the crusaders, after capturing Antioch, passed through this mountainous terrain and possessed it without meeting any effective resistance. This indicates that even after twenty years the region was not able to recover from the havoc; but a few years later, when it had partially recovered, it was very

Sevim, 201; Ibn Abīl-Dam, 134r.; Al-Bustān, 90r.v.; Dāval, II, 4; Al-Dhahabī, OR 50, 11r.; Ibn Kathir, XI, 119; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 203; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 137-138; Al-Šafādi, II, 123.

 Zubda, II, 65-67; Mir'at, Sevim, 201.
difficult for Nur al-Din Maḥmūd Zankī and his successors to wrest it from the crusaders.

Everybody was convinced that Sabiq was incapable of doing anything to improve the situation in his Emirate, therefore the population of northern Syria, including the tribe of Kilāb, looked for a strong and just leader. The Sultan, Malik-Shāh, certainly did not fit this role for he was living far away from the scene of events. His brother, Tutush, equally could not satisfy the need, for his behaviour was no better than that of Afshān. Muslim b. Quraysh, the ‘Uqayli Amir of al-Mogul, appeared to be the man to fit the character. Several delegations and a great number of refugees went to his domains appealing to him to come and take over Aleppo. The chroniclers relate that even Sabiq b. Maḥmūd made the same appeal to Muslim. In the poetical work of Ibn Ḥayyūṣ, who spent about sixty years of his life eulogising the Fāṭimid Governors of Damascus, the Mirdāsids of Aleppo and a number of the Fāṭimid Viziers and Officials in Cairo, there is a particular stanza which he recited at the end of his life. It is very warm and sentimental. He addressed it to Muslim b. Quraysh after he had taken possession of Aleppo. Muslim was described as the mercy of heaven sent to give life to a nation (Ummah) which had, for a long time, suffered from the Turcomans who had no mercy. Muslim, he said, had removed the darkness of disasters, driven away fear and oppression and restored northern Syria to
peace and security. He returned dignity to the 'Arabs' and soon he would purge Syria from every Turcoman. Ibn Ḥayyūs cherished a dream of purging Syria from the Turcomans which, as we shall see in detail, did not materialise, and they ultimately defeated Muslim killing him and dominating Syria for centuries.

Upon hearing of the destruction wreaked by Afšīn, Tutush left Damascus and went northward under the pretext that his intention was to chastise Afšīn and thus prevent further destruction. His real intention was, however, to seize the opportunity provided by Afšīn and to capture Aleppo. He besieged Aleppo for a few days but when he found himself unable to take it by force, he lifted the siege and went north raiding several of the nearby villages and after returned to Damascus.

In the town of al-Mosul Muslim b. Quraysh received an Aleppopine delegation together with a communication from Aleppo Afḍāth calling on him once again to come to the rescue of Aleppo. He also received the Chieftains of the tribe of Ḵawīr who made the same request and offered the support of their tribesmen. According to some chroniclers, Ṣābiq b. Ṭāhir wrote to Muslim not only appealing for help but offering to relinquish Aleppo. From the accounts of the chroniclers it is not clear what kind

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of offer Sābiq had made, but it is certain that he offered him at least part of the emirate.

Muslim, who received these encouraging demands, decided not only to capture Aleppo but to gain possession of the whole of Syria. One of Muslim's wives was the sister of Alp-Arsalan and when he intended to march on Aleppo he took the precaution of sending her son to the Sultan Malik-Shāh offering him the sum of 300,000 dinars as an annual tribute if he would permit him (i.e. Muslim) to take Aleppo. The Sultan accepted the offer and Muslim led a Bedouin army towards Aleppo. It was raised from all the tribes of upper Mesopotamia and northern Syria, but chiefly from the tribes of 'Uqayl, Kilāb and Numayr. When Muslim approached Aleppo, Shāhib and Waththāb, Sābiq's brothers, obliged him to shut the city's gates and to refuse to surrender it to Muslim. The Aleppines together with the Aḥdāth, however, favoured the surrender and opposed resistance to Muslim. During the last ten days of June 1080 A.D. the Aḥdāth opened the city's gates and Muslim entered and took possession of it. The Mirdasid Amir persistently refused and Sābiq entrenched himself in the citadel while his brothers Shāhib and Waththāb did the same in the palace which was attached to it. Muslim began to lay siege to the palace and the citadel, and the siege lasted for more than four months. Out of patience, during this period, Muslim was inclined to lift the siege, abandon Aleppo and withdraw to Mesopotamia;
but the encouragement he received from the population and promises made by the Kilābī chieftains together with the outstanding personnel of the state to mediate between him and the Mirdāsid Amirs induced him to remain in Aleppo and maintain the siege.

A dispute arose among the three Mirdāsid brothers, which created an opportunity to be immediately seized by the Munqīdhi Amir, 'Alī b. Muqallid, to mediate between Muslim and the three brothers. 'Alī succeeded in persuading them to surrender the palace and the citadel to Muslim. This resulted in an agreement arranged between Muslim and the Mirdāsids by which Muslim took possession of the citadel together with the palace, married Mani'ah, sister of the three brothers, granted Shabīb and Waththāb the castles of 'Azāz and al-Āthārib together with several villages as an iqṭa', and also granted Sabiq an iqṭa' in the region of al-Rahba. It was Sunday the 10th of Rabi' al-Ākhīr, 473 (or Tuesday 5th) A.H./27th September, 1300 A.D. when Muslim b. Quraysh became master of the Citadel of Aleppo and so brought the Mirdāsid dynasty to an end. 26

26 Ibn al-Qalānisi, 113; Al-'Āqīmi, 184r.; Al-Kāmil, IX, 165; I, 74; Al-Muntazam, VIII, 523; Ibn al-'Āmid, 568; Zubār, II, 67-70, 73, 75; Rughya, A., VII, 145v.-147v.; Mir'at, Sevim, 202-203, 207; Ibn Abī l-Dam, 134r.; Al-Bundari, 66; Al-Mansūrī, 74v.; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 149-150, 203; Duwal, II, 4; Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 11r.; Al-Durra, 406; 'Iqd, XI, 581; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 571-572, 588; Al-Ṣafādī, II, 87; Munajjim, I, 328v.
Previous to this, during the reign of Sabiq, the Munqidhī Amir, 'Alī b. Muqallid of Kafar-Ṭāb, had planned to possess the impregnable castle of Shayzar. This castle was ruled by the Bishop of al-Barah who acknowledged the overlordship of the Byzantine Emperor. Unable to take the castle by force, 'Alī b. Muqallid built a counter castle nearby on the bank of the Orontes which became known as Qal'at al-Jisr (i.e. the castle of the Bridge). By this means 'Alī was able to carry out a long siege and to inflict starvation on the garrison of Shayzar. After the fall of the Mirdasid dynasty, 'Alī b. Muqallid left Aleppo and went back to Qal'at al-Jisr and focussed his energies on the capture of Shayzar. By dint of siege and promises, 'Alī succeeded in inducing the Bishop to relinquish it to him in exchange for a sum of money. On Sunday, 15th Rajab, 474 A.H./19th December 1081 A.D. 'Alī b. Muqallid became the Lord of the castle of Shayzar and began the Munqidhī rule of Shayzar.27

In Aleppo, when Muslim received the news of 'Alī's gain, he moved rapidly in an attempt to wrest Shayzar from him. Firstly he sent an army led by his brother 'Alī b. Quraysh which began to lay siege on Shayzar. Within the castle, its Munqidhī Master was fully prepared. After futile attempts by 'Alī b. Quraysh, Muslim

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27 Al-'Aṣimī, 184v.; Ibn Abī l-Hayyān, 131v.; Ibn Al-'Aṣimī, 568; Bughya, A., VII, 147r.v.; Zubda, II, 75, 77; Mirāt, A., Annals, 474H; Al-Manṣūrī, 74v.; Al-Dhahabī, OR 50, 11v.; Ibn Abī l-Dam, 134 r.v.; Duwal, II, 4; Al-Mu próp, V, 113-114.
took personal command of his entire forces and marched on Shayzar. In June, 1082 A.D. Muslim began to besiege Shayzar, but when in July he found himself baffled he went to Υίμη leaving a division of his troops to continue the siege. The Munqidhi Amir sent to Υίμη a delegation consisting of his wife, his sister and his son. This delegation met Muslim and, by offering him the sum of 10,000 dinars, they succeeded in inducing him to order his troops to withdraw.

Ibn al-ʿAdīm alleges that envy was the reason for Muslim's desire to capture Shayzar. 28 Events prove, however, that the more likely reason was that Muslim was endeavouring to establish a united state under his direct rule. After he had captured Aleppo Muslim's ambition turned him towards the Numayri principality at Ḫarrān which he annexed to his dominions. 29 After that Muslim deprived all the Mirdāsid Amirs of their iqṭāʿs, wrested those parts of the emirate of Aleppo which were in Turcoman hands, purged the Turcomans from northern Syria as far as Ḫamah, and prevented — for the time being — any of the Turcoman bands from entering or passing through any of his territory. Moreover, he extended his influence over the Byzantine towns of Edessa and Antioch. 30

28 Zubda, II, 77; Mirʿat, Sevim, 215.
29 Ibn Abī l-Hayḥāʾ, 131v.; Al-Kāmil, X, 78; Mirʿat, Sevim, 208; Duwal, II, 4; Al-Muṣṭafī, V, 113.
30 Al-Kāmil, X, 78; Zubda, II, 75, 78-79; Mirʿat, Sevim, 208, 216.
After he left Shayzar and went to Hims he aimed at capturing it together with its citadel from Khalaf b. Mula‘ib. Muslim was able to capture the city of Hims and began to lay siege to its citadel. During the siege he learned that Tutush intended to march against him from Damascus. Unprepared for a clash with Tutush - the Sultan's brother - Muslim accepted the Munqidhi's offer, agreed to leave Ibn Mula‘ib in his post and withdrew from Hims. He returned to Aleppo and went from there to al-Mogul where he began to prepare an expedition against Damascus.

Since he had captured Aleppo or even before, Muslim, who professed the Shi‘a doctrine (twelver), communicated with the Fatimid Caliphate in Cairo and while arranging a campaign against Damascus he had received a promise from Badr al-Jamali that when he approached Damascus there would be a Fatimid army ready to assist him. Meanwhile in Damascus Tutush received letters from the two Mirdasid Amirs, Shabib and Waththab, from Khalaf b. Mula‘ib and from the Munqidhi Amir of Shayzar; they complained against Muslim and offered Tutush their support if he would come to northern Syria and attempt to take it from Muslim. Tutush responded to the call and went to the region of Antioch, while those Chiefs who called on him assembled their forces and advanced towards Aleppo. After possessing Hamah they tried to capture Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man and after to continue towards Aleppo. This indicates
that there was a plan to capture Aleppo according to which Tutush would capture the north-west region of Aleppo and then advance on the city itself while the Arab Chiefs would capture the southern region and afterwards join Tutush at the walls of Aleppo where they would unite in an endeavour to gain possession of it.

This assumed plan was only partially carried out, for when Muslim received news of Tutush and his allies' activities he led his forces across the Euphrates aiming first at Aleppo and then at Damascus. This obliged Tutush and his allies to retreat to their own bases where they took defensive positions. In June, 1063, Muslim laid siege to Damascus, thus making the last and perhaps most important step towards the establishment of an Arabic kingdom comprising Syria and Upper Mesopotamia.

After he had besieged Damascus for about a month, Muslim failed to conquer it and was obliged to withdraw. The dominant reasons for his failure were:

a) The tribal composition of his army containing elements from his own 'Uqayli tribesmen in addition to large auxiliary forces from the tribes of Kilab and Numayr which, later was augmented by some members of the tribes of Tayy', Kalb and 'Ulaym. The only section of this army which was, to some extent, loyal to Muslim was that of the 'Uqaylids. The others had joined his army because he had obliged them
to do so or because they hoped to gain his favour and booty by his conquest of Damascus. It would be well to note here that, up to the time of this event, the number of the Turcomans who had entered Syria and settled there could not be estimated at more than 15,000. There were only a few Chiefs and every Chief, as we saw before, had 500 to 1,000 followers. The aggregate number of the Turcomans was therefore far less than any one of the Arab tribes who were inhabiting Syria and Upper Mesopotamia at that time. But, while the Arabs greatly outnumbered the Turcomans, their fighting capacity was greatly inferior. The Turcomans had the greater advantage in archery against which the Arabs were unable to compete and, more important still, the Turcomans possessed the fierce nomadic spirit which the Arabs had lost some centuries before. There is much evidence to support this, but perhaps the defeat of the tribe of Kilāb at the hands of Ahmad-Shāh which has already been mentioned and Muslim b. Quraysh's end, which will be dealt with later, are sufficient examples.

b) Tutush's resistance and successful counter-attack.

c) The broken promise of the Fatimid Caliphate to send assistance.

d) A rebellion which occurred against Muslim in Harrān was the reason for lifting the siege and final withdrawal.
He hastened northward to Harran and when he arrived there he stormed it and brutally slaughtered the rebels and many citizens alike. Harran's rebellion was chiefly prompted by religious emotion. It was led by the city's Kadi who, together with most of the city's population professed the Sunni doctrine. During their rebellion they called on Jubuq, one of the Turcoman Chiefs, who was at that time in the region, to come to their help against the heretic Muslim. 31

At this juncture a new Turcoman wave arrived in northern Syria and upper Mesopotamia. The most notable Chiefs in this wave were Jubuq and Artuq, in fact Artuq was the more important for, in the years following, he played a very effective part in dealing the final blow to the Arabic power in upper Mesopotamia, and also in the struggle for Syria amongst the Turcomans themselves.

At the time when the Saljuqs were laying the foundation of their empire and extending their control over the Muslim states, it was not only the Turcoman Chiefs who endeavoured to seize opportunity to establish principalities for themselves, but many members of the Muslim Bureaucracy did the same. Among these latter

was the family of Jahir whose head Muhammad b. Ahmad occupied the post of vizier in al-Muṣul, his native town. Also in Aleppo during Thīmāl’s reign, then in Noyyafariqin and eventually in Baghdad as the Vizier of the Abbasid Caliph al-Qā’im, then to his successor al-Muqtadī. Muhammad who was known as Fakhr al-Dawla, had established a very good relation with the celebrated Saljuq Vizier, Nizām al-Mulk. His son, Muhammad, known as ‘Amid al-Dawla, married two of the daughters of Nizām al-Mulk. By pressure from Nizām al-Mulk, ‘Amid al-Dawla succeeded his father as the Caliph’s Vizier and held that post until he was finally dismissed on Friday, 25th Safar, 476 A.H./14th July, 1083 A.D. Upon this the whole family of Jahir left Baghdad and went to Isfahan where they were met and welcomed by both Nizām al-Mulk and the Sultan Malik-Shāh. In October of the same year the Sultan commissioned Fakhr al-Dawla to lead an army towards Mesopotamia for the capture of Diyar-Bakr and the abolishment of the Marwānid dynasty. Aq-Sunqur, the first Saljuq ruler of Aleppo whose reign will be discussed later, was the officer charged with the military affairs of this army. In Mesopotamia the news of this army called for a pact and temporary cessation of hostilities between Muslim b. Quraysh and the Marwānids. As a price for his assistance the Marwānids yielded to Muslim the town of Amid. Muslim’s army was assembled near Amid and prepared to encounter that of Fakhr al-Dawla. Fakhr al-Dawla informed the Sultan of the situation and asked for reinforcements.
Upon this, the Sultan sent an instruction to Artuq to lead his fellow-Turcomans and to join forces with Fakhr al-Dawla. To avoid a clash with Muslim or rather, as some chroniclers relate, to avoid the Arabs' power being destroyed by his hand, Fakhr al-Dawla communicated with Muslim and persuaded him to withdraw. Artuq was apparently contented with this arrangement but the rank and file of the Turcomans would not consent to forego the spoils of war, therefore, while negotiation concerning the withdrawal was in process, they made a sudden attack on Muslim's troops, routed them, took a great number of the Chiefs together with many men and women of the tribe of 'Uqayl into captivity, seized the property of 'Uqayl and obliged Muslim to entrench himself behind the walls of Amid. Fakhr al-Dawla informed the Sultan of what had occurred and ordered Artuq to besiege Amid and to keep vigilant watch on Muslim to prevent his escape.

In Isfahan, on hearing the news, the Sultan prematurely considered Syria and upper Mesopotamia already in his hands and, in order to consolidate and exploit the victory of Amid, he led his forces toward al-Moṣul which he occupied. IN Amid, at a high price, Muslim induced Artuq - who preferred his own interest to that of the Sultan - to facilitate his escape. On his way to al-Moṣul, the Sultan Malik-Shāh learned that on Sunday, 27th July, 1084 A.D. Muslim had escaped and afterwards, in al-Moṣul, he was informed that his brother Tekish was leading a rebellion against him in
Khurasān. These two events, especially the latter, obliged the Sultan to seek a settlement with Muslim. He sent Nizām al-Mulk's son to al-Rakah where he met Muslim and arranged a settlement. Accordingly Muslim came to al-Mogul, paid homage to the Sultan and proffered him a sum of money, how much is not known, and a number of horses together with some valuable objects. Afterwards the Sultan departed from al-Mogul and thus, in spite of his severe defeat, Muslim did not lose any part of his dominions.32

Despite his settlement with the Sultan, Muslim was unable to restore his power and recover from the severe blow he suffered at Amid. When he escaped from Amid, Muslim sent his uncle, Muqbil b. Badrān, to Cairo as an envoy. The mission of Muqbil was to meet Badr al-Jamālī and to try to form a pact between Muslim and the Fātimid Caliphate. According to Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, Muqbil informed the authorities of Cairo that Muslim was ready to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Fātimid Caliph and to secure for him Syria, Mesopotamia and Iraq if they would supply him with the necessary aid. Sibṭ also relates that Artuq, who feared that retaliation would follow from the Sultan on account of Muslim's escape from Amid, was from the beginning involved in Muslim's plan, and both of them

32 Ibn Abī'l-Hayża', 132r.; Al-'Aqīmī, 185v.; Al-Muntazam, IX, 7, 14; Al-Kamīl, X, 83, 86-88; Al-Bundārī, 69-71; Zubda, II, 84-86; Bar Hebraeus, 228; Mufarrīj, I, 11-14; Mir at. Sevim, 223-229; Al-Bustān, 92r.; Al-Mukhtasar, 204-205, 209; Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 12v.-13r., 165v.; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 124, 126; Al-Rawdatān, I, 59; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 573-575.
hoped that Tutush would join forces with them. Prior to the
time of this plan, however, Tutush had contacted Cairo and, in
1083, he was to marry Badr al-Jamālī's daughter.33

Muslim's plan, however, was too late to help him to recover
from his plight and the Fāṭimid Caliphate was unable to supply
him with any effective aid. Not long after the escape of Muslim
from Amid, Antioch was captured by the Saljuq Chief, Sulaymān b.
Qutulmush.34 The capture of Antioch was another blow to Muslim's
regime for it brought a positive threat to his position in Aleppo.
Sulaymān began to extend his control over the region of Aleppo
in preparation to seizing Aleppo itself. Many of the Mirāsids
and their followers, together with some of Muslim's own troops,
deserted him and rallied to Sulaymān.

Facing this drastic situation Muslim collected an army,
crossed the Euphrates and arrived at Aleppo. Muslim's army upon
which he depended for the inevitable clash with Sulaymān was formed
of tribal troops and the Turcoman followers Jubuq. After he
arrived at Aleppo Muslim made a raid on Antioch territory and
plundered it. In turn, as an act of retaliation, Sulaymān made
a similar raid on the region of Aleppo. According to the chroniclers

33Zubda, II, 84-85; Mir'ât, Sevim, 224, 245-246.

34For details of this capture see Al-'Azīmī, 183r.; 185v.; Ibn Abī'l-Hayrāj, 132r.; Zubda, II, 86-88; Bar Hebraeus, 229;
Mufarrīj, I, 14; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 205; Al-Maqrīzī, 75v; Ibn Kathir, XI, 126; Al-Nujūm, V, 124; Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 13r.
the peasants who suffered from this raid complained to Sulaymān and he returned most of their property. He justified his action by affirming that it was not in his nature to pillage the Muslims, but that Muslim b. Quraysh's action had forced him to retaliate.

Muslim gave as a reason for his raid Sulaymān's non-compliance with his demands. Prior to the capture of Antioch by Sulaymān the Byzantine authority of the town had paid Muslim an annual sum of money as tribute. When he came to Aleppo, Muslim demanded that Sulaymān should continue to pay him the same amount and Sulaymān had refused the demand saying that the Byzantine Christians were compelled to pay a poll tax, but "I am, thanks to Allah, a Believer and do not pay poll tax".

Muslim was advised to avoid a struggle with Sulaymān who was not on good terms with the Sultan and to find a way for reconciliation. Muslim, however, refused the advice and decided to invade Antioch and to take it by force. He led his troops, which were about 6,000, and marched on Antioch and was intercepted by Sulaymān who had an army of about 4,000 horsemen. By the small river running near 'Afrīn, at a place called Qarzāhil, and in the late afternoon of Saturday, 24th Safar, 478 A.H./21st June, 1085 A.D., the two armies engaged in combat. The eyes of Muslim's troops were dazzled by the brilliant rays of the sun, which they faced. Almost at the beginning of the engagement most of Muslim's tribesmen fled and Jubuq fellow-Turcomans defected to Sulaymān. When he found
that most of his troops had deserted him. Muslim tried to escape to Aleppo. Six hundred of Aleppo Aḥdāth were in his army and loyally endeavoured to cover his escape. Four hundred of them mainly paid for this with their lives and Muslim received a blow which ended his own life.  

The death of Muslim marked the end of a period during which the struggle for Aleppo was between the Arab Bedouins and the Turco-man nomads. From that time the Arab Bedouins were almost obliterated from the political scene and the struggle for Aleppo became one between the Turcomans.

When Muslim had captured Aleppo it was the city's Aḥdāth which had opened the gates to his troops and surrendered it to him. The Chief of the Aḥdāth at that time was al-Sharīf Ḥasan b. Hibat-Allāh al-Ḥutayti. Al-Ḥutayti was the actual ruler of the city of Aleppo during Muslim's reign. It would appear that the number of the Aḥdāth at this period had increased as we are informed that six hundred of them were in Muslim's army. During Muslim's reign his cousin Ṣālim b. Malik was governor of the citadel of Aleppo, but after his death the fate of Aleppo rested in the hands of al-Ḥutayti.

35 Al-ʿAzīmī, 185v.; Ibn Abīl-Hayyajāʾ, 132r.; Ibn Al-ʿAmyād, 568-569; Al-Kāmil, X, 90-91; Al-Bahir, 6; Zubda, II, 88-92; Mir'at, Sevim, 229-230, 234; Bar Hebraeus, 229-230; Mufarrīj, I, 15; Ibn Abīl-Dam, 135r.; Al-Busta, 92r.; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 205; Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 13r.v., 46v., 165v.; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 575-575; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 126; Al-Nujum, V, 119.
After his victory Sulaymān b. Qutulmush brought the body of Muslim and threw it at the gate of Aleppo hoping that the city would soon surrender to him. Al-Ḥutaytī refused to surrender it and Sulaymān began to besiege it. During the siege, al-Ḥutaytī sent a message to the Sultan Malik-Shāh informing him of the situation in Aleppo and calling on him to come to Aleppo and take direct control of it.

Meanwhile to secure his position in Aleppo, al-Ḥutaytī, who had no control over the citadel, built a second citadel in the southern part of the city for himself and his followers. The site of this citadel still retains its original name of Qal‘at al-Sharīf (i.e. the citadel of the Sharif).

Sulaymān did not give his entire attention to the siege but busied himself in capturing Kafar-Ṭab, Laṭmīn and Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘mān. To be near Aleppo and in constant observation of it he restored part of the town of Qinassrin and made it a base for his activities.

In Khūrāsān the Sultan Malik-Shāh responded to al-Ḥutaytī’s call and moved towards Aleppo. His progress was, however, slow and the anxious al-Ḥutaytī became impatient and called on Tutush, Malik-Shāh’s brother, to come to Aleppo and take possession of it.

In Damascus Tutush, who had previously been joined by Artuq and his followers, was delighted with the call; he mustered
his troops together with those of Artuq and in Muharram, 479 A.H./ April 1085 A.D., marched northward to Aleppo. Before approaching it, Tutush was intercepted by Sulayman and his army who endeavoured to prevent him from reaching Aleppo. The two Saljuq armies engaged in conflict which ended in victory for Tutush and the death of Sulayman. This battle, which took place almost a year after the death of Muslim b. Quraysh,\(^{36}\) inaugurated a new era in the history of Aleppo. It is important not only because it was the first conflict among the Saljuqs for Aleppo, but also because, for the first time in its history, Aleppo was placed under direct Saljuq rule. This rule had a significant value for, as we shall see, it caused fundamental changes in the political and social life of the inhabitants of northern Syria.

After his victory over Sulayman, Tutush came to Aleppo hoping that on his arrival the gates of the city would be opened to him and that he would become its sole ruler. To his surprise, when Tutush reached Aleppo, he found the gates not only closed but guarded and that al-Ḥutayti refused to yield the city to him on the grounds that he received a communication from the Sultan informing him of his imminent arrival. As a result of this Tutush began to besiege Aleppo but it was a very short siege, for on Saturday 26th

\(^{36}\) Al-‘Azīmī, 185v.; Ibn Abī’l-Hay ja’, 133r.; Ibn al-‘Āmid, 569-571; Al-Kāmil, X, 96-97; Al-Bahir, 7; Dughya, A., VII, 197r.v., 198v.; Zubda, II, 94-98; Mīr al, Sevim, 236-239, 234; Ibn Abī’l-Dam, 135r.; Bar Hebraeus, 230; Mufarrij, I, 15-16; Al-Bustān, 92r.; Al-Mukhtagar, I, 206-207; Al-Durrā, 423; Al-Nujūm, V, 124; Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 14v.; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 130; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 589; Al-Durr, 35.
Rabi' al-Awal, 479 A.H./11th July, 1086 A.D. a group of the Aleppines who disliked al-Ḥutaytī opened one of the city's gates and enabled Tutush to become its possessor.

When Tutush took possession of Aleppo, al-Ḥutaytī, together with some of his fellow Abdāth, entrenched themselves in his citadel - Qal'at al-Šarīf - and refused to surrender. Meanwhile the great citadel also refused to surrender, for its governor Salim b. Malik proclaimed that he would not yield it to anyone except the Sultan himself. Before long al-Ḥutaytī ended his resistance and surrendered himself after receiving safe conduct from Tutush. For a month Tutush besieged the great citadel but, when he learnt that the vanguard of his brother's army had arrived in the vicinity of Aleppo he lifted the siege and withdrew towards Damascus, thus avoiding a clash with his brother. It is worthy of mention here that after al-Ḥutaytī had surrendered himself to Tutush he was exiled to Jerusalem and never allowed to return to Aleppo.37

A large division of Malik-Shāh's army reached Aleppo before the Sultan himself. This division was headed by three Chiefs, Bur-suq, Iyāz and Buzān. On the 3rd December, 1086 A.D., Malik-Shāh arrived at Aleppo and took possession of it and its citadel. By way of compensation for the citadel of Aleppo he conferred on Salim b. Malik, Qal'at-Ja'bar, as an iqṭā'. He also granted

37 Ibn Abi 'l-Hayā'jā', 133r.; Ibn al-'Āmid, 507-571; Al-Kāmil, X, 96-97; Bughya, A., VII, 197v., 198r.v.; Zubda, II, 98-99; Mir'at, Sevim, 239; Mufarrij, I, 16-17; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 207; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 589.
Muhammad b. Muslim b. Quraysh, who was his paternal cousin, al-Raḥba, al-Raqqa, Ḥarrāz, Shrūj and al-Khabur as iqṭaʾs, and allowed him to marry his (i.e. Malik-Shah's) sister. This grant was a partial revival of the heritage of Muslim b. Quraysh, but meanwhile it was given at the expense of the state of Aleppo, for it deprived this state of its Mesopotamian territory. It also indicates that the tribe of Kilāb lost its footing and traditional power in this territory.38

The Sultan spent a few days in Aleppo and went from there to Antioch, where he also remained for a few days. Before returning to Aleppo he appointed one of his officers, Yaghi-Siyyān, as Governor of Antioch. In Aleppo, Malik-Shah celebrated ‘Īd al-Fiṭr (8th January, 1087 A.D.) then departed and went eastward to Khurāsān. While he was in Aleppo, Malik-Shāh received a communication from Naqr b. ‘Alī, the Munqidhi Amir of Shayzar, offering allegiance and relinquishing to him Latakia, Afamy and Kafar-Ṭab. Before he left Aleppo, Malik-Shāh appointed a certain Nuḥ al-Turki as governor of the citadel of Aleppo and Aq-Sunqur as ruler of the state of Aleppo. He conferred on Aq-Sunqur the title of Qasim al-Dawla and left with him a garrison of 4,000 horsemen. On his way back, Malik-Shāh appointed another of his officers, Buzār, as governor of

38 Al-Kāmil, X, 105; Al-Bahir, 8; Al-ʿAzīmī, 186v.; Zubda, II, 100-101; Dughyā, A., VII, 198r.v.; Nufarrīj, I, 18; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 207-208; Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 15v.; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 590; Ibn Kathir, XI, 131; Al-Bustān, 92r.
the town of Edessa.\footnote{Al-ʿAẓīmī, 186v.; Ibn Abī l-Hayājā', 133r.; Al-Ḥamīl, X, 98, 107; Al-Bahīr, 8; Duhāya, A., III, 267v., 268v., 272r.; Zubda, II, 101-102; Mirʿat, Sevim, 240-241; Mufarrīj, I, 18-19; Bar Hebraeus, 231; Al-Dhahabī, OR 50, 14v.; Ibn Abī l-Damnā, 136v.; Al-Bustān, 92r.; Al-Mansūrī, 75r.; Al-Mukhtaṣarī, I, 207; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 130-131; Ibn Khaldūn, IV, 590; Al-Rawdatānī, I, 61.}

Malik-Shāh's campaign was the second major military expedition led against northern Syria by a Saljuq Sultan. In his expedition Malik-Shāh followed the same route as his father, but by possessing Edessa, Aleppo and Antioch, he accomplished what his father had failed to do, and brought the Saljuq Empire to its zenith. In fact, the two campaigns of Malik-Shāh and his father together with that of Ibn Jahīr were rather more than military expeditions. They were actually influxes of Turcoman migrants. It was the campaign of Alp-Arslan which brought to Syria Atsiz, Tutush and Afschīn together with their followers. Similarly the campaign of Ibn Jahīr opened the way for Jubuq and Artuq together with their fellow Turcomans to enter Syria and the campaign of Malik-Shāh left behind it Buzān, Yaghi-Siyan and Aq-Sunqur together with their followers.

The reign of Aq-Sunqur in Aleppo lasted for almost seven years. It was an important period in the history of Aleppo for it created fundamental changes covering every aspect of its life. In the account of the chroniclers of this period Aq-Sunqur is most conspicuous and highly praised not because he was Zanki's father and Nur al-Dīn Maḥmūd's grandfather but because he brought stability
and security to Aleppo whose population, for many years, had suffered from insecurity and political uncertainty. During Aq-Sunqur's reign, Al-ʻAzīmī says, everything became plentiful and cheap.

He loved the Aleppines and looked after their interests and they, in turn, loved and respected him. Al-ʻAzīmī goes on to say that he observed the rule of justice and revived the law of Islam and by his order the minaret of the Great Mosque of Aleppo and two Nashhads were erected.

Aq-Sunqur was the first Saljuq ruler of Aleppo to assume the place of its Arabic-Bedouin Amir. Whereas Aq-Sunqur's influence penetrated deeply into every aspect of the life of Aleppo, that of the former Arabic Amirs had been little more than a shadow. The Arabic rulers had lived in the citadel of Aleppo and, save for taxation, perhaps had made but little impact on the Aleppines. On the contrary, Aq-Sunqur imposed himself on all - even into the minor - affairs of the state. During the Arabic period the Amir of Aleppo remained as a tribal chief whose duty was only to defend his tribe and his post from all intruders. Aq-Sunqur's behaviour was entirely different from that of his Arabic predecessors. He turned most of his attention to the life of Aleppo and its people and frequently interfered with the details of everyday life. He personally in-

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40 Al-Kāmil, X, 107; Al-Bāhir, 8; Zubda, II, 102-103; Bughiya, A., III, 267v.-268r.v., 272r.; Mufarrij, I, 19; Nīrāt, Sevim, 244.
spected everything, even enquiring from a peasant the reason for not leaving his plough in the field during the night.

He had previously ordained that no-one in his dominion should fear any loss of property; any thief or offender would be dealt with drastically; any caravan suffering loss while passing through city or village must be reimbursed by the inhabitants. He expected his orders to be implicitly obeyed. For this purpose he himself carried out the inspection which enforced obedience. The conclusion of the incident referred to above emphasises this point and indicates the method by which he was able to interfere in the lives of his subjects. The peasant's reply was that his plough was removed not from fear of theft but for fear that a wandering jackal might devour its leather straps. Aq-Sunqur, who could not tolerate disobedience from wild animals, decreed that all jackals be immediately exterminated. Needless to say, the order was effectively carried out, for Ibn al-ʿAdīm reports later in the thirteenth century that, as a result of this, there were no jackals in the state of Allocco.\(^4\)

Aq-Sunqur's general behaviour was that of an autocrat. He had been trained and had lived in the court of the Saljuq Sultan in Persia and there his conception of government was formulated. The traditional rule of this court was autocratic and emanated

\(^4\)Zubda, II, 104-105; Baghya, III, 268r.v.
from Turkish origin which was largely influenced by the tradition of Muslim Persia. It was a new experiment in Aleppo whose people were accustomed chiefly to the Bedouin way of rule. During the Arab period, as we saw, the Amir of Aleppo depended chiefly on his tribesmen and his state therefore was a tribal one (see ch. II, pp. 63-82). It remained without change, because the Mirdasid rule was spasmodically interrupted. The term of each Mirdasid Amir was too short to give opportunity for any effective change.

In the Mirdasid tribal state and during the 'Uqaylid period the chieftains of the tribes were the outstanding figures of the state. They played a vital role in the political life of the emirate and impressed it with their own character and customs. The undisciplined chiefs together with their own fellow tribesmen preferred instability and had their own standards of loyalty which were volatile and fluctuated between various contestants for power. By this behaviour it was possible for internal groups to flourish and to exercise their influence over the affairs of the state. In addition it opened the way to alien groups, such as the Turcomans, to infiltrate into their state and finally to usurp it.

Under this somewhat loose and though not autocratic rule it was sufficiently liberal for people with free minds, such as Abu 'l-'Alā' al-Ma'arri to live and teach their philosophy. There is no doubt that if Abu 'l-'Alā' had lived during the Saljuq's reign in which al-Ash'arī was cursed from the pulpits he would have

42Al-‘Azīmī, 177v.; Al-Nujūm, V, 54-55; al-Rawdātānī, I, 58.
been executed. The collapse of the Arabic regime put an end to the progress of its culture. After the Turcoman autocrats had replaced the Amirs, there were no more poets such as Abu 'l-
'Ala' al-Ma'arrī, Ibn Hayyūs, Ibn Sinān al-Khafajī or Ibn Abī Ḥasanān, etc.

The rule of these autocrats depended on semi-professional troops, thus the Turcoman rule was a military one. Aq-Sunqur was one of the Sultan's officers and, as has been previously mentioned, when he was appointed he commanded 4,000 horsemen. At a later period under this type of regime, the officers of the army became the most powerful figures of the state and their ambition brought about changes in the political scene. To exemplify this, Zanki and Saladin were officers and caused political changes and established new dynasties.

After the manner of the autocrats, who allow no power but their own, from the time when Aleppo was conquered by the Saljuqs, the power of the Āḥdath diminished and finally vanished. Autocratic government invariably acquires wealth in order to satisfy its own desire and to maintain its troops. Aq-Sunqur had raised the sum of 1,500 dinars every day from Aleppo's city market and, when in 1091 A.D. he arrived at the court of the Sultan who was then holding a celebration near Baghdad, his (i.e. Aq-Sunqur's) pomp and magnificent procession were incomparable.43

43. Al-Kāmil, X, 133-134; Al-Bahir, 8; Al-Bundarī, 75; Mufarrij, I, 19; Bughyā, A., III, 269r.
The autocratic rulers make a pretence of being interested in the welfare of their subjects and appear as pious rulers who fight heretics and cherish orthodoxy. It is mentioned above that the chroniclers relate that Aq-Sunqur revived the law of Islam and built the minaret of the Great Mosque together with two Mashhads. In later periods this policy was developed and many new mosques and shrines were erected. It was also accompanied by the prompting of religious men thus promulgating a new social strata which developed an effective power.

In the history of Syria there has always been a rivalry or rather struggle for supremacy between south and north. During the eleventh century Damascus remained the centre of the south and Aleppo that of the north and as a result of this these two cities were the focus of this struggle. The controversy between them was social, economical and frequently political. Prior to the Saljuq's conquest the Fatimid rulers of Damascus attempted to, and on some occasions succeeded in, extending their control over Aleppo. After the Saljuq conquest the struggle between Damascus and Aleppo continued. The most important events which occurred during Aq-Sunqur's reign in Aleppo were the outcome of his relation with Tutush, either during the life of Malik-Shah or after his death. The significance of this relation, as we shall see later in detail, was the victory of Tutush and the death of Aq-Sunqur.
Although after the death of Aq-Sunqur Tutush became the lord of Aleppo, the struggle between Aleppo and Damascus did not cease. Shortly after he became the lord of Aleppo, Tutush was killed. His son Ruğwân succeeded him in Aleppo and Duqaq, his other son, in Damascus. Ruğwân was not on good terms with his brother. The history of his reign is more concerned with the twelfth century, its assassins and crusaders, rather than with the history of the eleventh century. Tutush lost his life in Persia far from Aleppo and this occurred during his struggle to succeed his brother as the Sultan of the Saljuq Empire. Because of this the discussion will end with the death of Aq-Sunqur.

Since he became the lord of Damascus Tutush had endeavoured to extend his control over the important cities of the Levant. There he was met with local opposition and Fātimid resistance. According to Sibt b. al-Jawzi, in 480 A.H./1087 A.D. Tutush appealed to his brother Malik-Shāh for help and Malik-Shāh instructed Aq-Sunqur and Buzañ, the governor of Edessa, to supply Tutush with the needed assistance. In 482 A.H./1089 A.D. a Fātimid army succeeded in capturing the towns of Tyre, Sidon, Jubayyl and Acre. This army besieged the town of Ba’albak and there, during the siege, Khalaf b. Mula’īb, the ruler of Ḫim and Ḥamya met its leader and formally acknowledged the suzerainty of the Fātimid Caliph. During

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44 For the death of Tutush and the succession of Ruğwân, see al-ʿAẓimī, 168v.; Ibn Abī l-Hayjaʿ, 134v.; Al-Kamil, X, 166-167; Ibn al-ʿAmid, 575-577; Zubda, II, 119-120; Bughya, A., VI,
its expedition the Fatimid army seized some of Tutush's property. As a result of this Tutush repeated his appeal and Aq-Sunqur and Buzan together with Yaghi-Siyân received an order from Malik-Shah to join their forces with those of Tutush, to take punitive action against Ibn Mula'ib and to attempt to wrest all the Fatimid property in Syria.

The leadership of these joint forces was assigned by Malik-Shah to Tutush. It would appear that Aq-Sunqur and Buzan reluctantly accepted this. They did not like Tutush's leadership for personal reasons, for everything they gained went to Tutush. Their reluctance undermined Tutush's plan and gave it only partial success. The reasons for taking punitive action against Ibn Mula'ib were not only because of his allegiance to the Fatimids but also because he was a brigand, practising highway robbery.

In 1090 A.D. the forces of Buzan, Aq-Sunqur, Yaghi-Siyân and Tutush joined at Himis and succeeded in capturing it from Ibn Mula'ib and in taking him prisoner. The rulership of Himis was bestowed on Tutush and Ibn Mula'ib was put in an iron cage and sent

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46 Mir'at, A., Annals, 486-486H; Al-Masudi, 75v; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 216-217; Al-Nujum, V, 155.

45 Mir'at, Sevin, 244; Al-Kamil, X, 78-94; Ibn Abi'l-Dam, 134r., 136v; Al-Bustan, 91v.; Al-Masudi, 75r.; Al-Nujum, V, 111, 113, 116, 125.

44 Al-Kamil, X, 116, 117; Ibn Muyassar, II, 28; Mir'at, A., Annals, 482H; Al-Dhahabi, OR. 50, 17r.; Al-Nujum, V, 126.
and sent to the Sultan.

In the accounts of the chroniclers it is not clear what was the next step taken by Tutush and his co-leaders. We have been informed that in 1091 A.D. the city of Tripoli was besieged by them and Afāmya was captured by Aq-Sunqur. It is not certain whether, after the capture of Ḫimṣ, each of them returned to his own territory or whether they proceeded to Tripoli. Presumably it was to Tripoli, which Tutush desired to wrest for himself. Ibn al-

'Adim relates that, after Ḫimṣ had been captured, it came under the control of Aq-Sunqur who by the Sultan's order reluctantly relinquished it to Tutush. When they arrived at Tripoli they began to besiege it, but Aq-Sunqur - who did not wish to see Tutush annex Tripoli to his state - worked for an opportunity to prevent his success. In Tripoli, Ibn 'Ammār, its ruler, protested against the siege and produced documents signed by the Sultan conferring on him the rulership of Tripoli. Meanwhile Ibn 'Ammār, who seemed to be aware of Aq-Sunqur's attitude towards Tutush, offered Aq-Sunqur the sum of 30,000 dinars if he would help him. Upon this Aq-Sunqur told Tutush that by besieging Tripoli they were disobeying the Sultan.

A quarrel arose between them and Aq-Sunqur withdrew his forces and went back towards Aleppo, thus obliging Tutush - who was unable to carry the siege alone - to lift it and withdraw to Damascus. 48 Apparently, on his way to Aleppo in September

48 Al-Kāmil, X, 136-137; Zubda, II, 106; Mir'āt, A., Annals, 484H; Mufarrij, I, 22; Al-Nujum, V, 132.
of the same year, 1091 A.D., Aq-Sunqur captured Afamyə, which was a part of Ibn Mula'i'd's heritage. After capturing it Aq-Sunqur entrusted its rule to Naṣr b. 'Alî, the Munqidhi ruler of Shayzar. This suggests that the relation between Aq-Sunqur and this Amir was good. The relationship between them, however, was not always good for in 1088 A.D. Aq-Sunqur made an unsuccessful attempt to capture Shayzar. It would appear that Aq-Sunqur passed Afamyə to the Munqidhi to prevent Tutush from possessing it and meanwhile to avoid any pretext by which Tutush could make complaint to the Sultan.

The Sultan Malik-Shah summoned to his presence all the governors of Syria and Mesopotamia. On the 28th Ramadan, 484 A.H./13th November, 1091 A.D., Malik-Shah arrived at Baghdad and there he remained for a few months celebrating, parading his forces and receiving his appointed governors. At the court of Malik-Shah, Tutush lost his case against Aq-Sunqur because the Sultan did not credit his accusation. The Munqidhi chroniclers 'Alî b. Murşid Ibn al-Athîr and Sibt b. al-Jawzi relate this, but Sibt comments that it is difficult to credit that Tutush made the journey to his brother's court. Sibt gives evidence for his doubt. When Malik-Shah had come to Aleppo Tutush avoided him and went to Damascus without paying respect to him. Neither Al-'Imad al-Iṣfahānī nor Ibn Ṭasīl mention the name of Tutush among those who came to the presence of the Sultan. Al-'Imad only cites

49Al-ʿĀqīmī, 137v.; Al-Kāmil, X, 111; Bughya, A., III, 272r.;
the names of Aq-Sunqur and Buzān. He does not mention the dispute between Aq-Sunqur and Tutush, but he as well as Ibn Wāṣil and other chroniclers relate that Malik-Shāh authorised Tutush to conquer Egypt's property in Syria and for this purpose he ordered Aq-Sunqur to join forces with him and to be under his command. The capture of Ḫims has already been spoken of and that Malik-Shāh conferred its rulership upon Tutush. The appointment of Tutush as leader together with the grant of Ḫims infers that, after Malik-Shāh had left Aleppo, Tutush made a reconciliation with him. If this were so there is no reason to disbelieve that Tutush actually made the journey to Baghdad and presented his case to his brother. In 1094 A.D., as we shall see in detail, Tutush executed in cold blood and by his own hands Aq-Sunqur whom he hated. The Munqidhi chronicler ‘Alī b. Murshid relates that when Tutush was presenting his complaint to the Sultan, Aq-Sunqur accused him of lying and having evil designs against his brother. As a result of this Tutush not only lost his case but before he left for Damascus he was obliged to leave one of his sons as hostage in the court of the Sultan. Shortly after Tutush had left, the Sultan gave leave to Aq-Sunqur, who returned to his

V, 221v.−222r.; Zubda, II, 105-106; Mīrāṭ, A., Annals, 461, 464H; Mufarrij, I, 19-21; Al-Mukhtasar, I, 208; Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 16r.; Al-Mujāhid, V, 132.
post in Aleppo more firmly established. 50

The relation between them developed further, not as a direct result of what had happened in Baghdad, but because on the 29th November 1092 A.D., the Sultan Malik-Shah died. 51 Malik-Shah died at the age of thirty eight years and he left a number of sons none of whom were old enough to rule in his place. A struggle broke out among the Saljuqs for his succession. During this struggle, Aq-Sunqur and Buzan shared the same opinion and stood by each other through the changing political scene. Their allegiance fluctuated between the struggling parties of the Saljuqs until fate overtook them both. Ibn al-'Adim relates that after Malik-Shah had died Aq-Sunqur acknowledged the Sultanate of Mahmud, Malik-Shah's younger son. 52

When Tutush was informed of his brother's death he proclaimed himself as his successor and to consolidate this he recruited a large army. In Aleppo Aq-Sunqur realised the significance of Tutush's move and also learned that the sons of Malik-Shah were fighting each other for succession. He found himself unable to

50 Al-Kamil, X, 133-134; Al-Bahir, 8; Bughya, A., III, 269r.; Mir'at, A., Annals, 485H; Al-Bundari, 65-66, 75; Mufarrij, I, 19; Al-Nujum, V, 133.

51 Al-Bahir, 10; Al-Bundari, 64, 75; Zubda, II, 106; Bar Hebraeus, 231-232; Mufarrij, I, 23; Al-Rawdatain, I, 65.

52 Zubda, II, 106.
resist Tutush and therefore reluctantly acknowledged his claim. In 1093 A.D., probably in February of that year, Tutush passed by Aleppo aiming at Khurāsān and was joined by Aq-Sunqur, Yağhi-Siyan and Buzān. On their way they captured al-Raḥba and Muṣaybin.

In the region of al-Mogul they were faced by an ‘Uqaylid army of 30,000 warriors led by Ibrāhīm b. Quraysh who had assumed power in al-Mogul after the death of his brother Muslim. The Turkish army, which consisted of 10,000 warriors, was by the efforts of Aq-Sunqur able to inflict a severe defeat on the ‘Uqaylids. The battlefield which lay a few miles from al-Mogul was known as Muṣayya and there a great number of the ‘Uqaylids, including their Amir, lost their lives and property.

This victory enhanced the position of Tutush and gave him the mastery over the whole of Mesopotamia. He wrote to the Caliph of Baghdad demanding that he should proclaim him as Sultan. The Caliph refused to do so and said that could only be when Tutush had acquired Persia and the consent of all the Saljuqs. Tutush therefore proceeded towards Persia but when he arrived at the city of Tabriz, Aq-Sunqur and Buzān together with their followers deserted him.

They went to the city of al-Ray – near modern Teheran – where they joined Barkyāruq, son of Malik-Shāh, who had assumed succession to his father, Malik-Shāh. They helped Barkyāruq to strengthen his position and when they asked his leave to return to their own territories he accompanied them to al-Raḥba.
There Barkyāruq was able to make a pact between them and ‘Abd b. Muslim b. Quraysh who became the outstanding Amir in the tribe of ‘Uqayl after the death of his uncle Ibrahim. From al-Raḥba Aq-Sunqur, accompanied by his own men, and escorted by some of the ‘Uqayli tribesmen together with some of Barkyāruq's troops proceeded to Aleppo which he reached in November of the same year.

The desertion of Al-Sunqur and Buzān was a severe setback to Tutush's plans. He was obliged to leave Persia and to return to Syria. He first went with Yaghi-Siyān to Antioch and there he spent the winter of 1093 A.D. Afterwards he went to Damascus where he raised a large army and made preparation to resume his bid for the Sultanate. In Aleppo, Aq-Sunqur also made counter-preparations and aimed at preventing Tutush from departing from Syria or perhaps capturing Damascus from him. He received as reinforcements Buzān, the governor of Edessa, Karbugha, the governor of Al-Moṣul, Yosuf b. ʿAbīq, the governor of Al-Raḥba, together with their troops which comprised 2,500 horsemen.

He also recruited a great number from the tribe of Kilāb.

It is noteworthy that Tutush gathered most of his recruits from

among the Bedouin tribes, especially from Kilāb. It would appear that after the fall of their dynasty, the Mirdāsids lost most of their control over the tribe of Kilāb. During Aq-Sunqur's reign the bulk of the tribe was under the leadership of Shībl. b. Jāmi' and seemed to dwell mostly in the south-western region of Aleppo. The remaining part of the tribe was led by the Mirdāsid Amir, Wath̲th̲āb b. Māhāmūd, who entered the service of Tutush.

On the whole, the relation between Aq-Sunqur and the tribe of Kilāb was not good. Aq-Sunqur was obliged to recruit the Kilābīs in his army because the number of his Turkish troops was insufficient, and he did not receive from Barkyāruq any further reinforcements; also because Kilāb was the best, if not the only source of recruitment in northern Syria. He was aware of their attitude towards him and always suspected their loyalty.

For similar reasons Tutush left Damascus and marched northward. At Ḫamāh he was joined by Yaqūt-Siyān together with his troops of Antioch. His plan was to go to Antioch first and probably to prepare the second stage of his campaign from there. Tutush was, however, intercepted by Aq-Sunqur who was at the head of an army consisting of more than 6,000 troops (according to some chroniclers, more than 30,000 troops). On either Thursday, 25th May or on Saturday, 26th, the army of Aq-Sunqur engaged that of Tutush at the stream of Sab'in which lay six parasanges to the east of Aleppo. There Aq-Sunqur lost the day
because he hastened the engagement without proper formation of his army.

His suspicion of the loyalty of the Kilābīs was the reason which caused his mismanagement of the fight and because of this, during the fight, not only the Kilābīs but most of his Turcomans fled and left him at the mercy of Tutush. Aq-Sunqur fell prisoner to Tutush and was brought to his presence. We are told by eye-witnesses that when Aq-Sunqur was brought before Tutush he asked him what he would do if he, Tutush, were his prisoner. Aq-Sunqur's dignified reply was "I would execute you". "The same sentence has been passed upon you" replied Tutush and thereupon carried it out by his own hand.

On the following day Tutush took possession of Aleppo and remained there for three days, then proceeded towards Persia where he met his fate.
"History we know now is not merely or even primarily past politics. It is also past economics, past society, past religion, past civilisation - in short, past everything."\(^1\)

Hitherto it was possible to depict, perhaps not fully, the past politics of the Emirate of Aleppo during the eleventh century. In turning the attention to the economic history of this emirate, we find it is impossible, for lack of sufficient or specific information, to write anything about it. As is well-known, the works of the Arabic geographers are a prime source of information concerning the economic history of the Muslim world. In the first volume of his book *Bughyat al-Talab*, Ibn al-'Adîm quotes almost every account given by all the Arabic geographers up to the thirteenth century, about the emirate of Aleppo.\(^2\) Some of these accounts, such as that of al-Ḥasan b. Ḍāhir al-Muhallabi, which he wrote in his book *al-Masâlik Wa'l-Mamâlik* (generally known as *Kitâb al-'Azîzî* because he dedicated it to the Fatimid Caliph al-'Azîz, 975-996 A.D.) have survived to reach us only from his quotations.\(^3\) Save for the

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\(^1\) S.T. Bindoff, 'Approaches to History, I'.

\(^2\) *Bughya*, AS., 29-397.

quotation from the itinerary of the Baghdadī Christian physician Ibn Baṭlān (al-Mukhtar b. al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbdūn) who, in 440 A.H./1048 A.D., had visited Aleppo and lived there for a short while, all the information given in the other quotations belong to periods before or after the eleventh century. Ibn Baṭlān's information is both inadequate and vague. All he says is "... and in it /al-Rāḥbā'/ countless kinds of fruits, and in it also nineteen kinds of grapes... and it /Aleppo/is a city which has little fruit and vegetables and wine except those which come from Byzantium..... and one of the wonders of Aleppo is that in the silk market /Qisāriyat al-Bazz/ there are twenty shops belonging to the agents /al-Wukalā'/ 20,000 dinars' worth of goods sold in them every day and this has been uninterrupted for twenty years".  

Ibn Baṭlān was not the only traveller who visited Aleppo during the eleventh century. Nasiri Khusraw also visited it in 1047 A.D., almost a year before Ibn Baṭlān. After describing the city he says "This city is a place where they levy the customs /on merchandise passing/between the land of Syria and al-Rūm /Byzantium/ and Diyār Bakr and Egypt and Iraq and there come merchants and traders from out all these lands to Aleppo." and, after visiting Maʿarrat al-Nuʿmān he says "...

4 Bugḥiyā, AS., 117; see also Al-Qīftī, 295-296; Yaʿqūt (Halab); Ibn ʿAbī Uṣaybiʿah, 1, 241.
I saw its markets which are many, teeming with life... there are also fig trees and olives and pistachios and almonds and grapes in plenty". This scanty information of both Ibn Baʿlān and Nāsirī Khusrau is not enough on which to build an economic history of Aleppo at that time. In addition the works of the chroniclers add very little or nothing to our knowledge. They merely mention that in 1031, 1032, 1033, 1056, 1057, 1066, 1076 A.D. Syria, including Aleppo, was affected either by dearth or pestilence as a result of drought, plagues, locusts or earthquakes.


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5 P.P.T.S., IV, 1-3; Taʾrif, 582; Safar-Noma (Al-Khashshāb), 10-11.

6 Al-Antakī, 272-272; Al-Kāmil, IX, 290, 298; XI, 95; Al-Huntazam, VIII, 246; Zubda, II, 10; Bar Hebraeus, 194, 209, 225-226, 230; Al-Bundari, 49; Al-Mujīm, V, 59; Ibn Kathīr, XI, 112; Al-Ibar, Dh., III, 218; Al-Durra, 369-370. In 359/970 an important treaty between Aleppo and Byzantium was formed. Ibn al-ʿAdīm gives full details of this treaty which contains valuable information concerning the economic relations between Aleppo and Byzantium during the latter part of the 10th century. It is hazardous to presume that similar conditions were extant during the 11th century because of political changes occurring during this century and for the lack of information, which is even more important. For this treaty, see Zubda, I, 163-168; A. Lewis, The Naval Power, 213; H.L. Adelson, Medieval Commerce, 55-56, 61-62, 143-144. For
of Tanukh and Quraysh. There is information that some of the non-Arabs were of Kurdish origin. Al-al-Khashshāb was one of the prominent families of Aleppo during the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries and it was of Kurdish descent.:

During the eleventh century (even before and after) Islam, Christianity and Judaism were the religions professed by the population of Aleppo. Because of this, it would, perhaps be more apt to classify the population of Aleppo as three major communities, Muslim Christian and Jewish.

Little or nothing is known of the Jewish community save that it inhabited a large section in the north-west of the city known as Maḥallāt al-Yahūd (i.e. the Jewish Quarter). Neither Ibn Bajlān nor Nasērī Khowârî mention this community, but the latter however mentions that the city had four gates and one of them was known as Bāb al-Yahūd (i.e. the Jewish Gate). Ibn al-‘Adīm says "... and this gate acquired its name because the Jewish quarter was immediately inside it and their cemetery lay outside the gate". The Jewish community, presumably, had

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7 Bughya, AS., 114.
9 Bughya, A., I, 18v.
10 P.P.T.S. IV, 2; Safar Nama (Al-Khashshāb), 11; Al-Qiftī, 295-296; Bughya, AS., 117; Yaḥūt (Qalab); Baron, III,
its social and religious organisation and participated in the commercial life of Aleppo and the Muslim world, especially the Fatimid State. The members of this community spoke an Arabic dialect of their own and used both Arabic and Hebrew languages and characters in their writings.11

There is more detailed information concerning both the Muslims and the Christians and the relations between them. Before dealing with this it is well to mention that the life of the Christians of northern Syria, together with their relation with Muslims was shaped by special circumstances. Since the seventh century northern Syria had been the battlefield for both Muslim and Christian power. Perpetual religious strife gave this region and its inhabitants special attributes and made its impression on the entire domestic life.

Southern Syria adopted Islam from comparatively early times and it was not long before the local Syrians and the Muslim conquerors integrated. This was not the case in northern Syria where the local Syrians, most of them were Christians, probably devout in their beliefs and resistant to every attempt to divert their faith, maintained a clear division between themselves and the Muslims. It is noticeable that there was always

104; V, 50, 311; VII, 247, 447; Jewish Encyclopaedia (Aleppo), . This gate retained its name until the reign of the Ayyubid al-Malik al-Zahir (1186-1216). He destroyed this gate and built in its place a new one named Bab al-Nasr (i.e. victory gate) which has been maintained until the present day. Bughya, AS., 110.

11 Zubda, I, 204; Mediterranean Society, I, 271, 294.
a large Christian community in northern Syria. This community remained large for several reasons among which was the struggle between the Byzantine Empire and the Muslim States. This struggle strengthened the Christians in their belief rather than subverted them from it. The Muslims who came to northern Syria (particularly before the 11th century) were, for the most part, troops devoted to their military commitments or nomadic tribes who held their religious beliefs somewhat loosely. The religious policies practised in both Byzantium and the Muslim world together with the lack of religious freedom and social security which often followed local disturbances or crises brought about the movement of many Christians to a country which they hoped would offer greater security. During the reign of al-Ḥakim (the Fākim Caliph 996-1021) and as a result of his religious policy of ill-treatment and humiliation of both Jews and Christians in Egypt and southern Syria, great numbers of Christians migrated to north and north-western Syria and Byzantium.  

Most of these Christians preferred north and north-western Syria rather than Byzantium because their beliefs did not coincide with the Byzantine Church.

There was always a large Armenian community in Aleppo and

12 Al-Antaki, 201, 204, 207, 221, 222; Al-Kamil, IX, 137; Bar Hebraeus, 185; Ibn al-Qalansī, 68; Mir'at, B.M. 195 r.v.; Akhbar, 63 r.; Al-'Ibar, Dh., III, 66-67.
its surroundings (see below) and this was, perhaps, due to the policy pursued by the Byzantine Empire or as a result of invasions. In more recent times the policy of the Ottomans (the successive empire) has caused more Armenians to join the community which had migrated to these regions for similar reasons to those during previous centuries.

During the eleventh century, a large portion of the Christian community lived in the city of Aleppo itself. There is no direct information concerning their proportion of the whole population of the city. Ibn Baqlan reports that there were two chapels and one mosque in the citadel and six churches and one mosque in the city. This indicates that the Christians were a considerable part of the entire population.\(^{13}\) It is noteworthy that the city's mosque mentioned by Ibn Baqlan had no minaret when he visited Aleppo. In a long list of names and

\(^{13}\) Al-Giftî, 295-296; Bughya, AS., 117; Yâqût (Halab). One of the city's churches was a large and famous cathedral built, according to the Arabic chroniclers, by Flavia Gulia Helena (248-327 A.D.; generally known as St. Helena, mother of the Emperor Constantine the Great). It remained the most venerated Christian temple in Aleppo until 518 A.H./1124 A.D., when a crusader army besieged the city. This army failed to capture Aleppo and, in revenge, exhumed the Muslim cemeteries. Muhammad Ibn Yalîya al Khashshab, the cadi of Aleppo at that time, made reprisal by taking possession of four of the six churches and converting them to Islamic mosques. Perhaps this is one of the many incidents which occurred at and after the coming of the crusaders and which show one reason why the power of the Christian Syrians dwindled. See Al-†a†aq, I, 31, 41, 45-46; Al-Durr, 81-83, 115; Zubda, II, 224.
a description of Aleppo's mosques presented by Ibn Shaddād we find only one more mosque named al-Ghadā'iri in addition to the one mentioned by Ibn Baṭlān. The erection of mosques began to spread in Aleppo after the Saljuq conquest (see ch. IV, p.236).

Some Christians also lived in Ma‘arrat al-‘Ummān and its surroundings. Some of their villages were distinguished by the prefix "Kafar" (i.e. village or town), such as Kafar-Mubbū. The greater number of Christians occupied the northern districts of Aleppo and it would appear that most of them were of Armenian origin.

The Byzantine revival of the tenth century, which enabled the empire to capture a large part of northern Syria and to annex Armenia, had a particular effect on the structure of the population in northern Syria. It increased the number of the

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14 This minaret was built during Aq-Sunqur's reign, see ch. IV, p.232; Al-‘A’laq, I, 44.

15 Al-Durr al-Maknūn, 77v.; Yaqt (Kafar-Roma, Kafar-Sut, Kafar-Ghamma, Kafar-Lātha, Kafar-Talatha, Kafar-Nabbū, Kafar-Najd, Kafar-Dhubbin). These villages were in the region of Ma‘arrat al-‘Ummān and other parts of the emirate of Aleppo and some of their inhabitants were Christians, as Yaqt relates, Al-‘Ummān, I, 134.

16 Mir’at, Sevim, II, 34; Al-Qiftī, 296; Bughya, AS., 139; Zībāda, II, 12-13, 127; Al-‘A’laq, BM.59v.; Yaqt (Tal-Bashir, `Imm).

the Christians and decreased that of the Muslims. It also brought about the revival of Christianity in Egypt and Syria. In spite of some instances of ill-treatment (credited by some authors as the major cause of the crusades) the epoch between the second half of the tenth century and the latter part of the eleventh was, in fact, a golden age for the Christians of Syria. Prior to this period little is heard of Christian activity hereabout, but from this period they are to be found everywhere, especially in the palaces and courts of the rulers. They monopolised much of the administration of Syria. Many of them occupied posts of vizier and chief clerk (Katib) and tax farmers. Al-Maqdisi states that at the end of the tenth century all the state officials in Syria were Christians.¹⁸

In Aleppo the vizier of ʿṢaliḥ b. Mirdas was a Christian by the name of Tadharus (Theodorus?) b. al-Ḥasan. "This Christian had a great influence over ʿṢaliḥ" says Ibn al-ʿAdīm. "He was the commander of both the military and administrative affairs ʿṢāḥīb al-Sayf Waʾl-Qalam". It has been said that governors, Cadis and those of lower ranks used to dismount to him" as a sign of homage.¹⁹ Tadharus died with ʿṢaliḥ (Ch.II,

¹⁸ Al-Maqdisi, 183; Zubda, I, 132-144; Bar Hebraeus, 180; Ibn al-Qalanisi, 57-59, 60-61.
and when Naqr b. Šaliḥ became the amir of Aleppo he appointed the Christian Abu’l-Faraj al-Mu’ammil b. Yusuf al-Shammas as his vizier. Ibn al-‘Adīm praises him and describes him as a good capable man. The brother of this vizier was the governor of the suburb of Aleppo. Ibn al-‘Adīm relates that this governor rebuilt this suburb and its mosques. An interesting point which indicates the tolerance of the Christians of the city of Aleppo towards the Muslims is a matter which will be discussed below. The vizier of Mahmūd b. Naqr was also a Christian named Abu Bishr. He was wealthy and supported Mahmūd by money and effort until he captured Aleppo. As a result of an intrigue Abu Bishr was killed by Mahmud’s order. Abu’l-Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Yusuf b. Abī’l-Thurayyā was the man who plotted against Abu Bishr and killed him in order to gain his post. Ibn Abī’l-Thurayyā was killed by Naqr b. Mahmūd’s order when he became Amir of Aleppo (see ch. IV, p. 194). Ibn al-‘Adīm cites some contemporary Muslims as saying that Abu Bishr died as a martyr and Ibn Abī’l-Thurayyā suffered the death of a dog. This, in turn, indicates the tolerant attitude of the Muslims of the city of Aleppo towards their Christian neighbours. One of Mahmūd b. Naqr’s chief clerks (Katib) and sometime his vizier was a Christian named Zurra’ b. Musā. Another one of his chief clerks was also a Christian by the name of Sa’īd b. ‘Isā (i.e. Sa’īd the son of Jesus) who was also a great poet. Once again,
a Christian named 'Isa b. Bīrus (i.e. Jesus, son of Peter) served as a vizier to Sābiq b. Maḥmūd, the last Mirdasid Amir.

In this conjunction it is worthy to note that our information concerning these Christian viziers (together with three other Muslim viziers) and chief clerks gives no indication of their function and therefore it is impossible to discuss the administration in Aleppo during the eleventh century.\(^{20}\) In addition the sparse information concerning those who held the post of cadi adds nothing to clarify this administration.\(^{21}\)

Many Christians were well educated men, poets and physicians (for there was a small hospital in Aleppo) and no doubt participated in the business life of the emirate. They specialised in certain branches of trade which the Muslims did not try to undertake for religious and other reasons. The Bedouin origin of some of the Muslims precluded participation in certain industries such as blacksmith, gold and silver-smiths, masonry, etc. Islamic teaching forbade drinking and trading in wine and those trades akin to it, such as the keeping of public taverns and brothels.

\(^{20}\) Bughya, A., VI, 172r.; VIII, 16r.-17v.; Zubda, I, 238, 269, 284-285, 293; II, 32-34, 48, 70; Al-Mukhtagar, I, 209; Al-Durr, 56.

\(^{21}\) Al-‘Azīnī, 177r., 184v.; Zubda, I, 232, 269; II, 92; Al-Dhahabi, OR 49, 92v.

\(^{22}\) Al-Qiftī, 295-298; Yāqūt (Halab); Bughya, AS., 117, Bughya, A., III, 25v.; Zubda, I, 284-285.
In the emirate of Aleppo during the eleventh century there were many public taverns and inns (Makhûr, Ḥanah, Khān and Fun-duq) where travellers with money could be provided with wine, women and song in addition to a night's lodging. This kind of house is mentioned by some chroniclers, travellers and poets of the period, such as Ibn Baṭlān, Abu'l-ʿAlāʾ al-ʾMaʿarrī and his relative who was also one of his disciples, the chronicler Abu-Ǧählīb, Ǧammām b. ʿAṭā b. Jaʿfar b. al-ʾMuhāḏḏhab.

Our information about the house which was in Maʿarrat al-ʾNuʿmān is perhaps a sufficient example. It is connected with an incident which occurred in 417 A.H./1026 A.D. This house was apparently situated in the suburb of Maʿarrat al-ʾNuʿmān. The main structure of the building was wood and it housed several harlots and flautists whom we are told adorned their hands and feet with henna. It would appear that this house, though state owned, was let to a Christian tenant (Ḏāmin) who proffered varied entertainment and wine. In 1026 A.H. the Ẓāmin of this house tried to seduce a Muslim woman who, apparently, refused and came on a Friday to the Cathedral Mosque (al-ʾMāṣṣjid al-Ǧāmiʿ) and cried out "that Ṣāhib al-Nākhūr /i.e. the keeper of the tavern/ tried to rape her". All who were in the mosque rushed out, marched on the tavern and completely demolished the house and everything in it. This indicates that there was high tension in Maʿarrat al-ʾNuʿmān which was easily inflamed.
by any small provocation. Religious fervour and disapproval of the things which were taking place in that house was probably at the root of the tension.

After the destruction of the tavern the people of Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man became apprehensive that Ṣalih b. Mirdas, the amir of Aleppo, would take punitive action against them. Ṣaliḥ, who was not in Aleppo when the incident took place, returned there during the first week of November, 1027 A.D. and immediately ordered the arrest of all the notable personnel of Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man. Seventy people were cast into prison for more than seventy days (?) and Ṣalih was advised by Tādharus to kill some of them, if not all. The celebrated Abu‘l-‘Ala‘ al-Ma‘arrī, who had chosen to live in solitude for many years past, became alarmed at the gravity of the situation. For the first and last time he broke his solitude, left Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man and went to meet Ṣaliḥ. When they met he pleaded for the lives and liberty of the prisoners. As a gesture of respect and perhaps propaganda, the plea was granted and the prisoners were released, not, however, without payment of 1,000 dinars as a fine.23

Tādharus advised Ṣalih to inflict severe penalty on the people of Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man because of his hatred towards them

23 Al-Luzumiyat, II, 100, 188; Zubda, I, 233–234; Bughya, A., I, 219v–221r.; Bughya, AS., 139; Ta‘rif, 566–568; Al-Qifti, 295–298; Yaqt (Dalab, Antakia, Ladhiqiya); Irshād, I, 215–216.
and a desire for personal revenge. On a previous occasion the people of the village of ัส, which lay close to Ma’arrat al-Nu’man, had killed Tadharus’ father-in-law, who was a priest (Khuri). After he heard the news of this Tadharus led some of Aleppo’s troops and marched on ัส. He arrested some of the murderers whom he tortured and afterwards crucified. "When their bodies had been brought down from the crosses for funeral prayer and burial a great Muslim multitude attended the ceremony. The Muslims then said - in order to annoy the Christians - 'we saw white birds on them and they are nothing but angels'" thus indicating martyrdom. When Tadharus learnt what the Muslims of Ma’arrat al-Nu’man had said he was annoyed and waited for an opportunity for revenge. The release of the Ma’arrī prisoners did not put an end to the struggle between the Muslims and the Christians. In the year 420 A.H./1029 A.D., after the defeat of Šalih’s troops and his own death, together with that of Tadharus (see ch. II, pp.102-104) the Muslims of the districts surrounding Ma’arrat al-Nu’man raided the Christian village of Kafar-Nubbu (or Nubbul) which was surrounded by a defensive wall. The Christians defended their village and killed some of the invaders but ultimately they were obliged to abandon their homes and to migrate to another nearby village under Byzantine control. 24

It is questionable why the Muslims of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man and its environment were hostile to their Christian neighbours while most of those in the city of Aleppo were tolerant. It was not the ordinary Muslims of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man who were intolerant but the highly educated Abu'l-'Alā' was even more so. After he mentions the woman and her cries in the mosque, Abu'l-'Alā' says that if the Muslims of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man had not supported her, the heaven of Allah would have rained down fire and brimstone upon them. On several occasions in his poems Abu'l-'Alā' tries to prove the falsity of Christianity. He deplored the conversion of a certain Tāriq, who was more than thirty years of age, to Christianity. Abu'l-'Alā' reproved Tāriq's action and wondered how any sensible man could depart from the grace of Islam and prostrate himself before the cross. Abu'l-'Alā' went on to say that the prayer of the mosque was more rewarding than that of the patriarchs; for they had in their churches the enchantment of music and song, silken garments, velvet furnishing and the beautiful faces of monks and nuns, none of which had lasting value or any benefit. Abu'l-'Alā' wondered how Tāriq preferred the fire of hell to poverty, the meat of the pig to the stigma of a bad name. Abu'l-'Alā' believed that poverty should be endured and that it was no disgrace to wear the clothing of the common people.\(^{25}\) An interesting

\(^{25}\) Al-Luzu'diyyat, I, 129, 158; II, 188; III, 216-217.
point in Abu’l-‘Alā’ s poem is that the Christians of Ma’arrat al-Nu’mān and probably the whole emirate of Aleppo were more prosperous than the Muslims. Abu’l-‘Alā’ appears to consider that Tāriq’s conversion was due rather to prosperity than faith. On the other hand, there were some conversions from Christianity to Islam, but not necessarily for the love of Islam, as Abu’l-‘Alā’ declares. It was, he says, either for the acquisition of high posts, through fear or for marriage to a Muslim girl. 26

It would appear that the amir of Aleppo used to approve and sometimes to appoint the religious leaders of the Christians. Al-Qiftī relates that after Ibn Baǧlān had entered Aleppo he presented himself to Thimal b. ǧāliḥ and asked him to appoint him to supervise the Christian worship. Ibn Baǧlān undertook the performance of the religious rites in a strictly orthodox manner. Some of the Christians hated Ibn Baǧlān’s insistence on religious duties and succeeded in embarrassing him so much that he left Aleppo and retired to Antioch. 27

There were some occasions when the governor of Aleppo conscripted both Christians and Jews for military duty. Such action took place in 1014 A.D. during the struggle for Aleppo between ǧāliḥ b. Mirdās and Māngūr b. Lu’lu’. When the latter tried

26 Al-Luzāmiyyāt, IV, 212.
27 Al-Qiftī, 315; Ibn Abi Uqaybi’ah, I, 241.
to quell ʿAlīh's rebellion and prevent him from invading Aleppo, he mustered an Aleppine army (see ch. I, p. 47). Ibn al-ʿAdīm describes Ibn Luʾluʾ's action: "... and he collected his troops and mustered all who were in Aleppo of the rabble, commoners, Christians and Jews and obliged them to go with him... ʿAlīh sent a spy to Ibn Luʾluʾ's army who informed him, on his return, that most of his Ibn Luʾluʾ's troops were Jews and Christians." 28

It is worthy of mention here that when Manṣūr b. Luʾluʾ was obliged to abandon Aleppo (see ch. I, pp. 50-51) disorder prevailed in the city for a short while - an opportunity which was seized by the Muslim mobs to pillage some houses and shops belonging to the Jews and Christians. 29

The Muslims of Aleppo could be divided into two parts, Sunni and Shiʿa. Most of the Shiʿa professed the Imāmi doctrine (Twelver) and the rest were Duruz and Ismaʿili. Al-Muḥallabī reports that the Muslim Aleppinos professed Sunnism during his time. Ibn al-ʿAdīm comments on this by saying that this was the case until the year 351 A.H./969 A.D. when the Byzantine troops conquered Aleppo and killed most of its Muslim population(?). After this Sayf al-Dawla al-Ḥamdānī, its ruler, 945-967 A.D., restored some of the population from the inhabitants of Harrān. Those professed the Shiʿa Twelver faith, as

28 Zubda, I, 204-205.

29 Ibid., I, 208-209; Al-ʿAntākī, 214.
did Sayf al-Dawla himself and by their efforts and those of Sayf al-Dawla, their faith spread in Aleppo and finally became predominant. This is confirmed by Ibn Batlan who relates that when he was in Aleppo: "... the divines [al-Fuqaha] were dispensing the law [yuftun] in accordance with the Twelver doctrine." 30

There is no reference to the existence of an Ismāʿili mission or any followers in the city of Aleppo during our period. It would seem that the Ismāʿili missionaries who later appeared in Aleppo were, during this period, more successfully active in the region around the city. This is shown in the district of Jabal (mountain) al-Summaq and Sarmin (a large village which lies at the foot of this mountain). 31 This region was also the scene of a different kind of Ismāʿili activity, that is of the Duruz sect, who believed in the divinity of al-Hākim, the Fatimid Caliph. The Duruz missionary effort culminated in a rebellion which took place in the year 423 A.H./1031 A.D., during Nagr b. Šāliḥ's reign. Al-Antāki gives detailed account of this rebellion. He says "... and it happened that a group of the Durzi assembled in

30 Al-Qifti, 295-296; Yaqūt (Ḥalab); Bughya, AS., 115-117.

31 Ibn Muḥassar, II, 37; Yaqūt (Aqminas, Jabal al-Summaq); Zubda, II, 122; Bughya, AS., 41, 260-262; Al-Durr, 35, 164; The Assassins, 100, 103.
the Byzantine part of Jabal al-Summaq. They proclaimed their doctrine and destroyed all the mosques that were there. Their missionaries (du‘ātihim) and a great many of their followers took defensive positions in lofty and inaccessible caves. Their number increased as many people of the same faith joined them." They afterwards raided the nearby villages causing disturbance and harm alike to Muslims and Byzantines. The Byzantine governor of Antioch, assisted by Aleppine troops, besieged their caves; by use of fire and smoke the rebellion was quelled.32

In the Annals of 426 A.H./1034 A.D., al-Dhahabi mentions the death of a certain Abu Bakr al-Mannini, and says that he was the only religious man in Syria who was called Abu Bakr. By this al-Dhahabi indicates that the Shi‘a doctrines prevailed at that time throughout Syria; a condition he clearly emphasised when he enumerated the annals of 451 A.H./1059 A.D.33 Al-Dhahabi's statement, however, does not accord with the facts.

Concerning the emirate of Aleppo, Shi‘a doctrines were professed by the majority of the Muslims of the city of Aleppo and by a small minority of the urban and rural Muslims of the state. The Muslims of Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man together with those of the region

32 Al-Antaki, 265; Al–‘Azimi, 168r.; Zubda, I, 248-249; Itti‘az, Annals, 425 H; Al–‘Ibar, Dh., III, 98; Al–Durra, 334.

33 Al-Dhahabi, OR 50, 2r.; Al–‘Ibar, Dh., III, 160.
of Kafar-Ṭab professed Sunnism. The orthodox belief of these Muslims perhaps provides an explanation of the rigid attitude they exercised toward their Christian neighbours. On the other hand the Shi‘a belief of the majority of Muslims in the city of Aleppo was the possible explanation of their tolerant attitude towards the Christians of the city. To this may be added another reason. Since there were in the city of Aleppo a minority of orthodox Muslims, the whole Muslim community was probably too pre-occupied with its own internal quarrel to pay attention to other religious communities.

There is scanty information about the Muslim Sunnis of the city of Aleppo and their quarrel with the Shi‘a. They probably occupied a special quarter in the northern part of the city called Baḥsita. There is information about a clash between them and the Shi‘a which occurred on an ‘Ashūrā day (which commemorated the death of al-Ḥusain b. ‘Alī, the grandson of the prophet), probably during the reign of Thīmāl. This clash ended in bloodshed and the looting of what might be described as Aleppo’s general library which was in the Cathedral Mosque. Al-Khashshāb family which has already been mentioned as one of the prominent families of Aleppo, many of whose members held high posts,

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34 Bughya, A, VII, 190r.; Ta‘rīf, 556-557.
35 Ibn Sinān, 18; Yaqt (Baḥsīta); Bughya, A., VII, 196r.v.; Ta‘rīf, 556-557.
professed the Shi‘a (Twelver) faith. Al-Hasan b. Ahmad b. ‘Ali b. al-Mu‘allim is the name of one of Aleppo's Twelver learned men and a religious leader. In addition to being a poet and well-informed in Arabic literature, he wrote two books on theology named Al-Tājī and Ma‘ālim al-Dīn. Unfortunately there is no information on the contents of these two books, since no copy of them appears to be extant and no quotation from them has reached us.

On the other side Salim b. ‘Ali, generally known as Ibn al-Ḥammāmi, is the name of one of Aleppo's Sunni learned men and a religious leader. He was alive in 445 A.H./1072 A.D. and we know nothing about the content of his teaching and writing.

The Shi‘a Twelver Aleppines were attached to their belief and violently resisted any attempt made to bring them back to the Sunni faith. This was manifested by Aleppo's long resistance to the Saljuqs, especially when the city was besieged by the Sultan, Alp-Arslan (see Ch.III, pp.185-6). Previous to this siege in Shawāl 462 A.H./July 1070 A.D. Ma‘mūd b. Naṣr had ceased to acknowledge the suzerainty of al-Mustansir, the Fatimid Caliph, and instead proclaimed the supremacy of both al-Qā‘im, the ‘Abbāsid...

36 Bughyā, A., I, 18v.; see also previous note no. 13.
Caliph, and Alp-Arslan, the Saljuq Sultan (see Ch. III, pp. 184-185). Mahmud did this after consulting and inducing the Twelver leaders of Aleppo. During the ceremony of the first Khutba in the names of al-Qa'im and Alp-Arslan, most of the people who were present protested by abandoning the mosque when the names of al-Qa'im and Alp-Arslan were recited. On the following Friday Mahmud posted Ibn Khān at the gate of the mosque and ordered him to kill everyone who would desert the mosque and not attend the ceremony. By this the ceremony was performed without interruption but shortly after, when probably Ibn Khān and his followers withdrew, the Shi'a Aleppines came to the mosque and, in protest, purloined all the prayer-mats saying "these mats belong to 'Ali, let Abu Bakr bring his own for the people to pray on". The proclamation of al-Qa'im and Alp-Arslan did not end the Shi'a belief in the city of Aleppo, for for a long time to come the Muezzins of Aleppo continued to use the Shi'a calls (Hayya 'Alā Khayr al-'Amal) to prayer.38

In the history of Aleppo all the Rule[s and Dynasties which dominated the state were alien in the sense that they were not of

Aleppine origins. No Aleppine had tried, or succeeded in establishing a local dynasty as had happened, for instance, in Tripoli. Presumably the reason for this was that Aleppo on account of its geographical position was always surrounded by greater powers who were alert and eager to capture it. The existence of alien rule did not mean that the Aleppines were deprived of participation in the management of state affairs. In fact, the people of Aleppo, as we saw, were, on many occasions, able to decide the future of their city and they had great influence in the business life of Aleppo. Of them were the merchants and the administrators who wielded the actual power of the emirate.

During the struggle for Aleppo between Şâliḥ b. Mirdas and Mansūr b. Lu’lu’ (see Ch. I, pp. 47-48) chiefs from among the population of the city mediated between the struggling parties and participated in arranging the future rule of their city.

Ibn Sinān al-Khāfajī, who professed Shi‘a’ (Twelver) and was a poet in the Mirdāsid court, mentions Mukābir and Banukah as two of Aleppo’s Twelver popular leaders. On the other hand, Ibn al-‘Adīm describes them as members of the Shi‘a’ Twelver ghawghā (i.e. rabble or vulgar) who led the Shi‘a’ in their clash with the Sunni,39 which is mentioned below. But how the Shi‘a’ and the Sunni were organised and functioned we do not know, in fact

39 Bughya, A., VII, 196r.v.; Ta’rif, 557; Zubda, I, 206-207.
our information concerning the society classes, factions and parties is non-existent save for that concerning the militant organisation of the Ṣaḥāba.

The Ṣaḥāba, says Claud Cahen "literally young men, a kind of urban militia, which played a considerable role in the 4th/10th to the 6th/12th centuries and is particularly well-known at Aleppo and Damascus. Officially its role is that of police, charged with public order, fire-fighting etc., ... the only distinction between them and any ordinary police is the local non-professional nature of their recruitment, but it is precisely that which gives them an effective function much more important and often quite different from that of police ... the term is found in earlier centuries in Iraq especially in Basra and Kufa in the second/eighth century, but also in Baghdad and elsewhere... the further question arises of the relation between the Syrian and Mesopotamian Ṣaḥāba and the Fīṭyān and 'Ayyārun, whose existence is documented in Iraq and the Iranian regions throughout the middle ages and who were also specially active from the 4th/10th to the 6th/12th centuries. These certainly played the role of active wing of the popular opposition to the official authorities... in fact the two institutions differ in their origin ... it may not be accidental that the boundary between cities with Fīṭyān and those with Ṣaḥāba corresponds very closely to the ancient Byzantine Sasanid frontier, a fact which suggests that the
Aḥdāth may possibly be related to the ancient factions of the later Roman empire." ⁴⁰

The Aḥdāth movement in Syria was simultaneous with and similar to the ‘Ayyārūn and Fītyān movements which were Iraqi and were the outcome of the special circumstances prevailing through both countries. There is no evidence to connect the Aḥdāth organisation with the factions of the later Roman empire. In spite of the fact that Syria and upper Mesopotamia were under Byzantine rule before the Islamic conquest of the 7th century, there is no record to support the theory that such factions existed in Syria before the Islamic conquest. A foreign nation ruling another does not necessarily implant its constitution and customs upon the one that it rules. When Syria was under the rule of Rome, and later Constantinople, her social and religious influence on them was greater than those countries on her. Whilst Syria was under Byzantine rule she was more occupied by religious rather than social factions. ⁴¹

The Aḥdāth was born and matured chiefly in Damascus and Aleppo; although these cities, during the Byzantine occupation, were not the principal cities of Syria. They were Antioch and Jerusalem. The Muslim conquest obscured, to a large extent, the fame of Antioch and some other cities which were prominent during the


Byzantine occupation and developed the importance of Damascus and, more particularly, that of Aleppo. What would be more likely than that the movement of the Ḥādāth was the outcome of the political and social circumstances which had dominated Syria and upper Mesopotamia since the second half of the third/ninth century. The Abbasid power declined; the strife with the Byzantine empire continued; the rise of independent Egypt and its policy towards Syria; the Qaramita revolutions and the Bedouin incursions no doubt created instability and resentment among the urban population of Syria. Under these conditions it is conceivable that the inhabitants of cities and villages organised some kind of resistance to aggression or intrusion and some force to maintain social order.\(^{42}\) Such a force originally created to serve public order eventually developed into a form of militia and was used for the personal gain of its leaders or other ambitious personalities. It is also probable that some rulers encouraged the militia by using the organisation as an instrument for their own purposes.

In Aleppo, during the 5th/11th centuries, the Ḥādāth (militia) were in their golden age, for their activity and influence over the city's affairs then reached its peak. Al-Muʿayyad Fi al-Din, who was in Aleppo in the year 449 A.H./1057 A.D.,

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\(^{42}\) In 902, Aleppo was besieged by al-Qaramīṭa and when an Abbasid army of more than 10,000 troops failed to repulse them, the Aleppines organised a local resistance which was able to
says "... and in the city Aleppo itself a group of people named the Aḥdāth, who possess it more than its possessors and who hold sovereignty more than its sovereign, between them and al-Maghribah (literally the westerners - the name applied to Egyptian authority at that time) from old times are hatreds and feuds; its eyes could not sleep and its debt could not be repaid". 43 Šāliḥ b. Mirdas captured Aleppo by the help of the Aḥdāth, whose leader Salım b. Mustafad (a son of a former page (ghulam) of Sayf al-Dawla al-Ḥamdānī) opened the city’s gate of Qinnasrin and welcomed Šāliḥ in the name of Aleppo’s population (see Ch.II, p. 98). Šalim, together with his fellow Aḥdāth, aided Šalilh’s troops in fighting the Fāsimid garrison which had taken stronghold in the citadel. After the capture of the citadel, Šalim was rewarded by Šalih who conferred on him the rulership of the city of Aleppo and entrusted to him the post of its Ra’is together with the leadership (muqaddamat) of the Aḥdāth. This is cited by Ibn al-‘Adim from Ibn al-Muhadhdhab, the Ma’arri chronicler of the 11th century. It does, however, indicate that both posts of Aleppo’s Ra’is and the Aḥdāth leadership were in existence before. There are references to the Aḥdāth as being active in Aleppo before this period, but we have no reference to the post of

foil the al-Qaramiṭa attempt to capture the city, see Bugḥya, A., V., 231v.–233r.; Ṭabari, 2222, 2231; for other similar examples see Zubda, I, 134–139.

Aleppo's Ra'is. This, however, caused Professor Claude Cahen to suppose that this post was probably created for the first time for Sālim by Sālih. In the biography of Sālim, Ibn al-'Adīm cites Ibn al-Muhadhdbab as saying that Sālim was a distinguished person and one of Aleppo's famous military leaders (quwād). Sālim, whose father served in the army of Sayf-al-Dawla, grew up in the same profession. It is therefore possible that there were many similar cases among the Āḥḍāth; it is also conceivable that some ex-military men became absorbed into the Āḥḍāth organisation and may have helped to develop its military character.

After Sālih's death and during the reign of his son Naqr, Sālim retained his posts until the year 423 A.H./1033 A.D., when a dispute arose between him and Naqr. We do not know its reason but we know that it culminated in an open rebellion. Sālim mobilised the city's Āḥḍāth and mob and prepared himself to besiege the citadel where Nasr had his residence. A Christian kātib by the name of Toma (Thomas) acted as envoy between Naqr and Sālim. Toma, however, distorted Sālim's messages and exaggerated his demands. What his motive was is obscure. Because of this and without allowing Sālim time for further organisation, Naqr descended upon him and completely routed him which was an easy task, for most of the Āḥḍāth had deserted Sālim and Naqr arrested him
and then put him to death.

Al-‘Azīmī relates that Naṣr killed Salīm after consulting the Byzantine governor of Antioch, but he does not explain why. Although there is no information concerning the cause of the dispute, we know that Naṣr, in spite of his victory over the Byzantine emperor, Romanus III had asked for Byzantine pardon and protection and offered to pay an annual tribute (see Ch. II, pp. 122-124). It is possible to suppose that Salīm was not content with this arrangement which also probably displeased the population of Aleppo and Salīm attempted to make use of the opportunity for personal promotion.⁴⁴

The death of Salīm left no significant diminution of the Aḥdāth power, neither did it affect their preference for the Mirdāsīb; for after the short Fatimid occupation which followed the death of Naṣr, the Aḥdāth, as we saw, helped Thīmāl to recapture Aleppo (ch. III, p. 144). Once again, when Thīmāl was obliged to abdicate his post in favour of a Fatimid ruler, the Aḥdāth resisted and after a while rebelled against the Fatimid governor and helped Thīmāl’s nephew, Maḥmūd b. Naṣr, to take possession (see Ch. III, pp. 166-167).

On the occasions of dispute between the Mirdasid amirs for the rulership of Aleppo, such as that between Thimāl and Māhmud (see Ch. III, p. 175) and between Māhmud and ‘Atiyya, the Aḥdāth played an effective part in deciding the future of each amir.⁴⁵ On some occasions the Aḥdāth had been used as regular troops. ‘Atiyya used them in raiding the Byzantine territory (see ch. III, p. 175) and 600 of them were in the army of Muslim b. Quraysh when he fought against Sulaymān b. Qutulmush (see ch. IV, p. 226).

These few examples illustrate how important was the role that the Aḥdāth played in Aleppo during the 11th century. Their attitude towards the Turcomans and the Saljuqs, together with their participation in every event which took place in Aleppo during this period, has been discussed throughout this thesis and repetition is not necessary.

The Aḥdāth used to receive a yearly payment; how much is not known and, on occasion of disorder they often demanded increased payment.⁴⁶

During the 5th/11th century, Aleppo was "a fine city" and well populated. "It has a great wall," says Nāṣirī Khusraw,

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⁴⁵ Zubda, I, 286-287, 294.
⁴⁶ Ibid., 276-277, 294.
"whose height I estimate at 25 cubits." Most of its houses were built of stone, but because of the wall which limited the area of the city and because of the density of the population "... all the houses and buildings of Aleppo stand close one beside the other."47

The city had insufficient sources of water for the Quwayq river was small and only in full spate in winter and dried up in the summer. In the north of Aleppo where lies the village of Hilān there were several springs. The waters of these springs were carried to Aleppo by canal, but the supply was inadequate and the canal services only the lower parts of the city; because of that, every house in Aleppo had its own cistern (sahrij) which was frequently replenished by rain water.48

In spite of the fact that the 5th/11th century was a period of political instability and there is insufficient information to enable us to deal with the economic situation, it would appear that Aleppo was a prosperous city. Its population was "... a superior people both in face and figure (?); most of their complexions are either fair, rosy or olive and their eyes large and black. They have the best character and finest appearance of all human beings."49 Al-Maqdisī says "and its /Aleppo/

47 P.P.T.S., IV, 2; Bughya, AS., 114-115; Al-Maqdisī, 115.
48 This was stated by Ibn Baṭlān, see Bughya, AS., 117.
49 Bughya, AS., 114-115 (quotation from Kitāb al-ʿAzīzī).
people have humour, wisdom and wealth". Perhaps the humour
was expressed in the forementioned incident of the silk bandage
round the tower which had been struck by the stones from the man­
gonel (see ch. III, p. ).

A great number of poets had lived in the Mirdāsid court
and each one received an annual payment in addition to occasional
prize bonuses. Among these poets there were three outstanding
ones, Ibn Sinān al-Kahfāji, Ibn Ḥayyūs and Ibn Ḥasīna, who were
dignified by the title of amīr. The bulk of their poetical
works has survived and reached us. They contain valuable informa­
tion which has been used throughout this thesis. The standard
of these poets and their place in the history of Arabic literature,
together with the cultural life of the emirate of Aleppo during
the 11th century, is rather the topic of the student of Arabic
literature than that of the student of Islamic history.

From the poems written by these poets, we know that the re­
sidence of the Mirdāsids in the citadel of Aleppo comprised sever­
al halls. One of these halls was known as Sār al-Dhahab (i.e. the
golden hall). Its floor was paved with red alabaster (marmar)
and its walls were probably gilded. Another hall had a dome

50 Al-Maqdisī, 115.

51 Ibn Abī Ḥaṣīna, I, 17, 22-25; Ibn Ḥayyūs, I, 17, 18; Baghya, A.,
I, 65v., 66v., 74v.; Al-Kharīda, II, 53.
adorned by the picture of the rising sun. Maḥmūd b. Naṣr built a house and adorned its rooms and halls with gold, mosaic and coloured glass. These materials were used in such a way that they depicted scenes of battle, various kinds of birds, two giraffes, one elephant with its mahout, camels, the sea with its ships and fishes, palm trees and a view which showed the story of Majnun Layla. The floors were paved with various coloured marbles in beautiful designs; and pictures of glorious gardens were painted on the ceilings.  

Unfortunately none of those buildings have survived and no excavation has taken place in the citadel to improve our meagre knowledge of this period and to separate fact from fantasy in the work of poets and other literary sources.
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A'ima al-Fatimiyin al-Khulafa
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al-Shayyal)

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Ibn Junghul
Al-Kāmil
Ibn Kathīr
Al-Kutubi
Ibn Khaldūn
Al-Khārija
Al-Khabīda
Al-Khiṣāṣ
Al-Luzzūmiyyaṭ
Maʾāthīr
Al-Maqdisi
Masālik
Mirʾāt

Jamharat Ansāabal-‘Arab
Journal of American Oriental Society
Tarīkh al-Ma’arra
Tarīkh Ibn Junghul
Al-Kāmil Fi’l-Tarīkh
Al-Bidayah Wa’l Nihayah
‘Uyun al-Tawārikh
Al-‘Ibar Wa Diwan al-Mubtada Wa’l-
Khabar
Tarīkh Khalīfa B. Khayyāṭ
Kharidat al-Qasr Wa Jaridat al-‘Aṣr
Khitaṭ al-Maqrizī
Diwan Luzūm Mala Yalzam
Maʾāthir al-Ināfa
Ahsan al-Taqasīm
Masalik al-Aṣgar
Mirʾāt al-Zaman (The initial Sevim
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Yaqt 

Mu’jam al-Buldan

Zubda 

Zubdat al-Halab Min Tarikh Halab

It is not known how long he occupied this post. In 688/1299, the traveller al-‘Abdārī, who was passing through Tlemcen and who had a great admiration for him, found him in difficult circumstances. Ten years later, Tlemcen was invested by the Marinid Abu Ya’qūb Yusuf (685-706/1286-1307) and the siege lasted a hundred months, until the besieger was assassinated. Although the exact date and the manner are unknown, it was during this siege that Ibn Khāmis left his native town, following an attack on his life by those in power who accused him of being in favour of a surrender of the city. This at least is what he himself insinuates in two of his poems. He went to Ceuta, at that time governed by Abū Ṭālib ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥ. b. ʿĀhmad al-ʿAzāfī and his brother Abū Ḥātim; there he attempted to establish himself as a teacher, but his attempt failed, his own pupils, instigated by a rival named Abu ʿl-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Abī ʿl-Rabī’, having baffled him from the start by hurling at him embarrassing grammatical questions. He went to Algeciras, then to Malaga and finally, in 703/1304, to Granada. Everywhere he earned his living by teaching and by writing poems in which he gives himself the “pleasure of praising” the great. The ruler of Granada at this time was Muhammad III, known as al-Malikī (702/1302-9), whose vizier, Ibn al-Hakīm Muḥ. b. ʿAbd al-Rahwān b. ʿIbrāhīm (660-708/1262-1308), was an important personality of the period and by way of being a patron. Returning from a long voyage in the east, the latter had passed through Tlemcen where he had met Ibn Khāmis. At Granada his court was attended by scholars and men of letters; he invited Ibn Khāmis to join it, thus assuring him at last an easy life, in return of course for laudatory poems. In 706/1306, Ibn Khāmis returned to Malaga on a visit, then went to Almeria where the general Ibn Kumāṃa, a subordinate of Ibn al-Hakīm, hastened to welcome him. He loved to travel—“I am”, he said “like the blood; I put myself in motion every spring”. He never forgot Tlemcen, and dreamed of returning there. But, one morning, on the feast of the breaking of the fast in the year 708/1309, he was surprised in his dwelling at Granada by a riot resulting from the coup d’état provoked by Abu al-Dhuyyāḥ Nāṣr, who had murdered al-Shāfi’i (708/1309-14); a certain ʿAlī b. Nāṣr, called al-Aḥlam (the dumb), killed him with a lance. The reason for the murder was his connexion with Ibn al-Hakīm, who was killed on the same day.

The biographers of Ibn Khāmis describe him as a scholar, philosopher, sage, astrologer, alchemist, heresiographer, and littérateur. But there is no positive evidence for these attributes and all that is certain is that he was a poet. All that have survived of any works he may have written are poems. They are said to have been collected by a certain ʿAlī ʿAbd Allāh Muḥ. b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥāḍirānī, who has not been further identified, in a collection entitled al-Durr al-nafis fi ʿızār Ibn Khāmis, of which nothing more is known. The poems of Ibn Khāmis are nevertheless accessible, if not entirely, at least in large part. They are scattered throughout the works of al-Abdārī, Yahyā Ibn Khālīf, Ibn al-Kādī and al-Mālikī, who reproduces Ibn al-Khālīf, Ibn Manṣūr was able to collect of them sixteen ḥuṣūds, totalling more than 650 verses, ten of them each consisting of more than 30 verses and two reaching 80 verses each.

We find in them the traditional themes: madbū’, ḥiṭṣah, fakhr, sometimes preceded by nasib. He praises the Banū Zayyān of Tlemcen, the traveller
Ibn Rushayd and especially the vizier Ibn al-Hakim, who has protected the poet and confounded his enemies, and who has power, courage, generosity, etc. ... He directs his satire against the Banū Yağmūr (sic), who have attempted to have him assassinated and who are thus responsible for his exile far from his own small country, bruised by anarchy, who have "forfeited their loyalty for a cheap reward," and who are proud, pitiless and vile tyrants. He prides himself on his illustrious ancestry: Muḥammad bin Ṣalih, Nahshāl, Ḥimyar, Ṣakāsīk, etc. He was a teacher, who spoke well and easily; he knew how to crack a joke successfully, and moreover he had very beautiful handwriting. Among his pupils were Abū Saʿīd al-Saʿīd and ʿĪsā ʿAbd al-Dīn al-ʿIṣbāḥānī; the latter composed a dithyrambic panegyric of him (Khāridat al-baṣr, i, ʿArād al-ʾIrāqī, Damascus 1375/1955, 28, and al-Kīti, Inbāh, ii, 102). But, apart from such rewarding teaching, his great intellectual activity bore very little fruit: four raddīs (refutations), his reaction to what he read or to accepted teaching; three śarkīs which he did not complete, and certain other writings. Something was lacking in all this great activity. Al-Kīti (op. cit., ii, 173) speaks of the ṣhadār, the black mood, to which he was subject. Here we have an indication that his nervous equilibrium was unsatisfactory. This point may explain the lack of control which revealed itself even in his dress and conduct and which was the cause of adverse criticism; and he was also accused of avarice.

The raddīs: Radd of Ibn Bābashādī in his ʿArād al-ʾIrāqī, in the Kāmil al-ḥabr of al-Zādīdājī (Ḥāḍidji Khalīfa, ii, no. 4197). Radd of Abū Zakariyyā ʿAlī Tībrīzī in his Taḥādāth al-ʾIsnāl al-mantîk of Ibn al-Sīkīt (ibid., i, no. 828). Radd of Abū Saʿīd Ibn al-Shādri, last maqālīs of his Amārī, on the subject of verses of al-Mutanabbi (ibid., i, no. 1780). Only one has been preserved, the Radd of the Makhāmūr of al-Ḥarīrī, in manuscript with various titles before Al-Brockelmann, S I, 494), published under the title al-Iṣbāḥānī (ahl Maḥāmūr al-Ḥarīrī wa-nissār Ibn Barri (Istanbul 1328) and following these Maḥāmūr (Cairo 1326); see also Ḥāḍidji Khalīfa, i, no. 1329. On the question of his glosses on the subject of the Durrat al-gha)][a]mās of al-Ḥarīrī and the reply of Ibn Barri, see C. C. Torrey, Orient. Studien Th. Nolde gewidmet, Giessen 1906, ii, 212-3.

The šarkīs: Šarkī to the K. al-Lusnīyat fi l-ʾinwār of Ibn Dīmān. Šarkī to the Muḥaddīsim fi l-ʾinwār of the vizier Ibn Hubayra. The only one to have survived is the Šarkī to the K. al-Dīmānī of l-ʾinwār of ʿAbd al-Kāhir al-Dūrjānī, which he called al-Muratāli fi šarkī al-Dīmānī, MSS at Gotha (271) and elsewhere (Brockelmann, S I, 504).

Ḥāḍidji Khalīfa (v, no. 1109) also refers to his Lāmiyat fi l-ʾinwār and Mawūrīl anb al-bayt (vi, no. 13360), which does indeed seem to be his work and which is relevant to what has been called his knowledge of al-Khāshāb.

Two works not mentioned in the sources consulted have survived in manuscript. MS Köprüli 1393/5 (five folios) (MSO, xiv, 1911, 193, no. 59) contains al-Lusnīyat fi l-ʾinwār and mustaʿmalīs of the word ʾinwār (amen). MS Cairo, iii, 281,2, has preserved al-Kādī al-Bābīsīl al-arabīyāt al-dīmānīya l-ṣaḥāt al-faḍālī wa-l-rīmār al-imānīya, dedicated to Abu ʿl-Barakāt Ibn al-Anbāʾī like himself, a pupil of al-Diawālīlī); it is a versified work on ten subjects relating to the Islamic sciences, enumerated in the Catalogue (282) referred to, and repeated by Brockelmann (S I, 494). This Catalogue gives the reference: see ʿAbd al-Kādīr al-Muṣṭarīfī in al-Dāyūnīyat fi l-ʾanwār wa-l-ʾidāhānī wa-l-ʾaḥādīs wa-l-ʾtaṣālihī al-Dīmānī, vi, 204-17.

Bibliography: In addition to the references in the text: Brockelmann, I I, 666 and S I, 493/4; H. Suter, Die Mathematiker und Astronomen der Araber und ihre Werke, Leipzig, 1900 no. 298. Arabic sources: information was gathered together by Yāẖūṭ, Muqāfān al-ʿubdāth, xii, 47-54 = Irādād, iv, 286-8 and Kīti, Inbāh al-ruwāt, Cairo 1371/1952, ii, 99-103. For the date of his birth, Ibn Khallīkān, Wafāyāt, ii, 288-9, no. 323. In
the other authors mainly repetitions: Abū Ahmad al-Yaḥyā, Miʿrāḍ al-dīnān, 1338, ii, 381-2; Ibn al-Infād, Ṣaḥḥārat, Cairo 1350, iv, 220-2; Suyūṭī, Bagyra, 1876, copied Yāḥyā, references given above; etc. See references in Kiftī, 106, ii, 90, n. 1, (H. Fleischer).

Ibn al-Khaṣib, Abū Ṣalih Ahmad b. Ismaʿīl b. Ibrahim b. Isḥāq al-Anṣārī, khitbat min man of letters of the 3rd/9th century, called Naṭṭāḥa and known also, as his grandfather Ibrahim had been (Ibn al-Muʿatta, Tābakāt, 142), as al-Khaṣibī, after the ancestor of the family, the governor of Egypt al-Khaṣibī b. Abū al-Hamīd, who had been praised by Abū Nuwās (see E. Wagner, Abū Nuwās, Wiesbaden 1965, 70 ff. and index).

Often confused with the viziers Ahmad b. al-Khaṣīb and his grandson Ahmad b. Ubayd Allāh [see al-Khaṣīl], he was in fact only the secretary of Ubayd Allāh b. Abū Allāh b. Tāhir (d. 300/914); according to the Fiḥrist (Cairo ed., 181), he was executed by Muhammad b. Tāhir (d. 968/968-9), but this may have been the son of Ubayd Allāh (d. 301/914); further details are available on Ibn al-Nadim, who has nevertheless a permanent place in Arabic epistolography (see e.g., A. Z. Salwāt, Dānawarat rasāʾil al-Arāb, iv, 362-4).

Ibn al-Nadim (Cairo ed., 180) and, after him, Yāḥyā (Udabād, ii, 227-30) attribute particularly to Naṭṭāḥa a voluminous collection of letters, a K. al-Tābakāt, a K. Tābakat al-khitbat, a K. Siḥārat al-nafṣ and a collection of private letters; Ibn al-Nadim states that the majority of his letters are ikhtiyārat and notes that he had carried on a correspondence with Ibn al-Muʿatta. He was also well known as a poet, and some lines of his have survived.

Bibliography: in the article; see also Ḩusayr, Zahr, 113 (correcting ḥaṭṭa to Naṭṭāḥa). (Ed.)

Ibn al-Khaṣib, Abū Bakr al-Ḥasan b. al-Khaṣib, astrolabe who lived in the 3rd/9th century, in the circle of the Barakids (cf. in Ibn al-Kiftī the mention of a Khiṭab al-Manāhīr dedicated to his father al-Khāṣibī). He was born in Europe under the name of Al-Ḫanīq al-Fāris al-Khāṣibī al-Fārisī (cf. Al-Ḫanīq), or more frequently under that of “Abūbāthar” (Schelbel, Astronomische bibliographie, Brussels 1792, under year 1492). He was given the flattering description of “Auctor astronomiae perspicuum.” This “astronomer,” to judge by the works which have survived (cf. Brockelmann), was primarily an astrolabe. Little is known of his life except that he was of Persian origin and lived for a long time at Kufa. His learning reflects strongly this origin and the special position which astrology had acquired among the Persians. Probably of “Sebāni” sympathies, he practised with enthusiasm the art of ṭabīḥ al-ṭabāh, masāʿ (elationes, interrogaciones). He made use of “lots” (salām, puruṣ, cf. al-Bīrūnī, Khiṭab al-Taṭbīṣī, ed. Dīlāl b. Fāyūnān, 440). Going beyond the apparent scientific reserve affected by Ptolemy in his Tetrabiblion (opus quadrupartitum), he enjoyed speculating on the compatibility and incompatibility of the planets, signs and houses of the Zodiac, and “lots.” He also used ḥayalāţaḥyel. He was also bold enough to predict the duration of states and dynasties (taḥwīl sīnī ḫāṭimān, an idea of Zurvanite or Indian origin). He earned thus the wrath of his biographer Ibn al-Kiftī, who complains of having been misled by the falseness of these prophecies, based on the absolute confidence which Ibn al-Khaṣib placed in the geographical dominance of the sign of Gemini over Egypt. He thus was a man of resources, with an ample supply of prescriptions of all kinds, whose enormous repertoire prepared him the goodwill of his patrons and later the interested approbation of foreign civilizations. The work which earned him the most lasting success was the Mukātī fi l-manāḥīr, De nativitatisibus, an extract from a sort of astrological encyclopedia to which he had given the Persian name of Kār-i miḥtar (“The Practice of the Prince”).

The text of it is preserved in the Arabic collection in the Escurial. In Latin translation, in the manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale mentioned above and in the two Sessa editions published in Venice in 1492 and 1501. Ibn al-Khaṣib’s translator was the Jewish scholar Plato of Tivoli, whose manuscript was the basis for the works of Sessa. Two centuries later, the learned librarian of the Elector of Saxony, Johannes Milīus, drew attention to and wrote a commentary on the works of Albabather. The De nativitatisibus was from then on inseparable from the Centilugiem of the pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus, with which Sessa linked it in a single volume (Milīus, Memoria bibilothecae genonis sive Designationes manuscriptorum, 193). At the end of his career, as at the beginning, Albabather’s works formed an integral part of Hermetic literature.

Bibliography: In addition to the works mentioned in the article, see Fīḥrist, 272; Ibn al-Kiftī, ed. Khāndjī, Cairo, 114; Brockelmann, i, 221, s I, 394. (J.-C. Vadej)

Ibn al-Khaṭīb, Abū ʿΑbd Allāh Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿīd b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿīd b. ʿAlī b. Ahmad al-Salmānī, vizier and historian of Granada, who bore the ṭābābat of Lišān al-Dīn and Dhu l-wizāratayn, apart from those by which he was designated after his death. Of Arab descent through the sub-tribe of the Salmān, a clan of the Murād of the Yemen, he came from a family which was established in Syria and which arrived in the Iberian peninsula in the 8th/8th century, took up residence in Cordova, and then moved successively to Toledo, Loja and Granada. At first the family was known by the name Ibn al-Bawāzir, but after Saʿīd al-Salmānī it had the name Banu l-Khaṭīb. Lišān al-Dīn Ibn al-Khaṭīb was born in Loja, about 50 km. from Granada, on 25 Rajab 713/15 November 1313, but he was educated in Granada where his father had settled in order to enter the service of the sultan Abu l-Walīd Ismāʿīl. He had numerous eminent teachers who were listed by his biographers and, thanks to their instruction and to his own particular aptitudes, he succeeded in acquiring a vast fund of knowledge which later enabled him to win distinction in various branches of learning and to write many works, whose titles number more than 60. After his father’s death in the battle of S PACKAGE or Turf on 7 Dhu ḫaḍrāt 741/10 October 1340, his talents and learning enabled him to enter the service of sultan Abu l-Ḥaddājī Yūsuf b. Ismāʿīl as secretary, under the administrative and technical direction of the vizier Abu l-Ḥasan ʿAṭī b. al-Dīnyāb; when the latter died of the plague in the middle of Shawwāl 749/mid-January 1343, Ibn Khaṭīb was appointed to the office of ṭābābat al-dīn, head of the royal chancellery, with the title of vizier; he retained this office in the reign of Muḥammad V al-Ghanī bi-liḥlī who raised his rank, and it was then that he assumed the title of Dhu l-wizāratayn. After Muḥammad V’s deposition (760/1358-9), Ibn al-Khaṭīb’s fortune changed for some years; the
Ibn al-Khatib, who had enjoyed great influence and authority in that sovereign's reign before his fall, was assassinated, Lisân al-Din was put in prison, and it was only as a result of the intervention of his friend Ibn Marzûk, secretary of the Marinid sultan Abî Sâlim, that he regained his freedom and was permitted to go to Morocco, accompanying the dethroned sovereign into exile. He traveled throughout the territory of the Marinids and finally settled in Salé where he acquired estates and wrote some of his works, his Mâlûka was-Salûd, translated from the text of Muller in his Beiträge, i, 1-13, under the title El "Parangon entre Malaga y Salé", by E. García Gómez, in Andalucía, ii (1934), 185-96; and Mâyâr al-ighnîbâr fi-djâh al-mâlûka was-ldîyâr, edited earlier by Simonet, in Descripción del reino de Granada bajo la dominación de los nazaríes, Madrid 1862, and by Muller in his Beiträge, i, 45-200; finally, 'Abbâdî gives for the first time an edition of a Rûkûla of Lisân al-Din across the Maghrib taken from the K. Nusfâdat al-djirâb fi Sulûdat al-ighnîrab (ms. Esorial 1755), the whole preceded by an introduction and accompanied by notes and a bibliography, all helpful.

Ibn al-Khatib is also the author of medical works such as al-Majûma and the Risâla fi tahwûl (takawwun) al-djânîn (cf. Renaud, in Hespéris, xix (1942-5), 97 ff., xxxiii (1946), 213 ff.) and of an anthology of poetry entitled Diâyû al-tawwâbî (cf. Stern, Two anthologies of muwassâh poetry: Ibn al-Khatib's ..., in Arabica, ii (1955), 151-69, without counting the poems of his own composition which occur in his works. Pending the completion of Mme. Arid's thesis on the writings of Ibn al-Khatib, the most complete list of his works is that given by al-Maâkârî in the final sections of the Naqîf al-tasbîh, to which one must refer for everything relating to this great figure of the politics and literature of Granada (see also Ibn Khaldûn; Pons Boigues, Ensayo, 334-47, no. 294; and Brockelmann, ii, 260-3 and S II, 372).

In spite of Ibn al-Khatib's large corpus of writings, which also includes certain works on mystico-philosophical subjects such as the Rawdat al-tawrîf bi l-hubb al-gharîf (ms. Damascus Zâhiryya, tasawwufi 85) and others (see 'Abd al-'Azîz b. 'Abd Allâh, al-Falsafa wa l-akhlâq 'ind Ibn al-Khatib, Tetuan 1953 and, lastly, Muhammâb b. Abî Bakr al-Tîtważâni, Ibn al-Khatib min khîldîh khâtûbîlî, which have no apparatus criticus), it is above all as an historian that he is renowned. In this field of writing, we may select in particular: (1) al-Ihâl fi ta'khîrîh wa'dîrîh (ms. Tunis) in two parts containing the description of the town and the biographies of celebrated personages, including the amirs, who were born or lived in Granada or who visited it, with most interesting historical notes, in some cases unique; only a number of incomplete editions have appeared: Cairo 1319/1901-2, 2 vols., very imperfect; Cairo 1955, one vol. by 'Abd Allâh b. 'Inân on this ed., and the surviving ms. of the Ihâl, see, in addition to the editor's introd., MIDEO, iii (1956), 324-8. (2) al-Lâmib al-badriyya fi l-dâwâda al-nasîriyya (Casîrî has given long extracts from this, as well as from the Ihâl, together with a Latin trans., in his Bibliotheca, ii, 71 ff., 177-246, 246-319. A fairly acceptable edition of the Lâmib was published in Cairo in 1347/1928-9; I. S. Allouche translated some chapters from it in his article La vie économique et sociale à Granada au XIVe siècle, in Méth. d'hist. et d'archéol.: Hommage à G. Marçais, Algiers 1957, ii, 7-12). This work of Ibn al-Khatib presents a panorama of the civilization of Granada, with biographies of the Nasrid sovereigns, from approximately 628 to 765/1230 to 1363. (3) A'mâl al-âlâm fî-mân bâyî'ah bâl-'al-tîlîm min wa'idîh al-Islâm, one of the last works written by Ibn al-Khatib, in 774 and 776/1372-4 (partial ed. by H. H. 'Abd al-Wahhab, in Centenario M. Anari, ii (1910), 427-82 (trans. R. Castillo, El Africa del Norte en el A'mâl al-Âlâm de Ibn al-Jahfîb, Madrid
**IBN AL-KHAṬĪB — IBN AL-KHAYYĀṬ**

(1958) and E. Lévi-Provençal, Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane extraite du Kitāb ʿAmād al-ʿAṯānā, Rabat 1934, Beirut 1956; partial ed. by A. M. al-Abbādī and M. I. al-Katānī, Kitāb ʿAmād al-ʿAṯānā, Casablanca 1964). This is an unfinished history of Islam, the first part of which is devoted to the history of Islam, the first part of which is devoted to the period of the period. The National Library of Madrid (ms. 511 gg. 390 Cat. Guillén Robles) possesses a poem of Ibn Khāṭīma that is also included in his Dīwān; it is a takhrīs of a poem of Ibn Khayyāt of mystical character.

**Bibliography:** In addition to the works referred to: Ibn al-Khāṭīb, Ḣāfa, Cairo 1939, i, 114-24; Māḥkār, Naṣīḥ al-fīḥ, Cairo 1364/1949, viii, 739-48; Idrīsī, Abūl-ʿrīyān, Cairo 1358-61/1949-50, i, 1, 23, 250, ii, 252, 259, 302, 346, 392; Ibn al-Khāṭīb, Durraṭ al-dīwān, Rabat 1934, i, no. 116; Ahmad Bābhā al-Tambūkti, Naṣīḥ al-fīḥ, Cairo 1939, 72; Djiari, Ḥayyān al-nihāya fi ṣalabat al-burrā, Paris 1932, i, 78; Ummār, Māṣālīk al-ḥāfīr fi mānālik al-aʿṣār, mss. Paris, no. 2337, xvi, fol. 210; Brockelmann, II, 259, S II, 36b; Pons Boiges, Ensayo, 331-3; G. S. Colin, Quelques poètes arabes d'Occident au XIVe siècle, in Hesperis, 1931, 241; M. Antuña, Abūnājima de Almirón y su tratado de la poesía, in Religión y Cultura, Madrid, Oct. 1928. (S. Gibert)

**IBN KHATTĀB** [see al-Khattābi].

**IBN KHAYR AL-ISBĪLĪ**

Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Khayr b. Umār b. Khalīfa al-Lanṭūnī al-Ammāwī, philologist and traditionist of Seville, where he was born in 502/1108. He became inām of the mosque at Cordova, and died in that city in 575/1179. Ibn Khayr, who studied under many teachers in different regions of al-Andalus, owes his fame to the catalogue (fahras f. q.) of the works in which he had read and of the teachers who had given him their ijāza at Seville, Cordova, Almería, Malaga, Granada, etc. This work, called Fahrasat ma rawašu ṣu ʿallayḥī bi min al-dawāwīn al-muṣannafas fī darūb al-ʿIlm wa-anwār al-μaṣdrīfī, was published in Saragos in 1894-5 by J. Ribera y Tarrago (vols., as vols. ix-x of the BAH) under the title Index librorum de diversis scientiarum ordinibus quos a magistros didicit. After an introduction studded with badīlīs, the author enumerates the works he has studied on Qur'ānic sciences (readings, abrogating and abrogated verses, commentary), goes on to badīlīs, to which he devotes much space, together with the siyar and the aṣūrīn, then to Mālikī fīḥ. Next come grammar, lexicography, adab, poetry. Finally, he lists the fahras which preceded his own. For each discipline he quotes the names of his masters, classifying them by region, but gives hardly any biographical information on them. The catalogue is a most important document for the study of the works known and taught in the author's day in Muslim Spain (see H. Peres, Poètesandaloune, 28 ff.). Ibn Khayr in his turn had a great many pupils, a list of whom occupied, it is said, ten thirty-page notebooks.

**Bibliography:** Dabbī, Buḫayya, 112; Ibn al-Abbār, Takhima, 780; Ḥādīṭ Khalfā, vii, 540; Pons Boiges, Ensayo, 424-4; Wüstenfeld, Geschichtschronologen, no. 231; Ahwānī, in RIMA, H (1955), 97-8; González Palencia, Literatura, 195; Brockelmann, S I, 499. (Ch. Pellat)

**IBN AL-KHAYYĀṬ**

Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Umār b. Maṇṣūr, known as Ibn al-Khayyāt,
grammarians, a native of Samarkand who lived in Baṣra and Baghdad. In Baghdad he is said to have quarreled over grammatical matters with al-Zaghîlî (d. 316/928 [q.v.]). Among his pupils are mentioned Abu 'l-Kasîn al-Zaghîlî and Abû ʿAli al-Farîsî. The latter, in a reply to Sayf al-Dawla, denying having tried to denigrate Ibn al-Khayyat (see Yâkût); and from this we learn also that at a certain period of his life the grammarian became afflicted by complete deafness. But Yâkût also depicts Ibn al-Khayyat as endowed with a splendid physique and as being a pleasant companion. He died in Baṣra in 320/932.

Apart from the K. Ma'ānī 'l-Ḳur'ān, all the works attributed to Ibn al-Khayyat are concerned with Arabic grammar: al-Naḥâ al-habîr, al-Maġāfîs fi 'l-naḥâ, al-Mâkînîs fi 'l-naḥâ. Since the time of the Fihrist (77 and 81), this grammarian has been classed under the head of the Kalbîs, whose political actions, and especially al-Khayyât is to be considered as the true panegyrist of his life. He seems to have lived for about 80 years. He was born in Baṣra, and it would appear that he was educated and also taught exclusively in his native city, not travelling to other cities as was then customary. This is indicated by the fact that al-Khaṭîb al-Baghdâdi does not mention him in his History of Baghdad, nor does any other chronicler or biographer refer to any journey that he undertook; furthermore, most of his teachers were of Baṣri origin or had resided in Baṣra. He came of a well-educated family; his grandfather, who bore the same name, and also his father, were authorities in Tradition. Several men of outstanding culture were among his teachers, such as Yâṣîd b. Zurayqî, Sâfînî b. Uyaynî, Muḥammad b. Diʿâr Muḥammad, Highâm al-Kalbî, ʿAli b. Muḥammad al-Madârînî, etc., but he was closest to Yâṣîd b. Zurayqî (q.v.), who is described by Ibn Saʿd as a worthy man with ʿUthmâni tendencies. These tendencies are apparent, to some extent, in Ibn Khayyat's works.

On the whole Ibn Khayyat is regarded by scholars of traditions as honourable, straightforward and trustworthy. Among his many disciples were al-Buhârî, ʿAbî Allâh b. Ahmad, Ibn Ḫanbal and Baḍî b. Maḥbûl.

According to Ibn al-Nadîm, he was the author of four books: al-Taʿrîkh, Tabâḥât al-Kurra, Taʿrîkh al-Zamâna wa-l-ʿurjânî wa-l-marâja wa-l-ʿumâqâ, and Kāthî Aḥṣâī al-Kurra wa-l-ʿâbârîn wa-ṣâhînî wa-ʾayyâlîn. It would appear that the Tabâḥât al-Kurra mentioned by Ibn al-Nadîm is identical with the book which has survived under the title of Tabâḥât Kālîfîs b. Khayyât (the unique copy of this book is now in al-Zâhirîya Library, Damascus).

Al-Taʿrîkh has also survived, in a copy found in Morocco (the only copy so far known). In a single volume of 168 fol., it was copied in Muslim Spain in 477/1084.

The author commences his book by defining the word taʿrîkh. After discussing the birth of the Prophet he covers the period from the Hijârâ to the year 232/846, thus ignoring the Meccan period of the Prophet's life. The importance of the work lies not only in the fact that it is the oldest complete Islamic survey of events which has reached us, but also in the materials it contains and the way in which it was written. The author gives special attention to the Umayyad Caliphate of Damascus and to Muslim foreign affairs, in particular to the extension of the Islamic Empire. He usually narrates each event from two points of view: local and official. He pays little attention to Islamic internal affairs, but he does deal with such decisive events as the death of ʿUthmân, the war between ʿAli and Muʿawiyah, the battle of al-Harra, the Khaṭîbî movements, etc.

This book is a very important document for the study of Islamic administration in its early years, as the author, at the end of his account of each Caliph's reign, enumerates all the statesmen, generals and senior officials who held office under him.

As for the biographical al-Tabâḥât, it too is the oldest complete book of its kind to have survived; Ibn Saʿd, though earlier, is incomplete. The unique
copy was made by one of the author's disciples, probably during the author's life-time. It consists of 97 folios, written in a fine hand between kāfī and nasīh. Age and mishandling have made it very difficult to read. It contains the biographies of approximately 3375 men and women who were cited as authorities for Islamic traditions during the first 236 years of Islam. It is divided into two unequal parts, a very large one devoted to the men and a smaller to the women.

Ibn Khayyāt composed his book in a different way from his contemporary and fellow-citizen Ibn Sa'd. He begins by enumerating the men who were authorities in tradition and lived in Medina, commencing with the Prophet, then the members of Kūraysh, group by group according to their pedigree and their relation to the Prophet, then the members of the other Arab tribes. He then takes the Muslim cities and centres and deals with them in a similar manner.

The author's biographical accounts are very brief but the significance of the book lies in the fact of its completeness and the close attention which the author pays to genealogy: he enumerates every Arab tribe, group and family who had migrated at the rise of Islam and names their place of settlement. Such information is most valuable for the study of the Islamic movement, the great Arab migration of the 1st/7th century and the history of the Umayyad Caliphate, for the vital role played by the tribes under this dynasty. The book is of at least equal importance for the study of Islamic dogma, culture and society.

Both texts were edited, independently, by Sulayḥ Zakhārīya (Damascus 1969) and by Akram al-Umarī (Baghdād 1967).


IBN KHĀZĪM [see ʿAḍĪ ALLĀH b. KHĀZĪM]

IBN KHURRĀDĀBDĪH, ʿAḌĪ KĀSIM ʿUṣFŪRĪ b. ʿAḌĪ ALLĀH b. ʿAḌĪ ALLĀH (VAR. AḤMAD), IS ONE OF THE EARLIEST GEOGRAPHICAL WRITERS IN ARABIC WHOSE WRITINGS HAVE SURVIVED MORE OR LESS IN THEIR ORIGINAL FORM. His biography did not interest early authors. Only al-Masʿūdī, Ibn al-Nadim and al-Isfahānī, all of the 4th/10th century, provided some brief particulars concerning his work. His grandfather's Iranian name was transliterated Kh. r.d.h.b.h. and read both as Khurrazābdī, "excellent gift of the sun", and Khurrazābdīhī, "created by the excellent sun".

Originally a Zoroastrian, he embraced Islam in order, it is said, to please a member of the powerful Iranian family of the Barrāmānīa [q.v.] viziers, probably Yahyā b. Khālid [q.v.].

Of his father, it is known only that in 201/816, during the caliphate of Maʿṣūm, he was governor of Tabaristān and that he succeeded in bringing certain districts of Daylam [q.v.] into submission. He himself seems to have been born in Khurram; as to the dates of his birth and death there is some disagreement: the years 205/820 and 212/825 have been suggested for the former and 306/911 for the latter. He grew up apparently in Baghdad, in case and comfort, and received an excellent literary and artistic education from teachers of the standing of Ishāk al-Mawsī [q.v.]. He is said to have had a marked propensity for knowledge and study.

When he reached manhood, his principal career was at first as Director of Posts and Intelligence (sāḥib al-barīd wa l-kh̲āṣāb) in the province of Dibbā [q.v.], subsequently being promoted to the office of director-general of the same department in Bagdad and later in Sāmarra. In this capacity he had access to the caliph al-Muʿtamin and soon became his familiar and friend, taking part in his diversions and sharing his taste for entertainment, secular literature and the arts.

This turn of mind, his Iranian origins and the requirements of his professional career are all reflected in his literary works. A list of them, apparently incomplete, is given by Ibn al-Nadim, according to whom he wrote the following works: 1. Addāb al-samān (correct behaviour when listening to singing and music); 2. Kitāb al-Tahdīb (on drinking); 3. Kitāb al-Shārāb (on drinking); 4. Kitāb al-Nadvān̲āt wal-duṣ̲ās̲a (on boon-companions and fellow revellers); 5. Kitāb al-Anwaḥ [q.v.]. None of these five works has survived. 6. Kitāb al-Lahw wal-mawlālī, edited from the unique manuscript by I. A. Khalīfī (Beirut 1964); it is presumably to this work that al-Maʿṣūrī [q.v.] is alluding in his Risālat al-Gh̲frān̲ in which he speaks of the "classes of singers" (t̲abābāt al-marwān̲a). In this book he treats of music and musicians, borrowing the basic technical vocabulary from Persian and giving allegedly historical information (which al-Isfahānī considered to be unacceptable). Al-Maṣūrī reproduces five pages from the text of a dissertation on the same subject given by Ibn Khurrazābdīhī in the presence of the caliph al-Muʿtamin. These have been edited by al-ʿAzzāwī under the title K. al-Lahw wal-mawlālī. De Goeje translated this title as "Le livre du jeu et des instruments de musique" (The book of playing and of musical instruments). 7. Kitāb Dīnj̲awārat (var. Dīnj̲awār) anṣāb al-Fars wa-l-nawāb̲k̲īl̲ (var. nawāfīl̲) (= The book of the principal genealogies of the Persians and of the transplantuted population). 8. Kitāb al-Tarīż̲īk̲, regarded by al-Maṣūrī as "the best constructed and most exhaustive" work of its kind (yet it does not appear in Ibn al-Nadim's list). These two works are frequently cited by al-Thaʿlīlī, and no. 8 is cited once by Ibn Shaddād. 9. Kitāb al-Masd̲l̲ik̲ wa-l-nawān̲āl̲i̇k̲ (The book of itineraries and kingdoms), which made his reputation, often copied or used as a model for imitation and twice edited and translated into French in full, and once in part only: it has been the subject of a controversy that is still unresolved in regard to the date of its composition and the authenticity of the version which has survived; finally, in regard to its scientific value, it has given rise to contradictory appreciations by the early Arab writers and by modern orientalists.

Bibliography: Brockelmann, I, 225-6; S, i, 404; Ṭabarī, iii and ṣassam; Masʿūdī, Murādī, i, 72, viii, 80 (Cairo ed., 1367/1948, i, 14, iv, 220-5); Aḥrānī, ṣassam; Fihrist, 149 (Cairo ed., 1348/1929, 212); Thaʿlīlī, Ghurār aḥhār mulāk al-Fars (= History of the Kings of the Persians), Paris 1900, ṣassam; Maʿarī, Risālat al-Gh̲frān̲, Cairo 1950, 461; Ibn Shaddād, al-Aṭīb al-kh̲afira fī dhīkr unna bī ṣāḥīb al-ṣālim wa-l-Dinārīa (≡ Ibn Shaddād's description of Damascus), Damascus 1956, 25; C. Barbier de Meynard, in J. d. v (1865); BCA, vi, 1899; J. Marquart, Osteuropaische und ostasi-
IBN AL-KIFTI, DIJAMIL AL-DIN ABU 'L-HASAN 'ALI B. YUSUF N. IBRAHIM N. 'ABD AL-WAJHD AL-SHABANI, versatille Arab writer, born in 568/1172 at Kift in Upper Egypt. He received his early education in Cairo and in 583/1187 went to Jerusalem, where his father had been appointed as deputy to the Kâlid al-Faḍlī, the famous chancellor and adviser of Ṣālah al-Dîn (Saladin). During the many years which he spent as a student there he was already collecting the material for his later works. He was forced by the disturbances which followed Ṣālah al-Dîn's death to go in 589/1195 to Aleppo, where, under the protection and with the encouragement of a friend of his father, he was able again to pursue his scholarly interests for several years. At the Ababeg of Aleppo, al-Malik al-Zâhir, placed him in charge of the diwân of the finances, a task which he undertook only reluctantly, but which brought him the honorable title of al-Kâlid al-Ahrâm. After al-Zâhir's death (631/1234) he resigned, but three years later was appointed by al-Zahir's successor to the same post, which he then held without interruption until 628/1230. There is no doubt that Ibn al-Kifti had used his influential position in order to further the cause of scholarship, for during these years he gave shelter in Aleppo to Yaḥyâ, who had fled from the Mongols, and gave him much help in the compilation of his great geographical dictionary. Dismissed at his own request in 628/1230, Ibn al-Kifti was able to devote a few years to his own studies until he was appointed vizier by al-Malik al-ʿĀzīz in 633/1236. He remained in this office until his death in 646/1248.

Of the 26 works of Ibn al-Kifti of which the titles are known only two survive: (1) The Kâlid Ikhbâr al-ʿulâmâ bi-akhbâr al-ḥulâmâ, usually referred to simply as Taʾrîkh al-ḥukamâ, which exists in an epitome by al-Zawzawî (written in 647/1250), ed. J. Lippert, Leipzig 1903; it contains 442 biographies of physicians, philosophers and astronomers with many statements from Greek writers which have not survived in the original; (2) Taʾrîkh al-ruwât al-ādāb anbâh al-mufârid, parts 1-11 ed. by Muḥ. Abū l-Ḥaḍīr Ibrâhîm, Cairo 1369-74, which contains about a thousand biographies of scholars. Of the posthumous Aḥbâr al-Muḥamadîn min al-ghurârî there exist only fragments in Ms. Paris arab. 3335. The remaining titles are mainly of historical works: a history of Cairo until the reign of Ṣālah al-Dîn, a history of the Seljûqs, of the Mirdâšids, of the Buṭyads, of Mâjmûd b. Sabuktâkin, of the Maghribi, of the Yemen; a comprehensive Taʾrîkh al-Kifti in the epitome of Ibn Maktûm (d. 740/1340) is evidently identical with the history of the Fatimid empire above. Other titles indicate individual biographies (of Abû Rashîk, Abî Saʿîd al-Ṣâfî), the history of scholarship (the Shaykhs of al-Kindî), a supplement to the Ansâb al-Balâdhûrî, etc.

Bibliography: Kutubi, Fawâd, Cairo 51, ii, 213-205, = Ibrâhîm, ed. Margoulion, v, 477-94; idem, Muḥâjâm al-balâdân, v, 129; Abû Usâyiya, ʿUyûn al-anbâb, index; Barhebræus, Taʾrîkh al-ṭabarîs al-diwanî, ed. Fâlî, 476; Suyûti, Bughâya, Cairo 1326, 358; idem, Ḥusn al-mudâdâra, Cairo 1321, 1, 205; Abû l-İmâm, Shahârârî, v, 236; ʿAdâwî, al-Ẓâib al-ʿâsd, Cairo 1333, 237 f.; Ibn Taghrîbîrî, Nuṣûm, vi, Cairo 1355, 381; A. Müller in Actes du 8e Congrès International des Orientalistes, Section i, Leiden 1890, 15-36; Brockelmann, 1, 396 f., 5, 559; R. Sellheim, in Oriens, viii (1955), 348-52.

(A. Dietrich)
Ibn Killis's foreign policy was expressed in the advice which he gave before he died to al-'Aζiz: to undertake nothing against the Byzantines so long as they themselves did not attack, to be satisfied with a vague acknowledgement of vassalage from the Ḥamdânids of Aleppo, but not to spare Mufarrid b. al-Djarrâh, the chief of the Tâyyî Arabs of Palestine [see Ḥammîdî]. He carried it out successfully but not without resorting to intrigue, to deception and even to attempts at assassination. He re-took Damascas from the Turk Alptakin, ally of the caliph in a race, a fact of which the vizier's enemies had made use to slander him. Ibn Killis explained how it had come about that one of his pigeons had outstripped that of the caliph in a race, a fact of which the vizier's enemies had made use to slander him.

In domestic policy, the favour which Ibn Killis enjoyed suffered only one eclipse of some months (373-4), the reasons for which were perhaps the caliph's anger after the poisoning of Alptakin, or disturbances caused by a famine in Egypt. He soon recovered all his offices and his immense riches. Moreover Ibn Killis did not fail to flatter his master, because he had had put to death the tenant of the lands which the vizier owned in the region of Damascus and had seized these lands to leave Damascus [for details, see al-'Aζiz]. But Ibn Killis prevented the caliph from getting too deeply engaged in northern Syria.

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sources was favourable to Ibn al-Kitt, siege was laid but three years later he exterminated with all his men; Alfonso indignantly reforming Malidi, and the two of them traversed the Sarradj prudently withdrew, Ibn al-Kitt invited Aragon and Cucumber b. IJafsun; he did not succeed in sandals and riding a donkey, he travelled all over the ascetic. Dressed in coarse homespun, wearing rope launched a desperate attack on the enemy and was himself abandoned by almost all his followers, launched a desperate attack on the enemy and was killed, on 20 Rajab 288/10 July 901. For a long time his head remained hanging from the top of one of the gates of Zamora. “This tragi-comical expedition was no more than an isolated episode in the annals of the lower and central Marches” at the end of the 3rd/9th century and at the beginning of the 4th/10th, and its only repercussion is the expedition said to have been undertaken in the same year by the future Ordoño III, son of Alfonso III, who, setting out from Viseo, crossed the Tagus and then the Guadiana to reach the region of Seville, where he sacked and burnt one of the villages’.


(Al-Hûcî Mûra Mûnand)

Ibn Kûbûrûna [see Ibn Kârûrûn]

Ibn Kûdâmâ al-Mâkdisî, Muwaffak al-Dîn Abû Muhammâd ‘Abd Allâh b. Abû Muhîmmâd, Hanbâlî ascetic, juristconsult and traditionalist theologian. He was born in Djamâûlî, near Jerusalem (Bayt al-Mâkdis, whence his ethnic name) in Sha’bân 541/Jan.-Feb. 1147, and died in Damascus on 5 or 6 Djamâûl II 620/627 or 7 July 1225.

In 531/1146, the Banû Kudâmâ moved from Djamâûlî to take up residence in Damascus. The chroniclers explain this exodus as caused by the bad treatment the Muslims were receiving at the hands of the Franks.

From the sources available to us at the present time it is possible to reconstruct two main branches of this large family from the 5th/11th to the 9th/16th centuries. At the head of one branch is Muwaffak al-Dîn’s father, the Shaykh ‘Abd Allâh b. Muhammad b. Kudâmâ (497-538/1097-1122), the preacher (khâfu’d) of Djamâûlî, a man known for his asceticism, for whom a mosque was built in Damascus (Na’aymî, Dâris, ii, 354). On his brother ‘Ubayd Allâh, who stands at the head of the other branch, the sources seem to be silent; but he is the ancestor of Yusuf b. Abû Hâdi (840-909/1436-1503), whose autograph certificates of audition (samâ‘) are to be seen on the margins and in the colophons of many of the manuscripts of the Zahirîiya library in Damascus. The most numerous sub-branch of this family is by far that of Muwaffak al-Dîn’s brother, the ascetic Shaykh Abû ‘Umar (528-607/1133-1210). Regarding the other brother, ‘Ubayd Allâh, our sources are silent, though other members of this sub-branch are known: the son Abû Hâdi (573-613/1177-1216), the latter’s two grandsons Abû Hâdi (614-687/1217-1288) and ‘Ubayd Allâh (635-684/1237-1285), and the latter’s grandson ‘Abd Allâh (d. 803/1400).

The smallest sub-branch of all is that of Muwaffak al-Dîn Ibn Kudâmâ, whose three sons died in his lifetime and who was survived by his grandson Abûh (605-643/1208-1242).

Muwaffak al-Dîn received the first phase of his education in Damascus where he studied the Kur’a’n and hadîth. He made his first visit to Baghdad in 562 in the company of his maternal cousin, a well-known Hanbâlî traditionist, Abû al-Ghânî al-Makdisî (541-600/1146-1203), also originally from Djamâûlî, a member of a numerous family tracing their origin back to a certain Surûr b. Râdî. At Baghdad the were received by the famous Fârîdî b. ‘Abd Allâh, the celebrated mystic ‘Abd al-Kâdir al-Dîlî [q.v.]. Their discipleship was cut short by the latter’s death.
Brief though it may have been, this experience must have had its influence on the young Muawaffak-al-Din, who was to reserve a special place in his heart for mystics and mysticism. This is attested by what the present author regards as his condoning of Ibn 'Akil's [q.v.] venation for the great mystic al-Hallâdî (q.v.), and in a sîsîla preserved in a manuscript in the Zâbiyriya library of Damascus (see Madîni, 18, fol. 234b); Muawaffak-al-Din figures as having received the ḥikrîra from 'Abd al-Kâdir al-Dhîlî and passed it on to another Hanbali, his cousin 'Ibrâhîm b. 'Abd al-Wâlîjîd (546/1151-1217), brother of the above mentioned 'Abd al-Qâhîn. On the other hand, Muawaffak al-Din did not condone what he believed to be the excessive rationalism of mystics and mysticism. This is attested by what he wrote Taḥrîr al-mawâfîr fi kutub alî al-kalâm (see G. Makdisi, Ibn Qâdîmâ's censure of speculative theology, London 1962).

Muawaffak al-Din's first sojourn in Baghdâd lasted four years. He is known to have visited it again in 567 and 574, making his pilgrimage to Mecca in the previous year 573, and finally settling in Damascus in 575. He left Damascus once again in 583 to take part in Salâdîn's expedition against the Franks, particularly in the conquest of Jerusalem, which occurred that year.

Muawaffak al-Din is known especially for his works on Hanbali law: al-Mughnî and al-'Unda on positive law, and Rawżat al-nâşir, on the methodology of law, all of which have been published.


G. MAKDISI

IBN KUNÂSA, 'Abû Yâhâ Muḥâammad b. 'Abd Allâh (= Kûnâsâ) b. 'Abd al-Allâh al-Mâzinî al-Asâdi, poet, philologist and râwî of the 'Abbasid period. Born in Kûfâ in 123/741, he studied in his native town poetry, hadîth and the other traditional sciences under the most distinguished members of the Banû Asad and became the transmittor of the works of several poets, among whom the most famous was al-Kunâsî (q.v.). He also transmitted a certain number of hadîth to such important traditionists as al-A'îshî (q.v.) and Sufyân al-Thawrî (q.v.). Although he lived in Baghdâd he does not seem to have tried to gain admittance to the court. He died at Kûfâ on 3 Shawwâl 207/1 February 823, or in 209/824. So far as can be judged by the few verses which have survived, Ibn Kunâsî was not a great poet, but his poetry, of great simplicity, reflects a morality and a serenity which are worthy of note. Nephew of 'Ibrâhîm b. al-Adham (q.v.) and brought up in a milieu of extreme piety, Ibn Kunâsî nevertheless was the owner of a well-known slave singing-girl, Dânnâr, whose death he lamented. His descriptions of Kûfâ are also worthy of mention.

He wrote in addition several works, among which the Fîhrîst mentions a Kitâb Ma'âshir 'l-shirîr, a K. Sârîkîl al-Kunâsî min al-Kârîdân and a K. al-Qâhîn, which was much used later by writers and is probably the earliest work of this type (see Ch. Pellat in Arâbica, 1955-56, 36).

Bibliography: Dâhîr, Bayân and Hayawa'n, index; Fîhrîst, Cairo ed., 105, 223; Ibn Kutayba, Anwa'r, index; Ma'ârif, 543; Aghâni, xii, 105-10 (Beirut ed., xiiis, 338-47); Biruni, Âhâr, 336; Ibn al-Djârâh, Wafaydt, 517-23; Kâhîf Baghdâdî, Taarîkh Baghdâdî, v, 404-8; Ibn Khallîkân, tr. de Slane, I, 473; 'Aurâlî, al-Djâwârî al-mughamâ'înî, Cairo n.d., 155-62; F. Bustânî, Dîrâsî al-mawâfîr, iii, 482-3. (Ch. Pellat)

IBN KUNFUDH, 'Abû 'l-'Abbâs Ahmad b. Husân (incorrect var. Husayn) b. 'Ali b. Husân al-Qâthîtî b. 'Ali b. Mâmûn b. Kûnâfûdî (var. al-Kûnûfûdî), Algerian jurist, traditionist and historian born in 732/1330 or, more probably, in 747/1340, died in 809/1406 or 810/1407, in Constantinople, a member of a family of teachers and jurists from that town and its environs. His ancestor, Husân b. 'Ali al-Qâthîtî, who taught hadîth in Constantinople and claimed to belong to the confraternity of the Shâhîdîyya, died in 664/1265 (cf. Wafaydt, 52); his grandfather 'Ali b. Husân, also kâhîfî in Constantinople for half a century and hâmî for many years, died in 733/1332 (cf. Wafaydt, 54). His maternal grandfather Yûsuf b. Yâqûb b. Malikârî, a disciple of 'Abû Mâdîyân (q.v.) the mystic, was director of a sâniyya, "two stages to the west of Constantinople", where he taught; he died in 689/1289 (cf. Wafaydt, 58). Finally, his father Husân b. 'Ali, also kâhîfî in Constantinople, was a jurist of repute and author of a work entitled al-Masnûn fi aṭkhâl al-fâlîn; he died in 759/1359 (cf. Wafaydt, 58).

It is therefore probable that, in the first instance, it was from such relatives as these that he received the essential part of his cultural education. But we know that he left his native town as early as 759/1357, at the age of eighteen, on travels which lasted for eighteen years and which took him first to Fâs and later to Marrâkûsh. In 763/1358-9 he was with the Hâfsid prince 'Abû 'l-'Abbâs Ahmad (759/1358-93), and after that in Tunisia where, together with another Hâfsid prince, 'Abû Fâris 'Abd al-'Azîz (797-834/1397-1434), he attended the lectures of the scholar 'Abd Mâhît ʻIsâ b. Ahmad b. Muḥâammad b. Muḥâammad al-Ghûbrînî (d. 815/1402). Finally, he returned to Constantinople, at an unknown date, and there assumed the offices of a muftî and hâmî. In 809/1401 he was dismissed, and he lived in disgrace until his death.

During his travels, he endeavoured to perfect his knowledge of tafsîr, hadîth, fiqh, muqaddas, mathematics, etc. and to obtain diplomatic passports from his various masters, whose names he subsequently recorded with care in his Wafaydt, in chronological order according to the date of his death. They are: (a) in Fâs: 1. 'Abû Zayd 'Abd al-Râhîm b. Sulaymân al-Lajâqînî, d. 771/1367, a pupil of the mathematician Ibn al-Banna5; 2. 'Abû 'Imrân Mûsâ b. Muḥâammad b. Mû'ūf al-'Abbâsî, d. 776/1374, a native of Mâkûs; 3. Abu 'l-'Abbâs Ahmad al-Kabîbî, d. 779/1378; 4. 'Abû Muḥâammad 'Abd Allâh al-Wângâlî, the blind, d. 779/1378; 5. 'Abû 'Abd Allâh Muḥâammad b. Hayâlî, d. 781/1379; 6. 'Abû Muḥâammad 'Abd al-Hâkî al-Hâskîrî; (b) in Salâ: 7. Ibn 'Aṣârîr Abu 'l-'Abbâs Ahmad, d. 785/ 1383; 8. Ṭâsîsîn al-Din b. Ibn al-Kâhîfî, d. 770/1374; (c) in Marrâkûsh: 9. 'Abû Muḥâammad 'Abd Allâh al-Zukandari, d. 768/1367; (d) in Tlemcen: 10. 'Abû

(1) Bughuyat al-fâdîd min al-hisâb wa 'l-farâdîd, which is probably the same as the Mu'âwâwâl al-râdîd fi maâbâd 'l-farâdîd or again the Shârîr al-urdiyya (var. al-ma'âdinîyâ) [q.v.], ed. M. Nayfar and A. Turkish, Tunis 1968, with an important introd. (2) al-Masâfa al-saniyya fi 'l-tisdr al-saniyya, which is probably the same as Ibn Kûnûfîd, 1855, cf. Jâdis, who was at the end of his education. Among the most important of them, but a few names should be mentioned:


[notes continued]

IBN KÛNUFÎD — IBN KUTAYBA

IBN KUTAYBA, 'Abû Muhammad 1'Abd Allâh b. Musîm al-Dînawârî (some add al-Kîfî, which refers to his place of birth, and al-Mâkwâzî, which is probably the same name of his father's), is one of the great Sunnî polygraphs of the 3rd/9th century, being both a theologian and a writer of adab. He seems to have been descended, in the second or third generation, from an Arabized Iranian family from Khorûsân which was connected on the female side with the Bâhilis of Bâchra and may have come to Irâk in the wake of the 2nd/8th century.

He was born at Kûfa in 213/828, but little is known of his childhood and adolescence. At the most we are able to compile a list of his teachers which, on careful examination, provides much information on his education. Among the most important of them we find men who owe their reputations generally to the Sunna, either as theologians, traditionists or philologists, or usually as all three. The biographers and critics have produced long lists of them, but a few should be mentioned here. The three persons who had the greatest influence on the young Ibn Kutayba are undoubtedly Isâbî, a theological tradition, and finally al-Abbas b. al-Faradj al-Rîyashî (d. 257/871), one of the leaders of philological studies in Irâk, transmitter of the works of Ibn al-Qûnûfîd, 1855, cf. Jâdis, who was at the end of his education. Among the most important of them, but a few names should be mentioned:

(1) 'Abî 'Abd Allâh Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Harakî, d. 780/1379, cf. Jâdis, who was at the end of his education. Among the most important of them, but a few names should be mentioned:


Ibn Kutayba's son, Ahmad, appears to have been his chief disciple. He is certainly responsible, as is his son 'Abd al-Wahid, for the transmission to Egypt, he remained until his death in 276/889.

In al-Andalus, the direct transmission of Ibn Kutayba's work was ensured by the famous Kāsim b. Aṣbagh, who had come to study in Baghdād in 274/887. Among the eastern disciples, 'Ubayd Allāh b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Sulikālī (d. 320/934) seems to have played a particularly important part, his name being found at the head of numerous naḥāda. But there should also be mentioned 'Abd Muhammad 'Abd Allāh b. Dinārīf. Ibn Durāstawāy [q.v.], and Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Ayyūb al-Ṣāquī (d. 312/925), in addition to other minor disciples.

It can be stated that, with the exception of two titles, all the authentic works of Ibn Kutayba as at present known have been published. We list them here, giving for each the most useful edition and a brief description of the contents:

(1) K. Adāb al-kāḥib (ed. Grünert, Leiden 1900), manual of philology for the use of secretaries, with a famous introduction which may be regarded as a politico-cultural profession of faith.

(2) K. al-Awārīd (ed. Pellat-Ḥamidullah, Ḥaydarābād 1375/1956), treatise on practical astronomy and meteorology.

(3) K. al-Abūr (ed. Kurd Allāh b. Kasā'il al-Bulāghāt, Cairo 1325/1946, 341-77), treatise in the anti-Shī'ī tradition on the relative merits of the Arabs, the Persians, and the inhabitants of Kūrāsān.


(5) K. al-Iḥlāṣ fī ʾl-lāfeṣ waʿl-radd ʿalaʾl-Dīnāh-miyya waʿl-Muṣjābīya (ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawthārī, Cairo 1349), a theological pamphlet reftining the position of the Muṣjābīya on attributes and that of the Muṭāzīlīs with Dīnāh-miyya tendencies on the pronunciation of the Kurān.

(6) K. Maʾṣā'ī fī ʾl-ghīr (2 vols., Ḥaydarābād 1368/1949), long work on the themes of poetry.

(7) K. al-Maʿṣūrīf (ed. Ṣafārīnā, Cairo 1960), a historical manual with encyclopaedic appendices on very varied subjects.

(8) K. al-Maṣūṣi fī ʾl-naḏība (Cairo 1349 H.), a theological work.

(9) K. al-Maṣarīr fī ʾl-kīdāb (ed. Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, Cairo 1343), a juridico-philological study on games of chance, as the K. al-Qurṭāba was on fermented drinks.

(10) K. al-Shīr fī ʾl-šīrārā (ed. Ahmad Ǧāhir, 2 vols., Cairo 1364/65/1945-50), poetical anthology arranged chronologically, devoting a large section to the "modern" poets. The introduction, somewhat overrated, is often considered as a manifesto of neo-classicism (ed. and tr. Gaudelroy-Demouny, under the title Introduction au Livre de la Poésie et des Poètes, Paris 1947).


(12) K. Taʿwil muḥkālīf al-khāṣṣ (ed. Farajī Allāh Zakī al-Kurdi, Mārāfīī al-ʿĀlī, Māhād Ǧāḥīmār-dāndā, Cairo 1326), Ibn Kutayba's most important "theological" work, in which are clearly set out his religious, heresiographical and political ideas (Fr. tr. by G. Lecomte, Damas 1962).

(13) K. Taʿwil muṣkhīl al-Kūrān (ed. Ahmad Ǧūr, Cairo 1375/1954), treatise on Kurānic rhetoric and on ḥadīṣ fī al-Kūrān.

(14) K. ʿUyun al-akhbār (ed. Ahmad Zakī al-ʿAdavi, Cairo 1343-8/1925-30), a large compendium of adab, on a number of apparently secular subjects; important introduction.

The only two authentic texts which are unpublished are:

(15) K. Gharīb al-khāṣṣ, an incomplete manuscript of which exists in the Zāhirīyya at Damascus (lugha, 34-5), a philological commentary on ḥadīṣ, in the broadest sense, from the Fatimid to Muṭawwila al-Mukātab afīṣīn (ed. A. al-Mukātab afīṣīn, Cairo 1353/1935), and in the ʿAbbasid society in the 3rd/10th century, which means that they drew their inspiration also from a very wide range of written sources.

In addition to showing the influence of Ibn Kutayba's teachers briefly discussed above, these works bear traces of the main cultural ideas current in ʿAbbasīd society in the 3rd/10th century, which means that they drew their inspiration also from a very wide range of written sources.
Bukhārā. About the remainder one can only guess. Finally, it is not without interest to note that Ibn Kutayba borrowed extensively from existing, and remarkably faithful, translations of the Torah and of the Gospels (in Maʿṣūf, Muḥballī al-baḥṭī and ʿUyun al-ḥabībār).

Interested mainly in his work on adab, which in fact was all currently the only example of his literary output in their libraries, western critics have often tended to overlook Ibn Kutayba’s “theological” work and to pass in silence over his religious ideas.

It seems clear however that at some stage Ibn Kutayba put his literary talents at the service of the enterprise of the restoration of Sunnism which was undertaken by al-Mutawakkil and his chief helpers. This meant that a number of his works were intended to expound a politico-religious doctrine which we might expect would take its place in the ideological line of the Sunna then coming into being, and particularly that represented by Ibn Ḥanbal and Ishāq b. Rāhawayh.

Nevertheless, Ibn Kutayba, who admits to having been tempted in his youth by the quasi-rationalist ideologies which were in vogue at the time, was at times somewhat troubled by the implicit intransigence towards the upholders of Tradition.

Although his theodicy is fairly clearly “Hanbali”, his attitude on ḍādar has nevertheless some strange nuances; although his attitude concerning the Kurʾān is orthodox, he is much less categorical on the problem of lāfğ (q.v.), which he states does not prevent membership of the Sunni community; although his attitude concerning the Companions is that which remained in later times the touchstone of the Sunna, he nevertheless retained a deep and reverent respect for the family and descendants of the Prophet, so far as they were politically neutral. Even his opinions about the “national groups” (al-ṣuʿūb al-dawn) seem much more subtle than has hitherto been admitted: whether he is writing of ethnic or of religious groups, one is led to think that he tends to gather together peaceably among the reigning dynasty those among whom he considered it possible to work over politically.

On the other hand Ibn Kutayba’s methodology—which of where he nowhere gives a systematic definition—certainly seems steadfastly to despise the rational as “Baghdādis’” and the synthesis of which so much has been made is no more than a genuine eclecticism which never claimed to form a school.

All that can be said is that Ibn Kutayba in fact joins certain reputedly Kūfī tendencies to others considered to be Başran. His position may be summarized by stating that in grammar he remains on the whole a supporter of the norm, i.e., “Baṣran”, in spite of his attachment to the teaching of al-Kisāʿi and of al-Farrāʾ, whereas in a more general way, in philology and especially in poetry, he does not hesitate to depart from the usually accepted views, an attitude considered to be “Kūfī”. Ibn Kutayba’s writing on poetry is found mainly in two works: the K. Maʿṣūf ʿl-ḥabībār, a long anthology of poetic themes, and the K. al-ʿUyun wa ʿl-ḥabībār, a mainly chronologically arranged anthology. It is possible that other works, now lost, were also on poetry. Thus there is frequently mentioned a K. ʿUyun al-ṣuʿūb of which nothing is known. It is usual (see Gaudreway-Denombynes, op. cit.) to attribute great importance to the introduction to the K. al-ʿUyun wa ʿl-ṣuʿūb. It is true that it appears as a “veritable manuel du néo-classicisme” (R. Blachère, HLA, i, 140) in the sense that it exhorts writers to “create antique verses on new thoughts” and contributes some original ideas on the ideal poetic technique. But one has no hesitation in saying that this text, though of some interest for the evidence it contains, is nevertheless grossly overrated as a treatise on style. Close inspection reveals that its few main ideas have nothing at all to do with poetic style. They concern in fact a great problem of cultural ethos, that of the quarrel of Ancients and Moderns, and in addition an important problem of historical method, that of the documentary value of a literary work in the strict sense. There is nothing in this which truly concerns poetics. As Ibn Kutayba composed no poetry at all himself, he continues to be regarded as a writer of prose.

Nevertheless, he must be regarded as an innovator, in the sense that he devotes in his anthologies, and particularly in the Shīr, at least as much space to the “modern” as to the “ancient” poets. Thus he professes a great admiration for writers such as Bāshshār and Abū Nuwas, to mention only the greatest. In addition he has the merit of mentioning poets of whom otherwise almost nothing is known.

Ibn Kutayba’s reputation, especially in the West, is based mainly on his ability as a writer of adab. His adab, which comprises an ethos and a culture in which are united all the intellectual currents of ʿAbbāsid society at the beginning of the 3rd/9th century, and which displays an intent to popularize, at least for a certain literate public, is in this sense a kind of humanism. But it would be wrong, in the light of the eclectic professions of faith in the introductions of the ʿUyun and the Adab al-ḥabīb, to regard it as a secularist or even simply as a secular humanism, as some have tended to do in the West. What has been said above on his religious position and his attitude as defender of the Sunna clearly proves that in his mind there is no difference in kind but simply one of degree between the religious and the secular aspect of his educational work.

Ibn Kutayba’s culture amalgamates in several
ways the four great cultural trends of his period: the Arabo trend proper, which consists of the "Arabic" sciences, i.e., the religious sciences properly so-called, to which must be added the philological and "historical" sciences; the Indo-Iranian current, which contributes a certain administrative culture and a certain conception of the social relations in a developed society; the Judeo-Christian trend, which adds a certain spiritual ferment; and, in a lesser degree, the Hellenistic trend which contributes the taste for logic and experimental knowledge.


For Ibn Kutayba's place in the development of rhetoric, see Bālāgha and al-ṣanāʿāʾ wāl-bayān.

(G. Lecomte)

IBN AL-KŪṬĪYYA, ABU BAKR B. UMAR B. ʿABD AL-ʿAZĪZ B. İBRAHİM B. ʿĪSĀ B. MUẒĀḤIM, A GRAMMARIAN AND, IN PARTICULAR, HISTORIAN OF MUSLIM SPAIN, WHO OWES HIS APPellation "SON OF THE GOTHIC WOMAN" TO THE FACT THAT ONE OF HIS ANCESTORS, ʿĪSĀ B. MUẒĀḤIM, A FREEMAN OF UMAR B. ʿABD AL-ʿAZĪZ, HAD MARRIED SARĀ, DAUGHTER OF OLMUNDO AND GRANDDAUGHTER OF THE PENULTIMATE VISIGOTHIC KING, VITIBA. LEAVING SEVILLE WHERE HER FAMILY WAS LIVING, SARĀ HAD GONE TO DAMASCUS TO COMPLAIN TO THE CALIPH ʿABD AL-MALIK OF THE LOSSES SHE HAD SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF HER UNCLE ARDABASTO WHO, ON THE DEATH OF HIS BROTHER, HAD SEIZED HIS POSSESSIONS IN THE EAST OF AL-ANDALUS. ʿĪSĀ AND SARĀ RETURNED TO AL-ANDALUS, AND THEIR DESCENDANTS LIVED IN SEVILLE.

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Bibliography: (1) Principal bio-bibliographical references: Dhallabi, Miṣḥan, Cairo 1315, ii, 77; Khatib Baghdadi, Taʾrīkh, Cairo 1349/1931, x,
Ibn al-Kūṭiyya was thus a maqādīr of the Umayyads and a descendant of the Visigothic nobility. Born in Seville, he settled in Córdoba after studying in his native town and in the capital of al-Andalus, under such famous teachers as Ḥasan b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Zubayrī, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ayyānān, Muḥammad b. ʿUmar b. Lubābā and Kāsim b. Aḥbāb. He lectured in Córdoba and had several pupils, some of whom are well-known, especially the Khālīṣ Abu ʿl-Ḥazām Khuṭṭī and the historian Ibn al-Farāḍī, his principal biographer. He won distinction as a poet, but even more through his knowledge of grammar and lexicography, on which subjects he wrote works highly esteemed by later generations. He also gained a reputation as a jurist—consultant and traditionist and, though criticized, he was none the less consulted as to the meaning or idea of such and such a phrase from the grammatical or lexicological point of view. His fame led to his being presented to al-Ḥākam II as the greatest philologist of his time; he held the office of ḥādī and enjoyed great prestige during his lifetime. He died in Córdoba, in old age, on Tuesday 23 Rābul 1367/6 November 977.

Of his various works, among which was his Kitāb al-Maḥṣūr wa l-maṁdūd, the only ones to have survived are: (1) Kitāb Taṣārīf al-afālī, published by L. Guidi (ii libro dei verbi di . . . Ibn al-Qūṭiyya, Leiden 1894) and re-edited recently by ʿAīf Fawda, under the title Al-afālī, Cairo 1953. (2) Taʿrīkh šīfiṭāb (var. fath) al-Andalus, a history of the conquest of the Iberian peninsula and of the emirate to the end of the reign of the amīr ʿAbd Allāh; the Arabic text, prepared from ms. Paris 706 by Gayangos, Saavedra and Codera, was printed in 1868, but it was published only by J. Ribera, with a Spanish trans. and a helpful introduction, under the title Historia de la conquista de España de Abenal-cordés el cordobés (vol. ii of the Colección de obras ardiqos de historia y geografía que publica la Real Academia de la Historia), Madrid 1926. Earlier, A. Cherbonneau had brought out an incomplete French trans. (Histoire de la conquête de l'Espagne par les Musulmans, in JA, i (1853), 458-85 and viii (1856), 428-527); O. Houssa published the first part of the Arabic text with a French trans. (Histoire de la conquête de l'Andalousie, in Recueil de textes . . ., published by the staff of the École des Langues Orientales, i, Paris 1889, 219-80); E. Fagnan also published a trans. of some fragments in his Extraits, 195 ff. The Taʿrīkh was re-edited recently by ʿAbd Allāh Anās al-Ṭabbāḥ, Beirut n.d. [1957].

The chronicle of Ibn al-Kūṭiyya was dictated in the second half of the 4th/10th century and was written down by one of his pupils; it consists of a series of detached notes taken down from dictation, and it is possible that there existed various recensions or copies made by other pupils; a hypothesis of this kind is supported by the fact that the incomplete edition of the Taʿrīkh fath al-Andalus published in Cairo contains many variants (see Muḥ. Ibn ʿAzīzī, Una edizione parzialmente conosciuta della "Historia de Ibn al-Qūṭiyya", in al-Andalus, xxvi (1952), 233-7). This chronicle, which could not have been disseminated before the 5th/11th century, has a special value for the history of al-Andalus in the 3rd/9th century, since it contains traditions, anecdotes, observations and personal impressions, not to be found in any other authors, on specific aspects of life at the Cordovan court and of certain personages. However, it provides, in its first part particularly, only somewhat scanty, imprecise and uncertain information.

Bibliography: Ibn al-Farāḍī, Taʿrīkh ul'amāra al-Andalus, no. 1316; Dabbī, Bughyatul-muḥāram, no. 223; Ibn Khallikān, Bughā, iii, 336 (de Slane, iii, 79); Thaʿālibī, Yatimīa, i, 411; al-Stayhi b. Khālīṣ, Maṣūmā, Istanbul 1302, 58; Suyūṭī, Bughya, 84; Dozy, Histoire de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne, intitulée al-Bayano l-Mogrib, Leiden 1846-57, i, 28-30 (still useful); Wüstenfeld, Geschichtsschreiber, no. 141; Pons Boigues, Ensayo, no. 45; Brockelmann, i, 130, 8, 252; Muḥammad Ben Cheneb, Ét. sur les personnages mentionnés dans l'Iṣāba al-Andalus, no. 231; Sánchez Alborno, Fuentes de la historia Hispánico-Musulmana del siglo VIII (En torno a los orígenes del feudalismo), ii, Mendoza 1942, 216-23 and index (critical and fundamental). (J. BOSCH-VILA)

IBN KULTÜBÜGHĂ, KĀSIM B. KULTÜBÜGHĂ AL-ḤANAFĪ, Egyptian scholar in hadīṯ and religious law. He was born in Muḥarram 802/September 1399. His father, Kultağhū, a freedman of Sūdūn al-Shaykhūnī (d. 798/1396), died while he was still young. He supported himself in his youth as an accomplished tailor (needleworker) but embarked early upon his religious studies, which he pursued all his life. An early teacher of his was Ẓāz al-Dīn Ibn Djamāʿa (d. 819/1416). His principal Shaykh was Ibn al-Humān (d. 865/1457). Like all the aspiring young scholars of the time, he also studied with Ibn Ḥaǧīr. His travels, not very extensive ones, brought him to Damascus, Jerusalem, Al-Andalus, and Mecca. His professional career was not outstanding. He held only shortlived teaching appointments, for instance, in the Baybarsiyā and in the madrasa of Dīnābāk al-Dījdīwī. Equally shortlived stipends from influential friends, consisting in one instance of a monthly allowance of 800, and in another of 2000 dīrāms, helped him to support his large family. But his scholarly prestige was great, and it seems that his writings and his legal advice work yielded enough income for his needs. He had close Shīfi connections and, in the great debate about mysticism, took a stand favorable to Ibn al-ʿArābī and Ibn al-Fārāḍī. Death came to him on the night of Wednesday-Thursday, 4 Rabīʿ II 879/17-18 August 1474.

His literary production, begun in his nineteenth year, was voluminous, approaching, it would seem, about a hundred titles. Among them, there are several works of historical interest and even a treatise on Avicennan logic. However, practically all he did was in the fields of hadīṯ and law. His works were the usual commentaries on legal school texts, compilations of traditions, glosses, additions, indexes of legal works, compilations of biographies of religious scholars, studies on Abū Ḥanīfa and his Musnad, discussions of individual legal problems, fatwās, and the like. Manuscripts of his more popular works have been preserved in great profusion. The catalogue of the Suleymaniye Library in Istanbul, for instance, lists about seventy manuscripts, among them some twenty of his Tādī al-tarāḏīqīm. This compilation of brief biographies of Ḥanīfa authors was first published by G. Pflügel and made Ibn Kultağhū's name known in the West (Abh. K. M., ii/3, 1862, also Baghādī 1962; a manuscript dated 866 in Chester Beatty 3572[5]). Another of his biographical compilations, the large collection of brief biographies of reliable transmitters entitled al-Thābit min al-nasūdī, is largely preserved in the Ms. Istanbul Körprüli, i, 264 and 1060. An inventory of his surviving writings, let alone a census of autograph copies and important old manuscripts, has