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"The Tripartite Countries (Iran, Pakistan and Turkey)
of the Regional Cooperation for Development - A
Geographical Study of a Regional Grouping"

by

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London,
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ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to analyse the possible economic development in the countries working together for the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). It embodies the study of the resource pattern, which would further the economic development of the participating countries.

The investigation has been mainly directed towards the possible ways of exploiting to a maximum the various resources of the region, on a joint basis. It has for example been found during the course of study that the deficiencies of certain resources in one country could be made up by the other member countries. This possibility of mutual exchange makes the region as a whole appear much richer in resources than the individual countries.

In order to comprehend the magnitude of the task involved, and to visualise ways and means of implementing further development of the countries and the region consistent with the geographical and economic factors which affect such development, the main features of the geography and economy of the regions have been examined. The first four chapters treat the geography of the three countries regarding their area, climate and cultural affinities as well as the stages of economic development reached by the participants, their industrial set up and the historical and political setting. All these aspects have been analytically studied in the following pages, by using secondary sources.

The remaining chapters deal with the degree of cooperation achieved in the first seven years of the Regional Cooperation for Development, outlining the projects implemented and approved and their impression^{UPON} to the respective participants. The study also treats the function of the R.C.D. countries with respect to military alliances to which the member countries were party and which is an assessment of the future role and significance of the Regional Cooperation for Development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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In the end I acknowledge with grateful thanks my debt to Miss Jabeen Bunyad who has been very cooperative and helpful throughout my stay with her in this country.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSInternational Organizations

CENTO	Central Treaty Organization.
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Area.
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariff.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NIOC	National Iranian Oil Company.
RCD	Regional Cooperation for Development.
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization.
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Periodicals

AAA	Annals of the Association of American Geographers.
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit.
GJ	Geographical Journal.
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
MEJ	Middle East Journal
OG	Oriental Geographer.
PGR	Pakistan Geographical Review.
PIIA	Pakistan Institute of International Affairs.
QER	Quarterly Economic Review.
RCDB	Regional Cooperation for Development Bulletin.
RIIA	Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Other Abbreviations

GNP	Gross National Product.
ha	Hectares.
lbs.	Pounds - weight.
Km.	Kilometre.
m.	Metre.
mm.	Millimetre.

PIA	Pakistan International Airlines.
Rs.	Rupees.
Sq. Km.	Square Kilometres.
₹	United States dollars.
tons	Long tons.
One Lakh	100,000
One Crore	10,000,000

Exchange rates August 1971

	<u>Iran</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>	<u>Turkey</u>
	Rials	Rupees	Lira
One £ sterling	18.83	11.43	35.94*
One U.S. \$	76.37	4.72	14.85*

* Turkey devalued on August 9th 1970. Before August 1970 the following exchange rates obtained:--

One £ Sterling	21.8 Lira
One \$ U.S.	9.0 Lira

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CHAPTER 1

GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE THREE COUNTRIES

I.1 Introduction

The idea of cooperation among the Muslim countries dates back to Jamalud-Din-Afghani (1839-1897 A.D.) who was the modern messenger of Pan-Islamism.¹ Abdul Hamid II, the sultan of Turkey in 1882 welcomed the idea of cooperation among the Middle East countries. Nationalism had become a powerful doctrine in Egypt and there was a growing conflict within the Muslim community on the issue of whether prior loyalty should be given to one particular section of the Islamic world or to the whole. Generally, however, the link of religion proved its ineffectiveness whenever the interests of individual states were in conflict with it or with each other. Besides, there was no great Muslim power to govern the nucleus of any United Muslim state. Nevertheless, the ideal of an integrated Muslim brotherhood persists. It does not conflict with nationalism in theory, but on the level of political and social theory there was some reconciliation brought about by Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and in recent times by writers and politicians like Zia Gokalp in Turkey, Sheikh Mohammad Abdu in Egypt and Iqbal in Pakistan.

1. Hussain (Arif), Pakistan, its Ideology and Foreign Policy, Frank Cass, London, 1966, p.131.

The formation of Regional Cooperation for Development on 24th July 1964 was not a surprise, for the three countries - Iran, Pakistan and Turkey - have had previous ties which were conducive to a regional arrangement of this kind. Iran, Pakistan and Turkey may be identified as belonging to a distinct cultural area. Although many diversities exist in their cultural patterns and there is no linguistic unity amongst them, essentially these three states are non-Arab and the Turko-Persian culture dominates the lives of their people. The earlier Empires, such as the Ottoman, the Safavid and the Mongol, which united a large part of this area, gave it a common culture.

However, it was primarily due to their national interest and strategic needs that the three countries came together. As early as 1937 Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan concluded the Sadabad Pact,¹ which was fundamentally an assertion of regional cohesion. The pact is important in the sense that it was for the first time the Muslim countries in the Middle East had attempted some form of regional cooperation. The pact made no mention of any form of cooperation in the economic and cultural sphere. Although this pact never proved to be

1. Ramazani (R.K.), The Foreign Policy of Iran - 1500-1941, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1966, p.272. On July 8th 1937 Iran signed a treaty of non-aggression with Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey at the King Riza Shah's Sadabad Palace in Shahr-e Qadisiyah, a northern suburb of Tehran. The draft of the treaty had been signed at Geneva by Iran, Iraq and Turkey on 2nd October 1935 and had been accepted at a later date by Afghanistan.

an effective link between the participating countries, it was important for it was the first regional arrangement embracing any part of the Middle East since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire.

The new concept of Regional Cooperation among countries of the Middle East lying close to the Soviet Union was initiated in 1964. National and strategic interests played the most important roles in bringing Iran, Turkey and Pakistan together, as proved by the fact that, despite cultural and religious ties between these countries, cooperation among them was at first confined mainly to defence. In the year 1955 the Baghdad Pact had been signed between Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Britain, with the United States as an observer.¹ Thus, when these three countries first came together, it was primarily for their own mutual defence and security. Immediately after the Second World War both Turkey and Iran feared that the Soviet Union would try to extend its influence southwards as Tsarist Russia had already attempted to do in the 19th century. In the post-1945 period when Turkey was again subjected to Soviet pressures and Iran was faced with the Azarbaijan crisis, in which the Communists were included, the two countries turned towards the West for aid. In Pakistan, on the other hand, the main source of anxiety was India and not the U.S.S.R., and it was for

1. United Nations Treaty Series, 233, 1956, No.3264.

this reason that Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad Pact, which was Western sponsored, followed NATO 1949 and SEATO 1954, and closed the gap between them. From the Western point of view this was containment of Communist power, i.e. U.S.S.R. and China. From the point of view of Pakistan it was defence against India. The attraction to the Turks of some defensive system which would safeguard their northern flank was obvious, and the same was the case with Iran, but much less so with Pakistan. In 1958 Iraq withdrew from the Pact after the overthrow of the pro-Western Hashimite dynasty, the headquarters of the Baghdad Pact were shifted from Baghdad to Ankara and so the Baghdad Pact was renamed as CENTO.¹ These were the factors which brought into being the CENTO Pact.

Those factors do not exist any more, however. To the Turks and Iranians the fears of the Soviet Union are also receding. Since the Shah's last visit to Moscow in 1956, Russian and Iranian relations have changed from sharp antagonism to superficial concordance.² The U.S.S.R. concluded an

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1. For a detailed account of the Pact's genesis structure and development, see "The Baghdad Pact", The Round Table, 215-224, June 1957.
 2. Quarterly Economic Review, (E.I.U.), Iran, 1965, p.2.

agreement with Iran by which it would undertake to finance and construct an industrial complex ground Esfahan based on a steel mill and other plants to produce machine tools, tractors and agricultural machinery. In exchange Iran would export natural gas to the Soviet Union, possibly from the N.I.O.C. fields at Sarajen and Gorgan. Agreements were signed for the import of 300,000 tons of sugar during the year 1968 of which 75,000 tons was obtained from the Soviet Union under the established bilateral agreement between the two countries.¹

The Soviet Union is giving economic assistance to Turkey in the form of investment loans and technical assistance to develop the country's industries. Pakistan went even further than its other two partners in establishing good relations with the U.S.S.R. Up to 1969 Pakistan had received four Credits from the U.S.S.R. - 30 million dollars for oil exploration, 11 million dollars for import of agricultural machinery, 50 million dollars for import of other machinery and 84 million dollars for two electrical complexes, mineral survey and power station at Mari. Of this, 13 million dollars have been made available during the period 1967-1969.²

-
1. Quarterly Economic Review, (E.I.U.), September 1967, pp.5-7.
 2. Pakistan Journal of Industry, Commerce and Investment, 'Finance and Industry', Vol.4, No.11, 1969.

If the activities of CENTO had remained confined to cooperation for security and defence, which it had originally been designed for, RCD would have hardly evoked any speculation. It would seem quite natural for the three countries to extend the area of their cooperation from defence to economics. The reason why RCD has assumed a significance of its own is that it has been superficially described as an organization outside CENTO and, within CENTO itself, the emphasis has shifted to economics. A study of the economic activities of CENTO shows that they correspond with the declared aims of the RCD, that is the Istanbul Pact. The difference between RCD and CENTO is that the former is not an offshoot of a military alliance with outside powers. Since under RCD regional, economic and cultural cooperation has been agreed upon voluntarily and it does not have as its basis a military Pact, it may prove to be more effective in the long run. It is hoped that Afghanistan might, in the near future, join RCD and if it did, that would not jeopardise the Afghan policy of non-alignment.¹

Although RCD was more an economic agreement than political, still it was hoped that it would lead the three parties to support each other more firmly on political matters. In the outside world, RCD

1. Dawn, Karachi, 18th September 1964.

has generally been accepted as a progressive move similar to the European Common Market. Although its political implications are apparent, yet there has been no hostile criticism of the pact from any power. The Times editorial described RCD as "A natural process, not directed against anybody".¹ The Economist, though critical of the political implications of RCD wrote, "it may direct its energies more toward the real needs of the three countries than CENTO's economic planners have done."²

The rapidly changing pattern of economic and social life in all the countries has led to the growth of regional economic groups. Usually the original impulse for the formation of such groups comes from geographical closeness and deep-rooted historical, political and cultural ties. Attempts have been made recently to develop regional areas of free trade. The idea has gradually emerged, and in post-war Europe, economic cooperation involved a series of bilateral arrangements through the organization of European Economic Community. The Treaty of Rome and the emergence of the European Economic Community were the natural development of this trend. Shortly afterwards a second regional area of free trade was established in Europe known as the European Free Trade Area.

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1. The Times, London, 21st August 1964.
 2. The Economist, London, 15th August 1964, pp.620-21.

The increased emphasis which COMECON has recently acquired is proof that on whatever pattern the economy is organized the need for getting together and cooperating on a regional basis is felt.

As years have gone by and events have followed, the regional groupings for the economic development have become more and more important. Efforts to develop export promotion and import substitution have brought many countries face to face with the needs for harmonising their actions particularly on a regional basis.¹

Just as the economic groupings of other countries, the regional groupings in the development of the countries of Iran, Turkey and Pakistan is a decision of great importance, and the economic survival of these countries may very much depend upon such a cooperation. One of the first vital steps to achieve economic integration between the tripartite countries is the cooperation in trade. The economics of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey are such that pooling of markets will not deliver the goods. The stage of economic and social development, level of financial resources, and in the short term the problem of economic growth are very similar.² Each country of the region has its special commodities which are not

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1. Hanson (J.L.), A textbook of Economics, Macdonald & Evans, Ltd., 1961, p.756.
 2. Journal of Industry, 'Table of the Trade of the Region' (1961-63), Vol.4, No.11, 1964, pp.10-12.

shared by other countries and on which they depend for most of their foreign exchange earnings. In the case of Iran it is oil and for Pakistan it is jute and jute manufactures and in the case of Turkey it is tobacco. Each country depends on one or two commodities for the major part of its export earnings which do not compete with each other in the foreign market.

Currently not much can be done to supply the needs of these countries from the production within the regions except in the case of oil and minerals from Iran and jute manufactures from Pakistan. The RCD countries are trying to develop in the shortest possible time, hence they are embarking on an industrialisation programme which is based on import substitution. Industrial progress based on raw materials produced domestically has to be harmonised with a common policy of imports, otherwise industrial progress may suffer a set back. The substitution of intra-regional trade for extra-regional trade can only be meaningful if it helps in the economic development of the region as a whole. The objectives should not be to expand trade for trade's sake but to expand in the interest of development of the region.

The prospects for expanding intra-regional trade in agricultural commodities particularly rice from Pakistan, tobacco from Turkey, spices from Iran, are bright. The combined effort of the tripartite countries in the field of agricultural production and marketing

is going on. At present most of these products are exported to countries outside the region. As climatic conditions are not very different, the tendency is now to produce similar primary products for their own industries. Intra-regional trade of the commodities produced by these industries needed by other countries of the region will definitely help the regional trade.

Another important aspect is that each of these countries is in relatively similar state of self-realization, believing that their future will be the result of social and economic progress, unaccompanied by violent upheavals and attempts to improve their own position at the expense of neighbours. The growth of projects based upon participation would tend to end the isolation of any one country. Afghanistan must take into account the landlocked position of the country and the fact that it must always rely upon the goodwill of its neighbours for outlets to seas or to any markets beyond its own frontier. Afghanistan could use routes of access to the Indian Ocean through Iran. On the other hand closer ties between the RCD countries would lead to a friendly resolution of the question of outlets and the integration of a part of the Afghan economy with that of this area. It is possible that Pakistan may give special facilities to Afghanistan at the port of Karachi, and that Iran would move ahead to develop the natural harbour of

Chahbahr as a free port, situated just inside the eastern frontier of Iran. It would give economic development to Afghanistan and be of enormous benefit to Iran by opening up the eastern reaches of the country from Meshed down to the Persian Gulf. Industrial development and the creation of facilities are much further advanced in Iran than in Afghanistan, and with trained and skilled engineers as well as with funds Iran has the capability of aiding Afghanistan.

Pakistan has its own reasons for favouring regional ties. The area of West Pakistan has ancient historical ties with Iran and Afghanistan and, on the ethnic grounds, with the Turks. These ties were strongest during the 12th century which began with the invasion of India by way of Afghanistan, continued with the conversion of millions of Hindus to Islam, and had a brilliant climax at the height of the Moghul period. Pakistan is the heir of Moghul power, with its renaissance of Muslim culture. With Afghanistan's cooperation, the RCD pact could be strengthened. It was in 1962 that Pakistan invited Afghanistan to join a federation.¹ An agreement in 1964 was signed between Rawalpindi and Kabul. It is true to say that such efforts for the confederation of the Non-Arab Muslim countries bore

1. Dupree (Louis), "A suggested Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan Federation". The Middle East Journal, Washington, 1963, p.394.

some fruit in July 1964 in the shape of the Istanbul Pact. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have improved since 1963 as the trade, which was once stopped between the two countries due to strained relations, has been resumed and there is the possibility of a joint steel mill to be set up in Afghanistan. So all this augurs well for future Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and may make it easier for Afghanistan to become a member of the Istanbul Pact - which would form an even bigger Muslim Block.

1.2 The Region

The contiguous land-mass extending from Istanbul to Karachi (see Fig. 1) has the attributes of a natural region. It has been the cradle of several ancient rulers - the Achaemenians, the Greeks, the Parthians, the Sassanians, the Abbasids, the Mongols and others. Physically the rulers were anchored in Iran which is a great natural rampart, but it has links with the farthest ends of Turkey and Pakistan. The Plateau has the Persian Gulf in the south, the Indus valley in the east, the Tigris in the west and the Caspian Sea and Central Asian deserts in the north. It is a huge fortress, a well placed unit, and by reason of its location and natural resources it is a potential "Centre of Political Gravity" as Sir Olaf Caroe observes in "The Wells of Power".¹

The region encompassed by the RCD has a total area of 33,46,267 sq. Km. (Turkey 77,69,97; Iran 16,26,513; Pakistan 9,42,756) and a total population of nearly 160 million. There are the physical resources of the region in food grains, agricultural crops and minerals, especially ore, petroleum and natural gas. They can best be tapped through joint planning on a regional basis.

The three countries, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, can be considered as a physical or economic region.

1. Caroe (Sir Olaf K.), The Wells of Power; the oilfields of South Western Asia, London, 1951,

The tripartite countries share many features. They enjoy a degree of basic geographic unity, evidenced by their physical separation from the rest of the Middle East, by their common geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, with which they share many physical features. The area of RCD stretches from the borders of Bulgaria and Greece in Europe to those of Pakistan in Asia.

This region of the tripartite countries is considered as part of the Middle East. There are different opinions of different geographers about the extent of the Middle East region. None would include Pakistan in the Middle East region, although for the most part in its dry climatic conditions and environment it bears a close resemblance to the arid countries of the Middle East, with which it also has strong cultural ties. Scenically, the area is varied with an assortment of rugged mountain ranges, high plateaux and level planes. The first chain of mountain system traverses northern Turkey, northern Iran and northern Pakistan. These mountains, part of the Alpine-Himalayan Tertiary fold system are known in Turkey as the Northern Anatolian or Pontic mountains, in Iran as the Elburz, and in Pakistan as the Sulaiman Range; there is one offshoot which lies towards Afghanistan and is known as Koh-i-Baba and Hindu Kush mountains. In all the three countries are found high active volcano cones, for example Mount Ararat.

The second chain of mountains in this region is also the continuation of the arc entering the area from Europe. In Turkey the system continues as the Taurus, and Anti Taurus mountains, and in Western and Southern parts of Iran as the Zagros mountains, which continue to the south along the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to Pakistan. Along the south west of the Iranian Plateau are a series of high parallel ranges and longitudinal valleys which are the continuation of the Kurdistan mountains of upper Iraq. One elevation reaches 3,917 m, but 2,439 m. is the general height of the ridge crests. These mountains are a succession of anticlines and synclines, somewhat in Appalachian style. The slightly more humid Zagros are succeeded south-eastward by the drier Fars and equally arid Makran next to Pakistan.


The topography of the tripartite countries has common features. All the three countries are surrounded by mountains with barren lands over much of the area. The conditions are quite similar surrounding the arid plateau of Iran and Turkey. Away from the seaboard and coast lands, most of Turkey is at the best semi-steppe country suitable only for pastoral nomads. Much of the plateau is marked by volcanic caves, salt lakes, mud flats and marshes. It is not a single plain but broken by many mountains, hills and gorges. A number of rivers are found and these make life possible. As compared with the complete barrenness of much of the central part

of Iran, Turkey has some cultivation in the central plateau. (See Fig. 1).

The physical characteristics of the Central plateau of Iran is quite similar to that of Turkey. It is also ringed by mountains which range in altitude from 305 m. to 6,000 m. Unlike the central plateau of Turkey it is thinly inhabited and undrained. In about the centre of Iran are the two deserts - Dasht-i-Kavir and Dasht-i-Lut.

Like Iran, Pakistan too has arid lands. In the south-east of the plain there is the Thar desert, which extends into West Pakistan from India. In Bahawalpur the desert is known as the Cholistan and in Khairpur as the Nora. To the west of Jhelum there is the Thal desert which is being reclaimed by the construction of canals. The Plateau of Baluchistan in West Pakistan which is 305 m. high, lies to the west of the Sulaiman and Kirthar mountains. Dry hills run over the plateau from the north-east to the south-west. A large area in the north-west is desert. Besides the arid land, the green and fertile area is also found in the three countries. Pakistan was once covered with natural forests, but for generations they have been cut down or burned to make way for crops and animals. In West Pakistan forests cover about 2.5 per cent of the prairie^{area}, while in East Pakistan it is 16 per cent of the area. Some of the important plantations are at Changamanga and Chichowatni and Wan Bachran.¹

1. Ahmed (Kazi S.), A Geography of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Pakistan, 1964, p.43.



Source: 1. Ahmad, K.S., A Geography Of Pakistan, 1964.

2. Cressey, G.B., Crossroads, 1960.

In Turkey the fertile lands are located in the region around the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara. It is here that the ^{highest} density of population is found. The strip around the Black Sea coast includes some of the best forest areas of the region;


In Iran the most cultivated area is found on the Iranian coast of the Caspian Sea, the coastline is about 644 Km. long and its borderlands roughly coincide with the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran and Gorgan¹. This area that is the Caspian coast is one of the most densely populated areas of the region.

Extremes of climate are characteristic. In winter the temperature falls extremely low whereas in summer it rises very high. In Iran the temperature falls to $- .8^{\circ}\text{C}$ at Tabriz, -1.1°C in Turkey at Kara in the extreme north-east of the region, $- .5^{\circ}\text{C}$ in Pakistan at Murree. In summer in Iran the temperature reaches to 51.6°C at the Persian Gulf, 48.8°C in Turkey, and 43.3°C in Pakistan.

The rainfall also varies greatly. It can reach as much as 254.00 mm annually in the eastern end of the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea coasts. In Turkey it may drop to almost zero, in the deserts of Iran and West Pakistan it is generally arid with low rainfall whereas East Pakistan has generally heavy rainfall. (See Fig. 1).

So taking the above mentioned physical points into consideration, it can be seen how these three countries, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, are to some

¹. See Fig. 1.



Source: Pounds & Kingsbury - An Atlas Of Middle Eastern Affairs, 1966.

D.S. KUREHI

FIG. 1

extent linked together. Not only the countries are contiguous, but the region has a topographic unity and enjoys similar climatic conditions. Besides these, the historical, cultural, political (which are dealt with in the following Chapters) and socio-economic factors are also important.

1.3 Climate

1.3.1. Iran

Iran is a land-bridge between the Mediterranean climate of parts of Asia Minor and the monsoon climate of India. In winter and spring, atmospheric depressions travelling eastwards from the Mediterranean cause the bulk of the rainfall that Iran receives; in summer the influence of the south-west monsoon is felt on the shores of the Gulf of Oman, but the effects are so weak that no rainfall occurs. Apart from the changes in wind direction accompanying the passage of depressions, the surface winds of Iran are mainly controlled by the pressure system over Central Asia, which is high in the winter and low in summer. In winter winds from a northerly quarter prevail almost throughout Persia. In summer a low-pressure belt extends from Sind to the Persian Gulf and Arabia. Since these winds come from over the land mass of Asia they are relatively dry and condemn the greater part of Iran to intense aridity.

Iran lies in sub-tropical latitudes where the summer should be hot and the winter delightfully warm. But because of the size and relief of the country, the climate is extreme with winters being abnormally cold for the latitude. The northern and western mountains derive much moisture in winter and spring from easterly moving depressions, but the country to the south and east of these highlands is rainless and arid. This area which covers about two-thirds of the whole kingdom, is a series of vast silt-filled basins lying for the most part at 915 m. to 1,525 m. above

sea level. The temperature drops rapidly after sundown all the year, and in winter the nights are bitterly cold. In the same way the hot summer conditions change suddenly to cold winter weather. Rains are low and erratic, and evaporation occurs at a high rate through the prevailing high temperatures and strong winds, which blow unchecked over the flatter areas. These strong winds also emphasise the extreme seasonal temperatures. These climatic features are sufficiently distinctive to give the name 'Iranian type' to the climate of other interior plateaux in sub-tropical latitudes.

Climatically Iran consists of two contrasting areas, the rainy mountain fringes of the north, and west, and the arid lands of the interior and south.

- a) The coastlands of the Caspian Sea
- b) The Elburz Mountains
- c) The Zagros Mountains
- d) The basins and ranges of interior Iran
- e) The lowlands of the Persian and Oman Gulf.

The first three belong to 'rainy' Persia and the last two to 'arid' Persia. The coastlands of the Caspian Sea have a very humid and uncomfortable climate.¹ The winters are cloudy and wet, temperature 4.4°C; the summers hot and steamy, temperature 36.6°C. The rainfall is abundant, about 5080 mm, for six months of the year, and showery, cloudy periods occur occasionally even in the hot season.

1. Geographical Handbook series, Persia, Naval Intelligence Division, p.156.

The E'burz Mountains form the greatest climatic divide in Iran. To the north is the winter warmth and feverish summer heat of a green tropical landscape. To the south the frigid winters and dry torrid summers of the arid plateau. The air on the northern side contains much moisture, and precipitation is heavy on the lower and middle slopes of the range. The temperature decreases with increasing altitude, but even on Demavend snow usually remains all the year only in sheltered hollows. The influence of the moisture laden winds decreases mostly rapidly eastwards, so that the Khurasan mountain summits are not snow covered in summer and autumn.

The Zagros mountains throughout their length of 1,288 Km. maintain altitudes of over 1,829 m, and in many parts exceed 3,658 m. In summer the temperatures are high - Shiraz, mean temperature is 29.4°C in July. In winter the temperature drops more rapidly with the ascent, and has a mean of 4.4°C . or less for January. However the climate of the Zagros range is distinguished mainly by its precipitation. The most northerly of the exposed slopes have 508 mm to 1016 mm in a year, and rain or snow may fall almost every day for two or three weeks in winter. In southern Fars the Zagros mountains begin to lose most of their climatic affinities with wetter Iran. Throughout the range the snowfalls of winter and spring may be heavy, and snow-cover may continue for some weeks or months in the colder wetter parts.

The basins of interior Iran cover about 906,497 sq. Km. of territory that is distinguished climatically by its aridity and extreme of temperature. In summer the skies are practically cloudless and the sun's rays so powerful that despite the altitude temperatures are little lower than those on the plains of the Persian Gulf. The July means increase from between 26.6°C and 29.4°C in the north to about 32.2°C in the south and east. Winters are cold, the January means being scarcely above freezing point. On most of the northern half of the area, the temperature falls below zero and frosts may occur in October and April. The annual total rainfalls average about 2540 mm in the north and less than 1270 mm in most of the south and south-east.

The lowlands of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman are distinguished from the interior by the intense heat and oppressiveness of their hot season, and mildness of their winters. The plains of Khuzistan are the hottest in Iran, mean temperature exceeding 32.2°C . Away from the coast discomfort is alleviated by a strong north-westerly wind movement. The winters are mild, although slight frosts occur in most places, while in summer the wind over the coastlands of the Persian Gulf is relatively humid (relative humidity 70%). Similar hot weather prevails over the Gulf of Oman. At Bushire the temperature never drops below freezing point; the Makran Coast has the warmest winters in Iran, night temperatures below 9.9°C being rare. Absolute drought prevails from at least May to September and occasionally extends into December.

1.3 . 2. Pakistan

The whole of West Pakistan and almost the whole of East Pakistan lie in a warm temperate zone. Only a small south-eastern part of East Pakistan is situated in the torrid zone or within the tropics.

There is a great contrast in the climate of the two parts. Much of West Pakistan is at a great distance from the sea and to the north and west there are high mountainous regions. The climate is on the whole arid and extreme or continental. The rainfall is generally low. The summers are hot and the winters are cold. As East Pakistan is a much smaller area, no part of it lies at any great distance from the sea and there are no high mountains. It has for the most part a wet and moderate (and mild) climate. The rainfall is generally heavy and while summers are hot, winters are by no means cold.

From the point of view of temperature, the year in both regions can be divided into two seasons:

1. A summer that lasts from April to September
2. A winter that lasts from October to March

In summer monsoon rains are general throughout both wings of the country. The main rainy seasons being from July to September in West Pakistan and from June to September in East Pakistan.

West Pakistan has four temperature regions¹.

1. Qureshi (Ahmed K.), "Climatic Regions of Pakistan," Pakistan Geographical Review, Vol.2, No.2, 1965, p.27.

The first in the northern and north western mountains of Pakistan experiences very cold winters with heavy falls of snow, and mild summers. The range between the hottest and coldest months is 1.1°C .

Second, the plains to the south of the region have a continental type of climate. The temperatures in summer are very high. At this time of the year the dry winds, called 'loo', blow during the day. The heavy rainfall brought by thunderstorms produces a slight decrease in temperature. June is the hottest month in this region - 23.8°C to 26.6°C is the lowest. The highest recorded temperature in Jacobabad is 52.2°C .

Third, in the south and near the sea, there are not such extremes of temperature. The proximity of the sea makes the atmosphere humid. In winter, temperatures are about 6.6° lower than they are in the summer.


Fourth, on the Baluchistan plateau conditions are similar to those in the northern region, but the temperatures are high in summer and not so low in winter.

Both wings of Pakistan are dominated by monsoon winds and most of their rainfall comes during the summer monsoons. The Arabian Sea branch of the monsoon blows over West Pakistan, and the Bay of Bengal branch over East Pakistan. The climate of Pakistan can be divided into the following climatic regions.

West Pakistan is divided into four climatic regions:¹--


1. Sub-tropical coastlands. It includes the southern coastal strip. The annual rainfall is less than 1778 mm but the humidity is high. Under the influence of the sea, the temperatures are moderate, and there is a steady inflow of sea-breezes throughout the summer.
2. Sub-tropical continental lowlands. This includes the whole of the plain of West Pakistan except the coastlands. Arid and extreme climate, with high summer temperatures and mainly late summer monsoon rains. Rainfall is less than 2540 mm and falls in summer. In the northern part the rainfall is adequate for cultivation.
3. Sub-tropical continental highlands. Cold, snowy winters, mostly arid with mainly winter and spring rains. This region includes mountains to the north and west of the Indus plain. It has cold snowy winters and spring rains. The central part of the belt (Kohat-Waziristan) has about 2540 mm of rainfall a year, but precipitation diminishes towards the north in Gilgit and the south in Makran.
4. Sub-tropical continental Plateau, (extreme climate, very arid). This includes the north western part of Baluchistan, which is a very arid desert. The rainfall averages less than 1270 mm a year. Summer temperatures are very high and dust storms are numerous. The winters are cold.

1. See Fig. 3.



Source: Ahmad, K.S., A Geography Of Pakistan, 1964.

FIG.3



Source: Ahmad, K.S., A Geography Of Pakistan, 1964.

FIG.4

East Pakistan is divided into three climatic regions:¹-

1. Tropical wet region. Southern and south eastern parts. It has high humidity, a long hot summer with heavy rainfall, generally above 2032 mm. Winters are dry and mild, and the range of temperature is low. In the southern part of Chittagong District the rainfall exceeds 30480 mm. The climate is modified, to a certain extent, by relief and the hills are cool and pleasant.

2. Sub-tropical wet region. This region includes the northern and north eastern parts. It has high humidity and the rainfall is heavy. The summers are hotter and the winters cooler because it is farther from the sea. The sub montane tract in the north east has the highest rainfall in East Pakistan and therefore the summers are not so hot.

3. Sub-tropical moderately wet region. This includes the central and western parts broadening out towards the west. The humidity is almost as high as in the rest of East Pakistan and the rainfall is moderately heavy (12700 - 15240 mm). Summers are hotter and winters are cooler than in regions 1 and 2. The climate is to a small extent continental, and the temperatures range increases towards the west.

1. See Fig. 4.

1.3 3 Turkey

The climate of Turkey presents a wide range of extremes. Turkey touches the warm temperate Mediterranean, the cold rainy Caucasus and the belt of desert and steppe which runs from the Sahara to Central Asia. The rugged topography inundated plains, steep depressions and high relief of the mountains are all very important from the climatic point of view. If we look at the map of both the relief and climate of a country we can see clearly that relief plays an important part in climatic variations.

The country is throughout subject to the influences of the surrounding land and water masses, the subtropical high pressure area over the northern Atlantic, and the cyclonic disturbances coming from this ocean, especially during the winter period.

According to the prevailing influences the four following chief climatic types can be distinguished.¹

1. The Mediterranean (in the south and west) with hot dry summers and mild, wet winters.
2. The Pontic (in the south) with warm summers, mild winters and sufficient precipitation at all seasons.
3. The Sub-Continental (in the north east) with fairly warm summers, but very cold winters and sufficient precipitation at all seasons.

1. Erinc (Siri), "The Climates of Turkey according to Thornthwaites," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. XXXIX, 1949, p.26.

4. The semi-arid (in the interior and south east) with cold winters and hot, dry summers.

Various climatic types are present because of the country's transitional situation between the areas of temperate and sub-tropical climates and its irregular relief. Three classes of cold climate, together with superhumid, humid, sub-humid and semi-arid climates are found. The greater part of Turkey has the climate of the sub-humid group. In Thrace are only sub-humid and humid mesothermal types, whereas in Anatolia, i.e. in the Asiatic part of Turkey, great variety may be seen. The centre of Anatolia has a semi-arid climate. Surrounding this is a belt of various sub-humid climates, round west and east, extending to the shores of the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmora on the one hand and to Lake Van on the other. The main area of cold climates is confined to the northeastern highlands between Erzerum and Kars. Frost and snow occur throughout the year in Pontic mountainous region.

The distribution of moisture regions reflects largely the influence of relief. The interior plateaux and basins suffer from moisture deficiency, whereas the external slopes of the marginal mountainous ranges are humid. The areas of humid climates are more extensive than those of perhumid climates. Two belts of humid climates fringe central Anatolia on the north and south. The northern belt occupies the Black Sea coast and the southern belt increases in elevation from west to east.

1.4 Mineral Resources of R.C.D. Countries¹

1.4 1. Iran

Iran is rich, not only in Petroleum but also in a wide range of other minerals, though serious commercial exploration has only just begun and other minerals have not yet been developed to the extent of oil exploration.

Lead and Zincs - Iran until recently was the 25th lead-zinc exporting country in the world. By 1964 Iran had become the 12th leading exporter of lead in the world. Lead and zinc are mined at Bafq near Yazd, at Khomein west of Esfahan and at Ravanj near Qum, with a combined potential of 600 tons of concentrates daily.

Chrome - Although discovered in Iran in 1940, commercial export did not begin until 1952. Chromite is the second largest foreign exchange earner of the exported minerals after lead. It is found mostly from the Elburz mountains and near Bandar Abbas.

Iron - It is produced from the deposits in the Elburz, in Yazd, Kerman and at Esfahan. Known iron ore deposits were at Shamsabad and Bafq, believed to hold 120 million tons. A recent discovery is the Chograd mine which will be the source of the first ore to be supplied to Esfahan steel mill, scheduled to go into production in 1971. Chograd is said to be rich enough to supply the mill's requirements for

1. See Fig. 5.

25 to 50 years and estimated to have iron deposits of about 140 million tons.¹ Some more deposits of iron ore have been discovered in Kerman Province of about 112 million tons.²

Coal - Coal deposits have been produced near Tehran and in Eastern Mazandaran (total production was 300,000 tons). About 67 million tons of coal has also been discovered in Kerman province.

Sulphur and Salt are produced on the coast of the Gulf, near Bandar Abbas. Deposits of copper ore have been found in Azarbaijan, Kerman and in Yazd and Anarak areas. About 8,000 tons of copper ore is mined annually in Azarbaijan. A very important deposit of copper has been found at Sas Chesmeh near Kerman; some deposits have also been discovered at Mazraeh Ahar, northeast of Tabriz.

Petroleum - The major industry of Iran is the oil industry, to which the second largest town of Abadan owes its entire existence. The Abadan refinery is one of the largest in the world. Its output in 1968 averaged some 410,000 barrels per day. Iran's second refinery at Karmanshah produces an average of 8,000 barrels per day for regional economic consumption. In 1968 a third refinery was completed at Tehran. The largest field is Agha Jari which has produced 2,000 million barrels of crude oil. The second largest

1. Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac, 1970, Tehran, p.301.

2. Ibid.

field is Gach Saran where production averaged over 665,000 barrels per day in 1967.¹ Since 1960 a number of new fields have been brought into production, including Ahwaz (1960) and Pazanu (1963), Kharg, Karaj and Bibi Hakimeh (1964), Marum (1965), Ramshir, Raje Safid and Paris (1966). Both Bibi Hakimeh and Marum are now included among the four largest producing fields in Iran. Total production from fifteen fields amounted to 132.9 million tons in 1968. Iran is now the largest producer in the Middle East and the fourth largest in the world.

1.4.2. Pakistan

Pakistan possesses^{as} a varied assortment of potential mineral wealth which has hardly been tapped as yet. Concerted search has revealed an impressive reserve of natural wealth. Natural gas, coal, iron ore, chromite, barytes, gypsum and other minerals have been found in both wings of Pakistan.

Coal - Coal is one of the principal minerals produced in Pakistan and consumed on an extensive scale. The production is ~~not~~ sufficient for the country's needs. In 1965 it was 1½ million tons and the rest had to be imported. It is expected that the production will reach to 4.8 million tons by 1975. The main coal mines are at Dandot and Pidh

1. Europa Publications Ltd., The Middle East and North Africa, 1970-71. Seventeenth Edition, p.271.

in the eastern salt range and at Makarwal in the western, or trans Indus salt range. Other fields include Nakus and Zardalu in Khost Shahrig - Harnai region, the Singidi-Les coalfields near Quetta, and the Jhimpir field near district of Tatta.

In East Pakistan coal is of good quality and has been found at Sunamganj in Sylhet and Sibganj in Rajshahi, and some deposits in the Khulna District.

Iron Ores - The known iron ore resources in Pakistan are estimated at over 400 million tons. The largest known iron ore deposits, of more than 300 million tons, are located in Kalabagh-Makarwal area and may become the principal source of iron ore for a national iron and steel industry. Total available resources of iron deposits in Hazara regions are about 60 million tons. Recently discovered iron deposits near Langrial Hazara district are estimated to be about 27 million tons. Some deposits are in Chitral at Dammer Nissar, at Ziarat in Quetta and at Dalbandin and Chagai.

Chromite - This ore is mined in the Hindubagh (Zhob District). The production, which is still increasing was 14,000 tons in 1965. New deposits have been found in Kharan Waziristan (near Tangi, thirty miles from Peshawar).¹

1. Ahmed (Kazi S.), A Geography of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1964, p.103. Also got information from the Pakistan High Commission in London.

Salt - There are deposits of excellent quality of rock salt in the western part of Pakistan near the sea coasts. There are six salt mines and quarries in the western wing at Khewra (Jhelum), Warcha (Sargodha), Kalabagh (Mianwali) and at Jatta, Bahadurkhel and Karak (Kohat).

Gypsum - is found in large deposits in the salt range and the western mountains of West Pakistan, the most important being Khewra, Dandot and Daud Khel in the former, and Spintangi, Kohat and Rohi in the latter.

Lead ore - has been found in Hazara, Chitral, Las Bela and Chagai.

Marble - of very good quality and in a wide range of colours is found at Nulla Ghosi, Maneri and the Ghundai Tarko hill in Mardan District; also in the State of Swat and at Chagai in the Quetta Division. Some of these marbles are among the best in the world. In Campbellpur District near Fatehjang is the Kala-Chitta range (black and white marble), and near Nazampur village is the Kawagar hill which yields absi (pink marble).

Asbestos - has been mined in small quantities north of Hindubagh, and sulphur is to be extracted from the extinct volcano, Koh-i-Sultan (Chagai District).

Petroleum. Before independence Pakistan had only one small refinery at Rawalpindi processing local production. The first refinery to be set up after independence was at Korangi, Karachi and it went into production in October 1962. The next venture started in 1960 was also located in the Korangi industrial area, has a capacity of half a million tons and is mainly producing diesel oil, kerosene oil and jet fuels. The third refinery based on imported crude oil is under installation at Chittagong, and is to have a capacity of one million tons. While the refinery at Rawalpindi meets the need for motor gasoline, fuel oil and a part of kerosene oil, those at Karachi meet the demand of ships for fuel and of foreign airlines calling at Karachi.

¹Natural Gas - In all there are 14 gas fields in Pakistan - six in the Eastern wing and eight in the Western. Their total reserves have been estimated at over 21.80 billion cubic feet. The gas fields are at Giri, Zin, Uch, Khairpur, Mari, Dhulian Mazarani and Khand Kol in West Pakistan, and in East Pakistan at Sylhet, Chattak, Rashidpur, Kailash Tila, Titas and Habiganj.

The country's oil and gas industry has recently located two new promising gas-fields, one at Baldi,

1. Twenty Years of Pakistan, 1947-1967, Pakistan Publications, Karachi, August 1967, p.245.

near Chittagong, and the other at Sari, about 81 Km. from Karachi.

1.4 3. Turkey

The three countries represent a market with a population of about 160 million people, which represents a huge potential for economic growth. Turkey possesses rich mineral reserves and has copper, chrome and borax in abundance. In fact so far as the first two ores were concerned, Turkey has one of the richest reserves in the world. Further it has diversity of rich mineral resources, and these are an important item in the country's foreign trade. Between 1964 and 1968 mining production rose by some 33 per cent. An investment of £T. 4,100 million is planned during the second plan, with the biggest increases in production expected from copper ore, petroleum, and iron ore. Turkey's mineral resources have not been measured accurately, but investigations are being carried out in all parts of the country.

Some of the other important minerals of Turkey are as follows -

Coal - Bitumous coal is found at and around Zenguldak on the Black Sea coast. The seams are steeply inclined, and much folded, and strongly faulted. The mines constitute the Etibank's largest operation, and the coalfield is the largest in this part of the world, including the Balkans. Production has risen from around 6,000,000 tons in 1962 to 7,457,000 tons in 1967 and 7,506,000 tons in 1968.

Lignite. - It is found in many parts of Central and Western Anatolia. Seams located in Western Turkey are operated by West Lignite Mines. Total production amounted to 6,400,000 tons in 1966 and 1967 and indicated a rise in 1969 when production exceeded 8,000,000 tons. The chief mines are at Soma, Değiranisaz and Tunçbilek.

Iron Ore - Practically all the production comes from Divrigi iron ore mine situated between Sivas and Erzerum in north-east Turkey. Between 1963 and 1968 production has more than doubled, reaching 2,223,400 tons in the latter year.

Chrome - Turkey is the second largest chrome producer in the world. The mineral was first discovered in 1848, near Bursa in the Marmara region. The richest deposits today are in Guleman in south-eastern Turkey, in the vicinity of Iskenderun; in the area around Eskisehir, north-west Anatolia; and between Fathiye and Antalya on the Mediterranean coast. The Guleman mines produce 25 percent of the country's total. Production rose to a record figure of 689,000 tons in 1966 but dropped in 1967 to 614,000 tons and 607,000 tons in 1969.

Copper.- Copper has been mined in Turkey since ancient times. Present day production comes from the Ergani mines, situated at Maden in Elazığ and

All the figures are quoted from The Statesman's Year-book, 1970-71, Edited by John Paxton, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1970.

the Murgul Copper Mines at Borçka. A third copper complex is planned for Samsun. Annual production of refined copper and blister is about 35,000 tons, most of which is exported to Federal Germany, the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. Copper content of the ore reserves is estimated at about 255,000 tons at Ergani and 400,000 tons at Murgul mines.

Other minerals - Manganese, magnesite, lead, sulphur, salt, asbestos, antimony, zinc and mercury are important mineral resources. Of these Manganese ranks first in importance. Deposits are found in areas near Eskisehir and in the Ergeli district. Lead is mined at Keban, west of Elaziz. Turkey's bauxite deposits are about to be developed for the first time. An aluminium complex is being built at Kayseri with Soviet help. Petroleum - oil was first struck in 1950, it now meets about half of total Turkish requirements. There are some recently discovered deposits at Gazan and Ramandag, Magrip, Batiraman and Kurtalan. The largest oil refinery in Turkey is at Mersin, the capacity being 4,700,000 tons of crude oil a year.

1.5 The Concept of R.C.D. Countries Unity -
Common Problems of Economic Growth

Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are under-developed countries and as such they are facing many common problems. For instance there is the ever-present danger of high rate of population growth, there is a lack of capital formation and an infrastructure suitable for economic development and there is the dearth of trained managers and technicians who are indispensable for industrial progress.

Before going into greater details, however, it would be worthwhile to get some idea of the economic conditions prevailing in these countries. To some extent all the three countries are essentially agricultural countries with a large agricultural base.

During the course of history, these countries have become merely the suppliers of raw materials and the buyers of finished products. Their terms of trade have not been favourable in relation to industrial raw materials which they urgently need; such fluctuations have led to instability in their economies.

All the three countries have essentially mixed types of economies having a large and flourishing private sector. Most of the areas of investment are open to private individuals although economic controls have an important place in the overall economic development.

The Government of the three countries have already accepted the necessity of planning and are busy implementing their development plans. In the case of Pakistan, most of the industrial targets set forth in the Second Plan (1960-65) have been achieved. The country has demonstrated its capacity to achieve growth rates higher than 5 percent per annum in both East and West Pakistan. The investment level is estimated to have risen to over 18 percent of G.N.P. The increase in national income is estimated to be over 29 percent compared to the Plan targets of 24 percent.

The Third Plan (1965-70) stipulates an increase of 68 percent in development expenditure over the five-year period, and the annual compound rate of about 11 percent. During the Plan period the annual rate of growth in G.N.P. is estimated at 6.5 percent as compared to 5.2 percent during 1960-65.

Similarly during the Third Plan of Iran (1963-68) the G.N.P. has increased at an average annual rate of 8.6 percent. The industry and mining sectors contributed largely to economic growth with an average annual growth rate of 14 percent. Agriculture, although continuing to form the largest single sector of G.N.P., has shown a

disappointing rate of growth and has gradually declined in importance as a contributor to national output.¹ G.N.P. is projected to increase at an average annual rate of 9.4 per- cent during the Fourth Plan.

So far as Turkey is concerned, she is also busy implementing her industrial development Plan. In spite of the steady increase in industrialisation during the last ten years, Turkey is still predom- inantly an agricultural country. Although 40 per- cent of her export earnings are still derived from agricultural products, the share of industry has increased from 16 percent of the national income in 1950 to 23 percent in 1964, and imports of capital goods and raw material have also increased considerably while that of consumer goods have relieved. Private investment has contributed a great deal to maintain the upward trend in the industrial sector.

1. Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, 1970, Tehran, Iran, p.241.

Common Problems of Economic Growth

1.5 1 Population¹


It is with these facts in mind that we should try to study some of the basic economic problems that are being faced in the region and which have made it important for unity of the tripartite countries. One of the most important problems is that of rapid increase in population. Pakistan's current population is 102 million and is increasing at the rate of around 2.6 percent.

Rapid increase in population has also been experienced in the case of Turkey where population has about doubled itself to 80 million from 15 million in 1939. The annual rate of increase is about 2.8 percent. This is a very high rate of growth and necessitates rapid economic development so that suitable jobs may be provided for the increasing labour force and per capita incomes maintained.

So far as Iran is concerned, she has a relatively less acute population problem at this stage because of vast uninhabited areas. However, population is increasing at a high rate of 2.5 percent per annum.

In general terms, the pressure of population on land, particularly arable land, provides a good

1. See Fig. 6.



Source: Pounds & Kingsbury - An Atlas Of Middle Eastern Affairs, 1966.

indication of the relative shortage or excess of manpower in a country. In the case of Pakistan, the pressure of population on land is extremely high, particularly in East Pakistan which is one of the most densely populated regions of the world, with an average density of about 922 persons per square mile, or 2.6 square Km. The western region on the other hand is comparatively sparsely populated with 138 persons per square mile or 2.6 sq. KM, although in this region, the population is increasing at a fast rate.

The comparative figures for Turkey and Iran are 93 persons per square mile or 2.6^{per} Sq. KM and 37 persons per square mile or 2.6^{per} Sq. KM respectively. In relation to arable land, the figures for the three countries are 120 persons per 100 acres or 247^{per} ha for West Pakistan and 277 persons per 100 acres or 247^{per} ha for East Pakistan; 44 persons per 100 acres or 247^{per} ha for Turkey and 14 persons per 100 acres or 247^{per} ha for Iran.¹ The output per head in these countries can be increased if the quality of the labour force is improved, and this can be done by free movement of trained labour within the region which could help to maximize output.

1. The estimates with regard to population are based on population data for the year 1960-61.

1.5 2 Lack of Capital

The lack of capital is a common feature in all the three countries. There are two aspects of this problem which should be emphasised. First, domestic savings are not sufficient for investment purposes. These will need to be stimulated and mobilised through the setting up of cooperative societies and savings banks of various kinds to mobilise savings on a large scale.

Secondly, the distribution of personal incomes is unequal within all the countries of the region, a problem which only can be tackled by appropriate fiscal legislation. Another aspect of this lack of capital is the heavy dependence of the countries on external resources for their development programmes. Iran has a potential for earning foreign exchange because of her oil, but even in that country the need for foreign capital is paramount. Similarly, Pakistan and Turkey need foreign capital whether Government or private on a large scale.

1.5 3 Infrastructure

The countries in the region lack an infrastructure for economic growth. There is the lack of suitable roads, railways and other means of communication, so that both processed goods as well as raw materials may be supplied from one place to another. There is also the problem of developing electricity and power on a sufficiently large scale which may form a basis for the development of industries in different regions. All the three countries are busy developing power generating and

engineering projects but since these have a long planning and construction period, their results are not at once evident.

Major developments related to the infrastructure are going ahead in all three countries. Investment in road, port and other communication facilities is a relatively high proportion of total investment.


CHAPTER 22.1 HISTORY AND POLITICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE EASTERN CALIPHATE2.1.1. The Arab Empire - (Rise and Spread of Islam)¹

Islam, more than any other force, has given the Middle East its distinctive identity. The social, cultural and political life of every nation in the region, including Christian Lebanon and Jewish Israel, bears the stamp of this latest of the Western world's three great religions. After more than thirteen centuries the spiritual force of Islam is still vital, and is still the one pattern that covers the whole Middle East.

When the founder of Islam, Muhammad, was born in the sixth century A.D., his native Mecca was in great turmoil. The decline of trade with Europe through the dislocation of routes to the West by successive battles between the Eastern Roman Empire and its Iranian Sassanid neighbours adversely affected the economy of the Arabian peninsula.

In Mecca the Prophet faced much opposition since his ideas endangered established pagan worship at the Kabah from which the town's merchant oligarchy earned great profits. It was in 622 A.D. that Muhammad along with his few dozen followers

1. See fig. 7 - The Muslim Expansion



Source: Historical Atlas Of The Muslim Peoples, Amsterdam, 1957.

moved from Mecca to Medina some 200 miles away. This hijra¹ was later designated the beginning of the Muslim era. In Medina, Muhammad became the town's leading warrior, legislator, judge and civil administrator, planting the just seeds of the Muslim states that were later established in Syria and Iraq by his successors. Strengthened by his success in Medina, he returned to his home town and conquered it. By 632 A.D. most of the Arabian Peninsula was subjugated.

Following the death of Muhammad on June 8, 632, the newly born Muslim Community was confronted with the problem of succession to the Caliphate which remained a living issue until the twentieth century when the Kemalists abolished its Ottoman phase and several Pan-Islamic Congresses were subsequently held in Mecca and Cairo to determine the rightful heir, but all without success.

The aged Abu-Bakr was by a form of loose election declared successor, thus ushering the first series of Caliphs, that of the Orthodox, so called because they followed closely in the footsteps of the Prophet. The seat of this short-lived Caliphate was Medina (632-661). During the reign of Abu-Bakr (632-634) the entire peninsula was brought under the sway of Islam.

1. The migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina, the starting point of the Islamic era.

The first significant task facing the new leadership was to maintain the degree of centralization in Arabia already established by Mohammad. Except for Medina, Mecca, and a few other nearby places thoroughly controlled by the Muslims of Medina, most of the Arabs renounced the political and fiscal authority of Medina. Khalid Ibn-al-Walid subdued the tribes of Central Arabia, many of which had not been conquered by Muhammad. Following this Islam was thoroughly established throughout Arabia, including Bahrayn, Oman, Yamen and Hadhramaut.

The reign of the second Caliph, Umar (634-644) marked the opening of a ten-year administration of an energetic and brilliant man. In fact he strengthened Islam with many religious decrees and renewed the theocratic state of Muhammad's time. During the reign of the second Caliph the banner of the new faith was carried eastward to Persia, westward to Barca in North Africa, and northward to the Taurus. These permanent conquests developed into military campaigns that netted for Islam an empire that extended in the Umayyad Caliphate from Spain and France in Europe to Turkestan and India in Asia, covering all North Africa. Such rapid and brilliant successes at the expense of the two world powers of the day - the Byzantine and Persian - were astounding, not only in themselves but in their result.

¹Over the next several years parties raided Khuzistan, took Sus, and advanced toward Isfahan. Iranian forces rallied at Hamadan, but with the removal of Umar's ban on advances into Iran, Muslims over-ran that land from one end to another. In ten years of Umar's Caliphate, Muslim armies had, in an amazing and almost unbelievable sweep, conquered Mesopotamia and Iran. Other armies at the same time were engaged in conquering Syria and Egypt.

Umar's accession to the Caliphate did not change Muslim activities in Palestine or Syria. Several Arab forces converged upon Damascus in 635, and after a siege of more than six months the city capitulated to Khalid. During his Caliphate, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Egypt became parts of the Muslim world. They, together with Arabia, are still today the heartland of Islam.²

Uthman was a member of the very prominent and powerful Umayyad family of the Kuraysh. Noted for his mild manners and his piety, his only distinction as a Muslim leader was having been a respected companion of the Prophet Muhammad. He repulsed a

1. Fisher (Nettleton S.), The Middle East - (A History), New York, 1959, p.49.

2. Ibid.

large Byzantine army in 647, and in subsequent years sent raiding parties into Asia Minor. He too built a fleet, took Cyprus in 649 and destroyed a large part of the Byzantine navy off the Lycian Coast.

Arab armies were active during these years in Iran, ever fanning out eastward. Fars was fully subdued by 650, inroads were made into Armenia in 652, and before the end of Uthman's Caliphate raiding expeditions reached Balk, Kabul and Ghazna.

Ali, Muhammad's cousin, was the fourth Caliph, who, as an individual soldier in his younger days, had shown as one of the great heroes of Muslim battles. Generally throughout the Muslim world he was recognized as the Caliph, and the new governors appointed by him were accepted everywhere except in Syria, where Muwiyah refused to resign.

When Ali was proclaimed the Caliph in 656, the Arabs had conquered nearly all the Middle East, including the region from the Egyptian frontier to the borders of present day Pakistan. During the Umayyad era the Arab Empire expanded to its maximum extent. It swept across North Africa and up into Spain and France; it reached the gates of Byzantine Constantinople; it spread into Central Asia beyond the Oxus river to the north and into the Indus valley to the east.¹ By 732, the Arab rule extended

1. Peretz (Jon), The Middle East Today, New York, 1963, p.24.

from the Atlantic ocean to the boundaries of India and China.¹ Although the religious factor was important, the Umayyad Caliphate laid stress on the economic and political structure of the Government, attempting to centralize their new empire.

Although the Umayyad dynasty brought the Arabs to the apogee of their territorial expansion, it was marked by numerous internal weaknesses. When the Arabs moved northward out of the peninsula, there were two major powers on the Middle Eastern scene, Christian Byzantine and the Zoroastrian Sassanid Kingdom of Iran. For 300 years these two empires had contended with each other for control of the Middle East.

2.1.2. The Arab Expansion

The Byzantine Empire included the Balkans, Asia Minor, the Levantine coast, the Nile Valley, and North Africa as far west as Libya. The Iranians held the area from present day Pakistan west to Iraq, bordering on the Byzantine provinces. Both the powers were weakened by their struggle and a new propelling Arab force erupted. Arabic and Islamic influences gradually spread throughout most of the Middle East. The region closest to Arabia became Arabic in language and culture, although

1. See Fig. 7 - The Muslim Expansion.

many groups with more sophisticated and complex religions remained non-Muslim, retaining their distinctive cultural traits.

Throughout a much more extensive area whole populations converted to Islam without absorbing the Arabic language and culture. The advantages of conversion was that they were exempted from paying the taxes in lieu of military services.

The non-Arab Islamic area included the present day states of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. Muslim missionaries later converted millions in Indonesia, China and as far from Arabia as the Philippines. Iran and Pakistan became Muslim although not Arab, the Arabs being driven from these countries after they had converted most of the population but before the language could take root. Then the Turkish tribes over-ran Anatolia and the Balkans, bringing the Muslim religion with them long after the decline of the Arab Empire. Thus millions of Albanians, Yugoslavs and Bulgars also became Muslims.

The early Muslim conquests were nominally directed by a central power with headquarters just in Arabia, then in the Umayyad capital at Damascus, Syria, and after 762 in the Abbasid Baghdad in Iraq. For five centuries after the Muslim Empire reached the zenith of its western conquests in 732, it held

its ground, receding only slowly in the west. Each block tended to expand away from the centre of power. The Latins pushed northward, seizing the Baltic regions and cementing the western Slavs. The Byzantines evangelized the Balkans and spread into Russia. Islam continued its expansion into east and central Asia and Africa.

It was during the illustrious Caliphate of Abd-al-Malik and his son that the Arab Empire reached its height from Tours in northwestern France to Kashgar in Chinese Turkestan, an extent equalled by only few empires in history. Spain in the course of these conquests, was brought within the embrace of Islam, where it remained in full or in part for seven centuries; the Indus Valley was subdued and its conquest, after a long period of chequered history, emerged as late as 1947, as the state of Pakistan. For the first time vital contact was established with a new ethnic element, the Turks, destined to become the great champions of militant Islam in Eastern Europe.

The year 750 witnessed the inauguration of a new Caliphate, that of the Abbasids, with whom the centre of gravity in Islam shifted from Syria to Iraq. The Abbasids were so named from an uncle of the Prophet Muhammad. Their assumption of power

was consequent on their victory over their Umayyad rivals in the Battle of the Zab, a tributary of the Tigris. On the Abbasids side, Shiites and Persians were arrayed. The Abbasid dynasty was the longest-lived (750-1258) and the most renowned of all the Caliphates. Its orientation was Persian.

The real founder of the Abbasid Caliphate was the second in series, Al-Manṣur (754-775) who built the City of Baghdad which later developed into an emporium of trade. That was in the days of Harun-al-Rashid (786-809).

The bulk of Muslim "foreign" trade was with the Far East. From Baghdad and Basra, Muslim merchants carried their goods by sea to China, India and the Archipelago, but the main route to China lay overland through Samarkand. Trade with Italy, France and Germany, or with Constantinople, Russia and Scandinavia was undoubtedly profitable.

¹Concurrent with the rich agriculture and brisk commerce of the Abbasid Empire, there developed an active industry in every province. Artisan traditions of the ancient Middle East had never perished, and under a relatively secure political system these industries revived and expanded.

1. Hitti (Philip K.), History of the Arabs, (from the earliest times to the present), Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, 1968, p.343.

Textiles of linen, cotton, silk and wool were the most important. Although each area produced high quality fabrics of many types, every city or province excelled in some particular pattern or technique; carpets from Bukhara, silk from Kufah, linens from Egypt, and brocades from Shiraz gained world renown.

The science of paper making was acquired from China, and by the tenth century paper mills existed in Iran and Egypt. In the twelfth century one was built in Spain. Fibre glass was produced in Egypt. The ceramic industry in the Middle East reached back into the most distant past, and the Abbasid era created some of the finest potteries and glazed tiles. Middle Eastern artisans were equally skilled in the shaping, working and hammering of metals; iron, steel, brass, copper, silver and gold.

The Middle East in the eighth and ninth centuries utilized many arts, skills and techniques of the handicrafts of China, India, Iran and the East Roman Empire, and those of the early civilizations of Greece, Egypt and Mesopotamia. The synthesis of these gave great life to Muslim industry, which was regarded in Europe as the best of the ages.

The rise of a new power in Persia, the Saljuqs, destroyed the ascendancy of the Buwayhids, and the

guardianship of the Caliph passed into their hands. This new and vigorous Turkish race, which first appears in Muslim history at the beginning of the eleventh century, entered upon a career of conquest by which it built up an empire, stretching in the days of its greatness from the Oxus and the Hindu Kush to the Syrian shore of the Mediterranean in the west, and from the north of Persia to the borders of the Arabian desert in the south. The powers of the Buwayhids declined before the rise of this new power, till the Saljuqs swept them away entirely.

2.1. 3. The Arab Caliphates in Iran

The rapid success of the Arabs was due to the exhaustion of the two empires and the unexpected nature, movement and direction of the attack. The Byzantine Empire survived the first shock and lost no more than Syria and Egypt to the Arabs. The Sassanids were completely overthrown because of the extreme dependence of the State upon a particular dynasty. The first stage in the conquest of Persia was completed in 651-652. The Arab hold on Persia was gradually consolidated in the following 50 years, and between 705 and 715 was extended to the regions between the Oxus and Jaxartes to Ferghana.¹

1. Persia, Geographical Handbook Series, Naval Intelligence Division, September 1945, p.251.

Persia became Muslim but never an Arab country, although the Arab script was adopted for writing the Persian language. Except in Khuzistan, which is only an extension of Southern Mesopotamia (Iraq), Arab settlement was numerous enough to form solid Arab zones. In the time of the Arab Caliphates Shi'ism (a religious sect) was never predominant in Persia. But it was always a disturbing factor. This sect bitterly opposed the Umayyad Caliphate which ruled the Muslim world from Damascus between 661 and 750.

The Abbasid Caliphate, which lasted until 1258, moved its capital from Syria to Iraq and it was only for the first century that the Abbasid Caliphs directly controlled the Persian provinces. Within the provinces, Persians began to dominate the intrusive Arab element, and the revival of Persian thought and literature increased its strength in each generation. At Baghdad, Persian scholars contributed to the new Arabic literature, philosophy and science which was the glory of the Abbasid Caliphate, though the direct influence of Persian civilization was perhaps greatest on the material side as in architecture.

In general the Mongol conquests mark the beginning of a new era. It destroyed the life of the Abbasid Empire in Iran, introduced a large Turkoman

or Turanian element into the Iranian population, particularly in Azāpāijan in the west and on the northern fringe of Khurasan in the east, and helped the emergence of the Persian State in the sixteenth century.

2.1.4. The Arabs in Sind

Sind, at the head of the Arabian Sea, was the first province of India to come under Muslim control. In 711 only eighty years after the death of Muhammad, Arab invaders moving across Baluchistan conquered Sind and placed it under the control of the first Umayyad Caliphate. Thus Sind fell under Islamic influence at almost the very moment that Spain did, and these two conquests marked the end and farthest extent of the first great period of Islamic expansion. For several years Sind was occupied by Arab rulers. (The Arabs reached Baluchistan earlier, but Baluchistan, like Afghanistan, lay outside the sub-continent).

At various times in its history, Sind was a more or less independent Muslim kingdom, very often within the sphere of Afghan or Persian influence. Sind is not, however, a natural gateway to the rest of India. Of all the peoples that have poured down into the sub-continent, not many have chosen the southern route across the terrible deserts of Makran.

Now, having arrived in Sind did the early Arab invaders push further across the Indian desert which lies to the east of the Indus delta.

The two towns of Kabul and Kandahar in Afghanistan have historically tended to be the anchor points for almost all incursions into India, and the keys to India's frontiers. The mountains (Hindu Kush) which ring the sub-continent offer three or four natural passes, all in the north-west, and these two towns command the western approach to those passes: the Khyber above Peshawar, the Bolan Pass below Quetta, and several other routes in between - the Kurram valley, the Bannu plain, the Gamal Pass. Aside from the Arab influence in Sind, most of the Muslim influence in India filtered through these passes, which placed the Punjab first in the line of march.


In the tenth century the Punjab was raided many times by Muslim Kings based on the Kabul/Kandahar line, the most destructive being that of Timurlane. At last, in 1524, the history of Muslim rule entered a new phase by the emergence of the Mughals claiming descent from Timurlane who ruled over all north India from the middle of the sixteenth century until the British first appeared.

2.2 The Ottoman Empire

2.2.1. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire¹

The first seriously organized movement of the Turkish tribes on their westward march was somewhere round the year A.D. 1000. Under a leader named Seljuk a large number of them crossed the Oxus River in Central Asia, and penetrated into the northern parts of the Abbasid Caliph's territory in what is now Persia. Their movement was started by other nomadic tribes which were pressing on them from the remoter parts of Central Asia. As they advanced into the Arab Empire they found other Turks who had come before them in command of the outlying Arab garrisons, while others they found as Governors of Arab provinces in the service of the Caliph. Probably for this reason they did not penetrate further south, but left the Caliph's domain to be absorbed later, and meanwhile sought new pastures by turning west towards Anatolia. Crossing the low mountain ranges which separate what is now Persia from Anatolia, they found themselves up against the eastern outposts of the Byzantine Greek Empire; they drove them back and advanced right into the heart of Anatolia. For a time Konia in the heart of Anatolia became the

1. See Fig. 8 - The Ottoman Empire at its Height.



Source: Historical Atlas Of The Muslim Peoples, Amsterdam, p.34, 1957.
 2. Peretz D., The Middle East Today, U.S.A., p.66, 1963.

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FIG-8

Chief Centre of the Seljuks, and during the last of the eleventh century and the early part of the twelfth century the greater part of the Anatolia came under their control. The Byzantine Empire never recovered from the shock, and declined from this time onward. The Seljuks ruled Anatolia in a loose federation of provinces, with Governors appointed mostly from relations of the ruling family. The first Seljuk ruler of Anatolia was Tog'ul (1037-63), then Alp Aslam (1063-72) and Malik Shah (1072-92).

Rough nomad tribesmen though these Seljuks were, they nevertheless soon began to appreciate the civilization of the Persians and the Greeks with whom they came in contact, as is illustrated by widescale construction of fine buildings, many of them standing to this day. The best examples of this work are seen today at Konia and Erzerum. On the other hand there is nothing original about Seljuk architecture. The main features to be observed are Persian and Arab. In literature too, they were sufficiently shrewd to encourage religious thinkers and philosophers. The famous Jalal-ud-din Rumi flourished under the auspices in Konia, and so did others of the Sufi school of Persian mysticism.

In the thirteenth century the great Mongol invasion of the west started. The greatest of the Nomads movements of the Middle Ages swept out of Central Asia and carried all before it. One great horde led by Hulago Khan, came down through Persia in 1275 and reached Baghdad, which it destroyed. They thus ended the feeble Abbasid Caliphate and advanced into Syria, but were stopped by the Egyptians who, with their army under the leadership of Turkish Commanders, inflicted a decisive defeat on them.¹

The Mongols caused great chaos and the masses of people left their homes and pastures to settle in remote and quiet parts. Consequently a small Turkish tribe which had been settled in the regions of the Oxus in Central Asia, decided to move off and found a new home with grazing grounds for their flocks in the plateaux of Anatolia. At the time of this movement, the leader of this tribe was Suleiman whose son was Ertogrul. He was given the land in Anatolia in the neighbourhood of Erzinjan by one of the later Seljuk sultans, and here the original Osmanli tribe of Turks first settled. For some time they remained under the suzerainty of the Seljuk Sultan, but then his political system in Anatolia

1. Kirk (Geroge E.), A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, Revised, New York, 1955, p.20.

started declining. In any case, Osman, founder of the Ottoman State and son of Ertogrül began to acquire by capture or by alliance a number of small towns such as Eskishehir, Inonu, Bilajik, and Yenishehir. Between 1300 and 1320 using Yenishehir as a base, Osman seized the countryside west of the Sakarya River as far south as Eskishehir, and west and north to Mt. Olympus and the Sea of Marmara. Yet they were not strong enough to take the walled towns of Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicemedia.¹ Not until Osman was on his deathbed in 1326 did his son Orhan (Orkhan in old Turkish spelling) take Brusa, which surrendered without a struggle after several years of seige.

The fall of Brusa was the collapse of the Byzantines in that corner of Asia Minor. Orhan occupied Nicaea in 1331, Nicemedia in 1337. Thus, by 1345 the Ottoman State included the entire north-western corner of Asia Minor from the Aegean to the Black Sea. The Osmanli being pagans, were tolerant of all customs and religions, and in the fourteenth century they accepted Islam. Their conversion to Islam welded the Osmanlis together. Gradually they began to absorb even some of the Greeks into their system. Through the Greeks, the Turks came in

1. Fisher (S. N.), The Middle East - A History, New York, 1959, pp.171-172.

contact with the art and culture of the ancient world. In architecture it was Greek influence that produced the early Osmanli buildings at Brusa. The Turkish mosques were based on the style of the Byzantine churches. The only original Turkish conception in architecture were the minarets. The two great civilizations of this period of history in the Middle East were the Arabs and the Byzantine. The Arab was revived by the Mongul invasion, the Byzantine by the Fourth Crusade and the Latin occupation.

The Osmanlis under the leadership of Murad I, the son of Orkhan, began contacting the Slav civilization across the Aegean Sea to the west of the Byzantine Empire. Then the Turkish forces began to cross the sea and land in Thrace. The internal disruption within the Byzantine Empire greatly facilitated the Osmanlis expansion into Europe. By the beginning of the reign of Murad, the Osmanlis were securely planted on the coasts of Thrace, taking full advantage of the civil War among the Greeks. Thus by long before the Turks had any status in Asia Minor, they were beginning to become a power in Europe. The Turks were advancing into the Balkans at a time when the greater part of Asia Minor was held by quite different branches, the Turkish speaking

people. In 1360 Murad took Adrianople from the Byzantine. This was the next important city of the Empire after Constantinople. The European rulers who, up to now, had paid no attention to the Osmanlis began to get alarmed at their progress in military and political power in Europe.

Meanwhile jealousies and quarrels between Serbians, Bulgars and Hungarians made easy the Turkish advance. Murad was one of the greatest of the Osmanli leaders of the early days. His successful military campaigns in Thrace and the Balkans made him the real founder of the Ottoman Empire.¹ Murad had the wisdom to see that the Christians were better educated than the Turks, and that their incorporation into the Ottoman State, if it could be achieved, would ensure administrative ability and organizing capacity for political systems.

When Murad died on the battlefield of Kossovo in 1389, his son Bayazid became Emir of Osmanlis. He made it a point of doing all that he could to consolidate the Serbs. He gave them full autonomy, and incorporated Serbian troops into his army with the same rights as his Muslim troops. However, in 1402, he had to give up further plans for the siege

1. Gibbons (H.A.), Foundations of the Ottoman Empire (1304-1403); Oxford University Press, 1916, p.112. Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1968, p.120.

of Constantinople in order to meet a much more serious danger than the Byzantine Empire. For Timur Lane, the last of the great Central Asian Tartar conquerors, had entered Asia Minor, had taken Sivas by storm and was marching west. Timur Lane claimed descent from Genghiz Khan through the latter's son, Djagatai. He was more interested in the lands of Syria and Egypt. Bayazid had invaded territory beyond the Euphrates, to the Tigris and given indications of ambitions in Syria, thereby threatening Timur. The Turkish and the Tartar armies met in Ankara in July 1402; and the Turks lost the war. Bayazid had a dream of empire, but it was shattered at Ankara. It was the first defeat which the Ottoman armies had suffered for the first three centuries of Turkish history.¹

2.2. 2 The Fall of the Ottoman Empire

As long as personal bravery, ability to govern and efficiency at the centre of administration were the vital qualities which made empires possible and kept them functioning, all was well with the Ottoman Empire. But with the coming of the sixteenth century Western Europe began to stir with new ideas. Its

1. See Gibbons (H.A.), Foundations of the Ottoman Empire (1304-1403), O.U.P. 1916. also Toynbee (Arnold) and Kirkwood (Kenneth), Turkey, Moslem World Series, Vol.VI. Berne, 1926. and Edward (Creasy S.), History of the Ottoman Turks, London, 1877.

material wealth grew, and with it the fighting strength of its armies. But the Turks were quite unaffected by all this. The Islamic Law still governed any major decisions of policy. Thus the Turks after a while found themselves definitely inferior to the west in, for instance, military equipment. Turkey, in fact, did not keep pace with Europe in the transition from the Middle Ages to Modern Times.

Moreover, the Ottoman Empire itself now began to feel the effects of internal instability. ¹As far back as 1536, in the days of Suleiman, King Francis of France, smarting under his defeat at the battle of Pavia at the hands of the Emperor Charles the Fifth, turned to the Ottoman Empire to try to redress the balance of power in Europe. The system of 'capitulations' took shape which in the new circumstances arising out of the Reformation in Europe led to grave complications for the Ottoman Empire. For, while the Turks were still governed by the Sacred Laws of Islam and modern ideas and science made no headway in Turkey, the Christian subjects of the Sultan were under no such inhibitions. In fact, these subject races of the Empire became aware of the new ideas spreading in from Europe long before

1. Price (Philip M.), A History of Turkey, From Empire to Republic, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956, p.64.

their Muslim co-subjects even knew they existed. This intensified the disequilibrium in the State, and hastened the decline of the Empire both internally and Turkey's power and influence abroad.

Weak Sultans followed one after the other - Selim II, Murad III, Ibrahim and Mahomed IV. At the battle of Lepanto in 1571 naval weakness had just shown itself, but now at the battle of St. Gothard in 1663 the European powers showed that they had better naval and military equipment than the Turks, whose weapons had not improved since the days of Suleiman. Further, in 1683 the Turk's final attempt to capture Vienna resulted in their first really serious defeat and marked the beginning of their long retreat from Europe altogether.

But there now appeared on the horizon of Eastern Europe a new power which was destined to have profound effects upon the fortunes of the Ottoman Empire and to further its decline. For some five centuries the Eastern Slavs, hemmed in among the forests and swamps of Northern Europe by hostile Tartar tribes to the east and south, began now to form the centralised state of Great Russia and to press towards the Black Sea. The Russians had certain advantages over the Muslim people to the south and east of them and over the Ottoman Empire in particular.

On the other hand Russia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries developed a system of serfdom among her peasantry and of large private landowners which, as seen, Turkey largely avoided.

The Ottoman Empire began to feel the change of this new Slav state growing in the north by the middle of the eighteenth century. The former was already a declining political and military force. But Russia, having suffered more at the hands of Mongol invaders, like Batu Khan, than the Turks, who had only a brief period of subjection to Timur, was consequently later in developing its state institutions.

In one respect the histories of Russia and Turkey had a common feature. Neither power, being East European and Near Asiatic, came under the influence of the Reformation. The benefits of science and new discoveries were largely denied to both between the 16th and early 19th centuries. But starting more or less at the same stage of economic development, the balance of power gradually began to tilt in favour of Russia on account of her wider territories and greater manpower resources.

In the late 17th century Russians began a movement of expansion southwards. The urge to expand his territories and free himself from physical hindrances such as lack of access to the sea, from

dependence on other states for engaging in foreign trade, was the chief aim of Peter the Great's foreign policy. In the early 18th century he accomplished what Selim the Grim and Suleiman the Magnificent had done for the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century when they opened the way to the East and the Mediterranean. He defeated the Swedes in 1709 at Poltava and opened a window for Russia on the Baltic. But Peter of Russia looked not only west but south, and hence his inevitable clash with the Sultan, made all the more determined by the fact that the Russian and Turkish peoples had different beliefs which since the time of the Crusades had been in deadly conflict with each other.

Between the years 1672-1914 there were twelve Russo-Turkish wars. Although Karlowitz ceded Azov and about eighty miles of hinterland, Peter the Great was not satisfied. The Black Sea, the Straits, and outlet to the Mediterranean which would mean free commerce with the West, and most important Constantinople - all beckoned the Russians on against the Ottomans. In 1710 he advanced down the Pruth, but got into difficulties, was surrounded by the Turkish Army, and only escaped being taken prisoner by surrendering Azov. In 1789 Catherine the Great

took the Crimea, breaking the power of the Khan and advancing the Russian frontier to the Dniester. From now on, however, the influence of the sea-powers of the West began to make itself felt in defence of the Ottoman Empire. France and Great Britain did not want to see a great land power capture the gateway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and close the Levant to their trade. At the end of each Russo-Turkish war in the nineteenth century, Russia was thus compelled by western pressure to give up some of her gains. The Russo-Turkish conflict in the nineteenth century began to acquire a somewhat different aspect of those of the eighteenth century. In the latter time they were mainly territorial in aim and opportunities for commercial expansion. In the nineteenth century these conflicts began to be ideological as well as territorial. Finally, the Emperor Nicholas I of Russia was tempted in the 1840s to draw up plans for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and its partition by the powers of Europe. His plan foundered in the Crimean War (1854-56). But the Ottoman Empire, though protected by sea powers of the West, continued in decline, and from that time on was known as "the sick man of Europe".

A landmark along the road to Russian mastery of the region was the 1774 treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, terminating a six-year war with the Ottomans. The document, which became the basis of Russo-Ottoman relations until World War I, ended the Ottoman's exclusive domination of the Black Sea. Russia now not only shared the shores of the Black Sea, but was also assured of unrestricted commercial navigation through it, and through the straits leading into the Mediterranean. From that time a major drive of Russian foreign policy became the complete domination of the Straits to gain unequivocal entrance into the Mediterranean.

2.3 The Muslim Empire in Decline

The Islamic Empire reached its zenith when political fragmentation had already begun to erode the unity of the empire. When the era of cultural flowering began to wither away around 950 A.D., Baghdad, seat of the Abbasid Caliphate, had lost its authority. The Islamic cultural influence continued its general decline until it became almost insignificant compared to the new cultures and civilizations flourishing in Western Europe. By 1500 Europe got what there was to learn from the Muslim world. As medieval Europe emerged into the modern era, medieval Islam withdrew to the east and south side of the Mediterranean, where it remained until the nineteenth century reawakening.

Muslim civilization grew through its tolerance of alien elements, its Arab roots proved too slim to carry and unify the legacies of the many parts which Islam found itself called upon to administer.

When the Islamic (Turkish) Empire suffered defeat at Vienna, then it lost its ground in the west. By the end of the eighth century, the Arabs had been pushed back to the south of the Pyrenees, and during the following centuries, the revival of the kingdom of Spain had steadily forced the Arabs even further south. In 1492, the last Moorish stronghold in

Southern Spain, was surrendered to the Spaniards and thus the Muslims were expelled by them.

The Turks were driven from the Hungarian plain but for many years were able to hold the line of the River Danube. The revolt within the Balkan Empire had been reduced to a small foothold, the European Turkey today. The sovereignty of the Turkish Sultans had long been something of a fiction outside Turkey, the Balkans and the Middle East. The Muslim Empire areas along the North African Coast which had been conquered and converted by the Arabs in the 7th century had long been a law to themselves, and Morocco itself never passed under Turkish control. The French began the occupation of Algeria in 1830, and then Tunisia in 1881. The British, whose interest in Egypt had been increasing since the opening of the Suez Canal, occupied that country militarily in 1882. Then in 1907 the French took Morocco under **their** protection. And in 1911, the Italians annexed Libya, and hence the Moslem Empire of North Africa was gone.

2.4

Arab Nationalism

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Middle Eastern society was organized on a traditional religious basis. The religion which was by far the most important and which at the same time was the religion of the ruling class. By its whole teaching and its outlook, the religion Islam, though Arab in its origin, was strictly international, or rather supranational, representing a brotherhood of the faithful irrespective of descent or race, language or native land. This community of civilization and way of life maintained itself until the twentieth century, more intensive in its feeling of unity and more unified in its outlook. The only differentiation was according to religious sects within Islam, and in that respect it might be said that the Shi'ites represented on the whole a Persian national tradition. The conquests of the Wahhabis who were animated by the crusading spirit, and the short reign of these religious warriors over the whole of Central Arabia from which they were dislodged only in 1818 by Egyptian troops, can be regarded as the first manifestation of a new Arab nationalism.

As a result of the fact that European Turkey was most closely exposed to Western influences, and that its officers and administrators had to acquire a knowledge of European languages and science, a literary and political awakening in the European

sense could first be noticed among Turkish intellectuals in the 1860's. It was, however, only in 1908 that this reformist nationalism entered the political stage with the successful Young Turk military revolt. Meanwhile, the Young Turks had changed their name to Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, and their rising nationalism encountered the difficulty presented by the rise of other and opposed nationalism in the formerly supra-national Ottoman Empire.

Among these new nationalisms which worked for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire were not only those of Armenians, Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians, but also Muslim peoples, above all the Arabs, and to a less degree the Albanians and Kurds. With them, as in Egypt and Persia, nationalism became vocal in the first decade of the twentieth century though in Egypt proper the nationalist slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians" was first heard as far back as 1878. But this early movement, led by one of the few officers of Egyptian origin in the Egyptian army, Arabi Pasha, collapsed quickly in 1882 and provided occasion for British occupation of the country.

It was in the beginning of the twentieth century that nationalism appeared as a force in

Egyptian public life, at the same time that it did in Turkey, in Iran and among the Arabs. In all these cases, as throughout Asia and Africa, these new nationalist aspirations drew encouragement from the Japanese victory over Russia, and from the example of the Russian Revolution of 1917.

At first nationalism was confined only to purely intellectual and cultural movements and to a little group of intellectuals.¹ The few attempts at what might be called a political awakening were hindered by the wars. Mustafa Kamal (1876-1908) demanded the Union of Egypt and the Sudan under purely Egyptian control. He died in the same year that the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, frightened by the possible consequences for Turkey of the British-Russian agreement of 1907, compelled the Sultan to reintroduce the constitution which had been in force for only a short time thirty years before. The following year, 1909, Abdul Hamid II was deposed, and the Young Turks assumed full control of Turkey, with the aim of transforming it into a modern centralized nationalist state. To support the Turkish national policy, the Young Turks under the leadership of Enver Pasha (1881-1922) developed the theory of Pan-Turkism - a union of

1. Marlowe (John), Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism - A Study in Power Politics, London, 1961, p.9.

all the Turk¹speaking peoples, the bulk of whom lived within the confines of the Russian Empire.¹ Pan-Turcanism was, in that way, not only to add great numerical strength to the Ottoman Turks, a minority within the Ottoman Empire, but also to counteract Pan-Slavism and the Russian design against Turkey.

At the same time, the Turks who had for centuries regarded themselves exclusively as members of the Islamic civilization, founded largely on Arabic and Persian cultural traditions, rediscovered their pre-Islamic racial and linguistic past.

Of a different structure to Pan-Turcanism was the Pan-Arab movement with the beginnings in the period after 1908, which was a countermovement to the strong emphasis on Turkish and Turcanism Nationalism, destroying the unity of the Islamic world. Pan-Arabism aimed to unite the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the Fertile Crescent of Mesopotamia and Syria, which stretched from the Persian Gulf to the Suez Canal, and the nomad inhabitants of the Arab desert, of which only the fringes, especially Hejaz with the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina were under Ottoman control.

1. Edi (Rivlin B.) and Szykiewicz (S.), The Contemporary Middle East, New York, 1965, p.217.

But many Pan-Arabs went further and dreamed of the Union of all Arabic speaking countries, which would include not only Egypt but the whole of North Africa. The centre of these Pan-Arab aspirations was partly in Syria, where it was led by intellectuals who worked for the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire and the Arab autonomy within it, and partly in Mecca, where Husein ibn-Ali (1856-1931) was appointed Sherif of Mecca in 1908.

The same years after 1908, which saw the beginning of political nationalism among the Turks and Arabs, witnessed a similar development in Persia. There the Islamic reform agitation of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and the westernizing tendencies of Malcolm Khan, a Persian diplomat of American descent, had laid the foundations in the later part of the nineteenth century for an awakening of the small Persian intelligentsia to the need of national reform.

As a result of the World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved. From the ethical centre of the Turkish population, from the highlands of Anatolia, came the victorious opposition of the Turks under Mustafa Kemal against the victors of World War I. His success against the Greek invaders of Anatolia in 1922 made it possible for Turkey to establish her complete independence within her

ethnic frontiers by the Peace Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Only in eastern Anatolia did the Kurds form a national minority and resist in several uprisings, their forced integration into Turkish nationality. Mustafa Kemal's reforms transformed Turkey from a medieval Islamic State into a modern secular nation-state. Zia Gökalp (1875-1924) may be regarded as the intellectual father of the new nationalism, with its reinterpretation and re-appreciation of the Turkish past and its application to western ways to the Turkish future.¹

Under the impact of new nationalism, Islam was deposed as the religion of the State; modern law was introduced instead of Islamic law, special attention was paid to the introduction of the people to the new ideology and to the spreading of literacy; the language was divested of its Arabic and Persian words and influences; Latin script was introduced instead of the Arabic; and an all-out effort was made to establish the new Turkish civilization on the two-fold foundation of ancient Turkish traditions and of modern western influences, thus weakening the impact of the Islamic civilization which had shaped Turkish life and destiny for the last six centuries.

1. Zeine (Z.N.), Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism, Beirut, 1958, p.81. See further Hain (S.G.), "The Arab Awakening".

In 1925 Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran tried to emulate Mustafa Kemal's nationalist reforms, but the conditions in Iran were much less favourable than in Turkey.¹ Iran possessed neither long cultural contact with the West nor a governing class with administrative abilities; on the other hand the strength of Shia religion and complexity of native cultural traditions were greater there than in its Western neighbours. As in Turkey, this new nationalism was accompanied by efforts towards a strict centralization of Government, the emancipation of women, and the modernization of economic life.

More complex was the development of nationalism in the Arab-speaking countries. Various factors fought against an early unification of all the lands into one Arab national state, as the nationalists demanded. There were important religious minorities such as the Shi'ites in Iraq, the Christians in Lebanon, and the Copts in Egypt, and there was the opposition of the fanatical Wahhabis' to other Muslims. Even stronger as a retarding factor was the hesitation of the Egyptians between allegiance to a "Pharonic" civilization of the Nile Valley and the common tie of culture and language with the Arab lands. The situation of nationalism

1. Sykes (Percy), A History of Persia, Vol.II. London, 1958, p.547.

in the Arab-speaking countries may be compared with that in Italy in the first half of the nineteenth century, when similar circumstances delayed the unification of the Italian nation propogated by nationalist intellectuals.

In 1948 conflicting tendencies among the Arab countries were at last temporarily bridged by their common resistance to Zionism and to the transformation of Palestine, with its originally large Arab majority, into a Jewish national state. To that end, the Arab states formed an Arab League, but its diplomatic and military measures did not avail against the formation of the State of Israel, thereby creating the vast problem of Arab expelled persons and refugees from Palestine. This ineffectiveness of the Arab League reveals the present weakness of Arab nationalism.

In India the high point of Hindu-Muslim cooperation within the nationalist movement came just after the first World War. During the war, Muslim national sentiment had been particularly strengthened, as Muslims found British India ranged, as part of the Empire, against the Turkish Empire, and hence the Caliphate. The war had also fostered a rapid growth of national sentiment among Hindus, particularly as Indian industry, long held back

by colonial commercial policy under wartime emergency conditions. It was a time of great trouble in India. In 1916 the Muslim League backed up by the National Congress in demands for home rule, and the two groups entered into a pact (The Lucknow Pact) regarding separate proportional representation for minorities in the various provinces. The Muslim League was not, however, particularly aggressive, nor particularly strong, at that time. In the years just after the war the Khilafat Movement, led by Mohammad Ali, swept over the Muslim community and dominated Muslim politics.¹

Between 1916 and 1922 a number of difficulties of nationalistic feeling came together. Nationalism erupted in countless acts of violence and demonstrations. After Khilafat Movement and Gandhi's non-cooperation movement were virtually one. Muslims adopted passive resistance, Gandhi advocated the preservation of the Turkish Caliphate in the Peace settlements. The Turkish revolution of Kamal Ataturk and the disappearance of the Caliphate removed another prop from the Muslim Nationalist movement.²

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1. See Symonds (Richard), The Making of Pakistan, London, 1951, pp.38-48.
 2. Brown (Norman W.), The United States and India and Pakistan, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp.123-124.

Although from time to time Muslim writers and speakers had suggested that a separate Muslim nation existed in India, the idea had received little attention, even within the Muslim League, until late in the 1930's. In 1930 Sir Mohammad Iqbal had first suggested something like a separate state for Indian Muslims. A little later the term Pakistan itself was apparently invented by Muslim students at Cambridge University in 1933. Finally in February, 1947, the British announced that two dominions should be set up if the Muslims wished, and that a commission should determine the boundaries between them on the basis of communal majorities. On August 14th, 1947, Pakistan officially came into existence and became an independent dominion in the British Commonwealth. The fixing of the political boundary lines and the partition of Pakistan would be dealt with in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

CURRENT POLITICAL BOUNDARIES

3.1 Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in the Great Powers Struggle from 1800 to the Second World War

"In Geopolitics special interest attaches to the 'Great' and 'Middle' Powers, because in their hands lie the direction of the international affairs. Special interest necessarily attaches also to the regimes, which owing to the facts of Physical Geography and the events of political history have attracted the attention and interest of the Great Powers, for which reason they have become and can again become danger areas of international relations". The region comprising Turkey, Iran, West Pakistan and Afghanistan is one of such "danger areas".¹ A hundred and fifty years of political history is witness to the nibbling, infiltrating and the economic as well as diplomatic manoeuvring that has at times endangered the sovereign rights of these states.

In the beginning of the 19th century, Pakistan as such did not exist, nor was it part of India, and the whole of the Indus Basin consisted of two petty political units. The first was the Punjab and Kashmir, a Sikh confederacy ruled by Ranjit Singh. The second was the Sindh which consisted

1. Gordon (East) and Modie (M.E.), The Changing World, New York, World Book Company, Yonkason Hudson, 1956, p.30.

of estates of a few Amirs. India was the British Base in the rivalry with Russia and Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan caught as they were between the two Great Powers, served as the stage for diplomatic moves and counter moves.

The prime purpose of the Russian policy was to reach the warm oceans and India ... a land of fabulous wealth, a vast market and a source of many raw materials. As Ellen C. Semple has said, "it is chiefly the 'Gates of Herat' and the lure of India which have drawn Russian dominion across the scorched plains of Turkestan¹". The British efforts vis-a-vis Russian efforts were bent towards keeping the Russians away from the regions of their interest (the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean), which were so important to Britain for the control of the sea route to India.

The industrial revolution had set a stage for large scale trade, for the mass production which results from mechanisation necessitates mass consumption. Colonies in tropical lands could serve as a market for industrial products and in return supply the industrial nations with raw materials such as cotton, jute, rubber etc. The age of voyage and discovery led to an age of colonization,

1. Semple (E.C.), "Influences of Geographic Environment", New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1911, p.498.

which reached its peak in the 19th century. Since it was profitable for European countries to have colonies, the British, French, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese actively competed for possessions in Asia and Africa.

By 1800 the British in India had extended their control as far north as the River Sutlej. At the same time the southern boundary of Imperial Russia lay north of the Caucasus mountains, and the Aral Sea. Between the British and Russia were a Sikh Confederacy, the Afghan Kingdom, the Turk Khanates of Central Asia and Iran. The French, who had failed to occupy any appreciable part of India, though they reached India before the British, were still contesting the area. Russia too was looking for the acquisition of an empire.

In 1800 Napoleon embarked on a scheme to overthrow the British by means of a military alliance with Russia, which would make it possible to reach India by a land route through Iran and Afghanistan. The defeat of Napoleon removed France from any further competition in Central Asia, but Russia and the Great Britain continued as rivals in the area. Later, Germany twice entered the power struggle, preceeding and during the two World Wars.

The Muslims headed by the Turks, became for the Russians a legitimate target. There were no fewer than twelve Russo-Turkish wars between 1676 and 1914. Generally speaking, the four centuries

of Russian expansion at the expense of the Muslim World coincide with four hundred years of Turkish domination of the Arab peoples.

In the sixteenth century, the Russian state was already conducting a regular trade with the Near and Middle East. During the early part of the century Russian trade in this area was largely in the hands of Turkish contractors, but later direct trade with Iran and Central Asia, particularly with the Nogai Horde, was established. Russian trade with the East was of greater significance for the economic development of the country than was her trade with the West.

It was Peter the Great's ambition to extend Russian boundaries from the Baltic to the Black and Caspian Seas. Motivated by a desire to open a route to India, he seized from Persia in 1723 the western and southern shores of the Caspian Sea, including Daghestan and thus initiated the conquest of the Caucasus, although this territory was relinquished by his successors. The route to India was blocked not only by Persian Muslims, but likewise by the Muslim Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara in Central Asia, and Peter the Great's efforts to expand in this direction proved unsuccessful.

Because of the war fatigue on the part of both the nations, the Russo-Turkish war was concluded in 1774 by the Peace of Kuchuk-Kainardji. By this treaty, a landmark in Russian relations with the Near East, Russia retained a control of the northern shores of the Black Sea from the river Bug to the river Dnieper and the right of free navigation of its waters. The treaty of 1774 set the pattern for future international settlements pertaining to the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. When the conflict was renewed by the Turks in 1787, the Russians once again defeated them and expanded Russian territory along the shores of the Azov and Black Sea to include the fortress of Otchakov.

In 1799 Russo-Turkish collaboration recognized the freedom of passage of Russian ships through the Straits, and the closure of this strategic waterway to the warships of other foreign powers.

When the wars involving Russia in the Middle East and Near East broke out, the first of these was with Iran. ¹The Treaty of Turkmanchay was signed in 1828, by which the Russians acquired the left bank of the Araxes. In addition Persia paid a large indemnity of 36,000,000 roubles and abandoned her claim to the Caucasus.


1. Hurewitz (J.C.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East; Vol. I, 1535-1914, Princeton, New Jersey, 1956, p.96.

Scarcely had peace been concluded with Persia, when Russia was again involved in war, this time with Turkey. This conflict grew out of the Greek struggle for independence (1821-1829). The Russians, supported by the Serbs, almost reached Constantinople. The treaty of Adrianople brought the war to a close in September 1829, and also the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In addition to her cessions to Russia, Turkey agreed to recognize the independence of the Greeks and to open the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to friendly nations.

Since the reign of Catherine II, England had watched with increasing concern the expansion of Russia at the expense of Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Having limited their freedom of action in the Balkans, the Russians turned their attention to Persia and Afghanistan.

While the British were busy in consolidating the Indian Empire, the Russians were just as busy extending their Empire southward. By the end of 1826 Iran had lost Mongrellia, Karabagh, Shirvan, Derbent, Baku, Erivan and Nakhichevan to Russia, and this southern encroachment was only halted by the Treaty of Turkomanchay which established the river Aras as the boundary between Iran and Russia.¹ Having thus achieved virtual control of Iran, the Russians persuaded the Shah of Iran to bring Herat under Iranian domination, which would have given the Russians a passage to India via

1. See Fig. 9.



Source: After Fraser Tytler

FIG. 9

Qandahar and Quetta, thus bypassing the Amir at Kabul. It was not difficult to persuade an Iranian King to conquer Herat, for the city had changed hands many a time in history. Feeling assured of his success, the Shah moved to beseige Herat in July 1837. "Although the immediate objective was nothing more than the capture of Herat, an offensive and defensive alliance between Iran and Afghanistan, which would undoubtedly have Russian support would bring Russian influence into closer proximity to the Indus valley. A counter move was essential".¹ The counter move was a British threat of war against Iran. But because Iran could not fight against the British, so the Shah retreated from Herat, and the Russian plan to reach India was checked for the time being.

In 1837, a new wave of Russian conquests started. The island of Ashur-ada in the Bay of Asterabad was occupied. A Russian expedition conquered the independent Khanates of Bukhara and Khiwa. This close approach of Russia to the Iranian and Afghan borders was viewed apprehensively by the rulers of India, who until that time had been following a policy of non-interference in the affairs of Iran and Afghanistan.

1. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W. K.), Afghanistan, London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p.90.

.. The British recognized the role of the Hindu Kush Mountains as the natural barrier to the Indian Sub-continent. Since they could not depend on the Afghans and the Sikhs effectively to take matters into their own hands ^{they} and dropped the policy of non-interference in favour of a policy of "forward to the Hindu Kush". A justification of this policy of aggression was that "the civilised must for the sake of their own preservation, overrun and absorb into their domain the uncivilised on their border. If they do not do so, they will themselves be overwhelmed".¹ The real issue remained the establishment of a balance of power in Central Asia as shown by Lord Palmerston's statements that, "the loss of Khiva independence would be considered injurious to the British interest and might result in a counter move across the Hindu Kush. Occupation of Khiva would give Russia access to the lower Oxus, and England might consider the command of the upper course of the river necessary as a measure of precaution and defence."²

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1. William (Habberton), Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan, 1837-1901, Urbana, Illinois, University of Illinois, 1937, p.21.
 1. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W.K.), Afghanistan, London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p.76.

The Russian pattern of aggression had a characteristic feature. They always tried to have more than one front so that if opposition stiffened at one point they can switch to a weaker area. From 1855 onward the pressure was lessened on the Iranian front and increased on Turkey. Russia helped Bulgaria get her freedom from Turkish control. By the treaty of San Stefano (1878), the Bulgarian boundaries extended to the Strait of Dardanelles, which would have meant passage to the Mediterranean for Russia. But the treaty of Berlin cancelled Russian gains and transformed Russian success into defeat. Russia, checked in Europe, transferred her attention to Asia and in particular to British India. For any attack on India, an alliance with Afghanistan would be necessary. The British, however, concluded the Treaty of Peshawar with Dost Muhammed, who until then had been following a closed door policy. By this treaty, Dost Muhammed promised not to let any hostile nation pass through Afghanistan, and the British in return were to help Dost Muhammed win back Herat which had been lost to Iran during the First Afghan War. The British succeeded in extending their influence to the Oxus River, and the Zulfikar Pass, which is called the Gateway to Herat, came under Afghan control. This move was necessary because Herat under a Russian dominated Iran was a danger to India. The Herat - Qandahar - Quetta

route is the easiest connection between Russia and India, and both Russia and Great Britain have tried to keep Herat under the control of the country that happened to be under their influence.

The south and southeastern boundary agreement of 1893, between the British and Sardar Abdur Rahman came to be known as Durand Line after Sir Mortimer Durand, who demarcated the boundary. The control of the Sulaiman Passes was brought under the Indian Government by running the Durand Line along the highest summits of the ranges except where it crosses a pass.

In the 20th century up to the Second World War, Afghanistan was not a big issue between Russia and Great Britain. The Third Afghan War freed the foreign policy of the state from the British in 1919. Since then Afghanistan became a member of the League of Nations under the auspices of Turkey^A of non-aggression pact^{3/12}. The Pact of Sadabad³ was signed with Iran, Iraq and Turkey in 1937.¹ The existence of this pact in spirit was reconfirmed in Kabul and Tehran as late as 1949. The 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-aggression between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was extended again in December 1955.

1. Hurewitz (J.C.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East; Vol. II, 1914-1956, Princeton, New Jersey, 1956, p.214.

3.2 Boundary Problems of Iran

Alliances and wars dominated Iran's foreign policy in the first half of the nineteenth century, boundary problems and economic activities received major emphasis later. Not that boundary problems did not exist earlier, but the Anglo-Russian rivalry, which continued to be such an important factor in Iranian foreign policy, reached a peak after Russian advances into Central Asia, and this intensified Iran's own boundary difficulties with Russia.

Anglo-Russian rivalry continued to be the most important factor with which Iran had to contend in foreign affairs. This rivalry intensified in the second half of the 19th century and reached a new peak after the spectacular Russian expansion in Central Asia. Iran's boundary problems with Russia and Afghanistan were intimately interwoven with the whole Central Asian Question.

Russia's advance into Central Asia has been attributed to a wide variety of considerations, different observers emphasizing different motives. Russian expansion in Central Asia has been characterised as a way to solve the Eastern Question, a "detour on the royal road to Constantinople and the Straits." The road to the Straits had been barred by Great Britain, hence Russia had to strike at the enemy's heart - India. It has also been stated that Central Asia proved so attractive to Russia that she could not resist the temptation of conquest.¹ The attraction of the area, it is argued, lay in the fact that a vast power vacuum stretched all the way from

1. See Fig. 9.

the Caspian Sea to the borders of China, from Afghanistan to the edge of the Siberian plain. Another view stresses that the object of Russian policy in Central Asia was the attainment of an outlet to the ocean both in the Near and Middle East. This view linked the Central Asian Question to the Persian Gulf, where Russia wished to get a foothold.¹

Sir Henry Rawlinson insisted in "Memorandum on the Central Asian Question" that the easiest route for Russia to take towards India was not through the heart of Afghanistan by way of the difficult mountain passes to Kabul and the Khyber, but via the country's western flank, from the Caspian littoral down to the Merw, Herat and Qandahar. This flank was commanded, or at any rate presided over, by Iran. Iran's existence had always been a political necessity for the Indian Empire; now Iran's strength had become "a military requisite."²

The Central Asian problem affected Iran in two different but related ways. First, the Russian conquests east of the Caspian Sea made Russia the immediate neighbour of Iran along the borders of Khorasan. No definite frontiers had previously existed between Iran and its nomadic neighbours, and

1. See Geoffrey (Drage), Russian Affairs, London, 1904, p.564.

2. England and Russia in the East; London, 1875, pp.263-92. See also Thornton (A.P.), "British Policy in Persia, 1858-1890", English Historical Review, LXIX (1954).

Russia's move into the area faced Iran with a question: Where would Russia stop? Second, Iran was affected by the strategic significance that the Russians advance in Central Asia added to the areas coveted by Iran. Sistan was one of these areas. Its geographic position and other features made it "an object of much interest, both to Russia and Great Britain. Situated at the point of junction of the frontier of Persia, Afghanistan and Baluchistan, its future affects the destinies of all the three countries."¹ Great Britain, therefore, became directly involved in Iran's frontier problem with Afghanistan.

1. Greaves (R.L.), Persia and the Defence of India; 1884-1892, London, 1959, p.18.

3.2.1. Iran's Boundary Problems with Turkey

Iran's boundary dispute with Turkey in the nineteenth century was a legacy from an earlier era. The inconclusive wars of the Safawi's had been concluded by a treaty in 1639. The obscure boundary provisions of this treaty had done little to help the relations of Iran and Turkey. The same vague provisions had been confirmed in the peace treaty of 1746 that terminated Nādir Shah's war with Turkey.¹ The problem of the controversial boundaries continued into the nineteenth century.² Whether the war between Iran and Turkey which started in 1821 was instigated by Russia³, or by Great Britain⁴, the ambiguous terms of the old boundary treaties did not help the situation. The immediate cause of the wars between Iran and Turkey however, was a dispute over wandering tribes. In 1821 the Serakier of Erzerum (in Turkey) and the Governor of Tabriz (in Iran) wrangled over two wandering tribes, which Iran claimed as its subjects and to which Turkey offered protection. The clash dragged on until 1823, when as the result of British mediation, a new peace treaty was signed at Erzerum.

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1. The text of the treaties of 1639 and 1746 are in Hurewitz (J.C.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Vol.I, Princeton, N.J., 1956, pp.1, 21-23, 51-52.
 2. Sir Ward (A.W.) and Geoch (G.P.), The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, New York, 1923, p.11, 204.
 3. Sykes (Sir Percy) A History of Persia, London, 1930, pp. 11, 316.
 4. Mahmūd Farhād Mutamid, Tārikhi-i Ramābiṭ-i Siyasi-i Iran wa Usmani, Tehran, 1326 (1947-48), p.29.

The failure to demarcate the boundary definitely had led to further tense relations between the two countries soon after the treaty of Erzerum was signed, claims and counter claims began to mount. Iran claimed that some of its Kurdish tribes had been "unfairly" abstracted from its territory and demanded compensation for having allowed the Turkish tribes of Sulaymaniyah to pasture their flocks on Iranian soil during the summer months. Turkey protested Iran's retention of the district of the bridge of Zohab on the frontier of Kermanshah. From 1834 to 1840 tensions increased dangerously. The districts of Kotur and Khoi were ravaged, the districts of Margavar was plundered and the town of Mohammarah was demolished. War between the two again threatened, but British mediation averted it.

A boundary commission composed of Iranian, Turkish, British and Russian members sat between 1843 and 1847 and produced a new agreement between Iran and Turkey (1847), which confirmed some of the previous treaties' provisions. Iran undertook to relinquish the extensive province of Zhob, i.e. its western territory. In return Turkey recognized the sovereignty of Iran over the town and port of Mohammarah, the island of Al Khizr, and the lands on the left side (the eastern bank) of the Shatt-al-Arab, which were admittedly in the possession of Iranian tribes.

The boundary having been defined in general terms, another commission, composed like the first one, covered the frontier zone (1848-52). Its surveys were discontinued during the Crimean War, but were resumed in 1857. The British and Russian surveyors laboured for eight years in St. Petersburg and in 1865 produced two separate maps "in the first eight sheets of which were four thousand discrepancies¹". The task was continued until 1869, when the "Carte identique" was completed. During the same year Iran and Turkey agreed to preserve the status quo and respect the disputed lands until the boundary lines were settled as the result of the efforts of the four power Commission.²

3.2 2 Iran's Boundaries with Russia

Iran's boundary problems with Russia involved both sides of the Caspian Sea. The boundaries west of the Caspian were established in the first half of the nineteenth century. Russian conquests were confirmed by the treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkomanchay (1828). The Iran-Russian boundary as

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1. See Boggs (S.W.), International Boundaries - A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems, New York, 1940, p.147.
 2. The text of the temporary boundary agreement of 1869 is in Sir Edward Mertslet, Treaties etc. Concluded between Gt. Britain and Iran and between Iran and other Foreign Powers, wholly or partially in force on the 1st April 1891; London, 1891, pp.176-178.

yet set by the second of these treaties was to run from the Turkish frontier to the summit of the Little Ararat and then descend to the Lower Karassow River. Thence it was to follow the Aras and the Astara rivers to the point of the latter's discharge into the Caspian Sea.

East of the Caspian, Iran's boundary problem was the result of the Russian conquests in Central Asia. Russia occupied Krasnovodsk in 1869. Iran regarded this Russian advance as a threat to its claims to Merv and Akhal. These areas were inhabited by the Turkomans, who did not owe allegiance to Iran. Twice between 1857 and 1861 the Governor General of Khorasan had attacked and occupied Merv, but he had failed to establish Iran's control over it.

During the Russian advance in Turkomanistan, Iran had mixed feelings. It was alarmed because one of the nine tribes dwelling along the Iranian border and on the shores of the Caspian Sea for the most part owed allegiance to Iran. On the other hand, although Iran had watched the Russian subjugation of the tribes with considerable alarm, it could hardly protest the result. Iran, like Russia, nursed many grievances against the ruthless Tekeh Turkomans who had plundered Khorasan, Iran's north-eastern province, for many generations. It is believed that in 1873 Iran had been aggrieved by the Tekeh border raids that the Shah promised Russian cooperation in punishing the tribes in Merv and Akhal.

Iran finally signed a treaty regarding its eastern boundary with Russia in 1881. By the Treaty of Akhal-Khorasan, Iran and Russia agreed not to allow the Turkomans arms or ammunition. Iran also relinquished its claims to Merv. The frontier was drawn along the lower Atrek, beginning at the Hasan Quli Gulf on the Caspian Sea, following the Atrek and thence along the outer flanks of the Kopet Dagh to the Tejen River.¹ Iran also undertook to evacuate the forts of Ginab and Gul-gulah.

Although the treaties of Turkomanchay and Akhal-Khorasan defined the frontiers of Iran with Russia to the west and to the east of the Caspian Sea, frontier controversies between the two countries continued. On the eastern side, for example, Russia pressured Iran into signing a new agreement in 1893 by which the frontier village of Firuzah was taken from Iran in return for a piece of land on the west side of the Caspian. Boundary problems with Russia as with Turkey continued to plague twentieth century policy makers.

1. The text of the Akhal - Khorasan treaty is in Hertslet, op. cit., pp.136-40.

3.2 3. Iran - Afghan Boundary Disputes

Iran's third major boundary quarrel during the second half of the nineteenth century was with Afghanistan. As mentioned earlier, Great Britain became involved in the boundary problem between Iran and Afghanistan because of its strategic interests in the latter country. A dispute flared up in 1870 over sovereignty in Sistan. This problem can be traced back at least to the time of Nadir Shah. After Nadir's assassination in 1747 and the break up of his empire, Sistan had joined a part of the new Afghan Empire. Afghan control over the area continued for over a century, and Yār Mohammad Khan, the ruler of Herat, held it as a tributary until his death in 1851.¹

From 1851 on, the situation at Herat and Sistan favoured Iran. Yār Mohammad's immediate successors pursued pro-Iranian policies. Nāsir-al-Dīn Shah's decision in 1856 to recover Herat by force of arms was influenced by favourable conditions at Herat. In fact, the ruler of Herat welcomed the army of the Shah, although subsequent developments in the city, and also Great Britain's reluctant war with Iran, forced him to abandon his plans.

1. Sykes, op.cit., pp.326-66.

The Treaty of Paris (1857), which terminated that war and by which Iran recognized the independence of Afghanistan, made no provision for Sistan. The Shah complained to the British of Afghan aggression against Sistan, and repeatedly requested the British Government, during 1861-63, to intervene under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. Great Britain, however, was pursuing a policy of "neutrality" and did not recognize the sovereignty of Iran over Sistan in any case. When Great Britain was pressed for a definite answer by the Shah, the Foreign Office stated that "Her Majesty's Government, being informed that the title of the territory of Sistan is disputed between Persia and Afghanistan, must decline in the matter, and must leave it to both parties to make good their possession by force of arms."

In 1870, when Sher Ali Khan, the ruler of Kabul, threatened war with Iran over Sistan, the British decided to intervene. British political interests in 1870 were, in essence, the same as in the 1840's. In the Irano-Turkish dispute they had intervened to arrest a war because it would have further weakened the two Muslim States separating the vast possessions of Great Britain in India from those of Russia. In the Irano-Afghan boundary disputes the same consideration predominated and Sistan's strategic significance for Great Britain increased as the result of the Russian advance in Central Asia.

Great Britain complied with Iran's request for an arbitrator in 1872. In general the Iranian claims to Sistan rested upon two major grounds: ancient rights and present possession. The Afghan claim, on the other hand, rested primarily on its recent exercise of sovereignty over Sistan, i.e. from 1747, when the province joined a part of the Afghan Empire, until 1855, when Iran began to exercise considerable, if not complete, control over it.

The Iranian claims based on ancient rights were first disposed of, it was found to be uncertain and not clearly supported by historical evidence, and more than a century of Afghan control over Sistan to be cogent evidence in favour of Afghanistan. The second question, i.e. "present possession", was more difficult. Although it was clear that since 1855 Iran had exercised considerable authority over Sistan, it was problematic what the term "Sistan" included at the time of arbitration. It was "very vague", the award said, "for ancient limits have long become obsolete."

The arbitration award distinguished between "Sistan Proper" and "outer Sistan". The former was "compact and concentrated" and the latter was "detached and irregular". These two Sistans were separated by the Helmand River. The award gave Sistan Proper to Iran, on the grounds of geographical and political requirements, and outer Sistan to

Afghanistan, which was also given both banks of the Helmand above the Kobah Band. Furthermore, the award emphatically stated that "no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on the banks of the Helmand.

In 1891, the Helmand began to change its course. By 1896, the main channel of the river flowed considerably west of the channel which Goldsmid had designated as the boundary in 1872. The local Governors of Iran and Afghanistan managed to compose their differences over utilization of the water for a number of years, but in 1902 Iran felt that the problem should again be referred to the British for arbitration because the local officials were no longer able to handle the matter. In requesting the appointment of a new arbitrator, however, Iran made it absolutely clear that any award that might be given "must completely comply" with Goldsmid's award of 1872.

Great Britain complied with the request and dispatched Henry McMahon to head an arbitration Commission to Sistan. Having completed its studies, the Commission gave an award in 1905. Its fundamental point was that Sistan had often suffered, not so much because of a shortage of water, but because of floods. On the basis of this observation, the

award provided that Iran should have one-third of the water of the Helmand River from the Kamal Khan Dam down. It also repeated the earlier injunction that no works were to be carried out by either Iran or Afghanistan that would interfere with the requisite amount of water needed for irrigation on both sides of the banks of Helmand.

Iran vigorously protested the award, objecting in particular to its small share of the water. Iran believed that the award was incompatible with Goldsmid's ruling in 1872 and that it could therefore be rejected. The Foreign Office retorted that Iran could not reject it; the Iranian Government might only appeal to the British Government if it had any reasonable grounds for complaint. It also warned that should Iran fail to file an appeal within a reasonable period of time, the award would be regarded as final and binding. The Helmand River problem had not been settled.

3.3.1. Pakistan's Boundary with Afghanistan.

The only boundary which had an international status prior to the establishment of Pakistan and which has been inherited unchanged by the new state, is the western boundary of West Pakistan. For the most part it borders on Afghanistan and has been very problematic; only in the south-west where it borders on Iran is peaceful and satisfactory to both countries.

The boundary with Afghanistan can be divided into a northern and southern part. The northern part is the same as the Durand Line which was demarcated by the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission in 1895 with the concurrence of the Afghanistan Government. A rugged and inaccessible spur of the Saikol range in the north of the Indian sub-continent carries the boundary into regions of perpetual ice and snow to its junction with the main range, the Hindu Kush. Here, amidst a solitary wilderness 6,096 m above sea level, absolutely inaccessible to man, with few living creatures other than Pamir eagles, the three great Empires actually meet. No more fitting trijunction could possibly be found.¹ In the extreme north-east the long narrow Wakhan ridge served as a buffer strip between the two spheres of influence.

1. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W. K.), Afghanistan; London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p.6.

From the westerly end of the Wakhan ridge to the Mandal Pass, the boundary follows the water divide of the Eastern Hindu Kush, separating the Kocha river of the Oxus system in the north from the Chitral which flows into the Indus system in the south. Crossing the western arm of a bend in the Kabul river obliquely, it cuts across the Kabul-Peshawar highway and leaves the famous Khyber Pass inside West Pakistan. From here it turns westward along the Safed Koh. Parachina, the old garrison atop the range guards very difficult country. On the Pakistan side of the Khost salient lie two important river valleys (The Kurum and Tochi) which form traditional settlements areas as well as old routes from Afghanistan in India.

South of the Khost salient, the boundary proceeds south-westerly across the Gamal river to Chawan, leaving the Gamal Pass, the bulk of the Gamal Valley as well as Chaman on the Pakistan side. It can be seen that, from the geographical point of view, the Durand Line is a most inefficient boundary. It consistently follows neither any single natural feature, nor any astronomical line. It cuts across four river valleys, many lines of communication, and numerous tribal regions.

The southern half of the Afghan-Pakistan boundary runs in a barren and uninhabited region which has little attraction for the Afghans. From Chaman it descends to the Registan of Lora, climbs the Chagai range, and finally descends westward to the southern margin of the salty wastes of Sistan. The entire belt along the boundary is barren and virtually isolates Baluchistan from Afghanistan. South of the Quetta and Chaman garrisons lies the state of Kalat which serves as an additional barrier to any Afghan threats from the north.

3.3.2. Pakistan's Boundary with Iran

From Koh-Malik Siah, which forms the tri-junction of Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan boundaries, the boundary runs south-eastwards along the edge of the Baluchistan range in Iran and the Baluchistan Salt range in West Pakistan. It crosses the low saddle between the Baluchistan and the Siahnam ranges, turns south-eastwards, forming a deep salient in the desolate area, and finally reaching Gwatar Bay on the Arabian Sea.

The only section of economic importance along or near the boundary is in the north where mining for sulphur and chromium is carried on. Zahidan,

on the Iranian side, is also located in this section. It is the terminus of the railway line from Quetta and in future may become a town of great value when it will be linked to Tehran by rail. Relations between the two countries are most friendly and the boundary is likely to remain satisfactory and peaceful as it has been in the past.

The Iran-Pakistan boundary agreement was concluded as far back as 6th February 1958. What took place on 15th July 1963 was purely the ceremonial act of the transfer of the areas concerned. This arose out of the obligation incurred by both the countries under the boundary agreement of 6th February 1958. It is not a fact that Pakistan has given away 7769.7 sq. Km. to Iran. Pakistan agreed to give Iran 802.9 sq. Km. of its territory which was occupied by the British, when they were rulers of the sub-continent and against which occupation the Government of Iran had always protested. In 1871, 1896 and 1905 Iran had been asked to conclude a boundary agreement but they had consistently refused to demarcate the boundary on the basis of those agreements. With the advent of Pakistan, and in view of its friendly and fraternal relations with Iran, a solution of this problem, which had been left over from the Colonial period, became possible.

With the transfer of some 802.9 sq. Km. of territory to Iran, the Government of Iran has ceded 246 sq. Km. of territory hitherto under its occupation, to the Government of Pakistan. If the demarcation of the border had taken place in accordance with the 1905 agreement, concluded between the British and Iranians, 777 sq. Km. of territory would have had to be relinquished to Iran, but there would have been no cession by Iran of the 246 sq. Km. of the territory which Pakistan has now acquired under the agreement of 1958. Pakistan has gained 246 sq. Km. of territory under the border agreement.

In the extreme north, the boundary traverses a highly mountainous, very sparsely populated and relatively inaccessible region which contains the junction of four international boundaries, respectively of West Pakistan, Afghanistan, and beyond the Afghan buffer, of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

The eastern boundary as a whole is a good geographical divide. It separates the canal-irrigated, densely populated Indus alluvium from the sparsely populated riverless desert uplands of Thar and Rajputana in the south, the newly irrigated lands of East Punjab farther north, and the mountainous state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north-east.

North of the Radcliffe line the boundary follows the old line separating the province of Punjab from the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Differences of race, language and economy between the two areas are well known. However, the bulk of the people on either side have a common religion, and issue which has been highlighted by the political dispute between Pakistan and India over the control of Kashmir.

3.4 Boundary Disputes of Pakistan

Even if a state be economically and politically strong internally, it must still content with threats from its neighbours and other outside powers. This is particularly true in the case of Pakistan, whose relations have been least friendly with India, and not cordial with Afghanistan, the two countries with which it is most closely related historically and geographically as mentioned in the previous two chapters.

3.4.1. Dispute with Afghanistan

The unfriendly relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan arose when, since 1947, Afghanistan has consistently repudiated the Durand Line and demanded the right of self-determination for the Pathans because she does not consider them a part of Pakistan. Pakistan refutes this assertion, insisting on the validity of the Durand Line, and considers the Afghan claim a violation of international law. Hence it is a matter of international politics rather than a local reality. The territorial claim for a Pakhtun state has varied from tribal territory to the entire trans Indus area from Chitral to the Arabian Sea. The status of this state has sometimes been desired as an independent state and at others as an autonomous unit within Pakistan.

According to Afghan sources,¹ Pakhtunistan consists of the area west of the river Indus up to the Afghan frontier, a tract of land of 492081 sq. Km., inhabited by seven million people who are divided into numerous tribes. It extends from Chitral in the north to Baluchistan in the south, both inclusive, and besides these it includes the districts of Hazara, Kohistan, Swat, Dir, Bunar, Peshawar, Firaq, Bajaur, Kohat, Banna, Deraghazi Khan, Dera Ismail Khan, Waziristan, Khyber, Pezu, Gomal, Bolan and Malakand. According to the same sources Baluchistan is also inhabited by Pakhtun clans, principally the Shorani in the north and the Kahari, Dunar and Mandokhel in the south.

This inclusion of Baluchistan is questionable, since its population of about two million consists of Baluchis, Brahmins, Jats and some other Indian as well as negroid people, none of whom is regarded as Pakhtun. Percival Spear, emphasising the difference between the Baluchis and the Pathans, says: "In dealing with the frontier the distinction must always be remembered between the Baluchis and the Pathans, peoples very different in customs and situation, who require separate treatments."²

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1. Pakhtunistan - The Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, Home, London, 1952.
 2. Percival Spear in Smith (V.A.), (ed.), The Oxford History of India, Oxford, 1958, p.698.

Fraser-Tytler also says that the majority of the Baluchis are not Pathans, but rather of mixed race.


The development of Pakhtunistan as a political issue started in 1929, when Nadir Shah, the father of the present Afghan King Zahir Shah, criticized the Durand Line because it divided the Pakhtuns who wanted independence from foreign rule. In the same year the Khudi Khidmatgar (Red Shirts) movement for Pakhtun independence got under way. This movement cooperated with the Congress Party, which was working for the independence of India. The leader of the Khudi Khidmatgar, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was even called the "frontier Gandhi". The basis for cooperation between the two movements was the understanding that in the event of Indian freedom the Pakhtuns would also gain their independence, and not be under Hindu domination.

Afghanistan has been a buffer state between two Great Powers - Great Britain and Russia. When Great Britain left India, it became imperative for Afghanistan to have a friendly India as a substitute for British Power. Afghans also doubted the emergence of true Hindu-Muslim unity. Faced with this dual nature of the problem, the Afghans wanted at least to be assured of the independence of the Pathans.

"Many years before Pakistan had ever been mentioned as a possible solution to the India problem, a high official in Kabul put Afghan fears into words, 'We know the Durand Line is, but what about the Gandhi Line?'"¹ It seems that Afghanistan would have liked to redraw the eastern boundary, but how far? During the Durrañi period, the glorious age of Afghans, the eastern boundary of Afghanistan was along the Sutlej River; and around 1800 it was the Indus River. The Indus Line was justifiable to some extent on ethnic basis. Actually no specific boundary was proposed until after partition of India, when Sardar Najibullah, then Afghan Ambassador in India, drew a plan for the state of Pakhtunistan which included the entire area from Chitral to the Arabian Sea. In the official map the southern limit was a little below the northern boundary of Baluchistan. (See Fig. 10).

The Hindus were conscious that the Pathans could not be kept under their domination by any means. They also wanted a friendly Afghanistan for the defence and peace on the northwestern frontier. It is a matter of speculation, but India might have acceded to a change in the Durand Line that would have included the tribal area only. The addition

1. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W.K.), Afghanistan, London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p.257.



Source: The Khyber Pass As The Focus of The New State of Pakhtunistan, London, 1952. FIG.10

of some more tribal units without the advantages of the Indus Basin would not have helped Afghanistan in any way. However, the chance to make any such agreement did not arise because the idea of Pakistan came to the fore inviting the hostility of both Afghanistan as well as India.

Towards the end of 1947, Sardar Najibullah proposed a Pakhtun state within Pakistan. A periodical 'Pakhtunistan' was published in Delhi and a Pakhtunistan Day was held in London. This kind of propaganda continued, and in 1950 a referendum was called for by the Afghan Government so that the tribal people would have the opportunity to choose between Pakistan and an independent Pakhtunistan. The Pakistan Government did not agree to such a proposal. Consequently relations between the two countries became strained, and transit trade was partially stopped. After a short quiet spell the issue again became hot in 1955 following the merger of the Western States of Pakistan, including the North-West Frontier province, into a single West Pakistan. The closure of the frontier was a sharp blow to the Afghan economy, and its consequences contributed to the resignation in March 1963, after ten years as virtual ruler of Afghanistan, of Prince Daud, who then held the position of Premier. It was after him that tension between the two countries began to ease and, through the good offices of the Shah of Persia, diplomatic relations were restored in May 1963.

But since the clash of 1960-61 between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Russian attitude has changed. Having made a notable effort in 1965-66 to compose the quarrel between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Russia will not want to see yet another frontier war flaring up in an area where the development of its interests require stability. The main aim of the current Soviet diplomatic effort seems to be to persuade Afghanistan and Pakistan that they have mutual economic interests, for it is on their recognizing this that the unhampered outflow of Russian goods through these countries largely depends.

The Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are certainly becoming more aware of their mutual interests; and in their dealings with one another, if not in their public pronouncements, 1963 seems to have marked the beginning of a new phase in their relations. Pakistan cannot afford further frontier involvements when already overextended in its struggle with India over Kashmir. On the other hand, Afghanistan now realises that it cannot afford to provoke Pakistan again into closing the common frontier, because Afghanistan is a landlocked state whose shortest and easiest access to the sea or the outside world lies through West Pakistan. Communications within the country are also meagre.* It is the

* Note: The new road is very good indeed. From Herat, Khandahar, Kabul, also to U.S.S.R. through Herat.

only free country in Asia without a single mile of railway, and the only motor road^{out} of Afghanistan open all the year round leads across the Khyber Pass into West Pakistan. It is possible that the boundaries of a friendly or subservient Pakhtunistan would enable Afghanistan to use the Indus River, but even then the river would be useless as long as Peshawar in the north and Karachi in the south remain in Pakistan, and can block Afghanistan's foreign trade. As the Pakistani side of the Frontier is economically better developed, Afghanistan cannot avoid the fear that this may tempt even its own Pathans to defect to Pakistan.

3.4 • 2. Pakistan's Disputes with India

Unlike Afghanistan, India is the largest and the common neighbour of both the units of Pakistan. It is most unfortunate that its relations with Pakistan have been so unhappy. With India other problems have resulted from partition and particularly from the Punjab boundary award. On the basis of "other factors", the Gurdaspur district east of the river Ravi was awarded to India although it was a Muslim majority contiguous district. Thus India attained access to Kashmir via Pathankot-Kathna road, east of which high ranges bar every access to Kashmir.

In the words of Lord Bridwood, "had the Gurdaspur district not been awarded to India, India could certainly never have fought a war in Kashmir."¹

But Lord Bridwood justifies this inconsistency in the boundary award on the basis that to have awarded the Gurdaspur district to Pakistan would have placed the headworks of the upper Bari Doab canal at Madhupur under Pakistan control. The canal irrigates Lahore, Amritsar and Gurdaspur districts. This reasoning seems incorrect as well as unfair.

Amritsar district lies between Gurdaspur and Lahore would inevitably irrigate Amritsar in between, and there is nothing objectionable or illegal in placing a canal that irrigates most Pakistan lands under Pakistan control.

On the contrary, it would have been the only proper arrangement. There are headworks of canals which irrigate land in both parts of the Punjab, Madhupur headworks on the Ravi and Ferozpur on the Sutlej. The Ferozpur headworks under Pakistan would have kept a balance in the control of river waters. By awarding control of both to India, India unilaterally controls the waters of the Ravi and the Sutlej Rivers, the award also gave India the ability to parch West Pakistan at will. "No army with bombs

1. Lord Birdwood, India and Pakistan, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1954, p.36.

and shellfire could devastate a land as thoroughly as West Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the fields and people of West Pakistan alive."¹

Early in 1948 the Central Bari Doab Canal and the Dipalpur Canal were closed. Pakistan faced with a host of problems, hastily pressed for some kind of agreement that would reopen the Canals. On the 4th May the East Punjab Government assured the West Punjab Government that it had no intention of withholding water from West Punjab without giving it time to tap alternate sources. After this agreement India quickened work on dams and canal constructions for the development of East Punjab agriculture. Bakhra Dam on the river Sutlej was raised to 127 m. which is higher than the Ho^over Dam. The dam now has the capacity to hold the entire flow of the Sutlej. Harike Dam at the confluence of the Beas and Sutlej Rivers is under construction. As a result of these dams, the eastern part of West Pakistan, which is one of the most highly productive areas, is dry. During these twenty three years of independence, numerous agreements and proposals have been made, but none have been satisfactory. Since

1. David Lilienthal, "Lilienthal Proposal for Indus Basin Water Dispute", Colliers, August 4th, 1957.

the Spring of 1958 the Central Bari Doab and Dipalpur Canals have been completely closed.

This water dispute is also tied to the Kashmir problem. The dispute over the division of water has been referred to as the Indus Basin Water Dispute, and the Indus Basin includes Kashmir. Had the Kashmir been a part of Pakistan, the dispute would have been limited to the waters of the eastern rivers - Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, and India could never have attained full control of the waters of the three above mentioned rivers. The International Court of Justice's decision on water supply was influenced by Indian occupation of Kashmir, although the Kashmir problem is yet to be settled. The decision as it stands today is that the entire flow of Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, the eastern rivers, is Indian and that the entire flow of the western rivers, ie. Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum belongs to Pakistan, except that Kashmir may claim her pre-partition supply from the Jhelum River. Since India does not use the water of the western rivers in their upper course, Pakistan cannot claim her pre-partition share of water from the eastern rivers, in their lower courses. The World Bank has suggested the establishment of a tribunal to study the equitable use of the eastern rivers but India is not ready to assign to any tribunal the right to interpret the May 1948 agreement.

Indian occupation of Kashmir is impinging not only upon Pakistan's economic development, but on the development of Kashmir itself. The natural terrain of the state is towards the southwest. Various mountain ranges projecting from the Great Himalayan Range shut off any access from East Punjab, whereas, these open as valleys and spurs towards the West Punjab. Most important waterways are the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, important highways are Rawalpindi-Srinagar road and Sialkot-Jammu road, and other means of transport and communication are also much better on the western side than on the eastern.

Sheikh Abdullah once pointed out that the nearest railway station from Srinagar is Rawalpindi and the nearest seaport Karachi. ~~Kashmir cannot utilise the waters of the western rivers because of India's right on the entire flow of the eastern rivers.~~ Hydroelectric projects cannot be developed by either Kashmir or Pakistan because they would be too close to the boundary, and hence vulnerable. Although the Riasi district is quite rich in iron ore, it is too close to the Pakistan border. Neither state is willing to develop this section, and India doesn't need to develop this part for her better investments are in Orissa and the Deccan plateau.

It has been seen that the ^aRadcliffe Award, by awarding Gurdaspur district to India, provided the only natural link between India and Jammu. The Raja being Hindu naturally inclined towards India, but the 77 per cent of Muslim population was opposed to the idea of accession to India. Just three days before the final boundary award was to be announced an interior agreement signed between India and Pakistan postponed the decision. The next event of great importance was the march of the tribal people into the vale of Kashmir. There were good reasons for this tribal campaign. The population in the western and the north-western parts of Kashmir consists of Pathans who had never been ruled by the Raja, and accession to India meant that these Pathans would also become Indian subjects. In this light, the campaign was a revolt against the Raja and his suspected accession to India. Secondly, the tribal people had long resented the Raja's tyranny. They would have gone and fought in Kashmir long before, but British control was effective enough to prevent such a move.

Kashmir is now a divided state. The Pakistan section is in two political units. The small strip of Jammu and Kashmir along the Punjab, known as Azad Kashmir, is one unit. The other unit comprises Gilgit and Baluchistan, the Chiefs of which have acceded to Pakistan. The greater part of Kashmir and Jammu and Ladakh province belong to India.

This unit maintained some pretence of autonomy until 1954. During this period of partial autonomy Sheikh Abdullah, the leading figure in the struggle of freedom for Kashmir, and the first Prime Minister of Kashmir after accession of the state to India, seemed to be shifting from Independent Kashmir to having close relations with Pakistan. Indian deduction is that since Kashmir is an integral part of India by virtue of the fact that legally the state had acceded to India, there is no need for a plebiscite, though the legality of accession was conditioned by a plebiscite. For further justification, the 1957 election in India-held Kashmir is considered enough of a plebiscite. If a plebiscite is limited to the region where the population is rather mixed, it necessarily implies partition of Kashmir, an idea India has never even tolerated. The present truce line is neither acceptable to India nor to Pakistan.

India seems to have succeeded in her campaign, and any further discussion on the Kashmir Issue has been dropped. There is little possibility of a plebiscite now because, according to Indian leaders, an impartial attitude from the United States cannot be expected because of military aid to Pakistan. They want the whole issue withdrawn from the Security Council.

Although the need to solve the Kashmir Issue is a pressing one, the chances for a solution are remote. The only possibility for the issue to be revived is if a third party enters the scuffle, and should that occur, both India and Pakistan would be losers.


Pakistan as a nation has many problems, the forces that resulted in the creation of Pakistan may still be strong enough to preserve its future. The birth of Pakistan was highly idealistic, and idealism is a powerful force. Mackinder said: "Idealists are the salt of the earth, without them to move us, society would soon stagnate and civilization fade."¹

1. Mackinder (Sir Halford J.), Democratic Ideals and Reality; New York, Henry Holt & Company, 1942, p.7.

CHAPTER 4ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF R.C.D. COUNTRIES¹

The homogeneity of a society is a major factor in the solidarity of a state. Such homogeneity may be ethnic, racial or psychological. The ethnic structure of the region, which includes Turkey, Iran and West Pakistan, is so complex as to invalidate any generalization. From 2500 B.C. to the end of the 14th century there were large scale migrations from the north and north east. Various tribes moved south plundering and fighting the previously settled people, and settled themselves in the same areas. Every new onslaught resulted in a superimposition of another ethnic group on the preceding groups. People from the north were not the only cause of this diversity in the ethnic pattern. The Persians, the Greeks and the Arabs expanded their empires to the east. This east-west shift of empires was accompanied by a complementary movement of people, which further confused the ethnic picture. Many of these tribes, partially cut off from one another by the nature of the land, survived as homogeneous groups which preserved their differences in social life, language and, to some extent, codes of law. The ethnic

1. See Fig. 11.



Source: 1. Tayyeb, A., - Pakistan , A Political Geography, 1966.

FIG 11

homogeneity so desirable for a strong and coherent state is hard to achieve in any of these countries in spite of the fact that people of the area are mostly Aryans or Turks, or a mixture of the two, known as Turko-Iranians.

Very little is known of the people indigenous to the region. The earliest records indicate three migrations of the Aryans. The first group settled in Asia Minor and Western Iran, the second advanced to the east of the Caspian Sea and occupied eastern Iran, and the third took a more easterly course and inhabited what is now Afghanistan and West Pakistan. Among the Aryans were a sprinkling of Greeks. Being small in number and cut off from their homeland, they were absorbed by the Aryans, so there is no group of people that can be recognized as Greeks today even though their influence may seem to appear among the inhabitants of some isolated valleys.

The Aryans were followed by Scythians, Yueh Chi and Kushans who pushed the Aryans further east and west and colonized the bridging land, or northern Afghanistan. The Arabs brought Muslim rule, but their area of effective colonization was confined to the western slopes of the Zagros Mountains and the southern coastal strip along the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. From the 8th

century to the 13th century was a period of Turkish advent. This was the longest period of encroachment on the Middle East and Northern India by one type of people, and consequently the impact of the Turks has been the strongest.

Over the years, and especially after the innovation of Islam, there has been considerable intermingling, yet settlement of various groups in different valleys separated from one another helped preserve the tribal organization. Today each country offers varying degrees of tribal complexity, and must be considered separately. A description of various groups and area relationships will be given for the individual countries.

4.1 Turkey:

Though the nomad expansion during the tenth and eleventh centuries the word 'Turk', which started as the name of a small clan of the Hiungun people of Mongolia, had been extended to cover a large number of tribes of mixed descent, some conquering, some being conquered. They were far from uniform either in physique or in culture, and their only bond was that all spoke dialects related to the speech of the original Turks. In its ethnological, as opposed to its political, sense, therefore, the word 'Turk' is strictly speaking, a linguistic term,

and it is incorrect to speak of the Turks as a 'race'. In this sense many existing tribes of Central and Western Asia can call themselves 'Turks', though they are not included in the political definition of the constitution of the Turkish Republic.

The Central tribes, and those who faced eastwards, took on the culture of the Mongols, with whom they also mixed physically in varying degrees, until at the present day some of them are indistinguishable from the Mongol neighbours, except in their speech. These have been called, as a body, 'Turanian Turks', though no hard and fast line divides them from the 'Iranian Turks'. The term means only that they are under Mongolian, Chinese and Tibetan cultural influences, while retaining Turkic speech. Their main tribes are the Kirghiz-Kazak, who live between the Aral Sea and Lake Balkash, and near the borders of the Lena river and its tributaries in eastern and northern Siberia, and the Tatars, who still roam over the steppes of southern Siberia, Dzungaria and northern Mongolia.

Those who moved westwards, but did not go into Asia Minor, fraternized with the Iranians, whose mode of life they adopted, while keeping their own language. Their chief representatives today are the Turkoman, the Sart, the Taranchi, and

the Uzbek. Their culture was strongly influenced in the past by the Arabs, and later by the Persians, and ethnologists therefore find it convenient to group them together under the title 'Iranian Turks'. It is estimated that there are about twenty-five million people speaking various Turki languages - Turanian and Iranian - outside the present boundaries of Turkey. Most of them are now under the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R. and form the majority of the population in eleven of its republics and autonomous provinces. The Tatar invasions, which were responsible for the presence of Turki-speaking groups on the Volga and in the Crimea, also left groups in northern Persia and Afghanistan. Further east a large part of the population of the Chinese province of Sinkiang (which used to be called Chinese Turkistan) is also Turki-speaking.

The differences between the Anatolian Turks and those of Iran and Central Asia result from the circumstances of their arrival in their historical home. Westward infiltration of Turkish tribes into Anatolia had probably begun a century or two before the mass migration, of which the Seljuk and Osmanli (Ottoman) are the most important. They occurred in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and were due to Mongol pressure from farther east. All alike began in the search for new pastures by pastoral nomads;

they therefore affected the fertile and populous areas less than the steppes and foothills. There was intercourse from the first, and frequent inter-marriage, especially when Turkish families became sedentary and settled in the towns. There are, however, still pastoral communities in many districts of the plateau and adjacent highlands whose breed is as little changed as their mode of life.

Physical observations show that the modern Turks are a mixed people, compounded of the types of breeds characteristic of the Mediterranean and of the Mountain Zone, but there is certainly a marked Mediterranean strain. As this has been found also on ancient sites, it seems likely that both these physical types have lived together in Anatolia since prehistoric times.

The evidence of physical anthropology supports their claims both (a) to be descended from Central Asiatic ancestors, and (b) to be akin to the Hittites and other ancient inhabitants of Asia Minor. It has been estimated that the Turkish people of today owe perhaps 75 per cent of its ancestry to the inhabitants of Anatolia before the first inrush of Turki-speaking nomads, and about 25 per cent to those new comers from Asia.

One minority group - the Kurds - stands out from the rest of the population. The western Kurds,

especially, are tall and are extremely long-headed, among very round-headed neighbours. They are pastoral nomads who graze their flocks and herds over parts of Turkey, Persia and Iraq with little respect for political frontiers, particularly during their seasonal migrations. Their language is Iranian, akin to Persian, and quite distinct from Turkish or Arabic; they may therefore be descended from early immigrants out of the northern steppe. Within the present political boundaries of Turkey they are chiefly concentrated in the south-east. The descendants of this ancient people are still numerous, especially in the eastern province bordering on the Armenian district of Persia and the U.S.S.R. Their cradle-land is in the Ararat highland, the uppermost Murat Valley, and the Van basin, between the Caucasus and Mesopotamia, extending westward as far as the Central Plateau, and southward into Taurus, where they have long been inextricably intermixed with Kurds.

North of the Armenian homeland lie the isolated mountain districts of Azaristan and Lazistan, the classical Colchis. The people of both districts are allied closely to the Georgians of the Caucasus, a fact proved by their language; but they are distinguished from these by their religion and the habits acquired under Islam. They are mountain

people living in village settlements along the mountain valleys, both cultivators and herdsmen. They are known to the Turks as Kazars and formerly enjoyed a bad reputation among the ruling class.

4.2 Iran

In Iran the Persians are of the old Aryan tribes. They constitute a little less than two-thirds of the total population. They are the well educated community of the country and are particularly powerful in and about Tehran. The national language of Iran being Persian and the Persians being all of the Shia sect of Islam, they contribute to the homogeneity of the Centre.¹ However there are Turkish tribes in Mazanderan and Gilan. At one time in history they provided the ruling dynasty, The Qajars, the ruling Turkish tribe held sway from 1736 to 1926 in spite of all the international troubles and internal disorder. At present there is no friction between them and the Persians.

Surrounding the Persians are several tribal units of varying strength. The most important of these tribes are in Azarbaijan. They are called the Azeris and are descendents of a Turk tribe of

1. For details see Arberry, The Legacy of Persia, Oxford University Press.

the same name. The more than two million Azeris have preserved their Turki culture and languages, and though Persian is taught in the schools, many Azeris are not yet bilingual as is the case with other ethnic groups. They do belong to the Shia sect, the state religion of Iran.

The Safawi dynasty, which preceded the Qajars, reconquered the northern and the north-western provinces from the Ottoman Turks, bringing the boundary of Iran to the Caucasus Mountains. The Qajar period, however, was a period of Russian aggression, and the boundary of Iran was pushed back to the Aras River in 1826 (Treaty of Turkomanchay).¹ As a result Azarbaijan was split into Russian Azarbaijan and Iranian Azarbaijan, which means that the Iranian Azeris have racial, linguistic and cultural affinities with their kinsfolk north of the river Aras. Divided as it is between cultural and national ties, Azarbaijan has been exploited by the Soviet Union more than once and is still in a politically exploitable state. There are also Armenians, Assyrians and the Turki tribes of Qizilbash and Shah Sanan in Azarbaijan.

1. Sykes, Persia, Oxford University Press, 1931, p.50.

The other ethnic groups are mostly pastoral, and in general the tribes are self-contained economic units organized for the control of their pastureland. The Bakhtiaries tribes, one of the well organized groups, live in the valleys of the Zagros around Isfahan. Some of the Bakhtiariss speak a Persian dialect and others a Turki dialect. They are supposed to be the descendents of a Mongol noble, Bakhtiar by name. Turki influence in their dialect signifies a mixing of Turkish tribes. They are of Shia faith and feel quite close to the Persians, even though they were an autonomous unit until 1924.

The Kurds, an important political and ethnic entity, occupy the area west and south of Lake Urmia around Mahabad. Aryans by race, they are believed to be the descendents of the Medes. Their language is closely related to Persian, but is distinctive enough to be designated as Kurdish. In religion they belong to the Sunni sect of Islam. The Kurds also live across the Iranian boundary in Iraq and Turkey. Their aspirations for independence have been curbed with force by all of the states of which they form a part. Kurdish nationalism in Iran springs from the fact that, "since they were members of the same Iranian racial family as the Persians proper, there is no reason why they could

not form the same combination as did the ancient Medes and Persians¹". This would mean a Kurdish republic within Iran which is not justified by cultural or political separateness, even though mountain barriers come between them and the Persians.

Between the Kurds and the Bakhtiaris live the Lurs, They are thought to be the indigenous people of Iran. They speak a Persian dialect, are of the Shia sect. They are good hunters. They are proud and feel very superior to the Kurds.

East of the Bakhtiaris are the Turki speaking tribes known as the Qashqai. Their centre is Shiraz. They have mixed with the Arabs to some extent, but their cultural traits are still Turkish. The only cultural element they really have in common with Persians is religion. South of the Qashqai group there are Arabs along the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. They are of course Sunni in their belief and speak Arabic. Their influence is considerable in the province of Khuzistan. Bahrain was lost to the Persians because of Arab numerical superiority, though in Persian official books Bahrain is still part of Iran and is shown as the eleventh Ostan.²

1. Roosevelt (Archie), "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," Middle East Journal, I, July 1947, p.262.

2. Ostan is the Persian word for province.

Other tribal groups are Turkmen in northern Khurasan along the Russo-Iranian border, and the Baluchis in the south-eastern part along the Pakistan border. A greater number of Baluchi people live in Baluchistan, West Pakistan. A contiguous area in southern Afghanistan also has a small number of Baluchis. These tribes of Aryan origin were forced southward by the successive raids from the north. They speak Baluchi, one of the Aryan groups of languages. Among the Baluchis a remnant of the Dravidians has survived. They are called the Brahmis. Their language belongs to the Dravidian family of languages. A major group of the Brahmis is in West Pakistan. The Makranis, a negroid race, live along the Makran Coast both in Iran and West Pakistan. (See F14 II)

An interesting feature of the ethnic distribution in Iran is that each major group has a city as its centre. Tehran for the Persians, Tabriz for the Azeris, Shiraz for Qashqais, Isfahan for the Bakhtiaris and Kermanshah and Hamadan for the Kurds.

The ethnic picture of Iran would be incomplete without mentioning the Afghans. Afghans domination of Iran began with the reign of Mahmud Ghaznavi. In the period following a number of Afghan tribes migrated, among which the Abdalis, and Chilzais were

of importance. At the beginning of the 18th century the Afghans lost their importance as soldiers because the 18th century marks the beginning of Qajar rule and Russo-British rivalry, and a decline in the strength of the Iranian national army. Most of the Afghans, therefore, returned to Qandahar, though some remained and still are in Khurasan and Sistan.

As for the ethnic groups of Afghanistan, one of Persian origin is called the Tajik. The Tajiks are non-nomadic people engaged in various business pursuits and farming, and are peaceful and hard-working. Most of them live in the north-eastern part of Afghanistan in the Valley of the River Panjshir. Other areas of Tajik settlement are the plateau of Badakshan, Kohistan and the cities of Kabul and Herat. At the time of Turkish invasions the Tajiks were the ruling tribes. The Ghorî dynasty from the Tajik tribe once again rose to power around 1150. Their language, known as Tajik, is an older type of Persian, and people knowing present Persian can converse with Tajiks without difficulty.

The Pathans, usually referred to as the true Afghans¹, are the dominant group in Afghanistan. The original home of the Pathans was supposed to have been around the Sulaiman ranges. According

1. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W.K.), Afghanistan, third edition, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.48.

to Raverty¹, "the Pathans derive their name from the fact that they are the people who live behind or between the ridges of the Sulaiman Range, the word Pasht in Tajik Persian signifying the back of a mountain range²". Al Otbi, secretary to Mahmud Ghaznavi, mentions the Afghans as unruly tribes of the Sulaiman mountains which were subdued by the Turk rulers of Ghazni. In 1333, Ibn Batuta, a Moorish traveller, described the Pathans as highwaymen from the Koh-i-Sulaiman. They rose to prominence in the country after their contact with the Turks, and formed a major part of the armies of the Ghaznavi, the Moghuls and the Persian Kings. Recent studies indicate that the indigenous people of the Sulaiman Mountains, for whom the term Pathan is used, freely intermingled with the Turks.³ Some decades back, the Ghilzaris or the Khiljis were considered true Pathans, but it has been proved that they are the descendants of a Turkish tribe known as Khalaj.⁴ In all probability the Pathans are

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1. Raverty (Henry G.), is the author of Notes on Afghanistan, considered the most authentic work on the country.
 2. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W.K.), Afghanistan, London, Oxford University Press, 1953, p.49.
 3. Geographical Handbook Series, Turkey, Vol.I, April 1942, N.I.D., p.345.
 4. Fraser-Tytler (Sir W.K.), Afghanistan, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, p.53.

either direct descendents of the Turks or mixed Turks and indigenous Pathans.

Currently the designation "Pathan" includes all pushtu speaking people in the area extending northeast from Qandahar to Rawalpindi. Along the Indus River a section within the area of Pathan population, the Pathans are a settled society, but in a belt straddling the Durand Line the tribal organisations are strong. The Pathans are probably the majority ethnic group of Afghanistan, constituting nearly 60 per cent of the population. What may be even more surprising is that there may be so many, if not more, Pathans in West Pakistan. According to the 1961 Census figures there were 3,647,158 Pathans in tribal territory. The North Western Frontier population, which is primarily Pathans, was given as 4,258,000.¹ There are Pathans east of the river Indus in the district of Attock, Mianwali and Dera Gazi Khan. In addition a number of tribes settled throughout the Punjab and since partition, many of them have migrated from the East Punjab to West Pakistan.

The Hazaras are a third major group in Afghanistan. These people are Mongol by race, and their language has been described as "archaic Persian".

1. Ginsberg (Norton S.), (Editor), The Patterns of Asia, Engleward Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1958, p. 680.

They are found mostly in the central part of the country, north and south of Koh-i-Baha, but when Amir Abdur Rehman was subduing various tribes to unify the Afghanistan State, many of the Hazara tribes fled to Peshawar and Quetta and some to Meshed. Also, since they live in a poor part of the country, many moved out in search of a livelihood, and for this reason smaller groups of Hazara people may be found far away from their homeland -- Hazarijat in the North West Frontier Province, probably takes its name from these people, though the present population is quite mixed. A notable difference of the Hazaras is that they profess to the Shia faith in a predominantly Sunni Afghanistan.

There are other Turk and Turco-Mongol tribes in the northern part of Afghanistan along the Soviet boundary. From west to east they are Turkomen, Uzbeks and Kirghiz. The Kirghiz tribe is a small group confined to the Wakhan section. The Uzbeks are Turco-Mongol, who speak a Turki dialect, but most of them also understand Persian. They number about 820,000 according to Soviet estimates, and are mostly farmers and shepherds. West of the Uzbeks about 200,000 Turkomen live in Afghanistan. As the name indicates, they are rather unmixed, Turk tribes. A far greater number of Turkomen, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kirghiz live on the other side of the river Oxus in Russian territory.

The Kafirs, another small group, may be added to this tribal set up. The name signifies that this group did not accept Islam so are called the Kafirs. According to this version they could be of early Aryan descent pushed into seclusion of their present abode by later invasions. There are other versions too. One is that they are the relics of the Greeks. They have also been referred to as Dravidian aborigines of the wild country. They live on either side of the Durand Line¹ in the Kumar River Valley.

4.3 West Pakistan

As for the ethnic structure of West Pakistan, the Pathans and the Baluchis have already been mentioned. The majority of the population may be grouped as the Punjabis and the Sindhis, the names of the provinces from which the inhabitants also took their name. After the birth of Pakistan these terms have lost some of their significance, since millions of immigrants from other provinces of India have joined the Punjabis and the Sindhis, and the Punjab has been divided. The significant fact is that almost all the tribal groups that make up the ethnic structure of Iran and Afghanistan are also represented in West Pakistan, but without the tribal organisation.

1. The International boundary between West Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Under the present classification, in addition to the Punjabis and Sindhis, there are the Pathans, known as the "frontier people", and the immigrants who form a special group known as "refugees". However, Turkish is the strongest single element among the Pakistanis.¹ This is borne out by the prevalence of Turki words in Urdu as well as in various other dialects spoken in West Pakistan, by the similarity of food and certain customs, and by facial characteristics in common with the Turks. Some believe that the Rajputs of India are also Turks. This idea can be supported on the grounds that the Rajputs of today might probably be the Kushans, who came to India before the advent of Islam and were absorbed in the Indian population.²

Other Turkish invasions after the advent of Islam brought many more Turks into the northern part of India, but the restrictions of Islam on intermarriage with idol worshippers seemed to keep the Muslims and Hindus of the Indian sub-continent apart. The religious ban on mixing made the preservation of Turkish traits possible, especially among the elite.

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1. Spear and Ikram, The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan, Karachi, 1955, p.8
 2. Rauf (Abdur), Renaissance of Islamic Culture and Civilization in Pakistan, Lahore, 1965, p.10

4.4 General Ethnic Patterns

Returning to a consideration of the whole area, a general ethnic pattern emerges in spite of the apparent ethnic complexity. Aryan tribes occupy the central area from Iran to Baluchistan. The various Turkish tribes are to be found along the northern borders of Iran and Afghanistan, extending from Azarbaijan to Wakhan. The Arabs live in the south along the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, their number and influence decreases eastward, i.e. from Khuzistan towards Makran. All the foregoing ethnic groups are so mixed in West Pakistan that any tribal identity is lost except in the extreme north western part. What separates various groups is not the cultural differences, but their tribal organisations which were their political organisations prior to the growth of the national state.

To correlate the study of ethnic groups to the study of 'cores' (see page 1) it may be said that, within the total area of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan there are many individual 'cores' geographically bounded by marshlands and ethnically homogeneous. However, in the states as political units, this homogeneity is lost because they contain within their boundaries numbers of dissimilar

'cores'. The different 'cores' produced by history and preserved by geography have been a hinderance to the development of national unity.¹ The homogeneous 'cores' have first call for loyalty of the individuals beyond the national state.²

Each of the states has therefore more than one 'core'. At the same time there has been a shift of certain Asiatic capitals to the coast. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the capital of Russia was moved from Moscow, the historic capital, to St. Petersburg, the newly built "window on the west", a shift symbolic of the new-found desire of the Czars for contacts with western Europe. By the time of the Communist Revolution, this westward orientation had exhausted its role, the national tradition was now to be emphasised, and the capital was restored to Moscow.

The movement in Turkey shows a more complex pattern of movement. The Ottoman Turks conquered Asia Minor in the fourteenth century and established their capital successively at sites farther and farther west until in 1326 it came to Bursa. In the fourteenth century they invaded Europe and over-

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1. Febvre (Lucien), A Geographical Introduction to History, London, Kegan & Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1932, p.310.
 2. Derwent (Whittlesey), The Earth and the State, New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1944, p.597; "Core or Nuclear Core. The area in which or about which a state originates".

ran the Balkan peninsula. Their capital was moved to Edirne (Adrianople), in the Maritza valley. It remained here until it was moved to Constantinople, which fell to the Turks in 1453. Constantinople (Istanbul) was well placed to serve as the capital of an empire which stretched from the Danube to the Euphrates and the Nile. When the European possessions had largely been lost and the Asiatic seriously diminished, Constantinople (Istanbul) ceased to be as suitably placed geographically. After 1923 Turkey became an essentially Turkish state. The new ruler, Mustafa Kamal Attaturk, emphasised the narrowly national aspects of the state, the capital was transferred to Ankara, a site in the midst of the plateau of Anatolia, where essentially Turkish traditions could be developed.

In Iran the major core at Tehran is the strongest, but it is not ethnically homogeneous. Tabriz, Mahabad and Isfahan are effective separate ethnic cores within the main core area. Meshed and Kerman are two small cores in the eastern part of Iran. In Afghanistan there are three cores, Kabul, Herat and Qandahar. Kabul is the most important because it is the capital of the state and enjoys a relatively safe location. Qandahar and Kabul are connected, but both are cut off from Herat by the large Hindu Kush ranges. Herat is closer to Meshed than to Kabul.

In Pakistan too there were three cores, Dacca, Lahore and Karachi, but now Rawalpindi has also been added to the core areas. From the point of view of homogeneity, the Dacca core in East Pakistan is very coherent. West Pakistan's population is rather varied, and added to the three provincial groups, it has received more than 7,000,000 refugees. The refugee influx has made the population of Karachi more varied than that of any other city or town in the country. It is often referred to as "the city of strangers". The roots of this homogeneity are not very deep and strong. However, under the existing conditions Karachi seems to serve as a boundary core between the two main cores of the country, at Lahore and Dacca.

In January 1959 the suitability of Karachi as the permanent capital of Pakistan from the point of view of geographical location, communications, defence, climate and availability of a productive hinterland, was considered. The Commission came to the conclusion that Karachi was not suitable. They finally recommended that the capital should be located in the Potwar Plateau near Rawalpindi. So the present capital is about seven miles from Rawalpindi under the lee of the Margala Hills. Spread over 906.5 sq. Km. of the Potwar Plateau, the site is of natural terraces and meadows, rising

from 518 m. to 609.6 m. above sea level with mountain ranges. The place has a rich history. It was one of man's earliest homes, dating back four hundred thousand years, as shown by the Stone Age relics of the "Sohan culture" found in the Potwar Plateau.¹

As for the boundaries of these states, few are what might be termed natural. The one between Iran and Afghanistan runs through a marshland, except in the vicinity of Herat, and the southern boundaries of Iran and West Pakistan are oceans. All other boundaries cut through core areas. The northern boundary of Iran west of the Caspian Sea divides the Azeris. East of the Caspian Sea the northern boundary of both Iran and Afghanistan extend along the southern limits of a marshland which has been annexed by Russia. At the extreme north-east end, this boundary cuts across a part of the Tashkent-Samarkand core (Turk). On three sides, the boundaries of West Pakistan cut through the Punjab,² which as a geographical entity includes Kashmir and the North West Frontier Province. It divides the Pathans in the west, and Kashmir in the north, and the Punjabis in the east. The eastern boundary, however, has become a sharp ethnic line between Muslim and Hindu due to the mass migration following partition of the sub-continent in 1947.

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1. Wheeler (Sir Mortimer R.E.), Five Thousand Years of Pakistan, Christopher Johnson Ltd., 1950, p.16.
 2. Before 1900 the Punjab included the Vale of Kashmir and a greater part of the present N.W.F.P. In 1846 Kashmir was made a separate state and in 1901 Lord Curzon created a North Western Frontier Province.

CHAPTER 5R.C.D. PACT INCLUDING INTERNAL BILATERAL
AGREEMENTSFIELDS OF COOPERATION

Today the greatest concern of the developing countries is to raise the per capita income and living standards of their people. This aim underlies the development plans that now constitute an integral part of the approach to the problem of effective allocation of resources. These early years of RCD are difficult and crucial, because the expectations of the masses of the developing countries have been raised to a point such that it is even by the most ingenious methods difficult to maintain the required pace of development.

One marked characteristic of the world economic situation is a clear concentration of wealth and well being in certain regions of the world. This seems to support the hypothesis that economic development once started, accelerates and gains impetus in certain regions, within a country as well as in the world at large, i.e. there are growth points or centres and around these points a more rapid and accelerated growth process takes place. What is more striking, however, is that not only there exists a large gap between the incomes of a different region, but that this gap tends to widen through time. In most of the developing countries the existence of national economic barriers may be a factor impeding more speedy growth. Therefore adherence to the idea

of regional cooperation between the developing countries has become desirable. The cooperation thus engendered through regional cooperation could result in a more broad based economy, a fruitful application of the factors of production, a larger marketing area, a greater bargaining position for trade with other countries and capability to undertake large joint projects on a regional basis.

The emergence of regional economic cooperation involving preferential treatment is an outstanding feature of the evolution of international economic relations in recent years. Although this cooperation shows variations in form and purpose, a common feature is that they seek not merely to provide a means for discussion for joint action on common problems but also to integrate the economics of member countries by removal of quantitative restrictions and tariffs on trade amongst them coupled with other measures necessary to secure the establishment of a unified market.

Not for many years would it be a practical proposition to build up international economic relations on the concept of the world as an appropriate economic unit. Meanwhile regionalism has come to be considered preferable to both world wide freeing of trade and national self-sufficiency.

Three forms of regional cooperation amongst the member countries may be distinguished. First, there are those activities which do not directly involve commercial and development policies. Secondly, there are those activities consisting of joint efforts to secure the common or integrated development of process facilities or natural resources but which do not directly involve limitations on the independent determination of commercial policies of the member countries. Thirdly, there are those forms of cooperation which arise from the treatment of the region as a whole as a single market. Cooperation at this level directly impinges on the development and commercial policies of member countries and thus results in decisions of a larger and far-reaching nature than is involved in other forms of cooperation. Nevertheless, it is precisely in this field that regional cooperation seems particularly appropriate. But undoubtedly the difficulties of securing this are much greater because it requires the establishment of preferential economic relations among member countries including freer trade and coordination of development plans. In order to achieve this, member Governments must be prepared to make special efforts and to accept limitations of their sovereignty in carrying out their development and commercial policies.

5.1 Joint Purpose Enterprises

The Istanbul Summit Conference decided that the development plans and production potential of the countries of the region should be studied with a view to making recommendations on joint purpose projects and long-term purchase agreements. It was observed that joint purpose projects would feed the requirements of the three countries. There were several projects for which none of these countries can provide a sufficient domestic market, yet they could be viable projects if the total requirements of the three countries are taken into consideration.

Joint Purpose Enterprises constitute the major field of RCD activity. RCD provides a market of some 180 million people. The Gross National Product of the RCD countries - Pakistan \$13 billion, Iran \$7 billion and Turkey \$10 billion is estimated at about \$30 billion and this is estimated to be growing at the rate of 8 per cent to 10 per cent per annum.¹ The number of people and the size of GNP indicates that it is possible to establish almost any worthwhile industry on an RCD basis.

The scope of RCD Joint Purpose Enterprises has been kept flexible so as to obtain the largest

1. Pakistan : Third Plan 1965-70, Iran : Third Plan 1962-68, Turkey : First Development Plan 1963-67.

possible measure of cooperation in this sphere.

Under the aegis of RCD, Joint Purpose Enterprises can be undertaken in various forms such as joint ownerships, either in the public or private sectors, ownership by one country or more for making supplies to the others, establishing production facilities in one country for which raw materials are produced in the other, and long-term purchase agreements based on productive facilities in any of the countries. This definition has been repeated in Article 3 of the "Agreement amongst Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for Promotion and Operation of Joint Purpose Enterprises".

During the course of the last six years RCD has made steady progress in the establishment of joint purpose enterprises, including petroleum and petrochemical industries. Thirteen joint RCD industrial enterprises started production in 1968, according to a statement released by the RCD Secretariat in Tehran recently.¹ A total of fifty-five Joint Purpose Enterprises had been approved by the RCD countries since the establishment of the alliance. These were:²

Located in Iran:

1. Aluminium; 2. RCD Carbon Black; 3. Dumpers Plant;

1. Pakistan News Digest, February 15th 1970, Karachi.

2. Regional Cooperation for Development, Fifth Anniversary Publication, July 21st 1969, Tehran, p.25.

4. Seamless Steel Pipes and Tubes; 5. Sodium Tri-polyphosphate; 6. Naphthol Dyes; 7. Caprolactum; 8. Polyisoprene Rubber; 9. Carbon Rods and Carbon Products; 10. Rotating Electrical Machinery; 11. Glycerine; 12. Diesel Engines for use in Marine Craft, tractors, earth moving equipment and light and heavy trucks and buses.

Located in Pakistan:

13. Bank Note Paper; 14. Kraft Paper; 15. Ball Bearing; 16. Textile Machinery Manufacture; 17. PAS Sodium; 18. Reactive Dyes; 19. Optical Bleaches; 20. Ultramarine Blue; 21. Toxaphene; 22. Dipterex; 23. Jute Manufactures; 24. Machine Tools; 25. Crawler Type Earth Moving Equipment; 26. Shock Absorbers; 27. Gear Boxes; 28. Aluminium Sheets etc; 29. Polyester Fibre; 30. Polyacrylonitrile Fibre; 31. Polybutadiene Rubber; 32. Methanol; 33. Glycerine; 34. Manufacture of Resistors, Capacitators, semi-conductors and TV picture tubes, RF Transformers, IF Transformers, Audio Transformers, Speakers, Mobile Radio Equipment, sound equipment excluding Movie Equipment, and Testing and Measuring Equipment; 35. Diesel Engines for use in Marine-craft, Tractors, Earth Moving Equipment and Light and Heavy Trucks and Buses; 36. Static Electrical Equipment.

Located in Turkey

37. Locomotives; 38. Kraft Paper Pulp; 39. Organic Pigment Dyes; 40. Basic and Chronic Dyes; 41. Borax and Boric Acid; 42. Manufacture of Machinery for Tea Industry; 43. Rubber Tyred Earth Moving Equipment; 44. Tungsten Carbide Tips and Tools; 45. Centrifugal and Special Filters for Chemical Industry; 46. Locomotive Diesel Engine Project; 47. Izmir Oil Refinery Project; 48. Polystyrene Project; 49. Filament for Electric Lamps; 50. Manufacture of Resistors, Capacitators, semi-Conductors and TV Picture Tubes, RF Transformers, IF Transformers, Audio Transformers, Speakers, Mobile Radio Equipment, sound Equipment excluding Movie Equipment and Testing and Measuring Equipment; 51. Diesel Engines for use in Marine-craft, Tractors, Earth-Moving Equipment and Light and Heavy Trucks and Buses.

Eight Joint Purpose Enterprises, namely Ball Bearings, Jute Manufactures, and Shock Absorbers located in Pakistan, Aluminium located in Iran, and Izmir Oil Refinery located in Turkey, and the three projects relating to Diesel Engines required for use in Marine-craft, Tractors, Earth-Moving Equipment and Light and Heavy Trucks and Buses project located in each of the three countries, were under various stages of implementation and should go into production by the end of 1970 or shortly thereafter.

5.1 . 1. The RCD Aluminium Project:

At Arak in Iran, this project has an annual production capacity of 45,000 metric tons^{per annum} and is based on imported alumina. The total cost is estimated at \$45.6 million. The equity of the project is \$20.5 million, of which Pakistan is providing \$1 million, Iran \$14 million and Reynolds International of U.S.A. \$5.5 million.¹ The long-term borrowings are \$25.1 million which will probably be obtained from the Export-Import Bank of U.S.A. The annual recurring cost on the import of alumina, interest on foreign loan and technical fees is estimated at \$8 million as against foreign exchange earnings through exports to countries other than Pakistan of about \$10.4 million.² In addition, Pakistan has undertaken to purchase 10,000 tons of aluminium per annum (\$5.3 million) for five years commencing from the time the plant goes into commercial operation.³ The project will thus give a net earning of \$7.7 million every year in foreign exchange. It is estimated that the project will earn a profit of 10 per cent per annum when it goes into operation in the beginning of next year, i.e. 1971.

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1. President's Secretariat, 'Background Paper on RCD', edited by Adil, A., Government of Pakistan, October-November 1967, p.9.
 2. The figures are quoted from 'Commerce and Industry', An RCD Magazine, October-November 1967, Tehran.
 3. Ibid.

5.1 . 2. RCD Jute Mill

The setting up of an RCD jute mill in East Pakistan with the cooperation of the tripartite countries, that is Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, is another joint purpose enterprise in the field of industry. The RCD Jute Mills project envisages a capacity of 500 jute looms (400 for hessian and 100 for sacking) with provision for further expansion. The total capital cost is estimated at \$8.68 million. The total equity capital of the RCD Jute Mills Ltd., will be \$4 million. Iran and Turkey will contribute \$400,000, each to the equity of the project.¹ The balance will be provided by Pakistan. Iran and Turkey have agreed to obtain their entire requirements of jute manufactures from Pakistan. Their anticipated requirements are estimated at about 20,000 tons per annum. The annual recurring foreign exchange cost of the project is estimated at \$588,000 as against a foreign exchange earning of \$5 million. The project is estimated to earn a profit of 25 per cent per annum on equity investment.

1. Pakistan News Digest, Karachi, 1st February, 1968.

5.1 . 3. The Bank Note Paper Project

The RCD Bank Note Paper project which has gone into production in mid-January 1969 was set up in Karachi adjacent to the Pakistan Security Printing Corporation with a total annual production capacity of 1,440 tons of Bank Note Paper. The total cost of the project is estimated at \$5.8 million (Rs. 2.8 Crores¹) with a loan component of \$3.3 million (Rs. 1.6 Crores). Iran and Turkey will participate in equity of the project to the extent of \$265,000 each and will meet their requirements of Bank Note and other security Papers from this project.² A loan of \$1.9 million has been obtained from the United Kingdom for financing of 85 per cent of the foreign exchange component cost of this project. It is estimated that the project will earn foreign exchange worth \$700,000 through exports to Iran and Turkey.³

5.1 . 4 A Carbon Black Project

This is being set up in Iran as a Joint Purpose Enterprise amongst Iran, Pakistan and a foreign collaborator. The total cost of the project is estimated at \$4.8 million out of which \$1.92 million

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1. One Crore is 10,000,000
 2. RCD News, The Bulletin of Regional Cooperation for Development, Vol.4, No.31, December 1968, Tehran, p.11.
 3. Kayhan International, July 16th, 1969, Tehran.

would be equity investment. Pakistan has undertaken to invest in the equity of the project as well as purchase 2,500 tons of carbon black per annum during the first five years of the operation of the project. The Iranian Government is negotiating with foreign Governments and firms for technical and financial collaboration in this project.

5.1 • 5. The RCD Ball Bearing Project

This project envisages an annual production of 1.12 million deep grooves ball bearings in the first phase and 1.46 million in the second phase. It is proposed to finance Phase I of the project through an equity investment of \$0.9 million, \$0.77 million through Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation loan, and the balance through local loan. The Sponsors have signed an agreement for technical collaboration with Messrs. N. S. K. of Japan.¹ Equity participation to the extent of \$157,000 each has been offered to Iran and Turkey. The project expects to make an annual profit of 10 per cent on equity investment.

Under the aegis of RCD, Joint Purpose Enterprises can be undertaken in various forms such as joint ownership either in the public and private

1. Islam, Q.V. "Financing of RCD Joint Purpose Enterprises", in R.C.D., Fourth Anniversary Publication, July 21st, 1968, Tehran, p.40.

sectors, ownership by one country or more for making supplies to the others, establishing production facilities in one country for which raw material is produced in the other, and long-term purchase agreements based on productive facilities in any of the countries.

The general criteria governing the establishment of Joint Purpose Enterprises are as follows:-

1. Products of such enterprises established in a particular country should be sold to other member countries at internationally competitive prices.
2. The Joint Purpose Enterprises should take all the measures necessary to ensure acceptable quality and standard for its products.
3. In determining the projects for regional development priority should normally be accorded to the establishment of such industries which require a market larger than any one member country can provide to ensure economic production.
4. Within the broad concept and spirit of Regional Cooperation for Development, attempts should be made to try and secure over a period of time, a reasonable share to each member country in the benefits that would flow from the establishment of Joint Purpose Enterprises

5.1 . 6. Petrochemical Project

Perhaps the most fertile ground for cooperation on a Joint Purpose Enterprise is in the field of petrochemicals. Iran has prepared a project for the production of Carbon Black with the participation of the United Carbon Company of U.S.A. Turkey is also setting up this project and so will purchase some of the raw material from Iran. Since Iran could meet only its own requirements from its petrochemical complex, so it was suggested at the Council Meeting of the RCD Ministers held in Tehran in October 1967 that the development of aeronautics should be a Joint Purpose Enterprise. Turkey signed to buy aeronautics from Iran if its own production fell short of domestic consumption. Pakistan's requirements for sulphur are met from Iran. ^{The} ~~Its current~~ annual requirement for sulphur ^{to the middle 1960's and} ~~is~~ 12,000 tons ^{was} which increased to about 30,000 tons by 1970. Iran's two petrochemical plants will produce 50,000 tons per annum initially to be raised to a million tons. Iran could supply Pakistan with 75,000 tons of required sulphur. Iran has agreed to supply 25,000 tons per annum of pure Caprolactam to Pakistan and 1,000 tons per annum to Turkey for polymerisation into Chips and further processing in the latter countries.

Pakistan's project on Polyester Fibre started at the end of 1968, and then she supplied Iran with 3,000 tons and Turkey with 2,000 tons per annum. Both Turkey and Pakistan will purchase their tetraethyl lead requirements from Iran. Their requirements are estimated at 500 and 430 tons respectively by 1970, rising to 1,000 tons each by 1980.

5.1 . 7. Izmir Oil Refinery

The development of the Izmir Oil Refinery in Turkey is under way. This was approved in the RCD meeting held in Ankara on January 23-24th 1967.¹ Iran will construct a pipeline to carry oil from Iranian oil fields to a Mediterranean port in Turkey. Turkey has proposed that the 3.5 million tons a year refinery should be supplied through a pipeline from Iranian oil fields under the terms of a long-term contract. At the same time the pipeline route would be open for the transport of other Iranian oil to a Mediterranean terminal on the Turkish coast. The project has obvious political and strategic advantages, since it would offer a means of by-passing the Suez Canal and at the same time cement RCD economic ties.

1. The Pakistan Times, January 26th, 1967, Lahore.

5.2 Technical Cooperation and Public Administration

Members of RCD countries need technical assistance if they are to maintain the rapid rate of economic development. To this end they have been receiving technical assistance from a number of foreign countries, chiefly the United States and Western Europe. But within their region they have developed high skills and experience in a number of fields. In these fields they are able to offer technical advice to other countries. It is therefore essential that RCD members should offer, and accept, technical aid to and from each other. The Committee on Technical Cooperation and Public Administration has been busy in this respect. A comprehensive programme has been under implementation since 1965. Under this programme the member countries have exchanged trainees and experts, organised seminars on subjects of common interest and published papers read at the seminars. The cost of the training facilities and experts is shared by the member countries. In respect of trainees the recipient country pays for their international passage whereas the donor country provides the subsistence allowance and other facilities. In the case of experts, the donor country bears the international travel cost and the recipient country provides subsistence allowance, internal travel, office and other facilities.

The RCD Programme of Technical Cooperation for 1967 envisages 113 training facilities for Iran (78 in Pakistan and 35 in Turkey), 83 facilities for Pakistan (52 in Iran and 31 in Turkey), and 51 for Turkey (25 in Iran and 26 in Pakistan), also an exchange of 29 experts, organisation of 8 seminars and publication of papers read at the seminars.¹ So far seminars on such important subjects as problems of economic development, problems of education and social welfare, family planning, implementation of development programme in the public sector, banking, role of local government in national development, and status of women have been organised.²

An ad-hoc Committee on Health comprising of top medical experts from the three countries was set up under the provisions of the report of the fifth session of the Council of Ministers of RCD. The Committee met at Islamabad on October 26-27th 1967 and reviewed the field of health for cooperation. Other effective measures recommended by the Committee include training facilities for health personnel on reciprocal basis under the RCD Technical Cooperation Programme, intra-regional trade in drugs and

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1. Papers read at the RCD Seminar, held at Tehran September 25th-29th 1967.
 2. Papers read at the RCD Colloquium, Karachi, June 28th-30th, 1966, 1967, 1968.

pharmaceuticals, family planning and the formation of an RCD Medical Association.¹

In the field of Public Administration the constructive part has been the organisation of the First Joint Course on Public Administration and Management at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore from October 9th 1967. The course was attended by 10 participants from Pakistan, 6 from Iran and 5 from Turkey. Two speakers each from Iran and Turkey came to deliver the lectures. At the same time useful seminars have been held by RCD. These include one on family planning held in April 1966 in Karachi; one on Islamic architecture, held in Tehran in June 1966.

A bibliography on Public Administration and Management has been prepared by the RCD Secretariat.

1. Decided at the RCD Council meeting held at Islamabad October 26th-27th 1967.

5.3 Communication and Transportation

Communication plays an extremely important role in the socio-economic life of a nation, and its significance is heightened in a developing economy. Economic development and its rapid growth depend upon an effective well developed transport and communication system. The availability of easy, quick and cheap means of communication have a direct connection with the expansion of trade and commerce, exchange of information, social, cultural contacts making a deep impact on the national life and its pattern. The economic development and social integration of the region would to a large extent depend upon the quality, adequacy and efficiency of communication.

5.3 . 1. Telecommunications

The development of telecommunication as an infra-structure is a must for the development of a country. It is a matter of satisfaction that there has been useful cooperation between the RCD countries in telecommunication so far, and a big field is open to the countries of the region for helping each other to attain rapid economic development in this sector. The different important aspects of the cooperation in telecommunications between the regional countries are as follows:-

1. Reduction of rates of telephone calls and telegrams between the three countries.
2. Reduction of the rates of transit of international telephone and telegraph traffic.
3. Transmission of television programmes between the three countries.
4. Manufacturing of different telecommunication equipment to make the region self-sufficient as far as possible and to give stability to telecommunication.
5. Collaboration in the field of satellite communication.

Soon after the formation of RCD, the telephone and telegraph rates were reduced to bring them in line with the local telephone and telegraph rates applicable in the three regional countries. The telegraph charges between Pakistan and Iran were reduced by 51 per cent and those between Pakistan and Turkey by 81 per cent. Telephone trunk call rates between Pakistan and Turkey were also reduced by 71 per cent. As a result of this, telephone traffic within the three countries has risen to more than 30 times.

The region of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey is geographically situated centrally between the countries of Europe, Africa and Asia. Therefore it is ideally placed for the transmission of transit traffic between these countries. The CENTO microwave system, the longest in the world when it was

constructed, utilizes 88 relay stations to provide up to 600 simultaneous telephone channels - from Ankara through Tehran to Karachi, a distance of 4924 Km.¹ Completed at the end of 1964, it was tested for six months and then turned over for Government operation in June 1965. In Iran, and to some extent in Turkey, the system is becoming the major trunk-line for telephone and telegraph traffic within the country. The introduction of operators dialling between Ankara, Tehran and Karachi started in 1966.

The telecommunications experts of the three countries have worked out a plan which will enable the introduction of semi-automatic trunk dialling among the three countries of the region on the microwave link.

5.3 . 2. Postage Rates

Postage rates on all categories of surface letter mail, viz. letters, commercial papers, books, newspapers, samples of merchandize and small packets, have been reduced to the level of internal rates of each country.² This means that a letter or a packet posted in any of the regional countries can go anywhere in the region without extra charge. This reduction has helped the free flow of printed matter like

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1. CENTO, Public Relations Division, Ankara, 1967, p.36.
 2. RCD 'Report on the Regional Planning Council and Regional Ministerial Council', Fifth Session, held at Tehran, May 18th-21st, 1966, p.51.

books and newspapers and can thus provide cultural collaboration. The postal charge on a parcel for Turkey weighing 22 lbs. from Pakistan was 15.00 Rs, but has now been reduced to Rs.8.25. Similarly, a parcel for Pakistan of the same weight from Iran was Rs.18.36 but now has been reduced to Rs.6.25.

To mark the fifth anniversary of RCD on July 21st 1969, the three countries, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, held the exhibition of stamps, issuing special stamps showing Mughal (Pakistan), Safavi (Iran) and Ottoman (Turkey) miniature paintings.¹

5.3 . 3. Shipping

The sea is the preferred medium of transport for heavy and bulky goods. For this reason, international trade and commerce largely depend upon ships plying the oceans. Even countries connected by land, circumstances often favour the movement of goods by sea, specially when the distance over land are large. Iran, Turkey and West Pakistan are so situated that movement between them is possible without hindrance by land and air and by sea also. Unrestricted movement between East Pakistan and the other two countries is possible by sea.

1. Regional Cooperation for Development, Fifth Anniversary Publication, July 21st, 1969, Tehran, p.42.

Iran - West Pakistan

Since the time of Alexander the Great, recorded sea communications have existed between Iran and Pakistan. The routes from Basra to Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, South East Asia and Africa, all passing initially along the Iranian coast, were established by the Arabs in and after the eighth century. As in the case of Alexander the Great, the sea route from the Persian Gulf to Pakistan area was opened mostly for military purposes, but soon sea communication had to be maintained for commercial purposes. The route between the Persian Gulf and the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent grew in importance with the passage of centuries after the Muslims established themselves as rulers here, and is even now quite a flourishing route even though, with the discovery and exploitation of the vast oil fields around the Persian Gulf, the emphasis has shifted to oil tanker traffic to Europe.

From Karachi the distance to the nearest port of Gwatar is 483 Km. and to the farthest Khorramshar 18989 Km., the nearest Iranian ports being not of much interest. The main stress of Iranian commerce, including oil, flows from the ports at the head of the Gulf. They are also connected by rail with Tehran and other Iranian cities. A sea route from Iran to Pakistan should play an important part in facilitating and developing Pakistan-Iran trade.

Turkey - Pakistan

There is no long established or existing sea communication between Turkey and Pakistan. Before the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967 the distance from Karachi to the nearest Turkish port of Iskanderun was 5230 Km., and to Istanbul 5910 Km. The route was comparatively circuitous and now is even more so, having been increased by 70 per cent through the closure of the Canal. Even so, the cost of transport by sea would be cheaper than across land by the rail and road routes yet to be established across Iran. The best route apparently is between Pakistan and the Black Sea ports of Eastern Europe and Russia, on which the Turkish ports lie directly. Another alternative would be to use the Pakistan - U.S.A. or Pakistan - Continent route by making a slight diversion to the southern Turkish ports of Iskanderun, Mersin or even Izmir. West-bound ships to the U.S.A. also usually go full and they can benefit from any cargo available between Pakistan and Turkey.

Iran - Turkey

The two countries of Iran and Turkey share a common frontier and the distance over land between their centres of production and consumption is perhaps less than 1609 Km. Road communications already exist and are being developed, and railway

communications are being provided. On the other hand, the sea route round the Arabian Peninsular and Africa is extremely long and circuitous, the distance between Khorramshahr and Istanbul being 6691 Km.

There is thus a great future for establishing firm shipping links between Iran and Pakistan and Turkey.

The RCD Shipping Services has been established since June 1966 at Istanbul. The Service was inaugurated when M/V Padma sailed from East Pakistan with 4000 bales of jute manufactures to the port of Istanbul in Turkey.¹ The second anniversary of the signing of RCD Istanbul Pact came shortly after the commencement of the service and this occasion was marked by the sailing of a Turkish vessel M/V Kirsehir with general cargoes for Karachi. During a period of one year from May 1966 to May 1967, the RCD Shipping Services provided 11 sailings from Turkey to Pakistan and 11 from Pakistan to Turkey, 12 sailings between Pakistan and Iran and other Persian Gulf ports and Red Sea ports.² The frequency thus achieved was one sailing every five weeks in each direction between Turkey and Pakistan, and a sailing a month between Pakistan and Iran, Persian Gulf Ports and Red Sea Ports.

1. Dawn, July 21st, 1966, Karachi.

2. Pakistan and RCD, Three Years of Regional Co-operation for Development, 1964-1967, Government of Pakistan, p.46.

As a result of the closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967, the Intra-Regional services were badly disrupted and direct sailings between Turkey and Pakistan were curtailed depending on the availability of economic load of cargo. However, the trade continued to be served through transshipment at the German port of Bremen. When a direct railway was not possible, the shipping services have offered reductions of 30 per cent in the normal freight rates from U.K./Continent to the port of Trabzon with reduced port charges to make this transportation arrangement economically viable and to avoid the long, circuitous route via the Cape.

The main service of the RCD from United States Gulf and the United States Atlantic Ports to Turkey and Pakistan commenced in August/September 1966. Since the time of starting the services 201,123 tons of cargo have been carried from the U.S.A. to Turkey, and 501,582 tons from the U.S.A. to Pakistan in RCD vessels.¹ A frequency of two sailings a month to Pakistan and two sailings a month to Turkey has been provided. Services also provided to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea Ports by the National Shipping Corporation which is a member of the RCD Shipping Services. During one year, 12 sailings^{were} provided in East and West direction, serving the ports of Muscat, Doha, Kuwait, Khorramshahr and Basra.

1. The Pakistan Times, June 2nd, 1967, Lahore.

The cargo covered by the RCD Shipping Services is carried by the respective Flag carriers in the designated trades in the following proportions:-¹

RCD Trade	Total percentage of Traffic of Joint Services	Percentage of trade to be carried by -		
		Turkish Flag Carriers	Iranian Flag Carriers	Pakistan Flag Carriers
a) Turkish trade	35	80	2	18
b) Iranian trade	15	5	80	15
c) Pakistan trade	50	12.5	4.5	83


5.3.4. Air Transportation²

As in the case of shipping, air transportation also offers a field of cooperation with the ultimate aim of forming a regional air line capable of offering full regional network and of competing with the major airlines of the world.

The RCD air service came into operation by the first RCD flight by PIA on November 4th 1966, linking Karachi with Tehran and Istanbul. The flight goes on to London via Beirut and Geneva. Iran Air inaugurated its jet service between Tehran and Istanbul, going to points beyond Europe, early in September 1967. PIA has also established a route to Europe via Istanbul. During the summer months, a seasonal line operates from Tabriz in Iran to Diarbekir in

1. President's Secretariat, 'Background Paper on RCD' Edited by Adil, A., Government of Pakistan, October-November 1967, p.27.

2. See Fig.12 - Airways and Microwave Links.



Source: Drawn on the basis of information from United States Information Service.

FIG. 13

Eastern Turkey. The lines between Tehran and Karachi have been established for several years, with PIA and Iran Air having several regular flights between Karachi and Tehran.

As part of the RCD air transportation policies to appoint each other general sales agent in their respective countries, PIA is now General Sales Agent for Iran Air in Pakistan, Iran Air is General Sales Agent for PIA in Turkey. Iran Air is now appointed as PIA's General Sales Agent in Iran, PIA as THY's General Sales Agent in Pakistan and THY as Iran Air's General Sales Agent in Turkey.

The RCD Committee on Air Transportation which met in Tehran on December 2nd, 1966, accepted the proposal of Iran Air for naming Pakistan International Airlines and Iran Air services linking Karachi, Tehran and Istanbul as RCD Air Services.

An agreement in principle has been reached among the RCD partners that an international aviation consultant be appointed to examine the feasibility of establishment of a joint airline to operate jumbo-jets and supersonic aircraft.¹ It is proposed that the three national airlines remain independent and that the new company concentrate solely on operating the larger aircraft likely to become the basis of international travel in the next five years.

1. Quarterly Economic Review, Iran, No.1, 1969, Economist Intelligence Unit, p.14.

5.3.5. Road and Railways

5.3.5. 1. Roads

Turkey, which a decade ago had a modest system of roads, embarked upon the development of roads and has spent several hundred million dollars on road construction during the last 10-15 years. The total network of roads in Turkey is 57,499 Km. long.

In Iran the modern network of roads and highways was started by His late Majesty Reza the Great. Several major highway projects were drawn up in 1926. Within nine years and at the cost of 450 million rials, some 17,000 Km. of highways and secondary roads were built throughout the country, despite the primitive road construction equipment available in those days. Parallel with this, a Trans-Iranian Railroad was built connecting two major ports in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea to the capital. These works continued until the outbreak of the war in Iran in 1941. Further development work was disrupted because of the war. The present road network of the country totals 27,000 Km. of which 12,000 Km. are highways. Of the total highways, 5,700 Km. are asphalted. At the moment, many major highways and secondary roads are under construction or in the planning stages as part of the national development plans.


In Pakistan also, during the Third Five Year Plan - 1960-65, the Government allocated an amount of Rs.9000 million for the development of roads in West Pakistan which system would link Iran.

The aim of the three countries is to establish road links joining Istanbul in the West to Karachi in the East. The length of the sub-standard and missing portions is about 644 Km. between Pakistan and Iran, a little over 724 Km. in Iran and about 322 Km. in Turkey.¹ The RCD Highway linking Iran, Pakistan and Turkey was expected to be completed by the end of 1969, but still work is going on on some highways.² Turkey has paved and completed the 120 KM. stretch between Ankara and Gerikli, the 225 Km. stretch between Samsun and Giresun, the 325 Km. road between Askale and Trabzon. The 137 Km. between Askale and Horasan and the Iran border are third class paved roads. The Turkish Government has also undertaken work on a direct road via Sivas.

In Iran, several stretches between Takistan and the Turkish border at Bazargan have been paved and completed. A two-lane highway already connects Takistan to Qazwin, Tehran, Qum and Isfahan.³ Both the Takistan-Bazargan and Kerman stretches were completed in 1968.

In Pakistan, a surface treated road exists between Quetta and Kalat. Work is under way on the road from Khuzdar to Uthal. From Uthal to Karachi

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1. Turkey : First Five Year Development Plan, Table No.294, p.344, Ankara.
 2. See Fig.13 - RCD Highway and Port Project.
 3. See Fig.13 - RCD Highway and Port Project.



Source: Drawn on the basis of information from the United States information Service.

FIG.13

a paved road already exists. The RCD Highway will be about 6,304 KM. long and will consist of 3,774 Km. in Iran, 1,317 Km. in Pakistan and 1,214 Km. in Turkey.¹ The three countries have agreed in principal to adopt a uniform system of road signs and agreed for the international system used on the Continent of Europe, but the final decision has been deferred until UNESCO holds an international meeting on this question early in 1971.

The 605 Km. of the RCD super highway linking Karachi with Qila Sufaid on the Pakistan-Iran border have been completed. A total distance of 596 Km. of the 1,288 Km. Karachi-Kalat-Quetta-Zahidan RCD Highway, linking Pakistan with Iran, had so far been 'black-topped at a cost of Rs.6 Crore', Mr. Manzoor Ahmed Sheikh, Chief Engineer, Western Region, told "The Pakistan Times".²

He said the remaining portion of the Highway would be black-topped by the end of 1970 at a cost of Rs.8 Crore. He also said this was the only over-land route linking Pakistan with the RCD, Middle Eastern and the European countries. Due to the growing socio-economic relations with the RCD and the Middle East countries, the West Pakistan Government was giving top priority to the completion of this

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1. Regional Cooperation for Development, Anniversary Publication, July 21st, 1965, p.75, Tehran.
 2. The Pakistan Times, July 19th, 1968, Lahore.

large project to meet the ever-increasing flow of trade and tourist traffic.

The construction has been divided into three sections at Karachi, Khuzdar and Quetta. Rs.40 Lakh¹ on the Karachi-Khuzdar section, and Rs.30 Lakh each on the Khuzdar-Kalat and Dalbandin-Zahidan sections. The terrain through which the Highway passed was mountainous, with scarcity of water and labour. This highway would reduce the distance between Quetta and Karachi by 160 Km. Zahidan was also being linked with Lahore by a metalled road via Quetta, Leralai and Dera Ghazi Khan - 186 Km. long portion of this road survey has been completed. The Western Provincial Government has sanctioned Rs.70 Lakh for the construction of another 97 Km. of the road in this sector. On completion of this road, the distance between Quetta and Lahore would be reduced by 241 Km. This project would cost Rs.1.87 Crore and would also be completed by the end of 1970.

The highway systems of the three countries would be linked, roughly near the northern and southern ends of the borders, making possible all-season passenger and freight traffic from West Pakistan and Iran to the Turkish ports on the Mediterranean and Black Sea, and through Istanbul to the European road systems. Completion is anticipated earlier on the shorter, mountainous roads between Turkey and Iran

1. One Lakh is 100,000

than on the much longer sections crossing the Iran-Pakistan deserts.

5.3.5.2. Railways¹


As regards the rail link, the working group on Roads and Railways, at its first meeting held at Tehran from August 29th, 1967, observed that the most suitable connection between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey was to link Mus in Turkey with Sharafkhaneh in Iran, and Kasham with Zahidan in Iran,² to provide a continuous link between Ankara and Quetta (Pakistan), thus linking the Turkish and Pakistani Railway System.

The construction of the Turkish-Iranian link was completed in 1969. The stretch between Mus and Tatwan was opened in 1964 in Turkey and the remaining stretch between Tatwan and the Iranian border, with a length of 200 Km. is nearing completion. Part of this stretch passes Lake Van, which requires the construction of a ferry system using two ferry harbours and two wagon ferries and a railroad between Van and the Iranian border.

The Western section of the Iranian railway, linking with Turkey, is shorter (140 Km.) and passing through mountainous terrain. The Qotour valley alone, for instance, requires a bridge 410 metres long, and 110 metres high. A total of 6 tunnels is to be constructed on this line, with lengths ranging between 85 m. to 400 m.

1. See Fig. 14 - RCD Railway Project.

2. Dawn, July 22nd, 1968, Karachi.



Source: Drawn on the basis of information from United States Information Service.

FIG.14

On the Iran - Pakistan side, the length of the link from Zahidan Kashan is 1236 Km., comprising three sections, namely (i) Zahidan - Ban - Kerman; (ii) Kerman - Yazd; and (iii) Yazd - Kashan, this was completed in 1969.¹

On the Pakistan side, a railway link takes off the Sibi - Quetta main line of the Pakistan Western Railway at Spezand and goes up to Zahidan to Iran. Its total length from Spezand to Zahidan is 709 Km., out of which 616 Km. are located in Pakistan and 93 Km. in Iran. The capacity of this line is 8 trains each way daily. The present traffic consists of one mixed passenger-cum-goods train and one goods train per week in each direction.

The CENTO projects were approved to provide links between the railway systems of the three regional countries. One traverses the 274 Km. of rugged mountainous terrain between Turkey's easternmost rail terminus and the nearest railhead in northwestern Iran. The other spans some 805 Km. of bleak desert between Kashan in Central Iran and Zahidan the border town which is where Pakistan's westernmost rail link ends. The Turkey - Iran link was completed at the end of 1969.

The United States extended long-term loans of \$10.5 million and \$7.84 million to Turkey and Iran respectively for the completion of the railway link, between the two countries; the new loans should permit

1. U.S.I.S., Tapestry of Progress, "Linking the CENTO Regions", 1967.

the construction of the 200 Km. stretch between
Kara Tepe in Iran and the Turkish town of Van.¹

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1. U.S.I.S., *Tapestry of Progress*, "Linking the CENTO
Regions," 1969.

5.4 Cultural Cooperation

The RCD Regional Cultural Institute has been set up at Tehran from June 1966. The branches of the Institute have been established at Istanbul, Lahore and Dacca. The RCD Regional Cultural Institute has drawn up comprehensive publications programme which included a book on history, culture and civilisation of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey; a book on social customs and practice in Iran, Pakistan and Turkey; translations of Allama Iqbal's works in Turkish and Persian; publication of selected poems of Qazi Nuzrul Islam into Persian and Turkish; publication of monograph on Mehmet Akif in English, Persian, Urdu and Bengali; translation into Persian, Urdu and Bengali of the Autobiography of Ataturk and Shahinshah Aryamehr Reza Shah. Research by the RCD Regional Cultural Institute is being carried out on translation of Persian, Urdu and Bengali and Turkish words into latin character, and documentation of manuscripts and research on the development of Muslim miniature art in Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. A Quarterly Journal is being published by the Institute covering wide range of subjects in the field of history, literature and art, mainly relating to the region.

CHAPTER 6

ALLIANCES AND REGIONALISM

6.1 The Background to these Alliances

Much of the Western effort to defend the Middle East has gone into the building of alliances and treaty systems. To obtain the necessary cooperation from the Middle Eastern governments, it seemed logical to seek commitments from them to help in defence of the region in times of crisis, or at least provide needed facilities so that the Western powers could defend it. Turkey, an ally of Britain and France since 1939, though it remained neutral until almost the very end of the Second World War, made its choice after the warⁱⁿ favour of formal alignment with the West through NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and was ready to participate in a treaty organization for the Middle East. Iran at first maintained its historic policy of balance between Britain and Russia, wishing to provoke neither by too close ties with the other, but after the fall of Mosaddaq in 1953 the Shah was forced to consider alignment with the West. In the Arab countries two treaty systems were in existence at the close of the war, one of British origin and the other the Arab League.

The British Government had already seen during World War II that it would have to make more of a compromise with Arab nationalism in order to make the system work, and had given its consent to the

League of Arab States, established in 1945. But basically the League was the result of Arab self-assertion, not of British diplomacy. In 1950 its members concluded an Arab Collective Security Pact pledging military action in case of an attack on any one of them.¹

The entrance of the United States on to the scene raised new questions. Would it become a partner in the British system, or try to replace it, or would it attempt to work out some new relationship with the local Governments? In the Middle East the American approach was guided by three concepts : the strategy of air power with its requirements for bases near the Soviet Union, the principle of collective security, and the desire for friendly relations with all concerned.

The first concept was largely responsible for the special relationships which the United States developed with Saudi Arabia and with Libya providing for use of Dhahran and Wheelus respectively with economic benefits to the local countries. We have seen the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom to build a military alliance system linking Turkey and the Arab States with the West, and also a successful attempt to create an alliance of states on the "northern tier" of the

1. Hurewitz (J.C.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record, V.2, pp.245-249, 311-314.

Middle East, and the result — the Baghdad Pact, joined by Britain but not by the United States. And we have seen how Iraq's defection to the West nearly broke up the Arab League through the refusal of others to follow Iraq's example and the attempts of Abdul Nasser to build his own alliance system through bilateral treaties with Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The Arab States fell into a number of different and conflicting alignments, although all proclaimed loyalty to the Arab League and its Collective Security Pact of 1950.

The decision of Pakistan to join the Baghdad Pact was motivated by its desire to maintain peace and stability in the Middle East. It is an area which is contiguous to West Pakistan and has been in the grip of the same ferment that seized South-East Asia. Pakistan has manifold interests in the Middle East. It is a natural area for the development of her trade, though until recently it has accounted for only 10 per cent of Pakistan's exports and 15 per cent of her imports. But lately the prospects of jute exports have brightened, for Pakistan is helping Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon to set up jute mills. The Pakistan Industrial Corporation is investing capital in them. Pakistan's intrinsic interest in the Middle East also stems from the fact that it was the cradle of Islamic culture and

civilization. The majority of the people of Pakistan are Muslims and as such they have strong religious, ethnic and cultural ties with the people of the Middle East (see Chapter 4). Its occupation by any hostile power could not only harm Pakistan economically, but militarily also it can endanger her freedom and security.

6.2 The Strategic Importance of the Middle East

Because of its great strategic importance, the Middle East has always been coveted by the Great Powers. Britain's first and paramount interest in the area was, and is, to obtain oil under fair commercial conditions from the States which produce it, and then to bring it to Europe by the cheapest and safest route. The second interest is to keep open trade and other communications to the lands east of Suez. Her third interest is that the Middle East land bridge to Africa should not fall under the influence or possession of any power hostile to her. It is a land-bridge that provides sea and air communications between three continents of the world, namely Europe, Asia and Africa. The geographical factor in Middle Eastern history has great significance, since no other region is so strategically located in the Middle land, where three continents meet and merge, along the middle sea, the Mediterranean, which connects or separates three oceans. The geographical and geostrategic heritage of the Middle East has been shared by every nation of that area, from the early epoch when the Trojan War was fought for control of the Dardanelles and the first "Suez Canal" was built by the Pharoahs, down to our century. The Middle East contains nearly

two thirds of the world's oil reserves. It is not surprising, therefore, that since the beginning of World War II the Middle East should have figured highly in the Great Powers' strategy. Great Britain always feared that the conquest of this region by the Soviet Union, which is contiguous to it, would endanger the West's southern flank and also cut off her communication lines with the Far East.

America's interest in this part of the world, though in time they may become more involved with oil, are mainly of a politico-strategic character, and stem largely from the Cold War. The Middle East to America is a 'large piece of real estate' whose passage into the Soviet orbit would materially upset the American defence position and effort.¹ Such a passage might in the view of America's leaders occur either through direct military action, or subversion developing out of the social and political instability of the area, and its Government. Direct Soviet entry into the area is to be met by force. This was the purpose of the section of the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, and which said that the sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East is against the predatory desires of "international Communism".²

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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, "British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East", Oxford University Press, London, 1958, p.40.
 2. Marlowe (John), Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism : A study in Power Politics, London, 1961, p.147.

Soviet Russian aims and interests are almost completely the reverse and are chiefly concerned to stimulate any development that promises to mar Western interests generally. Russia is keen to counter American action if not to exclude America altogether from the Middle East. If America visualizes her policy as being to ring the Soviet Union with 'defensive' alliances and bases, Russia's leaders are naturally cynical about the degree of offensiveness that a defensive alliance may cover, and see it as their policy to encourage the disintegration of such alliances. If the American desire for 'defensive' alliances leads her to do her best to promote stability in the area, then it may be Russia's interest to encourage instability.

Behind this lies the more general question of Soviet expansionism, on which it is impossible to give any very conclusive answer. It is always possible that the absence of stable, secure regimes in neighbouring countries may at some time tempt one or other into a foreign adventure. However World War II proved a set-back to the Russian aspirations in the Middle East. Russia did occupy Persia in cooperation with Britain during the course of the war. When the war was over, Russia not only continued occupation of Persia but also created in its North a puppet Communist Government, but she withdrew when Britain and the United Nations protested vigorously. After that, for some years, she did

not take any active interest in the Middle East. There were many reasons for this. The Soviet Union, which emerged from the war badly mauled, was afraid to tempt American intervention. Britain and France were so devastated by the war that they could hardly contain the Soviet penetration in the Middle East.¹ The Soviet Union, therefore, preferred to keep away the United States even at the cost of tolerating the British. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was busy consolidating her gains in Eastern Europe and could not possibly embark upon new ventures in Asia.

1. Lenczowski (George), Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948. (A Study in Big Rivalry), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1949. p. 73

6.3 The Strategic Location of Iran

Protection of India was the main objective of the British policy in the area. Napoleon had demonstrated the vulnerability of the route to India and measures were taken to keep the route through Iran out of his grasp. The Treaty of Tehran in 1814 provided for British subsidy and military help to Iran in case of aggression and in return Iran promised to resist the passage of any foreign troops towards India. In 1856 Iran attacked Britain's ally Afghanistan in order to seize the strategic fortress of Herat. The British declared war on Iran. Peace was concluded in 1857 in Paris. Iran renounced Herat, and thus indirectly, Russia was deprived of an opportunity to infiltrate this buffer territory of India.¹

In the book 'Russia and the West in Iran', the writer indicates the strategic importance of the Middle East including Iran with reference to India in the eyes of revolutionary Russia. "India is our principal objective. Persia is the only path open to India. The Persian revolution is the key to the revolution of all the Orient, just as Egypt and the Suez Canal are the key to the British domination of the Orient. Persia is the Suez Canal of the revolution. If we shift the political centre of

1. Lenczowski (George), Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, (A Study in Big Power Rivalry), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1949. P.4.

gravity of the revolutionary movement to Persia, the Suez Canal loses its strategic value and importance. This precious key to the uprising of the Orient must be in the hands of Bolshevism, cost what it may ... Persia must be ours, Persia must belong to the revolution."

Iran was never treated as an area of direct colonial expansion but simply as a buffer state between India and Russia.¹ Petrovsky, a Soviet Ambassador in Tehran, once gave the following description of Russo-Iranian Relations. "What counts in Persia is North Persia only and the latter is fully dependent on Russia. All North Persian products that must be exported can find their only market in Russia. If we Russians stop buying them, Persia is bankrupt in one month. This is Russia's strength which has no equivalent on the British side."² Petrovsky's statement was not inaccurate and Russia more than once made use of this economic weapon in her dealings with Iran. If Turkey was the pivot of what is commonly called the Eastern Question, Persia no less than Afghanistan may properly be regarded as a focal point of the Central Asian Question.

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1. Greaves (Rose Le) Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892, The Athlone Press, University of London, 1959, p.2.
 2. Campbell (John C.), Defense of the Middle East, Harper and Brothers, N.Y., 1958, p.164.

The Russians and the British emerged as the principal opponents in what came to be named by one of its participants "the Great Game in Central Asia".¹

The game lasted for more than a century and was played upon a field which extended north over the plateau of the Pamirs and east into Chinese Turkestan; it swept westward through the deserts and steppes of the Muslim Khanates of Central Asia; it moved south over Afghanistan's Hindu Kush mountains, and it found its westward limits in the Iranian plateau.

1. Kaye (J. W.) in his History of the War in Afghanistan seems first to have popularised the expression "Great Game in Central Asia" when he used it in his second Chapter in Volume II.

6.4 Northern Tier Alignment between Pakistan and Turkey

The cornerstone of any northern tier alignment could only be Turkey, the strongest state in the Middle East. Already a member of NATO, Turkey had committed its armed forces wholly to the NATO Command. Together with Greece, with which it had signed a treaty of friendship in February 1958, it provided indispensable territory and manpower for the defence of the eastern Mediterranean area. Turkey happened to be also the only firm base from which the Western Alliance system and Western powers could be extended to the Middle East.

As early as August 1952, Washington had been eyeing Pakistan as another potential position of strength, an eastern cornerstone for a Middle East defence system. Pakistan might conceivably play the military role that British India had played before partition, providing manpower and supplies for the defence of the Middle East. Pakistan's reasons were eminently practical. They wished to strengthen their country's international position, particularly against India. Concern over Soviet aggression, either directly against Pakistan, or in the Middle East, was hardly a major factor in their decision.¹

1. Chaudhuri (Ahsan M.), "Pakistan and the United States", Pakistan Horizon, Volume 9 (December 1956), pp.200-206.

On April 2nd 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation for Security.¹ It was no military alliance, providing only that the parties would study the means and extent of their cooperation for collective defence to meet an attack from outside. It was actually intended as a constructive step toward better ensuring the security of the whole Middle East, and specifically open to accession by other States. The logical land-bridge, Iran, now rid of the Anti Western Mosaddaq regime, and working its way slowly towards political stability and a settlement of the controversy with the West on oil, was not yet ready to consider adherence. Iraq seemed a more likely candidate. For Iraq, however, the decision to ally with Turkey and thus indirectly with the West was one of great moment to take, for it raised the whole question of relations with other Arab states and the possible breaking of the "solidarity" of the Arab League. The Turkish-Iraqi pact, signed at Baghdad on February 24th, 1955, pledged the two nations to cooperation "for their security and their defence".²

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1. Text of Agreement in Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954, cited, pp.376-378.
 2. Text in Middle East Journal, Volume 9, (Spring 1955), pp.177-178.

Counterbalancing these setbacks in the Arab World had been the success in completing the alliance across the northern tier. Pakistan acceded to the Baghdad Pact in September 1955, and Iran joined in October. Turkey was already a member of NATO, and Pakistan by allying herself with Turkey became an indirect associate of NATO. East Pakistan is a vital link between South East Asia and the Indian sub-continent. It stands in relation to Communist China much the same as does West Pakistan to Soviet Russia. In view of this, the Turco-Pakistan alliance was an invaluable contribution to the build up of a defensive bulwark against Communism. By 1956 the American - Pakistan - Turkish arrangements formed part of the 'northern tier plan' and a five nation security organization covering the previously open gap between NATO and SEATO.

But Pakistan's alliances with Turkey and the United States, respectively, were opposed by Egypt, India and the Soviet Union. But in Pakistan the MEDO (Middle East Defence Organization) was favourable. The Pakistan newspapers quoted - "Pakistan is both a Middle Eastern, as well as an Asian country; One half of Pakistan is contiguous to the Muslim Middle East, and the other and more populous half is firmly planted in the very heart of South-East Asia". Egypt considered this pact as an idea

to split the Arab World. Soviet Union also opposed the idea and stated that she could not regard with indifference the reports about Pakistan's participation in a United States plan to set up a military aggressive bloc in the Middle East.¹ The Government of Pakistan replied that her primary concern was the security of the country and was not intending to take any step hostile to the U.S.S.R. In March 1953, Moscow sent a warning to Turkey as well that her treaty with Pakistan had a "direct relationship to Soviet security", and therefore she must take upon herself the responsibility for the consequences of such a situation.²

Regarding Iran, she had pursued a neutral policy for over a century and a half, and being the next door neighbour of Russia, was afraid of antagonising this powerful neighbour. Why did Iran set aside her traditional neutrality? It was because the Shah came to realize that in the present world no weak state could afford to remain neutral without jeopardising its national interests. He felt under the new strain of international politics that like other members of the United Nations the country was entitled to join any regional pact that guaranteed her security. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact was welcomed by its proponents because it closed up 'northern tier' defence.

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1. Chronology of International Events and Documents, November 19th, 1953, p.770.
 2. The New York Times, March 20th, 1954.

6.5 The Formation of CENTO Pact

As at this stage Russian influence had begun to penetrate into the Middle East, the fear grew that the Soviet ground, air and naval forces which were stationed in areas adjacent to the Baghdad Pact Countries, could march into the Middle East at any time. There were various factors which combined to strengthen this impression. The creation of the Baghdad Pact had highlighted some old dynastic feuds and rivalries in the Middle East. These rivalries stemmed directly from Cairo's constant efforts to gain ascendancy in the Arab World. During the Conference in January 1955 held in Egypt, it was announced that the Arab countries would not join the Turco-Iraqi Pact or any other military or political pact without the approval of the Arab League (22nd March 1945). Besides the Conference paved the way for the Arab defence pacts between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia as a counter move to the Baghdad Pact.

But this cooperation could not be very effective, since none of these countries was strong enough either economically or militarily to resist aggression. Egypt wanted to become militarily strong because the State of Israel held a constant threat to its security. The United States was willing to give military aid to Egypt but on condition that Egypt either signed a mutual security pact, giving the United States the right to supervise the use of military aid supplied by her, or paid the price of arms and ammunition in

dollars. Egypt refused to accept these terms. But soon afterwards entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union, bartering cotton and rice for Soviet jets, tanks, submarines and other war equipment. This commercial agreement provided a much-sought after opening for Russia.

The arms deal provoked an international chain reaction. A few months after the Soviet-Egypt agreement, the United States and Britain refused to finance the Aswan Dam. President Nasser reacted sharply by nationalising the Suez Canal Company and declaring that its revenues would help build the Aswan Dam. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal touched off a new world crisis; it paralleled in many respects Dr. Mossadegh's nationalisation of British owned 'Anglo-Iranian Oil Company'.

The British, French and Israeli action against Egypt aroused the indignation of Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact. They called a meeting in Tehran and condemned Israeli aggression. So strong was the pressure brought to bear on Britain by the Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact that it contributed in no insignificant measure to the cessation of hostilities in Egypt. These developments saved the Baghdad Pact itself from breaking up. Iraq had stated earlier that it would boycott any Baghdad Pact Council meeting attended by the United Kingdom. Under constant pressure from other members of the Arab League, Iraq had also announced that she stood together with the other Arab countries against the danger to their "freedom and dignity".

The usefulness of the Pact for Pakistan and other members is very evident from the fact that it has been singled out by the Communists and neutralists as their special target. To Pakistan it gave an unmistakable assurance that she had allies on whom she could count in the event of aggression from outside. Addressing the Pakistan National Assembly on February 23rd, 1957, Prime Minister Suhrawady had stated: "We were spending far too great a percentage than our national economy demands on our Armed forces purely for defensive reasons. We found it, therefore, necessary to look out for friends and it was fortunate that countries that professed the same attitude and believed in the same form of democratic Government came to our assistance. We found it necessary to request the United States for military assistance, and an agreement was drawn up. The aid we have thus received has enabled us to be strong enough to meet aggression from any quarter. It has therefore been necessary for us to join the Central Treaty Organization. This is a Pact of purely defensive nature. It does not permit any country which may have committed aggression would be helped by any of the members of the Pact¹."

1. Dawn, Karachi, February 23rd, 1957.

6.6 Pakistan and SEATO

Since Pakistan had rejected the policy of neutrality, it was, therefore, natural that she should join hands with the West in maintaining peace and security. Five months after the signing of the Mutual Assistance Agreement with the United States for economic and military aid, Pakistan became a signatory to the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954. In doing so, Pakistan's main objective was to deter countries which might have aggressive designs against her, and to ensure peace and stability in South-East Asia. It is a region in which, as has already been pointed out, Pakistan has vital interests. East Pakistan's coast line, opening on the waters that separate the Pacific from the Indian Ocean, lies close to Burma, Malaya, Thailand and Indo-China. These countries are Pakistan's first line of defence against an attack from the East. In the last World War, it was only after the Japanese had acquired control of Thailand and Indo-China that their conquest of Burma became possible and they made Burma the base for land attack on the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.

Pakistan has great strategic, political and economic interests involved in this region. Her geography makes her an integral part of South-East Asia. East Pakistan has a 1200 mile long frontier with India, and borders on Burma. Beyond Burma to the north-east is the Chinese mainland. To the

east and south of Burma lie Thailand, Indo-China and Malaya. The Indo-Chinese frontier is about 500 miles from East Pakistan and Thailand is even less than that. Pakistan, therefore, has always been vitally interested in the peace, security and economic development of South-East Asia. Any disturbance in the region is likely to worry Pakistan because of the vulnerability of its eastern zone, access to which from West Pakistan can be easily intercepted by a hostile power blocking the Bay of Bengal.

In the economic field the countries of South-East Asia are large producers of food and raw materials for export. Burma occupies a place of some importance in Pakistan's foreign trade. It exports rice to East Pakistan and timber to both East and West Pakistan. On Pakistan's import schedule copra and coconut oil from Indonesia and the Philippines occupy a prominent place. If these countries were to come under communist domination, it is not certain what trade policy they would follow. They might just confine their trade to the Communist bloc. Though that is a remote possibility, the threat could well upset the economic equilibrium that now obtains in the area. The imposition of communist rule in these countries, whether by force or by subversion, would endanger the independence of Pakistan and disturb the status quo of the rest of Asia.

The creation of SEATO, and Pakistan's participation in it particularly, invoked strong reactions from India, China and the Soviet Union. To the Prime Minister of India, SEATO was "an unfortunate development as it was bound to increase the sense of insecurity among the people¹". To the Chinese Premier, SEATO, like NATO, was established "for the sole purpose of obtaining manpower and ensuring the setting up of new military spring-boards and bases, as well as to place the small countries in a subordinate position, politically and economically²". There is no evidence, however, that SEATO was directed against any country.³

The reaction of the Soviet Union to SEATO was similar. SEATO, as the Prime Minister saw it, was aimed at the "preservation and consolidation of colonialism, suppression of national liberation movements and interference in the affairs of the Chinese Peoples' Republic and the other Asian countries."⁴

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1. The Statesman, New Delhi, February 26th, 1955.
 2. Kahin (George M.), The Asian-African Conference, New York, 1955, p.63.
 3. At the Bandung Conference, the Prime Minister of Pakistan explained to the Chinese Prime Minister that SEATO, from Pakistan's point of view was a purely defensive pact.
 4. The Statesman, New Delhi, May 13th, 1955.

Notwithstanding the criticism levelled against SEATO, it is an incontrovertible fact that this Treaty has increased a sense of security among all nations of the area, even though they do not happen to be members of SEATO. But before discussing its usefulness, the steps taken to implement SEATO must be noted. The first meeting of the Council at Bangkok on February 23rd, 1955, decided on the Pact's mode of operation and the organizational framework of the Council itself. To carry out the economic commitments arising out of the Treaty, a body of economic experts was provided with the express purpose of assisting and advising the Council of Representatives.

At the second meeting of the SEATO Council of Foreign Ministers which was held in Karachi in March 1956, it was agreed that there should be a stronger central organization with the headquarters in Bangkok. The total volume of the United States allocations for economic aid to the Asian members of SEATO increased almost fourfold since the signing of the Treaty. It was confirmed that since the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line - the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan - all borders of Pakistan fall under the protective mantle of SEATO. This was an important development because it meant that Pakistan could invoke the Treaty in case of attack on her western territories inhabited by the Pathans. Besides, the SEATO Council

affirmed the need to settle the Kashmir question through the United Nations or by direct negotiations. This assumed a particular significance after the Soviet leaders' inflammatory statement on Kashmir and 'Pakhtoonistan' during their tour of India and Afghanistan in December 1955.¹

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1. Crowley (Desmond), "The Background to Current Affairs", Macmillan & Company, 4th edition, 1966, p.284.

6.7 Present Importance of these Pacts in
Relation to the Changing Foreign Policy
of the Tripartite Countries of RCD
towards Russia, U.S.A. and U.K., with
Special Reference to Pakistan's Foreign
Policy

The last few years have witnessed a distinct change in the external policy of the three Regional Cooperation Development countries, viz. Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. Pakistan's policy has been reflected in her relations with the major Powers as well as with the Afro-Asian countries. From a policy of non-alignment, she has gradually shifted towards one of qualified alignment. Though she is still formally allied with the United States by a whole band of bilateral agreements and has not formally renounced her membership of SEATO or CENTO, these relationships are not, as they were in the years 1954-1960, 'the sheet-anchor' of her foreign policy.¹ Attempts have been made, and are being made, to establish closer relations with the Afro-Asian countries, and to repair links with Moscow which had been badly damaged when she decided to align herself with the West.

Pakistan has cemented her relations with Communist China. A boundary Agreement was signed in March 1963 (mentioned in Chapter 3), followed

1. As stated by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in an address on "Foreign Policy of Pakistan", given at the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. See Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XIII (1960), p.12.

by a trade agreement and an air-transport agreement. The President of Pakistan visited the Soviet Union in 1965 and came back more than satisfied. The Shahinshah of Iran also visited the Soviet Union in June 1965. Their visits were preceded by that of the Turkish Foreign Minister, who went to the Soviet Union in October 1964. It was the first visit of a Turkish Foreign Minister to Moscow since 1939. These visits have been preceded and followed up with talks, agreements and steps for achieving greater practical cooperation between the Soviet Union and these three countries.

Today the three countries find themselves faced with the challenge of a completely different nature. With the Democrats continuing in power in the United States in the mid-1960s, the importance of Republican sponsored military pacts like CENTO lessened. For Pakistan there could not have been a bigger American fault than to ignore years of solid alliance and rush military assistance to India, the country whose fear made Pakistan stick to the pacts.

The Sino-Russian conflict in 1964-65 and the 'rapprochement' between America and Russia had worried Turkey and Iran. With the new understanding the United States no longer seemed concerned by the threat from the Soviet side. The new focus was on the South East Asian threat of war. It would, therefore, have been absolutely wrong for Iran and Turkey to have not made necessary shifts in their international relations in accordance with the dictates of the new situation.

As in Pakistan, there is great dissatisfaction in Iran and in Turkey, against the Western policies. Turkey feels let down by the West on Cyprus. So strong are the anti-West feelings in Turkey that there has been a report of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Iran too has responded towards Moscow, and has come out with generous offers of economic assistance to these three countries (Pakistan, Iran and Turkey), without making an issue of their still valid membership of pacts such as CENTO, SEATO and NATO.

Thus, though acting individually, the three RCD countries have been following a similar pattern of readjustments of their international alignments. Hence the RCD has in the fold, as in many others, become an expression of the dissatisfaction of these countries with the West. To all these three countries the Soviet Union is a giant neighbour, it is the leader of the Socialist bloc, a counterbalance to United States political and military power. Improving relations with her, therefore, automatically signifies a fundamental shift in the policy of these countries - a shift from a one-sided alignment to a policy of friendship with all. One special feature of this shift in the thinking - again common to the three countries is that none of them is desirous of completely breaking off with the United States. If the United States suspended Pakistan's aid in 1965, it was because of American reaction to Pakistan's

policies. Pakistan on her part continued in CENTO and SEATO despite friendship with Peking and despite the provocation of United States military build up in India.

During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, China extended diplomatic support, and more recently, since the suspension of American military aid to Pakistan, she has helped her to fill her depleted armoury. But it would be wrong to conclude from this that Pakistan has irrevocably cast her lot with China. There is no ideological affinities between the two countries. Pakistan does not have a Communist Party, and her internal economic policies show an unmistakable bias towards the private sector. It is not always realized that, although the Sino-Indian war may have helped China and Pakistan to draw closer, their relations were consistently cordial even before that, and Pakistan was among the first few countries to establish diplomatic relations with Peking. Even when Pakistan joined SEATO, China, unlike the Soviet Union, did not become hostile towards her, or support India's position on Kashmir. There is no likelihood of a clash of interests between the two countries in the foreseeable future, especially since there is no outstanding dispute between them, as for instance there is between Pakistan and India and Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan has been trying hard in the past few years to normalize her relations with the Soviet Union. The first step in that direction was taken when she signed the Oil Agreement in July 1961,¹ whereby a Russian five-year loan of technical assistance was made available for oil exploration. But while Mr. Khrushchev was in power, it was difficult for her to make much headway. Since his overthrow the new leadership in the Soviet Union has been keen to win the goodwill of Pakistan. It induced Pakistan to attend the Tashkent Conference in January 1966, and later to consent to the Agreement reached there.² Pakistan has currently explored the possibilities of an arms deal with the Soviet Union and sent a military delegation to Moscow in June 1965 for that purpose. The freezing of American military aid has made the need for an alternative source quite urgent, especially to replace War losses. Pakistan is, therefore, keen to have continuing cordiality in her relations with the Soviet Union, and now that she has been playing down her membership of the SEATO and CENTO pacts and her alliance with the United States, her efforts are likely to be more fruitful. The Soviet Union, in turn, seems quite willing to reciprocate in order to contain China's growing influence, and because

1. Pakistan News Digest, Karachi, September 1962, p.10.

2. Brines (R.), 'The Indo-Pakistan Conflict', Pall Mall Press, London, 1968, p.411.

of India's growing involvement with Washington, reelected particularly in her economic policies.

Originally conceived during the Dulles - Eden era as a means of 'firming up' the states of the "Northern Tier" against the threat of Soviet penetration, CENTO has declined in strategic importance since 1960, as the inter-action of numerous factors significantly altered the premises and world situation against which it was conceived.

The thaw in the Cold War was a basic factor in this process. It brought a significant decline in the hostility and suspicion with which the United States and the Soviet Union up to then had regarded one another.

New developments in weaponry, such as the long-range ballistic missile and the nuclear-powered submarine, reduced the importance, for the West, of overseas bases. At the same time, these factors gave countries like Iran and Pakistan a great deal of room to manoeuvre in the field of foreign policy.

In Iran, the effect of these developments was reflected in a rapprochement with the Soviet Union beginning in 1962. In November of that year, the government gave the Soviet Union verbal and written assurances that it would not allow Iran to be used as a base for aggression against the Soviet Union or permit missiles of a foreign power to be based on Iranian soil.¹

1. Iran Almanac, 1962, published by the Echo of Iran, Tehran, p.226.

In the wake of this, Iran and the U.S.S.R. signed a series of agreements under which the Russians extended to Iran a \$36 million credit for the construction of a joint hydro-electric dam across the Aras River, the border waterway between the two countries; the development of Iranian fisheries by Soviet exports, and the construction, with Russian help, of a string of grain silos across the country.

In the aftermath, U.S.S.R. President, Mr. Brezhnev visited Iran and His Imperial Majesty visited the Soviet Union in 1965 (the first time in nine years) and the two countries capped their new era of good feelings with the now famous steel-for-gas deal, under which the Russians undertook to help Iran build a steel mill in exchange for Iranian natural gas.

Iran's expansion of trade relations with the Soviet Union and the East bloc has been followed by a similar development, although on a smaller scale, by the other two regional members of CENTO - Turkey and Pakistan. In all three countries, economic considerations - the need to expand trade to finance internal development - has acted to encourage trade exchanges with the Communist bloc.

In addition, the thaw in the Cold War has permitted each of the regional countries to pay more attention to immediate foreign policy problems closer to home. For Iran, the focus of attention has been on the Persian Gulf, for Pakistan on Kashmir,

and for Turkey on Cyprus.

Thus, in recent years, regional CENTO members have been more concerned with questions particular to each single country rather than with a commonly shared threat.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistan "war" was one sign that regional politics - having been pushed into the background during the Cold War era - were once more assuming prominence. From the point of view of CENTO, the "war" was something of a watershed.

Pakistan felt that CENTO's non-regional associates, Britain and the United States, should have come to its assistance. The two powers not only refused to get involved in a local war, the U.S. placed an embargo on weapons and spare parts deliveries to the combatants, thus virtually terminating the progress of the war.

To Pakistan, this was an indication that CENTO could not be used in the pursuit of foreign policy aims unconnected with the general East-West struggle. Later statements by the Shahinshah indicated that Iran had drawn similar conclusions from the incident.¹

Countries like Iran had, moreover, experienced difficulties in securing the weapons they felt they should have within the CENTO framework. The United States had never become a full member of the organization.

1. Quarterly Economic Review, Iran, The Economist Intelligence Unit, No.1., 1968, p.3.

And in any case, each of the three regional members of RCD was allied to the United States through other agreements.

Turkey depended for her defence needs more on her membership in NATO than in CENTO. Pakistan and Iran have relied on their bilateral defence agreements with the United States.

In the last three or four years, therefore, regional members have more or less openly indicated their declining interest in the Organization. Beginning in 1965, Pakistan has refrained from sending a Minister to the Council sessions. The Shahinshah has described CENTO as an organization which "never really had any teeth from the beginning". Besides, he has said "fortunately the threat which instigated us to join CENTO is no more¹".

Even the economic importance of the Organization has been downgraded in recent years by the establishment "outside the CENTO framework", of the Regional Cooperation for Development by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan in 1963.

If the importance of CENTO has declined considerably in the last few years, there are also reasons why it has not gone out of existence altogether. It is still a vehicle for the joint economic development of the three regional countries. The CENTO microwave link and the rail link ups are concrete evidence of this.

1. Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, 1968, Echo of Iran, Tehran, p.230.

CENTO permits both regional and non-regional members to exchange views on the defence needs of the region and to use the organization as a vehicle through which to gain support for their foreign policy positions.

The Regional Countries in CENTO have established new relations with the East bloc, and that each of these countries had made economic progress (see Chapter 7). The problems these countries now face are not all of the same kind. Mr. Zahadi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, stated that "CENTO should move beyond the concept of a strict anti-Communist alliance and direct itself more to the problems of concern to the regional states¹." The invasion of Czechoslovakia stressed the need for continuing vigilance.

1. Sixteenth CENTO Ministerial Council Meeting, held in Tehran, May 26th, 1969.

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

The Future Role and Importance of R.C.D. in the Middle East

7.1 Economic Development and Trade

7.1 1. Industry

Co-operation in the field of Industry constitutes a vital aspect of Regional Cooperation for Development. Although the implementation of Joint Purpose Enterprises scheme is essentially a slow process, there has been considerable progress in this field since the last summit conference in December 1968.

The number of approved and/or approved in principle Joint Purpose Enterprises is fifty five at present. The R.C.D. Council have recently proposed the approval of a new Joint Purpose Enterprise on the manufacture of Tetracycline.

Out of the fifty five approved in principle joint purpose enterprises, thirteen projects have already gone into production. This is a fair record of industrial planning on a regional basis and the materialisation of cooperative efforts in this field is expected to have a significant impact both on the expansion of intra-regional trade and the economics of the three R.C.D. countries.

The thirteen projects which had already gone into production are namely - 1. Bank-Note paper, 2. Machine Tools, 3. Gear Boxes and Differential Systems, 4. Glycerine, 5. Machinery for the Tea Industry, 6. Tungsten Carbide, 7. Borax and Boric Acid, 8. Centrifugal and Special Filters for Chemical Industry, 9. Locomotives Diesel Engines, 10. Polystyrene, 11. Methanol, 12. Urea Formaldehyde and 13. Glycerine. The Council further noted that four projects, namely Ultramarine Blue, Jute Mills, Ball Bearings and Shock Absorbers would go into production by 1971.

The most significant project in the field of petroleum and petro-chemicals, namely construction of a pipeline from Iran to a Mediterranean port in Turkey, has made considerable headway. The supply of crude oil from Iranian sources to the Izmir oil refinery is closely linked with the pipeline project.

The Iskenderun Pipeline will reduce Iran's dependence on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean route for the export of its crude oil to Central and Eastern Europe. As long as the Suez Canal remains closed Iran would immensely benefit from an outlet to the Mediterranean. In a few years time, Iran will need both the Persian Gulf outlet and the Mediterranean to export its crude oil expected to reach 6 million barrels per day.

It has been confirmed by the Council that further bids have been made by member oil companies within the Iranian Oil Consortium for part capacity of the 800,000 b/d line.¹ A consortium of construction companies including Bechtel (U.S.) Entrepos (France), William Bros. (U.K.), Mannesman, Thyssan (both W. Germany) and plans to pipe Iranian crude oil to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Iskenderum; besides by-passing the Gulf and Suez, would assure Turkey useful passage rights as well as a regular supply of Crude for its refineries.

7.1 2. Trade

The extent and nature of mutual benefits from economic cooperation between the R.C.D. countries will largely depend on the character and the stages of their respective economies, which determine their present and future competitiveness.

1. Q.E.R. Turkey, Annual Supplement, 1970, p.4, E.I.U.

The existing volume of inter-regional trade is very limited. In 1962 imports from the member countries constituted 0.7 per cent of Iran's total commodity purchases abroad whereas her sales to the area constituted 4 per cent of her total exports. In the case of Pakistan, the respective percentages were 4 per cent and 0.3 per cent in 1963. In the case of Turkey the percentage of imports was 2.2 per cent and that of exports was negligible. The trade of Turkey with the other members, especially with Pakistan, is the least developed, whereas Pakistan and Iran have closer trade relationships. Though data on the detailed composition of intra-regional trade is scanty, it is clear that all but a small proportion of it consists of trade in agricultural goods. The countries sell to each other those products which, on account of favourable physical and climatic conditions, they are particularly well-suited to produce.

The scope for the future expansion of intra-regional trade may be properly evaluated in the context of an analysis of the existing composition of total as well as intra-regional trade. The largest single import commodity group in the three member countries is machinery and equipment, which constitutes about 35 per cent, 40 per cent and 33 per cent of the total imports of Pakistan, Turkey and Iran respectively. The next important category of imports is constituted by intermediate goods - semi finished manufactures - which serve as inputs for the local industries. The major exports of the R.C.D. countries are not competitive. Pakistan's major exports are raw jute, jute manufactures, fish, rice, raw cotton and cotton manufactures, constituting together around 80 per cent of that country's trade. Iran's major export commodities are petroleum and petroleum products - about 88 per cent of her exports, whereas Turkey's major sales abroad involve

cotton, tobacco, fresh and dried fruits and sugar representing together 70 per cent of her total exports. These major exports find their main markets in countries outside the R.C.D. group, mainly in the advanced countries. Only in raw cotton are Pakistan and Turkey competitive, but they are both marginal suppliers in the world market. There is already some trade between the member countries in these commodities, but despite the complementarity of exports, it is clear that insofar as exports of primary products constitute the main source of foreign exchange for the R.C.D. countries, it will not be in their interest to direct trade away from the advanced countries from where they obtain their much-needed capital goods. Exports of manufactured goods are as yet very limited, and are based on the availability of specific raw materials, such as wool for carpets in Iran, pig-iron in Turkey, and leather in Pakistan.

There exists at present bilateral trade agreements between Pakistan and Turkey, between Pakistan and Iran, and between Iran and Turkey. These agreements provide the partners with most-favoured national treatment and transit facilities for trade and restrict the re-export of goods imported from partner countries. The Iran-Pakistan agreement goes a step further, and includes a list of commodities in which an expansion of trade is considered desirable by the signatory countries.¹

The lists of commodities in which an expansion of intra-regional trade is sought may be compared with the present

1. Text of the trade agreement between the Governments of Iran and the Republic Government of Turkey, Shahrivar, 3, 1943, quoted in Bank Markezi Iran Bulletin, Vol.3, No.17, Jan.-Feb. 1965, p.752.

composition of intra-regional trade in the total exports and imports of these items. In absence of data on the share of R.C.D. trade in each member country's total trade, an analysis has been made only of Pakistan's trade with the R.C.D. countries vis-a-vis her total trade. This reveals that the majority of the commodities in which a further expansion of imports from the R.C.D. countries into Pakistan constitute a small fraction of her total or global imports of these commodities.

Pakistan's exports to R.C.D. countries amounted to \$6,080,508 during the first ten months of the year 1968-69, as compared with \$8,941,909 during the same period in 1967. Export receipts increased from this region from \$338,983 in March 1969 to \$614,407 during April 1969. Out of the total earnings Iran accounted for 25.423%¹ while Turkey's share was \$33,898.

In order to implement the removal of barriers to regional trade, first a multilateral payments agreement was already working on a tripartite basis which itself ensured the development of intra-regional trade with great facility, up to a level of about \$6 m. per annum.² A substantial increase in trade is in fact already visible as a consequence of this agreement. Secondly, it is noted that when the 80 or more large joint enterprises are completed, their output will give regional trade a very big and sudden upward boost, because the three partners are committed to meeting all their requirements of these items from their jointly owned industries.

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1. Export receipts, State Bank of Pakistan, Department of Statistics, April 1969, p. (viii).
 2. R.C.D. News, The Bulletin of R.C.D., Vol.5, No.32, Jan.-Feb, 1969, p.10.

7.1 3. Communications

The R.C.D. countries have cooperated in or have plans to develop further communication links which will be mutually advantageous. One of the most important projects is the international highway between the three countries. The Tehran-Turkey border highway 898 Km. has been completed and is already under traffic.

On the Tehran-Kerman-Pakistan border highway sector, the portion connecting Tehran-Esfahan-Naeiv, 594 Km. has been completed and is already under traffic. Another portion from Naeiv to Kerman (571 Km) is being reconstructed and will be completed during the Fourth National Plan of Iran. The portion connecting Kerman, Zahedan and Mirfajeh (Pakistan border) 637 Km. is a gravel road and is under regular maintenance by the highway departments and some portions which fall below the R.C.D. standards are being improved.

The total lengths of the R.C.D. highway in Pakistan is 1,317 Km. This is divided into three categories as follows:-

1. Completed asphalt road according to R.C.D. standards, = 120 Km.
2. Asphalt road below R.C.D. standard = 406 Km.
3. Grand road below R.C.D. standards = 752 Km.

As for the rail link, Pakistan Railway system extends up to the Iranian city of Zahedan. The railway link between Tehran and Kashan is already in operation and the section from Kashan to Yazd and Kerman is expected to be completed shortly. The section from Kerman to Zahedan has been included in the Fourth National Plan of Iran. The Tehran-Ankara railway link became fully operative at the end of 1969.

Shipping was one of the fields of commerce which attracted early attention in R.C.D. All three R.C.D. members

have direct access to the high seas and conduct the bulk of their trade by sea, and yet none of them could be called a maritime power. Of the three Pakistan necessarily had the largest merchant fleet and longest experience. Turkey came next, with relatively large and advanced shipping lines carrying both cargo and passengers between Turkey and the Mediterranean and Atlantic ports. Iran, once a great sea power of the world, had neglected its merchant marine in the recent past.

It were these considerations which led to the formation of an R.C.D. Joint Shipping Service. The head office of the three Shipping Service Company was established in Istanbul. The shipping service has been carrying cargo in the following proportions: Pakistan, 50 per cent, Turkey 35 per cent, and Iran 15 per cent. The ships of the service not only connect regional ports, but also operate on the U.S. route. Prior to the commencement of R.C.D. Service there was no direct shipping link between Pakistan and Turkey. The cargoes were transhipped at Port Said entailing delays.

7.2 Future Economic Development in relation to the Middle East

For the future, prospects of the development plans will to a considerable extent, depend on historical, economic and political background of the member countries. We shall have to take into consideration not only the internal social and political set up of the member countries, but also their relation to and position in the comity of nations. The external strings and pressures from friendly nations other than those of R.C.D., as well as the exigencies that may arise from time to time, will have to be taken into account. All this is bound to have its impact on the member countries of

R.C.D., and consequently on the progress and development of joint projects in the region. It is possible that some other countries like Afghanistan, which at present is not a member, yet after a few years may be compelled or persuaded by its geographical location, economic conditions, or political reasons to join the R.C.D. Thus if it ever happens, will widen the scope of the activities of R.C.D. besides strengthening the non-Arab Muslim States extending over a vast stretch of land from Europe to South East Asia.

An approach to regional planning in the R.C.D. countries is initially different from that to national planning. National planning aims at achieving social and economic objectives within the framework of national resources. Regional planning involves the pooling together of all the resources of the member countries and exploring the possibilities of how to utilize them to the maximum mutual benefits of all the participants.

So far the three member countries have been developing their own resources separately. It is likely that each nation will be more advanced than the other two in certain fields. For example, Pakistan is superior in aviation, and Turkey in shipping. Under normal arrangements it is likely that these partners with superior technical expertise and facilities would assert this supremacy in an authoritative way, leading to friction. Now that the R.C.D. countries have entered into a pact to develop the region jointly, it will be expedient that the various Committees for different development programmes should function on a cooperative rather than an authoritative basis.

No doubt a thorough study is being made of the surplus

goods for mutual exchange among the member countries but there is every likelihood that there may still be in one country certain surplus goods which may not be needed in other member countries. For example Pakistan's jute surplus might be processed advantageously in Turkey and Iran, where the home market could serve as well as some export.

Turkey has iron in surplus which if exchanged on barter system will save foreign exchange to Pakistan where a steel industry is of viable use if ore be available at a low cost. Meanwhile the U.S.S.R. have set up in Iran a steel industry for which Turkey can come to her aid by exchanging iron ore for Iranian oil.

Pakistan possesses plants for the assemblage of vehicles and produces trucks. But in spite of these facilities a large amount of Pakistan's exchange is spent on the purchase of vehicles from outside. It is the same in Iran.

With respect to the manufacture of locomotives it is suggested that the two countries, viz. Pakistan and Iran, should invest capital jointly in Turkey where the prospects of manufacturing locomotives are very bright, so that these could be made available to Pakistan and Iran at relatively lower prices.

Cement is a vital commodity and is required in large quantities in Pakistan. At present it is imported from countries other than the R.C.D. block. The shortage is very acute in East Pakistan. Turkey and Iran can satisfy the needs of Pakistan. Turkey produces clove oil of a superior quality which sells at a lower market price than that produced in France. Pakistan imports its requirements of clove oil from France, which she might advantageously purchase from Turkey.

While there are numbers of difficulties involved in the economic field of Regional Cooperation for Development, there are also a number of opportunities for economic gains that could be derived therefrom. Such integration could result in the creation of a wider market for R.C.D. industrial products, affect a greater and more economic utilisation of regional resources for regional purposes, and lead to a larger flow of capital into the region and to additional markets for products outside the region. As a group R.C.D. countries could create a wider market for the products of the developing countries, and that such a market could better enable these countries to establish diversified and economically viable industrial structures and thereby accelerate their rate of economic growth.

Hence, in attributing opportunities for economic gains to the tripartite countries cooperation, one must also consider the effects that such cooperation could have on the trade and economic relations of the R.C.D. countries with the Middle East countries. There could be two principal effects that cooperation could have on such relations. First, by negotiating as an economic entity, the R.C.D. countries could strengthen their bargaining position in trade and economic negotiations with the Middle East countries. Second, by creating a larger single market, undertaking a programme of regional development and coordinating and functioning as a regional economic entity, they could place themselves in a position to receive larger sums of economic aid from private and public resources and could encourage the investment of larger sums within the region by private companies. The tripartite countries would be in much better positions to obtain

their objectives in multilateral and bilateral negotiations with the industrialized countries of the Middle East if they were to negotiate as a group rather than as separate entities. Likewise in international trade and commerce they could assume a much more important position.

The geographical proximity and the ethnic and social factors that these countries have in common, including similarities in religion, language and culture - have not been sufficient to supply the impetus. The political and economic factors have been the controlling factors, and although at times these factors have been such that the R.C.D. countries have been willing to pay more than lip service to regional cooperation, they have not been such that these countries have been willing to pursue a course of action to effect it. It remains to be seen whether the vested domestic interests and political and economic differences within the R.C.D. countries will tend to proliferate and solidify so as to further impede economic cooperation, or whether future political and economic developments will facilitate or create an impetus for such cooperation.

7.3 External Relations and Security

Strategically, the R.C.D. region is an extremely well-placed unit. In his will, Peter the Great advised: "Approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs them will be true sovereign of the world ... Establish dockyards on the Black Sea ... Penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf ... Advance as far as India."¹ The Soviet Union's policies in

1. Sykes, Sir Percy : op. cit. p. 244.

the region are in consonance with this directive of Peter the Great.

Sir Olaf Caroe finds this confederation extending from Istanbul to Karachi in the area of the overlap of four theatres of world powers, namely Europe, West of Russia, the Eurasian landmass of South Russia, the Indian Ocean and Africa. He points out that this area of the overlap stretches in a rough arc from Kashmir, westward across the North-West Frontier, Afghanistan, Iran - a curve embracing the Persian Gulf as closely and neatly as the Turkish crescent embraces the star. This region according to him, contains in this age of political gravity, exercising an attractive force, the greater by reason of its location and its possession of natural resources of inestimable value.¹

Arnold Toynbee looks at this region from another angle. He writes: "In an air age, the locus of the centre of gravity of human affairs may be determined not by physical but by human geography. Among these human factors, the weight of numbers may eventually come to count for more than its influence in the past ... Their gravitational pull may draw the centre-point of human affairs in some locus approximately equidistant from the western pole of the world's population in Europe and North America and the eastern pole in China and India and this would indicate a site in the neighbourhood of Babylon."² From this viewpoint, R.C.D. countries together are more strategically important as they lie in the areas defined as the centre of the world. It has access to the seas and can influence events both in the east and the west; in all the theatres of

1. See Caroe, Sir Olaf, Wells of Power, London, 1951.

2. Toynbee, A, Civilization on Trial, New York, 1948. p.88.

world power.

In view of the present developments in war weapons, techniques and strategies, Central Asia is no longer the Heartland of Eurasia. It is not immune from air attacks. Being land-bound, the forces there are less mobile. The region enjoys all the advantages of the Heartland and is free from its handicaps. Collectively these countries have immense human and vital material resources. The spiritual force of Islam can be activated by unifying the people. It has access to the seas and is situated on the land and air routes of the world. In fact the R.C.D. region and not Central Asia occupies the Heartland of the world.

The tripartite countries are apparently alive to the demands of defence strategy. In CENTO they have evolved a sort of infra-structure of defence. Common strategies for national security and integrity inevitably lead to common foreign policies. This in turn affects economic and other home policies. Cooperation in the field of defence thus automatically leads to the formulation of similar policies over a wide range. It is such factors which have created a sentiment in favour of regional cooperation for development.

The slowly evolving patterns of the expansion of Soviet power and influence to the south is getting clearer. The expansion of Russian navies in the Mediterranean, round the periphery of the CENTO area and the Indian Ocean is often pointed to as a sign that the Soviet Union is preparing to dig itself in militarily in the Middle East and neighbouring areas.

It is possible that the area of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union may be moving away from the Middle East towards the Indian Ocean, or at any rate

that both the super powers are aware of this as a possibility and are making their plans accordingly. It is in this area that we can see a new balance of power shaping. It is going to be in Indo-Pakistan sub-continent that the confrontation between the triumvirate of power - the Soviet Union, the United States, and China- is likely to be resolved. The drive to the south is one of the traditional directions of Russian foreign policy; with the 'retreat' of the West, the Middle East has become a power vacuum, and the emergence of China as a great power, hostile to the Soviet Union, has given additional impetus to Soviet activities there and in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent.¹

The opportunities opened to Russia in the Persian Gulf after an interval of more than five decades were wider than those before 1914; it is no longer merely a question of access to warm waters and bringing pressure to bear on the British. With the extension of the Soviet sphere of interest into East Africa and South East Asia, the Persian Gulf acquired new importance as a bridgehead. At the same time renewed Russian interest in the Indian Ocean was probably not unconnected with the fear of China, and the idea that the Indian Ocean could mark the beginning of a line to contain China. "For over a century Russia had leaned on one side of the Middle East door to the Indian Ocean and Britain on the other."

In January 1968 Mr. Eugene Rostow expressed the hope that Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would form a nucleus around which security arrangements could in future be built. It is a foregone conclusion that the Soviet Union will

1. Laqueur(W), The Struggle for the Middle East, London, 1969, p.193.

be drawn even more into the Persian Gulf, and the return of Soviet influence as one of the central factors in Gulf politics does not come as a surprise. Gulf oil will have a great deal of attraction for years to come, and those who own it hope that they will be able to play the Soviet bloc against the West, and vice versa, as Iran has done for many years with considerable success.

Looking ahead rather optimistically, it might be added that R.C.D. as a group would definitely help Pakistan's solidarity. A Pakistan as part of a unified bloc might bring about a change in Indian attitude that would make possible a peaceful solution of issues which have strained the relations between the two states. If India could somehow be brought to understand that anything that weakens Pakistan or Afghanistan as well is ultimately detrimental to India, she might throw her weight in support of, rather than in opposition to, her north-western neighbours. No development would be more likely to promote desirable political advances, which up to the present, have been unattainable because of the atmosphere of mutual fear and suspicion. India may come to realise that in matters of world politics and the balance between the major power blocs, what happens to Iran or Pakistan will ultimately affect India. In past history India has always shared the fate of her north-western neighbours. If India should become Communist, which is democratically very possible as the Second strongest party in the country is Communist, it would drastically effect the neighbouring countries. The importance of India to Asian affairs is that in some respects she is more susceptible to communism than her neighbours.

Although a full-scale outcome of political cooperation between the tripartite countries may be difficult to achieve

in the face of so many conflicting interests, there is no reason why steps should not be carried on towards economic cooperation.

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