

THE FIRST AND SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESSES
OF THE CHINESE SOVIET REPUBLIC,
1931 AND 1934

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ABSTRACT

The early 1930's, or "Kiangsi soviet" period in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is one of the most obscure in the entire development of the communist movement. The major significance of the two National Congresses of 1931 and 1934 is that using them as a focal-point for analysis provides new information on the inter-related themes of political processes and power-relations during this period.

In 1930, the CCP leader Li Li-san attempted to convene the First Congress. The attempt proved abortive when Li fell from power in November 1930. The "Returned Student group", as the new Party leadership, continued to press for a Congress in order to assert their authority over that of Mao Tse-tung in the soviet areas. Many of the new leaders moved to the soviet areas from Shanghai prior to the First Congress of November 1931, but although they were successful in gaining control of the CCP organisation in the soviet areas, the Congress, and the governmental apparatus produced by it, remained under the control of the Maoists.

Mao did little during 1931 to provide an efficient governmental administrative apparatus for the soviet areas, preferring to use military organisations, a situation which was rectified by the "Returned Students" after the First Congress. By 1933, they had asserted their dominance over Mao in the military sphere, and by

the summer of that year, they had sufficiently eroded his influence in the governmental sphere to permit them to convene the Second Congress of January 1934, which formalised their authority in the government. The "Returned Student group" then controlled all three power structures in the soviet areas - Party, army and government. Mao and his followers, in order to retain some influence, publicly agreed with what they considered to be the incorrect policies of the "Returned Student" leaders.

In spite of a lack of success in mobilising the support of the local population, the establishment of a formal government of the Chinese Soviet Republic institutionalised the shift of CCP operations from the cities to the countryside, and in addition, created a potential national government, which was a victory for the communists in their drive to represent an "alternative way" to that of the Kuomintang.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CC	Central Committee
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEC	Central Executive Committee
CPC	Council of People's Commissars
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
ECCI	Executive Committee of the Communist International
HCJP	<u>Hung Ch'i Jih-pao</u> (Red Flag Daily)
HSCH	<u>Hung-se Chung-hua</u> (Red China)
KMT	Kuomintang
RMC	Revolutionary Military Council

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT.....	2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	4
ABBREVIATIONS.....	6
INTRODUCTION.....	8
Chapter	
I THE LI LI-SAN PERIOD.....	27
Progress towards a Central Government	
II THE FIRST NATIONAL SOVIET CONGRESS.....	82
Laws and Resolutions of the Congress	
Creation of a Soviet Government	
Summary	
III THE SECOND NATIONAL SOVIET CONGRESS.....	171
Preparations for the Second Congress	
The Election Campaign	
Proceedings of the Congress	
Analysis of the New Government	
Summary	
IV CONCLUSION.....	316
APPENDIX.....	324
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	344

INTRODUCTION

Up until 1927, the official Stalinist line for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was based on the aim of infiltrating and controlling Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT), and thereby accomplishing the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China. The anti-communist coup launched by Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927 ended all possibility of achieving this aim. The policy had failed partially because Stalin did not control the KMT army, and partially because of the policy of the Communist International (Comintern) itself, whose agent Borodin had organised the KMT on a democratic-centralist basis, thus making it well-nigh invulnerable to communist infiltration.¹

Stalin however, largely because of his domestic conflict with Trotsky, refused to acknowledge the incorrectness of his policies, and while attacking the right wing of the KMT, adopted a conciliatory attitude towards its left faction in Wuhan. It is at this time, mid 1927, after the break with the KMT Left in July, that Stalin first moots the possibility of soviets in China.² The term "soviet" was borrowed directly from Russian experience and referred to the kind of representative council of workers, peasants and soldiers first set up at the time of the 1905 revolution.

¹ Democratic centralism refers to the election of all leading Party organs, the submission of the minority to the majority, and the binding force of decisions of higher Party organs on lower Party organs.

² Pravda, July 28, 1927; quoted in Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, (Second Etdn., Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 109.

and later repeated in 1917. In China it later came to refer more generally to any territorial area controlled by the CCP.

China had become a pawn in the Trotsky-Stalin conflict, and in mid-1927, with Trotsky claiming that Chiang's coup d'état had ended the revolutionary situation, Stalin postulated the reverse assumption that the revolutionary wave was just climbing towards its crest. In order to demonstrate the truth of this assertion, he needed revolutionary victories in China, and therefore sent an agent, Lominadze, who organised the short-lived and unsuccessful Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927.

As was becoming customary in the international communist movement, Stalin blamed the leaders of the local communist parties for his own errors. The August 7, 1927 Emergency Conference of the CCP marked the dismissal of its long-time leader Ch'en Tu-hsiu and the rise of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai. The Conference confirmed the new Comintern line of increased reliance on the peasantry (although not to the abandonment of the urban proletariat) and called for further armed uprisings in the light of the postulated "rising revolutionary wave".¹

It is now time to examine briefly the actions of Mao during the year, as the development of his activities was later to become the mainstream of the movement. In line with the call for further

¹ Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and J. K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 97-102, 118-123. (Henceforth referred to as Documentary History). See also Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 93-96.

armed revolts issued by the new CCP leader Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Mao was sent to Hunan to organise the Autumn Harvest Uprisings of August and September. These sporadic risings ended in failure and Mao was dismissed from the Politburo. During the Uprisings, Mao had prematurely adopted the policy of organising soviets which, although as has been mentioned, had been tentatively mooted by Stalin as a slogan as early as July, was not actually authorised by the Comintern as a policy until the end of September 1927.¹

In spite of repeated failures, the November 9 Plenum of the CCP Central Committee found no shift in the Comintern line. A rising tide was still postulated, with failures said to be due "to the 'subjective' inadequacies of those involved".² Stalin needed a victory to prove the correctness of the line, and engineered the Canton Commune of December 1927, which however suffered the same fate as the Nanchang Uprising. Again the CCP paid the price for Moscow's errors, as Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai was removed

¹ Stuart R. Schram, "On the Nature of Mao Tse-tung's 'Deviation' in 1927", China Quarterly, No. 18 (April-June, 1964), p. 60. See also his article "The 'Military Deviation' of Mao Tse-tung", Problems of Communism, Vol. XIII, No. 1, (January-February 1964), pp. 51-52. See also John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935, (Hoover Institution, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 77. According to Wang Chien-min, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang Shih-kao, (A History of the Chinese Communist Party), (Three Volumes, Taiwan: 1965), Vol. II, p. 165, this followed a statement by Stalin to the Comintern on September 27. /All future references to Wang Chien-min refer to Volume II/.

² Schwartz, op.cit., pp. 103-104.

from power and replaced by a new General-Secretary Hsiang Chung-fa, although real power was probably with two other Central Committee members, Li Li-san and Chou En-lai.

Meanwhile Mao, after the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings, had taken refuge in the mountain fastness of Chingkang-shan on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, where he began to establish "soviet areas". There were at least 300 of these soviet areas in existence at one time or another during the tortuous and complex history of the CCP from its foundation in 1921 to the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949.¹ The soviets sprang to life in different provinces of China, lasted for varying periods of time, and ranged in nature from a hideout for purely bandit guerrilla operations to functioning, viable political entities - autonomous enclaves in the heart of China. The so-called "Kiangsi soviet period" in the history of the CCP is the early history of

¹ Hung-ch'i Jih-pao, (Red Flag Daily), No. 52, (October 8, 1930), p. 1; also, Chung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) ti-i-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei wei-yuan-hui ch'uan-t'i hui-i pu-kao, (Proclamation of the Plenum of the Central Preparatory Committee for the First National Congress of the Chinese Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Meetings [Soviets]), printed in Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1934, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967), Volume II, the Chinese Documents, p. 82. I am particularly indebted throughout this dissertation to this pioneering work of Professor Hsiao, and also to his earlier volume of the same title, consisting of commentaries on the documents. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961). Henceforth both volumes will be referred to simply as either Hsiao I or II.

the Chinese Soviet Republic which existed in south-central China from the spring of 1929¹ to the autumn of 1934, and was, prior to the Long March, the most important of the latter type of soviet mentioned above.

Following the liquidation of the CCP's urban power centres by the KMT coup d'état of April 1927, the remnants of the Party had retreated for safety into the rural hinterland. After the Autumn Harvest Uprisings of September, Mao withdrew his First Regiment of the First Division of the First Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to Chingkangshan in October 1927.² In November, the first soviet was set up by the Red Army at Tsalin (Ch'aling) on the Hunan border.³

Mao's original band that took Chingkangshan numbered only

¹ Mao and Chu Teh began operations in the Kiangsi-Fukien area at that time. See Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), p. 204. The Chinese Soviet Republic was not actually established until November 1931, and was only formally abandoned in 1937 on the conclusion of an anti-Japanese united front with the KMT.

² Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, (Four Vols., Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), I, p. 92; North, op.cit., p. 125.

³ Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 169. Other attempts to set up soviets were being carried out at about the same time. One of the most important of these early trials was the short-lived Hai-lu-feng soviet of 1927-1928. For a good description, see the two articles by Shinkichi Eto in China Quarterly, No. 8 (October-December, 1961), pp. 161-183 and No. 9, (January-March, 1962), pp. 149-181. Other early experiments are mentioned by Mao in Selected Works, I, p. 72 note 8; and in Snow, op.cit., pp. 171-172.

about 1,000.¹ However, the Party Central² had written to Chu Teh in December 1927, urging him to make contact with Mao and establish soviets.³ Chu, together with Lin Piao and Ch'en Yi, leading a number of units that had taken part in the Nanchang Uprising that August, finally joined Mao in April or May 1928⁴, to form the Fourth Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, about 3,000 strong.⁵ Chu Teh was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army and also Commander of the 10th. Division. Mao Tse-tung became the Party representative and Commander of the 11th. Division. Ch'en Yi was given command of the 12th. Division.⁶ According to Robert North, Communist sources estimate that the number of effectively armed troops did not exceed 2,000.⁷

¹ Snow, op.cit., p. 169; but Warren Kuo, "The Movement of Chinese Communist Soviets", Issues and Studies, Vol. II, No. 4 (January 1966), p. 46 says only 600.

² The term Central (chung-yang) was widely used to describe the Party's leading organs such as the Politburo and the Central Committee.

³ Chung-kung chung-yang chih Chu Teh han, (A Letter from CCP Central to Chu Teh), dated December 21, 1927; summarised in Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 180-181.

⁴ Snow, op.cit., p. 170 says May, as does Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 182, when he reports that the link-up occurred after Chu's troops were attacked by a strong KMT force, and Mao went to help. Mao, in his Selected Works, I, p. 75 and p. 102 note 4, says April.

⁵ Warren Kuo, loc.cit. Communist sources quote much higher figures, eg. 10,000. See Kung Yung-kang, "The Revolutionary Bases in the Countryside, 1928-1933", People's China, No. 8, (April 16, 1957), p. 30. One even cites 20,000 /Flame on High Mountain, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), p.v.⁷

⁶ Kung Yung-kang, loc.cit.

⁷ North, op.cit., p. 125

In the official Party history, Mao's statement "Why is it that Red Political Power can exist in China?"¹ is regarded as providing, together with his "A Single Spark can start a Prairie Fire",² the fundamental basis for his policies which foreshadowed the subsequent development of the Chinese communist movement.³ The crux of these statements was an argument in favour of developing a Red Army and establishing rural revolutionary bases (soviets). With specific reference to the Chingkang mountain area,⁴ Mao and Chu pursued a policy of setting up political power in the area by organising the peasants, carrying out land redistribution and opposing the attacking KMT forces⁵. Inevitably, with such a precarious military and economic position, little time was left for politics once the needs of military and economic survival were taken care of. In many areas there was no political organisation at all, and in others it existed only in name. The Party had little time to educate and propagandise the peasants into political participation and out of their age-long acceptance of arbitrary dictation.⁶

¹ Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, I, pp. 63-72.

² Ibid., pp. 117-128.

³ Hu Chiao-mu, Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959), pp. 33-35.

⁴ These mountains are the middle section of the Lohsiao range that runs along the borders of Hunan and Kiangsi provinces. Selected Works, I, p. 72 note 10. For more detail see ibid., p. 86.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 75-76.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 90-91.

Chu Teh later related to Nym Wales that there were three small military campaigns against the CCP on Ching kangshan.¹ The first was organized by the warlords and troops of Hunan, Kiangsi and Kwangtung, with each province sending two armies. The Red Army was in a good strategic position on Ching kangshan, being on the borders of all three provinces. The tactics used were to attack only the Kiangsi troops, because of the existence of Communist Party workers among them, who caused the troops to defect. The remaining Kiangsi troops were defeated, and the two other provincial armies retired.² The two following campaigns were also defeated, and it was only when the KMT began a blockade of the area that the Red Army was forced to withdraw.³ During this period, Mao and Chu began developing their characteristic methods of guerrilla warfare.

This military situation inevitably resulted in economic hardship, and the peasants on Ching kangshan eked out a bare survival existence. In the Red Army, the situation was just as bad, each man receiving "only five cents a day for cooking oil, salt, firewood and vegetables, and even this", said Mao "is hard to keep up".⁴ Faced with such extreme economic conditions, Mao implemented a land

¹ Nym Wales, New China, (Calcutta: Eagle Publishers, 1944), p. 52 (Reprinted from her book Inside Red China).

² Ibid., pp. 52-53.

³ Ibid., p. 53 (in early 1929).

⁴ Selected Works, I, p. 82. Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 184, reports that the monthly salary of Red Army men dropped from \$20 to \$3 per day after they moved to Ching kangshan.

distribution policy of confiscating the land of the landlords and redistributing it to the poor peasants to win their support. Mao's relatively moderate policies brought him into conflict with the Party leadership, and this intra-Party conflict was a continuing factor in the history of the CCP up to, and probably beyond, 1935. Mao of course, had been in trouble with the Party hierarchy before. After the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings, he had been upbraided by the November 1927 Plenum of the Central Committee for his "peasant policy" and dismissed from the Politburo.¹ On Ching Kangshan in March 1928, he was criticised by a representative of the Southern Hunan Special Committee for his land policy, for having done "too little burning and killing"² and, refusing to adopt such policies, he was dubbed "reformist".³ Because of this, Mao's Front Committee was abolished that same month by the Special Committee,⁴ which now reflected the extreme left line adopted by the November Plenum of the Central Committee. From the standpoint of military tactics, Mao opposed "dividing our forces for an

¹ Nym Wales, Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952), Introduction by Robert C. North, p. 10. See also Rue, op.cit., pp. 80-82; Schwartz, op.cit., p. 100; and Snow, op.cit., p. 169.

² Selected Works, I, p. 98.

³ Snow, op.cit., p. 170.

⁴ Selected Works, I, p. 75 [According to Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 182, the Front Committee was only established in May. No documentation is cited however.]

adventurous advance",¹ and in his article "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", (which was a report submitted by him to the Central Committee of the Party), he criticised "some comrades" for advocating not only this tactic, but also for proposing to leave the rear undefended by "leaving the defence of extensive areas to the Red Guards alone".² Mao complained to the Central Committee that those comrades such as himself who urged gradual military advances, were called "conservative",³ and he blamed these "wrong ideas" for the defeats of the Red Army.⁴

Mao also complained of constant emissaries from the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Party arriving in Chingkangshan, all with "absolutely correct" but mutually incompatible orders for the Red Army.⁵ On occasions, Mao was able to ignore Party commands, but often he was forced to comply.⁶ Strife over economic and political policies between the rural-based Mao and the urban Party leadership continued throughout the Chingkangshan period. The First Party Congress of the border area (Chingkangshan), held at Maop'ing on May 20, 1928, had elected Mao as Secretary of

¹ Ibid., p. 74.

² Ibid. The Red Guards were armed peasants, who in contrast to the regular members of the Red Army, carried on with their normal occupations. The same criticism was to be levied by Mao against the CCP leader Li Li-san, when Li ordered the Red Army to attack the cities in the summer of 1930.

³ Ibid., p. 74.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 100.

⁶ Ibid.

the 23-man First Special Committee, but he was replaced in July by Yang K'ai-ming, sent by the Hunan Provincial Committee.¹ Military defeats followed under Yang's faulty guidance, and in September, Yang "fell ill".² At the Second Party Congress of the border area, held in October, T'an Chen-lin, a long-term associate of Mao's, was elected Secretary of the new Second Special Committee's Standing Committee.³ Mao thus had a supporter in control of the local Party organisation, a situation which was repeated in the case of the Red Army when Chu Teh was elected Secretary of its Standing Committee at the Sixth Party Congress of the Red Army held in November.⁴ Mao also became Secretary of the Front Committee when it was re-established that same month.⁵ Since both the Special and Army Committees were subordinate to the Front Committee,⁶ Mao

¹ Ibid., p. 96.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.; For detailed analyses of both Mao'ping Conferences, see Rue, op.cit., pp. 93-95, and pp. 107-108.

⁴ Chu Teh may not have supported Mao in all his policies. At least one contemporary Red Guard newspaper has criticised Chu for opposing Mao's idea of establishing consolidated revolutionary base areas, and has attacked him for leading troops to fight in South Hunan, where they were defeated. See Tung-fang Hung, (The East is Red), (February 11, 1967), p. 3. Warren Kuo concludes from verbal evidence that Chu "bore a grudge against Mao" because of military failures in southern Hunan. / Issues and Studies, Vol. II, No. 5, (February 1966), pp. 40-42 /.

⁵ Selected Works, I, pp. 96-97.

⁶ Ibid., p. 96.

was in undisputed command of the area.¹

There is obviously good reason for doubting the extent of the authority of the Central Committee or the Hunan Provincial Committee over Mao during these years. As Schwartz has observed, it was inherent in the nature of the circumstances - poor communication, surrounded by enemy territory, and partisan warfare needing on-the-spot decisions based on intimate knowledge of the local terrain - that the activities of Mao and Chu could not be based on directives from Shanghai or Moscow.² The Sixth Congress of the CCP, meeting in Moscow in July 1928, had, amongst other resolutions, drawn up detailed plans for the formation of Chinese soviets.³ The Congress resolutions reached Mao and Chu in the winter of 1928, and Mao, when he talked to Edgar Snow, expressed

¹ One must not however over-estimate the amount of contact between the Central Committee in Shanghai and the Party in the soviet areas. Chu Teh told Agnes Smedley that there was no contact between the Red Army and the Central Committee before the spring of 1929. See Agnes Smedley, The Great Road: the Life and Times of Chu Teh, (London: John Calder, 1958), p. 252.

² Schwartz, op.cit., p. 136.

³ Mao did not attend the Congress but was elected in absentia to the CCP Central Committee. See Howard L. Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung: the Lacquered Image", China Quarterly, No. 16 (October-December 1963), p. 18. See also Ho Kan-chih, op.cit., p. 197.

his complete agreement with them.¹ Later however, Mao was to qualify his remarks, and say that although the line of the Sixth Congress was "basically correct", it had many shortcomings, including a lack of the necessary understanding of the importance of rural base areas.²

Mao was not entirely independent of the wishes of higher Party authorities however. As one scholar has pointed out, Mao's land policies were opposed by the Central Committee, whose letter to Mao of November 2 included proposals for a more radical land policy -- proposals which were subsequently incorporated into Mao's December 1928 Land Law.³

Quite clearly, the experience of Chingkangshan was basically one of failure, and in early 1929 it effectively ceased to exist as a revolutionary base area when Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and their followers withdrew under KMT pressure to search for a more suitable location. The CCP had failed to win the support of the local population because of military pressure and economic deprivation. The abject poverty in the soviet areas caused by the KMT blockade meant little enthusiasm on the part of the peasants for the CCP's

¹ Snow, op.cit., p. 171.

² "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party", Selected Works, III, pp. 182-183. This is the official Maoist line on the history of the CCP during this period, adopted by the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1945. (Henceforth referred to as RCQHP).

³ See Rue, op.cit., pp. 111-115, for a translation of the December 1928 Land Law, and analysis. Also see Stuart R. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin Books Ltd., 1966), pp. 130-131.

policies, if only because "people completely occupied by the day-to-day task of keeping alive have no surplus of time and energy to invest in long-run ventures for betterment through political action."¹ In spite of this, Mao concluded that his policies of creating a Red Army, operating out of a rural base area, were fundamentally correct. Departure from Ching kangshan meant, not a return to the cities, but the establishment of a new soviet base, which proved to be a far more enduring and viable political entity than any of its forerunners. Chalmers Johnson has aptly described the idea of the territorial bases as "a 'rebel infrastructure', or 'autonomous government', ... (providing) food, refuge, an area in which military equipment may be manufactured, and training bases; and they weaken the status quo power by removing territory from the system's productive substructure."² It is greatly to be doubted whether the Ching kangshan base met such requirements, but it was there that the foundation was laid for the future Chinese Soviet Republic.

Breaking through the KMT blockade in January 1929,³ Chu and

¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 274.

² Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, (Hoover Institution Studies No. 3; Hoover Institution: Stanford University, 1964), p. 62.

³ Snow, op.cit., p. 173: however, Nym Wales, New China, pp. 54-55, and Kung Yung-kang, op.cit., p. 31 speak of the end of 1928.

Mao, with P'eng Teh-huai's Fifth Army guarding their rear,¹ began campaigning in Kiangsi² and throughout 1929 consolidated their base in the south Kiangsi and western Fukien area, with Juichin as its centre.³ Although the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP, meeting on July 9, 1929, only stated rather bleakly that "certain Soviet areas as well as the Red Army under the command of Chu (Teh) and Mao (Tse-tung) are still in existence",⁴ by the end of 1930 nearly the whole of south Kiangsi had fallen to the Red Army, and the base of the central soviet regions had been established.⁵

The various sources and accounts of the actual soviet territory of the different areas in 1930-1931 differ to some extent, no doubt due to the fluctuating fortunes of many of the peripheral areas which waxed, waned or ceased to exist, depending on the current military situation. What is clear is that the soviets were mostly in south-central China, especially on the borders of two or more provinces, in Kiangsi, Fukien, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangsi, Anhwei, Honan

¹ P'eng's 5th. Red Army had joined Mao and Chu on Ching kangshan in November. [Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 185]

² Snow, loc.cit.. According to Chu Teh, the Central Committee appointed three places to develop soviets: west Fukien, south Kiangsi, and the Tung-kiang (East River) district of Kwangtung (Wales, loc.cit.)

³ Hu Chiao-mu, op.cit., p. 33.

⁴ Documentary History, p. 170.

⁵ Snow, op.cit., p. 174.

Kwangtung and Szechuan.¹ Two accounts refer to a total of fifteen base areas,² which can be listed as follows: 1/ Hunan-Kiangsi (Ching kangshan), 2/ Fukien-Kiangsi, 3/ Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi, 4/ Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi, 5/ Hunan-Hupeh, 6/ Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi, 7/ western Hupeh-Hunan, 8/ Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei, 9/ Kiangsi-Fukien-Anhwei, 10/ Kwangtung-Kiangsi, 11/ Kwangsi (the Left and Right River Soviets), 12/ Kiangsi-Hunan-Kwangtung, 13/ Kiangsi-Anhwei-Chekiang.³ Ching kangshan had been retaken by P'eng Teh-huai's Fifth Army in June 1929, after its temporary occupation by KMT forces.⁴ In addition, there was a small base in north Shensi,

¹ Chu Teh, "25 Years of the People's Liberation Army", Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. IV, No. 31, (September 13, 1952), p. 17. Chu also includes Shensi as a revolutionary base area, although there were only sporadic guerrilla activities there at that time. [For a discussion of activity in this area, see Mark Selden, "The Guerrilla Movement in North West China: the origins of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region", China Quarterly, No. 28, (October-December 1966), pp. 63-81, and No. 29, (January-March 1967), pp. 61-81] Chu does not include the provinces of Fukien or Kwangtung in his list. Another source does not include Kwangsi, but does add Fukien and Kwangtung. [Hsin-ting hsin-ming-tz'u tz'u-tien, (Dictionary of New Terms), (New revised edition; Shanghai: Ch'un-ming ch'u-pan-she, 1952), p. 3034] Szechuan became a soviet area only in 1933.

² Chu Teh, ibid., and Hsin-ting hsin-ming-tz'u tz'u-tien, ibid.

³ Ch'ih-fei fan-tung wen-chien hui-pien, (A Collection of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents), compiled under General Ch'en Ch'eng, 1935; reprinted 1960 (Taipei: microfilm), p. 659. (Henceforth referred to as CRBRD). Also, Chung-kung su-ch'ü chung-yang-chü t'ung-kao ti-i-hao - su-wei-ai ch'ü-yü chung-yang-chü ti ch'eng-li chi ch'i jen-wu, (Circular No. 1 of the CCP Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas - the Establishment of the Central Bureau and its Tasks), January 15, 1931: Shih Sou Collection (henceforth SSC) Microfilm Reel 14. CRBRD was compiled from this collection.

⁴ Shih Ch'eng-chih, Lun chung-kung ti chün-shih fa-chan, (The Development of the Chinese Communist Army), (Hong Kong: Yu-lien ch'u-pan-she, 1952), pp. 15-16.

another near Swatow,¹ and yet another that incorporated part of Kweichow.² The most important and stable soviet base was the Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi.³ Not all the bases were contiguous, although by 1931 most of them could communicate by radio.⁴

In line with the demands of the Ninth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), held in February 1928, the CCP leadership attempted to create a single centralised Red Army from bands of roving guerrilla units, in order to carry out the agrarian revolution. By 1930 therefore, the stage was set for the protracted struggle of the Party leadership to call the First National Soviet Congress and thereby help extend their authority over the Red Army and the soviet bases. The struggle was to last almost two years.

The following chapters will describe and analyse the continuing power struggle, the beginning of which has been summarised in this chapter, between the Comintern in Moscow, the official CCP leadership, and Mao and his followers in the soviet areas. Focussing on the two

¹ Hu Hua, Chung-kuo ko-ming-shih chiang-i, (Lectures on the History of the Chinese Revolution), (Peking: 1959), p. 247. Also see Hu Chiao-mu, op.cit., p. 37 who refers to bases in Kansu and Hainan Island, Kwangtung.

² Hsü Kuang-ta, Wang Chen and Wang Shang-jung, "Hsiang-o-hsi ho Hsiang-o-ch'uan-ch'ien ti wu-chuang tou-cheng", (Armed Struggle in west Hupeh-Hunan and Hupeh-Hunan-Szechuan-Kweichow), Jen-min Jih-pao, (February 1, 1962), p. 5.

³ See Chung-kung su-ch'ü chung-yang-ch'ü t'ung-kao ti-i-hao, op.cit.

⁴ Wales, New China, p. 62. But on p. 63, Chu Teh says that in Hsiang-o-hsi in 1932, where the Second Front Army was operating with Ho Lung as Commander-in-Chief, there was no radio.

National Soviet Congresses of 1931 and 1934 provides excellent points of reference for an analysis of the struggle of the CCP leadership in Shanghai to create a soviet government, and to examine the major theme of political processes in the soviet areas. Use will also be made of this analysis to test some of the assumptions concerning the power struggle contained in the retrospective Maoist interpretation of this period.¹

¹ RCQHP, pp. 177-225. Military differences are also dealt with in "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", Selected Works, I, pp. 179-254 (The article is dated December 1936).

CHAPTER I

THE LI LI-SAN PERIOD

During 1929, the CCP leader Li Li-san was trying, with little success, to exercise his mandate to recapture the Party's proletarian bases by making great efforts to organise the Party in the cities. In spite of this lack of success, the Comintern announced in October 1929 that the trough between the waves was ending, that a new revolutionary wave was beginning, and that the CCP should "take steps to overthrow the landlord-bourgeois regime and set up a dictatorship of peasants and workers of the soviet type."¹

It is in the light of a flood of directives from Moscow prophesying an imminent revolutionary wave, coupled with the apathy of the urban proletariat, that we must view the development of the so-called "Li Li-san Line" during 1930. Both Li and Moscow wished to make use of the growing strength of the Red Army in the countryside, but without endangering the leading role of the proletariat in the cities. Up to and including April 1930, Li's idea was to foment uprisings in the cities, which would expand towards the countryside, where they would be supported by the guerrillas.

But the proletariat stubbornly refused to revolt, and in May Li's policy began, slowly, to shift. Li hypothesised that if a revolutionary wave was present, then there could be no harm in allowing the Red Army to ignite the spark of revolution in the cities. This policy, the heart of the Li Li-san line, using the

¹ Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), No. 16, (February 15, 1930), p. 9. Quoted in Schwartz, op.cit., p. 134. Also Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 40.

rural-based Red Army to attack the urban centres, was sanctioned by the Comintern in July, although it was to be nearly twenty years before it was successfully put into effect.¹

It is against the background of the Li Li-san line in 1930 that we must see the attempts made by the Party Central in Shanghai to bring into closer co-ordination the scattered soviet areas, to establish a soviet government, and to affirm the control of the Party Central over the guerrilla leaders. Use of the Red Army in conjunction with urban uprisings would obviously require close collaboration between the Party Central and the soviet area leaders, as well as acceptance by the soviet leaders of orders from Shanghai.

There had in fact been little contact between the two groups from 1928 until the beginning of 1930. It was reported by Chu Teh to Agnes Smedley that contact between the Red Army and the Party Central in Shanghai was not made until the spring of 1929.² Another source puts the first contact as late as 1930.³ The Second Plenum

¹ For a good analysis of the "Li Li-san line", see James P. Harrison, "The Li Li-san Line and the CCP in 1930", China Quarterly, No. 14 (April-June 1963), pp. 178-194, and No. 15 (July-September, 1963), pp. 140-159.

² Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, p. 252.

³ Li Kuang, Chung-kuo hsin-chün-tui, (China's New Army), (Soviet Union: 1936), p. 83; referred to in James P. Harrison, "The Li Li-san Line and the CCP in 1930", China Quarterly, No. 14 (April-June, 1963), p. 191.

of the CCP Central Committee, meeting in Shanghai in June 1929, had therefore complained of a lack of positive direction from the CC to the peasant movement and the Red Army in the soviet districts.¹ What was required said the Plenum, was that the Party Central should lead the guerrilla warfare and transform it into organised, mass-based action.² The conclusions of the Second Plenum were given further authority with the receipt of a Comintern directive in October 1929, which spoke of a "new revolutionary tide" in China and urged the setting up of a workers and peasants soviet dictatorship.³

One of the first steps to implement the resolutions of the Second Plenum and the Comintern was the move to unify some of the dispersed soviet areas by the creation of the Southwest Kiangsi Soviet Government in February 1930.⁴ This government was probably established at the meeting referred to by McLane as "an important conference of Party leaders in the Soviet areas...in southern Kiangsi (which was) 'led by the Central Committee' and guided by recent

¹ The Resolutions and Spirit of the Second Plenum of the CC, (July 9, 1929) in Documentary History, p. 167.

² Ibid., p. 173.

³ Hung-Ch'i, No. 16, (February 15, 1930), p. 10, quoted in Schwartz, op.cit., p. 134.

⁴ Chiang-hsi ti chung-yang su-ch'ü, (The Central Soviet Area of Kiangsi), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 426. Also see Snow, op.cit., pp. 174-175.

instructions received from the Comintern and from the Party Centre."¹ This meeting, although held under Central's auspices, appears to have been dominated by Mao, for the Land Law passed contained policies associated with him, which were severely criticised by later conferences held more closely under the control of Li Li-san.²

Li's aim was to convene a National (All-China) Soviet Congress, which would formally establish a soviet government to co-ordinate all the soviet areas, and would inaugurate a soviet regime as an alternative to KMT rule. This would establish his authority in the red bases, and the resulting "co-ordination" would facilitate the execution of the "Li Li-san line". Furthermore, the existence of an alternative regime within China would be of great propaganda value to the CCP.

As a preliminary move towards the establishing of a soviet government, Li called for a national Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas. The call was issued on February 25, 1930 jointly by the CCP and the National Labour Federation.³

The chief purpose of the Conference (apart from the long-range goal of setting up a soviet regime) was to secure a closer connection between partisan actions and the activities of the urban proletariat. In communist jargon, this was spoken of as "the need

¹ Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 36-37.

² For a copy of the Land Law, see GRBRD, pp. 912-918.

³ Schwartz, op.cit., p. 140; North, op.cit., p. 134, ft. 42; Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 74.

for a greater amount of proletarian hegemony in the soviet areas". By achieving this hegemony, Li Li-san hoped to arrive at a joint programme of uniform tactics for the forthcoming struggle.¹ A Central Committee circular issued a day after the call for the Conference (February 26), spoke of the expansion of the soviet areas and successes of the Red Army, and foreshadowed the later development of the Li Li-san line by calling for initial victories in one or more provinces, centered around Wuhan. The Circular criticised Mao and Chu for continuing their old strategy of troop dispersion instead of carrying out concentrated attacks.² Clearly, central control over the Red Army in the soviet areas had to be established if Li's policies were to be implemented. In order therefore to acquaint Mao Tse-tung with his plans and to gain his acceptance, or to remove Mao from his position of power in the soviet areas, Li urged the soviet leader to come to Shanghai to attend the Conference. Central sent two letters with this request to Mao's Fourth Front Army, on April 3 and April 26, 1930.³

¹ Inprecor, X, (1930), p. 509; cited in Harrison, op.cit., p. 191. Also Inprecor, (May 22, 1930), pp. 431-432; cited in North, op.cit., p. 135.

² Warren Kuo, "The Li Li-san Line in the CCP", Issues & Studies, Vol. II, No. 8, (May 1966), pp. 37-38.

³ An English translation of both letters can be found in Issues and Studies, Vol. II, No. 5, (February 1966), pp. 49-52.

In the first letter, the Central Committee reiterated the call for initial victories in several provinces centered on Wuhan. Soviet leaders were criticised for opposing this policy with the idea of occupying border areas of Kwangtung, Fukien and Kiangsi, and for proposing to seize political power in the single province of Kiangsi. The CC noted that the expansion of the 4th. Army was slow, and blamed conservatism, the wrong policy of arming scattered peasants, and a lack of mass mobilisation to join the Red Army.¹

In the second letter, Central said that they had not received a detailed report on Red Army activities for a long while. At the same time, the revolutionary situation was gaining momentum, and the instructions which Central wished to give to the Red Army during this period could not possibly be contained in one directive letter. For these reasons, it was stated, a National Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas was being convened, and Mao Tse-tung was assigned to attend it. Furthermore, Mao was urged to come to Shanghai even if he missed the Conference. Chu Teh was appointed to be general commander of the 3rd., 4th., and 5th. Red Armies during Mao's absence, and Mao's post as Secretary of the General Front Committee was to be filled by a secretary from one of the three army Front Committees.²

¹ Ibid., pp. 49-51.

² Ibid., pp. 51-52. Rue (op.cit., p. 193) says that the General Front Committee was set up by Li Li-san on April 26, the date of his second letter. It is clear from the letter however, that the Front Committee was established by a joint meeting of the 4th., 5th., and 6th. armies, acting on their own initiative, before April 26.

No evidence can be found that Mao actually went to Shanghai to attend the Conference. As he was known to have opposed Li's policies at the time, and as Chu Teh does not mention the Shanghai meeting in his life-story described to Agnes Smedley, it is highly probable that he stayed in the soviet areas, and ignored Li's invitation.

The Conference finally convened in Shanghai towards the end of May 1930.¹ It was attended by 49 delegates from the Party, the trade unions, revolutionary organisations, the Red Army and the various soviet areas, although who these delegates were is unknown.² The major documents approved by the Conference included a temporary

¹ A report by the Riga correspondent of the North China Star (dated May 16, 1930), published in that paper on May 17, 1930, cited a "Moscow message" which said that the Conference was to be held in the soviet areas, but in view of the fact that bodies set up by the Conference later decided to move from Shanghai to the soviet areas, this is unlikely. Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 277, says that a preparatory meeting was held on May 5 followed by a formal opening on May 20. But V. A. Yakhontoff / The Chinese Soviets, (New York: Coward-McCann, 1934), p. 130 / says May 31.

² One document speaks of Party branches in the Tungchiang and East Hupeh soviet areas selecting female worker and peasant delegates. Wu-ytleh kung-tso ytl fu-nll ylln-tung, (April's Work and the Women's Movement), General Announcement of Central No. 74, (April 3, 1930) SSC4.

Land Law, a Labour Protection Law, and a Declaration on the national political situation and the tasks of the soviet areas.¹

The Declaration of the Conference² is probably the Political Resolution passed by the Conference. A document entitled the "Chinese Soviet Political Programme"³ contains an editorial note to the effect that it was extracted from the Political Resolution of the Conference, but it is usually assumed that this latter document was not available.⁴ However, a comparison between the "Chinese Soviet Political Programme" and the Declaration indicates that they both follow the same general line.

As can be imagined, the Declaration clearly manifested the current Li Li-san line, and spoke of the existence in China of two different political systems - one the system of the gentry, the landlords, the comprador bourgeoisie and the KMT, and the other the soviet regime of the workers, peasants, soldiers and toiling masses.

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 277. The Conference also passed (a) plans for enlarging the Red Army and arming the peasants, (b) a soviet organisation law, (c) a message to the peasants, (d) a message to the workers of the whole country, (e) a message to working women and youth, (f) aid to the oppressed people's of the East. (Ibid.)

² Ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai ch'ü-yü tai-piao ta-hui hstlan-yen, (Declaration of the National Soviet Areas Delegate Conference), translated back into Chinese from an un-named Japanese source by Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 277-280. This appears to be the same as the original Chinese document printed, although barely legible, in Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 29.

³ Chung-kuo su-wei-ai ti cheng-kang, reproduced in Ch'ih-fei mi-mi wen-chien hui-pien, (A Collection of Red Bandit Secret Documents), Vol. III, leaves 1-2, SSC 20.

⁴ Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 19.

These two regimes, it was announced, represented the final battle between two different classes. The Declaration called for armed uprisings and said that the workers' struggle, peasant uprisings, the development of the Red Army and the soviet areas was all proof that the ruling classes were on the point of collapse.¹

Both the Declaration and the Chinese Soviet Political Programme were substantially in line with the Ten Great Demands of the Chinese Revolution passed by the Sixth National Congress of the CCP in Moscow in September 1928.² However, the Chinese Soviet Political Programme, like the (temporary) Land Law passed by the Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas both contain Li Li-san-ist characteristics such as the call for the nationalisation of land, though this is not included in the Declaration, for some inexplicable reason. The Declaration also does not call for any confiscation of the rich peasants' land, whereas the Land Law speaks of the confiscation of that portion of their land which was rented out³ and the Political Programme demands the confiscation of the land of the "counter-revolutionary rich peasants."⁴ It is possible that the Declaration was aimed at a wider audience and was therefore designed to be more moderate in tone.

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 279.

² Documentary History, p. 132.

³ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 360.

⁴ Article 4.

The Declaration also called for the confiscation of the land owned by landlords and its distribution to the landless and small-landed peasants. Furthermore, it proposed an eight hour working day for adults and six for minors, together with a minimum wage and unemployment insurance. Women were to have eight weeks holiday on full pay during childbirth.¹ The Labour Protection Law contained a clause saying that it would only come into force when approved by a National Soviet Congress.² Since this Congress projected by Li Li-san never in fact convened, it is unlikely that the Law was put into force before 1931 at the earliest. The Declaration and the two Laws had not originated at the Conference - indeed they had apparently been published over two months earlier in official Comintern organs.³

The Conference appeared to be successful in organising the Red Army to carry out the Li Li-san line. Mao later confirmed his acceptance of the Conference decisions.⁴ No doubt he had his private disagreements, but he did not voice them at the time. Assent however, did not necessarily imply obedience, and Mao refused to integrate the Red Guards (militia) into the Red Army, for this would have meant leaving the soviet areas open to the enemy when

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 279.

² Article 42. The Law is only partially legible in Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 30.

³ According to R. C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, p. 134, ft. 42.

⁴ Harrison, op.cit., p. 192.

the army marched towards the cities.¹

The Li Li-san line at this time (May 1930) had not yet reached the extreme stage of using the Red Army to attack the towns. Indeed Li himself had written articles during April and May in which he said that encircling the cities with the country, or relying on the Red Army to take the cities, was sheer nonsense.² This was just the policy he was in fact to adopt in a few weeks. Li's original policy was that armed uprisings in the cities would expand into the countryside, to be supported by the guerrillas. The prime role of the city would ensure proletarian hegemony. By the time of the Conference, it seemed as though a middle position between the two was favoured - that the Red Army might be used in conjunction with urban uprisings to take the cities.

The first indications that Li was moving towards the position of using the Red Army to attack the cities came shortly after the Conference in a Politburo Resolution published on June 11, 1930.³ In the Resolution, which still decried the "erroneous concept" of relying on the Red Army alone to occupy the cities,⁴ there are

¹ Snow, op.cit., p. 179.

² Hung Ch'i, No. 90, (April 5, 1930), and No. 104, (May 24, 1930), cited in Schwartz, op.cit., p. 139. Also see Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 17.

³ Hsin ti ko-ming kao-ch'ao yü i-sheng huo chi-sheng shou-hsien sheng-li, (The New Revolutionary High Tide and Preliminary Successes in One or More Provinces), printed in Ch'ih-fei mi-mi wen-chien hui-pien, op.cit., Vol. III, leaves 12-24. Also in Documentary History, pp. 184-200.

⁴ Documentary History, p. 191.

references to "powerful assaults by the Red Army"¹ and of using the Red Army for "resolute attacks on the major forces of the enemy, (and) assaults on key cities."²

Since the resolution called for armed uprisings in the cities coupled with attacks on key cities by the Red Army, it is not surprising that the implication throughout is that a soviet government should be set up in an urban area without delay. Referring to the strategy of the Red Army in winning preliminary successes in one or more provinces, the resolution said "the overall aim of this task (of the Red Army) is the seizure of political power and the establishment of a national revolutionary regime in coordination with armed uprisings in key cities".³ The prime target was to be Wuhan.⁴

This policy was repeated in Moscow by Chou En-lai when he addressed the 16th. Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on July 5, 1930. Chou spoke in favour of centralising the soviet areas and strengthening the Red Army's command, so as to develop towards the industrial centres, after the occupation of which a central government was to be established to act as a base for opposition to the KMT.⁵

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., p. 197.

³ Ibid., p. 198.

⁴ Ibid., p. 194.

⁵ Chung-kuo ko-ming hsin kao-ch'ao yü chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang, (The New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution and the CCP), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 138.

The tactic of siting the proposed soviet government in a major industrial centre such as Wuhan, or at least in Changsha or Nanchang, had been CCP policy as early as the May Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas.¹

However, after the Comintern had deliberated on the June 11 resolution of Li Li-san, it issued a directive which was published in China later the following month, on July 23.² This directive, although it gave general approval to the task of achieving initial victories in one or several provinces, nevertheless did not sanction the creation of the soviet government in a major industrial centre. The Comintern, while it approved of the idea of founding such a government, on the tactical question of where it was to be sited, said it should be associated with the Red Army, and set up in "the most protected area".³

Li Li-san was therefore more optimistic than the Comintern that his policy of capturing key cities would succeed. Moscow,

¹ The available documentation of the May Conference does not mention the site for the government, but confines itself to resolutions urging its establishment. The allegation about siting it in Wuhan was made by Chou En-lai in his Report to the Third Plenum in September.

² Chung-kuo wen-t'i ch'ieh-i-an, (Resolution on the Chinese Problem), passed by the ECCI Political Secretariat July 23, 1930. SSC 16. The actual date of the Resolution was late June 1930. (Stuart R. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 147.)

³ Ibid., p. 16 (Emphasis added). Presumably Chou En-lai in favouring Li Li-san's site for the government in his speech to the 16th. CPSU Congress, had not read this directive.

more cautious, urged him to found the government in the revolutionary base areas. Nevertheless, Li continued with his plan to take Changsha and Nanchang, and then march on Wuhan. On July 27 P'eng Teh-huai took Changsha, but found little popular support for the CCP and withdrew within a few days, whereupon Mao and Chu Teh made a brief attack on Nanchang and failed to break the city's defences.

Hsiang Chung-fa, writing on August 25 after the brief occupation of Changsha by the Red Army, said that he realised that a soviet government in Changsha, Nanchang or Wuhan would be of great national significance, but that the Party should not wait "mechanically" for the occupation of a central city. He pointed out that Lenin, during the 1905 uprising on the Black Sea, had proposed to set up a government in Odessa, even though Moscow and St. Petersburg were still in the hands of the Tsar.¹

But notwithstanding the Comintern's directive on the site of the government, and the wavering support if not opposition of Hsiang Chung-fa, the Li Li-san line continued unchanged. In spite of the fact that Changsha had been heavily reinforced with KMT troops, Li ordered a second attack on the city, preparatory to a

¹ Wei chien-li ch'uan-chung-kuo chung-yang su-wei-ai cheng-ch'uan erh tou-cheng (Struggle for the Establishment of a National Central Soviet Regime), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 77. In his commentary, Hsiao Tso-liang has misinterpreted this article to mean that Hsiang proposed to set up a central government in Wuhan, Changsha or Nanchang to the exclusion of any alternative. (Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 41). There was a brief mutiny of the Black Sea fleet during the 1905 Russian Revolution, and soviets were formed in Moscow and St. Petersburg by the Mensheviks, although they received little support from Lenin.

march on Wuhan. Mao and Chu Teh carried out orders, but soon commanded their troops to withdraw, without however, seeking permission from the Central Committee.¹

There had of course to be an inquest on these failures of the Li Li-san line, and this took place at the Third Plenum of the CC CCP, meeting from September 24-28, 1930. Li's main opponents however, were not the soviet area leaders, but a group of young Chinese intellectuals who had returned from Moscow that year after four years study in the Soviet Union. The "Returned Student" group, as they were known, were led by Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming), Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), and Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu). They had as their mentor and powerful patron one Pavel Mif, the most eminent of Stalin's experts on China and Comintern representative in that country.²

The Third Plenum found no basic errors of line in the actions of Li Li-san, except that he had been guilty of errors in tactics,

¹ Schwartz, op.cit., p. 182. It is possible that Chu may not have been wholly in agreement with Mao during this period. A recent Red Guard newspaper reported that Chu supported Li Li-san, and that he strongly advocated the defeating of the cities. Tung-fang Hung, (The East is Red), (February 11, 1967), p. 3.

² The "Returned Student" group were also known as the "28 Bolsheviks". Whether there were actually 28 of them who studied in Moscow at the same time is uncertain, but it is clear that the term came to be used of all those who supported their faction in the Party. Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 100 has a list which is alleged to be of the original "28 Bolsheviks."

for example in his attack on Changsha.¹ But from this time on, with his policy of armed uprisings in ruins, Li's authority began to wane.

That same summer a former leader of the CCP, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, was sent back to Shanghai from Moscow, where he attacked Li at the Third Plenum. But surprisingly, in spite of the opposition of Ch'ü, who was anxious to regain his position of leadership, and of the ambitious Returned Student group, the Plenum reconfirmed Li in power. Li had in fact a strong grip on the Party machine, and was staunchly supported by Chou En-lai. Furthermore, it was extremely difficult for Ch'ü to criticise the Li Li-san line without criticising the Comintern line, since the two were identical in their strategy. Mif was reported to be infuriated with the result of the Plenum, claimed that it had been held behind his back, and redoubled his efforts to unseat Li and his proteges.²

At the Third Plenum, Chou En-lai (under his alias of Shao Shan) reversed his earlier standpoint of July and criticised the May Conference of Delegates for insisting that the government be located in a major city. "Of course", said Chou, "it is better

¹ Shao Shan pao-kao; san-chung ch'üan-hui ts'ai-liao ti chiu-hao, (Report of Shao Shan; reference item No. 9 of the Third Plenum of the CC [CCP]), September 24, 1930, pp. 3-4. (Pamphlet dated January 3, 1931).

² Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chung-yang wei-yüan-hui k'uo-ta-hui ti szu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i ch'ieh-i-an, (Resolution of the Enlarged Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP), January 1931, CRBRD, p. 430. See also Pavel Mif, Heroic China, (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1937), p. 68.

to establish it (the provisional central government) in a key city rather than a small city, but this is a question of secondary importance".¹ He advocated a government which would "advance towards the key industrial cities".²

The resolution passed by the Third Plenum accepting the Comintern's July 23 directive acknowledged that one of the most important tasks of the Party was to establish a provisional central government in the most secure area - the soviet bases - and also create a strong Red Army which could, according to political and military circumstances, occupy one or several political and industrial centres.³ However, in spite of this resolution, Li Li-san (under his alias of Po Shan) took a different line at the Plenum. While admitting that to insist that the central regime be linked to victories in one or several provinces was a "mechanical concept", as also was the insistence on Wuhan as the only suitable place, he nevertheless condemned the idea of establishing it in the mountains (shan-shang) as a "joke", and asked why it could not be set up in Kian, Changsha or Nanchang.⁴

¹ Shao Shan pao-kao, p. 4.

² Ibid., p. 3 (Emphasis added).

³ Cheng-chih Chuang-k'uang ho tang-ti tsung jen-wu i-ch'ieh-an, (Resolution on the Political Situation and the Party's General Tasks), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 179.

⁴ Po Shan fa-yen; san-chung ch'uan-hui ts'ai-liao ti shih-hao, (Statement of Po Shan; reference item No. 10 of the Third Plenum), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 157. On the occupation of Kian by the Red Army in October, a Kiangsi provincial soviet government was founded, but the communists withdrew from the city in November. See Chiang-hsi ti chung-yang su-ch'ü, (The Central Soviet Area of Kiangsi), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 423.

It is clear however, that even before the Third Plenum, CCP policy was switching from an urban to a more rural orientation. The second attack of the Red Armies on Changsha in early September had been accompanied by a telegram dated September 12 from the Plenum of the Central Preparatory Committee, which was then in session, declaring that the Red Armies were attacking towards the central cities, so as to struggle for a national soviet regime.¹

But after the failure of this second attack, CCP policy changed emphasis from the urban to the rural areas, when an editorial in Hung-ch'i Jih-pao of September 17 said that the Red Army should not just concentrate on Changsha, but should pay greater attention to the hsien and hsiang soviet areas in Hunan.² There is no clear indication though, following the Third Plenum, of the location of the new site for the central government in the revolutionary base areas. In none of the issues of the Party newspaper for October³ is the place of the proposed government named, although there are articles going into great detail concerning the preparations for the National Soviet Congress. There is only one oblique reference

¹ Ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei-hui ch'üan-t'i hui-i wei-lao hung-chün ti-san, szu, wu, pa, shih-erh chün tien), (Congratulatory Telegram from the Plenary Session of the Central Preparatory Committee of the National Soviet Congress to the 3rd., 4th., 5th., 8th. and 12th. Red Armies), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 71. One secondary source, published two months after the plenum, said that the plenum had decided that the Soviet Congress was to be called in the soviet areas Li (?), "Support the First All-China Soviet Congress!", International News, (New York), November 12, 1930, p. 4. (Huston Collection), Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In view of the wording of the telegram, this was probably incorrect.

² Hung-chün wei-kung chang-sha ti chan-lüeh, (The Strategy of the Red Army in the Encircling of Changsha), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 72.

³ Of those issues of Hung-ch'i Jih-pao that are available for October. (Henceforth abbreviated to HCJP).

which indicated the policy switch in favour of the soviet areas. "You...the labouring people...should elect and send your own delegates to participate in the Congress...so that they may see with their own eyes what really are the conditions in the soviet areas".¹ But the change in CCP policy was too minor to be capable of saving Li.

The Comintern letter of November 16, 1930,² which devastatingly attacked Li Li-san for major errors of line, resulted in his resignation at a Politburo meeting on November 25.³ In addition, Li was heavily criticised for not having set up a soviet government. The letter said that the significance of setting up such a government was that the CCP was working towards armed uprisings in the big cities, but that to undertake this task without estimating the environment, or analysing the balance of forces in the big cities, was "blind actionism" and not Leninism.⁴ The Comintern reiterated that the government must be set up in the revolutionary base areas, where it could rely on the Red Army.⁵

In his report to the Presidium of the ECCI, made in Moscow

¹ HCJP, No. 53, p. 1.

² Kung-ch'an kuo-chi chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui kei chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chung-yang wei-yüan-hui ti hsin, (Letter from the ECCI to the Central Committee of the CCP), received November 16, 1930; Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 201-204.

³ According to Schwartz, op.cit., p. 156.

⁴ Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 202.

⁵ Ibid., p. 203.

the following month, Li confessed that he had not understood the Comintern's policy on the necessity for consolidated bases - bases which could become the starting points for developing the revolution elsewhere. He also admitted to not understanding the significance of establishing a provisional revolutionary government, and confessed that he had erred in deciding to delay this until after the big industrial cities had been occupied by the Red Army.¹

Other Comintern documents also accused Li of failing to establish a soviet government in the base areas, and criticised him for his comment (made at the Central Committee's Third Plenum) that this was "ascend mountainism" (shang-shan-chu-i). The Comintern said that Li also considered this an annexationist line, that only wanted to found a soviet government in areas outside the direct influence of the proletariat.²

The differences over the siting of the government which have just been analysed did not affect the basic duplicity of the Comintern when they attacked Li Li-san's "errors of line". The broad outlines of Li's policies were identical with those of the Comintern. The divergence was one of tactic - not of line. No one disputed the

¹ Li-san Pao-kao, (Li-san's Report), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 210.

² Kuo-chi tung-fang-pu kuan-yü chung-kuo tang san-chung ch'üan-hui yü Li Li-san t'ung-chih ti ts'o-wu ti pao-kao, (Report of the Comintern Eastern Department on the Errors of the CCP Third Plenum and of Comrade Li Li-san), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 205.

general line - that it was imperative to establish a central government - but there were discrepancies in tactics as to where to establish it, and the speed with which this could be accomplished. Li, in advocating an urban base, was too ambitious, and was caught by the failure of the Red Army's attacks on the cities that summer. As Chang Kuo-t'ao later (1950) remarked: Li went beyond Moscow's orders in planning the insurrectionary policy in 1930, "(he) tended always to be adventurist in those days".¹

On the tactical question of where to locate the proposed soviet government, the Comintern was closer to Mao Tse-tung than

¹ Robert G. North interview with Chang Kuo-t'ao (November 3, 1950), Hoover Library, Stanford University, 1962. Hsiao Tso-liang however, feels that Li was disgraced because he had in fact deviated from the Comintern line, as set out in the July 23 directive. The key passage in the directive, according to Hsiao, is the command to attack the cities in the future, and Hsiao interprets this to mean the distant future, rather than the attack on Changsha later that month. (Hsiao, I, p. 30. Emphasis my own). But Moscow was delighted with the brief capture of Changsha, and later, when Li was deposed, the new Returned Student group leaders, whose backer was Pavel Mif, the Comintern representative, continued to call for attacks on the cities. It is also hard to agree with Hsiao when he claims that the July 23 directive "foreshadowed the whole subsequent development of the Chinese Communist movement". (p. 28) This implies that Moscow possessed a crystal ball that made them tell the Party leaders not to attack the cities until the future - the future being a quarter of a century ahead in the late 1940's. Clearly there were differences of timing and execution between Li and Moscow, as in the case discussed of the location of the soviet government. Also, the Comintern resolution of July 23 was considerably more moderate in tone than Li's statement of June 11. (See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 146-7).

Li Li-san, for Mao, instead of leaning towards the cities, wanted to establish "Red political power" in the rural soviet areas.¹

In 1945, Mao was to characterise the Li Li-san line as "adventurist", and to say that he had never agreed with it. Mao complained that his desired policy of consolidating the rural base areas had been dismissed by Li Li-san as "utterly erroneous... localism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality."²

One explanation for Mao's initial compliance with Li's programme is that Mao was not in a strong enough position to defy the Li Li-san line until after the assaults on the cities had ended in failure. Speaking of this period, Mao later recounted to Edgar Snow that "the Li Li-san line dominated the Party then; outside Soviet areas, and was sufficiently influential to force acceptance to some extent, in the Red Army, against the judgement of its field command."³ This looks like a retrospective rationalisation, and Chu Teh sounded a truer note when he admitted that although he and Mao were sceptical about Li's plans, they realised that they had been isolated for years, and therefore had very incomplete information about the national situation, and had to accept the analysis of the CC.⁴

¹ Mao Tse-tung, "A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire", Selected Works, I, pp. 117-128. (Dated January 5, 1930). Also see his "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", I, op.cit., p. 203.

² RCQHP, Selected Works, III, p. 134.

³ Snow, op.cit., p. 178.

⁴ Smedley, The Great Road, p. 275.

The general collapse of Li's policies of seizing key cities did not imply any abandonment of the basic task of establishing a central soviet regime and a provisional soviet government. Indeed it was clear from the proceedings of the May Conference of Delegates from Soviet Areas that although the immediate aim was to formalise contacts between the Red Army and the central organs of the Party in Shanghai, the long-term goal was to create a soviet regime that would be a "state within a state", from which to conduct operations against the KMT. Therefore the failure of the Li Li-san line did not initially inhibit the activities of the Central Preparatory Committee in its drive to call a National Soviet Congress which would formally set up a soviet government.

Progress Towards a Central Government

Months before Li's demise, before the first attack of the Red Army on Changsha, the Presidium of the National Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas met on July 7.

The Declaration issued by the Presidium compared the "tottering rule" of the Nanking government with the development of the working-class struggle in the major cities and the formation of soviet regimes in Kiangsi, Hupeh and Fukien. The Declaration also stated that it had been decided to call for the National Soviet Congress to convene on November 7, 1930, the anniversary of the Russian

Revolution.¹ To prepare for this event, it was resolved to invite delegates of the CCP, the National Labour Federation, from the soviet areas, Red Army units and all revolutionary organisations, to organise a Central Preparatory Committee. This Committee would have the tasks of holding mass meetings in every factory, workshop, village, school and street so as to elect delegates to attend the National Soviet Congress.²

A provisional Standing Committee of the Central Preparatory Committee met in Shanghai on July 23. Delegates were present from the Central Committee of the CCP and the Communist Youth Corps (CY), as well as the National Labour Federation and others.³ These delegates organised themselves into a Provisional Standing Committee with the CCP Central Committee delegate as chairman and the delegate of the National Labour Federation as Secretary-General.⁴ Both

¹ Hao-chao chung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) ti-i-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsi'an-yen, (Declaration calling for the First National Congress of Chinese Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Meetings [Soviets]) Hsiao Tso-liang, II, op.cit., pp. 74-75. Hsiao has added a comment of his own to this document to the effect that the date of the Congress was later changed by the Central Preparatory Committee's plenary session from November 7 to December 11, 1930. (Ibid., p. 75) This cannot be part of the original document, which calls for the organising of such a Preparatory Committee.

² Ibid., p. 75.

³ Other delegates came from the Mutual Aid Association, Shanghai Labour Federation, Great Freedom Alliance, Great Anti-Imperialist Alliance, Social Scientists Association and the Left-Wing Authors Association. Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 283.

⁴ In addition, the Youth Corps delegate was appointed head of the Organisation Department; Left-Wing Authors Association delegate as head of the Propaganda Department; Social Scientists Association delegate as chief editor of the newspaper, and delegates from the Shanghai Labour Federation, Anti-Imperialist Alliance, Freedom Alliance and Mutual Aid Association as members of the Editorial Committee.

committees were firmly under the control of Li Li-san. It is not recorded that any delegates from the soviet areas attended. A work programme was then decided on for the Central Preparatory Committee, as well as an organisational outline for a provisional Standing Committee, and budget proposals. But the Preparatory Committee was not destined to meet in plenary session until September, by which time the situation in China had changed considerably. The delay in convening the plenary session was primarily due to the fact that Li had to await the outcome of his policy of seizing key cities before going ahead to establish a government.

On September 10 the Central Preparatory Committee urged all delegates to hurry to a meeting which was originally to have been held on August 20, but had had to be postponed because of the military situation and the KMT blockade of the soviet areas.¹

The plenary session of the Committee convened on September 12, probably in Nanking.² In addition to those bodies and organisations represented at the Provisional Standing Committee meeting of the

¹ Ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei wei-yüan-hui chin-chi t'ung-chih, (Urgent Notice of the Central Preparatory Committee for the National Soviet Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 78. The rest of the document only reiterates the demands of the July 7 Declaration.

² Yung-hu su-wei-ai chung-yang chun-pei wei-yüan-hui yü chien-li ch'üan-kuo chung-yang su-wei-ai cheng-ch'üan, (Support the Soviet Central Preparatory Committee and Establish a National Central Soviet Regime), Hsiao Tso-liang, II, op.cit., p. 79. (This document states that it was a meeting of the Standing Committee.) According to Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 42, International Press Correspondence of October 23, 1930 said that the plenum took place in Shanghai.

Preparatory Committee on July 23, there were delegates from other trade unions, the soviet areas and the Red Army.¹ The number of delegates to the meeting apparently exceeded the originally scheduled number by two-thirds.²

The Proclamation issued by the plenum stated that in the conditions of having created a 300,000-strong Red Army, and 300 soviet areas, the current tasks were to link up the scattered soviet regimes and centralise their directing organs. This task was to be coordinated with armed uprisings in the KMT areas. The election of a provisional Central Executive Committee of the soviet government by a National Congress was spoken of as being the most basic and urgent task. Once established, the government would unify the regimes of the various soviet areas, and put the Red Army under centralised command.³ The Proclamation also

¹ One delegate from each of the following: Railway and seamen's trade unions, the general trade unions of Tientsin, Hupeh, Kwangtung and Harbin; the soviet areas of Southwest Kiangsi, Northeast Kiangsi, West Fukien, North Fukien, Northeast Hupeh, Tung-chiang, Hailufeng, Hainan Island, the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, T'ung-hai, the Left and Right river soviets, West Anhwei, Chih-nan and Yen-chi; the 1st., 2nd., 3rd., 4th., 5th., 6th., 7th., 8th., 11th., and 12th. Red Armies; and the Shanghai, Peiping and Harbin Revolutionary Student Associations. Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 283.

² Ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei wei-yüan-hui ch'üan-t'i hui-i ching-kuo, (The Experience of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Preparatory Committee for the National Soviet Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 80.

³ Chung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei wei-yüan-hui ch'üan-t'i hui-i pu-kao, (Proclamation of the Plenum of the Central Preparatory Committee for the First National Congress of Chinese Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Meetings [Soviets]), Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 82-83.

discussed the creation of preparatory committees for the National Congress, and urged that three weeks after they had started work, that they should convene special region (t'e-ch'ü) delegate conferences of the special region soviets, so as to send delegates to the National Congress. They were urged to try their best to hold these conferences before November 7, and also to send delegates from the KMT areas.¹ All preparatory committees were told to make good use of the October 10 revolutionary anniversary of the 1911 revolution "to expose the counter-revolutionary KMT evil-doers".²

The major task of the Central Preparatory Committee was to continue preparatory work towards the convening of the National Soviet Congress, which would set up a National Soviet Government.³ The Plenum decided to postpone the calling of the First National Soviet Congress from November 7 to December 11, the anniversary of the Canton Commune. The reason given was the need for preparatory work to be carried out fully.⁴ The Committee's Presidium proposed that the Committee should move to the red areas (soviet areas). This proposal was accepted unanimously, as was a resolution

¹ Ibid., pp. 83-84.

² Wei tsu-chih ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u ta-hui hsüan-chü yün-tung t'ung-ling, (Decree on the Organisation of the Electoral Movement for the First National Soviet Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 106-107. Also see ibid., p. 82.

³ Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 79.

⁴ Ibid., p. 80.

to establish a Central Office in the "reactionary-ruled areas" to manage preparatory work there. According to one source, the move to the soviet areas was to be made to south Kiangsi.¹ The Plenum also passed a series of electoral regulations, and the draft outline of a constitution.²

The draft outline of the constitution, or state basic law, of the Chinese Soviet Republic was proposed by the CCP Central Committee.³ The outline stated that in the current conditions of the expanding revolutionary war, with the soviet regime not yet set up over the whole of China, it was not possible to lay down detailed concrete provisions. However, seven basic principles were enunciated: the guarantee of true democracy for the broad masses, and equal treatment without regard to sex, nationality or religion; the realisation of the regime of the labouring masses themselves, in which they would directly carry out all kinds of administrative affairs, thereby eliminating the opposition between government and people found in capitalist states; the emancipation of women; self-determination for all national minorities; alliance with the Soviet Union, and the overthrowing of the rule of imperialism in China so as to liberate China economically and politically; to realise the revolutionary

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 284.

² Hsiao, II, loc.cit. The electoral regulations will be dealt with in detail later.

³ Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo kuo-chia ken-pen-fa (hsien-fa) ta-kang ts'ao-an, (Draft Outline of the State Basic Law [Constitution] of the Chinese Soviet Republic), Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 96-99.

democratic-dictatorship of workers and peasants, and in the future reach proletarian dictatorship; and finally to support the interests of the workers and carry out the land revolution to liquidate all feudal remnants.¹

In addition to the draft outline of the constitution the Plenum also considered the Labour Protection Law and draft Land Law originally passed by the May Conference of Delegates. The Labour Protection Law was passed without change,² but the Land Law was amended, as some of its provisions had come under fire from the Comintern for being too radical.³

The agenda for the proposed First National Soviet Congress, adopted by the plenary session, consisted of five items. In addition to the Labour and Land Laws (about the latter of which the plenum said it had made "slight revisions") the agenda included a Political Report and Declaration of the Congress, the State Basic Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic, and the election of the committee members of the provisional central government. The State Basic Law referred to the draft constitution approved by the Plenum. The Political Report was to put forward a revolutionary political programme, and Declaration would call on all "workers, peasants, soldiers and poor

¹ Ibid.

² Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 99-101.

³ For example, the Comintern directive of July 23, 1930 criticised as premature the prohibition on the buying and selling of land. The revised draft Land Law is reprinted in Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 101-103.

people" to mobilise and "firmly strive for the victory of the national soviet regime". Concerning the members of the government, the agenda noted only that the National Congress should elect those who were most loyal and capable, and who believed in revolutionary leadership.¹

Next, the plenum drafted the outline for a network of subordinate preparatory committees. The tasks of these committees were to carry out propaganda for the soviet regime and the National Congress; to organise the election movement; to get the mass organisations and the Red Army to play an active role in this movement; to put forward the most active and brave revolutionaries as candidates for election, or to receive the candidates' list proposed by local revolutionary organisations and recommend them to the masses; and to collect opinions and demands brought up at the election meetings for transmission to the National Congress.²

Preparatory committees had a different organisation in the soviet and non-soviet areas. As already noted, the Central Preparatory Committee itself was to be located in the soviet areas. In these areas, committees were to be established separately in the urban and rural districts, down to the city districts (shih-ch'ü) and village levels, and appointed by the executive committee

¹ Ch'üan-kuo ta-hui i-shih jih-ch'eng, (The Agenda of the National Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 95.

² Chung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui ko-chi chun-pei wei-yüan-hui tsu-chih ta-kang, (Organisational Outline of Preparatory Committees at Various Levels for the First National Congress of Chinese Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Meetings [Soviets]), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 104.

of the local workers', peasants' and soldiers' soviet.¹ The actual selection of lists of delegates however, remained largely in the hands of the local Party branch, who's job, in addition to proposing its own list, was to induce the Youth Corps, trade unions, Red Guards, Young Pioneers and Poor Peasant Corps etc. to do the same. These lists were to be collected by the preparatory committee, but formally published under the leadership of the Party branch.² It was the Party that directed the preparatory committees to add activist non-Party people to the names list, with a single candidates' list for election being proposed jointly by the Party branch and the various mass organisations. If the masses opposed individuals on the list, then Party Central ordered that a replacement could be voted on.³ The Red Army in the soviet areas had its own system down to the battalion level, run by the Army political departments.⁴

An Office of the Central Preparatory Committee was set up in Shanghai to control preparatory work in the non-soviet areas.⁵ In some provinces (e.g. Manchuria) and hsien (e.g. T'ung-hai), special region (t'e-ch'u) committees could be formed, based on

¹ Ibid., p. 83.

² Chia-chin chun-pei ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui ti kung-tso, (Step Up the Preparatory Work for the First National Soviet Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 111.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 104.

⁵ Ibid., p. 110.

the professional organisations and revolutionary mass organisations in the area.¹ Normally however, preparatory committees were to be set up in the cities and rural hsien based on the local professional and mass organisations, which were to act as the subordinate levels of the committees.² The executive organs of the professional and mass organisations were ordered to undertake the work of the preparatory committees.³ It would therefore appear that in the non-soviet areas, such communist organisations as were in existence were simply appointed to shoulder the tasks of preparations for the Congress. These preparatory committees were directed through the Party and Youth Corps organisations of Central's North, South and Yangtze River Bureaux, and by the Party branches under the provincial Party committee in Manchuria.⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 105. "Professional organisations" refer to factory committees, hired peasant unions, handicraft workers and shop assistants organisations, poor peasant corps, soldiers committees etc. "Revolutionary mass organisations" encompassed the Anti-imperialist Great Alliance, Freedom Alliance, Revolutionary Mutual Aid Association, Revolutionary Cultural Association, Revolutionary Students Association, CCP and Youth Corps branches etc.


² It is not clear how this arrangement differed from that of the "special regions". Possibly the difference lay in the way delegates were to be elected to the National Congress.

³ Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 105-106 (See also Table I.)

⁴ Ibid., p. 110

T A B L E I

PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ORGANISATION¹



¹ Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 81 and p. 104.

In addition, the plenary session voted on a list of candidates for election to the Central Preparatory Committee. The list was proposed by the 5-man Presidium of the plenum, and after discussion, 25 men were elected, with one (un-named) individual being rejected.¹ Once elected, the Committee could then proceed, in accordance with article 6 of the Organisational Outline, to elect its Standing Committee of 5-9 members.

According to one source, the Committee elected the following nine men as members of the Standing Committee:-²

Hsiang Chung-fa

Hsiang Ying

Mao Tse-tung

Yü Fei

Yüan Ping-hui

Hsü Hsi-ken

Ch'en Yü

Lin Yü-nan

Lin Ju-lan

Hsiang Chung-fa, who was probably chairman of the Standing Committee (being listed first) was a Politburo member.

¹ Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 81.

² Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 284. Under the Standing Committee was set up a Secretariat, an Organisation Department, a Propaganda Department, and an Editorial Committee. (Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 105).

and Secretary-General of the CCP; Hsiang Ying was possibly a Politburo member at the time and almost certainly a member of the CCP Central Committee; Mao was on the Central Committee, as were Yü Fei, Hsü Hsi-ken and Ch'en Yü.¹ Little is known of Yüan Ping-hui, Lin Yü-nan or Lin Ju-lan, but the impressive number of high-ranking men on the Committee gave some indication of the top priority that the Party assigned to the task of creating a soviet government.

It is particularly interesting that Mao, in spite of his lack of co-operation in executing the attack on Changsha, and his apparent refusal to attend the May Conference of Delegates, was considered to be powerful enough to warrant inclusion on the Standing Committee. The fact that the Committee was planning to move to the soviet areas must have been instrumental in adding Mao's name. Nevertheless, he was heavily outnumbered by Li's supporters.

Some two weeks later, the Party leadership called on all members to step up preparations for the Congress,² and the work

¹ Wu Hsiang-hsiang (ed.), Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chih t'ou-shih, (Revelations of the CCP), (Taipei: 1962), Vol. III, p. 118. Also China Youth, No. 12, (June 16, 1961).

² Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 109-112. It is odd that in this commentary, Hsiao states that "after this document nothing has been heard of the proposed Soviet congress under the Li Li-san leadership". (Vol. I, p. 49) There is considerable evidence of activity relating to the Congress up to and indeed after Li's fall on receipt of the Comintern's letter of November 16, 1930.

of preparing for the National Congress was given great emphasis.

The CCP's official daily paper announced that:

"Following the plenary meeting of the Central Preparatory Committee of the Soviet Conference and especially since the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, the questions concerning the positive preparations for the National Soviet Congress and the establishment of a central soviet regime have become the current tasks of the revolutionary masses throughout the country...Further still, as soon as the 'double tenth' (October 10) comes around this year, we should intensify the broad propaganda movement across the country in all factories, villages and schools, where we should exert all our energies to convene meetings of the broad masses...(arrange for) the election of delegates to attend the Soviet Congress."¹

The theme that the movement for a Soviet Congress had to be a broad movement was often repeated. The groundwork was to be laid just as thoroughly in the KMT-controlled part of the country as in the soviet areas, and was to be built on as wide a foundation of workers and peasants as possible. As the official Party paper pointed out, "should the movement be confined to the few elements who are the most advanced, there is no doubt that any superficial slogan that should thereby be produced would in the end prevent the development of a true soviet movement."²

The Central Preparatory Committee urged the "broad masses" to take part in the election movement, and wherever possible to convene delegate conferences in all the soviet areas, factory committees, trade unions, peasant associations, soldiers committees and

¹ "Tsen-yang chin-hsing yung-hu su-wei-ai ti yün-tung?", (How are we to advance support for the Soviet Movement?), HCJP, No. 51, (October 7, 1930), p. 1.

² Ibid.

revolutionary mass organisations. All areas were requested to have convened these conferences before November 7, and to elect only "the most sincere and courageous revolutionary elements as delegates."¹

A reading of the CCP propaganda leaves no doubt as to the two main overt reasons for the decision to set up a soviet government. The first reason was the belief that a central soviet government would be more effective a fighting force against the Nationalists. A central government would be able to assist the revolutionary masses to "centralise and gather together all the forces for the revolution (especially to closely unite the reactionary controlled regions with the soviet areas), to activate and moreover organise the masses in every kind of struggle and intensify the preparations for armed uprisings, resolutely organise the revolutionary war to eliminate the warlord battles and overthrow the reactionary domination of the imperialist KMT."²

By drawing together the more than 300 scattered soviet areas and a Red Army reported to be 300,000 strong³ under a single unified administration, Li Li-san thought that the result would be a relatively rapid expansion of the soviet areas throughout the

¹ "Chung-yang chun-pei wei-yüan-hui pu-kao", (Central Preparatory Committee Announcement), HCJP, No. 52, (October 8, 1930), p. 1.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

whole of China. His view was given credence when the Red Army, returning after the failure of their second attack on Changsha, captured Kian in South Kiangsi on October 4.¹ It was after this event that the Central Soviet Area was created and a Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government established.²

The second reason was that a well-run Communist "state" in the heart of China would act to offset the authority of KMT rule and show up the Nationalist government as the corrupt regime the CCP felt it to be. As an editorial in the Party newspaper put it:

"The election of the National Soviet Congress is clearly totally different from the so-called party rule (tang-chih) of the KMT of the gentry, landlords and bourgeoisie; and from the so-called National Conference of the reorganisationist³ and liquidationist⁴ cliques. (These)...are elected and managed completely by the gentry, landlords and bourgeoisie. Moreover the workers, peasants, soldiers and all the toiling masses are not only excluded from elections and participation in political power, but are subjected to extremely cruel oppression. Soviet political power however, is the political power of the workers, peasants, soldiers and toiling masses. Only the labourers, being the overwhelming majority of the total population, have the right to elect and be elected, and all the exploiting classes and those who regard the working class as an enemy are deprived of electoral rights."⁵

¹ "Chien-li kung-nung-ping tai-piao hui-i [su-wei-ai cheng-ch'üan]" (The Establishment of a Worker, Peasant, Soldier Delegate Conference [Soviet Regime]), in HCJP, No. 54, (October 11, 1930), p. 1.

² Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 423. Also, see China Forum, (January 27, 1932), p. 4; and Shih-hua, (True Words), No. 2, (December 9, 1930), p. 4.

³ A neutralist group.

⁴ The Comintern nickname for the 'Trotskyite' group under Ch'en Tu-hsiu, a former leader of the CCP who fell from power in 1927. They advocated that the CCP should participate in a National Assembly under the sponsorship of the KMT.

⁵ "Je-lieh ti ts'an-chia su-wei-ai hsdan-chü", (Enthusiastically participate in the soviet elections), HCJP, No. 52, (October 8, 1930), p. 1.

Furthermore, it was expected that the "broad masses" would compare conditions in the soviet areas with those under the KMT. In contrast to the "cruel oppression" of the Nationalists, there were the soviet areas, where, it was claimed, the landlords and warlords' land was confiscated and distributed to all, taxes were low, education was free, and women had equal rights with men, as did soldiers with officers.¹

In the preparations for the Congress, the task of establishing a central government was described as the most important current need and central task of the broad mass movement,² as well as being the central task of the Party.³ All mass organisations were to be used as propaganda vehicles, and Party branches were to be their leadership cores. It was stressed that it was essential to link propaganda for the Soviet Congress to the everyday problems of the masses, so that in this way, the struggle to create a soviet government would become, via participation in the electoral movement, a political struggle against imperialism and the KMT.⁴ The Party branches did their best to carry out these directives. For example, at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Shop Assistants General Trades Union, a resolution was

¹ "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chung-yang wei-yüan-hui wei su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui kao min-chung shu", (A Message to the People from the CCP Central Committee concerning the First National Soviet Congress), HCJP, No. 53 (October 9, 1930), p. 1.

² HCJP, No. 52 (October 8, 1930), p. 1.

³ HCJP, No. 55 (October 12, 1930), p. 1.

⁴ Ibid.

passed opposing capitalists who laid off workers during the autumn, and calling on all workers to fight against the capitalists. In another case, sympathetic strikes were called for. At the same meeting, another resolution urged propaganda for the soviet government to compare life in the soviet areas with that under the KMT.¹ In a further case, the election of delegates to the Congress was combined with a call for higher wages and better working conditions.²

The September 12 plenum of the Central Preparatory Committee had ordered the creation of a network of subordinate committees at lower levels. These were only gradually established, and one month later the Party press was still calling upon all levels of government in the soviet areas to set up preparatory organs which would then organise a soviet conference for that particular area to send delegates to the National Congress. Preparatory organs were also ordered to be established in the non-soviet areas.³ An apparently typical case of the latter variety was the founding of the Tientsin Soviet Preparatory Committee, which was "demanded" by a number of organisations, including the Tientsin Municipal Committee of the CCP and the Communist Youth League, the Tientsin Revolutionary Mutual Aid Association and a number of trade unions. It duly convened on September 28 with a meeting of over 30 delegates from the above bodies, and also from the railways, textile and cigarette

¹ HCJP, No. 52 (October 8, 1930), p. 3.

² HCJP, No. 61 (October 17, 1930), p. 3.

³ HCJP, No. 52 (October 8, 1930), p. 1.

factories, posts and telegraphs, rickshaw men, dockers, soldiers, students, and peasants from neighbouring districts. The delegates heard a report from a representative of the Central Preparatory Committee, and then formally established a 17-man Tientsin Soviet Preparatory Committee, and urged that lower-level committees be set up in every factory, street, soldiers' camp and school.¹

Similarly in Peking, the Peiping Municipal Committee of the CCP and the Communist Youth League, together with various mass organisations, issued a call for a Preparatory Committee, which assembled on September 21. Delegates came from Party organisations and trade unions, although the total numbers were depleted as no soldier delegates were present because of military exercises, the Printers Union delegates had been arrested, and the peasants and seamen did not arrive due to communication problems. As in Tientsin, the meeting decided to set up lower-level preparatory committees for agitation and propaganda work. It was further decided that henceforth the main committee would meet only once a month, while a Standing Committee was formed, which was to meet twice a week. The Peiping CCP delegate was elected as Chairman of the Standing Committee.²

¹ HCJP, No. 56 (October 13, 1930), p. 2.

² HCJP, No. 56 (October 13, 1930), p. 2.

The preamble to the electoral regulations for the National Congress stated that because of the severe KMT "white terror" in the cities, and the attacks on the Red Army, the Congress would most definitely not be a "construction Congress" (chien-she ti hui-yi), but a "struggle Congress" (tou-cheng ti hui-yi). On the one hand, it had to represent "the millions of struggling revolutionary masses", and, organisationally, to take account of the military situation on the other.¹

Everyone who was 16 or older, regardless of sex, race, nationality or creed, had the right to elect and be elected, provided that they fell into one of several broad categories. Generally speaking, those who possessed electoral rights were those who lived by productive labour (or whose occupation was of "public benefit"); all Red Army officers and men; soldiers of warlord armies; those who do not hire labour but use their own manpower to manage small commercial firms (hsiao-shang-yeh) or handicraft firms, students, and professional people such as doctors.² Those deprived of electoral rights included landlords, factory and shop owners, rich peasants employing long-term labour, warlords, bureaucrats and gentry; all officials of the Public Security Bureau, min-t'uan, and other counter-revolutionary elements; Buddhist monks, and nuns, Taoist bonzes, and other clergy; opium addicts, lunatics and those convicted and deprived

¹ "Ti-i-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsuan-ch'ü t'iao-li", (Electoral Regulations of the First National Congress), HCJP, No. 52, (October 8, 1930), p. 2.

² Ibid.

of their public rights by a Soviet government court.¹

Different electoral methods were drafted for soviet and KMT areas. Precedure in the soviet areas was that delegates to attend the Congress were to be elected either at a Special Region (t'e-ch'ü) Worker, Peasant, and Soldier Conference All-Region Congress, or from an All-Region Emergency Delegate Congress. Quite what the difference was is not stated, but from the list of Special Regions, it appears that it lay in the procedure to be adopted rather than different procedures for different kinds of soviet area. Nine Special Regions were listed, which covered most of the soviet areas in existence at the time:-²

- 1) Hsiang-o-kan (Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi)
- 2) Southwest Kiangsi
- 3) Northeast Kiangsi
- 4) Min-yüeh (Fukien-Kwangtung)
- 5) West Hupeh and West Hunan
- 6) O-yü-wan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei)
- 7) South Hunan
- 8) Kwangsi
- 9) Hainan Island

¹ Ibid. According to Rue, (op.cit., p. 221) this regulation weakened Li Li-san's Kiangsi Action Committee, because Mao claimed that Taoist priests were "among the members of some of its local soviet governments." The priests had therefore to be removed.

² "Ti-i-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsüan-chü yüan-tse", (General Principles of Elections to the First National Congress), HCJP, No. 53, (October 9, 1930), p. 2.

Complex procedures were drafted for the soviet areas under the special region.¹ In the rural areas at the grass-roots level, the village directly elected 9-21 delegates to the ts'un workers', peasants' and soldiers' conference. (Soviet). Hired peasants and coolies had to make up 10% of the total number. Villages having less than 30 families had to unite together for electoral purposes.² The various ts'un soviets then each elected delegates to attend the hsiang conference, on the basis of one delegate to every 100 residents, up to a maximum of 50, composed of 15% workers, and the remainder peasants.³ At the hsiang conferences, delegates were elected to attend the hsien-ch'u conference, on the basis of one delegate to every 500 residents, up to a total of 100, with the same class ratio as the ts'un delegations.⁴ At the hsien-ch'u conference, yet another election took place for those representatives who would attend the hsien conference, with one delegate being permitted for every 3,000 inhabitants. (10-15% workers, 80-90%

¹ Chung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) ti-i-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui su-wei-ai ch'u-yü hst'an-chü chan-hsing t'iao-li, (Provisional Regulations concerning Elections in the Soviet Areas for the First National Soviet Congress of Chinese Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Meetings [Soviets]), Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 89-93. Separate regulations were passed for cities in the soviet areas having over 50,000 industrial workers, but no such cities were occupied by the Red Army.

² Ibid., pp. 92-93.

³ Ibid., p. 92.

⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

peasants). Here, at the hsien conference, the hsien-ch'u delegations were joined by those from independent chen (market towns having over 500 workers).¹ The independent chen had initially held their own soviet conferences to which delegates had been elected from the factory workers' meetings, trade unions etc.,² and had then sent delegates to the hsien conference on the basis of one to every 100 inhabitants, with workers comprising 70-80% and peasants 20-30%.³ Also present at the hsien conference were delegates from the Red Army, based on the ratio of one to every 500 men. Delegates from all three sources - hsien-ch'u, independent chen and the Red Army - were not to exceed 200.⁴

The penultimate step in sending delegates to the proposed National Congress took place at this hsien conference, which sent delegates to the Special Region conference. At the hsien conference, one delegate was elected for every 100,000 residents, their class distribution being 15-20% worker, 5-10% Red Army, 60-75% peasants, and poor people and others, 5%. The total number of delegates to the Special Region was not to exceed 250. This figure however, also included delegates elected from the soviet conferences of independent shih (cities having over 5,000 workers).⁵ These delegates had initially been elected by factory meetings, and handicraft

¹ Ibid., p. 90.

² Ibid., p. 92.

³ Ibid., p. 90.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 89-90.

workers', shop assistants' and professional workers' meetings, via shih-ch'u conferences, to attend the independent shih conference.¹ The class ratio from this conference was workers 50-65%, Red Army 20-35% and poor people 15-25%.²

Because of the urgency of the situation (presumably referring to the constant KMT military depredations), it was stated that the number of delegates to the National Congress from the special region conferences could not be precisely in accordance with population statistics and normal electoral methods. Instead, a rough standard was laid down that there should be one delegate per 200,000 electors.³

The precise number of delegates, and their class distribution, that it was proposed to elect from the nine Special Regions to the National Congress, can be seen from Table II. From the point of view of social composition the delegations were weighted heavily in favour of the peasants, who were to make up 75% of the total, the rest being distributed as follows: workers 12.5%, Red Army 10% and poor people 2.5%.⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 91.

² Ibid., p. 90.

³ Ibid., p. 89. Also HCJP, No. 53, (October 9, 1930), p. 2.

⁴ HCJP, No. 53, (October 9, 1930), p. 2 (See Table II). Another source gives a slightly different distribution of 15-20% workers, 10-15% Red Army, 60-70% peasants, and urban poor and others 5%. (Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 89).

T A B L E II

DISTRIBUTION OF DELEGATES TO THE NATIONAL CONGRESS,
BY SOVIET AREA AND SOCIAL GROUP¹

GROUP	AREA							TOTAL	
	Hainan Island	O-yü-wan	North-east Kiangsi	Kwangtung-Fukien	Kwangsi Hunan	South Hunan, West Hupeh	South-west Kiangsi		Hunan-Hupeh Kiangsi
Workers	0	1	1	3	1	3	9	12	30
Red Army	1	1	1	1	1	1	7	10	24
Poor People	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	2	5
Peasants	2	3	6	20	3	20	58	76	190
TOTAL	3	5	8	25	5	25	75	100	249

¹ HCJP, No. 53, (October 9, 1930), p. 2.
249 delegates implied a total soviet population of approximately 50 million, which was a gross exaggeration.

For election purposes, the non-soviet areas were divided into two - large cities on the one hand, and smaller towns and villages on the other. With reference to the larger cities (ta-ch'eng-shih) (such as Shanghai, Wuhan, Tientsin, Canton and Hong Kong) which had over 30-50,000 factory workers, there was one procedure for the workers, and another for the "generally poor" and their revolutionary organisations. Elections in the factories were to be under the leadership of the factory committee, or, if none existed, the trade union branch. Factories with over 2,000 workers were permitted two delegates, 500-2,000 one delegate, and if they had under 500 workers they were requested to combine with two or more factories to elect one delegate. For the handicraft workers and shop assistants, each trade was permitted one delegate, except where the numbers exceeded 10,000 in which case two were allowed. Elections were to be under the leadership of the trade union. Little was said of the "generally poor", except that the Paupers Consultation Associations were each to elect one delegate. Other revolutionary organisations such as the Anti-Imperialist Alliance, and the Freedom Alliance, were allowed one delegate each.¹

After the election was completed in each large city, wherever possible there being representation from every factory, industrial trade union and revolutionary organisation, a city conference was convened to be attended by all the members of the city delegation,

¹ HCJP, No. 53, (October 9, 1930), p. 2.

who were to discuss the views of the city, and its problems, before they went to the National Congress.¹

In large hsien towns, the handicraft workers and shop assistants were allowed three delegates, small hsien towns being permitted a single representative. Hsien towns without factory workers were to combine with the villages to organise electoral districts (ch'ü). In the villages, if the Peasants Association had over 1,000 members, it was granted one delegate and, if not, it was requested to combine with other areas to make up the numbers. Finally, "revolutionary soldiers committees" in the warlord armies could elect delegates according to local circumstances.²

The Central Preparatory Committee pointed out that it was absolutely prohibited to adopt the method of having delegates nominated by organs or a minority of people.³ Based on election, it was decided that the total number of delegates coming from the KMT controlled areas should not exceed 100, composed of 70 workers, 16 peasants, 8 soldiers and 3 each from the poor peoples' and

¹ Ibid.

² HGJP, No. 54, (October 11, 1930), p. 2.

³ Chih fan-tung t'ung-chih ch'ü-yü ko t'uan-t'i kuan-yü hshian-chü yün-tung kung-han, (An Official Letter to the Various Organisations in the Reactionary Ruled Areas concerning the Election Movement), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 94. (This document is dated September 21 in Hsiao, I, p. 45 - but September 22 in Hsiao, II, p. 94).

revolutionary organisations.¹ These delegates were therefore to be outnumbered by more than two to one by those from the soviet areas.

The fact that Li was prepared to countenance such a large number of delegates from the soviet areas suggests he was confident that his supporters and their network of "action committees" could be relied upon to produce "reliable" delegates.

Furthermore, peasants would predominate at the National Congress, since they comprised up to 75% of the soviet area delegates and 16% of KMT area delegates. When one considers that a majority of the Red Army and the "poor people" would have been made up of those of peasant extraction, and that many of the rural "workers" would at best be handicraft workers, the gap between this revolution and the Marxist model can be clearly seen. In order to narrow the gap, the CCP resorted to various subterfuges -- such as calling peasants a "rural proletariat", or claiming that it was a true proletarian revolution because it was led by the CCP, which was by definition the "vanguard of the proletariat".² It is unfortunate that no overall figures are available for the success of this electoral campaign, with respect to the total number of delegates or their geographical or class distribution.

¹ Ibid., p. 94.

² For an excellent discussion of these points of theory, see Schwartz, op.cit., pp. 191-199.

All that is known is that Preparatory Committees were set up in Tientsin¹ and Peking² and that the Seamen's General Trade Union was in the process of electing delegates to the Congress.³

On November 20, 1930 the Central Preparatory Committee formally invited the CCP to send delegates to the Congress. Central was allowed two delegates, and the Party branch "in the place where the Congress is to be held" was allowed one.⁴ As the CCP Central was the directing brain behind the Congress, and the Central Preparatory Committee was its creation, this could only have been a formality. But after this date no more was heard of the proposed National Soviet Congress of December 11, 1930.

Clearly, the immediate reason for the sudden lack of interest in the Congress was the fall of Li Li-san, who it will be remembered, was toppled by the receipt of the Comintern directive on November 16.

¹ "T'ien-chin su-wei-ai chun-pei wei-yüan-hui ch'eng-li", (Tientsin Soviet Preparatory Committee Established), HCJP, No. 55, (October 12, 1930), p. 2.

² "Pei-p'ing su-wei-ai chun-pei wei-yüan-hui i ch'eng-li", (Peiping Soviet Preparatory Committee Established), HCJP, No. 56, (October 13, 1930), p. 2.

³ "Ch'üan-kuo hai-yüan tsung-kung-hui chia-chin su-wei-ai hstüan-chü hstüan-chuan", (All-China Seamen's General Trade Union intensifies propaganda work for the soviet elections), HCJP, No. 56, (October 14, 1930), p. 4. (Same number but different date to the previous issue.)

⁴ Chih chung-kung chung-yang kung-han, (An Official Letter to CCP Central), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 109.

This led to his resignation and departure for Moscow. But since the policy of Moscow was to set up a central soviet government, and this policy remained unchanged with the fall of Li Li-san, the cancellation of the December 11 Congress must be sought elsewhere.

Two main reasons for this can be discerned. Firstly, the departure of Li for Moscow led to a power struggle within the CCP which, until it was resolved in 1931, pre-empted all organisational matters. The struggle was between the "Returned Student" group on the one hand, backed by Pavel Mif, and the faction centered around the north China labour leader Ho Meng-hsiung, on the other. Factionalism within the Party was further complicated by the occurrence of "Li Li-san-ism without Li Li-san" - the fight of Li's loyal supporters against the returned students.¹ The Party obviously did not wish to convene a Congress that might be dominated by Li Li-san-ists.

Ho Meng-hsiung had opposed Li Li-san's "adventurist" policies at least since May 1930. He claimed that Li exaggerated the role of the Chinese revolution, and that he followed incorrect policies with regard to the Chinese labour movement.² Eventually, in October,

¹ See Hsiao, I, op.cit., pp. 125-149. According to Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 67-68, there was a top Party meeting on November 22, at which the Returned Students were criticised on the basis of the Li Li-san line. Apparently Chou En-lai attacked the returned student Shen Tse-min for having said that the lines of the Third Plenum and the Comintern were not the same.

² Ho Meng-hsiung i-chien-shu, (A Statement of the Views of Ho Meng-hsiung), dated September 8, 1930.

under the prevalence of Li Li-san, Ho confessed to his "errors".¹ With the fall of Li Li-san in November, Ho was rehabilitated, but soon found himself in opposition to the Returned Student group. He was defeated by them at the Fourth Plenum in January 1931. It is a further indication of Mao's view of Li Li-san that he subsequently spoke well of Ho Meng-hsiung.² Since the leaders of the "28 Bolsheviks" were not established in power until January 1931 (and even then they were still subject to opposition from Ho Meng-hsiung and former Li Li-san-ists), it is not surprising that they did not feel able to organise the December 11, National Congress. No doubt the Party also felt the need to put on a show of unity at such an occasion.

The second reason for not holding the Congress was undoubtedly the prevailing military situation. The Nationalists were particularly active, towards the end of 1930, in hunting down Communists in the cities,³ but, more importantly, the First "Bandit Encirclement Campaign" was launched by Chiang Kai-shek in December, against the soviet areas.⁴ Therefore one cannot be surprised that the Congress

¹ Ho Meng-hsiung i-chien-shu, (A Statement of the Views of Ho Meng-hsiung), dated October 9, 1930.

² Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, III, p. 188.

³ T'ang Liang-li, Suppressing Communist Banditry in China, "China Today" Series, No. 1, (Shanghai: China United Press, 1934), p. 60.

⁴ Edgar Snow, op.cit., pp. 182-3. Also see Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 159.

never met in 1930, but such was the importance of it to the Party that it again became a major item of policy as early as January 1931 when the Returned Student group formally triumphed at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee.

CHAPTER 2

THE FIRST NATIONAL SOVIET CONGRESS

The initial impetus for a Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee came from the Comintern during the trial of Li Li-san in Moscow, December 1930. Dmitri Manuilsky, the Comintern representative in charge of the proceedings, called for a new Plenum to indulge in self-criticism and eliminate the errors of the Li Li-san line from the Party.¹

The Fourth Plenum was convened in Shanghai early in January, 1931. It pointed out the bad influences of the Li Li-san line on the Party - the weakening of the Party's influence over the masses, and the weakening of the mass organisations,² and especially condemned the premature attack on Changsha, made, according to the Plenum, without adequate preparation.³ Li Li-san was also castigated for neglecting the task of establishing a strong central soviet government.⁴

As was discussed in the preceding chapter, Li had in fact paid considerable attention to the creation of a soviet government, and a good deal of preparatory work had been carried out. The only point concerning the soviet government on which he could be held guilty was the tactical error of proposing to site it in

¹ "Ma-nu-i-szu-chi fa-yen", (Remarks of Manuilsky), dated December 1930, in Pu-erh-se-wei-k'ie, Vol. IV, No. 3, (May 10, 1931), p. 42.

² Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chung-yang wei-yüan-hui k'uo-ta-hui ti-szu-tz'u ch'üan-t'i hui-i i-ch'üeh-an (Resolution of the Enlarged Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee), SSC 15. Also in CRBRD, p. 424.

³ CRBRD, p. 425.

⁴ Ibid., p. 426.

a large city, rather than in the rural soviet areas. This had led him to delay the creation of a central soviet government while he attempted to occupy a key city with the Red Army. The fact that the National Soviet Congress was not held on the date proposed was largely due to factors not under Li's control. The Plenum elected a new Politburo of 16 full and alternate members. Ch'en Shao-yü, Chang Wen-t'ien and Shen Tse-min, members of the Returned Student group, were made leaders of the Party. Ch'en Shao-yü was appointed a member of the Standing Committee,¹ and General Secretary of the Kiangsu Provincial Committee; Chang Wen-t'ien became head of the Peasant Department, the Women's Department and Chairman of the Party newspaper's editorial committee; Shen Tse-min became head of the Propaganda Department; and Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku) General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Young Communists. Many of those associated with the Li Li-san leadership or with opposition to the "28 Bolsheviks" were removed from power, including Li Li-san, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Lo Chang-lung, Wang K'o-ch'üan, Li Wei-han, Ho Ch'ang, and Kuan Hsiang-ying. Hsiang Chung-fa was re-elected and retained as General Secretary after making a public confession. Chou En-lai was also re-elected and appointed head

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 99 (Presumably of the Politburo, although no other such members were listed).

of the Military Affairs Department.¹

The establishment of a new leadership in power meant no diminution in the priority accorded to the creation of a soviet regime, and this was made clear by the Resolution of the Fourth Plenum. This did not imply however, any abandonment of the Party's main task of capturing the urban proletariat. On the contrary, the Fourth Plenum spoke of giving special emphasis to Party work in the factories,² and as will be discussed shortly, Party documents during 1931 generally spoke of the soviet areas as being developed so as to occupy cities such as Changsha and Wuhan as soon as practicable, a policy which in fact differed little from that of Li Li-san.

But in spite of the desire of the Party leadership not to lose sight of their urban goals, it became apparent during the year that lack of response to the Party's overtures from the workers in the towns, and the increasing harshness of Kuomintang oppression and police supervision, coupled with the desire of the new CCP

¹ No definitive list of Politburo members elected at the Fourth Plenum is available. This information is drawn from Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 115, Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 99, and Wu Hsiang-hsiang, op.cit., p. 118. Also Tang ti Chien-shih, (Party Reconstruction), No. 1, (January 25, 1931), pp. 17-21. (I am grateful to Mr. Roy Hoffheinz of the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, for information from this last source). With the arrest of Hsiang Chung-fa in June, the Returned Student group further consolidated their hold on the Party, with the appointment of Ch'en Shao-yü as General Secretary, and Chang Wen-t'ien as head of the Organisation Department.

² CRBRD, p. 433.

leadership to establish control over Mao in the rural hinterland (for the soviet areas had been developing extensively) led the Party to pay increasing attention to the countryside - a switch which was institutionalised by the formal creation of the Chinese Soviet Republic at Juichin, Kiangsi on November 7, 1931.

Soon after the Fourth Plenum, on January 15,¹ the new Party leadership created the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas - a new organ which was to be directly responsible to the Politburo, but located in the soviet areas, in charge of preparatory work for the Soviet Congress² and of facilitating the transfer of the CC from Shanghai to Kiangsi.³ A Preparatory Commission was also

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 503.

² Su-wei-ai ch'ü-yü chung-yang-chü ti ch'eng-li chi ch'i jen-wu, (Establishment of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas and its Tasks), Notice No. 1 of the CCP Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas, (January 15, 1931), SSC 14. (Also reprinted in Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 503-506) Although formally inaugurated at this time, the Central Bureau had its origins at the Third Plenum of September 1930. As Rue points out, one of its members, Yü Fei, had opposed the Returned Student leaders and would not therefore have been given his position had the Central Bureau been newly created in 1931. [John E. Rue, op.cit., pp. 235-236.] In fact, Yü was removed from his position on the Central Bureau shortly after the Fourth Plenum [Warren Kuo, "Chinese Communist 6th. CC's 4th. Plenum and Party Rift (Part 1)", Issues and Studies, Vol. II, No. 12, (September 1966), p. 46] In addition, the document on the establishment of the Central Bureau refers to the need of the Party to implement the resolutions of the Third Plenum. (See Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 505; or the copy of the original document on SSC 14, p. 6 - emphasis mine. The Wang Chien-min version has been checked against the original document, where the latter is legible.)

³ Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 151. Interview with Chang Kuo-t'ao.

set up, but its work was halted when twenty-four of its members were arrested in January 1931, and executed the following month.¹

Under the situation of the new revolutionary high tide in China, the documents stated that the Party had two major tasks. The first was to consolidate the soviet areas, establish a national soviet base, and a provisional central government, and strengthen the leadership of the Party in the soviet areas, so that "in the future, according to political and military circumstances, (we will) be able to occupy one or several key industrial or administrative centres",² which were specified as Nanchang, Changsha or Wuhan.³ The second task was to strengthen the Party's leadership of the workers' movement, so as to strengthen the leadership of the proletariat with respect to the soviet areas. Armed uprisings were called for, to be coordinated with the work in the soviet areas. For the implementation of these tasks, the existing soviet areas were divided into the following six administrative districts:-

1. Southwest Kiangsi special area and the Hsiangokan (Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi) border special area to be the Central Soviet District and the seat of the central provisional government.⁴

¹ Agnes Smedley, China's Red Army Marches, (New York: Vanguard Press, 1934), pp. 290-291.

² Su-wei-ai ch'ü-yü chung-yang-chü ti ch'eng-li chi ch'i jen-wu, op.cit., p. 3, Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 504.

³ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 505.

⁴ Possibly this area was chosen in preference to Oytwan because of the desire on the part of the CC to control Mao's activities in Kiangsi. See R. W. McColl, "The Oytwan Soviet Area, 1927-32", Journal of Asian Studies, XXVII, No. 1, (November 1967), p. 54.

2. Hsiango (Hunan-Hupeh) border soviet special area, which included West Hupeh and Northwest Hunan.

3. Oytwan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei) border special area, which included Northeast Hupeh, Southeast Honan and West Anhwei.

4. Kanminwan (Kiangsi-Fukien-Anhwei) border special area, which included East Kiangsi, North Fukien and the Anhwei-Kiangsi border.

5. Minytlehkan (Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi) special area, which included West Fukien, Northeast Kwangtung and a part of Southeast Kiangsi.

6. The Kwangsi Left and Right River Soviets special areas.¹

With reference to the soviet areas, the Party was urged:-

1. to carry out land reform, equally distribute the land, and establish a soviet areas broad mass base.

2. to conduct elections to set up and transform the soviet organs by encouraging the active participation of the masses while driving out the rich peasants and corrupt bureaucratic elements. During the elections, propaganda for the National Soviet Congress and the central government was to be expanded.

3. in addition to the capture of key cities, to expand the soviet areas, and coordinate their development so as to cause the soviet areas of the whole country to combine.

4. organisationally, a special region (t'e-ch'u) committee was set up in each soviet, responsible directly to the Central

¹ Su-wei-ai ch'u-yü chung-yang-chü ti ch'eng-li chi ch'i jen-wu, op.cit., p. 4. (The microfilm copy is so poor at this point that I have relied on Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 505.)

Bureau. Areas not linked to the central soviet district could, where conditions proved difficult, take their orders from the highest Party branch in the area.¹

The Central Bureau had a membership of nine, headed by Chou En-lai, and including Hsiang Ying, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Jen Pi-shih, Yü Fei, Tseng Shan and two others - one from the Hsiangkan special border area, and one from the Central Committee of the Young Communists,² probably Ku Tso-lin.³ The Maoists (Mao, Chu and Tseng Shan) were clearly the dominant grouping in the soviet areas. Chou En-lai did not move towards Juichin until the spring or summer of 1931, about the same time as Jen Pi-shih left for the Hsiangosi soviet area.⁴ As already mentioned, Yü Fei ceased to be a member of the Bureau early that year. Hsiang Ying was the only Returned Student supporter on the Central Bureau actually present in the soviet areas for the few months after its creation in January 1931.⁵ So Mao, in spite of the fact that his General Front Committee had been abolished by the Third Plenum,⁶ was able to

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 505-506.

² Ibid., p. 503. According to one source, members co-opted from within the soviet areas included "Chu Teh, Dseng Bing-chiu (?), Tcheu Yi (Chen Yi), Dscho Yi-li, P'eng Teh-huai and Ling Piao (Lin Piao)" ["Letter from Central Bureau of Soviet Areas to the CC", (April 19, 1931), in Chinese Nation, (September 19, 1931), Nym Wales Collection, (Hoover Library); quoted in Shanti Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement, 1927-34, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 247]

³ Warren Kuo, "The CCP after Japanese Invasion of Manchuria (Part 1)", Issues & Studies, Vol. III, No. 6, (March 1967), p. 50.

⁴ Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., interview with Chang Kuo-t'ao, p. 162.

⁵ It is not known where Ku Tso-lin was at the time.

⁶ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 506.

consolidate his position by temporarily capturing the Central Bureau, and also by virtue of his position as director of the General Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council.¹ Mao retained control of the Central Bureau at least up to the time of its first expanded meeting in March.² By the autumn however, following the transfer of the bulk of the Central Committee to the soviet areas, Mao had lost his hold over the Party apparatus.

But to return for a time to the situation following the Fourth Plenum in early 1931, it appears that a "Soviet Movement Committee" was set up either at, or shortly after, the Plenum. This committee contained both Party and non-Party members, and had the task of drawing up draft resolutions for the National Soviet Congress and submitting them for ratification to the Party Politburo.³ However, it is clear that slow progress was made towards calling a Congress, and in February, the Politburo re-emphasised that one of

¹ The directive establishing the Central Bureau had ordered the immediate creation of a Central Revolutionary Military Council to unify the Red Army command. (Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 505) In January 1931, Mao was appointed director of its General Political Department. (Warren Kuo, "The CCP 6th. CC's 4th. Plenum and Party Rift (Part 3)", Issues and Studies, Vol. III, No. 2, (November 1966), p. 45)

² The Returned Students later attacked the March meeting for "errors of left and right opportunism" (Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 509-510).

³ "Resolution on Militarist Attacks on Soviet Areas", adopted by the Politburo on January 20, 1931; quoted in Warren Kuo, "Chinese Communist 6th. CC's 4th. Plenum and Party Rift (Part 2)", Issues and Studies, Vol. III, No. 1, (October 1966), pp. 47-48.

the central tasks of the CCP was defined as being the coordination of the soviet areas in preparation for the establishment of a soviet government, which was to be a government of the labouring masses under proletarian leadership.¹ A June directive of the CC said that the Congress should be convened in the central soviet in Kiangsi by August 1 at the latest.²

The fact that Mao was not associated with the calls to convene a National Congress is a fairly clear indication that he realised that the Returned Student leadership was out to use the Congress to change the policies he was implementing in the revolutionary base areas.

Chu Teh also related to Agnes Smedley that early in March "we received resolutions passed by the Fourth Delegates Congress of our

¹ "Mu-ch'ien cheng-chih hsing-shih yü chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti chung-hsin jen-wu", (The Current Political Situation and the Central Tasks of the CCP), Shih-hua, No. 8, (February 2, 1931), p. 2.

² "CC directive to Party Branches in the Red Army and local areas at all levels - on the current political situation and urgent tasks of the Party", approved by the Politburo in June 1931; quoted in Warren Kuo, "Chinese Communist 6th. CC's 4th. Plenum and Party Rift (Part 2)", op.cit., p. 50. This confirms what Chu Teh told Agnes Smedley - that August 1 (the anniversary of the Nanchang Uprising) was the first date proposed for the Soviet Congress. / See Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, p. 294 / There are two references to the Congress being planned for May, but that idea must have been quickly abandoned. / Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 4, (April 6, 1931) p. 1, and Agnes Smedley, China's Red Army Marches, p. 289. / An even earlier source, dated February 28, 1931, refers to "support and preparation for the National Soviet Congress", which probably implied the projected May meeting. / "Chun-pei 'Shang-hai pao-tung' yü 'Pa-li kung-she' chi-nien-chieh ti kung-tso", (The Work of Preparation for the 'Shanghai Uprising' and 'Paris Commune' anniversary celebrations), CCP Soviet Areas Central Bureau notice No. 16, leaf 3, SSC 3. /

Party..., which finally repudiated the Li Li-san line and re-affirmed ours",¹ and he went on to say that on receiving the instructions to prepare for the National Soviet Congress on August 1, (in south Kiangsi), he and Mao called a conference of Communist Party delegates from all the soviet districts which lasted nearly one month. There are no records of this conference, but it is probable that Mao and his followers were actively engaged in ensuring that they had the electoral machinery for the Congress firmly under their control. Committees were set up to prepare for the Congress, but, said Chu Teh, KMT military activities caused the date to be put back first to November 7, then December 11. (The Congress actually did convene on November 7, so Chu was probably confused here with the 1930 Congress which was supposed to have been held on December 11.) Chu said that during 1931 the soviets became efficient administrative organs for dealing with such problems as finance, communications, local armed forces, health and education. Their organisation was pyramidal in form, reaching from the village to the province.² This organisation was to be formalised and extended at the Soviet Congress.

¹ Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, p. 294. Chu was quite mistaken about the identity of views between himself and Mao on the one hand, and the new Party leadership on the other. Subsequent Maoist commentary classifies the period from the Fourth Plenum to the Tsunyi meeting (January 1935) as the gravest of the three "Left" errors of the Party (the other two being those of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and Li Li-san), which "caused serious losses to our Party and to the Chinese revolution". (RCQHP, p. 180.)

² Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, loc.cit.

The Eleventh Plenum of the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Comintern) was held in Moscow in April 1931 and discussed the future programme of the CCP.¹ In a directive to the CCP two months later, the ECCI Presidium listed its conclusions on the Chinese revolution. The directive approved of the changes wrought by the Fourth Plenum in liquidating the Li Li-san line and rectifying the Party line,² and urged the formation of a soviet government,³ which had been opposed by the anti-Leninist line of Li Li-san.⁴ Although the directive praised the leadership of the Returned Student group, it gave no indication of wanting to eliminate Mao's position in the soviet areas, and indeed spoke highly of his experiences there.⁵ Another Comintern directive a month later also urged that "a central soviet government should be formed in the shortest possible time, in the most secure area".⁶

These Comintern instructions had duly to be relayed to the soviet districts and therefore, on September 1, the Party Central organs in Shanghai sent a major directive to their counterparts

¹ "Kung-ch'an kuo-chi chih-wei ti shih-i-tz'u ch'üan-hui ch'üeh-i-an", (Resolution of the ECCI Eleventh Plenum), dated April 1931, printed in Kuo-chi Lu-hsien, (December 1932), pp. 1-26; published by the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas. SSC 14.

² "Kung-ch'an kuo-chi chih-wei chu-hsi-t'uan kei chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang ti hsin", (A Letter of the ECCI Presidium to the CCP), dated July 1931; in Pu-erh-se-wei-k'e, No. 1, (July 1934), p. 10. SSC 15.

³ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 9-10

⁵ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

⁶ Resolution of the ECCI Presidium on the tasks of the CCP, (August 26, 1931). Printed in Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International 1919-1943: documents (Three Volumes, London: Oxford University Press, 1965), III, p. 174.

in the soviet areas.¹

The directive explicitly criticised Mao's land policy of "drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce" and "drawing on the fat to make up for the lean", and urged that the fertile land and surplus implements of the rich peasant should be confiscated and distributed to the poor and hired peasants. The rich peasant was to be given poor land in return.² Central stated that using productive implements as a criterion for land distribution was a rich peasant line,³ and that the criterion to be adopted was the mixed criterion of population and labour power.⁴ The fact that these policies had not been carried out said Central "shows that the fruits of the land revolution have still not fallen into the hands of the poor and middle peasants, but have been seized by the rich peasants."⁵

The Red Army was urged to occupy one or two comparatively large cities,⁶ but the letter said that the Red Army's organisation was not suitable for large-scale war and the achieving of initial victories in one or more provinces.⁷ The concept of guerrilla warfare was criticised and the Red Army was told to "completely get rid of the tradition of guerrilla-ism"⁸ although Central did not advo-

¹ Chung-yang tui su-ch'ü chih-shih-hsin, (A directive letter of Central to the soviet areas), (September 1, 1931), SSC 14.

² Ibid., p. 4 and p. 15.

³ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

⁸ Ibid.

cate the abandoning of the function of guerrilla techniques.¹

The letter complained that the soviet areas had not yet been unified and that a provisional central government had still not been set up.² Central went on to say that they realised that the war had caused great difficulties in choosing a suitable place to convene the National Soviet Congress. However, said the directive, it was not important as to whether or not the Congress could be convened for the whole of China, nor even as to whether it could be convened for all the soviet areas. "The important thing is that we must have a soviet government of the masses to lead the civil war to overthrow the rule of the imperialist KMT and to develop the land revolution."³

Central stated that the soviet government would be produced by a National Congress that would convene on the anniversary of the October Revolution, for there were to be no more time extensions.⁴ Prior to the Congress, there was to be a re-election movement in the central soviet area, which would ensure that "all landlord elements, rich peasants, merchants, employers, and corrupt elements" would be eliminated from the organs of soviet government and the revolutionary organisations, so that soviet delegates would truly elect members of the "worker and peasant labouring masses". This work, said Central, had in the past been put off, not carried out, or carried out poorly. Now it had to be carried out successfully,

¹ Ibid., p. 18.

² Ibid., p. 1 and p. 19.

³ Ibid., p. 19.

⁴ Ibid.

even if it meant that delegates from other soviet areas would not be able to come to the Congress on time.¹

It is clear that this letter represented an attack by the Returned Student leadership in Shanghai on the policies pursued by Mao in the central soviet district. For example, in addition to attacking Mao's land policies, Central attacked the idea of guerrilla warfare, which Mao favoured, and urged the occupation by the Red Army of large cities, which Mao opposed.² Furthermore, Mao wanted the main emphasis of operations to be in the rural areas, rather than directed towards the cities.³ The directive was accepted by the First Party Congress of the Soviet Areas, held in November 1931,⁴ and shows that the Maoists had been unable to withstand the onslaught of the Returned Students, carrying the mantle of the official Party leadership and backed by the prestige of Moscow, and had lost control of the CCP machine in the central soviet districts.

The Political Resolution of the Party Congress urged the soviet area leaders to eliminate the gentry, landlords and rich peasants,

¹ Ibid., p. 20.

² RCQHP, pp. 199-200.

³ Ibid., p. 198.

⁴ Su-ch'ü tang ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui t'ung-kuo: cheng-chih ch'ieh-i-an, (Political Resolution adopted by the First Congress of the Party in the Soviet Areas), Central Bureau, Soviet Areas, (November 1931), SSC 15. [The actual date of the Party Congress was November 1 (Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 288)]

to deepen the class struggle, and link up outlying soviet areas with the central soviet district.¹ As in the September 1 letter, Mao's land policies were condemned by the Party Congress as "a rich peasant line".² Village and town soviets were to be established as the basic organisations of soviet government. By the system of conferences based on these units, democracy would be maintained, and "in this way, the soviet regime would become a genuine mass regime of the workers and peasants."³

Progress towards the Soviet Congress was aided by the Mukden Incident of September 18, when Japan occupied Manchuria and distracted Chiang Kai-shek's attention from the prosecution of his third "bandit encirclement campaign", which was in the throes of making successful inroads into the soviet areas. For almost two years, until April 1933, the soviet areas were to be relatively free of KMT military encroachments, and to enjoy their greatest period of stability and development.⁴

It was in this atmosphere that electoral preparations got underway for the First National Soviet Congress. Propaganda

¹ Ibid., p. 10.

² Ibid., p. 3.

³ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴ According to Chu Teh, the first KMT campaign was from December 1930-January 1931, the second from May - May/June 1931, third from July - September 1931, fourth April - June 1933, and fifth from October 1933, resulting in the loss of the soviet areas in October 1934. Nym Wales, New China, pp. 58-66.

documents concerning the Congress asked the question "why do we have to hold the National Congress?", and then answered:-

1. Because of the need to summarise the experience of land distribution and soviet organisation of several years.

2. To establish a soviet government of workers, peasants and soldiers to unite and centralise all organisation and work.

3. To discuss and decide important laws and regulations of the soviet government and development plans of the future.¹

If there were to be added to this list the desire of the Returned Student group to centralise organisation and work under their own control, and to implement their own policies, it would become an accurate summary of some of the main reasons for convening the Congress.

For administrative and electoral purposes, according to the law passed by the CCP,² local soviets were divided into sheng, shih, hsien, ch'ü, hsiang and ts'un. The hierarchical organisation of these units was not clear, although the law stated that there were in fact only four levels, as the shih and hsien were on the same level and had the same organisation, as did the ch'ü and hsiang. Probably the shih and ch'ü referred to urban areas, and the hsien

¹ Kuan-yü ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui ti wen-ta, (Questions and Answers on the National Soviet Congress), reprinted by the Hsingkuo hsien soviet government, (June 21, 1931), SSC 10. See also Chi-nien shih-yüeh ko-ming yü yung-hu ch'üan-su ta-hui hsüan-ch'uan ta-kang, (Propaganda Outline for Commemorating the October Revolution and Supporting the National Soviet Congress), General Political Department, Central Revolutionary Military Council, (October 24, 1931). SSC 3.

² Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 339.

and hsiang to the rural areas, with ts'un sending delegates to the hsiang soviet conference. The kind of committee structure set up under each levels' delegate conference (or mass meeting in the case of the ts'un) was similar to that finalised by the First Soviet Congress at the national level, with a soviet committee and chairman controlling the cabinet, or Council of People's Commissars, under which various departments functioned.¹ In theory, the provincial committee had from 70-150 members, each with a two-year term of office, one quarter of them being re-elected every six months. The provincial delegate conference was to meet once every six months. Proceeding to lower levels in the soviet administrative hierarchy, the numbers on the committees grew fewer, they had shorter terms of office, and they met more frequently.²

On August 1, 1931, the Revolutionary Military Council laid down the electoral rights and regulations for the production of delegates to the First Soviet Congress.³ It was stated that all people had the right of election and being elected with the exception of landlords, gentry, capitalists, rich peasants, those preaching

¹ Ten in all, such as finance, culture, land etc., and a secretariat. (Ibid.) [According to another source, there were only four levels of soviet organisation - hsien, ch'u, hsiang and ts'un. The hsiang and ts'un soviets were directly produced by mass meetings. Higher level soviets were produced by either mass meetings or delegate conferences. (Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 423)]

² Ibid.

³ Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 423-424.

religion for a living, participants in counter-revolutionary organisations, and those deprived of their public rights by the soviet government. All who were not included in one of these categories, and who earned their living by labour, were given electoral rights, provided they were over 16 years of age, regardless of sex or nationality.¹ On this basis, the hsiang was taken as the initial electoral unit, and delegates were elected using the ratios of one to every five workers and hired peasants and one to every 50 poor and middle peasants and others. At the ch'u delegate conferences, every 20 workers and hired peasants elected one delegate, as did every 200 poor and middle peasants etc. The hsien was the final unit, and sent the representatives direct to the National Soviet Congress, using the ratio of one delegate for every 3,000 people.²

In an overall comparison between these electoral rules and those of the Li Li-san Congress of 1930, one is struck by a considerable difference in emphasis which reflected the transfer of the energies and outlook of the CCP from the urban to the rural areas. The 1930 regulations discussed in Chapter I placed heavy

¹ Ibid. (These categories were virtually the same as those of the Li Li-san period).

² Ibid., p. 424. The Red Army, using the company as the electoral unit, had one representative for every 30 men. At the ensuing delegate conference, delegates were sent to the Soviet Congress on the basis of one to 300 men. There were also regulations concerning electoral procedures in the cities. (Ibid.) Slightly different procedures are described in one secondary source / China Forum, (January 27, 1932), pp. 4-5.]

emphasis on election of delegates from the cities under KMT control, and laid out detailed proposals for producing these delegates.

The 1931 regulations, however, as the title indicates, were concerned mainly with the soviet areas, and there were but few references in the literature to activity on behalf of the Soviet Congress in non-soviet areas.¹ In listing the areas and organisations from which the delegates came, documents of the Congress record only that some Trades Unions were represented, together with representatives from partisan groups from places like Hainan Island.² There was apparently no substantial body of delegates coming from the urban proletariat.

The proletariat was represented only in the Leninist sense that the Communist Party was by definition the "vanguard of the proletariat", even if the Party itself was largely made up of members of peasant background. In fact the soviet movement remained a movement of the villages alone, and the Red Army never controlled the large towns held by the KMT such as Kiukang, Nanchang or Kanchow, which lay within the soviet territories.³

¹ There is one injunction to calling mass meetings to raise delegates in the "enemy controlled areas", in Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 4 (April 6, 1931), p. 1.

² "Chung-hua su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui kei chung-kung chung-yang tien", (The Telegram of the Chinese Soviet Congress to the CCP Central Committee), Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 25, (December, 1931), pp. 1-2.

³ Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, p. 339. The Central Soviet Area in the summer of 1931 comprised, according to one communist source, some 31 hsien, and measured 400 li from north to south and 300 li from east to west. (Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 423).

However, with reference to the election campaign of the summer and autumn of 1931, there is evidence indicating that elections were either not conducted at all, or that they were carried out in a manner which bore little relationship to any formal system of organisation.

To begin with, a Central Executive Committee directive issued shortly after the First Congress said that soviet organisation had, in the past, been very imperfect.¹ The administrative areas had been too wide and inconvenient, and there were too many levels of government for the efficient communication of instructions. The directive said that neither mass meetings, nor delegate meetings or joint meetings of chairmen had been convened so as to elect the various levels of the government, and further complained that the work division and work methods inside the various levels of government were largely unsuitable - all of which was neither in accordance with the constitution or with the provisions made by Central.²

It became clear that the Party saw a number of deficiencies in local soviet government which it wished to eliminate. One source spoke of "bad elements" such as rich peasants, rascals and members of the AB (Anti-Bolshevik) Corps, who had hidden in and sabotaged the soviet organisations.³

¹ "Su-wei-ai chien-she chung-yao ti hsün-ling", (Important Instructions concerning Soviet Construction), Hung-se Chung-hua, (Red China), No. 2, (December 18, 1931), p. 4. / All future references to Hung-se Chung-hua will be abbreviated to HSCH /

² Ibid.

³ Kuan-yü ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui ti wen-ta, op.cit. (Also see HSCH, No. 43, December 5, 1932, p. 2).

Reform was also necessary it was said, in order to oppose bureaucratism, commandism, and the separation of the soviets from the masses. It was also required to wash out rich peasants, rascals and all reactionaries, and replace them with workers, hired and poor peasants, middle peasants, coolies and labouring women.¹

The reference to rascals (liu-mang) shows that the complete electoral law in force at this time has yet to be located, for this term cannot be found in any one of the sources discussed so far. The September 1 directive letter of Central for example, pointed out that "the slogan 'wash out rascals' in the soviet electoral law also stipulates that rascals do not have the right to elect or be elected",² and that this stipulation was a confused class line that would cause bankrupt and homeless peasants to be treated as rascals, and so "drive them outside the land revolution battleline".³ In 1932, this was to be referred to as "last years' indiscriminating with respect to class (pu-fen chieh-chi) mistaken electoral method".⁴ Central's September 1 letter went on to say that the soviet re-election movement had so far had very little success, that the lower levels of the soviets had become "pan-ch'ai" (or "routine work") organs; that the participation of the masses' delegates in daily work was extremely defective, and that landlords, rich peasants and merchants still managed many soviets and mass

¹ Ibid.

² Op.cit., p. 3.

³ Ibid., p. 4.

⁴ HSCH, No. 39, (November 7, 1932), p. 3.

organisations.¹

A later source reported that voters frequently had no contact with the ts'un or hsiang soviets, which were supposed to be the basic soviet organisations of the regime.² Furthermore, not one city (ch'eng-shih) soviet had been established.³

Writing at the time of the election campaign for the Second Congress, the Preparatory Committee noted that there were many defects in the campaign for the First Congress.⁴ Residents were not clearly distinguished between those having electoral rights and those not, and furthermore, "many of the masses did not fully realise that the election was their own to administer, an important part of their life, and thus we did not achieve the participation of the majority of electors in the election."⁵

Judging by the results of the First Congress - which confirmed Mao and his supporters in power in the soviet government - it would seem that Mao's machine kept a tight grip on the electoral machinery so as to ensure the election of delegates with views sympathetic to their own. The evidence cited above shows clearly enough that

¹ Op.cit., pp. 4-5.

² Hsiang Ying, "Ti-fang su-wei-ai ti chien-she wen-t'i", (The Problem of Local Soviet Construction), HSCH, No. 2, (December 18, 1931), p. 1.

³ Ibid.

⁴ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui hstün-ling", (Chinese Soviet Republic CEC Order), Hstün-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 1, (August 25, 1933), p. 2, SSC 10.

⁵ Ibid.

the election was not an affair that involved the large mass of the soviet population in an orderly procedure. More probably, the Maoists hindered the movement to reform and re-elect the soviet administrative organs and arranged for the selection of their own representatives to the National Congress.

Apparently, at some time prior to September 1, the workers' and peasants' revolutionary committees (or soviets), which were the provisional organs of the regime before the establishment of a central government, had been abolished, and a "military organisation" had been substituted for them.¹ In addition, the electoral regulations in force at that time were laid down by the Revolutionary Military Council.² Since Mao almost certainly retained his position as head of the General Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council up to November 1931, and this body was known to have been running the land reform programme during the year,³ it is reasonable to assume that it was also in charge of the election movement, arranging the production of a majority of Congress delegates

¹ Chung-yang tui su-ch'ü chih-shih-hsin, p. 4 & p. 19.

² Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 423. See also China Forum, (January 27, 1932), p. 4.

³ Pu-tso tiao-ch'a mei-you fa-yan-ch'üan, pu-tso cheng-ch'üeh ti tiao-ch'a t'ung-yang mei-you fa-yan-ch'üan, (If you have not made an investigation, then you have no right to speak, and if you have not made a correct investigation you have no right to speak), Notice of the General Political Department, Revolutionary Military Council, director Mao Tse-tung, (April 2, 1931), SSC 6. This document makes it clear that the General Political Department was in command of the land reform movement at that time.

with pro-Mao sympathies.¹

Laws and Resolutions of the Congress

The First National Soviet Congress convened at dawn in Juichin, Kiangsi on November 7, 1931, the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, with a ceremonial parade. Some 610 delegates were in attendance, representing the Central Soviet Area, West Fukien, Hsiangokan (Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi), Hsiangkan (Hunan-Kiangsi), Hsiangosi (Hunan-West Hupeh), Northeast Honan and Hainan Island. Delegates also came from the Red Army's First and Third Army Corps, the Second, Sixth and Sixteenth Armies, and various independent divisions. The National Labour Federation, the Seamens Union and Korea were also represented.² One secondary source says that the latter was in fact a representative of the Korean Communist Party.³ About one quarter of the delegates were women.⁴

¹ According to an eyewitness, one of the charges levelled by the CC at Mao during the period prior to the First Congress was that of using nepotism in the Red Army so as to increase his personal influence. [Warren Kuo, "The Anti-Mao Struggle during the Government 4th. Encircling Offensive (Part 1)", Issues and Studies, Vol. III, No. 8, (May 1967), p. 45]

² Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 25, (December, 1931), p. 2.

³ M. James and R. Doonping, Soviet China, (London: Modern Books Ltd., 1932), p. 15. Agnes Smedley also reports that there were delegations present from Korea and Formosa. She also states that the Congress was held, not in Juichin, but in Yehping, some 10 li to the north. Miss Smedley however, was never in the soviet areas (China's Red Army Marches, pp. 292-4).

⁴ Kung Yung-kang, "The revolutionary bases in the countryside, 1928-1933", People's China, No. 8, (April 16, 1957), pp. 34-35.

A comparison between the soviets represented at the Congress and the list of soviet areas put forward by the Central Bureau in January reveals certain discrepancies. The Hunan-Hupeh soviet of January was now the Hunan-West Hupeh soviet - a minor difference representing a small change in territory. However, neither Oytüwan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei), Kanminwan (Kiangsi-Fukien-Anhwei), Minyüehkan (Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi), or the Kwangsi Left and Right River soviets were reported present. Kanminwan and Minyüehkan had undoubtedly suffered during Chiang Kai-shek's "bandit encirclement campaigns", and what was left of them probably joined with the central soviet area. The Kwangsi soviets were still in existence but probably did not send delegates because of their distance from Juichin.

Oytüwan was the most important and stable soviet next to the central soviet district itself. Two important Central Committee members, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Shen Tse-min, had been sent there in April to implement the policies of the Fourth Plenum.¹ According to Chang delegates were not sent only because of the presence of KMT troops between the Oytüwan soviet area and Kiangsi.²

The main items on the agenda of the Congress were a Political

¹ Interview of Chang Kuo-t'ao with Hsiao Tso-liang, quoted in Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., pp. 161-2.

² Ibid., p. 172. One account does say that Chang sent a representative to the Congress, but he is not identified. See Agnes Smedley, Red Flood over China, (Moscow & Leningrad: Co-operative Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1934), p. 377.

Programme, a Constitution, a Land Law and a Labour Law, resolutions on the Red Army and economic policy, and other laws and decrees. The Chinese Soviet Republic was formally established, and a central soviet government was elected.¹

None of the laws or resolutions passed by the assembled delegates had their origin at the Congress. They had all been basically decided on well beforehand, and most of them had their roots in Comintern directives or CCP policies of 1930, during the reign of Li Li-san, or stemmed back even earlier to the Sixth Congress of the CCP in Moscow, 1928.

A Russian source disclosed that the majority of the proposals put to the Congress were circulated in draft form as early as March 1931,² and some days before the Congress was due to convene (in Hung Ch'i Chou-pao of October 30, 1931), an article written by Chang Wen-t'ien, a leader of the Returned Student group, announced

¹ CRBRD, p. 650. According to this source, the name of Juichin was changed to Juiching, because the town was made the formal capital of the Republic. In the Party press, however, the name of Juichin was maintained.

² Sovety v Kitae: sbornik material ov i documentov, (The Soviets in China: a collection of materials and documents), Moscow, 1933, p. 417. Quoted in Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946, p. 38.

all the major decisions of the Congress.¹

The First Congress did not adopt a full Constitution, but only a constitutional outline, introduced by the Central Committee.² This contained 17 articles, whereas the electoral regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic, also passed at the Congress, made reference to articles 73-84 of the Constitution.³ No fuller Constitution has been found, other than the outline.⁴

The outline constitution as passed on November 7, 1931, was shorter, but virtually identical in principle to that drawn up by Li Li-san's Central Preparatory Committee in 1930.

It was not a law laid down for immediate implementation in the soviet areas; rather it was a statement of aims which were to

¹ Szu Mei (Chang Wen-t'ien), Ch'ing-chu su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui, (Celebrate the First National Soviet Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 429-430. The draft resolutions and laws had in fact circulated in book form before the Congress so that Party members could discuss them and make suggestions for revision to the Central Bureau of the CCP. This comment, and the drafts, are in Ch'uan-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui ts'ao-an, (Draft Resolutions of the First National Soviet Congress), proposed by the CCP Central Committee; reprinted by the General Political Department, Third Army Corps, First Front Army, Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, n.d. SSC 16.

² "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo hsien-fa ta-kang", (Constitutional Outline of the Chinese Soviet Republic), Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 25, (December 1931), pp. 2-7.

³ CRBRD, p. 814.

⁴ Hsiang Ying, speaking on the constitutional situation to the Second Soviet Congress in January 1934 did not mention the existence of a fuller constitution other than the outline passed in 1931. See "Hsiang Ying t'ung-chih kuan-yü hsien-fa ti pao-kao", (Report of Comrade Hsiang Ying on the Constitution), HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, (February 3, 1934), p. 3.

be put into practice over the whole of China "after the defeat of the imperialists and the Kuomintang".¹ Currently, a start was being made in carrying out the constitutional provisions in the CCP controlled areas.² According to the outline, the state form of the Chinese Soviet Republic was to be a workers and peasants democratic dictatorship,³ a transitional form en route to a proletarian dictatorship. This was the identical form to that adopted by Lenin' during the 1905 revolution in Russia, although circumstances were quite different. Lenin's formula was aimed at a coalition government of his Social Democrats with the Socialist Revolutionaries, in a provisional revolutionary government in which the peasants would be represented by their own party.⁴ (Emphasis mine). In China however, both the workers and the peasants were to be represented by one party - the Communist Party. Consequently, the Chinese Soviet Republic made no claim to being anything but a communist party dictatorship.⁵

In the interval between Congresses, said the Constitution, there was to be a Central Executive Committee which would be the supreme executive power. The CEC in turn was to appoint a Council

¹ Hsien-fa ta-kang, Preamble.

² Ibid.

³ Op.cit., article 1.

⁴ Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1960), p. 78.

⁵ In organisation charts, communist sources showed the authority of the Congress as stemming directly from the Party. e.g. Lien-yu, (Russian Friends), No. 7, (Peking), May 21, 1932, p. 6.

of People's Commissars¹ as the highest administrative organ of the state.² There may have existed an even higher body than the CEC or the CPC, for the Resolution on the Question of the Red Army passed by the Congress charged the Presidium of the CEC with enforcing the provisions of the Resolution.³ The CEC Presidium may have been one of the organs specified in the full constitution, which has not been found. Official government documents issued after the Congress however, were signed by CEC officials, and made no mention of a Presidium, so in all probability it was not established at that time.

In the outline, the soviet government pledged itself to free China from the "yoke of imperialism", and threatened to nationalise much of the property owned by the "imperialists".⁴ However, it was declared that foreign enterprises would be allowed to continue production for the present, provided that they complied with all the laws of the soviet government.⁵ As in the constitution of the Soviet Union, national minorities were given the right of self-determination. This meant, in theory, that they could either choose to join with the Chinese Soviet Republic or break away and set up their own state.⁶

¹ Jen-min wei-yüan-hui.

² Hsien-fa ta-kang, article 3.

³ Hung-chün wen-t'i chüeh-i-an, (Resolution on the Question of the Red Army), November 1931, SSC 16 (Emphasis my own).

⁴ Hsien-fa ta-kang, article 8 (Banks, railways, factories etc.)

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., article 14.

The constitution guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly and the press to the worker and peasant labouring masses; spoke in favour of democracy for the workers and peasants and against the democracy of the landlords and bourgeoisie, who were to be deprived of all political freedom.¹ In addition, the outline affirmed that the goal of the soviet regime was the liberation of women,² asserted that it would introduce free and universal education for all the worker and peasant toiling masses - the progress of the class struggle permitting,³ and guaranteed "true" religious freedom,⁴ although priests, monks, and other clergy were deprived of the right to vote. Finally, in line with international communist policy after the Manchurian Incident, the soviet regime expressed its desire to form a revolutionary alignment with the world proletariat and oppressed nationalities, and proclaimed its loyalty to the Soviet Union.⁵

The Political Programme of the Chinese Soviet Republic, adopted by the Soviet Congress, was a general collection of basic principles, and was actually listed before the constitutional outline in the first proclamation of the CEC.⁶

¹ Ibid., article 10.

² Ibid., article 11.

³ Ibid., article 12.

⁴ Ibid., article 13.

⁵ Ibid., article 17.

⁶ Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pu-kao ti-i hao, (The First Proclamation of the CEC of the Chinese Soviet Republic), December 1, 1931; SSC 16. The Political Programme can be found in CRBRD, pp. 657-8, and in Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 321-2, labelled "Ten Great Political Programmes".

Unlike the constitutional outline, the political programme differs considerably with its counterpart from the Li Li-san period. The major distinction between the two was on agrarian policy. The 1930 Li Li-san document prohibited the buying and selling, and leasing of land, as well as the mortgage system. It also urged the nationalisation of land. This policy was denounced later by many Comintern directives.¹ The Programme passed by the 1931 Congress reflected the views of those directives and permitted what would have been forbidden by Li Li-san.² The 1931 Programme, although it urged the confiscation of the land of the feudal landlords, rich gentry and other groups, did not however call for the confiscation of the land of the rich peasant, a demand which was included in the 1930 document, as well as in both the draft and final Land Laws of the 1931 Congress .

Other differences included the permitting of private enterprise and free trade by the 1931 programme,³ a right which was not guaranteed in 1930; no provision for the right of assembly, speech and strike action, such as was contained in the 1930 document;⁴ and some elaboration in 1931 of the "foreign policy" of the new state.⁵

¹ For example, the Comintern letter received by the CCP on November 16, 1930 (SSC 12), and the July 1931 letter of the ECCI Presidium to the CCP, (SSC 15).

² Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo cheng-kang, (1931), article 6.

³ Article 9, (1931).

⁴ Article 6, (1930).

⁵ Article 10. (1931).

The Labour Law passed by the First National Soviet Congress¹ was in substance the same as the Draft Labour Law circulated earlier.² The Draft Law itself was almost identical in its major provisions with those included in the Comintern directive of July 1931, and with those of the Labour Protection Law put forward in 1930 by Li Li-san. In turn, this drew on the Political Programme adopted by the May 1930 Conference of Delegates, which was directly linked to the Ten Great Demands passed by the CCP's Sixth Congress held in Moscow in 1928.³

The final Labour Law was fuller than its draft, and stipulated that it covered all wage earners in factories, workshops and other productive enterprises as well as governmental, co-operative and private institutions. The other provisions added to the draft law in general increased the benefits and advantages to the workers. For example, the final Law specified that tools were to be provided without cost to the worker,⁴ and free housing was to be made available to him.⁵ Neither provision can be found in the draft law. He was also to get one more day's holiday - on March 18, the anniversary of the Paris Commune - than originally laid down.⁶ Trade Unions

¹ Lao-tung fa, CRBRD, pp. 1341-56.

² Ch'uan-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui ts'ao-an, op.cit., pp. 15-25. Some differences are discussed in Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., pp. 181-2.

³ For the Ten Great Demands, see Documentary History, p. 132.

⁴ Lao-tung fa, article 52.

⁵ Ibid., article 53.

⁶ Ibid., article 21.

also acquired benefits under the new law that were not included in its draft.¹

The Labour Law was clearly designed with an industrial proletariat in mind. It provided for trade unions,² collective bargaining,³ an eight-hour working day (less for minors),⁴ two weeks' holiday a year on full pay,⁵ a minimum wage,⁶ and a social insurance fund contributed to only by the employer, which would provide sick benefits, old age pensions etc.⁷ The final clause stated that the Labour Law did not apply to non-contiguous soviet areas, whose local governments could make their own Labour Laws.⁸

Clearly this Labour Law could not be implemented in a backward economic area, made up largely of peasants, whose only "industry" was agriculture and whose only "workers" were handicraft workers and village artisans. No doubt it was passed in the hopes of soon capturing "one or more key administrative or industrial centres", but as this never happened, what value it had must have remained purely on the level of propaganda.

¹ Ibid., articles 63 & 64.

² Ibid., article 6.

³ Ibid., articles 10-13.

⁴ Ibid., articles 14-15.

⁵ Ibid., article 20.

⁶ Ibid., article 25.

⁷ Ibid., articles 68-71.

⁸ Ibid., article 75.

As was seen in the discussion on the Political Programme, the Land Law passed by the First Congress was the law that differed most from its predecessors of the Li Li-san period. The Provisional Land Law passed by the May 1930 Conference of delegates from the soviet areas prohibited the buying, selling and leasing of land; condemned the "mortgage" system; and advocated collectivisation of land.¹

These policies passed by the 1930 Conference were condemned as premature in the Comintern directive of July 23, 1930, with the consequence that the Provisional Land Law was revised by the Central Preparatory Committee in time for its September 12, 1930 meeting. The offending passages of the May law were removed, although one secondary source reports that in the first draft of the 1931 Land Law there was still a clause permitting voluntary collectivisation.²

The Land Law passed by the Congress spoke approvingly of the nationalisation of land, but said the putting into practice of the measure would have to await the victory of the land revolution in important regions of China, and have the support of the peasants. However, said the Law, the Soviet government at the present time should explain the advantages of land nationalisation to the peasantry.³

¹ In CRBRD, pp. 918-921. "Mortgage" is the usual translation of the Chinese term "tien-ya". In fact, the tien system, in which a peasant makes over the title deeds of his land to a landowner in return for a loan, differs considerably from the Western mortgage system, mainly in the rights of conditional ownership granted by the peasant to the landlord.

² Rhetchina, (Moscow: 1934), p. 621. Quoted in Documentary History, p. 218.

³ Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo t'u-ti fa, (Land Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic), December 1, 1931, Article 12. SSC 18. The translations of the Law in Documentary History, pp. 224-226, and in Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic, (London: Martin Lawrence Ltd., 1934), pp. 24-27, both contain only seven clauses, whereas the actual law has 14.

Following the correct anti-Li Li-san line, the Land Law also permitted the leasing, and buying and selling of land, but cautioned that the rich peasants and landlords were not to be allowed to buy back their confiscated land.¹ Abolition of the tien system was covered by article 9.

The Land Law when finally passed was drawn from Comintern directives - for example the Draft Resolution on the Land and Peasant Problem in the Soviet Areas of November 1930,² and the letter of the ECCI Presidium to the CCP of July 1931.

The aim of the Land Law was to correct the policy of land reform in the soviet areas during 1930 and 1931 which had proved to be ineffective. In many places, the landlords and rich peasants, by pretending to support soviet policies, managed either to retain control of their land, or to be in a position to implement the land reform policy, which meant that they either escaped expropriation completely, or redistributed the best land to themselves. The poor peasants got no land or poor land, and their continued requests for land caused repeated redistributions, which resulted in reduced crops.³

¹ Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo t'u-ti fa, (1931), article 12.

² Su-wei-ai ch'u-yü t'u-ti nung-min wen-t'i i-chüeh-an ts'ao-an, Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 195-7.

³ Rétechina, part III, passim, quoted in Documentary History, p. 219. Also, Pavel Mif, China's struggle for freedom, (London: Modern Books Ltd., n.d.), p. 76.

The 1931 Land Law therefore confiscated the land of all the feudal landowners, landlords, rich gentry, militarists and bureaucrats without compensation - their land to be given to the poor, middle and hired peasants.¹ The land belonging to ancestral shrines and temples was to be confiscated, but with the support of the peasants, so as not to offend their religious feelings.² The land of the rich peasant was also to be confiscated, but unlike the landlords and gentry etc., he was entitled to receive some "comparatively poor" land in the subsequent redistribution, providing that he cultivated it with his own labour power.³ The confiscated land was to be distributed according to the principle of equal distribution,⁴ although the law protected the interests of the middle peasants by allowing them not to participate in the operation of this principle if the majority of them were unwilling.⁵ However, local soviets were to select the principle most advantageous, under their local conditions, to the interests of the poor, middle and hired peasants, and were to give out the land using a mixed principle of the total number of people in a family and the number of persons capable of working in each family. Or alternatively, in areas where the poor, middle and hired peasants received land on the principle of equal distribution according to the number of people in the family, every person capable of working in a rich peasant family was to receive as much land as every consumer in the family of a poor, middle or

¹ T'u-ti fa, article 1.

² Ibid., article 6.

³ Ibid., article 3.

⁴ Ibid., article 5.

⁵ Ibid.

hired peasant.¹

This article clearly hit at the rich peasants, who sought to have the land distributed according to the productive implements possessed² - a measure that would have gained them land at the expense of the poorer peasant classes.

In addition to land, all the fixed and moveable property, houses, granaries, cattle and farm implements of the feudal militarists, rich gentry and landlords was to be confiscated. After distributing the land, the rich peasants' surplus houses, farm implements, cattle, water mills and oil presses were also to be confiscated. The confiscated houses were to be distributed partly to the poor and middle peasants who had no homes, and partly made into schools and clubs for the use of local soviets, Party and Youth Corps committees, trade unions etc.³

The confiscated cattle and farm implements were either to be distributed to the poor and middle peasants or, if peasant opinion was favourable, rudimentary cooperatives could be formed.⁴

¹ Ibid., article 7 (emphasis my own). This was in line with the Comintern directive of November 1930, which pointed out that rich peasants often had big families, with several generations living together, and that it was therefore preferable to distribute land to them using the criterion of labour power. (Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 196)

² Ibid., article 7.

³ Ibid., article 8.

⁴ Ibid.

The law stated that where land had already been distributed in the soviet areas in accordance with the principles laid down, then it must not be re-distributed. However, where it had been distributed in accordance with principles not corresponding to those in the law, then it must be re-distributed.¹

Special provisions were made in the law for Red Army men, who were each to be given a plot of land. Arrangements were to be made by the local soviet for it to be cultivated in their absence.²

It is now time to consider the significance of the differences between the draft Land Law introduced by the CC of the Party, and the final Land Law passed by the Congress. Article 5 of the final law protected the interests of the middle peasants more than the draft by allowing them to opt out of the land reform under the principle of equal distribution if a majority of them so desired. This addition to the draft law was in harmony with the Comintern July letter which urged the CCP to obtain the agreement of the middle peasants before carrying out land distribution, and stressed the need to consolidate the alliance between the proletariat and the poor and middle peasants.³

Articles 7 and 8 of the final law were different from their counterparts in the draft law, and the changes reflected differences in land reform with respect to the rich peasants. Both the draft and final laws were in agreement that the rich peasants' land

¹ Ibid., article 14.

² Ibid., article 2.

³ Op.cit., article 27.

should be confiscated, and that when it was distributed, he should receive a share, although not land of the best quality. With regard to the criteria for distribution however, article 7 of the draft law stipulated that a mixed principle was to be applied, so that land was to be divided among families partially according to the total number of people in the family, and partially according to the number of people in the family capable of working. Article 7 of the final law repeats this, but then adds that an alternative principle could be adopted - that the poor, middle and hired peasants could receive land according to the number of people in their families, while the rich peasants would receive land according to the number of people in the family who had the ability to work. This new principle were detrimental to the interests of the rich peasants, for it implied that in the hypothetical case of a poor peasant family of five, made up of two adults and three young children, that they would receive five units of land, whereas an identical rich peasant family would receive only two units (and those would be of poor quality). Although the draft land law stipulated that the mixed principle of land distribution was to be implemented by local soviets in the way that would be most advantageous to the poor and middle peasants, it is clear that the additional criterion included in the final law made more specific and concrete the discrimination against the rich peasants. The changes made in article 8 confirm this, for while the draft law ordered the confiscation of the rich peasants' surplus farm implements and cattle, the final law adds to these two items the confiscation of their surplus

houses, water mills and oil presses.¹

The principle of land distribution enunciated by Mao in his February 7 (1930) Land Law of "draw on the plentiful to make up for the scarce" and "draw on the fat to make up for the lean", appears in neither the draft nor final 1931 Land Law. This principle was attacked as a "rich peasant line" by the Returned Student group, for example by the September 1 directive letter, and at the First Congress of the Party in the Soviet Areas. However, it cannot necessarily be concluded from this omission that the law was passed against the opposition of Mao. He may very well have changed his mind on the operation of this principle, which was in fact referred to in the February 7 Law as "striking a blow at the rich peasant".² Although the text of the final land law certainly discriminated more against the rich peasant than the February 7 law, under both laws his land was to be confiscated.

¹ Rue, op.cit., pp. 249-250 has mis-read these two articles, which leads him to interpret the changes in the law as being beneficial to the rich peasants.

² Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 357. According to one account, at a meeting of the Central Bureau before the Party Congress, Mao defended his land policies on the grounds that they were "only temporary measures to meet a wartime situation, and not an implementation of the rich peasant line". See Warren Kuo, "The CCP after Japanese Invasion of Manchuria (Part 2)", Issues and Studies, Vol. III, No. 7, (April 1967), p. 38.

The Returned Student group attacked not only the text of the February 7 law, but also the way that the "draw on the plentiful..." principle apparently worked out in practice to the interests of the rich peasant in the soviet areas.¹ Given the radical land policies carried out by Mao in earlier years on Ching Kangshan, he possibly concurred in some of their opinions, thus explaining the differences between the texts of the draft and final 1931 Land Laws.

The resolution on the Red Army that was adopted by the Congress dealt essentially with questions of military administration, and did not concern itself with matters of strategy or tactics.² The resolution as passed was identical to that of the Draft Resolution proposed earlier by the Party, with the addition of a section dealing with special privileges to be granted to fighters in the Red Army.³

One of the main proposals of the Resolution was to establish a Revolutionary Military Council (ko-ming ch'ün-shih wei-yüan-hui) to centralise the leadership of the Red Army.⁴

The Resolution urged an increase in Red Army recruitment, particularly among "revolutionary workers" and agricultural labourers.

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 508.

² Hung-ch'ün wen-t'i ch'üeh-i-an (Resolution on the Question of the Red Army), November 1931, SSC 16.

³ Ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui ts'ao-an, pp. 1-7, SSC 16.

⁴ Hung-ch'ün wen-t'i ch'üeh-i-an, article 1. The Resolution gives the impression that the RMC was a newly created body, but other documents show that it was operating at least as early as April 1931.

This, together with the strengthening of Communist Party organizations in the Red Army, would ensure proletarian leadership.¹ The leading military and political positions in the Red Army were to go to workers, agricultural labourers, poor peasants and revolutionary fighters of proven loyalty.²

The special privileges extended to Red Army men included grants of land when land reform was carried out; provision for the cultivating of this land during their absence; and help for the families of Red Army men away fighting.³ In addition, soldiers were exempt from taxes, their families lived rent free (if they lived in a house belonging to the state), and bought goods at reduced prices, as well as having priority treatment in the supply of scarce commodities.⁴ Pensions and disability benefits were provided for.⁵ Article 18 however, specified that the wife of a Red Army man could obtain a divorce only with the consent of her husband, a rule which put the Red Army man on a different basis to that of the rest of the soviet population, for the Marriage Laws

¹ Ibid., article 2.

² Ibid., article 4.

³ Ibid., articles 1-5. These articles are to be found separate from the main Resolution. They are on SSC 8. Hung-chün yu-tai t'iao-li (Regulations on special privileges for Red Army men), passed by the First National Soviet Congress; printed by Central Revolutionary Military Council Pol. Dept., December 1, 1931.

⁴ Ibid., articles 6-8.

⁵ Ibid., articles 12-14.

passed by the Soviet Congress specified that a divorce could be obtained either by mutual consent or at the firm demand of either one of the two parties.¹

Another resolution of major importance passed by the Congress was that on economic policy.² Like most of the resolutions, it was virtually identical to its draft introduced earlier by the Party.³ The draft, in turn, borrowed heavily from the Li Li-san Political Programme passed at the May 1930 Conference of Delegates.

The resolution stated that the soviet government would nationalise all the key enterprises of the imperialists, though unlike the 1930 Programme, if the imperialists concluded contracts with the soviet government that included the enforcement of the soviet government's Labour Law, then they would be allowed to continue production.⁴ Industries belonging to the Chinese were not to be nationalised

¹ Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang cheng-fu pan-pu: hun-yin t'iao-li, (Marriage Regulations promulgated by the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic), (December 1931), article 9. SSC 6.

² Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ching-chi cheng-ts'e, (Economic Policies of the Chinese Soviet Republic), (December 1, 1931), SSC 11. For some reason, Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 184, says that this resolution is not available. (It can also be located in Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 373-375, in an abbreviated form).

³ Ching-chi cheng-ts'e ts'ao-an, (Draft Resolution on Economic Policy), printed in Ch'uan-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui ts'ao-an, pp. 27-30, SSC 16. One phrase has been added to the final resolution, Part 3, Article 1, which however, does not alter the meaning.

⁴ Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ching-chi cheng-ts'e, Section 1, Article 1.

but were to be run by the workers - ownership remaining with the capitalist.¹ On the one hand, freedom of trade was guaranteed, but on the other hand, the government proposed to combat speculation, inflation and monopoly prices, and to fix maximum prices in emergencies.²

Consumer co-operatives were to be encouraged by the government,³ and the old system of taxation was to be replaced by a single progressive tax.⁴ In order to develop the economy, a workers' and peasants' bank was to be set up, which would give credit to the peasants, to industry and to the Co-ops.⁵ Little was said about economic policy towards agriculture, presumably because this field was covered by the Land Law.

A further major resolution passed by the Congress was a series of regulations concerning the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.⁶ Of all the drafts introduced prior to the Congress by the Party CC, the difference between this draft and its final product is greater than that between any other law or resolution.⁷ The organisational

¹ Ibid., Section 1, Article 2.

² Ibid., Section 2, Article 1.

³ Ibid., Section 2, Article 3.

⁴ Ibid., Section 3, Article 1.

⁵ Ibid., Section 3, Article 4.

⁶ Kung-nung chien-ch'a-pu tsu-chih t'iao-li, (Organisational Regulations of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate), passed by the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic, (November 1931), SSC 10.

⁷ Kung-nung chien-ch'a-ch'u ti tsu-chih hsi-t'ung yü jen-wu ts'ao-an, (Draft Resolution on the Organisational Structure and Tasks of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate), in Ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui ts'ao-an, pp. 31-36, SSC 16.

system of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate (WPI) as defined in the final resolution was more formalised than that of the draft. It provided for a system of WPI's from the central level down to ch'ü and shih soviets, each level under the control of the respective soviet Executive Committee, and at the same time receiving orders from higher level WPI organs.¹

Duties of the WPI included the supervision of state enterprises and organs, supervising the implementation of the labour and land laws etc., supervision of soviet organs and economic policy, and the referring of criminal acts such as bribery and corruption to the courts for action.² These tasks were in substance the same as laid down in the draft resolution except that the draft specifically included the preparation and conduct of soviet elections.³ The draft explicitly stated that the Inspectorate was not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Party or the Red Army,⁴ a demand which was left implicit in the final version. The draft version also referred to the fact that during land distribution, the poor and hired peasants often received poor quality land, while the rich peasants, occupying the soviet organs, retained property and good quality land for themselves.⁵ The WPI was charged with rectifying this situation. In the final law, these items were implicitly

¹ Tsu-chih t'iao-li, articles 1-3.

² Ibid., articles 5-6.

³ Ts'ao-an, article 2.

⁴ Ibid., article 3.

⁵ Ibid., article 5.

subsumed under the heading of implementing the land law.

In order to facilitate the work of inspecting state organs and economic enterprises, the final resolution provided for the establishment of specialist committees (such as a land distribution inspection committee) of 3-5 members.¹ The results of the inspection, and the committees' proposals, were to be reported to the personnel of the enterprises for discussion, and the proposals were to be enforced by the local soviet.² Whereas these methods were provided for in the draft resolution, the final resolution also spoke of establishing commando units to suddenly inspect state organs and enterprises, as it was easier in this way to discover corrupt elements and bureaucratism.³ Both the draft and final resolutions mentioned the need for proposals to be made by the WPI to the inspected enterprises' personnel meeting, in order to rectify errors and defects in work that had been disclosed by the inspection. Both resolutions also provided for legal proceedings in cases of violation of the laws. The final resolution however, also referred to the establishing of "mass courts" to deal with "cases not involving acts violating the law". These courts would have the power to dismiss work personnel and publicly announce the facts of corruption.⁴ No such article was included in the draft law.

The draft law did make explicit the close connection between the

¹ Tsu-chih t'iao-li, article 6.

² Ibid., article 8.

³ Ibid., article 11.

⁴ Ibid., article 12.

WPI (a government organ) and the Party. The draft specified close links between the WPI and the Party's inspection committee, and said that although the two organs were completely independent, the Party's inspection committee personnel were all members of the WPI, and participated in its work. The draft stated that this connection had proved absolutely necessary.¹ This article in the draft was not included in the final resolution, but there is no reason to suppose that close links between the Party and the WPI were not established after the latter's creation in November 1931, and that the WPI therefore became an organ for the Party supervision and control of soviet organs.

At the first plenary session of the CEC, held on November 27, new regulations were announced concerning the demarcation of administrative areas and the organisation of local soviet regimes, as well as a set of electoral procedures. As these were a fairly complex series of regulations, they must have been under consideration for some time and were undoubtedly discussed at the Congress. These regulations were generally designed to rectify the deficiencies of the previous system, to create a more permanent and organised administrative system, so as to bring the regime into closer connection with the masses and facilitate control of the people in the soviet areas. As Hsiang Ying wrote in a Red China editorial, the various local soviet governments were not very well established and "had still not got rid of the provisional regime form and made progress towards a formal regime system".² Hsiang Ying went on to say that "if we do

¹ Ts'ao-an, article 8.

² Hsiang Ying, HSCH, No. 2, p. 1.

not have completely healthy local soviets, then we are not able to consolidate the basis of the Chinese Soviet Republic. If we do not have local regimes with a strong work capacity, then we are not able to fully put into practice all the political programmes of the soviets to unite with the countless worker and peasant labouring masses, and will not be able to go and strive for the victory of the soviets over all China".¹


According to the CEC, the old system of administrative areas in China was more suited to feudal rule than soviet democratic centralism. Also, because of wartime conditions, the soviets had developed unevenly, some occupying only part of a province, hsien or ch'ü, and some in between several provinces. In addition, the original system of administrative areas demarcated by the soviets had proved to be too large, (especially at the ch'ü and hsiang levels), for administrative convenience. There were also too many levels of government so that the transmission of orders took a long time to reach the grass roots. A new system was therefore required.²

Basically, the new regulations prescribed that the hsien, ch'ü, shih,³ and hsiang soviet areas were to be demarcated anew, that the ts'un and small group organisations were abolished, and that the hsiang

¹ Ibid.

² Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo hua-fen hsing-cheng ch'ü-yü chan-hsing t'iao-li, (Temporary Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic for the Demarcation of Administrative Areas), printed in Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 328-9; also HSCH, No. 2, p. 4.

³ Also referred to in contemporary documents as the ch'eng or ch'eng-shih. Shih is used throughout this thesis for the sake of consistency.

T A B L E III¹SOVIET ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION(November 1931 to 1934)

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 328.

and shih areas were to be the basic level soviets of the regime.¹
The new hierarchy of soviet organs would therefore be as in Table III.²

The sphere of jurisdiction of the provincial soviet was to be decided by the central government according to the military situation and the nature of the terrain. The jurisdiction of the hsien soviet depended on whether it was in mountainous territory or level land. In the case of mountain areas, the hsien was to command a maximum of 12 ch'ü, but this could be increased to 15 in the case of level land. The actual hsien soviet organisation was to be established in a big market town.³ Likewise in the case of the ch'ü soviet, in mountain areas it was to have jurisdiction over a maximum of 9 hsiang, and its length and breadth was not to exceed 45 li. On level land, the maximum number of hsiang to be controlled was not stated, but the dimensions of the ch'ü were not to exceed 30 li. This made it a smaller unit than the old ch'ü area, and therefore easier for the soviet organisations to implement their policies. Each ch'ü was to have an economic centre, such as a market town, to function as an administrative centre.⁴ The jurisdiction of hsiang soviets in mountain areas was not to exceed a length and breadth of 15 li, with a total population of not more than 3,000. On level land the optimum length and breadth was 5 li, although this could be increased up to 10 li, with a maximum population of 5,000. When redefining the jurisdiction of the hsiang, local soviets were warned

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 328-9.

² On the previous page.

³ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 329.

⁴ Ibid.

to use the principle of "not changing the old field division units",¹ "in order to avoid generating disputes among the masses".² For shih soviets, besides the area of the city, neighbouring areas up to 2 li from the city's circumference could participate.³

The regulations also stated that while the original names of the old areas could be retained, very feudal names should be changed - either by adopting the name of a market town in the area, or the name of a "suitable great struggle incident" or great revolutionary leader.⁴ The names had to be approved by the provincial soviet and registered with the central government.⁵

The kind of soviet organisation that was to be established on this administrative base was as follows: as usual, each lower level soviet sent delegates to form the next higher level soviets' delegate conference, from the hsiang and shih up to the provincial and central levels. The organisation of the provincial, hsien, and ch'ü level soviets were the same. (Central soviet organisation will be dealt with later in the chapter.) Each of these three levels' delegate conferences elected an Executive Committee, which in turn elected a Presidium and a chairman of the Presidium. Under-

¹ Ibid., pp. 328-9.

² Hsiang Ying, loc.cit.

³ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 329.

⁴ For example the renaming of Ningtu hsien as P'ö-sheng hsien after Chao P'ö-sheng, a leader of the Ningtu Uprising. See HSCH, No. 47, (January 14, 1933), p. 1. Kunglueh county was named after Huang Kung-lueh, Commander of the Third Army Corps of the Red Army, killed there in October 1931, according to Selected Works, I, p. 152, ft. 3.

⁵ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 329.

neath the Presidium were set up various departments for land, finance, labour, military affairs, culture, health etc. In the case of the province, the Executive Committee (EC) was to hold a plenary session at least every four months - every two months in the case of the hsien, and every month for the ch'u. The number of personnel controlling expenditure at the provincial level was not to exceed 90 - 25 at the hsien level, 15 at the ch'u level. In general, from higher to lower levels there was a progressive reduction in numbers of delegates, the plenums met more frequently, and the delegates had shorter periods of office.¹

The structure of the basic level soviet organisations, the shih and hsiang soviets, was different. The shih soviet had a Presidium, which met once a week, but no EC. There were no departments (pu) under the Presidium, but various personnel were allocated to supervise military affairs, labour, cultural affairs and so forth.² The hsiang soviet possessed neither an EC nor a Presidium. Instead, the hsiang soviet itself was to be responsible for all affairs, with a plenary session convening once every 10 days,

¹ This, and subsequent information on soviet organisation, is drawn from Ti-fang su-wei-ai cheng-fu chan-hsing tsu-chih t'iao-li, (Local Soviet Government Temporary Organisation Regulations), printed in ibid., pp. 341-344.

² One source says that sections (k'o) rather than supervisory personnel, were responsible for this work. The source also adds that a shih soviet plenum was convened every two weeks. See Ho Chung-jen, "Ti-erh-tz'u kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i ko-ming ken-chu-ti ti chi-ts'eng cheng-ch'u'an chien-she", (Basic level construction of a political regime in the revolutionary bases during the second revolutionary civil war period), Kuang-ming Jih-pao, (June 27, 1953), p. 5.

under the guidance of a chairman. (Large hsiang were permitted a vice-chairman as well). No sections or departments were provided for in the organisational regulations, although provisional committees were permitted, for example, during periods when land confiscation was in progress, a provisional committee to watch over this could be formed.¹ The number of those controlling expenditure was not to exceed three.

Finally, the first plenum of the CEC passed a set of detailed electoral regulations.² The initial step in soviet elections was for the urban soviets or (in rural areas) district (ch'u) executive committees to organise an electoral committee to manage the election for that area. The same applied to the big cities (if any) and the large districts, except that these were allowed electoral sub-committees.³

The fact that the electoral committees were to be formed by the soviets rather than elected by the general population meant that from the start the election would be controlled by those having power over the soviet machinery. Once formed, the electoral committee had to compile a list of all those in its district who were eligible to vote. Then the total number of voters was to be

¹ Ibid., says that the hsiang was allowed provisional and ordinary departments.

² Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti hst'an-ch'ü hsi-tse, (Detailed Electoral Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic), in CRBRD, pp. 814-823.

³ Ibid., Section 3.

announced, together with the number of delegates permitted by this figure. The list of names of those deprived of electoral rights was also to be made public.¹

The actual process of arriving at delegates to attend the National Congress was a complicated one, and by its nature virtually guaranteed that no-one unacceptable to the Party could be a delegate. At the lowest level, election meetings were to be held in the urban areas on the basis of each "unit of production". In the countryside, meetings were organised with the village (ts'un), or groups of villages, as the basic unit.²

The meeting was to begin as soon as half the total possible number of voters was present, and was to elect first the full delegates and then the alternates. Election was to be determined by a majority vote on a show of hands.³ The lack of any form of secret ballot facilitated official supervision.

At this point, a contradiction arises in the electoral regulations. As already mentioned, article 18 specified that the basic electoral unit was to be the ts'un in the rural area, and the "production unit" in the towns.⁴ However, the electoral regulations do not specify the ratio of delegates to population to be elected

¹ Ibid., Section 4.

² Ibid., article 18.

³ Ibid., articles 28-33.

⁴ Ibid. (This was reiterated by article 4 of the Constitution.)

at these meetings, or to which higher level organs the delegates were sent. Instead, the regulations, when they refer to the question of the number of delegates, initially speak of all-hsiang voters conferences which would elect delegates to the hsiang soviets.¹ In the rural areas therefore, it would seem that the hsiang (rather than the ts'un) was to be the basic unit. Similarly, in the case of the towns, the regulations spoke of all-city (ch'eng-shih) voters conferences electing delegates to the urban soviets, thus replacing the production unit as the basis of soviet elections.²

One possible solution to this contradiction is that the "voters conferences" in fact referred to the ts'un and production unit meetings, even though this is never stated explicitly.

Delegates to the hsiang soviet were permitted on a ratio of one to every fifty residents of the hsiang. The ratio in the towns was one delegate for every two hundred residents. This ratio in favour of the peasantry however, was reversed at higher levels. The hsiang soviets then elected delegates to an all-ch'u soviet conference (one delegate to four hundred residents).³ The ch'u conference then sent delegates to the hsien (one to one thousand five hundred residents), where they were joined by representatives from the city (one to five hundred residents).⁴

¹ Ibid., article 34.

² Ibid., article 35.

³ Ibid., article 36.

⁴ Ibid., article 37.

The hsien conference duly elected delegates to the provincial conference (one delegate to twenty-five thousand rural residents), and were joined there by delegates from towns under the direct responsibility of the province (one to five thousand residents).¹

Finally, the provincial conference elected delegates to attend the National Soviet Congress (one to fifty thousand rural residents), as did cities under the direct responsibility of the Central level (one to ten thousand urban residents).² In addition, candidate delegates were permitted at each level up to one-fifth the number of full delegates.³

The local population of the soviet areas participated in only the very first of the series of elections - and from then onwards the elections were of delegates voting for other delegates, an indirect system which preserved soviet control over the end product, while giving the appearance of democracy for all.

It is now appropriate to discuss the way the soviet leaders envisaged that this soviet organisation would function - how soviet political processes would operate to produce personnel to man the soviet structure, and how the structure would operate as a two-way transmission belt, delivering orders from the higher levels to the masses, and reflecting information and public opinion back to the leadership.

¹ Ibid., article 38.

² Ibid., article 39.

³ Ibid., article 35 (Appendix).

In the past (i.e. throughout 1930-1931 up to the time of the First Congress) it appeared that many of the hsiang and shih soviets had existed in name only, and that few delegate meetings had been convened.¹ Hsiang Ying pointed out that "the previous reckless concept of re-election and reform must be discarded", that these processes had to be carried out carefully in order to avoid having to repeat the process time and again. In the past, the masses had had little or no contact with the various sections and departments set up under the ch'ü or hsien, so that now they had decided to create the hsiang and shih soviets as the basic level organs of the regime, and to structure them as delegate conferences rather than have a committee system, so that all the soviet delegates at these two levels would be responsible directly for all the work to the whole body of voters within the area.²

The task of re-structuring was under the command of the various provincial governments. Initially, the provincial soviet was to call meetings of "responsible personnel" from the hsien and ch'ü levels, to be held at the place where the provincial government was sited. Meetings of responsible personnel from the hsiang and ts'un levels would follow, under the guidance of the provincial soviet.³ The purpose of these meetings was to discuss in detail

¹ HSCH, No. 2, p. 4.

² Hsiang Ying, HSCH, No. 2, p. 1.

³ HSCH, No. 2, p. 4. (Ts'un here is possibly a misprint for ch'eng or shih).

the task of soviet construction and how to put it into practice. Although the soviet organs were to be constructed from the bottom up, supervision and control of this process proceeded from the top down, with the hsien commanding the ch'u, and the ch'u commanding the hsiang.¹

Following the discussion meetings, the process of electing soviet organs started with the hsiang and shih soviets. The basic electoral units at these levels were arranged according to the areas where the factory workers lived, and according to where the handicraft workers, peasants and urban poor lived. In practice this meant that the peasants used the ts'un as the basic unit and the workers the hsiang. Some one to two months prior to the actual voting, electoral committees, composed of delegates from local Party branches, local government and various peoples' organisations, were established to prepare for the election. This represented a significant intrusion by the Party into local soviet organisation. These committees were the means by which the leadership controlled the elections and the resulting soviet apparatus. The preparatory work of the committees entailed compiling an electoral register which listed on a red poster those possessing electoral rights and those under 16 years of age and therefore without electoral rights, and on a white poster the names of those deprived of electoral rights. These posters were to be made public in the areas where

¹Ibid.

the elections were to be held, at the same time as propaganda for the elections was to be carried out by the committee.¹

The electoral committee was also in charge of the vital task of drawing up a list of candidates for election. The list of candidates for election at the basic levels of the hsiang and shih soviets was particularly important, since only at this level did the population of the soviet areas (those with the right to vote) participate in electing government representatives, for all the organs of the higher soviet levels were formed from delegates of lower level soviets, with no direct election by the people.

The candidate list had to contain at least twice the number of people to be elected, and to contain a sufficient number of worker and peasant delegates "to guarantee working-class leadership, and a strong foundation for the worker-peasant alliance". It was then forwarded to meetings of the members of mass organisations, trade unions, poor peasant corps, mutual aid associations, anti-imperialist alliances, female worker-peasant conferences etc. A major task of these meetings was to criticise candidates on the list who were known "to care only for their individual lives, who were inactive in work, or had a bureaucratic style of work". These people had a note made under their names, so that "the electors, before participating in the election meeting, have previous

¹ Ho Chung-jen, loc.cit.

preparation as to whether they should or should not elect certain men".¹ When the electoral meeting was convened, the electoral committee was to report on electoral work, then the responsible members of the hsiang and shih would report on government work, followed by statements from higher level government delegates, and finally the names on the candidates list would be voted on one at a time.²

In this way the leaders of the regime hoped to absorb a large number of activists into local soviet work at all levels of the government. To summarise Hsiang Ying, this was the basic work of local soviet construction, and soviet work personnel had to devote great effort and time to it as well as making the broad masses understand it, and enthusiastically support and participate in it, for only then could the soviet base be really established, so as to allow the re-election of the ch'u, hsien and provincial soviets.³

Having been established, the hsiang and shih soviets became the basic units of the administrative organisation of the regime, through which all policies, laws and decisions were transmitted to

¹ Ibid. (No mention was made in this article, of the existence of rich peasant elements in the soviet organs, which was one of the major criticisms of soviet administration made in the September 1 letter of the Central Bureau.)

² Ibid.

³ Hsiang Ying, loc.cit.

the people, and by which the people were mobilised to carry out these policies. Organisationally, in order to foster a close relationship between government and people, the hsiang or shih soviet was divided up so that each soviet delegate was responsible for a neighbourhood of 30-70 residents. These delegates were to work at the ts'un and street level "paying attention and listening carefully to the criticisms of the masses, and suggestions concerning government work, without delay understanding the masses' difficulties and demands, so as to guarantee the coordination of all work and the masses practical interests."¹ At this level therefore, the soviet representative would be in constant personal contact with the residents within his small area, able to draw them into political life and break down some of the localist barriers of loyalty to units lower than the state, such as family or village, that hampered the execution of soviet policies.

For every 3-7 delegates, there was elected one chief delegate, whose task it was to distribute work to the other delegates, and transmit to them the decisions of the hsiang and shih soviet presidia. The chief delegate was also in charge of convening a voters meeting to examine work and solve practical problems concerning his area. This was in addition to the regular meetings of all the voters (once a month) and plenary sessions of the soviets (every 10 days to two weeks) which also summarised work progress. The

¹ Ho Chung-jen, loc.cit.

masses directly concerned in a particular problem being discussed were invited to join in the plenary session.¹ This exposition shows up the basic characteristic of the hsiang and shih soviets as important two-way transmission belts of the soviet regime, helping the leaders implement policy, and ascertaining the reactions of the population at the same time.

To conclude this section, other laws and resolutions passed by the Congress which were either of lesser importance or of purely propaganda value, included:-

- (a) Marriage Regulations.
- (b) A letter from the Chinese soviet first national congress to the workers and labouring masses of China, (November 9, 1931).²
- (c) Manifesto of the provisional government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, (November 7, 1931).³
- (d) Resolution on the question of national minorities in China.⁴

¹ Ibid.

² In Su-wei-ai yen-chiu she, (Soviet Investigation Society), (Shanghai: China Bookstore, 1932), pp. 1-6.

³ Ibid., pp. 6-8. According to Wang Chien-min, op.cit., it can also be found in Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 24, (November 27, 1931); Wang has an abridged version on p. 289. The fact that this was addressed to "the toilers and governments of the whole world" led the Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury, (November 10, 1931) to comment on receiving a copy that they could not understand why they had been sent one, "since we toil little and govern not at all".

⁴ A translation is in Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic, pp. 78-83. This book also contains translations of most of the other laws and resolutions, although there are a number of errors in translation. The Land Law is considerably abbreviated.

(e) Telegram to the whole country's revolutionary bodies for transmission to all labouring masses and revolutionary soldiers.

(f) Telegram to the oppressed peoples and proletariat of the whole world.

(g) Telegram to the workers of every country, (November 11).

(h) Telegram on the same day to the American Communist Party and Youth Corps.

(i) Telegram on the same day to all China's workers, peasants and Red Army soldiers.¹

Creation of a Soviet Government

Having passed all the aforementioned decrees, the delegates to the Congress set about electing the personnel of the soviet government. The first body elected was the Central Executive Committee, composed of 63 members. There were no candidate members.²

Among those elected to the Central Executive Committee (CEC) were Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch'en Shao-yü, (Wang Ming), Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Jen Pi-shih, Lin Piao, Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Teh-huai and Shen Tse-min.³

¹ Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 290.

² See Table IV, footnote.

³ A full list will be found in Table IV.

T A B L E IVALPHABETICAL LIST OF ALL CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS
ELECTED AT THE FIRST NATIONAL SOVIET CONGRESS, NOVEMBER 1931¹

41	Chang Hua-hsien	15	Kuan Hsiang-ying
3	Chang Kuo-t'ao	16	K'ung Ho-ch'ung
8	Chang Ting-ch'eng	60	Li Tsung-po
49	Chang Yün-yi	24	Lin Piao
31	Ch'en Cheng-jen	59	Liu Chien-chung
38	Ch'en Fu-yüan	56	Liu Kuang-wan
13	Ch'en Shao-yü	29	Liu Shao-ch'i
48	Ch'en Yi	61	Liu Sheng-yüan
25	Ch'en Yü	30	Liu Ta-ch'ao
4	Chou En-lai	47	Lo Ping-hui
50	Chou Yi-li	26	Lo Teng-hsien
6	Chu Teh	5	Lu Fu-t'an
7	Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai	51	Lu Teh-kuang
34	Ch'ü Teng-kao	1	Mao Tse-tung
12	Fan Lo-ch'un	37	P'eng Kuei
17	Fang Chih-min	14	P'eng Teh-huai
19	Ho Lung	54	Shao Shih-p'ing
42	Ho Shu-heng	20	Shen Tse-min
27	Hsia Hsi	21	T'an Chen-lin
2	Hsiang Ying	9	Teng Fa
46	Hsiao Heng-t'ai	28	Teng Tzu-hui
11	Hsü Hsi-ken	45	T'eng Tai-yüan
53	Hsü T'eh-li	23	Tseng Shan
52	Hu Chün-ho	33	Ts'ui Ch'i
44	Hu Hai	35	Tuan Teh-ch'ang
22	Huang P'ing	10	Wang Chia-ch'iang
43	Huang Su	62	Wang Yung-sheng
55	Hung Tzu-ch'ing	40	Wei Pa-ch'ün
18	Jen Pi-shih	58	Wu Chih-min
63	Juan Hsiao-hsien	57	Yü Han-chao
36	Ko Yao-shan	32	Yüan Teh-sheng
39	Ku Ta-ts'un		

¹ This list is taken from an original copy of the Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pu-kao, ti-i-hao, (Announcement No. 1 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic), dated December 1, 1931 - on SSC 16; also printed in HSCH, No. 1, (December 11, 1931), p. 2. The numbers represent the order that the names were listed on the Announcement and possibly indicate the relative number of votes received. (Also in CRBRD, pp. 650-651.)

The CEC was to be the highest political organ of the Chinese soviet government when the National Congress was not in session. On November 27 the CEC had its first meeting and elected Mao Tse-tung as Chairman.¹ By virtue of this post, Mao became Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic, a post which he was to hold until the collapse of the Republic in October 1934. Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao were elected as Vice-Chairmen.²

On the same day, the CEC also elected a Council of People's Commissars (or cabinet) as the central administrative organ of the Republic. Its membership composition was as follows:

Wang Chia-ch'ing	Foreign Affairs
Chu Teh	Military Affairs
Hsiang Ying	Labour Affairs
Teng Tzu-hui	Financial Affairs
Chang Ting-ch'eng	Land
Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai	Education
Chou Yi-li ³	Internal Affairs
Chang Kuo-t'ao	Judicial Affairs

As with the GEC, Mao was elected Chairman of the CPC, with Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao as Vice-Chairmen.⁴

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Not Chou Yi-su as stated in Jerome Ch'en, op.cit., p. 172, ft. 58.

⁴ Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pu-kao, ti-i-hao, op.cit.

In addition to these eight commissariats, there was also set up a Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, which was not directly controlled by the CPC, although its head, Ho Shu-heng, was a Commissar like the other heads of departments. Unlike the other departments, this one was set up as the result of a resolution introduced, like the other Congress resolutions, in the draft resolutions proposed by the Party's Central Committee, which was adopted by the Congress. Finally, under the CPC there was set up a State Political Security Bureau, with Teng Fa as its head.

In order to analyse the evidence offered by the proceedings of the First National Soviet Congress on the inner-Party struggle existing in the CCP at the time, it is necessary initially to return to the policies adopted by the Congress. The origins of these resolutions and laws have been traced back, in the main, to the 1928-1930 period between the Sixth Congress of the CCP and the fall of Li Li-san. It is clear therefore that the impact in the field of policy of the Fourth Plenum and the Returned Student leadership should not be over-estimated. However, a considerable divergence of opinion can be discerned between the Returned Students, and Mao and his followers in the soviet areas. Writing some years after the event, the Maoist leadership strongly criticised the leadership of the Returned Students for the period from the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee (January 1931) to the Tsunyi Conference of January 1935, held on the Long March.¹

¹ RCQHP, op.cit., Selected Works, III, pp. 177-225.

Mao's general thesis is that the Returned Students applied an "incorrect" line, particularly with respect to military policy and policy towards the peasants. In the military sphere, because the central leadership "greatly exaggerated both the current crisis of the Kuomintang regime and the growth of the revolutionary forces...it once again put forward many adventurist proposals, such as the seizure of key cities by the Red Army..."¹ Furthermore, the Returned Student exponents of the "Third Left Line"² underestimated the importance of peasant guerrilla warfare and rural base areas, and "were for ever dreaming that the struggle of the workers and the other masses in the cities would suddenly... erupt into armed insurrections in key cities",³ and "they did not realise that they had to adapt themselves to dispersed rural areas and to protracted guerrilla warfare..."⁴

According to the account of a Mr. Chen Jan, who was present in the Kiangsi area during the period, the Central Committee favoured a skilled Red Army, capable of large-scale operations, and the imitation of Soviet experience with political commissars, and mobile and positional warfare. Mao opposed these ideas as "bookish Marxism-Leninism unsuitable for combat and Soviet military experiences

¹ Ibid., p. 189.

² A term used by the Maoist leadership to describe the policies of the Returned Student leadership during the latter's period of dominance. (The first two "Left Lines" were those of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, 1927-8; and Li Li-san, 1930).

³ Ibid., p. 199.

⁴ Ibid., p. 200.

unadaptable to China", and favoured a peasant guerrilla force.¹

Mao, who opposed "positional warfare and so-called regular warfare, which relied solely on the main forces",² and who favoured a reliance on peasant guerrilla warfare, the tactics of which had served the Red Army well during the first three of Chiang Kai-shek's "Bandit Encirclement" Campaigns of 1930-1931, consequently believed in a moderate agrarian policy that would win the support of the majority of peasants - support that was vital for a successful guerrilla policy. Mao's extremely radical land policies that were initially implemented on Ching kangshan had not succeeded in producing this peasant support that was needed if the soviet areas were to survive.³ The early policy of confiscating the land of all the peasants was ameliorated somewhat in April 1929,⁴ and by Mao's Land Law of February 1930.⁵ This, together with other "rightist errors", was the basis of the "rich peasant line" which was attacked by the Returned Student leadership as being "the main danger in the Party at present".⁶

¹ Warren Kuo, Issues and Studies, Vol. III, No. 8, p. 45.

² Ibid., p. 207. Also see his "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", (1936), Selected Works, I, pp. 239-244.

³ See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 130-131; Selected Works, I, p. 87; for a translation of Mao's December 1928 Land Law on Ching kangshan and his later comments, see Rue, op.cit., pp. 111-114.

⁴ Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 137.

⁵ CRBRD, pp. 912-918; a translation can be found in Rue, op.cit., pp. 300-304.

⁶ RGQHP, pp. 186-187.

After the Fourth Plenum, which according to Mao "played no positive or constructive role",¹ the glaring contrast between the successes of Mao and the Red Army in the soviet areas, and the waning influence of the Party in the cities, naturally forced the new leadership to pay increasing attention to the situation in the countryside, and to attempt to put their policies into practice there, which led to the inevitable clash with Mao and his supporters.

After the Fourth Plenum the Returned Students sent representatives to all parts of the country to oppose Mao's policies.² However, before the "erroneous line" of the new leadership could be implemented, the Red Army was victorious in smashing the two military campaigns of the Kuomintang (spring and summer 1931) because of "the correct leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung".³

According to Mao, his progressive loss of power was accelerated after the Returned Student leaders arrived in Juichin in January 1933, where they "elbowed aside Mao Tse-tung's leadership, especially his leadership in the Red Army, and imposed and carried out their own wrong policies."⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 187.

² Ibid., p. 188. [In addition to sending Hsia Hsi to run the Hsiangosi Sub-bureau, Teng Chung-hsia went to the Fukien-Kwangtung area, Ts'ai Ho-sen to Kwangtung, and other Returned Student supporters to other provinces. (Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 101)]

³ Ibid., p. 189.

⁴ "From the First to the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party", People's China, No. 18, (September 16, 1956); printed in John W. Lewis (ed.), Major Doctrines of Communist China, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964), p. 27. Mao told Edgar Snow in 1936 that "from October 1932...I myself devoted my time almost exclusively to work with the soviet government, leaving the military command to Chu Teh and others". (Snow, op.cit., p. 185.) These points will be dealt with more fully in the following chapter.

Mao could well be wrong on the date of the move, but there is unfortunately no hard and fast evidence for the date of the transfer of the CC - various observers having put it between the summer of 1931¹ and January 1934.²

Robert North, partly on the evidence of his interview with Chang Kuo-t'ao, is in favour of the autumn of 1932 as the probable date of the transfer.³ Schwartz also agrees broadly with the "1932-1933" period.⁴ Chang Kuo-t'ao has said that he left for the Oytwan soviet district in April 1931, that Chou En-lai went to Juichin in May to organise the National Soviet Congress, and that the rest of the CC followed Chou there in August.⁵ Reminded in his interview with Robert North that he had put the date of transfer as 1932, Chang said that he had been in error.⁶

¹ Chang Kuo-t'ao interview with Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., p. 161.

² Li Ang, Hung-se Wu-t'ai, (The Red Stage), (Chungking: 1942), Chap. XIV. Quoted in Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, pp. 157-8.

³ Ibid., p. 158.

⁴ Schwartz, op.cit., p. 185.

⁵ Interview with Lieberman, printed in Charles B. McLane, op.cit., p. 38. An eyewitness at the First Congress however, reported that Chou did not arrive until mid-December, after the close of the Congress. / Warren Kuo, "The CCP after Japanese Invasion of Manchuria (Part I)", Issues and Studies, Vol. III, No. 6, (March 1967), p. 49 /

⁶ Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., p. 162.

Hsiao Tso-liang also interviewed Kung Ch'u, a Red Army officer during the Kiangsi period, who agreed with Chang Kuo-t'ao that the CC had arrived in Kiangsi by the autumn of 1931.¹

The probability must not be overlooked that a combination of dates is possible, based on the assumption that the CC travelled not as a body, but, for the sake of safety, as individuals, by differing routes, over a substantial period of time. This is particularly likely as not all the CC went to the Central Soviet Area. According to Chang Kuo-t'ao, leading Party figures such as Chou En-lai, Po Ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien), Lo Fu (Chang Wen-t'ien), went to Kiangsi (where the central base was), but Jen Pi-shih, Hsia Hsi and Kuan Hsiang-ying went to Ho Lung's area - the Hsiangosi soviet, with Ch'en Chang-hao, Shen Tse-min and Chang himself going to the Oytwan soviet.² A newly formed rump Central Bureau was left in Shanghai headed by Liu Shao-ch'i.³

¹ Ibid., p. 161. It is possible that Kung, a military man, could have mistaken the Central Bureau - set up by the CC - for the CC itself, but it is inconceivable that Chang Kuo-t'ao, a top Party leader, would have made the same mistake. One scholar, John Rue, also believes that the CC was present at the First Congress, but he states that they then returned to Shanghai, only to transfer permanently to the soviet areas in 1932. It is possible, but rather improbable that they made this journey three times. Given the difficulties in travelling caused by the KMT, the likelihood is that, if they arrived there in 1931, they stayed. See John Rue, op.cit., p. 250 & p. 257.

² Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 162; North, op.cit., p. 159; Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 101.

³ Hsiao, ibid. According to Harold Isaacs, "the communist nuclei in these cities (of the central and eastern provinces)... narrowed down to shrinking groups of intellectuals, students and a tiny handful of workers... (who) performed the function of a 'rear' for the peasant forces in the countryside, carrying on agitation about their accomplishments and even recruiting workers and intellectuals to leave the cities for the distant Red districts." Isaacs, op.cit., p. 303.

Yet more evidence is offered by Warren Kuo, provided by an eyewitness in Juichin.¹ This is more likely to be correct than that of either Kung Ch'u (who was often absent from the soviet capital) or Chang Kuo-t'ao (who was never there at all). Kuo's evidence is to the effect that a large advance contingent of ranking Party personnel moved to the soviet areas in the summer of 1931,² but that the CC did not transfer formally until a year later (October 1932), when Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t'ien and Yang Shang-k'un left for Juichin, leaving a new Central Bureau behind in Shanghai under Liu Shao-ch'i. In January 1933 the CC formally began functioning in the soviet areas. While this corroborates Mao's statement, it should be noted that prior to the formal establishment of the CC in the soviet areas, large numbers of Returned Student supporters, and the bulk of the CC apparatus, moved before that time.

In addition to the date of the transfer of the Central Committee from Shanghai, there are other problems in this retrospective interpretation of the period by the Maoist leadership. Difficulties

¹ Warren Kuo, "The Struggle against the Lo Ming Line in the CCP (Part I)", Issues and Studies, Vol. III, No. 10, (July 1967), pp. 40-43.

² The KMT "white terror" was at its height in Shanghai in the summer of 1931. The arrest of Noulens and his wife on June 15 "destroyed for a time the Komintern's technical apparatus for liaison with the communist parties in the Far East". Robert Magnenoz, From Confucius to Lenin, n.d., (typescript), p. 259.

in the analysis of the statement are compounded by conflicts between what Mao said at the time (in the 1930's) and what he stated in 1945.¹ Some of these conflicts can be resolved on the assumption that Mao, as he progressively lost power in the soviet areas, found himself forced to speak under duress, so that his public pronouncements may not necessarily reflect his real opinions at the time.

However, whether or not Mao occasionally voiced agreement with the policies of the Returned Student group, it is clear that there was a genuine conflict of views between them. Mao's agrarian and military policies were condemned by the September 1 directive letter of Central to the Soviet Areas, and by the First Congress of the Party in the Soviet Areas, whose Political Resolution echoed the September 1 letter.² Even so, the laws and resolutions passed by the First Soviet Congress, although introduced by the Returned Student group, did not contain proposals to which Mao would have taken objection, except possibly in the case of the Land Law. (As already mentioned, even in the case of the Land Law,

¹ Discussion of some of these discrepancies, e.g. the "Lo Ming" line, and the question of the treatment of the Fukien rebels, will be left to the next chapter.

² See also the Hung-ch'ün wen-t'i ch'ieh-i-an (Resolution on the Question of the Red Army) adopted by the First Congress of the Party in the Soviet Areas; printed by Central Bureau, Soviet Areas; (October 1931.) SSC 16. This attacks "guerrilla-ism" in the Red Army. Also see Mao's comments on the "correct" line being maligned by the Party Congress. (Selected Works, III, p. 190.)

it is extremely difficult to classify its proposals from the point of view of the power struggle in the soviet areas.) In 1931 therefore, the Returned Students apparently realised that they were unable to prevent Mao from dominating the Congress. This would explain the differences between the resolutions of the Party Congress and those introduced by the Party to the Soviet Congress. However, the Returned Students then went on to consolidate their command of the Party organisation and eroded Mao's support in the military and governmental spheres, foreseeing that once having usurped Mao's military and governmental power, they would then be in a position to convene a Second Congress more favourable to themselves. Therefore, Mao and his supporters, at the time of the First Congress, did not have control over the Party in the soviet areas, but did command the government apparatus, a hypothesis which is substantiated by the following analysis of the structure and personnel of the government.

An inspection of the organs elected at the First Congress shows the pre-eminence of Mao and his supporters. The 63-man Central Executive Committee (CEC) contained both "Maoists" and members of the Returned Student Group, but it is significant that two important members of the Party leadership - Po Ku and Lo Fu - failed to win places.¹ Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming) was elected to the CEC, but

¹ Schwartz is therefore incorrect in stating that "all the CC leaders won positions as members of the CEC of the new government". Op.cit., p. 185.

whether this was in absentia or not is uncertain.¹

Although the CEC was theoretically the highest organ of the government when the National Congress was not in session, the fact that its membership was made up of men from widely separated soviets, plus representatives present in Shanghai,² meant that the actual responsibility of government was vested in the smaller Council of People's Commissars (CPC), the regime's top administrative body, whose members were largely drawn from those provinces adjacent to or making up the central soviet area.

According to Jerome Ch'en, "none of the commissars of the Provisional Soviet Government belonged to Mao's central soviet except Mao himself and perhaps Teng Tzu-hui", a fact which "made manifest the party centre's efforts to intensify its control over the soviets".³ Although the Party centre was undoubtedly trying to control the soviets, this statement does not stand up to examination.

¹ Wang Ming left for Moscow about this time. Chang Kuo-t'ao says this was in the winter of 1932 (North interview, Hoover microfilm), but another source dates his departure as 1933 / China Youth News, July 27, 1957; quoted in Who's Who in Communist China, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1966), p. 79. A Russian source however, indicates that he was in Moscow in time to address the Profintern at the end of 1931, and if this was the case, it is unlikely that he attended the Congress at all. (Charles B. McLane, op.cit., p. 38, ft. 96). This is substantiated by Warren Kuo, who says Wang left Shanghai for Moscow in September 1931. / "Chinese Communist 6th. CC's 4th. Plenum and Party Rift (Part 2)", Issues & Studies, Vol. III, No. 1, (October 1966), p. 46.

² For example Liu Shao-ch'i, and Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai.

³ Jerome Ch'en, op.cit., p. 172.

In addition to Mao himself as Chairman of the CPC, Chu Teh, Teng Tzu-hui, Chang Ting-ch'eng, Ho Shu-heng and Teng Fa could be counted as Maoists. Chu Teh had been with Mao since the early days on Ching kangshan from 1928, and together they had founded the Kiangsi soviet base. Teng Tzu-hui was a graduate of the peasant training school in Canton when Mao had been its Director in the mid-1920's. He too had been active in the central soviet district as Chairman of a small soviet in Western Fukien from 1930, and as a political officer in the Red Army. He worked closely with two other CPC members, Chang Ting-ch'eng and Teng Fa. Chang Ting-ch'eng was the founder of one of the first soviets in Fukien and chairman of the Fukien Provincial Soviet in 1930. Teng Fa was Secretary of the Fukien-Kwangtung-Kwangsi Committee of the CCP in 1930 as well as Chairman of its Military Sub-committee. He was apparently summoned by Mao to Kiangsi to head the State Political Security Bureau, being selected for this job because of his loyalty to Mao.¹ Ho Shu-heng had a long history of association with Mao, stemming back to 1913 when they met the Hunan First Normal School in Changsha. In 1918 Ho joined the New Peoples Study Society that had been founded by Mao and Ts'ai Ho-sen. The two of them went to

¹ I must thank Mr. William R. Dorrill, Research Analysis Corporation, for this point. According to Mr. Dorrill, the establishment of the Political Security Bureau preceded by some months the creation of the central soviet government.

Shanghai in 1921 and were the two Hunan representatives at the founding of the CCP that year. Little is known about Chou Yi-li's factional sympathies. Possibly he was a Maoist, as he was appointed the Chief Editor of the official government newspaper Red China in December 1931.¹ Presumably Mao, as head of the government, would have appointed someone loyal to himself.

Of the three remaining personalities, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai cannot be classed as a Maoist, but neither can he be classed as a supporter of the Party leadership, since as an adherent of Li Li-san, he had been attacked by the Returned Student leaders at the Fourth Plenum and removed from the Politburo or Central Committee at that time.² Chang Kuo-t'ao would also have played little part in the power struggle in the central soviet area, as he was in the Oytwan soviet area or Szechuan during the whole period, and never visited the central districts. Hsiang Ying on the other hand, had been made Secretary of the Central Bureau by the new Party leadership, and went to the soviet areas in the summer of 1931 to see that the policies of the Fourth Plenum were carried out. And Wang Chia-ch'iang was also a member of the Returned Student leadership who was in Kiangsi for the Congress. Nevertheless, it is clear that Mao and his supporters dominated the chief organ of the government, for out of a total of ten members of the CPC,³

¹ HSCH, No. 2, (December 18, 1931), p. 4.

² In any case, Ch'ü was elected in absentia, for he remained in Shanghai until December 1933. See Hung Ch'i P'iao-piao, (Red Flags Fluttering), No. 5, (December 15, 1957), p. 101.

³ Eight commissariats, plus the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate and the State Political Security Bureau.

at least five (and probably six) members can be marked as being loyal to him, as opposed to two members of the official Party leadership.

The same situation prevailed during the actual proceedings of the Congress. The body responsible for guiding the major items on the agenda through the Congress was the Standing Committee of the Presidium, an ad hoc steering committee.¹ Its seven-man membership was made up of Hsiang Ying, Chou Yi-li, Tseng Shan, Teng Fa, Chang Ting-ch'eng, Ch'en Cheng-jen and Chu Teh.

The same analysis that applied to the CPC applies here. In addition to the Mao supporters Chu Teh, Chang Ting-ch'eng and Teng Fa (and probably Chou Yi-li) can be added Tseng Shan and Ch'en Cheng-jen, both of whom were old and trusted supporters of Mao in the Kiangsi area. Only Hsiang Ying remained to redress the balance.

Control over the organs of the new soviet government was therefore vested in the trusted supporters of Mao Tse-tung who had their roots in the soviet areas, rather than in the former Shanghai leadership of the Central Committee. Consequently Chang Kuo-t'ao must be wrong when he told Robert North that Chou En-lai called the First National Soviet Congress and "squeezed Mao out".²

¹ Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 29, (January 15, 1932,) pp. 71-72. See also the signatures appended to the Land Law (SSC 18) and the Economic Resolution (SSC 11). This substantiates the hypothesis that Chou En-lai was not in Juichin at the time. Since he had been appointed by the CC to supervise the Congress he would have been a member of this Standing Committee if he were present.

² North, op.cit., p. 158.

A similar result is obtained if one applies the same analysis to those members of the CEC who were actually present at the First Congress and were operative in the central soviet district.¹ Of the 63 members, 27 were most probably present, 15 were not, and the whereabouts of the other 21 at the time is unknown. (See Table V) Of these 21, in the vast majority of cases their factional loyalty is unknown, and it is interesting to note that 15 of them (or over 70%) were not re-elected to the CEC at the Second Congress in 1934, indicating that in general they can be considered relatively unimportant figures.

Of those presumed absent from the Congress, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Shen Tse-min were in the Oyüwan soviet area, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, Lu Fu-t'an and Liu Shao-ch'i were in Shanghai, Ch'en Shao-yü was probably in Moscow, Lo Teng-hsien was in Manchuria, Wei Pa-ch'ün was active in Kwangsi, Chou En-lai was en route for Juichin, and the remainder, Ho Lung, Hsia Hsi, Hsü Hsi-ken, Jen Pi-shih, Kuan Hsiang-ying and Tuan Teh-ch'ang were in the Hsiangosi soviet area (although one or more of them may perhaps have made the journey to Juichin). Of those present at the Congress, an absolute majority can be identified as

¹ This is determined by reports of the individual taking part in the proceedings of the Congress, by his election to such bodies as the Steering Committee which functioned at the Congress, or by his known existence in the Juichin area or adjoining soviet at the time. For the sources from which this data has been drawn, see the bibliography.

T A B L E V

<u>Present at Congress</u>	<u>Absent from Congress</u>	<u>Whereabouts Unknown</u>
Chang Hua-hsien	Chang Kuo-t'ao	Ch'en Fu-yüan
Chang Ting-ch'eng	Ch'en Shao-yü	Ch'ü Teng-kao
Chang Yün-i	Chou En-lai	Fan Lo-ch'un
Ch'en Cheng-jen	Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai	Hsiao Heng-t'ai
Ch'en Yi	Ho Lung	Hu Hai
Ch'en Yü	Hsia Hsi	Huang Su
Chou Yi-li	Hsü Hsi-ken	Hung Tzu-ch'ing
Chu Teh	Jen Pi-shih	Juan Hsiao-hsien
Fang Chih-min	Kuan Hsiang-ying	Ko Yao-shan
Ho Shu-heng	Liu Shao-ch'i	K'ung Ho-ch'ung
Hsiang Ying	Lo Teng-hsien	Li Tsung-po
Hsü T'eh-li	Lu Fu-t'an	Liu Chien-chung
Hu Chün-ho	Shen Tse-min	Liu Kuang-wan
Huang P'ing	Tuan Teh-ch'ang	Liu Sheng-yüan
Ku Ta-ts'un	Wei Pa-ch'ün	Liu Ta-ch'ao
Lin Piao		Lu Teh-kuang
Lo Ping-hui		Ts'ui Ch'i
Mao Tse-tung		Wang Yung-sheng
P'eng Kuei		Wu Chih-min
P'eng Teh-huai		Yü Han-chao
Shao Shih-p'ing		Yüan Teh-sheng
T'an Chen-lin		
Teng Fa		
Teng Tzu-hui		
T'eng Tai-yüan		
Tseng Shan		
Wang Chia-ch'iang		

being Maoists. Eighteen people fall into this category,¹ with only two definitely classed as representing the Returned Student leadership - Hsiang Ying and Wang Chia-ch'iang. A further seven cannot be definitively classified with respect to their factional affiliations, if any.²

The situation with regard to the organs of military command and their relationship to the Party and the government is complex, obscure, and outside the scope of this thesis. There were at least four overlapping military organs - the Central Revolutionary Military Council, the Military Affairs Commissariat, the Military Affairs Committee of the Party and the General Political Department of the Red Army. In December 1931, the CEC appointed Chu Teh as Chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Council, with Wang Chia-ch'iang and P'eng Teh-huai as Vice Chairmen.³ Chu Teh was also appointed Military Affairs Commissar at the National Congress. Wang Chia-ch'iang was also appointed by the CEC as head of the General Political Department - probably the highest position to be held at the time by a member of the Returned Student group.⁴

¹ Chang Ting-ch'eng, Chang Yün-i, Ch'en Cheng-jen, Ch'en Yi, Chou Yi-li, Chu Teh, Fang Chih-min, Ho Shu-heng, Hsu T'eh-li, Ku Ta-ts'un, Lin Piao, P'eng Teh-huai, Shao Shih-p'ing, T'an Chen-lin, Teng Fa, Teng Tzu-hui, Tseng Shan, and of course Mao himself.

² Chang Hua-hsien, Ch'en Yü, Hu Chün-ho, Huang P'ing, Lo Ping-hui, P'eng Kuei, and T'eng Tai-yüan.

³ HSCH, No. 2, (December 18, 1931), p. 4. (For a complete list of RMC members, see Table VI).

⁴ Ibid.

T A B L E VIMembers of the Central Revolutionary Military Council
appointed at the First National Soviet Congress¹

Chu Teh	Chairman
P'eng Teh-huai	Vice-Chairman
Wang Chia-ch'iang	"
Lin Piao	
T'an Chen-lin	
Yeh Chien-ying	
K'ung Ho-ch'ung	
Chou En-lai	
Chang Kuo-t'ao	
Shao Shih-p'ing	
Ho Lung	
Mao Tse-tung	
Hs'ü Hsiang-ch'ien	
Kuan Hsiang-ying	
Wang Sheng-jung	

¹ HSCH, No. 2, (December 18, 1931), p. 4.

The same conclusion is reached - that Mao and his followers retained control at the First Congress - if we examine the composition of the Revolutionary Military Council - the only military organ for which there is a complete membership list. Of those members active in the central soviet district or vicinity, six out of eleven were probably loyal to Mao, (Chu Teh,¹ P'eng Teh-huai, Lin Piao, T'an Chen-lin, Shao Shih-p'ing and Mao himself). Ho Lung, another probable Maoist, was operating in the western Hunan-Hupeh (Hsiangosi) soviet district, with Kuan Hsiang-ying, who, if he was not pro-Mao, at least had no liking for the Returned Student leadership who had dismissed him as a Li Li-san-ist from his place on the CC at the Fourth Plenum. Chang Kuo-t'ao of course was in the Oyt'wan soviet area during the entire 1931-1934 period, and never visited the central soviet area, a fact which also applies to another RMC member, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien.

Little is known of Yeh Chien-ying's factional sympathies. He studied in Moscow at the same time as the Returned Student Group, but was not known to be particularly associated with them. He was not at the Sun Yat-sen University, but in a military training class. Little is known about two other RMC members, K'ung Ho-ch'ung and

¹ Possibly Chu Teh may have opposed Mao's "dictatorial role in the military force". See Warren Kuo, Issues and Studies, Vol. III, No. 7, p. 38.

Wang Sheng-jung,¹ neither of whom were particularly prominent in the Kiangsi period, or after it. This leaves only two known supporters of the Party leadership, Wang Chia-ch'iang and Chou En-lai on the 15-man RMC.

Summary

The First National Soviet Congress therefore accomplished the following ends:-

- 1) It created a formal state, the Chinese Soviet Republic, which was of enormous value to the Communists in their claim to represent an "alternative way" for the Chinese people to that taken by the KMT. As the Comintern asserted, "(the laws and resolutions of the First and Second Soviet Congresses) have an immensely wider significance than that of mere guides to action in the areas already won by the soviets. They are the programme documents for the entire national revolutionary war in China and for the development of the agrarian revolution."²
(Emphasis in original.)
- 2) In addition, by the creation of a soviet government it institutionalised the shift of the Party's efforts from the city to the countryside - where it was to remain for more than fifteen years.

¹ Wang Sheng-jung is classified as a member of the Returned Student group by Wang Chien-min (op.cit., p. 100). No source is given.

² Programmnye dokumenty kitaiskikh sovetov, (Programme Documents of the Chinese Soviets), Moscow, 1935, p. 3 of the Introduction, printed in Charles B. McLane, op.cit., p. 21.

There, through the occupation by the CCP of parts of central-south China by the Red Army, the local population experienced a primitive form of "social mobilisation".¹ The Red Army and the CCP conducted propaganda among the peasants, recruited them as soldiers and distributed to them the land which had been confiscated from the landlords and gentry. The Party and the Army held widespread literacy campaigns, organised trade unions and poor peasant associations. This marked increase in political and military activity brought about by the communists in turn generated demands from the peasants for administrative and economic services based on new experiences and expectations which needed a bureaucratic apparatus to provide them. As the communists had destroyed the traditional government in the area, they had to set up their own as a replacement.

- 3) This new bureaucratic apparatus had not been well-established by the time of the First Congress. Taking the criticisms of the Returned Students from 1931-1933 concerning this pre-Congress period - criticisms of guerrilla-ism in the Red Army, a feudal administrative structure, few soviet elections, a poor soviet apparatus infiltrated by "class alien elements", and little mass participation - and combining them with other

¹ For a theoretical discussion of this term, see Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilisation and Political Development", American Political Science Review, Vol. LV, No. 3, (September 1961), pp. 493-514.

evidence pointing to the dominance of the military in the day-to-day running of the soviet base, it would appear that Mao and his supporters were operating in some ways more like warlords than communists, having made little attempt to organise a soviet administrative apparatus to convey policy to the masses, and to listen to and pass on the opinions of the masses to the soviet leaders. There is virtually no evidence in this pre-Congress period of Party organisational control over soviet elections at the local level. It is significant from the point of view of Mao's declining authority after the First Congress that the regulations on soviet construction, passed shortly after the Congress, specifically provided for Party participation in the crucial electoral committees, which drew up the candidates' list, compiled the electoral register, and conducted the electoral meetings, all under the general directive of "guaranteeing working-class (i.e. Communist Party) leadership".

- 4) The new government it produced represented a counter-weight to the Party organisation in the soviet areas. The Returned Student leaders clashed with Mao over the policies to be followed in the revolutionary base areas. This struggle deepened after the transfer of many of the Central Committee personnel from Shanghai to Juichin in the summer and autumn of 1931. Nevertheless, although the Returned Student group gained control over the Party in the soviet areas, Mao and his supporters, by controlling

the machinery for electing delegates to the Congress, won command of the soviet government established by the Congress, and were sufficiently influential to ensure that the laws and resolutions passed at the Congress were favourable to their way of thinking. The analysis of the First Congress therefore confirms the assumption implicit in the Maoist interpretation of the events of this period, (as set forth in the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party"), that Mao and his followers, although under attack from the Returned Students, nevertheless retained a substantial measure of authority in the soviet areas for some time after 1931.¹

In addition, Mao, as the head of this embryo national government, must have had considerable prestige, and his personal stature was far greater than that of the Party leaders, although this was offset to some extent by the fact that Moscow still dispatched its rather intermittent directives, not through Mao, but via the official Party leaders, mainly Po Ku.²

- 5) The Congress, by the inclusion in the government of leaders from other soviet areas, (for example Ho Lung from Hsiangosi, Chang Kuo-t'ao from Oyüwan, Chang Ting-ch'eng and Fang Chih-min from Fukien, and P'eng Teh-huai from Hsiangkan), also substantiated

¹ It is significant that the Resolution refers explicitly to loss of power in the Party and military spheres, but does not refer to the soviet government.

² Chang Kuo-t'ao interview with Robert C. North. (Hoover Library microfilm).

the claim of the new central government to represent all the soviet areas, and to be a potential national government.

CHAPTER 3

THE SECOND NATIONAL SOVIET CONGRESS

Once the government of the Chinese Soviet Republic had been formally established in November 1931, it increased its efforts to ensure that the other soviet areas accepted its jurisdiction and implemented the decrees and resolutions passed at the Congress. These aims appear to have met with considerable success. At the Soviet Congress of Fukien Province, which opened on March 18, 1932 (the 61st anniversary of the Paris Commune), the central government sent no less a figure than Jen Pi-shih (member of the CCP Politbureau and the Central Bureau) to give the political report to the Congress, and to make certain that the directive sent by the central government was adopted.¹ The Fukien Congress duly "accepted the laws and decrees of the All-Soviet Congress, and the directives of the central government."²

Because of communication problems, Juichin was not able to adopt the same procedure of sending a personal delegate when the Soviet Congress of the Hsiangkan (Hunan-Kiangsi) area convened in June 1932. Instead they radioed a directive.³ Perhaps this did

¹ "Fu-chien sheng kung-nung-ping su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui sheng-k'uang", (The festive event of the Fukien Soviet Congress of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers), HSCH, No. 15, (March 23, 1932), pp. 5-6.

² Ibid., p. 7. (The directive itself is pp. 1-2.)

³ "Chung-yang cheng-fu kei Hsiang-Kan sheng kung-nung-ping tai-piao ta-hui tien", (Telegram of the Central Government to the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers Congress of Hunan-Kiangsi Province), HSCH, No. 22, (June 9, 1932), p. 1.

not have the same effect as a personal visit by a high-ranking official, for the following February the Council of Peoples Commissars found important errors in the work of the province. They did not have a clear class line, and were not actively expanding their soviet territory so as to unite with the central soviet area. Central resolved to send a further detailed directive pointing out these conservative errors and the remedial measures to be taken.¹

As further examples of the extension of the power of the central territory into the outlying soviet areas, one can cite the establishment in the Hsiangosi area (West Hupeh-Hunan under the control of Ho Lung), of a provisional central government office headed by Kuan Hsiang-ying, a member of the Central Executive Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council.² In March of 1932, the Hsiangosi soviet had called the first meeting of its new Executive Committee to accept the decisions of the National Congress and the Communist Party.³ In 1931 an emissary, Liu Shui-shen, was sent by Juichin to the Hsiangokan (Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi) area to ensure correspondence of policy between the two.⁴ Finally, when

¹ 32nd. CPC Meeting, reported in HSCH, No. 51, (February 10, 1933), p. 1.

² 20th. CPC Meeting, reported in HSCH, No. 30, (August 4, 1932), p. 4. It later transpired that sometime between the First Congress and August 1933, sub-bureaux of the CCP Central Bureau were established in Oydwan [in June 1931 (Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 461)] and Hsiangosi [by November 1931 (Hsiao, I, op.cit., pp. 196-7)] and Szechuan, Minchekan, Hsiangokan and Hsiangkan [HSCH, No. 108, (September 6, 1933), p. 3]

³ HSCH, No. 14, (March 16, 1932), p. 2.

⁴ Nym Wales, Red Dust, p. 104.

the new soviet area of Minchekan (Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi) was formed in December 1932, its leaders pledged themselves to accept the "correct leadership" of the CCP, the Central Government and the Revolutionary Military Council, and to put into practice the laws and decrees of the government.¹

As Chu Teh told Nym Wales: "Our most important work in 1932 was in 'reddening' the new areas, that is, in penetrating further and in consolidating and deepening the Soviet movement. We co-ordinated and connected the Soviet movement in all different districts, united the various armies and established schools, as well as doing much other work of this kind."² However, Chu went on to say, the fact that the armies in the three provinces of Kiangsi, Hunan and Hupeh were unable to establish close communication and co-ordination deprived the Red Army of even greater success.³

Nevertheless, the period between the two National Soviet Congresses from November 1931 to January 1934, represented the highest point of soviet power. The first three of Chiang Kai-shek's "Bandit Encirclement" campaigns had been defeated by October 1931, and the fourth campaign, which was begun in the late spring of 1932, was

¹ "Min-che-kan hsin su-ch'ü", (The new soviet area of Minchekan), HSCH, No. 46, (January 7, 1933), p. 1.

² Nym Wales, New China, p. 63. [A communist source stated that the First Congress set up a government which had united the leadership of the various soviet areas. See Su-wei-ai Cheng-ch'üan, (The Soviet Regime), (January 1932), p. 13. SSC 10.]

³ Ibid.

vanquished.¹

In spite of the fourth campaign however, the Red Army was able to take the offensive on several occasions, and to increase its ranks substantially. From Moscow, Wang Ming in November 1933 estimated the number of Red Army regulars at 350,000 plus a further 600,000 irregulars. (Partisans and Red Guards.)² Harold Isaacs, who says he checked his information carefully, quotes a much lower figure of 151,000 of whom only 97,500 had rifles.³ A Chinese, but non-communist, source gives a median figure of 200,000 troops with 150,000 rifles.⁴

The discussion in the previous chapter showed that Mao's military policies had long been disputed by the leading organs of the Party. In the Central Soviet Area during 1931, Mao, in addition to waging a war of purely traditional guerrilla tactics, had used the Red Army as an all-purpose tool for a variety of non-military

¹ Edgar Snow is of the opinion that there were no campaigns against the soviet areas in 1932. (See Red Star over China, pp. 185-6 ft.) He asserts that no communist documents refer to a fourth campaign in 1932. But in fact many do, for example the "Chung-yang kuan-yü ti-kuo-chu-i kuo-min-tang szu-tz'u 'wei-chiao' yü wo-men ti jen-wu ti ch'ieh-i", (Resolution of Central concerning the imperialist KMT's fourth "encirclement" campaign and our tasks), dated June 21, 1932, printed in Ko-ming yü Chan-cheng (Revolution and War), No. 1 (August 1, 1932), SSC 15. There is no real contradiction here however. Preparatory moves were made in the fourth campaign during 1932, but the main attack against the central soviet district did not start until the spring of 1933. (See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 171 ft.)

² Wang Ming and Kang Sing (K'ang Sheng), Revolutionary China Today, (London: Modern Books Ltd., n.d.), p. 12.

³ Harold Isaacs, Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction, (Shanghai: China Forum, 1932), p. 129.

⁴ T'ang Liang-li, Suppressing Communist Banditry in China, p. 75.

tasks. It was the Red Army in fact that "administered" the soviet areas, carrying out the land reform programme, supervising elections, and operating fund-raising drives and mass movement work. According to a Central Bureau resolution of June 1932, this led to the development of a "backward peasant mentality".¹ Little effort was made by Mao and his supporters to establish soviets, and indeed military organs were substituted for the worker and peasant revolutionary committees.

In November 1931 Chu Teh and Wang Chia-ch'iang (who replaced Mao as head of the General Political Department of the RMC) "denounced Mao's dictatorial role in the military force".² From this time on, the role of the military in the economy and administration declined rapidly, and these affairs came under the control of organs established by the new soviet government.

Militarily, the main objectives of the Red Army were to link the major soviet areas together, starting with initial victories in Kiangsi and neighbouring provinces.³ From February-March 1932,

¹ Warren Kuo, "The CCP after Japanese Invasion of Manchuria (Part 2)", Issues & Studies, Vol. III, No. 7, (April 1967), p. 42.

² Ibid., p. 38.

³ "Chung-kung chung-yang kuan-yü cheng-ch'ü ko-ming ts'ai i-sheng yü shu-sheng shou-hsien sheng-li ti ch'eh-i", (Resolution of CCP Central concerning the achieving of initial victories for the revolution in one or more provinces), dated January 9, 1932; published in Shih-hua, No. 3, (April 20, 1932), pp. 7-11, SSC 18. See also: "Chung-kung chung-yang wei fan-tui ti-kuo-chu-i chin-kung su-lien kua-fen chung-kuo kei ko su-ch'ü tang-pu hsin", (Letter from the CCP Central to the Party Headquarters in the various soviet areas objecting to the imperialists' invasion of Soviet Russia and their partition of China), dated April 14, 1932; in Shih-hua, No. 4 (May 10, 1932), pp. 5-8.

the Red Army attacked the large city of Kanchow, but was unable to occupy it.¹ By the summer of 1932, the 100,000 troops deployed by the KMT had liquidated the Hunan-Hupeh soviet area under the command of Ho Lung, and Oyuwan, the second largest soviet after the central base area, was hard pressed.² In October, Chang Kuo-t'ao was forced to withdraw his troops from Oyuwan and seek refuge in Szechuan.³

In the face of these reverses, the Central Bureau convened a meeting at Ningtu, Kiangsi, in August 1932 to discuss military strategy. According to Mao, who attended the Conference, it continued the erroneous policies decided at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee in January 1931.⁴ Mao favoured a policy of mobile guerrilla warfare, and the luring of the enemy deep into soviet territory before launching a surprise attack. These views had been ridiculed shortly before the Conference in an article by Liu Po-ch'eng, (a high-ranking military leader who was head of both the Red Army academy and of the Political Department of the 5th. Army Corps), who attacked "guerrilla-ism and narrow empiricism", and those who used Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Sun Tzu's The Art of War as guides to modern strategy and tactics.⁵

¹ Edgar Snow, op.cit., p. 185.

² Jerome Ch'en, op.cit., p. 176.

³ Nym Wales, Red Dust, p. 158.

⁴ RCQHP, p. 190.

⁵ Liu Po-ch'eng, "Lun chan-shu chan-l'leh ti shih-tai-hsing yu' women hung-ch'ün mu-ch'ien tui-yu' chan-shu chan-l'leh jen-shih wen-t'i", (On the question of the timing of tactics and strategy and our Red Army's current knowledge of tactics and strategy), dated July 20, 1932; printed in Ko-ming yu' Chan-cheng, No. 1, (August 1, 1932), leaves 14-22. SSC 15.

Mao clashed at the Ningtu Conference with Chou En-lai who, as Secretary of the Central Bureau, backed by the Central Committee and encouraged by the growth of the Red Army, advocated positional warfare, capturing the cities, and taking the war into enemy territory.¹ The views of Chou En-lai prevailed, and Mao, according to his own testimony, devoted himself almost entirely to governmental work from October 1932 onwards,² while Chou later became political commissar over the Red Army.³ At the same time, Returned Student Po Ku, and his supporter Hsiang Ying became members of the Central Revolutionary Military Council, and Hsiang was also made its temporary acting Chairman, indicating not only a decline in Mao's military influence, but a similar reduction in the authority of Chu Teh, the formal Chairman of the RMC.⁴

The fact that the new strategy proved successful against Chiang's fourth campaign reinforced the belief of the Party leaders that Mao's guerrilla tactics were obsolete. Mao was later to claim that the fourth campaign was defeated only because his influence in the Red Army had not been completely eradicated, and that the defeat

¹ Kung Ch'u, Wo yü Hung-chün, (The Red Army and I), (Hong Kong: South Wind Publishing Co., 1954), pp. 310-314.

² Edgar Snow, op.cit., p. 185.

³ HSCH, No. 78 (May 11, 1933), p. 1. CRBRD, pp. 449-50. This is substantiated by the testimony of Chang Kuo-t'ao, who says that upon arriving in Kiangsi, Chou En-lai wrested political control of the Red Army from Mao. ("Chou En-lai is a round man", New York Times Magazine, April 25, 1954, p. 56.)

⁴ HSCH, ibid.

inflicted on the Red Army by the fifth and final campaign, and the consequent loss of the Kiangsi base, were due in large part to the use of the incorrect strategy.¹ This chronology allows Mao to reap the credit for the successes against the first four campaigns, while absolving him from blame for the loss of the soviet areas. It also provides one possible explanation for Mao's statement that the CC transferred from Shanghai to Juichin in early 1933 rather than 1931-1932 as the available evidence suggests. Had Mao taken 1931 as the year of the move, it would have been difficult for him not to have given them some credit for the successes over the four defeated encirclement campaigns of Chiang Kai-shek. The probability remains however that due to inadequate local support, poor resources, and the blockhouse tactics of the KMT, the fifth campaign would have resulted in a defeat for the communists regardless of the strategy they adopted. After the summer of 1932 therefore, Mao's power in the military sphere declined and was negligible by the spring of 1933. With his military and political spheres of influence eclipsed by the Returned Student leadership, only the governmental structure remained as a power base.

To turn now from the military to the social and political environment, in the year following the First Congress, new decrees were published concerning the division of soviet territory into

¹ RCQHP, pp. 190-1.

administrative districts, and the establishing of a network of local government from provincial to village level.¹ Co-operatives were encouraged, and a system of credits for agricultural investment was inaugurated.² These measures, and other reforms, were designed to win the approval of the local population, an approval which was necessary to the survival of the regime, dependent as it was on local production to feed the Red Army, to supply recruits to the Red Army, and to function as a general support and intelligence network for guerrilla activities.

The deficiencies and shortcomings of the soviet governmental and administrative apparatus during 1931 have already been analysed in some detail in the previous chapter. One month after the First Soviet Congress, instructions were issued to carry out a re-election campaign to transform the soviet organs in the central soviet district.³ Kiangsi and Fukien soviet areas (and the hsien directly under the control of Juichin) were given one hundred days between December 20, 1931 and March 31, 1932 to complete the task of soviet construction. These provincial soviets were ordered to make out work plans immediately and to spend most of their time carrying out demarcation and elections at the hsiang level. Other provinces were to adopt a similar procedure.⁴

¹ For details, see Chapter 2.

² Wang Ming and K'ang Sheng, Revolutionary China Today, p. 13.

³ HSCH, No. 2, (December 18, 1931), p. 4.

⁴ Ibid.

A few days after the receipt of this directive, various levels of the soviet governments of Kiangsi, Fukien and Juichin hsien called discussion meetings to decide how to put the re-election campaign into effect. Preliminary joint meetings of hsien and ch'u soviet chairmen were held in west Fukien (December 20) and Kiangsi (December 25), with Juichin holding a similar meeting on December 26 composed of ch'u and hsiang soviet chairmen. At all three meetings, delegates from Central were present to provide guidance. The meetings went on for 3-4 days, and investigated past work as well as deciding future election strategy.¹

But in spite of this planning, the elections did not succeed as intended. In April, after the due date of March 31 for the completion of the elections, Hsiang Ying wrote that in spite of three months work, they were still not completed. Even in the majority of hsiang and shih soviets where an attempt to carry out elections had taken place, they had been undertaken incorrectly. Mass meetings were called, but the election went ahead even if few voters turned up, in spite of laws to the contrary, and a minority of local chairmen ran everything without concern for the wishes of the masses.² Hsiang Ying reiterated that hsiang and shih

¹ "Min-hsi Chiang-hsi liang-sheng-su Jui-chin hsien-su k'ai-hui t'ao-lun chung-yang cheng-fu ko-chung hshun-ling", (The two provincial soviet areas of west Fukien and Kiangsi, and Juichin hsien soviet convene meetings to discuss the various instructions of the central government", HSCH, No. 3, (December 28, 1931), p. 4.

² Hsiang Ying, "Ch'iang-ku ch'eng-hsiang su-wei-ai ti tsu-chih kung-tso", (Strengthen ch'eng and hsiang soviets organisation and work), HSCH, No. 16, (April 6, 1932), p. 1.

soviets were the basic level organisations of the soviet regime, by which "the great majority of the worker and peasant masses are directly attracted to participate in the work of the regime", and that it was essential to consolidate the basis of the regime, otherwise it would stand little chance of victory. Hsiang ordered new elections in places where they had been performed incorrectly.¹

The case of Ningtu hsien (Kiangsi) soviet may be typical. Its first soviet conference was held from April 10-13, 1932.² At the same time however, Liang Po-t'ai (a CEC member specialising in soviet construction work) listed a phenomenal number of shortcomings and deficiencies in the work of Ningtu. These included: a few hsiang soviets conspiring with the Ching bandits; hsiang and shih soviet Executive Committees and Presidia not holding meetings; weak connections between the upper and lower levels of government; the smoking of opium by soviet work personnel; merchants acting as secretaries in the government; and in some cases, the basic soviet organisation of the hsiang and shih delegate conferences were non-existent. In electoral work, Liang reported that there was a general failure to mobilise the masses to take part in the election; that some ch'ü had still not yet completed their elections; where

¹ Ibid.

² "Ning-tu kung-nung-ping su-wei-ai ch'üan-hsien ti-i-tz'u ta-hui ti ching-kuo", (The experience of the first workers', peasants' and soldiers' soviet conference of Ningtu hsien), HSCH, No. 18, (April 21, 1932), p. 5.

elections had been held, representatives were sometimes elected even though voters did not register; in some areas no electoral organisations were formed at all; in one ch'u all opium smokers were deprived of electoral rights, regardless of their class origin, and in another ch'u all those over age 45 were similarly deprived. Liang ended by saying that the election would have to be repeated in some areas.¹

It would seem therefore that although efforts were made in early 1932 to create a viable soviet organisation from Central down to the grass roots level, that this endeavour was largely unsuccessful, particularly at the lower levels. The idea that the masses themselves were in charge of the election and had the power to elect their candidates had become so far divorced from reality that one of the top Party leadership had to write an article stressing that there was in fact no difference between "soviet political power" and "mass political power". Many people, said Lo Fu, thought that soviet political power was what existed in the soviet areas, while mass political power was in the KMT areas. He pointed out that the slogan had been put forward precisely to show that the two were the same, that both were put into effect under the soviet regime, and that "mass political power" was designed to show the distinction between the soviet

¹ Liang Po-t'ai, "Ning-tu su-wei-ai kung-tso chih i-pan", (A section on Ningtu soviet work), dated April 21, (1932), in HSCH, No. 18, (April 21, 1932), p. 6.

areas, and the white areas - where only a minority had any rights.¹

In September 1932, the CEC decided that yet another attempt was to be made to mobilise the population in a new series of elections. In spite of earlier efforts, the directive noted, there still remained soviet governments with "class outsiders" in them, following an anti-class line in their work. Rotten bureaucrats persisted in local soviets, and there was a serious problem of corruption. All this had led to an isolation of the government from the masses. The purpose of the new election campaign was to eliminate all "class outsiders, elements sabotaging revolutionary war work and corrupt, rotten bureaucratic elements," and to replace them with active cadres, so as to set up strong and capable soviet governments who could really carry out the task of leading the revolutionary war.²

Since to hold all the elections at the same time would have the effect of causing the momentary cessation of the vital task of winning the war, it was decided that some hsien would undergo a total re-election and some only a partial re-election, and that these would be carried out one at a time. Seven hsien in Kiangsi and four

¹ Lo Fu, "Lun su-wei-ai cheng-ch'üan yü min-chung cheng-ch'üan", (Concerning soviet political power and mass political power), dated January 19, 1932; in Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 30, (February 15, 1932), pp. 20-23.

² "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui ti shih-wu hao hsün-ling", (Fifteenth instruction of the CEC), signed by Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao; dated September 20, 1932, in HSCH, No. 35, (September 27, 1932), p. 1.

in Fukien were designated for total re-election, and seven in Kiangsi and two in Fukien for partial re-election. Juichin hsien was also to have a partial re-election.

During the election campaign, the masses were to be propagandised to participate, and to examine and criticise soviet work. Soviet governments were to pay attention to attracting worker activists to participate in the ch'ü and hsien Executive Committees, so as to strengthen the worker component at the various levels of the soviets.¹ Following the receipt of this directive, the hsiang and ch'ü governments made annual work reports to the electorate on November 8. The electors examined the reports and voiced opinions on soviet work.²

At the same time, in an attempt to enforce Central directives, it was decided to set up a formal system for examining the work of the local soviets, and to establish training classes for soviet cadres.³ However, an inspection carried out at the end of November revealed that little progress had been made in reforming local soviet

¹ Ibid.

² "Kuan-yü chung-yang cheng-fu chou-nien chi-nien", (On the first anniversary of the central government), CEC order No. 9, dated September 24, 1932; in HSCH, No. 35, (September 27, 1932), p. 8.

³ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo lin-shih chung-yang cheng-fu ch'eng-li chou-nien chi-nien shang ch'üan-t'i hsüan-min kung-tso pao-kao shu", (The provisional central government of the Chinese Soviet Republic makes a work report to the whole electorate on the first anniversary of its establishment), HSCH, No. 39, (November 7, 1932), pp. 2-4.

governments.¹

By December it became clear that the campaign had proved a failure. Not one hsien had completed its election, the campaigns were all peaceful with no struggle to get the masses to participate, the electoral laws were not complied with, the elections that did take place were superficial and negative, and bureaucratism was still rampant.² The CEC ordered an immediate inspection of the election campaign. If the electoral law was found to have been violated, then the election would have to be repeated. Detailed instructions were issued, but the leadership must have realised that diminishing returns had set in, as no further electoral work was carried out until well into 1933.³

Preparations for the Second Congress

It was with this general failure in mass organisation and technique that the Chinese Soviet Republic entered 1933. The constitutional outline that had been passed by the First National Soviet Congress in 1931 did not mention at what intervals Congresses had to be called. However the Organisation Law that was promulgated in 1934 by the Second Congress stipulated that All-China Congresses were to be convened every two years, which meant that the Second

¹ 28th. CPC meeting, reported in HSCH, No. 42, (November 28, 1932), p. 6.

² "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui chüeh-i kuan-yü ko-chi hsdan-chü yün-tung ti chien-ch'a", (CEC resolution concerning the inspection of the electoral movement at the various levels), signed by Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao, dated December 1, 1932; in HSCH, No. 43, (December 5, 1932), p. 2.

³ The electoral disasters of 1932 did not prevent a later communist source from claiming spectacular successes, with over 90% attendance at some electoral meetings, and general mass enthusiasm, with only those sick, pregnant, or on guard duty not attending. See Kuang-ming Jih-pao, (June 27, 1953), p. 5.

Congress would be due on or by November 1933. The first hint of any political activity directed towards elections in 1933 can be found in a decision of the Council of People's Commissars (CPC) calling for work in preparation for a general re-election movement at the shih and hsiang levels, which was to be held in the Central Soviet Area prior to the autumn harvests.¹ The first indication that this would culminate in a Second Congress came in a central government directive of June 1.² This was soon followed by an official resolution of the Central Executive Committee (the highest governmental organ in the soviet when the Congress was not in session), issued on June 8, 1933 calling for the Second National Soviet Congress to open on December 11, 1933, the anniversary of the Canton Commune, and slightly over two years since the First Congress of November 1931.³ The Congress was to be held in the Central Soviet Area.⁴

The Resolution declared that the revolutionary war was entering a higher stage of development, and that in order to strengthen the leadership of the revolution, and to summarise the experiences of the soviet movement over the last two years, it had been decided to hold a Second Congress, and to elect a new CEC.⁵

¹ HSCH, No. 74, (April 29, 1933), p. 1.

² HSCH, No. 85, (June 14, 1933), p. 3.

³ "Su-wei-ai chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui kuan-yü chao-chi ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan -su ta-hui ti ch'üeh-i", (Resolution of the Soviet Central Executive Committee on the convening of the Second National Soviet Congress), dated June 8, 1933; in HSCH, No. 86, (June 17, 1933), p. 2. Also in Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 59, (August 1933), pp. 5-6.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

The CEC decided that the summary of the experience of the soviet movement was the task of the Council of People's Commissars, which would deliver a work report to the Congress.¹ Various electoral procedures were also decided: elections were to be carried out on the usual hierarchical basis, with delegates from lower administrative areas attending the conferences of higher areas, up to the provincial level, the delegates from which would attend the National Congress. These elections in the central soviet district at hsiang, ch'ü, hsien, and sheng levels were ordered to be completed by November 15, and the delegates to the new Congress to be in place by December 5. In the case of other soviet areas, their elections had to be completed by October 31, and the delegates were requested to reach the central soviet area by November 30.²

After the elections up to each level had been completed, the electoral situation was to be reported to the next higher level. Before November 15, each provincial soviet was asked to send a report to the central soviet government summarising its experiences of the last two years.³

All revolutionary mass organisations or individuals in the KMT areas, and in the countries neighbouring China, were invited either to send delegates to the Congress, or to come themselves.⁴

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

The fact that the call for a Second Congress was issued by the CEC in June 1933 is a significant indication that by this time the Returned Student leadership felt that it had sufficiently eroded the influence of the Maoists in the governmental machine to be able to go ahead and convene a Congress that would formally pass laws and resolutions proposed by them, and replace the old government. Indeed, the evidence points to an enlargement of the sphere of control of the CCP leadership over the government organisation by the summer of 1933 - sufficient to ensure the dominance of their authority in the running of the election campaign for the Second Congress.

In June 1933, T'an Chen-lin, a prominent Maoist and CEC member, was attacked on the basis of associating with the "Lo Ming line".¹ Teng Tzu-hui was demoted to Deputy Commissar of Finance in August.² Chou Yi-li lost control of the Internal Affairs Department in January 1933 to Ho Shu-heng (another Maoist) who was in turn replaced by Liang Po-t'ai (a probable member of the Returned Student group) by the time of the election campaign.³ Ho Shu-heng was criticised for

¹ Lo Ming was acting Secretary of the Fukien Provincial Committee of the CCP. He was attacked by the Returned Student leaders for employing mobile and guerrilla warfare in opposition to the "correct" line of the Party. T'an Chen-lin became linked with this line. See Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 669-670.

² HSCH, No. 105, (August 25, 1933), p. 1.

³ HSCH, No. 46, (January 7, 1933), p. 4. Also Hstlan-cht' Ytn-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, (September 10, 1933), pp. 6-8. Since most of the attacks on the Maoists were printed in HSCH, Chou Yi-li must have lost the position of Chief Editor that he had held since November 1931.

"bureaucratism" in September.¹ In addition, Chang Ting-ch'eng, Commissar for Land, was accused of "right opportunism" in November 1933.² All those who found themselves under fire were Maoists.

Some while after the CEC resolution, the provisional Central Government issued a formal declaration on the convocation of the Second Congress. The declaration stated that the Congress was being convened to centralise the leadership of the soviet movement throughout China, to develop and consolidate the soviet regime, and to sum up the experiences of the period since the first Congress. It was also announced that the Congress would be held, as before, in Juichin, Kiangsi, the soviet capital.³

The CEC set up a Preparatory Committee to make the necessary arrangements for the Second Congress.⁴ This Committee held its first meeting on June 9.⁵ With reference to preparatory work in the central soviet area, the Committee decided that during July and August, the area should be re-demarcated, at the same time carrying out the field investigation movement (ch'a-t'ien yün-tung),

¹ HSCH, No. 107, (September 3, 1933), p. 5.

² HSCH, No. 125, (November 14, 1933), p. 4.

³ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo lin-shih chung-yang cheng-fu chao-chi ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui hsüan-yeñ", (Declaration of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic convening the Second National Soviet Congress), dated August 1, 1933, signed by Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying, and Chang Kuo-t'ao; in HSCH, No. 101, (August 13, 1933), p. 2.

⁴ Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 1, (August 25, 1933), p. 8. SSC 10.

⁵ Ibid. The names of the Committee members were not specified.

and investigating the effect of the new Labour Law. It was hoped that hsiang, ch'ü and hsien level soviets would complete their election work during September and October, and that the whole province would be ready during November.¹

Additional organisational measures were taken by the Committee. The heads of Internal Affairs Departments of Kiangsi, Fukien, Minkan (Kiangsi-Fukien) provinces, and Jiichin hsien were summoned to hold a joint meeting to discuss the execution of the election work.² Similarly, the Central (organ) of every mass organisation, and press organs were ordered to hold a joint meeting to discuss preparatory work. It was decided that there should be a continuous stream of radio reports, as well as press coverage of the elections in Red China and other papers. Various problems of the Congress budget, the Hall for the Congress, and the lodging of delegates, were also brought up.³

With reference to the re-demarcation of the administrative areas in the summer of 1933, prior to the election campaign, the basic reasons behind the regulations can be reduced to one: the need to facilitate organisation, propaganda and control over the population by decreasing the size of the administrative unit, particularly at the basic levels of the hsiang and shih soviets. For all practical purposes, consideration of the shih soviets can be omitted, for

¹ "Chun-pei ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui ti kung-tso chi-hua", (Working plan of preparations for the Second Congress), dated June 10, 1933, HSCH, No. 88, (June 23, 1933), p. 1.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

city (shih) soviets were virtually non-existent in the soviet areas. Indeed an order of the CPC, issued on July 22, (the day after the promulgation of the resolution on re-demarcation), spoke only of the need to accomplish the elections to the Second Congress from hsiang, ch'ü, hsien and sheng soviets, and made no reference to soviets at the shih level.¹

The new hsiang units were considerably smaller than the old hsiang. As before, a distinction was made between hsiang on level land and those on mountainous territory, although a new type was now added referring to hsiang in areas of mixed level and mountainous land.² Under the new demarcation, hsiang on level land (or of especially crowded population) had a jurisdiction over 2,000 population, as compared with 5,000 under the November 1931 regulations. Provision however was made for the figure of 2,000 to be increased if there were several villages within 5 li, although the total was not to exceed 2,500. Correspondingly, if a river divided the area into two hsiang, the figure of 2,000 could be reduced.³ The new type of hsiang created for mixed terrain was to have jurisdiction over 1,500 inhabitants, with provision for variations.⁴

In mountainous terrain, the jurisdiction of the hsiang was 1,000 (as compared with 3,000 previously) and provision was made for this

¹ Kuan-yü chih-hsing chung-hsin hua-fen hsing-cheng ch'ü-yü ti ch'üeh-i (Concerning the carrying out of the decision to re-demarcate the administrative areas), Order No. 46 of the CPC (July 22, 1933) SSC 10.

² Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 330. [Also printed in HSCH, No. 98, (August 1, 1933), p. 3.]

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

to be drastically reduced to a minimum of 250 if the mountains were large and the population sparse.¹ The new ch'u soviets were each to control seven hsiang, which could be increased to nine in flat crowded areas, or reduced to five in sparsely populated mountain areas. Once again, this was a reduction in size compared with before. Unlike the earlier regulations, no legislation was passed concerning the linear dimensions of the soviets.

Responsibility for the correct demarcation of the hsiang rested with the ch'u soviet, although decisions had to be reported to the hsien committee for investigation and approval. Similarly, demarcation of the ch'u was the responsibility of the hsien committee, which was obliged to report to the provincial committee. The provincial committees in turn reported to the Central Internal Affairs Commissariat.² The Internal Affairs Commissariat was responsible for general guidance of the whole demarcation and sent personnel to various places to inspect the execution of the work. Once it was finished the elections could begin.³

An article in Red China during July gave some more details about the election timetable. From September 25 to October 10, there were to take place the elections in the hsiang and shih soviets. Following this, from October 10-20 the ch'u soviet conferences were

¹ Ibid.

² Kuan-yü chih-hsing chung-hsin hua-fen hsing-cheng ch'u-yü ti ch'üeh-i, op.cit.

³ Ibid.

to be held. Hsien soviet conferences were allocated October 20-30, and finally November 1-15 for the provincial conference, which were to elect the delegates to the All-China Congress.¹ This timetable indicates that the schedule laid down by the original resolution of the CEC of June 8, was still being adhered to.²

Meetings of the Preparatory Committee continued to be held regularly, and work to mobilise the population to take part in the Congress went on apace. At its third meeting on July 5, the Committee requested the trades unions to send special deputies to help with the preparatory work.³ At the fourth meeting on July 20, a budget for the Congress of over 56,800 yüan was put forward and sent to the Council of People's Commissars for approval.⁴ And at the fifth meeting on July 26, the draft of the Election Law was examined and sent to the CEC to be promulgated after it had been inspected.⁵

¹ "Erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui ti kung-tso pu-chih", (Arrangements for the work of the Second National Soviet Congress), HSCH, No. 90, (July 2, 1933), p. 6.

² HSCH, No. 86, p. 2.

³ Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 1, loc.cit. [The response to this request was slow. It was not until January 1934 (a few weeks before the Congress actually opened) that the Executive Bureau of the Trades Union Federation decided to send 150 of the best cadres to help carry out the extra work at the Second Congress. (HSCH, No. 140, January 4, 1934, p. 3.)]

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

This new Election Law,¹ took effect from August 15, 1933 at which time it superceded the "Detailed Electoral Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic", which had been passed by the First Congress.

The new Election Law, differed little, in essence, from the 1931 Law. All residents of the soviet areas over 16 years of age had the right to vote, regardless of religion, sex or nationality, provided that they were hired labourers, poor or middle peasants, workers, members of the sea, land or air forces of the Chinese Soviet Republic, or a dependent of a man falling into one of these categories.² Likewise, as in 1931, those deprived of their electoral rights included those who lived off the labour of others, lived from profit or rent; rich peasants, capitalists, landlords, compradors; "those who rely on the propagation of religious superstition for a living"; KMT police, and spies, lunatics and criminals.³

The hierarchy of delegate conferences which were finally to produce the delegates who would actually attend the National Soviet Congress were treated in a little more detail in 1933 than in 1931, but the administrative units were basically the same, and

¹ Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hst'an-chü-fa, (Soviet Temporary Election Law, dated August 9, 1933. SSC 10. Part 9 contains a note which states that the Law was to take effect in the central soviet district when published, and in other soviet areas when it reached them. (Also published in CRBRD, pp. 829-846).

² Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hst'an-chü-fa, article 4.

³ Ibid., article 5.

the bias in the favour of workers vis-à-vis peasants was apparent at every level of the hierarchy.¹ The 1933 Law however, did make explicit, in its Preamble, that the workers enjoyed "superior rights", which were in fact guaranteed by the Constitution. Also, less residents (urban or rural) were needed in order to produce one delegate, than in 1931, reflecting the growth of soviet administration, and the desire to have a larger and more representative All-China Congress.

Only at the very lowest level did the population as a whole play a direct part in sending their representatives to the Second National Congress. Above this level, matters were in the hands of delegate conferences, and with each step up the hierarchy, the elections became progressively divorced from the mass of the people, and more closely controlled by the CCP through its network of Electoral Committees.²

¹ Mao Tse-tung, in his Report to the Second National Soviet Congress, stressed that the bias in favour of the workers was designed to guarantee the leading position of the workers. Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, (Collected Documents of the Second National Soviet Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic), p. 53, SSC 16.

² It was the job of the Electoral Committee to manage the election on its particular level. It was composed of delegates from the government and the mass organisations. They performed the tasks of voter registration, posting up lists of voters and candidates for election, deciding the place of the election meeting and the agenda. (Articles 45-55).

Initially, workers were to hold electoral meetings taking production, or occupation and industrial organisation as the basic unit.¹ Peasants did the same with the "small village" (hsiao-ts'un-tzu) as the basic unit.² At this, the basic level of the soviet elections, one delegate was elected to the hsiang conference for every 13 worker residents, and one delegate for every 50 peasants and other classes of residents. In small hsiang this ratio could be reduced to 1:8 for workers and 1:32 for other classes.³ The bias towards the peasantry of the earlier election law at the grass-roots level was therefore replaced by a bias in favour of the proletariat. The electoral process at this level will be discussed in detail later.

At the hsiang conference, the law of 1933 stated that delegates from this body to the ch'ü conference should be elected on the basis of one formal delegate for every two hundred rural (hsiang-ts'un) residents.⁴ The 1933 law also introduced a new provision that workers had to comprise 20-25% of the total number of delegates.⁵

¹ Article 11. A later source clarified this to mean either the place of production, or the trade union organisation. \sphericalangle (Hsieh) Ch'ieh-ts'ai, "Tsen-yang k'ai hsiang-chü-hui", (How to Start an Election Meeting), HSCH, No. 116, (October 6, 1933), p. 3. \sphericalangle

² Ibid.

³ Article 21.

⁴ Article 26.

⁵ Ibid.

Delegates elected from the hsiang conference then joined delegates elected from shih soviets to form the ch'u conference, which was to elect delegates to attend the hsien conference. Here a distinction between urban and rural dwellers was made. At the ch'u conference, one formal delegate was allowed for every four hundred market (shih-ch'ang) residents and only one for every sixteen hundred village residents.¹ In addition, the 1933 Law specified that worker delegates must make up 20-30% of the total.²

The delegates elected at the ch'u conference then joined those elected from soviets of towns directly responsible to the hsien, to form the hsien conference, the task of which was to elect delegates to attend the provincial conference. Market dwellers were permitted one formal delegate for every fifteen hundred, and rural dwellers one delegate for every six thousand people.³ The additional instruction included in the 1933 Law was that of the total number of delegates, workers should make up 25-35%.⁴

The penultimate step in the procedure of electing a government came when delegates from the hsien conference joined soviet

¹ Article 27.

² Ibid.

³ Article 28.

⁴ Ibid.

delegates from shih directly under the jurisdiction of the province, to form the provincial (sheng) conference, which was to elect the delegates who would have the privilege of being present at the All-China Soviet Congress. The 1933 Law allowed urban (ch'eng-shih) dwellers one formal delegate for every fifteen hundred of their number, with rural residents having to be content with only one delegate for every six thousand they could muster.¹ Workers, the 1933 Law stated, must form 25-35% of the total number of delegates.² In addition, delegates were also elected directly to the National Soviet Congress from town soviets directly belonging to the Central.³ These regulations in general required a much lower ratio of voters to delegates than 1931, and insisted on a stricter bias towards worker delegates, reflecting the views of the CCP leadership.

In addition to the numbers of formal delegates that were permitted, candidate (or alternate) delegates could be elected in the ratio of one to every five formal delegates. These candidate delegates had the right to speak but not to vote.⁴ Special provisions were made, as in 1931, for Red Army men to be integrated into the election.⁵

¹ Article 29.

² Ibid.


³ Article 25.

⁴ Article 31.

⁵ Articles 35-39. Front Armies elected delegates direct to the All-China Congress, as did guerrilla units. Other units sent delegates to the ch'ü, hsien or provincial conferences. Police units participated in the areas where they were stationed. A high number of delegates per soldier was allowed, for example, one for every 100 (to attend the hsien conference), and one for every 600 (when electing direct to the All-China Congress).

T A B L E VII

CHART OF 1933 ELECTORAL SYSTEM¹



¹ Appended to the 1933 Electoral Law, SSC 10.

² Town (shih) soviets under the ch'u were given one delegate for every 13 workers, and one for every 50 other residents. Those under the hsien were given one delegate for every 20 workers, and one for every 80 other residents. Those under the province were given one delegate for every 100 workers, and one for every 400 other residents. Town soviets electing directly to the All-China Congress were permitted one delegate for every 500 workers, and one for every 2,000 other residents. (Articles 22-25).

In addition to the election of delegates, the conferences at every level were to elect an Executive Committee which would be the supreme governmental organ of administration in that area. Maximum numbers of membership on these committees were laid down as follows:-¹

<u>ch'u</u>	Executive Committee	35
<u>hsien</u>	" "	55
province	" "	95

The All-China Congress was to elect a Central Executive Committee which was not to exceed 581.²

Not surprisingly, a reading of the press following the publication of this Electoral Law shows that not all soviet citizens fully understood its requirements. A high soviet government official admitted that some people did not know the difference between the voters list and the candidates list.³ He also had to point out that it was only those people who derived their living from the propagation of religion who were deprived of the vote, and not all those who possessed religious beliefs.⁴

¹ Article 34 (1933).

² Ibid. This conflicts slightly with the Organisation Law passed at the Congress which stipulated that the CEC was not to exceed 585. Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang su-wei-ai tsu-chih fa, (Organisation Law of the Central Soviet of the Chinese Soviet Republic), February 17, 1934; printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., p. 154, Article 8. SSC 16.

³ Liang Po-t'ai, "Kuan-y'u hshuan-ch'u-fa shang chi-ke t'i-wen ti chieh-shih", (Explanation of some questions posed by the Electoral Law), HSCH, No. 116, (October 6, 1933), p. 3.

⁴ Ibid.

In October, the Internal Affairs Commissariat, which was responsible for organising the election, admitted that it had received constant requests for clarification of the law, especially with respect to provisions concerning electoral rights.¹ The Commissariat published a number of explicit, but complex explanations which can be summarised as follows:-

1. Under the original electoral law, representatives of the landlords and capitalists, middlemen, compradores, warlords, and the police spies and gendarmes in the service of the KMT were all deprived of electoral rights. However, in the cases of the representatives of landlords and capitalists, and middlemen and compradores, they could be allowed electoral rights if (i) before the soviets were established they had been in their jobs for not more than two years, after which they relied upon their own labour as their main source of income, or (ii) if they were in their jobs for three years, but it was not their main source of livelihood, then they could retain their electoral rights. In the cases of warlords and bureaucrats who were in these positions for less than one year, and did not oppress the workers and peasants, and they and their families relied on their own labour as their main source of income, then they could also retain their electoral rights. Police, spies and gendarmes if they worked at these jobs for less than one year, did not oppress the workers and peasants, and their families relied on

¹ Tui-yü su-wei-ai chan-hsing hstlan-chü-fa t'iao-wen ti chieh-shih, (Explanation of the Provisions of the Soviet Temporary Electoral Law), signed by Liang Po-t'ai; dated October 29, 1933. SSC 10.

their own labour as a principal source of income, or, if before soviet occupation, they left their jobs and devoted themselves to labour for more than one year, were not opposed by the people and obeyed the laws of the soviets, then they too could have electoral rights.¹

2. In the case of Communist Party members coming from landlord, rich peasant or capitalist families, it was stated that they had abandoned their original class interests in favour of struggling for the workers and peasants, and that therefore they should enjoy the same electoral rights as the workers and peasants.

3. Persons who came from landlord or rich peasant families who would normally be deprived of electoral rights could, if they participated in soviet work, retain their rights if (i) they participated in soviet work "during the uprising, and firmly struggled for the interests of the workers and peasants", or (ii) if they participated in soviet work only after the uprising, but did this for more than five years, and then passed an examination by the ch'u Executive Committee or shih soviet.

4. Captured officers and men of the KMT army were allowed electoral rights in certain circumstances. (i) Captured men, if they joined the Red Army, or if they did not join the Red Army, but lived on soviet territory, relied on their own labour as their principal source of livelihood, observed soviet law, and passed an

¹ Ibid.

inspection and investigation by the local soviet government, could retain their electoral rights. (ii) In the case of captured officers, if they were only platoon or company commanders, subsequently joined the Red Army, and came from a worker or peasant background, then after a long period of observation "to prove that they were firmly struggling for the interests of the workers and peasants", then they could receive electoral rights, provided that they served in the Red Army for more than a year (two years for a company commander) and were favourably inspected by the Red Army Political Department. Battalion commanders required five years' observation, and regimental commanders and above were deprived of electoral rights for ever.¹

Again, in an article entitled "Two questions on the Electoral Law", one Huang Ta said that the Law stated that a man who was a military policeman of the reactionary government was deprived of the vote, and so was his family. But what if his family were residents of the soviet areas, poor or middle peasants, and all engaged in manual labour? The answer came back that they could have the vote provided that they had no economic link or counter-revolutionary activity with the reactionary government.² Huang Ta also asked the definition of the word "dependent" in the case of a

¹ Ibid.

² Huang Ta, "Kuan-yü hsüan-chü-fa ti liang-ke t'i-wen", (Two questions on the Electoral Law), HSCH, No. 120, (October 18, 1933), p. 3.

worker's dependent, and pointed out that there might be landlords and rich peasants included in "dependents" if uncles etc. were included. The official reply was that only wives, children, and those directly relying on the worker for their principal source of livelihood were covered by the term, and that all others were excluded.¹

In view of the relatively simple nature of these queries, it can be sincerely doubted whether the extremely complex provisions of many sections of the Election Law were ever put into practice in quite the way the government intended them to be. The calculation of the number of formal and candidate (alternate) delegates permitted by the total number of voters at each electoral level, and the ascertaining of the right number of these required to reach the correct percentage of worker representation, must have been beyond the statistical ability and administrative experience of the majority of soviet officials.²

In addition to writing an Election Law that virtually ensured the production of delegations to the Second Congress having similar

¹ Ibid. Another source spoke of some people incorrectly depriving all deserters and cripples of electoral rights. ∠ Kuan-yü hsüan-chü yün-tung ti chih-shih (Directive on the election campaign), issued by the Internal Affairs Department of the Kiangsi Soviet Government, September 13, 1933. SSC 10. ✓

² In an attempt to clarify the Election Law, the soviet government distributed some 500,000 posters and 150,000 illustrated booklets, just prior to the elections, in September. (Chinese Workers Correspondence, No. 82, n.d., p. 5.)

views to their own, the Party stressed that, if possible, within each delegation, there should be set up a Party Corps (tang-t'uan) or faction, "to guarantee the leadership work of the Party".¹ The major policy decisions for the Congress were taken just prior to the Congress, at the Fifth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, and were transmitted from the Fifth Plenum to the Party Corps, thus ensuring synonymy of policy between the CCP and the resolutions and decrees expressed by the soviet government during the Congress.²

The Election Campaign

On a theoretical plane, the Returned Student leader Lo Fu explained the significance of the campaign:

"The revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants above all relies on force for the seizure and maintenance of its power. It relies on force to carry out the cruel and protracted civil war with external enemies, imperialism and the armed forces of the KMT. It also relies upon force to suppress landlord remnants within the soviet areas, and capitalist and rich peasant counter-revolutionary activity. But when it comes down to it, what are the prerequisites this force is dependent on? Lenin clearly answered this question thus: 'Rely on the masses.'"³

¹ "Chung-yang kuan-yü chao-chi su-ta-hui ti t'ung-chih", (Notice of Central convening the Second Congress), August 13, (1933), in Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 59, (August 1933), p. 8.

² "Chung-kung wu-chung ch'üan-hui kei erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui tang-t'uan ti chih-ling", (Instructions of the CCP Fifth Plenum to the Party Corps at the Second National Soviet Congress); printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 9-21. SSC 16. Also in Tou-cheng, No. 47. (February 16, 1934), pp. 16-20. SSC 18.

³ Lo Fu, "Erh-tz'u su-ta-hui ti kai-hsüan yün-tung yü su-wei-ai ti teh-mo-k'o-la-hsi", (The new election campaign of the Second National Soviet Congress and soviet democracy), Tou-cheng, No. 21, (August 20, 1933), p. 9.

Reliance on the masses implied winning the support of the people by bringing them into the political life of society, and making them feel that they played their part, however little, in the decision making process, a concept that was quite absent from the traditional life of the Chinese peasant. "Since", Lo Fu went on to say, "our soviet regime is the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants, under the leadership of the vanguard of the proletariat, the Communist Party, therefore the central task of soviet democracy is to bring in the broad masses of workers and peasants to participate in political power and to teach them to administer their own state."¹

In practice, of course, the idea of participation had to be linked during the campaign to the current political tasks. The major aims of the CCP, it was stated, were to create a healthy soviet organisation, to build up on the experience of two years management of the soviet regime, to discuss new policies, to strengthen the leadership, and to prepare to defeat Chiang Kai-shek's Fifth "Encirclement Campaign", which was in preparation, and commenced in October 1933.² It was felt that in addition to the military advantage, the defeat of Chiang's Fifth Campaign would

¹ Ibid., p. 10.

² "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui hstün-ling; ti nien-erh hao", (Order No. 22 of the CEC of the Chinese Soviet Republic; Directive on the Election Campaign), Hstün-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 1, (August 25, 1933), p. 2. SSC 10. Henceforth referred to as Ti nien-erh hao.

give a tremendous psychological boost to the activities of the Second Congress.¹ Thus the central government spoke of "presenting" the victory to the Second Congress.²

Soviet propaganda tended to slight the impact of the Fifth Campaign and compared the situation for the Second Congress favourably with the First. As compared with the First Congress, it was stated, domestically there was a nation-wide anti-KMT and anti-imperialist upsurge, the soviet areas had been extended, and internationally the world was heading towards a new revolutionary stage.³

In an attempt to whip up nationalist sentiment among the peasants, Mao spoke at election meetings of the links between the KMT's anti-communist crusades and the desires of the imperialists to carve out spheres of influence in China. Manchuria he said, had been annexed by Japan, in the south the British were trying to use the Tibetan lamas to establish a Tibetan "nation", the French

¹ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo lin-shih chung-yang cheng-fu ch'eng-li liang chou-nien chi-nien tui ch'uan-t'i hsi'an-min ti kung-tse pao-kao-shu", (Work Report to all the Voters Commemorating the Second Anniversary of the Establishment of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic), dated November 13, 1933, printed in Ch'ih-fei wen-chien hui-pien, (Red Bandit Collected Documents), Vol. 7, p. 325, SSC 20.

² Ibid.

³ Kuan-yü yung-hu ti-erh-tz'u ch'uan-su ta-hui: cheng-chih k'o ts'ai-liao, (Concerning Support for the Second All-Soviet Congress: Political Lesson Materials), Red Army Political Department, September 30, 1933. SSC 4.

imperialists were after Yunnan and Kweichow, and in Central China, the Americans planned to rule over several provinces along the Yangtse. "The Kuomintang", said Mao, "serves as an accomplice to the imperialist plots".¹

Therefore, Mao went on to say, the soviets under the leadership of the CCP, were the leaders in a big revolutionary war, and it was essential to crush the Fifth Campaign that was just starting against them. In order to wage the war successfully, the election must produce powerful soviets, especially as the year 1933 was no ordinary election year, but the year of the Second National Congress and the re-election of the soviet government.² Furthermore, in order to achieve a satisfactory election, "a great number of the most progressive, most class-conscious, and most positive individuals must be elected to the soviets..., and the old useless number in them must be eliminated".³

Mao pointed out that with reference to previous election campaigns "the function of soviet powers and the importance of soviet elections have not been clearly understood by most people".⁴ He

¹ "Significance of this year's soviet election: Speech given by President Mao Tsak Tung (sic) in the election meeting of the Southern Eighteen Districts in Kiangsi", in Chinese Workers Correspondence, (Peking: n.d.), No. 1, p. 5. / This can also be found in HSCH, No. 108, (September 6, 1933), pp. 1-2. /

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

then commented that "one who does not realise the importance of the election cannot be expected to participate in the election in the most positive manner, and likewise, soviet officials, who do not understand the significance, cannot lead the movement satisfactorily".¹

The CEC, in its directive on the election campaign, said that although electoral procedures in 1932 were a great improvement on those for the First Congress, the importance of fully mobilising the masses had still not been fully understood during 1932 by the chairmen of local soviet governments.² Nor, the directive continued, had they seen the importance of leadership, or propaganda incitement work, with the result that in many places only a minority of voters had participated in the elections.³

Mass mobilisation had suffered because in many soviet departments, from the hsiang level right up to the centre, a few people were entrusted with everything, with the activists and delegates from the masses not being brought into the work.⁴ Yet at the same time, complained Lo Fu, there were comrades in these departments who nevertheless claimed that the soviet was short of working staff.⁵

¹ Ibid.

² Tien-nien-erh hao, p. 3.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Tou-cheng, No. 21, p. 12.

⁵ Ibid.

A further consequence of the lack of mass mobilisation during previous elections was that some areas had had "completely peaceful campaigns", with none of the "ardent criticism and struggle" that the Party considered essential to win the support of the people.¹ The masses had played little part in the discussion of the draft proposals, and there had been little change from the past.² The result was that "negative, slothful, corrupt elements and 'class outsiders' had not been fully investigated, and were able to worm their way into the soviet regime".³ Other shortcomings in electoral work included insufficient workers put up for election, and lack of female participation.⁴ At times, it was said, taking the hsiang as the electoral unit had created too big a unit, so that many could not travel the distance needed to get to the electoral meeting, and even if they did get there, often the resolution on the list of candidates was apparently taken before the list was discussed.⁵ Finally, it was reported that in a minority of districts, the responsible officials had simply ignored the election law, had not called voters' meetings and had just nominated their own delegates.⁶

The management of the election at the grass-roots level was largely the responsibility of specially appointed election committees.

¹ Ti nien-erh hao, p. 3.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

These were to be organised at the shih and ch'u levels, although in practice, owing to the absence of urban areas in soviet territory, only the ch'u committees were operative. The ch'u committee was composed of 9-13 people.¹ Nine people would be sufficient for a small ch'u, made up of the heads of the following departments: Intern_al Affairs, Labour, Land, Education, and the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate. The committee was also to include a member of the CCP and Youth League ch'u committees, and two trade union members. In the case of a large ch'u, this membership could be expanded to 11 or 13 by the addition of members from the Anti-Imperialist Alliance and Poor Peasant Corps. One female member was also to be appointed.² The committee was to be chaired by the head of the ch'u Internal Affairs Department, or, if he was unable to cope, by the head of either the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate, or Labour or Land Departments.³ All the committee members were to be chosen by a meeting of the ch'u Executive Committee presidium, and approved by the hsien EC Presidium.⁴ Electoral sub-committees were established in each hsiang, organised from one

¹ Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hst'an-ch'u-fa, article 45.

² "Wei chin-hsing hst'an-ch'u tui Chiang-hsi i-feng chih-shih-hsin", (A directive letter to Kiangsi on carrying out the election campaign), signed by Liang Po-t'ai, acting Chairman of the Central Internal Affairs Commissariat of the CPC, dated September 7, 1933; printed in Hst'an-ch'u Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, (September 10, 1933), p. 6.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hst'an-ch'u-fa, article 46.

representative of the hsiang soviet, one from the trade unions, two from the Poor Peasant Corps, one from the female delegates conference, and one each from the Party and Youth League committees. The director of the electoral sub-committee was to be elected by this group.¹ The CEC directed that the electoral committees were not to be all name and no substance, as in the past.²

The primary initial task of the electoral committees was to mobilise the masses in the soviet areas to become aware of, and participate in the election campaign. The hsiang electoral sub-committees organised propaganda teams of 9-11 members, which received training at the hands of the ch'ü election committee.³ Joint meetings to discuss the electoral law and electoral work were held between mass organisations at the ch'ü and hsiang levels, as well as meetings of individual mass organisations. In this way, the trade unions, Poor Peasant Corps and female worker and peasant delegate meetings were mobilised.⁴

Hung-se Chung-hua printed a two-part article about one particular ch'ü which was considered to be a model of its kind. Ts'ai-hsi ch'ü in Fukien convened expanded meetings of the Party, Youth League committees and the ch'ü soviet to discuss electoral work,

¹ Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, loc.cit.

² Ti nien-erh hao, p. 5.

³ Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, p. 7.

⁴ Ti nien-erh hao, p. 5.

organise an electoral committee, and elect sub-committees. Discussion of the electoral work was also undertaken by the trade unions, Poor Peasant Corps and female delegate meetings. In every hsiang and ts'un propaganda teams were organised, which carried out propaganda family by family, in addition to putting on plays and delivering speeches. In this way "they mobilised the broad worker and peasant masses of Ts'ai-hsi ch'ü to enthusiastically support and participate in the election."¹

The main target of the propaganda campaign was to register voters to cast ballots at election time.² The first step was to decide who, under the provisions of the electoral law, was entitled to enjoy electoral rights. Voters organised into trade unions or Poor Peasant Corps were registered through their organisations. The others were catered for by the registrar from the hsiang electoral committee.³ Soviet workers were enjoined not to let landlords and rich peasants steal the election rights of the workers and peasants.⁴ Those who were given electoral rights had their names written on red paper, and those who had been deprived of electoral rights were written on white paper. In the case of

¹ Chang Ting-ch'eng, "Hsüan-chü yün-tung ti hao mo-fan", (A Good Example of an Election Campaign), HSCH, No. 126, (November 17, 1933), p. 3 & No. 127, (November 20, 1933), p. 3.

² Ibid.

³ Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, p. 8.

⁴ Kuan-yü hsüan-chü yün-tung ti chih-shih, op.cit.

those with electoral rights, their work capacities and "struggle history" had also to be listed.¹ In the case of Ting-lung ch'ü in Hsingkuo hsien, it turned out that 6,094 (68%) out of a total of 8,920 had the right of election, with 2,826 (32%) deprived of electoral rights.² An example was given of a member of the Fukien provincial soviet work personnel, one Kuan Ch'ü-wu, who although he was a rich peasant, was listed on red paper during voter registration in Ts'ai-hsi ch'ü. According to the source, the people of the hsiang immediately went to the hsiang soviet and "struggled" with the electoral committee, "and they did not allow his name to be written on the red paper". From this, said the article, it could be clearly seen that in Ts'ai-hsi ch'ü "the worker and peasant masses supported and respected their own electoral rights, and paid very cautious attention to inspecting for class enemies."³ After voter registration came the even more important task of selecting a candidates list, from among which the delegates would be elected to attend the hsiang soviet conferences, which would send representatives to the ch'ü conference, until a few would eventually reach the National Soviet Congress. Initially, at the lowest levels

¹ HSCH, No. 126, (November 17, 1933), p.3.

² "Mo-fan ch'ü ti hsüan-chü yün-tung", (An example of a ch'ü election campaign), HSCH, No. 113, (September 27, 1933), p. 1.

³ HSCH, No. 126, p. 3.

of the hierarchy, the ch'ü electoral committee directed in the hsiang electoral sub-committee to mobilise all the mass organisations to propose candidates.¹ The lists of candidates from the trade unions, Poor Peasant Corps, Mutual Aid Societies etc. were then collected and distributed among the electoral units in the hsiang, each electoral unit only having a proportion of the total list, so that they would be able to give their candidates careful consideration and examination.²

This examination was designed not only to ensure the production of "good" delegates to the Second Congress, but also to weed out from the hsiang, ch'ü, hsien "and even up to the provincial and central levels", those people who were "corrupt, passive, not actively struggling against the warlords and rich peasants, or who oppressed the workers and peasants."³ Those not suitable for candidacy also included "all landlords, capitalists, compromise elements, those with corrupt behaviour or commandist work methods."⁴

In addition to class background, political behaviour was clearly an important criterion for election, as was the attention paid to those "who work industriously for the revolution, especially those

¹ Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, p. 7.

² Ibid.

³ Yung-hu ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui hsüan-ch'üan ta-kang, (Propaganda Outline for the Support of the Second All-Soviet Congress), published by the Central Bureau Propaganda Department, September 1, (1933). SSC 15.

⁴ Ti nien-erh hao, p. 5.

elements who can really represent our worker and peasant masses in speech and action."¹ However, ability to work had also to be considered, for apparently in the past "in several places we only looked at class origins, not at ability, and elements weak in ability were admitted into the government."² The people were therefore encouraged to "raise opinions to oppose bad elements, for if we do not raise our own opinions during the election period, this would be to abandon our own rights."³ In this way the soviet authorities hoped "to know who is good and who is bad, so that we can elect the good but not the bad."⁴

A concrete example of this was provided by the case of Ts'ai-hsi ch'ü where it was claimed that the process had obtained great success.⁵ The candidates' name list was submitted by all the Party and Youth League branches, Poor Peasant Corps and female delegate meetings. The list received immediate criticism by the masses in some places. For example, in Shanghang, one Wang Pao-tzu who had collected taxes before the arrival of the communists, appeared on the candidates list, was criticised by the masses, and removed. He was also deprived of his electoral rights. Another man, Lan Kuang-fa was discovered to be a Red Army deserter and was

¹ Yung-hu ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui hsüan-ch'uan ta-kang, op.cit.

² Ti nien-erh hao, loc.cit.

³ Yung-hu ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui hsüan-ch'uan ta-kang, op.cit.

⁴ "Tsen-yang chun-pei hou-hsüan ming-tan", (How to prepare electoral candidates' names list), Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, p. 7

⁵ HSCH, No. 126, p. 3.

not allowed to be a delegate. A woman was similarly removed, for it was found that although she came from a poor peasant family, she had lived in a landlord and bad gentry family for a long time.¹

In the case of T'ung-hsien hsiang (in Ts'ai-hsi ch'ü) however, no-one offered criticism of the candidates list, and the hsiang electoral committee had to mobilise the people to action. As a result of the ensuing criticism, the secretary of the Party branch was discovered to have stolen good land for himself during the field investigation movement, and the chairman of the hsiang soviet was found to have embezzled soviet funds, "so that he ate good food, better than others." Neither of these two people were elected as delegates.² Ts'ai-hsi ch'ü was most probably not typical of the average soviet electoral unit, but it is illustrative of the kind of model the soviet leaders wished the election to follow.

The overall responsibility for the election rested with the Internal Affairs Commissariat of the CPC, headed by Liang Po-t'ai, a man who had specialised in "soviet construction work" since early 1932.³ In September 1933 the Internal Affairs Commissariat requested the soviet presidia at all levels of the government to transfer work personnel to the local Internal Affairs Departments,

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ See HSCH, No. 9, (February 10, 1932), p. 8.

so as to strengthen these departments and improve their guidance of the election campaign.¹ The Internal Affairs Commissariat was also jointly responsible with the Education Commissariat for propaganda incitement work.² The mass organisations in the soviet areas had first to mobilise the masses within their own organisations, and to discuss with them in detail the work for the Second Congress.³ Then the masses had to be brought to inspect and criticise the work of the government, to collect material on how the decrees of the government were being carried out, and forward these, at the end of August, to the Preparatory Committee for the Second Congress.⁴

In addition, the mass organisations had the task of encouraging "young comrades" to take part in the work of the electoral committees, and of inducing "capable worker comrades to strengthen proletarian leadership at the electoral conferences."⁵ The masses were also to examine soviet work over the previous two years, and to send reports

¹ Kuan-yü hsüan-chü yün-tung ti chih-shih, op.cit.

² Ti nien-erh hao, p. 4. The Propaganda Committees of the CCP also worked for the Second Congress. (Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 59, p. 9).

³ "Su-ch'ü ch'ün-chung t'uan-t'i chin-hsing yung-hu ch'üan-su ta-hui kung-tso", (Soviet areas mass organisations carry out work of supporting the All-Soviet Congress), HSCH, No. 101, (August 13, 1933), p. 2.

⁴ Ibid., section 4.

⁵ Ibid.

to the delegate conferences for discussion.¹

The reports of the soviet government to the voters, on how the work of the government had progressed, were an important part of pre-election propaganda. One of the defects of past work was that they had often been omitted. Their main purpose was to inform the people of the government's policies and get their criticism in return. Initially, one week before the hsiang election, voters meetings would be convened, taking the house or village as the unit, at which the experiences of the government would be put forward, and the opinions of the voters welcomed. Similarly, progressing up the administrative ladder, the ch'ü government sent delegates to report on its work to the hsiang and shih conferences, as did the hsien to the ch'ü and so on. Simultaneously, the Executive Committee at each level made a report to its own conference. The opinions of the voters and delegates were to be transmitted up to the central government "so that they will understand the masses' situation and needs."²

In the case of Ts'ai-hsi ch'ü, their report dwelt on the land problem, labour protection, the task of mobilising for the war,

¹ "Chung-kung chung-yang tsu-chih-chü kuan-yü ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui chun-pei kung-tso ti ch'üeh-ting", (Resolution of the CCP Central Organisation Bureau concerning preparatory work for the Second All-Soviet Congress), dated August 1, 1933, in HSCH, No. 108, (September 6, 1933), p. 3.

² Ti nien-erh hao, p. 7.

expanding the Red Army, economic mobilisation etc. The successes and defects were pointed out, mass criticism was launched, "and the Ts'ai-hsi masses firmly struggled against the incorrect tendencies, and criticised the soviet."¹ The central government made a report to the whole soviet area on November 13 in which it summarised the work situation of the last year. With a rather optimistic view, the report spoke of the great strengthening and expansion of the Red Army, the victories won in the Fourth and Fifth Campaigns, and the expansion and consolidation of the soviet areas.² However, the report went on to say, even further expansion of the Red Army was needed to defeat the Fifth Campaign, the new soviet areas needed to be more speedily developed and consolidated than they had been, and the field investigation movement should be further developed.³

On top of these multifarious activities, the propaganda outline issued by the Central Bureau laid down that "the election movement must be coordinated with the current main work",⁴ such as the field investigation and class investigation movement, and the tasks of actively expanding the Red Army, resisting the attacks of the capitalists, selling economic construction bonds and joining the

¹ HSCH, No. 126, p. 3.

² Ch'ih-fei wen-chien hui-pien, loc.cit.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Yung-hu ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui hsüan-ch'uan ta-kang, op.cit.

cooperatives.¹

With reference to the field investigation movement, the mass organisations were instructed to "penetrate deeply" (shen-ju) during the election campaign. Indeed, said the Party, it was impossible to separate the two,² since the field investigation campaign would discover hidden landlords and kulaks (rich peasants) who had hitherto thieved election rights to which they were not entitled, and would deprive them and other corrupt elements of the rights they had illegally usurped, and cleanse them from the soviet organs.³ The field investigation movement was under the control of the CPC and the Land Commissariat. It also had the task of ensuring that the poor and middle peasants received, and exercised, the rights to which they were entitled under the election law.⁴ Chiu-pao ch'ü in Juichin hsien for example, inspected more than 200 landlords and rich peasants.⁵

¹ Ibid.

² HSCH, No. 108, (September 6, 1933), p. 3.

³ Mao Tse-tung, "Significance of this year's soviet election", Chinese Workers Correspondence, No. 1, pp. 5-6.

⁴ Ti nien-erh hao, p. 4. For an analysis of the land policy of the investigation, and Mao's direct connection with the movement, see Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 166-168.

⁵ "Chiu-pao ch'ü ti hsüan-chü yün-tung", (The Election Campaign of Chiu-pao ch'ü), HSCH, No. 116, (October 6, 1933), p. 3.

Although it had overall responsibility, the Internal Affairs Commissariat was not the only government department to be involved. As already mentioned, the Education Commissariat was concerned with propaganda work, and the Land Commissariat with the field investigation movement. In addition, the Judicial Commissariat issued orders to the Adjudgement Departments (ts'ai-p'an-pu) at all levels, to ensure that those people who had been deprived unjustly of their electoral rights in the past should not be excluded this time.¹

The Labour Commissariat was ordered to guide the Labour Departments at the various levels of government in investigating how well the Labour Law was being implemented. The Labour Commissariat was also required "to develop the struggle between the workers and the capitalists, protect the daily interests of the workers, mobilise the workers to actively participate in the election and perform a leadership function during the election campaign."²

The Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate was required to launch a self-criticism movement to oppose corruption and passivity in carrying out the field investigation and Labour Law implementation movements and commandism in electoral work.³

Other tasks of the election campaign included encouraging people to join the Red Army,⁴ getting deserters to return to the

¹ Ti nien-erh hao, p. 7.

² Ibid., p. 4.

³ Ibid.

⁴ 47 joined from Ts'ai-hsi ch'u (HSCH, No. 127, p. 3.)

ranks, giving preferential treatment to Red Army dependents, selling economic construction bonds and developing cooperative societies.¹

With reference to the actual timing of the elections, Liang Po-t'ai decided that on August 26 in Kiangsi, in Posheng hsien there would be summoned the election campaign conference of all the heads of Internal Affairs Departments at the ch'ü level and above.² On September 5 a similar group was to assemble in Juichin, drawn from the Kwangtung-Kiangsi area, Fukien, and the hsien directly controlled by Juichin.³ In both cases they were to discuss electoral work, the organisation of the Internal Affairs Departments, and in particular, the "shattering of the enemy's Fifth Encirclement Campaign."⁴ At the latter meeting, which lasted for four days and drew officials from 17 hsien, it was Mao Tse-tung who spoke on the KMT's Fifth campaign, and Liang Po-t'ai who reported on the election law and the work of the Internal Affairs Departments.⁵

In a directive letter probably written on the basis of the

¹ For further details, see ibid., and HSCH, No. 116, p. 3.

² "Chiang-hsi ch'üan-sheng ch'ü i-shang nei-wu pu-chang hsiüan-chü yün-tung ta-hui ti tsung-chieh", (Summary of the election campaign conference of heads of Internal Affairs Departments of ch'ü and above in Kiangsi province), in Hsiüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, (September 10, 1933), p. 4.

³ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "Fu-chien Yüeh-kan liang-sheng chi Jui-chin chih-shu hsien ch'ü i-shang nei-wu pu-chang hsiüan-chü yün-tung ta-hui k'ai-mu", (The opening of the electoral movement meeting of the heads of Internal Affairs Departments from the ch'ü and above levels of Fukien, Yüehkan and the hsien under the direct jurisdiction of Juichin), Hsiüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, p. 5.

experiences gained at the two meetings of local officials, Liang decided that by September 25, all the electoral preparatory work should be completed in Kiangsi, and that at that time the election itself could begin, and that at the shih and hsiang levels, the election could be completed by October 5.¹

However, probably because of the lack of understanding of the electoral law caused by its complexity, plus the lack of competent personnel, and other shortcomings previously described, the central government issued a directive at the end of September 1933 to all levels announcing that the date of the elections was to be postponed by one month.² Up to this time all delegate conferences up to provincial level were to have been completed by November 15, but the new completion date was December 15.³ The official explanation for the delay was that the work of demarcating the administrative areas had not been finished on time, and this no doubt was a major factor in the decision, although the apathy at the grass roots level meant that elections could not adequately be run from September 25, as was originally planned.⁴

Red China published a report by Liang Po-t'ai dated September 20 which said that the work of re-demarcation, scheduled for completion at the end of August, had still not been finished. Liang stated

¹ Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, p. 6.

² "Kuan-yü hsüan-chü ti jih-ch'i", (Concerning the election date), HSCH, No. 113, (September 27, 1933), p. 1.

³ Ibid.

⁴ HSCH, No. 90, p. 6.

that this was an obstacle to soviet work, and that the demarcation should be concluded by the end of September.¹

The new schedule laid down that preparatory work should be carried out between September 20 and October 15. During this time, the administrative regions would be completely demarcated, electoral committees organised, and a voter list would be drawn up.² The actual elections (at the hsiang and shih levels) were re-scheduled for October 16-25.³ Following these, the ch'ü conferences were arranged for October 26-November 10, the hsien conferences from November 11-30 and the provincial conferences from December 1-15.⁴ In the case of the Red Army, the General Political Department announced that they were held from December 1-10.⁵

From the point of view of voter participation, it was clearly essential that the size of the electoral unit at the hsiang level be kept small, and this was the basic idea behind the re-demarcation of the administrative areas in the summer of 1933. One article,

¹ Kuan-yü hua-fen hsing-cheng ch'ü-yü fa-chan ching-chi chien-she yü she-li chen-liao-suo wen-t'i, (Concerning the problems of demarcating the administrative areas, developing economic construction and establishing clinics), Notice No. 5 of the Internal Affairs Commissariat, dated September 20, 1933, SSC 10.

² HSCH, No. 113, p. 1, section 1.

³ Ibid., section 2.

⁴ Ibid., section 3.

⁵ "Chung-yang-chün hstün-chü yün-tung chung ti pien-tuan", (An episode in the central army electoral movement), n.d., Hung Hsing, No. 22, (December 31, 1933), p. 3.

for example, said that a distance of 10 li was too far to travel to the election meeting, and certainly meant that voters would not be able to attend with their whole families.¹ Repeating the election law, the article stated that peasants should take their village (or groups of villages) as the unit, with workers in the cities using their place of production or trade union organisation, or, if this was inapplicable, they could use one or two streets as a unit.²

Five days before the hsiang election, the electoral committee published the lists of voters, those deprived of the vote, and the candidates lists.³ Voters in each area were to be informed of the place and time of the meeting three days in advance.⁴ The meeting was convened by first sounding a gong and then letting off firecrackers,⁵ and the registrar took the names of the voters as they entered the meeting hall.⁶ The electoral meeting was in the hands of a Presidium of three, two of whom were elected by the meeting, the third being the representative of the electoral committee, who was to be the chairman.⁷ He was trained beforehand for the post, "so as to avoid an uneasy attitude at the meeting which would cause bad guidance."⁸

¹ HSCH, No. 116, p. 3.

² Ibid.

³ Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hsüan-chü-fa, article 51.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ HSCH, No. 105, (August 25, 1933), p. 1.

⁶ Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hsüan-chü-fa, loc.cit.

⁷ Ibid., article 16.

⁸ Kuei-ting ko-chi cheng-fu hsüan-chü jih-ch'i ti chih-shih-shu, (A directive stipulating the election dates at the various levels of the government), n.d. SSC 10.

The meeting could only begin if the number of voters present was over 50% of the total possible. If less than 50% were present, the meeting was to be convened again at a later date.¹ If at the second meeting, a quorum was still not present, the election was nevertheless to go ahead.² The first item on the agenda was for the chairman to announce the number of voters present, and whether there was a quorum or not.³ Then followed the election of soviet delegates, first the formal and then the candidate delegates. These were to be voted on separately, and not as batches.⁴ The names were to be proposed one at a time for discussion, and the voters were encouraged to give their opinions on the candidates "so as to cause the revolutionary democratic spirit to be fully manifested."⁵ Voting was by a show of hands, "for only in this way can we select the delegates...who are supported by the real majority of the people."⁶ If it appeared that the majority of the voters opposed one of the candidates, then he was to be removed, and another suitable candidate proposed.⁷ The ratio of workers

¹ Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hst'an-chü-fa, article 13.

² Ibid., article 14.

³ Ibid., article 17.

⁴ Ibid., article 18.

⁵ Ti nien-erh hao, p. 5.

⁶ HSCH, No. 116, p. 3.

⁷ Ti nien-erh hao, loc.cit.

to peasants among the delegates has already been discussed in connection with the Election Law. Subsequent directives also added that "labouring females" should constitute 25% of the representatives.¹

Following the election of delegates to the hsiang and shih soviets, the final item on the agenda was the passing of the voters' proposals. The draft proposals, concerned with the economic situation, the policies of the government, and the war, had been prepared well beforehand, and the opinions of the electorate had also been sounded.² Delegates in Manchuria for example, proposed that troops be sent to liberate Japanese held territory, and that guerrilla warfare should be organised in Manchuria.³ The Red Army Third Army Corps requested that more worker cadres should enter the Red Army, and that Red Army soldiers under 16 should have electoral rights.⁴

After the close of the meeting, the records were signed by the Presidium and the secretary, and sent for inspection to higher level soviets.⁵

In the case of the hsiang electoral meetings of Ts'ai-hsi ch'ü, it was reported that there was usually a more than 90%

¹ Kuan-yü hst'an-chü yün-tung ti chih-shih, op.cit.

² Ti nien-erh hao, p. 6.

³ "Ko-ti tai-piao ti chung-yao t'i-an", (Important proposals of delegates from various areas", HSCB, No. 145, (January 19, 1934), p.2.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hst'an-chü-fa, articles 19-20.

attendance, with only the aged and ill being absent. Female representatives often constituted more than 30% of the delegates, but worker representation was often too low, because they did not announce the total number of people in their families, on which basis their allowable number of delegates was to be calculated.

Nevertheless, it was said that Ts'ai-hsi ch'u is "our model for an election. We want every ch'u, hsiang and hsien to learn from this."¹

On the completion of the election of hsiang soviet delegates a plenary session of the new hsiang soviet was convened, which selected a chairman and vice-chairman, and elected delegates to attend the ch'u soviet conference.² Conferences at the ch'u, hsien and provincial levels were convened by their respective Executive Committees, and followed a similar pattern to their lower-level counterparts, with the agenda announced two weeks beforehand.³ Careful investigation was to be made of those people elected to the new E.C.'s as well as those elected as delegates to higher level soviets.⁴

It is clear that each level's conference was organized and controlled by the level immediately superior to it. Thus the provincial soviet was ordered to designate capable people to attend the

¹ HSCH, No. 127, p. 3.

² Ti nien-erh hao, p. 6.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

hsien conference and direct its work.¹ Hsien conferences were held in groups of 7-10 hsien to speed up the process, and the provincial soviets were warned to make sure that these conferences were not all held at the same time, so risking the chance that they could not send men to supervise them all.² The hsien soviet officials, in their turn, were to do the same for the ch'ü conferences, and the ch'ü officials for the hsiang conferences,³ thus ensuring Party control over the final result-- the delegates and resolutions forwarded to the Second Congress.

Since the elections were postponed, it was inevitable that the date originally set for the Second Congress, December 11, 1933, would have to be set back. In October, it was announced that it would now convene on January 1, 1934.⁴ In the last few weeks before the Congress, meetings of mass organisations were to be held to discuss the event, and oral propaganda and wall newspaper propaganda teams were to be organised. The workers and peasants

¹ HSCH, No. 113, p. 1.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ "Erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui tsai hung-ch'ün chung tsen-yang chin-hsing hsüan-ch'ü", (How the election for the Second National Soviet Congress will be carried out in the Red Army), n.d., Hung Hsing, No. 12, (October 22, 1933), p. 3.

were asked to donate gifts of local produce and cloth to delegates. On the day the Congress was to be convened, Party and Youth League members were instructed to attend hsiang meetings, and parties were to be held in the evening to provide an enthusiastic atmosphere for the Congress.¹

Great efforts were also made on behalf of the election campaign in the other soviet districts apart from the central soviet area. This effort, in conjunction with work in the KMT areas, was designed primarily to get the other soviet areas and non-soviet territory to hold elections for the sending of delegates to the Second Congress so that it might in reality become a Congress representing all China.² In the case of soviet areas outside the central soviet district, the Central sub-bureaux and provincial committees of Oytwan,³ Hsiangosi,⁴ Szechuan, Minchekan,⁵ Hsiangokan,⁶ and Hsiangkan⁷ were instructed to lead the electoral movement in their areas.⁸ In addition, the central government decided to send delegations or observer corps to Minchekan, Hsiangokan, and Hsiangkan "to help this movement".⁹

¹ Kuan-yü yung-hu ch'üan-su ta-hui ti wen-t'i, (On the question of supporting the National Soviet Congress), December 7, (1933). SSC 4.

² HSCH, No. 108, p. 3.

³ Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Border Area.

⁴ Western Hupeh-Hunan Border Area.

⁵ Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Border Area.

⁶ Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Border Area.

⁷ Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area.

⁸ HSCH, No. 108, p. 3.

⁹ Ibid.

Mao Tse-tung, speaking at an election meeting in September 1933, announced that "in the crushing of (the) enemies' fourth offensive, the soviet dominion has been greatly extended, and we are seeing this year that the soviet election takes place in ten provincial units."¹ In addition to the six areas mentioned by the CCP Organisation Bureau,² Mao spoke of a further four - the Kiangsi (soviet area), the Fukien (soviet area), the Kwangtung-Kiangsi Border (area), and the Fukien-Kiangsi Border (area).³

The question then arises as to whether these ten soviet areas existed as anything other than names on paper, and if so, whether they did in fact bestir themselves to send representatives to the Second Congress, providing of course that the military situation and communication problems allowed them to do so.

In the case of the Oytwan soviet, it is most unlikely that there was any organised electoral activity. Chiang Kai-shek's Encirclement Campaign of August 1932 forced Chang Kuo-t'ao and the Red Army's Fourth Front Army under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien to flee to Szechuan, which they reached in December 1932.⁴ Some troops (which later formed part of the 25th Army) were left behind, where they remained until September 1934, but it is unlikely that their guerrilla operations permitted elections to be held.⁵

¹ Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Workers Correspondence, loc.cit.

² HSCH, No. 108, p. 3.

³ Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Workers Correspondence, loc.cit.

⁴ Nym Wales, Red Dust, p. 158.

⁵ Ibid. See also Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution, p. 263.

There was however one representative of the Oyuwan soviet present at the Congress. The name of Ch'eng Fang-wu appears in the list of delegates elected to the Presidium of the Congress coupled with the information that he was from Oyuwan.¹ Ch'eng was also elected to the Central Executive Committee. It is possible that Ch'eng was not a delegate from Oyuwan at all, but was deputed to be their representative, possibly because he might have had some contact with the area in the past.² A communist source, listing the areas sending delegates, makes no mention of any from Oyuwan, either having arrived, or being awaited.³

¹ CRBRD, p. 652. See also HSCH, Special Edition for the Second Congress, No. 2, (January 24, 1934), p. 2. For full list see Table VIII.

² In spite of a Party injunction that "every delegate must be elected by a mass conference, and is not permitted to be deputed", "Chung-yang kuan-yü chao-chi su-ta-hui ti t'ung-chih", (Notice of Central convening the Soviet Congress), dated August 13, (1933), Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 59, (August, 1933), p. 8. ✓

³ "Tsai ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui ch'ien-nien", (Before the Second National Soviet Congress), HSCH, No. 145, (January 19, 1934), p. 2.

T A B L E VIIIPresidium of the Second National Congress of Soviets¹Delegates from Kiangsi (16)

Mao Tse-tung

Po Ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien)

Hsiang Ying

Wu Liang-p'ing

Liu Shao-ch'i

Ho K'o-ch'üan

Chou Yüeh-lin

Chin Wei-ying

Liu Ch'i-yao

Chang Ch'ang-t'ao

Ts'ai Ch'ang

Tseng Shan

Hsieh P'ei-lan

Liu Ch'üan-hsing

Wang Yüeh

Chung Hsün-jen

Delegates from Fukien (6)

Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu)

Teng Fa

Wang Sheng-jung

Fan Lo-ch'un

Wu Tzu-yüan

Huang Yi-chang

Delegates from Yuehkan (6)

Lo Mai (Li Wei-han)

Ch'en Yün

Liu Kuo-chu

Fu Ts'ai-hsiu

Chou Yi-k'ai

Chung Shih-pin

Delegates from the Red Army (10)

Chu Teh

Chou En-lai

Wang Chia-ch'iang

Ho Ch'ang-kung

Wang Chen

T'eng Tai-yüan

Sung Jen-ch'üung

Chang Chen-shan

Liu Chang-hung

Feng Wen-pin

Delegates from Juichin (8)

Tung Pi-wu

Yang Shih-chu

Kao Tzu-li

Hsü T'eh-li

Liang Po-t'ai

Chu Ti-yüan

Teng Chen-hsün

Liu Ch'ün-hsien.

T A B L E VIII (contd.)Delegates from Minkan (3)

Ku Tso-lin

Hu Teh-lan

Chu Wei-yüan

Delegates from Minchekan (3)

Wang Chin-hsiang

Chang Tung-hsiu

Hsü Li-ch'eng

Delegates from Hsiangokan (3)

Huang Kuang-lu

Chang Yün-hsien

Chang Chin-lou

Delegate from Hsiangkan

T'an Yü-pao

Delegate from Ki-an

Wang Jui-chang

Delegate from Oytüwan

Ch'eng Fang-wu

Delegate from the Hupeh-Honan Border

Chang Hsing

Delegate from Shanghai

Chu Ch'i

Delegate from Manchuria

Ho Teh

Delegate from Shensi

Chia Yüan

Delegate from Honan

Wang Mu

Delegate from East River

Hsü Ch'eng

Delegate from Hongkong

Wang Shen

Delegate from Amoy

Wang Hui

Delegate from Szechuan

Miu K'un

Delegate from Shantung

Wang Sheng

Delegate from Korea

Pi Shih-t'i

Delegate from Java

Chang Jan-ho

Delegate from Taiwan

Ts'ai Kan

Delegate from Annam

Hung Shui

Delegate from the Arsenal

Lu Tsung-ch'ang

T A B L E VIII (contd.)

¹ According to CRBRD, p. 651, Ts'ai Ch'ang, a delegate from Kiangsi, proposed that the Congress select the above Presidium from the more than 700 delegates and 1,000 observers present at the Congress. The number is given as 75, but only 73 names are listed, with no explanation for the missing two. Robert Elegant refers to Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai as being elected to the Presidium from the Kiangsi delegation. Elegant gives no source, and Ch'ü does not feature as a member of the delegation, but he was in Kiangsi and present at the time, and this might explain one of the missing two men. [Elegant, China's Red Masters, (New York: Twayne Publishing Co., 1951), p. 170.] This was probably taken from HSCH, Special Edition of the Second Congress, No. 2, (January 24, 1934), p. 2., from which the list is drawn, which also states that there were 75 members, but lists only 73. Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 312, repeats this error. McLane is mistaken when he says that none of the three principal speakers at the CCP Fifth Plenum (Lo Fu, Ch'en Yün, Po Ku), were "elected to active membership on the soviet presidium", whereas they "were elected honorary members". All three were on the working presidium. McLane confused this with the honorary presidium. [Charles B. McLane, Soviet policy and the Chinese communists, 1931-1946, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 41.]

The same Encirclement Campaign (Chiang Kai-shek's fourth), destroyed Ho Lung's soviet base on the (western) Hupeh-Hunan border, from whence they were driven to the borders of Hupeh, Hunan, Szechuan and Kweichow.¹

Although it is most unlikely that there were elections in the area, two representatives were elected to the Presidium of the Congress, one, Chang Hsing, from the Hupeh-Honan border; and the other, Wang Mu, from Honan. Neither appear to have played a major role in the Congress proceedings.

After the collapse of the Oyüwan base, the Fourth Front Army headed for Szechuan, where they arrived in December 1932.² According to the commander of the Fourth Front Army, Hstü Hsiang-ch'ien, a soviet delegates conference was held in May 1933, at Pa-chou, where 3,000 delegates gathered - representing one million people living in the fourteen hsien which made up the new Szechuan-Shensi soviet area.³ There are no records of this conference, which was in any case held too early to be aware of the forthcoming Second Congress. Both Hstü Hsiang-ch'ien and Chang Kuo-t'ao were elected to the Central Executive Committee, but neither were actually present at the Congress. One delegate, Miu K'un allegedly from Szechuan, was elected to the Presidium of the Congress.⁴

¹ Jerome Ch'en, op.cit., p. 176.

² Nym Wales, Red Dust, p. 158.

³ Ibid.

⁴ CRBRD, p. 652. HSCH, No. 145, p. 2, refers to delegate(s) from Szechuan having arrived in Juichin.

The Kiangsi-Kwangtung (Yüehkan) soviet area was set up in the summer of 1933 on the basis of a decision taken at the 48th. meeting of the Council of People's Commissars on August 16.¹ The area held its first Party Congress in November 1933, and although mention is made of the soviet election movement taking place, no details are available.² Two sources however refer to delegates from "the East River of Kwangtung",³ and the Presidium of the Congress has six men listed as representing Yüehkan.⁴

The Minchekan (Fukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi) soviet area held its third Congress in November 1933, at which it was proposed to elect delegates to attend the National Congress.⁵ A delegation from the area did arrive in the central soviet districts,⁶ and Minchekan had three representatives on the Congress Presidium one of whom,

¹ HSCH, No. 106, (August 31, 1933), p. 5.

² Lo Mai, "Tsai Yüeh-kan sheng ti-i-tz'u tang tai-piao hui-i ti ch'ien-mien", (Before the First Party Congress of Yüehkan Province), dated November 4, 1933; printed in Tou-cheng, No. 34, (November 12, 1933), pp. 1-5.

³ HSCH, No. 145, p. 2. CRBRD, loc.cit., refers to one delegate from "East River".

⁴ CRBRD, p. 651. The six were: Lo Mai, Ch'en Yün, Liu Kuo-chu, Fu Ts'ai-hsiu, Chou Yi-k'ai and Chung Shih-pin.

⁵ HSCH, No. 127, (November 20, 1933), p. 3.

⁶ HSCH, No. 145, p. 2.

Wang Chin-hsiang, was later elected to the Central Executive Committee.¹

The Minkan (Fukien-Kiangsi) soviet area held its first workers, peasants and soldiers delegate conference in December 1933.² Very limited information is available concerning this meeting, but it is probable that arrangements were made to have the soviet represented at the National Congress. Chu Wei-yüan, who was elected to the formal Presidium of the Minkan Conference,³ was also elected to the Presidium of the National Congress, together with two other delegates from Minkan, Ku Tso-lin and Hu Te-lan.⁴

On October 30, 1933 there was convened the third delegate conference of the Hsiangokan (Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi) soviet area.⁵ The record of the proceedings does not refer to the election of delegates to attend the National Congress in Juichin, but this probably took place. Chang Chin-lou, one of the two vice-chairmen of the Hsiangokan presidium set up at the conference, was subsequently

¹ CRBRD, loc.cit. The other two were Chang Tung-hsiu and Hsü Li-ch'eng.

² Ta-hui T'ie-k'ian, (Special Publication of the Congress), No. 2, (December 14, 1933), p. 1. Parts of this are illegible. SSC 9. (No. 1 is not available.)

³ Ibid.

⁴ CRBRD, loc.cit. Chu Wei-yüan and Ku Tso-lin were both to be put on the CEC.

⁵ Article dated November 17, 1933 in HSCH, No. 128, (November 23, 1933), p. 1.

elected to the Presidium of the Second Congress.¹ Four members of the Hsiangokan presidium, including the Chairman, Ho Chen-wu, and the two vice-chairmen, Chang Chin-lou and K'ung Ho-ch'ung, were made members of the CEC at the Second Congress.² The Hsiangkan (Hunan-Kiangsi) soviet is known to have sent a delegation to the Second Congress,³ and to have carried out an election campaign within its territory.⁴ T'an Yü-pao represented the area on the Congress Presidium, and was later elevated to the CEC.⁵

Fukien was represented on the Presidium of the Second Congress by a very strong delegation, six in all, who were all elected to the CEC.⁶ The six included Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu) and Teng Fa, both CCP Politburo members.

From Kiangsi came the strongest delegation of all, which might be expected as the province housed the soviet capital, and was the most secure of all the communist controlled territories.

¹ See ibid., and CRBRD, loc.cit. As was Chang Yün-hsien, a member of the Hsiangokan presidium. The third member of the delegation was Huang Kuang-lu.

² HSCH, No. 128, p. 1. The fourth member was Chang Yün-hsien.

³ HSCH, No. 145, p. 2.

⁴ Hung-se Hsiang-kan, (Red Hunan-Kiangsi), No. 21, (November 13, 1933), p. 6.

⁵ CRBRD, pp. 651-652. T'an was the Chairman of the soviet. [Hung-se Hsiang-kan, No. 25, (March 8, 1934), p. 3.]

⁶ CRBRD, p. 651.

Two hundred and fifty delegates were sent to Juichin to attend the Second Congress.¹ They were elected at the Second Conference of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet, held in December 1933.²

The Presidium of the Second Congress had its largest delegation from Kiangsi - 16 in all, including the Chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial soviet Liu Ch'i-yao, and the vice-chairman Tseng Shan. Mao Tse-tung, head of the soviet government was included, as well as one of the vice-chairmen Hsiang Ying, and a leader of the "Russian Returned Student" group Po Ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien).³ Of the 16, no less than 12 were to find their way onto the CEC.

In addition to its own delegation from Kiangsi the central soviet area was strengthened by a separate body of delegates elected from the soviet capital itself. Juichin hsien held its fifth workers', peasants' and soldiers' representative conference just prior to the Second Congress, to which it sent 70 delegates.⁴ It had a membership of eight on the Congress Presidium, all of whom were made members of the CEC.

¹ "Chiang-hsi ti-erh-tz'u sheng-su ta-hui chan-tou ti ch'eng-kung-le", (The Fighting Success of the Second Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Congress), HSCH, No. 140, (January 4, 1934), p. 3.

² Chiang-hsi sheng su-wei-ai chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pu-kao ti-i-hao, (Announcement No. 1 of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Executive Committee), February 5, 1934. SSC 16.

³ CRBRD, loc.cit.

⁴ HSCH, No. 143, (January 13, 1934), p. 3.

One can therefore conclude that in their efforts to make the Second Congress representative of all the soviet areas, the CCP and the soviet government met with some measure of success. All the soviet areas mentioned by Mao in his election speech were present at the Congress. This fact must be tempered however, by the knowledge that the overwhelming weight of soviet area delegates came from the central soviet Kiangsi/Fukien area. One report says that over 700 delegates arrived,¹ although apparently provisions were made for more than 2,000.² Of the 700, no fewer than 320 were known to have come from Kiangsi or Juichin, and this does not include those from Fukien or from the Red Army operating in the central area.³

The same argument applies, a fortiori, to the Presidium of the Congress. The delegates from the Red Army were mainly active in the central soviet district, and together with those from Kiangsi, Fukien and Juichin, they gave the men from the central area an absolute majority on the Presidium.⁴

The Communist Party, in addition to seeking representation from all the soviet areas, sought to establish the Chinese Soviet Republic as an alternative state to the Kuomintang regime, and therefore exerted considerable efforts to encourage delegates to

¹ CRBRD, loc.cit.

² HSCH, No. 145, p. 2. This figure probably included observers in addition to official delegates.

³ HSCH, No. 140, p. 3. (250 from Kiangsi and 70 from Juichin).

⁴ The Presidium was a form of Steering Committee for the Congress, and it can be assumed that its members were present at the time, unlike those nominated to the Honorary Presidium.

come to the Second Congress from the KMT-controlled parts of the country - particularly from the industrial centres. The CCP ordered its members to convene mass meetings "especially among workers in large factories",¹ so that they might send delegates to Juichin.

Party branches were required to send production workers from all the centres of production - Kiangsu, Hopeh, Wuhan and Manchuria.² Particular attention was paid to Shanghai, where the Party members were told to liaise with the trades unions in sabotaging and confiscating imported munitions.³ Anti-imperialist organisations in the city were to spread propaganda concerning the Congress.⁴

The CCP made some headway in Shanghai, for it was later reported that on November 6 the dockers had carried out some propaganda activities by holding meetings, passing out leaflets, hanging up red flags and the like, and that they had also elected some 25 peasants and 24 dock workers to attend the Second Congress.⁵

¹ HSCH, No. 108, p. 3.

² Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 59, p. 7.

³ Ibid., p. 10.

⁴ Ibid., p. 9. Exhibitions and "mobile art units" were to be set up, and left wing writers were to be "mobilised".

⁵ "Shang-hai kung-nung tsai fan fa-hsi-szu tou-cheng chung hsüan-ch'ü ch'u-hsi erh-su ta-hui tai-piao", (Shanghai workers and peasants in the anti-fascist struggle elect delegates to the Second National Soviet Congress), HSCH, No. 128, (November 23, 1933), p. 1.

Six more delegates were said to have been selected elsewhere in Shanghai, and the Seamen's Club sent a further three.¹

Apart from the soviet areas, and the industrial and commercial centres in the KMT districts, the CCP leaders had a third main target in creating propaganda and dissaffection in the White (KMT) armies. Party members were told to use any methods to infiltrate into enemy units taking part in the encirclement campaign, and to incite the soldiers to insurrection.² This was particularly important in view of the CCP policy of breaking the KMT's economic embargo on the soviet territories, which was having a severe effect on the soviet economy.³ Guerrilla districts in the White areas were also instructed to elect and send delegates to the Second Congress.⁴

Overall, it is clear that the Party made much greater efforts to secure representation from outside the soviet areas than they did in the case of the First Congress of 1931. Delegates to the Second Congress reportedly came from areas such as Manchuria, Shensi, Amoy and Shantung, as well as further places like Hong Kong, Korea, Java, Annam and Taiwan.⁵

¹ Ibid.

² Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 59, pp. 9-10.

³ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵ See Table VIII.

Immediately prior to the opening of the Congress, the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP convened in Juichin. In addition to members and alternate members of the CC being present, there were also representatives from the provincial committees.¹ Whether Mao actually attended the Plenum or not is unknown, but if he did he certainly was not chosen to deliver any one of the three major reports adopted by the Plenum. In fact, he was apparently attacked by Po Ku for his "countryside" policy.² It was Po Ku who reported on the current situation and the Party's tasks,³ followed by Ch'en Yün on the economic struggle in the KMT areas,⁴ and Lo Fu on the soviet movement.⁵ Lo Fu's report was later to be termed the "Instructions of the Fifth Plenum to the Party Corps at the Second National Soviet Congress",⁶

¹ "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chung-yang cheng-chih-ch'ü t'ung-chih", (Notice of the CCP Central Politburo), dated February 10, 1934; printed in Tou-cheng, No. 47, (February 16, 1934), p. 1. SSC 18.

² R. C. North interview with Chang Kuo-t'ao. (Hoover Library Microfilm.)

³ "Mu-ch'ien ti hsing-shih yü tang ti jen-wu ch'üeh-i", (Resolution on the current situation and the tasks of the Party), adopted by the Fifth Plenum on January 18, 1934; printed in Tou-cheng, No. 47, (February 16, 1934), pp. 1-16. SSC 18.

⁴ "Wu-chung ch'üan-hui kuan-yü pai-se ch'ü-yü chung ching-chi tou-cheng yü kung-hui kung-tso ti ch'üeh-i", (Resolution of the Fifth Plenum on economic struggle and trade union work in the white areas); printed in Tou-cheng, No. 50, (March 11, 1934), pp. 1-12. SSC 18.

⁵ Tou-cheng, No. 47, p. 1.

⁶ "Wu-chung ch'üan-hui kei erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui tang-t'uan ti chih-ling", printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 9-21.

which laid down the line the Central Committee wished the Congress to follow. This line, expressed in general terms by the Instructions to the Party Corps, said that from the time of the Fourth Plenum the Chinese soviet regime had been greatly consolidated and developed, soviet territory had been expanded, a strong Red Army created, and centralised leadership of the soviet government established, so that the regime was now a major factor in China's revolutionary situation. Since the immediate aim of the regime was to achieve initial victories in one or more provinces, the Second Congress had to strengthen political and military leadership over the soviet areas, and join them together. Furthermore, to build up the Red Army to one million men, and establish the absolute leadership of the Party over the Red Army, so as to wipe out the tradition of guerrilla-ism. Within the soviet areas, the solving of the land problem and the improving of economic conditions was a guarantee of victory in the war, and the task now was to take the field investigation movement from the advanced to the backward soviet areas. In line with Comintern instructions, Lo Fu's report condemned the nationalisation of land as mistaken at the current time. The Party was instructed to strengthen its leadership function in the soviet areas so that all personnel would have "a deep understanding that the soviet regime is only consolidated and developed

under the leadership of the Party, and that the Party carries absolute responsibility for all the work of the soviet government. The strengthening of proletarian leadership in the soviet regime provides the necessary conditions and guarantee for the future change of the soviet revolution into socialism".¹ These general principles and sentiments were all followed and made more concrete at the various speeches presented to the Second Congress.

Many of the proposals and resolutions of the Plenum were later attacked by Mao, although he agreed with them at the time. Writing in 1945, Mao condemned the Fifth Plenum as marking "the peak of the development of the third 'Left' line",² under the leadership of the Returned Students Ch'en Shao-yü, and especially Chang Wen-t'ien and Ch'in Pang-hsien. (Po Ku).³ The conclusions of the Fifth Plenum diagnosed the existence of a revolutionary situation in China.⁴ This was in harmony with the so-called "forward and offensive line" which had been the policy of the Returned Student group since late 1931.⁵ Over-optimistic in their vision of the revolutionary prospects

¹ Ibid., p. 21.

² RCQHP, p. 191.

³ Ch'en Shao-yü was in Moscow at the time. Po Ku was re-elected Secretary-General. He and Chang Wen-t'ien, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, and Ch'en Yun formed the new Standing Committee of the Politburo. Issues and Studies, Vol. IV, No. 1, (October 1967), p. 38.

⁴ Po Ku, "Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang chung-yang wei-yüan-hui ti-wu-tz'u ch'üan-hui tsung-chieh", (Conclusions of the Fifth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee), Tou-cheng, No. 48, (February 23, 1934), p. 3. SSC 18.

⁵ Hsiao Tso-liang, II, op.cit., pp. 490-492.

for China, the Returned Student leaders urged positional warfare against Chiang Kai-shek rather than reliance on Mao's guerrilla methods. The "forward and offensive line" was reinforced by the Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI, which affirmed the existence of a revolutionary situation in China.¹ Mao later condemned this line,² but voiced his agreement with it at the time.³ In 1945, he also commented that "the Fifth Plenary Session blindly concluded that 'the revolutionary crisis in China has reached a new acute stage' ...",⁴ and that this was just to repeat the views of the Li Li-san line.⁵

¹ Ibid., p. 652. Also, Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International, 1919-1943, III, p. 222.

² RCQHP, p. 203.

³ See for example his "Fen-sui wu-tz'u 'wei-chiao' yü su-wei-ai ching-chi chien-she jen-wu", (Smashing the Fifth Encirclement Campaign and the tasks of the soviet economic construction), HSCH, No. 102, (August 16, 1933), pp. 2-4.

⁴ RCQHP, p. 191.

⁵ Ibid. In addition to these points, Mao may also have been at odds with the Politburo over the question of the "Fukien revolt", which refers to the rebellion of the KMT's Nineteenth Route Army in November 1933, occurring after a preliminary agreement with the CCP. The Politburo however, gave little support to the rebels, refused to aid them militarily, with the result that they were crushed by Chiang Kai-shek in January 1934. Mao later denounced this policy as erroneous, and said that the CCP should have allied themselves with the rebels. (Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, p. 186). The question arises as to what was Mao's position on the Fukien rebels at the time. All the indications are that he opposed collaboration with them. See Mao's denunciation of the Fukien government in his report to the Second Congress, pp. 40-41. [See also Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 172-175. For a survey of the documents, see Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., pp. 248-260; and II, pp. 676-688. For a differing viewpoint, see John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in opposition, 1927-1935, pp. 260-261.]

The Returned Students, having supervised the electoral campaign from start to finish, having organised a network of Party factions in each delegation, and having re-affirmed their line at the Fifth Plenum, were now ready to go ahead with the Second Congress and formally establish their control over the organs of soviet government. The CCP however did not rely on a very formalised institutional structure to control the soviet governmental apparatus. There is no indication of the "double track" system of parallel Party and government committees which existed in the USSR at that time, and were imported into China after 1949.¹ Under this system, a hsien soviet for example would have been under the jurisdiction of both the Party committee on its own level (the hsien Party committee) and its superior soviet organ (the provincial soviet). Instead, the Party maintained control by having a loyal official (Liang Po-t'ai) as head of the CPC's Internal Affairs Department, which had jurisdiction over all soviet construction and soviet elections, and by CCP participation in the electoral committees to create a Party Corps in each delegation to the Second Congress.²

¹ Michel C. Oksenberg, "Aspects of Local Government and Politics in China: 1955-58", Journal of Development Studies, Vol. IV, No. 1, (October 1967), pp. 28-31.

² The Party Corps (tang-t'uan) were groups of Party members within non-Party organisations, who had the responsibility of ensuring that these organisations conformed to Party policy. For an outline of their activities, see Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 189.

The Proceedings of the Congress

The Second National Soviet Congress officially opened on January 22, 1934, and lasted for eleven days.¹

In the afternoon of January 22,² following a salute of three rounds of gunfire,³ Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the soviet government, formally proclaimed the Congress open.⁴ This proclamation was followed by thunderous applause, and a "magnificent military

¹ The date of January 22 is given by Hung Hsing, No. 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1; in HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, (January 24, 1934), p. 2; and CRBRD, p. 651. An official copy of the Proclamation of the CEC gives the date of January 21. See Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pu-kao, ti-i hao, (Announcement No. 1 of the CEC of the Chinese Soviet Republic), February 5, 1934, SSC 16, as does the reprint of the Announcement in HSCH, No. 148, (February 12, 1934), p. 2.

² Before the formal opening of the Congress however, Mao, Chu Teh and Ts'ai Ch'ang had reviewed troops early that morning. "/ "Ta-hui tai-piao yüeh-ping? (illegible)-sheng", (Congress Delegates Review Troops), HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, (January 24, 1934), p. 4. "/ The troops included those from the Red Army Academy, the First and Second Infantry School, and others. "/ See "Wei-ta ti-yi-t'ien", (A Great Day), Hung Hsing, No. 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1. "/

³ "Erh-su ta-hui k'ai-mu tien-li", (Opening Ceremony of the Second National Soviet Congress), HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p. 2. "/ HSCH, ran a series of special numbers for the Congress - seven in all - which are located on SSC 17. "/ See also Hung Hsing, No. 26, p. 1. The gunfire was followed by firecrackers, and "the sounds of the gunfire and the firecrackers shook the colonies of the East". (HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, loc.cit.)

⁴ Mao made a brief and formal speech which did not add anything of substance to the HSCH opening editorial of that date. See "Mao chu-hsi Chiang-tz'u ti su-hsieh", (Shorthand Copy of the Speech of Chairman Mao), HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p. 1.

march was struck up".¹ The Congress was held in a new auditorium which could hold 1,000 people.² It was bedecked with red and green flags, which had written on them slogans such as "Only the Soviets can save China" and "Develop and Consolidate the Soviet Areas."³

Delegates to the Congress came from the various soviet areas then functioning within China, from many provinces in the White areas, and from neighbouring countries.⁴ The official list of delegates, gives a total of 693 full delegates and 83 alternates. (Plus approximately 1,500 observers.) The breakdown in terms of numbers and origin is as on Table IX. The Chart therefore refers to a total of 776 full or alternate delegates.⁵

These figures are not always in agreement with others cited earlier. For example, the Second Congress of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet was reported to have sent some 250 delegates to the National Congress,⁶ not 222 as listed. Nor is there any mention of the 70 delegates from Juichin.⁷ Possibly the "surplus" delegates were

¹ HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p. 2.

² "Hung-se chan-shih san-chi", (Scattered Reminiscences of Red Fighters), Hung Chi P'iao-p'iao, No. 8, (July 1958), p. 97. Obviously not all the people concerned could be accommodated, since there were said to be 700 delegates and over 1,500 observers. One source enlarged the capacity of the hall to 10,000. See Chieh Hua, Inprecor, No. 32, (June 1, 1934), p. 844.

³ HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p. 2.

⁴ This point has already been discussed to some extent in my section dealing with the preparatory work of the Congress, and the efforts of the government to ensure that the Congress was representative of all China.

⁵ Two secondary sources are therefore incorrect in referring to 821 delegates. (See Pavel Mif, Heroic China, p.75. Also Charles B. McClane, op.cit., p. 25.)

⁶ Supra.

⁷ Supra.

T A B L E IXDelegations to the Second Congress¹

<u>Delegation</u>	<u>Full</u>	<u>Alternate</u>
Hsiang-kan	43	0
Local armed forces	13	9
Red Army	117	28
Minkan	37	0
Ytshkan	63	12
Fukien	79	8
Kiangsi	196	26
Central Level	48	0
National Minorities	3	0
White Areas	17	0
Szechuan	1	0
Oytwan	1	0
Hsiangokan	30	0
Minchekan	45	0
TOTAL	693	83

¹ "Tao-hui tai-piao t'ung-chi", (Statistics of those attending Congress), Hung Hsing, No. 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1. The chart can also be found in HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p. 3.

subsumed under the heading of "observers", and that these, and similar discrepancies in the figures can be thus explained. A probable alternative explanation is that many of the delegates elected in 1933 were either called to the front to counter the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, or that they were intercepted on their way to the Congress.¹ In the case of Juichin delegates, they might well have been listed under "Central Level". In addition, some of the delegates listed as members of the Presidium of the Congress, represented areas which do not appear in the Chart of those attending the Congress. There is no mention in the chart, for instance, of delegates from either Shensi or the Hupeh-Honan border area, both of whom were on the Presidium. Possibly these delegates came under the heading of the "Red Army", or "Local Armed Forces". Presidium members marked as representing such places as Shanghai and Hong Kong were probably grouped under the title of "White Areas". If one includes areas referred to in other sources as having representation at the Congress, then the chart from Red Star must be expanded to include the following:

Manchuria

Shanghai

Shantung

¹ For example, it was reported that three delegates from Foochow in the White Areas were arrested en route by KMT "executionist thugs". ("Chui-tao wo-men ti hsi-sheng-che", ∟ Mourn our Sacrifices ∟, HSCH, No. 146, ∟ February 6, 1934 ∟, p. 1.)

Honan
 Shensi
 Amoy
 Kwangtung
 Kwangsi
 East River
 Kiangsi White Areas
 Korea
 Taiwan
 Annam¹

A Russian source also mentions Java.² This now brings the listing into close agreement with the representation on the Presidium.

A subsequent edition of Red Star carried a breakdown of the delegates into their Party membership and class origin.³

Youth League Members	116
Party Members	628
Others	64
Small Merchants	4
Middle Peasants	25

¹ "Chan-cheng tung-yüan chung ti tai-piao sheng-huo", (Life of the Delegates during War Mobilisation), HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, (February 1, 1934), p. 3.

² Chieh Hua, Inprecor, loc.cit.

³ "Tai-piao ch'eng-fen tiao-ch'a piao", (Delegate Component Investigation Chart), HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, (February 3, 1934), p. 4. (It carries a note saying that this is the chart for the 30th January.)

Poor Peasants	303
Hired Peasants	122
Shopworkers	12
Coolies	53
Handicraft Workers	244 ¹
Industrial Workers	8
TOTAL	<u>1,579</u>

The total numbers (1,579) so much exceed the total number of delegates (776) that it can only be assumed that observers were included in the figures. (Or it is possible that there was an element of double-counting present, with peasants who were Party members being subsumed under both headings.) It is surprising that the soviet government published such figures showing that a tiny number of eight men out of 1,579 were drawn from the ranks of the industrial workers, since they usually took pains to emphasise the predominance of the proletariat.² Indeed, one report stressed that of 75 delegates from Hang-ts'ai ch'ü in Fukien, 35 of them or 46.5% were workers.³ No breakdown is given of the

¹ The middle figure is illegible on the above reference, but 244 is given by Pavel Mif, loc.cit., who refers to the handicraft workers as "artisans". He only lists 2 "shop assistants", and describes the 64 "others" as "small shopkeepers, students, professional people and others", ibid. He makes no mention of Youth League or Party members, nor does McLane (op.cit., p. 25), who took his figures from a Soviet source.

² For an analysis of the methods by which the CCP tried to camouflage its primarily peasant membership, see Schwartz, op.cit., especially pp. 191-199.

³ Hung Yi, "Hsien kei ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui", (Dedicated to the Second National Soviet Congress), Tou-cheng, No. 44 (January 26, 1934), p. 7. The fact that there were supposed to be 35 workers from Fukien alone, whereas only 8 appear as industrial workers on the chart is no doubt because these so-called "workers" were handicraft or shop workers.

class membership of the Party and Youth League members, probably because they themselves were mainly peasants or handicraft workers. However, they made up nearly 50% of the total.

According to an editorial published on the front page of the first special edition of Red China celebrating the Second Congress, the Congress was to perform the following functions:-¹

- 1) In the two years since the First Congress (November 1931), the Chinese soviet movement, under the correct leadership of the CCP, the support of the workers and the peasants, and the struggle of the Red Army, had been greatly developed and consolidated. All forces had been centralised to smash four of Chiang Kai-shek's Encirclement Campaigns. The soviet regime was now the only leader and organiser in China of the anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist movement. The Second Congress had therefore been convened to sum up the rich experiences of the last two years, and to plan the future struggle against Japan and imperialism.
- 2) The Second Congress was being held at a time when the Fifth Encirclement Campaign was being launched, and also at a time of transition in the great world revolutionary struggle. It

¹ "Ying-chieh chung-kuo su-wei-ai sheng-li ti ta ko-ming", (Welcome the Great Revolution of the Chinese Soviet Victory), HSCB, Special Edition No. 1, (January 22, 1934), p. 1. This is not in Special Edition No. 7, as stated in Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., p. 268.

was a time of crisis in the battle between the soviet road and the colonial road, and the soviet regime was on the eve of a great revolutionary victory. The Second Congress was therefore of great historical significance.

- 3) During the Congress, the Party must ensure that the regime fulfil the slogan of building a Red Army of one million men, mobilise the masses, seize key cities and win initial victories in one or more provinces. (It is clear from the above points that the Congress was dutifully echoing the line of the Fifth Plenum.)
- 4) The editorial pointed out that although there had been achievements in economic work, these still did not meet requirements. The Congress was therefore to discuss measures for raising the level of trade, and of agricultural and industrial production. In pursuit of this aim, it was necessary to carry out a fierce class struggle, to attack the feudal remnants, the reactionary plots of the rich peasants and capitalists, and in the new and border areas, to liquidate the landlords, oppose (fan-tui) the rich peasants, ally with the poor peasant and link up with the middle peasant. It would also be necessary to weed out from soviet area organs all counter-revolutionary elements who attempted to sabotage soviet work and the Red Army.

- 5) It was pointed out that the weakest link in current work was the consolidation of the new areas and the border areas, that the land question in these areas needed to be speedily resolved, together with the suppression of reactionary armed forces.
- 6) Weaknesses were also reported in the work of the provincial soviets of Kiangsi and Fukien. Leading comrades had become bureaucratic and divorced from the masses.¹

On the same opening day of January 22, after Mao had declared the Congress open, there were brief opening speeches by Po Ku,² who spoke representing the CCP Central Committee; Liu Shao-ch'i,³ who represented the All-China Federation of Trade Unions; Chu Teh⁴ for the Red Army; and Ho K'o-ch'uan on behalf of the Youth League. Chu Teh claimed that the Red Army had smashed half of the Fifth Encirclement Campaign, and that they were confident of dealing similarly with the other half.⁵ In the main however, none of these brief remarks added anything to the opening editorial of Red China.

Following the opening speeches, the Congress, acting on a proposal by Ts'ai Ch'ang, a delegate from Kiangsi, elected a 75-man

¹ Ibid.

² "Po Ku t'ung-chih chih-tz'u ti chieh-lu", (Excerpt from the Speech of Comrade Po Ku), HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, (January 24, 1934), p. 1.

³ There is no record of the content of Liu's remarks.

⁴ "Chu Teh t'ung-chih chih-tz'u", (Speech of Comrade Chu Teh), HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p. 2.

⁵ Ibid.

Presidium.¹ This body was in the nature of a steering committee, and no doubt dealt with the order of the agenda etc.² Po Ku proposed that an Honorary Presidium should be elected. This was approved, and the Honorary Presidium consisted of Stalin, Kalinin, Molotov, Thälmann and Okano.³ Further preliminary business followed the election of the two Presidia. The assembled delegates first elected six committees, and then chose Liang Po-t'ai as Secretary General.⁴ The six committees were as follows:-

- 1) Credentials Committee
- 2) Committee for the Resolution on the Work Report of the CEC
- 3) Committee for the Resolution on Red Army Construction
- 4) Committee for the Resolution on Economic Construction
- 5) Committee for the Resolution on Soviet Construction
- 6) Laws and Decrees Committee

¹ See Table VIII.

² The Presidium may also have dealt with the financial arrangements for the Congress. Most of the funds seem to have been extracted from the landlords and rich peasants. See "Chiu hsien p'in-nung-t'uan tai-piao ta-hui yung-hu ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui t'ung-tien", (Congress of Poor Peasant Corps in Nine Hsien send a Telegram Supporting the Second National Soviet Congress), HSCH, No. 101, (August 13, 1933), p. 3. (The orders of Central were that delegates' travelling expenses were to be met by "sympathetic subscriptions solicited from the masses". See Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 59, p. 8.)

³ HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, op.cit., p. 2. (Okano becomes Nagaoka in Inprecor, 32, loc.cit.)

⁴ Ibid.

The delegates also passed the agenda.¹ Finally, Liu Shao-ch'i proposed sending a telegram to the Heroic Red Army of the North-East; Ho K'o-ch'uan suggested a similar telegram to the revolutionary fighters in the KMT areas; and yet another was despatched to the workers of the USSR. K'ang K'o-ch'ing (the wife of Chu Teh) suggested sending gifts to the wounded soldiers in hospital.²

The Congress agenda consisted of the following six items:-³

- 1) Report on the last two years' work of the CEC (to be delivered by Mao Tse-tung)
- 2) Resolution on Red Army Construction (Chu Teh)
- 3) Resolution on Soviet Construction (Wu Liang-p'ing)
- 4) Resolution on Economic Construction (Lin Po-ch'ü)
- 5) Adoption of a Constitution and other Laws
- 6) The election of a new CEC

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid. That evening, there was a torchlight procession, and a party organised by the Drama Society (Ibid.). Li K'o-nung, who was active in the Political Security Bureau, played the part of a local bully (t'u-hao) in one of the Society's productions. (See Ch'eng Tz'u-yü, "I-ke ching-ts'ai ti wan-hui", (A Colourful Evening Party), HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p. 4.)

³ Hung Hsing, No. 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1 and HSCH, No. 145, (January 19, 1934), p. 2. This agenda had been under discussion for some time - at least since August 12, 1933, when the Congress Preparatory Committee met to draft an agenda. Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 1, (August 25, 1933), p. 8. The six items were decided on at the 48th. meeting of the CPC held on August 16, 1933. HSCH, No. 106, (August 31, 1933), p. 5.

On the day after the opening of the Congress, there were no meetings.¹ On the afternoon of the 24th.,² Mao began his summary of the achievements in soviet work since the First National Soviet Congress.³ He continued his speech to its conclusion on the morning of January 25. Overall, Mao's report followed the lines laid down by the Fifth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee. Echoing the ECCI's Twelfth Plenum, he stated that the Chinese revolution had taken a more acute turn,⁴ and that China was now in a decisive historical stage of struggle between revolution and counter-revolution,

¹ Hung Hsing, No. 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1.

² The timetable of the Congress is included in "Erh-su ta-hui sheng-li ti pi-mu-le", (Victorious Conclusion of the Second Soviet Congress), Hung Hsing, No. 27, (February 4, 1934), p. 1.

³ Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui yü jen-min wei-yüan-hui tui ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui ti pao-kao, (Report of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese Soviet Republic to the Second National Soviet Congress), printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 22-124 (not pp. 122-24, as stated in Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 270). Henceforth referred to as CEC Report. / Also to be found in HSCH, Special Edition No. 3, (January 26, 1934), pp. 1-12 (pp. 5-8 are missing on the SSC microfilm copy). For a listing of where extracts of the CEC Report may be found, together with the origins and deficiencies of these extracts, see Hsiao, I, op.cit., pp. 270-271. In addition, extracts can be located in Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 294-311; a short excerpt, dealing with economic policy, incorrectly datelined January 23, 1934, is in Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, I, pp. 141-145; a summary of the speech can also be seen in Inprecor, No. 37, (June 29, 1934), p. 957, and No. 38, (July 6, 1934), pp. 977-8. /

⁴ CEC Report, p. 23. (All references are drawn from Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien). For the line of the ECCI Twelfth Plenum, see, for example, Tou-cheng, No. 21, (August 12, 1933), p. 1. With reference to the Chinese revolution "taking a more acute turn", Mao was later to denounce the Fifth Plenum for "blindly concluding" that this was the case. (See RCQHP, p. 191).

between the soviet regime and the KMT regime.¹ This struggle would be decided by the victory or defeat of the latest "Encirclement Campaign" of Chiang Kai-shek. Mao went on to describe the great victories of the Red Army over the Fourth Campaign in the first half of 1933,² which led to the expansion of soviet territory in Szechuan, north-west Fukien, east Kiangsi, and the new Min-kan soviet.³ These territorial acquisitions expanded the population of the soviet areas by nearly one million people.⁴ Mao made a brief reference to the appearance in Fukien of a People's Government, but

¹ Ibid., p. 26. Mao later claimed to have opposed this idea. (RCQHP, p. 200).

² In his Report, Mao attributed the defeat of the KMT's Fourth Campaign as being due to the Party's "forward and offensive line", which had in fact been used for the first time instead of Mao's traditional guerrilla tactics. In 1945 however, he claimed that victory was due to the use of his own tactics, and denounced the "forward and offensive line". (RCQHP, p. 190) The success of the Party's new strategy over the Fourth Campaign reinforced their belief that "guerrilla-ism" was obsolete. According to Mao, this led to defeat in the Fifth Campaign, and the loss of the revolutionary base areas. It is unlikely however, that guerrilla tactics could have done more than postponed defeat against the KMT's blockhouse techniques and superior numbers. (See RCQHP, pp. 190-191, p. 204 and p. 207. Also Selected Works, I, pp. 206-207, 220-221, 247-248.)

³ CEC Report, p. 37. [The new Minkan soviet area held its first Congress on December 14, 1933. See Ta-hui t'e-k'an, (Special Publication of the Congress), No. 2, SSC 9.]

⁴ Ibid. According to one communist source, the central revolutionary base area had a population of three million at this time. [Kung Yung-kang, "The Revolutionary Bases in the Countryside, 1928-1933", People's China, No. 8, (April 16, 1957), p. 36.] The total area of the Republic was alleged to be 1,348,180 sq. kms., of which 681,255 sq.kms. represented stable districts. (Wang Ming and K'ang Sheng, Revolutionary China Today, p. 10.)

again echoed the line of the Fifth Plenum in denouncing them.¹ With reference to the work of the government in the soviet areas, the report enthused on the mobilisation of the masses under the soviet regime, and went into some detail on the workings of soviet democracy. Mao stated that because the soviet regime depended on the people, "its enormous strength is not able to be compared with any other state form in history", and that although it used strong power to deal with "class enemies", towards its own class basis (workers and peasants) "it employs no force but demonstrates only the broadest democracy".² Mao said that soviet democracy was first of all manifested in its own elections. He summarised electoral procedures and stated that the electors now realised the connection between the elections and their own lives, so that in the 1932/3 elections, in many places more than 80% of those eligible voted.³ Great success had been obtained, reported Mao, in putting forward women as soviet delegates, so that in Ts'ai-hsi hsiang, about 60% of the delegates were female.⁴ The Report then summarised soviet organisation at the grass roots level and discussed the work of the hsiang committees, by which "soviet work is organised into a complete network in which the broad masses can directly participate."⁵ Government

¹ CEC Report, pp. 40-41.

² Ibid., pp. 52-53.

³ Ibid., p. 54.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 55-56.

work personnel, said Mao, were all appointed by election, and if they were incompetent, they could be recalled by public opinion, so that the solution of all problems was based on public opinion.¹ The democratic nature of the soviets was further manifested by the rights of speech, assembly, association, publication and strike, for which facilities such as meeting places, paper and print shops existed, by contrast to their suppression in the White areas by "KMT fascist terror".²

Mao also spoke of the Labour Law, which was the only major law passed by the First Congress which had been superceded by a revised law prior to the Second Congress.³ The new Labour Law was being implemented everywhere, and had resulted in a better standard of living. Mao also gave figures for the number of workers belonging to trades unions in the soviet areas, and claimed that in the central soviet district, over 95% belonged.⁴ On agrarian policy, the Report reiterated the class line of annihilating the landlords, relying on the hired farm hands and poor peasants, and allying with the middle peasant, which was the line of the editorial of the first Special Edition of Red China,⁵ and of the Fifth Plenum. In the

¹ Ibid., p. 57.

² Ibid., p. 57.

³ Ibid., pp. 64-74. The new Labour Law was passed in October 1933. It can be found in Su-wei-ai fa-tien, (The Soviet Code), Vol. 2, pp. 3-40. SSC 16.

⁴ Ibid., p. 72.

⁵ Supra.

case of the rich peasant however, Mao's Report was more moderate in its language towards them than either the Red China editorial or the Fifth Plenum, both of which used the term "to oppose" (fan-tui)¹ the rich peasants, while Mao employed "exploit" or "squeeze" (po-hstleh).²

Charles McLane erroneously states that the line of the Fifth Plenum was to liquidate the rich peasants, and that Mao opposed this in his Report to the Second Congress.³

Mao then spoke of the land investigation movement. He emphasised that redistribution was to be carried out quickly, and once complete, was not to be carried out all over again, for fear of alienating the peasants.⁴ The Report noted that, after redistribution, agricultural output usually increased over what it had been before, so that in some soviet areas, production was 15-20% higher in 1933 than 1932.⁵ Having discussed the progress of the educational system in the soviet areas,⁶ and the effectiveness

¹ Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 699 and p. 697.

² Ibid., p. 716. There is room for disagreement however on the precise shades of meaning of these two terms, and the relationship between them.

³ Charles McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, p. 41. McLane places considerable reliance on this incorrect view of the line of the Fifth Plenum, in support of his argument that Mao was in command of the soviet government, so that the CCP Central organs were "mere shells of authority". (p. 42) In fact, it is clear that the CCP Central organs laid down the line for the Second Congress, to which Mao was forced to adhere.

⁴ CEC Report, pp. 77-78. For some comments on the land investigation movement in the soviet areas, see Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp.166-168.

⁵ Ibid., p. 85.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 90-96.

of the Marriage Laws passed in 1931,¹ Mao turned to the question of the Red Army.² Most of his comments were concentrated on the need to expand the Red Army, under the slogan of creating "a one-million-strong iron Red Army", and the need to raise the level of political education of Red Army soldiers.³

In order to raise economic, and particularly agricultural production, Mao spoke of organising mutual-aid societies and ploughing teams, which was to be carried out by the Commissariat for National Economy.⁴ The work of the Grain Commissariat was also to be linked with this, so as to maintain the supply of grain to the masses and to the Red Army.⁵ Mao also urged the development of co-operatives, and the possibility of setting up state-owned enterprises in certain cases.⁶ He concluded this section of his speech on economic construction by pleading for the smashing of the enemy's economic blockade, and the development of external trade.⁷

In his discussion of soviet work, Mao said that although it had achieved glorious successes, it could still be improved. The work

¹ Ibid., pp. 96-98.

² Ibid., pp. 107-111.

³ Ibid., pp. 107-109.

⁴ Ibid., p. 112.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 113-114.

⁷ Ibid.

of the CEC and the CPC should be differentiated, and there must be an increase in the number of work personnel in the local people's commissariats.¹ Soviet workers should struggle against bureaucratism and commandism, which led to a gulf being created between the soviets and the masses.² Finally, Mao called on the soviets to strengthen their leadership of the anti-imperialist struggle, to call on the masses to fight for the independence of China, and to defeat the KMT and Japanese imperialism.³

On January 26 and 27, the delegates divided themselves into groups to discuss Chairman Mao's Report.⁴ The summary of their discussions in Red China disclosed only that they were all in agreement with Mao's Report, and that the groups tended to concentrate their discussion on the parts of the Report containing problems particularly relevant to their own areas. Some criticisms of individual delegates appeared - "for only repeating what Chairman Mao said", and for "not understanding the false revolution of the Fukien people's government". In addition, Fukien delegates violently criticised "the work style of aimless-talk-ism and bureaucratism in the Fukien provincial soviet", and the Minchekan delegate raised the problem of whether opium smokers should be allowed to join the guerrilla

¹ Ibid., p. 115.

² Ibid., p. 118. These themes were developed in greater detail by Wu Liang-p'ing in his Report on Soviet Construction.

³ Ibid., pp. 122-123.

⁴ "Fen-tzu t'ao-lun su-wei-ai kung-tso pao-kao ti ching-kuo", (Dividing into Groups to Discuss the Soviet Work Report), HSCH, Special Edition No. 4, (January 28, 1934), p. 3. / See also "Victorious Conclusion of the Second Congress", Hung Hsing, No. 27, p. 1. Discussion on the 27th only is referred to in "Ta-hui chung-yao fa-yen ti i-p'ieh", (A Glance at the Important Speeches of the Congress), HSCH, Special Edition No. 5, (January 31, 1934), p. 3. /

forces, although no decision on this question was reported.¹

Red China, in reproducing a selection of the speeches made by delegates during discussion, also noted that no-one revealed any opinions contrary to those expressed in the Report.² The Kiangsi and Fukien delegates, Liu Ch'i-yao and Fan Lo-ch'un, both accepted Mao's criticisms of bureaucratic errors in the soviet work of their areas, and said that measures were being taken to struggle against bureaucratism.³ Liu also referred to the fact that the struggle against opportunists such as Ku Po and Hsieh Wei-ch'un had not been started as soon as should have done.⁴ This is interesting because Ku and Hsieh were both allied with Mao's brother Mao Tse-t'an, as followers of the "Lo Ming Line", alleged to be pessimistic and defeatist by the Returned Student leadership. Although Liu did not mention Mao's brother personally as an opportunist, this was a thinly disguised attack on the Chairman.⁵

The Minchekan delegate Wang Chin-hsiang admitted the error of conservatism in the work of his area, and also the existence of opportunism which had caused some personnel to take difficulties of supply as a pretext for abandoning recruitment for the Red Army.⁶

¹ Ibid.

² HSCH, Special Edition No. 5, p. 3.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., The Hsiangkan delegate T'an Yü-pao also joined in condemning the "Lo Ming Line".

⁶ Ibid.

The Hsiangkan delegate also spoke of opportunism in his area, manifested in a poor performance with respect to expanding the Red Army, and lack of contact between the soviets and the masses.¹ Problems with the Red Army were also referred to by Lin Jung-k'un, the representative of Juichin, where there was a serious problem with deserters.²

Another major focus of attention in the speeches was the work being carried out in the border soviet areas. Liu Ch'i-yao acknowledged that the Kiangsi provincial soviet had been remiss in this respect. Kiangsi had neglected the work of the Red Guards and Young Pioneers in these areas, had not sent them good cadres from the central area, and the work of eliminating "counter-revolutionaries" was weak, so that "Chiang Kai-shek spies" had penetrated into Hsingkuo hsien. Furthermore, it transpired that "some comrades" were confiscating the land and houses of those peasants who had been forced to follow the gentry and landlords to the white areas and were now in the soviet border areas. In the future, said Liu, they should not be treated as traitors.³ Tseng Ch'ao-sheng, a Red Army delegate, also emphasised that in the new and border areas the work of Red Army recruitment was weak, and that some "opportunist elements". simply said that "the border areas are unable to mobilise".

¹ Ibid., p. 4.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., p. 3.

These viewpoints, said Tseng, should be given "merciless blows".¹

The connection between the soviet organs and the people was another major area of concern to delegates. Chou Tseng-ts'ai, speaking for Hsingkuo hsien, was enthusiastic about the close relationship in his area between the soviets and the mass organizations. In one hsiang, he reported, more than 30 committees had been formed, all the people had been organized, meetings were held three times a month, and each delegate supervised 30-50 people, so that over-all their work met with success.² The female delegate from Kiangsi, Hsieh P'ei-lan, spoke about the role of women in encouraging mass participation in soviet work, especially with regard to Red Army recruitment and morale. However, she said, some women wavered on this last point by preventing their husbands from joining the Red Army. This was to be opposed as sabotaging the expansion of the Red Army.³ Other delegates whose speeches were reported included: Ch'eng Fang-wu (Oytlwan), Chu Ch'i (Shanghai), Ho Teh (Manchuria), and Ch'en Teh-ch'in (Korea).⁴ After the delegates' discussion was completed on January 27, Mao made some

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p. 4.

concluding remarks.¹ Mao began by correcting "some comrades" who he said, had included incorrect views in their speeches. This included those who believed that the Fifth Encirclement Campaign had already been shattered, and those who said that the Red Army was barely in the process of destroying it. The former view, said Mao, was "an exaggerated estimation of our own victory", while the latter "disregarded the serious attacks launched by the Red Army against the enemy", in which the Red Army had already achieved the first stage of victory.² Mao went on to dismiss the opinion of "one comrade who said that the Fukien People's Revolutionary Government was not completely counter-revolutionary in nature".³ "Another comrade", (possibly Fan Lo-ch'un), was ridiculed for claiming that "all the work personnel in Fukien were opportunists."⁴ Mao admitted the existence of some opportunist elements, "but as for what the comrade says, it is a slander directed at the soviet."⁵

¹ "Kuan-yü chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pao-kao ti chieh-lun", (Conclusion Concerning the Report of the CEC), HSCH, Special Edition No. 5, (January 31, 1934), pp. 1-2. [Also printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 125-139. A section can be found in Selected Works, I, pp. 147-152, under the title "Be concerned with the well-being of the masses, pay attention to methods of work". There are numerous omissions from the original Chinese text.]

² Ibid., p. 1. [The Returned Student leaders agreed. In Moscow, Wang Ming spoke in opposition to "pessimistic views about the chances of the survival of the soviet regime in the face of KMT attack." He also attacked those who considered the KMT to be "nothing but a dead corpse". (Wang Ming and K'ang Sheng, op.cit., p. 62)]

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

In a move designed to bolster Red Army morale, Mao declared that divorce was not available to wives of Red Army men unless they had the consent of their husbands, or unless they had not heard from their husbands for two years. Mao refused to accept proposals put forward by some delegates that the minimum marriage age (20 for men, 18 for women) should be lowered.¹

Mao then switched to economic policy, and urged the local soviets to improve the living of the masses, and not just concentrate on expanding the Red Army.² By feeding and clothing the masses, observed Mao, the Red Army would thereby win their support, and encourage peasants to join. Mao spoke highly of the movement to expand the Red Army in Juichin, "under the direct leadership of the Central Bureau and the Central Revolutionary Military Committee".³ Mao completed his remarks by pointing out weaknesses in the soviet work of most of the soviet areas, and advising them to become like the model hsien of Hsingkuo (Kiangsi).⁴

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., p. 2. (This is the section appearing in Selected Works.)

³ Ibid. Omitted from the current editions of Selected Works.

⁴ Areas criticised were Yüehkan, Minkan, Hsiangokan, Hsiangkan and Fukien. This is omitted from the Selected Works. (Rue, op.cit., pp. 262-263 believes that this was an attack levied against the Returned Student leadership, saying that the places criticised by Mao were strongholds of their supporters, while those praised by him were pro-Mao.)

Immediately following Mao's speech, the Congress passed a resolution approving his Report.¹ The resolution summarised and approved the main points of Mao's Report, and concentrated on the need to smash the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. Credit for victory over the Fourth Campaign was given to "the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the CCP and the central government," as well as to the masses and the Red Army.² The resolution stated that the soviets were now "situated in the protracted decisive struggle of shattering the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. We are at the crisis point in grasping the soviet road of victory over the whole country."³ The new CEC and CPC to be elected at the Congress would be expected to implement these tasks.⁴ To these ends, a one-million-strong Red Army was to be created, and local guerrilla forces were to act in a complementary way to the main force of the Red Army.⁵ Mao was opposed to this placing of guerrilla warfare in a subordinate role. He later referred to the "serious mistakes (of meeting) the vastly superior

¹ "Kuan-yü chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pao-kao ti chüeh-i", (Resolution on the Report of the CEC), in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 140-143.

² Ibid., p. 140.

³ Ibid., p. 141.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

Nanking forces in positional warfare, at which the Red Army was neither technically nor spiritually at its best."¹ The resolution concluded by saying that "the Second National Soviet Congress believes that by following the correct Bolshevik line of the Central Committee of the CCP and the soviet central government... the soviets...will overturn the rule of imperialism and the KMT so that the acute revolutionary situation which exists in China will turn into a victorious revolution. Moreover...the leadership of the proletariat will be strengthened, so that the democratic revolution of the Chinese workers and peasants will become a future socialist revolution."²

On the following day, January 28, Chu Teh reported to the Congress on the progress in Red Army construction.³ Chu spoke on the intensification of the revolutionary situation in China, the successes of the Red Armies in the Central Soviet Area, Hsiangkan,

¹ Snow, Red Star over China, p. 186. Wang Ming, however, opposed the conversion of regular Red Army units into "small partisan detachments" (Wang Ming & K'ang Sheng, op.cit., p. 64).

² Kuan-yü chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pao-kao ti ch'leh-i, op.cit., pp. 142-143.

³ Hung Hsing, No. 27, p. 1. Hsiang Ying also spoke on the enlargement of the Red Army and the "record-setting movement" (t'u-chi yün-tung) / Ibid. / See also "Kuan-yü hung-chün wen-t'i ti ch'leh-i", (Resolution on the Question of the Red Army), in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit. pp. 167-175. The Report itself is not available.

Minchekan, Hsiangokan, Oyt'wan and Shansi in their smashing of the Fourth Encirclement campaign, and the need to crush the Fifth Campaign. He continued by stressing the need to expand the Red Army into a one-million-strong force, to strengthen its political work, and ensure the absolute leadership of the Party in the Red Army.¹ His Report added details to Mao's CEC Report to the Congress, but did not differ in principle. On the evening of the 28th., and the morning of the 29th., several delegates such as Lo Mai (Li Wei-han), Ho Ch'ang-kung and (Fang?) Wen-ping² made speeches concerning the Report.³

The Report on Soviet Economic Construction was given by Lin Po-ch'ü on the morning of January 29.⁴ Lin referred to the economic depression and the fall in industrial and agricultural production

¹ Kuan-yü hung-ch'ün wen-t'i ti ch'eh-i, op.cit.

² The first character is illegible, but Fang Wen-ping, as Secretary of the CCP Youth League, was one of the men responsible for recruitment into the Red Army. (See Nym Wales, New China, pp. 87-88).

³ "San-ko chung-yao pao-kao: t'ao-lun yü chieh-lun", (Three Important Reports: Discussion and Conclusions), n.d., HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, (February 1, 1934), p. 2.

⁴ This description is based on "Kuan-yü su-wei-ai ching-chi chien-she ti ch'eh-i", (Resolution on Soviet Economic Construction), printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 176-187. / A summary can be found in Chinese Workers Correspondence, No. 26, (July 12, 1934), pp. 2-4. The Report itself is not available, although it is summarised in HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, p. 2. /

(combined with rising unemployment) in the KMT areas of China.¹ Lin then contrasted this picture with his own estimate of the rising production of the soviet areas, the development of external trade, and of a flourishing internal market.² Rice production was reported to have been greatly increased (by more than 200% in the Minchekan area), more than 200,000 picul worth of swamp land had been reclaimed, and such industries as iron, lime, paper, coal and tungsten had been revived.³ The cooperative movement was also reported to be developing widely, with over 500,000 members, and 50% of the population joining in some areas.⁴ In general, said Lin, a planned economy was now initiated in the soviet areas following the inauguration of a Commissariat for National Economy.⁵ However, said the Resolution, further increases in production were necessary, particularly in agriculture.⁶ Peasant cooperatives were to be encouraged,⁷ and trade was to be developed.⁸ The solution to the grain problem was to be found by the establishment of a new Grain Commissariat, which would tackle the food shortages of 1933 by means of cooperatives.⁹ The

¹ Ibid., p. 176.

² Ibid., pp. 176-178.

³ Ibid., p. 177.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 178.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., p. 179.

⁸ Ibid., p. 181.

⁹ Ibid., p. 183.

Resolution called on the CPC, and the CEC Presidium to strengthen their leadership over the National Economy, Finance and Grain Commissariats and the State Bank; to train new cadres so as to strengthen the leadership of the proletariat in economic construction, and draw on labouring women to work on the economic front.¹ However, the Resolution also stated that the economic difficulties of the soviet areas could only be overcome by military victory against the KMT and the occupation of key cities, and that economic construction therefore had to be subordinated, for the present, to the needs of the war.²

Overall, the Resolution painted far too rosy a picture of the soviet economy, which was being severely affected by the war and Chiang Kai-shek's use of blockhouses in his economic blockade. Many essential goods, including salt, were in very short supply. Wang Ming, speaking in Moscow to the ECCI's Thirteenth Plenum, admitted that soviet economic policy had encountered difficulties because of the scattering and backwardness of the soviet districts, and because of the continuous and lengthy war.³ The measures that Lin advocated became soviet economic policy as carried out in the communist-controlled areas during 1934.

¹ Ibid., p. 186.

² Ibid., p. 187.

³ Wang Ming and K'ang Sheng, op.cit., p. 45 passim. Also see Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets, pp. 148, 156-157; and Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, p. 302.

Lin Po-ch'ü's Report was discussed by the delegates on the afternoon of the 29th., and in general, they completely agreed with his analysis and recommendations.¹ Time ran out on the 29th., and discussion was continued on the 30th., after which Lin Po-ch'ü summed up, "bringing out to all the comrades who had spoken, points on which they were not clear,...and certain errors by delegates in their speeches."²

At this stage during the proceedings however, it was known that the Congress was about to come to an abrupt end. Lin Po-ch'ü's Report had been cut short by the Congress Presidium the previous afternoon (January 29), so that Mao could make an emergency announcement.³ Mao reported that news had been received from the front that Chiang Kai-shek had defeated the Fukien People's Government, and was now preparing to attack the soviet areas in force, from three directions.⁴ Mao urged immediate mobilisation, the suppression of counter-revolutionary landlords and rich peasants who might take advantage of the enemy's attack, and the implementation of measures to ensure the supply of grain to the Red Army. By opposing the errors of "left" and "right" opportunism said Mao,

¹HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, p. 2.

²Ibid.

³"Kuan-yü chin-chi tung-yüan ti pao-kao", (Report Concerning Urgent Mobilisation), HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, (February 1, 1934), p. 1.

⁴ Ibid.

the enemy's three-pronged attack could be defeated.¹ After Mao's speech was concluded, it was proposed that the Congress finish five days earlier than planned, so as to close on February 1st. The work of the Congress would be intensified so as to complete it within a shorter space of time, and this would allow the delegates to return to their districts a little sooner to mobilise the masses against the expected attack.² This proposal was accepted unanimously by the delegates.³

On the afternoon of January 30th., following Lin Po-ch'u's Report on Economic Construction, Wu Liang - p'ing delivered his Report on Soviet Construction.⁴ The Report initially dwelt on the successful development of soviet organisation since the time of the First Congress, and quoted examples of the increased number of "worker and peasant activist elements" being drawn in to participate in soviet work.⁵ Wu claimed that basic soviet work at

¹ Ibid.

² "Ta-hui t'i-ch'ien pi-mu", (Congress Closure Brought Forward), HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, (February 1, 1934), p. 1.

³ Ibid.

⁴ The summary in the text is based on "Su-wei-ai chien-she chu'h-i-an", (Resolution on Soviet Construction), printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 188-198. / Also in HSCH, No. 152, (February 20, 1934), pp. 5-6. A summary in English is in Chinese Workers Correspondence, Vol. 4, No. 25, (July 5, 1934), pp. 1-2. The Report itself is not available: however it is clear from a comparison between the summary of the Report contained in HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, p. 2 and the above Resolution, that the Report and the Resolution were essentially the same. This point also applies to the Resolutions on the Red Army and Soviet Economic Construction. /

⁵ Upper and Lower Ts'ai-hsi hsiang, for example, had each added 110 participants to committee work under the hsiang soviet. Ibid., p. 188.

the hsiang and shih levels had greatly improved, and that the field investigation movement had produced many new cadres who had been raised to leadership positions in soviet organs. It was also claimed that on the average, more than 75% of the electorate "participated in the elections", and in some places this reached 95%.¹ However, Wu went on to say, in spite of these successes, a large number of defects and shortcomings still existed, and he spent far more time discussing these than he did discussing the good points.

First of all, said the Resolution, the work was progressing unevenly. In Hsingkuo, Juichin, Shengli and other hsien in the Central Soviet area, and in parts of some hsien in Minchekan and Hsiangkan, great progress had been made, while in the majority of places in Ydehkan, Minkan, and Hsiangokan and other provinces, little success had been achieved in drawing the population into political life, few women participated, the right of recall of representatives was seldom invoked, and bureaucratism existed in the soviet organs.²

Wu then outlined several measures necessary for carrying out the central task of winning the war. Firstly, to improve the work of the central government, the division of responsibility between the CEC and the CPC had to be clearly demarcated.³ Wu did not

¹ Ibid., pp. 188-189.

² Ibid., pp. 189-190.

³ Ibid., p. 191.

elaborate on this, but it would seem to indicate that the CPC, although theoretically under the jurisdiction of the unwieldy 63-man CEC, had become in practice the dominant organ of the central government, because of its compact size. This situation was rectified at the Second Congress by the creation of an inner Presidium of the CEC. The central government was also instructed to increase its supervision of the provincial soviets, especially the key levels of the provincial soviets, especially the key levels of the provincial soviet's Executive Committees, which with their Presidia were responsible for all the work of the hsien soviets. The Resolution specifically singled out Minchekan, Hsiangokan and Hsiangkan as provinces over which the central government should intensify its leadership, and instructed the central government to make connection with Oytwan, Hsiangosi, and Szechuan-Shensi provinces.¹

From the province and hsien level, the Resolution moved down to discuss hsiang and shih level work. It was pointed out that these were the basic level organs of the soviet regime, through which all laws and directives were transmitted to the people. They were therefore to draw in as many "worker and peasant activist elements" as possible to participate in soviet work.²

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., p. 192.

Turning to the work of the new and border areas, Wu urged that strong Revolutionary Committees should be established to intensify the arming of the workers and peasants, organise guerrilla forces, and set up "strong committees to liquidate the counter-revolutionaries so as to eliminate any kind of counter-revolutionary behaviour". He added that in the new and border areas, the land problem should be quickly solved and that the property of the landlords and "counter-revolutionary cliques" should be confiscated, the larger part of it to be distributed among the "local masses".¹ However, the "indiscriminate beating" of the local gentry by guerrilla troops had to be stopped, as this tended to alienate many of the local populace. Finally, in order to assist work in the new and border areas, and to help them make the transition to formal soviets, the central government was instructed to send them experienced cadres.²

In order to strengthen the mass base of the soviets, the Resolution urged an increase in voter participation in elections, and more use of the right of recall to remove unsuitable soviet delegates. Soviet organs were instructed to awake the masses to take part in political life, and it was directed that more frequent work reports should be made to the electorate, that criticism by the electorate was to be encouraged, and that soviet personnel

¹ Ibid., p. 193.

² Ibid., p. 194.

should pay close attention to the criticism, opinions and problems of the people, so as to enlist their support.¹

According to the Resolution, it appeared that the main shortcoming in soviet organisation was the existence of bureaucratism, which was directly linked to the non-involvement of the people in the political affairs of the soviets. This non-involvement caused a separation of the soviets from the people, and an ignorance on the part of soviet personnel about the living conditions of the people, and their problems. These problems, which the Resolution concluded were largely the result of "class alien elements" infiltrating into the soviet organs, and using "groundless talk and hollow cries" and getting orders obeyed by force, were to be controlled by using the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate to weed out these bad influences.² The soviet organs were also instructed to develop closer relations with the mass organisations, particularly the trade unions, from which many cadres were recruited.³

The Resolution concluded with a general statement on the relationship between the Party and the soviets, and the future form of the soviet regime. It was made clear that "proletarian leadership" - Party control over the soviets - was essential. The soviets therefore must "resolutely support the leadership

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., pp. 195-196.

³ Ibid., p. 197.

of the proletarian political party, the Communist Party, guarantee Party control over soviet elections, for only in this way could the soviets complete the democratic revolution and prepare for the transformation to a socialist revolution".¹

After the Report was concluded, the delegates discussed it that evening, and again the following morning.² Wu Liang-p'ing then summed up.³

On the afternoon of January 31st., Hsiang Ying reported on the Constitution.⁴ After his Report, the Constitution was agreed to by the delegates, who then passed it over to the CEC for discussion and promulgation.⁵ The Constitution⁶ as passed by the Second Congress⁷ differed only in a few minor respects⁸ from that

¹ Ibid., pp. 197-198.

² HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, p. 2.

³ Ibid.

⁴ "Hsiang Ying t'ung-chih kuan-yü hsien-fa ti pao-kao", (The Report of Comrade Hsiang Ying on the Constitution), HSCH, Special Edition, No. 7, (February 3, 1934), p. 3.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ To be precise, it was in fact only a "constitutional outline".

⁷ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo hsien-fa ta-kang", (Constitutional Outline of the Chinese Soviet Republic), HSCH, No. 149, (February 14, 1934), p. 2.

⁸ For a listing of the actual textual discrepancies, see Hsian Tso-liang, I, op.cit., pp. 274-275.

passed by the First Congress in 1931.¹ In his Report, Hsiang Ying said that "the experience of two years of soviet work has proved that the simple constitution of the First National Soviet Congress is basically correct".² Hsiang went on to say that nevertheless it was not felt to be 100% appropriate, and therefore the Central Committee of the CCP had prepared another constitution, which however, had not been received owing to "reasons of communication".³ The actual report given by Hsiang was, according to the precis of his speech in Red China,⁴ nothing but a summary of the provisions of the old Constitution.

During its final session on the morning of February 1st., the Congress elected a new government.⁵ The Congress also passed a Manifesto addressed to all the people of China, which pointed out that there were only two roads for the Chinese people to choose from - the soviet road or the colonial road.⁶ The Manifesto devoted

¹ Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 25, (December 1931), pp. 2-7.

² HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, p. 3.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ This will be dealt with in detail later.

⁶ "Ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui hsiüan-yen", (Manifesto of the Second National Soviet Congress), dated February 1, 1934; HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, (February 3, 1934), p. 2.

itself to contrasting the advantages of the soviet road to that of the KMT imperialist path, and stated that the soviets were prepared to sign an alliance with any armed force which would stop attacking the soviet areas, and give its people the rights of speech, assembly, strike, and the right to bear arms. Then the soviets and all who cared to join them could drive Japanese imperialism out of China.¹

Before the elections, Chu Ch'i proposed that the Congress send a telegram "opposing the KMT fascist white terror", and calling upon the people of China to demand that the KMT government immediately release the Noulens and Wang Teh Li Hui.² Hsiang Ying proposed that a telegram of congratulations be sent to the Seventeenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, which was in session in Moscow at the time.³ These proposals were passed unanimously, and given to the Presidium for drafting and publication.⁴ Another source refers to a third telegram demanding "opposition to the German fascists" and "the release of the German workers' leader, Comrade Thälmann".⁵ The delegates then approved

¹ Ibid. [The Manifesto was originally proposed by the Congress after Mao's speech on urgent mobilisation of January 29. (See HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, p. 1.)]

² "Wei-ta ti pi-mu shih", (Great Closing Ceremony), HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, (February 3, 1934), p. 1. [The Noulens were an Austrian couple arrested in Shanghai in 1932, and later convicted of being Comintern agents. (See Snow, Red Star over China, p. 415.) It is not known who Comrade "Wang Teh Li Hui" was.]

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Hung Hsing, No. 27, p. 1.

designs for a national emblem, a national flag and a military flag.¹

After the election of the new government, Mao made a closing speech, in which he declared that the Congress had been completely successful.² He announced that the Congress had decided the policies and plans for the victory of the revolution over the whole country, and that the task was now to go and put these policies and plans into effect.³ Mao concluded by painting for the delegates a vision not only of the proletarian dictatorship towards which he said China was moving, but of China's future communist society.⁴ The assembled delegates then sang the "Internationale" amid the sound of firecrackers.⁵

On February 2nd., the day after the formal close of the Congress, the remaining delegates held an unveiling ceremony for the "Martyrs Memorial Tower", dedicated to those who fell in the

¹ "Ti-erh-tz'u ch'üan-su ta-hui kuan-yü kuo-hui kuo-ch'i chi ch'ün-ch'i ti ch'üeh-ting", (Decisions of the Second National Soviet Congress on the National Emblem, the National Flag and the Military Flag), HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, (February 3, 1934), p. 3.

² "Ta-hui pi-mu tz'u", (Closing Speech of the Congress), HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, p. 1.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, p. 1.

Red Army. Other delegates went and did manual labour to help the dependents of Red Army men.¹

In summary, it is clear that Mao played a very conspicuous role at the Second Congress, and was, in terms of speeches made to the delegates, the dominant individual present. He was also conspicuous for voicing agreement with the line adopted by the Returned Student leadership and the Fifth Plenum. This can be explained on the assumption that Mao, in return for a leading role in the soviet government, agreed not to oppose the Party leadership publicly. An analysis of the new government shows however that his real power was considerably diminished compared with the situation immediately following the First Congress at the end of 1931.

On February 1, 1934, the last day of the Second Congress, at 9 o'clock in the morning, Lo Mai proposed that the delegates consider the last item on their agenda, which was the election of a new Central Executive Committee (CEC),² to replace the CEC elected by the First Congress over two years earlier. According to the Central Soviet Organisation Law,³ which was enacted in

¹ Hung Hsing, No. 27, p. 1.

² HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, p. 1.

³ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang su-wei-ai tsu-chih fa," (Organisation Law of the Central Soviet of the Chinese Soviet Republic), dated February 17, 1934; printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 152-166. (Henceforth referred to as Tsu-chih Fa.)

accordance with the principles of the Constitution,¹ the National Congress was the highest organ of the soviet regime,² and had the power to elect the CEC.³

The organising of the new CEC membership had been under way for several months, under the guidance of a committee set up in August 1933 by the CPC. The Committee had fifteen members: Wang Chia-ch'iang, Liu Po-ch'eng, Lo Fu, P'an Han-nien, Mao Tse-tung, Hu Hai, Wu Liang-p'ing, Sha K'o-fu, Liu Shao-ch'i, Ch'en Yün, Ho K'o-ch'üan, Liang Po-t'ai (who headed the Committee), Teng Fa, Kao Tzu-li and Lin Po-ch'ü.⁴ The Returned Students almost certainly controlled this Committee as six of its members were definitely associated with them,⁵ another three possibly supported them,⁶ while Mao had only one certain supporter.⁷

The Congress Presidium proposed the list of candidates up for election to the CEC, the list having been previously handed in by each of the delegations. There were 175 formal members on the list, and the names of 35 alternate, or candidate, members.⁸ Lo Mai then

¹ Ibid., article 1.

² Ibid., article 2.

³ Ibid., article 6.

⁴ HSCH, No. 106, (August 31, 1933), p. 5.

⁵ Wang Chia-ch'iang, Lo Fu, Wu Liang-p'ing, Ch'en Yün, Ho K'o-ch'üan, Liang Po-t'ai.

⁶ Liu Po-ch'eng, Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Fa.

⁷ Liu Po-ch'ü. The factional loyalties of P'an Han-nien, Hu Hai, Sha K'o-fu and Kao Tzu-li are uncertain.

⁸ HSCH Special Edition No. 7, p. 1.

announced the name of each candidate up for election, plus his place of residence, social origin (ch'eng-fen), sex, Party Corps organisation, nationality and present occupation.¹ Five of the candidates put forward underwent examination by the delegates, one of whom was rejected "because his work history was not clear".² The vacancy was filled and the Congress unanimously passed the list of the 175 full members of the CEC.³ The number of names put forward for alternate membership was raised from 35 to 36 (possibly to accommodate the delegate who was refused full membership), and these were passed by the Congress one by one.⁴ The Congress then elected a 35-man Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.⁵

The new CEC held its first plenary session on February 3, 1934.⁶ According to the Organisation Law, the CEC was the highest organ of the soviet regime when the National Congress was not in session,⁷ its

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid. (His name was not disclosed.)

³ Ibid. A full list will be found in Table X.

⁴ Ibid. A full list will be found in Table X.

⁵ Ibid. A full list will be found in Table XI. [One source refers to a Presidium of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate, although no names were mentioned. See "M-erh-chieh chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui ti-i-tz'u hui-i chi-sheng", (Record of the First Meeting of the Second CEC), HSCH, No. 146, (February 6, 1934), p. 1.]

⁶ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pu-kao, ti-i-hao", (Announcement No. 1 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic), reprinted in HSCH, No. 148, (February 12, 1934), p. 1.

⁷ Tsu-chih Fa, article 7.

T A B L E X

Alphabetical List of all Full and Alternate Members
of the CEC elected at the Second National Soviet
Congress, February, 1934

79 Chan Yi-chin	131 Chou Shao-wen
Chang Ai-p'ing (18)	106 Chou Yi-k'ai
31 Chang Chi-chih	9 Chou Yüeh-lin
130 Chang Chin-lou	78 Chu Ch'i
69 Chang Ch'in-ch'iu	66 Chu Jui
74 Chang Jan-ho	Chu Jung-sheng (13)
86 Chang Kuan-yi	29 Chu Teh
59 Chang Kuo-t'ao	165 Chu Ti-yüan
175 Chang Ch'un-ch'ing	94 Chu Chao-hsiang
121 Chang Ta-ho	93 Chu Wei-yüan
92 Chang Teh-san	8 Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai
123 Chang Ting-ch'eng	23 Chung Ch'ang-t'ao
117 Chang Wen-t'ien	25 Chung Hsün-jen
120 Chang Yün-hsien	108 Chung Kuei-hsin
170 Chao Yün	19 Chung Pao-yüan
61 Ch'en A-chin	105 Chung Shih-pin
58 Ch'en Ch'ang-hao	Chung Yi-chin (26)
109 Ch'en Hsing-sheng	112 Fan Lo-ch'un
55 Ch'en Hung-shih	Fang Chen-hua (28)
49 Ch'en Kuang	161 Fang Chih-min
2 Ch'en Shao-yü	Fang Ching-ho (24)
133 Ch'en Shou-ch'ang	Feng Hsüeh-feng (15)
128 Ch'en T'an-ch'iu	96 Fu Ts'ai-hsiu
151 Ch'en Tzu-ch'ien	34 Ho Ch'ang
54 Ch'en Yi	35 Ho Ch'ang-kung
126 Ch'en Yün	132 Ho Chen-wu
87 Cheng Chen-fen	3 Ho K'o-ch'üan
89 Cheng Wei-san	60 Ho Lung
90 Ch'eng Fang-wu	157 Ho Shu-heng
Chia Yüan (14)	148 Ho Wei
76 Chiang A-san	71 Hsia Hsi
10 Chin Wei-ying	6 Hsiang Ying
116 Ch'iu Hsien-ying	65 Hsiao K'o
Ch'iu Shih-feng (3)	15 Hsiao Shih-pang
51 Chou Chien-p'ing	Hsieh Chen-fu (2)
30 Chou En-lai	28 Hsieh Hsien-szu
140 Chou Kuang-k'un	14 Hsieh Ming-jen
Chou Kuei-hsiang (33)	Hsieh Ping-huang (25)
52 Chou K'un	12 Hsieh Yü-ch'in

T A B L E X (contd.)

- | | |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| 107 Hsiung Hsien-pi | Li Yi-meng (16) |
| 137 Hsiung Kuo-ping | 158 Liang Po-t'ai |
| 68 Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien | Liao Han-hua (30) |
| Hsü Ming-fu (10) | 16 Lin Kuo-sung |
| Hsü Shun-yüan (9) | 44 Lin Piao |
| 21 Hsü Ta-chih | 100 Lin Po-ch'ü |
| 168 Hsü Teh-li | 24 Liu Ch'i-yao |
| 67 Hsü Yen-kang | 57 Liu Ch'ou-hsi |
| 40 Hsün Huai-chou | 110 Liu Ch'ün-hsien |
| 111 Hu Hai | 95 Liu Hsiao |
| Hua Hsin-hsiang (32) | 27 Liu Kuang-ch'en |
| 17 Huang Ch'ang-chiao | 98 Liu Kuo-chu |
| 129 Huang Chia-kao | 97 Liu Ming-hui |
| 11 Huang Fa-kuei | 33 Liu Po-ch'eng |
| Huang Fu-wu (27) | 46 Liu Po-chien |
| 141 Huang Kuang-pao | 4 Liu Shao-ch'i |
| 37 Huang Su | 143 Liu Shih-chieh |
| 103 Huang Tao | Liu Yen-yü (23) |
| 162 Huang Wan-sheng | Liu Yi (6) |
| 122 Huang Yi-chang | 50 Lo Jui-ch'ing |
| 82 Hung Shui | Lo Jung-huan (19) |
| 145 Jen Pi-shih | 99 Lo Mai |
| 159 Juan Hsiao-hsien | 81 Lo Ping-hui |
| K'ang K'o-ch'ing (36) | 172 Lo Tzu-ming |
| 88 Kao Chün-t'ing | 20 Lou Meng-hsia |
| 167 Kao Tzu-li | Lung Ch'un-shan (31) |
| 77 Ku Ta-ts'un | 5 Mao Tse-tung |
| 101 Ku Tso-lin | 38 Nieh Hung-chün |
| 164 Kuan Ch'un-hsiang | 45 Nieh Jung-chen |
| 70 Kuan Hsiang-ying | 119 P'an Han-nien |
| 163 Kuan Ying | 85 P'an Shih-chung |
| K'uang Chu-ch'üan (34) | 135 P'eng Jen-ch'ang |
| 144 K'uang Piao | 42 P'eng Teh-huai |
| 56 K'ung Ho-ch'ung | 64 Pi Shih-t'i |
| 104 K'ung Shu-an | 1 Po Ku |
| 91 Kuo Shu-shen | 102 Shao Shih-p'ing |
| 174 Lai Mei-yü | 72 Sung Pai-min |
| 150 Li Ch'eng-chia | 142 T'an Yü-pao |
| 124 Li Chien-chen | 166 Teng Chen-hsün |
| 26 Li Cho-jan | 118 Teng Fa |
| 13 Li Fu-ch'un | Teng P'ing (35) |
| 139 Li Hsien-nien | Teng Tzu-hui (12) |
| Li K'o-nung (17) | Teng Yao-sheng (4) |
| Li Mei-ch'ün (7) | 169 Teng Ying-ch'ao |
| Li Tz'u-fan (20) | 41 T'eng Tai-yüan |
| 138 Li Wei-hai | 18 Ts'ai Ch'ang |
| | 83 Ts'ai Kan |

T A B L E X (contd.)

47 Ts'ai Shu-fan	115 Wu Lan-fu
113 Tseng Hung-yi	7 Wu Liang-p'ing
149 Tseng Kuang-lan	125 Wu Pi-hsien
22 Tseng Shan	136 Wu Teh-feng
Tsou Chung-ts'ai (8)	114 Wu Tzu-yüan
Tsou Tun-hou (29)	155 Wu Yü-chang
Tung Ch'ang-sheng (5)	156 Yang Ch'i-hsin
36 Tung Chen-t'ang	Yang Ping-lung (1)
160 Tung Pi-wu	43 Yang Shang-k'un
39 Wan Yung-ch'eng	173 Yang Shih-chu
134 Wang Chen	63 Yeh Chien-ying
32 Wang Chia-ch'iang	Yeh Teh-kuei (11)
153 Wang Chin-hsiang	Yen Li-chi (21)
80 Wang Feng-ming	Yin Jen-kuei (22)
171 Wang Hsien-hstlan	152 Yü Han-chao
146 Wang Hsiu-chang	154 Yü Chen-nung
48 Wang Ju-ch'ih	84 Yü Hung-wen
127 Wang Sheng-jung	147 Yü Hung-yüan
75 Wang Shih-t'ai	62 Yüan Kuo-p'ing
73 Wang Wei-chou	53 Yüeh Shao-hua

This list is taken from an original copy of the "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yüan-hui pu-kao, ti-i-hao", (Announcement No. 1 of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic), dated February 5, 1934, SSC 16. Also printed in HSCH, No. 148, (February 12, 1934), p.1 dated February 3, 1934. The two copies also list the members in a slightly different order. The numbers in Table X represent the order of listing of CEC members as on the original Proclamation. The numbering of full members is on the left, from 1-175; alternate members are numbered on the right, in brackets, from 1-36.

T. A B L E X IMembers of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate Elected¹
at the Second National Soviet Congress

Nung Hsi	? Fang-?
Chu K'o-sheng	*Tung Pi-wu
Li Sheng-pao	Wang Hsiu
*T'eng Tai-yüan	K'ang Pao-kuan
*Lo Jung-huan	Id(?) Kuang-yüan
*Ts'ai Ch'ang	Teng Hsien-?
*Huang Ch'ang-chiao ²	Liu Ch'uan-chia
Lo Yüan-? ³	Wang Han-chang
Hsieh Hsüeh-lien	Tuan Sung-jui
Liu Lieh-chu	Yeh Fang-?
*Fan Lo-ch'un	Chang Piao
Li Lien-hsiu	Liu Chin-wen
Lai Jung-kuang	Lu T'ung-hao
Wang Fu-shan	Chang Chen-fang
Tseng Chao-ming	*Hsiang Ying
Hu Mei-shui	Wu Hsiu-ying
Leng Cheng(?) -yi	Ch'iu Jung-hsien
Chang Ping-ju	

¹ HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, (February 3, 1934), p. 1.

² Chiao is a different character to that of the CEC list. But as Huang was elected to the Kiangsi Inspectorate, they are probably the same.

³ ? indicates obscure character on microfilm.

* means CEC member.

numbers were not to exceed 585,¹ and under normal circumstances, plenary sessions were to be convened by the CEC Presidium every six months.² The CEC was responsible to the National Soviet Congress,³ but while that National Congress was not in session, the CEC could itself promulgate a wide variety of laws and decrees,⁴ including decisions on major issues of domestic or foreign policy, enacting legislation for the soviet regime, organising the judicial system, demarcating administrative areas, and creating or dissolving subordinate organs of local government.⁵

At the first meeting of the new CEC only 79 full and alternate members were present,⁶ out of a possible total of 211. This was no doubt due to the military situation having called a substantial number of delegates back to the front or to their home areas as soon as the Congress concluded. The meeting went ahead however, because "according to the power given to them by the Second Congress, when over one-third of the committee members attend, then there is a quorum."⁷

¹ Tsu-chih Fa, article 8.

² Ibid., article 9.

³ Ibid., article 11.

⁴ Ibid., article 12.

⁵ Ibid., article 24.

⁶ HSCH, No. 146, p. 1.

⁷ Ibid. (There is however no such provision in either the Constitution or the Tsu-chih Fa.)

The members first of all elected a provisional Presidium of three - Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao.¹ They must have been chosen because they were the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen, respectively, of the soviet government. Chang Kuo-t'ao was in Szechuan at the time, and was never actually present for any of the deliberations of the Second Congress. The meeting then proceeded according to the agenda, and Mao Tse-tung reported that the first item was the ratification of the central government Organisation Law.² Liang Po-t'ai spoke of the important principles of the Law, with which the meeting agreed in general, and the detailed clauses were handed over to the CEC Presidium for editing.³ The CEC then unanimously elected the following 17-man Presidium of the CEC:-⁴

Mao Tse-tung (Chairman)	Ch'en Yün
Hsiang Ying (Vice-Chairman)	Lin Po-ch'ü
Chang Kuo-t'ao (Vice-Chairman)	Teng Chen-hsün
Chang Wen-t'ien	Chu Ti-yüan
Chu Teh	Teng Fa
Po Ku	Fang Chih-min
Chou En-lai	Lo Mai
Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai	Chou Yüeh-lin
Liu Shao-ch'i	

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. (Also see CRBRD, p. 654.)

Mao was elected as Chairman of the new Presidium, with Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao as his two Vice-Chairmen. This was in accordance with the Organisation Law, which stated that the CEC was to elect a Presidium of not more than 35 members, including a Chairman and 2-4 Vice-Chairmen.¹ The Presidium was the most important of all governmental organs, for it took charge of affairs when the CEC itself was not in session.² Since the majority of CEC members were rarely, if ever, able to get together in one place at one time, the Presidium, or those members of it present in Juichin, was the de facto government, even though in theory the Presidium was responsible to the CEC,³ which had the right to veto and amend its decisions.⁴ The tasks of the Presidium included the supervision of the Constitution, and of the execution of the laws and decrees of the National Congress and the CEC.⁵ It also had the right to promulgate various laws and decrees of its own.⁶ Having decided on a Presidium, the CEC then elected a Council of People's Commissars (CPC),⁷ composed of the following commissariats:-

¹ Tsu-chih Pa, article 15.

² Ibid., article 17.

³ Ibid., article 23.

⁴ Ibid., article 14.

⁵ Ibid., article 18.

⁶ Ibid., article 21.

⁷ HSCH, No. 146, p. 1.

Wang Chia-ch'iang	Foreign Affairs
Chu Teh	Military Affairs
Teng Chen-hstn	Labour Affairs
Kao Tzu-li	Land
Lin Po-ch'ü	Finance
Wu Liang-p'ing	National Economy ¹
Ch'en T'an-ch'iu	Food ²
Liang Po-t'ai	Judicial Affairs ³
Tseng Shan	Internal Affairs
Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai	Education ⁴

Chang Wen-t'ien was elected Chairman of the CPC.⁵ The CPC was the highest administrative organ of the regime,⁶ and its membership included the members of the various commissariats under its command, plus its Chairman, and the Chairman of the

¹The Commissariat for National Economy was first mooted in March 1933, [HSCH, No. 58, (March 6, 1933), p. 5] and eventually set up in April 1933. [See HSCH, No. 77, (May 8, 1933), p. 5. Also Inprecor, No. 65, (December 29, 1934), p. 1753.] Wu had been Deputy Commissar since July 1933. [See HSCH, No. 95, (July 17, 1933), p. 1.]

²This was a new Commissariat set up at the time of the Second Congress.

³Liang had been appointed Deputy Commissar for Judicial Affairs in April 1933. [See HSCH, No. 74, (April 29, 1933), p. 1.]

⁴Mao was not therefore made Minister of Education at the Fifth Plenum, as Chang Kuo-t'ao reported. (North interview, op.cit.)

⁵HSCH, No. 146, p. 1.

⁶Tsu-chih Fa, article 25.

Workers and Peasants Inspectorate,¹ who was Hsiang Ying at that time.² The major task of the CPC was that "within the scope laid down by the CEC, it should promulgate all laws and decrees..., and must adopt appropriate administrative measures to guarantee their speedy and orderly execution."³

Decisions of the CPC on major policies however, had to be given to the CEC or its Presidium for examination and approval, although the CPC could decide on emergency matters, and report later.⁴ In general, the CPC was responsible to the CEC (or its Presidium),⁵ and the CEC had the power to elect to, or dismiss from office the personnel and the Chairman of the CPC,⁶ and to co-opt new men onto its membership.⁷ The Organisation Law required all those elected to membership of the CPC to be members of the CEC,⁸ though it is not clear whether this applied to co-opted members. Certainly all the heads of the various Commissariats were on the CEC. Furthermore, the CEC had the power to veto or

¹ Tsu-chih Fa, article 26.

² He was so elected at the first session of the new CEC. See HSCH, No. 146, p. 1.

³ Tsu-chih Fa, article 28.

⁴ Ibid., articles 21 and 30.

⁵ Ibid., article 33.

⁶ Ibid., article 24.

⁷ Ibid., article 26, note.1.

⁸ Ibid., article 16.

amend the decisions of the CPC,¹ and its constituent commissariats.² In addition, under the CPC, there was elected a Central Revolutionary Military Committee,³ with Chu Teh as Chairman, and Chou En-lai and Wang Chia-ch'iang as Vice-Chairmen.⁴ Also, there was elected a Central Auditing (shen-chi) Committee, with Juan Hsiao-hsien as its head.⁵ The responsibilities of this body were to investigate the state's annual income and expenditure, and to supervise the implementation of the National Budget.⁶ The Auditing Committee apparently consisted of a total of 5-9 men.⁷ Finally, Tung Pi-wu was made temporary Chairman of the Supreme Court,⁸ the job of which was to guarantee the "revolutionary law of the Chinese Soviet Republic."⁹ It had the power to investigate all violations of the law by members of the highest organs of the regime, except in the case of CEC members, which were to be "settled separately by the CEC or by its Presidium".¹⁰ The first plenary session of

¹ Ibid., article 14.

² Ibid., article 19.

³ Ibid., article 50.

⁴ HSCH, No. 148, p. 1. Chou En-lai was also elected chairman of the Central Military Council, a Party organ. See Issues and Studies, Vol. IV, No. 1. p. 38.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Tsu-chih Fa, article 41.

⁷ Ibid., article 42.

⁸ HSCH, No. 148, p. 1.

⁹ Tsu-chih Fa, article 34.

¹⁰ Ibid., article 37 (iii).

the new CEC was then adjourned.¹

Analysis of the New Government

As compared with the CEC elected at the First Congress in 1931, which had 63 members, the new CEC numbered 211, of whom 175 were full members and 36 were alternates. The creation of alternate or candidate members, was an innovation of the Second Congress. Of the original 63-man CEC, only 32 were re-elected in 1934.² Of those who were not re-elected, five are known to have died before the Second Congress - Lo Teng-hsien,³ P'eng Kuei,⁴ Shen Tse-min,⁵ Tuan Teh-ch'ang,⁶ and Wei Pa-ch'ün.⁷ A further three, Hsü Hsi-ken, Hu Ch'ün-ho and Huang P'ing, were condemned as traitors in 1933.⁸ T'ian Chen-lin was also not re-elected. He became linked with Lo Ming in 1933, when the Party leadership was attacking the "Lo Ming line".⁹

¹ The Tsu-chih Fa, article 27, also provided for the establishment of a State Political Security Bureau under the CPC, "with the object of suppressing counter-revolution". Such a Bureau was set up at the time of the First Congress, headed by Teng Fa, but no mention was made of it at the time of the Second Congress.

² This figure does not include Teng Tzu-hui, who was only re-elected to alternate membership in 1934.

³ Obituary in HSCH, No. 207, (June 26, 1934), p. 4.

⁴ China Quarterly, No. 9, (January-March 1962), pp. 179-180.

⁵ Hung Hsing, No. 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1.

⁶ Nym Wales, Red Dust, p. 95.

⁷ Hung Hsing, No. 26, p. 1.

⁸ At the 31st Meeting of the CPC, HSCH, No. 51, (February 10, 1934), p. 1.

⁹ Hsiao Tso-liang, II, op.cit., p. 669.

Teng Tzu-hui also became identified with the "Lo Ming line", and was demoted from full to alternate membership.¹ Lu Teh-kuang absconded to Hong Kong with Party funds.² Of the remaining 20 members of the 1931 CEC who did not re-appear on the 1934 listing, little is known. The names of the majority of them do not occur again in the history of the Chinese communist movement, and the probability is that most of them lost their lives in battle against one or other of Chiang Kai-shek's "Bandit Encirclement" campaigns.

Of the 175 full members of the new CEC, 143 had not been elected in 1931. Of the 36 candidate members, none had been seated on the 1931 body, with the exception of Teng Tzu-hui. Among the group of newcomers to full membership of the CEC were several important members of the Returned Student leadership, and their supporters, including Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, Chu Jui, Po Ku, and Wu Liang-p'ing. Reflecting the impact of the Returned Student leadership, there was also an increase in the incidence of men who had been in the Soviet Union, either for educational or political purposes (or a combination of both), before going to the soviet areas. Whereas it can be estimated that of the original 1931 CEC, 18 had some experience of the Soviet Union, a further 26 of the new full members of the 1934 CEC qualified in this way.

¹ Appointed Finance Commissar at the First Congress, he was reduced to Deputy Commissar in 1933. HSCH, No. 105, (August 25, 1933), p. 1.⁷ Lin Po-ch'u became the new Finance Commissar. (Ibid.)

² Issues and Studies, Vol. III, No. 10, (July 1967), p. 45.

The great expansion of the CEC in terms of numbers reflected the growth of the administrative infrastructure since 1931, and the increased scope of government activities, particularly in the most secure area around the capital. Taking the CEC newcomers as a whole, (including the alternate members), it can be estimated that at least 20% came from the area of the Central Soviet District.

In order to analyse the changes in political power that occurred since the First Congress, it is necessary to examine, not the entire CEC, but rather the smaller and more powerful organs of the Presidium of the CEC, and the CPC. No Presidium of the CEC was set up in 1931, But obviously with the great expansion of membership, most of which could not be present for meetings, there was a need for a smaller body to take control, and the 17-man Presidium was formally established at the Second Congress. There is evidence that such a body had been functioning, at least informally, prior to the Congress. In his Report to the Congress, Mao referred to the need "to perfect the organisation and work of the CEC Presidium".¹

All the members of the Presidium, with the exception of Chang Kuo-t'ao, were present at the Second Congress, and were

¹ CEC Report, p. 115.

probably able to attend meetings following the Congress.¹ In addition to Mao himself, three members of the Presidium can be counted as Maoists - Chu Teh, Lin Po-ch'ü, and Fang Chih-min. Lin Po-ch'ü (Lin Tsu-han) had been a member of Mao's first communist group in Hunan in 1921, and had worked with him during the period of cooperation with the KMT. However he cooperated with the Returned Students to some extent by joining the CC Party Affairs Committee at the Fifth Plenum. Fang Chih-min was a veteran guerrilla fighter in the north-east Kiangsi area, whose policies were identified with those of Mao.² On the other hand, four men can definitely be identified as members or supporters of the Returned Student group. These were Hsiang Ying, Chang Wen-t'ien, Po Ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien) and Chou En-lai. In addition, Teng Fa and Lo Mai (Li Wei-han) may well have supported this faction. Teng Fa had been a supporter of Mao at least up to 1931, when he was made chief of the new Political Security Bureau. By 1934 however, it was this Bureau which reportedly guarded Mao if and when he was under house arrest at Yü-tu.³ Furthermore, when Mao replaced

¹ Presence at the Congress is assumed from the fact of the individual in question having spoken at the Congress, or because he was a member of the Congress Presidium. Examination of the data available on this body points to the fact that its members were present to carry out the functions of a Steering Committee. There is no evidence that any one of the members was not present. Ability to attend meetings is assumed because all CEC Presidium members came from the Juichin, Kiangsi, Fukien area.

² Rue, op.cit., pp. 205, 240, 269.

³ Rue, op.cit., p. 267; also see Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 177. Teng Fa was elected a member of the CC Party Affairs Committee at the Fifth Plenum; see Issues & Studies, Vol. IV, No. 1, p. 38.

Chou En-lai as Chairman of the RMC at the time of the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935, Teng Fa was dropped from membership of the RMC.¹ Nor was he re-elected to the CCP Central Committee in 1945. Lo Mai also seems to have allied himself with the Returned Student leadership by joining in their attack on Lo Ming and the "Lo Ming line".² Also, after having been removed from the CCP Politburo at the Fourth Plenum, he was re-elected to CC membership by the Fifth Plenum.³ Ch'en Yün can be classified with the Returned Student group, as he delivered a major report to the Fifth Plenum of the CC in January 1934, and was elected as a Politburo Standing Committee member.⁴ It is not known which faction, if any, was backed by Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai or Liu Shao-ch'i. Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai cannot definitely be identified as a Maoist, nor can he be classed as a supporter of the Party leadership, since they had removed him, with Lo Mai and others, from the Politburo or CC at the Fourth Plenum. In any case, he had only been in the soviet areas for a month.⁵ Liu Shao-ch'i seems to have steered clear of becoming involved in the

¹ Rue, ibid., p. 270, quoting Nym Wales, Red Dust, p. 67. As Rue notes (p. 338), the list of members of the Revolutionary Military Council cited in Red Dust, from which Teng is missing, is referred to only as containing the chief members, so it cannot be certain that Teng was deprived of his position.

² Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 671-2.

³ Issues and Studies, loc.cit.

⁴ Issues and Studies, loc.cit.

⁵ Hung Ch'i P'iao-p'iao, No. 5, (December 15, 1957), p. 101.

factional disputes, although he became a member of the CC Party Affairs Committee at the Fifth Plenum. Of the remaining three members, Teng Chen-hsün, Chou Yüeh-lin and Chu Ti-yüan, nothing is known. The Maoists therefore commanded only four men, as opposed to a probable seven for the Returned Students.

On examination therefore, the conclusion is that the Returned Student leadership gained control of the CEC Presidium, and therefore of the government apparatus. Furthermore, Mao's Chairmanship of the Presidium stood him in little stead, for the Returned Students could always vote him out if necessary. Although their supporters out-numbered those of Mao however, there were so many unknown personalities present who could have tipped the balance one way or the other that this fact cannot be as conclusively substantiated as in the case of Mao's control of the soviet government in November 1931. Even so, it is clear that, compared with the First Congress, Mao's power had suffered a substantial decline.

The Council of People's Commissars originally set up at the time of the First Congress, then had a membership of ten, made up of eight Commissariats, plus the Chairman, and the head of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate. This was enlarged to 12 at the Second Congress, by the addition of two new Commissariats for Food and National Economy. Only four members of the original body remained in 1934. Wang Chia-ch'iang retained Foreign Affairs, Chu Teh Military Affairs and Ch'ü Ch'ü-pai Education. (A post

which he was now able to take over actively since his arrival in the soviet areas in December 1933). Hsiang Ying retained his place on the CPC, but he was transferred from Labour to the head of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.

Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the CPC in 1931, was dropped from the Chairmanship, and from membership of the CPC in 1934. His place was taken by a member of the Returned Student leadership, Chang Wen-t'ien. Like Mao in 1931, Chang had no Commissariat, but unlike Mao, he did not have two Vice-Chairmen under him.

In addition to Mao, five others lost their places - Teng Tzu-hui, Chang Ting-ch'eng, Chou Yi-li, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Ho Shu-heng. Teng Tzu-hui had become identified with the "Lo Ming line" and was not even a full member of the CEC any longer.¹ Chang Ting-ch'eng had been criticised for "right opportunism" in November 1933.² Chang Kuo-t'ao was no doubt replaced because he showed no sign of ever coming to the Central Soviet District. He was in Oyt'wan at the time of the First Congress, and had moved to Szechuan by the time the Second Congress was held. Chou Yi-li, who had been appointed Chief Editor of Red China in 1931, lost the post of

¹ Teng was initially scheduled to be head of the new Commissariat for National Economy. [See HSCH, No. 58, (March 6, 1933), p. 5.]

² HSCH, No. 125, (November 14, 1933), p. 4.

Internal Affairs Commissar, and his place on the CEC.¹ Ho Shu-heng ceased to be head of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate, but did retain a seat on the CEC. The operation of both these Commissariats (and Education) had been criticised in an article by Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu) written in August 1933.² There were eight newcomers to the CPC - Teng Chen-hsün, Kao Tzu-li, Lin Po-ch'ü, Wu Liang-p'ing, Ch'en T'an-ch'iu, Liang Po-t'ai, Chang Wen-t'ien and Tseng Shan - all of whom, with the single exception of Tseng Shan, were elected to the CEC for the first time. As far as is known, all the CPC members were present at the Second Congress,³ and all were drawn from the Juichin, Kiangsi, Fukien area.

In looking at the total membership of the CPC from the point of view of factional divisions, five men can be identified as

¹ Rue (op.cit., p. 249 ft.) says that "he disappeared before the Second All-China Soviet Congress in January 1934". But according to Nym Wales, he remained behind in Kiangsi at the time of the Long March, and was captured and killed at the same time as Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, in 1935. (Red Dust, p. 172).

² Tou-cheng, No. 21, (August 12, 1933), p. 12. In addition, Ho had been criticised for "bureaucratism and political vacillation" as head of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate. [See HSCH, No. 107, (September 3, 1933), p. 5.]

³ This is established in the same way as for the CEC Presidium. The only person about whom some uncertainty remains is Ch'en T'an-ch'iu.

supporters of the Returned Student leadership, and four as supporters of Mao Tse-tung. Into the former category fall Wu Liang-p'ing, Chang Wen-t'ien, Wang Chia-ch'iang, Hsiang Ying and Liang Po-t'ai,¹ and into the latter category fall Lin Po-ch'ü, Ch'en T'ian-ch'iu,² Tseng Shan,³ and Chu Teh. As before, the loyalties of Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai remain uncertain, and those of Teng Chen-hsün and Kao Tzu-li are unknown.

With the balance of forces about equally divided (at least among the known personalities), it cannot be clearly ascertained who had final control over the affairs of the CPC. It should be noted however, that compared with the 1931 CPC, the power of the Maoists had diminished considerably. In 1931 the Maoists had an overwhelming majority in the CPC, with only two Returned Student members, Wang Chia-ch'iang and Hsiang Ying present. Furthermore,

¹ There is evidence that Liang was probably a member of the Returned Student group. As acting head of the Internal Affairs Commissariat he was in charge of electoral proceedings for the Second Congress, and he had replaced two of Mao's supporters, Chou Yi-li and Ho Shu-heng who had had the position before him. [See HSCH, No. 46, (January 7, 1933), p. 4; also Hsüan-chü Yün-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, (September 10, 1933), pp. 6-8.] Furthermore, he was made Secretary General of the Second Congress. Rue (who refers to him as Liang Pai-t'ai) claims that he has definitely identified Liang as a member of the Returned Student group, but cites no evidence. (Op.cit., p. 7 ft., and p. 270 ft.).

² Ch'en, like Teng Tzu-hui and others, was attacked for supporting the "Lo Ming" line. Just prior to the Congress the CC had recommended that Ch'en be dismissed from his position as Secretary of the Fukien Provincial Party Committee. See Tou-cheng, No. 43, (January 19, 1934), p. 2.

³ Tseng had been an associate of Mao's in Kiangsi for some years, was Chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government, and helped Mao put down the Fut'ien rebellion.

all the CPC members who lost their positions in 1934 were Maoists.¹ (With the exception of Chang Kuo-t'ao, who played no role in the proceedings). Even if the CPC were in the hands of Mao's supporters, the provisions of the Organisation Law required that all major policies be referred to the CEC or its Presidium, which, as has been shown, were probably in the hands of the official Party leadership.

On the basis of the available evidence, it would appear that Mao, having lost control over the Party in the soviet areas prior to the First Congress, then lost command of the government apparatus in 1933, and that one of the reasons for convening a Second Congress was to enable the Returned Student group to formalise their control over the soviet government. Although no precise date can be set for Mao's loss of control over the government, many of his supporters found themselves dismissed or criticised in mid-1933. In June, T'an Chen-lin was linked with the "Lo Ming line", and was not re-elected to the CEC in 1934. Teng Tzu-hui was demoted from Commissar to Deputy Commissar, and criticised for "right opportunism" in August, and Chang Ting-ch'eng, Commissar for Land, was similarly attacked in November. Another Maoist, Ho Shu-heng, was accused of bureaucratism in the summer of 1933, and Chou Yi-li's place as Commissar for Internal Affairs was found to be taken by a probable member of the Returned Student group, Liang Po-t'ai, who was placed in charge of the soviet elections. That some of Mao's supporters

¹ Teng Tzu-hui, Chang Ting-ch'eng, Ho Shu-heng, Chou Yi-li, and Mao himself.

turned up in positions of prominence at the Second Congress was no doubt due to the same reasons that Mao was there - they agreed to "toe the Party line", and, since trained and experienced men were at a premium in the soviet areas, they were allowed positions of responsibility.

Summary

Once the soviet government was formally established in Juichin at the close of 1931, it successfully extended its authority over the other soviet areas, including those not contiguous to the Central Soviet Area. After the First Congress, the Party started to play a greater role in organising a formal governmental and administrative structure that would bring the soviet leadership into closer contact with the soviet population, so that the Central Soviet Area began to take on more of the characteristics of a formal state, and appear less like a guerrilla encampment. With this change, the process of social mobilisation continued, with only marginal success at first in 1932, but showing improvement, as measured by the degree of participation by the people in soviet work and elections, during 1933. This improvement however, seems to have been largely confined to the Central Soviet Area. The administrative apparatus of the soviet government expanded with the creation of two new Commissariats and an enlarged CEC, which can be seen as a response by the government to the demands of the

population - demands which were themselves engendered by the propaganda of the communists.

In 1933, the control by the Returned Students over the soviet administrative apparatus and the machinery for soviet elections, plus the activities of the Party Corps placed in each delegation to the Second Congress by the Party leadership guaranteed that the Programme of the Congress would be as laid down by the Central Committee of the CCP and the Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI. There was no reliance however on the parallel, or "double track" system of Party and government committees common to the USSR and post-1949 China. Rather, control was exercised over the governmental structure through the electoral committees and the Internal Affairs Department of the GPC.

At the Second Congress, far greater emphasis was placed on Party leadership over the soviet government and its policies than was the case in 1931. This was also noticeable in the attendance at the Second Congress: of the 1579 observers and delegates, nearly 50% were Party or Youth League members.

1933 had witnessed the progressive loss of control by Mao and his supporters over the organs of the soviet government. The new soviet government elected at the Second Congress substantiated this, and formalised the control over the government apparatus of the Returned Student leadership, who now commanded all three power structures - Party, military and governmental - in the soviet areas.

At the Second Congress, there was a marked turnover of personnel; Maoists such as T'an Chen-lin and Teng Tzu-hui were removed from full membership of the CEC, while many of the Returned Students obtained places for the first time. In addition, a new Presidium of the CEC was created as the supreme governmental organ of the soviet regime, on which the Maoists were outnumbered. Mao was dropped from his Chairmanship of the highest administrative organ of the state, the Council of People's Commissars, and did not even remain as a member. Many of his supporters were also removed from the CPC and replaced by others loyal to the Returned Student leadership. Although the balance of forces on the new CPC appeared roughly equal (as compared with the overwhelming dominance of the Maoists in 1931), it was under the control of the newly-established Presidium of the CEC, which was controlled by the Returned Students, who therefore asserted their authority over the soviet government. Mao and his supporters, in return for public acquiescence to the official Party line, were allowed a substantial role at the Congress and in the new government.

The Second Congress vindicated the claim of the soviet government to be a government of all the soviet territories. Many soviet areas were represented on the official steering committee (Presidium) in charge of the arrangements of the Congress, and on

the new CEC. However, the claim of the Congress to be a national "All-China" event was not as well substantiated. Out of a total of 693 delegates, only 17 came from the White areas. In addition, de facto control over the government was in the hands of the CEC Presidium, the vast majority of whose members came from the Kiangsi-Fukien area, as was also the case with the steering committee of the Congress.

The Second Congress manifested the heady optimism of most of the Returned Student leadership, which saw the struggle against the Kuomintang entering a new stage, and who wished to sum up and capitalise on the experiences of running the revolutionary base areas for two years, so as to improve the economic situation, co-ordinate military action to crush the Fifth "Bandit Encirclement" campaign, and, ideally, to capture towns and link up the Central Soviet District with the outlying soviet areas. Although their optimism proved unjustified, the much-publicised Second Congress did continue their claim, however briefly, that "in the Chinese Soviet Republic all conditions and elements of a modern state, worthy of being called a civilised people's republic, already exist."¹

¹ Wang Ming and K'ang Sheng, op.cit., p. 20 (emphasis in original).

CONCLUSION

The major significance of the two National Soviet Congresses is that using them as a focal point for analysis sheds light on an extremely obscure period in the history of the CCP, with particular reference to the analysis of the two inter-related themes of power relations and political processes.

Also, since the Kiangsi experience was basically one of failure, ending with the flight of the communists on the Long March, it is especially important to test some of the assumptions of the retrospective survey of the period made after the end of the Long March, which purport to define Mao Tse-tung's role at the time.

The first efforts towards establishing a soviet government were made in 1930 by the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Li Li-san. It was believed that such a government would centralise and consolidate the opposition to the Kuomintang, particularly in the military sphere. Furthermore, the CCP believed that the government would be able to win the support of the people by giving them political rights, and depriving the landlords and other "exploiting" groups of their political and economic power. Li also wanted to enforce his own policies on the soviet area leaders, and in so doing, extend his authority over the revolutionary base areas.

Preparations for a Congress to create a central government reached an advanced stage, but were halted by the political demise of Li Li-san in November 1930. The ensuing struggle for supremacy

within the Party, in conjunction with the poor military situation with which the communists were faced, pre-empted the policy of constructing a government.

The policy of the CCP and Li Li-san was based on directives from the Comintern in Moscow. In spite of allegations to the contrary from the Comintern, there was basic agreement on strategy between the two. Li however, was caught in a tactical "error" when he continued to insist that the soviet government should be formed in a city, after the Comintern had decided that the countryside was a safer place. Li was accused at the Fourth Plenum of the CC of having neglected the task of establishing a strong central soviet government. Although he had in fact put a great deal of effort into preparations for creating a government, he had delayed its actual establishment while he attempted to take a key city with the Red Army.

The year 1931 saw a switch in emphasis of CCP operations from the city to the countryside. Mao was pre-eminent in the Central Soviet Area, and successfully employed guerrilla tactics against the KMT. In the field of civil administration however, he also tended to employ military organisations, and did little to create an efficient governmental and administrative apparatus which would have drawn the people into political activity, while probably hindering attempts at reform.

The Returned Student leadership went ahead with preparations for the First National Soviet Congress, which was eventually convened in November 1931 at the soviet capital of Juichin, Kiangsi, in the rural hinterland of China. The main aim of the Returned Student leaders in calling the Congress was to use it as a vehicle for extending their own authority over Mao Tse-tung in the soviet areas. But despite the fact that many of the Returned Students moved from their headquarters in Shanghai to Juichin so as to attend the Congress, Mao and his supporters because of their entrenched influence in the soviet administrative and electoral machinery, won control of the government created by the Congress. The Returned Students, however, clearly won command of the Party apparatus in the Central Soviet Area.

Unlike the resolutions passed by the Congress of the Party in the Soviet Areas which contained attacks on Mao's views, the laws and resolutions passed by the First Congress that same month (November 1931) were basically favourable to the Maoist view point, indicating that the Returned Students, although they had successfully exerted their authority over the Party apparatus in the soviet areas, had not had a similar success with the government machinery.

The Chinese Soviet Republic, formally inaugurated by the First Congress, was of tremendous propaganda value to the communists in support of their claim to be an "alternative road" for the Chinese people to that offered by the Kuomintang. In addition, it

institutionalised the shift in the operations of the Party from the city to the countryside of China, and set about the task of centralising the previously fragmented administration of the widely-scattered rural soviet areas. After the close of the Congress, and going into 1932, the authority of the government in Juichin was extended over the other soviet districts.

The Returned Students became dominant in military affairs by the spring of 1933 at the latest, and were able to abandon Mao's techniques of guerrilla warfare in their fight against the KMT's fourth campaign. At the same time as Mao had lost power in the Party and military structure, his predominance in the government structure was under attack, and many of his supporters were criticised or dismissed in mid-1933. It is significant that the call for a Second Congress was issued by the government in June 1933, indicating that the Returned Student leadership was able to enforce its will on the governmental apparatus by that time. By putting their own followers in charge of the electoral machinery, they reversed the situation of 1931, and ensured the production of a Congress which, this time, would be responsive to their wishes. This was done, not by means of Party control exercised by parallel Party and government organs, the system familiar to both the USSR and post-1949 China, but rather by Party control over the Council of People's Commissars, and particularly its Internal Affairs Department, and by influencing the composition of the electoral

committees. In this way, Party factions were inserted in each delegation to the Second Congress.

The Congress was preceded by a massive propaganda barrage directed against the inhabitants of the soviet areas, designed to show off the record of the soviet government and win support for the Red Army in its struggle to defeat the military campaigns of Chiang Kai-shek. By mid-1933, a primitive state apparatus had been created, which in spite of its imperfections was nevertheless able to function as a two-way transmission belt between people and government, implementing Party policy and listening to the reactions of the population, as well as encouraging a few to play an active political role. The 1933 election campaign for the Second Congress was therefore far more successful in drawing the masses into political participation than its predecessor had been.

The Congress was also designed to formalise the victory of the Returned Students over the Maoist government in the soviet areas. The laws and resolutions approved by the Congress were an enumeration of the policies passed by the CCP's Fifth Plenum in January 1934, (based on the line laid down by the ECCI's Twelfth Plenum), and disclosed the over-optimistic view of the situation characteristic of the Returned Student leaders. When the Second Congress actually convened the same month, the Returned Students emerged in control of the new government elected by the assembled

delegates, though not to the same overwhelming extent that marked the victory of the Maoists in 1931. Mao and his followers publicly echoed the line of the Fifth Plenum, and in return for their acquiescence in the policies of the Returned Students, they were permitted to retain a substantial role in soviet affairs. Mao himself was the dominant personality at the Congress.

The composition of the delegates to the Second Congress, and the composition of the Central Executive Committee, attested to the claim of the CCP that the soviet government was representative of all "soviet China". However, its representation and authority extended only in the smallest degree outside the territorial enclaves controlled by the CCP and the Red Army. It therefore existed only as a potential national government.

To a large extent, the evidence offered by an analysis of the two Soviet Congresses tends to corroborate the statements made by Mao's machine in 1945 concerning power relations during the Kiangsi soviet period, although there are numerous discrepancies between Mao's later statements and his public remarks at the time. Mao is correct in stating that the Returned Student leadership usurped his Party and military leadership. They controlled the leading positions of the Party in the soviet areas by November 1931, and won control over the Red Army during the period from the Ningtu Conference of August 1932 to the appointment of Chou En-lai as Red

Army Political Commissar in May 1933. (Mao now claims that his military tactics, which were not employed, were responsible for victory against the fourth "bandit encirclement" campaign of the KMT in 1933.)

Mao never explicitly refers to his loss of control over the soviet government, no doubt because he was its formal head throughout the entire period of the dominance of the "third Left line". By mid-1933 however, he had lost effective control over the government, a situation which was formalised by the Second Congress. It is significant that the CCP's Fifth Plenum, held just prior to the Second Congress, is described by Mao as marking "the peak of the development of the third 'Left' line". The First and Second Congresses therefore, far from being stepping-stones on Mao's road to power, were in reality evidence of his temporary decline.

APPENDIX

THE LEADERS OF THE KIANGSI SOVIET

The Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Chinese Soviet Republic, and its supreme governmental organ,¹ comprised a total of 241 people elected either at the First National Soviet Congress in November 1931, or at the Second Congress of January-February 1934, or both. At one time or another the CEC numbered among its membership virtually all the Chinese communist leaders of the time,² including Chou En-lai, Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming), Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu), Shen Tse-min, Hsiang Ying, Jen Pi-shih, Liu Shao-ch'i, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Tseng Shan, Fang Chih-min, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai and others.³

An inspection of the characteristics of only the men forming the Politburo and Central Committee would provide too small a sample for an analysis of communists active during the Kiangsi soviet period, even omitting the difficulties of determining such membership. Furthermore, the histories and careers of many of

¹ A 17-man Presidium was elected from the CEC membership at the Second Congress. The CEC however retained de jure control over its Presidium.

² Defined primarily by membership of the Central Committee or Politburo.

³ Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai was not a Central Committee member, as he was removed from this office at the time of its Fourth Plenum in January 1931. One probable Central Committee member not elected to the CEC, Teng Chung-hsia, was criticised for "opportunism" in 1931.

these Party leaders have been documented as well as possible elsewhere. Widening the group to include all CEC members (not one of whom is known to have been a non-communist) makes for a more comprehensive analysis of the communist movement of the time, by providing some idea as to the kind of people the leaders were, and the careers they followed.

This analysis also furnishes clues as to the nature of the present-day Chinese communist leadership, so many of whose members first grew to prominence in the Party during this period.

It is unfortunate that, despite intensive investigation, in many cases nothing is known about some CEC personnel except their names and their election in 1931 or 1934. On average, for any given characteristic, there is information on about 30% of the total.¹ Many of the "unknowns" were probably military figures who were killed in action during the Kiangsi period, who did not survive the Long March, or who were only elected to alternate membership at the Second Congress, and never fulfilled their earlier promise. Although 30% is not a large sample, much of the information, particularly that from the Ch'en Ch'eng Collection of documents, has not hitherto been brought to light, and it is believed that this biographical analysis, together with the description and

¹ The tendency is for the majority of characteristics to be identified for the same 30% of CEC members, although there are individuals on whom isolated bits of information are available. All the tables (I - VIII) therefore analyse approximately the same sample group.

analysis of the two Soviet Congresses, provides new knowledge of the political processes and political power during this period in the history of the Chinese communist movement, which still remains in many respects as one leading scholar has described it - "largely a myth, if not a blank, in our knowledge of the history of the CCP to date".¹

It is not assumed that the CEC as an institution wielded a great deal of power in soviet China. In fact, it was too large a body, its membership was scattered over a wide area, and its functions were usually performed by the Council of People's Commissars (CPC) or the Presidium of the CEC. Rather, CEC membership is taken as being indicative of holding a position of some standing in the soviet areas.²

The CEC was an overwhelmingly male group, as might be expected of a revolutionary elite functioning under wartime conditions. Of the known females in the group, many were the wives of prominent communists who were themselves elected to the CEC. These wives included Chang Ch'in-ch'iu (who had been married to Ch'en Ch'ang-hao and to Shen Tse-min), K'ang K'o-ch'ing (wife of Chu Teh), Liu Ch'ün-hsien (married to Po Ku), Teng Ying-ch'ao (married to Chou En-lai),

¹ Hsiao Tso-ling, I, op.cit., p. 302.

² This analysis is therefore of CEC membership, and not of the CEC as an institution. It is impossible to footnote all the sources in this appendix, especially when making statistical generalizations. Major sources of information are listed in the bibliography.

and Ts'ai Ch'ang (wife of Li Fu-ch'un). It is not clear to what extent nepotism played a role in their selection.

As far as is known, the vast majority of the CEC were Han Chinese. The only known exceptions were Kuan Hsiang-ying who was a Manchu, and Wei Pa-ch'un who was one of the Chuang national minority.

In the case of province of origin, the provinces of Hunan, Szechuan and Hupeh were the most heavily represented - indeed they account for over half the sample. Next come Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Chekiang and Kiangsu. Taken together, these seven provinces of the South and Central Coast, and Central Interior of China provided the birthplaces of approximately 86% of all CEC members whose birthplaces are known.¹ The figures are particularly striking when the percentage of CEC members from a given province is contrasted with the percentage of the total population of China (in 1926) from the same province. Hunan is grossly over-represented in terms of communists coming from that province, as is Hupeh, and also Szechuan (though to a lesser extent). The six northern provinces are very under-represented, reflecting the southern

¹ See Table I.

T A B L E I

GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN OF CEC MEMBERS

<u>Birthplace</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u> ¹	<u>% of China's Total</u> ² <u>Population in 1926</u>
South & Central Coast			
Kwangtung	7	8.5	7.6
Fukien	2	2.4	3.0
Chekiang	6	7.3	5.0
Kiangsu	6	7.3	7.1
Central Interior			
Hunan	22	26.8	8.4
Szechuan	12	14.6	10.7
Hupeh	11	13.4	5.9
Anhwei	3	3.7	4.2
Kiangsi	7	8.5	5.7
South Interior			
Kwangsi	1	1.2	2.5
Kweichow	0	0	2.3
Yunnan	1	1.2	2.3
North			
Shantung	0	0	7.1
Hopeh	0	0	8.0
Honan	1	1.2	7.3
Shansi	1	1.2	2.5
Shensi	1	1.2	3.6
Kansu	0	0	1.5
Tibet	0	0	1.3
Sinkiang	0	0	0.5
Mongolia	0	0	*
Manchuria	1	1.2	9.9
Unknown	159		
<u>Total</u>	<u>241</u>	<u>99.7</u> ³	

¹ Percentage of the 82 members of the CEC whose provinces of origin can be identified.

² Post Office estimate, from The China Year Book, 1931; p. 2, quoted in North and Pool, op.cit., p. 403.

³ Not 100% owing to rounding percentages to one decimal place.

* Figure for Mongolia not included in the Post Office Estimate.

orientation of the CCP in its early years.¹ As North notes: "an examination of Chinese upheavals since 1850 reveals South China as a revolutionary incubator, while the North has been more conservative."²

Information is available on the social origins of CEC members for slightly less than one-quarter (23%) of the total.³ This is probably due to a reticence to reveal a background other than proletarian, and to a desire on the part of the leadership to

¹ The figures for the 1945 Central Committee show a very similar distribution, with only a slight percentage decrease in personnel coming from the favoured areas of Szechuan and Hupeh (there was actually a slight increase in the percentage from Hunan in 1945), and a slight increase from the northern provinces of Shantung, Shansi and Shensi. [See Robert C. North with Ithiel de Sola Pool, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites, in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (Eds.), World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966), p. 403.] By 1955 however, the fact that Shensi was the base of the CCP after the Long March had made itself felt in terms of numbers of men in the CCP leadership. [See Harold C. Hinton, Leaders of Communist China, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, RM-1845, 1956). p. 194.]

² North and Pool, op.cit., p. 402.

³ There is insufficient data on family antecedents to draw any distinctions between fathers' occupation and family status, which could well be different in the period of economic and social flux during which the personnel under discussion grew to maturity.

minimise the essentially rural-peasant nature of the Party as a whole.¹ One of the most striking points about Table II is that two of the predominant categories are gentry and scholar-officials (12), and landlords (7). As might be expected, a peasant background is predominant (18), while only six men can trace their origins to any kind of proletarian form.²

Of the 74 men whose date of birth is known, (although the sources conflict or are imprecise in the cases of some individuals), the majority - almost 80% - were born between 1895 and 1909, making them aged 22-36 years old in 1931.³ This is a remarkably young revolutionary elite, which joined the Party during the 1920's when nationalist fervour was running high.⁴

¹ See Table II.

² A slightly larger number were found to have had working-class occupations prior to joining the CCP. See Table VII.

³ See Table III.

⁴ The aging, and the continuity of this elite is demonstrated by the Table in the RAND study (op.cit., p. 192), which reveals an almost identical distribution, that is, an overwhelming preponderance of Chinese communist leaders in 1955 born in the 1895-1909 period. In 1955, they made up almost 78% of the 94 leaders whose date of birth is known.

T A B L E II

FAMILY BACKGROUNDS OF CEC MEMBERS

<u>Classification</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u> ¹
Peasant	8	
Poor peasant	5	
Rich peasant	5	
		32.7
Gentry, officials	6	
Poor gentry, officials	3	
Rich gentry, officials	3	
Landlords	7	
		34.6
Workers	6	10.9
Merchants	4	7.3
Military	2	3.6
Professional	4	7.3
Other (grocer, travelling musician)	2	3.6
<u>Total</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>100.0</u>

¹ Expressed as a percentage of the total number of CEC personnel whose backgrounds are known.

T A B L E I I I

AGE OF CEC MEMBERS¹

<u>Date of Birth</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u> ²
1875-1879	3	4.1
1880-1884	2	2.7
1885-1889	3	4.1
1890-1894	4	5.4
1895-1899	16	21.6
1900-1904	22	29.7
1905-1909	21	28.4
1910-1914	3	4.1
<u>Total</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>100.1</u> ³

¹ By year of birth.

² Expressed as a percentage of all CEC members whose year of birth is known.

³ This figure does not total 100% owing to the statistical error caused by rounding to the first decimal place.

The date of joining the CCP is known for 67 individuals.¹ The initial 1921-1923 period covers the interval between the founding of the CCP and the inauguration of its alliance with the KMT. The 1924-1927 period covers the period of the first KMT-CCP united front, until its collapse in 1927. Most of the CEC members referred to therefore, (60%), joined the CCP during its alliance with the KMT. It is probable that many of the "unknowns" were locally recruited from the revolutionary base areas in the early 1930's, as membership statistics indicate a considerable growth rate from 1928-1933.²

The exceptionally well-educated nature of the Chinese soviet leadership is evidenced by Table V showing the educational stage attained by the 74 men on whom data exists with regard to this characteristic.³ Of these 74, an extremely large number, 57 (or 77%), received some kind of advanced education, which was a university education in the case of 42 of them. In the majority of such cases, this meant an education in one of the establishments in the Soviet Union such as the University for the Toilers of the East, or the Sun Yat-sen University.⁴

¹ See Table IV. In some cases, the individual was associated with the Party, or a member of the Youth Corps prior to full membership of the Party.

² John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 110.

³ An individual is classified only according to the highest stage reached. i.e. if a man had primary and secondary school experience, plus advanced training, he is classified only as "advanced". Also, the fact of a university training does not necessarily imply a secondary education.

⁴ See Table VI.

T A B L E IV

DATE OF JOINING CCP

<u>Date</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u> ¹
1921-1923	21	31.3
1924-1927	40	59.7
1928-	6	9.0
	—	—
<u>Total</u>	67	100.0

¹ Expressed as a percentage of all CEC personnel whose dates of joining the Party can be identified.

T A B L E V

DISTRIBUTION OF CEC PERSONNEL BY EDUCATIONAL
LEVEL ATTAINED

<u>Classification</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u> ¹
None	7	9.5
Primary	4	5.4
Secondary	6	8.1
Advanced		
Military Academy	7	9.5
University	42	56.7
Other ²	8	10.8
	---	---
<u>Total</u>	74	100.0

¹ Expressed as a percentage of all CEC members whose educational level can be ascertained.

² For example: Peasant Movement Training Institute, engineering school etc.

As education is a prestige characteristic in China, it is probable that a large proportion of those making up the "unknowns" received only a minimum of education, or perhaps up to the secondary stage. Since they had achieved some prominence in the soviet areas, it is unlikely that they were completely illiterate.

The Table on "foreign experience"¹ covers 51 men, and indicates that in most cases, this meant a period of study in the Soviet Union. Then, in descending order, came France, Japan, another European country, and the USA. In the case of visits abroad which did not involve study, the USSR was again the most popular place, followed by a European country - usually visited while based in France. It is clear that education abroad, combined with a stay in Russia, was a big factor in the revolutionary experience of communist leaders, as also was experience of the work-study programme in France, under which many first came into contact with the CCP.²

In the case of the occupations of communist leaders prior to joining the Party, few careers are identifiable. In many cases, none of their background is known, and even in the case of those whose history is available, a good number had no career. They joined the CCP in their student days, or in other ways became professional revolutionaries before settling into an occupation. Careerists must have been more attracted into the KMT, as those

¹ Table VI.

² Individuals may be classified in Table VI under more than one heading, if they studied in or visited more than one country.

T A B L E VI

STUDY ABROAD AND FOREIGN VISITS OF CEC PERSONNEL¹

<u>Country</u>	<u>Study</u> (number)	<u>Other²</u> (number)
USSR	35	8
France	14	2
Japan	7	2
Other European country	6	5
USA	1	0
<u>Total</u>	63 ³	17 ³

¹ Of the total of 241 CEC members, 51 are known to have been abroad at least once by the time of the Second National Soviet Congress of 1934.

² "Other" includes, for example, political visits, or visits to other countries while studying abroad.

³ An individual is counted more than once if he has visited more than one country, but not if he has visited the same country more than once. (Regardless of the purpose of the visit.)

seeking a career were unlikely to be tempted by the rather bleak prospects of political power offered by the CCP - especially after 1927.

Of the 40 individuals whose careers are known, the largest group (35%) were in education, showing perhaps the desire to improve society which led them to join the CCP.¹ A further 15% were in journalism, 22% already had a military career before joining the Red Army, and 27% were workers, a category which includes not only "true proletarians" such as miners, but also carpenters, cooks, and apprentice silk-workers.

Once in the CCP and operative in the soviet areas, not all those who were teachers in "civilian life" remained in the field of education and training. The majority, in fact, became full-time Party workers, organisers and administrators, which offered a better chance for advancement by using their talents.² Journalists tended to put their skills to use in Party propaganda work. Without exception, those who were following military careers continued to pursue their calling in the ranks of the Red Army. There are 99 (41%) CEC members on whom there is data about their main occupation while in the soviet areas. Of these, the largest single group (33% of them) was made up of military and police personnel, as might be

¹ See Table VII.

² See Table VIII.

T A B L E VII

OCCUPATION OF CEC MEMBERS PRIOR TO JOINING CCP

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u> ¹
Education	14	35.0
Journalism	6	15.0
Military	9	22.5
Worker	11	27.5
	<u>40</u>	<u>100.0</u>
<u>Total</u>	40	100.0

¹ Expressed as a percentage of the sample of CEC members whose occupation can be identified, and omitting those known to have had no occupation.

T A B L E VIII

CEC PERSONNEL BY TYPE OF WORK IN SOVIET AREAS

<u>Classification</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u> ¹
Political	25	25.2
Political work in Army	19	19.2
Military or police	33	33.4
Trade union, peasant organisation work	9	9.1
Education, training, youth work	13	13.1
	—	—
<u>Total</u>	99	100.0

¹ Expressed as a percentage of the total number of CEC personnel whose main occupation in the soviet areas can be identified.

expected in a situation of almost constant warfare that was the lot of the Chinese Soviet Republic. In addition, a further 19% were engaged in political work connected with the Red Army, either as members of the General Political Department, or as political commissars. The military therefore absorbed over 50% of the sample. Of the remainder, 25% were full-time Party workers within the CCP apparatus, 9% were engaged in organising labour unions or peasant associations, and 13% devoted their time to education and youth work.

In summary and conclusion, it can be said, on the basis of the sample of CEC members on whom data exists, that communist leaders at this time were predominantly male, Han Chinese, youthful (their average was 34 in 1934), the majority of whom came from provinces in the central interior of China, particularly Hunan, Szechuan and Hupeh. In terms of the percentage of the total population, these provinces, and others along the south and central coastal regions are heavily over-represented among the communists, while the north and outlying regions of the country, such as Tibet and Sinkiang are grossly under-represented. Given the stress laid by traditional Marxism on poor, urban, proletarian origins, it is surprising that so many of the sample originate from landlord and gentry families, or from rural peasant backgrounds. In terms of education, they are a remarkably well-educated elite, much of the

training having been provided abroad, particularly at Russian universities. The majority of the sample tended to join the CCP when they were in their middle twenties, from 1924-1927, prior to the split between the CCP and the KMT. Most of them had no career outside the communist movement. Once in the revolutionary base areas, they tended to work in the Red Army, either as military specialists, or frequently as political commissars attached to the communist troops. Those not in the Red Army were primarily full-time Party functionaries.

The importance of Kiangsi soviet period can hardly be over-rated. One study has shown that of the 97 members elected to the Eighth Central Committee in 1956, no less than 82 (or 84.5%) participated in guerrilla warfare during all or part of the period,¹ and also that of the total membership of the Eighth Central Committee, no less than 53.6% came from the provinces of Hunan, Szechuan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei, reflecting recruitment in the Chinese Soviet Republic prior to the Long March.² Many of the Chinese communist leaders therefore, first became significant during the time of the Kiangsi soviet, and an understanding of the nature of the political elite functioning during this period is essential to an understanding of later developments.

¹ Franklin W. Houn, "The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. A Study of an Elite", American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, (June 1957), p. 400.

² Ibid., p. 395.

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