THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NORTH-WEST

FRONTIER PROVINCE, 1901-1919

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This work is a study of the administration of the North-West Frontier Province from 1901 to 1919. Two aspects of the administration have been dealt with: the British Government's relations with the tribes of the frontier, and some important aspects of the civil administration of the settled districts of the Province. The first chapter deals with the formation of the Province by Curzon in 1901, and his new frontier policy. The second chapter in analysing the Government's relations with the three most important Pathan tribes, the Mahsuds, the Afridis and the Mohmands, shows how the new policy worked. The period 1915-1919 was dominated by the events of the First World War, the impact of which on the Frontier has been described in the third chapter. The fourth chapter traces the development of the means of communication such as roads and railways, which were built primarily with military and strategic objectives. The fifth and the sixth chapters describe the new land system introduced by the British in the settled districts and the Government's efforts to develop agriculture by irrigation projects. Educational development formed an important item in the civil administration of the Province; the course of this development and the educational policy of the Government constitute the theme of the last chapter.
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INTRODUCTION

Thanks to its geographical position the North-West Frontier Province played an outstanding role in the history of British India. The region which constituted the province is situated between 31° and 35° north latitude and between 69° and 74° east longitude. The extent of the Province, from north to south was 408 miles and from east to west 279 miles, the total area being approximately 38,919 square miles. To its north lay the Hindu-Kush, to the south Baluchistan and the Dera Ghazi Khan district of the Punjab; Kashmir and the Punjab lay to its east and Afghanistan to its west. Except the district of Hazara and part of Kohistan which were cis-Indus, the rest of the Province was trans-Indus.

The Province had a double boundary, the one administrative, and the other political. The former separated the five administered districts from the tribal territory and extended to the foot of

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1 In 1955 the Province ceased to exist, as it merged in the 'one-unit' scheme of Pakistan.

2 For the Geography of the Province, see Census of India, 1911, vol. XIII, N.W.F.P., pp. 5-7; ibid., p.192, vol. XIV, pp. 7-9; Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908, Provincial series, N.W.F.P., pp. 1-5, 11; O.H.K.Spate, India and Pakistan, pp. 432-451; David Dichter, The North-West Frontier of West Pakistan.
the mountains. The latter boundary, known as the "Durand Line" marked off Afghanistan from British India. The intervening area between the two boundaries was - and still is - occupied by Pathan tribes.

The Province had two political divisions: the five regularly administered districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan with a total area of 13,419 square miles, and the tribal territory with five political agencies - the Malakand, the Khyber, the Kurram, Northern Waziristan and Southern Waziristan and five 'tribal areas'. The Malakand agency included the frontier Chieftainships of Chitral, Dir and Nawagai. The tribal territory had an area of 25,500 square miles.

The physical features of the North-West Frontier Province presented an extremely complex and varied picture. There were three principal geographical divisions: first, the cis-Indus district of Hazara extending north-eastwards into the Himalayas. Its northern section was hilly, while the southern part opened out into the fertile plains of the Punjab. Second, the comparatively narrow strip between the Indus and the hills, in which area lay, from north to south, the four districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The tribal territory between the districts and the Afghan frontier formed the third division containing a terrain, rugged, rocky and wild with lofty mountains and between
them deep, narrow and inaccessible valleys. The Political Agency of Dir, Swat and Chitral lay between the Hindu Kush and the border of Peshawar made up of mountains and valleys with but scanty cultivation. To Chitral's south lay the hills of Dir and Bajaur and the fertile valleys of the Swat and Panjkora rivers. The Mohmand hills, which were mostly without vegetation, flanked the Malakand agency on the south-western side. Further south was the narrow gorge of the Khyber pass linking Jamrud, on the Peshawar border, with the eastern boundary of Afghanistan at Landi Khana. Still further south lay Tirah, the home of the Afridis and Orakzais. The Kurram agency, a fertile valley, was situated to the west of the Khyber agency and extended from the high peak of the Sikar and the Paiwar-Kotal passes to the western end of the Miranzai valley of the Kohat district. Further south could be seen the hilly area of Waziristan, the Tochi valley and the plain of Wana. The Wazir hills joined another mountain range, the Sulaimans, which dominated the Derajat.

The north-western hills of the Province had some very important passes serving for centuries as routes of invasion and

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trade between Central Asia and the plains of the sub-continent. These passes invested the Province with great strategic and political importance; Baroghil and Dorah, the two important passes, lay in the northern zone of the Hindu Kush ranges, the former leading into the Pamirs and the latter into Afghanistan. Further south lay a route leading from the Kunar valley into Bajaur, Swat and the Peshawar plain. In the southern zone of the Hindukush lay the famous Khyber pass, the main route of communication between Afghanistan and the sub-continent. Further south the Peiwar Kotal and Shutargardan passes led to Kabul and Ghazni. Then there were the Tochi and Gomal passes, the latter much used by trade caravans from Afghanistan.

The Indus, which entered the Province north of the Black Mountains, was the principal river, draining almost the entire territory of the Province,¹ and forming about two hundred miles of its eastern boundary. Besides, the mountain streams of Hazara flowing into the Indus, the river was fed by its most important tributary, the Landai. The Kabul river was another important source of water supply for the Province. Rising in the Hindu Kush range about forty-five miles west of Kabul, the river flowed eastwards, crossed the Mohmand hills and entered the Peshawar district

¹With the exception of Kunhar river in Hazara which falls into the Jhelum river.
at Warsak. The Bara river, which issued from the hills of Tirah south of the Safed Koh range and drained the Afridi country, fell into the Kabul river, and so did the Yarkhun, Chitral, Kunar, Panjkora and Swat rivers which drained the territories of Chitral, Dir, Swat and Bajaur. The Kurram river flowed down from the southern slopes of the Safed Koh, and after crossing the Kurram valley and the Lower Wazir hills entered into the Bannu district. The Tochi or the Gambila river watered North Waziristan.

In population the North-West Frontier was the smallest province of British India. The 1921 census showed its total individual as 5,076,476. Of these about ninety two per cent were Muslims and over seven per cent were Hindus and Sikhs. As for the inhabitants of the Province, Dr. Davies has rightly observed that

No ethnological problem is more complicated and intricate than that which is presented by the North-West Frontier of India.

Pathans predominated, including the tribes of the Yusufzais, Mohmands, Afridis, Shinwaris, Orakzais, Turis, Bangashes, Wazirs,

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1Baluchistan (799,625), Ajmer-Merwara (495,271), and Coorg (163,838) had smaller populations than the North-West Frontier Province. Census of India, 1921, vol. XIV, N.W.F.P., p.11.

2It was estimated that the tribal territory contained fifty-six per cent of the total population, ibid.

3C.C. Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908, p.37.
Mahsuds, Bhittanis, Daura, Khattacks and Bannuchis. The cis-Indus district of Hazara had a mixed population, mainly of Indian origin such as the Awans, Gujars, Tanaolis, Dhunds, and Kashmiris. In the Dera Ismail Khan district, the Baluchi and Jat tribes predominated. The Pathans of the settled districts and of the tribal territory were similar, culturally, linguistically and racially, but the former were regarded as far less unruly and fierce than the latter.¹

The Tribal Territory

The administration of the Frontier region under the Sikhs (1818-1849) had been of the "loosest type". The Sikhs possessed but little influence in the trans-Indus tracts, and what influence they had was confined to the plains. Even here they were obeyed only in the immediate vicinity of their forts which studded the country.²


²Davies, op.cit., p.21.
The Sikhs failed to establish peace and order in the Frontier; the prevailing lawlessness among the tribes, their bitter feuds leading to incessant violence and their unwillingness to pay revenue which led to frequent armed encounters with the rulers created a state of continuous anarchy.¹

On the annexation of the Punjab by the British in 1849, the task of establishing peace and order, the assurance of the security of life and property, therefore, fell to the lot of the Punjab authorities who were entrusted with the administration of the Frontier region. This administration had two aspects: the management of the tribes in order to ensure the security of the settled districts from frequent tribal raids; and the civil administration of the settled districts. This arrangement continued until the formation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1901.

The British policy on the North-West Frontier passed through various stages. For over a quarter of a century, after the annexation of the Punjab, the Punjab Government followed what came to be known as the 'close-border' policy.² The main feature of


²The relative merits and demerits of the 'close border' policy on the Punjab frontier had often been compared with another system adopted on the Sind frontier in dealing with the Baluch tribes. Its exponent was Captain Sandeman. In 1877 the Baluchistan Agency was created and Sandeman was appointed the first Agent
the policy was to guard the border closely with a view to keeping
raids and consequent reprisals by military expeditions to the
minimum. Non-aggression on tribal territory and non-interference
in tribal affairs were the declared objects of this policy. For
defensive purposes a military force, called the Punjab Frontier
Force was raised under the supreme control of the Government of
the Punjab which in 1886 was amalgamated with the regular army.
The existing forts were repaired and new ones were built along
the administrative boundary and were connected together by a
military road. At the same time, various conciliatory measures
were adopted. Agreements were made with the tribes obliging them
to maintain peaceful and friendly relations with the Government
in return for subsidies and allowances. The tribesmen were allowed
entry into British territory and to trade freely, but British

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Governor-General in Baluchistan. The policy which Sandeman
followed was described as "one of friendly and conciliatory inter­
vention". He occupied the central points in the agency by troops
and linked those points by good roads. He made friends with the
Baluch chiefs and made them responsible for the control of their
tribes. Railway and telegraph development was also undertaken.
For discussion on the respective policies, see Davies, op.cit.,
pp. 33-5; Philip Woodruff, The Men who ruled India. The Guardians,
pp. 143-9; "Sind and Punjab Frontier Systems" by H.B.Frere,
22 March 1876, P.S.M., A.12; H.T.Lambrick, John Jacob of Jacobabad,
officers were instructed not to cross into tribal territory.\textsuperscript{1}
The tribesmen, however, frequently broke these agreements and obliged the Government to stop the allowances, impose fines or blockades and, when all these proved unwavering, to send expeditions into tribal territory. Between 1849 and 1899, the Punjab Government had to undertake as many as sixty two expeditions.\textsuperscript{2}

But this policy had to be abandoned in favour of what came to be known as the 'Forward Policy' of the 'Nineties'. The Russian expansion in Central Asia and her advance towards the borders of Afghanistan alarmed the British who regarded the Russian threat as "a very real" and "a very close" danger to the frontier of India.\textsuperscript{3} Consequently the defence of India had to be organised and this could be achieved by the occupation of the "scientific Frontier" based on the Kabul/Kandahar line.\textsuperscript{4}


\textsuperscript{2}A complete list of expeditions is given in Harris, op.cit., Appendix G, pp. 433-40. See also Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, vol. I; Tribes North of the Kabul River, vol. II, North-West Frontier: Tribes Between the Kabul and Gomal Rivers, P.S.D.L., B.234; H.L.Nevill, Campaigns on the North-West Frontier, 1849-1908; H.C.Wylly, From the Black Mountain to Waziristan.

\textsuperscript{3}Lytton to Salisbury, 15 July 1877, B.M. Add. MSS. 39164, vol. CCXXXIV, Lazard Papers, Quoted by Harris, op.cit., p.384.

\textsuperscript{4}This was the strategic line which the Government of India was to
It was, therefore, necessary to control the passes in the north-western hills, to improve the communication both in tribal and British territory and to set up advanced military posts in the tribal region with a view especially to facilitate the occupation of the strategic line. The implementation of this policy involved the establishment of a workable relationship with the Amir of Afghanistan and control over the frontier tribes.¹

Under Lansdowne (1888-1894) and Elgin (1894-1899) the Government of India took new measures for the defence of India. A forward policy was followed in tribal territory.² The Government had already acquired control of the Khyber Pass during the Second Afghan War (1878-80). In 1878 the Khyber Agency was created and the Political Agent conducted relations with the tribes³ of the Agency. In 1890, agreements were made with the Shiranis, Mahsuds and the Darwesh Khel to open the Gomal pass in South Waziristan for traffic. To guard the pass, tribal levies were raised and levy posts built. In 1891, the Samana range was occupied in case of a Russian move towards India or in the event of domestic troubles in Afghanistan. See for details, Harris, op.cit., pp. 384-96.

¹Imperial Gazetteer of India, N.W.F.P., p. 25
²A lucid discussion is given in Harris, op.cit., pp. 22-41.
³Afidis, Orakzais, Mullagoris, Shilmanis and Shinwaris.
cupied enabling the Government to dominate the Miranzai valley and Southern Tirah. Here also posts were built and occupied by the tribal militia. In 1892, the Turis let the British acquire their country where a political agency was set up and the area was brought under direct administration. The Kurram militia was raised in 1893. The acquisition of the Kurram valley gave the British command of the Kurram route leading over the Peiwar Kotal pass to Ghazni and Kabul.¹

These forward moves on the Indo-Afghan border alarmed the Amir of Afghanistan and aroused his suspicions of the intentions of the Government of India. Considerable uncertainty prevailed regarding the respective spheres of influence of the two governments over the tribes. To resolve this, in 1893, the Durand Agreement was concluded for the delimitation of the boundary between India and Afghanistan. In 1894, a section of the boundary from the Bashghal valley on the borders of Kafiristan to Nawa Kotal on the junction of Bajaur and the Mohmand country was demarcated. Further south the demarcation could not be carried out as the Amir was not prepared to accept the British proposals regarding the Mohmand territory. The section from the Kabul river to Sikaram (Safed Koh) was also left undemarcated and it was not until 1919, after the conclusion of the Third Afghan War,

¹Davies, op.cit. pp. 71-91; R.I. Bruce, The Forward Policy and its results.; H. Harris, op.cit.
that this section was defined. From Kurram to the Gomal river the line was demarcated in 1894-95, but only when an expedition was undertaken against the Mahsuds, whose country, the South Waziristan, was made a Political Agency in 1896. The Mahsud allowances were redistributed in return for their promise to maintain the peace and security of the Gomal Pass, the construction of militia posts in a few places and their undertaking to desist from raids into the British areas. In October 1895, at the request of the Daurs and Wazirs of the Tochi valley, the Government occupied their country and constituted it into the North-Waziristan Agency. The Daur valley, like the Kurram valley, was brought under direct administration.

Simultaneously, the forward policy was pursued in the north as well; the object was to secure control of passes in the Eastern Hindu Kush. Since 1878 the British had exercised some influence in the area through the Maharaja of Kashmir, a dependent ally of the Government of India. In 1889, the Gilgit agency was formed. In 1892, taking advantage of the death of the ruler of Chitral and the anarchy that followed, garrisons were stationed at Chalt and Hunza. Three years later, Chitral's external relations were taken over by the Government of India.

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1 Harris, op.cit., pp. 108-137; Davies, op.cit., pp. 158-62. See also P. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand.
and a permanent garrison placed at Chitral. British troops also guarded the Malakand pass and the Swat river crossing. The construction of a road connecting Peshawar with Chitral through the Malakand pass, Swat and Dir was begun in 1895. The Khan of Dir and the tribes of Dir were given allowances in return for their undertaking to protect communications in their areas, to provide tribal levies to guard military posts and to allow the movement of British troops for relief operations. This led to the creation of the Malakand agency in 1896 consisting of Dir, Swat and Chitral. Unlike other agencies, which were under the Punjab Government, the Malakand Agency was put under the direct control of the Government of India.

The active forward move into the tribal territory during the 'nineties' alarmed the tribesmen who feared that the Government were out to destroy their cherished independence. Their reaction took the form of a great tribal uprising in 1897 involving the Darwesh Khel Waziris, the Swatis, the Mohmands, the Afridis and Orakzais. This led the Government to undertake seven military operations against the tribesmen in which 70,000 troops were

1Davies, _op.cit._, pp. 80-88.

2Lower Swat was directly administered by the Government while Chitral, Dir and Bajaur had chiefs who were the allies of the Government.
engaged. The operations were "long, arduous and costly". The events of 1897 brought home to the Government the fact that the frontier policy needed revaluation. Elgin's viceroyalty having come to an end in 1898, Curzon launched upon a new frontier policy with far-reaching results not only on British relations with the tribes but on the administration of the settled districts.

Administrative Territory

The problem which the Punjab Government faced in the so-called settled districts was of civil administration. After the annexation, the trans-Indus plains between the Indus and the hills had been divided, for administrative purposes, into five districts, stretching from north to south into the districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan. Including the cis-Indus district of Hazara, all six became the frontier districts of the Punjab. They were organised into two divisions, the Peshawar division in 1850 and the Derajat Division in 1861, each under a Commissioner. A simple but efficient and forceful

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2Dera Ghazi Khan was on the border of the Baluch country.

3The Peshawar Division included Hazara, Peshawar and Kohat districts.
administration based on the non-regulation system was introduced. Under this system the district officers had more extensive criminal powers than in a regulation province. In addition, the Deputy Commissioners of the frontier districts conducted relations with the tribesmen of the adjoining tribal areas. After the system of tribal agencies came into force, they were left with only a few "tribal tracts" bordering their districts.

The British administrators introduced reforms in all branches of administration including the police, justice, land revenue, public works and education etc. in the new territory. But during

and the Derajat Division consisted of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan. *Imperial Gazetteer of India, N.W.F.P.*, pp. 19, 58.

1 *The Cambridge History of India*, vol. VI, pp. 90-3, 292.

2 See pp. 13-4.

the rule of over half a century by the Punjab Government over the Frontier districts, these areas had made slow progress and were less developed in various fields of administration than the cis-Indus areas of the Punjab. Their somewhat neglected condition might be attributed to the Punjab Government's preoccupation more with the problem of security, law and order in the frontier districts than with other administrative matters. Added to this, indeed, was the strategic importance of this "outpost of the Indian Empire" where administrative developments were subordinated to strategic necessities.

One of the first concerns of the new rulers was the preservation of law and order and the suppression of crime. The duties of civil police were invested in levies which were under the control of the Deputy Commissioner in each district. These levies were made up of local tribesmen who were chosen by their chiefs and paid by the Government. This police force was gradually changed into a regular police force. Village watchmen were also appointed who helped the police in the prevention and detection of crime.¹ Unlike the other districts of the Punjab, the people in the trans-Indus districts were allowed to retain their arms for the protection of life and property from the raids

¹ Imperial Gazetteer of India, N.W.F.P., pp. 69-71.
of the trans-border tribesmen. ¹ This system remained in force till 1899-1900 when partial disarmament of the districts was undertaken.² Another special measure which the Punjab Government undertook for the administration of justice was the enactment of the Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation in 1872. This regulation empowered the Deputy Commissioner of a frontier district to refer the question of guilt or innocence of an accused person to a jirga (Council of Elders) convened according to Pathan customs.³

The complex question of land revenue administration was dealt with with some vigour. The frontier districts were at first put under summary settlements. The policy was to fix the revenue at a low rate because the villagers were "refractory, and if pressed betake themselves to the hills".⁴ Besides the influential classes were treated with special concessions.⁵

³ Report on the Administration of the Punjab and its Dependencies 1873-4, Chapter III, p.21. This Regulation was superseded by the Punjab Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1887 and again by the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901, see pp.61-5.
period of the summary settlements of the frontier districts lasted rather a long time until in the eighteen sixties it was thought practicable to undertake the first regular settlements, a time when revised settlements were being made in most of the other Punjab districts.  

Closely linked with the systematization of land revenue was the development of canal irrigation for agricultural improvements. Tremendous progress had been made in this field in the Punjab but, by comparison with the enormous irrigation works constructed there, the irrigational projects in the Frontier districts were much less conspicuous.

The fostering of trade, commerce and agriculture by constructing roads had, too, been given some attention. On the Frontier, a further purpose of building roads and railways was strategic. No sooner was the Punjab annexed than the Government of India directed the Board of Administration to take steps for laying out the military roads in the Frontier areas and linking them with the rest of the Punjab. But the progress made in the field was slow.

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1. Ibid., p.33.


As for education, the Frontier districts made similarly little progress. The organisation of a Department of Public Instruction in the Punjab took place in 1854 when it was put under a Director. The new educational system grew slowly and institutions of all kinds were established. But education in the Frontier Districts did not proceed beyond the Secondary stage. Amongst the thirty-one districts of the Punjab, the Frontier districts were by far the least advanced in regard to education.

It may be concluded therefore that in 1901, at the time of the creation of the North-West Frontier Province under Curzon, the Frontier districts were much less developed in all aspects of administration than the remaining districts of the Punjab. The object of the subsequent developments will be a subject of later chapters.

The numerous works on the North-West Frontier which exist are dominated by one theme: the political and strategic aspects of the British frontier policy. Issues like the British reaction to the Russian approach to the Indian border, British relations

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with the Amir of Afghanistan and the Pathan tribes have been extensively studied over many years. Of the comparatively modern works, Dr. C. C. Davies' *The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908* (1932) is the most authoritative. Written more than thirty five years ago, it still holds the field as the most lucid exposition of the subject, although due mainly to the unavailability of some of the source materials the author has not been able to deal with the various issues with equal depth. For instance, while the Mahsud blockade of 1900-1902 has been given sufficient space, British relations with the Afridis and Mohmands have been treated rather briefly. Nevertheless over the years the book has provided the guide line for all succeeding works on the subject. Another useful older work is R.I. Bruce's *The Forward Policy and its Results* (1900) which gives a good account of Robert Sandeman's policy in Baluchistan and its application by Bruce in Waziristan. Of recent works, L. Harris's thesis on *British Policy on the North-West Frontier, 1889-1901* is worth mentioning as a competent study of the Frontier policy in the nineties, the reaction it set off in the tribal territory and the revaluation of that policy by the British Government. Based on source materials to which Dr. Davies had little access, Dr. Harris's work has filled certain gaps which are found in Dr. Davies' book.
There are three other general works, also of comparatively recent date, the theme of which is the peoples of the Frontier rather than British frontier policy. *The Pathans (550 B.C. - A.D. 1957* (1958) by Sir Olaf Caroe traces the history of the settlements of the Pathans and their ethnology from ancient times. The author's intimate association with the Pathans among whom he lived and worked for about twenty years and his love and admiration for them is reflected in the book and makes it absorbing reading. Unlike the authors mentioned earlier, Sir Olaf has but briefly dealt with the administration developments under the British but the book contains an interesting account of some famous British officers who served on the Frontier. However, Sir Olaf has made but little use of archival materials. *The Pathan Borderland* (1963) by J. W. Spain, an American, is an account of the social and cultural life of the Pathans with a summary of British frontier policy, the political reforms in the Frontier Province, the problems faced by the Pakistan Government in the area and the progress achieved after 1947. *Arthur Swinson's North-West Frontier, People and Events, 1839-1947* (1967) is primarily intended for general readers. It provides no more than an attractive narrative of a few interesting political and military events which took place in the region.

There is as yet no history of the administration of the
Frontier Province which deals not only with the course of the British Government's relations with the tribes (which is but one aspect of the administration) but with the development of the civil administration of the settled districts of the Frontier Province as well. Nor is there any satisfactory account of British relations with the tribes after the first decade of the present century. Such an account it has been my object to write, and the opening of the private papers of several Viceroy's, Chief Commissioners and others and of several series of secret and confidential Government documents has made this attempt possible. Since a comprehensive treatment of all aspects of the administration of the settled districts is not possible within the space allowed in a thesis I have concentrated only on a few aspects of the administration.
Chapter I

THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

On assuming office as Viceroy in January 1899 Curzon had to deal with the two-fold problem of the North-West frontier of India: the reorganisation of military defences, and the reform of the administration of the trans-frontier districts. The frontier was Curzon's forte. By wide travel and study he had acquired an extensive knowledge of frontier problems and politics, particularly of Central Asia, although he belonged to "neither school of Frontier theorists". Even before coming to India he had given indications of not only his appreciation of India's frontier problems, but his desire to deal with them as well.

Soon after his arrival, Curzon took up the question of military dispositions and the control of the tribes. Curzon's policy was, first, the "withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions"; second, "the concentration of British forces in British territory behind them as a safeguard and a support" and, finally, "the improvement of communications in the rear". The regular garrison

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2 M. Edwardes, High Noon of the Empire, p. 64.


4 T. Raleigh, Lord Curzon in India 1898-1905, p. 429; L. Fraser, India
in Chitral was reduced, the troops being concentrated at Kila Drosh at the extreme southern end of the Chitral country. The outlying posts were manned by the Chitrali levies themselves. Further southwards, such posts were held by levies from Dir and Swat for the security of the Dir-Chitral road. Regular troops were stationed at Chakdara, Malakand and Dargai to support the levies. To strengthen the British position at Malakand a light railway was constructed from Nowsherā to Dargai in 1901. In the Khyber all regular troops were withdrawn from advanced positions and replaced by two battalions - 1,250 strong - of the reorganised and enlarged Khyber Rifles¹ with an increased number of British officers and an improved scale of pay. For their reinforcement a flying column was maintained in readiness at Peshawar, and for its support Peshawar was linked with Jamrud - a distance of ten miles - by an extension of the broad-gauge railway, and with Landi-Kotal by a road running through the Mullagori country.² Between Peshawar and Kohat a cart road was built through the Kohat pass. South of Kohat a force of tribal militia - 450 strong - called the Samana Rifles

¹See chapter IV, p. 99.

was raised under British officers. It was largely recruited from the Orakzai tribesmen and formed a part of the Border Military Police; the Samana Rifles replaced the regular garrison of the Samana Range. In the Kurram valley the Kurram Militia was augmented and reorganised in two battalions - 1,250 strong - on the model of the Khyber Rifles. Both the Samana and the Kurram positions were to be supported by a light railway to be constructed from Kohat to Thal.¹

Further to the south, two battalions of the Waziristan Militia - 800 strong each - were raised, one being for the Tochi valley or North Waziristan, and the other for the Gomal valley or South Waziristan. The militia replaced the large garrisons of regular troops which had been kept in these valleys since 1895, and were supported by mobile columns garrisoned at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. By 1904 the new frontier defence policy was in operation along the entire line from Chitral to Baluchistan.

The new military structure, in the words of Curzon, had the advantages of "reduced outlay, of increased tactical mobility, and of tribal contentment".² It relieved the soldiers of the Indian army of arduous trans-frontier duty and left them, in the event of a war,

¹See Chapter IV, p. 204.
to be concentrated on the two main routes to Afghanistan, Bolan and Khyber. It was further hoped that the presence of local garrisons would reduce the chance of "commotion and reproach attached to military disaster", besides increasing the tribesmen's attachment to the British Raj through a service which would at the same time nurture their patriotism.¹

The press in India and England commended Curzon's frontier policy on economic and political grounds. The Times of India hailed it as "the most important work" undertaken by the Viceroy "in the domain of the Indian Statesmanship".² The Spectator and The Times approved the new policy, although the latter was not "without doubts as to the confidence and loyalty of the tribal levies."³ Curzon's own mood was one of cautious optimism. He was fully aware that his frontier policy would not save the Government "from frontier warfare, or from occasional expeditions, or from chronic anxiety". His plan, he claimed, was essentially one of "military concentration as against diffusion, and of tribal conciliation in place of exasperation".⁴

Not only the military defences were reorganised, but to improve the relations with the tribes some positive measures were also adopted.

¹Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 26 October 1899, P.S.L.I., vol. 117, Reg. No. 208.
²The Times of India, 8 August 1899.
³The Spectator, 12 August 1899; The Times, 8 August 1899.
The frontier officers were given increased freedom to act on their own responsibility and initiative; they were asked to cultivate friendly relations with the tribes and to acquire by slow degrees control over them; they were also required to deal with local offences expeditiously.¹

At the same time subsidies to the tribes were increased. It was expected that the system of tribal militia and local levies would make the tribesman responsible for the maintenance of peace in his own land; make his service to the Government "a guarantee" for the "independence" of his land, and instil in him discipline by close contact with British officers, which contact, in its turn, would foster "mutual trust". It would mitigate to a certain extent the poverty and unemployment in the tribal area.² The policy was an attempt at developing intimate knowledge of the tribesmen and their affairs, improving their economic condition and in this process gradually acquiring an influence over them.³

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¹L. Harris, op. cit., pp. 343-4.

²In October 1896, the amount of allowances given to the North-West Frontier tribes on the Punjab border, including payment to tribal levies was Rs. 5,65,864. In February 1908, the grand total of tribal allowances including payment to militia and tribal levies swelled to Rs. 18,49,600 per annum. L. Harris, op. cit., Appendix E, pp. 427-30; Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 24 February 1908, F.S.L.I., vol. 212, Reg. No. 458.

The success of his frontier defence scheme, Curzon was certain, depended on the reform of the administration of the trans-frontier districts. The existing system of administration, he saw, was full of "complexities... anomalies and... ineradicable flaws". The remedy, in his view, lay in the formation of a frontier province: the trans-Indus regions had to be brought under "more prompt, more imperative and more direct" control and authority of the Government of India by the removal of the intervening barrier of the "elaborate organisation" of the Punjab government.¹

The idea was not Curzon's own. Throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, schemes of different character had been mooted by officials, submitted to and debated by the Government of India for the formation of a new administrative unit on the frontier. Most of the frontier experts of the time had agreed on the need for such a unit.² Yet, the fact that this much-desired change had not been effected was a pointer to the complexity of the issue.

From the Mutiny until 1889, the frontier question centred on the various proposals to amalgamate Sind with the Punjab with a view to co-ordinating the frontier policies of the two administrations. From time to time schemes for the transfer of Sind from Bombay to the Punjab were submitted to the Government but ultimately dropped.

¹ Curzon's minute, op.cit., p2.
In 1876, Lord Northbrook’s recommendations on the same issue were accepted in principle by the then Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury. However, "the plan foundered, partly on the question of cost, but more because of the opposition of the Bombay Presidency". The Bombay government was not prepared to lose Sind unless compensated by the transfer of other areas to its jurisdiction. During Lytton’s viceroyalty the increased danger of Russian aggression from Central Asia necessitated a "vigilantly precautionary frontier policy". Salisbury strongly urged unity of action on the part of the Government in the western and north-western frontier of India by bringing it under the direct control of the Government of India. Lytton in his well-known minute of April 1877 accepted the Secretary of State’s suggestion and sketched out a scheme for the formation of a separate trans-Indus province which went far beyond the original recommendations of the Secretary of State. The proposed province was to consist of the six frontier districts of the Punjab-Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (excluding the cis-Indus tracts), Dera Ismail Khan (with the same exception) and Dera Ghazi Khan - and trans-Indus Sind (excluding Karachi). This large province was to be headed by a Chief-Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General. Under him were to be two Commissioners, the one for the


Pathan, the other for the Baluch, tribes.¹

Salisbury saw that Lytton's proposals were "measures of defence and security, not of aggression", but since they involved a huge expense and "too large a change", he rejected them. Alternatively, he proposed a compromise scheme: two Commissioners, the one for the trans-Indus Punjab, the other for Sind, to be appointed directly by the Viceroy. In regard to external affairs they would correspond with the Viceroy direct, while, in matters of internal administration, they would act under the Punjab government.² Salisbury's proposal met with severe criticism. Charles Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, and Robert Egerton, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, condemned it as "full of the seeds of future misunderstanding, confusion... divided responsibility" and certain to cause "the worst effect upon the internal administration of the frontier districts".³ Despite this criticism, Lytton accepted Salisbury's proposals. General Frederick Roberts was designated the first Commissioner of the trans-Indus districts. But, soon afterwards, the Second Afghan war broke out resulting in the termination of Lytton's viceroyalty. Ripon, who succeeded Lytton, abandoned the scheme altogether.

¹Ibid.
²Curzon's Minute, 3.3.
³Ibid.
In 1889, when Lansdowne was the Viceroy, the Baluchistan Agency was created with Robert Sandeman as its head; Sind ceased to be a frontier province. Before laying down his office, Lansdowne expressed the desirability of the creation of a single frontier charge which should be entrusted to the management of a single officer under the immediate direction of the Government of India.

The tribal uprising of 1897-8, as has already been seen, underscored the need for the detachment of the tribal territory from the Punjab administration and its placement under the direct control of the Government of India to ensure its efficient management. Hamilton, the Secretary of State, therefore suggested to Elgin, who had taken over from Lansdowne in 1895, that the present arrangements are not satisfactory, and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India. Accordingly he proposed a scheme which provided that the Commissioner of Peshawar and his subordinate officers responsible for dealings with frontier tribes should act directly under the Government of India, while in all matters of civil administration, he and his subordinates would continue to be under the Punjab government. It

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2Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 5 August 1898, C.C., vol. 301.
was exactly the reproduction of Salisbury's scheme twenty-one
years before and met with an equally frosty reception from the
Punjab authorities. It fell to Curzon's lot to deal with the
problem which had taxed the energies of the earlier Viceroy's.

Curzon was not the man to let matters drift. Before Elgin
left India Curzon had discussed the matter with him. In April
1899 he held discussions with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Pun­
jab, Mackworth Young, and other frontier officers. Curzon sug­
gested four possible solutions: first, the status quo should be
maintained; second, a separate frontier province and commission
should be created; third, Hamilton's compromise plan should be
adopted; fourth, the trans-frontier districts should be divided
into five or six separate charges each under a political officer.
Curzon claimed that the opinion of the Punjab officers was in
favour of the creation of a separate province, while the Lieutenant­
Governor, though in favour of maintaining the status quo, did not
seem either "unreasonable or immoderate". Curzon, for himself,
maintained that the status quo was unsatisfactory. The existing
system was such that the Viceroy, though directly responsible for
frontier administration, had to implement his policy through the
medium of subordinate officials who might well have no special

1Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 10 November 1898, P.S.L.I., vol. 109,

2Curzon to Hamilton, 12 January, 5 April 1899, C.C., vol. 158.
knowledge of frontier affairs and over whose appointment, inter­change or removal, the Viceroy had no control. In normal times the Supreme Government did not interfere with the Punjab govern­ment's handling of frontier affairs. But emergencies could arise when they had to act and even assume entire control of the frontier. Such a control could hardly be effective as the Supreme Government had to act through agents who are not its own; while the Punjab govern­ment, dispossessed and sullen, stands on one side, criticising everything that is done.¹

Naturally Curzon felt gratified to have received what he called "a unanimous pronouncement of the leading officials of the Punjab government against their own system".²

In a series of private and official letters to Hamilton, Curzon scathingly condemned the extremely unsatisfactory way the frontier was being administered by the Punjab government. The latter, he pointed out, had no idea of any frontier policy at all; the officers at Lahore had neither any knowledge of nor any interest in frontier affairs; the Punjab government showed "distrust" of their own officers in the frontier areas which bred mutual dis­agreement, "perpetual friction... inevitable blunder and... scandalous delay."³

¹Ibid.
²Curzon to Hamilton, 5 April 1899, C.C., vol. 158.
³Curzon to Hamilton, 9 March, 27 September 1899, ibid.
In a minute dated 27th August 1900, "perhaps the most elaborate written by a Viceroy", Curzon sketched out his scheme for taking over the administration of the frontier from the Punjab government and the constitution of a new province. In Curzon's opinion the area between the Swat river and the Gomal valley was the "most critical, most anxious and most explosive section of the entire frontier" of India. It was inhabited by the "most numerous, fanatical and turbulent of the Pathan tribes". And in regard to such an area, the Viceroy, who was the "Foreign Minister" of India, could not issue orders or make an appointment except through the Punjab government. This, Curzon asserted, was a most reprehensible system:

I venture to affirm that there is not another country or Government in the world which adopts a system so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most important sphere of activity, the barrier, not of a subordinate official, but of a subordinate Government, on the mere geographical plea that the latter resides in close proximity to the scene of action - a plea which itself breaks down when it is remembered that for five months in the year the Supreme and the Local governments are both located at the same spot, Simla.  

Curzon felt that the officers posted to the frontier did not possess the necessary qualifications and training. Nor could they gain

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1 Edwards, op.cit., p.111.
2 Curzon's Minute, op.cit., p.8.
enough experience and specialised knowledge for they did not serve long enough on the frontier. He pointed out that the five Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab since 1877, who had to their credit the total cumulative service of 145 years at the time of their appointment as heads of the Punjab government, had only served in the frontier districts for the total cumulative period of twenty months. None of the Chief Secretaries of the Punjab government between 1878 and 1899 had, at the time of their appointments, any experience of political service in the frontier at all.\(^1\) Curzon, therefore, believed that the Punjab government's personnel was not specially equipped with the requisite knowledge and experience of the frontier. The officers of the Punjab Commission, the Viceroy went on, due to the wider scope of promotion in the Revenue and Finance Departments, did not like to serve on the frontier, for it was a tedious, risky and less remunerative job. There was much "departmental irresolution" in the administration, and the "dissipation instead of concentration of responsibility". Where "rapidity of action and swiftness of execution" were so essential, the long official chain and numerous links of references made prompt action impossible. It was wrong to suppose, said Curzon, that the interposition of the Punjab government between the Supreme Government

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\(^1\)Curzon's Minute, *op.cit.*, p.9.
and the Frontier involved "a wise and necessary decentralisation". On the contrary, it led to "centralisation of the pettiest and most exasperating description". Three factors were responsible for this: the indecision of the Punjab government, "the timidity" of its junior local officers, and the restrictions on the initiative and authority of these officers. Curzon concluded that the existing system of frontier administration

attenuates without diminishing the ultimate responsibility of the Government of India. It protracts without strengthening their action. It interposes between the Foreign Minister of India and his subordinate agents, not an Ambassador, or a Minister, or a Consul, but the elaborate mechanism of a Local Government, and the necessarily exalted personality of a Lieutenant Governor... Worked as the system has been with unfailing loyalty and with profound devotion to duty, it has yet been the source of friction, of divided counsels, of vacillation, of exaggerated centralisation, of interminable delay.¹

The remedy lay, Curzon was convinced, in the creation of a new province, consisting of the trans-Indus districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and the political agencies of Dir, Swat and Chitral with headquarters at Malakand, Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Wana. The inhabitants would be as far as possible Pathan only.

The head of the new administration would be a Chief-Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, appointed by and directly subord-

¹Curzon's Minute, op.cit., p.13.
inate to the Government of India. He would reside at Peshawar, and would be assisted by a Revenue Commissioner and a Judicial Commissioner. A small commission would be set up to deal with matters regarding the recruitment, replacement and promotion of officers in the new province. The frontier officers would cease to belong to the Punjab Commission, being brought within the graded list of the Political department of the Government of India. However, the Divisional and District Judges and Settlement Officers would be borrowed from the Punjab or from other provinces. For other departments, such as Police, Jail, Medical, Education, Irrigation and Public Works, and the subordinate establishments of all departments, Curzon would take over temporarily the whole or the bulk of the existing staff of the Punjab government serving in the area of the proposed province. The Viceroy expected that in return for the employment of the officers of the Punjab Commission in the new province, the Punjab government might be willing to employ educated Pathans of good family in the Punjab civil service.¹

The plan for the new province having been set out, Curzon proceeded with meeting some objections to the project and emphasising its compensating advantages. Hamilton, in his despatch of 5 August 1898 had raised four possible objections to a new frontier province.

The first was that the scheme would have the effect of breaking up the established administrative units of the Punjab and disturbing, in particular, the revenue system in the Peshawar, Kohat and Bannu districts. The proper functioning of the revenue system needed specially-trained officers such as were not ordinarily available in the Political Department. To overcome this difficulty, Curzon proposed that the new province would continue to get officials with experience in revenue matters from the Punjab. In this way the revenue administration of the frontier districts would be left undisturbed.\(^1\)

Hamilton's second objection was that the creation of a new province would entail "a succession of territorial rectifications and compensations". Curzon did not regard it a valid objection for the change did not warrant any compensation to the Punjab. The new province, Curzon pointed out, would take away only one-fourteenth of the Punjab's total area, one-fifteenth of its total revenue, and a little less than one-eighteenth of its entire population.\(^2\) In the circumstances the question of any territorial compensation to the Punjab, he said, did not arise at all. Moreover the districts

\(^1\) Curzon's Minute, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

\(^2\) The area, population and revenue of the Punjab according to the 1891 census were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Revenue (rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>148,966 sq. miles</td>
<td>25,130,127</td>
<td>27,532,972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the districts to be withdrawn from the Punjab:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Revenue (rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10,691 sq. miles</td>
<td>1,365,575</td>
<td>1,875,847</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
proposed to be detached did not belong to the Punjab either geographically, historically or ethnologically; they were inhabited by entirely different peoples having different modes and standards of life. These essentially different conditions obtaining in the area had, in fact, been recognised by the Government as indicated by the operation of special rules and regulations in the frontier districts. ¹ Besides, Curzon went on, the making of Baluchistan into a separate administration, the inclusion of Chitral and Dir within the British sphere of influence, the Durand Agreement ² and the consequent political protectorate over Waziristan had "revolutionised the state of affairs on the frontier". These developments had changed the nature of frontier work which had become mainly political so as to bring it within the sphere of the Supreme government. Considerations of compensating the Punjab government for the loss of its jurisdiction, Curzon contended, should no longer stand in the way of the long overdue change. He dismissed these pleas as being superfluous and reinforced his arguments against any compensation by referring to the opinion of P. D. Cunningham, the Commissioner of Peshawar who in 1896 had remarked:

the population, revenue, trade and wealth of the province [Punjab] have so increased since the question of a separate Frontier Commissionership was mooted

¹See pp. 22-3.
²See p. 17.
some 20 years ago under the Government of Lord Lytton, that what would be left to the Punjab after removing Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat and a strip of the Derajat is still sufficient to constitute an administrative area of the first class.¹

Hamilton's third objection to a new province was that it would deprive the Punjab government of a valuable opportunity of training officers for the Frontier service and of acquiring knowledge of the tribesmen. Curzon maintained the contrary view: the creation of a Frontier province would offer greater opportunities for such training than had hitherto existed as the officials would belong to a separate Political Department of the Government of India. An officer displaying exceptional ability in tribal dealings would have no fear of being withdrawn, unless his services were required for a more responsible post of a similar nature in Baluchistan or in the Political Department of the Supreme Government. On the other hand, an officer lacking in aptitude in dealing with the tribesmen could be easily transferred to another place in the Foreign Department. It could be expected that a "fresh goal of ambition" would lie in front of political officers; that, in the near future, the new Province would attract the best men in the civil and military service and that it would be "the nursery of a new school of political officers who would revive the memories

¹Quoted by Curzon in his Minute, op.cit., p.25.
and credit of bygone days."\(^1\)

Finally, Hamilton had held that the change would lead to a "forward and aggressive policy" on the part of the Government. This Curzon rejected as an "entire illusion", contending that, in the past, the intervention of the Punjab government had not acted as a barrier against "a forward policy" or saved the Supreme Government from punitive expeditions or from Frontier war. The fifty years control of the Punjab government over the Frontier, he asserted, had neither prevented the forty military expeditions against the tribes nor held back the rapid forward move of the Government into the tribal territory.\(^2\)

Having dismissed the objections raised by the Secretary of State, Curzon proceeded to convince the members of his Council. Copies of his Minute were sent to each member of the Viceroy's Council at the end of August 1900. A special meeting of the Council was held on 10 September 1900 for final discussion\(^3\) and, three days later, Curzon's Minute with a covering despatch was sent to the Home government "with an expression of our unanimous and hearty agreement with its main provisions".\(^4\) In a mood of relief Curzon

\(^1\)Curzon's Minute, *op.cit.*, p.25.

\(^2\)Curzon's Minute, *op.cit.*, p.27.

\(^3\)Note by Curzon, 27 August 1900, *C.C.*, vol. 319.

\(^4\)Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 13 September 1900, *ibid.*
wrote to Arthur Godley, the Permanent Under Secretary of State at the India Office:

My Frontier Scheme is finished and done at last.
I feel like an Eton boy who has got through trials.
Be kind to it and help it on. I t would break my heart if it were now to fall through.¹

Even though Curzon had claimed the "unanimous and hearty agreement" of his officers he, in fact, had not bothered to consult the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Mackworth Young, before he sent his proposals to the Secretary of State. The Viceroy's explanation of why he kept the matter from the Lieutenant-Governor was that the latter being "slow, very sensitive" and "very disputatious" would have taken the measure as "a wilful diminution of his prestige" or even as a "personal affront". He would have "violently protested" against the scheme, incited an agitation both in India and in England, and rendered its passage through the Council difficult.² But after sending off the despatch to the India Office, Curzon privately informed Young about his scheme and assured him that if it received the approval of the Home government he would have with the Lieutenant-Governor "full and immediate" consultations concerning the details of the plan and show the most scrupulous regard for "the traditions, interests and feeling" of the Punjab government and of Young himself.³

¹Curzon to Godley, 12 September 1900, ibid., vol. 159.
²Curzon to Hamilton, 15 August 1900, C.C., vol. 159.
³Curzon to Young, 15 September 1900, ibid., vol. 202.
Naturally the Lieutenant-Governor's reaction was one of anger and surprise; he had expected that Curzon would give him a chance of expressing his opinion about the issue before any formal proposals were made to the Secretary of State. Young blamed Curzon for having ignored him altogether and for showing want of confidence in him.¹

In January 1901 the government of India, after having received the sanction of the Home authorities to their scheme officially informed the Punjab government and solicited their "heartfelt cooperation" in its execution.² The relations between the Viceroy and the Lieutenant-Governor had now become extremely strained, the latter maintaining that from the constitutional point of view the Viceroy's not having consulted the Punjab government was an "unprecedented" procedure and that it involved "a most dangerous doctrine".³ Young was indiscreet enough to give vent to his bitterness and wrath in public, which embittered his relations with the Viceroy still further. Curzon heard from "several persons" that Lady Mackworth Young entertained "bitter feelings" and had said "bitter

¹Young to Curzon, 20 September, 1900, C.C., vol. 202; Lt. Governor, Punjab to Viceroy, Tel. 20 September 1900, ibid.
²Govt. of India to Govt. of Punjab, 23 January 1901, C.C., vol. 338.
³Govt. of Punjab to Govt. of India, 13 February 1901, ibid.
things" about him, and he believed that she had "vilified and abused" him all over Simla. These incidents wounded Curzon deeply, and it was long before they were "effaced from his recollection".¹ Not only the Lieutenant-Governor himself but his subordinate officers also took the decision of the Supreme Government as a personal slight. When Curzon's Minute was published Herbert Fanshawe, the Commissioner of Delhi and an ex-Chief Secretary of the Punjab, resigned, feeling that "a great public indignity had been thrust upon the Punjab administration as unmerited as it was ungenerous".² The appointment of Colonel H. Deane as the first Agent to the Governor-General in the new province gave further offence to the Punjab government. Deane was then Political Agent of the Kalastrand agency. Curzon considered him, by his experience and qualifications, to be the best officer outside the Punjab Commission to head the new province. Young objected to Curzon's choice, pointing out that the two Frontier Commissioners, P. Cunningham and W. H. Merk, were the most senior officers in the Punjab Commissioner. Deane was junior to both the officers by thirteen and ten years respectively and had served under them. Young recommended that either Cunningham or Merk be given the post. Curzon rejected

¹E. Baring (military secretary to Viceroy) to Lady Young, 23 September 1901; H. Young to Curzon, 30 September, 1901, C.C., vol. 230.
²Curzon to Hamilton, 11 June 1901, C.C., vol. 161; The Spectator, 15, 22 June 1901.
the recommendation; Cunningham was about to retire and Mark did not appear to the Viceroy to be a suitable choice. Deane was "highly thought of" in the India Office and his proposed appointment was received favourably there.

Deane was asked by the Viceroy to thrash out a plan to make the new province "independent, self-contained, and self-supporting". Accordingly Deane recommended the inclusion of the Mansahra, Abbottabad and Haripur tahsil of Hazara district in the new province not originally included in the scheme. The reasons given for this incorporation were that, leaving aside the Abbottabad tahsil, Hazara was a frontier district. It was a part of the Peshawar administrative division where the same Border Military Police System and the Frontier Crimes Regulations were in force. A considerable proportion of the inhabitants of Hazara was of Pathan extraction. Moreover Hazara would provide the base for the political control over the Cis-Indus Black Mountain tribes. In addition, Hazara would provide a good sanatorium in summer for the Agent to the Governor-General and his officers and would bring the whole of the Punjab Frontier Force with its Headquarters at Abbottabad within the local limits of one single civil

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1 Curzon to Hamilton, 15 August 1900, C.C., vol. 160.
2 Curzon to Young, Tel. 4 February 1901, C.C., vol. 203.
3 Scheme for the Administration of the N.W.F. Province, p.1, ibid., vol. 320.
administration.¹

Young, as could be expected, was critical of the scheme contending that the severance of the districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara from the Punjab would be unpopular with the people and the chiefs of the districts alike; that the "miniature administration" of the new province, apart from involving considerable expense, would be far from efficient; that the Chief Commissioner would not be able to give equal attention to his political and administrative duties, and that under the new scheme the border districts would be reduced to a status of an "inconvenient appendage".²

Curzon dismissed Young's views as the "belated edition" of his protest against the formation of the new province.³ He also rejected Young's request that the severance of the frontier districts from his charge be put off until March 1902 when he would retire. The Viceroy, was eager to inaugurate the new administration without any delay because, as he said,

The unfortunate attitude of M. Young is known everywhere in the Province, the idea had been widely disseminated that the Local and Supreme Governments are at loggerheads with each other; that the Lieutenant-

¹Ibid., p.4.


Governor has successfully defied the Viceroy; and that it is possible that the new scheme may still fall to the ground.\(^1\)

The only way to disprove these apprehensions was to bring the new administration into existence with as little delay as possible. The North-West Frontier Province, therefore, came into being on the King's birthday, 9 November 1901.\(^2\) The formal inauguration of the Province took place five and a half months later, on 26 April 1902, when Curzon held a big durbar (reception) of three thousand dignitaries of the area in the Shahi Bagh at Peshawar. Curzon's address to the assembly was a full statement of his frontier policy. He told his audience that the Viceroy's presence in person on the occasion was proof of his interest in the new province and his sympathy with the new work. He hoped that the creation of the province would lead to "the peace and tranquillity and contentment of the Frontier". Its control by the Government of India "instead of somebody else", the Viceroy asserted, would be advantageous both for the Government and the frontier people.

Business will be better done and more quickly done; and there will not be long and vexatious delays. The system of rule will not be altered, but it will be more efficiently worked. Everyman in the Frontier districts ought to look upon it as a direct gain to

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himself that he has a local government on the spot, and that there is nobody above that local Government but the Government of India... Merit will be better known under the new system, service will be more quickly rewarded, abuses will be more promptly checked, responsibility will be more strictly enforced and punishment, when punishment is needed, will be more swift. ¹

The Viceroy called upon the leading men of the Province to co-operate with the local administration especially in the detection and punishment of violent crimes to help the Government attain their object of establishing peace and order in the Province. Curzon assured the durbaris that he would watch the new administration "with a fond and parental eye", see to it that the "local pride and local patriotism" were "jealously guarded" and that the Province showed itself "ever more and more deserving of the interest that has secured for it a separate existence and an independent name".²

The head of the North-West Frontier Province was a Chief-Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, appointed by and directly responsible to the Government of India. The Chief-Commissioner had a dual duty to perform which constituted a unique feature of the administration of the Province. In his capacity as the Agent to

²Ibid., pp. 427-8.
the Governor-General, he controlled the political relations
with the border tribes, while as the Chief Commissioner, he exer-
cised the same powers in the civil administration of the Province
as the heads of other provinces did in their charge. The staff
of the Chief Commissioner consisted of members of the Indian Civil
Service, Military officers of the Political Department of the Govern-
ment of India and the Punjab Commission, members of the Provincial
and Subordinate Civil Services, Police officers and officers speci-
ally recruited for the departments such as Medical, Education,
Public Works, Forest and Jails etc. The Chief Commissioner's
principal advisers were the Judicial and Revenue Commissioners.
The Judicial Commissioner headed the judicial administration of
the province, his court being the highest Civil and Criminal appel-
late tribunal which replaced the Chief-Court of the Punjab. Sub-
ordinate to the Judicial Commissioner were the two Divisional and
Sessions Judges of Peshawar and the Derajat. As Divisional Judges,
these officers decided most of the appeals in civil suits from
the "Courts of first instance". As Sessions Judges, they tried
Sessions cases, with the aid of assessors, and heard criminal appeals.
The Revenue Commissioner was the controlling and final appellate
revenue authority in the province. He had also to act as the Re-
venue and Financial Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, besides

1 Imperial Gazetteer of India: North West Frontier Province, pp. 57-8;
Davies, op. cit., p.112; Scheme for the Administration of N.W.F.P.,
1901, op. cit., p.1.
being the Director of Land Records and Agriculture, Commissioner of Excise, Superintendent of Stamps, Registrar-General, Inspector-General of Registration and Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. No change was reflected in the subordinate revenue agency. Each of the five districts remained, as before, under a Deputy Commissioner. The Yusufzai, Mardan and Nowshera tahsils in Peshawar, and the tahsils of Thal in Kohat and Tank in Dera Ismail Khan formed subdivisions, each in charge of an Assistant or Extra-Assistant Commissioner. Each of the five political agencies had a Political Agent. In the Kurram, Northern and Southern Waziristan Agencies, the Political Agents exercised the powers of District Magistrates and Court of Session in dealing with criminal cases.

The administration of the Province had certain distinctive features which were indicative of the special treatment which the Government thought the area deserved in view of its political and strategic importance. The first such feature was that not only was the Province itself under the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India but the higher posts of Chief Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners and Political Agents in the Province were mainly manned by officers in the Political Department and by men who had political experience and training. The first Chief Commissioner

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1 Ibid., pp. 9-16; Imperial Gazetteer of India: North-West Frontier Province, p. 61.

2 Between 1901 and 1921 the position of military officers who held the post of Deputy Commissioners in the five districts was as follows:
was Colonel (later Sir) Harold Deane. From 1885 to 1895 he was Assistant Commissioner in charge of the Yusufzai subdivision of the Peshawar district and the Deputy Commissioner of the district. Between 1895 and 1900 he acted as the Political Agent of the Dir, Swat and Chitral agencies. Deane's long record of service among the Pathans enabled him to know the people well, to speak their language and to command their respect and confidence. His political experience, combined with his strong personality and fearless character, had influenced Curzon's decision to give him the charge of the Province in preference to his seniors in the service.\(^1\) Curzon regarded him as "an ideal ruler" of the new Province, who was "modest, cool, alert, well-balanced, a master of his subjects and his men" and who inspired "both affection and respect".\(^2\) Deane remained in office for over six and a half years before being succeeded, in June 1908, by Lt. Col. G. Roos-Keppel, who since 1900

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\(^1\) *Who was Who, 1897-1916*, p.188; Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, pp. 421-2. See also *supra*, p.50.

had been Political Officer in Khyber.\(^1\) Lord Minto, the Governor-General, selected him mainly because he was "an expert in tribal administration" who wielded remarkable personal influence with the Afridi tribes. Though Minto liked Michael O'Dwyer, the Revenue Commissioner of the Province, he did not give him the Chief-Commissionership because, as the Governor-General himself put it,

> the pressing need of the ... Province is tribal administration and not the furtherance of revenue questions - as yet at any rate.\(^2\)

There was an adverse reaction in the Political Department on Roos-Keppel's appointment "over the heads of 50 seniors or even over 80". Besides, Roos-Keppel had no experience of civil administration. But John Morley, the Secretary of State, approved of Minto's choice because he said "Peshawar requires" a man like Roos-Keppel.\(^3\) Roos-Keppel remained in office until 1919 when he retired.

Another striking feature of the administration of the Province was that it had always a budget deficit. From 1901 to 1910 the revenue and expenditure of the Province was wholly Imperial. It was hoped at the time of the formation of the Province that its finances would be provincialised by a "quasi-provincial contract"

\(^1\)History of Services Punjab, 1919-20, pp. 148-9.
\(^2\)Minto to Morley, 4 June 1908, M.P., vol. 16.
\(^3\)Morley to Minto, 16 July 1908, ibid., vol. 3.
as soon as possible but, because there was no "sufficient data to go upon",\(^1\) the hope remained unfulfilled. In 1909 the Decentralisation Commission took up the issue and recommended a quasi-provincial settlement for the Province on the lines of Baluchistan,\(^2\) and the recommendation was accepted by the Government in 1910-11. According to this settlement, the local administration was assigned revenues under major heads such as land revenue, stamps, excise, forest, registration, police, medical, jails, education etc. In the event of expenditure exceeding the assigned revenues, the difference was to be made up by a fixed recurring grant from Imperial revenues. The Government of India also took the responsibility for providing the expenditure under the "political subsidies", "refugees and state prisoners" and "salaries of officers borne on the cadre of the Political Department". In regard to the assigned revenue and expenditure, the Chief Commissioner was empowered to exercise the same powers as the heads of other local governments.\(^3\)

\(^1\)Summary of Curzon's Administration, op.cit., p.24.


revenue increased steadily, but the expenditure of the administration rose rapidly, too, with the result that the budget always showed a deficit. The large excess of expenditure over revenue was attributed to the geographical position and political importance of the Province, considerations of imperial policy calling for special outlay under political... police, public general administration and civil works.

The government's main expenditure lay in matters relating to the tribal tracts and border defence, the largest increases in this expenditure appearing, necessarily, under Political and Police, which included the tribal allowances, maintenance of tribal levies and the Border Military Police which was reorganised.

1 The North-West Frontier Province Revenue and Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Revenue (Rs.)</th>
<th>Expenditure (Rs.)</th>
<th>Deficit (Rs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902-03</td>
<td>45,40,924</td>
<td>74,92,646</td>
<td>29,51,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>46,57,275</td>
<td>99,30,435</td>
<td>52,75,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>70,85,845</td>
<td>1,80,20,927</td>
<td>1,09,34,032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2 Imperial Gazetteer of India; North-West Frontier Province, p.62.
in 1912-13 as the Frontier Constabulary. The figures below show that the "principal rise in expenditure", since the formation of the Province, had been due to the need for the "protection of India's land frontier".  

The peculiar feature of the judicial administration of the Province was the Frontier Crimes Regulation, "an exceptional and somewhat primitive" Regulation, as the India Office described it. It was enacted in 1872 by the Punjab government and was revised in 1887 and 1901. The Regulation empowered the Deputy Commissioner to refer both civil and criminal cases to Council of Elders, called the Jirga. The Jirga was a traditional indigenous institution for administering justice recognised and resorted to by the tribesmen themselves. The government, in a modified form,

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Selected Items of Revenue and Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1902-03 Rs.</th>
<th>1910-11 Rs.</th>
<th>1919-20 Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Revenue</td>
<td>17,26,302</td>
<td>20,32,731</td>
<td>20,28,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation</td>
<td>1,53,755</td>
<td>7,63,302</td>
<td>13,58,273</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stamps and Excise</td>
<td>5,81,876</td>
<td>8,80,210</td>
<td>17,29,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Political&quot;</td>
<td>20,97,106</td>
<td>32,14,115</td>
<td>53,11,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Justice</td>
<td>5,84,080</td>
<td>7,02,020</td>
<td>11,33,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>10,17,104</td>
<td>15,59,816</td>
<td>41,05,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>29,937</td>
<td>1,61,796</td>
<td>8,81,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Works (roads and buildings)</td>
<td>26,041</td>
<td>21,53,735</td>
<td>21,32,755</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 N.W.F.P. Enquiry Committee Report, op. cit., p.20.
3 N.W.F.P., 1901, vol. 579, Reg. no. 1815, India Office's Comment on Frontier Crimes Regulation.
preserved and made use of the institution in the settled districts as well as in the administered tracts of the political agencies. Under the Regulation, a Jirga consisted of three or more persons, nominated and appointed by the Deputy-Commissioner. The latter referred a civil case to the Jirga if he was convinced that the dispute would cause blood-feud, or murder, a breach of peace or some other mischief, especially if a frontier tribe were involved in the dispute. The Jirga was required to make an on-the-spot investigation and to submit a report of its findings to the Deputy Commissioner. If the report were acceptable to the Deputy Commissioner he passed a decree which, however, had to be agreed upon by not less than three-fourths of the Jirga members. If the Deputy Commissioner did not agree with the findings of the Jirga, he could remand the case again to the Jirga for a further enquiry, or refer it to another Jirga. Disputes involving local customs, matrimonial infidelity and claims for debts etc. could be disposed of by the Jirga without recourse to the ordinary law courts, so that the vakils and pleaders were dispensed with. The system had the practical advantage of securing decisions with the assistance of those who had the best knowledge of actual incidents and of local custom. In regard to criminal cases the Deputy Commissioner's power of the Frontier-Crimes Regulation, 1901.
nomination of Jirga members was limited in one respect: the accused person had the right to object to any nominated member of the Jirga. The maximum penalty for a criminal offence was fourteen years rigorous imprisonment or transportation for life.¹ No appeal could be made to a higher court against the ultimate decision of the Deputy Commissioner, but it was common to petition the Chief Commissioner requesting him to review the Deputy Commissioner's decision.² Section 21 of the Regulation provided for the blockade of hostile or unfriendly tribes. The usefulness of the Regulation was emphasised by the Frontier Enquiry Committee (1924) thus:

To repeal its civil sections would be to inflict grave hardship on the Pathans, who rely on them for a cheap and expeditious settlement of their disputes by a Jirga... To repeal the criminal sections would be to undermine the forces of law and order and to deprive the Hindus, in particular, of one of their greatest safeguards, in a land where passions are hot, blood feuds are endemic, legal evidence is exceedingly difficult to obtain, and refuge from the arm of the law is close to hand across the border. To repeal the trans-frontier sections would be to paralyse our whole system of trans-frontier control.³

¹Ibid., the Regulation, sections 8-12. Imperial Gazetteer, op.cit., p.51; Davies, op.cit., pp. 53-4; James, W.Spain, The Pathan Borderland, pp. 145-7.

²W.F.F., Enquiry Committee Report, p.27.
Chapter II

THE RELATIONS WITH THE FRONTIER TRIBES.

1901-14

The main object of Curzon’s North West Frontier policy was to ensure law and order upon the borders of settled British territory. He sought to achieve this end by securing the "pacification and contentment" of the frontier tribes. One great question was what mixture of force, threat of force, diplomacy or material inducement would best produce that pacification and contentment. The other, of course, was how far the means chosen could be reconciled with the maintenance of good relations with the Amir of Afghanistan, with whose considerable influence over the tribesmen the British had always to reckon. Not all areas of the frontier were of equal military sensitiveness, nor were all the tribes of such strength of strategic importance as to be able vitally to affect the success of Curzon's policy. The evolution of that policy will therefore be considered in relation to Waziristan, and the country south and north of the Khyber and to the inhabitants of these regions, the Mahsuds, Afridis and Mohmands.

The Mahsuds

The first area to be considered is Waziristan, the southern portion of the area of mountains which forms part of the North-West Frontier. Waziristan is situated between the Kurram river on the
north, the Gomal river on the south, the Durand line on the west, and the administrative border of the Bannu and Dera-Ismail Khan districts on the east. Its strategic importance lies in the fact that it dominates the Tochi and Gomal, two historic routes from Afghanistan to India. The southern half of the area is a tangled mass of mountains, cut and intersected by ravines. "There are well defined ranges which protect the interior of the country by double barriers, and make penetration into it a matter of extreme difficulty." North Waziristan, on the other hand, is richer and more open, consisting of large and fertile valleys separated by high barren hills.

Waziristan is inhabited by several tribes, the most important of which are called by the generic name Waziris. In origin the Mahsuds are Waziris, but by the British period they were for all practical purposes considered to be a separate tribe. The inaccessibility of Waziristan has always prevented any close contact with the ruling power of either India or Afghanistan, and its inhabitants boast that "they never owned the sway of any sovereign".¹ The Mahsuds occupying the central portion of Waziristan are of particularly independent nature. And if the isolation of Waziristan has produced, in Denys Bray's words, the "economic stringency, the crass

¹Gazetteer of the Tochi and Northern Waziristan, 1898, p.91, C.C., vol. 309.
ignorance, and the wanton insolence and barbaric cruelty that springs from a sense of security", the Mahsuds were considered to share these attitudes in full measure.

On their annexation of the Punjab in 1849 the main problem of the British government regarding the border had been the defence and security of the settled districts of the Punjab from trans-frontier marauders. It was not deemed politic to maintain direct relations with the Mahsuds nor was it held to be advantageous to interfere in their affairs. Instead the Government decided to deal with them through intermediaries like the Nawab of Tank, who were thought to have considerable influence over them. But this method of keeping the tribes quiet proved a short-lived and unsuccessful expedient, for the Mahsuds, in March 1860, attacked Tank. The Government of India thereupon fell back on force and launched an expedition. For some years hereafter order prevailed.

But the campaign had another result. Having once entered the tribal lands the Punjab government became involved in Mahsud affairs. In 1865-66, therefore, the new experiment was tried of

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1 Denys Bray on British policy towards the Frontier tribes, 5 March 1923; C. H. Philips, ed., The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947, p.496.


settling a number of Mahsuds on lands allotted to them in Tank and in return of making them responsible for border defence. This experiment, too, proved unsuccessful, whereupon the Punjab government assumed "direct control of border affairs".¹

During the second Afghan War (1878-80), the frontier was greatly disturbed and the tribes once again became troublesome. In January 1879 the Mahsuds burnt Tank. An expedition was then sent, and the Mahsuds were compelled to make the reparations demanded by the Government. By this time a new factor had been introduced into frontier politics: the British fear of Russian aggression. Consequently, the non-interventionist policy hitherto followed gave way to 'Forward Policy'. In 1887-88, a survey expedition was sent up the Gomal pass to secure this strategic line of communication. But, the attempt having failed, a new policy was tried. In 1889-90 Robert Bruce, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera-Ismail Khan, and later the Commissioner of the Derajat, proposed a plan to control the Mahsuds through their own tribal organisation. A policy of control through tribal leaders had been tried with success in Baluchistan by Robert Sandeman.² Now a similar scheme called the 'Maliki system' was introduced by Bruce for Waziristan. The leading Maliks were selected by Bruce and graded according to their supposed power and

²See pp. 13-14. n.
influence and paid allowances by the Government. In return they were required to supply a number of tribesmen for service as levies to guard the Gomal pass, to control the tribe as a body, and to surrender individual criminals to the Government for trial.\footnote{W. R. Herk to Govt. of the Punjab, 24 July 1900, \textit{P.S.I.I.}, vol. 127, Reg. No. 1169; C. Aitchison, \textit{A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads}, vol. XI, p.160.}

But, according to Dr. Davies, Bruce committed three mistakes in introducing the 'Maliki system' in Waziristan. First, unlike Sandeman, Bruce did not occupy some central points in Waziristan with troops so as to assist the Maliks in times of emergency. Secondly, Baluchis and Brahuis had powerful tribal chiefs who could control them whereas among the Mahsuds no such powerful chiefs existed. And lastly, the Mahsuds were much more democratic compared with the Baluchis which made the former extremely difficult to control.\footnote{Davies, op.cit., pp. 34, 124-5.}

These factors soon made the 'Maliki system' face a hard test. In 1893, a British officer was assassinated by the Mahsuds. The offenders were tried by the jirga and sentenced, which infuriated a faction of Mahsuds with pronounced anti-British feelings. They, under their leader, Nulla Powindah, attacked the Maliks who had tried the murderers of the British officer. Three of the Maliks were killed and others were forced to flee the country. The Punjab Govern-
ment urged that a punitive expedition be undertaken but, as the Supreme Government were busy with frontier demarcation under the Durand Agreement concluded in 1893, this course of action was not adopted. However, soon after, in 1894-95, the Government of India were obliged to mount their third expedition against the Mahsuds following an attack on Wana, which had come under permanent British occupation in 1894. The expedition was a success and in 1895 the whole of Waziristan was brought under British political control. Political agents were posted at Wana and Tochi with garrisons at Wana and Miranshah. The Government also continued their policy of giving allowances; these were now increased on the undertaking by the Kaliks of general good behaviour of the tribesmen, their desistance from attack on British territory or protected areas such as Gomal, Wana, Spin and Zarmelan, surrender of criminals to the Government, and readiness to serve under the British in any part of the country. For three years after this, the Mahsuds remained generally quiet; they did not even participate in the great tribal uprising of 1897-98.

But the turn of the century saw a resumption of Mahsud outrages in British territory. Government troops were ambushed and


2 From Rs. 51,228 to a total of Rs. 61,548.

3 See pp. 14-50.
attempts made on the lives of British political officers. The man behind all these troubles was believed to be Mulla Powindah. However, in the absence of any positive evidence, no punishment could be inflicted except the enforcement of tribal responsibility by the imposition of a fine.\(^1\) Apart from the Mulla's complicity, the Mahsud outrages were attributed to their receiving the allowances from the Government which enabled them to buy rifles and to the activities of the Mahsud colony in Dera Ismail Khan.\(^2\) This colony, as one of the border chiefs described, was a "school of badmashi opened by the Government for the instruction of our young men".\(^3\)

This was the situation in Waziristan when Curzon took over as Viceroy. The Government had not yet evolved a sound policy, and the best method of dealing with the local tribesmen was "still a matter of experiment".\(^4\) Curzon's Viceroyalty witnessed a change in the Government's policy towards Mulla Powindah and the Mahsud tribe in

\(^1\) Howell, *op.cit.*, pp. 7-13.

\(^2\) In 1896, R. I. Bruce, the Commissioner of Derajat, allotted 5,500 acres of land in the Tank tahsil of the Dera-Ismail Khan district to Mahsud Malik for the settlement of Mahsuds as tenants on this land.


\(^4\) Govt. of India to Govt. of the Punjab, 16 May 1900, *P.S.L.I.*, vol. 127, Reg. No. 1169.
general. In the middle of 1900 the Government of India bestowed a monthly allowance of one hundred rupees on the Mulla to "destroy or at any rate greatly reduce" his influence and prestige among the tribesmen, who were expected to look down upon a religious man seeking to advance his own material interests by accepting the ignoble position of a British stipendiary. Though the Government was thus ready to buy peace with the Mulla, whom Curzon nevertheless labelled "a first rate scoundrel", W. R. Merk, the Commissioner of the Derajat was dissatisfied with the Maliki system as a whole. In July 1900 he pointed out to the Punjab government:

There is something radically wrong... in the present system. We move in a vicious circle. We look to the Maliks and they look to us. Between the two the management of the Mahsuds falls to the ground.

Merk proposed that allowances be paid to the tribe and not to some selected Maliks, and that the Government should deal with the tribe as a whole and enforce tribal, instead of individual, responsibility in case of offences. The practical advantage of the method, he argued, was that every member of the tribe would become interested in controlling the bad characters.


2 Merk to Govt. of the Punjab, 24 July 1900, P.S.L.I., vol. 127, Reg. No. 1169. For tribal responsibility system, see Davies, op.cit., p.125.
The argument about a change in the Maliki system was given further urgency by the continuation of Mahsud raids. Early in September 1900, therefore, two conferences were held at Simla attended by Curzon, Young, General Egerton, the Commander of the Punjab Frontier Force, and Merk to discuss the Mahsud problem. It was decided that the Mahsuds should be given a period of grace within which to make a settlement with the Government, and that failing compliance a blockade of the whole tribe should be imposed at the beginning of December 1900. Merk's recommendation to discontinue the Maliki system was also accepted; in future the Government would deal with the tribal or sectional Jirga to whom the subsidy would be paid; a portion of the subsidy, however, might be reserved for certain individuals whose interests were impossible to ignore.¹

In October 1900 the Government imposed a fine of one lakh of rupees on the Mahsuds for the offences committed by them.² On 8 November 1900, Merk summoned a great Jirga of the Mahsuds at Tank. The Maliks declared themselves helpless and requested that their country be taken over by the Government; this, however, was not in

¹Note by Curzon in the Military Dept., 9 August 1900, Note by Curzon, 10 September 1900, C.C., vol. 308; Govt. of India to Govt. of the Punjab, 13 October 1900, P.S.L.I., vol. 127, Reg. No. 1169.

²Govt. of the Punjab to Govt. of India, 25 October 1900, P.S.L.I., vol. 141, Reg. No. 293; Govt. of India to Govt. of the Punjab, Tel. 25 October 1900, ibid.
accordance with the wishes of the tribesmen. Merk then announced the terms of the Government to the assembly, and the tribe was given fifteen days to discuss them. The Kalika consulted the tribe but with no result. The time of grace was over and the blockade duly began on 1 December 1900 with the avowed object of starving the tribe into submission. The blockade lasted until March 1902. In the initial stages it failed in its purpose; the Mahsuds continued both to raid and trade. Eventually in November 1901, active operations were mounted against the tribe - and successfully. The Mahsuds came to their senses. On 16 January 1902, they sent in a deputation to tender submission. The terms offered by the Government were the payment of the fine of one lakh of rupees in full, the return of all rifles looted and all cattle taken during the blockade, and the surrender of certain outlaws.

On 5 March 1902 Merk met the Mahsud jirga at Tank. The jirga appointed and despatched two hundred chalweshtis (Mahsud tribal police) for the arrest of the outlaws demanded by the Government. On the promise of future good behaviour and the acceptance of tribal responsibility, the jirga was permitted to disperse with orders to

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1 Commissioner, Derajat Division, to Govt. of the Punjab, Tel. 8 November 1900, ibid.

2 Commissioner, Derajat Division, to Govt. of Punjab, Tel. 1 December 1900, ibid.

reassemble at Tank on 24 March 1902.\(^1\) On 10 March, the blockade was raised and on 24 March Deane, the Chief Commissioner, accepted the formal submission of the Mahsuds and announced the restoration of their allowances.\(^2\)

In Deane's view blockade was not a very effective method for dealing with hostile tribes, and he certainly did not feel that the Mahsud blockade had been a success. He argued rather, that "the punitive expedition remains and will remain as the best source for enforcing peace on the frontier". Deane was not sure that even this extreme measure would be a guarantee for the future behaviour of the tribe

whose record for all time has been one of thieving and raiding and who for years past have terrorised their neighbours, and it may be that restless and turbulent spirit in the tribe may again prevail.\(^3\)

This was Curzon's feeling, too, for he commented that the Mahsud problem had not been solved either permanently or temporarily, that before long the Government might be compelled to take coercive measures against the tribe.\(^4\)

Merk, however, still hoped to conciliate the tribe through allowances. Accordingly, on 5 April 1902, he distributed the tribal


\(^2\)Merk to Govt. of India, TEL. 10 March 1902, ibid. Note by Curzon, 8 March 1902, C.C., vol. 303.

\(^3\)Deane to Govt. of India, 27 March 1902, P.S.L.I., vol. 144, Reg. No. 618.

\(^4\)Note by Curzon, 8 April 1902, C.C., vol. 303.
payments. Out of the total sum of Rs. 61,000, Rs. 54,000 were equally apportioned among the three sections of the Mahsuds - the Alizai, Bahlolzai and Shaman Khel. The balance was reserved for distribution among the old Malikas as rewards for their services to the Government. Merk regarded the arrangement as satisfactory and reported to the Government:

So far as I am able to judge the Mahsuds have not the slightest intention of permitting any one to do what may lead to the forfeiture of the tribal allowances and to the rescission of the present settlement... If nothing unforeseen occurs, I see no reason why the settlement should not work. There will be difficulties of course... but one may reasonably hope that they will be overcome and that affairs will go smoothly till they become matters of routine.¹

This proved, however, to be too optimistic a view. Within three months of Merk's settlement, Johnston, the Political Agent of Wana, was pointing out the inadequacies of the arrangement and forecast its failure. Merk had laid down that the payment of fines by the three sections of the tribe was to be made in exactly the same proportion as the distribution of allowances among them. He had thus stretched tribal responsibility for offences to a point where even the innocent had to share the punishment with the guilty. He also argued that the sum reserved for the

¹Merk to Deane, 12 April 1902, P.S.L.I. vol. 147, Reg. No. 1073; Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 160-1.
deserving Maliks was inadequate; most of the old Maliks and the large class whom Johnston called Mutabars had held aloof from the settlement. Without their cooperation it was impossible to conduct relations with the tribe. In Johnston's view, the arrangement was unworkable. He therefore proposed a compromise scheme between the Maliki system and Merk's tribal responsibility arrangement; the old Maliks were to receive better recognition than hitherto while the distribution of allowances was not to be on a sectional basis as was proposed under Merk's arrangement. Johnston recommended that an additional sum of Rs. 9,000 be sanctioned, thus raising the total allowances to Rs. 70,000 per annum. Of this Rs. 54,000 as arranged by Merk were to be Tumani¹ for the tribe as a whole, and the balance was to be distributed among the old Maliks and Mutabars.²

Deane supported Johnston. He pointed out the risks involved in conducting relations with "the great jirga of the Mahsuds" which was "an armed rabble of several thousand strong". It was, besides, expensive to entertain such a large gathering.³ Curzon had become exasperated with the frontier officers' "constant oscillations" of

¹Tumani = the whole body of the tribe; Tumani = payment of allowances to the whole tribe.

²Johnston to Deane, July 1902, P.S.L.I., vol. 149, Reg. No. 1448-A.

policy and the lack of a fixed plan. He now reluctantly accepted "Johnston's conglomerate scheme on the express responsibility of those who proposed it". He urged the officers to make earnest efforts to secure continuity in the Government's dealings with Naziristan and to bring the era of divided counsels and fluctuating actions to an end.¹

In February 1903, Johnson proceeded to put the scheme into effect. He held a fully representative jirga of 3,500 men at Jandola; Mulla Powinda, and every other man of importance attended the jirga. The jirga unanimously agreed to do away with all the tribal representatives selected in the preceding year as they were men of no account. For these were substituted all the old Maliks and other leading men who at the last distribution of allowances had stood aloof in the hope of obtaining separate recognition.

It was proposed that the old Maliks and Mutabars should enter the Tuman as Vakils (representatives), that Rs. 16,000 assigned for Maliks should not be divided in any arbitrary way but should follow the tribal distribution and be given solely to the Maliks. The Mulla, who had been receiving a secret allowance from the Government and who was attending the jirga for the first time, stood up to defend the new arrangement as a "fair, just and generous" scheme.

¹Note by Curzon, 9 December 1902, C.C., vol. 338.
which would usher in a new era in Mahsud relations with the British Government. For ten years past he had constantly opposed the Government, but now he promised to cooperate with them for the good of the tribe.¹

Deane was happy that in place of the unwieldy, expensive and irresponsible Tumen the new scheme had set up a comprehensive system of representation. He hoped that the arrangement of subsidising the Mahsuds would secure both their goodwill and the cooperation of their leaders and thus ensure peace.² The hope was strengthened when the Mahsuds willingly enlisted in the militias. Three companies, each about one hundred strong, were recruited in the South Waziristan Militia, each company being formed from a different clan of the tribe. One such company was recruited in the North Waziristan Militia. Gradually the militias took over all the posts in Waziristan which were formerly held by regulars, with the exception of Jandola.³

These were evidently encouraging signs, but there were others which clearly suggested that the conduct of the tribe was, indeed, unpredictable. Thus, within about eighteen months of Johnston's


2Deane to Govt. of India, 25 March 1903, ibid.

3Howell, op. cit., p. 20.
arrangement a sepoy of the South Waziristan Militia murdered Captain Bowring, Political Agent, Wana. In February 1905 Captain Harman, Commandant of the South Waziristan Militia, was murdered by another Mahsud sepoy. At first fanaticism was suspected to be the cause of these incidents. Then they were attributed to a "plot among certain Mahsuds in the militia". In consequence, four hundred Mahsuds in the Militia were disbanded and sent back to their homes, while twenty, who were suspected of being the perpetrators of the crimes, were sent to Dera Ismail Khan for trial. In November 1905, a third British Officer, Captain Donaldson, Brigade Major at Bannu, fell victim to an ex-militia man. It now came to the surface that Mulla Powindah had actually instigated these murders.¹

This was the position on the frontier when Curzon in November 1905 handed over charge to Minto. Before his departure from India, in a speech at the Simla United Services Club, Curzon claimed that the frontier was quiet and that during seven years of his Vice-royalty no frontier expedition had been undertaken, and that the Government had spent only £248,000 on what he called the "semi-pacific operation of the Mahsud blockade" as compared to £4¹⁄₂ million in the five years preceding his rule.²

Minto, the incoming Viceroy, refused to accept Curzon's

¹Deane to Govt. of India, 14 March, 1905, F.S.L.I., vol. 176, Reg. No. 690; Crump to Deane, 11 June 1906, ibid., vol. 190, Reg. No. 1382.

²Raleigh, op. cit., p. 567.
claims. He felt, indeed, that he had

inherited a difficult position on the frontier. Our relations with the Amir, with the tribes, the position of the militia levies, and the view our officers take generally of frontier questions all seem to me to have been influenced by a spirit which I do not profess quite to understand, but which I think has not indicated a sense of the necessity of avoiding friction on the frontier as much as possible.¹

He could point to the evidence of unrest in the series of murders of British officers by Mahsud militiamen. It became increasingly obvious that the Border Military Police were not strong enough to safeguard the border from tribal raids, which grew in intensity and frequency. Moreover Minto soon discovered that the official reports submitted during Curzon's time had been deliberately slanted to throw a favourable light on the frontier situation. Several daring raids had been suppressed by the local authorities but not brought to the notice of the Foreign Department, "for the sake of giving a good impression of Curzon's frontier policy". Minto declared himself unable to understand the line adopted by the previous administration, and in a strong letter he warned Deane that

the suppression of information respecting raids and the tendency to ascribe as many evil acts as possible to Afghan influence cannot be tolerated.²

¹ Minto to Morley, 8 March 1906, Minto Papers, vol. N 1005.
² Minto to Morley, 5 March 1906, ibid.
The immediate problem Minto had to deal with was the punish-
ment of the Mahsud murderers. Deane's proposal was that the five
relatives of Captain Donaldson's assassin should be surrendered by
the tribe to the Government, that all lands in the British terri-
tory belonging to the Sultani section of the Alizai clan of the
Mahsuds be confiscated, that the Mahsud allowances be stopped for
two years and, that a fine of 25,000 rupees be imposed on the tribe.
Failing compliance within a month, Deane recommended that an ex-
pedition be sent and the Mahsud country occupied.¹

In December, 1905 and January 1906 Minto discussed the issue
in his Council. There were two questions: first, the need for
immediate action to secure the safety of British officers serving
with the militia levies on the frontier; second, how best to pun-
ish the tribe. As for the first, two alternatives were suggested:
either the militia posts in Waziristan should be strengthened by
the addition of separate contingents of troops from India, or the
militia levies should be reorganised by the incorporation of a pro-
portion of Sikhs and Dogras who would act as a counter to the Mah-
suds. The former was a difficult course to adopt, for to send small
bodily of troops to reinforce the militia posts was risky in the
existing state of feelings in Waziristan, while the reorganisation
of the militia levies would take some time.²

¹ Memorandum of Information for December 1905, regarding affairs on
² Minto to Morley, 23 December 1905, 1 February 1906, Minto Papers,
vol. M 1005.
As for punishing the Mahsuds by an expedition, neither Minto nor Kitchener was favourably disposed. The members of the Council, though generally desirous of adopting the course, could not ignore the risk of the expedition escalating into a frontier war.1 Minto, therefore, accepted Deane's proposal to impose a fine of Rs. 25,000 to be recovered from the tribal allowances, and to withhold all allowances for one year, unless the tribe cleared itself of suspicion or handed over to the Government the five men suspected of the murder of British officers.2 The plan seemed to have worked when Mulla Powindah surrendered three of the men demanded. The fourth was also soon brought in. But the fifth, a relative of the Mulla, fled to Birmal, within the Afghan boundary. In spite of the suspected complicity of the Mulla in the recent crimes, the Government hesitated to take action against him. L. Crump, the Political Agent of Wana, for instance, thought that the Mulla was implicated in the crimes but commented that to "punish him means war and war means annexation". Crump, therefore, proposed that the Government purchase the Mulla's loyalty by publicly granting him a plot of land in British territory; this would bind him "by ties of personal interest to Government" and "incident-

1 Minto to Morley, 10 January, 1906, ibid.
2 Minto to Morley, 1 February 1905, Morley to Minto, 29 March 1906, ibid.
ally ... reduce his paramount influence", in the tribe. Simultaneously, Crump asked the Government to rearrange the Maliki allowances of Rs. 16,000, for he thought that Johnston's Vakils were merely ordinary householders of the tribe who did not exercise any real influence but had undeservedly got a share in the Tumani and in the Maliki allowances. Crump wanted to introduce the old Vakil into the settlement to give the tribe alternative leaders and "to strengthen the oligarchy of really efficient Maliks" to counterbalance the influence of the Mulla.1 Deane was not in favour of Crump's "revolutionary" proposal regarding the Mulla,2 but Minto believed that it was worth buying the Mulla off.3 Unlike Curzon's secret allowance to the Mulla, the grant of land to him was therefore publicly announced, the Government's intention being to "cut away from him all his pretensions to religious piety" and "to set the Tumani strongly against him". Johnston's "Conglomerate" scheme was also changed; the number of recipients of Maliki allowances was reduced from 1,500 to 300.4

2 Deane to Govt. of India, 11 July 1906, ibid.
For a while the officials claimed that the Government's object of curbing the Mulla's influence had been realised. Several attempts were reported to have been made on the Mulla's life, possibly by those 1,200 men who attributed the loss of their Maliki allowance to him. This led the officials to believe that the Mulla's prestige was at a low ebb which was indeed wishful thinking, for the Mulla continued his struggle with the discontented Maliks, "a struggle fraught with menace to the peace of the border".¹

There was a recrudescence of raids by the Mahsuds with an organised system of assassinations. British subjects inside the administered area ran great risks while the British officers in Waziristan were practically prisoners in the militia forts.

The Government were convinced that Mulla Powindah was the brain behind the Mahsud outrages.² The situation which seemed to be getting out of hand was described by Minto thus:

We sent what practically amounted to an ultimatum to the Mahsuds in July, warning them that if they did not behave themselves the consequences would be more serious. Their reply to this has been a raid by a force of an unusual strength, composed of all sections of the tribe into British territory and an insolent letter to Crump ... much of it in a tone of contempt and defiance, whilst a man has been arrested near the tennis ground at Wana, who has confessed that he was employed by the Mulla Powinda to assassinate Crump.³

¹Ibid.
²Minto to Morley, 29 August 1907, Minto Papers, vol. H 1007.
³Minto to Morley, 16 October 1907, ibid.
The Government had therefore no choice but to withdraw the grant of land from the Mullas as well as the special secret allowance. But this was not enough.

Deane, who was "rather pessimistic" about the frontier affairs, once again urged upon Minto the launching of an expedition against the Mahsuds. Minto was in a predicament: he held that for the vindication of the Government's authority and prestige an expedition was justified but he was handicapped by the fact that it might have unfavourable repercussions on British relations with Afghanistan as well as with Russia. "It is all-important" Minto explained to Horley, "that nothing should arise to jeopardise the Treaty with Russia, and violent anti-British feeling on the frontier might for the moment react on Afghan politics, and handicap the Amir in any wish he may have to meet us half way." Besides, any expedition was an expensive undertaking. Minto was supported in his views by Kitchener who absolutely agreed that to enter the Mahsud country simply to punish the tribe and then to withdraw would be "full of the most unfortunate results". Minto had an intense dislike for what was known as the "steam roller policy", that is,

1Howell, op.cit., p.23.
2The Anglo-Russian Convention concluded in August 1907.
going into a country simply to burn and destroy all we can lay our hands on and then going away again, leaving a starving population with their hatred for us increased a hundred fold.

The withdrawal of the British troops after inflicting punishment on the Mahsuds, Minto explained,

would be credited to no feelings of generosity on our side, but simply to fear of the tribes... whilst our own soldiers would say, with truth, that their comrades who were killed had sacrificed their lives for nothing.

However, should an expedition be forced on the Government by the continued misbehaviour of the tribe, then Minto preferred to occupy the Mahsud country by establishing military posts and improving the means of communication rather than to devastate it and then withdraw. It was not necessary in his view to force upon it a "British administration, collection of revenues" etc. It would be sufficient to hold the area

by the creation of one or two roads, or rather by the improvement of existing roads by means of tribal labour, for which we should not pay, and the establishment of a few armed posts, leaving the tribe as heretofore to carry on its own tribal administration.

It was a safe policy to adopt, Minto asserted, as well as one likely to bring "happiness and prosperity to the districts we have pacified". Moreover the "pacification of Waziristan" by this means would, Minto hoped, "in the long run, be far less expensive than a succession of expeditions".¹

¹Minto to Morley, 16 October 1907, M.P., vol. 13. Also see Mary, Countess of Minto, India, Minto and Morley,1905-1910, pp. 185-6; J. Buchan, Lord Minto, A Memoir, pp. 268-9.
The Home Government's reaction was cautious. Morley was not only against any expedition but he was opposed to any form of occupation of the tribal territory. On 5 December 1907 he wrote to Minto:

Things may be tiresome; they always are tiresome in that delectable region, but who thinks they would have been less so, if we had listened to frontier counsels. Whatever the Amir may say about the Russian Convention, for us to have gone into the field against his friends on the border while he is deciding his tactics, would beyond all doubt have prejudiced our chances of his assent to the Convention. Much therefore do I applaud your cautious refusal to go in for punitive expeditions... as at present advised, or as likely to be advised, H.M.'s Government will certainly refuse to set up permanent posts, or anything else that is of the nature of annexation.¹

Meanwhile, the Mahsud attempts to kill British officers went on unabated. On 13 March 1908 matters came to a head. The Mahsud assassins killed the Political Agent's bearer and the Political Tahsildar's Munshi. Thereupon Crump effected an immediate baremata (seizure of person and property) of all the Mahsuds in the protected and administered areas and secured the capture of four hundred Mahsuds.² Deane and Minto fully approved of this step but Morley felt "rather quaking". He wrote to Minto that the "doings of Crump and Deane" struck him "as savouring unpleasantly of the forward frontier school". Morley feared that Crump's action without orders

¹ Morley to Minto, 5 December 1907, H.P., vol. 2.
was just the kind of thing to commit his Government to an expedition. ¹

While the Viceroy and the Secretary of State were busy in debating the wisdom of Crump's action, Deane was directed to get in touch with the Mahsud jirga. In April 1908, Deane interviewed the jirga at Tank, announced the definite forfeiture of the previous year's allowances and reiterated the warning of July 1907 regarding tribal responsibility for the prevention of outrages on British territory and attempts at the murder of British officers and British subjects. Unless the tribe stopped these practices, its allowances would be withheld. The Maliks as before pleaded their inability to control the outlaws and Mulla Powindah, whereupon Deane recommended to the Government the launching of an expedition as the only solution of the long festering problem. ²

Minto by now was very anxious; he realised the extreme strain under which the British officers were living in the troubled region "with their lives in their hands from day to day with a constant threat of assassination". ³ An expedition, as repeatedly

¹Morley to Minto, 15 April 1908, Minto Papers, vol. M 1008.


³Minto to Morley, 15 April 1908, Minto Papers, vol. M 1008.
urged by Deane, seemed to the Viceroy the only course left. However, since Minto found it "uncommonly hard" to persuade Morley to sanction the course, he had to drop the idea.¹

Matters kept on drifting and no satisfactory solution of the intricate Mahsud problem was forthcoming. In June 1908, Roos-Keppel replaced Deane whose health under the heavy strain gave way.² Deane went home, a physical wreck, and died soon after.³ One of the first steps taken by Roos-Keppel was to place Waziristan under D. S. Donald, the Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, a senior and experienced officer, to coordinate and control all political work in the region.⁴

During this time an unofficial correspondence took place between Crump and Roos-Keppel. Crump recommended the occupation and direct administration of Waziristan. He proposed the construction of a road from Thal in Kurram via Idak in Tochi through the heart of the Mahsud country to Wana in the Gomal. There would be a garrison of some 2,500 regular troops at Razmak, and the road would be held by a series of militia posts. The entire tribal

¹Minto to Morley, 23 June 1908, Morley to Minto, 16 July 1908, ibid.
²Minto to Morley, 4 June 1908, M.P., vol. 16.
³Olaf Caroe, op.cit., p.422.
⁴Roos-Keppel to Govt. of India, 18 June 1909, Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 3 November 1910, P.S.L.I., vol. 244, Reg.No. 1670.
territory would be administered on the system in force in the protected areas of the Wana and Tochi agencies. A light revenue in the form of a house tax would be levied. Grump also laid stress on adopting such measures by the Government as would promote the economic development of the Mahsud country. The mineral wealth and forests of Waziristan, if developed, would not only bring prosperity to the country but transform the people's habits as well. Urging a change of outlook on the part of the Government, Grump wrote:

At present the Mahsud is treated as an outcaste, with suspicion and hatred. He is a byword for treachery. ... There is splendid material of humanity in the people, and it is time that Government ceased to treat the Mahsud as a brute, and began to treat him as a man. Let Government enter and administer the country; it will not only be blessed by its own subjects, but afford a chance of civilisation to one of the finest of the Pathan tribes.¹

Grump's scheme was a departure from the Government's policy of non-interference in the internal administration of the tribal people. Roos-Keppel, considering it as "a war policy", did not attach much importance to it,² while Minto, regarding it as the "irresponsible utterance of a subordinate official" asked Morley to ignore it.³

² Roos-Keppel to Govt. of India, 11 January 1909, ibid.
³ Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 8 April 1909, ibid.
The year 1909 began with the Mahsud problem becoming a trifle easier. In January sixty rifles were surrendered to the Government as a token of the Mahsud submission and as an assurance of the tribe's future good behaviour.¹ The Government also made certain gestures. In May sectional instead of tribal responsibility was once again enforced. Several sections of the tribe paid fines to the Government, and to allay the dissatisfaction regarding the existing system of distribution of Maliki allowances, the Government made a rearrangement of the system. Lists of sectional Maliks were drawn up by each section and allowances were paid out by the Government in accordance with the lists. Simultaneously the recruitment of Mahsuds in the army was also undertaken.² Mulla Powindah's influence, too, seemed to be on the wane. He failed to convene a jirga at Kaniguram in November 1909 and to prevent the Mahsuds attending a jirga called by the Government at Tank in January 1910.³

In late 1910 Minto was succeeded by Lord Hardinge, who, in the words of Morley, was "an enemy of the Forward Policy".⁴ Under

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⁴ Morley to Minto, 15 June 1910; M.P., vol. 5.
Minto, whatever the Viceroy's personal beliefs and convictions might have been, the Mahsud situation had been handled by makeshift arrangements with the predominant object of avoiding a punitive expedition. As a result, the situation was by no means easy, and the new Viceroy had plenty of anxiety and worry in store for him.

The year 1911 was very hard for the Mahsuds, the country suffered from a bad drought and famine. The Government feared that the failure of crops would intensify the Mahsuds' propensity for raiding. They, therefore, thought it "very desirable from the political point of view" to give some sort of employment to the Mahsuds to ease their economic distress and thereby to minimise the risk of Mahsud attacks on British territory. The railway department had at that time a scheme for the extension of the Kalabagh-Bannu line from Lakki to Tank. Hardinge saw that the section from Lakki to Pezu – a distance of about twenty five miles – could offer employment to a large number of Mahsuds for a few months. Accordingly, in February 1912, nearly 2,000 Mahsuds were employed and many more were engaged on the Khuzma road in the Gomal and the Mughal Kot road in the Zhob valley. The development of communications on the Waziristan border by the Government was distasteful to Mulla Powindah who unsuccessfully tried to damage the Khuzma road.

3 Roos-Keppel to Govt. of India, Tels. 1, 4, 6 March 1912, P.S.F.,
In November 1915 the Mulla died. For nearly two decades he had dominated the politics of South Waziristan. He saw in the advance of the British government into Waziristan, with its outward manifestations of the Militia, military posts and roads, a menace to the cherished independence of his country. To safeguard this independence he set himself to wreck the British plans, and his methods—raids on the British territory, assassination of British officers and intrigues with the anti-British party at Kabul—had proved a constant source of anxiety for the British government. The latter's policy towards the Mulla lacked consistency. At first he was ignored; then he was favoured with a liberal gratuity and friendly relations with British officers; later he was deprived of both. This "mixture of cajolery and snubs" had turned the Mulla into a bitter opponent of the British in his later years. Curzon, Minto and Kitchener, to whom the Mulla had given many anxious moments, despised him as a "first class scoundrel", "a great rascal" and "a pestilent priest", but to a later competent British observer, Evelyn Howell, the Mulla was a remarkable man.

In Howell's view, the Mulla cannot be judged by any standard current among Englishmen... By those who had made allowances for the environment in which he lived, he cannot be denied some

vol. 13, 1912, File No. 1088, Govt. of India to Roos-Keppel, Tel. 15 March 1912, ibid., File no. 1291.
tribute of admiration as a determined and astute, though not altogether single-minded, patriot and champion of his tribe's independence. His forceful character, striking appearance and persuasive eloquence made a deep impression on those with whom he came into personal contact. A man, who without any inherited advantages and without education, could make so large an instalment of frontier history in effect, but a series of chapters in his own biography, can have been no little man, and given more malleable material to work upon than Mahsuds have ever afforded and a more fortunate setting in time and space, he might well have ranked with many who are accounted great men.1

The Mulla's second surviving son, Fazl-Din, a stripling of fourteen or fifteen years of age, was destined to carry on his father's policy as a "centre of opposition" to any friendly relations of the Mahsuds with the Government.

This was soon apparent for in January 1914, Captain Butler, Second-in-Command, South Waziristan Militia, was killed by a sepoy. Two months later Major Dodd, Political Agent, Wana, Captain Brown, Second-in-Command, South Waziristan Militia and Lieutenant Hickie of the Royal Artillery, along with three sepoys, lost their lives at the hands of a Bahlolzai Mahsud, Sarfraz by name, who was the personal orderly of Major Dodd. An enquiry into the incident revealed that the murders had been previously planned and were the result not of any private grievance but of a "tribal movement".

Nulla Abdul Hakim, an intimate friend and for years the "confidential

1 Howell, op. cit., p.30.
munshi" of the late Mulla Powindah, was strongly suspected of complicity in the crime.¹

Donald, who was officiating as the Chief Commissioner, interviewed the Mahsud jirga in May 1914, enforced tribal responsibility and suspended the tribal allowances. The Mahsuds were asked to surrender three relatives of Sarafraz and three other men, the accomplices in the murder of British officers. The Mahsuds refused compliance.² Shortly thereafter the Great War started, accentuating the hostile attitude of the Mahsuds towards the British government.³

The Afridis

The Gomal and Khyber passes have a local strategic and commercial importance, but there is no doubt that of all the routes from Central Asia and Afghanistan, none rival the Khyber. The Khyber has been rightly described as "the most historic ... of all the passes of the world".⁴ It begins near Jamrud, ten and a half miles west of Peshawar, and runs through the Khyber hills for about thirty-three miles, in a north-westerly direction till it reaches Loi Dakka

¹Donald to Govt. of India, 6 June 1914, P.S.F., vol. 46, 1914, File No. 2627; Note by F. A. Hirtzel, undated, ibid., File No. 1469.
²Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge, 1910-16, p.100, H.P., vol. 131, Donald to Hardinge, 19 July 1914, enclosed in Hardinge to Crewe, 30 July 1914, ibid., vol. 120: IV.
³Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge, p.100, H.P., vol. 131.
⁴J. W. Spain, op.cit., p.25.
in Afghan territory. The Khyber has always been the high-road from Central Asia to India; hence, its strategic and commercial importance.

The guardians of the Khyber pass are the Afridis,\(^1\) who like the Waziris, are "warlike and predatory" tribesmen.\(^2\) The Khyber Afridis are divided into six distinct clans: The Kambar Khel, Kamarai Khel, Kuki Khel, Malikdin Khel, Sipah Khel and Zakka Khel. Their common homeland is the Tirah to the south of the Khyber pass; each clan has its own habitat. Of these clans, the Zakka Khel are the most important, most powerful and the most turbulent, being regarded as the "archetype" of Afridis. They were less amenable to British control than other clans partly because their settlements were a long way from the settled border, and also because their trade with the British territory was small.\(^3\)

The British government first came in contact with the Afridis during the first Afghan war. Then when Peshawar as a part of the State of Lahore became a British possession in 1849, Afridis took service in the British Indian army and served well during the Mutiny.

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\(^1\)Davies, op.cit., p.135.

\(^2\)Besides the Khyber Afridis, there are two other Afridi clans: the Adam Khel, who live in the Kohat pass between Peshawar and Kohat, and the Aka Khel, who live in the hills south of Jamrud.

\(^3\)Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, vol. II, pp. 13-4, 19.
In the beginning, British relations with the Afridis, as with
the Mahsuds, were maintained through influential men of the
Peshawar border, called the Arbabs. These intermediaries,
however, proved unreliable, being prone to intrigues against
the British. To enhance their own importance, they fomented
unrest among the Afridis and prevented friendly relations de­
veloping between the tribe and the British Government. During
the second Afghan war, the Afridis, particularly the Zakkar Khel,
harassed the British troops passing through the Khyber. In 1878,
the Government were forced to send a punitive expedition against
the tribe.¹

In 1879, by the Treaty of Gandamak concluded with the Amir
of Afghanistan, the British Government secured the control of the
Khyber pass. The Khyber Political Agency, the first of its kind
on the frontier, was then created by the Government. It included
the Mullagori country north of the Khyber, the Tirah to the south
and the country on both sides of the Khyber pass. An agreement was
also made on 17 February 1881 between the British government and the
Afridis, by which the latter, together with the Loargai Shinwaris
of Landi Kotal accepted entire and exclusive responsibility for the
safety of the Khyber, and, on condition of British recognition of

¹Imperial Gazetteer of India, North West Frontier Province, 1908,
pp. 251-2; R. Warburton, Eighteen years in the Khyber (1879-1898),
pp. 35-6, 328-9.
their independence, undertook to have no relations with any foreign power. In pursuance of this agreement allowances were fixed for the Afridis, including the Shinwaris of Loargai, amounting to Rs. 87,540 per annum, which was liable to forfeiture if the Afridis committed dacoity, highway robbery or murder in British territory. The management of the Khyber pass was entrusted to the tribesmen themselves. Some local levies called _Jezailchis_ numbering about four hundred, were also raised for escorting caravans through the Khyber twice a week. They were paid by the Government, but their appointment and dismissal lay with the chiefs of the clans concerned, who were solely responsible for the management of the levies. The Political Agent of the Khyber dealt with matters relating to the Afridis. The British government exercised the right of levying tolls on traffic carried through the Khyber pass.¹

During the tribal disturbances of 1897-8 the Afridis were severely dealt with by the Tirah Expeditionary force under General William Lockhart.² In 1898 a fresh settlement was made with the Afridis requiring them to have no intercourse with any power except the British and to raise no objections to the construction of railways or roads by the Government through the Khyber pass. On these conditions their allowances were restored with a small increase

¹ Aitchison, _op. cit._, pp. 27-8, 97-9.
² See _Biographical Notes_, pp. 469-70
of two hundred and fifty rupees per mensem for the Kambar Khel. ¹

Under Curzon's scheme of frontier defence the Jazailchis were
renamed the Khyber Rifles and augmented to two battalions of
six hundred men, each. They were placed under British officers
and supported by a mobile column at Peshawar. The government
of India took responsibility for the safety of the Khyber road
and the Khyber Rifles.²

Before the Agreement of 1881 had brought the Afridis under
British control, the Amir of Afghanistan had been accustomed to
exercise "some measure of control" over them. He had, for ex-
ample, paid allowances to the tribe to keep the Khyber pass open
for trade. Under the 1881 Agreement, the Amir was obliged to re-
frain from interfering with the Afridis.³ However, Afghan influence
over the tribe did not suddenly cease, and neither did her intrigues
with them. These intrigues and continual raids by the tribe on
frontier districts constituted the main problem of the British gov-
ernment in the period under review.

In 1902-03 Afghan intrigues not only with the Afridis but the Orakzaïs and Mohmands also took what was considered by the Govern-

²See Chapter I, p.30.
ment to be an "extremely undesirable" turn. The tribesmen visited Kabul in large numbers in response to invitations from persons who represented themselves as the Amir's agents. Khwas Khan, an ex-Malik of Zakka Khel, who had fled to Kabul after the 1897 disturbances, was the Amir's "principal agent" in dealing with the tribes. In Kabul the tribesmen were liberally treated; substantial sums of money were distributed among them; pensions and allowances were fixed for some of the headmen; facilities were provided for extensive purchase of arms and ammunition; and they were even enlisted in the Afghan army. It was also reported that the Amir had conferred the title of Khan Bahadur on five Afridi leaders including Chaman, a notorious Zakka Khel raider and rifle thief, thus making a mockery of Curzon's bestowal of that title on the pro-British Malik, Yar Muhammad Khan of the Malikdin Khel. The Amir declared that the man honoured by Curzon was "disloyal to his tribe and his King", and that his own nominees were "faithful to their religion".¹

Afghan intrigues resulted in what looked to the British to be the splitting up of the Afridis into two factions, the Kabul party and the Sarkar (Government) party. The former was numerically weak but its members, out of gratitude for past and hope of future favours at the hands of the Amir, were his active and enthusiastic.

supporters. They openly boasted that their object was to embroil the Afridis with the government of India and to bring the tribe closer to the Amir. The Sarkar party, on the other hand, was headed by the Maliks and elders who were well-disposed to the Government but powerless against the "malcontent minority".¹

The Government took a serious view of the Amir's activities but were not very sure of their motivation. The British Government's agent in Kabul reported in September 1904 that the Amir had doubts about the British friendship and so had deemed it expedient to increase his influence with the Afridis. It was also possible that by intriguing with the tribes on the undemarcated section of the Indo-Afghan boundary, Habibullah was seeking to "force us at demarcation to accept his views", or perhaps "trying to coerce us on the subject of our general arrangements with him".²

In September 1904, in a despatch to the Secretary of State, they elaborated their views on the Afghan intrigues and the measures they deemed necessary to deal with the situation. The Government of India proposed that they should ask the Amir to abide by his treaty engagement and to press the Afridis to observe their agreements. If the Amir desisted from intrigues, it

¹Khyber Political Diary week ending 24 September 1904, P.S.L.I., vol. 170, Reg. No. 1927A.

²Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 22 September 1904, P.S.S.F., vol. 33, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. No. 1776.
would not be difficult for the Government to deal with the Afridis, especially if the demarcation of the Indo-Afghan boundary was carried out.\footnote{See pp. 17-8.} The Government were ready to establish a post at Sassobi on the border to close this "back-door" to Afghanistan used by the Sarheng of Dakka\footnote{Dakka was a village in the Jalalabad district of Afghanistan and was twelve and a half miles from Landi Kotal on the road to Kabul. A force of two hundred Khassadars armed with Lee-Metford rifles was stationed here, under a Sarheng or Sartip.} for his communication with the Afridis. In the event of the Orakzais and Afridis refusing to obey Government orders and of their continuing to ignore the 1898 settlement, the Government would stop their allowances and accept the request of the Shia Orakzais to take over their country.\footnote{Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 22 September 1904, P.S.S.F., vol. 33, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. No. 1776.}

This request had been made in the beginning of 1904 by certain clans of the Shia Orakzais across the Kohat border who were seeking protection against rival Sunni clans who oppressed them. Deane strongly urged the Government to annex the country of the Shia Orakzais because of its many advantages. The Government would secure a firmer political control over the adjacent Afridis, especially the Zakka Khel and Aka Khel sections, by occupying a strategic base in the rear of the Afridi country. Deane recommended that after
taking the Shia Orakzais under their protection, the Government should administer the tract on the lines of the Kurram agency. A native Assistant working under the Deputy Commissioner of Kohat should be appointed, a cess of four rupees per house should be collected and a corps of two hundred local levies should be raised for the protection of the border and affiliated to the Samana Rifles.¹

Curzon, so it seemed to Ampthill, the Acting Viceroy, was "a little dubious" about the matter. Kitchener and Edmund Elles, the Military Member of the Council, were willing to accept Deane's recommendations. But in Ampthill's view this course involved a distinct departure from the existing frontier policy as laid down by the Home government in 1898, prohibiting the undertaking of any new responsibility unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities, and any unnecessary interference with the tribes.² At the end of 1904 the issue was discussed in the Council. Kitchener stuck to his views, maintaining that the Kabul-Kandahar line was the strategical boundary for the defence of India against an enemy advance through Afghanistan. That being so, it was absolutely essential that the Government should assert themselves and control

¹Deane to Govt. of India, 14 May 1904, P.S.L.I., vol. 168, Reg.No.1558.
the tribes up to the Durand line, for these tribes were both able and ready to endanger the approaches to the Kabul-Kandhar position. Kitchener strongly urged that such control required the gradual incorporation and absorption of the frontier tribes. To leave them in a "state of semi-independence as a sort of buffer state" would, in his view, be "fatal to any scheme for the defence of India". Edmond Elles, the Military Member, supported Kitchener, but other members of the Council opposed the idea, being unwilling to reverse the existing frontier policy, to incur the expense involved in the project and to run the risk of stirring up hostilities with the Afridis.

The news of the Orakzai approach to the Government of India by July 1904 had already reached the Afridis, and according to one informer, "there is not a tree in Maidan under which you will not find three or four men discussing the Shia affair". The Amir, too, was aware of the matter. Ampthill, hesitating to take a definite decision, sent a "non-committal" despatch to the Secretary of State, stating that

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1 Ampthill to Brodrick, 27 July 1904, ibid. See also A Note on the Military Policy of India by Kitchener, 19 July 1905, K.P., vol. 30.
if the policy of peaceful penetration is actively pursued all along the border, we shall add seriously to our responsibilities, while our relations with the Amir will become closer and more delicate.¹

In October of the same year the Cabinet discussed the issue and decided against any departure from the policy as laid down in 1898.² Curzon, then in England, wrote a minute supporting the Cabinet's decision.³

Meanwhile, the Indian government, while preparing for the despatch of a mission to Kabul, to conclude a fresh treaty with Afghanistan, suggested to the Home government that the Amir be addressed on the subject of intrigues and raids on the border. Ampthill explained:

Our attitude should be firm and uncompromising, and the Amir should be told in an unmistakable language that he will be held to the engagement of 1893, and that any interference or intriguing with the tribes on our side of the boundary that may be fixed under the Durand Agreement will be regarded as an unfriendly act and a most serious violation of that Agreement, which may necessitate our taking measures to prevent the possibility of such action on his part in the future.⁴

Louis Dane, the leader of the Mission, was instructed accordingly.⁵

¹ Ibid.
² Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 28 October 1904, ibid.
³ Morley to Minto, 8 January, 1908, H.P., vol. 3.
⁴ Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 22 September 1904, P.S.S.F., vol. 33, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. No. 1776.
⁵ Aide Memoire for Dane, enclosed in Brodrick to Ampthill, 20 October 1904, Ampthill Papers, vol. 37.
In December Dane raised the issue with the Amir. In March 1905 after signing his treaty with the Government of India the Amir informed Dane that he had appointed a committee of seven persons to deal with the general question of frontier crimes and control of the outlaws. Dane hoped that the Amir's "Septemvirate" would cooperate with the British officers on the frontier, but later it was found that no such committee was ever formed. However, after the treaty, there was a temporary cessation of raids, creating in the Government some hope that the tribe had changed its hostile attitude; this hope soon proved illusory.

From the middle of 1905 until the beginning of 1908 the Zakka Khel, with the assistance of the Orakzais and the Hazarnao gang, a band of Afghan outlaws, perpetrated a series of daring raids into British territory. Five raiding gangs were organised under the most notorious elders of the Kabul party, Dadai, Usman, Multan, Gulbaz and Muhammad Afzal. Peaceful villages well within the administered districts were raided, border military posts were attacked, Government property robbed, British Military Police constables and British subjects abducted. The efforts of the Afridi jirgas and Maliks to bring the raiders to their senses did not succeed. In July 1906 the Zakka Khel wreaked vengeance on an elder of their own section for assisting the Government in the capture of a few Afghan outlaws; they thus meted out what they claimed to be an
exemplary punishment to those traitors to the national cause who had dared to ... aid the British authorities.\footnote{Roos-Keppel to Deane, 18 November 1906, \textit{ibid.}, Reg. No. 2134; Roos-Keppel to Deane, 3 December 1906, \textit{ibid.}, Reg. No. 2179; Roos-Keppel to Deane, 7 February 1907, \textit{ibid.}, Reg. No. 491; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 7 March 1907, \textit{ibid.}, Reg. No. 559; Roos-Keppel to Deane, 1 November 1907, \textit{ibid.}, Reg. No. 2149B.}

The activities of the Zakka Khel were creating a bad moral effect on other clans. Roos-Keppel, then Political Agent, Khyber, reported

Every man, woman and child looks upon those who commit raids, murders and robberies in Peshawar or Kohat as heroes and champions. They are the crusaders of the nation; they depart with the good wishes and prayers of all, and are received on their return after a successful raid with universal rejoicings and congratulations. Should a raider be killed during a raid... he is pronounced to be a martyr, and is mourned as such. On the other hand his victims die as 'Kafirs' and are condemned to eternal damnation for no crime but that of being British subjects.\footnote{Roos-Keppel to Deane, 18 November 1906, \textit{ibid.}, Reg. No. 2134; Davies, \textit{op.cit.}, p.146.}

In February 1907, Roos-Keppel again informed the Government that

Men of other tribes - Aka Khel, Orakzai, Sturi Khel, are joining the raiders and the temptation to the Afridis of all sections to do so is becoming overpowering as they see that, week after week, villages, police posts, cattle, camels, horses, women, and men, even Government servants, can be carried off and sold or held to ransom, while the authorities appear to regard the matter with indifference.\footnote{Roos-Keppel to Deane, 7 February 1907, \textit{P.S.S.F.}, vol. 32, 1904, Reg. No. 491.}

Deane estimated that during the previous seven years thirty-two British subjects had been murdered, twenty nine wounded, thirty...
seven kidnapped and held up to ransom by the Zakka Khel either alone or in conjunction with the Hazarnao gang, while the property looted was worth over one lakh of rupees.¹

The Zakka Khel kept visiting Kabul where they were encouraged by Nasrullah Khan, the Amir's brother and the leader of the anti-British party in the Afghan court. The Zakka Khel praised Nasrullah for his "generosity and Pan-Islamic sympathy" and for having gone "further in encouragement to Afridis than ever did his father or brother".²

The Frontier Province government adopted several measures to check the Afridi raids. An elaborate system of picquetting the Peshawar and Kohat roads by troops was established and detachments of regulars and cavalry were engaged to cut off raiders. Special patrols of the Border Military Police were organised and Border Military Police posts near the Peshawar and Kohat frontier were strengthened. Border villages were given arms and village chighas (pursuit parties) were organised to cooperate with the local authorities to defend themselves against raiders. But all these defensive measures proved inadequate to deal with the situation. The tribesmen set up an elaborate system of espionage, the wide stretch

¹ Deane to Govt. of India, 13 February 1907, ibid.; Davies, op.cit., p.146.

² Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 9 January 1908, P.S.S.F., vol. 33, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. No.192.
of the country and its terrain with which the sure-footed hill men were thoroughly familiar enabled them to avoid Government posts, patrols and armed villages; the Border Military Police was inadequate in strength, far from efficient and lacked discipline. Their arms were inferior to those of the tribesmen who obtained better rifles from the Persian gulf.

The situation was evidently gloomy but the Government's policy towards the Afridis was as cautious as it was towards the Mahsuds. In consequence, the Zakka Khel long remained unpunished. Since 1906, Roos-Keppel had been urging the Government to occupy the Bazar valley and to hold it with Militia Posts at important points like China, Mangal Bagh and Sassobi to be garrisoned by the Khyber Rifles; this in his view was the "only completely satisfactory" solution of the Zakka Khel problem. The occupation of the Bazar valley, Roos-Keppel pointed out, would give the Government command of the passes leading to Tirah and Afghanistan which were used by the Zakka Khel as their escape route. Should the Government decline to take this step, Roos-Keppel recommended the stoppage of the Zakka Khel allowances. Deane had agreed with Roos-Keppel, urging the Government that they must decide whether to let

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2. See pp. 142-4.
things go on as heretofore or to take "definite action" against the Zakka Khel. The Indian government were at this time anxious to avoid any disturbance in the Khyber region as the Amir was about to visit India; they were naturally unwilling to take any step which might lead to an open rupture with the Zakka Khel until the Amir returned home. Therefore, the Government, instead of stopping the Afridi allowances altogether, instructed Deane to defer their payment until March 1907 when the Amir was expected to have left India.  

Minto, as seen earlier, was in favour of peaceful penetration into the tribal area and against the policy of punitive expeditions. He explained to Morley that he did not have "any land hunger" so far as the tribal territory was concerned. Rather his policy was actuated by a strong belief that the extension of British administration on the frontier would bring "an increase in prosperity and happiness and a greater security for life" as he claimed had been the case in the Kurram, Tochi, Sam Ranizai and Baluchistan areas. The Viceroy agreed with the frontier officers regarding the

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1 Roos-Keppel to Deane, 18 November 1906, Deane to Govt. of India, 3 December 1906, P.S.S.F., vol. 32, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. No. 2134.

2 Govt. of India to Deane, Tel. 13 December 1906, ibid., Reg. No. 2174.

3 See pp. 85-6.
occupation of the Bazar valley and the construction of military posts there because

certain posts on our political frontier would deprive the raiders of their lines of retreat into Afghanistan, and would give us such a general control over the Bazar valley (without ourselves attempting to administer it) as would do much to constitute to the safety of the frontier.¹

Morley, however, had two objections to Minto's policy; it was expensive and it was risky: "though an individual post cost no mountains or marvel of money, yet the policy is not cheap". Morley asked Minto if frontier officers like Deane and Roos-Keppel, advocating the policy, were "alive to the risks ... of the posts kindling the wrath of neighbouring tribes". The Home government, Morley added, could never forget the Tirah campaign, a result of the sort of policy in question. At any rate Morley needed a tremendous weight of argument to induce him to sanction the policy of establishing posts in the tribal tracts.²

Realising that Morley remained absolutely unimpressed by his arguments, Minto left the issue for the moment.

In the circumstances there was no chance left to Minto except to address the Amir regarding the sanctuary given to Zakka Khel and other raiders at Ningrahah in Afghan territory requesting him

¹Minto to Morley, 28 October 1906, Minto Papers, vol. M 1006; Minto to Morley, 18 February 1907, ibid., vol. M. 1007.
²Morley to Minto, 14 March 1907, ibid.
to release the kidnapped British subjects, to restore the looted
British property and prevent the Afghan territory being used as
a base by the Zakka Khel. The Amir promised to make enquiries
into the matter.¹

Towards the end of 1907 an interesting development took
place. The Gaduns on the Yusufzai border and the Darwesh Khel
Waziris of the Tochi valley asked for the Government's protection
saying they wanted "peace and quiet". Deane welcomed this over­
ture, believing that the taking over of the frontier tribes gener­
ally was the "eventual solution of a lot of difficulty on the
frontier".² Minto agreed with Deane and took the opportunity of
writing a long private letter to Morley, elaborating his general
frontier policy. Minto said that he

had always considered the gradual absorption of
tribal districts as the proper solution of our
frontier difficulties.

He once again "really earnestly" asked Morley "not to think that
we are afflicted with incurable land-hunger, but that we only wish
to do what is best in the cause of peace and civilisation". It
seemed clear to Minto,

that when these unfortunate people, sick of fighting,
come to us and ask us to take them over, we should
not lose the opportunity of doing so. It would not

¹Viceroy to Amir, 10 May 1907, Amir to Viceroy, 29 May 1907,

²Deane to Viceroy, 18 November 1907, enclosed in Minto to Morley,
mean that we assume the government of their country with the idea of administering it and collecting revenue, but that we guarantee the peace of their homes leaving their territory to their own tribal administration, whilst the fact that we have taken over a district does not only affect the district itself, but contiguous districts throughout the border. It is a choice between a continuance of perpetual raids into British territory and murders of British subjects followed by useless punitive expeditions and possibly the necessity for ultimate conquest, or meeting the wishes of the tribes themselves, and taking them under our wing.

Minto supposed that "it was the suspicion of a policy of advance and grab" which stood in the way of what promised to lead gradually to a peaceful solution. Minto regretted that the Government had made a great mistake in refusing to take over the Shia Orakzais at their own request. "If we had done so", he pointed out to Morley, "we should have been far better able to deal with recent raids, some of which indeed very probably would not have occurred". Minto's conclusion was:

now if we are forced to enter the Bazar valley, I cannot but think it will be unfortunate if we do not leave behind us a sufficient number of small posts to guarantee future quiet.¹

Morley was unmoved, and refused to act, for apart from the expense and the risks of a tribal conflagration there was the fear of estrangement from the Amir. Morley was totally against any

¹ibid.
absorption, incorporation, or by whatever other names the Deanes and Crumps choose to call a process that would inevitably mean fresh responsibility and increased expenditure.¹

Any lingering hope in Minto's mind of eventually succeeding in bringing Morley round to the Indian government's views was removed by the latter's private letter to the Viceroy, dated 19 February 1908. Morley wrote:

you speak of frontier policy and suspect that I only half understand your view. I do believe I understand it wholly, though I read the lessons of the Tirah campaign² in a different sense from yours. Now I dislike a ragged edge as much as you do, and in many painful ways the state of the borderland is what you bluntly call it 'disreputable' - and if we had a quarrel with the Amir, or with the Czar, these 300,000 catamounts, or caterans, or whatever the name for border ruffian may be, would be not only disreputable but dangerous. Only I cannot but think that any policy tending towards a repetition of Tirah ... would be, or might be a great deal more dangerous still.

Morley felt "as strongly as I can feel about anything relating to frontier policy" that Lord Salisbury's government "were as right as right could be" in asking the Indian government under Curzon to forbear from a forceful frontier policy, and pointing out to them that the Home government, in consideration of international implications, would not allow any deviation from their instruction. Morley asked Minto to convince the Home government

¹Morley to Minto, 8 January 1908, ibid., vol. 3.
²See p. 98.
of three things and then "we would throw the reins on your neck, and let you stay in the Bazar valley etc., as long as ever you like." The three things were

(1) Would it not be likely to alarm and irritate their /Zakka Khel/ neighbours against us? ...
(2) Would it not put a good card into the hands of the anti-British party at Cabul - just at the moment when we are (with rather uncomfortable minds) waiting for the Amir to show himself our friend? (3) Would it not involve exposure to fresh liabilities, risks and, above all, expenditure?

And then Morley put his foot firmly down: "we won't prolong the controversy, unless you like, but that's my sort of case".¹

Meanwhile, the Zakka Khel made the situation very intolerable for the Government. Visits to Kabul went on; increased allowances were received from Nasrullah Khan and his men; the Zakka Khel bought large quantities of arms and ammunition and carried out raids of greater daring on the Peshawar and Kohat border. Deane and Roos-Keppel once more urged a punitive expedition and the occupation of the Zakka territory.² On 28 January 1908 a gang of sixty to eighty Zakka Khel raided the house of a Hindu banker and decamped with property worth one lakh of rupees. British troops and the Khyber Rifles chased the gang but in vain. "The boldness of the

¹Morley to Minto, 19 February 1908, ibid.; J. Morley, Recollections, II, p.246.

²Roos-Keppel to Deane, 9 October 1907, P.S.S.F., vol. 32, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. No. 644; Roos-Keppel to Deane, 1 November 1907, Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 25 November 1907, ibid., Reg. No. 2049B; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 9 January 1908, ibid., vol. 33, 1904, File No. 1776, Reg. No. 192.
exploit**, so ran the Khyber Political Diary, "and the enormous booty carried off fired the minds of Zakka Khel and indeed of all the Afridis, who openly expressed their regret that they were not among the raiders".¹ It was the proverbial last straw.

The Indian government had now reached the end of their patience. They were determined to take decisive action against the Zakka Khel. The Secretary of State was informed that the Government would summon an Afridi **jirga** and demand that the tribe ensure that the Zakka Khel should make reparation for their offences and should not misbehave, otherwise, the Afridis would be warned, the Government would take punitive measures against them. The government would not only punish the offenders but would recover the fine and disarm the Zakka Khel, capture and bring their leaders to trial and finally construct a road in the Zakka territory to be maintained on the lines of the Khyber road. This would enable the Government to control the Zakka Khel by holding the exits to Tirah and Afghanistan.² Morley, while maintaining his opposition to any occupation or annexation of tribal territory agreed to "consider proposals limited to blockade and punitive measures or combining blockade with punitive action" as in the Mahsud blockade of 1901. He asked the Indian government to ensure the

¹Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 1 February 1908, p.31, ibid., Reg. No. 496.

²Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 31 January 1908, 1 February 1908, ibid., Reg. Nos. 259-60.
neutrality, if not the active cooperation of other sections of the Afridis in punishing the Zakka Khel.¹ On 31 January 1908 Minto discussed the situation in the Council where it was decided that it was absolutely necessary to vindicate authority without delay. It was also decided to summon the Maliks of different sections of the Afridis, to point out to them the gravity of the situation and to reassure them that in taking action against the Zakka Khel, the Government in no way intended to injure other sections of the Afridis or interrupt the Government's friendly relations with them.² This assurance would immediately be followed by the entry of troops into the Bazar valley. Morley approved of the course but at the same time reminded the Indian government that the expedition should be

strictly limited to punishment of Zakka Khel and not either immediately or ultimately, directly or indirectly, to occupation or annexation of tribal territory.³

On 5 February the Amir was informed of the Government's determination to punish the Zakka Khel and he was requested to ask his frontier officials to prevent the Zakka Khel fleeing to Afghan territory or

¹Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tels. 2, 6 February, 1908, ibid., ibid., Reg. No. 204.
²Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 31 January 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 259.
³Morley to Minto, Tels. 2, 6 February 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 204.
securring assistance from Afghan subjects. A week later, Deane met a jirga of Afrida Malik and sought their cooperation to make the Zakka Khel come to a settlement with the Government. On the next day the Bazar Field Force, under the command of Major General James Willcocks left for the Zakka territory, and then for four days from 18 to 21 February battered the clan. No frontier tribe had ever been so "sharply, quickly and effectively" punished as the Zakka Khel on this occasion.

The success of the expedition was due to several factors: the military skill of the British troops; the loyal co-operation of the Afridi Maliks; the exemplary behaviour of the Khyber Rifles; the remarkable influence of Sahibsada Abdul Qaiyum, the Assistant Political Agent, Khyber, on the Afridis and, above all, the tact of Roos-Keppel. On 28 February a settlement was effected with the Zakka Khel. Other Afridi clans held themselves responsible jointly and separately for the future good behaviour of the Zakka Khel and promised, when called upon by the Government, to assist each

1 Viceroy to Amir, 5 February 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 445.
2 Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 14 February 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 260.
3 Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 20 February 1908, enclosing Reports from Wilcocks, ibid., Reg. No. 416; Wilcocks to Govt. of India, Tel. 25 February 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 584.
4 For A. Qaiyum see Biographical Notes, p. 468
other in punishing Zakka raiders; the Afridi clans also agreed to the Government's right to punish them by fine or by exclusion from British territory for the misdeeds of the Zakka Khel, for whom they had stood security. The clans deposited fifty-three rifles with the Government as a guarantee to honour their commitments. The next day, British troops pulled out of the Bazar valley.¹

Morley was very happy with the result of the expedition. He informed Minto:

we Indians are all in great spirits here just now at the end of the Zakkas, and at its being a good end, and our gratification is shared to the full by all the rest of the world. I think the Policy of His Majesty's Government has amply justified itself in the result.²

The Afridi Maliks and elders kept their word; they succeeded in punishing most of the notorious Zakka raiders except Multan and in restoring to the Government looted property worth about Rs. 33,489 in two months.³ Multan, who fled to Jalalabad, met his end eleven months later in an encounter with the Border Military Police at Peshawar. ⁴ Hereafter the relations between the

¹Roos-Keppel to General Mullaly, 3 March 1908, op.cit.
²Morley to Minto, 4 March 1908, Minto Papers, vol. M 1008.
⁴Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 23 January 1909, P.S.L.I., vol. 225, Reg. No. 1 68; The Pioneer Mail, 8 January 1909.
Zakka Khel and the Afridis with the British government in general remained free from strain and trouble. One result of the Zakka Khel expedition, however, was to unsettle another tribe, the Mohmands, against whom the Government had to send an expedition in May 1908.¹

The construction of strategic roads through the Khyber pass in 1913-14² raised an important political issue. It provided the Afridis with an opportunity to demand an increase in their allowances on the ground that these roads had "lessened permanently the strategical value" of the Khyber pass, a development which its owners naturally resented. In 1914 the Afridis submitted a petition to the Government further pointing out that the rise in prices and in population had considerably reduced the value of the Afridi allowances. On the other hand, the value of tolls in the Khyber realised by the Government had risen considerably and the responsibilities of the Afridis in the Khyber area had thus increased.

S. E. Pears, the Political Agent of Khyber, strongly supported the Afridi petition and pointed out the inadequacy of the allowances the tribe received from the Government. Pears pointed out that the net increase in the allowances between 1879 and 1914—thirty-

¹See p. 140.
²See pp. 233-6.
five years - had been only Rs. 6,500,\(^1\) while the rise in the total income of the Government from the tolls in the Khyber pass for the same period had been more than Rs. 27,000.\(^2\) Moreover, with the years the Afridi responsibilities had increased both within and outside the pass limits. Originally the tribe's responsibility was limited to the provision of security for the movement of caravans on fixed days and during the rare movement of local officers through the pass. With the construction of roads had occurred an increase in traffic which threw an extra burden on the Afridis for their security. Moreover, the Government's policy of direct contact with the Maliks and "the grey beards" of the tribe, making them responsible for good behaviour of different tribal sections, had increased the burden of responsibility on these elders and through them on the tribe itself. When, for example, a crime was committed at Peshawar or Kohat by the Afridis, "a long and troublesome pressure" was exerted by the Political Agent, Khyber, on the tribal leaders to bring the offenders to their senses. Pears pointed out that this system of control through sureties had gradually spread from Khyber to the Tirah and the Bazar valley when in 1908 each subsection of the Zakka Khel was subjected to the guarantees and control of other powerful sections of the Afridis.\(^3\) For

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\(^1\) In 1879 the tribal allowances were Rs. 72,600 per annum; in 1914 they were Rs. 79,200 per annum. Note on the Petition of Afridi Maliks by S.E. Pears, 15 January 1915, P.S.F., vol. 26, 1912, Reg. No. 974.

\(^2\) In 1882-3, the income from these tolls amounted to Rs. 55,882; in 1913-14, it was Rs. 83,161. Ibid.

\(^3\) See pp. 118-9.
their services and heavy responsibilities the Malik and elders received from the Government rewards by no means adequate - only six to seven thousand rupees a year distributed among seven hundred men - rewards which were accepted, Pears said, "only for their sentimental value attached to the recognised status of 'grey beards' in tribal society". The construction of the Khyber road in 1913-14 had converted the Khyber pass "from a doorway into a gateway". Formerly the political and strategical value of the Khyber pass had lain not only in its being the main artery of communication through the mountain barrier between Afghanistan and India, but in its providing a gap which could be easily closed and held by the Afridis against a force far superior in number. But with the construction of strategic roads in the Khyber the Government could now easily send the Khyber mobile column up to Landi-Kotal to prevent the closure of the pass by the Afridis. The latter had well realised the diminution of their power; one Afridi Malik remarked in a jirga:

The Mullagori road and the new Khyber road have emasculated the Afridis.

In such circumstances Pears strongly felt that the Afridi grievances set forth in their petition to the Government were genuine and therefore that their allowances should be increased.¹ The World

¹Note on the Petition of Afridi Maliks by Pears, op.cit.
War had by now broken out, making the maintenance of peace and order on the frontier the first care of the Government. Donald, the Officiating Chief Commissioner, fully agreed with Pears, thinking it politically expedient to accept the Afridi petition, and in 1915 action was taken on it by the Indian government.  

The Mohmands

North of the Khyber and in the great angle formed by the Kabul and Kunar rivers is to be found the country of the Mohmands. They live partly in the Afghan province of Ningrahar, partly in the hills between the Kunar valley and the Peshawar plain, and partly in the Peshawar district. The Mohmands who live between the Kunar valley and the Peshawar plain were known to the British as the "independent" or "hill Mohmands". They were divided into eight clans - the Khwezai, Baizai, Halimzai, Tarakzai, Isa Khel, Burhan Khel, Dawezai and Utmanzai.

Since the days of Ahmad Shah Abdali the rulers of Kabul had exercised "some sort of vague suzerainty" over the Mohmands as they

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2 See Chapter III.

had over the Afridis. The Mohmands were ruled by hereditary chiefs, selected by the Amirs of Kabul who paid allowances to different sections of the tribe through their chiefs. In addition the Halimzai and Tarakzai, the two clans of the eastern Mohmands, held large jagirs on the Peshawar border, of which they were dispossessed by the British after the latter had annexed Peshawar in 1849. The clans naturally took a hostile attitude towards the British; with a view to recovering their lost fiefs, they made inroads into Peshawar and brought upon themselves punitive expeditions in 1851, 1852 and 1854.

During the Mutiny, the Mohmands were widely excited, looking upon the event as an opportunity to strike a blow against the British government and to recover their lost territories. The Government had no troops to move against the tribe, and Colonel Herbert Edwardes, the Commissioner of Peshawar, had to promise that their territories would be restored. This quietened the tribe. In 1859 the jagirs of the Tarakzai Mohmands were restored, subject to good conduct and the payment of a light revenue to the Government. In 1864, following a Mohmand attack on Shabkadar fort, the Government sent their fourth expedition against the tribe. From 1864 to 1897 there was comparative peace on the Mohmand border,

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disturbed only on two occasions. In 1873, Major Macdonald, Commandant of Fort Nichni, was murdered in an assault in which the third brother of the Khan of Lalpura, a Mohmand chief, was implicated. During the second Afghan War the Mohmands, many of whom were Afghan subjects, constantly attacked the British line of communications and were punished in 1880.¹

The Durand Agreement of 1893 divided the Mohmand country between the British and Afghan governments. The boundary drawn on the map according to the agreement ran through the centre of the Mohmand hills. This boundary had, however, never been demarcated, and later, on various occasions, it was disputed. After signing the agreement, Durand had an interview with the Amir who told him:

I won't interfere with Bajaur but, of course, all the Mohmand country is mine.²

The government of India thought that the Amir either did not understand or pretended that he did not understand the map attached to the Agreement he had signed. Later, in 1895, when the Delimitation Commission reached Nawa Kotal, the Afghan Commissioner contended that the line would so run as to include all the Mohmands within the Afghan territory. The government of India having disputed this

¹Roos-Keppel to Grant, 14 June 1917, P.S.S.F., vol. 48, 1913, File No. 1364, Reg. No. 3775; Davies, op.cit., pp. 149-52.
claim, a deadlock was reached.\footnote{For details on the Durand Agreement see L. Harris, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 108-37; Davies, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 161-2; W.K. Fraser-Tytler, \textit{Afghanistan: A study of Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia}, pp. 188-9.}

According to the Durand Agreement, the eastern Mohmand clans fell to the British side of the border. In 1896 the jirgas of the eastern Mohmands - Halimzai, Kamali, Davezai, Utmanzai and Tarkakzai - were received by Dennis Fitzpatrick, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, and on condition that they would remain faithful to the British, allowances were granted to them to replace those which they had hitherto been receiving from Kabul. Henceforth, these Mohmands were called the "assured" clans to distinguish them from those who were not under the control of the British government.\footnote{Aitchison, \textit{op.cit.}, p.24, \textit{P.P.}, 1908, vol. LXXIV, Cd. 4201, p.125.}

In August 1897, during the tribal uprising, the Mohmands, led by Hadda Mulla, attacked Shabkadar and burnt the town whereupon the Government despatched a punitive expedition. However, on payment of a fine of fifteen thousand rupees and a few rifles, the Mohmand allowances, stopped during the expedition, were restored.\footnote{Roos-Keppel to Grant, 14 June 1917, \textit{P.S.S.F.}, vol. 48, 1913.}

In November 1902 the Baizai Musa Khel of Mitai became an "assured" clan and received allowances on conditions similar to those imposed on other clans by the agreement of 1896. Amir
Habibullah and the Afghan Hullas resented this.\textsuperscript{1}

At this time the Government of India had under consideration the construction of the strategic railway from Peshawar to the Afghan frontier through the Khyber,\textsuperscript{2} and British engineers were sent out to Khyber and Mullagori to make preliminary inspections while in March 1903 Kitchener visited Loi-Shilman in the Kohmand country. The Afghans disliked these visits.\textsuperscript{3} At the instigation of the Sartip\textsuperscript{4} of Dakka the Afghan Khassadars destroyed wells and crops in the border villages of Shinpokh and Smatzai whose Maliks had friendly relations with the Government of India.\textsuperscript{5}

Early in 1903, on Curzon’s instruction, Captain W. E. Venour, the Political Agent of Khyber, marched with the Khyber Rifles into Smatzai and Shinpokh and occupied the two places without facing any opposition. The risk of further trouble being over, the Khyber Rifles withdrew and some thirty Shilman Khassadars were engaged by the Government for the protection of Smatzai and Shinpokh.\textsuperscript{6}


\textsuperscript{2}See Chapter IV.

\textsuperscript{3}Curzon to Hamilton, 13 April 1903, C.C., vol. 162.

\textsuperscript{4}Sartip was the leader of six or more bairaks (companies) of Khassadars, who were irregular foot soldiers.

\textsuperscript{5}Deane to Govt. of India, Tel. 22 April 1903, P.S.L.I., vol. 153, Reg. No. 658.

\textsuperscript{6}Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tels. 6, 10 May 1903, P.S.L.I., vol. 153, Reg. Nos. 596, 605; Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, vol. I, p.493.
These incidents indicated to the Indian government the desirability of demarcating the section of the frontier between the Kabul river and the Sassobi pass, south of Landi Khana, so that uncertainty about the boundary could not spark off such friction in future. Also, a suitable demarcation of this sector of the frontier might, in Kitchener's view, give a terminus for the broad-gauge railway which the Government were contemplating constructing from Peshawar to Kam Dakka.¹

A lengthy correspondence then began between the Government of India and the Afghan government. Mentioning the incidents at Smatzai and Shinpokh and pointing out the objectionable conduct of the Sartip of Dakka, and claiming that the two places lay on the British side of the Durand Line, Curzon proposed to the Amir in April 1903 that the boundary between the Kabul river and the Sassobi pass be demarcated.² The Amir agreed about the need for the demarcation of the boundary but he made a counter proposal that the entire border from Nawa Kotal (on the dividing range between Kunar and Bajaur) to the Sikaram Sar (at the Western end of the Safed Koh overhanging the Peiwar Kotal) be delimited. This section passed through (and bisected) the Mohmand country and included the Khyber and Afridi boundaries towards Afghanistan.³ The

²Viceroy to Amir, 29 April 1903, ibid., Reg. No. 658.
³Amir to Viceroy, 8 May 1903, ibid., vol. 154, Reg. No. 796.
demarcation of this section had been left undone in 1897-8. The Viceroy did not accept the Amir's proposal for the delimitation of the entire undemarcated boundary from Nawa Kotal to Sikaram Sar. He held that there was no necessity for delimitation of the Mohmand section of the boundary because all was quiet in the region, but the position was different in the southern section of the boundary between Palossi on the Kabul river and the Sassobi pass; it was in this section, Curzon pointed out, that the recent "acts of aggression" on British territory had taken place with the connivance of the Amir's officers. Curzon was ready to name the British representative for the joint demarcation as soon as the Amir should agree to the proposed demarcation from the boundary from the Kabul river near Palossi to the Sassobi pass.¹ It is interesting to note that Curzon in his private letter to Hamilton admitted that although in regard to Shinpokh the Amir had "no case", his claim to Smatzai was "a very fair one".² The India Office, too, agreed that Smatzai was, indeed, prima-facie Afghan.³ Habibullah did not dispute Curzon's claim on Shinpokh and Shilman as British but as for Smatzai he contended that pending demarcation of the boundary, it was difficult to say whether the place was British or Afghan. As for the boundary demarcation,

¹Viceroy to Amir, 26 May 1903, ibid.
²Curzon to Hamilton, 21 May 1903, C.C., vol. 162.
Habibullah reiterated his earlier proposal, adding that over the Bohai Dag lands in the Mohmand country, he had "full rights".¹

Deane when consulted by the Government of India² about the Amir's claim on Bohai Dag pointed out that the value of the area in question lay in the fact that the Government by paying allowances to the local Mohmands could strengthen their relations with a view to ensuring their cooperation in the protection of the projected Kabul River Railway.³ But then, if the Government could get Kam Dakka from the Amir in exchange for Bohai Dag, it would be a good bargain because the possession of Kam Dakka would provide the terminus for the projected railway, and the boundary along the Kabul river and then to Sassobi pass would "effectually round up the Khyber territory".⁴

Curzon, while avoiding any formal offer of Bohai Dag to the Amir, again tried to settle the boundary demarcation issue with him. He informed Habibullah that the British government agreed with the Amir that the entire undemarcated frontier should be demarcated and necessary arrangements would follow soon, but urged that in the meanwhile the delimitation of the line between Palossi

¹Amir to Viceroy, 8 July 1903, P.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1903, File No. 1552, Reg. No. 1074.
²Govt. of India to Deane, 27 July 1903, ibid., Reg. No. 1552.
³See Chapter W.
⁴Deane to Govt. of India, 19 August 1903, P.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1903, File No. 1552, Reg. No. 1552.
and the Sassobi pass should be undertaken. Curzon proposed Roos-Keppe as the British representative for the joint demarcation of this sector. The Amir did not budge from his stand; he insisted that the entire line should be demarcated and not only a section. The government of India thought that the Amir was intransigent because he hoped to get from the British government the Mohmand country before conceding any territory to them on the Kabul river and, once he had what he wanted, he would refuse any concession to them, thus emerging "doubly victorious". Curzon believed that he had seen through the Amir's game, and therefore he would take a firm attitude; he would concede "nothing... in the Mohmand country except in return for a corresponding concession by the Amir on the Kabul river".

Deane when consulted again expressed his readiness to cede Bohai Dag with the definite stipulation that the Amir must give a "substantial quid pro quo" on the Kabul river - a suitable boundary including, or in the neighbourhood of, Loi Dakka. The military authorities took a stiffer attitude: no cession of Bohai Dag to the Amir before the British had actually

1Viceroy to Amir, 29 August 1903, ibid., Reg. No. 1334.
2Amir to Viceroy, 19 September 1903, ibid.
3Govt. of India to Deane, 6 November 1903, ibid., Reg. No. 296.
4Deane to Govt. of India, 10 November 1903, ibid.
secured the *quid pro quo* from him.\(^1\)

Curzon then proposed to the Amir that a survey for the delimitation of the boundary should start, pending the settlement of any points over which the Commissioners of the two governments might fail to agree.\(^2\) The Indian government's line of thinking was: demarcation should begin in the north from Nawa Kotal as the Amir had desired; on coming down to the Bohai Dag section, if the Afghan Commissioner claimed the area, its delimitation would be put off and the matter referred to the Amir; the Commissioners would then proceed further south to demarcate the section the British wanted. This proposal, so Curzon calculated, would provide the test whether the Amir was at all serious about demarcation and whether he wanted really to effect a bargain.\(^3\) The Amir in his reply stated that the delimitation must follow the original Durand line and repeated with greater firmness his claim over Bohai Dag.\(^4\)

The Amir's attitude now convinced the British that they would not get what they wanted. While Curzon, therefore, thought of "dropping the project" altogether,\(^5\) Deane recommended its postpone-

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3. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 9 December 1903, *ibid.*
5. Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 28 February 1904, *ibid.*
ment until circumstances became favourable.\(^1\) Habibullah in his reply to Curzon's letter took the opportunity of using the delimitation issue as a peg on which to hang all his grievances against the Viceroy regarding the subsidy and arms and ammunition.\(^2\)

As the answer to this letter involved the wider question of the general relations between the British and Afghan governments and consequently required the Home government's decision, the government of India decided not to reply to it.\(^3\)

The Anglo-Afghan boundary issue was again taken up in 1905 when the Dane Mission went to Kabul to negotiate a treaty with the Amir.\(^4\) Dane was instructed by the Government to press the Amir to agree to a railway terminus at Loi-Dakka "on the ground that the military cooperation and support for Kabul, for which the Amir had pleaded" were out of the question unless the government of India had a railway reaching the Kabul river plain. If the Amir did not concede this, Dane was to press for Kam Dakka and ascertain whether the Amir wanted any territorial compensation elsewhere. Dane was further instructed not to mention any other place as the terminus for the Kabul River Railway because the Indian government were not prepared to let the Amir lay a claim to

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\(^1\) Deane to Govt. of India, 17 March 1904, \textit{ibid.}, Reg. No.918.

\(^2\) Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 25, March 1904, Viceroy to Amir, 1 April 1904, \textit{ibid.}

\(^3\) Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 7 May 1904, Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 16 May 1904, \textit{P.S.S.F.}, vol. 4, 1903, File No. 1552, Reg. No. 1697.

\(^4\) For Dane Mission to Kabul see L. W. Adamec, \textit{Afghanistan 1900-1923. A Diplomatic History}.
Smatzai. However, Dane found the Amir in no mood to discuss any question of territorial concession on the frontier, let alone to deal specifically with the Kabul River Railway issue which he regarded with extreme suspicion and resentment. The Mission's long stay had raised suspicion in Kabul that great concessions were being made to the British, and this also had some influence on Habibullah's attitude.¹

Shortly after Dane's return from Kabul, the government of India again considered raising the demarcation issue with the Amir. But Deane was unenthusiastic, he saw no reason why the Government should be eager to reopen the issue. The Government, he pointed out, suffered no inconvenience from the frontier being undefined, except as regards the difficulty of acquiring a suitable rail-head for the Kabul River Railway. Deane was not in the least optimistic that delimitation of the boundary would enable the Government to obtain as the rail-head either Kam Dakka or Loi Dakka; it was, moreover, doubtful whether Smatzai would be theirs, even though it was now under British control. In such circumstances, instead of asking the Amir for co-operation in demarcating the boundary, the Government should confine their efforts to secure a suitable rail-head by direct negotiations with him. It would be

¹Dane to Govt. of India, 27 March 1905, P.S.S.F., vol. 4, 1903, File No. 1552; Reg. No. 1095; Summary of Curzon's Administration, Foreign Dept., p.66, C.O., vol. 526.
preferable, in Deane's view, to request the Amir to grant the
Government a lease of the necessary ground on payment of rent
or in return for a gift of rifles rather than to try to obtain
from him a cession of territory. The Amir should himself state
the amount he wanted as rent, for if the British suggested any
sum, he would use it as a "basis for argument and obstruction".¹

The time, too, was not suitable for delimiting the boundary.
Strong religious feelings were then being fanned by Afghan Mulla
among the Mohmands. Two Mulla, Sufi Sahib and Kama Mulla, had,
in fact, "produced a state of terror, both spiritual and material"
on the Mohmand border. Consequently, the Dawezai, Utmanzai and
Hitai Musa Khel clans of the Mohmands hesitated to come to receive
their allowances. Even the Halimzai clan, with whom the Government's
relations were closest, only received their subsidy after consider­
able reluctance. They also appealed to the Deputy Commissioner of
Peshawar for the Government's protection against the Afghan Mulla.²
Then followed an abortive Afghan attack on Smatzai at the instigation
of the Sartip of Dakka. To the Viceroy's request to call the Sartip
to account, the Amir sent a letter from the Sartip claiming Smatzai
"to be in my charge and... belonging to my Government". The Amir

¹Deane to Govt. of India, 9 May 1905, P.S.S.T., vol. 4, 1903, File
No. 1552, Reg. No. 1095.
²Ibid.
supported this assertion, pointing out to the Viceroy that the revenue payment of Smatzai had been "entered in my record here", and that no evidence pointing to the cession of the place to the British could be found recorded – Smatzai was Afghan property. Curzon intended to make a spirited reply to the Amir's assertion and his refusal to admonish the Sartip and to raise once again the delimitation and rail-head issue. But the Secretary of State, St. John Brodrick, advised caution in view of the temper of the Mohmands and the feelings of the Amir. He instructed Curzon to mention to the Amir only the Smatzai incident and affirm its being in British territory and not to raise matters like the rail-head and boundary demarcation. Habibullah did not hereafter continue any discussion on the Smatzai issue and disposed of it with the claim: "Smatzai is and always will be ours". The British government also did not see any point in continuing discussion with the Amir about the delimitation issue. The India Office, some time later, summed up the situation thus:

2 Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 2 August 1905, ibid.
3 Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tels. 12, 24 August 1905, Ibid., Reg. Nos. 1246, 1322; Viceroy to Amir, 30 August 1905, Ibid., Reg. No. 1456.
4 Mohmand Delimitation: A Memorandum by L. B. Lindsay, 22 June 1908, P.S.M., AM7.
it would be unwise again to suggest demarcation of the debatable portion of the boundary. From past experience it is certain that we shall issue from any negotiations badly discomfited or minus considerable concessions. It is apparent that demarcation is for some reason or other distasteful to the Amir.¹

Meanwhile the Government went ahead with the Kabul River Railway project. Although no part of the railway actually crossed through the Mohmand country, nevertheless since an attack on it by the tribe from the left bank of the Kabul river was not unlikely, it was decided to grant additional allowances of Rs. 5,000 to the Tarakzai Mohmands at the end of 1905. A few Mohmands were also recruited in the Peshawar Border Military Police.²

The Mohmands generally remained quiet until the beginning of 1908 when the Bazar valley expedition³ gave them a chance to rise against the British. For the Afghan Mullahs, too, the expedition and the unrest among the Mohmands was grist to their mill. The Mohmands collected a lashkar but it was too late to prove of any real assistance to the Zakka Khel. Jihad was preached by the Afghan

¹Ibid.
²Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 4 January 1906, P.S.S.F., vol. 9, 1905, File No. 382, Reg. No. 264; Aitchison, op.cit., p.91.
³See p. 118.
Mullas; supplies of grain, arms and ammunition from Ningrahur flowed in. Overtures were made to the tribes of Dir, Swat and Bajaur; the Afridis, Loargai Shinwaris and Zakka Khel were also approached but without success.¹

The Government were not quite certain about the causes leading to the Mohmand rising. Deane believed that the rising was due to a rumour that the Indian government intended to invade the Mohmand country.² To Minto the origin of the tribal excitement was "a mystery". It might have been the aftermath of the Zakka expedition. Minto believed that the withdrawal of the British troops from the Bazar valley had been well-timed. A delay in the withdrawal, he feared, would have unsettled the whole frontier. But the withdrawal had also another effect. It was "talked of in Afghanistan as a retreat, and there was a general determination amongst many who were too late for the fray not to be despoiled of the fun of a fight". The Mullas had taken advantage of this feeling and it seemed to Minto more than probable that Nasrullah was trying his utmost to set the tribesmen against the British, "very possibly in hopes of rendering the Amir's agreement to the Anglo-Russian Convention more difficult for him". Reports of great

¹ Frontier Disturbances, Mohmands, Diary of Events, April-May 1908, P.S.M., A 167.
² Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 17 April 1908, P.S.S.F., vol. 3, 1903, File No. 1552, Reg. No. 796.
military activity in Kabul came thick and fast, making even Kitchener, usually cool and confident, feel "extremely anxious and apprehensive" that the British were face to face with possible hostilities with Afghanistan.¹

The Government chose to pick their way; they took defensive measures until the situation reached such a pass that punitive measures against the Mohmands became absolutely unavoidable. Then the British troops were alerted, and on 24 April 1908, General Willcocks dispersed a mixed Afghan-Mohmand lashkar near Matta and Sardar Ghari. Ten days later, another Afghan lashkar under Sufi Sahib was driven back near Landi Khana on the border.²

Minto, in the meanwhile, apprised the Amir of the situation, requesting him forthwith to recall the armed bodies of his subjects taking part in the fighting and to prevent them from violating British territory. The Amir responded. He issued strict orders against any Afghan crossing into British territory, recalled those who had joined the Mohmands and took steps against the Afghan ringleaders.³ This relieved the Government of their fear of Afghan involvement in the Mohmand trouble.

¹Minto to Morley, 25, 30 April 1908, H.P., vol. 15.
³Viceroy to Secy. of State, 24 April 1908, Amir to Viceroy, 5 May 1908, ibid., Reg. Nos. 836, 984.
In May 1908, the Government decided to summon a Mohmand jirga to meet Willcocks, hoping to reach a settlement with the tribe without resorting to an expedition. But the Mohmand Maliks refused to come and sent "insulting" replies. Minto then instructed Willcocks to march against the Mohmands, reminding him that the object of the expedition was purely punitive, to bring the tribe as soon as possible to submission. Willcocks was asked to make it widely known that the Government had no intention of annexing territory or of interfering with the status quo as regards general relations between the tribe and the Government. Willcocks was further asked to spare no opportunity of securing the assistance of other sections of the tribe in bringing the offending sections to submission. The Government's policy regarding the Mohmand expedition was thus, in Minto's own words, "the same as that ... in the case of the Zakka expedition". The Amir was informed of the expedition and requested to see to it that his subjects did not join the Mohmands. On 11 May the Mohmand Field Force under Willcocks advanced into the Mohmand territory, fighting their way through valleys and villages. On 30 May it withdrew. Next day the Mohmands paid fines; they had submitted. The expedition was

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1Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tels. 10, 13 May 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 964.
2Viceroy to Amir, 13 May 1908, ibid.
3Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 2 June 1908, ibid., Reg. No. 1119.
short and successful because of the cooperation of the Tarakzai and Balinazai Mohmands and the friendly attitude of the Khans of Dir, Swat and Bajaur. The Amir, too, kept his subjects on the leash.¹

After the expedition, the Mohmands were left in suspense for a time; they were not told definitely whether or not peace had been made with them. In this state of uncertainty jirgas of various Mohmand sections visited Afghanistan. Though well treated and given sums of money, they seem to have received only evasive promises from the Amir regarding his active assistance against the British or his taking the tribe under his protection. In September 1908 Roos-Keppel interviewed a representative Mohmand jirga at Peshawar which presented to him a number of petitions for arrears and increase of allowances, for the release of Mohmand prisoners and for the appointment of a special Political Officer. Thereupon the Government restored the Mohmand allowances withheld so long.² Hereafter followed a long period of comparative quiet broken only by occasional demonstrations of those sections of the tribe who thought their allowances to be inadequate, or by the depredations of outlaws from the Afghan side of the border.³ It was


²Minto's Administration of India: Afghanistan and North-West Frontier, 1908-09, pp. 11–2, Minto Papers, vol. M 959.

only with the outbreak of the World War that fresh turbulence in the Mohmand country occurred.\footnote{See Chapter III, pp. 157-8.}

In dealing with the tribal disturbances the Government took two important measures during the period under review: the suppression of the arms traffic from the Persian Gulf to the tribal territory, and the improvement of the Border Military Police. The first decade of the present century saw a flourishing arms trade in the Persian Gulf. European firms poured arms and ammunition into Maskat which were then smuggled across to the Persian coast and which ultimately found their way in large quantities into Afghanistan and the adjacent tribal territory. The growth of this trade led to the tribesmen's possessing arms of precision which increased their military power and intensified their raiding propensities and lawlessness. The Afridis and the Ghilzais were the main dealers in the arms trade which also received the active assistance of the Afghan government.\footnote{For Arms Traffic see \textit{P.S.M.}, B 182, 196, 196B, D 171, 181, 132, 225-4, \textit{P.S.S.F.}, vols. 2-3, 14, 1907; vols. 4-7, 82, 1912.}
estimated the fighting population in the tribal territory as
270,000 men who had some 94,000 breech-loading rifles; in a
few years, Kitchener had no doubt, every fighting man in the area
would possess a modern rifle. In 1907, 15,000 rifles were re-
ported to have been smuggled into Afghanistan from the Persian
Gulf, a figure which increased to 40,000 in 1909. In 1909 the
Indian government reported to the Home government that the arms
traffic had "upset the balance of power", constituting a serious
menace to the maintenance of peace on the frontier. Next year,
when Minto visited the frontier and went to the Kohat pass, the
thing which impressed him most was "the complete change in the
personal armament of the tribesmen". In olden days the tribesmen
had only flintlocks, matchlocks, shields and long knives, but now
breech-loading rifles were "universal", the Martini-Henry being
by far the most numerous, besides there were plenty of .303's and
a sprinkling of the old snider. At a jirga in the Kohat pass Minto
saw several hundred rifles - "every rifle loaded and full-cock, and
their owners heavily laden with ammunition". The whole atmosphere,
the Viceroy said, was "full of stories of raids, counter-raids, blood-

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1Minto's Administration of India, Afghanistan and North-West Frontier,
1907-08, p.17, Minto Papers, vol. M 958.

2Davies, op.cit., p.177.

feuds. He warned Morley:

One cannot but shut one's eyes to the seriousness of the position. The conditions we should have to face now in a frontier war on a big scale would be entirely different to those of past years.¹

The Home government then stirred themselves to a vigorous action to suppress the arms trade. In 1910 they instituted a strong naval blockade in the Persian Gulf to intercept the arms-laden boats on their way from Maskat to the Persian coast. The blockade continued until the outbreak of the war in August 1914 when the vessels employed for the blockade had to be diverted for war services. From the very outset the blockade was successful, and besides the capture of large quantities of arms and ammunition, it reduced the dealers' profit to such an extent that all the European firms, except one - the Goguyers - at Maskat were forced to wind up their business.²

The second measure for effectively dealing with the tribal problem was the improvement of the Border Military Police. Since the 1880's this force had been the Government's main instrument for securing life and property on the frontier against tribal raids. The Border Military Police in each of the frontier districts formed an important link between the district officers and the tribes across

the border, supplied intelligence of the movements of raiding
gangs and bad characters, and repelled raids. The corps received
frequent support from regular troops and armed villagers. But
Curzon's tribal policy brought considerable changes in the state
of things. He withdrew the regular troops from the tribal areas
and disarmed the border villages and so deprived the Border Military
Police of assistance when threatened by tribal raiders. Besides,
while the tribesmen had improved arms, the Border Military Police
used weapons poor in quality. There had been no improvement in its
personnel either. It was reported that service in the corps had
become with the years unpopular, and men from good families could
not be obtained as recruits; the pay of the sepoys had also long
"ceased to be a living wage". No wonder, the corps appeared to
the Government in 1912 to be useless as a defence against organised
lawlessness in the frontier. For several years much discussion and
voluminous correspondence had taken place about improving the corps,
but nothing positive was achieved until 1911 when Hardinge appointed
a very strong committee to go into the question of the Border Mili-
tary Police and the suppression of crime on the border. The Com-
mittee made several recommendations that first, the garrison at Thal
be increased to one battalion with two cavalry squadrons and that

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1 Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 5 September 1912, P.S.F., vol. 10, 1912, Reg. No. 3676.
2 The Committee consisted of Harcourt Butler, the Education Member, Henry McMahon, the Foreign Secretary, Roos-Keppel, the Chief Commissioner of the Frontier Province, A. Hamilton Gordon, the Director of Military Operations, and H.G. Stokes, Deputy Secretary in the Finance Department.
at Tank to one battalion and one regiment of cavalry; regulars should be retained at Shabkadr, Abazai, Hangu, Kohat, Fort Lockhart and Bannu, and the Samana Range be held entirely by regular troops and not, as hitherto, jointly by the Samana Rifles and regular troops; second, the lower Tochi posts be entirely handed over to the Militia or the Border Military Police; third, the Thal-Idak line of posts be held permanently by the Northern Waziristan Militia and the Samana rifles; fourth, all posts in the Jana agency be abandoned beyond Sarwakai and Sarwakai be made the headquarters of the South Waziristan Militia and of the Agency; similarly, all posts in the Tochi valley beyond Idak be abandoned, and Idak be made the headquarters of the North Waziristan Militia and the Agency. Fifth, the pay of the Kurram-Waziristan Militia be increased. Finally, the entire Border Military Police Corps was to be reorganised under the name of "Frontier Constabulary" and would be a purely civil force under whole-time police officers and at the disposal of the Deputy Commissioners. "The interior economy and discipline" of the corps would be the responsibility of the commandants who would be directly responsible to the Chief-Commissioner. The force would be entirely local, recruited within the frontier districts. The duties of the force would be to "watch and ward" the district borders, "to collect

1 Since the beginning of 1911 the posts had been held temporarily by these Militias.
information and to serve as the medium of communication with
the tribes under the control of the Deputy Commissioners". The
Committee's proposals involved an initial expenditure of Rs. 750,000,
and an additional annual expenditure of about Rs. 100,000.¹

The Government of India did not accept all these proposals
partly because they involved "considerable departure from estab­
lished policy" and partly on grounds of "prohibitive expenses".
They accepted only a part of the first proposal that all the Samana
posts be made over to the regular troops; the Committee's third,
fifth and sixth proposals were also accepted. In December 1912,
the Home Government approved of the proposals.²

The relations of the Government of India with the frontier
tribes were of such an intricate nature that they almost defied
solution. Curzon's frontier policy alone stood the test of the
tribal unrest. The Mahsud blockade, the short and swift Zakka Khel
and Mohmand expeditions were comparatively easily dealt with. The
Militia experiment seemed to be successful except for its temporary
blow in South Waziristan where the British officers fell victims
to the Mahsud Militiamen. Curzon, however, set his face against any
direct interference or involvement in tribal affairs. This was

¹Secy. to the Border Military Police Reorganisation Committee to
Govt. of India, 19 August 1911, enclosed in Govt. of India to Secy.
²Secy. of State to Govt. of India, Tel. 5 December 1912, ibid.
clear from his inconsistent policy in regard to the Mahsuds which he was forced to follow while admitting its unsatisfactory character. A military occupation of the Mahsud country, in Curzon's opinion, was the final solution of the problem, as he put it:

No patchwork scheme - and all our present recent schemes, blockade, allowances, etc., are mere patchwork - will settle the Waziristan problem. Not until the military steam-roller has passed over the country from end to end, will there be peace. But I do not want to be the person to start that machine.¹

Minto advocated a change in the policy towards the frontier tribes. A gradual occupation and absorption of the tribal areas by the Government of India would, in his view, tend to the prosperity and happiness of the tribes concerned and lead to ultimate peace on the border. This was a forward policy and did not find favour with Morley, the extremely cautious Secretary of State. Minto's policy, Morley said, would involve fresh responsibilities and increased expenditure. It would be dangerous, too, because it would stir up the tribes and adversely affect the Anglo-Afghan relations. Hardinge carried on the policy which he found in operation but attempted one essential reform in the system of border defence - the reorganisation of the Border Military Police into the Frontier Constabulary.

¹Note by Curzon, 9 December 1902, C.C., vol. 338.
Chapter III

WORLD WAR I AND THE TRIBAL TERRITORY

During the first World War, the situation on the North-West Frontier, which had been a "perennial source of danger" for the Government of India, gave them many anxious moments.\(^1\) They expressed the fear that the attitude of the Amir of Afghanistan, which had hitherto been far from cordial,\(^2\) would take a turn for the worse, events in Europe providing him with an opportunity to declare a "preventive war" against the British. An Anglo-Afghan war would be certain to rouse the frontier tribes and involve them in a tribal conflagration. Should large scale tribal raids on British territory be made in the hope of finding the frontier denuded by the despatch of troops overseas, then the Government might be forced to launch a campaign into tribal territory, and the consequences of that would be unforeseeable. The situation was all the more dangerous for the Government because of serious internal troubles caused by increasing terrorist activities in Bengal, Western India and the Punjab.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) External Situation of India consequent on the War by A. Hirtzel, 15 June 1915, Cabinet Papers, Cab. 37/130, no. 4.

\(^2\) The conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention in August 1907 without consultation with the Amir had enraged him and increased his suspicion of the British, Afghanistan, Anglo-Russian Convention, P.S.S.F., vols. 17-18, 1907, File No. 3082; Davies, op.cit., pp. 172-3; Sykes, op.cit., pp. 235-6.

\(^3\) Internal Situation of India consequent on the War, 15 June, 1915, Cabinet Papers, Cab. 37/130, no. 7; Hardinge to Crewe, 17 February
further fear that Indian Muslims might be stirred up by Pan-Islamic propaganda emanating from Turkey, which had joined the War against the British, and by frontier uprisings.¹

Hardinge's policy was to keep on good terms with Amir Habibullah, who was promptly informed of the outbreak of the War, advised to maintain neutrality and requested to take special steps for the preservation of order on the Indo-Afghan boundary. To the relief of the Government of India, the Amir assured them of his neutrality, an assurance which he repeated in November 1914 when Turkey entered the War.² Throughout the War the Amir remained true to his pledged word, although this was by no means an easy task for him. The anti-British and pro-Turkish faction at Kabul headed by Nasrullah and supported by priests and "fanatical" elements made no secret of their opposition to the Amir's neutral policy. Nasrullah and his men exerted strong pressure on Habibullah to eschew his policy and join the War in favour of Turkey.³ The


¹External Situation of India consequent on the War, by A. Hirtzel, 15 June 1915, P.S.M., D.210; K. K. Aziz, Britain and Muslim India, pp.84-6.

²Viceroy to Amir, 8 August 1914, P.S.S.F., vol. 21, 1914, File No. 3092, Reg. No. 3485; Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 29 August 1914, ibid.; Reg. No. 3364; Viceroy to Amir, 5 November 1914, ibid., Reg. No. 4741; Amir to Viceroy, 18 November 1914, ibid., Reg. No. 5025.

arrival at Kabul in August 1915 of a Turco-German Mission, allegedly bearing messages from the Sultan of Turkey and the Kaiser of Germany, and the intrigues of Indian "seditionists" with the anti-British elements at Kabul made the situation all the more difficult for the Amir: there were rumours of rebellion against him, and even of his assassination. Habibullah handled the situation with consummate tact; he listened to the advice of the pro-Turkish elements in his court but never acted on it; he welcomed the Turko-German Mission but kept it guessing whether or not he would definitely join the Germans and Turks against the British; he also kept an effective control over the frontier tribes. He restrained his subjects from committing offences in British territory, sent troops to recall those assisting in raids, reproved the most influential Afghan mullahs for directing those operations, and discouraged the tribes on the Indian side of the Durand line from hostility towards the British Government. The Amir's influence was of vital political importance, for it helped in steady-
ing the situation on the frontier.\textsuperscript{1} Hardinge had the "firmest confidence" in Habibullah's good faith, and so had the Home Government. In recognition of his attitude, King George V sent the Amir a letter of thanks in September 1915 and the Government of India increased his subsidy by two lakhs of rupees.\textsuperscript{2}

Towards the tribes Hardinge had meanwhile, with the concurrence of Crewe, maintained a "watchful policy". In August 1914 three divisions of infantry and a cavalry brigade were maintained on the frontier on a "mobilised footing", with three other frontier brigades at Kohat, Bannu and Derajat.\textsuperscript{3} Their particular task at the commencement of the War was to watch the Mohmands and the Mahsuds, both of whom were restless. From the adjacent Afghan district of Khost, over which due to maladministration the Amir's authority had slackened, incursions on the Kurram and Tochi Valleys were apprehended.\textsuperscript{4} However, there were some important loyal elements in the tribal territory like the Mehtar of Chitral, the Nawab of

\textsuperscript{1}External Situation..., War, op. cit.


\textsuperscript{3}Memorandum on events in India, 1917-8, circulated by the Secretary of State for India. Imperial War Committee, 1918. P.S.M., D.235, Memorandum by E. Barrow on the military situation of India, 6 June 1915, Cabinet Papers, Cab. 37/129, No. 16.

Amb, the tribes of Swat and the Khyber agency, all of whom offered their services and cooperation to the British. So did the Bhittanis of Jandola and the Waziris of Tochi; the Khyber Rifles and the North-Waziristan Militia volunteered contingents for active service.¹

The uneasy balance of forces on the frontier was threatened in November 1914 by Turkey's entry into the war. Increased vigilance over Indian Muslims, who were reported to be in a state of "considerable bitterness and some unrest" was called for.² Yet at the same time more and more Indian Army units had to be despatched to Mesopotamia and other theatres of war in the Middle East. As a result, for several weeks in 1915 the number of troops for the maintenance of internal security fell "dangerously below the safety level", the total British garrison in India being less than fifteen thousand men.³ The mutiny of the 130th Baluch Regiment and the suspected disaffection of other Indian troops added to the Government's worries.⁴

War with Turkey also furnished the mullas in the tribal territory with an admirable opportunity to incite the local population

¹J. S. Donald, Officiating Chief Commissioner, to Secretary to Foreign and Political Dept., 11 November 1914, P.S.S.F., vol. 80, 1914, File No. 4265, Reg. No. 4965-6.
³Lord Hardinge, My Indian Years, 1910-16, pp. 102, 117-8.
to *jihad*. "Hopes of a great Islamic renaissance were at once aroused." It was fondly expected that Persia would join the War on the side of Turkey and that the Amir, notwithstanding his present neutrality, would ultimately join Persia. The tribal mullahs were reinforced by the mullahs of Southern Afghanistan in urging the tribesmen to rise in the name of the Sultan of Turkey and to take advantage of the drain of Government troops caused by the War. The return of invalid soldiers from France gave rise to stories of German invincibility and many trans-border tribesmen serving in the Indian army deserted their ranks, and joined the mullahs. To this situation among the frontier tribes the Government of India, with depleted and in some cases wavering forces, was compelled to respond as much by political as by military measures.

From the Government's point of view, the attitude of the Afridis, "the keystone of the frontier arch", was of paramount importance. Roos-Keppel in emphasising this stated:

> in the Muhammadan crisis, which there is reason to believe is approaching rapidly, their Afridi

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1 In 1914 there were nearly five thousand trans-border Pathans in the Indian army, of whom about half were Afridis. By June 1915, over six hundred Afridis had deserted; there were many dismissals and discharges for misconduct. In November 1915 recruitment of all trans-border Pathans was stopped. By the end of 1918 there were less than eighteen hundred trans-border Pathans in the Indian army. Report of the Tribal Control and Defence Committee, 1931, P.S.L., B-293, p.54.

friendship will be of incalculable value. So long as we hold Afridis, who form a fire-proof curtain between northern and southern Islam on this frontier, no Jehad or rising can be general.1

The Mohmands, Orakzais and other neighbouring tribes, he pointed out, were eagerly awaiting a lead from the Afridis. Roos-Keppel therefore urged upon the Government that as the general situation was grave and as the Afridis were key to it their allowances should be forthwith increased. This was the easier to allow since an Afridi petition for an increase was already before the local government.2 The Government of India being anxious to secure the goodwill of the Afridis doubled their allowances.3 The Home government endorsed this decision, agreeing that the "wisdom of this concession at the present time can hardly be disputed".4

On 15 February 1915 Roos-Keppel held a representative jirga of three thousand men in the Victoria Memorial Hall, Peshawar, where he announced the grant of increased allowances on conditions of "loyalty, good conduct, ratification of past agreements and equitable distribution of whole subsidy" by the tribe. The announcement

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2 Ibid.; see Chapter II, pp. 120-3.

3 Formerly the allowances were Rs. 84,040.

4 Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 2 February 1915, P.S.F., vol. 26, 1912, Reg. No. 974; Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 4 June 1915, Note by Thomas Holderness, Under Secy., ibid., Reg. No. 1402A.
was received with a satisfaction which led Roos-Keppel to hope that

the maliks, the elders and the tribe as a whole will be with us and that nothing but a general upheaval of the Islamic World, including Afghanistan, will shake the Afridis.¹

Further, as a measure of support and encouragement to the loyal trans-border chiefs, Roos-Keppel recommended a gift of rifles and ammunition to the Mehtar of Chitral and the Nawabs of Amb and Dir.²

Simultaneously military arrangements were also effected, the main feature of which was the modifications in the distribution of troops among the key points of the frontier. A detachment of Gurkhas was stationed at Oghi at the foot of the Black Mountains to defend the border against the Black Mountain tribes and "Hindustani fanatics".³ Parachinar in Kurram was also strengthened with the addition of two companies of Gurkhas and a squadron of cavalry to repel any attack from Khost. A strong column was located at Miranshah to defend the upper Tochi from Afghan incursions from Khost. The Dera Ismail Khan brigade was moved to Tank to keep an eye on the Mahsuds. Further, mobile wireless stations were installed

¹Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 14 February 1915, ibid.


³For Hindustani fanatics, see pp. 168-73.
at Wana, Tank, Miranshah, Bannu, Kohat and Landi-Kotal. These military measures, though they strengthened forward positions, were intended to be "purely defensive". Preoccupied with the war in Europe and the Middle East, the Government had to be content with what Hardinge described as "necessarily a hand to mouth policy" on the frontier. This policy, as Roos-Keppel later elaborated it was to keep on as good terms as possible with the tribes who are behaving well, freely to use force in crushing any incipient outbreak, to encourage and support the people of the Districts in resisting trans-frontier raids and, generally, to carry on as well as possible until the cessation of other preoccupations enables us to initiate a definite policy of setting our house in order. 2

The development of the War made the maintenance of this policy increasingly difficult. In 1915 a number of raids on British territory took place, and incitement to Jihad by the mullas continued unabated. There were attacks on Miranshah and Spina Khaisora in the Tochi Valley by the Afghans of Khost, but they were effectively repulsed by the North-Waziristan Militia and the Bannu Brigade. The instigation of the mullas led to five attacks on the Peshawar border by the Mohmands and Bunerwals, but the first Division, part of the second Division and the Frontier Constabulary successfully repulsed these attacks. Though outside India little was known about

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1 Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 10 March 1915, R.P.
2 Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 28 March 1915, 10 May 1915, Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 13 April 1916, ibid.
these frontier incidents, Hardinge claimed to have quietly and successfully carried out "the greatest military operations on the frontier since the frontier campaign of 1897".¹

That these Jihad campaigns and disturbances did not escalate into a general uprising in the tribal territory might be ascribed to three causes. First, the Amir's attitude had a generally restraining influence on the tribes. Hardinge kept Habibullah informed about the movements of his Afghan subjects and urged him to hold them in leash. Habibullah made genuine though not uniformly successful efforts to check his subjects from taking part in the Jihad or creating trouble for the British.²

Roos-Keppel was sure that

but for the Amir's prompt action, the flame of Jehad would have spread and that there would have been a whole rising of Ningrahbar and of the Kohmand and Bajaur countries. His Majesty has displayed unprecedented boldness in his attitude towards the Mullas and the Jehad party and has incurred much unpopularity, but his attitude and action have been of incalculable value to us.³

It was, indeed, a most striking admission on the part of the Chief

622. See also Gazette of India, Extraordinary, 4 July 1916, Despatch of Commander-in-Chief in India on Operations on the North-West Frontier up to 9 March 1916.

¹Lord Hardinge, op.cit., p.131.

²P.S.M., D-210, 15 June 1915, op.cit.

Commissioner who, as the India Office noted, had "seldom ... a
good word to say for the Amir",¹ and who appeared to Lord Chelms-
ford, Hardinge's successor, as "confessedly an Afghanphobe".²

The second favourable factor for the Government was the
continued loyal behaviour of the Afridis, which, true to Roos-
Keppel's anticipation, drove "an effective wedge" between the
tribes of the northern and the southern borders of the province.
Apart from the increased allowances, one factor which contributed
notably to the quiet in the Afridi country was the remarkable
influence of Abdul Qaiyum, the Assistant Political Agent of Khyber,
who, in Roos-Keppel's words, was "the anchor to which Tirah is
moored". "If we get through this critical year 1915", the Chief
Commissioner informed Hardinge, "this will be more due to Abdul
Qayyum than to any other individual, I include myself."³

The third factor in the Government's favour was the loyalty
and co-operation of the Khans and Nawabs of the settled districts
who volunteered their services to the local government to put
down tribal disorders.⁴ It was fortunate that the Amir and the
Afridis did hold firm, for, from the military point of view, 1915

¹Ibid., Dept. Note.
²Chelmsford to Montagu, 4 June 1919, C.P., vol. IV.
³Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 19 July 1915, R.P.
⁴Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 21 April 1915, ibid.
was a very trying year for the Government of India. Their military strength was waning as a result of Kitchener's unceasing demands for troops from India to which Hardinge's government responded with increasing reluctance. The efficiency of the three frontier divisions was greatly affected when good Indian battalions from these divisions were sent overseas and inferior Indian battalions replaced them, for the replacements were "under-officered, under-gunned" and composed chiefly of new recruits and reservists. This the tribesmen soon came to know about. They had the "utmost contempt" for Indian battalions, especially those having Brahmin elements; it was only British battalions, so Hardinge believed, whom the tribesmen feared.\footnote{Hardinge to Chamberlain, 2 July 1915, \textit{H.P.}, vol. 121. On 10 September Hardinge complained bitterly of the "melting away" of the 4th Quetta Division, and on 5 November 1915 pointed out that only two British cavalry regiments remained in India - of which one was already on the frontier. See Hardinge to Chamberlain, 10 September, 5 November 1915, \textit{H.P.}, vol. 121.}  

The Government of India's anxiety over the draining away of their troops was reinforced by the War situation in Mesopotamia and Persia and its reaction on Afghanistan and the Frontier. In July 1915, when Kitchener asked for more British regular battalions from India, both Hardinge and Beauchamp Duff, the Commander-in-Chief, flatly refused to send any. There were then only eight British battalions in India, all being stationed on the frontier. It was impossible in Hardinge's opinion "to play with the situation
on the frontier", where peace hung on a delicate balance. If Persia were involved in the War that balance, Hardinge feared, could no longer be maintained, and this the Viceroy clearly pointed out to the Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain. 1

The Home Government saw Hardinge's point. In December 1915 Chamberlain apprised the War Committee of the Cabinet of the Viceroy's anxiety about the military situation on the frontier. The War Committee decided to send "without delay" drafts for the British regiments in Mesopotamia and on the Indian frontier. Accordingly, four garrison battalions forthwith sailed for India. 2

Meanwhile Roos-Keppel was becoming concerned over the situation at Kabul. Reports of the German intriguers consolidating their influence came thick and fast; Nasrullah's influence, too, was on the increase: he was now being addressed as "Amir Nasrullah Khan". In January 1916 an apparently forged letter purportedly signed by the Amir, by Nasrullah and by the pro-Turkish elements in the Afghan Court was circulated in the frontier asking the "mullahs, maliks and kazis of the Tirah ilaka" to prepare for a jihad in the spring of 1916. Stories of German plans for the invasion of Egypt, Persia and Afghanistan gained wide currency and ready credence in the frontier province. Roos-Keppel apprehended that under the pressure of Nasrullah and his men the Amir was

1Hardinge to Chamberlain, 2 July, 10 September 1915, H.P., vol. 121.
2Chamberlain to Hardinge, 9 September 1915, ibid.
"showing signs of wavering" from his neutral policy.  

Hardinge reporting Roos-Keppel's anxiety to Chamberlain in January 1916 made it clear that he still regarded the Chief Commissioner's views as rather too pessimistic. Nevertheless the Viceroy himself was uneasy, and he waited impatiently for the Amir's reply to the letter from King George sent three months back, speculating whether the recent British set back in Mesopotamia had compromised the British prestige so much as to force Habibullah to abandon his erstwhile neutrality under pressure of Nasrullah and his men. As the Amir was the only man who stood "between a jehad and a War", Hardinge had reason to speculate anxiously on what would happen if Habibullah, because of his resistance to the anti-British line, urged by the pro-Turkish party, were assassinated. This element of uncertainty regarding the Amir and his future conduct troubled Hardinge's mind and he, therefore, thought it prudent to be "both watchful and prepared" for any emergency from the Afghan quarter. In order to strengthen the Amir's hand the Viceroy intended to write a farewell letter.

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1Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 28 December 1915, 13, 31 January, 26 February 1916, R.P.


4Ibid.

5Hardinge to O'Dwyer, 20 January 1916, H.P., vol. 91.
to him, using the announcement of his impending retirement
to cover a veiled warning that any hostile attitude towards the
British would be dangerous for Afghanistan. However, in Feb­
ruary 1916, the tension relaxed. The long-awaited reply of the
Amir to the King's and the Viceroy's letters reached Delhi.
Habibullah saw the British agent at Kabul as well. These were
encouraging signs. Harding could now

\[
\text{feel confident that he } \underline{\text{Amir}} \text{ means to maintain}
\text{his neutrality, provided that he can do so, and}
\text{I think he can.}^1
\]

Meanwhile, the Russian successes in Persia and the Caucasus
had restored the Allied Powers' prestige in Afghanistan and
proportionately strengthened Habibullah's position. The govern­
ment of India's military position had also improved by the beginning
of 1916. In January the four garrison battalions from England
arrived in India. The Government of India had also steadily but
quietly moved up territorial battalions to the frontier. Two
flights of aircraft were also sent to the frontier which could
not but profoundly impress the tribes, the mullas and Afghans.\(^2\)
On 17 February 1916, at a garden party at Peshawar, twenty-five
thousand tribesmen with many Afridi maliks and chiefs among
them saw an aeroplane flight organised by Roos-Keppel. The effect

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\(^1\) Hardinge to Chamberlain, 14 January, 11 February 1916, \textit{H.P.},
vol. 122.

was tremendous. One Afridi elder asked Roos-Keppel:

What do those things cost? The two that you have there are worth twenty thousand men to you.

A good number of Afghans were also present who sent off a special report of the flight to Kabul on the same day. That the anti-British elements in the tribal territory were impressed by the aerial display was evident from one of their intercepted letters. The writer, one Mulla Doda Jan, informed Babra Mulla thus:

I have heard wonderful things from the Mulla of Khema who says that the wicked British have got aeroplanes in Peshawar district where they fly in the sky. God knows whether we can fight against them or not. The Mulla of Khema is sent on to you in order to relate the account to you personally. But the grace of God is greater than such deeds of devils.¹

As a further demonstration of British military might armoured cars and mechanical transport were also kept on the frontier.²

But what was most heartening for the Government of India was what they regarded as a "wonderful change" in the attitude of the War Office in London to the military situation on the frontier. Both Hardinge and Beauchamp-Duff had long complained that Kitchener treated India simply as "a milch cow". This attitude, so it seemed to the Government of India, changed after William Robertson

¹Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 26 February, 13 March 1916, R.P.
came to the War Office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He was far more considerate regarding India's military requirements than Kitchener ever was. In the middle of March 1916, Robertson provisionally earmarked two divisions in Egypt as a reserve for meeting possible contingencies on the Indian frontier.\(^1\)

Hitherto the Government of India had adopted a purely defensive frontier policy; now their position was much stronger. Indeed, if need be, Hardinge told Chamberlain, the Government could even take an offensive policy on the frontier.\(^2\) Hardinge assured Roos-Keppel that he could now look with "equanimity upon the frontier situation, no matter what the Afghans tried to do".\(^3\)

The War Committee in London, however, were against any offensive policy, and the Government of India was warned accordingly. Chamberlain laid down that if active operations became absolutely unavoidable, they should be strictly "local and limited".\(^4\) The same restrictions were also placed on Lord Chelmsford who took over from Hardinge at the end of March 1916. The new Viceroy had committed himself, before he set sail for India, to follow "a strictly defensive policy on the frontier".\(^5\)


\(^2\) Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 18 March 1916, \textit{C.P.}, vol. VII.

\(^3\) Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 18 March 1916, \textit{H.P.}, vol. 81.

\(^4\) Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 7 April 1916, \textit{C.P.}, vol. VII.

\(^5\) Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 28 April 1916, \textit{ibid.}, vol. II.
In April 1916, the probability of the fall of Kut in Mesopotamia led to the adoption of further defensive measures on the frontier. Under these, one infantry division and one cavalry brigade, together with internal security troops, were stationed in the Peshawar plain; brigades of infantry, with attached units, were allotted to the Mahsud area at Kohat, Bannu and Derajat; a further infantry brigade with divisional troops attached was posted to the Quetta area. Behind these forward troops, a central reserve was created at Rawalpindi, consisting of six infantry brigades and one of cavalry, together with the remainder of the divisional troops, and the troops on internal security duty.¹

The Secretary of State approved of these measures,² but his military advisers, Charles Egerton and Edmund Barrow,³ supported by Curzon had little confidence in Duff's distribution of the troops. Chamberlain had earlier urged that the territorial battalions held at Bangalore as part of the central reserve should be moved within "striking distance" of the frontier, but had been told that this was not immediately possible because every military station and barrack was already full.⁴ Now his advisers strongly

¹See Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 20 April 1916, Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel., 22 April 1916, ibid., vol. VII.
²Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 24 April 1916, ibid.¹
³See Biographical Notes pp. 468-9.
⁴Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 22 April 1916, C.P., vol. VII.
pressed Chamberlain to issue definite instructions to the
Government of India for the reinforcement of the Kurram and
Khyber positions at the "shortest notice". Chamberlain could
neither reject the views of his military advisers nor over
rule the Indian Commander-in-Chief; he therefore brought the
matter before the War Committee. The War Committee supported
the military advisers of the Secretary of State whereupon the
latter asked the Government of India to make certain that they
would be able to take prompt and effective action in Khyber
and Kurram; that their proposed distribution of troops was
suitable and adequate; and that the forces detailed for Quetta
and Zhob were sufficient. On receiving satisfactory assurance
from the Government of India on these points, Chamberlain reported
it to the War Committee and the Cabinet and they accepted this
assurance.

The maintenance of peaceful relations with the frontier
tribes during the War was made still more difficult by the presence
within tribal territory of anti-British elements both from India
and abroad. These elements were the Mujahidin (holy warriors)
called by the British the "Hindustani fanatics", the Indian "sedi-

1Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 26 April, 11 May 1916, C.P., vol. II.
2Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 28 April, 1916, Viceroy to Secy.
of State, Tel. 29 April 1916, C.P., vol. VII. Telegrams regarding
action to be taken in connection with the Defence of the N.W.F.,
Cabinet Papers, Cab. 37/148, no. 48.
tionists" and agents from Turkey. The Haji Sahib of Turangzai, a religious leader, also figured prominently in the troubled politics of the frontier in the War years. For all these intrigues the tribal territories formed both a rendezvous and a base of operations.

The Mujahidin colony at Sittana in Buner had long been a centre of unrest in the tribal territory. The Mujahidin were followers of Syed Ahmad Shahid (1786-1831), a native of Rai Bareilly in Oudh\(^1\) and a spiritual disciple of Shah Abdul Aziz of Delhi. Their aim was the reestablishment of a Muslim state as conceived by Shah Wali-ullah (1703-62), a renowned Muslim scholar and reformist, and to deliver the Muslims from the bondage of the "infidels."

"They faced formidable opponents; the Marathas in the south, Sikhs in the Punjab and the British who were to overthrow all."\(^2\) In 1842,

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\(^2\)Hafeez Malik, op. cit., p.141.
Syed Ahmad appeared on the Yusufzai border and soon stirred up the local population to holy war against the Sikh rulers of Peshawar.\(^1\) The conflict with the Sikhs met with varying fortunes but thenceforward the **Mujahidin** on the frontier were regularly associated with deeds of blind fanaticism against the non-Islamic rulers of India, and no period of political stress... had passed without attempt on their part, attended with varying success, to engender religious excitement among the border tribes.\(^2\)

In the nineteenth century the **Mujahidin** had several armed conflicts with British troops; they created great disturbance during the Mutiny and were the prime cause of the Ambeyla campaign of 1863, "the most important and powerful single campaign led by the English" against them.\(^3\) However, during the last quarter of the century the fighting spirit of these "professional fanatics"—as the British called them—deteriorated and thereafter their activity was confined to "occasionally making a noise" in the tribal region with the object of keeping up "the supply of presents from the Amir of Afghanistan and of offerings from the dupes in India".\(^4\)


\(^2\) The **Mujahidin** had always maintained a secret communication with their sympathisers in India who sent men and money to the colony. See Brief History of Hindustani Fanatics, June 1915, *P.S.M.*, D.209.

\(^3\) For details see Q. Ahmad, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-209.

From 1914 the Mujahidin, no doubt seizing the opportunity of British involvement in the War, stepped up their activity. Their colony, moved in 1915 to Samasta in Buner, provided a rallying point for intrigues against the British, like the "seditionists" from the Punjab and the Haji Sahib of Turangzai.\(^1\) The Haji, who joined the Mujahidin in June 1915, was "probably the most respected and trusted" mulla in the tribal territory, his influence being strongest in the Peshawar district and its tribal border where he enjoyed a "reputation for sanctity and unselfish benevolence". The Haji intermittently visited the Swatis, Bajauris and Mohmands to preach jihad. He also established contact with the anti-British party at Kabul and set up a press from which he issued a series of "rousing jihad leaflets".\(^2\)

Some time in the middle of 1915 a branch colony of the Mujahidin was set up at Chamarkand in Bajaur, possibly by the "seditionists" from the Punjab. Chamarkand was chosen because it lay "very handy for communications with India and Kabul". Soon after its foundation, one hundred and ten Indian "seditionists" who lived in Kabul and a hundred others living in Samasta joined the new colony which eventually became the Mujahidin headquarters.\(^3\)


\(^3\) Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt. of India, 20 September 1916, enclosed in
The Mujahidin were directly implicated in a tribal attack on the village of Rustam on the Peshawar border in April 1915. The Government retaliated by blockading the Mujahidin. The blockade pressed hard on the Mujahidin. By January 1917 Niamatullah Khan, their Amir, was driven to appeal "in misericordiam" to Roos-Keppel and Abdul Qaiyum to raise the Blockade. Niamatullah stated that the Blockade had caused "unbearable loss" to his people, who could not move out even for their "everyday necessaries". He further contended that in the tribal disturbances in 1915 the Mujahidin had not joined of their own accord; they had been compelled by the Haji and the people of Buner to launch an attack on the Government. He assured Roos-Keppel that the Mujahidin colony "neither cherishes" ill-feelings towards the Government, nor does anything prejudicial to the interests of the Government". Roos-Keppel was not impressed; he did not relax the blockade. Niamatullah continued to appeal that the blockade had really reduced his men to sore straits. However, in April 1917 two Bengali Muslims were arrested at Peshawar while carrying eight thousand rupees for the Mujahidin. This

Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 28 September 1916, C.P., vol. II.

1 Sedition Committee Report, op.cit., p.124; Mehr, Sargazasht-i-Mujahidin, pp. 544-5.

2 See p. 157.

3 Niamatullah to Chief Commissioner, and to Abdul Qaiyum, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 19 January 1917, C.P., vol. III.

4 Roos-Keppel to Grant, Secy. Govt. of India, 7 May 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
strengthened the Government's decision not to raise the blockade, but they forebore from any stronger step against the Mujahidin in view of the Mahsud disturbances.¹ During these disturbances the Government in fact adopted a temporising policy towards the Mujahidin.² The blockade was continued, but at the same time Niamatullah was given some hope that the Government would accept his overtures for a settlement. Abdul Qaiyyum was instructed to ask Niamatullah to send representatives to meet him for a settlement.³ After four months of negotiations, in October 1917, when the Mahsud disturbances had been dealt with, an understanding was reached, the Government giving Niamatullah certain allowances on condition that he kept his men away from anti-British elements in the tribal territory.⁴ Niamatullah was thus won over. Later, in recognition of his friendliness to the Government during the third Afghan War (1919) Roos-Keppel recommended a reward of Rs. 25,000 and twenty-five squares of good land in the Punjab for his family.⁵

¹ See below, pp.181-7.
² Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 31 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
³ Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 16 May 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 31 May 1917, ibid.
⁴ G. R. Mihr, Sarguzasht-i-Mujahidin, p.504.
⁵ Roos-Keppel to Hignell, 21 August 1917, C.P., vol. 23. Roos-Keppel to A. H. Grant, 1 September 1919, R.P.
attachment to the Government made him unpopular with the extremists among his followers who assassinated him on 4 May 1921. The Mujahidin were a Muslim body whose opposition to infidel rule in India was of long standing and cast in a traditional orthodox mould. But there were other revolutionaries in the tribal territory, the small but well-organised group of Indian "seditionists", Hindu and Sikh as well as Muslim, whose terrorist aim was to overthrow the British Government in India by violent means. They took their models from Europe and looked for support there as well as in India. They saw in the war an opportunity to stir up troubles by appealing to "the ignorance and fanaticism" of the frontier tribes. During the War years the "seditionists" from the Punjab, East Bengal and even the Far East found their way into the tribal territory. They included eight students from the North-West Frontier Province as well. In August 1915 the famous Indian anarchists, Barakatullah and Mahendra Pratap, reached Kabul along with the Turko-German Mission.

1 Anti-British Conspiracy... on the Indo-Afghan Frontier, P.S.M., a-195.


3 Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 12 January 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 19 January 1917, C.P., vol. III.

4 Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 9 March 1915, P.S.S.F., vol. 22, 1915, File No. 622, Reg. No. 951; Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 4 March 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 10 March 1917, C.P., vol. III.

5 For Mahendra Pratap and his activities, see P.S.S.F., vols. 34-5, 1914, File No. 3443; vols. 1-3, 1915, File No. 53; vol. 22, 1915, File No. 622; vol. 15, 1916, File No. 1287. See also his autobiography, My Life Story of Fifty-five years; "My German Mission to High Asia",
Obaid Ullāh Sindhi, one of the leaders of the Mujahidin, joined them. They induced the Amir to declare a holy war against the British; they hatched the "silk-letter plot"; they were in close touch with the Mujahidin, the Haji Sahib of Turangzai and all important mullahs on the northern sector of the border. The "seditionists" remained active on the border until the early 1920s.

The "seditionists" made use of Turkish agents to intrigue with the tribes, and their operations had the financial support of Nasrullah, who sent Kazim Bey, the principal member of the Turkish Mission at Kabul, to the tribal territory to report on the developments there. The most serious attempt to incite the tribes was made in the Tirah where in June 1916 two emissaries were sent; one was Khired Bey, a staff colonel of the Turkish army, and the other was Mohammad Abid, alias Abidin, an Arab.


1 For Obaid Ullāh Sindhi see Muhammad Sarwar, Tālimat-i-Mawlana 'Obaid Ullāh Sindhi, Kabul Mein Sāt Sāl.

2 In August 1916 the "silk letter plot" was discovered by the Govt. of India. This was a conspiracy hatched in Kabul by Mahendra Pratap, Obaid Ullah and Barkatullah, who formed a "Provincial Government of India", with Mahendra Pratap as its President. Obaid Ullah wrote letters to his friend, Mawlana Mahmud Hassan, at Mecca, urging him to persuade the Turkish government to form an alliance with the "Provisional Government of India" against the British. These letters were written on yellow silk, and, hence, the "silk letter plot". P.S.S.F., vol. 55, 1916, File No. 4260. Also see Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography, pp. 148-52.
formerly employed by the Turks as a drill instructor in Kabul. Turkish agents also operated in Bajaur and the Mahsud country.¹

Before the Turkish emissaries arrived in the Tirah, one of their agents, Mir Mast by name, had already been intriguing with the Afridis. Mir Mast was a Kambar Khel Afridi and an ex-Jemadar of the 58th Rifles, from which he had deserted in France and then accompanied the Turko-German Mission to Kabul. The "uneasy feelings" in the tribal area as a result of the intrigues of the Turko-German Mission at Kabul were further intensified by Mir Mast's activities in the Khyber².

On their arrival in the Tirah the Turkish emissaries were welcomed by Mir Mast and a prominent mulla of the Kambar Khel. The emissaries delivered a number of speeches at Bagh in the Khyber, where they unfurled a flag which they claimed had been blessed by the Turkish Caliph. They declared themselves to be the Turkish Sultan's plenipotentiaries and offered the Afridis his protection and assistance against the British. The Afridis were promised arms, ammunition and money and were called upon to assist the emissaries who declared that they were serving the Afghan Government.³

¹Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, November 1916, R.P.; Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt. of India, 29 July 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 4 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.


³Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 21, 29 July 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 4 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
In the middle of 1916 deserters and dismissed Pathan Sepoys from the Indian army swelled the ranks - mainly pro-Afghan Afridi - of the emissaries. The latter started recruiting for what they gave out to be sometimes a "Turkish army" and sometimes to be the "Amir's army". Roos-Keppel, who had kept a close watch on these developments, believed that the Turks wanted to raise an Afridi army and keep it in Bazar "for use as escorts to further Turkish or German visitors and to act as a thorn" in the British side "whenever demonstration is considered to be advisable".  

By July 1916 the total number of Afridi recruits enlisted by the Turkish agents was reported to have reached about four hundred; the recruits were posted at three Kambar Khel villages and drilled every day by Mir Mast under the supervision of Khired Bey, the Turkish Colonel.

Mahendra Pratap came to the Tirah in August 1916, bringing money from Nasrullah for distribution among the local mullas. He soon returned to Kabul with a delegation of seventy Afridis who probably wanted to make sure that the Amir endorsed the promises of arms and allowances held out to them by the Turkish emissaries.

Roos-Keppel, whose policy was to keep on good terms with the Afridi tribe, was concerned that the tribe was slowly being divided.

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1 Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 29 July 1916, ibid.
2 Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 31 July 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 11 August 1916, ibid.
into two camps: the one in favour of maintaining peace and friendship with the Government, and the other advocating the opposite policy. The latter consisted of deserters and discharged soldiers from the Indian army and other pro-Afghan elements, while the former was composed chiefly of Maliks and elders who were looked upon by Roos-Keppel as the "best element" in the tribe. The pro-Government faction had, indeed, "a very difficult part to play not unlike that of the Amir with his people" in controlling the rival faction.\(^1\) Roos-Keppel believed that the Turkish agents were responsible for creating the schism in the tribe, but he could not ask the Government to take action against the agents for fear of aggravating the hostility of the anti-Government Afridis, and thereby disturbing what he saw as "a very delicate equilibrium" in the tribe. Besides, strong measures to foil Turkish intrigues were most likely to strain the Indian government's relations with the Amir whose policy, as seen by A. H. Grant, the Secretary to the Foreign Department, was one of "cognizance if not connivance" in these intrigues. The Amir was fully aware of Nasrullah's policy of "keeping the frontier sore open". Nasrullah, Grant noted, has always aimed at preventing, so far as possible, the establishment of really good relations between us /Britain/ and our trans-border tribes. A belt of disturbed territory is a safeguard to Afghanistan.

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\(^1\) Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt. of India, D August 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 18 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
so Nasrullah thinks. This does not, however, mean that Nasrullah wants war between Afghanistan and India — at present anyway. All he wants at present is to detach the Afridis from their allegiance to us in case circumstances later make war between Afghanistan and India inevitable. I do not believe that the Amir is a definite party to this business, though he probably gives Nasrullah a free hand to intrigue as he thinks fit up to a certain point.¹

In such circumstances, Roos-Keppel considered it better to "leave the Turks alone".²

However, the Turkish intrigues with the Afridis could not get very far. The pro-Government Afridis, so their leaders reported to Roos-Keppel, told the Turks that unless they saw "the Amir, the Germans and the Turkish armies with their own eyes", the Afridis would never raise any trouble with the British.³ The Turks were further asked not to expect any help from the tribe unless the Amir himself led a jihad and unless the tribesmen were given "very large quantities of arms ammunition and money".⁴ The Turks, for their part, could not procure from Nasrullah more than £1,500 in all, and later bitterly complained that "Nasrullah had ruined the movement by failing to send the money and ammunition which he had promised."⁵ The time, too, was not suitable for the success of:

¹National Archives of India, Foreign Secret War Proceedings, April 1917, Nos. 22, 25, Notes, cited by Adamec, op.cit., p.98.
²Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt. of India, 29 July 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 4 August 1916, C.P., vol. II.
³Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 18 August 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 25 August 1916, ibid.
⁴Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 7 August 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 11 August 1916, ibid.
⁵Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt. of India, 4 October 1916, enclosed in
the Turkish intrigues. The Turkish agents began their activity late in summer when the Afridis eagerly looked forward to the approach of cold weather when they would go to British territory for their allowances and employment. This naturally had a restraining effect - so at least Roos-Keppel believed - on Afridi desire to indulge in overt hostility towards the Government. Finally, Abdul Qaiyyum successfully played upon the mutual jealousy of the Afridi mullas, and kept some of them attached to the Government. ¹

The Afridi delegation which had gone to Kabul with Mahendra Pratap returned disappointed, with very small allowances. ² Eventually, in the middle of September 1916, the Afridis under a "gentle pressure" from the British officers at Khyber drove off the Turks to Rajgal, near the Afghan border. Here the Turks got protection from an anti-British Kuki-Khel mulla ³ and remained active for a further six months. Then in March 1917, Malik Zaman Khan, an influential pro-British Afridi elder, led a four hundred strong lashkar (a tribal force) into Rajgal and killed the anti-British mulla. ⁴

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¹ Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 18 August 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 21 August 1916, ibid.
³ Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 4 October 1916, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 12 October 1916, C.F., vol. II.
⁴ Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 4 March 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 10 March 1917, ibid., vol. III.
June 1917 the Turks were reported to have finally left the tribal territory and crossed over to Afghanistan.¹

Turkish machinations were more successful in the Mohmand country and in Bajaur where two Pathans, who had lived for a long time in Berlin and then had accompanied the Turko-German Mission to Kabul, acted as agents of Turkish intrigues. These intrigues, fomented by the local mullahs, served as one of the causes of the Mohmand troubles in November 1916.² In September 1916 the Mohmands demanded the immediate restoration of their allowances which had been suspended since 1915.³ Receiving what they dismissed as an unsatisfactory reply from the Government, the Mohmands began to raid extensively in the Peshawar district.

The Government promptly reinforced the Shabkadr garrison by despatching troops from Peshawar and decided to impose a blockade. In October 1916 a barbed wire fence strengthened by a live electric wire was erected from Michni to Abazai - a distance of seventeen miles - and was guarded by block-houses at intervals of about eight hundred yards. Four hundred Mohmands were caught and electrocuted by the wire. No stronger measures were adopted by the Govern-

²Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, November 1916, R.P.
³See p. 157.
ment because of their preoccupation with the War, although Roos-Keppel for his part had no doubt that the "only final solution" to the Mohmand problem lay in the despatch of an expedition to their country with the object of crushing the tribe and then opening up the country by roads. The blockade notwithstanding, Haji Sahib of Turangzai and Mulla Babra encouraged the Mohmands to attack Shabkadr. The attack was launched on 15 November 1916, but was successfully repulsed by Government troops with thirty guns and ten aeroplanes — the first time in Indian warfare that aeroplanes were used. The blockade continued until July 1917 when a settlement was made with the Mohmands by which their allowances and jagirs in British territory were forfeited; the tribesmen restored stolen rifles, and then the blockade was lifted.

The Government made peace with the Mohmands because of troubles with the Mahsuds. Since the Tank outrage of April 1914, the Mahsuds had been openly hostile to the Government, and this hostility was fanned by the pro-Turkish and anti-British elements

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1 Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 14 June 1917, P.S.S.F., vol. 48, 1913, File No. 1364, Reg. No. 3755.

2 For Mulla Babra see Maulvi Mohammad Ali Qasuri, Mushahidat-i-Kabul wa Yaghistan, p.77.


5 See Chapter II, p.94.
from Kabul. In 1915-16, the Mahsuds committed nearly a thousand offences, killing and wounding one hundred and seventy persons and kidnapping ninety three, chiefly Hindus.¹ In January 1916, Roos-Keppel described the situation thus:

No village is safe, and the Mahsuds raid from their hills right down to the banks of the Indus and kill, entrap and abduct Hindus... altogether the position of the people is pitiable, and we can do very little to protect them or even to alleviate their sufferings.²

On 24 March 1916, in a speech Hardinge announced that the cup of "Mahsud misdeeds was already overflowing" and that "the day of retribution only delayed till our pre-occupations elsewhere should be relieved".³ Chelmsford, on assuming power, also saw that the Mahsud "infernal nuisance" had created a complete reign of terror in Dera Ismail Khan and in the southern half of the Bannu district, but that the Government had to put up with it because of the war situation.⁴ In the beginning of 1917 the Mahsuds attacked Government picquets, garrisons and convoys. In March and April, in two encounters, Government losses were heavy: one British and two

¹E. Howell, A Monograph on the Mahsuds, 1913, p.38.
²Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 31 January 1916, R.P.
³E. Howell, op.cit., p.36.
⁴Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 23 April 1916, C.P., vol. II.
Indian officers and forty-two sepoys were killed, twenty-five sepoys were wounded, thirteen were taken prisoner; forty-six rifles were taken away. Of the raiders, only three were killed. On 1 May 1917, a convoy of camels was attacked between Nili and Khajuri Kach. Two British officers, two Indian officers and fifty-one sepoys lost their lives; fifty-three were wounded and sixty-four rifles were lost. Mahsud losses were only one killed and one wounded.¹ This incident gave a great shock to the Government; to Roos-Keppel it amounted to "an act of war" against the British by the tribe.² The Government had three alternatives in dealing with the Mahsuds: First, to send a punitive expedition. This Chelmsford knew was inevitable, but impracticable under the circumstances. Second, the Government could withdraw from the advanced positions such as Wana, but this would be damaging to the Government's prestige. The last course was, as Chelmsford described it, "muddling along but strengthening our forces considerably".³ Ultimately, this last course was adopted. A column was sent to Sarwakai, the Derajat Brigade was reinforced, and a field force was organised to keep communications open between

¹Howell, op.cit., p.37.
²Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 7 May 1917, enclosed in Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
³Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 7 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
On 10 May 1917 another fierce encounter took place between Government troops and Mahsud gangs between Khuzmasar and Sarwakai. Government losses were two British and one Indian officer and thirty-six sepoys killed, sixty-three sepoys wounded and seventy missing; one hundred and twenty-three rifles were lost. On the Mahsud side, seventy were killed. Roos-Keppel, whose patience had by now been exhausted, pressed for an immediate punitive expedition, and both Chelmsford and C. C. Monro, the Commander-in-Chief, with all their reluctance to take this course, could not help agreeing that prompt punishment of the tribe was imperative.

On 16 and 19 May came more news of Mahsud outrage. On 21 May the Secretary of State was informed of the Government of India's decision to adopt punitive measures against the Mahsuds. The Viceroy declared that the present policy of passive defence was no longer tenable and ... punitive measures alone would prevent a general rising of the tribes between the Kurram and the Gomal rivers with danger of further extensions.

Accordingly an army called the Waziristan Field Force was mobilised under the command of Major-General Beynon. The armed strength of the

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2 Howell, op. cit., p. 37.

3 Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 13 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.
Mahsud was estimated at 11,450 men having 333 magazine rifles and 3,349 breech-loading rifles. Chamberlain communicated the Government of India's decision to the Cabinet, which, unanimously left the matter to the Government of India's discretion.

Meanwhile Chelmsford had kept Habibullah informed of the Mahsud outrages. Habibullah was told that the Mahsuds had forced the Government's hands and that a decisive action against the tribe could no longer be avoided. The Amir was requested immediately to ask his officers at Khost to restrain the local Afghans from joining the Mahsuds. Habibullah made a favourable response to this request. His officers at Khost were instructed in the way the British desired and the Amir also discouraged the Mahsuds, telling them not to come to Kabul for allowances while they were fighting the British Government. The Mahsuds were also advised against risking a war unless British troops entered their country. This message was announced to the Mahsud jirga at Kaniguram on 27 May 1917. Habibullah also requested the Viceroy to avoid an expedition if he could; he wanted the British to punish the Mahsuds only mildly, otherwise a general border conflagration would follow.

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1Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 21 May 1917, P.S.S.F., vol. 49, 1913, File No. 1364, Reg. No. 2211.

2Chamberlain to Chelmsford, 23 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.

which would not only cause great embarrassment to the Afghan Government but might even draw them into a war with the British. Habibullah's discouragement seemed to have a telling effect on the Mahsuds, who appeared to show willingness to come to terms with the Government. The latter, too, were keen to seize any opportunity to patch up a settlement with the tribe on "fairly generous terms", in order to avoid what was considered as a most unwelcome and untimely military diversion. However, the Government's hopes were soon dashed. On 31 May a Mahsud gang occupied the Tut Narai post in Tochi, killing six and wounding eight of the small garrison defending the post. The raiders decamped with fifty-nine rifles and eight thousand rounds of ammunition. This incident convinced Chelmsford that one action against the Mahsuds was "absolutely necessary" before any negotiations were attempted with them at all. Accordingly, on 13 June, Beynon marched into the Mahsud country; the operation lasted until 2 July, when the Mahsud maliks sued for peace. On 9 July 1917 a five hundred strong

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2 Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 31 May 1917, C.P., vol. III.

3 Ibid.

4 Howell, op. cit., p. 37.

5 Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 6 June 1917, P.S.S.F., vol. 49, 1913, File No. 1364, Reg. No. 2309.

6 Full account of the Mahsud operations is given in a Despatch by A. A. Barrett, March-August 1917, P.S.S.F., vol. 50, 1913, File No. 1364, Pt. 6.
Mahsud jirga undertook to return the rifles looted and to try the offenders according to tribal custom. The Government, for their part, agreed to restore Mahsud allowances, to release Mahsud prisoners, and not to make any new roads or set up new posts in the Mahsud country. The Mahsud jirga handed over one hundred and twenty-four rifles, gave hostages for those still undelivered and tried the men implicated in the Dodd murder case.¹ On 10 August 1917, Donald and Beynon met a fully representative jirga, three thousand strong, when an agreement was arrived at. Of the three hundred and eighty-five rifles demanded by the Government, the tribesmen brought all but ninety-seven, for which they gave guarantees. The Government agreed to restore the Mahsud allowances when the remaining rifles were delivered.² This brought the Mahsud affair to an end to the great relief of the India Office. "The North-West frontier of India", the Political Secretary hopefully commented, "is now free from trouble."³ In March 1918 a free bonus of one year's allowances was given to the Afridis - "a good investment" so Roos-Keppel thought, in the existing situation.⁴

¹Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 11 July 1917, P.S.S.F., vol. 49, 1913, File No. 1364, Reg. No. 2835.
²Viceroy to Secy, of State, Tel. 11 August 1917, P.S.S.F., vol. 50, 1913, File No. 1364, Reg. No. 3262.
³Note by Political Secy., India Office, 16 August 1917, ibid., Reg. No. 3265.
Nawabs of Amb and Dir and the Mehtar of Chitral were also re-
warded for their loyalty, and Roos-Keppel for himself had already,
in 1917, earned a G.C.S.I. for his war services. The War ended
in November 1918, and for some months afterwards the frontier
appeared to the Chief Commissioner to be settling down to a quieter
and quieter state. There was "no history for the year 1918-19", Roos-Keppel commented in the Administration Report of that year.¹

It proved, however, to be a deceptive calm: a lull before the storm. Within one year and a half of the end of the World War the third Afghan War broke out, setting the tribal area once more aflame.² It has already been seen how Habibullah's neutrality during the War had estranged the anti-British party in his court and caused his general unpopularity. Egged on by Nasrullah and his men, the Amir, on 2 February 1919, wrote to the Viceroy that Afghanistan must be represented in the Peace Conference and that the "absolute liberty, freedom of action and perpetual independence" of Afghanistan must be recognised.³ Before an answer explaining to the Amir that the Peace Conference was confined only to the belligerents could be despatched, the Amir was assassinated on 20

³ Adamec, op.cit., pp. 104.05; Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., p.194.
February 1919.

In the bids for the throne, Amanullah, the third son of the late Amir, emerged successful. He was hardly in the saddle, however, when a "distinct reaction" was seen against him. The orthodox elements in the country were displeased with him as he had interned Nasrullah for complicity in Habibullah's death; the army turned against him because he had released the Mosahibin family, who were the suspected accomplices in the murder, and the popular belief was that Habibullah's death had been caused by Amanullah's connivance. Amanullah, for his part, distrusted both his people and the army and felt his throne tottering. He therefore sought a diversion by launching an attack on the British and rallying his people's support. He had received many accounts of the unrest in India caused by the Rowlatt Act, the Satyagraha movement and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre. Most of the accounts were supplied by Afghan agents in India and more particularly by one Ghulam Haider, the Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar. Indian "seditionists" tried to exploit the war-weariness of the British and stir up trouble in the Frontier Province, especially in Peshawar.

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1 Rowlatt Act (1919) was designed to stamp out "sedition" by highly autocratic methods. Gandhi started a campaign of Satyagraha or passive resistance against the action taken by the Government to deal with "sedition". In April 1919, widespread disturbances broke out. At Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar, General Dyer resorted to firing to disperse a peaceful meeting which resulted in the death of 379 persons and the wounding of about twelve hundred. For details, see Nehru, op. cit., pp. 40-44.
A mob of ten thousand collected in the city and was assured by the "seditionists" of gifts of arms and money and prospects of loot. The "seditionists" planned to wreck the mobilisation stores in the city, the treasury, wireless installations and railway stations, as soon as the news of the first fight between British and Afghan troops at Landi Kotal reached Peshawar. The city was thus ripe for revolt when Amanullah attacked on 6 May 1919.

But the plan miscarried. The Peshawar plot was discovered by the Government on 7 May and on the following day Roos-Keppel took drastic action. The city was cordoned off by British troops. The Afghan Postmaster was arrested with all his principal associates, who were later deported to Burma. One lakh of rupees was found in the Postmaster's house, evidently meant for the planned rising. On the 9th, martial law was proclaimed in the Peshawar district and five hundred regular troops were posted in the Peshawar city. These moves cowed the city and the danger of large scale disturbances passed off.


2 Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 5 May 1919, C.P., vol. 22.

3 Dairy of Events, 29th April to 4th August 1919.

4 Chief Commissioner to Private Secy. to the Viceroy, Tels. 9, 11 May 1919, C.P., vol. 22.
The Afghan War lasted in "a half-hearted fashion" for about a month during which the Afghan troops were beaten on every front. The bombing of Kabul which had a salutary effect on morale soon obliged Amanullah to ask for an armistice on 31 May 1919.¹

The Afghan War was soon over but its disastrous effect in unsettling tribal territory was long felt. It had been an axiom with frontier officers having an intimate knowledge of the region that the frontier tribes would rise at once in the event of an Afghan Amir declaring Holy war against the British government, and the Afghan plan of campaign was, in fact, based on that belief. Simultaneously with the outbreak of hostilities, a proclamation against the British, "couched in the most hostile terms" was distributed by Afghan agents in the tribal territory, summoning the tribes to take part in the jihad.² Intrigues with the tribesmen were carried on, and arms, ammunition, money and inflammatory messages poured into the region, particularly the Afridi country.³ This was accompanied by the sedulous efforts of the seditionists in Peshawar to undermine the loyalty of the Khyber Rifles, and this

¹Diary of Events, 29th April to 4th August, 1919, R.P.
³Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 22 May 1919, ibid.
was accomplished without much difficulty. The Khyber Rifles lacked the support of regular troops. The British officers of the Militia were so occupied with fighting the Afghans on the main fronts that they neglected the outposts held by their men. The latter were fed with messages from anti-British elements in Peshawar city that the Afghans were winning on every front, that their victory at Landi Kotal was certain, too, and that the Peshawar had risen against the Government. The Militia then began to desert in large numbers. On 18 May 1919 the Government were obliged to disband the Khyber Rifles.¹

Happily for the Government, there was no rising in the Afridi country, and this was attributed by Roos-Keppel to British success against the Afghan troops on the Khyber front. The Afridi situation, so Roos-Keppel assured the Viceroy on 24 May, was stable.²

It was otherwise in Waziristan. There the Afghan general, Nadir Khan (afterwards His Majesty Nadir Shah) advanced slowly from Khost towards the Indian border with Afghan regulars and tribal levies. The British decided on 26 May to evacuate the militia posts in Upper Tochi and on the Thal-Idak line, and to concentrate troops at Miranshah. The evacuated posts were immediately occupied by

²Chief Commissioner to Private Secy. to Viceroy, Tel. 24 May 1919, C.P., vol. 22.
Mahsuds and Waziris. Spinwan fell to the Afghans. The danger of an all-out Mahsud and Waziri uprising having become imminent, the Political Agent of Wana ordered the withdrawal of the Sarwakai and lower Gomal posts, and the Wana and upper Gomal posts. The Waziris and Afridis in the North and South Waziristan Militia then mutinied. Twelve hundred rifles and seven hundred thousand rounds of ammunition fell into their hands, and Wana was occupied by Afghan troops. The whole of Waziristan was now in arms. The tribesmen chased away the few loyal men of the South Waziristan Militia across the Gomal to Baluchistan. Many desertions took place in the Zhob Militia, too, and Fort Sandeman was attacked. The Government thus lost the whole of Waziristan except the line of the Tochi Valley up to Miranshah which was also seriously threatened.

Roos-Keppel was utterly dismayed. It was quite "heart-breaking" for him to see that the Afridis who were the most important tribe in frontier politics had managed to keep quiet while Waziristan rose. The Chief Commissioner was convinced that Amanullah had "lit a fire which will give us a lot of trouble before we can put it out".

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1 Chief Commissioner to Private Secy. to Viceroy, tels. 26, 27 May 1919, ibid.

2 Howell, op.cit., p.40.

3 Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 27 May, 3 June 1919, C.F., vol. 22.
The armistice with Afghanistan did not lead to the cessation of tribal troubles. Tribal lawlessness which continued well into 1920 resulted in 611 raids in the settled districts of the frontier province. During these raids 298 British subjects were killed, 392 wounded and 463 kidnapped. The loss of property was estimated at thirty lakhs of rupees. Towards the end of 1919, the Government undertook military operations against the Mahsuds. These operations lasted for nearly four years and resulted in the re-establishment of Government control over Waziristan.¹

The Afghan war and its effects on tribal territory exposed the weakness of the existing tribal policy of the Government and led them to formulate and adopt a new policy. The existing policy, as it had been framed by Curzon, had the militia system as one of its main features. This system broke down under the strain of the Afghan war, when the Afridis, Waziris, Sherwanis, Bhittanis and Orakzaïs who composed the Khyber Rifles and the North and South Waziristan Militia proved their "treachery and unreliability". But then, the Government had themselves to blame for this. As Roos-Keppel pointed out, "the Militia system grew up as a cheap expedient to relieve regular troops from irksome and arduous duties in a country where service is unpopular".² The militia outposts were located


far off in tribal areas, and miles of hostile and dangerous
country separated them from the nearest posts of regular troops.
In such circumstances, and particularly when there were no regular
troops to support them during the Afghan war, the militia men
could hardly be expected to remain loyal to the British Government in
the face of the cry of *jihad* in Afghanistan and the aggravated anti-
British feelings in the tribal territory.¹

Besides, as Roos-Keppel, with his quarter of a century of
experience on the frontier, pointed out in August 1919 the existing
tribal policy had three other defects. First, it provided no real
security to the people of the settled districts against recurrent
tribal raids which the Government dealt with by a policy of only
"patched up peace or truce". There was no compensation for the
loss: the people suffered nor any effective provision to guard
against similar raids in future. Second, the policy proved a failure
in so far as Afghanistan was concerned. It provided no defence
against constant Afghan intrigues with the tribes on the British
side of the border, intrigues which proved an abiding cause of
misunderstanding between the Afghan and the British governments.
Third, the Government's policy of non-interference with the tribes,
Roos-Keppel held, had been carried too far. It was a clear indi-

¹Fraser-Tytler, op.cit., p.259; Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, "The
C. A. Court Repington, "The North-West Frontier", *The Nineteenth
Century and After*, February 1924, pp. 269-77.
cation, in his opinion, of a shirking of responsibility and duty
towards the tribesmen. The same policy, he said, had been observed
with the Zulus of South Africa and with similar consequences.
To illustrate his point, Roos-Keppel cited Sir Bartle Frere's
letter to Gladstone in which Frere had drawn attention to the
dangers of British policy towards the Zulus. "The true causes of
the Zulu, as of the Afghan War", Frere wrote,
are neglect of neighbourly duties and responsibilities
incumbent on a rich, civilised and powerful nation
towards poor barbarious tribes on its borders. We have
allowed a noble people, capable of rapid and permanent
advancement in civilisation, to grow in numbers, whilst
they festered in barbarism, till they became a serious
danger to us. We have shut out eyes and turned our
backs on their wants and defects, left them as much as
possible to themselves, endeavoured to see and know as
little of them and to let them see and know as little
of us as possible, and then we are surprised to find
that they have grown into a danger only to be averted
by war.

Roos-Keppel then sketched out a new frontier policy, the aim of
which, he contended, should be to
civilise the Frontier tribes up to the Durand line,
first by crushing their fighting power and disarming
them, and then by making roads throughout their countries
and establishing and maintaining order, which would be
welcomed by a large percentage who are tired by the
anarchy which prevailed in tribal territory.2

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1 The Zulu war in 1878-9 coincided with the second Afghan war. Sir
Bartle Frere was the Governor of Cape Colony in 1877-80. In defence
of his policy towards the Zulus and in refutation of Gladstone's charges
against his policy, Frere wrote a series of letters to Gladstone which
were published in 1881 under the heading, Afghanistan and South Africa,
a letter to the Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone regarding portions
of his Midlothian Speeches. Frere was Governor of Bombay in 1862-67,
whereafter he became a Member of the Council of India.

He would not start "immediately and without provocation" a general crusade against all the frontier tribes: that would be both expensive and inexpedient. Nevertheless, a start to this new policy must be given. He urged that now that the Afghan war had ended, an expedition at least against the Mahsuds should be immediately undertaken. Subsequently, whenever any tribe rose, similar expeditions should follow with the ultimate object of civilising the tribe. "By this policy and by this alone," he emphasised, "we can secure immunity from further trouble and expense on the Frontier and at the same time discharge our obligations to the people who live under our rule and to the tribes for whom we are responsible."\(^1\)

This policy, called the "modified forward policy", was adopted by the Government after the Waziristan campaign in 1919-23.\(^2\) Its main features were to ensure British control of Waziristan through a road system and the maintenance of some 4,600 Khassadars\(^3\) and about 5,000 troops at Wana and Razmak. It was, as Denys Bray, the

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3 The Khassadars were tribesmen, mainly trans-border, employed for watch and ward on and across the border. They patrolled and picketed roads, furnished escorts and intercepted raiders. They fed, clothed, housed and armed themselves. They received a monthly salary from the Government which in 1922 was between twenty and thirty rupees. Extract
Secretary to the Foreign Department, elaborated, "a forward policy in a very real sense of the word"; it was, he added, a policy of progress... a big step forward on the long and laborious road towards the pacification through civilisation of the most backward and inaccessible and, therefore, the most truculent and aggressive tribes on our border.

The Government were determined, as Bray stated, that "come what may, civilisation must be made to penetrate" the hills of Waziristan, and this object had to be achieved by the development of communications in the region. Although the policy was originally adopted in Waziristan, it was gradually extended to the whole frontier from the Gomal river in the south to the Malakand pass in the north, and was in continued operation until 1947.

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Chapter IV

STRATEGIC RAILWAYS AND ROADS

There were three main considerations behind the British Government's construction of strategic railways and roads in the frontier regions. First, the steady advance of Russia in Central Asia since the 1860s; second, the uneasy relations between the Governments of India and Afghanistan, especially in the last decade of the 19th century; third, the disturbed situation in the tribal territory.

The Russian conquests of Central Asian territories had invariably been consolidated by the construction of a network of railways. The Central Asian or the Trans-Caspian line reached Kizil Ayvat in 1881 and was extended to Askabad in 1885, and to Merv in 1886. From Merv, the line was carried to Samarkand in 1888 and linked with Tashkent and Andijan in 1899. Another line was extended in 1900 to Kushk on the Russo-Afghan border. In the same year the construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent line began; it was completed in September 1904.¹

The Russian advances in Central Asia alarmed the British government, and the fear of Russian aggression in India prompted them to strengthen Afghanistan as a buffer state. But the relations between

¹Military Report on Russian Turkestan or Central Asia, by General Staff, India, 1911, P.S.D.L., A-107; The Central Asian Railways in Russian Turkestan, by D.A.O., 1907, ibid., A-96; Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 4 June 1904, C.I.D.P., Cab. 38/5, no. 54.
the Government of India and of Afghanistan failed to remain as friendly as the British would have liked. Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan (1880-1901) was extremely suspicious by nature and jealous of his independence, and proved a troublesome ally.\(^1\)

After his death there was fear of a bloody struggle for succession with the consequent risk of political instability at Kabul and further deterioration in Anglo-Afghan relations.\(^2\)

The attitude of frontier tribes, as seen already, was hostile, and it was considered necessary to bring them under greater British control, one means of doing this being to construct roads and railways for the quick movement of troops into the tribal territory.

It was during and after the second Afghan war (1878-80) that the British made determined efforts to improve their lines of communication on the frontier. In anticipation of a Russian thrust towards Afghanistan, the British were anxious to occupy the approaches to the Afghan cities of Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar. These cities guarded the approaches to the main passes leading from Central Asia to India, and hence had great strategic importance.\(^3\)

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concentrated their efforts on constructing railways in two main directions: to the south towards the Bolan pass, and to the north towards Khyber and Kurram. Lord Roberts, when Commander-in-Chief in India (1885-93), was an ardent exponent of frontier roads and railways. He wanted to "push on" with their construction in "all possible speed"; he urged:

we must have roads, and we must have railways; they cannot be made on short notice, and every rupee spent upon them now will repay us tenfold hereafter. Nothing will tend to secure the safety of the frontier so much as the power of rapidly concentrating troops on any threatened point, and nothing will strengthen our military position more than to open out the country and improve our relations with the frontier tribes. There are no better civilisers than roads and railways; and although some of those recommended to be made may never be required for military purposes, they will be of the greatest assistance to the civil power in the administration of the country.¹

In May 1880 the Government of India completed the first strategic railway from Ruk to Sibi and extended it to Quetta in 1887. Five years later it reached Chaman on the Afghan boundary. Abdur Rahman strongly disliked it, regarding it as a "knife in his vitals".² On the northern side, a railway was extended from Jhelum to Rawalpindi in October 1880. Two linesforked from this terminus: one to Khushalgarh, which was completed in 1881, the other to Peshawar, completed in 1883. In

1889 there were only forty-four miles of railway in the frontier districts of the Punjab.

The railway system was supplemented by several important roads not only in the settled districts but in the tribal territory as well. The Grand-Trunk Road\(^1\) was constructed in 1863-4 parallel to the railway from Attock to Peshawar. In the 1890s the construction of the North-West Frontier Road (234 miles) began, connecting the headquarters of the four trans-Indus districts of the Punjab - Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. This road while passing through the Kohat pass, linking Kohat and Peshawar, was not metalled. Another road connected Khushalgarh, the railway terminus from Rawalpindi, with Kohat and Thal.\(^2\) From Thal a rough country road fifty-seven miles long, which ran through the Kurram valley to Parachinar, was improved. From Parachinar a trade route followed over the Peiwar and Shutargardan passes to Kabul. Another road from Dera Ismail Khan to Murtaza via Tank was metalled.\(^3\) In 1897-8 Bannu was linked with the Tochi Valley by a metalled road passing through Miranshah to Datta Khel.\(^4\) A

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\(^1\)The *Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, Punjab*, pt. I, p.91.

\(^2\)The road was ninety-six miles long.

\(^3\)The road was sixty miles long.

\(^4\)The road was sixty-four miles long.
metalled road from Dargai in lower Swat was also built up the Swat Valley to Chakdara. From Chakdara an unmetalled road was carried through the Upper Swat and Dir, and to the top of Lawarai pass to Chitral. Abbottabad, the headquarters of Hazara, was linked with Hassan Abdal, which was eight miles from the boundary of the Haripur plain, by a metalled road, forty four miles long. In 1900-01 there were four hundred and forty-eight miles of metalled roads in the frontier districts of the Punjab.

The development of communications formed one of the main principles of Curzon’s frontier policy, his object being to rapidly concentrate troops at any threatened point and to reinforce tribal militia, to inspire the militia men with "greater confidence in themselves" and to give them "security in their loyalty" to the Government. "Half these frontier questions of forts, cantonments and moveable columns", Curzon pointed out to Hamilton, would be solved if only the Government constructed railways. Railways were expected to give an impetus to trade as well which in its turn would, Curzon, added, bring prosperity to the frontier tracts and foster peace and good understanding between the Government and

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1 From Dargai to Lawarai pass the distance is 118 miles.

2 Imperial Gazetteer, Provincial Series, North-West Frontier Province, 1908, p.55.


4 Raleigh, op.cit., p.425.
the local people.  

In January 1901 a narrow gauge (2' 6") railway was built from Nowshera to Dargai - about forty miles - to strengthen the British position at Malakand. Another, a thirty-three-mile line, was constructed from Khushalgarh to Kohat in May 1902, and about a year later extended to Thal. In January 1908 the Khushalgarh-Kohat section was converted to broad gauge (5' 6") with a bridge over the Indus at Khushalgarh.

Alongside railways some roads were also constructed, the most important of them being the Kohat Pass road, the Murtaza-Wana road and the Thal-Parachinar road. In April 1899 Curzon took up the project of improving the road between Peshawar and Kohat through the Kohat pass; this improvement, he believed, would repair a serious break in border communication. The Government of India asked the Punjab Government to assure the Kohat pass Afridis that the project would involve no change in the Government's existing relations with the tribe nor any interference in its internal affairs. The tribesmen would be given labour work on the road, if they wanted it, and their allowances would be moderately increased, if they assisted in the execution of the project, but if not, the Government would take

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1Curzon to Hamilton, 9 March 1899, C.C., vol. 158.

2In 1849 the British government entered into an agreement with the Kohat pass Afridis by which the latter undertook to keep open communication through the pass after being assured of an annual payment of 5,700 rupees. The Afridis, however, honoured the agreement more in the breach than in the observance. Aitchison, op.cit., pp. 31-2. Also see Speeches by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, vol. 1, pp. 344-6.
all necessary measures for both the construction and maintenance of the road. In order to buy off the tribesmen, who "generation after generation" had evaded their engagements, the Punjab government proposed a large increase in their subsidy. In the beginning Curzon was not enthusiastic but in September 1899 he accepted the recommendations of the Punjab government. The Kohat pass Afridis agreed to let the Government construct a metalled road through the pass on the condition that the tribal subsidy would be increased by 3,000 rupees; 2,500 rupees would be given to deserving maliks; reasonable compensation would be paid individually to owners of cultivated land through which the road would pass and the tribe would be consulted if the Government desired to construct railway and telegraph lines through the pass. Within two years the road was completed and thus Curzon was able to wipe out what he considered a standing disgrace to the British prestige in the area.

Having achieved the object which in Curzon's words had taken "exactly half a century to realise", the Government of India entered into agreements with the Waziris in North Waziristan for opening

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1 Govt. of India to Govt. of Punjab, 16 April 1899, enclosed in Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 21 September 1899, P.S.I.I.I., vol. 116, Reg. No. 929.

2 Govt. of Punjab to Govt. of India, 1 June 1899, ibid.

3 Govt. of India to Govt. of Punjab, 20 June 1899, ibid.

4 Deputy Commissioner, Kohat, to Dane, Tel. 5 September 1899, Govt. of Punjab to Govt. of India, 12 October 1899, ibid.; Aitchison, op. cit., p.107.

5 Curzon to Hamilton, 27 September 1899, C.C., vol. 158.
and safeguarding the routes passing through their territory.¹

In 1903 the construction of a road from Murtaza to Wana—sixty-four miles—through Kajuri Kach in South Waziristan was undertaken and completed in 1906. The road passed along the Gomal river valley through which lay an ancient trade route from Afghanistan to India. Every year hundreds of well-armed Powindahs passed through this route.² In 1904-05 the Government of India improved the Kurram valley road from Thal to Parachinar—a distance of fifty-four miles. The improvement was undertaken mainly on "military grounds", the Government's object being to keep the road in a thoroughly efficient condition, fit for wheeled traffic throughout the year.³ However, for financial reasons the road could not be metalled.

It was in the Khyber that the most important communication projects were undertaken, Curzon's policy being to confirm the Government's hold on this strategically important pass and to secure it not only against any external threat but against the ever-present troubles from the Afridis. Within two months of his taking over as the Viceroy of India Curzon considered the feasibility of


constructing a railway through the Khyber pass with the object of linking Peshawar with Jalalabad and later with Kabul. A railway through the Khyber was not Curzon's brainchild. His predecessor, Elgin, had, in June 1898, proposed a narrow gauge railway from Peshawar to Landi Kotal up the Khyber, and the Home government had approved the project which, however, could not be taken up on account of Elgin's departure shortly thereafter. Curzon took up the issue where Elgin had left it. Technical and political difficulties in putting the project through engaged the attention of the Government for several years.

There were two possible routes for a railway from Peshawar into Afghanistan: the Khyber pass route, and the Kabul river valley route. Several objections were raised to the Khyber pass route. The high and rocky terrain involved great engineering difficulties and consequent expense, as a result of which the railway had to be a narrow gauge one. But this would not have adequately served the purpose of moving large bodies of troops in times of emergency. Expensive to build and difficult to maintain, the railway would have aroused Afridi opposition and the Government would have been constantly involved in ensuring the safety of the line. Curzon was therefore, totally averse to "placing too valuable a hostage" in

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¹ Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 20 July 1899, P.S.L.I., vol. 115, Reg. No. 775A.
the hands of the Afridis. Further, the Government feared that the railway might produce a "widely diffused apprehension" in other tribes that through the construction of the railways the British wanted to suppress the independence of the tribes. Fearing that the venture would involve the Government in constant friction with the tribes, none of the members of Curzon's council except Edwin Collen thought that the railway would be so profitable as "to justify the constant expense which its maintenance must involve".¹

The second route was through the Kabul river valley, which had been surveyed by Captain Macdonald in 1890-91 under the orders of Roberts, the then Commander-in-Chief. Macdonald had reported that a broad gauge line could be constructed from Peshawar to Dakka along the southern bank of the Kabul river. The route presented no great engineering problems, and the temper of the neighbouring tribes - so Curzon expected - was such as to make the line less exposed to attacks than if it were built through the Khyber. In the circumstances, the Kabul river valley route commended itself to Curzon and his colleagues who from a political point of view regarded it as "the permanent line of advance" from British India into Afghanistan.²

But it was one thing to draw the project on paper and quite another to implement it. Curzon had no doubt that the project must embroil the Government in hostility with the Amir. Therefore, he

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
in February 1899 had taken steps to invite the Amir's views. Abdur Rahman had no objection to the construction of railways through the British territory but he was determined not to allow any railway pass through the Afghan territory "to the extent of even a single span".\(^1\) To be of any "positive military value at all, the line had to be carried on to Dakka or Jalalabad lying in the Afghan sector. This could be done either through British occupation of the two places — an impolitic course — or by improving relations with Abdur Rahman or in the event of his death with his successor. Curzon and three members of his council, Colleen, C. E. Dawkins and T. Raleigh, were extremely uncertain about the "political future of Afghanistan and of the part we shall play in it" and therefore they regarded it "unwise at present to spend money on so large and costly an experiment" as the project involved. The line could not even be carried on to Shinpokh and Smatzai because they were on the still undemarcated section of the Indo-Afghan boundary and the Amir had laid claim to them.\(^2\) Neither place was deemed suitable for a railway terminus, and Curzon clearly saw that "if we ran the line to either and went no further we should be caught in a cul de sac" which would be politically unwise. Besides a railway extended to Smatzai or Shinpokh only

\(^{1}\text{Viceroy to Amir, 15 February 1899, Amir to Viceroy, 4 April 1899, C.C., vol. 286.}\)

\(^{2}\text{See Chapter II, p. 129, 135-6.}\)
would be of no commercial value, because the Amir would never permit his people to use it. In such circumstances Curzon wanted the project to stand over, particularly when there were "many other pressing demands" on the Government finance.¹

But the Commander-in-Chief, General W. S. Lockhart, and two members of the Council, S. Rivaz and R. Gardiner, took the opposite view: the line must be built at once at least up to Smatzai or Shimpokh. They were influenced "more particularly by a sense of the great military value" of the line which, in the event of emergency, would enable the Government to land men and material within a comparatively short distance of Jalalabad and, if necessary, to occupy it. They strongly held that if the railway were built at least up to the border during the existing peace time, the Government would not only construct it at half the cost which would be necessary if it were made in a hurry in time of war but they would when the emergency arose, have gained practically a start of two years in the matter of railway construction towards Afghanistan.²

Pending the settlement of the issue, Curzon, impressed by the tribal uprising or for facilitating an advance into Afghanistan, recommended to the Secretary of State the construction of twelve

¹Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 20 July 1899, P.S.L.I., vol. 115, Reg. No. 775A.
²Ibid.
mile broad gauge railway from Peshawar to Jamrud. The "commercial" utility of the line was also impressed; the railway was to cost five to six lakhs of rupees only.¹ In August 1899 Hamilton sanctioned the scheme expressing his agreement with Curzon and the majority of his colleagues in the Council about the inexpediency of commencing the construction of the Kabul river line.²

While the construction was in progress, the Government in May 1900 noticed increasing signs of unrest among the Afridis who were persuaded by the Amir's officials to obstruct the work. The position seemed intolerable to Curzon who directed Roos-Keppel to remind the Afridis of their agreement of 1898³ whereby they had accepted the British right of making railways in the Khyber. At the same time they were warned to keep themselves off the railway which lay entirely within the British territory or else they would be severely dealt with.⁴ The threat worked, the Afridi opposition "fizzled out",⁵ and the line was opened in January 1901. A daily train service was introduced in October 1901.⁶

¹Ibid.
²Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 30 August 1899, Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 1 September 1899, P.S.I.I., vol. 115, Reg. No. 577B.
³See Chapter II, p. 98.
⁴Curzon to Hamilton, May 1900, C.C., vol. 159.
⁵Curzon to A. Godley, 4 July 1900, ibid.
In July 1901 the Government of India appointed a Light Military Railway Commission to report on the best possible route for a railway from Peshawar to Afghanistan. In their preliminary report of 18 September 1902, the Commission recommended the construction of a light military railway of 2' 6" gauge from Peshawar via Warsak to Dakka. The line should be laid along the Kabul river up to the point where the river met the Kam Shilman valley. From that point the railway should be taken via the Loi Shilman valley to Dakka, the route being considered "the easiest and quickest". The section from Peshawar to the point where the Kabul river met the Kam Shilman valley, as pointed out earlier, had already been surveyed by Colonel Macdonald in 1890-91. The other section, between Kam Shilman and Dakka needed reconnaissance and survey. Accordingly, in September 1902, a team of four members with Colonel W. R. L. Macdonald as the chairman was sent for the reconnaissance. They submitted their report on 5 November 1902, examining the existing means of communication between Peshawar and Dakka and proposing their improvement and development. The report pointed out that there were three routes of advance from Peshawar to Dakka; first, the unmetalled Khyber road connecting Jamrud and Landi Khana - a distance of twenty-four miles. From Landi Khana to Dakka - ten miles.

1 Col. W. R. L. Macdonald, Roos-Keppel, Major Walton and Major N. Dundee were the members. Ibid.
the road was merely a nulla bed. The second route was the old Kafila route, a very rough mule track passing through the Mullahgori country to the east of Khyber. The third route was through the Kabul river which was navigable from Warsak to Dakka. All the three routes, the Macdonald Committee pointed out, were "lamentably defective", and were utterly insufficient for the movement of a large body of troops. The Committee, therefore, urged the absolute necessity of improving roads and constructing railway in the Khyber. It recommended that a railway be built along the Kabul river from Peshawar to the Indo-Afghan border; the line should proceed via Warsak to the point where the Kabul river met the Loi Shilman valley, whence the line should cut across the hills on the side of the Loi Shilman gorge to Multan Killa, and thereafter it should proceed up the open valley to the summit of the Shilman-Ghakke pass which was close to the Durand line. From Peshawar to the Shilman-Ghakke pass the distance was about thirty-nine miles. The Committee assumed that both Shinpokh and Smatzai were in Afghan territory, and therefore in neither of the two places could the Government secure a terminus for the railway unless the Amir agreed to modify the Durand line and give the two places to the British.¹

¹Report of Colonel Macdonald's Committee on Communications between Peshawar and Dakka, 5 November 1902, enclosed in Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 11 August 1904, P.S.S.F., File No. 382 1905, Reg. No. 1515.
On the political aspect of the project Roos-Keppel pointed out that the development of communication through the Khyber pass would be "distasteful" to the Afridis who "hate the idea of a railway through their limits", and to the Amir who wielded considerable influence over the Western Mohmands north of the Kabul river and who maintained close and constant touch with the Afridis.¹

In the circumstances, Curzon, after considering the report of the Committee, decided to postpone the construction of the railway until relations with Habibullah the new Amir improved.²

The Viceroy, then took up another project: a military road through the Mullagori country in the Khyber linking Landi Kotal with Peshawar - a distance of forty-two miles - and passing through the territories of the Shinwaris, Shilmanis and Mullagoris who were friendly to the Government. Such a road had been recommended by Warburton in 1887 and necessary survey had been conducted by Captain Macdonald in 1888-9, whereafter the construction had commenced. But the work had soon been abandoned because of Roberts' preference for a railway along the Kabul river valley.⁴

¹Memorandum on Political questions connected with the proposals of Colonel Macdonald's Committee, by Roos-Keppel, 5 November 1902, ibid.
²Habibullah succeeded Abdur Rahman in 1901.
³Summary of Curzon's Administration, op.cit., p.65.
⁴Secy., Govt. of India to Deane, 10 May 1901, P.S.L.I., vol. 133, Reg. No. 673.
In 1900-01, Roos-Keppel also had strongly proposed the construction of a road through the Mullagori country. Afghan opposition and Afridi resentment were, of course, anticipated, but Roos-Keppel believed that the local friendly tribes, if promised increased allowances and trade facilities with Peshawar, were unlikely to be influenced by Afghan or Afridi incitement. Roos-Keppel had suggested that construction work should be undertaken in cold weather when Afridis with their families migrated to the Peshawar plain, thus enabling the Government to hold them as sureties. Deane went a step further, contending that the road must be built even at the risk of tribal troubles.¹

The idea appealed to Curzon: the Mullagori road would provide an alternative to the Khyber pass route and would enable the Government to reinforce their position at Landi Kotal and if needed to move troops against the Afridis. Thus, as Curzon explained to Hamilton,

instead of all our eggs being in one basket, as they now are with the present Khyber route, and the Afridis being practically able to dictate terms to us in the event of a frontier campaign, we shall have them completely in our hands, by our ability to leave the Khyber pass severely alone, and shall have a permanent guarantee for their good behaviour.²

¹Secy., Govt. of India to Roos-Keppel, 4 May 1901, Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 5 May 1901, Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 13 May 1901, P.S.L.I., vol. 113, Reg. No. 673.

²Curzon to Hamilton, 8 May 1901, C.C., vol. 160.
Curzon did not take the Afridi opposition to the Mullagori road very seriously: the tribe might just "fret and fume". Nor did he expect "any sort of protest" from the Amir because the road would be on the British side of the Durand line. He therefore appealed to Hamilton to accord immediate sanction to the proposed project. The Secretary of State while agreeing with Curzon about the usefulness of the road advised caution; the construction of the road at a time when the South African War lay heavily on the British Government's hands and which might cause alarm in the tribal territory necessitating a military undertaking to which the Home authorities would be averse. Moreover, the Frontier Province was then being formed, and any disturbance on the border, so Hamilton warned Curzon, would encourage the Punjab Government to intensify their opposition to the formation of the new province. Prudence, therefore, dictated that the project had better be postponed.

It was after the establishment of the Frontier Province that in October 1902 Hamilton telegraphically authorized the offended Viceroy to start the construction of the Mullagori road. Curzon with his usual zeal, within ten days of the receipt of the Secretary of State's telegram, put Major Dundee in charge of the work with

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1 Curzon to Hamilton, 10 July 1901, ibid.
3 Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 18 October 1902, P.S.L.I., vol. 148, Reg. No. 1311.
instructions to carry out the project without any delay. Small contracts for different sections of the road were given to friendly tribes through whose territory it passed.¹ The road, which was metalled, was completed in the beginning of 1905 at a cost of Rs. 404,000 and without any tribal opposition. For their good behaviour during the construction of the road, the Mullagoris, Shinwaris and Shilmanis were rewarded with an increase in their allowances.²

The successful completion of the Mullagori road encouraged Curzon to improve the existing means of communication between Peshawar and Landi-Khana through the Khyber pass itself. The main road in the pass was commonly known as the North Khyber road which was unmetalled. In addition, there was a track running close and parallel to the North Khyber road and sometimes used by Kafilas (caravans); this track was known as the South Khyber road. The Government wanted to widen and metal the North Khyber road and improve the South Khyber road – both the operations being

¹Secy., Govt. of India to Dean, 28 October 1902, Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 15 November 1902, ibid., vol. 145, Reg. No. 1546.

called the "doubling" or "duplication" of the Khyber pass road. Major Dundee, with his recent experience of the construction of the Mullagori road, was put in charge of the new project and the same method of construction was followed. First, contracts were given to the friendly Shinwaris of Loargai for the section Landi Kotal to Landi Khana. The progress having been found "extraordinary", contracts were next given to the maliks and elders of the Kuki Khel and Malikdin Khel Afridis for the section Jamrud to Gurgurra which lay three miles beyond Ali Masjid. The contractors had to contend with "every kind of pressure direct and indirect" by other Afridi clans who were influenced by Afghan mullas. There were cases of firing on the coolie camps, necessitating the reinforcement of the Khyber Rifles between Jamrud and Ali Masjid. PatROLS were organised and armed; chowkidars engaged. At the end of December 1905, Habibullah protested against the construction of the road when it approached Landi Khana, contending that as the Indo-Afghan boundary near Landi Khana was still undemarcated, the British should desist from their activity. But the Government of India ignored the Amir's protest. By the middle of 1907 the North

3 Khyber Political Diary for the week ending 6 January 1906, vol. 185, Reg. No. 448.
Khyber road had been metalled to a width of twelve feet and the South Khyber road, though unmetalled, had been considerably improved.¹ Six years later further improvements were made in both the roads. In 1910 two motor cars of the Amir passed through the Khyber road to Peshawar—an event which, in the Government's opinion, "deserved to be placed on record as a landmark in the history of the road".²

Roads in the Khyber were no doubt an achievement on the part of the Government but, from the military point of view, they were not enough—particularly in Kitchener's eyes. The Commander-in-Chief would have railways, too, and shortly after his assumption of office he pressed for the implementation of the Kabul river railway project which Curzon had earlier put off.³ Until he left India in 1909 Kitchener did not cease urging the Government to construct the railway which he looked upon as an essential military requirement. In March 1903 Kitchener visited the Loi Shilman valley with a view to "thoroughly looking" into the project. He returned convinced of the feasibility and urgency of constructing a broad-gauge railway from Peshawar to Smatzai through Warsak, Loi Shilman valley and Shilman-Ghakke pass.⁴ Curzon, however, was reluctant to

² P.P., 1912-13, vol. 61, C.147, East India, Progress and Condition, p.124.
⁴ Kitchener to Lord Roberts, 12 March 1903, K.P., vol. 29, Viceroy to
take up the project because although Smatzai and Shinpokh had been occupied by the British in April 1903, the occupation had not been recognised by the Amir nor the Indo-Afghan boundary in this sector demarcated yet.

In London the Committee of Imperial Defence discussed the issue in several meetings. The Prime Minister, A. J. Balfour, was "fairly puzzled" by the difficulties, both political and technical, of the project. Roberts, now the Commander-in-Chief of the British army and a member of the Committee, repeatedly urged the imperative necessity of "keeping Russia where she is as long as possible" and "endeavouring by every means in our power to extend our railway system so that when the time comes we may be able to meet the Russians with a sufficiently large army". In March 1904, in a private telegram to Curzon, Brodrick the new Secretary of State apprised the Viceroy of the Defence Committee's anxiety regarding the Amir's consistent opposition to the British railway project in the Khyber region.

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4. Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 28 March 1904, Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 30 March 1904, C.C., vol. 174.
This, together with Kitchener's insistence, led Curzon, in April 1904, to agree to the undertaking of a survey of the Loi Shilman route. A preliminary reconnaissance of the route was undertaken in July-August 1904 when Ampthill was the Acting Viceroy. Brodrick while approving of the survey operation reminded Ampthill that not merely strategic factors but the British government's general political relations with the Amir should be carefully considered before the construction of the railway was started.

In December 1904 Captain Hopkins of the Royal Engineers submitted a report of the survey of the Loi Shilman route. Hopkins maintained that a railway from Peshawar to the Indo-Afghan border through the Loi Shilman valley and the Shilman-Ghakke pass had many disadvantages compared to its construction along the south bank of the Kabul river which Captain Macdonald had already surveyed in 1890-91. The Loi Shilman route was more expensive than the river valley route, for engineering difficulties were relatively greater. A railway through the Loi Shilman route would have less hauling capacity than the other route, which had also greater commercial prospects. Whereas a railway through the river valley route

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2. Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 11 August 1904, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 1515.
3. Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 23 September 1904, ibid.
could be a broad gauge line and would take two and a half years to complete, that through the Loi Shilman route had to be a narrow gauge line which could not be completed in less than three and a quarter years.\footnote{Report on Loi Shilman Railway by Captain Hopkins, 1 December 1904, \textit{P.S.S.F.}, No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 382.} Dundee also favoured the river route, and so did Deane.\footnote{W. H. J. Dundee to Commanding Royal Engineer, \textit{N.W.F.P.}, 9 December 1904, Deane to Secy. Govt. of India, 17 December 1904, \textit{ibid}.}

Louis Deane's mission to Kabul offered the Government of India an opportunity to raise the Kabul river railway issue with the Amir. Deane was instructed to persuade the Amir to agree to a rail-head at Loi Dakka or Kam Dakka. Deane raised the matter several times with the Amir but only succeeded in eliciting from the latter an assurance that the British government could build railways on their side of the demarcated section of the Indo-Afghan boundary, but they must keep off the undemarcated section of the boundary.\footnote{Deane to Secy. Govt. of India, 27 March 1905, \textit{P.S.S.F.}, No. 1552/1903, Reg. No. 1094; Extract from a letter by L. W. Deane, 15 April 1905, \textit{P.S.S.F.}, No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 212A; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 4 May 1905, \textit{D.P.}, vol. 5.} The Amir's attitude was clear enough from his remark: "Your Khyber railway is a spear pointed at my heart."\footnote{Cited by E. Haward, "India's Defence as an Imperial Problem", \textit{J.R.C.A.S.}, vol. XIII, 1926, p.125.}

Meanwhile, the Imperial Defence Committee in London was anxiously awaiting the decision of the Government of India regarding
the Kabul river railway project, and on 17 April 1905 Brodrick telegraphed Curzon voicing this anxiety.\(^1\) Curzon was at first against the Loi Shilman route\(^2\) but ultimately yielded to Kitchener who wanted this route and no other.\(^3\) Brodrick was informed on 9 June 1905 that a railway would be built up to the Shilman-Ghakke pass but its extension towards Dakka had to wait until the Amir's attitude changed for the better.\(^4\) The estimated cost of the railway was put at Rs. 15,100,000.

The Imperial Defence Committee, however, expressed its preference for the river route rather than the Loi Shilman route. But Brodrick pointed out to the Committee that the first twenty-five miles - Peshawar to Haidar Khan - were common to both the routes, and so the Government of India should be allowed to commence the construction of this section of the line pending the decision regarding the route the line would take from Haidar Khan onwards. Brodrick's suggestion was accepted by the Committee and the Government of India were instructed accordingly.\(^5\) The Government of India

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1. Minute of 68th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on Indian Frontier Railways, 29 March 1905, C.I.D.F., Cab. 38/8, No. 29; Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 17 April 1905, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 2857.

2. Curzon preferred the River valley route.


5. Minute of 74th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the
were further asked to review their decision to take the line through the Loi Shilman route and to send to the Secretary of State a more detailed report on the merits of this and the river route.¹

The construction of the line up to Haidar Khan duly started. Since the railway was exposed to attacks by the Afridis on the right bank of the Kabul river and by the Mohmands on the left bank it was decided to strengthen the Khyber rifles, who would guard the line, by employing the friendly Mullagoris, Shilmanis, Shinwaris and some Mohmands from the "assured clans"² as escort parties.³

In November 1905 Minto took over from Curzon. Unlike his predecessor, the new Viceroy was at first not enthusiastic about pushing railways on to the Afghan frontier. Regarding the Kabul river railway the Viceroy's personal opinion was that no matter

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¹See Chapter XI, p. 126.

²See Chapter II, p. 126.

³Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 5 August 1905, Secy. of State to Viceroy, 24 August 1905, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 1253; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 4 January 1906, Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 16 March 1906, ibid., Reg. No. 254.
what route the railway took after Haidar Khan had been reached, it would be "intensely unpopular" with the frontier tribes, as well as with the Amir, and therefore the project had better be abandoned. Minto explained

To my mind it is of immense importance to us to keep on good terms with the Amir and to encourage him to trust us, and the advance of our railways will, I am afraid, militate against our influence with him. Again, as to the frontier tribes, everything points to an inflammable state of affairs, and the advance of the railway may lead to a blaze - and a frontier war on a big scale would be a harder nut to crack than it has ever been before owing to the better arms and the large supply now in possession of the tribes.¹

Besides, the Viceroy thought that the Anglo-Russian general political relations were showing signs of improvement, and that the negotiations which were afoot in London and St. Petersburgh promised relaxation of the century-old tension between the two powers and composition of their differences. In such circumstances Russian pressure on the Indian frontier was most likely to be released in the near future which would proportionately diminish the need for expensive railway projects by the Government of India. Minto, therefore, questioned the need for extending the projected railways beyond Haidar Khan, believing that the recently improved Khyber roads were sufficient for military purposes.²

¹Minto to Kitchener, 19 May 1906, Minto Papers, M 978.
²Ibid.
Kitchener, when consulted, very strongly advocated the construction of frontier railways and carrying them to the Afghan border. Giving a comparative survey of railway construction in Central Asia by Russia and such construction by Britain towards Afghanistan, Kitchener sought to establish that the Russians had one "ultimate view", viz., "the menacing of Afghanistan, Persia and India". The Merv-Kushk line, built in 1900, had brought Russia within about seventy miles of Herat, posing a threat to the Kandahar line, while the completion of the Orenburg-Tashkent line in September 1904 was an equally great danger to the Oxus-Kabul line. These railways appeared to Kitchener to have completely changed the strategic conditions affecting the defence of India. Kitchener, warned that the Government of India "must on no account allow" the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line to be menaced by Russia, and that the preparations for the defence of India should take this paramount factor into consideration. The construction of the projected Loi Shilman railway, Kitchener pointed out, was an attempt by the British government, "in a modest fashion" to restore the military balance which had been disturbed by the latest Russian railways in Central Asia. The railway would meet the Russian danger on the "Kabul flank of the strategic front", it was not "only an essential measure of precaution" on this flank, but also one the abandonment or postponement of which at the present moment would make it necessary for the British to recast their entire defensive preparations. Kitchener
would, therefore, go on with the project no matter what turn the international politics might have taken. He warned:

Any power dominating Afghanistan at Kabul and attracting to her side the tribes on our frontier, would constitute so serious a menace to our Empire that I consider that no matter how peaceful the immediate aspect of the international horizon may appear, we should lose neither time nor chance now, in time of peace, and with money available, to take the simple and obvious measures which alone can avert so dangerous a state of affairs.1

The Loi Shilman railway was looked upon by Kitchener as not only of "the greatest value in the critical phases", but probably "a saving factor" in war in Afghanistan. Kitchener added that Roberts with his unrivalled knowledge of the frontier and its military requirements had been pressing him for the immediate construction of a railway from Peshawar to the Afghan border. Its abandonment in Kitchener's view would leave the British "impotent" in regard either to defence of the Amir against Russia or "even to coerce him ourselves", if necessary. The Amir, already hard to manage, would become harder still, while the tribesmen would regard the abandonment as an "exhibition of extraordinary weakness" on the part of the British government. The railway projects of the Government on the frontier, Kitchener held, provided "the shortest, safest and most economical" means of securing British control on the border; they constituted "the best guarantee of

1 Kitchener to Minto, 23 May 1906, enclosed in Minto to Morley, 12 June 1906, ibid., vol. M 1005.
continued peace on the frontier" by enabling the Government "to dominate ... the most formidable and important section of the whole border land", and at the same time providing the tribesmen with "those increased facilities for trade which have hitherto invariably proved a great civilising factor amongst the Pathans".

As for the route which the railway would take from Haidar Khan onwards, although Kitchener admitted that the river route would pose less engineering difficulties, he stuck to his preference for the Loi Shilman route because it passed through the friendly Shilman country and hence carried less risks of political troubles.¹

Minto also asked Deane as to the effect of the abandonment of the Kabul river railway project on the Amir and the tribesmen.² The Chief Commissioner, like Kitchener, considered that the abandonment would be a political mistake: the tribesmen would take it as a manifestation of the Government's weakness, while those engaged in the construction and protection of the line would lose confidence in the Government. Deane also pointed out that the Amir would not object if he were assured that the line would be extended only up to Shimpokh and not beyond until the Khyber section of the boundary were delimited.³

¹Kitchener to Minto, 23 May 1906, ibid. Also see A Note on the Military Policy of India by Kitchener, 19 July 1905, K.P., vol. 30.
²D. Smith (Private Secy. to Minto) to Deane, 23 May 1906, Minto Papers, vol. M 978.
³Deane to D. Smith, 29 May 1906, ibid.
Minto was very much impressed by Kitchener's views and entirely agreed with his line of argument. The projected railway to the Afghan border was indeed a great military necessity and this he impressed upon Morley in a private letter dated 12 June 1906. Morley had asked Minto's views regarding the Home government's proposal to include as one of the terms in the contemplated Anglo-Russian agreement a ten-year moratorium on railway construction towards the Afghan frontier by both the powers. But Minto was "strongly opposed to any agreement with Russia in respect to railways" because such an agreement would "grievously cripple" the security of the Indian frontier and would "tend to delay" for a decade "the prosperous development and better government" of frontier tracts. Minto urged:

we must surely be masters in our own house. We surely cannot agree to sacrifice the security and internal improvement of a portion of our domains for the sake of our relations with a foreign power?¹

Developing his arguments further, Minto pointed out that from the British military point of view the proposed agreement with Russia regarding railway construction would suffer from onesidedness: a ban on such construction would put the British at a serious disadvantage. The construction of the railway from Peshawar to the Afghan border which was in progress would take at least two and a half years more to be completed, while the Russians could connect

¹Minto to Morley, 12 June 1906, Minto Papers, vol. M 1005.
Samarkand with the Afghan frontier by railway in a few months. Besides, Russia had the advantage of water transport along the Oxus river, while the British had no such facility. It was also reported that the Russians had a railway plant at Charjui ready for an immediate advance parallel to the Oxus, and another plant at Kushk preparatory for an advance on Herat. The Russians had a military base on the Afghan frontier which would give them a definitely better position than the British could have in the event of a war in Afghanistan. Thus, even if the Anglo-Russian entente lasted for ten years, at the end of that period "Russia would still be in the same superior position as regards aggression in Afghanistan" as she now was, while Britain would "still be at the same disadvantage". Besides, discontinuance of frontier railway construction would seriously handicap the Government in dealing with any future Afghan or tribal hostility. Minto also drew Morley's attention to the civilising influence of railways and the economic setback to frontier tracts which the abandonment of railway projects would entail.\(^1\) These views prevailed with the Home government who ultimately decided to drop the railway issue from the Anglo-Russian negotiations.\(^2\)

Minto then tackled the still undecided issue: the alignment

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\(^1\)Minto to Morley, 12 June 1906, ibid.

\(^2\)The Cambridge History of India, vol. VI, p.430.
of the railway after it had reached Haidar Khan. In January 1907 the Railway Board appointed H. S. Harington, the Chief Engineer, to examine the issue and submit to Minto an "unprejudiced" report. Harington decided in favour of the Loi Shilman alignment. However, Minto soon came to know and was "surprised" that Kitchener had advised Harington to report against the river valley route. Minto thereupon himself went into the matter and wrote a memorandum in support of the river valley route. But lest the members of his Council felt any "hesitation" to agree with him, Minto proposed that another railway expert report on the issue. Accordingly, W. H. Johns, a Superintending Engineer, was entrusted with the task in October 1907. Johns' report established that the river valley route was preferable to the Loi Shilman route on grounds mainly of economy and greater carrying capacity. Deane also supported this route, as he had done earlier. But before a decision could be taken by the Government of India, the Mohmand troubles broke out in the beginning of 1908. All work on the railway was

1 Report on Loi-Shilman-Dakka Railway by H. S. Harington, 10 May 1907, enclosed in Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 18 May 1907, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 1195.

2 Memorandum on Kabul River Railway by Minto, 28 August 1907, enclosed in Minto to Morley, 29 August 1907, M.F., vol. 12.


4 Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 6 January 1908, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 326.

then stopped. The railway had not yet reached Haidar Khan.

Towards the end of 1908, the Kabul River Railway project was reviewed by the India Office. L. Abrahams, the Financial Secretary, pointed out the great increase in the estimated outlay on the project since it was sanctioned in November 1905. He asked the Political Department if it was worthwhile to go on with such an expensive project. Richmond Ritchie, the Secretary of the Political Department, did not think that the railway was at all essential in view of the improved political relations between Russia and Britain as a result of the Convention of 1907. The Convention in his opinion had "completely altered" the political situation justifying the continuation of the project. Morley agreed with Ritchie, and telegraphed Minto on 21 December asking him to stop further expenditure on the railway. The scheme was then abandoned. In 1911, lines and girders were removed leaving no trace of what was regarded as "the most expensive line in the world."

Another project which was abandoned in 1908 and on the same grounds was the scheme for the conversion of the narrow-gauge Kohat-

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1 In November 1905 the estimated expenditure was Rs. 5,042,874; in 1906 it was increased to Rs. 7,230,000 and by November 1908 it was further increased to Rs. 10,875,157.

2 Minute by L. Abrahams, 17 November 1908, Minute by R. Ritchie, 18 November 1908, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 212A.

3 Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 21 December 1908, Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 25 December 1905, ibid.; Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge, Army Dept., p.87, H.P., vol. 131; Magnus Philip, Kitchener: The portrait of an Imperialist, pp. 232-3.

4 A. H. McMahon to F. Hirtzel, D.O., 4 October 1911, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905,
Thal line to broad gauge and the construction of a broad gauge line from Thal to Parachinar. In February 1907 Morley had already pointed out that the revised estimate of the cost of the project had far exceeded the original estimate which had been sanctioned in December 1906, and so the scheme should be suspended.\(^1\) Kitchener greatly regretted the decision.\(^2\) In December 1908, the scheme was scrapped altogether.\(^3\)

Further improvement in the Khyber pass roads was the most important communication project undertaken under Hardinge. The improvement was urged by Indian military authorities who pointed out that notwithstanding the relaxation of Anglo-Russian tension following the Convention of 1907, the need for strengthening the Government's position in the frontier by roads and railways remained because relations with the Amir were still far from satisfactory and there had been no diminution of tribal disturbances. In July 1912 Percy Lake, the Chief of the General Staff, pointed out that in the event of a war with Afghanistan the Government would have to depend "almost entirely" on the road communication through the Khyber which, unless improved in peace time, might cause a serious

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\(^1\) Minto's Administration of India, Afghanistan and North-West Frontier, 1906-7, pp. 6-7, Minto Papers, vol. M 957.


\(^3\) The estimated cost of the project in 1906-7 was Rs. 85,90,000; in 1907-8, the estimate was increased to Rs. 115,53,452; in 1909-10, it was put at Rs. 162,52,288. Minute by L. Abrahams, 17 November 1908, P.S.S.F., No. 382/1905, Reg. No. 212A.

Reg. No. 1722; Sandes, op. cit., p. 160; M. B. K. Malik, Hundred Years of Pakistan Railways, p. 117.
breakdown in the Government's plans of operation in Afghanistan.

Lake, therefore, recommended that the existing twelve-foot wide metalled North Khyber road be widened to twenty-four feet, and the South Khyber road, which was unmetalled, be metalled to a width of twelve feet. Because of Afridi opposition, the work, Lake noted, would require great caution and tact on the part of the political officers. It should be taken up "gradually bit by bit" and as "unostentatiously" as possible. Lake suggested that the Government of India should maintain "perfect secrecy" in the matter, the Viceroy informing the Secretary of State only privately.¹ Roos-Keppel agreed with Lake about the need for tactfully handling the Afridi tribe, the guardian of the pass, and suggested that the cultivated tracts through which the South Khyber road passed be purchased piecemeal at a high price. The Amir, in Roos-Keppel's opinion, was unlikely to object to the improvement of the Khyber pass roads if he were assured that the improvement was being effected for facilitating the movement of caravans, which was in the interest of Afghan trade.² In a telegram, dated 6 August 1912, Hardinge strongly urged Creweto sanction the scheme, stating that

the military authorities cannot accept responsibility for success of possible operations /in Afghanistan/

²Note by Roos-Keppel, 20 July 1912, ibid.
unless proposed improvement is effect-ed.¹

Crewe, however, refused to oblige Hardinge before the latter submitted a detailed report on the scheme.² It was not until April 1913 that the sanction was accorded by the Secretary of State. Without any further delay, the Government of India took steps to start the project as the conditions on the frontier at the time were favourable.³ Roos-Keppel had informed the Government of India that the Afridis were suffering under a prolonged drought and were pressing for some employment to mitigate their suffering. The Assistant Political Agent of Khyber, Abdul Qayyum, who enjoyed the confidence of the Afridis to "a remarkable degree" and so was "the fittest" person to induce the Afridis to part with their cherished land for the road, was shortly going on leave - and this was ad­duced by Roos-Keppel as a strong reason why the project should be immediately taken in hand.⁴ These arguments prevailed with Crewe.⁵

The work was completed by the end of 1914 without any unfavourable

¹Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 6 August 1912, ibid., Reg. No. 3067.
²Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 21 August 1912, ibid.
³Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 20 September 1912, ibid., Reg. No. 3352, Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 14 November 1912, ibid., Reg. No. 4585A, Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt. of India, 13 March 1913, Secy. Govt. of India to Roos-Keppel, 21 April 1913, enclosed in Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 8 May 1913, ibid., Reg. No. 2043.
⁴Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 13 March 1913, ibid.
⁵Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 20 June 1913, ibid.
incident. It was carried out "so quietly and with so little friction" that few people among the general public of the province were aware of the project. The successful implementation of the project was a testimony to the "tact and discretion" of both the Political Agent of Khyber, S. E. Pears, and his assistant, Abdul Qayyum. ¹

Another example of employing tribal labour in frontier communication projects at a time of economic distress prevailing in the tribal territory was afforded by the extension of the Kalabagh-Bannu line from Lakki to Tank. ² In March 1913, 4,500 Mahsuds were working on this narrow gauge line and their economic dependence on the Government kept them — as was the Government's declared object — quiet. The line was constructed to strengthen the Government's position towards North and South Waziristan as well as to tap the trade which hitherto passed between Afghanistan and India through the Gomal pass. ³ The line was opened to traffic in October 1917.

The road and railway building activities were interrupted during the war years, partly for financial reasons and partly due to

¹ Donald to Secy., Govt. of India, 19 January 1915, ibid., Reg. No. 974.

² Viceroy to Secy. of State, Tel. 24 October 1911, Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 24 November 1911, I.R.P., vol. 8986, July 1912, Proc. Nos. 125-151. The section from Lakki to Tank was 46.48 miles long.

the Government's anxiety to avoid troubles with the tribes which such activities were most likely to cause. However, after the Afghan war (1919), and in pursuance of the Government's new policy in Waziristan, important communication projects were taken up and completed between 1921 and 1925. A broad gauge railway, twenty-seven miles long, was constructed through the Khyber pass and linked Jamrud with Landi Khana. In Waziristan one hundred and forty miles of roads fit for mechanical transport were constructed connecting all the important posts of the irregulars and regular troops such as Jandola, Dwa Toi, Razmak, Miranshah, Datta Khel, Wana, Tanai and Sarwakai. Along the border of Derajat, one hundred miles of road were built for lateral communication.¹

Dictated by strategic considerations, the period under review witnessed considerable activities in the building of roads and railways in the province. Out of a total of 1,015.26 miles of metalled roads in 1919-20, no less than 631.20 miles of roads were "military communications". Likewise, the railway lines, which increased from forty-four miles in 1899 to 283.49 miles in 1919-20,

were all military in nature. Curzon was mainly responsible for the improvement and extension of these roads and railways; his policy of the withdrawal of troops from advanced positions in the tribal territory had created a great urgency for such measures. Even though a railway prior to Curzon's reign had reached Peshawar and another touched Khushalgarh on the Indus, Curzon with his characteristic zeal pushed these lines to Dargai, Jamrud and Thal, the points which dominated the Malakand, the Khyber and the Kurram agencies. Simultaneously the existing roads were improved and new ones added in the Kohat pass, Khyber and Kurram valleys and in Waziristan. Like Curzon, Kitchener was a great exponent of the extension of means of communications on the frontier. Under his influence the permanent bridge across the Indus at Khushalgarh was constructed and the narrow gauge line from Khushalgarh to Kohat was converted to broad gauge. He advocated the construction of both the Kabul river and the Kurram valley railways. In fact it was under his pressure that their construction started. But a conflict of views appeared between Kitchener, Minto and the India Office authorities over the possible alignment of the Kabul river railway after it had reached Haidar Khan. Kitchener insisted on the Shilman route whereas Minto and the India Office were inclined towards the Kabul river valley route. While the issue was still being debated, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 "decreased the presumption of war with Russia".¹

¹Summary of Hardinge's Administration, Army Dept., p.87, H.P., vol. 131.
Consequently, the strategic considerations and financial stringency demanded a change in policy. By the end of 1908 Morley, the Secretary of State, decided to abandon the projects.

Unlike the Russian threat the possibility of trouble from Afghanistan and the tribesmen could not be ruled out. This led Minto and Hardinge to carry on improvements in roads on the frontier and to build a narrow gauge railway line from Kalabagh to Bannu and extend it from Lakki to Tank. The Third Afghan War (1919) and the consequent unrest in the tribal territory once more with greater force brought home to the British authorities the need for further construction of roads and railways on the stormy frontier.

Though built purely for military purposes, the railways and roads did serve, to some extent, commercial and political purposes as well. It was expected that they would give impetus to trade and through trade to peace on the border. Addressing a durbar (reception) at Peshawar in April 1902, Curzon foreshadowed the beneficial effects of railway lines:

The Pathan is a curious mixture. He is a man of war, but he is also a born trader. I see him conducting business right away in the bazaars of Bengal. I have come across him in Burma and Assam. The trade of Swat pours down the line to Nowshera. Some day the trade of Afghanistan will descend the other Frontier lines. As people trade together they get to know each other better, and every mile of Frontier railroad that we build will turn out in the long run to be a link in the chain of friendship as well as of peace.  

Besides, the Government tried, as far as possible, to employ tribal labour on the communication projects in order to keep the tribesmen busy and quiet. This afforded a valuable inducement to their good behaviour as was done by Hardinge's Government in 1912-13.

The roads and railways opened up new avenues for trade not only in Afghanistan but also in Dir, Swat, Bajaur, Tirah, Kurram and Waziristan. The Frontier Province, so far as the commerce was concerned, mainly depended on its external land trade. Situated as it was across the historic trade routes, the province linked the tribal territory and the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia with India. The important routes of trade from Afghanistan were the Khyber pass to Peshawar, the Peiwar-Kotal to Kurram and Kohat, and the old Gomal route to Derajat. The caravans laden with merchandise and passing through these routes were registered near the entrances of the passes. Improved and new roads in the area facilitated the flow of passenger and goods traffic. For instance, the new Murtaza-Wana road, it was reported, was increasingly becoming popular with the Powindahs (nomad merchants). Some of the affluent among them were even travelling in tumtum (carriages drawn by horses). Similarly the Nowshera-Dargai railway became highly popular with the tribesmen of Swat. When in 1901 the line was opened

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1 Reports on the External Land Trade of N.W.F.R., 1901-02, 1907-08.
for traffic, "the platforms were soon three feet deep in grain" and the tribesmen were " clamouring for more room for their produce."\(^1\) Five years later, in April 1906, when Minto visited Dargai, the inhabitants of Sam Ranizai requested the Viceroy for a daily return service between Dargai and Mardan and the conversion of the line to broad gauge.\(^2\) Minto accorded his acceptance to the first request, but the conversion of the line to broad gauge had to wait because it was not urgently required on political and military grounds. Nevertheless, by 1906 the passenger traffic on the railway had increased sixty per cent and the goods traffic had more than trebled since 1901.\(^3\) The overall external land trade with Afghanistan, tribal territory and between Kashmir and Hazara also registered a steady expansion and this increase, in part, was attributed to the extension of road and railway facilities as would appear from the following figures:\(^4\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports Rs.</th>
<th>Exports Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901-02</td>
<td>8,760,325</td>
<td>14,514,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910-11</td>
<td>9,442,108</td>
<td>24,778,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>19,156,717</td>
<td>39,128,262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^3\) Deputy Secy., Govt. of India to Deane, 22 June 1906, Secy., Govt. of India to Deane, 25 January 1907, Deane to Secy. Govt. of India, 12 April 1907, Deputy Secy., Govt. of India to Deane, 29 October 1907, ibid.

It is, however, doubtful if the increase in trade caused any corresponding increase in prosperity of the populace in the Frontier Province. A statement made in 1911 referred to this aspect in the negative. It ran thus:

It was observed many years ago that the advent of the railway on the left bank of the Indus had lessened the importance as trade centres of the towns of Dera Ismail Khan District; and similar causes appear to have had the same effects elsewhere in the Province. The railways have facilitated the carriage of merchandise far into India. It has always been the custom of the Powindah traders from the west to carry their goods to long distances beyond the Indus; the railways have given a great impetus to this tendency, and while the amount of trade as registered at the frontier stations has largely increased, there has been no corresponding rise in the importance of the markets of the Province; for goods, instead of being sold in them, are carried further and further afield to be disposed of.¹

¹Census of India, 1911, N.W.F.P., p.32.
Chapter V
THE LAND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION

To the British administrator, the most striking feature of all Indian land systems was the absence of absolute private property in land and the presence everywhere of communal shares in the produce of the soil. The classic English pattern of landlord, tenant farmer and landless agricultural labour was replaced by the Indian pattern of the grain leap in which ruler, officials, zamindars, cultivating ryots and village servants all had a customary share. In the Frontier districts this communal property, not so much in the soil perhaps as in its output of crops was particularly clear, though with the one difference that only at intervals was a ruler able successfully to demand a share in the tribal property.

The most notable features of Pathan land tenure, then, was that it was based on a strong sense of territorial right which was collective, while providing for the separate enjoyment of the individual family share in the land. The first important feature of the Pathan tenure was *taqsim* or the division of newly conquered tracts among the tribes, their clans and sub-sections.

...the possession of a separate tract by each tribe was parcelled out into blocks and held separately by different clans or sections of clans. Thus, there were *tappas* representing the lots of different main subdivisions of a tribe and estates consisting of blocks of land in each *tappa* allotted to different sections or *khels*. Inside the estates were *kandis* or *tarafa*...
representing the minor sub-divisions of these khels, generally the different branches of what was originally the same family, while inside each kandi each individual proprietor had his share or bakhra. Each bakhra was not, however, represented by a single compact plot of land, for to secure an equality of distribution each kandi was subdivided into wands according to the nature of the soil or facilities for irrigation, and each share was represented by a field or fields in each wand which usually ran the whole length of the block.

The main allotments of territories were originally made by tribal chiefs, while the further sub-divisions of land were effected by the various sub-sections of tribes (khels) themselves. The tagsim in the Peshawar district, for example, was associated with the name of Sheikh Mali of the Akazai clan, who was the chief mulla of the Yusufzai tribe.

According to tribal custom some portion of land was set apart for the purpose of common grazing (shamilat). The individual share of the shamilat was called inam. The tribal land was called daftar, and the individual having a share in the daftar was known as a daftari. In Dir and Swat the status of a daftari was considered very important, because the very membership in the tribe

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   In the Hazara district the original distribution of tribal land was known
was based on the holding of that title. A man, who ceased to be a daftari "was no longer entitled to be called a Pathan", but became a "fakir, without a voice in village or tribal councils". The Pathan clans had not only their general territorial boundary which they were prepared to defend resolutely as a body, but also every clansman had an indefeasible right to a certain share in the territory.

The second interesting but very complicated feature of Pathan land tenure was the custom of periodical redistribution or exchange of all tribal lands by the casting of lots - the custom being locally known as vesh or khasanyé. The practice was originally intended to remedy the defects of the first distribution of land, which was "admittedly imperfect", and to keep up a common interest in the land and the "feeling of a sort of general clan ownership". It no doubt reflected the jealous and democratic nature of the Pathans, and was an attempt to seek equality by ensuring the enjoyment of the better lands by turn and to as wirasat or inheritance, the owner being called waris or inheritor. See E. H. Wace, Report of the Land Revenue Settlement of the Hazara district, 1868-74, p. 109.


Hastings, op.cit., p.85.
check "the development of leadership based on economic power".¹

These exchanges of land were done both among the different sections of a tribe and among the different members of the same sections at fixed intervals. The system involved no mere adjustments of possession according to shares, but complete exchanges of property between one group of proprietors and another, followed by division among the proprietors of each group.

Nor were these exchanges and distributions confined to the proprietors of a single village. The tribe, and not the village, was in many cases the true proprietary unit, and the exchange was made between the proprietors residing in one village and those of a neighbouring village. In some cases land alone was exchanged; in others the exchange included houses as well as land.²

In the course of time the vesh system fell into desuetude. This may be attributed in part to the overriding of Pathan traditions by foreign rulers such as the Sikhs, in part to the fact that in such districts as Dera Ismail Khan or Hazara the Pathans formed only twenty nine and ten per cent respectively of the total population, and in part to the greater availability of land as more and more forests were cleared. However, the system was still found during the first regular settlements in 1868-80 in the Tank tahsil of Dera

¹Spain, op.cit., p.84.

Ismail Khan, the Upper Miranazai of Kohat district, in the Marwat tahsil of Bannu and in some Peshawar villages, though in a languishing form. In the tribal territories of Dir, Swat, Bajaur and the Utman Khel country, indeed, the system was found existing with "little or no change" as late as 1901.¹

Tribal custom allowed khans (chiefs) and maliks (leading men) as a rule to claim no more land than their fellow tribesmen; they had no "territorial revenue", only their personal share of the tribal possession. Originally the khans and maliks were, in fact, no more than leaders of the tribesmen in war and their agents in dealing with others; they possessed influence rather than power, which lay in the jirga or tribal council.² The priestly classes, mullas and sayyids, were allowed no share in the tribal daftar. However, since their services were considered indispensable to the community, some portions of the common land, called seri, were assigned to them. Sometimes such assignments were also made to important khans to enable them to meet the expenses which their position warranted. But the grant of the seri land was not always "a matter of unselfish generosity", for they were

as a rule lands on the border between two communities, disputed lands, and lands which for some reason or other would be difficult to hold except by those whose

²Ibid., p.245.
strength, religious status etc. both enabled them to hold such lands in peace and also to form useful buffers for the rest of the community.¹

The maliks and khans might receive some recognition of their responsibilities in the form of seri land, but otherwise they were on the same footing as the other full members of the tribe, the daftaris. Each daftari cultivated his own share in the tribal land, paying "no tribute, or share of the produce to anyone". What he did contribute was his obligatory participation in all tribal defensive and offensive operations, in accordance with the decision of his jirga.²

Besides the full tribal members, Pathan villages contained dependent cultivators, called fakirs and also village servants, menials and artisans who held land rent free in return for the service to the tribe in peace and war. There were also hamsayas (neighbours) who were dependent cultivators occupying bandas (hamlets) on the outskirts of tappas. These men held lands on condition that they would assist the tribe to whom the lands belonged in repelling the raids of rival tribes. Such hamsayas could not claim a share by descent within the tribe, but could in this way be given pseudo-daftari status. Only the daftari, of course, had a voice in the tribal council.³

¹McMahon and Ramsay, op.cit., p.21; Olaf Caroe, op.cit., p.182.
²H. R. James, Settlement Report of the Peshawar District, 1865, para 296.
³Baden Powell, Village Community, op.cit., p.255; Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, 1897-8, p.158.
Under the Durrani and Sikh rule the position of khans and maliks in the tribal society was strengthened as a result of their individual ambition and prowess and the official recognition given them by the rulers. The Durranis and the Sikhs gave the khans and maliks large tracts of land on lease at fixed sums, leasing it to them to reimburse themselves from the revenue collections they made. The Sikh revenue system was based upon the principle of dealing not "with the people but with the chiefs"; the Sikhs "did not collect land revenue but exacted tribute" from the chiefs. Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and parts of Dera Ismail Khan were actually "tributary areas". Hashtnagar in Peshawar, for instance, was assigned to one Sardar Sultan Muhammad Khan Barakzai. In Bannu the tribute levied on local maliks was "never paid except under compulsion". The more powerful khans took possession of the waste lands set aside for common pasturage. Sometimes they appropriated the lands of those tribesmen who had left the country or died childless. Sometimes they even overruled the old tribal division of land, "becoming virtually owners of the whole of the land". The khans and maliks did not personally cultivate their lands but handed them over to tenants such as fakirs and hamsayas on condition of the latter's pledge of assistance against rival khans and maliks.¹

The Sikhs usually collected the tribute in kind, the rates being one-half of the produce on irrigated lands, and from one-third to one-eighth on unirrigated lands. Besides, they imposed numerous cesses and vexatious dues.¹ In Hazara the Sikhs destroyed the proprietary rights of the old land-owning community, the warises, and claimed the entire area as belonging to the state. The warises and their tenants were treated alike, being allowed to hold their land at the will of the State and on condition of paying the full rent which was in theory one half of the gross produce, but in practice it varied in different taluks.²

The blurring of the lines of the old tribal structure of landholding which occurred under the Durranis and Sikhs continued after the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 by the British. The successful imposition of a state demand upon the independent tribes had necessarily given the khan and malik who were made responsible for the apportionment and collection of tribute the appearance of super landholders. The movement towards a landlord-tenant relationship fitted British predispositions and was to continue. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the Frontier districts, questions of tenures and agricultural usages were not raised for some considerable time: the immediate problems were those of assessment and

¹Barron, op.cit., p.7; James, op.cit., para.325.
²Wace, op.cit., pp. 110-11.
collection.\textsuperscript{1}

The districts were first put under summary settlements\textsuperscript{2} which were very light and no regular settlement in the district was carried out for many years because it was considered "inexpedient".\textsuperscript{3} It was not until 1868-1880 that the first regular settlements of the frontier districts were undertaken.

Settlement operations required, first, the framing of a record of rights in land and, then, the making of a fair assessment of land revenue. For this an accurate map of each village was needed indicating the position and boundaries of each field. This was accomplished through a systematic survey of the fields. The survey parties, while engaged in their operations, encountered many difficulties. For instance, on the Waziri border in Bannu they had to be escorted by militia and to sleep in outposts, while the local Babbu Khel at first refused to let them enter their lands unless a promise was given that the demand for land revenue would not be increased. One survey party without escort was "surrounded, robbed and stripped naked in broad day light, and then allowed to go".\textsuperscript{4} Owing to these difficulties and to the general

\textsuperscript{1}Report on the Land Revenue Administration of the Punjab and its dependencies, 1871-2, pp. 103-4.

\textsuperscript{2}Summary settlement consisted of "fixation of a preliminary amount of revenue, pending a more exact adjustment and pending arrangement for a survey and record of rights." The Land Systems of British India, vol. I, p.304. In the Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Hazara districts, there were two, four, two, three and two summary settlements respectively between 1847 and 1858.

\textsuperscript{3}Douie, op.cit., pp. 22-3.

\textsuperscript{4}Gazetteer of the Bannu District, 1883-4, p.179.
reluctance of the Pathans to furnish the settlement officers with accurate information, the Survey operations during the first regular settlements could not be satisfactorily carried out in all parts of the frontier districts.¹

The Survey operations resulted in the production of village boundary maps (Nakshi Thakbast), field maps (Shajra-Kishtwar) and a register (Khasra) showing for each field the name of its owner and the person who cultivated it, its lineal dimensions and extent, the class of land it contained and the crops grown.²

The next step was the determination of the rights of different individuals in the soil with the object of fixing the land revenue. In fact, in the first regular settlements, the framing of the record of rights in land was considered much more important than assessment of land, because

the result of one operation was permanent and for all practical purposes final; the result of the second was temporary and remediable.

The settlement officers were armed with judicial powers for determining the titles in land which were in "very confused and doubtful condition".³ The settlement officers took great pains to make


²Douie, op.cit., pp. 112-3.

³Ibid., pp. 53-4.
the people understand that

this was the time to establish all their rights and claims; and to prevent any man raising the objection that he did not know what was recorded about his status, because of his inability to read.¹

The result of these operations was that the five classes of men holding permanent proprietary rights in land were recognised: full proprietors, Malik Kabza (owners by possession), superior proprietors, inferior proprietors, and occupancy tenants. A full proprietor was one who cultivated his land himself and was entitled to the full produce of his land. He had unrestricted power of alienating the land, subject only to the right of pre-emption vested in the co-sharers, relations and other proprietors of the Kandi or village.² In the Hazara district, the rights of the old proprietary class, the varises, who had suffered during the Sikh rule, were in most cases reaffirmed and recorded in the first regular settlement in 1868-74. A Malik Kabza was often a Kemin or Hindu who had acquired his proprietary right in land by purchase or by favour of the government. He occupied an intermediate position between the full proprietor and a tenant. He was not a member of the co-percenary body of the village proprietors nor could he claim any share in the common land of the village. He

¹H.G.G. Hastings, Review of the Regular Settlement of the Peshawar District, by Deputy Commissioner Macnabb, 29 September, 1876, p.ii.
²Report of the Administration, N.W.F.P., 1901-03, p.15.
was responsible for the payment of the revenue and cesses on his holding and could alienate his land. A superior proprietor was one whose interest in land was confined to the receipt of quit rent; sometimes he had large rights in waste land, though he had little control over cultivated holdings. The inferior proprietor was often the actual cultivator but sometimes he might have tenants under him. Where superior and inferior proprietors co-existed, the policy was to make the settlement with the latter.

The tendency was to commute the superior rights where they were established into a moderate percentage on the revenue and to take engagements from the inferior proprietors and allow them the sole management of the estates.

The area under dual ownership was not great except in Kohat, where the Khan of Leri had been recognised as the superior proprietor of the tahsil after its settlement of 1885-1895. He was allowed to collect certain dues fixed by the Government from the tenant of his tahsil.

Simultaneously with the question of rights of owners in the land came that of the rights of tenants as well. Two classes of tenants - occupancy tenants and tenants-at-will were recognised.

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1 Wace, op.cit., pp. 118, 121; Douie, op.cit., pp. 66-7, 88.
3 Douie, op.cit., pp. 58, 60.
The former were known as Maurusi or hereditary tenants, and the latter as Ghair Maurusi or non-hereditary. The occupancy tenants were those who paid no rent beyond the share of the State revenue demand and the village cesses and had continuously remained in possession of their land for twenty years or more. They had a right to hold their land so long as they paid the fixed rent. A tenant-at-will, on the other hand, was a tenant from year to year. His rent was determined by agreement between himself and his landlord. He was liable to ejection at the end of an agricultural year in pursuance of a notice of ejection issued by a revenue officer on the application of a landlord.¹

The status of tenants in all the frontier districts, except Hazara, was first officially determined by the Punjab Tenancy Act XXVIII of 1868.² In the Dera Ismail Khan district tenants like butemars and lathbands² acquired permanent rights in land by bringing waste lands under cultivation. In the Hazara district the determination of tenants' rights necessitated a special regulation. Captain Wace, the settlement officer of Hazara, pointed out that if the Punjab Tenancy Act (1868) was applied to Hazara many tenants who were fairly entitled to occupancy rights would be excluded from such privileges, and that the Act would "degrade

²Butemar and lathband were tenants who acquired permanent rights in the land by clearing it of jangul and by embanking fields. Tucker, op.cit., p.106.
them to a position of insecurity lower than they have ever pre-
viously occupied". Wace strongly advocated that the occupancy
rights of the tenants in the district should be protected:

proprietors of Hazara are, as a class, lamentably
deficient in those principles of generosity and
fair dealing without which their investment with
unlimited powers over their tenants could only
result in the material degradation of the tenantry
and ill fame to the Government that permitted it.
The tenantry of Hazara are a very numerous body,
and have prospered greatly under our rule; they
are a thrifty set, well-off, contented, and well-
disposed to our rule. To cut off from them the pro-
tection of the state which they have hitherto en-
joyed, would immediately and materially lower their
present prosperity, discontent them with our rule,
indeinitely retard much promising agricultural
improvement, and destroy a cardinal element of the
stability of our revenue.1

Accordingly, a Special Regulation (3 of 1873) was passed which
gave a broader interpretation to the term "occupancy right" than
that given in the Punjab Tenancy Act.2 The Regulation conferred
the right of occupancy on every tenant who either himself or through
his predecessor had continuously occupied his holding from a period
earlier than the summary settlement of 1847.3

As regards assessment of land the policy in the frontier
districts was the same as in the Punjab. Two methods of assessment

1 Wace, op.cit., pp. 124-7.
2 Watson, op.cit., p.18. The Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868 was replaced
later by the new Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887. Similarly, the Hazara Re-
gulation of 1873 was also revised and a new regulation called the
Hazara Tenancy Regulation 13 of 1887 was passed which determined the
status of tenants in the Hazara district.
3 Wace, op.cit., pp. 126-7; Watson, op.cit., p.18.
were introduced at the time of the first regular settlements: fixed cash assessment and fluctuating assessment. Under the former, which was introduced in all the frontier districts except some parts of Dera Ismail Khan, the state demand was fixed for the entire term of the settlement. The fluctuating system was applied in the Daman tract of Dera Ismail Khan where the yield of crops was liable to extreme variations due to the uncertainty of supply of water. Under this system, land revenue was assessed at prescribed rates on such crops only as actually matured at each harvest. The assessment of land revenue was based on the principle of half-net assets. It was laid down that Government demand of land revenue should not exceed "the estimated value of half the net produce (nisf mahsul milkiyat) of an estate, or, in other words, one-half of the share of the produce of an estate ordinarily receivable by the landlord either in money or kind". But in fixing the land revenue demand, the policy was laid down that the assessment of the frontier districts should be light and the border villages should be favourably assessed, because

1 Daman represents the plain which slopes down from the Sulaiman range to the Indus where cultivation is carried on in embanked fields by means of irrigation from the hill streams which issue from that range. Baden Powell, The Land Systems of British India, vol. II, pp. 595-8. See also Chapter IV, pp. 319-20.


3 Tucker, op.cit., p.165; Gazetteer of the Bannu district, 1883-4, p.179.
administrative and political questions on this border intimately connected with the land revenue demand, and other considerations than the productivity of the soil and the resources of the people must determine the measure of assessment. From border villages the Government expects effective assistance in repelling raids and robberies by tribes beyond the frontier, and in return for active service concessions may fairly be made in the settlement.¹

The determination of half-net assets was a laborious process. The district was first divided into homogeneous assessment circles. Then all cultivated land was graded into separate categories according to productivity. To estimate the gross produce of each district, the average area annually under each crop was ascertained by circles and soils. Next, the percentage of the average matured area having principal crops and their yield per acre in the circles and different kinds of soil was set out. The results attained were then valued at commutation prices.² To work out the half-net assets, the rent rates were applied to the value of the gross produce of the district. Broadly speaking, three kinds of rent were prevalent in the frontier districts: batai (kind) rents, zabti (cash) rents and chakota or kalang rents (consolidated cash rents on a holding). Rents in kind were common; cash rents were uncommon in all districts except Hazara where twenty-four per cent of the cultivated area was held by tenants

paying such rents. The rent rates varied from district to
district and from tract to tract in each district. For instance,
in the Daman tract of the Dera Ismail Khan district, the rent
rates on good Rodhkohi (hill torrent) lands were forty five to
fifty per cent; on Kalapani (perennial streams of clear water
issuing from hills) lands about fifty per cent, and on the poorest
Dagar tracts about a third of the gross produce.\(^2\) In the Kohat
district the rent rates were usually half of the produce for abi
(streams) lands and a quarter for barani (rain) lands.\(^4\)

In the frontier districts, as elsewhere in the Punjab, for
purposes of revenue collection, the system of joint village re-
sponsibility was introduced instead of the tribal responsibility
obtaining under the Sikh rule.\(^5\) The collection of land revenue
was entrusted to a number of lambardars, who were representatives
of the whole or part of a proprietary community. The lambardars
were usually maliks and other influential men and were allowed a
five per cent commission on the actual revenues collected.\(^6\) This

\(^1\) Tucker, op.cit., pp. 90-91; Wace, op.cit., p.263; Hastings, op.cit.,
p.166; Gazetteer of the Bannu District, 1883-4, p.89; Gazetteer
of the Hazara District, 1883-4, p.96.

\(^2\) A steep slope like the bank of a river.

\(^3\) Gazetteer of the Dera Ismail Khan District, 1883-4, p.87.

\(^4\) Gazetteer of the Kohat District, 1883-4, p.90.

\(^5\) Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, 1897-8, p.154.

commission was called the **lambardari** cess.

The terms of the first regular settlements were, twenty-five years for Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan, and thirty years for Bannu and Hazara.

An important feature of the British land revenue administration of the frontier districts was the large assignments of government land revenue to the local **Nawabs, Khans** and other leading men with a view to attaching the influential to the Government. The practice was partly inherited from the Durrani and Sikh rule and partly created by the British themselves, who confirmed many old grants and gave new grants after the annexation of the Punjab and after the Mutiny when the general policy of the British government was to treat liberally all those who had rendered them service.¹

Before the first regular settlements the **jagirdars**, who were "adepts at the art of rack renting", were allowed to collect revenue in kind with the result that their exactions bore hard on the tenants. In order to protect the latter it was decided during the first regular settlement to abandon the practice of assignment of revenue in kind. The change affected the **jagirdars'** pecuniary interests as well as their influence and position among the tenants. The Government, therefore, made the **jagirdars** some extra cash grants

¹Wace, *op.cit.*, p.277; Tucker, *op.cit.*, p.253. The assignments to individuals of revenue due to the State were called **jagirs** and the assignees, **jagirdars**.
a measure which was justified thus:

... it was found on examination into their /jagirdars/ status, that if their assignments were cut down to the letter of the grants they held from the British Government, and they were to be prohibited from taking ought from their jagirs beyond the bare amount of the Government demand assessed thereon, they would be ruined, all their influence and power for usefulness would be gone, and we should have for our leading men a body of needy malcontents.¹

The cash grants - a purely British creation - were otherwise called "political pensions". In Peshawar they were known as muwajib. Similar allowances given to the important chiefs of the Marwat tehsil of the Bannu district were called Barat. These allowances had been given by the Sikhs, too, but the British converted them from kind to cash. Leading zamindars, lambardars, religious families like the sayyids and ulema and sometimes religious shrines were given revenue-free lands, called muafies, within the boundaries of assessed villages. These grants were made either for life or for the term of the settlement. The continuance of each grant depended on the good conduct of its recipient and on proper maintenance of a religious institution if the grant was made towards its upkeep.²


There were several kinds of Inam or cash allowance made to leading men of the frontier districts for political or administrative purposes. The lambardars were allowed a fixed remuneration of five per cent on their collection, but it was considered "desirable to reward specially the most deserving, influential and useful members of this class", and the end was achieved by giving the leading lambardars inams in addition to the five per cent cess. In Bannu the leading Waziri maliks were granted lungi inams, similar inams were given to maliks of Peshawar. Then there were sufedposhi inams granted to lambardars in the Dera Ismail Khan district. Leading daftaris in the Mohmand and Daudzai tappas received daftari inams.

Villages adjacent to the tribal border and families requiring special consideration for services rendered to the Government were favourably assessed. This grant of frontier remissions was designed to encourage the settlement of tribesmen within British territory and to encourage those villagers on the border who were most vulnerable to tribal raids and whose services as militia levies were

required by the Government for "repelling raids, pursuing raiders, capturing dacoits or outlaws and recovering stolen property". The concession could be withdrawn wholly or partly upon neglect of these duties.¹

The British system of land revenue administration brought considerable changes in land tenures. The villages were constituted into Zamindari, Pattidari and Bhaiachara types, and were made units for assessment of land revenue.² The Vesh system of periodic repartition was not recognised because it was against the spirit of the new land revenue procedure. The fixity of tenure which became


²In the Zamindari villages "the land is so held that all the village co-sharers have each their proportionate share in it as common property without any possession or title to distinct portions of it; and the measure of each proprietor's interest is his share as fixed by the customary law of inheritance". Pattidari villages are "a form of joint or landlord village in which the land is divided out on shares purely ancestral; here there is a several enjoyment, but the community is not dissolved". Bhaiachara villages are those which were once "ancestrally shared, but where the shares have been (wholly or partly) lost or upset. The term also represents villages which were "never shared at all - each man's possession the measure of his right". Baden Powell, The Land Systems of British India, vol. I, pp. 157-77.
more possible under the settled Government was further helped by the introduction of canal and well irrigation on a larger scale giving a great impetus to agricultural improvement. Moreover the framing of the records of rights in land and maps made it increasingly hard to adhere to the *vash* system except in alluvial lands where changes were expected due to river action.¹

The Punjab revenue administration treated the Frontier districts very differently from the rest of the province, leaving them for a considerable period very much as they were until it became practicable to undertake regular settlements. These when concluded naturally brought changes but the people were pacified by the light revenue demand. When the Frontier Province was formed in 1901, the terms of the first regular settlements had come to an end in four of the five districts. Between 1900 and 1908 therefore, revised settlements were undertaken in Kohat, Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. (The Peshawar district had been resettled in 1896-7.²) The Doer Valley in the Tochi Agency and the Kurram Agency were also brought for the first time under regular settlements between 1903 and 1907. The term of the new settlements in the four districts and in the Kurram Agency was provisionally

²For the revised settlement of the Peshawar district, see L. W. Dane, *Final Report of the Settlement of Peshawar District, 1898*. The term of the settlement was for twenty years.
³There had been only one summary settlement in the Kurram Valley.
fixed for twenty years and in the Daur Valley for ten years.

II

The second regular settlements sought to adjust the Government's demand for land revenue to the changes brought about during the currency of the first settlements and to rectify the defects of the earlier settlements. The revision of settlement necessitated the revision of maps and records of rights in land and water in almost all districts. The previous maps and records were, in many cases, found misleading and inaccurate. Thus, in Hazara, one-fourth of the old records of the remote and inaccessible tracts had to be discarded during the revised settlement. The unreliability and inaccuracy of old maps and records were not merely due to the indifference of the local people. In Dera Ismail Khan, for example, the extraordinary diversity of tenures, the intricate system of irrigation, the partition of large areas of common tribal land, the recurrence of seasons of drought and scarcity and the vagaries of the Indus had rendered the old records out of date. Besides, since the first regular settlement in 1872-79 there had been frequent sales and mortgages of land, improvements in canal irrigation and extension of cultivation. But the revenue establishment

in 1893-4 which was for ten years. As for the Daur Valley, the Government in 1895 collected a tithe of the gross produce which was commuted into a payment of Rs. 6,000 levied by means of a house-tax.

1Glancy, op.cit., p.28; Watson, op.cit., p.10.

2See above, pp.251-2.
being "insufficient and inefficient", had not been able to keep pace with the rapid changes in the agricultural conditions and consequently were not in possession of up to date records. Therefore, during the revised settlements new records of rights in land were compiled, and in the new Riwaj-i-Abpashi a very exhaustive description of rights in water was given in the hope that in future it would help in the expeditious settlement of disputes over water rights.

The revised settlements effected no changes in the methods of assessment except in Dera Ismail Khan where because of its extremely precarious irrigation system and the consequent uncertainty of cultivation, the fluctuating system had been extensively adopted. The Government of India were at first not favourably disposed towards its adoption because under this system, as the assessment varied annually with the out turn of crops, no maximum limit in cash could be fixed. Moreover, it gave the subordinate revenue officials an "undesirable amount of power", since the assessment of revenue depended upon their first-hand reports. In short, it was a "retrograde step" and amounted to a "reversion to the methods

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of native rule". But then, despite their aversion to the system, the Government of India ultimately relented when Deane, the Chief Commissioner drew their attention to the peculiar conditions prevailing in the district. Deane asserted that there was no other tract in the Frontier Province or in the Punjab where the conditions of life were so arduous:

with a rainfall averaging less than 10 and often falling short of 5 inches; where for months in the hot weather, the bulk of the population has to migrate to the river banks, while those who remain behind can drink only once a day and water their cattle only every other day; a land without shade or water, where the summer heat and the winter cold are equally inclement; where the cultivator has no guarantee that he will reap where he has sown, it is a wonder to find any agricultural population at all.2

Deane attacked what he called the "short-sighted and illiberal policy" hitherto followed by the Government in matters relating to revenue administration in the district. The revenue history of the tract, he continued, was a record of "unsuitable forms of assessment which broke down in bad years, of frequent but partial efforts to adjust the revenue demand to the extraordinary fluctuations of agriculture, of want of system and continuity in managing the hill torrent floods on which the success of agriculture

1Resolution on the Land Revenue Policy, 16th January, 1902, para 36.


3See Chapter VI, pp. 319-22.
mainly depended. In the circumstances, Deane felt that the fluctuating system was the only suitable method of assessment for Dera Ismail Khan. With such strong advocacy from Deane, the Government of India had no choice but to accept his recommendations. Consequently, in the new settlement ninety five per cent of the estimated land revenue of the district was made fully fluctuating.

The principle of assessment remained the usual half-net assets, but the rent rates had shown a steady upward tendency brought about by factors such as the growth of population, the improvement of markets and rising prices. In the Haripur tahsil of the Hazara district, for instance, rents of tenants-at-will had risen from one-third to two-fifths of the produce on unirrigated and from forty-one to forty-five per cent on irrigated land since the last regular settlement in 1868-74. Similarly, in the Abbotabad tahsil of the same district the increase had been from thirty-eight to forty-four per cent. In the whole Bannu tahsil the rise in the rent rates was forty-eight per cent during the new settlement as against thirty-six per cent at the last settlement in 1872-8.

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2 Ibid., p.9.
4 Glancy, op.cit., p.11.
As a consequence of these rent rises, the revenue demand based upon the half-net asset rule also rose proportionately.

In Hazara district however the Government were faced with the problem that the cash rents there were mostly lump sums fixed on the individual holdings (chakota) which could not normally be enhanced except by voluntary agreement between landlord and occupancy tenant or by a suit in the revenue courts. If Government demand was here increased in line with other districts there was the prospect that "hundreds of law suits" would be filed by the landlords. To avoid the waste involved in such suits a special regulation, No. III of 1904, was issued empowering the settlement officer to adjust the cash rents paid by the occupancy tenants by expressing the rents in terms of the revenue. The result was that the Government could hereafter enhance these rents whenever assessments were revised and the general revenue demand increased.¹

Regulation III gave the revenue authorities considerable power, but it did not solve the difficult question of how, in the revision of assessments, to strike a balance between political, social and economic advantage. Both political and economic considerations called for moderation, leniency and caution in assessment, while the changes which had occurred since the time of the

first settlement operations justified an enhancement in the revenue demand. For political reasons, the settlement officers were reluctant to change the existing "deliberately accepted" policy of light assessments because "any marked or sudden alteration of that policy would now be felt as a hardship". They also had to take into account other factors such as the general smallness of proprietary and tenancy holdings, the deficiency of agricultural stock, and the burden of debt commonly caused by litigation and by extravagance during marriages and funerals. "The Pathan's love of display, gambling, litigiousness and the costly luxury of crime" had ruined many leading families. Any enhancement which involved "a revolution in the domestic economy" of the landlord," wrote Glancy, was certain to provoke the "most serious resentment" even if the rates imposed were low in comparison with those prevailing elsewhere in northern India. On the other hand, there was considerable justification for an enhanced assessment:

The local conditions bearing on the assessment, prices, communications... have been so completely revolutionised within the past twenty five years that the old settlement... is no longer even a guide, though the principles of

1 W. D. Watson, Review of the Final report of the second regular settlement of the Hazara district, p.7; Baron, op.cit., p.38.
2 Barron, op.cit., p.21.
3 Glancy, op.cit., p.19.
The rise in the value of land, in rents and in food grain prices; the increase in the irrigated and cultivated area, and at places improvements in the methods of cultivation, the development of communications and new markets, and the growth of such supplementary sources of income as Government service, all these factors justified the abandonment of the old rates of assessment.

The latter arguments won and the new revenue demand was therefore considerably increased. In certain tracts and villages it was "doubled, or even trebled and quadrupled". In the Hazara district the revenue demand was increased by sixty-seven per cent over the first assessment; in Bannu by sixty-five per cent; in Kohat by forty-four per cent; in Dera Ismail Khan by twenty-four per cent; in Kurram by 180 per cent and in the Daur Valley by 600 per cent. The following table shows the exact amount fixed for each district.

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1 Barron, op. cit., p. 38.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Demand under the First Settlements</th>
<th>New demand as imposed under the Second Settlements</th>
<th>Percentage of Enhancement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>Rs. 2,94,006</td>
<td>Rs. 4,91,228</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bannu</td>
<td>Rs. 2,61,366</td>
<td>Rs. 4,31,258</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohat</td>
<td>Rs. 1,93,139</td>
<td>Rs. 2,77,395</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.I.Khan</td>
<td>Rs. 2,72,097</td>
<td>Rs. 3,18,691</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurram</td>
<td>Rs. 31,435</td>
<td>Rs. 88,000</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur Valley</td>
<td>Rs. 6,000</td>
<td>Rs. 36,000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This drastic enhancement in the revenue demand was not in keeping with the general policy of the Government of India who believed that any increase in revenue must be considered from the practical point of view, and with reference to the conditions of human nature. The State cannot without hesitation call upon people suddenly to effect a great

reduction in their domestic expenditure, however well justified in theory its demand may be.\textsuperscript{1} It became necessary, therefore, for the revenue authorities "to ease off" the burden of enhanced assessment of the application of the principle of progressive assessment.\textsuperscript{2} Consequently at the time of the completion of the settlements the local government sanctioned deferments in Hazara of Rs. 57,596, in Kohat of Rs. 17,356, in Bannu of Rs. 68,387 and in Kurram of Rs. 16,500 of the enhanced demand.\textsuperscript{3}

But these measures of relief were not deemed sufficient by the Supreme Government. In their orders on the final reports of settlements of the Kohat, Hazara and Bannu districts in 1908, they criticised the local government for the insufficient steps taken by them to mitigate the effects of heavy assessments. The Supreme Government expressed their opposition to "any large and sudden increases of revenue" in the frontier districts. They asked the local government to afford a relief of Rs. 48,000 to the revenue payers of the Upper Miranzai circle in the Kohat district where the enhancement of revenue under the new settlement had been enormous.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}Resolutions on the Land Revenue Policy, 16 January 1902, paras. 33-34.

\textsuperscript{2}By this method the full amount of the new revenue demand was announced to the landowner, but the actual collection of part of the increase was deferred for a few years.

\textsuperscript{3}Watson, op.cit., p.25; Glancy, op.cit., p.27; Barron, op.cit., p.41.

\textsuperscript{4}The assessment had been raised from Rs. 7,318 to Rs. 16,000 initial, rising to Rs. 24,000 after ten years.
The local government was also asked to extend the term of settlement of the Hazara district from twenty to thirty years, and to grant a relief of Rs. 35,808 to the revenue payers of Bannu. Deane was instructed to show "more liberality" in the matter of deferring enhancements and to submit proposals to the Government of India for the reduction of assessments in regard to particular cases of excessive enhancements.¹

Roos-Keppel² also commented upon excessive increase in the revenue demand, which appeared to him "extraordinary and without precedent". He believed that popular discontent had not yet erupted into the open because there were no means of conveying it - "no press, no bar and no public opinion" - not even rioting, for the people knew "that the province is crammed full of troops".³ In the summer of 1904 Roos-Keppel received petitions from the inhabitants of the frontier districts "complaining of the excessive increase in the revenue demand". For four months - September to December - he made on the spot enquiries in the districts as well as

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²Roos-Keppel had taken over from Deane in June 1908.

³Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt. of India, 10 August 1908, enclosed in Minto to Morley, 25 August 1908, M.P., vol. 17.
in the Kurram and Tochi Agencies. He "met in each district at every stage, deputations of cultivators begging for relief from what they described as a 'crushing impost'" levied on them by the Government. Roos-Keppel was convinced of the "genuineness and spontaneity" of these appeals: the very high enhancement, he said, had, indeed "completely destroyed the equilibrium of their domestic economy". He felt so strongly about the situation that he soon called for the services of Major Rawlinson, the late Officiating Revenue Commissioner of the Frontier Province, to enquire into the whole matter and submit a report.1

Rawlinson made a thorough enquiry. He visited Hazara, Kohat and Bannu and discussed the subject with the Deputy Commissioners, Revenue Assistants and leading men of the districts. In Bannu Rawlinson tried to conduct on the spot enquiries into villages where the increase in the revenue demand had been excessive. But having found that the enquiries were taking an inordinately long time to complete, he stopped the investigation and prepared statements from the revenue records of those villages in Hazara, Kohat and Bannu where the total gross new assessment had increased by more than the district average of enhancement. Rawlinson's findings led him to conclude that theoretically the enhancements

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were justified, and the burden of enhancements had been lightened in practically all cases by the introduction of deferred or progressive assessments. Yet, he wrote

whatever the improvements effected during the currency of the former settlements, it may be said that as a whole communications remain poor, markets are few and distant, and the efficiency of agriculture is not of a high level.¹

Conditions in general were still harder and more strenuous than in the plains of the Punjab. Moreover, in the Frontier districts the average cultivator experienced "an ever present sense of insecurity" due to his constant exposure to raids and attacks by "trans-border gangs of robbers and dacoits" - fears from which the average Punjab peasant was immune.

Rawlinson pointed out a further factor - the popular expectation of general relief excited by the review he and other officials were making. Exaggerated stories and rumours were in spate and it was commonly believed that all the four settlements would soon be "favourably revised in toto". A flood of petitions, verbal and written, followed, indicating the expectations of the people. These the Government could neither completely ignore nor fully meet.²


² Ibid., p.4.
In such circumstances Rawlinson recommended "leniency in the matter of all assessments", and equal treatment to all the districts, because any "marked distinction in treatment between the districts concerned will inevitably result in heartburnings, discontent and jealousies". In elaborating his recommendations, Rawlinson examined four ways of granting relief. First, a fresh settlement of the districts could be made, but this was a costly measure and so undesirable. Second, relief could be limited to those villages which were most heavily assessed - a step likely to provoke jealousy and discontent. The third possibility was to grant an all round reduction of revenue of two annas in a rupee. This, too, was not advisable because it would cause a heavy loss to the jagirdars. Finally Government could discontinue the collection of the local rate and the lambardari cess. This last course seemed to Rawlinson the best, for it would afford relief to all the revenue payers without distinction. Rawlinson recommended that the Government themselves should provide money to the district boards for the maintenance of rural schools, dispensaries and roads and also make the payments to the lambardars; this would involve an annual expense of two lakhs of rupees on the part of the

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1 Ibid.

2 The local rate was 8.54 per cent of the land revenue collected from the revenue payers for the maintenance of village schools, dispensaries and roads etc.

3 The cess was five per cent of the land revenue.
Government.¹

Roos-Keppel strongly urged the Government to accept Rawlinson's recommendations. He also suggested that in the Kurram Agency where people were "thoroughly loyal, reliable and devoted to the British Raj" the Government should altogether remit the deferred land revenue.² For Tochi, Roos-Keppel proposed an increase of fifteen percent in the Muafis and Inams. The total amount of relief proposed by Roos-Keppel for the four districts and two agencies was Rs. 220,400.³

The Government of India accepted Roos-Keppel's recommendations regarding the agencies. They also extended the term of the settlement in the Tochi valley from ten to twenty years. But the recommendations of the Chief Commissioner regarding the districts were not accepted. The Supreme Government held that the general abolition of local rates and of the lambardari cess throughout the four districts would amount to giving a relief to all areas, unnecessary in some, insufficient in others. The Government of India therefore decided to give relief in individual cases of excessive enhancement in the Bannu and Hazara districts and to follow "a somewhat more liberal policy" in granting frontier remissions in the Kohat district.

¹Rawlinson, op.cit.,pp.11-13.
²The deferred revenue amounted to Rs. 16,500.
Accordingly the Chief Commissioner was asked to make recommendations.¹

In the meantime Merk had taken over as the Officiating Chief Commissioner. Merk, who was formerly the Financial Commissioner of the Punjab, opened the issue afresh. A careful comparison of the frontier districts with the neighbouring districts of Rawalpindi, Attock and Mianwali in the Punjab, which had been settled at the same time as the frontier districts, led Merk to the conclusion that

throughout, the tendency was to raise the frontier districts far too rapidly, and this quite irrespective of the powerful ground of political expediency.

Merk suggested outright remission of the deferred revenues in Kohat, Bannu and Hazara, totalling Rs. 143,339, and of another Rs. 75,000 to relieve cases of individual hardships in these districts which were not covered by the deferments. In addition, he recommended the remission of the goat tax in Hazara and the date-palm tax in the Tirkha circle of the Bannu district as both these taxes had been introduced in the new revised settlements.²

The Government of India accepted Merk's proposals regarding the remission of the date-palm tax and the goat tax; they also agreed to remit deferred revenue in Hazara but only to the extent

¹Secy. Govt. of India to Chief-Commissioner, 23 September 1909, ibid.

of Rs. 13,559. For the rest, the Supreme Government asked for more detailed and definite information before agreeing to the "large surrender of revenue proposed".  

Accordingly, Merk, with the assistance of his Revenue Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioners of Hazara, Kohat and Bannu, undertook a detailed scrutiny of the village note books and revenue administration papers. After this enquiry, Merk proposed that a total of Rs. 79,599 be remitted for the Hazara, Kohat and Bannu districts. The proposal was accepted by the Government of India. They also granted, on Merk's suggestion, frontier remissions of Rs. 2,205 to the border villages of Teri tahsil of the Kohat district, and extended the term of the Kurram settlement from twenty to thirty years. As a result of these modifications in the revenue demand, the percentage of enhancement in the Hazara, Kohat, Bannu and Kurram districts was reduced to 42, 30, 35 and 127 respectively.

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1 Secy., Govt. of India to Chief-Commr., 31 March 1910, ibid.


In addition to the remissions, the Government also continued their policy of revenue assignments to men of mark and influence in the Province. However, except in Dera Ismail Khan, the total amount of assignments was everywhere lower than it had been under the first regular settlement. In Dera Ismail Khan the amount was slightly increased. O'Dwyer, the Revenue Commissioner, justified the increase thus:

The liberality shown in the past and the present settlements in the matter of assignments have borne good fruits. There is no other district on the frontier where Government can count on such prompt and willing assistance both from Chiefs and people whether in internal administration or in the event of trans-border complications; there is no district in which the relations of all classes of the people and the local officers are closer and more cordial.2

One other policy was adopted to soften the effect of the increases in revenue demand. This was to introduce a local element, preferably Muslim, in the subordinate ranks of the settlement establishment in the districts. Formerly the patwaris and qanungos were all Hindus from the Punjab; most of them were either moneylenders themselves or related to the local Hindu moneylenders; the majority of them had acquired lands, profiting by the increasing rural indebtedness. The Government strongly disapproved of such land alienation

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1The percentage of the gross revenue alienated in revenue assignments and frontier remissions at the time of the second regular settlements was: Peshawar 17.3, Bannu 11.6, Hazara 23.0, D.I.Khan 39.0 and Kohat both assigned and remitted 48.0. For comparison see p.2b2.,f.n.

2H.N.Bolton, Review of the settlement report of the Dera Ismail Khan district, p.11.
to members of a non-agricultural community. Many Hindu patwaris and thanuns were therefore replaced by new ones, mostly local Muslims, and the change, so the settlement officers claimed, resulted in the improvement of the character and efficiency of the subordinate settlement establishment.¹

III

An important feature of the land revenue administration of the Frontier Province was the application of several legislative acts designed to ameliorate the condition of the agricultural community. Curzon, who held that the Indian peasants "should be the first and final object of every Viceroy's regard",² was mainly responsible for enunciating two important principles on which the British land revenue administration came to be based hereafter. The declared object of the principles was to save the peasant from ruin by restricting his power to alienate the land; and to encourage the people to cooperate for the mutual supply of capital at cheap and reasonable rates.³

¹Glancy, op.cit., p.35; Watson, op.cit., pp. 46-7; Dane, op.cit., pp. 52-3.
²Lovat Fraser, India Under Curzon and After, p.148.
³Summary of Curzon's Administration, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, p.17, C.C., vol. 493.
Of the several resolutions and acts under Curzon's rule, the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900), the Land Revenue Resolution (1902), the Cooperative Credit Societies Act (1904), the Suspensions and Remissions Resolution (1905), the Resolution on takavi advances (1905), and the Resolution passed in the same year regarding the exemption from assessment of improvements made at the cost of private capital were the most important. Minto's victory was characterised by the "continuance and development" of Curzon's policy.¹

These measures were applied to the Frontier Province with some amendments to suit local conditions. In bringing about the improvement of the lot of agriculturists in the Province, the Government had to reckon with the age-old local customs and practices associated with the land. There were, besides, political considerations dictating restraint on the part of the Government.

The Land Revenue Resolution of 16 January 1902 set the guidelines for land revenue administration in the Frontier Province, as in other Provinces. The Resolution was an outcome of the famine of 1899-1900 which exposed the Government to the criticism of prominent civil servants that "the intensity and frequency of recent famines were largely due to poverty caused by over-assessment".

¹Summary of Minto's Administration, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, p.31, Minto Papers, vol. M 851.
The Resolution was a frank exposition and a spirited defence of the Government's land revenue policy. It averred that the cause of famine is want of rain and not over-assessment, and that improvement in assessment can at most be a mitigation, and not a preventive of distress.1

It also laid down "liberal principles", emphasising moderation in revenue assessment and collection in respect of the progressive and graduated imposition of large enhancements; greater elasticity in the revenue collection, and a more general resort to reduction of assessment in cases of hardship.2 No doubt, while asking the government of the Frontier Province to review their second regular settlements, the Supreme Government has taken these principles into consideration.3

The extension of the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900) to the Frontier Province was another wholesome measure. The Act was passed to restrict the transfer of land from agriculturists to non-agriculturists, such transfer being attributed to the increasing rural indebtedness. Land was passing from the hands of old land-owning families to an entirely new class of men such as the money lenders, the townsmen, the successful landlords and prosperous merchants. Rural indebtedness was caused by several

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1 *Summary of Curzon's Administration, Department of Revenue and Agriculture*, pp. 17-60, C.C., vol. 493.


factors: the general poverty of the peasants which forced
them to borrow in poor seasons or for any investment in their
land, their improvidence and extravagance, their proneness to
litigation and gambling, excessive subdivisions and fragmentation
of the soil, and the insecurity of harvests due to lack of ade­
quate rainfall and irrigation facilities. The increased value
of land, caused by improved communication facilities and the
opening of new markets, provided a good security upon which to
borrow. At the end of the nineteenth century, rural indebtedness
and the sale and mortgaging of land had reached "an acute stage",
especially in the Punjab, and the Government viewed it as a
phenomenon likely to breed not only economic but "social and
political discontent". The Punjab Land Alienation Act aimed at
alleviating this discontent.  

For the purposes of the Act, the population was divided into
two categories: first, the agricultural tribes the protection
of whose interests was the prime object of the Act; second,
statutory agriculturists - "a more or less artificial class" -
who were not members of any agricultural tribe but who had "long
and settled interest" in the land, a class "who were considered
to have certain prescriptive claims which could not be "ignored

1Summary of Curzon's Administration, Department of Revenue and
Agriculture, pp. 22-3, C.C., vol. 493; Vera Anstey, The Economic
Development of India, pp. 185-8.
by the Government" and who included the agriculturist money lenders and, third, the "trading usurers" from whom particularly the agricultural tribes had to be protected. The second and third categories of people were free to sell or mortgage their land, without restriction, but the first category of people were not given this freedom. The agricultural tribes could sell their land only to an "agriculturist" of the same village or to members of the same agricultural tribe or group of tribes. They could, however, mortgage their land to members of the second or third categories of people provided that the mortgager should "remain in cultivating possession" of the land at a reasonable rent or that the mortgagee should hold possession of the land "for a reasonable time not exceeding twenty years, at the expiry of which the mortgage debt and interest thereon will be considered cancelled".¹

As in the Punjab, so in the Frontier districts, land was passing from the hands of agriculturists to non-agriculturists. Between the first and second regular settlements, land alienations in the Frontier districts showed a slow but steady passing of agricultural tracts into the hands of Hindu sahukars or money-lenders. The extent of land acquisition by non-agriculturists was considered especially serious in the Dera Ismail Khan district.

¹Ibid., p.25. For a detailed study of the Act, see Norman G. Barrier, The Punjab Alienation of Land Bill of 1900.
In this district, eleven per cent of the total area under mortgage at the revised settlement in 1900-05 had been alienated to Hindu sahukars. The total area sold since the first regular settlement in the same district was 396,495 acres of which 112,680 acres had been sold to Hindus. The percentage of the total proprietary area held by Hindus at the first regular settlement had been 3.4 and this increased to 8.1 at the second settlement. In the Bannu district, the total cultivated area mortgaged was 99,484 acres, of which Hindu money lenders held 43,843 acres. In the Kohat district, 5.3 per cent of the cultivated area had been mortgaged to money lenders of which two per cent had been sold to them since the first regular settlement. In this district most of the sales and mortgages, however, had been confined to landowners themselves. In the Hazara district, the total cultivated area under mortgage to non-agriculturists was four per cent, while three per cent of the area had been sold to them since the first settlement. H. D. Watson, the settlement officer, reported that the Hindu sahukar had not yet

obtained much hold on the land in the district, but "he was exhibiting an undoubted tendency to get more and more land into his clutches".¹

In 1898-99, while the Punjab Land Alienation Bill was under discussion, the Government of India had asked for the opinion of the Punjab Government as to whether or not the frontier districts should be covered by the proposed legislation. The Supreme Government were against the idea because they thought that

it might be politically inadvisable to extend to the Pathans of the trans-Indus measures which might safely be applied to the Sikhs and Muhammadans of the cis-Indus districts.²

The Punjab government, however, were generally in favour of the proposal. In 1899, the Commissioners of Derajat and Peshawar fully discussed the draft Bill and ascertained the feelings of the agricultural population in the districts of Hazara, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu where both official and non-official opinion was found to be in support of the scheme. As for Kohat the scheme was adjudged unnecessary. In Peshawar, the official opinion was favourable, but the local agriculturists' feelings were not ascertained. In 1900, the Act was passed but its extension to the frontier districts

was deferred pending further discussion. On the methods of applying the Act to the said districts. The Punjab Government had not yet reached their final decision when the question of separating the frontier districts from the Punjab arose and the Punjab Government decided that the practicability of the Land Alienation Act could best be considered by the new administration when it came into being.¹

Nearly two years elapsed before the issue was taken up by Deane. He and O'Dwyer, the Revenue Commissioner, discussed the matter afresh with officials and the local agricultural population. It was found that as in the Punjab, owners of land were at first inclined to regard the proposed legislation with suspicion and disfavour, and since its introduction in the Punjab they have been jealously watching its working.

In Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan, where the population was "more Punjabi than Pathan", there was "now a great preponderance of opinion" favourable to the Act. In Bannu, opinion was at first averse, but appeared "to be gradually veering round". However, in the "purely Pathan" districts of Peshawar and Kohat local opinion was "on the whole adverse particularly to any interference with the freedom of transfer"; here the feeling of

¹ Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 10 October, 1903, op. cit.
personal and individual ownership of land was particularly strong. The small peasant-proprietors apprehended that the restrictions on the right to transfer land to an outsider "will place him at the mercy of the khans and make them masters of the situation", while for the well-to-do khans and maliks complete freedom of transfer of their land was the most essential means of living an extravagant life and gratifying their "love of litigation".\(^1\) In such circumstances Deane considered it "impolitic to force the Punjab legislation on people who are not at present willing or able to appreciate its advantages"; he was, therefore, disposed to leave things as they were in Peshawar and Kohat, while recommending the extension of the Act only to Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan.

Deane suggested two modifications in the Act. First, instead of three classes of people as specified in the Act, Deane would recognise only two classes - agriculturists and non-agriculturists - thus omitting the class designated in the Act as "Statutory Agriculturists". Deane felt that it was from the latter community, too, that the agricultural tribes needed protection. In the Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts there was a strong community of agricultural moneylenders, mostly Hindus, who expropriated

\(^1\) Deane to Secy. Govt. of India, 10 October 1903, opp. cit.; Report of the Land Revenue Administration of North-West Frontier Province, 1901-02, pp.14-5.
the hereditary agricultural tribes as effectively as common usurers elsewhere. As Lewis Tupper, the Financial Commissioner of the Punjab, wrote in 1901, the "dividing line" between agriculturists and non-agriculturists in the frontier districts was "really one of religion", and that the Government should "protect the bonafide agricultural tribesmen against the encroachments of the despised kirars [Hindu money-lenders]". In Derajat, especially, it was these "statutory agriculturists" or landowning kirars who were regarded as the chief danger to the agricultural community, and it was the expropriation of land to them which Deane wished to prevent.¹

Secondly, Deane wanted to bring the occupancy tenants within the purview of the Act, imposing the same restrictions on their right to sell or mortgage their land as had been imposed on the agricultural tribes. Between these tribes and the occupancy tenants, Deane pointed out, there were close ties of religion, race and vocation. In the three districts of Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan about one-sixth of the total cultivated area was in the possession of occupancy tenants.² The Government of India accepted Deane's proposals, and with these two amendments, the Punjab Land Alienation Act was extended to the districts of Hazara, Bannu and Dera Ismail

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.

The effectiveness of the Act was soon realised. After three years of its working, it was reported that the zamindars regarded it as a "real boon". To belong to an agricultural tribe was now considered a privilege which was keenly sought after.

The contraction of credit popularised the takawi advances which were liberally given. A decrease both in sales and mortgages was noticed, as was curtailment in the unnecessary expenditure on social occasions. Later in 1921-22 the Act was extended to Kohat and Peshawar districts as well, when the Government found the local agricultural tribes favourable to the measure.\footnote{Report on the Administration of Land Revenue in N.W.F.P., 1906-07, p.25; \textit{ibid.}, 1907-08, p.24; \textit{ibid.}, 1920-21, p.18; \textit{ibid.}, 1921-22, p.19.}

A necessary corollary to the Punjab Land Alienation Act was the amendment of the Law of Preemption in 1905. The new Preemption Regulation was applied to the Frontier Province in 1906. The Regulation provided that the right of preemption, that is, the right of a person to acquire agricultural land or village immovable property, would be restricted to the members of the agricultural tribes alone. The regulation was intended to be complementary to the Land Alienation Act. Whereas the main object of the Act was to prevent agricultural land passing permanently out of the hands of the old established agricultural communities
of the province, the Preemption Regulation sought to afford facilities for preserving the possession of such land, when a member of an agricultural tribe wanted to sell, within the family or tribe to which the vendor belonged; and when a member of a non-agricultural tribe sold land which he happened to have acquired the Regulation was intended "to provide a means of its ordinarily reverting to the possession of some members of an agricultural tribe".¹

The Suspensions and Remissions Resolution of March 1905 was put into effect in the Frontier Province in September 1907. This provided for greater elasticity in Government revenue demand in times of failures of crops. It was, in Curzon's words, an act of compassion on the part of the State, but it is compassion in a form little distinguishable from justice; for it relates to cases and seasons in which the cultivator cannot pay his fixed demand, because the crops which he has reaped barely suffice for his own sustenance, and where, if he is called upon to pay it, he can only do so by plunging deeper into debt. In such cases rigidity of collection is not only a hardship but an injustice.²

The Resolution established two circumstances justifying suspensions and remissions of land revenue: local calamities resulting from hailstorms, floods and locusts; and widespread calamities such as droughts and famines and general failure of

crops. In case of local calamities the Collector would inspect the affected fields and ascertain the damage done to the crops in each field before granting any suspension of revenue. Thereafter, the Collector would await Government orders for remissions. In granting suspensions or recommending remissions, the Collector should use his discretion, taking into account the wealth or poverty of the revenue payer and the extent of damage to the crops. Three classes of people might be excluded from the relief offered: men who were known to be bad landlords and rackrenters; those well-to-do landowners who could pay revenue without jeopardising their future solvency, and the capitalists, money lenders and such other men who held land as an investment. In case of widespread calamities, resulting in the failure of more than half the normal crops, the principle of relief was: "the degree of relief should increase, as the field decreases, more rapidly than the degree of failure". Suspension or remission of land revenue should follow a proportionate suspension or remission of rents payable by the tenants to the landlords. No differentiation should be made between the rich and poor villages and the rich and poor revenue payers.  

Another Resolution prepared under Curzon but passed in May 1906 under Minto provided that agricultural improvements effected

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by private individuals should be exempted from the enhancement of land revenue. The exemptions were applicable to reclaimed waste lands and to privately constructed wells, tanks and embankments. In the Frontier Province these exemption rules were thought sufficiently liberal to provide a "strong stimulus" to the improvement of land by private initiative. In regard to reclamation of small areas of waste land adjoining cultivated tracts the rule was that if these areas had been reclaimed during the currency of a settlement, they would not be assessed until the term of the settlement had expired. The considerable stimulus provided by the rule was seen in the reclamation of 27,000 acres of waste land in the Kohat district in just two years from 1904 to 1906. Similar reclamation had been done in the Hazara district as well. Lands whose productivity had increased as a result of the construction or renovation of wells, tanks and embankments by the local people were also exempted from assessment for a term of twenty years. In cases where private irrigation works had ceased to be in use, the Deputy Commissioner had the power to remit the revenue from the land under such works. There was also provision for relief to individual revenue payers when their holdings deteriorated during the currency of a settlement on account of diluvium.

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1 Summary of Curzon's Administration, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, pp. 20-22, C.C., vol. 493.
deposit of sand, spread of salt and water-logging.¹

Two other important measures for agricultural development deserve mention: first, the grant of state assistance to ryots in the form of takavi loans and second, the provision of credit facilities to agriculturists through cooperative credit societies, established by an Act of 1904. In the North-West Frontier Province, as elsewhere in India, the grant of takavi loans to ryots was made under the Land Improvement Loans Act of 1883 and the Agriculturists Loans Act of 1884. The object of the first Act was to grant long term loans for permanent improvements such as the sinking of wells, construction of dams and embankments, excavation of new tanks and channels. The second Act provided short term loans for current agricultural needs such as the purchase of seeds, cattle, manure and implements. In 1905 the Government of India passed a Resolution which aimed at securing "greater liberality, greater simplicity and greater elasticity" in the grant of state loans to agriculturists. The Resolution provided for greater leniency in the Government demand for security from the agriculturists. It was left to the local government's discretion to remit outstanding instalments or part of them, when the work for which the loan was granted failed due to unforeseen

¹Exemption of Improvements in the North-West Frontier Province from Enhancement of Assessment, enclosed in Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 13 August 1907, I.L.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 7612, October 1907, Proc. Nos. 29-30; Watson, op. cit., Appendix E.
circumstances. It was also provided that the suspension of land revenue should automatically involve the suspension of takavi payments.\(^1\) In the Frontier Province a slow and gradual increase took place in the amount of agricultural loans advanced by the Government. In 1901-02 the loans amounted to Rs. 142,844 which increased to Rs. 176,655 in 1910-11 and to 251,487 in 1919-20 - an increase of seventy-five per cent in two decades.\(^2\)

These takavi loans, though useful, were too small in amount to make good the contraction of credit caused by the passing of the Punjab Land Alienation Act. As a further measure to restore credit, and as a means of imbuing the peasants with the spirit of self-help, the Co-operative Credit Societies Act was passed in 1904. The object of the Act was, as expressed by Curzon, "to make the cultivating classes themselves the borrowers", to improve their credit, develop their thrift and to train them "to utilise for their own benefit the great advantage ... of mutual co-operation".\(^3\)

The justification for the co-operative movement lay in the fact that

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\(^1\)Summary of Minto's Administration, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, p.3, Minto Papers, vol. M 851.


\(^3\)T. Raleigh, Lord Curzon in India (1898-1905), p.178.
an isolated and powerless individual can, by
association with others, and by moral develop-
ment and mutual support, obtain in his own de-
gree the material advances available to wealthy
or powerful persons, and thereby develop him-
self to the fullest extent of his natural abilities.¹

The co-operative movement in the Frontier Province had a
very slow beginning. In 1904 the local government decided to
start a few co-operative societies on an experimental basis.
The societies would be managed by Settlement Officers and Revenue
Assistants, their object being to provide capital to the peasants
for the purchase of seeds and implements, for effecting improve-
ment in the land and for enabling them to tide over the difficulties
resulting from bad harvests. Two such societies were opened in Dera
Ismail Khan. In 1907-08 their total membership was ninety-eight
with a total working capital of Rs. 860.² In 1905, it was decided
to start a society in the Marwat tahsil of the Bannu district, but
"the opposition by an orthodox Muhammadan population to the taking
of interest" was so great that there was doubt about the success
of the society.³ It took several years before the co-operative
movement got a truly sound footing in the Frontier Province. By

¹ Vera Anstey, op.cit., p.190.
² Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 26 October 1906, I.L.A.P. (Land
Revenue), November 1906, vol. 7536, Proc. No. 10; Report on the
Administration of Land Revenue, N.W.F.P., 1904-5, p.15; ibid.,
1907-8, p.15.
³ Ibid., 1904-5, p.16.
In 1930 the number of societies had increased to 106, the number of members to 5,825, and the amount of capital to nearly nine lakhs of rupees. The Government's attitude to the movement was one of "wise restraint" because experience had shown the difficulties that had to be overcome in instilling into the Pathan mind the true spirit of cooperation, without which the movement could not hope for success.¹

The measures so far outlined had all been designed to protect the agricultural classes and to provide financial aid for them in the pursuit of their own traditional farming. In 1901, however, a first move was made to apply the resources of Government to the improvement of farming methods when the Imperial Agricultural Department was set up in 1901 with an Inspector General of Agriculture as its head. In pursuance of Curzon's "new economic policy based on science and efficiency",² an Agricultural Institute was opened at Pusa in Bihar in 1904 which later became a famous centre for "agricultural research, experiment, education and demonstration".³ The Provincial Governments were also encouraged to set up agricultural departments and to open agricultural colleges and experimental farms. In 1905, Deane submitted his proposals for an agric-

²Vera Anstey, op. cit., p. 165.
³Lovat Fraser, India under Curzon and After, pp. 172-3.
cultural department for his Province under a Superintendent of Farms. He also proposed to establish an experimental agricultural farm in the Peshawar district. Accordingly, an area of 100 acres was selected in 1906 for that purpose about ten miles east of Peshawar. The farm, known as the Tarnab farm, served later as a centre of agriculture research in the Province. To equip the farm with trained staff the Government of India in 1905-07 granted agricultural scholarships to five frontier students, belonging to agricultural tribes, for a three-year training in the Cawnpore Agricultural College; all were later employed on the farm.

However, Deane's scheme to establish a Department of Agriculture for the Province did not materialise until four years later, when in May 1910 Robertson-Brown, the Superintendent of the Agri-Herboculture Gardens of Lahore was appointed the head of the Department.

Roos-Keppel exhibited a keen interest in the development both of agriculture and fruit culture in his province. District officers,

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1 Report on the Administration of Land Revenue, N.W.F.P., 1904-05, p.16; ibid., 1905-6, p.15.
2 Ibid., 1906-7, p.15.
3 Ibid., 1909-10, pp. 10-11.
political Agents and Extra Assistant Commissioners were urged to visit Tarnab farm and to encourage agricultural improvements which the Chief Commissioner believed would "appeal more to the people than anything else". At Tarnab farm were grown improved strains of cereals imported from Australia and America, and finer varieties of cash crops like sugar cane and tobacco with the help of English and American imported implements. The finest varieties of peaches, plums, apricots, grapes and oranges were brought from Pusa, Simla, Quetta, Saharanpur and Lahore for the Peshawar, Hazara, Bannu and Kurram farms.

The administration of the Frontier Province began with the heavy work of the revised settlements in four frontier districts. In addition the Dauer valley and the Kurram agency were also settled for the first time. The resettlement operations removed the defects found in the records of rights in land and water of the previous settlements, while much relief was afforded to the cultivators of Dera Ismail Khan by the adoption of the fluctuating system of assessment on a large scale. The very large increases proposed in Government revenue demand under the revised settlements for a moment threatened to make the Frontier Province administration generally

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disliked. But rethinking over the next few years led to smaller and more gradual increases being imposed which did secure to Government a modest share in the increased prosperity of agriculture but avoided any outcry. A more popular change was that which came over the subordinate revenue establishment when local people, especially the Muslims, were recruited as patwaris and qanungos. (This was an indication, too, that the Muslim community was by this point taking to education.) These changes apart, however, the land administration of the Frontier Province did not seem very different from that of its predecessor.

The establishment of the Agricultural Department in 1911 was a great landmark in the agricultural development of the province. The personal interest shown by Roos-Keppel did much in popularising the newly-established agricultural farms in the districts and the agencies alike.

Various measures relating to the land, passed by the Supreme Government for India as a whole, or for the Punjab were introduced in the Frontier Province but here one tendency was noticeable. New measures were applied with more caution than in other areas as a special regard has to be paid to local usages, customs and traditions of the people.
Chapter VI
IRRIGATION

A review of irrigation in the North-West Frontier Province in this period pre-supposes a general understanding of the meteorological conditions in the province which rendered such irrigation necessary. Except in Hazara, where annual rainfall varied from thirty inches in the south to fifty inches in the hill tracts, the annual average rainfall in the rest of the province was under twenty inches; it was, besides, uncertain and uneven in distribution and liable to failure or serious deficiency. In such circumstances, cultivation had to depend on artificial watering of crops, for which there were varied methods: the use of wells, hill torrents, perennial streams and canals.

The Pathan knew the value of irrigation which was expressed in a proverb: "there are four good things in life - river water, wheat on irrigated land, weeping rice and the strength of a young man." No wonder, then, the Pathan jealously safeguarded his rights and interests in water. These rights, like those in land, were very old and usually inherited. Originally land for cultivation which depended on irrigation was parcelled out among the main sections of the tribes. Subsequently the amount of labour which the

Report of the Land Revenue Administration, N.W.F.P., 1901-02, p.10; Imperial Gazetteer of India (Provincial series), North-West Frontier Province, 1908, p.11.
different sub-sections of the tribes contributed to the maintenance, improvement and extension of the existing irrigation facilities determined their shares in water. These practical shares hardened into rights which passed from generation to generation. During Sikh rule, in some places, these rights were replaced by new ones based upon the principle that one who paid kalam or tribute should receive the proprietary right to both soil and water. In teppas having abundant water supply, shares and rights in water created no problems, but where the water supply was inadequate, the tribesmen were naturally extremely tenacious in maintaining their rights and fought over them. In fact, they looked upon these rights as distinct from those in land - as "separate properties, being bought, sold and mortgaged independently".

The distribution of water among villages was determined by local customs of great variety and intricacy. Investigation into water rights during the time of the first regular settlements of the frontier districts between 1868 and 1880 provided the settlement officers with much information about the local customs and traditions regarding the distribution and use of water. In the Bannu district, each main canal was the joint property of a number of villages most

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1See p. 243.

of which had a fixed share in the water, whether drawn off directly or from a branch channel. Water was distributed into these villages by means of sluices, known locally as *sitta*, and the unit of measuring the volume of water to be distributed was called a *ganda* or *guta*. At the important points of diversion, watchmen (*chalweshtas*) were posted to superintend the distribution of water. The cultivator's turn (*war*) for using the water was regulated by the casting of lots (*isk*). In the Peshawar district, water was turned from the river bed into *walaś* (irrigation channels) by means of dams. The villages near the head of the channel were called *sar-i-warakh*, while those further down were called *pain-warakh*. The system of division and distribution of water in a section (*kandi*) of a village was rather complicated. The shares (*bakhras*) of a *kandi* were first grouped by fours; for the irrigation of every four *bakhras*, a period of time (*waqat*) was fixed, this being either from sunrise to sunset or vice-versa. Lots (*pūcha*) settled the order of turns (*naubats*) among the cultivators. *Sar-i-warakh* fields got the water first and then the *pain-warakh* fields. But if, due to insufficient supply of water, the land of a proprietor remained unirrigated, at the next turn of water distri-

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1. A log or board of wood laid horizontally under water across the main and branch channels for regulating the flow of water. Thorburn, *op.cit.*., p.98.

2. Boards or stakes backed by clods, stones and brush-wood used to divide the width of the water section. The smaller unit is called *ganda*, and the larger *guta*. Ibid., p.98.

3. Ibid.
bution, he was entitled to claim the water first.\(^1\) In Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan similar customs called *lara* and *saroba-paina* prevailed, according to which lands at the head of a stream of channel were entitled to be watered first and then the lower fields.\(^2\) Water disputes usually took place when supply was scanty and when people failed to agree to a fair and equitable distribution of water among themselves. It was on such occasions that interference by Government officials became necessary. In the Peshawar district complaints were mostly made by the proprietors of *pain-warakh* villages against those of the *sar-i-warakh* villages who were charged with theft of water and tampering with the heads of the distributaries.\(^3\)

When the North-West Frontier Province was formed, of the gross cultivated area - 2,639,727 acres - only twenty eight per cent was irrigated. Of the total irrigated area about two per cent was under well irrigation, confined mostly to the Swabi tahsil of the Peshawar district and the Indus valley in Dera Ismail Khan; three per cent of the irrigated area was watered by perennial streams in all the five districts; another three per cent was inundated by

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river floods, mostly in Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu. The final twenty per cent was canal irrigated. With forty per cent of its area under irrigation, Peshawar was the most fully irrigated district.¹

The canals of the province utilised the waters of the Swat and Kabul rivers in Peshawar; of the Kurram river in the Kurram agency and Bannu; of the Tochi river in the Daur valley (in north Waziristan) and Bannu; and of the minor tributaries of the Indus in Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. The Indus formed the eastern boundary of the province for about two hundred miles. The Punjab government had until 1901-02 done nothing to utilise the waters of this river for irrigating the frontier districts. The mountainous nature of the country along the Indus banks in Hazara and Kohat and its rapid fall to the river in Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan made canal construction difficult.²

There were four categories of canals in the frontier districts under the Punjab administration. The first, the private, "unscheduled" canals, ³ existed in all districts except Peshawar. These communal

² Ibid., p.10.
³ The North India Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 and the Peshawar Canals Regulations, 1898, described the unscheduled canals as those not constructed, controlled, and maintained by the Government. P. Hari Rao, The Punjab Acts (Civil, Criminal and Revenue), 1798-1924, pp. 441-2, 525-7.
canals were the "property of the people". Some of them were very old, like the Kachkot and Chasna canals in Bannu, built by the Mangals and Hanni tribes in the fourteenth century. These canals had always been managed by the representatives of the government of the day, whose supervision ensured their efficient working. Under the British government, the Deputy Commissioners undertook the management of these canals on behalf of the people. No canal tax beyond a small cess to cover the expenses of an establishment of Mirabs or supervisors of irrigation was levied on these private canals. The irrigators had the customary obligation to furnish free labour for the construction of dams (bund) and for silt clearance. Bund-making was performed jointly by all the share-holding villages of a canal under their tappa-maliks or other representative managers. When a village failed to furnish its quota of labourers, the manager levied a fine called Naqha or absentee fee. The receipts from this fine were credited to special canal funds in the districts.

The second category of canals was the "Zeminderi" or "Scheduled" canals of the Peshawar district. Most of these canals had been con-

1Ibid., 1901-02, p.8.
2Ibid., p.9.
3Thorburn, op.cit., pp. 100-02.
structured by the Mughal or Durrani kardars\(^1\) in the sixteenth-eleventh centuries. The most important of these works were the Jui Zardad, the Jui Mamun, and the Shahi Mahal. The last named canal used to irrigate six villages "forming the privy purse estate of Ahmad Shah Abdali". As was the case with private canals in other districts, a Mirabi cess was levied on the Zamindari canals. These canals were managed from 1898 by the Deputy Commissioner under the Peshawar Canals Regulation (1898).\(^2\) This Regulation gave the Government full authority over the canals, vesting the Deputy Commissioner with all powers of control, management and direction necessary for the efficient maintenance and working of the canals and for fair distribution of their water. The right-holders (those entitled to use the canal) were obliged to furnish unpaid labour for effecting the annual silt clearance and maintaining the canal in an efficient state. The Deputy Commissioner was empowered to resolve disputes between right-holders regarding the use of water, the construction and the maintenance of the water -courses. But the order of a Deputy Commissioner was not final because it could be set aside by the decree of a civil court. The Regulation further provided that the local government might direct that the cost of

\(^{1}\) Governors.

any establishment necessary for the control and management of
the canal should be recovered from the right-holders. The local
government might also at any time "suspend or extinguish" any
right to which a person was entitled over any "scheduled" canal;
but compensation would be paid to the person affected. On these
canals also a Mirabi cess was levied.

The third category of canals was that constructed with
District Board Loans. The two examples in this period were the
Michni Canal begun in 1896, which took off from the left bank of
the Kabul river about a mile above Michni fort, and the Shabkadar
branch canal of 1896 from the right bank of the Swat river in the
Peshawar district. The Michni canal was some eight and a half miles
long and irrigated three thousand six hundred acres. The Shabkadar
branch canal was one and a half miles long and watered about one
thousand eight hundred acres. A water rate was charged on the users
of both these canals.

Finally in the fourth category there were the most important
canals in the province, those owned and managed by the Punjab Govern­
ment - the Swat, Kabul and Bara river canals in the Peshawar district.

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2 ibid., pp. 10-11.
3 Ibid., p.11.
4 Imperial Gazetteer of India, N.W.F.P., 1908, pp. 44-5.
Over all these categories of canals Government exercised some degree of control, and in all it had a variety of economic and political interests. All Indian Governments, the British included, were interested in irrigation because irrigation increased the yields and security of agriculture from which governments drew a major part of their revenues. The extension of irrigation also meant an extension of the settled population of tribesmen with a valuable permanent stake in the land who, for that reason, were more open to Government control. Both these aspects of irrigation were readily grasped by the Punjab Government. From the first, therefore, it was government policy to maintain, improve and extend the indigenous irrigation works, canals especially. This was an inherited duty, a potent means of extending government influence, and also a useful source of practical experience which might later be applied to larger works for harnessing rivers and constructing canals. Revenues might be increased, waste tracts populated, as elsewhere in India even financial unproductive works might be undertaken as an insurance against drought and famine, and at all times irrigation works might be used to "pacify" the lawless tribes.

The first of the Government's projects to be undertaken, the

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1D. G. Harris, *Irrigation in India*, p.99.
Swat River canal, very clearly demonstrates the many purposes canal construction might serve, for though it was designed to irrigate the dry, unproductive plains in the north-east of the Peshawar valley, its construction was also prompted by political considerations. It was clearly hoped that

if only members of the Mohmand and other tribes from beyond the frontier could be induced, by the promise of good crops, to settle peaceably in British territory, a great step forward would... have been made in the direction of promoting habits of industry and friendly intercourse among the border clans.¹

The original plan, made in 1874, was to irrigate an area of 126,000 acres at a cost of Rs. 1,945,000; the canal was expected to yield a return of 10.7 per cent on capital outlay.² The construction of the canal posed a formidable problem for the Government. It was to pass through "a most forbidding country" with an average annual rainfall of only fourteen inches; it was a barren, treeless and unpeopled tract. The tribesmen beyond the border raided the work and killed a number of labourers, while those within were sullenly hostile. In consequence, armed guards had to be employed to protect the working parties at a considerable cost, which increased still further when it was found that workers had to be given higher wages to restrain them from fleeing.³ The

¹Harris, op.cit., pp. 42-4.
²Gazetteer of the Peshawar District, 1897-8, pp. 348-56.
³Harris, op.cit., pp. 42-4.
work also suffered interruption during the second Afghan war (1878-80). A revised estimate put the cost at Rs. 3,454,810, and the net area to be irrigated at only 90,000 acres; the net revenue yield was 3.7 per cent on the capital outlay. The canal was classed as a "Famine Relief Protective Public Work". It was completed in 1885 and proved a great success.¹ "Even the most optimistic hopes originally entertained of the project fell far short of the results actually achieved."²

Contrary to all expectations, it was developed with astonishing rapidity and soon became an outstanding financial and political success. Cultivation, green fields, trees and peaceful villages sprang into existence; despite its early vicissitudes, a canal has seldom been so happily and unexpectedly favoured by fortune.³

The waste and deserted land (Maira) was brought under cultivation, resulting in an increase in the production of crops and in population.⁴ Within four years of its completion the canal provided water to over 107,910 acres. In 1900-01 the area irrigated increased to 166,031 acres; the percentage of net revenue on capital outlay was 10.41.⁵ The tribes also derived such economic benefits

¹Peshawar District Gazetteer, op.cit., pp. 348-56.
²Harris, op.cit., p. 45.
³Newhouse (Frederick) and Others, Irrigation, p. 54.
⁴Dane, op.cit., p. 8.
from the canal as made them change their earlier hostile attitude to it, which led the Chief Engineer, J. Benton, to remark that the tribesmen "generally regard the canal as wholly beneficial, and are the enemies of any who would seek to injure canal works".¹

The Kabul river canal was another important state-owned project. Its construction began in 1885 and took five years to complete. The canal was taken out at the right bank of the Kabul river at Warsak; its total length was thirty-eight miles of which twenty-three were in the Peshawar and fifteen in the Nowshera tahsil. The canal proved highly remunerative. The capital outlay on the canal up to 1903-04 was Rs. 501,241, the total area irrigated was 29,427 acres, and the net revenue earned was Rs. 55,135, or 11 per cent on the capital outlay. The revenue management of the canal rested with the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and its maintenance and the regulation of water supply was the responsibility of the Irrigation Department.²

The Bara River canal was of the "Scheduled" type. The Bara river supplied water for drinking and irrigation purposes to the Mohmand and Khalil villages as well as to the Cantonment and


³There were about 34 villages to the west and south of the Peshawar district inhabited by the settled clans of Mohmands and Khalils of the Mohmand tribe.
City of Peshawar. The supply of water often ran short in summer which gave rise to constant disputes between the Mohmands and Khalils and created difficulties for the peoples in the cantonment and city as well. In 1897 therefore the weir and upper distributaries of a canal from the Bara river were constructed by the Punjab irrigation department to ensure a better distribution of the river water. Water rate was levied on this canal.¹

The formation of the Frontier Province in 1901 coincided with the appointment of the Indian Irrigation Commission ² which considered the utility of irrigation as a protection against famine and drought. The Commission made certain recommendations regarding irrigation in the new province; with the implementation of these recommendations, the irrigation development in the province entered upon a new phase.

The Commission emphasised the potential protective and remunerative value of the construction of the Hazarkhani branch of the Kabul river canal in the Peshawar district and the Paharpur canal in the Dera Ismail Khan district; their construction in the past had been held in abeyance "solely for want of funds".³ The Commission also recommended the improvement and development of private

¹Dane, op.cit., pp. 5, 12.

²Thomas Raleigh, ed., Lord Curzon in India, 1898-1905, pp. 456-7; Lovat Fraser, India under Curzon and After, pp. 299-304.

irrigation works in the montane and submontane districts of the province, because their collective protective value was thought to be considerable. The Commission advised the construction of "long low dams across the beds of the streams as they debouch from the hills, so as to form, not storage reservoirs, but distributary basins by which flood waters can be drawn off into a radiating system of distributaries". The Commission's recommendations also included assistance to the farmers in the form of takavi advances, liberal grants in aid and departmental advice. To resolve water disputes, the Commission advised that rights in water should be as carefully recorded as those in land.¹

These recommendations were gradually implemented. The first step taken was to improve the minor canals and to bring them under closer governmental supervision, management and control; with this end in view the Punjab Minor Canals Act III of 1905 was extended to the Frontier Province in 1907. Hitherto, as already observed,² the management of the minor, private canals, though under the Deputy Commissioners, was in fact based on the acquiescence of the people, their local customs and traditions. By and

¹Ibid., para 63.
²See pp. 307-10.
large it worked well, but its working depended "almost entirely" on the initiative of the Deputy Commissioners. An enterprising and bold officer could, with the consent of the people, extend and improve the irrigation, but one who lacked these qualities and who wanted to avoid involvement in disputes over water distribution and water rights could easily justify his inaction by pleading the want of necessary legal powers. Further, the increased value of rights in land and water over the years had to a great extent altered the attitude of the people. Now they questioned executive orders in matters of canal administration in the courts of law; consequently it was difficult for the revenue officers to carry out this administration. In fact, all the Deputy Commissioners and Settlement Officers had been urging the local government for a regulation on the lines of the Punjab Minor Canals Act; even the judicial officers supported this demand because they found it "almost impossible" to decide the cases involving complex questions of water rights and disputes. The Punjab Minor Canals Act embodied several of the useful provisions of the Peshawar Canals Regulation (1898); but it also went beyond and was an improvement on the latter.¹ For instance, section 13 of the Peshawar Canals Regulation had empowered the Collector to

¹The new act was an improvement in the eyes of the executive; whether the summary procedures, untestable in the courts, were an improvement in the eyes of all the people might have been more open to doubt.
pass orders on a water-dispute which remained in force until set aside by orders of a civil court, while under section 43 of the Punjab Minor Canals Act, the Collector's order was final unless set aside on appeal by the Commissioner, and it could not be questioned in a civil court at all. The latter provision was considered to be useful in dealing with a population prone to ruinous litigation and with cases which could be more easily disposed of by the revenue officers than by the civil courts.

Again, the Nacha, or the compensation payable by a defaulter to furnish unpaid labour for canals was recoverable under section 9(2)(e) of the Peshawar Canals Regulation as a fine, while under section 68 of the Punjab Minor Canals Act, it could be realised as an arrear of the land revenue. On these grounds Deane in December 1905 urged the Government to apply the Punjab Minor Canals Act to the Frontier Province. The interests involved, both of the people and the Government, he pointed out, were considerable.

The total irrigated area under private canals in the four districts of Kohat, Hazara, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu was 432,000 acres, of which the latter two accounted for 200,000 and 154,000 acres respectively; a special arrangement for the efficient working of the private canals in these two districts was, therefore, essential. Deane's proposal was accepted by the Government, and in February 1907 the Punjab Minor Canals Act was extended to the Frontier Province with certain modifications to suit local conditions and the
Peshawar Canals Regulation was repealed.¹

The next step taken by the Government was the improvement of the **Damān** system of irrigation in the Dera Ismail Khan district. The **Damān** is the upland tract lying between the Indus valley and the Suleiman range and forming the western boundary of the district. In this area agriculture depended — and still depends to some extent — mainly on floods caused by hill torrents (**Rodhkohi**) swelled by melted snow or heavy rains in the hills. In describing this system of irrigation, Captain Crosthwaite, the Settlement Officer of Damān, wrote in 1903:

... the waters of these torrents are caught by dams and spread out through shallow channels into the embanked fields. These fields are flooded and the water sinks into the ground leaving a rich deposit of silt. As the lands attached to each series of dams are irrigated, the dam is cut and the water sent down to the next dam of the series. These torrents, when held up by the dams, which are often imperfectly built and break under the rush of the flood-water, continually cut out new channels or form ravines, and the whole country is seamed by the scour of the flood-water. Throughout the tract, especially in its centre, there are large areas of land which are above the reach of beyond the limits of the flood-water. In these cultivation is only possible by draining the barren plains of their meagre rainfall and collecting the supply so obtained in embanked fields.²

Under this system of irrigation cultivation was precarious and...

¹Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 22 December 1905, 1 February 1906, Secy., Govt. of India, to Agent to Governor-General, N.W.F.P., 12 May 1906, I.R.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 7335, May 1906, Proc. Nos. 19-21. Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 28 November 1906, Under Secy. to Govt. of India to Agent to Governor-General, N.W.F.P., 2 February 1907, ibid., vol. 7610, February 1907, Proc. Nos. 4-5.

the condition of the people, naturally, hard.

"There is no tract in the Punjab", Crosthwaite pointed out, "or in the North-West Frontier Province, in which the conditions of life are so arduous. The extremely precarious cultivation depends on the hill torrents. These often fail... Without the laborious building of dams, the embanking of fields and the construction of many channels and of the 'pāls' ¹ on the catchment areas, the Daman would lie a desert plain scored with huge ravines with a few "trees in their beds".²

Under the Daman system of irrigation the cultivators, in keeping with age-old customs, supplied free labour for the construction and repair of the irrigation dams, called sadds, and for the maintenance of the channels. Fines (Nagha) were levied on defaulters and credited to an "Excluded Local Fund" known as the "Saddana or Embankment Fund".³

Until 1903 the Government had taken no interest in Daman irrigation, which led J. Wilson, the then acting Settlement Commissioner of the Dera Ismail Khan district, to condemn the Government's policy as "short-sighted" and "illiberal". He observed that although the income from land revenue depended on the maintenance

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¹ Pāls are flanking embankments forming a continuation of the main dam which prevents the water falling back into its old channel.
² H. N. Bolton, op.cit., p.3.
of the many embankments which stemmed the floods caused by the hill torrents, the Government had

hitherto contributed practically nothing towards their cost. They are made and maintained by the labour of the people, and even the pay of the establishment necessary has been defrayed from a fund made up of fines levied from absentees. This is not only shabby but short-sighted policy. More especially in future where the assessment will probably be entirely fluctuating, any improvement in irrigation will at once result in an increase of land revenue, and any falling off in the area irrigated will be at once followed by a decrease... It is therefore to the pecuniary interest of the Government to contribute to the cost of these embankments.

Wilson recommended that the Government should not only defray the expenses of the irrigation supervisory staff but allocate substantial funds towards the construction of new embankments. This was in keeping with the recommendations of the Irrigation Commission. He also suggested that a separate fund be created for carrying out irrigation works in Dera Ismail Khan.¹

But no action was taken on these recommendations until 1905 when O'Dwyer suggested the improvement of Daman irrigation. For raising the funds required for the improvements, he recommended that a revised cess of Rs. 3-2-0 per cent on the land revenue be paid by the cultivators; the Government and the assignees of land revenue.² should also contribute an equal amount. Secondly,

¹Ibid., cited by O'Dwyer in the above letter.
²See Chapter V, pp. 266-8.
O'Dwyer asked for the enlargement of the existing irrigation establishment at Government cost. Finally, to do away with the "oppressive" Nagha system, under which labour for canal clearance, repair and construction of dams etc. had hitherto been provided free, O'Dwyer suggested moderate wages for the labourers. The Government of India accepted these proposals. ¹

Improvement was also effected in the irrigation system of the Bannu district where the principal means of irrigation were the Kurram and Lohra canals. The defective working of the Kurram canals was pointed out in 1907 by R.I.R. Glancy, the Settlement Officer of Bannu.

"There is no masonry weir," Glancy pointed out, "at the head of the [Kurram] valley: wherever possible water is drawn off from the river all along its course by means of rough boulder dams which are carried away by any heavy flood: many of the canals are aligned on wrong principles: proper escapes are not provided: the natural line of drainage is often blocked and large areas are water-logged. The system is faulty and wasteful in the extreme."²

It was in September 1907 that Deane asked for the improvement of irrigation works in Bannu, emphasising how heavily the Government receipts out of land revenue depended on these works. He pointed out that in the resettlement operations³ of 1903-07,

¹O'Dwyer to Deputy Sec. to Govt. of India, 3 August 1905, I.R.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 7334, January 1906, Proc. Nos. 37-9. Secy. to Govt. of India to Agent to Governor-General, N.W.F.P., 19 December 1905, ibid.


³See Chapter V, p.264.
the fixed assessment in the district had been raised to Rs. 2,60,000, that but for the existing private canals as much as 21,000 acres of land would not have been cultivated at all, or at the most would have paid a dry rate of not more than four annas per acre, yielding a total revenue of about Rs. 30,000 for the Government, and that without irrigation Government would have lost Rs. 2,30,000 land revenue from the district.¹ Deane's conclusion was that the Government should take a greater interest in the private canals in the district, and that as a first step a small but experienced engineering establishment should be appointed to maintain the canals in good working order and to draw up schemes for their improvement and extension. The appointment of a qualified canal engineer from the Irrigation Department was asked for because the control and supervision of the perennial canals in Bannu involved a task of a delicate and arduous nature requiring not only considerable technical skill but special tact and force of character in dealing with the Pathan population, jealous of their rights and apt to resent any ill-considered interference with the traditional system of canal management.² Deane also wanted an enlarged revenue establishment to deal with the complicated issues of water distribution, the allotment and

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¹Deane to Secy. to Govt. of India, 2 September 1907, Deputy Secy. to Govt. of India to Chief-Commissioner, 7 December 1907, I.L.R.P., vol. 7612, December 1907, Proc. Nos. 41-6.

collection of statutory labour, preparation of lists of defaulter, collection of fines and reporting cases of damage from deficient or excessive water supply. Deane also proposed a uniform cess of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the land revenue and an equal amount from Government to pay for the enlarged revenue establishment.¹ The Government of India accepted Deane's recommendations except the one regarding cess; they were inclined to abolish the cess altogether, because this would be in keeping with their general policy to abolish cesses wherever possible.² Deane insisted on the retention of the cess and pointed out that since the owners of canal irrigated land in Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan were paying a similar cess, its abolition in Bannu would make it hard to justify its retention in the former districts. Further, the new assessment on canal lands was "extremely light", and the people could easily pay the cess. Moreover the labour supplied by the people was light as the canals were perennial, the population dense and the need for canal clearance, owing to the rapid slope of the ground, comparatively slight.³


²Deputy Secy. to Govt. of India to Chief Commissioner, 7 December 1907, ibid.

These arguments had the desired effect: the Indian government did not press for the abolition of the cess and they asked the Chief Commissioner to pay a moderate rate of wages to those who had the customary obligation to provide free labour for the maintenance of the canals. The arrangement, so Roos-Keppel observed later, proved "popular and fairly satisfactory", which justified its continuance.

Deane did not find much opportunity for the improvement of minor canals in other districts - Hazara, Kohat and Peshawar. The hill streams in the three districts were snow fed and perennial. In Hazara and Kohat, they were fully utilised by a system of distributaries constructed and maintained by the people themselves. In Peshawar, the hill streams were diverted into Government and private canals.

The recommendation of the Irrigation Commission for takavi loans and liberal grants-in-aid to the cultivators for irrigation works was also acted upon by the North-West Frontier administration. From 1903, sums varying from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 32,000 per annum were spent as takavi loans for the construction of minor irrigation

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1 Deputy Secy. to Govt. of India to Chief-Commissioner, 4 May, 11 June 1908, ibid.


3 Deane to Secy. to Govt. of India, 24 August 1907, I.R.A.P. (FAMINE), vol. 7617, September 1907, Proc. No. 2.
works in the Province. These grants, Deane informed the Indian government, were much appreciated by the people and a good many useful but "unpretentious" schemes were carried out.\textsuperscript{1}

In 1906 the Indian government took another important step to improve private irrigation works by legislating for the enforcement of the obligation to repair them. All the local governments were asked to report, first, on the existing laws and customs obliging the landlords and tenants to repair the works, and, secondly, whether any step was necessary to make such laws and customs more definite so as to enforce such obligations.\textsuperscript{2}

For the Frontier Province Deane reported that in the five settled districts the obligations of the irrigators had always been embodied in a statement called the \textit{Riwaj-i-Abpashi}. The statement was first compiled for the Peshawar district during the settlement of 1892-6, and for other districts during the revised settlements (1900-1907).\textsuperscript{3} It embodied the customs regarding water distribution, construction of new channels, their maintenance and repair and silt clearance. Penalties were imposed on land owners and tenants for non-performance of their stipulated duties and ob-

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{2}Govt. of India Circular No. 7-40-1 of 9 March 1906, para 5, cited in Deane's letter to Secy. to Govt. of India, 5 August 1906, I.R.A.P. (FAMINE), vol. 7341, August 1906, Proc. No. 40.

\textsuperscript{3}See Chapter V , p. 266.
ligations which were well-known and accepted. The disadvantage of working through the Riwaj was that no clear enforcement system existed. Deane therefore proposed that the Punjab Minor Canals Act should be extended to the Frontier Province so as to provide a legal and administrative mechanism for enforcing penalties on defaulters. Sections 26 and 27 of this Act empowered the local government to compel the irrigators to furnish free labour for clearing the canals and keeping them in an efficient state. The Collectors would frame rules regarding the amount of labour to be furnished, the attendance, distribution and control of labourers. They would assess and recover the cost of such labour from defaulters and spend that money on the upkeep of the canals. These provisions, in Deane's view, were sufficient to ensure the efficient working of the private canals in his Province, and no further definition of existing irrigation laws and customs was required. Deane's proposals were accepted by the Government of India and in February 1907 these sections of the Punjab Minor Canals Act were duly extended to the Frontier Province.  

From improving and extending private irrigation works the Frontier Province authorities turned again to the construction of

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1 See pp. 307-10.
State irrigation projects: the Paharpur Inundation Canal, the Hazarkhani branch of the Kabul River Canal and the Upper Swat Canal in the Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar districts.

It was in 1900 that the scheme for the Paharpur Inundation Canal was first mooted by H.W. Gee, the then Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan. Its object was to utilise the Indus waters for irrigating those parts of the district which had suffered most in the prevailing drought of that year. For some time no action was taken by the Punjab government mainly due to the lack of necessary funds. In 1904, J. Benton, the Chief Engineer, Punjab, who was also the Secretary for Irrigation, North-West Frontier Province, submitted a definite plan for the construction of the canal. The tract to be irrigated lay on the west side of the Indus and extended from Bilot to Dera Ismail Khan cantonment, an agriculturally insecure area. The estimated expense was Rs. 7,25,000; the gross area to be irrigated was 41,588 acres, and the hoped-for return was 7.03 per cent on the total capital outlay. The local government recommended the project as a minor work, but the

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1 After the construction of the new Swat River canal, the old Swat River canal (see p.304–4) came to be known as the Lower Swat Canal, and the new canal as the Upper Swat Canal.

2 See p.315.

Government of India found the scheme fulfilled the conditions of a productive public work and approved it as such. In December 1908 a revised estimate put the total cost at Rs. 9,88,282, and the return at 4.33 per cent on the total capital outlay. In March 1910 the canal was completed. Its total length, including the Hafizkur distributary was fifty-seven miles.

An area of about 10,000 acres of Government waste land was commanded by the new canal, and the expected income from this tract was regarded by the Government as one of the main assets of the canal. In 1907 Deane submitted a scheme for the colonisation of the Government waste land; the scheme was based on the Chenab and Jhelum Colonies System with some modification to suit the

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1 Ibid.; Govt. of India to Secy. of State, No. 34, 1 December 1904, ibid.

3 The vast tract of land now irrigated by the lower Chenab, Jhelum and Bari Doab canals in the Punjab, was originally a desert with very scanty rainfall. Hence, "it was necessary simultaneously with the introduction of irrigation to transport bodily whole communities into the new areas thus opened up." Before the colonists arrived, the alignment of the water-course was made, the land in each colony tract was demarcated into large and small blocks, and land was set apart in the vicinity for grazing and other communal purposes. These colony villages were thus systematically planned. The colonists who were chosen by British revenue officers had a fair proportion of hereditary landlords or occupancy tenants among them. The average area allotted to each individual was generally from forty to fifty acres. Harris, op.cit., pp. 32-8; G. B. Jathar, and S. G. Beri, Indian Economics, I (Fourth edn.), pp. 229-30.
local conditions. Deane proposed that Jats, Baluchis, Harvat Pathans and other Pathans who were the main agricultural tribes of Dera Ismail Khan and known to be the best cultivators in the district should be settled on the lands. The new settlers were to be grouped according to tribes into four or five new villages. Deane wished that one-fourth of the land should be reserved for the Nawabs, Raizes (chiefs) and the leading Khans of the district as a reward for their loyalty and past services to Government. In order to woo the Nawabs and Khans, Deane suggested special terms for them; they were to pay nazrana to be realized in instalments and also malikana at the rate of eight annas per rupee on the land revenue for the first three years and twelve annas per rupee thereafter. However, the peasant colonists would pay, in addition to land revenue and cesses, a malikana of twelve annas per rupee for the first three years and thereafter a sum equal to the land revenue. Deane also proposed that the Khans be at once granted rights of occupancy which would pass to their successors in accordance with the rules of primogeniture. The peasant grantees, on the other hand, would not be given occupancy rights before the expiry of five years and only after they had fulfilled certain conditions as regards cultivation and payment of sums to cover the cost of construction and maintenance of water courses. The Government would assist the settlers with takavi loans and allow them full remission of land revenue for the first two harvests.
reaped after the commencement of the tenancy. However, Deane's colonisation scheme could not be put through. The Government of India withheld their sanction as they had before them a bill amending the law relating to the colonisation of government waste lands in the Punjab and wanted the same to be extended to the Frontier Province.

In the meantime, the Mahsud problem on the border caused great anxiety to the Government and various measures to deal with the situation were examined. One of these was to settle the Mahsuds on government waste lands on the Paharpur canal which would bring about their future pacification. To W.R.H.Merk, the Acting Chief Commissioner, whose opinion was sought by the Government, the scheme appeared feasible and worth trying. Merk suggested the settlement of one thousand Mahsud families over an area of about ten thousand acres of waste land. The selection of the families to be settled was to be entirely left to the tribesmen themselves, because any Government attempt at general

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3 See Chapter IX, p. 84-9.

selection might cause resentment among those excluded. The management of the colony would, however, be exclusively under the direct orders of the Chief Commissioner and the Resident in Waziristan. The colony would be placed under the immediate charge of an Extra Assistant Commissioner or Tahsildar who would deal with its revenue and magisterial administration. As regards the conditions of colonisation Merk recommended that for the first two years nothing should be charged from the colonists; for the next three years eight annas per acre should be levied, and then one rupee per acre for the next five years; thereafter the rates might be further enhanced. But the assessment should always be on consolidated rates since the Mahsuds were and would remain incapable of understanding the British land revenue administration with all its complexities of owner's rate, occupier's rate, water rate and so forth. The Mahsuds, since they were financially not well off, should also be assisted by advances of fifty rupees per family. The terms on which land would be given to the Mahsuds were, according to Merk, "loyalty to Government, good conduct, aid to Government officers in matters relating to the tribe, and reasonable punctuality in the payment of sums due on the land". Merk pointed out that if by adopting this scheme, the Government could pacify the tribe and avoid the need for expeditions into the Mahsud country, they would escape "a grievous and deplorable burden
The Government of India then asked for the opinions of other officers having an intimate knowledge of the Mahsuds; these opinions were divided. H.R. Fraser, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, for instance, was not opposed to the scheme in principle but he could not at the same time overlook that there was some danger in the settlement of the Mahsuds, "a tribe of notoriously criminal propensities", in close proximity to the peaceful population of the district. Besides, the preferential treatment proposed for the Mahsuds in the form of lighter water rates and land revenue would cause soreness to the British subjects in the district who might feel that misdeeds rather than loyalty to the Government were being rewarded. Major G. Dodd, Political Agent, Wana, however, welcomed Merk's scheme as an important means of "securing satisfactory relations" with the tribe. He suggested that

the land should be made available to the Mahsuds, and that no secret should be made of the fact, and that the tribe should be informed that it would be given to them when they had set their own house in order and had shown by their continued behaviour that they were worthy of confidence, and when they were capable of allotting the land among themselves in such a way as would be satisfactory to the whole tribe and would comply with Government conditions as to tenancy.

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1 Merk to Secy. to Govt. of India, 21 December 1909, ibid.

2 Depy. Secy. to Govt. of India to Chief Commissioner, 1 June 1910, ibid.

Dodd believed that this policy was the "very best" for bringing about the pacification of the tribe.\(^1\) F. W. Johnston, the Officiating Resident of Waziristan, "generally agreed" with both Fraser and Dodd, but added that any preferential treatment to the Mahsuds would have "bad effect on the tribe as well as on the inhabitants of the district".\(^2\) Merk appreciated the doubts and qualifications of his subordinates, but held to his own view that the Mahsud colonisation scheme ought to be given a trial. He recommended that the Mahsud settlers be given "easy terms in the outset" but he treated equally with the British subjects in the district in the long run. Merk pointed out that "a clear, reasonable and firm policy" towards the Mahsuds would promote better understanding between them and the Government, enabling the latter to construct works of public utility like roads, hospitals and wireless stations in the Mahsud country - as had been done in the Khyber and Malakand Agencies.\(^3\)

The Mahsud Colonisation Scheme was still hanging fire when Roos-Keppel returned from England in late 1910. Roos-Keppel did not agree with Merk, whose scheme, he condemned as both "tactically and morally wrong". The British subjects in the district, Roos-Keppel

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\(^1\) Dodd to Johnston, 18 August 1910, *ibid.*

\(^2\) Johnston to Secy. to the Chief-Commissioner, 5 September 1910, *ibid.*

\(^3\) Merk to Secy., Govt. of *India*, 7 October 1910, *ibid.*
argued, had a stronger claim on the Government waste land than the Mahsuds. Besides, the grant of such land had always been made as a reward for good conduct, not as "bribes to induce unrepentant criminals to reform". Roos-Keppel believed that the proposed Mahsud colony "would fail, that the ultimate result in improving Government's relations with the tribe would be nil, and that it might make things worse than they were now". The colony might serve as a base for dacoity, and the loyal British subjects of Dera Ismail Khan might resent "the dumping of undesirables" in their midst. Roos-Keppel also doubted if the Mahsud colonists could be held as a guarantee for the good behaviour of the rest of the tribe; the Government could not, of course, punish the colonists for the crimes of their brethren in the tribal territory.¹ These arguments went home, the Indian government ultimately abandoned the scheme and the waste land was distributed among British subjects.²

The construction of the Paharpur canal necessitated the re-organisation of the subordinate revenue establishment of the Dera Ismail Khan district in connection with the working of the new canal. To avoid the inconveniences of double revenue establishment —

¹Roos-Keppel to Secy. to Govt. of India, 1 December 1910, ibid.
²Deputy Secy. to Govt. of India to Chief-Commissioner, 10 May 1912, ibid., vol. 8968, May 1912, Proc. No. 18.
the ordinary district establishment to assess the land revenue, and a special canal establishment for the recording of irrigation and assessment of water rates - the two functions, Deane proposed, should be discharged by the district establishment under the Collector. The latter would be responsible for the revenue management of the canal, the assessment of water rates, their collection and furnishing of returns to the Irrigation Department. The Irrigation Department would be responsible for the maintenance of the canal and the proper distribution of its water. To cope with the consequent increase of work of the district revenue staff, Deane asked for an enlarged establishment.\(^1\) All these recommendations were accepted by the Government of India, and the arrangements worked "fairly satisfactorily" in the period under review.\(^2\)

However, the Paharpur canal did not prove remunerative. In 1919-20, the total area irrigated amounted to only 20,670 acres, while the culturable area originally estimated had been 63,450 acres. The total revenue realised from the canal in 1919-20 was only Rs. 14,193, but the working expenses ran to Rs. 93,609 in that year. There was, thus, a deficit of Rs. 79,416. The loss was 8.62 per cent on the capital outlay.\(^3\) The unremunerative character of the

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\(^1\) Deane to Secy. to Govt. of India, 27 November 1907, Deputy Secy. to Govt. of India to Chief Commissioner, 11 February 1908, I.R.A.P. (Land Revenue), vol. 7894, February 1908, Proc. Nos. 3-4.

canal was attributed to two main causes; first, the water rates were extremely low\(^1\) and for a two fold reason: it was an inundation canal usable for only about four months in the year — May to September — and the construction of the canal had resulted in the closure of two natural channels with which the cultivators had previously been irrigating their land. As a concession to these cultivators the water rates on the canal had to be kept low.\(^2\) Secondly, nearly every year the canal was extensively breached by hill torrents, putting it out of action at the time of the "keenest demand" for water;\(^3\) besides, heavy expenditure had to be incurred to repair the canal. In 1917-18 the Indus had changed its course to the east bank. As a result the Bilot creek from which the canal led off, silted up and eventually the flow of water into the canal ceased at any but the highest floods of the Indus.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)The water rates varied according to circles and nature of the crop; in 1907, the average incidence per acre was between Rs. 1-2-3 and Rs. 2-5-0. **I.P.W.P. (Irrigation)**, vol. 7625, March 1907, Proc. Nos. 40-42.


\(^4\)**Ibid.**, p.5.
The second state project was the Hazarkhani branch of the Kabul River canal in the Peshawar district. The need for this work which would supply water to the cantonment and city of Peshawar and irrigate the Hazarkhani boundary area was realised by the Punjab Government in 1895. The lack of funds prevented its construction until 1902 when M.R. Field, the Officiating Chief Engineer and Secretary for Irrigation, North-West Frontier Province, submitted an estimate for the work. A more detailed estimate was prepared two years later by J. Benton, Field's successor. The area to be irrigated was 11,251 acres. The revenue return on the capital expenditure was expected to be 5.37 per cent. The project was completed in 1906-07. In 1905-06 the canal irrigated an area of 31,668 acres; in 1907-08, 37,632 acres. In 1905-06, the total revenue assessment of the canal was Rs. 1,26,572 and in 1907-08, Rs. 1,41,477.

Finally, the boldest irrigation scheme of the Government was the Upper Swat Canal in the Peshawar district. In the words of Harris, "although of moderate size," there are "few irrigation works in India which make so direct an appeal to the imagination

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1 Field to Secy. to Govt. of India, 18 September 1902, I.P.W.P. (Irrigation), vol. 6573, November 1902, Proc. No. 22.

2 Benton to Secy. to Govt. of India, 7 September 1904, ibid., vol. 6840, December 1904, Proc. No. 34.

3 Revenue Report of the Canals in N.W.F.P. for the triennial period, 1905-06 to 1907-08, p.9.
as this canal.\textsuperscript{1}

The great success, both financial and political, of the Swat River Canal\textsuperscript{2} inspired the Chief Commissioner, Deane, to extend irrigation in the Peshawar valley still further. From time to time various schemes had been put forward with the object of enlarging and extending the waters of the Indus for irrigating the \textit{khadir} (low-lying lands near river) lands in Swabi \textit{tahsil}.\textsuperscript{3}

Early in 1904, Benton inspected the Swat River Canal and was convinced of the necessity of constructing an entirely new canal taken out of the Swat river at a much higher level so as to command a much greater area. Benton's plan was to lead a canal about half-a-mile down stream of Chakdarra fort, and to carry it along fairly low land, nearly parallel with the Chakdarra-Malakand road to the Malakand pass. There the range of hills would be pierced by a tunnel about five hundred feet long. The water on emerging from the tunnel would fall into the Dargai Nulla, forming a three hundred foot cataract. On reaching Dargai, the main line (17 miles) would bifurcate into the Machai (50.6 miles) and Abazai (18.6 miles) branches. The Machai branch would follow the foot of the hills on the east until the crest of the Swabi plateau commanding

\textsuperscript{1}Harris, \textit{op.cit.}, p.76.

\textsuperscript{2}See pp.311-4.

\textsuperscript{3}Minto's Administration of India, Public Works Dept., pp. 11-2, Minto Papers, vol. M 853.
the Indus valley and both sides of the Swabi range of hills was reached. Then it would split again into the Pehur (14.6 miles), Indus (21.5 miles) and Maira (20.4 miles) branches. The Abazai branch would go along the foot of the hills to the west. The entire seventeen-mile main line of the canal, from Chakdarra to Dargai, would be located in tribal territory. The total area to be commanded by the canal was estimated at 448,895 acres, of which 382,000 acres or eighty-five per cent would be perenially irrigated. The canal would yield a revenue of Rs. 1,458,057, representing a return of eight per cent on the total capital outlay of Rs. 18,240,284.¹

This "exceedingly bold project" had two important features: the construction of its headworks and upper reach across the frontier in tribal territory, and the great amount of tunnelling work "never before attempted in canal construction".²

In September 1905, O'Dwyer, who was officiating as the Chief Commissioner, observed that the scheme was "financially sound, politically expedient and administratively desirable". O'Dwyer quoted Deane to emphasise the political advantages of the canal.


²Ibid.
"A work of this sort," Deane had written, "which necessarily assists in settling down and bringing prosperity to a restless people must have a good political effect. It further affords employment to a considerable number of trans-border men who have poor lands of their own and who come in as cultivators. The Swat Canal was originally undertaken as a political work. It has paid in every respect beyond expectations, and I see no reason why this new canal should not be as successful."

A shrewd Pathan had also advised O'Dwyer in like terms. The Pathan had said that

were it not for the Swat River Canal the inhabitants of our town territory north of the Kabul river would have been against us [British] to a man in the disturbances of 1897. The hold which the Canal gives us [British] over them [tribes], he said, not only kept our own people straight, but about 30 to 40 per cent of the tribal population on the Peshawar border, whose interests were directly or indirectly bound up with the canal.

The result of the new canal, the Pathan assured O'Dwyer, would be, in the first place, "to make the possibility of a rising like that of 1897 very remote" and should one occur "to keep 70 to 80 per cent of the tribes to the north of Peshawar" on the British side.

The attitude of the tribes, so it was reported, was most favourable. Both within the settled districts and in the tribal territory people were already beginning to calculate the benefits they would derive from the canal, and were eagerly looking forward

1 Ibid.

to its construction. Reports had it that the value of land in the Babusai tract below the Malakand had already risen from thirty to eighty rupees per acre, and it had become difficult to purchase even fallow lands. Moreover the maliks of Upper Swat whose tracts were beyond the scope of the new canal scheme had begun to approach the Political Agent of Malakand to get contracts to supply labour for the canal.¹

In sanctioning the scheme the Home government advised the Government of India to observe "caution and tact" during both the construction and subsequent administration of the canal, especially in so far as it involved dealings with the frontier tribes.²

In June 1907 the construction of the canal began. About fifteen months later, in September 1908, it was found that the attitude of the tribesmen was not as friendly as had been expected. It had been planned that the first half of the eight or nine miles of the canal in tribal territory would be carried through the Amandarra pass. This, however, was a sacred place containing a large number of graves, and the Khan Khels of Batkhela protested against this. Moreover, the Alizai Khans raised objections to labour

¹ O'Dwyer to Secy. to Govt. of India, 4 September 1905, ibid., vol. 7349, February 1906, Proc. Nos. 45-6.

being imported for the canal.\textsuperscript{1} Though Deane had originally intended to execute one-fourth of the work by local labour, it had been found impracticable to do so. The Swatis, through whose villages the canal would pass, were too well-off to agree to work as "navvies". They refused to undertake hard work at market rates of wages. The jirgas wanted to supply labour at rates which were much higher than the Government could give. The maliks, too, would take large contracts from the Government at favourable rates and then sublet the contracts to other contractors.\textsuperscript{2} Besides, trouble was also anticipated regarding the existing tribal water rights which were likely to be affected by the new canal. Roos-Keppel pointed out to Government that these political difficulties had not been given due consideration when the construction of the canal started, and that the work had been undertaken without "sufficient regard to the feelings and apprehensions of a suspicious, ignorant and fanatical people".\textsuperscript{3}

In February 1909, the Government of India asked Roos-Keppel for a fuller report on the attitude of the tribesmen towards the canal and the political effect of dropping the project altogether.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Minto's Administration of India, Public Works Dept., p. 3, Minto Papers, vol. M 853.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Minto's Administration of India, Public Works Dept, p. 3, Minto Papers, vol. M 853.
\end{itemize}
The Chief Commissioner reported that the tribes of Sam Ranizai on the south side of the Malakand pass were strongly in favour of the canal because it would provide irrigation facilities to their lands hitherto unirrigated. The tribes of Ranizai living on the northern side of the Malakand pass were also favourably disposed towards the canal. But the tribes of Lower and Upper Swat resented the construction of the canal, because they would not derive any benefit from it while the canal would give the Government a further footing in Swat. Roos-Keppel was against the abandonment of the canal project, because it would give a chance to the mullas and other influential men of Lower and Upper Swat to boast that merely by "a show of opposition" they had foiled the Government's plan. If the project were abandoned the tribes of Sam Ranizai would think that they had been misled by the Government.\footnote{Roos-Keppel to Secy. to Govt. of India, 1 May 1909, I.F.P.P. (Frontier), vol. 8513, May 1910, Proc. Nos. 1-17.}

In view of these political difficulties, Roos-Keppel reported, the canal authorities had made some alterations in the original plan of the canal. A new low-level alignment of the canal was selected to obviate many of the difficulties of the original line and to remove the grievances of the tribesmen.\footnote{Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 1 May 1909, I.F.P.P. (Frontier), vol. 8513, May 1910, Proc. Nos. 1-17.} Next, measures
had been taken to obtain the tribal goodwill; some allowances and "quarrying royalties" were paid to the jirgas; "very liberal rates were given for the land required for the canal, this being in many cases taken on a perpetual lease instead of, as usual, being acquired outright so as not to affect the position held in their villages by the owners as landlords."¹

A large force of khassadars was also engaged to provide employment to the tribesmen as well as to make them responsible for the safety of the canal works during construction.²

The new low level alignment of the canal shortened the main channel by about four and a half miles, but involved the construction of a tunnel 11,234 feet long (later known as the Benton tunnel) which was more than twice the length originally planned. These changes led in December 1913 to revised estimates; the total cost now stood at Rs. 1,99,24,287 and the return expected at 7.5 per cent on the capital outlay.³ The canal was opened in 1914 but it was soon found that the capacity of the Benton tunnel was much below the full requirements. To remedy this and some other defects, the second revised estimate was made in May 1915. The cost

¹Harris, op.cit., p.77.


³R. Eggerton Pervez, Secy. Irrigation, N.W.F.P., to Secy. to Govt. of India, 15 December 1913, Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 13 August 1914, Secy. of State to Viceroy, Tel. 23 September 1914, I.P.W.P. (Irrigation), vol. 9477, August 1914, Proc. Nos. 4-7.
now estimated was Rs. 2,01,29,088 and the revenue return was 6.5 per cent on the capital outlay.¹

Financially, the canal proved a failure. It was expected that in 1919-20, the canal would water 283,682 acres of land but only 138,191 acres or a little less than half of the original estimate was irrigated in that year. The gross revenue realised as water-rates in 1919-20 was Rs. 5,16,125, but the working expenses of the canal in that year were Rs. 5,24,265, which meant a deficit of 0.038 per cent on the capital outlay.² The unproductive nature of the canal was partly attributable to political causes. In 1914-15 when the Government first intended to levy water rates, Roos-Keppel advised that only light rates should be imposed on the tribesmen as a conciliatory measure during the existing War situation.³ In September 1915 a permanent remission of canal water rates on one thousand acres of land in the tribal territory was granted to the tribesmen as a mark of appreciation of their co-operation in the construction of the canal. This involved the Irrigation Department in an annual loss of Rs. 45,000.⁴ Moreover

the Government had to incur some additional expenses for maintaining special establishments like the khassadars and guards for the protection of the canal. In 1921 the expense on this head was Rs. 47,000.¹ The Government of India was not unduly disturbed, however, that the canal had proved unremunerative in a strict sense. For, as they put it, if the canal tended "to convert the turbulent and restless tribesmen of the Swat valley into peaceful and contented husbandmen, such a result will have been cheaply purchased even if the canal were to fail altogether to satisfy the conditions of a productive public work".²

The extension of irrigation in the Frontier Province resulted in a change in the system of administrative control of the canals. At the time of the formation of the province it was decided that the state canals in the new province should be managed, as they had hitherto been, by the Punjab Irrigation Department. The Chief Engineer and Secretary to the Department would act in like capacity for the new province. The new province had only one division, called the Mardan division, with jurisdiction over the Swat River canal and the Kabul River canal. The division formed a part of the Jhelum circle under the control of a Superintending Engineer.


²Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 26 May 1916, Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 26 July 1916, ibid., vol. 9966, September 1916, Proc. No. 25.
With the construction of new canals in the Frontier Province, considerable change took place in the canal administration. In 1903 the revenue management of the Kabul River Canal was transferred from the Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar to the Irrigation Department of the Punjab Government. In 1905, the Paharpur inundation canal was placed in charge of the canal officers of the Jhelum Circle. In 1907, when the Upper Swat Canal Project was taken up, a new circle called the Swat River Canals Circle was constituted. It included all the Government canals in the Peshawar district. The Paharpur Canal was later transferred to this circle.

In August 1911, Roos-Keppel pointed out that the great expansion in irrigation in the province had rendered the existing administration of the Irrigation Department unsatisfactory. Under this administration, a closer relation between the Chief Commissioner and his Irrigation Secretary was not possible. The Irrigation Department received its funds direct from and referred financial matters direct to the Government of India. But in 1910, by the introduction of the quasi-provincial settlement, the expenditure on all the state canals, except the Upper Swat River Canal, which remained Imperial, had become provincial. Therefore, for the maintenance of financial control, direct relations between the

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1 See Chapter I, pp. 58-9.
Chief-Commissioner and his Irrigation Secretary were essential. But the Secretary lived at Lahore, and it was only on the "rarest occasions" that he and the Chief-Commissioner could meet. Roos-Keppel therefore proposed that with the exception of the Upper Swat River Canal, which would remain Imperial, all the other state canals should be placed under the control of the Superintending Engineer, Swat River Canals Circle, who would also be the Secretary to the Irrigation Department of the Frontier Province. His headquarters would be at Peshawar so that the Chief-Commissioner could consult him whenever necessary. However, the Government of India decided not to change the existing system until the completion of the Upper Swat River Canal. It was thus not till 1915 that the Frontier Province acquired a separate Irrigation Department.

A survey of the development of irrigation in the period under review shows certain facts, the most important of them being the increase in acreage under irrigation. In 1911, the area irrigated by the state canals was 225,890 acres, in 1921, 335,809 acres - an increase of 47.78 per cent.

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2 Deputy Secy. to Govt. of India to Chief-Commissioner, 8 February 1912, ibid.; Secy., Irrigation, N.W.F.P., to Secy. to Govt. of India, 28 April 1913, Offg. Secy. to Govt. of India to Chief-Commissioner, 23 August 1913, ibid., vol. 9229, September 1913, Proc. Nos. 10-11, Under Secy. to Govt. of India to Chief-Commissioner, 19 February 1915, ibid., vol. 9736, February 1916, Proc. Nos. 39-42.

But in spite of this fairly progressive development of irrigation in the province, there was still room for further expansion of irrigation facilities. The table illustrates this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Length of main lines in miles</th>
<th>Culturable area commanded by each in acres</th>
<th>Average area irrigated in 1919-20</th>
<th>Date of first irrigation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Swat Canal</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>150,406</td>
<td>162,073</td>
<td>1887-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul River Canal</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34,913</td>
<td>45,773</td>
<td>1903-1904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paharpur Canal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>63,450</td>
<td>20,670</td>
<td>1907-1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Swat Canal</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>309,996</td>
<td>138,194</td>
<td>1914-15(^1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is evident that the Lower Swat and Kabul River Canals irrigated more area than they had originally been expected to do, but there was still room for extension of the area irrigated by the Upper Swat and the Paharpur Canals. These two canals involved heavy and increas-


ing working expenses for the Irrigation Department of the Province. In 1918-19 the net loss to the Department from the two canals was Rs. 4,39,974; in 1920 Rs. 5,08,231; in 1921 Rs. 6,91,331.¹

It was mainly due to the implementation of the recommendations of the Indian Irrigation Commission (1901-03) and the keen interest taken by the local authorities of the Province that a satisfactory progress in the field of irrigation became possible. The development was two-fold; the improvement and extension of the private irrigation works and the construction of new canals by the Government.

The private irrigation systems of the Daman in Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu were improved with active financial support from the Government. Also for their efficient administration, a large establishment was created. Moreover, the powers of the Deputy Commissioners of supervising, managing and controlling the private irrigation works were enhanced in 1907 when the Punjab Minor Canals Act was extended to the Frontier Province.

The local Government constructed the Hazar Khani branch of the Kabul River Canal, Upper Swat Canal and the Paharpur Inundation Canal. These developments created the necessity of a separate Irrigation Department for the Province, which was

¹North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee Report, 1924, p.42.
established in 1915. The change broke the utter dependence of
the Frontier Province on the Punjab Irrigation Authorities
who, in the past, had not been able to pay adequate attention to
the irrigational needs of the Province.
Chapter VII

EDUCATION

Compared with other provinces of British India, the development of modern education in the Frontier province has a relatively recent history. With the exception of Burma, the area which constituted the North-West Frontier Province was the last acquisition of the British and hence the last to receive the benefits of the educational system. Since the regions were outlying tracts, the Government's efforts in introducing and expanding education in the territory were more restricted than in centrally situated areas. Local prejudice and indifference to Western education had a considerable effect in retarding the spread of education. The mulls and such other religious men who wielded overwhelming influence on the local population were hostile to British schemes of popular education, suspecting them to be deliberate attempts at undermining the sacerdotal authority and destroying the religious faith of the population.\(^1\) The inhabitants of the province, proud of their martial character, preferred "the sword to the pen". In fact, the Pathan

always despised education as fit only for Hindus and cowards. He had little need for spelling, but much for swordsmanship, and if the Hamsayah of an alien creed, whom he employed to look after his money matters, cheated him so flagrantly that even his ignorant master could not overlook it, there was short shrift for the accountant, and a fresh start was made with a clean sheet.1

Two stages can be clearly identified in the educational development of the province during the period under review. The first (1901-1910) was a period when the system of education obtaining in the Punjab was continued in the Frontier districts, the educational administration being in the hands of the officers of the Punjab government. During these years education made slow progress primarily for two reasons: the lack of initiative and drive on the part of the educational authorities; and the paucity of funds - the strings of the Imperial Exchequer were quite tight. The local boards did not have enough funds; private initiative was not forthcoming and the majority Muslim community lacked both the spirit of cooperation and enthusiasm about secular instruction. The second phase of educational development extended from 1911 to 1921. These were years full of promise, hope and activity; the authorities displayed resourcefulness, energy and initiative; funds were available; above all, a clear-cut, ambitious programme was laid out, the object being

1 Census of India, 1911, N.W.F.P., p.176; Census of India, 1921, N.W.F.P., 177.
a wide diffusion of free primary education...
the consolidation and re-organisation of existing facilities for secondary education and the encouragement of local effort for the extension of collegiate education on popular lines.¹

At the time of the formation of the new province there were three kinds of schools: those established and maintained by private munificence, endowments and customary gifts of the communities; those established and managed privately, but recognised and aided by Government; those managed and maintained by the Government through local boards. The existing private schools had been set up by the three main communities, the Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. The Muslims had their mosque schools, maktabs and madrasas. In maktabs, the maulvis and Imams taught chiefly the Qur'an by rote, taking no fees from the pupils. In madrasas instruction was confined to the teaching of Arabic and Persian. Girls also attended schools where the Qur'an was taught to them by the wives of men who were teachers by profession. The Hindus had their pathsalas and the Sikhs their Gurmukhi schools; instruction in both being confined mainly to sacred scriptures. They also maintained Mahajani schools where commercial instruction was imparted to students. In general the private schools were beginning to decline, the Government giving little encouragement

particularly to those schools imparting only religious instruction.\(^1\)

In 1901-02, there were 927 private schools in the settled districts with 13,636 pupils.\(^2\)

The aided and the Government schools were divided into two categories, primary and secondary, the latter having middle and high classes. Secondary schools were classified into Anglo-Vernacular and Vernacular according to whether instruction in English did or did not form part of their regular curriculum. High Schools were all Anglo-Vernacular, while Middle and Primary Schools were of both kinds. In the Anglo-Vernacular schools emphasis was given to the teaching of English and in the higher classes instruction in all subjects was imparted through the medium of English. The High Schools had two classes, the Middle Schools three. The primary schools were divided into two categories, upper primary (having two classes) and lower primary (having three). More than half of the school-going children did not study beyond the upper primary stage.\(^3\)


\(^2\) *Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1901-02*, p. 3.

The curriculum in the primary schools consisted of reading, writing and arithmetic besides some lessons in Geography, Persian and Mensuration. The courses of study in the secondary schools were the same as prescribed for such schools in the Punjab. In the Anglo-Vernacular middle schools the curriculum consisted of vernacular languages, English, arithmetic, history, geography, mensuration, elementary science and drawing; geometry and algebra were optional. The same course was taught in the Vernacular middle schools with the only difference that English did not form part of the curriculum. The High Schools prepared students for the matriculation examination of the Punjab University.¹ In 1901-02, there were one hundred and fifty-four primary schools for boys in the Province, of which one hundred and thirty-one were maintained by local bodies, sixteen were aided, and seven unaided. These primary schools contained 7,365 pupils.² The Province possessed only twenty-eight Vernacular and Anglo-Vernacular middle and high schools for boys, of which seventeen were maintained by local bodies, five were aided, and six were unaided. The total number of students in these institutions was 5,082.³

¹ The curriculum in High Schools consisted of English, a classical or vernacular or oriental or Western language, elementary mathematics, History and Geography. In addition, there were alternative courses in science and commercial subjects.


³ Quinquennial Review of Educational Progress in India, 1897-1902, Statistical Tables, p.95.
The Government's grants-in-aid to private schools were given partly per capita, the amount of aid per pupil varying according to his instructional stages. Further, schools for purposes of grants-in-aid were classed according to the standard of instruction imparted in them into excellent, good and fair; the better the standard, the more liberal the grant. Schools with suitably qualified teachers received more money than those with none. The main purpose of the grant-in-aid system obtaining in the frontier districts was to encourage private enterprise to improve the standard of instruction in schools rather than the expansion of educational institutions.¹ To encourage primary education, fees in schools were kept low; the special rates had to be continued for many years because of "the backward state of education in almost all the districts". In 1901-02, there were no scholarships for pupils studying at the primary level except a sum of Rs. 147 granted in studentships to a few Waziri and Dauri boys in Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu districts.² One hundred and five scholarships of the total annual value of Rs. 4,217 were given for middle and high school students.³

³Ibid., pp. 7-9.
Of the three main communities - Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, the former was the most backward in education. Though it constituted 92.1 per cent of the total population in 1901, the percentage of boys attending institutions of all kinds was only 11.7 compared with 36.3 and 22.3 per cent in the case of Hindus and Sikhs respectively. The Government encouraged education among Muslims by granting fee concessions and special scholarships. There were nine high and thirteen middle school Victoria scholarships awarded annually and special elementary schools were maintained at Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu and Abbottabad for Muslim boys. Peshawar had an Islamia Anglo-Vernacular high school and an Anglo-Vernacular middle school.\footnote{Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1897-1902, pp. 13-4.}

The main difficulty in the expansion and improvement of education was the lack of funds. In January 1905 Deane, the Chief Commissioner, asked for a grant of at least four lakhs of rupees which, in his opinion, was the minimum amount needed if any improvements were to be carried out in the educational system, especially primary education.\footnote{Deane to Curzon, 26 January 1905, C.C., vol. 210.} The Government of India, however, sanctioned only Rs. 40,000 which was hardly sufficient even for opening a few new schools. Out of this meagre sum the cost of
establishing a training school for primary teachers at Peshawar – the first of its kind in the province – was also met.¹

As for secondary education, the general policy of the Government of India as set down by their Resolution of 1904 was not implemented in the Frontier Province. According to this resolution local governments were asked to bring about an improvement in the existing institutions by three ways – the Government providing one high school in each district as a model for private enterprise; the Government helping private secondary schools by large grants-in-aid to raise them to the standard of Government schools and finally providing greater facilities for the training of secondary school teachers.² Because of lack of funds no scheme of any importance was undertaken in the period (1901-1910) by the local government for the improvement of secondary education with the result that the education reports of the period showed nothing except a routine slow increase in the figures of schools and students, the former being negligible.³

²Indian Educational Policy. Being a Resolution Issued by the Governor-General in Council on the 11th March 1904, pp. 21-22, 41-44.
³In 1901-02, the number of secondary schools in the province was twenty-eight and it increased to thirty in 1910-11; the number of students in corresponding years was 5,082 and 9,128. Quinquennium Report, 1897-1902, p.1; ibid., 1907-12, p.5.
However, Collegiate education received some encouragement under the new educational reforms introduced by Curzon. The first College in the Province grew out of the Edwardes Collegiate (Mission) school established by the Church Mission Society. The Society had established its mission at Peshawar as far back as 1853 through the efforts of Herbert Edwardes, the then Commissioner of the Peshawar Division. In May 1855, the Society opened a primary school in the Peshawar City which was named after Edwardes, and was raised later to a high school. It was the first institution in the frontier districts to impart modern education to the local Pathans and members of other communities. The school soon achieved remarkable success being considered "one of the best in India". The Viceroy's, Lord Canning and Lord Lawrence, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Robert Montgomery, in particular showed keen interest in its progress. A hostel was built in 1872 with the alleged intention of bringing the "sons of Pathan... chiefs under Christian influence". In 1883-4 the school had five hundred students, mostly sons of gentry from

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Peshawar and Kohat. In 1901, an intermediate arts class was opened in the school with six students to meet what was claimed by the missionaries as a demand for more advanced studies on the part of local young men who hoped to qualify themselves for a professional career. In the second year the college had seventeen students which led the Principal to hopefully record that "there has been a growing interest in the new college". An annual grant of Rs. 1,200 was given to the college in 1904 and in 1907 a special grant of Rs. 25,000 was made to the college for the construction of new buildings, a science laboratory, a hostel and a library. In 1908 four college scholarships were instituted for the students of the Frontier province tenable at the Edwardes College or at any recognised college in the Punjab or at the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh.


In the Agencies, the state of education was worse than in the settled districts. There were only six aided primary schools in 1901-02 in the Kurram Agency with one hundred and ten students.¹ In the next decade, the activity of the local Government was confined to the opening of a few primary schools in the Tochi Valley, Khyber and the Shirani country. These schools were under the control of the Political Agents and in fact owed their existence to the individual efforts, personal interest and initiative of these officers. Education was free for the tribal boys, and the schools were periodically inspected by the officers of the Education Department.²

Educationally, the period 1901-10 was marked by little conspicuous progress. In fact, the percentage of literacy had fallen from 5.5 in 1901 to .50 in 1911.³ The facilities for primary education in the rural areas were entirely inadequate. For an area of 4,530 square miles with a population of 1,065,097 there were only 214 District Board Schools and forty aided schools. The educational facilities in the urban areas were no better.

¹Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1897-1902, p.10.
²Quinquennium Reports on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1902-7, p.20; ibid., 1907-12, p.21; ibid., 1912-17, pp. 48-50.
³The male population of the province had increased from 1,105,683 in 1901 to 1,182,102 in 1911, while the number of literate males had decreased from 61,264 to 60,113. Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy., Govt. of India, 6 September 1911, I.E.P., vol. 8943, November 1912, Proc. No. 48.
The educational expenditure of the five municipalities - Peshawar, Abbottabad, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu - had been largely absorbed in the maintenance of the five municipal high schools while primary education had been left to private enterprise. Out of a population of approximately eighty thousand males in these five municipal areas, only 3,250 boys were receiving education in all kinds of recognised schools.¹

The state of affairs was highly unsatisfactory; education had made little or no progress. Roos-Keppel attributed this to official apathy, ineffective control and supervision² of the educational establishments and inadequate finance. He saw that

very little interest was taken in Pathan education by the Punjab Government which always looked upon the trans-Indus tract more as a step-child than as a child.²

The trouble was that after the formation of the new province no material change had taken place in the educational set up; the entire machinery of education continued to be run and controlled as before by the Punjab Government. A temporary arrangement was made regarding the educational administration of the Frontier province. An Assistant Inspector of Education of the Punjab Government was put in charge of education while the Dir-

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¹Ibid.
ector of Public Instruction, Punjab, exercised general super-
vision. The district inspectors in all districts, except Kohat, also belonged to the Punjab service. The teaching staff in the schools, too, was mostly Punjabi. It was the Punjab educational institutions again to which the Frontier Province turned for Collegiate education, the training of teachers, examinations and the choice of text books. 

It is interesting to note that when the local government of the Frontier Province were enthusiastic about the spread of education, it was the Government of India who failed to provide adequate support. Thus within one year of the formation of the province, Deane had asked the Supreme Government for the appointment of an officer of the Indian Educational Service to take charge of the Education Department. However, more than two years elapsed before, in January 1904, M.A. Stein was appointed as the Inspector-General of Education and Archaeological Surveyor for the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Stein had

2 Scheme for the administration of the N.W.F.P., 1901, pp. 71-4, C.C., vol. 320.
3 Deane to Secy., Govt. of India, 24 October 1902, Govt. of India to Secy. of State, 28 May 1903, Secy. of State to Govt. of India, 10 July 1903, I.J.P.P., vol. 638, 1903, Reg. No. 1119.
4 Dr. M.A. Stein was the Registrar of the Punjab University and Principal of the Oriental College, Lahore. Earlier he had served as Principal of the Calcutta Madrassa. He was a famous archaeologist.
hardly been in the province for two years when, in the beginning of 1906, he was sent to Turkestan on an archaeological expedition and his duties were performed by officers of the Punjab Educational service until 1910.¹

The combination of the two responsibilities — the supervision of archaeology and management of education — by the same officer had been a blunder for Stein was too occupied in archaeological excavations and exploration in distant countries to find time for effecting educational development in the province. The result was that "while research gained education languished". The system of loaning officers from the Punjab Educational Service was defective as these officers "disliked what was to them foreign service" and always longed to go back to their parent province. They had shown least inclination to visit the rural areas, where schools were in a deplorable state. The newly established schools which these officers had "shown with pride in the returns" were "wretched beyond degree". The Punjabi teachers in these schools "with little or no knowledge of Pushto, drawing Rupees 6 or Rupees 8 a month — less than the pay of a sweeper with practically no qualifications for teaching" had proved a failure. They combined with their

educational work the functions of post master, unlicensed petition-writer, shopkeeper and private secretary to the local Khan, represented in many cases the entire teaching staff of what appeared in the annual returns as a flourishing school with 30 or 40 pupils.¹

No wonder the education offered in these schools appeared to the Chief Commissioner as "a sham".

The books prescribed for the schools were out of date and in most cases unsuitable for the pupils. Roos-Keppel, while visiting some of the schools, patiently listened to recitation of English poetry by Pathan boys which appeared to him "unintelligible nonsense". The pupils themselves were least interested in what they read:

Neither lullabies to infants, nor poems on English flowers are attractive subjects for recitation by Pathan boys of 16 years of age.²

The state of affairs deeply disappointed the Chief Commissioner in whose opinion the entire educational system needed over-hauling. He therefore embarked upon large scale reforms which were carried out in the period 1911-21. The policy was the handiwork of Roos-Keppel who brought into his office anew and clear vision, a high purpose, a resolute spirit and ambition. He left education invigorated in all spheres, awakening the authorities to the fullness

²Ibid., p. 3.
of their responsibilities for the moral development of the people of his province. The personal interest he took in the matter carried him to far-flung rural areas, from where he returned convinced of the defects of the existing educational machinery and determined to remove them.

The most conspicuous feature of the reforms lay in the formation by the local government of a comprehensive and systematic policy of education and their ability to secure the necessary support from the Supreme Government to implement it. Roos-Keppel's first task was to secure effective control of the educational administration by demanding its separation from the control of the Punjab government. In 1909 he had proposed that the Education Department of the Frontier province be placed under a separate Director of Public Instruction who should belong to the Indian Educational Service. The Government of India accepted the proposal but appointed a Director who held the combined charge of the Frontier province and Baluchistan.¹

The change in Roos-Keppel's opinion had hardly been advantageous; the officer had sufficient work to do in the Frontier alone, and it was "ridiculous" that the Government should ask him "to inspect and direct education at places which are as far apart as

are London and Warsaw". Roos-Keppel kept on protesting; the Government of India took heed and in 1914 the educational charge of Baluchistan was separated and the Frontier Province got a whole-time Director of Public Instruction of its own. A separate provincial educational cadre was created for the new province and a revised scale of pay for the officers in the Education Department of the Frontier Province was introduced.

Now that the battle was won, Roos-Keppel with the cooperation of the new Director launched upon a comprehensive plan of educational reforms the aim of which he spelled out thus:

Our desire is not to be brilliantly successful with a few selected schools or merely to aim at the higher education of picked scholars, but rather to lay the foundation of an educational system, the result of which would be apparent many years hence. We hope eventually to provide every village with a primary school on demand; a proportion of scholars of these primary schools will go on to the Middle Schools and a percentage of those of the Middle Schools will go on to the High Schools, being aided whenever necessary, by scholarships... From the High Schools we shall get our College students and select our future generation of teachers, training them ourselves at the Peshawar Normal School, get a class of Primary teachers of good standing, conversant with the language of the country and in touch with the parents instead of the dregs of the Punjab, which is all we could expect to get before on the miserable pay offered.

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1 Review by Roos-Keppel, Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1911-12, p.3.


3 Roos-Keppel to Joint Secy., Govt. of India, 27 November 1911, I.E.P., vol. 8942, April 1912, Proc. Nos. 8-12; Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 15 June 1912; Secy., Govt. of India
Roos-Keppel hoped that "with the Government of India, missions, private individuals and Indian Societies working together" he could make the province a "model educational Province" by establishing at least one Primary School in every village, a Middle School within easy reach of every village, High Schools in all cities and at the capitals of all sub-divisions, and above them, competing in friendly rivalry, the Edwardes Mission Arts College and the Provincial Islamia Arts College both affiliated to the Punjab University.¹

The first item in Roos-Keppel's programme was to bring about a rapid development of primary education throughout the province. This was in keeping with the Government of India's educational policy as set out in their Resolution of 21 February 1913.² In July 1911, the Government of India had asked the local governments to submit schemes for the expansion of primary education.³

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² See below, pp.379-380.


⁴ Joint Secy., Govt. of India, to Local Governments, 6 July 1911,
Accordingly in September 1911, Roos-Keppel submitted his plan which aimed at the opening of four hundred and forty five new primary schools in the rural areas within the next five years. He had even selected the sites for these schools and had devoted considerable time in examining the curriculum which he wanted to be as simple as possible. Only Pashtu speaking teachers were to be engaged and the maximum number of pupils for a teacher was fixed at forty. In order to attract trained teachers, a special Elementary Teachers' Service consisting of four grades of salary was to be created.¹ The schools would be under the District Boards as Roos-Keppel did not have any hope of private initiative and enterprise playing any encouraging role in spreading primary education in the near future.² In order to ensure the supply of trained teachers for urban primary schools he recommended that the number of stipends at the Normal School at Peshawar should be increased from sixty to one hundred.³

To ensure better inspection of the schools, Roos-Keppel suggested the appointment of two additional inspectors, one for Peshawar and Hazara and the other for Bannu, Kohat and Dera

³Ibid.
Ismail Khan, who would relieve the District Inspectors of their administrative and clerical duty and enable them to exercise greater supervision over the instructional methods. The expenditure for all these plans would be met from three sources: funds of the local bodies, provincial revenues and grants from the Government of India which Roos-Keppel wanted to be liberally made available to him.¹

An important step towards the popularisation of primary education was taken when, in November 1911, it was made free in the schools under District Board management. At the same time English was eliminated from the primary section of the Anglo-Vernacular schools.²

Thanks to the Chief Commissioner's sustained interest and enthusiasm and liberal grants from the Government of India³ primary education made considerable progress. The number of schools in the settled districts increased from 260 in 1911-2 to 585 in 1916-7, and the number of students from 14,129 to

¹Ibid.


³The Govt. of India made a recurring grant of rupees 50,000 for primary education in 1912-13, of Rs. 55,000 in 1913-14, and of Rs. 38,000 in 1914-15. Quinquennium Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1912-7, p.13.
However, Roos-Keppel showed no great enthusiasm for rapid expansion of education in tribal territories through Government efforts. He believed that education in the independent areas will only make progress by force of the example of the districts.²

It was only in 1912 that the first Government primary school was opened in the Malakand Agency and a vernacular Middle School in 1914-15. The standard of instruction imparted in the schools was low because of lack of trained teachers; the local teachers were as reluctant to go to the Normal School at Peshawar as trained teachers from settled districts were to serve in the tribal agencies. In order to facilitate the exchange of teachers between the districts and the agencies Roos-Keppel, in 1918, instituted in the agencies the system of provident fund and pension scheme existing in the districts.³

Between 1917 and 1922, educational progress in the Province was retarded by the Government's preoccupation in the War and the disturbed political situation and the consequent diversion

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¹Ibid., p.1.


of Government funds to meet the military and political exigencies. During these five years, the District Boards could open only forty new primary schools and the number of students increased by only 902 over the 1917 figure. The economic difficulties in the War years hit the privately run institutions hard. Politically the year 1919-20 proved worst when the third Afghan War, the Rowlatt Bill agitation, the non-Cooperation and Hijrat movements, the prolonged tribal disorder and extensive tribal raids on the Bannu and Dera Ismail districts created a sense of general insecurity. The number of students attending public schools decreased.

These events held out one important lesson for the local government and for Roos-Keppel in particular. The Chief Commissioner firmly believed that the ignorant and credulous Pathans had fallen an easy prey to the "insidiousness of religious and political propaganda" of anti-British elements who sought to create trouble in the Province. The best means to avert the recurrence of such events, Roos-Keppel believed, lay in "education, more education

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3 In 1919-20, the net decrease in attendance was 1,329. Annual Report, 1919-20, p.5.
4 See "Pre-WW1-2, 414-6."
and better education". He, therefore, proposed the opening of five hundred new primary schools in the next decade. To provide greater opportunities for the training of teachers, he recommended the opening of a second training class in 1920 with thirty stipendiaries who would be attached to the Government high school at Bannu. The pay of the teachers was increased from fourteen rupees to thirty-one rupees per month. Although Roos-Keppel laid main emphasis on primary education, he did not neglect secondary education. So far as the vernacular middle schools were concerned, he saw scope for "considerable expansion". He proposed to open five such schools in the next five years, thus bringing their total to nineteen. The schools were required to employ trained staff on adequate rates of pay, and local boards were provided with special grants from the provincial revenues to help the schools. These reforms, in Roos-Keppel's opinion, were "now reasonably adequate".

In regard to high schools, Roos-Keppel brought about considerable changes. The total number of high schools in the Pro-

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vince in 1911 was twelve, of which five were at the head-quarters of the five districts of the Province; they were maintained by municipalities. The remaining seven were under private management and in receipt of grants-in-aid from the Government. Roos-Keppel proposed to convert the municipal high schools into Government high schools, a reform which was in line with Curzon's policy.¹ This measure was expected to relieve the municipalities of the burden of maintaining high schools and set their resources free for the improvement of primary education which, as already noted, was in an extremely unsatisfactory state. In addition, Roos-Keppel proposed to raise the status of the Anglo-Vernacular middle school at Marden, managed by District Board, into a Government high school. Thus, altogether there would be six Government high schools in the Province. The Chief-Commissioner further recommended that a uniform standard of staff and scale of salaries be adopted in all Government high schools. Roos-Keppel proposed that the pay of the head-masters and district inspectors should be made identical so as to facilitate the interchange between the teaching and inspecting branches.²

¹ Nurullah and Naik, op.cit., pp. 475-85.

As regards the seven aided high schools under Private management, Roos-Keppel's object here was to ensure "a high minimum standard of efficiency!" His main recommendations were: to provide more liberal grants to the schools, to fix a minimum standard for teachers' qualifications and their pay, to give additional grants to teachers whose qualifications were higher than the prescribed minimum.¹

A new curriculum was introduced in the secondary schools, a uniform and higher rate of fees was levied, more free studentships and scholarships were given to students belonging to the agricultural community, "admittedly the most backward section of the population".² It was provided that scholarships would be distributed district-wise and according to population in each district. The award of scholarships to students was to be governed by the two conditions of poverty and merit.³

In accordance with the resolution of the Government of India of 21 February 1913, the Government of the Frontier Province

¹Ibid.

²In 1901-02 there were 105 secondary school scholarships; in 1912 the number increased to 162. The Educational Code of the North-West Frontier Province, 1915, pp. 34-9.


provided secondary school teachers with greater opportunities for training than hitherto available. In 1916 the Normal School at Peshawar was made a Teachers' Training College, thus releasing the Province from its erstwhile dependence on the Central Teachers' College at Lahore where teachers from the North-West Frontier Province found it hard to get admission in view of the competition from teachers of the Punjab schools.\(^1\) In the same year the local government introduced the Secondary School Leaving Certificate examination.\(^2\) In April 1919 Roos-Keppel made vernacular middle school education free hoping that this would provide an incentive to the boys, who gave up studies after primary education, and would prevent their "relapse into illiteracy".\(^3\) Another reform suggested by Roos-Keppel was the placing of the five Government High Schools in the Province under head-masters in the Indian Educational Service to ensure better academic standards and more efficient supervision. The students of these schools were ex-

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\(^3\) Review by Chief Commissioner of the Annual Report on Public Instruction in 1919-20, p. 20.
pected to play in future an important role in the life of the Province, and the type of education they received, so Roos-Keppel pointed out, would considerably influence their future attitude towards the Government; closer governmental association with these institutions of higher education would earn political dividends in future.¹

That the local government were keen on controlling the centres of higher education was all the more evident by their involvement in the Islamia College movement at Peshawar. The movement was launched by some leading men of the local Muslim community, of which Abdul Qaiyyum was the most prominent. From its very inception in 1907-8, the local government had kept themselves in close touch with the movement. The Education Report noted in 1907-8 thus:

Both in the districts and across the frontier there exists a strong feeling among Mohamadan gentleman in favour of a Provincial College, established under religious auspices, where Arabic would be taught side by side with more modern subjects.²

The issue was brought several times to the notice of the local government which encouraged the move while keeping themselves informed of the local public reaction to it. In 1910, Merk,

while officiating as the Chief Commissioner, invited Theodore Morrison, the Principal of the Aligarh College, to discuss the subject with the leading men of the Province; Merk was convinced that there was "widespread desire" for a local Islamia College. A Committee was formed and a scheme for the college was discussed with Morrison. On 24 May 1910 the leading men of the Province made a formal representation to the Chief Commissioner requesting help for the establishment of the College.¹ In April 1911, a Provincial Committee and District Committees were formed to collect subscriptions for the College. Hamilton Grant, the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, and Abdul Qaiyyum were appointed Joint Secretaries of the Provincial Committee.² The response of the Muslim Community to the scheme was overwhelming. In May 1911 it was reported that "utmost interest has been excited and all classes, including the most bigoted mullas are exerting themselves to help".³ The Afridi chiefs contributed one month's allowances and sent a deputation to Roos-Keppel urging that a college should be set

¹Merk to Secy., Govt. of India, 3 October 1910, enclosing letter from leading gentleman from Peshawar to the Chief Commissioner, 24 May 1910, _I.E.P._, vol. 8699, August 1911, Proc. Nos. 53-4.

²Roos-Keppel to Butler, 1 May 1911, _B.P._, vol. 32.

up for their sons. The Khyber Rifles gave 3,520 rupees.\textsuperscript{1} Within six months - by October 1911 - five lakhs of rupees had been collected. Roos-Keppel hoped that very soon the collection would reach seven to eight lakhs. This, so the Chief Commissioner informed the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, clearly showed that "Fathers of sons are realising the necessity for education". But

family affection is so strong among Pathans that few will send their sons to Aligarh, while they will not send them to mission schools, as these, without making Christians, manufacture agnostics.\textsuperscript{2}

In such circumstances the proposed Islamia College at Peshawar was bound to be popular.

By the beginning of 1912 the total subscription for the college had risen to more than eight lakhs of rupees. Roos-Keppel and Abdul Qa'iyyum selected a spot for the site of the college near the mouth of the historic Khyber pass. On 21 March 1912, Roos-Keppel laid the foundation stone of the college.\textsuperscript{3}

The college was a "triple institution": a high school, an arts college where provision was made for "the study of modern languages and sciences", and an oriental faculty providing for religious instruction. This faculty was expected to turn out men

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1}Roos-Keppel to Butler, 1 May 1911, \textit{B.P.}, vol. 32.

\textsuperscript{2}Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 27 October 1911, \textit{H.P.}, vol. 82.

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with tolerant religious views who, while retaining their influence with the local people would also be attached to the Government. The Islamia College Committee set out the object of the Oriental faculty thus:

Our chief aim in this faculty will... be to turn out mullahs not of the ignorant and fanatical type that we have got at present, but gentlemen imbued with enlightened and civilised ideas, their fanaticism eradicated, and their minds filled with rational, humane and sound religious principles, with their whole nature permeated with devotion and loyalty to the British Crown, a duty which is ordained by our religion in its true spirit and light, and which should be the marked characteristic of every true and sincere follower of Islam.¹

The Committee believed that the mullahs who would pass out of the College would exercise a humanising and civilising influence" over the peoples in the tribal territory and in trying to make them "the most loyal adherents of the British Empire" would contribute to the peace and tranquillity of the settled districts.²

Regarding the management and control of the college, the Committee submitted certain proposals to Roos-Keppel, which while giving the local government considerable power of control left its general administration to three bodies, partly nominated and partly elected. The first was a Board of Governors, comprising one hundred members, whose selection would rest with the existing

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
college committee, the selection being subject to the approval of the local government. The members of the governing body would be chosen from those who had contributed to the establishment of the college, and whose influence was necessary for the success of the institution. The governing body's main aim would be to make the institution popular with the Muhammadan community of the Province and to further its interests. The second was a Board of Trustees of twenty persons who would hold office for five years. The Board's function would be purely financial: looking after the public funds and contributions to the college. The third body was called the Council of Management consisting of fourteen members, five of them being high ranking Government officials.¹ and the rest being chosen by the Board of Trustees, and holding office for one year. The Council was to exercise a general control over all matters connected with the organisation and management of the College, frame the annual budget for submission to the Board of Trustees, and hold the power of dismissing the members of the college staff. The Chief Commissioner would be the ex-officio patron of the institution having the power of vetoing any measure recommended by any of the three bodies.²

¹The Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, The Director of Public Instruction in the Province, The Inspector General of Police, The Commanding Royal Engineer and Chief Medical Officer.
²Islamia College Committee to Roos-Keppel, 22 May 1912, op.cit.
However, Roos-Keppel wanted more powers, considering that his right of veto was not enough. The right, he said, did not empower him to initiate measures he deemed necessary nor did it give him power to interfere with the management of the institution except by rejecting a resolution passed by the three managing bodies. Therefore, Roos-Keppel asked the Government of India to suggest means which would enable him to exercise stronger influence and control over the college without offending the susceptibilities of the College Committee.¹

Roos-Keppel was in no doubt that with Government control "the College will be an influence for good, without it of evil".² The Government of India responded favourably and suggested that the College rules should provide that the Chief Commissioner should have the power to suspend the constitution of the institution and to direct its authorities to take such action as might appear to him desirable.³ The College Committee, however, opposed this suggestion, considering that it gave "altogether too sweeping" powers to the Chief Commissioner and that it might have the effect of converting an independent aided college to a purely Government institution. As a compromise, Roos-Keppel

² Roos-Keppel to Harcourt Butler, 7 October 1911, 23 February 1912, B.P., vol. 32.
thereupon proposed that the Chief Commissioner should have powers to suggest to the governing bodies of the institution any measure which he might consider beneficial, and that he should also have the power to veto any measure passed by the three managing bodies. This was accepted by the College Committee.¹

The Government's active encouragement of the Islamia College movement and close association with it were not without political considerations. The Islamia College would not only educate and enlighten influential Pathan families but was expected to attach them to the Government. As Roos-Keppel expressed it:

I believe that the effect on the peace of the border will be very great eventually, as I shall try to get in all sons of the tribal maliks, the chiefs of the next generation, to attend the School and to learn that the Feringhi and his administration are not so black as they are painted.²

Hardinge wholly approved of the policy; like Roos-Keppel he, too, was quite certain that the spread of education is the most satisfactory means of revolutionising the situation on the North-West Frontier and keeping the tribes quiet.³

²Roos-Keppel to Hardingœ, 27 October 1911, H.P., vol. 82.
³Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 2 November 1911, ibid.
In 1913, the first year of the college, sixty-five students representing almost every independent tribe were admitted. The college authorities hoped that

as time goes on from this source will spring a river which, though the current may be slow, will eventually carry knowledge and progress among our wild trans-frontier neighbours.¹

The Islamia College was expected to serve another political purpose: to keep the Frontier Muslims away from educational institutions in India and particularly from the ones, like Aligarh, which were regarded as hot-beds of Muslim political agitation. The private correspondence of Hardinge, Roos-Keppel and Harcourt Butler, the Education Member of the Viceroy's Council and a close friend of Roos-Keppel, provides clear proof of the Government's policy of keeping the Frontier Muslims away from the Aligarh influence. Butler saw to it that the Islamic College received liberal Imperial grants. In June 1911, in a secret Minute on the allotment of these grants, Butler strongly recommended that Rs. 50,000 be earmarked for the Islamia College because it was

a matter of first political importance to civilise the frontier people through a big educational institution started under our control. It is an oppor-

¹Review by the Chief Commissioner of the Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1913-4, pp. 3722.
tunity not to be missed... on every ground it is important to isolate the frontier people and let them have their own institution... I regard it as a form of future insurance against frontier troubles which is worth the expenditure of a far larger sum. 1

In April 1913 Butler wrote to Hardinge in clearer terms:

There is a tendency to isolate Aligarh, and I think we should be wise to foster this tendency... If we strongly support the Islamia College, Peshawar, the Islamia College, Lahore, the projected Colleges at Bombay and at Dacca, and perhaps also at Calcutta, Aligarh will cease to hold the position it has got now. 2

Hardinge cordially approved of the suggestion. 3 The members of the Islamia College Committee, all influential local men and all loyal supporters of the British Government, were equally anxious to keep the frontier people away from political movements in India and Abdul Quayyum in particular acted in close collaboration with Roos-Keppel in achieving this object. The Muslim University Scheme launched by the Aligarh Muslims had little support in the Frontier Province, and the Islamia College

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1 Secret Minute on Imperial Grants for Education by Harcourt Butler, 22 June 1911, B.P., vol. 47.

2 Harcourt Butler to Hardinge, 3 April 1913, H.P., vol. 85. Roos-Keppel came out even more clearly when he wrote to Hardinge that "the College will prove a very valuable barrier against Indian political sentiment, and especially against Aligarh, which is now a focus of Mahomedan discontent". Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 26 September 1913, ibid.

3 Hardinge to Butler, 9 April 1913, ibid.
Committee saw to it that no subscriptions were sent to Aligarh in support of the University scheme. The Committee refused to entertain deputations from Aligarh for collection of subscriptions, and Abdul Qaiyyum did not even accept the invitation of the Raja of Mahmudabad, President of the Aligarh Muslim University Constitution Committee, to a meeting of the committee to be held at Lucknow. The Aligarh Muslims had requested the Islamia College Committee to provide a President for the forthcoming Muslim Educational Conference from among the frontier Nawabs and chiefs and to send many delegates from the Province to the conference. The Islamia College Committee showed no favourable reaction to the proposal, and Abdul Qaiyyum, when approached by the "Safir" (messenger) of the Muslim Educational Conference to be its President, evaded the suggestion.¹

The Muslims connected with the Aligarh University scheme did not fail to detect that the poor response from the frontier Muslims was because of the Government. They thought that the counter move for the establishment of the Islamia College was "not a spontaneous desire of the people for education" but the idea had been put forward by Government with a view to breaking up the growing unity of Indian Musalmans and of damaging the University Scheme.²

¹Abdul Qaiyyum to Roos-Keppel, 25 August 1912, R.K.
²Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 6 September 1912, ibid.
The Islamia College Committee took great offence at such remarks and resolved to do all they could in "keeping these Aligarhians away from our people". Roos-Keppel was happy, convinced that the pushing on of the work of the Islamia College will widen the breach between Peshawar and Aligarh.¹

The Hindu press in the Punjab denounced the Islamia College Scheme² while the Muslim press of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province welcomed it.³ Under the caption "Sir George Roos-Keppel's heap of sins", the Punjab Advocate pointed out that

the blackest part of his sinfulness is connected with the interest which he has been evincing in the establishment of the Islamia College at Peshawar.⁴

However, the Muslim press fully supported Roos-Keppel's encouragement of the Islamia College movement and strongly condemned the Hindu papers' opposition to it. The Afghan of 23 January 1910 commented that the Islamia Collegiate School will protect the frontier peoples from "the unholy influence of the Hindu Schools", the sole object of which was to disseminate sedition against the Government and false ideas about Islam and its Prophet. The School will also save the frontier peoples

¹Ibid.

²The Punjab Advocate, 6 July 1911, 27 June 1912; The Wakil, 3 December 1913; The Punjab Native News Papers Reports, 1911-1912, 1913.

³The Afghan, 15, 23 January 1910; The Paisa Akhbar, 5 March 1910, 4 May 1911; The Zamindar, 8 September 1911; The Observer, 18, 22 May 1912, ibid., 1910, 1911, 1912.

⁴Cited in The Zamindar, 4 May 1912, ibid., 1912.
from the pernicious influence of the mission schools. The Paisa Akhbar welcomed the Islamia College Scheme and hoped that the Amir of Afghanistan would give it financial help as he had been giving the Islamia College at Lahore. The Zamindar refuted the charge made by the Hindu press that the people of the Frontier Province had been forced to subscribe for the college, holding that all payments had been purely voluntary. The Observer strongly defended Roos-Keppel's active association with the college, stating that the criticisms levelled by the Hindu newspapers were

the outcome of the hated imagination of the Hindu press, for whom an Islamia College at Peshawar and Government sympathy for it are hateful...

Defending Roos-Keppel for his support of the college, the papers wrote that Roos-Keppel was "entirely free from all these unfounded and unjustifiable blames and slurs". The Milap spoke in similar terms.

On 5 April 1913 Butler, the Education Member, performed the opening ceremony of the Islamia Collegiate School. Expressing

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2 The Paisa Akhbar, 5 March, 9 July 1910, ibid., pp.257, 632.

3 The Zamindar, 4 May 1912, ibid., p.391.

4 The Observer, 18, 22 May 1912, ibid., pp. 414-5.

5 The Milap, 24 May 1912, ibid., p.459.
a great hope in the future of the institution he remarked:

Standing here on the most famous highway of Asia, facing the mouth of the Khyber pass, I confess that my imagination is powerfully affected at the prospect of the enlightenment which will radiate from this School and College, not only in this Province and along the Frontier, but far into the recesses of Asia.¹

The Islamia College was opened six months later. On the staff there were three Cambridge graduates: L.Tipping, the Principal;² Inayat-Ullah-Khan, the Vice-Principal and Professor of Mathematics; and H.T.Bousfield, Professor of History. The college, which was affiliated to the Punjab University, attracted students from the settled districts as well as tribal territory. In 1915 courses leading to Arts Degrees were started, and in 1921, science classes were added. In 1917, the Collegiate School had three hundred students on its rolls and the Islamia College

¹ Annual Report on Public Instruction in N.W.F.P., 1913-4, p.4. Hardinge also sent a congratulatory message to the college authorities showing his "appreciation of the unserving loyalty of the Mahommedans of the North in comparison with some of their brethren of weaker calibre". See Viceroy to Butler, Tels. 4, 9 April 1913, H.P., vol. 85.

had one hundred. The success of the institution was due mainly to the sustained interest of Abdul Qaiyum, its Honorary Secretary, whom Roos-Keppel described as "the Sir Syed Ahmad of Mussalman education and progress in North-West Frontier Province".

Female Education

Female education in the Frontier Province had made little progress as local prejudices against educating women were so great that the Government could hardly be expected to make much headway in establishing a system of education which should meet the practical and social needs of women in the Province. Indeed, whatever attempts were made by the Government and whatever results achieved were all confined to the period 1911 onwards.

In 1901-02 there were only eight Government recognised primary schools for girls in the entire Province with four hundred and ninety-one pupils, and the total annual expenditure incurred to maintain them was not more than 2,477 rupees. The pupils were mostly Hindu girls belonging to the families of Government servants and traders. There were no Muslim girls attending public

\[1\text{Quinquennium Report, 1912-7, op.cit., p.9.}\]

\[2\text{Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 4 April 1917, C.P., vol. 18. In 1950 the Islamic College grew into the University of Peshawar, see Islamic College and Collegiate School, Peshawar. Golden Jubilee, 1913-63. Muhammad Sarwar, Islamia Collegiate School, Peshawar; Report of the N.W.F. Enquiry Committee, 1924, pp. 20-21.}\]
schools in Peshawar and Hazara, educationally the most backward districts.¹

The curriculum in the girls' schools consisted of the three Rs. In addition, needlework was taught in all schools, and those at Abbottabad had provisions for sewing, knitting and embroidery. The Arya Kanya aided school at Dera Ismail Khan, run by the local Hindus was the most flourishing female education centre. For the encouragement of upper primary education among girls, the Government of the Punjab instituted seventeen scholarships for twenty-three girls who constituted the total number of students receiving upper primary education in the entire Province.² There was no secondary school for girls until 1906, when the Arya Kanya School was raised to the status of a middle school.³ The Government's efforts were mainly directed towards improving the standards of female education rather than its expansion. In the absence of female teachers in general the girls' schools had to be staffed by old retired teachers of boys' primary schools. There was, besides, hardly any inspection of girls' schools, for the rigid purdah system

²Ibid.
prevalent among the Muslims did not permit such inspection. In 1906-07 the local government secured the services of an Assistant Inspectress of Schools from the Punjab, but after two years she asked for transfer and it was not until 1916-7 that the Frontier Province had its own Inspectress of Girls' Schools. This was followed by the sending of six women to Lahore for training in the local Normal School for women. In 1920 a Normal School for women was opened at Peshawar but after two years it had to close down for financial reasons.\(^1\)

In 1920-1 the curriculum in girls' schools was revised, emphasis being laid on instruction in domestic science which was "to form the chief function of a girl in after life".\(^2\) Elementary nature study and instruction in handicrafts were also introduced.

The number of girls' primary schools in 1920-1 stood at fifty-six as against twenty-eight in 1911-2; and the number of pupils was 3,513 and 1,925 in the corresponding years. Middle schools for girls, first established in 1906, increased from one to three, and the number of students from 322 to 783 in the same period.\(^3\)


\(^2\) Census of India, 1921, N.W.F.P., p. 183.

Female education in the Province was still in its infancy. It had, as the Census Report of 1921 put it, hardly gone beyond the primary stage, for there was little demand for secondary education. There was no girls' high school, while a girls' college was "still a dream of the future". Prejudice against the spread of education among women, especially in the Muslim community, had "not yet appreciably weakened". The "perpetual tutelage of women which had been practised so long among both Hindus and Musalmans" continued, and most parents still disfavoured female education which was "likely to result in the social emancipation of the weaker sex".¹

Considering the general lack of eagerness of the local people for western education and the consequent difficulty in implementing any large scale programme for the rapid development of education, the Government could claim that their efforts had borne fruit. In the two decades under review education had indeed made progress, though not with uniform steadiness; the number of educational institutions and students in the settled districts had increased, as had the Government's expense in maintaining the educational establishments. However, education made little progress in the tribal territory.

¹Census of India, 1921, N.W.F.P., p.182.
Among the local people there had been a slow awareness of the benefits of modern education, not the least of which consisted in the opportunity it provided for Government service. The development of communications and the need for increasing contact with other parts of India acted as additional incentives. This would also explain why the Hindus and Sikh communities of the Province took to the British system of education far more eagerly than the Muslims. It was the two former communities whose occupation as Government employees and traders made it necessary for them to attain proficiency in modern education. But the Muslims being agriculturists did not fully agree with the benefits of modern education.\(^1\) Besides, the former concentrated mostly in towns where opportunities for education were more easily available than in the villages where the Muslims lived. Moreover, language was a handicap for the Pathans. Urdu, which was the medium of instruction in the rural primary schools was foreign to the Pathans who spoke only Pushtu, their mother tongue, while those who lived in urban areas, like the Sikhs

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\(^1\) Numerically, the strength of the Muslims in 1921 was about ninety-two per cent of the total population of the Province, but they had only 29 male and 2 female literates per 1,000 of the Muslim population, while the corresponding figures for Hindus were 322 male and 84 female and 469 male and 188 female for Sikhs in the Province. *Census of India, 1921*, vol. XIV, N.W.F.P., pp. 172-3.
and Hindus, were bilingual, knowing both Urdu and Pushtu. Besides, the decline of private schools due to lack of adequate government support resulted in the loss of what could have been an effective means of popularising education in the rural areas among the Muslims.

1 In 1901-2, the total number of private schools was 927 with an attendance of 13,626 but in 1921-22, they decreased to 234 and 4,519 respectively. Quinquennium Report, 1897-1902, p.1; ibid., 1917-22, p.1.
CONCLUSION

The eighteen-year old history of the administration of the North-West Frontier Province which forms the subject of the present thesis had two main aspects: the application of Curzon's new tribal policy amidst strains and uncertainties, and the development of the administration of the settled districts rather on independent lines but in conformity with the new policies of the Government of India.

Curzon's tribal policy had its merits, although its success hung on a delicate balance. It was designed to secure so at any rate Curzon claimed - the contentment of the tribesmen and to ensure the security of British subjects in the settled districts. The withdrawal of regular troops from tribal territory had for its object the general reduction of military pressure on the tribes and the easing of tension in the region. Curzon's new militia scheme was a bold experiment and in normal circumstances worked well; but it broke down under the stress of emergency in 1919. The influence which the British officers of the militia established over their men and tribal leaders through close personal contact was found useful for the Government. For instance, in the Khyber, the friendly maliks supplied secret information regarding the movements of the raiding gangs, aided the Government in effecting agreements between the tribe and the Government, and in con-
structing roads and railways in tribal areas. Curzon, however, did not ignore the military defence of the North-West Frontier. The number of regular troops was increased; the troops were stationed in Cantonments in the settled districts flanking the border, and their rapid concentration at a threatened point was facilitated by the construction of strategic roads and railways.

Despite Curzon's bold assertions, the pacification of the tribes - the goal of his policy - was hardly achieved as the Government's strained relations with the Mahsuds, Afridis and Mohmands, the most important tribes, testify. There was no diminution in the number of daring raids by the tribesmen which cost British subjects heavily both in lives and property. The Government's policy lacked consistency and their 'patch-up' arrangement with the Mahsuds, for example, with a view to avoiding a full scale expedition clearly revealed the weakness of the system. Had it not been for the increase of Afridi allowances and the co-operation of the Amir of Afghanistan, Habibullah, the maintenance of peace and order in the province during World War I would have been extremely difficult.

1 In 1899, there were 15,289 regulars across the administrative border of British India which had been reduced to 4,156 in 1905 while the supporting garrisons within the British border had been increased from 2,197 to 23,341. Summary of Curzon's Administration Foreign Department, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, part II, p.5, C.C., vol. 526.
The weakness of Curzon’s tribal policy was evident to the men on whom fell the task of implementing it. Both Deane and Roos-Keppel, advocated modification of that policy and so did Minto. Deane urged that whenever a tribe misbehaved and forced upon itself a punitive expedition, the Government, after punishing it, should occupy permanently places of strategic importance in the area and strengthen that occupation by the construction of roads. Besides, those tribes who desired to come under the Government’s protection should be taken over and their territories should be administered on the lines of the protected areas of Tochi, Sam Ranizai and Kurram.\(^1\) Roos-Keppel in later years also criticised the Government of India for shirking responsibility by refusing to interfere in tribal affairs. In his opinion the only lasting solution of the frontier problem was to crush the tribes by force, to disarm them and to occupy their country. He urged this course because it was desirable partly in our own interest, partly in the interests of the people of our settled districts to whom we owe protection... but mainly in the interests of the tribes themselves - in fact as a scheme for the reclamation from barbarism of a fine, manly and courageous people of great development.

\(^1\) Note on the probable attitude of the Frontier Tribes and of Afghanistan in the event of an attempted invasion of India by Russia and on the Frontier Policy in connection therewith by H. Deane, 13 July 1906, P.S.D.M., A 166.
Minto was in agreement with the 'forward' views of his frontier officers. He believed that the peaceful penetration into the tribal territory and its gradual absorption would bring prosperity and happiness to the tribesmen and would lead to ultimate peace on the border. But Morley had set his heart against any annexation and aggression on the frontier. He prohibited any unnecessary interference with the tribes and the undertaking of any fresh responsibility in the tribal territory unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessity. He warned Minto that the forward move which the Viceroy and his frontier officers were advocating would involve increased expenditure, alarm the tribes and estrange the Amir of Kabul.

This cautious but strong stand against "rolling the tribes up to the Durand line" was maintained by Morley's successors until 1921-22 when a new forward policy was adopted on the frontier.

There were several factors which had added to the complexity of the problem and to Government's difficulty in resolving it. While the local government and the Government of India viewed the tribal issue mainly as a local problem, the Home Government treated it as affecting the broader question of Imperial strategy.

1Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 13 March 1916, R.P.
Strategic considerations dictated the adoption of more stringent measures than was probably necessary. It was thought expedient from a military point of view to take away from the tribes a tithe of their independence and to keep them under some sort of control. This the tribes resisted. They had a long tradition of independence which they were determined to maintain. This spirit of independence and hatred of outside control made their suppression a herculean task. Moreover, the tribesmen's virile and martial character, their skill in warfare, increased by their acquisition of vast quantities of modern weapons and their staunch devotion to their faith made them formidable antagonists. They had another advantage over their enemies in the inaccessibility of their country; in their mountain recesses they were extremely efficient guerilla fighters. By nature, the Pathans were intractable. In their settlements with the Government they insisted that their views must be taken into account as also their own notions of what was right and proper before an agreement could be arrived at. It was this attitude which often created difficulties in the distribution of allowances especially among the Mahsuds. Finally, the intrigues carried on intermittently from the Afghan side and the immense influence exercised by the Amir of Afghanistan over the tribes on the British side of the border, aggravated the tribal problem. The tribes-
men's racial, religious and linguistic affinity with the tribes on the Afghan side of the Durand line added to Government's difficulties, for raiders, outlaws, deserters and in fact all anti-British elements found a safe asylum in the Afghan territory which for political reasons the British could hardly violate.>

It was mainly to overcome the difficulties faced by previous administrations in dealing with tribal questions that Curzon had embarked upon the establishment of a new province. The experiment was a success. It served the purpose of bringing the administration of one of the most difficult areas of British India under the direct control of the Supreme Government and this control did contribute to the vigour and efficiency of the new administration. The province was Curzon's child and he rejoiced seeing his child "robust and strong".¹ Selected and able officers, a mixed body of civilians and soldiers were given charge of the new province. Although prophecies could not be made about a region where the course of events had been so uncertain, it can be reasonably assumed that the Punjab Government would have had an extremely hard time during the period of the First World War followed by the Third Afghan War, the Khilafat and the Migrat movements, had the frontier areas been under their control. The comparatively easy handling of these events on the

¹ Curzon to O'Dwyer, 9 September 1905, C.C., vol. 211.
Frontier and the progress made in various fields of administration which had been neglected under the Punjab Government justified the creation of the new administration and vindicated Curzon's stand.

But political considerations dominated the policies of the rulers and these account for the slow progress made by the province. The policy behind the construction of roads and railways in the province was primarily to meet the requirements of the defence of India's most vulnerable land frontier. Curzon gave great impetus to the extension of communications by his policy of withdrawal of regular troops from the tribal regions. Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief, enthusiastically supported this policy. But his remarkable scheme for the Kabul river railway was shelved by Morley on the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907, after which Minto and Hardinge carried on only half-hearted and piece-meal extensions and improvements in roads and railways. These roads and railways gave some boost to the external land trade of the region and to passengers' traffic, besides helping in breaking down the isolation of the border areas. But the development of communications for purposes other than strategic was neglected. Those already in existence were inadequate and could by no means meet the growing needs of the province.
Lack of communications and other factors proved a great handicap in the way of settlement operations. For quite some time the Frontier districts had to be content with summary settlements. When the first and second settlements were carried out, the officials had to take into account the peculiar nature of the Frontier tracts and the political problems confronting the administration there. When it was found that the new revenue demand during the revised assessments in the districts of Kohat, Bannu and Hazara were somewhat heavy, the defect had to be remedied and the Government had to adopt a policy of light assessment. The earlier policy of liberal land revenue assignments and frontier remissions was also continued in order to keep the class of privileged and truly loyal persons attached to the administration. Various resolutions and acts passed by Curzon and his successor Minto for the welfare of the peasantry in India were put into effect; the most important being the extension of the Punjab Land Alienation Act and the Co-operative Credit Societies Act. The application of both these measures showed that Deane paid due regard to local customs and usages and did not push these policies on the agriculturists unless they themselves realised the utility of these measures. The creation of a separate department of Agriculture helped to promote an improved agronomy.

The measures adopted by the Frontier administration to improve
the state of irrigation both in extending and widening minor canals and constructing the new state canals were a great step forward. But here too political considerations could not be overlooked. The Upper Swat canal was a pyrrhic venture and political motives played no less important a part in its construction. It was not until the removal of the control of the Punjab irrigation authorities over the irrigation projects of the Frontier Province that the working of the Department of Irrigation reached a standard of efficiency.

As for education although Deane realised the need for its expansion, he could not achieve much because of the limitations imposed by inadequate funds and ill-equipped staff. A great step forward was taken by Roos-Keppel when he managed to find the necessary funds and embarked upon a systematic policy of educational reforms. Roos-Keppel's educational reforms laid great emphasis on the extension of primary education and the improvement of secondary education. As for collegiate education, private efforts were encouraged. Grants were given to the Edwards Church Mission College and financial assistance and active encouragement rendered to the project of Islamia College at Peshawar. World War I had a deleterious effect on the educational development of the province for the necessary funds were not forthcoming. Roos-Keppel, however, did not abandon these projects. His initiative and drive
was mainly responsible for the impetus given to education in the province. However, the most to benefit from the educational reforms were the Hindus and Sikhs. The Muslims as mainly an agriculturist community, did not fully avail themselves of the opportunities provided by the administration and more accelerated efforts were necessary to popularise education among them.

The backward state of education and the nature of the administration of the Province were responsible for the conspicuous slow growth of political consciousness of the people. From the Government's point of view the political, strategic and military problems of the area justified the policy of keeping the local people as far as possible away from political influences of other parts of India.\(^1\) It is therefore no wonder that the province lacked the means of formulating and articulating public opinion. In 1902-03 there were only three vernacular newspapers\(^2\) in the Province as against two hundred and nine Vernacular, Anglo-Vernacular and English newspapers in the Punjab,\(^3\) and even these ceased publication by 1906.\(^4\) In 1905 the Frontier Advocate a weekly was started from

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2. Administration Report of the N.W.F.P., 1901-03, p.72. The papers were Tuhfa-i-Sarhad, the Frontier Gazette and the Daulat-i-Hind.
Dera Ismail Khan, with a circulation of two hundred copies. In April 1910 the publication of the paper was stopped by the Government for its communal and anti-British tone. In 1909 another newspaper the Afghan appeared from Peshawar with limited circulation. The Punjab newspapers had very few readers among the Pathans. There was no literary society worth the name in the Province, let alone any organised political associations and platforms.

In fact apathy regarding public affairs was most noticeable among the Frontier people. Local self-government was in its infancy and the people had neither acquired experience nor showed eagerness to associate themselves with it. "Municipal feeling" was almost non-existent, the members of the municipalities themselves showing little interest in public affairs. Between 1867 and 1873 municipalities had been set up in all the district headquarters except Kohat and ten years later Kohat

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and seven other towns had municipalities. But by 1904 their number was reduced to six as little use was made of them. The five districts had a District Board each. Unlike other provinces the members of the Municipal and District Boards were wholly nominated; they often absented themselves from the meetings. Two influential Khans of the province, for instance informed the Decentralisation Commission (1909) that they had been members of the District Boards for over twenty years but one Khan had attended the meetings about once a year only and the other had attended a mere five times in the entire twenty years.

Political consciousness in the province in its initial phase was a product of the stirrings caused by political developments in the Muslim world in general and by the political aspirations of the Indian Muslims in particular. Events in Turkey and its disintegration, Italy's occupation of Tripoli

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3 Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 20 August 1916, R.P.
4 Tinker, *op.cit.*, p.79.
(1911), the Balkan wars (1912-3) and Russia's encroachments in Northern Persia (1911-2) agitated the Islamic World where these events appeared as "a Christian conspiracy" against the Muslims. In India the Government was faced with Muslim discontent over issues like the annulment of the partition of Bengal and the affiliation of the Aligarh Muslim University. Through the Aligarh Muslims "tides and waves of the so-called national spirit" reached the province. "Their object is to get round us and, ignorant as we are, to work up our fanatical ideas and then use us as a cat's paw." But the Government had no immediate fear of any general disturbance in the province though there was little doubt that political situation in India would sooner or later set off repercussions on the Frontier. "A warlike and fanatical" Muslim population of four millions, observed Roos-Keppel "was a good seed-bed for revolutionary ideas and every effort will be made in coming years to sow upon this fertile ground." In the circumstances Roos-Keppel advocated that the longer we can stave off any close connection between the Frontier and India, the better it will be for the Province and for the Government.


2Abdul Qaiyum to Roos-Keppel, 25 August 1912, R.P.

3Roos-Keppel to Secy. Govt. of India, 6 September 1912, ibid.

4Ibid.
Roos-Keppel was prepared to deal drastically with people who stirred up trouble; the Frontier Crimes Regulation had given him the necessary powers to do so. His vigilant policy, the operation of which was no doubt facilitated by the loyalty and cooperation of the leading gentry of the province paid off. During the War, the province remained peaceful, unlike other parts of India especially Bengal and the Punjab, where revolutionary activities grew in intensity necessitating rigorous measures on the part of the Government. The Fronter Muslims, although "deeply distressed" over the plight of Turkey could not be roused. They prayed almost every Friday for the victory of their "Sultan Sahib" but showed no hostility towards the Government. Political unrest of any kind was reported to be "practically non-existent" in the province; the local government received public co-operation in dealing with tribal disturbances and in obtaining men and money for the War; 45,231 men of whom 32,181 were combatants were recruited during the war. Though the

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1 Ibid.
3 Roos-Keppel to Secy., Govt. of India, 6 September 1912, R.P.
province was poor, with no industrial resources, it contributed sixty lakhs of rupees to the War loans.¹

The post-war years saw significant constitutional reforms in India but for political reasons the Frontier Province was excluded from this policy, both the Supreme and local Governments regarding political reforms unnecessary and inexpedient. Chelmsford clearly stated that the reforms scarcely concerned the Frontier Province where the Chief Commissioner had "other things to think about".² This was quite in keeping with Roos-Keppel's own ideas: No political reforms were needed as there was no agitation or demand for them and the people were "curiously indifferent to purely Indian affairs" being "much more interested in Cabul and Persia".³ In the circumstances the Montford Report (1918) while recommending dyarchy in other provinces did not suggest any change in the administration of the Frontier Province. "For reasons of strategy", the Report pointed out, the personal administration of the Chief Commissioner should continue and "no principle of responsibility" be intro-

²Chelmsford to Roos-Keppel, 6 October 1917, R.P.
³Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 10 October 1917, ibid.
However, "some form of advisory council, adjusted to composition and function to local conditions" was recommended.¹

But Roos-Keppel found considerable difficulty even in accepting this meagre concession. He was doubtful if the leading men of the Province would be willing to act as advisers to the local Government without receiving any salary. Roos-Keppel had hitherto taken their advice and had consulted them on various issues but only informally and privately. He doubted if these "confidential advisers" would be able to give him "as frank and honest" advice in a "semi-public Council" as they had hitherto done. All important questions, in his opinion, in the Province were political, stemming from the British Government's relations with Afghanistan and the Frontier tribes or from the effect of events in Central Asia and Persia on the tribes. These matters were treated as secret and could not be discussed "in a semi-public manner". And by the elimination of these subjects from discussion in the Council, only "parish politics" would remain which in Roos-Keppel's opinion could well be settled in consultation with the leaders of different communities. In short, the overwhelmingly political character of the administration required

¹ Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918, para 198.
² Ibid.
that its decisions should remain quite outside the purview of a local council. Roos-Keppel's conclusion was

we ... are practically unaffected by the domestic politics of India. It is thus difficult to see what advantage the institution of an Advisory Council would have?¹

With this adverse comment from Roos-Keppel, the Government of India decided to shelve the issue for the moment. They thought that it was best to wait and see the general results of the introduction of constitutional reforms in other provinces before taking any definite action in regard to the Frontier Province.²

The Pathans were no doubt low in the scale of political advancement, but they were not as immune from political influence or insensitive to political events in India as Roos-Keppel imagined - and this he himself had to admit when he saw the Pathan reaction to the Satyagraha movement and the Rowlatt Bill agitation.

He received petitions against the Rowlatt Bill from every tribe, every caste and every community in the Peshawar district; the biggest men have signed these, even including the ones who are most on our side, as they say that they would lose their position and what little power they now have to help us if they declined to forward to me a unanimous petition from the whole of their people.³

¹ Roos-Keppel to Govt. of India, 31 August 1918, I.F.P.P., vol. 10891, March 1920, Proc. No. 11 (C).
³ Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 8 May 1919, O.P., vol. 22.
In Roos-Keppel's own admission the Satyagrah movement, though essentially Hindu and foreign to the province,¹ had "united all in hatred to British rule" and that "a large number hate us with such bitterness that they would work on even an invasion if they saw a chance of getting rid of us".² He was amazed at the rapidity and completeness of its development. The propaganda from down country distributing mischievous descriptions of the Rowlatt Bill has affected everybody. The illiterate classes believe these statements implicitly and even the most educated believe them in part. No counter propaganda had any effect at all.³

Emissaries were sent from the Punjab to Peshawar to encourage the people to observe hartal and take part in the non-cooperation movement. Panchayats were established to deal with civil and criminal disputes so that litigants could dispense with the Government courts.⁴ There were public demonstrations as well. The Satyagraha agitators were assisted by the Afghan Postmaster at Peshawar, and were active in the Utmanzai village in the Charsadda tahsil of the Peshawar district. The synchronism of the third Afghan War and the Satyagraha movement made the

¹Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 27 April 1919, R.P.
²Roos-Keppel to Chelmsford, 5, 13 May 1919, R.P.
³Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 8 May 1919, C.P., vol. 22.
situation difficult for Roos-Keppel, but with firm and prompt measures he weathered the crisis.¹

But the Satyagraha movement had given the local people "a taste for public meetings and for the passing of resolutions". These appeared portentous developments to Roos-Keppel because political agitation might "prove troublesome in the future when the people have a real grievance instead of a fancy one like the present".² The winds of change blowing in India had reached the Frontier; Roos-Keppel could only hope that his province "will change more slowly than the most advanced parts" of the country.³ It was, in fact, proving difficult to maintain the policy of "intellectual and political segregation of the Pathans"⁴ from the rest of India, and in trying to do so Roos-Keppel seemed to have set himself against the current of the times. As Olaf Caroe observes, Roos-Keppel loved Pathans, he "cared and worked" for them, but

he failed to weigh up the workings of the higher education on the Pathan mind, or to appreciate that if frontier pride was to be turned into new

¹Chief Commissioner to Private Secy. to Viceroy, Tels. 8, 9, 12, 30 May 1919, C.P., vol. 22. See also Chapter III, pp. 189-90
²Roos-Keppel to Maffey, 27 April 1919, C.P., vol. 22.
³Ibid.
⁴Abdul Quayyum, Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier, p. 28.
channels and harnessed in the service of a sub-continent, the people must be permitted, indeed encouraged, to keep up with the latest fashions.¹

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Vol.No. 1 Original Manuscript correspondence with persons in India from 27 April to 22 December 1904 (printed in item 34)

Vol.No. 2 Original manuscript correspondence with the Secretary of State, Lord Curzon, and Sir A. Godley, April to November 1904 (printed in item 37)

Vol.No. 3 Original manuscript correspondence with persons in England, from 8 April to 17 November 1904 (printed in item 40)

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V. NEWSPAPERS

A. PUNJAB NATIVE NEWSPAPER REPORTS, 1901-1920

B. THE TIMES

THE SPECTATOR
1. **Abdul Qaiyum, Khan Bahadur Nawab,**

Sir Sahibzada (12 December 1864 - 4 December 1937).

Held non-gazetted appointments, 15 February 1887-June 1898; officiating mir munshi to Government of the Punjab, June 1898-September 1898; Assistant Political Agent, Khyber, September 1898-1910; Extra Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Political Agent, Chitral, June 1910; Assistant Political Agent, Khyber, September 1910; K.C.I.E., June 1917; Political Agent, Khyber, May 1918; Retired, December 1919; Kaisar-i-Hind Medal (1st class), June 1929; Delegate to Indian Round Table Conference, London, November 1930-January 1931; and Session, September-December 1931; Minister of North-West Frontier Province under the Reforms of 1932, 1932-37.

2. **Barrow, General Sir Edmund (George),**

(28 January 1852 - 3 January 1934).

Entered Army, 1871; Raised and commanded the Hong Kong Regiment, 1892-95; General, 1909; Served in Afghan War, 1878-79; Egyptian War, 1882; Tirah Expedition, 1897-98; Chief of Staff, China Expeditionary Force, 1900; Lockhart Boundary Mission to Chitral, Kafiristan, Hunza and
Wakhan, 1885-86; Anglo-Siamese Boundary Commission, 1889-90; Secretary, Government of India, Military Department, 1901-03; Commanded 1st Division, India, 1904-07; Southern Army, India, 1908-12; A.D.C. General to the King, 1911-12; Military Secretary to the India Office, 1914-17; Member of the Council of India, 1917-24.

3. Egerton, Field Marshal Sir Charles (Comyn),
(10 November 1848 - 20 February 1921).
Entered Army, 1867; Colonel, 1895; served during Afghan War, 1878-80; Murre Expedition, 1880; Black Mountain Expedition, 1888; First and second Miranzai Expeditions; Waziristan Field Force, 1894-95; Commanded Indian contingent in the Dongola Expedition; Commanded 1st Brigade, Tochi Field Force, 1897-98; Commanded troops in Waziristan, 1901-02; Commanded Somaliland Field Force, 1903-04; Action of Jidballi; Commanding troops Madras,1904-07; Retired, 1907; Member of the Council of India, 1907-17; Field Marshal, 1917.

4. Lockhart, General Sir W. S. A.
( - 18 March 1900).
First Commissioned, 4th October 1858; served in the Bhootan
Expedition, 1864-66; A.D.C. to the Brigadier-General in the Abyssinian Expedition of 1867-68; D.A.Q.M.G. in the Hazara Expedition, 1868; in the Dutch War in Sumatra, 1875-77; Ass. Gr.-Mr.-Gen. in the Afghan Campaign, 1880; Brigadier-General with the Burmese Expeditions, 1885-87; Commanded Miranzai Expedition, 1892; Waziristan Expedition, 1894-95; Commanded a division in Bengal as Major-General, 1892-95; Lieutenant-General; Commanding the Punjab Army Corps, April 1895; Commanded the Tirah Expedition, 1897-98; Commander-in-Chief, India, 1898-1900.
Glossary: Definitions and Explanations

Arbab
Middleman. This applied specifically to the influential men of the Peshawar border who acted as intermediaries between the Sikh Government and the trans-border tribes. The practice was continued by the British Government until the end of the 19th century.

Bach
Distribution of revenue over holdings.

Badmash
Scoundrel.

Badragga
Tribal escort.

Bakhra
Share.

Band
Bank of earth to obstruct the flow of water.

Banda
Hamlet.

Barat
An assignment of land revenue.

Baremta
The system of enforcing vicarious responsibility by which any member of a tribe or section was liable to distress upon his person or property to make good the misdeeds of other members of the same tribe or section.

Batai
Share of produce paid as rent.

Butemar
A tenant who had acquired rights in land by clearing forests.
Lump grain rent in the rabi, and a fixed amount of cash in the ḥarīf harvest.

An occupancy tenant of superior position.

Mahsud tribal police; a canal watchman and share distributor.

Watchman.

Hue and cry; pursuit party.

Pathan expression for the settlement of ancestral shares.

Holder of an ancestral share; proprietor or land-owner.

Reception.

An influential tribesman who was not himself a recognised malik. In some agencies elders received annual rewards in the form of lungis.

Religious mendicant: without status: cultivator or farm servant.

A remission of land revenue enjoyed by villages in exposed tracts or actually on the border. It usually amounted to one-third or one-quarter of the demand.

Boards or stakes backed by clods, stones and brushwood used to divide the width of the water.
section. The smaller unit was called Ganda and the larger Guta.

Hamsaya: Dependent occupying outlying hamlets of a Pathan estate on condition of assisting in repelling raids on the land of the proprietor.

Hartal: Strike.

Inam: A cash allowance paid to secure the services of a man of influence.

Inamdar: The holder of an inam.

Isk or Iska: A lot; the casting of lots (also Uska and Hisk).

Jagir: An assignment of land-revenue.

Jagirdar: Holder of an assignment of land revenue.

Jezail: Matchlock.

Jezailchie: Tribal levies armed with jezails.

Jihad: Holy war.

Jirga: A tribal assembly, council or delegation.

Kafila: Caravan. A number of animals carrying merchandise or baggage.

Kafir: Unbeliever.

Kandi: Section of a village: a division of an estate.

Kalang: Arbitrary tax or assessment imposed by the Sikhs.

Kalapani: Perennial streams issuing from the hills.

Khalsa: Revenue credited to Government from Crown lands.
Khasanrai  A straw, dry twig used for casting lots.
Khassadar  Was the representative of his tribe within its area for carrying out its engagements with Government, but paid by Government. He was an irregular foot soldier: the police of the country.
Khasra  Field number.
Khel  A clan.
Khula vesh  Fresh calculation of shares at time of vesh: an individual share of land.
Lambardar  Village headman.
Lashkar  A tribal force which should in theory take the field under the tribal banner. The tribesmen composing a lashkar were in general armed with rifle, bandolier and cartridges and a dagger or two stuck in the waist belt. Sufficient food for three or four days or even more was carried in a skin bag.
Lath  Field embankment to retain irrigation.
Lathband  Occupancy tenant who acquired rights in land by embanking fields.
Levy  In the North-West Frontier Province, the levy system was applied mostly in the settled dis-
tricts. These levies consisted of tribesmen settled in British India, were armed by Government and in receipt of a basic wage. The distinction between the District levies and khassadars was that,

1) the levy was a cis-border formation; the khassadar trans-border;

2) the levy was armed by Government; the khassadar provided his own weapon;

3) the levy was employed in British India; the khassadar functioned only in tribal territory.

Lungi
A head-dress of honour often accompanied by a reward or a cash payment; an annual cash payment.

Maidan
Plain.

Maira
High land dependant for crops on rain.

Malik
A proprietor of land.

Malik
A tribal headman, who may be recognised as head of a whole tribe, or one of its major or minor sub-divisions, or of a section or sub-section.

Maliki
Fraction of the tribal allowance paid to a malik.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malik kabza</td>
<td>One who owned the land actually in his possession, but had no share in the common property of the village community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malikana &amp;</td>
<td>A due taken by the superior proprietor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mazater</td>
<td>Literally 'binding up lions' applied to feudal tenants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurusi</td>
<td>Occupancy tenant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehtar</td>
<td>Title of honour; a tribal chief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirāb</td>
<td>Supervisor to look after the distribution of water for irrigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muafī</td>
<td>A Revenue-free assignment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahidin</td>
<td>Holy warriors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulla</td>
<td>Muslim priest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munshi</td>
<td>Ībāt clerk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutabar</td>
<td>Responsible head.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muwājib</td>
<td>Cash allowance paid by the treasury in recognition of family service. It was originally paid by the Sikhs as fees for collection of the revenue to a khan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahri</td>
<td>Irrigated from a canal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naksh-i-Thakbast</td>
<td>Rough boundary plan of an estate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naubat</td>
<td>Order of turns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paina</td>
<td>A term used to describe the rights in water of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of villages situated at the tail of a canal, or channel.

**Pāls**
Flanking embankments forming a continuation of the main dam which prevents the water falling back into its old channel.

**Patwari**
A village accountant or registrar.

**Powindah**
The Nomadic Afghan tribesman from Eastern Afghanistan (Ghilzai etc.).

**Pūcha**
Casting of lots: share.

**Riwaj-i-Abpashi**
Record of irrigation customs and rights.

**Rodkhobi**
Hill-torrent water.

**Sadd**
Dam thrown across a ravine to catch flood water from the hills.

**Sarhang**
In Persia a Major, or Lieutenant-Colonel.

In Afghanistan the leader of three "bairaks" of khashadars.

**Sarishta**
The tribal organisation for the enforcement of Pathan custom or the apportionment of profit and loss amongst tribal sections.

**Sarkar**
Government.

**Saroba**
A term used to describe the water rights of villages at the head of a stream.

**Sartip**
In Persia a Colonel or General. In Afghanistan
the leader of six or more "bairaks" of khassadars.
(Bairak (Turki) a company of khassadars).
It appeared to be in reality an honorary title.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shamilat</td>
<td>Village common land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>A Muslim sect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitta</td>
<td>A log or board of wood laid horizontally under water across the main and branch channels for regulating the flow of water for irrigation purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suqodposhi Inam</td>
<td>A reward assigned out of the revenue to a leading man in return for which certain services were demanded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>A Muslim sect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahsil</td>
<td>A sub-division of a district, charge of a tahsildar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahsildar</td>
<td>Official in charge of a talsil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takavi</td>
<td>Loan granted by Government to a cultivator for agricultural purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tappa</td>
<td>Tribal sub-division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taksim</td>
<td>Distribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taraf</td>
<td>A sub-division of an estate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumen</td>
<td>A tribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumandar</td>
<td>Chief of a tribe.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tumani  According to tribal shares.
Tumtuns  Two-wheeled carriage.
Ulus  Body of Mahsud tribe.
Vakil  Representative; a lawyer.
Vesh  Periodical redistribution of land among proprietors.
Wala  Water channel.
Wand  Land with known boundaries, a territorial block.
Waqat  Time
Wara  A turn or timed share of canal water.
Warakh  A small hole in the side of a water-course.
Yaghistan  Land of the unruly.
Zaildar  A headman in charge of a circle of villages called a zail.
Zamindar  The cultivating owner of land and true agriculturist.
Zamindari  A form of tenure where an estate is held by a sole proprietor or by several proprietors in common.