Bajpai (S.G.)

(Indian History)
INTER-STATE RELATIONS IN
NORTHERN INDIA: C. A.D. 800-1200

by
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The present work is a study of the theory of inter-state relations in Northern India from c. A.D. 800 to 1200.

Chapter I deals with the nature, scope, and source materials of the present enquiry and points out that the traditional theory of inter-state relations is interpreted and re-stated by our Sanskrit authorities.

In Chapter II we consider the concept of the state and maintain that a state comprising seven constituent elements, indicating its sovereignty and power, is the subject of the theory of inter-state relations and that feudatories are ignored. It is also shown that sovereignty is a relative concept in the inter-state sphere, and states are classified on the basis of power, independence, payment of tribute, and political allegiance.

Chapter III explains that the theory of inter-state relations is a corollary of the concept of the state, and it is based on the assumption of conflict of power and ambition for political supremacy among states. After a brief introduction to the development of the three concepts of inter-state relations, viz. mandala (circle of states), sadgurva (sixfold policy), and upayas (political expedients), we discuss the mandala system, which outlines a hypothetical pattern of inter-state relations based on the principles of geo-politics and power-politics. It provides a framework for the conduct of relations of a king desirous of conquest and supremacy over others.
Chapters IV to VII deal with the various aspects of the sixfold policy. We have attempted to define and analyse the policies of peace, war, marching, staying quiet, dual policy and seeking shelter and have pointed out that each one of them is an instrument of the politico-military strategy for overcoming enemies during vicissitudes of power. It has been shown that all six policies are concerned with hostile relations and āsana (staying quiet) is not 'neutrality', as some modern scholars contend.

Chapter VIII deals with the political expedients and analyses their contents. It shows that the means of diplomacy and war are comprehensive for attaining success in inter-state relations.

It is pointed out in conclusion that the dominant theme of the theory of inter-state relations as well as the dynastic history of our period is conflict of power and struggle for supremacy, which indicates the impact of political ideas on inter-dynastic relations.
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Dr. J. G. de Casparis, who has kindly supervised this work, and whose able guidance, valuable comments and constant encouragement sustained me through my labours. I am greatly obliged to Professor A. L. Basham, under whose inspiring supervision I commenced this study and who gave unhesitatingly of his time and talents in the first year of my research. I take this opportunity to place on record my sincere gratitude and appreciation of my supervisors for their invaluable guidance and affectionate care. I am extremely grateful to Mr. T. R. Trautmann for going through my draft and offering constructive suggestions. Thanks are due to Professor J. D. M. Derrett for occasional help and valuable suggestions, to Professor J. C. Wright, Dr. P. S. Jaini and Mrs. Aparna Dasgupta for their help in translating difficult Sanskrit passages, to Seth Ramchandra Poddar, Dr. N. C. Sethi, Miss J. M. Hayes, Mr. D. S. Chavda, and Mr. B. N. Sampat for various kinds of help, to the members of the staff of the libraries of the School of Oriental and African Studies and the British Museum for their assistance, and to Mrs. L. Fuller for typing the thesis. I am also thankful to the authorities of the Banaras Hindu University and the School of Oriental and African Studies for extending timely financial aid during my studies.

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<tr>
<td>ASS</td>
<td>Anandaśrama Sanskrit Series.</td>
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<td>A.V.</td>
<td>Atharva Veda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>BI.</td>
<td>Bibliotheca Indica.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C.I.I.</td>
<td>Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum.</td>
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<td>GOS.</td>
<td>Gaekwad Oriental Series.</td>
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<td>BI.</td>
<td>Epigraphia Indica.</td>
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<td>HA.</td>
<td>Hemacandra's Arhanniti.</td>
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<td>HAC.</td>
<td>Hemacandra's Abhidhanacintāmapi.</td>
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<td>HDS.</td>
<td>History of Dharmasastra.</td>
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<td>HM.</td>
<td>Hammīra-mayākavya.</td>
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<td>HMM.</td>
<td>Hammīramadamardana.</td>
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<td>IA.</td>
<td>Indian Antiquary.</td>
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<td>IYBIA</td>
<td>Indian Year Book of International Affairs.</td>
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<td>KA.</td>
<td>Kauṭiliya Arthasastra.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Title</td>
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<tr>
<td>KN.</td>
<td>Kamandakiya Nitisāra.</td>
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<td>Mānas.</td>
<td>Mānsollāsa.</td>
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<td>Nbh.</td>
<td>Mahābhārata.</td>
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<td>Medh.</td>
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<td>Mit.</td>
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<td>NSP.</td>
<td>Nirṇaya Sagar Press.</td>
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<td>NV.</td>
<td>Nītivākyāṁṛta.</td>
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<td>PB.</td>
<td>Pañcaviṃśa Brāhamaṇa</td>
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<td>PC.</td>
<td>Prabandacintāmaṇi.</td>
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<td>PV.</td>
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<td>RDK.</td>
<td>Rajadharmakāpda.</td>
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<td>Rāj. R.</td>
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RV.  
\( \text{Rg Veda.} \)

SBE.  
\( \text{Sacred Books of the East.} \)

TB.  
\( \text{Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa.} \)

TS.  
\( \text{Taittirīya Saṁhitā.} \)

TSS.  
\( \text{Trivandrum Sanskrit Series.} \)

Vdh.  
\( \text{Visṇudarmottara Purāṇa.} \)

WAI.  
\( \text{War in Ancient India.} \)

Ykt.  
\( \text{Yuktikalpataru.} \)

Z.D.M.G.  
\( \text{Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.} \)
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The period with which the present study is concerned, that is from c. A.D. 800 to 1200, occupies a position of great importance in Indian history. It is of great political and cultural interest as it witnessed a great upsurge of dynasties whose records reveal a persistent struggle for power and significant developments in the fields of Sanskrit literature, historiography, architecture, iconography, and religion. The comparatively rich source material for the history of this period shows the full development, the maturity, and the beginning of the decay of the institutions of Classical India. The period also marks the end of Hindu sovereignty in Northern India and ushers in an era of Muslim rule.

This period has, however, only recently been a subject of historical research. Scholars, focusing their attention mainly on political history, have produced several monographs dealing with the history and culture of the various regional dynasties which ruled in North India. These monographs, learned as they are, do not enquire into the political thought and problems of inter-state relations nor do they give an integrated account of the history of this period. While presenting authentic accounts of inter-dynastic relations, they
do not reflect any knowledge of the principles and precepts of the inter-state intercourse which influenced the thought and activity of kings in the conduct of their foreign relations, much less discuss them. A recent work on the period, the fourth and fifth volumes of the *History and Culture of the Indian People*, prepared by eminent Indologists, though seeking to present the political history in a chronological order and dynastic sequence, fails to underline, or even to investigate, the ideological background to the inter-state relationships of the period generally summed up as 'endemic warfare'. Its two chapters on political theory and institutions, one in each of the fourth and fifth volumes, take some notice of the institution of kingship, especially the basis of political authority and the grounds of political obligation, but they hardly do justice to the bulk of material bearing on polity during this period. Even in these sections no cognizance has been taken of the theory and practice of inter-state relations despite the fact that most of the treatises on polity of this period deal with the subject. In fact, political thought and institutions of this period in general, and the theory and practice of inter-state relations in particular, have been neglected because scholars have been satisfied with the study of earlier authorities such as Kautilya and Manu and probably considered those who followed lacking in originality, hence of not much value. However, a general description of several aspects of the political thought of this period has been given by U. N. Ghoshal in his excellent work *A History of Indian Political Ideas*. Another recent study, *Kingship in Northern*
India A.D. 600 - 1200 by R. C. P. Singh enquires into the various aspects of kingship but treats the theory of inter-state relations in a single chapter mainly based upon the Kāmandakiya Nītisāra.

Further, a few modern works devoted to the study of the theory of inter-state relations and diplomatic practices in ancient India on the basis of sources earlier than our period suffer from many drawbacks. The first monograph, *Inter-state Relations in Ancient India* pt. I (Calcutta 1920) by Narendra Nath Law deals with the concepts of mandala (Indian inter-state system) and of śādgunyā (sixfold foreign policy) of which only one type of policy, viz. sandhi (treaty or peace) is studied in some detail. It omits the concept of upāyas altogether, which, it seems, was to be dealt with along with the remaining five forms of the sixfold policy in the second part of this book as planned by the author, which, however, never appeared. This study mainly based on the *Arthaśāstra* is incomplete besides containing doubtful interpretations, which are noted in this thesis at the proper places.

The second monograph, *Les théories diplomatiques de l'Inde ancienne et l'Arthaśāstra* by Kalidas Nag, (Paris, 1923) gives an account of the traditional background of theories of diplomacy on the basis of Vedic literature, sūtras, dharmaśāstras and the epics and gives a general outline of Kauṭilyan diplomacy. Dr. Nag points to the prakṛtis (i.e. seven constituents) of the state as the basis of diplomacy; outlines the concept of mandala, which he calls 'sphere of


action; mentions upāyas, and discusses śādgunya in some detail. He, however, merely reproduces the relevant sections of the Arthasastra, especially from its Books VI and VII. He does not make any critical study of the subject matter, much less does he illustrate various theories and principles by reference to historical events.

The third monograph, *International Law in Ancient India* (Madras, 1925), by Mr. S. V. Viswanath is entirely new in its approach to the theory and practice of inter-state relations in Ancient India. Viswanath dealt with the usages and conventions which regulated intercourse among ancient Indian kings according to the familiar categories of modern international law, viz., war, peace, neutrality, and diplomacy or diplomatic agents. He made an excellent job of the source material up to the fifth century A.D. in presenting the ideas and principles of inter-state relations, but in his desire to demonstrate the prevalence of some sort of international law in ancient India he concentrated on śādgunya (sixfold foreign policy), its various implications for international law in ancient times, and diplomatic agents instead of presenting a full and critical study of the concepts of mandala and upāyas. His study, though very useful, does not, however, establish the complete theory of inter-state relations nor does it refer to historical events to illustrate its conclusions.

V. R. R. Dikshitar, also dealt with the theory of inter-state relations in two chapters of his book *War in Ancient India* (Madras, 1948). Like Law and Nag, he also did not utilize the source-material of our period nor give the subject a thorough treatment. In his
conclusions he is greatly influenced by Law and Nag. However, his discussion of the role of diplomatic agents is thorough, though mainly based on the Arthasastra. He often quotes from a late work Śivatatvaratnākara but if he compared it with the Maṇasollāsa he would have instantly realized that the former reproduces the latter on the topics of the subdivisions of śādgunya and upāyas, which Dikshitar thinks are the evidence of the development of political ideas until quite late in Indian history.

In the last decade two more works have been published, viz., B. A. Saletore's India's Diplomatic Relations with the West (Bombay, 1958) and H. L. Chatterjee's International Law and Inter-state Relations in Ancient India (Cal. 1958). Saletore briefly describes the theory of inter-state relations and diplomacy in one chapter of his book, but he does not accomplish much by way of critical examination. In fact, in the elucidation of the concept of maṇḍala, he not only commits the blunder of assuming Kautilya's version of the maṇḍala dependent on Manu's but also overlooks the fact that Kautilya himself gives two versions of maṇḍala and does not favour the simpler one found in the Manusmṛti, but another, which he himself perfected and which he made the basis of the exposition of the sixfold policy. Besides shortcomings like this, Saletore sel dom utilizes sources of our period for the discussion of the theory of inter-state relations. He, however, some useful observations on the diplomatic agents (dūta) for which he has utilized later sources, especially the Kāmandakiya Nītisāra and the Agni Purāṇa.
H. L. Chatterjee's work closely follows the pattern set by Viswanath like whom he applies the modern categories of international law to the study of ancient Indian thought and practices on different topics of inter-state intercourse. But like his predecessor, Chatterjee omits a full and critical study of the concepts of mandala and upāyas. His study is primarily based on the Kautilīya Arthasastra, the Manusmṛti, the Yājñavalkyasūtra, the Epics, and the Kāmandakīya Nītisāra with occasional references to a few other sources. In presenting the speculations of the ancient Hindus on War, Peace, Diplomacy and Neutrality, he scarcely tries to illustrate the theoretical formulations from history, and when he does so, he relies on examples from the Epics and legends rather than historical instances.

In addition to these special studies, sections on the theory of inter-state relations are found in many books on ancient Indian polity. But these are far from thorough and critical studies because of the limitations of the works, of which they form a part.

Thus, despite all that has so far been written on inter-state relations in ancient India, three prominent shortcomings are evident. Firstly, the investigations have been largely confined to the sources before A.D. 800; secondly, the three concepts of inter-state relations have not been thoroughly and critically treated as a whole to bring out their full significance; and thirdly, the theoretical formulations have hardly ever been illustrated by well attested historical instances. In addition to these there are many lopsided interpretations
and unfounded conclusions. We have made an attempt to fulfil the first want, to accomplish the second, and to remove the last defect in the present study. We have also avoided the temptation of applying modern categories of international law to the ancient Indian principles of inter-state relations, but rather have followed our ancient authorities according to their own categories. Reading the present into the past is unhistorical and only creates confusion and misconception.

The importance of the subject for this period can hardly be over emphasized, as it stands out as a well-marked epoch in which the struggle for empire in Northern India continued unabated. This struggle for hegemony became fierce towards the closing decades of the 8th century A.D. At this time there were two claimants for the overlordship of the North, the Pālas of Bengal and the Pratihāras of Avantī. The latter fought their way to Kanauj where they succeeded in establishing their seat of power in about 815 A.D. The Pratihāra kings had not only to confront the Pālas of Bengal but also the Rāṣṭrakūṭas of the Deccan who had been their inveterate enemies since their rise to political prominence in the middle of 8th century. It seems that the Pratihāras had aimed at becoming a North Indian power and wanted, like Harṣavardhana, to set up a unified Uttarāpatha in response to the challenge of the Rāṣṭrakūṭas who had assumed the mantle of the Gāṇukyas, the lords of Dakṣiṇāpatha. The conflict for supremacy assumed a tripartite character from the closing decades of the 8th century. But one strikingly prominent feature in inter-state
politics is the bi-partite character of wars, for it has not been conclusively established that the Pratiharas ever fought against a combined force of the Pālas and the Rāṣṭrakūṭas, although there exists a strong possibility that the Pālas derived comfort at the periodic shake-up of the Pratihāra power by the Rāṣṭrakūṭas and improved their status in inter-state relations thereby. As their records reveal, the Pratiharas, the Pālas, and the Rāṣṭrakūṭas fought intermittently until their strength gave out towards the middle of the tenth century A.D. Despite their chequered ascendancy, the Pratiharas succeeded in establishing their hegemony over major parts of Northern India and their empire under Bhoja and Mahendrapāla embraced territories as widely apart as Rājpūtāna, eastern Punjab, Gorakhpur region, North Bengal, Bundelkhand, Ujjain, and Saurāṣṭra. The decline of the Pratiharas began in about the middle of the 10th century A.D. The fissiparous tendencies ready to operate in such circumstances worked rapidly until the division of the Kānaūj empire into several independent powers was accomplished.

The second sub-period (A.D. 1000-1200) is marked by the emergence of erstwhile feudatories and small powers owing nominal allegiance to imperial houses, into independent states. Among these the Candellas of Jejākabhukti, the Cedis of Dāhala, the Paramāras of Mālwā, the Cauḷukyās of Anhilavāḍa, the Gāhamānas of Śākambhari were most noteworthy. In addition, dynasties like the Gāhaḍavālas of Varanasi and Kānaūj and the Senas of Bengal came into prominence some time later. The Śāhis of Kābul and later of Udbhāṇḍapur
became conspicuous in the arena of North Indian politics owing to their defensive, but all the more heroic warfare, with the Muslims of the north-west. To these Hindu kingdoms may be added the Muslim principalities particularly of Ghaznī and Ghor. Unmindful of the rising Muslim power in the north-west the Hindu ruling dynasties incessantly fought among themselves for supremacy and empire. The struggle became serious on the entry of the Sultāns of Ghaznī and Ghor into North Indian inter-state rivalry. Owing to the number of ambitious kings, who sought wealth and expansion of their power by encroaching upon others, the problem of the defence of a kingdom against its aggressors became acute. Political isolation as a measure of defence was neither possible nor was it traditional as far as the kingdoms within the geo-political bounds of the Indian sub-continent were concerned. This is not to say that all kingdoms were involved in conflict with every other, but that each major one was engaged with a few others in political relations, as evident from historical sources. The conflict for power was naturally made more intense by the Ghaznavid and Ghurid incursions during our period.

Theoretically the importance of inter-state relations is set in clear terms by our authorities. The Nītisāstra (science of politics) is divided into two aspects as it concerns the activities of a king relating to the protection of his own kingdom and those matters relating to the acquisition of the territory belonging to others.¹

¹. NV, XXX. 47.
Somadeva, appropriating Kauṭilya, postulates that the well-being of a state depends on the wise application of the sixfold foreign policy (sādgunya), for, what results from it is the advancement, stability or decline of a state, which is measured in terms of the threefold power (of intelligence or statesmanship, of might, and of energy) and the threefold success (siddhi) in these spheres. Medhātithi also expresses the importance of the subject by exemplifying the visible acts 'of the king', virtually constituting Rajadharma, by sādgunya. He further comments that the 'highest success' (siddhiṣca paramā) that a king may attain to, means 'success in the form of undisputed sovereignty (ekādhipatya) which accrues to a vijigīṣu'. Thus he sets out the goal of the king, which is the attainment of paramountcy and explains the importance of foreign policy, which has to be decided and applied after special deliberation. Further, the subjects of maṇḍala (inter-state system), sādgunya (sixfold policy) and upāyas (means of policy) are introduced in the smṛtis and purāṇas as important concerns in the daily routine of the king, which implies that foreign relations were important. It will be evident in the following pages that the theoretical disquisitions on inter-state relations emphasize the conflict of power and struggle for supremacy in the inter-state sphere. The objectives of foreign policy are security, prosperity, and political hegemony which can be realized by the promotion of one's own economic and military

1. Ibid., XXIX.136ff; cf. KA, VI. 2. 4-5.
2. On Manu, VII. 1.
resources and by the acquisition of others' wealth. The principal means to realize the ambition of conquest and hegemony are conciliation, gifts, concession or bribery, sowing dissension among enemies, and force. The success of a king in foreign affairs is said to depend on his knowledge of the science of politics in general and the wise application of śādguṇya and the intelligent employment of upāyas in particular, as by good policy (naya) he can not only foil the attempts of his enemies to harm him and maintain a favourable balance of power among kings, but also realize his ambition of paramountcy. It may be pointed out that the theoretical importance of foreign affairs is in accordance with the historical experience of our period characterized by the inter-dynastic struggle for hegemony. It will be our purpose to study the theory of inter-state relations in the context of history in order to show the ideas and principles which influenced the struggle for hegemony, and enquire into the correspondence between theory and practice.

The period between c. A.D. 800 and 1200 is generally regarded as an era of great commentaries and digests in the history of ancient Indian political ideas and jurisprudence. Since among the extant published smṛti commentaries, which incorporate sections on polity especially dealing with the theory of inter-state relations, are datable about or after A.D. 800 we have considered it a convenient date for the delimitation of the field of the present

enquiry which extends up to A.D. 1200 when the Hindu sovereignty in Northern India had come to an end.

* * * * *

The source material is somewhat complex in nature. There are commentaries on the Manusmṛti and the Yājñavalkyaśmṛti, and the Purāṇas which have sections on Rājadharma, a term which covers 'law, governmental policy, statecraft and politics under the somewhat misleading expression 'duties of the King'; smṛti digests, especially the Krtyakalpataru which has a separate section on Rājadharma: and several independent treatises on polity (Nīti) like the Nītvākyāmṛta and the Laghvarhannīti. In addition to such primary sources, there is a bulk of literary and epigraphic source material which in some way or other throws light on the prevalence and popularity of the principles of inter-state relations and precepts on statecraft. Incidental information may also be gathered from the Muslim accounts which mention Indian usages and observances concerning war, destruction, booty, settlement of conquered kingdoms, and the practice of sending envoys and messengers to the opponent for demanding submission before taking recourse to battle as well as the trust that Hindu kings reposed in promise, truce or agreement. As it will cover much space even to mention briefly the variety of literary and epigraphic sources utilized in this study, only some of the important ones, especially the texts bearing directly on our subject
can be discussed.

Before we commence our discussion of the primary source material, it may be observed that it consists of two classes of literature on polity, viz. (a) dharmaśāstra and (b) nītisāra or arthaśāstra. Without undertaking an exhaustive discussion of their relative authority, it may be concluded with Prof. K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar that by and large the rules of the former were mandatory and those of the latter commendatory.¹ However, it will be evident from the following pages that with slight differences both the dharmaśāstra and nītisāra approach to the problems of inter-state relations and their precepts on inter-state politics tend to concur rather than to conflict with each other. This is due mostly to the fact that the celebrated smṛtis of Manu and Yājñavalkya used arthaśāstra material and adopted its technique at least in the exposition of the theory of inter-state relations. Their dependence on arthaśāstra works is evident from the actual use of terms as maṇḍala, śādgunya and upāya, pārśnigrāha, and ākranda which cannot be properly understood without a reference to such works. The brevity of Manu and Yājñavalkya demanded some kind of commentary from the very beginning, especially in the sections on Rājadharmā in general and the passages concerning inter-state relations in particular. Their commentators would therefore be justified in turning to arthaśāstra and nītisāra authorities for the elucidation and supplementation (wherever necessary) of their texts. But, as Prof. J. D. M. Derrett rightly observes, 'In view of the dichotomy of the śāstras a certain

¹. RDK, Preface, p. vi.
self-consciousness would be expected, which accounts for the rare reference to arthaśāstra itself. However, these commentators have extensively drawn upon the arthaśāstra and the nītisāra works to which they are closer on issues of inter-state relations than the smṛtis. The Purāṇas also assimilated the ideas on inter-state relations found in the technical works on polity and the Agni Purāṇa, as we will see below, even appropriated the relevant verses from the Kāmandakīya Nītisāra on all the three concepts of inter-state relations, viz. the mandala, śādgya, and upāya. Thus, the dharmāśāstra and the arthaśāstra or nītisāra approach to the foreign affairs of a state is, by and large, similar and the dependence of the former on the latter is accentuated by the borrowings of the commentators and later Purāṇas.

Another point to be made at the outset concerns certain texts utilized in this thesis which were written much earlier than our period. The first category includes the smṛtis particularly those of Manu and Yājñavalkya, which were extensively commented upon during our period. Although we have primarily concentrated on their commentaries, nevertheless, we have had to appropriate more often than not the texts themselves, because sometimes the comments are sparing when verses are self-explanatory or inexplicable without a reference to the text itself. Furthermore, the Manusmrīti and the Yājñavalkyasmrīti enjoyed great popularity in northern India as authoritative treatises

1. See below p. 17, fn. 1.
2. See below, pp. 30-31.
laying down the principles of government and politics and were as valid in our period as when they were written. This is borne out by all the verses concerning the theory of inter-state relations being reproduced in the Rājadharmakānda, a work of our period, and by their being paraphrased or plagiarized by others such as Hemacandra. Other smṛtis appearing in the body of this thesis as also the dharmasūtras and the Epics are used where these are cited by the smṛti commentators and the digest compilers. The second category includes the Kāmandakiya Nītisāra and the Kauṭiliya Arthaśāstra, which are constantly consulted for making comparisons or checking the deviations in later works. These are referred to the footnotes unless reproduced partly or wholly in the works of our period. The references to the Kāmandakiya in the body of the thesis are rather frequent as it is profusely appropriated by the Agni Purāṇa and quoted occasionally by the Yuktikalpataru without acknowledgement.

Commentaries on the Manusmṛti

Manubhaṣya of Medhātithi

Among the extant published commentaries on Manu, the Manubhaṣya of Medhātithi occupies the foremost place. Medhātithi, a great scholar of dharmaśāstra as well as arthaśāstra literature, is assigned to the period between A.D. 825 and 900. He was a northerner.

2. HDS, p. 275.
and probably a Kashmiri. ¹

The commentary on the Rājadharma section of the smṛti which includes the theory of inter-state relations is scholarly, exhaustive, and illuminating. In order to give correct interpretations and cogent elucidations Medhatithi not only cites numerous smṛti writers like Gauḍa, Apastamba, Yājñavalkya, Viśnu, Vyāsa, Nārada, Kātyāyana and others, but also several arthaśāstra authorities such as Brhaspati and Uśanas, and he mentions Cānaka.² There is, however, a controversy among modern scholars on the exact source or sources of arthaśāstra material in the Manubhāṣya, especially in Book VII. On the grounds that Medhatithi knew about a samājanatapra (an obtrusively anonymous source) and quotes the Adhyākṣapracāra, a section of the present Kautilīya Arthaśāstra, it has been suggested that Medhatithi drew upon the Kautilīya.³ Recently Prof. J. D. M. Derrett has shown that the arthaśāstra material of the Manubhāṣya is derived from Bhāruci's Vivarāṇa, an early commentary on Manu, which draws upon the Kautilīya Arthaśāstra without acknowledgement; a copy of an anonymous work, which was essentially an excerpt from the

1. Ibid., I. pp. 269ff; Bühler, Laws of Manu, Intr. p. cxxiii.
2. HDS, I. p. 270.
3. Jolly's ed. Kautilīya, Intr. p. 11. Jolly found that Medh. used Kautilīya at vii. 61 and 81 where Adhyākṣapracāra (KA Bk. II) is referred and also at VII. 53, 54, 104 without acknowledgement. Kane, (HDS, I. p. 270) found that Medh. used Kautilīya at VII, 54, 48, 154. See also VII. 160; cf. KA, VII. 1. 20; Further Medh, on Manu, VII. 191 quotes a verse as from 'samānantrotkām' which is the same as KA, X. 5. 50.
Arthasastra, and the Adhyakṣapracāra section of the Arthasastra probably passing under an independent title, besides the works of Brhaspati and Uśanas. Medhātithi's failure to name the Kauṭiliya Arthasastra is due to the fact that neither Bhāruci, whom Medhātithi closely follows, named his Arthasastra source, nor did Medhātithi possess a complete copy of the Arthasastra under the name of Kauṭiliya. But another recent writer, Dieter Schlingloff, contends that both Medhātithi and Kauṭiliya drew upon an early common Arthasastra treatise and that the former did not draw upon the Arthasastra as we now have it. But, Medhātithi mentions Cāṇakya as an authority on the science of politics (daṇḍanīti), which may indicate his inclination to utilise this famous work rather than an earlier arthasastra treatise. Schlingloff's view cannot, therefore, be upheld until the discovery of such a hypothetical common source of both Medhātithi and Kauṭiliya. It may be further pointed out that this conclusion is drawn upon a comparison of parallel passages in the two works which are close in phraseology but rarely identical. The assumption of Schlingloff is, of course, that Medhātithi would have quoted Kauṭiliya verbatim, if


2. Ibid.

indeed it was this work he was drawing upon. But this assumption is unwarranted; while a passage from śruti or smṛti is generally quoted verbatim, the tendency is to paraphrase, rather than to quote, works outside these categories, often without ascription.

Medhātithi's comments on Manu's verses dealing with the concepts of inter-state relations are most valuable. He does not merely explain the verses, of which he sometimes gives different readings and variant interpretations, but also elucidates and supplements them with rich arthasastra material so that the terse smṛti contents become comprehensible both in their meaning and implication. He also brings political principles up to date by introducing in his comments certain prevailing ideas and practices, as for instance, the terms of agreement between the conqueror and a newly installed tributary king in an occupied kingdom, which outline the nature of relationship between overlord and vassal.¹

Manuṭīkā of Govindarāja (c. 1050-1080).

The next commentary on Manu is the Manuṭīkā of Govindarāja. Its author claims to have received the śāstras of Manu in an unbroken tradition of pupil and teacher.² From his statement that the

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Mleccha countries like Āndhra and such others were unfit for performing sacrifices, it is plausible to infer that he was a northerner.¹

Both Jolly and Bühler assigned Govindaṛāja to the 12th and 13th century, but P. V. Kane² convincingly shows that '... the period of Govindaṛāja is between 1050 to 1100 or 1140 A.D.' He further says, 'Govindaṛāja will have to be pushed back between 1050 — 1080 if Jimūtāvāhana flourished between 1090 to 1140 A.D. as is held by many.'³

The Manuṭīkā is a very concise and complete paraphrase of Manu's text. In the opinion of Bühler it is an abstract of Medhātithi's commentary 'from which Govindaṛāja appropriated whatever seemed to him most valuable.'⁴ Govindaṛāja has not only discarded many of Medhātithi's alternative explanations and controversial disquisitions but also added interpretations to those words of Manu left without comment by his predecessors. In these he sometimes expresses original opinions, although these made him an object of ridicule for his successor Kullūka. Notwithstanding his indebtedness to early commentators on Manu and numerous smṛti writers he quotes, Govindaṛāja is clear and refreshing in his interpretations and elucidations of Manu's verses bearing on inter-state relations. We may mention in particular his explanation of Manu, VII. 156

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1. On Manu, II. 23.
2. HDS, I. pp. 313-315.
3. Ibid., I. p. 315.
4. Bühler, op.cit., Intro. p. CXXVII
describing the eight constituents of *mandala* besides the *vijigīṣu, ari, madhyama* and *udāsīna*, where, unlike Medhātithi, he follows the *nītisāra* version of the composition of the *mandala*. Further he appropriates *Kāmandaka* in verse 167 to explain that *dvaidhībhāva* also means duplicity. His knowledge of the *nītisāra* works is further shown by his clear comments on verse 206 stating that if the enemy is willing to make an alliance, to pay tribute, and to cede some territory, the *vijigīṣu* may also make peace with him without actually fighting and may return home. The later commentators Nārāyaṇa and Kullūka accepted Govindarāja’s explanations. Thus Govindarāja is not without scholarship as alleged by Kullūka. His is the best and most complete explanation of Manu’s text which helps the student to understand the text and also to find his way through the tangled mesh of the *Manubhāṣya*.

The *Manvatthavivṛti* of Sarvajña Nārāyaṇa

The *Manvatthavivṛti* was written by Sarvajña Nārāyaṇa with the avowed intention of superseding the works of his predecessors.  

1. All the commentators except Medh. used the *Kāmandakiya Nītisāra* or some prose work of the same school to elucidate *Manu*, VII. 155-56 and other verses. See Bühlcr, op. cit., fn. to verse. 156; J. Jolly, *Arthaśāstra und Dharmaśāstra*, Z.D.M.G., L xvii. (1913, pp. 9-96.) p.96.

Nārāyaṇa was, as he himself tells us, well-versed not only in the sacred laws but also in various other śāstras.¹ His other works on dharma, the Kāmadhenuḍīpaka and the Suddhidīpaka are also known.² His place of origin is unknown but from the slender evidence of his examples of rivers and mountains for which he mentions the Ganges and the Himalayas it is inferred that he was a northerner.³ Bühler concludes that "...Nārāyaṇa cannot have written later than in the last half of the fourteenth century. Possibly he may be somewhat older." ⁴ But P. V. Kane rightly thinks that Nārāyaṇa flourished between A.D. 1100–1300 as Kūḷūka (who is certainly later,⁵) composed his work about A.D. 1250 and flourished before A.D. 1300.⁶

The Manvārthavivrti is not a running commentary but confines itself to the elucidation of difficult passages of the Manusmṛti. In his anxiety to offer explanations different from Medhātithi and Govindarāja, Nārāyaṇa sometimes accepts the views rejected by Medhātithi; but more often than not his explanations are his own or taken from earlier commentaries not accessible to us. As far as the verses relating to the theory of inter-state relations are concerned Nārāyaṇa does not generally differ from Medhātithi and Govindarāja and in several cases where he does, as for instance in Book VII, verse 167,

1. Ibid., I. 1 anekasākhāmsṛtipāradarśi.
2. Ibid., V. 56, 80, 104, XI. 72.
3. Ibid., III. 9.
5. Ibid.
his explanations seem rather out of context and meaningless.\(^1\)

The Manvarthamuktävali of Kullükabhaṭṭa

The Manvarthamuktävali is the last among the commentaries on Manu, which, although somewhat later than our period, has been utilized by us. Its author Kullükā came of a Varendra Brāhmaṇa family of Gauḍa (Bengal) and was the son of Bhaṭṭa Divākara.\(^2\) Kullükā composed it in Kāshi in the company of pandīts there.\(^3\) Bühler held that he probably lived in the fifteenth century.\(^4\) But Kane convincingly argues that Kullükā flourished before A.D. 1300 and wrote his work about A.D. 1250.\(^5\)

The Manvarthamuktävali is concise, lucid, and to the point. Kullükā made extensive use of Medhātithi, whom he abridged,\(^6\) and also plagiarized Govindarāja. Despite the claims of Kullükā himself that he has elucidated the text in a manner not done before and adduced explanations not found elsewhere,\(^6\) and the high praise given to his splendid achievements by Sir William Jones, Jolly and Bühler are right in criticizing him for offering an improved version of Manuṭīkā and copying its portions verbatim.\(^7\) Kane also thinks that Kullükā

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1. See also On Manu VII. 154. Nārāyaṇa's explanation of paṇcavarga.
3. Ibid.
5. HDS, I. 363.
is not quite original. However, Kallūka is not without interest as his interpretations are marked by clarity, boldness and independence, if not originality.

Commentaries on the Yājñavalkyasmrī.

The principal commentaries on the Yājñavalkyasmrī belonging to our period are three: the Bālakrīdā of Viśvarūpa, who flourished about A.D. 800-825; the Rju Mitākṣara (generally referred as the Mitākṣara) composed by Viṣhāneśvara between A.D. 1070 and 1100; and the Aparārka-Yājñavalkya-dharmaśāstra-nibandha written by Aparārka or Aparādityadeva, a Śilāhāra prince of Koṅkaṇa (A.D. 1115-30), probably after 1126 A.D. Of these three commentaries, especially on the Rājadharma section of the smṛī, it can be said that the first one is concise and illuminating, although not complete; the second is thorough, exhaustive, and voluminous, and at the same time most learned; and the third like the second, is really in the nature of a digest and far more voluminous than it, but not so original or influential. It can further be pointed out that the commentators were well read in the dharmaśāstras and were also aware of the arthaśāstra literature. The latter influenced their explanations of the text pertaining to the principles of inter-state relations. While

1. HDS, I. p. 359.
2. HDS, I. p. 263.
3. Ibid., p. 290; The Struggle for Empire, p. 333 - refers to Rangaswami Aiyangar's view that the Mitākṣara was composed between A.D. 1118 and 1127, possibly in 1120.
5. The Struggle for Empire, p. 333.
Visvarūpa quotes Brhaspati at Yājñ. I. 307 and 323, and cites Visālākṣa at ibid, 328. Vijñānesvara simply states that the details of the different terms for the kings of the maṇḍala are explained in other works, evidently a reference to the arthasastra or nitisāra works, hence they have been omitted by the Lord of Yogīs (i.e. Yājñavalka). However, the influence of the arthasastra or nitisāra versions of the theory of the inter-state relations are obvious in Vijñānesvara's comments, although it is difficult to determine whether this is derived from other early smṛti commentaries or from technical treatises on polity.

All these commentators were southerners, but their works have been utilized because the Yājñavalka smṛti was by no means less authoritative in the North than in the South, and their elucidations of the verses on inter-state relations do not show any local trait. On the contrary, they corroborate the view that the general principles of inter-state relations were the same all over India. These commentaries help us to understand the text, which also had its relevant verses quoted by Lakṣmīdhara.

Digests on polity

Alongside the commentaries, some of which were themselves in the nature of digests, grew up the digest literature in which the dharma was stated through the sources themselves. The compilers offered only the minimum of comments to the more difficult of the

1. Mit. on Yājñ., I. 345.
passages cited in order to make their views clear. Their main contribution lay in their judicious citations and interpretation of the selected source material by skilful juxtaposition. A few of these digest compilers are known to have included a separate section on the *Rājadharma* or *Rajanīti* (science of royal polity), which also includes the theory of inter-state relations. We are only concerned with such digests and not those which have hardly anything to do with politics or confine themselves to law and religion.

The **Rājadharmakāṇḍa** of the *Kṛtyakalpataru*

The foremost among the extant digests is the *Kṛtyakalpataru*, an encyclopaedic work divided into twelve kāṇḍas (sections) of which the eleventh and the twelfth are assigned to the exposition of the *Rājadharma* and *Vyavahāra*. In this, "we for the first time come across that scheme of mechanical repetition of strings of the ancient texts, which is the surest index of the hidebound scholasticism." Its author, Lakṣmīdhara, was the Minister for *Rāce* and *War* (sāndhivigrahika) of the Gāhadavāla king Govindaendra (c. 1146-1155).

The **Rājadharmakāṇḍa**, the smallest of the *Kṛtyakalpataru's* divisions, is of great interest to us. Its contents fall into three distinct divisions: the first consists of eleven chapters devoted to the discussion of the seven elements of the state (*saptāṅga*) and the security princes; the second, comprises three

chapters dealing with the state-counsel (mantra), ways and means of policy (upāyas), concept of mandala (inter-state system) and sād̐gūnya (sixfold foreign policy), yātra (expedition), diplomacy, war, military code, booty, settlement of the conquered territory, and also the duties of a consecrated king with regard to internal affairs; and the third consists of the last seven chapters, which describe the ritual performances that promote the well-being of the state. The discussion of the concepts of inter-state relations as of other topics constitutes the reproduction of the smṛtī passages and citations from other dharmaśāstra works. There are some useful short explanations of difficult citations. However, despite the fact that Lakṣmīdhara was not only a very great scholar but also an active statesman who conducted the foreign affairs of one of the most powerful kings of northern India of his times, his work has no claim to originality. Nevertheless it is valuable as it attests to the fact that ancient ideas on polity in general and inter-state relations in particular were cherished by kings and statesman of our period. It also shows that there was a good deal of flexibility as regards the concept of mandala, which is borne out by two versions of its composition in the Rajadharmakanda. The concepts of sād̐gūnya and upāya are given adequate but only theoretical attention. K. V. Rangaswami sees not unreasonably the influence of contemporary unsettled political conditions and the danger of Muslim invasions in Lakṣmīdhara’s emphasis on the duty of fighting and rewards of heaven in the event of death on the battle-field. ¹

¹ RDK., Intr. p. 75.
The Krtyakalpataru exercised great influence on posterity and curiously enough was considered by later authors such as Caṇḍēśvara as a work on nīti.

The Kāmadhenu of Gopāla was another smṛti digest which had a separate section on polity called the Rājanītikāmadhenu; Gopāla was probably a contemporary of Lākṣmīdhara, but little is known about him. His work is also lost. It is now known from a few quotations in a late work, the Rājanītiratnakara of Caṇḍēśvara, which quotes both the Rājanītikāmadhenu and its author Gopāla. We have utilized these references especially in regard to the types of rulers.

The Purāṇas

The Purāṇas, which as a class of literature existed from ancient times, are a mine of information on various subjects such as religion, philosophy, mythology, history, geography, law, politics, astrology, astronomy, iconography, art and architecture etc. Some of them, especially the Matsya, the Viṣṇudharmottara, and the Agni Purāṇas, deal with the science of politics and statecraft under separate sections entitled Rājadharma. While it seems certain that some of the eighteen Mahāpurāṇas and eighteen Upapurāṇas belong to our period, the chronology of the Purāṇas is still unsettled and we have to be extremely cautious in utilizing this valuable source.

1. Rāj. R., pp. 2, 4, 72, 75; see also its Intr. by K. P. Jajswal, p. 23.
We have, however, used the Matsya, the Visnudharmottara, and especially the Agni Purānas for our subject. The first two purānas are generally dated earlier than our period, although U. N. Ghoshal\(^1\) utilizes their evidence for the exposition of the political ideas of the period, A.D. 800-1200. As regards the Matsya Purāna P.V. Kane\(^2\) says that it cannot be later than the sixth century, but Hans Losch prefers the later sixth to seventh century as the period of its composition.\(^3\) R. C. Hazra\(^4\) convincingly shows that the Matsya was first compiled about the last quarter of the third or the first quarter of the fourth century A.D. But he also concludes that the Rājadharma section cannot possibly be dated earlier than A.D. 600 or rather 650 and not later than A.D. 1000, although alterations, additions, and even interpolations continued to be made in certain other chapters as late as A.D. 1100.\(^5\) It is further pointed out that the Matsya has borrowed from the Visnudharmottara in its Rājadharma section, which is apparent from the comparison of its chapters 215-227 with the latter's section II, chs. 24-28 and 65-72.\(^6\) In view of the conflicting opinions on the date of the Matsya Purāṇa and its

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1. A History of Indian Political Ideas, pp. 437ff.
6. See also Hans Losch, op. cit., pp. 262-267 for concordance of verses and also his footnotes to the Viṣṇu text.
different chapters, we have been extremely careful in utilizing its material on the theory of inter-state relations and only such verses of the Matsya which have been quoted in the Rājadharmakānda, occur in the body of this thesis. It may, however, be pointed out that nothing valuable on our subject in this Purāṇa has been left out as Lakṣmīdhara cites it rather profusely because it contains predominantly dharmaśāstra material.

The Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa, an encyclopaedic work, excluded from the list of the traditional Mahāpurāṇas, is often quoted by Al-Biruṇī as an authoritative treatise in the eleventh century A.D. Dr. Hazra concludes after an extensive investigation that the Viṣṇudharmottara cannot be dated earlier than 400 A.D. and not later than 500 A.D. However, Hans Losch prefers to assign its composition to the end of the seventh century. Its section of the Rājadharma which figures mainly in the second part is important as it deals with the concepts of maṇḍala, śādgunyā and upāyas and also marching against an enemy, battle and other related issues. It is rightly maintained that the Āgni P. has extensively borrowed from it in the Rājadharma section, which makes it necessary for us to refer to this primary source as the former was composed during our period.

2. Ibid., p. 212.
4. Ibid., pp. 224-273 for a list of concordance between the verses of Viṣṇu and Āgni: see also Hazra, op. cit., p. 209.
The Agni Purāṇa is the most important for our purpose as it gives a fairly full treatment to the theory of inter-state relations. P. V. Kane cogently argues that the extant Agni Purāṇa, which quotes Daṇḍin and Bhāmaḥa and knew the theory of dhvani, was composed about A.D. 900. Dr. Hazra also holds that the present Agni Purāṇa was compiled sometime during the 'ninth century' most probably in West Bengal. Thus the Agni Purāṇa belongs to our period and we have extensively used this text.

The Agni Purāṇa is essentially a Śaivite work. It has an encyclopaedic character as it deals with subjects like religion, astronomy, astrology, geography, politics and law, metrics and grammar, marriage and death, costumes etc. etc. Its section on the Rājadharmya has, however, hardly any claim to originality; nevertheless it is interesting and valuable because it not only faithfully reproduces the purānic traditions on polity manifest in its incorporation of numerous verses of the Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa, but also in its appropriation of the Kāmandaṇīya Niśisāra almost verbatim especially in its chapters 239-242, which describe the duties of the king and concepts of mandala, sādgunya, upāyas and war. The Agni Purāṇa repeats the discussion of the theory of inter-state relations and several chapters overlap. As for example, it discusses upāyas in chs. 226, 234 and 241 which clearly show that in chs. 226 and

1. HDS, I. p. 172; also Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, pp. III-V.
2. Hazra, R.C., op. cit., p. 138; see also its footnotes no. 134-136.
it is recording the purānic tradition by drawing upon the Viṣṇudharmottara P. II. chs. 67, 70, 147-149 and the Matsya P. chs. 222-225, while in ch. 241 it is quoting from the Kāmandakiya Nītisāra, canto XVIII. Similarly the repetitious discussions of the concepts of mandala in chs. 233 and 240 and of śādguna in chs. 234 and 240 are also due to the differences in sources. This admixture of the sources, however, does not represent any new attempt to synthesize the dharmaśāstra and the nītisāra ideas on inter-state relations because we have already seen that the smṛtis themselves and their commentators had done so in their own way. Nevertheless the Agni Purāṇa attests to the fact that the Nītisāra treatises had come close to the dharmaśāstra and that the Kāmandakiya Nītisāra had become quite popular in Northern India.

Furthermore, a Jain purāṇa called the Ādipurāṇa of Jinasena written in the ninth century A.D. has some material on polity. It refers briefly to the principles of inter-state relations in the account of the patriarch Rṣabhadeva's instructions to the assemblage of kings in Kṣatriya behaviour. The speaker characteristically puts forward a plea for a pacifist approach to war as he recommends paying tribute to a powerful invader instead of fighting because of the risks and losses of war. However, this pacifism in inter-state relations is limited to the situations of battle; it does not

1. cf. Vīhāra, II. chs. 145, & 150; KN, VIII. 16-19, & IX. 1, 2-4, 21, 24-28; X. 1-5, 16, 17, 19-23, 25-27; XI. 2, 12, 23, 24, 25. See also Hans Losch, op.cit., pp. 224-274 - for studious compilation of concordance among the verses of the Vīhāra, Matsya, and Agni, and also a list of verses reproduced by the Agni Purāṇa from the Kāmandakiya; HDS, I. pp 170ff -Kane shows that the Agni Purāṇa reproduces the vyāvahāra section of the Yajñavalkyasmṛti.
emphasize inter-state co-operation and amity as an alternative to political domination and rivalry.

Works on polity

(1) **Nītīvākyāṁṛta**

The Nītivākyāṁṛta is the work of the Jain monk Somadeva Sūri, who wrote it after A.D. 959, which is the date of the completion of his Yaśastilaka Campū, a religious romance, according to its colophon. Somadeva was a great scholar poet, disputant and logician. He enjoyed the favour of the Cālukya kings of Vemulavāḍa (now in Karimnagar District of Hyderabad), who were feudatories of the Rāstrakūṭas. However, he does not seem to have been connected with the Rāstrakūṭa emperor Kṛṣṇa III, whose conquests of the south in A.D. 959 he mentions in the colophon of the Yaśastilaka. Notwithstanding his religious professions, Somadeva was keenly interested in the social and political life of his age. His Yaśastilaka Campū is justly described as a socio-political study of the age and a learned compendium of philosophy, theology, and religion. In its third section, Somadeva displays a wide knowledge of political ideas and appreciable understanding of the problems of statecraft. He dwells upon such topics of polity as the obligations and duties of the king,

1. NV, p. 406. the colophon.
3. K. K. Handiqui, Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture (Sholapur, 1949), pref. p. V.
qualifications and duties of ministers, risks of the corrupt officials and the need of the spies to inform the king about the maladministration of his kingdom, the problems of foreign relations, the selection of the appropriate policy against foreign kings in the light of the traditional inter-state system, questions of war and peace. But these found a separate, complete, and erudite treatment in his independent work on polity, the Nītivākyāmrta, which appears to be the product of his mature age. What urged Somadeva to write the Nītivākyāmrta we do not know for certain, although its anonymous commentator alleges that he was asked by Mahendradeva, the king of Kanauj, to compose a simple treatise on politics as the king was distressed at the difficult and abstruse text of the Arthasastra of a former savant (ācārya)\(^1\), probably a reference to the Kautiliya Arthasastra. Although Somadeva extensively draws upon the Arthasastra, it cannot be substantiated that he wrote the Nītivākyāmrta at the behest of king Mahendradeva of Kanauj, because the only contemporary king of that name could have been the Pratihāra ruler Mahendrapāla II\(^2\) whose Pratābgarh inscription is dated in A.D. 946\(^3\), but who must have been dead even before the completion of the Yaśastilaka in 959 A.D., which preceded the Nītivākyāmrta as is clear from the colophon to the latter.

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There is a dispute among modern scholars as to the immediate source of inspiration of the Nātivākyāmṛta. Shamashastra in his introduction to the Arthaśāstra says that it is evident from the phrases and style that the Nātivākyāmṛta, like the Kāmandakīya Nītisāra, is an abridged version of the Kautiliya Arthaśāstra. But U. N. Ghoshal observes that 'the immediate source of Somadeva's inspiration has probably to be found in the large number of metrical works dealing with topics on politics which are quoted by the anonymous commentary on the Nātivākyāmṛta.'

It seems, however, from internal evidence that Somadeva may have been inspired by the metrical smṛtis if the commentary is taken as a guide but, in fact, he had as the model for his work the Arthaśāstra, which he follows closely in his treatment of the old problem of the values of the four traditional sciences (vidyās) in the context of a prince's educational curriculum, the theory of inter-state relations, and the problems of war and peace.

The Nātivākyāmṛta is divided into thirty-two sections dealing with the three ends of life: dharma, artha, and kāma, which the state helps to promote; the four traditional sciences philosophy (ānvīksiki), three Vedas (trayī), economics (vārttā), and science of politics (daṇḍanīti), appointment and qualifications of ministers, the royal chaplain, commander of the army, envoys, spies, the seven constituents of the state, law, disputes, sixfold policy,

war, etc. It also manages occasional digressions on such topics as the daily duties of the householder, moral conduct, marriage etc. because Somadeva held nīti in its wider concept of appropriate policy and general morals. Its two sections (XXIX & XXX) entitled Sādgunyasamuddēśya and Yuddhasamuddēśya are exclusively devoted to the foreign relations of a king. In both these sections Somadeva extensively draws upon the Arthasastra, which he more often than not merely abridges or paraphrases. He is, however, very clear and straightforward in his treatment of the concept of the maṇḍala, śādgunya and upāyas in which he also displays the qualities of an independent approach to the traditional principles. Despite the fact that his ideas on politics are often suffused with moral maxims, the dominant theme of his statements on inter-state relations is power and success. He regards every king as a potential vijigīṣu and instructs him to so arrange his internal affairs and external relations as to be able to achieve overlordship. While he pleads for inter-state amity and advises a weak king to retain the goodwill of his powerful neighbour by paying him tribute under some pretext, he observes that the basis of a durable treaty is solemn affirmation (satya) and trust; he extols the virtues of union and alliance and recommends diplomatic struggle rather than fighting, and permits the use of force only in the last resort and primarily in the defence of the kingdom; yet, he is no pacifist in his approach to war. He has advocated such restraints on war which arise out of the consideration of sound policy and power rather than religious
morality or non-violent tenets of his own faith. Whether he in fact advocates pacifism or aggression in foreign relations cannot be stated categorically. But it is evident that in his approach to inter-state relations Somadeva prefers stability to adventure, consolidation and to expansion; conciliation to confrontation. He is not averse to the exercise of power in a wider political sphere if it promotes the well-being of the state.

The Nītivākyāmṛta is quite original in its independent affirmation of old ideas and their modification either through greater emphasis or prudent omission of details. It is characterized by an objective approach to politics and freedom from any kind of sectarian bias. The impact of contemporary political life is perhaps to be seen in Somadeva's emphasis on the consolidation of political power in the kingdom and appreciation of inter-state politics dominated by factors of interests, power, and cause. However, like other political thinkers he does not draw upon historical events to illustrate principles and policies and lacks political imagination to realize the need for innovations in the old concepts in order to foster inter-state understanding and cooperation.

The Yuktikalpataru is a compendium on polity and many other subjects of secular interest such as the construction of buildings, weapons, draught animals, vehicles, boats and ships, and shipbuilding.

1. That Somadeva knew about the political events of his age may be seen from the colophon of the Yaśāstilaka Campū in which the historical events of the years of its completion are mentioned; the conquest of Cōla and Pāṇḍya kingdoms by the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Kṛṣṇa III.
intended for the education of a prince. Its authorship is ascribed to the Paramāra polyhistor king Bhoja of Dhārā (A.D. 1000-1055). The first eighteen chapters of the printed edition of the Yuktikalpapurana deal with topics relating to polity such as the significance of dandanīti, importance of nīti for the king, appointment of ministers, officials, envoys and spies etc., their qualifications and functions, the sixfold foreign policy (śādguna), the expedients (upāyas), law and punishment, fortifications etc. The author himself says that he has compiled it from the nibandhas of ancient sagas. He really cites or plagiarizes the metrical smṛtis especially Manu and Yājñavalkya and reproduces verses from the Kāmandaksiya Nītisāra without acknowledgement. The ideas of Bhoja on issues of inter-state relations have hardly any claim to originality. The significant point about the book is that it draws equally upon the dharmaśāstra and the nītisāra sources, without any difference or deference.

The Mānasollāsa or Abhilāśitārthacintāmaṇi is an encyclopaedic work, which is attributed to the Western Cālukya king Someśvara III (A.D. 1126-1138) of Kalyāṇī. It deals with five sections (called vimsāti) of twenty chapters each with a hundred different topics connected with the royal household and royal court and other necessities. Its second vimsāti is devoted to polity. Its first

2. Concordance between Ykt., vv. 72-74, 112b, 113a, 118, and Manu vii. 63-64, 66, 147, 74, Ykt., v. 109 and Yājñ., I. 344.
3. Compare verses relating to sandhi, vigraha, āsana, dvaidhībhāva and saṁśraya,
seven chapters deal with the seven constituents of state; chapters eight to ten describe the threefold power (śakti); chapters eleven to sixteen discuss the sixfold foreign policy (śādgunya, one chapter is devoted each to sandhi, vigraha and the others), and chapters seventeen to twenty elucidate the four expedients (upāyas). The last chapter, which is devoted to danda, also includes some aspects of private law and punishment evidently as an adjunct. Thus, the whole vimsati is really a treatise on polity.

The value of the work as regards different aspects of polity and especially the theory of inter-state relations is noteworthy. Its treatment of the seven constituents, though conventional in nature, is nevertheless not devoid of original features like the government by ministers in which the king is relegated to the background. The work displays a marked quality in its elucidations of the two major concepts of the theory of inter-state relations, namely, the śādgunya and the upāyas. The various sub-classification of each of the six guṇas (forms of policy), viz., sandhi, vigraha etc., and each of the four upāyas, viz., sāma, dāna, bheda and danda, as found in the Mānasollāsa are unique, if not entirely original.

The Mānasollāsa may be regarded as the last composition on polity which synthesizes the traditional material and carries forward the development of political ideas at least in respect of the sixfold policy and the expedients. With all its merits, the work, however, by and large follows a conventional pattern. Whatever knowledge
of the practice of inter-state politics is implicit in the many explanations, the treatment of the subject matter is theoretical, and is not historical.

The Arhanniti or Laghvarhanniti written by the Jain monk Hemacandra (A.D. 1088-1172) styled 'the Omniscient one of the Kali age' (Kalikālasarvajña) is a concise work on polity written at the request of Kumarapala (A.D. 1143-1172), the Gauḍukya king of Gujarāt. Written in metrical form the Laghvarhanniti begins its treatment of the science of politics (nīti) by describing the qualities of the king and his officers especially the ministers, the commander (senāpati), envoy (dūta) - their training and functions; then it divides nīti into three topics: war (yuddha-nīti), punishment (danda-nīti), and law and procedure (vyavahāra). Strangely enough a fourth topic, penance (prāyascitta), is also dealt with at the end. Besides its opening verses which mention the constituents of state, its section on the yuddhanīti is of use to us as it is devoted to the discussion of the sixfold foreign policy, expedients, war, rules of fighting and the settlement of the conquered kingdom and other related issues of inter-state relations. Notwithstanding the claim of Hemacandra that the science of politics originated with the Jain mythical royal patriarch Ṛabhadeva, there is nothing different or original as regards the political ideas on inter-state relations that either comes from his Jain heritage or from his own vast learning and close relationship with the two most powerful kings,

1. HA, I. 8ff.
Jayasimha Siddharaja and Kumarpala, of Gujarat. He draws extensively upon the Manusmrti and sometimes on the Yajnavalkyasmrtri. He plagiarises Manu on the topics of Sadgunya, Upayas, and war with occasional borrowing from Yajnavalkya. Clearly, there is an influence of some nitisara work, whether Kāmandakīya or Bhoja's Yuktikalpataru or even Somadeva's Nītivākyāmṛta. He follows the smṛti-nitisāra tradition and his approach to war is characterised by the clear statement that it is a matter of power and that force is the last means to overcome the enemy when all other politic means of diplomacy have failed. He lays great emphasis on the role of diplomacy (nīti-mārga and nīti-yuddha) and the mission of envoys before the war. His statements are marked by clarity, brevity, and a thorough knowledge of the principles of politics as found in early works. Hemacandra is, however, the only author who takes note of the Muslim kings and prescribes that the commander should be acquainted with the language of the Mlecchas and should employ the expedients against them.

In addition to the Arhanniti, Hemacandra's Trisastisālakāpurusacarita (Lives of the sixty-three famous men) and Abhidhanacintāmani, a lexicon, are of some use for our purpose. The latter is particularly helpful in determining the meaning and interpretation of certain political terms as understood in our period.

3. Ibid., I. 78.
Another text on polity is the *Bārbhaspatya* (Arthasastra), which, according to F. W. Thomas, is a work of 12th century. It has some interesting information on certain aspects of polity such as the importance of daṇḍanīti in the traditional list of sciences (vidyā), kingship, and theories of government. Its discussion of the concept of upāyas is of special interest to us.

Next comes the *Sukranītisāra*, which until recently was assigned to the early mediaeval period, most probably 11th and 12th century. But Dr. Gopal has now convincingly shown that the present text was composed in about c. 1850 A.D. by some man who had an intimate knowledge of the East India Company's regulations of the first quarter of the 19th century and was also familiar with Maratha history and institutions. We have therefore excluded the text from the body of this thesis, although it is sometimes referred to the footnotes for elucidating a point, making a comparison or pointing to the continuity of the traditional political ideas.

The *Rājanītiratnākara* is yet another work on polity, composed in the fourteenth century by Candesvara of Mithilā (Bihar). It is a small work based on the quotations from dharmaśāstra and nītisāra authorities. Candesvara has, however, added his comments to his citations. Although outside our period, we have occasionally used its evidence especially when it comes from the authorities belonging to our period.

Last but not least, we have occasionally used the Lekhapaddhati, which is a collection of documents intended to provide specimens of different types of letters, official and private, charters etc., that were in use in mediaeval times. It is difficult to determine the date of its compilation but a recent writer has shown that 'a large number of documents in the Lekhapaddhati are authentic ones belonging to the early years of the thirteenth century', although it was compiled in the fifteenth century. We have often referred to it for its text of a treaty purported to have been concluded between the Cañkulka minister LavanaPrasāda and the Yañava king Simhaña in V.S. 1288.

Chapter II

RĀJYA (THE STATE AND ITS CONSTITUENTS)

An enquiry into inter-state relations presupposes a concept of the state, which forms its basis. The composition and character of the state has a direct bearing on inter-state intercourse, because other states of like form and character would respond and react in similar ways. The constituents of the state denote the elements of power and point to the impact of power in the inter-state sphere. A knowledge of the composition of the state and the elements of its power is therefore necessary for a full understanding of its external activities.

Much has been written on the subject of whether or not ancient Indian political theorists developed any concept of the state, which, some would assert, is a relatively modern political idea. While it is true that a concept of the state, like the modern western one, is unknown in the early Indian sources, it can be suggested that notions about the state as a political entity are traceable in a vague form in the literature on Indian polity. The state is, however, approached as largely as a practical concern rather than a political concept. It is the physical character of the state and its political organisation which engage the attention of our authorities, who show a remarkably clear understanding as to what constitutes the state and what are its constituent and ministerant functions.

Notwithstanding the controversy among modern scholars about the
precise Sanskrit term for the state our authorities use the term rajya for it and proceed to lay down its seven constituents, which, while falling short of connoting ideas behind the modern concept of state, substantially express its form and character. Etymologically rajya means the karma or bhāva (activity or state) of a king being derived from the root raj- with the affix ya. There are not many authorities who even care to define rajya and it is interpreted in a variety of ways in our sources. However, Somadeva, who is an original thinker of our period, says: "Rajya means the activity of the ruler that would be appropriate to protecting the earth (prthvī)", which is further defined as 'possessed of the people belonging to the four classes and the four stages of life and bestowing cereals, gold, cattle, and forest products etc.' The anonymous commentator on the Nītivākyārta draws a clear distinction between rajya as the activity of a king and rajya as the territorial state: "Rajya is not only defined as the protection by the ruler of his subjects'; rajya means the earth' endowed with the aforementioned qualities. In fact, rajya may mean kingship, government, kingdom, a prosperous people, etc. depending

1 H.D.S., III.p.19.
2 NV, V.4. Rajñah prthvīpalanocitam karma rajyam.
5 Manas., III.viii.688 ff.
6 Medh. on Manu, VII.111; On Yajñ. I.153; cf. KN, XIV.81-82.
7 Medh. on Manu, VIII.1. Prajāsāvyaḥ hi rajyam ucyate.
upon the context in which it is used. However, when rendered as government 'it includes only the king and his ministers and conveys, even in modern times, the agency or machinery through which the will of the state is formulated, realized or carried out'. In popular parlance and also in works on polity राज्या is, however, generally, used in the sense of a kingdom, that is, a distinct territory inhabited by a socially organized people under a ruler. According to our texts the राज्या is said to comprise the seven elements which determine its physical form as well as its nature. Thus, the term राज्या when understood both in the sense of the government and governed may be rendered as the state.

The seven constituents of the state (Saptāṅga राज्या)

Our authorities declare that the राज्या consists of seven elements. They are: the lord or sovereign (स्वामिन), the minister (अमात्य), the territory and its people (जनपद or राष्ट्र), the fort or fortified city (दुर्गा or पुर), the treasury (कोसा), the army (बल), and the ally (मित्र or सहमत). According to our texts, the सप्तांगा राज्या is comprised of these seven elements.

1 H.D.S., III.p.19.

the Manu stone inscription, also mention 'āṅgani saptā',¹ that is, the seven limbs of the state. These seven constituents are called prakṛtis or āṅgas. The term prakṛti (element or constituent) in this context means the operating cause (kārana) so as to make these elements the components of the state in the same manner as potsherds are components of a jar, or it refers to their nature (svabhāva) so as to make the state partake of their characteristics,² or 'root cause' of the state,³ or better still, that whereby a product is made, fixed and brought into shape as gold is the prakṛti of an earring.⁴ Thus, the prakṛtis are both the material as well as the abstract causes of the state and their characteristics determine the composition, character and the nature of the ancient Indian state.

It will be apparent from the quotations already cited from different authorities that the order of precedence as well as the nomenclature of the seven constituents of the state vary. While the lists of the Manuśmrta,

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² Medh. on Manu, IX.294.
³ Gt. on Yaj., I.353.
⁴ Aparārka on Ibid.
the *Agni Purana* and other texts are different, those of Kauṭilya, Yaṣñavalkya, Kamandaka, Somadeva etc., show a marked similarity. K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar\(^1\) tends to assign the latter order, viz., the lord, or the king, ministers, territory and its people, fort, treasury, army and ally, to the Gupta period and attributes changes from Manu's list as for instance precedence of *śagga* over the *pura* (fortified capital) or the substitution of the *pura* by the *durga* (fort) to India's experience of war extending over a period from the advent of the Saka to the Hūpa inroads. He thus tries to exhibit the empirical knowledge of defence needs contained in this 'apparently crude list'.\(^2\)

It is true that the composition of the seven-limbed state reflects the defence mechanism and political realism which cannot be divorced from historical experience, but Rangaswami Aiyangar's theory is inconsistent. For Kauṭilya had already enumerated the *prakṛtis* in a standard order of precedence and nomenclature according to their importance and role in the whole body-politic and there is no apparent reason why later authors reverted to him in preference to Manu or rearranged the latter's list in view of any potential or proven military value of these *prakṛtis* realized afterwards. The commentators on Manu do not adjust the list accordingly, nor do all the post-Guptan authors conform to Kauṭilya, as is illustrated by the *Agni*.

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\(^1\)RDK, Intr., p.46.

\(^2\)Ibid.
Purāṇa, Lakṣmīdhara and others. Moreover, Manu himself is aware of the Kauṭilyan order in his enumeration, in a different context (discussion of the circle of states), of at least five prakṛitis viz., the minister, the territory and its people, the fortified city, the treasury, and the ally.¹ This fully bears out his awareness of their relative military importance, if any, in a calculated order, in the struggle for power among states. It appears that while making a general statement Manu gave a correspondingly higher importance to the fortified capital (pura) over the territory and its people (rājāṇpa) because it suited his theory of royal autocracy as the protection of the person of the king is of vital importance to the existence of the state.² But he could not overlook their relative significance when especially viewed in the context of inter-state relations. Other authorities, who, like Kauṭilya,³ Manu,⁴ and Kamandaka,⁵ do not expressly state that when calamities occur in each of these seven constituents those of each earlier one are more serious to the state than those of each later one, arrange them in an order which suits their metrical needs, although they are consistent as regards the precedence of the king and the ministers over the rest.

¹On Manu, VII.157.
²Ibid., IX.295.
³KA, VIII.1.5.
⁴Manu, VII.295. See Medh. comments, which adjudge the precedence on the basis of defence-potential of each and greater role in maintaining internal solidarity and external security.
⁵KI, XIV.93.
All our sources give a pre-eminent place to the svāmin (lord) among the seven constituents. Kaṭṭilya puts the matter emphatically, 'the king and the kingdom: this is the sum total of the constituents'. Somadeva recounts the same idea when he says, 'the lord is the root of all the prakṛtis; they accomplish their object but not those without the lord'. The wording of the Kaṭṭilyan summing up is sometimes taken to imply the recognition of only one prakṛti, that is, the king is the state, although not in the same sense as expressed by Louis XIV's words 'l'état c'est moi'. However, it seems correct to recognize in this passage two prakṛtis, viz. rāja and rājya, the latter signifying the kingdom comprising the remaining six prakṛtis from the minister to the ally, as two commentators on the Arthāṣāstra and Kāmandaka state. The distinction between the king and his five prakṛtis,

1 KA, VIII.2.1. Rājā rājyaṁ iti prakṛtisamkṣepah.
2 NV, XVII.4; also Agni, 225.12; cf. Matsya, 222.20-21.
3 H.D.S., III.p.18; D.R. Bhandarkar, Some aspects of ancient Hindu polity, p.127.
4 KA (tr.) VIII.2.1. p.451, fn.1; KN, XV.1. R. P. Kangle asserts that the "rājya refers to rulership or rule and does not mean 'kingdom'. The idea here is that the king and his rule constitute the sum-total of prakṛtis." He rejects the view of the commentaries, Mayacandrika and T. Ganapati Sāstry's modern Śrīmula, that there are two elements, the king and the kingdom, the latter comprising the remaining prakṛtis from the āmatya to mitra. But Kāmandaka (XV.1: Āmatyadyah prakṛtayo mitṛāṇāṁ rājyaṁ ucyate) gives sufficient basis for this distinction. Other scholars have also found king and kingdom distinct in Kaṭṭilya's statement. See U.N. Ghoshal, op.cit., p.119; Shamasāstry, Arth. (tr.), p.352.
(rajaparakti. and dravyaparakti) is also drawn in the formulation of the circle of state-constituents (prakrti-mandala). Further, a fourteenth century author Candesvara also distinguishes these two prakrtis, viz., the king and kingdom, in his description of the coronation rituals of the successor of an abdicating ruler. Near the end of the ceremony came the rite of making over the six-limbed kingdom (sadanga-rajya) to the new king by the abdicating ruler, who is also required to proclaim the end of his rule and the inauguration of the new ruler.

Neither the sovereign nor the other six constituents are treated in abstraction. They are quite real. The relative precedence is adjudged in view of the location of the sovereignty or coercive authority, the power and function of the different organs of the state. In determining the precedence or presenting the state as a composite entity the need of law and order within the kingdom and its defence from foreign invasions are uppermost. In advising the king to abandon the six prakrtis, if they cannot be saved and to protect himself at all costs, some authorities clearly imply that the sovereign symbolizes the state, the distinct mark of which is independence in the comity of states. It is this idea which runs through the pronouncements that each preceding constituent is superior to the following one. The king is the sovereign and he represents the unifying force among the constituents of the state. The Indian theory places him between

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1 Kulluka on Manu, VII.157; KN, VIII.25 and comms., cf. also KA, VI.2.28.

2 Raj, R., p.74; cf. Matsya, 220.21 which enjoins upon the king the protection of the six limbs of the state (sadanga raksa).
civil order and anarchy.\(^1\) Thus, while svāmin is justly placed at the head and is aptly regarded as of primary importance, he does not, by himself, sum up the state, nor is he the state, but the king and the kingdom constitute in brief all the prakṛtis.

The state is conceived as an integration of the seven constituents, which form an harmonious whole. Each of these seven are regarded as complementary, mutually dependent and helpful.\(^2\) This is expressed by Manu and his commentators' statement that 'no one of them is superior', which, as Medhātithi points out, means that 'due care should be taken in the guarding of the "ally" and other limbs also' in want of which the rājya would become exposed to the peril of destruction.\(^3\)

The cohesive character and mutually dependent characteristics of the seven constituents impart to the state a sort of organic unity, which is implied by calling them aṅga, organs or limbs, or prakṛti, material cause or element. Manu expresses the distinctiveness of each of the seven elements, as well as the essential unity in their integration, by comparing the seven-limbed state with the three staves of a sanyāsin's (ascetic's) staff, which are tied together (by strands of cow's hair) so as to form a single staff.\(^4\) Medhātithi comments: 'in as much as they [the seven constituents] are helpful to one another, there can be no distinction among them, just as there is none among the soil, seed and

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\(^1\) RDK, I.p.2; on Manu, VII.3.

\(^2\) Agni, 239.1; on Manu, IX.296; cf. KN, IV.1-2.

\(^3\) On Manu, IX.296.

\(^4\) Manu, IX.296.
water in the process of cultivation. Some authorities liken the state to a tree with the sixfold policy (sadganya) as its projecting branches, with conciliation etc. (i.e. upayas, means) as its four beautiful flowers and the trivarga (virtue, wealth and desire) as its three fruits. The Sukranitisara compares the seven limbs of the state to the different parts of the body.

It may be mentioned that in several works the ministers are described as the eyes and hands of the king or state; but these vague expressions do not suggest any organic structure of the state. However inadequate and vague these analogies between the constituents of the state and the human body or tree etc. may be, they indicate an appreciation of the mutual dependence of the elements of the state and a need for harmony in their functioning, while at the same time they concede a distinctive place to each in the body politic. The objective put forth for each of the seven constituents is a dynamic increase in the power of the whole through mutual cooperation. The progress and the prosperity of the state are measured by the sum total of the excellences of all the seven constituents in themselves and in comparison with other states. It is sufficiently evident that

1 Medh. on Manu, IX.296.
2 Commentary on NV, p.7. quotes Sukra.
3 Sukra (tr.), I.122-124. Of these seven constituent elements of the state the king is the head, the minister is the eye, the ally is the ear, the treasury is the mouth, the army is the mind, the fort is the arm and the territory and its people are the legs.
the state as a political institution could be thought of neither as an ill-assorted assemblage of discordant factors, nor as being in complete isolation from other states. The interdependence of the constituent elements of the state is constantly emphasized sometimes through organic analogies; and the interdependence of states is recognized by including the ally among the seven constituents of the state.

As the political status and role of a state would correspond largely to the relatively superior, equal or inferior excellences (gūpa or sampat) of these seven constituents, it would be worth while to describe them briefly at the outset.

**Svāmin (the lord or sovereign)**

The word svāmin (owner) means 'lord' or 'sovereign', and denotes the king in this context. The Indian political genius found its fulfilment largely in a monarchical rather than a republican state. Monarchy was the normal form of government during our period. The general trend of political thought was towards benevolent autocracy which became more pronounced during our period. The divinity of the king was an accepted doctrine¹ which is even emphasized by Jain author Somadeva who regards the king as the visible representation of the Hindu trinity - Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva². Our authors state that

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² NV, XXIX.16-19.
the king endowed with immense power appears in different forms—Agni, Indra, Soma, Yama and Kuber and several other lesser gods by performing their functions. The divinity of the king gave a basis to his authority which could not ordinarily be assailed. He was the wielder of the rod of chastisement (danda) or in other words he exercised the coercive authority. As the king is called the destroyer of enemies, protector of the people and dispensator of equitable justice, he was possessed of political, economic and judicial powers. The legislative prerogatives were vested in him and as an upholder of the varnasramadharma he even enjoyed substantial social and religious powers. His authority was absolute and his order an impassable wall to all. He who is slighted by the king, writes Somadeva, is slighted by all, and he who is honoured by the king is honoured by the people. Almost paraphrasing Manu Somadeva writes, 'Even a king in pictures should not be despised, for the Kshatriya's strength resides in it as in a deity in a mighty human form'.

His basic function was the protection of the subjects, but the sources also emphasize the ministrant functions of promoting the all-round welfare of his state, although their discharge was often offset by frequent warfare which put greater stress on defence from

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1 Agni, 218.2: Rāja bhavedchatrubanta prajāpālah sudanda.b.ān.
2 NV, XVII.25-28; RDK, I.p.2 ff. quotes Manu and Nārada.
3 NV, XVII.34-35.
4 Ibid., XXII.66; Manu, VII.8; RDK, I.pp. 4-5. quotes Nārada.
external dangers. However, our authorities tend to ascribe full responsibility for the good and ill that befalls the state to the king, who is said to be 'the maker of his age, raising or lowering its tone by his action (राजा कलास्य करणम)\(^1\). His greatest obligation was to please his subjects by identifying their pleasures and miseries with his own\(^2\).

The exercise of vast powers and the discharge of heavy responsibilities put a premium upon the high qualities of both head and heart of the ruler. Our sources naturally have a disquisition on the excellences of an ideal king. As a typical example, Somadeva says, 'one who is virtuous, of noble lineage, endowed with majesty or sovereignty (प्रतापवान), intent on following good policy, independent in showing his anger and favour, possessed of increasing personal excellences and wealth is a स्वामिन\(^3\). The qualities of an ideal king comprise the excellences of easy approachability (अभिगामिकान), noble lineage, intelligence and spirit, not breaking one's promise etc., the possession of weak neighbouring princes (साक्यसमांत), qualities of intellect (प्रज्ञागुन) such as desire to learn, thorough understanding, retention etc.; qualities of energy and exertion (उत्साहगुन) such as bravery, resentment, quickness, dexterity; and finally, numerous personal excellences (आत्मसम्पत) such as eloquence, boldness, memory, self-

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1 NV, XVII.50; cf. शुक्र, I.1.43-44; र्दक, I.1.4ff; also III, pp. 20-21; अग्नि, 218.2 ff.
2 र्दक, II.pp. 20-21. quotes विस्पु. 3.36; अग्नि, 220.24.
3 NV, XVII.1-2. धर्मिकेकुलाचारभिजनाशुध्दाह प्रतापवाननायुगतावर्त्स.ca स्वामिन. कोपप्रसादायोह्स्वतत्राणामात्मिसायामधनामवास्याछिस sa स्वामिन.
4 अग्नि, 239.4; cf. का, VI.1.3.
control, freedom from vice, proficiency in undertaking works at the
proper time and place, knowledge of statecraft, discrimination between
agreement or peace and hostility or war, capability to guard secrets
of his own policy, and to pierce into the enemy's weak points etc., etc.\(^1\)
Most of these qualities are repeated by our sources in their descriptions
of an ideal king, and they also often recur in the inscriptions of our
period. Someśvara, however, sums up his catalogue of 'the king's
forty-four qualities by prescribing the five most essential ones:
truthfulness, valour, forbearance, liberality and capacity to appre-
ciate others' merits.\(^2\)

It may be remarked that offsetting the acceptance and advocacy of
royal autocracy by Manu, Nārada quoted by Lākṣmīdharā, Somadeva, Someś-
vāra and others, there is emphasis on the qualities of the king designed
to encourage the ruler to be self-disciplined, proficient, just and
benevolent. In the absence of constitutional safeguards against royal
tyranny,\(^3\) the king has to be repeatedly reminded to be personally
virtuous, to identify his interests with those of his subjects, to

\(^1\) On Manu, I.32-44; On Yajñ., I.309-311 - Mit. draws a distinction between
the inward or the most essential (antaraṅga) and the outward
(bahirāṅga) qualities of the king. NV, XVII.1.ff; HA, I.24-30 enumerates
36 qualities; RDK, III.18 ff. quotes the Sahkhaliṣhita, which substantially
agrees with Kautilya (VI.1.3-6) in enumerating royal qualities, Gautama
(II.1-6), Yajñ., Manu, Katyayana (Kane, I-3 & 8-10), Vāisu (Jolly, 3.88);

\(^2\) Menaś., II.1.8.

\(^3\) NV, XVII.44. It is said that there is no remedy against the injustice of
the king and it should be considered as the result of the 'Kali Age'. (pāṛhi, ed)
consult his minister and listen to elders, and above all, strictly to adhere to the principles of dharma. The king is, however, also warned that his injustice and oppression of the subjects would ruin him and his tyrannical acts would cause his destruction at the hands of his relatives, enemies or even daring men.¹

Perhaps the most striking point made by our authors, in this case Somadeva and Someśvara, is that the sovereign (svāmin) must be his own master. Somadeva in the list of attributes mentioned above, calls him 'independent in showing anger and favour'.² His commentator explains that the sovereign is an independent king who, by his own decision, inflicts punishments upon the wicked when angry, and who grants favours to the virtuous when pleased.³ Somadeva describes 'sovereignty (aśvārya) as consisting in the carrying out of commands (ājñāphala)⁴ and states that 'the king's command is an impassable barrier, which cannot be overstepped by anybody'.⁵ The king does not brook disobedience even from his own son.⁶

Someśvara defines 'a sovereign (prabhu)' as a king who is himself competent to show favour and disfavour, to give gifts and to withhold them, to undertake acts and to undo them, to imprison and

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¹ NV, XVIII.20; Medh. on Manu, VII.111.
² NV, XVII.2.
³ Ibid.
⁴ Ibid., 21.
⁵ Ibid., 22.
⁶ Ibid., 23.
to release, whose commands are not obstructed, and who is thus possessed of his own powers'. ¹ 'Sovereignty (prabhu-śakti)', he says, 'is that power which prevails over all in the form of command, which is endowed with splendour, and which rises out of might.'² It appears that Somesvara is here describing the svāmin who is the same as prabhu.

Somesvara also describes the problem of the exercise of sovereign power, which forms the basis for distinguishing three grades of kings as well as three types of government. 'The lowest type of the government is that in which the minister boasts that the government and the king are under his control and that nobody can question whatever is done by him. This is called a government dependent upon the minister (sacivāyatta rājya).³ The middle type of government is that 'in which the minister, by attributing equality to both i.e. himself and the king' says that whatever plan of action is communicated by him, the king considers as necessary to be done'.⁴ The verse also seems to imply that whatever acts the minister has performed will meet with the royal assent. 'As the success depends on both, there prevail happiness and unhappiness; this is called a government which depends on both, i.e. the minister and the king (ubhayāyatta rājya).⁵ The

¹ Manas., II.viii.694-695.
² Ibid., 696.
³ Ibid., 688-89.
⁴ Ibid., 690.
⁵ Ibid., 691.
The best type of government is that in which the king wholly depends upon himself (atmāyatta rājya), and in which the minister realizes that he is incapable of accomplishing his acts without the sovereign's command, and, thus fearing the king, remains loyal. Under such a government there is no insecurity; it is said to give happiness and success of all kinds and it is the most stable form of government. Thus, in the lowest type of government the minister usurps the sovereign power and relegates the king into the background; in the second type, the minister and the king are mutually dependent for the exercise of sovereign power; and in the third type, the king is his own master and has his minister under control. It seems that Somesvara's statements are based on the historical facts about the working of government. However, the best ruler is one who is an autocrat and even in these types of government, there is no indication of any constitutional limitations of the ruler's exercise of sovereign power. They only indicate practical handicaps occasioned by the inability of the ruler to exercise his power, owing to his weakness or absorption in amusements, on the one hand, and the tendency of the minister to usurp the royal authority, on the other.

Thus the svāmin is conceived as a sovereign and the state as independent. The corollary of this is that the feudatories and their domains do not come under the rubric of rājya (state) and are, therefore, excluded from the theory of inter-state relations. This, in a period of

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1 Kānas., II.viii. 692-693.
increasing importance of feudatories, is the chief weakness of political theory.

**Amātya (minister)**

The second constituent element of the state is called amātya (minister or counsellor) which term denotes assistants to the ruler. Mantrin and sacīva (counsellor) are mostly used as synonyms for amātya. Somadeva says that 'the counsellors (mantrins) are those who commence undertakings not begun before, accomplish those already commenced, and increase the excellences of those already completed'.

He further writes that 'the ministers (amātyas) are those whose prosperity and adversity are determined by gifts and honour granted or withheld with regard to their zeal or negligence in the performance of their duties'.

He, however, tends to differentiate between mantrin and amātya by emphasizing the advisory function of the former and the executive function of the latter.

Our authorities emphasize the indispensability of the ministers to the ruler. Somadeva says, 'a single man does not attain success; one wheel alone does not turn.' 'The work of the king,' according to Medhatithi, 'is an important undertaking and leads to important results;
its proper accomplishment bears important fruits and important results accrue to the man who fulfils it. But a single man cannot be expected to know all the sixfold policy (sadgnyya). Hence it is necessary for the king to appoint to the several departments of state trusted assistants, who are possessed of qualifications similar to those of the king himself. It is thus emphasized that the sovereign needs advisors and officials, who, together with him, administer the state.

As the many-sided activities of the state demand persons of diverse abilities, there is great stress on the qualifications of the ministers and officials. Moreover, since counsellors and officials owe their position to the king and are to be responsible to him, their success in administration and influence in the state depend largely upon their ability, integrity and loyalty, which enhance the sovereign's trust in them and win public cooperation and support. Among the numerous qualifications prescribed by our sources as conditions for the appointment of a minister, it is stressed that besides qualities of intelligence, honesty, purity, devotion, endurance, statesmanship, experience in administration, influence, farsightedness, etc., one must belong to one of the three classes of Brahmana, Ksatriya and Vaisya, must be born of high family, be a native of the country, a hereditary subject of the kingdom (maula) and so have a stake in the country and remain there to experience

1 Medh. on Manu, VII.55.
the results of one's advice and action, be possessed of the knowledge of all śāstras, laws and customs, proficient in the art of government, skilled in the application of the sixfold policy, adept in military affairs, be of pure conduct and free from all kinds of vice, be capable of grave consideration of the pros and cons of an issue and of exclusive devotion to the ways and means, be firmly devoted to the king, acceptable to the subjects or approved by the people (jananāṃ sammata) and, above all, be capable of keeping the secrets of policies which have been deliberated.  

The recruitment to high offices finally involves severe tests called upadās, those of piety (dharma), material gain (artha), lust (kama) and fear (bhaya).  

The ministers (mantrins) are to be appointed when they have the necessary qualifications and successfully cleared of all tests. But those failing in a few are to be given responsibilities in those spheres in which they have proved their fitness. The qualifications specified are designed to ensure both efficiency and loyalty. Thus, the king should appoint seven or eight or three, five or seven highly qualified ministers to counsel him in all matters of state and many.

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1 On Manu, VII.54; on Vājir., I.312. NV, X.5; see also XVIII, 13 ff. for disqualifications of the amātya. HA, I.61-66; RDK, IV, pp. 22 ff, XII. pp. 104 ff; Agni, 239.11-15; cf. KN, IV.18.24-30; Manas, II. 52-59 ff; E.I., I.w.30-31, 36, 40-41, pp.201-2, 205-6.


3 NV, X.71; see also on Manu, VII.54 prescribes seven or eight ministers which is regarded by Medhatithi as a restrictive rule. Manas., II.ii, 57—seven or eight ministers.
high officials to put the state policy into action, and thereby complete the organization of the government. ¹

Every undertaking of the state is to be preceded by due deliberation. Medhatithi says that with his counsellors and finance ministers the king should deliberate upon questions of war and peace in general (specific details being discussed in connection with the sixfold policy); discuss the state (sthāna), which is fourfold, consisting of army, treasury, capital city and kingdom, that is, their administration, protection and welfare; 'sources of revenue' (samudaya) 'such as agriculture, pastures, barriers, trade, fines and so forth'; 'means of protection' (gupti) of the king's own kingdom and 'consolidation of what has been acquired' (labdha prāsamana), which involves 'the honouring of learned and pious men and the continuance of bounties to them, granting of fresh bounties, and the removal of all restraints; merciful treatment of the poor and the diseased, the instituting of fresh public sports and rejoicings and the continuance of those already in vogue. He shall put a stop to all abuses regarding the treasury (kosa) and judicial procedure and introduce sounder methods of work. If any improper act is perpetrated by others he shall stop it; but he shall not interfere with any righteous act that may be done by others.'² Our other authorities also include all kinds of state business under the deliberative sphere.

¹ For list of ministers and high officials vide H.D.S., III. pp. 112 ff.

² Hedh. on Manu, VII.56; RDK, XII,p.106,108. See also Hedh.on Manu, VII.151-154, three alternative explanations of the eightfold business of the state, especially the 'eightfold business of deliberation comprising 1) undertaking of what has not been done, 2) the doing of what (cont.)
of the ministers but Somadeva pointedly remarks that the main functions of the amatyas concern the revenue, the expenditure, the protection of the king (i.e. his person, his dharma, wife and children), and the maintenance of the army.\(^1\) It is, however, evident from all our sources that the business of deliberation is divided between external and internal affairs. The concentration on issues of protection and defence, the sixfold policy, finance and army implies that matters affecting the independence and status of a state among other states are given greater importance during our period. We may strengthen this suggestion by a reference to the inscriptions and literary works in which ministers take special pride in recording that their counsel and diplomacy (mantra) made many kings tributaries to their masters.\(^3\)

It is expressly laid down that the state depends upon mantra (counsel or policy arrived at after due deliberation with the counsellors).\(^4\) This points to the vital place of ministers and officials in the existence and prosperity of the state. It is greatly emphasized that the mantra should be kept strictly secret until the appearance of the

\(^{\text{1}}\) IV, XVIII. 6, 7-12.

\(^{\text{2}}\) Medh. and others on Manu, VII.56; RDK, XII.p.12; also Manas., II.ix, 706-7, 709, 712.

\(^{\text{3}}\) E.I., pp. 195-207. Mau stone Ins. refers to a family of ministers who served the Candella kings. Some of these ministers ascribe the success of their masters to their own policy. cf. also Ibid., I, pp. 208 ff - Bates'vara Ins.; RDK, p.1. Lakṣmidhara claims that his mantra (counsel and diplomacy) enabled his master to establish supremacy over other kings.

\(^{\text{4}}\) On Yajñ., I.344; on Manu, VII.143; RDK, XII.pp. 101 ff.
the fruits of the undertaking.¹ Somadeva, reproducing Kautilya, states that mantra accomplishes the following: 'coming to know what is not known, definite strengthening of what has become known, removal of doubt in case of two possible alternatives in a matter, finding out the rest in a matter that is partly known'.² Further, mantra is said to be fivefold: 'the means of starting undertakings, the excellences of men and material [to be supplied]/[suitable] apportionment of time and place, provision against failure, and the accomplishment of the work',³ which would promote the prosperity of the state. Thus, it is comprehensive and covers all aspects of the functions of the state.

According to our texts, the role and place of amatyas is second only to the sovereign. They affect the nature of government by counselling the king and executing the policies finally approved by him. Mutual trust, cooperation, dependence and regard between the sovereign and his advisers are essential for the smooth running of the government and progress and prosperity of the state. The ministers have to check any rash and impulsive move of the sovereign, whose duty it is to treat them as parents and preceptor,⁴ thereby

¹On Yajñ., I.344; NV, X.28. Ṭ kāryasiddhe raksitavyo mantrah.
²NV, X.23; cf. KA, I.15.20; Agni, 241,3-4; cf. KN, XII.30, also Jayamangala comm.
³NV, X.25; cf. KA, I.15.42; Medh. on Manu, VII.146; Nāgas, II.ix. 697-98.
⁴NV, XI.2.
implying a willingness to submit to wholesome ministerial restraints.

It is the duty of the ministers to speak the right thing in an amiable manner without regard for the king's displeasure. For, if the ministers and the officials indulge in pleasing the king by giving him such advice as is palatable to him, instead of speaking the right thing, says Kātyāyāna, the kingdom would be speedily ruined.¹ Though the king enjoys the finality of decision and is not bound by his ministers' advice,² he is normally strongly advised not to overrule it, for Somadeva says, 'he is no king who acts in disregard of his ministers',³ and the king who makes himself self-sufficient destroys everything.⁴ He further warns that the most serious of all disaffections is that of the leading ministers and officials.⁵ Practical wisdom consists in acting according to the counsel of the chaplain, ministers, and the commander-in-chief.⁶ However, according to Somesvara, the best government is that in which the ministers are under complete control of the sovereign, and that in which they exercise royal powers and relegate the sovereign into the background is the lowest.

¹ RDK, wp. 24 quotes Kātyāyāna (Kane 11-15).
² Hedh. on Hanu, VII 56; Nāņas., II.ix.716.
³ NV, X.58.
⁴ Ibid., X.142.
⁵ Ibid., X.165.
⁶ Ibid., X.1.
We have some historical instances of kings flouting their ministers' solemn advice, as for instance Vākpatīrāja II Mufija of Mālāwā who invaded the kingdom of the Čālukya of Kālyāpi against the wishes of his chief minister Rūdrāditya and crossed the river Godāvari against his specific instructions never to do so;¹ or Vigrhaśāja IV who brushed aside his chief minister who did not want him to incur the displeasure of the Muslims.² But we also have instances of ministers' plotting against their masters and succeeding in reversing the policy, as for example the action of Ajayadeva, the chief minister of the Candella king Paramardideva, who has been charged by the Muslim authors with having been against his master's submitting to the invader Kutub-ud-dīn and finally holding out against the Muslims for some time either by assassinating Paramardideva or reversing the latter's decision on his sudden death.³ It may be added that sometimes a minister or ministers maintained the state during the incapacity of the king or in situations contingent upon the extinction of the dynasty caused by the removal of the sovereign by death or otherwise.

¹D. C. Ganguly, History of the Paramara Dynasty, p. 59.
²D. Sharma, Early Chauhan Dynasties, p. 61.
Rāstra or Janapada (Territory and its people)

By rāstra or janapada is meant the territory and its people, which, according to the Agni Purāṇa, is the most important constituent element of the state. As a typical example, Somadeva says, 'rāstra is so called because it shines with the abundance of its cattle, crops, gold and riches'. He further defines janapada as that which is the residence of the people characterized by the classes and the stages of life (varnāśrama) and is the source of the production of various articles. Our sources provide a catalogue of the excellences of the territory and its inhabitants for an ideal state. They bring out the qualities of a rāstra such as its physical features, territorial suitability for economic development and defence, possession of vast arable land, natural resources and mineral deposits, production of manufactured goods and varied rich substances, flourishing trade and industry etc. A territory so richly endowed should be inhabited by a socially organised population consisting mainly of the productive castes, obedient and loyal to the sovereign and antagonistic to the enemy, and finally, there should prevail a wise government and efficient administration. These characteristics are still prized by a modern state.

1. Agni, 239.2; Rajyavoñnem varam rāstram... Vi. Vey., 39.6.
2. MV, XIX.1. Paśudhanyahiranyasampada ājate sabhate iti rāstram.
3. Ibid., XIX.5. Janasya varnāśramalakṣaṇasya dravyotpatter ā pādām sthanam iti janapadah, cf. also KA, XIII.4.5.
4. On Yajñ., I.321; On Manu, VII.69, VIII.22. Agni, 239.24-27; same as KN, IV, 49-54; MV, XIX.8, see also 9-10 for the demerits of rāstra; Manas, II.iii.151-54. Cf. also RDK, V. pp. 39-40. quotes Yajñ. Manu and Matsya, 217.2-5, cf. also KA, VI.1.8.
in its territory and citizens. However, it is true that the idea of nationalism as such could not be fostered even during our period, although the preceding qualities of an ideal rātra betray an implied knowledge of its basic requirements and seek to inculcate them in the population.

The topics of town and rural administration, development of land, construction of irrigation works, and protective works such as fortifications, care of rivers, trees and cattle, the protection of property, the preservation of territorial integrity from the encroachments by others and enemies' invasions are discussed under this constituent. It is expressly stated that the qualities of land increase, the excellences of the country and these enhance the prosperity of the king. It clearly emphasizes the inter-dependence of the king and his government and the rātra. Somadeva also states that both the janapada and the king are each other's protectors. It may be interesting to know that Somadeva considered the distinguishing mark of a deśa (country) to consist in its contribution to the king's treasury and army, and that of a vīgaya (region or district) in its provision of elephants and horses for the ruler. The loyalty of a village is indicated by its contribution to the augmentation of the royal army in all its four arms. It is evident

1 On Manus, VII. 113 ff; also Medh. on Manus, VII. 56; RDK, VII. pp. 79 ff; Manas., II.iii.154 ff; Ykt., 39.p.6;
2 Manas., II.iii.151; cf. KN, IV.48.
3 IV, XIX.8.
4 Ibid., XIX.2-5.
5 IV, XIX.22.
that Somadeva's definitions tend to assess the value of the state
territory from the standpoint of its military and economic advantages
to the ruler and indicate that the possession of a strong army was not
only requisite for the king, but also the hallmark of the power
and prosperity of a stable state. It is not unlikely that in this,
and many other respects, Somadeva shows the impact of the contemporary
politics which echoed with the clash of swords, putting a premium
upon the treasury and army. The Agni Purana regards the possession
of the weak neighbouring princes as a quality of the king, but Kauṭilya
has included it among those of the janapada as well, which
implies that the ideal of conquest set by our authorities before
every energetic Hindu ruler needed, for its a sound treasury, a well
equipped army, as well as feeble opponents. Since not every rāgira
can be expected to possess all the advantages of an ideal territory
its ruler has to do his best with all such qualities as his kingdom has. The
king, however, could and did increase the qualities of his state
territory by developing its latent potentialities as well as by
adding new territory through occupation and annexation.

Durga or Pura (Fort or fortified city)

Somadeva says, 'durga (fort or stronghold) is that by the use of

1 Agni, 239.4.
2 KA, VI.1.6.
3 Cf. Kataya, 217.1-5.
which the enemies come to harm or which removes calamities of one's own side caused by the efforts of evil persons.\(^1\) The king is asked to build fortresses and establish his capital there. Bhāṣpati quoted by Lakṣmīdhara states that the king should construct a fort with ramparts and gates for the protection of himself, his wives, the people and the accumulated wealth.\(^2\) Our authorities concur in that the purpose of the forts is to provide a well protected residence for the king and the high officials of the state, to safeguard one's people, treasure and person, to enable the ruler to withstand sudden threats to his rule from internal insurrections and external aggressions, and to wage a defensive war and obtain refuge in times of catastrophe.\(^3\) A fort is essential to the waging of mantreyuddha (war of wits) and tugpān-yuddha (secret warfare). Secured within the ramparts, a king could effect a change in his politico-military strategy by taking recourse to the dual policy (dvaidhibhāva)\(^4\) and also to instigate the non-committed kings of the udāśīna and madhyama types against his assailant. In ordinary times a king could employ expedients against his enemy with impunity and protect his subjects from the latter's blandishments and machinations, as a fort enables the king to distinguish between friends and foes, for the entry into a fort is to be regulated by a permit system.\(^5\) The defensive merits of the fort, from a purely

\(^{1}\) RV, XX.1. Yasyābhīyogat pare dukham sacchhanti durjanodyoga vīsaya vā svasyapado samayat iti durgama.

\(^{2}\) RV, V.p.40.

\(^{3}\) RV, XX.1ff; On Yajn., I.321; Medh. on Hanu, VII.75; Agni, 24.19-21; cf. KN, XIV.23-29. also comm.; Mānas, II.xv.950.

\(^{4}\) Medh. on Hanu, VII.167; HA, II.13. explanations of dvaidhibhāva.

\(^{5}\) RV, XX.6-7.
Military point of view, are admirably summed up by Manu, (often quoted by our sources) thus: 'A single bowman, standing on a rampart, can fight against a hundred, and a hundred can fight against ten thousand; it is for this reason that fortification has been enjoined.'

Forts were of two types: natural and artificial, but the kinds of forts mentioned in our sources vary from four to nine. Most of our authors, following Manu, enumerate six kinds of forts: desert fort, land fort, water fort, forest fort, one fortified by armed forces (nṛdūrga), and mountain fort. To these Somesvara adds three more: those built with stones, baked bricks and mud. These forts had to have sufficient room inside; some were veritable cities with all the necessaries of princely accommodation. Our sources prescribe that forts, especially those that are capitals, should possess plenty of food, fodder, and fuel, drugs and other requisites, gold and silver, horses, elephants, and draught animals, armouries, and stock-piles of weapons; further, artisans, physicians, and also Brāhmaṇas to perform benedictory rites or to ward off evils, and a strong garrison in order to meet any assault and withstand a long...

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1 Manu, VII.74, also comms; Manu is quoted in Ykt, v.118; RDK, v.p.41.

2 IV, xx.2; Ykt., 119.p. 17.

3 On Manu, VII.70; On Yajñ., I.321; Arni, 222.4-5; cf. Vdh.,II.26.6-7; Matsya, 217.6-7; RDK, v.p.40; Manas., II.v.541-42.

4 Manas., II.v.542.
spear, if necessary.\(^1\) Detailed instructions for the construction of forts of various types are found in many sources.\(^2\) Somadeva in particular emphasizes that a fort must have a secret exit, otherwise it will be a prison.\(^3\) He further prescribes that nobody should be allowed to enter or leave the fort without a pass or without being searched.\(^4\)

It is evident from our sources that forts were an integral part of political life. Our authors talk about them in terms of their use. Some even give directions as to the capture of enemy forts.\(^5\)

As to their importance, Bhoja observes that the ordinary military strength of a king is no strength; his real strength lies in forts, because a king even with a meagre force becomes powerful on account of their invincibility.\(^6\) Somadeva also states that anybody could conquer a country without a fort.\(^7\) A king, he says further, has no refuge without a fort, like a bird let loose from a ship in the midst of an ocean.\(^8\) In fact, the role of forts in the defence of the kingdoms during our period is immense and siege warfare occupies an important place in the history. Their importance can hardly be exaggerated for an age when the impregnable ramparts could hold

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\(^1\)Cf. [Manu, VII.75-76; RDK, V.pp. 39 ff; Matsya, 217.2 ff; Vdh., II.26. 20 ff; IV, XX.3; Manas., II.5. 549-55; Agni, 239.29.]

\(^2\)RDK, V.p.42 ff; Nidh. Cf. Manu, VII.70.

\(^3\)IV, XX.3; Manas., II.V.550.

\(^4\)Ibid., XX.7.

\(^5\)Ibid., XX.6; Manas., II.XX.1061 ff.

\(^6\)Vkt., 117, 141 ff. pp. 17, 21. Cf. Sārīṇagadharapaddhati, No. 1363 - It states that the purpose of a fort cannot be had even from a thousand (cont.)
out against a vastly superior army and a powerful king was obliged to retreat because his fortifications were inadequate to meet the enemy.

Kośa (Treasury)

The kośa (treasury) is essential to the state. Somadeva says that the kośa is that which increases or strengthens the army of a king in prosperity and adversity. The Agni Purāṇa considers it as the mainstay of the state and the means to the external consummation of the Trivarga (i.e. three ends of human endeavours viz., dharma, artha, and kama). According to our sources an excellent treasury is one which is lawfully acquired by one's ancestor or oneself, contains various kinds of big jewels and large cash, and which can withstand a great calamity even of a long duration involving heavy expenditure and little collection. Its proceeds should be vast and disbursement limited, like the water pot of an ascetic which has a wide mouth for filling but a narrow hole for discharge. The accumulation of funds (cont.) elephants and a lakh of horses.

7 IV, xix.4.
8 Ibid., 5.

1 IV, XXI.1.
2 Agni, 241.22; cf. KU, XIV.32-33, Kāmas., II.iv.539.
3 IV, XXI.2; Ibid., 239.30; RDK, VIII.p.94; cf. KU, IV.61-62; KA, VI.1.10.
4 Ibid., XVIII.7; cf. KN, IV.60,
was required for the purpose of launching state undertakings, increasing wealth, promoting happiness through its enjoyment, maintaining dependents, state officials, servants, army, etc., and above all, for advancing in dharma.\(^1\) It was thus not only a source of human satisfaction, but also a means of achieving the ends of the state. A king with a depleted treasury oppresses the subjects (paurajanapada),\(^2\) who, in consequence, desert the kingdom. The king is also forsaken by his attendants, and supporters, for none serves without subsistence and thus, causing disaffection among the prakrtis, he ruins himself through tyrannical rule and exposes the state to the attack of the enemy. It was laid down by our thinkers that such a state deserves to be subjugated by another powerful ruler. In view of these perils, the king was told that the kosa, not his breath, is the life of the king; it is that by which he exists, and not by his body.\(^4\)

Even today a sound economy is the first requisite of a stable and just government; it helps to determine the position of one state with regard to others. Indian political thinkers rightly regarded it as 'power' and it is rightly stated that the foundations of rulership are in the treasury. Such statements clearly emphasize that the state,

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\(^1\)Ykt., 31.p.5; cf. KN, IV,62; RDK, VIII.p.87; Manas, IV.IV.539; Arca, 241.22.

\(^2\)IV, XXI.6.

\(^3\)Ibid., XXI.10.

\(^4\)Ibid., XXI.5, 7; Ykt., 30-31.p.4-5.
no less than the individual, requires rich sustenance for its upkeep and the fulfilment of its ends. This emphasis, however, does not indicate either that the state is an economic institution or that it is determined by economic factors, but merely shows one of its aspects.

Somadeva is right when he declares that 'one who has money in hand conquers',¹ for the $kōsa$ increases the army and enhances power.

**Bala or Danda (Army or armed forces)**

The sixth constituent element of the state is called bala or danda which in this context means army or armed forces. Somadeva says, 'bala (army) is that which, for the sake of gifts of wealth and endearing remarks ($priya-bhāsana$) strengthens and shields the king's welfare in all conditions, by warding off the enemy.'²

The author of the Agni Purāṇa writes that 'force (danda) tends to create friends and foes alike, and enables a king to acquire wealth...to conquer his adversaries and to accomplish with despatch, a work requiring time for its completion...'.³ In fact, a strong army is indispensable to the state, and our authorities, by calling it danda, which primarily denotes the coercive power of the state to inflict punishment on the wrong-doer, imply that a state is ultimately maintained by the army.

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¹ *IV, XII.8.*
² *Ibid., XXII.1*  
³ *Agni, 240.23; cf. KN, XIV. 35-36.*
The Agni Purāṇa further describes the excellences of a good army. It says, ‘an army comprising hereditary troops (naua), thoroughly obedient and disciplined, firmly united, well paid, well-known for bravery and manliness, skilful in handling all kinds of weapons, commanded by experts in the art of war, trained in various modes of warfare, crowned with legions of warriors, swarming with elephants and horses, purified by the nirajana ceremony, accustomed to staying abroad and to trouble and distress, indefatigable in fight, having its ranks filled with never vacillating kgatriyas, is excellent.’¹ These merits of the army are repeated in other sources.

Traditionally, the army consists of four parts, viz., elephants, cavalry, chariots and infantry.² But Laksmīdhara, quoting Bhīma, in the Mahābhārata, describes the eightfold army, which distinguishes four more constituents: compulsory labour (vīṣṭi), navy, intelligence corps or spics (cāraḥ) and guides (daśīkāḥ or natives of the invaded country).³ In other works, the army is said to be sixfold and the fifth and sixth constituents are named as treasury and mechanics⁴ or mantra (counsel and diplomacy) and kosa (treasury).⁵ The texts

¹ Agni, 239.31-33, same as Kn, IV.63-65; cf. Ka, VI.1.11; NV, XXII.13.
² Medh. on Manu, VII.56; Yukt, 43.p.6; NV, XXII. 2 ff.
³ RDK, IX.p.95; also ibid., Intro., p.65. Laksmīdhara interprets vīṣṭi as 'compulsorily recruited labour corps (balat kareṇa akṛṣṭaḥ karmakaram)’ but Rangaswami interprets it as 'conscripts’. However, his interpretation of daśīkāḥ as 'natives of the invaded country recruited as guides’, seems correct.
⁴ Medh. on Manu, VII.185.
⁵ Agni, 242.2; cf. Ka, XII. 24.
emphasize an elaborate organization of armed forces and the promotion of all-round strength of the state in which they also realized the importance of the power of counsel and diplomacy and treasury. Further, they dilate upon the relative effectiveness of each of the traditional four army divisions and describe their equipment as well as the country and seasons best suited for their operation.

The army comprises six classes of troops: **maula** (hereditary troops), **bhṛtya** (hired troops), **śreṇi** (soldiers belonging to guilds or corporations), **mītra** (troops of allies) and **āmitra** (troops that once belonged to enemies). ¹ Several authorities hold that each preceding class of troops is superior to the succeeding one in view of their loyalty, efficiency, and overall effectiveness. ²

Detailed descriptions of these different classes of troops, their recruitment, training, discipline, pay and rewards, are found in our texts. There is, however, great emphasis on the training of elephants and horses and the unity and cohesion among the soldiers, their fitness and loyalty. Somadeva says that a small but good and well-knit army is better than a vast herd of men. For disorganized and weak

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¹ Medh. on **Maṇḍ.**, VII.185; **Agni**, 242.1 - the printed text has bhūta and śraṇḍi in place of bhṛtya and śreṇi which have been translated by M. N. Dutt as 'the front or vanguard and the rear'; cf. **Ka**, XIX.3; **Kanagas**, IV.1.556 ff; **Ykt.**, 44 p.7; **NV.**, XXII.12 - Somadeva omits āmitra-bala but makes up the six by differentiating between bhṛtaka (retainers) and bhṛtya (hired troops); see also Udepur praśasti of kings of Mālwa, **I.**, 1. pp. 235-36, v.19.

² **Agni.**, 242.2; cf. **Ki.**, XX.3; **NV.**, XXII.12; cf. **Ka.**, IX.2.13 ff.; **Ykt.**, 44.p.7.
troops cause the destruction of his best division.\textsuperscript{1} Lakṣāmīdhara also observes that a king may conquer a territory, even with a small army which is loyal, well-fed and in good spirits.\textsuperscript{2}

Thus, the army was indispensable and by including it among the constituents of the state, our authors showed their practical approach to the problems of government and particularly of defence.

**MITRA** or **SUHRT** (Ally or Friend)

The seventh constituent element of the state is mitra or suhrt which denotes an ally or a friendly state. Medhātithi says, 'an ally is one having the same end in view; as it has been said: "next to him comes an ally (mitram tasmād anantaram)"'.\textsuperscript{3} This latter reference alludes to the definition of mitra in the context of the mandala (circle of states).\textsuperscript{4} Vījñanēśvara, Kullūka and others clearly bear out this cross-classification.\textsuperscript{5} According to the principle of the mandala, a king or state beyond the state called enemy (ari), who is immediately next to the king himself, is the ally (mitra).\textsuperscript{6} Such an ally is called prākṛta (natural) merely on the basis of the geo-political position of the state itself. The common purpose of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}NV, XXX.16-17.
\item \textsuperscript{2}RDK, IX.p.95.
\item \textsuperscript{3}On Manu, IX.294;
\item \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., VII.158; also Agni, 233.21.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Ibid., IX.294; VII.158; On Yajñ, I.353, 345.
\item \textsuperscript{6}Ibid., VII.158; Ibid., I.345. Agni, 233.14-15; NV, XXIX.20; RDK, XII.107,110.
\end{itemize}
these two states arises from the presumption of the enmity of the intervening state to both of them, and hence the common need of protection against it. Thus, notwithstanding the different kinds of allies, the one who is conceived of as the prākṛti of the state is the prākṛta-mitra (natural ally), viz., the king or state beyond one's neighbouring state.

This interpretation, however, presupposes the existence of a neighbouring king or state who is termed prakṛtari (natural enemy) by Vijñānavāra and who is treated by Kautilya as if he were an eighth element of the state. But prakṛtari is never recognized as a constituent element of the state as such since this would undermine the cohesiveness and concordance and militate against the promotion of the welfare of the state. Further, the inclusion of the enemy is against the conception of sovereignty, for other prakṛtis '...when they operate become subordinate to the excellences of the king'. However, the inclusion of an ally as a constituent element of the state and cognizance of the enemy state demonstrate the appreciation of the external aspects of sovereignty and of the fact that a state cannot be conceived in isolation from others. It is forthwith recognized that external allies are essential

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1 On Rāj., I.345.
2 cf. KA, VI.1.13-15.
3 KA, VI.1.15.
for the defence and progress of the state\(^1\) and that inter-state
relationships are basic to the idea of the state in a wider geo-
political sphere.

Somadeva briefly states that 'one who supports \(^{\text{vait.}}\) "to
\text{ānā́kṣ} \text{ē} \text{vātī}^{\text{ī}}\) in adversity as in prosperity is an ally'.\(^2\) This
definition together with Medhatithi's interpretation of an ally
being 'one who has the same end in view' provides a fairly sound
basis for an alliance and the condition of its continuity. Ordin-
arily two classes of allies, natural (\text{sahaja}) and acquired (\text{krtrima})
are distinguished,\(^3\) but some authorities have a threefold classi-
fication: born (\text{sahaja}), such as 'a sister's son, a father's sister's
son and the like'; natural (\text{prakṛta}), 'the ruler of the state next
beyond the adjoining state'; and acquired (\text{krtrima}), one 'who has
done a good turn or towards whom some good has been done'.\(^4\) Soma-
deva classifies allies as a constant ally (\text{nitya mitra}), one who
is protected or one who protects without a motive; a born (\text{sahaja})
ally, one who is related by ancestry; and an acquired (\text{krtrima}) ally,
one whose livelihood and protection depend on the friendly relation-
ship.\(^5\) Lakṣmidhara, quoting the Matsya Purāṇa, classifies allies as

\(^1\)Medh. on Manu, IX.296.
\(^2\)NV, XXIII.1: \text{Yaḥ sampadīva vipady api medyati tan mitram}.
\(^3\)Medh. on Manu, VII.158.
\(^4\)Nit. on Yājñ., I.345, 353; Kullūka on Manu, IX.294; RDK, X.p.96.
\(^5\)NV, XXIII.2-4.
those who are allies for generations, enemies of the neighbouring enemy (समन्तसर तथारिपन), and acquired allies.¹ These classifications of the ally show various grounds of alliance such as common purpose, mutual defence, ancestral bonds, heredity, relationship and self-interest, and include a wide range of persons who are treated as allies.

It may be suggested that the classifications of allies were so comprehensive that they could even include the समन्तस (feudatories),² whose relations with their overlord often partook of the nature of allies. The epigraphic and literary evidence shows that the role of leading समन्तस, some of whom were relatives, in the internal affairs of their overlord,³ such as rebellion, and in the latter's external undertakings, particularly campaigns of conquest, was similar to that

¹RDK, X.p.96; cf. RNP, p.277, which says that the Vijnudharmottara Purāṇa reads 'अमित्रम तथारिपन' for the Matsya passage समन्तसर तथारिपन. K.V.Rangaswami Aiyangar, RDK (Intr. p.61) translates the latter as 'discontented feudatories or the enemies of the enemy'. In this context, however, 'discontented feudatories' is a wrong rendering. M.N.Dutt (Agni, (tr.) II, p.835) is also mistaken in translating समन्तस as 'the feudatory or the dependent estates of an empire' in a context where it clearly means the neighbouring king, who, according to the mandala theory, is a natural enemy. On this question see Lallanji Gopal, 'समन्तस - Its varying significance in ancient India' in J.R.A.S., 1963, p. 21 ff.

²cf. Raj.R., pp. 43 includes even friendly ministers under the category of ally.

³Medh. on Manu, IX.294; cf. Agni, (tr.), II, p.865. Dutt is mistaken in his translation of the Agni, 240.20-22. The verses are reproduced from the Kamandakiya Nitisara (XIV.28-29), which describe the uses of the fort, and not the duties of feudatories as wrongly stated by Dutt.
of the allies. Someśvara describes different grades of śamantas and entrusts feudal relations to the care of the Minister for Peace and War (sāndhivigrahika).¹ This indicates the importance and the nature of political relations between the śamantas and their overlord. Even petty feudatories, who depended on the king for their sustenance and protection, can be classified as acquired allies in view of Somadeva's definition. While these possibilities exist, the determination of the status of the various grades of śamantas (feudatories, vassals or tributaries) from the standpoint of the seventh constituent of the state is uncertain, because our authorities do not discuss it. In fact, the traditional theory of state has no place for the feudal or tributary relations. Our authorities retain it as a relic of the past, and while they try to re-interpret it, they fail to include many facts of contemporary political organization, particularly the śamanta system, although śamantas as such are sometimes mentioned.

Our authorities prescribe many qualities of the ideal ally, the prominent ones of which are: allied from the days of the father and grandfather, constant, truthful, grateful, loyal, righteous, nobly born, of pure conduct, well-versed in the science of polity, having many partisans and contented prakṛtis (i.e. other constituents of state as officials and subjects), persevering in action, not having a separate interest, free from vices especially those concerning women

¹Manas., II.1.127-28.
and wealth, ready to attend in calamity without being asked, not becoming jealous of the friend when the latter is pleased or angry, not being selfish at his friend’s cost nor intrigueing to appropriate his wealth by deceit, vigilant in carrying out his friend’s objectives, faithful in prosperity and adversity and capable of sacrificing wealth and life for his friend. The principal characteristic of an ally is the identity of his and his friend’s interests and it is frankly admitted that the real basis of alliance or friendship is self-interest.

The higher purpose of making allies is to secure virtue (dharmā), wealth (artha) and fulfilment of desires (kāma) or happiness (sukha); in other words the ends of the ruler as well as of the state. According to the Agni Purāṇa, an ally promotes his friend’s welfare by performing many duties, such as restraining other allies from throwing off allegiance, destroying his friend’s enemies and helping him with men and money in calamities. Owing to these important services a king is advised to preserve zealously his allies by truth and consistency as regards the promises made. The Agni Purāṇa, repeating Kāmandaka, states that alliances are made and strengthened by a visit even from a distant country, coming out to accord a hearty

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1 Kullāka on Manu, VII.209; RDK, X.p.96-97; NV, XXIII.5; Agni, 239. 34-37; cf. KN, IV.66-73. Manas., II. vii.685-86. Cf. KA, VI.1.12.
2 RDK, X.p.97 quotes Mbh.; Medh. on Manu, VII.177., cf. KN, IV.73.
3 Agni, 239.36; cf. KN, IV.70; Manas., II.vii.686.
5 On Yājñ., I.352; RDK, X.p.96.
welcome even from a distance, cordial and unambiguous conference, and
fulfilment of promises.\textsuperscript{1}

Perhaps owing to the varied services of allies several authorities
like Manu, Yajñavalkya and their commentators regarded the gain of an
ally even superior to that of money or of land, in a king's inter-
state enterprise.\textsuperscript{2} In fact, the chief value of an ally lay in his being
an element of a king's power as he could be invoked to promote self-
aggrandizement in prosperity and to safeguard the state in adversity.
In conditions of no inter-state laws alliances helped to maintain and
promote the status and power of a king in inter-state relations.

Thus, a state comprising these seven constituent elements, indi-
cating its sovereignty and power, is the subject of the theory of
inter-state relations.

\textbf{Classifications of states and the scope of inter-state relations}

States were distinguished in inter-state relations on the basis
of power rather than any principle of international law. Independent
states were graded as superior, equal or inferior in accordance with
the condition of their power in relation to others.\textsuperscript{3} The concept of
power was threefold: power of counsel or statesmanship (\textit{mantraśakti});

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} \textit{Agni}, 239.35; cf. \textit{KN}, IV.69.
\item \textsuperscript{2} \textit{Manu}, VII.208; \textit{Yajñi.}, I.352.
\item \textsuperscript{3} \textit{NV}, XXIX.41; cf. \textit{KA}, VI.2.35; IX.1.2ff.
\end{itemize}
of might (prabhu-śakti), which consisted in the power of the treasury
and army; and of energy (utsāha-śakti) which indicated a ruler's
valour and resolution to play an active role in the internal as well
as external affairs. The condition of the threefold power indicated
whether a state was advancing, stable, or declining. This influenced
the status of its ruler in inter-state relations. In fact, the
selection and pursuit of the different measures of the sixfold foreign
policy, as well as the appropriate use of the political expedients,
were conditioned by one's power in relation to others. Kings of
superior, equal or inferior grades merited different kinds of treatment
in situations of peace and war. The degree of one's power in relation
to others could even compromise an independent course of action in
external relations and could reduce a king to a semi-independent
status. However, the power principle only classified the states
and graded the rulers; the title of the state as such depended on
the traditional definition of rajya.

While most authorities describe grades of kings on the basis
of power, Narada and Gopala quoted by Cāpadeśvara, a fourteenth
century writer on polity, distinguish three types of kings in inter-
state relations on the basis of the payment of tribute, the exercise
of sovereignty (consisting in the independence to award punishment),
and the nature of political allegiance. According to Narada, the
three types of king are: the emperor (samrāt or cakravartin), one

1 N.V., XXIX.36-40; cf. KA., VI.2.33; Agni, 241.1; Mānas., II. chs.
8-10. See below, pp. 180 ff.
who levies tribute from all kings; the tributary king (sakara-adhīśvara), one who pays tribute monthly to the emperor, and the non-tributary or semi-independent king (akara-adhīśvara), one who sends tribute to the emperor at his will (svecchayā) pretending an order to pay or under the pretext of sending messages (sandeśa vyājena).¹

A further twofold classification of the semi-independent (akara) and tributary rulers is found in Gopāla's Rajanīti Kāmadhenu: 'There are two kinds of adhīśvaras (kings): There is akara (lit. non-tributary) by reason of the emperor's favour. The first gives dānā etc. (punishment) at his will and pleasure /i.e. he has absolute jurisdiction in the exercise of coercive authority/; the second as a favour of the emperor. For a smṛti says, "But O Destroyer of enemies, the akara does everything himself, provided he enjoys the favour of the emperor; for then he acts simply in accordance with justice /law/. This may be taken with a second meaning: the first gives some tribute for the sake of peace (samartha) pretending an order to pay (sandeśa vyājena).² It is evident from this remarkable passage that the criterion for the distinction between two types of semi-independent kings is the exercise of sovereignty in internal affairs. If this is done by virtue of one's own power it indicates complete independence and absolute jurisdiction. If, however, the

¹ Raj. R., p. 3.
² Ibid., p. 4.
power of penal justice is exercised under political favour or by grace of another superior authority, it implies dependence even in the internal affairs. Gopala clearly says that the first type of semi-independent king gives tribute for the sake of peace, which indicates that he is independent even in those spheres of his external activities which do not come into conflict with the emperor. In fact, both these types of non-tributary rulers have semi-independent status. The first type may be a weak neighbour, anxious to maintain peace with the emperor in the interest of his independence and the second may be a ruler, who has submitted to the emperor for the sake of retaining a semi-independent status and thereby escaping being reduced to a dependent status. This distinction between the emperor and semi-independent rulers points to the fact that sovereignty is a relative concept in inter-state relations, because, although the first type of semi-independent ruler enjoys absolute jurisdiction within his kingdom, and pays tribute to the emperor at his will in the form of presents under some pretext, his status in the inter-state sphere is compromised owing to the presence of another more powerful ruler, whom he owes some sort of political allegiance. Somadeva also implies a similar knowledge of political relationships when he advises a weak king to appease his powerful neighbour by giving him occasional gifts in order to avoid the possibility of being forced to pay tribute on stipulated basis which would compromise his independence.\footnote{NV, XXX.32-33.}
The two sub-classes of the tributary kings (sakara) are:

'One who has been invested with danda etc. /i.e. criminal jurisdiction and so on or power to award punishment/ and one who has not been invested with danda etc. From the judgement of the first there is an appeal to the emperor by which the punishment, when carried out (?), is not annulled; but the authority in the judgement of the other is not an authority that extends to punishment, but there is an appeal from the decision (nyāya). If by mere force he entertains litigants against his authority, i.e. transgresses his jurisdiction and arbitrarily awards punishment then, in the case of a crime with sahasa /violence/, the punishment consists in fining him by the emperor according to the sahasa /damage/, in cases other than violence, if he /i.e. the tributary/ approaches him, /i.e. the emperor/, the emperor should not accept a fee for his grace /prasadakara, i.e. tribute brought by the tributary king to obtain the emperor's pardon/, but, by not allowing him audience for two or three days put him off so as to humiliate him. However his act is not to be annulled amongst his subjects by the emperor. For the Nārādiya Smṛti says, "all subjects are dependent, only the lord of earth is independent". The verse applies only to this class of ruler /sakara/ here, for it would be impossible in the case of the emperor and the rest; and the tradition is to the same effect.¹

¹Raj. R., p.4.
The above passage makes it quite clear that the sakara rulers are feudatories and are under the control of the emperor, although one type has greater autonomy and power to award punishment etc., the other has only administrative authority. The distinction, however, points only to the status of tributary kings within the empire; it does not give them any status in inter-state relations. It may be added that there were different grades of feudatories in the empires of our period whose powers seem to have varied. The second type of sakara may refer to a class of hereditary administrative officers with the rank of a feudatory or petty chief within the empire. The full-fledged tributary or feudatory appears to have enjoyed greater autonomy in the exercise of the coercive authority within his jurisdiction. Thus from the description of the sakara kings, it is evident that he is a dependent king, who, therefore, has no status in the inter-state sphere. In fact, in the strict terms of the mandala system, the feudatories primarily presented problems of what we may call inter-state adjustments rather than inter-state relations. Thus, there are three grades of sovereign kings or states: superior, equal and inferior; and three types of rulers: emperor, semi-independent and dependent.

Our sources, however, mention yet another type of king, who can be called a protected king and his kingdom a protectorate. The protectorates are said to come into existence as a result of the policy of seeking shelter (samsraya) adopted by weak kings to avert destruction in the event of an external aggression or to deter the enemies from future harassment of their kingdom. The status of a protectorate is
obtained by submitting either to another powerful ruler or to the aggressor himself. The obligations of a protected king towards his protector are so sweeping in political terms that he becomes virtually a feudatory; but his powers seem to have been determined by the circumstances in which the shelter has been sought, as well as whether the protector is the invader or some other powerful king. His status, however, seems to be that of a dependent king, somewhere between the aforementioned semi-independent and tributary kings.

All these types of kings or states existed in the inter-state sphere, but they were not entitled to the same status in inter-state relations. The feudatories or tributaries and protectorates were inferior inter-state entities because of their being dependent states. Any significant political dealings with them implicated their overlord, who would intervene in such affairs which affected his supremacy. In the history of our period we find that although many feudatory kings received recognition from their overlord in different ways, they had a second-rate status in the inter-state sphere. When, however, feudatories became so powerful as to defy their overlord, they could and did improve their status by alliance and war with other kings, as for example did the Candellas of Jejakabhukti from the time of their king Harṣadeva onwards. Although the changes in the political status of kings owing to the vicissitudes of power were considered in the context of conquest, the traditional theory of inter-state relations nevertheless dealt with the independent states.

1 Medh. on Manu, VII.175; cf. KA, VII.15.21 ff.
Chapter III

MANDALA (CIRCLE OF STATES)

The theory of inter-state relations in Ancient India is developed as a corollary of the concept of the state (rañya). The seven constituents of the state include an ally who is a friendly king of another state situated immediately beyond the neighbour called 'enemy' (amitra). Thus, inter-state relations are regarded as inevitable on the basis of the mere existence of the state and foreign states are initially distinguished as hostile and friendly. The inclusion of an ally as an integral constituent of the state and the recognition of the enemy as a related political entity further reflect upon the concept of sovereignty in its external aspect. Its obvious implication is that a state, in order to exercise its sovereignty unobstructed by and independent of other states, has to recognize the limits of its power internally and the restraints imposed by its existing among other states externally. A state has to foster understanding with those with which some basis for common interest exists and to deal with those which are inimical in order to protect itself and promote its power and prosperity. Thus the need for recognizing allies and confronting enemies leads to the consideration of other existing states.

The purpose of the state is to promote the well-being of its subjects, which consists in acquisition (yoga) and security (kṣema).

1 NV I.p.7. Dharmarthakāma-phalāya ca rañyaṇa namaka; cf. RDK, I. pp. 2-8, III. pp. 20-21; KN, IV.74; On Manu, VII.151.
These spring from peace (śama) and activity (vyāyama), which depend on the sixfold policy (śādgunya), a formula of foreign policy to deal with enemies. The framework in which the sixfold policy operates is the circle of states (mandala), which stands for the geo-political sphere of action of an ambitious king comprising several states arranged in a hypothetical pattern of inter-relationships. The objectives of the sixfold policy are to ensure the accomplishment of one's own economic and defence undertakings and to acquire wealth and territory belonging to one's enemies. The consequences of the application of the sixfold policy reflect whether a state is advancing, stable or declining, which is measured in terms of the threefold power, viz. power of counsel or statesmanship (mantraśakti), power of majesty and might (prabhuśakti) and power of energy (utsāhaśakti). It is thus evident that the accomplishment of one's own undertakings and the security of their enjoyment, much more than the aggrandizement of one's own interests at the expense of enemies, depend on the success of one's policy towards others. The assumptions underlying this line of thought are, however, fear and need of defence rather than trust and co-

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1 NV, XXIX.1 ff; cf. KA, VI.2.1 ff; Medh. on Manu, VII.160; cf. Mbh., XII.164-68; XV.11.5-6.

2 NV, XXIX.20 ff; cf. KA, VII.1.1; Medh. on Manu, VII.154-160 & ff; Agni, 233.13 ff, 234.16 ff, 240.1 ff.

3 See below, p. 174.

4 NV, XXIX.40; cf. KA, VI.2.35; RDK, XIX.p.154.

5 Ibid., XXIX.36-42; cf. Ibid, VI.2.30 ff; see below, pp. 181 ff.
operation. It also points to the twofold aspect of the problem of protection: internal and external, and emphasizes their interdependence. Further, it assumes the conflict of interests among states as normal, which is highlighted by our authorities when they evaluate the status of a state in terms of power. Thus, we discern a conflict of interests which ultimately turns into a conflict of power among states.

Our authors do not hold a static ideal of stability and order for the state; on the contrary, it is dynamic in terms of power and prosperity which are again regarded as comparative achievements with far-reaching consequences in the struggle for supremacy among states. Recognising the natural urge for domination, Somadeva states that the nitiśāstra consists of tantra and āvāpas; the former concerned with the protection of one's own territory and the latter deals with the acquisition of territory belonging to others.\(^1\)

It is evident that internal administration and foreign affairs are equally important. The political objective of state activity is to enhance its power, which, in turn, implies and promotes prosperity. Thus, the state policy naturally addresses itself to maintaining and increasing power, and finally, to demonstrating power in internal as well as foreign affairs.\(^2\) The application of the sixfold policy has always to be with due regard to one's

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\(^2\) *Nāthā* on *Manu*, VII.105.
The ideals of imperial sway connected with the sārvabhauma or cakravartin, samrāj (the lord of the whole world or emperor), which were advocated for every king, further accentuate the conflict for power and the struggle for supremacy which follows from the nature of the state and its policy.

Thus the inter-dependence of one state with another for protection, promotion of prosperity and political ambition, the inevitability of competition for material possessions, and the conflict of interests defined as power prompted the ancient Indian thinkers to study the behaviour of a group of states situated at varying distances apart from a state intending conquest and striving for hegemony over them. They devised a hypothetical structure of the inter-state system and contemplated its governing principles of inter-relationship, the underlying motives and the interplay of recognisable and recondite forces, which helped them to evolve a general pattern in the light of political happenings. Although inter-state relations should touch upon many different aspects of a state, our authors concentrated on the political and military problems and dealt with economic, religious and cultural issues only by implication.

The ancient Indian theory of inter-state relations comprised three concepts:

\[^1\text{KA, VII.3.1; see below, pp. 180 ff.}\]
1) the **mandala** (the circle of states or the geo-political inter-state sphere),

2) the **śadgūnya** (the sixfold policy or six instruments or measures of foreign policy), and

3) the **upāyas** (the means or political expedients).

These three concepts were formulated at an early stage of Indian history as they are found fully developed in the *Arthasastra* and the *Manu-smṛti*. However, the antiquity of the theory of **mandala** cannot be ascertained although its formulation is attributed to some of the earliest authorities on polity like Uṣṇas, Visalākṣa, Mānavas etc.¹

V.R.R. Dikshitar alleges that Uṣṇas took his idea of the circle of kings from the Vedic ritual of the twelve-day rite performed by Brahmā in order to acquire power, prosperity, and glory which is described in the *Aitareya Brahmana*.² It is, however, impossible to substantiate Dikshitar's contention as the age of Uṣṇas and other authorities cannot be determined. The theory of the **mandala** is clearly based on an elaborated concept of the state. What is evident from the extant sources is a three-staged development of the theory of **mandala** by the time it had appeared in the *Arthasastra*.³ Similarly, the concept of the **śadgūnya** (the sixfold foreign policy,

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¹ *KN*, VIII. 20-28.

² *WAI*, p. 311.

³ See below, pp. 106 ff.
namely, sandhi (compact or peace), vigraha (hostility or war),
yāna (marching), āsana (staying quiet, pause or waiting),
dvaidhībhava (dual policy), and samsraya (seeking shelter),\(^1\) is
'associated with, but does not necessarily presuppose the theory
of mandala'.\(^2\) It also shows signs of development from two types
of policy, peace and war, by the time it had appeared in the
Arthasastra.\(^3\) Finally, the earliest of the three concepts seems
to be that of upāyas (political or diplomatic expedients). Its
antiquity is indicated by the expedients being the means and
methods to deal with the everyday affairs of the people as also the
internal problems of a state besides those of foreign affairs.\(^4\)
The upāyas originally are four in number: sāma (conciliation),
dāna (gifts or bribery), bheda (sowing dissension), and danda (force),
to which are later added three more: māyā (illusion), upekṣā
(indifference), and indrajāla (incantation or magic). There is some
overlapping between the sixfold policy and four or seven expedients,
as for example, sāma and sandhi, danda and vigraha combined with yāna, and
upekṣā and āsana defined as indifference,\(^5\) but by and large the sixfold

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\(^1\) See below, pp. 173 ff.


\(^3\) KA, VII.1.3-4; KM, XI. 35-40; see also below, p.177.

\(^4\) Mit. on Ya7ī., I.346; Medh. on Manu, VII.214-15; KA, I.13.15 ff; see below, pp. 368 ff.

\(^5\) Cf. also Vādirāja’s commentary on Mbh., XV.12.1 - Samakaranam dravyadānam
sambandhakaranam ceti sandherupayatrayam. Yanamasanam astraśastradidāda-
danam ceti vigrahasyopaya trayam. Medh. on Mamb, VII.167 calls
dvaidhībhava an upāya.
policy is addressed to the inter-state conflict, while the political expedients are applicable to situations between states as between men. Further, upayas constitute means to implement the foreign policy, although these measures are often called policy (niti) or policies.

It seems that these three concepts, viz. mandala, sadgunya, and upayas, appeared more or less independently, but they were developed and integrated at a certain stage of the development of political ideas to form the body of principles governing the inter-state relations. The mandala concept outlined a hypothetical inter-state structure related to an ambitious state with a view to providing the basic knowledge of the potential political attitudes towards its policy of conquest; sadgunya was concerned with the suitable measures laying out the politico-military strategy of inter-state conflicts in view of the relative factors of power, place and time; and upayas embodied means and methods appropriate to achieving the objectives of foreign policy.

After this introduction to the development of the theory of inter-state relations in general, we shall now proceed to discuss each of its three concepts.

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1 Cf. KN, VIII.42 and its comms. which liken the inter-state system to a tree that has four trunks (lit. roots) i.e. the conqueror, enemy, middle and neutral kings, eight branches, i.e. subsidiary kings of the circle of twelve, states, sixty leaves i.e. five material constituents each of twelve states (see below, pp. 20-21), two props i.e. Destiny and human endeavour, six flowers i.e. sixfold policy, and three fruits i.e. advancement, stability, and decline - the three conditions of the state. Cf. also Dasakumāracarita viii tr. by Kale, p.150.
THE THEORY OF MANDALA (CIRCLE OF STATES OR KINGS, OR INTER-STATE SYSTEM)

The term mandala, which ordinarily means circle, orb, territory, administrative division of a kingdom or province, etc. has, however, a specific connotation in the context of inter-state relations. It indicates a circle or, more precisely, the geo-political sphere of an ambitious state's near and distant neighbours with whom it should maintain political and diplomatic relations. The mandala theory, in other words, seeks to outline a hypothetical inter-state structure primarily based on the principles of geopolitics and power politics. While its fundamental premise is a state or king desirous of conquest (vijigisu) in order eventually to establish its hegemony over its geopolitical sphere, nevertheless each state has to recognise this potential pattern of the mandala relationship and conduct its foreign affairs accordingly.¹

The theory of mandala is clearly based on the concept of state. Since svāmi (the lord, sovereign or king) is defined as an independent ruler, the mandala deals only with sovereign states and ignores feudatories. The constituent states of the mandala may be of any size since size is not a consideration in the definition of the state. Initially it distinguishes foreign states as hostile and

¹On Manu, VII.154; Ča Yajñ, I.345; Agni, 233.13 ff; 240.1 ff.
friendly because the neighbour is described as the enemy and the king beyond him as an ally according to the concept of the state. It assumes the conflict of power between states as natural and concentrates on the political urge of a powerful king to establish his hegemony over others. In fact, the mandala theory envisages a pattern of political relations in a given geo-political sphere from the point of view of an ambitious and powerful ruler in order to enable him not only to promote his economic and defence undertakings calculated to enhance his power and to ensure greater security, but also to guide him in acquiring the wealth and territory belonging to his enemies, and thus extend his sway through a policy of aggrandizement. Its subject is not only the king, but the whole state. This is shown by the twofold aspects of the mandala structure; the circle of kings (rajamandala) is distinguished from the corresponding circle of their material constituents (dravyapraekrtis) comprising the ministers, country and its people, stronghold or fortifications, treasury and army. The purpose of this distinction and its importance for the foreign policy consist in enabling the king to reckon the total power and potential of his state in relation to others in the inter-state sphere.

As already remarked, it seems that the theory of mandala underwent development in three stages. However, it should be emphasized that

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these three stages represent a logical sequence based on an analysis of the principal versions of *mandala*, and not necessarily a chronological one. The basic versions of *mandala* which suggest these three stages of development may be broadly classified as a) the threefold *mandala*, b) the fourfold *mandala*, and c) the standard *mandala* of twelve kings or states. We shall now discuss each one of them separately.

I  The threefold *mandala*

The nucleus of the theory of *mandala* (circle of states) was a group of three states related to a fourth one which is fundamental to it. The king of the primary state is designated as the *vijigīṣu* (one desiring victory, or would be conqueror, henceforth referred to simply as conqueror). Yājñavalkya states: 'An enemy (*ari*), an ally (*mitra*), a neutral (*udāśīna*); that is an adjoining one, the one next to him, and the one beyond him; who constitute the *mandala* of the conqueror tacitly assumed in the verse, 'should be thought of in due order by means such as the conciliation and others (i.e. *upayās*).'

Manu, while advocating the fourfold *mandala*, displays the knowledge of this basic *mandala* when he writes, 'He /the conqueror/ shall regard as his enemy, his immediate neighbour, as also those who help his enemy; the immediate neighbour of his enemy he shall regard

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1 Yajn., I.345; see also comm. esp. Mit.
as ally; and as neutral the king who is beyond these two.¹

Thus, this basic mandala approach differentiates three kinds of
rulers besides the conqueror and places them in successive geo-
political contiguity from the vijigisu. Both Yajñavalkya and Manu
are in agreement as regards the pattern of the composition of
mandala as well as its political nature. Kaujilya also agrees
with the above geo-political relationship but only as regards
the conqueror, the enemy, and ally;² he does not accept the
position of the neutral as described in the threefold mandala
because he postulates a different as well as a larger mandala.
Kāmandaka concludes that a mandala virtually consists of enemies,
allies and neutrals, but he also disagrees with the above-
mentioned geo-political place of the neutral.³ Somadeva sub-
stantially accepts the formulation of the threefold mandala as
far as the kings in front of the vijigisu are concerned, but he
introduces a new constituent called antardhi (buffer king) between
the conqueror and his enemy.⁴ Hemacandra reproduces the definitions
of the enemy, ally, and the neutral according to the threefold

¹ Manu, VII.158; cf. ibid., VII.177, 180; see also comms. esp. Kull-ùka; RDK, XII.p.107 quotes Manu.
² KA, VI.2.14-15.
³ KN, VIII.89.
⁴ NV, XXIX.20-21.
mandala, but he does not obviously describe the threefold mandala because he defines pārṇaśīra (the enemy in the rear of the conqueror) as well. It is thus evident that all authorities accept the basic premise of the threefold mandala as regards the inter-relationship among the conqueror, enemy, and ally, but many of them differ on the place of the neutral. The threefold mandala may be illustrated with a diagram:

Diagram No. 1A.

\[ \text{Diagram with labels:} \]

\[ \text{C = Conqueror} \]
\[ \text{E = Enemy} \]
\[ \text{A = Ally} \]
\[ \text{N = Neutral} \]

1 Abhidhanacintamani, III.396.
These authorities show that in the formulation of the basic circle of states only three states in addition to the conqueror are involved. The nature of their respective relationships is determined by the geopolitical factor and the imperial ambition, power and policy of the vijigisa. This mandala approach to the inter-relation of a group of states fairly demonstrates enmity, friendship and neutrality as the fundamental political attitudes which prevail in the inter-state sphere from the point of view of the conqueror's designs. The relative geo-political nearness or remoteness determines the extent of the conflict of interests, which, reinforced by the problems of marching across an intervening kingdom, dictates the corresponding potential political attitudes towards one's near and distant neighbours. It is also assumed that common enmity is likely to unite neighbours on opposite sides of a state.

Circle of 13 kings or states: An extension of the threefold mandala

Vijñāneśvara and Aparārka commenting on Yājñavalkya and Kullūka commenting on Manu, however, elaborated this circle of states by stating that the vijigisa is surrounded on each of his four sides by a similar set of three kings, viz. the enemy, ally

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1 On Yājñ., I.345.
2 On Manu, VII.158.
and neutral in territorial succession. Vijñāneśvara called it a circle of thirteen kings in the shape of a lotus, while Aparārka and others wrongly described it as a circle of twelve kings. We may draw a diagram to illustrate this circle of thirteen kings.

Diagram No. 1B.

C = Conqueror
E = Enemy
A = Ally
N = Neutral
It is evident that these śāstra commentators while describing a concentric band of states around the viśijigīsu's state, which is its axis, postulate a naive inter-state structure. The states seem to be arranged as contents in cosmology. There is no discussion of the relative power of the states involved in the mandala system nor is there any attempt made to describe the complexities of the aggressive policy of the viśijigīsu to establish his hegemony over the mandala. It may, however, be mentioned that these particulars are not found in śāstra texts, although the commentators on Manu describe them by borrowing the ideas from the arthasastra or nītisāra works. The commentators on Yaśnavalkya, notably Viśnūsūrya, nevertheless distinguish three kinds of enemies, allies and neutrals as natural (prākṛta), acquired (kaśyā) and hereditary (sahaja), thereby emphasizing that the geo-political factor is not the only criterion for determining the potential political relations among states. The addition of the factors of heredity and cause is quite significant as it makes the mandala system flexible.

II The fourfold mandala

A second stage in the development of the mandala concept seems to have been the fourfold mandala with its extension into the mandala of twelve kings and their sixty material constituents of state. It

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\[\text{mit. on Yaś., I.345; also Visvārupa on ibid.}\]
is attributed to the Mānavīḥ (the followers of Manu)¹ and discussed in the Manusmṛti and its commentaries,² although it is also described in the Arthasastra,³ the Kāmandakiya Nītisāra,⁴ the Rājadharmakānda⁵ and other works on polity as another version of the mandala.

Commenting on Manu, Medhatithi says, 'Of the said circle of kings the following are the principal elements: the king bent upon conquest (vijīgīṣu), the enemy (ari), the middle king (madhyama) and the neutral king (udāsīna)...'⁶ These four have been described as the "root" or basic components of the circle; and there are "eight others" also - i.e. each of these four have two belonging to each, in the shape of the "ally" and the "enemy"...⁷ Altogether they constitute the circle of twelve kings.⁸ Lakṣmīdharā also agrees with Medhatithi on the pattern of the composition, namely, that each of the four principal kings has an ally and an enemy making a total

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¹ KN, VIII.24.
² Manu, VII.155-57; also comms.; cf. Mbh., XV.11.1.
³ KA, VI.2.24-28.
⁴ KN, VIII.24.
⁵ RDK, XII.pp. 107, quotes Manu, VII.155-57, p.109.
⁶ On Manu, VII.155.
⁷ On Manu, VII. 156. Kullūka and other commentators confuse the arrangement of twelve kings by describing it exactly on the pattern of the standard mandala of Kauṭilya, which is, however, different from the fourfold mandala.
⁸ Ibid.
of twelve kings in the mandala. In this formulation the existence of the vijiglu is explicit, while that of the ally is assumed; an entirely new political entity, the middle king, is admitted to the mandala. On an analysis the following formation is suggested:

Group I - Conqueror - his enemy - his ally

" II - Enemy - his enemy - his ally

" III - Middle king - his enemy - his ally

" IV - Neutral king - his enemy - his ally

IIA. Circle of separate groups.

This elaboration of the fourfold mandala may be called the circle of separate groups; for, if the conqueror's enemy of group I were the enemy of group II, and similarly the conqueror's ally were the enemy's enemy, as would be the case if the states of the first two circles were thought of as lying in the front of the conqueror, there would be a total of ten kings and not twelve. Thus, in this formulation of the mandala, the geographical relation between the four principal groups is left unspecified. This may be illustrated by a diagram: No. 2A.
II.B. Circle of interlocking groups

It is interesting to find a different version of the constituents of each of the principal groups in the elaboration of the fourfold mandala into a circle of twelve states in the Rāja-nīti-prakāśa. It quotes from a different text of the Kṛtyakalpataru Lakṣmidhara's comments on the aforementioned verse of Manu, which makes the group of each of the principal states comprise the leader, his ally and his ally's ally.¹ This formulation of each bloc,

¹RNP, p.323. Vijīgisumitram vijīgisumitramitram, arimitram, arimitramitram, madhyamamitraram, madhyamamitraramitram, udasnamitram, udasnamitramitram cetvastau, prakṛtaśpatasrah prakṛtaya iti dvadasa ity aha.
incidentally, is virtually the same as described by Kautilya in his description of the fourfold mandala,¹ which, however, is only one of the two types of the mandala found in the Arthasastra.² This may be illustrated by another diagram:

Diagram No. 28.

Group I - C: Conqueror, C's A = his ally, C's A's A = his ally's ally.

II - E: Enemy, E's A = his ally, E's A's A = his ally's ally.

III - M: Middle king, M's A = his ally, M's A's A = his ally's ally.

IV - N: Neutral king, N's A = his ally, N's A's A = his ally's ally.

¹ Ka, VII.2.24-27.
² B. A. Saletore, India's Diplomatic Relations with the West, pp. 38-39. fails to notice the two types of the mandala in the Arthasastra, and wrongly regards Kautilya's version of the mandala, which we term as the standard mandala, as reproduction of Manu's version.
Because in this scheme the enemy of group II comes between the conqueror and his ally of group I and similarly the enemy's ally of group II intervenes between the conqueror's ally and his ally's ally of group I, this formulation can be called the circle of interlocking groups. Moreover the diagram above will show that the middle and neutral kings are discrete as they are said never to be contiguous to each other, although we have presumed that their groups interlock.

Of these two different versions of the constituents of each of the four groups of the fourfold mandala in its elaboration into a mandala of twelve states, we may observe that the circle of the interlocking groups is adequate to explain political facts and is more convincing than the circle of the separate groups because it emphasises the allied nature of the constituents, while the latter merely outlines an equal division of the inter-state sphere into four separate groups each consisting of the leader, his enemy, and his ally. In comparison, however, the circle of interlocking groups in its elaborated shape tends to make each of the four groups some sort of an entente or alliance in as much as its leader and two allied members are presumably drawn together by the geo-political factor and considerations of common interests and fears. It shows that at least the circles of the conqueror and the enemy are interlocked, which implies the political nature of the fourfold mandala as characterised by potential alliances and counter-alliances. There is, however, no clear evidence as to the nature of the relationship
of the middle and neutral kings nor to their relation with the conqueror and the enemy in the Manusmrti, although these are described by the commentators, who borrow them from the Arthasastra or nitisāra version of a different type of mandala. Medhatithi only describes the geo-political relation of the middle king, whose territory is said to be co-terminous with the conqueror and his enemy and ignores the place of the neutral king in the mandala. Kullūka also does the same and so also Laksāndhara. But all commentators and Laksāndhara describe the power of the middle king in relation to the conqueror and his enemy, although Medhatithi's comments according to the printed edition of G. Jha are confused. He is said to be capable of showing favour to the conqueror and his enemy when they are united and chastising them when they are dis-united. The neutral king is said to be capable of defeating the conqueror, his enemy and the middle king singly, but not conjointly. The implications of the relative factor of power of each principal constituent will be discussed later.

III The standard mandala

The third stage in the development of the mandala concept seems to have been the formulation of the standard mandala of twelve states or kings, which carries over the nucleus of the threefold mandala, that is, only the geo-political alignment of the vijīśu, his enemy and his ally, and the system of the interlocking groups of the fourfold mandala as well as its feature of the four principal constituents. These are synthesized on a rational pattern by making
innovations in the schematic arrangement of states, by interpreting the geo-political relationship, and by introducing power political considerations. This is accomplished for the first time in the *Arthasastra* among the extant sources with the deliberate design of demonstrating the feasibility of the eventual domination of the *mandala* by the *vijigisu*, who is central to the inter-state system.

The standard *mandala* owes its advocacy to *Kauṭilya*, although its origin is ascribed to *Usnas*. It is also described in the *Kamandakiya Nitisāra*, *Agni Purāṇa* and some of its salient features are introduced in the commentaries on the *Manu-smṛti* in order to explain the verses on the *mandala*. It is, found in a considerably circumscribed form in the *Nītivāca-yamṛta* and several features of it, such as the terms denoting kings or states, are mentioned in almost every kind of writing on polity.

The formulation of the standard *mandala* of twelve kings begins by positing No. 1. the conqueror (*vijigisu*) as the central king or state, his distinguishing marks being the ambition and potential power to eventually establish his hegemony over the geo-political

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1 *KA*, VI. 2.13 ff.
2 *KN*, VIII.22-23, 41.
3 *Agni*, 233.14-20, 240.1-5.
4 On *Manu*, VII.155-58 - Kullūka arranges the twelve kings in the same order as according to *Kauṭilya* and designations of the component kings are also identical.
5 *NV*, XXIX.20 ff.
sphere consisting of eleven other kings or states each of whom
has a distinct designation in accordance with his relative terri-
torial contiguity, potential political attitude, and the relative
degree of power primarily from the point of view of the conqueror.
These are mainly arranged in the front indicating the direction of
the conqueror's aggrandizement, in the rear and on his side, usually
in succession. Those in the front of the conqueror are: No. 2.
enemy (ari), whose territory is adjacent to that of the conqueror;
No. 3. ally (mitra) with territory immediately beyond that of the
enemy; No. 4. enemy's ally (arimitra) with territory beyond that
of the ally; No. 5. ally's ally (mitramitra) with territory
beyond enemy's ally; No. 6. enemy's ally's ally (arimitramitra) with
territory beyond the ally's ally; and those in the rear of the
conqueror are: No. 7. the enemy immediately behind the conqueror
(pārgnicrāha) who is potentially in league with the enemy in the
front; No. 8. the ally in the rear (ākranda) with territory behind
that of the enemy in the rear; No. 9. the ally of the enemy in the
rear (pārgnicrāhasāra) behind that of the ally in the rear; and
No. 10. the ally's ally in the rear (ākrandāsāra) further behind the
enemy's ally in the rear. The remaining two constituents are:
No. 11. the middle king or state (madhyama), whose territory is
co-terminous with that of the conqueror and the enemy, and who is
stronger than either of the latter; and No. 12. the neutral king or

\[1\text{Cf. KN, VIII.44.}\]

\[2\text{Agni, 233.14-17; 240.1-3; Kullūka on Manu, VII.156-58; cf. KA, VI.}
\text{2.12-18; KN, VIII.16-17.}\]

\[3\text{On Manu, VII.155; NV, XXIX.22; Agni, 233.18, 240.3-4; RDK, XII.p.109;}
\text{cf. KA, VI.2.21; KN, VIII.18.}\]
state (udāsīna) 'lying outside' is more powerful than the conqueror, the enemy, and the middle king individually.¹ This mandala of twelve states may be illustrated with a diagram.

Diagram No. 3.

N
M
C
E
Cs.A
E's.A
CsA's.A's.A

direction of Conqueror's aggression

RE = Rearward Enemy
RA = Rearward Ally
RE's A = Rearward Enemy's Ally
RA's A = Rearward Ally's Ally

For other abbreviations see above p. 110.

There is some confusion among modern scholars about the place of the neutral king (udāsīna) in the standard mandala of twelve states, stemming from the lack of precise information in the Sanskrit texts. N. N. Law places the neutral king on the conqueror's flank

¹On Manu, VII.155; NV, XXIX.21; Agni, 233.19, 240.4-5; cf. KA, VI.2.22; KN, VIII.19.
opposite the middle king. But such a position is impossible in view of whatever information our authorities afford about the neutral's place and also because it sandwiches the conqueror between two kings, each stronger than himself, when he is expected to become the overlord of the mandala. P. V. Kane places the neutral at the side of the conqueror's ally, enemy's ally, and conqueror's ally's ally on the opposite side of the middle king, which is untenable because not only the place of the neutral king does not support the geo-political implications of his position which makes him friendly to the vijigisu and his ally and ally's ally in the front and unfriendly to the enemy and his allies, but also the neutral is not


2_\text{H.D.S., III.p.222. Kane's diagram:}

3_\text{cfKA, VII.18.1-2, 26.}
ascribed such a vast territory in any text. As a rectification of P. V. Kane's scheme of twelve kings, Prof. W. Rüben suggests that the neutral one should be placed at the side of the vijigīsu, the middle one and the enemy,\(^1\) which is again implausible because the neutral king is never said to be contiguous to the middle king. As, however, in the standard mandala the neutral king is said to be 'lying outside the mandala' (i.e. of the vijigīsu's mandala of ten kings); as a commentator on the Kamandakiya says that the neutral is near the enemy's ally's ally,\(^2\) and as the neutral's only possible place in the fourfold mandala under its interlocking groups is near the enemy's ally's ally, it can be inferred that the neutral's position is as depicted in our diagram. The neutral king should be placed near the enemy's ally's ally on the same side as the middle king in the standard mandala.

On analysis it is realised that the threefold and fourfold mandalas are so skilfully adjusted and synthesized in the standard mandala of twelve that a new finished structure of inter-state system comes into existence. It is stated that in respect of the middle king, and by implication, of the neutral king, the conqueror, his ally and ally's ally are friendly elements, the enemy, his ally and his ally's ally are unfriendly elements.\(^3\) This statement not only explains their relationship to the mandala but also sums up with only

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\(^2\) Upādhyāyairpeksanusamā commentary (Bibliotheca Indica) on KN, VIII.45. See also M. N. Dutt's tr. KN, VIII.45, 46.

\(^3\) KA, VII.18.1-2, 26.
four kings what was described according to the fourfold mandala with eight subsidiary kings, for, the relations of the middle and neutral kings to the kings or states in the rear of the conqueror are not touched at all. It is thus evident that the separate groups of the middle and neutral kings are merged with the states in front of the conqueror. The logical implications of this are that the conqueror's hegemony over the mandala is shown to be eventually feasible; for, he can outweigh his enemy through a prudent foreign policy and skilful diplomacy. On the whole this schematic grouping of states is so geometrically perfect that the balance of the partisans, and also the balance of power, tips in favour of the conqueror. The principle of balance of power unfolds itself in the description of the power of the middle king in relation to the conqueror and his enemy, and of the neutral king in relation to the conqueror, his enemy, and the middle king. The middle king is indeed designed to hold the balance of power between the belligerents and the neutral king between all the three. However, the conqueror has also to balance the power between his interlocking blocs as it would influence the conduct of the middle and neutral kings, who normally remain disinterested in the struggle between the conqueror and his enemy until one of them requests either shelter or protective alliance in a catastrophe.

Thus, the originality of the standard mandala consists in the addition of four states or kings in the rear of the conqueror, arranged as the enemy and the ally in the rear and their respective allies further behind, in the definition of the geo-political relationship of
the middle and neutral kings to the mandala and the elimination of their separate groups, and the introduction of the principle of relative power in the mandala system. The standard mandala makes a great advance on previous formulations. The subsequent versions of the mandala as described in the Kāmandakīya Nītisāra and other works do not make any really original contributions in principle or in the pattern of inter-state relations. The smaller and bigger versions of mandala as described by Kāmandaka mark an exercise in subtraction and multiplication of the constituents of the standard mandala.

IV The vijigīru's mandala of ten kings

The mandala formed on the pattern of the standard mandala but without the middle (madhyama) and neutral kings (udāsīna) is separately called the vijigīru's (conqueror's) mandala of ten kings or states by Kāmandaka, the author of the Aṃga Purāṇa and Lakṣmīdhara.1 Lakṣmīdhara describes it by quoting verses from the Mahābhārata, and he evidently differentiates it from the fourfold mandala, which he reproduces from Manu. This version implies that the concept of mandala is essentially a doctrine of the equilibration of power; the balance of power, if any, arises from the confrontation of the potential belligerents and the artful management of one's own allies against

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1 KN, VIII.35; Aṃga, 240.3; RDK, XII.p.110 quotes Mbh. cf. Sarasvatīvilāsa, pp. 37-41, which attributes the formulation of the vijigīru's mandala to Uśhas; see also KA, XIII.4.56. K. also imagines a mandala without the madhyama and udāsīna.
one's enemy's allies both in front and in rear. The distinct mention of the vijigisu's mandala in the Rajadharmakanda may suggest that the position and political attitudes of the states of middle and neutral character were regarded uncertain in the inter-state relations, an inference strengthened by Somadeva's views about them. The vijigisu's mandala of ten kings is, however, limited in its approach to inter-state relations, which are confined to enmity and alliance without any cognizance of neutrality as a political attitude in the context of the struggle for supremacy. It may be added in passing that these four different formulations of the mandala system are inter-related and an appreciation of any one of them in isolation is difficult.

V The prakrti-mandala (circle of state-constituents)

The advocates of the fourfold mandala and the standard of twelve states distinguish between the kings and their material constituents of state or resource elements in the formulation of the mandala. They state that there are in the entire mandala a total of twelve constituents who are kings (raja-prakrtis) and sixty material constituents (dravya-prakrtis), viz. the ministers, the country and its people, the fort or stronghold, the treasury, and the army, five for each king, which together makes an aggregate of seventy-two constituents in all. This is called the circle of state-constituents (prakrti-

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1 On Manu, VII.157; RDK, XII. pp. 107, 109; KA, VI.2.25-29; KN, VIII.24-25. According to N.N.Dutt's translation of KN, VIII.27, 29, 32, 36 the prakrtimandala consists of the six constituents of state, viz. the ministers, the country and its people, the stronghold, the treasury, the army and the ally, which is confusing because the ally is already a royal constituent of the mandala reckoned in the respective preceding verses and this interpretation excludes the king. The translator has (cont.)
mandala). The cohesion in this apparent conglomeration of the constituents of states in the inter-state system is sometimes suggested on the analogy of a tree implying the idea of inter-dependence among states. It is, however, striking to note that as in the concept of state, so in the concept of the circle of state-constituents, the material constituents usually figure as a unit, the minister being their leader.

The purpose of delineating the prakṛtimandala is not only to demonstrate that the state as such entered into the inter-state sphere, but also to provide the basis for an accurate assessment of the condition of these resource elements individually and collectively, as it was essential for estimating the total power of each state in relation to the other and its impact on the inter-state system. Indeed, no proper evaluation of the power of a state would be possible unless one judged each element of one's own power in correlation with all those states of friendly, hostile, and neutral character with whom one has to deal both in peace and war. As the selection of the suitable measures of foreign policy and the corresponding employment of political expedients were conditioned by the relative excellences of the constituents of one's own state with others, it was essential that these should be weighed in the mandala. The role of these

(cont.) obviously misunderstood the meaning, which, however, is explicit in the Jayamaṅgalā commentary.

1 On Manu, VII.156-57, esp. Kullūka; Kn, VIII.42, also Jayamaṅgalā commentary.

2 Cf. Mbh., XV.11.4.
constituents in strengthening the prospective alliances, apprehending the potential enmities, and ensuring likely neutrality was considered important. The disposition and the condition of the constituents of state largely influenced the course of war and the nature of fighting, as also the pacification of a conquered territory and its annexation.\(^1\) Even in normal times they were under constant strain of the political expedients employed by the allies and the enemies alike in the intrigues of inter-state politics.

However, the *Agni Purāṇa* and the *Nātivākyāmṛta* omit from their discussion the corresponding circle of state-constituents. This omission seems to have been deliberate and points to the overriding importance of the king in inter-state relations in our period. Perhaps a conglomeration of the constituents of states came to be regarded as irrelevant in a political life of which the main feature was the existence of numerous feudatories, although they are not mentioned as substitutes for the constituents of state in the *manda* system by our authorities. The omission, however, seems to have been a retrograde step, at least theoretically, because it undermines the significance of the other constituents of the state in the theory of inter-state relations, and strikes at the basis of a fair estimate of one's total power in relation to others.

While these aforementioned types of *manda* were mainly discussed in the texts of our period, which strikingly ignore many

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\(^1\) Needh. on Ṛgveda, VII.197, 261-2.
other mandalas of varying sizes ranging from the lowest number of one or two kings to the largest number of 54 kings and 324 constituents of states as found in the Kāmandalīya Nitīsara. Somadeva postulated a different type of mandala which is quite interesting and which by its implications could point to some important consequences in inter-state relations. His views deserve separate treatment because of their clarity and originality.

VI Somadeva's mandala of ten kings

The circle of states as described by Somadeva consists of only ten kings, nine of whom are traditional, namely, the conqueror, the enemy, and the ally in front; the conqueror's enemy in the rear, the ally in the rear, and their respective allies further behind; and the middle and neutral kings; but the tenth, a buffer king or state called antardhi (lit. from antar-dhā 'to place between') as an integral constituent of the mandala system is novel. Somadeva says, 'an antardhi (a buffer king) is one whose place of livelihood is between the realms of the conqueror (vijigīṣu) and the enemy (āri), who is in the pay of both, and who takes refuge in mountains or forests.' This mandala may be illustrated with a diagram:

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1KN, VIII.20 ff.

2NV, XXIX. 20. Udāsīna-madhyama-vijigīṣu-emitra-mitra-pārśvīgraha-
krandastarantardhaya yathāsambhavagunagapa-vibhavantaratamyan
mandalanan adhīsthatarah.

3Ibid., 29. Aри-vijigīṣor mandalāntar vihitavṛttir ubhayavetanah
parvatajāvikṛtaśrayas ca antardhiḥ.
The recognition of the buffer king as a constituent of the mandala system shows that the kings situated especially in or near the forest and mountainous areas between the rivals played a significant role in inter-state relations. Kautilya mentions a buffer king, who, although weak, is nevertheless a hindrance to the strong, if in possession of a fort or forest as a place of retreat, and says that he entertains feelings of dependence towards his powerful neighbour. He, however, does not concede him a distinct place in the mandala. Somadeva, on the contrary, regards a buffer king as a regular constituent of the mandala, although he agrees with Kautilya about the character and conduct of the buffer king.

The inclusion of a buffer king as a regular constituent is also significant owing to the possible implications that territorial boundaries were vague, and more often than not the bordering areas between two kingdoms, especially when these were forest and mountains, were ruled by local kings, who depended for their well-being on both of the rivals. The commentator on the *Nītivākyāmya* states that a buffer king was present between every two kingdoms and dubs him as wagtail (*carata*) owing to his inconstant political loyalties. The character of a buffer king remains dubious owing to his being in the pay of both neighbours on his opposite sides. His policy towards them is marked by duplicity and conducted on the basis of expediency. However, the rivals exploit the buffer king in their political intrigues as well as during military campaigns in order to afflict each other. Envoys and spies are asked to win over the buffer king and to use him for inciting trouble in the enemy kingdom and to harass an invader. In passing, it may be noted that the admission of a buffer king in the *mandala* suggests that the political boundaries and not so much the territorial ones were important in inter-state politics.

Historical illustrations of the position and role of the kings of the antardhī's character may be inferred from the shifting allegiances of such dynasties, like the Kalacuṇis of Tripurī, the Paramāra of Mālwa, and even the Candellas of Jejakabhukti during the period of intense struggle for hegemony among the Pratihāras, the Rāgrakūtas and the Pālas before the middle of the tenth century. Further examples may be found in the checkered history of the Lāṭa.
principality and its role in the conflict for power among the Caulukyas of Gujarat, the Paramāras of Mālwa, Galukyas of Kalyāṇī and later the Yādavas of Devagiri, as it shifted its allegiance to each one of them at its convenience. The position of the Cāhamāna kingdom of Nāḍūla and several political changes in its history at least during the wars between the Caulukya king Kumārapāla and the Cāhamāna king Arporāja and also their successors can be properly understood if we recognise that Nāḍūla kingdom tended towards the position of the antardhī and consequently the attitudes of the rivals towards it, as also its own towards them, could be moulded according to the situations in inter-state politics. Furthermore, the buffer states largely owed their status and security to their geo-political position and rivalry between powerful neighbours on their opposite sides owing to which their political allegiance fluctuated. This may be the reason for conflicting claims of success against them put forward by rivals, as in the case of Lāṭā, by all of its neighbours during the reign of their more energetic kings such as Vākpatirāja II and Muṇja, Sindhurāja, Bhoja and later Subhaṭavarmanā, Devāpala of the Paramāra dynasty of Mālwa on the one hand, the Caulukya Mularāja I, Bhima I, Bhima II and others on the other, Tailappa II, Vikramāditya VI of the Cālukya dynasty of Kalyāṇī and Siṃhapaṇa and other Yādava kings.
of Devagiri notwithstanding. 1

Another contribution of Somadeva to the concept of mandala consists in his explanation about the geo-political position of the udāsīna (neutral king or state). He says: 'One situated in the front, in the rear, at an angle, near or in the circle of the vijigīstu is the udāsīna, who, although capable of suppressing the middle king etc. when disunited and helping them when united, remains indifferent for some reason or other to the endeavours of the vijigīstu.' 2 It is evident that his statement makes the position of the neutral king extremely uncertain; his circle is said to be irregular; and what is, therefore, important is his attitude of

1 See for details the standard works on the dynastic history:
1. H.C. Ray, Dynastic History of Northern India, vols. I & II.
2. R.S. Tripathi, History of Kanauj.
3. A.S. Altekar, Rashtrakutas and their times.
7. A.K. Majumdar, Chaulukyas of Gujarat.
8. D. Sharma, Early Chauhan dynasties.

2 NV, XXIX. 21. Agrataḥ prastataḥ kone vā samikṣram vā mandale sthito madyamadinaḥ vijṛāśtanām nigrāhe, samhitān anugrahe sanartho'nukenacit karanamanyasmin bhunatal vijāśtramga ya udaste sa udāsīnaḥ. P.V. Kanṭa (H.D.S., III, p. 220) remarks about the uncertain position of the udāsīna, which he ascribes to Kulluka on Maṇu (VII. 153) are confusing since Kulluka confines himself to the discussion of the udāsīna as according to the threefold basic mandala elaborated into a mandala of 15 or 12 kings.
indifference to the conqueror, which again is due to some cause (kārana) and his capability to chastise any of the leading kings of the mandala. It is, however, not unlikely that the changing political status of several kingdoms in the contemporary politics and their uncertain attitude towards the kings of far and near underlie the observation of Somadeva.

As to the factors determining the relative position and relationship of the constituent kings or states of the mandala, Somadeva recognises three, namely, excellences of the king and the other constituents of his kingdom, might and territorial contiguity.\(^1\) The potential political attitudes of enmity, friendship, and neutrality of the kings of the circle towards the conqueror are not determined by the geo-political principle alone, but by motives of interest and specific causes (kārana) and the power to play the corresponding role in the inter-state sphere or, in other words, by power politics and not so much by geo-politics.\(^2\) Somadeva is the only author who explicitly and rightly says that the middle king, for some reason or other adopts an attitude of mediation towards the conqueror in conflict with his enemy.\(^3\) It is thus evident that he regards the inter-state structure as flexible and not geo-politically rigid, the

\(^1\)\textit{NV}, XXIX.20.
\(^2\)\textit{Ibid.}, XXIX.21-35.
\(^3\)\textit{Ibid.}, XXIX.22.
characterisation of the kings dependent on the excellences and might, and the political attitudes contingent upon the conflict of interests defined as power and specific causes (काराग्रा).

In conclusion, we may remark that old ideas on the theory of mandala prevailed during our period. Only Somadeva showed some new thinking. His views on the place and role of the उदासिन (neutral king) in the mandala pointed to certain important consequences in inter-state relations approached on the traditional pattern because they showed the possibility of the उदासिन becoming a contender for political supremacy in the विक्रम संवत\'s mandala, if the factors of power politics changed. To illustrate this, we may refer to a crude illustration of the alignment of kingdoms in Northern India by the beginning of the eleventh century. At this time the Candellas of Jejakabhukti had come to occupy the status of the विक्रम संवत. Their enemies were the Pratiharas of Kanauj, and the Candella king Vidyadhara had friendly relations with the साहिबंग कांड दत्त, and his predecessor Daṅga had helped them against their enemy, the Muslim Sultan of Ghazni. According to Somadeva's version of the mandala the Sultāns of Ghazni would be the उदासिन who remained indifferent to the rivalry between the Candellas and the Pratiharas, until Sultan Mahmūd had succeeded in overrunning the Sāhis. It is true that Candellas, along with others, probably joined the Sāhis as confederates to fight Sultan Mahmūd in A.D.1008 but they later failed to take any initiative in the direction of a concerted action when Mahmūd invaded other parts of Northern India. On the contrary, the Candella king,
Vidyādhara exploited the discomfiture of the Pratihāra king Rajyapāla at the hands of Māhāmūḍ in order to exterminate him. He, however, showed a certain amount of appreciation of the geo-political changes when after installing Trilocanapāla on Rajyapāla’s throne under his aegis, he tried to assist the fallen Śahi king Trilocanapāla in recovering his kingdom from Māhāmūḍ. This move of the Candella king provoked another invasion of Māhāmūḍ of Ghaznī in A.D.1019 and subsequently in A.D.1021-22. The result was that, although the Candella kingdom did not suffer much in either property or political power, yet the Śahi prince and perhaps also the Pratihāra king Trilocanapāla were eliminated in the course of the struggle. What was suggested by these happenings was that the viṣiṣṭa and the uddāsina could also become rivals for political supremacy as was indicated by Somadeva’s concept of mandala. It, however, puts a premium upon the vigilance and statesmanship of the viṣiṣṭa, who should organize a confederacy to oppose an invader of the erstwhile uddāsina character. It was in this respect that the Hindu kings failed, owing to lack of political foresight and many other factors. Somadeva’s contributions in this respect passed unnoticed as is clear from the great popularity of Smṛtis and the composition of the Kṛtyakalpataru, although Lakṣmīdhara indicates that the mandala without the middle and the neutral could be thought of, which probably influenced the statesmen more during our period.

It will have been apparent that notwithstanding the concentric band of states situated around the viṣiṣṭa, according to the threefold
of the fourfold mandala, the standard mandala of twelve, the vijigisu's mandala of ten, and Somadeva's mandala are linear rather than circular in structure. It may be mentioned in passing that our authors do not indicate the size of states forming the mandala nor do they admit the vassals to the inter-state system. The constituent states may be small or large as the area of the universal emperor (cakravartin or sarvabhauma) is said to be the entire Indian subcontinent from the Himalayas to the seas. It is, however, more correct to say that states forming the subject matter of the mandala, were of small size, although the mandala itself was expandable to the whole country depending on the size and power of the conqueror's state.

Constituents of the mandala

We have already mentioned various designations of the constituents of the mandala system and noted some of their characteristics. These terms, viz. ari, mitra, pārāngigrāha, ākṛanda, madhyama, udāśina, etc. define, however, the position of individual rulers or states in relation to the vijigisu in a dynamic inter-state relation. All are subject to political changes owing to the vicissitudes of power. The prominent constituents of the mandala, however, need more detailed discussion as there exists controversy among modern scholars about their character and political conduct.
VIJIGISU (would-be conqueror or a king intending conquest)

Our authorities state that a king endowed with personal excellences, fortune, and excellent material constituents, who is the seat of good policy and valour, and who has made up his mind to conquer the earth (i.e. Indian sub-continent) is the vijjigisu by reason of his being endowed with courage and strength.¹ The vijjigisu is thus distinguished not only by his power and ambition but also by his endeavours to carry out his designs of subduing the world. He is called a righteous conqueror by the Agni Purana.² Somadeva stresses that the vijjigisu and other kings are the lords of the mandala as far as compatible with their excellences, might and majesty, and contiguity. It is, therefore, not the geo-politically central position or imaginative central placing in the mandala, but, in fact, the ambition for conquest backed by power and exertion to materialize it that entitles a king or state to the rank of the vijjigisu, his neighbours and others are then named according to their geo-political and power political position relative to him. Thus, the vijjigisu is the fundamental power political entity of the mandala system distinguished by his policy of conquest seeking to establish his sole sovereignty or supremacy (ekadhinatya)³ over the mandala.

¹NV, XXIX.23; Raja tvam adi Chitra-giri aprakrtisampanna dhamavikrāmyo adhīsthānam vijjigisub; cf. KA, VI.2.13; Agni, 233.24–26; Medh. on Manu, VII.155; Tatra ca yo raja prakrtisampannam dhamavikrāmyo utthihi muktah sa vijjigisub uttahasaktiyogat; also other comms.; RDK, XII.p.109; Tatraīsām eva rajaprakrtisampannānām āguṣṭum abhyudyatāh sa vijjigisub.
²Agni, 233.26; Jigisu dharmavijayī tathā lokam vaśam nayet.
³Medh. on Manu, VII.1.
In view of the evidence we disagree with N.N.Law who proposed to render vijigisu by a colourless word such as 'central state' because he wrongly argued that the aspiration for conquest was not the particular characteristic of the vijigisu alone in a cluster of kings nor was the mandala meant for use only in times of war. In his zeal to reduce the concept of the vijigisu to a generality, Law missed its real spirit. We also feel that the remark of Winternitz that the vijigisu must 'always be a model of virtue, possessed of the best prakrtis and the embodiment of statesmanship' is misleading as it tends to regard such a king a historical impossibility. In fact, these excellences of the vijigisu are to be judged in comparison with other kings. Even theoretically the vijigisu is considered to be inferior to two other constituents of the mandala, the middle and neutral kings.

W. Ruben writes that 'one should avoid to translate the term vijigisu as "desiring conquest" because that would imply from the very beginning that the vijigisu wants to conquer an empire, which according to the text i.e. the Arthasastra he does not.' Later on he states that the vijigisu does not conquer the countries of his enemies. It is evident that Ruben's objection is based on

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1 Op.cit., p.3; Studies in Indian history and culture, pp. 197-198.
2 Cited in N.N.Law, Studies in Indian History and Culture, p. 217; M. Winternitz, Some Problems of Indian Literature, p.97.
4 Ibid., pp. 140-141.
the interpretation of the terms 'conquest' and 'conquering an empire', the latter implying taking possession of a country by force, thereby involving territorial annexations. It seems, however, that Rüben tends to be pedantic, for conquest also means 'action of overcoming, gaining of victory, etc.' which justifies the translation of the vijigū as 'desiring conquest'. Moreover, as we will see in the following pages, the vijigū also conquers his enemies and annexes their territories. Among the three types of victors, righteous, greedy, and demoniacal, the last two seek to acquire the territory, and the demoniacal is said to be satisfied with the seizure of land, goods, sons, wives, and the life of the adversary. According to Vijnānēvara the objective of an expedition is to annex the enemy's territory. Among the three gains of marching, Kautilya and Somadeva prefer territory to money and money to ally. Yajnavalkya and his commentators describe the duties of the conqueror towards the conquered kingdom; they do not mention the reinstatement of either the defeated king or a scion of his family, if he had died in battle. Medhatithi shows that the victory in the battle leads to the subjugation of the conquered kingdom, and he countenances the installation of a scion of the fallen king as a vassal only when the occupied kingdom cannot be annexed owing to the loyalty of the subjects.

1 Agni, 233.24: Satrum jīgīṣur ucchindyāt svaṃn sāknoti chedyadi.
2 NV, XXX.71-72; KA, XII.1.10-16.
3 Mit., on Yajñ., I.348; see also Ibid., I.324.
4 NV, XXIX.78; KA, VII.9.1 ff.
5 Yajñ., I.342-343; also comm. 
It is thus evident that the viṣiṣṭa is not forbidden from annexing the enemy's territories, although in many sources including the Arthasastra the conqueror is ideally asked to subdue the enemy and reduce him or his scion to tributary or feudatory status. In fact, the Indian empires were built both by annexing the enemy's territories and by reducing the adversaries to tributary status.

Thus, the viṣiṣṭa is one particular king who is assigned a central position in the inter-state system at a particular time and place by virtue of his imperial ambition and power. The relative position and characterisation of other kings or states of the mandala are subject to change as their power and success (śakti and siddhi) wax or wane. Indeed, the mandala concept revolves round the viṣiṣṭa, who is not a static phenomenon but a changing political entity. Geographical adjacency was the physical factor behind the structure of the mandala, but devoid of power no king or state could be assumed to be the centre of political gravity.

**ART (Enemy)**

The king of the state contiguous to that of the viṣiṣṭa in front, that is, the direction of the latter's aggrandizement, is called the ari or enemy in the formulation of the mandala, although

all kings on the circumference of the vijigisu's territory are characterized as potential enemies. The vijigisu himself is advised against treating them as serious contenders at a particular moment. The mandala concept concentrates on only one king in the front (ari) of the vijigisu and another in his rear called pārapāgraḥa (lit. heel-catcher); others are described as friendly and dependent neighbours. Somadeva says, 'one who does harm to his vijigisu's party and persists in opposing him is an ari'. The factors really determining the enemy character are distinct rivalry expressed through pursuing the same object, power and policy to oppose, motives of interest (svartha), cause (kārāṇa) and force of circumstance. These together outweigh the considerations of geo-politics, which, however, are retained owing to their physical relevance in the context of power politics.

According to our authorities an ari is said to be of three kinds: born (sahaja or kula), acquired (kṛtrima), and natural (bhūmyanantara or prākrtya, i.e. from being the prakṛty of the mandala of the vijigisu). Vijñāneśvara, who also extends this threefold classification to the ally (mitra) and the neutral (udāsīna), elucidates these categories

1 Mit. on Yājñ., I.345; Kullūka on Manu, VII,158; cf. Ka, VI.2.14.
2 cf. KA, VII.18.29.
3 NV, XXI.24 - Yā eva svasyāhitānugrahānena prātikulyan īyati sa evāriḥ.
4 Medh. on Manu, VII.177; Agni, 233.20; NV, XXI.35; also 33-34; RDK, X.p.96 quotes Mbh. and Vyasa; cf. Ki, VIII.14, 52 ff; Mbh.(p), XII.138, 133; On Yājñ., I.345.
5 Mit. on Yājñ., I.345; Agni, 233.21; RDK, XII.p.109; Kullūka on Manu, VII.155.
6 Mit. on Yājñ., I.345.
by stating that among these 'born enemies' are relations such as half-brothers, uncles and their sons; an acquired enemy is one to whom some wrong has been done or by whom some wrong has been done; while a 'natural' (prākṛta) is the ruler of an adjoining country. The Agni Purana adds that each preceding type is more serious than the following one. But many authorities admit of only a twofold distinction of enemies: 'born', i.e. of the same family (śaṅkja), and 'acquired' (kṣātra), one who opposes, on account of harm previously done to him by the viṣṇu, incites antagonists, or himself precipitates conflict. The Agni Purana, following the Vighnudharmottara, states that in its opinion the 'natural' is virtually the acquired', which fact further bears out that the territorial contiguity is not sufficient ground for enmity.

Enemy states (ari or satru) are further divided into four categories in view of the condition of the resources, power, and political status. They are: vātavya, fit to be attacked, i.e. the ruler of an adjoining state possessed of qualities of an ideal enemy, namely greed, cruelty, ignoble birth, idleness, injustice, one having mean

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1 Mit. on Tājīn, I, 345.
2 Agni, 233.21.
3 Medh. on Manu, VII.155; NV, XXIX, 33-34; cf. KN, VIII. 58 & ff.
4 Agni, 233.22; cf. Vdh., II.145.15-16.
councillors, and disaffected prakrtis, particularly one forsaken by his allies, ministers, feudatories, army commander, and afflicted with calamities; ucchedanīya, 'fit to be extirpated', one who is without a fort, an ally or a place to seek shelter, and is weak; pīdanīya, 'fit to be harassed', is one who is wanting in good counsel (mantra) and forces; and, karganiya, 'to be weakened', one who has powerful allies and strong forces. This differentiation enables the vijigīṣu or any other king to adopt suitable measures to deal effectively with his enemies in order to achieve his political objectives. However, it is also pointed out by several authors, that an ari who is intelligent, of noble race, brave, clever, charitable, grateful and firm, thus endowed with personal qualities like the vijigīṣu himself, is most troublesome.

It is evident from the three or two kinds of enemies and their fourfold division according to the condition of their power and status that hostile attitudes are to be assessed in view of the conflict of interests defined as power. It is implied that a weak neighbour is more likely to become a prey to a strong vijigīṣu, while a powerful neighbouring prince not only maintains his own security, but also proves troublesome in the struggle for empire. What our authorities primarily mean is not a political condition but an attitude of hostility which is subject to modification under the

1 NV, XXIX.30-32; Mit. on Yajñ., I.345; cf. KA, VI.1.13, 2.16-17; KN, VIII.58-63.
2 On Menu, VII.210; RDK, XII.107.
compulsion of circumstances. By emphasizing the acquired hostility (krtrima) our authorities suggest that it is possible to ally with a neighbouring king out of common fear and interests, and to dissuade him from open hostility by the use of diplomatic expedients. In fact, the actual rivalry and alliance are seen to be contingent upon causes, capacity and situations rather than a priori considerations. Even in respect of the 'born enemy' (sahaja) these considerations are equally strong as may be noted in the relations between the Cāhamānas of Sākambhari and the Cāhamānas of Nāḍgūla, although the latter's political allegiance to the Caulukyas of Gujarāt was a significant factor.

The ari has two allies in the front of the vijigīṣu, who are called arimitra (the enemy's ally) and arimitrāmitra (the enemy's ally's ally). Besides the ari, another enemy king in the rear of the vijigīṣu is called pārśpīgrāha ('the heel catcher'), who invades the rear after the vijigīṣu has undertaken an expedition in front.¹ The pārśpīgrāha's ally is called pārśpīgrāhāsāra, who moves forward to help him from behind the vijigīṣu's ally in the rear (ākranda).

MITRA (ally)

The mitra (ally), as a component of the mandala, is the king or state situated beyond the ari in front of the vijigīṣu. The

¹ RV, xii.26, 23 (Delhi. ed.); Agni, 238.16.17.
criteria of geo-politics and power-politics are applied to determine the basis and character of an alliance as in the case of enmity. It is insisted that 'no king becomes a friend or foe without sufficient cause or without due regard for his own interests, only for the sake of amity or discord,' and 'friends and enemies are to be regarded only in accordance with the power they possess.' Like the ari, the mitra is also of three or two kinds but the differentiation of the ally in view of the condition of power and the corresponding policy on the part of the vijigīśu is only twofold: Vijñāneśvara says, 'One who is to be strengthened (ḥṛjanīya) and the other who is to be weakened (karsanīya). One weak in money and forces (kogabala) is to be strengthened, and one strong in finance and forces is to be weakened.' It is evident that the vijigīśu should maintain a sort of balance of power among his allies in order to maintain his superiority over them, to retain their reasonable dependence upon him, and to sustain their power in comparison with his enemy's allies. Kāmandaka has described double dealings of the vijigīśu even against some of his own allies, especially unsteady and distant ones, and has even recommended the extirpation of an ally who has become hopelessly corrupt and a liability in the

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1Agni, 233.20; NV, XIX.35; cf. Kn, VIII.52.

2Medh. on Manu, VII.177; see above, p.136 fn. 4.

3Mit. on Yajñ., I.345.

4Cf. Kn, VIII.81.
struggle for power. The real test of an alliance is the service other kings render to their leader. In fact, the principles behind alliances, like enmity, are those of power politics and political expediency.

Beside mitra, an ally in the rear of the vijigigu situated behind the enemy in the rear is important. He is called akranda, one for whose help cry may be raised by the vijigigu. He has an ally or helpmate (asara), who is situated behind the ally of the vijigigu's enemy in the rear. The role of these allies is quite significant in the event of an attack in the rear of the vijigigu's kingdom, while he is away on expedition in front.

However, the idea of a potential alliance is fundamental to the working of the mandala system. The vijigigu and also the ari have their potential allies both in the front and the rear in their respective zones. Since enmity is the basis of inter-state politics, alliances are essential to confront enemies in the struggle for power. Thus, the alliances and counter alliances among members of alternative states help the aggrandizement of a powerful party but may also contribute to the maintenance of the status quo and thereby safeguard the existence of weaker states. According to the texts the pattern of alliance of the mandala type aims at isolating external interference in the event of war between the vijigigu and the

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1 KN, VIII.74-76.
2 NV, XXIX.27-28 (Delhi ed.); Agni, 233.16-17.
ari, nevertheless the former is said to have better advantages as he can manoeuvre to crush the latter between his weight and that of his ally. The purpose of cherishing allies is to enable the vijigīṣu to realise his ambition of overlordship over the circle of kings, to maintain a favourable balance of power among hostile and friendly states and to find support and shelter at the time of the worst calamities. However, the interests and causes which are the basis of an alliance should be properly appreciated and continuously appraised.

MADHYAMA (middle king or state)

Kadhyama (the middle king) is one of the four principal constituents of the circle of twelve kings. Our authorities define his geographical situation as co-terminous with that of the vijigīṣu and ari; his power is said to be greater than that of the vijigīṣu and the ari separately but less than their conjoint strength and also inferior to another constituent of the mandala called the udāsīna. His attitude towards either the vijigīṣu or the ari remains uncertain unless crystallised by word or deed. However Kauṭilya and Medhatithi consider the madhyama normally to be friendly to the vijigīṣu and his allies in the front. Somadeva says that the

1 Agni, 233.23; cf. KN, VIII.44-50; RDK, XII.p.110.
2 Agni, 233.18, 240.3-4; NV, XXIX.20, 22; Kulūkka on Manu, VII.155; RDK, XII.p.109; cf. KN, VIII.18; KA, VI.2.21.
3 KA, VII.18.1; Medh. on Manu, VII.177.
madhyama adopts an attitude of mediation towards the activities of the vijigšu for some reason or other. Our sources make the madhyama's favour or disfavour dependent on the unity or disunity between the conqueror and the enemy. It appears reasonable to assume that the madhyama's conduct was regulated by realistic politics and the calculation of advantages. Normally the madhyama remains aloof from the mutual rivalry between the conqueror and the enemy because his interests are being served thereby, and he does not run the risk of enlarging the area of the conflict nor of exposing the mandala to the intervention of the udāśīna by his open partisanship. The madhyama, however, may grant protection (samsṛaya) to either the vijigšu or the ari when threatened with annihilation. This is required in the interest of the balance of power. The madhyama when invading the mandala first starts warfare in the region of the allies of the vijigšu and the ari in the front and does not invade them directly to cause their combination against himself. Our authorities prescribe several measures to the vijigšu in order to forestall the designs of an aggressive madhyama and

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1NV, XXIX.22; Udāśīnavad aniyatamendalo 'parabhūpāpeksagā samadhikabale'pi kutaścit karanad anyasmin nrpatau vijigšumane yo madhyasthabhavam avalambate sa madhyasthab.

2Agni, 234.20; cf. Vdh, II.150-3-5; KA, VII.2.21.

3Cf. KN, VIII. 55, see also comm.; KA, VII.18.5 ff.
introduce in this context the principle of the balance of power by emphasizing the need of a concerted move by the conqueror and his enemy to suppress the destroyer of the political equilibrium in the circle.¹

N.N. Law interprets the term *madhyama* as the 'medium power' and says that it is so called from its strength being intermediate between those of the central state (i.e. the *vijigisva*) on the one hand and the *udasina* on the other, the last being the strongest power in the first zone.² He rejects Shamsastry's rendering of the *madhyama* as 'mediatory' and argues that 'Mediation need not be the special work of a particular neighbour'.³ Dikshitar first rendered *madhyama* as the 'neutral king' but later accepted Law's interpretation.⁴ Kangle translates the word literally as 'the middle king' which may appropriately connote the meaning of the *madhyama*.⁵

In order to form a correct idea of the status of the *madhyama* in the mandala we have to keep in view the factors of geo-political contiguity, power, the material excellences and the operative causes. Law's approach, based on the principle of power, is inadequate

¹ KN, VII.I.55, see also comms; KA, VII.18.5 ff; also see below pp.319 ff.
³ *ibid.*, p.13.
⁴ HAI, p.311; *Hindu Administrative Institutions*, p.271.
⁵ KA, VII.2.21.
to account for the *madhyama*’s attitude towards the *vijigigu* and his *ari*, particularly in view of Kaupilya’s statement that with respect to the middle king the *vijigigu* and his allies in the front are normally friendly constituents and the enemy and his allies are unfriendly elements. If the attitude of the *madhyama* were to alternate between hostility and friendship on the condition of the unity and disunity between the conqueror and the enemy we should expect an attitude of opportune intervention or veiled hostility as the chances of their alliance are slender by the nature of the *mandala*. It seems reasonable to conclude that the superiority of the power of the *madhyama* is for the purpose of the defence of his own territory against the impetuosity of either the *vijigigu* or the *ari*. His friendship towards the *vijigigu* is negative in nature. It is further derived from the calculations of the *vijigigu* being the potential overlord of the *mandala* of ten kings and inferior in power to the *madhyama* only in degree, and that too not unreasonably due to the potential confrontation of his enemy. The absence of hostility between the *madhyama* and the *vijigigu* is further assumed by the probability of the intervention of the *udāsīna*, who may injure all the three combatants, the middle king, the conqueror and the enemy, more or less equally. The *vijigigu*, on the other hand, is advised first to subdue the circle of ten kings and then to conquer the *madhyama*,

1 *KA*, VII.18.1, see also Kangle’s critical note; Medh. on *Manu*, VII.177.
2 Cf. *KA*, VII.18.5 ff; XIII.4.54-61.
which means that he will not offend the madhyama until he has
gained power superior to him. Moreover the interests of the
madhyama are not in peril on account of the vijigis's activity.
It is, therefore, likely that the vijigis can count upon the
non-interference of the madhyama in his feuds with others. However,
sometimes the madhyama is called a common ally which demands a
further intensive diplomatic activity to keep up the normal feelings
of friendliness of the madhyama towards the vijigis to ensure
that he refrains from taking part in the vijigis's war with the
enemy.

The sense of mediation, if any, attached to the term madhyama
springs neither from his special suitability to mediate between
the conqueror and the enemy nor from his attitude or policy towards
them, but from his position to grant shelter or protection (samśraya)\(^1\)
to the vijigis if his enemies overpower him, or to restore him
to his kingdom in the event of the collapse of his authority. This
may, however, be the outcome less of friendship than of the calcu-
lations of power politics. The madhyama enjoys a middle position
in respect of his geographical situation that does not imply a direct
potential confrontation with either the vijigis or the arī; his
power is medium in relation to the combined strength of the conqueror
and the enemy; his interests in the first zone of natural enmity are

\(^1\) Harley, 274.20; cf. Vih., III.150.3-5; cf. ViI., VII.2.21.
always middling as compared to those of the conqueror and the enemy, and he follows a middle course of conduct towards them even when he decides to aggrandize himself at the expense of the circle of the vijīṣṭu, for, the outbreak of hostilities in such an event generally takes place in the distant zone of natural friendship of both the conqueror and the enemy. The madhyama, like the udāśina, has an irregular circle of friends and foes and his attitude towards them remains mostly inexplicable since it depends on power, material objects and operative causes. Thus, the madhyama's attitude towards the vijīṣṭu in conflict with the ari is characterised by negative friendship, opportune hostility and for the most part cautious neutrality. The neutrality in his case is the result of the fear of enraging either the vijīṣṭu or the ari or unwillingness to take sides.

Viswanath's suggestion that 'the term madhyama ... referred to a king whose state was neutralized permanently or temporarily' seems to be plausible because the madhyama is expected to show equal favour to both the vijīṣṭu and his enemy and their respective allies, thereby displaying his impartiality and causing no offence to the vijīṣṭu. When he takes sides with one he becomes the enemy of the other and when he invades the vijīṣṭu's allies

\^[1] NV, XXX.22.
\^[3] LA, VII.18.3.
he is likely to provoke the mandala lead by the vijiṣṭu against him and cause a confederacy of kings to defeat him.\footnote{KA, VII.18.5 ff.} So his bounds are fixed by his own geo-political position, power, interests, and policy. It is, however, not possible to agree with Viswanath that the madhyama's policy is characterized by āsana (staying quiet) because our texts do not say so nor does āsana mean a policy of neutrality.\footnote{Viswanath, \textit{op. cit.}, p.189.}

\textbf{UDĀSĪNA (Neutral or indifferent king or state)}

Modern scholars differ as to the correct interpretation of the term udāśīna. Shamaśastry rendered it as 'neutral',\footnote{Shamaśastry, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 10-11, 13; \textit{Studies in Indian History & Culture}, pp. 200-211} V.R.R. Dikshitār first translated it as 'negligible'\footnote{Hindu Adm. Institutions, p.271; WAI, pp. 311-12.} but later agreed with N.N. Law, who interpreted it as 'super power' as its strength is considered the greatest among the constituents of the mandala.\footnote{\textit{Op. cit.}, pp. 10-11, 13; \textit{Studies in Indian History & Culture}, pp. 200-211}

Sometimes the word is also rendered as 'indifferent' and it is taken to denote 'an attitude of passive indifference'.\footnote{Viswanath, \textit{op. cit.}, p.189.} There are others who hold that 'the term refers to a king situated in a particular position in the circle of states; it does not refer to a neutral king'.\footnote{H. L. Chatterjee, \textit{International Law and Inter-State Relations in Ancient India}, p.137.} It is apparent that three different approaches...
underlie these interpretations. On the basis of the literal meaning of the word udāśīna, i.e. 'one who sits apart', 'neutral' or 'indifferent', the term suggests such an attitude towards the vijīgu at war with his enemy. As to his geo-political situation he is generally assumed to be distant from the vijīgu, while his relative power among the kings of the maṇḍala is superior. It is, therefore, necessary to examine these three aspects to obtain a correct idea of the udāśīna's status and his attitude in the circle of kings before we accept or reject any of the interpretations mentioned above.

We have already discussed the geo-political position of the udāśīna in the maṇḍala, and noted that it varies under different formulations. Nevertheless, the udāśīna is never said to be adjacent to the vijīgu, and his placing next to the vijīgu's ally, although in any direction, is the nearest in the maṇḍala formulation. This distance, however, has some bearing on the character of the udāśīna in normal times, as it indicates no direct conflict of interest with the vijīgu nor hostility to the latter's ari on mere geo-political grounds.

Notwithstanding the varying geo-political positions, our authorities uniformly maintain that the udāśīna is superior in power to the vijīgu, ari, and madhyama separately, but inferior to their combined strength. He thus holds the balance of power

1 On Manu, VII.158; RDK, XII.p.109; Agni, 233.19, 240-4; Cf. KN, VIII.19; NV, XXIX.21; cf. KA, VI.2.22.
over all three, particularly during war, because it is laid down that the *udāśīna* is capable of helping the *vijigīṣu*, *ari* and *madhyama* when they are united, and of suppressing them when they are disunited. It follows that the superiority of his power is primarily for defensive purposes and serves as a deterrent to the impetuosity of the *vijigīṣu*. N.N. Law and others are therefore right in designating the *udāśīna* as the 'super power', but this is not the only aspect of his significance in the maṇḍala, as Law wrongly contends, because alongside his power, his attitude of neutrality is equally important. Law further remarks that on account of his power the *udāśīna* could meet 'the emergencies of reference' without explaining this term. These emergencies, however, relate to either the *vijigīṣu* or the *ari* taking shelter with him in the event of military defeat.

There is, however, some confusion among modern scholars about the position and policy of the *udāśīna* owing to the lack of any explanation of his possession of superior power. We do not know whether it results from the larger extent of his realm or greater

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excellences of the constituents of his state. As to the excellences of the udāśīna himself, Manu and his commentators mention nobility, knowledge of men, bravery, compassion and constant liberality; but these in no way excel those of the viṣṇīgaahence they cannot account for his superiority. The mandala pattern of relationships, as well as the manner in which his power is described, suggest that the secrets of the udāśīna's superior power, as also largely that of the madhyama, are his flexible attitude towards other constituents of the viṣṇīga's mandala, his impartiality, and his ability to form alliances for strengthening his side, when in conflict with the viṣṇīga, the ari, or even the madhyama. We may refer to the Arthaśāstra in which the viṣṇīga is described as helping the udāśīna at war with the madhyama under certain conditions. Somadeva probably had this aspect of the udāśīna in mind when he attributed to him an irregular circle of friends and enemies (aniyata-mandala). It may be added that the partisan character of the kings of the viṣṇīga's mandala enhances the manoeuvrability of the udāśīna, who thus has all the politico-military advantages to swell his power in order to frustrate any aggression against himself.

According to our sources the udāśīna's normal political

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1 On Manu, VII.211.
2 KA, VII.18.24–25.
3 NV, XXIX.21–22
attitude towards the viṣiṣṭa in conflict with his enemy is characterised by neutrality or indifference. Further, from the manner of the description of his superior power it appears that the udāsīna’s favour, expressed through financial and military assistance to the viṣiṣṭa, and by implication to the ari and even the madhyama, and disfavour, indicated by the declaration of vigraha against them, alternate as they are united or divided, suggesting thereby the impact of the political developments. In fact, the neutrality of the udāsīna is not a political condition but an attitude. It is initially deduced from his geo-political position in the mandala, which shows primarily that the udāsīna lacks direct political stakes in the zone of viṣiṣṭa’s natural enmity and has no vital interests involved that affect his power and status. Further, he is handicapped as regards military intervention in the conflict between the viṣiṣṭa and his ari on account of the interposing territory of at least the natural ally of the viṣiṣṭa. In comparison to the madhyama, the udāsīna is thus further removed from the geo-political consequences of the struggle for supremacy between belligerents, so he can afford to observe neutrality or indifference.

To these geo-political considerations are added the overriding calculations of the power politics which really determine

1 NV, XXIX.21.
2 See above, p. 150, fn.1.
and crystallise neutrality in a given political situation. Somadeva expressly states that the udāśīna remains neutral to the vijigīṣu owing to certain causes.\(^1\) It implies that the neutrality is made possible through political reciprocity; it is not a one-sided affair. The vijigīṣu has to take precautions through policy and political expedients and so manage his inter-state relations that the neutral disposition of the udāśīna does not alter adversely owing to apprehensions on his account. The neutrality of the udāśīna is further facilitated by the manḍala considerations, which, according to Kautilya, make the udāśīna normally friendly to the vijigīṣu (a political leverage which the latter may exploit), but should not take for granted, because the friendly trait of the udāśīna is rather negative in bearing as far as the vijigīṣu’s ambition is concerned. This is evident from the fact that the udāśīna is a non-aligned power even in the standard manḍala. He is definitely said to possess an irregular circle of friends and foes. It is also implied that the udāśīna like the madhyama may persecute the vijigīṣu’s ally, although, on the other hand, the vijigīṣu may also exploit him to restrain his ari’s ally in time of war.\(^2\) Moreover, the udāśīna can grant shelter to the vijigīṣu and the ari alike when approached in a catastrophe. It is thus indicated that despite the neutral disposition of the udāśīna his policy

\(^{1}\text{NV, XXIX.21.}\)

\(^{2}\text{KN, VIII.45, esp. Upādhyāyanirpekaśaṃsūrirṇī comm. (Bibliotheca Indica).}\)
of neutrality or attitude of non-intervention is quite flexible. In its adjustment to the situations it may vary from qualified support to open enmity by granting shelter to either of the contestants.\(^1\) The vijigisu has to be ever vigilant of the ud̄asīna because his neutrality is, by and large, a matter of politico-military strategy and subject to modification in view of interstate vicissitudes.

Notwithstanding the freaks of his political behaviour the neutrality of the ud̄asīna is further ensured by the balance of power in the mandala arising out of the two confronting power blocs of the vijigisu and his ari. It is laid down that if the ud̄asīna were to invade the mandala owing to his excessive power the vijigisu should join together with other kings according to the rule of union (sangha-dharma)\(^2\) in order to frustrate the powerful invader from the outside. Its obvious implication is that the ud̄asīna's policy of aggrandizement against the vijigisu's mandala is doomed to failure if the vijigisu has the foresight and shows proper realization of the threat to the balance of power. In the absence of concerted action against the aggressive ud̄asīna not only would he upset the existing distribution of power inclined in favour of the vijigisu but also the independence of many states would be compromised, and the mandala itself might disintegrate. This precept

\(^1\)See Medh. on Manu, VII.184, 197.

\(^2\)KN, VIII.56.
while fully appreciating the gravity of the situation and prescribing remedial measures also points to the restraints on the udāśina's political designs, thereby showing the profitability and the feasibility of the policy of neutrality, which adequately safeguards and promotes the udāśina's interests without much exertion.

Furthermore, the vijigīṣu is not advised to aggrandize against the udāśina until he has subdued his enemies in the mandala together with the madhyama. In none of the mandala formulations is it indicated that the imperial drives of the vijigīṣu and the udāśina clash with each other until at least the former has been able to overwhelm his natural enemy and to accommodate his natural ally in the altered geo-political set-up. Thus, the vijigīṣu eschews provocative actions against the udāśina, likely to induce him to renounce his neutrality and cultivate partisanship with the vijigīṣu's enemy. On his own part the udāśina is powerful enough to protect his kingdom against the military adventurism of the vijigīṣu or for that matter any other king of the mandala.

It is evident that neutrality is not an attribute of a weak state nor is a neutral position assigned to a king who cannot effectively defend himself. The superior power which protects his neutrality is, however, not dependent on the degree of conflict between

\(^1\)Cf. KA, XIII.4.54-61.
rivals; on the contrary, it is supposed to inhere in states or kings of the madhyama and the udāśīna designations. It may be reasonable to remark that this concept of neutrality, which is implied in the theory of the mandala, partakes of the nature of armed neutrality. The neutral position of the udāśīna is not normally sought to be compromised in the interest of belligerency; nor is it implied that it is by any means a stage in the rivalry itself. When, however, the udāśīna is spoken of in general terms the emphasis is on his superior power and potential attitude of neutrality, which are related to the bi-partite struggle for supremacy rather than to the geo-political arrangements of states. Thus devoid of the geo-political factor, the position and the policy of the udāśīna would be compromised if these were not determined by the consideration of power politics. It is realised that the neutral position and neutrality of the madhyama and the udāśīna would end if they were to be faced with a direct stand against the vijigīgu or ari. In fact, the only conceivable situation in which neutrality could function is in holding the balance of power between rivals. The presence of belligerency or rival power blocs is thus the essential pre-requisite of neutrality, which, however, is the cardinal feature of the theory of mandala.

The udāśīna like the madhyama is a relative and dynamic character in the mandala. His attitude of neutrality or policy of non-intervention in the conflict between the vijigīgu and his ari is finally determined in view of power, interest and operative
causes, which imply that neutrality could also be a strategy and an expedient in certain circumstances. It is tempting to visualise the influence of this aspect of neutrality as an expedient on the concept of āsana (staying quiet, pause or watchful waiting) defined as upekṣa (indifference) especially when the latter can be linked with the political expedient of upekṣa (indifference) in its application. But āsana and neutrality (nirapekṣatā or udāsīnatā) are different political concepts.

The requisites of neutrality as a political attitude deducible from the udāsīna are uncommitted position in relation to the vijigīṣu and āri, superior power to project one's own kingdom against the military adventurism of the vijigīṣu, lack of the vital interests in the conflict, and usually a certain distance from the vijigīṣu. On the contrary, āsana is an instrument of the sixfold foreign policy which is applicable to the state of belligerency, nay, it characterises a particular phase in the rivalry between the vijigīṣu and his enemy or for that matter between any two hostile parties. Āsana means withholding action and neutrality means non-intervention. The indifference implied by āsana is directed against the warfare and not against the enemy himself or the ambitious king's expedition which characterises the policy of the udāsīna towards the vijigīṣu in normal course of warfare. Moreover, the impact of the policy of āsana on the balance of power in the mandala is not significant as it involves only a temporary cessation of hostilities, while that of the udāsīna's neutrality is important because it contributes to the preservation of the balance of power. The neutrality of the
udasīna or the mediatory propensities of the madhyama thus have no connexion with the policy of "asana" either in our texts or in the inter-state system to which they apply. Hence many scholars such as Viswanatha, Krishna Rao, Chatterjee and others are wrong in explaining the conduct of the udasīna in terms of asana. The concept of neutrality which they arbitrarily developed from the forced conjunction of the character of the udasīna and the madhyama with that of the asana is misleading.

It may be added that their misconception of the neutrality has led Viswanatha and Chatterjee to erroneously remark that it was possible for one who was not sufficiently powerful, as compared to any one of the belligerent nations, to assume the neutral attitude. We must, however, remember that both the madhyama and the udasīna are individually superior to the viṣṇiga and his atri separately and their main characteristic is 'abstinence from hostility'. What is, therefore, true for asana, a measure of policy which is adopted in a state of weakness, indecision or oscillation due to the external forces, and consequent upon some understanding with the opposite party or parties does not hold good in case of the udasīna or the madhyama, whose neutrality is both a condition as well as a policy towards the belligerents. Further Chatterjee, in his illustration of

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2 WAI, 321-322.
the neutrality in the mandala, has misunderstood the meaning of several terms. Not only is he unable to appreciate whatever implications the geo-political factor has as regards neutrality, but also argues that the natural ally of the vijjigipu remains neutral until other considerations urge him to take the side of the vijjigipu at war with his enemy. While it is true that friends and foes alike determined their policies in view of the realities of the situation - the chances of the success and failures, advantages and disadvantages in the end, military involvement etc. - there is no treatise on ancient Indian polity which concedes neutrality to a natural ally as suggested by Chatterjee. Further, his remark contravenes his own approval of the definition of neutrality as 'the continuation of a previously existing condition', because, according to the mandala formulation, the division of the kings into partisan character is the normal condition of the inter-state sphere. In fact, the neutrality or intermediary position were hard to find in the mandala except in case of the udasina or the madhyama because of the prevailing selfishness.

In the end, we may remark that both the madhyama and the udasina were characteristic elements of the inter-state system as they explain the presence of the neutral states with policies of non-
intervention in the conflict between belligerents. This non-partisanship is essentially a self-imposed political status which is related only to the belligerents and not to other states for, as we have already seen, the madhyama and the udasina both have their allies and enemies in their own geo-political sphere. The nature of neutrality is however not static, passive or negative in relation to the struggle for power between two parties, but it is dynamic, cautious and vigilant and is conditioned by the area of conflict whether it affects it vitally or not. As already noted, neutrality will become meaningless if the madhyama or the udasina were to face the vijigisu or the ari directly or decide to invade the mandala by themselves. Neutrality or non-partisanship thus depends on many political factors; it is not an absolute condition, but a relative political character of state in inter-state relations. It is therefore wrong to maintain that there is 'no evidence of non-alignment in either the mandala doctrine'¹ or in Indian tradition.

Further, the political propensities of the madhyama and the udasina indicate that they could also play the role of a third party in a dispute between the vijigisu and the ari. It has been noted that madhyama is more prone to mediate in the conflict between the belligerents, obviously for the purpose of bringing an end to it, and the udasina is also ready to grant shelter to either of the hard-pressed contenders. It follows from this that

¹ Indian traditions and Rule of Law among nations, Report of All India Seminar (Delhi, 1960), p.19.
they may act as a third party. It is, however, doubtful if any one of them could be effective unless threatening to ally with the aggrieved in order to coerce the uncompromising party. This third-party intervention could only be fruitful if one of the neutrals initiated it and the other remained unconcerned. In such cases the action of the madhyama would create fewer problems than that of the udāśina. But, the third-party role has less scope because of the implied rivalry between the madhyama and the udāśina as indicated in the Arthasastra. It must be pointed out that in an inter-state dispute negotiations were generally conducted mutually and what could not be agreed between the rivals themselves had little chance of settlement even on the intervention of the third party. Moreover, the madhyama and the udāśina may intervene on the side of one party against another. It is not an independent course of action undertaken in the interest of inter-state peace. However, the historical instances of the third-party intervention in the interest of the balance of power are found but not of the third-party judgment in a feud between kings.

Principles and precepts of the theory of mandala

The theory of the mandala, as will be evident from the preceding discussion, is based on the two fundamental principles of geo-politics and power politics, the former providing the physical framework of the inter-state system and the latter outlining the pattern of inter-relationship of states and laying down its rules.
on the basis of political realism. In fact, it is the latter that explains the former in order to rationalise the conflict of interest defined as power, particularly in relation to an ambitious state which pursues a policy of imperialism and of prestige seeking to change the existing distribution of power and thus threatening the inter-state status quo emerging from the formulation of the circle of states. Once it is understood that any political struggle is for interest and power, the geo-political principles help to devise a hypothetical scheme of inter-state arrangement. This is highlighted when an energetic king, endowed with statesmanship and might, tries to anticipate the political attitudes of a set of states situated at varying distances from himself, to lay down the broad outlines of his foreign policy which aims at the gradual subjugation of his enemies. This being the real nature of the mandala, geo-politics has its relevance in the context of power-politics because the sovereigns of the mandala acquire their respective positions, compatible with their excellences, power, and majesty, and lastly, geo-political relationship; mere territorial contiguity or remoteness creates neither enmity nor amity nor even neutrality, for these are due to the motives of interests and the operative cause (kāreṇa)¹. While radically modifying the principle of geo-politics, the principle of power politics does not negate it, but only obviates

¹NV, XXIX. 20-22, 35; Agni, 233.20; Medh. on Manu, VII, f.77; RDK, X.p.96-97.
its rigidity. Together they thus explain why the belligerents are usually contiguous. The operation of these principles may be seen in the events of a set of contiguous kingdoms. The history of the Paramāras of Mālwā and the Gauḍukyas of Gujarāt or the Cāhamānas of Sākambhari and the Gāhaḍavālas of Kanauj demonstrates that while territorial contiguity tended to make them potential belligerents, the real conflicts took place only when one of them had an energetic and powerful ruler. Potential enmity does not mean confrontation unless one of the neighbours embarked upon a policy of conquest; and in this case also the aspirant had not to treat all his neighbours as active opponents; but only one of them lying in the direction of his imperialistic drive and another in his rear, who might be in league with the enemy in front. It is therefore apparent that the principles of geo-politics and power politics are complementary and not contradictory. However, the greater emphasis is on the principle of power-politics rather than geo-politics. The inter-state structure founded on these principles is really flexible. Inter-state politics is thus explained as a matter of continuous concern and contingent adjustments according to political expediency, rather than a stereotyped arrangement of states.

Thus, these two fundamental principles define the relationship between the conqueror and his neighbours as one of hostility. They are further developed to define his relationship with the ally, middle and neutral kings. Firstly, the belligerents are usually
adjacent, as the geo-political contiguity may create conflict of interests. It is natural to expect an immediate neighbour to defy any attempt at domination by another neighbour because it involves deeper issues of political independence and a compromise of the material interests. Secondly, in the case of the conqueror and his ally the principle involved is that common enmity tends to unite the neighbours on opposite sides of a state, as for example the alliance between the Kalacuri king Lakṣmīkarna of Tripuri and the Caulukya king Bhima I of Gujarāt against the Paramāra king Bhoja of Mālwa.¹ Next, with regard to the middle king, the principle involved is that a state with territory co-terminous with those of the belligerents and stronger than each of them holds the balance of power between them and occupies a middle position in relation to them. It tends, however, to become neutral towards the conqueror in conflict with his enemy, because its interests are served by their mutual weakening and its own inability to aggrandize itself against the belligerents, owing to the fear of causing their confederation against itself. As an example, we may refer to the incidental attitude and policy of the Cālukya king Someśvara I of Kalyāṇī towards the invasions by Kalacuri and the Cālukya troops against Bhoja. Paramāra some time about A.D.1055. Finally, with regard to the neutral, the principle is that a king outside the circle of the conqueror, his enemy, and the middle king,

¹C.I.I., IV.pp. xciv-v.
with power to chastise any one of them individually, holds the balance of power over them and adopts an attitude of indifference towards the conqueror because the struggle for power at a considerable distance does not call for partisanship, since it does not threaten his interests. Moreover, intervention against the conqueror is fraught with the danger that he might suspend hostilities with his enemy and form a confederacy to defeat and suppress the intruder from outside.

It may also be added that the political attitudes towards a conqueror, though formed in view of the principles of geo-politics and power politics, are finally crystallised by some definite cause at a particular moment in history. Herein lies the importance of diplomacy, on which the success or failure of the foreign policy depends.

The theory of the mandala also implies several precepts of political expediency and military strategy, such as, it is impolitic and dangerous to antagonise all neighbours at the same time and to march against an enemy without safeguarding the rear where one's hostile neighbour generally awaits an opportunity to exploit such a situation. It is further suggested that alliances other than natural ones are difficult to conclude and are not enduring. It is again not possible to form an alliance, whether for an immediate purpose or a long term objective without some basis of common interests or fears.
The purpose and the significance of the Theory of Mandala; its historical relevance.

The central concept of the theory of Mandala is a state whose king is called the vijigatu or would-be conqueror. Its main purpose, therefore, seems to be to promote expansion, in general, by outlining the political complexities of an aggressive venture and suggesting the kind of interstate strategy which would eventually bring success. As the advocates of the Mandala concept fully appreciate the fact that the conquest depends on the skilful political and diplomatic strategy as well as on power, they adequately emphasize that the interstate system is characterized by alliances formed to push forward the plans of conquest, as also counter alliances created in response to them, in order to maintain the existing distribution of power in a given geo-political sphere. The struggle for power thus represents a conflict between the policy of imperialism and the policy of maintaining the status quo. Thus, the Mandala has for the conqueror a twofold purpose: namely, to promote his aggrandizement against his enemies in prosperity, and to defend his interests in vicissitudes by maintaining the balance of power; and, for the victims of the policy of imperialism its purpose is defensive, and in extreme distress the Mandala is a means of survival.

The whole idea of the Mandala begins with the recognition of an equilibrium of power among a group of interlocking independent states. This equilibrium of power arises on account of the potential confrontation between two power blocs and operates on the principle
of balancing enemies against allies and is transformed into the
balance of power on admission of the two states of neutral disposition,
who in the last analysis of the mandala system, contribute to the
preservation of the balance of power. It is, however, remarkable
that neither of the neutral states can, by itself, upset this
balance of power without an alliance with one of the principal rivals
which, however, is again not foreseen until one of the belligerents
fears his total annihilation and seeks shelter with anyone of them.

Despite this precarious balance of power the ambitious king
is shown to be capable of establishing his supremacy over the whole
mandala through political or diplomatic expedients, aggression,
and finally a policy of prestige. However, in view of the balance
of power, while the conqueror is urged to put the knowledge of the
interstate system to his political advantage and crush his enemies,
one by one, by cutting them off from their allies through the in­
strumentality of his own allies and isolating them from the neutrals
by enlisting their friendship through diplomacy, thereby preventing
any outside help or intervention in favour of his enemies, neverthe­
less he is strongly advised to act with moderation in the hour of
victory. The restraints of the mandala system are contained in the
warnings against the annexation of the conquered kingdom by uprooting
the fallen dynasty or forcing a vanquished king to desperate re­
sistance or seeking shelter with the middle or neutral kings. The

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{RDK, XII. p.110; Agni, 233.23-24; Cf. KN, VIII.46 ff.}\]
conqueror is also advised against persecuting a submissive king and coveting his property; because such a course of action is not only morally unjust, but politically disastrous, as it is likely to provoke the whole mandala to rise and destroy him. In fact, the dictates of the moral conscience are sought to be harmonised with political realism. In this respect the theory of mandala is in accord with the ideal of universal conqueror and the conquest of the four quarters of the earth. It also seems to correspond with the ḫṣatriva ethic of war in respect to its discouragement of annexations and the treatment of the conquered kingdom. It is likely that the theory of mandala was developed as a geo-political counterpart to the ideal of the universal emperor (sarvabhauma or cakravartin) in order to approximate it through a policy of gradual aggrandizement.

This restraining influence of the mandala incidentally defines the limits of the foreign policy, and reflects upon the character of empires built against the background of the mandala theory. It indicates that the conqueror should generally aim at overlordship and to accommodate the vanquished states under his imperial sway. We know that most empires in early mediaeval India represented a conglomeration of vassals or tributaries and semi-independent units, which lacked cohesion. In fact, empires came into existence through a delicate balance between the aspirations of imperial unity actuated by the ideals of sarvabhauma or cakravartin, on the one hand,

\[1\] KA, VII.30 ff.
and the forces promoting independent existence or regional and
dynastic separatism on the other. The Indian empire was thus a
compromise between these tendencies forced by the superior power
of an ambitious ruler. The mandala theory seems to have favoured
this precarious balance by discouraging territorial annexations and
by allowing the defeated states to retain the elements of their
power, which led to the disintegration of empires when imperial
superiority declined. Thus the mandala concept may also contribute
to an understanding of the persistent tendency in Indian history
of political disintegration and regionalism.

The theory of mandala acknowledges the existence of several
independent states and demonstrates that the inter-state system
operates on the principle of checks and balances. By not conceding
an independent role to the vassals or tributary kings in the inter­
state system, it indicates that their importance lay within a parti­
cular sovereign state or empire. However, the vassals and chieftains
could be exploited as instruments of intrigue in inter-state
politics. During our period, i.e. c. A.D.800-1200, we notice that
many feudatories wielded great influence with their overlords and
played a significant part in interstate relations, although this
did not entitle them to recognition as sovereign kings. Nevertheless,
one of the most striking shortcomings of the mandala theory is the
absence of any clear reference to the samanta system and its role
in interstate relations.

It is generally thought that the whole theory of mandala was an
intellectual exercise in political geometry without much relevance to events in Indian history. The mandala concept, it is true, is primarily and finally a theory; and the political condition in India at no time in her history fully conformed to the hypothetical structure outlined by it. However, it cannot be said that it has no historical relevance because some crude historical illustrations, at least during the history of early mediaeval India, can be suggested. It is, moreover, possible to illustrate the principles underlying the concept of mandala from the early mediaeval Indian history already suggested. However, it seems to us, that the theory of mandala provided an excellent working hypothesis, which, when addressed to a particular ambitious king, could explain the possible political complications of interstate situations, and thus become the basis for deliberation on the sixfold foreign policy and the employment of political expedients or diplomacy. Historical illustrations of the application of the sixfold policy can also be pointed out and the employment of the political or diplomatic expedients through royal edicts, envoys and spies ascertained from the chronicles and literary works written during our period. Even in those works written by kings such as the Yuktikalpataru and the Manasollasa, while they do not describe the theory of mandala as such, they nevertheless mention several of its salient features in their discussion of foreign policy and diplomacy. Thus, the influence of the theory of mandala can be deduced from the events of early mediaeval Indian history, although its geo-political structure cannot be illustrated.
in its entirety.

The significance of the theory of mandala, in itself, lies in the fact that it outlines and interprets an interstate system, which gives to the foreign policy of a state a sense of direction by pointing to the limits of its objectives, as well as the course of action conducive to the accomplishment of those aims. It also indicates the task of diplomacy and determines its sphere of action. Further, it defines the interstate conflict in terms of power, which, however, is really material interest. On the whole, the theory appears to be striking in its approach to the interstate system, which is political and materialistic rather than religious and philosophical.

The importance of the theory may be judged from the continuous interest in it, as evident from the writings on Indian policy from the earliest time to the 12th century A.D. The various works written over a long period are not merely repetitive, but their authors show some originality as regards the formulations of mandala, which may have been due to the influence of contemporary history no less than their proclivity for scholastic discussion. Since the objective of the mandala theory is not to describe the historical kingdoms and their inter-relations but to lay down general rules of guidance and disclose the potential pattern of interstate system, its illustration is greatly handicapped. It is conspicuous, for the same reason, by its omission of the impact of the foreign invaders except that which can be inferred from the attitude and conduct of the udasina. These limitations, however, do not mean that the theory has
no influence on historical events. In the *rajadharma* section of
the *smrtis* and *purāṇas* it is urged that the king should deliberate
on foreign affairs in the context of the *mandala* system, and we do not
feel that the education of a king as well as the precepts of state-
craft had no influence on his activities. The *mandala* system is
intended to be relevant to the situations created by the policy of
conquest of the *vijigigu* aiming at the supremacy over kings of his geo-
political sphere, and it seems that its deliberative value could not
be ignored, which explains its popularity in ancient India.
Chapter IV

ŚADGUNYA (SIXFOLD POLICY)

Having demonstrated that conflict for power among a group of states is natural, on the presumption of the political relations based on the mandala system, our authorities discuss the vital subject of inter-state policy, primarily, with a view to offering guidance to the vijigīśu on how to attain success in the struggle for supremacy. This constitutes the subject matter of the concept of śadguna which outlines policies to deal with enemies in inter-state relations and meet situations consequent upon the vicissitudes of power.

The term śadguna means that which is composed of six guṇas or policies which are: sandhi (compact or treaty, i.e. policy of peace), vīgraha (hostility or war), yāna (marching on an expedition), āsana (pause or staying quiet or a policy of waiting), dvaidhībhava (dual policy or duplicity), and samārāya (seeking shelter or protective alliance). The king is asked to deliberate carefully and calmly upon these six policies with his ministers in the context of the inter-state system and to have recourse to the appropriate one in

1NV, XXIX.42 - Sandhivigrahayānasānasamārāya-dvaidhībhavaśādgunyam.
Agni, 234.17 - Sandhī ca vigraha caiva yānam āsānam ēva ca.
Dvaidhībhavaḥ samārāyasāva śādgunyāḥ parikirtitah. cf. Vāh., II.150. 3 ff; also Agni, 240.5 ff; On Manu, VII.160-61; On Yājñ., I.347; HA, II.6-14. RDK, XIII.pp. 111 ff; Mānas., II. chs. 11-16, also 17 verses 970-71. cf. KN, IX-XI; KA, VII.1.1 ff.
view of the factors of power, place, time and the
his allies' by means of which, he feels, he would be
enabled to erect fortifications, capture elephants, dig mines,
carry on trade, cut down forests, raise embankments round fields
in tracts not irrigated by rain, and to win the wealth of enemies
parasya7 Other authorities succinctly state that the
objectives of the application of the sadgunya are to promote
one's own advancement and bring about the decline of enemies. 3
That sadgunya is applicable to foreign affairs is evident, not
only from the discussion of it on the basis of mandala, but also
from the statements of Medhatithi that 'from among the sixfold
policy the king should resort to one or the other, according to
his capacity for the conquest of mandala'. 4 Someśvara III also
says that these six policies are to be applied against the enemy
bloc (satrumandala). 5
The composite term sadgunya thus stands for the foreign policy
of state. 6 Each guna (policy or proper course of action) is

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1 Mit. on Yajñi., I.347, on Manu, VII.56; Medh. on Manu, VII, 154, 160-5.
2 Medh. on Manu, VII.160; cf. KA, VII.1.20.
3 Kull. on Manu, VII.160; Agni, 234, 21 ff.
4 Medh. on Manu, VII.176.
5 Manas, II.17.970-71.
6 There is no term for foreign policy as such, although Somadeva uses
the term avapa as opposed to tantra and says that the former constitutes
activities of a king pertaining to the acquisition of enemy's territory.
(NV, XXX.47; see also above, p.94.)
however not only a form, a type, an attribute, or an aspect of 
the foreign policy, but also constitutes its instrument or measure. 
It is evident that gadgunya is primarily addressed to the enemies 
and thus seeks to deal with the conflict for power. Its objectives 
are to augment the economic and defence potentials of the king and 
to win the wealth of enemies by a policy of self-aggrandizement.

A glance at gadgunya is sufficient to indicate our authorities' 
comprehensive approach to the problems of inter-state conflict and 
their imagination to devise policies to cope with politico-military 
complications in the struggle for supremacy. It may give another 
instance of their delight in pedantic thoroughness, which, however, 
is not without significance. Gadgunya obviously distinguishes six 
facets of inter-state relations by taking into account the possible 
vicissitudes of power, caused by bad policy and chance. It seems 
that these types of policy could not have been laid down without 
a reference to real inter-state conditions. For, it cannot be 
denied that there are intermediary conditions between peace and 
war and policies to deal with them must accordingly differ. Further, 
it is evident that these six policies are arranged as alternatives 
such as peace and war, marching and pause, dual policy and 
seeking shelter, which clearly imply an adjustment of policy to 
politico-military situations and an appreciation of the aggressive 

\[^1\text{See below, pp. 180 ff.}\]
and defensive measures to promote and safeguard vital interests on the basis of expediency. In some circumstances, however, the six policies together would represent different stages and aspects of relations between two rival states. As, for instance, sandhi represents a stage when the rivals can resolve their differences and enter into a compact to desist from active hostility or to cooperate with each other in the sphere of common interest. If sandhi is not possible on mutually agreeable terms, the alternative is a state of war (vigraha). Its initial stages are marked by hostilities and diplomatic contest which, however, come to a head with the sending of envoys by the aggressive party with an ultimatum of peace on its own terms or war. On the failure of the diplomatic mission, yana is the next stage; then comes the stage of pause (asana) in active hostility, which may be resorted to before, during, and after the actual invasion or battle. The fifth stage is that of dvaidhibhava which may also be adopted by the aggressor according to the situations resulting from warfare; and finally, comes the stage of samiraya to cope with the threat of annihilation. Even the aggressor may be caught in such a situation when his army has been massacred in the battle. It is thus evident that the sadgunya provides instruments of politico-military strategy of the different stages and situations in the conflict to suit the demands and tactics of the struggle for power. It is, however, striking that the concept of sadgunya suffers from serious limitations because of being confined to hostile relations only.
Several authorities hold that basic and best among the six policies are those of peace (sandhi) and war (vigraha). It is pointed out that in as much as dual policy (dvaidhībhāva) and seeking shelter (samsraya) are prompted by a desire for peace (sandhi) and involve an agreement, they are included under sandhi, and marching on expedition (yāna) and pause (āsana) are the aspects of vigraha. But others, following Kaṇḍinya, argue that all the six policies are distinct because of the difference in the situations (āvasthābheda) they express and seek to ameliorate. While it is true that these six policies, as well as the conditions, are different, nevertheless, a close examination of these will show that, strictly speaking, peace is only one of the six categories, the others being different aspects of war.

We shall see in the following pages that in certain circumstances dvaidhībhāva is resorted

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1 Agni, 234.16; KN, XI.35-37; KA, VII.1.3 quotes Vatavyādhi, who taught a twofold foreign policy comprising only sandhi and vigraha but Kaṇḍinya refutes his view and states the sixfold policy.

2 Cf. KN, XI.35-37; Bṛhaspati (ibid., 38-39) recognised a threefold foreign policy comprising only sandhi, vigraha and samsraya. Kāmandaka finally says (40) that logically there is only one policy (guna), viz. vigraha; sandhi and others proceed from it.

3 KA, VII.1.5; KN, XI.40. Except for the Agni P., our sources do not take cognizance of these opinions but only state that the policy is sixfold.

4 Cf. A. L. Basham, The Wonder that was India, p.125.
to in order to prosecute war on another front and a recourse to samgraha prolongs rather than terminates hostilities. This analysis strengthens our earlier conclusion that the sadguna as a concept outlines instruments of the politico-military strategy of inter-state conditions for the self-aggrandizement of a state in prosperity and protection from enemies in adversity.

Some modern scholars argue that the principal types of policies are three: vigraha (war), sandhi (peace) and asana (neutrality(sic.)) which correspond roughly to the types of rulers in the mandala and reflect the divisions of international relations.\(^1\) Viswanatha, Dikshitar, and Chatterjee assign the policy of asana to the madhyama and udasina\(^2\), and the former implies that the vijigaha will pursue the policy of war and the ara that of peace. Viswanatha further regards the remaining three policies, viz. samgraha, yanapa, and dvaidhībhava as minor ones and explains the dual policy as applied by an 'imperial state' towards its refractory vassals.\(^3\) But he has evidently missed the full import of sadguna which seems obviously addressed in its entirety to the vijigaha for successfully

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This is, however, different from Byhaspati's view of the threefold policy (see above p.177 fn.2. )


\(^3\) S.V.Viswanatha, *op.cit.*, p.35.
dealing with situations complicated by his foreign enterprise. Although, as we will note below, the six policies have a general applicability, nevertheless, there is no evidence which distinguishes śādgūnya into major and minor divisions in the preceding manner, nor one that ties them up with the three categories of the kings in the mandala. On the contrary, a text, Čakṣusuīyam, states that these six policies constitute measures to deal with the enemy, ally, middle and neutral kings.

The disquisition of śādgūnya is, however, meant not only for the vijigīṣu, but also for other rulers, because guidance is needed for all those to be affected by his activities as much as for him. Moreover, any and every king should consider himself as vijigīṣu, as the characterizations of rulers of the mandala are all relative. Further, as already remarked, śādgūnya consists of precepts of inter-state relations which embody alternative courses of action, as for instance, when the vijigīṣu is told when and whom to attack in prosperity, as well as how and when to pause in his offensive and defend himself in distress or weakness. It is implied that the aggrieved ruler will pursue an alternative policy suited for the protection against invasion. Further, these six policies also admit of combinations, as each one is an instrument of success and the inter-state conditions

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1 Sutra, 54, p.20
may call forth the application of several such instruments owing to the multiplicity of parties involved in inter-state relations.

A thorough knowledge, proper appreciation, and wise application after due deliberation of सद्गुण्य is fundamental to the vital interests of state. Somadeva, reproducing Kauṭilya, observes, 'Peace (सेमा) and activity (व्ययमा) constitute the source of acquisition and security (योगाक्षेमा). Activity is that which brings about the accomplishment of works undertaken. Peace is that which brings about security of enjoyment of the fruits of works.'¹ And Kauṭilya states, 'The source of peace and activity is the sixfold policy. Decline, stability and advancement are the consequences of that policy.'² It is thus evident that the well-being of the state, and not only its inter-state status, depends on the application of सद्गुण्य.

Since the advancement, stability, or decline in the condition of a state is measured in terms of power (सक्ति) and success (सिद्धि) attained by it, the concept of सद्गुण्य seems to have been developed in view of the vicissitudes of power. In fact, the criteria for the distinction of these six policies are different inter-state conditions created by the conflict for power and a king is to employ the sixfold policy with due regard to his power and the

¹NV, XXIX.1-2; KA, VI.2.1-3.
²KA, VI.2.4-5. These lines are omitted in the NV.
principle of expediency. As we shall later discuss in relation to the application of each policy, it would be evident that the general rule is that when one is weaker than the enemy, he should pursue the policy of *sandhi*, if stronger than him, then *vigraha*; if both equal in power, *asana* is the policy to be preferred; if excessively powerful, *vana* should be undertaken; if with the help from one the fight against another enemy can be carried on with success, than *dvaidhibhava* is the right policy; and when one is very weak, the policy of *samprasa* is to be resorted to. It is, therefore, necessary to have some idea of the concept of power in order to appreciate the concept of *sadbya*.

**Concept of Power (śakti)**

Somadeva and Someśvara III have prefaced their expositions of *sadbya* with an elucidation of the concept of power. *Power is the possession of strength,* says Kautilya, and our authorities following him hold that it is threefold: power of counsel or intelligence (*mantraśakti* or *buddhisakti*), power of might or majesty (*prabhusakti*), and power of energy (*utsahasakti*). The strength of knowledge (i.e. of statecraft and diplomacy) is the power of counsel or intelligence; the strength of treasury and army is the power of might; and the strength of valour is the power of energy.

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1. NV, XXIX.50 ff; On Manu, VII.169-174. RDK, XIII.pp.112-13; KA, II.9-14.
2. KA, VI.2.31 Balam śaktiḥ.
3. NV, XXIX.36-40; Yaśastilake, III.p.386; Agni, 241.1; Manas., II.chs.8-10.
4. NV, XXIX.36-40; Jñānabalam mantraśaktiḥ. Kośađandabalam prabhusaktiḥ. Vikreya balam cotsahasaktiḥ. (Delhi ed.); cf. KA, VI.2.35.
Kauṭilya, whom Somadeva reproduces as regards the threefold power, has also described the threefold success (siddhi) attained by each of these three powers respectively.¹ Like Kauṭilya and Kāmandaṇaka, both Somadeva and the Agni Purāṇa declare the power of counsel or intelligence to be the most superior.² Mantraśakti really consists in the knowledge of statecraft, framing of wise foreign policy, decision on the suitable measures of policy conducive to the accomplishment of objectives and the employment of upāyas (expedients) in order to subdue the enemy with little or no loss to oneself, and protection of one's own kingdom.³ In fact, as already seen, the state depends on mantra and Somadeva holds that the state is preserved by the good policy (nava) and valour (vikrama).⁴ In fact, the two principal concerns of mantra (counsel or state policy) as regards the foreign affairs are decisions on the application of sadgunya and the employment of upāyas (means or expedients), which together bring about success in external undertakings. The effectiveness of mantraśakti is expressed by the analogy of a hare killing a lion through intelligence.⁵

¹KA, VI.2.34.

²NV, XXIX.36; XXX.4-8; Agni, 241.1, cf. KN, XII.7.

³Manas, II.9.697-721. Deliberation on the whole range of state policy, internal and external, and ways and means to accomplish the objectives come under the scope of Mantraśakti; Viśvarupa on Yajñī, I.344; Yāśastilaka, III. pp. 375-94.

⁴NV, XXX.3.

⁵Ibid., XXIX.37.
to be an unfailing weapon against the enemy\(^1\) and a type of fighting termed *mantrayuddha* or *buddhiyuddha* (diplomatic warfare) between rivals, enmeshing even the non-committed kings like the *madhyama* and the *udāsīna*.\(^2\) It is not unreasonable to find some ministers claiming that their *mantra* enabled their masters to subdue their enemies, make other kings their tributaries and win glory,\(^3\) since they advised them on the application of *ṣadgupta*.

It is evident that our authorities have a wholesome concept of power, which is not the same as force, although the army is an important constituent of power.

It is the condition of the threefold power which really determines the status of a state in inter-state relations. Repeating Kautilya, Somadeva says, 'thriving with these three powers, a king becomes superior, reduced in these inferior, and with equal powers equal'.\(^4\) So the decline, stability and the advancement of a kingdom are judged by the extent of its possession of the threefold power, which, as already pointed out, result from the application of *ṣadgupta*. As these powers are mutable, so should the instruments of inter-state policy vary according to the actual circumstances.

\(^1\) *NV*, XXX.8.


\(^3\) *RDK*, p.1; *E.I.*, I.pp. 195-207 - Mau stone ins; pp. 207 ff. - *Bājeśvara Ins.* for Candella minister's claims; *E.I.*, II.pp. 161 ff. - *Badala pillar ins.* contains eulogy of five generations of hereditary Pāla ministers, whose policy, it is claimed, was responsible for the success of their masters.

\(^4\) *NV*, XXIX.41; *KA*, VI.2.35.
In addition to power, other factors determining the selection from and the application of sadguna are place, time, and allies,\(^1\) which clearly indicate that it is primarily a matter of political and military expediency rather than religious morality. It is striking that the influence of the alliances on the pursuit of the foreign policy is recognised.

Despite the fact that our sources emphasise these factors, they invariably insert a discussion on the relative role of human endeavour (paurüga or mañuṣa) and Destiny (daiva) in the success of all undertakings of the king.\(^2\) It is acknowledged that both the human and providential factors govern the world. The human acts are characterised as good policy or bad policy (nayanāya) and that of Destiny as fortune and misfortune. It is, however, emphasised that the king should concentrate on the human endeavours which can be thought of, and propitiate or disregard the providential elements that are incalculable. Despite the fact that good or bad policy is said to account primarily for the success in internal as well as the external undertakings of the king, the role of the Destiny or providential factors or chance elements is not altogether discounted. In several sources the prevailing importance of daiva is rather over-exaggerated and the Vīśṇudharmottara Purāṇa even

\(^1\)Mit. on Yajña, I.347; On Manu, VII.56; Medh. on Manu, VII. 160–61.

\(^2\)On Manu, VII.205.; On Yajña, 349–51; RDK, XIV, pp. 139–141; Agni, 226.1–5; NV, XXIX. \(\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\)\(\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\); also Yaśastilaka, Act. III.
elevated it to the status of a fourth power, \(^1\) which should be taken into account by the king in the determination of his policy. Thus, the application of the sixfold policy is also affected by this factor and Medhatithi accounts for the sudden weakness in finances and forces of a king by the elements of chance as well, which compel him to adopt the policy of āsana. \(^2\) This belief also accounts for the elaborate rituals that preceded a campaign, and the attention that kings paid to omens, portents, and astrology. The chance elements did play an important role in the affairs of the state, as also in the life of the individual, and sometimes even changed the course of events. For instance, we may refer to the sudden snow and hail storm which caused panic among the troops of the Śahi king Jayapāla fighting with the Muslim ruler Subuktāgil in 986, and changed a possible victory into an abject defeat, because Hindu hordes considered this incident as an act of adverse Destiny. \(^3\) It seems that the incident even demoralised the king to the extent that he never regained his confidence against the Muslims. Indeed, the advice is against too much reliance on Destiny, but it seems to have impressed the king and ministers alike so much so that some of the kings lost heart in the secular activities and confidence in their endeavour to ameliorate adverse conditions. We can hear the wail of such resigned spirits in the futility of life even in the inscriptions. It seems that the application of

\(^1\) Vyāh., II.71.11.

\(^2\) On \text{Menu, VII.166.}

\(^3\) A.B. Pandey, \textit{Early Mediaeval India}, pp. 64.
the sixfold policy as well as the employment of the expedients (upāyas) was influenced by the belief in the working of daiva.

However, the objectives of foreign policy were to bring about an all-round increase in the economic and military power of the kingdom and to contrive the decline in the power of the enemy. It is interesting to note that although gādguṇya, like the concept of upāyas, has the ultimate aim of enabling the king to realize the trivarga (dharma, artha, and kāma), nevertheless, its immediate objectives are materialistic rather than religious. The cost of the pursuit is reckoned by the profit or loss in men, money and material and political influence in the inter-state system. Its success is measured in terms of the advancement of power and prosperity, rather than spiritual or even religious merit. The selection from and application of gādguṇya are based on power and political expediency rather than rules of religious ethics.

A. SANDHI (Treaty, Compact or Peace: Policy of peace)

Meaning of Sandhi

Reproducing Kautilya, Somadeva states, 'Entering into a treaty is sandhi'.

As will emerge in these pages, sanḍhi (lit. 'conjunction') is best translated 'treaty' or 'compact' as it is never considered an end in itself, but as a means of terminating hostilities, securing one's rear or gaining an ally for the purpose of warfare. We sometimes retain the translation 'peace', however, to preserve the symmetry with 'war' (vigrāha, lit. 'rupture').

1. NV, XXIX.43 - Paṇabandhaḥ sandhiḥ; KA, VII.1.6; Agni, 234.18 - Paṇabandhaḥ smṛtaḥ sandhiḥ... Ykt., 79c.p.11 - Paṇavaddho bhavet sandhiḥ svaḥ hinas tam acaret.
an adjustment or a settlement,\(^1\) which, according to our authorities, involves conditions or terms stipulating friendly relations, financial and military obligations, and promises for mutual help and cooperation or even such agreement as 'we should not do any harm to each other'.\(^2\) Medhatithi and other commentators on Manu imply that sandhi means coming to terms with the rival even at the cost of slight harm or loss in money (to oneself) for the cessation of hostilities.\(^3\) It may be pointed out at the outset that sandhi is primarily addressed to the conflict or war between rivals, of whom the aggressor has a threefold objective of acquiring an ally, money, and territory,\(^4\) which means that any agreement between the antagonists would contain terms relating to one or all of these three objects. The preceding definitions make it evident that sandhi means a treaty or compact containing terms or conditions which seek to adjust issues of conflict in order to avoid war and establish peace between rivals.\(^5\) In itself, sandhi is both a policy and an instrument of policy, a method of the settlement of disputes. However, as an aspect of foreign policy, it expresses a

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\(^1\) Mit. on Yājñ., I.347 - Sandhir vyavasthākaraṇam; HA, II.6. - Sandhir vyavastha.

\(^2\) On Manu, VII.163,202,206; Mit. on Yājñ., I.352. See also below pp.199. kinds of sandhi. RNP,R324.

\(^3\) On Manu, VII.169. cf. Sūkra, IV. 7.466-67 defines sandhi as that by which a powerful enemy becomes friendly.

\(^4\) Gov. and Kull. on Manu, VII.206; RDK, XIV.p.142, also Yājñ., I.352. Medh. on Manu, VII.202,212.
desire and the decision of a king to try amicably to compose his differences with the adversary before resorting to war or to terminate war by mutual agreement on political status and material interests. Sandhi demands compromise and concessions in treasury, troops, territory, and even political status. It is characterized by mutual appreciation of politico-military situation and each other's difficulties. Even the treaty which a victor concluded with the defeated king or a scion of the slain king, whom he has installed on the throne of the occupied kingdom, has in view his own difficulties to annex the country to his own territory, as well as a regard for the defiant spirit of the vanquished people who refuse to acquiesce in his rule.¹

In another context, however, sandhi provides for an alliance between two rulers for some political or material end. Medhatithi says, 'Presents of gold and other things to secure the good-will of both parties constitute (sandhi)². Other commentators on Manu also state that sandhi is entering into a treaty for mutual benefit such as 'we shall help each other with elephants, horses, chariots, money,' and so forth.³ It seems that sandhi in this context is connected with another policy of sadguna, viz., yana (marching against an enemy), and its terms bind the contracting parties to mutual cooperation in war. This is borne out by Medhatithi's

¹ Medh, on Manu, vii. 201-2. 
² On Manu, VII.160 - Tatra hiranyadidanobheyanugraharthak sandhi. 
³ Kull. ibid., cf. RNP, p. 324.
comments on the following verse. He observes, 'Having entered into alliance (sandhi) with one party, the king shall declare war upon another even under false pretences'. Here it seems that the king has concluded a treaty with another enemy, possibly in his rear or on the periphery of his kingdom, in order to undertake an allied expedition against his adversary. This meaning and purpose of sandhi is in full accord with the text and commentaries which further distinguish two kinds of sandhi.

Nature of sandhi

Notwithstanding the objectives, whether self-preservation by bringing about a cessation in hostilities through political and financial concessions to the aggressor, or self-aggrandizement by means of an alliance with one enemy for a successful attack upon another, or by compelling the opponent to yield to the proposal of a treaty demanding submission and concession in treasury, troops or territory, sandhi is by nature an agreement for mutual benefit, which arrests further deterioration in relations between contracting parties by establishing peace between them. It may be added that even sandhi for an alliance with another enemy for cooperation in war cannot be concluded without the abjuration of mutual hostilities.

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1 On Manu, VII.161.

2 Ibid., VII.163; cf. KA, VII.6.2.ff; see below, p. 199.
howsoever temporarily. It is evident that agreement and peace constitute essentials of sandhi. Thus, the policy of sandhi seeks a settlement of the conflict by agreement on terms, which bring about peace and hold out a promise of good-will and mutual cooperation. Sandhi, therefore, is a means to an end. However, strictly speaking, sandhi is not peace, but an instrument of peaceful relations and mutual cooperation between rivals as well as between friends. In the case of the latter it may mean a means to consolidate existing friendship, or, it may embody mutual agreement on terms and conditions for a common undertaking.

It is striking that, unlike Kautilya who distinguishes between treaties with or without stipulations, our authorities only recognize sandhi with stipulations, probably because the elucidation of a treaty without stipulations in the Arthasastra itself constitutes a trick of confidence and a means to dupe an enemy suffering from vices until one is able to strike at him. The stipulations of a treaty are in respect of object, place, and time, which are clearly shown by Medhatithi's explanation of two kinds of sandhi and also by the provisions of the treaty concluded between a victor and his protégé on the throne of a conquered kingdom. Further,

\(^1\) Ka, VII.6.2 ff.
\(^2\) Ibid., VII.6.13.
\(^3\) Ibid., VII.6.11.
\(^4\) On Manu, VII.163,202.
the stipulations of the draft-treaty, purported to have been concluded between Lavaṇaprasada, the minister of the Caulukya king Bhīma II and the Yadava king Siṁha, relate to mutual non-aggression, defensive alliance against a powerful invader attacking either of them, an undertaking to refuse asylum to any rebellious prince or noble who has fled from either country, and to restore to each other, all valuables removed by the refugees.¹

That sandhis were often with stipulations may also be inferred from a few historical instances, such as one entered into by the Caulukya king Bhīma I and the Kalacuri king Lakkumārkara for the simultaneous invasion of Malwa,² or the one concluded by Jagaddeva Pratiḥāra, the chief minister of Bhīma II of Gujarāt with Pṛthvīrāja III of Sākambhari providing for peace. It seems that Jagaddeva, in pursuance of the stipulations of the peace-treaty (sandhi), threatened his subordinate dāndanāyaka Abhayadeva of Āsvāla with dire punishment, when the latter desired permission to rob rich travellers from the Cāhāmāna kingdom, as this act would have contravened the provisions of a treaty relating to the abstinence from mutual hostilities. Thus, sandhis concluded during our period seem to have been generally with stipulations. It is, however, also emphasized in our texts that the king concluding sandhi must

¹ Lekhapaddhati, p.52.
³ Ibid., p.141; D. Sharma, op.cit., p.77.
ensure that there would be no violation of the terms and conditions of the treaty by the opponent. 1

Factors and circumstances connected with sandhi

A recourse to the policy of sandhi to meet the situations arising in the inter-state conflict for power is primarily dictated by the weakness and inconvenience of a king with regard to the factors of power, place, time, and friendly alliances relative to his opponent and the prospect of certain loss in men and material in the event of war. 2 Our authorities recommend a stronger king, one equal in power, and especially a weaker king to adopt the policy of sandhi against an invader, when afflicted with calamities, when seeing certain mutual destruction in battle but expecting future superiority in power, and when lacking means to protect himself and his kingdom. It is argued that like ice-cold water entering into a sore, even a weaker aggressor causes pain to a stronger king suffering from calamities. 3 Should, however, such an aggressor refuse the offer of treaty, the king is advised to strike him down when the opponent is confident of victory. The advisability of sandhi with an equal is argued from the standpoint of the uncertainties of victory in war, while loss and eventual death in it is certain. It is against sound policy to wage uncertain war. The futility of a fight between

1 NV, XXIX.50; Ykt., 79–80.p.12.
2 On Manu, VII.169; NV, XXI.50. ; Agni, 240.6; cf. KN, IX.1. Ykt., 79 ff. pp. 11–12; HA, II.9.
3 Cf. KN, IX.63–64.
equals is illustrated by the simile of the clash between two unbaked jars, which is destructive to both.¹ Medhatithi and other commentators on Manu, however, ascribe the decision to conclude sandhi with the enemy equal in power to the aggrieved king's expectation of victory over the opponent in future, when he hopes to have enhanced his power by impairing his opponent's strength through creating dissension among his ministers and subjects or by contracting powerful alliances.² Should, however, the equal king refuse to make sandhi on agreeable terms, the king should cause him harm to the same extent, and even more than that which he has sustained, 'for, iron does not join unless heated'.³ Through the employment of force and other expedients (upāyas) an equal king should be forced to conclude sandhi.

Sandhi is the best policy for a weak king, who, according to Someśvara III and others, cannot overcome the aggressor by force owing to such factors as place, time, etc., or when the enemy is overwhelmingly strong, or when he is unable to hit back at his powerful assailant; in fact, when he has no effective means to protect his interests in face of an invasion.⁴ He should offer to the assailant an alliance, treasury, territory, or its produce, to conclude a

¹NV, XXX.60; cf. KN, IX.61; KA, VII.3.4.
²On Manu, VII.169.
³NV, XXX.57-58, cf. KN, IX.77-78; KA, VII.3.7.9; XII.1.204.
⁴Manas, II.11.72три-27; see also above, p. 192 fn. 2.
sandhi. If the invader is not willing to accept sandhi on the
offered terms, the king should perform several military and
diplomatic feats and even threaten him with fight to the finish.
On the other hand, a powerful invader is counselled not to outrage
a desperate and submissive ruler by further persecution, but to
conclude peace by treaty; for in the alternative, he will resort
to a desperate battle which may imperil the invader, 'because
heroism born of grief and resentment makes one fight bravely' 'like a forest fire', and '... even Indra dare not stand before
such men...'. Such a desperate king also becomes the object
of the favour of the mandala and is likely to be helped by neutral
kings. Thus, the pursuance of the policy of sandhi is also facilitated
by these politic considerations.

Besides the advisability of the policy of sandhi to meet an
invasion, it is recommended in all circumstances of general decline
in power. Bhoja prescribes it to all those kings who are distressed
by an adverse fate (daiva), whose kingdoms are threatened, and who
have many enemies. Since sandhi provides for the cessation of
hostilities between antagonists, it not only preserves the king in
adverse circumstances, but also enables him to recoup his powers;

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1NV, XXIX.64-66, also, 31-33; Manas., II.11.728 ff; Agni, 240.6 ff.
2Ibid., XXX.63-64; cf. KA, VII.3.10-11.
3Medh. on Manu, VII.200.
4Ykt., 83.p.12.
for the period of this absence of hostilities in foreign relations is to be utilized to promote one's interests by all available means.

However, a policy of sandhi is also conducive to promoting self-aggrandizement when an ambitious king wants to subjugate an adversary who is equal in power. In order to increase his strength, he is advised to contract alliances with his less hostile enemies and undertake an expedition. Even a vijigisu, who does not need any alliance with his enemies to commence a war, combines the policy of vigraha and yena with that of sandhi. This finds expression before, during, and after the war with the adversary. The pursuit of the policy of sandhi in such circumstances is not, however, dictated by unfavourable factors of power, place, and time, but is prompted by a desire to avoid war and minimize losses in men and material, if the objectives of hostility can be secured by agreement. After victory in the battlefield, the policy of sandhi is aimed at the pacification of the conquered kingdom and the conclusion of a treaty with the newly installed or reinstated king embodying the political, financial, and military settlement, which would be the basis of mutual relations in future.

Thus, the factors determining the adoption of the policy of sandhi may vary from weakness in power to superior strength, and its circumstances, from self-preservation to self-aggrandizement through aggression. The advice of our authorities in general is in favour of a policy of sandhi, whether for averting an encounter and ending war or increasing strength to make war. The motive behind
sandhi is to promote one's interests whether by acquiring an ally, money, or territory, or by arresting further deterioration through concessions to the adversary.

Some striking features of inter-state relations are suggested by the preceding discussion. It is evident that while recommending a policy of sandhi to deal with an invader, our authorities do not advocate the instant submission of the aggrieved king. In general, it is advisable to perform diplomatic and military manoeuvres to inflict losses upon the enemy in order to secure favourable terms of sandhi. Somadeva cryptically states that 'it is neither forbearance nor indifference but the display of spirit [heroism] which makes for sandhi'. It therefore follows that force is a prelude to peace, although its employment is in pursuance of the policy of sandhi. It may be remarked that resistance, even from the officials and subjects of an already vanquished kingdom, obliges a conqueror to install on the vanquished throne a scion of the fallen king and contract a treaty with him. Relentless opposition on the part of the loser may explain the matrimonial alliances offered by the victor, as for instance, the Caulukya king Jayasimha Siddharāja's offer of his daughter in marriage to his defeated adversary the Cakamāna king Arporāja. This was often the only way of overcoming his hostility and initiating a phase of peaceful relations promising

2NV, XXX.59.
cooperation in future.

As regards the advice of concluding sandhi with an aggressor, the historical events of our period point to contrary facts. The rivals seldom come to terms without war, howsoever indecisive. Those equal in power often prefer war to peace (sandhi) involving the loss of face. A weak assailant is beaten back even at a considerable loss. Even a stronger aggressor is often fought recklessly to the complete disregard of the material consequences. In fact, politic guidance is generally dashed against dynastic pride and political rivalry, with the result that peace treaties between antagonists proceed from war, rather than forestall it.

**Parties with whom treaties should not be concluded**

Following Kamandaka, the author of the Agni Purāṇa observes that a king should never enter into a treaty with a child, an old man, an invalid, a man deserted by his friends and relations, a coward or a terrified person, a greedy or a covetous person, nor with persons who have renounced all worldly concerns or are excessively fond of earthly possessions. Similarly, a king should never enter into an alliance with a king who devises many schemes at a time and does everything in a half-hearted way; or with those who speak ill of gods and Brahmaṇas; nor with a king whose territory has badly suffered from visitations of Nature, such as famine etc; nor one with an army discontented and mutinous; nor with a king whose dominion, long rent asunder with civil dissensions,
has regained its peace after a long time; nor with kings who are void of all sense of religion or truth. Like Kāmandaka, he decries a compact with these twenty-one persons, who should always be attacked. Bhoja has also advised against sandhi with those who have bad policies or divided counsel, those who are excessively engrossed in truth and religion (i.e. to the extent of being unworldly), and especially those who have previously been in distress or calamity. For, anyone concluding a treaty with them is likely to lose even his life.

A glance at the condition of the above parties gives an idea of our authors' motives for these prohibitions. In fact, the apparent grounds are weaknesses in the threefold power and want of its consummation, unstable kingdom and disloyal subjects; and lack of discrimination as regards reliance on human exertion and Fate, religiousness and self-reliance in the king himself, and above all, vulnerability of such kings and the prospects of gaining easy victory over them. The considerations against making treaties with such rulers are, therefore, politic par excellence. A sharp contrast is evinced in the Kāmandakīya (not reproduced in our authorities) which advocates alliance even with an Anārya (non-Āryan), if

2 *Ykt.*, 85.p.12.
3 Cf. *KN*, IX.29-42.
he is strong, along with six other kinds of rulers: a king true to his promise, an Ārya (a noble king), a virtuous prince, one having many friends, a very powerful sovereign, and one who has come off victorious in many wars.¹

Kinds of sandhi

Medhatithi and other commentators on Manu describe sandhi in two contexts, one in which it terminates war with the aggressor² and the other in which it provides for an alliance in an expedition.³ The latter is divided into two kinds: that in which the act of marching is undertaken in common with the ally, who was an enemy before sandhi, and that in which it is separate.⁴ Medhatithi further elucidates that in the first case the agreement entered into is in the following form: 'Let us march toward the goal conjointly, having equal shares in it, and I shall not be passed over by you; whatever we gain shall belong to both of us'; and in the second: 'You march one way, I go the other', 'where the action is not joint'.⁵ Further, the commentators on Manu also mention a treaty embodying the settlement of a conquered kingdom. The subject of defensive alliance (samsāraya) is, however, discussed separately in

¹ KN, IX.43 ff.
² On Manu, VII.169; RDK, XIII.p.112.
³ Ibid., VII.163; Ibid., XIII.p.111.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid., see also below, pp.293-4. - sandhayayāna.
Alliances between kings for cooperation in war against a common enemy are known, as for example between the Kalacuri king Lakṣmīkṛṣṇa and the Caulukya king Bhīma I for simultaneous attack on Mālwa. Merutudra alleges that Karṇa had promised half of the kingdom of Mālwa to Bhīma, but after victory, he violated the previous agreement and annexed the whole of Mālwa. This enraged Bhīma who invaded the Cedi country; but Karṇa made peace with him by presenting him horses, elephants and the golden mandapīka of Bhoja which he had carried away.\footnote{RC, pp. 74-75; C.I.I., vol. IV, pp. xciv-xcv.} This instance shows that alliances with stipulations were contracted. We may as well refer to an alliance between the Yadava king Simhaṇa, the Lāṇaka chieftain Samgrāma Sipha, and the Paramāra king Devapāla for a joint attack on Gujarāt, although it is not possible to ascertain the stipulations. An alliance between the Paramāra king Bhoja and the Kalacuri king Gāṅgēyadeva was also concluded for a joint attack against the Čalukyas of Kalyāṇī.\footnote{C.I.I., vol. IV, pp. lxxxix-xc.}

Following Kāmandaka the author of the Agni Purāṇa divides treaties into sixteen classes: kapāla (potsherd treaty), upāhāra (treaty through gifts), santāna (by offering a princess in marriage),
sanigata (treaty based on friendship), upanyasa (treaty settling all outstanding controversies), pratikāra (treaty for mutual benefit), samyoga (treaty for accomplishing an act of common interest), purusāntara (treaty providing for transfer of best troops to the conqueror), adṛṣṭanena (or puruṣa) (treaty with persons unseen), ātmamāsā (treaty 'with himself as prey', i.e. one concluded by submitting himself with his army to the enemy), upagraha (treaty for the preservation of oneself by surrendering everything), parikraya (treaty with the surrender of a part or whole of the treasury), skandhopaneya (a treaty with 'support', when the indemnity is to be delivered in instalments), ṛṣṭaya (directed treaty, through the cession of a part of territory), the ucchinna ('exterminated treaty', concluded through the surrender of one's best lands /KN, IX.19/) or surrender of lands from which all riches have been removed with the exception of the base /KA, VII.32/) and the paribhūṣana or paridūṣana (treaty involving complete surrender of the produce of the lands). ¹

Further repeating Kāmandaka, the Agni Purāṇa recognizes only four kinds of principal treaties or compacts (sandhi): parasparopakāra.

¹Agni, 240.7-8. KN, IX.2-20. Also vide KA, VII. 3-23 ff. On a comparison with Kauṭilya's list of peace-treaties it will be seen that only with slight differences in meaning (in a few cases) and with the exception of the avakraya (hire treaty) these sixteen kinds of treaties not only include all varieties of the hina-sandhi but also treaties resulting from reciprocal goodwill and political necessity.
Somesvara also subscribes to this view, and enumerates four similar classifications,\(^2\) It appears that in our period the prevailing forms of treaties were summed up under these four categories.

1. **Parasparopakāra (pratikāra) sandhi** (treaty through mutual benefit)

Kāmandaka defines this as 'I did him good, he will also do the same to me, or I shall do him good, he will also do the same to me, when treaty is concluded under such considerations, this is called pratikāra sandhi.'\(^3\) Somesvara also calls it *parasparopakārasandhi*, that is an agreement to help each other.\(^4\) It appears that in pursuance of this kind of agreement on a personal level between the Paramāra king Jayasimha and the Later Calukya king Vikramāditya (later Vikramāditya VI of Kalyānī), the former sided with the latter in his feuds with his elder brother Somesvara II (c. A.D.1068-1126),\(^5\) which, however, proved disastrous for the Paramāras. This kind of sandhi seems to be fairly comprehensive in scope and may include compacts for various purposes, even offensive and defensive alliance.

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\(^1\) *Agni*, 240.9; *KN*, IX.21, see *Jayamaṅgala* comm.

\(^2\) *Manas.*, II.11.728.

\(^3\) *KN*, IX.11.7.

\(^4\) *Manas.*, II.11.731.

2. **Maitra or saṅgata sandhi** (treaty through friendship)

Kāmandaka says, 'That sandhi is named saṅgata which is founded on friendship between two good men. This kind of sandhi lasts as long as parties to it live; the parties identify their acts and resources; it is not broken by any cause whatsoever, either in prosperity or adversity. This kind of sandhi is excellent, like gold among other metals. People versed in treaty-making also call this sandhi, kaṅcana or golden.\(^1\) Somesvara designates it as maitra, the treaty which is concluded through mutual friendship based on the goodness and virtues of both parties along with their relations.\(^2\) It implies a friendly alliance between virtuous parties for mutual cooperation and help, as well as for the settlement of conflict between them.

3. **Sambandha sandhi** (treaty through marriage)

According to Somesvara this treaty is concluded by a king giving his daughter in marriage to another king for some reason.\(^3\) This is really matrimonial alliance, which was concluded by kings having different motives such as the termination of a war.

4. **Upahāra sandhi** (treaty through gifts)

Sandhi which is concluded through offer of presents or concessions of various sorts as tokens of friendship is called upahāra.\(^4\)

\(^1\) KN, IX.7-9.

\(^2\) Manas., II.11.729.

\(^3\) Ibid., 730; cf. KN, IX.6. calls it santāna sandhi.

\(^4\) Cf. KN, IX.6. see also comms.
According to Somesvara, a treaty which is concluded by giving elephants, horses, jewels, gold and land is called upahāra sandhi.¹ It may be remarked that all kinds of peace treaties (hīna-sandhi) concluded with troops surrendered, with treasury submitted, and with land or its produce ceded, as described in the Arthasastra² are included under the heading of upahāra. Somadeva also recommends the conclusion of a peace treaty when necessary, by giving any one of these objects.³ However, where the cession of land is involved, he favours the giving of the produce of land to land itself; for land once ceded is difficult to recover and ceding it strikes at the root of a king and his dynasty.⁴ As an instance of simple upahāra sandhi we may mention the Cāhamāna king Somesvara's sending of a silver or golden pavilion to the Cālukya king Ajayapāla after his defeat at the hands of the latter.⁵ Probably Somesvara was forced to pay some tribute to Ajayapāla as a mark of submission. The treaty between the Candella king Vidyādhara and Sultan Mahmūd in 1022 may be treated as another example of upahāra sandhi.

¹ Manas., II.11.732.
² Ka, VII. 3. 22 ½.
³ cf. NV, XXIX. 64-66, 78-79.
⁴ NV, XXIX. 65-66. (Delhi ed.)
⁵ A.K. Majumdar, op.cit., p.127; D. Sharma, op.cit., p.70.
These four principal classes of sandhi cover a wide range of political agreements and point to main grounds and objects of their conclusion. They include not only treaties concluded between belligerents in order to terminate war, but also those contracted for strengthening one's power and status in relation to one's enemies, as well as friendly alliances for promoting one's interests in interstate relations. The pratikara and saṅgata (or parasparopakāra and maitra) sandhis seem to be more in the nature of alliance, rather than of treaties to establish peaceful relations after war. The saṃbandha (or santāna) sandhi, which figures as a subsidiary arrangement to the treaties with troops surrendered (dandopanata) and with treasury submitted (kośopenata) in the Arthaśāstra,¹ became an independent category by itself long before our period. It is, however, not unlikely that the matrimonial alliance continued as a part, indeed a significant one, of conditions of peace treaties. The matrimonial alliances seem to have been regarded as an honourable means of bringing about cessation of hostilities during our period, when pride and chivalry overrode material calculations. We have several historical examples of matrimonial alliances, such as the marriages of the Gāhamāna king Arjorajā's daughter with the victorious Caulukya king Kumārapāla,² of the Pāla king Rānapāla's niece Kumāradevi (?) with the victorious Gāhaḍavāla crown prince Govindaścandra,³ of the

¹KA, VII.3.26.
²Dvīṣāraya, kāvya, XIX.21-4; D. Sharma, op. cit., p.54; A.K. Majumdar, op. cit., p.105.
daughter of Jayantasiṃha (a usurper king of Gujarāt), Vijayaśrī with the victorious Paramāra king Arjunavarman, which were concluded by the defeated kings to bring about an end to war and establish peaceful relations. But several other examples suggest that matrimonial alliances served various other purposes as well. For instance, the marriage of Kāmcanaḍeṣvī, the daughter of the victorious Caulukya king Jayasiṃha Siddhaṛāja with the vanquished Cāhamāna king Arṣorāja, aimed not only at ending war and placating the Cāhamāna pride, but also securing Arṣorāja's cooperation in Jayasiṃha's conquest of Mālwa. This matrimonial alliance achieved its immediate as well as distant objective, because it is known that Arṣorāja actively assisted Jayasiṃha Siddhaṛāja to subjugate Mālwa. Sometimes political marriages between rivals served as an instrument of security and defence against another enemy and also provided an honourable means to the defeated to accept vassalage. The Tomara king succeeded in retaining his existence probably through the marriage of Deśladeṣvī (a Tomara princess) with Vigrahaṛāja IV, the Cāhamāna king, who conquered the Tomara kingdom. The matrimonial alliances sometimes also

3 A.K. Majumdar, op.cit., p.71.
4 D. Sharma, op.cit., pp. 61 ff; see also Lalitavigraha-raja-nāṭaka.
saved the independence of weaker neighbours. As for instance, the Kalacuri kings owed their independent status during the palmy days of the Raṣṭrakūṭa imperialism to their friendly relations with the latter, in which the marriages of the Kalacuri princesses to the Raṣṭrakūṭa kings and princes played a significant part.\(^1\) In fact, matrimonial alliance was the recognized means to terminate hostilities, to ensure peace and good neighbourly relations, to augment one’s power and prestige and to strengthen one’s forces of aggression as well as the resources of defence. However, the effectiveness of matrimonial alliances to terminate hostilities and establish lasting peace between rivals or to guarantee inviolability of terms of treaty may be doubted, for these, as we will see later, largely depended on power and political expediency.

Four activities connected with sandhi

There are four kinds of activities connected with sandhi:

1) the making of a treaty and settlement of its terms, 2) maintenance of a treaty made, 3) spoiling or violating the terms of a treaty, and 4) repair or restoration of what is broken.\(^2\)

We shall now discuss sandhi in these aspects.

1. Treaty-making

The power of treaty-making during our period was exercised by

\(^1\)C.I.I., IV. p.lxxii,

\(^2\)cf. KA, VII.6.16.
the king himself. Although inter-state affairs were put under the charge of the Minister for Peace and War (Sāndhivigrahika), the king was personally responsible for initiating negotiations and concluding sandhi. As an example, we may refer to the Caṇulukya king Mūlaraja I (c. A.D. 941-997) who made a personal approach to the Cāhamāna invader Vīgraḥaraja II in the latter's camp for a peace-treaty.¹ Medhatithi, discussing the application of sama, implies that the rival kings should sit together and converse with each other etc., obviously to negotiate a settlement of the conflict.²

However, sometimes the power of treaty-making was delegated by the king to his representatives such as envoys (dūta) and other high ranking ministers. Medhatithi, commenting on Manu's statement that '...upon the ambassador depend peace and its opposite' (dūte sandhi-viparyayau),³ observes that 'peace (sandhi) is obtained by the use of agreeable words and showing off what is done by his envoy's master; the opposite of this leads to war; both of these thus are dependent upon the envoy.'⁴ The envoy is further said to bring about the alliance of kings and also to disunite those who are already

¹ P.C.(p) 23-24; D. Sharma, op.cit., p.30; A.K.Majumdar, op.cit., p.28.
² Manu, VII.198; also comms.
³ Ibid., 65; RDK, IV.p.33 quotes ibid.
⁴ On Manu, VII.65; see also Kuliñka.
Our texts distinguish three classes of envoys: a) nispartha (envoy plenipotentiary; lit. to whom the matter has been entrusted (with full powers of negotiation)), b) mitartha (an envoy with limited mission), and c) sasanahara (bearer of a message or messenger-envoy). Among these the nispartha is entrusted with full discretion as to what is to be said appropriate to time and place in order to accomplish his mission. Whatever he has settled or done concerning peace and war (sandhivigrahau) becomes valid and binding on his king. The nispartha is said to be an envoy, like Krishna of the Pandavas, who has full powers to conclude a treaty or declare war. It may be added, that the nispartha was normally an envoy because a d̄uta is designated as mantrin equal in rank to Senapati and it seems that ministers were commissioned to perform the function of envoy especially when a treaty was to be negotiated. It seems certain that the envoys, at least of nispartha class, possessed delegated power to negotiate and conclude a treaty.

As an instance of ministers concluding a treaty, we may refer to Lavanaprasāda, the minister of the Caulukya king Bhima II (c. A.D. 166).

1 On Manu, VII.66; RDK, IV.p.33.
2 R.P. Kangle, (tr.) KA, I.16.2, see also fn.; A.S.Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India, p.222.
3 Agni, 241.8, same as KN, XIII.3; NV, XIII.3; cf. KA, I.16.2-4. Mit. on Yajñ, I.328 names the second as sandistartha; Ykt., 74-76.p.11.
4 Mit. on Yajñ, I.328.
5 NV, XIII.4.
6 Ibid.
1178-1242) who is said to have concluded a treaty with the Yadava king Sīhapa, which, curiously enough, does not even mention the name of Bhīma.\footnote{Kharataragacchapattavali, v.1244 cited by D. Sharma, op.cit., p. 77 fn.} Another instance is that of Jagaddeva Pratihāra, the chief minister of Bhīma, who claims to have concluded a peace treaty with the Cāhamāna king Prthvīrāja.\footnote{Lekhapaddhati, p.52.}

However, it seems that when exercising the power of treaty-making the kings often utilized the agency of envoys to carry on the negotiations. Treaties concluded through envoys and representatives seem to have been subsequently ratified by the king himself. In this connection it may be remarked that H. L. Chatterjee reads too much into the Arthasastra, when he states that the ratification was done '... by the rulers concerned by means of a śāsana or royal writ, for, Kaṭṭilya says that matters relating to peace and war depend upon writs.'\footnote{See R.P.Kangle, KA, vol. III, pp. 202-3.} In fact, Kaṭṭilya seems to be concerned with the drafting of edicts and the proficiency of scribes in this regard, as a careless composition may affect the issues of peace and war. Somadeva, who substantially reproduces Kaṭṭilya, substitutes lekha (document) for śāsana (edict), and states, 'A king should not

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{On Manu, VII.65; RDK, IV.p.33; Ykt., 75-76.p.11.}
\footnote{See R.P.Kangle, KA, vol. III. pp. 202-3.}
\end{footnotes}
disregard a *lekha* (document or letter) from any one. For kings principally depend on documents (*lekha*), peace and war being rooted in them.\(^1\) While it is possible to infer from Somadeva's statement that *lekha* may include a treaty document, it does not follow either from him or Kauṭilya that the ratification of a treaty was done by means of royal writs. Perhaps the association of a writ or document with matters of peace and war may imply a reference to royal writs pertaining to an ultimatum to the enemy for peace or war.

2. **The binding character of treaties and their maintenance**

In ancient times the sanctity of compacts or treaties (*sandhi*) was ensured by gods like Mitra, Varuṇa and Indra,\(^2\) who protected compacts (*sandhis*) and punished their violation. It was thus the fear of the wrath of these gods, as well as respect for virtues of truth and honesty, which gave a binding character to *sandhi*, besides of course, mutual benefits and dreadful consequences of war. But, as suggested by Kauṭilya, who quotes an anonymous teacher, the invocation of gods and the fear of sin were found inadequate to guarantee the inviolability of agreements, with the consequence that a system of sureties and hostages came to be instituted.\(^3\)

Later, Kauṭilya disagrees with the teacher, and

\(^1\) *NV*, XXXII.29.

\(^2\) *NV*, X.89.9, VII.49.3, See also, S.B. Singh *Ancient Indian Warfare with special reference to the Vedic Period*, p.155.

\(^3\) *KA*, VII.17.3.
regards a treaty, with solemn affirmation or by taking an oath, or by
plighting one's troth, such as 'we have made a pact', as more stable
in the next world as well as here, than one which only seeks such
mundane guarantees as sureties and hostages. In our period Soma­
deva follows Kaupilya in this respect and states that 'the creation
of confidence in others is the purpose of plighted word (satya),
oath (šapatha), the surety of a principal officer or a hostage'.
Like Kaupilya, he also considers a solemn oath as the best security
against the violation of the treaty; for '... while one whose word
is like the written decree is honoured by all, ... he who breaks
his word wins bliss neither here nor hereafter. There is no greater
sin than treachery.' Somadeva further dilates upon the dreadful
consequences of false oath, treachery and dishonesty in this and
the next world. In fact, Somadeva is in agreement with Kaupilya
that plighted word or solemn oath binds the conscience of a king which
may prick if he were to contemplate violation of the terms of the
treaty, whereas sureties and hostages do not involve moral scruples,
and when grown stronger a king can secure their escape by some ruse
and violate sandhi. It seems that during our period hostages were
not normally exchanged, although the Lekhapaddhati mentions the

1KA, VII. 17.5-6.
2NV, XXIX.84; cf. KA, VII.17.1-2; Lekhapaddhati, p.52.
3NV, XXX.80,82-83.
4Ibid., XXX.79, 84 - see also Ibid. (Delhi ed. fn. which has a few
more verses describing the evils of a false oath.)
exchange of sureties (pratibhū) between Lavanaprasāda and Siṃhaṇa in order that the terms of alliance should be observed. It may, however, be contended that the princesses, given in marriage to the adversaries in order to conclude a peace-treaty, were hostages. But these princesses do not really seem to be hostages because they could not be freed from the enemy since Hindu marriage creates an indissoluble bond, nor does the husband have the right to kill his wife, which is the threat that hangs over the hostage’s head. Moreover, Kauṭilya himself says that a girl hostage cannot be harassed. Further, these marriages were arranged to create friendly relations and also to establish family connections. Marriage was a sacred institution and, while it could serve political purpose, the custom of diplomatic marriage was by no means the same as a system of hostages. The binding character of a treaty, therefore, rested on oaths and possibly sureties in our period.

The maintenance of a treaty involved the observance of its terms and conditions by both parties. A treaty providing for mutual benefits and goodwill had greater chances of being observed until such time as one of the parties, especially the stronger, did depart from his pledges. The maintenance of a treaty really depended on diplomatic resources and upāyas were employed to create conditions for the fulfilment of its provisions.

1 Lekhapaddhati, p.52.
2 KA, VII.17.16.
The breaking of treaties

What we have written above does not mean that no treaty could be violated by any king in any circumstances. In fact, it appears that there were perhaps more cases of violations of treaties than of their observance. In the ancient period gods like Visnú and Indra are accused of bad faith; Indra is alleged to have violated his pledge and slain Vṛtra and cut off the head of Namuci after having reached a mutual agreement not to kill each other.\(^1\) These examples are quoted in the Epic and works on polity in support of a policy of distrust and treachery against the enemy with whom a treaty has been concluded.\(^2\) The tenor of inter-state diplomacy is selfishness and distrust. The nītisāra works and sometimes the smṛti commentators as well betray the rule of opportunism and expediency, which treats morality and virtue with slight respect.

Notwithstanding the fact that pledges are given and oaths are taken at the conclusion of a treaty, a king is normally ill-advised to repose absolute confidence in the enemy.\(^3\) On the contrary, a king is advised to win the confidence of his powerful adversary and befriend his supporters in order to weaken them later by means

\(^{1}\)TS, VI.5.1-3; XII.6.8; P.B., XX.15.6; TB, I.7.1.6 ff. See S.D. Singh, op. cit., pp. 156-57.

\(^{2}\)Cf. Mbh., II.50.20: KN, IX.54.

\(^{3}\)Ykt., 80. p.10; cf. KN, IX.54; Mbh(f), XII.138.185 ff, 140.14 ff, 37 ff.
of upāyas. When he has succeeded in undermining the strength of his rival and enhancing his own, he could disregard the treaty obligations. Both Kauṭilya and Kāmandaka prescribe that when grown in power after concluding a treaty, a king may contrive the escape of hostages given to the enemy and thus break the treaty. Even Medhatithi advises a king whose constituents of state (prakṛtis, i.e. ministers, etc.) are in excellent condition and who is rich in funds, beasts of burden, and other military potential '... to break the treaty under some false pretext and have recourse to war'. It follows that a treaty can be abrogated if the condition of the threefold power warranted it. The merest pretext may be enough to launch a war, as for example, the Caulukya king Mūlarāja did against Graharipu, the ruler of Saurāstra, with whom he had previously made a settlement. The pretext for war in this case, it is alleged, was the command of Lord Mahādeva, given to Mūlarāja in a dream, to exterminate Graharipu, who had become an oppressor of pilgrims. It seems that the sandhi which Mūlarāja had earlier concluded with Graharipu was unsatisfactory because Mūlarāja could

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1 Cf. KN, IX.55, 65 ff. describes how a king should afflict his powerful enemy with whom he has concluded a treaty, by means of intrigues.

2 cf. KA, VII.17.32 ff.

3 On Manu, VII.170.

not annex Saurāgṛha. Sandhi in many cases is a temporary measure and a king concludes it in order to bide his time until he is able to challenge his adversary. Even aggressors, who concluded treaties owing to political and military handicaps in subjugating their adversaries, are found to violate their agreements later when chances of a decisive victory appear certain. It therefore follows that might, political expediency and a favourable balance of power justified the violation of treaty. How precarious is the binding character and the efficacy of the oath!

In fact, neither the system of hostages and sureties nor even matrimonial alliances contracted mainly for the purpose of cementing the treaties could give adequate binding character to treaties and guarantee lasting peace. Of matrimonial alliances mentioned earlier, we know that Arṇorāja desisted from hostility to the Cālukyas only during the life-time of Jayasimha Siddharāja. He later opposed Kumārapāla, with the consequence that two bloody wars took place and he was ultimately defeated by the Cālukya king. The marriage of the Cāhamāna princess Jhala with Kumārapāla also failed to bring peace; for Vīgraharāja IV, soon after his accession to the Cāhamāna throne, led expeditions against Kumārapāla's feudatories in order to avenge his father Arṇorāja's humiliation. Similarly the Gahaḍavāla king Govindyaśandra spared the Pāla king

1 Medh. on Manu, VII.169.

2 See above, pp. 205 ff.
after his marriage with the Pāla princess only for the time he took in consolidating his kingdom and subjugating the Kalacuris, his inveterate enemies. The case of the marriage between the Cāhamāna king Vīgraharāja IV and the Tomara princess seems to have been different because the Tomara king accepted the position of a vassal after his defeat. Similarly, treaties of alliances for cooperation in war such as those entered between the Paramāra king Bhoja and the Kalacuri Gangeyadeva for a joint military operation against the Calukyas of Kalyāṇi, between Lakṣmikarṇa and Bhīma I, and even a treaty of non-aggression and mutual assistance as in the case of Lavānaprasāda and Simhaṇa, ultimately failed to inaugurate any change in the traditional relationship of hostility beyond a temporary phase of opportune understanding. Unless the treaty provided for the subordination of a king, who was willing to be faithful to his pledges, its security hung in the balance of power.

It appears that normally there was one condition which overrode all others in the matter of keeping treaties, viz. an essential change of circumstances from those which prevailed when a treaty was concluded. This change is primarily brought about by the augmentation of the power of one party and relative decline of that of the other. A king who had to submit to an invader on account of his weakness or some calamity he had suffered, may set aside the treaty if the changed circumstances favour this. H. L. Chatterjee thinks that this condition is comparable to the modern principle of rebus sic stantibus or the principle that a treaty ceases to be
binding when an essential transformation in the circumstances in which it was concluded occurs.¹

In the last analysis, therefore, the security of a treaty depends on the vicissitudes of power, although it is said to be created by an oath or a surety or hostages. The sanctity of a treaty was not guaranteed by any inter-state organisation nor upheld by international law. There is no evidence in our period to suggest that a king violating a treaty suffered either in public estimation or in the gathering of kings. Once a king was able to extricate himself from overwhelmingly unfavourable circumstances, he could reject the treaty concluded under them, like the Sāhi king Jayapāla, who later refused to comply with the obligations of the treaty he had to acquiesce in on his defeat by Sultān Subuktāgin of Ghaznī.

Besides the changed circumstances created by the vicissitudes of power and political convenience which cause the violation of a treaty, the diplomacy and secret devices employed by a third party may also wreck an alliance (sandhi). As an example, we may refer to the machinations of the Caulukya agents who caused the break up of the coalition of the Paramāra king Devapāla, the Yadava king Śimhaṇa, and the Lāṭa ruler Sāmghāma Śimha organised for the purpose of joint attack on Gujarāt.² Thus, such violations of treaties (sandhi) may occur in many ways and the factors that contributed to these

can be diverse. The real reason for honouring the terms of a treaty and maintaining it intact seems to have been weakness and fear of retaliation, and not pledges, sureties or hostages. Nevertheless, the fact that a king has to find some pretext for violating a treaty suggests that oaths and pledges carried weight and a frequent disavowal of one's solemn promises affected one's prestige in inter-state dealings. Somadeva and Bhoja warn a king that he should conclude a treaty (sandhi) only when there is no danger of the violation of its stipulations by the other party.¹

4. **Repairing a treaty**

It may be inferred from the use of upāyas that a treaty whose terms and conditions have been violated could be repaired, although it is not clear whether it involved the conclusion of another treaty or the mere affirmation of the previous one. Except in the case of kings under the overlordship of an emperor, there is hardly any prospect of reconciliation and restoration of a treaty without a recourse to war followed by another treaty. However, former allies, who joined the enemy side, may return to the king when he is marching against the same enemy. Medhatithi, who seems to be paraphrasing Kauṭilya, distinguishes four categories of allies who have gone to the enemy's side but have returned.² Such persons, according to

¹ *NV*, XXIX.5D; *Vkt.*, 79-80.p.12.

² Medh. on *Manu*, VII.186; cf. *KA*, VII.6.23 ff.
him, may be re-admitted to the alliance on the previous basis only after the king has thoroughly investigated the motives and reasons for their actions. Those who are found to be fickle or in secret league with the enemy should not be taken back. In fact, whenever a treaty has to be concluded or repaired the king must scrutinize the motives of an enemy approaching for a sandhi.

In conclusion, we may remark that a sandhi means a treaty or an agreement, be it the result of defeat or brought about by the need of an alliance for war or the outcome of friendly feelings. However, it is generally rooted in weakness of power and politico-military inconveniences of a king who takes the initiative for the conclusion of a treaty. The king personally exercises the power of making treaties, but he sometimes entrusts the negotiations to a high-ranking minister or an envoy. The binding character of the treaty is derived from solemn affirmation and honesty, although the system of sureties and hostages is known to our authors. The duration of a treaty depends on the element of power, diplomacy and the inter-state alignments which may create an essential change of circumstances from those when it was concluded, and thus cause its repudiation; for, no king seems to observe commitments nor is he advised by political thinkers to do so, provided he can withstand the repercussions of the violation of

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1. [Medh. on Manu, VII.186; cf. KA, VII.6, A. NV, XXIX.75.]

2. [NV, XXIX, 75.80; also comm.]
the treaty. The breaking away of feudatories from their suzerain during his decline in power stands on a different footing; for several other factors, such as the sense of loyalty to the emperor and the countervailing jealousy and rivalry among the feudatories themselves influence the process of defection. However, the role of power and attendant diplomatic expedients is also evinced in such circumstances. The binding character and the duration of a treaty are therefore contingent upon the diplomatic resourcefulness, and changes in the balance of power in the circle of states. A treaty resulting in a coalition or confederacy of kings generally has a limited scope and a particular objective. Nevertheless, these occasions can be exploited for improving the relations between rivals; but this does not seem to have been either attempted or achieved during or after such confederacies, which were indeed the outcome of common interests and fears of short term duration. Sandhi was a measure of policy as could be resorted to before, during and after war. Before war it expressed the desire to achieve the mutual objective by agreement; during war it might be resorted to in order to seek politico-military help from others; and after war it embodied the settlement of the conquered kingdom. Through sandhi it was possible for the kings of early mediaeval India to maintain friendly relations and desist from fighting, even though only for brief intervals. It was the only measure by which the relations with distant monarchs could be regulated until they entered the arena of strife. Since permanent peace or an honest policy
of peace, which demands areas of common interests and unity of purpose, was hard to realize in an age of mutual rivalry and struggle for empire, this measure of sandhi granted respite to the contestants and sometimes gave to declining dynasties a breathing spell in which they had a chance to revive their power and glory. Although the strains on the policy of peace were at all times heavy, and particularly so in the absence of any inter-state law or inter-state organisation, yet, by placing this measure first of the items of the sixfold policy, our authors suggested that a king should first seek the fulfilment of his designs and deal with inter-state situations by its application. When the prospect of peace grew dim after an extensive employment of diplomatic expedients, a king was permitted to go to war. But the inevitability of war with an enemy and his allies did not mean all-out war on all sides. A king could, therefore, fight with a few opponents and remain at peace with those not involved against him.
Chapter V

SĀDGUNYA: B. VIGRAHA
(HOSTILITY OR WAR)

The term vigraha is opposed to sandhi. It expresses hostility or a state of war between two states. Our authorities define vigraha by apakāra, aparādha, or vaira which terms denote 'offence', 'injury', 'harm', 'wrong', or hostility. It seems clear from various terms that causing harm to another king constitutes vigraha, which according to Bhoja may include even a battle. Kullūka says, 'practising hostility on account of the excess of power constitutes vigraha.' However, the act of any injury, which is called vigraha, is not a one-sided affair. Reproducing Kamandaka, the author of the Agni Purāṇa explains that 'a war is the direct result of injuries done to each other by hostile kings'.

It is evident from the above that for a state of vigraha to arise there must be hostility, which is different from an ordinary quarrel.

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1Mit. on Yājñ., I.347. Vigraho'pakāraḥ: Agni, 234.18. cf. KA, VII.1.7.
2NV, XXIX.4. Aparādho vigrahah.
3Aparārka on Yājñ., I.345; HA, II.6.
4Ykt., 56.p.8; cf. RNP, p.324; also Vīramaityodaya on Yājñ., I.347.
5On Manu, VII.160: Vairem vizgrahācaraṁadhyādhisthikyena.
or strife, and that there should be not only offensive acts but also an explicit intention to use armed forces in order to settle a dispute or promote self-aggrandizement, and that there exists a state of mutual hostility. The outbreak of war has to be preceded by an active rivalry on both sides and when the antagonism reaches the climax a recourse to force is taken to resolve it. According to the mandala concept, there are enemies with whom a conflict is inevitable, and an ambitious king is advised to afflict his enemies in various ways according to the condition of their relative strength in order to prepare grounds for the eventual assault on the vulnerable ones among them. Even wars for self-aggrandizement are to be preceded by diplomatic activity in order to ascertain the strength of the adversary's hostility and to explore the possibility of exacting submission without doing battle. The threatening messages to submit or fight, sent by an aggressor to his adversary, satisfy the last condition of war; for it is defiance that precipitates war; if, on the other hand, submission is forthcoming before battle, it ends in sandhi. Thus, the policy of vigraha creates a state of war.

There is some controversy about the precise meaning of vigraha. Viswanatha writes that 'probably the condition or attitude of belligerency was denoted by the term vigraha'. Manu, however, uses the word

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1Sukra, IV.vii.501 distinguishes vigraha (war) from kalaha (strife) and says 'that is said to be vigraha or war by which an enemy is oppressed and subjugated'.

yuddhāmanam for belligerents and yuddhāmanatvam means belligerency. In view of these terms Viswanath's interpretation seems untenable. Taking a partially correct view, Dikshitar states that vigraha is a diplomatic contest and is but a means to the end, viz., to avoid regular war. In the first place vigraha is clearly not a means of avoiding war, but, on the contrary, is an invitation to it. In the second place, while diplomatic warfare characterizes the state of vigraha, being the form which hostilities take in initial stages, it by no means sums up vigraha, which itself may have been created by the diplomatic expedients (upayasya). Moreover, the diplomatic contest is sometimes an aftermath of vigraha and normally a necessary prelude to fighting. Moreover, it is a kind of fighting primarily suited to a weak king and for defensive purposes. Vigraha, on the other hand, is the state of war created by the aggressive decision of a powerful king, who is ready to strike with his army should his demand for submission not be fulfilled through diplomatic expedients. It may be borne in mind that conquerors are of three kinds: righteous (dharma-vijayin), greedy (lobha-vijayin) and demoniacal (asura-vijayin). While there is scope for diplomatic contest with the first two types, hardly any exists in the case of the last, who seeks to completely destroy the enemy and

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1. Manu, VII. p.199 and comm.
2. H.L. Chatterjee, op.cit., p.73.
3. WA, p.319.
4. NV, XXX. 3 ff; KA, XII. chs. 1-3.
5. NV, XXX.70-72; cf. KA, XII.1.10-16.
appropriate his wives, wealth and land. Further, the means of diplomatic confrontation are political expedients other than open force, which, while primarily seeking to achieve objectives without hazarding battle, nevertheless simultaneously promote military strategy.

In addition to these considerations we may also take note of the fact that several authors regard diplomatic contest (mantra yuddha) as the first stage of armed rivalry and discuss the role of upāyas under yatra (expedition), an equivalent to yana (marching of troops against the enemy), thus bringing diplomatic contest under the heading of yana, not vigraha. It is striking that Bhoja Paramāra understands the dominant feature of vigraha to be regular war.

We may observe that vigraha is a state of war, whether it is sought to be resolved or aggravated by diplomatic ways of fighting. Vigraha may also demand the employment of force, which is aprakāśa (not open or covert) during this stage of hostility. The rivals apply covert force against each other such as the execution of the enemy king and his supporters by poison, fire, assassination and incantation, and the destruction of his subjects by poisoning wells, corn, etc. before coming to grips. Vigraha, therefore, is an aggressive

1 See below pp. 433-5.
2 See below pp. 433-5.
3 RDK, XIV. pp. 125 ff; Ykt., p. 7.
4 Ykt., 56-58, p.8. Bhoja devotes three verses to describe vigraha. The first deals with the battle (yuddha), when destruction is certain whether one fights or not; the second explains the cause of vigraha, viz. excess of power; and the third warns the king against the danger of personally fighting in the battle.
5 Agni, 234.2-4; Vdh., II.146.1-5; cf. KN, XVIII.10-12. Mit. on Yd., (cont.)
war, which commences with hostile provocations, continues in diplomatic moves, and ends either in the fulfilment of the objective of the powerful rival, who initiated the hostility or in armed conflict following the formal declaration of war or the failure of the embassy. 1

H. L. Chatterjee says that to constitute vigraha 'there must be operations, i.e. hostilities or contest, there must be intention to carry on such operations or, in other words, the intention to do harm, and in fact there cannot be any offensive operation unless there is a desire backing it'. 2 However, his statement is not free from ambiguity, as is apparent if compared with the above.

The most precise interpretation is offered by Derrett who renders vigraha as 'hostility possibly leading to war'. He further writes, by way of elucidation, that 'danda means actual application of force, vigraha the breach of relations which may lead to it'. 3 However, we have to bear in mind certain features of vigraha in order to realise fully its meaning. In the first place, vigraha is created by a king who is rising in power and prosperity and has no

(cont.) I.346, cf. RDK, IX.95; cf. also RNK, p.303.
6Ibid.

1HA, IX.20-28.
disaffection in his army, with a view to subduing his enemy or settling a dispute with him by an eventual appeal to arms. In the second place, **vigraha** is the outcome of mutual hostilities. In this connection it may be remembered that a king caused offence to his powerful neighbour, especially to an aspirant to empire, by undertaking works calculated to consolidate his power and increase his defence potential. In the third place, our sources clearly distinguish between **vigraha** and **yāna** (expedition) which shows that the state of war is different from actual military operations. Moreover, once **vigraha** has been embarked upon, the king has a choice of **yāna** or **āsana** (staying quiet). **Vigraha**, which expresses a warlike situation, thus falls short of actual invasion and is, therefore, not equivalent to battle. We may sum up that by **vigraha** is meant the outbreak of hostilities, possibly leading to battle or breach of relations culminating in a formal declaration of war by the aggressive party. This is indeed the escalation of mutually offensive acts, the outcome of unyielding antagonism and an unmistakable resolve to end the conflict by an appeal to arms. Thus, **vigraha** can be rendered as 'state of war'.

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1NV, XXIX.51; Ykt., 57.p.8; HA, II.10. On Manu, VII.170; Viśvarūpa on Yajñ., I.343 (Mit., 347).
The policy of war recommended for dealing with the situations arising largely out of conflict for power among states cannot be adequately appreciated nor can the endemic warfare of early mediaeval India be explained without a knowledge of the concept of war. Echoing an early difference in the approach to war as found in the dharmasastra and the arthasastra works, our authorities also reflect a twin concept of war, which may be termed heroic and politic.

The heroic concept of war seems to be more ancient and may be traced back to the Vedic period, for the Rig Veda recognises the Aśvamedha yajña (the Horse sacrifice), which is linked with the political ideal of servabhauma or samrāj (lord of the whole earth or emperor) and his campaigns of conquest of the quarters (digvijaya) in the later literature. It is developed in the later Vedic literature especially the Brāhmaṇas and the Dharmasūtras, Saptiś, Epics, Purāṇas literary works and royal eulogies (prasāstis). It became popular in the epic traditions when the essentially religio-political ideal of cakravartin (supreme emperor, or 'one who wields overlordship over a circle of kings')

overshadowed the ancient politic-religious ideal of servabhauma.

In contrast, the politic concept of war is later and seems to have followed in historical times with the establishment of territorial monarchies and administrative institutions, which synchronised
with development of the concept of the seven-limbed state. Among the extant sources, the politic concept of war is systematically developed for the first time in the *Arthasastra*, although its several features can be traced back to the wars fought by rulers of Magadha and other kingdoms for building up an empire at least from the times of Bimbisāra and Ajātaśatru. It is further advocated by the *nītiśāra* authors like Kāmandaka, Somadeva and others and its several features are also found in the epics, *purāṇas* and *saurāṅga*-commentaries. It is no doubt inextricably connected with the ideal of overlordship, but, as we shall see, its character is political and secular rather than religio-political or politico-religious. In our sources the different strands of heroic and politic concepts of war cross each other, but can be distinguished by a comparative study of the different aspects of war and activities connected with them.

**Heroic concept of war**

With the establishment of several Aryan tribal kingdoms and the recognition of the grades of rulers such as rājan (king) and *samrāja* (emperor), war became a means to expansion and glory. A king endowed with valour and military strength fought with others as a part of his kingly obligations in the natural course of events. The need for greater social cohesion, the desirability of the political unification of the various kingdoms, Aryan and non-Aryan alike, and the spirit of domination and paramountcy gave birth to the ideal of
the sārvabhauma ('the lord of the whole earth bound by sea up to its very extremities...') and the digvijaya (conquest of the quarters of the earth). An emperor's campaigns were further magnified by linking them with the politico-religious ceremonies like the Āśvamedha (the Horse sacrifice), the Rājasūya (the ceremony of the royal consecration), the Vājapeya (the Drink of Strength), the Viśvajit (Imperial ceremony related to the conquest of the world), and the Aindrā-mahābhāṣeṣa (the great anointment ceremony of Indra, performed for a king aspiring for the overlordship of the whole earth, sārvabhauma). These ceremonies and sacrifices marked the initiation as well as the culmination of the politico-military exploits of an ambitious ruler, whom they promised power, glory, and heaven. The conquest of the whole earth for the assertion of prowess and paramountcy was enjoined. War became a great and noble sacrifice and battle itself is equivalent to the performance of the Āśvamedha. The elevation of the politico-military aspirations of an ambitious ruler to a religio-cultural plane crystallised a concept of war, which we may term heroic.

For an appreciation of the heroic concept of war we have to mention briefly the motive and nature of the conquest of a sārvabhauma, which

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1 Ait. Br., 39.1.1, (8.15.1)


3 RK, XIV. pp. 133 ff. quotes Devala, Apāstamba and others; cf. NV, XXX.94; cf. also Mit. on Yajū, I.325; Agni, 236.56; cf. KA, X.3.28 ff.
later became synonymous with the term cakravartin. It is, however, difficult to ascertain when the ideal of cakravartin (universal emperor) replaced that of the sarvabhauma, but it is certain that the former is much popularized in the Buddhist texts and perhaps was adopted by the Hindu writers later as a substitute for the sarvabhauma which was also a politico-religious concept, although not quite in the same sense as the cakravartin. It is striking that while the ideal of cakravartin is very popular in the epics, purāṇas and courtly literature including the prāṣastis (eulogies) of kings in the inscriptions, both the dharmasastra and the nītisāra works do not mention it in the discussion of mandala. Although Kauṭilya implies a knowledge of the ideal of cakravartin when he says that 'the region of the sovereign ruler (cakravartin) extends northwards between the Himayat and the sea...' and twice mentions caturanta (the king ruling up to the four quarters of the earth, i.e. the Indian sub-continent), yet the ideal for the vijigūs is said to be sarvabhauma. Even Medhātithi says that the highest success that accrues to the vijigūs is in the form of ekādhipatya (supreme sovereignty), a term which is associated with the ideal of sarvabhauma. It seems that the political

1 Amarakosa II.8.1; Abhidhanacintāmaṇi, III.355 ff.
2 KA, IX.1.18.
3 Ibid., I.6.4; VI.1.17.
4 Ibid., VI.1.18, IV, XXIX.67.
5 On Manu, VII.1.
theorists preferred the older term sarvabhauma to cakravartin not only because the later was not only associated with Buddhism, but also was more religious than political. However, the impact of the ideal of sarvabhauma or cakravartin on the concept of the vijigisu is obvious from the fact that the vijigisu is called a dharma-vijayin (righteous conqueror) in some Purāṇas as he seeks to conquer the world by good policy.¹

Notwithstanding the precise difference in the connotation of the terms sarvabhauma and cakravartin, the ideal is associated with the overlordship over all kings of the Indian subcontinent. The motive of war is not so much gain as glory and campaigns of conquest are to be characterized by righteousness. An ideal cakravartin does not desire the dethronement of the defeated kings or the annexation of their territories. He primarily seeks the acknowledgement of his superior prowess by his opponents and is satisfied with homage and tribute. Ideally he liberates the vanquished and restores them to their thrones, when they have made obeisance to him. His approach to war is heroic and he fights a righteous battle without recourse to strategem to win victory.² For it is laid down:

¹ Agni, 233.26; cf. Vāraṇ, II.145.21. Even Kauṭilya (XII.1.10-11) and Somadeva (IV, XXX.70-72) admit that a conqueror may be righteous, greedy or demoniacal, and state that the righteous conqueror is satisfied with the submission of the adversary who accepts his paramountcy.

² On Yaśā, I.324; On Manu, VII.87-90; RDK, XIV, pp. 131-32. Raghuvamśa, IV.113 - Grahita-pratimokṣasya sa dharma-vijayi nṛpah Śrīyaś mahendranāthaśa ya jaharaṇahāriḥ kṛṣṇa; cf. also Allahabad P.Ins, for Śrī Samudragupta's conquests; Girinār Ins. of Rudradāman; Vāraṇ, II.145.26; KA, XII.1.10-11, IV, XXX.70 - state that a righteous conqueror is satisfied with submission. Mbh, chs.26-32; HDS,III, p.68.
A king (cakravartin) should not attempt
to gain the earth unrighteously,
For who reveres the king
Who wins unrighteous victory?
Unrighteous victory is impermanent
and does not lead to heaven.1

Every powerful king always longed to attain the status of a cakravartin by undertaking imperial campaigns extending over a vast country bound by the Himalayas on the north, by Rama's Bridge on the south and by the ocean on the eastern and western sides. The literary accounts of wars fought according to the ideal of cakravartin depict large-scale armed tournaments and sometimes they seem almost festive occasions. The fruits of victory are tribute and homage to superior power. War becomes a noble act of bravery and sublime means for the realization of politico-religious ideals. It is no longer animated by sordid motives nor is it conducted without regard to rules of chivalry and fair play or a humane ethic of war.2 However in the ultimate analysis, even according to the heroic ideals, war remains a means of exercising and vindicating power and prowess, although its ultimate goal is righteousness and merit.

In our period almost every king of some military power aspired for the overlordship over others and many kings like the Čahamāna Pythviraja III were described as cakravartins in the dynastic chronicles and courtly literature. But cakravartin ideals had undergone serious

2See below, pp. 256-7.
devaluation as not only minor kings assumed this title but literary accounts of digvijaya were often more poetic than historical. Nevertheless, the ideal remained almost as a passion with kings and did account for many wars of aggression marked by feats of heroism in the pursuit of glory. But, as will be evident in the following pages, even the righteous victors found it difficult to live up to the traditional heroic ideals in practice.

War as a duty

While war is glorified by the ideal of cakravartin, the heroic spirit is rooted in the king's duty to fight not only in defence of his kingdom, but also to suppress his enemies by force, which may lead to aggressive wars. Manu and his commentator enjoin a king to keep his troops in readiness and to fight in the true spirit of the imperious law when challenged or provoked. 'No shirking from battle, protecting the people, and attending on the Brahmāyas' are three duties of the king which bring equal rewards. Beside being impelled by political considerations, a king can look forward to accumulating religious merit by waging aggressive wars, which enable him to distribute the wealth acquired in them among the Brahmāyas and give immunity to his subjects from harm or fear. There are profuse ex-

1 On Manu, VII.87, 32, 103; *RDK*, XIV. p.131; cf. *Mbh*, XII.138.5 ff; 90.9 ff.

2 Ibid., VII.102-103.

3 Ibid., VII.87; *RDK*, XIV.p.131.

4 Nādh. Ibid., VII.88.

5 On Yājñ, I.323.
hortations to the king to undertake defensive as well as offensive wars for the protection of a cow, a Brahmāṇa, a friend, a refugee, varnāsramadharma and religion, to free the land from the oppression of a vile king. In the event of death, a king is certain of attaining heaven, but in the case of victory he obtains fame, and material gains together with the religious merit. War is thus not only incumbent on the defendant, but also obligatory for the aggressor in the pursuit of merit.

Besides that of the king, every kṣatriya's svadharma (distinctive duty) required him to be always ready to fight, for nothing was more beneficial than to fight a just battle. Our sources echo with the glorification of kṣatrādharmā which embodied war. It was an occasion for a kṣatriya to fulfil the obligation of his class, to discharge his duty, to repay the debt of his master, to acquire earthly riches, honour, and merit and, in the event of being slain while fighting heroically, to ascend to heaven which sages obtain after hard penances. War was thus enjoined on the grounds of varnadharmā and jñanadharmā. In fact the dharmasastra authorities could not deprecate war as such because it would have been inconsistent with their advocacy of fighting as the duty of the kṣatriya class.

1 RDK, XIV pp. 133 ff. Cf. Ebh, XII.90.11 ff; 66.9.15-16; 21.18; 79.27 ff; 101.77-83.
2 Ibid.; On Yajñasūtra, I.324 especially Aparārktaka who mentions war in defence as well as offence.
3 On Manu, VII.89; On Yajñasūtra, I.324; RDK, XIV. pp. 133 ff.
4 See also RDK, intr., p.72 ff.
In addition to the ideal of cakravartin and the approach to war as duty, the _mandala_ pattern of inter-state relations also contributed to the heroic concept of war by summarizing the inter-state politics as a science of enmity, which gave some sort of inevitability to both defensive and offensive wars owing to the natural tendency of every state to pursue greater security and prosperity in inter-state sphere. As already remarked, the element of power in the concept of _mandala_ is adequately appreciated in the _arthaśāstra_ or _nītisāra_ works, which are utilized by the _smṛti_ commentators and the _Purāṇas_. But it is absent in purely _dharmaśastra_ works which indicates that the problem of _vigraha_ is approached not so much from the standpoint of power politics as from that of geo-politics.

However, according to both the heroic and politic concepts, the duty to fight in defence is greater than the obligation to subdue one's rivals in the larger interests of the state or for the vindication of one's prowess and power. The stakes in defence are vital, while the gains in offensive wars are laudable. The heroic approach to defensive war is characterized more by imperativeness and virtue than political and military expediency, which figure in the politic concept. The _dharmaśāstras_ recommend the use of means of diplomacy, conciliation, gifts or bribery, sowing dissension, and threat or application of force in order to avoid battle even in defence and to seek an honourable treaty. If, however, the aggressor cannot be dissuaded from his invasion, the defending king has to take recourse to the measures of _dvārakābhāva_ (bifurcation of troops) and
samrajya (seeking shelter), in order to avert annihilation. But if no course is honourable and expedient a reckless fight is enjoined.¹ Yaśvāvalkya does not mention retreat and flight, and Manu, while showing knowledge,² does not discuss it in the context of battle, since probably it was considered unheroic. Medhatithi, however, recommends retreat to a king who has been overwhelmed by his enemies,³ as well as to an aggressor who is faced with certain destruction.⁴ But he also reiterates that victory is possible even in a desperate battle because those fighting after having given up all hopes of life are difficult to overcome.⁵ Further, victory in either case, whether one wins battle or dies fighting, is certain, because in case of the former, he gains a kingdom, and in the case of the latter, he attains heaven. However, Medhatithi is against an aggressor fighting a reckless battle, but he concedes it to a defensive king, when taking shelter is destructive or inglorious. The Mahābhārata and Some Purāṇas regard retreat and flight as an act of wisdom and political necessity.⁶ But, by and large, retreat and flight from battle are not considered heroic, certainly with the presence of an honourable alternative.

¹Manu, VII.176 also comms.
²Ibid., VII. 106; cf. also VII.213.
³On Manu, VII.106.
⁴Ibid., VII.200.
⁵Ibid., VII.176, 200; see also MA, II.15-16.
⁶Ibid. XII.138.12; Agni, 236.34.
Kautilya is against a reckless fight 'like a moth flying into the fire',¹ but Somadeva is rather equivocal on the issue. For in the context of the policy of seeking shelter, he and Hemacandra state that a proud defender may die fighting rather than take shelter, which involves the selling of oneself, that is, abject submission and a servile status.² Hemacandra repeats the religious rewards of heaven to desperate fighters and asks why one should be afraid of death in battle for the sake of this body, which is destructible.³ Both Somadeva and Bhoja urge fighting when destruction is certain whether one fights or not,⁴ but Somadeva at the same time counsels against a suicidal battle and urges retreat.

It is clear that, by and large, our sources recommend a desperate fight when there is no honourable alternative, although Somadeva simultaneously recommends retreat in the event of a suicidal battle. The difference between the heroic and the politic concepts on the question of a desperate fight in defence is that the latter does emphasize retreat in battle and recommends the use of all means, fair and foul, to afflict the enemy, while the former takes general notice of the retreat and prohibits the use of stratagems, fire, and poison as their employment would debar their user from heaven should he die in battle.

It appears that the heroic traditions of just war and a fight

¹KA, VII.15.14 ff.
²NV, XXX.58; HA, II.15-16.
³HA, II.15.
⁴NV, XXX.12; Yt-t, 56.p.8.
to the finish, the hope that the valour of a desperate warrior or an army makes him invincible, and the faith that victory in the form of attaining heaven is certain, contributed to the desperate fight which some Rajput kings offered to the Muslim invaders. The practice of jaunara followed by fighting to the last man which characterized many a siege in mediaeval India derived its ideas and the necessary religious fortitude of those who took part from the heroic ideals of reckless fighting.

The Politic concept of war

In contrast to the heroic concept, the politic approach is based on the stark realisation of the conflict of power in inter-state relations. The problems of war and peace are approached from the standpoints of the concepts of māṇḍala, gāḍgṛṇya and uṇāves which together betray the complexities of the policy of a state pursuing security and prosperity through inter-state relations with the ultimate objective of establishing its paramountcy over others. The pragmatic thinking of the arthasastra and nītisāra writers revealed to them that neither the tribal type of war with its characteristic absence of ethical considerations, lust for booty, and the seizure of cultivated land, nor the dīvijāviny's approach to war with its predominantly politico-religious features and righteous military code could be conducive to the needs and interests of a territorial monarchy. As their approach to the state is institutional in character and is marked by an attempt to identify politics with the material
well-being of the subjects, they tend to subordinate the religious ethics to political and economic principles or sublimate them in a general philosophy of power (śakti).

While these thinkers were not averse to religion and morality, they often treat moral maxims of statecraft in a rather cavalier manner. The standards of political life are viewed as being above the social and individual morality. Acts which ordinarily provoke social condemnation are not only condoned, but also considered virtuous. By and large, they posit that expediency is the criterion of policy; power is the justification of action; material gains are the proof of righteousness, for do not dharma as well as kāma depend on artha?1

In every sphere of state activity power and success, not so much righteousness, are cherished because, as already noted, they determine the condition of state, whether advancing, stable or declining. The problem of war, therefore, is not viewed from the predominantly idealistic standpoint but is approached from the political, military and economic necessities. This is evident not only from the pragmatic approach to the inter-state relations, but also from the three kinds of war: open or righteous (prakāśa yuddha), concealed (kūta yuddha) and secret (tulpōliyuddha),2 which take into account the

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1 MV, II, 1; III, 17 - dharma kāma artha mulatvāt (MV, Delhi edition). cf. KA, I. 7, 6-7; vide.

2 Hbhr XXII, 154.6 ff; I, ch. 142.6 ff; II, 108-109; state that right leans on might and sātra dharma (i.e. duty of kings) transforms sin into righteousness and invites hypocrisy.

2 See below, pp. 260-61.
political and military factors determining the course of hostilities.

Like the advocates of the heroic concept, those of the politic concept of war also state that protection of the kingdom and subjects is the supreme duty of the ruler. But they insist that this has to be discharged primarily by increasing the economic and defence potential of the kingdom, which require peace rather than continual campaigning. However, the promotion of the material progress of the kingdom in itself constitutes a threat to weak neighbours and an offence to stronger ones. For this reason, a king has carefully to adjust his foreign policy particularly in relation to his rivals. Although the advocates of the politic concept emphasize that it is cause (kāraṇa) and interests (svārthā) that create hostile relations, yet they admit that a struggle for power is inherent in the very nature of the inter-state structure. The quest for security against external dangers necessitates war, but they advise a weak king against aggression even on the grounds of defence. It is the excess of power and prosperity and the prospect of political and material gains that justifies an expedition. It follows that while rulership carries the duty of protection which involves fighting, statesmanship demands a knowledge of relative strength and cool calculation of the consequences rather than an adherence to the imperious law of the

1. NV, VII. 21. Sa kim raja yo na raksati prajāh.
Kṣatriya order to fight heroically when challenged or provoked. War in defence is incumbent, but it is not imperative, for protection can be secured by other measures involving even complete submission. Only in a really desperate situation is war permitted.

The nitisāra authors also uphold the traditional varṇāśrama system and recognize the Kṣatriya's distinctive duty to fight, although Somadeva is conspicuous by disqualifying a Kṣatriya for appointment as a minister or counsellor owing to the Kṣatriya's aggressive nature and tendency to settle every issue by the sword since war would justify his importance for the kingdom and offer an opportunity to fulfil his ambition. But they emphasize military organization and disciplined force, which offer better defence and reduce contingencies which stimulate a more heroic and martial spirit. It is noteworthy that while Bhīṣma describes eight divisions of the army, most of our sources including the śṛṅgīs and the Purāṇas detail six kinds of troops which include even forest troops. The king enlisted the services of other sections of community for military duty, and the Kṣatriya class alone was not enough. On account of the war-mongering attitude of Kṣatriyas, Somadeva even advises their exclusion from the deliberations and decisions about state policy.1

1  RV, X.101-104.
2  RV, XII.59. 40-41; quoted in RDK, p.95, see above, pp.77.
3  RV, X.101-104.
It seems that the politic concept advocates a realistic and sober approach to war in contrast to its spirited advocacy by the exponents of the heroic concept.

The realistic approach to inter-state relations, however, does not curb the aggressive spirit of the ruler for whom the ideal of supreme suzerainty or paramountcy (sārvabhauma) is advocated by the exponents of the politic concept of war. Each king, especially the viśyajñā, is urged to maintain his initiative in inter-state relations. The mandala theory visualizes the possibility of the viśyajñā's sway eventually extending over the mandala, if he succeeds in fulfilling his ambition by a policy of self-aggrandizement. However, the ideal of the viśyajñā is secular as compared to that of the cakravartin which is religious. A king becomes viśyajñā when he is endowed with personal qualities, fortune (daiva), excellent material constituents of the state, statesmanship, and valour, and not by being born as a semi-divine figure. It is on account of his prowess, power, and good policy that he is urged to make himself the overlord of the mandala. Military and economic superriority are the prerequisites of paramountcy, and wars of aggrandizement are the result of conflict for power and supremacy rather than the outcome of politico-religious ambition. Vīgra ha, as a policy to realise the ambition of paramountcy, is viewed as an act of political necessity. Enmity and friendliness, the prevailing norms of the circle of states, impart some sort of inevitability to war. The politic approach differs from the heroic in the sense
that its basic premise is the conflict of power and the whole issue is approached from pragmatic, material, and even diplomatic standpoints. The probabilities of victory and defeat are matters of concern even for a heroic king, but a vijigatu is vexed, in addition, about the cost of war in men and material as compared with gains, which again have to be estimated with reference to time, amount, propinquity, and continuity. Further, the inter-state reactions to war have also to be anticipated and the necessary measures to avoid complications have to be undertaken. War is not viewed as a purely military affair; it becomes a political and diplomatic proposition. The diplomatic warfare forms an indispensable element in the armed conflict. In the approach to war the politic concept emphasizes expediency, profit, and political success; and it is not concerned with the acquisition of religious merit and righteousness for the king or the state except by implication for the king in person.

_Causes of vigraha_

There was no lack of causi bellorum for those intending to start vigraha. Our sources mention numerous causes of war which range from the politico-economic factors to socio-religious and even compassionate considerations. The _dharma_sāstras describe

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1. _on Hanu, V.I.199._

2. _AV, XXIX.25 ff.; cf. _KJ, X.19-26, IX.61, XVI.23; MA, IX.41 ff, 4.1ff._
various sources of *vigraha* which include among others the protection of the cow, Brahmaha, friends or allies, wealth, etc. and the acquisition of other's treasury, troops and territory and also a new ally. The *Agni Purana*, reproducing *Kamandaka*, enumerates such causes of *vigraha* as the usurpation of a kingdom, abduction of a woman, capture of a fort, seizure of territory, frontier bickerings, carrying away of men of learning or soldiers, arrogance, morbid sense of honour, extinction of erudition, devastation of property, predatory raids, decay of power, evil influence of destiny, for the aid of allies, insult, destruction of a friend or relation, want of compassion towards creatures, disaffection of the *mandala*, and common eagerness for the possession of the same object. However, the sources of hostility are reduced to five: rivalry, dispute about land and a woman, *due to (cutting) speech* and offence (*aparadha*). Someśvara III has, however, summed up the prolific sources of war under eight headings: 1) lust for woman, 2) greed for another's property, 3) territory, 4) pride and prestige, 5) *grant of asylum to the enemy's opponent*, 6) desire for helping allies, relations and servants, 7) arrogance, and 8) common eagerness for the acquisition of the same object. It is evident from these sources of war that greed is equalled by the desire to maintain prestige. The powerful motive of political rivalry for the acquisition of a common object as well as for the

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2 *Agni*, 240.16-18; *Ku*, X.2 ff.


4 *Mānas*, II., XII. 754-35
mastery over others who have become weak or are in decline is given due prominence. Further, the obligations towards allies, friends, relations and dependants also create war either for the sake of helping them against their enemies or for avenging their destruction. It is striking to note that love for a woman is considered as a cause of war, which hardly served any purpose except the gratification of a ruler's desire. Significantly the Indian kings are permitted to risk war by granting shelter or asylum to the victim of another king's wrath. In fact the texts prescribe that granting freedom from fear to any distressed person is the noble duty of a king, and several kings like Hammira of Ragathambhor suffered dire consequences for living up to this ideal. Wars fought for economic gain and even territorial annexations are numerous during our period. It appears that even those who pursued the ideal of cakravartin did not really seek empty glory, but had their eyes on enormous booty and the prospect of tribute from the vanquished kings if their campaigns were successful. The tributary arrangements, if they embodied the terms as Medhatithi has outlined, really secured for the victor immense benefits, provided he could ensure their continuance by his military superiority or by some other means. It may be conceded that the prospect of financial gain was present in most of the campaigns for conquest, although the economic motive was not the most characteristic feature of every war. Wars of our period can be said to have sprung from any one or a combination of the causes mentioned above.
Objectives of war

The objectives of both the heroic and politic war are land, wealth, and an ally. But in opposition to the latter, the former regards the gain of an ally as superior to money, which again is preferable to land. ¹ This reflects the impact of the ideal of the cakravartin and the digvijaya, which discouraged territorial annexations. Nevertheless, the smṛti commentators agree that territory is an objective of war and territorial annexations have to be given up only if the ministers and subjects of the occupied kingdom cannot be persuaded to accept the victor's rule.² The Arthaśāstra, and nītisāra works, however, distinguish three classes of conqueror, righteous, greedy and demoniacal, accordingly as they seek to exact submission and tribute, to seize the treasury, and to appropriate the kingdom, wives and sons of the adversary.³ The territorial gains are cherished provided they can be made without provoking the mandala or causing rebellion in one's own kingdom.⁴ Some territorial gains could, however, be secured by peace treaty, which enabled Somadeva to follow Kaṭṭilīya with regard to the three types of territorial acquisitions, new, formerly possessed, and inherited.⁵ The

¹ see Manus, 207; On Yajñ, I.352; NV, XXIX. 78-79; cf KA, VII.9.1; Kṣ, X.29-30. Kamandaka, however, adopts a middle position in his preferential order which is land, ally, and money.
² see Manus, 201, 212; On Yajñ, I.324; RDK, XIV. p.132.
³ NV, XXX.70-72; KA, XII.2.10-16.
⁴ Cf. KA, VII.10. 30-32.
⁵ NV, XXXX.162; cf. KA, XIII.5.1.
objectives of the political concept of war are materialistic as well as imperialistic, while those of the heroic concept are primarily imperialistic. It seems that a middle way between the conflicting priorities of the three kinds of gains was found in the system of feudatories with the result that in many cases victors in our period allowed the vanquished to retain their possessions if they accepted tributary status and observed the treaty obligations.\(^1\) This does not, however, mean that the territorial annexations were not made during our period, but the dynastic wars for supremacy are often characterized by gains of a subordinate ally and money, more than territory. The seizure of some territories and the establishment of the victor's rule over parts of the vanquished territories often followed battle when the defeated king refused to come to terms as, for example, the Paramāra king Vākpatirāja II Muñija occupied territories in southern Rājaputāna and appointed his sons Aragyarāja and Čandana and his nephew Duśala to the governorships respectively of Mount Abu, Jabālīpur (mod. Jalor in Jodhpur), and Bhīlamāla (mod. Bhīnamāla in Jodhpur) when the defeated Cāhamāna king Balirāja preferred flight to tributary status.\(^2\)

\[\text{Scope for diplomatic expedients}\]

Notwithstanding the idealization of war and the inevitability

\(^1\) Medh on \textit{Manu}, VII.202. mentions the financial and military gains as well as the acquisition of a vassal by treaty.

\(^2\) D. C. Ganguly, \textit{op. cit.}, p.52. \textit{The Age of Imperial Kanauj}, p.96.
of hostility in inter-state relations, the advocates of both the heroic and politic concepts of war urge the rivals to apply diplomatic expedients (upāyas) on the outbreak of hostilities in order to achieve their objectives without fighting a full-scale war. It is stressed that recourse to the application of force, i.e. battle, should be the last resort. The diplomacy embodied in the artful employment of means (upāyas) other than open force (danda) seeks to bring about an end to hostilities either by contriving the submission of the aggrieved on the aggressor's terms or by forestalling the invasion by forcing the aggressor to realize the futility of war. The envoys, messengers and spies are despatched to deal with the enemy in various ways.

The diplomatic contest culminates in the sending of an envoy by the aggressor to his adversary with an ultimatum to submit or fight. If the opponent persists in defiance, and the diplomatic mission fails, it is considered a valid justification to wage war. The defensive king likewise may despatch an envoy with counter-proposals to forestall the invasion of his kingdom, and if unsuccessful, he may feel justified in resorting to violence. It is indeed heroic to give a chance to the rival to come to terms, but it is difficult to ascertain what moral overtones the failure of the diplomatic mission added to a war of aggression for the demonstration of prowess and power, although it could be an argument to vindicate violence. In fact, the straightforward diplomacy of the heroic concept only offers an alternative between submission and fight. If it succeeds,
it is not because of any genuine desire to avoid violence or the
resourcefulness of diplomacy but because the aggressor is righteous
who wants only homage and tribute, and the aggrieved is weaker and
fears no significant loss. But if both the rivals are proud kings,
or one of the belligerents is unrighteous, war is unavoidable.

However, while concentrating on the realization of objectives
without battle, diplomacy does not overlook the possibility of
eventual war. Hence, during the phase of the diplomatic contest
rivals ascertain through envoys and spies their relative strength
and employ expedients to weaken each other's power by weaning away
the alienable persons and supporters as well as by creating dis­
sension among the enemy's kinsmen, ministers, warriors, feudatories,
allies and others. Efforts are also made to isolate the enemy
from the middle and neutral kings. In fact, the tasks of diplomacy
in the contest of vigraha and yana are manifold. They range from
securing the objectives of hostility without battle to manipulating
the political and military strategy for the eventual war. During
war and between its intervals the belligerents improve their re­
spective position by the separate or collective use of the upayas,
which means that diplomacy does not cease its work even in war, al­
though its role becomes secondary.

Notwithstanding the forceful advocacy that a king should fight
only when all the three expedients, viz. conciliation, gifts or
bribery, and sowing dissension have proved of no avail, the role
of diplomacy in a heroic war is limited because of its straightforward
character as regards means and manner of their application. The advocates of the heroic concept do not permit the use of secret means of violence, like assassination, poisoning, etc. nor do they allow recourse to treachery and strategems. It is true that sowing dis­
sension involves recourse to unfair means, but Manu and his commentators imply that alienation (upajāpa) in general is practised as a counter­
measure and they even show preference for conciliation and force, though admitting the utility of gifts or bribery and sowing dis­
sension.\(^1\) By and large the scope for diplomatic expedients is limited by the contents of the means and the manner of their application on the one hand and the presumption that rivals are always righteous on the other.

In contrast, the advocates of the politic concept of war describe diplomatic war (mantrayuddha or buddhiyuddha) as a necessary prelude to fighting as well as an indispensable concomitant of three kinds of war: open, concealed, and secret. They not only enjoin the use of the above mentioned four expedients and sanction the application of secret force (aprakāśadanda) involving treacherous acts of violence, poisoning, arson, assassination etc., but also add three more expedients: illusion (māyā), indifference (upekṣa) and incantation or magic (indrajala). These later upāyas seek to translate čanda (punishment) into reality by accentuating its impact with or without battle, to intensify psychological warfare by causing stupefaction

\(^1\)On Manu, VII.104, 107-109.
and panic in the enemy's camp and subjects through psychic spectres and acts of heartless cruelty, and, above all, to accelerate or impede military victory in the event of inevitable battle. They contribute more to the military strategy and tactics rather than to the political manoeuvrability, but as an adjunct of diplomacy immediately before battle, they could be employed to impress the opponent with the grim consequences of war and uncertainty of his victory. However, indifference (upeka) is itself a means of diplomacy of war which may bring hostilities to a standstill and offer a chance of reconciliation. Further, these expedients are used to cause damage to the enemy's war potential with a view to backing the threat of force and bring sufficient pressure on him to compromise.

A defensive king is advised to wage diplomatic warfare before the aggression and continue to do so even after the commencement of aggression. Kautilya has detailed the various activities connected with diplomatic warfare, which involve various kinds of treachery, stratagem and secret violence, but these details are largely omitted in our sources in the interest of public morality. In fact, with a variety of weapons ranging from simple conciliation to murderous spells, diplomacy becomes resourceful enough to deal with enemies of different character, both righteous and demoniacal, in diverse circumstances. Secret (tāmā) war is largely waged with these weapons of diplomacy and normally excludes the military engagements. Thus the scope of diplomacy is widened to include all sorts of enemics and to deal with diverse circumstances in hostile
relations. Diplomacy is largely freed from righteous inhibitions and brought closer to the realities of inter-state politics.

The military code

While justifying violence, the advocates of the heroic concept of war insist upon the strict observance of war ethics on the battlefield. They approve only of open war (prakāśa yuddha) or righteous battle (dharma yuddha). It is laid down that one must fight according to the just principles of war, not with feelings of wrath and murderous intention. Although earlier sources speak of the use of poison and stratagem to overpower enemies, this is outlawed by later dharmasāstras. Manu and his commentator prohibit warriors from striking with concealed weapons and arrows that are poisoned, barbed or with flaming shafts. Kedhatithi even asks a king fighting a desperate battle to eschew all treacherous ways of fighting; so also all such operations as would bring about either the utter annihilation of the enemy or too much harassment.

1 Cf. Mbh, XII.96.11.
2 R.V., VI.75.15; cf. also A.V., IV.6.7.8; Yaj., I.324 also comm., cf. Mbh, XII.96.11 - only unrighteous warriors fight with poisoned arrows or dangerous projectiles. ḪA, II.59.60; ḪK, XIII.7.22 forbids the use of fire if fighting is possible.
3 On Manu, VII.90.
4 Ibid., VII.200.
Yājñavalkya and his commentators restrict entry to heaven only to those who fight according to the chivalrous code of war and without using treacherous ways, traps, weapons dipped in poison in both offensive and defensive war.\(^1\) Even the advocates of the politic concept of war forbid the excessive harassment or torture of a broken enemy\(^2\), although not so much owing to any religious or moral scruples but rather because the vehemence of one returning to fight despairing of life becomes irresistible,\(^3\) and Kautilya adds, 'he becomes the object of favour of the circle of kings'.\(^4\) These rules of chivalry reflect the approach to battle and discourage excess of violence in war. It is said that these principles anticipate certain provisions as the Fourth Hague Convention (Art. 33),\(^5\) but in an entirely different way, rather they remind one of mediaeval codes of chivalrous spirit.

The heroic traditions of combat required fighting with those equal in rank, armament, and strength; elephants were to oppose elephants, and so chariots, cavalry and infantry their respective counterparts.\(^6\) A warrior was ideally to fight with only one person at a time;

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\(^1\) Yājñ, I.324 and comms; also Manu, VII.98.

\(^2\) NY, XXI.66. Nātibharmanā pīdayet.

\(^3\) Ibid., 63; Ka, VII.3.11; X.3.56-57; also Medh. on Manu, VII.200 quotes Vyasa who gives this reason in order to discourage torturing of an enemy.

\(^4\) Ka, VII.3.12.

\(^5\) H. L. Chatterjee, op. cit., p.114.

\(^6\) Agni, 236.57, Medh. on Manu, VII.91-92; Kit. on Yājñ, I.326; cf. Bdh, VI.1.27, 23, XII.96, 7-16; 97.7; 236.5.
one unable to fight was left out; an attack at army strength was to be opposed by an army; and when challenged the fate of battle could be decided by a duel between the rival kings. These provisions visualize war as in the nature of a duel on a large scale. It is, however, difficult to imagine how all these rules could be strictly observed in the mêlée of a raging battle.

The chivalrous and righteous military code prescribed that 'a warrior shall not fight with those in fear, intoxicated, insane, or out of their minds, those who have lost their armour, nor with women, infants, old people and Brāhmaṇas.' He is further forbidden to strike at spectators, eunuchs, messengers, attendants, non-combatants, and an envoy or a Brāhmaṇa come for truce. As regards opponents Gautama, quoted by Lakṣaṇadāra, lays down that 'no sin is incurred in slaying foes in battle excepting those who have lost their horses, chariots, arms, those who join their hands in supplication, those who flee with flying hair, those who sit down with averted face, those who have climbed in flight on eminences or trees, messengers, and those who declare themselves to be cows or Brāhmaṇas.' A warrior is further prohibited to kill one who is

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2 Baudhāyana, 1.18.11 quoted in RDK, XIV. p.131.

3 On Manu, VII.91-92; On Yajñ, I.326. Agni, 236.58.

4 Gautama, 10.16,17 quoted in RDK, XIV. p.131 and also in Mit, I.326.
asleep, unprepared, not fighting or fighting with another, drinking water or eating, taking off his shoes or departing, dying or fatally wounded, one who is frightened or has turned back. These rules are repeated in our sources and Medhatithi declares that 'these are positive rules to be observed'. Manu and his commentators emphatically enjoin a Kṣatriya never to deviate from them. The battle is considered a sacrifice (yajñā); it should be performed righteously. There is firm faith in the victory of the just.

Even the advocates of the politic concept of war recognize these rules of fair fighting. Kauṭilya enjoins the soldier to grant quarter to those fallen down, those turning back, those surrendering, those with loose hair, those without weapons or with broken weapons, those disfigured by terror and those not fighting. Somadeva equates the slaughter of such soldiers with the murder of a Brāhmaṇa.

The Hindu kings and warriors generally tried to live up to these ideals, although deviations from them occurred in times of
distress because of the impracticability of rules or through human weakness. The many rules governing the treatment of soldiers in distress seem to have been normally adhered to. The principle of not fighting with an enemy or his troops flying from the battle may be exemplified by Pythvîrâja III's action of not pursuing the retreating hordes of the wounded Mohammad Ghorî in 1192. A. L. Basham rightly observes, 'It is doubtful if any other ancient civilization set such humane ideals of warfare'.

Once it was conceded that war is justifiable and righteous, it became obligatory for the combatants to fight to the finish. The zealous exertion of warriors participating in war was needed for victory. Martial spirit must be roused; doubts reassured; and assurances of advantages accruing through war, both earthly and heavenly, must be held out to the fighters. All our sources promise heaven to those killed in fighting and to those living after victory, pleasing experience of life. Devalswârtî, quoted by Lakshmîdhara, says that a Ksatriya who dies fighting wins the same fruit which one obtains through the performance of the horse sacrifice (Aśvameâcha) and goes to the heaven of Indra. 'The Ksatriya killed in the defence of the property of a brahmâpa is the spirit of sacrifice incarnate.' There is no other way of repaying the master's wages than dying for him in battle. Soldiers dying in battle do not stand in need of the usual obsequies, nor do they communicate any impurity

\[\text{Citr., p.126.}\]
\[\text{RDK, xiv. p.133.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., xiv. pp.133-34.}\]
to their relations by their death. These religious rewards, which accrue to saints by hard penances, besides mundane allurements of honour, fame, booty and the rest, instilled in warriors a sense of dedication to fighting and made war an overpowering passion with them.

In contrast the greatest ignominy and sin befalls a warrior who is either unwilling to fight or deserts his master in battle or flees from the combat. If he escapes alive, he suffers the agony of humiliation and popular reproach, which is worse than death, and if he is slain while flying from battle, he takes upon himself the sins of his master, who conversely appropriates all his accumulated merit.\(^1\) Vyāsa proclaims that there is no greater sin for a Kṣatriya than fleeing from battle,\(^2\) and Parāśara equates every step taken by such a deserter as equal in sin to brāhmaṇicide.\(^3\) Even the advocates of the politic concept of war emphasize the heavenly rewards to soldiers killed in battle and fear of the punishment of hell and loss of earthly well-being to the deserters.\(^4\) Somadeva says that the march of a soldier to the battle is equivalent in merit to the horse sacrifice (Aśvamedha) and a soldier deserting his master on the battlefield destroys his well-being both here and hereafter by his act.\(^5\) These religious fears as well as the prospect of

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\(^1\) Kedh. on \textit{Manu}, VII.94.

\(^2\) \textit{RDK}, XIV, p.134.

\(^3\) Ibid., XIV, p.135. Lakṣṇidhara also quotes \textit{Yama}, ibid., pp. 130-31; \textit{Āmi}, 236-55.

\(^4\) Cf. \textit{Ka}, X.3.43.

\(^5\) \textit{Ka}, X.94-95. cf. \textit{Hbb}, XII.93.21-23 prescribes mundane punishment for (cont.)
humiliations by and large goaded a warrior to fight to the finish. However, there are references in inscriptions, literary works and Muslim accounts to soldiers fleeing from the battlefield. But it may be pointed out that the king in distress could always order a retreat of troops which may create situations of flight. The death or capture of the king in the battlefield caused confusion and panic and often put soldiers to flight. These are, however, contingencies of war and it cannot be conclusively shown that all wars were righteous or that soldiers could never succumb to mortal fears.

Military code

In contrast to the dharmashāstra authorities who normally condemn kūṭayuddha (concealed warfare), the advocates of politic concept allow prakāśa-yuddha (open war) only when the invader is superior in troops and has the advantages of time, place and season together with success in secret instigation and division in the enemy's camp as well as his kingdom.¹ They recognise three kinds of war: prakāśa-yuddha, kūṭa-yuddha, and tūgāṁ yuddha (silent warfare). Prakāśa-yuddha is fighting at an indicated place and time and indeed a righteous war. Kūṭa-yuddha is fighting with a feint.² It includes creating fright, sudden assault, striking when there is operational

(cont.) the deserter, who could be stoned to death or burnt to death.

¹Arul, 242.12-13; cf. KN, XIX.54; cf. KA, X.31-2.
²IV, XXX.90-91; cf. KA, VII.6.40-41.
³IV, XXX.90.
error or calamity in rival troops, giving way in one place in
order to strike hard at another, ambushes, night attack, killing enemy
troops while asleep or fatigued and resting, and employing all kinds
of stratagems, traps and strategic and tactical bluffs to annihilate
the enemy.¹ Tugjun-yuddha is that which involves secret practices
like poisoning, instigations through secret agents and incantations
contriving the destruction of the rival.²

Somadeva, who begins his discussion on war by first taking into
account the condition of a defensive king, describes in general the
diplomatic war without Kautilyan details; discusses open war without
saying so, and, finally, notes the concealed and secret kinds of war
without dilating upon the manner of their prosecution. War may pass
through all these stages and the question as to its ethics has, therefore,
to be determined in relation to the particular type of war.

We have already noted that the advocates of the politic concept
of war are substantially in agreement with those of the heroic concept
as regards the righteous or open war, although it is not clear whether
all of them prohibit the use of treacherous means and contrivances or
weapons of large scale destruction altogether.³ It is, however, clear

¹HV, XXX.90; Agni, 236, 58-61, 242.13-23; Cf. KN, XIX. 55-67; KA:
X.3.2-25. Ibid., X.6.48-50.
²Ibid., 91; Cf. KA, VII.6.41, XII.2-5.
³KA, II. 59-60 forbids the means and methods of kuta-yuddha, fire,
poisonous arrows, etc. and enjoins the conduct of battle according to
rules of propriety (niti yuddha), but it also adds that if the enemy
follows unjust ways of doing harm the king may take recourse to
whatever is expedient.
that they also consider a battle as a sacrifice;¹ uphold that a soldier killed in battle attains heaven and one who deserts destroys his welfare here as well as in the next world.² But in encouraging troops, the promise of material rewards accordingly as soldiers kill the enemy king, crown prince, commander by their individual feats and cause significant damage to the opposing troops are equally emphasized.³ The promise of double pay and whatever one seizes as booty is made.⁴ So the prospect of material gains animates warriors together with the assurance of heaven in the event of death.

As regards the humane ethic of war, that is, the positive rules of not killing opponents in fright and various kinds of distressing situations, and non-combatants, this is to be observed in any kind of fighting,⁵ although the observance would be difficult in concealed warfare.

However there was not much scope for rules of fair fighting in Kūta-yuddha and tuskīm-yuddha. In fact, stratagem, strategic bluffs and tactical deception are planned in these types of warfare.

¹Nū, XXX.94; KA, X.3.26 ff.
²Ibid., 95; Ibid.
³Agni, 242.34 ff; cf. Kī, XX.6-21; Kānas, II. XX.1163-67; KA, X.3.45; cf. also Medh on Manu, VII.194, emphasizes the gain of wealth, the promotion of the happiness of one's dependents, and the acquisition of heaven and repayment of the debt owing to employer as incentives to soldier to fight to the finish.
⁴KA, X.3.45; Kī, XX.2; same as Manu, VII.96.
⁵See above, p.257. Kautilya's enumeration of these rules in the context of the capture of fort is significant.
The use of poison, fire, secret murder, incantation, nocturnal attacks, brutal killing of rival troops caught in any operational quandary etc. constitute the effective means of contriving the enemy's discomfiture. Ingenious victory and not a fair combat is the goal, which indeed negates the presence of any chivalrous code of war. The political authors do not condemn these wars nor do they advocate any restraint on treachery; instead Kāmanda rules that 'a king should always slay his foes by concealed war. The slaughter of foe by deceitful measures is not detrimental to righteousness. The son of Droga (Āvatthāman, the Mahābhārata warrior) with his sharp weapons slew the Pāṇḍavas (sons of Druṣpac) when they were unsuspectingly locked in the arms of sleep at night'.

However the Agni Purāṇa restricts the Kūṭa-yuddha to distressing conditions.

Devastation of the enemy's kingdom and the oppression of his subjects

Since the devastation of the enemy kingdom especially territories through which the invading army marched and the places of resistance such as forts was inevitable as well as an act of military necessity, the advocates of both the heroic and politic concepts of war countenance it. The cutting of forests, the dislocation of inhabitants of the places through which the army passed, the

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1 KN, XIX. 71.
2 Agni, 236.59.
seizure and destruction of the enemy's crops standing in the fields were normal activities during a campaign.\(^1\) Manu and his commentator permit an invader who has besieged his enemy in the fort to harass the inhabitants of the territory outside the fort by kidnapping them and persecuting them in various ways, to vitiate enemy's supply of food, fodder, fuel, and water, to destroy tanks, ditches, water reservoirs and embankments, ramparts, to assail the enemy in the fort and its breaches, and even to frighten the besieged at night by means of men holding jars of flaming fire and crying like jackals in order to cause fatigue by keeping them awake so that the garrison may be easily reduced.\(^2\) Kaumilya also details similar ravages during warfare for capturing a fort. The defensive king, according to early authorities, may also resort to something like 'the scorched earth policy' in order to prevent the invader from living off the country and from finding a place to entrench himself against the harassing tactics of the defenders.\(^3\)

But no wanton destruction of the life and property of the enemy kingdom on a large scale is encouraged. Medhatithi says that 'when a king is attacking another kingdom he does not destroy the inhabitants of that realm if it is at all possible to save them'.\(^4\) Katyayana

\(^1\) Medh on \textit{Kanu}, VII.102.


\(^3\) \textit{Mbh}, XII.69.33- 40; \textit{Ka}, XII.5.9.12 ff.

\(^4\) On \textit{Kanu}, VII.32.
also forbids the destruction of the territory and people of even a wicked enemy on the ground that the subjects did not consent to his taking to an unjust course that precipitated war.\(^1\) Even Kaṭṭilāya restrains a king engaged in the conquest from ravaging the countryside and exterminating the people, and from the wholesale destruction of the life and property inside enemy forts, because the conquest would be fruitless at the end.\(^2\)

However, according to the advocates of the political concept of war, the devastation of the enemy kingdom may even precede actual invasion. Vigraha may lead to the application of secret danda comprising the destruction of enemy property, burning of crops and villages, poisoning of wells etc.,\(^3\) which equally hit the hostile king and his subjects. During the phase of diplomatic warfare, rivals indulged in damaging each other's defence potentials and creating disorder which affected the subjects as well. Further, even the application of open force, according to Someśvara III, is of twelve types which include the devastation of country (desanāsa), mutilation of hostile people (janaigaccheda), burning and sacking of towns, depriving the enemy of his entire possessions etc.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) *RDk*, XIV, p.139 quotes Kaṭyāyan (Kane, v.21) - Duṣṭasyāpi narendrasya tad rastra na vinasayet // Na prejanumato yasmāṇyayesu pravartate\n
\(^2\) *Ka*, XIII. 4.; 2-5, 22-24.

\(^3\) *Agni*, 234.3; cf. Vāh, II. 146.4-5.

\(^4\) *Manas*, II. 20.1035 ff, see below pp. 469-13
which amply bear out that the people were oppressed and their sufferings were great. The dynastic chronicles and inscriptions record the burning of villages, sack of cities, and devastation of the country by invaders.¹ It seems that devastations of the enemy country and deprivations of people were greater in a war of attrition or revenge or when an aggressor had to make a quick job of his expedition owing to an invasion into his own kingdom or some internal troubles. As for example Prthvirāja III's devastation of the Candella territories might have been caused by his anxiety to hurry home where meanwhile Bhīma II had made an invasion.² Further, invaders sometimes caused havoc in order to create panic in the subjects of a stubborn enemy, and thus undermine his resistance or even force him to sue for peace. The destruction of the life and property was somewhat greater in the concealed and secret kinds of warfare than in righteous war. Whatever the contingencies and consideration it cannot be denied that the invading hordes devastated the country under their feet

¹Somesāvara's Lāñkaśāstra, IV.42-53 for an account of the Yaḍava invasion into Gujārāt. He narrates, 'The enemy burnt villages on their way and the volume of smoke that rose up in the air showed the position of their camp to the terrified people and enabled them to direct their moves accordingly. The Yaḍavas overran the country about Bāgukaccha while the plentiful crops were still standing in the fields.'

²Archaeological Survey of India Report, X.p.598, XXII. pp. 137 ff. See also D. Sharma, op.cit., p.75.
and sometimes even did not spare places of public worship from
the cataclysm of war. Nevertheless, while engaged in the conquest, an invader normally restricted his depredations to the places of resistance and avoided a wholesale destruction of the enemy kingdom because it was neither righteous nor politic.

On storming the enemy capital the victor might seize the enjoyable commodities and indulge in such acts of destruction as were imperative to break the back of the enemy's resistance. But once he has occupied a territory, the violence and destruction must cease, although those who persisted in offering resistance could be persecuted and punished. But, in general, the people were granted safety, their property was left unmolested, and the places of public worship were protected.

Booty

It is contrary to the heroic ideals of war to sack a town or indulge in systematic plunder and looting of the property of the subjects of the enemy. Booty, by and large, consists of what is acquired in the battlefield or in storming a fort or capital, and it does not include loot. Gautama, quoted by Laksmania, lays down that 'the victor should receive the booty gained in battle'.

1. *Sukrataśrī Kalolbini*, v.175; *Sukratiśanārtana*, XI.v.33; see also A. K. Majumdar, *op.cit.*, pp. 147 ff.

2 *Agni*, 236. 22 ff; see below pp.171 ff. settlement of the conquered kingdom.

3 *DK*, XIV. p.137.
The Ādiṣṭana Purāṇa also states that 'having satisfied the king and having won booty from Kṣatriyas killed in battle, if a soldier does not take to himself any of the booty, he goes to heaven. If a king having overrun a kingdom but desisting from taking any booty therefrom, happens to be killed, he goes to heaven.' However, huge booty consisting of elephants, horses, wealth, cattle, grain, various rich articles and even women is mentioned as being seized during the course of a campaign of conquest.

Regarding rules of apportionment of booty, Manu says, 'chariots and horses, elephants, umbrellas, wealth, grains, animals, women, all goods and baser metals belong to him who wins them.' Kedhātithi comments, 'The king being the master of all he might take away all the spoils of war; hence the text mentions a few exceptions.' But he goes further by ruling that 'gold, silver, lands, buildings and so forth accrue to the king ... arms and conveyances also accrue to the king .... It is in view of all this that there is the popular saying "Half belongs to the king." Further, the Vedic tradition upheld by the dharmaśāstras and also quoted by Kedhātithi required that notwithstanding this rule every soldier should voluntarily present to the king the choice portion from the booty individually seized by him in war. Kedhātithi thus

1. RDK, XIV. p.136.
2 Manu, VII. 96; also comms.; RDK, XIV. 137.
3 On Manu, VII. 96.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, VII, 97; RDK, XIV. p 137.
not only asserts the royal right to the spoils of war but also urges that soldiers have an obligation to share their booty with their king. The Agni Purana, however, clearly recognises the royal right to the spoils of war by ruling that 'gems and wealth acquired in war conducted even by ministers of a king should be held as belonging to the sovereign by the right of conquest.' \(^1\) The rules regarding the apportionment of the booty were nevertheless flexible. Lakshmidhara who quotes Manu with approval also cites Gautama who held that the booty (saṁgrāmikam vīttam) belongs to the captor, but the conveyances (vāhana) (which should include the elephants, chariots and horses etc.) go to the king even though they have been won by soldiers in single combat. \(^2\) It may be mentioned that Medhatithi also says that conveyances accrue to the king but he does not elaborate it because if it included the chariots etc. it would be against the provisions of Manu. However, it seems that rules regarding the conveyances were uncertain. Booty won by the king or his troops collectively is to be apportioned by the king among his supporters and servants 'in accordance with the maxim of bestowing on worthy recipients'. \(^3\)

It is clear that with certain exceptions the royal right to the spoils of war is recognised. But H. L. Chatterjee is wrong

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\(^1\) *Śrīd.,* 236.65.

\(^2\) *ṚDK,* XIV. pp. 157-38.

\(^3\) *Ibid.*; *Kedh. on Manu,* VII.67.
when he asserts that the booty seized in war first went over
to the king, who later distributed the same among his soldiers
simply remembering that an article seized by a soldier would
have to be made over to him.\(^1\) What Kanu lays down is that
the various articles mentioned above belonged to the individual
captor, who, according to the Vedic tradition or convention, was
required to present to the king the best object from his booty.
The royal right over the immovable property seized as booty was,
however, undisputed as also over those movable objects not men-
tioned by our authorities.

The advocates of the politic concept of war, however, do not
place any restriction on the objects which could be seized as
booty, and seem to have followed the rules of the *smritis* regarding
the apportionment. Kautilya mentions in connection with the re-
wards promised to soldiers on the eve of battle that the soldiers
are to be encouraged by promising them the right to retain what-
ever they seize in battle.\(^2\) Kāmandaka also says that the con-
vveyances, gold and base metal or minor objects of utility will
belong to one who seizes them in battle.\(^3\)

**Settlement of the conquered kingdom**

Violence and harassment ceased with the occupation of the
enemy kingdom and the conqueror proceeded to pacify its inhabitants

\(^1\) *Cf. cit.*, p. 96.
\(^2\) *Ka*, xx.3.45.
\(^3\) *Ka*, xx.21.
by various measures. The dharmaśastras emphatically stated that 'the very duty which exists for a sovereign for the protection of his own country, that very one in entirety he incurs, when he brings under his sway his enemy's kingdom'. The conqueror was to proclaim a general amnesty to the people forgiving them for what they had done by virtue of their loyalty to their former master and assuring them of their freedom to take to their normal callings, to worship the gods and the righteous Brāhmaṇas, to give gifts to his people, to grant remissions of the burdensome taxes to the householder for a year or two in order to enable them to provide for their livelihood and to bear the sufferings of war and to recuperate. He was further to observe, maintain and affirm the laws, customs, family usages obtaining in the country before his conquest unless otherwise repugnant to the śāstras or contrary to dharma (law), and to confirm customs relating to the property of Brāhmaṇas or temples and to the duties of the people as also those relating to the status and economic position of the leading men. These measures were undertaken in order to ingratiate the conqueror to the vanquished people with

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1 *Hit. on Yajña, I.343.*

2 *Yajña, I.342,* also comms.

3 *Kedh. on Manu, VII.201, Agni, 236.22-23. RDK, XIV. pp. 137-38.

4 Vis. and *Hit. on Yajña, I.343; Kedh on Manu, VII.203; RDK, XIV, pp. 138-39; Agni, 236.22.*

5 Kedh. on Manu, VII.203.
a view to establishing his rule.¹ Kautilya also details these measures for the pacification of the occupied kingdom and the establishment of the conqueror's government.² It is striking to note that notwithstanding the ideal objective of viṣṇaḥa which according to the dharmaśastras is the acquisition of an ally, the smṛti commentators enjoin the victor to first endeavour to establish his rule. In this regard the commentators on Yājñavalkya are more consistent as they maintain that the objective of an expedition is the annexation of the enemy's kingdom³ and they, therefore, recommend how the conqueror has to accomplish this after victory in the battlefield.

However Medhātithi observes, 'if even after bestowing of such favours [i.e. as mentioned above] he finds that the citizens and people are so loyal to their former master that they still cherish feelings of attachment towards his dynasty, and that any government of his own would not be lasting' then after ascertaining the wishes of the citizens and people the victor is to instal a scion of the fallen enemy on the latter's throne and conclude a treaty with him.⁴ The terms of the treaty are: 'You and I shall have

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¹ RDK, XIV. p.138. Lakṣmiṇidhara says that remission of portion of taxes is advised for favouring the people (janaṇuvaṛgaraḥ) and creating attachment for oneself; also Hedh. on Kanu, VII. 201-203.
² la, XIII. 5. 3ff.
³ Hit. on Yajñ., I.348 '... paramāstratāmasatkaṃ un vrajet; see also on Yajñ., I.324.
⁴ Hedh. on Kanu, VII.202; lA, II.57-58.
equal shares in your income, you shall consult me in all that you do or do not do, at the proper time you shall come and help me with your treasury and force and so forth'. The terms are indeed stringent; and they institute vassalage. Having made the political settlement with the new king promising obedience and loyalty, the victor would honour him with presents of weapons, money, grains, ornaments, conveyances, umbrellas, throne, crown and so forth and confirm the religious grants and usages relating to the family status and economic stakes of the leading men in order to create attachment among them for himself.\(^1\)

But the general tone of Manu seems to favour the installation of a scion of the fallen king, conclusion of a treaty with him, and finally, evacuation of the enemy kingdom even though it may be very safe and conducive to the victor's prosperity. Lakṣmisṛdhara, who quotes Manu and Yājñāvalkya,\(^3\) also cites the Viṣṇu to the effect that the victor should set up a member of the fallen king's family and after having made a settlement with him, return to his own kingdom.\(^4\) Manu and Viṣṇu and also the Agni Purāṇa cherish the heroic ideal of war according to which the conqueror is to seek gratification in glory and in acquiring a tributary ally.

\(^1\) Medh. on Manu, VII.202; Ṛg, II.57-63.
\(^2\) Medh. on Manu, VII.203; Ṛg, II.68.
\(^3\) Dhār, XIV. pp. 137-39.
\(^4\) Ibid., p.138.
But, as already observed, Kedhatithi ascribes the creation of a vassal to a conqueror's inability to establish his rule on lasting ground owing to the loyalty of the people to their former master. Even regarding the evacuation of the enemy kingdom so forcefully enjoined in the text, Kedhatithi observes 'he shall not evacuate in a hurry the territory occupied by him; he should give up only that territory with regard to which he feels that if he continued to stay the people of the land will try to recover it from him. So as soon as he finds that evacuation would not mean any financial or strategic harm to himself and his allies, he shall give up the territory even though it possess all the qualities...' viz. it is safe, fertile and conducive to the increase of cattle. It is obvious that Kedhatithi would prefer the creation of a vassal to the victor's unstable rule and concede evacuation only when it is not financially and strategically harmful. He is in fact reconciling the traditional objectives of the righteous conquest with the political practice of his age which favoured the creation of vassals or feudatories. Kedhatithi is also closer to the political concept which favours annexation if it does not involve loss and create enmity with another king.

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1 Cn Lam, VII.212.
2 Ibid.
3 Cf. KII, VIII.67.
It appears that the traditional settlement of the conquered kingdom required the victor first to pacify the ministers, relations and subjects of the defeated king. Then he should reinstate the vanquished or install a scion of his family and conclude a treaty providing for the tributary obligations, after which the victor was to evacuate the enemy territory. This is in accordance with the ideal of a righteous conqueror even according to Kautilya, Kamandaka and others who recommend similar settlement.\textsuperscript{1} Hemacandra also favours such a settlement.\textsuperscript{2} Somadeva is not very clear, although from his statements that the victor should do good to the enemy king captured in war and liberate him,\textsuperscript{3} that after reducing the enemy the conqueror should win over his kinsmen by granting them lands, and in the alternative,\textsuperscript{4} i.e. if they persist in hostility, afflict them, and that the territorial gains are of three kinds: new, formerly possessed, and inherited,\textsuperscript{5} it may be inferred that he also preferred annexation as well as reducing the enemy kingdom to vassalage. Thus the settlement of the conquered kingdom may mean either the establishment of the victor's rule or creation of vassalage. The latter arrangement was more

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. KA, VII.16.26-28, 30-32; KV, VIII. 67.
\textsuperscript{2} II, 66-68.
\textsuperscript{3} KV, XXI.76.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid., XXI.83.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid., XXIX.102.
popular during our period as is known from the dynastic records and is also testified by the Arab merchant Suleiman. Annexations also took place but the practice of reducing the defeated kingdom to tributary status was preferable as it was apparently in keeping with the heroic traditions of conquest and it ensured the political, military and financial gains to the victor as well, without involving administrative responsibilities and creating permanent bitterness with the enemy house and his loyal subjects.

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1 Elliot and Dowson, *History of India, as told by its own historians*, vol. 1, p.7.
Chapter VI

SADGUNYA: C. YANA
(Expedition or Marching)

When vigraha (war) has been declared, yana (expedition or marching) naturally follows in the normal course of events. Several authors of our period have dealt with yana under the term yatra (expedition),\(^1\) which means a 'journey' in its ordinary use. But, as an equivalent of yana, it is concerned with the details of military marching and is a synonym for yana in the context of the sadgunya. Aparaśka says: 'Marching is expedition';\(^2\) the author of the Agni Purāṇa tells us that yatra means the marching of a king desirous of victory against his adversary.\(^3\)

It appears, however, from the Yuktikalpataru that our authors' preference for the term yatra against yana is due to the latter's association with a conveyance in popular usage. In fact, Bhoja himself details various kinds of conveyances such as elephants, horses, palanquins, boats and aerial cars under yana\(^4\) and treats it as an instrument of the sixfold policy under yatra.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Ykt., p.7; RDK, XIV.p.145 ff. Lekeśīdhara, however, deals with yana as an instrument of the sixfold policy in the previous chapter, 'Sadgunya' (RDK, XIII.pp.111-13). Cf. Mbh., XII.69.67.

\(^2\) On Yaj., 345 (347) - Yānaḥ yatraḥ; cf. Manu, VII.182 - Mārgasirṣa śūbe māsi yayād yatram māhipatik.

\(^3\) Agni, 234.18 - Jīgasāḥ śatruviṣaye yānaḥ yatraḥ abhidhiyate.


\(^5\) Ibid., 51 ff. p.7,
Hedhatithi defines yana as going forward with a single purpose, and other commentators on Manu explain that 'a march against the enemy is yana'. Somadeva says, 'Rise of power and prosperity is marching'. It is evident that he describes the condition of power in which the policy of yana is appropriate. But the commentator of the Nitiivalyvars interprets it as marching of a king against his foe for the rise of his powers. Commenting on Yajñavalkya, Visvarūpa states that 'marching against an enemy on account of the excessive augmentation of powers is yana'. Vijñānāsvara simply remarks that 'yana means march against an enemy'.

It is evident from the above that by yana was meant actual march of troops against an enemy for battle. It is further obvious that yana was generally construed as an aggressive expedition, because Visvarūpa and Somadeva clearly state that the cause of the expedition is the excess of a king's power in contrast to his enemy and the motive is ambition and greed to attain further rise of power, prosperity and political ascendancy through

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1 On Manu, VII.160 - Ekantat-samanam yanam.
2 Ibid., Kulluka, Yanam strum prati gamanam.
3 MV, XXIX.45 - Abhyudayo yanam; cf. KA, VII.1.9.
4 Ibid.
5 On Yajñ., 343 - Abhyuccayatireke ripu prati gamanam yanam.
6 Ibid., 347 - Yanam paramapratyatra.
military victory. According to Vijñāneśvara the object of यानं is the annexation of enemy's territory.¹

Factors and circumstances connected with यानं.

Recourse to the policy of यानं is beset with many serious political and military complications and fraught with internal as well as external risks. It demands a correct estimate of the relative strength of the adversary and his allies, an appraisal of the chances of success in view of the material condition of the enemy's kingdom and his subjects, a knowledge of the diplomatic moves of the enemy especially his secret approaches to the middle and neutral kings;² and, finally, the assessment of the measure of precautions and preparations required to stave off any internal trouble and a threat from the enemy in the rear. The conditions for an actual expedition are different from those of the outbreak of hostilities (विग्रहा).

The predominant factor which prompts the marching of a king against his enemy is the excess of his power in comparison with the weakness of the rival. Our authorities unanimously declare that 'when a king thinks that his army is happy and strong in condition' or 'abounds in high spirited and mighty warriors and various kinds of draught animals', 'and that of the enemy is in the reverse', 'then

¹Mit. on याज्ञि, I.348. Tadā para-raśtram atmaśat kartuṁ vrajet.
²Medh. on मनु, VII.184, 197.
shall he march against the enemy. We have already noticed that the policy of vigraha is vouchsafed by the advancement (vrddhi) of powers and the zealous loyalty of the allies. But since the army accomplished the objective of the expedition its superiority has overriding priority when actual operations of war become imminent. Some Puranas also attribute yana primarily to the plethora of one's military strength, the loyalty of warriors and servants, capability to protect his capital from the enemy in the rear and to crush internal troubles during his absence on expedition.

Somadeva and Bhoja lay down that 'when possessed of a preponderance of the excellent qualities (of constituents) a king should march against his enemy provided there is no thorn (i.e. trouble or rebellion) in his kingdom and no disturbance in the rear.' It is evident that Somadeva, who regards a contented and high-spirited army together with the rising strength in general as a necessary condition of vigraha, emphasizes all-round superiority of power and prosperity as an essential pre-requisite of yana.

However, a mere preponderance of the excellent qualities is not enough. The aggressive king must have fully consolidated his power

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1. Manu, VIII.171; also comm. on Yajñ., I, 348; H.A., II.11.
2. Agni, 228, 2ff; Matsya, 240.3 ff quoted in RDH, XIV.115-16.
3. NV, XXIX.53 - Guṇatiśayyuktō yāyādyādī na santi rastra-kāntaka madhyē na bhavati pascat krodhaḥ; "ṣMad., 51.8.7.
4. NV, XXIX.51; cf. KA, VII.1.14,33.
in his own kingdom by destroying internal thorns and eradicating internecine feuds. For an expedition may turn into a fiasco if internal troubles break out while the king is away in the enemy kingdom. The chances of internal uprisings on such occasions were greater during our period because feudatories were always anxious to exploit situations created by the absence of the king on expedition in a distant country, especially when he met with failure or waged a protracted war.

Somadeva strongly counsels against an invasion of the enemy in the front when there is the danger of even a small disturbance in the rear. He stresses its magnitude by saying that 'when advantage from the gain in front is one-thousandth while the disturbance in the rear is one-hundredth, he should not march.' Misfortunes, indeed, have the eye of a needle, which though small, enables the huge thread to pierce it. He further expresses the importance of the protection of one's own kingdom before undertaking an expedition through a homely simile. He says, 'A king invading his enemy's country without having fully protected his own, acts like a naked man wearing the garment on his head.'

The Matsya Purāṇa and the Agni Purāṇa state that a favourable political opportunity for yāna arises when the vijigṣu's ally

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1NV, XXIX.85; cf. KA, IX.3.4; KN, XVI.14.
2Ibid., XXIX.86; Ibid., IX.3.4; Ibid., XVI.15.
3Ibid., XXIX.54.
in the rear (ākranda) is powerful and is pressing hard against his rear enemy (pārṣṇigrāha).\(^1\) Alternatively, a king may march against his enemy in front if he is in a position to leave behind troops superior to those of the enemy in the rear in order to protect his capital and kingdom and to quell any internal disturbance during his absence.\(^2\) Manu and his commentators also emphasize that a king should make suitable arrangements for safeguarding his own kingdom before setting out on an expedition.\(^3\) It may be noted that the danger of such an eventuality was considerably greater during our age in which the political atmosphere was charged with bitter dynastic rivalries. Often the hereditary rivals exploited such situations and forced even the successful conquerors to abandon their expeditions at an indecisive stage or suffer some losses in the rear of their kingdoms. As for example, the Paramāra king Bhoja who sent his general Kulacandra to sack Aṇhilavāda, the capital of the Caulukya kingdom when Bhīma I (c.1022-1066 A.D.) was away on an expedition in Sindh.\(^4\) Another instance is the attack on Sāmālakṣā by the Caulukya king Bhīma II probably at the time when

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\(^1\) *Agni*, 228.1; *Matsya*, 240.2 quoted in *RDK*, XIV.p.115.


\(^3\) *Manu*, VII.184; *RDK*, XIV.p.122.

the Cāhamāna king Prthvīrāja was subjugating the Candella kingdom of Jejākabhukti during the course of his digvijaya.¹ These instances show that the political advice of our authors was based on historical experience, and although the kings generally heeded it and took necessary precautions, these sometimes proved inadequate. Sometimes, however, these considerations seem to have checked aggressive campaigns in certain directions. It appears that the Pratihāra kings of Kanauj, although hostile to the Arabs, never sincerely attempted the liquidation of their principality of Sindh because of the fear of an invasion in the rear from the Rāṣṭrakūṭas or the Pālas.

In addition to these prerequisites of power and precautions, and the existence of a favourable balance of power in the circle of kings, the deterioration of an enemy's constituents could provoke an attack on him by a powerful rival. Medhātithi asserts that 'the causes that prompt actual marching against the enemy are not the same that lead the king to make war; in fact, these latter, as also the loss of happiness and strength of the enemy's people are the causes that should prompt actual marching.'² It is evident from his comments that 'condition' (bhāva) which is the cause of happiness and strength' expresses the general situation of the constituents. The weakness and distress of the army is symptomatic of the decline of the kingdom and subjects; and it is the latter which causes an

¹A.K. Majumdar, op.cit., pp. 140-141; D. Sharma, op.cit., pp. 74-77.
²On Manu, VII.171; cf. On Manu, VII.165; also 164; cf. KA, VII.4.14 ff.
invasion. Some Purāṇas also prescribe that a king should proceed against his enemy without delay when he finds him in calamities, his country struck by such visitations of nature as earthquakes, heavenly disturbances, famine etc.; his army discontented and afflicted with vices; and his country full of disturbances and uprisings. Someśvara mainly concentrates on the calamities and weaknesses of the enemy which justify an attack on him by the vījīgīṣu. He states that a king should march against one whom an adverse fate has deprived of his revenue, one who is struck down with disease, one whose mind is drawn towards vices, or one who is oppressed by his enemy, a foe who is without adequate troops and revenue or who has been deserted by his friends and allies. The vījīgīṣu is sure to achieve sweeping success in his expedition against such a rival.

It is striking to note that Bhoja and Someśvara warn that a march should not be undertaken against a country struck down with drought, famine, epidemics and other grave calamities including internal disturbances. We may recall that Yājñavalkya advises

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1On Manu, VII.164-65, 171.
2Agni, 228.3-4; Matsya, 240. 7, 9, 10, 15 quoted in RDK, XIV. pp. 115-16.
4Ykt., 53.p.7; Mānas., II,xiii.928.
an expedition when the enemy country is rich in corn, water, and fodder.\(^1\) It appears that Someśvara's prohibitions have in view practical difficulties of procuring food, fodder, and water for the troops which would also be exposed to the hazards of the raging epidemics in enemy country. Bhoja Paramāra is, however, actuated by chivalrous ideals since he says that a \textit{vijigīṣu} desires victory over an adversary, who is without panic, calamity, affliction and disease.\(^2\)

It is thus evident that a policy of \textit{yāna} is justifiable mainly on three conditions:

the superiority of military strength over an enemy and superiority in other constituents as well;

a favourable balance of power in the inter-state sphere created by the rising strength of allies, especially in the rear;

and finally, calamities suffered by the enemy both human and divine in political, economic and personal fields.

In comparison with the factors precipitating war, those of \textit{yāna} are the same; in addition to the loss of happiness and strength of the enemy's subjects and his politico-military disadvantages brought about by his fate, folly and vices as well as the corrosive effect of the expedients employed against him by the aggressive king.

\(^1\)\textit{Yajñā}, I.348; also comm.; \textit{RDK}, XIV.p.115.

As to the actual invasion, however, other factors, especially those of place and time, must be taken into account. The geography of the country to be attacked, whether it is plain, hilly, marshy, desert or forest, had to be ascertained for operational and strategic reasons. The condition of the highways and the regions through which they run have to be scrutinized to minimise the hazards of the journey. Further, the seasonal considerations which greatly affect the efficacy of the different kinds of troops must be evaluated. In view of the problems of supply, food, fodder and water, and the climatic conditions in the different seasons which have an influence on the physical stamina of soldiers and beasts of burden the advantages of the proper time are emphasized. Most of our authors favour the months of Mārgaśīrṣa (November-December), Phālguna (February-March) and Caitra (March-May) for undertaking an expedition. Explaining the reasons for this Medhātithi writes: 'When he [the king] is going to undertake an expedition involving a campaign that might be a long one ... he shall march against the hostile kingdom in the month of Mārgaśīrṣa... Starting about this time, he can easily carry with him the autumn fruits garnered in the house and is cheered by the prospects of the spring harvest. The time is quite fit for the work of laying siege to fortresses and so forth, and the path is also not beset with deviations and diversions due to the overgrowth of grass or the overflowing of rivers;

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1 On Manu, VII.161-85; Yukt., 52 ff.p.7; Manas., II.xiii.754; Agni, 228.1 ff; Matsya, 240. 19-27, 47-49; RDK, XIV, pp. 115,123-4. cf. KN, XVI.5 ff.

2 On Manu, VII.184-185; RDK, XIV.p.125 quotes Śākhalikhita.
and the season is neither too hot nor too cold. At any other time of
the year good grains, even though sufficient, cannot be of sufficiently
diverse quality, the seasons for the three harvests being far off,
so that the enemy would be likely to take shelter under a powerful
king, which would lead to unnecessary expenditure of the stock of
food-grains of both parties, and the attacking king's own forces would
become weakened.'

'If, however, the king is desirous only of inflicting some injury
on the enemy's territory, or when the expedition is expected to take
a short time, and his force is sufficiently strong, then he may start
also during the months of Phālguna and Čaitra, especially against a
country which is rich in spring harvests. At this time of the year
also, he can obtain fodder, and at the same time inflict injury upon
the other party, by destroying the crops standing on the fields.'

If, however, a campaign has to be undertaken in months other
than those indicated, the king should equip himself with that parti-
cular division of the army which would be decisive in the field of
operation such as infantry and elephants in the rainy season, chariots
and cavalry in the winter, and all the four divisions of the army
in the spring. This seasonal consideration has another motive,
which is to deprive the enemy of his harvest. However, an expedition

1Medh. on Manu, VII.182.

2Agni, 228.7; Matsya, 240.19-27 quoted in RDK, pp. 124-5.
could be undertaken at any time when the king sees certain prospects of victory owing to the difficulties of the enemy.\(^1\)

Even when factors of power, place and time are all favourable, a king is not to commence the marching of troops without consulting astrologers and prognostics. Many works, especially the Purānas, give detailed accounts of numerous auspicious and inauspicious asterisms, dreams, omens, portents and prognostics of various kinds such as the voices of birds, jackals, etc. which indicated the success or otherwise of an expedition.\(^2\) We have already noted that the divine agency (daiva) had a tremendous impact on the state policy, and our sources bear out the hold of daiva on the royal disposition for military action. Bhoja Paramāra says that a king should march when his Fate (daiva) is propitious and the enemy's in the reverse state.\(^3\) We often come across discussions on the relative importance of human endeavour and Fate,\(^4\) which together are said to control the course of action. It was therefore by no means unusual if kings consulted astrologers in order to determine an auspicious day and time for commencing the expedition and paid heed to the physical portents

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\(^1\) Medh. on Manu, VII.182.

\(^2\) Ibid., VII.197. Agni, 228.7-8, chs. 229, 230, 231, and 232 are devoted to the discussion of the nature and significance of dreams, auspicious articles, animals, birds etc. and the indications from the voices of crow, jackal, horse and the rest; cf. Matsya, chs. 241-243; RDK, XIV, pp. 116-122 quotes Matsya, 241. 2, 12, 14; 242. 2ff. and the Rāmayana, Sundarakanda, Sarga 27 on this subject; Manas, II.xiii.755 ff.


such as spontaneous throbbing of muscles, reflected upon dreams,
and tried to familiarize themselves with good and bad portents,
omens and objects.\textsuperscript{1} The influence of daiva indeed grew greater with
the time; This probably follows from the \textit{Vishuddharmottara Purana}'s
raising it to the status of a fourthpower, the other three being those
of counsel, might and energy.\textsuperscript{2} On account of the increased importance
of daiva a large body of prognostics came into existence. A king
was naturally inclined to consult every extra-mundane factor because
he had not only to strengthen his psychological condition but also
to boost the morale of his troops by proclaiming that every factor,
human and divine, promised victory in the undertaking and their
toils and tribulations during the war would be richly rewarded.
While the fighting zeal of troops would not be unduly undermined
if they were asked to engage in a battle in which all the prognostics
were arrayed against them, a king was advised to attach greater
importance to human endeavours and discount fate and prognostics
when an urgent occasion arose. But kings who undertook imperial
campaigns of conquest (\textit{digvijaya}) could always afford to take all
necessary measures, real and superstitious, which enabled them to
anticipate their success and to encourage their soldiers.

\textsuperscript{1}Agni, 228.7-8; \textit{RDK}, XIV.p.116 quotes \textit{Matsya}, 241.2, 12, 14, see above
\textit{fn.} 2. p.238.

\textsuperscript{2}Vdh., II.71.11.
Kinds of yāna

Our authors distinguish several kinds of yāna by taking into consideration factors of power, place and time as well as allies and inter-state developments. Commentators on Manu explain two kinds of yāna described in the text. They are: one led by the vijigīṣu all alone, when the enemy has been reduced to difficult straits by calamities and has impoverished and disaffected subjects, which situation is called an 'emergent occasion' promising sure success; and the other, led by the vijigīṣu accompanied by his allies obviously in a situation of his own indecisive superiority over the enemy.¹

Reproducing Kāmandaka, the author of the Agni Purāṇa mentions five kinds of yāna: vigṛhya, sandhaya, sambhuya, prasanga and upekṣa.² Bhoja describes only two kinds of yāna: vigṛhya and sandhaya.³ Someśvara, however, details seven types of yātra: sandhanaja, pāṛṣṇirodha, mitravigrahapi, dvandvaja, nirvyayaja, kulya and śīghraga,⁴ but some of these are sub-types of the vigṛhyayāna.

Vigṛhyayāna is the marching after a declaration of war. This is the expedition of an eminently powerful king, undertaken when his own constituents of state are in excellent condition and those of the enemy in an unsatisfactory state, or his own allies are devoted and strong and those of the enemy are in the reverse condition.⁵ Thus

¹On Manu, VII.165. comments on the verse are Kauṭilyan in substance; cf. KA, VII.4.15.
²Agni, 240.26-27; cf. KN, XI.2; KA, VII.4.15 ff.
³Ykt, 51-52.p.7.
⁴Manas., II.xiii.746.
⁵Agni, 240.26; KN, XI.3-4; KA, VII.4.17 ff.
the king obviously marches all alone owing to his own superiority
of power, or he undertakes the expedition owing to a favourable
balance of power between his and his enemy's allies. Someśvara's
dvandvajā (expedition born of a duel or due to opposition between
two rulers) and nirvyājajā (expedition without deceit) come under
this category, for, according to him, the former kind of expedition
is that which is undertaken by the king himself against that enemy
whom he faces through his policy and the latter type means an
expedition without deceit which the strong king undertakes with a
calm mind in order to destroy his enemy. It appears, however, that
the dvandvajā expedition involves the use of political expedients
and even strategem in order to create conflict between the enemy
and another king, which provides the opportunity for the marching
of the king, while the nirvyājajā is an open challenge to fight,
similar to the expedition of a digvijayin. As an example of the
latter, we may mention the expedition of Pythvīrāja III (A.D. c. 1178-
1192), the Gahamāna king of Sakambhari, against the Candella king
Paramardideva in A.D. 1182. This was an expedition of the Nirvyājajā
type because Pythvīrāja III is not known to have undertaken the exp-
edition by preparing its grounds through policy and strategem.

Manas., II.xiii.750: Yasyopari svasyaṁ yāyaṁ anayet tad arīṁ navaṁ.
Sa yatra dvandvajā prokta ripa saṁharakārini. The literal meaning
of the verse does not make much sense. It seems that an expedition
which is undertaken in order to exploit a situation created by war be-
tween two kings is intended. The king is advised to march against an
enemy who is at war with another; this war may have been created by
the king's own policy or diplomacy. It may well correspond to another
type of āśṛtyayana in which one's own allies fight with enemy's
allies on all sides, and the king proceeds against the adversary to
destroy him. Cf. KN, XI.4, Sukra (tr.) VIII. 510.511.

/cont.)
Besides these, Somesvara's pārṇaprodha and mitra-vigrahaṇi expeditions are also the sub-types of vīgāḥ-yaśāyaṇa. According to him, when a king marches against the enemy after committing a portion of his stupendous forces to make war upon the rear enemy, it is called pārṇaprodha or march after obstructing the rear enemy.  

Kauṭilya describes such an expedition as vīgāḥ-yaśāyaṇa. The mitra-vigrahaṇi yātrā is when the king proceeds against his enemy accompanied by his allies who have already embroiled the enemy and his allies in war. This is also included by Kauṭilya under vīgāḥ-yaśāyaṇa. It is evident that not only Somesvara's four types of yātrā but also Manu's two kinds are indeed different sub-types of vīgāḥ-yaśāyaṇa. Somesvara's differentiation of these kinds is, however, significant on account of the particular feature in each. Pārṇaprodha emphasizes the stupendous forces of the king and simultaneous expeditions both in the rear and in the front; the mitra-vigrahaṇi stresses the importance of allies obstructing enemies; the dvandvaṇa indicates the role of policy, and nirvyajaja displays the straightforward character of the expedition.

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2 Manas., II.xiii.751.

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1 Manas., II.XIII.748.
2 KA, VII.4.17; cf. KN, XVI.18.
3 Manas., II.xiii.749.
4 KA, VII.4.16.
Sanḍhāyayāna is when a king marches against the adversary in front after concluding a treaty or an agreement (sandhi) with his rear enemy (pārśpigraḥa), which obviously provides for the cessation of hostilities between them and binds the rear enemy not to invade his kingdom while he is engaged in warfare elsewhere. This kind of expedition thus involves the arrangements for safeguarding the kingdom at the rear and at the same time strikes at the adversary's power, whose potential ally has been weaned away. Someśvara calls it sanḍhānāja because the expedition is created by an alliance with the rear enemy (pārśpigraḥa). The rear enemy may be obliged to actively cooperate in the expedition under the terms of the compact, as was done, for example, by Jagaddeva alias Lākṣaṇamadeva, the king of Mālwa on joining with Vikramaditya VI of Kālayāṇī against the Hoysalas.

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1. Manas., II.xiii.747; Ykt., 57.p.7 (the verse seems to be corrupt as a comparison with KN, XI.5. will show); cf. Śukra (tr.) IV.vii. 512-13; KA, VII.4.18. There is some confusion about this kind of yāna due to R.P.Kangle's explanatory remark on Kauṭilya's verse referred to above. Kangle translates 'sandhāya yayat' as 'make peace and march' to which he adds his remark that 'this is downright duplicity, making peace and then attacking the enemy when he is least expecting such an attack'. But his remark seems to be unjust because the king does not attack his rear enemy, but an enemy in the front. Kalman daka (X.5) and his commentators say that having allied with the rear enemy the king marches elsewhere (sanḍhāyanyat: yā yatra pārśpigraheṇa śatruṇā). In fact the viṣṇu concludes an alliance with his enemy in the rear, who is the natural ally of his adversary (ari) and marches against the latter. So it is duplicity in a different sense and not as understood by Kangle.


or simply to give an undertaking that he would create no troubles in the rear while the ambitious king is away on expedition elsewhere as perhaps was given by Kumārapāla, the Caulukya king of Gujarāt to the Cāhamāna king Vīgraharāja IV, as the latter could not have successfully led expeditions in Northern India conquering the kingdom of Delhi and others unless the former had given an undertaking not to create troubles in the rear.

3. **Sambhūya yāna**: when a king, joining forces with powerful and sincere sāmantas (feudatories or kings of neighbouring kingdoms or both), undertakes an expedition against a common enemy to attain a single specified objective, it is called *sambhūya yāna*. Normally such a contingency arises when the middle or neutral king assumes a threatening posture or invades an ally of the vijugīsu and thus acts as the arbiter of the balance of power in the inter-state sphere and the vijugīsu finds it necessary to march but is powerless to do so without the cooperation of other kings. In another situation when two neighbours join forces for marching against a common enemy

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3 Cf. *KN*, VIII.55-56; *KA*, VII.18, 6-10.
it is also sambhāya yāna, as for example, when the confederacy of the Cāhamāna king Arporāja of Sākambhari and Ballāla, the king of Mālwā, marched against Caulukya Kumārapāla of Gujarāt at the beginning of Kumārapāla's reign when Arporāja is said to have invaded Gujarāt. Another example of such a type of yāna is that organized by Bhoja Paramāra of Mālwā against the Cālukyas of Kalyāṇī in alliance with Gāggeyadeva, the king of Tripuri and the Cōla king Rājendra I. Paramāra king Devapāla later organised another confederacy with the Yādava king Simhapaṇa and the Lāṇa ruler Samgrāma-simha for a simultaneous invasion of Gujarāt about A.D.1228. The Sāhi king of Punjab, Jayapāla, is alleged by Firishta to have organised a confederacy in A.D.991 against the Ghaznivid ruler Subuktāgīn. It is said that Jayapāla commanded a huge army which consisted of contingents of troops sent to him by kings of Kālinjir, Kanauj and Ajmera when he invaded Ghazni in A.D.991. It is thus apparent that the expeditions at the head of confederate forces were possible, provided that the neighbouring kings could override their political prejudices and dynastic rivalries.

4. The prasānga yāna is that kind of expedition which takes place when a king, obviously marching against a particular enemy,

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afterwards, through some contingency, proceeds against another. As an example, we may mention the diversion of Bhoja Paramāra's expedition towards the Čālukyas of Kalyāṇī, although he had originally intended to invade the Caulukya kingdom of Gujarāt. This, according to Merutuṅga, was affected through the ingenuity of the crafty Dāmodara, the agent of Bhīma I of Gujarāt, who was commissioned to prevent the imminent Paramāra invasion.¹

Upeksāvāna is when the conqueror, marching against a foe, has every chance of complete victory but, disregarding it, he proceeds against the latter's ally.² From Kāmandaka's example of Arjuna's vanquishing the Nīvatakavacas but neglecting the fruits of victory and destroying the dwellers of the Golden City,³ it appears that this kind of yāna involves the victor's indifference to the spoils of victory. It also implies neglecting the gains from the defeated kings as, for example, did Mahmūd of Ghaznī with his hostile opponents of Ṛajpūtānā during his invasion of Somanāth. Another explanation of the upeksāvāna as suggested by M. N. Dutt is that the conqueror does not consolidate his victory over his adversary but, disregarding it, assaults the latter's allies, who, all the time thinking him to be satisfied with the victory obtained, were off their guard.⁴

¹D. C. Ganguly, op. cit., p. 89; see A. K. Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 51-52.
²Agni, 240.27; KN, XI.9.
³KN, XI.10.
⁴Kāmandakaśya Nītisāra, p. 153.
We may refer to Lakṣmīkārṇa's (A.D. c.1042-72) expedition against the Lāha country and also the feudatories of the Cāḷukyas of Kālaṅgī after his military triumph over the Pāramāras.\textsuperscript{1} It may be remembered in this connexion that Cāḷukya Someśvara I had become friendly to Jayasimha, the successor of Bhoja when the latter had lost his kingdom to Lakṣmīkārṇa.\textsuperscript{2} There were many instances when a conqueror passed on to another enemy after victory over the kingdom antagonistic to him. Such diversionary or extended expeditions were quite common during the course of a digvijaya.

Someśvara's śīghra-gaḥ yātṛā (hurried expedition) presents another side of this indifference, although an opposite one. He says that 'when a king leaving aside other mishaps or accidents' or in other words ignoring or disregarding his own shortcomings, 'undertakes a violently sudden expedition for exterminating his enemy, it is called śīghra-gaḥ yātṛā.'\textsuperscript{3} In fact, this kind of expedition involves indifference towards one's own weaknesses for the purpose of conquest of the enemy which is its distinctive feature in addition to it being a sudden march. It apparently appropriates the feature of indifference as well as the march after declaring war (vīgrhyayāna). It further suggests a condition of urgency, when the success of an expedition depends on the rapidity of attack, and may, therefore, be similar to a surprise expedition.

\textsuperscript{1}D.C. Ganguly, \textit{op. cit.} pp. 123-24.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 124.
\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Manas,}, II.xiii.753.
5. **Kulya yātra.** We have already remarked that *kulya yātra* seems to be an original contribution of Somesvara to the variety of expeditions, although it is by no means novel in view of its main distinctive mark. He says, 'When a king, assisted by the relatives of the enemy [such as a brother, a son, a queen or any other scion of the same dynasty probably a claimant to the throne], marches against the adversary, it is called *kulya*, which causes terror to the opponent.'

It appears that Somesvara has such expeditions in mind which were undertaken at the time of either disputed succession or when the enemy's relations, including ministers, have been won over; as for example Arjoraja the Šamana king invaded Gujarat at the instigation and assistance of Bahada or Cahaḍa, whom Meruṅgga calls an adopted son of Jayasīgha Siddharaja.* Besides this version of *kulya*, we may further state that the aggressors always tried to enlist the services of the frustrated elements of the enemy's family because they greatly contributed to a military victory, especially during a siege.

Thus, the policy of *yāna* meant the actual march of troops against the adversary for victory. The different varieties of *yāna* were based on the particular dominant factor which caused the expedition. The success of *yāna* depended on the military strength and prosperity of the consolidated kingdom, condition of allies, and regional and seasonal

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1. *Nanasa*, II.xii.752.
4. Medh. on *Manu*, VII.197; *NV*, XXX.54-56.
considerations, which affected the supply and strategy.

D. **ASANA** (Staying quiet or pause: policy of watchful waiting)

**Asana** is opposed to **yana** and our authorities suggest that **vigraha** is followed either by **asana** or **yana**, or both, one after the other, according to the circumstances. But the term **asana**, which literally means 'sitting' or 'sitting down', has aroused a good deal of controversy among modern scholars, who have rendered it into English in many ways and given divergent interpretations, which often tend to confuse its meaning and significance as an instrument of the sixfold policy in inter-state relations. **Asana** has been rendered as 'halting', 'neutrality', 'an attitude of indifference', 'armed and ready to intervene', 'maintaining a post against an enemy', and 'staying quiet', etc. Its interpretation has been approached from two points of view: one, that it indicates a certain position in which the **vigraha** and his enemy are equally matched, and the other, that **asana** corresponds to the policy of neutrality, the latter being the

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2 G.N. Jha's translation of the *Manasmrtyi* with the commentary of Medhätithi, vii.160ff.


5 *RDK*, Intro. p.86.


view of some modern scholars. But these interpretations are unsatisfactory. Therefore, in order to express the full impact of the term, we need to examine our source material in detail.

According to Visvarūpa 'Non-commencement (of yāna) is staying quiet (āsana)',\(^1\) which is caused by two factors: the weak condition of one's own power, especially of the troops, and the consideration for ally.\(^2\) Medhātithi says, 'Ignoring the enemy is staying quiet (āsana)'\(^3\). In another context, however, he also says, 'Āsana means withdrawing (lit. hiding or covering) of oneself',\(^4\) apparently from a collision with the enemy. The Agni Purāṇa explains that āsana consists in the halt of a king (with his army fully mobilised) in his own country after declaring war\(^5\), thus suggesting that it is readiness for attack or a pause in an expedition. Elsewhere, however, reproducing Kāmandaka, it defines āsana as a policy expressing a condition 'when the vijīgīśu and the ari are capable of destroying each other',\(^6\) thereby defining it by the situation when it is

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1. On Yājñ, I. 343. Anārambhakatvam āsanam
2. Ibid.
3. On Manu, VII. 160. Upeksyām āsanam,
4. Ibid., VII. 166. Ātmasamvaranam āsanam.
6. Ibid., 240. 27. Parasparasya sāmarthyavighatād āsanam smrtam. cf. KN, XI. 12. which reads sāmarthyavighatād, though one Ms. agrees with Agni.
appropriate and implying that it is a kind of balance of power.

Reproducing Kautilya, Somadeva says, 'Remaining indifferent is staying quiet (āsana)', a definition which is repeated by several smṛti commentators and other writers on polity. The commentator of the Nītivākyāmrta, however, states that when the invader is endeavouring to attack, the defensive king should adopt a policy of indifference towards him and suddenly abandoning his place, withdraw to another, irrespective of the fact whether or not he has the power to fight him. He thus understands āsana as a policy of strategic withdrawal from one place to another which proceeds from indifference to the invasion. In contrast, however, we may adduce the evidence of the lexicographer Halāyudha who explains āsana as a strategic position which a viśjīgītā adopt for assaulting forts, etc., which shows that it is an instrument of aggression. Somesvara also understands by the term āsana 'a position of watchful waiting', 'halt of troops', 'encampment', 'siege' or any strategic pause or position to which an invader resorts under varying circumstances before, during, and after

1. NV, xxix. 46. Upeksanam. āsanam; cf. KA, VII. 1. 8.
2. Kullūka on Manu, VII. 160; Mit. on Yajñ., I. 347; also Ap. arārka; Rāj. R., p. 56.
3. NV, XXIX. 46.
4. Halāyudha Śabdakośa (Abhidhāna Ratnamālā), p. 58 - Vijigishordurgadin dharsayatah sthitih. cf. Hariharacaturanga, VI. 85. It is a 16th century work on the military system and inter-state relations which was written by Godavara Misra, a Brāhmaṇa protégé of the King Pratāpa Rudradeva of Orissa. It defines āsana as a strategic position enabling the viśjīgī to triumph over his enemy (sthanam satru-jayartham tadasanamhoyate); see also Sukrā, IV. 7. 471. suaraksanam. satrunasāv bhavet sthanat tadasanam; cf. also Bhasakautaliyam commentary on KA, VII. 4. 13. cited by Kangale.
an invasion. ¹

It is evident from the preceding statements that the essence of the policy of *asana* is said to be indifference against the enemy, which leads to maintaining a particular politico-military position against him by an intending conqueror or any other king. A recourse to *asana* brings to a stand-still active military operations such as the mobilisation of troops to the enemy frontier, the expedition already commenced, and even the fighting itself because of either the enemy shutting himself up in a fort or the aggressor's tactical withdrawal of troops from a challenging posture to that of discrete manipulation through policy, while apparently maintaining his position of hostility and possible armed encounter. However, the attitude of indifference and the resultant military position are evidently a matter of strategy and tactics rather than a change in the nature of the policy leading to peace. It is thus possible to remark that *asana* does not strictly profess to serve as an instrument of either peace or actual warfare, but certainly a measure involving the cessation of hostilities and a means to gain respite without incurring any major loss in prestige and property on this account. It is a policy which seeks to retain the politico-military *status quo* between the belligerents in which neither side suffers directly but both are restrained from moving towards the cataclysm of mutual destruction. It must not, however, be forgotten that *asana* primarily expresses the relationship at a certain stage in the belligerency between rivals and

is not concerned with kings standing aloof from conflict. Further, it also conveys the sense of a unilateral decision and action in the face of hostility. It is thus evident that the policy of āsana operates on the base of enmity and the indifference or inactivity that attends it is, in fact, treated as an expedient. Because hostilities persist the maintenance of a militarily deterrent position against the enemy becomes indispensable.

In order to realize the full import of the term āsana we have to regard it as an instrument of policy comprising two elements: an attitude of indifference and a measure for maintaining a strategic position against the enemy. While these two constituents of āsana are distinguishable, they are by no means separable. In actual application, however, strategic position generally assumes predominance over the attitude of indifference involving military inactivity in the face of hostility. In a situation which requires a temporary cessation of fighting and not the abandonment of hostility, indifference is a misleading equivalent for āsana. Indifference (upeksana) as an elucidation of āsana in our authorities appears to be rather a misnomer in many cases because it is precisely applicable to undertaking an expedition or actual fighting and not to the enemy in general; for discussing āsana Medhatithi and Hemacandra urge the pacification of the enemy by the upāyas which involves diplomatic intercourse with the enemy rather than indifference towards him.

1. On Manu, VII. 172; ṢA. II; 12.
Whatever the purpose of āsana, be it the promotion of one's undertakings and causing simultaneous deterioration of those of the enemy or only the recuperation of the suddenly weakened strength, it cannot be fulfilled without the acquiescence of the enemy, who has been engaged in, or is about to commence hostilities. Except in situations preceding the invasion into the enemy's territory, a king's 'indifference' is meaningless. Since Kautilya is concerned with āsana as an alternative to yāna, he is successful in balancing its two constituents, viz., the attitude of indifference and the strategic position, in which he is greatly helped by his constant theme being the advancement of a king's powers mainly through the completion of his economic and defensive undertakings. But the later authors such as Kāmandaka, commentators of smṛtis, Bhoja and Somesvara, who extended the meaning of āsana and the scope of its application succumbed to the realities of the situations and largely considered āsana as an expedient with a pronounced emphasis on a strategic position, militarily feasible and temporarily profitable. Except such situations where upekṣāsana, prītyāsana, or svasthāsana is possible the element of indifference is a feature of āsana gets lost and āsana gradually becomes identical with a strategic position that awaits the fulfilment of a certain specific objective of short term duration or an increase of military and financial strength through recuperation or reorganisation of forces and change of tactics. It may be pointed out

1. cf. KA, VII. 1. 22, 34; VII. 4. 4ff.
that asana if applied to an attempt at averting a mutual disaster
normally before an invasion implies a balance between an attitude of
indifference and a position of armed intervention; when addressed to
the advanced stage of belligerency after expedition it means either a
pause or withdrawal of troops even after an inconclusive battle;\(^1\) when
incidental upon sudden losses in might during warfare it leads to a
truce or armistice but not to peace. However, whether or not an
attitude of indifference is present, asana in all cases corresponds to
a position of watchful waiting and involves a pause in hostilities.

Factors and circumstances connected with asana

The factors which obliged one of the belligerents, especially the
evijigisu, to take recourse to asana vary from parity of strength to
sudden weakness due to military, financial, even strategical and
topographical handicaps. Repeating Kautilya, Somadeva says: "(when a
king thinks), "The enemy is not able to do me harm, nor I him," he
should stay quiet perceiving his good (i.e. his safety and the
advancement of power) in the long run."\(^2\) Reproducing Kāmandaka, the
Agni Purāṇa states that a king should resort to asana when he and his
enemy are capable of ruin ing each other.\(^3\) It is apparent that the

1. As an example, we may refer to the strategic withdrawal of the
Candella king Vidyādharā in the darkness of night after a day-
long inconclusive battle with Mahmūd of Ghaznī in AD 1019. It
was not a flight nor abandonment of hostility, but a change from
attack to defensive position. See for details, H. C. Ray, op. cit.,
II, pp. 690-91.

2. NV, XXIX. 52; KA, VII. 1. 15.
3. Agni, 240. 27; KN, XI. 12.
equal power of the rivals for mutual destruction induces indifference towards each other and imposes inactivity as far as the ensuing military operations are concerned. However, Somadeva adds the prospect of improvement of one's own power in the long run when the king would be able to overreach his enemy. He has, however, omitted detailed explanations given in the *Arthasāstra* how the policy of āsana following that of vigraha can produce future benefits.¹ But it is clear that it is not only the inability to do any harm on account of equal power or the terror of mutual destruction but also the prospect of eventual superiority vis-à-vis the enemy that determines a recourse to āsana.

Visvarūpa on Yājñavalkya and the commentators on *Manu*, however, prescribe a recourse to āsana mainly on the crippling of a king's might - soldiers, elephants, horses, military equipment etc. - and the inadequacy of funds (kosa) suddenly caused by chance (daiva) or his own imprudence.² Further, the weakness of a king's ally on account of which he does not find it safe to rise against the king's enemy also forces the king to adopt the policy of āsana.³ Bhoja and Hemacandra also recommend āsana when a king has become weak in military strength on account of fighting with the rival or loss of superiority acquired in previous encounters.⁴ The policy of āsana is implemented by effecting

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¹ See *KA*, VII. 1. 22, 34; VII. 4. 1-13, where Kautilya discusses how a king can utilize the interval between vigraha and yana by adopting a policy of āsana in order to promote his power and cause strain to the enemy's resources by various measures.

² On *Manu*, VII. 166, 172; On *Yājñavalkya*, I, 343. (Mit. I, 347.)

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Vkt.*, 87. p. 13; *H A.*, II. 12.
a pause in one's own hostile activities or military operations and quietly pacifying one's enemy by conciliation 'consisting in peaceful overtures and gifts'. A king is thus able to effect his withdrawal from war. It is noteworthy that this situation is radically different from that described by Somadeva and the Agni Purana because it is characterised neither by mutual parity of strength of the belligerents nor by an attitude of indifference to the enemy. Although Medhatithi says that the king should ignore the enemy, he clearly means ignoring battle and not the enemy himself as the has to be pacified by overtures of peace leading to some sort of truce which is made feasible by the successful employment of conciliation, gifts, and even sowing dissension which involve diplomatic contact, not indifference. It is not merely the fear of mutual ruin which induces the opponent to adopt reciprocal measures in order to bring about a temporary cessation of active hostilities, but a kind of truce or understanding quietly reached through diplomatic means. The initiative for  is taken by a king, who realizes his sudden military weakness, although he may be otherwise prosperous. While adopting the policy of , he however, does not renounce hostilities but merely suspends active military operations.  thus emerges as a policy leading to passive confrontation, which implies an indifference to battle but signifies a wait-and-watch policy because the truce or understanding with the enemy

1. Medh. on Manu, VII. 172; H A, II. 12.
2. Medh. on Manu, VII. 146.
neither provides for peace based on treaty (sandhi) nor involves the repudiation of the state of war (vigraha).

Bhoja further enumerates three more factors for taking recourse to asana: causing the seizure of the enemy through someone else, apprehension of invasion from the middle or neutral king (madhyama or udasina), and a desire to create amity with others, which, as we shall see later, produce different kinds of asana. Someśvara takes into account as many as ten factors such as the destruction of the enemy circle, natural calamities suffered by the enemy, siege strategy, seasonal obstruction of the highway, fascination for a pleasant site after military victory, need for encampment near the enemy's kingdom, who is to be invaded, great distance of one's own capital from the occupied kingdom, allurements promised by the enemy, and dependence on another, which produce ten kinds of asana. Some of these factors simply imply a halt of troops or taking up a strategic position, while a few indicate a change in politico-military strategy emanating from a policy of watchful waiting.

The motives behind the policy of asana are largely self-preservation, promotion of one's power and the maintenance of the politico-military status quo without prejudice to hostility. The main concern is to ward off an imminent danger or to put off a crucial moment mainly because of the indecisive balance of power. In some cases, it is a

2. Manas, II. XIV. 93ff.
protective measure, in others a deterrent, and yet in several others, asana serves as an instrument of self-aggrandisement against the enemy. It thus serves the temporary requirements of belligerency and also preserves the King, who adopts it, from a further deterioration of his position.

Kinds of Asana

The commentators on Manu describe two types of asana: one resorted to by the king because of his own weakness in army and loss of treasury, and the other out of consideration for his ally's reduced power. Thus, recourse to asana in the former case is in the king's self-interest and the decision is independent, but in case of the latter, it is dependent on the ally, who requests the king to pause because he apprehends peril from the enemy, if he rose against him while in a precarious condition. In both cases, however, asana indicates a stage in belligerency after declaring war, and therefore these may be regarded as sub-types of the vigrahyasana (staying quiet after declaring war) as understood by Kauṭilya, Kāmandaka and the others.

Reproducing Kāmandaka, the author of the Agni Purāṇa mentions five kinds of asana:

1. On Manu, VII. 166; RDK, XIII, pp. 112-113, quotes Manu See also Viśvarūpa on Yaṭī, I. 343.
2. Ibid.
(1) **Vigrhyasana** (staying quiet after declaring or making war)

(2) **Sandhayasana** (staying quiet after making truce with the enemy)

(3) **Sambhyyasana** (staying quiet after organizing a confederacy)

(4) **Prasangaasana** (staying quiet incidental upon a - contingency)

(5) **Upeksasana** (staying quiet on account of an attitude of indifference to the hostile acts of the stronger aggressor).

Bhoja repeats only the first three of these types but adds a fourth called **prityasana**, which he considers to be the best of all.

Somesvara, however, makes an exhaustive study of the different kinds of asana and details as many as ten varieties: svasthasana, upeksasana, margarodhasana, durgasadhuyasana, rastrsvikaranasana, ramaniyasana, nikatasana, duramargasana, pralobhasana, and paradhinasana. While it is possible to group Somesvara's durgasadhuyasana, and nikatasana under vigrhyasana, and to connect his svasthasana with Bhoja's prityasana, the others are different from the known categories.

**Vigrhyasana**

Kamandaka says, 'When both the *ari* and the *vijigisu* endeavour to overpower the other (by thwarting each other's plan of operation in war), this is called vigrhyasana.'

This definition implies that both

observe pause in their large scale military operations by taking up a strategic position and engage themselves in such political moves and military manoeuvres which enable one of them to overrun the other. Kamandaka describes under the vigrhaśana a king's position on besieging his foe in a stronghold, which is also precisely the meaning of Someśvara's durgasādhyaśana (staying quiet or pause by laying siege for the capture of the fort). Asana for the capture of a fort involves a sort of land blockade of the area around the fort in order to cut off the enemy's supplies of food, fodder, etc. and prevent any reinforcements reaching the beleaguered from the outside. While the besieger tightens his hold on the besieged, he has to wait until the garrisons surrender or sally forth when they have run out of essential commodities or he himself is able to storm the fort. Asana in this case is thus identical with siege which creates a pause in regular fighting on any large scale and involves a policy of waiting for overcoming the enemy. Such kinds of asana were familiar in an age when fortifications dominated defence in many parts of India. We may allude to Mahmūd's siege of Kālinjara in A.D. 1022 and Prthvīraja III's siege of Bhaṭinda to illustrate the durgasādhyaśana.

Other subtypes of the vigrhaśana mentioned by Bhoja are that which occur when a king stays quiet after having the enemy seized

1. Ibid., XI. 13-14.
2. Manas., II. XIV. 937; cf also: Sukra (tr), IV. 7. 568-73.
3. Mānas., II. XIV. 937; KN, XI. 14-15; see also Jayamangala commentary.
through some one else or when he remains at his place after declaring war with the enemy. In both circumstances asana indicates a pause in direct hostilities. In the former case, however, the pause and the policy of waiting are due to the fact that the object of hostility is sought to be accomplished possibly by allies and no need is felt for direct intervention, but in the latter case recourse to asana is taken due to the King's own calculations of advantages and disadvantages. Someśvara's nikatāsana means a king's encamping near the kingdom of a distant enemy whom he wants to fight, which merely indicates that asana is a military halt for the purpose of finalising the actual plan of operations, while awaiting the opponent's political and military moves.

It is evident that these sub-types of the vigrhyāsana do not precisely indicate a policy of neutrality or an attitude of indifference, although they imply an absence of fighting on any significant scale. On the contrary, these suggest that asana implied a temporary cessation of military expedition, or halt of troops due to the strategic consideration or change in the nature of fighting, or a mere lull before the storm. In all aspects of vigrhyāsana, it is a question of military strategy and tactics and an adjustment of political expediencies to the needs of situations. These in a way express the policy decision as well, for a king may return after the victory

1. Ykt., 86. p. 12.
2. Manasī, II. XIV. 941.
in a few engagements with the enemy and disdain besieging him in the
fort since it involves tiresome tactics, long waiting and much hardship.
Recourse to āsana by rival kings after declaring war or undertaking
an expedition was not, however, unusual during our period. Inter-
dynastic relations suggest that every king endeavoured to maintain a
watchful position against his enemy during a state of vigraha and
the outbreak of hostilities did not always immediately lead to battle
as may be inferred from the Caulukya king Bhima I's relations with the
Paramāra Bhoja when he had to wait for a favourable balance of power
in order to avenge the wrongs done by the latter during his absence
on expedition in Sindh.¹

Sandhayāsana

Reproducing Kamandaka, Bhoja says, 'When the enemy and the
vijigisu both being weakened in war stop it by concluding an agreement
(that is, by agreeing on a truce or an armistice), it is called
sandhayāsana.'² This kind of āsana also retains hostility while
providing for the end of war, which, however, does not inaugurate
peace but affords an interval for the recuperation of strength that
may again cause a flare up at an opportune moment.

1. A. K. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 53.
   Anyaisca vijigisocca vigrahe hiyamanayoh Sandhaya yadavasthanam
   sandhyanamucyate Kamandaka has areśca in place of ahyaisca.
   cf. Sukra, (tr.), IV. 574-75.
Sambhuyāsana

When apprehending hostility in the neutral king (udasina), the middle king (madhyama) or one equal to them, the vijjīgīsu united with his confederates waits, mustering up all his forces for invasion from any one of them, it is called sambhuyāsana. Asana in this case is a policy of waiting for an encounter after having made arrangements for a united front with other kings including one's enemy or enemies. The policy of sambhuyāsana further involves taking up a strategic position of military preparedness against the aggressor by collecting together one's own forces and those of confederate princes. It implies suspension of hostilities by the vijjīgīsu against his enemy (ari) or enemies in order that he may be able not only to muster up all his forces by reducing tension on other fronts, but also to secure the latter's active or even passive help in an emergency created by the apprehended invasion from the neutral or middle kings, either of whom, according to the concept of mandala, is superior in power to the vijjīgīsu disunited from or at war with his enemy (ari). It has been already pointed out that Kāmandaka and others advise the vijjīgīsu to form a confederacy of kings to oppose an aggressive neutral or middle king, and sambhuyāsana seems to be related to this kind of situation. Sambhuyāsana is really an alternative to sambhuyāsana (confederate expedition),

1. Ykt., 87. p. 12 -
udāsinena madhyamanena va samane pratisankaya eva ekabhuya vyavasthanam
sambhuyāsanaṃ suhitam, cf. KN, XI. 18-19; also the Jayamāṅgala and Bibliotheca commentaries. Kāmandaka, however, reads "madhyamanena ca samane pratisankaya."
which, as already noted, requires the *vijigisu* to march after joining forces with his *samantas* (neighbouring kings or feudatories or both) in order to subdue a common enemy. Kamandaka suggests that *sambhūyasana* is also appropriate in the circumstances when the common foe (that is the neutral or the middle king) wants to destroy both the *vijigisu* and his enemy, who should therefore form a confederacy according to the rule of union (*samgha-dharma*) in order to defeat the invader.¹ Theoretically the united front is possible because the aggressiveness of the middle or neutral king presents a threat to the whole circle of kings (*mandala*) and the *vijigisu* may be able to rouse common fear. It seems, however, that during our period *sambhūyasana* indicated a policy of waiting against a powerful aggressor, which required the king adopting it to arrange for a united front by mustering up all his *samantas* (feudatory or tributary kings) and by ceasing hostilities with his neighbouring kings (also called *samanta*), some of whom might be persuaded to join together in the spirit of union against a common foe. We may refer to the Čahamana king Prthvirāja III's policy towards Muhammad Ghorī in A.D. 1190-91 in order vaguely to illustrate *sambhūyasana*.² When threatened with the Muslim invasion Prthvirāja III seems to have taken recourse to something like *sambhūyasana*, which enabled him to muster up a huge force consisting of many *samantas*

1. KN, XI. 19, VIII. 56.
united with whom he awaited Muhammad Ghori at the field of Tarain.\(^1\)

We do not know whether his neighbouring enemy kings, Jayacandra of Kanauj and Bhima II of Gujarat, rendered him any assistance on this occasion, but it seems certain that neither of them distracted Prthviraja's attempt to present a united front, though limited to his own *sāmantas*, which enabled the Cāhāmanas to defeat Muhammad Ghori in 1191. But when passive confrontation between Prthviraja III and Jayacandra was ignited by the abduction of Jayacandra's daughter Samyogitā from her *svayamvara* at Kanauj by Prthviraja late in 1191 or early in 1192, the Cāhāmana king had probably to fight on two fronts when Muhammad Ghori again invaded his kingdom in 1192.\(^2\) This shows that the *sambhūyasana* has its own limitations and can be realised only if the king adopting it is able to cease hostilities with his neighbouring kings (*sāmantas*) and unite, together all his resources. *Sambhūyasana* is a defensive policy and is made feasible through a confederacy of princes. It is alleged by Firishta that the *Śahi* king Anandapala organised a confederacy in A.D. 1008-9 in order to oppose Mahmūd of Ghazni.\(^3\) Anandapala's policy on this occasion seems to be similar to the *sambhūyasana*. It however, seems that the chances for

1. Firishta (*TF.*, I, p. 175.) mentions one hundred and fifty rulers (*Rāi* i.e. *sāmantas*) who fought under Prthviraja III against Mohammad Ghori. See also D. Sharma, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

2. *The Struggle for Empire*, p. 112.

adopting the policy of sambhūyasana during our period were few and far between, because of inter-dynastic rivalry and personal enmity, as well as the narrow political outlook which militated against a confederate position and action. The united front which is essential for the sambhūyasana, was generally limited to one's own feudatories or tributaries (sāmantas). It is possible to attribute the failure to appreciate the merits of sambhūyasana to the confused character of aggressors, who could seldom be represented as a common foe by partaking the characteristics of a neutral or middle king nor their aggressive designs be interpreted by as a threat to other neighbouring kings as well.

Prasāṅgasana

Kamandaka says, 'When a king desirous of going to a certain place (or person) halts through some contingency or other at a place different from where he intended to go at first, it is called prasāṅgasana by those well-versed in the science of polity.' This kind of asana appears to be related to a military halt during the course of marching, which, however, may be caused by some contingency such as topographical and seasonal obstacles, the politico-military attitude of an intervening king, an unexpected fall of an ally before joining him etc.

Upeksāsana

Kamandaka writes, 'The apparently indifferent attitude of a

1. KN, XI. 20. See also M. N. Dutt's translation p. 158.
king before an enemy more powerful than himself is called staying quiet owing to indifference.\(^1\) His two illustrations, namely the attitude of Indra when Krishna carried away the Parijata flowers from his gardens, and Rukma's inactivity when Krishna abducted his sister Rukmini\(^2\) suggest that two factors especially favour upaksasana: greater power of the aggressor who intends to cause slight injury and a certain specific reason or secret motive. As an example, we may refer to the policy and position adopted by the Candella king Madanavarman when faced with an invasion of his kingdom by Caulukya Jayasimha Siddharaja. The aggressor in this instance did not aim at the subjugation of the Candella king but merely to put an end to the latter's claim on the Paramara kingdom of Malwa, which he had conquered. Knowing the objective of the invader Madanavarman initially ignored him and is alleged to have later befriended him without giving battle.\(^3\)

The Gujarat chroniclers exaggerate the course and consequence of the rivalry, but the above conclusion is unavoidable on the sifting of

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1. Ibid., XI. 21.
2. Ibid., XI. 21-22.
3. A. K. Majumdar, op. cit., pp. 76-77 esp. the account of Jayasimha's relations with Madanavarman as given by Jina Mandana.
the related accounts and the events that followed. It may be remarked en passant that upeksāsana serves defensive requirements and suggests that when material losses in battle are greater and the loss without doing it negligible, asana is the best policy.

Quite contrary to Kāmanḍaka's explanation of upeksāsana, Somesvara says, 'When that which one king seeks to accomplish (by expedition against the enemy, that is, the latter's destruction) is being done by Fate (daiva), through the employment of severe punishment, calamities, (or, enemy's vices), unseen acts, famine, epidemic, which would cause certain destruction of the enemy, the king stays quiet ignoring the enemy suffering from calamities, it is called upeksāsana.'

It is evident that Somesvara explains upeksāsana by reference to the policy of an aggressive king towards his declining enemy. He ignores the enemy because the latter is being destroyed by his own vices or by natural calamities. He, however, maintains a position of military preparedness against him since the state of war persists. But he refrains from invasion because the objective of destroying the enemy is being accomplished without fighting, and there are chances that when the enemy would have been considerably weakened in consequence of calamities he might submit of his own accord or be easily vanquished. Moreover, it was against the heroic ideals to invade a king in extreme distress. Furthermore, Somesvara forbids a king to march against a kingdom struck down with drought, famine, and

1. Manas, II. XIV. 934-35.
pestilence probably in view of the hardships and contagion to which even the invading troops would be exposed.\footnote{1}

It is evident that while approaching the explanation of upeksāsana from different standpoints, both Kāmandaka and Someśvara agree that the result of this measure of policy is the absence of armed encounter, whether owing to defensive motives or to politic calculations that serve offensive designs. With Kāmandaka it is ignoring the aggressor’s intrusion because of his greater power and with Someśvara it is refraining from invasion because the enemy is himself being hopefully weakened. In each case, however, upeksāsana involves a policy of prudent waiting presumably with military preparedness until further political and military developments.

Prītyāsana

According to Bhoja prītyāsana is that which creates amity with all and is the characteristic quality of one’s state. This is the best of all āsanas.\footnote{2} It is not very clear what the author really wants to convey, and whether or not prītyāsana has any direct relation to war. Perhaps he means it as a policy of friendliness and no war together with the maintenance of a position of effective resistance should any other king attack the kingdom of the person observing prītyāsana. If prītyāsana is to be understood as a policy that follows vīgraḥa, in that case it means suspension of hostilities and creation of amity with the rival, which brings peace. It is striking

\footnote{1} Manas., II XIV, 928.
\footnote{2} Ykt., 89. p. 13, Sarveśaṁ prīti’jananam nijarāśtrasya lakṣaṇam।

Etat prītyāsanam nāma sarvasana mahattaram।
that śrītīyāsana is not said to involve sandhi (treaty or compact), although it creates goodwill among rivals. It seems to be a policy of peace, which is different from sandhi involving compromise or settlement, and the king pursuing it is able to avoid war by creating amity and good-will among the enemies despite their policy to start hostilities. Since śrītīyāsana is described as the mark (laksāna) of one's kingdom, it envisages a general policy of peace in the fullest sense of the term, which is conducive to the king's own interests as well as to inter-state accord.

Somesvara's svasthāsana, which means 'staying quiet when the kingdom is free from dangers (lit. thorns) and the enemy circle is destroyed,' seems to be somewhat associated with śrītīyāsana as it also indicates a policy of self-abiding, though made feasible by the presence of internal security and the absence of war with enemies. It seems to have characterized relations of a powerful king who had consolidated his power in his own kingdom and subdued his external enemies, as for example, the relations of the Caulukya king Jayasimha Siddharāja with his neighbouring kings after his conquest of Malwa in about 1138 and the settlement of conflict with the Candella king Madanavarman. This may be said to correspond to svasthāsana. Similarly his successor Kumārapāla's policy after his war with Kohkana may be described as svasthāsana. It may be added that this self-abiding policy could not be pursued without maintaining a watchful

1. Manas, II. XIV. 933.
position of military preparedness, which is one of the main characteristics of asana in general.

However, svasthasana is different from prityasana as it implies a rather negative approach to hostile relations in contrast to the positive character of the latter suggested by its quality of creating amity and accord with all kings, especially enemies. Svasthasana marks a pause in the policy of self-aggrandizement at the expense of enemies on the achievement of sufficient success in ensuring internal solidarity and external supremacy over enemies, but prityasana implies good neighbourly relations, and while it may assume internal security of the kingdom, it does not necessarily indicate any superiority over enemies in external relations.

Among Someśvara's ten kinds of asanas we have already discussed the svasthasana, the durgasadhyasana, nikatasana, and upeksasana. We will now explain the remaining types.

Māgarodhasana

Someśvara says, 'If the march (of troops) is obstructed by the river in spate and the king halts at that place, it is called staying quiet on account of the obstruction in the way.' This is clearly a halting or stoppage necessitated by natural barriers.

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1. Manas, II, XIV. 936.
Having acquired a country by force, when a king stays there for the consolidation of his rule, this is called staying quiet for annexing a country. Victory on the field of battle entitles a victor to rule over a country, but the conqueror needs the temporary occupation of the vanquished kingdom to finalise its political settlement, to approve laws and customs of the land, to confirm grants and other arrangements of the vanquished king, and to introduce necessary political, fiscal and even religious measures that may ingratiate him to his new subjects. This kind of temporary stay is in no way connected with any attitude of indifference, on the contrary, it is taking up a position of power and authority in an occupied kingdom for the purpose of reducing it to lasting subjection. During our periods victors are known to have temporarily stayed in the occupied kingdom for the purpose of celebrating their victory and annexing the territory. They sometimes appointed a governor in charge of the administration and defence of the country or divided it among several feudatories, who extended their rule over those areas. Thus, the arrangements for annexing a territory or kingdom required the victor to stay temporarily in the occupied kingdom, for it also helped the consolidation of his authority since his awe and majesty could easily evoke loyalty from the

1. Ibid., II. XIV, 938.
2. See above, p. 271.
3. E.g. Jayasimha Siddharāja appointed Mahādeva as his governor in Mālwa in A.D. 1138; see A. K. Majumdar, op. cit., p. 76.
hostile subjects and discourage any further resistance.

Ramaniyasana

'Having marched against the enemy and killed him in the battle, when a king seeing the pleasant surroundings stays (encamps) together with his followers at a place full of corn, water, fuel, and fodder, this is called ramaniyasana.'¹ This is simply a halt probably on the way back home from a successful expedition, which the victor makes in order to remove fatigue and indulge in camp revelries.

Duramārgasana

'Having gone to a distant (enemy) country and having fully accomplished his business, when a king, realizing that his own capital is far away, stays there unperplexed during the rainy season until the advent of sarad (October - November), that halting at a proper place far away is called duramārgasana.'² This is again a temporary stay together with the army probably in the enemy kingdom or at the capital of a submissive king.³

1. Manas, II. XIV. 939-40.
3. e.g. the stay of the Rastrakūta emperor Govinda III at Sribhavana, the capital of Sarva, a Vindhya chief, during the rainy season, while he was returning from his successful Northern Indian campaign. See, A. S. Altaker, The Rastrakūtas and their Times, (Poona, 1934). pp. 67-68.
Pralobhāsana

When the king stops there, tempted by the inducements of another ruler, who asks: 'Stay a while, I will give you elephants, horses, wealth, jewels, a fort and territory after killing my enemy,' this is called pralobhāsana. 'When another ruler allures the king to stay by promising him gifts within a month, a fortnight, ten days or five days and the king bearing that hope awaits for a long time, this is called pralobhāsana.' It appears that in this kind of asana the alluring promises are made by a ruler who has submitted to a treaty providing for the yielding of treasury and territory. It may again be presumed to correspond to the position of an invader, who has halted with his troops at a strategic place and demanded treasury, beasts of burden, and even territory from the enemy, who is engaged in a war with another foe. The aggrieved ruler in his predicament promises to pay rich gifts and puts off the invasion by requesting the invader to stay quiet for some time. In both cases, asana involves inactivity and the maintenance of a post against the enemy on the part of the king who stays quiet in view of the tempting offers.

Parādhīnāsana

When a king stays at some place because he cannot go to his own country owing to either affection or hostility (of another ruler), this is called parādhīnāsana or staying quiet owing to dependence upon

1. Manas, II, XIV. 944-47.
another. Such situations, when the king is immobilised or stranded, may arise after the occupation of a hostile kingdom where the king has installed one of his relatives or protégés for whose stability he has to stay for some time, and also when he apprehends hostility from the vanquished if he quits his kingdom without crushing his sinews of power. This kind of asana emphasizes the stranded position of a king with his troops in a foreign country and his policy to stay on owing to factors which he is unable to overcome otherwise.

Having discussed asana at length we now propose to examine the contention of those scholars who interpret it as a policy of neutrality. We have, however, to remember that neutrality as a concept of international relations is of relatively recent origin. Neutrality means 'a neutral attitude between contending parties or powers', or 'the condition of a state which abstains from taking part in a dispute between two other states'. As a modern concept, neutrality is a legal
position of a state which intends to remain neutral from war between two states or groups of states while maintaining certain rights towards belligerents and observing certain duties prescribed by customary law.\textsuperscript{1}

Oppenheim states: 'Neutrality may be defined as the attitude of impartiality adopted by third states towards belligerents and recognised by belligerents, such attitude creating rights and duties between the impartial states and belligerents.'\textsuperscript{2} In view of these definitions we have to examine how far the policy of āsana squares with the concept of neutrality.

S. V. Viswanatha and, following him, H. L. Chatterjee begin with the premise that āsana is neutrality because our authorities equate it with upakṣaṇa.\textsuperscript{3} H. L. Chatterjee claims to adduce a new piece of evidence from the Kullūka's commentary on Manu, for, he says 'Kullūkabhaṭṭa uses the term 'nairapekṣya' (impartiality) to explain the term āsana.'\textsuperscript{4} This is, however, due to a complete misunderstanding of the text, because Kullūka does not use the word nairapekṣya to clarify the meaning of āsana in the context at all. What Kullūka really means by it in the original line is that sandhi, etc. are independently explained later on.\textsuperscript{5} Thus H. L. Chatterjee imputes a

\textsuperscript{1} G. G. Fenwick, \textit{International Law} (2nd ed.), ch. 32. pp. 530ff.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{International Law}, ( \dots \textit{5th} \dots \textit{ed}) Vol. II. pp. 514-515.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Op. cit.}, p. 188; \textit{op. cit.}, p. 130
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Op. cit.}, p. 130.
\textsuperscript{5} Kullūka on \textit{Manu}, VII. 161 - Āsanaṁ iti $\frac{1}{2}$ which is his shorthand way of referring to the entire verse of Manu, wherein all six gunas are mentioned (not only āsana), before proceeding to his comments/ Sandhyadigunanāṁ nairapekṣyenaṁsthānānāṁśanantaramuktām taducitāṁsthitāṁśuṣyāmārambhāṁ //
meaning to āsana on the strength of an interpretation of the Kullūka's commentary which is absolutely wrong. He further quotes Ksīrāsvāmin, a commentator of the Amarakośa, who writes, āsanaṁ vigrahaśadinivṛttih, which Chatterjeé translates as 'abstention from war is neutrality.'

It may, however, be translated as 'āsana (a pause) is cessation of fighting etc.' Even Ksīrāsvāmin's explanation does not refer to āsana being a policy of a king towards belligerents; on the contrary it is a policy of one of the belligerents that brings about the cessation of fighting etc. We are thus finally left with the laconic definition: upekṣanam āsanam. Can this mean neutrality?

Our discussion of āsana has shown that while indifference to war is an attribute of āsana, indifference (upekṣa) really denotes waiting patiently in a state of war (vigraha) until one's own power becomes superior to that of the adversary, who is equal when recourse to āsana is taken. Further, indifference is in fact an expedient to translate the policy of āsana by bringing about a suspension of military operations; it does not, however, end hostilities. On the contrary as already noted, āsana retains the state of vigraha while involving non-commencement of an expedition or pause or cessation of fighting. Thus, the indifference (upekṣa) which is equated with āsana cannot be construed as neutrality, because the latter regards an absence of war between the parties concerned as a prerequisite of its existence.

Further, since  

aśana is not normally construed as an instrument of peace, a strategic position of military preparedness for offensive or defensive reasons became the predominant feature of aśana. This position against the enemy gradually subordinated the element of indifference which aśana originally implied with the result that Kamandaka and Somesvara included even a siege strategy among many kings of aśana. Commentators on Manu and Yājñavalkya emphasized the withdrawal of the king from an armed conflict with the adversary as an important aspect of aśana, thus denoting that aśana is a policy of seeking cover (ātmasamvaranam) when the king has become weakened. Somesvara further reduced aśana in some cases to a military halting, encamping and even temporary staying of a victor in an occupied kingdom for some compelling reasons; thereby showing that aśana does not even imply any indifference to war as such. Aśana really denotes a policy of waiting in a particular position, which is far removed from that of neutrality.

According to the modern view 'neutrality denotes the condition of impartiality or non-belligerence in war or rights and duties of states enjoying such a condition.' But aśana does not indicate these features; on the contrary, it (at best, denotes inactive confrontation, avoidance of direct clash of arms and lack of any rights and duties excepting those entailed by truce in case of sandhāyāśana. It may, however, be pointed out that even prityāśana and svasthāśana,  

which denote the condition of a king who seeks to create good neighbourly relations or to avoid war with enemies, do not in any way correspond to neutrality.

In fact, the equation of āsana with neutrality is rather irrelevant mainly because the latter is the policy or condition of non-belligerence adopted by a third party towards belligerents or a third party attitude of not taking part in an armed conflict between two contending powers. In other words, neutrality in inter-state relations is possible in the presence of belligerents or two mutually conflicting powers. There cannot be any neutrality between the belligerents themselves, which is what is described by the policy of āsana. Āsana is applicable to situations of hostility between rivals and it may be adopted by either the aggressor or his adversary in certain circumstances. Āsana primarily describes an intermediary relationship between contending parties following the declaration of war (vīgraḥa). Thus, the basic premises of āsana and neutrality are different.

Further, neutrality as a modern principle of foreign policy is possible only if both the contenders consent to respect the neutrality of a state, which wishes to keep aloof from the conflict and observe impartiality. But āsana normally involves an unilateral decision of either of the belligerents to put off the moment of mutual destruction or to manipulate one's own escape from a war that no longer promises any benefit or to wait until the removal of certain obstacles or the full-fulfilment calculated objectives. This unilateral decision is possible because of the power and readiness to take counter-measures should the
adversary continue fighting. Sometimes, however, the acquiescence of
the adversary is managed through the quiet use of political means
such as conciliation or through a truce.

It is only in one stanza that Somesvāra writes: 'A wise (king)
stays until the destruction of his enemies who are weakening owing to
their mutual conflict.' This may imply that the policy of असानम is
a third party attitude of non-intervention but it really means a policy
of waiting and not precipitating war when the object of hostility is
being served without direct involvement. असानम in this instance may
be said to be 'the continuation of the previously existing state', a
definition of neutrality, but it is of hostility (विग्रहा), which is
inconsistent with the concept of neutrality. In fact, the king is
advised to adopt असानम in such a situation as the task of subjugating
the weakened enemies would be easier later, while the invasion would
bring them together and adversely affect the balance of power.

It is thus evident that the concept of असानम does not fulfil
the basic requirements of neutrality, not to say of 'neutrality as a
legal position of a state.'

To sum up our discussion we feel that there are no sufficient
grounds to describe असानम as neutrality either on the basis of its
definition or by connecting it with the मध्यमा or the उदसिना kings;
for the former is related to a stage in the belligerency between rivals
and also underlies a position of military preparedness, and the

1. Manas, II. XIV. 929 -
Paraspara-virodhena kṣiyamaneṣu śatruṣu
Tadvināso bhaved yāvat tāvat tiṣṭhatyāuddhīman.

latter essays an arbitration of context in which asana is explained. In addition, while modern neutrality is an attitude of a third party and presupposes an absence of hostility, asana is invariably a policy and position of one of the belligerents. In the strict sense of the term asana indicates an absence of armed encounter in a state of mutual hostility. If this aspect of asana is developed without any reference to our authorities in the light of the modern concept of neutrality then alone it may correspond to neutrality. But this would be a new and modern principle and not the traditional and historical asana.
Our authorities differ on the meaning and interpretation of the term ādāna, which may be rendered as 'dual policy' regardless of its elucidation in several sources as 'the bifurcation of troops'.¹ Defining ādāna, Visvarūpa says, 'Employment of two seeds [policies? of peace (sandhi) and war (vīgraha) is the dual policy'.² Keśāthithi writes, 'Employment of peace and war is ādāna'.³ Somadeva explains it as 'concluding peace (sandhi) with one and [thereafter] waging war (vīgraha) upon another or making sandhi (truce or treaty) with the foe first and fighting with him afterwards'.⁴ These authors apparently repeat Kautilya's terms without modification except the extension of the applicability of ādāna to a single powerful invader at alternate stages in the belligerency, which, however, implies that ādāna is also a policy of duplicity. In Kautilya's terms, Somadeva's second definition of ādāna should

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¹See below, p.

²I. Xæ, 1. 545. Sandhi-vīgraha-dvīdābhāva-dvādāna dvādābhāvac.


⁴IV. XXIX. 43. Ekena saha sandhāvyayena saha vīgraha-karanam ekena vai -Sahāsandhāvyayena vīgrahā dvādābhāvac.

⁵I. VII. 1. 11. Sandhi-vīgraha-pādāna dvādābhāvac iti.
properly be called sanhārasyāna.¹ Kauṭilya keeps the two terms separate, but our authorities expand the definitions of both concepts so that they overlap.

The essential features of the dual policy consist in practising peace and war simultaneously or alternately in order to aggrandize and safeguard his interests as the king has to deal with two enemies on different sides or a single powerful foe. The duality of the measures of sandhi and vigraha smacks of duplicity in as much as a king treats his two enemies in different ways or the same enemy differently after an interval. Dvaidhibhāva thus demands deftness and secrecy because its success depends largely on the confidence a king is able to instil in his enemy with whom he has concluded a sandhi, which he really does not intend to endure for long. Somadeva rightly says that dvaidhibhāva is dependent on intelligence² and its success, according to Someśvara, depends on the ingenuity of the king to keep his counsel (mantra) strictly secret.³

Kedhatithi, however, departs from Kauṭilya when later confronted with Hanu's explicit definition that dvaidhibhāva consists in the bifurcation of troops.⁴ He says, 'when different positions

¹KA, VII.4.18. See also Kangle's explanatory notes.
²IV, XXI.49.
³Hanas., II, XVI.959.
⁴On Hanu, VII.157; RDK, XIII.112-13 also quotes Hanu, VII.167, 173.
are taken up by the Master and his army - the Master with a small force, remains in the fort, while the Commander, with a larger force proceeds elsewhere. Or, some sort of "bifurcation" is resorted to by way of favouring the different divisions, in the way of allowing all the divisions opportunities for securing booties of gold and other things.\(^1\) Vijñānacārīya and Āparākṣa on Yājñavalkya and Kullūka on Kauśī agree with this explanation and define dvāidhibhāvā as 'bifurcation of troops'\(^2\) for the accomplishment of some purpose.\(^3\) The Āṃśika Purāṇa also repeats the idea when it says, 'Dvāidhibhāvā signifies the mobilisation of half of the army against an enemy'.\(^4\) It is clear that, according to these authorities, dvāidhibhāvā comprises the division of troops into two strategic formations or positions, whether during the course of an invasion or defensive operation. This kind of interpretation reduces dvāidhibhāvā to a mere military strategy regardless of the subtlety of policy or cunningness of diplomacy. Obviously this explanation gives an altogether different meaning hardly consistent with the original idea of dual policy which combines measures of sandhi and vīgraha as two prongs of political action. Some of our modern scholars, without being aware of the contradiction between dvāidhibhāvā

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\(^1\) On Kauśī, VII.167; see also MA, II.7, 13-14; RDK, XIII. p.112.

\(^2\) On Yājñ., I. 347 - Svabalaśya dvāidhakaranaṁ.

\(^3\) Kullūka on Kauśī VII. 160. Svārthāciddhaye balasyadvādikaranaṁ dvāidhībhavah.

as a politic measure and as a military bifurcation, interpret it as 'division of forces into two, one apparently marching against the enemy while the other remains behind to prevent a rear attack by the neighbour on the other side, who is also a potential foe;\(^1\) indeed, an exact equivalent of वर्ग्योर्धपायत् \(^2\) or as a measure of military necessity which requires giving up the concentration of resources and forces of a fortified capital when a division is rendered necessary by the fear of an aggressor encircling the army.\(^3\) Medhatithi also says that in certain circumstances an invading army is divided into two so as to give all divisions of the army equal opportunities of securing booty.\(^4\)

While it may be conceded that द्वादिढिभाव is sometimes expressed through the division of troops for either invasion or defence, these positions however do not sum it up. Govindarāja and Nandana, the two later commentators on Manu, realised the confusion in mistaking strategy for policy and hence explained it away by quoting Kaśyapa on the issue.\(^5\) But this in no way helps in resolving the confusion of the Smṛti text. It is Viśvarūpa who attempted to remove the incongruity between द्वादिढिभाव as either a strategic

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\(^1\) RK, Intr. pp. 87 ff.

\(^2\) See above, p. 242.

\(^3\) RK, Intr. p. 66.

\(^4\) On Manu, VII. 167.

\(^5\) On Manu, VII. 167.
division of forces or a politic expedient. Commenting on Yājñavalkya he says that, though weak, a king should stand firm by dividing his forces into two strategic formations and resort to the dual policy of sandhi and vicraha.\(^1\) It is apparent that Visvarūpa retains Manu's explanation but he attempts to harmonize it with his previous definition which, as already noted, is Kauṭilyan in diction.\(^2\) What he seems to indicate is that these military divisions help the execution of dual policy as the king from his secure place (i.e. his capital or fort) may carry on negotiations for sandhi with the assailant himself or another invader cooperating with him, while the larger division of his troops is poised for the counter-offensive. The bifurcation of forces thus expresses the twin measures of sandhi and vicraha and is construed as a means to the end. The measure of the dual policy in defensive position aims at avoiding a military defeat and an abject surrender by negotiating a sandhi while threatening to fight, if forced. It is a pity that none of the commentators on Hanu realised the contribution of Visvarūpa in this regard. We may, however, add that the commentators on Hanu, and Kauṭilya who follows Hanu, indirectly imply the combination of sandhi and vicraha as characteristic features of the dvaidhībhāva. This is

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\(^1\) On Yājñ, I. 343.

\(^2\) But not Kauṭilyan in substance: for Kauṭilya, dvaidhībhāva is not duplicity. Cf. KA, VII.1.37.
indicated by their relating dvaidhībhāva to a king's seeking shelter in a fort in the event of an attack on him. This is followed by his efforts to secure outside help from friends or to seek shelter with another powerful ruler for which negotiations are to be initiated while he is still able to withstand the invading hordes. These approaches culminate in some sort of a sandhi with those sympathetic to the king's distress. It is thus by implication and in an extended application of the dvaidhībhāva defined as bifurcation of troops that we may discern its original meaning.

A more pointed explanation of dvaidhībhāva as a defensive measure of the foreign policy is given by Kamandaka, who has been repeated by the author of the Agni Purāṇa, Bhoja Paramāra, Govindarāja and Mandana on Hānu, and Somesvara. He says, 'when placed between two powerful enemies a king should verbally surrender to both and himself remain imperceptible like the single eye-ball of the crow'. The king should try assiduously to put off by empty promises one of the two powerful enemies who is dangerously close at hand. But if both assail him simultaneously he should ally himself to the stronger of the two. If, however,
both enemies have been convinced of his duplicity and each rejects his overtures of sandhi. the king should seek shelter with the enemy of them both or surrender to the stronger of the assailants.\footnote{1} It is clear that the dual policy involves recourse to both sandhi and vigraha in a dubious way. The exposure of the duplicity in putting forward empty promises and playing off one enemy against another would result in either seeking shelter with an enemy of his assailants or surrendering to the stronger of the assailants. In the event of an invasion from two sides a king is advised to ally with the stronger of the two invaders for crushing another when he finds that duplicity is of no avail. It is apparent that Kāmandaka and his followers realize the role of sandhi and vigraha as combined elements of dvaidhibhava, which is implemented through guile and even crookedness.

Explaining dvaidhibhava, Soneśvara further regards it as a policy of duplicity and deceit.\footnote{2} It involves double-dealing with two kings hostile to each other and even double-crossing them. Taking recourse to dvaidhibhava a king may secure illicit emoluments from the enemy of his overlord, while really serving his overlord in all circumstances or dodge his two neighbours inimical to each other by pretending to be friendly to each and

\footnote{1}{KH, XI.25; Agni, 240.30. The text of the Agni Purāṇa has the word Vrajat instead of Sañjārayet, which is obviously an error of the copyist.}

\footnote{2}{Hānas., II, XVI.956, 960-963.}
promising to co-operate in war against the other but actually promoting his own advancement by robbing them of their riches and beasts of burden.\(^1\) Besides it being the policy of the viśālu for dealing with his enemies in a straitened condition, it also corresponds to the policy of a buffer king (antarchi), who is apparently friendly to his neighbours but evades each in turn. In nature dvaidhībhāva is full of treachery and deceit and may imperil the pursuer if his secrets of counsel are divulged.\(^2\)

It is now evident that dvaidhībhāva is an ingenious measure of the sixfold policy which needs pursuing both sandhi and vigraha as instruments of a single policy in a dubious way, for the sake of safeguarding and promoting one's interests in inter-state conflict. There is no sincerity as far as parties to sandhi and vigraha are concerned; on the contrary, the king attempts to dupe his enemies by false pretensions. However, it may be mentioned that the implications of dvaidhībhāva in the Arthasastra are politic but not treacherous in as much as the illustrations hardly go beyond sembhīya-yana; in the Kanu-smṛti and its commentaries, they are only strategically deceptive; but in the later works like the Kanandakīya Mātisāra, the Uśīvalākṣyāmṛta, the Kanasollāsa, etc. they

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\(^1\)Iṣna., II. XVI. 953–968; cf. KA, VII. 2. 15 ff.

\(^2\)Ibid.
are dubious, deceptive and even treacherous. While duplicity characterises the *modus operandi* of the *dvaidhībhāva* according to later texts, there is no justification for Prof. Dikshitar's bold but erroneous suggestion that Dr. Chamasastry's interpretation of *dvaidhībhāva* as 'making peace with one and waging war with another' is subject to correction. It is in later works that *dvaidhībhāva* came to be closely associated with a confidence trick created by false pretensions of friendship and hostility. These remarks become more poignant in view of the narrowest explanation of *dvaidhībhāva* expressed in the overtures of *sandhi* made by belligerents to each other varying in initiative according to circumstance, while intensely preparing for war. In a sense *dvaidhībhāva* may also correspond to an ultimatum of war reiterated before the rival armies come to grips with each other. In such cases it indicates an element of indetermination born of weakness to plunge into warfare. A resort to the dual policy after taking shelter in the fort marks a precarious state of affairs, which leans on another measure called *samrāya*.

Factors and circumstances connected with *dvaidhībhāva*.

1. Mother impelled by desire for gain or by fear, or having well-being as his aim, a king residing between two /hostile states remains

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1. *MM*, p.324. Prof. Kangle follows Dr. Chamasastry's interpretation of this passage in his translation, *MM*, VII. 1.11.

secure for a long time by resorting to dvaidhibhava. 1

The situations amenable to dvaidhibhava vary from the expedition against an enemy to defensive resistance and even to the maintenance of a precarious balance of power. In all circumstances, however, the inferiority of the strength of the king in comparison to that of his enemies seems to be the determining factor. This weakness is sought to be overcome by overtures for sandhi with one of the foes, who binds himself to help the king with treasury and troops for a fair return at the termination of the king's expedition as well as to desist from active hostility during this period. 2 Thus strengthened the king is able to march against his enemy in order to subdue him and enhance his power. While this explanation of the cause and circumstances is plausible a discordant note is struck by the author of Agni Purana and by Kedhatithi, who disavow that dvaidhibhava is always rooted in weakness. According to them it springs from the greater strength of the aggressive

1 Kaناس, II. XVI. 957. Labhād va’pi bhuyad va’pi yogakṣenārtham udyataḥ. dvayoḥmadhye cireṇ kalem dvaidhibhāvena yācayet. || In view of this evidence we disagree with Prof. Dikshitar's statement that 'dvaidhibhava means practicing duplicity against one's enemies invariably through fear of them', for fear is but only one of many motives.

2 Kṣ, XXX. 45; cf. Kṣ, VII. 7. 1ff.
Medhatithi says, 'It is found that it is only the more powerful king who divides his forces, when under difficulties', or '... by way of allowing all the divisions of troops opportunities for securing booties of gold and other things'.

But for the interpretation of dvaidhibhavā as bifurcation of troops, the position of Medhatithi would be inexplicable.

Dvaidhibhavā is also a qualified expedient to deal with the situation created by an invasion of a kingdom by its two enemies from two sides or by a single powerful foe. The victim opens negotiations for śanāhī with both in order to dupe them or concludes it with the more powerful of the two assailants and proceeds to exterminate the other. We may illustrate this by a reference to an event in the reign of the Govindaraja king Kāla-raja I of Gujarāt. According to Heruttunga, Kālarāja was simultaneously attacked by Bārapa from Lāja and the Cāhanana king Vigrahārāja II of Sapādālaṅka. Though he tried to overcome his predicament by despatching troops towards both enemies and himself taking shelter in a fortress called Kanthādurgā (Kanthakota

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1. Cn Kanu, VII.173; Agni, 234.19; RDK, XIII. pp. 112-13 quotes Kanu Balyaneva hi vyasahe balaq dvidhakaro ti drṣyate.

2. Cn Kanu, VII.173.

3. Ibid., VII.167.

in Cutch) he had finally to negotiate a sandhi with Vīgraharāja II, whom he approached personally in the latter's camp. After the conclusion of this agreement Vīgraharāja joined Mūlarāja in the latter's expedition against Bārapa.1 This one historical event bears out the essential features of dvaiddhibhāva as found in Hānu and his commentator, Nādhātithi, etc. as well as in the mātisāra works.

Another historical event connected with the reign of the Cauḷukya king Bhimā II, namely the invasion of Gujarāt by the Yādava king Simhāpa, which finally ended in a sandhi, also bears out the application of dvaiddhibhāva.2 In this instance the Cauḷukya minister Lavaṇaprasāda first advanced to oppose the Yādava assailant, but opened negotiation for sandhi because of the simultaneous uprising of the kings of Harwāḍ. While negotiations were yet in progress he had managed to send an army under his son Vīrāchavala to ravage the territory of the Yādavas. Thus, by practising an alternate policy of war and peace with one and the same ruler and finally concluding a sandhi because of war on another front Lavaṇaprasāda succeeded in defending the Cauḷukya kingdom.

In both these instances the weakness of forces in coping with the invasions was the main factor in favour of a dual policy which, in such circumstances, is even admitted by Nādhātithi for, he says, 'when a ... has been attacked by a strong king recouping

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1 PC, p.25-4; PrthviRājaVijaya, V. vv.50-53; Dvaiddrayāvya, V. vv.1-96; H., II.9; A.K. Nājundar, op.cit., pp. 28-29; D. Sharma, op.cit., p.50.

2 Trīkāumudī, IV.42 ff; Lekhapaddhāti, pp. 52, 45; A.K. Nājundar, op.cit., pp. 150 ff.
is impossible; what is beneficial is resorting to a fortress, and this means garrisoning, which involves bifurcation.¹

It is, however, surprising that Medhatithi never returns to his previous definition but sticks to Manu's interpretation of dvaidhibhāva, whatever the circumstance.

In addition to the situations of aggression and self-defence, Somesvara recommends to a king the application of dvaidhibhāva towards his two neighbours inimical to one another when he finds that an estrangement with either would imperil his interests and by playing off one against the other he would not only maintain the precarious balance of power but also increase his own treasury and troops.² In such a situation the king concludes a sandhi with each and pledges to cooperate in vigraha against the other and thus secretly profits by their credulity in his false pretentions, while himself remaining virtually hostile to both of them.³ It is, however, indicated that such a king succeeds because each of the two rivals wants to make him a scapegoat of their rivalry without realizing the dodges being administered to themselves.

Kinds of Dvaidhibhāva

Medhatithi describes two kinds of dvaidhibhāva (bifurcation of troops), viz. 1) that which is done for one's own sake and

¹On Manu, 173.
²Manas., II, XVI.966-68.
³Ibid.
2) that done for the sake of others.\(^1\) Karayapa, however, supposes that in one case the army stops in front of the enemy under the command of a general, while the king marches with a portion of his forces, and that in other cases the contrary takes place.\(^2\) Kananda\(^a\), whose definition of dvaidhībhāva is quoted by Govindarāja on Kanu, also distinguishes its two types: that which is done independently (avatāntra) because it is conducive to the interests of the king himself and that which is dependent upon others (paratāntra) owing to the king's receiving remuneration from two kings inimical to each other.\(^3\) This latter variety resembles the policy of the buffer king whose main characteristic is proclivity to dodge his neighbours by accepting remuneration from both in return for his partisan pretensions to each.

Somasvara has further described five kinds of dvaidhībhāva interpreted as duplicity.\(^4\) Hithyacitta refers to a king who is really hostile to the other in his heart of hearts but speaks in pleasant terms, that is, pretends to be friendly towards him.

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\(^1\) On Kanu, VII.167.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid., cf. Ka, XI.255.

\(^4\) See above, p. 123. Antardhī is called Ubhayavetana by Somacova, XV, XXX, 29.

\(^5\) Kanas., II, XVI.958-59.
while virtually harbouring enmity, \(^1\) nityyavacana raihifaya means speaking out agreeable things to others but acting contrariwise, that is, performing harmful acts. \(^2\) Kithyakaraya consists in falsely performing bit by bit desirable acts with a view to gain confidence of the other but subverting him by destroying his great works at the end; \(^3\) ubhayavetana comprises the policy of a king who stealthily accepts illicit emoluments from the enemy of his master in addition to the payment from his overlord but reveals the fact to the latter and pries into the secrets of the former's counsel in confidence, but betrays these to his real master. His policy of receiving payment from both, i.e. his real master as well as his enemy, corresponds to the conduct of a deceitful spy who enters the enemy side by hiding his real character but serves the interests of his master, while also enjoying the benefits conferred by the enemy. \(^4\) Finally, yugmaprabhytaka is indeed a policy of downright duplicity. It involves a king's secret acceptance of huge gifts from each of the two mutually hostile rulers for accomplishing identically inimical purposes. The king accepts large presents from one ruler who asks him to restrain his enemy but at the same time he also receives horses and elephants etc. from the latter's enemy for suppressing him (i.e. the ruler who

\(^1\) Hanas., II. XVI. 960.

\(^2\) Ibid., 961.

\(^3\) Ibid., 962-63.

\(^4\) Ibid., 964-65.
The king promises to the one to overpower his enemy and to his enemy to despatch troops for the subjugation of the other, but pretending so he actually robs both of their treasury and beasts of burden by playing off one against another and thus swells up his strength in order to aggrandize his interests.\(^1\) This conduct of apparent treachery is conducive to a ruler who cannot afford antagonizing either of the two rivals but concentrates on securing his own advancement by exploiting their mutual hostility. It appears that besides viipiraga who takes recourse to this policy when in troubles, it normally characterises the policy of such buffer kings as antardhina in the mandala. It may be noted on passant that these different kinds amply demonstrate that the \textit{dvaidhibrava} consists of two apparently contradictory elements and the real motive is sought to be cloaked in pretentious appearances which others mistake for genuineness. It is a policy of dodging the enemy or enemies when one is in a precarious position.

Thus \textit{dvaidhibrava} means dual policy which combines the measures of \textit{sandhi} and \textit{vigraha}. It is expedient in a particular

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\(^1\) \textit{Manas.}, II. XVI.966-69. Prof. Dikshitar's explanation of these five kinds of \textit{dvaidhibrava} on the basis of a late work, \textit{Siyatattvaratnakara} (5.12.30-41) could have been refreshing if he had taken into account the \textit{Hanasollasa}, where these are discussed for the first time. In several instances his interpretations seem to indicate slightly different implications. Vide \textit{JAL}, pp. 325-26.
situation especially when one has to deal with two enemies at the same time. Although in the *Arthasastra* it is not described as duplicity nor is it said to be so in its interpretation as 'bifurcation of troops', but in several texts of our period *dvaidhībhāva* is clearly considered a policy of duplicity, deceit and even double dealing.
When dvaidhibhava becomes increasingly precarious and the king no longer feels himself secure even in his fort because of his reduced strength, he is advised to resort to the policy of Samsraya (or साम्राज्य) in a last bid to stave off the impending disaster. Samsraya has been variously rendered as 'support', or 'support of allies', 'protection', 'subordinate alliance', 'seeking refuge',¹ but it is felt that its translation as 'seeking shelter' adopted by many learned translators of ancient works on law and polity² is more appropriate because it adequately expresses the meaning and conveys the full import of the term.

Samsraya has been defined by the commentator Visvarūpa as 'seeking shelter with another when one is reduced in power'.³ In agreement with Kautilya both Medhatithi and Somadeva say 'submitting of oneself to another is samsraya'.⁴ Qualifying the protector Vijñānesvara observes: 'Seeking protection of a stronger one is samsraya'.⁵ Aparārka and Kulluka explain it as: 'Seeking

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² Cf. G. Jhā, tr. Manusmyti; R. P. Kangle; KA, VII.1.2.
³ On Yājñ., I.343.
⁴ On Manu, VII.160; NV, XXIX.47, Parasyātmārpanam samśrayah; Cf. KA, VII.1.10. Pararpapan samśrayah.
⁵ On Yājñ., I, 347. Samśrayo balavadāśrayanam.
shelter with a powerful king when persecuted by an enemy.\(^1\) The *Agni Purāṇa* at one place merely states, 'entrusting to the udāsīna or madhyama (the middle or neutral king) is samāraya'.\(^2\) However, repeating Kāmandaka the author of the *Agni Purāṇa* elsewhere and Bhoja Paramēra say that 'when one who has no means of counter-action is being destroyed by a strong king he should seek shelter with a mighty ruler of noble lineage and truthful disposition'.\(^3\) Someśvara also writes: 'When the enemy is oppressive and the king is himself weak and sees no chance of success, he should seek shelter at a place of safety'.\(^4\)

These definitions clearly indicate that samāraya involves self-submission of a king usually to another powerful ruler in order to escape extermination at the hands of an oppressive enemy. Its real character and form depend on the specific situations during the state of war. For, before the actual invasion of the kingdom, it constitutes a kind of protective subordinate alliance which may deter the aggressive enemy; during warfare, it expresses an appeal for military help on the basis of self-submission; and after sustaining a decisive defeat at the hands of the invader, it is simply seeking


\(^2\)*Agni, 234.20.* *Udāsīno madhyama va samārayat samārayah smrtah,* cf. *KA, VII.2.21 ff; X.2.13.*

\(^3\)*Agni, 240.31; *Ykt, 93.p.13; KN, XI.27.* *Ucchidyamāno balinā nirūpayah pratikriyāḥ kulodgatāṁ satyamaryamaśrayet balotkatam.*

\(^4\)*Manas., II.XV.949.* *Sveyam hinabalo rāja jayahetum na paśyati Balina pīgyamano yah kṣemasthānam samaśrayet.*
shelter to protect life and recover the kingdom later on.\(^1\) However, in certain circumstances flight to a place of safety such as a fort or secret stronghold is also called *samśraya*, a measure akin to the dual policy, which, however, overlaps with *samśraya* in several other ways.

According to Medhatithi, *samśraya* in another context means entering into a protective alliance with another mighty ruler in normal times.\(^2\) The object in such cases is to acquire a political status in the interstate sphere that would save the king from the future harassment of his enemies because they would be restrained by the fear of retaliation from his protector in such an event.\(^3\) It may be remarked that such kinds of subordinate alliances for protection often created protectorates because the weak king not only acknowledged the suzerainty of an overlord but willingly took upon himself the duties and obligations of a tributary king or political satellite. *Samśraya* seems to differ from *sandhi* in the respect that it institutes a subordinate alliance for protection based upon self-submission of the king seeking shelter, while the latter means a compact for both undertaking and terminating war.\(^4\) *Sandhi* may lead to friendship and to the ending of disputes, while *samśraya*

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\(^1\) Medh. on *Manu*, VII.168 - *says* that a king seeking shelter may have to give up his kingdom and go to the realm of his protector.

\(^2\) On *Manu*, VII.168.

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) *Sandhi* is generally between equals, although *hīna-sandhi* is a subordinate treaty.
brings safety. The essence of the former is an accord between two parties and that of the latter is self-submission of the one and condescension of the other.

Factors and circumstances connected with samśraya

Our authorities agree that the compelling factor which obliges a king to resort to samśraya is the depletion of his power beyond hope of timely recuperation and, in contrast, the overwhelmingly superior might of the assailant.¹ The king who seeks shelter also realizes the inadequacy of his diplomacy to persuade the aggressor to conclude a sandhi, the weakness of his forces as well as those of his allies to withstand the aggression for a desirable period; and, above all, his helplessness even to protect his own person in an extremely disastrous situation. The motive behind samśraya is not fear but the welfare of his government and people.² The immediate purpose is to secure protection in order to put an end to the enemy's oppression and ward off the impending peril of annihilation at his hands.³ It may be even necessary for accomplishing this purpose that the king should give up his own territory and go over to the realm of his powerful protector.⁴

The circumstances for samśraya normally arise in face of continual harassment by the enemy and in the wake of an aggression.

¹ On Manu, VII.168, 174; on Yajñ, I.347; Agni, 234.25; NV, XXIX, 55; Ykt., 93, p.14; HA, II. 14; RDK, XIII.pp.112-13 quotes Manu; Manas., II. XV.949 ff.
² Agni, 234.25; NV, XXIX.59; Ykt., 92, p.13.
³ On Manu, VII.168.
⁴ Medh. on Manu, VII.168.
on a weak king, who perceives his certain collapse at some stage during the war. Medhatithi says: 'When he finds that while in fortress he is quite liable to be assailed, then quickly he shall give up the fortress and take refuge with another righteous king.' In fact *samsraya* is a measure for a helpless situation when the victim of aggression is completely devoid of power; the constituent parts of his kingdom (*prakrti*) are in distress; and he himself is liable to be seized and exterminated. Sometimes in circumstances of inferior power in general without there being a threat of extermination from any of his enemies, a king seeks by *samsraya* a status in the inter-state sphere, for this serves as armour against his enemies' future harassment. Thus the circumstances created by the enemy's oppression, whether real or potential, lead to *samsraya*. But a continued dependence on others for one's security in the absence of any imminent threat of war doubtless brings scorn from others as Cakrayudha, the king of Kanauj, received from the Pratihara king Nagabhata II, who ultimately exterminated him. It may be added in passing that an invader whose plans of operation have gone astray, could also be forced to take shelter in extreme hardship when even his withdrawal promised no safety.

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1 On *Manu*, VII.174; other commentators also agree with this elucidation; *HA*, II.14.

2 *Agni*, 234.25; On *Manu*, VII.168; On *Yajn.*, I.347; see above p.353 , fn 1 .

3 Medh. on *Manu*, VII.168.

4 *El*, XVIII. p.108. v.9. *Jitvā parcāśraya-kṛta-sphuta-nīcabhāvam Cakrayudham...* (Gwalior Praśasti of Bhoja)
Kinds of samáraya

The commentators on Manu distinguish two kinds of samáraya, one, which is resorted to in order to put an end to harassment and invasion by one's enemy, and the other, to acquire political status among other kings of the inter-state system and so to forestall any future harassment.\(^1\) It is evident that the real distinction lies in the form and not in the nature of samáraya, for self-submission for protection in a weakened condition of power characterizes the alliance of both kinds. Somesvara, however, has further divided samáraya into three kinds on the basis of differences with regard to shelterer.\(^2\) Firstly, when, oppressed by a powerful enemy, a weak king takes shelter with the foe himself knowing him to have many allies and great virtues, it is called satsamáraya.\(^3\) Secondly, when knowing his foe, who is intent on annihilating him, to be devoid of virtues, a king lacking in means to withstand him seeks shelter with another ruler who is more powerful, righteous, truthful and has performed good deeds, it is known as anya-samáraya.\(^4\) Thirdly, when oppressed by a powerful assailant, a king, unequal to him in might, takes shelter in a fort, it is said to be durga-samáraya.\(^5\)

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\(^1\) On Manu, VII.168; RDK, XIII.p.112 quotes Manu.

\(^2\) Manes., II.XV.950 ff.

\(^3\) Ibid., II.XV.951-52; cf. NV, XXIX, 59; Ykt., 94, p.14, repeats KN, XI.30; also, see KA, VII.2.7. for advocating samáraya with the invader.

\(^4\) Ibid., 953-54.

\(^5\) Ibid., 955.
It is clear that Someśvara's distinctions take into account the nature and qualities of the assailant, the relative weakness of the king seeking shelter, and the variety of refuge. It may be mentioned that apart from the clarity and distinct terminology, there is nothing original in these three types of *samśraya* for they are discussed in the *Arthasastra* and the *Kamandakiya*.¹

**Samśraya with whom?**

A king in distress could seek shelter with any ruler because ideally every king in ancient India had the duty to grant freedom from fear to any suppliant in distress including his most despicable foe.² Traditionally, request for protection and political asylum was not to be refused since protection of the refugee was considered highly meritorious and its disregard a denial of moral obligation of rulership. Kings who staked their life and kingdom on the protection of refugees at their courts were praised for their liberality, uprightness, and heroism, ³ but those who turned away the suppliants were charged with avarice and cowardice.⁴ A king betraying his refugee by secretly contemplating to hand him over to the latter's enemy might alienate some of his own supporters and fall a victim to

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¹ *KA*, VII.2.6ff; *KN*, XI.29 ff.


³ *Rājarataṅgaṇī*, VII.144; *NM*, Intro. p.9 and text.

⁴ *Prthvīraja Rāsa*, p.58 ff. Viśaladeva did not offer refuge to anyone and amassed wealth in his treasury.
His refugee's intrigues in his own capital. It was thus possible to find kings willing to protect any ruler in distress and even to go to war with his enemy, if needed.

The easy availability of a protector, however, does not imply the ability of every king to give efficient protection. Our authors, therefore, advise the king who seeks shelter to approach another powerful ruler in general, and name the madhyma and the udāsīna in particular. Failing to find a suitable protector anywhere, a distressed king is asked to resort to the invader himself. It is thus evident that any other powerful king even outside the mandala, the madhyma, or the udāsīna and lastly the invader himself may become protector. It is wrong to suggest, as R.C.P. Singh does, that the victor or invader could not be protector in face of the direct evidence of the Arthasastra, the Kamandakiya, the Nitivākyāmṛta, the Yuktikalpataru and the Mānasollāsa. It follows that the weaker kings should not be embarrassed with an appeal to grant shelter.

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1 D.C. Ganguly, op.cit., p.226. The Mālāwa king Jayavarmā II was killed by Vagbhata, a Čahamana refugee at his court, when the former had agreed to hand over the latter to the Sultan Jalāluddin of Delhi; see also HM, IV. V. 107ff. See also Intro. p26.

2 Mānas, II.XII.738 mentions abhayākhyā as one of the causes of vigraha.

3 See above, p.350 fn3.

4 Agni, 234.20; cf. KN, VII.2.23-24; X.2.13; Kullūka on Manu, VII.21f. See also above, p.350.

5 KA, VII.2.7 ff; KN, XI.30; NV, XXIX.59; Ykt, 94.p.14; Mānas, II.XV. 951-2.

6 R.C.P. Singh, op.cit., p.430.

7 See above fn.5.
Whoever is resorted to must have the requisite qualifications to protect the suppliant and ensure his welfare. The prerequisite of a protector is his greater power, for samaśeyya by the weak with the weak is useless, for what safety is there to a person who takes shelter on a castor plant from fear of an elephant. Determining the criterion of the powerfulness Madhātithi says 'With that king alone he shall seek shelter, who is capable of chastising the enemy's forces, as also the disloyal subjects of the king seeking his shelter.' The specific mention of the madhyama udāsina as probable protectors further indicates the strength required of a protector; for, as already stated, they are successively more powerful rulers of the mandala and designed to hold the balance of power between belligerents; thus they seem to be specially competent to entertain requests for shelter. But power to protect is not enough to attract a king in distress. Ideally a protector should be highborn, noble, righteous, truthful, not greedy, one at whose hand no ill-treatment need be feared, who has a reputation for his calm and dispassionate nature. A king with whom the ancestors of the king seeking shelter may have resorted to, and who belongs to friendly circles, is preferable. It is pointed out in the

1 See above, p. 351, fns. 1-3.
2 NV, XXIX. 55 ff.
3 On Manu, VII.175; also other comms; RDK, XII. p. 113 quotes Manu.
4 On Yajñ, 347; On Manu, VII.168, 174; On Yajñ, I.345 - Visvarūpa seems to repeat KA, VII.2; 24; Agni, 240.31 quotes KN, XI.27; Ykt., 93-94. p.14. Manas, II.XV.952-54; RDK, XII.p.113.
Manasollása that if the invader is endowed with good qualities and has many allies, the victim may well seek shelter with him. It is obvious from these qualifications that a protector should be powerful and virtuous enough to allay the fears of the king seeking shelter that he will come to no harm afterwards.

The question arises whether or not the protector is obliged to fight the enemy of the king seeking shelter with him and to assist the latter to recover his kingdom, if lost? Its answer is indeed difficult because our authors do not mention what obligations a protector takes upon himself except that of protecting the king from his enemy. It appears that the nature of virtual support depends on the exigencies of the circumstances when shelter is sought. If it is resorted to before actual military collapse the protector may be bound to defend his protégé; but after the destruction of the army and the loss of kingdom simhara may guarantee only political asylum without any commitment to help in the recovery of the kingdom. However, in certain cases the protector may take up the cudgels and fight to restore the king (seeking shelter) to his throne, as did Someśvara I.

of Kalyāṇī on granting shelter to Jayasiṁha, the Paramāra Prince of Mālwa. The Rastrakūṭa king Dhavala of Hastikundī (Rājasthān)

1Manas, II. XV.951-52.
is known to have given shelter to one Dharapārāha, probably the
king of Saurāstra, and to the armies of a Gurjara king, probably
Mularāja I, worsted in the battle by Vakpatirāja II Muhammad,1 but
it is not known for certain what he did for them. Kalhana tells
us that the King Ananta of Kashmir spent a huge sum of money in
caring for the welfare of the Śahi princes, who had sought refuge
with him after being driven out of their kingdom by the Muslims.2
Although the Kashmiri king Sangramarāja had actively associated
himself with Śahis in their resistance to Muhammad, we do not know
if Ananta was able to help the Śahis regain their kingdom. Besides
these examples, we may also mention the policy of protectors to­
wards their protégés. Although Cakrāyudha of Kanauj was a protégé
of the Pāla king Dharmapāla and so was Trilocana pāla, the Pratihāra
ruler, of the Candella king Vidyādhara, it is not known what actual
assistance these protégés obtained from their protectors when their
enemies, the Pratihāra Nāgabhata II in the case of Cakrāyudha, and
Muhammad and later Bhoja Paramāra in the case of Trilocana pāla,
invaded their kingdoms. Both of these protected kings had to flee
for safety and ended their life in obscurity. It can be concluded
that the role of the protector in the hostility between the king
seeking shelter and his enemy was always a matter of political ex­
pediency. The interests of the protector were supreme. In fact

1 Bhariśīkta, I, v, 5-6; D. C. Ganguly, op. cit., p. 54; A. K. Majumdar,
op. cit., p. 30 also fn. 48.

2 Rajatarangini, VII.144.
the political motives and considerations of the balance of power determined the role of the protector, although these were not always primary factors for extending the protection as suggested by R.C.P. Singh.¹ Indeed, the obligations of the protector towards the king seeking shelter with him were determined by the extent of his own politico-military involvement in the conflict and prospect of material gain. The protector thus undertook only the obligation of protecting the king seeking shelter against his enemy and to fight if the latter attacked his own kingdom. When the invader himself was the shelterer his only obligation was to put an end to his own harassment of the victim who had submitted, and allow him to rule his kingdom as a tributary.

Obligations of the king seeking shelter

Self-submission being the essence of saṃsraya, the king taking recourse to it undertakes all sorts of obligations towards his protector. In general he is advised to behave submissively, to adopt a respectful attitude towards his protector and to perform any service for him including personal attendance.² Medhatithi states that a protector 'shall be served like a preceptor; and in so doing the king shall not consider his dignity at all; he should have no such notion as he also is a great king, so I shall

¹ op. cit., pp. 429-30.
² Agni, 240.32; Ykt., 93.1.14; cf. KN, XI.28-29.
treat him as my equal', in fact he shall be attended upon like a master'. The king taking shelter shall please his protector 'by all such means as saying agreeable things, attending on him and so forth'. It is evident that the king completely subordinates himself to his protector and relinquishes his independence of decision and action with regard to his own affairs. That samsraya entails burdensome obligations is also borne out by the Agni Purana which regards it as the lowest and worst measure of the six-fold policy because it involves depletion of power, great loss and expenditure. If the protector is the virtuous invader himself, the king should satisfy him with his troops, treasury, and territory, which virtually amounts to self-surrender for protection. Thus, the obligations of one who submits himself have no limits and it seems that the danger of a king becoming a tool in the hands of his protectors for the latter's ambition was always present; for Somadeva cautions the king that he should seek shelter when there is no fear of being swallowed up thereafter and that the samsraya should ideally create such a union or alliance as that between two inter-twined strands of a rope, which, while mutually increasing the strength, remain recognisable. Somadeva thus expands the meaning

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1 On Manu, VII.175.
2 Agni, 234, 24.
3 Ykt., 94.p.13; cf. KN, XI.30; kA. VII.2.7.
4 NV, XXIX. 55.
of \textit{samsraya} so that it overlaps with that of \textit{sandhi}.

Our authors in general are critical about the advisability of the policy of \textit{samsraya} mainly because the king serves the interests of his protector for a time to the abandonment of his own.\footnote{\textit{Agni}, 234. 24; cf. \textit{KN}, XI.33; \textit{KA}, VII.2.5.} \textit{Samsraya} is conceded in an extreme situation for positive purposes of protection and future advantages.\footnote{\textit{NV}, XXIX.55, 59; \textit{Ykt.}, 92. p.13.} The approach is purely utilitarian and the method is political expediency. The \textit{nitisara} authorities would recommend the policy of \textit{samsraya} if it eventually ensures the material interests and the welfare of the king seeking shelter and \textit{smrati} commentators would add the preservation of honour and self-respect, for they say that the protector may grant protection, but, if he ill-treats the king in distress by showing disrespect, describing misdeeds, inattention, disagreeable speech or repents after having given shelter, the king should prefer a desperate charge against his enemy and heroic death on the battlefield.\footnote{Comms. on \textit{Manu}, VII.168, 176.} Somadeva also says that if \textit{samsraya} involves the selling of oneself, it is better for an honourable king to die fighting.\footnote{\textit{NV}, XXIX. 68; see also \textit{HA}, II.15.16.} of whose \textit{Kamandaka}, whose many verses are reproduced in the \textit{Agni Purana} and the \textit{Yuktikalpataru} also advises against a hasty \textit{samsraya}.\footnote{\textit{KN}, XI.33.} It is
thus evident that the policy of *samśraya* is subject to several requirements and it is to be resorted to as a last measure.

The discourse on *samśraya* ends with a heroic alternative, which is a desperate fight to the last man. It is, however, significant to note that the earlier *nītisāra* authorities like Kāmandaka, who is repeated by Bhoja, concede the policy of self-surrender to the enemy for protection, to which Somesvara adds that this should be done only if the enemy is virtuous. Since the policy of *samśraya* involves the loss of pride and appears unchivalrous, we find both the *dharmaśāstra* and the *nītisāra* authors justifying it on the grounds that 'to a living man joy will come, even if it be after the lapse of a century'; 'one who remains alive passes through pleasing experience and accomplishes his purpose'. For justifying the policy of *samśraya* both *smṛti* and *nītisāra* writers permit retreat from battle and allow the king to forsake his wife, wealth, and even kingdom for the sake of self-preservation. But, the force of material advantages seems to be on the decline in later times and that of pride and honour on the increase. This further suggests that the materialistic aspects of the political concept of war were giving way to the heroic ideals. If the com-

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1. *Mānas*, II. XV. 952-3


3. Ibid.
mentators like Medhatithi approve that if the king finds any wrong, such as disrespect on the part of his protector, he should die fighting his enemy, an act considered to be honourable even by Somadeva. We should not be surprised when we find that many proud Rajput kings preferred to court death on the battlefield or to disappear in obscurity rather than sacrifice their self-respect. While we have some historical instances of defeated kings seeking shelter with others, such as the Paramara Prince Jayasimha taking refuge with Calukya Somesvara I and Sahi princes fleeing to Kashmir for shelter at the court of King Ananta, it appears that samsraya as a measure of the six-fold policy fell in disfavour with the rising sense of clanish pride, which was much stimulated by mutual rivalry and inter-dynastic warfare. This pride heightened to the extent of morbidity when the Muslim invaders entered the arena of political strife. The alternative of samsraya, fight to the last man, became more attractive since it had a heroic appeal and the approval of the smriti writers as well as authors like Somadeva. In fact, when a protector superior to an unvirtuous invader, especially the Muslim could not be found, the result was a reckless and desperate type of warfare, which was, however, exceptional in Northern India. This naturally led to the grim practice of jauhar, a last right of defenders, ghastly, appalling, cruel, but indeed chivalrous and heroic!

Although earlier authorities like Kautilya and Kamandaka did not enjoin suicidal warfare, they could not approve of a king's
remaining under another's protection for a long time. After having sought shelter a king was to try his best to regain his independence by means of upāyas other than war. If the invader was the protector, the king taking shelter was to undermine his strength and create conditions of his own liberation. All kinds of treacherous means could be employed to this end. Thus, the policy of semśrāya was a temporary measure and a compelling necessity to ward off annihilation. It had only the grudging approval of our authorities.

\[1\] KN, XI.32; KA, VII.2, 9-12.
Politics consists in the formulation and pursuit of policies with due regard to interest and power. The terms nayya (good policy) and gāḍgūnya are mainly concerned with the framing of policy in general and the determination of appropriate policies in situations of inter-state conflict in particular, in order to fulfil the two-fold obligation of government, viz., the security and well-being of one's own mandala (geo-political sphere) and the acquisition of the enemy's mandala. But the pursuit of policy or policies and the implementation of particular measures in all situations of friendly and hostile intercourse are tasks to be accomplished by upāyas. The concept of upāyas thus deals with the operation of policies and embodies ways and means appropriate to achieving their objectives.

The term upāya literally means 'that by which one reaches one's aim', 'means or expedient' and is sometimes translated as 'stratagem or artifice'. However, it stands for 'means of success against an enemy'. In other words, upāya denotes an expedient or the means to overcome opposition to accomplishing a task or achieving an objective. In its very nature upāya indicates both a method and a means to secure compliance of others.

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1 MV, XXX.45-47; HAC, III.379; RDK, XIV. p.142 quotes Vīppu; On Māmū, VII.32.
to one's own will or policy.

In politics, however, upāyas are the expedients or means to translate policy into action by overcoming opposition and obstacles. Our texts state that the king should endeavour to achieve success in his undertakings by employing, separately or collectively, upāyas, which can remove all kinds of troubles and calamities (vyasanas), both human and divine, hampering the amelioration of an adverse state of affairs or the augmentation of power.¹

It is during the discussion of internal administration that the upāyas are first mentioned in the Arthasastra, the topic being 'keeping a watch over the seducible and non-seducible parties in one's own territory'.² It is prescribed in this connexion that the king should discover the contentedness and discontentedness

¹On Menu, 214; Agni, 226.5; Ykt., 99. p. 14; HA, II. 18.

²KA, I, 13.15-26. It has been alleged by K. P. Jayaswal, P. V. Kane and other scholars that upāyas became popular long before the Hathigumpha inscription of Kharavela of Kalinga (1st B.C.) in which it is written '... the following the threefold policy of chastisement, alliance and conciliation (danda sandhi sama) sends out an expedition against Bharatavasa...' and brings about the conquest of the land for country... obtains jewels and precious things of the kings attacked.' (E.I., XX.79, 88). Some scholars think that there are three upāyas but they fail to notice that sandhi and sama overlap. It appears to me that it is not very certain whether upāyas are at all mentioned in the inscription because letters after sa are completely effaced and restorations and emendations which have been suggested are, therefore, speculative. Moreover, the sequence, danda sandhi sama is unusual and I have not come across such a formulation in the theoretical texts.
among prominent and common people of his kingdom through spies and should 'manage those who are discontented by means (upayasa) of conciliation (sama), gifts (dana), dissension (bheda) and force (danda).\(^1\) In this way he should guard against the secret instigations of his enemy. However, his own secret agents have to employ these very expedients to win over the seducible elements of his enemy's kingdom with a view to weaken the latter's strength.\(^2\) Again, these upayasa are discussed by Kautilya under 'the topic of edicts' which comprise matters of internal as well as external affairs'.\(^3\) In this context, it is evident that upayasa were the acknowledged means of implementing various policies and measures and of overcoming opposition and resolving conflicts in the way of success. On the ground that upayasa are usefully applicable to internal problems, including their effectiveness against a recalcitrant son, brother or kinsman, intriguing minister, rebellious subjects, frontier governors, forest chieftains etc. on the eve of a war, it has been suggested that the introduction of the upayasa in matters of foreign policy is secondary.\(^4\) The suggestion may be strengthened by adducing evidence from the Manusmrti and its commentaries, the Yuktikalopataru etc. which ascribe

\(^{1}\) KA, I.13.15-26.

\(^{2}\) Ibid., I.14.12.

\(^{3}\) Ibid., II.10.47-56; also II.10.2. 'Kings primarily depend on edicts, peace and war being rooted in them.' Compare NV, XXXII.29.

\(^{4}\) Kangle, op.cit., p.255.
almost universal competence and utility to the upāyas in dealing
with problems of statecraft and calamities of the constituents of
states. Some Purāṇas distinguish internal danda (svadeśe), in
which case it means punishment, from external (paradeśe), meaning
war, which further supports the preceding view.

It may, however, be further suggested that the introduction
of upāyas to the political theory itself represents an extension
of the precepts of prudence and tact observed by men in their
dealings. For, Viśiṣṭehāra says: "These expedients conciliation
etc. are not only applicable in regard to the affair of state,
but they are also resorts for every day dealing of the people, as
for instance, "Study O child study, I shall give you modakas (sweet-
meat) or I shall give these to others, and pull out thy ears."
It is evident that a father or a teacher addresses his son or pupil
making use of the traditional four expedients with a view to educating
the unwilling ward. The Agni Purāṇa elsewhere illustrates the use-
fulness of upāyas in the training and management of a horse. It thus

1See above, p.268; RDK, XIV, p.128 quotes Matsya 223.8-9. Mēnas., II.
XIX.1006-9.
2Agni, 234.1-2; 226.13ff; cf. Vāh., II.461ff; cf. Matsya, 225.1ff
226.1 ff. cf. RNP, pp.283 ff. Mitramiśra brings a resumé of
criminal law under danda, the fourth upāya, which is certainly due to
the belief that upāyas are equally valid with regard to internal as
well as external affairs. See also RDK, Intr. p.86. It is interesting
to note that Hemacandra in his Arhamiti distinguishes between war,
which he calls 'yuddhaniti', and criminal punishment, which he calls
'dandaniti'. Some purāṇas discuss both aspects of danda often
in continuation, but clearly point out the implications of the external
danda.
3On Vaiś., I.346.
4Agni, 288.29 ff.
appears that the *upāyas* were considered means of securing the submission of others to one's own will. Nevertheless, *upāyas* obtained formal definition as part of political theory rather than as a part of everyday life.

Notwithstanding the preceding possibilities, the concept of *upāyas* seems to have developed in its extant form and character as an integral part of the theory of inter-state relations. Our sources, including those which bear out the association of *upāyas* with everyday dealings of men and internal administration elucidate *upāyas*, discuss their contents, and outline their scope and utility, mainly in relation to the enemies of state in particular and all types of foreign rulers in general.\(^1\) It may be also pointed out that the context in which *upāyas* first occur in the *Arthasastra*, viz. as means of maintaining internal security and consolidation of power, bears cross-reference to the external enemies who constantly seek to exploit the weaknesses of their rival in order to safeguard and promote their interests.\(^2\) It would be more correct to say that *upāyas* were considered effective expedients mainly against those

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2 Cf. *KA*, I.13.15 ff; I.14.1 ff; also IX.3.6 ff., 5.9 ff, 7.68 ff. Medhin. on *Manu*, VII.104-5, 197; See below, pp. 394 ff. - alienable parties.
elements of one's own kingdom such as seditious people, intriguing 
kinsmen, refractory frontier governors, and perfidious forest chief-
tains etc., whose activities adversely affected the power of the 
state in relation to its external affairs. For the pursuit of foreign 
policy it was necessary that advances, made by foreign rulers with 
upayās against oneself inside one's own kingdom as well as among 
allies, must be counteracted by similar methods and means.¹ In this 
respect upayās were equally useful for putting down internal troubles 
not as for overcoming external difficulties, which could be divorced 
from internal policy.

In fact, the upayās attained greater relevance to foreign affairs, 
perhaps because unlike the internal sphere of state activity, which 
was governed by law and included a system of punishment and reward, 
an organized government and a sovereign responsible for law and order, 
the inter-state sphere was regulated merely by dharma, capable of 
elastic interpretation, and lacked inter-state organization or any 
recognised system to deal with disputes and problems arising out of 
conflict for power among states. Owing to these factors, while 
justice and adjustment of conflicting interests could be had in 
matters internal, by asserting political authority, these depended 
on the artful management, power and necessities of the rivals in 
inter-state sphere. Despite the claims of dharma being the law

¹Medh. on Manu, VII.104-5; Agni, 24I.46.ff.
among kings and the fact that conventions connected with war and
with conquered kingdoms were well established, it cannot be denied
that in the last analysis the foreign policy was based on power
and conducted on the basis of expediency rather than religious
principle.¹ And upāyas were rules of expediency by their very con-
notation. Moreover, the contents of upāyas and the mechanics of
their application leave no doubt as to their indispensability in
conducting foreign affairs and also their validity in dealing with
internal matters affecting the security and power of the kingdom.

In inter-state politics the concept of upāyas embodies ex-
pedients of statesmanship and diplomacy seeking artfully to arrange
and regulate the inter-state system to one's own best political
and material advantages by constantly endeavouring to create a
favourable balance of power in order to attain success in one's
internal undertakings and external enterprises. Manu and Yājñavalkya
and their commentators prescribe that a king should employ upāyas
in order to deal with circle of kings (mandala) in such a way
that he makes himself greater than his allies, enemies and neutrals
in respect of the threefold power, which sustains and expands his
political supremacy.² Like Viśvarūpa, Medhatithi clearly states:

¹ The classic illustration of the way in which the king should conduct
himself is furnished by Manu, who repeats the Arthaśāstra tradition
of expediency as the guiding principle in politics. Dakavac cintayed arthā
sinhavac ca prakṛmet. Vṛkavac cāvalumpeta śaśāvac ca vinispātēt.
Manu VII.106; see also Commentaries of Medh. and Kulluka; cf. Mbh(t),
XII.140-62 ff.

² On Manu, VII.159, 177, 180; also quoted in RDK, XII.p.108, XIII.p.113.
'By means of these expedients, the king shall deliberate upon his whole circle' (mandala),¹ and later commentators repeat such expressions. Manu says: 'All these allies, enemies, middle and neutral kings he shall win over by means of conciliation and the other expedients, severally as well as collectively, as also by prowess and policy.'² Viśvarūpa and Aparārka further elucidate the suitability of different expedients for prevailing over these kings of the mandala, the general rule being that the neighbouring enemy should be dealt with by force (danda), the ally by conciliation and also gifts, and showing gains or advantages (sama-dāna), the neutrals by gifts and conciliation, and all others especially the enemy's partisans, by sowing dissension (bheda).³ It is further emphasized that these guidelines with regard to the suitability of the particular expedients should never be divorced from the relative power of the parties, as for instance, Aparārka says that the king should overcome weaker kings of his mandala by force (danda), equals by conciliation, kings by gifts (dāna) and those even more powerful by sowing dissension (bheda).⁴

Further, the implementation of sadgunya against enemies involves the separate or collective employment of upāyas according to the

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¹On Manu, VII.177; On Yājñ, I.345.
²Manu, VII.159; cf. KA, VII.16.4.
³Viśvarūpa on Yājñ, I.342; Aparārka on Yājñ, I.343.
⁴Tbid.; cf KA, VII.6.3; Ceaksūryam, III.39.p.17.
factors of power, place and time, are particularly addressed to a state of war (vigraha), battle and siege. Even the policies of sandhi, āsana, dvaidhiḥbhāva and samśraya cannot be executed without their application. Indeed, according to Medhatithi and Hemacandra, the policy of āsana is made feasible by sāma, dāna, and bheda.¹ It may be reiterated that upāyas are detailed in connexion with sādgunya in general and yana or yattra in particular.² Thus, upāyas constitute means of diplomacy and war, which were employed to conduct one's external relations and to cope with problems arising out of conflict for power.

Having discussed the meaning of the upāyas we shall now proceed to describe their contents and mechanics.

The concept of upāyas developed and expanded its contents and character as it comprised the four expedients of sāma (conciliation), dāna (gifts, concession or bribery), bheda (sowing dissension) and dāga (punishment or force). These principal upāyas were further crystallised into several sub-types in the Arthasastra and later nitisara works. Our sources carry forward two distinct traditions. The earlier of these comprises the aforementioned four upāyas, while the latter adds three more, viz., māya (illusion or deceitful trick), upeksā (indifference) and indrajāla (magic or incantation). While the commentators on Manu and Yājñavalkya, Somadeva, ¹On Manu, VII.172; HA, II.12.
²On Manu, VII.197-98; RKX, XIV, pp.126 ff. See above p.371 fn. 1.
Bhoja, Hemacandra, Someśvara III\(^1\) mainly mention the principal four upāyas, the Purāṇas,\(^2\) viz., the Matsya, the Viśuddharmottara and the Agni, enumerate all the seven expedients. Lakṣmīdīhara quotes that very verse from the Matsya Purāṇa which describes all the seven expedients,\(^3\) although, like its author, he also omits the three later upāyas from his discussion as he follows 'a higher ethics of śāstras condemning the use of deception and unfair means'.\(^4\) Hans Losch\(^5\) has been misled by Prof. K. V. Rangswami's sweeping remark into believing that the three later upāyas do not occur in the Kṛtyakalpataru. Hemacandra also elsewhere betrays his knowledge of all the seven expedients, although he stigmatizes the later three as kṣudropāya (inferior expedients).\(^6\) Even Someśvara shows his knowledge of māyā \(3\) indrajāla \(4\) amā \(5\) upēkṣa in a different fashion for he describes upēkṣasana, includes māyā as a treacherous way of killing the enemy, and mentions abhicāra (same as indrajāla) under different kinds of danda.\(^7\) It seems that while some Purāṇas

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\(^1\)See above, p. 37, fn. 1.

\(^2\)Matsya, 222.2; Vāh., II.67.2; Agni, 226.5-6, 234. lff, 241. 46-53.

\(^3\)RDK, XIV. pp. 126-27.

\(^4\)Ibid., Intro. p.86.

\(^5\)Rajadharma, p. 106.

\(^6\)HAC, III, 400-402.

\(^7\)Manas., II.xii.933-35, xx.1237 ff.
and the Kāmanda-kīya gave full recognition to the three later expedients, other authorities countenanced them grudgingly in such contexts where these were expedient to success or to counteract similar stratagems of the enemy. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that though deprecating the use of māyā (deceitful trick) in an ideal king's conduct towards his enemies, Manu and his commentators admit that other kings applied it to alienate the seducible parties of their enemy's kingdom with a view to weaken their strength. Further, in connexion with siege warfare, Manu and his commentators recommend that 'the king shall frighten his enemy during the night by means of men holding on their heads jars of flaming fire, and crying like jackals. People seeing such portents would keep up during the night; and being fatigued by the waking would be easily reducible.' This is just a device of practising māyā. Furthermore, Kauṭilya has also described the foul practices of fire, poison and assassination, trickery, magic and spells and various other devices of deception and instigation to rebellion and treachery (upajāpa) in order to exasperate the enemy as means of concealed, secret and diplomatic kinds of war (kūta, tūṣnim and mantra yuddha). In fact, the practice of māyā and indrajāla goes further back to the Atharva Veda samhitā and its

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1 Medh. on Manu, VII.104-5.
3 See below, pp. 420.
4 Kā, X.6.48-50, XII.2.5.1 ff, XIII. chs. 1-4.
tenets,\textsuperscript{1} which describe a number of spells and charms, surely of baser kinds, to achieve one's object against an enemy. Even the Buddhist canonical books, as for example the Brahmajāla sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya\textsuperscript{2} countenance these superstitions, mysterious practices and stratagems. Thus, it is evident that these later practices are not unknown to earlier authorities nor the later Smṛti commentators. What some Purāṇas\textsuperscript{3} and the Barhaspatya Arthasastra and the Kāmandakīya did, was to systematize and regularize these deceptive expedients and advocate them as norms of diplomacy and war.

It is, however, difficult to ascertain when upekeśa, māya, and indrajāla became regular upāyas. The Barhaspatya Sūtra (Arthasastra) has upekeśa, māya and vādha\textsuperscript{3} and expressly forbids practising indrajāla.\textsuperscript{4} But, as pointed out earlier, the Matsya Purāṇa mentions them.\textsuperscript{5} It seems that the tradition of these baser practices of statecraft was old, but they obtained full recognition after the Gupta period. It is not unlikely that growing superstitions and interest in tantra during our period gave an impetus to such practices as recognised means of achieving political objectives.

In the end it may be pointed out that the full recognition of these later practices as independent expedients enriched the art of

\textsuperscript{1}AV, Bk. X. 5. (Griffith, Vol. II, p. 18, note); WAI, p. 335.

\textsuperscript{2}Vol. I pp. 146; see also B.C. Law, A History of Pali literature, pp. 81 ff.; cf. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, p. 36. All these references are cited from WAI, p. 335.

\textsuperscript{3}Sār. Sūtra, V. 3.

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., I. 8. Indrajāliko na kuryat.

\textsuperscript{5}Matsya, 222. 2; Mahābh. III, 149. 42 - mentions five upāyas and gives independent status to upekeśa.
diplomacy and war, which obtained new weapons to cause psychological disturbances in the enemy's ranks. The concept of upāyas was brought to completion by the addition of upekkha (indifference or inaction), which was advocated as an alternative expedient to all the four upāyas of action. Indifference was, however, not equivalent to apathy, but meant an expedient calculated to approximate ends without direct involvement with the enemy in a state of hostilities. It was an expedient to execute the policy of āsana in which respect it would have deserved its place in the concept of upāyas much earlier. Its later recognition may suggest that the independent tradition of the upāyas reasserted its distinct character against the concept of adguna and claimed equal, if not more, importance by increasing the number of its expedients thereby demonstrating it could sum up all that was worthwhile in statecraft. As sandhi and vigraha were the two basic policies, so sama and danda were the basic expedients. But, as the adguna developed six forms of foreign policy it was natural that the concept of upāyas would also acquire new expedients. Maya and indrajala further marked the exploitation of superstitions and popular beliefs for the purpose of promoting political objectives. In this respect diplomacy was freed from religio-ethical inhibitions and politics became a rather unrighteous pursuit of power and material well-being of subjects.

We shall now proceed to examine these seven expedients of diplomacy with regard to their nature and application.
SĀMA (conciliation)

The foremost expedient sāma means 'conciliation'. In its application, however, it comprises various methods and means to win over hostile elements of one’s own kingdom such as rebels, feudatories, disaffected ministers etc. or to overcome adversaries in inter-state relations. Sāma consists in [pleasant] speech and [winsome] gestures. Hemecandra says, 'Pacification by reception, honour, favour, pleasant conversation etc. is conciliation.' These ways of conciliation are repeated in other sources. Medhatithi further elucidates that a king should not go to war in a hurry. At first he should try conciliation, that is, friendly meetings, sitting together, conversing, seeking each other's wife and so forth... It is evident that sāma involves conciliatory talks and persuasion, which obviously imply some kind of negotiation. The talks are held in a cordial atmosphere, pursued with suavity and facilitated by exchange of courtesies and friendly visits to each other's family. Whatever the political objectives, whether

1 Agni, 226.11; on Manu, VII.198; cf. KA, IX.5.9 ff; IX.3.6 ff.

Agni, 241.54; same as KN, XVIII.15; HA, II.17; Ykt., 100.p.14; Manas., II.XVII.978 ff.


4 Kull. on Manu, 198; cf. KA, IX.5.10. Stāna-mana-karma sāntvam.

5 On Manu, VII.198. Na sahasā yuddhate, etāvat prathamam viśistasthēpanopadesaṁsumukham ca mitho saḥasanaṁkathā sahaḍaradārānādi.
demanding submission or suing for peace, it is sought to be accomplished by pleasing the opponent.

Repeating Kautilya, Somadeva says, 'sama is fivefold: praising of merits, mention of relationship, pointing out mutual benefits, showing (advantages in) the future, and placing oneself at the (other's) disposal.' These five forms are further elaborated by Kautilya as follows: "Among these, appreciation of the merits of birth, body, occupation, nature, learning property and so on, praise, adulation, this is praising of merits. The praising of (common) kinship, marriage relationship, relationship through teaching, relationship through sacrificial performances, (common) family, (affection of) the heart, and (common) friend, this is mention of relationship. The praising of mutual benefits accruing to one's party and the party of the other, this is pointing out mutual benefits. 'If this were done in this way, this will happen to us (both)' this raising of hope is showing (advantages) in the future. 'What I am is you, what object belongs to me should be used by you in your works; this is placing oneself at the (other's) disposal.'

The Matsya quoted by Laksmidhara and the Agni Purana also describe similar ways of conciliating righteous adversaries, viz., by extolling his family and good conduct, by mentioning services

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1 NV, XXIX, 70 - Tastra panoavidham sama, gunasaṅkīrtanam sambandhopakhyānam paropakaradarśānam ayatipradarśānam atmpanibandhanam iti; same as KA, II.10.48; cf. KN, XVIII.4-5.

2 KA, II.10.49-53; Somadeva omits the elucidation of the first four, but reproduces the fifth one, see NV, XXIX.71 - Yan mama ṛṇyam tadbhavatā svakṛtyeṣu prayujyatam ity atmopanidhanam.
rendered, by approving his activities in other spheres, by expressing gratitude, and by pointing to mutual benefits in the future.¹

The Agni Purāṇa discusses four kinds of conciliation, which are virtually a repetition of the last four aforementioned sāma.²

Someśvara, however, has somewhat different five-fold classifications of sāma.³ Karpasubhaga (pleasant to ears) consists in sweet and pleasant conversation between two parties who have different objectives at heart.⁴ Daivika (involving gods) is that in which oaths are taken by invoking gods in order to create confidence in the sincerity of conciliatory talks or negotiations of peace and amity.⁵ Smaijka is the same as sambandhopākhyāna of Kautilya, Kāmandaka, and Somadeva. It consists in reminding the enemy of the former kinship now forgotten by him.⁶ Lobhaja is virtually the appeasement of the greedy antagonist. It involves offering a village, a town, a country, elephants, horses, and money in order to conciliate an enemy.⁷ This kind of sāma is probably advisable for a weak king in order to induce the invader to conclude a treaty. Somadeva has also recommended the expedient of sāma

¹Matsya, 226.6-7, quoted in RNK, XIV, p.127. Agni, 226.8; 241.47-8; cf. Vāh., II.67.6-7.
²Agni, 241.47-48. Same as KN, XVIII.4-5.
³Manas, II.XVII.979-80.
⁴Ibid., 981.
⁵Ibid., 982.
⁶Ibid., 983.
⁷Ibid., 984.
involving the payment of money for dissuading a powerful adversary from invading one's kingdom.¹ A viṣṇujjiva may also practise it for conciliating his refractory feudatories, disloyal allies, enemy's confederates, people offering resistance in a conquered kingdom etc. It may, however, be remarked that lobhaja combines sama with another expedient, viz. dāna. The fifth, niṣārpaka, is the same as described by Kautilya, Kāmanda, and Somadeva, in which conciliation is practised by verbally placing one's property and oneself entirely at the service of another. It is evident that Somesvara's lobhaja and daivika are rather new kinds of sama, which seem to be connected with overtures of sandhi (peace treaty), which entailed the offer of beasts of burden, wealth and territory and depended on oath for its binding.

Further, some Purāṇas distinguish only two kinds of sama: satya-sāma (sincere conciliation) and asatya-sāma (insincere conciliation).² They lay down that the former is to be practised towards enemies, who are of high pedigree, upright, righteous and possess control over their senses, and the latter towards unrighteous and unscrupulous opponents.³ It is emphasized that sama could not be effective against all kinds of enemies. For some Purāṇas affirm that though it is said that even the Rākṣasas were won over by sama, it should not be applied to overcome a wicked enemy, because he regards the conciliatory advances of the king as signs of the latter's

¹ NV, XXX.32-33. ² Ṣaṇā, II-xvii. 985. ³ Agni, 226.6; Matsya, 222.3 quoted in RDV, XIV.p.127. cf. Vāh., II.67.3

² Agni, 226.6; Matsya, 222.3 quoted in RDK, XIV.p.127. cf. Vāh., II.67.3

³ Ibid., 226.7; Ibid., 222.5, quoted in RDK, XIV.p.127. cf. Vāh., II.67.4-5, 10; see also Matsya, 222.10.
weakness and indulges in greater mischief.¹ On account of this, the application of sama is ordinarily discouraged with enemies of highly suspicious nature, wicked disposition, and unrighteous conduct.² If, however, the conciliation of such enemies becomes necessary, it has to be insincere in nature and purely expedient in character. On the contrary, sincere conciliation is recommended as the best expedient to win over opponents who are noble, grateful, compassionate and righteous,³ and also those attaching importance to friendship and of honourable intentions.⁴

It is evident that in practising sama an appeal is made to the adversary's conscience, common sense and reason. He has to be persuaded to realize the mutual benefits of abandoning hostility. The stress is upon amity, attachment, friendship and future advantages, as against hostility, bitterness and loss, which mark the existing rupture. Sama also involves the granting of favours of

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¹Agni, 226.8; Matsya, 222.8 quoted in RDK, XIV, p.127. cf. Matsya, 148.69 ff; cf. Vādh., II.67.8.
²Matsya, 222.9; quoted in RDK, XIV, 126-27. RDK also quotes Rāmāyana: Ykt., II.6.16; cf. Matsya, 148.69 ff.
³Manas., XVII.978; see above, p.383 fn.3.
⁴Agni, 241.60 - maitripradhānām kalyānabuddhīṃ sāntvena sādhayet, same as KN, XVIII.46; KA, IX.6.22. Both Kaṭṭilya (ibid.) and Kamandaka (XVIII.45-46) recommend sama towards 'one whose energy has left him, one weary of war, one whose efforts are frustrated, one distressed by losses and expenses and by the expedition abroad, one seeking another ally with his integrity, one afraid of another..., a foolish king, women, boy king and one given to religion and others.'
various kinds as, for instance, in the case of internal enemies 'giving a position and showing honour', during an expedition, the protection of those dwelling in villages, forests, cattle, and trade routes, and handing over of those who are discarded, who have deserted and who have done harm, and in the course of negotiations making concessions of villages, towns and territory etc. and approval of the enemy's action in other spheres. An aggrieved king or a frightened rebellious feudatory may practice sama by making a verbal surrender of himself and his resources. Thus, the expedient of sama consists of many measures in different circumstances, and is the best expedient to remove hostility, having at its root animosity, insult, injustice, wounded pride and other grievances or disaffection among one's own constituents (prakrtis) of state. Conciliation has to be practised to win over submissive kings and those defeated in battle in order to ensure their loyalty to oneself as well as to one's descendants. Enemies whose strength has broken down and ministers and subjects of an occupied country should be brought under control by sama. In fact, the entire range of hostile activities has to be accompanied with conciliatory measures of some kind if one wishes to extend his sway over others. However, sama alone does not go much further without dana and is limited in its

1 KA., IX.5.10.
2 Ibid., VII.16.5.
3 Cf. KA., VII.16.3, 17-29.
4 On Manu, VII.201-4, 206-7; RDK, XIV.137-138; see above, p.384 fn4.
application by the virtuous disposition of opponents, and is not only ineffective but also risky with the wicked and unrighteous.

**Dāna** (Gifts, concessions or bribery)

Dāna is a very comprehensive term which literally means 'gifts or donation' of anything made for various purposes. As a political expedient, however, it denotes an agreeable transaction between two parties, one making gifts of his own possessions and the other accepting without anger whatever is being offered. According to Medhatithi, 'presents of gold and other things in token of affection for the purpose of creating mutual attachment is making gifts (dana). Somadeva says, 'Giving away a little money to appease the enemy for the protection of a great wealth from his wrath or invasion is making gifts (dana). Somesvara, however, construes dāna to consist in gifts of desired objects, grains, gold and other precious jewels and articles, elephants, horses, a village, territory or province, sea-coast including port and town, rank or honour, courtesans and girls or princesses in marriage. Our other sources repeat that dāna comprises these objects and also granting of safety of life (abhaya-dana), exemptions and even employment in works.

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1 Visvarūpa on *Yajñī*, I.342 - Dānam diyaṃānasāpyakopena graham, svakhyasyād dānam.
2 On *Manu*, VII.198.
3 NV, XXIX.73. Behvarthasamrakṣapāyālpārthapradānena paraprasaś-danaṃ upapradānem.
4 *Manas*, II.XIX.1010 ff.
5 *HA*, II.17.183; Commentators on *Manu*, VII.198. Mitā on *Yajñī*, I.345; /cont.
It is apparent from these statements that dāna comprises temptations, blandishments, and inducements of various kinds to win over opponents, to establish a liaison between oneself and the enemy's subjects who are disaffected or greedy, to maintain friendly relations and to wean away inimical forces in the inter-state sphere, as well as to overcome the discontented elements within one's own kingdom. In fact, dāna is capable of dealing with all kinds of internal troubles as well as achieving the objectives of policies against external enemies, friends and neutrals. In its application dāna may take the form of gifts, concessions, or bribery or rewards according to the motives and purposes to be achieved and the character of the parties involved in the transaction.

Medhatithi elucidates dāna in the context of expedition and siege, which implies that presents of precious objects are given by the vijigigu to the adversary or his feudatory to win over the latter as an ally, or mean bribery to the enemy's supporters, troops and allies and temptations to deserters in order to weaken the enemy's resistance or to create internal dangers for him; or, after the battle, to pacify the conquered subjects, to conciliate the enemy's followers and to ensure the loyalty of the newly created vassal; or, before battle, dāna may indicate gifts to one's own

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(cont.) Aparārka on Yājñ, I.343. KA, II.10.54, VII.16.6; IX.5.11.

1 On Manu, VII.198.

2 Ibid., VII.201,203-4.
warriors and other supporters. The employment of dāna by the aggrieved king may denote presents to the invader or offer of financial concessions with a view to creating attachment for himself and thus to induce the latter to conclude a sandhi. \(^1\) In this case dāna may also imply tribute or indemnity, or both. Likewise, it may mean bribery if the victim seeks to win over the aggressor's allies, feudatories, ministers, military officers with a view to compelling him to relent in his onslaught. The uses of dāna, in the sense of bribery, are many.

It is striking that Somadeva considers dāna to mean either tribute or presents to a powerful ruler in order to avert invasion or to maintain friendly relations. He makes a strong plea for paying tribute when a powerful adversary asks for it, either regularly or occasionally, especially when the demand is backed by a threat of invasion. He says, 'only a fool courts destruction for the sake of avoiding a small expenditure, for what wise man would abandon his merchandise for fear of paying the tolls and duties.' 'Is that an expense,' continues the author, 'which protects a great wealth.' 'When one refuses wealth to a strong enemy, his life along with his wealth is taken away by the latter.' \(^2\) Thus, he advises a weak king to avoid war by paying tribute when asked to do so by the strong aggressor. He further counsels a king to keep his powerful

\(^1\) See above, pp. 203-4. cf. KA, VII.15.20.

\(^2\) NV, XXX, 27-29, 31.
neighbour gratified by giving him wealth under some pretext on occasions of marriage, festival, entry into a new house etc. because, by not giving him wealth under some pretext for a long time, he runs the risk of being subjugated and bound by victor's orders to pay regular tribute.¹ Thus, Somadeva distinguishes between two kinds of kings, one who should pay tribute when the powerful king desires, as was probably the case between the overlord and feudatory, and another, an unequal king, who, under some pretext, offers presents to his strong neighbour in order to ensure the security of his possessions and maintain peaceful relations. Thus, the expedient of dāna applies to inter-state relations both in times of war and peace. Somadeva is, however, also aware of the ordinary connotations of dāna as making gifts of land, conferring favours on the enemy's relatives and gratifying one's own ministers and troops with money and other objects.

Somesvara construes the expedient of dāna mainly in the sense of bribing the enemy's ministers, officials, kinsmen, feudatories, vassals and his supporters in war and diplomacy, all those close to the enemy, his servants etc. who are disaffected with their master for various reasons, such as the king's expensive habit of giving away largesses of wealth, pretensions to family inheritance (e.g. a pretender to the throne), non-receipt of salary, and the seizure of wealth.² He further advises the king to employ dāna

¹ ṈV, XXX.32-33.
² Ḍanasa, Ḍ-XIX.1005-1008.
towards his own ministers and others who have no attachment for himself. 1 Thus his interpretation of दाना, both as bribery and gifts, make it to overlap भेदा on the one hand and सेरा on the other.

The अग्नि पुराण, repeating कामन्दक, holds that 'giving away of acquired wealth in large, small or middle quantity?' is making gifts (दाना). 2 It is fivefold: return (or exchange) of gifts, acquiescence in the seizure, bestowal of something not given before; permission (to seize or to keep) one's own acquisition (in the enemy country or from the enemy property), and remission of dues. 3

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1  Manas. J.XIX.1009.

2 Agni, 241.48 – यह सम्प्रप्ता-दणोत्सर्गा उत्तमदहमा-मध्यमायाएँ; same as KN, XVIII.6. cf. KA, II.10.54 – उपप्रदनयं अर्थोपकारयं. It may be pointed out that उत्तमदहमामध्यमायाएँ may also refer to the three classes of people receiving gifts according to their character and qualifications. Sañkarārya on KN, thinks that they refer to three kinds of allies in war.

3 Agni, 241.49-50 – प्रतिदानम तदस्यास्य यज्ञसमयमुदयानम। द्राव्यदानम अपूर्वम । स्वायंग्रह हृदयानां विवक्षेत्रार्थानां। स्वसाया निर्मक्षा। यह उपप्रदनम अर्थोपकारयं उपप्रदनम पांचविचारम्। the same as KN, XVIII.6-7, with slight difference in the last line, which reads 'पेयस्य निर्मक्षास्य ...' The translation and interpretation of these verses are divergent and faulty. Mr. M.N. Dutt, who translated both the अग्नि प. and the कामन्दकिया, failed to notice the former's reproduction from the latter and hence there is not much coherence in his translations. (See Agni Purāṇa (tr.) vol. II. p. 868; KN, (tr.) p.231. P. V. Kane (H.D.S., III.p.174) confusedly translates these verses without specifying the source. He, however, ventures no interpretation, nor is he able to make anything clear as regards the fivefold gifts. In fact, Kamandaka himself had reproduced Kautilya, who clearly describes the fivefold gifts as follows: देवविसारोग स्थिरवाङ्क्यानं अभ्यवतिदानम। स्वद्राव्यदानं। अपूर्वम परस्वप्त। स्वायंग्रहदानमा। का. IX.6.24.
These cryptic statements admit of divergent interpretations. Kautiliya, who first distinguished these five modes of making gifts, elsewhere, elucidates the second, third, and fourth in dealing with a rebellious son, brother or kinsman. He advises that 'if lacking in energy' to put down the rebel 'planning to seize the kingdom', the king should overcome the rebel 'by acquiescing in what is seized...'; 'or he should create confidence in him by grants of land to others not made before like him', 'or he should send troops superior to him that are permitted to seize what they can...'.

Thus, in the first case it is a concession; in the second, it is an extension of gifts to the other in consequence of the former act; and in the third, it is a permission to plunder one's own acquisitions now fallen into the possession of the enemy. In other contexts he shows how the king has to practise dana in subjugating other kings by force, when they behave submissively; there are also those contexts where dana is really bribery. The Jayamangala commentary on the Kamandakiya, however, construes the fivefold dana as exemplified by a king's ways of their application towards his confederates or allied troops in order to keep them under control. Śāhkarārya comments: that distinguished: between sāra (an ally or confederate prince) and asāra (a rearward ally) a king should practise dana by making return gifts from his acquired wealth

1KA, IX.6.24.
2Ibid., IX.3.15-17.
3Ibid., IX.6.23; VII.16.3.6.
(that is, probably wealth obtained with their assistance), by
approving of what they have seized (during war), by granting new
valuables from his treasury not given before, by permitting them
to seize what they can (i.e. permission to plunder) from the enemy's
property, and by remitting what is due (that is his own share of
spoils or tribute due to himself). ¹

However, the five-fold dāna may be given a broader application
during war itself. It may be suggested that return gifts (pratidāna)
can be practised between two antagonists intending an agreement or
treaty (sandhi) as, for instance, between Sultan Mahmūd and the
Candella king Vidyādharaka when the latter decided to come to honourable
terms with the former.² The 'acquiescence in seizure' may signify
a king's acceptance of a fait accompli such as the capture of valuables,
a fort or a territory by his adversary because he wants a rapprochement,
as probably happened between the Caulukya king Kumarapāla and the
Cāhamāna king Vīgraharāja IV, when the former approved of the latter's
encroachments on his empire, whereupon Vīgraharāja IV diverted his
later expeditions against kings to the north of his kingdom.³ The
'gifts of things not given before' may imply a conqueror's giving of
precious gifts of a weapon, umbrella, throne, crown and so forth
to the new king, whom he has installed in a vanquished realm.⁴

¹ KN, XVIII.6-7. cf. KA, VII.5.48-49.
² N.S. Bose, op.cit., pp. 60 ff.
³ D. Sharma, op.cit., pp. 57 ff.
⁴ On Medh. on Manu, VII.263.
The permission to one's own acquisition may imply a concession, from the conqueror to an ally, or feudatory, to seize what he can during or after a campaign. 'The remission of what is due' may just indicate the conqueror's liberality to forego his tributes from a vassal in order to win him over. In the Kamandakiya and the Agni Purāṇa these different ways of practising dāna are described from the point of view of a conqueror, but these may also be interpreted from the point of view of a submissive king or a king seeking to remove dangers from internal revolts and the collusion between enemies and allies.

Someśvara has detailed sixteen kinds of dāna. Abhīṣṭa is the gift of suitable things or desired objects to appropriate persons, according to their qualifications. Giving away as much grain as is sufficient for the whole family for a year is called hayana. Desya is the gift of land or country (rastra). Karaja is making a gift of taxes or revenue of a country or province (rastra). Gifts of elephants are called danti, and of horses saptiśa. Giving a tax-free village or one with taxes is grāmaja. Sasana is a royal

1 Manas, II XIX. 1010-11.
2 Ibid., 1012.
3 Ibid., 1013.
4 Ibid., 1014.
5 Ibid., 1015.
6 Ibid., 1015.
7 Ibid., 1016.
grant or charter making gifts of land etc. in perpetuity, heritable by the donor's descendants. The gift of beautiful jewels and decorations is known as bhuṣa-dāna. The gift of various kinds of clothes is called vāsana. Pratipatti is conferring high rank, honour, title or rule. It involves offering a seat (āsana) and giving a chowrie, parasol, conveyance with due honour and dignity. This may signify gifts made to a newly installed king in a vanquished country, as described by Medhatithi, or the grant of status such as the creation of a feudatory or appointment of a person to a position of authority and influence. It is also likely that pratipatti-dāna was practised in other contexts as well, but the articles involved in the gift largely imply the conferment of some political or administrative position. Ākara is gifts of mines of silver, gold and jewels. The gift of choicest gold ornaments for neck or breast (nīśkānī) (also used as money) is called rukma. Giving away of a girl possessed of good marks and adorned with ornaments in a proper manner (i.e. observing rites and ceremonies) is kanyādāna.

1Manas, J-XIX,1017.
2Ibid., 1018.
3Ibid., 1019-20.
4Ibid., 1021.
5On Manu, VII.203.
6Manas,J-XIX,1022.
7Ibid., 1023.
8Ibid., 1024.
The gift of a beautiful, youthful courtesan, who is proficient in music and dance is called vaisya. Velākara is the gift of a sea-coast along with a port and flourishing town inhabited by seafaring mercantile people, who deal in rich commodities.

These sixteen kinds of gifts are treated by Someśvara as comprising dāna, which is used as a political expedient. He also describes gifts of animals, probably for religious sacrifices, which win both worlds. The various articles of gifts for practising dāna suggest that it could be a very effective expedient towards opponents who would succumb to temptations or be won over by financial and territorial concessions or grant of rule. Dāna also includes political marriages and these were frequently contracted during our period. Many of these, as for instance, that of Kāmcamdeva, the daughter of the Caulukya king Jayasiṣṭha Siddharāja with the Āharāja; of Jehala, Arora's daughter with the Caulukya king Kumarapāla, and many others, had only political purposes for both parties. Political marriages were indeed a powerful means to overcome an enemy and also a factor of great importance in interstate politics. Someśvara's long list of objects involved in making gifts suggests that dāna was applied to achieve manifold political objectives ranging from the consolidation of power to the conquest

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1. Manas, J.XIX.1025.
2. Ibid., 1026-27.
3. Ibid., 1028.
and pacification of enemies in the inter-state sphere.

The expedient of dāna is particularly recommended for use towards those who are greedy by nature, weakened in resources, and given to various kinds of vices.\(^1\) Dāna, in fact, is said to be capable of accomplishing all objectives.\(^2\) In general, our sources consider it an irresistible expedient to avoid war, to pacify enemies in the inter-state sphere as well as within one's own kingdom, and to sever the fastest of alliances,\(^3\) to win over the enemy's men to one's own side and to approximate numerous other political objectives. The Purāṇas and Somesvara declare that there is none in this world who cannot be overcome by dāna; even gods are won over by gifts, what then of mortals.\(^4\) Even virtuous persons devoid of avarice, though they do not accept gifts, nevertheless side with the king who makes such a gesture.\(^5\) A king practising gifts wins both worlds and is worshipped like a god by the people.\(^6\)

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\(^2\) Manas, XIX.1030; cf. Matsya, 224.3.

\(^3\) Agni, 226.13; cf. Matsya, 224.4; Vdh, II.69.3.

\(^4\) Ibid., 226.12, cf. Ibid., 224.2-3; Ibid., II.69.2. Manas, XIX.1029.

\(^5\) Matsya, 224.5 quoted in RDK, XIV.p.129; cf. Vdh, II 69.3.

\(^6\) Agni, 226.12; Matsya, 224.1 quoted in RDK, XIV.p.129; Manas, XIX.1029-30; cf. Vdh, 69.1, 5-6.
The expedient of bheda (sowing dissension) is a method to safeguard, as well as to promote, one's own interests in interstate relations by creating mutual dissension and strife among enemies and their allies and alienating their men to serve one's own cause against the interests of their masters. According to Visvarūpa bheda means 'division of two united parties by instigation to rebellion or treachery'. Medhatithi writes, 'bheda is the winning over of his family members. This last means also the arousing of fear in his mind and so forth.' Somadeva defines bheda as 'Sowing mutual apprehension and reprimanding strife by admonition among the enemy troops by the agency of a bravo, a secret agent, a spy in the pay of both the king and his enemy.' Hemacandra states: 'generating mutual contrariness of purpose or will among ministers and others by temptations of wealth etc. and cleverness of speech is bheda.' Vijñāneshvara says, 'bheda is causing divisions;
that consists in causing enmity among neighbouring kings with each other.\footnote{On Yajñ., I.346; Bheda bhedakarapä, tañ̥asamantaśi̤naṃ parasparato vairasyotpādanaṃ.} Someśvara also understands bheda to consist in separating well united enemies from each other by employing one's own men in the enemy's kingdom, secret agents, and spies in the pay of both, the king and his enemy.\footnote{Kenas., XVIII.987-88; Ykt., 101.p.14.}

These statements are self-explanatory as regards the meaning and nature of bheda. It consists in creating mutual distrust, suspicion, apprehension, division, alienation, hatred, rivalry, rancour, and hostility in the enemy's ranks especially among his queen, crown prince, ministers, commander-in-chief, troops, feudatories, frontier governors, forest chieftains and other leading men and subjects, as well as in sowing discord among his neighbours and in separating him from his allies. Bheda is practised by means of secret overtures, temptations of wealth, honour, rank, etc., secret instigations to treachery and rebellion, false insinuations and other stratagems employed through many classes of secret agents and spies and also by making a demand for funds, troops, land, inheritance by supporting a neighbouring prince, a pretender from the family and a prince in disfavour or other such deserters or parties who have some following in the enemy's rank.\footnote{cf. KA, VII.16.7; Medh. on Manu, VII.197; Agni, 241.62; KN, XVIII.51-52.} However in general bheda...
is practised by creating fear amongst the enemy's men through the suggestion of their own king's displeasure; and by showing the benefits should they come over to oneself.\textsuperscript{1} Our authorities emphasise the alienation of the members of the enemy's family and employing them to destroy the enemy in the same way as one removes a thorn by means of another thorn or breaks a \textit{vilva} fruit with another.\textsuperscript{2}

\textbf{Bheda} partakes of the nature of intrigue and secret instigation to treachery, desertion and rebellion. Its operational character is twofold: to sow dissension in the enemy's ranks and thus disrupt his united front and weaken his power of resistance or to cause internal revolts in his kingdom, which dissipate his resources and undermine his strength, and to alienate the enemy's supporters and bring them to one's side so that they may be exploited for harming the enemy in various ways. This latter aspect of practising \textit{bheda} is distinctly called \textit{upājāpa}, which means alienation, secret instigation or seduction of enemy's men. 'The act of alienating consists in estranging the dependent from his chief and inciting him to take his own advantage at the cost of the latter.'\textsuperscript{3} The \textit{modus operandi} of \textit{bheda}, as well as of \textit{upājāpa}, is manifold, as it is directed against four groups of alienable or seducible persons

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textit{Matsya}, 223.3 quoted in \textit{RDK}, XIV.127; \textit{Agni}, 226.9-10.}
\footnote{\textit{Agni}, 226.10; \textit{NV}, XXX.53-55; cf. \textit{Matsya}, 223.12-15.}
\footnote{\textit{Medh. on Manu}, VII.197.}
\end{footnotes}
(krtyā), namely, the enraged (kruddha), the greedy (lubdha), the frightened (bhita) and the despised (avamānita). The Matsya Purāṇa quoted by Lakṣmīdhara, adds to these classes the wicked (dugta). Medhātithi, after Kauṭilya, details their characteristics and points out their different motives and reasons which prompt them to easily succumb to the foreign machinations and to act against the interests of their own king and country. The Agni Purāṇa, repeating Kāmandaka, advises the king to employ bheda through the enemy’s men who have been falsely reviled, those who are desirous of glory, those who have been invited but insulted, those who entertain hostility towards the sovereign, those who have been unjustly superseded in rank or honour, those who are filled with self-conceit, those who are prevented from pursuing virtue (dharma), wealth (artha) and desire (kāma), those who are enraged, those proud persons who have been insulted, those who have been banished or deserted without cause, those who assume a calm exterior though injured by their king, those whose wives and wealth have been forcibly taken away, and those who are worthy of honour but have been disregarded. These kinds of persons are classified under the preceding four groups of seducible parties by Kauṭilya, Medhātithi and Kāmandaka, who

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1 Medh. on Manu, VII.105; KA, I.14.2 ff.
2 Matsya, 223 quoted by RDK, XIV.p.127.
clearly recommend their alienation by intrigue.

The *Agni Purāṇa* states that *bheda* is of three kinds: to destroy affection and amity between two persons (i.e. by creating suspicion), to generate rivalry or mutual attrition, and to separate those who are united.\(^1\) It is evident that *bheda* can be practised in any one of these ways. However, these three types of distinctions in the application of *bheda* can be differentiated in actual practice, although they do not mark any definite advance from Somadeva's statement that *bheda* consists in either creating suspicion or reprimanding.\(^2\)

Somesvara has, however, distinguished six kinds of *bheda*.\(^3\) Praṇāpahā means creating fright for life in a person (of the enemy's side or the enemy's ally etc.) by betraying to him the alleged secrets of counsel of his king to have him murdered by a bravado or poisoner or some other secret means.\(^4\) Manabhaṅga is that in which it is alleged that the honour of the person to be alienated is at stake because, impelled by his enemies, the king dishonours him; thus should one sow dissension.\(^5\) Danahāni involves exploitation

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\(^1\) *Agni*, 241.50-51; *Snehārāgāpanayana samharsotpādanem tathāḥ Mitho bhedaśca bhedaścārthi bhedaścātrvidhah smrtah! This is same as KN, XVIII.8 with the difference as regards the third. Kamandaka has 'santarjanam' in place of 'mitho bhedaś ca'. Kamandaka thus emphasizes sowing dissension by creating fright or threatening, which would be expedient in the case of internal revolt or confederacy of hostile kings.

\(^2\) *NV*, XXIX.73; same as *KA*, II.10.55.

\(^3\) *Manas*, XVIII.989.

\(^4\) *Manas*, XVIII.990-91.

of a rich person's avarice. The spy in the pay of both (ubhayavetana) insinuates to the enemy king that a certain person is very rich but never gives anything to the king. His wealth should, therefore, be seized by any means. Having thus advised the king, the spy should disclose to the rich man that the king is very greedy and wants to seize his wealth. The spy thus sows dissension by such backbiting.¹ Bandhaka is creating fear of imprisonment in those who are devoted to their master's interests by insinuating that their king does not trust them any more and would have them enchained and thrown into the dungeon.² Darabhilāsa consists in a spy's sowing dissension between the enemy king and another person or his ally who has access to the king's harem. The spy alleges that the king has confided in him that the person concerned is voluptuous, lascivious, and libertine and has an eye on one of his wives. The king himself has seen him winking at his wife in the harem and decided that he deserves to be killed for his licentiousness.³ The spy may also allege to an ally of the enemy that the king was admiring his wife's beauty, youth, and grace before him, obviously with the desire to possess her. But as the king cannot do so while the

¹Manas.,Ⅺ, 993-995.
²Ibid., 996-97.
³Ibid., 998-999.
latter is living, he would create enmity with him, suggesting thereby, that the king would have him killed in a war so that he can obtain his wife. Thus the spy creates division by exploiting the alleged desire to possess another's wife.\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Angabhanga} is that mode of sowing dissension in which the fear of mutilation is raised. The spy divulges to one of the members of the enemy's family that the king suspects him of being desirous of the kingdom because of his birth in the same family. Therefore, the king would surely have his fingers chopped off or his eyes taken out.\textsuperscript{2}

It would appear that Somesvara's six kinds of \textit{bheda} make hardly any significant advance upon earlier methods of practising \textit{bheda}. He emphasizes the creation of suspicion and fright by exploiting vices of others or attributing allegations through intrigue. He, however, combines the nature of \textit{bheda} with the mechanics of \textit{upajāpa}, and the two together are employed to afflict the enemy. In fact, \textit{upajāpa} and \textit{bheda} are inseparable, for Visvarūpa implies that having seduced persons of the enemy's side, one sows dissensions in his ranks.\textsuperscript{3} Our authorities warn every king against the constant threat of secret instigations to treachery.

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Mānasā}., I.XX.1000-1001.
\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, XVIII.1002-3.
\textsuperscript{3}On \textit{Vaiṣṇava Jñānaśāstra}, I.342.
and rebellion among his ranks due to foreign intrigues and espionage, which he must foil by counter-measures in his own kingdom and against his external enemies. In this connection, it is pointed out that internal dangers especially from one's own family members, ministers, and other elements of his government and revolts in the interior region are much more serious than those in frontier regions and from the outside.\(^1\) The purpose of these pronouncements is to stress the crucial importance of internal solidarity, which was also constantly undermined by secret accomplices of enemies in one's own kingdom. These persons harm their king in two ways: by disrupting his strength and by giving information to the outside enemy as regards the vulnerability of their master.

Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the expedient of bheda, which is similar, in some ways, to the method of divide and rule as regards enemies of state, a king would be ill-advised if he tried to divide his own men and set some of them against others. The Brahma Purāṇa, quoted with approval by Lakṣmīdhara, deprecates practising bheda, in other words a policy of divide and rule, as a measure of exercising control in one's own kingdom. It warns that the king sowing dissension in his own side would ruin his forts, treasury and country even without a foreign enemy to assail,\(^2\) although his subjects are firmly rooted.\(^2\) However this advice of the Brahma Purāṇa

\(^1\)Agni, 226.11; Matsya, 223.8-9 quoted in RDK, XIV.p.128.

seems mainly to concern the *rajeprakrtis* (i.e. the queen, crown prince, ministers, commander-in-chief and those very close to the king) because other sources advocate the use of *bheda* and *danda* (force) against feudatories, forest chieftains, frontier governors etc. when these have become rebellious.\(^1\)

The dynastic chroniclers of our period have stories of how enemy partisans were sought to be divided and hostile confederacies split through stratagems and artifices wielded by a host of spies.\(^2\) It appears that the easy prey to an enemy's blandishments and stratagems were one's own kinsmen, who either aspired to the kingdom or felt their claims superseded or dishonoured, and corrupt ministers, intriguing feudatories many of whom painfully remembered their lost independence and injury to their pride in the past by their present overlord. More often than not these constituents of the government became willing associates of their master's enemies or themselves created dissensions which were exploited by outside rivals. There are some historical instances of the application of *bheda*, for example during the long war between the Caulukya king Kumārapāla and the Gāhamāna king Arperāja, in which the latter was joined by Gāhada, a claimant to the Caulukya throne, who alienated several supporters of Kumārapāla including his mahāauta (elephant-

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\(^2\) Disloyalty and defection of the feudatories had become such a common phenomenon that Jayānaka regards it a natural effect of the Kali Age (P.V. X.32); cf. K. Gopač, *op.cit.*, pp. 97-98; vide also *Rajatarāṅgini*, VIII.923, 927, 281 ff, 282 ff; also *RM*, XII.
Another example is the severance of the confederacy between the Paramara king Devapāla, the Lata chieftain Sangrama Simha, and the Yādava king Simhāpa against the Caulukya king Bhīma II by the spies of the Caulukya minister Vastupāla. The defection of the enemy's frontier feudatories could be effected by bheda and they could even be instigated to murder their overlord secretly, as for example, Vikramasigha, the feudatory of Kumārapāla in the Mt. Abu region, plotted to murder his overlord when he encamped there during his expedition against Arporāja. There is a strong possibility that Vikramasigha was won over by Arporāja or Cāhada by means of bheda.

In the end it may be said that kings seem to have indulged in dynastic intrigues and plots to weaken their rivals by creating dissensions among their ranks and alienating their men. It is in relation to bheda that the role of spies becomes very prominent and our authorities especially mention ubhayavetana (an agent in the pay of both) who seems to have had a sort of permanent commission at the enemy's court. Our authors betray a knowledge of psychology in their description of various groups of alienable parties and exploit it for sowing dissension.

2 A.K. Majumdar, p.155.
3 Ibid., p.110.
DANDA (Force; chastisement or war)

The last of the four traditional expedients is danda, which, according to Visvarūpa, means 'to reduce to subjection by force'. It is, in fact, the use of force to achieve political objectives. Our other authorities state, 'killing, tormenting and seizure of property constitute force'. However, Vijnāneśvara says: 'chastisement /i.e. causing injury, danda/ by secret and open means commencing with the deprivation of property leading up to killing' is danda (force). Danda is thus an instrument of physical coercion, used to subjugate enemies by violence, bodily injury or imprisonment, or damage to property. These different forms of danda may be practised separately or collectively. It is, however, the ultimate expedient to overcome dangers of all sorts inside one's kingdom and in the inter-state sphere.

As an expedient of inter-state policy the application of danda leads to war or brings about the destruction and seizure of the enemy's men and material by secret ways of perpetrating violence. It is striking that danda, which is an expedient of force, also indicates the forces of the state. These are divided into two kinds, firstly, prakaśa-danda (open force) comprising eight classes of troops, viz. infantry, cavalry, chariots, elephants etc. and secondly, aprakaśa danda (secret force) consisting of many

1 On Yajñ., I.342. Dandd ṣahat prasadhanam.

2 RV, XXIX.75. Vadhah parikleso 'rthaharapar ca dandah. Agni, 24. 51; same as Kav., XVIII.9; HA, II.17, 189. Manas., II.XX.1034.

3 Nid. on Yajñ., I.346.
types of secret agents, such as spies, bravadoes, assassins, poisoners and saboteurs. The latter class of forces is considered more deadly for inflicting danda upon the enemy. These agencies of danda further bear out the preceding connotation of danda as chastisement by force in order to overcome enemies.

Two types of danda, prakāsa (open) and aprakāsa (secret or covert) are distinguished in our sources in view of the means and instruments of its application. The open force is exercised through armed forces and means fighting and war that causes the devastation of villages in the enemy country, destruction of crops, arson and killing of the enemy and his supporters in battle. The secret danda is inflicted by means of assassination, poison, fire and incantations. Many classes of spies, bravadoes, poisoners are employed to carry out the killing of the foe, his ministers, princes of royal blood and others, pollution of crops, food, fodder and water. They also sow dissension in the enemy's rank and break his strength by stratagems and sabotage. The Brāhmaṇas and others

2 Agni, 234.2, 241.52; Mit., on Yājñ., I.346; cf. KN, XVIII.10,
3 Agni, 234.2, 241.52; cf. Vād., II.146.1ff; RNP, p.303. KN, XVIII.10. The text of the Agni Purāṇa seems to be corrupt, but the Vīgūḍharmottāra P., which records the same tradition, gives a clear account of these two kinds of danda.
4 Cf. Vād., II.146.4ff; KN, XVIII.12.
5 Agni, 234.3; cf. Vād., II.145.4-5. Manas., II.XX.1224-42; cf. also on Manu, VII.195-96; RNP, p.303.
adept at administering deadly charms and spells use these to ruin the opponents. These open and secret modes of practising danda conform to the nature and tactics of three kinds of war, open, concealed, and secret. It may, therefore, be observed that the employment of danda in inter-state relations normally denotes one of these kinds of war.

Somesvara has detailed twelve kinds of danda for employment by a powerful ruler and three more for a weak king in order to subdue intransigent enemies by chastisement and force. Deśanaśaka-danda comprises the cutting down of forests, the breaking up of water reservoirs and the destruction of villages by fire in the enemy country. Janaṅacchedaka constitutes the mutilation of the enemy's people by chopping off their nose and ears. Gograha danda involves a sudden seizure of all cattle of a country by force. Dhanyahara danda consists in forcibly carrying away the entire crop of the enemy territory and seizing all grains stored in the granaries and market places. This kind of punishment causes

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1 Cf. RNP, p.305; quotes Vdh., II.146.4ff. KA, X.48-50.

2 NV, XXX.90-91; Agni, 236-59-61; cf. KA, VII.16.8; KN, XIX.54 ff; Manas., II.XX.1034 ff.

3 Manas., II.XX.1035-1037.

4 Ibid., II.XX.1038.

5 Ibid., II.XX.1039.

6 Ibid., II.XX.1040.
depletion of food and fodder and produces famine in the enemy country. ¹ Bandigrāha is the imprisonment of the householders having large families, rich merchants and others of the enemy kingdom, probably with a view to forcing the enemy to abandon hostility and also to obtain ransom. ² Deshāraka danda means the annexation of a country by establishing oneself or one's administration there after having granted safety of life to the hostile people. ³ Dhanādana consists in the forcible seizure of gold and wealth of villages by invading troops, in other words, a mere raid of the enemy villages. ⁴ Sarvasvaharana danda means forcibly seizing all kinds of movable property, wealth, corn, cattle, stocks of iron and weapons, clothes and household implements of the enemy's flourishing city or town after investing it with a great army. This again implies a plundering expedition aimed at robbing enemy cities. Durgabhāṅga is the destruction of different kinds of enemy forts by means of siege, assault, machines, mines, fire and also stratagems and incantations that help to reduce enemy strongholds in various ways. ⁵ Sthanadahaka danda is sacking of the

¹ Manas., II.XX.1041-42.
² Ibid., II.XX.1043.
³ Ibid., II.XX.1044.
⁴ Ibid., II.XX.1045.
⁵ Ibid., XX.1046-47.
⁶ Ibid., XX.1048-1074. Someśvara brings in a résumé of siege warfare and means to capture a fort in the discussion of durgabhāṅga danda.
enemy capital by destroying ramparts, royal palaces, mansions of princes, ministers and other high officials and other dwelling places together with stables for horses, elephants and various storehouses.¹ Deśaniyāsaka danda means the banishment of the enemy from his kingdom and thus condemning him to mental torture and physical hardships caused by the deprivation of family, wealth, conveyances, dwelling, food and water, and other amenities.²

The twelfth kind of danda is yuddha or battle which is also called mahādanda (great punishment) that ruins the enemy.³ Someśvara discusses under it all kinds of activities connected with expedition, camping strategy, troop-formations, fighting and rules of war. It appears from these twelve kinds of application of force that a powerful ruler could adopt various ways to crush his enemies but he should not transgress beyond raids, plunder and open and concealed kinds of war.

However, a weak king is permitted to take recourse to three additional kinds of danda called visa danda, ghāṭa danda and abhicāraka danda. Visa danda means the application of various kinds of poisons and deadly venoms through different devices in order to kill the foe.

¹ Manas., XX.1075-1078.
² Ibid., XX.1079-81.
³ Ibid., XX.1037-1082 ff.
⁴ Ibid., XX.1225.
his crown prince, secretaries, ministers, commanders, deadly
elephants, best horses etc. The spies as well as the alienated
enemy's ranks should be used to administer poison in order to
create dissension through causing suspicion among the enemy's
warriors and to pollute tanks, wells and ponds. They should also
cause to be poisoned bathing tanks, oil, footwear and all other
articles and places likely to come in contact with the enemy and
his leading men. ¹ Thus should a weak king afflict his powerful
enemy and destroy his strength.

Ghata danda means the assassination of the enemy by employing
agents who are brave, loyal, not afraid for their lives, daring,
who know the right time for action, who are skilled in ways and
means of murder, the spy in the pay of both who has been given an
enormous amount of money, and other reliable agents. They would
contrive to kill the enemy when he would be off his guard, when he is
absorbed in music and dance, gambling, hunting, visiting temples,
pleasures of wrestling and other festivities; indulging in his
harem, engrossed in worship, and other activites or on occasions when
the enemy is impatient. The assassins and bravadoes would kill him
on these occasions by dropping weapons or other mechanisms through
various ways of creating illusions.²

¹ Manas., II.XX.1226-31.
² Ibid., XX.1232-37.
The last is abhicāraka danda which is wrought by magic and incantations. It consists in the six acts of magic performance known as sājākarma, each of which involves the invocation of supernatural powers to fulfil any of the six objects, namely averting calamity (śānti), bringing the enemy under the power of one's own will (vāśya, probably to bewitch him to accede to sandhi), paralysing or stopping (stambhana, that is, his powers or military advance), causing the enemy to quit his occupation (uccātana, for instance by creating violent psychic disturbance in the enemy so that he suddenly abandons his expedition), creating enmity (vidvega) among the enemy's allies, and finally, killing the enemy by spells (māraṇa). The Brahmaṇas adept in the magical formularies of the Atharva Veda and other kinds of incantations (tantras) are to be employed to afflict and destroy the enemy from a distance by conjuring up deadly spells through weird ceremonies. Abhicāraka danda actually comprises the last five acts, while śānti (alleviation of deadly spells of the enemy) is a counter-measure. The various malevolent magical practices are, in fact, included in the means of waging secret war (tusñim-yuddha). Someśvara's discussion thus leaves no doubt as to what constitutes danda because he nearly exhausts different kinds of injuries that can be done to the enemy's

1 Kāmas., II.XX.1238-41; cf. KA, X.3.44, X.6.48-50 and other contexts where Kauḍilya describes the practices of black magic and sorcery in war.

2 NV, XXX.91.
power and resources by direct force, secret agents and conjurers of deadly spells. It may be doubted whether he shows any striking originality, nevertheless, he seems to countenance the prevailing practices of the application of force in a systematic way, which helps the appraisal of force in inter-state politics and its consequences.

It is thus evident that danda means force or use of force. Its application involves injury and destruction. As an expedient of diplomacy it means a threat of war or commencement of expedition leading to battle (yuddha). However, secret danda may be used to force the rival into submission without battle or to impair his war potential preceding battle. Similarly the aggrieved king may employ secret danda to afflict the aggressive enemy in order to dissuade him from invasion or avert his own annihilation. While each application of danda may not necessarily lead to battle, it nevertheless results in the infliction of injury to the enemy's power.

UPEKŚĀ (Indifference)

Taking recourse to pretended indifference on account of unfavourable circumstances as an expedient of policy to deal with the enemy is called upekśā (indifference). Repeating Kāmandaka, the Agni Purāṇa states: 'upekśā consists in not preventing the enemy from indulging in unjust acts i.e. wrongful policy, in vices and in wars...'. This indicates that upekśā involves a feigned indifference.

1 Agni, 24.66: Anyāye vyasane yuddhe pravṛtasyānivarāgam upekṣeyam
smṛtya bhrātopeksitā ca Hidimbayaḥ KN, XVIII.57,59.
to the enemy's committing acts of injustice against one's frontier country or within his own kingdom, thereby causing grave provocation, or to his falling into vices like hunting etc., thereby offering an opportunity for invasion, or to his prosecuting war against oneself or one's allies or elsewhere thereby inviting intervention. We have already seen that since the enemy is himself on the road to destruction one should adopt an indifferent attitude because the objective of policy is being achieved without any loss.¹

The Agni Purāṇa states that upeksā is the only possible expedient when a king finds that conciliatory measures (sāma) would extol the enemy to the sky or would be derogatory to oneself, that the attempt to buy him off would be nothing more than squandering good money, and that in striving to create dissensions (bheda) among his ranks, he would be detected and punished.² It is clear that a king adopting the expedient of upeksā has no other means except to wait for a favourable situation when another of the four expedients would be employed. It is also evident that the use of force (danda) by the king himself is ruled out because it would be disastrous as the factors of power, place and time appear to be unfavourable. It thus appears that upeksā is an expedient of inter-state politics that

¹See above, p. 319.
²Agni, 234.4-7.
brings about a stalemate in hostilities, despite the fact that these are not renounced. It may be a situation following hostilities between rivals of near-equal power in which the aggrieved king takes no apparent action against the enemy. In fact, he does not employ any other means (upāya) because none is advantageous, although the expedient of indifference against the enemy may involve his sustaining some injuries. Further, a recourse to indifference by an aggressive king may imply a change of methods and means owing to the loss of opportune time of the expedition, inability to force the matter to a final conclusion, or the realization of the enemy's grave difficulties, which would oblige him a little later to acknowledge his sway without battle.¹

This interpretation of upākṣa as feigned indifference towards the enemy, involving suspension of all the four expedients of foreign policy, is further clarified by some Purāṇas by a direct reference to foreign policy. They state that a king should employ indifference when he finds that he can neither conclude sanāhi (treaty or peace) because it is harmful, nor fight a battle (rāpa) following hostility (vīgraha) because it would prove disastrous.² Our authorities further associate the expedient of upākṣa with the policy of āsana.

¹See above, pp. 3/4-20.
²Agni, 234.4-5; cf. Vaiṣ. II.147.1 ff.
(watchful waiting or pause) and attribute its adoption to the weakening of strength in men and material (lit. loss and expense).\(^1\) If this loss and expense is consequent upon initial armed engagements then the expedient of *upekṣa* would imply a discreet withdrawal without achieving the objective as, for instance, the pulling back of forces by Candella King Vidyādhara after a day-long battle with Sultan Mahmūd in A.D. 1019 because strategic factors went against him.\(^2\) A recourse to indifference may be had before launching an expedition against the enemy or the aggrieved king may resort to it against an aggressor who does not intend to inflict great injuries, as in the case of a powerful king trespassing on one's territory during an expedition against another king and thereby doing some damage. However, we have already discussed the implications of *āsana* and *upekṣa* and remarked that the latter is directed to the battle and not to the enemy. But from the viewpoint of an aggrieved king it may relate to both, because he may suffer certain injuries at the hands of the aggressor and yet adopt the expedient of indifference for fear of a disastrous battle. The Gujarāti chronicles tell us that when Jayasimha Siddharāja invaded the Candella kingdom, its ruler Madanavarman took no notice of the invasion probably because he could see that the former had

\(^1\) *Vdh*, II.147.lff; cf. *RNP*, p.304; see above 317-20.

no intention of ravaging his kingdom, as Jayasimha's object seems to have been to forestall any possible Candella interference in his recently conquered kingdom of Malwa. The chronicler narrates that Jayasimha, finding no resistance to his expedition, demanded a substantial sum of gold from Madanavarman, who was celebrating festivities. The Candella king contemptuously asked his ministers to pay off the money, whereupon Jayasimha was so much impressed by his graceful indifference that he insisted on being received by Madanavarmana probably as a guest and friend.\footnote{1} This instance of practising indifference may suggest that it could be an effective expedient provided the stakes are not too high. A king may further adopt this expedient against an enemy who has done harm in absence and instant retaliation is likely to prove ruinous. Thus, for instance, Bhima I of Gujarat temporarily ignored Paramara Bhoja's reassertion of overlordship over the Paramara principality of Mt. Abu, which he had reduced to submission, and also the sack of his capital by the Paramara general Kulacandra while he was away on expedition in Sindh.\footnote{2} The expedient of upekṣa could therefore be practised as long as one is unable to employ other expedients. 

Kautilya has described an aspect of āsana called upekgasana as 'non-employment of means'.\footnote{3} This seems to correspond to a phase

\footnote{1}{A. K. Mazumdar, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 76-77.}
\footnote{2}{Ibid., p.50 ff; D.C.Ganguly, p.116.}
\footnote{3}{K.A, VII.4.3. \textit{Upayānām aprayoga upekṣaṇam}.}
in inter-state relations when the policy of āsana is executed with the expedient of upeksā. Earlier we have noted a kind of āsana called upeksāḥ which is characterized by indifference to an enemy who is doomed to destruction without direct military intervention by a powerful king who wants to subjugate him.¹ The explanation of some Purāṇas implies the adoption of the expedient of indifference before precipitating a battle. It seems that, as āsana is an alternative to yāna, so upeksāḥ is an alternative to danda, and therefore an independent expedient by itself.² In fact, it is an alternative to all the four upāyas, and, as already observed, implies inaction as opposed to action. However, its application saves the king from shame and ensures his self-preservation in a state of very delicate balance of power.

MĀYA (Illusion)

Māya means illusion, which is created by ingenious contrivances and false proclamations about favourable omens, divine blessings, oracles and astrological predictions in order to hoodwink and frighten the enemy and to cause consternation among his ranks.³

¹See above, p. 319.
²Mbh. I.49.42 gives independent status to upeksāḥ as a fifth means.
It consists in deceptive appearances engineered to exploit superstitious fears of the enemy and his troops, with a view to advancing one's war strategy by breaking their morale and causing a scare about the dreadful consequences, which are shown to be inevitable. Maya also consists in exploiting objects of worship and superstition to contrive the enemy's destruction. It has, however, to be pointed out that while Maya consists in the use of illusory powers, deception, cunning and cruel intrigues, it is not created by spells or magic but is the product of human and material contrivances.

The Agni Purana, repeating Kamandaka, furnishes details of practising Maya which is of two kinds, human (manusya) and superhuman (amanusya). The former consists in concealing men in cavities of divine images carved in stone pillars and other places of worship, and clothing males in female costumes with a view to killing the enemy or his prominent supporters unawares.\(^1\) It is also practised by showing portents at night (betokening victory over the enemy) and by displaying live forms of vampires, meteors (this is produced by letting fly over the enemy line birds of strong and extensive plumage with lighted wicks attached to their tails), demons, stones and creating other physical disturbances.\(^2\) The latter consists in changing forms at will and in dropping weapons, stones and

\[^1\text{Agni, 241.63-64; cf. KN, XVIII.53-54.}\]

\[^2\text{Ibid., 241.64, 234.8-10; cf. Ibid.; Vdh., II.148.1-4.}\]
These illusory phenomena are created to terrify the enemy.

It is evident from the devices of practising *māyā* that this has a twofold application: firstly, to encompass the murder of the enemy by hiding assassins behind the objects of worship and in religious places or by men disguised as women, and secondly, to scare the enemy, his troops and subjects by displaying ominous spectres in the night before the battle or to use illusory devices of producing darkness, wind, fire, clouds and rain in the midst of fighting, in order to frighten and confuse enemy hordes, which can thus be destroyed. The second way of practising *māyā* may also indicate the creation of a camouflage for one's own troops which enables them to exterminate the enemy's men, bewildered and frightened by strange physical disturbances.

The *Agni Purāṇa* elsewhere also elaborates the methods for practising *māyā* as deception and guile. It says that the king should prompt ascetics and astrologers to proclaim among the enemy's men the preordained fall of their master in the ensuing battle. He should further propagate that his cause has been favoured with the blessings of the immortal gods, and that their wrath has alighted upon his enemies. At some time during the war, he should falsely declare that he has been reinforced by the timely arrival of fresh

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allies, whereby the enemy would lose heart and be put to rout. Further, war whoops and jubilant shouts of victory should be raised and it should be openly (although falsely) announced that the enemy has been irretrievably beaten. Thus, by various treacherous devices and deceptive methods a king is encouraged to destroy his enemy in battle. It may be mentioned that such deception and bluff are considered to be part of concealed fighting as also is siege warfare.

The deceptive devices connected with the application of mayā are mentioned in several other sources, which do not regard mayā as a regular expedient. Kauṭilya has recommended them to weaker kings and their secret agents in order to dispose of the enemy. Even Somesvara discusses them in order to contrive the assassination of the enemy. It seems that he considers vadha (assassination) and mayā inseparable, as the latter is created to contrive the former in places of worship and amusement etc. where the enemy can be caught unaware. These treacherous ways were sometimes really used to kill the enemy king. Merutunga's accounts of how the Paramāra king Bhoja was apprehended notably by two Gujarāti soldiers, Ālūyā and Kolūyā, while he had gone to worship in his family temple situated at the outskirts of Dhārā, indicates that they attempted his assassination but failed because Bhoja, though hotly pursued by them,

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1 Agni, 234.11-14; 236.60-63; cf. Vdh., II.148.4 ff.; 77, 80 ff.
2 KA, XII.4+5.
3 Manas., II.XX.1232 ff.
managed to run away from the temple on his swift steed. The incident seems to have taken place shortly before the invasion of Malwa by the Caulukya king Bhima I, who might have commissioned these bravadoes to kill Bhoja. The legends recorded in the semi-historical chronicles and story books like the Nevasahasankaracarita of Padmagupta and the Kathasaritasagaram show the use of different types of illusions in order to deceive and frighten the opponents in battle, although no actual historical examples can be quoted. It may, however, be conceded that the rivals used the expedient of Maya as bluffs and strategic tricks in fighting and utilized deceptive objects to contrive the secret murder of the enemy king or his prominent men. In fact, Maya was an expedient of causing disturbance among the enemy's ranks and harassing him by terrifying appearances and ill-omen or killing him by guile. The psychological persecution of the enemy and personal afflictions were contrived by the expedient of Maya. In war, Maya meant strategic illusion and tactical bluffs which aim at producing psychic disturbance in the enemy and panic in his troops and subjects.

**INDRAJALA** (Black magic or incantation)

Indrajala is the last of the expedients. It means magic, incantation or illusion created by incantation (mantra) and magical contrivances (tantra). As an expedient of policy and diplomacy it

2. Literally 'snare of Indra'.

denotes the employment of occult powers invoked by various mysterious practices to achieve political objectives of destroying the enemy by charms or causing panic in his troops and subjects and thus enervating them. It consists in practising exorcism, charms and performing various kinds of weird ceremonies, which create psychic spectres of horror that are directed to accomplish objects ranging from the killing of the enemy to creating hindrances in his war-like activities.

According to some Purānas and later nītisāra writers, indrajāla is practised by displaying miracles of different varieties, such as of fourfold troops at a distance so as to delude the enemy that they have been sent by gods to strengthen the already powerful arms of the invading monarch, of bodies with torn limbs and dripping with blood, of a similar severed head of the enemy king (to be exhibited at the terrace of his palace), of artificial clouds, hills or darkness, of a mirage like a picture of the enemy’s imminent reverses and his entire annihilation etc.¹ The purpose of practising indrajāla is to make the enemy troops and people dispirited and panic-stricken.² It is indeed some kind of terrorization of the enemy.

Someśvara describes the use of magic as an expedient of inflicting punishment (daṅga) on the enemy, although he uses the

¹Amr, 234.14-16; 241.67-68; cf. Vdh., II.149.1-2; cf. KN, XVIII.60-61. ²Ibid.
term abhicēra instead of indrajāla, which means more or less the same. It is, however, significant to mention that while Kautilya,¹ Kaśmandaka and some Purāṇas² recommend the use of indrajāla by the viyigīsu during his expedition, Someśvara, on the contrary, restricts it to a weak king who has hardly any alternative to stave off his annihilation. Irrespective of the strength of rivals, the employment of black magic and sorcery is part of the secret war (tūṣyīṃ yuddha).

In the early medieval period mantra (incantation) and tantra (magic) had become recognized as potent means of creating or averting calamities of various sorts. Brahmās and other persons proficient in magic and spells especially lived in the capital to protect the king and the kingdom against the enemy’s malevolent incantations or to perform these in distress in order to destroy the enemy king and create terror among his men. Men adept in charms and spells accompanied the king to the battle field.³ Even some of the kings, as for example Jayasimha Siddharāja of Gujarāt, strived to acquire magical skill. Siddharāja is said to have vanquished

¹KA, X.3.44, X.6.48-50; NV, XXX.91.

²Vāh., II.149.3 distinguishes between indrajāla and mahāndrajāla (great snare of Indra or deadly black magic) which is resorted to by one desirous of maintaining treaty, although he is devoid of good qualities.

³Cf. KA, X.3.44.
a forest chieftain, Sārabaraka, by his superior magical power.\textsuperscript{1} Someśvara states that when the kingdom of the Paramāra king was overrun by the Caulukyas, the former's priest called up by incantation an evil spirit for the destruction of his master's enemy \textsuperscript{[the Caulukya king]}. But Āma, the priest of Kāraṇa, also an ancestor of the author, succeeded in counter–acting by other potent incantations and turned back the evil spirit against the conjurer, who was immediately killed as a result.\textsuperscript{2} It is not therefore unlikely that black magic was practised on occasions in war with a view to destroying the rivals.

The precepts of the application of upāyas or guide lines of diplomacy

Statesmanship and diplomacy consist in the right selection from and effective application of upāyas, which may lead to success in political relations. Our authorities show considerable political discernment and pragmatism in laying down the guide lines of diplomacy and general rules of application of upāyas.

The main function of diplomacy is the execution of foreign policy with particular regard to the types of kings or states to be dealt with. As we have already noted, diplomacy is to make use of force towards enemies, conciliation and gifts, concession or

\textsuperscript{1} A.K.Majumdar, op.cit., p.81.

\textsuperscript{2} Surathotsava, XV.v.20; A.K.Majumdar, pp. 57-58.
bribery towards allies as well as neutrals and sowing dissension (bhēda) towards the enemy's partisans. This precept obviously has in view the geo-political factors in inter-state relations. It is reinforced by another precept that a king shall overcome weaker kings of the mandala by force, equals by conciliation, stronger by gifts, and still more powerful by sowing dissension, which adequately appreciates the factor of power-politics. These two precepts are much too generalised, but they take full cognisance of the political character, policies or political tendencies, and power of the various types of states or kings involved in inter-state politics. The third precept of diplomacy takes into account the psychological and human element in politics. It is laid down that conciliation should be practised towards the virtuous, sincere, and compassionate; gifts, concession and bribery towards the greedy; sowing dissension towards the wicked, enraged, frightened etc.; and force towards irreconcilable and wicked adversaries.

Thus, it is evident that the success of diplomacy depends on its ability to assess factors of geo-political relations, power political compulsions and human virtues and vices, which have to be so artfully exploited by these expedients that the objectives are attained.

1 Aparārka on Yājñ., I.343.
According to Manu and his commentators, the tasks of diplomacy contained in the employment of upāyas are threefold. Its first concern is 'the employer of the expedients',¹ that is 'the king himself',² also 'his ministers and others'³ who are directly associated with the employment of means. Medhātithi's sparing comments suggest that this involves self-examination and critical self-reliance as regards character, intelligence and motives of oneself as also persons connected with the conduct of diplomacy. This seems to imply a comparative assessment of one's power of intelligence and good counsel (mantrasakti) in relation to that possessed by the opposite side. The second task of diplomacy is to determine what objectives are to be attained by expedients in view of the existing factors of power, place and time.⁴ This involves weighing one's own objectives, power and policy against those of other kings in the inter-state sphere, who would be directly or indirectly affected by one's activities. The idea underlying this business of deliberation ————

¹Manu, VII.215.
²Medh. on Manu, VII.215.
³Nandana Ibid., cited by Bühler, Laws of Manu.
⁴Medh. and others on Manu, VII.215; On Ṛajña, I.346.
and decision on the specific objectives in a given situation is to strive only those which are feasible and profitable. The third task of diplomacy consists in the selection and application of particular expedient or expedients capable of accomplishing the objectives in view. This has to be done with full consideration of the relative factors of power, place, and time in given situations. The art of diplomacy consists in making the appropriate selection and putting the correct emphasis on particular means at the right time. Our authorities emphasize pragmatism in diplomacy by advising the king to act according to prudence, need and time.

There is distinct gradation and preference in the selection and application of upāyas. Sāma is definitely said to be the best by all authorities, although the Purāṇas attribute almost equal importance to dāna. Manu's preference lies with sāma and dāna for the subjugation of enemies and the advancement of the kingdom. Medhātithi comments: 'While there is conciliation there is no disturbance; and when force is employed everything becomes accomplished'. Someśvara, however, determining his preferential

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2 *On Yājñ., I.346; Agni, 241.60.*


4 *Manu,, VII.109 quoted in RDK, XIV.p.126; see also comm. on *Ibid.*

5 Medh. on *Manu, VII.109.*
order in view of the nature of each upāya and the fairness and risk involved in its employment states that sama is best for it, brings success without injury to others and loss of substance; bheda is meddling by creating suspicion among those evil men who are thus divided from their master; dāna is regarded as low, as it involves expense while its success is dependent upon destiny; and force is the worst of all, as victory, the kingdom and life itself are brought into jeopardy by war. Other authorities, however, prefer a graduated application of sama, dāna, bheda and finally danda. Their order of preference depends on the realities of inter-state politics and forces of opposition which have to be overcome.

The employment of upāyas may be separate or collective, that is gifts preceded by conciliation, dissension preceded by conciliation and gifts, fighting accompanied by conciliation, gifts and dissension, or gifts along with others and so on. In fact, where a single upāya is sufficient, others are unnecessary, but it is realized that a combination of upāyas may be imperative in case of allies and enemies, for, the means help each other.

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1 Manas., XVII. 972-976.


3 Medh. on Manu., VII. 214; cf. KA, IX. 6. 58-61.

4 Cf. KA, IX. 7. 70 ff.
We have already seen that even normally the upāyas in their application may overlap, as a few forms of conciliation include some features of gifts, and so also each following one does not ignore the utility of each preceding one. Several authorities point out that conciliation and gifts, as well as sowing dissension and force, form distinct units in actual practice.\(^1\) It is also stated that commanders and leading subjects of a country should be weaned away by distribution of gifts and sowing dissension, and the feudatories and forest chieftains etc. should be subjugated by sowing dissension and force.\(^2\) It seems likely, that more often than not, a combination of means is to be resorted to for the accomplishment of the objective in foreign affairs, probably because of the multiplicity of inter-state forces and the close connexion between diplomacy and war. It may be added that upēkṣa, māyā and indrajalā are generally combined with the use of force (danda).\(^3\)

Our authorities insist that a king should strive to attain success in foreign affairs by the separate and collective application of the first three expedients.\(^4\) Thus in the normal conduct of inter-

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\(^1\) Cf. KA, VII.16.3-19. 9 ff. advises the application of sama and dāna towards weak kings and rebels in the interior region, and bheda and danda towards strong enemies and rebels in outer regions.

\(^2\) Agni, 241.62; cf. KN, XVIII, 61; Jayamangala comm.

\(^3\) Cf. KN, XVIII, 61. Jayamangala comm.

state relations the employment of force is expressly discouraged. It is only when dangers cannot be overcome or enemies cannot be persuaded to submit that the use of force is permitted as a last resort. However, this restraint on the use of force concerns a full-scale war, and not its employment by secret methods. This is evident from the recommendations of the nitisāra writers and Vijñāneśvara, who ask the king to weaken and oppress his enemies and haughty allies growing unco-operative in order to retain a favourable balance of power as well as to prepare the ground for the eventual subjugation of enemies. The acts of weakening (kargana) and affliction (piḍana) consist in destruction of property, affliction of enemy's troops, secret murders of his ministers, commanders etc., and other acts of sabotage and secret instigation to treachery or rebellion.1 These have to be done by upāyas and clearly involve the use of force which is not the same as fighting. Further, vigraha (hostility) itself is the outcome of causing injury, which implies acts of destruction and even violence; but it does not constitute battle. It is thus evident that when our authors ask to use force as a last expedient, they mean the commencement of a full-scale war and not the use of force, either in the preceding manner or as a threat of war or bold challenge, so far as it remains within the restraints of diplomacy.2

1 Nitis. on Yajñ., I.346; NV, XXIX.32. cf. KN, VIII.60 ff; KA, VI.2.16.

2 The Manu and Yajñavalkya smrtis perhaps are more straightforward in their recommendations since they do not directly advocate treacherous war. MBh., XII.69.23 emphasizes three upāyas by prohibiting war.

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Furthermore, there arise certain grave situations in inter-state relations when the use of force has to be the first expedient, for the use of others would be 'like the oblation of clarified butter into the fire'. However, other expedients may be used during intervals between the fighting in order to avoid great loss in men and material. The reasons for advocating force as the last expedient are those noted earlier, namely, loss of men and material, and uncertainty about victory. It seems, however, that diplomacy between rivals stands more often than not on the brink of destruction and violence in some way or other. Force is implicit in the employment of other expedients as an ultimate sanction or as a grand arbiter of contentions.

As regards war being the last resort Prof. Derrett writes, 'This sounds well, but means little.' Force is said to be the last step in the process.'... but this is not to say that a Hindu ruler hesitated to make war when there was a good chance that a bold challenge would end in the enlargement of his territory. He struck with his army as the last stage in a process that commenced with

(cont.) In fact the Mahābhārata in this instance does not advocate that upayās are three but that the king should acquire dominion by sama, dana and bheda and not by force (danda), which means war or battle (yuddha). For a different view of Brhaspati on upayās especially the need of danda, see Matsya, 148.66 ff.

1 NV, XXX.39; cf. Matsya, 148.66 ff.
demands, continued with intrigues and threats, and matured with plots engineered insurrections, dynastic feuds, revolts, and the like. Hindu kings were ordinary citizens in this way that they were willing to bargain with one another, but objected to complying with orders: however it was as unbecoming to issue requests as it was to comply with them, and threats and bluffs played a very large part in diplomacy.\(^1\)

These observations, however, do not affect the role and importance of upāyas other than force, which deal with inter-state situations when the application of danda may be foolhardy or suicidal. In all situations, they canalize even the course of events calling for the use of force. On the very eve of battle messengers are to be sent to elicit submission without fight, a practice that was scrupulously followed by the Hindu kings and even Muslim invaders; the latter, however, sometimes exploited this opportunity to practise treachery by duping the rival through false statements of intent as for instance Muhammad Ghori did toward Prithviraja III before the second battle of Tarain in A.D.1192. In fact, the entire burden of the concept of upāyas is to minimize the chances of a full-scale war and, when it becomes inevitable, to have already laid the foundations of the eventual triumph by having demonstrated the justness of one's cause and taken all political and military measures which contribute to enemy's discomfiture. The process of the application

of *upāyas* or conduct of diplomacy between rivals is, however, the same, whether provoking war or trying to avoid it; hence ambiguity about their character and role. Nevertheless it is emphasized that aims of many kinds of war, as those having as their causes extermination of an ally, predatory raids, morbid sense of honour etc. should be reached by *upāyas* other than open force. However, it is felt that the success of *upāyas* in avoiding battle primarily depends on the magnitude of the cause of war and the relative strength of rivals.

Further, as inter-state relations are distinguished as friendly, hostile and neutral, the use of force, especially full-scale war, has but a restricted scope. Hence other means of diplomacy tend to assume a greater role in theory and practice. Furthermore, the time spent in actual warfare during the reign of most kings of our period is short in relation to the length of their reign, which may imply that means of diplomacy other than open force were frequently applied.

The application of *upāyas* other than open force is the business and art of diplomacy. Diplomacy is finally extended to include war. But it must also employ other means, even in situations when battle is unavoidable, in order to establish the justness of one's cause and the wrongfulness of the opposite side in the ensuing conflict. Medhatithi quotes: 'The careful man makes peace, the careful man has recourse to his own prowess; both these should be equipped with statesmanship i.e. knowledge of the employment of
upāyas, without which one would be as good as a thief. Before launching an expedition or taking field against an enemy in battle an envoy or a messenger is to be sent to make the last bid to avoid bloodshed, failing which, to demonstrate that the opposite party is in the wrong.

Scope and role of the upāyas

Our authorities make the scope of the upāyas co-extensive with the policy of state. As regards their applicability, it is laid down that whatever cannot be accomplished by these means, should not be undertaken. However, their role in internal matters is greatly exaggerated when it is said that they can cope with all kinds of human and divine calamities befalling the kingdom. Nevertheless, their precise role is exemplified with regard to disaffection among one's own ranks, which may be exploited or fomented by stratagems

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1. On Manu, VII.215.

2. HA, II.21-28, cf. KA, VII.15.18-20. Asked by Draupadi about the purpose of his hopeless mission as an envoy of Yuddhisthira to the Kaurava court, Krishna replied that he would put forward the Pandavas' case in the best light and make the former accept the latter's demands with the help of upāyas '... and if my efforts fail and war becomes inevitable we shall show the world how we are right and they are wrong so that world may not misjudge between us.' Cited by K.M. Panikkar, The Principles, and Practices of Diplomacy, p.7.

3. HA, II.18.

4. On Manu, VII.214.
of the enemy. Another example of their application is that directed
towards one's feudatories, vassals, leading commanders, probably
those in charge of forts and strategic posts, warden of the marches,
and forest chieftains or such leaders of political units who enjoy
greater degree of autonomy within their jurisdiction.¹

We may specially single out an overlord's relations with his
vassals or feudatories, and forest chieftains which substantially
partook of the character of inter-state relations. The epigraphic
evidence bears out that many feudatories were more or less inde­
pendent in their actions not prejudicial to the authority of their
overlord. They claimed in their records victories won by their over­
lord in which they successfully participated, undertook expeditions
against other kingdoms, apparently on their own, in order to increase
their resources and prestige in the imperial court, and also fought
battles sometimes with another feudatory of their overlord with
impunity.² They had all the paraphernalia of an autonomous state
within the empire, although their independence of action depended on
their resources and intelligence to hoodwink their overlord in matters
detrimental to the latter. Many feudatories entertained ambition
for independence and raised revolts whenever their overlords were
weak or a foreign enemy could effect their defection by seduction.

² T.A., XVII.p.202 ff., refers to a fight between Gugaraja and
Undabhacketa, who were feudatories of the Pratihara emperor
Mahendrapala. See B.N.Puri, op.cit., p.72.
Because of their political power and autonomy and financial and military resources their relations with their overlord were regulated by means of upāyas rather than by an internal legal or political system. Our authorities are aware of this feature of the political organisation of empire; for, Somesvara III entrusts the feudal relations to the sandhivigrahika (Minister or Secretary for Peace and War).\(^1\) We have already noted in the preceding pages the application of particular upāyas against internal enemies. Moreover, when feudatories rebelled the methods and means of their subjugation would be the same as those applied against an external enemy; for, these were beyond the competence of civil and criminal law, as feudatory relations themselves were normally based on political agreements rather than any legal code or constitution.\(^2\)

Indeed the problems of intra-state adjustment, that is, between the interests of the overlord and his feudatory or other autonomous political units, were more or less of the same pattern as those of inter-state relations. This feature of political organisation of an empire became more pronounced during the period of decline of an imperial dynasty, as for instance, of the Pratihāras of Kanauj, when feudatories strived to throw away the yoke of vassalage. Upāyas were, therefore, the means of accomplishing intra-state adjustments,\(^3\)

\(^1\) *Mānas.*, II.11.128.

\(^2\) Cf. Medh. on *Manu*, VII.202.
In relation to foreign affairs the scope of upāyās is much more extensive than that of sādgūnya, as the latter deals mainly with the problems of inter-state conflict, especially war and peace. However, the role of upāyās is exemplified in the execution of sādgūnya. The proficiency in the artful employment of upāyās is considered an indispensable qualification of a king aspiring to imperial status. A king pursues the policy of sandhi with the help of upāyās as they help in negotiations of terms of compacts for war or peace. Upāyās further are applied to maintain these compacts or break them through diplomacy, which can engineer conditions conducive to either requirement.

The role of expedients in conducting hostilities against rivals is both conspicuous and comprehensive. Our authors never allow a king to embark upon a full-scale war without a thorough application of upāyās. It is stated that wise men make an end to hostilities by expedients other than open force. Indeed the first phase of vigraha is marked by intense diplomatic activity, and Somadeva's statement that military operations follow the failure of battle of wits (buddhi-yuddha) or diplomatic struggle expresses the general opinion on this issue.\(^1\) While our authorities discourage war when the objective can be attained by the separate or collective employment of other expedients, they nevertheless concede the use of force as a surgical or caustic operation in

\(^1\) NV, XXX.4 ff; HA, II.27-28.
order to cure the malady when the medicine like the other expedients has proved of no avail.\(^1\) We have already seen that upāyas canalize vigraha and determine the kind of fighting. They continue to be relentlessly employed in all phases of hostility and war in order to contrive diplomatic strategy which aids the military subjugation of the enemy by enmeshing in its network, outside elements likely to fish in the troubled waters. The isolation of enemies from his allies and the neutralization of non-committed kings like the madhyama and udāśina are as important as fighting a successful battle.

The policy of āsana is translated into practice by the expedients of sama, dēna and bheda.\(^2\) Dvaidhibhava is itself called an upāya\(^3\) in which sense, however, it demands a considerable amount of diplomatic skill to practice a dual policy towards two enemies at one and the same time or dupe the enemy by diplomatic expedients to conclude a sandhi and afterwards to so manipulate one's affairs as to be able to engage the same enemy in war. The policy of samśraya again demands the employment of all expedients to secure safety of life and later to extricate oneself from humiliating and self-smothering obligations.

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\(^{2}\) HA, II.12; Medh. on Manu, VII.172.

\(^{3}\) Medh. on Manu, VII.167.
Instruments of Diplomacy

The instruments of modern diplomacy are two: the ministry of external affairs and the diplomatic representations abroad. Our authorities also ascribe the conduct of diplomacy to the king,¹ his foreign office under a minister called śāndhi-vigrahika (Minister for Peace and War),² the king's secretary (lekhaka)³ at home and envoys sent to foreign kings. Even the commander-in-chief is to be adept in the art of the application of upāyas. While our sources describe three categories of envoys, detail their qualifications, functions and immunities, and proclaim their importance by stating that '... war and peace depend upon ambassador', ⁴ it is not possible to ascertain whether the kings of our period had any system of maintaining permanent diplomatic agents at other courts. It is further difficult to find out whether agents were exchanged on a reciprocal basis, although certain individual agents seem to have played vital roles as emissaries for a long time between two rulers. Thus, Damodara, a shrewd Gujarāti statesman, is said to have adroitly managed the relations between his master Bhīma I and the Paramāra king Bhoja on several occasions.⁵

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¹NV, XXII.29.
²Agni, 220.3; RDK, IV.p.26 quotes Matsya, 215.16; NV, XXXII.2; Manas., II.127-130.
⁴On Manu, VII.65,66; RDK, IV.p.33.
⁵A.K. Majumdar, op.cit., pp. 51 ff.
The agencies of the \textit{upay\text{\textasciitilde}as} other than open force were, however, kings, ministers, envoys, emissaries and above all, secret agents. The Agni Pur\text{\textasciitilde}a states that an ambassador is but an open spy,\textsuperscript{1} which indicates the importance of a host of spies engaged in the same kind of work without privileges and immunities. It seems that each king has to maintain an inter-state intelligence service which virtually conducts diplomacy by means other than open force. When the use of open force becomes inevitable the formalities are completed by despatching an ambassador who brings the issues to a final conclusion. It appears that an agent called \textit{ubhayavetana} ('in the pay of both') is to be retained at the other king's court probably to serve as a permanent channel of diplomatic activity. There may be more than one \textit{ubhayavetana} agent at one court, but they would in most cases have been spies rather than diplomatic agents.\textsuperscript{2} However the spies in the pay of both kings play a prominent part in sowing dissension in the enemy's ranks and contribute immensely to the implementation of other \textit{upay\text{\textasciitilde}as}.

Diplomacy is both open and secret. When \textit{upay\text{\textasciitilde}as} are employed by a king, his ministers, envoys, it may be said to be open, but when they are implemented by secret agents, it can be called secret.

\textsuperscript{1}Agni, 244.12; cf. KN, XIII.33.

\textsuperscript{2}Prof. Dikshitar (Mauryan Polity, p.180) wrongly suggests that \textit{ubhayavetana} was probably a permanent ambassador in the foreign courts.
It is evident that **upāyas** comprised the expediens of inter-state politics; statesmanship (**naya**) consisted in the artful management of foreign relations through separate or collective employment of **upāyas**, which could effectively execute foreign policy with regard to all types of kings of a **mendala** in all conditions of peace and war. In this respect it must be pointed out that the possibilities of the **upāyas** exceeded the limits of **sākguna**, as the latter only took cognisance of inter-state conflicts. Thus, **upāyas** are means of diplomacy, in as much as their nature and contents include persuasion, conciliation, gifts or bribery, sowing dissension, and finally a threat of force, and they are employed by the king in his talks and edicts and by his agents, especially envoys and spies. It may, however, be added that the concept of **upāyas** reflects the proximity and co-ordination between diplomacy and war, especially when we recall Clausewitz’s classic definition of war as the continuation of diplomacy by other means.¹ For the application of **upāyas** never ceases. Further, the diplomacy understood as an art of the employment of **upāyas** by a host of agents using bewildering artifices is in itself a variety of warfare termed **mantra yuddha** (diplomatic warfare or war of wits), which was considered to be the deadliest of fighting² in view of the fact that power of counsel and intelligence is regarded as superior to all others.


² *NV*, XXX.4-5 Somadeva calls it buddhi-yuddha (fighting with the aid of intellect) and Hemacandra (**Hā**, II.60) calls it nitiyuddha (politic fighting)
The foregoing study shows that the sources bearing on polity were greatly concerned with the theory of inter-state relations, which, however, was expounded long before our period. The source material is mainly theoretical in nature and lacks originality as regards the basic approach to the pattern and problems of inter-state relations. The स्मृति commentators are notable for the utilization of the आर्थासास्त्र or नितिसार sources in order to elucidate the passages of their texts relating to the theory of inter-state relations. This imparts an authority to the नितिसार literature and shows the dependence of the धर्मासास्त्र on it for a detailed study of its own political ideas, especially those concerning inter-state relations. This admixture of sources produces a similarity of views between the स्मृति commentators and the नितिसार writers on many aspects of inter-state relations. Even the Jain authors repeat the Hindu theory of inter-state relations and have no specifically Jain characteristics. There is a common agreement among our various authorities on the main principles of inter-state politics and the nature of inter-state relations, which proves the ideological unity in this respect amidst the dynastic diversity in Northern India of our period.

The exponents of the theory of inter-state relations hold orthodox views. Arid intellectuality is noticeable in the repetitiousness of our texts and a concern for the preservation of the conventional interpretations, which points to the scholastic interest in the theory
rather than an endeavour to enhance its practical utility. The nature of political writings is such that it is often difficult to distinguish between those traditional principles which were prevalent in practice and those which had fallen into desuetude. This is due to the inability or unwillingness of our sources to draw upon history in order to illustrate their principles and fortify their conclusions. The authors of our period base their theories on the traditional classics and lack novel ideas. However, some originality is noticeable in their interpretations of the traditional concepts, as for example, the explanations of the sixfold policy, especially āsana and āvaidhi-bhāva, and the discussion of the different kinds of upāyas and their subtypes in the Yuktikalpataru and Manasollāsa, which indicate that an attempt was made to reinterpret, synthesize and even to develop some of the traditional ideas. Certain additions, such as the terms of agreement between the victor and the newly installed king in the conquered kingdom, are sometimes made, which suggest that our authorities assimilated those contemporary political practices which were in accord with the traditional ideals.

The state (rājya) is described by its seven constituents (prakṛtis or āṅga), which determine its form and nature. Somadeva is the only notable exception. This author defines the state as the ruler's activity appropriate to protecting the earth having varnasārāma system (i.e. social organization) and bestowing natural means of life and prosperity. The state is approached as a matter of practical concern rather than of philosophical interest. The political entity created
by the integration of the seven constituents is historically real as the kingdoms of our period present a similar picture. But the political organization, envisaged by the seven constituents of the state, does not embrace all facts of the contemporary political order, as it omits any clear reference to the samanta system. In this respect, our authorities failed to alter the traditional theory of the state and confined themselves to interpreting and advocating conventional ideas.

Sovereignty is conceived of as the supreme power to command and shows the independence of the sovereign (svāmin) to award punishment and reward. The sovereign is defined as an independent ruler without any precise limitations on the exercise of his autocratic power in internal and external affairs. However, the problem of the actual exercise of sovereign power is acknowledged by Someśvara whose distinction of three types of government (raja), viz., firstly, that in which the ministers exercise the sovereign's power and relegate the king into the background; secondly, that in which the king and ministers are mutually dependent for the exercise of sovereign power; and thirdly, that in which the king himself exercises his sovereign power and has his ministers under control, seem to be based on the historical experience of the working of the government. Even in these types of government there is no indication of any precise limitation on the autocracy of the ruler; on the contrary, Someśvara himself regards the third type of the government as best. It seems that these types of government only indicate practical handicaps
occasioned by the inability of the ruler to exercise his autocratic powers owing to his weakness or absorption in amusements on the one hand and the tendency of the ministers to usurp the royal authority on the other.

Sovereignty is, however, a relative concept in inter-state relations. Kings are graded as superior, equal, and inferior, according to their relative power, and they are to be treated accordingly in peace and war. Rulers are further classified as samrat (emperor), akara (semi-independent) and sakara (tributary) according to their political relations based on tribute and also to their independence in regard to the exercise of coercive authority (danda) within their kingdom. The akara has special relationship with the emperor in his external sphere and the sakara is a feudatory. A fourth type of king is one who is under the protection of another powerful king. His kingdom may be vaguely called a 'protectorate'. His status is, however, that of a dependent king. Thus inter-state relations are graded on the basis of power, independence, and political allegiance.

The theory of inter-state relations in ancient India was developed as a corollary of the concept of state. It was based on the assumption that conflict of power between neighbouring states was natural, and that a struggle for political supremacy was inevitable, owing to the twofold aspect of state activity, viz. protection of one's own territory and the acquisition of wealth and territory belonging to others. The ideals of sārvabhauma or cakravartin (the lord of the whole world i.e. the Indian sub-continent) accentuated the ambition
for paramountcy and encouraged the policy of the aggrandizement of power. The three concepts of the theory of inter-state relations, viz., the *mandala* (circle of states), *gaṇapya* (sixfold policy) and *upāyas* (means or political expedients) were formulated to offer guidance on the conduct of the external relations of a state, with a view to promoting the aggrandizement of power in prosperity and to maintaining a balance of power in inter-state sphere during vicissitudes.

It seems that the concept of *mandala* underwent development in three stages by the time it assumed its standard form in the *Arthasastra*, which explained the geo-political and power-political basis of the hypothetical pattern of inter-state relations among a group of states, situated at varying distances from the *vijigisu* (the king intending conquest), who was fundamental to it. The various types of *mandala* indicated the extremely theoretical nature of the geo-political structure envisaged by our authorities, who never described the historical arrangement of kingdoms at any given period in Indian history. The concept of *mandala* was valid for deliberative purposes as it outlined the sphere of action of the *vijigisu*, disclosed that conflict of power and the struggle for hegemony were norms of inter-state politics, and emphasized that enmity, friendship and neutrality, in relation to the *vijigisu*'s policy of conquest, were determined by the relative degree of power, motives of interest and specific causes (*kārana*), and not on the mere geo-political contiguity or remoteness, thus showing that the *mandala* system is flexible and essential power-political in nature. The fundamental political entity of the *mandala*
the vījīgisu, is a power-political entity, and other kings, designated as enemy, ally, middle and neutral, obtain their positions according to their power, policy, and geo-political contiguity in relation to him. This was also implied by taking into account the political and not the territorial boundaries in the delineation of the mandala system. The mandala approach to inter-state relations suggested a system of a balance of power which initially emerged from the presence of the potential belligerents, viz., the vījīgisu and his enemy, having prospective allies and enemies in alternative zones, both in front and in the rear, but it was only secured by the introduction of the middle and neutral kings, who could be approached by either of the belligerents in catastrophe in order to preserve the status quo. However, the mandala system was postulated to enable the vījīgisu to establish his hegemony, by overcoming his enemies through a policy of conquest in prosperity and to protect his potential claim of overlordship, by preserving the balance of power during vicissitudes. The enemy of the vījīgisu and his allies could utilize the knowledge of this mandala pattern of relationship to maintain the status quo and undermine those aspects of the mandala system which contributed to the vījīgisu’s strength. The implications of this pattern of political relations largely determined the pursuit of the sixfold policy and they were noticeable more in war than in peace. The restraints of the mandala system influenced the nature of conquest by discouraging the annexation of the kingdom of a submissive king and the persecution of a broken enemy, for fear of provoking other kings, thus providing political considerations for adhering to the
heroic ideals of conquest. However, the inter-state complexities of an aggressive venture in a circle of kings, without the middle and neutral, were minimal and even territorial annexations were feasible. It must, however, be added that the role of the middle and neutral kings was relative to the circumstances of the belligerents: their intervention was conditional on their being approached by either of the belligerents facing destruction.

Many of the theoretical possibilities of inter-state politics raised by the mandala system did in fact occur in the struggle for empire; but it must be maintained that the system was no more than an excellent working hypothesis to discern a pattern of inter-state relations from the standpoint of an ambitious king, in order to provide a basis for the pursuit of the sixfold policy and the conduct of diplomacy. The concept of mandala did not embody any historical system of states, but its principles of geo-politics and power politics influenced the inter-dynastic relations of our period. While it envisaged a system of potential alliances and counter alliances as well as the possibility of the intervention of another king indifferent to war in order to preserve the political status quo, it failed to visualize any inter-state organization to preserve peace among states.

The concept of sadmunya (sixfold policy) comprised measures of foreign policy which outlined the politico-military strategy of inter-state conflicts in accordance with the relative factors of power, place and time. The objectives of the sadgunya were the promotion of internal economic and military undertakings and the acquisition of
the wealth and territory belonging to enemies. Sādguna confined itself to the politico-military aspects of inter-state relations and dealt with economic, religious, and cultural issues only by implication. This indeed constitutes a very serious limitation of the concept of foreign policy.

The concept was, however, valuable, as it helped to develop certain norms of political behaviour in hostile relations. The policy of sandhi, while falling short of a policy of peace, was indeed an instrument of peaceful relations. Its application to secure an alliance for war, as well as to terminate war was frequent. The rules of concluding an agreement or treaty were laid down with care. The treaties depended for their binding character on oath and surety, but they really survived in the conditions of political necessity and weakness of power. The policy of vigrāha (hostility or war) was associated with the heroic and politic concept of war. It led to the formulation of principles and rules relating to the outbreak of hostilities, declaration of war, ethics of war, devastation of the enemy country, occupation and settlement of the conquered kingdom. Because of the variety of views on many of these issues, it was possible to conform to one or the other in practice according to the exigencies of circumstances. However, rules relating to the conduct of hostilities tended to humanize war and to limit its agonies. Yana (marching or expedition) was the policy of aggression. It was treated both as a military and as a political problem and was recommended in conditions of excessive superiority of power, particularly military, over the adversary for
the sake of a further rise in prosperity. Asana was interpreted as a policy of watchful waiting, involving the cessation of hostilities, and it was viewed as a politico-military tactic against the enemy in many situations. It did not mean neutrality, although some kinds of asana denoted that it could be a policy of self-abiding towards and non-aggression against enemies. Dvaidhibhāva was explained to denote the dual policy comprising measures of sandhi and vigraha pursued against two enemies; as bifurcation of troops on the eve of war, and, finally, as duplicity, which involved double dealing with two mutually hostile neighbours on the opposite sides of a king, by professing alliance for war with each against the other alternatively. It was the typical policy of a buffer king, and in the sense of the dual policy, it could help an aggrieved king to deal with two invaders on the opposite sides of his kingdom by making peace with one and waging war with another. Samsráya was the policy of seeking shelter in the hour of destruction. However, a recourse to it in normal times, for fear of the harassment by the enemies, led to the formation of a protective alliance with another powerful ruler on the basis of accepting the status and obligations of a protectorate. Seeking political refuge and forming protective alliances on the basis of willing subordination were admitted facts of inter-state relations. Every ruler had the obligation of granting refuge to a suppliant in distress, although his obligations towards the refugee were determined by the political considerations.
While the possibilities of co-operation with enemies on the basis of common interest and fears were emphasized and the need for a confederate course of action in certain situations, especially those created by a threat from outside, was acknowledged, the alliances and confederacies were always treated as a matter of politico-military expediency and none of the six policies were directed to create a concert of kings on a normal footing to review the political developments and preserve peace. The basis of stable cooperation between enemies was the subordination of the weaker one to the stronger, which offended pride and perpetuated political rivalry. The application of the sixfold policy was based on political expediency and none of the six policies were actuated by moral ideals, although moral scruples influenced the biding character of sandhi and the ethic of war.

The concept of upāyas (means or political expediency) embodied means of diplomacy and war. In devising the means to overcome opposition in inter-state relations, our authors took into account the factors of human psychology and physical force. The recognition of māyā (illusion), upekṣā (indifference), and indrajāla (incantation or magic) was significant. Upekṣā really completed the concept of upāyas by being an expedient of calculated inaction, as opposed to the traditional means of action, viz. sāma (conciliation), dāna (gifts or bribery), bheda (sowing dissension) and danda (force). Māyā and indrajāla, as means of inflicting secret punishment and of terrorizing the enemy, indicated the exploitation of religious objects and superstitious beliefs, and signified the role of treachery and underhand types of warfare in inter-
state relations.

All the seven **upāyas** were to be separately or collectively em-
ployed to attain success in foreign relations with the least effort
and smallest risk. The scope of the **upāyas** was wider than that of
the sixfold policy as they were also the means to deal with allies
and neutrals in the inter-state sphere. This demonstrated important
aspects of foreign policy not covered by the sixfold policy and showed
that in these spheres the **upāyas** comprised means of fostering inter-
state understanding and co-operation in order to promote one's own
interests. However, the **upāyas** were particularly associated with
the execution of the sixfold policy. In tackling problems of peace
and war, diplomacy consisting in the appropriate use of the **upāyas**
sought to achieve objectives of policy without engaging in battle,
which, however, is not the same as avoiding war. For, **upāyas** were the
means to cause war, to prosecute war, and to consolidate the gains
of victory, as well as the means to avoid war, to minimize the losses
of defeat, and later to extricate oneself from the conditions of
vassalage. The means and methods of avoiding war or precipitating it
were the same, and in the application of **upāyas** rivals, more often
than not, combined the strategy of war with that of peace. However,
while conducting hostilities by means other than open force, an attempt
was made to bargain with the adversary and to give him sufficient warn-
ings about the ultimate consequences, thereby justifying a recourse to
violence should he refuse to yield. So that, when war broke out, it
appeared only as an extension of diplomacy through other means.
The merit of the concept of *upāyas* consisted in its recommendation of means other than force to achieve political objectives, and in its contribution towards the establishment of a norm of political behaviour between rivals. The inherent prudence and effectiveness of these *upāyas* recommended themselves to kings and statesmen, who dealt with the problems of statecraft by their application. It may be pointed out, that the application of *upāyas* was based on the principle of expediency, and the political morality, if any, emerged from the reluctance to go to war except as a last resort.

Viewed as a whole the theory of inter-state relations was a significant achievement of the ancient Indian thinkers. The pattern and problems of inter-state relations were approached from a purely secular standpoint. Political realism is evident in the principles of geopolitics and power politics, in its delineation of the politico-military strategy of the situations in inter-state conflict, and the devising of means of diplomacy and war. However, the conflict of interests, which is viewed as conflict for power and political supremacy, is the dominant theme of the theory, as well as of the dynastic history of Northern India during our period. This shows that the political education of the kings and their counsellors, based as it was on the traditional political ideas, must have influenced their activities.
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