ADMINISTRATION IN THE

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN,

1899 - 1916.

by

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This thesis studies the establishment and development of administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, from the signing of the Condominium Agreement in January 1899, until the end of Wingate's governor-generalship in December 1916.

The role of the governor-general and of his principal assistants is examined in the introduction and in the first three chapters. Kitchener, who was governor-general in 1899, formulated some of the policies of the new administration but had neither the time nor the patience to implement them. During the next seventeen years Wingate served as governor-general of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. With the collaboration of Slatin, and a handful of British officials, Wingate determined and implemented administrative policies with little interference by the British or Egyptian governments. The only effective control over the Sudan administration was that of the British consuls-general in Egypt. After Cromer's resignation in 1907, even this supervision tended to diminish and reached its lowest ebb under Kitchener and McMahon in 1911-1916.

The predominant role of the British administrators is clearly demonstrated in chapters four and five, which analyse the structure of the new administration and of its personnel.

The remaining five chapters examine and evaluate the most important aspects of administrative policy in the Sudan. The government's religious policy developed upon separate lines in the northern and southern regions of the Sudan. In the Muslim north
the dominant position of Islam was preserved, whereas in the pagan south an anti-Islamic policy was pursued from 1910, and government support was extended to missionary societies.

The administration of justice and tribal policy aimed at pacifying the country and at establishing a religious and tribal leadership associated with the government. While achieving a large measure of success with regard to religious leadership, the government's tribal policy undermined the authority of tribal leaders, which had already been weakened during the Mahdia, and in consequence had to be revised.

The last two chapters examine spheres of policy which were largely connected with the economic stability of the Sudan. The system of land settlement and the insistence on a low rate of taxation, enabled the small landowners to cultivate their lands while avoiding the hazards of land alienation. The toleration of domestic and agricultural slavery, combined with the organization of labour, enabled the government to undertake the development of the country's economy and communications without disrupting its socio-economic structure.
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Abbreviations.


2. CAO - Sudan Government Civil Administration Orders, 1900-1908.


8. GGC - Minutes of the meetings of the Governor-General's Council.

9. GGR - Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Conditions of the Sudan (Confidential).


11. FO - Foreign Office Archives at the Public Record Office, London.


24. MWA - The immigration and distribution of West Africans in the Sudan. Sudan Government Memorandum |n.d.|

25. SAD - Sudan Archive, at the School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham.

26. SAR - Report by His Majesty's Agent and Consul General on the Finances, Administration, and Conditions of Egypt and
The Soudan.

27. SG - Sudan Gazette.

28. Shoucair, Ta'rikh- N. Shuqayr, Ta'rikh al-Sūdān al-qadīm wa'l-ḥadīth waṣfūrāfīyatuhu, (Cairo 1903).

29. SIR - Sudan Intelligence Report.

30. SNR - Sudan Notes and Records.


Explanatory note.

Vertical lines - |.....| - have been used to indicate square brackets.
Transliteration

For the transliteration of Arabic names and words I have followed the system of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (2nd edition), with the following exceptions:

\[ \mathbb{T} \] is represented by \( j \)
\[ \mathbb{S} \] is represented by \( q \)

Place names of larger towns are given in the conventional English form, e.g. El Obeid, Suakin, Khartoum.
a. The reconquest of the Sudan and the Condominium Agreement.

'...On 4th September 1898 the British and Egyptian flags were hoisted with due ceremony on the walls of the ruined palace at Khartoum...' and the Mahdist state came to an end.  

The overthrow of Mahdism had been propagated for many years by some of the senior British officers of the Egyptian army. Most notable among them was Major Wingate, head of the intelligence department, whose book Mahdistism and the Egyptian Sudan, was the beginning of a concerted effort to revive British interest in the reconquest of the Sudan. When on 13 March 1898, the British government ordered Kitchener to advance into the Sudan, public

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2 Wingate, General Sir Francis Reginald (1861-1953), joined the Egyptian army in 1883 and was appointed as A.D.C. on the staff of Sir Evelyn Wood, the first sirdar of the post 'Urabi Egyptian army. Following a brief period as assistant military secretary to Sir Francis Grenfell, in 1886-7, he became assistant adjutant general for intelligence. In 1889 Wingate was appointed director of military intelligence and held this post until he became governor-general of the Sudan in Dec. 1899. For details about Wingate's earlier career, see R. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, (London 1955), pp.29-127; for Wingate's governor-generalship, see pp.27-69.

3 Wingate's subsequent participation in writing Ohrwalder's memoirs, Ten years' captivity in the Mahdi's camp... and Slatin's, Fire and Sword in the Sudan, was first commented upon by W. S. Blunt, My Diaries, (London 1932), p.242. Holt subsequently proved Wingate's role in writing these books which he described as '...the public relations literature of the Egyptian Military Intelligence, the voice of the British officer-class in Egypt...', P.W. Holt, 'The source materials of the Sudanese Mahdia', St. Antony's Papers, Middle Eastern Affairs No.1. (London 1958), p.112; see also N. Daniel, Islam Europe and Empire, (Edinburgh 1966), pp.424-441.
opinion in Britain was well prepared for the forthcoming campaign. Britain was furnished with a pretext for the expedition by the defeat of the Italian forces at Adowa on 1 March 1896. However, subsequent evidence has proved that the British decision of 11-12 March was prompted by European reasons connected with the Triple Alliance. Egyptian interests in the Upper Nile played no role in the government's considerations, nor did the struggle for the control of the Nile, which became a dominating factor only in the later stages of the reconquest.

The military campaign which brought about the collapse of the Mahdist state started on 18 March 1896 and came to its successful conclusion on 24 November 1899. It was planned and executed by Kitchener, the sirdar of the Egyptian army, assisted by the information supplied by Wingate, Slatin, and the intelligence department.

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1. W.S. Blunt's letter to the *The Times*, 10 Sep. 1898, condemning the Dongola campaign, was a lone voice in the midst of the general approval with which the reconquest was greeted in the British press.


3. Wingate, who commanded the final battle against the Khalifa at Umm Diwaykarat, sent a telegram to Cromer: "...Mahdism has received its coup de grace on 24th and I hope a new era will now open for the unfortunate Sudanese people..." Wingate to Cromer, 25 Nov. 1899, SAD/269/11.

4. Slatin Pasha, Sir Rudolf Karl von, Baron (1857-1932). Austrian officer who started his service in the Sudan under Gordon in 1878; 1879-81 governor of Dâra in southern Darfur; 1881-4 general-governor of Darfur; in 1884 he surrendered to the Mahdist army at Dâra and remained in Omdurman for eleven years, first as prisoner and later as one of the Khalifa's private attendants (mulâzîm). Following his escape from Omdurman in 1895 he became Wingate's assistant in the intelligence department. For Slatin's earlier career see Hill, *Slatin*, pp. 1-67; see also pp. 70-102.
However, the crushing defeat of the Khalifa's army in the battles of the Atbara, Kararî, and Umm Diwaykarât, was first and foremost the result of the technological superiority of the advancing conquerors\(^1\).

The overthrow of the Mahdist state forced the British government to determine the status of the reconquered Sudan as well as its future administration. Until June 1898 there was every indication that the British government intended to restore Egyptian rule in the Sudan. In June 1898 Cromer pointed out to Salisbury that after the conquest of Omdurman the French might be encountered in the Upper Nile. In that case the Anglo-Egyptian commander would have to lay claim to the territory in the name either of the Egyptian government or of the British government or of both. Thus, in July 1898 the 'two flags' policy was adopted which marked the beginning of Anglo-Egyptian rule in the Sudan\(^2\). The Condominium Agreement which came into being as a result of this policy excluded Egyptian and international authority from the Sudan and vested the

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\(^1\)There are numerous descriptions of the Anglo-Egyptian invasion. For a detailed account see A.B. Theobald, *The Mahdiya, a History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899*, (London 1951), pp.189-236; see also Holt, *Mahdist State*, pp.210-224; who supplies information based on Sudanese sources. There is a striking similarity between Kitchener's campaign and that of Ismâ'il Pasha whose conquest of the Sudan in 1821 marked the beginning of the Turco-Egyptian period. An American officer in the Egyptian army, G.B. English, who took part in Ismâ'il's expedition wrote that the disparity in arms between the conquering Egyptians and the Sudanese was so vast that their defeat was unavoidable; see A narrative of the expedition to Dongola and Sennar, by 'an American in the service of the Viceroy', (London 1822), p.85.

supreme civil and military command in the British-nominated governor-general. On the 19 January 1899 Lord Cromer and Buṭrus Ghāli Pasha signed the 'Agreement for the Administration of the Sudan', and on the same day Lord Kitchener of Khartoum was appointed as the first sirdar and governor-general of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

b. Kitchener's governor-generalship.

The relationship between the governor-general of the Sudan and the British consul-general in Egypt was largely determined during the short period of Kitchener's governor-generalship. Following the battle of Karari, the relations between Cromer and Kitchener came to a crisis. Cromer had just completed the first draft of the Sudan agreement. Included in it were two articles relating to the control of the consul-general over Sudanese affairs. Kitchener strongly

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1 For a detailed account of the political and diplomatic background of the Condominium Agreement, see Ibid, pp. 332-380; M. Shibieika, The Independent Sudan, pp.441-59.

2 The Condominium Agreement included only those provinces which had been reconquered from the Mahdist state. On the 10 July 1899 it was extended to Suakin by a separate agreement. For the Condominium Agreement, see Inclosure 1 in No. 64, Cromer to Salisbury, 28 Jan. 1899 [sic.1899], FO 407/150; see also Shibieika - The Independent Sudan, pp.493-6, where both the Condominium Agreement and its subsequent extension to Suakin are reprinted. Kitchener was appointed by a Khedivial decree published in the Egyptian Journal Officiel, 21 Jan. 1899.

3 For Kitchener's earlier career, see Magnus, pp.15-149.

4 His full title was British agent and consul-general in Egypt. In the thesis he is referred to as consul-general.

5 As early as 1897 Kitchener had threatened to resign his sirdarship unless Cromer would relax his control; see Wingate to Rundle, 19 Oct. 1897; Rundle to Wingate, 25 Oct. 1897, SAD/266/1/1.

objected and during his visit to England persuaded Salisbury to alter the proposed constitution. In a letter to Cromer, Salisbury summed up Kitchener’s arguments:

...the Governor General of the Soudan is to govern and is to spend the money he has. In both cases he is, of course, to obey orders received from you...but he shall not by a formal document be forbidden to pass an Ordinance or to spend 100 £. without preliminary approval...

As a result of this letter the original draft of the proposed Condominium Agreement was amended. This draft contained, under article IV, a passage stating that the governor-general of the Sudan could not promulgate laws or regulations without the prior consent of the Khedive and the British consul-general in Cairo. Article VI stated that in all financial matters the Sudan would be controlled by the Egyptian ministry of finance. Both these articles were deleted from the final text of the agreement.

The financial regulation of the Sudan government thus became a separate document. This gave a much greater latitude to the governor-general of the Sudan who was empowered to make appointments of personnel and changes in the budget, with the only proviso that, should such changes entail any increase in the liability of Egypt, they must be approved by the ministry of finance and the Egyptian council of ministers.

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1 Salisbury to Cromer, 9 Dec. 1898, FO 633/7.
2 FO 78/5026.
3 FO 407/150. See also Cromer to Salisbury, 14 Jan. 1899, FO 78/5026.
4 FO 407/150.
5 For further details see pp. 43-4, 50-1.
The signed agreement, as amended, contained no mention of the control exercised by the British consul-general in Cairo over the governor-general. Salisbury, therefore, suggested that "...it will be necessary to take an acknowledgment from each new Governor-General on his appointment, of his subordination to the British Agency...". In the absence of any clearly defined regulations, it was left to Cromer and Kitchener to find a workable modus vivendi for the future relationship. On 19 January 1899 Cromer wrote to Kitchener stating the principles of his relations with the Sudan: "...Generally what I want is to control the big questions, but to leave all the detail and execution to be managed locally...". However, it was soon apparent that these general regulations were open to misinterpretation.

Kitchener's aims were clear when he became governor-general. He had avenged the murder of Gordon and proved that the Egyptian army could fight. Now, his first priority was to re-establish the seat of government in Khartoum, in the palace where Gordon had ruled, and to transfer the remnants of the population of Omdurman back to the former capital. The rebuilding of Khartoum was ordered by Kitchener in November 1898, while enjoying a hero's welcome in England. Inadequate sums had been set aside for this project in the

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1 Salisbury to Cromer, 14 Jan. 1899, FO 407/150. I have not been able to find any evidence that such a declaration was ever made either by Kitchener or Wingate.


3 Magnus, p. 149.
Sudan budget, and Kitchener set out to find the necessary funds through less conventional methods. On 26 January 1899, he directed Wingate to '...loot like blazes. I want any quantity of marble stairs, marble pavings, iron railings, looking glasses and fittings; doors, windows, furniture of all sorts...' Again he ordered Wingate not to send any of the Sudan accounts to Gorst, the financial adviser of the Egyptian government. Even Maxwell, the new governor of Khartoum province, was left in the dark and complained to Wingate, '...everything will be sacrificed to Khartoum...the Budget too is merely a blind and [Kitchener] is juggling with it...he is a past-master in this art but it is very difficult to follow...'

Cromer attempted to interfere, but to no avail. On two occasions Kitchener's obstinacy had far-reaching consequences. First, he decided to stop the field allowance granted to the Egyptian army serving in the Sudan; Cromer's order to renew this allowance went unheeded. Secondly, Kitchener adamantly refused to cancel some of the trainloads of building materials destined for Khartoum which

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1 Magnus, p. 149, quoting Kitchener to Wingate, 26 Jan. 1899.

2 Kitchener to Wingate, 1 Feb. 1899, SAD/269/2/1; according to the financial regulations, the transfer of funds from one budgetary item to another had to be reported and approved by the financial adviser. See also pp.

3 Maxwell Pasha, General Sir John Grenfell (1859-1929) was first governor of Khartoum 1898-1899; in 1900 he left for South Africa, and returned to Egypt in 1908 as commander of the British troops. DNBS, 1922-30, p. 570-1.

4 Maxwell to Wingate, 17 Jan. 1899, SAD/269/1.

5 Cromer to Sanderson, 29 Mar. 1899, FO 78/5026; Magnus, pp. 151-2.
were needed to supply grain for the famine stricken provinces.¹

The Times correspondent who wrote in April 1900 that the building of Khartoum was executed '...by the autocratic will of a single man...' was, therefore, not far from the mark. But he made the following criticisms. Firstly, owing to hasty legislation, most of the town's lands had passed into the hands of a few capitalists. Secondly, Kitchener's assumption that the population of Omdurman would move to Khartoum proved fallacious. Khartoum remained an empty city, while the inhabitants of Omdurman were completely neglected².

The Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Sudan started before Kitchener became governor-general. The reconquest had taken more than two years, during which period the new administration was slowly extended, first to Halfa and then to Dongola and Berber³. By April 1899, the reconquered territories of the country had been divided into five provinces and three districts, each under the governorship of a British officer, with Egyptian officers acting as Ma'murs⁴. A number of ordinances were promulgated, dealing mainly with tenure of property, taxation, the licensing of fire arms, and the sale of alcoholic liquors⁵. Kitchener also sent a set of instructions to

¹Kitchener to Cromer, 15 Apr. 1899, FO 78/5023. For details see pp.22-3.
²The Times, 11 Apr. 1900; see also Magnus, pp.149-150.
³For details see pp.133-5.
⁴Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 4 May 1899, FO 78/5023; Ma'mur was the title used by the Egyptian government, for the official in charge of a ma'mūrya, a sub-division of a province.
⁵SG - No.1-7, 1899; Cromer to Salisbury, 7 Mar. 1899, FO 407/150; for details see pp.
all governors, inspectors, and ma’mûrs laying down his principles of government. The main premise of these instructions was that '...The absolute uproootal by the Dervishes of the old system of government has afforded an opportunity for initiating a new administration more in harmony with the requirements of the Soudah...'

The new administration was to be built by '...individual action of British officers, working independently, but with a common purpose, on the individual natives whose confidence they have gained...'

Kitchener warned his governors that this could be achieved only through the '...better class of native, through whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole population...' Furthermore, the governors were warned against trusting the people of the Soudan who make things appear as pleasant to their superiors as possible.

The treatment of the inhabitants was to be just but severe: '...The Government should do nothing which could be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and all insubordination must be promptly and severely suppressed...'. The memorandum included also detailed instructions to the Egyptian ma’mûrs who were warned against accepting bribes, and were ordered '...to make the government of your district as great a contrast as possible to that of the Dervishes...' Lastly, the memorandum mentioned the three main principles to be observed by the Sudan government in the coming years. These were: the toleration of domestic slavery.

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1 Memorandum to Mudirs, Inclôsure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899, FO 78/5022; Mudir was the Egyptian title for a provincial governor. The following details are all from Kitchener's memorandum.
low taxation and the encouragement of Orthodox Islam as opposed to ṣūfī ṭarīqas.

Having laid down these general principles, Kitchener left his new governors to use their own initiative. He was not concerned with central administrative measures, and even refused to consider the Sudan Annual Report. In general, this system of decentralisation might have been acceptable in a country like the Sudan, devoid of effective communications and hampered by immense distances, provided that the governor-general enjoyed the respect and trust of his provincial governors. Unfortunately, Kitchener's relations with the British officers were predominantly based on fear. Hence the criticisms they offered never reached his ear, but were received by Wingate, who could only offer his sympathy.

Cromer, who knew Kitchener well, attempted to change the latter's attitude to his subordinates. In a private letter sent on the day of his appointment as governor-general, Cromer warned Kitchener, '...In the first place, pray encourage your subordinates to speak up and tell you when they do not agree with you. They are all far too much inclined to be frightened of you...'. It was not only fear that disturbed the relationship between Kitchener and

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1Ṣūfī ṭarīqa (pl. ṭuruq) - Islamic mystic order.

2In a telegram sent to Wingate, Kitchener wrote '...Re Lord C's [Cromer] report. I have no particular views am sure you will do it well...' Kitchener to Wingate, 26 Jan. 1899, SAD/269/1.

3See for instance Count Gleichen to Wingate, 24 Oct. 1898, SAD/266/10; Talbot to Wingate l.n.d. Nov. 1898, SAD/266/11.

4Cromer to Kitchener, 19 Jan. 1899, FO 633/8.
his subordinates. They also lost faith in his ability to construct a
civil administration and were concerned over his absolute absorption
in the rebuilding of Khartoum to the exclusion of everything else.

Mahon, then inspector in al-Qadarif, wrote to Wingate despairingly,
'...I am getting very tired of my life here...I do not really know
what I am supposed to be doing but I am doing nothing...'. Similarly,
Hamilton wrote from Omdurman, '...the place is much as you left it
and now I fancy Khartoum will be the centre of attraction...'.

These remarks were written towards the end of 1898, but when in 1899
famine broke out in the Sudan, conditions were still unchanged.

Kitchener received ample warning as to the coming famine. Towards
the end of 1898, over seventy Sudan notables presented him with a
petition in which they complained that the people of the Sudan had
been robbed of all they possessed. Moreover, they claimed that owing
to the compulsory recruitment of slaves into the army, cultivation
was at a standstill, and hence famine was imminent. As early as
April 1898, Talbot wrote to Wingate:'...I fancy we've skimmed the

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1 Mahon to Wingate, 30 Jan. 1899, SAD/269/1; Mahon Pasha, Sir Bryan
Thomas (1862-1930), joined the Egyptian army in 1893 and served in
the Dongola and Nile campaigns; left the Sudan for the Boer War 1900;
governor of Kordofan 1901-4; reverted to the British army in 1904.
Hill, BD, p.227.

2 Hamilton to Wingate, 19 Jan. 1899, SAD/269/1.

3 Petition to the sirdar |Arabic text n.d. 1898|, SAD/430/6.

4 Talbot Pasha, Milo George (1854-1931), joined the Egyptian army in
1897. Following Wingate's appointment as head of the Sudan office
in Cairo in 1899, Talbot became assistant DMI, and in 1900-5 was
Director of Surveys. He was one of Wingate's closest friends through­
gout his career, and came to help him during the First World War;
Hill, BD, p.355.
people pretty well. I hope they have enough left for seed...1
Commenting on Kitchener's proclamation to the shaykhs of Kordofan and Darfur2 a few months later, Talbot added...many of the men who are to receive it [the proclamation] are in here claiming that they have been robbed of all they have...3 By April, Talbot reported that on the White Nile ...people live upon water and nuts and are dying in large numbers...4 Yet, despite these warnings and Cromer's repeated demands, Kitchener refused to take any measures to alleviate the people's plight. He maintained that the famine aided his policy of depriving the Khalifa of local support, and left for a two months' vacation in England5.

This same attitude prevailed in Kitchener's treatment of the Egyptian army. The army was employed in constructing the Sudan railways and in the works' department, without receiving additional remuneration6. But it was not only in the financial sphere that Kitchener's attitude manifested itself. He also regarded the Egyptian officers with profound distrust, as expressed in his Memorandum to Mudirs. Before leaving the Sudan, he reiterated this distrust to Maxwell, who duly reported it to Wingate:

1Talbot to Wingate, 19 Apr. 1898, SAD/266/4.
2Proclamation of sirdar to Sheikhs of Kordofan and Darfur, 11 Nov. 1898, STR - 60, Appendix 98.
3Talbot to Wingate, (private), 11 Dec. 1898, SAD/266/12.
4Talbot to Wingate, 1 Apr. 1899, SAD/269/4.
5Magnus, p.152.
6Maxwell insisted that this was one of the reasons for the Omdurman mutiny in January 1900. Maxwell to Wingate, 19 Jan.1900, SAD/270/1/2.
...the last thing he said to me was to keep this in mind. The fact is they [the Egyptian officers] are not to be trusted and he always said even a British officer with no experience whatever would be better than a discontented intriguing Egyptian...

Kitchener's treatment of his officers, and his administrative measures, had won him the fear and mistrust of most of his subordinates. The destruction of the Mahdi's tomb, and the treatment of his remains, turned certain sections of public opinion in Britain against him. Throughout the crisis, Cromer and the British officers in the Sudan fully backed Kitchener's order to destroy the Mahdi's tomb. Kitchener argued that the destruction was dictated by political considerations, and that it was fully backed by the orthodox Muslim leaders.

This attitude prevailed when a few months later a Mahdist insurrection was reported from the Blue Nile. On 27 August, Muhammad Sharif (one of the Mahdi's Khalifas) and two of the Mahdi's sons were killed, and fifty-five prisoners taken. The insurrection seems to have been a minor affair, only three men of the Egyptian

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1Ibid.

2Magnus, pp.135-9.

3Cromer to Salisbury, 19 Feb. 1899, FO 78/5026; Wingate to Slatin, 2 Mar. 1899, SAD/431/11.

4Kitchener to Cromer, 1 Feb. 1899, FO 407/150; according to a statement made by Father Ohrwalder in 1891, shortly after his escape from Omdurman, the pilgrimage to the Mahdi's tomb had nearly stopped and only old women visited it. Hence, the reasons for its destruction could hardly be substantiated. General Military Report on the Egyptian Sudan 1891...Compiled from statements made by Father Ohrwalder, War Office London 1892, p.16.

5Rodd to Salisbury, 29 Aug. 1899, FO 78/5026.
force being slightly wounded. Yet Kitchener, fearing that any leniency might be interpreted as weakness, decided to execute all the prisoners and to arrest all those implicated in the revolt. Rodd, who was acting consul-general in Cromer's absence, refused to comply with Kitchener's demand, because '...of the effect on public opinion in England of a wholesale execution...'.

Kitchener's term of office as governor-general should probably be regarded as an extension of his work as sirdar, rather than as a new venture of a civil administrator. His desire to leave the Sudan was first expressed in September 1898, and persisted throughout his governor-generalship. Hence, it could hardly be expected that he would devote his time and his talents to the tedious details of long term government. The glory of rebuilding Khartoum and the palace, and the foundation of Gordon College, were bound to appeal more to Kitchener who regarded his sojourn in the Sudan as purely temporary.

Cromer, who originally proposed Kitchener's appointment as governor-general, soon changed his mind. He realized that the

1 Rodd to Salisbury, 31 Aug. 1899, Ibid, quoting a letter from Kitchener.
2 Ibid, and minutes by Salisbury who commented '...three or four executions at the very outside...'
3 Kitchener told Wingate that he hoped to replace Cromer as consul-general, should Cromer retire after his wife's death; see Wingate to Lady Wingate, 28 Sep. 1898, SAD/233/5.
4 Kitchener tried to use his connections in political circles in Britain in order to obtain an appointment in India; see Rowley to Wingate, 9 Nov. 1898, SAD/266/11; Magnus, p.151.
details of civilian government were beyond Kitchener's comprehension and hence did not insist that he should remain in the Sudan\textsuperscript{1}.

On 18 December 1899 Kitchener was appointed as Lord Roberts's Chief of Staff in the Boer War, and a week later he sailed for South Africa. To his successor he left a skeleton staff, a famine-stricken country and an army rife with discontent. It is no wonder, therefore, that when he expressed his wish to return to the Sudan after the Boer War, Cromer objected strongly and wrote: '...He would not be able to hold the Soudan without a large British force...'\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid; see also Cromer to Salisbury, 19 May 1899, FO 633/6.

\textsuperscript{2}Cromer to Salisbury, 27 Apr. 1900, Ibid.
Chapter I.

Wingate's governor-generalship 1899-1916

a. Wingate's appointment.

Wingate was appointed governor-general of the Sudan and sirdar of the Egyptian army on 23 December 1899. Up to the battle of Karari, Wingate had been in charge of military intelligence and so had played an important role in preparing the reconquest. He had established close relations with many of the Sudanese shaykhs and with the help of Slatin and Na‘ūm Shuqayr had succeeded in providing valuable information for the advancing Anglo-Egyptian forces.

With the battle nearing its end, Wingate knew that the importance of military intelligence was bound to decline. He, therefore, decided to seek a post which would secure his future in case.

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1 Wingate's policies as governor-general, and their implications will be discussed in later chapters. This chapter deals only with his routine of office and some of his main principles of government.

2 Egyptian Journal Officiel, 24 Dec. 1899; for the structure of the Sudan government, see p.104.

3 See pp.1223.

4 Na‘ūm Shuqayr (Shoucair)(1863-1922), a Lebanese Christian served in the Egyptian army from 1884 and joined the intelligence department under Wingate in 1890. After the reconquest he remained in Cairo, where he was responsible for the historical section of intelligence. During his service he published Ta‘rīkh al-Sūdān al-qādīm wal-hadīth wa‘l-thāli‘ī al-wajhārīyatuḥu (Cairo 1903), a major contribution to the history of the Sudan during the Mahdia. He also translated into English Isma‘īl ‘Abd al-Qādir's biography of the Mahdi, Kitāb sa‘ādat al-mustahdī bi-sirāt al-imām al-mahdī. The only known surviving copy of this work, as well as its translation are in the Sudan archive at Durham university. See SAD/99/6; SAD/260/2.
Kitchener decided to leave. In a letter to Kitchener, Wingate explained his views about the reorganization of the intelligence department and its division into quite distinct military and civil branches. He suggested that he should head the civil branch in Cairo, and coordinate policies with the British agency. Wingate was at this stage next to Kitchener on the Egyptian army seniority list. His presence in Cairo, in close proximity to Lord Cromer, and at the head of the Sudan office, could, therefore, place him in a better position when the next governor-general was appointed. In a letter to Rodd, Cromer’s first secretary at the agency, Wingate stated his views as to his future prospects:

...The departure of Hunter has placed me in the position of second in command of the Egyptian Army; I do not say for a moment that in the event of the departure of the present Sirdar, I should be selected to succeed him; at the same time I should not submit to any other officer now in the Egyptian Army being given the preference over me to succeed the present Sirdar. It seems to me quite possible that some senior general from outside the E.A. Egyptian Army may succeed, but under any circumstances I should, as head of the Sudan Office, be in a better position to have my claims considered...if I were an Anglo-Egyptian than if I were a purely British official...2

Cromer had mentioned the possibility of Wingate’s appointment to the governor-generalship as early as May 18993. He had known Wingate for fifteen years and held his achievements in the intelligence department in high esteem. Moreover, Cromer knew that

1Wingate to Kitchener, 7 Feb. 1899, SAD/269/2/1.
2Wingate to Rodd, 10 Mar. 1899, SAD/269/3.
3Cromer to Salisbury, 19 May 1899, FO 633/6.
Wingate would be easier to control than a general nominated by the War office, whose appointments Cromer regarded with complete mistrust. The appointment of a civilian governor-general was not considered at that time, as the whole country was ruled by military officers. For these reasons, when Kitchener was ordered to leave for the Boer War, Wingate's appointment seems to have been unopposed.

Wingate's appointment was greeted with satisfaction by the majority of the Egyptian army officers, who had suffered from Kitchener's autocratic methods. The Times correspondent in Khartoum described the atmosphere which was created by the appointment as '...a general expectation as of something springlike and mild...'

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1. The war office appointments were regarded with mistrust by many civil servants. Cromer reiterated his fears of war office appointments both during the reconquest and afterwards. In reply to one of his letters on the subject Salisbury wrote: '...The War Office never, in the first instance, thinks of the necessities of the public service. It pursues blindly its own regulations...' Salisbury to Cromer, 2 Mar. 1900, FO 633/11. Similar doubts were expressed by Gorst in 1909, when he feared that Wingate would have to be replaced due to his illness: '...I may have to appeal to you to prevent the War Office trying to foist some military officer of high rank and low intelligence upon us...'. Gorst to Salmer, 6 Nov. 1909, FO 633/14.


3. I have not found any correspondence between Cromer and Salisbury prior to Wingate's appointment. The only reference in Wingate's correspondence is a telegram he received from Kitchener on the 22 Dec. 1899, SAD/270/1/1.


5. The Times, 18 Apr. 1900.
Even *al-Ahm* accepted Wingate as the best possible choice, though commenting that it would have been better to appoint an Egyptian.¹

For Wingate himself, the initiation into the long-cherished post of governor-general could hardly have been more difficult. Many of the veteran officers who had been administering the provinces had left to take part in the Boer War, and before Wingate could wind up his affairs in Cairo, a mutiny of a Sudanese battalion broke out in Omdurman². Furthermore, the country was impoverished by continuous wars culminating in the famine of 1899³. Cultivation and trade were practically at a standstill owing to the decline in population⁴, the tribal policy of the Khalifa 'Abdallah⁵, and the trade and agricultural policy adopted by Kitchener⁶. These were some of the difficulties faced by Wingate when, with a handful of British officers, inexperienced in administration, and with little knowledge of local languages, aided by Egyptian officers and

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¹ *al-Ahram*, 26 Dec. 1899; *al-Liwâ* on the other hand commented that the appointment of an Egyptian governor-general was imperative, *al-Liwâ*, 4 Feb. 1900.

² For details of the mutiny see R. Wingate, *Wingate of the Sudan*, pp. 131-3.

³ See pp. 22-3.

⁴ According to an estimate made by Wingate in 1903, the population of the Sudan decreased from 8,525,000 before the Mahdia to 1,870,500 after the reconquest, SAR - 1903, p. 79.


⁶ Magnus, p. 152.
officials whom he did not trust, he set about to build up the Sudan civil administration.

Wingate's powers as governor-general and sirdar were the same as those of his predecessor. The following definition which appeared in *The Times* is a fairly accurate summary:

> ...Everything derives from the will of the Governor General... He unites in himself, and delegates from himself, all legislative, executive and judicial powers... He "notifies" his ordinances to the joint Sovereigns, but he is under no obligation to attend to their advice..."2

The governor-general was, to a certain extent, controlled by the British consul-general in Egypt, but apart from that his authority was not limited either by representative bodies or by public opinion. The consultations which did take place on an executive level, were undertaken by Wingate voluntarily, at least until 1910, when the governor-general's council was instituted.3

During the seventeen years of Wingate's governor-generalship, the underlying principle emerging was one of reconstruction. Development was slow, and consistent, but lacking in outstanding episodes. The Sudan emerged from a state of near famine and of financial dependence on Egypt, to a fairly stable economy which could support its growing

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1 For details see pp.15-7.

2 *The Times*, 18 Apr. 1900; when Colonel Phipps was selected by Wingate to become acting governor-general, Wingate defined the necessary characteristics of a governor-general as follows: '...firmness, impartiality and a thorough knowledge of your own mind are the three great essentials... make up your mind independently and do not let it be said that you are in the hands of this or that individual...' Wingate to Phipps, 6 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/1.

3 See pp.58-65.
population. An administrative structure was built up in the provinces and the centre, and though military rule prevailed, an ever-increasing number of civilians were recruited into the service and slowly affected its character. The extension of communications by rail and river, and the building of Port Sudan were some of the important achievements of this period, contributing greatly to economic development. Economic expansion culminated in the Gezira development project, sanctioned in 1913, which enabled the Sudan to become a major cotton-producing country. Thus the country, which was reconquered for strategical and political reasons only and was regarded as a financial liability, emerged as a potential economic asset for Britain before the Wingate era was over.

b. The routine of a governor-general.

A survey of Wingate's routine of office is essential in order to understand how his government functioned. The 'Sudan year' started in Cairo. The governor-general, accompanied by Slatin and by his private secretaries, used to arrive in Cairo from their annual leave towards the end of October. During the following two weeks the biggest annual meeting of Sudan officials took place. The directors of all the departments and most of the provincial governors

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1 See pp. 146-161.

2 The following remarks, unless otherwise stated, are based on the Sudan correspondence and Wingate's private letters in the Sudan Archive at Durham.
were gathered in Cairo to discuss the Sudan budget for the following year. The budget had already been hammered out during the summer months in England in endless meetings, in many of which Wingate had participated. The purpose of the meeting in Cairo was to enable the governors and directors of departments to voice their objections, with the hope that some minor changes could still be effected.

The Cairo gathering was Wingate's only opportunity of meeting all his provincial governors personally. Therefore, there was as much activity behind the scenes of the budget discussions, as in the meetings themselves. Matters ranging from personnel and promotions to tribal policy and military expeditions were discussed, and in many cases decided upon. There are numerous letters from Wingate to his governors insisting on their attending the Cairo gathering, so as to conclude arrangements regarding their provinces. During the month he stayed in Cairo, Wingate was a regular guest at the British agency where discussion with the consul-general took place regarding matters on which the latter's approval was necessary.

In his capacity as sirdar, Wingate had also certain functions to perform in Cairo. A courtesy visit to the Khedive and the minister of war, followed by a review of the troops and barracks, formed the official part of the sirdar's visit. More important, however, were the discussions with the financial adviser to the war office and with the British staff officers in Cairo. These were

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1 Wingate's correspondence during this period of the year was very blender, as most of his correspondents were in Cairo.
usually attended by the adjutant-general, and all matters concerning finance, recruiting and army personnel were decided upon.

Wingate arrived in Khartoum towards the middle of November and took up his residence at the governor-general's palace. The following extract from the diary of Butler, of the intelligence department, affords a glimpse of the palace routine.

...Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor General and Sirdar, was a most kind, pleasant little man... He loved pomp and state and his early morning rides round Khartoum were rather a joke with British Bimbashis, as the cavalcade was so glittering and immense, black cavalry men with lances, ADCs, B.S.s. and a herd of all grades of officials...  

The rest of the morning was spent in dealing with correspondence. Wingate kept up with nearly all his provincial governors a regular correspondence, in which matters concerning their respective provinces were discussed. Most of their requests were then sent by Wingate to the heads of departments enclosing his own recommendations. Wingate's letters to the British consul-general and the Sudan agent in Cairo formed the most voluminous part of his correspondence.

A lot of time was also devoted to dealing with petitions from inhabitants of the Sudan. The direct appeal to the governor-general had been an accepted procedure of government during the Turco-Egyptian

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1 Butler's memoirs, SAD/422/12; Butler, S.S., was seconded to the Egyptian army in 1909 and served in Wad Madani. In 1910 he was transferred to the Camel Corps in Kordofan and participated in several expeditions against the Nubas. Since April 1911 he served in the intelligence department in Khartoum. His diaries are in SAD/400/10, and his memoirs in SAD/422/12.
regime, and had been carried on by the Mahdi and the Khalifa. The number of petitions presented during the year was regarded by Wingate as indicating the extent of public contentment. Many of the petitions were forwarded by Wingate to Slatin and to the intelligence department. Others found their way to the provincial governor or the departmental director concerned. Shāhīn, Wingate's Arabic secretary, sorted out the petitions, translated them, and presented them to Wingate. The number of petitions presented to Wingate in 1900 was 4,074, and he soon realized that many petitioners were repeating requests which had already been decided upon. Hence in 1902 Wingate published an order to the effect that his decisions were final, and by 1905 the number of petitions had decreased to 1,108. Most of these dealt with problems of land ownership and taxation, while the number dealing with slavery cases decreased rapidly over the years.

During the winter Wingate entertained a host of distinguished guests, and compiled his annual report on the administration of the Sudan. This consisted of detailed reports by provincial governors.

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1. See for instance SAR - 1905, p.119, where Cromer reported that the decline in the number of petitions is the best indication of the general improvement.

2. See for instance petition of Mustafia bint Mansi, 7 Feb. 1915; and Wingate's correspondence thereon with the chief judge and the financial secretary, SAD/236/2.


5. GGR - 1906, p.6.

6. Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan - Confidential; see p.
and heads of departments, as well as a memorandum by Wingate himself. It was from these reports that the British consul-general compiled their annual reports on the Sudan, which were published as command papers. As for Wingate's guests, there were constant complaints in his correspondence with the consul-general, about the time and money he had to spend on entertainment. Yet judging by the many invitations he sent, he was by no means eager to put an end to these visits. It was Cromer who tried to limit his enthusiasm for guests when he wrote in 1905, "...I am all for entertaining the officials and local people. But I do not think you are at all called upon to do much for tourists. I do mighty little for them..."

Until 1912, the governor-general's palace was the only place for Anglican services in Khartoum, and Wingate never failed to attend. Wingate's deep religious feelings were described by Gwynne, the first Anglican Bishop of the Sudan: "...The holiness of life is most marked by all who come in contact with him...He never moves in the morning without prayer and Bible reading..." But apart from his duties as a Christian, Wingate was also a keen Freemason, and soon

1These bulky memoranda were a constant cause for complaint by Cromer who asked Wingate to limit himself to original remarks. Cromer to Wingate, 15 Nov. 1906, SAD/234/5.


3Cromer to Wingate, 19 May 1905, SAD/234/3.

4Gwynne to Adengy, 23 Jan. 1902, CMSA/E/03/1902; for details about Bishop Gwynne, see H.C. Jackson, Pastor on the Nile, (London 1960); see also pp. 220-9.
after his appointment to the governor-generalship, he was approached to establish a district lodge in the Sudan. In 1903 he founded the Reginald Wingate Lodge, which held its regular meetings at the palace. Wingate played an active part in all its activities which were often mentioned in the Sudan correspondence.

Wingate undertook at least one big tour of inspection each year. The official reports on these tours give little information. Fortunately, detailed accounts of some of them were written by the inspectors who accompanied Wingate or by Slatin who kept a regular diary of events. In 1902 Wingate himself kept a diary of his tour of the White Nile up to Gondokoro. On these tours the governor-general was usually accompanied by over twenty officers and officials of the Sudan government in addition to his military escort. Before arriving at any government post or village the governor-general was met by all government officials and army officers as well as by the shaykhs of the various tribes. Following a parade of the army and an inspection of its magazines, Wingate met the assembled shaykhs and religious notables to whom he distributed presents of beads or

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1 E. Bailey to Wingate, 13 Aug. 1900, SAD/270/8.

2 A short history of the Sir Reginald Wingate Lodge, SAD/292/2.

3 For reports on these expeditions see for instance, SIR - 200, Mar. 1911, p.2; SIR - 221, Dec. 1912, p.2; SIR - 232, Nov. 1913, p.2.

4 Savile's diary, 21 Feb. 1905, SAD/427/6; Diary of Governor General's Inspection of White Nile and Kordofan provinces, Nov. 1906, SAD/279/6. Both give full list of participants.

5 Slatin's diary, 21 Mar. 1901, SAD/441.
money and gave robes of honour or religious robes. During his stay at each station, Wingate received and settled petitions, appointed new shaykhs wherever necessary and attended various races and sporting events prepared in his honour.

Wingate's intention in these inspections was to keep in direct touch with his officers and officials as well as with the people of the Sudan. During the first World War Wingate's tours covered the length and breadth of the country. As a strong advocate of the value of direct contact, he believed that the loyalty of the Sudanese people to British rule was in fact a personal loyalty to the British governor-general who had ruled them for fifteen years. Wingate elaborated on this when he wrote: '...I feel that were I to leave the Sudan, even for a day...I shaould seriously risk an upset of the present tranquil state of affairs here...'

Commenting on his tours of Kordofan and the Gezira he noted: '...I have spent several hours daily talking to important natives...and I am confident that the sympathetic touch which these conversations produce is very helpful.'

During the hot summer months of April-June the governor-general and his staff moved to Erkowit, a hill station not far from Suakin,

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1 Slatin's diary, 23 Mar. 1901, Ibid; for details see pp. 315.
3 See for instance Wingate to Savile, 24 Sep. 1914, SAD/191/3.
4 Wingate to Sir Frederick Milner, 21 Jan. 1915, SAD/194/1.
5 Wingate to Clayton, 21 Aug. 1915, SAD/469/10; for further details see pp. 213-219.
which was established in 1902\(^1\). During his stay there Wingate had more time to deal with correspondence and to prepare the confidential reports on the British officers for the war office. While at Erkowit, Wingate usually undertook a tour of inspection of the Red Sea province.

In June Wingate left the Sudan for his annual leave in England, where he stayed until October. During the summer the Sudan was practically deserted by its British officials. A skeleton staff was kept in various government departments, but very little work was done and practically no decisions were taken\(^2\). The acting sirdar and governor-general had to be an officer of the rank of colonel, and consequently was not too well acquainted with the problems of administration\(^3\). During Wingate's long absence in England at least two acting governor-generals filled his position every year and apart from the adjutant-general, Colonel Asser\(^4\), most of them never did it for more than one year. As a result, the acting governor-general had very little authority and had to consult Wingate on any matter of importance\(^5\).

During these four summer months, the Sudan government continued

\(^1\) *GCC* - 1902, p.339.

\(^2\) See Clayton's diary, June 1907, SAD/473/7.

\(^3\) It was on this condition that the British war office agreed that the British detachment in Khartoum would be commanded by the sirdar. See also pp.67-9.

\(^4\) Asser Pasha, Sir Joseph John (1867-1944), joined the Egyptian army in 1892 and participated in the reconquest; 1905-14 adjutant-general of Egyptian army; 1910-14 member of governor-general's council. *Hill, BD*, p.62.

\(^5\) See for instance Wingate to Ferguson, 7 June 1902, SAD/272/4/1.
to function in England. Wingate spent most of his time in his country house in Dunbar from where all the Sudan correspondence was conducted by his private secretary. Many senior government officials visited Dunbar to discuss their departments or provinces between rounds of golf, and Slatin was a constant visitor. The stay in England usually culminated in a visit to Balmoral, where both Wingate and Slatin were regular summer guests, and in October the whole retinue started on its way back to Egypt.

c. Wingate's relations with the British consuls-general in Egypt.

As sirdar and governor-general Wingate owed his nomination to the British government and his appointment to the khedive. However, neither the British nor the Egyptian governments exercised substantial control over Sudan affairs. Egypt and lost its sovereignty as a result of British occupation and was thus in no position to assert its rights. The British government was quite happy to entrust the supervision of the Sudan to its consuls-general in Cairo from whom it received regular reports. Consequently, during the whole period of Wingate's governor-generalship, the Sudan was discussed by the British cabinet only on four occasions and only

\(^1\text{See pp. 49-57.}\)
once was Wingate's decision overruled\textsuperscript{1}. The extent of control over the administration of the Sudan can therefore only be assessed by analysing Wingate's relations with the four consuls-general under whom he served.

Throughout Cromer's tenure of office his relations with Wingate were strict but cordial. Cromer regarded Wingate as an able administrator but without any real grasp of the principles of government\textsuperscript{2}. Hence, his policy was '...to put Wingate to the front as much as possible before the public, but behind the scenes ...to exercise a thorough control over the whole administration...\textsuperscript{3}'

Wingate trusted Cromer and relied on his greater experience. Moreover, he had been witness to the uneasy relations between Cromer and Kitchener and knew that although constitutionally he was under no obligation to obey the consul-general, he had in fact little alternative but to follow his directives. Wingate expressed these

\textsuperscript{1}Inquiry of Omdurman mutiny, 22-6 Feb., Cab.37/52; Rebellion in the Blue Nile province, 15 June 1908, Cab.37/93; The Situation in the Soudan and the Egyptian Press, 16, 23 Oct. 1908, Cab.37/95; The Soudan Loan, 14 May 1912, Cab.37/110; 3 July 1912, Cab.37/111; 3 Jan. 1913, Cab.37/114. The only occasion upon which Wingate's decision was overruled was in 1908 when the Cabinet decided to commute the death sentences passed on the participants of the Wad Ḥabūba rebellion; see pp.203-7.

\textsuperscript{2}Cromer to Grey, 19 Apr. 1907, FO 633/13.

\textsuperscript{3}Cromer to Revelstoke, 12 Oct. 1910, FO 633/19.
views many years later when he wrote to Clayton about the tense relations between Kitchener and Cromer:

...Of course Cromer's personality and his strong character resulted in his being considered by our Government as the supreme authority both civil and military in Egypt and the Sudan, although if one hunted up chapter and verse for his constitutional rights of this, one would not find it... 2

Under these circumstances it was no wonder that, despite minor incidents, relations between Wingate and Cromer remained cordial. It was Cromer who formulated government policy and advised on all administrative measures, while details of execution were left in Wingate's hands.

The principles of policy to be followed by the Sudan government were enunciated by Cromer in January 1899 when he addressed the notables of the Sudan at Omdurman. Cromer promised that the new government would not interfere with the people's religion. Furthermore he insisted on low taxation and regarded the toleration of domestic slavery as a necessary evil during the first few years of the new government. Wingate never questioned the wisdom of these principles. He did, however, object to Cromer's view that the Sudan was an Egyptian province. This was expressed by Cromer when he wrote: '...The only reason why the British flag is flying, and why the Soudan has

1Clayton, Sir Gilbert Falkingham (1875-1929), joined the Egyptian army in 1900; and was transferred to the Sudan civil service in 1910; Wingate's private secretary 1908-14; Sudan agent and director of intelligence 1914-6; During World War I played an important role in the Arab bureau and in the subsequent Arab revolt; adviser to the Egyptian ministry of interior 1919; chief secretary in Palestine 1922-5. DNBS, 1922-30, pp.186-7.

2Wingate to Clayton, (private) 13 Sep. 1916, SAD/470/3.

3Cromer's speech to the Sheikhs and Notables of the Soudan, Omdurman, 4 Jan.1899, FO 633/25; for details see pp. 357-368, 380-387.
a Governor-General and special laws, is to avoid the capitulations and the rest of international paraphernalia...\(^1\) Cromer's attitude was demonstrated in 1905 when he contemplated withdrawing from the Bahr al-Gazal province. He wrote to Wingate: '...I daresay that the real point is how far is its possession necessary in order to secure the Egyptian water supply...\(^2\)

Wingate objected even more to Cromer's financial policy. Cromer regarded low taxation as a cornerstone of his policy both in Egypt and the Sudan. Yet, the development of the Sudan required large sums of money which, barring increased taxation, could only be acquired from outside sources. Cromer opposed Wingate's plea for additional aid from Egypt\(^3\). Moreover, when Wingate suggested approaching the British government to extend financial support for the Sudan's development, it was Cromer who interfered and urged Lansdowne to reject Wingate's plea\(^4\). There remained the possibility of developing the country by granting concessions. Yet once again Cromer

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\(^1\)Cromer to Wingate, 25 Jan. 1904, FO 633/8.

\(^2\)Cromer to Wingate, 9 Sep. 1905, SAD/234/4.

\(^3\)Cromer's speech to the Sheikhs and Notables of the Soudan, Khartoum, 24 Dec. 1900, FO 633/25; for a detailed account of the Sudan's development and its financial relations with Egypt, see J. Stone - The finance of Government economic development in the Sudan 1899-1913, Sudan Economic Institute, (Khartoum 1954)

\(^4\)Cromer to Landdowne, 4 Mar. 1903, FO 800/124.
disapproved of the scheme for what seemed valid reasons. I...I do not much believe in private enterprise in the Soudan except on terms which throw all the risk on the Gov. and give all the profits to private individuals... Consequently Wingate had to reconcile himself to a slow rate of development and it was only towards the end of his governor-generalship that the prospects of large-scale cotton production convinced the British authorities to change their financial policy.

Cromer was able to exercise his control over Sudan affairs without being hampered by the lack of definite directives. He developed various means to achieve his objective. His voluminous correspondence with Wingate and with many of his British subordinates enabled him to keep a constant watch over the smallest administrative details. A further opportunity to control Sudan affairs was afforded by the annual reports of the Sudan government. Cromer used his red pencil freely and struck out whatever, in his opinion was inessential or possibly embarrassing to the British

1Cromer to Wingate, 18 Sep. 1901, SAD/271/9.

2Wingate to Stack, 6 May 1913, SAD/108/16; Wingate observed that the reason for the sudden change of heart was that the British Cotton Growing Association used its pressure in order to change the government's attitude as it knew that the Gezira project would be very profitable.

3During Feb. 1900 Wingate exchanged with Cromer over 113 letters and telegrams. Although correspondence decreased in the following months it nevertheless remained extensive. Matters covered by Cromer ranged from education and land ownership to the excessive use of stationery in government offices. See Cromer to Wingate, 3 Feb. 1904, SAD/275/2; Cromer to Wingate, 17 Jan. 1901, FO 141/364; SAR - 1901, p.61.
government. Sudan government ordinances had to have Cromer's approval prior to their publication in the Sudan Gazette. Many ordinances were in fact amended by Cromer and were then submitted for approval to the Egyptian council of ministers.

Cromer succeeded in controlling and supervising the administration of the Sudan by means of his strong personality and the great esteem in which he was held by Wingate. However, when he left Egypt in 1907, he warned the foreign office that with a weaker consul-general in Cairo, control of the Sudan should be strengthened.

Gorst arrived in Egypt in October 1907 and served as British consul-general until his death in 1911. His relations with the Sudan were affected by his more flexible and conciliatory policy in Egypt. As regards administrative policy in the Sudan, Gorst intended to leave things as they were and to limit himself to the

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1See for instance Cromer to Wingate, 8 Apr. 1900, SAD/270/4, where he wrote that he had struck out Wingate's references to slavery as '...they frighten the F.O....' In the following year Cromer omitted a report on Egyptian convicts who were working in the Sudan as their employment was '...wholly illegal...' Cromer to Wingate, 18 Feb. 1901, SAD/271/1.

2Cromer to Wingate, 21 Feb. 1901, Fo 141/364.

3See for instance Cromer to Wingate, 13 May 1905, Fo 141/393, containing Cromer's amendments to the 'Mining Licences' and the 'Officials' Salaries Ordinances'; see also p.52.

4Cromer to Grey (private), 19 Apr. 1907, Fo 633/13.

necessary supervision.

Relations between Wingate and Gorst were, however, uneasy. Rumours about Wingate's dismissal were current as soon as Gorst's appointment was announced and persisted until 1909. Furthermore, Wingate had no confidence in Gorst's Egyptian policy and resented its application to the Sudan. Hence, it was only to be expected that Gorst's attempt to base his supervision of the Sudan on a personal basis was bound to fail. The result was that in 1910 the governor-general's council was instituted and the relations between the Sudan and the British consul-general were put on a formal basis. In a letter to Wingate, Gorst set down in detail the subjects on which he expected to be consulted by the governor-general. These included major policy decisions, laws, ordinances, military or punitive expeditions, new services, concessions, loans.

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1 Herbert to Wingate (private), 6 Nov. 1907, SAD/281/5, reporting on a meeting with Gorst; see also Gorst to Grey (private), 12 Jan. 1908, FO 800/47.

2 Slatin to Wingate, 26 Aug. 1907, SAD/281/2; Phipps to Wingate, 8 Sep. 1907, Ibid. The rumours were originally started by the Egyptian newspapers al-Liwa' and The Standard. They gained new lease of life following the Wad Habuba revolt in 1908. Only after Wingate placed his resignation in Gorst's hands did the latter succeed to convince him that he wanted him to stay. See Wingate to Gorst, 26 Jan. 1909, SAD/234/8; Gorst to Wingate (private), 31 Jan. 1909, Ibid.

3 Wingate to Slatin (private), 23 Mar. 1910, SAD/431/11.

4 The decrease in the volume of correspondence between Egypt and the Sudan following Cromer's departure, is remarkable. See for instance FO 141/423.

5 For details see pp. 58-62.
or grants from public funds, appointments of new members to the council, and the appointment of an acting governor-general. A close look at this list will prove that on all these matters Wingate had in fact consulted Cromer. Thus the new regulations only formalized the control which had existed prior to Gorst's appointment. Wingate was relieved of sending detailed reports to the consul-general. Instead Gorst received the minutes of the governor-general's council and it was up to him to decide if his intervention was required.

The last five years of Wingate's governor-generalship can largely be described as years of declining control from Cairo. Kitchener, who was British consul-general in Cairo from 1911-14 hardly intervened in the affairs of the Sudan. His only concern was in the Gezira development project and in military and punitive expeditions. Moreover, by reversing Gorst's conciliatory policy in Egypt, Kitchener enabled Wingate to proceed with the removal of Egyptian officials from the Sudan which had been slightly hampered by Gorst. It was not long before Wingate started complaining about Kitchener's lack

1Gorst to Wingate, 13 Jan. 1910, FO 407/175.

2See correspondence between Kitchener and Grey, 19 Oct. 1911, 10 May 1912, 14 May 1912, FO 407/178; see also Clayton to Wingate, 3 Nov. 1913, SAD/108/16; Clayton reported that the terms of the agreement between the Sudan government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, were dictated to him by Kitchener; see also Gaitskelly Gezira, pp. 59-73.


4See pp. 52-3.
of interest in Sudan affairs. He wrote to Stack, then Sudan agent in Cairo, that Kitchener's claim that the Sudan was autonomous was based on a misconception:

...There can be no manner of doubt that the intention of Lord Cromer and the British Government...was that the British Agent in Egypt should be the deciding authority, and I have always loyally played up to that understanding...

The appointment of McMahon as High commissioner in January 1915, increased Wingate's independence even further. McMahon had no previous experience either in Egypt or the Sudan. His appointment was temporary, made in order to enable Kitchener to return to Egypt after the War. Hence, he was in no position to offer Wingate advice as regards Sudanese affairs and whenever consultation was required, Wingate applied to Kitchener at the war office in London. In fact the roles were reversed for it was Wingate who offered his advice

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1 Wingate to Stack, 31 Mar. 1912, SAD/180/3; Wingate to Phipps, 29 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.

2 Stack, Sir Lee Oliver Fitzmaurice (1868-1924), joined the Egyptian army 1899; Wingate's private secretary 1904-8; Sudan agent in Cairo 1908-14; resigned from the British army and joined the Sudan government in 1910; civil secretary 1914-16; acting sirdar and governor-general 1917-19; sirdar and governor-general 1919-24; assassinated in Cairo, 20 Nov. 1924; DNBS 1922-30, pp.802-3.

3 Wingate to Stack, 6 May 1913, SAD/108/16.

4 Following the declaration of a British Protectorate over Egypt on 18 Dec. 1914, the consul-general became high-commissioner and the agency was called the residency.

5 Grey to Wingate (private), 12 Oct. 1916, SAD/104/2.

6 Wingate to Kitchener (private), 2 June 1915, SAD/195/10; see also FO 371/2351, where all correspondence regarding affairs in Egypt and the Sudan is minuted by Kitchener who in many cases proposed what action was to be taken.
and help to McMahon in formulating his Arab policy and in preparing the Arab revolt. Thus towards the end of Wingate's governor-generalship control from Cairo had decreased to a minimum. It was only after Wingate's appointment as high commissioner in 1916, that the process was reversed and the Sudan was brought once again under closer supervision from Cairo.

d. Wingate's relations with Egypt.

The Condominium agreement provided for a joint administration of the Sudan by the British and Egyptian governments. Yet it was clear from the outset that Egypt's part of this administration was to be purely nominal. The supreme civil and military command of the Sudan was vested in the governor-general who was nominated by the British government. Moreover, all the senior officials of the Sudan were British officers or civilians, and a deliberate policy of reducing the number of Egyptians serving in the Sudan was initiated by Cromer and Wingate in 1900 after the Omdurman mutiny.

1 The bulk of the correspondence between Wingate and McMahon was about British policy in the Middle East. See for instance Wingate to McMahon 15 May 1915, SAD/195/6; for an account of Wingate's part in formulating this policy see E. Kedourie, 'Cairo and Khartoum on the Arab question, 1915-18', The Historical Journal VII, 2 (1964), pp. 280-97.

2 Wingate to Clayton, 7 Nov. 1916, FO 141/669; ironically, it was Cromer, with whom Wingate had often clashed about the extent of control from Cairo, who advised him '...be careful and try not to govern the Soudan too much in detail from Cairo...'; Cromer to Wingate, 1 Dec. 1916, SAD/202/5.

3 Cromer to Salisbury, 8 June 1900, FO 633/6; for details see pp.165-8.
Wingate's attitude towards Egyptian rule in the Sudan crystalized during the Mahdia. He regarded Egyptian maladministration as the major reason for the Mahdi's success. Hence his primary aim on assuming office was to make the new Sudan as free from Egyptian interference as he could. To pursue this policy he had to overcome not only Egyptian opposition but also the reluctance of the British consuls-general who had to face its consequences in Cairo.

The main difficulty lay in finance, as the Sudan budget was balanced by an annual subvention granted by the Egyptian government. Moreover, the regulations for the financial administration of the Sudan were set down by the Egyptian council of ministers, without formal British participation, as Britain did not intend to assume any financial responsibility for the Sudan. The supervision of the Sudan budget was vested in the Egyptian ministry of finance and was executed by its British financial adviser. Wingate constantly asked for additional aid and at the same time rejected Egyptian demands for increased control. Cromer, while generally accepting Wingate's attitude towards Egyptian intervention, insisted at the

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1F.R. Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, (2nd edition London 1968), pp. 7-14, 466.
2Stone, pp. 2-6, 19-21, 59-89.
3Ibid; for the financial regulations see Inclosure 2 in No. 65, PO 407/150.
4Financial Regulations to be observed by the Soudan Government (signed) Gorst and Wingate, 6 May 1901, PO 407/157.
same time that it was only natural that '...those who pay the piper have a right to call the tune...'\(^1\) Gorst went even further in his desire to conciliate the Khedive and his council of ministers. Harvey, the financial adviser, was instructed to decrease the Egyptian subvention to the Sudan which resulted in endless clashes between him and Wingate\(^2\). It was Kitchener who brought these problems to an end in 1913 by stopping the Egyptian annual subvention. Consequently, the Sudan government was compelled to raise its ratio of taxation but was enabled at the same time to decrease Egyptian supervision even further\(^3\).

The Khedive and the Egyptian council of ministers were ostensibly the co-rulers of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. In reality, their spheres of control were limited. The Khedive controlled the bestowal of Egyptian decorations yet the recipients had to be recommended by the Sirdar and governor-general\(^4\). Moreover, Wingate never recommended Sudanese for Egyptian decorations, as he feared it '...would transfer the patronage from the British Governing authorities to the Khedive...'\(^5\)

In 1913, the Khedive's control over decorations was restricted by

\(^1\)Cromer to Wingate, 25 Jan. 1904, FO 633/8.

\(^2\)See for instance Harvey to Wingate, 30 Oct. 1907, SAD/281/5; Wingate to Harvey, 1 Dec. 1908, FO 141/416.

\(^3\)Wingate to Stack, 29 Feb. 1912, SAD/180/2/2; Wingate to Kitchener, (private) 7 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3; see also pp. 166-68.

\(^4\)Abbas Hilmi to Wingate, 31 Dec. 1905, SAD/277/6.

\(^5\)Wingate to Kitchener, (private) 26 Oct. 1911, SAD/301/4.
Kitchener to Wingate's delight. Apart from decorations the khedive and his ministers had little chance of interfering in the Sudan. Wingate reported to the khedive whenever the Egyptian army embarked on a major campaign, but these reports did not contain confidential details which were only included in the Sudan Intelligence reports.

The Egyptian council of ministers had to approve the Sudan ordinances and its yearly budget but could not amend them in any way. Even the minister of war, whose office ostensibly controlled the Egyptian army, sometimes received his information regarding military engagements in the Sudan, from the Egyptian press. Wingate expressed his attitude to the Egyptian war minister when he wrote: "...it suits our policy to have a purely nominal War Minister..."

Wingate's policy of reducing Egyptian influence in the Sudan suffered a setback during Gorst's consul-generalship. As part of his efforts to restore good relations with the khedive and the legislative assembly, Gorst suggested an increase of Egyptian participation in the administration of the Sudan. When in 1909 the opening ceremony of Port Sudan was about to take place Gorst wrote to Wingate:

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1 Wingate to Kitchener, 9 May 1914, SAD/190/2/2; Wingate wrote: "...I am much amused at the subterfuges to which our "ruler" is reduced owing to stoppage of funds from graves and decorations..."

2 Wingate to Stack, (private) 12 May 1908, SAD/284/13.

3 Memorandum by Clayton on the procedure regarding ordinances, 1912, SAD/183/3; see also p. 45.

4 Stack to Wingate, 5 Feb. 1912, SAD/180/2/2.

5 Wingate to Cecil (Secret please destroy!) 13 Jan. 1913, SAD/185/1/1.
...I am anxious that the show should be made as Egyptian as possible...we must try and reconcile the Egyptians to spending some of their money on the Soudan, and the way to do this is to make them feel that the Soudan is part of Egypt...1

Consequently, the Khedive 'Abbās accompanied by several ministers and members of the legislative assembly, attended the ceremony and toured the Sudan. Wingate's view about his guests of honour was concisely expressed when he wrote: '...God help the country that is governed by such rubbish...'2 A year later, Sirrī Pasha, the Egyptian minister of war and public works, visited the Sudan and compiled a report about its administrative policy. Wingate wrote indignantly: '...I am at a loss to know in what capacity Sirrī Pasha is reporting on the Government of the Sudan...'3 Gorst's reply was curt: '...we cannot object to Egyptian Ministers taking an interest in Soudan affairs, if we are constantly asking the Council of Ministers to provide money for the development of the country...'4

Gorst's conciliatory efforts were shortlived and under his successor Wingate was able to pursue his policy of diminishing

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1Gorst to Wingate, (private) 18 Feb. 1909, SAD/286/1. Originally Cromer had suggested that the new port be called 'Port Wingate', whereupon Wingate suggested to name it 'Port Cromer'. Wingate wrote, however, that he would '...strongly object to its being called "Port Gorst"...', Wingate to Cecil, 8 Nov. 1904, SAD/275/8.

2Wingate to Phipps, 13 Apr. 1909, SAD/287/1.

3Wingate to Gorst, 14 Mar. 1910, SAD/469/2/1.

4Gorst to Wingate, 16 Mar. 1910, Ibid.
Egyptian influence*. When Kitchener stopped the Egyptian ministers from interfering in the Sudan, Wingate expressed his delight:

'...Within the last year our Ministers have learnt some sad truths, but it is just about time they realised the "hands off" policy as far as the Sudan is concerned...'

There were two additional spheres in which Egyptian penetration into the Sudan was regarded as dangerous, namely Islam and nationalism. Of the two, Islam was the easier to control, as apart from the Egyptian qādis employed in the Sudan, there was no direct link between the Sudan and Egypt. The penetration of Egyptian nationalist ideas presented a far more difficult problem. Nationalism and anti-British propaganda were closely linked in the Egyptian press. Moreover, numerous anti-British attacks were directed against the British rulers of the Sudan. They criticized the Condominium Agreement which was regarded as an insult to Egyptian sovereignty. Heavy attacks were also launched against Wingate himself whose rule was compared to that of the tsar. He was also accused of degrading the honour of the Egyptian officers by compelling them to kiss his hand. A most frequent demand was that

1 Wingate to Stack, 18 Nov. 1912, SAD/183/2.
2 See pp. 176-7.
3 al-Liwa', 4 Feb. 1900; 3 May 1900.
5 al-Liwa', 15 Nov. 1908.
Egyptians should occupy the senior posts of the Sudan administration including that of governor-general. The financial regulations by which Egypt had to foot the Sudan bill without having a say in its administration, were also heavily criticized. The religious policy of the Sudan government and the extension of missionary education to the Muslim provinces, were resented by the Egyptian press more than anything else. Wingate would have preferred to see all these papers suspended. However, Cromer advocated a free press and did not believe that the Egyptian newspapers were influential enough to cause any real damage. Gorst, to begin with, followed Cromer's policy regarding the press, but in 1909 he decided to revive the Egyptian press law of 1881 in order to silence nationalist opposition. This gave Wingate the chance he had been waiting for and he decided to promulgate a press law for the Sudan.

1 al-Liwa', 4 Feb. 1900.


3 al-Liwa', 7 Feb. 1900; 3 May 1900; 30 May 1900; al-Nu'ayyad, 17 Dec. 1906. I have failed to find any substantial criticism about the government's religious policy in the southern provinces.

4 Wingate to Cromer, 7 Mar. 1900, FO 141/356.

5 Cromer to Sanderson, 26 Apr. 1899, FO 78/5026; Cromer to Wingate, 4 Jan. 1907, SAD/103/1.

6 Gorst to Grey, 20 Apr. 1907, FO 800/46.


8 Wingate to Bonham Carter, 29 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/1; see also Wingate to Clayton (private), 29 Mar. 1910; the new law was finally passed in 1912. See Wingate to Stack, 18 Nov. 1912, SAD/183/1/3.
Throughout these years Wingate devised his own methods of dealing with the press. Egyptian newspapers which criticized the Sudan government were stopped from entering the Sudan. The effectiveness of this measure was proved when Shaykh 'Allī Yusuf, editor of al-Mu'ayyad, agreed not to publish any news or articles about the Sudan without the prior consent of the Sudan agent in Cairo. Wingate also used the pro-government newspaper al-Mugṭṭṭam in which sponsored articles were published in order to counteract nationalist propaganda. Wingate's worries regarding the Egyptian press were greatly reduced under Kitchener who suspended their publication at the slightest provocation.

Wingate's aim in reducing Egyptian impact in the Sudan was two-fold. He genuinely believed that the majority of Sudanese hated the Egyptians and that undue Egyptian interference might instigate yet another revolt. Moreover, he wanted his rule in the Sudan to be as British as possible short only of outright annexation. To support his view, Wingate quoted the following from an interview he had with Sayyid 'Allī al-Mīrghānī, head of the Khatmiya order: "Why should you English people be surprised at the thoroughly disloyal

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1 Owen to Wingate, 16 May 1906, SAD/278/5; al-Liwa', al-Mu'ayyad, al Minbār, al-Dūṭr al-Miṣrī, al-Waṭān, and Wādī al-Nīl, were only a few of the newspapers which were stopped by order of the Sudan agent.

2 Wingate to Stack, 13 Apr. 1909, SAD/287/1.

3 This task was entrusted to Na'ūm Shuqayr of the intelligence department, see Shoucair to Stack, 24 Jan. 1909, SAD/286/1; see also al-Mugṭṭṭam, 22 Jan. 1909.

4 Kitchener to Wingate, 7 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.
attitude of the Egyptians? - They are a race of slaves and never will be anything better; their character is contemptible"... Whereupon Wingate commented:...This opinion is really representative of the bulk of the better class Sudanese, who are in every respect superior to the Egyptians and look down upon them with contempt...

With the outbreak of the first World War and the declaration of a British protectorate over Egypt Wingate saw his chance. In a long letter to McMahon, a copy of which was sent to Kitchener, Wingate stated his views on what he hoped might be a new venture in Anglo-Sudanese relations:

...Prior to the declaration of a Protectorate over Egypt,... the policy of H.B.M.'s Government had been to make the status of the Sudan as British as possible, without making an official declaration...The declaration of a British Protectorate over Egypt had left them [the Sudanese] cold - had Egypt been annexed by England..., then it is possible that, in time, they might have realized that control from Cairo meant British Control - as it stands...the Sudanese now cling more than ever to the British as distinct from the Egyptian, Government...

Although the status of the Sudan remained unchanged, Wingate intensified his policy of removing Egyptians from the Sudan administration until he left for Cairo in December 1916.

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1 Wingate to Cromer (private), 24 Feb. 1915, SAD/194/2; following these harsh words about the Egyptians it was interesting to read in an obituary published in al-Ahram, 22 Feb. 1968, that al-Mirghani played a leading role in the national struggle to liberate the Sudan from British rule, ever since the turn of the century. For details about 'Ali al-Mirghani, see pp.196-8.

2 Wingate to McMahon (private), 2 June 1915, SAD/195/10; Wingate to Kitchener, 2 June 1915, PRO/30/57, no.47. This letter was ostensibly written in order to explain why Egyptian decorations should not be granted to Sudanese.

3 For details see pp.161-8.
e. The governor-general's council.

During the first decade of his governor-generalship, Wingate set up numerous consultative bodies to advise him on administrative and economic problems. Among the more important committees were the Sudan government selection board\(^1\), the central economic board\(^2\), and the central government board\(^3\). The duties of each of these bodies were defined by Wingate who also appointed the members\(^4\). Moreover, it was left to Wingate's discretion to decide what to place on the committees' agenda\(^5\). In these circumstances it could hardly be expected that they would play a significant role in policy making. Government decisions were generally reached in direct consultation by Wingate with certain members of his staff. Slatin and the Sudan agents were privately consulted about most problems, while the 'three secretaries'\(^6\) formed an inner circle of the central administration and aided Wingate in formulating his policy\(^7\).

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\(^1\)The selection board was set up in 1905 when an increased number of civilians joined the Sudan civil service; Wingate to Cromer, 30 Nov. 1905, SAD/277/5.

\(^2\)CAO - 427, 7 June 1906; CGR - 1906, pp.141-2.

\(^3\)Wingate to Stack, 1?1 Nov. 1908, SAD/284/13.

\(^4\)See for instance Bonham Carter to Phipps, 13 August 1909, SAD/288/2.

\(^5\)Wingate to Phipps (private), 16 Apr. 1911, SAD/300/4/1.

\(^6\)The financial, legal, and civil secretaries were generally referred to as the 'three secretaries'.

\(^7\)This conclusion was reached by assessing Wingate's correspondence during this period. Sir Harold MacMichael, whom I interviewed on 6 June 1987, confirmed my impression and pointed out that Wingate's confidants namely: Slatin, Stack, Clayton, and Symes were all intelligence people like Wingate himself; for details see pp.100-2,113-7.
The governor-general's council came into being in January 1910, but already in 1908 it was first suggested to Wingate by his civil secretary. Wingate had complained that many major administrative decisions were reached as a result of a brief discussion at the Cairo budget meeting between himself, the financial secretary and the head of the department of the provincial governor concerned. He therefore suggested giving the permanent selection board power to deal also with general administrative problems. Phipps, the civil secretary, made a more far-reaching suggestion and proposed the creation of a governor-general's council, which would deal with "...every off, unusual, or unlegislated question..." Over a year passed before the subject was taken any further. Wingate had, in the meantime, been sent on a special mission to Somaliland, and upon his return in June 1909, proceeded direct to England. It was from his home in Dunbar that he asked both Stack and Clayton for their views on constituting a governor-general's council in the Sudan. Only in October 1909 was the first recorded move made by Gorst. In a private letter to Sir Edward Grey, he put forward the suggestion of "...instituting in the Soudan an executive legislative...

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1 Wingate to Phipps (Strictly confidential), 2 June 1908, SAD/282/6.
2 Phipps Pasha, Pownoll Ramsay (1864-1932), was seconded to the private Egyptian army in 1899; joined the Sudan government 1903; Wingate's private secretary 1903-4; civil secretary 1905-14; retired in 1914—Hill, p. 306.
3 Phipps to Wingate, 7 June 1908, SAD/282/6.
5 Wingate to Clayton, 11 Sep. 1909, SAD/469/1.
council on the lines of the Viceroy's Council in India..." and added that Wingate had already agreed to the suggestion. The 'Draft Ordinance for creating a council to assist the Governor General' was sent privately by Gorst to the foreign secretary on 7 October 1909. The only substantial suggestion made by the foreign office was to include a native member in the council. Wingate will perhaps be startled at the notion of a native member. I would not be, if I were in his shoes... Yet, in spite of Grey's recommendation, the suggestion of a native member was turned down,

...for the simple reason that there are no such people in the Soudan suitable to occupy a seat on the Council; nor are there likely to be for a long time to come. The Soudanese themselves are mere children, and the only Egyptians in the country are minor officials. Moreover,

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1 Gorst to Grey (private), 7 Oct. 1909, FO 800/47.

2 Ibid; the draft ordinance was later printed in FO 407/174.

G.M.A.Balchit in his thesis British Administration and Sudanese Nationalism, p.3, suggested that the governor-general's council was forced by Gorst on Wingate in order to bring the Sudan government to heel. Bakhit based his argument on Gorst's letter to Grey of 20 Nov. 1909, FO 407/174, which was written over a month after the draft ordinance for instituting the governor-general's council had been sent to England. Sir Geoffrey Archer, governor-general of the Sudan 1925-6, wrote that the council was founded "...at the instigation of the British Government...after General Sir R.Wingate had embarked-on his own initiative and at vast expense- on the creation of Port Sudan..." I have not been able to find any evidence to corroborate this claim. See G.Archer, Personal Historical Memoirs of an East Africa Administrator, (London 1963), p.189.

3 Sir R.Ritchie to Grey, 19 Oct. 1909, FO 800/47. The inclusion of natives was proposed again by the Egyptian council of ministers, but Stack reported that "...there is no intention of acceding to it...", Stack to Wingate, 30 Dec. 1909, SAD/289/3.

4 Grey to Gorst, 19 Oct. 1909, FO 800/47.
the inhabitants dislike the Egyptians, and much prefer the English...

When Gorst, therefore, approached Grey officially a month later the only comment offered in the foreign office minutes was to the effect that the council would only give formal status to a position which already existed in practice. This remark was certainly true with regard to the text of the ordinance itself.

The council was to be constituted of four ex-officio members, namely the inspector-general, the financial, legal, and civil secretaries, and between two and four members appointed by the governor-general. It was authorised to promulgate laws, regulations and ordinances, and to decide the yearly budget. The governor-general could overrule the council's decisions or suspend their operation, in which case he had to state his reasons for doing so. It was in a letter addressed to Wingate that Gorst laid down the nature of the relations between the governor-general and his council, on the one hand and the

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1 Gorst to Grey, 30 Oct. 1909, Ibid.
2 Gorst to Grey, 14 Nov. 1909, FO 371/664.
3 Refers to the central government board, which was instituted in 1908.
4 For full text of ordinance see SG No.167, 24 Jan. 1910. The text is identical with the draft ordinance.
5 After Slatin's resignation in 1914, there were only 3 ex-officio members.
6 Wingate refused to be bound by precedent as to the members he appointed and when Currie left in 1914, he refused to appoint his successor in the education department. See Glayton to Wingate, 16 Apr. 1914, SAD/469/6/2.
British consul-general on the other.  

One of the first tasks undertaken by the new council was to set down its own rules of procedure. These rules enabled the governor-general to refer to the council whatever he thought fit. Council could act, though only in an advisory capacity, on all matters concerning promotions, appointments, and defence, and was allowed to discuss these matters only if they were referred to it by the governor-general. Heads of departments and provincial governors could bring to council only business relating to their own departments or provinces, and the governors had first to obtain the sanction of the governor-general. The convening of council was left to the discretion of the governor-general who could also adjourn it whenever he thought fit.

The first meeting of the council was held at the governor-general's palace in Khartoum on 27 January 1910. According to the regulations, the discussions of the council were not recorded in the minutes. Only if a member dissented from the majority decision, was he required to give his reasons, which then became part of the minutes. During the first seven years the council held the following meetings:

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1 Gorst to Wingate, 13 Jan. 1910, FO 867/1, pp. 9-11. For details see pp. 46-7.
2 Inclosure in No. 78, Gorst to Grey, 28 May 1910, FO 497/175.
3 The suggestion of allowing governors to bring business to council was made by Currie. Phipps, the civil secretary, who felt that he represented the provincial governors, strongly objected and wrote to Wingate: 'I do not think our Governors are fit for it...'
4 FO 867/1, p. 7.
5 Gorst to Wingate, 12 Jan. 1910, FO 867/1.
number of meetings: 1910 (25), 1911 (20), 1912 (14), 1913 (11), 1914 (12), 1915 (10), 1916 (4). Wingate presided over less than fifty percent of the meetings and even then very rarely cast his vote. It was Slatin who used his extra casting vote as acting-president of the council at its second meeting, in February 1910. At its 9th meeting, the council decided that its members should take precedence over all other officials of the Sudan government.

The majority of the meetings dealt with problems of land ownership, personnel, agriculture, and trade, and a special series of meetings were devoted to the yearly budget. During its first year, the only serious disagreement occurred when the council had to deal with the salaries of its own members. Consequently Wingate and Gorst became the sole arbiters with regard to council members' promotions and pay. When, however, Gorst tried to interfere with the general terms of employment in the Sudan civil service, his suggestion was rejected by the council and Gorst had to withdraw.

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1 FO 867/1-7.
2 FO 867/1, p. 22. The vote was taken about the leasehold system in Omdurman market. See also pp. 356-57.
3 Ibid, p. 55.
4 See for instance Wingate to Stack (private), 29 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/3, where Wingate wrote that council had devoted five meetings of five to six hours each to budget discussions.
5 FO 867/1, pp. 137-8.
6 Wingate to Gorst, 17 Dec. 1910; Gorst to Wingate, 29 Dec. 1910, SAD/298/3.
7 FO 867/2, p. 8.
During Kitchener's period as consul-general, there were a number of clashes between him and the council, but all about minor matters, such as the payment of rent by government officials, or the increased charges on the government steamers\textsuperscript{1}. On one occasion Kitchener refused to approve the council's decision\textsuperscript{2}, and on several others ordinances passed by council had to be amended before Kitchener would sanction their publication\textsuperscript{3}.

Judging by the record of the first seven years of its existence, the council's achievements were rather modest. It provided a permanent framework for the exchange of opinions among the various heads of departments, and thus enabled them to gain a broader outlook over government affairs. It did not, however, diminish Wingate's private consultations with his closer associates about most of the subjects which were later brought to the council. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wingate very rarely found his views overruled by the council's majority.

The relations between the Sudan government and the British consuls-general in Cairo were hardly affected by the new council. It is true that a definite set of rules now existed, but misunderstandings occurred as before, and it is difficult to say that the

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid, pp.85-6.

\textsuperscript{2}FO 867/3, 31.

\textsuperscript{3}FO 867/3, pp.70, 77-8; FO 867/4, pp.21-2.
consul-general's control over Sudan affairs increased in any way.

As for the people of the Sudan, for whose benefit the government supposedly functioned, one can hardly see how the existence of a council, on which they had no representation and all of whose members were British government officials, could make any difference to their well-being. Native affairs were entrusted, as before, to the advice of Slatin, who together with Clayton and Stack, formed the inner circle of the governor-general's advisers.

Finally, judging by the diminishing number of the council's meetings, it seems fair to assume that its functions declined rather than increased during that period. Whether it assumed a greater role following Wingate's transfer to Egypt is outside the scope of this thesis.

f. Wingate's principles of government.

In his seventeen years as governor-general and sirdar, Wingate had imbued these posts with his personality. He was a strong believer in the direct personal approach both in his relations with his subordinates and his dealings with the Sudanese people. His relations with the British officials were cultivated during his tours of inspection, the annual Cairo gathering, other visits to Khartoum or Dunbar, and a voluminous correspondence, which in many cases went beyond the official relationship of a governor-general

1MacMichael's assertion that the inauguration of the council brought about the loosening of the Cairo bonds, seems just as unfounded; H. MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, (London 1934), pp. 113-4.
and his subordinates. Relations were, nevertheless, not familiar. Wingate's experience and understanding were treated with respect, even if some of them joked about his pompous appearance and strict morals. His relations with the non-British officials were, of course, on a different and more formal level, yet even with them he showed concern for their private welfare, and in some cases helped them with their promotion, or when they were due for retirement.

Wingate's attitude to the Sudanese was paternal rather than autocratic. He believed that he was in a better position than they were to know what was best for them. This manifested itself in his attitude to the Mahdia, and to the penetration of Egyptian nationalism into the Sudan, both of which were regarded by him not only as evil but as being contrary to the better aspirations of the Sudanese. Currie once said of Wingate that he was "...an advocate for the improvement of the native along the lines of his own institutions, and his customs and regulations..." This was in fact the official policy adopted by both Cromer and Wingate. In reality, however, it was not carried out. 'Native institutions' were, whenever necessary, determined by the authorities and 'the improvement

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1 Impressions of British officials about Wingate can be found in the private diaries which were kept by many of them. See for instance Butler's diary 1911-12, SAD/400/10; Willis's diary, SAD/210/2.

2 Wingate to Cromer, 9 May 1906, SAD/278/5; see also pp.161-2.

3 P.R.Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, (2nd edition London 1968) pp.466-9, 491; see also pp.54-7.

4 Currie to Wingate, 1 July 1901, SAD/271/7; Currie, Sir James (1868-1937), joined the Sudan civil service in 1900 as the first director of education, a post which he held until 1914; was member of the governor-general's council 1910-14, DNBS, 1931-40, pp.31-4.
of the natives' was also guided by the government and on lines
determined by it.\(^1\)

In the absence of any free expression of Sudanese public opinion
during Wingate's period, it is difficult to assess the popularity of
these measures.\(^2\) The attacks launched against Wingate's policy in
the Egyptian press can hardly be regarded as an expression of public
opinion, as they were motivated primarily by Egyptian political con-
siderations.\(^3\) The only criteria by which the government can be
judged, therefore, are the results.

If one were to look for the predominant principle which guided
Wingate as sirdar and governor-general, it would be his firm belief
in the unity of civil administration and military command in the
Sudan, and his conviction that interference from Egypt, in any form,
should be reduced to the utmost minimum. He believed in the unity
of civil and military command not only as embodied in his own person
but also in the lower echelons of the administration where provincial
governors were also the military commanders of their districts.

Suggestions to separate these functions made by Cromer,\(^4\) and by

\(^1\) For details see pp. 188-190; 305-316.

\(^2\) The only Sudanese newspapers at the time were the Sudan Times, which
was founded in 1903 by Fāris Nimr, the owner of al-Muqattam press in
Cairo, and the Sudan Herald founded in 1912 by two Greeks. Both were
under strong government influence and could not be regarded as a
free expression of Sudanese public opinion. For details see Mahgoub

\(^3\) See pp. 54-5.

\(^4\) Cromer to Lansdowne, (private) 9 Feb. 1902, FO 800/123.
senior British officers in the Egyptian army, were rejected by Wingate as absurd:...not only should such an idea not be countenanced for a moment but not even mooted. It would have a most unsettling effect on everyone and would result in confusion and chaos... Wingate regarded the insecurity of the Sudan and the fact that most of the higher British officials were army officers as important reasons for maintaining the unity.

These reasons, however, are not sufficient. After the first few years of the Condominium, security was never really threatened. The Egyptian army undertook punitive patrols in the southern provinces and occasionally had to suppress religious insurrections. These did not, however, endanger security. Moreover, two of the adjutants-general who served in the Egyptian army during that period objected to this unity of command in the provinces which they regarded as detrimental to the army itself. They claimed, with justice, that civil administration took preference over army command and that as a result the army was being neglected. Lastly, Wingate himself devoted most of his time and energy to his work as governor-general

1 Asser to Wingate, 16 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/3.

2 Wingate to Cromer, 23 May 1902, SAD/272/2. See also pp. 143-5.

3 The only major military undertaking was the conquest of Darfur in 1916. A. B. Theobald, 'Ali Dinár, pp. 162-207.

4 Ferguson to Wingate, 9 Mar. 1901, SAD/271/3; Asser to Wingate, 16 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/3.
while the running of the Egyptian army was largely entrusted to a handful of British officers. This was probably partly owing to his personal inclination, yet had security conditions really been as bad as he maintained, it is likely that he would have played a more active role in the day-to-day running of the army.

Wingate's main reason for opposing the separation was probably his belief that it was bound to increase control from Cairo and to create friction between the military and civil administration. Instead of a unified general supervision exercised by the consul-general over all Sudan affairs, there would have been an additional, purely military control exercised by the G.O.C. Egypt and the War Office in London.

Wingate's cherished aim throughout his governor-generalship was to relieve the Sudan of control from Cairo, as exercised by the British consul-general, and to stop any Egyptian penetration into the Sudan. The unity of civil and military command in his own hands, was regarded by him as the best way of achieving this aim.

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1. This can be assessed by the volume of correspondence in the Sudan archive in Durham, dealing with these spheres.

2. This may be easier to understand if one considers the problem of the British detachment in Khartoum, which belonged to the British army and was under the command of the G.O.C. Egypt. This arrangement caused friction in the Sudan as pointed out by Cromer on numerous occasions - (see for instance Cromer to Lansdowne, 10 Jan. 1900, FO 633/8; 16 Feb. 1903, FO 403/334). Only in 1905 was the command transferred to the sirdar (see Findlay to Asser, 28 July 1905, SAD/277/1). Judging by Wingate's concern over this minor problem of command, one can well understand his opposition to complete separation.

3. Up to Dec. 1898 the sirdar received all his instructions from the War Office through G.O.C. Egypt. See War Office to Foreign Office, 10 Dec. 1898, FO 407/147. Though officially the sirdar was under the command of the Khedive, in reality he had hardly any influence over the army's command.
Chapter II.

Slatin Pasha, the inspector-general.

Among the inner circle of Wingate's confidants, Slatin Pasha reigned supreme.

Slatin resigned from the Egyptian army following the battle of Karari. As assistant-director of intelligence since March 1895, he had played a significant role in the reconquest particularly after the capture of Omdurman when, as the only officer who was familiar with the town and its people, he rendered indispensable advice in establishing the new military administration. Yet, despite this, he decided to retire. He felt that he was disliked by Kitchener and that following the setting up of the Condominium, his position as the only officer who was neither Egyptian nor British would become unbearable. Thus in February 1899 Slatin left Egypt as a private citizen, having served in the Sudan for twenty-two years. However, before sailing, he was recruited by the Sudan Territories Exploration Syndicate to undertake a prospecting tour into the Nuba mountains and

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1 Two books, which have been recently published, describe in detail Slatin's activities while in the Sudan. R. Hill, Slatin Pasha (London 1965) affords a true understanding of Slatin's character and activities. A. B. Theobald, *Ali Dinar Last Sultan of Darfur 1898-1916*, (London 1965), analyses Slatin's policies and relations with Darfur. In this chapter it is intended to describe Slatin's unique position within the Anglo-Egyptian administration, without going into details regarding his policy in Darfur or the Sudan.

2 See p. 4.

3 Hill, Slatin, p. 60.

in January 1900 he returned to Cairo in his new capacity as prospecting agent 1.

a. Slatin's appointment.

In the eleven months that passed since Slatin's departure from the Sudan, the situation had radically changed. Kitchener, whose alleged antipathy was one of Slatin's main reasons for resigning, had himself left the Sudan. The new sirdar and governor-general was Wingate, Slatin's most intimate friend among the British officers. Moreover, following the famine of 1898 and the Omdurman mutiny in January 1900, Wingate felt in need of help as most of the experienced British officers had left the Sudan 2 to take part in the Boer War. It was, therefore, only to be expected that shortly after Slatin's arrival Wingate asked him to rejoin the Sudan government, promising "...to "create" any post Slatin would ask for..." 3 Slatin did not accede to this request immediately, as he was still committed to prospecting. Yet his trip into the Nuba mountains can well be described as the first act of the future inspector-general.

Slatin's diary, describing the trip resembles an intelligence officer's report rather than that of a prospecting agent. On 20 February Slatin interrogated 'Ali 'Abd al-Karīm an uncle of the Mahdi who was suspected of instigating a revolt. Though Slatin was

1 Ibid, pp.63-4.

2 See pp. 30-31.

3 Slatin's diary, 27 Feb. 1900, SAD/441.
convinced that 'Abd al-Karīm and his followers meant no harm he recommended they should be banished to Egypt as an example to others. Slatin wrote a proclamation to the people of the Sudan, signed by Wingate, in which he promised them peace and prosperity and urged them to cooperate with the government. He advised Lady Wingate to give money to the poor women in Omdurman, and chaired a meeting of the 'ulamā' concerning religious problems. En route to Kordofan Slatin received petitions, settled cases and advised British officers on the correct manner of administering their provinces.

Thus Slatin, a private citizen on a prospecting tour, became Wingate's travelling emissary even before he was appointed to a government post.

On his return to Egypt in June 1900, Slatin had long confabulations with Cromer, Gorst, Muṣṭafā Fahmī, and others, all of whom urged him to return to the Sudan. It seems that when Cromer wrote to Salisbury that he was "...suggesting to Wingate that Slatin's services might perhaps be utilized..." the appointment was as

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1 Ibid, 20-2 Feb. 1900; see also pp.199-200.

2 Ibid, 21 Feb. 1900.

3 Ibid, 23 Feb. 1900.


6 Slatin to Wingate, 30 June 1900, SAD/270/6.

7 Cromer to Salisbury, 8 June 1900, FO 633/6.
Slatin received his appointment as inspector-general on 29 September 1900. His duties and the extent of his authority were not clearly defined. He was intended to be a highly mobile officer who would travel over the vast areas of the Sudan and act as the governor-general's eyes and ears. There was also no decision regarding his salary. Wingate had offered him £E 1800 per annum apart from the £E 600 pension, which he received from Egypt for his previous services. This was vetoed by Cromer and they agreed on £E 1200 plus £E 200 travelling expenses and £E 600 pension.

By 1911, Slatin earned £E 1800 per annum which, together with his Egyptian pension and travelling expenses, made him the highest paid official in the Sudan. During his prospecting tour Slatin had arranged with Wingate that he should receive land in Khartoum as compensation for his house in Omdurman which had been requisitioned by the government.

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1 Hill, Slatin, pp. 71-2.
3 Bernard to Stack, 9 Nov. 1919, FO 141/636; according to Currie's suggestion, Slatin's pay was not included in the general scale of officials' salaries, as his inclusion would have brought about a demand for increased salaries by the legal and financial secretaries who were the highest paid officials. See memorandum by Currie, | n.d. 1910?|, SAD/282/5.
4 Slatin's diary, 28 Feb. 1900, SAD/441.
return the land and to live in a government-owned house.\footnote{Cromer to Wingate, 17 Jan. 1901; Wingate to Cromer (private), 21 Jan. 1901, FO 141/364; Hill states that the gift of land was originally Kitchener's idea and that Slatin gave it up as he had no money to build, and would have been unable to supervise its building even had the money been available. Hill, Slatin, p. 72.}

Wingate never regarded Slatin as a run-of-the-mill government official. He viewed his appointment as a personal post which '...will cease when Slatin leaves the service...'.\footnote{Memorandum by Wingate, n.d. Oct. 1907?; SAD/281/4.} Moreover, he confessed that even had he wanted to appoint another inspector-general it would have been impossible to find a man of equal qualifications.\footnote{Wingate to Asser, 29 Sep. 1909, SAD/288/5.}

Thus following Slatin's resignation on the outbreak of the first World War, the post of inspector-general ceased to exist and the work was divided between Symes, then Wingate's private secretary, and the intelligence department.\footnote{Slatin to Wingate, 30 Sep. 1914, SAD/223/1.}

Following several incidents between Slatin and British officer-administrators, Wingate decided to define more accurately Slatin's duties. He instructed the civil secretary to prepare a draft proposal

Following several incidents between Slatin and British officer-administrators, Wingate decided to define more accurately Slatin's duties. He instructed the civil secretary to prepare a draft proposal

\footnote{Symes, Sir Stuart, (1882-1963). Joined the Egyptian army in 1906; 1909-12 was A.D.I. Khartoum; 1913-16 was Wingate's private secretary and remained on his staff after he became high commissioner of Egypt in 1917. During the years 1920-34 he served in Egypt, Palestine, Aden, and Tanganyika, and returned to the Sudan as governor-general in the years 1934-40.}

\footnote{Wingate to F. Milner, 11 Mar. 1915, SAD/194/2; the post of inspector-general was revived for a short period in 1922, when Jackson Pasha filled the post. See SPS, p. 6.}
to this effect. The duties of the inspector-general as enumerated in this document did little to clarify the situation. Slatin was required:

...To act as adviser generally to H.E. the Gov. Gen. on all matters concerning his duties... to acquaint himself with the names and characters of the principle Sheikhs and other persons who either through their wealth, position, or for reasons connected with religion, have influence over the natives...

Slatin's supreme authority in connection with religious affairs was emphasized in two articles which empowered him to advise on all legal problems connected with religion, and to be in touch with the 'Board of Ulema' and other religious leaders as Wingate's adviser. Article XI emphasized Slatin's power regarding all tribal affairs, including taxation, and stressed his special responsibility for nomads. Several articles were intended to ensure amicable relations between Slatin and the British personnel. He was instructed to inform governors and inspectors before he undertook an inspection of their provinces. Again he was warned not to issue direct orders to any employee under a Mudir, except in case of

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1 One of the incidents which convinced Wingate that this was necessary was the 'Jackson affair' the details of which remain unknown; see Hill, Slatin, p.79; see also Wingate's Diary, 27 Feb. 1902, SAD/272/8 where he commented that Slatin was deeply involved in the Jackson affair. This view was not shared by Jackson himself, who wrote to Slatin '...of one thing I can assure you and that is, that the Sirdar's idea that I am suspicious of you is not the case. We have always been the best of friends since our meeting at Assuan and always shall remain so...'; see Jackson to Slatin, 5 Mar. 1902, SAD/452/276. Wingate wrote in his diary on 9 Mar. 1902, SAD/272/8, that he had instructed Nason, who became civil secretary following the 'Jackson affair', to prepare a draft of Slatin's duties. The draft itself is, however, in Slatin's own writing and the amendments are written by Wingate; see 'Duties of Inspector General, Sudan', 4 Apr. 1902, SAD/403/6. The following details are all quoted from this document.
absolute urgency when the Mudir is too far away to issue orders in time...'

Lastly, Slatin was '...to examine and remark upon the Intelligence Report before it is submitted to the Sirdar and Gover. Gen...'

These detailed instructions were sent by Wingate to all his provincial governors in the hope that the antagonism stimulated by Slatin's unique position would be reduced to a minimum.  

b. Slatin's policies.

The inspector-general's department was a one-man show. With a yearly budget of some £E 2500, Slatin toured the length and breadth of the Sudan, by foot, camel and train. An example of Slatin's method of work during one of his tours is afforded by the following notes:

...31 January 1913...reach Singa at 7 a.m., meet on the way Taylor, Tippets, Dupuis, Thompson...1 February...Have long meeting with Omdah Sheikhs, merchants, etc...2 February...Have single interviews with Omdahs and Sheikhs...3 February...give Govt. officials my instructions and views on all matters (shows in my notes at the end of this diary)...  

The observations written by a British inspector during one of Slatin's tours, make an interesting comparison:

1Wingate's diary, 9 Mar. 1902, SAD/272/8; Minutes to 'Duties of Inspector General, Sudan', 9 Apr. 1902, SAD/403/3; for details about Slatin's relations with the British officials see pp.95-100.  

2Stone, p. 256.  

3For details see Slatin's diaries for the years 1900-1914, SAD/441. In 1909 for instance he covered some 780 miles by camel and foot. Whenever he travelled by rail, he used a special saloon which was attached to the train; see for instance Slatin's diary, 25 Dec. 1911, Ibid.  

4Slatin's diary, 1913, Ibid.
...Slatin arrived on 14th and I had no news of him till he was only 7 miles off... He spent first day interviewing Ali Dinar's messengers - next day visited the Nazirs - interesting to hear him talk over Dervish times and pre Dervish times - he contrives to be amazingly tactless at times... Next morning Savile turned up and had to see the Nazirs etc too... We spent most of the day ciphering P.O. telegrams re. French... Following day we had gelsa of the Hamar Sheikhs, at which Slatin told them they would be put on to taxes. He managed to put it very badly, it would have been better to leave it alone and let me and Elwi do it...

While Slatin clearly regarded his tours as the only guarantee of a just administration, the recipients of his views regarded them as a necessary evil which they had to bear. It was during these tours that Slatin compiled his lists of recommendations which covered almost every sphere of policy. His suggestions, or rather orders, were given to the men of the spot and later communicated to Wingate.

A detailed description of all the spheres covered by Slatin would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet a brief resumé of his

1Savile, Lieut.-Colonel Robert Vesey; seconded to the Sudan government in 1902; served as inspector in Kassala 1902-6; and Dongola 1906-7; governor of Bahr al-Ghazal 1908; governor of Kordofan 1909-1917. SPS, p.11.

2Refers to the French advance in Wadai and Dār Tama and Masalit; see Theobald, Ali Dīnār, pp.81-118.

3Gelsa (jalsa) - meeting, gathering

4As nomads the Hamar tribe had previously paid tribute; see pp.364-5.

5Willis's diary, Dec. 1910, SAD/210/2. Willis, Charles Armine (b.1881) graduated from Oxford in 1904, and came to the Sudan in 1905 with one of the first groups of civil-servants. He served in Kordofan 1906-12, first as a junior inspector and following training at the legal department, he became the first legal inspector of Kordofan in 1909; 1913 - Senior inspector Red-Sea; 1914-5 - Dongola; 1915-9 - A.D.I.; 1920-6 - DMI. SPS, p.19.

6Slatin's annual reports were not printed in the Reports on the Administration of the Sudan, but were incorporated in Wingate's annual memorandum and in the departmental and provincial reports; GGR-1902, p.113.
major activities is clearly required in order to assess his impact on policy making. Slatin's own idea as to his responsibilities was clearly stated when he wrote to Wingate: '...There are several questions which I like to manage myself - like Darfur - Kababish raids - Seid el-Mekki affairs - increase of tribute and herd tax - Ulemas questions...'

Religious policy.

Islamic affairs were Slatin's prime responsibility. He lacked religious zeal of any kind and tended to steer clear of any spiritual speculation. Yet, his experience as a Muslim during the Mahdia, had made him familiar with Islamic custom and enabled him to understand the Sudanese Muslims better than did his fellow officers.

Slatin's first premise was that no missionary activities should be allowed in Muslim provinces. In this he was, at one with most of his British colleagues. But as a foreigner he was better able to speak up. '...Slatin Pasha...has just administered a heavy rebuke to those silly people who wish to shove the English Bibles down the throats of the African blacks...'

In an interview with the Neue Freie Presse, given shortly before leaving Austria to take up his post in the Sudan, Slatin stated: '...Jede propaganda Christlicher

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1 Slatin to Wingate, 27 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.

2 Hill, Slatin, pp.79-80.

3 For details see pp.220-239.

Missionare unter dem Moslemischen Stammen ist ausgeschlossen.  1

His tendency was to reduce the impact of every religion to the best of his ability. In 1901 he prepared a proclamation to the Muslims aimed at diminishing the influence of their religious leaders 2. He mistrusted all the ṣuflī tariqa, and attitude he probably inherited from his Mahdist overlords 3. Even Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani, the head of the Khatmiyya order, who was decorated by Cromer and received a monthly pay for his services 4 was refused official recognition by Slatin: 'I told him that he cannot be recognized as the head of a Teriga which are only tolerated...' 5 When H.C. Jackson, then a young inspector in Dongola, wanted to appoint Sayyid 'Abd al-Muta'al as head of the Idrisiyya order, Slatin reminded him '...that Terikas are only tolerated but not officially recognized and that we neither appoint nor dismiss "Khalifas"... 6 In dealing with the tariqa

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1 Neue Freie Presse, 10 Oct. 1900.
2 Slatin's diary, 26 May 1901, SAD/441.
3 During the Mahdia Sufism was prohibited throughout the Sudan; see Hill, Slatin, p.87.
4 Slatin's diary, Notes 1903, SAD/441; Slatin mentioned that Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani received £E 65, whereas his father used to get £E 85 in the Turco-Egyptian period.
5 Slatin to Wingate, 27 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.
6 Slatin to Wingate, 3 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/1. H.C. Jackson joined the Sudan government in 1907 and served in the administration for twenty-four years. He should not be confused with Brigadier-General Sir Herbert William Jackson, who was governor of Dongola for twenty years and is referred to throughout the thesis as Jackson.
Slatin observed a great measure of neutrality. He strongly opposed the favoured Khatmiya\(^2\); when they urged Wingate to expel one of the leaders of the rival Majdhubiyà\(^2\) order from the Sudan\(^1\).

Butler, who on being appointed to the intelligence department was instructed by Slatin as to government policy, described the latter's views:

...A busy morning with Slatin...He does not approve of Savile's action in appointing a leader of the Norghanlah tarika in El Obeid...Says Govt. should have nothing to do with these tarikas as the heads are really only after the monetary profits...they are really frauds and Govt. cannot be responsible for their activities...The only religion recognized by Govt. is Orthodox Muhamedanism...\(^2\)

Consequently Slatin relied on the 'Board of Ulema' which was instituted by the government in 1901, and on his three learned friends, Muhammad al-Badawi\(^3\), al-Tayyi al-Sa'id\(^4\), and Idris Wad Ibrahim\(^5\).

\(^1\)Slatin to Wingate, 10 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/1; the Khatmiya\(^2\) leaders at Tokar had convinced Wingate that the Majdhubiyà\(^2\) were still propagating Mahdism. Slatin was able to overcome these instigation by proving to Wingate that the hatred between the two orders dated to pre-Mahdist days; see also Wingate to Slatin, 12 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/1 where he wrote:...'...many thanks for your explanation...I have no doubt you are quite correct...' When Slatin himself later proposed to expel three fakïs, Wingate wrote '...you can expel as many more as you like, they are an infernal nuisance...', Wingate to Slatin, 5 Apr. 1913, SAD/108/15.

\(^2\)Butler's diary, 21 Nov. 1911, SMD/400/10.

\(^3\)Hill, BD, p.253.

\(^4\)Ibïd, p.353.

\(^5\)Hill, Slatin, p.86.
He asked their advice in problems of inheritance and consulted them whenever a religious problem occurred. In fact they became the sole interpreters of orthodox Islam in the Sudan. Slatin was also responsible for the appointment of qādis, many of whom were of Egyptian origin, and thus was in a position to supervise their activities in the Sudan.

In his policy towards Mahdist insurrections Slatin encouraged a cautious attitude. He was sceptical when a Mahdist rising was reported by Count Gleichen in 1901, and advised Wingate that 'it isn't good to tickle religious people or questions' unless the suspicions are proved beyond doubt. Following a report about a new Mahdi in the Nuba mountains in 1903 Slatin wrote: 'I suppose it was more a private affair then a religious matter.' Even after the Gezira rebellion in 1908, which was the most serious

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1 Slatin to Wingate, 19 Mar., 1907, SAD/280/3; in this instance, Slatin devised a way to overcome the rigidity of the Islamic law of inheritance.

2 See for instance Slatin to Wingate, 2 June 1908, SAD/451/124, where he insisted that before commuting the sentences of the Gezira rebels, Wingate should have consulted the 'Board of Ulema'; see also pp. 180-190, 199-200.

3 Wingate to Slatin, 24 July 1907; Slatin to Wingate, 9 Aug. 1907, SAD/281/1. In most cases Slatin consulted Muṣṭafā Bey Bayram, of the Egyptian Shari'a Court, as to the suitability of Egyptian qādis. Bayram was a close friend of Harry Boyle, the oriental secretary at the British agency in Cairo. Boyle to Wingate, 6 Dec. 1907, SAD/281/6; see also pp. 176-7.

4 Gleichen to Wingate, 25 July 1901, SAD/271/7; Count Gleichen was then Sudan agent and head of intelligence.


6 Slatin to Wingate, 1 Sep. 1903, SAD/273/9.
religious uprising during this period, Slatin did not join in the general witchhunt. He demanded a death sentence for the rebels, but at the same time warned against mass arrests amongst their followers who he knew would be kept out of mischief by the beginning of the rainy season. When a new religious movement was reported in 1911, Slatin wrote:...I got as usual the report on Nabi Alla Isa and as usual he appears at Sennar province - rot |sic| and nonsense."

Domestic slavery and intelligence work.

The intelligence department remained Slatin's second home even after he became inspector-general. He supervised its work and visited it daily when in Khartoum. It was there that his interviews with 'Ali Dinar's messengers, religious leaders, and other notables took place. His preoccupation with intelligence work can be seen by the lists of 'Trustworthy men' suited for intelligence work, which he compiled in his diaries.

Domestic slavery was also within Slatin's spheres of activity and was dealt with by the intelligence department. Slatin's opinions on

1Wingate to Stack, | quoting Slatin |, 12 May 1908, SAD/284/13; Slatin to Wingate, | n.d. May 1908? |, SAD/282/5.
2Slatin to Wingate, 15 Sep. 1911, SAD/301/3.
3Butler's Journal 1911, SAD/422/12; for details see pp.106-114.
4See for instance Slatin's diary, 1912, SAD/441, (the list is at the end of the diary).
5See Butler's diary, 21 Nov. 1911, SAD/400/10; The Labour Bureau which was organized to deal with freed slaves and to cope with the increased demand for labour, was also under Slatin's supervision. See CAO - 241, 18 Jan. 1905; see also pp.380-397.
slavery were formed during his long service in the Sudan, a country whose economy was largely based on slavery. During the reconquest he stated that he regarded slaves as:

...godforsaken swine [who] do not deserve to be treated like free and independent men...the blacks should be made to remain under the protection of their former masters who were forced to treat them well...²

This attitude prevailed throughout Slatin's inspector-generalship. When 'Alī Dīnār's messenger came to Omdurman in 1902 and sold fifteen female slaves, with the government's full knowledge, Wingate asserted that it '...was based on Slatin's advice...'.³ In 1906, Slatin fully supported a claim by Sayyid al-Makki for the return of his runaway slaves who had been caught in the Nuba mountains.⁴ He was Wingate's champion in his long drawn battle against the Egyptian department for the repression of slavery, until the latter finally became part of the Sudan government.⁵ Slatin realized that in order not to embarrass the government he had to refrain from using the term domestic slaves. In warning one of his subordinates he '...told him that if in an official document I find again that he calls Sudanese servants "slaves" - a finger from his right hand will be cut off...'.⁶

²See Hill, Slatin, pp.103-7.

³Slatin to Bigge, 6 Sep. 1897, SAD/438/653; the letter was sent in reply to a letter written by Bigge to Prince Francis of Teck on 7 Aug. 1897, Ibid; according to Hill, Slatin, pp.55-6, Bigge's letter was a forgery while Slatin's was written in his own hand.


⁵For details see pp.369-380.

⁶Slatin to Wingate, 2 Dec. 1912, SAD/183/3.
Despite his excessive freedom of expression Slatin's views did not differ from those of Wingate. He regarded domestic slavery as an essential part of the Sudan's economy and used all his influence to discourage runaway slaves.

**Darfur.**

Darfur, to all intents and purposes, was independent under Sultan 'Ali Dinar until its conquest in 1916. Its major problems during that period were its western borders which were threatened by the advancing French. Slatin, as the last general-governor of Darfur in the Turco-Egyptian Sudan, was regarded as the greatest living authority in its history and was entrusted with all its administrative problems. The principles underlying the relationship between Sudan and Darfur were laid down by Cromer in March 1900 when he vetoed Wingate's suggestion that the British flag should be hoisted in Darfur. Cromer insisted that the administration of Darfur from Khartoum would be costly, useless and inefficient, and that 'Alii

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1 In 1900, Slatin wrote a memorandum on conditions in the Sudan. One of his suggestions was to release from the army all slaves who could be induced to return to their masters in order to increase cultivation; Slatin to Wingate, 21 Jan. 1900, FO 78/5026. In 1901 Slatin again urged a firmer handling of runaway slaves. 'Notes Dongola', Slatin's diary 1901, SAD/441.

2 It is not intended to describe the problems of Darfur during 'Ali Dinar's rule; this account will be limited to questions affecting the Sudan, which were dealt with by Slatin. For a full account see A.B. Theobald, 'Ali Dinar.'

3 Wingate to Cromer, 27 Mar. 1900, FO 78/5087.
Dīnār should be left in peace. This policy was endorsed by the British government and was duly carried out by Slatin and Wingate.

Slatin's first aim was to establish cordial relations with Darfur which he hoped to achieve by visiting the country. 'Alī Dīnār thought differently, and wrote to Wingate: '...not to send Slatin who, owing to his personality, would do more harm in Darfur than the Khalifa did...'. In fact, no senior official of the Sudan government, was allowed into Darfur during 'Alī Dīnār's reign. Communications with Darfur were carried on by messengers and were conducted by Slatin until his retirement. His basic policy was not to interfere in Darfur's internal affairs. The Arab tribes of Darfur, such as the Maʾāliya and the Rizayqāt, who were constantly harassed by the Fūr army, were driven back across the borders whenever they sought refuge in the Sudan. Slatin only agreed to write to 'Alī Dīnār advising

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1. Cromer to Salisbury, 29 Mar. 1900, Ibid; Sanderson to Cromer, 13 Apr. 1900, Ibid.

2. During 1901 Wingate claimed that Darfur's independence was a threat to the Sudan, Wingate to Cromer, 3 Mar. 1901, FO 141/364.

3. Wingate to Cromer, 3 Mar. 1901, Ibid.

4. Theobald, 'Alī Dīnār, pp. 39-42; In 1908 a rumour was spread in the British press that Slatin had been captured in Darfur by 'Alī Dīnār, The Times, 5 May 1908; In his last letter to Slatin, 'Alī Dīnār reiterated his hopes that, god willing, their long awaited meeting will soon take place. See Lewis to Slatin (quoting 'Alī Dīnār's letter), 14 July 1914, SAD/434/228.

5. See Theobald, 'Alī Dīnār, pp. 45-50; 126-133; There were only few exceptions made to this rule. In 1901 a section of the Maʾāliya was allowed to settle in the Sudan, provided they leave the border region; SIR - 87, Oct. 1901; in 1913-4 a section of the Zayālīya who fled to Kordofan were forced to move to central Kordofan owing to Slatin's insistence. Theobald, 'Alī Dīnār, pp. 133-6.
him to adopt a more lenient tribal policy. Yet, concurrently, he ordered the Darfur tribes to obey their ruler. 'Ali Dīnār was paying a yearly tribute to the Sudan government, and was in Slatin's view immune from any interference in his internal affairs. Thus Slatin, who implemented a policy of free immigration into the Sudan from all the neighbouring states, insisted on this very rigid attitude towards the tribes of Darfur.

Numerous clashes also occurred between the nomadic tribes of Kordofan and the Bahr al-Ghazāl, and between tribes from Darfur and its army. In 1903 the Kordofan-Darfur border was agreed upon by Slatin and 'Ali Dīnār's cousin, and though border incidents persisted they were somewhat easier to control.

Several Mahdist amīrs who escaped from the Sudan found refuge in Darfur. Ostensibly the Sudan government had a right to demand their

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1 See for instance Mudir Kordofan to Ali Dīnār, 25 Sep. 1901, SIR-87, Oct. 1901, Appendix 'A'.

2 A special 'Ali Dīnār Fund' was founded in 1901 to absorb Darfur's yearly tribute. It was managed by Slatin and was used for expenses outside the regular budget. See Slatin to Wingate, 28 July 1914, SAD/273/1; see also Theobald, 'Ali Dīnār, pp.42-3, 77-80.

3 Ibid, p.70.

4 Butler's diary, 21 Nov. 1911, SAD/400/10; Slatin who initiated Butler into intelligence work, explained to him that immigration from all neighbour states was to be encouraged as it proved how good the Sudan government was. As for Darfur, all immigrants were to be forced back, due to their stealing cattle.

5 Theobald, 'Ali Dīnār, pp.67-9; SIR - 149, Dec. 1906.
extradition, or at least to be consulted regarding their fate.

Slatin, however, advised Wingate not to interfere, and when Karamallāh Kurqušāwī was executed by 'Alī Dīnār in 1903, he advised Wingate against any official censure. Darfur affairs were, thus, conducted by Slatin without undue interference by Wingate or by other British officials.

c. Slatin's tribal policy and his relations with non-British personnel.

In 1902, all the provincial governors were instructed that matters concerning nomad Arab tribes were to be dealt with by Slatin. Yet the difference between nomad and sedentary tribes was in many cases obscure, so that Slatin in fact assumed full responsibility for almost all tribal affairs, including appointments of shaykhs, tribal justice, land ownership and taxation.

During his first year in office Slatin fixed the tribute of the tribes in Kassala, Dongola, Berber, Khartoum and Fashoda. In 1901 Slatin ruled that all people who had lived in Nahud for over three years were to keep their lands and a third of their tebeldi trees.

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1Muḥammad Khālid Zuqāl and Muḥammad Ḫūṭmān Ḫūṭmān surrendered to 'Alī Dīnār in 1901, 'Arabī Dafāallaḥ surrendered in 1902 and in 1909 Fakīr Sanīn, was killed in action in Kabkabiyya. Theobald, 'Alī Dīnār, pp.54, 75-6; see also STIR-88, Nov. 1901; STIR-98, Sep. 1902; STIR-107, June 1903; STIR-176, Mar. 1909.

2CAO - 64, 17 Apr. 1902; for details about tribal policy see pp. 290-331.

3Slatin's diary, 1900, SAD/441.

4Tebeldi trees were used for storing water in the arid areas of western Kordofan and Darfur. H.S.Blunt, 'Tebeldis', SNR - Vol. 6 (1923), pp.114-116.
even if the previous land owners were to return. Following a tour of Kordofan in 1902, Slatin instructed the Hawazma to run a regular post service in the provinces; he lowered the ushr fixed by the governor and recommended that provincial governors should be enabled to spend a certain amount of money without the prior consent of the financial secretary. In 1903, Slatin forwarded a plan for the complete reorganization of the tribal administration in al-Qadarif, where hundreds of villages, scattered over vast areas, were supervised by a single nazir. A year later, Slatin telegraphed Henry, who was acting governor-general in Wingate's absence, to open the southern provinces to traders. He further objected to Shayqíya soldiers participating in patrols in the south as they were known to be slave-

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1 SIR - 82, May 1901, p.6. This order caused widespread dissatisfaction among the Hamar tribe, who had deserted their lands during the Mahdia.

2 The Hawazma, a Baqqara tribe, were among the tribes who joined the Mahdi before the siege of El Obeid. Holt, Mahdist State, pp.51-2; see also H.A.MacMichael, A history of the Arabs in the Sudan (2nd impression London 1967), Vol.1., pp.280-4.

3 Notes on Kordofan, Slatin's diary 1902, SAD/441; Slatin further complained about the high assessment of ushr at al-Masalamiya in 1903; see Slatin to Wingate, 26 Jan. 1903, SAD/273/1.


5 Slatin to Wingate, 18 July 1904, SAD/275/5. When Matthews, governor of the Upper-Nile, did not comply with this order, Wingate told Henry to send him on leave; see Wingate to Henry, 4 Sep. 1904, SAD/275/7.
raiders and hence were feared by the local tribes. Slatin's system in dealing with turbulent tribes was by collective punishment. He ordered members of the tribe to be arrested at random and kept in prison until the whole tribe paid the fine. He believed that the best way to deal with rebels was by martial law. He wrote after the Gezira rebellion that "...if our rebels... would have been - tried by martial law - I would have hanged them before anybody in Europe would have known that they were under trial..."

Slatin was also concerned with the protection of Sudanese landowners from land speculators and profiteers. He demanded that the government should develop pump irrigation on the Nile as he feared that "...small Greeks" come in with pumps to take the whole profit..." These worries were clearly expressed when Slatin pointed out the dangers of the 'Zeidab Concession' in Dongola to local landowners.

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1Henry to Wingate, 29 July 1904, SAD/275/5; telling him of Slatin's veto. Slatin later waived his objection, as the only alternative was to cancel the whole expedition, and he agreed that '...fear is better than love...'; Slatin to Wingate, 8 Sep. 1904, SAD/275/7.

2Slatin to Wingate, 19 Mar. 1906, SAD/278/3.

3Slatin to Wingate, 13 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/3.

4Slatin to Wingate, 19 Mar. 1907, SAD/280/3.

5For details of this concession, which was granted to an American capitalist, Leigh Hunt in 1904, see Gaitskell, Gezira, pp. 51-5.
The result will be that the Jaalin will evacuate their Sakiehs and work for the comp. Before long they will sell their lands for which they cannot pay the taxes and instead of land owners they will become tenants. It pays a man more to work where water and seed is supplied instead to worry behind his own Sakieh.

These convictions should have brought Slatin to support the leasehold system which was proposed by Currie for the town lands of Omdurman in order to avoid speculation. Slatin, however, opposed the scheme on the ground that leasehold was unpopular among the inhabitants of the Sudan.

By and large, Slatin seems to have favoured tradition and to have tried to restore the tribes to their position in pre-Mahdist times. This applied to tribal customs as well as to the choice of personnel. Slatin appointed nazirs and shaykhs whose families had proved loyal and whom he had known personally, rather than the men favoured by the local British officials. Bashür Kanbal, was a cause for bitter friction between Slatin and the British officials in Kordofan. Bashür, of Shāyyqi origin, had served with Slatin in Darfur in 1877 and was appointed after the reconquest as mu'awin.

1. Sakieh (ṣāqiya) - a wheel placed alongside the river and driven by oxen in order to lift the water for irrigation.

2. Slatin to Wingate, 17 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/4. In 1913 Slatin again interfered on behalf of the tenants at the Taybiya farm and succeeded to increase their share of the crop. See Slatin's diary, 4 Dec. 1913, SAD/441.

3. GGC, 10 Feb. 1910, FO 867/3; see also pp. 356-357.

4. See for instance K. D. D. Henderson, Some notes on the history of the tribes living south of Wadi el-Ghala (Typescript n.d.), SAD/478/5; Henderson described how Muḥammad al-FAQĪR was appointed as nazir of the Misirṭya on Slatin's recommendation, despite his toleration of slave raiding. Sir H. MacMichael confirmed these impressions in his interview on 6 June 1967, adding however that Slatin's judgement of men, was as a rule superior to that of his fellow officials.

5. Mu'awin of Arabs, was a special adjutant for Arab affairs.
of the Arabs in Kordofan. Slatin relied on his advice to the exclusion of everyone else, including his British colleagues. The same attitude was adopted towards 'Abd al-Rahīm Abū-Daqlal who, as minor Mahdist amīr, received a letter of amnesty from Slatin in September 1898, and was appointed nāẓir of the Ghara'yīyya branch of the Ḥamar. Despite the complaints that were levied against Abū-Daqlal by British inspectors, Slatin stood firmly by him. In certain cases he also disregarded the authority of his nominees within their own tribes. He appointed 'Abdās Rahmatallāh as shaykh of the Jaʿaliyyīn in Omdurman, despite widespread opposition from his tribe.

Slatin's special regard for his fellow-prisoners in Omdurman was clearly proved by the letters of recommendation he gave them. Following their appointments Slatin regarded their welfare as his responsibility. He insisted that the remuneration of the tribal

1See for instance Slatin's diary, 28 Mar. 1900, SAD/441, where he wrote that he told O'Connel, one of the first inspectors in Kordofan, not to do anything without Bashīr Kanbāl's advice; Willis's diary, 1 Mar. 1909, SAD/210/2; see also Willis to O., 6 June 1909, SAD/209/1, Willis wrote that the trouble between the Misirīyya and Ḥumr tribes of Kordofan '...was got up by a gang of Slatin's followers...encouraged by Bashir Bey our so called Mamur of Arabs, who is Slatin's chief star in Kordofan...'

2Rāhmatallāh, 'Note on the History of the Hamar Tribe of Western Kordofan', (1932), SAD/478/5/2; see also Hill, BD, p.15.

3SIR - 86, Sep. 1901.

4Hill, BD, p.2.

5Ferguson to Wingate, 3 June 1902, SAD/272/4/1, reporting that Slatin refused to receive the petitions against Rahmatallāh.

6Slatin to MacMichael, 21 Mar. 1909, recommending Shaykh al-Khiqr Wad al-Turkī; see also Slatin to MacMichael, 24 Mar. 1913, recommending Ahmad Muhammad al-Badawi; both of them were his former fellow prisoners, SAD/403/6/2.
shaykhs and 'umdas was not adequate. By 1907, shaykhs were paid for assessing 'ushr, and in 1912, the general remuneration of all tribal tax collectors was raised. In both cases this was done following demands made by Slatin. He also strongly urged Wingate to abolish the old Ottoman custom which still prevailed in the Sudan, whereby all Sudanese had to dismount when meeting an officer.

...the respectable Sudan merchant, Sheikh and Omdeh - hopps like a fly - up and down, because...if he rides to the streets of Khart and Omdurman he is bound to meet officers. If you agree I would find a suitable working in your name to do away with this old Turkish custom.

There was, however, a certain ambiguity in this attitude.

Slatin trusted his nominees but mistrusted the Sudanese generally,

...Sudanese are always...scoundrels - if they are not under control and under Kurbatsh the [sic] go wrong... Hence he insisted that a British officer should be in charge of Sinkât during the summer months... and not leave thousands of subjects to the mercy of Mohammed Bey Ahmed - although your favourite he is only native.

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1 'Umda (pl. 'umad; English form - 'umdas); village headman, administrative head of a number of villages.

2 Slatin's diary, Notes 1907, SAD/441.

3 GGC, 27 May 1912, PO 867/3; in his demands Slatin did not limit himself to shaykhs but looked after the welfare of the Sudanese policemen and ma'dhūns as he put it to Wingate, '...we have to do something for the little man...'; Slatin to Wingate, 27 Jan. 1903, SAD/273/1; see also Slatin's diary, Notes 1907, SAD/441; for details see pp. 313-15.

4 Slatin to Wingate, 10 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/1; according to Hill, Slatin, p.81, a similar suggestion was made by Slatin in 1903.

5 Kurbāj, a whip usually made of hippopotamus hide, used for punishing offenders.

6 Slatin to Wingate, 27 Jan. 1903, SAD/273/1.

7 Slatin to Wingate, 14 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.
An interesting side-light on Slatin's traditional approach was shown in a memorandum he sent to all provincial governors, warning them against the excessive freedom of the young generation. He instructed the governors to explain to local parents that they were responsible for their children until the age of eighteen, even should it entail '...giving a good licking to lazy boys and bad girls...' 1

In his mistrust of the Egyptian personnel Slatin did not differ largely from his British colleagues. Yet, at the same time he tried to be fair and to support them whenever they had a genuine grievance 2. This was well expressed in a letter to Wingate, where Slatin complained about a British administrator at Kassala.

...His [the British official] main work was to spy after Egyptian officers and to impress on natives, that we consider all Egyptians "scoundrels"...I am the last to trust a gypsy - but we have to pluck them up as long as nothing is against them... 3

This attitude prevailed when, in 1908, the Egyptian officers wished to open a club in Khartoum. The intelligence department opposed the project as they feared subversive propaganda. Slatin convinced Wingate that there was no harm in the club as '...Arabs can never keep secrets...' and that the inherent suspiciousness of the British

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2 See for instance Slatin's diary, June 1901, SAD/441, where he reported favourably on the Egyptian mā'mūrs at al-Rusayris; see also Slatin to Wingate, 30 Nov. 1902, SAD/272/8, where he asked for Wingate's assistance for one of the Egyptian employees at Kodok; see also Note-Singa in Slatin's diary 1913, SAD/441, where he complained that one of the Egyptian officials in Sennar had not been promoted for six years.

3 Slatin to Wingate, 16 February 1903, SAD/273/2.
officials should not be taken too seriously. Slatin also devised a plan encouraging Egyptian officers to settle in the Sudan by selling them land at a special reduced rate.

On the other hand Slatin's mistrust of Egyptians led him to oppose their being entrusted with too much responsibility, '...I have nothing special against Mah. H. |Mahmūd Ḥusayn| who is a hard working clever man - but it is my old complaint that he runs too much of the show...'. Basically, therefore, Slatin regarded both Sudanese and Egyptians as untrustworthy unless kept under strict control. Slatin's mistrust was reciprocated by the Egyptians and Sudanese; perhaps an inevitable repercussion. Wingate, who was aware of this, explained to Cromer that Slatin '...is unpopular with native officers whose maladministrative practices he fearlessly discloses...'. Butler, of the intelligence department, felt that the mistrust for Slatin was of a more general nature: '...He was not popular among the Sudanese as he was supposed to show favouritism to his pals among the tribes, and I dont think they trusted him...'.

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1 Slatin to Wingate, 28 Aug. 1908; see also Wingate to Amery, 31 Aug. 1908, where he repeats Slatin's arguments and tells Amery to support the club, SAD/283/8/3.

2 Slatin to Wingate, 19 Mar. 1907, SAD/280/3.

3 Slatin to Wingate, 30 Nov. 1902, SAD/272/8.

4 Wingate to Cromer (secret), 17 Jan. 1902, FO 141/371.

5 Butler's Journal, 1911, SAD/422/12; this did not stop Slatin from accusing Wingate of favouritism to his own nominees, '...Do you think that action like this increase your prestige as the head of the Government who should be impartial...'; see Slatin to Wingate, 20 Dec. 1913, SAD/104/6.
by saying that many Muslims rejected Slatin as a renegade who had changed his religion twice for reasons of political expediency 1.

While these were Slatin's main spheres of action, he rendered his advice in nearly every other field. In 1906 he advised establishing a separate governorship of the Nuba mountains 2. In 1910 the reorganization of the department of agriculture and lands was based on Slatin's suggestion 3. Even speeches by British personalities visiting the Sudan were prepared by Slatin. He suggested the main points for Cromer's speech to the 'Sheikhs and Notables' in 1900 4, and dictated to Wingate's secretary, his ideas for the King's speech to be delivered during George V's visit to the Sudan in 1912 5.

d. Slatin's relations with Wingate and with British officials.

Slatin's unique position was largely responsible for his relations with his fellow officials. He was an Austrian exercising:

...the second highest authority in a British Administration. His English was peculiar...His practical bent...inclined him to be impatient of academic ideas and gave him a very different

1 Interview with Sir H. MacMichael, 6 June 1967; this seems to be born out by a telegram Slatin received from the 'Union of Murder' in Cairo on the 9 Apr. 1910, in which they threatened to kill him for becoming a Christian. See Slatin's diary, 12 Apr. 1910, SAD/441.

2 GGR - 1906, p. 134. This was turned down owing to shortage of personnel and only in 1914 did the Nuba mountains become a separate province.

3 Slatin to Clayton, 1 Aug. 1910, SAD/297/2.

4 Slatin to Wingate, 26 Nov. 1900, SAD/270/11.

5 Slatin's diary, 29 Nov. 1911, SAD/441; all the points mentioned by Slatin, were in fact incorporated in the speech.
perspective to that of many of his colleagues...¹

Furthermore, many of the provincial governors regarded their own knowledge of local affairs as superior to Slatin's and therefore objected to his supreme authority which was never questioned by Wingate. They accused Slatin of appointing his cronies from the pre-Anglo-Egyptian period as shaykhs and nazirs, positions they did not deserve and which they often abused.² Some criticized his double talk in dealing with the tribes, claiming that he promised the shaykhs one thing while instructing the local inspector in the opposite sense.³

Basically the problem was that the men on the spot felt their authority was undermined by Slatin's interference.⁴ This feeling was apparently shared by both Cromer and Gorst. Following the 'Jackson affair', Cromer blamed Wingate for the '...injudicious manner in which Slatin's services have been utilized...'⁵ Gorst went even

¹Symes, Tour of Duty, (London 1946), p.16.
²See pp.90-1.
³Willis to O., 14 Apr. 1909, SAD/209/1.
⁴Following a tour of Kassala province, Slatin complained of his difficulties with its governor, Henry Pasha, '...Henry accept [sic] almost my advice but he expresses his feeling as follow: Well - I will do what you suggest - but people will say - you ordered me to do so - or why people send petitions to you? I am Mudir and I have to look after them...'Slatin to Wingate, 16 Feb. 1903, SAD/273/2.
Following a complaint from Henry, Wingate gave his full backing to Slatin's advice and added '...I quite understand=the irritation his "shouting down" causes you. I can only say that I also suffer from him in that respect...'Wingate to Henry, 1 Apr. 1903, SAD/273/4.
⁵Cromer to Lansdowne, 19 Jan. 1902, FO 633/6.
further in asserting, '...that it is, of course, quite impossible to get a man of his | Slatin's | character to understand the point of view of the British public...'.

Slatin was well aware of these views but they did not inhibit him from criticizing his British colleagues, both military and civil, whenever necessary. Following one of the frequent revolts in the Nuba mountains Slatin complained that the British officers had no inkling as to the real situation in their district. In 1909 he complained that the governor of Kassala '...had not seen notables of Berbera awlad Ahmed for two years...Never accepts any complaints... nobody is allowed to come near him and order is given to drive away natives attempting to talk or to reach him...'. Even more humiliating were Slatin's charges that some of his British colleagues were acting with undisguised injustice. He denounced them for administering public lashings to local dignitaries without adequate reason, and complained to Wingate that '...it isn't pleasant to justify or to defend an action of a comrade publicly which one had to condemn

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1 Gorst to Grey (private), 31 May 1908, FO 800/47; this letter was written following Slatin's views about the Gezira rebellion. Bonham Carter and Gurrie whose criticism of the British government's policy was even more blatant, were not accused for their un-British character.

2 Slatin to Wingate, 4 June 1906, SAD/278/6.

3 'Notes on Kassala', Slatin's diary 1909, SAD/441.
secretly...\(^1\)

On another occasion Slatin condemned a military action in the Nuba mountains insisting that it was undertaken for no better reason than to satisfy the British commandant's dislike of the local shaykh\(^2\). Even worse was the case near al-Qadārīf, when the local näẓīr was imprisoned, his wives ill-treated, and the whole village evacuated, for no adequate reason whatsoever. Slatin promptly reinstated the näẓīr and blamed the British officer for a miscarriage of justice\(^3\).

Despite these numerous incidents Slatin on the whole preferred the British officers to their fellow civilians with whom he failed to find a common language. He expressed his doubts about civilian employees when the suggestion of their employment was first made\(^4\). He vetoed the suggestion that Kerr\(^5\) should be appointed as the first

\(^1\) Slatin to Wingate, 19 Dec. 1908, SAD/284/12/2; Slatin's complaint was against the governor of Kordofan, who had ordered the son of the näẓīr of Bara to be lashed publicly; see also Slatin's diary, 20 Dec. 1908, SAD/441, where he complained that a tribesman in Kordofan had been lashed to death by order of the British inspector.

\(^2\) Slatin's diary, 6 Nov. 1910, SAD/441.

\(^3\) Slatin to Wingate, 20 Dec. 1913, SAD/104/6.

\(^4\) Slatin to Wingate, 4 Jan. 1900, SAD/276/10.

\(^5\) Kerr, Graham Campbell (1872-1913), joined the Sudan civil service in 1901, with the first group of British civilians recruited from universities. Following eight years service as an inspector in the Red Sea and Sennar provinces, he was appointed in 1909 as governor of the Red Sea province, the first civilian governor in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Hill, *BD*, p.198.
civilian governor in the Sudan and as a result the appointment was postponed for another year. Slatin constantly clashed with the senior civilian officials. He had no patience for their academic approach or for their insistence on an abstract form of justice which held no meaning whatsoever for Slatin. He criticized them for their 'stand offish' attitude towards the Sudanese, and never failed to mention their shortcomings. In 1910 Slatin wrote: "...I have been at the Damer Show [a yearly agricultural display]...I was rather sick that not one of the Civilians - who are so proud of their "liberal education" - ...thought it is worth while to go..." His opinion of the civilians was concisely expressed when he wrote:

"...The Red flag for all civilians under C & B Currie and Bonham Carter guidance! I wish I would have got a "liberal education" to be able to be useful and improve the situation..." Needless to say Slatin regarded his own usefulness as more than adequate and

1 Slatin to Wingate, 15 Mar. 1908, BLD/282/3/1.

2 See for instance Slatin's statement about Hasan 'Āmir ?, n.d. Dec. 1904?!, SAD/439/640, where he complained that Sterry, the chief judge, had no right to interfere in the dismissal of a certain 'Umda and was even less justified in criticising Slatin's decisions.

3 Slatin to Wingate, 20 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/1; see also Slatin to Wingate, 27 Mar. 1910, Ibid, where he reported that all the military officers attended the Mawlid al-Nabi, but not one civilian.

4 Ibid; Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, (1870-1956), was appointed first legal secretary of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in 1899 and held that post until 1917 when he was transferred to Iraq.
looked upon a 'liberal education' as an obstacle rather than an asset. Wingate, however, hardly relied on Slatin's advice concerning his British personnel, and the volume of Slatin's complaints in this field adequately bears this out\(^1\). The lack of complaints in other fields proves yet another fact, namely, that apart from personnel and finances, Slatin's advice was generally accepted\(^2\).

During his fourteen years as inspector-general Slatin contemplated resignation more than once. In 1906 Wingate overcame his threat by sending him on a long holiday and assuring him of his absolute confidence in his advice\(^3\). In 1908, Slatin sent Wingate an official letter of resignation on the grounds that the clemency extended to the Gezira rebels would endanger the Sudan\(^4\). Following a strong appeal from Wingate Slatin again withdrew his resignation stressing that he did so for Wingate's sake only\(^5\).

\(^1\)See for instance Slatin to Wingate, 28 Nov. 1902; Wingate to Slatin, 22 Dec. 1902, SAD/272/8; see also Slatin to Wingate, 21 Mar. 1913, SAD/185/3/1, where Slatin complained that by doing away with the Selection Board, Wingate had become a virtual dictator. In 1913 Slatin compiled a list of his complaints under the heading W [Wingate], most of which were concerned with problems of personnel; see Slatin's diary, 1913, SAD/441.

\(^2\)In the field of finances, Slatin apparently knew his shortcomings and hardly interfered. He complained, however, when the £3m. British guaranteed loan was announced in the Sudan Gazette, without his previous knowledge; see Slatin's diary 1913, (list of complaints at the end of diary), SAD/441.

\(^3\)Wingate to Slatin, 28 Mar. 1906, SAD/431/11.

\(^4\)Slatin to Hakim \(\text{Hakim 'Am}: the Egyptian term for governor-general\), 2 June 1908?, SAD/451/124.

\(^5\)Wingate to Slatin, 3 June 1908; Slatin to Wingate, 4 June 1908?, SAD/451/124.
The high regard in which Wingate held Slatin was expressed when he wrote to Stack: "...As for Slatin I look upon him as a very privileged person and his value to the Sudan Govt. is so enormous that I am quite ready to sacrifice my "Amour propre", for him..." Yet it was Slatin's 'very privileged' position which caused most of the difficulties. Here he was, a single Austrian in an Anglo-Egyptian administration, with a greater impact on policy making than any other official. He was consulted by Wingate on nearly all problems of Sudan administration, and in the majority of cases his opinions became government policy. It is true that Wingate also asked for the advice of his fellow British officials but in most cases they were only consulted regarding their immediate spheres of responsibility.

The explanation of Slatin's authority lies in a number of factors. His vast experience of Sudan affairs; his fearless criticism, and his position as inspector-general which enabled him, alone among government officials, to gain an overall view of the country's administration. Yet all this does not explain the unlimited trust Wingate had in Slatin. To understand it one would have to study the characters of these two men who, above all else, were the closest of friends for nearly four decades.

¹Wingate to Stack, 4 June 1908, SAD/284/13.
Slatin was first and foremost a man of worldly wisdom and of highly practical bent. He, like Wingate, had little patience for the theoretical manipulations and sophisticated arguments of his fellow civilians. But equally he discarded the purely military approach to administrative problems. Both Slatin and Wingate regarded themselves as the bearers of civilization and progress to the unprivileged people of the Sudan. They treated the penetration of Egyptian nationalism into the country as a great calamity. Even in their personal tastes they were very much alike. Their love of pomp and state and their high esteem for royalty were a standing joke in Sudan government circles.

It was as a result of their similarity of views and characters, combined with the high esteem in which they held each other, that Slatin and Wingate worked in close collaboration throughout Slatin’s service in the Sudan and remained close friends after his resignation in 1914.
Chapter III.

Government departments and provinces.

The administration of the Sudan was established during the Wingate era. Some of the central government departments had existed prior to the reconquest, within the Egyptian army, and were later transferred to the Sudan government. Others were established when their services were required and the meagre Sudan budget could support them. Provincial administration also evolved gradually. From 1899 to 1916 the number of provinces increased from eight to fifteen through the extension of territory and the subdivision of existing provinces.

At the top of the administrative hierarchy was the governor-general followed by Slatin, the inspector-general. The Sudan agent in Cairo, who was also head of intelligence, served as a liaison between the Sudan and Egypt and was selected from Wingate's confidants. At the head of the central administration in Khartoum were the financial, legal and civil secretaries, followed by the directors of the other departments and the provincial governors. A brief account of some of these departments will have to suffice. Only those whose duties had a direct bearing on administrative policy will be more fully discussed in later chapters.

1 According to the 1907 scale of salaries the inspector-general was at the top, followed by the financial secretary with £E 2500 per annum. The other departmental heads and governors were divided into three categories: category 'A' - the legal and financial secretaries £E 1500-1800 p.a.; category 'B' - the civil secretary and the directors of education, public works, agriculture and forests, railway and steamers, £E 1200-1500 p.a.; category 'C' - the Sudan agent, the directors of the remaining departments, and the provincial governors, £E 1080-1200 p.a.; 'Secret memorandum' - 1907, SAD/157/7.
The post of inspector-general ceased to exist in 1914, following Slatin's resignation.  

The Labour Bureau was set up in 1905, CAO - 241, 18 Jan. 1905.  

Up to 1910 there was a department for agriculture and lands and a department for woods and forests. In 1910 they were merged, and the lands section became part of the legal department; GGR - 1 Nov. 1910, FO 867; SS - 190, 5 Jan. 1911.  

The customs department was established in 1905 as an independent department and was affiliated to the financial secretary's office in 1914; CAO - 245, 18 Jan. 1905; Wingate to Clayton, 15 Dec. 1913, SAD/469/5; GGR - 3 Mar. 1914, FO 867/5.  

The prisons and police became part of the civil secretary's office in 1905; see CAO - 230, 12 Dec. 1904.  

The stores became part of the civil secretary's department in 1904 when the controller's department was abolished. CAO - 229, 12 Dec. 1904.  

Until 1904 it was a military department. The civil department established in 1904 was only in charge of the Northern provinces, while the South remained under the Egyptian army. GGR - 1904, p.63.  

Up to the end of 1906 the Egyptian army works department was responsible for public works. In 1907 a separate public works department was established. GGR - 1906, p.59.  

The steamers department was transferred from the Egyptian army in 1902; SS - 31, Jan. 1902. Up to 1909 it was called the steamers and boats department; SS - 147, Jan. 1909.  

Up until 1 Jan. 1910 this department was attached to the Egyptian ministry of Interior. In 1911 it became a central Sudan government department. Wingate to Gorst (secret), 6 Dec. 1910, SAD/298/2.  

The White Nile province was founded in 1905; SS - 69, 1 Jan. 1905.  

Mongalla province was founded in 1906 from the Bor and Mongalla districts of the Upper Nile province; GGR - 1906, p.707. In 1910 part of the Lado enclave was annexed to Mongalla.  

Kongalla province was founded in 1906 from the Bor and Mongalla districts of the Upper Nile province; GGR - 1906, p.707. In 1910 part of the Lado enclave was annexed to Kongalla.  

Up to 1905 it was called the Gezira province; SS - 69, 1 Jan. 1905; the Gezira province was formed in 1902 out of the southern half of Khartoum province. CAO - 66, 1 May 1902.  

The Bahr al-Ghazal was under military command until 1902, when it was transferred to the civil administration. SS - 34, Apr. 1902.  

The Nuba Mountains province was separated from Kordofan in 1914, GGR - 1914, p.60.  

Suakin was a separate governorate until 10 July 1899, when the Condominium Agreement extended over it. In 1906 its name was changed to the Red Sea province. GGR - 1905, p.55.  

The Upper Nile was called Fashoda district until 1905; SS - 56, Dec. 1903; the name of the town Fashoda, was changed to Kodok.  

During the first years of the Condominium there was a distinction between first class and second class provinces. (muwafaqya and mukaffa). Halfa, Fashoda, and Suakin were second class provinces while all other provinces were first class. SS - 45, 1 Mar. 1903. This distinction appears to have been discontinued in the later years.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY

British War Office

The Khedive

Egyptian War Office

Sirdar

Military Secretary

The Adjutant General - Khartoum

Director of Intelligence - Cairo

Deputy Director of Intelligence - Khartoum

Sinai

Ludiriya

Egyptian Army Departments

medical veterinary recruiting education ordnance & armament stores works supplies

Commanders of Military Districts

Blue Nile

Dongola

Kassala

Khartoum

Kordofan

Nuriyya

Red-Sea

Bahr-al-Ghazal

Halfa

Khartoum

Monriyya

Upper-Nile

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1. CGS - 1906; see also Asser to Wingate, 16 August 1911, SAD/301/3.
a. The Sudan agent and the intelligence department.

The intelligence department of the Egyptian army existed many years prior to the reconquest and Wingate acted as D.M.I. from 1889 until he became governor-general. After the battle of Karari most of the staff of the intelligence department was transferred to Khartoum, while the head of intelligence remained in Cairo and bore the additional title of Sudan agent.

The duties of the Sudan agent and his relations with other departments were formulated in several circulars during the years 1903-1910. The 1903 circular stated:

...The Sudan agent will broadly be the channel of communication between the outer world and the Civil Administration of the Sudan Government...He will be the channel between the Sudan and the various offices of the Egyptian Ministries and the Army of Occupation...He will be the sole channel between the Departments of the Sudan Government...and the British Agent and Consul General...

As for the intelligence department, the Sudan agent was required only

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1 See p.27; for details see R. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, pp.81-127.

2 Until 1903 the Sudan agent was Count Gleichen whose official title was 'Assistant Civil Secretary and Sudan Agent'. In 1903, the title was changed to Agent General and since 1905 it reverted to Sudan agent. CAO - 101, 30 Nov. 1903. See also diagrams, pp.104-5.

3 These circulars were quoted in a confidential report on the Sudan Agency submitted by the Sudan agent to the First Secretary of the Residency in Cairo, 27 Oct. 1925, FO 141/448; I have not been able to locate the original circulars. The following details are all from the confidential report.
to keep in close touch with its work. In November 1904, an additional circular delineated the intelligence duties of the department. It emphasized that it was impossible to divorce military work from political-civil considerations. The duties of Cecil, then agent-general, were further defined, and he was entrusted with the supreme command of all troops in Egypt in the sirdar's absence. Throughout all these years the Sudan agency remained part of the civil secretary's office. Only in 1907, during Owen's tenure of office as agent, were the two finally divorced. It was under Stack and Clayton that the Sudan agent achieved an even greater measure of authority.

In 1910, Stack complained that:

...Hitherto many cases have frequently occurred, in which the Sudan Agent, owing to lack of precise information, has been unable to reply at once to enquiries by the British Agency, representatives of the foreign Governments in Cairo, commercial firms and others...

Wingate thereupon ordered that the Sudan agency should become an independent office on lines similar to an agency of a colony. He

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1 Lord Edward Herbert Gascoyne Cecil (1867-1918), fourth son of the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, was seconded to the Egyptian army in 1896 and took part in the Dongola campaign and in the battle of Karari; agent-general 1903-5; under-secretary of state in Egyptian ministry of finance 1905-12; financial adviser 1912-18. DNBS, 1912-21, pp. 101-2.

2 These military duties seem to have disappeared after Cecil's replacement by Owen in 1905.

3 Owen, Roger Carmichael Robert (1866-1941), was seconded to the Egyptian army in 1902 and transferred to the Sudan government in 1903; Sudan agent and director of intelligence 1905-8; governor of Mongalla province 1908-18. Hill, BD, p. 300.

requested his heads of departments to acquaint the agent with all matters of importance so that he may become the sole representative of the Sudan government in Egypt. This order was circulated confidentially to all heads of departments, but was not published for Wingate regarded it "...undesirable to ...draw unnecessary attention to this administrative change...". The Sudan agent thus became the major link between his government and the outside world. His duties included commercial negotiations, the sale and registration of Sudan lands, and the recruiting of officials from other Arabic speaking countries. He was also the legal representative of the Sudan in Egypt and in charge of submitting Sudan government ordinances to the consul-general and the Egyptian authorities.

As head of the intelligence department the duties of the Sudan agent were less numerous, as the department's main work was done in Khartoum. Certain functions were, however, performed in Cairo, where secret agents were employed to gain information about foreign

1 Ibid, pp.5-6.
2 SG - 98, 1 July 1906.
3 SAR - 1902, p.79; see also SG - 24, 1 June 1901.
4 Agent General to Acting Agent, 21 Aug. 1905, FO 141/393; Sudan Agent to Acting Agent, 7 July 1906, FO 141/402.
missions in Egypt. Others spied on Egyptian officers in Cairo in order to ascertain whether they influenced "...native feelings in the Sudan..." During the World War, intelligence work in Cairo increased. Clayton, then Sudan agent, collaborated with Storrs in running the Arab Bureau and was also member of the Headquarters staff. He thus became immersed in the running of the Arab revolt and in intelligence work generally to the exclusion of many of his former activities.

By and large the Sudan agency and intelligence department were ordinary government departments. Their budget was allocated by the

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1 See for instance Owen to Wingate, 22 Apr. 1906; and Owen to Wingate, 25 Apr. 1906, SAD/278/4, where Owen sent Wingate a report on a conversation between his intelligence agent, Najib 'Azurî, and Dr. Oppenheim, ostensibly head of a German scientific mission, but in reality head of the German intelligence service in Egypt. Najib 'Azurî of the intelligence department became private secretary to the Egyptian minister of war in 1912 (Wingate to Cecil (secret), 13 Jan. 1913, SAD/185/1/1). On this evidence it is hard to determine whether this is the same 'Azurî who founded the 'Ligue de la Patrie Arabe' and published a monthly review in Paris during 1907–8. According to S. Haim, Arab Nationalism, (U.S.A. 1962), p. 30, 'Azurî was a shady character and was known to have had connections with the French intelligence.

2 Channer to Wingate, 10 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/2; one of their duties was also to conduct the Arabic examinations for British officials in Egypt; see Kitchener to Grey, 29 June 1912, FO 371/1364.

3 Sir Ronald Storrs became oriental secretary at the British agency in Cairo in 1909 following Harry Boyle's resignation.

4 Wingate to Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 31 Aug. 1916, SAD/201/5; Wingate complained that owing to pressure of work, Clayton had to neglect his duties as Sudan agent and suggested that he should be relieved of his responsibility on the Headquarters Staff.
Sudan government though the Egyptian war office contributed annually for intelligence work carried on in Egypt. The Sudan agent submitted an annual report on his activities. These reports were, however, never published due to the confidential information they contained. The non-confidential parts were included in Wingate's annual memorandum.

The intelligence department in Khartoum was nominally under the Sudan agent and the director of intelligence, Cairo. In reality, however, its work was done by an assistant director in Khartoum under the direct supervision of Slatin. The department received monthly intelligence reports from the provincial governors and from its own agents. These were compiled into official intelligence reports and forwarded to the British war office. The department compiled the Sudan Handbook series and its historical section prepared background material on Sudanese tribes, sufi tarics and other matters of importance. The department was also responsible for the repatriation

1 Maxwell (G.O.C. Egypt) to Wingate (secret), 28 Jan. 1911, SAD/300/1.
2 Owen to Wingate, 7 Apr. 1907, SAD/280/4.
3 Stack to Wingate, 29 Dec. 1909, SAD/289/3.
4 See p. 82.
5 This section was headed since 1913 by MacMichael, who had previously been inspector in the Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces. (Wingate to Phipps, 27 Mar. 1913, SAD/185/3/2); Historical research was also carried out by Na'im Shuqayr, Wingate's right hand man during the Mahdia, who was still on the staff of the intelligence in Cairo; see for instance - Notes on the History of the Magdhubiya - by N. Shoucair, 31 May 1915, SAD/195/7.
of tribes who were dislocated during the Mahdia\(^1\). In 1906 a special labour bureau was established within the intelligence department to cope with domestic slavery and with the growing demand of labour resulting from various development projects. This bureau was put under the direct supervision of Slatin \(\ldots\) who was the eminence girse\(\ldots\)' of the department\(^2\).

The work of the department was carried out by regular staff, mainly composed of Syrians with a Roumanian and a Maltese to undertake special duties. The head agent was an old Sudanese officer and several prominent ex-Mahdists were included on its payroll\(^3\). Part-time employees included the Shaykh of the Fallāta in Omdurman, and many local dignitaries\(^4\).

The routine of intelligence work was vividly described by Butler shortly after he joined the department in 1911:

\[\ldots\text{13th October 1911. I've been in the Intelligence Dept. now about a month and have met quite an interesting lot of people. The Grand Mufti by name Sheikh al Tayyib Hashim... He is I understand quite loyal to the Government and of assistance to us. He is the brother of...Sheikh Abdel Gasim,}\]

\(^1\)\textit{CAO} - 225, 16 Nov. 1904; see also pp. 303-4.

\(^2\)\textit{Butler's Journal}, 1911, SAD/422/12; see also pp. 387-397.

\(^3\)\textit{Butler's diary}, 13 Oct. 1911, SAD/400/10; among those employed was the son of the amīr 'Alī Ahmad, brother of the amīr Ṣāḥib al Māḥmūd; while Muddathir Ibrāhīm, the Khalifa's ex-secretary acted as Slatin's confidential adviser.

\(^4\)Ibid.; see also Slatin to Wingate, 20 Dec. 1913, SAD/104/6, where he tells him that an old friend of his, al-Taj Saʿīd came to Kassala pretending he had to prepare an intelligence report on the tribes and shaykhs of the province. The result was that he received endless presents from the shaykhs, including camels.
Cadi of Wad Medani, a great friend of mine...Sayyid al Mekki al Morgani - Head of the Tajantiya Tarika...I don't think he could be trusted very far, or would be loyaler than suits his convenience or his purse...Omar Eff. Abdullahi, eldest son of the Khalifa, a pleasant young man, dressed in European clothes, intelligent face - He is now in the Fin. Sec's office...Son of Madi Mahdi by name Said Abd al Rahman - a dignified young Arab in Arab dress...I am told (Atiya) that the people of the Sudan revere him and lots go to him at night to be healed...16 October 1911 full morning with Mudassa Muddathir Ibrahim, ex-tutor of Mahdi's sons - A great stand by and confidential advise of Slatin's...20 November. Visited Omdurman and surprised by the poor living conditions of well to do people like the Mufti...21 October, A busy morning with Slatin...He outlined Govt. policy to me...24 October. Interviewed Ismail El Azhari, Kadi of Sennar. A clever powerful man. Was sent away from El-Obeid because he took an important part in the morghanieh tarika dispute...31 October - As always had to go on rounds with various important chiefs and take them to the palace...8 November - Struve sent me down the amount of slave captures up at Roseires and their disposal...3

This description affords a true understanding of the department's daily procedure. It acted as a kind of tourist bureau for provincial leaders visiting the capital. Daily visitors included its own informers in Omdurman as well as religious leaders from other provinces who had been banished from their region for various reasons.

1 Samuel Atiya, a Lebanese, was one of the old employees of the department, and the most experienced of the Khartoum staff. He continued his work in the intelligence department until his retirement in 1928 when his post was given to his nephew Edward Atiyah. See E. Atiyah, An Arab tells his story (London 1946), pp. 156-9.

2 Isma'il Ahmad al-Azharī (1868-1947), was muftī of the Sudan, 1924-32. Isma'il al-Azharī, the President of the Republic of the Sudan, is his grandson. See Hill, BD, p. 184.

3 Butler's diary, October-November 1911, SAD/400/10.

A tour of visits to the notables of Omdurman was part of its routine. The department's aim in these activities was to gauge public opinion in the country which, lacking representative bodies or a free press, had no way of expressing itself. Yet the question remains: how reliable were these local agents' reports, especially as their links with the intelligence department were probably well known.

Wingate's relations with the Sudan agent and the intelligence department were closer than with any of the other departments. Partly this can be understood by his personal inclinations as a one-time D.M.T. and by his belief that intelligence was his most comprehensive yardstick for measuring public opinion. Also, the Sudan agent was Wingate's main link to the outside and apart from his official duties, supplied Wingate with confidential information regarding Egyptian politics and the inner workings of the British agency. Probably with this in mind Wingate selected the Sudan agents. Of the five agents during his tenure of office, three had served as his private secretaries prior to their appointment and one

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1 For many years Wingate tried to establish a direct link with London by appointing a permanent Sudan agent with a special office. However, he succeeded only in establishing a Sudan advertising agency, dealing mainly with commercial affairs; see Wingate to Drage, 23 Mar. 1912, SAD/180/3.

2 See for instance Cecil to Wingate, 1 Mar. 1903, SAD/273/3, where he wrote about the deteriorating relations between Gorst and Cromer. This was especially so, when Clayton became Sudan agent in 1914-16. His correspondence with Wingate during that period goes far beyond his duties as Sudan agent; see SAD/269; SAD/280.
was Wingate's close friend during the Dongola campaign. Apart from their specified duties Wingate consulted them on all major administrative problems and held their advice second only to Slatin's.

Wingate insisted that the Sudan agent should act only on his behalf and not as a free agent in his dealings with the authorities in Egypt. During Clayton's tenure of office Wingate clearly denounced his undue independence and reprimanded him for trying to serve three masters at once. He also disapproved of Clayton signing his own name to his numerous reports instead of using Wingate's, in which case '...more attention would have been paid to your appeals and views which after all emanate in the main from myself...'.

As for the intelligence department in Khartoum Wingate relied on Slatin's views rather than on those of the British assistant director of intelligence. Only after Slatin's resignation in 1914 did the department achieve a more prominent position.

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1 The Sudan agents were: Count Gleichen 1901-3; Lord Edward Cecil 1903-5; Owen 1905-8; Stack 1908-14; Clayton 1914-16. Cecil, Stack, and Clayton were Wingate's private secretaries while Gleichen was one of his closest friends.

2 Wingate's correspondence with the Sudan agents was more voluminous than with anyone else, and covered nearly all aspects of government policy; see the Sudan Correspondence and the Clayton papers in the Sudan Archive, Durham.

3 Wingate to Clayton (private), 13 Sep. 1916, SAD/470/3.
b. The 'three secretaries'.

The financial, legal, and vicil secretaries, were known as the 'three secretaries'. Unlike other directors of departments they were linked closely to the governor-general and acted as his advisers in their respective fields. All three of them had been on the central government board since 1908, and later became ex-officio members of the governor-general's council when it was constituted in 1910. Their respective departments had a direct bearing on the welfare of the Sudanese people, while the civil secretary's office was also responsible for the wellbeing of all government officials.

The personalities of the three secretaries played an important role in moulding their departments and in formulating their relations with the governor-general and with the other government officials. Bernard Pasha, the financial secretary from 1900-23, was a Catholic of Maltese origin, and hence regarded as an outsider by Wingate and by most of the British officials in the Sudan, who attributed his shortcomings to his 'oriental' characteristics.

Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, the legal secretary from 1899-1917, was the only civilian among the three secretaries. Of the senior officials his closest associate was Currie, the director of education, and together they became the spokesmen of the civil element within the Sudan Political Service. In drafting the legal system

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1 The functions of the legal secretary will be discussed in detail in chapter VI, pp. 260-289.
2 See pp. 58-61.
3 See pp. 119-121.
4 See pp. 158-160.
of the Sudan, Bonham Garter enjoyed the assistance of Sterry, the chief judge, and cooperated fully with the grand gādis who served under him.

Of the four civil secretaries who held office during Wingate's governor-generalship, possibly only Phipps (1905-14), greatly affected its character. Phipps was liked by most of his fellow officials but failed to gain much respect owing to the weakness of his character. Wingate regarded Phipps as his liaison officer with the provinces. Consequently, Phipps acted as personnel officer but had little impact on policy making. It was left to Lee Stack, who became civil secretary in 1914, to give greater prominence to the civil secretary's office. Stack, a man of pronounced views and strong character, was in a much better position to assert his personality.

1 Jackson was civil secretary in 1900-1, but was dismissed following the incident in 1902 (see p.75). His successor, Nason, held the post from 1901-5 and was succeeded by Phipps. Stack became civil secretary at the outbreak of the World War in 1914.

2 Phipps was also entrusted with compiling the reports on the provinces for Wingate's annual memorandum. See GHR - 1909, p.126.

3 Phipps character can best be assessed by reading through his correspondence at the Sudan Archive at Durham University. However, there are several more direct references to Phipps shortcomings. In 1910, Slatin wrote to Wingate that despite the latter's dislike for Bernard, he would make a better acting governor-general than Phipps, whose weak character made him unsuitable for the post; Slatin to Wingate, 13 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/1. See also Wingate to Phipps, 6 Mar. 1910, Ibid, where he warned him not to be influenced too easily, while acting as governor-general. In his interview on 6 June 1967, Sir Harold MacMichael confirmed the view that the civil secretary during these years was little more than a personnel officer.
A former Sudan agent and Wingate's private secretary, he enjoyed the latter's confidence and was entrusted with wider responsibility than his predecessors.1

The financial secretary.

The duties performed by the financial secretary were amongst the hardest and most unpopular undertaken by any Sudan government official. As a consequence of being under the direct supervision of both the British financial adviser in Egypt and the governor-general of the Sudan, he was often called upon to reconcile views which were diametrically opposed.2 Harman, the first financial secretary of the Sudan, could not cope with this task and resigned in May 1900.3 He was followed by Colonel Bernard, who held that post until 1923.

1There is little written evidence to prove this, as both Stack and Wingate spent the War years in the Sudan and hence could communicate orally. However, there are a few instances which prove Stack's greater authority. He was in charge of relations with the missionary societies, a task previously held by Wingate. He was also responsible for the appointment and dismissal of tribal chiefs, which had previously been dealt with by Slatin. See for instance Wilson to Wingate, 28 Nov. 1915, SAD/197/2/2; see also Manley (secretary of the C.M.S.) to Stack, 24 Sep. 1915, CMSA/Sudan 1.


3SG - 14, 1 Aug. 1900. In fact it is clear that Harman was dismissed for being unable to cooperate with other senior officials. Jackson, then civil secretary, wrote about him as follows: '...He has no power of organization, is obstinate, and it is very difficult to get any decision from him...He has no manners and cannot work cordially with anyone...'; Jackson to Wingate (private), 1 Apr. 1900, SAD/270/4.
During that period the Sudan increased its revenue from £E 124,500\(^1\) to £E 3,766,133\(^2\). But, even more important, the country's revenue after 1913 exceeded its expenditure, thus achieving economic viability within fourteen years of the reconquest\(^3\).

The duties and powers of the financial secretary were laid down in the 'Finance Circular No 1' in October 1899\(^4\). He was to be responsible for all revenue and expenditure, whether in kind or in money. Every expenditure, even if sanctioned in the budget, had to be authorized by him. Appointments of officials, whether in central government departments or in provinces, had to be authorized by the financial secretary if their monthly salary exceeded £E 5. The controller of stores, who was in charge of all revenue in kind, and who supplied the requirements of all government departments and provinces, was under the direct control of the financial secretary. A special audit office was established in Cairo to which all provincial governors had to send their monthly accounts and vouchers\(^5\).

Soon after Wingate became governor-general he was warned by Maxwell about the excessive powers granted to the financial secretary\(^6\). Consequently, certain functions were transferred from the financial.

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\(^1\)SAR - 1899, p.45.


\(^3\)Ibid, pp.91,122, 198; see also Stone, pp.19-21, 132-5; for an analysis of the Sudan's expenditure and revenue in the years 1899-1913.

\(^4\)SG - 5, 2 Oct. 1899.

\(^5\)SG - 6, 2 Nov. 1899.

\(^6\)Maxwell to Wingate, 6 Jan. 1900, SAD/270/1/2.
secretary to the governor-general. All appointments, except 
and clerks, had to be sanctioned by the governor-general who also 
approved the salaries; the controller of stores had to keep the fin-
ancial secretary informed, but was not to be under his control.  
Finally, applications by provincial governors for loans, had to be 
made directly to the governor-general. Yet despite the curtailment 
of his functions the financial secretary’s sphere of responsibility 
remained second to none, and was described by Cromer as ‘...not only 
the most important but also by far the most arduous in the Soudan...’
He continued to bear responsibility for the Sudan’s budget and was 
thus in a position to object to any expenses or increases in salaries 
if he regarded them as unwarranted or incompatible with the country’s 
finances. Furthermore, the financial secretary’s views on finance 
had more weight in Egypt than those of any other Sudan government

1Sarrāf -cashier, money changer; assisted in the collection of taxes.  
2In 1904 the controller of stores became part of the civil secretary’s 
office, see p.104.  
3SG - 10, 1 Apr. 1900.  
4Cromer to Wingate (private), 20 Apr. 1906, [copy sent to Grey], 
FO 800/46; Cromer’s letter was written in reply to a request by Win-
gate that a C.M.G. should be granted to Bonham Carter and Bernard.  
Cromer suggested that if only one C.M.G. was granted, Bernard should 
receive it and not Bonham Carter.  
5See for instance GGC, 26 Oct 1910; 26 Nov. 1910, FO 867/1, where 
over fifty new appointments, which had previously been approved for 
1911, were cancelled following a request by Bernard; see also GGC, 
29 Apr. 1911; 1–6 May 1911, FO 867/2; where following a suggestion 
by Bernard ‘...all proposals for new appointments or new services...’ 
for 1912, were disallowed.
official including Wingate, so that when the financial secretary opposed a majority decision of the governor-general's council, his views were in some cases accepted by the British consuls-general in preference to those of his colleagues.

Under these circumstances it was hardly surprising that Bernard had strained relations with nearly all the British officials. Though this state of affairs was partly due to Bernard's character, the majority of his difficulties were the direct result of his duties.

It was because of this inherent tension between Bernard and his colleagues that Wingate sought to ease the situation by establishing

1This was well known to Wingate who naturally resented it and wrote to Cecil: '..."Ikey" [Bernard] is at his old game of getting behind me to the Agency and I am naturally determined that his Dago methods shall not upset my relations with our present chief [Kitchener] — as he succeeded in doing with Lord Cromer...!', Wingate to Cecil, (very private and confidential), 20 Dec. 1912, SAD/183/3; (Wingate later asked Stack not to deliver this letter; see Wingate to Stack, 30 Dec. 1912, Ibid.)

2See for instance Gorst to Wingate, 11 Apr. 1908, FO 141/46; see also GGC, 20 Feb. 1912, FO 867/3. Following Bernard's disapproval of a majority decision of the council, Kitchener wrote: '...in view of the facts stated in the dissent recorded by the Financial Secretary, I cannot approve of the decision of the Council with regard to the remission of rents of Government Buildings...'

3There are numerous references to Bernard's disagreeable character in the Sudan Archive, Durham. Wingate was not only fully aware of the situation, but took an active part in referring to Bernard's character in his letters. He explained to Cromer that Bernard could not be promoted beyond his present position '...as a Maltese he would not be tolerated by the British Officers...', Wingate to Cromer, 17 May 1905, SAD/276/3; He complained that Bernard '...cannot see things like any ordinary Englishman...!', Wingate to Corbet, 4 May 1905, Ibid. Furthermore, Bernard was excluded from acting as sirdar and governor-general during Wingate's absence, although he was senior to those selected by Wingate; see Wingate to Slatin, 5 Mar. 1910, SAD/431/11, to which Slatin replied: '...it isn't necessary to make unnecessary statements to hide something else — the main reason is — you don't like Bernard...!', Slatin to Wingate, 13 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/1.
the Central Economic Board in 1906, and the Central Government Board in 1908. Unfortunately this move did little to ease the friction

When in 1914 Wingate decided to alter the regulations about financial control in the Sudan, he referred to Bernard's 'amour propre' as one of the major considerations.

...Hitherto, and in most financial questions as between Egypt and the Sudan, the anomalous position of the Financial Secretary...has always been a factor on which I have had to bestow an almost unnecessary amount of consideration...

However, The World War intervened and the situation remained unchanged. Despite the general criticism, the overall impression of the financial department is one of efficiency and purpose. It remained throughout one of the most centralized departments in the Sudan and gave little scope to the initiative of individual governors or heads of departments.

The civil secretary.

The civil secretary's office underwent several changes during its first few years of existence. Until 1903 the Sudan agent was assistant civil secretary, and much of the work was done at his office in Cairo.

In 1904 the controller's department became a section of

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1 When Bernard attended the Central Government Board's meeting for the first time, Wingate wrote that despite the fact that '...it lasted from ten till three...I am confident that this Board will save a great deal of trouble and unnecessary friction...', Wingate to Stack, n.d., Nov. 1908?, SAD/284/13.

2 Wingate to Stack (private), 25 April 1914, SAD/190/1/2.

3 See pp. 138-141.

4 See for instance Gleichen to Wingate, 17 July 1902, SAD/272/5/2. From 1903-5 the civil secretary was called secretary-general, SG - 53, 1 Nov. 1903; Wingate to Cromer, 10 Apr. 1905, SAD/276/4.
the civil secretary's office\(^1\) and the department of prisons and police was also incorporated under an assistant director\(^2\).

The civil secretary was nominally in charge of the provinces and had to sift the governors' requests before submitting them to the other departments\(^3\). His office controlled the movements of foreigners into the Sudan, and issued permits to trade in restricted provinces\(^4\). It was also responsible for supplying dhurra to needy districts\(^5\). Even requests for the erection of new pumps on the Nile, which required a permit from the Egyptian public works department, had to be sifted by the civil secretary\(^6\). His main responsibility, however, was in the field of government personnel. Any demands for transfers made by the governors, heads of departments, and other individual

\(^1\)CAO - 229, 12 Dec. 1904.

\(^2\)SAR - 1904, p.132; this was in line with the general trend of decentralization.

\(^3\)See for instance Phipps to Wingate, 15 July 1907, SAD/288/2; Phipps informed Wingate that he had received the lists of requirements and proposals from the governors.

\(^4\)SG - 64, 1 July 1904; the restricted areas included the southern provinces. See also pp.240-2.

\(^5\)See for instance Phipps to Wingate, 27 Aug. 1905, SAD/277/2, where Phipps suggested that the government should accept \textit{ushr} on dhurra, in kind, as it is required by the army and the provinces; See also Jackson to Slatin, 30 June 1914, SAD/452/276, where Jackson complained that despite his repeated appeals to the civil secretary, nothing was being done to alleviate the plight of his famine-stricken province (Dongola).

\(^6\)SG - 52, 1 Oct. 1903.
officials, had of necessity to be directed to him\(^1\). Following consultations with Wingate these proposals were then brought to the permanent appointments and promotions board. Yet, as in all spheres of administration, the final decision lay with Wingate\(^2\).

Police and prisons were under the assistant civil secretary from 1904. The Sudan police force, which had been part of the Egyptian army, assumed a civil character after the reconquest\(^3\). In the first few years its staff was recruited from the Egyptian army\(^4\). Yet from the very beginning the British officers had strong reservations concerning the suitability of Egyptians for police duties,\(^5\) and governors were authorized to replace the Egyptians by locally enlisted

\(^1\) Phipps to Wingate, 15 July 1907, SAD/288/2.

\(^2\) See Phipps to Wingate, 15 July 1905; 4 Sep. 1905, SAD/277/2, Phipps suggested that Kerr who had been acting governor, should be appointed governor of Khedive. He objected to Wingate's proposal of 'Bringing an army man over our Senior Civil Inspector...'. His suggestion was however overruled. See Phipps to Kerr, 31 Oct. 1905, SAD/277/4, where he informed him that a new military governor had been appointed. See also p.58.

\(^3\) 'Notes on the present organization', SAD/269/2; this undated memorandum was probably written by Wingate in 1899. It contains interesting information about the Egyptian army as well as the police.

\(^4\) GGR — 1902, pp.141-2. An Egyptian company was drafted en masse into the police force, while a Sudanese battalion became the nucleus of the prisons' staff.

\(^5\) In 1902, the governor of Khartoum wrote: 'The nature of the Egyptian policeman is to appear to be doing his work while watched...'; GGR — 1902, p.311; following the enlistment of local Arabs into the police, the governor of Berber wrote: 'The Egyptian soldier has never been trusted by the Arabs, and the Sudanese is only looked on as a slave...'; GGR — 1906, p.240.
men. In 1905 it was decided to decentralize the police department, and to place the police under the control of the provincial governors. The system of local enlistment was subsequently generally accepted so that by 1908 only 389 Egyptian remained in a police force totalling 2,979. Apart from the regular police, there was also a force of locally enlisted ghaffirs in all provinces. They acted as watchmen in towns, and were used by village 'umdas as messengers for weekly contacts with the ma'mur.

In 1904 the department of prisons also ceased its independent existence and became part of the civil secretary's office. At the same time the prisons section was decentralized, leaving all criminals sentenced to less than two years imprisonment in the charge of the provincial authorities. Hence only long-term convicts were sent to the central prison in Khartoum where they were usually employed in the prison workshop or by other departments. During the first

1GGR - 1902, pp.156-7. In 1902 the police force consisted of 51 officers, 541 Egyptian, 647 Sudanese, 80 locally enlisted men, and 317 Arabs. (The classification is not clear. The Sudanese were probably southern ex-soldiers of the Egyptian army, while locally enlisted men were mostly town dwellers, and the Arabs were northern Sudanese.)

2GGR - 1904, p.105; see also p.139.

3GGR - 1908, p.308. Most of the Egyptians served in the big towns and in the customs department.


5See p. 104.

6CAO - 227, 16 Nov. 1904; CAO -231, 12 Dec. 1904. Each province had its own dhātīyya where these prisoners were kept.

7See for instance GGR - 1902, p.155, where the income of the prisons' department from prisoners' work is stated as E£ 4,330. In 1911, a second central prison was opened in Port Sudan, SAR - 1911, pp.62-3.
years of the Condominium, excessive administration of corporal punishment caused concern to both Wingate and Cromer\(^1\), but by 1904, there had been a considerable reduction\(^2\). Political prisoners including the Mahdist amirs and their families, as well as those captured in various religious uprisings since the reconquest, were in a class by themselves\(^3\). During the first few years they were imprisoned in Damietta, but in 1908 Wingate decided to transfer them to Wadi Halfa, where they were kept in a special prison\(^4\).

c. Communications and agriculture.

Communications and agriculture were the main administrative problems of the Sudan. There were three departments directly concerned with communications, namely the department of post and telegraph, the railways department, and the department of steamers\(^5\). By the beginning of the first World War the post reached the remotest parts

\(^1\)The excessive use of corporal punishment was justified as follows: '...none of the wardens can read or write, which debars me from introducing the mark system by which lesser irregularities are dealt with in ordinary prisons...', GGR - 1902, pp.142-3.

\(^2\)GGR - 1904, p.99. Following the decentralization of prisons there was again a temporary increase in corporal punishment; GGR - 1908, p.290.

\(^3\)Prisoners were also classified according to their social classes. Those of the upper classes were '...considered entitled to a better class treatment than that of ordinary prisoners...', CAO - 226, 16 Nov. 1904.

\(^4\)SAR - 1908, p.67; see also pp.210-2.

of the country, by steamer, railway or camel, while the Sudan tele-
graph lines covered over 5000 miles. The railway, which had reached
Khartoum shortly after the battle of Kararí, extended eastwards to
Port Sudan and to the south west via the Gezira to El Obeid. By
1916 nearly 1500 miles of railways were open to traffic.

During the same period the steamer department could boast of two
main routes. The first ran from Halfâ to Shellal, thus connecting
the Egyptian railway system with that of the Sudan, while the second
route ran from Karima to Dongola and brought the produce of Dongola
to the Karima rail-head. A permanent steamer service also functioned
between Khartoum and Juba to connect the capital with the southern
provinces. Internal town transport was developed only in Omdurman
and Khartoum, where a combined steamer and tramway service was inau-
gurated in 1905.

It can easily be seen that in spite of the developments listed
above, the communications-system for a country the size of the Sudan
was woefully inadequate. The southern provinces could only be reached
from the north during high Nile, while the overwhelming majority of
roads were dirt tracks which could not be used during the rainy sea-
son. As a result a great deal of the transport in the south was

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1SAR - 1909, p.70.

2GGR - 1905, p.97; an internal tramway functioned in Khartoum since
1904, GGR - 1904, p.81.

3One of the major hazards which were only partially overcome was the
blocking of the rivers by sadd; see for instance 'Report on Sudd cut-
ting expedition', by Major M.P.Peake R.A. SIR - 77, Sep. 1900; GGR -
dependent on porters or animals and only slight beginnings were made in introducing mechanical vehicles. Of all the departments in the Sudan, that of public works was the most highly and constantly criticized—a state of affairs which nearly brought about the dismissal of its director. Most of the criticism was levelled against the low standard of buildings erected by the department for provincial government officials. This criticism increased as time went on but failed to bring about any apparent improvement. The department was also attacked for devoting most of its energy and money to Khartoum, a criticism shared by most central

1 GGR - 1914, pp.30,59; The first inter-city motor way between Khartoum and Kassala was opened in 1909. The distance of 510 miles was covered by lorry in six and a half days. SAR - 1909, p.70; A previous experiment to run a lorry service between Wau and Rumbek in the Bahr al-Ghazāl, was discontinued owing to the unsuitability of the road.

2 GGR - 1907, p.59.

3 In 1909 a special commission was appointed by Wingate to investigate charges of negligence against Kennedy, the director of the P.W.D. Kennedy was cleared by the commission and was allowed to stay on. See Gorst to Wingate, 12 May 1909, SAD/287/1.

4 In his report for 1906 Wingate tried to justify the department by saying that the low standard of building was due to budgetary reasons. See GGR - 1906, p.66. In 1911 however, Wingate made an inspection of the southern provinces following which he wrote that the government houses were: '...miserable huts which are tumbling down...'; Wingate to Stack, 18 Feb. 1911, SAD/300/1; see also Asser's Memorandum, Sep.1911, SAD/301/3, where he wrote that even the 1910 buildings in Bahr al-Ghazāl were falling to pieces and ends his letter: '...It really is quite extraordinary how deficient of ideas sapper officers are...'; see Currie to Wingate, 26 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2, and Bonham Carter to Wingate, 5 May 1914, SAD/190/2/2, both of whom complained bitterly about the housing situation in the provinces.

5 See for instance GGR - 1902, p.217; see also Cecil to Wingate, 14 July 1905, SAD/277/1, where Cecil reported a conversation with Garstin, then inspector of irrigation, who '...got hold very strongly of the cry that everything is done for Khartoum and nothing for the outstations...'
departments\(^1\). In 1908 the public works department was decentralized. District engineers were appointed in all the provinces, with instructions to submit their plans to the central department who would act as the supervisor and coordinator of the work\(^2\). However the reorganization did not prove successful, and a year later the whole system had to be reversed\(^3\). The failure of this department can be traced to a number of reasons. The budget was never sufficient, yet instead of limiting its projects, the department erected cheap buildings of poor quality. Communications also hampered its progress, as in many cases building materials had to be transported by camel\(^4\). Lastly, most of the department's staff was either unqualified, or lacked the ability to adapt their knowledge to local conditions\(^5\).

From the economic point of view the most important asset of the Sudan was clearly agriculture. Yet in spite of this fact, the first step in agricultural administration had to wait until 1903, and even

\(^1\)See for instance Matthews to Wingate, 9 Jan. 1904, SAD/275/1, where Matthews complained that the civil secretary was absorbed in Khartoum affairs and neglected the provinces.

\(^2\)GGR - 1908, pp. 313-15, 326-31. Up to 1908 the governors received a budget for clearing roads and building rest houses. Apparently these roads, while serving the provinces, were not linked up and thus did not serve the general communications system. Hence, since 1908, all road building was coordinated by the public works department.

\(^3\)Kennedy to Wingate, 27 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2. Kennedy insisted, however, that even after the department's centralization it remained more decentralized than any other P.W% he knew.

\(^4\)GGR - 1904, pp. 59-60; SAR - 1904, p. 137.

\(^5\)Asser's memorandum, Sep. 1911, SAD/301/3; see also GGR - 1904, p. 6; SAR - 1907, p. 65.
then development lagged well behind other spheres of administration until after the first World War. Prior to 1910, there were two departments detailed to deal with agriculture. The department of woods and forests was established in 1903 with one director and a subordinate staff of six. However, owing to the shortage of manpower it was '...considered best...for each Mudir to be ex officio Director of Woods and Forests within his own Province...' The department of agriculture and lands fared even worse. Restricted to two British officials and one clerk, it could hardly even cope with its clerical duties. Hence all matters relating to lands and development had to be dealt with by the civil secretary's office. The absence of a proper departmental head was rectified in 1905 when it was decided to engage a professional director and to incorporate the functions of agriculture and lands into one department. 

1 For a full account of agricultural development and administration during this period see Arthur Gaitskell, Gezira, A Story of Development in the Sudan, (London 1959); Abdel Wahab Abdel Rahim is at present writing a Ph.D. thesis for Manchester University entitled - An Economic History of the Gezira Scheme, 1900-1950; J.D.Tothill (ed.), Agriculture in the Sudan, (London 1948).

2 GGR - 1903, p.154.

3 GGR - 1904, pp.2-3; There was not even a director for the department. Hence the head of the department of woods and forests was called upon to serve as acting director of agriculture.

4 GG - 54, 1 Dec. 1903; for full details of land policy in the Sudan, see pp.332-357.

5 Wingate to Cromer, 24 Apr. 1905, SAD/276/4; see also CAO - 321, 18 July 1902, which ordered that land settlement, hitherto dealt with by the civil secretary, would be undertaken by the department of agriculture and lands.
director who was a British estate agent, turned the department into "...a Central Estate Office for Government properties..." much to the detriment of agricultural development and agricultural education which continued to suffer from neglect. As a result the hoped-for improvements were negligible and in 1910, when the director of the department resigned, it was therefore decided to try yet another reorganization. The lands section, which had hitherto been the main stay of agricultural administration, now became part of the legal department, while agriculture and forests were united under the directorship of a former provincial governor. Detailed instructions regarding the functions of the new department were laid down by the governor-general's council. The main spheres of activity were to be agricultural development and education, while a special committee was to be set up to deal with future concessions. The department, however, remained as weak as before, and was a constant cause for concern to Wingate and the central administration. In 1915 the department of agriculture and forests suffered yet another upheaval. Following the resignation of its director, it was decided to split it once again. The agricultural section was affiliated to the civil secretary's office, while that of forests was put under the financial

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2 Wingate to Gorst, 2 Jan. 1910, SAD/290/1; Wingate to Clayton, 1 Aug. 1910, SAD/297/2.

3 GGC, 1 Nov. 1910, FO 867/1.

4 Wingate to Stack, 29 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/3.
secretary. Thus seventeen years after the reconquest, and with the Gezira development scheme nearing realization, the Sudan government was left without any department or personnel capable of undertaking this major project. This was clearly one of the great failures of the new administration. Luckily, for most of that period the problem of land-settlement was dealt with by the legal department, while agricultural education and research were carried by the department of education. Hence at least two major aspects of agricultural development were being attended to, thus facilitating easier future development.

Of the other departments not much need be said. The department of education and its policy have been adequately described in numerous theses and articles. Hence it will only be discussed in connection with the training of Sudanese personnel and with regard to the government's religious policy. Two major works have also been written about the functions and policy of the medical department,

1 GGC, 2 Mar. 1915; 7-8 May 1915, FO 867/6.

2 The Central Research Farm at Khartoum North was managed by the education department, whose officials also undertook research into cotton growing in the Gezira. See for instance Education Department, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Bulletin No.1. Pump Irrigation in the Northern Sudan, with special reference to the cotton crop. (Khartoum 1915)


4 See pp. 174-182.

which was part of the military administration until 1905\(^1\). Yet even after the establishment of a civil department, the health of the southern provinces was entrusted to the Egyptian army.\(^2\) The only hospital where adequate medical facilities existed was the central hospital in Khartoum. The other provinces were provided with small clinics which often had to exist without trained staff\(^3\). The lack of communications with the outlying districts forced the government to use post offices as medicine stores and to train sanitary barbers for minor medical duties\(^4\). Progress was hampered by financial considerations and by the tendency of the population to consult their traditional doctors\(^5\).

The only other department whose policies and activities will be fully discussed is the department for the repression of slave trade, which was part of the Egyptian ministry of interior until 1910\(^6\).

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\(^2\) CAO - 368, 16 Nov. 1905.

\(^3\) GGR - 1902, pp. 120, 125-30, 136.

\(^4\) GGR - 1908, pp. 224-5; see also p. 173.


\(^6\) See chapter 9, pp. 369-380.
d. The provinces.

The foundation of provincial administration was laid down during the reconquest. Under the Khalifa's rule Dongola, Berber, and other frontier regions were administered as military provinces and governed by military commanders. This system of government collapsed with the reconquest of Dongola in 1896 and of Berber in 1897. There was also little sense in reviving the pre-Mahdist Egyptian system of government. On the eve of the Mahdia the Egyptians planned to control the Sudan more closely. They divided the country into three independent hukumāriyyāt, each consisting of several provinces, under the direct control of Egypt. A special Sudan minister was appointed in Cairo, who was responsible for the administration of the Sudan. Having discarded this system, the British commanders of the Egyptian army regarded the Sudan as a tabula rasa, where the system of provincial administration could be determined by them. In April 1897, Kitchener presented a memorandum to Cromer, in which he stated his views on the future government of the country based on the following assumptions:

...That the Sudanese absolutely despise the Egyptians... That there are forces in the Sudan that do not exist in Egypt... That the Sudanese...are not a difficult people to govern if the Government is one they respect...The present tendency is to govern Dongola Province exactly the same as any other province of Egypt, and this will naturally extend to other

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2 Report on the Soudan by Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, (1883), C.3670.
provinces when reconquered...I look upon this form of government as a grave danger to public security, and a very fertile cause of future discontent...1

Kitchener suggested therefore, that '...the future administration of the Sudan should be that of a crown colony of Egypt; and resemble our form of colonial Govt...'. Kitchener's intention was further clarified when he objected most strongly to a proposal to centralize the Sudan administration and put it under Egyptian government supervision. According to Kitchener, this system was tried in Tokar following its conquest in 1891:

...The result was that Tokar was flooded with most unsuitable Egyptian employees; these were not well received by the people. Things went on for about a year in this way the discontent of the people growing, until the Governor informed me that it was openly said by the natives that they preferred Dervish rule. Hence, Kitchener concluded, that the provinces should be administered by '...local administration suitable to the people, and that the chain of responsibility should be through competent officers having local experience...'.

The system suggested by Kitchener was adopted with certain modifications in Dongola and Berber. Following the Italian evacuation...

1 Memorandum presented to Lord Cromer on the 4 April 1897 (signed) Sirdar, SAD/266/1/1.
2 Ibid.
3 This proposal was put forward by Sir E. Palmer, the financial adviser, in a Minute to the Sirdar, 10 Apr. 1897, Ibid.
4 Memorandum presented to Lord Cromer, (signed) Sirdar, 10 Apr. 1897, Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 The first governor of Dongola was General Hunter who divided the province into eleven districts. His directive to ma'murs is in many respects similar to Kitchener's later 'Memorandum to Mudirs'. J.S.R. Duncan, The Sudan a record of achievement, (London 1952), pp. 64-6.
of Kassala in December 1897, a third province was established. Thus with most of the Sudan still under the Khalifa's rule, there were already three provinces and two districts under Anglo-Egyptian military administration. This system was later extended to other provinces and prevailed throughout Kitchener's and Wingate's governor-generalship.

When Wingate became governor-general in December 1899, the Sudan was already divided into ten provinces. Another four provinces were established between 1899-1914, while the reconquest of Darfur in 1916, added the fifteenth province to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Throughout these years there were constant changes in the internal boundaries of the provinces. Many of these changes were instituted in order to facilitate closer administrative control. In other cases boundaries were changed so as to unify tribes who had been split by an arbitrary border in the early years of the Condominium.

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1 Parsons to Cromer, 30 Dec. 1897, FO 407/146.
2 Wadi Halfa and Suakin were known as districts until 1903, they had remained under Anglo-Egyptian rule throughout the Mahdia.
3 For details of the early administration under Kitchener, see pp.19-21. see also Talbot to Wingate, 4 Feb. 1898, SAD/266/2.
4 For details see Handbook, pp.1-2; see also p.104.
5 The final delimitation of provincial and district boundaries was not completed until 1920, Handbook, pp.171-2.
6 GGR - 1905, pp.23-4; in that year it was decided to form Mongalla province out of the southern half of the Upper Nile province, and the White Nile province was established from certain districts of Kordofan and the Blue Nile provinces.
7 GGR - 1908, p.555; the splitting of tribes caused harm to taxation; for details see pp.364-5.
Each province was divided into a number of districts (marākiz), which in turn were divided into sub-districts (ma'mūriyat). The number of districts and sub-districts depended largely on funds and on the availability of suitable officials. Until after the first World War, both of these were scarce. Hence, a single inspector in Wahud was in charge of 700 villages of the Hamar, and in addition was responsible for two of the Baqqāra tribes and a few Nuba Mountains. His administrative staff consisted of two ma'mūrs and two sub-ma'mūrs. Similarly, the Yambio and Tambura districts of Bahr al-Ghazāl, were each administered by a single British officer assisted by an Egyptian ma'mūr. Although the situation in the northern provinces was somewhat better they also suffered considerably. The provincial governors constantly complained about the shortage of staff, and insisted that the additional expenditure would be more than offset by an increase of revenue. However, despite certain improvements, there was no major change. In 1912 the governor-general's council decided

1For a full list of the districts and sub-districts of the provinces see Handbook, pp.383-5; see also SG - 45, Mar. 1903. There seems to have been a confusion in the terminology used for describing the subdivisions. The Arabic text in the Sudan Gazette refers to marākiz, while the English version refers to 'Mamurias'.

2GGR - 1908, p.601.

3Handbook BAG, pp.40-1.

that no new appointments or services would be allowed except such as are warranted by an increase in the revenue. Thus the country's precarious finances dictated a course which, in reality, decreased its potential revenue.

The duties of governors, inspectors and ma'murs were laid down by Kitchener in 1899. They included responsibility for public security, the assessment and collection of taxes, the keeping and rendering of accounts, administration of justice and the registration of law. However, although these duties were rarely carried out during Kitchener's governor-generalship, they constituted the basis for future provincial administration. The governors were also instructed to develop the agricultural and industrial resources of their provinces, and to supervise the functions of all other officials. They were warned not to purchase land in the Sudan, not to embark on trade, and not to have dealings with native women of their districts.

An order published in 1902, forbade public servants to accept

1 GGC, 6-7 Apr. 1912, FO 867/3.

2 When in 1913, an addition to the staff of the Upper Nile province enabled the province to be divided into districts, the immediate result was an increase of £E 2000 in the tribute it had to bear. GGR - 1914, p.65; Following a trip in Kordofan in 1914, Bonham Carter argued that '...the proportion of British officials to the population is not low compared with...other colonies...inspectors waste much time on clerical work—especially so-called confidential work...', Bonham Carter to Wingate, 7 June 1914, SAD/190/3/2.

3 Memorandum to Mudirs - Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899, FO 78/5022.

4 See pp.19-21
...directly or indirectly any gift or any promise of gift from any native of the Sudan..." This order did not apply to non-European officials who were allowed to receive gifts from relatives. It also forbade European officials acquiring land in the Sudan "...except land occupied merely by a residence for their own use...". The establishment of the provincial headquarters was also laid down. Yet governors were warned that all appointments except sarrāfs and clerks at £E 5 per month, had to be authorised by the central government. Instructions were also sent to inspectors and ma'mūrs. The inspector was defined as:

"...the Mudir's staff officer in charge of the district to which he is appointed by the Mudir...He will not be a channel of communication between Mamurs and the Mudirieh— that is, Mamurs will forward direct to the Mudirieh all Reports and Returns called for..."

The inspector's duties were to supervise the administration of the ma'mūriyāt within his district, and especially the operations of the police. His only executive task was in the administration of justice.

The instructions sent by Kitchener to ma'mūrs were couched in rather more general terms. They were warned against taking bribes.

1 CAO - 41, 25 Feb. 1902; see also Wingate to Stanton, 24 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/4; Stanton governor of Khartoum since 1900, was offered presents by the people of his province. Wingate objected and suggested that "...a drinking fountain at the base of the Gordon Statue..." should be dedicated to him.

2 Finance Circular No.1; SG - 5, 2 Oct. 1899.

3 Memorandum to Mudirs, Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899, FO 78/5022.

4 Ibid.
or molesting women, and instructed to be just but severe in repres-
sing crimes. Ma'mūrs were given the power '...of sending offenders
to prison for one day...' All serious crimes had to be referred to
the nearest British officer. The first duty of the ma'mūrs was to
prepare detailed reports about all the villages in their ma'mūriya,
so as to enable tax to be assessed correctly¹.

During the seventeen years of Wingate's governor-generalship the
instructions laid down by Kitchener were generally followed. The
governors' administrative duties were further extended when the dep-
artment of police and prisons was decentralized in 1905². Following
this decentralization governors were made responsible for the enlist-
ment, training, discipline and pay of their police forces³. Finan-
cially, the governors were dependent on the central administration.
A certain relaxation of this dependency was afforded by the decentra-
lization of the department of stores: every governor had his own
budget for stores with which he could buyy whatever he required⁴.

¹Ibid; for detailed lists of the ma'mūriyat, towns and villages of
Kordofan, the White Nile, and the Bahr al-Ghazāl provinces, see
Handbook, Kordofan, pp.131-4; Handbook BAG, pp.74-6; for a further
elaboration of the duties of ma'mūrs, see The Sub-Mamurs' Handbook,
p.335-6.

²GGR - 1904, p.105; The Police Ordinance 1908, enabled governors to
issue special regulations for the police forces of their provinces;
SG - 142, 1 Sep. 1908; see also pp. 123-4.

³The police force of Bahr al-Ghazāl was called Jihaāiya. Besides its
police duties it also provided the military garrison for the western
district. Most of the N.C.O.s and men were locally enlisted and
owing to the multiplicity of tribes, served only in their own distr-
icts, see GGR - 1908, p.464.

⁴GGR - 1905, p.209.
Yet in other spheres of finance, the governors remained as tightly controlled as before. Their financial independence was limited to "...all expenditure of £E 10 - and under, for which provision exists in the Budget..." In 1905, the financial secretary extended his control over the local provincial rates. These rates were used for provincial services such as streets, sanitation, or gaffirs, which had hitherto been spent by the governors without any supervision. Furthermore, the amount of rates collected in each province depended largely on the initiative of the governor. From 1905 onwards governors were not allowed to impose local taxes without the authorization of the financial department. The rates as well as the expenditure were included in the annual budget, thus increasing the control of the central government. However, in the same way as before, the sums collected in any one province were spent on local services of that province. Following complaints the governors were authorized in 1906 to spend the sums allocated to their provinces in the budget without further reference to the financial secretary.

1 CAO - 60, 17 Apr. 1902.
2 GGR - 1905, pp. 274-6.
3 Out of £E 34,324 allocated to provincial services in 1905, £E 21,734 were spent in Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman. It was decided that certain provinces that could not raise the necessary sums locally would be assisted by the central government. However, these sums were given as a loan on which 3% interest was charged. GGR - 1905, pp. 274-5, 279; GGR - 1908, pp. 699-700.
Governors were, however, less controlled in their other spheres of activity. The administration of justice\(^1\), tribal affairs\(^2\), assessment of taxes\(^3\) and land settlement\(^4\) were largely the responsibility of the provincial staff. Here again the initiative of individual governors played an important role. Jackson\(^5\), the governor of Dongola, completed the cadastral survey of his province in 1906, whereas other provinces had to wait for many years before the central government could undertake their survey\(^6\). Similarly, in the field of irrigation, the invention of a special saqiya by Jackson facilitated a more rapid development in his province\(^7\), so that even Wingate whose relations with Jackson were never close, had to admit that Dongola was '...one of the most prominent features in the success of our Sudan administration...'.\(^8\)

The duties of inspectors largely corresponded to those laid down by Kitchener in his memorandum. Most of their time was taken up with the assessment of taxes and the administration of justice. In certain cases, where tribal organization was weak, the inspectors played an

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1 For details see pp. 268-272.
2 For details see pp. 305-312.
3 For details see pp. 312-13, 361-66.
4 For details see pp. 337-342.
5 Jackson Pasha, Sir Herbert William (1861-1931) was seconded to the Egyptian army 1888; commanded the Anglo-Egyptian force at Fashoda during the Fashoda incident in 1898; governor of Berber 1899; civil secretary and deputy governor-general 1900-1; governor of Berber 1902; governor of Dongola 1902-22; inspector general 1922; retired on 1 Jan. 1923. Hill, BD, pp. 188-9.
6 GGR - 1904, Appendix 'A', pp. 154-7; GGR - 1905, p. 223.
7 GGR - 1903, p. 10.
8 Wingate to Jackson, 25 Nov. 1914, SAD/192/2.
active role in the actual collection of taxes and in administering tribal law. Yet the shortage of officials compelled inspectors to diversify their activities and deal with cattle plagues, distribution of medicines and the compiling of provincial reports. Less information is available as regard to non-British officials, and what does exist is not always reliable. The staff of a ma'muriya included a ma'mur, a sarraf, one or more clerks, sanitary barbers and khaffirs. The overall view of the non-British staff, as presented by their British superiors, is not very flattering. They complained about the unsuitability of the Egyptian ma'murs and constantly referred to their untrustworthiness, and to their getting involved in local politics. Hence, ma'murs were warned from clashing in any way with the exercise by Sheikhs of their proper responsibilities.

1 See pp. 284-89, 312-13, 364-65.
2 Willis to 0., 15 Apr. 1909, SAD/209/1.
3 Handbook Kordofan, p.111.
4 Willis's diary, 22 Mar. 1910, SAD/210/2; Willis complained that whenever he stopped at El Obeid, he was asked to do administrative work, outside his sphere of duties. See also E.R.J. Hussey, Tropical Africa 1908-1944, (London 1947), p.20; Hussey, who was an inspector in Sennar in 1912, complained that most of his time was spent on matters of taxation, petitions from Sheikhs or from individuals...and lately to an increasing extent, answering queries from headquarters about matters which appeared to be of very little importance.

5 Most of the information about non-British personnel is taken from the diaries and letters of the British officials; see also pp.183-5.
6 Thompson's diary, 22 Jan. 1908, SAD/404/6; GGR - 1907, p.213.
7 See for instance Willis's diary, 1 Jan. 1912, SAD3210/2.
The major problem, however, was the shortage of suitable officials. When a Merkaz has over seven hundred villages it is obvious a man must be either very stupid or very unlucky who pays his taxes... The areas most seriously affected by this shortage were the southern provinces and the Nuba Mountains. The vast territory of the south, combined with the lack of communications and the difficult climate conditions, made service in these areas less popular than in the north. As a result the military character of the administration was more predominant in the south. The governor and most of the inspectors were British officers. Military administrative expeditions took the place of permanent government posts which could not be established due to lack of funds and a shortage of officials. The military command of each province, apart from Khartoum, was vested in its governor. However, the military duties of the governors of the northern provinces were purely nominal, so that in 1911, Asser, then adjutant general of the Egyptian army, was able to suggest a separation of the

1 GGR - 1908, p.592; see also GGR - 1907, pp.119,122, 132.
2 Sudan Political Service, pp.5-37; when a civilian was appointed to a post in the south, one of the provincial governors complained that he did not fit into the military establishment; see Matthews to Wingate, 19 July 1903, SAD/273/7.
3 CAO - 6, 10 Jan. 1903, All officials serving in the south enjoyed a climate allowance of 6-12 months per year. In 1910, the system was unified and all officials serving south of latitude 12° were granted nine months climate allowance per year; GGR - 1910, p.144; Despite this material advantage most officials did not serve in the south for any length of time, mainly owing to the deterioration of their health, GGR - 1911, p.87.
military and administrative functions\(^1\). Clayton, who was at that
time Wingate's private secretary, carried the argument further. He
asserted that '...a governor has not the time, and every year has
less of the knowledge, required to efficiently supervise the training,
discipline and administration of the troops...' Hence he suggested
that Wingate should '...divide the Sudan into a certain number of
districts, irrespective of provinces, and give each district a
Commandant and staff...'\(^2\) All these suggestions were rejected by
Wingate\(^3\). The only provinces where military commandants were
appointed were those whose governors were civilians\(^4\). The supremacy
of the governors' authority in all military and civil administrative
matters concerning their provinces remained unchallenged throughout
the Wingate era\(^5\). Consequently, both military and civil administration

\(^1\) Asser to Wingate, 16 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/3; Asser suggested the
separation of the civil from the military command in all provinces
apart from the Bahá' al-Ghazál and Mongalla; see also p. 105.

\(^2\) Clayton to Wingate, 11 Sep. 1911, SAD/301/3; see also Kitchener to
Wingate, 10 Jan. 1912, SAD/180/1; Kitchener wrote: '...You can have
a Governor and an Officer Commanding Troops in a district the Gover­
nor's military powers are then purely nominal...'

\(^3\) See pp. 67-9.

\(^4\) Monthly list of British Officers employed in the Egyptian Army.
Showing their stations on 1st December 1916, SAD/202/5.

\(^5\) This was true even in those cases where the governor's military rank
was lower than that of another British officer serving in his dis­
trict. Despite the difference in rank, the governor's military sup­
remacy was upheld; See Wingate to Cameron, 1 Dec. 1912, SAD/18/3.
suffered from a certain amount of neglect. In the northern provinces governors tended to neglect their military duties, whereas in the south the civil administration was often subjugated to military requirements.¹

¹See for instance Savile to Wingate, 24 Oct. 1915, SAD/197/1/2, where he admitted that all intelligence work in his province had been neglected; see also Asser to Wingate, 16 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/3; Wingate to Stack, 5 June 1914, SAD/190/3/2.
Chapter IV.

Government officials and the training of Sudanese personnel.

The administration of the Sudan emerged out of a military conquest. The British officers became administrators, and constituted the higher echelon of the country's central and provincial government until after the first World War.

The necessity of including civilians in the administration was brought home to the Sudan government by the Boer War. Kitchener and many of the British officers left the Sudan to pursue their military careers, leaving in their wake large gaps in the administration. Hence a policy of recruitment was instituted in 1900, in the hope of enticing young British civilians to serve in the intermediate grades of the administration.

The lower grades of the administration were filled by Egyptians and Lebanese, while the Sudanese were left to fill those posts which needed no qualifications. However, an educational policy was evolved whereby the administration hoped to replace the Egyptian officials by Sudanese.

a. The British military administrators.

The advantages of British administrators were clearly defined by a British officer following a tour of inspection in the Sudan:

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1See pp 26.
The special genius of our countrymen in general, and of our soldiers in particular, to act as bear leaders to barbarians... has never, and can never have, any better illustration than in the Sudan.\(^1\)

The first list of appointees for the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan included eighteen British officers and one civilian\(^2\). They were appointed as heads of departments and as provincial governors and inspectors. The only departments which had civilian directors and civilian staff from the outset were the departments of justice and education\(^3\). The qualifications, which, according to Symes, enabled military commanders to become civilian administrators, were as follows:

...They were quick to improvise and ready to tackle the most difficult situations with courage and common sense... They laid foundations of public tranquility and popular goodwill on which the structure of a civilised administration could be built securely...\(^4\)

The impoverished Sudan was not in a position to afford highly specialized officials. It required men, able and willing to undertake any job whatsoever, even though the task was far removed from their basic qualifications. They had to open roads, make surveys, build their own stations, and lead military expeditions into the unpenetrated areas of their provinces. Duties of a more civilian

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\(^1\) Report by the Inspector General of the Overseas Forces of an inspection of the Soudan, 1913 (Secret), FO 371/1639.

\(^2\) SG 1, 7 Mar. 1899. The civilian was E.G. Harman, the first financial secretary, who was soon replaced by Colonel Bernard; see p.117.

\(^3\) For details see pp.158-9, 172-183, 260-8.

\(^4\) S. Symes, Tour of Duty, p.13.
character included land-settlement, the assessment of taxes, and the establishment of provincial administration working in harmony with the tribal and religious leaders within its boundaries. Even Cromer, who was one of the first to advocate the establishment of a Sudanese civil service, stated that '...these officers constitute the best possible agents for the administration of a country in the present condition of the Soudan...'. For Wingate there were additional advantages in appointing officers. As an officer and administrator he believed in the unity of civil and military duties. Moreover, as he was the sirdar of the Egyptian army, the choice of British officers for service in the Sudan was at his sole discretion.

Once the officers had been appointed Wingate could renew their contracts, or terminate them whenever he regarded it necessary.

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1SAR - 1899, p.55.
3There was always a long waiting list of British officers who wanted to be seconded to the Egyptian army; see for instance McNaughton to Wingate, 20 July 1905, SAD/234/4; McNaughton suggested postponing Symes's secondment to the Egyptian army '...as we have so many good men much senior who have been waiting for a long time...'; When the officers who went to the Boer War asked to be re-employed in the Sudan, their acceptance was at Wingate’s discretion; see Gorringe to Wingate, 3 Sep. 1900, SAD/270/9; Watson to Wingate, 10 Sep. 1900, Ibid.; see also Wingate to Légin, 27 July 1908, SAD/283/7/1. Wingate wrote that Butler had been recommended for service in the Sudan '...He has a lot of varied experience, looks as strong as a horse, and is a nice looking fellow as well, so I don't think you can do better than put him very high up on your list...'. Butler was recruited shortly afterwards and was later employed in the intelligence department.

4See for instance Wingate to War Office, 9 Jan. 1900, SAD/270/1/1; Wingate objected to further British officers being sent to the Cape. However, he made one exception in asking for the immediate transfer of Colonel Maxwell; see also Wingate to Cromer, 21 Jan. 1901, SAD/271/1. Wingate had recommended the promotions of several officers and hoped that '...the snub to Gordon will be such that...he will resign...!'
However, it soon became clear that the officers' administration had many disadvantages. Most of the officers regarded their sojourn in the Sudan as a temporary phase. Those who wanted to pursue their military careers had to revert to the British army in order to get a substantive colonelcy. Others, who were willing to extend their contracts, had to go on half-pay and their work in the Sudan did not count as full service towards a pension. Wingate wished to retain as many British officers as possible. He repeatedly tried to alter their conditions of service, and in May 1900 sent his proposals to Cromer. He suggested that the sirdar should be able to retain the services of British officers on full pay, for periods ranging from two to ten years, and also argued that those officers who were retained beyond the period of ten years and were removed from the lists of their regiments should nevertheless remain eligible for promotion to brevet rank of colonel. Furthermore, according to Wingate, a gratuity of one month's pay for every complete year served in the Egyptian army, should be offered to officers serving beyond ten years.

1It was for this reason that Mahon, the first governor of Kordofan, left the Sudan; Mahon to Wingate, 1 June 1904, SAD/275/5; Stanton, who had served for twelve years in the Egyptian army and in the Sudan administration, complained that his standing in the British army had been ruined as a result. Stanton to Wingate, 25 Aug. 1914, PRO 30/57/No. 45.


3Inclosures 1 and 2 in Cromer to Salisbury, 11 May 1900, FO 78/5087; Cromer supported Wingate's proposals wholeheartedly; Salisbury also had expressed his full approval of the changed conditions. However, he had little trust in the logical decision being taken by the war office. See Salisbury to Cromer, 2 Mar. 1900, FO 633/11.
The British war office only partially accepted these proposals. The limit of seven years service at full pay was retained, after which officers lost their claim for regimental promotion. In 1902, Cromer appealed again to Lansdowne to alter the conditions. The war office agreed that officers would go on half-pay only after ten years service, provided that Egypt would bear the extra cost. Thus a compromise was reached, at Egypt's expense, which enabled Wingate to increase the number of British officers serving in the Sudan.

In 1914, the war office decided to limit the number of British officers serving in the Egyptian army to 184, unless their training and pension were paid by Egypt. Kitchener, then consul-general, strongly objected to this proposal. He stated that the war office suggestions would compel Egypt to pay for the training and pensions of British officers serving in the Sudan administration '...and would inevitably lead to serious criticism...' Yet despite Grey's support the war office refused to supply the required officers and suggested

1 Salisbury to Cromer, 30 Oct. 1900, FO 78/5089.
2 Conditions of service of British Officers in the Egyptian Army; War Office Cairo, 17 Nov. 1900, FO 78/5088.
3 Cromer to Lansdowne, 2 Jan. 1902, FO 407/157.
4 War Office to Cromer, 3 Mar. 1902; Lansdowne to Cromer, 18 Oct. 1902, Ibid.
6 Kitchener to Grey, 1 Mar. 1914, Ibid.
that Wingate should ask parliament for a grant in aid, instead of using "...indirect subsidies from Army funds..."\(^1\) It is interesting to note that even as late as 1914 Wingate was still reluctant to solve the Sudan's administrative problems by employing civilians. He ordered Clayton to enlighten Kitchener about "...the danger of introducing large numbers of civilians (which is the only alternative if officers are refused)..."\(^2\)

The World War which broke out a few months later radically altered the situation. By 1916 the Egyptian army and the Sudan government were 86 British officers short of the required numbers\(^3\), while the Sudan was faced with a problem similar to that created by the Boer War at the beginning of the century.

It is quite clear that the employment of officers undermined the continuity of central and provincial administration. Very few officers were willing to sacrifice their military careers in order to extend their service in the Sudan. Thus, of the first thirteen officer governors of the Sudan provinces, only two served for more than five years. In the seventeen years of Wingate's governor-generalship there were forty-four military governors. Of those, twenty-one served for 1-2 years; ten served for 3-5 years; and only

\(^1\) Crowe to Secretary Army Council, 26 Mar. 1914, Ibid; War Office to Grey, 25 May 1914, Ibid;

\(^2\) Wingate to Clayton, 29 Mar. 1914, SAD/469/6/1; see also Wingate to Kitchener, 29 Mar. 1914, FO371/1966.

\(^3\) Wingate to Clayton, 13 Jan. 1916, SAD/470/1.
thirteen served for longer periods. While many of those officers lacked the qualifications of administrators, their abbreviated periods of service did little to enable them to get a proper training. Willis, the inspector in Kordofan complained that "...they try too much to run the country as if it was a battalion - without the discipline of the ranks or the sufficiency of staff." Similar criticism was made by a correspondent of The Times who visited the Sudan in 1907. He claimed that in the Sudan "...no one other than a military officer is of any consequence..." This resulted in commerce and economic development being neglected, because the officers had little understanding of these subjects. "...Military despotism holds its sway, and civilian residents are kept in strict order. But there is no trade..." It was the combination of the shortcomings of many military administrators and the difficulty of retaining them for longer periods of service which drove Cromer to propose the establishment of a Sudan civil service. In June 1900 he wrote to Salisbury:

"...The only remedy is gradually to train up a number of young English

1H. MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Appendix to Chapter 6, Governors of Provinces, 1898-1933. These changes were mentioned in the annual reports of the Sudan. In 1908 Wingate reported changes in the governorship of nine provinces. *GGR* - 1908, pp.157, 161, 170, 172, 177, 181, 185, 187-8.

2Willis to 0., 29 Dec. 1908, SAD/209/1.

3The Times, Financial and Business Supplement, 22 July 1907; Commenting on this article, Wingate wrote that it was "...clearly the grumbling of some disappointed concessionaire, and I am rather surprised that a paper of the "Times" standing should publish a statement of that sort...", Wingate to Phipps, 25 July 1907, SAD/281/1.
civilians who will be prepared to stay in the country and acquire a thorough knowledge of the language...\(^1\)

b. The Sudan civil service.

The first eight civilians, who were recruited in 1901, were appointed as assistant inspectors in the provinces\(^2\). A suggestion made by Lansdowne to recruit retired civil servants from India for service in the Sudan was rejected by Cromer:\(\ldots\)...They are less likely than younger men to learn the language. Moreover, except as regards navigation, I have not found that Indian experience has been of much use here...\(^1\) Cromer also reiterated his belief that the best way to establish a Sudan civil service was \(\ldots\)to bring in young civilians at the bottom who will gradually take the place of the military element...\(^3\) A system for recruiting young British university graduates was accordingly initiated in 1905. Between 1905 and 1915 fifty

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\(^1\)Cromer to Salisbury, 8 June 1900, FO 633/6; see also Cromer to Lansdowne, 14 Nov. 1900, Ibid; where he wrote \(\ldots\)I have found the universities, rather than the army the best recruiting ground\(\ldots\)\(^1\). It is interesting to note that the first to propose the setting up of a Sudan civil service, was Colonel Maxwell. Maxwell to Wingate, 5 Nov. 1898, SAD/266/11.

\(^2\)Cromer to Lansdowne, 18 Nov. 1901, FO 403/313. By 1914, five of the civilians appointed in 1901-2 had become provincial governors. Kerr became governor of the Red Sea province in 1909; Iles, governor of the Blue Nile province since 1913; Lyal, More and Browne were appointed governors of Halfa, Khartoum and Berber respectively in 1914. SPS, pp.8-9,11.

\(^3\)Lansdowne to Cromer, 29 Jan. 1902, FO 800/123; Cromer to Lansdowne, 9 Feb. 1902, Ibid; the only notable exception was in the case of A.T. Brown, the director of the department of woods and forests, Wingate 1910, who was transferred from the Indian civil service; see Wingate to Cromer, 15 Feb. 1900, FO 141/356.
university graduates from Oxford, Cambridge, and Trinity College, Dublin were appointed to the Sudan civil service. Application forms were available at the universities and were forwarded by the universities' appointments boards to Cairo. It was then the duty of the Sudan agent to sift through the hundreds of application forms and letters of recommendation, and select a short list of candidates to invite to the meeting of the selection board, which met annually in London. The board was composed of British representatives of the Egyptian and Sudan governments. Wingate sat on the board in 1904 and 1905 as one of the Sudan's representatives, but following Cromer's suggestion Wingate agreed that the Sudan should be represented by its senior civilian official and an additional military or civilian member of the civil service. Wingate continued, however, to play an active role in the process of selection. He received hundreds of letters from friends asking him to recommend the appoint-

1SPS, pp.17-37; Out of those appointed, 32 were Oxford graduates, 14 were from Cambridge and 4 were from Dublin; although application was open to graduates from other universities, none were appointed. See Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Services, Information to Candidates, June 1913, SAD/152/7/7.

2See for instance Owen to Wingate, 22 May 1907, SAD/208/5; Owen complained that there were some 160 applicants for the three posts offered by the Sudan; see also Stack to Wingate, 17 May 1909, SAD/287/2; Stack wrote that out of hundreds of dossiers he had to pick '...the 12 gentlemen who are to appear before the Board which meets in London for the selection of two candidates required for the Sudan...'

3Cromer to Wingate, 25 Nov. 1905, SAD/234/3; Wingate to Cromer, 30 Nov. 1905, SAD/277/5; The Sudan was usually represented by the Sudan agent and by Bonham Carter or Currie.
ment of their relatives. In most cases the requests were politely refused. However, in certain cases these solicitations seem to have had their effect. One of the candidates was accepted in the Sudan civil service following a letter which read: his father is the archdeacon of Exeter and all the boys are athletic, public school boys, and brought up under the best influence with strong religious belief. In yet another case Wingate wrote to Phipps, the civil secretary:

...I enclose some correspondence I have had with Lady Tweeddale about her son Lord Edward Hay...I hope you and the other member of the Selection Board will use your influence to get him taken on as I think he is the type of man we want.

The following letter to Cromer is even more illuminating, as it suggests that applicants were selected according to political considerations, although this was clearly forbidden according to regulations:

...Will you carry your mind back years ago to the time when you wrote me, at the request of Mr. Arthur Balfour, to take young Edward Pease into the Sudan Civil Service. It always struck me as a peculiar request as of course the Pease family were political opponents of the Cecils, but there had been some

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1. These letters are preserved in the Wingate papers at the Sudan Archive in Durham, and are not the official letters of reference, which were required from every candidate.

2. See for instance Wingate to Mahon, 15 Nov. 1903, SAD/273/11; Mahon ex-governor of Kordofan, had recommended a friend for employment in the Sudan, but had his recommendation turned down on the grounds that the nominee was not qualified; see also Wingate to Colonel Sealy, 21 Feb. 1912, SAD/180/2/2.

3. Wilfrid Cummings, to Wingate, Karachi Christmas 1904, SAD/275/1.

4. Wingate to Phipps, 6 July 1912, SAD/182/1/2.

5. Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Services, Information to Candidates, June 1913, SAD/152/7/7.
financial crisis in the family and you agreed that an exception should be made in giving young Pease a nomination.\footnote{Wingate to Cromer, 1 Aug. 1913, SAD/187/2/3. Pease was appointed and served in the Sudan until 1911. In his letter Wingate asked Cromer to use his influence in order to get a post for Pease at the new School of Oriental Studies at London University.}

Despite these irregularities, the general entry route to a Sudan post was by application to the selection board, where nominees were judged according to their merits. The Sudan authorities refused to tie their hands by accepting civil servants according to the results of competitive examinations\footnote{Cecil to Wingate, 17 Sep. 1903, SAD/273/9; the lack of competitive examinations for the Egyptian and Sudan civil services gave rise to questions in the House of Commons on several occasions. In reply to a question asked by Mr. Weir on 4 Aug. 1904, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs stated that this was a decision taken by the governments of Egypt and the Sudan with which the British government saw no reason to interfere; FO 407/163.}. The qualities required from nominees included academic and athletic achievements, robust health, and a general tendency towards outdoor activities\footnote{R. Davies, pp. 8-14; E. R. J. Hussey, Tropical Africa 1908-1944, p. 1. Both relate how they came to be chosen for service. Davies attributed it to his success in the Boat Race of 1910. The secretary of the Sudan selection board was the brother of his senior coach who recommended his appointment. Hussey related that one of his reasons for going to the Sudan was '...that there was no special examination...' In the Information to Candidates, published by the Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Services in 1913, candidates were told that '...selection is based on the general fitness and capability of the candidates as well as on their intellectual and other attainments...', SAD/152/7/7.}. Those selected as probationers had to undertake a one-year course of training, at their own expense, at Oxford or Cambridge\footnote{Ibid; the lists of the probationers and their class of honours were published in The Times. See for instance The Times, 8 Aug. 1906; 7 June 1909.}. Studies included Arabic,
law, and surveying\(^1\), while a special course of anthropology was added to the curriculum in 1908\(^2\). When they arrived in the Sudan they were appointed on probation as deputy inspectors, and remained in Khartoum for a further three months of instruction in Arabic, law and surveying\(^3\). Most of them were then sent to the various provinces and initiated into the service proper\(^4\). During their second year of service all British officials had to pass examinations in Arabic, and law, the results of which determined their seniority\(^5\).

Most of the university graduates remained in the Sudan until they retired. Some became provincial governors, or heads of departments, others reverted to the Egyptian civil service, and a few were seconded to the British minister in Abyssinia for service on

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\(^1\)Bonham Carter to Wingate, 19 Jan. 1906, SAD/278/1; Bonham Carter criticized the course at Oxford: '...Margoliouth's teaching seems to be almost useless...I really think it is worth considering whether all candidates should not be made to go to Cambridge...'; see also GGR - 1906, p.123.

\(^2\)GGR - 1908, p.160. An exception was made with regards to professional people such as agricultural graduates, who underwent their one year's training in the Sudan. Wingate to Cromer, 6 Apr. 1905, SAD/276/4.

\(^3\)CAO - 145, 17 Mar. 1904; H.C. Jackson, Sudan Days and Ways, (London 1954), p.26; Davies, pp.23-5. From 1912 the titles deputy and junior inspector were abolished. All inspectors were henceforth graded according to pay, and the title of senior inspector was reserved for one inspector in each province; see GGR - 1912, p.117.

\(^4\)Davies, pp.25-32; of the 45 civilians employed in 1912 only 7 served in government departments; GGR - 1912, p.105.

\(^5\)Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Services, Information for Candidates, June 1913, SAD/152/1/7; for other conditions see GGC,1 Nov. 1910, F0 - 867/1; see also Sudan Pension Ordinance, 1904, SAD/248/17; Sudan Pension Ordinance 1914, F0 867/5.
the Abyssinian side of the Sudan border. Judging by achievements, the system of selection and the training provided in the Sudan civil service were both well suited to the administrative requirements of the country.

The civil service was composed of university graduates, yet British officers were continuously added to its ranks. Officers who wanted to join had to resign their commission in the British army before being appointed to permanent posts in the administration. As a rule, these officers had to complete ten years service in the Egyptian army with at least five being spent in service of the Sudan government. However, these rules were not always followed and the appointment of officers to the civil service hindered the civilians' prospects of promotion. They see Military men being constantly brought over their heads... I am told by some of the civilians that they find themselves lower on the seniority list after three or four

1 Of the 50 civilians appointed in the years 1901-6, 29 had become governors and 10 heads of departments by 1929. SPS - pp. 17-37.

2 For Wingate's analysis of the success of the civilians in government service, see GGR - 1907, pp. 138-9; when a suggestion was made to exchange British civil servants between Egypt and the Sudan, Wingate objected. He stated that the Anglo-Egyptians: '...lack all those essentials of training which are so very important to the Sudan...', Wingate to Currie, 11 Aug. 1911, SAD/297/1.

3 CAO - 84, 14 June 1901.

4 Wingate to Cromer, 3 Apr. 1905, SAD/276/3.

5 GGC, 1 Nov. 1910, FO 867/1.
years service than when they first joined.\textsuperscript{1} In order to overcome this problem Clayton proposed in 1914 to establish the Sudan Political Service. All officers undertaking administrative work were to belong to the new service, while civilians, as before, would belong to the Sudan civil service\textsuperscript{2}. Despite Wingate's agreement the plan did not materialize\textsuperscript{3}. As a result of the outbreak of the World War, many of the officers who were to have formed the nucleus of the new service, were called up. The only result of Clayton's proposal was that the administrative branch of the Sudan civil service became to be known as the Sudan Political Service.

Clashes between military and civil administrators were not only the result of problems of seniority. Some of the officers—

...were inclined to look on the Varsity recruit as a newly joined subaltern and expect the same attitude of mind as that of a young soldier...In consequence these particular officers were out to teach these young men where they got off...\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1} Bonham Carter to Wingate, 30 June 1910, SAD/469/2/1; Wingate who commented on Bonham Carter's letter wrote: '...You will observe that Bonham Carter is on the war path on behalf of the improved conditions for civilians...', Wingate to Clayton, 2 July 1910, SAD/469/2/2. Armbruster, one of the Sudan's senior civilians, complained '...that the action of the government in filling up the senior administrative posts in the Civil Service by permanently appointing to them soldiers of our own age has completely prejudiced such chances as we had originally of advancement in that service...'. Armbruster to Cromer, 24 Sep. 1910, FO 633/19. A case in point was the appointment of Major Howard as governor of the Red Sea province in 1905, over the head of Kerr, who was senior inspector; see Phipps to Wingate, 4 Sep. 1905, SAD/277/2.

\textsuperscript{2} Clayton to Wingate, (private), 8 Apr. 1914, SAD/469/6/2.

\textsuperscript{3} Wingate to Clayton, (private), 16 Apr. 1914, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{4} Memoirs of Ryder, 1905-1916, (typescript), SAD/400/8, p. 66.
By and large, the military mistrusted the civilians as a class. This attitude prevailed throughout Wingate's governor-generalship and was shared by many of the senior military officials.

Although there were no written regulations to exclude non-British Europeans from the Sudan civil service, the accepted policy was against accepting them. Thus when Wingate advertised for a director for the department of agriculture, Cromer wrote: "...I have erased the words "British Subjects", not that there is any intention of engaging others, but there is no necessity to say so in any official documents." One of the applicants for the post was a British subject who had served for many years in Cyprus, "...there is something Levantine about him and as you know that fact alone makes him undesirable..." An applicant for the post of private secretary was turned down as he spoke "...English with a slightly foreign accent..." If this was

1See for instance Matthews to Wingate, 19 July 1903, SAD/273/7; Wingate to Cromer, 22 Jan. 1904, SAD/275/1; Rein to Wingate, 15 Nov. 1909, SAD/448/1; Phipps to Wingate, 2 June 1910, SAD/296/1/3, Phipps suggested getting rid of Armbruster, a senior civilian official, who had "...been trying to get up a feeling against the military man. I am told they all call it the "Armbruster League"..."; Wingate to Phipps, 16 Apr. 1911, SAD/300/4/1; Phipps to Wingate, 2 Feb. 1913, SAD/185/2/1; Phipps suggested that although Currie was not yet qualified for pension "...it might suit the Government to let him go..."; see also Willis's diary, 28 March 1911; 25 Aug. 1911; 20 Dec. 1912; 12 Jan. 1913; SAD/210/2. Sir Harold MacMichael in his interview on 6 June 1967, confirmed these remarks. He stated, however, that relations between the civilian inspectors and their military superiors, were on the whole cordial. For Slatin's relations to the civilians see pp. 98-100.

2Cromer to Wingate, 10 Apr. 1905, SAD/234/3.


4Stack's minutes to an application for private secretary by Mr. Alfred W. Allsworth, 10 Oct. 1905, SAD/234/4.
the attitude towards British subjects with a foreign background, it is hardly surprising that very few foreigners succeeded in penetrating the Sudan civil service. The few Germans and Austrians who held posts in the lower ranks of the Sudan administration were discharged and deported on the outbreak of the World War.

c. Egyptian and Syrian officials.

The lower echelons of the Sudan administration were staffed with Egyptian, Lebanese and Sudanese officials, with a sprinkling of Greeks, Maltese and other nationalities added for good measure. During the Mahdia many Egyptians, Copts, and muwalladin, who had served in the Turco-Egyptian government, continued to serve in the central administration. Following the reconquest, many of them made their way to Egypt, hoping for compensation from the Egyptian

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1 SPS; Wingate to Bonus, 23 Aug. 1906, SAD/279/2; The only notable exception was Slatin, see p.101.

2 Assistant Director of Intelligence, to all Heads of Departments, 3 Nov. 1914, SAD/192/2.

3 In the official correspondence of the Sudan government the Lebanese were generally referred to as Syrians.

4 Muwallad (pl Muwalladin): the term by which persons of Egyptian or partially Egyptian origin were known in the Sudan where they constituted an important section of the towns' population.

5 For details, see Holt, Mahdist State, pp.233-5; see also SIR - 60, 25 May - 31 Dec. 1898, pp.54-8.
government. Most of these old officials were unemployable, and the new administration was forced to recruit new officials for most of its services.

The principle adopted during the reconquest was that '...whenever sufficiently educated Sudanese have been found to place in official positions, they have invariably been given the preference and with good results...'. There were only a few qualified Sudanese, hence a system was adopted '...of appointing Mamurs and police officers who have been brought up in the military school under British supervision and who are directly responsible to their superior British officers...'. The British authorities attained several advantages by recruiting Egyptian army officers, rather than civilians. Officers could more easily be replaced by Sudanese, by re-transferring them.

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1 Over 2000 Egyptian ex-officials and old soldiers came to Egypt in 1898 to demand their arrears of pay '...they received only a pound or two and were soon starving on the streets...' Wingate who was then in charge of the Sudan office in Cairo, sent them back to Khartoum. He was later informed by Talbot, then head of intelligence, that their resettlement in the Sudan was impossible, and that '...a lot of the poor devils will die of starvation...'. As a result of representations by Butrus Pasha Ghali, the Egyptian foreign minister, the Commissioners of the Debt granted £E 65,000 to solve the problem. See Wingate to Kitchener, 7 Feb. 1899, SAD/269/2; Talbot to Wingate, 10 Feb. 1899, Ibid; Butrus Ghali to Cromer, 25 May 1899, FO 407/151; Cromer to Salisbury, 8 Jan. 1900, FO 78/5086.

2 There were exceptions to this rule. Thus the pilots of the steamers department, who had served during the Turco-Egyptian period and the Mahdia, continued to serve under the Anglo-Egyptian government. R. Hill, Sudan Transport, p. 58.

3 Notes on Civil Administration in the Sudan | n.d. 1897? |, SAD/266/1/3; see also Cromer to Salisbury, 4 Dec. 1898, FO 407/147.
to the army. Thus the Egyptians in the police force, who were drafted *en masse* from the Egyptian army, were replaced by Sudanese as early as 1903. The Sudan railways which were built during the reconquest by the Egyptian army were put on a civilian basis by recruiting and training Sudanese to replace the Egyptians. Furthermore, the Egyptian army officers did not receive their pensions from the Sudan government and hence were cheaper to maintain. Lastly, the British authorities had adopted a policy of transferring the Egyptians from post to post so as to prevent them getting involved in local politics or deriving material benefits from their official standing. Clearly it was easier to transfer military men, who were more disciplined and less burdened by family considerations, than

1 *CAO* - 138, 14 Dec. 1901. According to this order all Egyptian officers who had served in the Sudan administration for five years had to revert to the army. The fact that an Egyptian officer due to promotion had to revert to the army or forego his promotion was an additional inducement to return to the army.

2 *GGR* - 1902, p.141; *CAO* - 3, 10 Jan. 1903. This order fixed the rates of pay for the Sudan police. Sudanese of all ranks were granted higher pay than Egyptians; see also pp.123-4.

3 Report on Soudan Railways by Kaimakan G.B. Macaulay, 2 Dec. 1900, FO 403/312. Macaulay reported that most of his staff were Egyptian soldiers who would soon be transferred to the reserve, and suggested replacing them by coolies. Parker, who joined the railways department in 1903, reported that only a few Egyptian artisans were left. The engine drivers were British, Greek, Armenian, and Italian, while the lower ranks were mainly recruited from the Ta'izish; see A.C. Parker, Memoirs of the early days, n.d., SAD/294/10.

4 The Sudan Government Pension Ordinance 1904, excluded all officers of the Egyptian army from serving towards a Sudanese pension, SAD/248/17.
Wingate reaffirmed the policy of transferring Egyptian ma'mūrs at short intervals when he wrote to Phipps: '...They [Egyptians] invariably become involved with the local people in an undesirable manner and their actions tend to throw discredit on the British Administration of the Sudan...'.

Certain departments, however, required qualified personnel and could not be supplied by the Egyptian army. Hence, most of the officials of the education and legal departments had of necessity to be recruited from Egyptian civilians. The British authorities soon realized that the better class of Egyptian officials could not be induced to serve in the Sudan unless offered considerable financial benefits. Currie complained that '...the Egyptian school master well paid as he is in Egypt...will not come to the Sudan for less than about 2½ times his pay - the good man I mean - Bonham [Carter] the legal secretary | is even greater |

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1. This can easily be ascertained by following the lists of appointments and transfers which were published regularly in the Sudan Gazette. To give a few examples: Ismā'īl 'Abd al-Ghaffār was appointed ma'mūr of Khartoum in July 1899, transferred to Wad Madani in Dec. 1899, and re-transferred into the army in May 1901. Muḥammad Fāhmi, was appointed ma'mūr at Taqalī in Jam. 1901, served for a few months at Karkūj and was transferred to Wad Madani in Sep. 1901.

2. Wingate to Phipps, 5 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/2.

3. For a full list of the personnel of the education department in 1902, see SG - 41, Nov. 1902, 'Opening Ceremony of the Gordon Memorial College'. For details of the personnel of the legal department, see pp. 263, 268-270, 278-282.

4. The Sudan Pension Ordinance 1904', included the Egyptians in Class 'B' which entitled them to retire after the age of 45 and with a higher pension than Sudanese employed in similar posts, SAD/248/17.
difficulties than I am... Thus following the death of the Egyptian
civilian inspector of Arabic in 1908, Currie decided to fill the va-
cancy by employing an Egyptian army officer, after having failed to
secure the services of a qualified teacher. The alternative course
of offering higher salaries, in order to attract qualified Egyptians,
was dismissed on financial grounds. Some of the Egyptians who served
in the Sudan increased their income by accepting bribes. Others who
did not resort to corruption soon realized that there was no future
in the Sudan for them. The result was that many of the Better Egyp-
tian officials left the country as soon as they had earned sufficient
funds to re-start their careers elsewhere.

Financial considerations were not the major reason for the reluc-
tance of the government to employ Egyptians. The British authorities
questioned the loyalty of their Egyptian subordinates and resented
their nationalistic sympathies. Following the Omdurman mutiny of

1Currie to Wingate, 6 Sep. 1907, SAD/281/3.

2GGR - 1908, pp.147-8. A correspondent of The Times, commenting on
the unwillingness of Egyptians to serve in the Sudan wrote:'...I think
that the Sudan will ultimately find reason to congratulate itself over
their disinclination to go there...'; The Times, 10 Jan. 1908.

3Bonham Carter to Wingate, 25 May 1909, SAD/287/3; '...it was decided
that a decent standard of competence should be insisted on and an ade-
quate salary paid, but the Financial office cannot resist cheap lab-
our...'; see also Nason to Wingate, 8 Aug. 1902, SAD/272/6; Nason sug-
gested increasing the pay of Egyptian land measurers, who were accep-
ting bribes.

4See for instance GGR - 1907, p.185; GGR - 1908, p.687; in both cases
governors of southern provinces complained of the constant changes of
personnel, caused by the low salaries; see also Willis's diary, 27
Sep. 1910, 1 Jan. 1912, SAD/210/2.
1900, Sa'id Shuqayr wrote that Egyptian nationalists '...mix with natives and transmit their spirit to them...'.2 Cromer who was then consul-general shared this view when he wrote that the Egyptian officials were '...almost without exception, lazy, corrupt and tyrannical...'.3 In consequence the Sudan authorities decided to reduce the Egyptian army and to increase the number of British supervisors in the civil administration.4 Wingate was well aware that his policy was detrimental to the future of Egyptian administrators in the Sudan and wrote:

...Our principle is not to allow these young officers to hold any of the higher Civil appointments, which are reserved exclusively for the young British Civilians. Therefore they have no hope of advancement in the Civil Service...5

This policy was consistently pursued throughout Wingate's governor-generalship, and was intensified during the World War as a result

1Sa'id Pasha Shuqayr, Sir (1868-1938), Lebanese of a distinguished Protestant family. Graduate of the Syrian Protestant College (later renamed American University of Beirut); 1889-1900 served in the Egyptian ministry of finance in Cairo and Suakin; 1900-21 served in the Sudan financial department first as chief accountant and from 1907 as director general of accounts. From 1921 until his death he was financial adviser of the Sudan government. Hill, BD, p.326.

2Shoucair to Wingate, 27 Jan. 1900, FO 78/5086.

3Cromer to Salisbury, 8 June 1900, FO 633/6.

4See for instance Wingate to Cromer, 28 Nov. 1900, FO 141/356; Wingate to Cromer, 14 Jan. 1901, FO 141/364. Following the Wad Habuba rebellion in 1908, Wingate wrote: '...I am rather inclined to think that we shall be able to trace the troubles back to malpractices on the part of our Egyptian coadjutors...'. Wingate to Stack, 12 May 1908, SAD/284/15; see also pp.56-7.

5Wingate to Cromer, 9 May 1906, SAD/278/5.
of Wingate's belief that a substantial number of Egyptian officials and officers '...sympathise with the Turks, or at any rate they do not sympathise with the new protectorate nor the appointment of the Sultan...'. The pronounced fear of Egyptian nationalism and of its effects on the people of the Sudan, brought about a plan for the reorganization of Gordon College. The reasons for the proposal were clearly stated by Wingate:

...The Egyptian teaching element in the College has undoubtedly introduced a good deal of noxious propaganda of the Nationalistic type amongst the students... There are only two alternatives within the range of practical politics; either we must leave things as they stand and thereby risk increasing the new spirit which we are doing our utmost to eradicate, or we must anglicise the teaching...this will enable me to reduce a few of the purely Egyptian staff - a step of which the latter will not fail to realize the true significance; whereas parents will also understand our intentions and will appreciate

1Wingate to Savile (private), 19 Apr. 1915, SAD/195/2; see also Wingate to Pearson (private), 22 May 1915, SAD/195/6.

2'Gordon College - Proposed reorganisation of the Upper School', n. d. July 1915? SAD/196/5. The plan was to reduce the Egyptian teaching staff by amalgamating the three courses of the upper school. It was justified by Crowfoot, the new director of education, on financial grounds. It also proposed discontinuing the course for primary school teachers on the grounds that the supply of teachers exceeded the demand. In a private and confidential letter to Wingate, Crowfoot was more specific: '...neither on political grounds nor on educational grounds can we defend the continued use of Arabic as the medium of higher instruction...'. Crowfoot to Wingate, 28 July, 1915, SAD/196/2.

Another reason why the dismissal of the Egyptian teaching staff was only undertaken in 1915, was that Currie the previous director of education did not share Wingate's views and defended his Egyptian subordinates on more than one occasion. In 1908 he wrote '...to suppose that an English community can rule in Khartoum...is to imagine a vain thing. And for better or worse it is the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan...', Currie to Wingate, 25 June 1908, SAD/282/6.
our efforts to prevent the Egyptianization ... of their children...1

In pursuing this policy the British authorities believed that they were serving the best interests of the Sudanese. The racial antagonism between the Egyptians and the Sudanese was regarded by the British as an indisputable fact; and became one of the basic considerations for the administration of the Sudan2.

...The fact is that the best class of Mohammedan Egyptians will not as a rule go to the Sudan,... Every dishonest or incompetent Egyptian official who is employed, tends to keep alive in the minds of the Sudanese the traditions of past Egyptian misgovernment, and to widen the breach which unquestionably separates the two races....3

With this in mind, the British authorities started looking for

1Wingate to Kitchener (private), 3 Aug. 1915, (26th Anniversary of the Battle of Toski), SAD/196/3. A similar policy was followed in the provinces, where Egyptian teachers were encouraged to resign; see Wingate to Wilson (private), 13 June 1915, SAD/195/9; By Sep. 1915, Crowfoot was able to report that seven Egyptian teachers had been dismissed or transferred from Gordon College, with the full agreement of the grand aâdi, Crowfoot to Wingate, 18 Sep. 1915, SAD/196/5.

2Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani, head of the Khatmîyya was one of the main propagators of anti-Egyptian views. He stated on several occasions that the people of the Sudan would never be content as long as the Egyptians stood between them and the British administrators. See for instance Ferguson to Wingate, 16 June 1902, SAD/272/4/2; Nason to Wingate, 23 July 1903, SAD/273/7. Whether this attitude was shared by the majority of the Sudanese, is open to grave doubts. MacMichael wrote in 1932, when he was civil secretary, that in the years 1905-19 the educated Sudanese regarded the Egyptians as their co-religionists who understood them more easily than the British administrators did: '...The somewhat venal methods of the Egyptian official, moreover, consorted with their own indinations...', MacMichael to Campbell, (Acting High Commissioner of Egypt), 10 Sep. 1932, SAD/403/7/4; see also pp. 56-7.

3GGR - 1902, p.16; see also SAR - 1902, p. 79. Cromer quoted from the report of the Sudan agent, Count Gleichen, that most of the Mohammedan Egyptians '...are absolute failures and have to be replaced by Syrians or occasionally Copts...!'
alternative officials to fill the gap until the Sudanese were ready to undertake these duties themselves. Their choice fell on two groups who were felt to have more in common with British interests than with Egyptian nationalism, namely the Copts and the Lebanese Christians\textsuperscript{1}. The Copts were first introduced into the Sudan by Muhammad 'Ali in order to manage the country's accounts\textsuperscript{2}. Many of them settled in the Sudan and served subsequent governments remaining in service throughout the Mahdia\textsuperscript{3}. The establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian administration brought many more Copts to the Sudan. They acted as head clerks, translators or ṣarrāfs in many of the provinces, and in several departments\textsuperscript{4}. Of the 281 Egyptians permanently employed in the post and telegraph department, more than half were Copts\textsuperscript{5}, and the proportion of Copts was even higher among the apprentices\textsuperscript{6}. There were also many Copts in the financial and civil

\textsuperscript{1}Cromer was reluctant to employ Copts or Lebanese in the Sudan, and it was following his criticism of their growing numbers in the administration that Wingate wrote: '...Your remarks on the Syrian and Coptic Bashkatibs are also entirely in accord with my own - I would certainly prefer Moslems...', Wingate to Cromer, 13 Apr. 1903, SAD/273/4. Wingate's subsequent actions prove, however, that he did not persist in this view.

\textsuperscript{2}Holt, Mahdist State, pp.14-5.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid, pp.229, 233-4; see also Yūsuf Mikhā'īl MS., 15 Dec. 1934

\textsuperscript{4}CAO - 401, 15 Mar. 1906.

\textsuperscript{5}GGR - 1908, p.263.

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid, p.261; Forty out of the fifty Egyptian apprentices who joined the department in 1908, were Copts. In 1906 there were twenty four Copts out of a total of forty six; GGR - 1906, p.418.
secretaries' departments, while Lebanese Christians predominated in the governor-general's office and in the intelligence and medical departments. The only departments where, for obvious reasons, the majority of employees were Egyptian Muslims, were the education department and the legal secretary's office.

The importance of the Lebanese officials in the Sudan, was clearly expressed by Wingate in 1908. Following the Young Turk revolution, he feared that Lebanese would find employment in the Lebanon and would cease to come to the Sudan, and wrote: "...so far they have been the backbone of our Sudan Clerical Staff..." The Lebanese

1When Sa'id Shuqayr wanted to retire in 1910, Slatin opposed the appointment of a British director of accounts: "...I don't believe any European can be gogood D.of acc. in the office where Arabic is the dominant language - if Seid won't stay try to get a Copte, a Jew or another Syrian...", Slatin to Wingate, 11 May 1910, SAD/296/2.

2H.C. Squires, The Sudan Medical Service, pp. 3-4, 8; in 1908 there were over thirty Lebanese on the staff of the medical department. Of the ten listed officials employed in the governor-general's office in the years 1903-6, nine were Christians. In the intelligence department there were two Muslim employees out of a total of eleven (these figures do not include the British personnel), CAO - 21, 7 Mar. 1903; CAO - 1?!, 25 Jan. 1905; CAO - 401, 15 Mar. 1906; Owen to Wingate, 6 Feb. 1907, SAD/280/2, Owen wrote that Samuel Atiya and Na'üm Shuqayr were the most informed men in the intelligence department; see also pp. 111-2.

3CAO - 21, 7 Mar. 1903; CAO - 1?!, 25 Jan. 1905; CAO - 401, 15 Mar. 1906; see also pp. 278-282.

4Gar - 1908, p. 156. The Lebanese were also predominant in the clerical staff of the Egyptian army; see Memorandum on the Egyptian Army (typescript), by Naum Shoucair, 16 Mar. 1899, SAD/269/3; see also SG - 43, Jan. 1903. On the occasion of the anniversary of the Khedive 'Abd al-Majid's accession, a levee and garden party were held at Khartoum. Of those present from the governor-general's office, the intelligence department, and the legal and civil secretaries' offices, eight were British officials, 19 were Lebanese and Copts, and only three were Muslims.
Christians were well suited for the responsible positions they held, both on account of their qualifications and on account of their loyalty to Britain. They were vehemently opposed to the Ottoman Empire, and supported the anti-nationalist political circles in Egypt. Their anti-Ottoman sentiments were clearly expressed when the Syrian community of Khartoum offered its services to Britain at the outbreak of the First World War. Moreover, they wrote to Wingate:

...That until a just and upright government has been established in our country, we, the Syrians in the Sudan shall be considered no longer as Ottoman subjects but as a separate nationality owing allegiance only to Great Britain.

In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Lebanese were regarded as second only to the British themselves in their loyalty to the British authorities in the Sudan.

1 This is verified by Na'īm Shuqayr's efforts to sponsor pro-British articles in al-Mugattam; see also Wingate to Herbert, 23 Jan. 1908, SAD/282/1. Wingate directed Herbert to ask the Khedive to promote Sa'id Shuqayr to the rank of Mīrmāran. Of course I thoroughly understand that there may be objections to further promotions of Syrians.

2 The Syrian Community in Khartoum, 11 Oct. 1914, SAD/192/1. The letter was signed by George Shaheen, Ibrahim Dimitri, Samuel Atiya and nine others, and sent to Wingate.

3 Syrian Community to Wingate, 29 Nov. 1914, SAD/192/2 (signed), Juredini (editor of the Sudan Times); the Syrian request was turned down by Wingate following Bonham Carter's advice. Bonham Carter feared that it might compromise their position with Turkey and suggested to treat them as friendly aliens. Bonham Carter to Symes, 30 Nov. 1914; Minutes by Wingate, 30 Nov. 1914, SAD/192/2. See also E. Atiyah, An Arab tells his story, pp. 25-43; Atiyah relates how as a child in Omdurman he came to worship Britain and regard British administration as an ideal.
d. The training of Sudanese personnel.

The policy of gradual Sudanization of the administration was laid down even before the reconquest was completed. Cromer defined this policy more clearly when he visited Khartoum in 1903:

...It is, to say the least, very difficult to govern any country properly without some administrative assistance from its inhabitants. In the Soudan the whole governing agency is practically foreign, for it must not be forgotten that the Egyptian is quite as much a foreigner as an Englishman...I do not doubt, therefore, that Sir Reginald Wingate...will do all in his power to create a class of Sudanese who will before long be capable of filling some of the subordinate posts under the Government. High education is, of course, for the time being quite out of the question, but if we limit our ambition to reading, writing, and arithmetic we ought to be able to produce some satisfactory results...

With this in view, the Sudanese authorities set about the establishment of an educational system geared to provide Sudanese officials for the lower grades of the administration. They also decided to appoint as many Sudanese as possible to posts where education was not regarded as essential. '...To satisfy religious feeling in each Mudiria, two Ulema, one Imam, and one Muassim were appointed...'

Efforts were made to reopen as many kuttāb as possible by offering government subsidies to the teachers. In the area of central

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1Notes on Civil Administration in the Sudan | n.d. 1997 | SAD/266/1/3

2Lord Cromer's Speech at Khartoum, 28 Jan. 1903, PO 633/25. (This speech was delivered at a dinner of the British officers, in honour of Captain Bailey).

31902, p.114.

4SG - 61, Apr. 1904. The monthly subsidy paid to teachers was £E 3. The Sudanese kuttābs were traditionally known as Khalwas. However, in all the official documents, the term kuttāb is used for the Qurʾān schools.
government, the Sudanese filled the subordinate posts in the police and prisons department\(^1\). The steamers department recruited ex-slaves in Omdurman to man its wood stations and dockyards, while '...the sailors and the reises were all berberines...'\(^2\) The Sudan medical department recruited Sudanese barbers (*hallâq*) to augment its services\(^3\). By 1908 one hundred paid sanitary barbers were employed by the department throughout the Sudan. Their service included the registration of births and deaths, vaccination, and minor operations. Sudanese women were trained to become nurses but were reported to be '...indolent, incapable of learning and quite unfit to be left in charge...'\(^4\) Ta’āîsha played a predominant role in the Sudan railways, while the Hadendowa became skilled bridge builders\(^5\). Even the intelligence department had several Sudanese on its pay-roll\(^6\). In

\(^1\)GGR - 1904, pp.104-9.

\(^2\)W. Scott Hill, Memoir, 'Ten Years in the Sudan', n.d., SAD/466/4/4. (Scott Hill arrived in the Sudan in 1904, as deputy director of the steamers department. In 1914 he rejoined the navy and later became admiral). The Berberines, were the Barbara who inhabited Sukkût and Maḥâs in the Wâdī Halfâ province.

\(^3\)GGR - 1902, p.120; the utilization of barbers for sanitary duties, was also common in Egypt. R.L. Tignor, *Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt, 1882-1914*, (Princeton 1966), pp.210-3.

\(^4\)GGR - 1903, pp.224-5.

\(^5\)GGR - 1908, p.628; for details regarding labour policy, see pp.387-97.

\(^6\)See p.111; see also Wingate to Savile, 15 Nov. 1914, SAD/192/2.
the provinces Sudanese were appointed as shaykhs and nāzirās, but only the lowest-paid clerks in the provincial headquarters were of Sudanese origin.

Education was therefore clearly required, and the director of the education department defined its aims in his first annual report. These included the creation of an artisans' class; the diffusion of an elementary education to enable the masses to understand the elements of government; and the training of an indigenous administrative class. In order to achieve these aims, different types of educational institutions were required. Instructional workshops were established in Kassala, Omdurman, and at the Gordon College, where pupils were instructed in metalwork, woodwork, stone-cutting, and in ginning of cotton. By 1908, the fifty-four boys who had graduated from the workshops had found employment in their respective trades. However, the better class Sudanese refused to send their children to these workshops. The governor of Khartoum expressed his concern when he wrote: 'I lately tried to get some apprentices for the Gordon College Workshops but failed. All want to become Effendis... Are not the seeds of a second Indian experience being sown...'

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1 See for instance CAO – 21, 7 Mar. 1903, 'Promotions and Increases of Pay'.
3 GGR – 1908, pp. 149-50, 167-8; see also Handbook, p. 314.
4 GGR – 1908, p. 572; see also The Sudan, a Record of Progress, 1898-1947, pp. 18-9.
departments established their own workshops. Sudanese were trained as telegraphists in a special school at Khartoum. The steamers and boats department had over sixty trainees at its Khartoum workshop, while the railways trained their required artisans at Atbara. In 1908, the first Sudanese youths were sent to India to be trained as forest rangers.

In order to disseminate the rudiments of education among the mass of the population, the government relied on the existing kuttābs. A few model kuttābs were established in the northern provinces, with teachers trained and paid by the government. Their syllabus included the traditional teaching of the Qur'ān, to which the rudiments of writing, reading, arithmetic, and geography, were added.

The third aim set down by Currie was the training of an administrative class. To achieve this aim, six primary schools were established at Halfa, Suakin, Berber, Omdurman, Khartoum, and Wad Madani.

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1 GGR - 1903, p.112.
2 GGR - 1906, pp.494-5.
3 R. Hill, Sudan Transport, pp.76-7.
4 Wingate to Cromer, 14 Feb. 1908, FO 141/416.
5 By 1912 there were forty-two modèle kuttābs in the northern provinces; GGR - 1912, p.292.
6 GGR - 1902, pp.75-6; GGR - 1903, p.22; GGR - 1904, p.38; GGR - 1908, p.298.
7 GGR - 1912, p.292. There was no primary school in Dongola, owing to Jackson's opposition to any English being taught in his province. He feared that the introduction of more advanced education, would tend to draw children away from agriculture. GGR - 1902, p.261; GGR - 1910, p.226.
By 1903 there were 600 boys studying at these schools, all receiving an English education. The graduates of these schools were directed by the government to take up employment in whatever department most required their services. In 1905 all the school graduates were sent to the survey department to undertake the cadastral survey of Berber province. '...The saving effected...by the provision of these native trained boys may be estimated at from £E 3000 to £E 4000 per annum in wages...'

By the end of 1906, over seventy graduates had been absorbed in the central administration and in the provinces. There were, however, two pressing needs which could not be met by these schools, namely the supply of teachers and of qādis. Consequently, a training course for young shaykhs was established in Omdurman in 1902. Its pupils were from selected Arab families, and went through a three years course of training to become teachers in the government's kuttābs. In 1903 a qādis' training course was set up at Gordon College. The qādis' and teachers' courses were combined

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1 GGR - 1903, pp.19-20. Subsidiary subjects such as geography and history were, however, taught in Arabic. Whereas in Egypt, English was the medium of instruction; GGR - 1904, p.35.

2 GGR - 1905, pp.50-1, 224-6.

3 GGR - 1906, pp.216-7; the distribution of these graduates was as follows: education - 10; religious courts - 8; survey - 13; post and telegraph - 25; railways - 12; Red Sea province - 2; and one each in the departments of justice, customs, and public works.

4 GGR - 1902, p.76; GGR - 1903, p.19.

5 Ibid.
in the first three years of their studies, and two additional years were added for specialization in the respective fields. Up to 1908 Arabic was the medium of education. However, the standards achieved were so low that the administration decided to send future candidates to the primary schools for their initial education. The forty teachers and qadīs who graduated up to the end of 1908, were all absorbed in the government service. Each of them represents a saving of something like £E 100 a year in salary, as compared with the rate of pay of an Egyptian with corresponding qualifications. The immediate result was the dismissal of as many Egyptian qadīs as possible. When Bonham Carter wanted to appoint Egyptian qadīs in 1907 and in 1916, he had to overcome Wingate's reluctance before the appointments were approved.

By 1904, Currie had come to realize that it would be necessary to open a secondary school in order to cope with the growing requirements of the administration. Currie argued that:

...in a country like this, if a man responsible for educational development does not submit every phase of his policy to the test of what the economic needs of the country are...he

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1. GGR - 1908, p.154; the government's reasons for not introducing an English education were '...to prevent these young Sheikhs from being so Europeanised...that they may not become permanently out of touch with their subsequent environment and duties...'; Ibid.

2. Ibid.


4. GGR - 1904, pp.34-6.
will merely walk in the old educational rut... ¹

Hence, prior to the establishment of the secondary school, he surveyed the needs of the various government departments and concluded that a technical trend was more urgently required. Two courses were, therefore, started in order to supply the needs of the departments of survey, irrigation, and public works, a two-year course for surveyors and a four-year course for subordinate engineers ². Owing to financial difficulties in 1909-10, the final year of the engineers' course had to be cancelled. Nevertheless, none of the graduates had difficulty in finding employment in government service ³.

The three southern provinces were not included in these educational schemes. The initiative taken by southern governors in establishing schools in their provinces was rebuked by Currie, who feared that the schools would help in spreading Islam ⁴. The only educational facilities provided by the government for the inhabitants of the south were those required by the military administration. In 1903 the first thirty boys from the southern provinces were admitted to a three years course at Gordon College. '...By this plan it is hoped that the

¹ GGR - 1905, p.55.
³ SAR - 1909, p.74; SAR - 1910, pp.90-1.
⁴ Boulnois to Currie, Jan. 1904, SAD/103/7/2; Currie to Boulnois, Jan. 1904, Ibid. When a similar suggestion was put forward in 1906, it was again turned down. Hill to Currie, 19 Dec. 1906, Ibid; Currie to Civil Secretary, 2 Feb. 1907, Ibid. See also GGR - 1902, pp.78-9. For details about missionary education, see pp. 230-9, 254-9.
efficiency and status of the future black officer may be considera-
ably raised...1 The scheme was further developed a year later by
the decision to establish a permanent military school at Khartoum2.
Thirty Sudanese graduates from the government's primary schools were
admitted yearly into the cadets school for a three-year course. Fol-
lowing their graduation they were drafted as officers into the army,
thus replacing Egyptian officers3. A special effort was made in the
southern provinces to substitute Sudanese for the Egyptian Muslim
army-clerks. By 1911, Asser reported that the army was '...on a
fair way to the extinction of the Egyptian from such stations...'

He added, however, that:

...the Sudanese Katibs of the Equatorial Companies, have...too
much of the Effendi about them...Education seems to deprive the
Oriental of any standing qualities he may have possessed and
replaces them by an effeminacy which seeks for soft jobs...5

The aims set down by Currie, on his assuming the directorship of

1GGR - 1903, p.18.
2GGR - 1904, p.59; see also Historical Records - Military School
3GGR - 1908, p.209; when in 1912 difficulties were experienced in fin-
ding suitable cadets, Wingate wrote, '...this looks as if Currie was
confining his attention to Egyptians and half-breeds, of course we
have to provide education for this class, but not at the expense of
the Sudanese who are to be our real mainstay in the future...'; Win-
gate to Phipps, 21 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2.

4Report by Colonel Asser on his tour of Inspection in the Bahr-el
4Report 28 Aug.- 9 Sep. 1911, SAD/301/3; see also Wingate to Currie,
4Dec. 1912, SAD/183/3, Currie was instructed to recruit suitable
Sudanese graduates to act as clerks in the Equatorial battalion.

5Asser to Wingate, 15 Sep. 1912, SAD/182/3/2.
Education in 1900, were partly achieved. By 1914 many graduates of the government primary schools and of the higher educational courses at Gordon College were employed in the lower ranks of the government and army administration¹. Even the sons of the three khalīfas and of many prominent Mahdist amīrs were absorbed in the government service². Shortly before retiring from his post, Currie proposed to make further changes by appointing Sudanese to higher administrative positions, even if efficiency suffered as a result³. This suggestion however, was not implemented. Only a preliminary step was undertaken in 1915, when the first Sudanese were appointed as sub-muḥāfīz. The full implementation of Currie's proposal had to wait until 1924⁴.

Certain sections of the population viewed the introduction of government-sponsored education into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan with great suspicion. They believed that government schools would give a Christian education and that school graduates would be forced to

¹By 1910, there was already a surplus of primary school graduates, seeking clerical jobs,'...If some of these youth...had only learned something about cotton how useful they might be...', Asser to Wingate, 12 Sep. 1910, SAD/297/3.

²List of the family of the Mahdi, the Khalifa, and of leading Mahdist Amirs, their place of residence and employment [n.d.1914?], SAD/106/2. None of the Mahdi's sons were employed by the government. Of the three khalīfas, 'Abdallāhī had nine sons in the government service, 'Alī Wad Hilū - five, and Muḥammad Sharīf - three.

³Currie to Wingate, 24 June 1914, SAD/190/3/2; Wingate to Currie, 1 July 1914, Ibid.

⁴Memorandum on the Future Status of the Sudan, Major General Sir L. Stack to Field Marshal Viscount Allenby, 25 May 1924, SAD/248/37; see also The Sudan a Record of Progress, pp.16-7.
become soldiers of officers.1 These suspicions prevailed in some of
the provinces and were particularly strong among the nomad tribes of
Kordofan and the Red Sea, with the result that progress was retarded.2
In the towns and larger villages progress was generally more rapid.
Yet the fact that a high percentage of the pupils were Egyptians or
muwalladīn caused deep concern to the administration, whose major aim
was to educate a bona fide Sudanese clerical class.3 Apart from Khartoum and Omdurman, where the general attitude towards education was
favourable, the Blue Nile and Sennar provinces were the strongest
supporters of education.4 It was in these two provinces that a voluntary
education tax was first imposed, following a suggestion made by
certain sections of the inhabitants.5 The Blue Nile province was also

1 Memorandum by Wingate on interview with Mudassir Ibrahim (late kateb
of the Khalifa), Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 11 Apr. 1899,
FO 407/151.

2 GGR — 1902, p.317; GGR — 1903, pp.74,96; GGR — 1904, p.105; GGR — 1906,
p.702; see also Willis’s diary, 14 Oct. 1911, SAD/210/2, who wrote:
'...the parents are giving a lot of trouble over the children of the
school, as a story had been circulated that the Govt. intends to take
all the pupils to Egypt to be soldiers...'; see also Handbook Kordofan,
p.110.

3 GGR — 1903, p.96, The governor of Suakin reported with concern that
out of 69 pupils at the primary school only 24 were Arabs and Sudanese.
The total number of pupils at the four government schools was 577, out
of whom only 180 were Sudanese; 179 muwalladīn; 128 Egyptians and the
remainder from numerous other nationalities. Ibid, part III, Appendix 'D'; see also Cromer to Wingate, 3 Feb. 1904, SAD/275/2, Cromer
who was deeply concerned, blamed Currie for the predominence of Egyp-
tians and muwalladīn in the schools.

4 See for instance GGR — 1902, p.310; GGR — 1904, p.121.

the pioneer of girls' education in the Sudan. This sphere was previously dominated by missionaries, and the government decided to get involved in it. In 1907, the first girls' school was opened in Rufa'a, by Shaykh Babikr Badri and following its inspection by Currie it received a regular government subsidy. The rapid growth of education, however, had its hazards. There were many parents who regarded education as a guarantee of a government post for their children. Hence the government, which was directly responsible for this attitude, was obliged to warn the parents that there was no certainty that their offspring would obtain government employment.

The conditions of service of Sudanese officials differed from those offered to Egyptians, Lebanese, or Europeans. According to the Sudan Pension Ordinance, all Sudanese officials belonged to 'Class A', and had to serve a minimum period of twenty-five years before retiring. Furthermore, Sudanese earned their pension at a lower rate than that offered to other officials. In 1914, the pension ordinance was amended, so as to prevent Egyptians earning less than £E 16 per month becoming eligible for pension under the more favourable conditions. The reason

1 GGR - 1905, p.41.
2 GGR - 1906, pp.223-4.
4 SG - 44, Feb. 1903.
6 The Sudan Pension Ordinance 1914, GGC, 8-9 Apr. 1914, FO 867/5.
was probably that by then there were sufficient Sudanese to fill these lower paid posts. In general, Sudanese were offered lower salaries than those paid to Egyptians or Syrians of equal qualifications. The reason for this was that the administration believed that an official serving in his own country should not qualify for the extra remuneration offered to foreigners. Even on the Sudan railways, the lower-paid Sudanese had to travel second or third class while on duty. In common with all other government officials, the Sudanese were prohibited from engaging in trade. Sudanese whom the government wanted to reward for their services received robes of honour or religious robes, which were bestowed by the governor-general, in preference to the Egyptian decorations, which were controlled by the Khedive.

The British community in Khartoum was on the whole a rather exclusive society. The British officers had their own club, and preferred the company of their fellow-countrymen to that of the Sudanese or Egyptian officials. There were, however, certain occasions when

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1 GGR - 1906, pp. 216-7, By then the government saved over £E 4000 per annum, through the lower rate of pay offered to Sudanese officials.

2 CAO - 1, 1 Jan. 1902, All officials who earned more than £E 300 per annum were entitled to free first class railway travel.

3 CAO - 99, 14 Aug. 1901.


5 For the relation of Wingate and Slatin to Egyptian and Sudanese officials, see pp. 56-7, 90-5.

6 Symes, Tour of Duty, p. 14; Hussey, Tropical Africa 1908-1944, pp. 4-5.
the British officers felt obliged to mix with the Muslim officials. Such an occasion was mawlid al-Nabi, and a description of the festivities by Balfour, one of the British officers, indicated the gulf that existed between the two peoples:

...I went to the weirdest show last Wednesday the Mohammedan feast of Mouled el-Nabbi...we were led to a table completely covered with dishes, on each of which was some form of cake or sweet more impossibly unwholesome than the next...In another crowd all held hands and jumped up and down making a noise like a dog barking in unison. This goes on until they get too giddy to stand or are sick...

In the provinces, relations were closer, especially in the outlying districts, where weeks would pass before the British inspector enjoyed the company of one of his compatriots. Yet the little evidence there is tends to show that the British inspectors did not regard their fellow officials very highly. The following passages from Wil- lis's diary, written when he was inspector at the Nahud district in Kordofan, illustrate his attitude to, and treatment of his subordinates.

...20 Mar. 1909...Had to beat el—Bashir for lying and playing the fool...Ali Gula is a fearful liar...16 Jan. 1912...Abu Zaid Hagar who is supposed to be Omda of these hills does not know even where they are...31 January 1912...The show at Port Sudan (the King's visit) seems to have been no end of a fantasia—all the Nazirs got putty medals and will all be too big for their boots...31 August 1912...Nazir |Ali Julla| is up to every game—

1 Hussey, who had a similar experience, related how he offered the food given to him by a faki, to his dog Mussa. Hussey's pony, was also honoured with a Muslim name, and was called Mufti, Ibid, pp.3,7.

2 Balfour to Lady F.Balfour | his mother |, 30 April 1907, SAD/303/6. The last paragraph of Balfour's description refers to the dhikr, a religious ceremony practiced by the sufī orders; see Trimingham, Islam, pp.146-8.
slavery, guns, female ivory, gunpowder—and has been collecting from all his folk to cover his expenses to Port Sudan which he says were £500 and were as a matter of fact nil...1

The absence of social relations between the British officials and the Egyptians and Sudanese is hardly surprising. They belonged to different civilizations and were of a different mentality and creed. Moreover, the British were taught to mistrust the Egyptians, and regarded the Sudanese as incompetent. Since many of the British believed that any sign of friendship or cordiality towards their co-officials would be interpreted as a sign of weakness, it is no wonder that they tended to place their relations with the inhabitants and non-British officials on an extremely autocratic and paternalistic footing2. Nonetheless, the British officials succeeded in establishing a direct link with the people of the Sudan, which was largely based on their sense of duty and on their just treatment of the inhabitants. Summing up the achievements of sixteen years of British rule in the Sudan, Symes wrote the following about the British administrators:

...The British official is recognised as the deus ex machina of a regenerated Sudan. He is not omnipotent...but he is just,

1Willis's diary, SAD/210/2; see also Colonel R.V. Savile, Diary of a tribute collecting tour in Kassala, Apr. 1903, SAD/427/3.

2In summing up the governorship of Gorringe in Sennar, Wingate wrote: '...He is severe, autocratic and determined and these qualities are very useful in this country up to a certain point...' In this instance Wingate decided not to renew Gorringe's contract, as he was dreaded not only by the Sudanese but also by his fellow British officers. Wingate to Cecil, 7 May 1904, SAD/275/4; see also E. Atiyah, An Arab tells his story, pp. 137-40. Atiyah described the arrogance of the British officials towards the Sudanese and Lebanese government employees.
he can organize and supervise, he has a passion to probe to the facts of a matter and, above all, in intention he is kindly and well disposed. His mistakes are, as often as not, attributed to his subordinate non-British officials; and his virtues have undoubtedly built the fabric of the new Sudan...

Wingate had a definite political aim when this memorandum was written, namely to sever the links between Egypt and the Sudan. Yet, whatever view one may take of this policy, Wingate's claim about the supreme position of the British administrators as compared to their fellow Egyptians, was fully corroborated by future events.

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2. See p. 57.

3. The comparative ease with which the Sudan administration was de-Egyptianized, following Stack's assassination in 1924, proved the weakness of the Egyptian element within the administration. However, the collaboration between the White Flag and Egyptian nationalists proved that Wingate's claim about the inherent hatred between Sudanese and Egyptians was no longer true. See Holt, The Sudan, pp. 130-33.
Chapter V.

Religious policy — Islam and Christianity.

The religious policy to be pursued by the Sudan government was first enunciated by Lord Cromer in 1899, in his speech at Omdurman. It was further elaborated by Kitchener in his memorandum to the provincial governors:

...Be careful to see that religious feelings are not in any way interfered with, and that, the Mohammedan religion is respected. At the same time, Fikis teaching different Tariks...should not be allowed to resume their former trade. In old days, these Fikis, who lived on the superstitious ignorance of the people, were one of the curses of the Soudan, and were responsible in a great measure for the rebellion. Mosques in the principal towns will be rebuilt; but private mosques, takias, zawiyas, Sheiks' tombs, & c., cannot be allowed to be re-established, as they generally formed centres of unorthodox fanaticism.

Cromer had also warned Salisbury against allowing Christian missionary activities in the Muslim provinces of the Sudan, even before the Condominium agreement was signed:

...It would in my opinion, be very unwise to take such action as would cause the extension of missionary enterprise to be regarded by the people of the Soudan as the first result of English interference.

In propagating this policy Cromer enjoyed the full support of the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, who regarded it as wise to restrain the undisciplined invasion of the Soudan by missionary agents...until

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1 Viscount Cromer's speech to the Sheikhs and Notables of the Soudan at Omdurman, 4 Jan. 1899, FO 633/25.

2 Memorandum to Mudirs, Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899, FO 78/5022; see also pp. 20-1.

3 Cromer to Salisbury, 11 Oct. 1898, FO 407/147.
the Government of the country is fully and firmly settled...\(^1\) These principles were followed, with certain modifications, throughout Wingate's governor-generalship. Orthodox Islam was actively supported, while Sufism, though unofficially recognized, was never completely trusted. The missionaries were allowed to proselytize in the southern provinces, but in the north they were restricted to educational and medical activities. This policy which implied the preservation of the status quo in the Muslim north whilst encouraging the gradual Christianization of the pagan tribes, was the first step in what in later years became known as Southern Policy.

\textbf{a. Islamic policy in the northern provinces}\(^2\).

The principle underlying the Sudan government's policy towards Islam was to encourage orthodox Islam while striving to lessen the impact of Sufism. The government aimed at establishing a Sudanese Muslim leadership which would find itself aligned to the interests of the established administration. It regarded Sufism as a movement based on superstition which could endanger the new regime by encouraging Mahdist uprisings. In order to promote its policy, the government issued a proclamation which was widely circulated throughout the Sudan. In it the government undertook to do everything in its power to encourage what it regarded as the true Islamic religion, by

\(^1\)Blyth to Cromer, 21 Feb. 1900, FO 407/155.

\(^2\)For a comprehensive study of Islam in the Sudan, see Trimingham, \textit{Islam}.
building mosques, encouraging waqfs, and by appointing 'ulamā' to teach the Shari'a, and act as qādis in the various provinces. However, those who were not within the sphere of orthodox Islam were warned against interfering in religious affairs. The proclamation was defined by Cromer as:

...an attempt on the part of the Sirdar to strengthen the orthodox body of Moslems which it had been his policy to form and support as against the numerous heretical Moslem sects of which the Sudan had ever been a hot-bed.

Another step in the same direction was the appointment of the 'Board of Ulema' in June 1901. All government decisions on matters regarding Islam were henceforth to require the sanction of the board. Yet once again Wingate's main worry was Sufism: '...Tarikas...have been rather on the increase but I hope with the aid of the Council of Ulema, to quietly but firmly deal with them...' In practice all religious questions were within Slatin's sphere of responsibility. The 'Board of Ulema' consisted of some of his closest friends whom he often consulted. By collaborating with the Board the government's

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1 For the administration of Islamic law by the qādis see pp.272-82.
2 Wingate to Cromer, 17 Jan. 1902, FO 141/371; the proclamation which was discussed by Wingate with the 'Board of Ulema', '...had a good effect in showing people that Govt. is generally opposed to the terika system which is a real danger requiring most careful attention...'. The proclamation was published in the Egyptian Journal Official, 14 Nov. 1901.
3 Adeney to Baylis, 21 Jan. 1902, CMSa/E/03/1902. Adeney, the secretary of the CMS in Egypt, was reporting an interview he had with Cromer.
4 Wingate to Cromer, 13 June 1901, SAD/271/6.
5 Ibid.
6 See pp.79-81.
decisions acquired an Islamic sanction. Reporting on certain of the Board's members, many years later, Willis wrote that they '...continue to play the "Vicars of Bray". They have not very much influence, but then I imagine they were not meant to have...'. There were several additional ways in which the government sought to propagate orthodox Islam. The authorities aided the establishment and maintenance of mosques, and assisted Muslims who went on pilgrimage to Mecca.

The government also supported the teaching of the Qur'ān in government-approved and subsidised kuttābs, whose teachers studied under orthodox Muslims. Lastly, the administration of justice in all spheres related to the personal status of Muslims was entrusted to the Muslim Shari'a Courts.

The erection of new mosques started immediately after the reconquest. In certain provinces most of the new mosques were privately built and financed by a method of subscription. Others were

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1 Willis to Slatin, 15 Mar. 1921, SAD/438/653; see also Butler's diary, 13 Oct. 1911, 21 Nov. 1911, SAD/400/10.

2 In 1911, Wingate suggested to send Sudanese 'ulamā' to study Muslim theology at Al-Azhar. As according to Slatin '...the alternative of sending Egyptian Ulema to Khartoum in order to teach Moslem Theology to the Sudanese, would be more harmful...'; Wingate to Kitbinder (private), 26 Oct. 1911, SAD/301/4; see also pp.175-7.

3 For details see pp. 272-8.

4 These mosques, which included ṣūfī zāwiya, were referred to as 'private mosques', in all the Sudan government reports, whilst the mosques subsidized by the government were defined as public. I have followed this terminology for reasons of clarity although this distinction does not exist in Islam.
officially recognized and received financial assistance from the government. By 1904 there were 413 mosques in the Sudan distributed over the northern provinces. Of these 189 were defined as 'Public Mosques' and 224 as 'Private Mosques'. Some of the public mosques were not only subsidized by the government but also built by the department of public works. Yet, by and large, the discrepancy in the number of mosques in the various provinces suggests that the initiative of the inhabitants and their financial resources played an important role. Provinces like Kordofan and Kassala had very few mosques. When the governor of Kassala requested government assistance in order to build a mosque in the province's capital, the government offered a subsidy of £20 on condition that the inhabitants raised an equal sum. By 1905 there was still no mosque in Kassala, while

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Public Mosques</th>
<th>Private Mosques</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berber</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongola</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>150</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gezira</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halfa</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>Kassala</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>Kordofan</td>
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<td>Sennar</td>
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1GGR - 1904, p.81. These mosques were distributed as follows:

2Ibid, p.34.

3The large concentration of mosques in the richer provinces is easy to comprehend. However, this fails to explain the large number of private mosques in Dongola as compared to Wadi Halfa, where most of the mosques were public. The re-establishment of 'private mosques' was a definite modification of Kitchener's Memorandum to Mudirs, see p.187.

4GGR - 1902, pp.299-300

5GGR - 1904, p.78; GGR - 1905, p.114.
in El Obeid the only mosque consisted of an open square with a straw shelter in its middle\(^1\). The part played by \textit{awqaf} in the building and maintenance of mosques seems to have been insignificant. \textit{Waqf} was not a traditional institution in the Sudan and seems to have been unknown in Sudanese land-tenure before the Turco-Egyptian conquest\(^2\). There were, however, a few exceptions.

The central mosque of Khartoum, which was inaugurated in 1904, was largely financed by Egyptian \textit{waqfs}\(^3\). The same applied to the mosques of Halfa and Tokar\(^4\). In 1906, members of the Egyptian legislative assembly purchased land in Khartoum in order to found a \textit{waqf khayri}\(^5\). Despite these exceptions most of the mosques were built and maintained by the local inhabitants aided by the

\(^1\)\textit{GGR} - 1906, p.702. The mosque at El Obeid was finally built with the aid of a local \textit{waqf}. Meinhof, pp.48-9.


\(^3\)\textit{GGR} - 1904, p.81. When the foundation stone of the mosque was laid in 1900, Cromer wrote: '...a little unnecessary zeal has been shown by some of the English authorities in laying the foundation stone of a mosque at Khartoum...I shall endeavour to moderate any enthusiasm in these directions otherwise the Bishop of Jerusalem will want me to lay the foundation stone of a Sudanese Cathedral...', see Cromer to Salisbury, 19 Oct. 1900, FO 633/6.

\(^4\)\textit{GGR} - 1903, p.97; in 1912 Wingate wrote that he never knew that the Tokar mosque was maintained by the Egyptian \textit{waqf} and ordered Stack to terminate Egyptian contributions. However, in the annual report of 1903, this was clearly stated; Wingate to Stack (private), 16 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2; see also \textit{GGR} - 1906, p.641.

\(^5\)Owen to Wingate, 3 Jan. 1906; 14 Jan. 1906; Wingate to Owen, 9 Jan. 1906, SAD/278/1; \textit{Waqf khayri} - a charitable endowment for religious purposes.
government. The government also assisted in providing and paying for the personnel required by the mosques and the kuttābs. Yet, owing to the precarious government finances this was more a token of government support than substantial assistance. The government could afford to be more generous in granting religious robes to the country's religious leaders. These were conferred by Wingate during the 'īd al-fitr or al-‘īd al-kabīr, both of which were observed as official holidays. The class of 'ulamā', which came into existence as a result of these measures, depended on the government for its economic wellbeing as well as for its political powers, and became the most prominent supporter of the new regime.

An additional measure undertaken by the Sudan government to encourage orthodox Islam was the assistance it granted for the pilgrimages to the holy places of Islam. Wingate knew that the Mahdi's interdiction of the pilgrimage, had caused considerable resentment.

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1 The government subsidies seem to have been rather small. In Bongola it took four years to complete the central mosque, which was largely financed by local contributions. GGR - 1905, p. 63. In al-Kawwa, on the White Nile south of Dueim, the government's contribution to the mosque amounted to £E 10 out of a total £E 700 spent in 1911. Wingate to Clayton, 13 Feb. 1911, SAD/300/2.

2 See for instance GGR 1905, p. 63; Jackson complained that over two years had passed since Wingate promised him to arrange for government payment to the imām and the mueszn of the Merowe mosque; see also SG - 36, June 1902, where a list of 'ulamā' who were appointed by the government is published. Their annual pay varied between £E 18-30.

3 See for instance SG - 34, Special supplement in honour of the celebration of the feast of Kurban Bairam [al-‘īd al-Kabīr] Apr. 1902. This supplement was published every year and contained lists of officers, officials, and dignitaries who were decorated for their services.

Hence, by encouraging the pilgrimage, the government hoped to gain local support and to strengthen the orthodox Muslim elements. In 1900 Sir Rennell Rodd presented a special report on the conditions of the pilgrimage to Mecca. He suggested that the Sudan government should be empowered to open a quarantine at Suakin, as by international regulations all pilgrims had to travel to Tor, some seven hundred miles from Suakin, to the internationally controlled quarantine. Rodd concluded: '...It is most undesirable that any obstacles should be placed in the way of the freedom of the Sudan pilgrimage...'.

However, the Sudan authorities were unable to overcome the regulations imposed by the international conference of the quarantine board at Venice. The result was that pilgrims avoided the quarantine and landed at Massawa or along the coast. In 1907 the Sudan government succeeded in opening its own quarantine at Suakin.

Hence, despite continued interference by the international quarantine board, the Sudan government was able to appoint its own officer and to provide its own arrangements for the pilgrims. Special pilgrims' villages were built at Suakin where pilgrims were accommodated according to tribal origin and where they lived under their own shaykhs.

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1 Rodd To Cromer, 29 Aug. 1900, FO 78/5088.

2 Report by Cuthbert James, on problems connected with the pilgrimage, 24 Apr. 1902, FO 141/371; GGR - 1904, p.38.

3 Report SG - 104, 1 Jan. 1907.

4 GGR - 1908, pp.627-8; see also 'The Quarantine Ordinance 1908', SG - 133, 21 May 1908.
until they resumed their journey. Throughout these years the government assisted the indigent pilgrims by paying their quarantine fees and their upkeep in the Suakin villages. In the years 1911-13, the annual subsidy granted by the government amounted to over £E 3000, while the pilgrims themselves contributed only about £E 400-600 per annum. Even during the World War the pilgrimage was only stopped for a few months and was resumed in July 1915. Special precautions were, however, taken to stop enemy agents or propaganda from infiltrating into the Sudan.

The reasons for the government's favourable attitude towards the pilgrimage are not hard to discover. Wingate was interested in gaining the support of orthodox Islam. By hampering the pilgrimage he knew that he would alienate those elements within the Muslim community whom he was anxious to cultivate. Secondly, owing to the sparse population of the Sudan and its meagre labour force, the Sudan government was keen on attracting immigrants from West Africa, who were popularly called Fallâta and Takârîr. Many of these settled in the

1GGR - 1908, p.627.


4SIR - 245, Dec. 1914; Wingate to Fitzgerald, 30 Dec. 1914,PRO/30/57/No.45; Wingate wrote that '...the pilgrims from Mecca...go through a course of moral disinfection at the hands of the loyal dikis...'; for details see pp.213-6.

5Wingate to Harvey, 20 Oct. 1910, SAD/284/10/1.
Sudan either before or after their pilgrimage. Despite their slave-dealing and religious fanaticism, these western immigrants made an important contribution to the country's economy.

Despite the government's official rejection of Sufism, it could not disregard its impact on the Muslim inhabitants of the Sudan. Furthermore, the Khatmiyya order, which was widespread in the eastern and northern Sudan, was in a separate category. Its leader, during the early stages of the Mahdia, was Muhammad 'Uthmān al-Mīrghānī II, who denounced the Mahdi and consequently escaped to Egypt, where he continued to receive government assistance. Following his death in 1886 he was succeeded by his son, 'Alī al-Mīrghānī, as shaykh of the Khatmiyya. The loyalty of the Khatmiyya and its leaders was soon to be rewarded. Sayyid 'Alī al-Mīrghānī was awarded the C.M.G. in 1900, thus becoming the first and only notable of the Sudan to receive a British decoration until the first World War. The central mosque of the Khatmiyya which was destroyed during the Mahdia was rebuilt.

1. MWA, pp. 19-35; C.A. Willis, Report on Slavery and the Pilgrimage (1926) SAD/212/2; see also p.395.


3. Ibid, p.187; see also Holt, Mahdist State, pp. 75, 147.

4. Slatin's diary, Notes 'Khatmiyya remuneration' 1903, SAD/441.


by the government in the Khatmiyya quarter of Kassala. Only the refusal of the British authorities to recognize him officially as the paramount shaykh of his tarīqa, caused Sayyid 'Alī al-Mīrghanī some bitterness. Yet despite constant appeals the government could hardly appoint an official shaykh to a ṣūfī tarīqa which, although respected, never acquired official recognition. In 1912, however, Wingate wrote a letter to Sayyid 'Alī, which granted him semi-official recognition as head of his family:

...The Morghani family lives in various places and are therefore under the local authority of the district in which they are living; but I have no doubt that all of them, like the government, look upon you as their own head and chief.

The Khatmiyya leadership continued to be divided between Sayyid 'Alī and his brother Ahmad al-Mīrghanī and was a cause of endless friction. The latter settled at the tariqa's headquarters in Kassala, where he enjoyed a dominant position. Both brothers continued on the

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1Trimingham, Islam, p.234; see also Wingate to Cromer, 26 Feb. 1901, FO 141/364, where he suggested to give Sayyid 'Alī al-Mīrghanī a good site of government land in Khartoum in exchange for some land in Halfaya (Khartoum North).

2Slatin to Wingate, 27 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3; see also pp.79-80.

3Wingate to Said Ali, 28 May 1912, SAD/101/17/4; notably, Wingate never mentioned the Khatmiyya order but referred throughout his letter to the Mīrghanī family.

4See for instance Wingate to Townsend, 26 Aug. 1916, SAD/201/5.

5In 1916 the governor of Kassala suggested giving Sayyid Ahmad an Egyptian decoration for his loyalty. He stressed the fact that Sayyid Ahmad's influence in Kassala was far greater than his brother's. Wingate who objected to Egyptian decorations on political grounds, sent him instead an enlarged photograph of himself. See Townsend to Wingate, 28 Jan. 1916; Wingate to Townsend, 15 Feb. 1916, SAD/199/1.
government's payroll, and when Cecil in 1916 suggested to stop their subsidy, Wingate objected strongly, stating that they were '...amongst the few who are genuinely and entirely on our side...'. Wingate had good reasons for being grateful to the Mirghanīs for they consistently supported his policy of reducing Egyptian influence in the Sudan. Moreover, fearing the competition of other ṣūfī ūtarīqās, notably the Majdhubīya, they were only too glad to inform against them.

The attitude of the government to the other ūtarīqās can be defined as one of suspicious tolerance. Sufism, its teachings and rituals, were regarded as dangerous fanaticism by most of the British officials who had only a limited knowledge of its true significance.

Describing his impressions of the members of one of the ūtarīqās, a government inspector wrote: '...It is when one sees such men that one realises the difficulty of any truce with Islam...'. Another inspector recorded his impressions of a ṣūfī celebration of Ṣawīld al-Nabī:

...on all their faces is a sort of "far away", rapt expression, not a pleasant dreamy peaceful look, but a look that makes one picture them waving blood stained swords, as they hack their way through the forces of "unbelievers" to the cry of "Allah Akbar"...their barbaric discords adding to the weirdness of the scene, and the pious ecstasy of the religious maniacs...5

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1 Wingate to Cecil, 5 July 1916, SAD/201/2.
2 See pp. 56-7, 168;
3 See Slatin to Wingate, 12 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/1, Slatin warned Wingate from relying too much on the information he received from one of the Khatmiyya leaders with regard to the Majdhubīya. See also p. 80.
5 Butler's Journal, 1911, SAD/422/12.
Although officially the Sudan government did not change its policy towards Sufi orders, the reality of the Sudan forced it to modify its policy over the years. This was most apparent in the case of Sufi zawiyas which were being rebuilt throughout the northern provinces. Even the attitude towards Sufi shaykhs was gradually modified and with the outbreak of the World War, they were recognized by the government as an essential part of Sudanese Muslim leadership.

b. Religious uprisings and religious-political prisoners.

Wingate was firmly convinced that considerable sections of Sudanese Muslims were still Mahdists at heart. '...The fact that Mohammed Ahmed was an impostor has by no means driven out of their heads that the "expected Mahdi" will eventually come...'. Hence the government was always on the alert. Hardly a year passed without some religious uprising, or certain fakhs being arrested and deported. In 1900 'Ali 'Abd al-Karim was arrested with twenty of his followers.'...At a

1 See pp. 190-1.

2 One of the principles guiding the government's attitude towards Sufi orders was not to interfere in their internal affairs. However, the important role played by the Sufis in local politics brought about an increasing interference by government officials in the appointment of Sufi shaykhs. This happened in El Obeid in 1911, when Isma'il al-Makki died. Savile, then governor of Kordofan, appointed Shaykh Ibrahim al-Mirghani as shaykh of the Isma'iIlIyya order as he was sure of the latter's cooperation with the government; see Butler's diary, 24 Oct. 1911, 21 Nov. 1911, SAD/400/10; see also pp. 217-9.

3 Wingate to Cromer, 24 Feb. 1901, SAD/271/2. Wingate's claim was right, he did not mention, however, that Mahdist pretenders appeared throughout the Khalifa's rule, and were thus no innovation. See Shoucair, Tarikh, Vol. III, pp. 460-3, 470-3, 548-9; for Slatin's attitude, see pp. 31-2.
meeting of the principle religious dignitaries...the sect was denounced as heterodox and dangerous..." and its members were deported to Halfa. In July 1901, the Sudan authorities were alarmed about '"...Dervish like terikas..." in the Gezira. Consequently, Shaykh 'Abd al-Mahmūd Wad Nūr al-Dā'im and several other religious leaders were arrested, only to be released a few weeks later when the alarm proved a false one. In August 1901 the 'Board of Ulema' was instructed to investigate the alleged anti-government preachings of a former Mahdist, Shaykh Mahdāwī 'Abd al-Ḥāmīn, who had recently returned from banishment at Nasser. In 1903, a fākil from Bornu, Muḥammad al-ʿAmīn, was reported to have declared himself as the mahdi. Nason, then civil secretary, suggested that "...a little killing in the neighbourhood...will have a good effect." Wingate, who was on holiday in England, approved of sending a punitive expedition.

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1 Wingate to Cromer, 1 Mar. 1900, FO 141/356. In 1901 some members of the sect were released but had to be re-arrested as they '"...were found to be again carrying on their old propaganda of the millennium..." GOR. - 1902, p.303. The religious dignitaries who decided the case included several qādis as well as sufī shaykhs. Shoucair, Taʾrīkh, Vol.3, p.670. When the sect's leaders were released in 1907, Slatin wrote, '"...Abd al Kerim & Co. were tried by the board of Ulemas and therefore one or two of Ulemas should have been sent to Wadi Halfa...before any action was taken."; Slatin to Wingate, 24 July 1907, SAD/281/1; see also SIR - 67,1Jan.-8 Mar. 1900, App.C.

2 SIR - 84, July 1901.

3 Gleichen to Wingate, 25 July 1901, SAD/271/7; Slatin to Wingate, 13 Aug. 1901, SAD/271/8.

4 SIR - 85, Aug. 1901.

5 Nason to Wingate, 18 Aug. 1903?, SAD/273/8; see also Nason to Wingate, 3 Sep. 1903, SAD/273/9.
but urged that "...Mahon...[should] do all he can to establish Govt. authority without unnecessary bloodshed." Muhammad al-Amīn was arrested with his followers on 12 September and was hanged in public at El Obeid. In justifying this extreme sentence Wingate resorted to arguments which were repeated in similar cases in the coming years and, therefore, warrants some detailed explanation.

...The movement which he had instigated was considerably more widespread and subversive of Government authority than had been anticipated. Had he been left at large for even a very short time longer, he would have succeeded in alienating a considerable number of tribes; and in view of the comparatively small number of troops...It is not improbable that he would soon have acquired an influence in the country which would have jeopardized Government authority. Colonel Nason's decision to carry out the extreme penalty of the law without delay shows how fully that officer realized the importance of dealing decisively in a matter which would have only become more difficult had the question of execution been postponed. Colonel Nason's prompt action will, in my opinion, act as a powerful deterrent to further disturbances.

Slatin, who fully approved of the death sentence, maintained that the reports about the so-called Mahdi were "...very exaggerated..."

In 1904 Muhammad Adam declared himself as Nabī 'Isā at Singa, in Sennar province. The Egyptian ma'mūr who set out to arrest the pretender, was killed and "...in the melee which ensued Mohammed Adam

1Wingate to Nason, 11 Sep. 1903, Ibid.

2Findlay to Lansdowne, 29 Sep. 1903, Fo 403/334; For Slatin's (ir)regular opinion of the case see also p. 81.


4GGR - 1903, pp. 70-1; see also SIR - 110, Sep. 1903, Appendix A.
and his followers lost their lives...\textsuperscript{1} Thus read the official report which, however, failed to mention that two of the Nabi 'Isa's followers, who were captured alive, were executed against the expressed wishes of the acting consul-general in Egypt but with Wingate's full approval.\textsuperscript{2}

1905, was a year without religious disturbances. Wingate remarked optimistically that '\textldots this is an indication that slowly but surely the effects of the mighty upheaval, for which the Mahdi and the Khalifa were mainly responsible, are gradually dying out... '\textsuperscript{3} A major incident which occurred in 1906 in the Nuba Mountains and which was first thought to have been instigated by religious or racial motives was discovered to have been prompted by the government's measures against slave raiding.\textsuperscript{4} However, early in 1907, two Nabi 'Isa's who declared themselves in al-Qad\textccedilla rif and Wad-Madani, were promptly banished to Halfa and Khartoum.\textsuperscript{5}

The major religious uprisings during Wingate's governor-generalship occurred in April 1908. A young British inspector and an Egyptian ma'mur were murdered by 'Abd al-Qadir Muhammad Im\textccedilla Wad

\textsuperscript{1}GGR - 1904, pp.9-10; see also SIR - 121, Aug. 1904.

\textsuperscript{2}Henry to Findlay, 16 Aug. 1904; Findlay to Henry, 17 Aug. 1904, FO 141/386; Wingate to Henry, 4 Sep. 1904, SAD 275/1; Henry to Wingate, 1 Sep. 1904, Ibid. Henry reported: '\textldots the execution is over. The numerous petitions and appeals were getting very trying...'

\textsuperscript{3}GGR - 1905, p.14.

\textsuperscript{4}SIR - 143, June 1906; see also pp.325-6.

\textsuperscript{5}SIR - 150, Jan. 1907.
Habūba and his followers in the Messelemia district of the Blue Nile province. In the battle which ensued ten men of the government troops and thirty-six rebels were killed. In the course of the resulting interrogation Wad Ḥabūba declared:

...My desire is that the Sudan should be governed by Muslims according to the Mohammedan laws and the Mahdi doctrines and precepts...I know the people of the Sudan better than the government does; I have no hesitation in saying that their friendliness and flattery is nothing but hypocrisy and lies, I am ready to swear that the people prefer Mahdism to the present government...

Wad Ḥabūba and twelve of his followers were sentenced to death. However, only the leader was executed as the British foreign office intervened and instructed Wingate to commute the sentences. Practically all of the Sudan's British officials were united in condemning the British government's decision. Currie wrote: '...Once again England falls back on the blood stained policy of attempting to conciliate its enemies by giving away its friends...'

Their main objection was that by commuting the sentences, the government gave in to Egyptian nationalist pressures, which labelled the Wad Ḥabūba incident as 'Another Dinshawai in the Sudan'. The 'Board of Ulema'

1 Slatin's diary, 3 May 1908, SAD/441. It is interesting to note that Slatin, who was informed of the incident while undertaking a tour of Mongalla, did not hurry back but continued to Lado and Gondokoro.

2 SIR - 166, May 1908, Appendix D.

3 Grey to Gorst, 30 May 1908, FO 141/416.

4 Currie to Slatin, 4 July 1908, SAD/431/50.

5 Article in al-Liwa', 28 May 1908, quoted in Graham to Grey, 8 Aug. 1908, FO 407/172; see also pp. 55-6.
fully backed this view and stated that the Wad Ḥabūba rebellion was a direct result of the government not carrying out '...their (the Ulema) decision, given at the time of the Milleniumists' trials, 1901 that all teachers of Mahdism should at once be put to death...'

The 'ulamā' and other notables of the Blue Nile province sent a telegram to the government professing their loyalty. '...May God punish the evil doers for their deeds. We promise before God and you that we will inform the Governor at once of the first signs of such uprisings...'

Wingate in his proclamation to the '...Ulema, Fikis, Omdehs, Sheikhs, Notables, and people of the Sudan...', warned that the government '...will feel compelled to modify its present policy of gentleness and indulgence...and you will then learn the might of the Government and its powers to enforce its orders...'

In his private correspondence, Wingate reiterated his belief that had Wad Ḥabūba succeeded in gaining a victory over the government troops,

...he would have been a prophet endowed with all sorts of miraculous gifts and we should have most of the Gezira at his heels. There is no doubt there is plenty of latent Mahdism and until the generation born and brought up in that faith has died out we shall be subject to these outbreaks.

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1 Wingate to Stack, (private), 12 May 1908, SAD/284/13; after quoting the above from a declaration of the 'Board of Ulema', Wingate wrote: '...I wonder how the Egyptian Nationalists the Robertsons & c. would like us to publish such statements...', Robertson was a leading member of the Egyptian lobby in the House of Commons.

2 SIR – 167, June 1908.

3 Proclamation by Wingate, 26 May 1908, Inclosure 2 in Graham to Grey, 6 Sep. 1908, FO 407/172.

4 Wingate to Maxwell (private), 12 May 1908, SAD/110/8.
Wingate and Bonham Carter vehemently denied the rumours that the Wad Ḥabūba rebellion was in any way connected with problems of land settlement, and reaffirmed their contention that it was of a purely religious nature. In a secret memorandum Wingate enumerated the new dangers threatening the Sudan, and demanded an immediate increase in the military force in the country or an adequate system of internal communications. Reports of a new Nabi 'Isā filtered from Kordofan, and rumour had it that 12,000 pilgrims were invading the country from the west. The intelligence department was ordered to keep a careful watch over suspected religious notables.

It is clear that the Wad Ḥabūba incident was treated as a far more serious threat to the security of the Sudan than previous incidents of a similar nature. An analysis of Wingate's report suggests that he misinterpreted the facts. Wad Ḥabūba and his supporters first murdered Scott-Moncrieff and Muḥammad Sharīf. They then surprised

1 GGR - 1908, p.200.
2 Memorandum by Sir R. Wingate, 9 Aug. 1908, (Strictly Confidential), FO 407/173.
3 SIR - 167, June 1908; GGR - 1908, p.590.
4 Asser to Wingate, 9 Aug. 1908; Slatin to Wingate, 9 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/4; this rumour was caused by a seasonal movement of nomad tribes.
5 Wingate to Channer, 22 July 1908, SAD/283/7/1; Channer was ordered to watch al-Ḥajj Ahmad Muḥammad 'Isā Azraq, brother of 'Uthmān Azraq, the Mahdist ʿamīr. Suspicion also fell on al-Šarīf al-Ḥindī, and Slatin ordered al-Ṭayyī Wad Saʿīd, to report on him. See Slatin to Wingate |n.d. June 1908?|, SAD/282/5.
the government troops by attacking them on the night of the 2 May and inflicting on them heavy casualties. Yet on 4 May, without any further military action, Wad Ḥabūba was captured by local villagers and brought in to the governor of the Blue Nile. As a result, the whole movement collapsed and most of those implicated in the rebellion were captured. The rebellion was broken, therefore, not as a result of a military victory by government troops, but by the lack of support afforded to the rebels by the local inhabitants. This clearly implied that the people of the Blue Nile were more interested in pursuing their personal welfare and cultivating their land than in any renewed religious uprising. The explanation of the extremely serious view taken by Wingate and the British officers of the Wad Ḥabūba rebellion should be sought in a different direction. Firstly, it was the first Muslim uprising since the reconquest in which a British official was murdered and a great number of losses were incurred by the government in the ensuing battle. Secondly, since 1904 there had been no Muslim rebellion and Wingate had therefore hoped that Mahdism was a thing of the past. Lastly, Wingate realized that without adequate communications the chances of attaining real security

1 GGR - 1908, pp.49-52.

2 Scott-Moncrieff, the British inspector who was killed, had joined the Sudan civil service in 1906, having graduated from Oxford a year earlier. His father, Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff had been in charge of Egyptian irrigation since 1883. As early as 1902 another British inspector by the name of Scott-Barbour was murdered by the Aggar Dinka. However, an uprising by a southern tribe which had not yet been brought under government control and was regarded as savage, was not viewed in the same light as the Wad Ḥabūba revolt. See pp.317-8.
were slight. Hence he decided to exploit the opportunities afforded by the Wad Ḥabūba rising in order to press the British government for a substantial loan.

There were no major religious rebellions in the following years, but nabī 'Isās continued to appear periodically while a close watch was kept on many ṣūfī shaykhs. In 1909 suspicion fell on Sayyid 'Abd al-Muta'āl, leader of the Idrīsīya in Dongola, whose nephew had declared himself Mahdi in Yemen. In the same year two of Wad Ḥabūba's followers were captured and executed. Religious unrest continued in 1910, only to be explained away by the appearance of Halley's comet. Phipps, who was acting governor-general at the time, arrested several Ta'āsha near Singa and reported that '...the bag of 267 spears and 7 Fikis seems very mixed...'. At the same time a new nabī 'Isā appeared at Shanābla in the White Nile province. The policemen who were to arrest the fakī and his son were '...compelled to fire at

1 Wingate to Gorst, (strictly confidential), 9 Aug 1908, FO 407/173; Gorst supported Wingate in his official letter to Grey, but wrote privately that Wingate was an alarmist and his glooming views about the Sudan's security need not be taken too seriously. Gorst to Grey, 9 Aug. 1908, Ibid.; Gorst to Grey (private), 22 June 1908, FO 800/47.

2 Channer to Wingate, 13 Sep. 1909, SAD/288/5.

3 Wingate to Stack (private), 3 Jan. 1909, SAD/286/1. In order not to risk interference from London, Wingate did not refer the sentences to Gorst for approval.

4 Phipps to Wingate, 14 July 1910; Wingate to Phipps, 28 July 1910, SAD/297/1. The arrested fakīs had the Mahdi's Rātib in their possession; SIR - 192, July 1910.
them, with the result that the son was shot dead and the fiki mortally wounded...\(^1\) In August 1910, a faki and his three sons were arrested in Berber on charges of religious fanaticism culminating in the murder of an 'umda and a policeman. All three were sentenced to death\(^2\).

Towards the end of 1910, the government became aware, for the first time, of the dangers of the Fallāta and Takrūrī immigrants. Najm al-Dīn, proclaimed himself mahdi at Shaykh Ṭalḥa on the Blue Nile. In consequence, tension ensued between the Takrūrīs and the local Mahdists\(^3\). Najm al-Dīn himself succeeded in escaping, but was shot dead in 1914 in Kassala province\(^4\). Many of the Fallāta who arrived in the Sudan after 1906 were political refugees fleeing from the British administration in Nigeria\(^5\). The Sudan government welcomed them on account of their thrift and industry\(^6\). However, in the years following 1910, these immigrants were responsible for many religious uprisings. In 1914, one of the Fallāta gathered some

\(^{1}\textit{GGR} - 1910, \text{pp.66-7}; \text{the faki later died of his wounds, \textit{SIR} - 190, May 1910.}\)

\(^{2}\textit{SIR} - 193, \text{Aug. 1910}; \textit{SIR} - 195, \text{Oct. 1910}; \text{the sentence of one of the sons was later commuted to life imprisonment.}\)

\(^{3}\text{Wingate to Gorst, 19 Nov. 1910, \text{SAD/298/2}; \textit{SIR} - 196, Nov. 1910.}\)

\(^{4}\textit{SIR} - 246, \text{Jan. 1915.}\)

\(^{5}\textit{MWA}, \text{p.41}; \text{this memorandum traces the origins of West African immigration to the Sudan, to the times of 'Uthmān Dan Fodio (1754-1817), who prophesied a Fulani empire on the Nile. After the battle of Burmi in 1905 large numbers of Fulani fugitives arrived in the Sudan led by Mauwurno Muhammad Bello, a descendant of 'Uthmān Dan Fodio.}\)

\(^{6}\text{See p.395.}\)
followers and killed the British officer who tried to arrest him. The following year, Ahmad 'Umar, a Fallāṭa from Sokoto who had settled in Omdurman, proclaimed himself nabi 'Isā, and retreated with his followers to Jabal Qadīr. He sent messengers to all the Fallāṭa villages to join him but met with little success. He was finally caught with thirty-one of his followers near Jabal Qadīr. By 1916, the Fallāṭa's reputation for religious unrest was so deep rooted, that the government stationed a special garrison in Sennar during the Darfur campaign.

Only two other religious uprisings need be mentioned. Both occurred in 1912 and were caused by Muslim pilgrims. In April 1912, a Tunisian fakī proclaimed himself mahdi near Jabal Qadīr and was duly shot dead with seven of his followers. In June of the same year a Tripolitan fakī was deported from the Sudan for preaching pan-Islamic propaganda.

The rather extensive list of religious uprisings during the first

1 MWA, p.41.

2 Ibid; see also SIR - 249, Apr. 1915; SIR - 250, May 1915; Wingate to Savile (private), 19 Apr. 1915, SAD/195/2, the similarity of his actions to those of the Mahdi is very striking. See Holt, Mahdist State, pp.47-50.

3 MWA, p.41.

4 GGR - 1912, p.9; Wingate to Wilson, 13 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2.

5 Butler to Wingate, 12 June 1912, SAD/181/3; the date suggests a possible connection with the Italian conquest of Tripoli and Cyrenaica and its possible repercussions in the Sudan which greatly concerned Wingate; see Wingate to Kitchener, 9 Nov. 1911, SAD/301/5.
seventeen years of the Condominium is noteworthy for the following reasons. It proved that resentment of foreign rule prevailed throughout that period. However, the comparative ease with which these upheavals were overcome, despite inadequate communications and military forces, proved that they failed to gain popular support. This was probably due to the fact that most of the Muslims of the old generation were still under the impact of the Khalifa's crushing defeat and were not inclined to risk their welfare, or indeed their lives, by participating in a religious rebellion.1

The government's attitude towards the Mahdist prisoners and their families was a direct result of its general religious policy, and therefore warrants a brief survey. The principal Mahdist amīrs were imprisoned in Damietta until 1908. Prisoners caught in later religious uprisings were kept in the Halfā prison.2 Many of the less important amīrs, as well as those who changed sides before the battle of Kararī, were not imprisoned, and some of them even held government posts.3 When Muḥammad 'Uṯmān Abū Qārja returned from captivity in

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1 When in 1924 a rebellion broke out in the Sudan, its reasons were primarily political and its leaders belonged to the young generation which had matured after the Mahdis. See Holt, The Sudan, pp.129-131; See also M. Abdel Rahim, 'Early Sudanese Nationalism:1900-1938', SNR - 47 (1966), pp.39-64; Abdel Rahim's assertion that the early religious risings failed owing to the government's military superiority is only partially true. None of the revolts gained sufficient popular support to challenge the government's authority, Ibid, p.39.

2 GGR - 1907, p.74; GGR - 1908, p.534. Other Mahdist amīrs escaped to Darfur and some of them were killed or imprisoned by 'Ali Dīnār, see pp.86-7.

3 See p.180.
Darfur in 1907 he was also allowed to settle on his lands in the White Nile province.  

In 1908 the government decided to move the Mhdist amirs from Damietta to Halfa and Port Sudan. Thus placing them out of the reach of the Egyptian nationalist press, while at the same time removing them from the eyes of inquisitive British Liberal M.P.s who persistently worried about the health and wellbeing of these prisoners. Parliamentary questions about the prisoners' prospects of release received similar answers year by year, namely that by releasing these amirs the peace of the Sudan would be threatened and the lives of the amirs would be endangered by a hostile population. In 1909, Slatin

1GGR - 1907, p.135.

2See Phipps to Wingate, 15 Mar. 1908; Wingate to Phipps, 20 Mar. 1908, SAD/282/3/2; following the transfer Wingate commented: '...I hope that these beastly Cairo rags will cease to worry any more about the matter...', Wingate to Stack, 16 Apr. 1908, SAD/284/13; see also Hasan Dafalla, 'A Note on the political prisoners of Wadi Halfa; SNR - 47 (1966), pp.148-150. Dafalla's assertion that the prisoners were moved to Halfa owing to the pressure of the British liberals and of the Egyptian nationalist press, fails to take into account the evidence afforded by the Wingate and Slatin papers. In fact Wingate suggested moving the prisoners secretly, so as to avoid an Egyptian nationalist campaign against their transfer. Slatin, however, objected to secrecy: '...Dervishes, asked to be transferred to a climate less damp - therefore we send them to Halfa - finish - we have their petition to prove it...', Slatin to Wingate, 2 Apr. 1908, SAD/282/3/2.

3See for instance Questions in Parliament by Mr Gooch M.P. and Grgy's reply thereto, The Times, 7 February 1908; see also Questions in Parliament by Mr Robertson M.P., 14 Aug. 1911 and reply by Mr McKennon Wood, FO 371/1115.
agreed that all Mahdist amīrs, except 'Uthmān Dīqna, should be released from their chains. In 1912 the government allowed twelve of the amīrs to reside in specified towns in the Sudan. By then the alleged danger to their lives had apparently disappeared. 'Uthmān Dīqna, who was reported to be '... quite crazy and lives just like an animal...', continued to reside in the Halfā prison.

While the government viewed the prospects of rehabilitating the older generation of amīrs with certain misgivings, it tried its best to educate their offspring as useful citizens. After the reconquest several of the amīrs' children were sent to Egypt to receive a proper education. Many of them were later absorbed in government departments and in provincial administration where they proved quite satisfactory. The only instance where one of the young generation of amīrs involved himself in a religious, anti-government movement occurred in 1915.

Hasan Sharīf, son of the Khalīfa Muḥammad Sharīf, was involved in a

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1Wingate to Gorst, 26 Dec. 1909, FO 141/423.

2Sir - 215, June 1912, their release took place on the occasion of the King's birthday.

3Minutes by E.G. Vansittart on a Parliamentary question by Mr Ponsonby M.P., 6 Feb. 1913, PO 371/1637.

4By 1908 Wingate regretted having sent them to Egypt, as they absorbed Egyptian nationalist ideas, and decided to transfer them to the Sudan, Wingate to Stack, 16 Apr. 1908, SAD/284/13.

5List of the Family of the Mahdi, the Khalīfa, & c. with place of residence and employment |n.d.|, SAD/106/2. Of the Khalīfa 'Abdallāhī's sons, nine were employed in government service. However, the majority were reported to be '... a lazy lot, and mostly unemployable...', Willis to Slatin, 15 Mar. 1921, SAD/438/653; see also p. 180.
Thus the principal Mahdist amirs and their families, caused little trouble to the new administration, and many of them were absorbed within its ranks.

c. Government policy during the First World War.

At the outbreak of the World War the Sudan government was gravely concerned about the loyalty of its Muslim inhabitants. It published a proclamation warning the inhabitants that according to the Condominium agreement the country was still under martial law. Internal censorship was imposed throughout the Sudan, and all enemy aliens except missionaries were deported. Special arrangements were made to prevent Turco-German Jehad propaganda from the west from being smuggled into the Sudan. A scheme for military tribal levies

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1 Wingate to Owen, 20 Apr. 1915, SAD/195/1. Thus the Anglo-Egyptian administration was following Mahdist and Turco-Egyptian precedents, in banishing criminals to the south. Owen remarked '...I tell him [Hasan Sharif] he is lucky to come and see this part of the Sudan for nothing, when tourists pay hundreds of pounds...I fear he doesn't see the joke...', Owen to Wingate, 3 June 1915, SAD/195/3.

2 In 1906, when there was a danger that a war might break out between Britain and Turkey over the Sisili peninsula, Wingate wrote: '...If religion is made the pretext for coming to blows we must be prepared for trouble on the part of the inhabitants in spite of their hatred for the Turks...', Wingate to Cromer, 8 May 1906, FO 141/402.

3 SG - 266, 16 Nov. 1914; GGR - 1914, p. 43.

4 STR - 247, Feb. 1915; see also Wingate to Clayton, 28 Oct. 1914, SAD/269/7; Wingate wrote that '...out of about 50,000 letters opened I do not think there were more than a dozen at the outside that contained anything undesirable....'

5 STR - 260, Mar. 1916. Wingate, however, insisted on reopening the pilgrimage route and on renewing trade with Jedda. See Wingate to Wilson, 20 May 1915, SAD/195/5; Wingate asked Wilson to gauge public opinion in Port Sudan, with regard to the reopening of trade with Jedda.
was prepared by the adjutant-general and included those tribes regarded as trustworthy. Special precautions were taken with some of the shaykhs and the arrest of several extremists '...had a sobering effect on hotheaded youths...'. The major steps undertaken by the Sudan government were of a rather more conciliatory nature. Upon his return to the Sudan, Wingate delivered a speech to the 'ulamā' at Khartoum. In it he tried to convince them that the war was not between Muslims and Christians, but against the misguided rulers of Turkey who had aligned themselves to Germany in order to fight Britain '...the one power who, by her actions and the sentiments of her people, has ever been a true and sympathetic friend to the Moslems and to Islam...'. Thousands of copies of this speech were distributed.

1 A.G. Khartoum to Private Secretary the palace, 18 Mar. 1916, SAD/199/3; trustworthy tribes included: the Ḥamar, Ḥumr, Misirīya, Kababīsh, and Kawahla in Kordofan; the Shukriya and Takārīr in Qallabāt; the Hadendowa, Bani ʿĀmir, and Halenga in Kassala. However in the Blue Nile province '...neither Sheikhs nor tribes sufficiently trustworthy to arm...', probably still as a result of the Wad Ḥabūba rebellion.

2 SIR - 249, Apr. 1915; Wingate to Pearson (private), 22 May 1915, SAD/195/6. Wingate ordered Pearson to exercise vigilance over the Fallāta at Shaykh Talḥa; Wingate to Clayton, 14 May 1916, SAD/470/2, Wingate wrote that according to ʿAlī al-Mīrghāni's advice, Muḥammad Idrīsī would not be allowed to return to the Idrīsīya in Dongola owing to the position of the Sanūsī and ʿAlī Dīnār.

3 H.E. Governor-General's Speech to the Ulema at Khartoum, 8 Nov. 1914, SIR - 244, Nov. 1914. Wingate's speech included a passage referring to the rulers of Turkey as a '...syndicate of Jews, financiers and low born intriguer...'. The speech was published in The Times of 29 Dec. 1914, and caused an immediate protest by Anglo-Jewry. The editor of The Jewish Chronicle, on 1 Jan. 1915, stated that despite the allowance one had to make for Britain's embarrassing position in Egypt, Wingate's insult to the Jewish people, many of whom were fighting on Britain's side, was beyond excuse. He concluded by demanding that: '...this incendiary document should be recalled without delay...'. The foreign office which had endorsed Wingate's speech in Nov. and had marked the passage '...This Syndicate of Jews...' as 'quite nice' (signed) L.O. Oliphant, Minute to SIR - Nov. 1914, FO 371/2349, (cont.)
throughout the Sudan. A speech on similar lines was delivered by Wingate to the Egyptian officers some of whom were of Turkish origin. More important, however, was the personal approach. Wingate traveled to many provinces where he met the principal tribal and religious leaders and was assured of their loyalty. This was accompanied by a government inspired press campaign, followed up by a tour of all the provinces by their respective governors during which protestations of loyalty were collected from the dignitaries. One of the more practical measures undertaken by the government was not mentioned in the official dispatches, and had little to do with its religious policy. The years 1912-14 were bad drought years in the Sudan. The

(continued from p. 214, n.3)

suddenly inquired whether Wingate had in fact made these remarks (Crowe to Cheetham, 7 Jan. 1915, SAD/194/1). Wingate rendered apologies to the Jewish Chronicle, through Symes, (Symes to Editor of the Jewish Chronicle, 23 Mar. 1915, SAD/194/3/2), who assumed the editor that Wingate's intention had been misinterpreted. Wingate also asked his cousin Sir Andrew Wingate, to use his good offices with the editors of the Jewish papers in London. He added 'had I known that a translation of my address was going to be published in the London papers I should have censored out the obnoxious words...' Wingate to A. Wingate, 23 Feb. 1915, SAD/194/2; Wingate's speech was originally prepared by Symes, his private secretary; see Wingate to Clayton, 7 Nov. 1914, SAD/469/7.

1 Wingate to Clayton, 11 Nov. 1914, Ibid.

2 SIR - 244, Nov. 1914.

3 A full description of all these actions was sent by Wingate to Cromer, 27 Nov. 1914, FO 633/23. In a note attached to a copy of this letter Wingate wrote: '...As I can get no notice taken in Cairo of the Sudan loyalty I have replied fairly fully to C's [Cromer's] query...' SAD/192/2. Apart from the 11 pages of his letter Wingate sent Cromer the following: Copies of his speech to the 'ulama', and to the Egyptian officers; A translation of a government inspired anonymous article written by the Egyptian grand qadi of the Sudan; A copy of a report of the governor of the White Nile province, including letters of 'ulama' and tribal leaders. See also SIR - 243, Oct. 1914; GGR - 1914, pp.2-3.
government, therefore, imported large quantities of dhurra from India, and when the War broke out it was able to distribute cheap dhurra to the poverty stricken provinces. Consequently, '...the majority of cultivators hardly realised there is a war at all.' The distribution of dhurra and the supply of pumps for irrigation had a considerable effect on their sense of loyalty. The result was that apart from a few insignificant incidents the Sudan remained quiet.

The only uprising of any importance was that of Fiki 'Ali in 1915. Fiki 'Ali was one of the most powerful and loyal Nuba makks. However, rumours spread by a Nubawi who had returned to the Nuba mountains from imprisonment in Khartoum convinced him that the British were on the verge of defeat and were about to be replaced by a Muslim government.

Fiki 'Ali was captured and sentenced to death, but succeeded in escaping.

1 GGR - 1914, pp.11-12.
2 Balfour to Wingate, 28 Nov. 1914, SAD/192/2; see also SIR - 257, Dec. 1915.
3 See for instance The Cultivators of Zeidab to Wingate [n.d. Feb. 1915?]. Symes to Browne, 3 Mar. 1915, SAD/194/3/3. In his letter Symes conveys Wingate's appreciation for the Zeidab cultivators expression of loyalty. The latter emphasized their gratitude to the government on account of the irrigation facilities which enabled them to supply dhurra to other parts of the country, despite the drought.

4 A slight affray occurred at Sinkat in Oct. 1915; SIR - 256, Nov. 1915; 2 fakhs were arrested in June 1916 for spreading seditious propaganda. In Feb. 1915 Turkish propaganda was discovered to have been sent to several religious leaders who brought it in to the governors. The Egyptian officer who was accused of being responsible for it, was caught and deported to Cairo. Wingate to Clayton, 13 Feb. 1915; 20 Feb. 1915, SAD/469/8.

en route to El Obeid. An arrangement made by the British inspectors enabled the makk to give himself up on the condition that his sentence would be commuted. Those implicated in the uprising included a few men of the Nuba Territorials, as well as Muhammad Faqır the nāẓir of the Misirīya.

With the coming of the World War, the government also modified its attitude towards the Sufi tarīqas and sought the support of many of the religious leaders who had hitherto been treated with suspicion. Al-Sharif Yusuf al-Hindī, who in 1909 was publicly charged and condemned by the 'Board of Ulema' for interfering in tribal affairs, became person grata and was recommended for a C.M.G. The shaykhs of the Idrīsīya, who had previously been under government surveillance, were acting on behalf of the intelligence department in its communication with the Sanūsī. Jackson, the governor of Dongola, was asked by Wingate '...to keep them in good humour...it

1 SIR - 251, June 1915, p. 6; see also Wingate to Wilson, 30 Sep. 1915, SAD/196/6.


3 Balfour to Wingate, 20 Aug. 1915, SAD/196/3.

4 Pearson to Wingate, 26 May 1915, SAD/195/6; Wingate to Savile, 19 June 1915, SAD/195/10.

5 SIR - 175, Feb. 1909.

6 Wingate to Grey (private), 8 Oct. 1916, SAD/202/1; see also al-Sharif Yusuf al-Hindī to Wingate, 14 Shawwal 1334, 13 Aug. 1915, SAD/201/4; al-Hindī wrote that he saw in a vision that Wingate was about to become a Lord. Symes [?] minuted the letter: '...Xel H. has nothing to learn of the gentle art...!'
would be a good thing to show some special mark of consideration for the family...¹ Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdī, who for years had been in retirement at Abā Island², emerged as one of the staunchest government supporters. When a religious Mahdist uprising occurred at Jabal Qadīr in 1915, Wingate was able to report: '...I am glad we knocked out the Gedir Fiki - (private) the man who informed about him was Abderrahman the late Mahdi's son - rather satisfactory...³ Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahmān, and five hundred other religious and tribal leaders signed the Sudan Book of Loyalty, pledging their full support for Great Britain and her allies during the war⁴.

The loyalty of the Sudanese Muslims during the First World War was regarded by the British authorities as absolute proof of the rightness of the government's policy and, moreover, as a personal triumph for Wingate. Cromer speaking in the House of Lords, said:

...The state of affairs in the Sudan, was one of the greatest indirect compliments that had ever been paid to the wisdom and beneficence of English administration...The main credit for the success achieved was unquestionably due to Sir Reginald Wingate and the officers under his command...⁵

Symes, then Wingate's private secretary, stated the Sudan government's view when he wrote that the loyalty of the Sudan will continue

¹Wingate to Jackson, (private and confidential), 21 Sep. 1915, SAD/196/5.
²Wingate to Gorst, 1 Jan. 1910, SAD/300/1.
⁴Sudan Times, 14 Aug. 1915; see also Juredini (editor of the Sudan Times) to Wingate, 20 Aug. 1915, SAD/196/3.
⁵The Times, 28 June 1915, quoting Lord Cromer's speech. See also speeches by Lord Grenfell and Viscount Bryce in praise of Wingate, Ibid.
'...so long as the population knows that their religious interests are being preserved intact and that the present government is permanent...'

The general impression one gets by reading the correspondence between the British officials and Wingate is that the mass of the Sudanese were loyal to their own interests, and showed little concern for the war or its outcome. By looking after the material welfare of the inhabitants the government probably gained more loyalty than by its attitude to Islam. As for the religious leaders, the government gained their support by modifying its previous policy. The non-orthodox Muslim leaders who were previously viewed with suspicion became a part of the government's establishment. The inherent suspicion of Egypt and Turkey, which was shared by many of the Sudanese leaders of the older generation, and the conviction that British rule was better and more permanent than that of its predecessors, were probably the major factors which rallied the Sudanese leaders to the British cause.


2 Wingate claimed that Britain's support of an Arab Khalifate, in 1915, had considerable effect on Muslim opinion in the Sudan. However there is no reason to assume that the loyalty of the Sudanese depended on British Middle Eastern policy either in 1915 or when Britain supported the Arab revolt in the following years. See 'Ali al-Mirghani to Wingate, 25 Apr. [1915?], SAD/194/3/3; Wingate to McMahon, 15 May 1915, SAD/195/6.

3 The climax of this support came in 1919 when 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdī, Yūsuf al-Hindī, and Ismā'īl al-Azhārī were included by Stack in the Sudanese delegation to Britain. All three of them had been previously suspected by the same government whose cause they were now called upon to serve. See Stack to Wingate, 3 July 1919, SAD/237/11.
d. Christianity in the Muslim provinces and the role of Bishop Gwynne

In its relations towards missionaries and Christianity the British authorities found themselves in an awkward position. Most of the higher and intermediate officials, whether British, Syrian, or Egyptian Copts, were of the Christian faith. However, the government firmly believed that any attempts to proselytize the Muslims were not only bound to fail but would create an atmosphere of Muslim fanaticism. Hence, the government tried to draw a line between the observance of its own Christian beliefs and the activities of missionaries. The latter were regarded as a necessary evil and their work was limited as much as possible.

The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan had been since 1899 nominally included in the Anglican diocese of Jerusalem. However, Bishop Blyth of Jerusalem was warned not to '...exercise active episcopal functions in that country...' and only in 1903 was the rule relaxed, and Gwynne was appointed as the first archdeacon of the Sudan. Even then it

1. The only biography of Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne is H.C. Jackson, Pastor on the Nile, (London 1960), which is more a work of piety than of critical scholarship. Gwynne's private papers are split between the Sudan archive in Durham and the CMS archive in London, both of which have been used in writing this thesis.

2. In an interview with Gwynne, Wingate said that the downfall of Islam will not come by converting Muslims to Christianity but by planting the truth in their heads without giving it a name. Gwynne to Baylis, 24 Feb. 1903, CMSA/E/03/1903.

3. Cromer to Blyth, 26 Oct. 1902, FO 633/8; Gwynne to Rev. Gelsthorpe, 5 Apr. 1947, SAD/419; see also F. Cantaur, the Archbishop of Canterbury to Cromer, 25 Sep. 1900, FO 78/5088; The Archbishop supported Cromer's ruling that nothing should be done in the Sudan until the government pronounced it permissible.
was considered as desirable to develop a separate Anglican bishopric in the Sudan, and funds were raised in order to make this possible. By 1908, £19,000 had been collected for the new bishopric, and Gwynne was appointed as the suffragan bishop of the Sudan. A proposal by Gorst to establish a united bishopric of Egypt and the Sudan was rejected by Wingate on political grounds with the able support of Bishop Blyth. In 1912, the Sudan became a separate and independent bishopric and Gwynne was appointed as its first bishop and dean of the newly consecrated Khartoum Cathedral. Thus, from the very beginning, the development of the Anglican church was intimately connected with Gwynne who was also a prominent member of the CMS.

Gwynne and Harpur of the CMS arrived in the Sudan in December 1899, following an agreement between Cromer, Kitchener, and the CMS headquarters, that the society would establish its first missionary station at Fashoda. The CMS, however, did not adhere to this

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1 Bishop Blyth to 'My dear Brother', Dec. 1903, 'Appeal for £10,000 for the Bishopric of Khartoum, SAD/420/3.


3 Gorst to Wingate (private), 22 Dec. 1910; Wingate to Gorst, 29 Dec. 1910, SAD/298/3; Blyth to Wingate, 28 Jan. 1911, SAD/300/1; Blyth to Bishop Wilkinson, 11 Feb. 1911, SAD/420/2; see also p.

4 Blyth to Gwynne, 3 Jan., 1912; Blyth to Wingate, 10 Jan. 1912, SAD/420/3.

5 Report on Interview with Lord Cromer and Sir Herbert Kitchener, 11 Oct. 1898, CMSA/E/03/1898/no.51; see also Memorandum of interview accorded by Lord Kitchener to the Rev. F. Baylis and Dr. F. J. Harpur, 18 July 1899, CMSA/E/03/1899.
agreement and instructed its missionaries to remain in Omdurman. Kitchener, then governor-general, on being informed by Gwynne of the CMS decision, was very surprised to hear that our Committee had instructed us to remain in Omdurman. However, Kitchener did not object to the CMS missionaries remaining in the north and showing friendliness to the Copts. When Wingate became governor-general a few weeks later he was informed that Gwynne and Harpur had found a few tame Christians to whom they administer all that is necessary. In March 1900, a Coptic bishop arrived in Omdurman and the two CMS missionaries had to seek new venues for their missionary zeal. Once again the CMS missionaries insisted that the missionaries stay in Khartoum and as a result of these circumstances Gwynne became chaplain of the British detachment in Khartoum. Cromer quite rightly suspected Gwynne's motives for wanting to obtain this appointment. He wrote to Salisbury and Lansdowne that Gwynne would now have an excuse to further his missionary ambitions among the Muslims. These were also the motives which

1 Adeney to General Committee CMS, 12 Dec. 1899, and Minutes of the General Committee instructing Gwynne and Harpur to remain in Omdurman and not to proceed to Fashoda, CMSA/Egypt/1899/125.

2 Gwynne and Harpur to Adeney, 22 Dec. 1899, CMSA/E/03/1899. This information does not agree with Hill's version that the CMS missionaries were stopped from proceeding to the south by the authorities. Hill, Missions, p.118.

3 Maxwell to Wingate, 19 Jan. 1900, SAD/270/1/2.

4 Harpur to Baylis, 19 Mar. 1900, CMSA/E/03/1900.

5 CMS Headquarters minutes, 31 July 1900, CMSA/Egypt/1900/78.

6 Cromer to Salisbury, 9 Nov. 1900, FO 78/5088.

7 Cromer to Lansdowne, 9 Mar. 1900, Fo 633/8; Cromer to Salisbury, 27 Apr. 1900, FO 407/155.
prompted the CMS to agree that one of its missionaries should undertake the duties of chaplain which were clearly outside the missionary sphere. Wingate's decision to appoint Gwynne as chaplain was probably the result of a number of reasons. The British detachment in Khartoum required an Anglican priest but was too small in numbers to warrant the appointment of an army chaplain. Gwynne had in the meantime gained the confidence of the British officers who strongly recommended his appointment. Lastly, Wingate may already then have toyed with the idea that by offering Gwynne an official appointment he would become part of the Anglican establishment and forsake his missionary ambitions.

Gwynne himself was in no doubt as to where his loyalty lay. When in 1901 he was asked by Cromer to help in raising funds for an Anglican church in Khartoum, he complied knowing that his services to future CMS activities would be enhanced by his accepting the offer. Similar motives induced the CMS to accept Gwynne's appointment as archdeacon of the Sudan in 1905, despite Wingate's insisting that in order to secure the appointment Gwynne had to resign from the CMS.

1 Baylis to Harpur, 31 July 1900, CMSA/Egypt/Vol.2; see also Baylis to Gwynne, 25 Oct. 1901, Ibid. Baylis wrote that the CMS decided '...to keep you knocking at the door which is not yet open...'

2 Ferguson to Wingate, 1 Nov. 1900, FO 78/5088.

3 See pp. 224-7.

4 Gwynne to Adeney, 18 Jan. 1901, CMSA/Eg/03/1901.

5 Baylis to Gwynne, 19 Feb. 1905, CMSA/Eg/Vol.3.
Wingate argued that a missionary could not be head of the church in a country where proselytizing was forbidden. However, he promised that the severance of Gwynne's relations with the CMS would be only nominal. The CMS concluded that Gwynne should resign his membership as he would '...be able to do more for the Society and at less expense than if he had remained a member...at the same time he is to be in a much more prominent and recognised position...'. When, a few months later, the CMS decided to establish its first missionary station in the south, Gwynne, the archdeacon of the Sudan, was appointed as 'Head of the Gordon Memorial Mission'. Although Gwynne was hardly in a position to undertake active missionary work, he tried his utmost to help his fellow missionaries, and to further missionary enterprise. In some cases this led to Wingate rebuking him for neglecting his duties as head of the Anglican community. It was not, however, until 1912 that Wingate became really worried about

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1 Wingate to Baylis, 11 May 1905, CMSA/Eg/03/1905; see also Wingate to Cromer, 19 Apr. 1905, PO 141/393.

2 Maclnnes to Baylis, 13 May 1905, CMSA/Eg/03/1905; see also Baylis to Gwynne, 7 Apr. 1905, CMSA/Eg/Vol.3.

3 Baylis to Gwynne, 17 Nov. 1905, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.1; until May 1906, all correspondence with the new mission was conducted through Gwynne. See Baylis to Gwynne, 23 Feb. 1906, Ibid. See also pp.250-3; Gwynne also remained in charge of the CMS educational activities in the northern provinces and continued to draw £100 per annum for his services, from the CMS, see Wingate to CMS, 20 Apr. 1905, CMSA/Egypt/Vol.3.

Gwynne's ambitions. He opposed Gwynne's appointment as an independent bishop of the Sudan, fearing that he might be tempted to assert his independence from the government\(^1\). The appointment was, therefore, postponed until Wingate was certain of his own authority over church affairs\(^2\). In 1914 Gwynne tried once more to alter the relations between church and state in the Sudan. He proposed the establishment of a Church Council in which voting would be by proxy and in which Gwynne himself would be empowered with the veto\(^3\). Wingate's main worry was about the support given to Gwynne by a number of prominent officials:

...I need hardly say that I view with grave apprehension any independent power being given to the Clerical party...which will require to be very carefully curbed if we are to keep missionary and other propaganda matters within safe limits...\(^4\)

Once again it was Bishop Blyth who came to Wingate's aid in limiting Gwynne's independence to purely clerical matters\(^5\). Satisfied with

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\(^1\) On 3 Jan. 1912 Blyth informed Gwynne of his appointment as first bishop of the Sudan and dean of the Cathedral; on 20 Jan., Wingate sent a telegram to Blyth to suspend Gwynne's appointment, this was followed by a letter from Wingate to Blyth on 22 Jan., explaining his reasons. One of the main issues was that Gwynne insisted on dissolving the Cathedral committee headed by Wingate, once the Cathedral was handed to him as the new dean, SAD/420/3.

\(^2\) Blyth, who fully supported Wingate, ordered Gwynne to withdraw his demand, and an agreement was reached. Blyth to Gwynne, 23 Jan. 1912; Wingate to Blyth, 1 Feb. 1912, SAD/420/3; see also Wingate to Kitchener, 11 Feb. 1912, SAD/180/2/2.

\(^3\) Wingate to Gwynne, 27 Jan. 1914, SAD/189/1; Wingate to Clayton, 14 Feb. 1914, SAD/469/6/1.

\(^4\) Wingate to Clayton, 14 Feb. 1914, Ibid; among those supporting Gwynne were Midwinter, Director of the Sudan railways; Robins, and Parsons.

\(^5\) Blyth to Gwynne, 3 Mar. 1914, SAD/420/3; Wingate to Kitchener (private), 19 Mar. 1914, SAD/189/3.
this achievement Wingate noted: '...It only emphasized the wisdom of our decision years ago, that the head of the Anglican Church in the Sudan should on no account have any direct attachment to any missionary body...'.

All the evidence tends to show that it would have greatly simplified matters had the bishop of the Sudan lacked proselytizing ambitions. For Gwynne, despite his resignation from the CMS remained at heart a missionary. The CMS headquarters in London made constant efforts to lift the Sudan government's restrictions on missionary activities. However, despite Gwynne's influential position in the Sudan, these efforts failed owing to the political weakness of the CMS in Britain. Wingate himself was by all accounts a religious man, although he believed that any interference by missionaries in the Muslim north was bound to result in trouble. He was, therefore, quite prepared to play an active part in any Christian activity which had no missionary content. Bishop Blyth, who visited the Sudan in 1906, was very impressed by the sincere religious atmosphere among the government officials, '...The fact that they are not ashamed of

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1 Wingate to Clayton, (private), 7 Mar. 1914, SAD/469/6/1.

2 Gwynne left the Sudan and became Bishop Chaplain in the British army for the duration of the World War. See Gwynne to Wingate, 5 Sep. 1914, SAD/191/3.

3 See pp. 36-7.

4 Wingate to Gwynne, 17 May 1911, SAD/300/5.
their own religion impresses the natives who respect them for that.\(^1\)

On the other hand, Bishop Gwynne wrote, '...I maintain that the Moslems despise us for neglecting the observance of our faith...'.\(^2\) The truth was that the British officials of the Sudan, whose Christian belief was centred around the moral content of their religion, had no desire to impose their beliefs upon others.\(^3\) Hence, Blyth, an Anglican Bishop, expressed his satisfaction, while Gwynne regarded any religion without missionary overtones as bordering on heresy.\(^4\)

Khartoum Cathedral was built through the efforts of Wingate and his fellow officers who regarded it as proof of the permanency of British rule in the Sudan.\(^5\) Princess Henry of Battenberg laid the foundation stone in 1904,\(^6\) and Wingate appealed to the British people to raise the necessary funds.\(^7\) Gwynne, as bishop, had to take an active part in the fund-raising and was pitied by his fellow officers.

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1 Blyth to Archbishop Davidson, 17 Mar. 1906, SAD/420/2.
2 Gwynne to Wingate, 19 Nov. 1911, SAD/301/5.
3 Hill, Missions, pp.114-5.
4 Gwynne to Wingate, 19 Nov. 1911, SAD/301/5; Gwynne claimed that the Muslims '...look upon us as "Kofa" [kuffar] and I am not surprised.'
5 A pamphlet published by the fund-raising committee, under Wingate's chairmanship claimed the Cathedral '...will, more than anything else, prove to the Oriental mind the permanent nature of our occupation...'

Khartoum Cathedral [n.d.], SAD/103/3.
6 Laying the Foundation Stone of All Saints Church - Khartoum, 7 Jan. 1904, by H.R.H. Princess Henry of Battenberg, SAD/275/2; GGR - 1904, p.81.
7 By 1908 £22,000 were collected by the Church fund-raising committee. English Church at Khartoum, 1899-1907, SAD/420/6.
missionaries who regarded the building of a Cathedral as '...perfectly mad...when money is urgently needed for real necessities...'\(^1\)

By 1912, the Cathedral was completed and the Bishop of London was invited to attend the consecration ceremony\(^2\). To Wingate's dismay the Bishop attacked Islam in a sermon he delivered to CMS missionaries in the Albert Hall shortly before his intended visit to the Sudan\(^3\). Wingate wrote to Gwynne: '...the Bishop of London puts himself on a level with the fanatical Sheikh Ali Youssef of "El-Moayyad" ...'\(^4\) Kitchener proposed cancelling the Bishop's visit\(^5\). However, the consecration took place on 26 January 1912, and no further incidents occurred\(^6\). Wingate was firmly convinced that the consecration ceremony and the Bishop's visit '...was to be made a peg on which to develop a strong anti Govt. policy as regards religious matters,'

\(^1\)MacInnes to Baylis, 13 May 1905, CMSA/E/03/1905.

\(^2\)Hill, Missions, p.128.

\(^3\)The Times, 28 Sep. 1911; see also Gleichen to Wingate, 1 Oct. 1911, SAD/301/4, Gleichen, a one time Sudan agent, sent Wingate the press cutting of the Bishop's speech and suggested the cancellation of his visit.

\(^4\)Wingate to Gwynne, 9 Oct. 1911, SAD/301/4.

\(^5\)Wingate to Gwynne, 12 Oct. 1911, Ibid.

\(^6\)Wingate to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 30 Jan. 1912, SAD/190/1; Wingate to Stack (very private), 31 Jan. 1912, Ibid. In his letter to Stack Wingate wrote that the Bishop was the wrong man to send to the East, about which he knew nothing. To the Archbishop he wrote: '...except for yourself, no more popular prelate could have been designated to carry out the consecration...'
more especially missions, education & c...  

Hence, he decided to revise and stiffen all regulations regarding missionary activities. A previous decision to have Sunday as a day of rest for British officials was cancelled as a result of the Bishop's London sermon.

Officially, therefore, Friday remained the day of rest for all government officials except in the southern provinces and Port Sudan, although the observance of Sunday by Christians was encouraged by Wingate whenever possible. Church of England services were held in all towns where the number of British officials was sufficient to justify it. The special link between the government and the Church of England was clearly demonstrated by the fact that services were held in the government houses and in the governor-general's palace until the churches were erected.

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1 Wingate to Kitchener (private; please destroy!), 11 Feb. 1912, SAD/180/2/2.

2 Ibid; see also pp.237-8.

3 Wingate to Kitchener, 28 Nov. 1911, SAD/301/5; Gwynne to Wingate, 19 Nov. 1911, Ibid. Gwynne wrote: '...I would rather ten thousand times the bishop of London stayed at home than he should jeopardise our chance of having a Sunday...'

4 Circular Memorandum No.244, Port Sudan, 19 Mar. 1910, SAD/402/12; the reason for introducing Sunday as weekly holiday in Port Sudan was probably because it was a new town and with a very cosmopolitan population. In 1906 there were 2725 foreigners in Port Sudan, out of a total population of 4289, GGR - 1906, p.720. For Sunday observance in the south, see pp. 255-9.

5 See for instance Wingate to Wilson, 26 Nov. 1912, SAD/183/2; Wingate objected to the fact that public concerts were taking place on Sunday nights at the Khartoum Skating Rink.

6 GGR - 1906, p.722; Journal No.1. by Rev.F.B.Hadow M.A.,CMS Missionary Lower Sudan; Hadow reported on the services in Khartoum; see also p.36.
Other Christian denominations had their respective Churches in Khartoum. A free grant of land was given to the Greek Orthodox community in 1901 to build a church. Similar grants were made to the Copts and to the Church of England. The Austrian missionaries built a Cathedral and opened schools in Khartoum and Omdurman. The Greek communities in Khartoum and Port Sudan, formed societies which undertook religious and educational functions as well as offering assistance to their poorer compatriots. The large Coptic community also established its own school in Khartoum. However, constant troubles between the Coptic Bishop and his flock hampered the development of more comprehensive communal services. The only other religious community to be founded in the Sudan was the Jewish community, whose synagogue and communal services were inaugurated by the Grand Rabbi of Alexandria in 1908.

e. Missionary activities in the northern provinces.

The government's policy of forbidding missionary freedom of preaching north of the 10th parallel was set down by Cromer and maintained

\[\text{SG} - 26, 1 \text{ Aug. 1901.}\]
\[\text{Wingate to Cromer, 16 May 1901, FO 141/364.}\]
\[\text{Hill, Missions, pp. 115-6; see also p. 231.}\]
\[\text{Fergusen to Wingate, 1 July 1902, SAD/272/5/2; GGR - 1908, p. 623.}\]
\[\text{Kyrillus - Patriarch of the Copts Catholique to Slatin, 1900 [n.d.], SAD/272/5/2.}\]
\[\text{Gwynne to Wingate, 14 Aug. 1902, SAD/272/6; Wingate to Clayton, (private), 15 Dec. 1913, SAD/469/5.}\]
\[\text{Wingate to Grand Rabbi Hazan of Alexandria, 1 Feb. 1908, SAD/282/2.}\]
with slight modifications throughout Wingate's governor-generalship. The missionary societies were allowed to establish medical stations and to open schools in the Muslim provinces. There were three missionary societies which functioned in the Sudan during the early period. The Verona fathers, usually referred to as the Austrian missionaries, had worked in the Sudan since 1848. During the Mahdia their stations were closed and some of the missionaries were imprisoned. The Verona fathers were the first to arrive in the reconquered Sudan and undertook to comply with the government's policy of non-proselytization. Hence, although they opened schools and medical stations in the north, they concentrated their efforts in the southern, non-Muslim provinces. The American Presbyterians arrived in the Sudan in 1899 and established their first station on the river Sobat in 1901. The CMS connection with the Sudan began after

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3 Among those imprisoned were Fathers Ohrwalder, Rosignoli, and Bonomi; Wingate, Ten years captivity, pp.22-3.

4 Hill, Missions, pp.115-6; Hill described how following certain initial suspicions between Kitchener and Raveglio, head of the Austrian mission, relations improved and remained cordial throughout Wingate's governor-generalship, especially after the appointment of Bishop Geyer in 1903. See also Wingate to Cromer, 17 Feb. 1900, FO 141/35.

5 See pp. 245-50.

Gordon's death in 1885, when, at a meeting in London, £3000 were allocated to a Gordon Memorial Mission in the Sudan. Following the reconquest the society repeatedly requested permission to open missionary stations in the northern Sudan.

Despite the government's refusal the CMS ordered its members to stay in Khartoum and undertake what work they could find. The society built its headquarters in Khartoum on land leased from the government. Yet, although this land was granted for building the society's depot for its future activities in the south, the CMS bided its time and waited for its chance to undertake missionary activities among the Muslims. In July 1900, the CMS managing committee decided:

'...That the Committee do not see their way to near prospect of manning two Missions in the Eastern Soudan...They decidedly prefer to aim at opening and maintaining a Mission at Khartoum...' The CMS, in fact, was less justified in keeping its missionaries in Khartoum

1Hill, Missions, p.117.

2The CMS honorary secretary was asked by the Archbishop of Canterbury why the society, instead of going to the south '...persisted in forcing itself against this closed door...The best answer that could be given was that the Society believed that God had sent it there...'

Interview of Honorary Secretary CMS with Archbishop of Canterbury, Lambeth Palace, 6 July 1901, CMSA/E/03/1901; see also pp. 221-3.

3Drage to Adeney, 4 Sep. 1900, CMSA/Eg/Vol.3/1900; Similar facilities were offered to other Christian denominations as well as to the Muslims.

4Minutes of CMS Managing Committee, 31 July 1900, CMSA/E3/3/1900; see also Adeney, Harpur, and Hall to CMS, 18 Apr. 1901, Ibid, 1901.
than the other missionary societies. The Presbyterian and Austrian missions had many adherents among the Christian population and were, therefore, allowed to start schools and medical stations in the north. The CMS, however, did '...not have a single native adherent and no children of adherents to educate...' Hence they were not permitted to undertake educational and medical work. Only in 1903, following Cromer's visit to the Sudan, were the restrictions on missionary education relaxed. The CMS was allowed to open a school in Khartoum provided that Muslim children were enabled to withdraw from Christian religious education. A government order forbidding missionaries to preach privately to Muslims was also relaxed. The CMS was allowed to preach to their domestic servants or at their mission, provided they did not hold public meetings. But the government's continued pressure on the CMS to establish a mission in the south went unheeded.

Instead, the CMS proposed to prepare:

1 Gwynne to Adeney, 16 Apr. 1901, CMSA/E/03/1901; A memorandum was sent by the CMS to Lansdowne, then secretary for foreign affairs, demanding the liberty to preach in the northern Sudan. The memorandum as well as Lansdowne's evasive reply were published by The Times, 19 Aug. 1901.

2 Gwynne to Baylis, 31 Jan. 1903, CMSA/E/03/1903. Following an interview with Cromer in 1902, Gwynne wrote: '...I had an interview with the great Lord C. last week. He knows nothing of education still less of the work of Christian missions and yet his opinion on both is final here...'. Gwynne to Baylis, 12 Nov. 1902, CMSA/E/03/1902. See also SAR - 1902, pp.89-90.

3 Baylis to Gwynne, 23 May 1903, CMSA/EG/Vol.2. Gwynne's report to the Egyptian Missionary Conference, 20 May 1903, CMSA/E/03/1903.

4 Baylis to Gwynne, 30 June 1904, CMSA/EG/Vol.2.
...a carefully worded memorial to the Sirdar referring to his admirable civil government of the Sudan and embodying the many urgent reasons...for Christian Mission work amongst its Mohammedan population...The memorial should be signed by a very large number of influential people, including as many members of the Royal family as it is possible to induce to do so...

In 1905 the CMS tried to appeal to the Muslims by distributing its paper Orient and Occident. The government again intervened and forbade its distribution in the northern provinces. It was only in 1906 that the CMS at last complied with the government's wish to establish a missionary station in the south. Yet, even in later years its major efforts were in the sphere of educational and medical missions in the Muslim provinces.

The CMS founded a girls' school at Khartoum in 1903, shortly after receiving Cromer's permission. The society, however, had no intention of complying with Cromer's request that every Muslim parent should give his written consent to his child receiving religious

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1 Spence to Secretary of Foreign Department, CMS, 15 Sep. 1903, CMSA/E/03/1903.

2 Cecil to Wingate, 15 Jan. 1905, SAD/276/1; MacInnes to Baylis, Report on interview with the Sirdar and Lord Cromer, Mar. 1905, CMSA/E/03/1905. The CMS were told that those who wanted to receive the paper had to send an application to the director of intelligence in Cairo.

3 For details see pp. 250-2.

4 When in 1914, Gwynne approached Wingate on behalf of the CMS, nearly all his requests referred to the extension of activities in the northern provinces, see Wingate to Stack (private), 18 Apr. 1914, SAD/190/1/2.

education. Hence, Gwynne expressed his satisfaction when Wingate failed to press this point and instead relied on Gwynne's good will. The result was that the CMS concentrated its efforts on getting Muslim girls to attend its schools. As for their participating in religious education, "...a few parents have occasionally said that they do not wish their children to do so, but they generally attend in the end..." Nevertheless, the CMS managing committee suggested that Muslims who were exempted from Scripture lessons should pay extra school fees. MacInnes refused to demand this charge on the ground that only four out of fifty-five girls did not attend Scripture lessons.

An article in al-Mu'ayyad, in December 1906, convinced the Sudan authorities and Cromer, that stricter measures had to be applied to the missionary schools. This article accused those responsible for the CMS girls' school of breaking their promise to Muslim parents whose daughters attended the Christian religious education despite

1 Henry to Wingate, 7 July 1904, SAD/275/5.
2 Gwynne to Baylis, 24 Feb. 1903, CMSA/E/03/1903.
4 MacInnes to CMS, 20 Apr. 1904, CMSA/Eg/03/1904. When Cromer reiterated his demand that Muslim parents should sign a document allowing their children to attend Christian religious lessons, MacInnes warned Gwynne not to pledge himself "...to a document which might be used to the prejudice of the School...", MacInnes to Parent Committee, 4 Nov. 1904, CMSA/E/03/1904.
5 Al-Mu'ayyad, 17 Dec. 1906. The article was translated by ShahIn from the intelligence department, who later reported that it had been written by one of the Egyptian teachers at Gordon College. ShahIn to Wingate, 14 Jan. 1907, SAD/103/7/4.
the undertaking that they would be exempt\(^1\).

There is no doubt that the accusations were justified, and that the Sudan authorities were aware of the true situation\(^2\). A special government committee which investigated the situation in the missionary schools proposed the imposition of government inspection on all missionary schools\(^3\). Strict conditions were laid down for conducting the schools, and a special clause stipulated that no child would be allowed to attend religious education without the written consent of its parents\(^4\). In January 1907 Phipps, then civil secretary, undertook an inspection of all missionary schools. His report revealed that all the Muslims at the Catholic schools were exempt from religious instruction. However, there were eleven Muslim boys at the Presbyterian school, and 59 Muslim girls at the CMS girls' school.

\(^1\) *Al-Mu'ayyad*, 17 Dec. 1906.

\(^2\) Gwynne to Wingate, 29 Dec. 1906, SAD/103/6; Gwynne did not deny the charge. He stated, however, that the article represented an opinion of a minority of Egyptians whose sole motive was to arouse anti-British feelings. He therefore suggested inviting the Egyptian Muslims to open a school for their own girls, as the government had no funds to open one. See also Gwynne to Wingate, 2 Feb. 1907, Ibid.

\(^3\) Confidential Report on Missionary Schools in the Northern Sudan, 2 Dec. 1906, (signed) Sterry, Currie, Bonus; the original report was sent to Wingate and a copy to Cromer, SAD/103/6. According to the report the Austrian Mission had always welcomed inspections of its schools, whereas the CMS '...had forfeited the confidence of a large section of Mohammedan parents, and would welcome the possibility of any guarantee that might revive such confidence...'.
who were subject to religious instruction. Cromer, realizing that
the major problem was the CMS girls' school, proposed opening a gov-
ernment school instead. Wingate was reluctant to accede to Cromer's
request. He argued that if the government was to open a girls' school
the CMS would agitate in the British press and would also object to
government inspection of their schools. Thus the government decided
not to persist with this project and the CMS opened additional girls' schools at Omdurman and Atbara.

By 1912 there were seventeen missionary schools in the Muslim
provinces, whereas in the south, which should have been the missiona-
ries' mainstay. There were only four schools, all run by the Austrian
Catholics. In the same year Wingate introduced even stricter contr-
rol over missionary education as a counter-measure to Gwynne's increa-
sed authority following the consecration of the Khartoum Cathedral.
Missionary schools were now to be inspected regularly by the governor-
general's representatives. Their syllabus and teaching staff had to

1 Phipps to Wingate, 19 Jan. 1907, SAD/103/6.
2 Cromer to Wingate, 6 Feb. 1907, FO 141/409.
3 Wingate to Cromer, 19 Mar. 1907, SAD/103/7/1; Gwynne to Wingate, 13
Mar. 1907, SAD/103/7/2; Gwynne warned Wingate against this project
which would compel the CMS to close its own school in Khartoum; See
also Extract from Annual Report of Education Department (1906), SAD/103/6.
4 GGR - 1912, pp. 289-90; there were nearly 1000 pupils educated in mis-
sionary schools. Out of the 21 schools, eight belonged to the Austrian
Catholic Missions, six to the Presbyterians, four to the Orthodox
Copts, and three to the CMS. The schools of the CMS and the Presby-
terians at their southern stations were so inadequate that they could
not be listed as proper schools.
be approved by the authorities and, as previously, any child had to bring the written approval of his parents if he wanted to participate in religious education.

The relations between the government and the other missionary societies were less strained than with the CMS. Giffen, of the Presbyterian mission, who arrived in the Sudan in 1899, related that relations between government officials and missionaries were very friendly. However, many of these officials regarded missionary activities as superfluous or even harmful. "...The religion the people already have", it was said, "is good enough for them; it is all they need, and all they can comprehend". The British officers found the Catholic mission most to their liking. The Austrian missionaries complied with government orders, undertook the work in the southern sphere which was allotted to them and concentrated on industrial education which the government was anxious to develop. The reasons for this more worldly attitude were probably that the Catholics, as foreigners, were less likely to interfere in administrative problems, or indeed to expect aid from the government. Also during the Turco-Egyptian period, the Verona fathers had made no attempt to proselytize.

1 Instructions as to the procedure to be carried out by individuals or societies desirous of opening schools in the Sudan, (signed) R. Wingate, 31 Jan. 1912, CMSA/Sudan/1; The instructions applied to all private schools, except kuttâbs.

2 J.K. Giffen, The Egyptian Sudan, p.57.

3 In 1912 the governor of Bahr al-Ghazāl asked Wingate to send the Catholics to his province rather than the CMS; see p.253; see also Wingate to Feilden, 21 Feb. 1913, SAD/185/2/2.
Muslims and had concentrated in the pagan south so that the new restrictions did not interfere with their work.

As for relations between the missionaries and the Muslim population, there is no evidence to show that they were strained, apart from occasional anti-missionary articles in the Egyptian press. Most of the missionaries had a very low opinion of Islam, which they expressed quite openly. Even Gwynne, who spent many years among the Muslims and was on friendly terms with many of them, persisted in these views and regarded Islam as a major factor in the country's backwardness.

The process of Islamization of the southern provinces made considerable progress during the Turco-Egyptian period as a result of trading penetration. During the Mahdia the penetration of Islam into the south suffered a setback owing to the brutality of Mahdist raids and its fanaticism. Thus the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, by virtue of the

2 See for instance al-*Liwā*, 7 Feb. 1900; 3 May 1900; see also pp. 55. When in 1915 Wingate asked Rashīd Rida to stop "...his diatribes against missionaries.", Rida replied that he only did so as the missionaries "..."write books and publish articles against the Prophet, the Kurān and the Mohammedan faith".", quoted in Wingate to Cromer, 28 Apr. 1915, SAD/195/2.
3 See for instance Dr. Lloyd's Journal, Apr. 1908, SAD/203/9/12; see also Giffen, *The Egyptian Sudan*, pp. 53-4.
5 For a comprehensive study of these provinces during the Mahdia see R. O. Collins, *The Southern Sudan 1883-1898* (Yale 1962); see also Collins, *Sudan Link*, pp. 362-9.
Islamic character of its army and the lower ranks of its administration, became an agent for spreading Islam in these provinces.

During the early years of the Condominium there was no consistent government action to halt the spreading of Islam in the south. The posts which were occupied by the Egyptian army attracted the northern jallāba and became centres for propagating Islam. Wingate was aware:

...that for one Christian officer or official who goes into the Southern districts there are hundreds of Moslems each one of whom is, by the very nature of his religion, an embryonic missionary; moreover, the Moslem religion appeals to the blacks very much more than the Christian religion can...²

However, apart from throwing the south open to missionaries, there was little he could do. The government, fearing the effects of Muslim education, decided not to extend its educational facilities to the south. When, in 1904, the governor of Bahr al-Ghazāl started a school for the children of the provincial staff, he was ordered by Currie to close it. Currie argued that by employing a Muslim teacher '...the net result of his teaching must tend towards Mohammedanism...³ Wingate who supported Currie suggested the employment of a Lebanese teacher and stated his views about the government's religious policy in clear terms:

¹Jallāba: trader; the Jallāba were traders mainly from the riverain tribes of the Sudan. During the Turco-Egyptian period many of them acted as intermediaries in the slave trade and some of them continued this practice during the early years of the Condominium. See also p.371.

²Wingate to Gwynne, (private), 4 Dec. 1910, SAD/298/3.

³Boulnois to Currie, Jan. 1904; Currie to Boulnois, Jan. 1904, SAD/103/7/2.
...I am not at all keen to propagate Mohammedanism in countries in which that religion is not the religion of the inhabitants. As a Govt. I do not intend interfering with religious beliefs and prefer to leave all that in the hands of the Missionaries. Then again the language question comes in; the language of the Bahr-el-Ghazal is not really Arabic, and therefore if any foreign language is taught, it ought to be English.

Towards the end of 1904 it became clear that Islamization was progressing. In consequence the governor decided to stop the teaching of reading, writing and arithmetic. A proposal made in 1906 to re-open the school for the children of government employees was again rejected by Currie who instead suggested that '...any eligible boy of decent parents...' shall be educated in Khartoum. These purely negative measures designed to discourage Muslim education soon proved a complete failure. Islam made rapid progress in the Bahr al-Ghazāl as well as in the Nuba mountains and in the Mongalla province.

Stack, then Sudan agent in Cairo, commented:

...It is sad to think that when by our administrative and

1Wingate to Boulnois (private), 3 Feb. 1904, SAD/103/7/2.
2Despite the precaution of employing a Syrian teacher, all the schools' pupils had become Muslims by the end of 1904. Wingate to Mudir Bahr El-Ghazāl (confidential), 21 Nov. 1904, Ibid.
3Boulnois to Wingate, 7 Dec. 1904, SAD/275/9.
4Hill to Civil Secretary, 19 Dec. 1906; Currie to Civil Secretary, 2 Feb. 1907, SAD/103/7/2.
5GGR - 1907, pp.183-4; GGR - 1908, p.466.
6SIR - 179, June 1909.
7Shaw to Baylis, 9 Aug. 1910, CMSA/Sudan/01/1910; Shaw reported on an interview he had with Owen, governor of Mongalla.
civilizing efforts we are able to induce the heathen tribes of the Sudan to live at peace with their hereditary foes, the Arabs, the former incline at once to Mohammedanism... ¹

Bishop Gwynne proposed '...to clear out the Egyptian Mamours and replace the Sudanese troops by police raised and employed locally and the encouragement of good British trading companies... '² Furthermore, he accused some of the British officers of aiding the progress of Islam by building mosques in the southern provinces³. Wingate, whilst admitting the fault of some of his officers, reiterated his belief that only the missionaries could provide the antidote to Muslim propaganda⁴. It is interesting to note that Gordon, the British officer blamed for building the mosque at Wau, stated that '...in 1899, when the Sudan Government re-occupied the Bahr el-Ghazal, the province was in a marked degree more Mohammedan than it is today... '⁵

The years after 1910 witnessed an increased attempt by the government to repulse the progress of Islam. The jallāba were restricted by government orders and needed a special permit to trade in the south⁶.

¹Stack to Wingate, 25 Mar. 1912, SAD/180/3; see also Gilan, Nubas, p.12.
²Gwynne to Wingate, 29 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/2; Gwynne had just returned from an inspection of the Lado Enclave, Bahr al-Ghazāl and Mongalla.
³Ibid; see also GGR – 1908, p.466. The governor of Bahr al-Ghazāl reported that a mosque was built in Wau by the Egyptian officers and officials, and by the traders.
⁴Wingate to Gwynne, 9 Oct. 1911, SAD/301/4.
⁵Gordon to Wingate, 30 June 1910, enclosed in Gwynne to Baylis, 4 Aug. 1910, CMSA/Sudan/01/1910.
In March 1911 Wingate took an important step in instituting what later came to be known as the 'Southern Policy'. Following a tour of inspection of the southern provinces he suggested replacing the Egyptian army in the south by locally recruited territorials. He stated that this would aid recruiting. His main argument was that it '...would afford of getting rid of the Moslemizing influence in the shape of the Egyptian Officers...' Wingate pledged Gorst to complete secrecy and asked him to '...avoid any reference to the religious aspect...'.

Thus the Equatorial Battalion came into being. The official reasons for recruiting the new battalions were stated to be financial and territorial. The Equatorials were cheaper than regular army units, and their services were required in occupying the Lado Enclave. By 1914 there were five Equatorial companies, and the number of Egyptian army units was accordingly decreased. However, Wingate's intention of excluding Muslim officers could not be realized as there

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1 Wingate to Gorst (private), 1 Mar. 1911, SAD/300/3; Collins, Sudan Link, p.379. Collins stated that the Equatorial battalion was first suggested by Owen, governor of Mongalla, on 29 Mar. 1911. Wingate's letter to Gorst may have been the result of his tour in Mongalla which, however preceded Owen's memorandum by four weeks.

2 Asser To Wingate, 16 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/2.

3 SIR - 210, Jan. 1912; The Equatorial battalions received less pay than the army units and were expected to grow their own food; see Conditions of Service, Equatorial Battalion, 27 Feb. 1912, SAD/106/4.

4 SIR - 236, Mar. 1914; see also SIR - 220, Nov. 1912; where it was reported that a battalion of the Egyptian army was disbanded for reasons of economy.
were not enough educated southerners.  

The only area where the government succeeded in excluding Muslim influence from the territorial battalions were the new districts of Gondokoro and Nimule which were ceded to the Sudan following the border settlement with Uganda. In the other southern provinces the government persisted in trying to eliminate the Muslim element as '...quite apart from the religious question per se, it would of course be politically undesirable for the Equatorials...to become Moslems...'.  This process of elimination was slightly retarded owing to the World War and to a mutiny of the Equatorials at Yambio in 1915.

In April 1912, a few months after the first Equatorial battalion was raised, Wingate suggested a similar plan for the Nuba mountains. Recruiting started in March 1913 and a year later the first company

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1 Wingate to Phipps, 6 Sep. 1911, SAD/301/3; Asser to Wingate, 15 Sep. 1912, SAD/182/3/2; In 1914 Dr. Stone from the CMS wrote that '...the new Azandi soldiers are under the influence of Sudanese muhammedan...officers; are taught a little Arabic; keep the muhammedan Sabbath and holidays and often are given muhammedan names...'; Report by Dr. R.Y. Stone on the Yambio district, Mar.-Apr. 1914, CMSA/S/01/15.

2 Wingate to Asser, 29 Aug. 1913, SAD/187/2/2; Owen to Wingate, 26 Jan. 1914, SAD/189/1; Owen to Wingate, 28 Mar. 1914, SAD/189/3.

3 Wingate to Fielden, 28 Mar. 1914, Ibid.

4 O.C. Bahr-el-Ghazal to A.G. Khartoum, 29 May 1915, 31 May 1915; A.G. to O.C. Bahr-el-Ghazal, 2 June 1915, SAD/195/11; Wingate to Owen, 21 Oct. 1915, SAD/197/1/2; there were also difficulties of recruiting owing to the discovery of sleeping sickness in that area.

5 Wingate to Kitchener, (private), 15 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.
of the Nuba Territorials assembled at Kadugli\(^1\). Most of the company consisted of ex-slaves from Jabal Miri, while the makk\(\text{a}\) of the other mountains dissuaded their men from joining fearing that this would result in a loss of authority\(^2\). The rising of Riki 'Ali, Makk of Jabal Miri in 1915, afforded ample proof of the company's loyalty, as only two of his former slaves joined in the revolt\(^3\). Wingate wrote optimistically that he hoped the Nuba Territorials would soon acquire such a reputation as not to merit the term "abid"...\(^4\)

Thus the Sudan government pursued an active policy of resisting the Islamization of the south. A further step in this direction was taken in 1911 when English became the official language of the southern provinces. However, this new departure was connected with the development of missionary activities\(^5\).

g. Missionary societies in the south.

The southern provinces were opened to missionary activities shortly after the reconquest. It was not however until 1900-1901 that the first missionaries proceeded to the south to survey their future areas of activity\(^6\). Following a suggestion made by the representatives of

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\(^1\)Historical Records - Nuba Territorial Company, SAD/106/5.

\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)Ibid; Wingate to Balfour, 24 July 1915, SAD/196/2.

\(^4\)Wingate to Balfour, 2 Nov. 1915, SAD/197/2/2.


the CMS and the Presbyterians, the Sudan government divided the areas south of parallel 10° into three spheres. The Austrian mission was allocated the left bank of the White Nile; the American Presbyterians were allowed to operate in the Sobat and Zaraf valleys; whilst the CMS received permission to work in the Bahr al-Jabal and in the area between the American and Austrian societies. Other missionary societies were discouraged by the government from operating in the Sudan. Only in 1913 was the Sudan United Mission allowed to open a station at Melut, south of Kodok, following the failure of the CMS to occupy its sphere effectively. The Lado Enclave, which reverted to the Sudan in 1910, was claimed by both the Austrian mission and the CMS. As a result of the CMS's poor record, Wingate decided to

1 Hall to Adeney, 12 Mar. 1901, CMSA/E/03/1901; the suggestion was at first turned down by the government who did not want to be tied down to any written agreement. Nason to Roman Catholic Mission, 17 Feb. 1902, FO. 403/322.

2 GGR - 1904, p.37.

3 Owen to Wingate, 25 June 1905, SAD/276/6.

4 Wingate to Stack, 14 June 1913, SAD/186/3; Wingate to Sir Andrew Wingate, 25 July 1913, SAD/187/1/1; Sir Andrew Wingate was Wingate's cousin and head of the Sudan United Mission; see also J.L. Maxwell, Half a Century of Grace: A jubilee history of the Sudan United Mission, (London n.d.), p.104.

5 Baylis to Gwynne, 6 May 1910, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.1; Gwynne to Phipps, 19 Feb. 1912, CMSA/S/01/1912; Geyer to Wingate, 14 Feb. 1912, SAD/180/2/2.
allot the area to the Austrian mission\(^1\). Furthermore, he warned the CMS that had the sphere system not been adopted they would have been the main losers\(^2\). However, Wingate compensated the CMS by granting them part of the Azande district in the Bah\(\text{r} \) al-Ghaz\(\text{\'}\)l province\(^3\).

In 1913 the government followed a new departure by allowing missionary activities north of latitude 10\(^\circ\). Following an appeal by Gwynne, Wingate allowed the Sudan United Mission to open a station at Melut, north of Kodok\(^4\). He also enabled the Austrian mission to re-open its station at Dilling, which had been closed on the Mahdi's order in 1883\(^5\). In both cases the areas were regarded by Wingate as non-Muslim, and missionaries were introduced in order to check the advance of Islam\(^6\). A year later the Austrian missionaries declared that

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\(^1\) Wingate to Baylis, 23 May 1912, CMSA/S/01/1912; in a private letter to Phipps, Wingate strongly criticised Gwynne for having joined the CMS in denying the Austrian claim: "...unless he can take a statesmanlike view instead of that of a last-joined petty missionary, he is practically useless to me..." Wingate to Phipps (private), 24 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.

\(^2\) Wingate to Baylis, 23 May 1912, CMSA/S/01/1912.

\(^3\) The CMS had previously suggested to abolish the sphere system. Following Wingate's letter they changed their minds; Baylis to Wingate, 10 May 1912, CMSA/S/01/1912; Baylis to Wingate, 16 July 1912, Ibid.

\(^4\) Gwynne to Parent Committee, 4 Jan. 1913, CMSA/S/01/1913; Wingate to Phipps, 29 July 1913, SAD/187/1/2.

\(^5\) Wingate to Kitchener, 20 Mar. 1912, SAD/180/3; see also Wingate, Ten Years Captivity, pp.23-30.

\(^6\) Wingate to Kitchener, 20 Mar. 1912, SAD/180/3; Wingate to Sir Andrew Wingate, 25 July 1913, SAD/187/1/1; see also Gwynne to Blyth, 19 Oct. 1913, SAD/420/3; Gwynne who had accompanied the new missionaries to Melut, wrote as follows: "...I came here a fortnight ago to start a new mission and try and thwart Islam in its threatened hold on the pagans..."
...Gebel Dilling had become rather too Mohammedan for them...¹, and in 1916 the station was closed for the duration of the World War².

The division into spheres did not apply in these new areas, or in the frontier districts which were ceded to the Sudan from Uganda in 1913³. But in other parts of the southern Sudan the division into spheres continued to be applied.

The government set down a number of regulations to which all missionary societies had to adhere. Missions were instructed to '...place themselves unreservedly [sic] under control of its local head in the country...' They were further ordered to '...act only with the approval and permission of the Governor General of the Sudan...' Missionaries were forbidden to trade, except for bartering for their immediate necessities. They were ordered not '...to act as intermediaries between natives and the Government...'⁴ Although these regulations were formalized only in 1912, they developed in the preceding years primarily as a result of practical requirements.

In 1905 the Austrian missionaries were granted government payment for their educational work in the Baḥr al-Ḡazāl⁵. The following

¹Wingate to Wilson, 3 July 1913, Ibid.
²SIR - 261, Apr. 1916.
³Wingate to Stack (private), 18 Apr. 1914, SAD/190/1/2; Manley to Wingate, 12 Jan. 1914, CMSA/S/01/1914.
⁴Regulations and conditions under which missionary work is permitted in the Sudan (signed) R. Wingate, 31 Jan. 1912, CMSA/S/01/1912; see also GGR - 1905, pp.151-2.
⁵Wingate to Henry, 6 Aug. 1905, SAD/277/3; see also p.255.
year Gwynne suggested that all missionaries should be granted a special reduction on the Sudan railways and steamers. He argued that "...Missionaries are doing more than any other Englishman to develop their part of the Soudan..." The government accepted his suggestion and a reduction of 50% was granted to all missionaries travelling in the Sudan. The order forbidding missionaries to trade was based on Wingate's belief that "...the Boxer movement in China was to a large extent caused by Missionaries becoming extensive traders..." In 1912 Wingate realized that missionaries could not exist in the outlying districts without being permitted to barter. Hence, he ordered trade regulations to be relaxed. Wingate also decided to exempt the Austrian missionary stations from paying animal tax. These regulations indicated that while striving to keep a clear distinction between missionary and government activities, the Sudan authorities attempted to assist the missionaries wherever they could.

The government's attitude to the different societies stemmed from their usefulness to the government rather than their creed. The British officials were, in the main, adherents of the Church of England. However, once it became clear that the Roman Catholics provided the

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1 Gwynne to Parent Committee, 16 Aug. 1906, CMSA/S/01/1906.
2 Owen to Thornton, 12 June 1907, SAD/208/6.
3 Wingate to Phipps, 3 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/3.
4 Wingate to Phipps, 18 Nov. 1912, SAD/183/2.
5 Wingate to Phipps, 19 Nov. 1912, SAD/183/1.
only effective missionary services in the Sudan, the government showed its gratitude by granting preference to the Austrian missionaries. Upon the opening of the south to the missionary societies, the Austrians established several stations in the Bahr al-Ghazāl and on the White Nile, while the Americans opened a station on the river Sobat.

Constant efforts of the Sudan government to urge the CMS to occupy its sphere in the south failed to produce results. In 1904 Wingate warned Gwynne that unless the CMS made a start he would have to apportion the districts of Gondokoro and Wadelai to the Austrians. The CMS headquarters excused their inability to occupy the south owing to lack of men. Cromer went even further than Wingate exhorting the CMS to bring to the southern provinces the English language and the Bible.

In 1905, the CMS decided to establish its first station in the

1SAR - 1902, pp.89-90. By 1909, the Austrian mission had established five stations in the southern provinces, as compared to one station of the American Presbyterians and one of the CMS; see SAR - 1909, pp. 63-4; Until 1914 the Austrians increased the number of their stations to seven, while the CMS opened a medical station in the Azande district, see GGR - 1914, pp.9,61. For the development of missionary activities in the south, see also H.C. Jackson, Pastor on the Nile, pp.54-86; Giffen, The Egyptian Sudan, pp.92-122, 192-215.

2Gwynne to Parent Committee, 30 May 1904, and minutes of the P.C., 30 June 1904, CMSA/E/03/1904.

3Maclnnes to Baylis, 4 Nov. 1904, Ibid. Reporting an interview with Cromer; see also Kennaway to Cromer, 25 Nov. 1904, Ibid; where he thanked Cromer for his clear call to the CMS. Cromer, however, warned the CMS not to use his words in the society’s propaganda as it would antagonize Muslim feelings; see Cromer to Kennaway, 1 Dec. 1904, Ibid.
Mongalla province. The CMS proclaimed:

...the course of history by which the British rule is established as a rule of peace in the Nile Basin; the remarkable call to the Society from the ruling authorities in that land to send a Mission there...all combine to make the Committee feel that the hand of God is manifest in the ordering of this new venture of faith...".

The CMS decided to link the work in the southern Sudan with their activities in Uganda, and instructed Dr Cook, one of its missionaries in Uganda, to stay in Mongalla for six months. It was probably as a result of the vehement views held by Cook that the new missionaries viewed the government officials with suspicions bordering on hostility. Hadow, the secretary of the mission, failed to reach an understanding with the governor of Mongalla. Before long he suggested leaving only two missionaries at Malek and transferring the rest to other countries. Despite Gwynne's protests the CMS decided to

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1. Interview between Wingate and Kennaway at CMS headquarters London, 14 July 1905, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.1; An interesting insight into the workings of a missionary society is afforded by the monthly journals of Rev. Hadow, and Dr Lloyd who were among the first CMS missionaries at Malek, SAD/203/9/1-20.


3. Baylis to Gwynne, 6 Jan. 1905, CMSA/E/03/1905; Baylis to Dr A. Cook, 27 Oct. 1905, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.1; see also Note by Rev. L. Gwynne [n.d. 1907]? The work of British Missions in the Sudan, SAD/103/6. Gwynne, who accompanied the missionaries for a few weeks, reported on their progress and problems.

4. Baylis to Cook, 27 Oct. 1905, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.1; Baylis warned Cook from making public his views on the undesirability of cooperating with the government.

5. Hadow to Baylis, 15 Jan. 1907, 30 May 1907, CMSA/S/01/1907.

6. Hadow to Parent Committee, 1 Dec. 1906, CMSA/S/10/1906. Hadow argued that the CMS sphere was too small for six missionaries, and that they were too '...high class for the work...'; Gwynne dismissed these arguments as untrue. Gwynne to Baylis, 19 June 1907, CMSA/S/01/1907.
accept Hadow’s proposals and withdrew most of its missionaries. In 1908, the CMS was compelled to abandon its station for a short period, and asked Gwynne to arrange for the government to supervise the mission’s property. By this time Gwynne was thoroughly disillusioned with the CMS. He wrote to Wingate: ‘...I shall tell them when I get home that I either have a voice in the management of the mission or I wash my hands of the whole business...’ Constant appeals by Wingate, Gwynne, and the two CMS missionaries in Mongalla failed to induce the CMS headquarters to extend their missionary activities.

It was only in 1913, that the CMS decided to open a new station at Yambio aided by two Australian missionaries.

In those circumstances it was hardly surprising that the Sudan government refused to extend the sphere granted to the CMS and

1 Gwynne to Baylis, Baylis to Hadow, 31 May 1907, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.1.
2 Baylis to Gwynne, 10 Apr. 1908, Ibid.
3 Gwynne to Wingate, 20 Apr. 1908, SAD/282/4.
4 Wingate to Baylis (private), 4 Mar. 1911; 29 Mar. 1911, CMSA/S/01/1911. The Times, 16 Sep. 1909, Gwynne appealed for volunteers to come to the CMS station; see also Gwynne to Parent Committee, 11 Feb. 1910; Shaw to Parent Committee, 1 Mar. 1910, 30 Mar. 1910, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.1; see also Minute VII, 6 May 1910, by Parent Committee, Ibid, where it admitted that there was little hope of finding men or means to extend their activities.
5 The Times, 25 Jan. 1913.
preferred the work of the Austrian mission. This view was clearly expressed by Wingate in 1912, when he tried to convince the CMS to forego their rights in the Azande district:

...I have no hesitation in saying that I should infinitely prefer to see the Roman Catholic Mission allowed to extend their stations into the Riketa and Yambio districts. The CMS have neither the means nor the organization to be anything like as useful to the Government as the Roman Catholics are.

Owen, governor of Mongalla and one of the few protagonists of the CMS, tried to assist the CMS in acquiring new spheres in the Lado Enclave. He was rebuked by Wingate in no uncertain terms:

...you must, however, remember that you only see one side, and that a rather prejudiced one...there is no question that the Austrian Mission have acquired rights which I recognised as long as six years ago.

Wingate's reliance on the Austrian Mission was clearly demonstrated during the World War. Most of the Catholic missionaries were technically enemy aliens, and as such should have been interned or deported. Wingate, however, declined to treat them as other aliens,

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1 It is, however, surprising that Gwynne who shared many of the criticisms of the CMS, failed to see this point. In 1913 he wrote to Manley, secretary of the CMS: '...Why he [Wingate] favours the Roman Catholics I cannot tell, for the majority of the R.C. missionaries are lay brothers, the lowest class of R.C. workers - when he [Wingate] asked me what was the difference between ours and theirs, I answered "breed" at which he exploded...!', Gwynne to Manley, 1 Sep. 1913, GMSA/S/01/1913.

2 Wingate to Feilden, (private), 27 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2; A year later Wingate asked Feilden to compile a list of all his complaints against the CMS; Wingate to Feilden, 28 June 1913, SAD/186/3.

3 Wingate to Owen (private), 4 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.

4 According to a government order (signed Willis), 6 Mar. 1915, all alien enemy subjects were ordered to leave the Sudan within fourteen days, SAD/194/3/2.
as Cromer had suggested, and instead decided to place them under government observation by concentrating them in certain stations. In a report prepared by Willis after the War, there was nothing but praise for the Austrian mission. As for the CMS, he proposed that '
the best thing to do with this Mission is to get it to go away... The CMS is too slow and bullies too much...'  

h. Missionary education in the south.

Until 1926 education in the southern provinces was based exclusively on missionary initiative. The government refrained from opening schools, even in cases where there was a genuine demand for education, on the grounds of lack of finance and fear of Islam. Every encouragement and inducement was offered to the missionary societies to open elementary and technical schools. Consequently, the Austrian mission opened four schools in the Bahr al-Ghazal and two in the Upper Nile province. The CMS opened its first school

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1 Wingate to Savile, 5 Mar. 1915, SAD/194/3/1; Wingate to Bishop Geyer, 17 Mar. 1915, SAD/194/2; Cromer to Wingate, 2 Sep. 1916, SAD/103/3; Report by the Aliens Committee as to the Austrian Mission in the Sudan, 1916, (signed) Bonham Carter, Stack, Willis, SAD/103/3; see also The Conduct of our Missionaries during the present crisis (signed) Bishop Geyer, 21 Sep. 1914, SAD/236/3; Geyer a German himself, urged all his fellow missionaries to help the government to observe order in the Sudan, and to refrain from any reference to the war in their correspondence, or in their dealings with local inhabitants.


4 GGR - 1904, p. 141; GGR - 1905, p. 158; see also pp. 240-1.

Malek in 1906 and a second one at Bor in 1915\textsuperscript{1}. The American Presbyterians opened a school at Doleib Hill in the Sobat valley in 1902\textsuperscript{2}. However, only the Austrian missionary schools were treated as government establishments and their teachers were paid by the education department\textsuperscript{3}. Hill, then governor of Bahr al-Ghazāl, defined the government's aims as follows:

...The Government does not want to make more Moslems, it wishes to technically instruct the natives, through the medium of their own language teaching them a certain amount of English...religious education can be given to those whose parents desire it in the Missionary schools...

Thus, the government's priorities were clearly defined. The principal aim was to stop the process of Islamization while the proselytizing efforts of the missionaries were treated as being only of secondary importance. The government was not altogether successful in pursuing this policy. The missionaries complained, justifiably, about the government's inconsistency and insisted that it was impossible to induce the southerners to learn English, as long as Arabic remained the official government language\textsuperscript{5}. Wingate admitted the soundness

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid, p.107; Owen to Wingate, 22 Aug. 1915, SAD/196/4; Manley to Shaw, 26 Jan. 1916, CMSA/Sudan/Vol.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{2}L. Sanderson, 'Educational development...', SNR - 43, p.107; Neither the CMS school at Malek nor that of the American Presbyterians were regarded by the government as proper schools; GGR - 1912, pp.289-90; see also p.237.
  \item \textsuperscript{3}Wingate to Hill, 21 Feb. 1907, SAD/103/7/2.
  \item \textsuperscript{4}Hill to Wingate, 30 Mar. 1907, Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{5}Gwynne to Wingate, 26 Dec. 1910, SAD/103/7/2; Gwynne wrote that at a consultation between Bishop Geyer, Shaw of the CMS, and himself they agreed that Islam could only be stopped from spreading if English became the official language in the south.
\end{itemize}
of these arguments and suggested making English the official language in the ḅahr al-Ghazāl:

...if the new system is started very quietly and tentatively - without any fuss and without putting the dots on the i's too prominently - the desideratum may become a fait accompli almost before anyone has realised that a change has taken place. It is very much easier to deal with an accomplished fact should opposition be eventually raised...1

At the same time Wingate proposed introducing Sunday as a weekly holiday in the remote districts of the ḅahr al-Ghazāl and Mongalla provinces2. He wrote to Feilden that although he realized that the introduction of English and of the Christian Sunday might cause Muslim resentment,

...we must remember that the bulk of the inhabitants of both yours and Owen's Provinces are not Moslems at all, that the whole of Uganda has accepted Christianity almost without a murmur, and that furthermore English is a very much easier language to learn than Arabic...3

By April 1911, Sunday had been introduced as a day of rest in the Lado Enclave4. In the following years English became the official

1Wingate to Feilden (private), 27 Dec. 1910, SAD/103/7/2; see also Hill, Missions, pp.130-1. Hill states that in the matter of English Wingate supported the missionary attitude. In fact Wingate opposed the teaching of Arabic as early as 1904, stating quite clearly that Arabic would help the spreading of Islam; see pp.240-1.

2Wingate to Feilden (private), 27 Dec. 1910, SAD/103/7/2.

3Ibid.

4Sunday had in fact been the official day of rest during the Belgian rule of the Lado Enclave; see Collins, Sudan Link, p.379. See also Wingate to Feilden (private), 15 Apr. 1911, SAD/300/4/2.
means of communication in the south. The enforcement of Sunday as the official day of rest was not pursued as vigorously as the missionaries would have liked.

Thus the foundations of the Southern Policy were laid during the Wingate era. In the early years of the Condominium this policy could hardly have been implemented. The threat of the Belgians in the Lado Enclave and the punitive expeditions against turbulent tribes required the presence of Egyptian and northern Sudanese Battalions in the south. Hence, Arabic and Islam were enabled to penetrate the southern provinces. The turning point arrived in 1910. The transfer of the Lado Enclave and the organization of the Equatorial battalions allowed the British authorities to pursue an active anti-Islamic policy. Aided by exclusive missionary education, the government took its first decisive step by introducing English as the semi-official language of the south. This laid the foundation

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\(^1\) Wingate to Feilden, Ibid; see also Shaw to Baylis, 10 May 1912, CMSA/S/01/1912; Owen to Wingate, 28 Aug. 1915, SAD/196/4, Owen reported that English had been introduced in Mongalla. When education was started in the Nuba mountains in 1923, English was introduced from the outset, L.M. Sanderson, 'Educational development...in the Nuba Mountains Region of the Sudan', *Journal of African History*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1963), pp. 233-48; see also C.H. Stigand, *Equatoria, the Lado Enclave*, (London 1923), p. 204.


\(^4\) Ibid, pp. 370-380.
of a separate political and administrative entity in the southern Sudan.

The government's aim was political rather than religious. It was primarily concerned with the containment of Islam, and not with aiding Christianity. The introduction of English was regarded as essential, while the imposing of Sunday as a day of rest was of lesser importance. Despite the complaints of missionaries who were constantly agitating in favour of stricter anti-Islamic measures, the advance of Islam into the south was largely contained. An additional argument justifying the Southern Policy was forwarded by Stigand, the first British inspector of the Lado Enclave, who argued that a complete separation of the south was essential for the economic development of that area:

...Little can be done for the Negro provinces whilst they are starved so as to turn over all available funds to the Arab provinces, and whilst they are subject to laws or regulations made for the benefit of the latter...So the Negro provinces

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1 Suggestions to link the southern Sudan to Uganda were made during the first World War, although not as official statements. See for instance Willis to O., 15 Oct. 1914, SAD/209/7; Gwynne to Parent Committee, 8 Sep. 1914, CMSA/S/01/1914; see also The Sudan a Record of Progress, 1898-1947, p.12, where these allegations were denied.


3 Trimingham, Islam, pp.242-51; Trimingham stated that whilst Islam had hardly penetrated south of latitude 10° it had made considerable advance in the Nuba Mountains.
should be put in a class by themselves, under a vice-governor... and allowed to work out their own salvation... \footnote{1}{C.H.Stigand, \textit{Equatoria, the Lado Enclave}, pp.201-2.}

During Wingate's governor-generalship there was very little criticism of the policy he adopted in the southern provinces. Even had such criticism existed, the lack of a free press in the Sudan did not enable the inhabitants to express their views. The Egyptian nationalist press was pre-occupied with Egyptian problems. When it ventured into Sudanese politics it was more concerned with criticizing British supremacy, with denouncing the treatment of Muslims in the north, and the activities of the missionaries in the Muslim provinces\footnote{2}{See pp. 54-6.}. However, the government's Southern Policy was challenged in 1907 by a British Liberal M.P. He demanded that the promotion of missionary activities in the south be stopped and that the separatist policy be abandoned\footnote{3}{\textit{The Times}, 26 Apr. 1907, Parliamentary Question by Mr. J.M.Robertson M.P.}.
Chapter VI.

The administration of justice.

Justice was one of the first requirements of the reconquered Sudan. The Condominium Agreement was not in itself a constitution. It gave formal recognition to the prevailing situation following the reconquest. At the same time its preamble stated the necessity of providing laws for the country, and set down the procedure by which they were to be enacted. It excluded the enforcement of Egyptian laws or decrees in the Sudan and barred the jurisdiction of the Egyptian mixed tribunals from the country. The Agreement stated that Europeans would not enjoy any special privileges, thereby excluding the extension of the Capitulations to the Sudan. It further laid down the procedure for the enactment of laws. Complete powers were granted to the governor-general to promulgate laws and regulations, and change them whenever necessary. Finally, it imposed martial

1 Agreement between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of His Highness the Khedive of Egypt, relative to the future administration of the Soudan, J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near Middle East, (U.S.A. 1956), pp.21-8; see also pp.15-7.

2 The Egyptian Judgement Ordinance 1901, gave power to judgments given in the Egyptian native tribunals people residing in the Sudan. SG - 23, 1 May 1901; a further arrangement made in 1902 enabled the mutual extradition of fugitives between the two countries, SG - 36, 1 June 1902.

3 In 1900 the Egyptian mixed tribunals passed judgement in a case involving the Sudan. However, the court's claim to jurisdiction was based on the fact that the case occurred prior to the signing of the Condominium Agreement, thereby recognizing its validity. See Cromer to Salisbury, 2 May 1900, FO 78/5087.
law over the Sudan, thereby extending even further the powers of the governor-general.

The first law to be enacted by the Anglo-Egyptian authorities dealt with land ownership in the Sudan. Following that, the Sudan Penal Code and the Code of Criminal procedure were drafted by Brunyate, the legal adviser of the Egyptian government. No Civil Code was enacted, instead the Civil Justice Ordinance was promulgated in 1900, having been drafted by Bonham Carter, the newly appointed legal secretary. The Sudan was thus provided with legal codes, largely based on those of India, but following the Egyptian procedure with regard to the hearing of cases. The Sudan Penal Code followed the Indian Penal Code of 1837, and the Civil Justice Ordinance was based on the Indian Civil Procedure Code as adapted in Burma. Questions concerning the personal status of Muslims were to be decided according to the Shari'a. Customary law was to be applied whenever possible.

1 In an article in al-Ahrām, 1 July 1914, its correspondent claimed that as a result of the Capitulations not being extended to the Sudan, foreigners were unprotected. It further claimed that compared with the unlimited powers vested in the Sudan's legal secretary, Capitulations were a blessing.

2 SG - 1, 7 Mar. 1899; for details see pp. 333-34, 349-51.

3 Commenting on Brunyate's work, Wingate wrote: "...his drafting of our original codes was a work of which every Gov. Gen. must always be grateful to him...", Wingate to Cromer, 6 Apr. 1905, SAD/276/4.

4 SAR - 1900, p.73.

5 Handbook, pp.288-9. This was confirmed by the Mohammedan Law Courts Ordinance 1902. For details see pp. 273-74.
...courts were instructed to decide cases, in default of local legislation, in accordance with "justice, equity, and good conscience". Cases of conflict of jurisdiction, between the civil and Mohammedan courts were to be decided by a special council.

The codes and ordinances were at first only extended to the provinces of Khartoum, Dongola, Berber, Sennar, Kassala, and Wadī Halfa. In the Bahr al-Ghazāl and the Upper Nile provinces, justice was administered according to tribal law, and martial law was resorted to whenever necessary. In Kordofan, the vast areas and scarcity of government officials, made the enactment of the new laws impossible. Only in 1906 were the Sudan Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Civil Justice Ordinance, declared to be in force in all Provinces except the Bahr El Ghazal Province... The governors of the Upper Nile and Mongalla were authorized to decide in what cases to take proceedings according to the above codes.

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2 The Sub Mamurs Handbook (Khartoum 1926), p. 107; In 1910 Wingate stated his views about the Sudan legal system as follows: "...In the Sudan we have endeavoured to graft the experience gained in India on the system we found existing in the Sudan and so far I have every reason to believe we have evolved something which is acceptable to the natives." Wingate to Mitchell Innes, 7 Aug. 1910, SAD/297/3.

3 SG - 5, 2 Oct. 1899.

4 GGR - 1904, p. 53.

5 Ibid, p. 104.

6 SG - 86, 1 Jan. 1906; a year later the Codes were enforced in the Bahr al-Ghazāl; SG - 107, 7 Feb. 1907.
Thus three legal systems developed side by side. The first was based on the legal codes and administered by government officials. The Şarî'â law was administered by Mohammedan law courts, and supervised by the grand gâfî and by the British legal secretary. The customary or tribal law was administered by tribal chiefs under the supervision of government officials. An additional way of obtaining justice was by petitions. The people of the Sudan were encouraged to petition their nearest government official, but could also appeal to the inspector-general, the legal secretary or the governor-general. Officials and judges were instructed ‘...to see personally every petitioner however unreasonable or obviously misdirected his petition may be, and to hear what he had to say...’\(^1\)

The central judicial staff consisted of the legal secretary, three judges, and the advocate general, all of whom were British\(^2\). In 1904 civil courts were established at Khartoum and Suakin. Other centres such as Berber, Dongola, and Kafr were visited by the civil judges three times a year\(^3\). In 1908 the Sudan courts of justice were inaugurated in Khartoum and it was decided to institute a high

\(^1\) GGR - 1905, p. 79; CAO - 104, 30 Nov. 1903; see also pp. 34-5.

\(^2\) GGR - 1904, p. 52; ‘The Civil Judges Ordinance 1901’ enabled judges to try cases both under the code of Criminal. procedure and the Civil Justice Ordinance. It gave judges ‘...all the judicial powers of a Mudir in all civil and criminal matters which may be referred to him ...by the Mudir...’, see SG - 26, 1 Aug. 1901.

\(^3\) GGR - 1904, p. 52.
court and a court of appeal¹.

Justice was, however, mainly administered by non-qualified officials acting as magistrates. Every province, including Khartoum, had a governor's court consisting of three magistrates. It was presided over by the governor or his nominee, acting as a magistrate of the first class. These courts were authorised to pass any sentence within the law. The minor district courts were also constituted of three magistrates and qualified to pass sentences not exceeding seven years imprisonment, or a fine not exceeding £E 50. Magistrates' courts of the second and third class could only hear cases summarily and pass sentences not exceeding two months imprisonment, or a fine not exceeding £E 5².

In 1908, a special court was established in Khartoum, to hear all cases connected with land ownership. At the same time five British officials were appointed as land settlement officials in the provinces.

¹The opening ceremony of the courts was performed by the Duke of Connaught. In his opening speech Wingate quoted the following from the Bible: '...What does the Lord require of thee but to love mercy and to do justice and walk humbly with thy God...'. In the Arabic translation of Wingate's speech this quotation was not included; SG - 132, May 1908.

²QGR - 1903, p.29; All governors and some inspectors were magistrates of the first class. Inspectors and other British officials, as well as a few non-British employees, were magistrates of the second class. Egyptian ma'mūrs and other non-British officials were magistrates of the third class. Up to 1905 only officers could be appointed as magistrates. In 1905 'The Magisterial and Police Powers Ordinance' enabled the governor-general to appoint also civilians and inspectors of the slavery repression department who were previously excluded. SG - 73, 1 Mar. 1905. The governor-general could confer magisterial powers of a higher class than that stipulated by virtue of office. SG - 91, 1 Mar. 1906.
of Berber, Blue Nile, White Nile, Halfa, and Dongola. It became clear that provincial judges over-extended the budget, so that special, non-qualified, judicial inspectors were appointed, whose duty it was to hear all the cases in the provinces, by travelling to the various district headquarters.

By and large, the agreed practice was to try criminal cases, wherever they occurred, by provincial staff, leaving the generally more complicated civil suits to legally-trained officials. The logic behind this practice was that punishment for a criminal offence varied according to ideas, habits, and the degree of civilization. '...The same crime committed by a Sudanese black, a Jaalin Arab, or a Kababish nomad would probably not be fairly met by the same punishment...' Inspectors of the nomad Arabs were told that '...camel stealing and raiding even if murder results, are, as once were cattle lifting on the Scottish border, but manly exercises...'

The fact that punishment was in the hands of the local administrator, also tended to boost the latter's authority in his district. Governors were allowed a wide latitude in interpreting the Sudan Penal Code as

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1GGR - 1907, p.86; GGR - 1908, p.193; For details see pp.337-43.

2GGR - 1908, p.193. The first three to be appointed were Willis in Kordofan, Bond in the Blue Nile, and Osborne in Berber. All three were civilians who had come to the Sudan in 1905 as junior inspectors. SPS, pp.17, 19.

3GGR - 1906, p.576.

4GGR - 1904, p.57.

5GGR - 1906, p.351.
a tribal society could ill afford to lose the benefits of blood money as a result of imprisonment or execution. Another principle was that claims, other than those connected with land, arising out of events taking place during the Mahdia should be refused. As years passed, new legislation was introduced creating new offences. Some ordinances applied to non-Muslims only, while others were limited to one or two provinces. New ordinances were published in the Sudan Gazette, and explained in the annual reports of the legal department.

1 GGR - 1906, p.700. Officially the Sudan Penal Code was introduced in Kordofan in 1901, however as elsewhere in the Southern Sudan the application of rigid code is a matter requiring considerable tact and discretion. According to the Penal Code, capital punishment or life imprisonment had to be imposed for murder. However, what usually happened was a petition to the Governor General to remit the death penalty. The Governor General would then refer the matter to the provincial Governor to try and make a settlement between the two sides. Following the payment of blood money, the death sentence would be substituted for a moderate term of imprisonment, so that the people might recognize that the Government has its right too. See Wasey Sterry, 'Some notes on the administration of justice in Africa', Reale Accademia D'Italia - VIII Convegno "Volta" (Roma 4-11 Ottobre 1938), p.4.

2 GAO - 133, Feb. 1904; as to lands, five years continuous possession was regarded as proof of ownership. See also pp.333-34.

3 GGR - 1908, p.148.

4 See for instance SG - 113, 1 June 1907, where provision was made for the administration of estates of deceased persons, excluding Muslims; in 1906, 'The Sudan Non-Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance' was promulgated, SG - 105, 8 Feb. 1907.

5 See Memoirs of Ryder 1905-16 (typescript), SAD/400/8, where he wrote about an ordinance dealing with the fight against mosquitoes which was enacted only for Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North.

6 See for instance GGR - 1903, p.80, where Bonham Carter stated the reasons for the 'Land Acquisition Ordinance' and the 'Taxation of Animals Ordinance', 1903.
By virtue of the Condominium Agreement, Wingate exercised complete authority over new legislation. Despite his control, which might have caused friction, his relations with the senior staff of the legal department were on the whole good. Yet, he expected them to cooperate fully with other branches of government administration and had little patience with legal technicalities. Hence, when Sterry, the chief judge, decided a case contrary to what Wingate regarded as in the best interests of the country he complained that it was '...quite useless... to argue with these legal people on matters of expediency, policy, etc, etc. - they no more understand it than the man on the moon...'. What the Sudan required were law officials '...who were capable of looking at a situation from the point of view in which those actually responsible for the administration have to consider them...'. Needless to say, Wingate's view prevailed, and cases were decided according to the principle that legal considerations had to be waived whenever administrative policy so required.

An additional defect was that there was no separation between the judiciary and the executive. This was remedied in 1908 by the

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1 Wingate to Stack (private), 10 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2.
2 Wingate to Stack (private), 19 May 1912, Ibid; the dispute was between Wingate and Sterry about a sentence the latter passed on an Egyptian officer. Many years later Sterry wrote that '...Judicial Staff should not be selected entirely from the ranks of professional lawyers, but partly also from the Administrative staff, who are likely...to be much better acquainted with native ideas, customs, and language than the professional lawyer...', Wasey Sterry, 'Some notes on the administration of justice in Africa', Reale Accademia D'Italia - VIII Convègno "Volta", (Roma 4-11 Ottobre 1938), p.4.
establishment of a high court and a court of appeal. However, Sterry claimed that it was unlikely that a Sudan law court would pass judgement against government officials and that '...justice is best obtained as a resultant of the executive and the judiciary...'

a. The administration of justice in the provinces.

The administration of justice in the provinces, was by and large, entrusted to the provincial officials. Hussey, commenting on the legal functions of the inspectors many years later, wrote:

"...in a primitive society no distinction is generally made between administrative and judicial functions. They are both part of the single function of the chief or ruler... in some respects the District Commissioner in a primitive society is in the same position..."

This, and the scarcity of legally trained officials, forced many an inexperienced junior inspector to settle cases ranging from trespassing and cattle thieving to adultery and murder. Writing on the situation in Suakin, a British inspector complained that '...the

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1SAR - 1908, p.60.

2Sterry to Wingate, 24 Jan. 1910, SAD/290/1.

3District Commissioners was the term used for inspectors after the Wingate era.

4E.R.J. Hussey, Tropical Africa 1908-1944, (London 1959), pp.45-6; Hussey was an Oxford graduate who served in the Sudan from 1908-25 mostly in the education department.

5In 1903, the director of the department of agriculture suggested that a permanent scale of fees be fixed for trespassing, which could be collected by the shaykh or 'umda without reference to a magistrate. The system then prevailing, meant that in order to prosecute trespassers, cultivators had to go to the nearest tābīya, sometimes over twenty miles away, GGR - 1903, p.175.
only legal machinery here is a clerk unable to speak a word of English...¹ Hence, the inspectors' duties comprised, "...those of Judge, Magistrate, Mayor, Registrar (he can marry and divorce you) and almost every kind of civil work..."² The legal training given to these young inspectors was nominal. Following their appointment, they spent the first few months in Khartoum, where they were trained in the various government departments and were made familiar with the Sudan's legal system.³ Only in 1908, when the first judicial inspectors were appointed, was a more comprehensive legal training required. One of the first legal inspectors in Berber province described his duties as follows:

...My job was to sit in the Civil Court in El Damer and hear the civil cases and also to keep the register of lands up to date which had taken us four years to compile. I also visited Atbara, Berber and Shendi once every month to hear civil cases... Also when the Governor so directed I sat as one of the members of a Mudir's court (three magistrates) to try some serious crime...⁴

In Kordofan the judicial inspector's job was not so straightforward. He spent most of his time roaming around the districts allotted to him. His duties varied from one district to another, and depended largely upon the competence of the shaykhs, nāzirs, or other tribal

¹Borton to Nason, 26 Sep. 1903, SAD/273/9.
³SAR — 1904, p. 128; see also Davies, pp. 22-41.
⁴Memoirs of Ryder, 1905-1916, SAD/400/8, p. 66; Ryder started his career in the Sudan in 1905 as a surveyor. In 1906 he was appointed land settlement officer in Berber, and from 1908-12 he became judicial inspector of Berber province.
chiefs. He was called upon to settle divorce cases concerning Dinkas which ought to have been decided by the tribal chiefs, according to customary law. In the absence of qādis and Shari'a courts he also had to settle cases concerning the personal status of Muslims.

Generally, the tasks of the judicial inspectors in Kordofan seem to have been very much those of ordinary inspectors. They assessed the tribute, appointed shaykhs, and were generally in charge of administration. Their short legal training enabled them to criticize the judicial proceedings of their untrained colleagues. Yet, as long as a greater number of qualified staff could not be afforded, nothing could be done to overcome these deficiencies.

A typical mishap occurred in Talodi, in the Nuba Mountains in 1906. Two tribal chiefs, who had led an attack against the local government post were court-martialled and hanged without reference

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1Willis's diary, 12-16 Mar. 1909, SAD/210/2.

2E.R.J. Hussey, *Tropical Africa 1908-1944*, p.46; Hussey wrote of a case of adultery brought before a young British inspector '...Such cases are more usually triable in the court of the Sudanese "Kadis"...'; see also Davies, pp.117-8. Sir Harold MacMichael, interview 6 June 1967, said that the general practice of inspectors was to refer all those cases to the nearest qādi.

3See Willis's diary, 10-12 Nov. 1911, SAD/210/2.

4Ibid, 10 Sep. 1911, '"Nahud...I am finding all sorts of horrors on the legal side—cases tried summarily which ought not to be, floggings given without justification & c...'; see also Davies, pp.52-4. Davies who was stationed in Kordofan in the years 1912-20, commented on the same judicial problems, experienced by his predecessor, Willis.
to Khartoum or Cairo. The sole reason for this hasty justice was that there were '...no effective means of safeguarding the prisoners.' The court consisted of one British and two Egyptian officers who, having heard twelve witnesses for the prosecution and two for the defence, sentenced the accused to be hanged. Bonham Carter criticized severely this action, and demanded that Hutchinson, the commanding officer at Talodi, be reprimanded. He stated '...that it is dangerous if officers think that the summoning and confirming of court martial can be justified merely on the ground of local convenience...'. Slatin reacted in much the same manner and Cromer concluded '...that apart from hasty procedure, and the wholly undefendable reasons given for hanging the Sheikhs, it is even questionable whether they deserved hanging at all...'. With the extension of the

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1 Findlay (acting consul-general) to Grey, 29 Aug. 1906, FO 407/167. Findlay quoted from a letter he received from Wingate.


3 Bonham Carter to Wingate, 27 Aug. 1906, SAD/279/2.


5 Wingate to Cromer, 7 Sep. 1906, SAD/279/3; quoting from Slatin's letters. Matthews, then governor of the Upper Nile province, wrote that according to the Arabs at Kodok, the Talodi incident was provoked by government officials whose treatment of '...native women is no better than in Dervish or old government times...', Matthews to Wingate, 6 June 1906, SAD/278/6.

6 Cromer to Wingate, 9 Sep. 1906, SAD/279/3; this however, did not stop both Wingate and Cromer from justifying the proceedings in their correspondence with the foreign office; Cromer to Grey, 25 Oct. 1906, FO 407/167.
railways and telegraph to Kordofan, hasty executions were avoided in later years. Yet the judges were as amateurish as before, and when in 1915, another rebel was tried in the Nuba Mountains a local inspector was appointed to act as president of the mudīr's court.\footnote{Wingate to Wilson, 30 Sep. 1915, SAD/196/6; the inspector was Balfour who had just been transferred to the Nuba Mountains. The rebel was Fiki 'Ali, who managed to escape en route to prison; see p.}

b. The administration of Islamic law\footnote{For the government's policy towards Islam see pp.188-213, 239-245.}.

In 1882, Colonel Stewart reported:

...There is in each province a Mahkeme or Sheriyat Court with a Cadi on a monthly salary varying from 100 to 1250 piastres. This official cannot inquire into criminal cases, but in civil suits, should both parties agree, he can be appealed to. His chief business is, however, connected with inheritances, marriages, divorce, & c...\footnote{Report on the Soudan, by Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, 1883, C.3670.}

The part played by the Shari'a courts was subordinate to that of the provincial courts and the central court at Khartoum\footnote{Ibid, the provincial court was called majlis mahallī and the central court - majlis al-ahkām.}. During the Mahdia, the secular courts ceased to exist. The Mahdi, and afterwards the Khalifa, asserted a personal paramountcy in all matters of law. Justice was based on the Qur'ān, the Sunna, and the edicts and decisions of the Mahdi. Next to the Mahdi was the qādis al-Islām who provided the channel of communication between the Mahdi and the provincial qādis\footnote{Under the Khalifa, the office of qādis al-Islām lost its importance, and after 1894 seems to have been cancelled; Holt, Mahdist State, pp.115-6, 243.}. Most of these qādis were laymen, as the qādis who
were trained in Egypt were not trusted by the Mahdi. Throughout the Mahdian the judiciary was dependent upon the administration. In the provinces the governors were dominant, and no qādi could be appointed without their approval. While in the centre '...the will of the Khalifa was predominant over all other considerations and the judiciary was a subservient tool.'

This had been the situation when, after the reconquest, the Anglo-Egyptian authorities decided to re-establish the Muslim judiciary, much on the lines that existed prior to the Mahdian.

The Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts Ordinance was promulgated in 1902. It provided for the establishment of a high court consisting of the grand qādi, the mufti, and one or more other members. The mudīrīya, muḥāfazat, and district courts were to consist of one qādi each. The 'Mohammedan Law Courts' were competent to deal with any question regarding marriage, divorce, inheritance, guardianship, awqāf, and all problems concerning the personal status of Muslims. They were also competent to decide upon any question other than those mentioned.

1Ibid, pp.115-6; During the Khalifa's rule, the provincial and district qādis were called nuwwāb.
3SG - 35, May 1902; all the following details are from the above ordinance.
4Qādi al-qudūt was called grand qādi by the British authorities.
5The functions of the high court were exercised by the grand qādi himself until 1904, when a properly constituted high court was established. SG - 61, 1 Apr. 1904.
provided that all parties, whether Muslims or not, made a formal demand to be bound by the ruling of the Islamic law. Conflicts of jurisdiction between the civil and Shari'a courts were to be decided by a council consisting of the legal secretary, the grand qadi, and the judicial commissioner.

In 1915 the Sudan was to become one of the first Muslim countries, following the Hanafi school, which introduced a reform of the divorce law. 'The Mohammedan Law Courts organisation and procedure regulations' enabled the grand qadi of the Sudan to order a departure from Hanafi jurisdiction whenever he thought necessary. As a result, the reform of family law in the Sudan, much on the lines advocated by Qasim Amin and Muhammad 'Abduh, anticipated that of Egypt. The Sudan Judicial Circular, No. 17, provided for judicial divorce for a wife whose husband failed to support her. It enabled a wife whose husband was presumed dead, to remarry, and granted judicial divorce to wives deserted for more than one year. It also granted divorce

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1 Until 1916 no judicial commissioner was appointed. Hence the third member of the council was appointed by the governor-general and was invariably of the senior British officials of the legal department.

2 SG - 284, 31 Aug. 1915. Several of the annual reports of the legal secretary mentioned Muslim divorce. In 1907 a judicial circular was published enabling qadis to grant judicial divorce against absentee; GGR - 1907, p. 86; in the report of the Mohammedan Law Courts for 1911, Bonham Carter explained that divorce by husbands did not need a qadi and had only to be registered. However, '... wives, to obtain a divorce ... must bring an action before the Kadi ... ', GGR - 1911, p. 141. A precedent of granting divorce to women whose husbands were outside the Sudan was set by the Mahdi, see Mahshīrat al-imām al-mahdī, Vol. III, p. 5.

to wives whose matrimonial discord was such that only divorce provided a solution. Thus the family law, which represents the very heart of the Sharī'ā, was reformed at last, and followed the less rigid jurisdiction of the Maliki school.

'The Mohammedan Law Courts Organization Regulations' of 1905, were of a purely administrative nature. They enabled the grand qādi to hear and decide any case whether previously heard by a Mohammedan court or not. It also fixed the fees of the Mohammedan courts and ordered that all suits should be heard in the district where the defendants resided. 'The Procedure Regulations for Mohammedan Courts', published in 1906, stated that any judgement passed by a Mohammedan court should be executed by the government officials or police officers, whenever required. In 1912, the 'Maazun Regulations' were published. Ma'dhūns were to be accepted on recommendations by shaykhs, 'umādas or notables and had to register

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2 SG - 76, 1 May 1905; see also CAO - 43, 21 May 1903, which allowed qādīs to send summonses to persons residing in another mī'amarīya.

3 SG - 98, 1 July 1900; This was however not always adhered to. In 1912 the grand qādi complained that '...some of the Administrative officials who are entrusted with the execution of the judgements of... Law Courts place impediments in the way of executions...', GGR - 1912, p. 365.

4 Ma'dhūn - official authorized by the qādi to perform and register marriages and divorces.
all marriages and divorces within their district.\(^1\)

A special inquiry about the \textit{wakfs} of the Sudan was ordered in 1901. The few \textit{wakfs} that existed were '...not properly registered in the Mehkemehs Shari'eh and...the produce thereof is being misappropriated...'.\(^2\) The management of these \textit{awqaf} was entrusted to the Sudan Mohammedan Law Courts\(^3\), as Wingate decided to stop any interference in Sudanese \textit{awqaf} by the 'Egyptian Wakfs Administration'.\(^4\) Apparently this was not fully implemented. The \textit{awqaf} of Kordofan were managed by the provincial headquarters at El Obeid, who built the central market on \textit{waqf} property and used its rent for building a mosque.\(^5\) Even in Khartoum the \textit{awqaf} were transferred to the supervision of the grand \textit{qādi} only in 1911. The annual income of

\(^1\)\textit{SG} - 227, 28 Dec. 1912; In 1914 there were 313 \textit{ma'dhūn}s in the Sudan and the number of marriages and divorces registered was 8,707 and 6,641 respectively. Commenting on this high rate of divorces, Wingate wrote that it was a '...striking and sad evidence of the want which existed among a considerable portion of the people...', \textit{GGR} - 1914, p.44. The grand \textit{qādi} regarded the remuneration of £E 1 per annum, granted to the \textit{ma'dhūn}s as inadequate, and the low standard of marriage registration was the result, \textit{GGR} - 1907, p.86. When the situation did not improve, the grand \textit{qādi} wrote that as long as payments continued to be as low '...we cannot expect to obtain men of sufficient education, nor can one be surprised if some of them supplement their earnings by dishonest methods...', \textit{GGR} - 1908, p.203. In 1912, the grand \textit{qādi} complained that \textit{ma'dhūn}s were appointed without examinations and did not carry out their duties, \textit{GGR} - 1912, p.364.

\(^2\)\textit{SG} - 19, 1 Jan. 1901.

\(^3\)\textit{SG} - 35, 1 May 1902.

\(^4\)Wingate to Gorst, (private), 22 Dec. 1908, SAD/284/15.

\(^5\)See Meinhof, pp. 48-9.
these waqf was £E 250 and was used for the maintenance and construction of mosques 1.

All the legislation and regulations connected with the Mohammedan courts were issued by the grand qadi subject to their approval by the governor-general 2. The grand qadi also submitted annual reports, the summaries of which were included in the reports of the legal department 3. Most of these reports dealt with the administration of Islamic law in the provinces and with problems of personnel. Commenting on the low standard of the qadis, Bonham Carter noted that '...the salaries paid to them are wretched and would be disgraceful if regarded as a normal salary, for a legal official...' He added, however, that '...their decisions...though probably wrong in form and possible in law are based on a knowledge of the people and are usually regarded by them as just...' 4 In 1904, the grand qadi introduced a new scale of fees for the Shari'a courts. '...The scale of fees which was undoubtedly too high for a poor country like

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1 GGR - 1911, p.141. In 1907, Bonham Carter proposed the establishment of a Sudanese Board of Awqaf, following his discovery that waqf land in Khartoum had been built upon by the government through lack of knowledge. Bonham Carter to Wingate, 13 July 1907, SAD/281/1; see also p.192.

2 SG - 35, 1 May 1902; see also Bonham Carter to Wingate, 21 Aug. 1912, SAD/182/2/2, where he asked him to approve the regulations for ma'dhûns.

3 In the years 1899-1916, these summaries were always included in the report of the legal secretary. Only once, in 1912, was the full report of Shaykh Muhammad Muṣṭafâ al-Marâghî printed separately; GGR - 1912, pp.355-366.

4 GGR - 1903, p.79.
the Sudan was considerably reduced...¹ In 1905, the grand gādī suggested '...that the registration of transactions relating to land be left entirely in the hands of Mohammedan Courts...' The reason for his suggestion was that '...the Mohammedan Law Courts have lost more than half of their original jurisdiction and are now confined to matters arising out of family relations...' Clearly, the grand gādī felt that this diminishing range of jurisdiction, undermined the authority of Islamic law, which he regarded as superior to all others².

The grand gādīs, the inspectors of the Shari'a courts³, and the majority of the provincial gādīs were Egyptians. The only Sudanese holding a central position in the judicial hierarchy was Shaykh al-Ṭayib Ahmad Ḥāshim, Muftī of the Sudan⁴. The first grand gādī of the Sudan was Muḥammad Shākir, who resigned in 1904, having been appointed head of the 'ulamā' of Alexandria. He was followed by Muḥammad Ḥārūn,

¹GGR - 1904, p.60. The decrease was offset by an increase in the number of courts from 34 in 1904, to 40 in 1906. See GGR - 1904, p.77; GGR - 1906, p.376.

²The grand gādī at that time was Muḥammad Ḥārūn, who was later criticized by Cromer for his conservative views; Bonham Carter, though clearly opposed to granting any additional powers to the Mohammedan Courts, tried to achieve some form of cooperation with them, GGR - 1905, p.88.

³Shaykh Muṣṭafā Ḥusayn Fulayfīl was inspector of the Sudan Shari'a courts from 1907-14, when he reverted to the Egyptian ministry of justice, GGR - 1914, p.43.

⁴Al-Ṭayib Ahmad Ḥāshim (c.1857-1924) was born at Berber of Jaʿalī origin, studied in the khalwa of Shaykh Muḥammad al-Khayr Khūjālī and was a clerk in the Shari'a court at Berber when the Mahdists took over. During the Mahdist's brother and tutor to his son al-Sayyid Muḥammad 'Abdallāhi. After the reconquest he became the first judge at the Shari'a court of Khartoum. From 1900-1924, he was Muftī of the Sudan. Hill, BD, p.354.
late inspector of the Mohammedan law courts. He belonged to the conservative trend in Islam, and stated that 'Mohammedan law is founded on equity...and does not require at any time any alteration or amendment.' Cromer, who held very definite views on Islamic reform and was a great admirer of Muḥammad ʿAbduh, stated that though:

...it is natural that a conservative Mohammedan should hold these opinions...but of course...they are sheer nonsense. Mohammedan law requires a great deal of alteration or amendment...I am inclined to think that a Kadi who holds the views set forth in the report I have just been reading is not altogether the man you want...

Whether as a result of Cromer's pressure or not, Muḥammad Ḥārūn resigned in 1908, and was replaced by Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-Marāgḥī who held the post of grand qādī until 1919. Al-Marāgḥī, an Azharite and a disciple of ʿAbduh, had previously served as qādī of Dongola and Khartoum, and was on the Egyptian waqf administration. His reforming zeal was brought to bear on the Islamic laws and earned him the respect of all the British judges. It was probably due to him that the Sudan reformed its marriage and divorce laws prior to Egypt.

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1 GGR - 1904, p.60.
2 Quoted by Cromer from a confidential report by the grand qādī; see Cromer to Wingate, 11 Feb. 1907, SAD/280/2.
3 Ibid; on the 17 Dec. 1906, al-Muʿayyad published an article attacking the missionary education given to Muslim girls. According to Shāhin, a Lebanese employee of the intelligence department, Muḥammad Ḥārūn instigated the writer of the article. Shahin to Wingate (private and secret), 14 Jan. 1907, SAD/103/7/4; see also p.235.
4 GGR - 1908, p.148; al-Marāghī later became rector of al-Azhar and supported the 1936 law which modernized the teachings of that institute.
6 See pp.274-75.
All of the provincial qādis during the formative period were also Egyptians. Yet, by 1912, twelve of the district qādis and twenty-two assistant qādis were graduates of the qādis' course at Gordon College. The number of provincial and district Shari'a courts increased from twenty-eight in 1903 to forty-five in 1912. Of these, eleven were provincial courts, and the others, district and sub-district courts. In 1908, the grand qādi decided not to increase the number of courts, despite ever-growing pressure of work, as he regarded the raising of qādis' wages as more essential. The department's budget did not provide for the inspection of the provincial Shari'a courts, and their qādis had to cope as best they could. The result was that many districts remained without courts and were visited by a qādi only once or twice a year. Hence, many cases, which should have been settled by Shari'a courts, were referred to the British inspectors.

1 ^GGR - 1912, p.94; see also pp.176-7.
2 ^GGR - 1903, p.93; GGR - 1912, p.94; the courts' staff comprised of 48 qādis and 82 clerks.
3 ^GGR - 1908, p.203.
4 ^GGR - 1907, p.86; a system of judicial examinations of all the Mohammedan courts, by examining their monthly returns, was introduced with great success in 1912. In the same year the Mohammedan courts at Kassala were inspected. GGR - 1912, pp.360-1.
5 See for instance SG - 208, 26 Dec. 1911, 'Circuit of Kadis of Mohammedan Law Courts, During 1912'.
6 See p.270.
Administratively, the qādis were under the supervision of the British governors and inspectors. It was through the governors that the qādis applied for leave, while the inspectors forwarded their confidential reports on qādis to the legal secretary. Governors were not allowed to communicate with either the grand qādi or the inspector of the Mohammedan courts and had to refer always to the legal secretary. The appointment of qādis for the central administration and the provinces was entrusted to Slatin and Bonham Carter. Muhammad ‘Abduh, who visited the Sudan in 1904–5, advised its authorities on the suitability of Egyptian qādis. It was on his recommendation that Mustaftā Sulṭān and Muhammad Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī were appointed to serve in the Sudan. The avowed aim of the Sudan authorities was to train Sudanese qādis in sufficient numbers, in order to forego the services of the Egyptians, who were regarded as unreliable and expensive. From 1908 onwards this aim was nearly

1 CAO - 257, 10 Mar. 1905. The grand qādi was to be kept informed of leave arrangements.
2 CAO - 345, 20 Sep. 1905. No reference was made to the grand qādi.
3 See Wingate to Sutherland, 28 Feb. 1907, SAD/280/2, where he instructed him to apologise to the legal secretary, for having referred a complaint about a qādi in his province, to the inspector of Mohammedan Courts. Following that incident Slatin sent a memorandum to all the governors instructing them to refer all their complaints to the legal secretary, '...we have to keep our Kādis in order from the Central administration...', Slatin to Wingate, 6 Aug. 1907, SAD/281/2.
4 See also p. 81.
5 Bonham Carter to Wingate, 15 Aug. 1904, SAD/275/6; see also 'Sheikh Maraghi as I knew him', by Bishop Gwynne, n.d., SAD/466/9/8. Muhammad ‘Abduh was at that time the Muftī of Egypt.
achieved. All junior posts were filled by Sudanese qādis and only a few senior positions continued to be held by Egyptians.¹

Karl Meinhof, who visited the Sudan in 1914, expressed his reservations on the wisdom of the Sudan government's attitude towards Islamic law. He asserted that the Shari'a, which was never practiced in its entirety in any Muslim country, had been introduced into the Sudan by a European government². This criticism cannot be substantiated. The role of the Shari'a courts in the Sudan was not bigger than in other Muslim countries. Moreover, their importance in the Sudan itself had declined since the reconquest, and their scope of jurisdiction was limited by the establishment of a system of civil justice.

The government's policy of entrusting all matters concerning the personal status of Muslims to the Shari'a courts was both necessary and wise. It enabled the government to avoid unnecessary friction with the Muslim inhabitants and helped establish an orthodox Muslim leadership whose interests were bound up with those of their British rulers.

¹See for instance Slatin to Wingate, 10 May 1912, SAD/182/1/2. Slatin informed Wingate that he appointed two new Egyptian qādis following consultations with Fathī Zaghlūl, then Egyptian minister of justice. After Slatin's resignation in 1914, Wingate's permission was required in order to appoint Egyptian qādis. See Wingate to Bonham Carter (private), 28 Sep. 1916, SAD/201/8.

²Meinhof, p. 48.
c. Tribal and customary law.  

The civil law courts had only partial jurisdiction over the southern provinces and over the nomadic tribes of the north. The Shari'a courts were also not extended to the non-Muslim southern provinces. The jurisdiction of these vast areas was to be left to tribal and customary law and to be administered by shaykhs and chiefs recognized by the government. Their decisions were liable to review by a British magistrate, and no sentence of capital punishment could be passed by them. Among the nomadic tribes of the north, justice was administered by the nāẓir according to the accepted tribal laws, while:

...the weight of influence on an important decision exercised by a British Inspector depends largely on the regard in which he is held. In the south, amongst the primitive Nuba hillmen and Nilotic tribes, few cases come under the codes. But the increasing acquiescence in the interpretation by the British officials of tribal and communal law and custom...is a hopeful sign of the times...

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1 For tribal administration, see pp. 290-331.

2 For the extension of the Sudan civil codes over the southern provinces, see p.262.

3 GGR - 1903, p.112. In his report on the Upper Nile province, the governor stated that no mosques or Shari'a courts existed in his province as apart from the Salīm Arabs there were no Muslims. By 1906 there was a provincial Mohammedan court in the Upper Nile, while the Bahr al-Ghazāl and Mongalla provinces remained without courts. GGR - 1906, p.376.


The government's assumption was that customary law could be interpreted and overruled by British officials, and that tribal chiefs could become part of the administrative hierarchy without losing their influence over their people. Governors could imprison or remove tribal chiefs for excesses, thereby undermining the latter's authority. Moreover, the very existence of government posts where most cases could be settled, enabled the tribesmen to flout the authority of their chiefs regardless of the intentions of the local government officials. Finally, the gradual pacification of the southern provinces also tended to make the need for strong tribal leaders less apparent.

Matthews, the governor of the Upper Nile province, was a staunch supporter of customary law which he regarded as '...worthy of deep consideration, and after purgation of Dervish contamination, of general adoption...'. In 1908, he wrote:

...as long as we decide cases according to equity and common sense, and avoid legal technicalities, we shall hold the confidence of these tribes...Provided neither cruelty nor extortion is practiced we should be careful to avoid the danger of robbing chiefs of their power...
Yet by deposing the makk of the Shilluks for '...Misappropriation and unjust treatment of his tribe...', Matthews undermined the authority of his successor. The newly appointed makk was not expected to rule his tribe according to his own standards '...Major Matthews is endeavouring by every means in his power to inculcate in this somewhat uncivilized potentate the elements of justice and honesty.'

The governor of Bahr al-Ghazāl was less enthusiastic about customary law. Consequently, the powers of the tribal leaders were '...limited to one month's imprisonment, all cases for which such punishment is considered inadequate being dealt with by the nearest Inspector...' In deciding these cases inspectors did not necessarily comply with the Sudan codes: '...and cases are tried by courts not legally empowered to deal with such cases...what is principally needed is for the punishment to be just and prompt...' 

It is hardly surprising that the powers of tribal chiefs diminished constantly to the dismay of the British inspectors. Following a tour of the Dengkur district in 1905, the inspector complained that most of his time was taken up by deciding cases '... which never get settled until an inspector goes round, instead of being decided right off by the Sheikh or elders...' Similarly, another inspector complained

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1GGR - 1903, pp.9-10; when the Shilluks stated their desire to have their shaykhs appointed by the governor, rather than by the makk, it was regarded as '...a consummation to be encouraged.'GGR-1902,p.346.
2GGR - 1908, p.463.
3Ibid.
4Cameron to Wilson, 9 May 1905, in SIR - 130, May 1905. Dengkur was part of Sennar province until 1906, when it became part of Mongalla.
that the Dinka shaykhs had no control over their men and he was called upon to settle all their cases. Paradoxically, only those tribal leaders who owed their allegiance to the government were accepted by the provincial authorities, yet the fact that they were bound to the government undermined their authority within their tribes. When Yambio, chief of the Azande, was killed in battle, the British inspector decided to appoint Oku, who "...openly stated that his following was so small that he could not maintain his position if the troops were withdrawn." The natural successors to the chieftainship, were turned down for fear of their excessive powers. It is small wonder that by 1908, the powers of the Azande chiefs had declined to such an extent that the British inspector had to settle "...a large number of cases nearly all being questions of ownership of women...", and clearly falling within the jurisdiction of customary law. The chiefs refused to hold court, for they did not know the government's rules and were afraid of exceeding their powers. Hence, the administrators were forced to conduct tribal affairs by

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1 SIR - 139, Feb. 1906, Appendix A.
2 SIR - 138, Jan. 1906.
3 SIR - 131, June 1905.
4 SIR - 170, Sep. 1908; SIR - 179, June 1909, Appendix A, 'Mongalla province diary' by R.G.R.Owen. Owen stated that in Mar. 1909, Bimbashi Bromly, a British inspector visited Kongor district and settled all its cases. However, the cases of the two most powerful shaykhs were left for Owen to settle. One of them was deported to Mongalla, "...where he could stay a few months in open arrest until "his head is alright"...and then I would see if he could return to his village..."
dealing directly with the tribes. By 1911, the Sultan of the Azande had lost most of his power, and was openly disobeyed by his sons and people. It is therefore hardly surprising that the administration of justice in the Bahr al-Ghazāl was summed up as follows: '...An increasing preference for the decision of an inspector is noticeable throughout the province, and in the Eastern district, especially, every petty case is submitted to him for adjustment...'.

The deterioration of customary law in the Nuba mountains followed a similar pattern. During the first few years administrators hardly ventured into the mountains, and only the Arab tribes who inhabited the valleys came to settle their cases in the scattered government stations. The Makk of Taqali stopped his people from bringing their cases to the government as he feared '...that he will lose his authority and power over his subjects...'. The administration of customary law remained in the hands of the Nuba makkas who were assisted by the kujurs (priests) and by the councils of elders. Among some of the tribes the kujurs' position was paramount. They vehemently

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1 Conrad C. Reining, The Zande Scheme, (U.S.A. 1966), pp.17-8; see also GGR - 1907, p.168, where the governor of Bahr al-Ghazāl reported that he had to replace the Sultan of the Azande '...as he was regarded with contempt by all Zandes...'

2 SIR - 201, Apr. 1911.

3 Handbook BAG, p.44.

4 SIR - 179, June 1909.
resisted any government encroachment upon their authority. However, by 1915, military expeditions had subjugated many of the Nubas and had broken the powers of both makks and kujurs. Consequently, the administration of justice passed into the hands of the inspectors.

Only those tribes, remote enough from a government post to be left in peace could administer their own customary law. The Nuer of the Upper Nile were rarely visited by government inspectors. Moreover, the area they roamed was so vast that many of them never saw an English inspector until 1922. The supreme authority continued to rest with the witch doctors, who were regarded "...as much a curse in the Southern Sudan as the illiterate fiki is in the North...". Once the government's control was extended, both civil and customary law were administered by its officials. In some provinces customary law had deteriorated yet the introduction of civil codes was regarded as premature. The governor, therefore, devised his own scale of punishments much to the embarrassment of the central government. Wingate commented on the high percentage of corporal punishment in Mongalla when he wrote to its governor:

"...I see that the infliction of this form of punishment in your provinces [sic] is not only greatly in excess of the other provinces quoted, but has also, in several cases, been

1 J.W. Sagar, 'Notes on the History, Religion and Customs of the Nuba', STR - 186, Jan. 1910, Appendix A; these notes were published as an article in SNR - Vol. 5 (1922), pp. 137-156; see also P. D. Kauczor, 'The Afitti Nuba of Gebel Dair and their relation to the Nuba proper', SNR - Vol. 6 (1923), pp. 1-34.

2 STR - 226, May 1913; see also pp. 325-28.

3 H. C. Jackson, 'The Nuer of the Upper Nile province', SNR - Vol. 6 (1923), p. 91. Captain Ferguson who was an inspector in the Nuer district of Bahr al-Ghazāl, 1919-27, regarded the witch-doctors '...very fair ... and ready to take extreme trouble over cases...', Ibid, p. 107.
illegally administered — notably in the case of the flogging of a woman in the Bor district which, although possibly not repugnant to native custom and conditions, is wholly contrary to British administrative methods and principles.

Another pitfall of the administration of tribal law by government officials was their tendency to codify these laws. A compendium of all Dinka laws was prepared by the British inspector, and tribal law was administered by government officials aiming "...to govern the inhabitants of the Southern Sudan entirely by their own "tribal codes"." The obvious dangers of codifying these laws were soon pointed out to the Sudan government:

"...Such a code can scarcely escape destroying or at least damaging the capacity of traditional laws and customs to mould themselves to new circumstances; and it runs the risk of perpetuating misunderstandings which are sometimes inevitable when people of higher civilization attempt to grasp the principles underlying the legislation of tribes with whom they are imperfectly acquainted." Despite this warning Sudan government officials continued to administer tribal justice according to their own interpretation, thus undermining tribal leadership and obstructing the natural course of development of tribal laws and customs.

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1 Wingate to Owen, 21 June 1915, SAD/195/11.


3 *GGR -* 1906, p. 743; in the years 1903-6 more than 1600 cases were decided by government officials according to Dinka laws. However, decisions were sometimes contrary to tribal law owing to the superficial knowledge of the officials concerned.

4 E.S. Hartland to Russel Rea, 29 Jan. 1908, SAD/282/1. This letter was written after Hartland had read the code of Dimka laws prepared by Captain O'Sullivan, a Sudan government inspector.
Chapter VII.

Tribal administration.

The population of the Sudan at the time of the reconquest was largely a tribal one. Despite the dislocation of tribes during the Mahdia and the weakening of their economic and social structure, the tribes continued to perform a major function in society. Hence the British authorities in the Sudan realized that the reconstruction of the country depended first and foremost on the pacification of the tribes, their resettlement and their loyalty to the new regime. To achieve these aims with a minimum of administration and expense, the authorities used different measures in the northern and southern provinces. The northern Sudan, with its Muslim and largely Arabic-speaking population, was the more easily accessible to the new administrators. Moreover, most of the government's officials were either Egyptians or Lebanese, who had a common language with, and in many cases the same religion as, the indigenous inhabitants. Consequently, after an initial period of pacification, the government could establish direct administrative control over most of this area with little recourse to military expeditions.


The administration of the towns will only be referred to in the chapter dealing with landownership and taxation. Omdurman, the largest town in the Sudan, was organized on a tribal basis and administered by tribal shaykhs under government supervision. F. Rehfish, 'An unrecorded population count of Omdurman', SNR - Vol. 46, (1965), pp. 33-9.
The southern provinces were in a different category. The negroid tribes of the Sudan occupied the area roughly south of latitude 10°, with the Bahr al-‘Arab forming a natural frontier between them and the Muslim north. Inhabited by a multiplicity of tribes without a common language, culture, or religion, the vast areas of the south had defied the continuous efforts of the Turco-Egyptians and the Mahdist state to establish a semblance of organized government in that region. Ravaged by successive waves of invaders, the tribal society of the south was not only dislocated but in many cases on the verge of a complete breakdown. Hence the Anglo-Egyptian forces, who began to penetrate the south two years after the reconquest, had to rely on military stations and armed expeditions to a far greater extent than in the northern provinces. The process of gradual pacification was not completed even by the end of Wingate's governor-generalship and continued well into the 1920s.

a. Pacification and resettlement.

Collaboration between several of the northern tribes and the Anglo-Egyptian forces started in 1896-7, during the Dongola campaign. Seeking relief from the Ta'丰满 autocracy, some of the riverain tribes raised tribal levies who participated in the final stages of

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the advance on Khartoum. The intelligence department under Wingate and Slatin did not rely merely on chance. Letters offering aman (clemency) to tribes and individuals were sent by the intelligence department to all the provinces and to the Mahdist amirs who were not of Baqqara origin. Although some of these letters found their way to the Khalifa 'Abdallahi, the intelligence department was well rewarded and received numerous requests for aman.

Following the battle of Karari, the government was in a position to extend its authority over several provinces and to order its British and Egyptian officials to undertake the gradual pacification of the country. The occupation of Kordofan in December 1899 completed

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1 STR - 60, 25 May-31 Dec. 1898; the tribal force consisted of 2081 men from six tribes of whom 830 were Ja'aliyin. This was hardly surprising, bearing in mind the massacre of the Ja'aliyin at al-Matamma in July 1897; see Holt, Mahdist State, pp.214-5. The Ja'aliyin who participated in the reconquest were paid for doing so; see Talbot to Wingate, 4 Feb. 1898, SAD/266/2.

2 For an English version of these letters, signed Kitchener, 28 June 1897; see SAD/101/1.

3 After the battle of Umm Diwaykarat on 24 Nov. 1899, 19 of these letters all addressed to shaykhs and makks of the Nuba mountains, were found in the Khalifa's leather pouch. This implies either that the messengers were caught or that the recipients were unwilling to betray the Khalifa. The letters and the pouch are in SAD/101/1.

4 See for instance Abū Sinn Walad Habūba, Shaykh 'Urbān gism al-Khartūm to Muhāfīz Dongola, 25 Shawbān 1314, 129 Jan. 1897, the date seems to be wrong as the letter was written in reply to a letter from Slatin dated 8 Apr. 1897; see also Ibrāhīm Muḥammad al-Nāṭūfī Ḥ to Kitchener, 22 Shābān 1314, 26 Jan. 1897, SAD/101/1; see also al-Nūr Bey 'Anqara to Slatin, 17 Jumādā I al-Ūlā, 1316/23 Sep. 1898, SAD/438/675; al-Nūr 'Anqara surrendered to the commandant of Kassala following Slatin's letters offering him amān. For al-Nūr 'Anqara's surrender to the Mahdi's army in Jan. 1883, see Holt, Mahdist State, pp.55-6.
the reconquest of the northern provinces and enabled Wingate, the newly appointed governor-general, to implement the necessary administrative measures. The principles of tribal administration had been defined by Kitchener in his Memorandum to Mudirs. Governors, inspectors and ma'mūrs were instructed to '...acquire the confidence of the people, to develop their resources, and to raise them to a higher level...' They were further advised to seek the cooperation of '...the better class of native, through whom we may hope gradually to influence the whole population...'. The first step was the establishment of government posts throughout the Sudan, the number of which was limited only by the state of the country's finances and the availability of personnel. These stations were manned by units of the Egyptian army or the camel corps and administered by British or Egyptian officers. They were entrusted with the establishment of law and order, and also assisted in the resettlement of the tribes in order to increase the area of cultivation.

In the southern Sudan progress was less rapid. Fashoda was the only district over which the government extended its authority during

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2 Memorandum to Mudirs, Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899, FO 78/5022; see also pp.19-21, 137-9.

3 See pp.141-5.

4 See for instance Handbook Kordofan, pp.90-2; SIR - 82, May 1901; SIR - 86, Sep. 1901. In some cases the stations were manned by Bāshī bazūks and without any supervision; see SIR - 83, June 1901.
1899. The prospects of establishing a proper administration in these areas must have seemed rather gloomy. Maxwell wrote: '...the country is only fit for Hippos, mosquitoes and Nuers to live in...' The government had neither the power nor the means to establish its authority in the south. Salisbury's suggestion to occupy Bahr al-Ghazāl from Uganda was turned down by Cromer on political grounds. Instead, in 1900, Wingate sent agents to several southern tribal leaders inviting them to Khartoum '...where matters could be explained to them, and flags issued to them to hoist in their territories. Four representatives arrived in Khartoum on the 14th April 1900...representing eleven chiefs of the Bahr-El-Ghazal...'

In the winter of 1900, the first government expedition was dispatched to the Bahr al-Ghazāl and several posts were set up. But a patrol which was sent to the province in November 1901 met with resistance and resulted in considerable loss of life, including that of a British inspector. The punitive expedition which followed

1SAR - 1899, p.59. The control of the three police posts in the Fashoda district was entrusted to a single British officer who toured the Nile in a gunboat.

2Maxwell to Wingate, 17 Jan. 1899, SAD/269/1.

3Cromer to Salisbury, 11 Dec. 1899, FO 78/5024.

4Inclosure (signed - Sparkes and Gleichen) in Cromer to Lansdowne, 14 Oct. 1902, FO 403/323; as a result several British and Egyptian flags were hoisted in the French side of the border; see Lansdowne to Cromer, 3 Oct. 1902, Ibid.

5SAR - 1900, p.67; SIR - 76, Nov.-Dec. 1900; SIR - 78, Jan.-Feb.1901; Most of these posts were manned by jihādīya; SIR - 105, Apr. 1903; SIR - 91, Feb. 1902.

6SIR - 92, Mar. 1902.
this murder was ruthless in its methods, and set a pattern for future relations between administrators and inhabitants. Many of the southern tribes viewed any form of government with the utmost suspicion and withdrew into the interior whenever they sighted a government patrol. By 1905 there were nine military posts in the Bahr al-Ghazāl and a total force of some 1300 men and 64 officers. The military character of the province was clearly visible, and it was only after the Equatorial battalions replaced the Egyptian army in 1912-13 that the administration assumed a more civilian character.

When Bishop Gwynne visited the Zande district in 1911 in order to establish a CMS station, he was given an Azande interpretation of British rule in the southern Sudan:

...You put the Egyptians in the front when you conquered the dervishes and you put the ex-dervishes in front rank when you conquered us and now one or two British rule many hundreds all over the Sudan...

The situation in the Upper Nile province, which until 1906 included Mongalla, was much the same. The southernmost post was

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1STIR - 93, Apr. 1902; for details see pp.316-331.

2STIR - 126, Jan. 1905; 51 of the officers were Egyptians and 13 British.

3The first civilian administrator arrived in the Zande district of Bahr al-Ghazāl in 1911; C. Reining, The Zande Scheme, p.8; see pp.243-4.

4Gwynne to Wingate, 29 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/2; Gwynne quoted from a conversation with one of the Zande shaykhs, who tried to illustrate the similarity between the Avungara, the ruling clan of the Azande, and the British officers.
established at Mongalla in 1901. However, government control did not extend beyond the immediate vicinity of the posts. Of the major tribes of the province only the Shilluks were brought under effective control. The Dinka kept aloof from the government, and were regarded as '...a lawless people...|who| only understand the strong arm...'.

As for the Nuer, they maintained an openly hostile attitude towards government interference in their tribal affairs, and resented the government's attempt to stop the internecine strife between them and the Dinka. The most turbulent tribes, however, were the Beir and Anuak who inhabited the area between the Bahr al-Zaraf and the Abyssinian border. In 1912 the government launched a punitive expedition against these tribes and decided to establish its administration on purely military lines.

The pattern of government penetration into the Nuba mountains followed a similar line. The few government posts were not able to

1*SIR* - 82, May 1901; the station was first established further south but it turned out to be Belgian territory.

2*GGR* - 1903, p.101; the reasons set down by the governor for his lack of control, were : bad communications, shortage of staff, and the enmity of the Nuer.

3*SIR* - 92, Mar. 1902. In 1906 Matthews, governor of the Upper Nile province wrote that the Shilluks '...have learnt to believe that the British are the friends of black humanity...', *GGR* - 1906, p.744.

4Phipps to Wingate, 7 Sep. 1904, SAD/234/2.

5*SIR* - 94, May 1902, pp.8-9; *SAR* - 1905, p.153; Even in the late 1920s the Nuer and Dinka had not yet been brought under effective administration; see Willis to Financial secretary, 31 May 1928, SAD/212/9; see also pp.321-24.

6Wingate to Kitchener (private), 7 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3; Wingate to Asser, 31 Aug. 1912, SAD/182/2/1; see pp.321-23.
control the intertribal fights between the various mountains, let alone the constant raids between the Nubas and their Arab neighbours. Slatin, who visited the Nuba mountains in 1900, witnessed the outbreak of hostilities between the Ḥawāzma and Makk Nāṣir of Kawalīb. Wingate, who knew that some of these intertribal feuds had been going on for many generations, wrote to Cromer,'...I have categorically refused to allow Government to be drawn into intertribal quarrels...'.

However, the underlying reason appears to have been that the government feared an intertribal coalition which might revolt against its authority. An intelligence report on Kordofan stated:'...there is little chance of a combination between the tribes without the introduction of some powerful object of common interest such as religion...'. This argument was carried even further in the case of the Nuba mountains which were part of Kordofan province until 1914. Instead of improving the communications between the Nuba mountains and El Obeid, the provincial capital, Asser, the adjutant-general, ordered the improvement of the road from Talodi in the Nuba mountains to Tonga on the Baḥr al-Ghazāl.

...You then have a force which is not dependent on the railway or on the North of Kordofan, and in case of the Arabs threatening the railway or Obeid, you can with the Southern and

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1 Slatin's diary, 6 Apr. 1900, 4 May 1900, SAD/441.

2 Wingate to Cromer, 24 Apr. 1902, SAD/272/2; for a history of the Nuba and their relations with the Arabs, see Sagar, 'Notes on the History, Religion and Customs of the Nuba', SNR- Vol. 5 (1922), pp. 137-56.

3 SIR - 171, Oct. 1908.
independent force turn the tables on them by threatening their houses and lines of communication...\textsuperscript{1}

While the government generally refrained from interfering in intertribal feuds, it did insist that its own authority should be respected. In the Nuba mountains, as in other southern provinces, this was partly achieved by punitive expeditions. When Wingate paid his first visit to the Nuba mountains in 1912 he wrote, '...This is the first time in which this country has been at rest or that it has had any chance of developing its resources...'\textsuperscript{2} Two years later Wingate again reported that the peace and prosperity of the Nubas had reached a new peak\textsuperscript{3}. However, successive punitive expeditions during the years 1908-1914 and the revolt of Fiki 'Ali in 1915, tend to suggest that Wingate's optimism was premature\textsuperscript{4}.

In order to pacify the tribes the government tried to limit the large quantities of arms and amunition which had been abandoned by the defeated Egyptian and Mahdist armies and had subsequently come into possession of the tribes. An ordinance for regulating the carrying of firearms was among the first laws to be promulgated by the Anglo-Egyptian authorities\textsuperscript{5}. However, the government continued

\textsuperscript{1}Asser to Wingate, (private), 15 July 1909, SAD/288/1.
\textsuperscript{2}Wingate to Kitchener, 20 Mar. 1912, SAD/180/3.
\textsuperscript{3}GGR - 1914, p.61.
\textsuperscript{4}See pp. 325-28.
\textsuperscript{5}SG - 2, 27 May 1899; this was superceded by the 'Fire Arms Ordinance 1903' which imposed higher fines; SG - 49, July 1903.
to hand out firearms '...as free gifts to sheikhs and others as a reward for services to Government,...'\(^1\) Further legislation limiting the import and use of arms and ammunition was enacted in the following years\(^2\). Yet, despite the increased fines and imprisonment, the legislation seemed to have had little effect. Arms smuggling continued, especially on the Abyssinian and the western borders\(^3\). In the southern provinces the jallāba were implicated in the illegal arms trade\(^4\), in spite of the restrictions the government imposed on their movements\(^5\). But by far the largest concentration of illegal firearms was in the Nuba mountains. Many Nubas had served in the Khalifa's jihādiya and had retained their arms following his defeat. In 1908 it was estimated that there were 20,000 Remington rifles in the Nuba mountains alone\(^6\). The increased number of government posts and the greater security they brought enabled the authorities in Kordofan to undertake the disarmament of the tribes, and by 1911 the

\(^1\)GAO - 92, 10 July 1901; although the order stated that this practice should be discontinued '...exceptwhere military considerations suggest its propriety...'; governors continued to issue arms to shaykhs and tribal leaders; see for instance SIR - 225, Apr. 1913.

\(^2\)SG - 105, 8 Jan. 1907, 'Ordinance for regulating the import of ammunition'; SG - 123, 1 Jan. 1908, 'Arms Ordinance 1907'; SG - 128, 1 Mar. 1908, 'The Sudan explosives Ordinance'.

\(^3\)Cases of the arm smugglers who were caught were reported in the Sudan intelligence reports. See for instance SIR - 178, May 1909; SIR - 179, June 1909; SIR - 183, Oct. 1909; SIR - 217, Aug. 1912.

\(^4\)SIR - 169, Aug. 1908.

\(^5\)SG - 47, 1 May 1903.

\(^6\)SIR - 171, Oct. 1908.
number of illegal weapons had decreased to 6500\(^1\).

Legislation concerning the import and sale of alcoholic liquor was first introduced in 1899. To begin with it had little effect on the tribal population as it did not apply to merissa (millet beer), or palm wine, the most popular drinks\(^2\). Provincial governors were ordered '...to ensure that no liquor is sold to natives...'\(^3\) Cromer, however, continued to be concerned about the excessive consumption of alcoholic drinks in the Sudan. He wrote: '...We don't want to demoralise the population by drink...'\(^4\) As a result, 'The Native Liquors Ordinance, 1903' was promulgated. It forbade the manufacture and sale of all liquors, including merissa, without a licence. It further stipulated that '...any person having over 30 litres of Merissa shall be deemed to have some for sale unless he proves otherwise...'\(^5\) In the following months this ordinance was enforced in most of the

1The total number of illegal firearms in the Sudan was estimated by the governors as 12,030 whereas the number of licensed weapons was only 447. SIR - 208, Nov. 1911. During the revolt of Fiki 'Ali in 1915, 221 illegal rifles were captured in one battle, SIR - 251, June 1915.

2SG - 2, 27 May 1899, 'An Ordinance for regulating and licensing the sale of alcoholic drinks'; see also Cromer to Salisbury, 15 Nov, 1899, FO 78/5024.

3Memorandum by Bonham Carter about the sale of liquors in the Sudan, 15 Nov., Ibid.

4Cromer to Wingate, 11 Feb. 1902, SAD/272/1; Cromer wrote that the 250 tons of spirits imported into the Sudan in 1901, seemed excessive. Cromer's concern was largely the result of pressure by the foreign office which in turn was caused by the lobbying of the Anti-Slavery Societies.

5SG - 49, July 1903; it was in accordance with this ordinance that Yusuf Mkhā'īl was imprisoned.
northern provinces as well as in Fashoda and the Bahir al-Ghazāl. Wingate, however, was continuously pestered by the English press and by questions in the House of Commons concerning the excessive consumption of liquor in the Sudan. Although these allegations were denied by Wingate, Lyall, then senior-inspector of the White Nile province, admitted that many crimes were caused by drunkenness among the tribes of his province. Consequently, a new ordinance for the prevention of drunkenness was promulgated in 1907. It gave the right to any police officer or ma’mur to arrest drunkards without a warrant and to impose on them a specified fine or imprisonment. Further legislation was introduced in 1908 which forbade the selling of any alcoholic liquors to any native of the Sudan. During all these years Wingate maintained that no alcoholic liquors were sold to Sudanese and that the many cases of drunkenness reported were the result of excessive consumption of merissa. By 1912 Wingate had to admit that large quantities of imported liquor were in fact


2. See for instance Parker to Findlay, 29 Sep. 1906, FO 141/492; Parker wrote in reply to a question in the House of Commons that Wingate was 'thoroughly satisfied that no imported alcoholic liquors are being sold to natives of the Sudan'; see also GGR - 1906, p.661.

3. SAR - 1906, p.146; in 1904 the import of alcoholic liquor into the Sudan was 613 tons, Ibid, p.133.

4. SG - 115, July 1907; see also Wingate to Gorst, 18 July 1907, FO 141/409; Wingate stated that the excessive consumption of merissa was caused by the cheap dhurra prices.

5. SG - 129, Mar. 1908.
sold to the Anuak and the Nuer. He therefore issued an order
"...to totally prohibit the transport of liquor, except for the reason-
able consumption of Europeans..." The more practical method of im-
posing heavier import duties on liquors was suggested by the director
of customs, and was adopted by the governor-general's council in 1914.

While arms and liquor were the two main spheres in which legisla-
tion was thought to have a direct bearing on the pacification of the
country, several other ordinances also had a direct effect on tribal
administration. 'The Wild Animals Preservation Ordinance' of 1900
sought to regulate the hunting habits of the Sudanese and to impose
taxes on Europeans hunting for pleasure. Legislation to protect the
country's forests was passed in the following year, and the 'Contra-
band Goods Ordinance' was promulgated in 1902. Finally, a special

1 Butler to Wingate, 27 July 1912, SAD/182/1/1; Wingate to Phipps,
19 Aug. 1912, SAD/182/2/1. According to Wingate the Sudan agent, who
was in charge of the import of liquors, only supervised the consign-
ments through Wādī Halfā and had no control over those which were
imported via Port Sudan.

2 Wingate to Phipps, 25 Aug. 1912, SAD/182/2/1.

3 Hayes Sadler to Wingate, 28 Mar. 1913, SAD/185/3/2; Hayes Sadler
complained about the low prices of liquor in the Sudan, "...a bottle
of whisky...after paying 8% Customs duty can be sold in the souk
market for 10 P.T. (s 2/-)..."; see also GGC, 13 Mar. 1914, FO 867/5.

4 For legislation concerning land ownership, see pp.333-38; taxation,
pp.358-64; the administration of justice, pp.260-8.

5 SG - 9, Feb. 1900.

6 SG - 26, 1 Aug. 1901.

7 SG - 31, 1 Jan. 1902.
ordinance '...for preventing the import sale and use of Hashish...' was enacted in 1907¹.

Following the initial period of pacification the resettlement of the tribes, which had been dislocated during the Mahdia, became a dominant feature of tribal policy². In 1900 the government called on the Baqqāra tribes in the Gezira to return to Kordofan³, and in the following months nearly 30,000 made their way to the west⁴. Many Dinka and Shilluk refugees were also assisted in making their way back to the south⁵. Emigration continued over a number of years, organized and assisted by the intelligence department⁶. The government's aim in encouraging this mass migration was threefold: to decrease the population of Omdurman; to encourage cultivation; and to restore the tribal map of the Sudan to what it had been before the Mahdia. The population of Omdurman, which continued to be the largest town in the Sudan, decreased from approximately 150,000 in 1892⁷ to about 40,000 in 1900⁸. Although the decrease can be partially

¹SG - 110, 1 Apr. 1907.
²SAR - 1899, pp.43-4. For the Khalifa's policy of forcing the Ta'āisha and other Baqqāra tribes to settle in Omdurman see Holt, Mahdist State, pp.141-6.
³SIR - 71, 9 June-8 July 1900. The tribes received an allocation of dhurra from the government, to assist them on their way.
⁴SIR - 75, 8 Oct.-8 Nov. 1900; SAR - 1901, p.69.
⁵See for instance SIR - 73, 6 Aug.-7 Sep. 1900; SIR - 77, 9 Dec.1900-8 Jan.1901.
⁶CAO - 225, 16 Nov. 1904.
⁷Wingate, Ten Years Captivity, p.283.
⁸The Times, 30 Mar. 1900.
attributed to the death-toll resulting from the reconquest, internal emigration too accounted for this sharp decline in population.

In order to encourage cultivation the government made available agricultural loans to assist landowners to erect saqiyas and to purchase cattle. Returning tribes were also provided with cheap dhurra for the first few months and with good seeds to start cultivation.

On resuming cultivation the newcomers were exempted from paying taxes during the first year. As a result of these and other measures, cultivation increased rapidly, and in 1908 it was realized that without additional irrigation facilities there was no further scope for expansion. Furthermore, efforts to improve agricultural techniques were frustrated by the apathy and total indifference of many tribes.

In 1903 the governor of Kordofan reported an ever increasing stream of immigrants returning to Kordofan and estimated the population of his province as 530,000, GGR - 1903, p.71.

The total sum issued up to the end of 1905 was £E 20,000.

See for instance Drage to Wingate, 9 June 1900, SAD/270/6; SIR - 241, Aug. 1914.

For the taxation of sedentaries and nomads see pp. 357-68.

Among the measures undertaken to encourage resettlement was the colonization of released Sudanese soldiers who were settled in military-agricultural settlements on the Blue and White Niles. This scheme was started in 1900 (SAR - 1900, p.71; CAO - 71, 12 June 1901), and by 1913 all these colonies were reported to be flourishing and no longer required government assistance. (Report on tour of inspection of the Blue Nile province (signed Charlton) 28 Nov.-9 Dec. 1913, SAD/108/6). A further measure was the encouragement of immigrants from the bordering countries to settle in the Sudan. (See for instance Slatin's diary 9 June 1901, SAD/441; GGR - 1903, p.82; GGR - 1905, p.152; GGR - 1907, pp.95,190; GGR - 1908, p.626). However, the Fallātā were by far the most numerous group among the immigrants. By 1912 there were over 16,000 Fallātā who had settled permanently in the Sudan. SIR - 220, Nov. 1912; MWA; see also pp. 387-95.

GGR - 1908, p.695.

GGR - 1902, p.305; GGR - 1905, p.121.
B. Tribal leadership.

Tribal leadership was disrupted during the Mahdia, which made a claim to loyalty superseding tribal boundaries and in certain cases interfered in tribal leadership.1

After the reconquest the Anglo-Egyptian authorities sought the cooperation of the shaykhs in order to impose the new administration upon the tribes, and to hasten their return to agriculture. Government officials were therefore instructed to remember that:

...not only are Sheikhs "Public Servants" but they perform work of the greatest importance and responsibility...it is the general aim of the Government to associate them as a class with the work of the administration...2

However, the government made it quite clear that it would determine the functions of the shaykhs and that government officials would have the authority to overrule their decisions3. Thus from the outset the government regarded the shaykhs as its tribal agents who could be appointed, overruled, and dismissed just as any government official. A government order of 1902 appertaining to the procedure of appointing new shaykhs stated:

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1 Holt, Mahdist State, pp.134-6; Holt described the Khalifa's actions against the Kababish and the Rizayqat whose shaykhs were killed. The appointment of Khalifa 'Abdallāh as the Mahdi's successor, instead of Muḥammad Sharīf, who was of the Mahdi's own tribe, also proves that tribal connections were not as highly regarded as the qualities of religious leadership. Ibid, pp.119-121. According to Seligman, certain sections of the Kababish remained loyal to the Khalifa despite the revolt of their head shaykh Ṣālih Fadlallāh Sālim. See Correspondence by C.G. Seligman, SNR - Vol.4, (1921), pp.53-6.


3 Handbook BAG, p.37.
...Mudirs and Administrators should send their recommendations in this respect, with full details as to hereditary title, influence & c. of the particular Sheikh to the Assistant Director of Intelligence Khartoum, for the approval of H.E. the Governor General...probationary Commissions will be made out...

This procedure was followed throughout Wingate's governor-generalship. Shaykhs were judged according to government standards of ability and their readiness to comply with orders. In 1900 Maxwell appointed 'Ali al-Tôm as head shaykh of the Kabâbîsh although he doubted whether the latter was capable of undertaking the work. He defended the appointment on the ground that 'Ali al-Tôm was '...the proper man by birth, secondly the other sheikhs have agreed to accept him, thirdly because there is no better man, at any rate...he cannot do much harm and it may be successful...'.

Full details about the appointed shaykhs and their qualifications were published in the annual reports of the provinces; and, in the case of important shaykhs, in the Sudan Gazette. Some of these shaykhs failed to pass their period of probation, while

1 CAO - 7, 18 Jan. 1902.

2 Maxwell to Wingate, 19 Jan. 1900, SAD/270/1/2; Several shaykhs who were appointed immediately after the reconquest for services rendered during the advance on Khartoum, were later dismissed because they lacked the qualifications and the authority; see GGR - 1908, p.557. 'Ali al-Tôm, however, was later appointed as Nazîr Umûm of the Kabâbîsh and served until his death in 1938. Hill, BD., p.52.


4 See for instance GGR - 1902, p.338. The governor of Suakin reported that he appointed Muhammad Hammad Mahmûd as nazîr of the 'Amarâr tribe. In the following year he dismissed him, following his failure to qualify; GGR - 1903, p.91.
others were dismissed for a great variety of reasons ranging from incompetence and lack of authority to malpractices and autocratic behaviour\(^1\). In certain cases the provincial governors decided that the number of shaykhs '...was out of proportion with the population..' and hence had to be reduced\(^2\). The governors argued that by having fewer shaykhs those who remained would tend to work harder and increase their efficiency\(^3\). Thus tribal leadership became fully dependent upon government administration.

...The policy adopted has been to raise the status of the Sheikh as far as possible in the eyes of his people by trying to impress on them (and on him) that he is the representative in his own village of the Government...\(^4\)

Tribal leaders who tried to assert their independent authority were not trusted by the government even if their loyalty was beyond doubt, as it was conceivable that their power, not derived from the government, might be directed against it\(^5\). In certain cases the näzir of the tribe was officially approached before one of his shaykhs was dismissed. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the näzir's

\(^1\)See for instance Ferguson to Wingate, 16 June 1902, SAD/272/4/2; Ferguson informed Wingate that he dismissed the hereditary shaykh of the Hamrān tribe for lack of authority; see also GGR - 1902, p.305; GGR - 1903, pp.9, 34, 54, 77-8, 104; GGR - 1904, pp.109-10, 126. In 1905 the governor of Berber reported the dismissal of six umdās and 48 shaykhs, while in the Blue Nile province 28 shaykhs were dismissed and 8 resigned. GGR - 1905, pp.15, 26; GGR - 1908, pp.456, 522-4, 540, 673.

\(^2\)GGR - 1902, p.242.

\(^3\)GGR - 1905, p.14.

\(^4\)GGR - 1906, p.710.

\(^5\)GGR - 1907, p.320.
view could have swayed the government's decision. Consultations with the elders of the tribe were also undertaken when new shaykhs had to be appointed. Yet, once again, the final decision rested with the government official:

...Muglad 12 November 1911...Had a strenuous moment with ten gentle Arabs, who as usual wanted to have their own way whatever happened...However got them into line & swore in several new sheikhs...Idris el-Sakin was the only man his people stuck to...2

With regard to nāzīr and head shaykhs, the government's policy was to undermine their authority and to strengthen the heads of the subordinate tribal units. 'Umdas were introduced in the Baqqāra tribes of Kordofan in 1911 in order to decrease the influence of their nāzīrs and to make the tribes dependent on direct government authority. The result was that while the nāzīrs lost much of their influence, the 'umdas, who had no hereditary powers, were not strong enough to assume control. The same policy prevailed in the Nuba mountains and in the southern provinces.

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1See for instance Wingate to Dumbell, 12 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/3; Wingate to Wilson, 15 Nov. 1915, SAD/197/2/2; in both cases Wingate consulted Shaykh Ibrāhīm Mūsā, nāzīr of the Hadendowa, about the replacement of one of the tribe's shaykhs.

2Willis's diary, 12 Nov. 1911, SAD/210/2; according to Willis the really influential man in the tribe was one Abū al-Khalīl who was not appointed.

3K.D.D. Henderson, 'Some notes on the history of the tribes living south of the Wadi el Ghala!', (typescript), pp.9-11; SAD/478/5; G.D. Lampen, 'The Baggara Tribes', Hamilton, pp.136-7; SIR - 191, June 1910. MacMichael who inspected the Dār Ḥāmid tribe in Kordofan objected to the appointment of a nāzīr, and suggested to let the 'umdas deal independently with their respective sections; see also Gunnison, Baggara Arabs..., pp.108-9. Gunnison stated that the 'umdas of the Ḥumr were appointed in order to reduce the excessive powers of their nāzīr 'Alī Julla.
Meks of the pliant Merkaz hanger-on type were appointed who were not only personally unsuitable and unacceptable to the people, but who were often impossible of acceptance to the people as not being of correct royal lineage...The equivalent of the Arab type of Omda scurrilously known as Kelb el Hakuma |sic| was by no means uncommon...¹

Amongst the southern tribes the deposing of the Makk of the Shilluks was probably the most noteworthy example. In 1899 Jackson, who had been in Fashoda, appointed Koor as makk of the Shilluks². By 1903, however, Makk Koor was found to '...have been guilty of misappropriation and unjust treatment of his subjects...and was in consequence deposed and banished from the country...'³ The new makk, who was duly appointed, had to accept '...the "XI conditions"of Mekship...' which were laid down by the British governor in order '...to show the power of Government...'⁴ Consequently, the powers of the new makk were so diminished that the governor himself complained of the makk's lack of authority⁵. The inevitable result of this policy was the further deterioration of tribal leadership.

There were certain exceptions, notably amongst the camel owning

¹Gillan, Nuba, p.13.
²Jackson to Wingate, 6 Jan. 1899, SAD/269/1.
³GGR - 1903, pp.9-10. Makk Koor died in the Halfa prison and when his successor was invited to Khartoum to attend the festivities of King George V's visit in 1912, he refused fearing that he would share his predecessor's fate; see Slatin's diary, 20 Dec.1911, SAD/441.
⁴Matthews to Wingate, 19 July 1903, SAD/273/7.
⁵Matthews to Wingate, 9 Jan. 1904, SAD/275/1; in 1905 the situation had apparently improved as Matthews reported that the makk had gained authority within his tribe; GGR - 1905, p.149. The disintegration of tribal leadership amongst the Zande tribe in the Bahr al-Ghazal, followed a similar course. C.Reining, The Zande Scheme; pp.17-22; see also pp.284-7.
tribes of Kordofan. 'Ali Wad al-Tôm, the nâzîr of the Kabâbîsh throughout this period, enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in administering his tribe¹. This was probably the result of a number of factors. Firstly, the Kabâbîsh remained a truly nomadic tribe which by virtue of its greater mobility could maintain a larger measure of independence. Secondly, the Kabâbîsh, who had been staunch opponents of the Khalifa, had to be rewarded by the British authorities; and lastly, 'Ali Wad al-Tôm was by all accounts an extremely capable leader who knew how to remain in the government's good books without losing his independence.² Yet the Kabâbîsh were by all accounts an exception, and the weakening of central tribal leadership which was extended to most of the other tribes was a logical conclusion of the government's policy of undermining tribal coalitions³.

Many of the nâzîris were dismissed during this period for a great variety of reasons. 'Abdallah Jadallah, the nâzîr of the Kawâhla in Kordofan, was dismissed in 1909. For years he had collected tribute


²The Kabâbîsh and the Ḥamar both belong to the Juhayna group of tribes. It is therefore interesting to note that while the Kabâbîsh maintained their nomadic character and independence, the Ḥamar who became largely sedentary, lost their independence. Ibid, pp.187-9; see also MacMichael, A History of the Arabs in the Sudan, Vo1.1, pp.314-6, 319-21.

³In 1913 the government decided to appoint a special inspector for Dar Kabâbîsh. However, the World War interfered and it was only in 1915 that the government started imposing its control over this tribe. Davies, pp.61-2. The southern tribes, with the exception of the Shilluks and the Zande, had no paramount chief and were generally ruled by the tribes' elders; see L.F. Nalder, 'The Two Sudans: some aspects of the South', Hamilton, pp.101-2; Evans Pritchard, The Nuer..., p.147.
from his tribe and used part of it for the mahr (bridal money) he was required to pay for marrying the Mahdi's daughter. The new nazir was elected by a council of elders, and gained the confidence of his tribe as well as that of the government. Muḥammad al-Faqīr, nazir of the Misrīya, who had for years been suspected for malpractices and slave trading, was dismissed in 1915 for being implicated in Fiki 'Alī's revolt. Yet, however justified these dismissals were, they could not fail to undermine the stability of tribal leadership which had already suffered during the Mahdia.

With the decreasing powers of shaykhs and nazirs one could hardly expect that the duties performed by them would be of major significance. The area of jurisdiction of the numerous shaykhs was determined by the government according to its own consideration. Owing to administrative exigencies, the Beja tribes were at first partitioned between three provinces: Berber, Red Sea, and Kassala. Tribal unity... naturally suffered. Along the borders the situation was even

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1 SIR - 184, Nov. 1909; Willis's diary, 22 Oct., 22 Nov. 1909, SAD/210/2; see also Hill, BD, p.5; Hill's statement that Jadallāh was dismissed in 1916 is wrong.


3 The new nazir, Muḥammad Dafā'allāh, was appointed by Savile following a meeting with the shaykhs and umdas of the tribe. Savile's diary, 4 Jan. 1916, SAD/427/7.

4 See for instance Slatin to Wingate, 16 Feb. 1903, SAD/273/2; Slatin reported that he had divided the tribes in the district of al-Qadarif into numerous sections and had appointed umdas and shaykhs to each of them.

worse, as the artificially drawn borders cut across many tribes. Numerous duties were entrusted to the shaykhs. These included: the digging of wells; the building of roads and rest houses; the guarding of communications; and various tasks of an administrative nature such as reporting deaths. The major functions, however, were to assist the government in the administration of justice and in the collection of taxes. In both these spheres the shaykhs held a subordinate position. The assessment of taxes was performed by the provincial inspectors and governors with the active participation of Slatin, while the shaykhs could only appeal against the government's decisions. It was then their duty to divide the agreed tax or tribute among the various sections of the tribe and to be responsible for its collection. The diaries of several government inspectors indicate

1See for instance SIR - 139, Feb. 1906, pp.11-2; SIR - 172, Nov. 1908, p.5.
2GOR - 1904, pp.5-6; 17-8, 70-1; GGR - 1902, p.235; SIR - 238, May 1914, p.2; GAO - 400, 15 Mar. 1906; Wingate to Jackson (private), 31 Dec. 1915, SAD/197/3/3.
3The administration of tribal law, see pp.283-9; for taxation - pp.357-68
4For Slatin's role in tribal administration see pp.87-95.
5E.R.J. Hussey, Tropical Africa 1908-1944, p.26. Savile's diary, 1 Apr. 1905, SAD/427/6; Savile related his meeting with the Shukriya shaykhs whom he informed that failing an agreement among them with regard to the division of tribute among the different sections, he would decide upon the matter himself; see also Willis's diary, 1909-10, SAD/210/2; GGR - 1902, pp.293-4. In 1905 the governor of the Upper Nile province reported that one of his inspectors had collected '...Herd Tax, which exceeded four times the value of the original tribute proposed...'
GGR - 1905, p.148. Once again the position of the nazar and shaykhs of the Kababish was quite different. The nominal tribute levied on the Kababish up to 1915, was apportioned and collected by the nazar without any government interference. In 1915, the Kababish were put on Herd Tax and as a result the assessment was performed by government officials and the nazar's position was weakened. Davies, pp.62-5.
that even this duty was often performed by the officials rather than by the shaykhs. Savile, whilst inspector in northern Kassala, described his methods of collecting tribute. His entourage included an officer and twenty-five soldiers. On arrival at a well, where the cattle had to be brought for watering, he erected a zariba, (cattle pen), and when the tribes arrived with their cattle he -

...took a portion of each herd of cattle and drove them into the zariba and kept them as hostages for the tribute; taking care to take about three times the value of tribute in live stock...1

Following this procedure the tribes had little alternative but to redeem their flock by paying the tribute demanded from them. The tribute was chiefly in gold nose rings and beads all absolutely filthy. The people almost all assured me that they had no money...2

When one of the tribesmen tried to cheat Savile out of 5d., he duly confiscated his sheep and gave it to his soldiers as extra rations3.

The rewards which the government offered the tribal leaders were inadequate throughout the period. Initially, the government granted the shaykhs minor tax exemptions. Thus a shaykh was not

1Colonel R.V.Savile, Diary of a tribute collecting tour in northern Kassala, 7 Apr. 1903; SAD/427/3.

2Ibid., 14 Apr. 1903.

3Ibid, 10-11 Apr. 1903; R.Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan*, pp.41-2; Hill described the brutality of the Shayqiya irregulars, who were used for collecting tribute from the nomads; see also J.Bruce, *Travels to discover the source of the Nile*, (ed)C.F.Bechingham, (Edinburgh 1964), p.231. Bruce related how the Funj extracted taxes from the Arabs as the latter left the Atbara to protect their cattle from the fly.
liable for land tax on one feddan if he cultivated 100 feddans, or more. When the 'Taxation of Animals Ordinance' was amended in 1903, the legal adviser wrote that its main object was to enable the Governor-General to exempt Omdas and Sheikhs, a class who do much work for the Government without pay, and have frequently to move about, from the payment of tax in respect to one riding animal.

In addition, shaykhs who provided detailed lists of the owners of animals within their tribes were granted a remission of 5% on the taxes they collected. In 1903 the government ordered that all shaykhs should receive an equal and fixed percentage of all taxes collected by them. provided the Mudir is satisfied that the Omdas and Sheikhs have performed their regular duties in a satisfactory manner.

The government's failure to compensate the 'umdas and shaykhs for their labours was quite apparent. Jackson demanded that the remuneration granted to the shaykhs of nomad tribes should be fixed at 20% of the tribute they collected. Even Wingate, who was well aware of

2 GGR - 1903, p.80; see also SG - 86, 1 Jan.1906, where the same order was repeated.
3 CAO - 29, 16 Feb. 1902.
4 CAO - 46, May 1903; CAO - 92, 25 Oct. 1903; according to these orders Omdas and shaykhs were to receive between them: 1% of land and date tax; 2½% of the 'ushr; 5% of the herd tax; and 10% of the tribute. The latter applied only to nomad tribes. See also CAO - 224, 16 Nov.1904.
5 Slatin's diary, Notes on Kordofan 1903, SAD/441; see also p.91-2.
6 Slatin to Wingate, Sunday [n.d.Mar. 1908?], SAD/282/3/1; Slatin who was inspecting Dongola wrote rather cynically: 'Dongola is I am afraid the centre of humanity..."
the government's financial difficulties, had to agree with his pro-
vincial governors that the remuneration of shaykhs was insufficient. 

**Nazirs**, who during the Turco-Egyptian period had been exempted from taxation, and in addition derived numerous benefits from their tribesmen, lost their privileged position under the new regime and received instead a low monthly salary. Hence, they continued to levy internal tribal taxes which were not recognized by the govern-
ment. The government, though fully aware of the situation, failed to rectify it owing to financial considerations. Instead it rewarded its shaykhs by granting them 'Robes of Honour' and by making them part of the administrative establishment without incurring heavy expenses.

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1 Wingate to Clayton, 13 Feb. 1911, SAD/469/3; Wingate who was inspecting the White Nile province wrote that '...out of over £30,000 collected in Taxes only about £1000 are given in remuneration - a small percentage indeed...'.

2 C. E. Lyall, 'Rights dues and customs prevailing among Arab tribes in the White Nile Province', SNR - Vol. 4 (1921) pp. 199-203; Willis's diary, 1 Mar. 1909, 6 Nov. 1909, 16 Nov. 1911, SAD/210/2; see also CAO - 46, 21 May 1903.

3 Willis's diary, 6 Nov. 1911, SAD/210/2; internal taxes such as **tulba** and **fitr** were paid by the shaykhs of smaller tribal units to the **nazir**, while **day'a** was levied on clients from other tribes; see also SIR - 130, May 1905; SIR - 135, Oct. 1905.

4 The 'Robes of Honour', were divided into three classes and were awarded by Wingate. The names of the recipients were published in the Sudan Gazette; see for instance SG - 19 (supplement), 19 Nov. 1901; SG - 34, (supplement), Apr. 1902; SG - 44, Jan. 1903; see also Wingate's diary, 10 Mar. 1902, SAD/272/8; Robes of honour could be withdrawn by the governor-general '...if the holder of the same ceases to be worthy of the honour bestowed upon him...' SG - 59, 1 Feb. 1904. One of the more amusing incidents was reported by the governor of Sennar who initiated the shaykhs '...into the game of polo on donkeys...', GGR - 1906, p. 732.
The government clearly failed to establish the authority of tribal leaders which was one of its declared aims. The disruption of tribal cohesion and the loss of leadership during the Mahdia made the achievement of this aim extremely difficult. The general impression obtained from reading the provincial reports, as well as the private correspondence and diaries of British officials, is one of confusion. The government constantly claimed to be interested in furthering the independence of tribal leaders, whereas the inspectors and governors undertook an ever increasing share of their responsibilities.

The ambiguous position of the Sudan chiefs had resulted from the assumption that they could be used as part of the administrative hierarchy and still maintain their traditional relationship with their people. The attempt in the early days to utilize them as part of the Government machinery while withdrawing some of their powers had resulted in a chaotic situation.

c. Punitive expeditions.

Armed expeditions were a permanent feature of tribal administration throughout Wingate's governor-generalship. They were aimed primarily at subduing turbulent tribes and protecting their tax-paying neighbours. In the frontier areas they had the additional task of fighting against the slave trade and arms runners.

1 This was only realized in 1926 when a new tribal policy was being advocated. A note on Government policy toward the Native population, pp. 5-7; see also B.K. Cooke, 'Native administration in practice: Historical outline', Hamilton, pp. 191-203.

2 C. Reining, The Zande Scheme, p. 35.
government could not afford to establish military posts in the remote districts of the southern provinces. Hence armed administrative patrols were undertaken by the government in order to demonstrate its power to the tribal population who otherwise would not have known of the government's existence.

During the early years of the Condominium the government was concerned with establishing posts and with opening a way through the sadd to the Bahr al-Ghazāl. Once a semblance of government was established, tribal resistance started, and was soon punished by military expeditions. A minor affray with the Dinka near Rumbek towards the end of 1901, was followed by a more serious conflict with the Agar Dinka, culminating with the murder of Scott-Barbour, a British inspector. Wingate, who at the time was inspecting the White Nile province, ordered the British officer commanding the punitive expedition "...to deal without mercy with all those he captures who were present at S.B's [Scott-Barbour] murder." Consequently, "...the villages of Sheikhs and headmen implicated were burnt and their cattle and grain confiscated and the men themselves shot when taken, and beyond all doubt, found guilty."  

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1 For a brief survey of these expeditions see Handbook, pp.180-3; for expeditions against religious movements and revolts see pp.199-210.


3 SIR - 88, Nov. 1901; GGR - 1902, p.229.


5 GGR - 1902, p.226.
Stacie, who was sent to reinforce the expedition, reported that
...punishment was inflicted by burning the houses...I should say
there are not more than a dozen houses left in the whole district.¹

But, a few months later, the Agar Dinka struck again. They attacked
the tribes who had been friendly to the government, burnt their
villages and stole their cattle. A new punitive expedition was there­
fore launched and several more tribesmen were shot². The British
officer in charge of the expedition reported optimistically that the
Agar Dinka had now become truly friendly to the government³.

A similar procedure was followed in the first government expedi­
tion against the Nuer in the Fashoda district, in April 1902. The
British officer in charge of Fashoda sent a message to Denkur, one
of the tribal leaders of the Nuer, that he should come to offer his
submission to the new government. When no reply was received, a
punitive expedition was undertaken:

...about 250 head of cattle were captured, 400-500 sheep and
and goats, and about 50 tusks of ivory, which should more
than pay all expenses incurred. Estimated value of loot £600
...Many of Denkur's villages were burnt...he himself must
have lost all prestige...⁴

Three months later the Nuer retaliated by attacking their neighbours,
the Dinka, who had assisted the government⁵. The governor of Fashoda

¹SIR - 94, May 1902.
²SIR - 96, July 1902.
³SIR - 97, Aug. 1902.
⁴SIR - 94, May 1902; SIR - 93, Apr. 1902.
⁵SIR - 96, July 1902.
who summed up the results of this expedition wrote:

...The Government has undoubtedly lost rather than gained ground, owing to the unfortunate results obtained by the expedition of Denkur in April last when the inhabitants fled before the government troops and returned to find their village burnt and cattle vanished...1

Thus the pattern of southern administration was set and was intensified during the following years. In the years 1903-5 the government sent three punitive expeditions to subjugate the Azande of the Bahr al-Ghazāl province. In 1905 the mission was finally accomplished. Yambio, the Sultan of the Azande, was killed in battle and the tribe, which had previously been harassed by the army of the Congo Free State, submitted without much resistance2. The inevitable result was that the Azande chiefs lost control of their tribe which, in consequence, had to be administered by government officials3.

Not all the senior British officials agreed with this policy. Matthews, the governor of the Upper Nile province from 1902-8, advocated peaceful penetration and insisted that '...the act of going through the country without molestation of the natives, cannot but appeal to the savage mind...'4 Following the first punitive expedition against the Azande, Matthews insisted that the tactless behaviour

1GGR - 1902, p.346.

2GGR - 1905, pp.6-8; A scientific expedition from the Congo had tried to establish itself in that area, and the urgency of establishing direct control over the Azande was probably motivated by fear of foreign penetration; see Correspondence regarding the 'Lemaire Expedition', 9 Jan.-30 Apr. 1904, FO 403/346, pp.4-105

3C. Reining, The Zande Scheme, pp.17-20; see also pp.286-7.

4GGR - 1904, p.133.
of its British commander was largely responsible for the subsequent hostility of the tribe. In his own province, Matthews consistently opposed the use of force. He sent Wilson, his senior inspector, to collect tribute south of the Sobat river accompanied by only six jihādiya. Wilson, "...assessed and collected... a tax worth about £400...he is one of the few men we seem to have who thoroughly understand the "pacification" policy..." The following year Matthews objected to launch a punitive expedition against the Nuer. He claimed that the "...hostility of the Nuers to the presence of a British official has been deliberately fabricated by the Dinkas...", and insisted that no armed intervention was necessary in an intertribal conflict. Matthews persisted in his views, until he left his province in 1908, and stated in his final report:

"...Government is a necessity, of course, if we are to occupy their country, but in some ways it is not an unmixed blessing, therefore one is probably not far wrong in saying that those tribes are best off which have as little of it as possible..."

A similar policy was advocated in 1906 by the new governor of Baḥr al-Ghazāl. He insisted that unnecessary emphasis had been placed on military expeditions:

1Matthews to Wingate, 12 Apr. 1904, SAD/275/3.
2Matthews to Wingate, 11 Apr. 1904, Ibid.
3GGR - 1905, p.16.
4Ibid, p.150; when in 1906 a punitive patrol was sent to deal with the Atwot Dinka, without trying peaceful penetration, Matthews protested strongly; see Matthews to Wingate, 2 Jan. 1907, SAD/280/1.
5GGR - 1908, p.655; see also pp.284-5.
Any further patrolling in the Southern districts, except by an inspector and his escort, is undesirable. We want the people to realize that we have ideas beyond the provision of supplies and carriers.\(^1\)

Owen, the governor of Mongalla and a former Sudan agent, held quite different views. He favoured active intervention in tribal and intertribal feuds which he was convinced would '...make both peoples happy and contented...'.\(^2\) His suggestion to undertake a punitive expedition against the Beir tribe was, however, vetoed by Wingate owing to lack of funds.\(^3\) When Owen renewed his demand two years later, Wingate stated:

> ...Our policy in the Sudan, which I must insist on being understood by all Governors who, like yourself, have in their provinces a great deal of non-effectively occupied country, must be never to advance into such unoccupied districts unless you fully intend to stay there, and in the present case...I am not yet in a position to effectively occupy the Beir Country...\(^4\)

In 1911 Wingate was ready to act. During that year the government had undertaken sixteen military expeditions to enforce its authority.\(^5\) Wingate therefore urged Gorst to sanction a punitive expedition against the Beir tribe who were constantly harassing the tax-paying Dinka. '...The only alternative would be to abandon all idea of taking

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\(^1\)CGR - 1906, p.552.

\(^2\)Owen to Wingate, 16 Aug. 1908, SAD/283/8/3.

\(^3\)Wingate to Owen, 17 Dec. 1908, SAD/298/3.

\(^4\)Wingate to Owen, 14 Jan. 1910, SAD/290/1.

\(^5\)Wingate to General Dalton, 18 Feb. 1911, SAD/300/1; Wingate wrote: '...I am glad to think that little is known of our various difficulties in this respect at home...'. Details of these expeditions were only mentioned in the Sudan Intelligence Reports.
taxes from those tribes we cannot effectively protect. The moral effect would be disastrous throughout the Sudan.\(^1\) Owing to difficulties of transport and water supply, nearly a year passed before the government was ready to strike.\(^2\) Wingate decided that the concentration of a large military force \(...\) affords an opportunity which should not be let slip for undertaking operations against the Anuaks.\(^1\) who were constantly raiding the tribute-paying Nuer tribe.\(^3\) Consequently the largest military operation since the Wad Ḥabūba revolt was set in motion.\(^4\) The expedition against the Beir was reported by Wingate to have been accomplished -

\[\ldots\] with a comparatively small loss of life on their side and a minimum of casualties on ours. In all \(...\) not more than 200 Beirs have been killed, whilst our casualties, including friendlies, were only 41.\(^5\)

The results of the Anuak patrol were regarded as less satisfactory. The intelligence report stated that the Anuak were encountered on 15 March 1912, and that their villages were captured and burnt. However, in the heavy fighting which took place about fifty officers and N.C.O.s lost their lives.\(^6\) The private correspondence

\(^1\) Wingate to Gorst, 1 Mar. 1911, SAD/300/3; see also Wingate to Grey, 20 Aug. 1911, SAD/301/2.

\(^2\) SIR - 211, Feb. 1912.

\(^3\) Wingate to Kitchener, 7 Dec. 1911, SAD/301/6/2.

\(^4\) Minutes - No. 13908, 2 Apr. 1912, FO 371/1362, (signed) R.P.M.

\(^5\) Wingate to Stack, 12 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3.

\(^6\) SIR - 212, Mar. 1912, p. 3; Stack to Wingate, 1 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2, Stack reported that Kitchener objected to the burning of villages being mentioned in official reports; see also Kitchener to Grey, 10 May 1912, FO 371/1362.
between Wingate, Slatin, and Stack indicated that the expedition was a complete failure. The British commander of the expedition underestimated the force of the Anuak, and consequently did not wait for reinforcements but relied on the support of the Nuer friends who were reported to be hostile to the Anuak. However, the Nuer were '...not sufficiently civilised to appreciate that point of view...' and failed to rally to the patrol's support. A special court of enquiry established that the British commander had not only disobeyed his instructions but had nearly caused a political scandal by infringing the Abyssinian border. On 26 March 1912 the government officially declared peace with the Beir bribe, and decided to establish military control over their district. Wingate noted optimistically that the Beir and Anuak were hereditary enemies '...and now that the Beirs can be said to have definitely accepted Government authority, we may make some use of them when we take on the Annuaks.'

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1 Wingate to Stack (private), 20 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1; Wingate wrote that none of these points will be mentioned in the official report; see also Slatin to Wingate, 27 Apr. 1912, Ibid. Slatin who was very critical of the expedition promised to be '...as discreet as possible down in Cairo...'

2 Wingate to Stack, 9 May 1912, SAD/181/2/2; Stack to Wingate, 20 May 1912, Ibid.

3 SIR - 213, Apr. 1912; it is interesting to note that Major Leveson who was so heavily criticized for the conduct of the Anuak expedition was appointed as commander of the new Pibor-Sobat district.

4 Wingate to Stack, 12 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3; later in the same year the Abyssinian government proposed a combined military expedition against the Anuak. This was turned down by Wingate who feared that the Abyssinian would raid in order to capture slaves; see Wingate to Asser, 10 Sep. 1912, SAD/182/3/2.
Despite the obvious shortcomings of punitive expeditions, Wingate persisted in his view that they were unavoidable. In 1913 he '...decided to bring the Agar Dinkas to book...these childish natives must be taught to respect the Government and to take the punishment for not doing so...'¹ When he proposed a further expedition against the Garjak Nuer it was vetoed by Kitchener who feared another fiasco². Wingate was therefore forced to cancel the expedition and to '...try peaceful penetration...'³ Less than six months later the expedition was sanctioned as peaceful penetration had apparently proved ineffective. Wingate was confident '...that captured cattle etc., from them [the Garjak Nuer] will, in all likelihood, cover the expense of the patrol...'⁴

Judging by the results, as reported by Wingate in 1914, the policy of punitive patrols had achieved little, if any results. Intertribal fighting continued to flourish throughout the southern Sudan⁵. Even Owen, an avowed protagonist of military force, had to admit that the fighting between the Nuer and the Bor Dinka was the outcome of the recent punitive expedition which '...left the Nuers free to act against their next door neighbours...'⁶

¹Wingate to Feilden, (Governor of Bahr al-Ghazāl), 21 Feb. 1913, SAD/185/2/2.
²Clayton to Wingate, 3 Nov. 1913, SAD/469/5.
³Wingate to Clayton, 6 Nov. 1913, Ibid.
⁴Wingate to Stack (private), 18 Apr. 1914, SAD/190/1/2.
⁵GGR - 1914, pp. 3-5; Wingate reported constant tribal fighting between the Anuak, the Nuer, and the Dinka, while the shaykhs of the Azande had to be deported for fermenting sedition.
⁶Owen to Wingate, 5 July 1914, SAD/191/1/2.
In the northern provinces of the Sudan the system of tribal administration followed different lines. Order was maintained by the government posts and military action was only required on the Darfur border. Turbulent tribes were dealt with by ordinary policies which in most cases proved quite adequate. But the Nuba mountains, although part of Kordofan, were dealt with on lines similar to those employed in the south. The first major military operation in the Nuba mountains took place at Talodi in 1906. On 25 May the Arabs near Talodi killed the Egyptian *ma'mur* and thirty-eight men at a local dance. According to the official report the main reason for the uprising was the Arabs' dissatisfaction with the government's anti-slavery measures. In the ensuing battle, in which the Nuba *makks* of Kadugli, Jabal Iliri, and Jabal Qadîr fought with the government against the Arabs, seven Arab shaykhs and 120 men were killed and 100 prisoners were taken to El Obeid. The government reinforcements, which arrived after the battle was over, killed another 350 Arabs and took 100 additional prisoners. Wingate who inspected Kordofan shortly after the incident, wrote:

1See pp.85-6.

2See for instance *GGR* - 1907, pp.44-5; *SIR* - 193, Aug. 1910.

3For religious uprisings in the Nuba mountains see pp.208-9.

4*GGR* - 1906, p.7; for the unofficial versions about the Talodi murder and the subsequent court martial of the rebels, see pp.270-1.

5*SIR* - 143, June 1906.
...I cannot but feel that with our pin point garrisons at El Obeid Bara, and Talodi, we are really ruling the vast Kordofan country far more by bluff than by anything else..."Yeshurn waxed fat and kicked" can well apply to the majority of Kordofan tribes and we ought to be in a position to deal with them if they kick...

A major operation against the Nyima mountains of the Nuba district was undertaken in 1908. This group of hills, which had not been under government control during the Turco-Egyptian period and the Mahdia, was captured by an overwhelming force and the inhabitants were punished severely. Justifying the burning of villages and the destroying of crops, the sub-governor of the Nuba mountains wrote: '...Until such a time as we can enforce the Penal Code the punishment must be collective...' The Nyima patrol opened a new period in the Nuba mountains during which the government relied on punitive expeditions to enforce its authority. Action was taken against the Katla Kidu, Tima, Tira, and Dagig hills during the years 1909-1910.

The government's method in one of these expeditions was described by Savile, then governor of Kordofan.

...On finding no opposition we only burned the houses and grain and killed all animals...after lunch we went on to a few tukls we had overlooked in the morning and while finishing off those and killing a few more pigs, we saw some of the friendlies coming up and doing a little looting...

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1 Wingate to Cromer, 12 Dec. 1906, SAD/279/6.
2 SAR - 1908, pp.57-8.
3 GGR - 1908, p.590; see also Wingate to Gorst, 29 Dec. 1908, FO 371/659.
4 Handbook Kordofan, p.95; GGR - 1910, pp. 56-61.
5 Savile's diary, 1 Feb. 1910, SAD/427/7.
At one of the mountains Savile met with opposition. The makk of Tagoi refused to accompany him to Tendik, whereupon Savile ordered his village to be destroyed. In the resulting battle, the government troops were beaten by the Nubas and forced to retreat. This incident was a direct result of Savile's lack of knowledge of intertribal relations, for it was caused by the long standing enmity between the makk of Tagoi and the other makks who were accompanying Savile. Nevertheless Wingate decided that punishment was essential, and entrusted the expedition to Asser, his adjutant-general. A severe battle took place in which many prisoners were taken. The makk of Tagoi, who succeeded in escaping, was eventually caught and executed in April 1911. Both Slatin and Asser condemned the expedition and blamed the British officer in charge of the Nuba mountains as being responsible for the unnecessary bloodshed. Asser wrote: 'I do not think that such a notoriously bloodthirsty medal hunter as Vickery is the type of man to look after and guide such people as the Nubas.' Slatin commented: 'The whole Tagoi Expedition is regrettable it was provoked by Bimb. Vickery...and could by careful management have been avoided.'

1 Ibid. 18 Apr. 1910.
2 SIR - 189, Apr. 1910.
3 Wingate to Asser, 12 Sep. 1910, SAD/297/3; Wingate to Gorst, 22 Sep. 1910, Ibid.
4 SAR - 1911, p.63; GGR - 1911, p.8.
5 Asser to Wingate, 12 Oct. 1910, SAD/298/1.
6 Slatin's diary, 6 Nov. 1910, SAD/441.
Nonetheless, similar expeditions were undertaken in the following years. In 1911 five punitive patrols were sent against the Nuba mountains. Villages and crops were burnt, cattle was confiscated, and many prisoners were taken. A major battle extending for over two months, took place in 1914, when over 5000 Nubas from Tira al-Akhqar fought against the government troops before they surrendered. With the outbreak of the first World War Wingate reluctantly decided to postpone further action until the conclusion of hostilities. The only major military action during the War was an expedition against Fiki 'Ali, one of the Nuba makks, who rebelled against the government in 1915. By the end of that year the preparations for the conquest of Darfur absorbed all the government's resources, and punitive expeditions against the tribes had to be postponed.

While punitive expeditions were aimed primarily at demonstrating the government's authority and collecting taxes, one of their most disturbing features was the compulsory drafting of prisoners into the army. This was yet another sphere in which the Anglo-Egyptian

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1 GGR - 1911, p. 8.
2 GGR 1914, pp. 5-6; SIR - 240, July 1914.
3 Ibid.
4 Frank Balfour to Lady Balfour, 27 July 1915, SAD/303/6; see also pp. 216-7.
5 Wingate to Balfour, 20 Dec. 1915, SAD/197/3/2; for details see Theobald, 'Ali Dīnār, pp. 154-161. An interesting sideline of the conquest of Darfur, was Wingate's plan to employ aeroplanes in the tribal administration of the less accessible districts; see Memorandum by Major C.H. Stigand, 20 Aug. 1916, SAD/200/5.
authorities followed in the footsteps of their Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist predecessors. An article published in 1902, claimed that '... it isn't war that they wage in Africa; what is there carried on is nigger hunting.'

Following the reconquest many of the old Sudanese soldiers had to be released from the Egyptian army, and were settled in colonies. Despite the mass recruiting which took place both from the ranks of the Mahdist jihiḏiya and from amongst the liberated slaves, there was a constant demand for more recruits. The situation was further aggravated by Wingate's policy of replacing Egyptian units by those composed of Sudanese. Hence provincial governors were instructed to do their utmost to obtain as many recruits as possible. But as volunteers apparently did not supply the required numbers, recruiting became an essential adjunct of the punitive expeditions. One of the major hunting grounds was in the Nuba mountains where punitive expeditions became very frequent after 1908. Following one of those expeditions, Slatin wrote: '... Today arrived over 100 Nuba prisoners;...

1. R. Hill, Egypt in the Sudan 1820-1881, pp. 46-8; for a description of the slave-soldiers (bāzinīr) in the southern provinces see Holt, Mahdist State, pp. 34-5; R. Slatin, Fire and Sword in the Sudan, p. 380; see also H. Russell, The ruin of the Soudan, cause, effect and remedy, (London 1892), pp. 17-9. Russell relates how the Baqqāra tribes undertook slave raiding in order to pay their taxes to the Turco-Egyptian government.


3. CAO - 71, 12 June 1901; see also p.


5. This policy was decided upon following the Omdurman mutiny of 1900; for details see pp. 165-8.

6. CAO - 66, 28 May 1901.
men & boys who were taken from the Kattla and Tirra mountains and will be enlisted as soldiers — all in a pitiable [sic] state... It seems that the number of prisoners to be recruited was even taken into account when planning an expedition. Following the patrol against the Beir and Anuak, Asser complained to Wingate: 'I find that owing to our expectation of obtaining prisoners from the Annuaks and Beirs not being realised, we are some 3000 Sudanese short...' In 1913 Asser suggested the imposition of a levy of men on some of the southern tribes:

"...I see the Nuers and Shilluks have had a scrap. Would it not be a good opportunity to help recruiting by making the Nuers produce a similar number of men to what they killed and hand them over to the Army? I would be a good way of introducing them to the idea of a levy of men..."

There can be no doubt that these methods of recruiting had a bad effect on the standard of the army as well as on the attitude of the tribes to the idea of voluntary recruiting. Analysing the massive desertion from Sudanese units in 1915, Colonel Drake, the new adjutant-general, wrote that the compulsory recruiting of prisoners and undesirables was largely to blame.

The failure of punitive expeditions was clearly stated by two

1 Slatin's diary, 29 Dec. 1910, SAD/441.
2 Asser to Wingate, 12 Aug. 1912, SAD/182/2/1.
3 Asser to Wingate, 4 Apr. 1913, SAD/186/1/2; Stack who was then Sudan agent came forward with the idea of exchanging cattle for recruits; Stack to Wingate, 7 Sep. 1913, SAD/187/3/1.
4 Drake to Wingate, 26 May 1915, SAD/195/5.
Anglo-Sudanese officials who served as inspectors during Wingate's governor-generalship. Willis, who became director of intelligence in 1920, defined the government's tribal policy in the south, as:

'...administration by raids...':

...It is not surprising if the natives could detect but little difference between the old Turkish, the Dervishes, and the Sudan Government. They all raided, but the last was not interested in slaves but took cattle only and was possibly more efficient in the methods of getting them...1

It was only after the first World War that '...a return was made to the old plan of peaceful penetration but under circumstances far more difficult...'. 2 A similar view was taken by Gillan, who had served in Kordofan since 19103: '...The success or otherwise of the administration was judged largely in terms of "patrols" and few other questions were asked...'.4 He also criticized the use of 'friendlies' in punitive expeditions as '...the looting and cruelty committed by undisciplined friendlies usually lead to subsequent recriminations and suspicions which take years to die down...'.5 Finally, Gillan warned against the burning of villages and the confiscation of cattle, which punished the innocent but allowed the ringleaders to prepare for the next round6.

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1Survey of the policy of the Sudan Government in the Upper Nile, n.d. 1926?, SAD/212/10/1. The survey was probably written by Willis.
2Ibid.
4Gillan, Nuba, p.5.
5Ibid, p.53.
6Ibid, pp.54-5.
Chapter VIII.

Land-settlement and taxation.

During the later years of the Khalifa's rule the Sudan was struck by continuous famine. Many of the cultivators of the Gezira, the most fertile part of the country, were partially expropriated to make room for the Baqqāra immigrants. Agriculture was not only overtaxed, but also ravaged by the ill-disciplined and starving Mahdist soldiers. The immediate resumption of cultivation was essential both economically and politically, and was regarded by the authorities as the best guarantee for peace. To achieve this, cultivators had to be assured that the ownership of their lands would not be challenged by the new authorities. Furthermore, land speculators had to be warned not to purchase land from its previous owners who had fled from the Sudan during the Mahdia and whose claims of ownership could not be acknowledged without evicting the present cultivators. A Khedivial decree was therefore promulgated in April 1897, which provided for the compulsory registration of titles.

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1For details see Holt, Mahdist State, pp.235-6; see also 'Ownership of Land', inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 20 Feb. 1900, FO 78/5086.

2E.F.Knight, Letters from the Sudan, (London 1897), pp.195-6; Knight, The Times special correspondent who accompanied the expeditory force during the Dongola campaign, warned against the massive sale of lands by refugees from the Sudan to Greek speculators in Cairo.

a. Agricultural land-settlement.

Following the reconquest, Kitchener proclaimed that no land sales would be recognized without a valid title to such lands\(^1\). This proclamation, which set out to protect the native landowners from foreign speculators, remained one of the guiding principles of the government's land policy throughout the Wingate era. The second principle regarding land-settlement was proclaimed in the 'Title to Lands Ordinance 1899'. It ordered that continuous possession of lands during the five years preceding the date of claim \(...\text{shall create an absolute title as against all persons}\)...\(^2\) It further stated that any person who claimed to have been dispossessed of his land during the Mahdia would have to supply ample proof as to his title. Finally, in default of the two previous conditions, \(...\text{continuous possession since the re-establishment of the civil authority shall create a prima facie title}\)...\(^3\) Thus the government in its desire to resume cultivation and to avoid any further dislocation of the inhabitants, recognized the legal validity of titles which were acquired during the Mahdia.\(^4\)

\(^1\) SG - 1, 7 Mar. 1899; SG - 10, 1 Apr. 1900.

\(^2\) SG - 2, 27 May 1899.

\(^3\) Ibid; see also 'Ownership of Land', incolsure in Cromer to Salisbury, 20 Feb. 1900, FO 78/5086.

\(^4\) A very similar attitude was adopted by the Mahdi. He wrote to Muḥammad al-Ḵayr ʿAbdallāh Khujalī, governor of Berber, that lands which were wrongfully taken during the Turkiya should be returned to their legal owners, unless a period of seven years had passed since their dispossession. See Mansūrāt al-Imām al-Mahdī, Vol.3, pp.41-2; for the legislation and settlement of town lands see pp.348-57.
In the following years further legislation was undertaken. The 'Land Acquisition Ordinance 1903', enabled the government to take possession of any land which was '...likely to be needed for any public purpose...' Compensation was to be settled by the provincial governors by '...a friendly agreement with the person interested...' Failing agreement, a commission of three members, two of whom were to be appointed by the governor, was empowered to settle the dispute. Accordingly, in the following years, the government took possession of lands required for development in many towns and rural districts of the Sudan. The land acquisition orders were published in the Sudan Gazette and contained the names of the landowners and the size of their respective plots of land.

Until 1905, no mention of government lands was made in any of the ordinances dealing with landownership. '...It seems to have been assumed that the Government had an inherent power of disposition over any land in which no private claims had been proved...' In 1905 the government promulgated an ordinance for the settlement of rights over

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1SG - 45, Mar. 1903; GGR - 1903, p.80.

2The first order was published in SG - 48, June 1903, and referred to lands belonging to Jirjis 'Aid al-Shâhid and his brothers; in July 1903, three sæqiyas were acquired in Dongola province belonging to al-Hajj Nūr al-Dā'īm Ahmad, Husayn Khalīfa, and Jamīl Bābikr. SG - 49, July 1903; see also SG - 58, Jan. 1904; SG - 65, Aug. 1904; SG - 73, Mar. 1905; see also GGR - 1906, pp.610, 673-4; where it was announced that the government acquired land in Karima and Khartoum for the expansion of the railway terminus.

waste forest and unoccupied lands. According to this ordinance the
government was deemed the legal owner of all lands and forests which
were '...entirely free from any private rights or that the rights
existings...do not amount to full ownership....' Should the govern-
ment decide to develop these lands '...The Governor-General may
compulsorily expropriate all private rights...existing in or over
such lands...'.

In 1905 the government took further action against the unautho-
rized sale of lands. In June 1906 Phipps warned Wingate that Greek
speculators were buying land in the Gezira for as little as P.T.40
a jad'a. The government therefore forbade the selling of lands
without the written consent of the provincial governors, and declared
that all sales to which such consent was not given would be regarded
as null and void. Prospective buyers were offered to apply only to
the provincial governors or to the director of agriculture and lands.
These orders were slightly modified in the years 1906-8, when the
government decided to recognize sales of land in the province of
Khartoum which had been concluded prior to the publication of the 1905

1SG - 80, 24 Aug. 1905.
2Ibid.
3Phipps to Wingate, 12 June 1905, SAD/276/6; according to Phipps a
jad'a consisted of 51/8 feddans and was the measurement used for
taxation. According to R.Hill, Egytpt in the Sudan..., p.41 a jad'a
was 51/3 feddans.
4SG78, July 1905, 'Disposal of land by natives'.
5SG - 79, Aug. 1905, 'Sale or lease of lands'.
order. It also enabled cultivators to sell or mortgage their rights in buqur lands without, however, prejudicing the ownership of the government over such lands.

The underlying motive of all these orders was to expand cultivation while safeguarding the inhabitants' rights and encouraging the formation of a Sudanese proprietary class. All lands which were regularly cultivated were regarded as mulk and the full rights of their owners were guaranteed. However, lands which depended for their cultivation on high floods or rains, as well as forests and waste lands, were deemed to belong to the government who could expropriate the cultivators when such lands were required for development. In 1911, Kitchener declared that all the lands in the Sudan were Kharajiya, thus providing the government with yet another safeguard against the alienation of lands.

1 SG - 96, 23 May 1906; SG - 113, June 1907.
2 Buqur or Karu were the lands lying behind the river banks which were only cultivable in years of exceptionally high floods. GGR - 1905, p. 64; J. D. Tothill, (ed) Agriculture in the Sudan, (London 1948), p. 943.
3 SG - 123, Jan. 1908.
4 Wingate to Cromer, 6 Apr. 1905, SAD/276/4; GGR - 1905, pp. 63-7.
5 Mulk - land in which full private ownership is recognized.
7 When in 1921 the government wanted to expropriate lands in the Gezira which had been recognized as mulk, a special ordinance had to be promulgated to that effect; Ibid, p. 14.
8 Kitchener to Wingate, 5 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3; Wingate to Kitchener, 15 Apr. 1912, Ibid; see also SAR - 1911, p. 52. Kharajiya lands which originally did not amount to full ownership, had since 1891 been regarded as equal to mulk. Thus Kitchener's declaration seems to have had no legal significance; see G. Baer, A history of landownership in modern Egypt 1800-1950, (London 1962), pp. 8-12.
The Sudan government had three major advantages in dealing with land-settlement. It was not hampered by the capitulations which had obstructed land legislation in Egypt and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, most of the cultivable lands were owned by small-holders, and the problem of large estates did not exist. Lastly, waqf existed only in a small measure and thus a major difficulty was avoided.

The 'Title of Lands Ordinance' of 1899, provided for the appointment of special commissions in the various provinces and districts in order to determine the ownership of lands within their jurisdiction. These commissions were appointed by the governor-general and consisted of three commissioned officers of the Egyptian army and of two Sudanese notables. Landowners could not appeal to any higher authority against the commission's decisions. However, the commissions were empowered to reconsider a case if a petition was presented within six months of its original decision.

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2For the problem of disintegration of the large estates in Egypt, see G.Baer, A history of landownership in modern Egypt 1800-1950, pp.13-39, 112-120.

3P.M.Holt, Holy families and Islam in the Sudan, Princeton Near East Papers, No.4 (1967), p.6; see also pp.192,276-7; for the problems connected with awqaf in Egypt, see G.Baer, A history of landownership in modern Egypt 1800-1950, pp.169-185.

4SG - 2, May 1899.

5SG - 45, Mar. 1903, amending the 'Title of Lands Ordinance 1899'.
The presidents of most of these commissions were British officers and inspectors, and its Sudanese members were generally the shaykhs of the most powerful tribes within its areas of jurisdiction. Parallel to the work of these commissions, a cadastral survey and a registration of title deeds was undertaken in the agricultural districts, while forests and wastelands were treated as a separate category and entrusted to specially appointed 'Settlement Officers'. The work of all these commissions was under the general supervision of the legal secretary who was in charge of land-settlement during a great part of this period. Defining the aims of the government's land policy in 1908, Bonham Carter wrote:

1. The settlement of all disputes as to land.
2. The establishment of all titles on a basis of certainty, and the registration of the same.
3. The ascertainment and registration of the rights of the Government to land.
4. Where land is subject to tax the provision of an equitable basis for taxation.

1 The appointments of these commissions were published in the Sudan Gazette. These commissions functioned for a limited period only. See for instance SG - 32, 1 Feb 1902; Sennar Mudiria Lands Commission; SG - 40, Oct. 1902, Dongola Mudiria Lands Commission; SG - 71, Feb. 1905, Berber Mudiria Lands Commission; SG - 86, Jan. 1906, Sennar Mudiria Lands Commission.

2 The central cadastral survey was started in Dongola by its governor Colonel Jackson in 1903, but only in 1905 did the government order that surveys be started in other provinces. GGR - 1903, Appendix A, pp.154-7; see also SG - 80, 24 Aug. 1905, 'The Demarcation and Survey Ordinance 1905'.

3 Ibid.

4 In the years 1904-10 land-settlement was part of the department of agriculture and lands; see pp.129-130.

5 GGR - 1908, The Legal Secretary's Report, p.197.
In order to achieve these aims the government had to overcome numerous problems which were described by several government officials responsible for land-settlement during that period. During the first few years the settlement officers were concerned primarily with the ownership of ṣāqīya and other lands which were cultivated regularly. Ownership was determined according to continuous cultivation for a period of two to five years, while those who could prove legal ownership but had not cultivated the land during the past few years were compensated with land elsewhere.

The ownership of lands that could only be cultivated during years of exceptional rains or floods was far more difficult to determine.

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1. The most comprehensive work in this field is by H. St. G. Peacock, A Report on the Land Settlement of the Gezira, Messelemia District, (London 1943). Peacock was a judge of the Sudan civil court and was in charge of the Gezira land-settlement in the years 1906-10. A second report was written by J. G. Matthew, inspector in the Sennar province 1905-9, and president of the land-settlement commission for Singa district. 'Land Customs and Tenure in Singa District', SNR, Vol. 4, (1921), pp. 1-19. The third report was about land-settlement in the province of Berber and was written by Ryder, who became land-settlement officer in 1906. 'Memoirs of Ryder 1905-16', (typescript), SAD/400/8. (Short references: Peacock, Matthew, Ryder)

2. Ryder, pp. 61-2; Peacock, p. 21.

3. Title to Lands Ordinance 1899', SG - 2, 27 May 1899.

4. The terms used for the classification of lands were different in many of the provinces and were based on local usage. Thus Matthew (pp. 17-9) uses four terms for riverain lands, whilst Peacock divides them into six classes using different terms (Peacock pp. 47-8). The classification used by the government divided the lands into four main groups: a) ṣāqīya or shadūf lands (artificially irrigated), b) saluka lands (irrigated by floods), c) maṭara lands (dependent on rains), d) Karu and buqr (cultivated in years of exceptionally high floods) See GGR - 1904, pp. 5-7.
These lands were usually claimed on a tribal basis and there was rarely any documentary evidence to prove ownership. Where valid titles existed they derived from the Funj sultans, the Turco-Egyptian authorities, or the Mahdist state. In the Singa district of the province of Sennar the majority of landownership claims were based on titles acquired during the Funj Sultanate. The tribal leaders who held most of these titles were regarded as the unchallenged owners of these lands, and were duly acknowledged as such by the new authorities. Over the years many of these lands had been subdivided amongst the individual members of the tribe, or were reassigned to other tribes and individual fakīs. In the Messelemia district of the Gezira, titles which were acquired during the Turkiya or the Mahdia had greater weight than those of the Funj Sultanate and were regarded as ample proof when put forward in claiming ownership. In the majority of cases, however, claims were based on oral evidence. In Sennar, the presence of Makk 'Adlān, a direct descendant of the Funj Sultans, enabled the government officials to rely on his information.

1Matthew, pp.2,8; GGR - 1908, p.198.
2Matthew, pp.1-11.
3Matthew, pp.2-5.
4Matthew, pp.5-7; for the granting of lands as free gifts (sadaqa) to fakīs, see P.M.Holt, Holy families and Islam in the Sudan, Princeton Near East Papers, No.4,(1967), p.6.
5Peacock, pp. 42-4.
6Matthew, p.16.
Blue Nile province landownership was based largely on inheritance. In the majority of cases the land inherited was not divided according to the *Sharī'a*, but was partitioned amongst the heirs by common consent. The registration of titles of inherited land depended on oral evidence as there was generally no documentary proof\(^1\). Other claims of landownership were based on purchase, dowries, gifts, and continuous cultivation\(^2\). In cases of dispute the settlement officer '...registers the land in the name of the person who appears to be the right owner...and directs the other party, if not satisfied with the registration, to petition the Settlement Officer...'\(^3\)

A different approach was adopted for uncultivated lands in which native rights were recognized. The settlement officer was ordered to '...liquidate those native rights on the spot, and give in land...such compensation as he considers desirable, leaving the remainder of the land to be registered to Government free of rights...'\(^4\). The inevitable result was that the government commissions were overwhelmed with petitions. In 1906 there were 1,323 petitions dealing with land-settlement in the Shendi district of Berber alone\(^5\), while many other

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\(^1\)Ibid; *GGR* - 1905, p.357; Peacock, pp.31-2, 43-4.

\(^2\)Ibid, pp.33-4.

\(^3\)Ibid, p.35.

\(^4\)Corbyn (Settlement Officer Kamlin) to Legal Secretary, 28 Feb. 1910, SAD/290/2/2, inclosure in Wingate to Gorst, 29 Mar. 1910, SAD/290/3/1.

\(^5\)*GGR* - 1906, p.352.
petitions were directed to the governor-general. Bonham Carter admitted that many of these petitions were the result of mistakes in the early years. He further blamed the many irregular and unrecorded sales which continued despite government orders. He therefore ordered that many of the disputed cases should in future be referred to the Shari'a Courts and not be left to the sole discretion of the settlement officers.

The area of privately owned land and the size of individual plots varied between the different provinces. Most of the lands in the Kassala province belonged to the government, while private ownership in the Gezira had been recognized in the past as long as living man remembered. Moreover, the average size of individual holdings in the Gezira was only 25 feddans, and each plot had to be registered separately. By 1913, the cadastral survey of over 2,300,000 feddans in the Gezira was completed. The ownership of these lands was divided between the government and about 40,000 individual owners. In the province of Khartoum the average size of landholdings was 15 feddans.

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1 Ibid, p.6; according to Shahin Bey, Wingate's Arabic secretary, the majority of the 1,185 petitions presented to Wingate concerned landownership.


3 GGR - 1904, p.73.

4 Peacock, p.36.

5 Ibid, p.60.

6 Pearson (director of survey) to Wingate, 25 Apr. 1913, SAD/108/16.
for säğiya lands and 55 feddans for bugr lands\(^1\). In Dongola and
Haife\(^2\) individual shares in land and date trees were often so small
that the governor of Dongola proposed '...to compel small shareholders
to sell to larger...\(^2\). In the southern provinces and in the Nuba mountains land-settle-
ment was not undertaken during this period. Tribal disputes concern-
ing land '...did arise as elsewhere..., but these were adjusted on a
tribal basis either by agreement or administrative decision...\(^3\). In
Kordofan the only land-settlement undertaken until 1916, was that of
El Obeid and Dueim. Nearly all other lands were either owned by
tribes of by the government and the few disputes that arose were
settled according to local custom\(^4\). In the district of Bara, where
many claims to private land were put forward by members of the river-
ain tribes, they were recognized whenever supported by valid evidence\(^5\).

In the years 1907-11 land registration was completed in most of
the agricultural districts of the Sudan\(^6\). Motivated by its desire to
increase cultivation and to establish a contented class of small

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\(^1\)GGR - 1906, p.519.
\(^2\)Ibid, pp.614, 639.
\(^3\)Gillan, Nuba, p.37.
\(^4\)Handbook Kordofan, pp.109-10; see also SIR - 171, Oct. 1908; GGR -
1908, p.596; SIR - 238, May 1914.
\(^5\)SIR - 159, Oct. 1907; see also H.A. MacMichael, 'The Kheiran', SNR -
Vol.3, (1920), pp. 231-244.
\(^6\)GGR - 1907, p.20; GGR - 1909, pp.62-3; GGR - 1911, p.29.
landowners, the government recognised the cultivators as owners and divided tribal lands into individually held plots. By 1913, many of the uncultivated lands which had been given up by their owners owing to the introduction of a progressive land-tax were being reclaimed by their previous owners; '...A proof of their increased means of cultivation...'

The anti-speculative measures which had been introduced since 1899, were not applied to what the government regarded as reliable capitalist companies which in turn were urged to undertake the development of uncultivated lands. But private enterprise failed to respond; most of the foreign companies who applied lacked the necessary capital, and thus until the end of the First World War, the majority of development projects were undertaken by the government itself.

1 In 1903 Slatin arranged with the Abu Sinn family of the Shukriya tribe that they would give up 56,000 acres of their lands to the smallholders who cultivated them. See Slatin to Wingate, 26 Jan. 1903, SAD/273/1; see also Peacock, pp. 39-40.

2 GGR - 1912, p. 102. For the introduction and the effects of the progressive land-tax, see p. 361.

3 GGR - 1904, pp. 45-50; The report was by a special commission appointed by Wingate to investigate the role of private enterprise in the Sudan's economic development; see also The Times, 18 July 1904; SG - 64, 1 July 1904; GGR - 1907, pp. 17-18.

4 Gaitskell, Gazira, pp. 46-50; see also Owen to Wingate, 13 Jan. 1907, SAD/280/1; Owen reported that the Khedive and Prince Muhammad Ali had bought a considerable amount of land from Muhammad Sharif Nur al-Da'im with the intention of floating a company in Britain to undertake its development. The scheme failed as a result of Owen's intervention; see also Wingate to Slatin, 12 Apr. 1911, SAD/431/11; Wingate reported enthusiastically about the progress made at the government's development area near Tokar.
one notable exception was the Sudan Experimental Plantation Syndicate which was founded by an American, Leigh Hunt, in 1904. The syndicate received a concession of 10,000 feddans at Zeidab, near the confluence of the Atbara with the Nile. It was this company which, under its new name 'The Sudan Plantation Syndicate', undertook the Gezira development project after the first World War.

While capitalist companies failed to respond to the government's appeals, land sales to private speculators flourished despite the government's regulations. There were a number of reasons why the government failed to enforce its policy: firstly, the land in question was in the main privately owned and in many cases sold without government permission; secondly, once the registration of titles was completed the government had no power to stop sales; and lastly, while some of the governors adhered to the regulations, others adopted a more flexible attitude. It was also difficult to force local

1 Gaitskell, Gezira, pp.51-3; the papers and correspondence in connection with the Zeidab concession, and the negotiations regarding the Gezira scheme are in SAD/108;415; For other land concessions granted during this period see GGR - 1908, pp.5-8.

2 Gaitskell, Gezira, pp.53-73.

3 See for instance Bonham Carter to Nicola Amarandus, 22 Feb. 1902, FO 141/371; Bonham Carter informed Amarandus that his purchase of lands in Khartoum, was based on forged documents and would not be accepted by the government; see also GGR - 1907, pp.17-18.

4 In 1906 Cromer warned Wingate '...that the manufacture of false native claims was going on at a great rate, the Greeks being the instigators...We must not allow ourselves to be 'done' in the presumed interests of the natives, but in the real interests probably of the Greeks...' Cromer to Wingate, 2 Feb. 1906, SAD/278/2.

5 The governors of Halfa and Khartoum adopted strict measures whilst the director of the department of agriculture and the governor of Dongola were more lenient; see GGR - 1902, pp.253, 287; GGR - 1906, pp.662, 769-770; GGR - 1907, pp.17-18.
cultivators to abstain from selling while the sale of government lands was advertised in the *Sudan Gazette* and lands were sold freely to willing bidders.

It was not long before some of the Greek merchants commenced buying lands in the Gezira from local landowners. Angello Capato, one of the biggest Greek merchants in the Sudan, purchased about 20,000 feddans in Kamlin mostly from the Habuba family and amongst others from Abd El Kader. Altogether, the resulting alienation of lands did not reach considerable proportions as there was more land for sale than willing purchasers. Moreover, the government refused to register the sold lands. Consequently, when in 1908 the Sudan was hit by an economic depression, many of the speculators had to sell at a loss, while others, who could not prove their ownership,

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1. The first advertisement of the sale of lands in the Gezira was published in the *Sudan Gazette* No. 46, April 1903. It referred to '...845 feddans of First Class Gezira land, situated in Kabushia.' In 1902 over 500 feddans were sold to Mr Costi Loiso, a Greek merchant and hotel-owner in Wadi Halfa. In the same year 1500 feddans were sold to Neberowi Bey; see *GGR* - 1902, pp. 242, 282; in 1906 Loiso bought another 500 feddans, and a concession of al-Hassa lands near Berber was sold to Amín Pasha 'Abdallāh; see *GGR* - 1906, pp. 570, 636; see also *GGR* - 1908, p. 4.

2. Cromer to Wingate, 2 Feb. 1906, SAD/278/2; *SAR* - 1905, p. 152. Cromer reported that Greek merchants in Khartoum bought over 50,000 acres in the Gezira for P.T. 4 1/2 an acre.

3. Bonham Carter to Wingate, 25 May 1909, SAD/287/3; according to certain reports, land-settlement problems were one of the reasons for the Wad Ḥabūba revolt, however, this was denied by Wingate; see p. 205.

4. *GGR* - 1902, p. 253; *SAR* - 1908, p. 60.

were declared bankrupt. In the case of Angello Capato, whose liabilities amounted to £E 230,000, Lord Grenfell, chairman of the Bank of Egypt, intervened personally and asked the government to register Capato's lands in the Gezira. This request was turned down by Bonham Carter, who wrote: "...that it was impossible to register purchases of unsurveyed and unsettled land." In a private letter to Wingate, Bonham Carter added that the lands purchased by Capato were "...cultivated by permanent tenants... and it is doubtful whether it would be advisable to allow these tenancy lands to get into the hands of foreigners..."

1 CGR - 1908, pp.554-6; see also Luzatto to Slatin, 15 Nov. 1908, SAD/284/11/2; Luzatto was the director of the Bank of Egypt; in his letter to Slatin he appealed to the Sudan authorities to grant title deeds to several Greek merchants, who were hit as a result of economic crisis in Egypt. Lists of bankruptcies were published in the Sudan Gazette, throughout the years 1908-9.

2 Grenfell, Francis Wallace, 1st Baron (1841-1925), sirdar of the Egyptian army 1888-1892; commanded the Egyptian army in the Battle of Tūshkī in 1889; in 1902 he was raised to the peerage; was made field-marshal in 1908; DNBS 1922-1930, pp.362-4.

3 Bonham Carter to Wingate, 25 May 1909, SAD/287/3. Grenfell had previously approached Wingate to help the financial undertakings of the Bank of Egypt in the Sudan. He promised Wingate that following the death of Luzatto, the bank's director in Egypt, the bank would be kept on more English lines. Wingate replied: "...You can rely upon me doing what I can to further the interests of the Bank in the Sudan...", see Grenfell to Wingate, 9 Mar. 1909; Wingate to Grenfell, 22 Mar. 1909, SAD/286/3.

4 Bonham Carter to Wingate, 25 May 1909, SAD/287/3. Wingate was at the time on a special mission in Somaliland and hence was not consulted by Bonham Carter about Grenfell's request, (R. Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, pp.151-3).

5 Bonham Carter to Wingate (private), 22 June 1909, SAD/287/4.
Aided by the economic depression, the Sudan government succeeded in checking land speculation in the Gezira, which was destined to become the country's major economic asset. In 1914 the government declared that no sales of land in the Gezira which occurred after 1 July 1905 would be recognized as valid. Furthermore, the right to purchase or lease lands in the Gezira was henceforth vested in the government. The government had similar powers to determine prices without taking into consideration any increase in the value of land. This policy was bitterly criticized by al-Ahram arguing that it was '...absurd to deprive the Egyptian of the right to possess land which he watered with his blood.' Similar articles appeared in other Egyptian papers. However, the government maintained its policy despite the criticism.

b. Urban land-settlement.

In his annual report for 1899 Cromer wrote that the treatment of urban property presented relatively few problems as compared with landownership in rural districts. Many of the towns had been reduced

1 SG - 247, Feb. 1914.
2 Ibid.
3 Al-Ahram, 5 July 1914; the quotation is from a letter to the editor signed by a former Sudan government official. It was written following an article in al-Ahram, 1 July 1914, which criticized the Sudan government's attitude to foreigners and its land policy. The article and the letter were translated by the intelligence department, SAD/191/1/2.
4 Butler to Wingate, 20 July 1914, Ibid; Butler wrote that several Egyptian newspapers criticized the land policy in the Sudan.
5 'Ownership of Land', inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 20 Feb. 1900, FO 78/5086.
to ruins during the Mahdia and the reconquest, while others were sparsely populated. Legislation for the ownership of town lands was initiated shortly after the reconquest, in all probability prompted by the government's desire to affect rapid urban development. The 'Town Lands Ordinance 1899' provided for the settling of landownership in Khartoum, Berber, and Dongola and for laying out and rebuilding the above towns. It authorized the government to obtain any land it required, either by purchase or by exchange, thus enabling the new towns to be planned without interference by property owners. Landowners were ordered to erect buildings conforming to the 'tanzīm' regulations, within two years. All lands which were not allotted to private owners, or whose owners failed to comply with the building regulations, were to become and be the absolute property of the Government. In March 1902, landowners in Khartoum were reminded that the time within which they were bound to erect buildings on

1 Of the major towns only Omdurman and Suakin had a considerable population, whilst Khartoum, Berber, Dongola, and El Obeid were ruined and largely deserted.

2 Stone, p.206.

3 SG2, 27 May 1899.

4 Ibid; the tanzīm regulations set down the standard of buildings which had to be erected according to the classification of the land.

5 W.H. McLeon, The planning of Khartoum and Omdurman, Paper read at the R.I.B.A. Town Planning Conference (London 10-15 Oct. 1910), SAD/235/1. According to The Times, 11 Apr. 1900, the two years regulation was imposed in order to induce the inhabitants of Omdurman who owned land in Khartoum to move to the new town.
their land expires on the 31st December 1902... ¹ A year later Wingate reported that most of the landowners had complied with the building regulations².

In 1904 the 'Towns Lands Ordinance' was extended to Kassala, al-Qadārīf, Dueim, and El Obeid, where land-settlement commissions had been functioning for some time³. The town lands commissions, which were composed of a president, two officers, and two notables, functioned in a similar way to the rural land commissions⁴. The building regulations were henceforth applied to all major towns and in 1907 twenty-three landowners in Kassala lost their lands, having failed to comply with the regulations⁵. In Ḥalīfah, landowners who wanted to build had to present a petition to the governor in order to confirm that the land was in fact theirs. The governor, who had initiated this 'paternal arrangement', argued that it had "proved of the

¹SG - 33, Mar. 1902.
²GGR - 1903, p. 63; see also SG - 42, Dec. 1902. The government announced that it will take possession of all lands whose owners had not complied with the building regulations.
³SG - 59, Feb. 1904; the ordinance was extended to these towns following the government's realization that the land-settlement commissions were functioning without any legal authority.
⁴The town land commissions for Khartoum, Dongola, and Berber were appointed in July 1899. The presidents of the Khartoum and Dongola commissions were British officers, whilst the Berber commission was presided over by an Egyptian; SG - 3, 31 July 1899; A few months later the only Egyptian president was replaced by a British officer; SG - 7, 2 Dec. 1899; see also SG - 10, Apr. 1900. For the functions of the rural settlement commissions, see pp. 337-38.
⁵SG - 120, 15 Nov. 1907.
greatest value in precluding or deciding subsequent law suits...\(^1\)

In 1909 the 'Town Building Regulations' were announced. They included detailed instructions as to the type of buildings allowed for each class of land and laid down sanitary regulations. Land-holders had to apply to the municipal authorities or to the provincial governor to obtain a building permit\(^2\).

Special ordinances were promulgated for the settlement of town lands in Suakin, Omdurman, and Khartoum North. The Suakin land ordinance was promulgated in 1904. It provided for the proof of titles by five years consecutive possession and its land-settlement commission consisted of only three members\(^3\). The lands of Omdurman, unlike those of other towns, were regarded as government property ever since the reconquest. In 1906 however, the government decided to allocate lands to all genuine claimants '...who were present at the time of the fall of Omdurman...'\(^4\) Wingate ordered the sub-governor of Omdurman to act as commissioner in hearing the cases and deciding which claims were to be recognized\(^5\). The 'Hillet Hamid (Khartoum North) village lands Ordinance' was promulgated in 1909. It provided

\(^1\)GGR - 1906, p. 624.

\(^2\)SG - 206, 2 Nov. 1909; the only town where municipal authorities existed during that period was Khartoum.

\(^3\)SH - 63, June 1904.

\(^4\)GGR - 1906, p. 660.

\(^5\)SG - 103, Dec. 1906; the commissioner was assisted by the \textit{umda} of Omdurman and the shaykhs of the quarters.
for the appointment of a settlement officer whose decision on claims was to be final, subject only to the approval of the governor-general.\(^1\)

The most notable difference between the land ordinance applied to Omdurman and Khartoum North, and those of other towns, was that the inhabitants of the former towns were not represented on the settlement commissions which consisted of a single British official.

Town surveys of Khartoum, Khartoum North, Omdurman, and Port Sudan were begun only in 1906\(^2\). A year later the 'Deeds Registration Ordinance' ordered the registration of '...every sale, gift, mortgage or other disposition...' The legality of the transaction could be proved by a document signed and sealed in the presence of a witness, or by a Shari'a court.\(^3\) Finally, in 1912 'The Government Town Lands (Native Occupation) Ordinance' was enacted.\(^4\) It enabled governors '...to set apart Government land near towns as sites on which natives may squat and erect dwellings...'. It also provided for compensation in the event of the occupiers being turned out of their sites. The governor was entitled to order the vacating of these sites without

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1 Inclosure in Asser to Gorst, 2 Oct. 1909, FO 141/423.

2 GGR - 1906, p.522.

3 SG - 117, Sep. 1907; the registration of the Khartoum town lands was already ordered in 1901; see SG - 24, June 1901.

4 SG - 225, 23 Nov. 1912; a previous order, published in 1902, required '...all natives who are not either householders or living with their employers...to live in the large village outside the lines of fortification...'. According to Wingate this was done '...in order to keep the City of Khartoum clean...', GGR - 1902, p.312.
stating his reasons, and the compensation of the inhabitants was left to the governor's discretion. In 1913 government lands occupied by the Sudanese in Khartoum, Khartoum North, El Obeid, and Dueim, were declared 'Native Lodging Areas'. Consequently, the labourers who had built Khartoum, and who had lived on the land allotted to them since 1899, became government tenants who could be evicted at a month's notice.

In its desire to effect the rapid development of Khartoum as the country's new capital the government sought the cooperation of private enterprise. Government and private lands were sold freehold '...for trifling sums to the Greek traders...and much of the most valuable land in the new city, passed thus at once into the hands of a few wealthy capitalists...'. A similar policy was adopted in other towns, but owing to lack of demand only a few plots of land were sold. It was not, however, until 1905 that the government decided to change its policy, and stop the sale of government lands in Khartoum.

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1 GGR - 1912, pp.92-3; SG - 225, 23 Nov. 1912.
2 SG - 232, 20 Mar. 1913; SG - 238, 30 June 1913.
4 During the Mahdia Omdurman was the seat of the country's central administration. The rebuilding of Khartoum was planned and partly executed during Kitchener's governor-generalship; see pp.17-19.
5 The Times, 11 Apr. 1900.
6 Ibid; see also GGR - 1902, p.338, where the governor of Suakin suggested to stop the sale of government owned town lands, until demand would increase and force up the prices.
Inevitably the result was that prices soared, and land speculators who had bought a plot for £E 30 could now sell it for £E 1000\(^1\). Wingate explained away the new policy on the grounds that it raised the price of privately owned lands\(^2\). The governor of Khartoum regarded the increased prices as a good sign for the future development of the city\(^3\). It is quite clear that the government, which had by that time sold most of its land in Khartoum at very low prices, lost a considerable source of income\(^4\). Consequently, when prospects for the development of new towns became apparent, the government decided not to sell its lands, and adopted the leasehold system\(^5\). In 1905 all the lands at El Damer were bought by the government '...in anticipation of the development of this town, which is situated close to the junction of the Nile-Red Sea Railway...'. A year later Wingate wrote optimistically that, '...the leasehold system adopted at El Damer and Atbara...has proved an unqualified success and may well be a forerunner of a general introduction of this anti-speculation method of dealing with town lands...'.

\(^1\)GGR - 1905, p.93.
\(^2\)Ibid, p.72.
\(^3\)Ibid, pp.93-4.
\(^4\)In 1906 the government tried to amend its losses by acquiring 1217 feddans near Khartoum, under the 'Land Acquisition Ordinance'. The land was intended for the future expansion of Khartoum and was known as the Mogren scheme. In 1908 the government abandoned its development. Land prices in Khartoum had decreased considerably as a result of the economic crisis in Egypt, and the scheme had lost its raison d'être. See GGR - 1906, p.183; Slatin to Wingate, 15 Mar. 1906; SAD/278/3; GGR - 1908, p.316.
\(^5\)GGR - 1905, p.7.
\(^6\)Ibid. The 527 feddans were acquired by the government under the 'Land Acquisition Ordinance 1903'; see SAD - 75, 19 Apr. 1905.
\(^7\)GGR - 1906, p.83.
Following the government's decision to establish the Sudan's major port at Shaykh Barghūt (Port Sudan), an investigation was agreed upon to decide the most suitable land policy for the new town. Wingate, and most of the senior British officials, favoured the leasehold system, which would guarantee the government's ownership of the town's lands. Cromer favoured the outright sale of lands which, he hoped, would provide the necessary funds for the development of Port Sudan. He agreed, however, that the leasehold system be adopted for a trial period of two years. By July 1907 it became clear that the new system had failed. The prospective lessees of Greek and Egyptian origin disliked the leasehold system as it prevented them raising money or speculating. British investors were also reluctant to take leases as they included a clause enabling the government, in case of bankruptcy, to take possession of the lease and all the buildings erected on it without paying compensation. In 1908 Bernard, the

1. The government's original intention was to develop Suakin as the major port. Only in Oct. 1904, a special commission found Suakin to be unsuitable and proposed Shaykh Barghūt as the site for a new harbour. See Bond to Wingate, 20 July 1904, SAD/275/5; Wingate to Bond, 28 July 1904, Ibid; 'Report by Commission on Sheikh Barghut' Oct. 1904, SAD/402/12/7.

2. Bonus to Wingate, 17 Nov. 1906, inclosure in Wingate to Cromer, 17 Nov. 1906, FO 141/402.

3. Ibid.


5. Amery to Wingate, 20 July 1907, SAD/281/1.

financial secretary, suggested abandoning the leasehold system and selling the lands as freehold. Despite the opposition of Wingate and the majority of the senior officials, Gorst ordered that "...some plan be devised by which these lands can be bought outright or leased as the public prefer." Thus, what came to be known as 'the combined leasehold-freehold system' came into being. Government lands were offered for sale and the rents procured were lowered considerably. The director of agriculture and lands reported that, owing to the modified terms, eighteen new leases were granted in Port Sudan while not a single plot of land was sold.

It is clear therefore that there is...no public desire to acquire freehold land at Port Sudan...except on the part of the speculator...The leasehold system is not unpopular with the class of person really wanted at Port Sudan viz. the person who will live and work there.

Nonetheless, the new system prevailed and when in 1910 a similar problem arose in Omdurman, the governor-general's council adopted the 'mixed leasehold freehold system' despite strong opposition from many senior British officials. The principal opposers were Currie and Bonham Carter who argued that it was essential that the government should maintain its control over the lands of the major native town in the Sudan. Slatin, however, was against leaseholds, which

1 Bernard to Wingate, 2 Apr. 1908, FO 141/416.
2 Bonus to Wingate, 12 Apr. 1908, Ibid; Wingate to Gorst, 28 Mar. 1908, Ibid; Harvey to Gorst, 8 Apr. 1908, Ibid; Gorst to Wingate, 11 Apr. 1908, Ibid.
he regarded as being unpopular amongst the inhabitants. He further argued that any native landowner '..is the best and cheapest intelligence agent to the Government.'¹ In March 1910, the governor-general's council decided that, '..Town lands including market lands should be offered either for sale or lease at the option of the grantee.'², thereby extending the new system over all the town lands of the Sudan.

The government's land policy, despite the mistakes of the early years, was on the whole successful. By recognizing the rights of private ownership in both rural and urban districts the government effected a rapid increase in cultivation and in urban development. By the end of Wingate's governor-generalship the bulk of the country's land was owned by its inhabitants and by the government. Although speculation and the alienation of lands caused deep concern in the early years, speculators were deterred by the government's policy which was aided by the effects of the economic crisis in Egypt.

6. Taxation.

The principle of light taxation was laid down by Cromer in 1899, when he assured the people of the Sudan that the system of taxation would be similar to that of other Muslim countries.³ In his first

¹Currie to GGC, 10 Feb. 1910; Slatin to GGC, 22 Jan. 1910, FO 867/3; Wingate to Slatin, 10 Feb. 1910, SAD/290/2/1; Wingate gave his full support to Slatin. See also GGC - 28 Feb. 1910, FO 867/1.

²GGC - 14 Mar. 1910, Ibid.

³Viscount Cromer's speech to the Sheikhs and Notables of the Soudan, Omdurman, 4 Jan. 1899, FO 633/25; see also pp.42-3.
annual report on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Cromer elaborated his views:

...On going through the list of the taxes which were collected under the Khalifa's rule, it was found that, although the manner in which they had been levied was cruel and extortionate to the last degree, they were based on principles which are generally recognized in all Moslem countries. No radical change of system was, therefore, necessary...

Thus a system of taxation evolved which was largely based on that of the Khalifa, which in turn was not unlike the system of the Turco-Egyptian Sudan. The principle taxes which were levied by the new administration included land-tax, 'ushr, date tax and herd tax (later animal tax), all of which were imposed on the sedentary population. Nomads paid an annual tribute based upon an approximate assessment of their cattle, and a royalty was imposed on gum, ostrich feathers, and ivory.

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1SAR - 1899, p.47.

2For the system of taxation during the latter years of the Khalifa's rule, see General Report on the Egyptian Soudan, March 1895, compiled from Statements made by Slatin Pasha, (confidential), inclosure in Cromer to Kimberley, 20 Apr. 1895, pp.8-9; Holt, The Khalifa, pp.165-195; For taxation in the Turco-Egyptian Sudan on the eve of the Mahdia see Report on the Soudan by Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, 9 Feb. 1883, C.3670; Peacock, pp.16-18; Peacock described the system of taxation in the Gezira, based on information he received from Shaykh Ahmad al-Sunni, 'Amil of the Gezira during the Mahdia. See also al-Ubayyad on eve of Mahdist revolt, Arabic MS. in possession of Mr. J. G. S. MacPhail; English translation in SAD/404/10.

3For a detailed description of these taxes and the revenue derived thereof see Stone, pp.100-116, 188-197; see also GGR - 1904, pp.210-3, 'List showing the principal taxes in force in the Sudan and the rates at which they are levied'.

4SG - 2, 27 May 1899, 'An Ordinance for regulating the Royalties on Gum, Ostrich Feathers, Ivory, and India Rubber'. Other taxes were of lesser importance including boat tax, house tax, road tax, and forest dues; see GGR - 1904, pp.210-3; for details see Stone, pp.122-6,198-203.
One of the first problems to be faced by the new administration was whether a taxpayer belonged to his tribal unit or to the district in which he resided. Following Slatin's advice it was decided that '...sedentary natives, although from different tribes, belong always to the district in which they are living; nomad Arabs, always to their tribe, although living or grazing in different districts...' A second problem was the definition of a nomad tribe. The importance of this definition lay in the fact that nomads paid only tribute, while sedentaries were taxed more heavily. The government's decision in each case depended only partly on the nomadic character of the tribes. Certain tribes in Kordofan, as well as in the southern provinces, paid tribute despite their being partly sedentary. This was done owing to the lack of government officials, who were required in order to impose the more complex sedentary taxes.

The principle of preserving a low rate of taxation was adhered to until 1912. Cromer regarded this as one of the major contributions towards the success of the British administration in the Sudan. Wingate, who was constantly urged to increase taxation, both by the Egyptian press as well as by the mounting financial needs of the Sudan,

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1 GGR - 1902, p.114.
2 Stone, pp.186-7; see also pp.293-7.
3 Cromer to Robinson, 21 Dec. 1914, FO 633/23;
withstood the pressure largely as a result of Cromer's advice. In 1912 Kitchener decided to withdraw the Egyptian annual subvention which hitherto had enabled Wingate to maintain a low rate of taxation. Consequently in 1913 taxes had to be raised but, according to Wingate, only by a small margin and "...without creating unrest among the inhabitants..."

The order promulgating land-tax and date tax was published in May 1899. Land tax was imposed on all irrigable lands the cultivation of which was not dependent upon rainfall. The annual rates of taxation varied between P.T. 20-50 per feddan, according to the land's classification and the method of irrigation. The governor-general determined in which districts and provinces the tax was to be levied.

In 1899 land-tax was imposed on the province of Dongola and in certain

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1 Wingate to Cromer (private), 9 Jan. 1915, SAD/194/1; In 1905 Wingate undertook a comparative study between the rates of taxation in the Turco-Egyptian Sudan and those in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. According to the figures of the revenue from taxation in 1883 and 1905, the rate of taxation per capita in 1905 was more than double that of 1883. Wingate, however, claimed that in 1883 more than 50% of the sums collected did not figure in the revenue as they were "...taken by Government officials and Sheikhs for their own purposes..." GGR - 1905, pp. 17-8.

2 Wingate to Stack, 29 Feb. 1912, SAD/180/2/2; Wingate wrote this letter during Kitchener's visit to the Sudan.

3 Wingate to Kitchener (private), 7 Apr. 1912, SAD/181/1/3; see also Stone, p. 188, who claims that in 1913 the government increased the area assessed for "ushr", despite the poor rains.

4 SG - 2, 27 May 1899; for details about date tax, see Stone, p. 121.

5 Ibid, pp. 188-191; see also SG - 2, 27 May 1899; the rates of taxation were altered in 1905. Lands were divided into six classes and the taxes fixed at P.T. 10-60 per feddan. SG - 82, Oct. 1905.
districts of Wādī Halfa and Berber. Khartoum province was brought within the taxation system in 1901-2, and in the following years land-tax was imposed on most of the irrigable lands in the northern provinces. In order to encourage cultivation, landowners erecting irrigation pumps were exempted from land-taxes for the first two years, while those erecting ṣaqiyas were exempted for one year.

In 1906 a progressive land-tax was imposed on uncultivated lands in order to induce their owners to commence cultivation. However, this experiment failed in all the provinces except Dongola, and in consequence was abandoned in 1908.

'Ushr was imposed on all lands depending on rain for their cultivation. It was also levied on irrigable lands which could not be assessed for a land-tax owing to the lack of detailed information.

The assessment and collection of 'ushr caused a great amount of

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1 SG - 6, 2 Nov. 1899; Dongola province had paid land-tax since 1897, according to a 'Khedivial Decree, dated 11th October 1897'. SG - 17, 1 Nov. 1900.

2 SG - 22, 1 Apr. 1901; SG - 31, 1 Jan. 1902; SG - 43, Jan. 1903; SG - 86, 1 Jan. 1906; SG - 111, 1 May 1907.

3 SG - 22, 1 Apr. 1901.

4 SG - 46, Apr. 1903.

5 GGR - 1905, p.69; according to this scheme a quarter of the lands was to be taxed after two years following which the whole plot was to come under taxation within 8-10 years.

6 GGR - 1908, p.21; the only result of the so-called progressive taxation was that many cultivators abandoned their lands; GGR - 1907, pp. 194-5, 221, 256.

7 Stone, p. 113; GGR - 1906, p.241.
labour as government officials had to assess the crops before the harvest. Moreover, many of the cultivators preferred to pay their *ushr in kind which compelled the government to arrange the required transport. In some of the outlying districts the expenses and labour incurred in transportation exceeded the income derived from *ushr. As a result the government decided not to persevere with the tax. Win-gate maintained that it was a better policy to accept this loss of revenue rather than embitter the population by demanding payment in money. The preference of the cultivators to pay in kind was probably caused by lack of cash as well as by their fear of paying more. The monetary equivalent of *ushr was fixed by the government according to the dhurra prices at the time of the harvest. However, many cultivators sold their dhurra before the harvest to Omdurman merchants at low prices. These merchants were thus in a position to increase the price in the various markets, forcing the cultivators to pay the *ushr.

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1. GGR - 1903, p.31

2. Despite a government order to pay *ushr in money, payment in kind continued and the governors were ordered to accept it; see SG - 19, 1 Jan. 1901; GGR - 1905, p.210.


4. GGR - 1907, p.75; However, in the same report the governor of the White Nile province wrote that all *ushr in his province had to be paid in money unless a special permission was granted by him allowing payment in kind. Ibid, p.134.
in prices which were more than double the price paid to them originally. In 1905 it was therefore decided '...that no dhurra is to be sold outside a Government market until the assessment of Ushr is completed...'.

By 1908 most of the cultivators were in a position to pay cash, so that the problem was solved without coercion. It was only after 1910 that some of the outlying districts in Kordofan and the Upper Nile provinces were assessed for 'ushr, while the cultivated lands of the Bahr al-Ghazal and Mongalla were not taxed throughout this period.

While 'ushr and a land-tax were promulgated to tax the sedentary population, a herd tax was introduced in 1899 to tax the nomads. Although this tax was supposed to replace the Muslim zakah, (charity tax), Cromer had his doubts about its efficiency and recommended its early abolition. He was soon to be proved right for the nomad tribes who depended on their herds for their livelihood could only pay the tax by parting with some of their animals. This they refused to do, and instead they withdrew to remote districts, out of reach.

\[1\] GGR - 1905, p.133; see also Phipps to Wingate, 27 Aug. 1905, SAD/277/2.
\[2\] GGR - 1908, p.391.
\[3\] Stone, pp.186-7.
\[4\] SG - 7, 2 Dec. 1899.
\[5\] SAR - 1899, p.49; see also Hickman to Wingate, 3 June 1900, SAD/270/6. Hickman, then governor of Dongola, suggested not to levy the herd tax during 1900.
of government control. Thus the tax, whose principal aim was to tax the nomads, could only be levied on sedentaries who already paid 'ushr or land-tax\(^1\). In August 1901 the herd tax was replaced by two new taxes. Nomads were ordered to pay a tribute which was meant to replace the *jizya*, (poll tax) while sedentaries continued to pay the animal tax\(^2\).

These new taxes, although easier to impose, had their drawbacks. Both the tribute and the animal tax were based on the number of animals as assessed by government officials. But the assessment of nomads was largely based on information supplied by their shaykhs and thus tended to be rather low. The government also feared that nomads would try to evade the tribute and therefore levied it at a lower rate than the animal tax\(^3\). Inevitably, the result was that the sedentaries attempted to evade the tax by sending their animals to graze with the nomads\(^4\). Moreover, certain tribes were split between two or more provinces, and while animal tax was levied on one part of the tribe,

\(^1\)Stone, p.109; quoting from the financial department's report, 1900.

\(^2\)SG - 26, 1 Aug. 1901, 'The Tribute Ordinance 1901', 'The Taxation of Animals Ordinance 1901'. The Animal tax was amended in 1903, 1906, and 1907. In each case the tax levied on different kinds of animals was changed and animals employed for agricultural or governmental work, were exempted. See SG - 45, Mar. 1903; GGR - 1905, p.134; Slatin to Wingate, 19 Mar. 1907, SAD/280/3. In 1913 the rate of taxation was increased as a result of Kitchener's demand; see GGC, 27 May, 1912, FO 867/3.

\(^3\)GGR - 1903, p.31; tribute was regarded more as a political measure than a financial one; see SAR - 1901, p.60.

\(^4\)SG - 48, 1 June 1903.
the other was paying tribute. Consequently, whenever a government inspector came to assess the taxes they crossed the border and joined their fellow tribesmen. A government order published in 1903 tried to overcome this problem by threatening prospective tax evaders with the confiscation of their animals. Evasion, however, continued until an increasing number of tribute-paying tribes were put on to animal tax.

In the southern provinces and the Nuba mountains only tribute was levied on cattle-owning tribes. The system of assessing the tribute in these inaccessible areas was extremely crude and unreliable. In the Nuba mountains the amount of tribute levied was, '...in inverse ratio to the amount of resistance likely to be incurred in its collection...the weak paid and the strong got off free...'. The same applied to the southern provinces, where tribes like the Nuer or Anuak did not pay any tribute owing to their remoteness from government control, whereas the Shilluk and Dinka had to pay a small tribute from 1902. In 1909, the government decided to impose '...a light

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1 See for instance Wilkinson to Wingate, 27 Dec. 1903, SAD/273/12.
2 CAO 51, 21 May 1903; SG 48, 1 June 1903.
3 GGR 1906, p.758; GGR 1908, p.672; GGR 1909, p.118; for the comparative increase of revenue from these taxes see Stone, pp.110-3, 192-7.
4 Wingate to Cromer, 2 June 1901, SAD/271/6; Wingate's diary, 26 Feb. 1902, SAD/272/8; GGR 1904, p.4.
5 Gillan, Nuba, p.40; In 1908 the total tribute from the Nuba mountains amounted to £E 1000 out of a total of £E 7728 paid by all the nomad tribes of Kordofan; see also SIR 171, Oct. 1908.
6 Wingate to Cromer, 2 June 1901, SAD/271/6; SIR 143, June 1906; SIR 145, Aug. 1906.
rain tax, amounting to one-tenth of Government requirements, to be collected from non-cattle owning tribes...1 in the Bahır al-Ghazāl.

Indirect taxation in the southern provinces included an annual requisition of grain for which payment was made below market prices, and a requisition of carriers for government convoys2.

While the system of taxation was primarily geared to the agricultural and nomadic population, numerous taxes of lesser importance were imposed on the inhabitants of towns and large villages. A house tax was levied in 1899 at the rate of one-twelfth of the annual rental value3. However, very few towns had to pay this tax and even Khartoum and Omdurman were exempt until 19064. It was not until 1913, that a serious effort was made to tax the non-agricultural population. The 'Local Taxation Ordinance 1912' imposed rates on all property owners in the Sudan. Once again the agricultural community was obliged to pay an additional rate amounting to 10% of their 'ushr or land tax5.

Other taxes included a boat tax of P.T.2 per ardeb of the boat's

1GGR - 1909, p.118; Handbook BAG, p.44.
2Ibid, p.45.
3SG - 323; Early 1899, this tax was amended in 1905; SG-73, Mar. 1905
4SG - 86, Jan. 1906; in 1899 house tax was levied only in Suakin and Tawfiqiyah. SG - 4, 9 Sep. 1899; In 1904 the tax was extended to Kassala and to all the major villages in Dongola. SG - 104, Jan. 1904; SG - 106, Dec. 1904.
5The Local Taxation Ordinance 1912', SG - 225, 23 Nov. 1912; this tax was probably introduced as a result of Kitchener's terminating the Egyptian subvention.
Road tax was levied by provincial governors who exploited the money for road maintenance. Market dues were introduced in 1899. They included fees for the sale of animals, weighing fees, slaughtering fees, and royalties. A trader's tax, introduced by the government in 1913, came under heavy criticism and had to be modified. This was perhaps the first time that the government had to give way under the pressure of public opinion and the local press. As most of the traders concerned were Greeks and Egyptians, the support they received from the Greek owned Sudan Herald was hardly surprising.

The assessment and collection of all taxes was performed mainly by government officials. This was laid down by Kitchener in his Instructions to Mudirs and was enunciated further in numerous government orders. The system of registering the land tax was copied

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1 SG - 3, 31 July 1899.

2 Stone, p.205; a certain percentage of the road tax was given to the shaykhs of the tribes through whose territory the routes passed. For a full list of these rates see GHR - 1904, p.212; see also SIR - 81, Apr.1901.


5 Wingate to Bernard, 6 May 1913, SAD/186/2/1. Commenting on the critical attitude of the Sudan Herald, Wingate wrote: '...Shall we take up the defence of our policy by a series of inspired articles in the press [Sudan Times] - or shall we take it "lying down"...'

6 Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899, FO 78/5022; The procedure of assessing animal tax was laid down in SG - 26, 1 Aug. 1901; instructions for the assessment of date tax were published in SG - 59, 1 Feb. 1904.
from the Egyptian *wird* which soon proved too complicated and detailed for the small number of clerks available in each district. Even tribute, which should have been collected without any government assistance was in fact collected with the active participation of Egyptian and British officials.

By the end of Wingate's governor-generalship an elaborate system of taxation had evolved, largely based on the system of taxation in other Muslim countries. The agricultural population contributed the larger share of revenue derived from taxation, while nomads and town dwellers continued to be under-taxed.

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1. *GGR* - 1908, p. 560; Dongola was apparently the only province where this system proved satisfactory. "...Wirds in possession of Samads are daily filled in ...the Sarraf sealing the same. This system works most satisfactorily; it is simple and popular with the people, and it follows native customs." Ibid, pp. 504-5. As Land tax in Dongola was levied only on the more sophisticated riverain tribes, it is probable that the *samads* were more reliable than in other provinces. *Samads* were village representatives responsible for the agricultural management of tenancies. The *wird* was probably a specially designed form used for registering taxes in Egyptian villages.

2. See pp. 312-5.

3. In 1914 the revenue from agricultural taxes (not including royalty) was £E 247,500; tribute amounted to £E 25,600; and trader's tax £E 7,400 of the revenue. This did not include the taxes collected from the towns and villages under the Local Taxation Ordinance. See *GGR* - 1914, p. 20.
Chapter IX.

Labour and slavery.

In the early years of the Condominium there was a permanent shortage of labour in the Sudan. This affected development projects as well as agriculture and was intimately connected with the problem of domestic slavery. It was probably this affinity which led the governor-general to entrust both domestic slavery and labour to the intelligence department in Khartoum.

Slave raiding and slave trade were regarded as a separate entity and came under the auspices of the Egyptian department for the repression of slave trade. However, in many cases the boundaries between the repression of slave trade and domestic slavery were rather obscure. Hence it is easier to comprehend the policy pursued in the Sudan by discussing the various aspects of slavery and labour in their entirety.

a. The department for the repression of slave trade.

The principles guiding the Sudan government's policy towards slavery were formulated by Lord Cromer in 1899, when he affirmed that the government would fight against slave raids and slave trade, but that domestic slavery would be tolerated by the new administration.\(^1\) This was based on the assumption that the anti-slavery measures undertaken in the Turco-Egyptian Sudan were largely responsible for the

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\(^1\) 'Lord Cromer's Speech to the Sheikhs and Notables of the Soudan', Omdurman, 4 Jan. 1899, FO 633/25; see also pp.
Mahdi's success. It is in the light of these beliefs that the subsequent relationship between the Sudan government and the slavery-repression department may be better understood.

The slavery-repression department was under the direction of the Egyptian ministry of the interior until the end of 1910. Its task was to abolish slave raids and to suppress the slave traders. At the time of the reconquest there were not less than 15,000 men employed in the slave trade. The first aim was to stop the exportation of slaves outside the Sudan borders and an order to that effect was published in 1901. Despite the regulations, slave trade continued, especially across the Red Sea to the Arabian peninsula and through the Abyssinian border. In 1902 a considerable number of Sudanese children and adults were abducted in Dongola and in the

1Wingate, Ten Years Captivity, pp.8-9; R.C. Slatin, Fire and Sword in the Sudan, 1879-1895, p.134; Reasons for the Sudanese Revolt |n.d. in Na'um Shuqayr's handwriting|, SAD/110/2/6; Holt, Mahdist State, pp.34-6; see also Handbook Kordofan, p.84. Symes wrote that ...'Gordon's campaign against the slave trade...laid a mine of unrest and discontent among the natives and officials throughout the country that the smallest spark was liable to kindle and which the advent of the Mahdi fanned...into open and widespread rebellion...'

2According to the Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention of 1877, slave trade from the Sudan was to have stopped by 1880. Owing to the Mahdia, the implementation of this convention in the Sudan had to be deferred until the reconquest. In Jan. 1899 slave trade in the Sudan was declared illegal. Handbook, pp.178-180.


4GAO - 133, 5 Dec. 1901; this order was superceded by more detailed instructions; SU - 63, 1 June 1904.
Gezira and smuggled to Arabia. Further cases were reported in Suakin and Kassala in 1904. On the Abyssinian border the slave trade was even more difficult to control. The border divided the Anuak tribe between the two countries, and constant raids on the Sudanese section of the tribe provided Abyssinia with an annual supply of slaves. Another source of slaves was the Nuba mountains. Slave raiding was practised both by the Arab tribes and by the Nubas and continued throughout Wingate's governor-generalship.

The main supply of slaves did not come from within the Sudan. Slaves were imported from the French Congo by the jallaba. The route into the Sudan passed through the western district of Bahir al-Ghazal, where vast uninhabited areas made control virtually impossible.

1GGR - 1903, pp. 27, 40.
2GGR - 1904, pp. 77, 129.
3Inclosure 2 in Cromer to Harrington, 2 Jan. 1906, FO 407/165.
4See for instance SIR - 92, Mar. 1902; SIR - 96, July 1902; following a tour of the Nuba mountains in 1903, the governor of Kordofan, Mahon, commented: "...personally I am not a great admirer of the black man, at his home, and am certain that you see him at his best as a slave, or soldier..." SIR - 104, Mar. 1903, Appendix "E". In 1905 it was claimed that actual slave raiding had ceased in the Nuba mountains, yet slave trade went on as before, SIR - 130, May 1905; SIR - 232, Nov. 1913; SIR - 247, Feb. 1915; SIR - 251, June 1915; all contain reports of slave raiding.
5The jallaba usually stated that they had married the women-slaves whom they imported, or that the slaves were presents from the sultans. GGR - 1906, p. 558.
without considerable forces\(^1\). Slaves were also smuggled into the Sudan by 'Ali Dīnār's emissaries and were sold in Omdurman market, with Wingate's approval and despite the protests of McMurdo, the British head of the department for the repression of slavery\(^2\).

The main route for smuggling slaves was by way of the pilgrimage from Western Africa to Mecca which passed through the Sudan\(^3\). Many of these pilgrims, Takārīr and Fallāta, settled in the Sudan in special colonies, either before reaching Mecca or on their way back. Owing to the length of the Sudanese borders and the scarcity of border patrols, this movement, which accounted for 90% of all Sudanese pilgrims, could not be controlled. The Fallāta either brought the slaves with them or obtained them in the Sudan, and then took them across to Arabia. Despite all government precautions, the pilgrims could cross the border into Eritrea and thus avoid control.

\(^1\)Stoney | inspector Bahr al-Ghazāl | to Wingate (confidential), 14 Sep. 1910, SAD/300/1. This report was based on a thorough investigation undertaken by the Sudan government and the French authorities. Even Ravenscroft, the senior inspector of the slavery department objected to strong measures being taken, as the slave trade was the only profitable enterprise in western Bahr al-Ghazāl, and by stopping it the tribes would be induced to leave the Sudan. SIR - 161, Dec. 1907.

\(^2\)Talbot to Wingate, 20 June 1903, SAD/234/1, Talbot suggested that 'Ali Dīnār be asked to stop the slave trade; Wingate to Cromer, 11 Dec. 1903, FO 141/378; Wingate justified this trade on political grounds; see also McMurdo to Cromer, 3 Dec. 1903, Ibid.

\(^3\)All details are taken from C.A. Willis, Report on Slavery and the Pilgrimage, (1926), SAD/212/2; the report was based on the data collected by the Sudan intelligence department of which Willis was the director since 1920. For details about the pilgrimage, see pp. 193-6.
Others sailed to Jedda from Suakin, and were obliged to pay a deposit at the government's quarantine. Even of those over three thousands failed to return in the years 1909–1913.

Thus, in the sphere of slave trade, where the authority of the department for the repression of slavery was unchallenged, it only succeeded in reducing the trade but could not stop it. This was partly the result of inadequate means, and the vast areas it had to control. However, the main reason for the continuation of slave trade, was the demand for slaves in the Arabian peninsula and the high remuneration offered. The department's greater success in suppressing slave raiding, was largely due to the extension of administrative control and to the greater risks involved in the raids. Yet the fact that in 1914 slavery was again on the increase is a clear proof that it was not completely uprooted, and that a more fundamental change in economic and social outlook was necessary in order to overcome it.

1The figures quoted by Willis do not agree with those given in the Sudan Intelligence Reports for those years; SIR – 174-233, Jan. 1909-Dec. 1913. They also do not correspond to the information sent by Wingate to Cromer, at the latter's request, when he wrote: "...The question of the traffic in slaves in connection with the annual pilgrimage has received very careful consideration ...and I am inclined to believe that the measures taken for the suppression of this traffic have proved to be efficient..." Wingate to Cromer, 9 Feb. 1914, FO 633/23.

2C.A. Willis, Report on Slavery and the Pilgrimage (1926), SAD/212/2.

3GR – 1914, p.36; Ravenscroft, then director of the slavery repression department, attributed the increase in slavery to the scarcity of grain.
The organization of the department for the repression of slave trade was unique in that its headquarters remained in Cairo although its centre of activities was in the Sudan. Moreover, Captain McMurdo, the director of the department until 1910, was not under the supervision of the governor-general of the Sudan. As an official of the Egyptian ministry of the interior he reported to the British consul-general in Egypt without any reference to Wingate. The department appointed its own inspectors who set up posts throughout the country, assisted by their own mounted police and camel corps. They could make arrests and issue warrants without reference to the local authorities. In 1902 the department launched its own stern wheeler 'Liberator', to control slave traffic on the upper reaches of the Nile.

In 1905, the department was reorganized and its police force was divided into three parts with their headquarters at El Obeid, al-Ru§ayri§, and Khartoum. Also its legal position vis-a-vis the Sudan government was defined so as to link it more closely to the

1 Croomer to Wingate, 13 Feb. 1901, FO 141/364; Hill, Slatin, p. 106.
2 Wingate included comments on slavery in his own yearly memorandum, but no report from the slavery department was printed among the departmental reports of the Sudan government, throughout Wingate's governor-generalship. In some cases Wingate did not receive even a copy of McMurdo's reports, GGR - 1903, p. 51.
3 GGR - 1901, Dec. 30.
4 GGR - 1902, p. 304.
5 GGR - 1905, pp. 56-7.
Sudan administration and to avoid unnecessary clashes. The department's police force was henceforward considered part of the Sudan police and its inspectors became ex-officio magistrates of the second class. They were also entitled to give orders to ma'murs and police officers in connection with slavery cases. On the other hand the provincial governors could make recommendations to the inspectors of the slavery-repression department and represent their views to the department's headquarters at Khartoum. Lastly, all the department's reports had to be forwarded through the governor-general.

Despite these organizational reforms clashes between government officials and the staff of the slavery department were frequent and covered almost every sphere of the department's activities. McMurdo explained the strained relations by the fact that his department functioned as an independent body within the Sudan. He further claimed that owing to Slatin's unique authority over everything connected with slavery: '...his [McMurdo's] point of view does not get a fair hearing...'. Despite a certain element of truth, this was an oversimplification of the issue. Basically, the antagonism was over matters of policy. Wingate regarded the religious and tribal revolts in the Gezira and the Nuba mountains as a direct result of the slavery department's efforts '...to pander to Exeter Hallism in

\[\text{Henry to Wingate, 18 July 1904, SAD/275/5; see also GAO - 268, 'Repression of Slavery Department', Khartoum, 12 Mar. 1905.}\]

\[\text{Stack to Wingate, 20 May 1908, SAD/284/14/1; quoting a discussion he had with McMurdo. For Slatin's views on slavery, see pp.82-4.}\]
endeavouring to suppress slave hunting and slave trading...'' As for domestic slavery "...any attempt on the part of the slavery department to interfere...will provide hundreds of Abdel Kaders before long, and I am afraid that our friend |McMurdo| is about the most injudicious person in Egypt on the Sudan...'' Wingate regarded it as his duty to convince the British government to follow his policy regarding slavery, rather than McMurdo's "...which if persisted in may lose us the Sudan...'' He further argued that "...McMurdo has no case and if he plays up to Exeter Hall and a Radical Government, the sooner we come to a full and complete understanding, the better..." It is only in the light of these views that the friction between the Sudan government and the slavery-repression department can be understood.

A suggestion to establish a home for freed slaves in Omdurman was rejected by Wingate on the grounds "...that the time has not yet come

1Wingate to Gorst, 19 Nov. 1908, SAD/284/15; Exeter Hall in London was a centre of anti-slavery activities in Britain, and Wingate believed that McMurdo was taking his orders from the Anti-Slavery Society. See Wingate to Stack, 31 May 1908, SAD/284/13; R.Hill, 'The Period of Egyptian Occupation, 1820-1881' SNR - Vol.39 (1958), pp.101-2

2Abd al-Qadir Wad Habuba was the leader of the Gezira rebellion in 1908; see pp.202-7.

3Wingate to Stack (private), 12 May 1908, SAD/284/13; see also McMurdo to Wingate, 2 Apr. 1908, SAD/282/4, where he apologized for one of his official's "...over zealousness and ignorance...'' in dealing with slavery problems.

4Wingate to Stack, 31 May 1908, SAD/284/13.
when we can establish in the Sudan anything in the shape of Government institutions as a refuge for the escaped slaves...¹ This however, did not stop the provincial governors from establishing homes for freed slaves in their provinces under their own supervision². The same attitude prevailed regarding the establishment of stations in the provinces manned by the staff of the slavery department. The Sudan government could not object openly to these stations, but tried to keep them attached to the government posts to allow control by the provincial inspectors. When the department for the repression of slavery suggested to establish an independent station of its own in south-east Kordofan, Slatin objected saying '...I do not like having posts scattered over mountains. Recomend [sic] that inspector and men should stay at Elliri with our own Mamur and Inspector...'³ When in 1909 the slavery department wanted to establish a post on the Darfur border, Savile, the governor of Kordofan, objected strongly, despite the fact that slave trade across the borders was a well known fact⁴.

The antagonism between Wingate and Slatin on the one hand, and

¹McMurdo to Wingate, 5 Dec. 1906; Wingate to McMurdo, 16 Dec. 1906, SAD/279/6.
²In 1902 a home for escaped slaves for the eastern Sudan was established in Nogara. See McMurdo to Cromer, 24 Feb. 1902, FO 141/371; See also GGR - 1902, p.332, where the governor of Sennar reported that all runaway slaves were collected at Wad Madani where accommodation had been arranged and were employed in the mudiriya.
³McMurdo to Stack, 18 Mar. 1907, SAD/280/3; Slatin to Wingate, 20 Mar. 1907, Ibid.
⁴Willis's diary, 16 May 1909, 6 Nov. 1909, SAD/210/2.
McMurdo on the other, was of course well known, even to junior inspectors. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that relations at the lower levels of administration were no better than at the top. The following extract from Willis's diary illustrates the situation in Kordofan:

...19 February 1910...Whithingham¹...has freed various slaves or rather annexed them...is full of nonsense about the Homr and slave dealing and is very much down on Ali Gula. He is doing a lot of harm and is putting the country back...28 March 1910...Slatin immensely pleased over my complaint re S.R.D. [slavery repression department] which I put in to Savile on receipt of Ali Gula's complaint about death of a man arrested by Whithingham. Slatin has his knife into him in a lot of other things...

The authorities at Khartoum and Kordofan were well aware that 'Ali Julla, the nāẓir of the Misirīya, was deeply involved in the slave trade. Yet they objected to any interference by the slavery department in what they regarded as an internal, tribal affair³.

There seems to have been general confusion as to the exact functions of the department for the repression of slavery. Domestic slaves

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¹Whithingham was one of the senior inspectors of the slavery department. Wingate's and Slatin's mistrust for him was a well known fact. Wingate to Gorst, (secret), 6 Dec. 1910, SAD/298/2.

²Willis's diary, Feb.-Mar. 1910, SAD/210/2.

³See for instance Willis's diary, 9 Nov. 1910, Ibid. Willis wrote that 'Ali Julla's Dinka slaves were bought in 1908 with the permission of Lloyd, then governor of Kordofan. See also K.D.D. Henderson, 'Some notes on the history of the tribes living south of the Wadi el Ghala' [n.d.], SAD/478/5. Henderson wrote the following about 'Ali Julla: '...Ali was allowed to rule his tribe more or less as he liked, and slave raiding went on as merrily as ever - the Nazir's share being about 25% of the profits...'. When in 1903, Sayyid al-Makki's son was imprisoned for slave raiding, Wingate wrote, '...I think it would be good policy to let the man out on account of his father's services...', Wingate to Nason, 4 Aug. 1903, SAD/273/8.
were outside its sphere of responsibility. But the exchange of slaves within the Sudan's boundaries was regarded by the department as part of the slave trade. The department also objected to the fact that despite the government's commitments to abolish domestic slavery gradually, new slaves were a common phenomenon. Many of those who were registered as slaves in 1918, were born to free parents after the Condominium Agreement was signed.  

The endless clashes between Sudan government officials and the department's staff are, therefore, easy to comprehend. Wingate's aim was to remove McMurdo, and to bring his department directly under the governor-general of the Sudan. He wrote to Gorst, that should his suggestion be accepted '...there would be no further need for the services of a Director...' and that in order to induce McMurdo to leave, a '...fairly liberal pension...' should be offered to him.  

By November 1910, the ground was prepared. McMurdo had agreed to retire, and Gorst set about the task of convincing the British government to agree to the new status of the department:

...As regards the effect which this change may be expected to have in the battle...against this detestable traffic,[in slaves] it is obvious that the exclusively British composition of the present Soudan administration affords greater guarantees than have hitherto been obtainable that this branch of their duties will be prosecuted with the utmost vigour...  

1 For details see pp. 382-84.  

2 Wingate to Gorst, 13 Apr. 1910, SAD/431/11. At the time this letter was written, McMurdo was shooting white rhino in the Lado Enclave despite a government order to the contrary...it is one of the morals of the age that the Head of a Dept. can use Govt. money as he does and nothing is said...'). Phipps to Wingate, 14 Apr. 1910, SAD/296/1/3.  

3 Gorst to Grey, 5 Nov. 1910, FO 371/895.
Following Grey's approval, the staff of the slavery department was transferred to the Sudan civil service and Major Ravenscroft was appointed as its new director. The department was financed, as before, by a special grant from the Egyptian government. It was decided to decrease its activities by absorbing its special police force within the ordinary provincial police. When Ravenscroft resigned in 1914, Wingate decided to amalgamate the remaining staff of the department with the provincial administration and wrote to Ravenscroft that he would '...probably do away with the appointment of a Director...'

Though the department for the repression of slave trade continued to exist, its functions were so limited, and its control by the government so complete, that no further clashes seem to have occurred in the following years.

b. Domestic slavery.

Domestic slavery was tolerated by the Sudan government on principle. Cromer initiated the policy in 1899, and it was reaffirmed by Kitchener in his 'Memorandum to Mudirs'. Fundamentally it was based

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1Grey to Gorst, 14 Nov. 1910, Ibid.
2Wingate to Gorst (secret), 6 Dec. 1910, SAD/298/2. Wingate demanded that the appointment of the new head should be left to him. Gorst, however, insisted that he should be consulted before the appointment was made. Gorst to Wingate, 12 Dec. 1910, Ibid.
3GGC, 20 Mar. 1911, FO 867/2; see also GGR - 1911, p.73.
4Wingate to Ravenscroft, (private), 1 July 1914, SAD/191/1/2.
5See pp.21,42.
6Inclosure in Cromer to Salisbury, 17 Mar. 1899, FO 78/5022.
on the belief that the Sudan's socio-economic structure could not withstand a sudden abolition of slavery, and that it was bound to cause renewed religious upheavals similar to the Mahdist revolt. Hence the government decided:

...whilst making every effort to suppress slave raiding and slave trafficking...deal as gently as possible with questions of domestic slavery...hoping to...gradually transform the status of slavery and substitute for it a system of paid labour...

The outcome of this policy was that domestic slaves were in fact urged to stay with their masters unless they were maltreated by them, and runaway slaves were urged to return to their owners. As late as 1915 inspectors were instructed '...to induce runaway servants to return to their masters...!' They were also informed that in order to free a slave the payment of his ransom had to be completed.

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1 See for instance Cromer to Robinson of The Times, 21 Dec. 1914, FO 633/24; see also GGR - 1907, p.76, where Wingate commented that as slavery is sanctioned by Islam, it is very hard to fight against. For the attitude of Islam towards slavery see 'Abd, Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition (Leiden 1954), pp.24-40.

2 GGR - 1904, p.36.

3 In 1913, Bonham Carter complained that '...escaped slaves are dealt with on no principle. Decisions are given which are not only contrary to the British policy as regards slavery, but which cannot be justified by Mohammedan Law...!', see Bonham Carter to Wingate, 28 Dec. 1913, SAD/188/3/1.

4 See for instance Slatin's diary 1902, SAD/441, 'Notes on the Bahr el Ghazal' '...Re."Freedom" - run away men and women should be send [sic] back to their master if not special reason prevent so...'; see also H.A. MacMichael, 'Reminiscences of Kordofan in 1906', (typescript), SAD/294/18. MacMichael wrote of a group of runaway women slaves, claimed by Sayyid al-Makkī, whom Slatin decided to return to their owner. Slatin's intention was nullified by Percival, officer commanding the camel corps, who arranged the marriage of the women to his men, without Slatin's knowledge.

5 J. Matthew (acting governor Red Sea) to all Inspectors, 26 Jan. 1915, Anti-Slavery Archive, G/282.
Among the measures introduced by the government to prevent the increase of domestic slaves by illegal trade or slave running was an order obliging all governors to register 'Sudanese servants' within their provinces. In the northern provinces registration was started in 1904 and a year later 19,638 Sudanese servants were registered in Dongola. In parts of Kordofan, Wingate objected to the registration as late as 1915, fearing that it might cause disturbances. The very limited effect which registration had in reducing the numbers of domestic slaves was clearly indicated in a memorandum written by Bonham Carter in 1913:

...In some provinces the rules as to the registration of Sudanese (Confidential Circular No. 10 and Confidential Circular No. 22) have been ignored. It was ordered that a Register of Sudanese should be made and completed as soon as possible. The object was to prevent the future buying or selling of Sudanese and preventing masters from making claims to domestic slaves who were not in their possession at the time the Register was made. In some Mudirias the Register has been kept open, thus defeating the object of the Register. Cases have come to my notice.

1 Domestic slaves were always referred to as servants in official communications; see p. 83.

2 GGR - 1905, p. 51.

3 Wingate to Savile, 17 May 1915, SAD/195/6.

4 I have not been able to locate these circulars. However, their content is clear from the above memorandum as well as from Confidential Circular No. 33 which superseded them in 1919; see pp. 386-87.
of children who have been born since the reoccupation being entered on such register...¹

It is apparent that there was a vast discrepancy between the official policy and its realization.² Slatin, the government's spokesman on slavery, stated that every slave was free to leave his master should he so desire.³ But in fact slaves were forced to remain in slavery and only gained their freedom if they could prove maltreatment. In certain cases even free-born men and women, who were enslaved after the reconquest, had to pay ransom

¹Bonham Carter to Wingate, 28 Dec. 1913, SAD/188/3/1; Bonham Carter ended his letter by asking for a general discussion about slavery to which Wingate agreed; see Symes to Stack, 3 Jan. 1914, SAD/189/1/1; In 1915 Wingate wrote to Wilson, governor of the Red Sea province, about a Sudanese woman who had been enslaved after the reconquest. He stated that if her children were aylād hārām (illegitimate), they belonged to her, and presumably were to become slaves too. Wingate to Wilson (private), 15 Nov. 1915, SAD/197/2/2.

²The British governors and inspectors, were on the whole, reluctant to apply fully the government's regulations. See for instance SIR — 159, Oct. 1907. Lloyd, governor of Kordofan, complained that the new regulations had caused considerable disturbances amongst the Hamar tribe and should be applied with care; see also Meinhof, p.37, who wrote that it was a blessing that the government's provincial officials did not take the government's policy literally, as this would have turned the slaves into criminals and disrupted the country's economy.

³Slatin to Wingate, 31 July 1909, SAD/288/1; this letter was written in reply to a request from Lord Cromer, who was pressed on that point by the Anti-Slavery Society in England. Slatin concluded his letter by writing'...I think if you explain this to old Cromer... he cannot do much harm but I prefer it always if the Sudan is left in peace...'; See also SAR — 1906, p.132 where Cromer quoted the following from a report by Slatin:'...To my certain knowledge no slave, male or female, is obliged by force to stay with his so-called master...'; For Slatin's views on slavery, see pp.82-4.
before being freed. It is therefore, surprising that the Sudan authorities were not subjected to pressure by the anti-slavery societies in Britain. Whatever criticism these societies made was against the slave trade and slave-raiding. Only in 1919 did the 'Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society' prepare a comprehensive memorandum on domestic slavery in the Sudan. Its allegations included the following:

...Fugitive slaves are returned by force to their masters. The Arab owners of the slaves take their earnings from them when wages have been paid by the employers. There are persistent allegations of cruelty to the slaves. Slaves who are subjected to cruelty fear to appeal to the Inspectors. Slaves are now being mortgaged under a system the full facts of which are not yet available.

1 See for instance SIR - 130, May 1905; where the governor of Kordofan reported that he had caught runaway slaves and returned them to their masters. He further wrote that Makk Geili, of the Nuba mountains, had captured many free people from the Khalida who now claim their freedom. '...in previous individual cases I have allowed persons claiming their free born relatives to have them on payment of 4-5 rials M., the assumed average price of people after the battle of Omdurman.' As for legitimately acquired slaves nobody '...should be entitled to claim them unless the owner is willing to take compensation offered....'

2 The Aborigines' Friend and the Anti-Slavery Reporter, the respective organs of the two anti-slavery societies, hardly referred to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan until after the First World War. In the few cases when reports on slavery in the Sudan were published, their criticism was very mild. See for instance Anti-Slavery Reporter Vol.22(1901), pp.53-4; The Aborigines' Friend Vol.6(Apr.1902). In 1909 the Anti-Slavery Reporter stated that '...slavery is practically, and to all intents and purposes, to an end in the Soudan...' as for domestic slaves, the report assured its readers that they were treated '...just as one of the family...' The report concluded by saying that in Dongola there were some 24000 Sudanese slaves, and about 120,000 Arabs; Anti-Slavery Reporter Vol.29(Mar.-May 1909), p.53. In 1908 the Anti-Slavery Society and the Aborigines Protection Society were amalgamated.

3 Memorandum from the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society upon the Existence of Slavery in the Sudan, 24 Nov. 1919. Anti-Slavery Archive, G/282; although this memorandum was written after Wingate's governor-generalship, most details concern the period under discussion.
Apart from the last complaint, all these allegations could be easily verified. Slaves were not only returned by force to their masters, but in certain cases were even brought to the ḍabṭya to be punished. The practice of keeping wage-earning slaves whose remuneration was forwarded to their masters was also widespread.

The criminal tendencies of freed slaves were regarded as a major problem since the reconquest. In 1908 Jackson, governor of Dongola, reported on crime in his province:

...The majority of offenders are Sudanese, men and women, who leave their masters on the slightest provocation... Many are reduced to want; after being unable to obtain regular employment, the men to thieving and the women to prostitution...

Similar reports came from other provinces, whose governors were concerned with the problem of public women. These were segregated and regularly examined by medical officers but the problem could not be solved. One of the governors stated rightly that '...until public opinion in these matters is influenced... no real control is possible...

However, when the Anti-Slavery Society offered its help by opening a home for freed female slaves, Cromer refused on the grounds that

1 W.E.Law to Director of Department for the Repression of Slave Trade, 16 Dec. 1918, Anti-Slavery Archive, G/282. Law, who was a private contractor, wrote about cases which happened to him and other employers, confirming the above accusations. See also Storrar's Letterbooks, 25 June 1905, SAD/549; Storrar, a railway official, wrote that '...sometimes a man will come and ask to work... Instead of starting to work himself, he produces a big strapping Sudanese, who he says is his slave and will work for him, which the Sudanese does with a most cheerful spirit...'

2 GGR - 1908, p.515.

3 GGR = 1907, p.231; See also GGR - 1906, pp.600, 728.
there was no problem of female slaves in the Sudan. Cromer was reluctant to admit the society's representatives into the country, and preferred to forego the much-required help in dealing with freed female slaves.

In 1919 the Sudan government sent a confidential circular to all government officials enunciating its policy regarding 'Sudanese Servants'. It defined Sudanese servants as '...persons who were in a state of slavery or are considered as such by natives...'; further, that '...every Sudanese servant not under contract had the right to leave his master if he wishes and may not be compelled or persuaded to return against his will...'. Yet governors and inspectors were instructed to try to reconcile master and slave as '...Sudanese servants who have lived many years with their masters are really happier and better off...'. Furthermore, as it was feared '...that Sudanese should through leaving the homes in which they have been brought up... take to thieving or prostitution...', governors were ordered to apply the regulations regarding the slaves' right of freedom with great care. The circular instructed all governors to keep the registers of Sudanese servants up to date, whereby implying that new slaves could still be registered. Finally, as slavery was not officially recognized by the government, cases between slaves and masters could not be decided according to Islamic laws but were to judged according to the rules

1 Travers Buxton to Wilkinson, 13 June 1901; Cromer to Travers Buxton, 26 June 1901; in The Anti-Slavery Reporter Vol.22,(1901), pp.53-4
of trusteeship as between master and servant.\textsuperscript{1}

Even in this late circular the ambiguous attitude of the government is quite clear. On the one hand it declared the right of every slave to become free, while on the other hand ensuring that as many slaves as possible should remain with their masters. The reasons for this position are clear; public opinion in England and elsewhere in Europe would not have tolerated the outright legalization of slavery, yet the British administrators of the Sudan were aware of the hazards of the complete abolition of slavery, namely, the disruption of the social and economic life of the country together with an increase in crime.

c. Labour.\textsuperscript{2}

The most serious objection to the abolition of slavery was voiced by the governors of provinces whose agricultural cultivation required a great deal of man-power. Hundreds of \textit{sāqiya}s were reported idle in Berber, Dongola, and the Blue Nile provinces, owing to the decrease of slaves.\textsuperscript{3} Even the Baqqāra tribes of Kordofan were affected, they being too lazy to cultivate by themselves.\textsuperscript{4} By-and-large the British governors, fearing the decrease in cultivation, sympathized with the landowners.

\textsuperscript{1}Sudan Government - Confidential Circular Memorandum No.33, Regulations as to Sudanese Servants. (signed) R.M. Feilden Lewa, Civil Secretary, 1 May 1919. Anti-Slavery Archive, G/282.

\textsuperscript{2}See also Handbook, pp.478-487.

\textsuperscript{3}\textit{GGR} - 1907, pp.192-3, 221, 236; \textit{GGR} - 1908, pp.21, 487-8, 556.

\textsuperscript{4}\textit{GGR} - 1906, p.744.
…in the interests, therefore, of the cultivators... and also of the Sudanese, it appears to be desirable to prevent the emigration of Sudanese without permission... The discontent of masters at the constant and increasing loss of their Sudanese servants is growing, and one cannot but sympathize with them...

The governors also stressed their belief that '…any feeling which may exist against the Government...is due to this cause more than to any other...'

There is no doubt that agriculture suffered greatly through the lack of labour and that extensive areas of arable land remained fallow. In 1908 the revenue derived from agricultural taxation fell for the first time. Analysing the reasons for this, Wingate noted: '…the desertion of slaves and the attraction of high pay on public works...' Wingate was aware that '…until the labouring classes are large enough for the needs of the growing country, it is only natural that the non-technical portion of the insufficient population will select the most profitable and pleasant method of earning a living...

During these early years the government departments were the main employers of labour. The extension of the railway to the Red Sea, the building of Port Sudan, and the opening of new roads

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1 GGR - 1907, p. 236.
2 GGR - 1908, p. 488.
4 GGR - 1908, p. 21.
5 Ibid, p. 177.
required thousands of manual workers. Governors complained that the railway enticed away their agricultural workers by offering higher wages. This situation was exacerbated with the building of Port Sudan which attracted all the casual labourers from the Khartoum, Berber, and Dongola provinces. By 1907, demand exceeded supply to such a degree that workers arrived from Jedda and the Arabian coast beguiled by the high wages. The government departments did not only fail to consider the needs of agriculture, they also competed against each other for the limited labour market. Finally, the modest beginnings of private enterprise also required labour, and the government, although eager to oblige, could not meet their demands.

This was the situation in all the northern provinces with the exception of Wadi Halfa, whose male population emigrated to Egypt during the winter tourist season to work as domestic servants and dragomans. In the south conditions were different. There were no

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1 Phipps to Wingate, 1 June 1905, SAD/276/6; see also A.C. Parker, 'Memoirs of the early days', SAD/294/10.

2 GGR - 1906, p.720; from Berber alone about 1500 workers were employed on the railway, apart from those working at Port Sudan. Ibid, p.565.

3 GGR - 1907, p.126; Wages for unskilled labourers had risen from P.T. 2½ per day to P.T. 6-13; see also GGR - 1906, p.565.

4 In 1906 the governor of Khartoum complained that instead of dividing their work over the whole of the year, all the departments put out their contracts at the same time, thereby causing an unnecessary increase in wages; Ibid, p.663.

5 In 1906 Mr Leigh Hunt, an American entrepreneur, required 1,000 daily labourers for his concession in Berber, yet only 500 could be supplied, Ibid, p.565.

6 GGR - 1902, p.279.
development schemes or railway extensions. Yet even the very few requirements of labour could not be met locally, as the southern tribes could not be induced to work, and all labourers were imported from the north. The southerners who cleared the roads, built the rest houses or acted as porters for government expeditions, were generally conscripted and forced to work against their will.

The government was quite aware of the situation. As early as 1900 suggestions were made to transport coolies from India to work on the Sudan railways. In 1902 an agreement was reached with the government of India to supply 5000 Muslim coolies to the Sudan, and the British government agreed to become a partner to the contract. Cromer, however, decided not to continue with this plan. Instead, he ordered Wingate to attempt to recruit the nomad tribes of the

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1 Handbook BAG, pp. 72-3; in 1910, labour requirements at Wau were for the first time met by local labour. See also P.F. Martin, The Sudan in Evolution, p. 223, who wrote that in Sennar too, the inhabitants were not attracted to wage earning.

2 See for instance Slatin's diary 1913, 'Notes Gedaref', SAD/441.


4 Government of India to Lord Hamilton, India Office, 4 Aug. 1902, FO 403/323.

5 Lansdowne to Cromer, 22 Oct. 1902, Ibid; On 12 Oct. Wingate forwarded a detailed memorandum on the conditions of employment of these coolies in the Sudan; see Wingate to Cromer, 12 Oct. 1902, FO 141/371.
northern provinces to undertake the work. It fell to Slatin to organize the recruiting. At a gathering of the shaykhs of the nomad tribes at Kokreb the conditions of work were agreed upon. The head shaykh of the Hadendowa was elected by the shaykhs to organize the work and to represent them in their dealings with the government. By the end of 1903 there were 300 nomads employed on the railways. Wingate reported optimistically that all those experts who had prophesied that nomads were lazy and indolent had been proved wrong. However, this optimism was unwarranted. The nomads did not carry out their agreement. With 'the first fall of rains on the mountains, [they] gave up their work, being thoroughly tired of it.

1 GGR - 1903, pp.22-4; Wingate who reported this, did not give any reason for Cromer's sudden change of heart. In 1905 the suggestion to import coolies from India was renewed, but again without results; Sudan Agent to Cromer, 24 Feb. 1905, FO 141/393. In the following years suggestions were made to induce American Negroes to settle in the Sudan, and to import Swahilis as porters in the southern provinces. Neither of these plans materialized; The Times, 27 Jan. 1904; Cecil to Cromer, 27 Apr. 1904, FO 141/386; a year later a group of Bosnians were sent to the Sudan as settlers and in 1913 a plan was devised for the immigration of Maltese labourers to work in the Gezira development; See Owen to Wingate, 25 June 1905, SAD/276/6; General Sir Ian Hamilton to Wingate, 10 Feb. 1913, SAD/185/2/1. This plan was rejected by the governor-general's council, following Bernard's advice. (Bernard was of Maltese origin), Wingate to Hamilton, 28 Feb. 1913, Ibid.

2 GGR - 1903, pp.61-2, Appendix B; 'Report by Slatin Pasha on the "Kokreb" meeting with Sheikhs of Nomad tribes to arrange the work on the Red Swa railway'.

3 Ibid, pp.23424.

4 Macauley to Wingate, 20 July, 1904, FO 141/386.
and longing to get back to their homes...\(^1\) Despite this failure, small groups of nomads continued to be employed on the railway, and by 1908, the Hadendowa had developed into expert bridge builders and were transferred by the railway department to the Khartoum-Shandi section\(^2\).

Egypt was by far the most obvious labour market on which to draw. Seasonal immigration of Egyptian fallāḥīn from Aswān began in the early years of the Condominium. They undertook agricultural work in the Wādī Halfā and Dongola provinces and then returned to Egypt to their own farms\(^3\). Yet despite repeated efforts to induce Egyptians to settle in the Sudan, only small numbers responded. Wingate concluded that '...The Egyptian Fellahin have a rooted objection to coming to the Sudan...' and entertained '...little hope of success in the future...'\(^4\) Efforts were, however, continued and in 1904 Egyptians were contracted to work on the Zeidab plantations\(^5\). The result was '...that Zeidab has become a den of thieves...' as most of the Egyptians who came were of bad character and left the Sudan.

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\(^1\)GGR - 1904, p.14. The above is a quotation from Slatin's report on the failure of nomad labour. In a private letter to Wingate, Slatin suggested that the refusal of the nomads to work, was due to their opposition to the building of the New port at Shaykh Barghūt, (later Port Sudan), and not at Suakin. Slatin to Wingate, 8 Sep.1904, SAD/275/7.

\(^2\)GGR - 1905, p.22; GGR - 1908, p.628.

\(^3\)GGR - 1902, p.280.

\(^4\)GGR - 1903, p.23.

\(^5\)GGR - 1904, p.13.
the minute they had enough money. Though experiments continued, there seems to have been no serious attempt to attract Egyptians to the Sudan by offering them more tempting conditions. When labour on a large scale was again required in the early stages of the Gezira scheme, Kitchener decided to utilize the services of Egyptian convicts rather than recruit more expensive labourers.

In order to overcome the problems created by the shortage of labour and to check the decrease in domestic slaves, it was decided in 1905 to establish a central labour bureau. The labour bureau was attached to the intelligence department in Khartoum under the supervision of Slatin. Detailed instructions as to the employment of labour were issued and the conditions of labour, including wages, were to be determined by the labour bureau. The heads of departments

1GGR - 1905, pp.13-14; see also Balfour to Lady Balfour, 11 Dec. 1906, SAD/303/6. Balfour who was then in the public works department at Port Sudan, wrote very favourably about the Egyptian workers. He added however: '...they say that they (like all the rest of us) are only here to make money.'

2In 1905, a plan was devised by Cecil, to settle 3000 Egyptian families in the Sudan every year, by offering them a subsidy of £E 20 per family, to be paid out of the Egyptian war office budget. The plan though approved by Wingate, apparently met with little success. See Cecil to Wingate, 25 July 1905, SAD/277/1; Wingate to Cecil, 10 Aug. 1905, SAD/277/2.

3Clayton to Wingate, 17 Dec. 1913, SAD/469/5; Clayton wrote that the convicts were to leave Egypt on 27 Dec. and that the operation was done in complete secrecy. See also Wingate to Clayton, 20 Dec. 1913, Ibid; Wingate who opposed the scheme wrote that: '...the employment of convict labour will be considerably more expensive than local labour...' At the outbreak of the World War in 1914, work was discontinued and not much had been achieved.

4CAO - 241, 18 Jan. 1905; see also pp.104, 111.
were instructed not to recruit labour except through the labour bureau to whom they had to submit all their labour requirements at least one month in advance. Employers were further restricted by a maximum daily wage of P.T. 3½, which was imposed by the government. Private contractors at Port Sudan were also instructed to recruit their labour only through the central bureau.

These measures were clearly not implemented and wages continued to rise. In 1909 Wingate commented: ...as long as Departments are willing to pay the present "famine wages" the labourers...are liable to refuse all offer of lower wages... Departments also continued to compete, one against the other, resulting in the unchecked desertion of agricultural areas. The labour bureau decided to halt this migration by ordering all Sudanese labourers in the provinces

1 'Instructions as to the Employment of Labour', Appendix 'A', GGR - 1905, pp.160-1.

2 Ibid, p.29; Wingate, who by inclination opposed any restriction on free enterprise, wrote: '...I am aware that in giving effect to the above proposals, some interference with the ordinary principles of supply and demand is involved, but it is contented that the exceptional circumstances...warrant the adoption of somewhat exceptional measures...', Ibid, p.30.

3 See for instance Appendix 'B' - General State of Labour Market, GGR - 1906, p.140.

4 GGR - 1909, p.55.

5 GGR - 1906, p.20.

6 GGR - 1907, pp.190-93.
to register, and by restricting their movements. In 1910 the labour bureau reported that its statistics proved that the Sudan labour force could meet all the country's requirements. This was confirmed in the following years when the supply of unskilled labour was equal to the demand, and the labour bureau could cope with all the requirements made upon it, from among the 11,443 registered Sudanese labourers. The bulk of the Sudan labour force consisted of Sudanese ex-slaves and Fallāṭa. Of the Arab tribesmen, only a few became regular town workers, while the majority returned to the villages after a short time.

During the first years of its existence the Sudan government legislated in order to safeguard the interests of employers and employees. In 1901 an order was published obliging all servants to be registered. A special shaykh was appointed to deal with all applications for servants and to be responsible for their misdeeds.

All those who employed servants were warned that if servants

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1 **GGR** - 1909, pp. 53-4; Wingate was again worried by '...the mistaken belief that the Labour Bureau...intended to interfere in the relations existing between employers and employed. These misconceptions have, I am glad to say, been successfully combated...', Ibid, p. 54.

2 **GGR** - 1910, p. 75.

3 **GGR** - 1914, p. 10.

4 **GGR** - 1909, p. 55, commenting on the attitude of the Arabs to the Fallāṭa, Wingate quoted the following: '..."Allah took away our slaves, but sent us the Fallata"...' 

5 **SG** - 19, 1 Jan. 1901; this rather curious labour exchange was probably founded to cope with the problem of domestic slaves, see pp. 382-3.
accompanied them to other provinces they were '...responsible for the return of such servants to Khartoum...'. In 1905 the 'Vagabonds Ordinance' was promulgated in order to induce freed slaves to take up permanent employment. A vagabond was defined as a person who can maintain himself partly or fully but refuses to do so; or who begs or gathers alms; or who has no settled home or means of subsistence. On committing an offence a vagabond was liable to more severe punishment than an ordinary citizen who committed a similar offence. Two ordinances safeguarding the rights of workers were published in 1908. The 'Workmen Compensation Ordinance' ensured the rights of workers injured or invalided while at work and fixed the amount of compensation. 'The Apprenticeship Ordinance' regulated the contracts for the instruction of children in handicrafts. No contracts were allowed without the approval of the governor of the province who had also to give his consent if the apprentice was removed from the Sudan. Until 1908 the only approved apprenticeships were at the Mather Workshops at Gordon College, the

1SG - 61, 1 Apr. 1904.
2GGR - 1905, p.90.
3SG - 80, 24 Aug. 1905.
5Probably a safeguard against slave trade. SG - 138, 21 June 1908.
government's workshop at Kassala, and the workshops of the railways, steamers, and telegraph departments. Skilled artisans had to be brought mainly from Greece and Italy, thus increasing the costs of many projects. It was to overcome this shortage of skilled labour that the apprentice ordinance was promulgated.

The intimate connection between labour and domestic slavery, and the belief that they should both be controlled from within the same department was stated clearly by Wingate when he wrote to Gorst:

'...With regards to the question of Domestic Slavery...we are now taking the first step by organizing a Labour Bureau...'

The establishment of the labour bureau enabled the government to regulate the supply and demand of labour and to control the domestic slaves whose desertion of their masters could have caused a disruption of the socio-economic structure of the Sudan.

1GGR - 1905, pp.31-2.
2Wingate to Gorst, 19 Nov. 1908, SAD/284/15.
Conclusion.

The first seventeen years of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan were of great significance, for during this period the foundation of a new administration was laid. The British governor-general was the central figure in the administration and it is through his activities that one can evaluate the new regime. By virtue of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement absolute powers were vested in the governor-general. His policies and administration were controlled by the British consuls-general in Egypt who reported regularly to the foreign office. It is difficult to assess accurately the extent of this control. However, it is certain that of the four consuls-general who served during those years it was Cromer's influence over Sudan affairs which was most decisive. Furthermore, the extent of control from Cairo declined over the years and reached its lowest point under Sir Henry McMahon.

Under the terms of the Condominium agreement, increased supervision over the Sudan necessitated stricter control by the consuls-general, as neither the British nor the Egyptian government was in a position to intervene directly. It seems that the weakening of central control was due to two main factors: the consolidation of the Sudanese administration; and the greater experience of the governor-general as compared to his superiors in Cairo. Under these circumstances the freedom of action granted to Wingate in the latter years of his rule was fully justified, and increased
intervention would not have improved the administrative efficiency.

Wingate's governor-generalship can best be described as government through voluntary consultation. He was not an autocrat by nature and preferred to act on the advice of close colleagues. Moreover, he balked at taking advice from his subordinates merely because they held a particular post. Even after a semblance of constitutional government was introduced in the form of the governor-general's council, he continued to rely on his own confidants rather than on the new body. It was to this aspect of Wingate's rule that Slatin owed his great influence over the administration. Slatin's experience in the Sudan helped the new administration in its early years, but as time progressed, his conservative attitude and pre-Mahdist conceptions about tribal and religious affairs probably hindered the necessary development of a new approach.

The British administrators of the Sudan, both civil and military, were among the best any country under foreign rule could desire. Most of them were honest, hard-working men, who in many cases risked their lives for seemingly inadequate material benefits. The young university graduates soon made their mark on administrative policies and became even more influential after Wingate's departure. The Egyptian officials in the Sudan were never intended to play a significant role in the new administration and had little chance of promotion to higher posts. Hence, it was not surprising that many of those who applied for employment were not of the
highest quality. In those spheres of administration where Egyptian supremacy could not be challenged, for want of alternative employees, the standard of the Egyptians was rarely a cause for complaint. This applied to the Shari'a courts and to education. The government was dilatory in training the Sudanese for administrative posts, and in consequence the rate of progress suffered. Sudanese children who started their education under the Condominium could have graduated from secondary schools by 1910 and filled important administrative posts. Instead they were relegated to minor positions. It was only after 1924 that they achieved some predominance as a result of the rapid removal of the Egyptians which followed the assassination of Sir Lee Stack.

The principles of the new administration were enunciated by Cromer and Kitchener in 1899, and remained unchanged throughout Wingate's governor-generalship. Kitchener's memorandum to Mudirs and Cromer's speech to the notables of the Sudan included all the major aspects of government policy. Although these policies were constantly proclaimed by Wingate as the foundation of his administration, some of them were never fully implemented.

The de-centralization of the Sudan's administration had been proclaimed by the Turco-Egyptian rulers on several occasions, but was not put into effect. During the Mahdia, centralization became the order of the day. Yet lack of effective communications and of reliable subordinates hindered the Khalifa 'Abdallāhī from
establishing effective control of the provincial governors.

Kitchener's Memorandum to Mudirs sought to decentralize the administration. But once again the intention was not fully implemented. Decentralization depended for its success on the relative strength of individual heads of departments vis-à-vis provincial governors. Certain departments, such as agriculture, public works, police and prisons were partly decentralized; others, notably education and finance, remained fully centralized throughout the period. Individual governors were also able to assert a greater measure of independence. Thus Dongola became Jackson's 'private kingdom', while Matthews reigned supreme in the Upper Nile province. One of the great obstacles impeding decentralization was the growing number of reports sent by the governors to the central departments. Again, the volume of correspondence between Wingate and his provincial governors is a reflection of the degree of centralization attained. But instead of relaxing central control, Wingate ordered the governors to decrease their correspondence without granting them a greater measure of independence. It is hard to determine whether

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1 The list of reports which each governor had to send to the central departments during the year increased from twenty-five in 1902, to seventy-five in 1905. This did not include the monthly intelligence reports and other military aspects of work. See CAO - 102, 19 July 1902; CAO - 354, 30 Oct. 1905.

2 CAO - 173, 11 June 1904; CAO - 275, 5 Apr. 1905. The Times correspondent who visited the Sudan in 1907, wrote that '...Sudan Government officials...are pestered and hampered incessantly by piles of petty accounts...The consequence is that their more important work suffers...', The Times, 10 Jan. 1908.
increased decentralization would have been of benefit to the administration during its early years. Many of the governors were military men without any previous administrative experience. Moreover, they were frequently relieved of their duties, and hence could not gain the experience and knowledge required for greater independence.

One of the corner-stones of the new administration was its religious policy. In the Muslim provinces the government’s aim was to establish orthodox Islam and to ignore, at least officially, the far greater impact that Sufism had on the Sudanese Muslims. The government largely succeeded in its first aim but was forced to revise its policy towards the ṣūfī orders. Orthodox Islam received its main impetus through the teachers’ and ḍā‘īs’ training colleges. In consequence, a firm hold was obtained on the Shari‘a courts and on the khalwas which the government subsidized. The government maintained its rather ambiguous attitude towards ṣūfī orders until the first World War. It was then forced to seek the cooperation of influential ṣūfī leaders and of Sayyid `Abd al-Rahmān al-Mahdī who had gained considerable support.

The prohibition of Christian proselytization in the Muslim provinces was both necessary and wise. The population of the Sudan regarded the missionaries as an integral part of the reconquest, and would have resented any attempt to interfere with their beliefs. Even the limited missionary activities in education and medicine were viewed by certain sections of the population with grave
misgivings. Under these circumstances there can be no doubt that the government's policy was fully justified.

In the southern non-Muslim provinces the government's policy crystallized only after 1910. Until then missionaries were encouraged to proselytize, but the government did not adopt positive measures to prohibit the spreading of Islam. With the introduction of English as the official language of the south and the adoption of Sunday as its weekly holiday, the government launched an active anti-Muslim policy thereby widening the existing gulf between the two parts of the Sudan. This policy was both unrealistic and unjustified. Wingate believed that, given an equal opportunity, Islam would have gained many more supporters than Christianity. As a Christian ruler, he did not want the south to become Muslim, and adopted a policy which jeopardized the prospects of a united Sudan in the foreseeable future. There is no proof that the separation of the southern provinces from the Sudan was contemplated during Wingate's era, but there can be little doubt that the religious policy adopted in the south gave rise to later separatist notions.

The government's tribal policy has been described in great detail. It is abundantly clear that the principle of encouraging tribal leadership was never fully implemented. The two major reasons for this failure seem very obvious. First, tribal leadership had largely disintegrated under the Turco-Egyptian and the Mahdist regimes. And secondly, independent tribal authority, by
its very nature, could not exist side by side with a strong centralized government. By entrusting tribal chiefs with administrative duties, and by replacing them whenever they failed, the government changed the status of shaykhs to that of government officials. Hence, their authority was derived from the government and did not reflect their influence with their tribes. The only way by which the authorities might have succeeded in resuscitating tribal society was by ceasing to administer the Sudan altogether; and this was clearly not intended.

The use of punitive expeditions was one of the most negative aspects of the government's tribal policy, and stemmed, in the main, from lack of administrative control. In undertaking these expeditions the government pursued a similar policy to that of their Mahdist and Turco-Egyptian predecessors, inevitably weakening tribal cohesion even further. The only justification for such policy could have been the establishment of orderly government. However, during the Wingate era many expeditions were undertaken in the remote regions of the south where it was abundantly clear that the government had neither the means nor the power to establish even a semblance of permanent administration.

While certain aspects of the Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Sudan are open to criticism, the general record of the government was by no means unsatisfactory. The hazards of foreign domination are abundantly clear and they require no further elucidation.
Bearing this in mind one could justly claim that the Sudanese fared better under their conquerors than many other countries under similar conditions. The administration of justice, land settlement, low taxation, and the toleration of domestic slavery were all ultimately in the best interests of the inhabitants. One of the major hazards of many African countries was the alienation of land from the indigenous population and the introduction of a foreign settler element. In the Sudan this problem was overcome by strict legislation and by creating conditions by which the inhabitants could cultivate their own lands at a profit. The government took care to preserve the rights of cultivators when granting concessions, and this acted as an additional safeguard against the alienation of land.

The predominant theme of government policy was to link the traditional leaders of Sudanese society with government interests. The loyalty of the religious and tribal leaders to British rule was a clear indication that this aim had been achieved. It owed its success only partly to the government's policy. Memories of the maladministration endured under the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist rulers played a significant role in confirming the loyalty of the old generation to their new masters. However, the young generation, which was not obsessed by memories of the past, was already influenced by nationalist ideas. Instead of recognizing the validity of their claims, the British authorities tried to banish their ideas from
the Sudan. They did this by dismissing the Egyptian teachers from Gordon College and by banning the nationalist press. These ineffective measures could only result in alienating the future leaders of the Sudan on whose cooperation the British authorities were bound to rely.
I. Unpublished Sources.


This archive contains the papers of the Aborigines Protection Society and the Anti-Slavery Society which were founded in the 1830s. The material relevant to slavery in the Sudan in the years 1898-1916 is in Box G-282.


The archive contains the correspondence between the CMS missionaries in the Sudan and their headquarters in Egypt and London. Until Nov. 1905, the Sudan belonged to Group No. 3 in Egypt and the material relevant to the Sudan is classified together with Egypt. From 1905 there are separate boxes and precis books containing the Sudan correspondence.


FO 78 Turkey Egypt, Political 1898-1905.

FO 141 Egypt, agency and consular archives, 1900-1909, 1924.

There are special letter books containing the correspondence between the British consul-general in Egypt and the governor-general of the Sudan. The correspondence of the years 1909-1924 is missing for unknown reasons.

FO 371 Egypt political 1906-1916. This series replaced FO 78 which was discontinued since Dec. 1905. Apart from correspondence between the consul-general and the foreign office, it also contains the Sudan intelligence reports.
FO 403 Confidential prints, North East Africa and the Soudan. This series was discontinued in 1904.

FO 407 Confidential prints, Egypt and the Soudan 1898-1916. The original letters and memoranda printed in these series are in FO 78 and FO 371.

II. Private Papers.

a. At the Public Record Office, London.

1. The Cromer papers, FO 633/5-24.
2. The Grey papers, FO 800/46-8.
3. The Kitchener papers, PRO/30/57, 10-48.

b. At the Sudan Archive, School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham.

This archive is made up of numerous collections of private papers belonging to British and other officials who served in the Sudan. The major collections are those of Sir Reginald Wingate, governor-general of the Sudan, 1899-1916, and Sir Rudolf von Slatin Pasha, inspector-general of the Sudan, 1900-1914.

1. The Wingate papers contain his private correspondence since 1878 and his correspondence regarding the Sudan from 1883-1916. However, many letters relevant to the Sudan are in the private correspondence. Special boxes contain Wingate's diaries and memoirs, and the manuscripts of his books Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, and Ten years' captivity in the Mahdi's camp.
2. The Slatin papers contain his correspondence from 1895-1932 (the correspondence between Wingate and Slatin is arranged in special boxes). The English and German manuscripts of Fire and Sword in the Sudan are in boxes 443-5. Slatin's diaries for the years 1896-1916 were of particular value, they are written partly in German and partly in English and contain Slatin's impressions during his tours of inspection as well as his recommendations regarding administrative policy.

Of the numerous other collections many have been mentioned throughout this thesis. Among those which have been more extensively used are the following:

3. The private letters of Lieutenant Colonel Frank C. Balfour, who started his service in the public works department at Port Sudan and later became inspector in the Nuba mountains.

4. The diaries and memoirs of Major General Stephen S. Butler contain his memoirs on the Egyptian army and his diaries for the years 1911-1912 while serving in the intelligence department.

5. The correspondence of Sir Gilbert F. Clayton Pasha with Wingate during his period as Wingate's private secretary 1908-1914, and as Sudan agent 1914-1916. His diaries for the years 1901-1929 are of no particular interest.
6. The private papers of Bishop Llewellyn Henry Gwynne are split between the Sudan archive in Durham and the CMS archive in London, both of which have been used extensively. There is also a special box (103) in the Sudan archive containing Wingate's correspondence with regard to missionary activities in the Sudan.

7. The letters and the manuscripts of several articles by K.D.D. Henderson are in boxes 448; 478-9.

8. The Journals of Reverend F.B. Hadow and of Dr. E. Lloyd for the years 1905-8, are in box 203. Hadow and Lloyd arrived in the Sudan in 1905 with the first group of CMS missionaries who opened the station at Melut in the Upper Nile province.

9. A memoir written by Colonel C.F. Ryder (box 400/8) was of particular value for the chapter dealing with land-settlement in the Sudan.

10. The diaries of Lieut. Colonel Robert V. Savile (box 427) were of considerable interest with regard to tribal administration and taxation in Kassala (1902-6) and Kordofan (1909-17).

11. The papers of Na'um Shuqayr (Shoucair) contain very little of his private correspondence (box 101/20). More important are his notes on the history of the Majdhubiya order (box 195), and his work in connection with Ismā'īl 'Abd al-Qādir's biography of the Mahdi (box 260/2).
12. The private papers of Sa'id Shuqayr (Shucair) cover the years 1909-1934. They are classified according to subjects and deal with the Sudan, Palestine, and Syria (boxes 493-4).

13. The correspondence and diaries of Charles Armine Willis (boxes 209-212) are of great interest. As a junior inspector in Kordofan since 1905, Willis kept a regular diary of events which contain many details regarding religious and tribal policy. His later diaries and memoranda afford a critical view of the government's policy as seen by a director of the intelligence department. These are only a few of the many valuable collections at the Sudan Archive in Durham, without which this work would not have been possible.

III. Unpublished and Confidential Reports.

a. British.


b. Sudan Government.

1. A note on Government policy towards the native population [n.d.]

1All these reports are in the Sudan Archive, Durham, unless otherwise mentioned.
2. Governor-General's Council, minutes of, 1910-1916, FO 867/1-7.


4. Slavery and the Pilgrimage, 1926, report by C. A. Willis, O.B.E.

5. Some aspects of Nuba administration, Sudan Government Memorandum No. 1, Nov. 1931, by J. A. Gillan, Strictly Confidential.


8. The immigration and distribution of West Africans in the Sudan, Sudan Government Memorandum, n.d.

IV. Unpublished Theses.


7. P.M. Holt - The personal rule of the Khalifa 'Abdallahi al-Ta'aishi.


10. L.M. Sanderson - A history of education in the Sudan with special

11. Education in the southern Sudan, 1898-1948.

V. Official publications.

a. British.


2. Reports by His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General on the
   Finances, Administration, and Condition of Egypt and the
   Soudan: 1898- C.9231; 1899- CD.95; 1900- CD.441; 1901- CD.1012;
   1902- CD.1529; 1903- CD.1951; 1904- CD.2409; 1905- CD.2817;
   1906- CD.3394; 1907-CD.3966; 1908- CD.4580; 1909- CD.5121;
   1910- CD.5633; 1911- CD.6149; 1912- CD.6682; 1913-CD.7358;
   1914- 19, CMD.957.

b. Egyptian.

c. Sudanese.

1. **Civil Administration Orders** 1900-1908.

2. **Handbook Series.** The Sudan government handbooks were compiled in the intelligence department in Khartoum. Those used in the thesis are:
   - *Kordofan and the region to the west of the White Nile, Dec. 1912.*
   - *Handbook of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1922, I.D. 1218.*
   - *The Sub-Mamu's handbook, Khartoum, 1926.*

3. **Reports on the Finances, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan.** Confidential. The reports are divided into four parts. A report by the consul-general in Egypt; a memorandum by the governor-general of the Sudan; reports of the central government departments; and reports by the provincial governors. The reports for the years 1902-1914 are in the School of Oriental Studies, Durham and in the library of the Foreign Office. I have not been able to locate the reports for the years 1899-1901.

4. **Sudan Gazette** 1899-1916. In the British Museum

5. **Sudan Political Service** 1899-1929. Civil Secretary's Office, Sudan Government 1930.

VI. Newspapers and periodicals.

a. Daily and weekly newspapers.

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al-Liwā', Cairo.

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al-Mugattām, Cairo.

Neue Freie Presse, Vienna.

The Standard, Cairo.

The Sudan Herald, Khartoum.

The Sudan Times, Khartoum.

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al-Watan, Cairo.

b. Periodicals.

The Aborigines' Friend, London.

Anti-Slavery Reporter, London.

Journal of African Administration, London.


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Sudan Notes and Records, Khartoum.

VII. Books and articles.


10. J. B. Christopherson - 'Notes on medicine in the Sudan', (typescript n.d. SAD/407/6)


18. E. E. Evans-Pritchard - 'An ethnological survey of the Sudan', in Hamilton (no. 23).


24. --------------- 'Evolutionary principles in native administration', in Hamilton (no. 23).


32. S. Hillelson - 'Religion in the Sudan', in Hamilton (no.23)
40. ----- Sudan days and ways, (London 1954).
44. G. D. Lampe - 'The Baggara tribes', in Hamilton, (no.23).
47. ----- 'Reminiscences of Kordofan in 1906', (typescript, n.d. SAD/294/18).


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60. C.C. Reining - The Zande Scheme, (Illinois 1966).


64. ---------'Educational development in the Southern Sudan', SNR, Vol.43, (1962).


66. N. Shuqayr (Shoucair) - Ta'rīkh al-Sūdān al-qadīm wa'l-ḥadīth wa jughrāfiyatuhu, (Cairo, n.d. 1903).


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