FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS JAPAN, 1854 - 1894.

by

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ABSTRACT.

Foreign influence on the modern history of Japan has been enormous, but little serious work has been done on the policies towards Japan of countries other than the United States. This is especially true of the seminal Meiji period, and this thesis attempts to fill a gap in our knowledge of these years by investigating French policy from the opening of Japan up to the period immediately preceding the Sino-Japanese War. Particular attention has been paid to the career of Léon Roches, the French Minister whose whole-hearted support for the Tokugawa Government had an important effect on Japanese politics in the period leading up to the Meiji Restoration; to the hesitant and unsuccessful attempts of the Ferry Government to involve Japan in France's dispute with China between 1883 and 1885; and to the French attitude towards Japan's attempts to revise the 'unequal treaties' imposed on her in 1858. The other major topics dealt with here, either for the first time or in greater detail than before, are the motives and circumstances of the French entry into diplomatic relations with Japan; the efforts of the first French Minister in Japan to maintain relations; French policy during the Meiji Restoration and the crucial early years of the Meiji Government; French attitudes towards the Meiji Government's early foreign policy; the French concern with prestige and influence in Japan; and the influence of trade

on French policy. The conclusion discusses the formulation and character of French policy towards Japan, and its significance in Japanese history.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TREATY RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND JAPAN

(a) The Background of French Activity in the Far East.[1]

The signing of the first treaty between France and Japan on October 9th, 1858, followed a long period of French interest and activity in the Far East, stretching back more or less continuously to the time of Richelieu. To place in perspective France's entry into diplomatic relations with Japan, some account of the main features of this period is necessary, especially in view of the degree of continuity that can be seen in French foreign policy, both in motives and methods, over the centuries.

From the early 17th century, the age when France first turned her attention to the Indian Ocean and beyond, until the 1850's, the point at which a serious interest in Japan began to develop, France was represented in the Far East principally by missionaries, trading companies, and naval officers. Of these, only missionaries were active throughout the whole period. From about 1625, when Père Joseph de Tremblay used his position as director of missions in the Levant to send a number of French Capuchins into India,

1. Most of what follows in this section is based on J.F.Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia, New York 1954; H.I.Priestley, France Overseas Through the Old Regime, New York 1939; and H.Blet, Histoire de la Colonisation Française, (vols. 1 & 2), Paris 1946.

China, Japan and Persia, in order to "establish a series of missionary stations whereby land communications with the seats of Oriental trade might be rendered permanent,"[2] until the reign of Louis-Philippe, when religious revival in France, joined to the decisive military superiority which Europe had just acquired, brought to their work in the Far East a new significance, Frenchmen engaged in religious work could always be found somewhere. In many ways their efforts can also be regarded as the most important French activity, for many of the missionaries sent out by the most active French-dominated religious organisation, the 1663 Paris Société des Missions Etrangères, either penetrated into hostile regions where they suffered persecution, or (though here the Jesuits were more prominent) acquired positions of influence at Eastern courts. They provided a possible means of political penetration in their wake, and there were notable examples of this happening in Siam in the 17th century and in Annam at the turn of the 19th. In Annam especially, the military and administrative ability of Pigneau de Béhaine produced an exceptionally promising situation,[3] but France was too occupied with the Napoleonic Wars to take advantage of it, and when, in 1821, she sought a treaty of commerce, she was refused by the new ruler. In the 1830's the latter instituted a policy of

2. Priestley, op. cit., p.92.
3. On this episode, see Cady, op. cit., pp. 12-14.

persecution against the missionaries and their position was still desperate at the time of the first French treaty with Japan. The 1850's, however, did see the first serious attempts at French intervention, which incidentally proved something of a hindrance to the establishment of relations with Japan.

It was not only in Siam and Annam that French missionaries created opportunities for intervention which France was unable or unwilling to take up until the Second Empire. Persecution in Korea from the 1830's onwards inspired no determined effort to intervene until 1866,[4] while in China, where the famous quarrel between the Jesuits and the other missionaries, including those from the Missions Etrangères, had brought about the proscription of missionary activities, occasional executions of French priests went virtually unheeded until 1844. In that year, the diplomatic missions sent out by Louis-Philippe were fortunate in that China's concern with more demanding 'barbarians' led her to make a few religious concessions. Not until the death of Chapdelaine in 1856 did France feel like using persecution as a pretext for taking up arms on behalf of missionary interests, and then only because Britain also had a claim to press against the Middle Kingdom.

4. On this unsuccessful French expedition, see R. Ristelhueber, "Un diplomate belliquex déclare la guerre à la Corée (en 1866)" Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, 1958. No. 2. pp. 111-117.

Of the other strands of French activity in the Far East, trading companies belonged to the 17th and 18th centuries. Richelieu had provided the first impetus, but it was Colbert who made them important. One of his creations was the French East India Company of 1664, which, among other things, had control of the China trade. Like its immediate predecessors, however, the Company made no use of its privilege, and France's backwardness in trade with the Far East was confirmed rather than reversed. In 1719 the China trade finally passed into the hands of the Compagnie des Indes and there was some increase in activity, with 92 French ships entering Canton between 1720 and 1770. This Company disappeared in 1791, and thereafter trade was left to the initiative of private merchants. Under the new conditions there was a slight improvement in the volume of trade. Three or four French ships per year on average visited Canton in the first quarter of the 19th century. Nevertheless, trade figures such as these were small for the new industrial age, and according to Cady, "commercial considerations played a very minor part in the 19th century revival of French interest in the Far East".[5] This view finds some support in the assertion of Dunham that "most French manufacturers had no interest in foreign trade,

5. Op. cit, p.2.

knew little or nothing about foreign markets or the needs and wishes of foreigners, and sold goods for export only when they could not sell them at home".[6] The situation was to change somewhat with Napoleon III's establishment of credit institutions such as the Comptoir d'Escompte which "not only performed well the services of a commercial bank, but by engaging actively in colonial and Far Eastern affairs, became a valuable economic instrument of penetration",[7] but not to any appreciable extent before the 1860's.

If trading companies had played their part and individual merchants had not yet assumed an important role, naval officers were, in the 1840's just coming into their own. With the establishment of a regular naval station in the China seas after the first Opium War (1839-42) they were as important around the mid-century as the diplomats whom France was just beginning to send out. This was especially so because the Ministry of Marine was not always disposed to subordinate its schemes to those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and because individual captains often took advantage of the distance that separated them from Paris to act according to their own inclination. The annexation of Tahiti without the authorization of the French Premier gives some indication

6. A.L. Dunham, The Industrial Revolution in France, 1815-48, New York 1955, p. 387.
7. S.B. Clough, France: A History of National Economics, 1789-1939, New York 1939, p. 173.

of what a bold naval commander could do,[8] and though few were as adventurous as this, there were frequent instances of officers intervening to help missionaries.

This brief summary of the background of French activity is necessary to give some idea of the French position in the Far East at the time when she became interested in securing a treaty with Japan. Nevertheless, the French tradition of earlier years should not, in an account of the opening of Japan, receive too much attention. In the first place there was something of a break in the tradition at the time of the Revolution, and when a real interest emerged again in the 1840's the balance of power between Asia and the West had changed dramatically, with the effect that while some of the traditional activities, such as the work of missionaries, continued to be important and to some extent acquired new significance, a new element had arisen in the situation, which placed everything in a new perspective. Technical progress in Europe had made possible, for the first time between Europe and the Far East, direct relations between government and government, and this placed individual or unofficial activities in a definitely subsidiary position. In the second place, after two centuries France had achieved little in the way of tangible gains. She had acquired no base which would serve as a launching point for an expedition to Japan, nor was

8. On this episode, see Cady, op. cit., p. 29 ff.

there anything in her Far Eastern tradition that bore directly upon that country. French missionaries had played no part in Japan's 'Christian century', nor had French ships, in the early 19th century, paid her the attention that British and Russian ships had shown. In any case, Japan was, on account of her remote position and her stubbornly-maintained traditional policy of isolation, a somewhat different proposition from other Far Eastern countries. As later events were to reveal, what happened in the rest of Asia did not necessarily happen in Japan.

(b) The Motivation Behind the Treaty

The above warning is justified by the testimony of the French documents relating to the opening of Japan.[9] In fact, none of the traditional elements in French Far Eastern activity played a decisive part in the establishment of treaty relations between France and Japan. Missionaries, it is true, were among the most ardent advocates of such a policy, which was hardly surprising, since the memory of the century when Japan had been open to Christianity and

9. The documents in question are contained in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay. Most are to be found in the series Correspondance Politique. Chine, (hereafter cited as C.P. Chine); but there are also a number of important dispatches and communications in two series devoted to Japan, the Correspondance Politique. Japon, (hereafter C.P.Japon), and the Mémoires et Documents.Japon, (hereafter M.D.Japon). Several of the documents in the first of these series are quoted at length by Cordier, "Le Premier Traité de la France avec le Japon", T'oung Pao XIII (1912) pp.209-290.

when conversions had taken place on a scale which seemed astonishing in the 19th century, had not been allowed to die.[10] France, too, was now the obvious and recognised protector to whom they looked, as the only maritime Catholic country which remained in the first rank among the Powers. But though Japan's opening was in some ways the prize most desired by the missionaries in the Far East, their position was much weaker than in other neighbouring countries because of the complete success of Japan's exclusion policy which meant that they could not provide the navy with any pretext for intervention or intimidation. Only in 1844 was a very slight breach made in that policy. In that year French missionary and naval needs came together when Captain Fornier-Duplan brought to the Ryūkyū islands, which vaguely acknowledged both Japanese and Chinese suzerainty, a priest from the Missions Etrangères, M. Forçade, soon to become, as bishop of Samos, vicar apostolic of Japan, and now intended to learn Japanese there in anticipation of its opening.[11] Two more French missionaries were left in 1846 but two years later one had died and the other was returned to Hong Kong on Admiral Cécille's instructions after Chinese protests at his presence. In the meantime,

10. For some idea of missionary feeling at this time, see A.Launay, Histoire Générale de la Société des Missions Etrangères, vol. III. Paris 1894. p. 201 ff.
11. For full details of this and other missionary activity preparatory to the opening of Japan, see F. Marnas, La 'Religion de Jesus' (Yaso JaKyo) Ressuscitée au Japon. Paris-Lyon, 1896. vol. I. [redacted] passim.

the promoted Forcade had briefly returned to Europe in 1847. In Paris he was granted interviews not only with the Foreign and Prime Ministers, but also with Louis-Philippe. His pleas for greater help for French missionaries in the Far East, however, met with little sympathy save from Guizot and he was sent away without so much as a promise. In 1855 several more missionaries were sent to the Ryūkyūs, but no-one ever came near setting a foot in Japan itself. The final proof of the comparatively small part played by the missionaries in the opening of Japan to France is shown by the instructions given to Baron Gros, the diplomat chosen to head the French expedition to China and Japan in 1857.[12] Missionary wishes notwithstanding, he was enjoined not to press the religious question, save to obtain permission for Frenchmen to practise their religion in the open ports, a concession which had already been obtained by other Powers by the time France signed her treaty.

That France, whose primacy in Far Eastern missionary operations had been recognized by the Pope in 1839 and whose new ruler was still showing himself eager to ensure religious support for the Second Empire, should go no further to advance missionary interests than Britain or the United States requires some explanation. Part of it lies, no doubt, in the fact that her naval power was inadequate to compel Japan to

12. These instructions, dated May 16th, 1857, are in both C.P.Japon I (as a first draft), and C.P.Chine XXI. They are unsigned.

concede more than she had to the other Powers, especially when Annam and China were making simultaneous demands on that power. Moreover, Britain and the United States might well have objected, had any special demand been pressed and had it led to a renewal of open Japanese hostility to foreigners. Nevertheless, reports from China had occasionally suggested during the previous few years that the Japanese had become less hostile towards Christianity and at one point it did look as if a special religious demand would be made, for in the draft instructions concerning Japan drawn up for Baron Gros on May 16th, 1857, there appears the following passage:

> "Je me contenterai donc de signaler à votre attention... le prix que nous attacherions à obtenir pour nos missionnaires la liberté de pénétrer et de s'établir dans le pays... Il est d'un intérêt général que les lumières et les bienfaits du christianisme aien le moyen de se répandre au Japon et d'y modifier avec le temps, les préjugés religieux qui contribuent pour une si forte part, à fermer aux étrangers l'accès de cet Empire." [12a.]

It is true that Gros was warned that he must proceed with caution, but the fact nevertheless remains that he was originally intended to seek for missionaries the right of access to the interior of Japan.

In fact, such a demand was not made in the 1858 negotiations, even in the most diplomatic and reserved manner. Before Gros' instructions were finally approved, the passage concerning religion was crossed out, because, a note in the margin explains, it would be dangerous to

12a. C.P.Japon. I. May 16, 1857.

raise the question.[13] The reason why the Quai d'Orsay changed its mind so speedily is not stated in the Correspondance Politique, but does come to light in the first volume of Mémoires et Documents, Japon. In this there is a mémoire for the Foreign Minister, dated May 1857, which begins by saying that missionaries abused their position in Japan in the 17th century and continues: "Les préjugés et la haine du gouvernement japonais à cet égard sont depuis lors restés les mêmes; un français qui a résidé quatre ans au Japon comme fermier du commerce hollandais me disait dernièrement que si on entrait en négociation avec ce pays, il faudrait éviter avant tout, sous peine d'exciter une méfiance profonde, et tout compromettre, de soulever la question religieuse."

"Il pourrait donc être préférable de supprimer dans les instructions données à M. le Baron Gros, ce qui rapporte à la faculté pour les Missionnaires de s'établir au Japon."[14]. Evidently this advice was followed.

This alteration of Gros' instructions has two interesting aspects. In the first place, it seems to have been done without any regard for the hopes of the missionaries who had spent years waiting eagerly for the opening of J apan and without any consultation with their Director in Paris. Secondly,

13. The renunciation was not quite total. In the instructions later given to de Bellecourt (C.P.Japon.I. June 8 1859) it was anticipated that despite the limitations placed upon them, missionaries would still succeed in penetrating to the interior, in which case France could not abandon the right of protecting them. The prediction proved over-optimistic.

14. M.D.Japon I. May 1857. Faugère to Walewski.

15. There can be no doubt that it was Delprat who was referred to. He was the only Frenchman at this time who had lived in Japan. His position and experiences at Nagasaki from 1845 to 1849 as a trader who had bought a trade monopoly from the Dutch, are referred to in a mémoire which he wrote for the Quai d'Orsay in 1854 (M.D.Japon,I. Nov. 1854).

and somewhat ironically, the Frenchman, Charles Delprat,[15] whose views were given so much weight, may well have been an anti-clerical who saw the prospect of missionary penetration of Japan without relish. His very admission into Japan suggests that he could not have been a Catholic, but more substantial evidence can be found in the tone of the mémoire which he supplied to the Quai d'Orsay in 1854.[16] In this he praised Japanese civilisation, asserted that there were worse examples of persecution by Christians in Europe than of persecution of Christians in Japan, and implied that they could not really complain about their exclusion. An article written by him for the Revue des Deux Mondes strengthens the impression of anti-clericalism. Unlike other Frenchmen, he did not speak of the benefits which the Christian religion could bring to a re-opened Japan. Rather his conclusion suggested the opposite: "En étudiant de près les moeurs, les institutions, les lois des Japonais, on finit par se demander si leur civilisation, parfaitement appropriée à leur pays, a quelque chose à envier à la nôtre, ou à celle des Etats-Unis." He claimed for Japan: "la disette impossible, l'absence d'impôts, la liberté pur le peuple... ce sont là pour les Japonais autant d'élémens de bonheur et de bien-être que leurs prétendus civilisateurs auront de la peine à perfectionner." 17. The odds are that the alteration inspired by Delprat's warning made no practical difference to Franco-Japanese relations, but it is just possible that, in certain circumstances, such as negotiation with strong naval support, retention of the original provision

15. See previous page.

16. Ibid.

17. "Le Japon et le Commerce Européen," Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 1856. p.640.

might have led to serious repercussions.

If missionaries did not play the key role in deciding France to enter into relations with Japan, neither did naval officers. Yet in one way they had a better opportunity to do so, for at least it was not impossible for them to visit the country. Nevertheless, their contribution was small, and before 1855 the French flag appeared in a Japanese port only on one occasion.[18] Moreover, when in May of that year Captain Tardy de Montravel appeared at Nagasaki with four ships and was offered a treaty identical to that signed with Admiral Stirling, he refused on the ground that he did not possess the necessary powers.[19] It is true that his refusal was principally motivated by his awareness that the Stirling convention was not regarded as satisfactory in Europe,[20] but there does seem to have been a lack of enterprise and interest in his unwillingness to negotiate something better. A similar failure to take advantage of a possible opportunity had occurred in 1848 when the officer who removed the French missionary from the Ryūkyūs made no attempt to use the attack by the populace in the previous year as an excuse for putting pressure on the local ruler. Presumably the navy saw no strategic or imperialistic possibilities in Japan.

18. In 1846. See footnote 29.
19. For his letter to the Nagasaki bugyō (officials) and his report to the Ministry of Marine, see Cordier, op.cit.,pp.228-31.
20. On this point, see W.G.Beasley, Gt.Britain and the Opening of Japan, London 1951, pp. 129-130, 145-147.

As regards the part played by trade, the evidence is inconclusive but seems on the whole to show it to have been not of such outstanding importance as might have been imagined. It is true that the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works was interested in opening Japan to trade and on more than one occasion made its wishes known to the Foreign Ministry,[21] and it would also seem that occasional articles in newspapers and journals, particularly in America, sometimes envisaged the prospect of a lucrative commerce when once Japan was opened.[22] But against this must be weighed the absence of any indication of pressure by French merchants or chambers of commerce and the slowness of the former to arrive in Japan after the ratification of the treaty. At this date Frenchmen were still unaware of the potentialities of Japanese silk and silkworms, later the main item of trade between the two countries; and the opinion of Delprat, as expressed in the widely-read Revue des Deux Mondes, that, since raw silk was imported into Japan from China, it was permissible to "douter que le Japon puisse jamais alimenter les retours d'un grand commerce,"[23] was hardly encouraging. In actual fact, Delprat's pessimism seems not entirely to have been accepted by the Quai d'Orsay, and the desire to extend French trade must have been important. Nevertheless, if even Britain, whose commercial prospects were far brighter,

21. C.P.Japon.I. June 10 1854; Ibid. June 18 1855; Ibid 21 Oct 1857.
22. They were ridiculed by Delprat in his article on "Le Japon et le Commerce Européen" op.cit. p.634.
23. Ibid. p. 635.

was willing to wait for the United States to open Japan, it is hard to believe that for France trade was the immediate factor. No doubt her commercial interests would have led her to seek a treaty once trade with Japan was firmly established, but they do not in themselves explain why the French government established relations with Japan as early as it did.

What then, if not the machinations of missionaries, the ambition of admirals, or the pursuit of profit, was the chief impulsion behind the attempts to secure a treaty in the 1850's? An answer is suggested by Delprat's already quoted article. "La France," he wrote, "se dispose ~~aussi~~ à joindre ses efforts à ceux que viennent de faire d'autres nations: elle ne peut rester étrangère, quoi qu'il arrive, au mouvement qui se porte vers cette partie lointaine du monde."[24] In view of the fact that Delprat saw no bright future for trade, it is hard to account for his desire to see France emulate the other Powers in securing a treaty except by some invocation of the motive of prestige.[25] Nor should he be considered untypical in his concern with this factor. That it was prestige that prompted France -

24. Ibid. p. 645.

25. Delprat did refer (Ibid. p.638) to the desirability of Japanese ports being opened in order to provide a haven during storms, but this can hardly be regarded as an important motive. He felt that France would find it comparatively easy to secure a treaty from the Japanese because "L'admiration qu'ils ont d'ailleurs pour la gloire militaire a popularisé chez eux le nom de Napoléon". (Ibid. p.645)

the feeling that it would lower France's standing in the world if she were not to show herself interested in the Far East-is a view for which there is a good deal of evidence in the correspondence between the Quai d'Orsay and the French representative in China, de Bourboulon, the man first entrusted with the powers to negotiate a treaty. The evidence is particularly striking in the instructions given by the Quai d'Orsay to Gros. In this important document the reason for his mission to Japan is stated thus: "Le Gouvernement de l'empereur est depuis longtemps convaincu que la France ne saurait continuer à rester en arrière des nations qui ont déjà cherché à assurer à leur commerce l'accès d'un pays riche et populeuse et que le moment est venu pour elle de se placer à cet égard sur le pied d'égalité avec les Puissances qui l'ont devancée dans cette voie." 26.

The scarcely hidden emphasis of this language makes it difficult not to feel that considerations of trade were overshadowed by the preoccupation with France's status as a leading Power. Similar indications of the influence of prestige are found in the story of France's attempts to secure a treaty.

(c) <u>The Attempts To Secure a Treaty. (1854-1858)</u>.

The date at which France first decided that she wanted a treaty with Japan is a matter of some doubt. One could trace it back to the age of Colbert. According to one 19th century writer,[27] Louis XIV's indefatigable minister

26. C.P. Japon. I. May 16, 1857.
27. E. Fraissinet, <u>Le Japon</u>, Vol. II. Paris 1853, pp.4-5.

lured into the service of France an ex-Dutch factor at Hirado, François Caron, with the intention of establishing trade relations with Japan, among other Oriental countries. He appears to have had a plan to obviate Japanese religious objections by sending only Protestants. The scheme was soon brought to nothing, however, by the death of Caron.

The next serious thoughts about Japan may have been in 1841, when, it has been alleged, two French warships were sent "to occupy if possible some island to the south of Japan, which would be valuable for strategic and commercial purposes, and to make treaties of trade and friendship with Japan, and especially with Korea."[28] Whether or not there was such an intention Japan did not in fact see the French flag until July 1846,[29] when Admiral Cécille appeared at Nagasaki on his own initiative with three ships and the double purpose of securing a promise of good treatment for

28. M.Medzini, "Léon Roches in Japan" in Papers On Japan, vol. 2, Harvard 1963, p.184. Medzini is here quoting W.E. Griffis, Corea, the Hermit Nation, New York 1911, but Griffis derived his information on this point from C.Dallet, Histoire de l'Eglise de Corée, Paris 1874 and in repeating Dallet's account he made a slight but significant alteration. What Dallet wrote was that Cécille "avait aussi l'intention de conclure des traités de commerce avec les royaumes voisins de la Chine, spécialement avec la Corée." (Ibid.p.257) Nowhere is Japan specifically mentioned. For the Orleanist Government to have contemplated an isolated attempt to secure a treaty with her would have been quite out of character.

29. There has been some uncertainty over the date of the first visit by French warships to Japan. Most authorities who refer to it give it as July 1846, but Cady states that it was Nov.1846, Fraissinet 1847, and G.B.Sansom (A History of Japan 1615-1867. London 1954) 1848. There can be little doubt that the first visit was July 29-31 1846. It is just possible that there may have been another visit in one of the following years.

any French sailors who might be shipwrecked on the Japanese coast and of displaying France's naval strength. He left empty-handed after three days, but his visit is said to have made a favourable impression on the Japanese.

Meanwhile the French had been showing some interest in the Ryūkyūs. Already in 1844 Captain Fornier-Duplan had been rebuffed when he attempted to secure a commercial treaty with the islands, and Cécille met with the same resistance immediately before his visit to Nagasaki. French ships continued to call there occasionally, however,[31] and there may possibly have been some trade in arms with Satsuma.[32] In the 1850's the Ministry of Marine became concerned about rumoured American designs on the islands, and as a result a treaty was secured with them by Rear-Admiral Guérin in December 1855.

This very favourable treaty was never ratified. Difficulties in China in 1856 naturally diverted attention from the tiny Ryūkyūs. However, since on this occasion

31. For details of the visits of French naval officers to the Ryūkyūs, see H.Cordier, Les Français aux Iles Lieou K'ieou, passim.
32. Y. Takekoshi, Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilisation of Japan, vol. 3, London 1930, pp. 277-79, says that Satsuma received from the Bakufu secret permission to trade with the French. Sansom, op.cit. p.229, alleges that Satsuma arranged through the Ryūkyūs one transaction, a purchase of arms and machinery. Such a transaction appears to have escaped the notice of both the Quai d'Orsay and of contemporary writers, such as Delprat or Fraissinet. Nor is there any mention of it in a report of Aug. 1856 on "Commerce avec le littoral Japonais et les îles Liou Tchiou", by an agent of the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works, A. Heurtier, to be found in Annales du Commerce Extérieur (Chine et Indo-Chine, 1855-67).

France as well as Britain was militarily involved and a powerful expedition was being sent out, hope could now be entertained of a direct approach to Japan proving successful. It was not, however, the first time that plans for a direct diplomatic approach had been laid, for already in 1854, at the time of the Perry expedition, the Quai d'Orsay had become interested in signing a treaty. The story of its failure to achieve this throws some light on the workings of French diplomacy.

The first step towards a treaty was taken in March 1854, when the Quai informed the French Minister in China, Bourboulon, that, as the Americans looked like being successful, he was being sent the full powers necessary to negotiate in his turn.[33] When he received this dispatch, however, Bourboulon did not feel in a position to act on it directly. He was busy trying to revise the treaty of Nanking, and did not think enough was known of the details of Perry's success. Above all, there was no French ship available. He had been offered passage by Bowring and Stirling but had declined. "Quelle serait en effet," he wrote back, "la position d'un Plénipotentiaire Français se présentant dans un pays comme le Japon pour y négocier un traité sans être accompagné par un seul bâtiment de sa nation, et comme l'humble protégé d'une grande Puissance étrangère?"[34] This was reasonable enough,

33. C.P.Chine, XV. March 6, 1854. Drouyn to Bourboulon.
34. C.P.Chine, XV. May 19, 1854. Bourboulon to Drouyn.

but Bourboulon's concern for French prestige went a good deal further. Notwithstanding the Quai's statement that Bowring had also been given full powers and that "l'intention de son gouvernement comme celle du gouvernement de l'Empereur est que vous vous prêterez un mutuel appui,"[35] Bourboulon maintained that action in common presented grave objections. It might well give rise to embarrassing difficulties over precedence, and it would show French naval strength in direct comparison with British. His suggestion that the Japanese might in such circumstances be led to regard France as a British satellite, coupled with another plea that the British were regarded by Japan with extreme suspicion and that it would be unwise to appear in association with them,[36] induced the Quai to modify its instructions. 'Mutuel appui' was no longer to be interpreted as enjoining simultaneous action.[37]

By this time, indeed as early as August 3rd, Bourboulon had decided that "une expédition au Japon se trouve maintenant forcément ajournée par l'état avancé de la saison jusqu'au commencement de l'année prochaine."[38] He was by no means displeased by his enforced inaction, nor by the effect of the Crimean War in preventing both Britain and France from negotiating a treaty so far, for he had learned that Admiral

35. C.P.Chine. XV. March 6, 1854. Drouyn to Bourboulon.
36. C.P.Chine. XV. Aug. 3, 1854. Bourboulon to Drouyn.
37. C.P.Chine. XV. Oct. 7, 1854. Drouyn to Bourboulon.
38. C.P.Chine. XV. Aug. 3, 1854. Bourboulon to Drouyn.

Laguerre was to receive considerable reinforcements which would enable him to visit Japan in style in 1855. The belief that an impressive display was necessary when dealing with Japan was as much a feature of French thinking as it was of British.

The Ministry of Marine had indeed decided in June to send out several more ships[39] and these would have been sufficient for Bourboulon's purpose in the following year. By 1855, however, the unfavourable reception of Stirling's convention in Europe had made the whole question of treaties with Japan uncertain, and the Quai d'Orsay was unwilling to make arrangements with the Ministry of Marine until it knew Britain's plans.[40] Clearly France did not feel herself capable of isolated effort. In any case, in the Far East itself, Bourboulon would have suffered from the same difficulties that beset Bowring, in that while it was possible for both French and British squadrons to visit Japan in the course of their war duties, the very nature of war rendered any precise prediction of the time of these visits, and hence the planning of a diplomatic mission, out of the question.[41]

Between the end of 1854 and the start of 1857 Britain seemed to lose interest in the question of Japan, and consequently it was more or less shelved by France too. Then with the

39. See C.P. Japon. I. June 9, 1854. Marine to Quai.
40. See C.P.Japon. I. Feb. 16 1855. Drouyn to Walewski (London).
41. On the difficulties encountered by Britain, see Beasley, op.cit., especially Chapters V-VII.

Arrow and Chapdelaine incidents came the sending of imposing British and French expeditionary forces to the China Seas. Given Japanese fears that they might suffer the same fate as the Chinese,[42] there was nothing now which could prevent the signing of France's first treaty with Japan save a failure to bring to a speedy end the war with China or a refusal of the naval commander to allow the subsidiary diplomatic mission to Japan a high enough priority to be worth the dispatch of a naval force. In fact, while the first of these possibilities was more or less excluded by mid-1858, the second nearly materialised. When, in July, Baron Gros sought from Admiral Rigault de Genouilly the means to carry out the part of his instructions relating to Japan, he found that the Ministry of Marine's plans differed somewhat from those of the Quai d'Orsay. All that the Admiral could spare from his expedition to Cochin-China were three unprepossessing vessels, one of which was not even a ship of war.[43]

42. The immense influence of the Arrow War upon Japan has often been remarked upon. In the words of one leading Japanese historian, "at that time China was being continually defeated. This state of affairs made a great impact on the Bakufu leaders. Consequently they greatly feared that, if they went on persistently refusing Harris' strong demands, it would finally lead to war, and would result in Japan sharing China's fate.... That is to say, through this war between China and Britain and France, the great military strength of the Western Powers made a deep impression on the Bakufu leaders too, and caused them to make these bold concessions." Oka Yoshitake, Kindai Nihon no Keisei. (The Shaping of Modern Japan) Tokyo, 1947, p.34.

43. C.P.Chine. XXV. Aug. 2, 1858. Gros to Walewski.

It was this mediocre naval support which was responsible for the British and French treaties with Japan being negotiated separately. When Gros was given his instructions in May 1857, Bourboulon's views were no longer accepted, and the Quai's attitude was that "il ne pouvait qu'être avantageux à nos vues et à celles du Cabinet de Londres de nous associer à lui dans la négociation qui viendrait à être entamée au Japon."[44] Gros accepted this, but because of the inferiority of his force he decided not to accompany Elgin on July 31, when the British Envoy set sail for Nagasaki in order to make a preliminary reconnaissance. He understood that Elgin would shortly return to settle Chinese tariff problems and then return to Japan with a smaller force which the French could accompany without too great a feeling of inferiority.[45] In the event Elgin returned on September 2nd with a treaty already signed. Gros had no alternative but to sail for Japan alone. His unimpressive showing may well have lost him the chance to secure some of the special concessions which he sought and which co-operation with Britain might have made possible.

(d) The 1858 Treaty

The mission of Baron Gros resulted in the signing of a Franco-Japanese Treaty of friendship and commerce in Edo

44. C.P.Chine. XXI. May 16, 1857.
45. C.P.Chine. XXV. Aug. 2, 1858. Gros to Walewski.

on October 9th.[46] In content it differed very little from the American, Dutch, and British treaties and like these it contained a most-favoured-nation clause, which guaranteed that France should enjoy any rights that Japan might grant to other Powers in the future. The most important concession which had been secured was the right of foreigners to reside and trade at Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Kanagawa immediately after the ratification of the treaties, and at Niigata and Hyōgo from 1860 and 1863 respectively. They were also to have the right to trade at Edo from 1862 and Osaka from 1863. In another important clause the Bakufu promised that no internal obstacles to trade would be imposed. Import and export duties were established at an average level of between 10% and 20%, though some luxuries in which France specialised were as high as 35%. The French treaty also contained, in common with the others, some jurisdictional clauses which, though not without ambiguity, ensured that Frenchmen could not be prosecuted in Japanese courts of law and could therefore under no circumstances be forced to suffer the rigours of the Japanese penal system. As regards the religious provisions in the treaty, these were limited to the right

46. There exist two accounts of Gros' negotiations in Japan by members of the expedition. They are: Ch. de Chassiron, Notes sur le Japon, la Chine, et l'Inde, Paris 1861, and Marquis de Moges, Souvenirs d'une Ambassade en Chine et au Japon en 1857 et 1858, Paris 1860. The former is more valuable for Japan. The treaty itself is printed by Cordier, "Le Premier Traité," pp. 278-290.

of Frenchmen to worship within the foreign settlements; missionaries were given no special position. The right to travel within the interior of Japan was granted in theory to diplomatic representatives, as was the right to establish legations in Edo, but the details of such matters were left to be arranged in collaboration with the Japanese authorities. Finally, it was stated that revision of those parts of the treaty which had proved inconvenient could be demanded by either contracting party, one year's notice having been given to the other, from August 1872.

About the negotiations leading up to the signing of the French treaty little need be said. They did not prove particularly difficult, since the Japanese authorities were already reconciled to the sacrifice they were to make. The success of the Europeans against China had made a deep impression on the Rōjū, who intended to take no chances of provoking hostilities, whatever the opposition within Japan.[47] To some extent their fears were unjustified, for Japan was in no immediate danger of attack in 1858. Indeed, as far as France was concerned, Gros' instructions emphasised the friendly character which the Emperor desired to give the negotiations,[48] and this fact, together with his weak force

47. The Bakufu position is explained by Beasley op.cit., pp.172-184.
48. They concluded: "...nous n'avons point de griefs à faire valoir contre le Japon, nous ne pouvons donc songer à employer la force contre lui pour le contraindre à négocier avec nous ou à accéder à nos propositions s'il les croyait préjudiciables à ses intérêts." C.P.Japon. I. May 16, 1857.

and lack of valuable presents, inevitably restricted Gros' negotiating power in the six conferences that were held between September 27 and October 9. Within these limitations he displayed considerable skill, combining firmness with flattery and with assurances of France's pacific and friendly sentiments. He even succeeded in off-setting the disadvantage of not being able to bestow lavish presents by implying that these would follow upon the exchange of ratifications. "Depuis ce moment, une intimité réelle et cordiale s'est établie entre nous,"[49] he wrote. Despite this claim, Gros was not conspicuously successful in improving upon the American and British treaties for the benefit of a special French interest. He found it impossible to secure a reduction in the 35% duty on wines, whereas Elgin had been able to get the duty on cotton and woollen fabrics cut to 5%. Nevertheless, when the French envoy left Edo on October 10, he did so well satisfied and with a high opinion of the Japanese. The treaty was received by the Emperor with 'une vive satisfaction.'[50]

(e) Conclusions

The main conclusion that emerges from the story of France's relations with Japan before the signing of the treaty in 1858 and of her attempts to secure that treaty

49. C.P.Chine. XXVI. Oct. 6, 1858. Gros to Walewski.
50. C.P.Chine. XXIX. Jan. 8, 1859. Walewski to Gros.

is that Japan did not rank very high on France's list of priorities. The missionaries, it is true, were passionately concerned, but their influence can easily be overrated. It seems obvious that they were not consulted on the concessions to be sought fron Japan. Trading interests, which might have exerted greater influence, showed no enthusiasm. This was hardly surprising considering that even the opening of China had brought but few French merchants to the East. If the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works displayed greater concern, even this was not exclusively commercial. The first note that the Ministry sent to the Quai on this question shows this. It declared that it had been informed that the Americans had secured trade concessions from Japan, and it might be that these could be shared de facto by other nations. Nevertheless, it added, "cette situation subordonnerait au Japon les intérêts comme l'influence des autres pays maritimes à ceux de la Nation Américaine, et je ne pense pas dès lors qu'elle soit de nature à être volontiers acceptée par eux, spécialement par la France."[51] If trade without the accompanying influence and prestige that would come from the actual signing of a treaty seemed unsatisfactory to the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Public Works, it is scarcely to be wondered at that for other Frenchmen these were important factors.

51. C.P.Japon. I. June 10, 1854.

This desire for influence and prestige owed something, no doubt, to the belief that success abroad would bolster up the régime at home, but at a deeper level it sprang from the conviction that France must show that she remained a great power.[52] Since as a trading nation, she clearly could not compare with Britain or America, Frenchmen tended, to prove France's greatness, to emphasize other attributes and qualities. Among her naval officers, Rear-Admiral Guérin provides an illustration of this. In August 1855 he visited Hakodate and, reporting his impressions, made the following remarks on Japan's attitude to foreign countries:

"Entre toutes les nations européennes, celle qui devait se montrer à leurs yeux la plus désintéressée et la plus loyale, est la France dont ils connaissent l'histoire, dont ils comprennent la politique dans la lutte actuelle et qu'ils ne redoutent que parce qu'elle représente dans le monde le principe catholique. Mais ce danger tout moral doit moins les effrayer que l'esprit envahissant des marchands anglais et américains, que l'ambition persévérante de la Russie. De là cette bienveillance dont je vous parlais et ce désir extrême de voir un traité se conclure entre les deux Empires." 53. A still more striking expression of

52. It is possible that the desire for influence in Japan sprang also from international rivalry in the Pacific between Britain, France, and the United States, and Russia. Barraclough, in his essay "Europe and the Wider World in the 19th and 20th Centuries", in A.O.Sarkissian (ed.) Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography, London 1961, seems to point to such an interpretation. Great Power rivalry may have coloured the Quai's attitude to the opening of Japan, but since it was never explicitly mentioned in this context, it is hard to regard it as more than a marginal influence on French policy. If it existed it was soon forgotten when the Powers discovered that they would have great difficulty even in maintaining trade relations with Japan.

53. Quoted by Cordier, "Le Premier Traité" p.233.

this belief that France's greatness was fundamentally different from that of other nations, and would be recognised as such, was that of a man whom Louis-Philippe's government employed as diplomatic observer in China in 1841-3, Dubois de Jancigny. In his unofficial negotiations then he sought to impress the Chinese with France's independence of Britain and her willingness to help China practically. In 1850, in a book on East Asia, he attacked Britain's desire to force Japan open to her manufacturers and asked:

"La voix désintéressée de l'humanité intelligente pourra-t-elle dominer ces clameurs avides? La France oserait-elle alors, noble et prévoyante médiatrice, se poser entre la soif des conquêtes, l'amour intempestif du gain, l'abus de la force d'un côté, et de l'autre la résistance meurtrière d'une nationalité héroïque autant qu'égoiste dans le rêve d'exclusion perpétuelle que caresse son ignorance et son orgueil?" 54.

His optimistic conclusion was that ",...la voix de la France y serait écoutée quand elle s'élèverait pour défendre l'indépendance relative des peuples asiatiques, et nous avons preuvé pour la Chine ce que nous n'hésitons pas à prédire pour le Japon, savoir, que notre intervention, dans les cas où les évènements viendraient proclamer son opportunité aux yeux de l'Europe libérale, serait accueillie aux confins de l'Orient par la confiance de ces populations, ménacées de subir le joug de la spéculation Britannique." 55.
Jancigny's views can be discounted in part; they were extreme even for a Frenchman. Also, the French Foreign Ministry had a proper respect, in practice, for the facts of international power and national interest, and for the sake of European politics was careful to follow a policy akin to

54. Dubois de Jancigny, Japon, Indo-Chine, Empire Birman (ou Ava), Siam, Annam, (ou Cochinchine), Péninsule Malaise, etc., Ceylan, Paris, 1850, p.110.

55. Ibid.

Britain's. Nevertheless such views found an echo too often to be ignored and they help to explain some significant aspects of French policy towards Japan in later years.

Even so, although the desire for prestige and influence was the dominant motive, in that, without it, the Quai d'Orsay would probably have been content, like Prussia or Austria, to leave until the 1860's the signing of a treaty with Japan, the strongest impression which emerges from the French archives is that this desire would have remained unsatisfied without the opportunity provided by the efforts of other Powers. Only after the groundwork had been prepared by the United States, Russia, Holland, and Britain, and co-operation had been arranged with the latter, did France seriously envisage sending an envoy to Japan. Had France alone been concerned, Japan would have remained in seclusion for many years to come.

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CHAPTER II

THE STRUGGLE TO ENFORCE THE TREATIES, 1859 - 1864

(a) The Implementation of the Treaties

The years 1859-1864 were dominated by the efforts of the Foreign representatives to ensure that Bakufu procrastination and anti-foreign reaction did not whittle away or even extinguish altogether the concessions secured by the Treaties. This fact was not surprising in view of Japan's long resistance to foreign intercourse and was to some extent anticipated in the instructions given to Duchesne de Bellecourt[1] in May and June 1859. Their burden was that his main duty would be to ensure that the Treaty was properly and completely implemented. In addition he was to see that Frenchmen did not lack any privileges enjoyed by nationals of other Powers, and, if possible, to secure further concessions from the Japanese Government, such as a reduction in the duty on wine. The European ignorance about the situation in Japan was revealed, however, by the Quai d'Orsay's expectation that this task would not involve Bellecourt in any political activity.

1. Bellecourt was the first permanent French representative in Japan. He served there as Consul-Général from September 1859 to February 1860, when the title Chargé d'Affaires was conferred on him to raise his standing with the Bakufu. In June, 1862 he was made Ministre Plénipotentiaire. He was succeeded by Léon Roches in April, 1864.

"N'ayant, du reste, aucune action à exercer sur le cour de Yédo, au dehors de la sphère des intérêts naturellement placés sous la protection du consulat-général, vous n'avez à remplir au Japon, au point de vue politique, qu'un rôle d' observation", he was informed[2] and the fact that he was appointed as Consul-General rather than Minister emphasized this expectation. Almost immediately upon arrival, however, Bellecourt found that his interest in Japanese politics would necessarily become closer than that of a mere observer. His very first report from Edo announced that: "Dans l'état actuel des choses il est évident que le Gouvernement Japonais est en ce moment travaillé dans les conseils Impériaux, par un parti essentiellement hostile aux Etrangers et fort mécontent des Traités conclus avec eux,...,[3] and he intimated that the presence of a warship was necessary to prevent attacks on foreigners. Apart from this general impression of hostility, however, his ideas about the situation in Japan were very imprecise. At this period, and for several years more, the Foreign Representatives were only able to gain sporadic insights into Japanese politics and it was a continual complaint of Bellecourt that the Bakufu, under the pretext of guarding them against hostile rōnin, was preventing them from coming into contact with any Japanese who might give them an

2. C.P.Japon. I. June 8, 1859. The drafter of the instructions is unnamed.

3. C.P.Japon. I. Sept. 10, 1859. Bellecourt to Walewski.

impartial account of the true state of affairs. Thus they were ignorant that Ii Naosuke, who had gained control of the Bakufu in 1858, had failed to secure the prior sanction of the Imperial Court at Kyoto for the Treaties, though they represented a fundamental reversal of a tradition lasting more than two centuries. They were also unaware at first that the Bakufu was in decline, owing both to grave financial difficulties and to internal dissensions centring around the branch houses of the ruling Tokugawa family and the more bureaucratic elements in the governmental system. Japanese politics were in a grave state of flux, with differences of personality and of policy adding to the financial and structural weaknesses of the Bakufu, and with powerful han like Satsuma and Chōshū eager to play a role in national politics and more particularly one which would help diminish the virtual de facto sovereignty of the Shōgun. The situation was further complicated by the disposition of the Emperor Kōmei, prompted by some of his Court Nobles, to reassume something of the old Imperial authority, and also by the presence in Edo and elsewhere of numerous rōnin, samurai who had left their han, whose anti-foreign feelings were so violent as to lead them to make attacks on high-ranking members of the Bakufu, on individual foreigners, or even on Foreign Legations. [redacted]. In this maze the one thing that was clear to Bellecourt was that their presence was hotly resented

by almost all the ruling class and that the commercial privileges they had been granted were a source of acute embarrassment to the Bakufu.[4]

The way in which the Japanese reaction against the treaties involved Bellecourt in something more than strictly consular activity was not any open refusal to ratify the 1858 treaty,[5] but what he considered a deliberate policy of paring it down to almost nothing in practice. The situation seemed so bad that by the end of 1859 he was writing: "A vrai dire, les Traités n'existent plus - on s'en joue à l'aide de promesses et de paroles... Les restrictions sans nombre que les Autorités locales imposent arbitrairement au commerce indigène paralysent toutes les transactions et les négociants songent déjà à quitter le pays si le Gouvernement Japonais ne se décide pas à changer de politique."6. His conclusion was that:"La crainte seule d'une action coërcitive de la part des Puissances étrangères peut encore arrêter le Gouvernement Japonais dans cette pente funeste. C'est la dernière carte à jouer et quelque circonscrit que soit le rôle qui m'ait été tracé ici, je dois dire que mon attitude ne peut se borner à un simple rôle d'observation. Je serai prudent, mais je ne puis me séparer complètement de mes Collègues; car, il faut le dire, on ne fait au Japon aucun distinction de nationalité; tous les Etrangers, à quelque pays qu'ils appartiennent, sont l'objet des mêmes répugnances et des mêmes procédés inconvenants pour ne pas dire injurieux." 7.

What he wrote here was significant, not only in its anticipation of the various political actions taken in the 1860's but also in its clear recognition of the necessity

4. For the best explanation of the complexities of the Japanese political scene and the impact of it on foreign diplomats, see the introduction to W.G.Beasley, Select Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy, 1853-68. London 1955.
5. This was effected in September 1859; the Bakufu was still too conscious of what Britain and France had been able to do to China to risk an open defiance of their demands.
6. C.P. Japon. I. Dec. 10, 1859. Bellecourt to Walewski.
7. Ibid.

for close entente between the Powers if any headway were to be made against the anti-foreign tendencies. Between France and Britain especially this movement towards entente was reinforced by political considerations in Europe. Close co-operation between the Powers, with the exception of Russia and occasionally the United States, which anyhow played a secondary role during the Civil War, was the rule up to 1865 and even afterwards it was religiously observed in name if not always in practice.

Given the Bakufu's reluctance to accept the implications of the treaties, there were, broadly speaking, two lines of policy which might be followed by the Powers. Bellecourt's preference was for the strong measures advocated by Alcock, the British Minister, rather than for the cautious patience of Harris, who presented the American view that the problems arising out of the new relations between Japanese and foreigners could eventually be settled by peaceful reasoning. Inevitably, however, owing to their lack of clear knowledge about the situation inside Japan, the policy of the English and French representatives was predominantly negative for the first two or three years. All they could do was to threaten the Bakufu with retribution if it persisted in its restrictive measures, while taking care to protect themselves and their nationals. Even these limited objectives were only imperfectly attained. On the one hand there were

frequent attacks on foreigners and their legations, with the result that, at one point, in 1861, Alcock and Bellecourt went so far as to withdraw their legations to Yokohama until the Bakufu promised stronger action against the rōnin.[8] On the other hand various modifications had to be made to the Treaties at the urgent request of the Bakufu, even though the Foreign Representatives, ever apprehensive of a return to the restrictions that had been imposed on the Dutch during the long period of isolation, were doubtful as to how seriously the Bakufu plea that to carry out all the Treaty provisions would lead to civil war should be taken. At the end of 1859 they agreed that Niigata need not be opened from the start of the following year, but when in September 1860, the Bakufu began to insist that a postponement be allowed for all four ports or cities due to be opened by 1863, acceptance was far less easily obtained and it required a Japanese mission to Europe in 1862 to achieve this important, if not vital, objective. Indeed, if things had been left to the Foreign Representatives alone, the outcome might well have been different, and a clash between Japan and the Powers, with possibly fatal consequences for the former, would have been hard to avoid.

The question of postponement deserves attention, not only because it was the focal point of diplomacy for two years, but also because it shows something of how French

8. See C.P. Japon. III. Jan 25, 1861. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.

policy was formulated, and in particular the importance France attached to co-operation with Britain. When he first received the Japanese request, Bellecourt's reaction was: "Pour ma part, il me semble que céder aux exigences de ce gouvernement serait compromettre davantage encore l'influence Occidentale au Japon," and he commented bitterly: "Après avoir, durant toute une année, annihilé, une à une, toutes les clauses du Traité, on en arrive, en ce moment, à en demander ouvertement la non-exécution!"[9] The Quai d'Orsay, however, showed itself somewhat more cautious. The power which France could bring to bear upon Japan being limited, it preferred to act in unity with Britain. As a result of its feelers it learned that the British Government did not feel the demand to be reasonable but that budgetary considerations made it very probable that it would not insist on strict enforcement of the treaty.[10] At the end of January, 1861, therefore, Foreign Minister Thouvenel wrote to Bellecourt informing him that if both London and Washington ended by accepting the Bakufu demand, "je ne pense pas que nous devions seule revendiquer les embarras d'une attitude contraire."[11] This did not prevent Bellecourt from repeating his view in July that "on pourrait, au Japon, dénaturer cette concession

9. C.P.Japon. II. Sept. 17, 1860. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
10. C.P.Japon. III. Jan. 1861. Flahault to Thouvenel.
11. C.P.Japon. III. Jan. 26, 1861. Thouvenel to Bellecourt.

bienveillante en le représentant comme consentie sous le coup de l'intimidation", and he argued that only part, at most, of the Japanese demand should be accepted.[12] The Quai naturally gave some consideration to the views of its agent and in October Flahault was again asked to make inquiries, this time being informed of the Quai's view, that concession offered serious objections.[13] No sign that Britain would be influenced by French views was forthcoming, however, and in November Thouvenel again wrote to Bellecourt implying that France no longer objected to postponement.[14] He claimed that the Japanese had recently been showing signs of good will, but the real reason was clearly that Britain, as a further dispatch revealed,[15] had herself more or less decided to accept postponement in return for compensations, such as the opening of Tsushima, which the Foreign Representatives were instructed to agree upon together. Before this arrived, however, another dispatch from Bellecourt showed that the agents of Britain, France and Holland felt strongly enough about the unwisdom of a policy of concession to have insisted on the opening of Osaka and Hyōgo after all.[16] Their intransigence had

~~11. C.P.Japon. III. Jan. 26, 1861. Thouvenel to Bellecourt.~~
12. C.P.Japon. IV. July 12, 1861. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
13. C.P.Japon. IV. Oct. 1861. Thouvenel to Flahault.
14. C.P.Japon. IV. Nov. 26, 1861. Thouvenel to Bellecourt.
15. C.P.Japon. IV. Dec. 10, 1861. Thouvenel to Bellecourt.
16. C.P.Japon. V. Feb. 26, 1862. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.

already led the Bakufu to decide on the sending of a mission to Europe in the hope of securing better terms, and this meant that the burden of decision was brought back to the French Government again. When the Japanese Envoys arrived in Europe in April, 1862, Thouvenel's opinion, as notes addressed by him, both to them and to the British Government reveal,[17] was still that postponement could only be allowed in return for such compensations as the opening of three ports in Tsushima and Korea, the extension of the foreign concession in Yokohama, and indemnities for assaults on Frenchmen. This was a slightly more moderate attitude than Bellecourt's, but for the Japanese it presented much the same objection in demanding an immediate and inopportune extension by the Bakufu of relations with foreigners. One month later, however, Thouvenel had swung right away from his representative's way of thinking. The cause of this transformation was an interview he had with Alcock, who had returned to Europe on leave. Alcock had become convinced that the Powers ought either to accept the Bakufu demand in toto, or prepare for war, and it is clear that he persuaded Thouvenel of the validity of this unpleasant set of alternatives. The position of France was such that she could only choose the former. As the French Foreign Minister expressed it to Flahault: "Je suis, plus que jamais

17. C.P.JAPON. V. April 24, 1862. Thouvenel to Japanese Envoys; Ibid, April 1862. Thouvenel to Russell (via Flahault).

porté à penser après tout ce que m'a dit M. Alcock que nous nous ne saurions songer à exiger de Japon l'exécution stricte et immédiate de nos traités sans courir le risque d'une rupture politique avec ce Gouvernement, c'est à dire sans nous exposer à nous jeter dans tous les embarras et dans toutes les dépenses d'une expédition lointaine dont l'utilité serait, peut-être, en dernière analyse très discutable." 18

Political and financial considerations like this weighed heavily in the calculations of the French Government, the extent of whose concern with Japan at this time may be gauged by the fact that, in September 1862, the Ministry of Marine decided for reasons of economy that it could not maintain a permanent presence in Japanese waters any longer.[19] All thought of opening new ports as compensation was dropped, and in the end, the only condition made by either France or Britain to their acquiesence in a five year postponement was that the clauses of the treaties should be executed in better faith, especially as regards the restrictions placed on the commercial operations of foreigners.

This last was more a pious hope than a real expectation. Ever since Bellecourt's arrival in Japan the Quai d'Orsay had been receiving dispatches recording the weakness of the Shōgun's authority, and it was hardly likely that a mere postponement of the opening of these ports and cities would do more than give the Bakufu a momentary respite. In fact, before long it was again forced by internal political and economic pressure, to try to restrict still further the

18. C.P.Japon. V. May 27, 1862. Thouvenel to Flahault.
19. C.P.Japon. VII. Sept. 10, 1862. Marine to Quai.

provisions of the 1858 treaty. Above all, Bellecourt reported at the end of January, 1863, the Bakufu was under strong pressure to close Yokohama altogether and confine foreign trade to Nagasaki and Hakodate.[20] This threat which, if carried out, would have reduced trade by well over a half, combined with the frequent requests to the Foreign Representatives to prepare for possible attacks by rōnin, and to avoid daimyō and other important personages on their way in and out of Edo, led the exasperated Bellecourt, together with Neale, the English chargé d'affaires, to make, in May 1863, a proposal of military aid to the Shōgun in the hope of re-establishing his authority. To see this in proper perspective, however, it is necessary to retrace the attitude towards the political situation taken by Bellecourt from the time of his arrival in Japan.

(b) Bellecourt and Japanese politics

In discussing Bellecourt's attitude to Japanese politics it is important to recognise that his position was not such as to make him an objective observer. The Government with which France had signed her treaty was that of the Shōgun. The Bakufu[21], therefore, was the only authority in Japan which France could claim in strict

20. C.P. Japon [redacted], VIII. Jan. 29, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
21. 'Bakufu' was the name generally used by Japanese to denote the governmental framework set up by Tokugawa Ieyasu in the 17th century.

conscience to have undertaken a legal obligation to the Powers,[22] and in view of the evident hostility of Japanese generally, it was important that it should continue to wield power. This consideration was re-inforced by others. The Powers were well aware that Edo, the centre of Bakufu power, could be intimidated from the sea where their own strength lay.[23] They were also in the position, especially in the first two years, of receiving their information about the internal situation almost exclusively from Bakufu officials and, not unnaturally, the latter invariably painted their own enemies as being violently hostile to foreigners, even going so far as to imply that it was solely due to the treaties that the Bakufu itself was resented by the various han. In addition, despite Bellecourt's valiant effort to clarify

22. The home governments, even in their most indulgent moods, never allowed themselves any doubts about the validity of their treaties, but from about mid-1861 their representatives began to have strong suspicions that the authority of the Mikado (Emperor) was potentially greater than that of the Shōgun, and from 1864 most of them were in no doubt of the advisability of securing the former's assent to the Treaties. Surprisingly, the second French minister, Roches, was one of those who shared this feeling. In a dispatch of Sept. 23, 1864 (C.P.Japon. XII. Roches to Drouyn) he stated bluntly that the Mikado was the sole legitimate Sovereign and the Taikoun (Shōgun) only his deputy, and that all important measures such as the Treaties must be sanctioned by the former. Bellecourt, on the other hand, after all his criticisms of Bakufu weakness, wrote just before he left that the Mikado would never acquire the strength of the Taikoun and that it was unnecessary to treat with him. (C.P.Japon. XI. March 19, 1864, Bellecourt to Drouyn).

23. See e.g. a dispatch of July 23, 1863 (C.P.Japon. IX) where Bellecourt, writing to Drouyn, not only makes this point but also envisages the possibility of the Powers establishing control over central Japan.

the political background by drawing up a statistical list of the revenues of the Bakufu and the daimyō,[24] his view of Japan, like that of his colleagues, was dominated by an over-riding concern with trade and the treaties, and this led him to ignore or misinterpret important events or trends.[25] It was not until the Legations produced men like Satow and Siebold, whose ability enabled them to make close contacts with influential Japanese of all parties, that it became possible for the Foreign Representatives to take a more than superficial view of the various claims which were made by the opposing interests. As far as France was concerned, one final factor which may be mentioned was that, possibly because of their own political tradition, neither Bellecourt nor Roches showed any favour for the suggestion that the Bakufu should share its power with the powerful han. This was an idea which both Alcock and Parkes came to advocate, but the two Frenchmen always felt that any reduction in the Bakufu's power was more likely to lead to conflict and prolonged instability than to harmony.

In his first reports on Japanese politics Bellecourt was content to reproduce the views of Alcock, who had arrived

24. C.P.Japon. III. May 20, 1861. Bellecourt derived this information through his interpreter Bleckman, from illicit contacts with pro-foreign Japanese and from secret Government publications. Unfortunately, he entirely omitted the important han of Chōshū, shortly to play a leading role in national politics.

25. An example of this can be found in a dispatch of June 26, 1862 (C.P.Japon. VI. Bellecourt to Thouvenel) where the growing authority of the Emperor was interpreted solely in terms of an attempt by reactionaries to invalidate the legal basis of the treaties.

in Japan earlier than his colleague, and had [redacted] established a considerable influence over the Frenchman. As these early dispatches portrayed the situation, the central Government of the '<u>Taikoun</u>' or 'temporal Emperor' ruled over the reactionary vassal 'Princes of the Empire' some of whom were friendly to him, while others were hostile, on account of the admission of foreigners. These hostile Princes, or <u>Daimyō</u>, of whom Mito, a Tokugawa collateral, was the most prominent, maintained numerous cohorts of warriors in Edo and looked for support to the '<u>Mikado</u>' or 'Spiritual Emperor' in his capacity as guardian of the laws.[26] The ambiguity of a situation where it was unclear which of the two Emperors they should regard as sovereign somewhat troubled Bellecourt's logical French mind even before the treaty was ratified, but he was soon persuaded by Alcock that the <u>Mikado</u> played no active part in affairs and could be ignored.[27] Their acceptance of the <u>Shōgun's</u> sovereignty was criticised by later arrivals, but in terms of foreign knowledge of Japan in 1859 it was entirely justifiable.

This early picture of Japan gradually became more subtle as additional information filtered through or past the <u>Bakufu</u>, but its essentials continued to be accepted for practical purposes for a considerable time. The main modification was

26. C.P.Japon. I. Sept. 10, 1859. Bellecourt to Walewski.
27. C.P.Japon. I. Sept. 19, 1859. Bellecourt to Walewski.

a gradual realisation, which came from its failure to punish criminals for offences against foreigners, that the Bakufu's power and friendliness were more limited than they had at first imagined. This led to some ominous reflections in Bellecourt's mind in September 1860. Having already reached a conviction that "les Japonais ne peuvent se faire à la pensée que les traités puissent modifier leurs anciens erremens et que leur indépendance ne leur est guarantie qu'àla condition d'observer scrupuleusement les termes de leur pacte avec la civilisation occidentale"; he went on to draw the conclusion that to set this state of affairs aright it would not be sufficient simply to bring the Bakufu back to recognition of its obligations towards the Powers. "Je suis convaincu que ce n'est pas seulement par une action uniquement dirigée sur Yédo que le Japon peut être astreint à tenir ses engagements, mais que si cette heure venait à sonner, il serait nécessaire aussi d'agir en particulier sur plusieurs des Princes de ces pays, tant sur les provinces côtières que sur le centre, facile à attaquer par mer vers Osacca, afin d'interrompre les communications entre le nord et le sud de l'Empire. C'est ainsi, pour suivre cette hypothèse qu'il me paraît qu'on pourrait déterminer facilement un tout autre cours d'idées chez les divers membres de cette féodalite dont le corps s'agite à Yédo, mais qui y changeraient vraisemblablement d'attitude s'ils se sentaient atteint jusque dans leurs propres possessions."28 As yet, these were just ideas. Within four years, however, they were to be put into practice, with results not unlike those which Bellecourt had predicted.

28. C.P.Japon. II. Sept. 17, 1860. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.

In the meantime, Bellecourt's political dispatches mostly recorded the weakness of the Shōgun. This had become very marked since early 1860, when the authoritarian rule of Ii Naosuke had been replaced, upon his assassination, by the weak government of Andō Nobumasa and Kuze Hirochika, whose desire to avoid war with the Powers was matched by the conflicting need to placate the Court and powerful han.[29] In April, 1861, the chargé d'affaires was sufficiently struck by the effect of this to write:

> "On peut donc se demander encore si les Puissances Occidentales n'auraient pas eu plus de certitude dans leurs relations avec cet Empire en concluant des traités séparés avec les grands Princes feudataires plutôt qu'avec le Gouvernement actuel qui parait ne tenir sa force que des appoints que lui fournissent les Grands Princes qu'on peut considérer à juste titre comme de véritables Rois."[30]

However, the fact remained that it was with the Shōgun that France had signed her treaty, so, regardless of the suspicion that began to be voiced in 1862 that some of the supposedly hostile daimyō had been misrepresented, the only practical policy was to work through the Bakufu. This meant, in part, exhorting the Bakufu to adopt a more friendly and open attitude. It also meant that the French and British representatives gave serious consideration to the question of whether there was any way of ending the seemingly ever-lasting state of affairs in which they could never feel sure

29. On their dilemma, which they sought to solve by the marriage of the Shōgun to the Emperor's sister and by the promise to rid Japan of foreigners within ten years, see Beasley, Select Documents, pp. 51-54.
30. C.P.Japon. III. April 18, 1861. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.

that a wave of reaction would not force the Bakufu to side openly with the Jōi (Anti-foreign) cause and thus force upon the Powers the unpleasant choice between costly war or ignominious withdrawal. Though it was contrary to their previous policy of abstention from internal politics and to their Governments' known wishes, the conclusion towards which they moved was that they must provide the Shōgun's government with material help in crushing their mutual enemies.[31] When in January, 1863, they were given to understand by the Rōjū, the Bakufu ruling council, that "la réaction des Daimios, réaction préparée depuis longtemps, ménace l'existence des relations amicales établies par les Traités,"[32] and when this was followed by further warnings about possible attacks by rōnin and by a great deal of procrastination over Neale's demands for compensation for the murder of Richardson by Satsuma samurai, they felt they could delay no longer. For France, there existed the additional encouragement to action that for once she had a considerable naval force in Japanese waters under the command of Admiral Jaurès.

The incident which appears to have provided the immediate incentive to act was the acquisition of a letter purporting to have been sent from the Shōgun to the Emperor indicating that the former had accepted the latter's demand for the expulsion of the foreigners. The two Representatives

31. C.P.Japon. VIII. Jan. 23, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
32. C.P.Japon. VIII. Jan. 29, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.

feared an imminent attack on Yokohama and took some measures to protect it. They then decided in conference that: "pour sauvegarder les droits et la dignité des nations Occidentales il n'y avait que deux moyens - ou de se refuser à de nouveaux attermoiemens avec le Gouvernement du Taicoun et d'entrer immédiatement dans la phase des hostilités contre tous, Taicoun et Daimios, ou de mettre inopinément le Gouvernement du Taicoun en demeure de se prononcer nettement dans la question extérieure en lui offrant un appui immédiat et complet contre les opposans quels qu'ils soient qui l'entraînent à manquer à sa parole. Si le Gouvernement du Taicoun est loyal, s'il veut conserver la paix avec l'extérieur, il acceptera cette proposition et il entraînera par sa décision les trois quarts des daimios contre l'audacieuse minorité qui agite en ce moment le pays contre les étrangers." 33

In fact Neale and Bellecourt envisaged putting into practice only the second of these two policies; the first would have been beyond their means and would have involved a blatant, instead of just a partial, breach of their instructions. It can only have been mentioned to give their governments some idea of the seriousness with which they viewed the situation and to make it appear that the policy they intended to follow was one of moderation. Exactly what they had in mind is unclear. Ishii Takashi, a leading authority in post-war Japan on Bakumatsu diplomacy assumes that it was to send a joint fleet, first to the Inland Sea, to support the Bakufu's actions in Kyoto, then to the territories of the respective daimyō.[34] Such action

33. C.P.Japon. VIII. May 3, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
34. Ishii, Gakusetsu Hihan Meiji Ishin Ron. Tokyo 1964, p.264

would have been in accord with Bellecourt's earlier thinking and with the policies adopted in the following two-and-a-half years. In May, 1863, however, their plan was premature. The Bakufu agent to whom they proposed it, Takemoto Masao, neither accepted nor refused it outright. While indicating that "maintenant le Gouvernement de Yédo n'en a pas encore besoin: plus tard, si cela était nécessaire, le Taicoun demanderait cet appui,"[35] he asked them to wait for an answer until the Bakufu leaders in Kyoto had been consulted. The reply was brought at the end of the month. It was a definite refusal:"... "le Taicoun aurait été fort sensible à cette amicale proposition des Puissances contractantes: mais l'amitié étant rétablie entre ce Prince et le Mikado, il reviendrait prochainement dans sa capital (Yédo) pour y régler les affaires pendantes et donner cours à une politique toute favorable à l'extension des relations commerciales avec les étrangers."[36]

A refusal couched in such terms and promising the decisive attitude of open acceptance of the treaties which had been their chief aim obviously took away from the Foreign Representatives, however belligerent their instincts, any pretext for implementing their plan of armed action. However, though abortive, the incident was more than just an anticipation of the 1864 Shimonoseki Expedition and the

35. C.P.Japon. VIII. May 10, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
36. C.P.Japon. VIII. May 27, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.

1865 Hyōgo demonstration. According to Ishii, "the important proposal of the English and French ministers gave great encouragement to the Bakufu faction which favoured the extension of Bakufu power and friendship with foreigners."[37] It thus made less likely the success of the policy of co-operation which Satsuma and some of the other powerful han had been working for in conjunction with some of the moderate members of the Bakufu and its supporters.

It is questionable whether, even if the Shōgun's government had accepted the offer of aid, Neale and Bellecourt could have carried out their plan to completion. For the reaction in Europe to such intervention was unfavourable to say the least. When the French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, read in Bellecourt's May 3rd dispatch that the two representatives intended to send for reinforcements from China, he could not forbear writing in the margin a blunt 'non'. His disapproval was expressed at somewhat greater length in his dispatch to Bellecourt of July 18th:

"Je ne puis approuver, davantage, l'offre que vous avez faite au Gouvernement Japonais de lui prêter votre assistance pour triompher de l'opposition des Daimios. La plus simple réflexion suffit pour démontrer que nous nous lancerions ainsi à l'aventure dans les risques d'une immixtion des plus compromettantes dans les affaires intérieures du Japon. Or, en l'état présent des choses, quand sur tant d'autres points du globe, des questions d'une importance capitale réclament notre attention ou absorbent déjà notre politique, il serait difficile de trouver une seule raison qui pût justifier une entreprise où les sacrifices du Gouvernement de l'Empereur seraient si disproportionnées aux avantages hypothèques qu'on aurait en vue."[38] In Drouyn's and the

37. Ishii, op.cit. p.265.
38. C.P.Japon. IX. July 18, 1863. Drouyn to Bellecourt.

Minister of Marine's view, Bellecourt and Jaurès might have pointlessly jeopardized French interests in Cochin-China. In his own defence Bellecourt claimed that he had had no intention of acting before receiving Paris' approval, but this seems doubtful. Drouyn de Lhuys' warning, however, was sufficient to ensure that the French Representative followed a more cautious policy until his departure in the following year. It is worth noting that the Quai d'Orsay doctrine here laid down of avoiding entanglement in Japanese politics remained official policy throughout the whole Bakumatsu period, save for a brief moment in 1864, when immediate decisions were placed in the hands of the Foreign Minister himself, owing to the visit of the Ikeda mission.

The remainder of Bellecourt's stay was mainly taken up by continued efforts to re-secure Bakufu acceptance of the provisions of the Treaties, for it was soon found that not only was the Shōgun's promise to take strong measures against hostile daimyō not being put into effect but that once more the Bakufu was being drawn into the position of promising the Court that it would expel the foreigners. At first this did not seem such a serious problem, for it was clear that the Bakufu feared the strength of the Powers' warships more than it did its internal opponents. This was shown in June 1863, when the authorities in Edo, led by Ogasawara Nagamichi, and using Bellecourt's good offices,

said that they had again received orders to demand the evacuation of Yokohama by the foreigners but asked for the co-operation of the Foreign Representatives in refusing their demand. As Bellecourt reported it, their plan was that Ogasawara "écrira séparément à tous les Représentans étrangers une lettre identique et il conseille à ceux-ci de répondre à cette notification dans les termes de la plus vive indignation car il est désirable que ces réponses qui seront montrées à Yédo et à Kioto, y produisent une profonde impression sur l'esprit des plus récalcitrants."[39] With this the Foreign Representatives complied, Bellecourt remarking that "l'acte qui vient de s'accomplir n'a certainement pas de précédent dans l'histoire" and that it was "bien incompréhensible".[40] His uncertainty suggests that he was not taken into the confidence of the faction which wished to re-establish Shōgunate control to any great extent[41] and despite Bakufu requests that Bellecourt be retained in Japan when he was about to be replaced by Roches the following year, it would be a gross exaggeration to liken the position of the former to that of his successor. It may well have been, indeed, that the Bakufu intended to make use of France as a powerful

39. C.P.Japon. IX. June 24, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
40. Ibid.
41. A contrary view may be found in Hattori Shisō, Kindai Nihon Gaikō-shi (A diplomatic history of modern Japan), Tokyo, 1954, p.55.

friend and intermediary, for Bellecourt remarked on "la préférence marquée que les Japonais affectent de donner en ce moment aux autorités françaises", but his reaction to this was quite different from his successor's, for he added:"Nous devons éviter aussi de leur donner jamais à penser qu'ils pourraient parvenir à nous séparer de nos alliés, pensée qui a peut-être été ou conçue ou suggérée."[42]

The cause of Bellecourt's unwillingnesss was undoubtedly his suspicion that the Bakufu had not yet given up all hope of easing its position by securing the removal of foreigners by some means or another. He never changed his original conviction that the Japanese Government's real desire was to return to conditions such as had been imposed upon the Dutch at Deshima. In this he was probably not far wrong. The greater the extension given to foreign trade, the less chance the Bakufu had of controlling it for its own benefit and the more disruptive the effect on the economy. Bellecourt even considered that the Bakufu was playing "une sorte de double jeu qui consisterait à mettre en avant mille prétextes pour éloigner une crise tout en laissant les Princes les plus déterminés commencer des hostilités qu'on pourra désavouer si elles ne réussissent pas et sur lesquelles on pourrait s'appuyer si elles avaient quelque chance de succès,"[43] and he warned a vice-minister that "l'indépendance du Japon

42.) C.P.Japon. IX. June 30,1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
43.) C.P.Japon. IX. July 29,1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.

serait affectée par cet état de choses bien plus vivement que par l'exécution loyale de traités conclus en vue d'avantages mutuels."[44] This sort of language, however, was forgotten after the arrival of Drouyn's July 18th dispatch.

His Foreign Minister's displeasure made a considerable difference to Bellecourt's diplomacy. This was especially seen in October when, after reporting the murder of a Lieutenant Camus and rumours that big merchants trading with foreigners were being attacked, he not only witheld from urging coercive action again, but even went so far as to conclude, resignedly, that: "il deviendra bientôt préférable d'abandonner la place, plutôt que de voir continuer un état qui ne leur offre que peu d'espoir de stabilité."[45] Finally he informed the Quai d'Orsay that the Bakufu seemed about to demand the closing of Yokohama again, this time in earnest.[46] He had refused to discuss it with Japanese officials, informing them that any decision to alter the Treaties must be made in Europe. A postscript announced that the Japanese government was considering a new embassy to Europe for that purpose.

(c) The 1864 Embassy to France and the Shimonoseki Expedition

The second Japanese embassy to Europe was announced to Bellecourt as definitely decided upon in December.

44. Ibid.
45. C.P.Japon. X. Oct. 23, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
46. C.P.Japon. X. Oct. 31, 1863.

He had encouraged it, as he thought it would relieve the pressure on the Bakufu from its internal enemies and on the foreigners from the Bakufu. Drouyn de Lhuys, however, did not welcome what he considered to be an unnecessary and inconvenient distraction.[47] Separated by so many thousands of miles from Japan, he could not feel the tensions or appreciate the subtleties of the political situation to the extent that his agent did. The reports Bellecourt had made indicating that Satsuma and some other han were now definitely known to be in favour of foreign trade, even if only secretly, appear to have convinced him that it was safe to refuse outright the demand for the closure of Yokohama, and he did not realise, as Bellecourt vaguely did, that Satsuma's conversion had not necessarily strengthened the Bakufu's position. He was unaware that the emergence of the Strengthen-the-Bakufu-Friendship-With-Foreigners faction as the dominant voice in the Bakufu in Edo had been followed by the forcible expulson of Jōi samurai by Satsuma from Kyoto. This success had greatly boosted Satsuma's prestige but it had also increased the jealousy and distrust for this han felt by the Strengthen-the-Bakufu faction, which had attempted to do the same thing as Satsuma two months earlier without success, and by the most important Bakufu leader, Tokugawa Yoshinobu.[48]

47. C.P.Japon. XI. March 20, 1864. Drouyn to Bellecourt.
48. See Ishii, op.cit., pp.268-9. Yoshinobu's name is often read as Keiki.

As a result, the Bakufu's relations with Satsuma became much less harmonious than in the previous two years, and at the start of 1864 it showed that it was no longer prepared to work with Satsuma in changing the Court's position on foreign affairs.[49] In short, the Shōgun's government was almost as weak and isolated as before, and the sending of an embassy to Europe was necessary in order to forestall the criticism that it was doing nothing to put into effect the expulsion order which the Court had issued in 1863.

Some Bakufu leaders, with the 1862 mission in mind, may really have hoped to achieve the closure of Yokohama. Others may only have expected to gain time. In either case, the new embassy proved a grave disappointment. Having left Japan at the end of January, 1864, it returned before the end of August, having visited only one country.[50] That country was France and it is not unreasonable to suppose that the French Foreign Minister's reception had a good deal to do with the shortness of the embassy's stay in Europe. Drouyn's attitude to the Japanese envoys showed nothing of the cautiousness that had marked his own instructions to Bellecourt. On the contrary, he displayed an unwillingness to make concessions that seemed to suggest a considerable

49. See Beasley, Select Documents, pp.72-4.
50. The account of the mission's leaders has been translated into English. Ibid. pp. 274-82.

degree of belligerence. For once the fear that France might be compelled to enforce her demands should they be refused was forgotten. It may well be that personal contact made the Foreign Minister feel that he could control the situation, whereas he did not fully trust Bellecourt's assessment and feared that he might take advantage of the four months it took to reply to dispatches to become involved more deeply than Paris was prepared to risk. There seems to be no other explanation for the volte-face of his offer of aid to the Shōgun, should the latter require it to overcome his internal difficulties.[51] Nor was this all. In the second conference on May 11, Drouyn also sought, as proof of the Shōgun's good will, that the three ports already open be made free, and he threatened to insist on the immediate opening of Osaka and Edo if his demand were refused. When the envoys said that to make Yokohama, Nagasaki and Hakodate free ports would provoke fresh hostility within Japan, the Foreign Minister's reply was: "Alors, la France devra employer la force." Upon this the envoys hastened to say that they

51. The offer was made on May 7, in the first of six conferences with the envoys. A procès-verbal of the conferences is included in C.P.Japon. XI. June 1864. Two other documents relating to the mission, one a memorandum drawn up by its adviser, the elder Siebold, are to be found in Mémoires et Documents, Japon. I. Siebold urged France to support the Shōgun and he may have influenced Drouyn and possibly even Napoleon III (See Ōtsuka, Bakumatsu Gaikō-shi no Kenkyū, (Studies in Bakumatsu Diplomatic History) Tokyo, 1950. p.288). It is difficult to see, however, how this influence could have been more than marginal. The main factor was probably Drouyn's assurance from personal contact that such intervention could not turn into a war with the Shōgun's government itself.

were not refusing, merely making an observation. In their fifth conference with Drouyn they proposed making Nagasaki and Hakodate free in return for the closing of Yokohama and also offered compensation for traders at the latter port. Despite their plea that "le sort du Japon dépend de la décision qui va être prise à cet égard par la France et ses alliés," Drouyn refused. The decisions taken in the six conferences between May 7th and June 10th were embodied in a convention on June 20th.[52] The main provision was that France would aid the Bakufu in opening the Shimonoseki Straits, which had been closed to foreign ships by Chōshū's batteries for a year, if they were still closed in three months' time. France dropped her absolute insistence on the freeing of the three ports but secured the promise of reductions in import duties and an indemnity of 140,000 dollars for Chōshū's bombardment of a French ship. In return Drouyn promised to allow Japanese students to study in Paris and to sanction the purchase of arms and some older warships. In the final conference the envoys stated that they no longer intended to visit any of the other European capitals. It may well be that, in view of Drouyn de Lhuys' attitude, they felt that it was less dangerous to negotiate in Japan than in Europe.[53]

52. The text, together with a number of dispatches, was printed by the French Government in Documents Diplomatiques V. Paris, 1865.

53. Ikeda, the leader of the mission had also become convinced that the Bakufu must abandon without delay the dangerous policy of trying to evade the provisions of the Treaties. See Beasley, Select Documents, pp.277-81.

The 1864 Japanese embassy was a failure in every respect save perhaps that it gave the Bakufu the assurance that France still regarded it as the sole legal Government of Japan. It had failed to secure a significant breathing-space, and worse still, it rendered the Bakufu even more open to jōi attack, in that by the June 20 convention its envoys had accepted the help of a foreign power against other Japanese. It is consequently not surprising that the new French Minister, Léon Roches, was secretly very relieved at the Bakufu's refusal to ratify the convention although he naturally pretended to be indignant.[54] To understand his feelings fully, however, it is necessary to turn to events in Japan during the Embassy's absence.

With the return of Alcock from leave in March 1864, determined never again to submit himself to the uncertainties of Japanese politics, a new era in diplomacy was foreshadowed. By the time Roches arrived to take up his post as Minister in Japan on April 27, the British Minister was already planning to put the strong fleet at his disposal to good use. On May 19, Roches reported that he had received a letter from Alcock proposing punitive action by the Treaty Powers against Chōshū in the hope not only of opening the Shimonoseki Straits which the latter had threatened with its batteries since June 1863, but also of weakening the bastion of anti-foreignism and

54. C.P.Japon. XII. Aug. 26, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.

strengthening, if possible, the co-operative elements within the Bakufu.[55] Since both the American and Dutch Ministers were in complete agreement with this scheme, Roches' position was a difficult one. On the one hand, he could not be ignorant that Bellecourt's tentative efforts to support the Shōgun had brought down upon him a severe reprimand. On the other hand, it was customary for France to act in common with Britain in Japanese affairs. At first Roches maintained an equivocal attitude,[56] but his natural inclination towards bold measures and his conviction that the situation would deteriorate if the Powers did not counteract the internal pressure on the Bakufu by a show of Western strength made it inevitable that he would sooner or later find a way of collaborating with Britain. Already before the receipt of Alcock's letter, Roches had reported that the prospect facing foreigners was eventual expulsion, once the Japanese had bought Western arms in sufficient quantities.[57] A week later, he added that in his first interview with the Rōjū, the demand that the Powers accept the closure of Yokohama had

55. C.P.Japon. XI. May 19, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
56. Ibid.
57. C.P.Japon. XI. May 17, 1864. Roches to Drouyn. At this stage Roches was still receiving advice from Bellecourt who remained at Yokohama till May 28.

been accompanied by a declaration that the Bakufu would soon be unable to protect foreigners there and that trade would become impossible. This, he claimed, was a threat to the treaty which he had been instructed to observe religiously, and justified him in according his moral support to his colleagues' scheme if the Japanese Government continued in its attitude. He had also promised his material support in protecting the persons and goods of their nationals.[58]

When this dispatch reached Paris at the start of August, Drouyn de Lhuys was somewhat disturbed, though not as much as he would have been had he known what Roches had been doing in the meantime. He 'invited' Roches to dissociate himself from any action that went beyond the immediate protection of foreigners, arguing that the convention he had just signed would bring the Bakufu back to sanity.[59] On August 15, he followed this up with a telegram stating that London persisted in its peaceful approach and had recalled Alcock.[60] Both these missives were fated to arrive too late to halt events, but Roches had in any case made virtually certain that there would be no official interference by not writing again until August 17. He then informed his Foreign Minister that

58. C.P.Japon. XI. May 25, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
59. C.P.Japon. XII. Aug. 10, 1864. Drouyn to Roches.
60. C.P.Japon. XII. Aug. 15, 1864. Drouyn to Roches.

he had requested Admiral Jaurès to participate in the expedition, if the Bakufu should fail to act against Chōshū itself.[61] Though he admitted that some persuasion had been needed, his statement made no mention of the sustained campaign to overcome Jaurès' resistance to which the latter's reports to the Ministry of Marine between June 15 and July 25 bear ample witness.[62] They also show that Roches had made up his mind long before he admitted it. Though he eventually justified his decision by quoting a Bakufu official to the effect that the Shōgun desired Chōshū's punishment but that as he could not carry it out itself he would readily give his tacit consent to the Powers' action,[63] it is obvious that Roches was prepared to engage French ships even without this guarantee that it would not lead to war with the legal government of Japan. It is obvious too that the three months' delay which Bakufu ratification of the Paris Convention would have necessitated would have ended the chances of an allied expedition. In its place, there was no real guarantee that France would provide the force to carry out the task in an imposing manner, yet because of it the Bakufu would have laid itself open to further nationalist attack. It was for these reasons that Roches reported

61. C.P.Japon. XII. Aug. 17, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
62. These dispatches were passed on to the Quai d'Orsay by a disgruntled Minister of Marine. See C.P.Japon.XII. Aug.26, 1864. Ibid. Sept. 16, 1864. Ibid. Oct. 13, 1864. All Marine to Quai.
63. C.P.Japon. XII. Aug. 17, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.

the rejection of the Paris Convention of June 20 with scarcely concealed satisfaction.

The return of the 1864 Embassy had occurred on the eve of the expedition's departure, but it did not delay it for long. By September 23, Roches was able to report its complete success.[64] The Chōshū batteries had been disarmed and, helped by the fact that a considerable number of Chōshū samurai were in Kyoto, attempting to regain the control of the Emperor which they had lost in the Satsuma coup of the previous year, the allied forces had been able to occupy Shimonoseki and impose terms on the defeated han. A month later the Bakufu agreed to pay a three-million dollar indemnity for the damage done to foreign ships and for the allies' consideration in not burning the town of Shimonoseki.[65] The indisputable success of the expedition meant that the Foreign Representatives had no need to fear for their careers on account of their independent action, but before its results were known in Europe, Roches in particular was condemned severely for his breach of orders. "Je n'admets pas, Monsieur," wrote Drouyn on October 1, "que la distance autorise, comme vous paraissez le croire, des agens à se départir ainsi de la ligne de conduite qui leur a été formellement prescrite et, en vous réitérant mes précédentes directions, je dois vous rappeler que vous ne pouvez vous écarter de leur stricte observation sans encourir la plus grave responsabilité."[66] Even when he learned of the outcome

64. C.P.Japon. XII. Sept. 23, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
65. See C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 31, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
66. C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 1, 1864. Drouyn to Roches.

he did not altogether relent. His only comments were that he understood the motives for the expedition, that the admirals were to be congratulated on not allowing the fighting to turn into a war, and that his own pacific policy was not wrong and must be maintained.[67] For Roches himself there was no word of praise.

The Shimonoseki Expedition had an enormous effect on diplomacy in Japan. The Japanese Government could never again dare to think of solving its problems by demanding the withdrawal of the foreigners. Since, however, its internal enemies could no longer attack it on this score, its stability was less threatened than before. For Roches too, the Expedition was important. By freeing the Foreign Representatives from their perpetual concern with survival, it allowed them to develop more ambitious ideas about their role in Japan. Roches was extremely alert to this possibility, and the fact that he had been proved right over the action against Chōshū, gave him a strong hand in his future dealings with his Foreign Minister. Moreover, another result of the Expedition was the recall to London, and then the posting to Peking, of the able Alcock. Up to then, he had dominated the Japanese scene. When the next forceful British Minister arrived in mid-1865, he was to find that Roches had succeeded to this position.

67. C.P.Japon. XII. Dec. 10, 1864. Drouyn to Roches.

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CHAPTER III.

LEON ROCHES AND FRENCH SUPPORT OF THE BAKUFU, 1864-1868.

(a) The Bakufu-France Special Relationship.

With the Shimonoseki Expedition the first period of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Treaty Powers came to an end. Thereafter the Foreign Representatives, satisfied that their presence was accepted both by the Bakufu and by the powerful daimyō, no longer felt any grave doubts about the future of trade, and the securing of Imperial Sanction for the treaties a year later did not mean a great deal in practical terms. For France the decisive factor was probably the lifting of restrictions on the export of silk and silkworm eggs, which Roches reported on October 15, 1864. That date may be regarded as an important turning-point in another way, for the same dispatch also contained the following passage: "Je [redacted] puis même ajouter que le Gorojo m'a donné des témoinages de considération et de confiance dont je crois inutile de rendre compte au département mais qui me font espérer de remplir avec fruit la mission que le gouvernement de l'Empereur m'a confiée."[1]

This dispatch of October 15, 1864, was the first sign of the special relationship between Japan and France which

1. C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 15, 1864.

distinguished the final years of the Tokugawa Bakufu and played so important a part in the latter's downfall. Despite the attention that has been paid to this relationship, some uncertainties still remain. They are centred on, firstly, the ultimate aims which Léon Roches was pursuing; secondly, the problem of whether the policy he was following was his own or his Government's; and thirdly, the extent to which the policy of France diverged from that of Britain. Without an examination of these aspects, it is impossible to understand the true nature and significance of French policy or to attempt an answer to the question of whether French assistance to the Bakufu was doomed to failure from the start or whether it could have given the Shōgun the strength either to subdue his enemies or, at least, preserve a large portion of his power.[2]

Before discussing specifically any of the problems connected with French policy during this period, however, it will be well to describe the main features of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Powers up to the end of 1867, and the ways in which the Bakufu-France friendship developed. Roches' special contribution can be seen in both spheres from an early stage. In the field of general

2. Unfortunately the evidence available on these points is not all that might be hoped for. Of all the Representatives whom France sent to Japan in the 19th century, Roches was by far the most irregular correspondent and the most secretive. Consequently the questions which arise from his activities can in most cases be answered only in terms of probabilities.

diplomacy the first problem to arise was that of the Shimonoseki Indemnity. In the settlement following the Expedition, the Bakufu, which had been allotted responsibility for Chōshū's offence, was given the choice of either paying a huge indemnity of three million dollars or opening another port. Britain, in particular, desired the latter and gained the support of the United States and Holland. The Bakufu, however, had strong objections to this. Even if the port were to be in Bakufu territory, which seemed unlikely, it would mean an increase in trade, with its attendant inflationary effects on the cost of living; even worse, perhaps, the opening of another port would also mean that the Bakufu would be extending, rather than restricting, the treaties, and this would seriously weaken its position vis-à-vis the Court and hostile daimyō by removing any credibility which its profession that it was working for the gradual removal of foreigners still possessed. Nevertheless, as it was in no position to pay the indemnity, it is very doubtful whether the Bakufu could have succeeded in resisting the pressure of the Powers had it not received the diplomatic support of France. Not that Roches' pro-Bakufu sympathies were France's only reason for prefering the indemnity to the opening of a new port. Money was always welcome, while French trade was not substantial enough at the ports already open to make her want another one, unless it should be the famed Osaka.

With limited budgets moreover, the expense of providing protection for their nationals in a new port was by no means a negligible factor.[3] More important still was the suspicion that the port would be Shimonoseki and that, were this to be opened, by some means or other Britain would come to gain some special advantage. This fear of Britain winning a march over France through her naval superiority was one which had troubled Bellecourt and had been responsible for his taking active steps to associate France with Britain during the Richardson affair. Roches' tactics were different. Instead of trying to control British policy by co-operating with it, he sought to nullify it by preventing the Powers from taking a unanimous stand and relying on the probability that England would not act in the absence of an entente. In this he was successful. Although Drouyn de Lhuys had stated in 1863 that what Britain did in Japan was no concern of France,[4] now, at the start of 1865, Roches secured his support on the Indemnity question,[5] and without France's adherence to a joint demand, neither Winchester nor Parkes, the two British Representatives involved, could force the Bakufu to concede what they desired.

3. C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 31, 1864. Roches to Drouyn; M.D.Japon. III. Jan. 10, 1865. Marine to Quai.
4. C.P.Japon. IX. July 18, 1863. Drouyn to Bellecourt.
5. C.P.Japon. XIII. Jan. 10, 1865. Drouyn to Roches.

It was his initial failure on this score that induced Parkes to make the next important move in diplomacy. This came in November, 1865, when the English Minister led his Dutch, American, and French colleagues in a powerful fleet to Hyōgo. The avowed purpose of the operation was to facilitate negotiation with the Shōgun, who had for some time been resident in Osaka. The Powers had three objects in mind - Imperial sanction of the 1858 treaties, lower tariffs, and the opening of Hyōgo and Osaka, in return for which they were prepared to waive payment of the remaining two-thirds of the indemnity. Beyond this, the expedition was intended by Parkes to give the Bakufu a forceful reminder that Britain had the power to disregard it, if it proved impotent or unsatisfactory, and negotiate directly with the Court or the leading han. The French, or rather Roches', response to Parkes' action (the Quai d'Orsay did not hear of it until it was all over) was similar to his attitude over the Shimonoseki Indemnity, but less effective. At first he opposed the idea altogether; then when he found Parkes adamant he agreed to the Rōjū's request that he accompany the English Minister and contribute a restraining influence.[6] Claiming to be ill, he took no part in the negotiations on the British flag-ship, but it seems he helped to draft the final note with which the Bakufu partially satisfied Parkes.[7] His own dispatches make no mention of the last fact.

6. C.P.Japon. XIII. Oct. 31, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.
7. See Beasley, Select Documents, p. 82.

Diplomatic activity from the end of 1865 was centred upon two issues, the first of which was the negotiation of a new Commercial Convention. Following its promise of November, the demoralised Bakufu reduced the import tariff to a general level of 5%. In deference to the superior interest of Britain in the Japan trade, Roches allowed Parkes to act for him in these negotiations, but it is worth noting that, in a dispatch to Paris, he claimed the credit for predisposing the Japanese towards more liberal ideas concerning international trade and his advocacy may well have been crucial.[8] With this matter settled, however, differences between France and Britain again became evident, for the second issue concerned the attitude the Powers should adopt regarding the Bakufu-Chōshū conflict.[9] Here Roches' actions were motivated

8. C.P.Japon. XIV. June 26, 1866. Roches to Drouyn.
9. This conflict, which eventually proved disastrous for Bakufu authority resulted from the Bakufu's decision to regain prestige by punishing Chōshū for influencing the Court against it. The attempted coup d'état by Chōshū samurai in Kyoto in 1864 provided an excellent pretext. The Bakufu expedition at the end of 1864 was an imposing one which forced the Chōshū leaders to come to terms but the apprehensions of Satsuma and other great daimyō prevented it from pursuing its advantage, and in a very short time it found itself opposed once more by new leaders in Chōshū, who had attained power by armed force and were pledged to the Bakufu's overthrow. It was therefore necessary for the Bakufu to undertake a new expedition, but the preparations were not completed until July 1866, by which time Chōshū had made a secret alliance with Satsuma and was amply equipped to resist that attack, which was called off before the end of the year. The essential book on this subject is A.M. Craig. Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration Cambridge, Mass. 1961.

entirely by his friendship with the Bakufu. Already, in June 1865, he had secured the agreement of the other representatives to the proposal that the Powers follow a policy of absolute neutrality in the Bakufu-Chōshū conflict[10] and the practical effect of this was to put a stop to the direct import of arms into Chōshū by foreign traders. In mid-1866 the Bakufu became greatly concerned at Parkes' relations with some of the South-Western daimyō. The approaches to Britain by agents of both Satsuma and Chōshū had become known and had given rise to the fear that the British Minister might take some official action that would reduce the Bakufu's prestige and encourage its enemies. Consequently, in July of that year, Roches was asked by one of the Rōjū to follow Parkes to Nagasaki and counteract his influence.[11] Previously he had always eschewed contact with the powerful han. Now he readily agreed to do what he could to help the Bakufu in this direction. He met a Satsuma envoy at Nagasaki and

10. See C.P.Japon, XIII. June 26, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.
11. See C.P.Japon. XIV. Aug. 27, 1866. Roches had already exerted some restraining influence on Parkes through his home government. His complaint that Parkes was acting rashly by opening direct relations with the daimyō was taken up by the Quai d'Orsay with the Foreign Office, which instructed its representative to act with the utmost prudence. See F.O.46. LXIV. No. 82. May 7, 1866. Clarendon to Parkes; F.O.27. MDCXVI. No. 588. May 4, 1866. Cowley to Clarendon.

addressed him with "un langage qui n'a dû laisser aucun doute dans son esprit à l'égard de la politique prudente et loyale que les Puissances Etrangères sont décidées à suivre à l'égard du Japon." With some relish his report adds: "Il était facile de lire le désappointement sur la physionomie de l'Officier de Satsouma."[12] Roches also succeeded in accompanying Parkes on his return from Nagasaki, but failed to persuade him to join in an offer of mediation to Chōshū when they passed through the Shimonoseki Straits. What Roches meant by mediation was shown in the note which he sent to Chōshū in which he spoke of the han's illegal actions and offered to facilitate its 'submission' to the Shōgun.[13] Even so, his attitude towards Chōshū was more moderate than that of the Bakufu, mainly because he saw how the struggle was weakening both the resources and prestige of the latter. His preference really would have been for a settlement that would have saved the faces of both sides.[14] It would appear, from information given to Parkes,[15] that it was only when the French Minister found the Bakufu unwilling to agree to his mediation on such a basis that he urged it to prosecute the war more vigourously. Rumour had it that he had then made an offer of military aid.

12. C.P.Japon. XIV. Aug. 27, 1866.
13. F.O.46. LXX. No. 131. Aug. 13, 1866. Parkes to Stanley. Inclosure.
14. C.P.Japon. XIV. Aug. 27, 1866. Roches to Drouyn.
15. F.O.46. LXX. No. 141. Sept. 2, 1866. Parkes to Stanley.

The Bakufu was said to have declined it, but it can be imagined that its enemies can hardly have been happy at the possibility that it could turn to a great Western Power for help if necessary. It is likely that the concern felt by the South-Western han at the growing intimacy between France and the Bakufu, a concern which is attested to in the reports of Satow, the English interpreter who had close contacts with important daimyō and samurai,[16] played a considerable part in bringing them together in an alliance which their mutual jealousies would certainly have delayed, if not prevented altogether.

In reality, the fears of those han were not without foundation. By the end of 1867, when the political turmoil finally came to a head, the Bakufu had been receiving material assistance from France for nearly three years, and with a few years more its position would have been significantly strengthened. The process had begun at the start of 1865 when the Bakufu officially requested French help in the construction of a maritime arsenal, which was intended to give the Shōgun a clear naval supremacy over the daimyō.[17] Thanks to Roches' skilful advocacy, this was agreed to at once. The Quai d'Orsay

16. See e.g. F.O.46. LXXVIII. No.8. Jan. 18, 1867. Parkes to Stanley. Inclosure. In Uwajima, Satow found, "The intimacy of the French with the Bakufu (Tycoon's Government) appeared to be a subject of great suspicion with [the ex-daimyo]" Ibid.
17. C.P.Japon. XIII. Jan. 16, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.

and Ministry of Marine even responded favourably to the accompanying request for sixteen of the new 'canons rayés', which previously had been denied to the Japanese.[18]

Plans for this arsenal and dockyard, on which the Bakufu proposed to spend up to thirty million francs, were rapidly set afoot. A preliminary survey was entrusted to Lieutenant Verny, a French engineer, and after he had suggested Yokosuka as a suitable site he was put in charge of constructing there Japan's first modern arsenal and dockyard. Materials and personnel were sought in France and in March, 1866, work was commenced. Skill and experience were supplied by 45 French workmen, many of them from the French navy. Partly to provide interpreters, and partly for more general cultural purposes, a French school under Roches' interpreter, Mermet de Cachon, was set up in Yokohama also. Unfortunately for the Bakufu the Restoration occurred before it could derive much benefit from the huge project.[19] Much the same thing applied to the small factory that was built with French help at Yokohama at about the same period.

18. C.P.Japon. XIII. March 18, 1865. Drouyn to Roches.
19. A short and rather superficial account of the dockyard J. Raoulx, "La Création de l'Arsénal de Yokoska" can be found in La Revue Maritime, May 1939, pp. 588-635.

Of more immediate value was another Bakufu-French enterprise, 'La société générale d'importations et d'exportations dans l'extrême Orient,' also known as 'la compagnie Franco-Japonaise.' First indications of this project were given by Roches on October 17, 1865, when he reported that he had been approached by the Rōjū with a proposal that 'une puissante Compagnie Etrangère' should be formed in France for the purpose of "nouer, au dehors de son action officielle, des rela tions avec une association du même genre composée de sujets Japonais." As he pointed out, although it was understood that "le gouvernement japonais renoncerait à toute action sur ces Compagnies autre que celle qu'exercent les gouvernements Européens sur des associations de ce genre," it seemed not impossible that "les avantages immenses qui seraient assurés à une Compagnie à laquelle ce gouvernement accorderait simplement sa bienveillance" would ensure that "le Japon serait pour nous ce que la Chine est pour l'Angleterre, c'est à dire un marché Français."[20] Roches envisaged a huge trade being built up on the base of French exports to Japan and Japanese exports of raw silk to France. The idea was blessed by the Quai d'Orsay and the Ministry of Commerce and a company was soon formed in France. Its activities never, of course,

20. C.C.Yédo. IV. Oct. 17, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.

reached the heights anticipated by Roches but it did play a by no means unimportant role, for although the contacts made by its representative, Coullet, with Japanese merchants had no time to come to fruition, it was used extensively by the Bakufu to import war materials of various sorts in 1866-7.

The military power of the Bakufu might have received an even greater strengthening by yet another project which depended largely on French aid. During the final years of the Tokugawa period the inadequacy of the traditional military system was becoming generally recognised and several han experimented with foreign methods. The military structure of the Bakufu particularly needed reform and at the start of 1866 a request was made to France, through Roches, to send a military mission to assist in forming the nucleus of a new army.[21] The Ministry of War readily provided a group of able young officers, who applied themselves to their task diligently, after they arrived in Japan in January 1867. Unfortunately for the mission's promoters, however, it had to be withdrawn from its task of instruction in April of the following year owing to the civil war, and in such a short time of operation its efforts could hardly bear much fruit.[22]

21. C.P.Japon. XIV. Feb. 15, 1866. Roches to Drouyn.
22. This and later military missions have been studied in detail by E. Presseisen, Before Aggression, Tucson, 1965.

Even with the military mission the list of changes initiated by the Bakufu under Roches' guidance is not exhausted. In fact, the end of 1866 saw the first steps towards a political reform which has been considered by Japanese historians to be the most significant of all the changes produced by the Bakufu-France friendship.[23] The reason for this judgement is not so much the effect of the reform on the political situation - it would seem that Tokugawa Yoshinobu, who promoted it after he replaced Iemochi as Shōgun, was only able to implement some of its least fundamental aspects - as the evidence it provides for the view that the Tokugawa Government was changing from a feudal organisation into an absolutist bureaucracy.[24] Whatever the truth of this view, it is perhaps worth noting that, for Roches, advocacy of political reform was meant, if his own statements can be believed, to pave the way for the eventual introduction of a liberal civilisation once the challenge to the Shōgun's power was defeated.[25] As regards the details of the projected reform, Roches' advice to

23. The most detailed account is by Honjō, Bakumatsu no Shin-seisaku, (The New Policies of the Bakumatsu Period), Tokyo, 1935, pp.188-199. A more recent, shorter, version can be found in Ishii, Meiji Ishin no Butai-ura, (Behind the Scene in the Meiji Restoration), Tokyo, 1960. pp.160-167.

24. Inoue Kiyoshi, while agreeing vehemently with Ishii that what the Bakufu was aiming at in its last years can best be termed 'Tokugawa comprador absolutism' dissents from the general view by holding that there was a real danger of its succeeding. See Ishii, Gakusetsu Hihan Meiji Ishin Ron.(The Meiji Restoration: A Critical Discussion of Scholarly Theories) Tokyo, 1961. pp.276-7.

25. C.P.Japon. XV. March 1, 1867.

Yoshinobu ranged boldly over the whole field of government. To the question of how to reform the old feudal system, the representative of France, working from his understanding of his own country's history, urged the necessity of extinguishing the power of the great Tozama daimyō and the incorporation of the fudai daimyō and their retainers, together with the hatamoto, into a rationalised government structure, with the able being allocated to the proposed new army and navy, while those unsuited to this role would be made to transfer to agriculture and commerce. Bakufu institutions themselves would undergo fundamental alteration, the Rōjū and Wakadoshiyori being replaced by western-style Ministries, headed by specialists and staffed by men of ability, virtually regardless of rank. As Ishii remarks, this was little different from the policy put into effect by the Meiji Government a few years later.[26] In Roches' scheme of things, however, the Emperor was to be returned to his former impotence and was to be so educated and controlled that he would never again provide a focus for anti-Tokugawa agitation. To establish a better financial support for the new modernised structure, Roches emphasised the necessity of reforming the fiscal system also. New taxes on many items were proposed as an addition to the traditional one on land, and a budget system based on the sale of all the Bakufu's rice revenues

26. Meiji Ishin no Butai-ura, p. 165.

was also envisaged. It may be questioned whether Yoshinobu intended to make use of all Roches' advice and whether he had not, in any case, a fairly good idea already of what was needed for Bakufu modernisation. What does seem certain, though, is that he placed an enormous amount of trust in friendship with France. This was shown in his readiness to send his younger brother, together with other young Japanese, to Paris in 1867, for the purpose of receiving a French education. His appreciation of Roches' efforts was expressed in several messages to the French Minister, but nowhere as strikingly as in a letter which he addressed to Napoleon III at the start of 1867. After referring to the new outlook and changes in Japan, he wrote:

> "Mais je serais injuste et ingrat si je ne disais pas que ces heureux changemens sont, en grande partie, dus à Votre Représentant, Léon Roches, qui a épuisé pour nous tout ce qu'il y a de vrai, de sincère et de bienveillant dans son coeur. J'ai en lui une confiance illimitée, et je compte bien, à l'avenir, en faire mon conseiller intime pour toutes les affaires étrangères." 27

Even allowing for flattery, such language indicates something more than mere technical co-operation, and it is worth mentioning in this context that in February 1867, an anonymous Quai d'Orsay review of Roches' career stated that "M. Roches a su obtenir une si légitime influence dans ce Pays, qui lui doit sa transformation depuis 1864, qu'il corréspond directement avec le Taikoun et que plusieurs

27. M.D.Japon. I. It is dated Keio 2.12.29. (Feb.3, 1867).

fois lorsque les ministres Japonais ont voulu faire adopter un plan par leur Souvérain, ils lui ont demandé de l'appuyer auprès de lui."[28] In all this, however, it is important to remember that Roches' relations with Yoshinobu were a much later development than his links with some influential middle-ranking Bakufu officials, notably Oguri Tadamasa and Kurimoto Kon [redacted], and it was their influence which had prompted most of the previous requests for aid.

(b) The Repudiation of Roches' Policy

In this brief outline of the growth of Bakufu-France co-operation, one important item has still not been mentioned. If the long-term plans for the re-establishment of Tokugawa power were to have any chance of success, the immediate challenge of the South-Western han would have to be suppressed, and for this the strengthening of the Shōgun's army was urgently required. As an important step to this end, agreement with Coullet had been reached in 1866 for the supply of arms and equipment on a large scale. Immediate payment for this, however, was impossible for a government whose finances were based on a system long out-of-date and whose resources were being further depleted by indemnities to foreign countries. The only solution possible was a foreign loan and, not surprisingly, it was planned by Roches and Oguri that the bulk of the

28. C.C. Yédo. IV. Feb. 1867.

five million dollars needed for this and future requirements should be sought in France. There can be little doubt that when the project was worked out, in the autumn of 1866, it seemed perfectly capable of realisation. Within a matter of months, however, circumstances had changed, and by the time Yoshinobu returned the Shōgunate's powers to the Emperor in November 1867, virtually all hope of success had disappeared. To understand the reasons for the failure of this important scheme,[29] it is necessary to return to the three basic questions about French policy formulated at the start of this section.

These questions become relevant from the fact that, in 1867, when movements to negotiate the loan were under way, the differences between French and British policy towards Japan reached a point where they could not help but clash, even if this clash did not take the shape of open antagonism between Roches and Parkes, but was masked by a change of Foreign Minister in Paris and diverted, to some extent into a difference between Roches and Drouyn de Lhuys' successor, the Marquis de Moustier. This clash

29. Ishii puts it even more strongly, "Bearing in mind the fact that the funds for completing the military preparations by means of which the Bakufu intended to suppress the powerful anti-Bakufu han were to come from this loan, one can say that it was on its success or failure that the Bakufu's existence really depended." Meiji Ishin no Butai-ura. pp.170-171.

not only proved a vital factor in the failure of the foreign loan but also tied Roches' hands almost completely thereafter, as far as help for the Bakufu was concerned. Why this clash occurred and why it had so decisive an effect, cannot be understood unless it is realised that French policy in Japan between 1865 and 1867 was largely the personal creation of Roches himself. Before discussing this point, however, it is appropriate to examine more closely the actual differences between French and British policy.

Up until 1864, although there were occasional disagreements between France and Britain, their fundamental attitude towards Japan remained the same. It was, as has been described, one of general support for the Shōgun. This picture began to change even before the Shimonoseki Expedition and it was the English Minister, Alcock, who first diverged from the earlier view. Contacts with Satsuma, after the British bombardment of Kagoshima, had convinced him that the daimyō were by no means as anti-foreign as they had been painted, and this, combined with an awareness of Bakufu weakness, led him to believe that the best solution both for Japan and for foreign trade was a constitutional compromise whereby the Shōgun would share his power with an assembly of daimyō.[30] This view was

30. See Ishii, Meiji Ishin no Butai-ura, pp.10-12. Some of Ishii's conclusions, however, are arguable.

more or less taken over by Parkes. It must be emphasized that neither the British Government nor any of its representatives desired the overthrow of the Shōgun's power completely. Their desire was for something similar to the Kōbu Gattai programme, which had been attracting strong support from Satsuma and other great daimyō in the early sixties.[31] They were certainly not aiming at the replacement of the Tokugawa by Satsuma and Chōshū, and it cannot even be said with certainty that Britain desired the abolition of the Shōgunate. To interpret Parkes' visits to the South-Western han as meaning that he supported the aims of their more extremist samurai-leaders is to ignore the fact that Britain had important trade interests to protect, which would be endangered by the civil war which must surely result from an overthrow-the-Bakufu policy. As this is different from the accepted view, some quotations in its support from Parkes' dispatches to the Foreign Office, may be appropriate. On July 24, 1866, while he was in the middle of his visit to Kyūshū and Shikoku, Parkes wrote from Nagasaki that "In regard to the political condition

31. To suggest as both Ishii and Inoue do, that Britain supported the powerful daimyō in order to prevent a revolution 'from below' in Japan, however, is surely to ignore the numerous exhortations by every British representative and Foreign Minister to the Rōjū to encourage merchants and foster the growth of a 'middle class'.

of Japan, the Tycoon's Government appears, as far as I can judge, to be the only power in the State which is able to preserve general order, and secure the faithful observance of our Treaties."[32] As for the purpose of his visits to the South-West, it was largely to make contacts and gain information, and in this context it is worth noting that he wrote on February 28, 1867: "It is by no means desirable that our communications with the Daimyōs should be confined to that section who appear opposed to the existing Government."[33] One might also cite his acceptance of an interview with Yoshinobu at the start of 1867, though conscious that this, in his own words, "might be of material service to him at a time when a considerable section of the daimyōs are not disposed to submit readily to his authority."[34] It is also

32. F.O.46. LXIX. No.123. July 24, 1866. Parkes to Clarendon.
33. F.O.46. LXXVIII. No.29. Feb.28, 1867. Parkes to Stanley.
34. F.O.46. LXXVIII. No.1. Jan.16, 1867. In his private correspondence with Hammond, Parkes came out in support of Yoshinobu still more decisively: "At the same time I am quite disposed to give him all the support I can in whatever position he occupies;....he certainly appears to me to be the most superior Japanese I have yet met and it is possible he will make for himself a name in History." (F.O.391. XIV. May 6, 1867). His enthusiasm paled somewhat at the end of the year when the Bakufu failed to find the murderers of some sailors from H.M.S. Icarus. He never, however, shared the strong anti-Bakufu sentiments of Satow, whose opinions, as expressed in A Diplomat in Japan, London 1921, are often taken to represent official British policy.

difficult to square with the policy of unqualified support for the South-Western daimyō, which Parkes is generally considered to have held the fact that he threw all his influence into ensuring that the Shōgun employed a British mission for the training of his naval officers, and not content with this, even attempted to acquire a share in the training of the army.[35] All in all, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Parkes only supported Satsuma and Chōshū claims to a limited extent and in so far as they could be achieved by 'constitutional' means, and that he was probably given a misleading impression of their intentions.

In reality, then, the British attitude to the Japanese political situation underwent relatively little change, and had French policy remained what it was in early 1864, there need never have been a clash between the two. As has been seen, however, if from one viewpoint French policy changed less than the British in that she maintained in full her support for the Shōgun, from another angle, it changed much more owing to the intensity of its implementation. Some of the assertions about French policy in this period, however, are misleading. It is alleged, for instance, that Roches was sent out by Drouyn de Lhuys with a special mission

35. See e.g. F.O.46. LXIX. No.123. July 24, 1866. Parkes to Clarendon.

to establish a new policy.[36] In fact, there is no documentary evidence in favour ofthis assertion, but a great deal to suggest that Roches was told to carry on where Bellecourt had left off. Paris had very little knowledge of Japanese affairs and Roches himself acknowledged his debt to his predecessor for informing him fully about conditions there on his arrival.[37] Drouyn's strictures on him for his participation in the Shimonoseki Expedition indicate that official Quai d'Orsay policy was still most concerned with avoiding risks of involvement.[38] The most that can safely be said about the appointment of Roches is that it indicated the desire of Napoleon III's government to extend her unsatisfactory commercial relations with Japan by sending there a man of known ability, who had special links with the French silk industry.[39] To treat his appointment as a 'new line'

36. See Medzini, op.cit. p.183, where he maintains that by the 1864 Paris Convention, France "cut herself loose from the policy she had pursued since 1859. The new 'line' was entrusted to her new envoy in Japan - Léon Roches." Ishii, Meiji Ishin no Kokusai-teki Kankyō. (The Meiji Restoration in its International Perspective), Tokyo, 1957. p.500., also sees the appointment of Roches as marking a reversal of French policy.

37. C.P.Japon. XI. May 15, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.

38. C.P.Japon. XII. Oct. 1, 1864. It would appear that Drouyn was led to believe by Ikeda that the Bakufu would deal with the Shimonoseki problem by itself.

39. Roches originally came from Grenoble. He was well acquainted with E. Duseigneur, a leading silk merchant in Lyons. See C.C.Yédo, III. Sept. 1, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.

for this reason, though, is to forget that Bellecourt had already taken steps in this direction himself by sending back to France some examples of Japanese silkworms and by constantly urging the Bakufu to remove the restrictions on their export.[40] In any case, the desire to boost trade can hardly be regarded as exceptional in the 1860's, or peculiar to France.

The 'new line' theory also carries the implication that the initiative towards Bakufu-France friendship came entirely from Roches. This again seems to rest on predisposition rather than evidence. As Roches' own dispatches tell the story, it was entirely a question of his responding sometimes hesitantly, to approaches by the Rōjū or their agents. If Roches' own account be suspected of disingenuousness, there are still other factors that would support it. In particular it should be noted that right from the beginning of treaty relations the Bakufu had looked for help from one of the Foreign Powers. Their purpose was obvious. Good relations with one of the Powers could reduce the danger of isolation and provide Japan with information about the wider world, as well as a channel for the import of arms and other material requirements. It might also temper the hostility of the Powers in a period when the Bakufu's

40. See e.g. C.C.Yédo. I. Oct. 3, 1861. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.

inability to execute the treaties made it highly vulnerable. Until his departure from Japan in 1862, Townsend Harris to some extent played this role. Thereafter there was something of a gap which the Bakufu partly managed to fill with Pruyn, Harris' successor, and also, fleetingly, with Bellecourt. Neither proved really satisfactory. Bellecourt, though sufficiently flattered by Japanese attentions in 1863, to be willing to act as mediator between the Bakufu and Britain, was too suspicious of Japan's ultimate intentions to accept the idea of her possession of the most up-to-date weapons.[41] Pruyn, on the other hand, was all too ready to act as a supplier of arms, but appears to have had too much of an eye on personal profit for the Japanese Government's liking.[42] In any case, the U.S.A. was too deeply involved in the Civil War to be of much use to Japan diplomatically. However, neither Russia, because of her territorial ambitions, nor Britain, because of her demands for the extension of trade, could be envisaged in the role of protector. Holland, on account of her political insignificance, and Prussia, not yet a naval power and with a highly unsympathetic minister, were also out of the question. Therefore, if the Bakufu were to continue to seek a special relationship with any of the Powers, that Power could only be France,

41. C.P.Japon. VII. Oct. 10, 1862. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
42. See F.O.46. LV. June 23, 1865. Winchester to Russell.

which, though diplomatically of very considerable weight, had not the strength in the Far East to be a real danger and had, since late 1863, shown much restraint. And, once the ambiguity of the Bakufu's attitude towards the Treaties had been removed by the Shimonoseki expedition, what reason had Roches for refusing a role which might bring added prestige to France? That the new relationship was so quick to emerge is explicable by the fact that Kurimoto Kon, one of the Bakufu officials, was already on friendly terms with Mermet de Cachon.[43] Of equal importance was Roches' own personality, especially his ability to treat Japanese officials with respect and to flatter them, his moderate and reasonable attitude, and his wide-ranging imagination and ambition.[44] Though he may have gone further in responding to the Bakufu approaches than he admitted, however, his reports and actions during his first six months in Japan when he criticised the Bakufu in the customary manner, are clear indication that

43. The impression given by Kurimoto in his memoirs, Kurimoto Joun Ikō, Tokyo, 1943, ed., pp.108-9, is that certain Bakufu leaders were eager to take advantage of his unusual friendship.
44. Roches' sympathies for the Japanese people were often visible in his dispatches. It is hard to imagine Parkes detecting a likeness between the Japanese character and that of his own country, as did Roches. See C.P.Japon. XIII. Jan. 10, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.

he did not arrive with any pre-conceived idea of forming any special tie with the Shōgun's government.

The crucial aspect of the Bakufu-French friendship, as far as the clash with British policy is concerned, was not, however, its origins, but the use to which Roches put it and the goals which he envisaged for it. He himself, in his dispatches,[45] claimed to be working not only for the consolidation of a pro-French government, but also for the good of the Japanese in general, and since he still supposed the dissident daimyō to be violently anti-foreign and reactionary, he may well have been sincere when he urged that under the guidance of Yoshinobu alone could Japan be made prosperous by the influx of foreign capital and the exploitation of her resources. That her introduction to the benefits of liberal Western civilisation would have a strong French flavour was particularly gratifying. However, this policy had other implications, of which Roches must have been [redacted] well aware. Most important was the potential addition to French strength and influence in the Far East which would result from the acquisition there of any ally, and perhaps a naval base,[46] from the immense increase in trade

45. See especially C.P.Japon. XV. March 1, 1867. Roches to Moustier, where he developed his views at some length.
46. The suspicion that France wished to use Japan as a base for a renewal of her 1866 expedition against Korea held a prominent place in Parkes' private letters to Hammond in 1867. See e.g. F.O. 391, XIV, Feb. 1. 1867.

that would follow, and from a new outlet for French capital.

These results, had they ever been realised, would have presented a considerable challenge to Britain's political and economic predominance in the Far East, and it would thus have been surprising if she had not attempted to sabotage the Bakufu-France friendship on this ground, despite Roches' skill in minimising the importance of his projects. Nor should one ignore the resentment of Parkes at being forced to take a back-seat in Japanese affairs after his experience in China.[47] Unfortunately for Roches, the point at which British opposition made itself felt coincided with the launching of the Franco-Japanese trading company and the preparations for the crucial loan. Such a consideration may not have been foreign to the mind of Parkes, at least. News of an undertaking of this nature was bound to spread, especially as part of the money was sought from the Oriental Bank of Yokohama, which was an English concern. Parkes himself made no open objections to the loan, but in a letter of November 14, 1867, to Hammond, he referred to Roches' position in a revealing passage: "The Company which he and Coullet have endeavoured to form has proved an utter failure from their not being able to get their shares taken. Their stock in trade would have been

47. Roches insinuated this in C.P.Japon. XIV. Aug. 27, 1866. Roches to Drouyn.

contracts with the Japanese Government and finance operations, in the way of loans on their account, but I have had something to do with checking these operations. Most of the contracts the Japanese Government thought of making have been abandoned as also the idea of raising a loan, and the proposed Company therefore find themselves without a field for their enterprise. I should, of course, not allow such a company to obtain any Exclusive privileges."[48] Parkes did not, unfortunately, specify what steps he took to obstruct the French scheme but it is possible that he advised the Oriental Bank not to co-operate with the Shōgun's government. Such a lack of response by the bank-on-the-spot would certainly have had a discouraging effect on French investors. Parkes also advised Japanese

48. F.O.46. LXXXII. Nov. 14, 1867. Private. With this report Parkes enclosed copies of four letters written to Roches, including two from Coullet and one from Fleury-Hérard which are extraordinarily revealing. Exactly why Roches showed them to him is not clear, though it may have been intended to prove to him that the Comte de Montblanc's military mission to Satsuma did not have official backing. In the light of Coullet's first letter, of Aug. 9, 1867, Parkes' statement that his Company had proved an utter failure seems slightly exaggerated. Though Coullet admitted that the public subscription for it had failed, he added that "il n'y a rien de perdu. On va reprendre l'affaire comme on aurait du le faire dès l'origine... le capital, plus restreint pour commencer, sera formé par les adhérents immédiats du groupe des fondateurs, et j'espère que nous aurions un retard mais non pas un échec." As far as large scale operations were concerned, however, Parkes' remark seems true enough, for Coullet admitted that the prospects of a loan had completely vanished. "Vous savez déjà qu'en ce moment il ne saurait être question d'emprunt Japonais."

officials against contracting any heavy obligation, but if he thought this had been effective, he was mistaken, for the Bakufu subsequently sent Kurimoto [redacted] to Paris, in an endeavour to achieve their object more quickly, and their earnestness was shown by the fact that he was empowered, in Roches' words, "de concéder à une Compagnie internationale l'exploitation des forêts et des mines de la grande île de Yézo."[49] Because of the failure to attract public support for the trading company, the idea of a loan had to be abandoned, but the basic cause of failure was not Parkes, but an ex-diplomat, Laurence Oliphant. In April, 1867, he gave notice of a question in the House of Commons concerning French 'official trading'.[50] This intention, which became known in France, must have been an additional factor in making Coullet's and Fleury Hérard's schemes seem extremely

49. C.P.Japon, XV. July 12, 1867. Roches to Moustier.

50. Presumably Oliphant was prompted either by a newspaper report of this or by a request from a member, or members, of the English community at Yokohama. He was put off by Lord Stanley and, contrary to what Ishii states in Meiji Ishin no Kokusai-teki Kankyō, p.596, the only question concerning Japan that was asked by him in Parliament was an innocuous one, concerning the stationing of European troops at Yokohama. (See Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, CLXXXVI, April 4, 1867. p. 1107). Nine days later, however, the Feb. 14th edition of the Japan Times, which contained a stronger attack on Roches, arrived, and this convinced the Foreign Office that Oliphant's original question could not be ignored. See M.D. III. April 18, 1867. Cowley to Moustier.

hazardous, especially when it led to action by the Foreign Office itself. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed to bring to the French Foreign Minister's notice the reports in the Japan Times which had accused Roches of violating the Treaties, and request an explanation so that Parliament might be satisfied.[51] Whether this action was deliberately intended to exert pressure on French policy or whether it was no more than it appeared, it had an effect far beyond what the Foreign Office could have hoped for. The Marquis de Moustier, the French Foreign Minister, who had already become concerned at British rumours of imminent Civil War in Japan, decided to take a hard look at what his agent had been doing. The result was the effective dissociation of the Quai d'Orsay from the policy to which Roches had devoted so much effort. Within France itself this new orientation was seen in the Quai d'Orsay's refusual, during the Paris Exhibition, to allow the Shōgun's claim to sovereignty over Satsuma, which was also represented there.[52] Such a refusal coming together with the anti-Tokugawa propaganda in the Paris press of the Comte de

51. Ibid. Cowley's note spoke of the Japan Times imputing to Roches "a course of proceeding of which it is certain the Imperial Government would not approve."

52. See M.D.Japon. I. May 1867, unsigned memorandum; M.D.Japon. I. Jan. 9, 1869, unsigned memorandum. Also Ōtsuka, op.cit., p.310.

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Montblanc and Mermet de Cachon,[53] and the departure later in the year of Montblanc's military mission, provided with passports for Satsuma, spelled doom for any last hope the loan might have had.[54] With regard to Roches' own position, a dispatch written on May 18th warned him that what he had done already was quite enough and that he should not associate France too closely with a government which might soon be overthrown. It was made clear to Roches that he could expect no support for any independent action in the future and that English views on Japan were considered more reliable than his.[55]

53. Montblanc, after his failure to be accepted as adviser by the Ikeda mission, developed contacts with Satsuma samurai in Europe from 1865, and wrote pamphlets, raised loans and bought arms on Satsuma's account. Mermet de Cachon, Roches' right-hand man, who had returned to France on the footsteps of Tokugawa Mimbu's mission, was disappointed in his hope of becoming the young prince's tutor and adviser. He suddenly turned against the Bakufu and attacked its authority both in the press and in a mémoire addressed to the Quai d'Orsay. (See M.D.Japon. I. May 9, 1867). His rejection by Mukōyama and the other leaders of the mission was apparently due to his religious status. See Ōtsuka. op.cit. p.304.

54. Whether the loan ever really had much chance is doubtful. With regard to Egyptian securities, a French banker wrote in 1861 that French capitalists "do not like to risk their funds in little known enterprises", and "consider, rightly or wrongly, that the countries of the Orient offer little in the way of guarantees". (D.Landes, Bankers and Pashas. London 1958. p.105.) In 1867, the end of the Egyptian boom and the collapse of the Crédit Mobilier had made investors even more cautious. In such circumstances the Bakufu loan could have been a serious proposition only if the Shōgun had been known to possess the unqualified support of both the French and British governments.

55. C.P.Japon. XV. May 18, 1867. Moustier to Roches.

How is it possible to explain this apparent willingness to abandon a successful policy at the first hint of British displeasure? Two factors have generally been cited - the worsening of France's position in Europe after the Austro-Prussian War and the Mexican Expedition, and the replacement of Drouyn de Lhuys, [redacted] regarded as the supporter of Roches and the Bakufu-French special link, by the Marquis de Moustier.[56] The new Minister, it is held, was above all anxious not to offend Britain or become deeply involved in affairs outside Europe, and this caused him to repudiate Roches. This view is not entirely satisfactory. If these two factors alone were involved, why, since Moustier was in office for more than six months before May 1867, was France's Japanese policy not changed in 1866? What evidence, moreover, is there to indicate that Drouyn was any less concerned than Moustier about involvement in distant parts? His instructions to Bellecourt and Roches in 1863 and 1864 are full of admonitions on this score, and he insisted after the Shimonoseki Expedition that his views had not changed. Even if one accepts that the basic cause for the change of policy was the fear of being involved in

56. Ishii, Meiji Ishin no Kokusai-teki Kankyō, p.596, sees the change of Minister as providing France with an opportunity of returning to her former policy. Ōtsuka, op.cit. pp.290-1, regards the change of Minister as the vital factor.

complications both with Britain and with a new and hostile Government in Japan, there are no good grounds for believing that much the same warning would not have been made by Drouyn too, had he remained in office, even though his attitude to the Japanese mission in 1867, might have been less cold. The point is not without significance, since by attributing the reversal of policy solely to international conditions and a new Minister it has been possible to ignore one of the most important characteristics of this period, namely, that French policy was made by Léon Roches and to a large extent remained his personal policy.[57] It was not the change in Foreign Minister that rendered French policy so vulnerable to British pressure but the fact that that policy was the work of the agent rather than the home government.

57. It does not seem fanciful to suggest that for Japanese historians, especially those with Marxist leanings or commitments, like Ishii and Inoue, there exists a certain temptation to see their country as having been a prey to Western Imperialism and in a state of semi-colonisation. It is obvious that the idea of the French government pursuing a policy of influence (or domination) in Japan fits this picture better than the idea that a mere diplomatic agent was chiefly responsible.

In support of the view that it was Roches' personal policy that was involved, rather than an official policy previously worked out in Paris, a great deal of evidence can be produced. The fact that Drouyn had nothing to do with the commencement of the Bakufu-French link has already been commented on. That policy continued to be decided in Japan is clearly indicated by the observation made by both Winchester and Parkes, that Roches used the words 'politique personnelle' when discussing his actions,[58] though, not surprisingly, these words never appear in his own dispatches home. Evidence that it was Roches who set the pace on the French side can be seen in the way that he presented the Japanese requests. He went out of this way to make a favourable case to the Quai d'Orsay, invoking Japanese preference for France and the need to strengthen the power which guaranteed the treaties, in such a way as to make refusal extremely difficult. Even so, Paris was not

58. See e.g. F.O.46. LIII. Feb. 28, 1865, Winchester to Hammond (private). According to Winchester, Roches declared"...that he would never deviate from common action in all that concerns commerce, land distribution, general advancement of Foreign influence, reserving what he termed his 'politique personnelle' to obtain such a share of influence or preponderance". Also F.O.391. XIV. March 16 1867; Ibid, Sept. 19, 1868 (Parkes to Hammond). Lest it be thought that this was merely a blind to conceal the Quai d'Orsay's Machiavellian designs, it should be added that Roches' successor, who would presumably have been informed on such a point, in speaking of his predecessor stated: "Il n'a fait ici que de la politique personnelle." C.P.Japon. XVI, Aug.22, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.

easy to convince. On the question of the military mission, for example, the Quai d'Orsay and the Ministry of War decided not to send as many instructors as Roches had asked for, on the ground that "il serait prudent de ne pas donner tout d'abord à la mission qui serait formé une importance trop grande."[59] Nor was Roches able to persuade Drouyn to ease the Bakufu's financial difficulties by renouncing France's share of the Shimonoseki Indemnity, an obvious action for the Foreign Minister to take had he been really concerned about the furtherance of a Bakufu-French link. The dispatch in which Drouyn refused to make this concession is worth quoting, in fact, for in it he defined French policy in terms to which even an English Minister would have found it hard to object:

"Je crois sans doute utile, dans les circonstances actuelles, que nous contribuons à accroître les ressources propres du Taicoun parce que je me plais à penser avec vous que nous l'aiderons ainsi à triompher des résistances que lui opposent les Daimios ennemis des traités. Mais les cessions d'armes et de projectiles que nous avons déjà consenties en sa faveur de même que le concours que nous sommes prêts à lui accorder pour la création d'un arsénal d'artillerie et de chantiers maritimes près d'Yokohama répondent suffisamment à ce but, et vous vous rendrez facilement compte des raisons qui ne nous permettraient d'aller plus loin." 60

59. C.P.Japon. XIV. May 15, 1866. Drouyn to Roches.
60. C.P.Japon. XIII, June 17, 1865. Drouyn to Roches. See also Ibid. Dec. 19, 1865, when Drouyn commented on Roches' renewed request, "Je ne crois pas bon de faire la remise de ce qui nous est du. Habituer ces gouvernements à ne pas considérer comme sérieux les engagemens pris envers nous, me semble une mauvaise politique".

Perhaps even more important than the fact that French policy had not been inspired by the Foreign Minister, was the Quai d'Orsay's ignorance of the full scope of French involvement. Roches' dispatches were few by any standard, but their infrequency is especially remarkable in view of the numerous important developments taking place in Japan at this time.[61] He excused himself by saying that all his time was taken up by action, and the fact that the Quai did not question this excuse, is worth noting, as it lends support to the view that there was, in Paris, a basic lack of positive interest in Japan. Because of this Roches was more easily able to conceal those aspects of his policy for which he could not expect approval, and it is significant that the Quai d'Orsay was not informed by its representative that he had advised the Bakufu on the tactics to employ against Chōshū.[62] However, it was not only a question of insufficient reports but also of misleading information. When Roches misrepresented the views of the South-Western daimyō the deception may not have been deliberate, for he himself had no direct contacts with them. It can scarcely have been anything else, however, when he reported Japanese requests for aid as emanating solely from the Japanese side. This fact was particularly

61. Roches' four years are covered by only five volumes of Correspondance Politique and two of Correspondance Commerciale, all of average length or under, compared with ten and two for the slightly shorter period of Bellecourt. 62. Roches' military advice is known only from Japanese sources. See Ōtsuka, op.cit., p.286.

important with regard to Yoshinobu's government reform plans, for Moustier must have regarded them as something entirely Japanese in origin, for which France had no responsibility whatsoever.

What were the motives behind Roches' method of diplomacy can, through lack of evidence, only be guessed at. It is by no means impossible to see ambition as the basic factor. If, when he came to Japan, he saw the chance of playing a key role, he must soon have realised that the Quai's caution would provide a check to any far-reaching schemes. By dissembling he may well have hoped to win for himself and his country a special position in a new Japan before Paris realised the depth of French involvement. The general picture of the man from his dispatches suggests strongly that this was so, and his previous career provides additional evidence in its favour.[63] With ambition may have gone a genuine sympathy with a government which was trying to modernise itself in response to internal and external challenge. It is significant that the Comte de Turenne, who later, as chargé d'affaires, was one of the most sympathetic observers of Meiji modernisation, gained his first experience of Japan as

63. His career in North Africa as a young man contained all the ingredients of a romantic novel. His own two-volume account, Trente-deux ans à travers l'Islam, Paris 1884-5, which does not suffer from excessive modesty, has been accepted in essentials, at least as regards one important episode, by the study of J. Caillé, Une Mission de Léon Roches à Rabat en 1845, Casablanca, 1947.

Roches' attaché. On his return to Paris in 1866, moreover, Turenne wrote a memorandum for the Quai d'Orsay which concluded a review of relations between the Shōgun and the Powers with the words: "Nous pouvons compter sur son concours intéressé, et par ce concours espérer de civiliser le Japon."[64] It would be strange if this attitude was not one which represented Roches' feelings too.

There is a further explanation, which, if true, would also account for the fact that Roches kept so much from the Quai d'Orsay, namely, the possibility that he had a financial interest in the Bakufu-French friendship. No evidence appears to exist on this point, nor indeed did an on-the-spot inquiry by the Yokohama Chamber of Commerce in 1866 find anything compromising.[65] Nevertheless, it is hard to dismiss the suspicions entirely. The very fact that it was Roches' own banker, Fleury Hérard, who was appointed Japanese consul-general in Paris and employed in all the Bakufu's financial transactions in Europe suggests that some sort of commission for the minister would have been easy both to arrange and conceal. The same would apply, to a lesser extent, to Coullet's

64. M.D.Japon. I. The memorandum is undated but was clearly written early in 1866.
65. See F.O.391. XIV. May 6, 1867 (Parkes to Hammond).

operations too, and to at least one silkworm egg transaction.[66] However, unless something more substantial turns up, the verdict must be 'not proven'. In any case, even if financial interest did exist, it need not have excluded other motives. Whatever the reasons for Roches' methods of diplomacy there can be little doubt that for most of the time he was in Japan, French policy possessed a personal character. The importance of this fact cannot be ignored. It means, firstly, that, however significant the Bakufu-French special link may appear to Marxist historians, the French Government cannot be suspected of harbouring any design of establishing an economic and political protectorate over Japan. Secondly, it explains the apparent volte-face on the part of the French Foreign Minister. If Roches' policy had been one which the French Government or the Foreign Ministry had laid down itself, it is hardly conceivable, even allowing for the change of Minister, that it could have been abandoned so lightly.[67] In fact, Moustier was unaware of the

66. On this subject and Roches' contribution to French trade generally, see Chapter VIII.
67. This is not to suggest that the French Government would ever have gone so far as to intervene during the civil war in favour of the Tokugawa and it is doubtful whether any help short of direct military and naval aid (which in any case would probably have been refused) could have preserved the Shōgunate, though strong moral support by the French Government might conceivably have boosted Bakufu morale.

full extent of French involvement in Japanese politics.[68] Consequently the Bakufu-French link was regarded as a luxury which could be abandoned without much loss to either side. It was this that made the clash with Britain so decisive.

(c) Roches and the Meiji Restoration

Though Moustier's May 18 dispatch was, in form, cautionary rather than censorious, it clearly meant the end of Roches' 'politique personelle' and this fact was recognised by the latter, for in his answering dispatch he tendered his resignation.[69] Thereafter Roches' hands were effectively tied, for the Foreign Minister had made it clear that he would stomach no "ingérence trop marquée dans les affaires intérieures du pays".[70] From this time on Moustier assiduously underlined all the statements in Roches' dispatches which referred to the Shōgun's actual weakness, obviously considering them of more significance than the latter's plans for recovery.

68. It might even be argued - and the mild language of the May 18 dispatch favours such an argument - that when Moustier repudiated Roches' policy, he was not aware that he was doing so, but imagined that he was merely taking precautions against the possibility of any such policy developing.
69. C.P.Japon. XV. July 13, 1867. Roches to Moustier.
70. C.P.Japon. XV. May 18, 1867. Moustier to Roches.

Despite this clear intimation of official dissatisfaction, until the arrival of his replacement, Roches remained in a position to give the Shōgun his moral support and help smooth any diplomatic difficulties that arose. With regard to one such difficulty he was able to be especially helpful since it was an affair which involved Frenchmen. This was the Uragami problem, which first became a diplomatic issue early in 1867.[71] As it turned out the problem became no more, for the Bakufu, than one of the many complications resulting from intercourse with foreigners, but it might have been a good deal more damaging had it not been for Roches' handling of what was potentially an explosive situation. In the area centring on the village of Uragami, near Nagasaki, several thousand Japanese Christians, whose families had preserved something of their faith from the seventeenth century, had been rediscovered by French priests in 1865. By 1867 their difficulties with local Buddhist priests and their more open Christian worship had created problems which the local Tokugawa officials decided to settle by the imprisonment of some of their number. This naturally

71. There is a detailed article on the Uragami problem in 1867 by Fujii Sadabumi, 'Uragami Kyōto Mondai o meguru Nichi-Futsu Kankei'. (Japanese-French Relations over the Problem of the Uragami Christians) in Kaikoku Hyakunen Kinen Meiji Bunka-shi Ronshū (Essays in Meiji History to Commemorate the Centenary of the Opening of the Country), Tokyo, 1953, pp.73-123.

led to lively protest by the Catholic priests, and, given a deeply religious or hostile French Minister, could have provided the pretext for strong diplomatic pressure. Had this occurred, the Shōgun would have been placed in an extremely awkward position. To alienate the Foreign Representatives by repressive measures at a time when he seemed at last to have secured their approval as a progressive ruler would have been to throw away a considerable asset and risk outside intervention. Yet to allow toleration to the Christians was impossible, for the long tradition of hostility towards Christianity in Japan meant that the enemies of Tokugawa power could have made great capital from the accusation that Yoshinobu was allowing the notoriously pernicious religion to creep in again. Thanks to Roches, the dilemma never really had to be faced. The French Minister did not entirely disregard the plight of the Christians or the pleas of the priests, but he was easily satisfied by the Shōgun's promises that harsh measures would not be used and he stressed in his communications with the missionaries, the limitations imposed by the Treaty on their movements.[72] The fact that Roches' main concern was for the Bakufu's position was only partly concealed by his attempts to secure promises of

72. See C.P.Japon, XV. Aug. 8, 1867; Roches to Moustier.

lenient treatment for the local Christians, and his evident preference for the Bakufu's version of what had been happening rather than that of the missionaries led to bitter criticism from some of the latter.[73] However, the whole question was submerged at the end of the year when the struggle for power in Japan came to a head and it was the new Meiji Government which had to solve it in the end.

It remains to describe Roches' actions during the period of transition lasting from the resignation of Yoshinobu as Shōgun to the consolidation of the new Government's control over the major part of Japan. There is some indication that by this time Roches' influence over Yoshinobu had declined. At any rate, the French Minister appears to have been caught off-balance by the sudden turn of events. When rumours first appeared in the Yokohama papers that the Shōgun had abdicated Roches greeted them with derision,[74] only to find himself, on November 28, forced to admit that such an act had taken place after all, though he strove vainly to convince the Quai that it would not really

73. The missionary writer, Pagès, reviewing the course of the persecution in Les Missions Catholiques, V, Jan.31, 1873, wrote of "...,la connivence de M. Léon Roches, ministre de France. Il était bien naturel qu'il en fut ainsi, car M. Léon Roches, né catholique, avait abjuré la foi de son baptême, et s'était fait musulman à Alger."
74. See C.P.Japon. XV. Oct. 15, 1867. Roches to Moustier.

weaken Yoshinobu's position.[75] At first Roches' hopes were high that Tokugawa power would not be endangered. Even when the South-Western Daimyō had gained the support of the Emperor, by their coup d'etat of January 3, 1868, Roches encouraged the ex-Shōgun to resist them, in the belief that success was well within his capacity.[76] At the same time, he assured him of France's moral support, but it is questionable whether, as has been implied,[77] Roches made any offer of direct material support. On the one hand his instructions so emphatically forbade this that he could have entertained no hope that his Government would acquiesce in any such involvement. More concretely, it is doubtful whether he possessed the power to involve France anyhow. The Ministry of Marine had always resented being regarded as the lackey of the Quai d'Orsay and on more than one occasion had adopted an independent attitude. By the start of 1868, moreover, the co-operative Jaurès was no longer in command of French naval forces in the Far East, and the obvious failure of Roches' policies made

75. C.P.Japon. XV. Nov. 28, 1867. Roches to Moustier. He called the Nov. 8 return of the Shōgun's powers to the Emperor "une démarche qui n'est pas sans grandeur et qui, je l'espère, sera sans danger pour l'avenir de son autorité." Yoshinobu's action was a compromise solution, favourable to the maintenance of Tokugawa predominance, which had been proposed by Tosa.
76. C.P.Japon. XVI. Jan. 10, 1868. Roches to Moustier.
77. e.g. by Yanaga, Japan Since Perry. New York, 1949. p. 46.

Admiral Ohier little inclined to provide the same uncritical backing as his predecessor. Indeed, on February 15, he visited Yoshinobu in Edo in person, and while assuring him of France's sympathy, gave him to understand that no armed support could be looked for.[78] In such circumstances any promise of direct action by the French Minister was inconceivable.

This failure to provide military aid does not mean that Roches did not make some attempt to help the Bakufu in the period of uncertainty at the beginning of 1868. He had promised France's moral support and he gave it by endeavouring to persuade his colleagues not to make any rash changes in the diplomatic situation.[79] His success in this was not complete, but the proclamation of neutrality by the Powers that did result from the foreign representatives' discussions was not without value to the Bakufu. The South-Western Daimyō had, after all, the huge advantage of recognition by the Emperor, who for some years had been generally regarded as the ultimate sovereign of Japan. Roches was hampered however, by the uncertainty of the situation. Any decision designed to benefit the Bakufu might in a matter of weeks prove a disadvantage. Later, when events had turned against Yoshinobu, Roches hoped that the Powers would intervene to stabilise the situation

78. See M.D.Japon.I. April 1, 1868. Ohier to Marine, copy sent from Marine to Quai d'Orsay.

79. See C.P.Japon XVI. Feb. 17, 1868. Roches to Moustier. also F.O.46. XCI. No.35. Feb. 15, 1868. Parkes to Stanley.

but Parkes refused to co-operate,[80] and after this point, the French Minister made little effort to influence events.

Even allowing for the fact that Roches was limited by his instructions, his influence on the early stages of the Meiji Restoration was surprisingly small considering his previous role. This is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that in the first months of the war two incidents occurred involving attacks on Frenchmen which afforded ample opportunity for diplomatic, and possibly military, interference. The first of these, it is true, was the fairly minor Bizen affair, in which other nationals were involved.[81] In this case Roches was given no chance to act independently because Parkes was quite as offended and disturbed as his colleague, and when the Foreign representatives took drastic steps by seizing Japanese ships, apologies and punishments were soon forthcoming. The Sakai massacre was somewhat different. It occurred on March 8, 1868, just over a month after the Bizen incident and this time concerned France alone. Eleven sailors of the frigate Dupleix who had landed near Sakai were killed by a band of anti-foreign samurai from Tosa. Despite

80. See F.O.391. XIV. March 11, 1868. Parkes to Hammond. Also C.P.Japon. XVI. March 11, 1868. Roches to Moustier.
81. The crossing of a column of Bizen samurai by a French soldier at Hyōgo prompted a display of aggressiveness on their part against foreigners. There was no loss of life, however. See F.O.46. XCI. No.22. Feb. 13, 1868. Parkes to Derby, for a full description of the incident.

this considerable provocation, Roches did not use the incident to break off relations but accepted the apologies, compensation and promise to execute the offenders, which the Meiji government speedily offered.[82] Such action, or inaction by the French Minister, denoted, in the circumstances, a surprising moderation.

Why Roches did not adopt a stronger line was probably due to several factors. One was the swiftness of the new Government to make amends, which compared favourably with the Bakufu's tardiness and gave little ground for complaint. Another was the need to protect the interests of French nationals at the treaty ports. A further factor was the attitude of the other Powers. By associating themselves with France, they ensured that reparation was speedily forthcoming and also made it difficult for her to make separate demands without seeming highly unreasonable. The chief reason, however, was Roches' growing conviction, as the Civil War progressed, that the Meiji Government was going to succeed and that therefore it was pointless to risk alienating it.[83] This conviction was made more acceptable by the fact that, for the first time, he was in possession of reliable information about the Meiji leaders, thanks to the co-operation of Montblanc.[84] It was against

82. See C.P.Japon. XVI. March 11, 1868; Ibid, March 19, 1868. Roches to Moustier.
83. See C.P.Japon. XVI. Feb. 24, 1868; Ibid, April 14, 1868. Roches to Moustier.
84. C.P.JAPON. XVI. March 2, 1868. Roches to Moustier.

this background, and perhaps also as a result of disappointment at Yoshinobu's failure to resist the South Western Daimyō after so much had been expected from him, that Roches, at the end of March, even accepted the new Government's invitation to an audience with the Emperor, an act which more or less set the seal of foreign approval on the new régime.[85] He never, up until the time of his departure in June, 1868, entirely gave up hope that the Tokugawa might recover some ground, but the influence this had on his attitude towards the Meiji Government was virtually nil.

85. Roches explained to Moustier that he did not wish to leave to Parkes "l'honneur de voir seul et le premier le Souvérain divin du Japon". C.P.Japon, XVI. March 19, 1868.

CHAPTER IV.

FRANCE AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE MEIJI GOVERNMENT

The main interest in Franco-Japanese relations during the decade and a half following the overthrow of the Tokugawa Bakufu centres on the French attitude and contribution to the consolidation of the Meiji Government. The position of the latter was for a considerable time precarious and its permanence unassured. There was no certainty that the victorious coalition would hold together, nor that it would adopt policies that would ensure its stability in the long run. The problems faced by the able samurai from South-West Japan who had plotted the overthrow of the Tokugawa in the name of the Emperor were enormous, and these problems were made even more complicated by the fact that they were forced to work, for more than three years, through nobles and daimyō whom it had been necessary to appoint to the highest offices in the new Government in order to retain Court support and to dispel distrust of Sat-Chō ambitions.[1] Many of these samurai leaders realised the need for fundamental changes of attitude and the erection of a strong central government

1. Satsuma and Chōshū, together with Tosa and Hizen, dominated the lower ranks of the new Government and it was widely suspected that they would attempt to create a new Bakufu. For an account of constitutional arrangements during the first years of the Meiji era, see R.A.Wilson, The Genesis of the Meiji Government, 1868-1871. (Berkeley, 1957.)

to defend Japan against any threat to its independence, but they were hindered not only by the conservatism and prejudices of most of the Court nobles, but also by the han loyalties of many samurai, including some important leaders. Until the establishment of the nucleus of a regular central army, drawn from their own han, in 1871, and the political defeat, and resignation from government, of the more traditionally-minded samurai leaders in 1873,[2] the hold of men like Ōkubo, Kido and Ōkuma over the direction of national policy was far from secure and they had to move cautiously in their pursuit of reforms. In this situation the attitude of the Western Powers remained of great importance, for the Meiji Government could not risk incurring their displeasure without rendering itself liable to attack on two fronts - the dilemma which the Bakufu had been unable to solve and which had proved fatal to it. Moreover, even when the Meiji Government had become strong enough to be able to abolish the han and set up prefectures in their place in 1871, it was still dependent on the West for expert assistance and guidance in the achievement of its basic aim of 'fukoku kyōhei' (rich country, strong army).

2. The dispute within the government was over a foreign policy issue, whether or not to invade Korea (Seikan Ron), but it was also marked by differences over domestic policy and leadership.

During this period of transition in Japan, French diplomacy was marked by an almost total lack of positive direction. Indeed, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that for most of this period France had no policy towards Japan, only relations with her. This does not mean that she did not continue to enjoy the privileges she had gained earlier or to defend them if they were challenged.[3] Nor does it mean that France refused to co-operate with Japan in her efforts at modernisation, especially if some gain in prestige were expected as a result. But there was no consistent attempt to build up a favourable position in Japan either by securing financial and economic advantages on the one hand or by offering protection and friendship to the new Government as it strove to develop Japan's resources and restore her full sovereign rights. Glimpses of both policies were seen, especially the latter, but they were not followed up with any persistence, and were in fact, liable to fluctuate considerably.

Such fluctuation was partly due to the fact that France was represented by no fewer than ten men during these years, and of these, only one, Outrey, remained for

3. The main challenge was a general one, the Japanese attempt to revise the 'unequal treaties', which affected all the Western Powers. The process of Treaty Revision, which was probably the chief aim of Japanese foreign policy, lasted well over 20 years, acquiring almost a separate diplomatic existence of its own. France's role in this is treated in Chapter VI.

more than two years.[4] This was a far from negligible factor in French diplomacy, for though communications with Europe gradually improved, Tokyo remained a post where much was left to the man on the spot, particularly since the Cabinet changes in France itself were so common that no French Foreign Minister could have more than a superficial understanding of developments in Japan. France's lack of interest in Japan, however, was due to deeper reasons than those of mere personality. The first decade of the Third Republic was a period of cautious readjustment in international affairs, and this resulted in her representatives being compelled, at least until the Republican triumph in 1879, to follow a policy of avoiding entanglements at all costs.[5] As far as the Far East was concerned, this

4. Even Outrey asked to be moved after little more than a year; see the letter of Aug. 3, 1869, in the Moniteur des Soies of Oct. 2, 1869, from a French merchant who claimed that "M.Outrey désire vivement rentrer et déjà demande au Gouvernement de lui envoyer un successeur." The Quai refused to give him another post, so he stayed in Japan. See C.P.Japon. XIX. Sept. 9, 1869. Auvergne Lauraguais to Outrey. Tokyo was clearly not considered a very desirable post from the angle of prestige. Nor, until the 1880's when the habit of spending the hottest months in more refreshing surroundings was adopted were the working conditions of foreign representatives always pleasant.

5. Frenchmen in Japan were very conscious of this. With pardonable exaggeration L'Echo du Japon claimed in 1883 that whereas Britain ordered her representatives "à tout prix défendre et faire triompher les intérêts anglais," instructions to French diplomats "commencaient et se terminaient invariablement par cette recommendation suprême: Surtout, ne nous créez pas des embarras!" (L'Echo du Japon, weekly edition, June 2, 1883.)

represented little change from the position in the 1860's but it was reinforced in the case of Japan by the reaction against Roches' active diplomacy which had almost brought France into collision with the Restoration Government and possibly Britain as well. On the economic side, there was a further reason for France to lose interest, in that from the early 1870's Japanese silkworms became less vital to the French silk industry as her own silkworms began to recover from the ravages of the previous decade. It was mainly for these reasons that French diplomacy played a smaller part in the formative years of Japan's emergence as a modern state than might have been expected.[6]

(a) Recognition of the New Régime.

The negative character of French diplomacy was in evidence from the early months of 1868, when the most urgent question for both Japan and the Western Powers was the attitude of the latter to the new Imperial Government.

6. It might be objected that France could never have had much of an impact owing to the differences of national character, political background and social institutions between the two countries. No doubt France was less close to Japan than, say, Germany was in many ways, but there were several aspects of French civilisation, in particular her highly centralised administrative structure which possessed considerable attraction for Japan. Bearing in mind this and the fact that France had a Far Eastern policy which did not conflict with Japanese interests, it seems reasonable to suggest that French influence on Japan might have been greater especially in view of her outstanding contribution to the economic development of Southern and Eastern Europe and the Middle East in the preceding half century.

The latter had already received de facto recognition by Roches, when he agreed to an audience with the Emperor, and there could be no question of Outrey altering this. Nevertheless, there remained room for differences in the interpretation of the proclamation of neutrality of Feb. 18. A strong show of sympathy for the Tokugawa would have given the new leaders cause for concern, and had it been combined with a determined attempt at mediation by France, as seemed possible on at least three occasions during the Civil War, it might have forced the Government to consider some modification of their demand for unconditional surrender. Outrey, who arrived in Japan on June 7, 1868, was, in fact, tempted by this possibility, but only briefly. Basically, he had none of Roches' ambition and imagination, and his previous career as consul at Alexandria had accustomed him to co-operation with Britain.[7] As a result, therefore, both of official policy and of personal temperament, France was disinclined to adopt an independent line and made no real attempt to obstruct the consolidation of power by the South-Western han.

The pattern of Outrey's relations with the Meiji Government was established within a month of his arrival, when in early July he sent the Comte de Montebello to Osaka to convey to it the most cordial assurances of his

7. Some details of Outrey's career in Egypt can be found in Landes, Bankers and Pashas, passim.

sympathetic feelings. That this was not designed to conceal continued relations with the Tokugawa is shown by the decided views he expressed a month later: "La seule chose que l'on puisse affirmer sans hésitation, c'est qu'il n'y a aucune chance de voir se rétablir le gouvernement du Taicoun et qu'il a bien réellement disparu de la scène, au moins pour très longtemps."[8] He had, it is true, a certain sympathy for the previous Government and when in September the Foreign Representatives were sent a manifesto by the rebel Northern daimyō, Outrey wrote that: "sans nous départir de notre attitude de neutralité, nous devons conserver quelques ménagements pour un parti qui avait très probablement fondé de grandes espérances sur l'appui de la France."[9] Despite the fact that this appeal opened a way to possible foreign mediation, however, Outrey never really attempted to transform these faint pro-Tokugawa feelings into action. Even when the Meiji Government itself sought his mediation in December 1868, he refused to allow himself to be involved and on two other occasions he ignored similar opportunities.[10]

8.

9. C.P.Japon. XVI. Sept.30,1868. Outrey to Moustier.

10. The approach by the Meiji Government through the Governor of Yokohama was reported in C.P.Japon, XVII, Dec. 16, 1868, Outrey to la Valette. He indicated that the rebels would be given land in Hokkaido if they surrendered. Outrey rejected any idea of treating with disobedient officers, so it is hardly surprising that in Feb. he failed to support the appeal of the Hokkaido rebels for a Franco-British mediation. See M.D.Japon.III, undated letter from Brunet to Chanoine. Also Outrey's report in C.P.Japon.XVIII, Feb.10.1869. A possible opening for mediation for which Outrey showed even less enthusiasm had earlier been prepared by Commandant du

/continued over.....

Outrey's unwillingness to respond to the rebels' appeal to mediate may have been partly due to his reluctance to offend the new Government at a time when France had financial claims to make on it. One of the legacies of the Roches period was the claim for payment for the merchandise worth nearly four million francs which the Bakufu had ordered from Coullet,[11] and this claim could only be satisfied by the new authorities. The question was settled to the Société's satisfaction in October, but the Meiji Government's preference for paying off the whole sum with a loan from the Oriental Bank of Yokohama rather than by twenty monthly instalments, as Outrey suggested, caused the latter to conclude: "...il est facile de voir l'ardeur que met le Représentant de la Grande Bretagne à entretenir chez les Japonais un sentiment de défiance contre les intentions de la France à l'égard du Gouvernement du Mikado."[12]

10. (continued).....Petit Thouars in July 1868. See M.D. Japon.I. July 25, 1868. Captain Challié to Ministry of Marine, copy sent by Marine to Quai.

11. Two and a half million francs' worth of goods had not reached the Bakufu and were held by the Customs. C.P.Japon. XVII. Oct.7, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.

12. Ibid. The reason for the Meiji Government's haste was that the Bakufu had pledged the Yokosuka dockyards as security for payment for its order. There is no indication, however, that France was eager to take advantage of Japanese impecunity, or even thought of possession of Yokosuka as a serious possibility. Except for this mention in Outrey's Oct.7. dispatch, after the matter was already solved, the mortgage of Yokosuka does not figure in the correspondence between Paris and Tokyo. For Parkes' views, see F.O.391, XIV. Sept. 19, 1868. Parkes to Hammond.

Outrey's growing awareness of Japanese suspicion of France, which he soon realised to be more than superficial, reinforced his natural tendency to caution. In January 1869, while remarking on Prussian and Italian jealousy of English influence, he outlined his policy as follows:

"Dans la situation actuelle le seul moyen de contrebalancer cette influence est d'avoir une politique dirigée dans une voie parallèle à celle des agents Anglais, de s'associer à eux pour tout ce qui est équitable et conforme aux véritables intérêts Européennes et enfin, de bien convaincre les Japonais que nous agissons sans partialité et dans des vues tout-à-fait désintéressées."[13]

This policy was eventually successful but in the short term it meant that France renounced the use of all means of influence, negative as well as positive.

The inevitable consequence of this policy of temporary abnegation was that France played an undistinguished role during the civil war in Japan. On only one occasion did Outrey adopt a strong tone towards the Meiji Government, when he warned it not to send warships to seize foreign vessels trading with the rebels, but in this he was safely following a British lead.[14] When in January, 1869, Iwakura, one of the leading figures in the Government, sought from the Powers the withdrawal of their proclamation of neutrality, Outrey did, indeed, make a tentative effort to act as mediator between Britain and Holland, who wished

13. C.P.Japon. XVIII. Jan.14, 1869. Outrey to Moustier.
14. See C.P.Japon. XVII. Oct.10.1868. Outrey to Moustier.

to accept the Japanese request, and Prussia and Italy, who opposed it. His compromise proposal of withdrawal after one month, however, did not receive the favour of either side, and although the Powers were ready to agree that the civil war had effectively ended, the legal position remained unchanged until Feb. 8, when the resistance of Prussia and Italy was finally overcome.[15] That diplomacy had really resumed its normal course was shown in May when the Powers requested of the Japanese Government the payment of the rest of the Shimonoseki Indemnity.[16]

(b) The Brunet Affair

For all Outrey's caution, France did become involved in the Civil War in a very direct and embarrassing way. The involvement resulted from the unauthorised action of Captain Brunet, one of the young officers chosen to form part of the military mission which the Bakufu had requested in 1866.[17] In common with the British naval mission, the French mission, had, at Parkes' instigation, ceased to function in April 1868, but its members continued to receive their pay from the Bakufu until July.[18] This situation

15. See C.P.Japon.XVIII. Feb.10, 1869. Outrey to La Valette. France's acceptance that the civil war was over amounted to full recognition of the Meiji Government.
16. C.P.Japon. XVIII. May 10, 1869. Outrey to la Valette.
17. Brunet had come to Japan as a Lieutenant. He was in charge of artillery instruction and acted as second-in-command of the mission.
18. See a document entitled "Historique de la Conduite de M.Brunet," drawn up for the Quai d'Orsay by the Ministry of War on Oct. 11, 1869. M.D.Japon. III.

became more and more intolerable as summer advanced and the Tokugawa forces were pushed back without the French officers being able to do anything, despite their strong sense of obligation and loyalty towards their previous employers and collaborators.[19] When in the autumn it became certain that the mission would soon have to return to France, the temptation to yield to the continual requests from Tokugawa officers to assist in the struggle against what they saw as a usurping clique, became irresistible to Brunet. On October 4, he suddenly disappeared, taking with him one N.C.O. named Cazeneuve.[20] Two months later it was reported that Tokugawa forces had seized control of Yezo (Hokkaido) under his command.[21]

Outrey's reaction to these developments was predictable. After months of effort, his attempt to dissociate French policy from Roches' involvement with the previous régime was now being sabotaged by a young soldier acting with a

19. Ibid.
20. Ibid. Three other officers attempted to resign and follow Brunet, but were dissuaded by Chanoine. Three more N.C.O.'s however, did succeed in joining him without delay. Eventually Brunet had nine Frenchmen assisting him. According to a report by Outrey to Moustier (C.P.Japon. XVII, Nov. 13, 1868) there were between sixty and eighty foreigners, mostly English and American adventurers, involved in the civil war at the time of the siege of Wakamatsu.
21. C.P. Japon. XVII, Dec. 16, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.

reckless disregard for the diplomatic complications he was causing. His indignation was so plainly genuine that the incident never, in fact, assumed the proportions he feared. It was obvious both to the Meiji Government and to Parkes that Outrey was not implicated and had no intention of siding with the rebels.[22] Not only did he refuse to have any dealings with them, but he also did his best to secure Brunet's dismissal from the French Army.[23] Thanks to his consistent attitude no lasting damage was done to French influence in Japan, even if there was some momentary ill-feeling which manifested itself in a number of attacks on French nationals[24] and in a few hésitant attempts by the Meiji Government to assert its right to an indemnity.[25]

The position taken by Outrey was a grave disappointment to Brunet and his sympathisers, among whom was numbered Captain Chanoine, the leader of the mission. They felt that the seizure of Yezo under French guidance presented

22. See F.O.391. XIV. Nov.13, 1868. Parkes to Hammond.
23. See M.D.Japon.III. July 9, 1869. Guerre to Quai.
24. See C.P.Japon. XVIII, May 8, 1869. Outrey to la Valette.
25. See C.P.Japon. XIX. Aug. 1.1869. Ibid. Sept. 4, 1869, Outrey to la Valette. Outrey resisted these insinuations strongly. "Ce serait accepter le rôle impossible de vaincu et l'insolence des Japonais n'aurait plus de bornes," he wrote in his Sept. 4 dispatch.

Outrey with an outstanding opportunity of emerging from the negative role in which he had so far been confined and of making France a power to be reckoned with once more. Their hopes, which persisted for several months before the recapture of the island in June 1869, are to be seen in a number of fascinating letters written by Brunet and a fellow officer to Chanoine, and in two memoranda drawn up by the latter for the Ministry of War. In April 1869, Chanoine reported that since the seizure of Yezo, Brunet "a pris en main...la direction des affaires politiques, il négocie un arbitrage combiné de la France et de l'Angleterre au sujet de Yézo qui deviendrait un fief destiné au Prince Mimbu Tayo sous l'investiture de Mikado." His action, Chanoine added, "peut produire au point de vue de la politique Française le plus heureux effet, si M. Outrey en sait tirer parti."[26]

What Brunet really had in mind regarding the eventual position of Yezo is not clear. In January he was working for "un arrangement politique entre mes Tokoungawas et les gens de Yézo,"[27] but there is no suggestion of any concession being offered other than the recognition of the Mikado's sovereignty, an act which might have meant very little in practice. He felt his position to be a

26. M.D.Japon.I. April, 1869. Chanoine to Marshal Niel.
27. See M.D.Japon.III. March 28, 1869. Brunet to Chanoine.

strong one. In his force of 3000, he claimed, there were 1500 samurai who had received training from the French mission and among whom strict discipline was maintained. Brunet doubted whether an army could be sent against them.[28]

These assertions indicate that Brunet believed his influence in the Tokugawa camp to be dominant. It would be easy to dismiss them as the illusions of vanity, and it may well be that Enomoto and the other Tokugawa leaders did feel it advisable to encourage Brunet's conviction that it was he who was in control. However, the evidence of a French officer who stayed at Hakodate for nearly two months on board a French ship indicates that Brunet's importance really was considerable. In a letter to Chanoine this unnamed officer stated that Brunet had taken complete charge of things. Once at Hakodate, he had begun to organise everything - customs, municipality, fortifications, army: "tout a passé par ses mains. Les bonshommes Japonais sont des marionettes dont il joue avec un grand talent." More than this, "Il a fait un véritable '89 dans ce brave Japon, le suffrage pour nommer des chefs et les grades donnés au mérite et non à la naissance, ce sont des choses fabuleuses pour ce pays là, et il a pu le faire très bien, vu la gravité de la position."[29]

28. Ibid.
29. M.D.Japon. III. June 22, 1869.

These reports make it difficult to believe that Brunet's aims extended no further than the hand-over of Yezo to the Meiji Government in return for the right to colonise it. Given his almost fanatical hostility to the South-western han who had overthrown the Bakufu with, he fervently asserted, England's aid, it does not seem unreasonable to ssume that Brunet hoped that Yezo would provide a rallying point for those supporters of the Tokugawa who planned revenge and were waiting for dissension to appear in the victorious coalition. It is significant that Paris itself believed that much more was involved than appeared on the surface. In an anonymous note of April 1869, it is argued that:

"M. Chanoine voudrait que l'initiative prise par le capitaine Brunet fut sanctionnée par le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et qu'on permit à d'autres officiers français d'aller le rejoindre, c'est-à-dire que nous prenions indirectement possession de l'île de Yéso, peut-être même d'une plus grande partie du territoire Japonais. Au système de M. Roches qu'il blame avec raison, c'est-à-dire, à l'exploitation du Japon par des spéculateurs français privilégiés, M. Chanoine substituerait simplement la conquête par les armes. Car il ne faut pas se dissimuler que l'aventure commencée par le capitaine Brunet, s'il y peut arriver avec lui quelques hommes énergiques et si elle est conduite avec habileté, n'irait à rien moins qu'à jeter dans la balance de la guerre civile du Japon un poids considérable, peut-être prépondérant, et que nos officiers transformés en Daimios pourraient à un moment donné devenir les arbitres et même les maîtres de l'Empire." [29a]

Even if this was all somewhat fanciful, it does suggest that the situation held certain possibilities. These possibilities, however, were rejected by Paris, just as they had been by Outrey. The note ended:

29a. M. D. Japon. III, April, 1869.

"Si on laissait les choses prendre une pareille tournure, il faudrait naturellement s'attendre à des réclamations énergiques des Puissances particulièrement de l'Angleterre. Il n'est pas besoin d'ajouter que ce serait rompre avec le Gouvernement du Mikado que nous venons de reconnaitre. On ne pense donc pas que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur puisse rien faire qui implique l'apparence d'une approbation quelconque donné à l'entreprise de M. le Capitaine Brunet." 30

Even if the decision had been different, it would have had no effect at that late stage. Contrary to what Brunet predicted, the Meiji Government quickly brought together a force sufficient to recapture the northern island, and Brunet was forced to seek refuge on a French ship, the Coëtlogon, on June 9, 1869.[31]

(c) The Uragami Question

The Brunet affair had arisen out of the ambiguous position in which the French military mission had been forced to remain inactive while its contract still had some time to run. This question of the fate of the mission was one of the numerous problems which Outrey complained privately had been left to him by Roches and which hindered the establishment of a satisfactory relationship with the Meiji Government.[32] It was not, however, the most difficult of these problems. That distinction belongs to the Uragami question.

30. M.D.Japon.III. April 1869. Though anonymous this memorandum undoubtedly emanated from within the Quai d'Orsay.
31. Brunet was punished by being suspended from active service. M.D.Japon.III. Oct.25,1869. Guette to Quai. The Japanese Govmt. withdrew its complaint against him in 1873, and he eventually reached the rank of General. See Chanoine, Documents pour servir à l'histoire des Relations entre la France et le Japon, (Paris, n.d.) p.83.
32. See Outrey's letter to Saint-Vallier, C.P.Japon.XVI. 22.Aug.1868

As has been seen, persecution of Japanese Christians had first occurred in 1867 while Roches was Minister but careful handling of the affair by both sides together with the outbreak of civil war, had pushed it into the background. It did not take long, however, to come to the fore again, since the new Government adopted exactly the same policy towards the Christians as its predecessor, the only difference being that its execution was more ruthless.

The resumption of persecution was a grave disappointment to the missionaries, who had to some extent moderated their activity. Their restraint was partly a result of Roches' pressure, partly in anticipation of a more liberal attitude from the new authorities.[33] The action of the latter can hardly be considered surprising, however, in view of the jōi background of the anti-Bakufu movement. Hatred and suspicion of Christianity had been one of the basic elements in the Sakoku policy which the Bakufu had surrendered to foreign pressure; and even if a number of the new leaders had been forced to the conclusion that isolation was no longer possible and that to catch up with the advanced Western nations was an urgent necessity, it did not mean that they were ready to tolerate the spread of a religion which was traditionally associated with political dissent. Even those of them who like Satsuma's

33. See Les Missions Catholiques. I. July 17, 1868

Komatsu, had no personal hostility towards Christianity, had an acute awareness of the danger to their cause that concessions to Christianity might bring.[34] Nor were Japanese objections regarded as baseless even by the French. Outrey recognised that there were good reasons for the Government's annoyance at missionary zeal. He held that: "le Christianisme introduit forcément avec lui les idées d'égalité ou d'indépendence sociale qui sont de nature à bouleverser l'organisation du pays par castes et professions."[35] In addition, he felt that a struggle between Christians and Buddhists would be inevitable, thus leading to a schism in society. A similar evaluation of Japanese motives was provided by Captain Challié, who spent some time in Japanese waters during 1868 and had the advantage of discussion with Montblanc, a Frenchman who had close links with Satsuma leaders. Challié's view was that the Meiji Government was greatly disturbed by the appointment in 1868 of a bishop, who could serve as a rallying-point for the spread of Christianity. This step might lead to even worse things. The Government, he declared, "redoute surtout que les étrangers puissent scruter la vie intérieure du pays. La crainte de les voir au moyen des chrétiens répandre leur propagande, pénétrer peut-être dans le Japon et y annoncer

34. See C.P.Japon. XVII. Sept.10.1868. Outrey to Moustier.
35. C.P.Japon. July 7, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.

un autre maître plus puissant que le Mikado, domine toute autre considération et donne à cette question une importance très sérieuse."[36] It is likely that both Outrey and Challié exaggerated the extent to which purely theological considerations had a part in Japanese thinking, and it seems improbable that the possibility of a struggle between Christians and Buddhists was a factor which caused the new leaders much concern. But the prospect which Challié hinted at of the Japanese Christians providing a pretext for foreigners to go beyond the limits of the treaty ports, and for Western powers to interfere with Japan's sovereign rights as they already had with China's, was clearly one which in the new Government's eyes called for speedy and drastic measures.

The measures it took, however, had to be such as not to call down upon it the fate which it was seeking to avoid. Indeed, the whole period when the issue of religious toleration was at stake is characterised by the Japanese Government's endeavour to plot a safe course between an inaction which would allow the evil to spread and an excessive rigour which would stir the Powers to action while the new regime was still insecure.[37] In the first phase, lasting

36. M.D.Japon.I. July 30,1868. Challié to Marine.
37. The Meiji Government's policy towards Christians was probably affected also by shifts of influence within the Government itself and the period of severest repression did coincide with a temporary weakening of the reforming centralisers' position during 1870. Nevertheless the basic factors involved were clearly traditional prejudice and foreign pressure.

from 1868 to the start of 1870, the Meiji Government tended, while occasionally lurching towards the second course, to favour a reasonable approach. That is to say, although maintaining its right to deal with its own subjects as it saw fit, it proved willing in practice to pay heed to the protests of the Powers by making comparatively few arrests and by treating the prisoners without too much harshness. It was, for the most part, willing to make promises of a more liberal treatment, even when it did not intend to carry them out. The earliest example of this policy occurred in May 1868, when the Foreign Representatives protested at the bad treatment of the Christians and the new leaders had to postpone their measures on account of their weak position.[38] This was while Roches was still Minister. The problem was to confront Outrey almost upon arrival.

Outrey's ability to see something of the Japanese side of the question has already been noted. Even if more concerned personally than Roches about the fate of the Japanese Christians, he had no desire to make a great issue out of what was still, in July 1868, a comparatively small affair, involving just over a hundred people. He had, in any case, a duty to avoid French involvement in internal

38. See C.P.Japon. XVI. May 27, 1868. Roches to Moustier. Also M.D.Japon. I. July 30, 1868. Challié to Marine.

affairs, and this duty was confirmed with respect to religious affairs in September 1868, when Moustier accepted that the treaties did not give France the means of intervening effectively in favour of the Japanese Christians. Outrey was further inhibited by his fear that too direct an interference on the part of the Powers would compromise the missionaries and diminish their chances of eventual success. Nevertheless, in view of France's special position as protector of Catholics and the fact that all the Catholic missionaries were French, he could hardly remain inactive. Outrey's activity, however, lay rather in the frequency of his representations to the Japanese Government than in the intensity with which he pursued them. In this he was a considerable disappointment to the missionaries who, as in the 1840's and 1850's, found themselves unable to influence French policy to any marked degree.[39] Despite an appeal from Petitjean,[40] and the letters complaining of persecution that appeared

39. It was alleged by Léon Pagès in 1873 that on the demand of [redacted] 18 deputies the Government had agreed to reinforce the French squadron in the Japan Seas, but was prevented by the Tientsin massacre and the Franco-Prussian War. Les Missions Catholiques, March 14, 1873. To some extent this may be regarded as an indirect success for missionary pressure, but there is no other evidence that the Quai d'Orsay was contemplating an actual change of policy.

40. See C.P.Japon. XVII. Sept. 10, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.

in '<u>Les Missions Catholiques</u>' in the summer, Outrey was reluctant to take any decisive step. In July 1868, he accepted his colleagues' decision not to make any written protest in order to "éviter une intervention isolée, qui en peu de temps, donnerait fatalement à notre politique au Japon un caractère spécial dont il serait facile à tirer parti pour compromettre notre influence morale et nos intérêts matériels,"[41] and in September, after failing to get an agreement about the sending of a collective note, he again contented himself with expressing his views verbally to Komatsu.[42]

Though unable to secure any definite promise from the Japanese Government, Outrey found enough in 1868 to remain basically optimistic. In November of that year he announced that there had been no complaints for two months, and though he believed that some new arrests had just taken place in Akashi, he was encouraged by the commentary in an official journal which, he claimed, "semble vouloir préparer l'opinion publique à accepter les faits avec des sentiments de modération."[43] In January 1869, he momentarily adopted a stronger pose when he was visited by Uwajima, a Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was anxious to forestall any official

41. C.P.Japon. XVI. July 7, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.
42. See C.P.Japon. XVII. Sept. 10, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.
43. C.P.Japon. XVII. Nov. 12, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.

intervention on account of harsh treatment of the Christians in the Gotō Islands. The French Minister informed him that:

"Les puissances européennes ne pouvaient rester indifférentes à des mesures odieuses qui blessaient les sentiments religieux de leurs peuples et que, si le gouvernement japonais ne prenait pas des dispositons sérieuses pour arrêter les persécutions, il devait s'attendre un jour à voir une indignation générale s'emparer de l'opinion publique et entraîner peut-être les Puissances à intervenir dans les conditions qu'aujourd 'hui elles ont à coeur d'éviter."44

This warning, however, Outrey was careful to add, was couched in an essentially amicable form. Nevertheless, he claimed the credit for the fact that the Japanese Government eventually sent the Foreign Representatives an official note declaring that cruel penalties would be replaced by more humane ones. The note was regarded as of great significance by Outrey. He saw it as marking a real change in the attitude of the government, adding that "il reconnaît en quelque sorte notre droit de parler au nom de ses sujets chrétiens, et, une fois sur ce terrain, la diplomatie européenne ne peut pas manquer de faire prévaloir les principes d'équité, de justice, et d'humanité qu'elle invoque en faveur de ses coreligionnaires."[45] In reality, it soon became clear that the Government was not carrying out all its promises. The French Minister's reaction to new reports of persecution was more in keeping with his habitual policy

44. C.P.Japon XVIII. Jan. 12, 1869. Outrey to Moustier.
45. C.P.Japon. XVIII. Jan. 12, 1869. Outrey to Moustier.

of caution, however, than with his veiled threats of January. He advised his Foreign Minister that the Japanese Government was probably powerless to give them complete satisfaction and asked permission to "agir lentement et avec beaucoup de ménagements."[46] This cautious attitude was maintained throughout the year despite continuing reports of persecution.

With the turn of 1870 the situation became more tense as Japanese Government politics showed signs of the increased influence of the traditionalists. In January of that year Outrey reported that over 3000 Christians had been forcibly taken from Uragami, dispersed among several han and set to work on public projects.[47] Reports from missionaries alleged that families were being deliberately split up. All the Foreign Representatives protested at once, but though they secured the promise to stop the process temporarily, they were not confident of having much effect on the Japanese Government. After their conference with Sanjō, Iwakura, Sawa, and Terashima, Outrey came to the conclusion that "Le Gouvernement Japonais est décidé à ne pas tolérer cette religion et il ne reculera devant aucune extrémité pour empêcher qu'elle se répande dans le pays....Il me parait impossible désormais," he added "de rien obtenir par la voie diplomatique."[48]

46. C.P.Japon. XVIII. May 11, 1869. Outrey to la Valette.
47. C.P.Japon. XIX. Jan.22, 1870. Outrey to Auvergne Lauraguais.
48. Ibid.

The hardened attitude of the Meiji Government made the position of the Foreign Representatives very difficult. To do nothing in the face of large-scale persecutions would arouse dissatisfaction in Europe; yet to achieve any success would call for more drastic counter-measures than had yet been envisaged. Outrey, encouraged perhaps by the unanimity of his colleagues' reaction, momentarily leaned towards strong measures. "Je suis très-disposé à croire" he wrote, "que le Gouvernement Japonais céderait devant une démarche comminatoire, si elle était faite en commun, mais il ne faut pas se dissimuler qu'elle devrait être appuyée par une démonstration imposante."[49]

Outrey was not the only foreigner to favour intervention at this time. In a private letter to the Comte de Montebello, a Quai d'Orsay official, a combined démarche was strongly advocated by another diplomat, whose identity is not stated, though the tone of the letter suggests that he was a Minister.[50] Discussions with Terashima, a Satsuma progressive, had convinced him that the Japanese Government would abandon its repressive measures if it really believed that these were going to endanger its good relations with the Powers. However, the likelihood of Paris authorising a naval demonstration was slight. The Comte Daru had only recently taken over the Quai d'Orsay and was scarcely in a position

49. Ibid.
50. The letter is dated Feb. 20, 1870 and is in C.P.Japon.XIX.

to act decisively. In May a Quai d'Orsay review of the question concluded by saying that the instructions sent to Parkes left very little doubt about the determination of the English Government to abstain from measures to force the Japanese Government to carry out its promises.[51] There was no further comment as to the effect of these instructions on French policy, nor was one necessary. That France could not act in isolation had, by this time, become one of the tacit assumptions of French policy.

Even if Paris had been more responsive and England more co-operative it is doubtful whether any new step would have been taken. It was not long before Outrey again modified his views on the best course to be followed.[52] The main reason for his change of line was seen in May 1870 when he reported that the Japanese Government had been showing itself more friendly to France.[53] A month later another dispatch revealed the cause.[54] It was one which, though not directly connected to the question of religious toleration, had a considerable influence upon it. Two years after the dismissal of the first French military mission, the Meiji Government had decided that Japan needed further French assistance in establishing a new army.[55]

51. C.P.Japon. XX. May 7, 1870.
52. In April he accepted the Japanese rejection of a moderately-toned collective note without demur. C.P.Japon.XX. April 12, 1870. Outrey to Daru.
53. C.P.Japon. XX. May 11, 1870. Outrey to Daru.
54. C.P.Japon. XX. June 4, 1870. Outrey to Daru.
55. For a discussion of Japanese motives, see E.L.Presseisen, Before Agression, pp.25-39.

Its approach had immediate effects. On the one hand France became reluctant to push the religious question too hard lest she lose her new chance of influence and prestige. On the other hand, Japanese need of French help gave Outrey a bargaining counter, which he was not slow to utilise. In the same interview in which Terashima made the military request, the French Minister bluntly posed the question - "Croyez-vous que la France soit désireuse d'aider au développement de cette force si elle doit être employée à des persécutions que la civilisation et l'humanité réprouvent?" Terashima's reply was encouraging:

> "Il a laissé à entendre qu'on avait cédé à l'opinion publique d'une grande partie du Japon qui ne peut oublier les évènements du XVIIe siècle, mais qu'en réalité le Gouvernement n'ayant aucun parti-pris contre le Christianisme, n'aurait aucune objection à se départir d'une rigeur imposée par les circonstances le jour où, se sentant plus fort, plus solidement établi, il pourrait sans danger résister à des préjugés invétérés dans le pays."[56]

Terashima's arguments more or less convinced Outrey. He recognised that coercive measures would be dangerous, especially since he was inclined to believe that Parkes "entretient les Japonais dans la pensée que la propagande de nos missionnaires est une manoeuvre de la diplomatie française," and he concluded: "Il me semble que la solution la plus vraie est celle que l'on obtiendra naturellement et sans efforts par la diffusion dans les masses de nos principes civilisateurs."[57]

56. C.P.Japon. XX. June 4, 1870. Outrey to Datu.
57. C.P.Japon. XX. June 4, 1870. Outrey to Datu.

Outrey's decision not to press Japan on the Uragami question was not disputed by the Quai d'Orsay. It meant that the Japanese Government need no longer fear outside intervention from the Power most concerned, provided it avoided sensational measures. Its hand was further strengthened by the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in August. Even if France had wanted to intervene, she would have had insufficient means for enforcing her will. Not surprisingly, therefore, the religious question disappeared from the correspondence between Paris and Tokyo. The problem reappeared again only in January 1872, when French affairs were in the hands of the Comte de Turenne, who had served under both Roches and Outrey. This final phase dragged on until the end of 1873, but was mostly devoid of excitement or threats. Turenne, like Roches, was usually ready to accept the Japanese Government's explanations, and there was, in any case, some movement towards toleration in practice. Perhaps the most interesting feature of this period was the comparative success of religious interests in putting their views across in Paris, but this success did not come until late 1872 when it could have but little effect. Already at the start of the year, the picture being presented in dispatches from Tokyo was a much more favourable one. In February 1872, seventy newly-arrested Christians were released following

an appeal by Turenne.[58] On April 1st, the chargé d'affaires announced that the edict imposing severe penalties on native christians had just been secretly revoked,[59] and in May came news that Japanese were now permitted to practise Christianity so long as they did not seek to make converts.[60] Turenne's confidence in the Meiji Government's liberal tendencies was strengthened by its release of more imprisoned Christians on his request.[61] In return he urged the missionaries, whose unthinking zeal he criticised, to maintain an extreme reserve.

Turenne's views evidently carried some weight with his Foreign Minister, but in December, with the arrival of the Iwakura mission imminent, the Comte de Rémusat was forced to regard the matter in a sterner light. The sufferings of Uragami, he informed the chargé d'affaires, had produced an emotion "assez profonde pour trouver de l'écho au sein de l'assemblée nationale."[62] The incident he referred to was a demand for French intervention by the Comte de Richemont on December 7, which had been received with applause, forcing Rémusat to assure the Assembly that he would take action.[63] He therefore instructed Turenne to remonstrate with the Japanese Government. He himself would do the same with Iwakura when the Japanese mission visited France. 64.

58. See C.P.Japon.XXI. Feb. 19, 1862. Turenne to Rémusat.
59. C.P.Japon. XXI. April 1, 1872. Turenne to Rémusat.
60. C.P.Japon. May 8, 1872. Turenne to Rémusat.
61. C.P.Japon. XXI. Aug. 28, 1872. Turenne to Rémusat.
62. C.P.Japon. XXI. Dec. 20, 1872.
63. See Les Missions Catholiques, Dec. 20, 1872.
64. C.P.Japon, XXI. Dec. 20, 1872.

Iwakura arrived in Paris in January 1873, and his interview with Rémusat took place on the 24th of that month. A month later the decision was taken to abandon the old policy of suppression. According to one Japanese historian, this change was the result of the experiences of the Iwakura mission.[65] If so, France was jointly responsible, but her attitude cannot be considered decisive. Despite religious pressure, Rémusat remained statesmanlike, simply advising Iwakura that "Le moyen le plus propre à attirer au Japon les sympathies de l'Europe et de l'Amérique serait que le Gouvernement japonais ambandonnât les errements suivis par lui jusqu'à ce jour et qu'il se montrât bienveillant à l'égard des Chrétiens;"[66] and when the Japanese envoy replied that, though he could make no definite promise the Japanese Government intended to establish religious toleration as soon as it was opportune, Rémusat declared himself satisfied.[67] Despite his final reminder that the question was important to France, the tone of the interview was friendly, and there was no suspicion of any threat of force.

~~In Japan, there was even more understanding of the Japanese position. Before receiving Rémusat's instructions he had pointed out that toleration would be delayed on~~

65. Hanabusa Nagamichi, Meiji Gaikōshi (Diplomatic History of the Meiji Period) (Tokyo, 1960) p.9.
66. See M.D.Japon. II. Compte-rendu of the meeting of Jan. 24, 1873
67. Ibid.

In Japan, Turenne was even more understanding of the Japanese position. Before receiving Rémusat's instructions he had pointed out that toleration would be delayed on account of the tension caused by samurai discontent,[68] and he had strongly advised against any pressure being put on the Meiji Government, which was continuing to act liberally.[69] He did, in February, go so far as to inform the Gaimushō of Richemont's intervention and Rémusat's concern, but was satisfied with a vice-minister's assurances that the accusations were distorted.[70] The whole question was settled a few days later so far as Turenne was concerned, when he learned of the decision to abrogate the anti-Christian edicts and return all the Uragami Christians to their home village.[71]

This was not quite, however, the end of the religious toleration problem. At the end of June, Turenne was replaced by the new Minister, Berthemy, who was less than sympathetic to the Japanese and was soon suggesting that the old edicts might be invoked again if the Christians proved an embarrassment.[72] Nevertheless, the sudden attempt to reactivate the question came not from him but from Paris. In March six deputies had addressed to the

68. C.P.Japon. XXI. Dec. 23, 1872. Turenne to Rémusat.
69. C.P.Japon. XXII. Jan. 20, 1873. Turenne to Rémusat.
70. C.P.Japon. XXII. Feb. 15, 1873. Turenne to Rémusat.
71. C.P.Japon. XXII. Feb. 24, 1873. Turenne to Rémusat.
72. C.P.Japon. XXIII. Sept. 22, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie.

Quai d'Orsay a letter demanding that France require from Japan complete religious toleration and free access for missionaries to the interior, as in China.[73] Whether there was any direct connection between this letter and the change in the Quai d'Orsay attitude is not clear, but the Duc de Broglie instructed Berthemy to raise the religious question in his coming negotiations on Treaty Revision, and the position which he directed his representative to adopt was essentially that which the deputies had advocated:

> "Nous nous bornons à considérer comme essentielle l'adoption par le Gouvernement Japonais des principes de liberté de conscience consacrés par nos conventions avec d'autres Cours moins rapprochées des idées Européennes, c'est à dire, pour les indigènes le droit d'embrasser et de professer librement la foi, pour les missionnaires la faculté de l'enseigner sans entraves... vous ne sauriez mettre trop d'insistance, dans le cas où vous recontriez une opposition qu'il me répugne de prévoir, pour assurer le triomphe du principe que nous tenons à honneur d'avoir constamment défendu." 74

Broglie's instructions, if followed by Berthemy, would have created considerable suspicion of French motives in Japan and would have made the maintenance of good

73. M.D.Japon.II. March 25, 1873. The signatories wanted "des garanties analogues à celles qui nous ont été données par le Gouvernement chinois dans le traité de Tientsin."
74. C.P.Japon.XXIII, Aug. 7, 1873. Broglie to Berthemy. The government which Broglie had done much to create in May contained an influential legitimist element, and it had already taken several steps which, in Seignobos' words, "annoncaient que les légitimistes comptaient sur le secours divin pour vaincre 'la Révolution'." See Ch.Seignobos, Le Déclin de l'Empire et l'Etablissement de la 3e République,' (vol. 7, Lavisse, Histoire de France Contemporaine) (Paris, 1921) pp. 364-5.

relations between the two countries extremely difficult. Berthemy, for all his dislike of the Japanese, realised this. He had already asserted, before he received Broglie's dispatch, that the zeal of the missionaries, when exercised prematurely, was prejudicial to the cause of religion in Japan.[75] When he heard that he was expected to seek new rights for missionaries he warned that it would be imprudent to insist on any such provision. His reason, based on an analysis of events since 1868 which stressed the jealousy of England, was one which normally carried much weight with the Quai d'Orsay: no other Representative would join him and the demand would be met with a blunt refusal by the Japanese Government.[76] Whether Berthemy's argument would have convinced Broglie is uncertain. By the time his dispatch reached Paris a Cabinet reshuffle by Broglie had brought to the Quai d'Orsay a new occupant, Decazes, whose opinions were less extreme.[77] He acknowledged that his predecessor had been unrealistic in his demands and accepted Berthemy's view that the missionaries could make best use of their zeal by devoting themselves to teaching.[78] Thus, an ugly incident in Franco-Japanese relations was averted.

75. C.P.Japon. XXIII. Sept. 22, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie. A pencilled comment says "Cette dépêche est un peu froide pour les Missionnaires."
76. C.P.Japon. XXIII. Oct. 15, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie.
77. Decazes was, in fact, more opposed than most Orleanists to the legitimist cause and his entry into the Conseil des Ministres in November 1873, marked the break with the extreme right. See Seignobos, op.cit. pp.377-8.
78. C.P.Japon. XXIII, Dec. 1, 1873. Decazes to Berthemy.

With persecution at an end, and with the gradual surreptitious penetration of the country by missionaries, the religious issue vanished from diplomacy, and except for a brief and relatively unimportant period in the 1880's, the fortunes of the Christian religion were henceforth to have no bearing whatsoever on French policy towards Japan.

(d) The Withdrawal of Foreign Troops

The religious question was not the only problem in Franco-Japanese relations which stretched over several years. One which, though basically far simpler, took even longer to settle, was the problem of withdrawal of French and British troops from Japanese soil. First raised in 1869, it was only settled in 1875. The reason for this long delay was that, like Treaty Revision, it was a question in which the European Powers were satisfied with the status quo and saw no compelling reason for change. The Japanese Government on the other hand, though anxious to get rid of their humiliating presence, was not disposed to offer any inducement or compensation that might have hastened the troops' departure and placed its hopes on wearing down the two Powers by continual appeals to their understanding of Japan's problems. This policy might in certain circumstances have been successful but too often it ran up against the lack of imagination that so often

characterised European thinking about Japan. Indeed, but for reasons of economy, the situation might well have prolonged itself for some years more.

The origin of the problem went back to the troubled years that followed the opening of treaty relations.[79] The evident hostility of the Japanese to foreigners made it natural for marines to be landed or troops to be called for to protect the legations and residents in Yokohama. As time went by, and the political situation inside Japan remained tense, the position of the British and French troops assumed a permanent character. In 1863, reports that the Bakufu had agreed to expel foreigners led the British and French admirals to fortify Yokohama, excluding Japanese troops in the process.[80] For its part, the Bakufu was not altogether displeased by the possibility that the Western military presence might be taken by its enemies to indicate that foreign support was available to the Shōgun, if necessary.

The Meiji Government was much less happy with this arrangement. The presence of foreign troops, numbering around 1000, hardly represented a direct threat to its own power, but it did offend national sentiment and it did

79. A detailed account of the whole question from the Japanese side can be found in Hora Tomio, "Bakumatsu Ishin ni okeru Ei-Futsu Guntai no Yokohama-chūton" (The Occupation of Yokohama by British and French Forces in the Bakumatsu and Restoration Periods) in Meiji Seiken no Kakuritsu Katei (The Consolidation-process of the Meiji Government). Meiji Shiryō Kenkyū Renrakkai (ed.) Tokyo, 1956.
80. In May 1863, the Bakufu sent Colonel Neale a letter which appeared to accept the occupation. Ibid. pp.;189-90. Eventually it even provided barrack areas.

imply a want of confidence in the power and stability of Japan's new rulers. Little could be done to alter the situation while the civil war continued in the North and while attacks on foreigners showed that old jōi feelings really were still far from under the Government's control, but in September 1869, these obstacles no longer seemed to remain. Parkes, who was then still enjoying his role as the Meiji government's mentor, tentatively suggested to Outrey that they withdraw their forces. He was met with a blunt rejection. The reason given by the French minister was security, but in reality an equally important factor was prestige. The existing set-up gave Outrey the same status as Parkes. "Le pied d'égalité sur lequel se trouvent ici la France et l'Angleterre", Outrey explained, "cette supériorité que donne indistinctement, aux deux puissances, la présence de leurs troupes à terre, le gènent extrêmement dans ses vues de prépondérance absolue."[81] Thus Japan was hindered, as so often later in her pursuit of treaty revision, not so much by the inadequacy of her case, as by the mutual jealousies of the Foreign Powers. In another form, this fact was again shown, when the Meiji Government made a second attempt in December, 1870, first through Parkes, then direct. This time Outrey's objection was that Prussia had recently threatened to demand the expulsion of French forces from Japan, and that such a step would therefore be

81. C.P.Japon. XIX. Oct. 2, 1869. Outrey to Auvergne-Lauraguais

wounding to France's dignity.[82] Nothing therefore, could be done while the war in Europe lasted. In actual fact, even before the war ended, there was some thought in Paris of ending the maintenance of the 260 French marines. Not surprisingly it was the financial burden that prompted the reconsideration and the Ministry of Marine that was feeling the pinch. It conveyed its views to the Quai d'Orsay,[83] and when Outrey received them in June, he no longer had any reason for refusing to be co-operative. When he consulted Parkes, however, he found that the British Minister had ceased to favour the idea, claiming that Japan was undergoing a grave internal crisis.[84] Nevertheless, Outrey now thought that the time for withdrawal would probably not be later than the following year.

This prediction proved too sanguine. Before 1871 was out, the Quai d'Orsay began to have doubts about the wisdom of an early withdrawal. Since the Japanese Government had declared its intention of revising the treaties in 1872, Rémusat wrote to the Ministry of Marine in September, "nous pourrions regretter de nous être privés d'un moyen d'action qui n'est pas sans valeur."[85] As it happened, no fresh approach was made by the Japanese Government during 1872, probably because it placed its hopes on the Iwakura mission, and when the issue was raised again, it

82. See C.P.Japon. XX. Dec. 24, 1870. Outrey to Favre.
83. C.P.Japon. XXI. April 8, 1871. Marine to Quai.
84. C.P.Japon. XXI. July 1, 1871. Outrey to Favre.
85. C.P.Japon. XXI. Sept. 21, 1871.

was Turenne who was responsible. He suggested to the Quai d'Orsay that France might derive some credit from withdrawal[86] and shortly afterwards mentioned his views to a delighted Soyejima.[87] The British chargé d'affaires, Watson, who was unaware that Turenne had already made the French initiative known to the Japanese, was then persuaded to urge this course of action upon the Foreign Office.[88] Turenne's manoeuvre proved unsuccessful. For once the joint recommendation of the men on the spot was overruled. By the time it reached Europe the two Foreign Ministers had already informed Iwakura that the troops could not yet be recalled. Rémusat explained to Turenne that Granville had told the Japanese Envoy that the security of the British Representative required their presence.[89] There was no thought on the French side of acting alone. Nevertheless, the French Government did not feel strongly about the matter and Iwakura had been given to understand that action would not long be deferred.[90]

A speedy settlement would certainly have been pleasing to the Ministry of Marine. In June, 1873, it raised the question for a second time, not unnaturally showing a certain amount of impatience.[91] Berthemy therefore, after delaying

86. C.P.Japon. XXI. Dec. 6, 1872, Turenne to Rémusat.
87. Soyejima had been left in charge of the Foreign Office during Iwakura's absence abroad.
88. See C.P.Japon. XXI. Dec. 23, 1872. Turenne to Rémusat.
89. C.P.Japon. XXII. Jan. 30, 1873. Rémusat to Turenne.
90. M.D.Japon. II. Compte-rendu of conference between Rémusat and Iwakura. Jan. 24, 1873.
91. See C.P.Japon. XXIII. June 26, 1873. Broglie to Berthemy.

in the hope of influencing the Treaty Revision negotiations, took the matter up in November, but again the objection of Parkes proved insuperable.[92] Nevertheless the pointlessness of the troops' presence was now so evident that in February, 1874, the French Minister decided to allow one company to leave, only postponing the evacuation of the rest on Parkes' lively representations.[93]

Not until January, 1875, did the Foreign Office decide to recall the British contingent, at the same time asking that France should do likewise.[94] The Ministry of Marine needed no encouraging and embarkation took place on March 1st. Seven years after assuming power the Meiji Government had at last received the final Western recognition of its stability.[95]

(e) The French Contribution To Japanese Modernisation

One final field in which French policy had some influence on the consolidation of the Meiji Government was one which was only indirectly political. The remarkable conversion of the Meiji leaders to a belief in the necessity of wide-spread modernisation was a development which carried some dangers, particularly from the many discontented *samurai*, but was, on the whole, conducive to their maintenance of power.

92. C.P.Japon. XXIII. Dec. 1, 1873. Berthemy to Decazes.
93. C.P.Japon. XXIV. Feb. 7, 1874. Berthemy to Decazes.
94. C.P.Japon. XXV. Jan. 21, 1875. Lord Lyons to Decazes.
95. Before the troops left, Iwakura significantly secured Berthemy's permission to publish their correspondence to show that "les Puissances étrangères ne conservent plus de doute sur la stabilité du Gouvernement actuel." C.P.Japon. XXV. Feb. 15, 1875. Berthemy to Decazes.

On the one hand, it was evident to the politically-aware that the government was doing all it could to strengthen the country against possible foreign threat; on the other, in several fields, and particularly the army and communications, modernisation brought to the central government an added ability to deal with any physical threat to its power from inside, and this was made so evident by the failure of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877 that thereafter opposition was forced into the relatively pacific form of political parties. Much of the French contribution to Japanese modernisation came from individuals and was unconnected with French diplomacy, but in some of the more important fields the co-operation of the French Government was essential. Moreover, although in the Bakumatsu period the Bakufu and various han had made occasional requests to Americans, Dutchmen and Englishmen, it was the French Minister, Roches, who first showed that a foreign country might be willing to lend a hand in the radical reshaping of Japanese government, economy and society, when he developed a close relation with the Bakufu from 1864 onwards.[96]

Space permits no more than a brief outline of the various French contributions to Japanese modernisation. Undoubtedly the most important was the help given by French

96. For all Harris' moral encouragement it is doubtful whether America would have been willing or able to supply the Bakufu with the means of removing the obstacles to centralised power, while the reaction of the British and French Ministers to requests for information about Western military technique had been uniformly unfavourable. Roches was the first important foreigner to believe that the Japanese would not use the West's weapons against the West itself.

soldiers in the creation of a modern army. It will be recalled that the sending of a French military mission was part of the Roches-Bakufu plan to reassert Tokugawa control but that, largely owing to its limited period of operation, this mission accomplished little. Nevertheless its political significance has drawn to it a good deal of attention, while the second mission, which, militarily, was of far greater importance, has been ignored.[97] The achievements of the second mission have been summarized by the recent historian of the European contribution to the Meiji army, Presseisen: "The French taught the Japanese to organize, train, and command military units from the company to the brigade. They demonstrated the use of artillery and insisted on the importance of field batteries despite the problems of the terrain. They drilled troops, educated the officers, and put their greatest efforts into the establishment of an officers' academy, which they rightly regarded as the key to a modern army. The mission must also be given credit for helping in Japan's industrial development by promoting military manufactures."[98] French assistance did not

97. Most general historians say nothing of the work of the second mission though it lasted far longer than the first - from 1872-80. By the time of its final departure, however, it had been considerably reduced in numbers.
98. Presseisen, Before Aggression, p.67. The author points out, however, the French failure to encourage the development of a General Staff. On the other hand, the fact that the French influence, before it faded from 1878 onwards, worked in favour of civil control of the military has recently been emphasized by Umetani Noboru in his Meiji Zenki Seiji-shi no Kenkyū. (Studies in Early Meiji Political History), (Tokyo 1963) pp.107-163

completely end with the departure of the Mission. From 1885 to 1888 two French officers were again employed at the Military Academy, and the number of Japanese students who were admitted to French military schools between 1878 and 1894 amounted to 114, compared with 87 in Germany.[99] If in the long run German influence prevailed, in the 1870's the French contribution played an essential part in strengthening the early Meiji Government, and this would have been impossible without the co-operation of the French Government.[100]

French assistance in another military field was also secured through governmental agency. The ability to build warships was a prime necessity for a country so open to a naval attack, yet until the close of the Tokugawa period there was no opportunity to develop such skills and even at the end of the 19th century Japan was still heavily dependent on Europe for additions to her navy. That she was beginning to build an increasing number of warships herself was partly due to France. Here again, the French contribution originated in the Roches period. The Yokosuka dockyard and arsenal was one of the earliest fruits of the

99. See the table compiled by the military attaché, Labry, for Minister Harmand in C.P.Japon.LXIV. Aug. 5, 1895. Harmand to Hanotaux.

100. It is worth noting that the French Ministry of War sent to Japan some of its most promising young officers. See C.P.Japon. XXI, March 26, 1872. Rémusat to Turenne. At least six of the fifteen officers who served there became generals. See Chanoine, op.cit. p.83.

Bakufu-Roches collaboration and its value was immediately obvious to the Meiji Government in 1868. The French engineer, who had planned this naval establishment, and who continued to direct it until 1876, Lieutenant Verny,[101] had conceived it as the Japanese equivalent of Toulon, and in scale it far surpassed the other shipyards where various han had experimented in the construction of steamships. At the time of the Restoration the Yokosuka arsenal had not yet reached the stage where ships could be built there, but it had already begun to prove its value for the purpose of ship repairs. In November, 1873, work was commenced there on the first warship to be built in Japan, an 840 ton 4 gunned vessel named the Seiki, which was successfully launched in the presence of the Emperor on March 5, 1875.[102] In the 1890's the dockyard began to be enlarged to build ships of 8000 tons and over, and it remained one of Japan's most important naval bases till the Pacific War, by which time the construction of 40,000 ton vessels was possible.[103] The French contribution to Yokosuka ended in 1878 when the last of the numerous French workers employed there left Japan.[104]

101. When Verny left in 1876, after eleven years, his functions as adviser to the Japanese head of the arsenal were taken over by another French officer, Thibaudier, who remained a further year. See C.P.Japon.XXV. Nov.20,1875; Ibid, May 14,1876. Both St. Quentin to Decazes.
102. See C.P.Japon.XXV.March 15, 1875. Berthemy to Decazes.
103. See J.Ray, Le Japon. (Paris, 1941) pp.99-100.
104. Throughout most of the period 1865-78 there were about 40 Frenchmen employed at Yokosuka.

The value of their efforts was assessed highly by Foreign Minister Terashima in a letter to the French representative, Geofroy: "Ils ont fondé au Japon l'art des constructions navales et c'est à eux que nous devons également de pouvoir constater aujourd 'hui l'achèvement de tous les services ayant rapport aux Constructions navales."[105] The importance of the role of diplomacy in all this was indicated by Terashima when he correctly added: "Ces résultats sont certainement le fruit du zèle et de l'activité déployés par ces fonctionnaires, mais c'est de la bienveillance de votre Gouvernement pour notre Pays qu'ils tenaient leur mandat."[106]

In naval construction, as in military training, French criticisms that their assistance had been dispensed with too soon for Japan's own good,[107] were partially justified by Japan's employment of a further Frenchman from 1886 to 1890. However, there was a significant difference in the level of help required. Louis-Emile Bertin, the man in question, was an outstanding Ministry of Marine

105. C.P.Japon. XXVI. Nov. 21, 1878. Geofroy to Waddington.
106. Ibid.
107. See e.g. C.P.Japon. XXV. Nov. 20, 1875. St. Quentin to Decazes, reporting conversation with Terashima. It should be observed, however, that there were good financial reasons for Japan's action, in that the first half of the 1880's were a time when Matsukata, the Finance Minister, was consistently pursuing a policy of economy and deflation to stabilise the erratic financial situation of the late 1870's.

engineer, with an international reputation as an innovator in naval construction.[108] His reputation and his previous instruction of Japanese students at Cherbourg decided the Japanese Government to appoint him as counsellor of the Navy Minister at a time when plans were being laid to give Japan a navy equal to or approaching that of any other Power in the Far East.[109] Bertin's main tasks were to advise on construction and superintend the establishment of new naval arsenals, and he was given the privilege of direct access to the Navy Minister.[110] In addition it was his recommendations as to what types of ships and materials should be purchased that led to the Japanese navy acquiring, among many smaller vessels, three warships of over 4,000 tons each, two of which were built in France and the other at Yokosuka.[111]

108. One of Bertin's books, La Marine Moderne, first published in 1905 went into two editions. In the 1880's, he was already known for his pioneer work on cellular bulkheads. See the commemorative pamphlet, Louis-Emile Bertin: Son Rôle dans la Création de la Marine Japonaise. (Paris, 1935), written by a Japanese naval attaché in France, Captain Togari.

109. See Matsushita Yoshio, Meiji no Guntai, (The Meiji Armed Forces), Tokyo 1960, pp.86-92. The Navy Ministry's need for Bertin is shown by the language used by Admiral Kawamura in requesting French Minister Sienkiewicz's co-operation: "Les constructeurs japonais de l'Arsénal de Yokosuka formés à l'école de M.Verny, ont tout d'abord très-bien travaillés, mais abandonnés à eux-mêmes, n'étant plus au courant des progrès de la science ils ont besoin actuellement d'être guidés." C.P.Japon. XXXI. Sept. 17 1885. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.

110. Ibid. See also Togari, op.cit. p.17-18.

111. Togari, op.cit., p.20-21; C.P.Japon. XLV. Jan.8, 1896. Harmand to Hanotaux.

It is further claimed for Bertin, that the specifications which he laid down for these ships made possible new battle tactics,[112] and their effectiveness was praised by Admiral Itō in December, 1894, after his victory in the battle of the Yalu, when he wrote to Bertin calling them "les éléments formidables de notre flotte."[113]

Bertin was clearly an adviser of highstanding and ability, but the Frenchman who had the greatest single influence was unquestionably Gustave-Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie, a professor of law. Boissonade spent more than twenty years in Japan, from 1873 to 1895, but time alone is insufficient to explain his importance, which derived essentially from two factors, one the impersonal attraction for the Japanese of the Codes Napoléoniens, the other Boissonade's personal dedication to the cause of international equality for Japan. This latter factor made him important not only in legal modernisation but also in Japanese foreign policy, for he gave valuable assistance to Ōkubo in his negotiations with China in 1874,[114] as well as enthusiastically providing the Japanese Government with ammunition in its struggle to wrest Treaty Revision from the Powers.[115]

112. Togari, op.cit. p.22.
113. Togari, op.cit. p.23.
114. See M. Iwata, Okubo Toshimichi, (Berkeley 1964), pp. 205-222. Iwata speaks of Boissonade as Ōkubo's 'trusted adviser' and concludes that Ōkubo "would not have been so successful without the dedicated counsel of such men as Boissonade and Legendre." (p.222).
115. In a dispatch written in May 1889, Sienkiewicz wrote: "M. Boissonade a, d'ailleurs, bien mérité du Japon: il a combattu, par tous les moyens dont il disposait, la politique

(continued.....

It was, however, his work in drafting new legal codes that absorbed most of Boissonade's energies and provides his main claim to fame. Boissonade was not the only legal adviser employed by the Meiji Government[116] but he was certainly among the most distinguished,[117] and it was

115. (continued)
des Puissances étrangères et notamment celle de la France dans l'affaire de la révision des Traités." (C.P.Japon. XXXIV. May 8, 1889) Boissonades' loyalty to the Meiji Government and dedication to his task is shown not only by the jurist's length of service in Japan, but also by his unremitting attention to his work. In reporting his departure on leave for Atami in Nov. 1884, the Echo du Japon added: "Les journaux indigènes, qui annoncent le départ de M. Boissonade, font observer que c'est la première fois qu'il prend un congé, depuis douze ans qu'il est au service du gouvernement japonais." (L'Echo du Japon, weekly edition, Nov. 21, 1884). More striking evidence still is provided by Boissonade's declaration, at the funeral of a legal colleague, M. Gambet-Gros, that he desired to be buried next to Ōkubo. (Ibid. Nov. 25, 1881) Though all foreign experts were well-paid, and the more outstanding advisers received as much or more than Japanese Ministers, it is doubtful whether the dedication of Boissonade (and, despite Sienkiewicz's insinuation, of others too) can be explained except in a way which takes account of their sense of participation in the construction of a new state and a new society. This was not a factor which weighed heavily with French diplomats, who were primarily interested in the prestige and influence which their own nationals might bring to France. It is revealing of the great importance which France attached to prestige, particularly cultural prestige, that Sienkiewicz considered the harm done by Boissonade to France's material interests to be more than compensated for by the effect of such an example of conscientiousness on the French reputation for loyalty and dedication.

116. Among the other German, American, English, and French lawyers in Japan was Georges Bousquet, author of Le Japon de nos Jours (Paris 1877). For his preparatory work, see Umetani Noboru, O yatoi Gaikōjin, (Honourable Foreign Employees) (Tokyo 1965) pp.77-82. Also the Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée. Vol.V.(1873) pp.275-7.

117. Boissonade was a 48 year old professor in the Faculty of Law at Paris when chosen. He was also joint editor of the Revue de Législa tion Ancienne et Moderne Française et Etrangère.

he who was entrusted with the bulk of the huge task of compiling the new legal codes which the Japanese Government required to prove her modernity to the Treaty Powers, to establish the legal foundations for a capitalist economy, and, in the Marxist view, to erect a firm base for the establishment of absolutism.[118] There is no room here to chronicle the various stages of Boissonade's work, but it is worth pointing out that, although he took the French codes as a base he was also concerned both to introduce improvements which other European countries had made and to relate this draft to the particular conditions of the Japanese social system.[119] In fact, the concessions

118. See Tōyama Shigeki's unfavourable assessment of Etō Shimpei, the Minister responsible for the appointment of the French legal advisers in "Mimpō-ten Ronsō no Seijiteki Kōsatsu"(A Political consideration of the Dispute over the Civil Code), his contribution to Minken ronkara Nashionarisumu e (From People's Rights to Nationalism) Tokyo 1956. pp.247-52. Choice of a French jurist to draft the new codes was determined by the reputation of France as a highly modernised state and of the Napoleonic Codes as a major foundation of this development, and by the difficulty of adapting the rival Anglo-Saxon concept of law to Japan with the necessary speed. See Y. Noda, Introduction au Droit Japonais, Paris 1966. p.51.

119. Among numerous testimonies to these facts, that of French Minister Roquette is particularly worthy of mention. His dispatch of July 29, 1881 (C.P.Japon XXVIII) contains a detailed analysis of the new penal code, See also L'Echo du Japon, weekly edition, Oct.22, 1879; Aug. 19, 1880. As regards the later Civil Code, Boissonade himself argued strongly that he had taken as much account of Japanese custom as was compatible with Japan's progress as a modern state. See "Les Nouveaux Codes Japonais", Revue Française du Japon, No.8. Sept. 30, 1892. There are several other articles in this short-lived periodical which are illustrative of Boissonade's views.

which he and his Japanese associates made to the family system did not go nearly far enough to satisfy the Confucian traditionalists, but it is probable that the chief reason for the postponement and redrafting of the Civil Code by a joint committee was the desire of the opposition parties in the Diet to make use of any means of putting pressure on the Hanbatsu Government, whose power they were challenging. Even though Boissonade's Civil Code was finally reshaped in a form more like that of the German Code, a good deal of its contents went unchanged, while the Penal Code which he had drawn up in 1877 remained in force from 1882 to 1908.[120] By the start of the twentieth century, it is true, French legal influences had been largely ousted by more authoritarian German ones. Nevertheless, in the intervening period, from his standpoint as an advocate of Natural Law, Boissonade had done much to propagate ideas of a universalist character which contributed to the development of liberalism in Japan.[121]

The army, shipbuilding, and the law were the fields in which French influence on Japanese modernisation were strongest, but there were many others in which Frenchmen,

120. See Noda, op.cit. pp.54-60.
121. It may be added that Boissonade's interests also included political economy. At the start of 1876 he gave a series of lectures to members of the Sei-in and Genrō-in, including Ōkubo and Itō. The views he expressed would not have done discredit to Cobden. See L'Echo du Japon, Jan. 10, 1876; Jan. 13, 1876; Feb. 3, 1876.

or French example, also played a part. In education, it has been maintained, the "system which was established by law in the fifth year of Meiji (1872) - which became the foundation of the new educational system of Japan - was, in the main, established also upon the basis of the French system."[122] The main attraction here was the high degree of centralisation achieved by France, and this led to several official missions being sent to France to study other aspects of this centralisation - in particular, the police and administrative systems.[123] However, individuals also filled an important function. A considerable number of Frenchmen taught at what in 1885 became Tokyo Imperial University, several of them in the sciences. In the realm of economic and material advance, the best-known example

122. K.Yoshida, "European and American Influences in Japanese Education," in I. Nitobe, ed., Western Influences In Modern Japan, (Chicago, 1931), p.27.

123. That this aspect of French influence was noticed at the time is shown by a letter written by a Francophile Japanese to L'Echo du Japon. After referring to a number of institutional similarities, however, he then went on to claim that "les institutions japonais sont, en général, une imitation des institutions françaises." Even the Echo felt obliged to comment: "Nous croyons qu'il exagère un peu." (L'Echo du Japon, weekly edition, Nov. 25, 1881) A clear case of French institutional influence working against the development of liberalism was cited by Geofroy, the French Minister, in 1878, when reporting the Genrō (non-elective Senate) debates on the proposal to elect departmental assemblies. See C.P.Japon XXVI, Aug. 10, 1878. Geofroy to Waddington.

of French influence was the model silk-reeling filature established in 1871 at Tomioka with the help of a French merchant, Brunat, but many Frenchmen were involved in other enterprises, particularly the development of mining.[124] In all, at least 177 Frenchmen played some part in the modernisation of industrial techniques at some point between 1860 and 1914.[125] If this was small compared with the numbers of Englishmen, it still left France at roughly the same level as America and Germany,[126] and if one concentrates on the formative first decade of the Meiji Period and government employees alone, France's contribution seems even more significant. In 1872 49 out of the Meiji Government's 213 foreign employees were French, fewer than the 119 English admittedly, but considerably more than the 16 Americans or 8 Germans.[127] In 1874 the proportion had gone down slightly, but the overall total had been more than doubled. Out of 503 foreign employees, 108 were French, compared with 269 English, 47 Americans and 37 Germans.[128] Even in 1879 when the French influence was waning somewhat, the 34

124. See Saigusa Hiroto, Nozaki Shigeru and Sasaki Takashi, Kindai Nihon Sangyō Gijutsu no Seiyōka (The Westernisation of Industrial Techniques in Modern Japan) (Tokyo 1960) pp.17-57.
125. This figure is based on the list of about 1400 names which Saigusa, Nozaki and Sasaki have compiled and which cannot be far from complete. See Ibid. pp.277-361.
126. The figures for Britain, America and Germany are 649, 177 and 135 respectively.
127. See Umetani, O-yatoi Gaikokujin, p.212.
128. Ibid. p.212.

French nationals employed by the Government still outnumbered the 30 Germans and were only slightly fewer than the Americans.[129]

Much of this French contribution to Japanese modernisation had no direct connection with French diplomacy. Indeed it would seem from the Quai d'Orsay archives that France's representatives in Japan knew nothing of the great majority of industrial experts and skilled workers referred to above. Nevertheless, diplomacy was a factor that cannot be ignored for much of the really significant French assistance had to come through official channels. This is obvious in the case of the military missions and the naval engineers, but it applied to some individuals as well. Boissonade, for instance, remained in Japan as long as he did partly because his position at Paris was kept open for him, on the request of the Quai d'Orsay, by Ministry of Public Instruction intervention.[130] Examples can be found on the economic side, too, of diplomacy at least lending a hand in the introduction of Frenchmen or French techniques, the most important being Outrey's support for the creation of the model silk-reeling filature at Tomioka which proved influential in the improvement of Japan's main export.[131]

129. Ibid. p.215. The total number was 277, of whom 140 were British.
130. See C.C.Tokyo. Ibis, July 6, 1882. Tricou to Freycinet. Also C.P.Japon.XXXI. Sept.18, 1885. Seinkiewicz to Freycinet.
131. See C.P.Japon.XX. Aug. 1, 1870. Outrey to Gramont.

The role of diplomacy as a channel for French assistance meant that the character of the diplomats themselves assumed a certain significance. When the Japanese Government desired to employ Frenchmen in official or semi-official positions, - and many of the most important foreign employees belonged to this category - it found it necessary to secure the approval and co-operation of the French Government, since few men were likely to come to Japan even on high pay, unless they were assured of being able to resume their normal career when they returned home. Japanese policy, therefore, was to make a preliminary unofficial approach to the French representative in Japan, since it was clear that if his support was secured, their request would have a better chance of being accepted by Paris. In addition this policy enabled the Meiji rulers to avoid the possible humiliation of formal rejection by a foreign Power. However, the absence of explicit instructions on this point[132] made it possible for representatives to encourage or reject approaches as they saw fit, and since, if their reaction was unsympathetic, there was little likelihood of the Japanese proceeding

132. Although the Quai d'Orsay never refused a Meiji Government request and from 1875 showed a great deal of concern for the continuation of the military mission and French supervision at Yokosuka, it always left the initiative to Tokyo, presumably assuming that new opportunities for French advisers could only be detected and evaluated by their representative on the spot.

with a formal request, French diplomats were in a position to discourage informal approaches without fear of the Quai d'Orsay ever learning of their action.

The importance of this personal factor is seen when one looks at the reasons why the Quai d'Orsay favoured French participation in Japanese modernisation and at the different characters of the men which it chose to represent France in Japan. In the 1860's and 1870's the Quai favoured the employment of French experts because it believed that French prestige in the Far East, especially her military prestige, gained considerably from the implication of French excellence which Japanese requests carried. In addition, these requests helped to restore French morale after the catastrophe of 1870-1, and were particularly satisfying when Frenchmen were chosen in preference to Germans or Englishmen. In the 1880's, however, the question became more directly political and was more urgently considered. Japan was becoming a power in her own right whose friendship was worth cultivating, and it was believed that having advisers there could provide an extremely useful way of influencing her in favour of France.[133] By this time, however, Japan was less in need of foreign help than earlier and there were thus far fewer opportunities

133. The first, and most notable expression of this belief occurred during the Franco-Chinese dispute, when it was anticipated by Foreign Minister Challemel-Lacour that Japan could, by such means, be induced to ally with France or attack China. See C.P.Japon.XXIX. July 6, 1883. Challemel-Lacour to Viel-Castel.

of acquiring new means of influence in this direction. For the most part, therefore, they were forced to place their hopes on the men who had been appointed to influential positions in the first decade of Meiji modernisation.

This being so, the attitude towards Japan of the earlier French diplomats assumed, in retrospect, considerable importance. It was fortunate for France that in the key period before and after the Restoration she was mostly represented by men who were sympathetic towards the progressive tendencies of the Meiji leaders. Roches and Turenne were both enthusiastic advocates of Japanese modernisation, and after two years in Japan Outrey also became convinced of its desirability. It is not surprising, therefore, that the years 1864-1873 saw a large number of requests for French assistance and several study missions to France. During Turenne's final year as chargé d'affaires Japanese approaches were especially numerous, so that the complete cessation of all requests under his successor, Berthemy, is all the more striking. In view of the latter's strong views on the changes taking place in Japan, however, the change can hardly be regarded as accidental.

"Les Représentants étrangers qui ont aspiré à l'honneur de créer une société nouvelle pendant la durée de leur exercice diplomatique et de l'inviter aux bienfaits de la civilisation,' he wrote, a fortnight after his arrival, 'ont oublié, ce me semble, qu'il est malaisé de construire un édifice lorsque l'on a fait disparaître la base sur laquelle reposait celui qu'il est destiné à remplacer. Ils ont oublié surtout que, dangereux parfois pour les peuples de race supérieure, le progrès, tel qu'il est généralement compris, est mortel aux races inférieures." 134

134. C.P.Japon.XXII. July 9, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie.

Bearing in mind the fact that 1875 saw the replacement of the notoriously anti-Japanese German Minister, von Brandt, and that most succeeding French representatives tended to accept Berthemy's rather than Roches' approach, it seems possible that the tendency that was apparent in Japan from the late 1870's to look towards Germany as a model may not have been due solely to the impersonal factor of similarities in the two countries' political development.

(f) French Views of the Political Development of Japan.

The differing attitudes of successive ministers towards French participation in Japanese modernisation and their handling of the problems with which they had to deal can be better understood if taken in conjunction with their views on the wider question of the changes and tendencies that were shaping the new Japan. A brief description of their reactions to political developments should also provide a convenient introduction to the question of French influence on Japanese foreign policy since, in a period when so little positive control was exercised from Paris, much depended on the twist or emphasis given to French policy by the diplomat in Tokyo.

The obvious starting-point in a review of this kind is the French attitude to the Meiji Restoration itself. What was its nature and what was its likely outcome? Outrey's first thoughts on these matters were expressed little more than a month after his arrival in Japan.

In the circumstances his observations were surprisingly acute. While admitting that the impact of foreigners had been partly responsible for the troubled situation in Japan, he added:

"Mais ce n'est pas là, d'après moi, la cause première d'un bouleversement aussi complet des institutions séculaires du Japon: le pays traverse une crise sociale des plus sérieuses et insensiblement une classe intermédiaire de la population semble tendre à se substituer à la classe supérieure qui seule jusqu'à ce jour a occupé la scène politique." [135]

The situation was too complex, however, for him to have any confidence about the outcome, and his inability to disentangle the thread of the future from the web of conflicting and overlapping political interests may have been partly responsible for the verdict he passed on Japan in a private letter: "C'est, en somme, un pays des plus médiocres, à tous les points de vue." [136]

It took two years for a less pessimistic attitude to emerge. In the meantime Outrey was consistently sceptical, first, of declarations that a far-reaching transformation was being aimed at, then, when he had become convinced of the reformers' sincerity, of their ability to carry their projects out. In September, 1868, he refused to believe 'ces semblants d'abnégation' when it was rumoured that the South-Western han were aiming at a unified Imperial government, [137] and when in April, 1869, he learned of the actual handover

135. C.P.Japon.XVI. July 9, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.
136. C.P.Japon.XVI. Aug.22, 1868. Outrey to Saint-Vallier.
137. C.P.Japon.XVII.Sept. 28, 1868. Outrey to Moustier.

to the Emperor of han registers by the Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa and Hizen daimyō he found it inexplicable, adding that public opinion did not believe in their sincerity.[138] By May, his grasp of the situation was better. He realised now that the daimyō were being manipulated by the samurai leaders, many of whom were genuinely seeking to establish a centralised government, but he doubted if the country was ready for such a radical change.[139] As for the experiment in public debate which the early Meiji Government felt obliged to inaugurate with the establishment of assemblies representing daimyō and samurai, Outrey, like his colleagues, was uninterested in any liberal potentialities these bodies might possess, and did his best to secure their abolition on account of the frequent expression of anti-foreign opinions in the course of the debate.[140]

138. C.P.Japon.XVIII. April 12, 1869. Outrey to la Valette.
139. C.P.Japon.XVIII. May11,1869. Outrey to la Valette.
140. See C.P.Japon.XIX. Aug. 1, 1869. Outrey to la Valette. Technically it cannot be said that the Foreign Representatives actually demanded the abolition of the assemblies, since the only action they took was to present three questions to the Meiji Government to elucidate the exact status of the assemblies. However, it is clear from Outrey's report that the questions were intended to warn the Government of the danger of allowing the discussion of proposals contrary to the stipulations of the treaties. The Foreign Representatives' intervention may have been a contributory factor in the Government's decision to allow the assemblies to fade away.

Throughout 1869 and early 1870, Outrey persisted in believing that there could be no significant change in Japan. In March, 1870, for instance, he described the Japanese Government's plan to build its first railway line as "une entreprise très problématique dans ses résultats."[141] Then in June 1870, he struck a different note: "Le Japon," he declared, "est en voie de transformation. Contrairement à ce qui se passe dans les autres pays d'Orient et particulièrement en Chine, il se jette résolument et avec ardeur dans les idées européennes."[142] It is significant that this conclusion followed the first definite request by the Meiji Government for a new military mission from France. No doubt the conversations he had just had with Iwakura and other leaders had given Outrey a new insight into Japanese political realities, but the Meiji Government still had some very important hurdles to cross, before it could be said to have firmly established both its own power and its modernising programme. Outrey's conclusion, therefore, was somewhat premature, and it is hard to dismiss the suspicion that his thinking on this subject was coloured

141. C.C.Yédo.VI. March 15, 1870. Outrey to Daru. See also C.P.Japon.XIX. Jan.20, 1870, Outrey to Auvergne-Lauraguais. The Quai d'Orsay did not feel the same way. A pencilled comment on Outrey's March dispatch reads: "Il est regrettable que l'industrie française s'est trouvée tout à fait étrangère à cette entreprise." The result was a cryptic instruction to renew his efforts to secure such a contract if the opportunity arose again. C.C.Yédo.VI. Aug. 25, 1870. Auvergne-Lauraguais to Outrey.

142. C.P.Japon.XX. June 4, 1870. Outrey to Daru.

by the fact that France had been asked to play an important part in Japan's transformation.[143] He was delighted that French advisers had been chosen in preference to Prussian, even though he was too experienced a diplomat to let the Japanese Government be aware of this, and it was a further satisfaction that the Meiji leaders held to their decision in spite of the Franco-Prussian War. It would appear, then, that in the case of Outrey, French participation in Japanese modernisation was motivated by a desire for prestige and influence and that his assessment of the political situation was dependent on the extent of French participation rather than vice-versa.

Whether the same was true of Turenne is uncertain. Although he shared to the full Outrey's desire to increase French prestige by contributing to Japan's development, the general tone of his dispatches suggests that he was in favour of Japanese progress whoever was responsible for it.[144]

143. The first time that Outrey spoke of Japan's transformation in a tone which implied that it might prove permanent was after an official dinner given to him by Iwakura. Iwakura's language had convinced him, he wrote, that this influential leader "se rend compte de la loyauté de notre politique et qu'il a fini par comprendre que n'avant aucune arrière-pensée, nous pouvons être un grand appui dans la voie des réformes dont il est un des principaux promoteurs." Ibid.

144. See e.g. C.P.Japon.XXI. March 24,1872. Turenne to Rémusat: "...durant ces derniers mois je n'ai négligé aucune occasion de recommander notre code civil à l'adoption du gouvernement Japonais." In a later dispatch he made some interesting observations on the increase of French influence in Japan and the attitudes of the French and Japanese governments to it, ending: "Aujourd'hui qu'il sait que notre politique extérieure est une politique d'expectation, il se laisse aller plus librement à ses sentiments de sympathie à notre égard. Si cette

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It may be, in fact, that his genuine sympathy for the Meiji Government's efforts was one of the reasons why the latter was so ready to approach him with requests for help in a variety of forms.[145] Gratification at this renewal of trust in France was undoubtedly one of the main reasons why Turenne, with Rémusat's approval, adopted a much more reasonable attitude on important political questions such as the Uragami Christians, the withdrawal of French troops, and even Treaty Revision. Indeed, the growing cordiality of relations between the two countries, during Turenne's service in Japan was beginning to approach that of the years from 1864 to 1867, and, as in the Roches period, it carried the promise of commercial advantage.[146]

144. (continued)
observation est juste, notre rôle devient celui de Conseiller du Gouvernement Japonais. Nous ne saurions nous en plaindre." C.P.Japon.XXI. Sept. 25, 1872. Turenne to Rémusat.

145. These requests concerned such matters as the provision of advisers, the reception of Japanese study missions in France, and the communication of French laws and regulations concerning public salubrity and police organization. It is significant that though the documents required in the latter instance were not only unpublished but also scattered among various sections, the Minister of the Interior was willing to make a special compilation for Japan's purpose. See C.P.Japon. XXII. April 11, 1873. Rémusat to Turenne.

146. Towards the end of Turenne's stay, he reported a conversation with Ōkuma, the Minister of Finance, in which the latter spoke "du désir qu'éprouvait le Gouvernement Japonais de se procurer en France pour une nouvelle ligne de chemin de fer un matériel complet." This led the chargé d'affaires to conclude that "nos grands établissements métallurgiques, tout du moins me donne lieu de le penser, vont trouver par ce moyen au Japon un nouveau débouché, d'une importance réelle pour l'écoulement de leurs produits." C.P.Japon.XXII. March 17,1873. Turenne to Rémusat. Turenne made it clear that he believed that Ōkuma's feeler would have been impossible had not Franco-

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With the coming of Berthemy in June 1873, this cordiality vanished. Whereas Turenne had welcomed every progressive move by the Meiji Government, and had willingly accepted that France should play a full part in promoting change, Berthemy showed nothing but distaste for the innovations that had been introduced: "Entreprise sans méthode, sans études préalables, poursuivie avec une précipitation fièvreuse, cette transformation", he immediately proclaimed, "est de nature à faire naître de sérieuses appréhensions pour l'avenir du pays."[147] The reason for such condemnation transpired in his next dispatch, which discussed the problem of the Japanese attack on extra-territoriality. In it, Berthemy lamented the "peu d'

146 (continued)
Japanese relations reached such a high point. Although he made no reference to Roches, it seems likely that his service under his outstanding predecessor had some influence on his policy. His success in Japan, however, was not appreciated by other Foreign Ministers. After subsequent appointments to Athens and the Holy See, in 1877 he was sent to Rio de Janeiro, having been promoted to Secretary, First class, at the by no means early age of 35. In Dec. 1878, his career temporarily came to a halt when he was retired, a victim, presumably, of the Republican triumph of 1877. He re-entered the service as Consul, First class, in 1884, but was still on the same rank ten years later, when his post was Budapest. Only in 1899 did he achieve the rank of Ministre. See the Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire.

147. C.P.Japon XXII. July 9, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie. This verdict seemed harsh even to Broglie, who was much less liberal than Rémusat had been. Nevertheless, although he pointed out that "il est impossible de méconnaître les progrès réalisés dans ces dernières années," he did nothing to limit Berthemy's freedom of action and ensure continuity of policy. C.P.Japon. XXIII. Oct.15, 1873. Broglie to Berthemy.

[redacted] entente qui semble exister entre les Représentants étrangers relativement à l'attitude qu'il convient d'observer vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Japonais à l'occasion des questions nouvelles journellement soulevées par lui. La plupart d'entre eux paraissent n'avoir d'autre objet en vue que d'obtenir pour leurs nationaux des places largement retribuées; il en résulte une véritable rivalité et afin de faire triompher son candidat on se laisse parfois entrainer à des complaisances compromettantes." 148

This situation was the more objectionable to him in that he had been sent to Japan, after serving as Minister in Peking and Washington, for the express purpose of securing Treaty Revision on Western terms.[149] Without the full co-operation of his fellow-diplomats his mission would have no hope of success and his own prospects of advancement would hardly be improved. For the first time, therefore, since the early 1860's the French attitude to Japanese modernisation, and with it French willingness to participate in the process, were subordinated to what was considered a higher political interest.[150]

148. C.P.Japon. XXII. July 12, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie.
149. See Chapter VI.
150. Berthemy was even willing to see the end of the military mission. He urged Decazes to withdraw it, together with French personnel at Yokosuka, in the event of war breaking out between Japan and China over the Formosan expedition. See C.P.Japon.XXIV. Sept.8, 1874. The Quai d'Orsay, however, was not prepared to abandon sources of prestige which France already possessed and a telegram was sent instructing the mission to withdraw temporarily to a French ship for the duration of the conflict. C.P.Japon XXIV. Oct.30, 1874. Decazes to Berthemy. A dispatch of the same date spoke of "la prévoyance qui nous recommande de ne pas désorganiser, sauf nécessité absolue, l'important établissement d'instruction militaire que nous avons fondé au Japon." Ibid.

Berthemy's hostility to the Meiji Government over its treaty revision policy seems to have affected his attitude towards internal politics also. At any rate, he showed more sympathy for Soyejima and his allies after their defeat over Korean policy in October, 1873, than for the surviving members of the Government. This, however, had nothing to do with the liberal manifesto which the former group issued in January, 1874, calling for a parliament. Indeed, Berthemy's comment on the proposal was scathing: "L'établissement d'un gouvernement représentatif," he wrote, "serait, je le crains, fatal au pays."[151] He justified this contention by an analysis of the Japanese character:

> "Les Japonais ont l'esprit mobile, impressionable, facile à entrainer dans une voie ou dans une autre; ils sont en même temps superficiels, aussi disposés à imiter que hors d'état de créer....Loin d'être en état de se gouverner eux-mêmes, ils ont par conséquent besoin, plus que d'autres, d'être dirigés et contenus." 152

His preference for the opponents of the Ōkubo-Iwakura Government can only be explained by his belief that their manifesto was simply 'une arme d'opposition' which would be forgotten if they came to power,[153] and that in the matter of Treaty Revision they would be more pliable than the existing leaders.

151. C.P.Japon.XXIV. Feb.10.1874. Berthemy to Decazes.
152. C.P.Japon.XXIV. Feb.10.1874. Berthemy to Decazes.
153. Ibid. It is worth noting that Berthemy had been on fairly good terms with Soyejima, and had continued to discuss affairs with him after his resignation. He did maintain earlier that "le libéralisme relatif de Soyejima n'a pas été étranger à la chute de ce dernier," but this referred more to his attitude towards Treaty Revision than internal politics.C.P.Japon.XXIII. Nov.9.1873.Berthemy to Broglie.

Berthemy's views remained constant throughout his stay in Japan. In January, 1875, in fact, he even committed the near-heresy of questioning whether the opening of Japan to the West had been to the former's advantage.[154] His successor, St. Quentin, was less decided in his opinions, but he too showed little liking for the changes taking place, especially those not introduced and controlled by the Government. His approval of the 1876 law, which curbed the freedom of the vigorous new press, revealed that he would continue what was becoming almost a French tradition of antipathy towards any threat to authoritarian rule,[155] and he was quick to point out that the publication of more liberal laws had been followed by an apparent increase in crime.[156] Unlike Berthemy, however, he did not lack concern for the prestige that France derived from the military mission and the French personnel at Yokosuka, and much of his time was taken up in urging the Meiji Government to maintain them.

154. See C.P.Japon.XXV. Jan.4.1875. Berthemy to Decazes.
155. St. Quentin commented that the newspapers' advocacy of assassination, atheism, and complete democracy was such as to "faire douter de la bonne influence de la civilisation Européenne sur ce pays." C.P.Japon.XXV. Sept.5.1876. St. Quentin to Decazes.
156. C.P.Japon.XXV. Aug.15, 1876. St.Quentin to Decazes.

St. Quentin left Japan in May, 1877. His successor, Geofroy, who had earlier served as Minister in China also showed some disposition at first to condemn Japan for her haste in adopting new ideas. In reporting the death of Saigō Takamori, he praised him for wishing to "revenir en arrière, ou, tout au moins, enrayer le mouvement inconsidéré de réformes dans lequel le Japon est jeté. L'idée était juste si les moyens employés n'étaient pas corrects, et il eût rendu un grand service à son pays en essayant de la réaliser d'une façon plus régulière."[157]

By 1878, however, closer acquaintance with Japan had led Geofroy to modify his views. In August, he admitted that many reforms had proved useful and only criticised the Japanese for not going far enough.[158] His comment on Ōkubo, when this dominant figure was assassinated by the admirers of Saigō, was even more favourable than his obituary of Saigō himself: "L'histoire de sa vie est liée à celle de l'étonnante réforme qui a transformé le Japon," he wrote,

157. C.P.Japon. XXVI. Oct. 6, 1877. Geofroy to Decazes. About the Satsuma Rebellion itself Geofroy had little to say, but in this he was typical of most French ministers, who did not conceive it as part of their task, once order had been established, to report on Japanese politics in detail.

158. C.P.Japon. XXVI. Aug. 11, 1878. Geofroy to Waddington. He was perceptive enough to realise the importance of the family system and claimed that "Tant qu'ils n'auront pas réglé ce point fondamental on peut tenir leur oeuvre pour superficielle et précaire."

characterising him as "le promoteur éclairé de la civilisation Européenne dans son pays."[159] It is not without interest that in his second year as Minister, Geofroy questioned the French stand on Treaty Revision and co-operated with Japan in Korean affairs to an extent which would have horrified Berthemy or St. Quentin.

It did horrify Geofroy's successor, Balloy, who was swift to dissociate France from Japanese foreign policy. Balloy's impressions of Japan were entirely unfavourable.[160] In the harshness of his criticism, though not in the depth of his judgement, he exceeded even Berthemy. His first dispatch declared that good relations would be difficult because "Les Japonais sont la vanité même, et voient partout des atteintes portées à leur droit de Souveraineté."[161] His attacks generally centred on the Meiji Government whose squeezing of the peasantry and patronage of commercial projects he blamed for its own financial difficulties and for the general sluggishness of trade. In one dispatch in 1880 the industrial programme of the Meiji leaders came under severe censure:

159. C.P.Japon.XXVI. May 19, 1878. Geofroy to Waddington.
160. He had already been in Japan for over a year before he became chargé d'affaires in Feb. 1879, and had three years' experience in China, from 1871 to 1874.
161. C.P.Japon.XXVII. March 12, 1879. Balloy to Waddington.

"Ils ne savaient pas où ils menaient le pays, mais ils espéraient que l'aventure leur rapporterait honneurs et profits. Sous ce rapport, ils ne se sont pas trompés.... C'est grâce à leur avidité que le Japon est couvert aujourd'hui de toutes ces associations qui ont pour but de monopoliser telle ou telle branche de commerce ou d'industrie et qui pèsent si lourdement sur la prospérité générale." 162

He saw only one remedy - stern retrenchment - which he wrongly believed to be beyond Japanese capability. He concluded therefore: "je crois pouvoir prédire que le Japon marche sûrement à l'anarchie, peut-être même au démembrement, cela dépendra de l'état des principales Puissances Etrangères, l'Amérique y comprise, au moment critique." 163

The Meiji Government's industrial programme was not the only aspect of Japanese political life with which Balloy found fault. His criticisms of the workings of Japanese justice were fierce, and the fact that changes had been made in Boissonade's work gave him an excuse for greeting it extremely coldly.[164] Yet for all his dislike of the existing Government, Balloy never wavered from the anti-liberal attitude of previous French Ministers. His comment in February, 1880, on the agitation for a democratic Government, provides a good

162. C.P.Japon.XXVII. Nov.12,1880. Balloy to Barthélemy St. Hilaire.

163. C.P.Japon.XXVII. Nov.12.1880. Balloy to Barthélemy St. Hilaire. Balloy was so impressed by the seriousness of the financial crisis that, when in September he heard rumours that a loan was to be sought in Europe, he wrote: "Si vous appreniez, M. le Ministre, que le Gouvernement Japonais est en pourparlers avec une maison de Banque Francaise, il serait prudent de la prémunir contre les dangers que courraient ses capitaux." C.P.Japon.XXVIII.Sept.14.1880. Balloy to Freycinet.

164. See C.P.Japon.XXVII. Aug.5.1880. Balloy to Freycinet. His successor Roquette was much more fair-minded. After a

(continued).....

illustration of this: "je n'envisagerais pas sans appréhension au point de vue des relations internationales de ce pays avec les Puissances Etrangères l'inauguration d'un système de Gouvernement qui aurait forcément pour effet de diminuer, sinon de détruire, le principe d'autorité représenté par le Mikado."[165]

Balloy left Japan in December, 1880. None of his successors was quite so vehement as he, though Tricou, who was Minister from mid-1882 to mid-1883, came fairly near, at least until the rapprochement brought about by France's difficulties with China. Up till then he was decidedly anti-Japanese, and his resentment at what he considered Japan's presumptious treaty revision proposals in 1882 led him to assert that "les dignitaires qui ont fait la révolution de 1868 ne cherchent à nous emprunter nos instruments de civilisation que dans l'espoir de pouvoir s'en servir un jour contre la civilisation et contre nous."[166] This warning had not been voiced since the time of Duchesne de Bellecourt, and to some extent this fact indicates how little serious attention was paid to Japan by France in the early years after the Restoration.

164. (continued.)
scrupulous examination of the codes he admitted that the only objection France could have concerned the quality and experience of the Japanese judges. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. July 29, 1881. Roquette to Barthélemy St. Hilaire.

165. C.P.Japon.XXVII. Feb.8.1880. Balloy to Freycinet.

166. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. July 19,1882. Tricou to Freycinet.

In conclusion, it must be observed that the on-the-spot reaction to Japanese progress of French representatives in Tokyo was much less favourable than that of Europe. This was remarked upon by Balloy in 1880. "Ce que je ne m'explique pas," he put it, "c'est comment le Japon a pu nous jeter assez de poudre aux yeux pour nous faire croire en Europe qu'en adoptant nos moeurs et notre civilisation il allait être notre Champion, notre avant-garde en Asie."[167] Whatever the reasons for Europe's encouragement may have been, the pertinent question here is how to account for the highly unsympathetic attitude of many of the French representatives. A reading of the French archives suggests that four factors were involved. One which was of lesser importance than the others may have well been the difficult conditions under which diplomats worked at this time. This seems to have induced a somewhat jaundiced view. Secondly, there was the fact that Japan was in such a hurry to make herself respectable that many of her reforms appeared ill-considered and gave offence to those whose country was taken as the model. Nor could diplomats be expected to approve when reforms were guided by nationals of other Powers. More important than these considerations, was the resentment, which was felt particularly strongly by Berthemy and Balloy, at the use Japan was making of Western methods and techniques. If Japan succeeded in

167. C.P.Japon.XXVII. Nov.12.1880. Balloy to Barthélemy St.Hilaire.

raising herself to the level of the Western Powers, abandonment of the cherished belief in Western uniqueness and inherent superiority would become an unpleasant necessity. These three factors, alone, however, can scarcely account for the bitterness of some of the attacks that have been cited. One must recall, in addition, that for most of this period, and especially during the later years, Japan was seeking to revise the Treaties. The Powers would have liked to refuse Japanese demands from the strong moral position that Japanese backwardness made the abandonment of extraterritoriality impossible and unreasonable. The fact that Japan actually was imitating the West made this argument, though still employed, much less satisfactory, and in any case it could obviously not be used forever. Gradually, the representatives were compelled to have recourse to a legalistic defence of their privileges, out of keeping with 19th century ways of thought. Though they tried to forget moral considerations, they could not hide from themselves the fact that the Japanese did see the question in these terms, and their unconscious resentment at being unable to cloak their countries' material interests with the justification that Japan refused to abandon her old ways, may be inferred by their indignation at what were not, in fact, unnatural demands on the part of the Japanese. Tricou's dispatch of July 19, 1882 is a good example of this. "Je ne présumais pas assez de l'ambition, mais trop de la discrètion

Japonaise. La cour de Tokio dévoile enfin ses visées sans ambages et dans leur étendue. Elle jette le masque."[168] This extravagant language was prompted by nothing more than the announcement by the Japanese Government that it wanted new treaties which might be terminated, rather than a mere revision of the old ones. Similarly he described a Japanese plan to achieve autonomy by separating the commercial from the jurisdictional aspects of the treaty as "un raisonnement puéril sans doute, mais d'autant plus Japonais qu'il est puéril."[169] This resort to insult can surely be explained only by the unconscious resentment which ministers felt at being forced onto ground which their consciences found uncomfortable. It is ironic that after so many exhortations to modernise from well-meaning foreigners in the 1860's, it should happen that in 1880 Inoue could complain bitterly to Roquette of the scant encouragement given by the Powers to Japan in her attempts to transform her civilisation.[170]

168. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. July 19,1882. Tricou to Freycinet.

169. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. July 15,1883. Tricou to Challemel-Lacour. Tricou's first dispatch, a month before, had referred to the 'vanité enfantine' of the Japanese. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. June 16,1882.

170. See C.P.Japon.XXVII. Dec.11.1880. Roquette to Barthélemy St. Hilaire.

CHAPTER V.

FRANCE AND THE EMERGENCE OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY, 1870-1885

(a) France and the First Steps in Japanese Diplomacy.

By 1873 the power of the Meiji Government was firmly established, and despite the challenge from samurai and peasant discontent which it had to face in the next few years it was never again in a position where its existence could be threatened by any manifestation of hostility on the part of the Powers. The chief interest in Franco-Japanese relations from this time on, therefore, concerns Japanese foreign policy, firstly the influence, if any, which French diplomacy had on its early development, and secondly, and more important, the attitude of Japan towards the Franco-Chinese dispute of 1883-5. The first of these questions can best be approached by considering the French position on the Korea and Ryūkyū problems, but before this, mention must be made of a lesser issue which particularly concerned France and which introduced Japan to international politics for the first time.

(i) The Franco-Prussian War and Japanese Neutrality

The outbreak of war between France and Prussia in July, 1870, presented the young Meiji Government with the opportunity of proclaiming her sovereignty to the world and strengthening her position in international law.

Her experience was not entirely reassuring, however, for the Franco-Prussian War also revealed in an unmistakeable manner Japan's weakness and vulnerability, and doubtless made more urgent the resolve of the Meiji leaders to achieve the speedy erection of a strong state.

The question of neutrality was first raised by the Prussian Minister, von Brandt, on Aug. 18, 1870. Since the Japanese Government was not unwilling, and Outrey also favoured the idea at this date, a provisional unofficial neutrality was agreed upon. In justification of his decision, Outrey pointed to "l'importance extrême qu'il y a à montrer aux Chinois, comme aux Japonais, que, même en état de guerre, les Puissances Européennes seront toujours prêtes à unir leur action pour protéger les intérêts Européens dans ces deux pays."[1]

This happy state of agreement did not survive for long. On August 24, the Japanese Government proceeded to publish on its own initiative a proclamation of neutrality based on an interpretation of Japan's rights as a neutral which was much too broad for the French Minister. Growing awareness of the gravity of the situation in Europe, together with the appearance on the scene of Admiral Dupré,

1. C.P.Japon.XX. Aug.22.1870. Outrey to Gramont. It should be added that the murder of the French consul and others at Tientsin in June was still very fresh in the mind of Europeans and that French naval strength in Japanese waters was temporarily weaker than the German.

whose frigate, corvette and gun-boat reestablished French naval superiority over the Prussian frigate and corvette in the Japan Seas, made Outrey anxious that France's freedom of action should be restricted as little as possible. He therefore, objected in the strongest terms to the Japanese neutrality regulations, and with the collaboration of von Brandt and Sawa, the Japanese Foreign Minister, a revised set was drawn up whereby the only significant limitations on French action were a prohibition on the seizure of German ships of any kind within seven miles of the Japanese coast and an obligation to let 24 hours pass before pursuing German warships leaving harbour. It now became possible for France to prevent trading activity by the twenty German merchant ships which normally visited Japan.[2]

It did not take von Brandt long to realise this might very well happen if France's position in Europe became desperate. In the method by which he attempted to retrieve the situation, however, he made a big miscalculation. Instead of consulting with his French colleague as before, he presented him with a fait accompli which turned the

2. See C.P.Japon.XX.Sept.30.1870. Outrey to Auvergne-Lauraguais. Outrey claimed that the first regulations included some articles which were contrary to the Treaties. Von Brandt's willingness to accept the changes of Sept.22. is difficult to explain. His memoirs refer to the neutrality question only in the most general terms of the need for European solidarity. See M.von Brandt, Dreiunddreissig Jahre in Ost-Asien, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1901) vol.II. p.288-291.It seems most likely that at the time of the Sept. agreement the Prussian Minister still

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question into one of prestige and thus ended all possibility of friendly agreement. By exerting pressure on the Japanese Government he induced it to issue, on Oct. 12, additional regulations which gave 24 hours' start to merchantmen as well as to warships, and, as had the original proclamation, prohibited hostilities in the Inland Sea.[3] Outrey's reaction was to reject outright any alteration in what he claimed was a tripartite international agreement which could not be changed except with the consent of all the parties involved. His argument found favour with most of his colleagues and on October 16, the Japanese Government officially withdrew the additional articles.[4]

Though Outrey displayed considerable skill in his handling of this question, the basis of his diplomatic victory lay in French naval strength. It was in Japan's interest to accept the German version of neutrality, but with no navy of her own to speak of, she would have invited humiliation had she attempted to implement the October 12th

2. (continued).....
had no reason to suspect that the French might change their attitude on the desirability of allowing trade to continue freely. This is roughly the view expressed by Parkes in F.O.46. CXXVII.No.155. Oct.22,1870. Parkes to Granville.

3. See C.P.Japon.XX. Oct.15,1870. Outrey to Favre. Also F.O.46. CXXVII. Oct.15,1870. Parkes to Hammond (Private).

4. See C.P.Japon.XX. Oct.28,1870. Outrey to Favre.

regulations in the face of Outrey's refusal to admit their validity. France was thus able to paralyse German shipping and gain some local prestige by the refusal of the German warships to meet the French challenge. Von Brandt himself refused to accept the Japanese renunciation of the October agreement, and strove continually to impose his view by making threats about an indemnity, though in the end no such demand was made.[5] The significance of this episode for Japan was obvious. It warned her of the twofold need for increased military strength and diplomatic caution. The domestic and foreign policies of the Meiji leaders in the next twenty years showed that they had learned the lesson well.

(ii) France and Sino-Japanese Relations

Of greater importance than the difficulties arising out of the Franco-Prussian War was the question of the French attitude to Japan's relations with China, which, next to Treaty Revision, was the main preoccupation of Japanese diplomacy in the first half of the Meiji era. Sino-Japanese relations centred around the twin problems of Korea and the Ryūkyūs, and since both these areas were vulnerable to Western naval strength, the Powers were in a

5. See Hanabusa Nagamichi, Meiji Gaikō-shi (Diplomatic History of the Meiji Period), Tokyo, 1960. p.18.

position to exert a very important influence on the policies of the two Far Eastern states towards them.

Both problems might have been expected to attract the attention of France. She had, in 1855, signed a treaty with the Ryūkyū authorities, and French missionaries had resided there.[6] More important, the islands occupied a strategic position as possible coaling stations. Despite these considerations, however, France showed virtually no interest in the area. The main reason for this would appear to be that she never questioned Japan's right to the islands. When Satsuma had participated in the Paris Exhibition of 1867, the daimyō had been recognized as King of the Ryūkyūs; and when the islands were forced to accept a centrally appointed governor in 1872, the reaction of Turenne implied that this was purely an internal measure which the Japanese Government had an indisputable right to take.[7] The Japanese action did not, at this stage, seem likely to be a cause of dispute with China, and no more thought was paid to the area for some years. When the murder of some Ryūkyūan sailors by Formosan aborigines provided the pretext for an expedition to Formosa under Saigō Tsugumichi in 1874, there was no suggestion by

6. The treaty was never ratified and the presence of missionaries had ended in the 1850's, however. See Cordier, Les Français aux Iles Lieou-Kieou. (Paris 1911).

7. See C.P.Japon.XXI. Oct.16,1872. Turenne to Rémusat.

Berthemy that Japan was not within her legal rights. Politically, too, France had reason to favour Japanese control of the Ryūkyūs. Though it was never explicitly stated, the islands were more likely to escape German attentions under the firm hand of the Meiji Government than under the distant control of China.[8]

The Formosa Expedition also gave rise to some interesting observations on European relations with China and Japan which threw some light on one of the factors underlying French inactivity. In June 1874, Iwakura sought Berthemy's opinion on the expedition, and although the French Minister counselled him to withdraw the Japanese troops as soon as they had chastised the natives lest Japan find herself at war with China, his report to the Quai d'Orsay suggests that he would not have been sorry to see his advice disregarded. Observing that:

"On m'écrit de Pékin que si le Japon échoue dans son entreprise, l'Orgueil des chinois ne connaîtra plus de bornes et deviendra intolérable," he continued:"Or, il en sera exactement de même à Yédo, si le succès couronne l'expédition de Formose. En présence de cette situation je ne vois pas d'autre parti à prendre que de laisser les évènements suivre leur cours, tout en les surveillant et en se réservant d'intervenir diplomatiquement lorsque les circonstances permettront de le faire avec utilité. Il importe, du reste, de ne pas perdre de vue qu'une guerre entre laChine et la Japon, suffisamment prolongée pour affaiblir les deux adversaires et arrêtée avant que l'un ou l'autre soit fondé à s'attribuer la victoire, peut épargner

8.) This concern about German expansion was stated explicitly regardin Formosa. Berthemy reported to the Quai that he was less opposed to the Formosa Expedition than his colleagues, because he felt that it would either reawaken China's interest in Formosa or leave Japan in control, and in either case there was less chance of an incident occuring which could give Germany an excuse for seizing the island. C.P.Japon. XXIV May 22, 1874. Berthemy to Decazes.

aux Puissances maritimes la nécessité d'entreprendre dans un avenir plus ou moins rapproché de coûteuses expéditions, afin de conserver dans l'extrême orient une situation qu'il devient chaque jour plus difficile, à Pékin comme à Yédo, de maintenir intacte." 9

Not all French diplomats were as Machiavellian as Berthemy, and in general the French attitude was more sympathetic to Japan, or perhaps one should say more hostile to China, than would appear from this dispatch.[10] Nevertheless, it was representative in that, underneath the wishful thinking about intervention it did reflect, more or less faithfully, the negative character of French thinking on Far Eastern questions. The basic rule of French diplomacy was still to avoid entanglements outside Europe.

The Formosa Expedition had largely been conceived by the Meiji Government as an outlet for samurai frustration It was, however, very much a second best. The first hope of both the restless samurai who had lost their social function and their han loyalties, and some leaders who saw the problem of national defence in the purely military terms of a previous age, was the conquest of Korea. In 1873, while Iwakura, Ōkubo, and many of the young modernisers

9. C.P.Japon.XXIV. June 30, 1874. Berthemy to Decazes.

10. See e.g. Decazes' reply, in which while accepting Berthemy's general conclusions he held that the danger to Western interests would be greater if China defeated Japan than vice-versa. C.P.Japon. XXIV. Aug. 27, 1874.

were still abroad, the advocates of a Korean expedition had come to comprise a majority of the Government, and when the Iwakura mission returned, it was only after a bitter struggle between Ōkubo, Iwakura and Kido on the one side, and Saigō, Itagaki, Soyejima and Etō on the other, that Japan was brought back to a policy of inward strengthening first.

For some time, certainly, an expedition appeared likely, and since the Foreign Representatives knew of this through Soyejima,[11] it might have been expected that the possibility of war would have stimulated the powers to give the problem of Korea, and especially Japan's ambitions there, serious consideration.

It might certainly have been expected that France would do so. Not only did she have persecuted missionaries in Korea[12] but their persecution had previously led to the first serious incursion into the 'Hermit Kingdom' by any Western Power. The French expedition of 1866, however, had proved a complete failure, and Frenchmen had since done their best to forget about it. Nevertheless,

11. Soyejima was extraordinarily frank in his discussions both before and after his resignation. See especially the reports by Parkes in F.O.46.CLXVII. No.62. Aug.18, 1873, and F.O. 46. CLXVIII. No.91. Nov. 3, 1873. Parkes to Granville.

12. Their case was presented the following year by Charles Dallet. Histoire de L'Eglise de [redacted] Corée, 2 vols. (Paris 1874).

missionary persecution continued to be severe and France might well have seen in Japan's plans an opportunity of securing religious concessions, even if Korea's poverty was too well known for there to be any great hopes of trade.

Any expectation by missionaries that this would be so were doomed to disappointment. Not only did the Seikan Ron fail to prompt any reconsideration of French policy towards Korea, but the whole question was regarded by Berthemy as no more than a side-issue in comparison with his treaty revision negotiations, and he did not even bother to demonstrate the weaknesss of the Japanese plan. The sketchy information which he passed on was hardly of a nature to interest a Quai d'Orsay which was obsessed with European issues at this time. In any case, [redacted] Korea had always been the province of the French Minister in China rather than Japan.

Though the Meiji Government decided against invasion in 1873, it continued to seek the opening of Korea and, by a show of force, occasioned by an attack on a Japanese surveying party, a treaty was secured in 1876 which made a first breach in Korea's stubbornly-held isolation policy. To St. Quentin, however, the treaty seemed of little importance. He showed scarcely any interest in the advantages that might result and none at all in its possible international repercussions. His main reaction was a

negative one. The treaty would be welcome "s'il n'était malheureusement à craindre que ce succès n'augmente encore l'orgueil du Japon de manière à rendre de plus en plus difficiles, sinon précaires, les relations avec ce pays."[13] The Quai d'Orsay did not even consider the matter worthy of comment.

About 1878-9, the era of cautious conservatism in French foreign policy began to wane, and this trend was evident in the Far East too, more particularly in Indo-China, but also to a certain extent in Korea. In April 1878, Geofroy, the French Minister in Tokyo, began to interest himself in the fate of the missionaries in the still little-known peninsula. Having failed to secure the co-operation of the French navy,[14] he was about to take the unprecedented step of asking the Japanese Government to intervene when Terashima spontaneously offered his good offices and sent a letter urging the Korean Government to release the missionaries.[15] The Japanese intervention does not appear to have been successful, but it was a gesture which helped pave the way for something of an entente between Geofroy and the Japanese Government. Japan's policy towards Korea was

13. C.P.Japon.XXV. March 11, 1876. St. Quentin to Decazes.
14. See C.P.Japon.XXVI. April 29, 1878. Geofroy to Waddington
15. See C.P.Japon.XXVI. May 28, 1878. Geofroy to Waddington.

now one of preventing Russian encroachment by opening her to the world generally, and since this seemed to Geofroy to be in France's real interests also, he assured Iwakura of his support in December 1878, and at the same time urged his Government to consider co-operating with Japan and other interested powers.[16]

Owing to the vagaries of French diplomatic appointments this harmony of views between France and Japan soon disappeared. Geofroy returned home on leave early in 1879, and his successor, Balloy, who had previously served as First Secretary, enunciated at once an entirely opposite view of the Korean situation. To support Japan's efforts to open Korea, he claimed, would be to appear to put themselves at Japan's beck-and-call, and her pretentions would become intolerable. France should, therefore, appear to lose interest in the question.[17] Despite his lower rank, the cautious Quai d'Orsay preferred his analysis to Geofroy's and a further overture by Inoue, the new Foreign Minister, was treated with extreme reserve.[18] By 1880, the possibility of co-operation seemed to have departed. It is impossible to assess the importance of

16. See C.P.Japon.XXVI. Dec.1.1878. Ibid. Dec.17,1868. Geofroy to Waddington. On Japanese policy, see H.Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea 1869-1910, (Philadelphia 1960) pp.84-101.

17. See C.P.Japon.XXVII. April 9, 1879. Balloy to Waddington.

18. Balloy's dispatch was approved by Waddington on May 18, 1879, (C.P.Japon.XXVII). Inoue's approach was reported in C.P.Japon.XXVII. Nov.19.1879. Balloy to Waddington.

the change in French attitudes. Japan continued to favour the establishment of the Western Powers in Korea, on the diplomatic level, as the most effective means of neutralising this vital area, and the withdrawal of the French promise of co-operation, though a disappointment, did not mean that the Powers had decided not to seek treaties. On the other hand, the French decision may have contributed to the delay in securing them and it was during this interval that China began to reassert her suzerainty over the states on her periphery. It is arguable, therefore, that the French failure to link her efforts with those of Japan allowed Korea to fall back into the Chinese orbit, thus making eventual conflict between the two Far Eastern powers inevitable.

Before Geofroy's departure the other Sino-Japanese problem had unexpectedly emerged again. It had seemed to be solved when the diplomatic settlement of the Formosa Expedition had implicitly accepted Japanese sovereignty over the islands. However, the situation had become uncertain again in 1876, when the Ryūkyūs, having resumed the tradition of sending a tributary mission to Peking in the previous year, sought Chinese support in a struggle against [redacted] modernisation by the Meiji Government.[19] When China proved unable to help because of her preoccupation

19. See Hanabusa, op.cit. p.31.

with her dispute with Russia over her Central Asian frontiers, the Ryūkyūans turned towards the representatives of the Western Powers with whom treaties had been signed. The reaction of Geofroy to their envoys was privately sympathetic, but officially discouraging.[20] He reasoned that if the Ryūkyūs ceased to be Japanese, they would come under Chinese rule, and: "Si l'ascendant de l'une ou de l'autre des deux Puissances devait être favorisé par nous, ce serait plutôt, ce me semble, celui du Japon sur qui nous avons moralement et matériellement plus de prise."[21] This was by no means the end of the problem for China proceeded to reassert her traditional claims in 1881, and there were strong rumours in 1883 that she intended to resort to force, even though Japan had offered to hand over to her the southern islands.[22] China's new attitude, and her increased military preparations did make a certain difference to the French position in that Roquette felt that Japan might be advised to give up

20. See C.P.Japon.XXVI. Dec. 2, 1878. Geofroy to Bourée. (Head of the Oriental Department at the Quai d'Orsay).

21. C.P.Japon.XXVI. Nov.18, 1878. Geofroy to Waddington.

22. Japan's offer was conditional on China conceding to her most-favoured-nation rights. See Hanabusa, op.cit. p.32.

the Ryūkyūs entirely rather than risk war,[23] but his views clearly had no influence on Japanese policy. France's official attitude remained one of absolute reserve, which concealed, as Geofroy's comment showed, a partiality for Japan.

On this matter, as on Korea[24] there could be no real change in basic attitude, only in tactics. France's own difficulties over her Annam protectorate meant that there could be no question of her siding with China. As Tricou, a later French Minister, wrote in 1882: "Les prétentions de suzeraineté de la Cour de Pékin, prétentions qui se manifestent actuellement dans toutes les directions,

23. See C.P.Japon.XXVIII. Oct.12,1881. Roquette to Barthélemy St. Hilaire.

24. Balloy did not object to the opening of Korea, but thought it should be done by means of a joint naval demonstration by the Western Powers, excluding Russia, which he suspected of harbouring designs of domination. See C.P.Japon. XXVII. Oct. 7, 1880. Balloy to Barthélemy St. Hilaire. In April 1881 the Foreign Minister expressed exactly the traditional French attitude, when he emphasised that "nous devons aussi nous appliquer à ne pas rester en arrière et à profiter des avantages que seront acquis aux autres Puissances dans ces parages," but at the same time warned that they should have no thought of "nous associer à aucune action exlusive, ni de prendre seuls ou avec une autre puissance une attitude prononcée qui risquerait de nous entraîner soit dans des difficultés en extrême Orient soit dans des rivalités avec certains Cabinets Européens." C.P.Japon.XXVIII. April 15, 1881. Barthélemy St. Hilaire to Roquette.

me paraissent devoir tenir notre vigilance en éveil, surtout du côté de l'Annam. J'estime pour ma part qu'en thèse générale, nous avons intérêt à les décourager partout et en toute occasion."[25] Nevertheless, for all France's latent sympathy with Japan's aims, her desire not to increase her difficulties in Indo-China by arousing Chinese suspicion and hostility, together with her traditional caution, and the personal inclination of her representatives in Tokyo, deterred her from supporting Japan openly.

Thus, the influence France exerted on Japanese foreign policy remained slight even though in Far Eastern politics the two countries had much in common. It would probably not be too much to say that France neglected, during the first decade and a half of the Meiji era, the opportunity to build up a position of goodwill and trust that might well have been useful later.

(b) <u>French Policy towards Japan during the ~~Franco-Japanese~~ Sino-French Dispute, 1883-5</u>.

The years 1883-5 form the most interesting period in Franco-Japanese relations during the Meiji era, and might have proved of great significance for both French and Japanese policy. Their importance derives from the fact that during this time the possibility of alliance,

25. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. Oct.16,1882. Tricou to Ducleré.

or entente, between France and Japan entered into the calculations of both countries. In the end, this episode left no lasting imprint on Franco-Japanese relations, and thus its significance lies mainly in the light it throws upon the character of Japanese foreign policy in the 1880's and in the perspective it lends to the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. Because they were inconclusive, and perhaps also because neither party was really certain what the other's true position was, the diplomatic manoeuvres and evasions which took place have remained unstudied and, indeed, almost unknown. Nevertheless, despite the failure of an alliance to emerge, it would be unwise to assume that an agreement was impossible.

In the Far Eastern situation of the early 1880's co-operation between France and Japan held out the promise of considerable advantages for both countries. The point which stands out most obviously at this period is China's struggle to maintain her territorial integrity and her traditional claim to suzerainty over the countries bordering her frontiers.[26] This claim to suzerainty was one which affected France and Japan more than any of the

26. "On the heels of the military reconquest of Chinese Turkestan.....(China) launched a gigantic political and diplomatic offensive aimed at restoring her dwindling or dormant prestige and influence in Tonkin, Annam, Burma, Tibet, Korea, and Manchuria." A. Malozemoff. Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. Berkeley, 1958. p.20.

other Powers with Far Eastern interests. It was, in fact, the issue that sparked off the Franco-Chinese Dispute, which first awakened in the French Government an awareness of Japan as a military power. Since the late 1870's France had been concerned to prevent the treaty which she had imposed on Annam in 1874 - a treaty which gave her a virtual protectorate over the latter's external relations - from becoming a dead letter,[27] but not until Jules Ferry formed his second Cabinet in 1883 was there any Premier willing to act effectively. Like most other Frenchmen, he could not free himself from the illusion that China, despite her traditional position, would not resist France's attempt to extend a protectorate over both Annam and Tongking. Instead he found stiff opposition from Chinese irregular troops, and a conflict began which eventually escalated into war on a much broader front, extending to Formosa and the Chinese coast.[28]

As has been seen, Japan too was in dispute with China over the latter's claims to suzerainty, and the hope that they would be weakened or undermined led her to take an exceptional interest in France's actions.[29] This hope

27. For a detailed study of the origins of the Franco-Chinese Dispute, see B.L.Evans. The Attitudes and Policies of Gt.Britain and China toward French Expansion in Cochin-China, Cambodia, Annam, and Tongking, 1858-83, Ph.D. thesis University of London, 1961.

28. The details of the war and the various negotiations that were carried on are treated clearly in T.F.Power, Jules Ferry and the Renaissance of French Imperialism, New York, 1944.

applied less perhaps to Korea, where the issues were complex, than to the Ryūkyūs. The latter were in Japanese possession, but the Meiji Government was in some apprehension lest Li Hung-Chang should invoke the long history of tribute missions from the ruler of the Ryūkyūs to reassert China's claims.[30] Korea, on the other hand, if not exactly under direct Chinese rule, was an area in which Chinese influence had been fairly actively exercised, and Japan had made little advance towards establishing either her own control over the peninsula or even a position equal to that of China. This situation was, perhaps, less disturbing than a power vacuum into which Russia might enter, but for many Japanese, whether motivated by concern about China's ultimate ability to keep Korea out of Russia's hands, by a desire to introduce the 'hermit kingdom' to the benefits of

29. A valuable general interpretation of Japanese foreign policy can be found in an article by Professor Oka Yoshitake, "Kokuminteki Dokuritsu to Kokka Risei" (National Independence and Raison d'Etat) in vol. 7. (Sekai no naka no Nihon) of the series Kindai Nihon Shisō-shi Kōza, Tokyo, 1960. On the period of the Franco-Chinese Dispute several relevant articles have been written by P'eng Tse-Chou, which will be referred to in the course of this chapter.

30. See, e.g. Foreign Minister Inoue to Minister in China, Enomoto, July 18, 1883. No.63 in vol. 1 of the collection of records held by the Japanese Foreign Ministry entitled 'Tongking ni Kansuru Shin-Futsu Sensō,' (hereafter referred to as Shin-Futsu Sensō). (The Sino-French War Over Tongking).

ing ni Kansuru Shin-Futsu Sensō,'
Shin-Futsu Sensō). (The Sino-Frenc

modernisation, or by simple thirst for territorial gain, it was a most unsatisfactory state of affairs, and for the Japanese Government itself, aware of the intensity of feeling which the Korean issue had aroused a decade before, the problem represented a point of weakness which its nationalistically-minded opponents might seek to use to their own advantage. Japan could hardly hope as yet to establish her influence in the peninsula by her own strength alone, but in alliance with a Western Power the situation would be transformed. Nor were the profits likely to be one-sided. France's chances of concluding her own dispute speedily and successfully would be greatly increased were China to be faced with Japanese forces as well as French, and this was a powerful factor for a government which was finding itself involved in a larger undertaking than it had anticipated, at a time, moreover, when economic depression was beginning to cause a strain on French agriculture and finances. There even existed some Frenchmen, army officers who had helped train the Japanese army in its early stages and were now rising towards the higher ranks in France, who had some appreciation of Japan's possibilities, not only as a temporary friend, but also as an ally in the long term.[31]

31. See Chanoine, Général, Documents pour servir à l'histoire des Relations entre la France et le Japon, Paris, n.d. (c.1907) p.172.

The effects of such an alliance can only be guessed at.

(i) The First Approaches.

The first real sign that something of importance might come of the situation was in June 1883, when news reached the outside world of Commandant Rivière's defeat and death outside Hanoi the previous month. This event seemed to indicate that China might prove more difficult than in previous years and that the situation might require a stronger force than France had on hand. On June 13th, the Comte de Viel-Castel, France's Chargé d'affaires, sent home a dispatch which suggested that the reinforcements France needed might well be found in Japan. Not only did he detect pro-French sympathies, but also a desire to join the French side: "...ce ne serait plus seulement en spectateurs, mais bien côté-à-côté, ou frères d'armes, que les Japonais songeraient à nous suivre dans la lutte où ils nous voient engagés contre le Céleste Empire."32 The dispatch gives no justification for this conclusion other than that a vice-minister of foreign affairs had requested that Japanese officers be allowed to follow the operations of the French troops in Tongking; that according to rumour three Japanese warships were prepared to cruise in Chinese waters, ready to protect Japanese

32. See C.P.Japon.XXIX. June 13, 1883. Viel-Castel to Challemel-Lacour.

nationals; and that public opinion appeared to favour war if it were possible to form an entente with France, which Viel-Castel termed 'l'allié de leur choix.' It may be that Viel-Castel had received other information of a more convincing nature, but this seems most unlikely. Japanese Foreign Office records[33] give no indication whatsoever of any inclination towards war at this stage. It may be that Viel-Castel, a man with no previous diplomatic experience at this level,[34] was overwhelmed by the excitement that followed the French reverse, and invested the intense Japanese interest with more significance than it actually possessed. By July 3rd, he was reporting that "—non seulement le rêve d'une alliance effective, mais celui d'une entente basée sur des intérêts communs, paraît avoir délaissé pour le moment le cerveau de ce peuple léger."[35] It is possible that what had really

33. Apart from the three-volume collection of dispatches on the Franco-Chinese War, which are admittedly incomplete, the Gaimushō also houses four volumes of copies of telegrams which were of value to this chapter. They are listed under the titles Denshin sha-ō (out-going) and Denshin sha-rai (in-coming). They, too, are incomplete, however, covering only parts of 1883 and 1885.

34. He was a first secretary when he unexpectedly took over from Tricou.

35. C.P.Japon.XXIX. July 3, 1883. Viel-Castel to Challemel-Lacour.

changed was his interpretation of the Japanese reaction.[36]

Whatever the true extent of Japanese interest in an entente or alliance with France, the fact remains that the French believed Japan to be interested. Indeed, the Quai d'Orsay had been aware of a certain amount of concern on Japan's part about events in Indo-China even before this was reported from Tokyo. In the early months of 1883, it had been approached twice by Frederick Marshall, an English adviser who supplied the Japanese Foreign Office with most of its political intelligence from Paris and who now gave the Quai d'Orsay to understand that Japan desired diplomatic co-operation against China.[37] Paris was therefore faced with the problem of what response to make as early as April. The first reaction of the Foreign Minister, Challemel-Lacour, was to instruct the French representative to find out directly what might be made out of Japan's interest.[38] This dispatch reached Tokyo in early June and probably helped to arouse Viel-Castel's

36. The fact that his judgement was somewhat over-hasty can be further illustrated by a report he wrote on Sept. 4, in which he asserted that "Un courant sympathique entre la Cour de Tokio et le Gouvernement Français semblerait donc exister en ce moment au plus haut degré, et il paraîtrait qu'il pourrait aisément franchir la limite qui le sépare d'une entente proprement dite." C.P.Japon.XXIX. Sept.4, 1883. This again seems to bear no relation to Japanese Government policy.

37. See C.P.Japon.XXIX. April 17, 1883. Challemel-Lacour to Tricou. The date of Marshall's first approach is uncertain; the second was on March 22nd.

38. Ibid.

excitement. It was supplemented by a further injunction on July 6, although the Quai had not at this time yet received Viel-Castel's sensational June 13 dispatch. This new order reveals some of the characteristic illusions of French diplomacy as well as the actual extent of official French interest in Japan at this date:

"Les ressources militaires et maritimes du Gouvernement du Mikado sont en effet assez considérables pour que, sans vouloir poser actuellement les bases d'une alliance effective, nous ne négligions pas de nous rapprocher de lui et de nous assurer un concours que les circonstances peuvent rendre utile. Il importe donc de ne pas perdre de vue les divers moyens d'influence dont nous pouvons disposer à cet effet et qui nous créent, dès à présent, une situation en quelque sorte privilégiée." 39

The means of influence referred to were the Frenchmen employed in high positions by the Japanese Government, or having access to top-ranking Japanese officers. Of the Frenchmen connected with education, it was expected that: "Vivant au milieu de la partie la plus intelligente et la plus active de la population de Tokio, liés avec des journalistes influents, ces professeurs pourraient avoir sur l'opinion une action réelle qu'il importerait de diriger dans le sens de nos intérêts."[40] While the Quai, for its part, declared that it would show itself more sympathetic towards Treaty Revision,[41] the tone of the

39. C.P.Japon.XXIX. July 6, 1883. Challemel-Lacour to Viel-Castel.

40. Ibid.

41. The Quai was prepared to take the initiative by stating its willingness to sign a new commercial arrangement and make some concessions on jurisdiction, all this being conditional, however, on the adhesion of other Powers. For fuller details, see Chapter VI.

dispatch indicated that it was relying mainly on the efforts of influential Frenchmen in Japan. It clearly expected that they would be able to keep government and public attention focussed on Japan's grievances against China and that this would predispose the Meiji leaders to respond favourably to any approach which France might later make. How far its suggestions were implemented it is difficult to tell, but they certainly never produced the swing to France that had been hoped for, and it is significant that the French chargé d'affaires never claimed any credit for his efforts in this direction. That these unofficial methods had no visible result is hardly surprising. There were good reasons for the lack of any serious response from the Meiji Government at this time. In particular, French diplomats did not seek to conceal that the French Government was still hopeful of the collapse of Chinese opposition,[42] and therefore really preferred not to be drawn into a complicating entanglement with Japan. So long as Franco-Chinese negotiations continued, and they did so until October,[43] the Japanese Government could scarcely have

42. This expectation appears in all the Quai's dispatches to Tokyo in 1883. In March 1884 it flatly rejected Marshall's new suggestion of a collective approach as inopportune. C.P. Japon.XXX. March 19,1884. Ferry to Sienkiewicz.

43. They were resumed again in March-April 1884, and the convention of Tientsin was signed between Li Hung-Chang and Commandant Fournier on May 11. However, belief that China had violated this agreement led the French to resort to undeclared war in June, though negotiations were carried on sporadically in Europe.

treated the cautious French approaches as a worthwhile proposition.[44]

Another reason why the Japanese response was negative may have been the attitude of the French representatives in Tokyo. Viel-Castel was not, in June, insensible to the advantages an agreement might bring. He pointed out that valuable information could be gleaned from the Japanese officers who had been carrying on spying activities in China, and he rated Japan's military valour highly. Moreover, the various disadvantages seemed to be outweighed in his mind by the importance of France's objective. However, his dispatch ended with a sentence that did much to vitiate his conclusion. "D'autre part," he wrote, "l'extrême réserve à laquelle Votre Excellence veut bien faire allusion est devenue d'autant plus obligatoire qu'il n'y a pas à se dissimuler qu'ici comme peut-être ailleurs

44. It was the less likely to do so after Aug. 4 1883, when it received a report sent from Hachisuka (though almost certainly written by Marshall) on June 22. (Shin-Futsu Sensō. vol. I. No.46.) In this detailed document, which includes some valuable comments on the Quai d'Orsay's thinking and methods, it was alleged that there was a basic split over French policy towards Annam, with Challemel-Lacour advocating extreme measures while Ferry was among those seeking to avoid a rupture. The influence of the split was that much greater, it was implied, in that it appeared "as if one of these parties was in ascendancy one day and the other the next day". In these circumstances the hazards of an agreement would have been increased considerably.

les Japonais feraient sonner très-haut la possibilité d'une entente que les évènements viendraient peut-être rompre avant qu'elle n'ait été consacrée."[45] He here touched on a factor which, especially with his successor, Sienkiewicz, was a powerful obstacle to any agreement. Either from fear of alienating China, or from suspicion that Japan might make use of French proposals as a bargaining counter for her own exclusive advantage, or from distaste at the prospect of treating Japan as an equal, the French representatives hesitated to take any firm steps. They neglected to show, at the right moments, that France was seriously interested in collaboration with Japan,[46] and their failure to make use of the telegraph on several critical occasions, left the Quai d'Orsay in the dark about the mood in Tokyo and thus in no position to order a less cautious approach.

The same hesitation was not shown by all French diplomats. Tricou, when he was transferred to China, went with the conviction that, "Nous n'avons qu'à dire un mot, et nous pouvons être assurés du concours, du Gouvernement

45. C.P.Japon.XXIX. June 13, 1883. Viel-Castel to Challemel-Lacour.

46. According to Sienkiewicz Viel-Castel waited a week before carrying out the Quai's July 6 instructions. C.P.Japon.XXIX. Nov. 7, 1883. Sienkiewicz to Challemel-Lacour. On the other hand, he may have exceeded those instructions on Sept. 1, when he had an interview with Inoue, which is recorded in Shin-Futsu Sensō, vol.I. No.75. If the Gaimushō version can be believed, Viel-Castel urged that if China were to attack Annam or the Ryūkyūs, Japan and France should co-operate together as eternal friends.

Japonais."[47] A force of twenty thousand Japanese would be enough, he believed, to rout the entire Chinese army. His distance from Japan did not prevent his seeking frequent interviews with the Japanese Minister and Consuls in which he urged their Government to join France. Nor did he disdain to influence the Meiji Government by supplying 'information' that Li Hung-Chang was aiming to make war over the Ryūkyū question.[48] His efforts were of little importance, however, partly, no doubt, because the Japanese suspected that he was really interested in finding a diplomatic prop to support his threats against China, but principally on account of the basic principles of the Meiji Government's foreign policy.

(ii) The Foreign Policy of Inoue Kaoru

The foreign policy of Inoue Kaoru was, in fact, the crucial factor in the failure of the French to evoke any response from the Japanese Government during the course of the war. Japanese foreign policy generally has been the subject of much controversy, but at the period of the Franco-Chinese dispute, at any rate, it would appear to have been essentially pacific. There is considerable evidence in the Japanese records for the view that at this

47. C.P.Chine.LXI. June 19, 1883. Tricou to Ferry.

48. Shin-Futsu Sensō, vol.1, No.52. July 3,1883. Shinagawa to Yoshida. For the approaches of Tricou and Galy, the French consul in Shanghai, Shin-Futsu Sensō, vol. 1, No. 65. July 31, 1883, Shinagawa to Inoue; No.105, Oct.22, 1883, Enomoto to Inoue; vol.I. No. 138, Feb. 7, 1884, Higashi to Itō.

time Inoue's main concern, apart from Treaty Revision, was to establish stability in the Far East and if possible remove the potential causes of conflict in the years to come.[49] This did not imply neglect of Japan's own interests, for underlying Inoue's policy there existed the assumption that the situation could not be stable so long as China refused to recognise Japan's interest in Korea, and condemned the latter to perpetual weakness by supporting conservative factions at the Korean Court against the progressives. In addition, the Meiji Government, and particularly the Chōshū elements in it, had good reason for wishing to avoid

49.) The attempt made by Inoue after the Tientsin Convention in 1885 offers the clearest proof of this. In a telegram to Enomoto (Denshin sha-ō, June 30, 1885) he asked the Japanese Minister to persuade Li Hung-chang that Korea's "foreign policy had very close bearing to the interests of both Japan and China and if left to herself no-one knows what foreign complications might arise which will seriously embarras them. Therefore I propose that after Li and myself having confidentially consulted and formed her foreign policy Li will undertake to let Corea adopt and enforce the same." The scheme failed because Li objected to the provision that the Korean king "should invariably consult with Li and through him with me", (Ibid. July 13,1885, Inoue to Enomoto) on the ground that it would give the impression that Japan was dictating to China. Inoue's comment was: "Such a plea of Li...shows the utter want of discerning the great and far-seeing idea which underlies my views." (Ibid.) That this Korean policy of Inoue was nothing new is shown by numerous dispatches and telegrams, while on the French side it was reported in June,1883, that Japan was obsessed by a project "qui consisterait à faire déclarer, à l'instar de celle de la Belgique, la neutralité de la Péninsule Coréenne." C.P.Japon. XXIX. June 13,1883.Viel-Castel to Challemel-Lacour.

a war before Japan's own military strength had been built up.[50] This does not necessarily mean that Inoue's principles of peaceful diplomacy were not genuinely held, however, and the events of 1883-5 show him consistently resisting the various pressures, both French and Japanese, for the adoption of stronger methods. It was, in fact, his attempt to implement his policy by diplomatic means in early 1883 that first made the Quai d'Orsay hopeful that Japan might act against China.[51] A glance at the follow-up of Inoue's approach then will serve to illustrate this policy and further explain the failure of France to incite Japan to action in the summer of 1883.

The object of the Japanese initiative was to secure from France a promise to join in a protest against China's claims to suzerainty, in the hope that the latter might be persuaded to modify her pretensions somewhat on account

50.) Referring to the early 1880's Fujiwara Akira says that "as regards the strategy of Continental field operations, which were anticipated in a war with China, the Japanese were painfully aware of their deficiencies, not only in organisational aspects but still more in numerical strength. In 1882 they established an expansion plan to equip completely from 1885 onwards, a force, doubled at one blow, of 28 infantry regiments, 7 artillery regiments, and 7 cavalry, engineering and commissariat battalions." Gunji-shi (A History of the Army), Tokyo, 1961, p.43.

51. See above, p.209.

of this. Between the time when Inoue sent his instructions, however, and the time when Marshall made his second approach, the situation in Annam deteriorated, and the proposal for co-operation inevitably seemed to imply a greater willingness to be involved in France's affairs than had been intended. Its significance was certainly exaggerated by Paris, perhaps because of Marshall's own inclinations, and this must have become apparent to Inoue by the start of May, when he received a report that the French Minister in China appeared anxious for Japanese co-operation.[52] The result was a hasty withdrawal. On May 9, Inoue sent to Hachisuka, the Japanese Minister in Paris, a nervous telegram which read: "Ito telegraphed France is completed [?compelled] by circumstances to take war measure against China; but we do not wish to go so far. What I...indicated in my private note to Marshall, was only to communicate mutually with France in regard to China and her minor neighbours and not at all intended to go as far as to take arms against China. So refuse as soundly as possible any warlike support of France against China."[53] The Quai d'Orsay, however, was never informed of Inoue's withdrawal and the impression of Japanese eagerness which it derived from the episode was partly responsible for the belief, which it never

52. Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (hereafter N.G.B.) vol.16, p.474-5. April 26, 1883. Enomoto to Inoue.

53. Denshin sha-ō. 1883. May 9.

entirely abandoned, that France could afford to wait for its potential ally to take the initiative.[54]

To understand fully Inoue's timidity and his annoyance over the dissemination in China of rumours of a Franco-Japanese alliance, it is necessary to recall the military and naval supremacy which China possessed over J apan, on paper at least, at this time. Until China was more fully engaged against France, fear of attack by her was a powerful factor in Japanese thinking. It was hinted at on several occasions[55] by Inoue and other Foreign Office officials as the reason why

54. This is strikingly indicated by a remark about Bourée's recall from China made to Marshall by Billot, the Director of Political Affairs at the Quai d'Orsay: "Pray do not take it as an encouragement for yourselves." See N.G.B. vol.17. p.462, March 23, 1883. Marshall to Inoue. The Japanese archives give the impression that the French diplomats in China did not share this reluctance to take the initiative. However, the reports of these diplomats themselves would suggest that they were assiduously prompted by their Japanese counter-parts, and though it is beyond doubt that they urged on the Japanese the advantages of alliance, it seems clear that it was with the object of inciting the Meiji Government to make a proposal itself.

55. e.g. C.P.Japon. XXIX. Aug.23, 1883. In this dispatch Viel-Castel reported: "M.Inoue s'est écrié, et sincèrement, je le crains; 'Mais une fois votre différend réglé, tous ces armements, tous ces préparatifs de la Chine, ne pourraient-ils pas être tournés contre nous?' " That Inoue was sincere is suggested by his urgency in buying warships in 1883. See especially his telegram of Jan. 6, 1883: "We are in a hurry to purchase the vessels in view of China's attitude." Denshin sha-ō, 1883.

Japan could not entertain thoughts of alliance with France or even officially accord her the favour of benevolent neutrality.[56] These considerations, together with certain domestic factors,[57] make it scarcely surprising that Japan declined the exceedingly tentative approaches of a Western Power whose governments were not noted for their stability. The real opportunity for an alliance was to come later.

(iii) The Escalation of the War and the Diplomatic Lull

Between July 1883 and the final months of 1884 the question of alliance or entente lost much of its intensity. The Quai d'Orsay accepted that "Les vives répugnances que la Cour de Tokio parait éprouver à se compromettre vis-à-vis de la Chine nous interdisent de rechercher quant à présent, son concours en vue d'un conflit que nous avons du reste le désir et l'espoir d'éviter."[58] Even though an unsuccessful attempt to reach a satisfactory settlement by means of Britain's good offices, had forced Ferry to the conclusion that force would be necessary, the large votes of credit for a Tongking expedition passed in December 1883, seemed

56. The question of neutrality became a much disputed issue in 1884. See footnote 66.

57. Apart from military unpreparedness, it is worth mentioning Japan's financial difficulties. The stability which Matsukata, the Finance Minister, had been introducing into Government revenues and expenditures since 1881 might have been jeopardised by a military adventure.

58. C.P.Japon.XXIX. Jan. 8, 1884. Ferry to Sienkiewicz.

sufficient for the purpose.[59] The reserve of the new French Minister, Sienkiewicz, exceeded that of Viel-Castel and he regarded his predecessors' efforts with distaste. There is no record of his making any approach to the Japanese government during this period.

It was not the case, however, that no approaches were made. In China, where more urgency was felt than in Japan and where contacts with Japanese agents were frequent, there were several attempts to raise the question again, all without success.[60] One approach also came from an unexpected direction, through Aoki in Berlin in August 1884, presumably in the hope that French reprisals on Foochow and designs on Formosa might alter the Japanese Government's disposition.[61] Again, the result was negative.

59. The French made some progress for a time, and were able to take Bac-Ninh in March. Li Hung-Chang opened negotiations with Commandant Fournier in April and a draft agreement was approved by Ferry on May 8. The Convention of Tientsin was signed three days later. By it China promised to withdraw her troops from Tonkin and France to respect China's border. The Convention was criticised in China and the Tsung-Li-Yamen ordered a halt to the troop withdrawal. A skirmish resulted, which momentarily convinced Ferry of China's bad faith, and he took the decision in July to extend the war to the Chinese coast, once again misjudging China's will to resist. See Power, op.cit. pp.171-5.

60. The attempts of Tricou and Galy, referred to above; Tricou was recalled at the end of Oct. 1883.

61. Shin-Futsu-Sensō, vol.3. No.261. Aug. 31, 1884. Unfortunately the full dispatch from Aoki is missing and only a short summary bears witness to the approach. According to this the French ambassador in Berlin hinted that Japan might take over Taiwan. Since, however, there is no reference to any French approach in the correspondence between the Quai d'Orsay and its Ambassador in Berlin, it is hard to regard this as a serious offer. In all probability it was no more than a chance after-dinner remark.

Some mention ought also to be made of two attempts at unofficial diplomacy during 1884. When in that year the Japanese Minister of War, General Ōyama, visited Europe with a high-ranking military mission, one of the French officers assigned to accompany it was Captain Descharmes, who had spent some years in Japan and was later to become Minister of War. He had long favoured an alliance with Japan and he now urged his views on Ōyama, who apparently "l'encouragea très vivement à en parler au gouvernement français se portant garant de l'approbation absolue de celui de son pays."[62] Whatever the truth about Ōyama's words or intentions,[63] the reaction of the French Minister of War, General Campenon, was unmistakeable. Descharmes was "brutalement invité à se montrer sérieux dans ses entretiens avec son ministre."[64]

This was not Campenon's last word on the matter, however. In September, the French failure in Formosa again led to the feeling that a quick solution would be difficult and introduced a sense of urgency into the French Government. It invited Ōyama to return to France before leaving Europe and when the invitation was accepted by General Miura, a

62. Chanoine, op.cit. p.193.
63. Mr. Ōyama Azusa, a Gaimushō historian, is of the opinion that his grandfather was here expressing a purely personal opinion. Interview, Oct. 1965.
64. Chanoine, op.cit. p.193.

Chōshū general who was a leading member of the military mission, Campenon was forced to make proposals of entente to him. Though the French did not know it, the choice of Miura to stand in for Ōyama indicated the desire of Inoue, Itō, and Yamagata, to avoid any commitment. If his memoirs can be believed, however, Miura, was not averse to making the most of his negative role. While evading any engagement by stating his lack of authority he buoyed up French hopes by agreeing that it was time for Japan to settle with China, and in return for this he secured the promise that French ministers would attend to Japanese grievances about treaty revision and facilities for Japanese students in France.[65] Unfortunately his account was written forty years after the event and is vague on dates, so it is impossible to place too great a reliance on his version of an approach, which, if it happened in the way he states, was the most definite on record. One statement in Miura's memoirs that is undoubtedly true, however, is that Inoue had no intention of entering into alliance with France. Throughout 1884 he continued to believe that Japan should not commit herself, and, far from seeking to take advantage of the rumours of alliance that were constantly being voiced in Tientsin and Shanghai, he assured Li Hung-Chang, through Minister Enomoto, of Japan's peaceful

65. Miura Gorō, Kanju Shōgun Kaikōroku, Tokyo, 1925. pp.143-163.

intentions, did his best to maintain Japanese neutrality, and even made some attempt to mediate between the two sides.[66]

(iv) The Incident in Seoul and the Renewal of Interest

In December 1884, just when France appeared to have accepted that Japan would never be budged, an incident occurred which reawakened Ferry's hopes. This was the attempted coup d'état in Seoul by Korean progressives sympathetic to Japan - a venture which was speedily suppressed with the aid of Chinese troops and which involved attacks on the Japanese Legation and Japanese nationals. When

66. Shin-Futsu Sensō, vol.3. Nos. 298.300.303.304. Nov.1884 The question of Japanese neutrality caused a certain amount of difficulty between Japan, France and China in 1884. France hoped at first that Japan would allow the French fleet to use Nagasaki, where stocks of war materials had been built up after the 1882 Seoul incident, as a base. Sienkiewicz reported (C.P.Japon.XXIX.Jan.3,1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry) that there was no chance of this being conceded. The French continued to believe, however, that they were entitled to seek coal and provisions in Japanese ports, and the possibility that Hong Kong might be closed to them at some point made them little inclined to give way on this. Thus, when on Aug. 30, China notified Japan that she was at war with France and demanded her neutrality under their 1871 treaty, Sienkiewicz was forced to remonstrate with the Japanese Government to prevent the privilege being withdrawn. This proved no easy task, even when China withdrew her notification. The fact that war undeniably did exist, even though not officially admitted, made the Meiji Government very concerned about the legal position, and Inoue showed a strong desire not to alienate China by openly favouring France. The end result was that he verbally intimated that the Japanese Government would turn a blind eye to the purchase of coal, while reserving its eventual position. All attempts by Sienkiewicz to secure an official declaration that, as in 1870-1, coal was not considered contraband, failed.

reported in Paris it caused the instant dispatch to Sienkiewicz, of an important telegram which read:

"Un télégramme de Patenôtre m'apprend du collision qui vient d'avoir lieu en Corée entre Chinois et Japonais. Ces évènements decideront peut-être le Japon à sortir du réserve où il se maintient depuis le commencement de notre conflit avec la Chine, et à saisir l'occasion de prendre à l'égard de la Cour de Pékin une attitude résolue. Nous sommes en mesure de lui prêter un utile appui, en empêchant, par exemple, l'envoi par mer de troupes Chinoises en Corée. On peut envisager même l'éventualité d'un arrangement final où la question de Formose vient en ligne de compte. Le Japon peut donc tirer un grand profit de la situation et nous avons de notre côté, de puissants motifs pour l'engager dans une action contre la Chine. Faites discrètement ce que vous jugerez possible en vue de ce résultat, et tenez moi exactement renseigné par le télégraphe." 67

This telegram indicated that France was on the verge of positive action at last in its pursuit of an agreement with Japan. It is noteworthy that Ferry only required "discretion" as opposed to the customary "extreme reserve." He had recently experienced some difficulty in securing new credits for Tongking[68] and was thus very sensible of the benefits to be gained from Japan's support. Moreover, he had grounds for optimism about the outcome of a new approach. For the second time in three years, Japan's representative in Seoul had been attacked.

67. C.P.Japon.XXX. Dec.15, 1884. Ferry to Sienkiewicz.

68. P'eng Tse-Chou, 'Fuerii Naikaku to Nihon' (The Ferry Cabinet and Japan,) in Shirin, vol.45. No.3. (May 1962) p.59. P'eng greatly exaggerates Ferry's financial difficulties however.

As yet the background of Japanese intrigue was unclear and all that could be seen was the insult offered to a nation which prized its honour highly. It was assumed by Paris that Japan would now see the necessity for force as the only way to counter China's stubborness.

This view was understandable but mistaken. Itō and Inoue had not decided on war and still looked to achieve their aims by negotiation. They had indeed shown a new boldness in Korea, but this indicated not so much a change of policy as a change in the circumstances within which this policy operated. With the intensification of the French conflict with China, the Japanese anxiety over the Ryūkyūs had gradually disappeared, together with the fears of China's naval strength. This was especially true after the votes of credit for Ferry at the end of November. News of this was published in Japanese papers on December 1st. It showed France's determination not to back down and clearly made it safer for Japan to push her own claims. Indeed, it has been alleged that "the fact that the Ferry Cabinet intended to extend their Asian colonisation, and the transmission of this news to Korea seems to have exerted a considerable influence on Minister Takezoe and to have caused his sudden action."[69] Whether the connection was really as close as this is doubtful, but it does seem likely that the Japanese Government was

69. Ibid.p.62. It seems unlikely however, that the news that new credits had been voted could have reached Korea by Dec. 4 and P'eng gives no evidence for this statement.

strongly influenced in its policy towards Korea by French actions. This applies not just to the general influence of the new credits and war measures, but also to a more direct link which the French Minister in Japan had with developments in Korea. This link can be traced back to late 1882, when overtures were made to France by Korean reformers, who claimed to be hostile to Chinese domination.[70] At that time Tricou had given them a very cautious reception, but when two more approaches were made in 1884,[71] Sienkiewicz, though still reserved, was not uninterested, and he suggested to Ferry that the idea of Korea being modernised under French auspices might be worth considering.[72] Ferry, however, had more than enough on his hands and rejected the idea, at least until diplomatic relations had been established.[73] This should have been the end of the matter, but in September, Sienkiewicz was twice visited by Gotō Shōjirō and Itagaki Taisuke, two former members of

70. C.P.Japon.XXVIII. Dec.2.1882. Tricou to Duclerc.

71. C.P.Japon.XXX. March 24,1884. June 7,1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry. The approaches were made by Kim Ok-Kiun and So Che-pil, who, influenced by Japan's employment of French military instructors, wanted French help in the formation of a Korean army.

72. C.P.Japon.XXX. June 7,1884.

73. C.P.Japon.XXX. July 30,1884. Ferry to Sienkiewicz.

the Meiji Government, who now led the principal political party, the Jiyūtō.[74] Claiming to be motivated by hatred of China, dissatisfaction with their own government, and admiration for the French revolutionary tradition, they proposed that France should lend a million yen to facilitate the modernisation of Korea by her young reformers. Sienkiewicz appears to have given the impression that such help might be forthcoming, possibly from private bankers, though his own reports make it hard to believe that he had any serious intention of following this suggestion up.[75] No doubt Gotō would soon have realised the unreality of the situation; but the news of the supposed French interest was almost immediately leaked by him, if the Jiyūtō-shi is to be believed, to Itō, now the leading figure in the Meiji Government.[76] The reaction of the Government was swift.

74. C.P.Japon.XXX.Sept.15,1884; Sept.27,1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry. The relationship of the two ex-samurai from Tosa with the Chōshū leaders was not one of irreconcilable opposition, and Sienkiewicz was at first more inclined to believe that they were unofficial emissaries of the Government The Jiyūtō went into dissolution at the end of October, on account of internal dissension and government pressure.

75. P'eng discusses the question of Sienkiewicz's response in "Chōsen Mondai o meguru Jiyūtō to Furansu", in Rekishi Gaku Kenkyu, No.265, June 1962, pp.19-27. He calls the French Minister's mention of a banker friend 'a diplomat's gesture.' Since Sienkiewicz did not mention any such point in his own reports, it seems likely that it simply represented the means he chose to retain a potentially valuable source of informatio as to Japanese policy towards China.

76. See Itagaki Taisuke ed. Jiyūtō-shi (History of the Jiyūtō), vol.3. p.128-9. Iwanami Bunko edition. Tokyo, 1958.

Takezoe Shinichiro, its Minister in Korea, was sent back from leave to Seoul where he soon commenced the discussions with Kim Ok-Kiun and his fellow conspirators which led to the attempted coup of December 4th. It is possible to interpret Takezoe's action as intended merely to prevent control of the situation from slipping into dangerous hands. As Conroy points out, discovery of the Gotō-Itagaki-Sienkiewicz interviews "would build a sense of urgency in government circl that the intriguers, whom they had been ignoring, must now be weaned away from their French connections, and kept under surveillance."[77] Certainly the Japanese Government's unwillingness to resort to arms in December 1884 makes it hard to believe that in October anything as serious as conflict with China was intended, even if it was hoped that the Chinese position would be undermined. However, thanks probably to rashness on the part of Takezoe, who seems not to have weighed the strength of the conspirators or the determination of their opponents nor awaited the permission of his superiors before committing Japanese troops to the protection of the conspirators and the king, the end result of Sienkiewicz's encouragement of Gotō was a clash between Japan and China and a situation in which a Franco-Japanese alliance was a distinct possibility.

77. H. Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910. Philadelphia, 1960, p.152. Conroy gives a detailed description of the attempted coup. He finds the Meiji Government not guilty of complicity in it.

Nevertheless, despite this development in Japanese policy and despite the excitement of December 1884, the fact remains that no alliance did emerge.[78] Was this inevitable? It hardly seems likely that Japanese policy was so inflexible that it could not adapt when confronted by highly favourable circumstances, and there were, in fact, signs that Inoue was becoming impatient with China.[79] In addition, there is some reason to believe that several of his colleagues felt strongly enough about events in Korea to take the plunge into war.[80] It is true that there still remained some powerful arguments against involvement with France. For one thing, Japan was not yet properly

78. It is worth emphasising that no alliance ever was formed because P'eng in an article entitled "Shin-futsu Sensō ni okeru Nihon no Taikan Seisaku" (Japan's Korean Policy during the Sino-French War) Shirin. vol.43, No.3. pp.124-143. (May, 1960) says that Inoue "raised Japan's international position by co-operating with capitalist France." p.124. Power, op.cit. p.185, is even more misleading when he states that Ferry "rejected a Japanese proposal for joint action against China" in Dec. 1884.

79. In a telegram to Enomoto which seems to date from the end of Nov. Inoue speaks of 'the stupidity of the Chinese Government' with regard to its failing to accept Japan's mediation suggestions. Shin-Futsu Sensō. vol.3. No.304.

80. In the first three months of 1885 the dispatches of Plunkett, the British Minister, frequently mention a 'war party' which he identified with Satsuma. DM.Brown, Nationalism in Japan, Berkeley, 1955, p.124. also states that "By about 1885 a quite powerful group within the Japanese Government was favouring military action against China."

equipped for war. For another, almost all the other Powers viewed the prospect of an enlarged conflict with disfavour.[81] Yet no foreign Power could be expected to side with China, and the goodwill of France might have played a considerable part in the achievement of Japan's principal aim of treaty revision, both because France had been proving the most difficult of all the Powers and because Ferry possessed considerable influence with Bismarck at this time.[82] Moreover the added status Japan would derive from alliance with a European Power could not have been a negligible factor for a Government whose efforts had largely been directed towards the securing of Western recognition of Japanese independence and the achievement of real equality. There must have been considerable temptation to take advantage of the exceptionally favourable circumstances in which, as it soon appeared, France was urging Japan to

81. See C.P.Japon.XXIX. Aug.23.1883; Viel-Castel to Challemel Lacour. Britain and the English press continually spoke against an alliance, and in Jan.1885, Plunkett claimed that Russia had warned Japan against agression in Korea. F.O.46. CCCXXVII. No.23. Jan. 19, 1885. Plunkett to Granville. A month later, however, he telegraphed Parkes: "If [Ito's] negotiations fail, war seems inevitable: I expect both France and Russia would support Japan." See F.O.46. CCCXXVIII. No.65. Feb.26.1885. Plunkett to Granville.

82. On Bismarck's conciliation of France in 1884-5, see A.J.P.Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe. Oxford 1954. pp.291-302. Taylor speaks of Bismarck "playing genuinely for agreement with France" in late 1884.

pursue her own ends and was offering financial and naval help for the purpose.[83]

Since the general considerations for and against were so equally balanced, it seems reasonable to look to a further factor which may perhaps have decided the issue against alliance with France. This was the diplomacy of Sienkiewicz. Like several other French Ministers who had served in China before coming to Japan,[84] he had a poor opinion of the Japanese, and he resented the fact that when he arrived rumours were circulating that France had offered an alliance and been refused. Although he generally paid lip-service to the notion of an agreement with Japan, his real feelings were shown by a letter which he wrote to Rear-Admiral Mayer in January, 1884. In it he argued that "nous lier, d'autre part, au Japon, par un traité, ce serait nous placer entre deux peuples de race jaune, c'est-à-dire entre deux peuples qui, malgré l'antagonisme qui

83. The possibility of entering into a financial relationship with France, the second greatest capital-exporter, may have held a considerable attraction for some Japanese leaders who favoured raising a foreign loan for the purpose of extending the railways. Among those who advocated such a loan were Aoki Shūzō, who in 1885 urged Inoue to make war on China, and Kuroda Kiyotaka, who was popularly thought to be the leader of a 'war party'. For their views, see Denshin Sha-rai, July 3, 1885; Ibid. Aug. 20, 1885; also Aoki Shūzō Shokan. (Letters of Aoki Shūzō) Kensei Shiryōshitsu, No.657. Vol.II. (to Inoue Kaoru) March 12 1885.

84. Sienkiewicz had been consul at Hong Kong, 1872-6.

existe entre eux, se comprennent beaucoup mieux que nous ne pourrons jamais les comprendre."[85] His real desire was that Japan should undertake a completely independent war against China. As an ally, he wrote later, she would have been worth little because of her vanity, fickleness and unreliability.[86]

It was scarcely to be expected, then, that Sienkiewicz would receive Ferry's order to make discreet approaches to Japan with enthusiasm. Even so, the extent of his evasion of his Minister's instructions is remarkable. His interpretation of discretion was so extreme that the Japanese Government was actually unaware that an approach was being made.[87] Two steps were taken to implement the December 15 telegram. Firstly Sienkiewicz, while answering a query by Inoue about Franco-Chinese relations dropped the remark: "Nous ferons peut-être également une excursion dans le Nord."[88] Secondly he charged a

85. Enclosure in C.P.Japon.XXIX. Jan.3, 1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.

86. C.P.Japon.vol.31.March 11,1885. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.

87. There is no reference in the Japanese records to any move by Sienkiewicz, and when on Dec. 24,1884, Plunkett reported to London some detailed and accurate information about French offers which he had secured from Yoshida, Inoue's deputy, he was able to write: "M. Sienkiewicz, the French Minister here, had never touched the subject either before or since the Corean revolt." F.O.46. CCCXVIII. Dec.24.1884. Plunkett to Granville.

88. C.P.Japon.XXX. Dec.18,1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.

'reliable person' to say to a Japanese on close terms with members of the Government: "Nous allons voir ce que savent faire les japonais et ce qu'ils valent. Vous ne vous imaginez, d'ailleurs, pas ce que vous êtes en passe de gagner."[89] This was to say nothing that was not already known, and was so imprecise as to be worthless. In the same dispatch in which he described these measures he revealingly added that the Japanese Government would take advantage of French overtures in order to bring China to terms, and that Inoue appeared to expect a confidence on his part - a confidence which he prided himself on not giving. All this would have been infuriating to Ferry, whose position was being jeopardised by lack of success in Tonkin, had not Sienkiewicz already destroyed his hopes by telegraphing that the excitement of 1882 had not been repeated. He summed up: "...on cherche à atténuer la gravité de la situation."[90] This, despite the fact that Sienkiewicz had not been in contact with Inoue or the Japanese Foreign Office since the first news of the Seoul incident had arrived,[91]

89. Ibid. The Japanese was not named.

90. C.P.Japon.XXX. Dec.17.1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.Telegram.

91. Making this point, P'eng states that Sienkiewicz "could not have known yet how the Meiji Government would handle the incident this time." "Fuerii Naikaku to Nihon" p.64. Inoue, he explains, only returned from Yamaguchi on the 16th. Although Sienkiewicz could conceivably have seen him immediately on his return, it is highly unlikely that he would have failed to mention this.

and despite the fact that only a fortnight before Gotō Shōjirō had informed the French interpreter that the Japanese Government "qui naguère encore avait peur de la Chine" was "aujourd'hui résolu à entrer en lutte avec cette Puissance".[92] Thus to dismiss the possibility of conflict before seeking the official view can only be regarded as an extraordinary procedure.

The exaggerated character of Sienkiewicz's interpretation of discretion is all the more striking when one compares it with that of his colleague in China. Within two days of Sienkiewicz's discouraging reply, Patenôtre was urging upon the Japanese Consul, Andō, the advantages of an 'action commun' with France,[93] and when asked if he was authorised to make overtures he did not hesitate to answer in the affirmative.[94] Patenôtre's eagerness, is shown by his promise that Japan would be able to raise a loan on low interest in France.[95] Nevertheless, even though such words seemed to indicate that France was more anxious

92. C.P.Japon. XXX. Dec.4,1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
93. C.P.Chine. LXVI. Dec.19,1884. Patenôtre to Ferry.
94. C.P.Chine. LXVI. Dec.24,1884. Patenôtre to Ferry.
95. The evidence for this offer is in a telegram of Dec. 20, 1884 from Andō at Shanghai to Inoue, contained in vol.3. of Nik-Kan Gaikō Shiryō Shūsei, (Collection of Japanese-Korean Diplomatic Materials) edited by Tanaka Shinkichi, Tokyo, 1962, p.43. Patenôtre himself failed to mention this in his own dispatch; which suggests that he might have been acting without authorisation.

for an alliance than she had been, the reticence of Sienkiewicz, through whom any serious approach would be expected, must have introduced an element of uncertainty into the situation and cannot have failed to arouse the suspicion that France was trying to lure Japan into making the first official offer, either to use it as a threat to bring China to her knees, or else to secure an agreement on more advantageous terms. ~~than if France herself were the one taking the initiative~~.

(v) The Diplomatic Background to the Tientsin Agreements

Despite the fact that Japan did not respond to the French hints and offers in December, 1884, the possibility still remained, so long as China resisted concessions, that the two countries might come to some arrangement. However, there was a noticeable change in their respective attitudes. On the French side interest in alliance diminished as their forces began to gain ground in Tongking[96] and as the assumption that Japan would not fight was again accepted. Sienkiewicz in particular, maintained that "les hommes qui exercent actuellement une influence prépondérante dans les conseils du gouvernement passeraient au second rang si la guerre venait à éclater," as a convincing reason why war could not be expected.[97]

96. Even the Echo du Japon, which had been advocating an alliance since 1883, now, in January 1885, spoke of Japan's help as unnecessary and ridiculed a Japanese newspaper for believing that Japan need only ask for an agreement to secure it on favourable terms. See the weekly edition of Jan.16.1885.
97. C.P.Japon.XXI. Feb.5.1885. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.

Japanese interest, on the other hand, increased. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the Meiji Government reluctantly found that it was being forced into the position where it had to reconsider the French proposition. Such, at any rate, is the conclusion to be drawn from the reports of the British Minister, Plunkett, who was kept well-informed by Inoue and Itō.[98] He noted the rise of war feeling at the start of January, and telegraphed on the 11th: "I am assured Cabinet desire peace but very extensive military preparations are already completed."[99] A few days later he added that the war party was pressing hard for action.[100] Meanwhile, l'Echo

98. Despite the authority of his informants, Plunkett's reports need to be evaluated with some caution. It is possible that the Japanese leaders deliberately exaggerated the pressure to which they were being subjected. They had an obvious motive for this in that, if the British Minister could be persuaded that Japan meant business, British concern lest trade be jeopardised and Russia given the chance to make further advances, could be expected to ensure that her influence was used in Peking to bring China to make concessions. That this did in fact, to some extent, happen is suggested by the letters between Plunkett and Parkes that are enclosed in F.O.46. CCCXXVIII. No.65. Feb.26.1885; Ibid. No.66, Feb.27.1885. Plunkett to Granville. It also allowed Japan to threaten China indirectly, though it should be noted that China tried to maintain her position by the same means. Nevertheless, the fact that Japan tried to exert indirect pressure on China does not necessarily mean that she was not prepared for war in the last resort and Plunkett's reports are in general supported by French impressions also.

99. F.O.46.CCCXXVII. No.9. Jan.11.1885. Plunkett to Granville.

100. F.O.46.CCCXXVII. No.11. Jan.16.1885. Plunkett to Granville

du Japon was noting on January 2nd that "L'opinion publique au Japon est vivement surexcité" and that all the newspapers were demanding that the government take vigorous measures. The reason for these heightened feelings in Japan lay in the failure of Inoue, during his mission to Korea, to reach an agreement with China about withdrawal of troops and future co-operation. The political necessity for the Japanese Government of an agreement by which China would acknowledge that Japan had a legitimate interest in Korea, and without which the risk of renewed conflict would remain, was obvious; and it was in the hope of achieving it that the decision was taken in February that Itō should himself go to China.[101]

It was obvious too, that if war was decided upon, Japan could hardly afford to neglect the naval and financial support of France. It is not surprising, therefore, that on February 17th Sienkiewicz derived from an interview with Inoue the impression that "sans oser surlever la question d'une entente entre la France et le Japon, il désirait néanmoins en préparer le terrain pour le cas où les évènements la rendraient nécessaire",[102] while less than a fortnight

101. On the decision to send Itō, Plunkett commented that "My colleagues generally believe that if Counts Inouye and Itō could have had their own way, no special mission would yet have been sent to Peking, but their hand has been forced and Count Itō's mission is the last card played to endeavour to secure the game in favour of peace." F.O.46. CCCXXVIII. No.82. March 11, 1885. Plunkett to Granville.

102. C.P.Japon. XXXI. Feb.17.1885. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.

later the issue was broached explicitly, though without commitment, when Roessler, the Meiji Government's German adviser, urged through a French interpreter that Sienkiewicz should make official overtures.[103] About the same time Plunkett was reporting, after 'wonderfully frank' interviews with Itō and Inoue that so far French advances had not been accepted but that "if Count Ito came back empty-handed from Peking, war with China and an arrangement with France would ensue."[104] As early as January 16th, the British Minister had reported that Admiral Kabayama and General Takashima, who had been on Inoue's mission to Korea, had gone straight to Shanghai, and he commented: "This looks suspicious as it is the French Minister there who is negotiating for alliance with Japan."[105] On March 9, he further announced that Kuroda had gone to Saigon, officially on a pleasure trip, but in public belief to be ready to combine future operations with the French commanders.[106] On the French side Bougouin, the military attache, was informed by General Miura in April that "Dans six mois, et peut-être même plus tôt, le Japon débarquerait une armée en Corée sous la protection de la flotte de l'Amiral Courbet."[107] With all these signs of

103. C.P.Japon.XXXI. March 1885. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
104. F.O. 46. CCCXXVII. No.71. March 1, 1885. Plunkett to Granville.
105. F.O.46. CCCXXVII. No.18. Jan. 16, 1885. Plunkett to Granville.
106. See enclosure to Parkes in F.O.46. CCCXXVIII. No.82. March 11, 1885. Plunkett to Granville.
107. C.P.Japon.XXXI. April 8,1885. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.

a tougher attitude it is hard to resist the conclusion that if China had refused to yield for much longer the idea of alliance would finally have been accepted by Japan.

As events turned out, Itō's mission to China was successful enough to permit the maintenance of Inoue's pacific policy. Both France and Japan benefited from China's readiness, clearly influenced by knowledge of Japan's threats of co-operation with France, to extricate herself from external complications while compromise was still possible.[108] Treaties were eventually signed, with Japan on April 18, and with France the next day.[109] To France, China abandoned her traditional rights in Indo-China, though she escaped the imposition of the indemnity that Ferry had sought. To Japan she implicitly acknowledged some share in her suzerainty over Korea. So the idea of a Franco-Japanese alliance vanished, just when it was about to materialise, having finally had the diplomatic effect that had always been its basic purpose.

108. Some acknowledgement of the fact that China recognized how much her difficulties would be increased by the prospective alliance between France and Japan may be seen in Li Hung-Chang's declaration to the French consul that "c'était grâce à l'accord récemment intervenu avec le Gouvernement Francais qu'il avait pu arriver aussi facilement à une entente avec le Japon." C.P.Chine. LXVII. April 18, 1885. Patenôtre to Freycinet.

109. In actual fact, a preliminary agreement had been signed with France on April 4. See Power. op.cit. p.189.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion it may be worth summarising the reasons why an agreement failed to materialise, and also to try to establish, as far as the evidence will allow, exactly what was at stake: whether alliance, entente or merely some tacit understanding.

To take the latter point first, is it justifiable to speak in terms of alliance, when discussing the approaches made by France to Japan? As regards 1883, and indeed most of 1884, the answer to this question is probably 'no', if one understands by the term 'alliance' a long-term alliance, such as that signed later between Japan and Britain. What France wanted throughout the whole period was a military agreement whereby Japan would co-ordinate the deployment of her troops in Korea or north China with that of the French in Tongking, Formosa and south China. Despite the rumours that circulated in Japan and were half believed by the Meiji Government itself, France never actually reached a decision to seek a formal alliance. Thus, until late in 1884, the Meiji Government would have gained from agreement with France no more than the temporary furtherance of her own interests at China's expense, together with some help in treaty revision. From the Japanese viewpoint such an arrangement could not be regarded as satisfactory. On the one hand the basic

preference of the men who controlled her foreign policy was, as Inoue's approaches in 1883 had shown, for co-operation on the diplomatic plane alone. On the other hand the risks of such a temporary agreement, involving, as it would, war with a nation whose leaders appeared to have made some progress in military self-strengthening, figured more prominently in the Japanese Covernment's calculations than its potential advantages. Before entering into an agreement, therefore, Japan would have had to be sure that it was of a more permanent character. Above all, it would have had to be agreed that neither side should make peace separately and that after the conclusion of peace Japan should not be left to face China's displeasure alone. In other words, one of the prerequisites of Japanese co-operation was that it should be embodied in a regular alliance or something approximating to it.[110] Up until the last quarter of 1884, at least, this was either not seriously considered by France or, if considered, was evidently regarded as an unnecessary complication.

Whether France would have been more willing to consider it after that date, however, is another question. Had the other prerequisite of Japanese co-operation - China's refusal

110. This was recognised on occasion by the French representatives in Japan. See C.P.Japon. XXIX. Aug.23,1883. Viel-Castel to Challemel-Lacour; Ibid. Nov.7,1883, Sienkiewicz to Challemel-Lacour. There is however, no record in French archives of any actual discussion at the Quai d'Orsay of the pros and cons of alliance.

to make concessions - continued, it is likely that Japan would have been forced to seek alliance with France: and in that case it is doubtful whether the obligations and encumbrances of such an alliance would have outweighed in Jules Ferry's mind the advantages of a quick settlement to a colonial war, which, begun with little serious thought, had dragged on far longer than originally expected. It seems especially doubtful in view of the fact that the war in Indo-China, though not unpopular in itself, was, because it was bound up with national honour,[111] a cause of acute embarrasment and eventually, as Ferry found on the fateful night of March 30, 1885, of downfall. There seems no reason why a man who had been willing to co-operate with Germany should have refused to pay the comparatively small price which would be demanded by Japan, even if this was distasteful to some of his subordinates. Moreover, the offers of a low-interest loan by Patenôtre and the approaches made to Miura, even if they cannot be accepted with absolute reliability as expressions of French official policy, do suggest that the French Government's attitude had become much more positive than it had been in 1883. In the end it was probably only Li Hung-Chang's willingness

111. Power, op.cit.p.180, referring to the end of 1884, observes that "The real role of Tonkin in French domestic politics was to give an already determined opposition a point vulnerable to attack by patriotic arguments, a course made possible because the campaign in the Far East was going poorly."

and ability to compromise in 1885 that prevented the first alliance between Japan and a western Power.

There were other reasons than Li Hung-Chang's diplomacy, however, which prevented an alliance from being made in the two years preceding April 1885. Many factors played their part, among them the disapproval of Britain and other Powers; the tactics employed, and the distrust felt, by both sides; the low estimate of Japan's military value by the French Minister of War; and the French misconception of Japan's eagerness for an agreement. One must also take into account the somewhat intangible factor of French reluctance, both in Tokyo and Paris, to link France with a country which was still not considered sufficiently civilised to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners.[112]

The greatest impediments to alliance, though, were on the Japanese side. Even when the fear of Chinese military strength which was repeatedly expressed in 1883 faded, a fundamental obstacle remained. This was Inoue's and Itō's policy of seeking security and stability through diplomacy rather than war. The main danger for the Japanese leaders was still Western expansion in the

112. Too much should not be made of this point, however, since Japan's respectability had grown enough by 1885 for her to be considered a possible ally by Britain in case of war with Russia. See F.O.46. CCCXXVI. No.64. June 8, 1885 in which Lord Granville wrote to Plunkett, "...I should be glad to have your opinion as to any steps that it might be desirable to take now or hereafter with the view of securing her [redacted] alliance."

Far East.[113] They were not eager, therefore, to see China weakened so long as they could achieve a reasonable settlement without war. In very favourable conditions this reluctance might have been overcome, but at the moments when international circumstances seemed most promising there were always diplomatic factors working in the opposite direction. Thus a Franco-Japanese alliance became nothing more than one of history's might-have-beens.

113. For evidence of this see F.O.46. CCCXVIII. Dec.31.1884, where Plunkett reported to Granville that Japanese Ministers "speak somewhat as if they considered such an alliance with a Western Power against an Eastern neighbour were contrary to the rules of the game..." A little later Inoue observed with concern that",...the European colonial policy is beginning very strong and aggressive in the direction of Asia." Denshin Sha-ō. 1885. May 16. Japanese newspapers often voiced the same complaint.

CHAPTER VI
FRANCE AND THE REVISION OF THE 'UNEQUAL TREATIES'.

FRANCE AND THE REVISION OF THE 'UNEQUAL TREATIES'.

For all the interest of the manoeuvres that took place during the Franco-Chinese War, the diplomatic issue which most concerned Japan was Treaty Revision. An almost perennial theme of diplomacy, its importance is difficult to exaggerate. For the Japanese, revision of the treaties meant removal of the humiliating stigma of inequality, and the desire to achieve this aim not only dominated diplomacy in the 1880's and 1890's, but was also one of the major factors in the acceptance of modernisation. Legal developments and reform, in particular, were prompted by the need to show the Powers that foreigners could abandon their special legal privileges without fear of the consequences, but many other changes also owed much to the Japanese belief that they would convince the Western Powers that Japan was becoming little different from themselves. The importance of treaty revision went beyond this, however. It permanently affected the structure of industry in that, during the long period in which Japan's lack of tariff autonomy prevented her from adopting protective measures, it was impossible to stimulate economic growth except by Government sponsorship and subsidies to particular enterprises. The result of this was to encourage the growth of zaibatsu, great companies whose domination of

the modern sectors of industry had far-reaching social and political consequences for Japan. An even more direct influence of Treaty Revision on politics was as a weapon to employ against the Government. The long drawn-out negotiations with the Powers in the late 1880's and early 1890's were a source of deep frustration for every Japanese, and criticism of the handling of the negotiations was the most effective way of uniting disparate opposition groups in assaults on the Hanbatsu leaders. The feelings which could be roused by this issue were strong enough to seriously disturb the Government and to cause it to introduce even sterner repressive measures than before against political agitation. More significant than this, however, was the tendency of the opposition parties to change the emphasis of their slogans from minken (people's rights) to kokken (national rights) as a result of the success which had attended their criticism of the Government's weakness in its handling of Treaty Revision. (1) In return for momentary advantage they embraced a chauvinistic policy which in the long-run was bound to strengthen the military, their main rival as heir to the power of the Meiji oligarchs. Finally, the overall effect of the long drawn-out Treaty Revision negotiations was to produce disillusionment and

(1) This is an important theme of Inoue Kiyoshi's Jōyaku Kaisei (Treaty Revision), (Tokyo, 1955). See also H. Conroy, The Japanese Seizure Of Korea, pp.216-218.

cynicism among the Japanese about Western pretentions to conduct international relations in accordance with impartial justice rather than military power.

In view of the immense importance of Treaty Revision to Meiji Japan and the length of the negotiations, the attitude of the Western Powers clearly demands close attention.(2). France's part in Treaty Revision was less important than that of either Britain, which had far more at stake commercially than any other country and which had too much power in the Far East for any solution to be possible without her agreement, or the United States, which set the pace in accepting the Japanese demands. Nevertheless, it was not insignificant. To begin with, the French treaty with Japan, like that of every other country, contained a most-favoured-nation clause which meant that complete revision would have to wait, at least in theory, on her consent. However, once the leading Power had given way, it became politically impossible for others to resist for long unless united, and the real interest in France's role lies in the early and middle periods of Treaty Revision, before Japan decided to concentrate on

2. There are very few studies of Treaty Revision in Western languages. The three most important works are F.C.Jones, Extraterritoriality in Japan, (New Haven, 1931), F.V.Dickins, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, vol.2, (London, 1894), and P.J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, 1853-1895, 2 vols, (Stanford, 1932). All of these, however, appeared too early to make use of European diplomatic archives. There are a considerable number of Treaty Revision studies in Japanese, of which the most notable are Shimomura

separate negotiations with Britain. In these years before 1890 France exerted a considerable influence on the course of events, partly because her co-operation and support was sought by Britain whenever the latter feared isolation, partly because her own political and commercial interests, or her representatives' conception of them, led her on occasion to further or hinder Japan's cause.

France's attitude towards Treaty Revision was moulded by several factors. The most basic was her commercial position. Though not on the same scale as Britain's, her trade with Japan was substantial and her interest in the maintenance of the low tariffs of 1866 was therefore high. However, the difference in value between her imports from, and her exports to, Japan, though less than that of some countries, was not inconsiderable. Whereas she took approximately one fifth of Japan's exports, she supplied no more than one tenth of the goods imported into Japan. Since any measure of Treaty Revision was certain to affect Japan's import duties far more than her export duties, France stood to lose much less than Britain, whose trade was weighted extremely heavily on the side of exports to Japan. In view of

2. (Cont. from previous page) Fujio, Meiji Shonen Jōyaku Kaisei-shino Kenkyū (Studies in the History of Treaty Revision in the Early Years of the Meiji Period) (Tokyo, 1962), Yamamoto Shigeru, Jōyaku Kaisei-shi (A History of Treaty Revision) (Tokyo, 1943), Nakamura Kikuo, Kindai Nihon no Hōteki Keisei (The Legal Formation of Modern Japan) (Tokyo, 1957). Especially important for the diplomatic side is the Gaimushō's Jōyaku Kaisei Keika Gaiyō, (Outline of the Process of Treaty Revision, (Tokyo, 1950,) This is a supplementary volume to the Gaimushō's series Jōyaku Kaisei Kankei Nihon Gaikō Bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Documents relating to Treaty Revision) 4 vols. (Tokyo, 1941-50) (hereafter cited as JKKNGB) which

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this it is somewhat surprising that for the most part France showed herself no more accommodating towards Japan's hopes of tariff revision than Britain. ,Part of the explanation for this is to be found in her special interest in the abolition of export duties on silk and in the sale to Japan of warships, since her desire to achieve these two objects made her reluctant to give up any potential bargaining counter, but by itself this is hardly sufficient. At least as important were the political and psychological factors that were involved.

Among political factors the most obvious was the French involvement in Indo-China, which at one point led the Quai d'Orsay to make a significant change in France's hitherto intransigent attitude. It also, however, caused France's representatives to adopt an extreme position, partly from resentment that the lure had not succeeded, partly in order to maintain a position from which further concessions could be offered, if such a line of approach should appear promising. Unfortunately for Japan, no such opportunity again seemed to present itself, and the French posture hardened into one of permanent opposition to Japanese demands. Its eventual emergence from this phase appears to have been largely the result of a growing awareness of Japan's increased military

2. (Cont. from previous page) contains almost all the Japanese documents of any importance, as well as many communications from foreign diplomats.

strength and of the difficulties that might be encountered if the Western Powers found that they had to deal with a clamorous Parliament rather than with the leaders who up to 1890 had no institutional opposition to worry about. This changed feelings on France's part also, however, owed something to the influence of the Franco-Russian Alliance, since with Russia eager, until 1891 at least, to arrive at some understanding with Japan, some encouragement was naturally directed towards her ally to remove existing sources of friction with Japan. Yet another political consideration that weighed upon France was jealousy of Germany, though this, like the Indo-China influence, led her towards both conciliation and obstinacy according to the circumstances. In general the effect was to produce hostility towards any policy which owed its origin to German initiative and from which Germany could draw credit. Finally, it should be remembered that France's attitude throughout almost the whole of the period was coloured by her sense of inferiority following the Franco-Prussian War. This was fortunate for Japan in so far as it meant that France was never prepared to stand out for the conditions she desired if all the other Powers had decided to give way, but it also had an adverse side. Her view of Treaty Revision was strongly affected by her sensitivity about French prestige, with the result that she was inclined, whenever the danger of isolation was slight,

to resist even minor concessions, on the ground that consistent resistance was the only way of winning Japanese respect.

France also had a cultural interest in Japan which might have been expected to modify her extremely unfavourable attitude towards Treaty Revision. Much of the work on the new legal codes which were intended to justify Japan's claim to complete judicial autonomy was carried out with the aid of French experts and with the Napoleonic Codes as the chief model, and since France generally saw the propagation of her cultural traditions and values as one of the main aims of diplomacy, the Japanese might have been pardoned for imagining that their legal reforms might be given an enthusiastic welcome. Any hope, however, that France would raise fewer objections than other countries to the abolition of extraterritoriality was soon shown to be illusory. Whether through irritation at the number of changes that were made to Boissonade's drafts, or annoyance that the French jurist was one of the most ardent opponents of the arguments with which the European Powers buttressed their resistance, or simply, as her ministers usually claimed, owing to doubt as to whether Japan had judges capable of administering the new system fairly, France was as hostile as any Power towards every proposal to place foreigners under the jurisdiction of Japanese courts.

Such were the main factors and interests which either permanently or occasionally conditioned the French attitude towards Treaty Revision. (3). How in detail they affected the French negotiations and the general course of Treaty Revision is the main subject of this chapter, but first it is desirable to describe briefly the objections Japan had against the 1858 Treaties with the U.S.A., Holland, Russia, Britain and France, and the similar agreements with other Powers in succeeding years. From the Japanese point of view there were three major defects in the Treaties, and these were of sufficient material and psychological importance to justify their use of the term 'unequal' in describing them. The most obvious mark of inequality was the fact that whereas all the Western countries had insisted on clauses guaranteeing most-favoured-nation treatment, Japan herself possessed no such safeguard, and the provisions relating

3. It may be worth pointing out here that, unlike Britain, France was not forced to pay a great deal of attention to the views of the French community in Japan. They were relatively few in numbers, and had no organisation of their own, and though their views were occasionally sought by the French minister in Tokyo there is no indication that their opposition to revision was ever able to prevent any change of policy which the Quai d'Orsay considered desirable for political reasons. This is not, of course, to say that the interests of French nationals were ignored.

to her rights in other countries were meagre. This, however, was of little practical importance in the 19th century and was no more than a nominal objection in comparison with the two other complaints. The one which was voiced most in the earlier period of Treaty Revision was that Japan had been inequitably deprived of tariff autonomy. By the 1858 Treaties import and export duties had been fixed for the duration of those Treaties. Not surprisingly in a period of enthusiastic Free Trade advocacy, these duties were made fairly low, though not unreasonably so, but the Bakufu had bequeathed to Meiji Japan a heavy burden by agreeing, in 1866, to a new Tariff Convention which brought almost every item down to 5%. (4). The lowness of these duties was a major obstacle to the establishment of modern industries in Japan, and from the late 1870's, when protectionism returned to Europe in full force, they were out of keeping with International trends.

4. The signing of this new Convention did, in addition, to some extent prevent the Meiji Government from claiming that the Treaties had been imposed upon Japan by threat of force. According to Roches, the other Foreign Representatives would have been satisfied with a base of 10% - 12% but he persuaded the Bakufu to accept the figure of 5%. See C.C. Yédo, IV, Dec. 1, 1865; also C.P. Japon, XIV, June 26, 1866; both Roches to Drouyn de Lhuys. Roches was presumably aiming to restore the Bakufu's position in foreign eyes; only by this hypothesis can the Bakufu's decision be understood, for the danger that the Powers would use force to lower tariffs in 1866 was negligible. The move was successful in the short run, but this was obviously no consolation to the leaders who overthrew the Tokugawa.

Nevertheless, although from the early 1880's the Powers were prepared to allow some modifications, the price asked in return was so high that Japan was forced to put up with them until 1899.

The other great objection, which probably rankled most deeply of all with the Japanese, and which dominated Treaty Revision from the middle 1880's, related to the legal provisions of the Treaties. These had established the bases of a system of extraterritorial jurisdiction, similar in theory to that which had been granted to Europeans by the Ottoman Empire from a position of strength in the 16th century, but even more similar to that which had recently been introduced after victorious war in China. Under extraterritoriality, foreigners were not subject to Japanese jurisdiction, except in cases where they brought actions against Japanese, and in practice many of the offences committed by them against Japanese law went unpunished by consular courts. In the conditions of the 1860's and 1870's the system was accepted by most thinking Japanese as the only way in which the gulf between Japanese and Western legal standards could be partially bridged, but with the drafting of Western-style codes from the late 1870's onwards some recognition of Japanese progressiveness was expected of the Western Powers. When this was not forthcoming, or was so grudging that the Japanese attempt to make something of it had to be hedged in with very

substantial conditions, it aroused fierce resentment among all politically-conscious Japanese.

A good deal of the Japanese opposition to the Treaties was due to the way in which clauses whose drafting lacked precision were interpreted by the Powers. Until the time of Ōkuma, for instance, the Japanese Government was obliged to accept the Western view that the most-favoured-nation right was an unconditional one, which entitled any Power to claim for its nationals any privilege granted to another Power without making an equivalent concession. More important than this, however, was the fact that, because of her weakness, Japan was unable to resist the Western interpretation of the clause relating to the conditions of revision. Article 20 of the French treaty, which was not unrepresentative, stated:

> "Il est également convenu que chacune des deux Hautes Parties contractantes pourra, après en avoir prévenu l'autre, une année d'avance, à dater du 15 août 1872, ou après cette époque, demander la révision du présent Traité pour y faire les modifications ou y insérer les amendements que l'expérience aurait démontrés nécessaires."

This provision was by no means as clear as, say, that included in the 1860 Commercial Treaty between Britain and France, but it was substantial enough for the Meiji Government to expect that it gave Japan the ultimate right to denounce any clause which had come to appear unsatisfactory. This interpretation received additional support from the

fact that the Treaties had actually been revised three times in the 1860's. (5). Since by accepting and seeking modifications the Powers had accepted the principle that the Treaties could be changed by mutual consent at any time, the inclusion of a revision clause in the Treaties could have had no meaning unless it signified that both Japan and the Treaty Powers were entitled from 1872 to rescind unilaterally any concession granted in 1858. This conclusion was not one which the Powers chose to accept. Except for a momentary hesitation about the legal position at the beginning and a brief attempt in 1873-4 by the French Minister to impose the extreme interpretation that the revision clause also gave the Powers the right to ask for new privileges (6)., the standpoint which they consistently maintained throughout almost the whole course of the Treaty Revision negotiations, was that no changes could be made without their consent. The unfortunate corollary of this for Japan was that the Powers were entitled to compensation for foregoing their rights, and they were not disposed to sell these cheaply.

5. The three occasions were the postponement of the opening of Nigata at the end of 1859, the postponement of opening of Edo, Osaka, Hyōgo, and Niigata in 1862, and the 1866 Tariff Convention.

6. ~~See Yamamoto, op.cit. p.107.~~ See below.

a) The First Phase of Treaty Revision (1869-1874).

The first demand for Treaty Revision on the Japanese side was voiced almost immediately after the Restoration, when on Feb. 8, 1868, at Iwakura Tomomi's instigation, an internal proclamation declared the new Government's intention of revising the treaties. (7). The importance of this proclamation lay in its implicit disavowal of the old Jōi position which logically would have required the total repudiation of the treaties rather than in any challenge to the Powers, for as yet, the inexperienced Japanese leaders had no concrete scheme of reform to propose. Indeed, the Meiji Government was not to formulate any clear ideas of its own until 1876. This early phase of Treaty Revision, therefore, was characterised firstly by the Western Powers' reaction to the mostly rather vague intimations of the Meiji Government that it desired to see changes effected in the Treaties, and secondly by the Japanese attempt to prevent alterations being made which would impair rather than improve Japan's position. (8).

7. See Yamamoto, op. cit. p. 107.

8. During this first phase the most important foreign country, as far as Treaty Revision was concerned, was the United States, The confusion which attended the Iwakura mission's visit to Washington in 1872 and the way in which it was induced by technicalities of Western diplomatic language and procedure to discuss Treaty Revision with Secretary of State Fish are brought out in a recent article by Marlene J. Mayo, "A Catechism of Western Diplomacy: The Japanese and Hamilton Fish, 1872", Journal of Asian Studies, (May, 1967).

In the case of France, the earliest indication that Japan intended to take advantage of the revision provision after 1872 was received on February 23, 1869. Like most of his colleagues Outrey informed the Japanese Government that he could not discuss revision before the fourteen years had elapsed, and though he asked it to specify the articles on which changes were desired, his comments make it clear that he did not accept that one party alone could decide what those changes should be. (9). In view of this rather unsympathetic reaction and the Foreign Ministry's awareness of its ignorance of international law, it is not particularly surprising that the whole subject was dropped until 1871.

When the Japanese claim was renewed on June 30, 1871, a note of caution was in evidence. The communication from Sawa and Terashima spoke only of modifying "un certain nombre de dispositions présentant des inconvénients." (10). The initial reaction of the French Government showed that such caution was not misplaced. Though nothing specific had been said of unilateral denunciation, Rémusat saw the

9. C.C. Yédo, V, March 15, 1869. Outrey to la Valette.
10. C.P. Japon. XXI. July 11, 1871, Outrey to Favre.

Japanese note as reason for maintaining French troops in Yokohama. (11). However, the French attitude was not yet as rigid as it was to become later. In May, 1872, Rémusat requested Turenne to report on the working of consular jurisdiction, (12). and in his reply the chargé d'affaires admitted that the existing system was imperfect and urged that mixed courts be established and that the right of preventive arrest be granted to the Japanese. (13). Nevertheless even Turenne, who was markedly sympathetic towards Japanese aspirations, considered that any further measure of Treaty Revision would be premature and his realistic assessment of Japanese hopes clearly indicated that complete revision would take a very long time. "En effet," he concluded, "bien qu'ils s'occupent

> actuellement d'une façon sérieuse de codifier leurs lois, en leur donnant les adoucissements que réclame notre civilisation, bien qu'en principe nous puissons admettre

11. C.P. Japon XXI. Sept. 21 1871. Rémusat to Marine.

12. C.P. Japon XXI. May 7 1872. Rémusat gave as a reason that the Japanese Ministers "ont manifesté l'intention de revendiquer, comme un des attributs de la souveraineté territoriale, une plus grande autorité judicaire."

13. C.P. Japon. XXI. July 17 1872. In a later memorandum, Outrey argued that the jurisdiction question should be solved by means of a gradual transition (C.P. Japon.XXI. Dec. 17 1872) and Turenne's comments showed that by the end of his stay in Japan he had moved a little nearer to the Japanese position. By April 1873, he was prepared to give Japan a merited encouragement by permitting Japanese magistrates to deal with a limited range of offences committed by foreigners.

avec eux que le droit de juridiction qui nous est concédé par les Traités n'est que temporaire, et qu'il leur fera retour quelque jour, il est notoire que nous ne pouvons pas d'ici à plusieurs années faire bon marché de cette juridiction, car nos intérêts ne pourraient être sauvegardés si on les leur confiait avant l'époque qu'ils auront formé des juges intègres et capables de mettre en pratique ces nouvelles lois." (14). This argument was to receive constant reiteration from the lips of various French representatives, usually in a much more rigorous and dogmatic form, in the next decade and a half.

As far as France was concerned, the actual problem of working out some trifling concessions to meet Japanese demands did not materialise at that stage. The feelers that had been put forward by the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo in June, 1871, were discontinued when the decision to send a high-ranking mission to America and Europe was taken. The task of laying the ground for Treaty Revision was entrusted to Iwakura, but it was not envisaged that he should actually commence negotiations, and after the confusion that was produced by Fish's offer to discuss a new treaty, the mission was not particularly eager to raise the question when it arrived in Paris at the start of 1873. In reply to Rémusat's offer to examine any propositions that Japan might make, Iwakura stated that the chief purpose of the mission was to convey to the Powers Japan's feelings towards them; apart from that, it welcomed the opportunity of gathering the Powers' opinions on Treaty Revision, but no step would be taken until the

14. C.P. Japon. XXI. July 17, 1872. Turenne to Rémusat.

mission returned to Japan. (15). When, in fact, the members of the mission did arrive back during the summer, they were mostly too conscious of the immense disparity between their own country and the countries they had visited to have much hope of gaining anything of value from renewed negotiations. Thus the Meiji Government did not take the initiative in resuming talks until 1876, and France was not approached until 1877.

This is not, however, to say that there were no further developments concerning Treaty Revision in 1873 and 1874, and the Japanese experience during this period may well have contributed firstly to the delay in taking up this prime diplomatic objective, and secondly to the cautious approach that marked Terashima's handling of the problem between 1876 and 1879. The attempt of the European Powers to secure Treaty Revision on their own terms is an episode which has received little attention, but it undoubtedly served to warn the Japanese of the dangers of acting over-hastily, and it is of particular interest to a study of French policy because the French Minister in Japan from June, 1873 to April, 1875, played a leading role in this European bid.

15. M.D. Japon. II. Jan. 24, 1873. Compte-rendu of conference between Rémusat and Iwakura. Rémusat prefaced his remarks by saying that France was satisfied with the treaties at present.

The European attempt to revise the treaties was not really due to a European initiative. It was the Japanese intimations, before and during the Iwakura mission, that they wished to commence negotiations which prompted the Powers to make preparations for such an eventuality, and by the time the ambassadors returned to Japan the machinery of revision was in operation. The Quai d'Orsay had taken two important steps to set it in motion. One was to consult the principal chambers of commerce in France, the most important of which expressed the view that tariffs should be lowered if possible. (16). More important was the appointment of Jules Berthemy, previously Minister at Peking and Washington, with the specific mission of accomplishing revision. (17). Berthemy's attitude suggests that he believed the post at Tokyo to be incommensurate with his abilities and standing

16. C.C. Yédo. VI. July 20 1873. Broglie to Berthemy. Apart from the lowering of tariffs the general view was that the status quo should be maintained.

17. The clearest evidence of this is an anonymous letter, dated March 1, in the Moniteur des Soies, of April 17, 1875. Berthemy, it was reported, had himself stated at a recent dinner that: "sa mission était remplie." The writer's comment was: "Or, comme il est au vu et sû de tout le monde que notre envoyé n'avait d'autre mission que l'attention de la révision, comme on l'avait choisi tout exprès pour cette tâche délicate en raison de son tact et de son habileté, il est permis de supposer qu'il a échoué, comme son collègue anglais, puisqu'il annonce que sa mission est terminée, alors que les choses restent dans le même état."

and felt that only a striking success with revision could compensate him for this. As a result he at once began a campaign to remove the one great restriction that the treaties had preserved - free access to the interior. Despite the fact that French opinion had hitherto opposed rather than favoured the complete opening of Japan, (18). and despite the fact that any Japanese Government which granted such a concession would have made its position within the country untenable, for the next 18 months, Berthemy pursued this objective relentlessly.

For Berthemy and his British and German colleagues the problem of opening the interior was that much less difficult to raise because Soyejima, the acting Foreign Minister, had, in response to Italian pressure early in 1873, offered free access to Italian traders under a passport system if Italy would agree to their being subject to Japanese laws and law courts outside the treaty ports. Though the Italian minister was tempted, the plan failed when the Italian government was advised by other European governments to keep in line and when it was made clear to Soyejima that this new privilege would be claimed

18. Roches had frequently warned against free access on the grounds that it would lead to an over-intensive rearing of silk-worms which while bringing quick profits would impair the quality of the stock in the long run. His views were echoed by the Lyon Chamber of Commerce in 1868. See C.C. Yédo. V. Aug. 6, 1868. Outrey to Gramont. See also the views of Duseigneur in the Moniteur des Soies of June 15, 1867. Outrey, too, in his memorandum of Dec.17, 1872, (M.D. Japon II.) was opposed to the opening of the whole country though he did hope that a passport system would be established whereby merchants would be allowed to visit the commercial centres.

as an unconditional right by the other Powers. (19). The very fact, however, that the Japanese government, in the hope of proving that extraterritoriality was not really essential, had shown that it was prepared to consider the conditional opening of Japan, convinced the Foreign Representatives that they were morally justified in claiming free access in return for making the concessions that they themselves believed sufficient to safeguard Japanese interests. Needless to say, their conception of Japan's interests did not entirely coincide with that of the Meiji Government, which could [redacted] hardly be happy at giving up its only important bargaining counter in exchange for the right to deal with petty offences outside the Treaty ports. Consequently it soon became apparent that even Soyejima, whom the Foreign Representatives considered sympathetic to some extension of foreign rights, was becoming more reserved and was unwilling to commit himself until the Iwakura mission returned home. Although Iwakura was to arrive within a matter of months, at the start of September, Berthemy was irritated by the delay. He held it to be wrong that a country which claimed to be entering the way of progress should restrict foreigners to a few ports and he urged upon his

19. See C.P. Japon. XXII. March 17, 1873. Turenne to Rémusat; Ibid. May, 12, 1873, Turenne to Rémusat; C.P. Japon XXIII. Aug. 17, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie

colleagues the necessity of working on the Japanese Government without delay. [20.] An interview in August with a conciliatory Soyejima persuaded him for a time that the negotiations which were promised within a month were likely to result in European demands being met, [21.] but two conversations with Iwakura and the Japanese Government's slowness in replying to the Foreign Representatives' reiterated demand for talks soon reversed that favourable impression. [22.] Before long Berthemy was beginning to doubt whether success could be achieved by what he deemed a reasonable approach. By November he was writing to his Minister ominously:

20. C.P. Japon. XXII. July 27, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie.
21. C.P. Japon. XXIII. Aug. 12, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie.
22. C.P. Japon. XXIII. Oct. 12, 1873. Berthemy to Broglie. The Foreign Representatives had presented a draft set of regulations relating to access to the interior, the main features of which were their acceptance that foreigners outside the treaty ports should be subject to local regulations and their insistance that offenders should be handed over to, and judged by, their own consul. The Japanese failure to reply at once was presumably due partly to the dispute over a Korean policy which led to Soyejima's resignation on October 22nd, but the main cause was undoubtedly their embarrassment over the position in which Soyejima had placed them. To allow access to the interior would open the way not only to awkward incidents between Japanese and foreigners but also to foreign economic penetration and although in theory foreigners would still not be able to own property, Japan would have very little left to hold out in the future as an incentive for complete treaty revision when that aim was made possible by the establishment of a reliable modern legal system.

"Vous n'apprendrez donc pas sans surprise, M. le Duc, que l'accueil empressé, pour ne pas dire plus, dont l'ambassade japonaise a été en Amérique et en Europe a eu un résultat diamétralement contraire à celui qu'en attendaient sans doute les gouvernements intéressés et que ce résultat vient de se traduire par un refus pur et simple de la part du nouveau Ministre des Relations Extérieures de discuter les propositions soumises à l'examen de son prédécesseur. Traité en enfant gâté, le Japon abuse de la position qu'on s'est plû à lui faire."[23]

For a man of Berthemy's temperament, this situation was not one to be accepted without a struggle. Strong protests, and the hint that the remaining payment on the Shimonoseki Indemnity would be insisted on were the Japanese Government uncooperative, led Terashima, the new Foreign Minister, to promise a counter-draft incorporating the conditions under which Japan would allow free access,[24] but this had still not been produced by the end of the year. The Foreign Representatives had already reminded the Meiji Government of its indemnity obligation by this time, but the latter appeared on second thoughts to have decided that this financial burden was preferable to the penetration of the interior and Terashima had promised to pay by July,1874.[25] Thus a major diplomatic weapon had been blunted and Berthemy was forced by the end of the year to conclude that as long as Iwakura remained in power there was little chance of progress.[26]

23.) C.P.Japon. XXIII. Nov.9,1873. Berthemy to Broglie.
24.) C.P.Japon. XXIII. Nov.20,1873. Berthemy to Broglie.
25.) C.P.Japon. XXIII. Dec.7,1873. Berthemy to Broglie. The indemnity actually was paid off in 1874.
26.) C.P.Japon. XXIII. Dec.28,1873. Berthemy to Broglie.

This verdict was made to seem a little pessimistic in January, when Terashima, reverting to the caution that normally characterised the Meiji Government's conduct of diplomatic relations, gave Berthemy to understand that access to the interior would be allowed for purposes other than trade.[27] Though this by no means satisfied the French minister, it gave him hope of a change of attitude on the more important question. Once more, however, disappointment followed. No attempt was made by the Meiji Government to implement its half-promise, and a number of incidents concerning foreign diplomats occurred which were dealt with in what the Foreign Representatives regarded as a half-hearted and tardy manner.[28] By late June it had become clear that the Japanese Government had no intention of agreeing to any change in the jurisdictional situation until it was in a position to claim the total abolition of extra-territoriality. At an interview with Terashima and two other Japanese Ministers, the Foreign Representatives were informed that the Dajōkan, the highest government council, had rejected both the Western proposals and the Foreign Ministry's counter-proposals, plainly a move dictated by the hope of ending all further discussion.

27.) C.P.Japon. XXIV. Jan.19,1874. Berthemy to Decazes.
28.) C.P.Japon. XXIV. May 4,1874; Ibid. May 8,1874. Berthemy to Decazes.

As a result of this action, Berthemy, Parkes, and von Brandt faced the problem of finding new tactics which would justify the continuation of the negotiations. They were able to do so by concentrating on an argument which up till then they had no more than hinted at. Since the Japanese Government employed several hundred foreigners to whom in many cases freedom of movement was necessarily allowed, the Foreign Representatives claimed that all their nationals were entitled to this privilege by right of their most-favoured-nation clauses, and at the end of their interview they informed Terashima of their view in unmistakable terms. By Berthemy, at least, this was intended to be more than an idle threat. The dispatch in which he reported these developments to the Quai d'Orsay ended with a recommendation that the Powers act firmly:

> 'Le moment est néanmoins venu pour les principaux d'entre eux de décider s'ils accepteront la situation faite à leurs nationaux par l'obstination injustifiable des conseillers actuels du Mikado, ou bien s'ils donneront à leurs Représentants les instructions nécessaires pour vaincre des obstacles qui disparaîtront, j'en suis certain, devant l'expression nettement formulée d'une volonté commune.'[29]

Whether the French and other European Governments would have agreed to impose their will upon Japan by means of joint action is somewhat doubtful.

29.) C.P.Japon.XXIV. July8,1874.

The collaboration of Britain would have been essential, yet Parkes does not seem to have been so committed to the cause of free access as Berthemy.[30] Even the Quai d'Orsay, though initially sympathetic, in practice did little to implement the suggestion of its representative.[31] Reactions might well have been less negative, however, had not the Meiji Government heeded the Foreign Representatives' language and taken steps to draw the sting from their newly-awakened irritation. By its note of July 13 it conceded to foreigners possessing the recommendation of their legation the right to ask the Japanese Foreign Office for passports permitting them to travel within Japan for the purpose of health, study, or other important reasons, trade alone being specifically excepted.[32] This compromise was welcomed by the British Foreign Office and, to a lesser extent, by Parkes,[33] and though Berthemy was still

30.) F.O.46. CLXXXI. No.157. Aug.21,1874. Parkes to Derby. At this period Parkes' attention was almost exclusively occupied by the possible consequences of the Formosan Expedition.
31.) A dispatch of July 16,1874, (C.P.Japon. XXIV) from Decazes had spoken in fairly critical terms of Japanese obstructionism and was quoted by Berthemy to Terashima. On September 30,1874, (C.P.Japon, XXIV) Decazes wrote again, approving Berthemy for his line of action and stating that he had recommended collective action to the other Cabinets, but the lack of reference to this move in the Foreign Office's correspondence with Parkes and in the correspondence between the Foreign Office and Paris indicates that the Berthemy line was not pursued with any vigour, if at all. The same Sept.30 dispatch actually states, in fact, that stronger pressure would not only have failed to secure the opening of the interior but would have offended the Japanese ministers.
32.) C.P.Japon. XXIV. July 20, 1874; Berthemy to Decazes.
33.) See F.O.46. CLXXXI. No.157. Aug.21,1874, Parkes to Derby, and the Foreign Office comment on it.

dissatisfied enough to push his colleagues into drawing up another collective note reiterating their previous demands,[34] all hope of substantial treaty revision was now at an end. The Japanese Government would not have considered yielding further unless clear evidence had emerged of the Powers' intention of taking firm collective action. Negotiations were not resumed and when positive instructions from Paris failed to materialise by December, 1874, even Berthemy, whose energy had been one of the chief features of this phase of Treaty Revision, gave up all idea of renewed effort.[35] Nevertheless, though little substantial change had emerged from this first phase, the results might have been very different had the Meiji Government shown itself less flexible.

34.) C.P.Japon. Aug.18,1874. Berthemy to Decazes.
35.) Berthemy admitted this in a dispatch of Dec. 6,1874 (C.P.Japon. XXIV). The Quai d'Orsay's failure to exert itself in his support is probably attributable to the Japanese concession of July 13th, Japan's successful conclusion of the Formosa Expedition, the French desire to maintain a military mission in Japan, and habitual caution.

b) The Second Phase. 1877-1889.

When the issue of Treaty Revision was next taken up, the Meiji Government not surprisingly approached France only when extensive preliminary negotiations had been carried out with other Powers.[36] At the beginning of this second phase, Foreign Minister Terashima, supported by the Finance Ministry under Ōkuma and Matsukata, confined Japan's demands to straightforward revision of tariffs.[37] The sympathetic response, first of Fish, then of Evarts, led to a new treaty being signed with the U.S.A. after two years of talks, on July 25, 1878. This treaty was to come in force, however, only when all other countries had revised their treaties with Japan, so that the problem of securing the assent to raised tariffs of the major European Powers still remained. Nevertheless there were some hopeful signs at this stage. Both Russia and Italy were favourable to new treaties, the one for political, the other for commercial reasons.[38] Unfortunately for Terashima, Britain and Germany were

36.) The three phases into which this account of Treaty Revision is divided are intended to refer not to phases of Japanese diplomacy, but to the stages at which the French attitude to Treaty Revision underwent important changes. After 1877 France no longer sought to take the initiative in Treaty Revision, since she realised that any change in the system would have to be a compromise favouring Japan. Except briefly during the Franco-Chinese dispute, therefore, she consistently opposed all efforts to alter the situation, an attitude which changed in the late 1880's, only when Japan's increasing strength convinced French diplomats that fundamental Treaty Revision was inevitable and that France should make the best bargain she could, before her treaty was denounced unilaterally.

37.) For the background to the Japanese resumption of negotiations see Shimomura Fujio, "Jōyaku Kaisei", (Treaty Revision) pp.73-75, in Kōnishi Shirō ed., Kindai Shakai (Modern Society) (Tokyo,1954). By this time there were also some demands for protectionism from

much less responsive and while these two countries stood together the chances of even moderate success were slight, so long as Japan refused to yield over the opening of the interior to trade. France's attitude could not materially affect the situation, but owing to the existence of a certain amount of divided opinion between Paris and Tokyo as to what line of policy was in France's best interests her influence was even less than it might have been. The inclination of Geofroy, the minister in Tokyo who received the first definite Japanese project of a revised tariff in February, 1878, was to make concessions to Japan without too much bargaining, in the hope that France might avoid incurring Japanese displeasure . Note that he felt that the new duties suggested, which ranged from 5% to 30%, were completely justified, but so long as woollen muslins did not suffer, French interests were in no real danger. His advice to his government, therefore, was to offer

37.) contd/.. the nascent Japanese press.
38.) Ibid. p.75.

"un accueil facile aux ouvertures du Gouvernment Japonais et de ne point subordonner notre acceptation à une entente avec l'Angleterre dont les intérêts au Japon sont essentiellement distincts des nôtres."[39]

The opinion of the Quai d'Orsay on this question provides one more example of how local and international factors tended to be viewed differently in Tokyo and Paris. In April, 1878, Foreign Minister Waddington replied that before deciding France's position on tariff revision, he wished to know how the Foreign Office felt.

39.) C.C. Tokyo.I. Feb.10,1878. See also his dispatch, written after a visit from Terashima, of Oct.16,1877, (C.P.Japon XXVI). In it he stated that: "...un refus des Puissances Européennes aurait probablement pour résultat de précipiter la conclusion d'un arrangement séparé entre le Japon et les Etats-Unis, arrangement auquel nous serions tôt ou tard forcés de nous rallier." This reads curiously in the light of the subsequent failure of the U.S.-Japan treaty to make any real impact on the Treaty Revision problem, but it does reveal the continuing French fear of isolation, which meant that Japan need not worry overmuch about a French refusal to acquiesce in any new treaty which had won general agreement. It may be worth adding that about this time Geofroy was becoming concerned about France's diminishing prestige in Japan. (See C.P.Japon. XXVI. Jan.28, 1878. Geofroy to Waddington)

> "Je n'ai pas à revenir ici," he wrote, "sur les considérations générales qui nous engagent à maintenir dans nos rapports avec les nations de l'Extreme Orient, particulièrement avec le Japon, l'harmonie de vues, dont se sont en toute circonstance inspirés les différents Cabinets Européens et qui a fait jusqu'ici leur force et leur sécurité."[40]

When the Quai d'Orsay was formally presented with Japan's demands by its Minister in Paris, Sameshima, it gave them an extremely cool reception,[41] and though Geofroy still felt that, general considerations apart, France would do well to align herself with the U.S.A. rather than Britain, he was forced by his instructions to inform Iwakura that France found the compensation that Japan was offering in return for higher tariffs insufficient.[42]

40.) C.P.Japon. XXVI. April 4, 1878. Waddington to Geofroy.
41.) See C.C.Tokyo. I. Sept.20,1878. Waddington to Geofroy. The French Government did not refuse absolutely to discuss the question, but it did inform Sameshima, as a later memorandum by Geofroy put it, that "toute négociation d'ailleurs nous semblait inutile qui n'embrasserait pas les mesures propres à étendre les relations commerciales des deux pays en facilitant l'accès du Japon aux citoyens et aux capitaux Français." M.D.Japon II. (June 26,1879). This was in line with the British position at the time. As Geofroy observed, to adopt such a standpoint was to reopen the question of extraterritoriality, which had proved insoluble in 1874, and was now to find itself inextricably linked to the question of tariffs, a development which made Treaty Revision inordinately complicated and was undoubtedly a major factor in preventing the achievement of even partial revision for a very long time. Some of the responsibility for this also rested with the Japanese who were impatient with any measure of progress which did not promise the abolition of extraterritoriality. Terashima's replacement by Inoue in Sept.,1879, was largely the result of this dissatisfaction. See Hanabusa, Meiji Gaikō-shi,p.65.
42.) C.P.Japon. XXVI. Dec.15,1878. Geofroy to Waddington.

In 1879 the want of unanimity over the attitude France should adopt towards Treaty Revision was made good by Geofroy's return to France. His successor, Balloy, had no difficulty in accepting the Quai d'Orsay's subordination of French interests to cooperation with Britain, and there was no question of his becoming an advocate forJapan. Indeed, his opinions gave Japan even less hope than those expressed by the Quai d'Orsay. Explaining, as he did, the Meiji Government's desire for Treaty Revision as an attempt to distract the Japanese people from its domestic grievances, rather than as a genuine national aspiration,[43] he was hardly likely to search for compromise. His advice to the Quai d'Orsay in fact was:

> "Laisser le Gouvernement Japonais faire ses propositions jusqu'au bout sans lui répondre. Une fois que tout ce qu'il demande sera connu, nous le prierons de dire ce qu'il nous offre en échange. Ses propositions seront vraisemblablement insuffisantes. Nous pourrons alors faire à notre tour des contre-propositions, et comme, de l'aveu même de Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, le Gouvernement Japonais est obligé de se créer des ressources nouvelles, nous le tiendrons par la question d'argent, et nous l'obligerons à en passer par ce que nous trouverons juste d'exiger de lui en compensation des charges plus élevées dont il frappera notre commerce."[44]

43.) C.P.Japon. XXVII. July 25,1879. Balloy to Waddington.

44.) C.C.Tokyo. I. Dec. 13,1879. Balloy's language to Inoue on this occasion is not without interest: "ne perdez pas de vue que, plus vous vous montrerez libéral avec nous, plus vous arriverez vite à votre but qui est de récouvrir l'intégralité de vos droits. En examinant les affaires à un point de vue étroit et mesquin comme c'est malheureusement trop souvent le cas vous ne nous encouragez pas à vous faire des concessions."

These somewhat Machiavellian suggestions were superseded a few months later when the proposals of Inoue, the new Foreign Minister, were actually made known. "Notre réplique," Balloy then stated, "doit être le rejet pur et simple des propositions actuelles comme bases de négociations."[45] At the same time he informed the Quai d'Orsay that he had been working with some success on his British, German, Russian, Austrian, and Dutch colleagues to induce them to recommend the same response to their own governments.[46] Until this point the Quai, despite several other dispatches from Balloy bitterly criticising the new draft codes and the workings of Japanese justice,[47] had preserved something, at least, of Geofroy's impartiality, and in June, 1880, it had recognized that the 1866 tariffs were excessively moderate,[48] but in the face of

45.) C.C.Tokyo. I bis. July 21,1880. Balloy to Freycinet.
46.) For his vigorous and outspoken approach to Kennedy, the British chargé d'affaires, see F.O.46. CCLXVIII. No.123. July 13,1880. Kennedy to Granville.
47.) C.P.Japon. XXVII. Sept.15,1879; Ibid. April 22,1880. Balloy also took the unusual step for a French diplomat of seeking the opinion on Treaty Revision of French traders at Yokohama. See L'Echo du Japon, Dec.12,1879. Clearly this was with the intention of gaining support for his opposition to the Japanese proposals. Normally little heed was paid to the views of interested merchants. SeeL'Echo du Japon's complaint in its edition of Nov.25,1881.
48.) C.C.Tokyo. I bis. June 11,1880. Freycinet to Balloy.

Balloy's strong advice and the apparent unanimity of the other important European powers, it now rejected Inoue's proposals outright.[49]

Balloy was not, and could not be, an important figure in the history of Treaty Revision, but attention has been paid to him here because his language so strikingly conveys the basic essence of French Treaty Revision policy from the late 1870's to the end of the 1880's. Fundamentally France was content with the status quo, saw no reason to encourage Japan, and was generally to be found dragging her heels whenever concessions were mooted. Even those ministers in Tokyo who did not share Balloy's anti-Japanese feelings followed his line rather than that which Geofroy had tentatively suggested. Roquette, for instance, who replaced Balloy in December, 1880, was a relatively impartial observer of the Japanese scene, as his painstaking and extremely fair-minded analysis of the new penal code and code of criminal procedure showed.[50] Nevertheless, despite his friendly relations with members of the Japanese Government and Foreign Office, he never felt able to give more than vague assurances of French sympathy in replyto Japanese appeals for advice and encouragement.

49.) C.C.Tokyo. I bis. Nov.24,1880. Barthélemy St. Hilaire to Balloy. Formal rejection, however, was only conveyed to Inoue in December, 1881. See C.P.Japon. XXVIII, Dec.8,1881. Roquette to Gambetta. Inoue's proposals had gone beyond what he suggested in early 1880. Owing partly to pressure from public and colleagues, and partly to the completion of a new penal code and a code of criminal instruction, he decided to extend the scope of Treaty Revision to extraterritoriality as well as tariffs.
50.) C.P.Japon. XXVIII, July 29,1881. Roquette to Barthélemy St. Hilaire.

His assurances, moreover, were always coupled with admonitions to be patient and to be content with minor improvements for the next twenty years at least. From the first he urged Japan to adopt a less demanding position and to appeal to the Powers for understanding of her progress and needs, but the fact that he himself, after making all these points to a disillusioned Itō in August, 1881, called them "consolations banales" suggests that he really had little confidence in the efficacy of such methods.[51] His one concrete proposal, which he made in conjunction with his British and German colleagues, was a European conference on Treaty Revision, but though this was welcomed by Inoue, by the time Itō and Terashima, the two Councillors specially concerned, had come to a decision in August, 1881, the whole project had been brought to naught by the opposition of the British and German Governments.[52] However, the idea of a European conference can hardly be regarded as a significant break in French policy. In regretting the decision of the European Cabinets Roquette wrote: "Si mes collègues et moi croyons qu'il eût été préférable de negocier en Europe, c'était pour tâcher d'arriver à donner le moins possible et contenter cependant les Delegués du Japon, tandis qu'ici, il est plus que douteux que nous arrivions à une entente."

51.) C.P.Japon. XXVIII.Aug.10,1881. See also Ibid, March 2,1881; Ibid, March 18, 1881. All Roquette to Barthélemy St. Hilaire.
52.) C.P.Japon. XXVIII. July 1,1881; Ibid, Aug.10,1881. Roquette to Barthélemy St. Hilaire.

En effet, dans la future révision, il s'agit seulement de faire des concessions - nous n'avons rien à attendre puisqu'on n'a rien à nous offrir - il fallait donc avec beaucoup de courtoisie et d'empressement exalter les progrès des dix dernières années et assigner comme récompense tel abandon de nos droits dans une limite prévue et arrêtée à l'avance. L'amour-propre est ici le grand mobile de tous les hommes d'Etat, et, se trouvant en Europe, ravis d'un compliment sorti de la bouche d'une personnage illustre, ils eussent exigé bien moins et eussent préféré la satisfaction d'une louange à la réalité d'une concession."[53]

Roquette's attitude offered no great hopes for Japanese aspirations but at least it was not overtly hostile. The next minister, Tricou, who arrived in June, 1882, was opposed even to the suggestion that the treaties should not be regarded as permanent.[54] In common with his colleagues, he was prepared to accept minor tariff concessions and the introduction of mixed tribunals in commercial matters, but these socalled concessions were to be hedged around in his scheme of things with conditions, and would, moreover, only be granted if foreigners were permitted to travel in the interior for purposes of trade.[55] To take this position was tantamount to rejection of the possibility of Treaty Revision, since the Japanese Government would gain a mere fraction of ~~her Government's~~ its demands, while in return it would give up its sole commercial bargaining-counter, and render itself open to the accusation

53.) C.P.Japon. XXVIII. Aug.10,1881. Roquette to Barthélemy St. Hilaire.
54.) C.P.Japon. XXVIII. July 15,1882. Tricou to Freycinet.
55.) C.C.Tokyo. II bis, Aug.141882. Tricou to Duclerc.

that it was endangering national independence.[56]

During Tricou's stay in Japan France maintained her position as the most obstinate of the major Powers, but with his sudden transfer to China in mid-1883, French policy was to swing briefly to the other extreme. This swing, however, was not due to any personal factor but to the outbreak of hostilities involving French and Chinese in Annam. It was, in fact, Paris which initiated the change of attitude, when in June, in the hope of securing some form of Japanese assistance, it decided to offer to renounce the principle of the Treaty's permanence, to return to Japan gradually the right to impose administrative regulations binding on foreigners without diplomatic intervention, and to negotiate a separate commercial agreement, all of which ideas had received a hostile reception from Tricou.[57] The French action was all the more significant in that it was taken, not only without consultation with Britain, but in the knowledge that it would undermine British

56.) Oka, in his previously cited essay, "Kokuminteki Dokuritsu to Kokka Risei," pp.14-17, stresses the fact that all sections of opinion in Japan showed a similar consciousness of Japanese inferiority to foreigners at this time, and the fear of economic or political domination from outside was strong enough in a large number of the Government's critics for them to oppose immediate mixed residence in the interior even in exchange for the abolition of extraterritoriality.
57.) At the end of 1882 the Quai had itself endorsed Tricou's reservations on both points. C.C.Tokyo. II bis. Nov.24,1882. It informed Tokyo of its changed attitude in July. C.P.Japon. XXIX. July6,1883. Challemel-Lacour to Viel-Castel. See also JKKNGB, Vol.II., documents 292-302, pp.918-969. The latter consist mainly of reports by Hachisuka and Marshall, in one of which it is stated that the change of attitude was only arrived at after the Commercial ~~Political~~ Department of the Quai d'Orsay was subjected to considerable pressure by the Political Department. Ibid. p.924. Nothing of this dispute is visible in the French archives, unfortunately.

Treaty Revision strategy.[58] Even if in substance France made no concession that could not be reversed if other Powers did not follow suit, it was the first initiative in Japan's favour which she had taken and was not without some influence on the Governments of Belgium, Holland, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, which hitherto, at least, had adopted a detached attitude. All these Powers, in fact, expressed approval of the German Government's compromise circular of July 4.[59] With other Powers more or less sympathetic also, Britain, by the end of 1883, was forced to modify her position to the extent of accepting that the new commercial treaties should be denunciable after ten or twelve years, providing that Japan had been opened to foreigners for a period of perhaps three years before notice of termination was given.[60]

58.) Britain had moved further from its late 1870's position than had France up to this point and had, in the 1882 preliminary revision conferences in Tokyo, collaborated with Germany in the drafting of a tariff project which would have gone some way towards meeting Japanese objections on the score of low import duties. However, commercial expediency dictated that her liberalism should go only so far, and in a circular of April 16, 1883, she attempted to secure the prior agreement of the Powers to her proposal that the new treaties should be unlimited in duration, Ibid. p.922.
59.) Jōyaku Kaisei Keika Gaiyō, p.203. It was claimed at the time by Marshall that the French attitude had stimulated the German action also. JKKNGB, vol.II, p.929, Marshall to Itō. July 19,1883.
60.) Ibid.p.832. Mori to Inoue, via Hanabusa, Dec 13, 1883.

This slight success proved less important than it might have been because the French change of attitude had sprung not from any basic re-alignment of policy towards Japan but from a temporary panic due to events in Indo-China. When it was found that the situation could be contained and that, in any case, Japan was anxious not to risk China's enmity, the traditional negative stand was, as far as was decently possible, resumed. This was indicated by the Quai as early as July, when in its reply to the British Note, it stated that it did not accept the argument that the new commercial treaties might be unilaterally denounced by Japan, and showed strong signs of reverting to the policy of entente with Britain.[61] Sienkiewicz himself was even more decided. His observation in November, 1883, that "nous avons accordé au Japon des concessions très-importantes dans la question de la révision des traités et nous n'avons obtenu, en échange, que le témoignage de la crainte que l'Empire Chinois inspire aux Ministres du Mikado"[62] did not augur well for Japan. The feeling that Japan had not responded to French generosity as she ought, and, possibly, the hope

61.) See the dispatch of July 7,1883, from Challemel-Lacour to Comte d'Aunay, French chargé d'affaires in London, enclosure 1, Marshall to Itō July 19,1883, Ibid.pp. 933-5. From a talk between Marshall and Clavery, the Commercial Director at the Quai d'Orsay it would seem that the main reason for the swift appearance of second thoughts was the hostility of the Commercial Department, which had immediate control over Revision policy. Enclosure, Hachisuka to Inoue, Oct.5,1883. Sienkiewicz to Challemel-Lacour Ibid. p.974-8

62.) C.P.Japon. XXIX. Nov.7, 1883. Sienkiewicz to Challemel-Lacour.

63.) Ibid.

that she might yet perceive what she stood to gain, appear to have persuaded the French Minister that France's interests would best be served by his leaving the initiative on Treaty Revision to Inoue and then discovering objections to Japan's proposals which had previously been overlooked.[63] His determination to resist further concession was reinforced by the fact that Germany had now taken the lead in encouraging Japan.

"Accepter les propositions Allemandes, c'est à dire fixer, dès maintenant, l'époque où les traités pourraient être dénoncés dans leur ensemble par le Japon," he wrote in December, 1883, "ce serait non seulement compromettre les intérêts de nos nationaux, mais servir l'influence de l'Allemagne qui, ayant pris l'initiative de cette concession exorbitante, serait nécessairement seule à en tirer les bénéfices qu'elle peut avoir en vue."[64]

He saw no injustice to Japan in this line of procedure. Like Balloy he believed that the Japanese leaders had themselves raised the Treaty Revision question as a means of gaining popularity. In reply to the German claim that revolution might result from continued intransigence, Sienkiewicz maintained that the Meiji Government would not dare to stir up agitation when they themselves might well be the victims.[65]

The main way in which Sienkiewicz implemented this policy was to demand compensation for the concessions expected of France. In particular, he continually insisted that the export

63.) Ibid.
64.) C.C.Tokyo.III. Dec.30,1883. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
65.) Ibid.

duty on silk be abolished. In itself this was not a claim which was particularly unwelcome to the Japanese. Some loss of revenue would be involved but this would be offset by higher import duties, and in any case there was advantage to be gained from improving the balance of trade by boosting silk exports and encouraging domestic production. The snag lay in the French requirement that Inoue should announce the abolition before or during the approaching Revision conference. If Japan agreed to this, she ran the risk of incurring similar demands from other Powers, all of whom had agreed to accept the import tariff worked out in 1882 but might be expected to resent any special treatment for France. Great efforts were made by Inoue and Hachisuka to persuade France to be content with a verbal guarantee that would bind Japan morally but would not have the character of legal obligation which could be regarded as an acceptance of foreign interference with Japan's export tariffs. These efforts were in vain. Although Sienkiewicz, Ferry and Freycinet relaxed France's demands slightly with regard both to form and timing, the essential feature remained - Japan must publicly state her intention to abolish the duties at a session of the Revision conference.[66]

66.) Sienkiewicz was not sent full powers to take part in a Revision conference until Inoue agreed. For the various stages of argument see C.P.Japon. XXIX,Dec,1883; C.P.Japon,May 3,1884; C.C.Tokyo,III, June9,1884; Ibid, July 11,1884; Ibid. July 31,1889; Ibid, Aug.22,1884; C.C.Tokyo, IV, Dec.13,1884; Ibid, Dec.15,1884; Ibid, Dec.19,1884;Ibid, Jan.28,1885; Ibid,Feb.13,1885; Ibid,Feb,17, 1885; Ibid, May4,1886; Ibid, May,6,1886; Ibid,May 19,1886; Ibid, May 28,1886. See also JKKNGB vol.II, pp.1027-1073.

In the end Inoue did make a declaration, though not until 1886, when a new series of Revision conferences was being held,[67] and fortunately for Japan there were no repercussions, possibly because the representatives of other Powers were too exhausted by the negotiations to wish to reopen the one question that had finally been solved. This piece of good luck, however, had nothing to do with French diplomatic tact. Throughout these years, France persisted in adding this extra complexity to the enormous problems faced by Inoue even when the hope of using Treaty Revision to secure Japanese support against China had disappeared and even though the silk duty removal was far from essential to the French silk industry.

Part of France's reluctance to dispense with a public undertaking on this question may have been due to the suspicion that once Japan had secured her increased import tariff she might find some excuse for not implementing a merely moral obligation, but the main reason was undoubtedly that Japan's obvious reluctance to acquiesce in her demand provided France with a valuable tactical advantage in her policy of avoiding further concession. As has been seen, this policy was determined by

67.) C.C.Tokyo. IV. June 9,1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. The declaration was made on June 8, in reply to a question from Sienkiewicz. Since, however, the negotiations broke down next year and the old import tariff remained in force, the silk export duty was not removed after all. It is one measure of the length of the Treaty Revision negotiations that before they ended the French and Japanese silk industries had so changed that the abolition of the duty was opposed by France as a possible threat to the silk-reeling section of the French industry. See Hanotaux' instructions to Harmand, C.P.Japon. XXXIX, June 9,1894

political as well as commercial considerations, and much of the tenacity with which it was held was due to this fact. Repeatedly the claim was made by Sienkiewicz that Treaty Revision had become a question of influence: France had nothing to gain from following her rivals but rather would win the respect of Japan for her consistent display of independence.[68]

In reality, however, France's position was not completely independent. She felt the need to buttress herself by reaching a new entente with Britain, the Power least likely to abandon her rights in Japan,[69] and when Plunkett, the Minister who had replaced Parkes, showed a disposition to moderate his demands in order to end the continual negotiations, France was forced to modify

68.) See e.g. C.P.Japon. XXX. July 31,1884, where Sienkiewicz wrote to Ferry that since "les concessions exagérées que nous pourrions faire, seraient plutôt attribuées à l'influence exercée sur nous par les autres puissances, nous devons, ce me semble, maintenir strictement les principes que nous devons défendre et les demandes que nous avons formulées. C'est, à un autre point de vue, l'unique moyen de ne pas perdre en considération aux yeux des Japonais." It is hardly surprising, in view of this attitude, that Treaty Revision took Japan so long to achieve.
69.) For Sienkiewicz's reasoning, see C.C.Tokyo.III. May 25,1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry. In reality, a working understanding proved impossible to achieve, but the ideal remained as a sort of general guideline.

her own position.[70]

The limitations which fear of isolation placed on French action were shown clearly in the 1886-7 Tokyo conferences which led up to Inoue's failure and resignation. After a good many changes of strategy the Japanese Foreign Minister had felt compelled by feelings within the country to attempt simultaneous revision of both the commercial and jurisdictional sides of the Treaties. This did not suit the French minister, who, though relatively little concerned about tariff charges, was extremely reluctant to countenance any concessions in the more fundamental matter of extraterritoriality, and had already proposed in vain, early in 1886, that the two matters be treated separately.[71]

70.) Her weakness was recognised by Sienkiewicz when, after claiming to detect an Anglo-German entente in Far Eastern affairs in 1886, he advised: "Et, dès lors, il s'agit, en ce qui touche la question de la révision, de ne pas montrer d'un moindre libéralisme que les autres Puissances, tout en nous réservant de proposer des amendements sérieux aux projets soumis à la Conférence. Une attitude différente de notre part n'entraverait probablement pas la marche des choses. Les Puissances, malgré notre opposition, concluraient avec le Japon des traités auxquels nous serions obligés de souscrire nous-mêmes dans un temps plus ou moins éloignés". C.P.Japon. XXXII. Aug.4,1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. The Quai d'Orsay expressed identical feelings later the same month. C.C.Tokyo.V. Aug.27,1886. Freycinet to Sienkiewicz. It should perhaps be added that no Power could maintain a completely independent position, both because of the difficulties her nationals might face in Japan and because, as Marshall observed in 1883, the European Powers "have always regarded the revision of the treaties with Japan as a question which concerns them collectively, as an element of the dealings of Europe with Asia." JKKNGB. vol.II. p.992.

71.) C.P.Japon. XXXII. Jan.28,1886; C.C.Tokyo.IV. Jan.30,1886 both Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. Sienkiewicz believed that Inoue would personally have been content at this stage with a commercial treaty only. C.P.Japon. XXXI Nov.31,1885. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.

He was more than dubious about the standard of justice that could be expected from the promised Japanese law courts and was specially anxious to preserve the strong foreign position in the ports already open.[72] In May, 1886, for instance, he alone opposed strongly the German-supported Japanese proposal to have the consular courts apply Japanese laws where the penalty was less than 5,000 francs fine or 5 years in prison.[73] When, however, in June, agreement was reached between Germany and Britain based on an earlier Japanese declaration, and France became isolated, Sienkiewicz decided to make a tactical retreat by making known that he was sympathetic towards the principle of the plan if not to the plan itself.[74] This was admittedly in accord with the strategy he had mapped out the previous month of avoiding blame for the breakdown of negotiations while seeking to modify or nullify any proposals which he considered dangerous. However, such a strategy proved unworkable when France was unable to find another Power or group of Powers to align with; and, when, during late 1886 and early 1887, the details of the new project were being thrashed out, Sienkiewicz discovered that he was alone in maintaining his former position virtually intact.

72.) See e.g. C.P.Japon. XXIX. Feb.9,1884; Sienkiewicz to Ferry. C.C.Tokyo.IV. Aug.29,1885. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
73.) C.C.Tokyo.IV.May 16,1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. Foreign Minister Freycinet telegraphed that Japanese laws could onlybe made applicable if first approved by the Powers. Ibid. May 21,1886.
74.) C.C.Tokyo. IV. June 24,1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.

Not only was he forced to admit, as early as June, 30,1886, that the abandonment of consular jurisdiction was a political necessity,[75] but in the detailed discussion of the mixed courts which were to replace it he was unable to secure from Japan what he considered a proper recognition of France's importance. Supported by Plunkett, Inoue refused in November to accept French as an official language in Japan's new courts. When Sienkiewicz stated that he could only accept the unfavourable vote of the Conference under an ad referendum formula, he was attempting to set an example which, if followed by other Powers, could have made the Conference's work meaningless. He was challenged, however, by the impatient British Minister, who thus encouraged the Japanese delegates to act firmly. As Sienkiewicz described it, they "poussèrent les choses à l'extrême et déclarèrent qu'ils suspendraient les réunions de la Conférence jusqu'au jour où je serais en mesure de donner une réponse formelle à la Conférence sur la question des langues. Faisant alors ressortir ce qu'il y avait d'anormal dans le procédé auquel on avait recours, je donnais les votes que je n'étais pas libre de refuser... Dire à un délégué étranger qu'on suspendra, à cause de lui, les réunions d'une Conférence," he resentfully added, "n'est-ce point dire également qu'on fera retomber sur lui les conséquences de cette mesure et n'est-ce point, par suite, exercer sur ce délégué une pression morale caractérisée."[76]

Thereafter, Sienkiewicz adopted the policy of voting for every conference decision, even those to which he publicly objected, hoping thus to make the other delegates aware that he was

75.) C.C.Tokyo. IV. June 30,1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
76.) C.C.Tokyo. V. Dec.28,1886. Sienkiewicz to Flourens.

re-introducing the ad referemdum formula in another guise.[77] His claim that this had made Inoue reconsider his earlier attitude was to some extent justified by the Japanese readiness to promise France a generous share in the allocation by nationality of foreign judges to serve in Japanese courts.[78] Nevertheless, the fact that Sienkiewicz, despite his Government's expressed displeasure at Japanese methods, dared not risk a disruption of the Conference indicated that France was unlikely to stand out against its completed decisions unless she could find an ally among the other Great Powers.

As it turned out, France was delivered from the necessity of choosing between unpopular isolation and ignominious retreat by an unexpected development. When Inoue's new plans for mixed tribunals with foreign judges, submission of Japan's new codes to foreign approval, and the complete opening of Japan, were leaked, first to other members of the Meiji Government, and then to the politically-conscious public, opposition began

77.) C.C.Tokyo. V. Jan.30,1887. Sienkiewicz to Flourens.

78.) C.C.Tokyo. V. March 22,1887. Sienkiewicz to Flourens.

to grow alarmingly within Japan itself.[79] The fear that the independence of the nation was being threatened combined with existing political rivalries both to undermine Inoue's support within the Cabinet and to bring about the resurgence of organised opposition to the Government.[80] Inoue endeavoured to meet the objection that he was yielding Japan's sovereign rights to foreigners by attempting to withdraw the provision for a foreign veto on the Japanese codes, but this not only met with opposition on the part of the Foreign Representatives but was far from sufficient to satisfy either those critics who realised that the Western Powers would concede little at that juncture and

79.) Inoue had kept his negotiations secret even from Yamada, the Minister of Justice. See Shimomura, "Jōyaku Kaisei", p.82. It is generally agreed that the source of the original leakage was Boissonade, who objected to the employment of foreign judges in Japanese courts and the necessity for seeking foreign approval for legal codes which were primarily designed to suit Japan. Although his hostility may have derived from resentment at the idea of his own work being tampered with, he was able to present an argument which was convincing to several members of the Government. His memorandum on the subject can be found in Yoshino Sakuzō (ed), Meiji Bunka Zenshū (Collection of Materials illustrating various aspects of the Meiji Period) vol.VI. Gaikō-hen (Diplomacy), Tokyo, 1928, pp.447-471. It was secretly published and, together with the memorandum of Tani Kanjō, an oligarch from Tosa, who resigned from the Government over this issue, provided the opposition with useful ammunition against Inoue's proposals. See Inoue Kiyoshi, Jōyaku Kaisei, pp.112-117.

80.) Most of the leaders of the earlier opposition parties, plus some right-wing nationalists, came together briefly under the nominal leadership of Gotō Shōjirō in the Daidō Danketsu. See Ibid, pp.119-138.

therefore advised that Treaty Revision be postponed until Japan had proved the extent of her progress or those opponents who claimed to believe that the 1858 Treaties could be denounced unilaterally.[81] As a result Inoue adjourned the Conference sine die on July 19,1887, and a month later admitted defeat by resigning.[82]

81.) The first alternative was forcefully propounded in Tani's lengthy memorandum, which he presented to the Emperor on Aug.9. 1887, and which was translated by the French Legation in 1888. C.P.Japon. XXXIII, Jan 22, 1888. Bourgarel to Flourens. The demand for unilateral denunciation was made many times by Japanese newspapers, but in the 1880's it was not taken seriously by diplomats. see e.g. C P.Japon. XXX. May 1,1884. Sienkiewicz to Ferry.
82.) It was stated by Sienkiewicz in 1889 that Itō had been deeply involved inInoue's resignation, just as in that of Ōkuma later: "De toutes ces complications, ce qui ressort de la manière la plus nette, c'est le but que poursuit le Comte Itō. En 1886, il prêtait tout son appui au projet de révision élaboré par le Comte Ino-ouye. Ce même appui, il ne l'a point marchandé, dans l'origine, au Comte Okuma. Mais, dans un cas comme dans l'autre,cet appui s'est transformé en opposition aussi ténace que dissimulée au moment précis où paraissaient s'évanouir les graves difficultés que rencontrait la conclusion de nouveaux Traités." C.C.Tokyo.VI. Nov.1,1889. Whether Ito's actions were due to the fear of being overshadowed by a Foreign Minister who achieved Treaty Revision, as Sienkiewicz insinuated, or whether they should be attributed to his sensitivity to the changing mood of public opinion, must remain an open question. It may be worth adding that the French chargé d'affaires, Bourgarel, expected Itō to be replaced by Kuroda as Prime Minister at any moment. When this occurred in May,1888, both he and the Russian Minister congratualted themselves on what they regarded as a Chōshū defeat. See C.P.Japon. XXXIII. Sept.19,1887; Bourgarel to Flourens; Ibid, May 6,1888; Ibid, June 2,1888, both Bourgarel to Goblet.

Inoue's resignation was obviously caused primarily by his failure to gauge the strength of anti-foreign feeling and fears and the extent to which the Government's authority had declined.[83] Nevertheless it is possible that he might have succeeded in securing a limited measure of Treaty Revision if he could have got an agreement signed before the political parties had recovered from their 1884 collapse and before the country began to react against the "Europeanisation" policy which the Government fostered in the middle 1880's. That an agreement did not emerge was largely due to the conservatism of the European Powers and among them France was pre-eminent in obstructiveness. In August, 1885, Sienkiewicz had outlined his attitude of Treaty Revision:

"Je dois, d'ailleurs, rappeler ici, une fois de plus, que tous mes collègues sont disposés à faire aux Japonais des concessions plus larges que celles que nous leur accordons. Je sais, même, qu'on me reproche de retarder la solution de la question de la révision par les difficultés que je soulève en ce qui touche la juridiction. La marche que j'ai suivie jusqu'à ce jour, me paraît, cependant, s'expliquer d'une manière très-simple : convaincu qu'au point de vue politique, nous n'avons pas intérêt à rester tout-à-fait en dehors de ce mouvement qui porte les Puissances à faire des concessions aux Japonais, je m'attache à modérer dans la mesure du possible ce que ces concessions pourraient avoir d'exagéré, me réservant de faire une opposition très-ferme aux mesures qui nous seraient directement nuisibles."[84]

Except for the brief swing in 1883 this was the line of policy

83.) In this connection it may be noted that in 1891 Sienkiewicz claimed that the Meiji Government would have been able to control the Diet if it had established it before 1887, while its prestige was still high. C.P.Japon. XXXV, April 10,1891, Sienkiewicz to Ribot.
84.) C.C.Tokyo. IV. Aug.29,1885. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.

which French diplomats attempted to follow throughout the Inoue period. Whether France had much influence on the course of Treaty Revision is open to question, but there can be no doubt that what influence she did have was directed towards delaying the negotiations and extracting concessions which a Japanese Foreign Minister could ill afford.

c) The Third Phase, 1889-1896.

For Japan, the resignation of Inoue, though of great importance politically, did not clearly mark the end of the second phase of Treaty Revision, since Ōkuma, Inoue's eventual successor, though he adopted different tactics and a less accommodating manner,[85] took as the basis of Japan's demands a project substantially similar to that of his predecessor. It was not until he too had been forced to resign as a result of popular attack and weakening of Cabinet support, and the opening of the Diet had become imminent, that the Japanese Government decided, in February 1890, that it must brave the hostility of the Powers and demand the abolition of extraterritorality with no legal guarantee other than the evidence of Japan's progress. For French diplomacy, however, the turning-point came sooner, in the first three months of 1889. It was not until then that France was involved in Treaty Revision again since Ōkuma had preferred to negotiate separately with those countries which were more favourable to

85.) Apart from executing the Treaties literally in a number of ways which damaged foreign interests, Ōkuma was much blunter than Inoue. See Sienkiewicz's complaints to Spuller in C.C.Tokyo VI. July 6, 1889.

Japan's desires or which were too important to be ignored. France's reputation obviously meant that she would only be approached at the last.

Sienkiewicz's first reaction to the new approach was to hope that either Britain or Germany would seek an entente with France, but his main preoccupation was with preventing France from being isolated,[86] and when, in March, the Foreign Office did approach the Quai in the hope of rallying it to support its reservations on Ōkuma's project, Sienkiewicz advised against cooperation.[87] He was influenced partly by his experience with Plunkett in the mid-1880's, which led him to believe that Britain would leave France isolated again if, for political or commercial reasons, she decided on a policy of concession, but also by his conviction that consular jurisdiction was doomed to imminent abolition and that it was more realistic for France to resign herself to the loss of jurisdictional rights and concentrate on securing substantial compensation on the commercial side. In May the Quai d'Orsay expressed its complete agreement with these recommendations.[88]

It is impossible to single out any one factor as decisive in this reversal of the old French attitude. Undoubtedly the old fear of isolation was present still, and the disposition to concession which it encouraged was reinforced, momentarily at least by the advice of the Russian Minister, who, in accordance with his

86.) C.C.Tokyo. VI. Jan.12,1889. Sienkiewicz to Goblet.
87.) C.C.Tokyo. VI. March 16,1889, Spuller to Sienkiewicz; Ibid. March 18.1889, Sienkiewicz to Spuller.
88.) C.C.Tokyo. VI. May 4,1889. Spuller to Sienkiewicz.

Government's policy of removing Japanese distrust, urged Sienkiewicz, in 1889, to execute a master stroke of diplomacy by accepting the Japanese project without reserve.[89] On a different level the influence of Japan's modernisation was also important. By May, 1889, Sienkiewicz had mellowed sufficiently to be able to urge: "Ne négligeons donc rien pour n'être pas les derniers à signer l'émancipation du seul peuple de tout l'Orient qui se soit attaché sérieusement, de son mieux, suivant ses forces et ses moyens, à s'assimiler la civilisation occidentale."[90] Nevertheless, to attribute great importance to admiration of such developments as the establishment of a Diet would probably be a mistake.[91] Much more fundamental, especially after the 1890 army manoeuvres, seems to have been the realisation that modernisation had endowed Japan with a new strength which could not lightly be ignored.[92] It was in this context primarily that the establishment of constitutionalism in Japan affected Treaty Revision. With an elected Parliament imminent, France was forced

89.) C.C.Tokyo. VI. May 18,1889. Sienkiewicz to Spuller. There is no evidence, however, that Russia attempted to put pressure on French policy towards Japan in any way.
90.) Ibid.
91.) On the eve of the promulgation of the Constitution, Sienkiewicz admitted that Japan had made astonishing progress in government, and even added "on serait tente de croire qu'ils vont résoudre les grands problèmes politiques qui s'agitent depuis si longtemps en Europe." But he maintained that in demanding a Constitution the "enlightened classes" had given evidence of suffering from illusions or vanity, and that the existing system was quite satisfactory. C.P.Japon. XXXIV, Feb.4,1889. Sienkiewicz to Goblet.
92.) See e.g. C.P.Japon. XXXIX. Jan.4,1894. Sienkiewicz to Casimir-Périer, in which Sienkiewicz criticised Europe for not taking Japan more seriously.

to anticipate the possibility that the Emperor's authority might be weakened and [redacted] the Government [redacted] replaced by a party cabinet or forced to bow to popular passions, thus presenting the Powers with the unpleasant alternative either of employing force or of giving up their rights without a struggle. [93.] These factors, together with the more uncompromising diplomatic approach of Ōkuma and the realisation that, with the possible exception of Britain, no other Power was likely to resist for long the demands of a nation which might soon play an important role in the Far Eastern situation, all made it inevitable that France would sooner or later choose the less dangerous course of concession. What was surprising was the flexibility she displayed in altering her tactics. Not only did she switch her emphasis to commercial matters [94.] but some care was taken to inform the Japanese Government of France's willingness to negotiate. [95.] Japan could thus concentrate on Britain, conscious that the main decision had been taken by France and that she could be more or less ignored for the time being. In these circumstances, France's influence on the final phase of Treaty Revision was even less than in the preceding period. The principal features worthy

93. This was Sienkiewicz's reasoning in C.P. Japon. XXXIV, Feb. 4, 1889. Sienkiewicz to Goblet.

94. This was first suggested by Sienkiewicz in March, 1889. C.C. Tokyo. VI. March 18, 1889. It was confirmed in June by Spuller, when he instructed his representative to concern himself "principalement à obtenir un traité avantageux au point de vue commercial." Ibid. June 26, 1889. It was frequently

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of note were the rejection of co-operation with Britain and the stubbornness of France's bargaining within the limits she considered realistic, but neither can be regarded as having any special importance, and in terms of their influence on events they probably cancelled each other out.

The French unwillingness to align themselves with Britain certainly weakened the latter's stand to some extent. It meant that she had to shoulder the main burden of resistance and risk the rupture of friendly relations with Japan at a time when her position in the Far East seemed threatened by the Russian decision to go ahead with the Trans-Siberian railway. Had Britain been able to secure an understanding with France, other European Powers might have been attracted to her. She might then have expected that some of Japan's resentment would be diverted towards them. It was not surprising, therefore, that she made overtures to France on at least three occasions during these years. The first, as has been seen, was in March,

94. (Contd. from previous page.)....reiterated in succeeding years.

95. See C.C. Tokyo VI. Feb. 23, (1889) Sienkiewicz to Goblet

C.C. Tokyo IX March 30, 1894. Casimir-Périer to Sienkiewicz.

1889, when the attempt failed because of Sienkiewicz's distrust.[96] The Quai d'Orsay did not actually question this, but in July of the same year it urged its representative to concert with his British colleague over the treaty signed by Ōkuma with Mexico. This treaty challenged the European interpretation of their most-favoured-nation clauses by opening the interior to Mexicans in return for recognition of Japan's right of jurisdiction. Sienkiewicz was far from happy about Ōkuma's claim that the most-favoured-nation treatment might be conditional, and he made verbal reservations about the treaty,[98] but he declined to make a written protest in combination with the British chargé d'affaires. Although informed by the Quai that Fraser was empowered to act in common,[99] Sienkiewicz maintained that Britain appeared to wish to act alone in the matter.[100] Since at the same time he claimed that strong action might seriously compromise France, it seems more than likely that his assessment of Fraser's attitude was a highly subjective one. Once again, however, his judgement was accepted by the Quai without question.

96. C.C. Tokyo. VI. March 18, 1889. Sienkiewicz to Spullet.
97. C.C. Tokyo VI. July 27, 1889. Spullet to Sienkiewicz.
98. C.C. Tokyo. VI. July 21 1889. Sienkiewicz to Spullet.
99. C.C. Tokyo. VI. Aug. 1, 1889. Spullet to Sienkiewicz.
100. C.C. Tokyo. VI. Aug. 5. 1889. Sienkiewicz to Spullet.

The possibility of an Anglo-French entente was raised again in January, 1890, on this occasion by Fraser, but his initiative withered in the face of Sienkiewicz's bitter memories of the mid-eighties. [101.] One more attempt was made in June, when Lord Salisbury requested French support for his counter-project, [102.] but even though Japan's terms were by then much higher than in January, Sienkiewicz still discouraged the idea, this time on the ground that the British project was not a practical basis for negotiation. [103.] Once again the Quai d'Orsay accepted his reasoning and this third failure brought Britain's efforts to an end. France herself made no attempt to concert her attitude with other Powers, and the main interest from 1890 lies in the tactics she employed in bargaining with Japan. Because of the decision of Ōkuma and succeeding Foreign Ministers, to deal with the Powers separately, concentrating first on Britain, most of this bargaining took place after July 1894. There were, it is true, serious negotiations in 1889 with Ōkuma, and it even seemed probable that a treaty would be achieved, [104.] but Ōkuma was forced to

101. C.C. Tokyo. VI. Jan. 22, 1890. Sienkiewicz to Spuller.
102. C.C. Tokyo. VII. June 14, 1890. Ribot to Sienkiewicz.
103. C.C. Tokyo. VII. July 30, 1890. Sienkiewicz to Ribot.
104. This was stated in the review of the history of Treaty Revision which prefaced Hanotaux's instructions to Harmand in 1894. C.P. Japon. XXXIX. C.C. Tokyo. VI. July 6, 1889. Sienkiewicz to Spuller.

resign before the final bargaining sessions could take place and a treaty signed in 1889 would, in any case, have involved fewer changes than one signed after the Diet had been inaugurated. Thereafter, only tentative approaches, evidently with the end of discovering if there was any change in the French attitude, were made until August, 1894, when, following the signing of the British treaty in the preceding month, negotiation of a new treaty was definitely undertaken by Mutsu.[105] By this time Sienkiewicz had been succeeded by Harmand, who, despite his pro-Japanese inclinations, was in no hurry to open discussions. Though it was impossible for him not to be aware that the state of feeling in Japan made it impossible for Treaty Revision to be postponed indefinitely, he did anticipate that a certain degree of hesitation in coming to terms might prove useful in securing special advantages.[106] In the event, he was not mistaken. Mutsu's complaint in March 1895, that "Japan's tariff proposals are already more favourable to France than to any other Power,"[107] attested to the success

105. There were some brief exchanges between Aoki and Sienkiewicz at the start of 1890, between Enomoto and Collin de Plancy in Jan. 1892, and between Mutsu and Sienkiewicz in March, 1894. See C.C. Tokyo. VI. March 7, 1890; C.C. Tokyo VII. March 25, 1890; C.C. Tokyo. VIII Jan. 17, 1892; C.C. Tokyo IX. May 18. 1894.
106. C,C. Tokyo. IX. Aug. 17, 1894. Harmand to Hanotaux.
107. JKKNGB, vol. IV, p.718. Mutsu to Sone, March 7, 1895. Sone was Japanese Minister in Paris, where the bulk of the arduous negotiations eventually took place. They can be followed in some detail in Ibid. pp653-818.

of France's tough negotiating, yet more than a year was still to elapse before agreement was reached. In the meantime France pressed for further concessions, in particular for reductions on the proposed import duties for woolen muslins, wines and perfumes. Her demands for commercial compensations of this kind, however, were strongly contested by Mutsu, who feared the repercussions that they might have on Powers with greater interests in Japan's import trade, In the end, however, a compromise agreement was reached, and the new treaty signed on August 4, 1896. It might well have taken longer but for a secret arrangement that Japan would buy warships from France. Warship orders had been linked with Treaty Revision in the French view since 1894, when they received considerable emphasis in Harmand's instructions, [108.] and on several occasions in 1895 and 1896 hints had been dropped to the Japanese Government that if treated favourably on this score France might be disposed to generosity on other matters. [109.] In April, 1896, there was a suggestion of possible success when, on the basis of

108. The Quai d'Orsay believed that it had received a raw deal over the 1893 naval orders. C.P. Japon. XXXIX. June 9, 1894. Hanotaux to Harmand. Instructions.
109. In Nov., 1895, Harmand made known to the Foreign and Navy Ministers that France would consider that she had been badly treated if she did not receive her share of the coming orders. Until this point, he wrote to Hanotaux, he hesitated to "faire comprendre plus clairement au Ministre lui-même que je pouvais concevoir une certaine correlation entre la signature de notre traité et les commandes de matériel naval à donner à l'industrie française." C.C. Tokyo, X, Nov. 14, 1895. The Quai itself raised the question in Jan., 1896, with Sone, who stated that such matters could only be dealt with in Tokyo. In his report home, however, Sone observed that "if French Government be assured of one at least of ship-building orders, I think it will be easy to conclude the treaty, otherwise it is very difficult to come to understanding without making concessions." J.K.K.N.G.B. vol. IV. p. 758. Sone to Saionji. Jan. 15. 1896.

long interviews on the subject with Prime Minister Itō and Navy Minister Saigō, Harmand telegraphed the Quai to postpone its signature of the new treaty, until it heard from him again.[110] Then, in June, the French Minister reported that orders had been given to the Société des Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée.[111] There was no open admission by Japan that any bargain had been reached and no documentary evidence appears in the voluminous Japanese printed sources, but in view of the heated state of Japanese politics, this is hardly surprising. There seems little doubt that the purchase of French ships shortened the Paris negotiations by some months.

7 The treaty between Japan and France was ratified without difficulty by both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on October 29, 1897, and December 23, 1897 respectively, and came into effect on August 4, 1899.[112] It was substantially the same as the treaties which most of the other Powers had already signed. From the commercial angle, the revised treaties naturally favoured the Powers, but since Japan was free to denounce them after twelve years and since they neither retained

110. C.P. Japon. XIV. April 23, 1896. Harmand to Hanotaux.
111. C.C. Tokyo, X, June 19, 1896. No details are given. It seems likely that the orders concerned either the cruiser Azuma, launched in 1899, or 4 Normand torpedo-boats completed the same year. These were the only ships purchased from French yards between 1895 and 1904. See F.T. Jane, The Imperial Navy of Japan. London, 1904. pp.195-6.
112. The text of the new treaty, together with its protocol and tariff schedule, can be found in JKKNGB, vol.IV, pp.790-804. There was no debate in the Chamber of Deputies; in the Senate a postponement motion was defeated 163 to 78. A report of the debate, in which some Senators complained about the tariff

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an unconditional most-favoured-nation-clause nor any element of extraterritoriality, they were clearly no longer founded on an unequal relationship. By dint of colossal efforts, Meiji diplomacy had finally achieved its first objective. It has been scarcely possible here to outline the main developments of France's attitude towards Treaty Revision, let alone do justice to the extraordinary complexity of the negotiations and the enormous patience and persistence of Japanese diplomacy. Basically, however, France's position was simple. She was well aware of the advantages she enjoyed under the unequal treaties and was only prepared to abandon them when abandonment seemed necessary. The moral question inherent in the situation was ignored, and if the Japanese insisted on introducing it, a moral justification could always be found in the argument that if Japan had really Westernised itself sufficiently for foreigners to be subjected to Japanese jurisdiction, then it would act like a Western country and

112 (Contd. from previous page)... agreement, can be found in Journal Officiel de la République Française, 1897. vol. XII, pp. 1479-82.

allow foreigners to travel, trade, and set up their own establishments anywhere in Japan. [113.] If the basic attitude was simple, however, a considerable amount of fluctuation took place over questions of detail and in some cases the length of the negotiations meant that there might be a complete reversal of attitude towards a particular problem. This was true of silk export duties; it was also partly true of a much more important matter. In 1874 one of Berthemy's main arguments in favour of the complete opening of Japan was that the existing situation compelled foreign merchants "à subir le ruineux intermédiaire des corporations indigènes qui monopolisent, avec l'assistance des autorités, toutes les branches du commerce...." [114.] By 1895 circumstances had so changed that the French vice-consul at Nagasaki, Steenackers, saw the prospect with some regret. "Quant aux commerçants," he wrote, "le droit d'acheter eux-mêmes les soies et autres produits dans l'intérieur, ne fera que leur enlever la garantie que l'acheteur pouvait avoir en opérant avec des intermédiaires Japonais..." [115.]

In conclusion, some reference should be made to an aspect of Treaty Revision which, though it never became an important

113. "C'est lorsque il se prétend entrer sérieusement dans la voie du progrès, lorsque il se targue d'une politique franchement libérale, ...c'est à ce moment qu'on le voit refuser sans raison avouable aux négociants, aux industriels, aux voyageurs étrangers, l'autorisation de s'avancer à plus de six lieux dans l'intérieur du pays." C.P. Japon. XXII, July 27, 1873, Berthemy to Broglie. Berthemy's indignation was not shared by all French diplomats, but his manner of reasoning was. Only fleetingly did any feeling that advantage had been taken of Japan appear, and this feeling was confined to the tariff questio /n

political issue, reveals something of the underlying realities of the question. For many years French representatives interpreted the Treaties to their advantage and did not hesitate to pounce on any Japanese infringement of them, however slight. Yet in 1893, after thirty-five years of treaty relations, Sienkiewicz could write to the Quai d'Orsay:

"Par mes rapports des 24 Juillet et 10 Août, 1885, ...j'ai eu l'honneur d'appeler l'attention du Département, sur l'étrange et dangereux privilège dont jouissent les Français au Japon, de n'être point tenus d'observer les lois de police et de sureté. Ne relevant que du tribunal consulaire, ils ne peuvent évidemment pas être punis de peines prévues par des lois japonaises et ils n'ont point, d'autre part, à redouter les lois de police françaises, l'action de celles-ci ne s'étendant pas au delà du territoire national."116. Clearly it was not only in their provisions but also in their execution that the 'unequal treaties' were unequal.

114. C.P. Japon. XXIV. Jan. 4, 1874. Berthemy to Decazes.
115. C.C. Tokyo. X. Jan. 19, 1895. Harmand to Hanotaux.
116. C.C. Tokyo. IX. April 2, 1893. Sienkiewicz to Develle.

CHAPTER VII.

THE DECLINE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE. 1885 - 1894.

As in previous periods, French policy towards Japan was strongly influenced between 1885 and 1894 by the diplomatic situation in Europe. However, whereas up to 1880 at least, this influence had worked to restrain all her overseas activity, it now helped to turn it, as far as Japan was concerned, in a more positive direction. Until the alliance with Russia was concluded in the early 1890's France remained theoretically isolated against the Triple Alliance, but with her army and defence reorganised, she felt less vulnerable than in the decade immediately following the Franco-Prussian War. A sudden attack by Bismarck was no longer feared. Indeed, the latter had actually courted France's friendship between 1883 and 1885. French hostility towards her recent conqueror, on the other hand, had scarcely diminished, and she sought to combat German influence and increase her own wherever she could. This rivalry was bound to be reflected in French policy towards Japan, since the latter, although showing particular interest in German ideas and values about this time, was an area in which France had a considerable tradition of influence. French concern was increased by the recognition, from about 1890 onwards, that Japan was becoming a military power which could not be

entirely neglected in Far Eastern affairs.[1] An added stimulus was jealousy of England, which, like hatred of Germany, was a constant element in French foreign policy.

Jealousy of other Powers and aspirations to influence were, together with concern for existing privileges, the chief characteristics of French policy in Japan during the first half of this period, but there was one other consideration which, though it operated only from 1890, carried much more weight and made the closing decade of the 19th century a turning point. This was the Franco-Russian alliance, which, though not applicable in theory to the Far East, in practice deprived France of her independent role in Japan. With its appearance, much of what French ministers in Tokyo had been hoping for was made meaningless.

a) The Pursuit of Prestige and Influence.

i) The Religious Protectorate.

1. The first clear recognition of Japan's military potential by a French Minister was in 1890, following the grand manoeuvres to which the Foreign Representatives had been invited. Sienkiewicz was sufficiently impressed to accept that, when the officers trained in Europe reached the higher ranks, the Japanese army "sera une armée redoutable", and he further admitted that "on peut presque affirmer que le Japon est à l'abri d'une invasion." C.P.Japon, XXXIV, April 10, 1890. Sienkiewiez to Ribot. Oddly enough, France, which in 1880 had become the first country to maintain a military attaché in Japan, had just suppressed the position. A new attaché was appointed three years later, however.

Between 1885 and 1894 no major issue of international politics arose to trouble the Far Eastern situation.[2] Japanese foreign policy, based on the caution of Inoue, and the unpreparedness of the military, entered a phase of extreme passivity.[3] Only one political question of any magnitude involving the Powers existed - the perennial one of Treaty Revision.

2. The remarkable stability from 1885 to 1894 came as a surprise to Sienkiewicz, who had seemed to predict new turbulence when in June, 1885 he spoke of the Far Eastern question (the first French use of this term) replacing the Eastern question. C.P. Japon. XXXI. June 29, 1885. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. Surprisingly, the Port Hamilton affair and the Korean problem aroused little interest in Sienkiewicz or the Quai d'Orsay. Indeed, the French Minister showed that he had come full circle when in Jan. 1894, he advised that France had no real interest in Korea and should not get involved in any way. C.P. Japon. XXXIX, Jan. 4, 1894. Sienkiewicz to Casimir-Périer.

3. Some interesting analyses of Japanese policy can be found in the French records. In March, 1886, Sienkiewicz attempted a general survey in which he implied that Japan had, for the sake of her territorial integrity, to maintain good relations with all, since, as he admitted, "Les grandes Puissances sont devenues, dans ces derniers temps, fort envahissantes." Enormous sacrifices, he added, had been made to establish an army and navy, "mais avant que ses forces soient organisées, des incidents peuvent naître. Le Japon est si riche en îles!" C.P.Japon. XXXII, March 1, 1886. A similar view can be found in an earlier report, which also recorded the low opinion of Japan's generals held by the French officers in Japan. C.P. Japon. XXXI. Oct. 8, 1885 Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. During his eleven years of service in Japan Sienkiewicz became aware of the feelings that favoured an entente between Japan and China, but he never believed that such an outcome would materialise. C.P.Japon. XXXV, July 25, 1891 Sienkiewicz to Ribot. A later dispatch suggests that his confidence on this matter was due to his conviction that the two races despised each other. C.P. Japon. XXXIX. Jan.4, Sienkiewicz to Casimir-Périer. Despite this, he continued to believe that peace would be preserved even if China interfered still further in Korean affairs. One reason was the conviction that Britain had been putting pressure on the two countries since 1886 to subordinate their mutual differences

France's attitude in this was motivated partly by commercial interest, partly by habit, and partly by prestige. In this case, however, prestige was conceived in the negative sense of the effect thought to be created on the Japanese mind by France's ability to resist continually all concession to Japan's demands. Moreover, the pattern of Treaty Revision had been set in preceeding years, and attitude to it did not properly represent the growing respect for the new Japan. Had a new political issue arisen, France would probably have been tempted to seek Japanese favour by lending her moral support. In the absence of such an issue France's representatives turned to other spheres, and their concern with religion and education, was, after Treaty Revision, their chief preoccupation between the Franco- Chinese and Sino-Japanese Wars. [4]

3 (cont.) to the need to maintain a united front against Russia. Ibid. Also C.P. Japon. XXXIV, Dec, 4, 1890. Sienkiewiez to Ribot. On another level, he argued that, "les hommes qui président aux destinées du Japon ne se guident point, surtout, en ce qui touche la direction à donner aux affaires extérieures, d'après les passions populaires. Ainsi il y a quelques années encore il existait deux systèmes de politique au Japon: celui du Gouvernement, et celui de l' opposition. Alors que les hommes politiques de l'opposition étaient en faveur d'une attitude de résistance, d'agression même, et ne reculaient pas devant la prospective d'une guerre, les membres du Cabinet étaient partisans d'une entente avec le puissant voisin." C.P. Japon, XXXIX, Jan. 4, 1894. Sienkiewiez to Casimir-Pétier.

4. Lack of space prevents more than a cursory mention of some of the less important problems that arose. Perhaps the most interesting was one that was carried over from the previous period - military instruction. The decision of Yamagata not to renew Commandant Berthaut's contract in 1888 infuriated French diplomats in Japan and led to the withdrawal of Berthaut and Captain Lefebvre before their work was fully completed. This episode is discussed by Presseisen, Before Aggression, pp 128-130. (cont.)

Of the two, the religious question was the first to become important. It emerged in the autumn of 1885, when an Imperial audience was granted to Mgr. Osouf, bishop of northern Japan, and bearer of an unprecedented Papal letter.[5] This letter expressed the Pope's appreciation of the religious liberty which the Meiji Government had allowed missionaries to enjoy, and was perhaps designed to elicit an explicit declaration of religious liberty. The issue for France was thus no longer the old one of securing toleration. Instead, it was the question of Japan's religious future, and, in connection with that, France's religious protectorate over Catholics in the Far East. The audience given to Osouf prompted some lengthy speculation by Sienkiewicz regarding the prospects of Japan becoming a Christian country.

4(cont. from previous page.) Another military question of some interest was that of factionalism in the Japanese Army. In 1886 Captain Bougouin, the military attaché, detected the appearance of an intermediary faction between those of Chōshū and Satsuma, whose leader was Prince Komatsu and whose chief members were Generals Horie, Miura, and Soga. C.P. Japon. XXXII, Oct.8, 1886, Sienkiewicz to Freycinet (inclosure). In the 1890's the Legation had close contacts with Komatsu's brother, Prince Kanin, who was to be Chief of Staff in the 1930's. C.P.Japon. XXXVI. Feb.9,1892; Ibid. Feb.24, 1892. See also C.P.Japon XXXVI, Jan.22,1892; C.P.Japon, XL, Aug.23,1894; and C.P.Japon, XLIV, Aug.5,1895. French hopes rested partly on this faction, partly on the officers trained in France or by French officers, and partly on Sat-Chō rivalry, to reverse the pro-German trend in the Army. Encouragement of pro-French officers was wisely confined to the social level, however.

5.) See C.P. Japon. XXXI, Sept.14,1885. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.

He began by noting the reactions of Inoue and Itō to this event. Inoue, he said, had not attempted to hide his satisfaction at the step taken by the Pope, a step which, as Sienkiewicz did not neglect to point out to him,

"contribuerait à faire rang au Japon parmi les Puissances de l'Occident," and at a further meeting he had remarked to Sienkiewicz that "Le Japon a tout emprunté aux pays d'Occident, son système d'administration, ses lois, son organisation militaire, et surtout ses méthodes d'enseignement et d'éducation. Dans un avenir prochain il sera doté comme les pays d'Europe et d'Amérique d'une constitution. Il lui restera à faire un pas de plus, à emprunter également à l'Occident la religion chrétienne. Il est préparé à accepter ce grand changement." [6]

Itō, Sienkiewicz added, had expressed himself in the same sense.

In reflecting on these events Sienkiewicz suggested that the Meiji Government had been thinking of the advantages of making Japan a Christian country for some time. It was not, he was quick to point out, anything to do with the conviction that Christian doctrine and morality were superior to Buddhism. On the contrary, the Japanese leaders were absolutely indifferent to religion as such. What had motivated their interest was its possible relevance to international relations. It was because extraterritoriality nowhere existed in Christian countries, that Christianity was regarded by many Japanese "comme l'attestation indiscutée de l'état de civilisation le plus avancé qui existe."[7]

6.) Ibid.

7.) Ibid. This fact was also recognised by the missionaries themselves. See Midon's quotations from the Jiji Shimpō and the Hōchi Shimbun in Les Missions Catholiques, Jan.9,1885.

The fact that the motive which might incline Japan towards Christianity was expediency rather that genuine religious feeling by no means detracted from Sienkiewicz's interest in the question. Just as Itō and Inoue were thinking in political terms, so was he concerned primarily with the non-religious advantages that might accrue to France from her religious protectorate. Up to now, the French minister argued, this right of protection had been theoretical only, since all Catholic missionaries in Japan had been entitled to protection as French nationals anyhow. However, since the protectorate could also be extended to Catholic missionaries of other nationalities if the case should arise it provided an influence which France should not disdain, even if it rendered her subject to the jealousy of other Powers, including non-Catholic ones. He also felt that if the Government's favourable tendencies bore fruit there might be a strong Buddhist reaction, in which case "des complications qu'il est impossible de prévoir aujourd'hui peuvent surgir,"[8]. and the religious protectorate might be invoked. Sienkiewicz's reasoning on this point was far from clear, but the suggestion seemed to be that, apart from showing that France still had an important role to play, the so-called protectorate would somehow encourage the growth of Catholicism, which already claimed 60% of the 50,000 converts. Progress in this field would inevitably be accompanied by something which he personally considered of much

8.) C.P. Japon. XXXI. Sept.14,1885.

greater importance - the spread of the French language. No other benefit was envisaged; the impression given is that this was a sufficient end in itself.[9.]

The adoption of Christianity as an official religion was discussed further in October. The audience given to Osouf, which had, incidentally, been arranged through French diplomatic channels, had given rise to speculation among other ministers in Tokyo, the Russian and British in particular. There was general agreement that, whatever the date at which the Japanese became Christians,[10.] the situation would be marked by the Japanese Government's official adoption of one particular sect. The Russian Minister, Davidov, considered that the Orthodox Church had none of the disadvantages of the other sects, while Plunkett, though himself a Catholic, believed that Catholicism was out of the question because the Japanese would never accept the French protectorate. Sienkiewicz disagreed, arguing that by then the protectorate would have disappeared of its own accord. The only argument that he produced in favour of Catholicism, however, was that there were great analogies, in regard to worship, between it and Buddhism.[11.] He might have added that there were good political reasons also for hoping for Catholic success.

9.) Ibid.
10.) To Sienkiewicz, at least, this was an "évènement éloignée encore, mais prévue et inévitable." C.P.Japon. XXX, Oct.20,1885. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. The main obstacle, he felt, was Buddhism: "N'était la crainte de soulever contre eux la masse des bouddhistes, les Ministres Japônais proclameraient aujourd'hui le Christianisme." Ibid. Buddhist opposition, however, did not concern him unduly, since he believed that it was fated to disappear entirely within a few years.
11.) Ibid.

As two Japanese historians of this period point out, "a Catholic's attitude towards his Pope was similar to the attitude the Japanese Government wanted to inculcate with respect to the Emperor".[12] Since this was being noted in Japan about the same time that, in the attempt to prove to the West that Japan had become a civilised country, "the Government as a matter of policy encouraged members of the upper classes to become Christians," it is obvious that Catholicism stood in a fairly favourable position.[13]

The hopes of a great mass conversion to Catholicism, based on a government lead, were soon to be dashed to the ground, however. The main reason for this halt in its swift progress was the reaction against all aspects of Westernisation that emerged strongly from about 1886, prompted partly by the failure to achieve an acceptable offer of Treaty Revision from the

12.) Ohata Kiyoshi and Ikado Fumio, in Kishimoto Hideo, ed. Japanese Religion in the Meiji Era, Tokyo, 1956, p.212. They add that in the 1880's "the Japanese realised that Modern Catholicism did not oppose monolithic government. In the secular realm, their own power would be strengthened if the number of Catholics increased". Ibid.

13.) Ibid. Some suspicion of all forms of Christianity, however must have remained, both for traditional reasons and because of the connection between Christianity and the People's Rights Movement. See Sumitani Mikio, "Tennō-sei no Kakuritsu to Kirisuto-kyō," (Christianity and the Establishment of the Emperor-system) in Meiji-shi Kenkyū Sōsho, (Collected Studies in Meiji History) vol.4, Tokyo, 1956, pp.210-246. In this historian's view, the Meiji rulers had difficulty in accepting Christianity, which was "critical of the foundation on which their power stood" Ibid., p.212. Exactly the same argument had been advanced by Duchesne de Bellecourt. M.D. Japon I. Aug. 30, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.

Powers. From the Japanese Government's point of view an additional inhibiting factor may well have been, as Plunkett foresaw, the French attitude to her protectorate. Regardless of the fact that this right could have little, if any, importance in Japan, since it was absurd to imagine that French action might be needed to protect Catholics from hostile Buddhists, it was decided, principally by Freycinet,[14.] that the religious protectorate must not be relaxed. The real reason for this insistence lay in events in China, where France's position in religious matters had given her advantages and influence which she had never dared to seek in Japan. This position was now in danger. Embittered, perhaps, by the anti-clerical tendencies of the French republicans, and hopeful that greater success would come if it could show itself independent of any Foreign Power, ~~and stimulated by the jealousy of other Catholic states~~, the Vatican was attempting to demolish the foundation of France's privilege by establishing direct relations with the Chinese Government.[15.] While the Quai d'Orsay was putting strong pressure on the Vatican through the French ambassador there to reverse this decision,[16.] it was determined not to allow its stand to be weakened by any evasion, however small,

14.) See his instructions to Sienkiewicz. C.P.Japon. XXXI. Nov.20, 1885.
15.) C.P. Japon. XXXII. Feb.12,1886. Freycinet to Sienkiewicz.
16.) See C.P. Japon. XXXII, Nov.5,1886, In which the Political Director, Malouet, brought Sienkiewicz up to date on developments in Europe.

of the principle that France must act as intermediary for the Pope. However, though this principle had been followed with regard to Osouf's audience in 1885, there were signs that Japan as well as the Vatican was reluctant to be bound by such rules in future. After some efforts, Sienkiewicz had secured a promise that the letter in which the Emperor was to reply to the Pope would be presented by the Japanese representative in France,[17.] but he suspected that a danger remained that the Japanese wished to enter into direct relations with the Vatican and might make use of Austria as an intermediary.[18.] Sienkiewicz attempted to sabotage Vatican schemes by urging upon Aoki Shūzō that a Papal nuncio in Japan might be forced to show excessive zeal and thus rekindle the religious question and he suggested that other countries might try to establish protectorates over their own priests without having France's experience and skill in smoothing over disputes.[19.] He was not, however, at all sure that his arguments had proved convincing and he suspected that the Japanese Government was under strong pressure from several of his colleagues on this issue.[20.]

17.) C.P. Japon. XXXII. March 16,1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
18.) C.P. Japon. XXXII, March 25, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. Telegram.
19.) C.P. Japon. XXXII, March 28, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
20) C.P. Japon. XXXII, June 11, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. The same accusation of foreign jealousy is made in a report of July 10, 1886, by Admiral Riennier, who laid the main blame for the damage done to the French position on the English press. C.P. Japon. XXXII. Aug.28, 1886. Marine to Quai.

Eventually the contradictions in the French position wore Sienkiewicz down. By September, 1886, he was questioning whether, if the Vatican was determined to proceed with its aims, "il convient à nos intérêts de maintenir une situation douteuse et qui bientôt ne nous vaudra plus que des ennemis et des embarras de toute sorte."[21.] He even suggested that it might be wise to abandon the protectorate even if the Vatican did not establish direct relations with China, since this would break the anti-French entente.[22.] The Quai d'Orsay, however, was less defeatist. Indeed it had already solved the problem. The Political Director's note of Nov.5,1886, gave Sienkiewicz the news that on the representation of the French ambassador, the Pope had consented to adjourn sine die a decision which would have been considered a 'mauvais procédé' towards France.[23.]

Because of the Vatican's fundamental differences with the Kingdom of Italy, France could exert strong pressure on the Pope over diplomatic matters. The Quai d'Orsay might have been somewhat less pleased with itself if it had been aware that the Japanese Government would be less willing to resign itself to acceptance of the traditional state of affairs. In December, 1887, when Sienkiewicz had returned to France on leave,

21.) C.P. Japon.XXXII. Sept.10, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
22.) Ibid. Behind this entente, Sienkiewicz suggested, lay the influence of Cardinal Manning, who "n'est probablement qu'un instrument de la politique anglaise." A pencilled Quai d'Orsay comment found the report 'fort discutable.'
23.) C.P.Japon. XXXII, Nov.5,1886.

the chargé d'affaires, Bourgarel, discovered that in the still undelivered letter from the Emperor there appeared a passage which invited the Pope to enter into direct relations with Japan.[24.] Bourgarel, who saw this not as the result of foreign scheming but as an expression of Japan's desire for independence and equality, could only hope the Vatican would not take up the offer. He made no protest; and the letter was eventually not only left unchanged but was handed over to the Pope by, of all people, the Japanese Minister to Germany. This step brought forth a demand for an explanation by Sienkiewicz when he returned to Japan, but Ōkuma, the Foreign Minister excused himself by blaming Inoue, and the incident was allowed to drop.[25.] France, despite German and Italian opposition, had received renewed assurances from both the Vatican and China that France should continue to act as intermediary,[26.] and the Japanese Government's tendencies no longer represented any real threat to the French position. As for the hopes of a massive victory for Catholicism in Japan itself, this was now seen as only a dream.

24.) C.P. Japon. XXXIII, Dec.27, 1887. Bourgarel to Flourens.
25.) C.P. Japon. XXXIII, Oct.25, 1888. Sienkiewicz to Goblet.
26.) C.P. Japon. XXXIV. Feb.9, 1889. Goblet to Sienkiewicz.

A long dispatch from Sienkiewicz to Spuller explained that individual conversions were all that could now be hoped for.[27] His analysis of the situation ended with the regretful conclusion that the religion most likely to become a State Religion was Buddhism - he ignored Shintoism - while the form of Christianity with the best chance of considerable success, especially if a Japanese Protestant should found a new sect, was Protestantism.[28]

ii. French Education in Japan.

One of the reasons why Sienkiewicz favoured the chances of Protestantism in Japan was the attention that Protestant missionaries paid to education. In making this point Sienkiewicz returned to a preoccupation which was in the 1890's to amount almost to a French obsession. Since one of the main advantages that was hoped for from the spread of Catholicism in Japan was the propagation of the French language, it is hardly surprising that France also pursued this aim by more direct means during these years. Concern with French schools and the teaching of the French language in Japan dated back, of course, to long before Sienkiewicz's arrival in Tokyo. As early as 1864 the

27.) C.P. Japon. XXXXIV, Dec.1,1889. His reasons were interesting. Apart from the reaction against foreign influences, the decline in Government authority, which the French Minister attributed to quarrels within the governing oligarchy, meant that even if the Meiji leaders decided that Japan should become a Christian country, the mass of the population would not follow blindly, and the emancipation of minds that was beginning to reveal itself very clearly made the missionaries' task even more difficult.
28.) Ibid.

Quai d'Orsay had transmitted to Roches a request from the Minister of Education for information as to the extent of French teaching there.[29.] The request was somewhat over-optimistic for at that time the only French school in Japan was the one-man undertaking of Mermet de Cachon in Hakodate. The situation was transformed when Roches and Mermet instituted their French school in Yokohama for the purpose of training the sons of fudai daimyō and other Tokugawa supporters.[30.] This project however, came to an end with the Restoration, and for some years both the Quai d'Orsay and the representatives in Tokyo showed scant interest in the matter. With the partial recovery of her international standing at the end of the 1870's, however, France once again became concerned that her cultural assets should be brought to bear in support of her pursuit of political prestige. Geofroy complained on more than one occasion of the prevalence of the English language and lamented that despite the fact that French was necessary for attendance at the Military School and the study of law at Tokyo University, it was steadily losing favour, but he made no suggestions for remedying the situation.[31.] Its further extension was impeded, according to a later French report, by the favour bestowed on English by Japanese officials, despite the French tendencies of Japan's educated classes.[32.]

29.) See C.C. Yédo. III. Dec.22, 1864.
30.) See C.P. Japon. XIII. March 18,1865; Ibid, April 4; C.P. Japon. XIV. Feb.5, 1866; all Roches to Drouyn.
31.) See C.P.Japon XXVI. Jan.28,1878; C.P.Japon. XXVII, Jan.13, 1879; both Geofroy to Waddington.
32.) C.P. Japon. XXVIII, May 19,1882. Conte to Freycinet. The chargé d'affaires ad interim justified this last statement by reporting the establishment of the Société Japonaise de langue

Until the arrival of Sienkiewicz, no French minister was prepared to try to improve the situation, perhaps because their periods of stay in Japan averaged less than two years.

Sienkiewicz himself had been in Japan for two years before he took any steps in this direction. His first show of concern appeared in his report on Osouf's audience, when he regretted that the French missionaries had insufficient funds to establish proper primary schools.[33] As a partial solution he arranged with Osouf to introduce into Japan one of the orders which devoted themselves to teaching.[34] He had good hope of success in such a venture since French was still the language most studied after English, despite the progress of German.

32. cont. from previous page). française. Details of this society, which was founded in Oct., 1880, by young officials, and whose full title was Société Japonaise pour la propogation de la langue française au Japon, can be found in L'Echo du Japon, Jan.7, 1881; March 17, 1881; Jan. 6, 1882; and Feb.17, 1882.

33.) With French as an extra subject. C.P. Japon. XXXI, Sept.14, 1885.

34.) Sienkiewicz had tried, he said, to do this earlier, but had found on the part of Osouf's deputy, Midon, "un esprit étroit et incapable de comprendre les services réciproques que peuvent se rendre les Missionnaires d'une part, la Puissance protectrice de l'autre." Ibid.

However, some time was to elapse before this plan could be implemented. It took Osouf over a year to find an order willing to take a chance on what was inevitably a somewhat hazardous commercial venture,[35.] and although in 1887 there was good news for France in the assurance of the Francophile Vice-Minister of Education, Tsuji, that 6,000 yen would be allocated to the recently founded école française for a chair of French law, in the meantime German made more headway than French.[36.]

From the late 1880's this relatively casual approach to the question of the propagation of the French language and values was abandoned. France's comparative unimportance, in both the political and commercial sides of Treaty Revision had been emphasized by the refusal to accept French as a privileged language in the proposed mixed courts and law codes. The irritation felt by France at this led to pettiness on occasion, as when Bourgarel was reprimanded for allowing the use of English in a document concerning a transaction in land between France and Japan.[37.] It also led to much reflection both on the part of Sienkiewicz and various Frenchmen employed in the Japanese educational system as to how the difficulties facing the spread of the French language could be overcome. The number of different, often conflicting, plans that were

35.) C.P.Japon. XXXII. Oct.17, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet. The efforts of the Congrégation des Marianites, which had agreed to set up a school, would be followed with sympathy, Freycinet stated in reply to this dispatch. C.P.Japon. XXXII, Dec. 13, 1886.

36.) C.P.Japon. XXXIII, April 12, 1887. Sienkiewicz to Flourens.

37.) C.P.Japon. XXXIII, June 11, 1888. Goblet to Bourgarel.

suggested to the Quai d'Orsay was extraordinary, even allowing for the varying backgrounds, experience, and prejudices of their authors. The bases on which the theorists had to work were three: the small, mostly elementary, schools established by missionaries, which numbered 66 at the end of 1889, had 3,400 pupils (compared with 10,000 pupils for American missionaries) and received a 600 franc subvention from the Legation; the Marianist Ecole de l'Etoile du Matin, with its 11 teachers but hopes of greater expansion, which catered for the sons of the wealthy and influential, both Japanese and foreign, at Tokyo; and the école de langue française, which had been founded by the Japanese Société de langue française, had been allotted by the Japanese Government in 1887 a subvention of 5000 yen to encourage the study of law and pay its 2 teachers of French, but had by 1891 been eclipsed by the école de droit français (also run by members of the Société de langue française) to such an extent that the number of pupils had declined from 140 in 1887 to 33 in 1891, and its subvention had been abolished by the Diet.[38] The basic questions were what segment of Japanese society and what stage of Japanese education France should attempt to influence;. Arrivet, a teacher at the Lycée Supérieur (Tokyo First Higher School) [redacted], held in 1891 that they should concentrate on the école de langue française and higher specialised education, whereas Sienkiewicz, with more sympathy for the Marianists,

38.) These details are taken from various reports, but principally C.P.Japon, XXXIV, Dec.1,1889. Sienkiewicz to Spuller, and C.P.Japon, XXV, Sept.4, 1891, Sienkiewicz to Ribot.

wanted to find scope for French education at all levels, with pupils of the Morning Star School graduating to the Lycée Supérieur and thence to the Imperial University, where the study of French language, history, literature and philosophy had recently been expanded, thanks partly to the French Minister's efforts.[39] He sought official financial backing from the French government for French education at two levels, 1800 francs for missionary schools and 6000 francs for the école de langue française, with a strict surveillance being placed on the employment of these funds. These suggestions underwent forced reconsideration only a fortnight later when Sienkiewicz heard that the école de langue française might be closed down. As an alternative he suggested the provision of scholarships to encourage students to enter the French section of the Lycée Supérieur.[40] This idea was supported by Collin de Plancy, the chargé d'affaires in 1892, who also came out in favour of a regular publication in the French language for Japanese readers[41] Thanks largely to the support of the Société de langue française and the fact that Collin de Plancy did not await Quai d'Orsay approval before launching it, the Revue Française du Japon appeared the same year. With numerous contributions from Boissonade in its early stages, it lasted for five years.

39.) Both opinions are in C.P. Japon. XXV, Sept.4, 1891.
40.) C.P. Japon, XXXV, Sept.20, 1891. Sienkiewicz to Ribot.
41.) C.P. Japon, XXXVI, April,5, 1892. Collin de Plancy to Ribot.

This sudden burst of energy is accounted for by Collin de Plancy's discovery that French had been overshadowed in popularity by German, and was even being rivalled by Italian. This alarming fact led to a considerable increase of interest at the Quai d'Orsay. In August, 1892, Foreign Minister Ribot promised 4000 francs for the école de langue française, together with 500 francs each for missionary schools and the Marianists.[42] The 4000 francs subvention, which was for one year only, was used by Sienkiewicz, however, not for the école de langue française but for bursaries at the Lycée Supérieur.[43] It apparently achieved its purpose since in 1894, at the demand of students in the French section there, French replaced English as the second language in the medical section, as well as being resumed at the Naval School.[44] These improvements were regarded by Sienkiewicz as justifying a request for an increased subvention but this was refused by Foreign Minister Hanotaux for technical budgetary reasons.[45] Three months later, however, a new report was produced by Michel Revon, professor of law at Tokyo University, which, while registering some improvement in the French position, also showed more clearly than ever before the weaknesses in it,[46] and in October, Hanotaux asked the new Minister in Tokyo, Harmand, to suggest some practical measures

42.) C.P.Japon. XXXIX. Aug.4,1892. Ribot to Collin de Plancy.

43.) C.P.Japon. XXXIX. March 20,1894. Sienkiewicz to Casimir-Périer. Sienkiewicz did not explain his action, but in 1895 Arivet claimed that it was because he feared its rivalry would be dangerous for the Marianists' school. See C.P.Japon. XLII. March 8,1895. Harmand to Hanotaux.

44.) C.P.Japon. XXXIX. March 20, 1894. Sienkiewicz to Casimir-Périer.

45.) C.P.Japon. XXXIX, June 23, 1894. Hanotaux to Harmand.

46.) Enclosure in C.P.Japon. XL.Sept.7,1894. Harmand to Hanotaux.

for remedying the situation.[47] The persons from whom Harmand sought advice were Revon and Arrivet. Revon, impressed by the fact that the private French schools had succeeded in getting very few of their pupils accepted in the Lycée, felt that France's main efforts should be devoted to the state schools, particularly the primary and lower secondary schools which supplied the lycées and through them the University. To introduce French courses it was necessary, he argued, to persuade the Japanese authorities of the usefulness of French.[48] Arrivet agreed with much of this. He too advocated the virtual abandonment of private schools, including those run by the missionaries, which he refused to take seriously, but his remedy was different from Revon's. It was in three parts; firstly, the establishment of a club for French-speaking Japanese, secondly, the improvement of the Revue Française du Japon (aided by French subsidy), and thirdly, the institution of bursaries in France or Indo-China for Japanese students.[49] Neither of these reports was acted upon at once by Hanotaux, who wished first to know Harmand's opinion. But there was a strong hint that determined action would at last be taken, for the Foreign Minister commented that "L'affaire est à mes yeux très-importante."[50] Preoccupied by the Sino-Japanese war and its aftermath, Harmand had no time to formulate considered

47.) C.P.Japon. XL. Oct.25, 1894.
48.) C.P.Japon. XLII. March 8, 1895. Harmand to Hanotaux.
49.) Ibid. Among Arrivet's criticisms of the Morning Star school were that its teaching of Japanese language, literature and history was not good enough to attract Japanese pupils who wished to proceed to High School and University, and that in order to mould their charges, the Marianists took them at too early an age.
50.) C.P.Japon. XLIII, May 10, 1895. Hanotaux to Harmand.

conclusions until January, 1896, when he showed himself in general agreement with Arrivet in favour of the establishment of a new 'Club Franco-Japonais' and the improvement of the Revue Française du Japon, or at least its re-orientation as a more effective organ of French propoganda. He believed that French would find its best opportunity among an élite, which would propagate French ideas better than any French professor,[51] and he had hopes of enlisting among the supporters of the proposed club several members of the Imperial Family. The best way of developing an élite which was truly Francophile was to extend to as many Japanese children as possible the teaching of French at an elementary level and to send to France on scholarships those who showed the greatest promise, thus ensuring that they really were imbued with a love of French culture. In addition, efforts should be made to persuade the Japanese Government to send students to France itself.[52]

51.) "Notre ambition doit consister à agir sur le Japon par les idées, et nous n'y arriverons que par l'intermédiaire d'un certain nombre d'hommes supérieurs, sortis du sein de la nation, bien plutôt que par l'action directe de professeurs," he wrote. Those Japanese who had spent several years in France, he added, "peuvent être considérés comme nos clients naturels, comme les partisans volontaires ou les propagateurs inconscients de notre influence intellectuelle et morale." C.P.Japon. XLV. Jan.10, 1896. Harmand to Hanotaux.

52.) Ibid. This idea of facilitating study in France by young men of ability or rank was not new, though previously it had been restricted to the military sphere. After the partial rupture caused by the sudden end of the third French military mission there had been a good deal of doubt in Japan as to whether Japanese military students would still be permitted to enter French military schools, and from the fact that the number of new entries dropped from 18 in 1888 to 2 in 1889 and 1 in each of the following two years, it would seem that in practice Japanese students were discouraged. There was, however, one notable exception. One of the Japanese students already in France was Prince Kanin, brother of Prince Komatsu.

The reception given to Harmand's suggestions cannot yet be discovered since the French correspondence with Japan after 1896 is not open to inspection. However, the fact that no reply was sent in the nine months after the Quai received his dispatch makes it seem somewhat unlikely that the request was granted in full, if at all. The fact that the Revue Française du Japon came to an end in 1897 makes the latter a distinct possibility. Nor is there any indication in later writers, such as Gérard, the first French Ambassador to Japan, of any notable expansion of French education.

What exactly was hoped for from the propagation of the French language and culture in the late 1880's and early 1890's and why was so little ever done to support the various educational projects financially? The answer to the first question in part holds the key to the second. Several motives can be detected. In April, 1894, for instance, Sienkiewicz, in reporting that some of the French students at the Lycée Supérieure were seeking the creation of a chair for aFrench professor of civil engineering at the University, noted that "Cette création pourrait avoir, dans un temps donné, une importance sérieuse pour notre industrie."53. Revon, too,

52.) cont. from previous page) [redacted] When he finished his course at the Ecole de Saumur, it was intimated to Sienkiewicz that the Emperor hoped to see him permitted to enter the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, the highest of France's military colleges. C.P. Japon.XXXIV. Feb.12, 1890. Sienkiewicz to Spuller. At first the Quai rejected the idea, on the grounds that the instruction there was confidential. C.P.Japon. XXIV. Feb.24,1890. Before long, however, the temptation to establish influence proved too strong, and in June, the admission of Kanin was authorised as an exceptional favour. C.P.Japon. XXXIV. June 12, 1890. Ribot to Sienkiewicz. Even when Japan broke ..(cont)

saw practical consequences in the extension of French studies. The benefits, in his view, might extend from the import of French pharmaceutical products to the commissioning of French battleships.[54] These references to commercial advantage were rare, however. More important by far was the mixture of desire for admiration and pursuit of influence, which, though usually taken for granted, occasionally led the writer into ecstatic prose. Revon, for instance, in speaking of French studies in the faculty of letters at the University, claimed that

"elles pourraient avoir une profonde influence morale sur l'esprit des jeunes générations, et en faisant aimer notre littérature, elles feraient aimer notre génie national, frère du génie national du Japon, par tant de noble côtés."[55]

Less lyrical, but more openly political, was the reasoning of Harmand in 1896. His belief that cultural links would have a political value was clearly shown when he urged that

"il n'est niable pour aucun français que notre pays, lui, a le plus grand intérêt à attirer chez lui, en vue de son action future politique et même economique sur le Japon, le plus possible de jeunes gens distingués et de les soustraire ainsi au rayonnement littéraire, scientifique et artistique de l'Allemagne."[56]

52. cont. from previous page.) a verbal promise by Oyama by engaging a German officer for the Tokyo War College, the French Government did not force Kanin to leave, as Sienkiewicz advised. The Quai comment on this suggestion was unambiguous, in fact - the two words 'Mais non.'. C.P.Japon. XXXV, Jan.4,1891. Sienkiewicz to Ribot. When he returned to Japan, Kanin became a frequent visitor at the French Legation. C.P.Japon. XXXVI. Feb.9,1892. Collin de Plancy to Ribot.
53.) C.P.Japon. XXXIX. April 3,1894. Sienkiewicz to Casimir-Périer.
54.) C.P.Japon. XLII. March 8,1895. Harmand to Hanotaux.
55.) Ibid.
56.) C.P.Japon. XLV, Jan.10,1896. Harmand to Hanotaux.

François, a teacher at the Military School, was even more explicit in his linking of culture with politics. He feared that Japan, now her value had been shown by her victory over China, might be tempted into an anti-French alliance by the promise of Indo-China.

"Ces redoutables éventualités sont à prévoir," he warned, "et dès aujourd'hui, nous devons prendre, pour les conjurer, toutes les mesures nécessaires, et dans nos possessions indo-chinoises, et au Japon, en nous créant des sympathies, des amis si possible, qui par l'étude de notre langue, auront appris à nous connaître, à nous juger par eux-mêmes, à nous voir par leurs propres yeux." 57.

It is obvious that the concern of Frenchmen for the extension of French studies was increased after 1894. As François noted, "Cette question d'influence a pris subitement une importance considérable, depuis les succès militaires éclatants remportés par le Japon sur la Chine." 58. How, therefore, is it possible to explain the Quai d'Orsay's tardiness in implementing the suggestions of its representatives? Budgetary considerations alone would surely not have prevented the expenditure of a few thousand francs a year on so important an objective. One answer is that the Sino-Japanese War and Japan's increased strength could not be entirely separated in France's thinking from the obligations of the Franco-Russian Alliance. Because Japan figured much less prominently in French foreign policy than in Russian, France was gradually losing her right to an independent role in Japan in the 1890's, and the concern of French

57.) C.P. Japon. XLVII. June 13, 1895. Harmand to Hanotaux.
58.) Ibid.

ministers in Japan to extend French influence by way of cultural prestige can be seen in part as an attempt to counter a tendency that had become evident to the Japanese even before 1895. Similarly the reluctance of Paris to implement the various proposals suggests that while it appreciated the end that was sought it realised that basically it had to choose between influence in Japan and alliance with Russia. The Sino-Japanese War forced it to choose, and its neglect of French education in Japan was a natural consequence of Hanotaux's decision to join in the Triple Intervention.

b) The Franco-Russian Alliance and Japan.

Even before the Triple Intervention of 1895 the Franco-Russian alliance had been exerting an influence over French policy and French standing in Japan. Signs that the two countries were drawing together were in evidence in Japan as early as 1887, when the French were informed of the contents of the Emperor's letter to the Pope by the Russian Minister.[59.] After 1890, when the rapprochement was developing into alliance, the influence of Russia was exerted in favour of France making concessions to Japan over Treaty Revision, Russia's policy at this time being to win Japan's friendship.[60.]

59.) See C.P. Japon. XXXIII, Oct.25, 1888. Sienkiewicz to Goblet.
60). "Depuis quelque temps surtout, la Russie semble attacher le plus grand prix à gagner l'amitié et même la confiance des Japonais." C.P. Japon. XXXIV. Dec.1, 1889. Sienkiewicz to Spuller. The passage was specially marked by someone at the Quai d'Orsay.

However, Japanese distrust of her powerful neighbour remained acute and even though at that date France had no formal ties with her, Sienkiewicz was complaining as early as 1891 that her friendship with Russia was placing her in an unfavourable light. He was in favour of showing general goodwill towards Russia but of stopping short of anything more compromising.[61.] It was natural for a diplomat to object to any development which would deprive him of the capacity to attract the friendship of the country in which he served, and this consideration was reinforced by the fact that Japan was clearly a valuable potential ally. Nevertheless, despite Sienkiewicz's representations, French Foreign Ministers inevitably saw things more in European terms. Regional considerations mattered little besides Russia's ability to rescue France from her long isolation, a fact which was abundantly proved by France's participation in the Triple Intervention, against the advice of Minister Harmand and against France's own interests in the area.[62.]

The effect of the Triple Intervention on France's relations with Japan was immense and lasting. Despite all his hopes that France's essential goodwill would be evident and reciprocated, Harmand was forced to register in June, 1896, the failure of his efforts. The feelings of bitterness against France and Russia, he wrote, far from diminishing, had actually grown deeper:

61.) C.P.Japon. XXXV. March 11, 1891. Sienkiewicz to Ribot.
62.) The diplomacy of the Sino-Japanese War lies outside the scope of this study, but it may be mentioned that Harmand was a keen advocate of a Franco-Japanese understanding as the best protection for France's position in Indo-China.

"Les Japonais des classes supérieures eux-mêmes, ...

s'écartent de plus en plus de nous, et, malgré tous les efforts que je fais pour les attirer chez moi, je suis obligé de constater que leurs visites deviennent plus rares, et leur attitude moins ouverte, même parmi les militaires." 63.

France's situation, he felt, had suffered more than Germany's since "l'on nous considère à présent comme les alliés définitifs des Russes et comme décidés à épouser jusqu'au bout toutes leurs querelles."[64] It was a sad state of affairs for a nation which above all wished to be admired.

The conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance marked the end of an epoch in the history of French policy towards Japan. It is true that the difficult atmosphere of 1895-6 was eventually to disappear, and after the Russo-Japanese war, indeed, there was a real rapprochement between the two countries, based partly on the new understanding between Russia and Japan, partly on the convenience for Japan of the French Bourse. Nevertheless, there was a great difference between the decade preceding the First World War and the years before 1890-1895. From the signing of the 1858 Treaty up until the final stages of Treaty Revision, France, for all her weaknesses and embarrassments, had retained an independent role in Japan. Once the alliance with Russia was signed that was no longer possible.

63.) C.P.Japon. XLVI. June 25, 1896. Harmand to Hanotaux.
64.) Ibid. Cuttings from Japanese newspapers had illustrated clearly the changed view of France. Whereas in January, 1895, the Yomiuri was praising "la grande voix de la France," and the Kokumin was urging that "il faut absolument qu'à son tour le Japon trouve un moyen de manifester clairement sa sympathie envers la France comme aussi sa reconnaissance," in July the Nippon was attacking her bitterly and dismissing her as an independent force: "Sa participation à l'oeuvre de l'intervention dans l'Extrême-Orient doit être considérée comme la suite

The verdict of the "Nippon" that "la réputation de la France n'est plus que dans le passé; sa gloire n'est plus de ce siècle"[65]. may have been over-harsh, but as far as Japan was concerned, it was painfully close to the mark.

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64. cont. from previous page) de son asservissement à la Russie et à l'Allemagne." C.P. Japon. XLII, Jan.11.1895; C.P.Japon, XLIII, July 13, 1895; both Harmand to Hanotaux.
65.) C.P. Japon XLIII. July 13, 1895. Harmand to Hanotaux.

CHAPTER VIII.

FRENCH TRADE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON FRENCH POLICY.

a) The Volume and Pattern of French Trade.

As was seen earlier, although trade was the basic justification and ultimate reason for the treaty with Japan, few tangible signs of interest in securing the treaty were shown by French traders themselves. Consequently it is not surprising to find very little French commercial activity in Japan in the years immediately following the opening of the ports. Statistics for those early years are, of course, both unsystematic and unreliable, especially on the French side. The French government refused to appoint a full-time consul at Yokohama until 1870, despite the protests of its diplomatic representatives and the French merchants there, and thus it was left to a member of the Legation Chancellery to attempt to unravel the affairs of a port which accounted for about three-quarters of the entire trade with Japan. This was a far from easy task. The Japanese customs officials were inexperienced and unhelpful, and the traders themselves notoriously made false declarations about the value of their goods.[1] Since in addition, a good deal of smuggling was carried on and much French trade was conveyed in foreign ships, it took a considerable time to reach any very exact conclusions as to the amount of imports from, and exports to, France.

1.) See the report by the Vicomte de la Tour du Pin to Bellecourt, which claimed that 25% should be added to official figures to get something like a true picture. C.C. Yédo. June 2, 1861. Bellecourt to Thouvenel. This was still the case in 1876. C.C.Yédo.VI. July 15,1876. St.Quentin to Decazes.

Nevertheless the overall pattern and growth of French trade are not hard to discern. Its development was very slow in the first three years. Although Bellecourt had arranged for French interests to be looked after by British traders, acting as consular agents in Yokohama, Nagasaki and Hakodate, by March, 1860, there were still only four Frenchmen at Yokohama, out of a total of 120 Europeans, and Bellecourt was doubtful about their ability to compete with the large English and American houses,[2.] To ensure the development of French trade he therefore worked on the Bakufu to extend the foreign settlement to twice its former size and allocate one-fifth of the new area to Frenchmen.[3.] Despite this official encouragement the French community did not establish a definite position for itself for several years. At the start of 1863 the number of Frenchmen in Yokohama was still only eight, for which unsatisfactory state of affairs Bellecourt blamed French caution:

2.) C.P. Japon. II. March 24, 1860. Bellecourt to Thouvenel.
3.) C.P. Japon. II. June 15, 1860. Bellecourt to Thouvenel. To prevent the French 'concession' being lost to France by French speculators who had no intention of trading permanently but only wished to take advantage of the high prices likely to develop, Bellecourt stipulated that Frenchmen could only sell this land to other Frenchmen. Ibid. This measure produced much dissatisfaction among French traders and was dropped by Roches in 1865. See C.P. Japon. V. Jan.4, 1862. Bellecourt to Thouvenel. C.C.Yédo. III. Nov.29, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn; C.C. Yédo. IV. Feb.1, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.

> "...il est probable qu'avant d'entreprendre des établissemens lointains, les maisons françaises auront voulu commencer par se rendre un compte exact des avantages que pouvait leur procurer l'emploi des Soies du Japon, et qu'elles auront préféré laisser d'abord à d'autres les chances des premiers risques en se bornant à quelques essais." 4.

1863, however, marked a turning-point in French trade with Japan. Between January and October, the number of Frenchmen at Yokohama rose sharply to 32 and before the end of the year it had reached 41.[5] Of equal significance was the decision taken by the Messageries Impériales at this time to extend their service to Yokohama, thus releasing French traders to a large extent from their dependence on English shipping and shipping routes.[6] The cause of these developments, was the sudden rise of the silk trade. Until late 1859 it had not been realised in Europe that Japan might prove to be an important silk exporter,[7] and the instructions given to Bellecourt by the Quai d'Orsay had ignored the entire subject, concentrating only on possible French imports into Japan.[8] In the event French imports found it difficult to make much impact. Only champagne among French wines found much favour. Articles de Paris, burdened by a 20% import duty, proved very disappointing.[9] On the other hand, even in the first years,

4.) C.C. Yédo. III. Oct.29,1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
5.) C.C. Yédo. III. Nov. 29, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn.
6.) C.C. Yédo. III. Nov. 1863. Quai d'Orsay memorandum.
7.) According to a North China Herald article reprinted in the Moniteur des Soies of Oct.31,1863, the fact that Japan produced silk only became known about the middle of 1859.
8) C.C. Yédo.I. May 24, 1859; C.P.Japon. I. June 8, 1859.
9.) See e.g. C.C.Yédo II.Feb.1,1862. Bellecourt to Thouvenal.

Japanese silk boosted the volume of exports to a total far beyond French imports into Japan. In 1861, for instance, the first year for which any overall estimate of French trade was attempted, silk exports to France direct from Yokohama amounted to c.2,600,000 francs, compared with only 500,000 francs for imports.[10.] The following year saw a decline in exports but they still outweighed the 871,023 francs worth of imports considerably.[11.] Then in 1863 came a steep rise in silk exports to France; one estimate put the figure at 8 million francs.[12.] This total does not appear to have increased by much in the following three years.[13.] In 1867 and 1868, however, Japanese exports to France again took a colossal leap. In

10.) Ibid. This was Bellecourt's estimate, the official figure for exports being 2,160,000 francs.
11.) C.C.Yédo. II. April 14, 1863. Bellecourt to Drouyn. The official figure for exports was 1,596,987 francs, of which 1,497,135fr. were due to silk. In addition, a good deal of Japanese raw silk was bought by Frenchmen in London, where over 26 million francs worth was imported in 1862. Moniteur des Soies, Jan.2, 1864.
12.) The estimate was Roches'. C.C.Yédo. III. Sept.1, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
13.) No figure is found for 1864 either in Roches' correspndence or in Annales du Commerce Extérieur, but it was probably smaller, for political reasons. The official figures for 1865 was 7,967,000 fr., Annales du Commerce Extérieur, XLIII. Chine et Indo-Chine. Faits Commerciaux. No.40. (Jan., 1868) For 1866 the same source placed the total at 9,885,000fr. Ibid. Faits Commerciaux. No.45.(June, 1870). The figures given here relate to goods destined for France, (Commerce spécial), not just passing through France (Commerce général). The latter are usually substantially larger.

the former year, they more than doubled to 20,221,000 francs,[14.] and in the latter, despite the civil was being waged in Northern Japan, they almost trebled to 56,809,501 fr.[15.] The reasons for this rapid growth lie partly in the more liberal attitude of the Bakufu but also in the development of a new item of trade - the silkworm egg - which for a few years was to rival the raw silk in value.[16.] Silkworm eggs accounted for 3,771,150 fr. in 1866, 7,163,557 fr. in 1867, and 25,232,962 fr. in 1868.[17.] This increase did not represent a matching increase in volume, however, since prices rose steeply during this period, mainly owing to increased demand.

The second half of the 1860's also saw French imports into Japan flourishing. The 1865 figure of 546,000 fr. quadrupled to 2,025,000 fr. the following year, and in 1867 soared to 7,480,000 fr.[18.] About 3½ million francs of this resulted from the orders given to Coullet[19.] but it seems clear that other sides of commerce also profited from Roches' good

14.) Ibid. Faits Commerciaux. No.45. (June, 1870). Of this total,11,914,000 francs came from raw silk.
15.) Ibid. Faits Commerciaux. No.50. (Nov.1876).
16.) Another factor was the success of Messageries Impériales in diverting an increasing amount of silk destined for the European Continent from London to Marseilles. As a result France received direct more than half as much raw silk as went to London in 1866-7, a very different proportion from that of earlier years. Moniteur des Soies., Oct.12, 1867.
17.) Annales du Commerce Extérieur, XLIII, Chine et Indo-Chine, Faits Commerciaux. Nos. 45 & 50.
18.) Ibid. Faits Commerciaux. Nos. 40 & 45.
17.) Annales du Commerce Extérieur, XLIII, Chine et Indo-Chine, Faits Commerciaux. Nos. 45 & 50.
18.) Ibid. Faits Commerciaux. Nos. 40 & 45.
19.) See C.P. Japon. XVII. Oct.7, 1868, Outrey to Moustier.

relations with the Bakufu.[20] This level was not sustained in succeeding years. In fact, it was not approached again until the mid-1870's and was only exceeded in the 1880's.

Trade statistics for the Meiji era are a little more satisfactory, at least after 1873. Those for the preceding four years are sufficient to show that Japanese exports to France fell considerably after the Restoration, though this drop, like the earlier rise, was partly caused by a change in the price-level.[21] The early 1870's also saw the decline of the silkworm-egg trade, while raw silk, after a momentary set-back, continued its steady rise.[22] Thereafter the pattern of trade saw few sudden changes. Silk, and silk products, remained by far the most important item of Japanese export to France. In 1885 they accounted for 23,837,740fr. out of a total of 29,254,771fr., and as late as 1901 raw silk alone made up 40,446,000fr. out of a figure of 77,060,000 fr.[23]

20.) Cf. Moniteur des Soies, Oct.12,1867, which reprints a letter dated June 19, from a Frenchman at Yokohama in which the following appears: "il y a de plus, pour le commerce français, de meilleures chances d'affaires que pour le commerce des autres nations, à cause des analogies de caractère et de climat qui existent entre le Japon et la France, à cause aussi des sympathies politiques qui paraissent incliner le Japon vers la France de préférence à tout autre pays."
21.) Annales du Commerce Extérieur XLIII. Chine et Indo-Chine. Faits Commerciaux. No.50. The editor of this official publication related the decrease in French trade to the effects of the Franco-Prussian War.
22.) A sketch of the history and decline of the silkworm trade can be found in L'Echo du Japon of June 27,1879.
23.) See the pamphlet by a French consular official, E. Clavery, Les Etrangers au Japon et les Japonais à l'étranger, Paris, 1904.

As regards French imports into Japan, a staple finally emerged in the mid-1870's in the form of woollen muslins, which by 1876 exceeded all other items put together in value and continued to take an ever larger share in Franco-Japanese trade.[24.] With the expansion of the Japanese navy in the mid-1880's another item of considerable importance also appeared. Munitions and warships were sought in huge quantities from Europe, and France made a considerable, and not unsuccessful, effort to share in these orders. However, although this aspect of trade made a difference of some millions of francs to the total value of French imports, in sheer size it always remained far inferior to woollen goods, and its importance was as much political as commercial.[25.] It was certainly far from sufficient to alter significantly the overall balance of trade, which had always favoured Japan, and from the 1880's did so overwhelmingly. Indeed, from 1875, which was a disastrous year for Japanese silkworm dealers, right up until 1951, there was no peacetime year in which Japanese imports from France exceeded her exports to that country. Some idea of the actual ratio as well as the rate of trade growth may be obtained by comparing the average annual figures during the respective

24.) The value of woollen muslins imported from France rose from just under 5 million francs in 1874 to 12 million francs in 1875, when they amounted to 60% of total French imports to Japan. C.C. Yédo. VI. July 15, 1876. St. Quentin to Decazes.
25.) See below.

phases of growth or decline in French imports from and exports to Japan between 1873 and 1914.[26] Between 1873 and 1881 French exports to Japan averaged roughly 15½ million francs a year. Then, from 1882 to 1887, they suffered a considerable drop to approximately 7½ millions.[27]

26.) The following figures are taken from Table 42 in the section on trade in the statistical appendix to Kyōto Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyūshitsu ed., Nihon Kindai-shi Jiten, (Dictionary of Modern Japanese History), Tokyo, 1958. pp. 882-893. Unfortunately the figures given are those for general commerce, which could be anything from 10% to 100% larger than those for special commerce, although 25% appears to be a rough average. The division of the years 1873-1914 into phases has been made with the intention primarily of indicating the periods at which significant change occurred in the value of imports and exports rather than in comparing them exactly with each other. Since the disparity of imports and export values is evident from any set of figures, little point would be served by forcing the figures into artificial patterns for the sake of direct comparison. Since the fortunes of exports and imports were not linked intimately with each other, the respective phases chosen are not always the same.

27.) This striking drop can be attributed mainly to the effects of the Matsukata deflation, though partly also to the stagnation in France following the imposition of protective tariffs in 1881. See Y. Guyot, Le Commerce et les Commerçants, Paris, 1909, pp. 357-359.

They picked up somewhat between 1888 and 1893 when the figure rose again to about 14 million francs, and thereafter there was a slight increase which maintained itself until 1913. The average for this period was in the region of 17 million francs.[28.]

The figures for French imports from Japan show less fluctuation. After a gradual rise in the 1870's and 1880's, they steadily accelerated from the 1890's to 1914, when they received an extra impulsion from the War. Between 1873 and 1880 they averaged 24½ million francs a year, a figure which rose between 1881 and 1887 to almost 40 millions, and between 1888 and 1902 to about 65 millions. Then in the following eleven years, they climbed, on average, to 112 millions a year, their best single year being 1913, when they stood at 165 million francs, compared with a best year for French exports of 22 millions in 1900.

28.) These values have been converted from yen into francs, in approximate correspondence with contemporary rates of exchange, in order to maintain continuity with previous figures and also because the franc fluctuated less than the yen, which depreciated rapidly until Japan went on the gold standard in 1897. Nevertheless the price level in France did fall by about 40% between 1873 and 1896, to rise again by about the same amount between 1896 and 1914, and in the light of this, it can be seen that, except during the 1880's, French exports to Japan changed very little in quantity over the whole forty years.

This disparity was inevitable, given the French demand for Japanese silk, and it cannot be said that the French Government showed any great concern about it, at least before 1900. It was, after all, small in terms of overall trade, and a good deal less substantial than that caused by her trade with China.[29]

Nevertheless, French traders, and the French commercial mentality, did occasionally come under criticism from French diplomats in Japan for their unadventurousness and inefficiency. Some of these criticisms may, perhaps, be disregarded as prejudiced or ill-informed, but others seem fairly well-founded. Roches' unfavourable comparison of French silkworm buyers in Japan with those from Italy,[30] for instance, is supported by the success of the Italian silkworm-rearing industry and the slow but unmistakeable decline of the French in the 1870's and 1880's.[31] In the 1870's criticisms of this kind are no longer encountered, but they make a definite

29.) In 1873, for instance, France imported from Japan 20,290,256 francs worth (Annales du Commerce Extérieur, XLIII, Chine et Indo-Chine, Faits Commerciaux No.50.), but her total imports amounted to 3,600,000,000 francs (M.Block, Statistique de la France, Paris, 1875. vol.II. pp.282-294.) Both figures relate to special commerce. Even in 1907, when Japanese exports to France had increased considerably, Japan, with 83 million francs, figured only 16th on the list of countries supplying French imports, whereas China, with 212 million francs, came 8th. Guyot op. cit., p.380. Although France regularly sold more to Japan than to China, except in 1868 and 1869 this superiority was easily outweighed by French imports from China.
30.) C.C. Yédo. V. Jan.7, 1868. Roches to Moustier.
31.) See G. Chapman, The Third Republic of France, London, 1962.p.109.

return in the mid-1880's with the campaign to secure naval orders for France. In view of the concern felt by the French Government that French shipyards should remain in full operation,[32.] the failure to secure so many orders as Britain and Germany required some explanation by French diplomats, and they found it, pretty consistently, in the inefficient selling methods of French companies. In 1886, when the race to supply the Japanese navy had only just begun, Sienkiewicz complained that only one French establishment was directly represented in Japan,[33.] and the fact that this complaint had not been heeded was seized upon by Collin de Plancy in 1892 to explain the decline in French prestige after three large orders actually had been gained.[34.] Some improvement both in expert knowledge of the market and in construction certainly was needed. One ship had taken longer to build than the contract stipulated and was further reported to be unseaworthy; another had had two accidents on the way to Japan and had still not arrived after 60 days, and a third

32.) This consideration is explicitly stated in an instruction sent to Sienkiewicz on the occasion of a mission to Japan by M. Lehenne, agent of an important French concern. The importance attributed to naval orders can be judged by the Quai's reminder to Sienkiewicz that: "L'intérêt qui s'attache au succès des négociations poursuivies par la Compagnie des Forges et Chantiers n'a pas besoin d'être démontré." C.C. Tokyo. IV. Oct.9, 1885. Freycinet to Sienkiewicz.
33.) C.P. Japon. XXXII. July 9, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
34.) C.P.Japon. XXXVI, Jan.26, 1892. Collin de Plancy to Ribot.

had failed by 3 knots to reach the required speed.[35] Since, in addition to these failings, French ships tended to be more expensive than those of France's rivals,[36] most of the successes which French industry achieved probably owed something to special influence or pressure of some kind. The influence of the French designer, Bertin, for instance, was a powerful factor in deciding the Japanese navy to equip itself with cruisers, which the French could build fairly well, rather than large battleships, in which field French shipyards could not compete.[37] It was also hoped that the Japanese Navy Minister from 1890 to 1892, Admiral Kabayama, might be tempted by the Grand Cross of

35.) Ibid. Even this was less embarrassing than the case of the 'Unebi', an earlier order from France which sank without trace somewhere between Singapore and Japan. See C.P.Japon. XXXIII. Jan.22, 1887. Sienkiewicz to Flourens.
36.) This is only hinted at in the correspondence between Paris and Tokyo but a clear admission can be found in a letter of May 11, 1896, from Deschatmes to Chanoine. According to Descharmes, French companies charged 25% more than Armstrong's and took one to two years longer to build. See Chanoine, op. cit. p.178.
37.) See the report of July 10, 1886, by Rear-Admiral Rieunier to the Ministry of Marine, which the latter sent to the Quai d'Orsay. C.P. Japon XXXII. Aug.28, 1886. Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.

of the Legion of Honour.[38] to favour France, but whether this method ever contributed to French success is doubtful. The one clear case of successfully influencing Japanese purchasing policy by non-commercial considerations occurred in1896, when Japan's need to cut short the protracted Treaty Revision negotiations presented France with an opportunity to bargain which the latter did not let slip.[39]

b.) Commercial Influences on French Policy.

The French Government's concern over the sale of warships raises the question of the extent to which French policy was dictated by considerations of trade. In theory, of course, the creation and continuation of a situation in which trade could be carried on freely was the original and basic justification for the French diplomatic presence in Japan. However, after the Bakumatsu period, the existence of the Treaties, and therefore of trade, was no longer in question, so that the chief way in

38.) C.P. Japon. XXXVI. Jan.26.1892. Collin de Plancy to Ribot; also C.P.Japon XXV, June 5, 1891, in which Sienkiewicz recommended the award in the following terms: "J'ajouterai que nous avons d'autant plus d'intérêt à le faire qu'il est question d'un emprunt intérieur assez sérieuse à l'effet d'augmenter les forces de la Marine Japonaise." Though the Quai d'Orsay rejected the suggestion, the language which it used shows that it saw the problem in the same way:"..."il y aurait lieu d'attendre qu'il nous ait donné des preuves réelles de ses sentiments à notre égard." Sienkiewicz was therefore permitted to inform Kabayama of the possibility. C.P.Japon. XXV. Sept.17,1891. Ribot to Sienkiewicz.

39.) See the chapter on Treaty Revision for details.

which policy might be influenced by trade was removed. Even before this, in any case, trade was sometimes used by France as a cloak for other motives, and after the Meiji Restoration, it was certainly never the shackle on French policy that British trading interests were on British policy. This point must be so apparent by now that it need not be pursued. What is worth investigating more fully, however, is the question of what influence was exerted on French policy by particular commercial needs or pressure groups at a particular times.

The topic which, above all others, suggests itself in this context is what special commercial motivation, if any, there was behind Roches' pro-Bakufu policy. The argument was first developed by Ōtsuka, and has been more or less accepted by most other historians, that it was Roches' pursuit of his mission to develop French trade which led him into blind support of the Shōgun.[40] Up to a point this can be accepted, though with the reservations that this official concern with trade was nothing new, that it need not have excluded other motives, and that the initiative for the Bakufu-French link came as much from a group of Japanese officials as from Roches himself. It is clear from his reports that the Bakufu's lifting of restrictions on the silk trade and cooperation in the provision of silkworm eggs did much to convince Roches of its good faith and friendly feelings

40.) Ōtsuka, Bakumatsu Gaikōshi no Kenkyū, p. 295.

towards France. The argument becomes misleading, however, when the assumption is then made that the extension of French trade was only possible if Roches acquired monopolistic rights in Japan.[41] The two items generally mentioned in connection with Roches' alleged monopoly are the export of silk and the import of arms and munitions. While admitting that Roches was not unhappy at the thought of France holding a special position with regard to either of these important sectors of trade, one may question the justice of the accusation that he was seeking monopolistic rights in any meaningful sense of the word.

To take the silk question first, it is true that there were rumours in Yokohama, which were to some extent accepted by both Winchester and von Poelsbrock, the Dutch Minister, that Roches had monopolistic intentions with regard to silkworm eggs and possibly raw silk itself.[42] But the facts to support such a supposition either do not exist or have been subject to misinterpretation. That suspicions should have been aroused at the time is not altogether surprising. In the early 1860's the vast bulk of silk exported from Japan went to England, whence it was largely re-exported to France. This was a constant source of irritation to the Lyons market and it was

41.) Ibid. See also Ishii, Meiji Ishin Ron, pp.270-271.
42.) See F.O.46. LIII. Feb.28,1865. Winchester to Hammond (Private);. Their suspicions became known to Roches, who chided his colleagues for them, but it is interesting that he declined to inform Drouyn de Lhuys of the details of this misunderstanding. See C.P.Japon. XIII, April 26, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.

largely in order to remedy the situation that the Messageries Impériales were encouraged to extend their service to Yokohama. It was against the background of the Messageries' decision that Roches arrived in Japan. His activity was not such as to allay the fears that had been aroused among the English merchants of new competition, and his secretive nature could hardly have been better calculated to stir up wild accusations. One of his first actions after the political impasse had been removed by the Shimonoseki Expedition, was to request the Bakufu to supply him with 15,000 silkworm eggs for the purpose of regenerating the French silkworm rearing industry.[43] The Bakufu's response was astonishing in view of its previous lack of cooperation. About 40,000 eggs were brought to Roches and a French expert, named Barlandier, was allowed to select the best specimens.[44] This move was followed, early in 1865, by a Bakufu request, which Roches supported, that the French Government supply the Shōgun with 16 of the new French rifled cannons.[45] Their arrival in June did not go unnoticed.[46] Finally, in the autumn of 1865, Roches accepted a further gift of silkworm eggs from the Bakufu.[47]

43.) C.C.Yédo,III. Sept. 1, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.
44.) C.C.Yédo,III. Nov.9,1864. Roches to Drouyn.
45.) C.P.Japon. XIII. Jan.16,1865. Roches to Drouyn.
46.) See F.O.46. LV. No.96. June, 7, 1865. Winchester to Russell.
47.) C.C. Yédo. IV. Sept.11, 1865. Roches to Drouyn. Whether or not this gift was provoked by Roches is uncertain. He himself claimed that it was a spontaneous act by the Bakufu. On the other hand, it is stated by Duseigneur in the Moniteur des Soies of March 17, 1866, that Roches asked for a second consignment at his prompting.

These three actions were connected and given an exaggerated interpretation by English opinion in Japan.[48] But if solid evidence rather than mere suspicion is taken into account it is plain that they presaged no attempt to establish a French monopoly. If one looks at the question from the French angle itself, for example, one finds that Roches' original purchase came under fire from French as well as English traders,[49] and his second acquisition was received with mixed feelings in France as well.[50] The complaint was made that he was competing on unfair terms with genuine traders, and that once the restriction on the export of eggs had been lifted at the start of 1865 any further official action was unnecessary. Still more significant, although Roches had been warmly congratulated by Drouyn de Lhuys, on the success of his first initiative, he was informed in 1865 that silkworm eggs should henceforth be left to the industry itself.[51] With both his Minister and

48. Winchester's suspicions appear in his private letter to Hammond of April 27, 1865, in F.O.46. LIV. See also the attack in the Japan Herald, which the Quai enclosed with a request to Roches for an explanation in C.C.Yédo IV. Sept. 25. 1866.

49. Moniteur des Soies, Jan.7.1865; Jan.14,1865. The main opponent was a merchant named Pila, who, having secured silkworm eggs himself after much difficulty, resented Government competition, as he regarded it, and was particularly aggrieved that Roches had not paid the 5% export duty.

50. Moniteur des Soies, Jan.13,1865; March 17, 1866.

51. C.C.Yédo. III. Dec. 22.1864. Drouyn to Roches. Drouyn's instruction not to intervene further does not appear in any of the series but is referred to in C.C.Yédo. IV. Sept.11.1865. Roches to Drouyn.

his own traders demanding an end to official intervention, it is hard to see how Roches could ever have thought of creating a monopoly, even if he had wanted to.[52]

Nor is the case of the import of arms by the Compagnie Franco-Japonaise much more incriminating. It is true that Roches spoke of Japan becoming a French market, but it is important to observe that he saw this prospect in terms of the British position in China, which, in so far as it was largely a British market, was so mainly because of British capital resources and established connections with important Chinese merchants. The Compagnie Franco-Japanaise was a short-cut to the same end, but that it did not imply an actual monopoly was expressly stated by Roches when he wrote:-

"Il a été bien entendu, d'ailleurs, que le gouvernement japonais renoncerait à tout action sur ces Compagnies autre que celle qu'exercent les gouvernements Européens sur des associations de ce genre et qu'il éviterait soigneusement de fournir aucun motif de plainte soit au commerce en général, soit à aucune des autres Puissances en particulier, en s'interdisant d'accorder aux Compagnies en question des privilèges incompatibles avec l'entière liberté réservée aux opérations Commerciales des Etrangers." 53

52. That, in any case, he did not want to, is indicated by his comment on the Bakufu edict of May 1866, which finally permitted silk to be brought direct to Yokohama without any transit duty: "Je crois superflu d'appuyer sur l'importance de cette mesure." C.P.Japon.XIV.May 27, 1866. Roches to Drouyn.

53. C.C.Yédo, IV. Oct. 17, 1865. Roches to Drouyn.

The Company appeared likely to secure a large share of the Japanese Government's orders of foreign manufacturers but, as Winchester himself had earlier admitted, "A Government going beyond its own territory to trade is a private individual and can suit itself as to a market."[54] What did disturb the English colony about Roches' schemes was that Government imports might be paid for "by consigning all the available silk worm eggs to France and as much silk as may be wanted to cover the contracts."[55] On this point, however, Winchester, at least, had his mind set at rest by Roches, who declared, after raising the topic himself, "that no such schemes were in contemplation" and "that if he pursued such vicious commercial schemes he would deserve to be put to the door (à la porte) by his government."[56] In view of the doubts about Roches' two very limited operations on the part of French merchants, the caution of the Quai d'Orsay, and the fact that the supplies of silk and silkworm eggs far exceeded the value of French imports into Japan, it seems not unreasonable to accept Roches' good faith in this matter.

There is further evidence that Roches was not aiming at a monopolistic position for France. Declarations and proposals that he made on various occasions, show him, in

54. F.O.46. LIII. Feb.28.1865. Winchester to Hammond (Private).
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.

diametrical opposition to the usual view, as a firm believer in free trade. It should be remembered that Roches' Lyons background was one which would have endowed him with a predisposition towards free trade.[57] To judge by some of Roches' language in fact, free trade was almost as much an ideology with him as it was with Cobden or Bright. The vehemence with which he repudiated the idea of monopoly has already been seen in his declaration to Winchester. His message to Chōshū in July 1864, contains a similar ideological element:

"comme les hommes sont tous Frères, le Très-Haut a décidé, dans sa Suprême miséricorde, qu'ils auraient entr'eux des rapports amicaux et des relations commerciales qui les mettraient tous à même de profiter des avantages qu'il a concédés aux différentes nations et aux différentes contrées." 58

That this was not mere verbiage is indicated by what Roches wrote in 1865 in connection with the approaching tariff revision negotiations: "mes collègues adopteraient, sans difficulté, la base de 10 à 12%, mais j'éspère amener le Gouvernement Japonais à consentir à ne plus lever sur toutes espèces de marchandises, sans distinction, qu'un droit de 5%."[59] That this was eventually achieved undoubtedly owed much to Roches and suggests that he was not engaging in duplicity, as Parkes suspected, when he unsuccessfully proposed to Drouyn that the French Government should support a plan to make Nagasaki and Hakodate free ports.[60]

57. "the silk-merchants of Lyon, who disposed of the great part of their output abroad... were natural freetraders." Chapman, op.cit., p.145.
58. F.O.46.VI.No.50. Aug.23,1864. Alcock to Palmerston. Inclosure 17. Roches to Prince of Chōshū, July 21,1864.
59. C.C.Yédo. IV. Dec.1.1865. Roches to Drouyn.

All this is not to argue that Roches' professions need always be taken at face value, or that in practice he was not prepared to see Frenchmen take advantage of the favour in which France stood. Moreover, in one respect he was opposed to complete freedom of trade. The desire of many silk merchants for complete access to the Japanese silkworm areas found no sympathy with him. The reason for this, however, was no nefarious scheme, but the belief which Duseigneur and many other experts held that the disease which had struck the silkworm-rearing industries of France and the rest of Europe, and even much of Asia, was caused by 'grainage industriel', the excessive commercial breeding of the silkworm.[61] Their anxiety lest the Japanese silkworm should have its quality impaired before the French varieties recovered was shared by Roches[62] and may have contributed to his reluctance to see any new ports opened. Apart from this, however, he took no actual measures to restrict the export of eggs, and in general it may be said that the evidence that Roches' policy was decided by the pursuit of monopoly rights is practically nil.

60. C.P.Japon.XIV. April 24, 1866. Drouyn to Roches; F.O.46. LXV. No.18. Jan.31, 1866. Parkes to Clarendon.

61. See e.g. the Minister of Agriculture's report to the Emperor in Moniteur des Soies, July 22, 1865.

62. C.C.Yédo.III. Oct. 15, 1864. Roches to Drouyn.

Apart from Roches and the sale of warships cases of commercial or economic pressures influencing diplomacy in anything but a general way, are comparatively few. In fact, it is just as easy to find examples of commercial interests failing to have the influence that might have been expected of them. For instance, though the need for Japanese silkworms was already being felt in 1862, the French Government made no special effort to coerce the Bakufu into relaxing its prohibition on their export, even though this prohibition was in fact contrary to the Treaty. It was claimed that Drouyn de Lhuys did instruct Bellecourt and Roches to facilitate the purchase of silkworm eggs,[63] but there is nothing in the archives to support this, and it is worth noting that Drouyn specifically referred to Roches' 'initiative' with regard to the first consignment of 15,000 eggs.[64] Moreover, on the very same day in 1863 that the Moniteur des Soies was proclaiming: "Les prochains courriers du Japon vont avoir aussi une grande influence sur nos marchés,"[65] Drouyn was writing reproving dispatches to Bellecourt, in which he spoke of France "n'ayant pas jusqu'à présent de grands intérêts à protéger dans les mers du Japon."[66]

63. By F. Jacquemart, in a report for the Société Impériale d'Acclimatation reprinted in the Moniteur des Soies, March 18, 1865. Drouyn was President of the Society.

64. C.C.Yédo.III. Dec.22,1864. Drouyn to Roches.

65. Moniteur des Soies, July 18, 1863.

66. C.P.Japon.IX.July 18,1863. A few months earlier Drouyn had refused Bellecourt's request for the establishment of a consulate at Yokohama, stating that the expense "...ne serait nullement justifiée par le degré d'importance de nos intérêts commerciaux et maritimes au Japon." C.C.Yédo.II.Mar.21.1863. Drouyn to Bellecourt.

In the important question of Treaty Revision, too, where the views of trade might have been expected to be heard, there is little evidence of consultation with the French community at Yokohama or with French Chambers of Commerce,[67] and the main decisions were frequently taken for political rather than economic reasons. Furthermore, not only was French policy not dominated by the desire to make Japan a new market for the export of capital, but from 1868 until the mid 1890's the very idea of a loan was only mentioned once by a French diplomat in Japan, and that with the object of warning French banks about Japan's financial instability.[68]

Against this, the examples that do exist of economic influences on diplomacy are all, apart from shipbuilding, connected with the silk trade, and for the most part had no real political significance. In 1881 the report that the Japanese Government had established a monopolistic silk-selling company led to telegrams and a protest from the Quai d'Orsay, but Roquette allowed himself to be satisfied with a

67. The Quai consulted French chambers of commerce in 1873 (C.C.Yédo.VI. July 20, 1873. Broglie to Berthemy) and Roquette requested it to do so again in 1882. (C.C.Yédo.II.Jan.19.1882) though there is no record of this having been done. French merchants in Japan were asked for their views in 1879 by Balloy (L'Echo du Japon. Dec.12.1879) and again in 1894 by Harmand (C.C.Tokyo IX. Sept.24,1894. Harmand to Hanotaux). No other instance of consultation during the quarter of a century of a century that Treaty Revision took has been found.

68. C.P.Japon. XXVII. Sept.14,1880. Balloy to Freycinet.

Government promise that the company did not possess official protection.[69] Three years later a more important instance occurred. In this case France demanded the removal of the Japanese export duty on silk in return for her agreement to a revised tariff, an act which considerably complicated Inoue's already difficult task, and contributed to the failure of the revision conferences.[70] Finally in 1897-8 a law passed to encourage the direct export of silk by Japanese merchants by means of a bounty caused anguished protests from French and British traders. Eventually the remonstrances of the Foreign Representatives and the threat of imposing a duty on Japanese-imported silk, equal to the bounty on its entry into France, secured the suppression of the law.[71] These incidents, however, though they involved diplomatic action of one sort or another, cannot be said to have had any effect on France's general policy towards Japan.

In conclusion it may be worthwhile to try and assess the economic importance to both countries of French trade with Japan. Its importance for France was naturally less than for Japan, since it formed only a small fraction of France's total overseas trade. Nevertheless, its value was greater than these figures alone would suggest. The French silk industry

69. C.C.Tokyo.II. Oct.28.1881. Ibid. Oct.31.1881. Barthélemy St. Hilaire to Roquette. Ibid. Undated telegram (Nov.3 or 4); Ibid. Nov.7.1881. both Roquette to Barthélemy St. Hilaire.

70. See Chapter VI.

71. C.C.Tokyo.X. March 31,1897. Harmand to Hanotaux;IBID. April 15,1897. Harmand to Hanotaux;Ibid.May 11.1897. Hanotaux to Harmand; Ibid.July 22,1897. Harmand to Hanotaux; C.C.Tokyo.XI. May.21.1898. Harmand to Hanotaux.

was one of the country's most important industries, and Roches was hardly exaggerating in 1864 when he claimed that "l'une des sources principales de notre richesse nationale ménacerait de tarir si un élément nouveau et sain ne venait régénérer celui qui fait défaut aujourd'hui."[72] Two quotations, from official and unofficial sources, will serve to indicate the part played by the Japanese silkworm in saving the French industry from the effects of the disease known as pébrine. The first, which is taken from a Government statement to the Senate in 1866, echoes the hopes of experts who had studied the crisis for two or three years: "L'industrie des soies, éprouvée déjà par plusieurs mauvaises récoltes a compté vainement sur celle de 1865, qui, plus défavourable encore que les précédentes, a demontré que les graines du Japon avaient seules, ou à peu près, quant à présent, le privilège de donner de bons résultats."[73] The second quotation, written five years later when the tide had turned, confirmed the hopes of 1866; "Les graines japonaises ont puissamment aidé la France, l'Italie et d'autres pays, à conserver une industrie qui, autrement, eût été ruinée,"[74]

72. C.C.Yédo.III. Sept. 1.1864. Roches to Drouyn.

73. Quoted in Moniteur des Soies, Jan.27. 1866.

74. Reprinted in Moniteur des Soies, July 8,1871. Production of cocoons in France had declined from 26 mill.kilos in 1853 to 7½ mill.kilos in 1856 and 4 mill.kilos in 1865. 1866 saw a brief recovery to 6,4000,000 kilos, but in 1867 an all-time low was reached with 3,400,000 kilos. The decline was then halted, but real recovery did not take place until 1871, when 7,350,300 kilos were produced. By the mid-1870's the average figure was a little more than 10 million kilos. Moniteur des Soies, June 24, 1876.

proclaimed an article in l'Echo du Japon.

Japanese silkworms rescued the French silkworm-rearing industry from almost complete extinction by providing an alternative supply while the French varieties recovered from their over-intensive exploitation. Their help was particularly valuable for two reasons. In the first place, the French industry, like the Japanese industry later, was largely organised on a domestic basis and the number of families which needed the work to supplement an inadequate return from agriculture was large - about 180,000, most of whom were concentrated in an area noted for its independence of Paris.[75] The social and political consequences of the collapse of the industry, therefore, would have been considerable. In the second place, finished silk was one of France's key exports.[76] Without the use of Japanese silkworms by French rearers a sufficient supply of raw material would have been difficult to procure and the balance of trade, which in the 1870's was becoming unfavourable to France, would have been worse than it was. In due course, high quality Japanese and Chinese raw silk became abundant and cheap enough to satisfy French manufacturing needs and the French silkworm-rearing industry slowly declined, both relatively and absolutely. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the short-term the Japanese silkworm provided a cushion against the shock of

75. See Chapman.op.cit. p.109; Moniteur des Soies, April 8,1876.
76. Until overtaken by woollen goods in the mid-1870's it had been France's chief foreign currency earner, being worth between 400 and 500 million francs annually. Chapman,op.cit. p.145.

pébrine. This was for France the most valuable result of the Japan trade - more important than the additional outlet for woollen muslins and warships, which affected the French economy only marginally.

The importance of French trade for Japan was of a different nature. As for France, it was most valuable during the 'sixties and 'seventies, even though its volume was greater in later years. For Japan it filled the extremely important function, in the 'sixties of providing a favourable balance of trade, and in the 'seventies of reducing the drain of specie from the country. In the decades before and after the Meiji Restoration, America, the great future market for Japan's staple export of silk, was not yet in a position to deal with really large quantities of the one branch of production for which Japan was specially suited, and for which production could be quickly expanded without the need for expensive equipment, Government initiative, or social disruption. Without the French and Italian markets, it is difficult to see how the Meiji Government could have afforded to lay the foundations of industrial modernisation in the 1870's. Foreign experts, model factories, and subsidies for key industries would all have been severely

restricted in scope.[77] Despite the many individual hardships caused to Japanese producers both of silk and silkworm eggs, by violent price fluctuations,[78] it seems undeniable that the trade between France and Japan brought appreciable advantages to both.

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77. An additional advantage can be seen in the fact that the Japanese Government was encouraged by foreign traders, among whom Frenchmen were prominent in this instance, to set up model filatures which would produce better quality silk. (See e.g. Moniteur des Soies, Sept.17, 1870.) This development provided the foundation for the even greater expansion of silk exports at the end of the century.

78. See e.g. Moniteur des Soies, Nov.4,1871; May 8,1875. L'Echo du Japon, June 27,1879. See also a letter from Ed. Schnell, a Swiss consular official in Japan, which stated that some Japanese merchants committed suicide in 1866 on account of the over-supply of silkworm eggs, Moniteur des Soies, July 21.1867.

CONCLUSIONS

The characteristic which marked French policy towards Japan between 1854 and 1894 most strikingly was its negative quality. From the time when her first Treaty with Japan was sought and signed in the late 1850's to the final stages of its revision in the 1890's, France was notable for her almost invariable unwillingness to take an initiative. She commenced her relations with Japan in the wake of the United States and in the shadow of Britain and she completed this period in tow to Russia. In the intervening years, the Quai d'Orsay's main concern was to preserve the advantages that had been so easily obtained in 1858. These advantages were primarily commercial, and French trade did, in fact, attain considerable proportions, but it cannot be said that the French Government showed particular enthusiasm for extending its scope, and traders themselves exerted almost no influence on French policy. Their views were consulted only rarely, and then mostly as a formality or an afterthought. Pressures from the ship-building and silk industries were more effective, but their influence remained marginal. If any consideration stirred France to positive action it was the desire to increase French prestige, an aim which was often linked with the desire to increase French influence. It was largely prestige which brought France to Japan in the first place and much of the French contribution to Japanese

modernisation, especially in the military sphere, stemmed from the belief that it would confirm France as a power of the first order and make her achievements respected throughout the Far East. On a more political level, considerations of prestige confirmed France in her opposition to Treaty Revision. Even prestige, however, had its limitations. The propagation of the French language was generally admitted to be the main foundation for the admiration of French culture, yet the cause of expansion of French education in Japan never attracted from any Foreign Minister a sum larger than 4000 francs, and most years received much less.

The negative quality that marked French diplomacy was not unique to France. None of the European Powers either mounted a sustained campaign to exploit Japan's weakness by extorting new privileges or seriously attempted to secure her as a satellite or ally, which were the two basic alternatives of positive, Imperialist diplomacy. If anything, indeed, France came nearest to pursuing both courses. Jules Berthemy played the leading role in the European attempt to revise the treaties in 1873-4, while in contrast to this, Léon Roches had, a few years earlier, come closer to making Japan dependent on the country he served than did any other Foreign Representative in modern Japanese history. In both these cases, the initiative belonged to the French Minister in Tokyo rather than to his superiors in Paris. Positive action of this sort was rarely promoted by the Quai d'Orsay and when an

important political initiative did originate with the Foreign Minister, as in the case of the decision to collaborate with Japan to weaken China in December 1884, or the decision of Drouyn de Lhuys to offer French help to the Bakufu in 1864 to open the Shimonoseki Straits, the French Minister in Tokyo's distaste for the idea considerably weakened its chances of success.

These facts invite a comparison of the respective parts played in French policy by the Quai d'Orsay and the French diplomats who served in Japan. One must recognize first that it is impossible to distinguish within the Quai d'Orsay itself between the Foreign Minister and his permanent, or near-permanent, senior officials. Almost none of the dispatches sent from the Quai d'Orsay which appear in the French archives bear any clear mark of their real authorship. Since, however, most French Foreign Ministers were in office for too short a time to gain much knowledge of so distant a country as Japan, and since in only one or two instances is there any discernible change of emphasis following a Ministerial changeover, it would not seem unreasonable to assume that Japanese affairs were mostly dealt with by the Political or Commercial Directors or their subordinates. As French diplomats in Japan also succeeded each other at fairly frequent intervals, it might be imagined that they too would be easily controlled. For a number of reasons,

this was not always so. To begin with, the only thing that the Quai d'Orsay impressed upon its agents was that they must avoid all complications which might lead France into costly military operations. This, however, was far from being a complete guide for diplomats faced with a variety of new questions arising out of changing circumstances. The distance separating Paris from Tokyo made their problem a very real one. To receive a reply to a written dispatch took between three and four months, if it was quick, and until the early 1880's telegrams were not much better. The latter means of communication, was, in any case, strongly discouraged by the Quai d'Orsay itself on account of its expense.

If distance presented a problem, it also presented ambitious diplomats with an opportunity. Roches certainly owed much of his success to this factor, and if, after the Quai d'Orsay had discovered how deeply he had involved France in Japanese politics, a closer watch was kept on his successors, there was still room for them to act independently in some areas and thus influence French policy by their personality. This was especially true of the differing importance which successive agents placed on the pursuit of prestige and influence. Although the Quai d'Orsay always favoured this in a general way, it never until the later 1880's actually intimated to French diplomats that they should concern themselves with it, perhaps because it realized that from Paris

it was impossible to predict when opportunities would arise, although more probably because the extent to which Japan turned to the West for help in modernisation took it by surprise. From the time of the Franco-Chinese War, it began to be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a matter of prime importance that France should be in a position to influence Japan by means of individuals or groups. By then, however, Japan was dispensing with most of her foreign experts and acquiring very few new ones. In these circumstances, the Quai d'Orsay was dependent on the efforts of earlier French representatives. As it happened, the majority of these, though not, for the most part, noticeably pro-Japanese, were extremely sensitive either to the idea of France's civilising mission or to the credit that would accrue to France, and omitted no opportunity of recommending to Japan the employment of French lawyers, soldiers, and technicians. Had more of them been shaped in the Berthemy mould, however, the out-come would have been very different.

French representatives also had a discernible influence on the course of Treaty Revision. Their direct knowledge of Japanese conditions compelled the Quai d'Orsay to pay considerable attention to their views, and when negotiations were held in Tokyo they had a tactical advantage in that the Quai could hardly question their reasons for seeking or rejecting co-operation with other Powers, if they should choose to exercise their own prejudices. Generally, they

used their position to hinder the work of Revision, and it is worth asking why this was so. One factor may have been that with very few exceptions all the diplomats who served as minister or chargé d'affaires in Japan were men whose careers had been spent outside Western Europe. They were not accustomed to treat the officials with whom they dealt on terms of real equality, and with these habits they did not adjust well to Japanese circumstances. Japan's attempts to recover full sovereignty, in particular, aroused extraordinary hostility among French diplomats, whose early reports often complained bitterly of Japanese vanity and ambition. The fact that the one French minister who remained in Japan for a longer period showed unmistakable signs of mellowing in his attitude towards the Japanese suggests that the brevity of most representatives' service was also not without its effects on French policy.

If the numerous changes in French representation tended to allow initial personal impressions to influence the character of French diplomacy in Japan, they also tended to weaken the force of recommendations sent from Tokyo, especially if they seemed to the Quai d'Orsay to threaten its policy of avoidance of complications. Numerous cases of recommendations being ignored could be cited, from Thouvenel's rejection of Duchesne de Bellecourt's advice regarding the postponed opening of Hyōgo, Osaka, Edo, and Niigata in 1860, up to Hanotaux's decision, in total disregard of

Harmand's warnings of the effect this would have on relations with Japan, to join Russia and Germany in the Triple Intervention. In view of this, there is no doubt that in the last resort the Quai d'Orsay maintained its control over the important sectors of policy. Even when the major decision-making role was allowed to slip into Roches' hands, the Quai d'Orsay managed to retrieve the situation before it was too late. This meant that whenever there was a conflict, or possible conflict, between French interests in Japan and European considerations (which usually meant the need to keep on good terms with Britain), the former were invariably subordinated to the latter.

The fact that French policy was basically negative meant that its influence on Japan was less than it might have been. It is true that Roches' deep involvement in the Bakufu's struggle for survival had the unlooked-for effect of hastening its overthrow. After the Meiji Restoration, however, there was very little attempt by France to influence the course of Japanese politics or foreign policy, nor was there any thought of indirect influence by means of economic or financial penetration. The main, and almost the sole, exception was the French interest in Japanese assistance during the Franco-Chinese War, but this was unsuccessful and in one respect may have confirmed Inoue in his pacific policy rather than the reverse, since the possibility of alliance contributed to China's willingness to come to terms with Japan regarding Korea.

All this is not to say that French policy was completely without influence on Japanese history. There can be no doubt that the French experts who came to Japan contributed appreciably to the consolidation of the Meiji Government and the establishment of a legal system suitable to a modern society. Much of the most important work could not have been carried out had not various French representatives been concerned with prestige and influence. On the other hand, the unimaginative French attitude towards Treaty Revision helped to delay fulfillment of the chief objective of the Meiji leaders some years longer than was probably necessary, and this had unfortunate repercussions on the character of both Japanese politics and foreign policy. The reasons for the French attitude were clearly stated by Frederick Marshall in a perceptive memorandum in 1883.

"When the question of revising the Japanese treaties first came before Europe, France took up an attitude of indifference towards Japan. Her Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed, repeatedly, during several years, in private conversations, the opinion that France had nothing to care about in Japan, and that though she would probably, in the end, act as other European nations might act in the matter, she would take no initiative therein, and would hold to the present treaty as long as she possibly could."

"France gave several reasons for this attitude. She said, in substance, that her position in Europe was delicate and difficult, that her whole thoughts were absorbed by that position, that her trade with Japan was small and her political interests there null, that she would only create difficulties with her European neighbours by assuming an active position in the Japanese revision, and that she wished to trouble herself as little as possible about that revision." 1.

1. J.K.K.N.G.B.vol.II.p.962.Enclosure in Hachisuka to Inoue, Sept.13.1883.

A study of the Quai d'Orsay archives confirms the truth of Marshall's allegations. The French Government's preoccupation with Europe prevented the Quai d'Orsay from paying serious attention to the problems of the new Japan. Nor, after Roches, did it have, except perhaps during the brief period when Turenne was in Tokyo, any Minister who had either an instinctive understanding of Japanese potentialities or sufficient time to see that the changes taking place were not so superficial as they seemed. No French diplomat ever realised before 1890 how considerable a military Power the high degree of centralisation and the strong feelings of nationalism would make Japan. Yet France, more than any other Power perhaps, would have benefited from and might have achieved, an entente with Japan. The sense of inferiority which she felt particularly strongly in the Far East because of her military and naval weakness there might have been alleviated had she entered into some sort of diplomatic collaboration with Japan. The position of both countries with regard to China would have been strengthened and the Far Eastern situation might well have proved more stable on that account. Between France and Japan there were no basic conflicts of interest, and because Japan was not an important market for her, France's policy was not shackled by the need to consult with influential traders. Indeed, if she had paid a little more attention to Japan, she might have realised that the latter's economy had within a decade of the Meiji

Restoration become inextricably involved in the international economy and that it would have been almost suicidal for a Japanese Government to denounce the Treaties in order to break off trade relations. On Japan's part, a tie based on common interests and without any suggestion of political inequality would, if France could have accepted it, have brought material and psychological advantages. To say that this was inconceivable at the time is to ignore the success of Léon Roches. Many of Roches' successors were men of ability, but to be a successful diplomat in Japan, something more was needed. When Sienkiewicz wrote in January 1894, "on est trop porté en Europe à ne pas prendre le Japon au sérieux,"[2] he was bearing witness also to his own failure, and that of his predecessors, to make allowances for the difficulties faced by a modernising nation. The main conclusion that emerges from a study of French policy towards Japan in the 19th century is that a great opportunity was missed through lack of imagination.

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2. C.P.Japon.XXXIX. Jan.4.1894. Sienkiewicz to Casimir-Périer.

ABBREVIATIONS.

C.P.Japon.	Correspondance Politique. Japon.
C.P.Chine.	Correspondance Politique. Chine.
C.P.Allemagne.	Correspondance Politique. Allemagne.
M.D.Japon.	Mémoires et Documents. Japon.
C.C.Yédo.	Correspondance Commerciale. Yédo.
C.C.Tokyo.	Correspondance Commerciale, Tokyo.
Shin-Futsu Sensō.	Tongking ni Kansuru Shin-Futsu Senso.
N.G.B.	Nihon Gaikō Bunsho.
F.O.46.	Foreign Office General Correspondence. Japan.
F.O.27.	Foreign Office General Correspondence. France.
F.O.17.	Foreign Office General Correspondence. China.
F.O.391.	The Hammond Papers.
J.K.K.N.G.B.	Jōyaku Kaisei Kankei Nihon Gaikō Bunsho.

GLOSSARY

Bakufu.	Literally 'tent government'. The administrative machine which handled Shogunate and national affairs.
Bakumatsu.	The final years of Tokugawa rule.
Bugyō.	Bakufu officials of the middle and upper levels of the administrative hierarchy. This group supplied the governors of cities such as Nagasaki.
Daimyō.	Lords who held fiefs valued at 10,000 koku. (4.96 bushels) of rice per year or above. Divided into two categories, fudai and tozama, the former being the descendants of men who had supported the founder of the Tokugawa dynasty before the decisive battle of Sekigahara in 1600.
Fukoku Kyōhei.	Literally 'rich country, strong army'. A slogan which expressed the key aim of the Meiji leaders.
Han.	The main political unit in the Tokugawa period. The area ruled by a daimyō.
Hanbatsu Seifu.	Literally 'government by han cliques.' A term used by the opposition in their attack on the Satsuma-Chōshū dominated Meiji Government.
Hatamoto.	Tokugawa vassals with fiefs valued at less than 10,000 koku per year.

Kōbu-Gattai.	Literally 'unity of Court and Bakufu'. Represented a programme which commanded wide support among all Japanese political groups in the first half of the 1860's.
Mikado.	A title widely used by foreigners to denote the Emperor.
Rōjū.	The senior Bakufu council, consisting usually of 4 or 5 of the more powerful fudai daimyō.
Rōnin.	Literally 'wave-men'. Samurai who had abandoned their han, often in order to attempt violent solutions to national problems.
Sakoku.	Literally 'closed country'. Referred to the Tokugawa policy of seclusion from the outside world.
Samurai.	Members of the warrior class which numbered about 5% of the population and was divided into a considerable number of ranks.
Shōgun.	Hereditary ruler of the Tokugawa Bakufu, whose powers to control national affairs were delegated to him, in theory, by the Emperor.
Sonnō-Jōi.	Literally 'Honour the Emperor - Expel the Barbarian'. A slogan deriving from two distinct roots which merged after 1858 to become an effective banner of the opponents of the Bakufu.

Taikoun.	In English generally 'tycoon'. The title by which foreigners generally referred to the Shōgun.
Wakadoshiyori.	The second Bakufu council.

APPENDIX A.

French Representatives in Japan, 1859-1894.

Duchesne de Bellecourt, June 1859-April 1864. Previously a member of Baron Gros' mission to China. Not listed in the Dictionnaire Diplomatique. Later Consul-Général, Batavia.

Léon Roches, April 1864-June 1868. Born 1809. Previous service in North Africa and Trieste.

Ange-Maxime Outrey, June 1868-October 1871. Born 1822. Previous service in Damascus, Beirut, and Alexandria.

Paul de Turenne d'Aynac, Chargé d'affaires, October 1871 - June 1873. Born 1842. Previous service in Japan, the Quai d'Orsay (Direction Politique), and Washington.

Jules Berthemy, June 1873 - April 1875. Previously Minister in Peking and Washington.

Ange-Guillaume Ouvré de Saint-Quentin, Chargé d'affaires, April 1875 - May 1877. Born 1828. Previous service on Pyrennees Commission, in Stuttgart, Tangiers, and Lima.

Francis-Henri-Louis de Geofroy, May 1877 - March 1879. Born 1822. Previous service in Washington, Athens, Madrid, the Quai d'Orsay and Peking.

Marie-René-Davy de Chavigné de Balloy. Chargé d'affaires,
Marie-René-Davy de Chavigné de Balloy. Chargé d'affaires,
March 1879 - Dec. 1880. Born 1845. Previous service in Brussels, Berlin, Peking and Teheran.

Guillaume de Roquette, Dec. 1880 - March 1882. Born 1837. Previous service in London, Tangiers, Peking and Berne.

Arthur Tricou, June 1882 - May 1883. Born 1837. Previous service in Beirut, Constantinople, Cairo, and Teheran.

Ulric de Viel Castel, Chargé d'affaires, May 1883 - Oct. 1883. Previous service in Madrid and St. Petersburg.

Joseph-Adam Sienkiewicz. Oct. 1883 - May 1894. (On leave May 1887 - Sept. 1888 and Nov. 1891 - February 1893). Born 1836. Previous service in Smyrna, Panama, Hong Kong, Malta, Beirut and Cairo.

Ernest-Adrien Bourgarel. Chargé d'affaires, May 1887 - Sept.1888 Born 1850. Previous service in Peking, the Quai d'Orsay, Berne, Santiago, and Rome.

Victor-Joseph Collin de Plancy, Chargé d'affaires Nov. 1891 - Feb. 1893. Born 1853. Previous service in Peking, Shanghai and Seoul.

Pierre-Georges Dubail, Chargé d'affaires, June-July 1894. Born 1845. Previous service in Santiago, Peking, Chefou, the Quai d'Orsay, Rome, Quebec, Amsterdam, and Shanghai.

François-Jules Harmand, July 1894 - 1905. Born 1845. Previous service in Bangkok, Tongking, Calcutta and Santiago.

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Appendix B.

French Foreign Ministers, 1854 - 1896.

	Date of Appointment.
Drouyn de Lhuys,	July, 1852.
Walewski,	May 8, 1855.
Baroche,	January 5, 1860 (Interim).
Thouvenel,	January 24, 1860.
Drouyn de Lhuys,	October 15, 1862.
de la Valette,	September 1, 1866 (Interim).
de Moustier,	October 2, 1866.
de la Valette,	December 17, 1868.
d'Auvergne Lauraguais,	July 17, 1869.
Daru,	January 2, 1870.
Ollivier,	April 14, 1870 (Interim).
Gramont,	May 15, 1870.
d'Auvergne Lauraguais,	August 10, 1870.
Favre,	September 4, 1870.
de Rémusat,	August 2, 1871.
Broglie,	May 26, 1873.
Decazes,	November 26, 1873.
de Banneville,	November 23, 1877.
Waddington,	December 13, 1877.
de Freycinet,	December 27, 1879.
Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire,	September 23, 1880.
Gambetta,	November 14, 1881.
de Freycinet,	January 30, 1882.

	Date of Appointment.
Duclerc,	August 7, 1882.
Fallières,	January 29, 1883 (Interim).
Challemel-Lacour,	February 21, 1883.
Ferry,	June 16, 1883 - July 1, 1883 (Interim).
"	September 16, 1883 - September 29, 1883 (Interim).
"	November 8, 1883 - November 20, 1883 (Interim).
"	November 20, 1883.
de Freycinet,	April 6, 1885.
Flourens,	December 11, 1886.
Goblet,	April 3, 1888.
Spuller,	February 22, 1889.
Ribot,	March 17, 1890.
Develle,	January 11, 1893.
Casimir-Périer,	December 3, 1893.
Hanotaux,	May 30, 1894.
Delcassé,	June 28, 1898.

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i. French.

Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères at the Quai d'Orsay. Correspondance Politique. Japon. Vols. I --XLVI. These volumes, averaging about 700 pages in length, cover the years 1854-1896. Their content is highly political, both because French Ministers interested themselves less in commercial and other matters than their British counterparts and because an indeterminate number of dispatches, particularly those coming under the heading of personnel, have been omitted in the compiling of the volumes. Thus dispatches are sometimes referred to which are not included in this, or any other, series. The arrangement of the volumes is straightforwardly chronological, with Quai d'Orsay dispatches (in draft), being interspersed with those from the French Minister in Japan. In the earlier volumes it is common to find duplicates of dispatches from the Correspondance Commerciale. Besides the correspondence between Paris and Tokyo, relevant dispatches to and from the French Ambassador in London are also included, as are a considerable number of inter-Ministerial communications, though these become rare in later years.

Correspondance Commerciale, Yédo. Vols.I-VI. (1859-1876).

Correspondance Commerciale, Tokyo. Vols. I-XI. (1877-1899). These two series, which are really one, contain, as well as

the occasional political dispatch, the correspondence between the Commercial Department of the Quai d'Orsay and the Minister in Japan on matters of general commercial interest. They are very patchy in places, one volume covering the whole of the period 1870-1877, but they do provide the bulk of the material relating to the later stages of Treaty Revision.

Mémoires et Documents, Japon. Vols. I-III. These three volumes, which cover the years 1854-70, 1871-84, and 1864-73 respectively, are of considerable importance. They contain most of the memoranda, either official or unofficial, which sought to influence French policy, particularly in the 1850's and 1860's, and thus provide an insight into the working of the Quai d'Orsay which is lacking in the other series. They also include documents which, because of their length, irregular form, or unusual source, were not inserted in the Correspondance Politique. Among these categories fall Brunet's letters, the translation of a Japanese historical claim to sovereignty over the Ryūkyūs, the account of the interview between Rémusat and Iwakura, and a number of documents relating to the terms of employment of the military missions.

Correspondance Politique, Chine. This series is an essential supplement to the series on Japan for the 1850's and the period of the Franco-Chinese dispute.

Mémoires et Documents, Chine. Though there is more material in this series than the comparable one for Japan, it revealed nothing about the efforts of Patenôtre to secure agreement

with Japan in 1884.

Correspondance Politique. Allemagne. This series was used only to investigate the suggestion in the Japanese records that an attempt to secure an entente was made in 1884 through the Japanese Minister in Berlin.

ii.) Japanese.

a) Archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Gaimushō).

Tongking ni Kansuru Shin-Futsu Sensō (The Sino-French War over Tongking), 3 vols. This undated typewritten series comprises a substantial selection, running to about 2,000 pages in all, of the correspondence between the Gaimushō and its agents, both ministerial and consular, in China, Korea, and Europe. Unfortunately, not all of the 371 dispatches listed in the index are present, presumably because there was a gap between the time of its compilation and that of the volumes themselves. A separate series dealing with reports of a Franco-Japanese alliance is referred to in the index, and it seems likely the missing dispatches were placed in this instead, only to be destroyed by fire later, like the original dispatches.

Denshinsha-ō (Copies of Telegrams - outgoing) (1883,1885) 2 Vols.

Denshin-rai (Copies of Telegrams - incoming) (1883,1885) 2 vols. These four surviving volumes of copies of telegrams provide a valuable guide to Inoue's main preoccupations at this time.

The Japanese Government used telegrams much more extensively than did the Western Powers and fortunately English was the only practical medium.

b) Material kept at the Diet Library, Constitutional History Records Room (Kenseishiryōshitsu).

Itō Hirobumi Kankei Shiryō (Records Relating to Itō Hirobumi), Series 624. Itō Hirobumi Ke Bunsho (ItōHirobumi'Family Documents) vols. XIV & XV, (letters from Inoue Kaoru).

Inoue Kaoru Kankei Bunsho (Records Relating to Inoue Kaoru).

Series 657.Vol.I. (letters from Aoki Shūzō)

Series 661.Vol.I. (letters from Itō Hirobumi).

These three series were the only ones at the Diet Library which yielded any information regarding the Japanese attitude towards the Franco-Chinese War. Other series looked at contained letters from Inoue to Yamagata, Gotō to Itō, and Kuroda to Inoue. The materials are of enormous value historically but difficulties of style make them an intimidating proposition for non-Japanese.

iii.) British.

Foreign Office Records kept at the Public Record Office.

F.O.46. This series contains the general correspondence with the British Minister in Japan. It has been used extensively to supplement the Correspondance Politique Japon for the 1860's, and also for the 1870's and 1880's in several cases when the policies of Britain and France were marked either by cooperation or discord.

F.O.17. This correspondence with the British Minister in China has been consulted for background to French diplomacy in China and Chinese attitudes in 1884.

F.O.27. This series, which contains the correspondence between the Foreign Office and the British Ambassador in Paris has been consulted for details of British approaches to France and for reports on French policy towards Japan.

F.O.391. (The Hammond Papers). Vol.I consists of letters between the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Alcock. Vol.XIV consists of letters from Parkes during 1866-68 and presents a clear picture of the latter's attitude to Roches.

B. Published.

i.) Official.

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iii.) Newspapers and Periodicals.

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contains nothing for the first five years. As a newspaper l'Echo du Japon was not of much stature, but its coverage of the silk trade was extremely good, and it has provided a certain amount of useful information to supplement the relatively thin French diplomatic records.

Le Temps. This influential newspaper, which was closely connected with the French metallurgical industry, was consulted in the hope of discovering whether there was any public interest in the idea of a Franco-Japanese entente in 1883-5. It proved to reflect the official neglect of Japan in containing no serious article on her.

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forum for the vigorous expression of differing viewpoints about the French silk industry by leading merchants and experts. Contains much information about Japan in the 1860's and 1870's.

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