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THE POLITICAL RELATIONS OF
THE MUGHALS WITH THE DECCAN STATES
(1556 -- 1658 A.D)

THESIS submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of London.

by

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ABSTRACT

I have divided my work into three main sections, one for each of the Mughal emperors, **AKBAR**, **JAHANGIR** and **SHAHJAHAN**.

The introduction deals with geography of the Deccan and the early history of the Deccan states and their relations with **IRAN**, with which they were connected by their common Shi'a faith. A detailed justification of my thesis subject is also advanced in the introduction.

Section I is divided into three chapters. The first deals with the difficulties of Akbar in subjugating the north, the motives of the emperor in penetrating into the south and inducements offered by Deccan weaknesses. In the second the conquest of **AHMADNAGAR** by the Mughals is discussed and is shown that the **NIZAM SHAHIS** were responsible for their own ruin, through their mutual rivalries. In the third the conquest of Asirgarh is discussed.

In the Section II, the ⁱⁿ⁻efficiency of **JAHANGIR** and the court intrigues, which encouraged the Deccanis to recapture their territory and which eventually led to the rebellion of **SHAHJAHAN** have been described.

Section III has three chapters. The first deals with the Mughals' permanent annexation of **AHMADNAGAR** in 1636. In the second the treaty of 1636 with **GOLCONDA** is discussed revealing that Qutb Shah himself was responsible for the ruin of his state in 1656. The third deals with the devastation of **BIJAPUR** and the treaty of 1636, which reduced 'ADIL SHAH

to a vassal of the Mughals. A discussion on the legality of the succession of 'ALI 'ADIL SHAH II follows and the Mughal invasion on BIJAPUR in 1657 is justified. In both the second and third chapters, court intrigues which checked the Mughal progress in the Deccan have been analysed.

The conclusion gives my personal views on the subject.

Appendix (a) contains a discussion on the respective value of Muslim and Jesuit sources for the capture of Asirgarh, (b) a commentary from the angle of this thesis upon some of the sources and (c) is a bibliography.

FOOTNOTE ABBREVIATIONS

ADAB;	Adab-i- ⁶ Alangiri
A.N:	Akbar Namah by Abu'l Fazl
A.S;	'Amal-i-Salih
B.M:	British Museum
C.G:	Chahar Gulshan
F.A.S:	Futuhāt-i-'Adil Shahi
F:	Tarikh-i-Firishta
H.G:	Haft Gulshan
I.N.J:	Iqbal Namah-i-Jahangiri
JALAL:	Padshah Namah by Jalal ud-Din Tabatabaī
LAHAURI:	Padshah Namah by 'Abdul Hamid Lahauri
M.A:	Mir'at-i-Ahmadi
M.L:	Muntakhab ul-Lubab
M.J:	Ma'asir-i-Jahangiri
M.T:	Muntakhab ut-Tawarikh
M.U:	Ma'asir ul-Umara
P.S:	Padshah Namah by Amin Qazwini
SIRHINDI	Akbar Namah by Faizi Sirhindi
T.A:	Tabaqat-i-Akbari
T.J:	Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri
T.M:	Tazkirat ul-Muluk
T.S:	Tawarikh-i-Shahjahani
WARIS:	Padshah Namah by Muhammad Waris
Z.T:	Zubdat ut-Tawarikh
Z.W:	Zafar ul-Walih Bi Muzaffar Wa Alih

Short names have been used for some authorities.

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
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THE DECCAN STATES IN THE SIXTEENTH
& SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES
(after DAVIES)

INTRODUCTION

The Vindhya and Satpura ranges of hills divide the Indian peninsula into two distinct regions - the Indo-Gangetic plains in the north and the Deccan in the south. The Deccan is a country of vast peneplains, in the north west formed of horizontal Deccan Lavas with their mesa-like relic hills, elsewhere broken by the fantastically craggy tors of the Archaean gneisses which form the foundation of the whole⁽¹⁾. The Deccan Lavas are generally from 2,000 to 5,000 feet thick and reach a maximum of 10,000. They cover some 20,000 square miles with their mesa-like terrain.⁽²⁾ The great rivers of the Deccan, almost dry for half the year, are graded to their heads in the Western Ghats, save where they break through the dis-connected hills lumped together as the Eastern Ghats. Most of the Deccan has a savannah aspect, but this probably the result of human and caprine activity; the hill girdles are forested, especially the steep and mildly dissected scarp of the western Ghats and their southern culmination in the Nilgris.⁽³⁾ In the north west of the Deccan lay the states of Malwa and Gujrat.

(1) The Changing Map of Asia pp 120-21; Imperial Gazetteer I p. 37.

(2) India and Pakistan p. 8. (for full details see pp 8-13, and 637-41).

(3) The Changing Map of Asia pp 120-21; Imperial Gazetteer I p. 42.

Though high mountains stood between north and south India, yet they were not absolutely impossible to cross. Since ancient times, the rulers of northern and southern India attempted to dominate each other. The north conquered the south more than once, but each, in plenitude of power, tried to realise the ambitious dreams of being the sole rulers from the Cape Comorin to the Himalayas. The attempts of Bindu-Sara and his son Asoka brought the south under the northern domination. After the end of the Sunga dynasty in 27 B.C., the Andhras held Magadha as a dependency for a considerable period. Samudragupta directed against eleven kings of the south in 340 A.D. A similar attempt was made by Harsha in the seventh century, to bring India under one sceptre, but he was checked by Pulakesin II of the Chalukya dynasty in fulfilling his desire.

Sultan 'Ala ud-Din Khalji was the first Muslim ruler who wanted to bring the south under the north. He sent his lieutenant Malik Kafur in 1309-10 A.D. to conquer the south. Malik Kafur went as far as Rameshvaram and brought homage from the rulers of the south. (1) Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq

(1) Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi by Barani pp 327-37; Khazainul-Futuh pp 104-113; 123; 141-149; 153; 155. South India and her Muhammadan Invaders pp 116-119; 136-137. Though ^{under} Sultan Jalalud-Din Khalji ~~sent~~ 'Ala ud-Din Khalji ^{went} in 1294-5 A.D. to capture Deogarh, in the south, but that cannot be regarded as a policy of Jalal ud-Din to bring south under north.

conquered the Deccan but he could not keep it long under him. It was during his period that the Bahmani kingdom in the south was founded by 'Ala ud-Din Hasam Bahman Shah, on Friday, 24th Rajab 748 A.N. / 3rd August, 1347 A.D. (1).

The Bahmani kingdom had a rival, the Hindu state of Vijayanagar, in the south, with whom the Bahmani sultans had constant quarrels. These quarrels weakened the Bahmani sultanate and sometimes even threatened the very existence of the Bahmani state itself. It is easy to attribute the cause of the differences between these two empires of the Deccan to the religious antagonism between the two. The sultans always gave the name of religion to cover their own personal desire for territorial expansion and the Court Chronicles were ever lavish in their encomiums on the real, presumed, supposed or imagined number of 'infidels' of the opposite camp who were killed during encounters.

After the assassination of Mahmud Gawan, the Bahmani wazir, in 1481 A.D., the Bahmani kingdom right up to its extinction in 1538 A.D. (2) was like the Mughal empire after 1764 A.D. when the position of the sultan was no more than that of a 'roi faineaut'. Though the Bahmani governors did not stop paying nominal homage to the Bahmani sultan until 1538 A.D., yet in so many words they like the European Companies, issued the coins in the name of the sovereign without any interference from the centre.

(1) FI pp. 279-82; Tazkira-i-Sultani-i-Deccan pp 66-68.

(2) Mahmud Gawan pp 171, 172; The Bahmanis of the Deccan pp 416-19.

For about forty years before the fall of the Bahmani dynasty, the founders of the Deccan states were administering the five administrative units of the empire in the name of the nominal sultans. These units were Bijapur (under 'Adil Khan); Golconda (under Qutb ul-Mulk); Bidar (under Barid ul-Mulk) Ahmadnagar (under Nizam ul-Mulk) and Berar (under 'Imad ul-Mulk). After the death of Kalim Ullah, the last ruler of the line in 1538 A.D. all the five governors declared their independence and became the real masters of their states. (1) Thus came into existence the five Muslim states of the Deccan.

When the last vestiges of nominal Bahmani supremacy were passing away in the Deccan in the 1520's and 1530's, a new era had dawned in ~~the~~ northern India as well. The sultanate of Delhi had come to its end and the Mughal rule in India was founded in 1526 A.D. by Babur. This political change in the north affected the south. *Being afraid that* the Mughal emperor *might capture* their states, the Bahmani governors, i.e. 'Adil Khan, Qutb ul-Mulk and Nizam ul-Mulk, sent their envoys to Babur in 1527 A.D. and assured ^{him} of their loyalty to him. Sultan Kalim Ullah Bahmani also looked to the north for help against his powerful governors. He wrote to Babur that his subordinates had usurped his country, he

(1) F.I. p. 376; Bahmanis of the Deccan pp 417-19.

was just a captive at their hands. If he ~~would~~ came to the south to help him, he would offer the provinces of Daulatabad and Berar. As Babur was not fully established by then, and moreover Gujrat and Malwa, the two independent states, lay on the way from Delhi to Bidar, the offer of the Bahmani Sultan was not accepted. When the secret offer of Kalim Ullah to the Mughal emperor was discovered by his governors, he had to flee from Bidar to save his life. (1)

With the northern influence more or less cut off, the handful of the Muslims of the Deccan turned towards other Muslim countries for cultural and other contacts. The two Bahmani sea ports of Dabul and Goa provided facilities for trade and sea traffic between the Deccan and the other countries. We find an increasing influx of a vigorous human element in the shape of new-comers from the coasts round the Persian Gulf and from further north round the Caspian Sea, i.e. from Iran, Iraq and Arabia in the shape of poets, literateurs, saints, artisans, merchants, soldiers and adventurers. Mahmud II, himself a scholar of Arabic and Persian, attracted Arab and Persian poets to the Deccan in order to make the country the seat of learning and art. He made Mir Fazlullah Inju Sadr-i-Jahan, who in turn tried to call Khwaja Hafiz of Shiraz (1322-1389 A.D.) to the Deccan.

(1) F.I. p. 376.

The Bahmani Sultan sent a boat to Ormuz to take the poet, who refused to come to the Deccan at the last moment. (1)

Sultan Taj ud-Din Firoz used to send Bahmani ships from Goa and Dabul in 'all directions' with a two-fold purpose of commerce with foreign lands and to collect men of learning for his court. It was this object which made the Deccan the rendezvous of such men as Maulana Lutf ud-Din Sabzwari, Hakim Hasan Gilani, Sayyid Mahmud Garzuni and many others from Iran and the shores of the Caspian. (2) Among the other important figures of his time was Mahmud Gawan, from the province of Gilan. Apart from his administrative qualities, Mahmud Gawan was a literary man. His letters in Riyaz ul-Insha prove his literary genius. (3) Others who came from Iran and Iraq to the Courts of the Deccan, the names of Naziri, the poet-laureate and Sadr-i-Jahan Shustari are worth mentioning. (4) These cultural ties with Iraq and Persia, once initiated by the Bahmani Sultans, were also carried on by the rulers of the Deccan states, after the fall of the Bahmani dynasty.

(1) Bahmanis of the Deccan pp 114-15.

(2) Ibid pp 147-48.

(3) Mahmud Gawan pp 22-184. (Mahmud Gawan was wazir of the Bahmani Sultan Mahmud III, during 1466 A.D. - 1473 A.D. but he continued to serve the dynasty until the day of his assassination i.e. 5th April, 1481).

(4) Ibid p.186.

The significant feature of the Deccan states is that while the Mughals in the north were Sunni monarchs, Bijapur, Ahmadnagar and Golconda had long accepted Shiism as the religion of the ruling dynasty. While the religious rivalry between the Shi'a and the Sunnis threatened the Muslim unity outside India - Turko-Turani efforts against the Qizilbashes of Iran, the religious antagonism also developed between the Mughals and the Deccan states especially during the reigns of Shahjahan and Aurangzeb. It appears from the statement of Firishta that Sultan Quli Qutb had accepted Shiism long before the Safawi dynasty of Iran. (1) Yusaf 'Adil Khan declared Shiism as his creed in 908 A.H./1503 A.D. and three years later, i.e. 1506 A.D. he actually ordered the Khutba to be read in the Shi'a style from the pulpit of Jama-i-Masjid of Bijapur. (2) Burhan Mizam ul-Mulk, the founder of the Mizam Shahi dynasty adopted Shiism through the influence of his Shi'i wazir Shah Tahir in 944 A.H./1537 A.D. (3) It is noteworthy that while the three greater states of the Deccan were Shi'a, the other two, i.e. Berar and Bidar remained Sunni.

When the Safawi dynasty was founded in 1502 A.D. in Iran, its rulers who were Shi'a tried to promulgate their creed in India. The ties of friendship with the Deccan states

(1) F.II; see also B.S.O. A.S. 1955 pp 71-73. {Quli Qutb} caused the names of 'the Twelve Imams' to be read in his khutba.

(2) F.II pp. 11, 12, 168. Tazkirah-i-Salatin-i-Deccan pp 665-66.

(3) Ibid pp 109-110.

once commenced by Shah Isma'íl Safawí, eventually caused the downfall of the states. In 920 A.H./1514 A.D. Shah Isma'íl sent an ambassador to Isma'íl 'Adil Khan of Bijapur. 'Adil Khan gave a warm reception to the Persian envoy. He acknowledged the Shah of Iran as his religious head. The Safawí Shah was much pleased at Isma'íl 'Adil Khan's response, sent him costly presents and addressed him as 'shah'. In recognition of his alliance with Iran, Isma'íl 'Adil Khan ordered that in future his soldiers should have a twelve peaked cap (after the Safawí pattern) as a part of their uniform. (1)

The friendly relations between Shah of Iran and the Deccani rulers and the efforts of the latter to obtain ~~help~~ ^{help} from Iran was bound to ~~rouse~~ Mughal wrath against the Deccanis since the Mughals and the Safawids were not sincere to each other. The Mughals could never brook for a single moment that any state within their reach should acknowledge the superiority of a foreign power. In the course of the thesis it has been shown that Bijapur, Golconda^d and Ahmadnagar exchanged diplomatic missions with the Persian court and antagonized the Mughals.

The political history of these five states of the Deccan since their birth is a record of almost continuous strife against each other. Each tried to impress its

(1) F.II pp 18,19.

dynastic superiority against the other. Vijaynagar exploited the weakness of these states who grew weaker and weaker so much so that their own existence was threatened by the former. The immediate danger obliged the Deccanis to forget their mutual disputes and resulted in forming an alliance against Vijayanagar.

A fierce battle took place in 1565 A.D. at Talikot or Talikota between the combined forces of the Deccanis and Vijaynagar. This battle was one of the decisive battles in Indian history. The Vijaynagaris were finally defeated and their power was broken.⁽¹⁾ The victorious kings divided a large portion of Vijayanagar state among themselves but allowed their victim to drag on like a sick man. From their common enemy, the Deccanis resumed their normal course of mutual quarrels, which encouraged the Mughals to march into their country.

One of the reasons of their continuous mutual disputes was the absence of a strong power in the north. The Delhi Sultanate was disintegrating during the 1520's and was finally replaced by the Mughals. Babur's whole life in India was spent in establishing his rule and expanding his domains. His successor Humayun suffered badly both at the hands of Bahadur Shah of Gujrat and Sher Shah Suri. The Afghan rule

(1) FII pp 38-40.

under the Surs was so short that none of their rulers could pay any attention to the affairs in the south. Akbar too had to spend the first forty years of his reign in bringing the north under him before he could take an active part in the Deccan politics.

An important point in the Mughal-Deccan conflict is, the strategy of war. The Mughal army ~~was~~ mainly consisted of soldiers who were experienced in fighting in plains and in pitched battles. The imperial army was armed with heavy equipment and was not mobile; whereas the Deccanis, taking advantage of their geographical condition, employed guerilla tactics. They would withdraw strategically for some miles, entice the enemy into difficult hilly passes, attack them *suddenly* and run away before the enemy could take *position*. The Deccanis were light troops and could move swiftly. The Mughals could not adopt easily this new system of war and we find that many experienced commanders of the imperial army had to suffer heavy losses from the guerilla tactics of the Deccanis.

- - - - -

No comprehensive and consistent study has so far been made of the Mughals' relations with the Deccan states, though some modern writers have expressed their views on the subject in parts of more general works. I have chosen the period

from 1556 to 1658, because the study of the Mughal's relations with the Deccan states in the reign of Aurangzeb itself requires a separate thesis. But in order to be as comprehensive as possible within the limits of my thesis, I have covered the reigns of Babur and Humayun in the course of my discussions.

As well as the standard sources, I have employed certain contemporary material, which has not been used so far. Smith, the critic of Akbar relied on English translations of the Persian sources which sometimes misled him in his conclusions as the translation was not always correct. I have used all the available sources in the original and have tried to make my account more intelligible than those of earlier scholars. More light has been thrown on Akbar's motives in penetrating into the south and on the political idiom of the age in the Deccan.

New points have been discussed attempting to establish the causes of the weak administration under Jahangir. I have tried to prove that Aurangzeb was chiefly responsible for bringing about the fall of the Deccan states - a fact which has been denied by one modern critic. ⁽¹⁾ By making a critical study of the contemporary sources, I have come to the conclusion that after the treaty of 1636, 'Adil Shah was a vassal of the Mughals and not an equal ally and that 'Ali the new 'Adil Shah in 1657, was not the legal son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah. The Mughals were therefore justified in interfering in the succession of Bijapur.

CAUSES FOR THE MUGHAL INVASION OF DECCANPART I: MUGHAL AMBITION

The state of Mughal relations with the Deccan powers was a weather gauge to the strength of their position in the north. The Mughals pursued an active policy towards the Deccan, when the general condition of their political economy was flourishing and allowed to lapse when other preoccupations in the north were more pressing.

The proclamation of Akbar as 'padshah' at Kalanaur on Friday, the 2nd Rabi-us-Sani 963 A.H./Feb.14, 1556 A.D., was not more than a registration of a claim to the sovereignty of India. He had a precarious hold on certain parts of Panjab only. Kabul was held by his brother Mirza Muhammad Hakim, who was to be a source of trouble till his death. Bengal was under Sulaiman, an Afghan Chief; Rajputana enjoyed her independence under their own rulers; Malwa and Gujrat had thrown off allegiance to Delhi long ago; Gondwana, the Central provinces and Orissa acknowledged their own chiefs. In the south the Muslim Deccan states -- Khandesh, Berar, Bidar, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda were governed by their own kings, who were generally at war with the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar. On the western coast the Portuguese were

encroaching upon Indian soil and commanded the entire maritime trading route to the Arabian and Red Seas. In the north Kashmir and Tibet enjoyed independence and Abdullah Khan of Turan was a perpetual danger to Mughal rule.

Akbar's aim was first to bring all northern India under one sceptre, then to move into the Deccan and finally to proceed to the conquest of Turan. To accomplish this purpose, Akbar preferred to win over his enemies by enlisting and promoting them under his service, ^{rather} than to drive them to despair by harsh treatment. He would bring their strength into his strength instead of allowing it to become a strength outside his own. The years 1556 - 1560 A.D., saw the fall of Delhi, Agra and Gwalior. ⁽¹⁾

Akbar's first contact with the southern states.

The first contact between the Mughals and the southern states of India came in 1561 A.D., when Akbar resolved on an expedition to Malwa. ⁽²⁾ During this campaign the Mughal sword measured its strength against the Deccanis who proved to be far inferior to the Mughals, thus encouraging them to believe that he could subdue the Deccan states easily. In the days of Sher Shah, Malwa had been held by Shuja'at Khan and after his death in 963 A.H/1555 A.D., his son Baz

(1) A.N. II pp. 35 - 45, 47, 57, 65 - 71; F.I. pp.246-47.

(2) M.L.I. pp.160 - 61; T.A. II, p.151; A.N.II. pp.89, 90.

Bahadur succeeded. Baz Bahadur had given himself up to sensuality and neglected the administration of the country. In 1561 A.D., Adham Khan, Pir Muhammad Khan and Abdullah Khan were deputed to subdue the province. Baz Bahadur showed little resistance and fled to Burhanpur to seek help from the ruler of Khandesh. (1)

After the conquest of Malwa, Pir Muhammad was appointed governor. He was a soldier ambitious to raise himself in his master's eyes by pursuing Akbar's opponents pertinaciously. He collected an army to subdue Asir and Burhanpur where the fugitive Baz Bahadur was taking refuge. He laid siege to Bijagarh in 1561 A.D., took it by storm and put all the garrison to the sword. He then advanced towards Asir where Baz Bahadur and Miran Mubarak Shah were strengthening themselves. Unable to take it, he crossed the river Narbada, destroyed many towns and villages, and returning to Burhanpur which he took by force perpetrated a general massacre. Mubarak Shah appealed to Tufail Khan of Berar, who joined him. The allies marched against Pir Muhammad. The Mughals, laden with plunder became disorderly and were defeated at Bijagarh. Pir Muhammad Khan fled towards Mandu and was drowned crossing

(1) T.A.II. pp.151-52; Majmaul-Akhbar f.457b; A.N.II p.90; F.I. pp.250-51.

the Narbada and according to Badayuni, "by way of water, he went to fire and the sighs of orphans and captives did their work with him."⁽¹⁾ The retreat of the imperialists resulted in the temporary restoration of Baz Bahadur to Malwa. This defeat at the hands of the Deccanis was a great shock to Mughal prestige, but on the other hand events had shown that a powerful and organized Mughal force under an able general and fully supported could easily subdue the states lying beyond the borders of Malwa and Gujrat.

It was essential to retrieve the disaster of Malwa to restore Mughal prestige. Abdullah Khan Uzbek was therefore appointed in 969 A.H/1562 A.D. to lead the army there, while Muzenud-Din Ahmad Khan and others were ordered to assist him.⁽²⁾ Unable to face the Mughal attack, Baz Bahadur fled to Rana Udai Singh of Chittor. Later on he preferred to throw himself on the mercy of the Mughal emperor who granted him a mansab of 2000. Mandu was re-occupied and Mughal rule was thus established in Malwa.⁽³⁾

The victorious 'Abdullah Khan fell into vain thoughts of rebellion, which proved a blessing in disguise for the imperial rule in the south. Akbar took the command himself and reached Mandu in Zil Haj 971 A.H/ 1564 A.D. 'Abdullah Khan fled to Chingiz Khan in Gujrat, which was then independent

(1) M.T. II. pp.50-51; Maj'amul-Akhbar, f.458b; F.I. pp.251-52; II.pp.286-87. T.A.II. pp.156-57.

(2) T.A.II. p.157.

(3) F.I. p.252; T.A. II. p.157.

of the Mughals. Akbar appointed Qara Beg as governor of Malwa. The neighbouring zamindars came to pay their homage to the Mughal emperor and were graciously received.

The presence of Akbar near the borders of Khandesh alarmed Miran Mubarak Shah. He saw advantage in sending envoys to Akbar, to apologise for his past deeds. The ambassadors were warmly received. When they wanted to return, an imperial farman was sent to Miran Mubarak Shah, directing him to send any one of his daughters whom he thought worthy to attend upon Akbar. The emperor also sent his own envoy 'Itmad Khan with presents to Khandesh. "When Mubarak Shah received the gracious communication," says the Court writer, "he was greatly delighted and sent his daughter with a suitable retinue and paraphernalia to the emperor." It was agreed that Mubarak Shah would acknowledge Akbar's overlordship and would henceforth cause the khutba to be read in his name. The districts of Bijagarh and Hindiya were given in the dowry of the Khandsehi princess.⁽¹⁾

The treaty concluded between the Mughals and Khandesh in 1564 A.D. made no alteration in the status to which the rulers of Khandesh had long been accustomed. Since 1417 A.D., they had been acknowledging the suzerainty of Gujrat. It

(1) T.A. II, p.172; M.L.I. pp.68-69, 164-65; F.I. p.257.

appears however that Mahmud III, the feeble ruler of Gujrat had not ventured to assert his overlordship over Khandesh and other Deccan states. Khandesh therefore now merely exchanged her former allegiance to Gujrat, to the Mughal emperor.

The years 1567 - 1569 A.D. saw the fall of Chittor,
 (1) Ranthambor and Kalinjar. The reduction of these mighty fortresses secured Akbar's position in the north; now he wanted to annex Gujrat, which had become ^a bolt-hole for (2) imperial rebels, and a threat to his own sovereignty.

It was during the campaign of Gujrat that Akbar made up his mind for the conquest of the Deccan, after being fully secured in the north, as the rebels driven out from Gujrat took refuge in the Deccan. Since Bahadur Shah's death in 1537 A.D., the kings of Gujrat had been mere puppets at the hands of their nobles. The kingdom was divided into warring principalities, over which Muzaffar III, exercised only nominal sovereignty. He was guided by two of his chief nobles i.e. 'Itmad Khan and Sher Khan Fuladi. These nobles belonged to rival groups. In 1567 A.D., Gujrat was involved in a civil war which was an indirect invitation to Akbar to intervene. Furthermore Gujrat had another importance for the Mughals. It lay on the pilgrim's route to Mecca and was a big trading entrepot. Its weak administration invited the aggression of the Portuguese

(1) Sirhindi ff. 48, 52, 55; A.N.II, pp.316-41; T.A.II. pp. 214-19; 225-26.

(2) F.I. pp.259-60; A.N.II. p.265.

both against its trade and against the pilgrimage ships.

Akbar himself assumed command of the Mughal army of conquest and set out for Gujrat on July 4, 1572 A.D. When he reached near the fort of Disa -- twenty miles from Patan, the sons of Sher Khan Fuladi, fled with their troops to Jdar. Hearing the news of the imperial troops towards Gujrat, Sher Khan Fuladi, who had been besieging Ahmadabad for six months, raised the siege and fled to Junagarh. Gujrat was conquered⁽¹⁾ by the Mughals after a little resistance. Many of Gujrati nobles and Abyssinians escaped to Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Khandesh, thinking that Akbar was not able to penetrate into the south.⁽²⁾ 'Itmad Khan, Ikhtiyar-ul-Mulk and many other chiefs waited upon the emperor.⁽³⁾

Though the nobles of Gujrat had outwardly submitted to Akbar, yet they were plotting secretly against him. 'Itmad Khan was designing a rebellion, but was caught and produced before the emperor. Akbar discussed the future of the suspect rebel with Shah Abu Turah, the author of Tarikh-i-Gujrat, apprehensive of 'Itmad Khan's intentions and thinking of those who sought refuge in the Deccan, suggested to the emperor to carry on the campaign still further in the south, i.e. the Deccan, so that 'Itmad Khan and other possible rebels might not find any chance of escaping there. The author further mentions

(1) M.A. I. p.8-11; F.I. p.259. A.N.II, pp.5-8; Tarikh-i-Gujrat, pp.51-53.

(2) Ahmad-i-Salatin-i-Bijapur f.18; M.L.I. p.170.

(3) M.T. p.141. M.A. I. p.109; A.N.III, p.7. T.A. II. p.239.

that the suggestion so affected Akbar that he pondered over the matter seriously and kept silent for a while. (1) The reasons for not pushing the Mughal border further in the south were obvious if Akbar's own political power in India at that time is considered. The designs of Mirza Muhammad Hakim of Kabul, the Uzbek's menace and the eastern provinces of India still lying out of the Mughal sway were in his mind. A shrewd politician like Akbar therefore was not ready to risk his northern holdings for the sake of the Deccan. Moreover, the geographical condition of the Deccan was such that full attention was needed to subdue the plateau. It appears that Akbar intended to subjugate it at his first opportunity but was obliged to put off the task.

After the annexation of Gujrat, Akbar appointed Mirza 'Aziz Kokah as governor of the province and himself left for Cambay. 'Itmad Khan and other Gujrati nobles were left behind in Ahmadabad to look into the administration. Seizing ^{an} opportunity of the emperor's absence, Ikhtiyar ul-Mulk fled to Ahmadnagar. (2) As no further reliance could be placed on the Gujratis, 'Itmad Khan was given into the custody of Shah Baz Khan. (3)

(1) Tarikh-i-Gujrat. pp.73,74.

(2) A.N.III, p.10; M.R. I.p.779; M.A.I. p.112; T.A.II,p.240; M.T. p.141.

(3) M.A.I., p.112.

Akbar's own cousins, the sons of Mirza Sulaiman, were a source of trouble to him. They fled from Agra and took refuge at Surat. Akbar therefore planned to take Surat, (1) where Muhammad Husain Mirza was strengthening himself. Meanwhile Ibrahim Hussain Mirza murdered a Mughal commander Rustam Khan and raised disturbances in Gujrat. Akbar dropped the idea of capturing Surat for the time being and set out to chastise Ibrahim Hussain Mirza. A fierce battle took place at Sarnal in Sept. 1572 A.D. and Ibrahim Hussain Mirza was lucky enough in saving his life and made off first to Ahmadnagar and then to Sirohi. (2)

Akbar was now free to take Surat. The fortress of Surat was small but secure and remarkable among fortresses. Safar Aqa entitled Khudawandha Khan, a slave of Sultan Mahmud Gujrati had built it on the seashore in 947 A.H./1540 A.D., in order to resist the attacks of the Portuguese. Before the fort was built, the Portuguese came to the city and brutally massacred the Muslims. They tried to prevent the erection of the fort but could not succeed. When they became unable to prevent the erection by force of arms, they offered large sums of money to stop construction. But (3) Khudawand Khan rejected their offer and completed it.

(1) M.R.I. p.700; A.N. II. p.11.

(2) T.A.II. pp.241-44; A.N. III, p.12-16; M.R.I. pp.781-83; Majma ul-Akhar f.466 b; M.A. pp.113-14.

(3) Tarikh-i-Gujrat. p.75. Sirhindi ff.73,74; M.T.pp.143; 146-47.

After defeating Ibrahim Hussain Mirsa Akbar set out
 to capture Surat. ⁽¹⁾ When the imperial forces arrived in
 the neighbourhood of the fort, Gul Rukh Begum, the daughter
 of Mirza Kamran and wife of Ibrahim Hussain, Mirza took her
 young son Muzaffar Hussain Mirza and fled to the Deccan.
 The imperialists pursued her for fifty kos but could not
 succeed in capturing her. ⁽²⁾

The besieged of Surat approached the Portuguese of Goa
 for help and in return promised to hand over the fortress
 to them. The Portuguese set out to the help of the Mirzas.
 When they saw the strength of the imperial force and the
 extent of the siege train, they lost all hope of the fort
 and pretended to be ambassadors to the Mughal emperor.
 They produced many rarities of their country and in return
 received many marks of favour. The response of the Portu-
 guese to the invitation of the Mirzas gave an impression to
 Akbar of their hidden designs against the imperial rule and
 of taking their advantage of the weakness of the native
 rulers to make territorial gains. But Akbar also dissimulated,
 and bided his time. He became curious about their country
 and made many inquiries about the wonders of Portugal and
 manners and customs of Europe. He cultivated friendly
 relations with them and they promised safe conduct for the
 Muslim pilgrims to Mecca. ⁽³⁾

(1) A.H.III. p.17, 18.

(2) Sirhindi, ff.73, 143b; M.A.I. p.115. Sawan-i-Akbari,
 f.250. T.A.II, p.246.

(3) A.N.III. p.27; Smith, p.113.

Surat was taken on Feb. 26, 1573 A.D., after a siege of one month and seventeen days. ⁽¹⁾ The neighbouring zamindars came to pay homage to the Mughal emperor. At this another Mughal rebel i.e., Sharfud-Din Hussain Mirza, son of Khwaja Abdullah, who fled from Jalore in 970 A.H/1562 A.D., and had taken refuge in Khandesh, was caught by Raja Bihar Jiu of Bhaglana. The raja produced the rebel before the emperor together with a two years ^{old} daughter of Ibrahim Hussain Mirza. ⁽²⁾

The trouble with the Mirzas was not yet ended. After their defeat, Ibrahim Hussain Mirza fled to Patan where he joined Muhammad Hussain and Shah Mirza who were planning to create trouble there. Aziz Kokah inflicted a defeat on Muhammad Hussain Mirza and his ally Sher Khan Fuladi; the former fled to the Deccan while the latter took refuge with Amin Khan of Junagarh. ⁽³⁾

As soon as Akbar withdrew to the north, however, the fugitives would re-emerge from their safe refuge in the Deccan and renew their activities. Thus when he departed for Agra in Zil Haj 980 A.H/1573 A.D. ⁽⁴⁾ Muhammad Hussain Mirza who was in Daulatabad came out from his asylum and attempted to re-capture Surat. Failing in his efforts, he

(1) A.N.III., p.28; M.A.I. p.322; Sirhindi f 79b; T.A.II. pp.247-48. T.A.II. pp.249-50.

(2) F.II. p.231; A.H.III, p.29-30; Majma ul-Akhbar, f.460b.

(3) A.N.III. pp.24-26; Tarikh-i-Gujrat, p.56; Sawan-i-Akbari, f.242. T.A.II. pp.250-52.

(4) A.N.III. pp.33,34.

(1)

then turned to Cambay which he took from Hasan Khan.

'Aziz Kokah sent Nauroz Khan and Sayyid Ahmad Bokhari against the Mirza and himself marched to Ahmadnagar and Id^aḡr which were usurped by Ikhtiyar-ul-Mulk.

'Aziz Kokah made many attempts to overpower his opponents but could not succeed. Meanwhile, the other rebels defeated by the imperial army came to the Deccan and joined ~~Akbar~~^{IKHTIYAR} ul-Mulk. They were the sons of Sher Khan Fuladi; the son of Jajhar Khan and Mirza Muhammad Hussain. The rebels collected 12,000 men - Mughals, Gujratis, Afghans and others and advanced to Ahmadabad. (2)

'Aziz Kokah sent urgent messages to Akbar to come himself. The speed with which Akbar came ~~to~~ to Gujrat is a remarkable feature of his military prowess. He started on Sunday 24th Rabi-ul-Akhir 981 A.H/ 23rd August 1573 A.D., with ^a few of his companions and covered the distance of four hundred miles in nine days. He reached the neighbourhood of Ahmadabad on 1st September 1573 A.D. (3)

When he saw Mirza Muhammad Hussain with a red canopy over his head, Akbar feared that the Mirza had declared himself as a rival king and his own sovereignty was in danger. (4) He relying on 'God's favour', dashed to the field with his three thousand followers and won the day.

(1) Sirhindi f.90; M.A.I.p.326; Z.T. ff.186a.

(2) A.N.III. pp.41-43; Z.T. ff.186a,187a; M.T. pp.164-165; T.A. II.pp.261-62.

(3) A.N.III. pp.44, 51; T.A.II, pp.264-69.

(4) M.A.I. p.126.

Both the Mirza and Ikhtyar-ul-Mulk were captured and put to ~~the~~ sword. Gujrat was finally annexed on 2nd September 1573 A.D. (1)

Despite the fact that Gujrat had been incorporated in the Mughal domain, it remained a centre of sedition as long as the Deccan was a refuge for the rebels. Gul Rukh Begum, who had fled to Khandesh in 1572 A.D. seized some territory in the Deccan and made Sultanpur ~~as~~ her base for future operations. After a period of six years, she returned to Gujrat in Safar 986 A.H/1578 A.D. with her son who was now fifteen. Being defeated at Dulaka, she escaped to Junagarh. She made another attempt but was driven back by Wazir Khan, the governor of Gujrat and finally took refuge in Khandesh. Raja 'Ali Khan the ruler of Khandesh, who showed marks of his faithfulness, captured Muzaffar Hussain Mirza and sent to Agra. (2)

From the above narrative of events, it should be evident that Akbar had excellent reasons by the 1570's for regarding the Deccan as a refuge and a centre of intrigue for all those who had fled before his armies or who had rebelled against him. It was evident that the Deccan states were so weak that even the un-organized hands of the rebels could seize their territory easily. However his other

(1) Z.T. f.197; Tarikh-i-Gujrat pp.83-95; A.N.III. pp.51-62; T.A.II, pp.269-72; M.R.I. pp.801-02.

(2) M.A.I. pp.136-37; Sawan-i-Akbari ff.383-85; Sirhindi, ff.143-45; T.A.II.pp.331-32.

and at this date more serious preoccupation in the north, prevented Akbar from a more active policy of expansion south of Narbada or a more active diplomacy viv-a-vis the Deccan states.

With the conquest of Gujrat, Akbar naturally wished to assume the same rights which the previous rulers of Gujrat had enjoyed in relation to the Deccan states. These were the rights of overlordship; & since 1417 A.D., the Deccan states had acknowledged the Sultan of Gujrat, had read the khutha in his name and had paid him an annual tribute. The position may now be described in more detail.

Nasir Khan Faruqi, son of Raja, the founder of ^{the} Faruqi dynasty of Khandesh, ~~once Nasir Khan had~~ advanced in 820 A.H/ 1417 A.D. to seize Nandarhar and Sultanpur -- south-eastern districts of Gujrat. Ahmad Shah of Gujrat came to oppose him and forced Nasir Khan to take refuge in the fortress of Thalner. Peace was restored on the submission of Nasir Khan who acknowledged Sultan Ahmad Shah as his overlord and in return the Sultan conferred the title of Khan and gave him 'Chatar' (insignia of royalty) and a red tent-enclosure. From that time onwards, the rulers of Khandesh had always acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan of Gujrat and read (1) Khutha in his name. The acknowledgement of the Gujrati

(1) F.II. 279-80.

Sultan by the Deccanis is also corroborated by the coins which were struck in his name. Two coins are found which belonged to Ahmad Shah of Gujrat (813 - 846 A.H/1410 - 1443 A.D.) had the years 843 A.H./1440 A.D. and 846 A.H/1443⁽¹⁾ A.D. respectively and were struck at the mint of Ahmadnagar.

The powerful sultans of Gujrat always kept the ruler of Khandesh under strict control. If that ruler attempted to assert his independence, he was forced by the Sultan of Gujrat to abandon the idea. Miran 'Ina known as 'Adil Khan Faruqi b. Mubarak Shah did not send the annual tribute for some years upon which Sultan Mahmud Baigra sent an ^{army} in 894 A.H/1498 A.D., under Qazi Pir. 'Adil Khan Faruqi was defeated and purchased peace by presenting himself personally at Mahmudabad; ⁽²⁾ acknowledged the sultan as his overlord and paid the arrears. Only once in 893 A.H/1492 A.D. when Nizamul-Mulk of Admadnagar penetrated into Khandesh, 'Adil Khan Faruqi II had to seek the help of Nasarud-Din of Malwa and in return agreed to read his name in Khutha. ⁽³⁾ But that was a temporary phase in their relations.

The Sultan of Gujrat not only controlled the external affairs of these states but also interfered in their internal affairs. In 865 A.H/1460 A.D., Sultan Mahmud Shah of Gujrat

(1) Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum by H.N.Wright, Vol.II, p.226. J.N.S. (Bombay) 1950, Vol.XII ii, p.154.

(2) F.II p.281.

(3) ibid. p.282.

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deposed 'Imad-ul-Mulk and confirmed his son Shihab-ud-Din on the throne of Berar. Similarly when Daud Shah Faruqi died in 914 A.H/1508 A.D., he had no male issue to succeed him. Nizam-ul-Mulk wanted to place his own puppet 'Alam Khan, who later on adopted the title of 'Adil Khan Faruqi III. The Sultan further strengthened Gujrat - Khandesh relations by having 'Adil Khan III married to the daughter of Muzaffar b. Mahmud, who later on became Sultan Muzaffar II of Gujrat. Being apprehensive of Nizam-ul-Mulk's revengeful and aggressive designs on Khandesh, 'Adil Khan III wrote to Sultan Mahmud who replied to him that Nizam-ul-Mulk was one of his subordinate ally⁽¹⁾ and would not dare to attack him.

Miran Muhammad was the first ruler of Faruqi dynasty who adopted the title of Shah, conferred by Bahadur Shah of Gujrat. Bahadur Shah favoured him so much that he appointed him his heir-apparent.⁽²⁾ Bahadur Shah was a powerful ruler and all the rulers of the Deccan states bowed their heads before him. In 934 A.H/1527 A.D., Burham Nizam ul-Mulk with the help of Amir Barid advanced against 'Imad ul-Mulk of Berar and captured Ilichpur. 'Imad ul-Mulk could not stand before Burham and fled to Miran Muhammad Shah. The combined forces of 'Imad and Miran Muhammad Shah were also defeated

(1) F.II. pp.204, 205. H.G. f.122.

(2) F.II. p.216, 225, 284; Z.W. p.150.

and the latter appealed to Bahadur Shah for help. Bahadur Shah advanced to the Deccan in 935 A.H/1528 A.D., via Nandarhar. 'Imad ul-Mulk became frightened at the Sultan's aggressive designs and in order to save his own state offered his submission and read khutha in Berar in the name of Bahadur Shah. (1)

Accepting 'Imad ul Mulk's submission, Bahadur Shah advanced towards Ahmadnagar, which he took without striking a blow. He stayed there for forty days and took homage from the nobles. He then marched towards Daulatabad and laid siege to it. Hearing of the advance of Nizam ul-Mulk and Qasim Barid towards Burhanpur, he sent 'Imad and Miran Muhammad Shah in advance and himself followed soon towards Burhanpur. When he reached Bir, Qasim Barid offered his submission which was accepted and Bahadur's name was read in the Khutba in Bidar. (2) Bahadur then pursued Nizam-ul-Mulk who had gone to Burhanpur. Pressed hard, Burhan now begged for peace in 936 A.H/1529 A.D. He promised to give back the seized elephants both to 'Imad and Miran Muhammad Shah and to read Khutba in Sultan Bahadur's name in Ahmadnagar. (3) Some time later, Burhan sent a letter and many gifts through

(1) E.II. pp.107, 216, 217, 284.

(2) Z.W. p.151; F.II, pp.105, 217.

(3) F.II. p.217, Z.W., pp.152-53.

his envoy Shah Tahir who conveyed the message that the
 Khutba was recited in Sultan Bahadur's name in Ahmadnagar. (1)

The events of 937 A.H./1530 A.D., which have been mentioned below, will clearly show that the Deccan states owed their political standing entirely to the Sultan of Gujrat. In order to bring Ahmadnagar - Gujrat relations closer, Shah Tahir managed a meeting between Sultan Bahadur and Burhan Nizam ul-Mulk. A great 'darbar' was held in Burhanpur in 937 A.H/ 1530 A.D.; Bahadur graciously received Burhan, who acknowledged him as his overlord and begged forgiveness for his past deeds. Bahadur Shah was very pleased with Burhan; gave him a jewelled sword, a dagger, horses etc., and conferring the title of Shah honoured him with a chatur and other paraphernalia of royalty. (2)

Similarly once Sultan Bahadur went to Ahmadnagar where 'Adil Khan of Bijapur and Qutb ul-Mulk of Golconda were also invited. In a ceremony held at Kala-Chubutra, Sultan Bahadur Shah conferred the titles of 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah on 'Adil Khan and Qutb ul-Mulk; gave them chatur and other insignias of kingship. (3)

Like other rulers of the Deccan states, both 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah also acknowledged Sultan Bahadur as their overlord.

When Sultan Bahadur captured Mandu in the end of 937 A.H/
 A.H/1530 A.D., and Khutba was read in Malwa in his name,

(1) Z.W., pp.152-53.

(2) F.II. pp.107-09, 219, 284; Z.W. pp.152-54; H.G. f.127a; T.A.IV, p.68. Tazkirat ul-Muluk f. 48a.

(3) Majlisus-Salatin f.112.

Burhan Nizam Shah sent congratulations on the Sultan's success. Thus we gather that the Sultan of Gujrat was at one time the undisputed suzerain acknowledged not only by the Deccan states but by Malwa also. After the death of Bahadur in 943 A.H/ 1536 A.D., Miran Muhammad Shah of Khandesh was declared Sultan of Gujrat by the Gujrati nobles and Khutba was read 'in absentia' in his name. While Miran Muhammad Shah was on his way back to Gujrat, he fell ill and died. (1)

The incident after the death of Miran Muhammad Shah once more confirmed the subordination of Khandesh to Gujrat. Miran Muhammad Shah was succeeded by Miran Mubarak Shah, who considered the throne of Gujrat as his legal right. Many Gujrati nobles who opposed Sultan Mahmud, the successor of Bahadur Shah fled to Khandesh and espoused Miran Mubarak Shah's cause. Sultan Mahmud asked Miran Mubarak to expel the rebels from his country and on his refusal, the former led an army into Khandesh. The Sultan Mahmud forced Miran Mubarak Shah to acknowledge him and in return Khandesh was conferred upon him as his fief. (2)

The purpose of defining the above relations, in detail, of the Sultan of Gujrat with the Deccan states, was to acquaint the reader with the fact that the rulers of the Deccan states acknowledged the Sultan of Gujrat as their overlord and read the Khutba in his name. So it was evident

(1) Z.T. f.311a; F.II pp.225, 286; H.G. f.130, 136b.

(2) H.G. f.130b; Tarikh-i-Gujrat ff.39, 40, 44; F.II, p.286.

that once Akbar brought Gujrat under him, he naturally assumed the right to exercise his suzerainty over the Deccan states.

Portuguese.

To push the Portuguese into the sea was another of the causes of Akbar's intention to subjugate the Deccan states. He had many justifications for his grievances against them. Before going into detail ~~of~~ the political activities of the Portuguese in India, it would be ~~desirable~~ first to acquaint with the geography and the political division of the then South India.

The western coastal tract of the Indian peninsula separated from Vijaynagar by the Ghats was an area where mutually hostile small princes held independent sway. This region, extending from Manglore to Cape Comorin, Cochin and Calicut was known as Malabar. The sea ports such as Goa, Diu, Daman and Chiul, which control the sea route to Arabian and Red Seas lay on the ~~south~~ west coast of India. The rulers of these ports were not skilled enough in naval warfare so as to oppose the Portuguese. The geographical position of the two Deccan states, i.e. Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, whose boundaries slightly touch the southern coast, was such that there lay many petty independent kingdoms of Malabar and the mighty mountains between them and the

western coast that it was impossible for them to pay a serious attention to the Portuguese at such an early state. Moreover we find that there was no strong kingdom at Delhi in the earlier phase of the Portuguese power in India to oppose its growth.

The Portuguese, the first European power to touch the Indian coast came in 1498 A.D. During that period any general combination against them was impossible. The Hindus and Muslim were engaged in a death-struggle over the great kingdom of Vijay^{an}agar and both looked on the intruding Portuguese as unclean corsairs who were unworthy of serious attention. "When Vasco da Gama reached Calicut in 1498, the search for 'Christian and spices' rather than new worlds to conquer was what had brought the Portuguese to India."⁽¹⁾ They therefore tried to cultivate friendly relations with some of the coastal powers in order to obtain trade facilities. But the internecine warfare of the Deccan states for superiority made the Portuguese realize the political weakness of these states and they found suitable opportunities for their aggrandisement. It can therefore be said the Indians of the south were themselves responsible for inducing the Portuguese to encroach upon their territories. Akbar realised the danger of the Portuguese activities in India

(1) Portugal and Brazil p.185. (But their missionary works started after the arrival of Jesuit Mission in India in 1542.)

(this point has been discussed in later pages) and regarded them as his enemies. A brief survey of the past activities of the Portuguese will show their hidden motives and policies with regard to the independent Indian states and the Mughal empire.

Though the Portuguese did not attempt to establish an empire on land, yet in order to secure their trade, they seized some strategic places on the southern coast of India. (1) In 1500 A.D., they built factories in Calicut and Cochin. Three years later, i.e. in 1503 A.D., they obtained permission from the Raja of Cochin to build a fort in his state. By 1509 A.D., they had attained such a power so as to defeat Zamorin of Calicut. The king of Portugal sent orders to the Portuguese governor to capture Calicut and Cochin. Though the Portuguese could not capture these places, yet the Raja of Cochin and Zamorin of Calicut were made tributaries to the king of Portugal. (3) In 931 A.H/1510 A.D., they conquered under the famous commander ~~D~~ Alfonso Dalboquerque, the Bijapuri port of Goa. (4) The exchange of

(1) Portugal and Brazil. p.192.

(2) The Portuguese in India I. pp.69, 77, 99, 182-84.

(3) The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, pp.128-29; Malabar and the Portuguese pp.66, 82, 86. The Portuguese in India, Vol.I., pp.330-31.

(4) Basatin us Salatin, f.19; F.I. pp.12-14; Noticias da India, Vol.I., part I., pp.256-58. Asia and Western dominance (p.47) says that after the conquest, Albuquerque wrote to the king of Portugal that he had put every Moor in Goa to the sword. He further said, "wherever he could find them no Moor has spared and they filled mosques with them and set them on fire."

correspondence, which went between the King of Portugal and Albuquerque in 1511 A.D., shows the hidden motives of the Portuguese. In 1511 A.D., King Manuel wrote to Albuquerque to surrender Goa to Adil Khan if he would agree to become the tributary to Portugal. But the Portuguese Commander declined and wrote to the King, "But when once Goa is conquered, everything else is at our command without any further trouble; If Your Highness in defence to the opinions of those who have written this advice to you, think it possible to secure your dominions in these parts by means of the fortresses of Cochin and Cananor, it is impossible for if once Portugal should suffer a reverse at sea, your Indian possessions have no power to hold out a day longer than the kings of the land choose to suffer..... By recapturing Goa, the kings of Cambay and Zamorin of Calicut have submitted to the Portuguese..... As far as I am concerned, Your Highness may be sure that so long I am governor, although I be put to much trouble, I shall not at any rate send you the painted pictures of fictitious places but rather kingdoms taken by force of arms from their masters and fortified by me in such a manner that they may give a good account of themselves in all time." (1) In 1522 A.D., Dabul became tributary to Portugal. (2)

(1) The Portuguese in India, I, pp.259-63.

(2) Ibid. p.353, 386.

The period 1531 - 1533 A.D., was one of rapid success for the Portuguese. During these years, Tarapur, Bulsar, Thana, Mahim (Bombay), submitted to them.⁽¹⁾ In 1534 A.D., Bahadur Shah of Gujrat concluded a treaty with them. The terms were : erection of a Portuguese fort at Diu; Bassein to be ceded to the Portuguese; all vessels bound sailing from India for the Straits, should first call at Bassein for passes and on the return voyage call there again in order to pay the customary dues, under penalty and risk of seizure; no ship of war to be built at any of the ports in the kingdom of Gujrat but trading ships were allowed to be constructed; Bahadur agreed not to allow any 'Rumes' to enter his dominion nor assist the Turkish fleet in the Indian seas and in return of all these concessions, the Sultan of Gujrat would receive Portuguese help against his enemies.⁽²⁾ It should be noted here that the Portuguese help against the enemies of Bahadur meant help against the Mughals because at that time Bahadur Shah was pressed hard by Humayun. In 1546, Adil Shah was forced to cede two peninsulas of Bardes and Salsette and he swore by Muhammad to be a perpetual friend of the king of Portugal and promised not to make war against them.⁽³⁾ In 1554 A.D., their territory was further increased by the cession to them by Adil Shah, the whole of Concan -- the

(1) The Portuguese in India I. pp.400-02.

(2) Z.W. pp.192, 217-18; F.II, pp.222-24; The Portuguese in India, I, pp.416-17; The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, pp.235-37.

(3) The Portuguese in India, Lp. 465.

territory lying between the Ghats and the sea from about 17° to lat. 19° N. In 1569, the town of Honaw^ar was taken. In 1592 A.D., Murtaza Nizam Shah invaded Beek^awanda near Chiul. The siege continued for two years and many Muslims lost their lives. ⁽¹⁾ In a letter dated January 22, 1598 A.D., the king of Portugal seriously urged the viceroy of Goa to fortify Goa against the enemy. ⁽²⁾

Second, the Portuguese regarded ^{the} Mughals as their enemy and encouraged Independent Muslim states secretly and helped them actively against the Mughals.

The Portuguese concluded a treaty with Bahadur in 1534 A.D. ^against the Mughal emperor Humayun. In 1535 A.D., the Portuguese governor sent his soldiers at the request of Bahadur to recover the fort Varinene on the Indus from the Mughals who eventually had to surrender the fort. ⁽³⁾ When Muhammad Zaman Mirza declared himself king of Gujrat in 1537 A.D. the Portuguese promised to help him against Humayun. Muhammad Zaman agreed to offer them all the coast from Mang^alor to Shial Bet, the town of Daman as far as Bassein, the royal residence at Nonanager and other advantages, if the Portuguese agreed to recognize him as the king of Gujrat. The Portuguese accepted the offer and promised to help him. But Muhammad Zaman Mirza could not succeed in his desire. ⁽⁴⁾

(1) F.A.S. ff.120-24; F.II, p.154.

(2) Corpo Chronologico. Vol.III. pp.211-13.

(3) The Portuguese in India, I., p.407-08.

(4).ibid. p.421.

Akbar himself had experienced the hostility of the Portuguese. They fought for Mirza Jani Beg of Thatta in 1592 A.D., against Akbar. The Chief of Thatta was so much affected by their influence that during the siege by the Mughals he had two hundred natives dressed as Portuguese. In the same year, i.e. 1592 A.D., during the siege of Junagarh, the Portuguese artillerymen took an active part against the imperial army. The letter of Cosmo de Lafeita, the governor of Cochin, to the king of Portugal dated January 15 1602 A.D., throws light on the Portuguese attitude towards Akbar. In this letter, the governor of Cochin says, "Adil Khan and other neighbouring kings are at peace with Goa. But this never cancels the duty of keeping towards them due consideration. At the present it behoves to dissimulate

everything and encourage them by offering them the favour of the State to defend them against the enemy, who was approaching." Later he says, "it is believed that the Magor (i.e. Akbar) is dead and if this be true, his sons will make an end to the conquest (i.e. the conquest of the Deccan).⁽¹⁾ The Mogor is a powerful enemy whose vicinity is large."

Again we find that when Muzaffar Gujrati fled from the prison of Akbarabad in 1592 A.D., the Portuguese sent some emissaries to the rebel and wanted to help him. The Portuguese started with a fleet of forty to Chiul. But as the

(1) Corpo Chrono-Logico III. pp.224-28.

Mughals succeeded, the Viceroy went back to Goa. (1) The Portuguese not only interfered in the internal affairs of the states but also exchanged diplomatic missions. The ambassador of Bijapur resided at Goa. (2)

Third, they controlled the entire maritime trade of the south western ports of India, (3) and the safety of the Muslim pilgrims to their holy shrines depended entirely on their good will. The Muslims had to seek passports from the Portuguese and had to pay heavy sums and even then they were not sure of safe voyage. (4) To command the sea and to oust the Muslim of India from trade was the chief characteristic of their policy from the very beginning. The letters of Almeida and Albuquerque in 1509 A.D. and 1512 A.D. respectively indicate this desire of the Portuguese. Almeida, the first Portuguese Viceroy in India, wrote to King D. Manuel in 1509 A.D., "Let all our forces be on the sea; because if

- (1) The Portuguese in India, II. p.53. The activities of the Portuguese in inducing the Deccan states against the Mughals continued even after Akbar's reign. For example in 1608 A.D., Couto volunteered to go to the Court of Bijapur, disguised as a horse-coper with four horses for sale, with the idea of inducing the 'Adil Shah "who is a nitwit, whore-monger, player and effeminate as a woman", to place himself under Portuguese protection the great Mogul --- The Historians of Portuguese Asia, p.18.
- (2) A History of British India I, pp.143, 169; Noticias da India Vol.I, part I, p.266. F.II, p.256; F.A.fff 153-55.
- (3) Portugal and Brazil, pp.192-195.
- (4) Portugal and Brazil, p.193; 215.

we should not be powerful at sea (which may the Lord forbid) everything will at once be against us." At another place he wrote, "Let it be known for certain that as long as you may be powerful at sea you will hold India as yours: and if you do not possess this power little will avail you a fortress on shore; and as to expelling the Moors (Muslims) from the country, I have found it will be done when the Lord pleases and will thus be served."⁽¹⁾ Albuquerque wrote to the Portuguese king in 1512 A.D.: "If it be the wish of our Lord to dispose the Commerce of India in such a manner that the goods and wealth contained in her should be forwarded to you year by year in your squadrons, I don't believe that in all Christendom there will be so rich a king as your Highness. And therefore I do urge you, Senhor, to work up warmly this affair of India with men and arms and strengthen your dealings and your factories. And that you wrest the wealth of India and business from the hands of the Moors and this by good fortresses gaining the principal places of business of the Moors."⁽²⁾

The Muslims were so depressed by the Portuguese brutality against the pilgrims that once Makhdum-ul-Mulk Maulana 'Abdullah Sultanpuri, a great religious leader

(1) A History of British India, I. pp.118-19.
 (2) A History of the British India I. pp.135-56.

during Akbar's reign, proclaimed a 'fatwa' that ^{the} ordinance of pilgrimage was no longer a binding on the Muslim of Mughal India. Justifying his statement he said that both the roads to Mecca -- one through Persia and the other through Gujrat were impracticable. Going overland, the (Sunni) pilgrims had to suffer injuries at the hands of the Shias of Iran and by sea they had to submit to indignities from the Portuguese on account of the passport requirements and the mulcting of heavy sums. ⁽¹⁾ When Akbar went to Cambay in 1572 A.D. he met the Portuguese authorities of Goa and arranged for the safety of the Muslim pilgrims. We find that Gulbadan Begum, the paternal aunt of Akbar could only go for Haj when arrangements were made with the Portuguese for their safe return. ⁽²⁾ In 985 A.H/1577 A.D. Akbar sent Sultan Khwaja Naqshbandi as Mir Haj to Mecca and gave him six lakhs of rupees for the expenses of the Caravan and Rs. 12,000 to distribute among the poor of Arabia. Though the Portuguese had promised safe conduct of the pilgrims yet they obstructed their way and demanded extortionate sums. The ship was delayed and Qulij Khan was despatched to bring the Portuguese to heel. He took an army from Idar and went to Surat and obtained permission ⁽³⁾ for the passage of the ship.

(1) M.T. II. p. 203.

(2) A.N. III. p. 145.

(3) M.T. II. p. 242; Sawan-i-Akbari ff. 377-78.

Any trade ship or otherwise, sailing even from the Mughal port of Surat had to obtain a passport from Goa, Diu or Daman where a Portuguese military force was kept. Any ship which had not the required passport was confiscated. It is mentioned that the Muslim ships such as Rahimi, Mahumma-adi and others were bound to the Middle East and Turkey. The letter of Aquanina (Rodolfi) to the provincial at Goa dated 27th Sep. 1582 A.D., shows that when the Portuguese captured a Mughal ship, the imperialists became perturbed at Agra. The letter reads:

"The day before yesterday news came of the capture of the ships of..... (a few words are here torn). The emperor has not spoken to me of this, but as I am writing, the emperor's mother has sent for me." Referring to the same incident, Coryate clearly mentions that a Mughal ship was seized by the Portuguese. Akbar's mother became furious and asked him to take revenge. As the emperor, then, wanted to avoid any open conflict with the Portuguese, he he appeased her anger diplomatically.⁽¹⁾

The past history of the Portuguese was known to Akbar. He had himself experienced their support of his enemies, who had concluded agreements with them against him. But he pretended friendship and bided his time because his own empire was not fully established and secure in the north.

(1) J.A.S.B. 1896, p.58; see foot note on pp.58-59 also.

He used to send his agents ostensibly as ambassadors to Goa to import European craftsmen, to have facilities in sea trade, but in fact to procure their secret designs and to ascertain their military and naval strength. He always sent his agents at times, when ships were said to be due from Portugal so that they might take note of what came in them whether in the way of merchandise or men. He planned to send an envoy in 1583 A.D., to Philip II of Spain to congratulate him for his occupation of Portugal in 1580 A.D. The ambassador came back from Goa as there was no ship due to sail for Portugal, that year.⁽¹⁾

Many times Akbar expressed his intention of ousting the Portuguese from India. In his letter of 1586 A.D., to 'Abdullah Khan of Turan, he wrote that the Hindu rajas and his other opponents had obeyed the imperial power. He therefore wanted to establish peace and order in those parts. He had kept before his mind the idea that when he would be at liberty from these tasks (.i.e. establishing a firm rule in the north) he would under the guidance of God's favour, undertake the destruction of the 'Firingis' infidels who had come to the island of the ocean; had raised the head of rebellion and oppressed the pilgrims to the holy places. They had become numerous and were a trouble both to the pilgrims and to the traders. He had thought of going in

(1) Smith, pp.205, 206; Thomas Roe, p.37.

person and cleaning that road from thorns and weeds. (1)

Similarly on another occasion, Akbar told his nobles that the Portuguese were like chicken and that he would easily overcome them when he would go to the south. (2)

Father Xavier also writes that, after conquering the Deccan, Akbar intended to conquer Goa and Malabar. (3)

Before the invasion of the Deccan under Akbar, the imperial forces attempted twice to push the Portuguese into the sea, but they were unsuccessful. In 987 A.H/1580 A.D., Quthbud-Din Khan was despatched with an army to capture Portuguese holdings. The nobles of Malwa and Gujrat were ordered to assist the imperial commander. The rulers of the Deccan were also informed to remove the 'Firingis' (i.e. Europeans but here it means Portuguese), who were a great menace in the way of the Muslim pilgrims to Hijaz. They were bidden to regard that news as an opportunity for showing their loyalty and directed to join the imperial army, so that the protest of service which they always made by their envoys might be fulfilled. (4) Probably due to the lack of support by the Deccani rulers and not having full

(1) A. N. III. pp. 497-99.

(2) Du Jarric. p. 113.

(3) Indian Antiquary, 1924, pp. 33. Du Jarric, p. 102.

(4) A. N. III, pp. 280-281.

attention from ^{the} north, the campaign seems to have been unsuccessful as nothing more was heard of it. The Mughals made their second attempt in 1001 A.H/1593 A.D., when Mirza 'Aziz Kokah led an army against the Portuguese of Diu. He stopped ^{the} coming and going of traders from all parts of Gujrat -- a traffic which made Diu prosperous. Though the Mughal army could not capture the fort still the Portuguese, ^{who} were put into straits, agreed to give some concessions. It was decided that the Mughal ship 'Jahazi-Ilahi', which was always loaded at Diu should only be half loaded there and that the remainder of the passengers and cargo should be embarked where its captain chose. It was further agreed that one thousand Mahmudis, which was the hire, would not be paid to the Portuguese. The Portuguese also issued a licence to 'Aziz Kokah authorising him to go to Mecca by sea. (1) Akbar could never forget the double shock to the Mughal prestige at the hands of the Portuguese but he waited for a right opportunity to take a strong action against them.

While describing the Province of Gujrat in the Ain, Abul Fazl also accuses the Portuguese who had captured the sea ports of Gujrat. He writes, "Through the negligence of the ministers of state, and the commanders of the frontier

(1) M.A.I. p.181; A.N.III. p.638.

provinces, many of these 'sarkars' are in the possession of the 'Firingis' such as Daman, Sanjan, Tarapur, Mahim (Bombay) and Base (i.e. Bassein) that they are both cities (1) and ports.

It can be concluded that since the Portuguese were increasing their power rapidly both on ^{coast-}land and at sea while they made agreements with the southern states of India against the Mughals and actively supported them against the imperial rule, a mighty conqueror like Akbar could not sit patiently and watch a foreign power encroaching upon the land which he regarded as his own by right. The Mughals had no naval power; to defeat the Portuguese could only be possible by land. Akbar therefore expected full cooperation of the Deccan states in pushing the Portuguese into the sea. But on the other hand, the Deccan states, which were more exposed to the Portuguese than the Mughal borders, were not ready to take the risk of turning the Portuguese, who were their immediate neighbour, into their perpetual enemy. They had already suffered defeats at the hands of the Portuguese in the past. Geography obliged the Deccanis to maintain friendly relations with the Portuguese on whom depended their sea trade and safety of their own frontiers.

(1) Ain-i-Akbari I. p.488.

Akbar therefore was forced to conquer these Deccan states first if he wanted to overthrow the Portuguese by land.

The army which Humayun brought with him on his return from Iran in 1554 A.D. was small. It ^{was} composed of such heterogeneous elements that after it had served the temporary purpose of re-occupying the country, it naturally threatened to become a source of danger rather than a source of strength to Humayun. Similarly when Akbar succeeded his father he had only a small army and a few officers. With the course of time, the Mughal army increased and mansabdars grew more. According to ^{the} Ain the total strength of the Mughal army under Akbar was forty-four lakhs including one thousand eight hundred and three mansabdars. It is true that the number given in the Ain was that of 1596 A.D. ⁽¹⁾ but it does not alter the fact that as the imperial kingdom extended number of the army and mansabdars grew more.

Akbar was a far-sighted politician. He always welcomed foreign fugitives, enrolled them amongst his mansabdars and gave them jagirs. Mirza Sulaiman, Mirza Shah Rukh, Muzaffar Hussain Mirza, Burhan Nizam-ul-Mulk and many others were given high mansabs and jagirs. When he was fully established in the north, should he disband ~~his~~ such a large army because his work in northern India was complete? ⁽²⁾ If he disbanded his

(1) Ain-i-Akbari I, pp.175, 231.

(2) This is my own conclusion which could be possible only after 1592/93 A.D.

soldiers or relieved some of the mansabdars of their position, anarchy would prevail and ^{the} labour of nearly forty years would become fruitless. If not, he should find some work where he could engage the army. Recording happy sayings of Akbar, Abul Fazl mentions that according to the Mughal emperor, "a monarch should be ever intent on conquest, otherwise his neighbours rise in arms against him. The army should be exercised in warfare lest from want of training they become self-indulgent." (1) After bringing ~~the~~ northern India under him, the only place which could occupy Akbar's attention was the south, that in itself was an open invitation for him.

Idea of Chakravartin.

Akbar cherished, it would seem, the ambition to be regarded as 'Chakravartin'. In Sanskrit, the word stands for "a ruler, the wheels of whose chariot roll everywhere without obstruction; ruler of a chakra or country extending from sea to sea." It has been recorded that the twelve princes beginning with Bharata were considered as Chakravartin. If the word Chakravartin is to be applied to India,

(1) A'in-i-Akbari, II, p.244.

it means the supreme lord of India. Since the days of Chandra-Gupta Maurya, it had been a fixed principle of Aryan polity that for the successful defence of Aryavarta from foreign aggression it was always expedient, if not absolutely necessary, to concentrate the strength of her Kshatriya defenders under the banner of a Chakravartin. History has repeatedly demonstrated the soundness of the theory and it had been recognized as the ideal of Kshatriya statesmanship but, unfortunately for India, the mutual jealous^uies of rival kings had made it difficult to carry out that principle into practice and few if any of the Aryan rulers of India had been able to reach to it.

Since the Muslim rule in India, Sultan 'Ala ud-Din Khalji had come nearer to that fulfilment but could not achieve it completely. Akbar was the first Muslim ruler in India, who had such a vast area under his command. He had secured his position firmly in the north by 1593 A.D. His authority extended over an empire far greater than that of Harsha. He was undisputed master of the whole of ancient Aryavarta (some rulers of which were known as Chakravartin) extending from the Himal^yas to the Narbada and Koh Hindu Kush to Bengal and was recognized by the vast majority of his Hindu subjects as fulfilling their ideal of an Aryan monarch. But the south stood as a challenge to Akbar's pride to be known as a 'Chakaravartin' ruler of India.

His notion of 'Chakravartin' appears to be due to the

influence of his Hindu associates, his matrimonial alliances with the Rajputs, in permitting his Hindu wives to perform their religious rites, his Hindu mansabdars and courtiers. Nearly half of his army consisted of Rajputs. All these factors if put together, give us an idea which could have created in his mind to assume the status of a Chakravartin. Badayuni records that once some Brahmans told Akbar that he was an incarnation of God, like Rama or Krishna, and that the Lord of the World had assumed his shape. In order to convince the emperor, they produced some old Sanskrit verses said to have been taken from the sayings of ancient Hindu saints who had predicted that a great conqueror would rise in India and who would respect Brahmans and the Hindu religion and would govern with justice. "Akbar", says the author, (1) "believed every word of it." Though full credit cannot be given to the authenticity of the details of Badayuni's story yet there is no doubt that Akbar used to converse with the Brahmans and discussed Hindu philosophy with them. The same underlying idea of regarding Akbar as a just ruler could also be inferred from Akbar's letter to 'Abdullah Khan of Turan and Abul Fazl's remarks regarding ^{the} emperor's concept of conquests, when we read that he took his conquests as a means to develop justice and order in those parts. (2) So it can be concluded that the idea of being known as a Chakravartin was in Akbar's

(1) M.T. II.p.326.

(2) A.N.III. pp.498, 499; 510-11, 728.

mind and this could only be put into practical shape if he mastered both north and south India.

Hereditary Right.

It seems that Akbar regarded domination over the Deccan states as the hereditary right of the Mughals. He knew that the Deccan states had recognised the Mughal emperors as their overlord in the past and he was therefore eager to enjoy the same right himself. The events of the past discussed in detail would justify Akbar's demand.

In 804 A.H/1400 A.D., it was rumoured that Timur intended to march to India once again to capture its remaining parts, after appointing one of his sons as governor of Delhi. In order to save his own kingdom, Sultan Firoz Shah Bahmani, the then ruler of the Deccan sent Amir Naqiud-Din and Maulana Lutfullah Sabzwari as his ambassadors to the Court of Timur at Samarkand, along with valuable gifts and a letter of acknowledgment of his overlordship. The Deccani Sultan assured Timur, of his sincerity and full cooperation whenever he needed it. The ambassadors remained six months at the Court of Timur who treated them well. Timur conferred the sovereignty of the Deccan, Gujrat and Malwa on Firoz Shah and awarded him a 'Chatar'. He was so much pleased at the submission of Firoz that Timur addressed him as 'his well-wishing son'. At the time of departure of the Deccani ambassadors, Timur sent a belt, a jewelled sword, a royal char-

qubbaah', a Turkish slave and four horses for Firoz Bahmani.

In 1528 A.D., Nizam ul-Mulk of Ahmadnagar, pressed by 'Imad Shah and Muhammad Shah Faruqi and in the apprehension that at Bahur, who had conquered Delhi and Agra and was advancing towards Bihar and Orissa, might not enter his own state, sent him a letter of congratulation and acknowledged him as his overlord. Nizam ul-Mulk assured Bahur of his full support in his career of conquest. He said that he wanted to send his envoys in 1526 A.D. to congratulate him but he could not do so due to the lack of safe passage to Delhi.

When Hamayun went to annex Malwa in 1534, he also wanted to seize Khandesh. He sent to the imperial envoy Asaf Khan to Nizam ul-Mulk to seek the latter's help. Miran Muhammad Shah, the ruler of Khandesh, appealed to Burhan Nizam ul-Mulk to request the emperor on his behalf to spare his state and offered his submission. Burhan wrote a recommendatory letter to Humayun asking him to spare Miran Muhammad Shah's kingdom.

(2) The fears of the Deccanis were ill-founded as Humayun was much harassed by the activities of Bahadur's

(1) F.I. p.312.

(2) Insha-i-Shah Tahir al-Hussaini ff.5-9a; M.L. I.p.264; F.II.p.105. But that was a purely formal acknowledgement of Burhan; because Bahadur Shah of Gujrat had also come to help 'Imad Shah and Muhammad Shah against Nizam ul-Mulk. The later events show that when peace was restored, and Gujrat became friendly with Nizam ul-Mulk, the name of Sultan Bahadur Shah was read in Khutba in Ahmadnagar in 1530 A.D. -- F.II. pp.106-107; 217; Z.W. 152-53.

(3) Insha-i-Shah Tahir al-Hussaini, ff.17-19a; F.I. pp.214-15. (This was the period when Humayun drove Bahadur out of Gujrat and captured his capital Champanir. Being victorious at the time being, Humayun thought of conquering Khandesh).

Amirs in Gujrat and was disturbed by the progress by his formidable opponent Sher Khan. He was therefore unable to stay any longer in Gujrat and retired to Mandu. Similarly in 944 A.H/1537 A.D., when Bijapur, Golconda and Behar united against Nizam-ul-Mulk, the latter saw his fortune in seeking help from north. He wrote a letter to Humayun that the friendship between the two houses existed since Bahur's time and he wanted to strengthen it. He promised his full cooperation to the Mughal emperor against the latter's enemies. He assured Humayun that if he came to curb his opponents, it would be an opportunity to show his loyalty to him. Humayun received Rasti Khan, the Nizam Shahi envoy and honoured him. As Humayun was himself busy with Sher Khan, he therefore could not pay much attention to Nizam ul-Mulk's request.⁽¹⁾

It can be inferred from these instances that the Deccan states were too weak to stand against the Mughals. Whenever they advanced to the borders of these states, their rulers hurriedly submitted to them. Akbar whose empire was far greater and better established than his Mughal predecessors was therefore tempted to have himself recognized by these states as their overlord in the same way.

(1) F.II. p.116; Insha-i-Shah Tahir al Hussaini, ff 9 - 13.

Wealth of the Deccan States.

The wealth and riches of the Deccan states tempted Akbar to bring the Deccan plateau under his rule. The states had enriched themselves with the treasures of ^{the} Bahmani kingdom. They further increased their wealth after the battle of Talikot in 1565 A.D., when Ram Raj, the ruler of Vijayanagar was finally defeated and a large portion of his state was divided by the Muslim Deccan states among themselves. (1) Gifts and offerings made after Akbar's death to Jahangir and Shahjahan by the Deccan states, reveal the extent of the wealth accumulated in the previous generation.

While describing different provinces of Mughal India, Abul Fazl also could not help praising the gold and diamond mines and the fertile land of the south. He writes that the province of Khandesh was famous for its fertile land where crops were gathered thrice a year and rich in high class cloth factories. Its revenue was 12,647,062 Berari tankas. After its conquest when it was properly administered by Mughal financial experts, the revenue increased totalling 455,294,232 dams. (2) The province of Berar had iron and mines of other metals in the districts of Indore and Narnal. It brought a large revenue of 642,603,272 Akbari dams. (3) Bijapur and (4) Golconda had gold and diamond mines in Masulipatam and Manaar.

(1) Ahwal-i-Salatin-i-Bijapur f.16; Tarikh-i-Quli Qutb Shah ff.12-14; Hadiqat-ul-Alam ff.110-13; Basatin us Salatin ff.25-29; F.II. pp.39,40.

(2) Ain-i-Akbari II, pp.473,474.

(3) Ibid.I. pp.477-78.

(4) T.J. p.236; Kaiser Akbari pp.289-90.

CHAPTER I: PART II

DECCAN WEAKNESSES

For a powerful and ambitious ruler like Akbar, the Deccan states offered both an easy and a glittering prize. For half a century before he became actively interested in their politics or in expansion at their expense, they had been engaged in internecine warfare which seriously threatened their resistance against outside attack. A glance at the history of the five states of Bidar, Berar, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda will reveal the encouragement their weakness and their quarrels offered Akbar in pursuing his ambitions.

Mutual quarrels among the Deccanis

The state of Ahmadnagar was the strongest and Nizam Shah checked any other ruler who wanted to strengthen his position at the expense of his weaker neighbours. In 938 A.H/1531 A.D., Burhan Nizam Shah advanced against Isma'il 'Adil Shah who wanted to seize Bidar. Burhan was defeated and it was agreed in 839 A.H/1532 A.D. that Burhan be permitted to add Berar, a bigger state than Bidar, while Isma'il 'Adil Shah be allowed to reduce Karnatak which was under Qutb Shah. It was also agreed that neither would interfere in each other's affairs, but both the parties could not carry out the proposed annexations. (1)

In 976 A.H/1568 A.D., the agreement was reaffirmed by

(1) F.II.p.25; F.A.S. f.113.

both the states but with a slight change. This time Murteza Nizam Shah was allowed to reduce Bidar also, while 'Ali 'Adil Shah would acquire an equivalent area out of the Qutb Shahi territory. (1) 'Ali 'Adil Shah conquered the fortresses of Dahur, Bankapur and Karur, and Murtaza also advanced towards Berar in 1547 A.D. He defeated Tufail Khan who fled to Burhanpur. Murtaza wrote to Miran Muhammad Shah to drive Tufail and his son from his country. In utter helplessness, Tufail Khan appealed to Akbar for help and wrote that due to religious prejudices, Murtaza had captured his country. He further stated that if he received imperial help, he would surrender Berar to the Mughals. Akbar, always seeking such an opportunity, sent an envoy to Murtaza demanding that he should refrain from the annexation of Berar as Tufail Khan had joined the imperial service. Murtaza knew the preoccupations of the emperor and put forward some excuses. Akbar also did not pay much heed to Deccan affairs at this stage, as he was engaged in the conquest of Bengal. Tufail and his son were captured by Murtaza and died in captivity. (2)

After annexing Berar, Murtaza advanced towards Bidar. Miran Muhammad Shah became alarmed by the usurpation of Berar by Murtaza lest the latter should one day capture his own state, and corresponded secretly with the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda who promised to help him. Thus encouraged, Miran Muhammad Shah advanced with six thousand horse; seized a large portion of Berar and forced Khudawand Khan and Khurshid Khan, the Nizam Shahi commanders to flee. Murtaza returned hastily from Bidar and marched to Burhanpur. Miran Muhammad Shah shut himself in Asir and begged for

(1) F.II.p.135. (2) F.II.p.136; T.A.III.p.69.

peace. He paid six lakhs Muzaffaris to Murtaza and four lakhs to his minister Chingiz Khan, as a war indemnity. Frustrated in his ambition, Qutb Shah decided to send his envoy Shah Mirza Isfahani to congratulate Murtaza on his success and requested him to desist from capturing Bidar. (1) But the request was declined.

Khandesh's Relations with Akbar.

The death of Miran Muhammad Shah in 984 A.H/1576 A.D. was a turning-point in the history of the relations of Khandesh with the Mughals. Khandesh which had hitherto stood as an independent sovereign state, was now to be regarded as a tributary of the Mughals and was to take a more active part in conjunction with the imperialists against the Deccan states. Miran Muhammad Shah left a minor son of fourteen, Hasan by name, and a brother Raja 'Ali Khan to dispute the succession. According to Tarikh-i-Firishta, Raja 'Ali Khan was at Akbar's court at Agra, when his brother died. Hasan Khan was enthroned but was deposed in favour of Raja 'Ali who had come from Agra. (2) But Haji ~~al-~~Dabir, the celebrated author of Zafar^{al-}Walih, gives quite a different picture. According to Haji ~~al-~~Dabir, Raja 'Ali Khan was present

(1) F.II. pp.137-138.

(2) F.II. p.288. H.G. f.138a. also corroborates Firishta. Abul Fazl (A.N.III p.30) says that Raja 'Ali Khan was despatched by his brother in 1573 A.D. on a good-will mission to Agra. Raja 'Ali Khan was detained on his way by ~~the~~ petty notions and Mir Khan was sent to bring the Raja. It is possible that Raja would have stayed so long at Agra that his brother expired in Khandesh in 1576 A.D., as in the mediaeval ages, the envoys used to stay two^{or} and sometimes even longer than that at the courts.

at his brother's death bed. It was agreed that Hasan should be the king and the Raja the guardian. After the discovery of a plot, which was planned by 'Ali Khan, the maternal uncle of Hasan, for the assassination of Raja 'Ali Khan, the latter deposed Hasan and enthroned himself. (1)

Firishta and Muhammad Hadi, the author of Haft Gulshan write that when Raja 'Ali Khan assumed power, Akbar had obtained possession not only of Hindustan proper, and Bengal, but also of Malwa and Gujrat. Hence Raja 'Ali Khan refrained from inciting the imperial wrath by assuming the traditional title of Shah. He regarded himself as Akbar's vassal and sent him annual tribute; but on the other hand he maintained friendly relations with the Deccan states. (2)

Firishta's statement does not seem to be wholly correct, for Haji Dabir's account states that Raja 'Ali Khan assumed the title of 'Adil Shah IV and he was described many times by the same title in Zafar al-Walih. It also seems that the title of 'Adil Shah IV was not employed only in Khandesh but was also used in the correspondence between Khandesh and the Deccan states. (3) The title of Raja by which he is known probably adopted by Raja 'Ali in imitation of the founder of his dynasty as a word which etymologically carries the same meaning as Shah and at the same time could not be objected to by Akbar who enrolled many rulers of the Hindu

(1) Z.W. p.66.

(2) F.II.p.288; H.G.f 138b. (3) Z.W. pp.67, 73, 79, 79, 85.

states among his mansabdars with the same title. Though Raja 'Ali Khan had acknowledged Akbar's overlordship yet he had full internal autonomy within Khandesh. But ~~that~~ it cannot be called full submission of Khandesh to Akbar or an act outside the traditional policy of Khandesh, which always recognized the ruler of Gujrat as its overlord. It was merely the reaffirmation for Khandesh of her sincerity as she had already acknowledged Akbar as its overlord in 1564 A.D. Such acknowledgment served Akbar's purpose as Khandesh might provide a 'point d'appui' for the conquest of the Deccan.

Raja 'Ali Khan, who had bowed his head before the Mughal storm was in reality sympathetic towards the Deccan states. Cultural ties and geographical conditions obliged Raja 'Ali Khan to foster friendly relations with the Deccan states and to make them realize the impending danger. He apprehended the aggressive designs of Akbar and vainly attempted to make a confederation of the Deccan states against the ever increasing expansionist policies of the Mughals. Hence he kept secret missions with them and adopted a hostile attitude from the beginning of his rule towards the Mughals. Abul Fazl also criticizes this duplicity of Raja when he mentions that he read ~~the~~ Khutba in the name of Akbar only in the presence of the imperial envoy and "became foolish ⁽¹⁾ from self-willed thoughts."

(1) A.N.III. p.696.

The first recorded instance when Raja 'Ali Khan was punished by Akbar for his hostile attitude was as early as 1578 A.D., when the emperor celebrated New Year's feast in Malwa at Dipalpur. On that occasion the local zamindars and other chiefs came to pay homage to the emperor: it seems however as if Raja 'Ali Khan did not care much for the royal presence in Malwa. Akbar became furious at Raja Ali's attitude and appointed an army of 10,000 horse under Shihab-ud-Din to chastise him. The Mughals ravaged the country as far as Bijagarh. Raja 'Ali Khan was forced to beg pardon. He promised to send tribute including elephants to the imperial court.⁽¹⁾

Though Raja 'Ali Khan had acknowledged the Mughal emperor as his overlord, yet he was not sincere in his loyalty. In 1579 A.D., Shah Budagh Khan, the governor of Malwa, sent his son 'Abdul Muttlah Khan to demand the agreed tribute. Raja 'Ali Khan refused to fulfil the imperial demand replying that he had collected his revenue for his army and was accountable only to his army for it. He sent an army to drive away 'Abdul Muttlah, who fled across the Narbada with great difficulty while his elephants, standards⁽²⁾ and other war material were seized by the Khandesh army.

(1) T.A. II. p.333; Z.T. f.211b.

(2) Z.W. I. p.67.

These instances clearly show that even Raja 'Ali Khan whose state ran with the Mughal frontiers and who was more exposed to the Mughals than any other Deccan state, was not ready to acknowledge Akbar willingly. He adopted such a policy because he knew that Akbar's hands were not free to pay full attention to southern affairs. But once Akbar became fully established in the north, we find that Raja 'Ali Khan had to change his attitude and join the Mughals against the Deccanis.

Dissensions in Ahmadnagar.

The civil war prevailing in Ahmadnagar attracted Akbar's attention lest some advantage could be taken out of the political weakness of the state. The cold behaviour of Murtaza Nizam Shah towards his relatives and nobles repeated the old story of the Lodis who incited Babur against Ibrahim Lodi. Burhan Nizam Shah, the younger brother of Murtaza Nizam Shah, managed to escape from the fortress of Lohogarh in 922 A.H/1584 A.D. He was supported by a party which opposed Murtaza for his insane activities. It was planned first to assassinate Salabat Khan, the all-powerful wazir of Murtaza and then to kill the latter and enthrone Burhan. The very day when the plan was to be executed, Salabat Khan came to know of the treachery; defeated

(1) F.II. p.144; A.N.III, pp.407-08; T.A.III, pp.75-76; M.L.I. p.188; M.R. p.887; C.G.99b.

the pretender, who fled to Concan. Unsuccessful in his second attempt too, Burhan eventually went to Agra. ⁽¹⁾ Burhan's arrival was a blessing in disguise to Akbar, for whom it proved a means of extending the imperial influence in the Deccan. Akbar received the fugitive graciously and conferred a jagir ⁽²⁾ in Bangash on him.

The arrival of Burhan was not the last Mughal opportunity for fishing in the troubled waters of Ahmadnagar politics. The incapacity of Murtaza Nizam Shah encouraged Akbar to believe that the Nizam Shahis would fall into the Mughal net ^{because} of their own incompetence and divisions. Murtaza Nizam Shah had retired from active politics and left the entire administration to his minister Salabat Khan. Salabat's harsh treatment alienated many and a civil war ensued. In 1584 A.D., the Beraris including Khudawand Khan and Sher Khan Nehani advanced under Sayyid Murtaza to oppose Salabat. A battle took place six miles from Ahmadnagar and ^{the} Beraris were defeated. Being defeated, Sayyid Murtaza and Khudawand Khan fled towards Burhanpur. Raja Ali Khan perceived that the defeated would go to Akbar to invoke his help and thus would bring the Mughal army into the Deccan and this he could not tolerate. His perception proved to be accurate. The fugitives set out for Agra. He sent an army to induce them to refrain from their intention. The Beraris did not agree and a battle took place. The Khandesh army seized one hundred and

(1) F.II.p.144; A.N.III, pp.407-08; T.A.III, pp.75-76; M.L.I. p.188; M.R. p.887; C.G. 99b.

(2) T.A.III. p.69.

fifty elephants of the fugitives, who crossed the Narbada
 (1) and reached Agra. Akbar took the opportunity; gave them
 jagirs and proper mansabs. Being apprehensive of Akbar's
 designs Raja 'Ali preferred to return the seized elephants.
 He also sent some gifts and a letter of apology to Akbar,
 through his son Ibrahim. The presents were accepted and he
 was instructed to get ready for the impending military
 (2) operation in the Deccan.

Akbar free in north India.

The preoccupations of Akbar in northern India together
 with threats to his empire both by the Uzbeks and his
 brother Mirza Muhammad Hakim of Kabul withheld him from
 taking any active measure in the south. He did not waste
 that period just by waiting an opportunity to go to the
 Deccan, but cultivated friendly relations with the Deccan
 states by exchange of diplomatic missions and *allured* them
 by his false pretensions. He was a man of military
 character, who had his motto clear, i.e. either the states
 should acknowledge him peacefully as their overlord or take
 the consequences of their obstinacy.

The year 1572 A.D. records the departure of Mir
 Mohsin Rizwi, the imperial envoy on a good-will mission to
 the Deccan. The Deccani rulers received him graciously and
 he returned with gifts. In 985 A.H/1577 A.D., Nizamul-Mulk

(1) F.II. p.288; Z.T. 231b; H.G. f.138b; Darbar-i-Akbari, p.260.
 (2) F.II. p.288; M.T.II.p.343; T.A.II. pp.393-94.

despatched Wafa Khan with a letter and some presents for the emperor in the company of Baqi Khan, the retiring Mughal ambassador. (1) Bijapur and Golconda also exchanged diplomatic missions with Akbar. Khwaja 'Abdullah and his son Shahi Beg were despatched by 'Adil Shah in 987 A.H/1580 A.D. to the imperial court. (2) The year 988 A.H/1581 A.D. marked the great embassy of Hakim 'Ali to Bijapur. When the Mughal ambassador was about to return, 'Adil Shah died. Abul Fazl does not seem to be satisfied with the late 'Adil Shah, when he remarks: "He was a man of feeble intellect and corrupt; who did not properly obey commands and was ever guarding himself by vulpine tricks from the onset of the armies of fortune." (3) The same year, i.e. 1581 A.D., Qutb-Shah sent an envoy with the rarities of his country, but the court writer does not seem to be pleased with him either for he writes: "though the rulers of the Deccan Deccan were not happy in their manner of service and obedience yet they always by sending petitions and presents considered themselves to be bound to the saddle-straps of dominion." (4) It is evident that though the Deccani Sultans were not sincerely submissive yet Akbar avoided any direct clash with them.

(1) A.N.III. p.205. (2) M.R.I. pp.863-64.

(3) A.N.III.p.298; M.T. p.268; Basatin us-Salatin, f.31b; F.II.p.470; T.A. II.p.333.

(4) A.N.III. p.297.

The death of Mirza Muhammad Hakim of Kabul in 1585 A.D., relieved Akbar from at least one permanent danger to his empire. From that time onwards we find a change in Akbar's dealings with the Deccan states, as he could give the affairs of the south fuller consideration. He therefore brought some changes in the administration of the neighbouring provinces of the Deccan as his preliminary preparations for the forthcoming campaign. He appointed Mirza 'Aziz Kokah to the government of Malwa, while Khan Khanan was sent to Gujrat.⁽¹⁾

Akbar's first attempt in the south.

With the arrival of 'Aziz Kokah in Malwa the situation underwent a rapid change in the Deccan. The presence of the Berari nobles and the claimant of the Nizam Shahi throne, i.e. Burhan Nizam Shah at the imperial court, the disturbed state of affairs in Ahmadnagar and above all the recent opportunity supplied by the death of Mirza Muhammad Hakim, were sufficient excuses for Akbar to wield the Mughal sword in the Deccan. He sent Burhan Nizam Shah, Sayyid Murtaza,

(1) A.N.III. pp.464, 465; M.T. f.360; F.I. 265; T.A.II. pp. 383-84; M.R. p.896.

Khudawand Khan, Fath Ullah Shirazi entitled 'Azdud-Daula to 'Aziz Kokah who was ordered to invade Berar to bring peace to that region. (1) Shihab-ud-Din, the governor of Ujjain, Raja 'Askran and 'Abdul Muttlab Khan were ordered to assist 'Aziz Kokah. Fateh Ullah was made Bakhshi and Mukhtar Beg, the diwan of the army. (2)

The imperial army sent in 1585 A.D., under 'Aziz Kokah was divided into two hostile groups and thus the mutual disputes of the nobles checked any success. Shihab ud-Din had been accused of participating in the murder of Atgah Khan, the father of 'Aziz Kokah. This accusation the Mirza could not forget or forgive. (3) Shihab ud-Din was vexed and went back to his jagir to Raisan without the permission of 'Aziz Kokah who became enraged and sent an army to punish him. A clash was about to ensue but was avoided by the intervention of other nobles. 'Aziz Kokah also became suspicious of Tulak Khan, an old Baburi officer, and imprisoned him. (4)

The disunity in the imperial camp encouraged the Deccanis

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- (1) A.N. III. pp.464, 65; M.T. f.360; F.I. 265; T.A.II, pp. 383-84; M.R. p.896.
 (2) M.R. p.297; M.L.I. p.188; A.N.III, p.465; M.T.p.360.
 (3) T.A.II. p.384; A.N.III. p.469; F.II. pp.288-89.
 (4) T.A.II. pp.384-85; A.N.III. p.409.

to unite themselves. Raja 'Ali Khan was observing all these happenings in the Mughal camp. His sympathies were with the Deccanis but his state ran with the Mughal border. He would have joined the imperial army had it remained under a successful commander. The Mughal danger of which he was afraid was coming nearer. He wanted to save the Deccanis from the imperial bondage as far as he could. He therefore availed himself of the chance of the dissension prevailing in the Mughal army and chose to resist the imperial advance in the Deccan. He ~~therefore~~ refused to listen to Mir Fath Ullah who had gone to persuade him to join the Mughals. (1)

After the return of the imperial envoy from Burhanpur, Raja 'Ali Khan mustered his troops and joined the Nizam Shahis. He and Mirza Muhammad Taqi, the Nizam Shahi commander advanced towards Hindiya with 30,000 soldiers and encamped at a distance of one 'kroh' opposite to the Mughal camp. Perceiving that he could not stand against the enemy, 'Aziz Kokah fled to Berar at night by another route without giving any battle. The Mughals ravaged Balapur and reached Ilichpur, the capital of Berar which they looted on March 20, 1586 A.D. Differences arose among the Mughals with regard to further advance. Some urged a further advance to Ahmadnagar while the other were satisfied with the campaign in Berar. Meantime the Deccanis finding Hindiya empty of the Mughals, burnt the place and advanced to pursue them. Unable to maintain his ground, 'Aziz

(1) F.I. p.265; II.p.288; M.L.I.p.188; A.N.III.p.489; T.A.II. p.384.

Kokah proceeded towards Nandarbar. The Deccanis followed the Mughals closely and inflicted heavy loss. Leaving his army at Nandarbar, Kokah went to Ahmadabad to seek help from Khan Khanan. The campaign was postponed to the next year due to the rainy season but it was never carried out. (1)

The causes of the failure of the campaign were chiefly two. First, the lack of cooperation on the part of Raja 'Ali Khan on whom the Mughals had counted much. The action of Raja 'Ali proved that though Khandesh had formally acknowledged Akbar out of fear of Mughal power, yet its sympathies were for the Deccanis. Second, Akbar could not devote himself completely to the south in 1585-86 A.D., as the Uzbek danger was not yet over in the north. (2) Thus the Deccan enjoyed a brief respite from foreign aggression. Akbar felt the defeat of 'Aziz Kokah so much that he dismissed him from the governorship of Malwa, although when his wrath cooled down, 'Aziz Kokah was later reinstated. (3)

Political Idiom of the age among the Deccanis.

But the Deccan states still failed to appreciate the danger facing them from the north. The Mughals had been

- (1) M.R. pp.897-98; F.II. pp.288-89; C.G. ff.98b, 99a; Z.T. f.237; T.A.II, ff.384-85; M.L.I.p.188.
 (2) 'Abdulla Khan was a great danger to Akbar. -- The Northwest Frontier Policy of the Mughals. -- Ph.D.thesis 1937, Cambridge, pp.43,87,98.
 (3) M.L.I.p.195.

unsuccessful so far but they were neither appeased nor deterred from their long-term aims. Oblivious of these realities, the Deccan states continued their quarrels with each other. In order to understand the reasons which made the Deccanis adopt such a course, we have to examine the political idiom of the age. Since these dynastic states came into existence, there was no ruler in the north strong enough to dictate his terms to the Deccanis. They therefore were free from any serious danger to their states and continued with their dynastic wars for superiority. When Babur founded Mughal rule in India in 1526 A.D., he was so much preoccupied with his affairs in the north that he had hardly any time to go to the south. Similarly, most of his time Humayun was also busy with his opponents in the north. It was only out of ~~the~~ fear that the Deccanis had sent their envoys both to Babur and Humayun and acknowledged the Mughal emperors formally as their overlords. The preoccupations of Babur and Humayun would have given an impression to the Deccanis that the Mughal rule in the north was not as much a danger as they had thought at first. Akbar had established himself more securely than his predecessors, but it seemed that the Deccanis did not pay attention to him either. They considered the arrival of imperial envoys under Akbar not more than good-will missions. But Akbar had secret designs behind them. The Deccanis therefore failed to understand Akbar's diplomacy and the danger, which could wipe out their existence. Thus they continued their normal course of mutual wars.

The other cause was the nature of the political allegiance of that period. Many of the nobles in the Deccan states had come from the foreign lands -- Iran, Iraq, etc. They therefore were not imbued with (if we may use the modern term) 'nationalism' but aspired to gather power into their own hands. The native Deccanis counteracted the ambition of these so-called 'foreigners' and thus the states drifted into anarchy. The nobles regarded their loyalty and service as due to a person rather than to a political abstraction -- the state.

As long as their ambition was fulfilled by their master, they were ready to serve him. But once they lost any hope of promotion in their own country, they deserted to the other party, which could offer them high ranks. The nobles knew that in case of a final defeat of their king, harm would come only to the royal family and not to them. They therefore cared more for their own rather than for the dynasty's welfare. They had the instances of Burhan Nizam Shah, Sayyid Murtaza, Khudawand Khan and others, who were given high mansabs by the Mughals. An attempt has been made, in the forthcoming pages, to show how the Deccanis continued their dynastic or civil wars and thus encouraged the Mughals to intervene in their affairs.

Confusion in Ahmadnagar.

The brutal activities of Murtaza Nizam Shah divided the Ahmadnagaris into two hostile groups and caused anarchy

which ultimately provoked Akbar to interfere in their state. Murtaza believed that his son Miran Hussain wanted to kill him and he therefore made an unsuccessful attempt to kill his son instead. The insanity of Murtaza turned his nobles against him. They supported his son, who put his father to death in 1588 A.D., by suffocating him in a bath of steam. The usurper was also killed in less than a year by his minister Mirza Khan. Isma'íl, a boy of twelve years, was made the king.⁽¹⁾

The reign of the minor king Isma'íl was a period of terror and persecution in the state. Jamal Khan, the guardian of the king, was a Mahdawi and he also made the latter join that sect. He massacred "the foreign element" and about three thousand innocent persons were put to death. Many of the foreigners fled to Bijapur and Golconda. Among the exiles was Firishta, the famous authority of Tarikh-i-Firishta, who reached Bijapur with great difficulty.⁽²⁾ The atrocities of Jamal Khan roused the Berari chiefs but they were defeated by him. In order to take the advantage of Isma'íl Adil Shah's difficulties, 'Adil Shah sent an army under Dilawar Khan. Both the parties halted for fifteen days opposite to each other and eventually peace was concluded. The Nizam Shahis agreed to pay a war indemnity of seventy

(1) F.II. pp.59,147; A.N.III, p.539; H.G. ff 200-02; T.A.III, pp.72-74.

(2) F.II.p.150.

thousand huns and Chand Bibi, the widow of 'Ali 'Adil Shah,
 (1)
 was sent back to Bijapur.

The confusions prevailing in both Ahmadnagar and Bijapur certainly offered Akbar more than sufficient opportunity for intervening in the Deccan. He had Burhan with him in whose name he could march into the Deccan and retrieve the Mughal prestige which had suffered badly in 1586 A.D. He therefore called Burhan from Bangash and offered him full support in obtaining the Nizam Shahi throne for him. Burhan declined the emperor's offer, representing that the presence of the imperial army would alienate the people of Ahmadnagar from him: if he went alone he might be able to induce the Nizam Shahis in his favour. Akbar was satisfied with that plea and gave him Hindiya in jagir to meet the expenses of the campaign. But at the same time, the emperor issued orders to Raja 'Ali Khan and 'Aziz Kokah to prepare themselves to assist Burhan if necessary. When Burhan reached Hindiya, he won over many local Nizam Shahi zamindars. He entered Berar by the route of Kandwana but was opposed by Jahangir Khan Habshi and came back to the imperial territory. (2)

The defeat of Burhan was another set-back to the

(1) F.II. pp.61, 62, 151-52; T.A.III. p.76; H G.f.201; A.N.III. p.539.

(2) A.N.III.p.568; F.II.p.151; H.G.f.201.

imperial prestige. He had refused the imperial offer and tried alone. But Akbar was not a ruler who could easily admit his defeat ~~easily~~ at the hands of the Deccanis. He took a more active part in his second attempt at enthroning Burhan in Ahmadnagar. He asked Raja 'Ali Khan to accompany him. Raja 'Ali Khan who had bided his time and avoided helping the Mughal cause, had to change his tactics now, when he realized that the emperor was becoming serious and active in the affairs of the Deccan.

In order to become sure of the success, Akbar asked 'Adil Shah to send reinforcements against the common opponent (1) i.e. Jamal Khan. 'Adil Shah sent Dilawar Khan with an army of 10,000 Mahdawis, but they were defeated by Jamal Khan. (2) Burhan advanced in April 1591 A.D. towards Ahmadnagar. A battle took place in May 1591 A.D. near Faridpur. Raja 'Ali Khan fought vigorously and Jamal Khan was killed. Ismail was brought as a prisoner before his father, and was put into confinement. Burhan Nizam Shah was declared king. (3)

(1) F.A.S. f.183a; Tazkirat ul-Muluk, f.136a; H.G. f.183a.

(2) F.A.S. f.186a.

(3) F.II.pp.151-52; A.N.III.p.587; T.A.III, p.75-77; H.G.f.202.

Burhan Nizam Shah and Akbar.

Burhan had been placed on the Nizam Shahi throne through the efforts of Akbar. However he not only forgot the favour, ~~the favour~~ which he received from his benefactor but also ignored him altogether. Akbar could not forget and forgive such ingratitude easily. He had given help for his own motives. Burhan had promised to become a vassal of the Mughal emperor, if became successful. Like Khandesh, Akbar also wanted Ahmadnagar to serve as his base for his future military operations in the Deccan. "But the wine of success," writes Abul Fazl, "robbed him of his senses and he forgot the varied favours he had received from the emperor. He set himself to oppress the weak and considered that his profit lay in injury to others."⁽¹⁾ The complaint which the court writer had against Burhan seems to be on two counts -- Burhan's refusal to become a vassal of Akbar and not fulfilling his promise of handing over Berar to the imperialists on his successful return to Ahmadnagar.⁽²⁾

There were two main reasons of Akbar's interest in Ahmadnagar. The geographical factor of the state and her

(1) A?N.111. p.596.

(2) F.I. p.269, II p.61; Burhan-i-Ma'asir f.153a.

situation of the then political superiority over the other Deccan states. The state of Ahmadnagar ran with the Mughal borders and therefore could provide easy entrance to Mughal power. If Ahmadnagar acknowledged Akbar, it might induce the other states to recognize the Mughal emperor or might help the Mughals in bringing the states under them by force. Akbar therefore aimed at alienating Ahmadnagar permanently from the other states and at discarding the agreed and conventional practice of the Deccanis that, "in case of a foreign aggression, all the three Deccan states would make a united front." Under these circumstances, Ahmadnagar therefore was first to be dealt with.

Burhan's interest was to ally himself with 'Adil Shah to whom he was already in debt for part assistance. Instead he waged war against him. 'Adil Shah demanded his three hundred elephants which were sent for Burhan's help and were seized by Jamal Khan. Burhan refused to comply with the request and advanced with an army towards Bijapur. But the 'Adil Shahis checked his advance and forced him
(1)
to retire.

It was certainly unwise of Burhan, who was aware of

(1) F.II. pp.151-53; Tazkirat ul-Muluk 140b, 141.
(2)

Akbar's designs on the Deccan, to reject 'Adil Shah's demand, which was in no way extravagant. A close alliance of the three chief states of the Deccan with the help of Raja 'Ali, and the southern Hindu states, could have bidden defiance to the Mughal army. Burhan, however, was guilty of allowing himself to be entrapped into a declaration of war with Bijapur and thus weakening his own position. He further worsened his position by making war on the Portuguese. In order to take Reekwanda, he marched with a large army. The Portuguese came with a force of four thousand men at Kherla and slaughtered twelve thousand Muslims in defeating the Nizam Shahis. (1)

Imperial missions to the Deccan.

At first, Akbar wanted to persuade the Deccanis by peaceful means. He was obliged to ^{adopt} such a policy by the fact that he was not yet free from the Uzbek menace in the north west. He decided to send four diplomatic missions to the states to know if Burhan and the other Deccan rulers were ready to acknowledge him as their suzerain -- an intention to substantiate the ancient title of his forefathers Timur and Bahur. If Burhan offered such a

(1) F.II. p.155; A.N. III, pp.667-68.

recognition, it was imperative that Bijapur and Golconda should do likewise as has been already pointed out that Ahmadnagar was the then most powerful state in the Deccan. Shaikh Faizi was sent to Raja 'Ali Khan; Khwaja Amin-ud-Din to Ahmadnagar; Mir Muhammad Rizwi to 'Adil Shah and Mir Munir to Qutb Shah. Shaikh Faizi was asked to proceed (1) to Ahmadnagar after completing his mission in Khandesh. (2) The envoys left Agra in Shahrivar 999 A.H/August 1591 A.D.

Accordingly Shaikh Faizi went to Khandesh and met Raja 'Ali Khan, who had become disappointed in his hopes of forming a Deccani confederation against Akbar, showed signs of complete subordination to the emperor. Faizi's letter, which records the interview with Raja 'Ali Khan, in the minutest detail, illustrates a complete change in Raja 'Ali's policy towards the Mughal emperor. The letter shows the complete submission of Khandesh to the Mughals and the fulfilment of Akbar's long-standing ambition to use Khandesh as 'point d'appui' for his future operations in the Deccan. The contents of the letter are as follows:

"After travelling a long distance, I arrived on the 20th of Pur (December) at a distance of fifty kos from Burhanpur. The next day I arranged my tent in a manner worthy of a servant of the imperial court. The tent was

(1) A.N.III. p.596-97; M.R.p.922; Sirhindi f.197b; M.T.II. p.377; Nizam ud-Ahmad (T.II.p.412) and Firishta (F.I. p.267) both say that Mir Muhammad Amin was sent to Bijapur. Firishta (F.I.267) also differs from Abul Fazl and says that Mirza Masud was sent to Bhagnar (i.e. Golconda).

(2) A.N.III.p.597; F.I.p.267.

divided into two rooms, the innermost of which, the royal throne was placed with gold-embroidered cushion on it; over which the canopy of velvet and gold embroidery was erected. The imperial sword, the khil'at and the royal letter were placed on the throne while men were standing around with folded hands. Raja 'Ali Khan in the company of his followers, wakils and other nobles approached with great respect that betokened their obedience and loyalty to Your Majesty. They alighted from their horses at some distance from the tent and were admitted into the outer chamber. They came respectfully and entered the second Chamber. When they saw the imperial throne, they saluted it and advanced bare-foot. When they came near at a certain distance, they were asked to stand and to salute three times, which they did and continued standing at the same place. I then took the royal letter in my hands, called ^{the Raja} a little nearer and said, "His Majesty, the viceregent of God, has sent Your Highness two royal orders with the greatest condescension and kindness -- this is one." He took the letter and put it on head respectfully and saluted it three times. I then said that H.M. has honoured you with a dress of honour. Upon this he bowed, kissed it and bowed again. In the same way he did homage for the sword and called Your Majesty's name.

After performing the due formalities Raja 'Ali Khan

then said, "I have for years wished to be seated in your presence," and at the same time he appeared anxious to do so. Whereupon I asked him to be seated and he sat down humbly in your servant's presence. When a fitting opportunity offered itself, and addressed him warily and said, "I could show him how he might promote his interest, but the chief part of my discourse consisted of praises and eulogiums of Your Majesty. He answered that he was a devoted servant of the emperor and considered himself highly favoured that he has seen Your Majesty's good will and favour. I replied that H.M.'s kindness towards him was great and he considers him among his confidential servants; the greatest proof of which was that he sent a man of rank to him. At this time he bowed several times and was much pleased.

During the period of my interview, I twice made signs to finish the discourse but he said, that he was not yet satisfied with my interview and wished to sit there till the evening; and he sat there for an hour and a half. At last betel-leaf and scents were brought. I asked him to give me with his own hands. I also gave him several pieces with my own hands at which he bowed many times. I then said, "Let us repeat for the long life of His Majesty," which he did and the audience was broken up.

He then went and stood respectfully in his place at the edge of the carpet opposite the throne. The royal horses

were there. He kissed the reins, placed them on his shoulders and saluted them. He then took his departure, My attendant counted that he made altogether twenty five salutations. When he first came in he said, "If you command me I am ready to make one thousand salutes in honour of the emperor and I am ready to sacrifice my life for him."⁽¹⁾

Raja 'Ali Khan was a strict Sunni and Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda being Shi'a states might easily excite the emperor's fanatical opposition. Desirable as the spread of Akbar's opinions might be, it was imperative to avoid religious collision as well as everything which might in the smallest degree prejudice the royal dignity. Raja 'Ali had realized the importance of the time. If he wanted to save his state, he had to bow before the Mughal might. Any negligence on his part might bring the imperial forces into his state which was more exposed to the Mughal borders than any other state of the Deccan. He not only reaffirmed the acknowledgment of Akbar's supremacy, but sent his daughter with choice gifts for prince Salim.⁽²⁾

Faizi, who was asked to proceed to Ahmadnagar after his meeting with Raja 'Ali, returned after an absence of one year, eight months and fourteen days and reported the

(1) Wakiat-i-Shaikh Faizi ff. 4b - 6.

(2) A.N.III. p.639.

failure of his mission ⁽¹⁾ to Ahmadnagar. "Burhan," says Abul Fazl, "in his arrogance and self-will had not listened to his counsels and did not send fitting presents and had prepared the material of his own injury. ⁽²⁾ Instead of recognizing the emperor, the other rulers too asserted their own independence and dismissed the imperial envoys ⁽³⁾ with paltry gifts.

The refusal of the Deccani rulers ~~and~~ to acknowledge the emperor left no alternative but the use of force. Apart from the court writers, even 'Abdul Baqi and Badayuni blame Burhan for his ingratitude to the emperor and held him ⁽⁴⁾ responsible for the ruin of his state. Firishta, the celebrated Deccani author also records that on the failure ⁽⁵⁾ of the imperial mission, the emperor resolved on war. A brief survey of the political situation of the Mughal India of that time would show that it was not because the Deccan states refused to acknowledge Akbar that he resolved to undertake a war in the south but because his hands were now free for decisive action in the south.

The refusal of the Deccan rulers arrived on 7th May 1593 A.D., that the mobilization of the army was complete -- a delay most probably caused by the hot and rainy season.

(1) Sirhindi f.218a; A.N.III, p.639; T.A.II,p.423c.

(2) A.N.III, p.639.

(3) F.I.p.269; M.R.p.930-31; Sirhindi ff.218a, 249a.

(4) M.R. pp.930-31; Sirhindi f.218a; T.A.II,p.423; M.T.III. 389.

(5) F.I.p.269.

Burhan persisted in the same insubordinate attitude as before but the emperor does not seem to have sent any further remonstrance. For that Akbar had many reasons. (1) Junagarh and Somnath fell in August 1592 A.D. The acquisition of Qandahar in 1004 A.H/1593 A.D. (2) placed Akbar in complete possession of his hereditary kingdom beyond the Indus and nearly at the same time he had completed the conquest of the Hindustan proper. Sind had fallen in 1592 A.D; the last attempt of rebellion in Kashmir was squashed about the same time, the reduction of Bengal was complete by the submission of Orissa which stretched the (3) Mughal border further south, confronting the Deccan states. All the disturbances in Gujrat terminated by the death of Muzaffar Gujrati in 1593 A.D; so that the whole of northern India to the Narbada was more under Akbar's authority than it had been under any former ruler of India. The Rana of Udaipur indeed continued unsubdued but was reduced to extremities, while the other Rajput chiefs changed from (4) jealous tributaries to active and attached adherents. Faizi Sirhindi and Abul Fazl offer the same reason for Akbar's activeness in the south -- that he determined to

(1) A.N.III. pp.619-20.

(2) Tarikh-i-Alam Ara-i-Abbasi pp.485-86; M.T.III.p.388. T.A.II.p.423.

(3) Sirhindi ff.200-o2, 209, 213a; T.A.II,pp.420-22; A.N. III.pp.594-95, 608-17; 629-630, 668-69; Z.T.ff.230-41.

(4) Sirhindi f.248b; A.N.III,p.624; M.R.pp.892-93. M.A.I. pp.180-81; Z.T.f.211; M.L.I.p.189; T.A.II.p.421.

to subjugate the Deccan once his hands were free in
 northern India. ⁽¹⁾

During the period of the absence of the imperial envoys to the Deccan, Akbar was getting ready to meet the crisis in the south. It was necessary that the provinces of Malwa and Gujrat, which were the bases of his preparatory operations should be properly administered under able generals. After the departure of Mirza 'Aziz Kokah for Mecca, Gujrat was allotted to Murad in April 1593 A.D. ⁽²⁾ The next appointment was of Mirza Shah Rukh to the governorship of Malwa. He was married to Shukr-un-Nisa, Akbar's daughter, and was raised to the rank of 5000. ⁽³⁾

Mughals preparations for the Deccan campaign.

Akbar moved from Agra in July 1593 A.D. in order to appoint an army for the Deccan. Prince Daniyal was appointed to lead the army of 70,000 men, including Khan Khanan, Rai Rai Singh and many others. Shah Rukh Mirza, Shahbaz Khan and other jagir holders in Malwa were ordered to equip their troops and to proceed to the Deccan. The importance of the campaign could well be understood that even Raja Man

(1) Sirhindi, f.248b. A.N.III.p.624.

(2) A.N.III. p.639; M.L.I.p.203; T.A.II.p.422; M.T.p.387; M.A.I.p.182.

(3) A.N.III. p.644; M.L.I.p.203; M.T.p.388.

Singh was also ordered to join the imperial army if his distant province of Bengal permitted his absence. Prince Murad was told to keep himself in readiness and wait for orders. (1) After making all these arrangements, Akbar left Agra for Sultanpur on 24th Dec. 1593 A.D., ostensibly on a hunting expedition but with the secret intention of speeding the march of the Deccan army. (2)

Akbar's expectations turned ^{out} to be accurate as the movement of the army was very slow. When Akbar reached Haibatpur, the news came that Daniyal was still at Sirhind and that the army was not making progress. Akbar summoned Khan Khanan to come post haste to review the situation. Khan Khanan suggested that the best time for the imperial army to enter the Deccan was after the rainy season when water and forage would be plentiful and corn cheap and suggested that on that account movement was slow. (3) It was further decided that the command of the army should be transferred from Daniyal to Murad and that the march should be made after the rainy season. Explaining the change in the transfer of command, Akbar said that since he ordered Murad to serve under Daniyal, his younger brother, perhaps the former had felt it ill. Qulij Khan was sent to bring Daniyal back and the prince was appointed to the governorship of Panjab. (4)

(1) A.N.III.pp.646-47; M.R.p.931; M.L.I. p.204; T.A.II.p.424; Z.T.f.239; M.T.II.p.389.

(2) M.R.p.931; Sirhindi f.218b; Z.T.f.239; A.N.III.p.647.

(3) A.N.III.pp.647-48; T.A.II.p.424; M.T.II.p.389.

(4) A.N.III.pp.647-48; Darbar-i-Akbari p.93; T.A.II.p.424; M.A.pp.424-25; M.T.II.p.389.

Civil War in Ahmadnagar.

While the Mughals were preparing to penetrate into the Deccan, the conditions in Ahmadnagar were going from bad to worse. Unity, the most urgent need of the hour, was conspicuous by its absence and civil war broke out in Ahmadnagar.

With the death of Burhan Nizam Shah on 20th Sha'ban 1003 A.H./12th April 1595 A.D., the state of Ahmadnagar divided into many hostile political factions. Burhan was succeeded by his son Ibrahim, a boy of twelve years. This was a chance for the ambitious nobles to gain power for themselves in the name of the boy-king. In the beginning there were two rival parties headed by Ikhlas Khan and Mian Manju. They busied themselves in overpowering each other and the administration of the country was thrown into disorder. One sentiment united the rival parties, i.e. their common enmity against Bijapur. The Bijapuri envoy who had come to congratulate the new Nizam Shah was insulted. Ibrahim Adil Shah was much incensed by this uncivil and brutal act and sent an army.

Realising the impending danger from the Mughals who

(1) M.T. II.p.402; F.I.p.269; (Firishta writes that when Khan Khan reached Mandu, Burhan Nizam Shah sent his envoy, 'Inayat Khan Shirazi to Khan Khan and submitted Berar to the Mughals. Before Berar could be taken by the imperial officers, Burhan died. But this episode has not been mentioned in any other chronicle).

(2) F.II.pp.156-57.

were mustering at the Deccan borders, Mian Manju suggested peace with Bijapur. On the other hand Ikhlas Khan insisted on war and advanced with 30,000 men towards Bijapur. He sent words to Hamid Khan, the Bijapur^y commander that Nizam Shah was too young a king to understand the importance of the time and requested him to retire as he would induce Nizam Shah to retreat. The Bijapuris responded to the request and retraced their steps. Considering that Bijapuris had retreated due to their own weakness, Ikhlas Khan waged war on them. A battle took place in which Ibrahim Nizam Shah (1) was killed on July 29th 1595 A.D.

The death of Ibrahim Nizam Shah was a signal for anarchy and a prelude to the extinction of the kingdom itself. The rival 'condottieri' grew even more numerous and the parties sought for a king in whose name they should rule. In the words of a German scholar, "Akbar hovered like an eagle on the northern horizon and watched the fighting cocks of the southern states, rendering and wearying each other until his own time should come to prey." (2)

In order to establish a stable authority, it was necessary for each party to settle the question of succession. The lawful heir to the throne was Bahdur, the only surviving son of Ibrahim Nizam Shah. (3) The child was a year and a

(1) A.N.III.p.670; F.II.p.157.

(2) Kaiser Akbar.I p.326.

(3) F.II.p.158.

(1)
 half old and weak in health. Mian Manju was not ready to accept him since his survival was not sure. He sent Bahadur to the fort of Chaunda and despatched Khmaja Nizam Astrabadi to Junair to bring Ahmad son of Shah Tahir, whom he asserted to be of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Ahmad was declared as king and ^{he} 'Khutba' was read in his name on (2)
 6th August 1595 A.D.

In declaring Ahmad as Nizam Shah, though Mian Manju had overcome his opponents for the time being, yet the contest was not complete. Ikhlas Khan was not the man to admit defeat easily. He and his party consequently busied themselves in inquiring into the parentage of Ahmad. Firishta and Fizumi Astrabadi, the author of Futahat-i-Adil Shahi relying on 'the best available sources,' (3) disproved Ahmad's claim to the Nizam Shahi throne. After

(1) H.G.f.205a; C.G.f.100a.

(2) F.II.p.158; F.A.S.f.223b; C.G.f.100a; F.I.p.90; Burhan-i-MASIR i-MASIR, f.124a; A.N.III.p.670.

(3) F.II.p.158; F.A.S.f.224; when Burhan Shah b.Hussain Shah b. Ahmad Nizam Shah died, his son Hussain Nizam Shah declared himself as his successor. His brothers Sultan Muhammad Khudabanda, Shah 'Ali, Muhammad Baqir, 'Abdul Qadir and Shah Haidar fled to different places in India, to save their lives. A long time after, during the reign of Murtaza Nizam Shah, a person reached Haidarabad (according to Futahat-i-Adil Shahi, Daulatabad) and claimed himself to be the son of Sultan Khudabanda. He said that on such and such date Sultan Khudabanda died in Bengal. Salabat Khan and other Ahmadnagaris tried to inquire the truth but could not succeed. In order to avoid any confusion that person was imprisoned. Some of the Deccanis, who knew Sultan Khudabanda personally were later on despatched to Burhan II, who then resided with Akbar. Burhan II told to the Deccanis that Sultan Khudabanda died at his own residence and his sons were living with him and said that any such person who claimed to be the Sultan's son, in the Deccan, was an imposter.

ten or fifteen days of Ahmad's succession, the nobles came (1)
to know the falsehood of Mian Manju and turned against him.

The discovery of Ahmad's parentage, was an opportunity for Ikhlas Khan to demand the pretender's deposition.

He ordered ^{the} governor of Daulatabad to release Abhang Khan Abyssinian and Habshi Khan from the prison while on the other hand he despatched someone to the governor of Chaund to release Bahadur. The governor of Chaund refused to (2)
surrender Bahadur without the permission of Mian Manju.

Ikhlas Khan solved the difficulty easily. He picked up a boy named Moti Shah from the ~~l~~azar of Ahmadnagar and asserted him to be of the Nizam Shahi dynasty, proclaiming (3)
him the new Nizam Shah. But that was not all. Chand Bibi, the widow of 'Adil Shah, espoused the cause of Bahadur, the lawful heir to the throne. The fourth party was of Abhang Khan Habshi, who supported Shah 'Ali b. (4)
Burhan Shah, an old prince of seventy years.

The struggle of the Nizam Shahi nobles to overpower each other, gave a chance for the Mughals to interfere in their internal affairs. Ikhlas Khan mustered a large army and forced Mian Manju to take shelter in the fortress of Ahmadnagar. Mian Manju sent his son Mian Hasan with seven hundred men to disperse Ikhlas Khan, who defeated Mian Hasan instead. Pressed hard, Mian Manju in a state of (5)
helplessness, appealed to prince Murad for help. The

(1) F. III. p. 158-59; F. A. S. f. 224. (2) F. II. p. 158. (3) F. II. p. 158.

(4) F. II. pp. 158-59. (only Firishta calls him Ahang Khan, while the other chronicles calls him Abhang Khan).

(5) F. II. pp. 90, 156-159; F. A. S. f. 225b; C. G. f. 100a; Burhan-i-Maasir f. 124b.

Prince, who was already preparing for his march, hurried towards the Deccan at the invitation of Mian Manju.

The reader may now, from the foregoing account of the political situation in the Deccan on the eve of the Mughal attack, be aware of the chaos and confusion, which reigned there and which encouraged the Mughal interference. The efforts of Mian Manju, Ikhlas Khan and Abhang Khan in establishing their authority clearly show that none of them was true to the cause of the dynasty. Each of them was trying to seize power for his own selfish motive. The devotion of the Ahmadnagaris to their country was such that Mian Manju who had once preached unity and twice attempted to avert war against Bijapur, himself became so selfish to achieve his goal that he invited a foreign power to assist him. His invitation was a further proof of the fact that the Deccanis always sought help from the Mughals to overthrow their mutual rivals. There was no doubt that the Mughals were already making arrangements for the conquest of the Deccan, but the Deccanis themselves provided them with an incentive to hasten their preparations.

CHAPTER IICONQUEST OF AHMADNAGAR

The Mughals were already preparing for a move towards the Deccan when Mian Manju's invitation arrived in Gujrat, but their mobilisation was suffering delays. The dissensions which seemed a common characteristic of oriental commanders also arose between Murad and Khan Khanan, when the former was asked to lead the army. The main cause of their delay arose through a difference of opinion on strategy. Murad insisted that all the troops should assemble in Gujrat from whence the imperialists should advance to the Deccan: while Khan Khanan wanted first to go to Raja 'Ali Khan without whose help the proposed invasion seemed to be incomplete and then from Burhanpur to proceed to Murad to Gujrat via Malwa. Eventually the prince left Ahmadabad and after staying for some time in Broach proceeded in June 1595 A.D. towards the Deccan. In order to make further preparations Khan Khanan went to his jagir Bhilsa and stayed there till 18th July 1595 A.D. While proceeding to Burhanpur, Khan Khanan appealed to Murad to stay for a time in Gujrat.¹ This was the time when Murad received the invitation of Mian Manju

To be sure of success, the Mughals had to have the

1. A.N.III. p.p.698-99.

support of Raja 'Ali Khan. Khandesh was a place which could serve as an imperial base for the Deccan operations. When Khan Khanan met Raja 'Ali he found him unfavourable to the Mughals. Raja 'Ali's sympathies were with the Deccanis and his opposition to Khan-i-'Azam's filibustering expedition was well known. It was thought advisable that Khan Khanan not only should assure himself of the Raja's acquiescence in the Mughals' forthcoming expedition of the Deccan, but also should convert him into an active ally. To achieve their aim, the Mughals bribed him with the district of Nandarbar in Gujrat and assured him of other favours; altogether these inducements secured the Raja's help. Another reason which seemed to induce Raja 'Ali to support the imperialists was that a large Mughal army of 30,000 men was marching near his own frontiers. If he refused to join them, he might lose his own domain. All these considerations obliged Raja 'Ali Khan to further the cause of the Mughals.

No sooner did Murad receive the invitation of Mian Manju than he advanced towards Ahmadnagar without waiting for Khan Khanan and Raja 'Ali Khan. When Khan Khanan heard of Murad's departure he left the main army behind hastened to join the former to whom he met on 29th Nov. 1595 A.D., near Chand, thirty miles from Ahmadnagar. ¹

1. A.N. III. P.699.

The main army, numbering more than 30,000 soon followed also. The combined forces of the Faruqis and the Mughals, advanced towards the garden of Hasht Bihisht and invested the fort of Ahmadnagar on 23rd Rabi us Sani 1004 A.H./ 16th Dec. 1595 A.D. ¹

Before the invitation of Mian Manju could reach Gujrat, events took a sudden change in Ahmadnagar. Many of the Abyssinians, who in the beginning opposed Mian Manju, later on withdrew their help from Ikhlas Khan and Abhang Khan and joined Mian Manju. The obvious reason of this change in support was, that Mian Manju so far held, the fort and seemed to be the winning party. Some of the nobles, who had joined the opponents of Mian Manju for selfish gains were easily tempted by his high offers and joined him. Thus being reinforced, Mian Manju defeated his great rival, Ikhlas Khan in the neighbourhood of 'Namazgah' on 25th Muharram 1004 A.H./22nd Sept. 1595 A.D. ²

Though Mian Manju had succeeded in overpowering his opponents, yet his days of triumph were few. The Mughals had arrived to measure swords with the Deccanis. He now repented for calling the Mughals to intervene in the domestic affairs of Ahmadnagar. He provisioned the fort

1. F.II. p.159; H.G. f 205 h; F.A.S. f 226a; Kaiser Akbar Ip.327.

2. F.II. p.159.

and appointed Ansar Khan to command in his absence. Taking Ahmad with him he set out for Ausa to obtain help from Bijapur and Golconda.¹

One of the chief causes of the disunity among the Deccanis was due to the political structure of the states. The Deccan states ^{were} ~~monarchical~~ ^c states based on the army. Such states could only be stable and on a firm footing if their rulers themselves were strong; otherwise nobles try to seize power into their own hands. The weakness of a monarch thus leads to civil war. The death of Ibrahim Nizam Shah in July 1595 A.D., led the question of succession. Until that question was not solved and the new monarch's authority was not fully established, there was an open challenge for the ambitious nobles to seize power.

How ^{could} the nobles ~~could~~ dare to aspire for supremacy? The reply lies in the nature of political allegiance in those days. Every noble had a 'mansab' and according to his rank, he commanded a certain number of soldiers. The recruitment of the army was based on ^{the} tribal system. In other words, the soldiers owed their immediate allegiance to the noble and not to the king. A noble thus could depend on his followers and ~~on~~ their support could rebel against his master or contest ~~against~~ his opponent. That

1. F.A.S. f.f. 226a; M.L. p.205; A.N.III p.699

is why we find that all the four parties of the Nizam Shahis had gathered their supporters and were trying to overthrow each other.

Though Chand Bibi's activities were genuine and unselfish, yet she failed in establishing her authority. If for some time, the Nizam Shahis had united, it was only to drive the Mughals out of their country so that after them, they could strive for their own supremacy. The most noteworthy point in the history of the Nizam Shahis is that none of the parties could establish itself firmly, with the result as that anarchy reigned throughout the course of Mughals' attempt to capture Ahmadnagar. The Mughals thus took full advantage of their dissensions, which eventually led to the downfall of ^{the} Ahmadnagar state.

The obstinacy of Ansar Khan, the supporter of Mian Manju, in yielding to Chand Bibi's genuine demand for the surrender of the fort, is another example of the character of the political allegiance of that period. Chand Bibi asked Ansar Khan to hand over the defence of the fort of Ahmadnagar to her. But Ansar Khan, who was appointed by Mian Manju refused to meet Chand Bibi's request without the permission of his master.

In order to achieve her goal, Chand Bibi procured the assassination of Ansar Khan and succeeded in taking whole affairs into her own hands. She sent someone to Jond to bring Bahadur. On the refusal of the commander

of the fort of Jond to deliver Bahadur, she proclaimed him king 'in absentia' and Khutba was read in his name. She made a general appeal to the Nizam Shais^h to defend their capital. Her appeal affected the varying groups, who tried to assist her.¹ But the later events would show that they had gathered round the person of Chand Bibi for their own selfish motive and not for the sake of dynasty. Because as soon as immediate danger finished, they resumed their hostilities.

Ikhlas Khan was the first to respond to the request of Chand Bibi and set out for Ahmadnagar, at the head of his 10,000 followers. Khan Khanan sent an army under Daulat Khan Lodi and Sher Khwaja to oppose Ikhlas Khan. After a severe battle at Patan, Ikhlas Khan was defeated and fled towards Bijapur.² Abhang Khan was the next to come to the help of the Ahmadnagaris. He came with a cavalry force of 7,000 and encamped six miles from the fort. He planned to enter the fort on the following night of his arrival, through the eastern part of the fort where a breach was caused the previous day. ^{It was} ~~It was~~ bad luck for Abhang Khan; ~~that~~ ^{that} when Murad came to reconnoitre ~~the~~ the next day, he found the fort unguarded.^u He ordered Khan Khanan to place a contingent to complete the ring of investment

1. F.II. p.159.

2. A.N.III. p.700; F.II. p.160.

Without the knowledge of the latest arrangements, Abhang Khan advanced at night with a selected contingent of three thousand sawars and a thousand artillerymen. A fierce engagement took place and ^{under} the cover of a heavy fire discharged by the besieged, he managed in throwing himself with his four hundred followers into the fort. Seven hundred Nizam Shahis sacrificed their lives in this attempt while the remainder including Shah 'Ali, the pretender, fled to Bijapur.⁽¹⁾

Like the Deccanis, the Mughal Camp was also not free from disunity. There were two main causes for that. First, the inefficiency of the imperialists in matching the guerilla tactics ^{of the Deccanis} and their accusations for holding each other responsible for the delay in the progress ^{of the imperial} army. Second, being far in the south, the imperialists were free from the personal observation of the emperor, and thus they indulged in mutual disputes. The imperial camp was divided into two rival groups - one headed by Khan Khanan and Shahbaz Khan and the second by Prince Murad and his tutor Sadiq Khan. It was decided in the beginning of the siege that each of the three armies should take upon itself one of ~~the~~ three things - first, to take the fort; second, to conquer the country and the third to guard the fort. "But nothing was done," writes Abu'l Fazl, "due to the non-cooperation in the imperial camp."⁽²⁾ Somehow all the

1. F.A.S. ff.228b, 229a; F.II. p.160

2. A.N. III. p.700.

great nobles such as Syed Murtaza Sabzwari, Raja Jagan Nath and the Faruqi Chief Raja 'Ali Khan were assigned duties to dig trenches round the fort. But the progress was slow.

The disunity of the imperialists encouraged Raja 'Ali Khan to help the Deccanis. Though he had joined the Mughals against his wishes yet he did not acquiesce in the armed intervention of the latter in Deccan affairs. He took advantage of the prevailing dissensions in the imperial camp, by sending supplies into the fort. He was also in correspondence with the besieged. Whenever a reinforcement of artillerymen came for the garrison he enabled them to enter the fort or sometime even sent few artillerymen from his own camp into the fort. When Murad came to know of the duplicity of Raja 'Ali Khan, he replaced him by Raja Jagan Nath.¹

Though the besieged had held the fort gallantly so far, yet they needed more help. There was an interesting feature in the history of the three Deccan states that though they were generally at war with each other, yet *they* united ~~themselves~~ against a foreign aggression. Chand Bibi therefore made an appeal for help both to 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah. "The three states of the Deccan", writes Faizi Sirhindi, "had settled to unite themselves against a foreign invader, irrespective of their mutual rivalries

1. Burhan-i-Ma'asir. F.141a.

and dynastic wars".¹ Ibrahim 'Adil Shah sent an army of 30,000 under his general Sohail Khan. Similarly Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah also despatched Mahdi Quli Sultan Turkman with an army of 10,000 men. All the reinforcements including the followers of Ikhlas Khan were ordered to assemble at Shah Dark and from there to advance towards Ahmadnagar under the supreme command of Sohail Khan.²

The Mughal progress was delayed due to the increasing rivalries between the Mughal commanders Khan Khanan and Murad. The main reason was their difference in the strategy of war. Khan Khanan being an experienced and veteran soldier preferred to carry out his own plan, while Murad wanted to dictate his own. The situation arose to such an extent that once Murad stated that the campaign could not become successful as long as Khan Khanan and Shahbaz Khan were present in the invading army.³ "Chand Bibi", writes Abu'l Fazl, "would have surrendered to the Mughals, had there been unity among the imperialists."⁴ Encouraged by the dissensions of the besiegers, the garrison resolved to hold the fort. The exchange of artillery continued for some time but no decisive result was obtained.

1. Sirhindi f.235b.

2. Burhan-i-Ma'asir f.142; F.A.S. f.229; M.L. p.207; F.II. p.160; Tarikh-i-Muhammad Quli Qutb Shahi f.160.

3. T.M. f.218.

4. A.N. III. p.699.

Unsuccessful in their attempt to take the fort by storm, the Mughals tried to persuade the enemy to surrender by peaceful means. The Mughals thought that Raja 'Ali Khan would be able to do so, since he was suspected to be in league with them. The position of Raja 'Ali Khan became very awkward. He did not wish the fall of the Nizam Shahis but could not refuse the imperial orders outright. He showed some reluctance to meet the imperial demand. But when pressure was put, he wrote a letter to them. He stated diplomatically that he accompanied the Mughals purposely, i.e. in order to save the honour and prestige of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Justifying his position, he explained that the fort would soon or later fall. If it was taken by storm the besieged might suffer badly. To avoid the worst, it would be better if they surrender voluntarily and in return, except the fort of Ahmadnagar, any other fort which the besieged would prefer would be given to them. ¹

The letter of Raja 'Ali Khan caused bewilderment in the fort. Afzal Khan, the besieged commander encouraged his followers and replied angrily to Raja 'Ali Khan. He said that it was he who brought the Mughals to their country. He therefore should be ready for their revenge as the Deccani reinforcements were *approaching* and with their

1. Burhan-i-Ma'asir f.141.

help, the besieged would easily defeat the Mughals.¹

Raja 'Ali Khan was ashamed by that reply as he lost faith in the eyes of his Deccani fellows.

Foiled in their attempt of persuading the enemy to surrender, the Mughals could only exert their utmost military efforts. They planned to take the fort before the arrival of the Deccani reinforcements: otherwise they would be caught ~~in~~ ^{Two fires.} between Orders were given to dig mines and blow ^{up} the fort walls. Five mines were dug on Thursday the 20th Feb. 1596 A.D. and were filled with gunpowder. It was planned that the mines would be set on fire after the Friday prayers. Khwaja Muhammad Khan, one of the imperialists took pity on the besieged and secretly told them the location of the mines. The garrison worked all night and emptied four by morning. Accordingly the ~~naptha~~ ^{naptha} was ignited on 21st Feb.² after the Friday prayers.

To the surprise of the besiegers, only the fifth mine exploded and caused a breach of fifty yards in the fort wall. Murad wanted to enter the fort through the breach. But Khan Khanan and Shahbaz Khan advised him to wait for the explosion of the other mines³ and thus missed an

1. Burhan-i-Ma'asir f.141.

2. F.A.S. f.231a (gives the name of Khwaja Muhammad Jan Sab~~z~~wari, who deserted to the besieged). Burhan-i-Ma'asir (f.143b) gives the name as 'Irfan Khwaja Muhammad; while Abu'l Fazl (A.N.III.p.700) does not mention any name.

3. A.N. III. p.700; F.II. p.161.

irreplaceable chance of capturing the fort. Some of the besieged such as Murtaza Khan, Shamshir Khan and Muhammad Khan became disheartened and contemplated surrendering. But Chand Bibi came to their rescue. Wearing full armour and with an unveiled face, she stood all night by the breach with a sword in her hand. The besieged worked all night and by the early hours of the morning, under the continued discharge of the artillery to keep the Mughals away, they were able to raise the wall. The Mughals attempted many times to hamper the erection of the wall but were repulsed every time.¹

Though the besieged had checked the Mughal progress so far, yet they became disheartened by the prolongation of the siege. Sohail Khan, the Bijapuri commander, who was coming to the help of the besieged, was still on his way. Chand Bibi sent him urgent messages to hasten his march. The Nizam Shahi messenger was caught by the advance guard of the Mughals and brought to Khan Khanan. The Mughal commander, in the pride of his strength, wrote to Sohail Khan on the back of the same paper that the Mughals were waiting for him for a long time in order to settle the matter. He therefore should come as early as possible.²

The prolongation of siege without any decisive result, obliged both the Mughals and the besieged to make peace.

1. F.II. p.161; T.M. f.218; Burhan-i-Ma'asir ff.146b, 147a; F.A.S. f.231b; A.N.III. p.700.

2. F.A.S. f.232; F.II p.162; Burhan-i- Ma'asir f.150b.

Each party had its own reasons for coming to that decision. The imperialists were frightened by the fast approach of the enemy's reinforcements, lest they might be caught in between. The disunity among the imperial commanders demoralized the common soldiers, who slackened their efforts. The scarcity of food and fodder in the imperial camp made the task more difficult for the invaders and there was no hope for immediate supply of provisions from the north. A council of war was held to review the situation.

It was decided to open negotiations with the Deccanis.¹ On the other side, the besieged thought that now the imperialists were frightened by the approach of the Deccani reinforcement and were inclined to make peace. If the reinforcement were also defeated, the Mughals would be encouraged and take the fort by storm and in such a case an immeasurable damage could be expected. The small number of the besieged and shortage of arms and provision in the fort, were the other factors, which obliged them to seek peace terms.

So negotiations were opened. All the Deccani chronicles agree that the initiative was taken by the Mughals,² but Abu'l Fazl gives a contrary account. A minute and critical study of Abu'l Fazl's own words makes

1. A.N.III. p.700

2. F.II. p.162; Burhan-i-Ma'asir f.f. 150b, 151a; T.M. f.218b; c.G. f.100b; H.G. f.206a.

us believe that the Deccani version is correct. Abu'l Fazl writes "Observing the dissensions in the Mughal camp, the besieged recovered their courage; became somewhat bewildered and suggested a peace." ¹

The demand of the Mughals was the surrender of Berar, which had already been offered by Tufail Khan in 1574 A.D. but was seized by Murtaza Nizam Shah. The Mughals further argued that Berar was promised to ~~be handed over to~~ them by Burhan Nizam Shah on his successful return, to Ahmadnagar, but the promise was not fulfilled. The besieged hesitated to comply with the Mughal demand but eventually agreed. The treaty was signed on 23rd February 1596 A.D. The terms settled were:- Berar would be ceded to the Mughals; and Bahadur Shah son of Ibrahim Nizam Shah would be recognized as the new Nizam Shah and a vassal of the Mughal emperor.² The treaty was ratified by both the parties and the siege was raised.

With the annexation of Berar, came to an end the first phase of Akbar's Deccan policy. Berar was now a foot-hold for the Mughals, who were determined to subjugate the whole of the peninsula. The imperial border expanded further south and ^{came} in closer contact with the Deccan states. The

1. A.N.III. p.700

2. F.A.S. f.232b; Burhan-i-Ma'asir F.II.p.162; A.N.III. p.700; C.G. f.100b; ff.154-55; H.G.f.206a; M.L. p.208.

Mughals had retired temporarily to renew their preparations but did not forefeit their desire to capture the Deccan states.

As soon as the Mughals withdrew from Ahmadnagar, the Nizam Shahis resumed hostilities. When Sohail Khan, the Bijapuri commander arrived ^{at} Ahmadnagar, he found the Nizam Shahis in a bad state of affairs. Mian Manju, who had once regretted his folly in calling the Mughals, ~~once~~ ^{once} ~~again~~ again to pursue his own ends. He wanted the recognition of his own candidate, i.e. Shah Ahmad, in whose name he could exercise power. He had gone to seek help from Bijapur and Golconda with one motive. His plan was first to drive the Mughals out of Ahmadnagar, with the help of the Deccani reinforcements and then to strive for the supremacy of Shah Ahmad. When he came back to Ahmadnagar, he lost all hopes. Bahadur was recognized by the Mughals and Chand Bibi was the regent of the boy-king. Sohail Khan reported the situation in Ahmadnagar to 'Adil Shah who sent Murtaza Khan with 4,000 soldiers to persuade Mian Manju to surrender his demand. Mian Manju agreed and went to Bijapur, where he was given a jagir. ¹

The removal of Mian Manju from Ahmadnagar was not the end of Chand Bibi's difficulties. Though she had unselfish motives yet she failed in establishing her own

1. F.II. p.162; H.G. f.206a.

authority over the Nizam Shahis. Whereas her efforts were to keep the dynasty alive, the aim of the selfish nobles was to seize power in their own hands. Muhammad Khan, was the peshwa of the boy-king and had the support of a vast number of his followers. He therefore aspired to outdo Chand Bibi and seize the entire power. He ~~sent~~ his opponents such as Abhang Khan and Shamshir Khan to jail, while many others, unable to suffer his atrocities fled to Bijapur and Golconda.¹

The activities of Muhammad Khan obliged Chand Bibi to seek help from 'Adil Shah. She wrote a very pathetic letter to 'Adil Shah. She bewailed her helplessness and said that if peace was not restored, the state would soon fall to the enemy, who was sitting "in an ambush and waiting for his prey." Ibrahim 'Adil Shah once again attempted to alarm the Nizam Shahis of the consequences of their dissensions. He sent Sohail Khan, to bring Muhammad Khan to ~~his~~ heel. Pressed hard, Muhammad Khan saw his fortune in invoking the Mughal help. When the besieged came to know of Muhammad Khan's design, they captured him and handed him over to Chand Bibi. Abhang Khan was appointed the new peshwa. Sohail Khan, who had come to Chand Bibi's help left Ahmadnagar, after the restoration of peace.²

After the capture of Berar, the Mughals attempted to

1. F.II. p.162.

2. F.II. p.162; C.G./f.100b.

administer the newly conquered area and establish their rule. Murad made Shahpur, a newly constructed town six miles from Balapur as his headquarters. Mir Murtaza was appointed to Ilichpur, while Mirzi 'Ali Beg and Shaikh Daulat were ordered to assist him. Sadiq Muhammad was the guardian of the frontiers and the general administration of the province was left to Khan Khanan and Mirza Shah Rukh.¹ It was evident to a general like Khan Khanan that Akbar would never be satisfied with the capture of one corner of the Deccan i.e. Berar. In order to exact more help from Raja 'Ali Khan for the Mughals' future operations in the Deccan, he ~~arranged~~^{for} Raja 'Ali Khan's grand-daughter (i.e. the daughter of Bahadur b. Raja 'Ali Khan) to be married to Murad. Khan Khanan thus brought Khandesh-Mughals relations closer than before.²

Though according to the treaty, the Beraris had to submit to the Mughals, yet they never accepted their domination in *their hearts*. Twice they attempted to overthrow the Mughal bondage but were crushed.³ Though failed twice in their efforts, yet the Nizam Shahis were not ready to yield. Hardly three months elapsed ^{since} their last attempt before the Deccanis and the Mughals accused each other of breach of faith. The Mughals after the battle of Nov. 1596 A.D.

1. A.N.III. pp.702-03; M.L.I.p.208; F.A.S. f.233a

2. M.L.I. p.208.

3. A.N.III. p.711,715.

had taken Pathri which according to them was included in old Berar while the Nizam Shahis claimed it to be the part of Ahmadnagar.¹ It seems that the Nizam Shahis who were defeated twice in their previous attempts were now encouraged by Bijapur and Golconda and attacked some Mughal posts. Skirmishes took place and the Nizam Shahis suffered heavy loss. Chand Bibi appealed both to 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah to send immediate help. Sohail Khan was again ordered to lead the confederate forces, which numbered more than 60,000.²

The march of the combined forces of Bijapur and Golconda obliged the Mughals to forget their mutual disputes. The decisive time had come for which the Mughals had been long waiting. When Khan Khanan heard the news of the advance of the Deccanis, he left Jabna and came to Shahpur to inform the prince.³ Murad wanted to lead the army but Khan Khanan, in order to credit the victory to his name assumed the command himself. The time factor made Murad agree to Khan Khanan's proposal. As in view of the seriousness of the situation, full cooperation and harmony was needed in the imperial army, Khan Khanan therefore left his rival

1. F.II. p.163; F.A.S. f.235a; H.G. f.206; C.G. f.101a.

2. H.G. f.207a; C.G. f.101a; M.L.I. pp.209-11; F.A.S. f.235; F.II. p.163; M.R. p.932.

3. F.II. p.163.

Sadiq Muhammad Khan with an army of 5,000 to guard the prince.¹ The imperial army including the contingents of Raja 'Ali, mustered 20,000 according to Firishta and 15,000 according to Abu'l Fazl. The imperialists encamped at Ashti, north bank of Godawari and twelve kos from Pathri.²

Both armies encamped for fifteen days opposite each other, during which period no action beyond slight skirmishes occurred.³ The course of events of the battle is lengthy and controversial but the main features are described here to make the reader realize ~~of~~ its importance, as this battle was a decisive factor in the future history of Ahmadnagar. It would show that the Mughals were superior to their opponents in the technique and strategy of the pitched battles. The Mughals arrayed in the following order: in the centre were Khan Khanan, Mirza Shah Rukh, 'Ali Beg and Ikhtiyar while the right and left wings were commanded by Raja 'Ali Khan and Raja Jagan Nath respectively. The Deccanis had their set rule. "It was their custom", writes Faizi Sirhindi, "that when the forces (i.e. Ahmadnagar Bijapur and Golconda armies) united against a foreign army, the Nizam Shahis commanded the centre; the 'Adil Shahis the right and the Qutb Shahis the left wings of the armies".

1. F.A.S. f.235b.

2. A.N.III. p.p.718; F.II p.163.

3. F.II. p.163.

Faizi Sirhindi's statement is further corroborated by Abu'l Fazl.¹

This significant battle was fought on 18th Jammadi-us-Sani 1005 A.H./27th Jan.1597 A.D.² As the right wing of the Mughals advanced, the enemy were shaken for a moment but stood firm. The Deccanis discharged artillery so heavily that Raja 'Ali Khan with his five hundred followers died in that action while the total loss of the imperialists was estimated at 3,000 or 4,000.³ Meantime the news of the death of Khan Khanan was rumoured in the imperial camp and disheartened the soldiers. The left and right wings of the imperialists gave way by evening and Sohail Khan regarded himself as master of the field. The fugitive imperialists fled to Shahpur, a distance of about a hundred miles and harassed the prince by making untrue reports. Murad and his tutor were so alarmed that they prepared to leave the Deccan.⁴ But Khan Khanan and Mirza Shah Rukh held their ground and put to flight the Nizam Shahis and Qutb Shahis.⁵

1. Sirhindi f.235b; A.N.III. p.718.

2. F.II. p.163;

3. F.II. p.163; H.G. f.207; A.N.III. p.719.

4. A.N.III. p.719; M.L.I.pp.209-10; F.II. p.163.

5. F.II. p.163; AN.III. p.719.

Lack of complete knowledge of the battle field gave a wrong impression to the opposing commanders. Regarding the victory as theirs, the 'Adil Shahis busied themselves in collecting the plunder and without the permission of their commanders returned to *deposit* their booty. Thus Sohail Khan was left with few of his followers to seek the fortune alone. ¹ When Khan Khanan returned in the darkness of night from the pursuit of the Deccanis, he halted to take rest and considered the victory his own. Both Sohail and Khan Khanan did not know until a watch of the night had passed that they were within a distance of a bow-shot from each other. *Throughout the* night the exchange of bullets continued and drums were beaten. ²

As the victory was indecisive, both parties tried to gather their followers to give a final blow. The second day's battle was fought more vigorously. By dawn the Deccanis were able to gather 25,000 while the imperialists numbered 7,000. ³ A fierce battle took place in which the Deccanis were utterly defeated, their commanders such as Ankas Khan, Haibat Khan and Dilpat Rai were killed. Sohail Khan himself was wounded in the beginning of the action and fled to Shah Darqk. The Nizam Shahis and Qutb

1. F.A.S. ff.236b; 237a. H.G. f.207; F.II.p.163.

2. F.I. p.270; II. p.163; H.G. f.207b; A.N.III. p.719.

3. A.N.III p.719; while Firishta (F.I.p.270) says that 10 or 12,000 Deccanis and 3 or 4,000 imperialists gathered again.

Shahis who were defeated the previous day reached Ahmadnagar and Haidarabad with great difficulty.¹ The Mughals were weary and did not pursue the enemy. The news of victory was sent to Akbar who was very pleased with Khan Khanan and sent him a khil'at and a horse.²

During the course of battle, when Raja 'Ali Khan could not be traced, it was suspected that either he had deserted to the enemy or fled to his country. His camp therefore was looted and a few of his followers were slain.³ After the victory, on the information of a Khandeshi trooper,⁴ the body of Raja 'Ali was discovered and buried honourably.⁵ His flags, drums and elephants were sent to Bahadur who succeeded his father to the throne of Khandesh.⁶ Bahadur bitterly resented the unfounded suspicions of his father's desertion and the plundering of his camp. From the very beginning, Bahadur adopted a hostile attitude towards the Mughals, the details of which have been discussed elsewhere. Murad sent congratulations to him at his accession and summoned him to his court. Bahadur excused himself from

1. F.I. p.270; II. p.163; A.N.III. p.719;

2. A.N.III. p.719; T.M. f.221a.

3. A.N. III. p.720.

4. F.A.S. ff238b. 239a.

5. A.N.III. p.720.

6. Z.W. p.79; F.II. p.239.

attending the prince's court in person but sent a contingent of four thousand Khandeshi soldiers to serve Murad.¹

The battle of Ashti had many results. It did much to retrieve the Mughal prestige which had been somewhat tarnished by the unsuccessful attempts on Ahmadnagar. The Mughals made the Deccanis realize that they were far superior to them in open battles and that they could defeat even their united forces. The defeat disheartened the allies of Nizam Shah so much that they could not dare to oppose the Mughals actively for some time. Thus the alienation of Bijapur and Golconda from the help of Nizam Shah paved the way for **the** success of the imperialists. To sum up, the victory encouraged the Mughals to believe that the Deccan states were weak and could easily be overthrown.

As soon as the danger, which had united the hostile parties of the Mughals, passed away, they resumed their disputes. The reason was the same as before whose plan would be carried out finally, Murad's or Khan Khanan's. Murad being the formal commander wanted to dictate his own plans. While Khan Khanan had his own schemes which were better and more advantageous than those of Murad's. He had won the battle of Ashti due to his own strategy and

1. Z.W. p.79.

therefore was eager to carry out his full plan to meet success. Thus the policy of Khan Khanan made Murad feel himself an incompetent general. Murad therefore was not ready to tolerate this supposed humiliation and the virtual superiority of Khan Khanan. Murad asked Khan Khanan to advance to Ahmadnagar soon after the battle of Ashti.

But Khan Khanan suggested, to capture the entire province of Berar with its dependencies first and then after restoring¹ the administration, to proceed to Ahmadnagar next year.

Khan Khanan was justified in his proposals as the country needed proper administration as it had suffered from war for the last two years, and the army also required re-organization before it could proceed on any other campaign. But the prince remained firm in his decision. He and Sadiq Muhammad Khan complained to Akbar of the non-cooperation of Khan Khanan.²

Akbar tried to cement the relations between Murad and ^{KHAN} Khanan, but since both were adamant, he decided to recall both the generals, to give them advice. Roop Kh^{was} was sent to bring Khan Khanan who had left the prince's camp and gone to his jagir.³ Disheartened and disappointed as he was, Khan Khanan came to the imperial court where he met ^{with} a cold reception.⁴ Murad hesitated in coming to

1. F.II. p.163; H.G. f.208a; M.L.I. pp.209-11.

2. F.II. p.163.

3. A.N. III. p.739.

4. F.I. p.270.

Agra. Akbar *intended* to go to the south personally to set ~~the~~ matters right but dropped the idea and sent Abu'l Fazl on 5th Jan 1599 A.D. to bring the prince from the Deccan. Abu'l Fazl was ordered that if the circumstances permitted he should accompany the prince otherwise he should despatch the prince alone and himself work in cooperation with Mirza Shah Rukh.¹

Inflicting a crushing defeat on the enemy at Ashti, the Mughals determined to extend their border southward. Within a short period, Murad conquered the forts of Ahubara, Kaveil, Silgarah, Parnala, Kherla and Nasik, which were the dependencies of Ahmadnagar.² But the imperial progress was checked due to the illness of Murad caused by excess^{ive} drinking. While coming from Shahpur to Daulatabad, he died on the way near Dihari, on May 12th 1599 A.D.³

The death of Murad and the absence of Khan Khanan from the Deccan, provided an opportunity for the Ahmadnagaris to regain their lost territory. When Abu'l Fazl reached the imperial camp, he found it in utter confusion. Some of the imperialists being discouraged by the death of the prince, deserted to the enemy. After

1. A.N.III. p.749.

2. A.N.III. pp.739, 745, 746, 751.

3. A.N.III. p.753; F.I. p.271; II p.164; C.G. f.101b; F.A.S. f.241a; T.M. f.222.

garrisoning Berar, Abu'l Fazl advanced towards Daulatabad, which he soon captured.¹ The Nizam Shahis advanced under Abhang Khan to recapture Bir. Sher Khwaja, the imperial commandant, was on the eve of surrender^{ing} to the enemy, had Abu'l Fazl's timely help not arrived there. Though the Nizam Shahis could not capture the fort, yet they inflicted heavy losses on the neighbouring villages. Many other Nizam Shahis took advantage of Abu'l Fazl's incompetency as a general and regained some parts of their lost territory. Unable to face the enemy's growing progress, Abu'l Fazl² appealed to Akbar for reinforcements.

The need of the hour obliged Akbar to be reconciled with his ill-treated commander, Khan Khanan. Akbar knew the qualities of able generalship in Khan Khanan from his previous military career. Akbar concluded that he had already some experience in the Deccan campaigns, and therefore was fit to be reappointed to make the success complete. Thus the ability of Khan Khanan prevailed over the intrigues of his opponents. Akbar sent for Khan Khanan; gave him a khil'at, a horse and showed him other marks of favour. The commander soon forgot the harsh treatment of his master and ^{became} reconciled with him.³

As the presence of a prince was regarded a symbol of royalty, which exacted the loyalty of the soldiers, therefore a prince of the royal blood, was generally sent

1. A.N.III. pp.756-58.

2. F.II. p.164; A.N.III. pp.759-61.

3. sirhindi f.250; A.N.III. p.763; F.II. p.164.

on important campaigns, with the army. After the death of Murad, Akbar first planned to appoint Salim, but dropped the idea as the prince couldn't attend the court at that time.¹ The emperor then nominated his youngest son Daniyal to lead the Deccan army.² As the imperialists had suffered previously due to the non-cooperation, Akbar was not ready to tolerate the same situation again. Harmony and unity between Khan Khanan and Daniyal were the essential pre-requisites for the success of the expedition. He therefore reinforced their relations by having Daniyal married to Janan Begum, the daughter of Khan Khanan, before their march to the Deccan.³ Akbar himself came as far as Ujjain to hasten the march of the Deccan army, and stayed there for some time.⁴

While the Mughals were preparing themselves for their second march into the Deccan, the Nizam Shahis were torn by their mutual disputes. Whenever peace was restored by ^{the} efforts of 'Adil Shah, it lasted for ^a short time.⁵

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1. A.N.III. p.757.
 2. F.A.S. f.241b; F.II p.164; A.N.III. p.757.
 3. T.M. f.222b; F.A.S. f.241b; M.L.I. p.213;
 4. A.N.III. pp.766-67; Sirhindi f.249.
 5. F.A.S. f.240; F.II. pp.163-64.

In order to gain time to strengthen her own position, Chand Bibi deceived the Mughal commander, Abu'l Fazl, by writing some diplomatic letters. She represented that when Abhang Khan *had been* overpowered, she would surrender the fort of Ahmadnagar to the Mughals and in return she demand^{ed} Bir to be given to her in jagir. She further stated that she would herself go to the imperial court and presented Bahadur to Akbar.¹ By employing this stratagem, she intended to gain time to get rid of Abhang Khan while at the same she wanted to avoid any aggression by the Mughals. Abu'l Fazl agreed to her proposals and was defeated in diplomacy. Had she been sincere *in* her promise, she could have easily asked for the Mughal help against Abhang Khan, but she never made such a request.

Daniyal started in March 1600 A.D. towards the Deccan. When he reached Burhanpur, he expected that Bahadur Khan of Khandesh, would pay him homage. Bahadur Khan, in the pride of the impregnability of the fortress of Asir, refused to meet the prince. His refusal brought the extinction of his dynasty, as will be recorded in the later pages. Daniyal thought of capturing Asir himself, but was ordered by his father to continue his march and leave the matter to him.²

1. A.N.III. p.765.

2. F.II. p.271; A.N.III. p.767.

The arrival of Daniyal and Khan Khanan in the Deccan, in the first week of April 1600 A.D. marked the second siege of Ahmadnagar under Akbar. The imperial army, which was better equipped and better organized than the previous time, numbered 30,000.¹ This time the Mughals had come with determination and singleness of purpose. The opponents of Khan Khanan were not included in order to bring full harmony in the army. Thus the imperialists were free from mutual disputes and other hindrances. Furthermore, the arrival of the emperor himself in Asir,^a few days after the siege of Ahmadnagar, stimulated the efforts of the Mughals. So it can be concluded that while the imperialists restarted their attempt with freshness and full unity, the Nizam Shahis were exhausted and worn out by their internal dissensions.

Before adopting the last resort, the Mughals tried to induce the besieged to surrender by peaceful means. Khan Khanan offered terms for the surrender of the fort. These were: Bahadur would be given a mansab of 5000 and any fort except Ahmadnagar and Daulatabad would be conferred on him; a jagir worthy of a mansabdar of 5000 rank would be bestowed on Chand Bibi. The Nizam Shahis preferred to hold the fort and rejected the Mughal offer.²

1. F.II. p.164.

2. F.A.S. f.247; A.N.III. p.774.

Foiled in their attempt to persuade the enemy, the Mughals invested the fort closely on 12th April 1600 A.D.¹ Mochals, i.e. batteries were employed and other siege engines were used. Exchange of fire continued and the besieged were reduced to extremities. The garrison tried ^{their} utmost to push back the invading army but failed and had to suffer heavily.

The downfall of the Nizam Shahis chiefly rests on them. Chand Bibi was still there to further the cause of the dynasty, but the dissensions of the nobles had precluded the effective defence of the country. Bijapur and Golconda did not dare to oppose the Mughals actively, when Akbar himself had come to the Deccan and except them there was no other ally on whom the besieged could count for help.

The shortage of arms and provisions in the fort was the other cause which weakened the resistance of the besieged. The imperialists dug mines and employed **babistas** and the fort was about to fall. In such a discouraging situation, Chand Bibi preferred to conclude peace, in order to save the honour of the royal family. She sent for Jita Khan, an eunuch, to inform him of her intentions. She said that the disunity of Abhang Khan and other Nizam Shahis had shown such an evil day Akbar had himself come to the Deccan² and the fort was about to fall.

1. A.N.III. p.744.

2. Akbar reached Burhanpur on 10th April 1600 A.D. for the siege of Asirgarh - described elsewhere.

The only way left for her was to surrender the fort to the Mughals and retire with Bahadur to Junair. Jita Khan declined her proposal and insisted on continuing the fight. But Chand Bibi was firm in her decision. The evil Jita Khan rushed to inform the besieged that the queen - dowager was in league with the Mughals and was ready to surrender the fort. A deluded mob rushed into her private apartment and murdered her.¹ Thus the last hope of the independence of Ahmadnagar was destroyed by the ~~hands~~ of Nizam Shahis themselves.

The death of Chand Bibi was a prelude to the downfall of the Nizam Shahi state. She had had some influence over the besieged. But after her death, there was none who could have at least that much influence in the fort. Each one aspired to take the command himself. The defenders were divided into many groups and disunity paid its price. The Mughals dug a mine in which a hundred and eighty 'mans' of Naptha was put and in the early hours of 16th August 1600 A.D., set it on fire. Twenty thousand men were kept ready to rush into the breach as soon as it appeared. The wall under Laila Burj was blown up and caused a breach of thirty yards. The Mughals rushed into the fort and a general massacre ensued. Jita Khan,

1. F.II. p.164; F.A.S. f.248; T.M. ff.222-24; C.G. f.101b; Abu'l Fazl (A.N.III. p.774) calls him Habisha Khan while Rafi Ud-Din (T.M. f.224a) calls him Chita Khan.

the assassin of Chand Bibi, met his reward and was cut to pieces by the sword of the invaders.¹

The innocent Bahadur, aged eight, was captured and was sent to the fort of **Gawaliyar** as a life prisoner.²

A vast booty including precious stones, a big library and twenty fine elephants fell to the victorious troops.³

Although Akbar, after so much and so prolonged effort now appeared victorious and Ahmadnagar extinguished as an independent power, yet ^{the} sentiments of the common people of Ahmadnagar had not been won over. As soon as Akbar left the Deccan, the Nizam Shahis were to try to overthrow the Mughal domination and the imperialists could hardly enjoy ^{the} fruit of ~~their~~ so hard a labour.

1. A.N. III. pp.774-75; F.A.S. ff.248, 249a, 258a, Firishta (F.II.p.164) says except Bahadur every one was put to death, including children, women and the old. But this statement of Firishta seems to be exaggerated. Abul Fazl (A.N.III. p.775) states that only fifteen hundred of the besieged were put to sword. (Z.T. f.263a says that one thousand besieged were killed.

2. F.II. p.164. A.N. III. p.755. **Fakuhat-i-'Adil** Shahi (f.258) records that when Bahadur was presented before Murad, the former asked whether the prince would also kill him like his other country-fellows. Murad felt pity on innocent Bahadur and said that he (Bahadur) was like his son and ^{he} would take care of him.

3. A.N. III. p.775.

CHAPTER III
CONQUEST OF ASIRGARH

When Qadr Khan, known as Bahadur Khan of Khandesh turned hostile towards the Mughals, Akbar was free in north India. The emperor's great rival, i.e. 'Abdullah Khan of Turan, who had been a threat to the Mughal empire, died on 24th January 1598 A.D. ¹ Shah 'Abbas was considered to be able to settle with 'Abdul Mun'im, the new Khan of Transoxiana. When some imperialists suggested sending an expedition to Turan, Akbar declined and preferred to satisfy his long-standing ambition in the Deccan and sent an embassy to condole ^{with} 'Abdul Mun'im Khan at his father's death. ²

Akbar was watching the affairs in the Deccan carefully and was not satisfied with the progress of his army. He twice contemplated going in person to the south as the campaign of Ahmadnagar had been dragging on for the last five or six years. ³ Once the threat from Turan finished, Akbar left for Agra after a stay of fourteen years in ~~the~~ Panjab. His motive in proceeding towards Agra was to go nearer to the scene of war and to march there in person

1. A.N. III. p.p. 736, 738; Darbar-i-Akbari p.93.

2. A.N. III. p.739.

3. AN III. p.745; Sirhindi f.249b.

should it seem necessary.¹ Apart from the fact that he came to Ujjain to hasten the march of the Deccan army, he had another motive. It was to send a strong reinforcement to Ahmadnagar under Bahadur Khan.²

The refusal of Bahadur to wait upon Daniyal, frustrated Akbar's expectations, which he had from Bahadur. The hostility of Bahadur expedited Akbar's march towards Khandesh as he was already in Malwa. He wanted to solve the matter by diplomacy before he could use force. The reason was that he did not want to open a second war front as the Mughals were then busy at Ahmadnagar. War with Khandesh would mean to divert the Mughal attention and the Deccanis could easily take advantage.

Akbar wished to convey the impression to Bahadur that he, Akbar, considered Bahadur's lack of respect to Daniyal as not due to rebelliousness, but to respect for the emperor himself - that having learnt of Akbar's intended march to the Deccan, he was reserving himself for an act of personal homage to the father rather than to the son. To make his strategem effective Akbar threatened that if Bahadur did not come to pay homage at the imperial court, ~~he~~ *he himself* would come to Burhanpur and set the matter right. Akbar's threat did not work completely. Bahadur simply agreed to send his son Kabir Khan with a contingent to serve under Daniyal. Akbar however would

1. A-N III p. 745.

2. Sirhindi f. 249b.

not be satisfied with anything less than the personal appearance of Bahadur Khan at his court.¹

The message which Akbar conveyed to Bahadur was that the latter should come to pay him homage at Ujjain and show obedience like his father. Akbar further said that it was Bahadur's duty to cooperate with the Mughals in order to take revenge of his father. Bahadur excused himself from coming and sent an envoy.² Similarly two other imperial embassies under Khwaja Ma'udud and Sadr-i-Jahan were sent but Bahadur declined to pay homage to Akbar.³

The report of Sadr-i-Jahan, sent to the emperor is very interesting about the mode of life of the Khandesh royal family. It illustrates the characteristics of the Faruqi dynasty and the nature of Bahadur. Sadr-i-Jahan stated that it was the custom of the Faruqi kings, for the ruling monarch to imprison his sons and other relatives~~to~~ guard against any possible attempt upon his throne. Similarly Bahadur had passed thirty years in prison when he became king. He knew nothing of the kingly ways and the administration of the government. When he came out of the prison, he plunged himself into dissipation. Unmindful of 'his duties' he showed no sign of avenging his father.⁽⁴⁾

1. A.N.III. p.767.

2. Sirhindi f.252a.

3. A.N.III. p.767.

4. Sirhindi ff.252b, 253a. Journal of Sinitic Studies April, 1957. Vol.II. No. 2 p.p.182.

Once, Bahadur made up his mind to see the emperor, but the pressure of his counsellors prevented him.¹ They perhaps reminded Bahadur of the strength of the fort, and made him hesitate for his submission. Akbar still hoped *for* a peaceful solution. He sent Peshra~~v~~ Khan and Abu'l Fazl respectively to Bahadur to offer him forgiveness if he would consent to make a personal appearance at the imperial court. Due to the obstinacy of Bahadur, the imperial missions failed likewise.²

The failure of four imperial missions, obliged Akbar to take severe against Bahadur. He had thought that Khandesh would provide a "point d'appui" in capturing the remaining parts of the Deccan, but it caused an obstacle in his way. Akbar, the emperor of northern India, could not tolerate such a set back to his prestige by a minor ruler like Bahadur. He therefore resolved to use force.

The Mughals now made preparations *for* the conquest of Asir. An army was sent in advance to capture Burhanpur, the fortification of which were already damaged by Bahadur and his accession. The governor of Burhanpur surrendered the fort on 31st March 1600 A.D. without any resistance.³

1. Sirhindi f.252b.

2. A.N.III; p.769. Sirhindi f.255.

3. Sirhindi ff.263b, 264a.

A contingent of a thousand soldiers was stationed near Asir to prevent any reinforcement to the besieged. Abu'l Fazl was appointed governor of Khandesh; his brother Abu'l Barakat and his son 'Abdul Rahman were despatched to different places to establish the imperial rule.¹

Only Haji Dabir, an eye witness can give us the state of affairs in Bahadur's camp. According to him, when the news of Akbar's departure for the Deccan reached Bahadur, the latter held a council. Afzal Khan the wazir and his party, who were in league with the Mughals, transmitted Akbar reports secretly. Afzal Khan expressed his views with duplicity to Bahadur. Sometimes he advised opposing Akbar and other times he suggested surrender and the payment of tribute to the Mughal emperor.² "But," writes Haji Dabir, "Bahadur chose a wrong policy for which he was later sorry."³ It seems that a plan was made that Bahadur and other princes should remain at different forts, in case Bahadur be defeated, the princes might continue to oppose Akbar. But the scheme failed from the lack of cooperation and Bahadur shut himself in the fortress of Asir.⁴

Bahadur's foolish behaviour alienated his followers. He had no sense of kingship and lacked shrewdness and

1. A.N.III. p.769.

2. Z.W. p.81.

3. ibid. p.82.

4. ibid. p.82.

diplomacy, which are the essential characteristics of a successful monarch. "He raised the law," writes Haji Dabir, "and put down the exalted and advanced those who were not successful and kept back those who were sound."¹ The result was that the garrison divided into different groups and dissension raised its head. Khandesh, now, as well as Ahmadnagar, by falling a prey to civil strife, made Akbar's task only easier. Fulad Khan, a prominent noble of Bahadur's court, being unable to cope with Afzal Khan left Bahadur to find his own fortune alone and went to his jagir in Sunkir, and "that was the last time," writes Haji Dabir, "when Bahadur saw Fulad Khan."² The imperialists took advantage of the prevailing disunity in Khandeshi camp and won over Fulad Khan and his adopted son Saif-ud-Din Muhammad Amin.³

Both Bahadur and Akbar were trying to outdo each other in diplomacy. Bahadur had once refused to see the emperor and he wanted to take a firm stand. According to him, Akbar would not dare to fight with him since the Mughals were preoccupied ~~at~~^{at} Ahmadnagar. Bahadur's belief in the impregnability of the fortress of Asirgarh further

1. Z.W. p.81.

2. *ibid.* pp.82-83.

3. A.N.III. p.770; Z.W. pp.83-85.

encouraged him to resist Akbar. However Bahadur continued his efforts and sent a letter of submission to Shaikh Farid Bokhari, requesting him to use his good offices to bring peace, and put some excuse in appearing before the emperor. Akbar was not ready to move an inch from his decision. In reply he was reminded how the Deccani rulers united against the emperor and how Raja 'Ali Khan, his father sacrificed his life for the Mughals. The emperor had resolved to take the revenge of his (Bahadur's) father and determined to conquer all the three states of the Deccan. Bahadur's duty therefore was to join hands with the Mughals in avenging ~~for~~ his father. The imperial mission failed as before. ⁽¹⁾ To avoid any overt breakdown of negotiations Bahadur sent Sayyid Isma'il to the emperor, ⁽²⁾ but it was of no use.

Akbar tried once again to avoid the crisis. He sent an army on 9th March 1600 A.D. under Shaikh Farid but instructed him first to try to persuade Bahadur by peaceful means and in failure of his attempt to besiege Asirgarh. ⁽³⁾ Accordingly Shaikh Farid arranged an interview with Bahadur. This episode was a significant feature in the history of the siege of Asir, when the two opponent commanders met personally, so it has been mentioned in detail.

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- (1) Sirhindi ff.256b.
 (2) Ibid.f.259a.
 (3) A.N.III.p.769.

Given assurances of his safety, by his host, Bahadur emerged from the fortress with a large escort to see Shaikh Farid at his tent. Every possible 'counsel' was given to Bahadur to induce him to make his submission to the emperor. When he could not give answer he just shook his head. He professed fear of ~~the~~ large army of the Mughals stationed in his country and suggested that when the imperial army would be withdrawn from his country he would appear before the emperor. "Some unwise men suggested", states Faizi Sirhindi, "that Shaikh ought to have taken Bahadur prisoner at this interview, but resort to subterfuge and want of faith and truth never prove successful". It appears that Shaikh Farid could not carry out the "unwise suggestion", as "Bahadur had a large escort with him to defeat the weak army of Shaikh".¹

When all efforts of the Mughals failed, the fort of Asir was besieged. Baz Bahadur and Uzbek and Qara Beg were sent to collect information regarding the fort. They surprised the whole imperial army by their account. Their accounts will show that how far Bahadur was right in depending on the strength and impregnability of the fort.

1. Sirhindi f.263.

Asir was a fort unequalled for height and strength. It was situated on a high hill. Its position was strengthened by three concentric and cleverly devised lines of fortifications. To the north side of it was the fortress of Maligarh. Whoever desired to enter the great fortress must pass by it. The fort was well equipped with war like material and provisions, sufficient for ten years. The summit of the hill, a space about sixty acres in extent was amply provided with water by natural springs and two or three reservoirs. "Men, who had seen the forts," writes Faizi Sirhindi, "of Iran, Turan, Turkey, 'Afrang', and of the whole inhabited world had never seen the equal of that In short the fortress was one of the wonders of the world." ¹

The awe-inspiring accounts of Asir, made the emperor more anxious to reach the battle field as early as possible. Akbar reached Asir, on 10th April 1600 A.D., and the immediate command, which was under Shaikh Farid, was taken

1. A.N.III. p.777; Sirhindi ff.259b -262a; F.II pp.290-91. Bombay Gazetteer Vol. XII. pp.574-577; The fort in north latitude $21^{\circ}26'$ and east longitude $76^{\circ}20'$ on an isolated hill in the *Satpuda* range about 900 feet from the plain and 2300 feet above sea level. The fort is about eleven hundred yards long from east to west and six hundred broad from north to south, and had an area of more than sixty acres. Round the foot of the fort wall is a bluff precipice from 80 to 120 feet high, scarped so as to leave only two pathways, one at the north west angle near the grand gateway and the other at the south-eastern bastion. Du Jarric p.103. The provisions were sufficient for many years for seventy thousand soldiers, who defended it.

by the emperor himself. Shaikh Farid took his usual charge of the Bakhshi.¹

The arrival of the emperor at Asir,² frightened Bahadur. Though the garrison discharged artillery heavily and made the task difficult for the besiegers, yet Bahadur was harassed and tried to avoid the crisis by submission in a more adroit way. He sent his grandmother and son with sixty elephants to the emperor and promised to give his daughter in marriage to prince Khurram and begged for pardon.³ Bahadur's attempt to negotiate was a device to gain time and to prolong the siege until provisions became scarce and dearer than the besiegers would be obliged to retire. Akbar would not listen to any such request and repeated his farman of Bahadur's submission in person.⁴

Though every sort of siege engine was tried, yet the nature of the fort rendered all efforts of the besiegers useless.⁵ Akbar realized the fact that slow progress in the campaign always discourages the soldiers. He therefore summoned Sardar Khan the grandson of Raja 'Ali

1. Sirhindi f.267b.

2. Du Jarric, p.98. **Guerreiro** p.6; Akbar took with him 100,000 men and 1,000 elephants when he started for the Deccan.

3. A.N. III. p.771; Sirhindi f.268b.

4. Sirhindi f.268b; A.N.III. p.771.

5. Sirhindi ff.265-268.

Khan from Agra and raised him to the rank of 1000.

The prince was asked to suborn the Khandeshi troopers in favour of the Mughals. Money would have been used in buying the loyalty of the besieged, but the court chroniclers don't speak of it. Somehow or other Sardar Khan managed to win support of some troopers and the Mughals army was able to capture the Sapan Hill in the middle of June.¹ It was a hill to the south west of Asir and one of its outer works. By its capture, the besieged were driven back inside the main fortress and the task seemed to have become easier for the imperialists.

A tight ring was made by the imperialists round the fort and the besieged could not hope for reinforcements but they held gallantly. There were two reasons in encouraging the garrison. First, Mughal attention was divided between two places, for Ahmadnagar had not fallen yet. Second, when Akbar came from Agra, he had not enough siege equipment in his train and did not expect that Asirgarh was so strong a fort. Though after his arrival at Asir, some guns were brought from Parnela, Kaneil and Ahmadabad, yet they did ^{not} prove effective against the hard walls of Asir.²

News coming from ^{the} north were not favourable as Salim was contemplating rebellion. Should Akbar stay for an unlimited period to subdue Asir? He designed to kill

1. A.N.III. p.772.

2. A.N.III. P.779.

one enemy at the hands of the other - a strategy, which he had employed in Rajputana. He planned to seek help from the ruler of Bijapur. He sent for Khan Khanan and Daniyal and explained his plan to them. Both agreed to the emperor's proposal.

Accordingly, an imperial letter was prepared with care and written in a diplomatic way. Akbar stated that he always thought of subjugating Nizam Shah, the enemy of Bijapur but due to his pre-occupation, he could not manage earlier. When chance arose to conquer Ahmadnagar, Bahadur Khan stood in his way. As friendly relations between the 'Adil Shahis and the Mughals had existed for a long time, he wanted to strengthen them. He wished Daniyal to be married to one of the 'Adil Shahi princess and hoped for some assistance against their common enemies. Akbar assured 'Adil Shah that the Bijapuri princess would enjoy the kingdom of the imperial Deccan as Daniyal would be appointed over the southern parts of the Mughal empire, after the conquests of Asir and Ahmadnagar.¹

The Mughal letter frightened 'Adil Shah for the time being, but he overcame his difficulty by his cleverness. He knew Akbar's aggressive designs, that the emperor would not be satisfied only with Ahmadnagar and Khandesh. But on the other hand he also realized that his plain refusal

1. F.A.S. ff.250-51.

to meet the imperial demand would invoke Akbar's wrath against him. Though feeble in military strength yet he arose equal in diplomacy. He replied that Akbar shouldn't need to worry as the forts would soon fall, before the imperialists. Declining to send any reinforcement he shrewdly stated that he would have gladly sent assistance to the Mughals but his commander Hamid Khan was busy in Tokocha and Gulharoman. Regarding the question of marriage, he half consented and kept the matter pending. ¹

After the discouraging letter of 'Adil Shah, the Mughals exerted their utmost to take Asir by storm. They captured the fortress of Alang on 13th August ² and attempted to capture Maligarh, without whose seizure any access to the main fortress was impossible. Bahadur's expectations turned ^{out} to be true. Provisions became scarce and dearer and the local zamindars refused to sell anything to the invading army. But ~~the~~ treachery and desertion solved the difficulty of the imperialists. "Afzal Khan" writes Haji Dabir, "who was de^{put}ed to guard Miligarh was in correspondence with the Mughals and was inclined towards them. ³

1. F. A. S. ff.252, 253a.

2. A. N. III. p.773.

3. Z. W. p.85.

An important and significant calamity which shook the defenders and weakened the defence, occurred in the fort. All the Muslim chronicles agree on this event, though differing over its details, but the Jesuit Fathers make absolutely no mention of it.¹ At that time when Bahadur shut himself in the fortress of Asir, he also against the advice of his counsellors, admitted a large number of common people who numbered more than 100,000.² Similarly a large number of cattle and other animals were also collected in the fort. Haji Dabir had also mentioned the same fact.³

Owing to the prolongation of siege for about nine months, air (atmosphere) in the fort became foul and unhealthy and caused a deadly pestilence. According to Firishta 40,000 persons perished, while Abu'l Fazl puts the number at 25,000.⁴ Faizi Sirhindi's account does not mention ^{the} number of the dead but gives some details of the calamity. He states that foulness of air caused two

1. See Appendix A, for a detailed discussion on Asir with regard to the accounts of Jesuit Fathers and those of the modern critics.

2. A.N.III. pp.781-82; F.II. p.290; F.A.S. f.242a; Du Jarric p.103 and Guerriero p.6. Say that 70,000 men defended the fort. Firishta II.p.290 puts the total number 1,20,000 including 18,000 common people.

3. Z.W. pp.82, 85.

4. F.II. p.290; A.N.III. 782; Kaiser Akbar Ip.361; Bombay Gazetteer vol. XII. p.247.

diseases. One was paralysis of the lower extremities from the waist downwards which deprived the sufferer of any power of movement. The second was weakness of eye sight at night. Haji Dabir also mentions that the foulness of air caused by the enormous number of men and animals resulted in a deadly pestilence.¹ If we believe for a moment that the number of the dead put forward both by Firishta and Abu'l Fazl is exaggerated but still their accounts with the statements of Faizi Sirhindi, and Haji Dabir, make us believe the truth of the event.

There were no hospitals to alleviate suffering.² Instead of showing consideration to the besieged at such a critical time, Bahadur treated them harshly. As the siege prolonged itself, the common people and the troopers ran short of provisions and they demanded some from Bahadur. Though he had large stores sufficient to feed the besieged for years, yet Bahadur owing to his foolishness and inexperience refused to supply them with provisions.³

"Bahadur", who was in the company of fools and riff-raff," writes Haji Dabir, "refused to comply with the urgent demands of the besieged."⁴

1. Z.W. p.85.

2. F.II. p.290.

3. Kaiser Akbar I. p.361; F.II. p.290.

4. Z.W. p.81.

The pestilence without any remedy and Bahadur's own harsh treatment caused the besieged to desert. One of the garrison deserted to the imperialists and disclosed to them a secret path to Maligarh. In the beginning no attention was paid to the deserter, who was thought to be mad. Eventually a contingent including Qara Beg and Abu'l Fazl was despatched under the guidance of the deserter to capture Maligarh. "When the besieged were discharging cannon balls like rain," writes Abu'l Fazl, "the fortress was captured by the efforts of the imperial army."¹ But Haji Dabir discredits Abu'l Fazl's statement. He mentions that Afzal Khan and his party who were guarding the entrance of Maligarh withdrew their forces and informed the Mughals of their action. The invading army, encouraged and succeeded in capturing the fortress.²

The capture of Maligarh by the Mughals was a turning point in the siege of Asirgarh. It afforded an easy access to reach the main fortress.³ Moreover the fall of Ahmadnagar on August 16, 1600 A.D. i.e. nearly three months before the capture of Maligarh, had disheartened the besieged as the Mughals could devote their undivided

1. A.N.III. pp.777-778.

2. Z.W. p. 86.

3. A.N.III. p.778.

attention to Asir. Bahadur could not expect any help from the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda, who were most concerned with their own borders. Under the leadership of Biljaj, the besieged approached Bahadur and requested him either to surrender the fort or they would hand him over to Akbar.¹

The rebellion of the besieged and the desertion of some of his followers, forced Bahadur to review the situation. He was a man of fickle-minded nature. "He had a streak of 'tawakkul' (fatalism)," writes Haji Dabir, "For he used to say when a matter troubled him, 'What God Wills will be'".² His belief in 'tawakkul' is also corroborated by the accounts of Khafi Khan,³ Firishta and Abul Fazl. It is recorded that Akbar engaged himself in devotion and took to repeating the Great Name ('ism-i-Azam'). Bahadur believed that the prevalence of the pestilence, the fall of Maligarh, were the result of the emperors' devotions and those of the magicians employed by the latter.⁴

1. Z.W. p. 86; F.II. p.290; Z.T. f.263a.

2. Z.W. p.80.

3. M.L.I. pp.214-15. There was a legend that Shaikh Burhan ud-Din once told that as long as that big stone in the Tapti river would remain in its true shape, the kingdom of Khandesh would remain in the hands of the Faruqi kings. If the stone turned into the shape of an elephant the country would fall out of the Faruqi kings. After the fall of Burhanpur, when Akbar came to know of the legend, he secretly caused the stone to be changed into the shape of an elephant. When Bahadur came to know that the stone had changed the shape of an elephant he became frightened. He thought that his end had come.

4. I know that the stone had changed into the shape of an elephant he became frightened. He thought that his end had

Bahadur became disheartened and held a council to discuss the situation. All great nobles such as Asaf Khan, Kabir Khan, Afzal Khan, Mirza Ja'far and Sa'adat Khan were asked to give their opinion. They unanimously suggested Bahadur should surrender. Forced by his counsellors, Bahadur agreed to seek peace.¹

According to Zafar al-Walih, Sa'adat Khan was selected and despatched to settle the preliminaries. Sa'adat Khan who was tired of Bahadur's harsh attitude, begged security of his life and those of his followers from Akbar. On the grant of his request, Sa'adat Khan and his party deserted Bahadur and joined the Mughals.²

Abul Fazl also records the same event but he puts it little earlier. He mentions that Sa'adat Khan requested to the emperor to allow him to join the imperial service as he had come with great difficulty. The emperor was pleased with him and granted him a mansab of 1000.³

There is no discrepancy regarding the terms of the agreement and the arrival of Bahadur at Akbar's court, though the accounts of Haji Dabir and Abu'l Fazl slightly differ in Details. According to Haji Dabir, who was one of the besieged, Bahadur sent Muqarrab Khan to Akbar,

1. F.II. p.290; A.N.III p.782; F.A.S. f.242a. Sirhindi (f.272b) says that Afzal Khan, the ~~wazir~~ ~~wasir~~ wazir of Bahadur tried his best to induce Bahadur to surrender. (It has been already shown that Afzal Khan was in league with the Mughals.)

2. Z.W. p.86.

3. Z.W. p.86.

after the desertion of Sa'adat Khan. It was agreed that first Bahadur should appear before the emperor who then would restore the kingdom to him. Muqarrab Khan, returned to the fort to bring Bahadur to the imperial court.

Bahadur sent for Ram Das Darbari from the Mughal court and went out with him in the company of his ministers to meet the emperor. On his coming out, Khan-i-'Azam Mirza 'Aziz Kokah went to meet ^{him} at the imperial command and brought him before the emperor. ¹

According to Abu'l Fazl, the day when Maligarh fell, Bahadur awoke from his somnolence and sent an envoy to him representing that he was ready to submit to the emperor. He, i.e. Abu'l Fazl did not accept the offer and gave no reply. But at the earnest requests of the envoy, he was sent to the emperor, who agreed to the offer. The message brought by Muqarrab Khan was that if the country and the fortress be restored to Bahadur, the latter would hasten to surrender. Akbar accepted the proposal and granted Bahadur life and honour. Next day the Abyssinian, Muqarrab Khan, returned to the imperial court and said that Bahadur requested that Khan-i-'Azam Mirza 'Aziz Kokah should take his hand and lead him to the imperial court. That was also granted. ²

1. Z.W. p.86.

2. A.N.III. P.779. Sirhindi f.272b. does not mention the name of the envoy sent by Bahadur. He simply says that one of the decendants of Shaikh Naseer ud-Din Chiragh Dihlwi, was sent to the emperor.

Bahadur's chief objection to the formal surrender was removed when he knew that the country would be restored to him. A critical study of Akbar Nama^h would show that it was Bahadur's secret plan that the garrison should hold out till his return.¹ Should Akbar break his promise, he could save himself from the emperor's wrath by representing the reluctance of the garrison to surrender, as an act of rebellion, on their part. So he descended from the fort in the company of his wazirs and Mirza 'Aziz Kokah brought him to the imperial court on 30th Azar 1008 A.H./10th Dec. 1600 A.D.²

Akbar held a great darbar to receive his guest. Bahadur was surprised and amazed at the imperial splendour. Having addressed some polite words to Bahadur, Akbar got him to write a letter to those who held the first line of fortification, that on the receipt of his letter they should surrender the fort.³

The beseiged (as I pointed out previously) refused to surrender the fort. Muqarrab Khan, who had already played his part as an intermediary was sent to demand the keys from the beseiged commander. When he approached

1. A.N.III. p.780.

2. A.N.III. p.779; Z.T. f.263b; Smith (p.277) says that the date on which Bahadur came down from the fort is not clearly mentioned and he wrongly concludes that the episode occurred late in August.

3. Z.W. p.86; Sirhindi f.273a; Guerreiro. p.7; Du Jarric p.105.

the fort walls, Malik Yaqut Sultani, his father spoke to him from the top of the hill. He reproached Muqarrab Khan and said, "You took Bahadur to the emperor and now you have come to ask to surrender the fort to the enemies. May God not show me your face."¹ The son whose duty was nothing more than a messenger could not bear the alleged responsibility and the harsh words of his father. He stabbed himself twice or thrice in Abul Fazl's presence and died after three or four days.² Faizi Sirhindi's statement regarding the death of Muqarrab Khan is also corroborated by Haji Dabir, an independent and accomplished author and militates against the Portuguese account.³ According to Du Jarric and Guerriero, Akbar ordered Muqarrab Khan to be put to death immediately after the Khan's refusal to comply with his request to bring Malik Yaqut to the imperial court.⁴

Who should be held responsible for the breach of the faith, Akbar or Bahadur? Bahadur had come to the imperial court but Akbar^{was} not satisfied as the garrison still held the fort and refused to listen to his orders. It was a game of diplomacy. Both Akbar and Bahadur wanted to outdo each other. According to Akbar, refusal of the

1. Z.W. P.86; Sirhindi. f.273a.

2. Sirhindi f.273a.

3. Z.W. pp.86, 87.

4. Du Jarric pp. 105-06; Guerreiro, p.7.

besieged to surrender the fort made his promise null and void. On the other hand, Bahadur had appeared before the emperor and fulfilled the condition of the emperor to confirm him in his kingdom. But he was detained by Akbar. Akbar was not a politician to dismiss such a chance, obtained after ten months. The failure of the expedition could bring a set back to his past glories and conquests. Akbar considered submission by the ruler to carry with it submission by the subject. Bahadur thus failed in his stratagem.

Haji Dabir is the only contemporary source and an eye witness, who provides us with information regarding the internal situation of the fort. He records that after his refusal to surrender, Malik Yaqut, who was blind and old, went to the palace and assembled ~~the~~ seven princes of the royal family. Addressing them he said, "The condition and the defence of the fort is visible to you. Who among you will choose to be the new king and preserve the honour of his ancestors". But none of them answered. He again spoke, "Would you were women, then you would be excused." When he despaired of the sons of Mubarak Shah, he went to his house. He made his will and performed ablutions and had his shroud brought and took leave of his family. He then went to the mosque¹ which ^{he} had built ^{and} for a long while ~~he~~ prayed, gave gifts

1. Firishta (F.II.p.291) says that after the conquest of Asir, Akbar ordered Daniyal to change that mosque into a temple but Daniyal, who was at Burhanpur did not carry out the order.

and did good *in* it. He then asked for a grave to be dug in a place he arranged for it. Then he ate opium and committed suicide and was buried there. On his committing suicide, the garrison repeated some verses of Quran: "O my servants who have committed extravagances against themselves, don't despair of mercy of God; indeed God forgives sins wholly; indeed he is forgiving merciful; so may God forgive him and be merciful to him." ¹

By giving in detail the account of Haji Dabir, of Malik Yaqut's *death*, it was to put before the reader to decide the truth of the episode in relation to the Portuguese account. According to Du Jarric and *Guerriero*, after the death of his son, the Abyssinian governor prayed God that he might not behold the face of a king so perfidious. Then, placing a *chap*eron about his neck, he addressed the besieged. He said that winter was at hand and Akbar would be obliged to return. He advised them to be united against the enemy, to rely on God and encouraged them not deliver the fort. For himself, he said, *h*e preferred to die rather than to live to look upon the face of so wicked a man. So saying, he tightened the knot of his *chap*eron and strangled himself. ²

The story told by the Portuguese could only be hearsay by the besieged who after the submission came out of the fort.

1. Z.W. p.87.

2. Du. Jarric, p.106; *Guerreiro* p.7.

How can an author quote with accuracy a speech which has been delivered in the fort while he himself was out of the fort in the imperial camp? Moreover, the way in which Haji Dabir, one of the besieged narrates the events leading to the death of Malik Yaqut, seems to be nearer to the Muslim idiom than those told by the Fathers.

The continuation of the defence, though half heartedly, by the besieged, *disappointed all* Akbar's ~~all~~ expectations. Time was very precious for him as his son Salim had rebelled at Allahabad. The need of the hour forced him to employ a device no doubt unworthy of his military career. Abu'l Fazl mentions that "though efforts were made to push on the batteries from "Korihyah" and big guns were ordered to be brought yet secretly the experienced soldiers busied in enticing the besieged by fascinating or deceitful words. They drew their hearts by sweet and kind words." ¹ Thus the court chronicler admits, in other words, that treachery was employed by the besiegers to make the besieged ~~to~~ desert. The besieged hesitated to surrender for some time. They represented that some writings of Bahadur addressed to different ^e captains, ^{ordering them} to submit, should be obtained so that the blame of desertion might not fall upon them. They also requested ~~the~~ issue of an imperial farman granting them their lives, honour and property: "Bahadur Khan",

1. A.N.III. p.780.

writes Abu'l Fazl, "hesitated to give such writings and spoke some improper words. But when pressure was put he was forced to write and put his seal on his writing."¹

On the receipt of Bahadur's letter and the imperial forman, the besieged submitted. Abu'l Fazl went to the main gate of the fortress and sat on the platform known as Tufawal Khan.² In four days the besieged rushed out like locusts, with their families and goods.³ On 5th Bahman 1009 A.H./15th January 1601 A.D., the leaders of the garrison such as Ikhtiyar Khan, Ulugh Khan Habshi, Marjan Habshi and others emerged from the fort. On 7th Bahman 1009 A.H./17th January Abdur Rahman, the son of Abu'l Fazl went into the fort and the defenders handed over the keys formally to the imperialists.⁴

A large booty fell to the victorious army. It included thirteen hundred pieces of large cannons, and numberless mortars and many "manjanigs", each of which threw stones of one or two thousand "mans". Jewels, silver, and gold were loaded on three hundred elephants.

1. ibid. p.780.

2. Z.W. p.87; A.N.III. p.780.

3. A.N.III. p.780; F.II. p.291.

4. A.N.III. p.780; Bahadur was sent to the fortress of Gawaliyar as state prisoner (A.N.III. P.785); Indian Antiquary 1924 Vol. LIII p.40; Rev. Heras states that the capitulation took place on Jan 17th 1601 A.D. according to an inscription that can be still seen on the facade of Jama Masjid in Asir.

According to Faizi Sirhindi, "there was a large store of provisions left untouched".⁽¹⁾

The responsibility for the fall of Asir partly rests on the person of Bahadur himself. Apart from the court writers, the author of Futuhat-i-Adil Shahi also blames him that owing to his foolishness and false pride, his country was annexed to the Mughal empire.⁽²⁾ From the character of Bahadur depicted by Haji Dabir, it can be easily seen how far he was responsible for the downfall of his dynasty. Haji Dabir states that Bahadur began to indulge in prohibited pastimes. He angered his father's wazirs so much so that they prayed for his death for their own security.⁽³⁾

The fall of Ahmadnagar and Asirgarh at first frightened the other Deccani rulers. But they also knew that after the conquest of Asirgarh Akbar would hasten to the north to squash the rebellion of Salim who was increasing the imperial domains under him. In order to gain time, the Deccanis saw their advantage in sending envoys to the imperial court. 'Adil Shah, whose territory then ran with the Mughal border took the initiative and sent his envoy to Akbar with valuable gifts. Soon after Qutb Shah and Barid Shah sent their envoys to the emperor. The Deccani envoys were received graciously by Akbar. In return, the emperor sent on 22nd January

(1) Sirhindi ff.260, 261; A.N.III. pp.781, 782.

(2) F.A.S. ff.243a, 246a.

(3) A.N.III. p.782. ('Adil Shah seems to have agreed now to give his daughter to Daniyal).

1601 A.D. Sharif Sarmadi, Masud Beg and Momin as his
ambassadors to Bijapur, Golconda and Bidar respectively. (1)

The newly annexed 'subah' of Khandesh was named Dandesh
after Daniyal, who was appointed governor of the imperial
province of the Deccan. (2)

The rebellion of Salim in the north obliged Akbar
to leave his task incomplete in the Deccan and to hasten
to Delhi. He therefore could not wait for the return of his
envoys from the Deccan courts and the marriage ceremony of
Daniyal. Akbar called Khan Khanan and said that his father
(i.e. Bairam Khan) made him the emperor and he in return
raised him (i.e. Khan Khanan) to such a high status. It was
therefore his duty to conquer the remaining parts of the
Deccan and ^{Akbar} assured him that if time permitted he would come
back to his assistance. He also advised Daniyal to work
in close cooperation with Khan Khanan in extending the
imperial border in the south. He further told him that he had
conquered half of the Deccan for him and wished to bring the
rest under the imperial rule. (3) After making due arrange-
ments for the administration of the imperial province of the
Deccan, Akbar left for Delhi on 21st April 1601 A.D. (4)

(1) A.N.III.p.782.

(2) A'ini-i-Akbari I.p.473.

(3) Takmila-i-Akbar Namah f.16a; T.M. ff.225-227; F.A.S. ff.244,245 (Akbar's statement both to Daniyal and Khan Khanan shows that perhaps Akbar had in mind to solve the question of his succession by dividing the country into two regions — the south under Daniyal and the north under Salim. Because by this time he had only two surviving sons.)

(4) A.N.III.p.789.

It is difficult to say that the Mughals enjoyed their success completely in the Deccan. They had to reckon with two great rivals, i.e. Malik 'Ambar and Raju. Though Malik 'Ambar and Raju were rivals yet they had a common cause, i.e. their enmity against the Mughals and their efforts to recapture the Nizam Shahi territory.

In the following pages a brief account of the attempts of the Nizam Shahis in expelling the Mughals from their country has been made. It will show that once Akbar left the Deccan, his generals proved unsuccessful against the enemy. The presence of the emperor in the Deccan was a check on the dissensions in which the nobles ^{were} involved after his departure. The Nizam Shahis, who had lost their country owing to the mutual disputes had gathered around the person of Malik 'Ambar, who became successful in bringing unity among his followers.

The presence of a king was essential as a symbolic head, in whose name Malik 'Ambar could justify his efforts. He appealed to Ibrahim 'Adil Shah to release Murtaza b 'Ali b. Burhan Shah I from Bijapur. On his release Murtaza was declared the new Nizam Shah.¹ Malik 'Ambar made Kirki ~~as~~ the new capital of the Nizam Shahis.

As soon as Akbar left the Deccan Raju recaptured Nasik and the area around Daulatabad.² "Taking the

1. F.A.S. ff. 269b, 270a; F.II.165.

2. F.II. p.165.

opportunity of the carelessness of the imperial officers," writes Abu'l Fazl, "RajU came from DaUlatabad and seized the area as far as Jalnapur".¹ RajU employed his guerilla tactics ~~with~~ which the imperialists were not accustomed to. He would not allow himself to be beaten ~~into~~ the open field but withdrew towards his own borders, encircling the enemy; cutting ^{off} their supplies and rendering them helpless. Many engagements took place but RajU was unwilling to surrender.² Eventually the Mughals had to make peace with him on the condition that he would let the area be cultivated and the revenue be shared between him and the Mughals.³

Meantime Malik 'Ambar took the neighbouring area of Ahmadnagar and DaUlatabad.⁴ Though he was defeated once on 16th May 1601 A.D. near the river Manjara, yet by the help of 'Adil Shah he looted Bidar.⁵ The imperialists fell into their mutual disputes and failed to inflict a crushing defeat on him. They had to make peace with him. Secure from the Mughal danger, Malik 'Ambar, took

1. A.N.III. pp.793, 794.

2. A.N.III. pp.794-797; Takmila-i-Akbar Namah f.20b, 21a; F.II. p.165.

3. F.A.S. f.269.

4. F.II. p.165.

5. A.N.III. p.805.

Qandahar from Qutb Shah and Chihil from the Portuguese.¹

Khan Khanan made an alliance with Malik 'Ambar against Raju.² In 1013 A.H./1605 A.D. Ibrahim 'Adil Shah sent his daughter Begum Sultan to Adhmadnagar to be married to Daniyal. Raju obstructed the way of the Bijapuri princess but was defeated severely by the combined forces of Malik 'Ambar and the Mughals. Raju retired to DaUlatabad.³

The events of the years 1013 -14 A.H./1604-05 A.D., gave a chance for Malik 'Ambar to strengthen his position. Daniyal's health was declining due to excess of drinking. The administration of the country fell into confusion and *bewilderment prevailed* in the imperial camp. The Nizam Shahis took advantage and pushed the Mughals further back. Akbar sent Abul Khair to bring the prince to the imperial court.⁴ But Daniyal was destined to meet the same fate as that of his elder brother Murad. He died on Saturday 22nd Shawal 1013A.H./11th March 1605 A.D.⁵

The death of Daniyal worsened the Mughal position in the Deccan. Many imperialists deserted to the enemy. Malik 'Ambar recaptured half of Balaghat, DaUlatabad, Nasik and many districts of Adhmadnagar.⁶ While the

1. F.II. p.165; H.G. ff.209b, 210a; A.N. III. p.805; F.A.S. f.271a.

2. F.II. p.165; F.A.S. f.268b.

3. F.II. pp.165-166; A.N.III. p.827; Takmila-i-Akbar Namah f.36; Darbar-i-Akbari p.94.

4. A.N.III p.828.

5. F.II. P.166; A.N. III. p.837.

6. H.G. f.210. F.II. pp.165,166.

Mughals were already losing ground to the Nizam Shahis, the death of Akbar on 15th October, 1605 A.D.¹ gave a further set-back to the imperial prestige in the Deccan. Malik 'Ambar mustered his force in large number and pushed the Mughals further back.

It could be gathered that it was not much left in the Deccan, under the Mughals at the time of the death of Akbar. The Mughal Deccan then consisted of Khandesh, half of Berar, and few districts of Ahmadnagar. Nearly half of the Nizam Shahi territory was in the hands of the new Nizam Shah. Bijapur and Golconda still ^{stood} apart and were an open challenge to Akbar's pride. In the light of these events it is impossible to believe that Akbar succeeded in his long standing desire of bringing the south under the north.

1. F.I. p.271; A.N.III p.841; Darbar-i-Akbari p.104.

SECTION IIJAHANGIR - AN INDECISIVE PHASE

FIRST Phase (1605 A.D. - 1612 A.D.)

The policy of expansion in the south once initiated by Akbar was to be continued and completed by his successors. Jahangir himself says that he derived his desire of subjugating the Deccan from his father. He writes in his Tuzuk, "My intentions are two - One is the conquest of Transoxiana, which was always in the mind of my father, though every time he determined on it, something occurred to prevent it. Second, to bring about the termination of war in the Deccan of which a part has been conquered by my father, so that it might ~~be a permanent possession~~ become part of the imperial territories. Once things are settled in India, I would leave Parvez^z in Hindustan and would go myself to Transoxiana, as there is no permanent ruler in that part."⁽¹⁾ The other reason which gave Jahangir a motive for the conquest of the Deccan was that he inherited a well established empire from his father and except Mewar,^{the} whole of north India was under him. He therefore preferred the Deccan ~~to~~ to the conquest of Transoxiana, which seemed difficult for the Mughals. But the history of Jahangir's reign will show that he never steadfastly devoted himself to fulfil his declared ambitions. The energies of Jahangir and those of his lieutenants were in fact taken up by court intrigues in which, relations to the

(1) T.J. p. 43.

Deccan states became another counter in the game. Jahangir would have started his campaigns in the south earlier, but ~~the~~ two main incidents, i.e., revolt of Khusrau and siege of Qandahar by the Persians, both of which happened in the beginning of his reign, prevented him from doing so.⁽¹⁾ As soon as he recovered from these incidents, he cast his eyes on the Deccan and sent the imperial armies *to the south*.

The reign of Jahangir is a drawn out story of dissensions among the imperial nobles and the court intrigues. In order to discuss his period in a coherent way, I have divided his reign into three phases:-

(i) the period between 1605 A.D. - 1612 A.D. - the unsuccessful attempts of the Mughals to regain their lost territory in the Deccan.

(ii) the period between 1612 A.D. - 1621 A.D. - the so called Nur ^{Junta} Junta period, when petticoat government was at the zenith of its power and exploited the Deccan for its selfish motives.

(iii) the period between 1622 A.D. - 1627 A.D. - the period of the fall of the Junta, which resulted in a severe shock to the imperial prestige in the south and when the Deccanis regained most of their lost territory captured by Jahangir.

1605 A.D. - 1612 A.D.

During the first three years of his reign, Jahangir was pre-occupied in bringing peace to the north, the Deccan

(1) T.J. pp. 24-32.

seized the opportunity to regain a large part of their territory, forfeited in Akbar's time. The Nizam Shahis regained half of Balaghat and many districts of Ahmadnagar and Daulatabad. The Mughal officials in the south were not given proper attention by the imperial government and some of them deserted to the Deccanis.⁽¹⁾ Thus it was not before the Mughals were reduced to extremities that the emperor took a serious action.

The character and the personality of Jahangir themselves were the significant features in the history of the Mughal relations with the Deccan. Jahangir was established in a better position in northern India than his predecessors.

^{Though} Rana Amar Singh of Mewar ~~though~~ defied the imperial rule yet he was reduced to impotence. The emperor was his own master during this period, but he lacked those qualities which furthered the Mughal progress in the Deccan. His past record as a military leader was not successful.⁽²⁾

Unlike his forefathers, Akbar, Babur and Timur, he lacked the military capacity which was essential to become a successful ruler of those days. This realization of his incapacity hindered him in taking the command in person either in the south or any other place. The result was that the enemy was encouraged by the weakness of the emperor and the imperialists fell into mutual recriminations. The Mughals

(1) A.S.I. p. 59. T.J. p. 74. M.J. f. 51a.

(2) He had not much experience as a military commander. He was sent by his father against the Rana of Mewar but he remained unsuccessful.

thus suffered badly in the Deccan and lost ground to the enemy.

The other causes of the enemy's regaining the power are as follows. First the Nizam Shahis during the reign of Akbar were worn out by their mutual dissensions. They had none among them who could establish his authority firmly and unite the Nizam Shahis into one body politic. The Mughals took the advantage and conquered Ahmadnagar. But the Nizam Shahis had rectified their mistake. Malik 'Ambar became the peshwa of Nizam Shah and was successful enough to enforce his authority on his followers. Khan Khanan or any other imperial noble could hardly match the skill and genius of Malik 'Ambar. Realizing the martial qualities of ^{the} Marhathas, Malik 'Ambar recruited them in the Nizam Shahi army. Regardless of their religious differences, the Marhathas and the Nizam Shahis had a strong common tie, i.e., ^{their desire} to overthrow the foreign domination of their country. The Mughals therefore had to deal with their forces united. Second, Bijapur and Golconda, which were so demoralised after the battle of Ashti in January 1597 A.D. ^{that they} did not dare to assist the Nizam Shahis restarted to help them during this period. The encouragement from Bijapur and Golconda, thus further strengthened the determination of the Nizam Shahis to resist the Mughal aggression and recapture ~~re~~ their territory.

When Khan Khanan heard of Jahangir's intention to continue Akbar's Deccan policy, he requested confirmation of his existing appointment as ~~Commander-in-Chief~~ of the Mughal armies in the Deccan. He offered to accept the full responsibility for failure, if, within two years (and on condition that he received a reinforcement of 12,000 men and an additional amount of Rs. 1,000,000) he had not completed the conquest. Jahangir was very pleased at Khan Khanan's courage and determination and agreed to his request. He raised Khan Khanan to the high rank of 'haft hazari (7,000), honoured him with a Khil'at and appointed him to lead the army. Within a short period both the demands of Khan Khanan were met and he left Agra for the Deccan on 14th Sha'ban 1017 A.H./24th December 1608 A.D., at the head of 12,000 horse⁽¹⁾.

Khan Khanan had to suffer heavily from the guerilla tactics of the Nizam Shahis. They enticed the imperialists to come into their country; cut off their communications and when they were about to retire plundered the imperial camp and annihilated the invaders. Khan Khanan tried to repulse the enemy but had to suffer instead. The imperial nobles started to accuse each other of incapacity to match the Deccanis. The Nizam Shahis encouraged by the disunity of the imperialists, captured ^{the} whole ^{of} Balaghat and many other imperial outposts.⁽²⁾

(1) M.J. f. 48 b. I.N.J. p. 34. T.J. pp 71,73.

(2) M.J. 51a. A.S., I p. 59.

Pressed hard by the enemy, Khan Khanan appealed to the emperor for reinforcement. Jahangir also realised that the presence of a prince might bring the dissensions of the imperialists to an end. He therefore recalled Parvez from Mewar campaign and appointed him with an army to the Deccan. Asaf Khan was sent with the prince as his guardian. In order to strengthen the imperial army, Jahangir also despatched Amir ul-Umara, Sharif Khan, Raja Man Singh, Raja Rai, Singh and other noted captains, in addition to 1,000 Ahadis. (1) A consignment of rupees two million was sanctioned to meet the expense of the army. (2)

Parvez reached Burhanpur in March 1610 A.D., but his presence did not change the situation. The chief cause was the character of Parvez himself. He was a youth of twenty years and was immoderate. The picturesque story given by the English ambassador Thomas Roe, depicts the prince's way of life. Thomas Roe wrote that Parvez held his court with all the traditional formality of Mughal etiquette. (3) The prince, who was expected to infuse an energetic spirit among his followers fell to merry makings instead and neglected the task entrusted to him. Observing the way of life of their commander, the subordinates also began to behave fecklessly. While on the other hand, the Nizam Shahis

(1) T.J. p. 74. A.S. I p. 160. I.N.J. pp 36, 37. M.J.f.51a.

(3) Thomas Roepp. 69-71. (2) I.N.J. p. 36. T.J. p. 74.

mustered in great number and were united to expell the Mughals.

The Mughals had to suffer from the inefficiency and treachery of Khan Khanan. Overestimating his strength, Khan Khanan advanced in July 1610 A.D., toward Balaghat. The Deccanis withdrew strategically and let the Mughals advance into their country. They cut off their supplies and blocked all access to the imperial army. To add to the Mughal adversity, it did not rain that year. Fodder and grain became scarce and famine broke out in the imperial camp. The Nizam Shahis tightened their ring around the Mughals and caused a heavy loss on them. They induced Khan Khanan to accept bribes and retreat. The negligence both of Parvez and Jahangir to the Deccan affairs encouraged Khan Khanan to accept gold offered by the enemy. He agreed to the offer of the Nizam Shahis and retreated to Burhanpur.⁽¹⁾

The retreat of Khan Khanan resulted in the loss of Ahmadnagar. Khwaja Beg the imperial commander was defending the fort in the hope that Khan Khanan would send him reinforcements. When he heard of Khan Khanan's defeat, the imperialists at Ahmadnagar became disheartened. Free from Khan Khanan's advance, the Nizam Shahis pressed hard on Ahmadnagar. The besieged, who were already short of arms and

(1) F.A.S. ff. 274-75. T.J. pp 85, 86. M.J. f. 56.
M.L. I pp 261-62.

provisions lost all hope of any help and on the guarantee of their lives and a free passage surrendered the fort,⁽¹⁾ whose capture once glorified Akbar's prestige.

The loss of Ahmadnagar was a great shock to the imperial prestige in the Deccan. The enemy became encouraged and regained more than half of their territory. Parvez and other nobles accused Khan Khanan of treachery and inefficiency. They held him solely responsible for the loss of the imperial territory and charged him ^{with} being in league with Malik 'Ambar from whom he received one third revenue of the enemy's country. Asaf Khan requested the emperor to come to the south to take the command himself.⁽²⁾

The discouraging news from the Deccan harassed Jahangir, who for a while contemplated taking the command himself. But his own sense of incapacity as a military commander prevailed over the urgent need of the hour. He was surrounded by a group of flatterers, who also advised him to satisfy *himself* by sending further reinforcements. The emperor held a council to review the situation. It was decided that an army under Khan Jahan Lodi should be sent to the Deccan.⁽³⁾

(1) M.J. f. 56 b.; I.N.J. p. 45; M.L. I p. 262;
T.J. ff. 87, 88; A.S. I p. 99.

(2) T.J. pp 77; Thomas Roe pp 242-43.

(3) I.N.J. pp 38-39; A.S. I p. 60.

Khan Jahan Lodi left for the Deccan in October 1610 A.D., with Nar Singh De~~M~~, Shuja 'at Khan, Raja Bikramajit and Badi'uz- Zaman, the son of Shah Rukh Mirza - they all commanded four or five thousand soldiers. It seemed as if Jahangir was determined to retrieve the Mughal prestige. He therefore also sent Saif Khan Barha, Islam Ullah 'Arab and Haji bi Zeg - the officers of the royal house-hold and commanded 7,000 horse to assist Khan Jahan. The imperial army sent under Khan Jahan numbered more than 11,000. Muhammadi Beg was made paymaster and ten lakhs rupees were granted for the expenditure. (1)

The jealousy between Khan Jahan Lodi and Khan Khanan worsened the Mughal position in the south. Khan Jahan was an ambitious soldier and aspired to take the chief command himself. The accusations of the imperialists against Khan Khanan provided an opportunity for Khan Jahan to humiliate him in the eyes of the emperor. He wrote a letter to the emperor assuring him of Khan Khanan's treachery and incapacity to check the enemy's advance. Later, Khan Jahan wrote an application to the emperor proposing either to recall him or to appoint him in full command in which case he promised to conquer both Ahmadnagar and Bijapur within two years on the condition of a reinforcement of 30,000 horse. He represented

(1) T.J. p. 78; I.N.J. p. 38; M.J. f 51 b; A.S.I. p.60.

that if he did not fulfil his undertaking, Jahangir could reprove him of his honour.⁽¹⁾ It could thus be said that the jealousies and the mutual disputes of the nobles checked the imperial progress in the Deccan.

The accusations of his opponents worked effectively against Khan Khanan. Jahangir also felt that Khan Khanan had failed to fulfil his promise and the command should be transferred. He therefore accepted Khan Jahan's proposal and appointed him to the chief command. As the Mughals were still busy in Mewar, therefore, the demanded quota could not be sent to the Deccan. However, an army of 10,000 men was despatched under 'Azam Khan, who was given a dress of honour, a jewelled sword-belt and a horse. Five lakhs ^{of} rupees were granted for the personal use of Khan 'Azam. Other great nobles, who accompanied the army such as Faridun Khan Birlas, Khan 'Alam and Baz Bahadur Qalmaq were also duly honoured. Rupees three million were granted for the army.⁽²⁾ Mahabat Khan was deputed to conduct ^{'AZAM} Khan ~~Barnas~~ to Burhanpur; to investigate the matter in the imperial camp and to bring back Khan Khanan to the court.⁽³⁾ Jahangir turned against Khan Khanan and treated him coldly.⁽⁴⁾

(1) M.J. f. 56 b; I.N.J. p. 45; T.J. p. 86; M.L. I p.262

(2) T.J. pp 88, 89; M.J. f 57a; I.N.J. p.46.

(3) T.J. p. 89; M.J. f. 57a.

(4) M.J. f. 57 b.

During this time a great change had occurred in the politics of the Deccanis. 'Adil Shah who had united himself with Malik 'Ambar turned against him due to his aggressive designs on Bijapur territory. Had Jahangir been a shrewd diplomat like his father, he would have benefitted himself from the disunity of the Deccanis. But he proved to be a tactless monarch and failed to exploit one enemy against the other. 'Adil Shah sent his envoy to Jahangir and assured him of his co-operation against the Nizam Shahis.⁽¹⁾ The request of 'Adil Shah seemed to be neglected chiefly due to the carelessness of the emperor himself.

The arrival of Khan Zaman in December 1610 A.D. in the Deccan did not bring much success to the imperialists. They failed to adopt the guerilla warfare of the Deccanis. Their failure, after repeated attempts to capture more than a few kos of Balaghat, despite their large forces, resulted in their accusing each other. The Nizam Shahis took advantage of the Mughal's disunity and drove them back.

Another reason for the poor progress of the imperialists in the Deccan was that the Mughal's attention was divided. Due to the inefficiency of the imperial commanders, the campaign of Mewar dragged on. It was therefore deemed ^{fit} first to finish the campaign in the north and then to continue in the Deccan. Some officers such as Mirza Badi' uz-Zaman, Khan 'Azam, Raja Nar Singh Deu, Muhammad Khan Niyazi were

(1) T.J. pp.77, 78, 114.

recalled from the Deccan army and sent to Mewar under prince Khurram. (1) Though the scheme of the emperor was profitable in the long run, yet the imperialists suffered badly in the south for the time being. The Deccansⁱ profited from the absence of imperial Captains from the south and drove the Mughals further back. (2)

The submission of Rana Amar Singh in April 1611 A.D., enabled the Mughals to take the offensive in the Deccan. Some changes were brought in the administration of the frontier provinces. Khan 'Azam was transferred from Gujrat to Malwa. 'Abdullah Khan Firoz Jang, who had displayed his valour in Mewar was sent to Gujrat. Khuraja Abul Hassan was appointed governor of the imperial Deccan. (3)

It was planned that 'Abdullah Khan would march at the head of 14,000 men against the Nizam Shahis by the route of Nasik and Trimbak; while Khan Jahan, Amir ul-Umara and Raja Man Singh would advance from Berar. Both the armies were instructed to remain in touch with each other so as to encircle the enemy, launch a surprise attack on a fixed day. Four lakhs of rupees were sanctioned for the army under 'Abdullah Khan, who was accompanied by such reputed captains

(1) A.S. I p.70; M.J. ff 77, 78a.

(2) A.S. I p.70.

(3) T.J. p. 98.

as Ram Das Kachwaha, Khan 'Alam, 'Ali Mardan Bahadur and Zafar Khan. (1)

This was the first time in the reign of Jahangir that the imperial army was mobilised on such a large scale for one campaign. But jealousy and pride of the nobles was a great menace in the way of progress.

The haughtiness of 'Abdullah Khan upset the plan of the Mughals. Proud of his success in Mewar, he overestimated his strength. In the hope of gaining all the credit for victory himself, he disregarded his instructions. Crossing Nasik and Ghats he advanced towards Daulatabad. 'Ambar was not the man to miss this chance. He sent some contingents of the Nizam Shahis to check the advance of Raja Man Singh and Khan Jahan, while he himself advanced to meet 'Abdullah Khan. 'Ambar withdrew towards Daulatabad and enticed the Mughals into difficult hilly passes. 'Abdullah Khan considered his advance as his progress. He continued his march and thus left the Berar army far behind. The Deccanis increased their number daily; cut off the supplies of the imperialists; discharged fire heavily from all sides and inflicted heavy losses on the Mughals. (2)

Apprised of 'Abdullah Khan's activities, Raja Man Singh and Khan Jahan evaded sending any help to him and left

(1) M.J. f. 69a; T.J. pp 97, 98, 107; A.S. I p.60;
I.N.J. p 58; M.L. I p. 273.

(2) M.J. f. 69; T.J. pp 107-08; M.L. I pp. 274-76.

him to meet the enemy alone. After suffering a heavy defeat, 'Abdullah Khan realized the tactical superiority of the enemy and designed to retreat to Burhanpur. The Deccanis followed the Mughals closely; plundered their camp and inflicted crippling losses. (1)

The daily increasing attacks of the Deccanis forced 'Abdullah Khan to change his plan of retreat. He entered the friendly border state of Baglana, from where he managed to reach Gujrat after great difficulty. During their retreat the imperialists lost ^{the} lives of many warriors including those of 'Ali Mardan and Zulfiqar Beg. (2) Hearing the news of 'Abdullah Khan, Raja Man Singh and Khan Jahan traced back to Parvez to 'Adilabad in the neighbourhood of Burhanpur. (3) Thus the plan of exterminating the enemy, ended unsuccessfully due to the disunity among the imperialists.

The news of the defeat of the imperial army caused bewilderment at the imperial court. Jahangir was much perturbed at the folly of 'Abdullah Khan and in ~~fit~~^a fit of anger, dismissed him from the governership of Gujrat. (4) The emperor was further provoked as Khan Jahan had failed to keep his promise and could not do better than his predecessors. Khan Jahan requested the emperor to take the command of the Deccan army himself. (5)

(1) M.J. f. 69.

(2) T.J. p.108; M.J. f. 69b; I.N.J. pp 65, 66; M.L. I pp.274-76.

(3) I.N. J. p. 66; M.J. f.70a; T.J. p.108.

(4) M.L. I p.286.

(5) I.N.J. p. 73.

There is no doubt that it was lack of cooperation on the part of the nobles, but Jahangir himself was not less responsible for the failure of the campaign in the Deccan. When he was requested many times by the imperial commanders to come to the Deccan, why then did he not go? What prevented him ~~from~~ taking an active part, when the Deccanis had regained two thirds of their territory, and were trying to push the Mughals still further? There seem to be two reasons. First, he had not much experience in warfare. He was sent against rana of Mewar but he proved to be an inefficient commander. This realization of his weakness made Jahangir hesitate to take the command in person. Second, he seemed to have preferred indolence to administrative activities.

A true picture of his private life since his princehood would show that he had not much interest in the affairs of the government. He was prone to women and wine. Before his accession to the throne, he had married twenty wives of various nationalities and religions and increased the number after his accession. (1) His habit of drinking wine since the age of seventeen increased so that once he wrote 'no one had the power to forbid me.' (2) All those evil associates who had induced him to rebel against his father were given high mansab~~s~~ by him after his accession. He himself

(1) History of Jahangir pp 30, 31.

(2) Ibid p. 27.

all his life suffered from weakness of will and resolution and surrendered himself to the mercies of superior talent or craft. His associates, it seemed, did not convey to him the true state of affairs in the Deccan and he continued his normal life of merry-making. The conjunction of these two reasons afforded a chance for the imperialists to revive their rivalries and they fell into mutual disputes.

However, a council of war was held to review the situation and explore the means to retrieve the imperial prestige in the Deccan. Khwaja Abul Hasan, an experienced soldier suggested the re-appointment of the discarded Khan Khanan. He argued that no one could understand the affairs in the Deccan better than Khan Khanan.⁽¹⁾ Jahangir agreed to the proposal. Khan Khanan was recalled from Qannuj; raised to the rank of 6,000 Zat and given a khil'at. His sons - Shah Nawaz Khan and Darab Khan were promoted to the ranks of 3,000 and 2,000 Zat respectively and honoured with jewelled daggers and Iraqi horses.⁽²⁾ In order to bring the full harmony and unity in the imperial camp, Jahangir sent Mahabat Khan to bring back Khan Jahan Lodi, the rival of Khan Khanan.⁽³⁾

(1) T.J. p. 108; M.J. f. 70.

(2) T.J. p. 108.

(3) I.N.J. p. 73.

Khan Khanan left Agra on 17th Ordibehesht 1021 A.H./ 5th May, 1612 A.D., with a band of five hundred experienced soldiers including Kh~~u~~aja Abul Hasan and Razzaq~~W~~ardi.⁽¹⁾ This time Khan Khanan had a fair chance of success. All his opponents either had perished or retired after his arrival from the Deccan. The field therefore was free from dissensions. Amir-ul-Umara, Sharif Khan died on 15th April, 1612 A.D., in the parganah of Nihalpur; Asaf Khan Jafar Beg breathed his last at Burhanpur. Khan 'Azam, who was anxious to leave the Deccan was first sent to Malwa and then to Mewar.^(1A) To add to Khan Khanan's good fortune, the Deccanis were worn out by their dynastic disputes. After defeating the imperialists, Malik 'Ambar advanced to seize Bijapuri territory. 'Adil Shah turned against him and allied himself with the Mughals.⁽²⁾

In order to keep the supply of the provisions during the campaign, Khan Khanan guarded Balapur and Burhanpur, the two main centres. Shah Nawaz Khan and Darab Khan were sent to these places with some contingents. He also guarded the Berar frontier lest the enemy ~~may~~ create disturbances during his absence from the imperial Deccan. He then busied himself in enticing the Nizam Shahis to weaken the power of Malik 'Ambar. He succeeded in winning over Ya~~q~~ut

(1) T. J. p. 108; M. J. 170

(1A) T. J. pp. 113-14.

(2) T. J. p. 141.

Khan, Adham Khan, Babu Jiu, Jadu Rai and many other captains of the Nizam Shahis. In order to induce the others to desert, the deserters were honoured and given high mansabs. (1)

The desertion of his followers and his enmity with Bijapur weakened the position of Malik 'Ambar, who now was obliged to be reconciled to the 'Adil Shah. He appealed to 'Adil Shah for his immediate help and begged for forgiveness. He thus made an offensive and defensive alliance both with Bijapur and Golconda and strengthened his position. (2)

The unity in the imperial camp bore fruit and the Mughals were able to defeat the Deccanis this time. 'Ambar himself assumed the command of the confederate forces, which numbered more than 10,000. (3) A fierce battle ensued in which the Deccanis were utterly routed. ~~Some~~ Darab Khan, the leader of the imperial vanguard, and other noted captains such as Raja Bir Singh Dev; Rai Chanda and 'Ali Khan Ni'azi displayed their valour. Thousands of the Deccans were killed and Malik 'Ambar hardly escaped under cover of darkness. Many officers of the enemy were made captive and a large *body of soldiers together with* fire arms and three hundred camels loaded with ammunition fell to the victorious army. (4) On the following

(1) M.J. f. 92b.; I.N.J. pp 84, 85.

(2) M.J. p. 93.

(3) F.A.S. f. 278; M.J. f. 93; I.N.J. p. 85; T.J. pp.153-54.

(4) I.N.J. pp 86, 87; T.J. p. 154; M.J. ff 93, 94a; M.L. I pp 284-85; F.A.S. I. 279.

day the imperialists set out for Khirki - capital of the Nizam Shahis. They *satisfied their anger* by devastating the town completely. Pressed hard, Malik 'Ambar offered his submission and agreed to pay twelve lakhs ^{of} 'huns' annually to the Mughal emperor. Khan Khanan returned to Burhanpur after a stay of three days at Khirki. The emperor appreciated the services of his commanders and raised their ranks. (1)

Though Khan Khanan had defeated the enemy and peace was restored temporarily, yet this success could not be regarded as the final acknowledgement of the emperor's suzerainty by the Deccanis. The Mughals did not realize that the so called peace was precarious and was not founded on sincere acceptance by the Deccanis of the fact of Mughal power and a permanent willingness to play second fiddle to that power. Jahangir seemed to be satisfied with the offerings of the Deccanis and unlike his father did not prove himself so eager for territorial expansion. The imperialists exerted ^{themselves} for seven years to regain their territory but failed. Nearly the whole of Balaghat and the fort of Ahmadnager were in the hands of the Nizam Shahis. It can be concluded that the efforts of the imperialists till 1612 A.D. proved to be fruitless in regaining their lost ground. The chief causes for their failure were disunity among the imperial commanders and lack of initiative on the part of Jahangir himself.

(1) M.J. f. 94 a; T.J. p. 154.

II PHASE

1612 - 1621 A.D.

Since the marriage of Jahangir to Nur Jahan in May 1611 A.D., ~~the~~ court politics took new forms. New associates of the emperor took an active part in politics of the country and their activities for one reason or another effected the Mughal relations with the Deccan states. Nur Jahan was the most influential person, the emperor being a puppet in her hands. The emperor's unreserved devotion to his wife made him negligent of the country's administration. She was assisted by a group of three persons, ~~namely~~ Asaf Khan, her brother, 'Itimad ud-Daulah, her father and prince Khurram. This union of four persons is commonly known as ^{the} Nur Jahan junta. As long as unity and harmony existed among the members of the junta, the country was at peace but once they *fell* ~~they~~ *out*, the kingdom was doomed to ruin.

Khusrau, the eldest son of Jahangir had rebelled and lost ^{the} favour of his father. Parvez proved to be intemperate and an unsuccessful commander both in ~~the~~ ^{the} Deccan and the Deccan. Prince Khurram was adopted in the beginning as heir-apparent by the junta and was highly favoured by Nur Jahan. But there was a rival group, consisting of old and experienced soldiers. They were Mahabat Khan, Khen 'Azam, Khan Khanan and others, who opposed the selfish activities of the junta.

The candidate for the throne of the rival group was Khusrau.

The intrigues of one group against the other affected imperial progress seriously in the Deccan. The members of the rival group, serving in the Deccan, when they knew that their services were not appreciated by the imperial government, slackened their activities against the Deccanis.

The adherents of the junta accused them of treachery and incapacity before the emperor. Consequently the Deccanis profited by the mutual rivalries of the Mughals. The change of position in the formation of the junta in 1622 A.D. worsened the Mughal position in the Deccan. But still it is ^a fact that as long as the junta enjoyed the cooperation of its members, though the Mughals could not annex the Deccan states, they were successful in capturing the territory lost during the early years of this reign.

The failure of Khan Khanan in maintaining a permanent peace in the Deccan, afforded an excuse for the junta to enhance the prestige of their candidate, i.e. Khurram. Those nobles who belonged to the junta and were serving in the Deccan, thwarted Khan Khanan's plans. They had the support at the centre and therefore did not cooperate with their commander. The imperial camp therefore once more became an arena ^{for the} mutual disputes of the nobles. Meanwhile the Nizam Shahis busied themselves in strengthening their position,

and lured the Mughals by their false pretentions. By 1615 A.D. Malik 'Ambar gathered some sources to oppose the Mughals. He attacked the imperialists and forced them to retire from the advanced posts of Balaghat and Ahmadnagar. The weak resistance of Khan Khanan against the enemy, provided an opportunity for the junta to fulfil their secret plan. It was represented that both Parvez and Khan Khanan had failed to bring a definite submission. It was therefore suggested that Parvez should be recalled and be replaced by Khurram. Jahangir, who was a mere tool in the hands of the junta, agreed to the proposal. Parvez was sent to Allahabad and Khurram was nominated to lead the Deccan army. (1)

Successful in carrying out its plan, the junta now busied ^{themselves} in the preparations for the Deccan campaign. Khurram was given the title of Shah - a title which was never bestowed upon any Timurid prince before, and was raised to a high rank of 20,000 Zat and 10,000 'Sawar-i-do-aspah' and 'sih-aspah'. (2) All those nobles who accompanied Khurram were honoured by the emperor. Khwaja Qasim was appointed 'Ariz, M^uhammad Khan, the author of Iqbal Namah-i-Jahangiri was raised to 1000 Zat and 250 sawar and appointed 'Bakhshi' of the army. 'Abdullah Khan, who was the supporter of Khurram,

(1) M.J. ff. 97b, 98a; I.N.J. p.91; A.S. I pp 100-01; Thomas Roe pp 242-43.

(2) M.J. f. 98a; A.S. I p. 100; T.J. p. 167; I.N.J.p.90.

was pardoned by the emperor and deputed to help the prince.⁽¹⁾
 On 24th November, 1617 A.D. Khurram's equipage left Ajmer for the Deccan and he himself marched in the following month at the head of 40,000 soldiers.⁽²⁾

In order to be sure of success the emperor was advised by his counsellors to go to Mandu nearer the seat of war. There seem to be three chief reasons for the march of the emperor to Mandu. They were: First, to hasten the speed of the Deccan army; second, to bring unity in the imperial camp and third, to impress the enemy, who might be frightened to surrender. As the true state of affairs was not reaching the imperial court, the emperor therefore ordered that news regarding the Deccan should be presented in future only through Khurram. The emperor reach Mandu on 8th April, 1617 A.D.⁽³⁾

The arrival of Khurram at Burhanpur on 5th Rabi-ul-Awwal 102 A.H. /8th April, 1617, A.D.⁽⁴⁾ at the head of a large army, frightened the Deccanis. The prince also preferred to bring about peace by negotiations. He sent Afzal Khan and Rai Rayan to 'Adil Shah while ^{Mutamad} Khan and Rai Jadu Das were despatched to Qutb Shah. Both the rulers were asked to persuade Malik Ambar to return the seized territory; while all the

(1) T.J. p. 167; I.N.J. p. 91; M.J. f. 98 b.

(2) T.J. pp 167; M.J. ff. 98; A.S. I p. 101; Thomas Roe pp. 281-82, 340.

(3) T.J. p. ~~167~~, 182.

(4) A.S. I p. 103; M.J. f. 103.

three states were ~~com~~manded to send tribute to the emperor. (1)

~~Khurram's~~ ^{KHURRAM'S} plan worked out effectively. Ibrabim 'Adil Shah advanced five miles to receive the imperial ambassadors and paid 'salam-o-zamin-bosi (bowing head and kissing ground) 'in absentia' to the emperor. Similarly a warm reception was given to the imperial envoys by Qutb Shah who showed his submission to the emperor. (2)

The Deccanis had realised that the arrival of the emperor nearer to the scene of war had diminished the dissensions, which had previously checked the imperial progress. Secondly the imperial army under the command of an able general like Khurram, who had subdued the resistant Rana of Mewar could defeat them easily. Thirdly, the spirit of collective defence with which the Deccanis were united in the past, was dying out slowly. Bijapur, the then most powerful state in the Deccan had taken a hostile attitude towards Ahmadnagar due to the aggressive designs of Nizam Shah and ~~he~~ was inclined now towards the Mughals. Qutb Shah, though ~~was~~ in full cooperation with Malik 'Ambar, yet was too weak to oppose the Mughals for the Nizam Shahis, whose own position was shaky. Malik 'Ambar himself was worn out by the

(1) M.J. f. 103a; I.N.J. p 99; A.S. I p. 102; M.L. pp. I 290-91.

(2) A.S. I p. 104; I.N.J. p. 99; M.J. f. 105.

successive battles with the Mughals and had not many sources to oppose them without the cooperation of Bijapur and Golconda.

Realizing this, 'Adil Shah submitted to Khurram. He assured the prince of the return of the seized imperial territory and the payment of the demanded tribute. In order to make Malik 'Ambar realize the seriousness of the situation 'Adil Shah sent his envoys to induce him to agree⁶ the imperial terms. Malik 'Ambar had also visualized that any more resistance could cause the extinction of the Nizam Shahi dynasty itself.⁽¹⁾ He therefore also submitted to the advice of 'Adil Shah. The territory of Balaghat and the fort of Ahmadnagar were delivered to the imperialists. Rai Rayan, who was the imperial envoy to the court of Bijapur took over charge of the ceded territory.⁽²⁾

With the arrival of the envoys of 'Adil Shah, Qutb Shah and Nizam Shah at Burhanpur, Khurram despatched sayyid 'Abdullah Barha to inform his father of his success.⁽³⁾ The messenger was first received by Nur Jahan, who conveyed the news to the emperor. Jahangir was very pleased with his wife and gave her the parganah of Todah as a reward for hearing good news. Sayyid 'Abdullah was given the title of

(1) A.S. i pp. 104-5; T.J. p. 182; M.J. f. 105; I.N.J. pp 99; M.L. I pp. 290-91.

(2) M.J. f. 106; A.S. I pp. 105-06;.

(3) A.S. I p. 105.

Saif Khan and a Khil'at. A unique Badakhshani ruby was sent to Khurram as a token of love.⁽¹⁾

The efforts of Ibrabim 'Adil Shah in bringing peace resulted in closer relations between him and the Mughals. He sent his envoys to Khurram along with the imperial ambassadors Afzal Khan and Rai Rayan to each of whom he gave two lakhs of rupees.⁽²⁾ Khurram was impressed by 'Adil Shah's services and recommended to the emperor that 'Adil Shah should be honoured with the title of 'son'. Jahangir accepted his son's request. He ordered the following couplet to be written and sent to Adil Shah:-

ندی از التماس شاه فرم
بفرزندى ما مشهور عالم

i.e., "on the request of Shah Khurram, you have been renowned in the world as my son."⁽³⁾

Proper administration of the ceded territories was necessary before Khurram could leave the Deccan. He appointed Khan Khanan as the chief administrator over Khandesh, Berar & Ahmadnagar. Shah Nawaz Khan ^{was} nominated to the government of Balaghat and 12,000 soldiers were placed under him. Khanjar Khan entitled Sipahdar Khan ^{was} deputed

(1) T.J. p. 188; A.S. I p. 105; M.J. f. 105b; I.N.J. pp. 100-01.

(2) M.J. f. 106a.

(3) T.S.S. ff. 203-04; M.J. f. 106a; T.J. pp. 192-93; T.J. p. 192; I.N.J. p. 101.

to the command of Jalnapur. Similarly in every 'sarkar' and big town suitable persons were appointed and the administration was brought to normal. Apprehending a breach of faith by the Deccanis, Khurram left 30,000 cavalry and 7,000 musketeers under the charge of different commanders for the general defence of the country.⁽¹⁾ After reorganizing the occupied territory Khurram proceeded towards Mandu where he arrived on 11th Shawwal 1026 A.H. / 11th November, 1617, A.D.⁽²⁾

The junta rejoiced at the 'success' of Khurram with great pomp and show. Khurram was given a warm reception, on his arrival. Jahangir called him his son from ^{the} 'jharoka' and permitted him to sit beside him. The prince was raised to the unprecedented rank of 30,000 Zat and 20,000 'sawar-i-dodaspah' and 'sih-aspah'. He was entitled Shahjahan - the title which he also adopted after becoming emperor himself. Jahangir gave him a khil'at worth Rs. 50,000, a jewelled dagger and many other gifts.⁽³⁾ Nur Jahan prepared a feast of victory and gave a dress of honour to the prince.⁽⁴⁾ All the great nobles, who accompanied Shahjahan such as Afzal Khan, Mahabat Khan, M^u and Khan and Raja Bahā Singh were

(1) A.S. I pp. 106, 109; T.J. p. 194; M.J. f. 107;
M.L. I pp. 292-93; I.N.J. pp. 101-02.

(2) A.S. I p. 110; T.J. p. 194; Thomas Roe pp. 385-86.

(3) A.S. I p. 111; T.J. p. 195; I.N.J. p. 104; M.J.
ff. 107-08a.

(4) T.J. p. 196; I.N.J. p. 105; M.J. f. 109a.

honoured and raised in their ranks.⁽¹⁾ Rai Rayan, who conducted the peace terms was entitled Raja Bikramajit.⁽²⁾ The Deccani envoys were also duly honoured.⁽³⁾

Shahjahan was eager to impress the whole empire by the glitter of the offerings of the Deccanis. On 5th Aban 1026 A.H. / 26th November, 1617 A.D., the gifts were exhibited. They included Sarnak, an elephant offered by 'Adil Shah. The elephant, reckoned at Rs. 125,000, appealed to the emperor so much that he changed his name to Nur Bakht and reserved it for his own use.⁽⁴⁾

Tenth Aban 1026 A.H. / 1st December, 1618, A.D., was the day of the greatest rejoicings, when public hall of the royal palace of Mandu dazzled by glitter of gold offered by the Deccanis. The offerings which could not be shown on the previous occasion were exhibited on that day. Among the gifts of 'Adil Shah, were a sapphire, that weighed six 'tankas' and seven 'surkhs' valued one lakh of rupees; a 'jamroka' diamond worth Rs. 40,000 and many horses and elephants. Two famous elephants, i.e. Mahupat (afterwards named Giranbar) and Bakht Buland were valued at one lakh of rupees each. The

(1) M.J. ff. 107b, 108a; I.N.J. p. 103; T.J. p. 195.

(2) T.J. p. 199.

(3) Ibid p. 197.

(4) A.S. I pp. 111-12; T.J. p. 198.

offerings of Qutb Shah included a ruby of Rs. 30,000 and two famous elephants namely Quddus Khan and Imam Raza, each valued at Rs. one lakh, and many other gifts. Similarly, Nizam Shah also sent gifts of great value. To Nur Jahan, Shahjahan gave gifts worth Rs. two lakhs, while other step (1) mothers, were also presented gifts of sixty thousand rupees.

All the three Deccan states offered one hundred 'Iraqi and Arabian horses and one hundred and fifty elephants, out (2) of them some had jewelled saddles and golden trappings.

Altogether the gifts valued at Rs. 2,260,000 or 75,000 (3) Irani tumans or 6,780,000 Turan Khanis. "Such offerings," writes Jahangir, "had never been submitted before to any (4) other emperor in Mughal history."

The rejoicings celebrated on Shahjahan's success were premature. He also failed to bring a permanent peace. Though Ahmadnagar was regained by Shahjahan yet it cannot be regarded as a new Mughal conquest. It had been captured by Akbar in 1601 A.D. The mere recapturing of the lost territory by Shahjahan was given an exaggerated significance by the junta. The position of the

(1) A.S.I. pp.112-13; T.J. pp.198; M.J. ff.108-09;
M.L. I. pp.293-94; I.N.J. p.105.

(2) I.N.J. p.105; A.S.I. pp.112-13; M.J. ff.108-09;
T.J. p.198.

(3) T.J. p.198.

(4) Ibid. p.198.

Mughals in 1617 A.D., was no better than that in 1605 A.D. - at the time of Jahangir's accession.

Deccani shrewdness had saved their country from further devastation by the Mughals. The jewels and gold offered by them ^{were meant to check the advance of the imperial army.} 'Adil Shah was successful in keeping the Nizam Shahis alive and in enhancing his own prestige in the eyes of the emperor.

What were the historical factors which prevented Shahjahan from annexing the State of Ahmadnagar? First, the junta exploited the Deccan situation for its own selfish motives. The sole aim of Nur Jahan's party, by sending Shahjahan to frighten the Deccanis to surrender, was to prove that their candidate was the most suitable claimant to the throne. Once the junta's aim was achieved by the false submission of the Deccanis, it was considered not desirable to advance ^{any} further into the enemy's country. The court intrigues *thus* afforded a chance to the Deccanis to strengthen themselves for future operations.

The second reason for not advancing further was the personality of Shahjahan. He had fought so far in the plains of north India and had not much experience of guerilla warfare. He knew the fact that his army included the same imperial captains who had been unsuccessful in the past against the stratagems of the Deccanis. He feared, lest he should meet the same fate. If the worst happened his own

position as a military commander could be challenged by the rival party. He therefore hesitated in facing the Deccanis on the battle field and preferred to adopt peaceful means if the matter could be solved amicably. Personal motive was thus involved over the country's interest. There seems no other reason, that after the cession of the mighty fort of Ahmadnagar ~~see~~ ~~the~~, when the Nizam Shahis were ~~crippled~~ and reduced to a cipher, why ~~Shahjahan~~ ^{then} left the task incomplete.

Malik 'Ambar proved a better diplomat than Nur Jahan. He had submitted to the Mughals but did not admit his final defeat. He had deceived them by his false submission. He wanted to gain time in order to strengthen himself and he became successful in his aim. Shahjahan's success, which was highly *felic*itated and was nothing more than the false representation of the junta to outdo the hostile group.

The peace made in 1617 A.D. was weak in its nature and was bound to break. The Nizam Shahis, who had bowed their head before the Mughal storm, busied themselves for two or three years in scraping together forces. Malik 'Ambar appealed both to 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah for help and warned them of the consequences if the Nizam Shahis were conquered by the Mughals. Malik 'Ambar's request appealed to them and a confederacy came into existence. The Nizam Shahi 'peshwa' was thus able to collect an *army* of 60,000 soldiers. (1)

(1) M.J. f. 140b; A.S. I (p.135) says 50,000 men.

The absence of the emperor and Shahjahan in Kashmir in 1619 and the preoccupations of the Mughals in Kangra were the other cause, which encouraged the Deccanis to overthrow the Mughal bondage.

Finding the circumstances favourable, Malik 'Ambar broke the treaty and advanced in 1620 A.D. towards Ahmadnagar. Khanjar Khan, the imperial commander, twice attempted unsuccessfully to check the enemy's advance but had to take refuge in the fort of Ahmadnagar.⁽¹⁾ Unable to resist the enemy's sudden advance, Khan Khanan appealed to the emperor for arms and funds. A grant of Rs. twenty lakhs was immediately sanctioned.⁽²⁾ The Deccanis were defeated by Darab Khan⁽³⁾ but they rallied again. Pressed hard, the Mughals decided to retreat from Rohingar to Balaghat and to stay there till the arrival of the reinforcements. As soon as the Mughals withdrew, the Deccanis cut off their supplies and caused a heavy loss. The imperialists were obliged to change their plan of retreat and encamped at Balapur.⁽⁴⁾

The preoccupation of the large armies of the Mughals in the Kangra Valley encouraged the Deccanis to drive the former

(1) I.N.J. p. 160; T.J. p. 305; M.J. f. 135.

(2) I.N.J. p. 160; T.J. p. 305;.

(3) T.J. p. 305; I.N.J. p. 160.

(4) T.J. p. 305; I.N.J. pp. 160-61; A.S. I pp.133-36; M.J. ff. 135; 139, 140.

as far as possible. The Deccanis assailed ^{them} from all sides and blocked all access to the imperialists at Balapur. Scarcity of food worsened the position of the imperial camp. Within a period of six months since their restart of the hostilities, the Deccanis seized a large portion of Khandesh, Berar and Ahmadnagar. (1)

The growing attacks of the Deccanis forced the Mughals to retreat still further. They retired to Burhanpur, which was besieged by the Deccanis. The governor of Burhanpur ~~sent~~^{sent} urgent appeals to the emperor for despatching fresh troops or to send Shahjahan. (2) Unable to capture Burhanpur, the Deccanis were able to seize many 'parganahs' of Khandesh and Berar and started to collect revenue. (3) They became even more daring. They crossed the Narbada in a body of eight thousand and looted Akbarpur. They advanced as far as Mandu and harassed the population. "The fort", writes Muhammed Salih, "would easily have fallen if the reinforcements had not arrived in time." (4)

(1) M.J. ff. 140 b; 141; A.S. I p.36; T.J. p. 322.

(2) M.J. ff. 140b, 141; A.S. I p. 136.

(3) T.J. p. 322.

(4) T.J. pp. 330-31; A.S. I p. 140.

A Brief Account of the Court Politics.

The declining health of Jahangir and the court politics were the other reasons for Mughal failure in the Deccan. Jahangir's health had been declining for the last two or three years through his excessive drinking. Congestion of blood produced serious eye trouble in 1619 A.D.. The pleasant valley of Kashmir was the only place suitable for him. The administration of the country was resting more than ever in the hands of Nur Jahan. She had supported Shahjahan as heir apparent in the beginning in the hope that she could influence him when he became emperor. But she later realised that Shahjahan was more clever than she had thought. She therefore now turned towards Khustau and vainly attempted to reconcile herself with him but he would not agree.⁽¹⁾ She then cast her eyes on Shahriyar who could serve her purpose. She arranged for her daughter ~~the~~ Ladli-Begum to be married to him in April 1621 A.D. and supported him as her candidate for succession to the throne.

This shifting of political alliances at the imperial court affected the sincerity of the members of the junta seriously. However, they still carried on with each other for some time

(1) Della Vale I pp. 56, 57.

for their own selfish motives. Shahjahan was well aware of the weak health of his father. Moreover the old nobility still supported Khusrau, who was equally popular among the masses. If Jahangir died during Shahjahan's absence in the south, the prince's chances for the throne were obscure. Shahjahan knew his ability to strike terror among the Deccanis as by then he had gained experience of hill warfare by his successful campaigns in Kangra.⁽¹⁾ But he did not want to go alone to the south without Khusrau. If he could manage to take Khusrau with him, he would overcome easily one claimant to the throne at least, and in case the worst happened he would be able to defeat Nur Jahan and her nominee.

Visualising the danger impending, Shahjahan demanded the custody of Khusrau before his departure for the Deccan. He represented to the emperor that delivering Khusrau would mean to frighten the Deccanis - "When the Deccanis shall hear that he was so favoured by the emperor that Khusrau had been delivered to him, they will be frightened into surrender." He further said that he had to face three united kings in the south. Khusrau's presence in the north would always cause him trouble and under such a position he would not be able to work whole-heartedly in the Deccan. ⁽²⁾

(1) I.N.J. pp. 171, 176; T.J. p. 318-19.

(2) F.A.S. ff. 282, 283; M.J. f. 141; Tavernier pp. 335-36; Thomas Roe p. 256; Della Vale I pp. 57, 58.

Jahangir, who had still paternal affection for Khusrau, under apprehension of the consequences of Khusrau's delivery refused to comply with Shahjahan's request.

The increasing attacks of the Deccanis⁽¹⁾ caused by the delay of Shahjahan in ^{the} north obliged Jahangir to change his mind. Moreover, Nur Jahan also induced her husband to deliver Khusrau to Shahjahan for her own evil design, i.e., to kill one enemy at the hands of the other. Jahangir, who was already under Nur Jahan's influence, reluctantly yielded to her insistence, but with conditions. He asked for the safe return of Khusrau. After being given the surety, Khusrau was delivered to Shahjahan never to be seen by his father again.⁽²⁾

(1) M.J. f. 141; M.L. I p. 305.

(2) F.A.S. f. 283; M.J. f. 141b; I.N.J. p. 176; A.S. I p. 137; MJ. I p. 307.

Only Thomas Roe gives (pp.256, 257) the reaction of the delivery of Khusrau, in the harem or among the general public. He writes: The poor prince remains in the tiger's powers, refuses meat and requests his father to take his life and not to let it be the triumph and delight of his enemies. The whole court is in whisper, the nobility sad, the multitude like itself, full of tumour and noise without head or foot, only it rages but bends itself upon no direct end. The sisters and divers women mourned, refused their food and said if he died, there be one hundred of his kindred burn for him. Common people murmur that the king has not delivered his son, but his own life into the hands of an ambitious prince and a treacherous faction.

After the delivery of Khusrau, preparations were made for Shahjahan's march to the Deccan. Shahjahan was given a khil'at, a jewelled sword and an elephant. He was permitted to have ten krors of 'dams', out of the Deccan revenue, after his conquest as a reward for his services. (1)

Shahjahan took with him twenty experienced and noted captains such as Raja Bikramajit, Afzal Khan, Khwaja Abul Hasan and the Sayyids of Barha. (2) There were six hundred and fifty mansabdars, one thousand Ahadis, one thousand Turkish gunners and five hundred musketeers in the train of the prince, apart from thirty one thousand men already in the south. One krur rupees were sanctioned to meet the expense of the army and Mumtaz Khan was made Bakhshi and waqia-nawis (news and reporter). On 12th December, 1620, A.D., Shahjahan left his father at Lahore never to meet him again. (3)

Shahjahan had taken a great risk and started for the Deccan. It was therefore necessary for him to obtain success in the south if he wanted to be sure of his accession; otherwise the Deccanis in the south and his rivals in the north would reduce him to impotence. He therefore wanted to infuse a spirit of emulation among his followers to face any possible danger that might come in their way. To impress

(1) I.N.J. p. 176; M.J. f. 141 b; T.J. p. 322; A.S. I p. 136.

(2) A.S. I pp. 136-37.

(3) M.J. f. 141; F.A.S. f. 283; T.J. p. 322; A.S. I p.136; I.N.J. p. 176.

the soldiers with his determination, he revived the tradition of his great grand-father Babur. On his way to the Deccan, Shahjahan broke all wine glasses and poured wine into the Narbada. He promised his followers not to drink again if he succeeded in defeating the Deccanis. Having confidence in their leader's determination, the followers swore on their heads to sacrifice their lives for him. (1)

The arrival of Shahjahan in the neighbourhood of Ujjain frightened the Deccanis, who were besieging Mandu. (2)

Khawaja Abul Hasan and Bairam Beg were sent with an advance guard of 5,000 against the besiegers. They reached the Narbada by a swift march and forced the Deccanis to raise the siege. The Mughals pursued the enemy for four 'kos' and the latter retired to Burhanpur. (3)

Shahjahan arrived at Burhanpur for the second time on 23rd February, 1621, A.D. (4) Khan Khanan and other officers advanced to welcome the prince and reported the sufferings they had undergone at the hands of the enemy. Shahjahan spent nine days at Burhanpur for re-organizing the army. He distributed Rs. 30,000,000 among his followers to equip themselves for future operations. (5) He designed an offensive

(1) A.S. I p. 138; M.J. f f. 144b.

(2) M. J. f. 144b; A.S. I p. 140.

(3) I.N.J. p. 181; M.J. ff. 144b, 145a; A.S. i pp. 140-42.

(4) M.J. f. 145a; T.J. p. 331; I.N.J. p. 181.

(5) M.J. f. 145b; A.S. I p. 145; I.N.J. p. 181.

plan on a large scale. The army of 30,000 men were divided groups. Each group was placed under an able commander, i.e. under Darab Khan, 'Abdullah Khan, Khwaja, Abul Hasan, Raja Bikramajit and Raja Bhim. (1)

The imperialists launched their attack vigorously. After defeating Deccani contingents at Malkapur, the imperialists advanced towards Balaghat, where Malik 'Ambar himself was waiting for battle. A fierce battle took place in which many famous officers of the Deccanis such as Tilang Rao, Firoz Khan Habshi and others were killed. The eventual success of the Mughals was bought at the heavy loss of the deaths of Gada Beg, sayyid Muzaffar Barha and Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali Barha. Malik 'Ambar fled with his ten thousand followers to Khirki. (2) The imperialists pursued the enemy closely. Nizam Shah and his family ^{would} have fallen into the hands of the Mughals, had Malik 'Ambar not removed them to Daulatabad ~~the day before~~ the arrival of the former. (3) The imperialists halted three days at Khirki and "utterly demolished the buildings, which took twenty years to build and needed another twenty years to be reconstructed." (4)

Shahjahan had determined to defeat the Deccanis this time in order to be safe on at least his southern flank.

(1) M.J. f. 145 b; A.S. I p. 145; M.L. I p. 317.

(2) T.J. p. 331; A.S. I pp. 148-49; M.J. f. 145b; I.N.J. p. 182.

(3) M.J. f. 145b; T.J. pp 331; I.N.J. p. 182; M.L. I p. 320; A.S. I p. 151.

(4) I.N.J. p. 182; T.J. p.331; M.J. f. 146a; A.S. I p. 151

When the Mughals returned from Khirki, fifteen thousand Deccanis attacked Raja Bikramajit's army. The imperialists were hard pressed by the enemy but the arrival of Raja Bhim and Darab Khan with their troops saved the Mughals from defeat. The Deccanis suffered a heavy loss and fled. Jadu Rai and Atish Khan, the Nizam Shahi commanders made another attempt but were defeated by Khywaja Abul Hassan. (1)

The next attempt of the Mughals was to relieve the besieged imperialists of Ahmadnagar. The imperial commander, i.e., Khanjar Khan, in spite of the shortage of arms and provisions had held it strongly. When Khanjar Khan heard of the imperial reinforcements, he became encouraged. He came out of the fort and killed two hundred and fifty Deccanis, who were besieging Ahmadnagar under the command of Jauhar Habshi, the son-in-law of 'Ambar. (2) In order to make the success complete, a Mughal detachment was sent to Nasik where the enemy also experienced a decisive defeat. (3)

The successive defeats at the hands of the Mughals forced Malik 'Ambar to surrender. The Nizam Shahis had suffered unaccountable losses both of men and animals. Their resources were exhausted and they had lost courage. A large

(1) A.S. I pp. 151, 153.

(2) A.S. I p. 152; M.L. I p. 320.

(3) M. L. I p. 321.

number of Malik 'Ambar's followers had perished during the battles and he had not much funds to raise fresh troops. He realised that any more resistance to the Mughals would mean the destruction of the Nizam Shahis altogether. He therefore preferred to make peace. He represented to Shahjahan that if he would be pardoned, he would never provoke the imperial wrath and would remain faithful to the Mughal emperor.⁽¹⁾ Shahjahan agreed to Malik 'Ambar's request and the campaign came to an end.

By accepting Malik 'Ambar's submission, the Mughals were once again defeated by the enemy in diplomacy. Malik 'Ambar bowed before the storm and let it pass over. He knew that once Shahjahan retired from the Deccan with the bulk of his army he could overpower the remaining imperialists easily. On the other hand, the Mughal camp was suffering from the scarcity of food and fodder.⁽²⁾ Shahjahan himself was also anxious to bring the war to an end as early as possible. His long stay in the south could provide a chance to the rival party at the court to strengthen its position. Shahjahan therefore was not ready to continue the war for an indefinite period. The imperial court, which had become an arena of political intrigues, was more interested for its

(1) A.S. I pp.156-57; M.J. f. 146; T.J. p. 331;
I.N.J. p. 182; M.L. I p.321.

(2) T.J. p. 331

selfish activities and ignored the country's demand. The health of the emperor was declining fast⁽¹⁾ and the political parties were anxious to the question of succession. When the court was not ready to appreciate the services of Shahjahan, why should he waste his energies and run the risk of a danger more important than the affairs of the Deccan?

Both Malik 'Ambar and Shahjahan for their own selfish motives agreed to conclude peace in June, 1621 A.D. Shahjahan preferred to gain a free hand to attend to his ambitions in the north and thus dictated light terms to the Nizam Shahis. Except the army, which he had under his immediate command, Shahjahan did not expect any help from the north in his impending struggle for the succession. He wanted to settle terms with the Deccanis in such a way that he could depend upon their help if required. The terms were: apart from the imperial territory seized by the Deccanis, an additional fourteen kos of adjoining area to be ceded to the Mughals; a war indemnity of fifty lakhs of rupees to be paid by the three states. The division of the amount was that Nizam Shah, 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah would pay twelve, eighteen and twenty lakhs of rupees respectively.⁽²⁾

(1) I.N.J. pp. 186-187.

(2) M.J. ff. 146b, 147a; T.J. p. 331; I.N.J. pp.182-83; M.L. I p. 321; A.S. I pp. 157-59, 161-62.

This was another precarious peace. Both Malik 'Ambar and Shahjahan had agreed to the terms under pressure of circumstances. This was the second time during the reign of Jahangir that Malik 'Ambar saved the Nizam Shahi dynasty from extinction. It was not that the Nizam Shahis were stronger than the Mughals in military power, but because court politics itself had provided a chance to the Deccanis that they could rally their forces and attempt to overthrow the foreign bondage.

The news of the imperial success was conveyed to the emperor who rewarded his nobles for their services. Afzal Khan, the *diwan* of Shahjahan, who conveyed the news was given a dress of honour, an elephant and a jewelled sword. Shahjahan was given a ruby plume and Roop Mati, a Turkish horse, both of which were presented to Jahangir by the Shah of Persia out of the Turkish booty. Khanjar Khan, the imperial commander of Ahmadnagar was promoted to 4,000 Zat and 1,000 sawar, for performing his heroic deeds.⁽¹⁾

After the submission of the Deccanis, Shahjahan spent a few months in the administration of the imperial Deccan. Darab Khan and Raja Bikramajit were deputed with 8,000 men in Zafarnagar; Pilpali was placed under Khwaja Abul Hasan. Sarbuland Khan and Jan Sipar Khan were ordered to guard Jabnapur and Bir respectively. Similarly, the defences

(1) T.J. pp, 331-33; I.N.J. p. 183; M.J. f. 147.

of Mahur and Munipatan was entrusted to Yaqub Khan Hab~~sh~~shi Adaji Ram. As there was no fort in the whole of Balaghat, therefore a fort of stones was built near Kharkpur. To defend the country against any possible aggression by the Deccanis, new military posts were opened between Burhanpur and Devalgaon.⁽¹⁾ Shahjahan's interest in the administration of the Deccan seemed to be for one motive. It was, that he wanted ~~to be~~ a firm control over the Deccan, through his own men, who could support him fully whenever the time arose.

Free from the affairs of the Deccan, Shahjahan^{was} tempted to fulfil his evil desire with regard to Khusrau. Jahangir's health was breaking down and the problem of succession became the most immediate urgency in the country. Khusrau was still alive and Shahjahan wanted to get rid of him, so as to remove at least one obstacle from his way. He put Khusrau to death and sent the news to the emperor that the prince died on 8th Bahman 1031 A.H. / 29th January, 1622, A.D., owing to Choleric pains.⁽²⁾ He ~~had~~ thus finished one of his great rivals in his contest ~~for~~ succession.

The relations between the Safawid Shahs of Iran and the Shia' states of the Deccan affected the Mughal's policy towards the Deccanis. Since the Deccan states had adopted Shiism

(1) A.S. I p. 159; M.J. f. 147.

(2) I.N.J. p. 191; T.J. p. 342; M.L. p. I 325; Tavernier pp 335-36; The English Factories in India Vol-II p.41; J.R.A.S. 1910 II p. 949.

there was a regular exchange of diplomatic missions between Iran and the Deccan courts. It was but natural that occupation of any part of the Deccan by the Mughals was not appreciated by the Safawids.

The Safawids remained quiescent over the Mughal seizure of part of the Deccan under Akbar, due to their own political weakness. When Daniyal offered some justification of the Mughal conquest in a letter sent to Shah 'Abbas I in 1602 A.D., the latter kept silent. ⁽¹⁾ Some years later, i.e. by 1615 A.D., Shah 'Abbas had regained power. Jahangir therefore preferred to avoid any conflict as far as possible between Ispahan and Delhi. In 1616 A.D., when the Ottoman Sultan, Ahmad I, suggested Jahangir advance against Persia, in conjunction with the Ottoman army, the Mughal emperor ⁽²⁾ declined to act.

Hard pressed by Shahjahan in 1621 A.D. the Deccani rulers tried to seek help from Iran against the Mughals. In reply to their request, the Safawid Shah sent Talib 'Ali Beg, Qasim Beg and Muhammad Beg to Bijapur, Golconda and Khirki respectively. ⁽³⁾ He wrote to Qutb Shah that he would write to Jahangir not to annex their states but on the other hand ⁽⁴⁾ he advised the Deccanis to unite themselves against the Mughals.

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- (1) Jamia-i-Marasilat ff. 223b - 225b.
 (2) Tarikh-i-Salim Shahi ff.137-38.
 (3) Tarikh-i-Alam Ara-i-Abbasi, p.470.
 (4) Jamia-i-Marasilat ff. 230b, 231a.

Realising the situation at the Mughal court, through his envoys, Shah 'Abbas I, aspired to assist his fellow Shi'a rulers in the Deccan. He wrote to Jahangir and pleaded at length on behalf of the Deccanis representing that they were both Jahangir's tributaries and friends of the Safawids. Since Jahangir's accession they had always followed the customary rules for a subordinate ally and if they had trespassed, they should be pardoned. Making his own position clear he said that it was a false charge that the Deccan states were in a secret alliance with him against the Mughals. Concluding his letter, the Shah said that whether the Deccani sultans remained submissive and tributaries to the Mughals or he captured their states and gave them to other people under him, it would not make any difference to the imperial government. He suggested that the states should not be annexed and be allowed to enjoy their present status.⁽¹⁾

The letter of Shah 'Abbas I did not affect the Mughal policy towards the Deccan. The Mughals whether a weak or a strong power were not ready to accept interference of a foreign power in the matter of their own policy. The later events will show that the Mughals continued their efforts in pushing their southern frontiers as far as possible.

(1) ^{JAMIAH-C-MARASILAT} ~~Ibid~~ ff. 229b, 230a.

1622 - 1627 A.D.

The Deccan policies of the Mughals during this period were dominated by the break up of the junta and the consequent rebellion of Shahjahan. The death of 'Itmad ud Daulah', in (1) January, 1622, A.D. was another blow to the unity among the members of the junta. He had kept the members in one unit. But after his death, there was no one to maintain harmony among the rival members. Nur Jahan and Shahjahan had turned into deadly enemies. Asaf Khan's sympathies were with his son-in-law, i.e. Shahjahan, but he kept his feelings secret lest they should harm him (i.e. Shahjahan). He continued ostensibly on the side of Nur Jahan and her husband *but* reserved himself for a final stroke *against* his opponent's ambitions. The hostilities of the rival groups increased and resulted in the rebellion of Shahjahan.

The background to Shahjahan's rebellion was the conquest of Qandahar by the Persians in April, 1622, A.D. (2) Nur Jahan *had* an imperial order issued *appointing* (3) Shahjahan to lead the Qandahar army. In view of the

(1) T.J. pp.336 - 37.

(2) Tarikh-i-~~Alam~~ Ara-i-~~Abbasi~~, pp.682-87; T.J. pp.342-46. (For details see Tarikh-i-~~Alam~~ Ara-i-~~Abbasi~~ pp.91-97; 485, 486, 552-669, 70, 682-87; A.N.III. p.668; T.J. pp.93, 94, 138, 164, 284, 315-16, 342-46, 349-52; Jamia-i-Morasilat ff.219-20; I.N.J. pp.191-93.

(3) T.J. p.345; A.S. I. p.166; M.J. f. 152b.

grave situation at the imperial court, Shahjahan put forward lavish demands before his march to the north-west. These were: the area between Multan and Qandahar to be placed at his disposal; ~~the~~ fort of Ranthambore to be allotted ^{to him} where he could lodge his family during his absence and picked soldiers of the imperial army to be sent with him. The demands were rejected and Shahjahan rebelled in January, 1623 A.D. (1)

Shahjahan's rebellion, which continued for about three years, was a serious threat to the stability of the Mughal empire. During this period, ^{the} attention of the central government was chiefly focussed on one problem, i.e., suppression of the rebellion. It provided a chance for the Deccanis to take advantage of the civil war in the Mughal empire. Many of the nobles such as Himmatt Khan, Darya Khan, Raja Bikramajit and others who were previously deputed against the Deccanis now joined with Shahjahan. In the words of Jahangir "the army sent against the rebel son could have been employed against the Deccanis, but he threw the whole empire into confusion." (2)

Mahabat Khan, the governor of Kabul was one of the best generals in the Mughal empire. He had a brilliant military record and was a good administrator. He was recalled from

(1) A.S. p. 167-8; T.J. pp. 394-450, 353; I.N.J. p. 194-198, 99, M.J. ff. 151-53, 158.

(2) T.J. pp. 353-54.

Kabul; given a khil'at, raised to the rank of 6,000, and ordered to lead the imperial army against Shahjahan.⁽¹⁾

Defeated by Mahabat Khan near Burhanpur, Shahjahan planned to seek help from the Deccanis. He was liberal in imposing the terms in 1621 A.D. and now wanted to benefit *from* his leniency. But Shahjahan forgot that the Deccanis created troubles only in the absence of an efficient Mughal army in the Deccan. They would not dare to help him when a general not less than the person of Mahabat Khan was present with a large army in the south. But still the rebel prince hoped against hope and sent Afzal Khan to Malik 'Ambar. Apprehending that any help to Shahjahan at such a critical hour would mean to invite the imperialists into his country, Malik 'Ambar refused the request. He advised Afzal Khan to go to Bijapur.⁽²⁾ When the envoy of Shahjahan met 'Adil Shah, the latter also rejected the appeal of the rebel prince.⁽³⁾

This was the first instance in the history of the Deccanis that they abstained from allying themselves with the imperial rebels. It was the fear of the Mughal forces which overawed the Deccanis to adopt such a recourse; otherwise the later events will show that once the central forces were

(1) I.N.J. pp. 197-98; T.J. pp. 348, 353.

(2) T.J. p. 378; A.S. I p. 177.

(3) T.J. p. 378.

away in the north, Malik 'Ambar resumed his normal course.

The desertion of some of his officers, weakened the position of Shahjahan in the south and he now planned to go to Bihar. The safe passage to Bihar was through Golconda territory. Qutb Shah, fearful of Shahjahan's forces, allowed him to pass through his country on the condition that he would not molest the population or give any harm to cultivation. He even gave some money and goods to Shahjahan. Shahjahan stayed for three days in Masulipatam and then left for Bihar. (1)

The presence of Mahabat Khan in the Deccan proved a great advantage to the imperial rule. The Deccanis were under the impression that Mahabat Khan perhaps would become governor of the Deccan in the near future. They therefore tried to win him over. As long as Shahjahan was present in the south, Mahabat Khan kept both Malik 'Ambar and 'Adil Shah, the rivals, in suspense. He did not commit himself to either party. Eager to employ the imperial force against 'Adil Shah, Malik 'Ambar sent 'Ali Sher to Mahabat Khan and promised to wait upon him in Devalgaon. He even agreed to send his son to serve under Parvez. But Mahabat Khan, the prudent diplomat, realising the weak position of Malik 'Ambar, evaded his request. (2)

(1) T.J. pp. 378-79, 382; A.S. I pp. 177-78; I.N.J. p.215; M.J. ff. 167-70.

(2) T.J. p. 381; M.J. f. 174 b; I.N.J. p. 216.

Mahabat Khan preferred to join with 'Adil Shah, who was then~~the~~ strongest of all the Deccani rulers. In April, 1624 A.D., Mahabat Khan sent 'Abdul 'Aziz to Bijapur. 'Adil Shah welcomed the invitation and agreed to send Mulla Lari with 5,000 soldiers to Mahabat Khan. (1)

As the territory of Nizam Shah lay on ^{the} Bijapur - Burhanpur route, so Mahabat Khan sent a contingent to conduct Mulla Lari to Burhanpur. Leaving Sarbuland Rai to guard the Deccan, Mahabat Khan set out with Mulla Lari for Bihar to face Shahjahan. But soon after Mulla Lari was sent back with his army to the Deccan to help Sarbuland Rai. However, Muhammad Amin, the son-in-law of Mulla Lari was called to serve under Parvez in Bihar. (2)

The alliance of Bijapur with the imperialists upset the balance of power in the Deccan. This treaty aimed to serve two purposes of the imperialists. First, to weaken the Deccanis by helping one against the other, and second to divert the attention of Malik 'Ambar, the most inveterate enemy of the imperialists, by keeping him at war with Bijapuris until the rebellion of Shahjahan could be squashed.

(1) T.J. p. 381; M.L. I p. 343; I.N.J. pp. 216-17, 223.

(2) I.N.J. p. 224; M.J. f. 175.

Perplexed at first by the Mughal-Bijapur alliance, Malik 'Ambar countered by allying himself with Golconda. He removed the family of Nizam Shah to the fort of Qandahar, on the Golconda border while he sent his own to Daulatabad. He exacted arrears of two years' tribute from Qutb Shah with whom he made an alliance.⁽¹⁾ He then advanced towards Bijapur while the imperialists were pre-occupied in the north.⁽²⁾

Hard pressed by Malik 'Ambar, 'Adil Shah requested Mahabat Khan to send back Mulla Lari with his followers and offered three lakhs of 'huns' as a price of the Bijapur troops.⁽³⁾

The time had come for the imperialists to defeat the Nizam Shahis. When Mahabat Khan was advised of ^{the} events in Bijapur he ordered Sarbuland Rai to send imperial reinforcements to 'Adil Shah along with the Bijapuri troops. Leaving a small army for defence of the imperial Deccan, Sarbuland Rai despatched Lashkar Khan, Mirza Manuchihr, Khanjar Khan, Jan Sipar and Uda Ram to help Mulla Lari.⁽⁴⁾

The imperial reinforcements upset Malik 'Ambar's plan. He did not expect that the imperialists would be able to help 'Adil Shah with such a large army. He tried vainly to stop

(1) M.J. 180a; T.J. pp. 386, 391; I.N.J. p. 234.

(2) T.J. p. 319; I.N.J. p. 234.

(3) I.N.J. pp. 234-35.

(4) I.N.J. p. 235.

the imperial help for his opponent. He wrote to Mahabat Khan that the rivalry between the Nizam Shahis and the 'Adil Shahis had existed for a long time and they should be left alone in their mutual struggle. He requested the withdrawal of the imperial reinforcements. Mahabat Khan did not pay any attention to Malik 'Ambar's request. (1)

Foiled in one attempt, Malik 'Ambar tried a second. He attempted to impress Mahabat Khan with his good intentions towards 'Adil Shah. At the arrival of Mulla Lari and Lashkar Khan, Malik 'Ambar raised the siege of Bijapur and withdrew for some distance with two motives - to give a false impression that he was faithful to the imperialists and to entice his opponents towards his own borders. (2)

Malik 'Ambar succeeded in his stratagem and defeated the opponent army. The allied forces continued their march and got themselves entrapped by the Nizam Shahis. Malik 'Ambar did not attack for sometime so as to take them out of their guard. He then made a surprise attack and a fierce battle took place at Bahutri. Mulla Lari was killed and his followers fled. Some imperial officers such as Lashkar Khan, Manuchihr and 'Aqidat Khan fell into the hands of the Nizam Shahis. Khanjar Khan and Jan Sipar and a few others *managed to escape.* (3)

(1) M.J. f. 181a; T.J. p. 392; I.N.J. p. 236.

(2) I.N.J. p. 236.

(3) M.J. f. 181; T.J. p. 392; I.N.J. p. 237.

The success of Malik 'Ambar left two impressions. First, the imperialists needed an able general to match the genius of Malik 'Ambar. Second, the undivided attention of the imperialists was required to defeat the Nizam Shahis. The events will show that as long as Shahjahan's rebellion continued, the Nizam Shahis succeeded in pushing the imperialists back.

The preoccupations of the imperial forces in the north and his success at Bahutri, encouraged Malik 'Ambar to extend his border. He tried to capture Ahmadnagar but Khanjar Khan, the imperial commander held it strongly.⁽¹⁾ Leaving a small force at Ahmadnagar, he advanced to Sholapur, which he took from the Bijapuris. Within a short time he conquered whole of Balaghat territory from the imperialists. He sent Yakut Khan with 10,000 men to besiege Burhanpur.⁽²⁾ The position of the imperialists became very precarious as the bulk of their army was busy with Shahjahan in the north. Sarbuland Rai planned to give a battle to the enemy but was ordered by Jahangir to wait the imperial reinforcements.⁽³⁾

Malik 'Ambar approached Shahjahan who had been defeated in Bengal in September, 1625 A.D., with a proposal for alliance. He assured the rebel prince every possible help against the imperial rule. What tempted Malik 'Ambar in

(1) T.J. p. 392; M.J. f. 181; I.N.J. 237.

(2) M.J. ff. 181-83; T.J. pp. 392-93.

(3) M.J. f. 183 b.

assisting Shahjahan now when he had refused him in the beginning? By nearly two and a half years continuous fighting the imperialists were exhausted and the spirit and vigour with which they started was decreasing with the course of time. Malik 'Ambar therefore took this opportunity and planned to help the rebel prince. Shahjahan accepted Malik 'Ambar's offer and allied himself with him.⁽¹⁾

The alliance between the two antagonists, i.e. Shahjahan and Malik 'Ambar came into existence under the pressure of circumstances. This is the first instance in the history of the Mughals that a Mughal prince, like Shahjahan, who was once regarded as the champion of a forward Deccan policy allied himself with the enemy of the Mughal empire. But it should, in no way be regarded, as Shahjahan's intentions to undermine the Mughal empire. His struggle was against a group of people who aimed to destroy him. Under the circumstances, Shahjahan had allied himself with the Deccanis, in order to achieve his own aim and that was to secure the throne of Delhi for himself.

Malik 'Ambar exploited the weakness of Shahjahan for his own ends. He asked Shahjahan to reinforce the Mizam Shahis in the siege of Burhanpur. Shahjahan himself encamped at

(1) ^{M. J} ~~Hid~~ f. 183 b; I.N.J. p. 283.

Devalgaon but sent an army under 'Abdullah Khan and Shah Quli to storm Burhanpur. The rebel army *fought* hard but *suffered heavy losses including* Shah Beg Khan, ^{an} Sardaz Khan and many others. ⁽¹⁾ The besiegers could have continued their efforts but the illness of Shahjahan and the arrival of Mahabat Khan in the Deccan, forced them to raise the siege.

Shahjahan's resources ^{were} exhausted due to the prolongation of his rebellion and few of his followers were left with him. He therefore submitted to his father in February, 1626 A.D. He was given a jagir in the south and retired to Nasik. ⁽²⁾ Mahabat Khan was sent to Bengal. Prince Parvez was made governor of the imperial Deccan and Khan Jahan Lodi ~~is~~ his wakil.

Events after the submission of Shahjahan.

The submission of Shahjahan brought a check on the progress of the Nizam Shahis, who had been profiting ~~themselves~~ from the civil war in the Mughal empire. Apprehending that now the imperialists would concentrate ^{exclusively} ~~upon~~ the Nizam Shahis, ~~with the~~ singleness of purpose, Malik 'Ambar preferred to stop hostilities. A few months later, he died on 6th Safar 1034 A.H. / 8th May, 1626 A.D. ⁽³⁾

(1) T.J. 393-94, 397; M.J. ff. 183b, 184a; M.L. I pp. 356-57; I.N.J. pp. 243-44.

(2) M.J. ff. 186-87; A.S. I p. 192; T.J. p. 397; M.L. I p. 357; I.N.J. p. 244.

(3) T.J. p. 409; M.J. f. 199; I.N.J. p. 271

The death of Malik 'Ambar was an irreparable loss to the Nizam Shahis. The genius and skill of this veteran Deccani warrior could be estimated by the tribute paid to him by his opponents. The authors of *Mafasir-i-Jahangiri* and *Iqbal Nama* write: "He had no equal in generalship and discipline. He spent the whole of his life with great honour that no other Deccani slave attained such a high status." (1) The spirit of cooperation, which he inspired among his followers vanished soon after his death. There was no one left among the Nizam Shahis who could control them and enforce his commands. The Nizam Shahis were divided into different political groups to attain supremacy.

The dissensions among the Nizam Shahis weakened their state and the rival groups once again sought the Mughal help to overthrow their opponents. In order to make his position strong, Yaqut Hab^yshi, the new peshwa of Nizam Shah opened negotiations with the Mughals. He came to Jabnapur with a band of five hundred followers including Fath Khan, the son of Malik 'Ambar. He sent a letter of submission to Khan Jahan Lodi, who had become governor of the Deccan after the death of Parvez on 28th October, 1626 A.D. Khan Jahan Lodi failed to understand ^{the} diplomacy of the Deccanis and ordered Sarbuland Rai to help Yaqut Hab^yshi. (2)

(1) M.J. f. 199a; I.N.J. pp. 271-72.

(2) T.J. p. 413; I.N.J. p. 280.

The political revolution in Khirki upset the peace concluded between the Nizam Shahis and the Mughals. Nizam Shah deposed Yaqut Habshi and appointed Hamid Khan as his peshwa and commander of the army. (1)

With coming into power, Hamid Khan started hostilities against the Mughals. He wanted to take advantage of the weak administration of the Mughal empire and to impress Nizam Shah of his efficiency in order to establish his own position. He sent Fath Khan to capture Balaghat. Leaving Lashkar Khan at Burhanpur, Khan Jahan himself advanced to meet the Nizam Shahis. Fath Khan had to retire and the imperialists advanced as far as Khirki. (2) The speed with which the Mughals were progressing could have easily overthrown the Nizam Shahis but gold offered by the latter checked the advance of the imperial army. Hamid Khan induced Khan Jahan to accept three lakhs of 'huns' (equivalent to twelve lakhs of rupees) and in return demanded ^{the} whole ^{of} Balaghat territory and fort of Ahmadnagar. Khan Jahan agreed to the offer of the enemy. (3)

Two main reasons induced Khan Jahan to accept bribes from the Nizam Shahis. The health of Jahangir was in a very delicate position and he was expected to pass away any time.

(1) M.J. f. 205; T.J. p. 415.

(2) I.N.J. pp 283.

(3) M.J. f. 216b; T.J. p. 414-15; I.N.J. pp.284, 299.

Nur Jahan and her adherents were devoted more than ever to the immediate question of succession. Chaos and confusion reigned in the Mughal empire and no attention was paid to the administration. Second, all the able generals such as Shahjahan, Mahabat Khan⁽¹⁾ and 'Abdullah Khan were either discarded or ignored in taking an active part in the policy of the country. Khan Jahan was therefore free to do anything according to his own choice. He therefore accepted Hamid Khan's offer and ordered imperial commanders to deliver ~~the~~ demanded area to the Nizam Shahis and to retire to Burhanpur. *A considerable part of the imperial territory was, thus* sold to the enemy by the treachery of one man. All commanders obeyed the order of Khan Jahan except Khanjar Khan, the commander of Ahmadnagar. Threat and pressure could not change his determination and he remained loyal to his master. (2)

(1) Mahabat Khan tried to capture Jahangir in March 1626 A.D. but could not keep the emperor for long under his *surveillance*. Jahangir was freed through the diplomacy of Nur Jahan and Mahabat Khan fled to Shahjahan but was pursued by the central army. T.J. pp. 402-03; M.J. ff. 187-89, 200-02.

(2) T.J. p. 415; M.J. f. 216b; I.N.J. p. 299; M.L. I p. 384.

This was the situation in the Deccan during the last days of Jahangir. With his death on Sunday 28th Safar, 1037 A.H. / 29th October, 1627 A.D., his inglorious reign came to an end.

It can be concluded that Jahangir failed to fulfil his desire which he expressed after his accession - to bring the entire Deccan under the imperial rule. In 1037 A.H. / 1627 A.D. the Mughals had hardly advanced beyond their frontier of 1014 A.H. / 1605, but rather had lost ground to the Deccanis. Shahjahan had forced the Deccanis to submit twice but he failed to bring a definite peace. The pre-occupations of the imperial court with its own selfish activities afforded a chance to the Nizam Shahis to recapture their lost territory. The imperialists fell into mutual disputes and ignored the defence of the country.

The success of the Deccanis proved that they were far superior to the Mughals in guerilla warfare. Jahangir, who unlike his father was free from the Uzbek menace and whose rule was firmly established in the north, did not exert himself seriously in his drive towards the south, otherwise the Deccanis, who had difficulties in scraping their forces together could easily have been crushed at the beginning of his reign. Every time when the Deccanis were on the point of final defeat, they presented gold and large offerings which happened to be more attractive to the Mughals than

territorial expansion. The Deccanis succeeded in gaining time to strengthen their position and pushed back the Mughals many times from their country. In the light of this discussion, it could be said that millions of rupees and thousands of lives failed to extend the Mughal border in the south, under Jahangir's reign.

SECTION III.

CHAPTER I.

AHMADNAGAR -- ITS ANNEXATION.

The reign of Shahjahan surpassed his predecessors, in the expansion of Mughal power in the south. As soon as the Mughal empire was free from the civil war and Shahjahan established himself in the north, he took the affairs of the Deccan seriously. In order to keep chronological order, with regard to Shahjahan's campaigns in the Deccan, this period has been divided into three chapters, namely, Ahmadnagar, Golconda and Bijapur. It has been shown in the previous chapter how the Mughals suffered in the south from the treachery of Khan Jahan Lodi, so Shahjahan, in order to recapture the imperial territory, started his campaigns against the Nizam Shahis. In 1636 A.D., Golconda was the first to acknowledge the Mughal emperor as her overlord and during the last years of Shahjahan's reign, Golconda was ^{the} first to be invaded by the Mughals. The attack on Bijapur in 1657 A.D., when this reign nearly comes to an end, was the last important venture of the Mughals against the Deccanis. The war of Golconda supplied some excuses to the Mughals for an attack on Bijapur.

When Shahjahan ascended the throne in 1037 A.H/1627 A.D., he confirmed Khan Jahan Lodi in his post in order to encourage loyalty from him. Shahjahan ordered him to regain the

(1)
 imperial territory in the south. Failing to comply with the imperial orders, Khan Jahan was replaced by Khan Zaman. The emperor also wrote a letter to Nizam Shah threatening him that if he did not return the imperial territories voluntarily, an army under Khan Zaman would be sent to take them by force. The Nizam Shah submitted stating that he was ready to hand over all the imperial territory but that (2)
 Sayyid Kamal, the commandant of Bir was out of his control.

Though Nizam Shah had submitted outwardly, yet he helped Sayyid Kamal ~~secretly~~. When Khan Zaman was besieging Bir, Nizam Shah sent an army of 6,000 men under Sahu Bhonsla, to Daul^utabad, to divert the Mughal attention. (3) But even so the Mughals captured Bir. (4) The Nizam Shah at that time ruled over Aurangabad, Jalna, Nasik, Baglana and some parts of Konkan. The major portion of the Nizam Shahi held area was hilly where the Deccanis could employ their guerilla tactics and prolong their existence.

The aggressive policy of the Nizam Shahis against Bijapur made the 'Adil Shahis ~~adopt~~ a different attitude towards them. The borders of the Nizam Shahis were largely

(1) Lahauri, Ii. p272.

(2) P S. ff: 173b, 174a; Lahauri Ii, pp.249,250;

(3) P.S. f.174; Lahauri, Ii, p.251.

(4) Lahauri Ii, pp.250-51.

reduced, their sources limited. But still they could have taken a firm stand against the Mughals, with a wise policy of cooperation with the other two Deccan states. But their own harsh treatment towards the 'Adil Shahis forced 'Adil Shah to turn against them. The Nizam Shahis advanced to capture the Bijapuri territory of Bahutri in 1625 A.D. They had killed Mulla Baha, the son-in-law of Mustafa Khan, the wazir of 'Adil Shah. When Shaikh Mu'een, the imperial envoy arrived at Bijapur in 1038 A.H/1028 A.D., Mustafa Khan attempted to persuade ^{KHIVAS} ~~Khrum~~ Khan to help the Mughals and suggested to divide the Nizam Shahi kingdom between 'Adil Shah and the Mughals. (1)

The question of dividing the Nizam Shahi country created two groups in Bijapur. The opposite group of Mustafa Khan, pleaded that if the Nizam Shahis were finished, the Mughals would draw nearer to the Bijapur frontiers and would become a perpetual threat to the 'Adil Shahis. After a hot discuss- (2) ion it was decided to help the Nizam Shahis. This attitude of the Bijapuris marks a fundamental change in the nature of their help to the Nizam Shahis. Previously they had been assisting them to keep the Nizam Shahi dynasty alive. But now they helped with a different motive. They reinforced the Nizam Shahis as a shield against the Mughals .

SASATIN-US-SALATIN

(1) ~~B.S.~~ ff.45,46a.

(2) *ibid* f 46a

In other words the Bijapuris used Ahmadnagar as a buffer state between the Mughal empire and Bijapur.

The outbreak of Khan Jahan's rebellion in 1039 A.H/⁽¹⁾ 1630 A.D., worsened the Mughal position in the Deccan. The rebellion of Khan Jahan illustrates the nature of political loyalties of mediaeval times. The recruitment to the army during that period was based on ^{the} tribal system. That is why we find that it was mainly with the support of his Afghan followers that Khan Jahan dared to rebel. When he fled towards the Deccan, two thousand Afghans, who were ⁽²⁾ at his immediate command, also followed him. Passing through the Bandela territory of Jajhar Singh, he hastened ⁽³⁾ to join his old ally a.e. Murtaza Nizam Shah.

The arrival of Khan Jahan in the Deccan provided the Nizam Shah with an excuse to drive the Mughals out of the original Nizam Shahi territory. He was ready to help the imperial rebels for his own motives. But Shahjahan, who ⁽⁴⁾ after the submission of Jajhar Singh, was free, became eager to curb the rebellion as early as possible in order to avoid a further set-back to the Mughal prestige. He therefore deputed five armies to the Deccan, first to round up Khan Jahan and second to intimidate the Deccanis into withholding assistance to the rebels.

(1) P.S. ff.179-184; T.S. f.14a.

(2) Lahauri II, pp.274,275.

(3) P.S. ff.180-182; Lahauri II, p.289.

(4) Lahauri II, pp.254,255. Jajhar Singh submitted in early 1038 A.H/1629 A.D.

The appointment of large armies in 1039 A.H/1630 A.D. opens the first active phase of Mughal relations with the Nizam Shahis. The plan to overpower the Deccanis was this: Iradat Khan (i.e. 'Azam Khan) was sent with 20,000 men to enter Balaghat and overpower Khan Jahan. Those who accompanied with him included Jajhar Singh, Raja Satar-sal, Khil^oji Bhonsla and others. ~~The~~^{THE} second army of 15,000 men was placed under Raja Gaj Singh. Sha'ista Khan was appointed the commander of the third army, which also numbered 15,000. The fourth army, numbering more than 8000, was sent under Khwaja Abul Hasan to capture Nasik and Trambak, while Nasiri Khan was sent to conquer Qandahar and Telingana. Iradat Khan was given the title of 'Azam Khan, a 'phul-katarah', a khil'at and a jewelled dagger. Both Sha'ista Khan and Raja Gaj Singh were raised to the rank of 5000. 'Azam Khan was nominated the principal commander and others were instructed to work in close cooperation with him. (1) In order to supervise the work of his commanders, Shahjahan himself left Delhi for the south on Monday 8th Jamadi ul Awwal 1039 A.H/25th January 1630 A.D. (2)

While the Mughals were devastating the Deccan, they also attempted to persuade the enemy by offering them high

(1) Lahauri II, 294-296; 298, 301; p.S. f.193b.

(2) T.S. f.20a.

rank and other marks of imperial favour. The Deccanis whose services were offered on personal motives rather than on the dynastic or national basis of modern times, could therefore be suborned with the promise of better opportunities for self-advancement. Some of those who deserted to the Mughals, included Yaqut Khan Habshi and Maloji who were given ranks of 5000. Rahim Khan and Chingiz Khan, the son and son-in-law of Malik 'Ambar were honoured with the mansabs of 2500 and 1500 respectively. Uda Jai Ram, Sarway Khan, 'Ali Dilawar Khan, Atish Khan, Qazi Muhammad Sa'eed, the wakil of 'Adil Shah and some time later the relations of Jadu Rai were the others who left their masters and joined the imperial service. (1)

The disunity which arose between Sha'ista Khan and 'Azam Khan, after ^a few months of the campaign delayed the Mughal progress. 'Azam Khan being the chief commander, wanted his own plan to be carried out. But Sha'ista Khan wanted his own way. In order to keep harmony among the imperialists, Shahjahan wisely recalled Sha'ista Khan who handed over the command of his contingents to 'Abdullah Khan. (2)

Help to Khan Jahan cost the Nizam Shahis heavily. 'Azam Khan, who was now freed from internal dissensions, worked more promptly. He led an army into the enemy's

(1) Lahauri, Ii, pp.293,300,308-310; P.N. ff.164a,176a,191; T.S. f.20b.

(2) T.S.f.20b; Lahauri i.p.302.

country and inflicted heavy losses. In order to save his country from further imperial penetration, Nizam Shah drove Khan Jahan out of his territory. Khan Jahan fled to Bijapur but was closely followed. He then intended to go to the northwest to arouse the tribal Afghans in his favour (1) but was killed by the imperialists when he reached Malwa.

With the suppression of Khan Jahan's rebellion, the Mughals now concentrated against the Deccanis with singleness of purpose. 'Azam Khan planned first to take Dharwar. After a heavy discharge of the imperial artillery, Salim Siddi, the besieged commander surrendered the fort on 23rd Jamadi ul Akhir 1040 A.H/18th March 1631 A.D. The imperialists captured seven elephants and eighty horses. (2)

Diplomacy of Bijapur and Golconda.

The capture of Dharwar by the Mughals, alarmed both 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah. In order to keep the Mughals from their countries as far as possible, they sent back the imperial envoys i.e. Shaikh ^{Mu'een} Mullu~~u~~-ud-Din and Shaikh Mohay^{ud-Din} (3) ud-Din with rich gifts from Bijapur and Golconda.

While on the other hand 'Adil Shah sent Randola Khan and his father Farhad Khan with 10,000 men to watch the frontiers. Randola Khan offered some terms, which were rejected by 'Azam Khan. (4) All efforts of the 'Adil Shahis to save the

(1) P.N. ff. 208, 209; T.S. ff. 27-29; Lahauri Ii, pp. 333-334.

(2) Lahauri Ii pp. 340-42; P.N. ff. 209-11; T.S. f. 32a.

(3) P.N. f. 213b; Lahauri Ii p. 356.

(4) T.S. ff. 32b, 33; P.N. f. 212; Lahauri Ii pp. 343-46.

Nizam Shahis proved fruitless and the Mughal pressure continued to increase.

Alliance between 'Adil Shah and Nizam Shah.

The next attempt of 'Azam Khan was against Parinda. Hard pressed, Muqarrab Khan, the Nizam Shahi commander appealed to Randola Khan for help. He wrote him a letter of warning and appeal, explaining the deplorable condition of the Nizam Shahis. He said: "Dharmar has been captured; Nasiri Khan is busy in taking Qandahar; Sangmnir, Baizapur and Junair are held by Sahu; Nasik has been captured by Khwaja Abul Hasan. Only Daulatabad and its dependencies are left under the Nizam Shahis." He offered Shalapur to 'Adil Shah in return for his help to the Nizam Shahis. He warned Randola Khan that if Sholapur also fell, the end of the Nizam Shahi dynasty would soon be at hand. The extinction of the Nizam Shahis would result in, first the destruction of Bijapur and then the conquest of the entire Deccan by the Mughals. The appeal of Muqarrab Khan affected 'Adil Shah who concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Nizam Shahis. (1)

Mughals unsuccessful attempts on Parinda.

The alliance between Bijapur and ^{the} Nizam Shahis was

(1) Lahauri li pp.356-58.

another breach of faith by 'Adil Shah. 'Azam Khan reminded Randola Khan of his previous promise to further the Mughal cause but the latter did not reply. (1) However 'Azam Khan besieged Parinda. 'Adil Shah sent an army under Vitholji to help the besieged but was defeated by the Mughals. (2)

The famine which occurred in 1039 A.H/1630 A.D., and continued for three years badly affected the whole of the Deccan. (3) It checked the Mughal progress in the Deccan and the imperialists had to retreat from many places due to the scarcity of food. Provisions were not procurable as far as seven miles from Parinda. The foraging party could bring only two or three days' supply. (4) 'Azam Khan attempted hard to capture the fort but had to retire. The enemy pursued the Mughals closely and inflicted heavy losses. (5)

Qandahar.

Foiled in his attempt to capture Parinda, 'Azam Khan advanced to reinforce Nasiri Khan who was besieging Qandahar. Despite the repeated efforts of the 'Adil Shahi commanders such as Sarfraz Khan and Randola Khan, the Mughal pressure intensified. (6) The besieged commander Sadiq, surrendered the fort on May 7, 1631 A.D. A vast booty fell to the

(1) LAHAURI I p.355. (2) History of Shahjahan of Dikli, p.134.
 (3) T.S. ff.29-32a; Lahauri Ii 362-64. The besieged of Parinda were forced to live on the boiled skins of the dead bodies of animals and leaves of trees.
 (4) Lahauri Ii p.374. (5) T.S. ff.34,35; Lahauri Ii.pp.371-7.
 (6) P.N. p.203.

victorious army including ten elephants and one hundred and sixteen cannons out of which four were famous ones -- Malik-i-Maidan, Bijli; Maidan-i-Dip and Mulk Zabt. The (1) fort of Manganu fell soon after the conquest of Qandahar.

The success of 'Azam Khan discouraged the Nizam Shahis so much that some of them deserted to the Mughals. Sahu, the father of Shivaji approached 'Azam Khan and begged to join the imperial service. The Marhatha chief came with his two thousand followers, who in order to reduce the others of their allegiance were generously treated. Sahu was given a mansab of 6000, an elephant and a horse. His nephew Minaji and his son Sabaji were given ranks of 300 and 200 respectively. His other followers such as Maloji, Iloji and Habaji were also given good mansabs. (2)

Telingana and Berar.

Khwaja Abul Hasan, who was deputed to lead the army in Telingana, made good progress. But he had to retire^{as} soon as ~~the~~ provisions were become dearer owing to the famine. He sent Zafar Khan, who looted some 'parganas' of Galna and came with a large booty. (3) The Deccanis burnt the stores of provisions in the neighbouring area lest the imperialists could make use of them. The imperialists had to go as far as

(1) T.S.ff.34,35; Lahauri Ii, pp.371-77.

(2) P.N.p.203.

(3) Lahauri Ii, p.361.

(1)
thirty miles to collect the provisions and fodder.

But in spite of the food shortage, the Mughals succeeded in capturing Nasik after four months. Trambak was next to be captured by the invaders. At the request of Sahu, who had then joined the imperial service, Nasik was handed over to him. (2) The Mughals advanced towards Taltam and Satunda, which fell without much resistance. After strengthening the occupied forts, Khmaja Abul Hasan retired to Shahgrah. Wazir Khan, the imperial commander, drove out the Nizam Shahis, who had entered Berar. (3)

Civil war among the Nizam Shahis.

While the Nizam Shahis were already suffering badly at the hands of the Mughals, their defences became weaker due to the civil war in their country. The reason was that after the death of Malik 'Ambar, there was no one left who could control the distracted and selfish Nizam Shahis. Everyone aspired for supremacy and did not care for the dynasty. The Nizam Shahi nobles knew that even if the dynasty fell, they could get mansabs in the imperial service.

Murtaza Nizam Shah had imprisoned his wakil Fath Khan, the son of Malik 'Ambar, and had appointed Muqarrab Khan as his commander and Hamid Khan as his wakil. Though

(1) T.S.f.22a. (2) Lahauri Ii p.367.
(3) T.S. f.38; Lahauri Ii pp.367-70.

Muqarrab Khan had kept the dynasty alive so far, yet he could not satisfy ~~the~~ Nizam Shah who wanted to recapture the whole of his ancestral lands. The author of Futuhat-i-Adil Shahi gives another reason for the downfall of Muqarrab Khan. He mentions that Fath Khan's sister, wife of Nizam Shah, convinced her husband that her brother was the only suitable person, who could retrieve the Nizam Shahi prestige. Nizam Shah therefore brought Fath Khan out of the prison and reinstated him to his original post in Nov. 1631 A.D. ⁽¹⁾

The action of Murtaza Nizam Shah gave Muqarrab Khan a motive for joining the Mughals. Thus he proved that he was not inspired by dynastic feelings of service to his master but by a desire to monopolise power as long as he could. As soon as that power was seized from him, he was ready to join the Mughals against whom he had fought so long. His was not the only example, but it will be found in the course of this thesis that many Deccanis left their masters and joined the Mughals to the destruction of the Deccan states.

Muqarrab Khan sent Tanaiji, his agent to 'Azam Khan and begged to join the imperial service. 'Azam Khan hastened to his request and sent his son Multafat Khan to welcome him. He gave him a jewelled dagger, four horses and Rs. one lakh in cash. Later on Shahjahan bestowed the title of Habsh Khan on Muqarrab Khan and gave him a rank of 5000 in the

(1) Lahauri Ii p.378; P.N. ff.245-47.

(1)

imperial service.

The dismissal of Muqarrab Khan was not the end of the civil war among the Nizam Shahis. Fath Khan was well aware of the suspicious and vacillating nature of Murtaza Nizam Shah. Before Murtaza could exercise his power, Fath Khan took the first opportunity. He dethroned Murtaza, imprisoned him and declared his ten-years-old son Hussain as the new Nizam Shah. In order to gain the Mughal support, he alleged that his aim had been to serve the emperor. Shahjahan appreciated Fath Khan's action and asked him to kill his captive as a further proof of his sincerity. Fath Khan complied. He made Murtaza drink a cup of poison and declared that he died a natural death. He also killed his other fifty most dangerous opponents. ⁽²⁾ Shahjahan sent Shukrullah 'Arab to Daulatabad with eleven horses and a khil'at as a reward to Fath Khan for his services. The emperor further demanded Fath Khan ^{to send} all the jewels, valuables, ⁽³⁾ elephants and the boy-king ~~to send~~ to the imperial Court.

Shahjahan's demands were meant to bring Daulatabad virtually under him without a war. But the delay of Fath Khan in complying with the imperial demand, obliged Shahjahan to order Wazir Khan and Nusrat-Khan to advance to reduce Daulatabad. Asaf Khan, who was despatched against 'Adil Shah

(1) T.S. f.36a; Lahauri II p.379.

(2) Lahauri II, pp.395, 402; P.N. f.247a; T.S. ff.37b,38a; Jalal ff.4b, 5a.

(3) Lahauri II, p.402; T.S.f.38a.

was ordered not to hand over any newly conquered fort to the followers of Fath Khan until the submission of the latter. (1)

The march of the imperial forces for Daulatabad frightened Fath Khan. He hastened to submit to the emperor and apologized for his conduct. He sent his son 'Abdur Rasul with a letter of submission, thirty elephants, nine 'Iraqi horses and diamonds -- a peshkesh worth Rs. twenty lakhs. He read 'Khutba' and struck coins in Shahjahan's name and promised to remain loyal to the Mughals. 'Abdur Rasul was received graciously and given a khil'at and an elephant. (2) Soon after, in March 1632 A.D., the emperor left Burhanpur for Agra. (3)

With the submission of Fath Khan in 1632 A.D., comes to an end the first phase of the Nizam Shahi history under Shahjahan. The state was not formally annexed but was reduced to impotency. The territories lost under Jahangir and early years of Shahjahan's reign were regained. The aim of Shahjahan in coming to the Deccan was partly completed. The rebellion of Khan Jahan was suppressed. Balaghat, Dharwar and Qandahar had been captured by the Mughals. But that did not make the final victory against the Nizam Shahis. Sahu still stood for the cause of the Nizam Shahis and challenged the Mughal domination. The unscrupulous 'Adil Shah was still ready to help the Nizam Shahis, though for his own protection. The detention of Hussain Nizam Shah by

(1) T.S. f.39a.

(2) Jalal f.5a; Lahauri II pp.421-22; T.S. f.41b; Hadiqa-i-Alam f.245; P.S. ff.244b,245a;

(3) T.S. f.41b; P.S. f.247a.

Fath Khan cast some doubts upon his sincerity to the Mughals.

Shahjahan's retirement to Agra.

Under these circumstances, why did Shahjahan retire to the north, when he knew that his work in the south was not yet finished? The court writers give two reasons, for the emperor's retirement from the Deccan. They mention that because the imperial prestige in the south was retrieved and the beloved wife of the emperor i.e. Mumtaz Mahal died at Burhanpur in Zil Qadh 1040 A.H./July 1631 A.D., so the emperor did not wish to stay any more in the Deccan. There is no doubt that affection prevailed over Shahjahan and he did not wish to stay at Burhanpur, the place of his wife's death. But a critical examination of the contemporary evidence suggests other motives were present too for his return to the north. Muhammad Sadiq, 'Abdul Hamid Lahauri and Muhammad Amin Qazwini give a picture of a dreadful famine which not only affected the southern India but Malwa and Gujrat as well. The famine started in 1631 A.D. and continued till the end of 1633 A.D. ⁽¹⁾ Provisions became scarce and dearer so that the emperor was obliged to leave the Deccan.

The other reason for Shahjahan's retirement from the south was that he was under a false impression that after the submission of Fath Khan, the Nizam Shahis were reduced to such a parlous state that if they stood against the

(1) T.S. ff, 29-32a; P.S. ff. 198, 280, 289; Lahauri Ii pp. 362-4.

imperial rule, an able general would be able to curb them. That was one of the reasons why he transferred many of his commanders to different provinces before his departure for Agra. For example, Nasiri Khan was sent to Malwa and 'Abdullah Khan Firoz Jang Bahadur was made governor of Bihar. Moreover at the same time, he deputed Asaf Khan with the bulk of the Deccan army against Bijapur. ⁽¹⁾ But Shahjahan's seemed to have underestimated the resistance of the Nizam Shahis, who were reinforced by the 'Adil Shahis. The imperial commanders deputed by him to carry on the campaign during his absence proved to be unsuccessful against the Nizam Shahis. Sahu's activities, which took a serious turn during 1633 - 1636 A.D., were beyond the expectations of Shahjahan, that the Marhatha chief would create such a situation that he had to come again to the south to set the matter right.

In order to carry on the campaign against the Nizam Shahis, Shahjahan offered the governorship of the Deccan to Asaf Khan, who preferring to stay with the emperor, ⁽²⁾ declined the offer. 'Azam Khan was next to be appointed but was soon replaced as inefficient by Mahabat Khan. As Mahabat Khan was at Delhi at that time, so Khan Zaman was ordered to take charge till the arrival of his father.

(1) P.N. ff.239-40; Lahauri II, pp.424-26.

(2) Lahauri II, p.424; P.S. f.248a. Jalal f.6a.

Mahabat Khan and his other four sons, namely Lahrasp, Dilir Himmat, Garshasp and Afrasiyab and his grandson Shukrullah were given khil'ats. Hakim Khush-Hal was made Bakhshi and waqia-nawis (news reporter) of the Deccan. (1)

Galna.

Mahmud Khan, the commandant of Galna, turned against Fath Khan due to the latter's brutal acts in Daulatabad, Sahu who had become a formidable enemy of the Mughals took the opportunity and sent his envoy to Mahmud Khan to induce him to join hands with him. When Khan Zaman came to know of the situation, he sent Mir Qasim to Galna to persuade Mahmud Khan to join the imperial service and assured him of a high rank. Thinking that his advantage would be in joining with a stronger power, Mahmud Khan dismissed the envoy of Sahu and surrendered the fort to the imperialists. (2) He was given a mansab of 4060 and fifty thousand rupees. Galna thus came under the Mughals peacefully due to the diplomacy of Khan Zaman.

Mughals and Sahu.

After the death of Malik 'Ambar, the most formidable enemy amongst the Nizam Shahis whom the Mughals had to face was Sahu. Like many other Nizam Shahis he was true to his

(1) P.S. ff.248, 249; Jalal ff.7b, 8a; T.S. f.41b; Lahauri, Ii pp.424-28.

(2) P.S f 43a, Lahuri I: pp443-44

own interests rather than to the cause of the dynasty. He had joined the Mughals who gave him a rank of 6000 and fought against the Nizam Shahis. But when he saw better chances in Daulatabad, he deserted the Mughals. When Sahu joined the imperial service in 1631 A.D. some 'mahals' of Fath Khan, the then enemy of the Mughals were given to him. But with the submission of Fath Khan to the Mughals in Feb. 1632 A.D., his 'mahals', which were held by Sahu, were restored to him. The seizure of his allotment upset Sahu, who left the Mughals and went to Bijapur. ⁽¹⁾ Fath Khan's harsh treatment to the pro-Nizam Shahis gave an opportunity to Sahu to exploit the people against the former. Furthermore 'Adil Shah, who was surrounded by the Mughals at that time was ready to help Sahu in order to relieve the Mughal pressure upon Bijapur.

Sahu planned first to take Daulatabad from Fath Khan before he could wield his sword against the Mughals. Reinforced by a large Bijapur artillery, he advanced towards Daulatabad. ⁽²⁾ Fath Khan, who had not established himself fully by then, became frightened at the advance of Sahu. Moreover the fort was not well provisioned due to the famine and foodstuffs were difficult to procure. He therefore requested Mahabat Khan for help and in return offered ⁽³⁾ Daulatabad to the Mughals.

(1) Lahauri II pp. 496-97; Jalal f. 48; T.S. f. 45.

(2) T.S. f. 45b; Jalal ff. 48, 49; P.S. f. 278.

(3) Lahauri II pp. 496, 97; P.S. f. 279.

The tempting offer of Fath Khan made Mahabat Khan send him reinforcements immediately. He despatched Khan Zaman with some contingents to Daulatabad, while Lahrasp was sent to check Sahu's advance. A ~~fight~~^{fight} took place between Sahu and the imperialists, seven miles from Daulatabad. Sahu was defeated and was pursued as far as Khirki. (1)

Conquest of Daulatabad.

Foiled in his attempt to take Daulatabad by force, Sahu attempted to persuade Fath Khan by peaceful means. 'Adil Shah also wrote a letter to Fath Khan and reminded him of the close relations between the two Deccan states in the past. 'Adil Shah promised to supply Fath Khan with provisions, which was the urgent need of the besieged and offered him three lakhs of huns in cash if he joined the Bijapuris. Fath^{KHAN} was warned by 'Adil Shah that the Mughals were not helping him out of any sympathy ~~for him~~ but to take the fort for themselves. The inducements and warnings by the Bijapuris prevailed over Fath Khan, who agreed to join with 'Adil Shah. (2) The desertion of Fath Khan was brought to the notice of Mahabat Khan, who ordered Khan Zaman to invest the fort and himself soon followed.

Mahabat Khan started the campaign of Daulatabad more carefully to avoid the past mistakes of the imperialists.

(1) T.S. ff.45b, 46a. Lahauri, II p.497.

(2) P.S. f.280a; Hadaqa^{ul} Alam f.256a; T.S. f.46a.

In order to have a continued supply of provision during the course of the siege, he won over the local dealers and guarded a communication line with the imperial centres in
(1)
Gujrat.

The arrival of Mahabat Khan on 1st March 1633 A.D., at Daulatabad marks the second phase of Shahjahan's relations with the Nizam Shahis. Batteries were erected and the ring of investment was brought closer.

The main fortress of Daulatabad had three adjoining fortifications. They were 'Ambarkot, Mahakot and Kalakot. In order to reach the main fortress, the capture of these three fortifications was absolutely necessary. The Mughals first undertook to conquer 'Ambarkot. In order to save Hussain Nizam Shah, Fatah Khan removed him to Mahakot while he himself stayed at Kalakot. Though the desertion of an imperial Marhatha chief Khiloji jeopardised the Mughal position for the time, yet they stood firm and conquered the
(2)
fort.

Mahakot was the next to be invested by the Mughals. In order to divert the Mughals, the Deccanis sent Farhad and Bahlol to create trouble in Berar. But Mahabat rose equal to the occasion. He despatched Khan Zaman Rao Satar^{CSal},
(3)
who drove the enemy out of Berar.

The shortage of food made the matter worse for the besieged of Mahakot. Randola and Sahu planned to send a

(1) T.S. f.46a; P.S.f.280; Jalal f.51.

(2) P.S. ff.281-88; T.S. ff.46a - 48a.

(3) A.S.I. p.585.

thousand loads of provisions guarded by 3000 Karnatak musketeers. The imperialists defeated the Karnatakis and captured the whole train of provision. (1)

With the arrival of Murari Pandit with the Bijapuri reinforcements, (2) Randola Khan and Sahu became encouraged and increased their guerilla tactics. They intercepted the imperial party, which had gone to bring arms and money from Burhanpur. The Deccanis who numbered more than 9000 attacked Khan Zaman who was bringing the imperial reinforcements. A fierce duel took place near Khirki and the imperialists suffered a heavy loss. After great difficulty the Mughals arrived at Daulatabad with a cash of Rs. six lakhs, one hundred 'mans' of naphtha and two hundred loads of provisions. (3).

The failure of Randola Khan ^{and} Sahu to check the Mughal progress disturbed Fath Khan. The Mughals dug a mine and placed naphtha in it. Fath Khan asked Mahabat Khan to postpone blowing the mine, for two days. In order to test his fidelity Mahabat Khan asked Fath Khan to send his son as hostage. On the refusal of Fath Khan in sending his son, the Mughals set the mine on fire and captured the fort. (4)

The Mughals now turned to capture Kalaket. The failure of the Bijapuris in sending provisions to the besieged and the fall of Ambarkot and Maharkot discouraged Fath Khan

(1) P.S. f.289b; A.S. I.586; T.S. f.49a, 53-57, 60; Jalal f.53a.

(2) A.S.I. pp.588, 589; T.S. f.49b; P.S.f.290; Jalal f.52.

(3) A.S.I.pp.592-93; P.S.ff.291b,292a; T.S.ff.50,51.

(4) P.S. ff.295b, 296a; Jalal f.68b; T.S.f.51; A.S.I.pp.599-601.

to resist any more. Moreover Kalakot was also about to fall. Fath Khan therefore sent his son Abdur Rasul to Mahabat Khan to pardon his past deeds. He promised to surrender Daulatabad and demanded seven days to evacuate the fort. Mahabat Khan agreed and gave Fath Khan two lakhs of rupees and supplied him the means of transport to help him for his evacuation. After the expiry of the time granted, Fath Khan came out of the fort on 6th Tir 1042 (1) A.H/17th June 1633 A.D. and the imperialists occupied it.

The news of the conquest of Daulatabad was sent to the emperor. Mahabat Khan was given a khil'at, ornamented with 'nadiri' and pearls and was increased in his mansab by 1000 zat. Khan Zaman and Nasiri Khan were also honoured. Nasiri Khan was given the title of Khan-i-Dauran and was raised to 5000 Zat and Samar. Other officers were also rewarded for their services. (2)

In order to avoid any possible treachery on the part of Fath Khan, Mahabat Khan put him and Hussain Nizam Shah under strict supervision. Later on both were sent to Agra, where they arrived on Sep.21, 1633 A.D. Murtaza was sent to the fortress of Gwalior where Bahadur, one of his predecessors, was already as a state prisoner. Fath Khan was granted an annual pension of two lakhs of rupees. (3)

The organization of the newly conquered area was necessary before Mahabat Khan could start for the north. As the

(1) A.S.I. pp.603-06; P.S. f.296b; Jalal f.70; T.S. f.52b; B.S. ff.46b,47a.

(2) A.S.I. p.607; T.S.f.53b. (3) T.S. f.54; A.S.I.pp.618-19.

fort of Daulatabad lacked provisions and arms, the majority of the imperialists was not willing to stay in the Deccan after Mahabat Khan's departure. The choice of Mahabat Khan fell on Khan-i-Dauran who was appointed qil'ad^a of Daulatabad and was assisted by Sayyid Murtaza with two thousand cavalry. (1)

The Bijapuris intercepted Mahabat Khan's way to Burhanpur but were defeated. During this clash many Deccani officers such as Tanaji Doriya, and others were killed. Murari Pandit sent Farhad Khan to conclude peace with Mahabat Khan, who refused to listen any such offer by the Bijapuris due to their past treachery. (2)

Foiled in their attempt to make peace with the Mughals, the Bijapuris tried to capture Daulatabad. They thought that as the fort lacked arms and provisions, the Mughals would not be able to defend it. But Khan-i-Dauran rose equal to the occasion and rendered the enemy's efforts fruitless. When Mahabat Khan came to know of the situation, he hastened from Zafarnagar towards Daulatabad. When he reached fifteen miles from the fort, the 'Adil Shahis fled and he resumed his journey for Agra. (3)

Though the Mughals had captured Daulatabad and Hussain regarded^a Shah was made a state prisoner, yet this could not be regarded as the final victory of the Mughals against the Nizam

(1)(1) T.S. f.53b; A.S.I. pp.609; Jalal f.72a.

(2) T.S. ff.52,53; A.S.I. pp.609.

(3) T.S. f. 53b; A.S.I. pp.610-11; Jalal f.72.

Shahis. The Mughal success was purely a successful military operation and they failed to win over the common people. They had not much time to establish their rule in the newly conquered area before new uprisings started against them. Sahu, the most formidable enemy of the Mughals was still free to collect some followers. After the fall of Daulatabad, when Iradat Khan, the imperial commander attempted to persuade Sahu to join the imperial service, the latter brushed away the offer. He told Iradat Khan that the loss of Daulatabad did not matter to him much as he would make Junair, the new Nizam Shahi capital and fight against the Mughals. ⁽¹⁾

The existence of a new Nizam Shah was necessary for Sahu to gain support from the Deccanis. He brought Murtaza, an eleven-years-old member of the Nizam Shahi dynasty, from Jijjan and declared him the new Nizam Shah. Sahu had Poona and Chakan in his jagir, but he soon conquered Balaghat, Junair, Sangmnir, Trambak and Nasik. ⁽²⁾

There are two reasons for Sahu's rapid progress. First, the bulk of the Mughal army was busy against the Bijapuris. ~~The Mughal army was busy against the Bijapuris.~~ The Mughals therefore could not pay much attention to Sahu. Second, the recall of prince Shuja in August 1634 A.D. from the Deccan and the death of Mahabat Khan in October 1634 A.D.

(1) BASATIN US-SALATIN ff- 48b.49a

(2) P.S. f.48b, 49; T.S. f..56b; A.S. II, p.48.

(1)

left the imperial Deccan without any able commander.

Murtaza Khan and AllahWardi Khan, the governors of Daulatabad and Payinghat were no match for the genius of Sahu. (2)

After devastating the dependencies of Daulatabad, Sahu advanced to capture the main fort. Murtaza Khan, the imperial commander, was contemplating the surrender of the fort, had Khan-i-Dauran not arrived in time. (3)

Shahjahan's march to the south.

Jajhar Singh's rebellion, which broke out in the middle of 1635 A.D. (4) proved to be a blessing in disguise for the imperial prestige in the Deccan. The inefficiency of the Mughals against both Sahu and Jajhar Singh impressed Shahjahan that his own presence at the seat of war was necessary as a means to success. He therefore left Agra on 21st Sep. 1635 A.D. for the south. (5) The march of the emperor made 'Adil Shah frightened of the consequences of his help to Sahu. He sent Shaikh Dabir to Shahjahan and begged for mercy. But the emperor was ^{not} easily to be satisfied. Shahjahan sent his envoys to 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah asking them to stop assisting Sahu. (6) The particulars of these missions have been recorded in detail in separate chapters.

(1) T.S. f.59b; A.S.II. p.68.

(2) T.S. ff.53b, 70; A.S.II. p.157; M.U.I. pp.208-14; III pp.280-85;

(3) T.S. f.336.

(4) T.S. ff.63,65-69; P.S. ff.343-49, 359; Jalal ff.137-38. A.S.II. pp.101-14; 122-130, 151. (5) A.S.II. pp.147-48;

(6) T.S. ff.69b,70a; A.S.II. pp.153-55; Jalal f.159a. P.S. ff.363b-364; Jalal ff.164b,165a.

The arrival of Shahjahan at Daulatabad on 10th Dec. 1635 A.D. marks the third and the last phase of the Nizam Shahi history during this period. By the time Shahjahan arrived in the Deccan, the rebellion of Jajhar Singh had been crushed, so the Mughals could concentrate against the Deccanis, with singleness of purpose. An offensive plan on a large scale was devised. Shahjahan appointed three armies to defeat Sahu and his allies. An army of 12,000 men was placed under Khan-i-Dauran, who was assisted by Raja Jai Singh, Mubaraz Khan and Raja Baithal Das. He was ordered to advance towards Qandahar and Nander to check the possible help from Bijapur and Golconda to the Nizam Shahis. Khan-i-Dauran was further ordered to conquer Ausa and Udgir and to march to Bijapur if the need arose. A second army of 12,000 soldiers was placed under Khan Zaman, who was assisted by Bahadur Khan Rohilla, Sayyid Shuj'at Shah and Raja Satar Sal. Khan Zaman was ordered to capture Chunarcond and Ashti -- the home land of Sahu. Sha'ista Khan was appointed commander of the third army, which numbered 6,000. It included AllahWardi Khan, Shaikh Farid and Raja Sang Ram. Sha'ista Khan was ordered to conquer Junair, Sangmnir, Nasik and Trambak. The
(1)
armies left on 22nd December 1635 A.D.

(1) T.S. ff.69b; 70a; A.S.II. pp.153-55; P.S. ff.363b-364; Jalal ff.164b, 165a.

By disposing his armies at strategic places, like Qandahar and Nander, Shahjahan had sealed the Nizam Shahi border to prevent help from outside. To give any more time to Sahu, when the Mughals were free from any rebellion or outside attack would mean strengthening the Nizam Shahis. Sahu therefore should be crushed and the state of Ahmadnagar be merged into the Mughal empire.

The account of the activities of the three imperial armies is lengthy but the main points would be mentioned to show the resistance of the tottering Nizam Shahis against a mighty power like the Mughals. As Sha'ista Khan was deputed to capture the major portion of the Nizam Shahi ^{territory} ~~territory~~, therefore the account of his army has been mentioned first.

Mughal success against the Nizam Shahis.

Sha'ista Khan started his campaign by sending Allah Wardi Khan and Sayyid Wahab Ullah to capture Chandore, which fell after a little resistance. Kunhor Rao, the Nizam Shahi commander of Anjari was the next to submit to Allah Wardi Khan on 8th Feb. 1635 A.D. Kunhar Rao was given a mansab of 2,000 and Rs. fifty thousand in cash. With the help of this Marhatha chief, the Mughals conquered the forts of Kanjhana and Manjhana. Other forts such as Rolah, Jolah, Ahunat, Kol, and Achla fell within a short time. The fort of Raj Dew Hara, where some members of

The Nizam Shahi family were taking refuge, took a longer time.

Given assurances of a mansab of 3000, Bhojmal the commander
(1)
of Raj Den Hara surrendered the fort to the Mughals.

While the lieutenants of Sha'ista Khan were making progress in the north west, he himself was busy with the forts in the west. He first captured Sangmnir and then Nasik. Despite the fact that Sahu attempted to divert the Mughal pressure by creating trouble in Konkan, Sha'ista Khan conquered Junair. Sha'ista Khan pursued the enemy as far as the river Bhima and then marched towards Ramgir which fell without any battle. To conclude the campaign of Sha'ista Khan, he brought twenty forts big and small and seven 'parganahs' such as Gulshanabad, Jandori, Angola and others under the imperial rule -- an area yielding a revenue of 26,000,000 dams
(2)
annually.

The submission of both 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah by April 1636 A.D. relieved Shahjahan of any danger from them. 'Adil Shah had promised not to give any more help to Sahu and to work in close cooperation with the Mughals. Moreover the over-all success of the Mughal commanders against the Nizam Shahis convinced Shahjahan that his presence in the Deccan was necessary no longer. He appointed prince Aurangzeb as the governor of the imperial Deccan. Khan-i-Dauran and Khan Zaman were ordered to reduce the remaining

(1) P.S. ff.368b, 369a; A.S.II. pp.166-69; T.S. f.71a.

(2) T.S. ff 70a, 71a; A.S.II p.169

forts of the Nizam Shahis and to work in close cooperation with the prince. Thus after a stay of nine months, Shahjahan left the Deccan on 19th June 1636 A.D. for Agra. (1)

Aurangzeb's first appointment in the Deccan.

Aurangzeb planned first to reduce the mighty forts of Ausa and Udgir and then to deal with Sahu, who was no more a threat to the Mughal empire. He sent Khan-i-Dauran to capture these forts.

Khan-i-Dauran attempted to persuade Sayyidi Miftah, the besieged commander to surrender and on the refusal of the latter he besieged the fort. Heavy artillery was employed and the fort was conquered on Thursday 17th Mihr 1045 A.H/ 20th Sep. 1636 A.D. Sayyidi Miftah was given a rank of 3000 in the imperial service and the title of Habsh Khan. (2)

Khan-i-Dauran now invested Udgir, which also fell on 19th October 1636 A.D. (3)

Khan Zaman was deputed to round up Sahu. The imperial commander was helped in his efforts by Randola Khan, the Bijapuri commander. Khan Zaman marched to Poona, the headquarters of Sahu and ravaged it completely. Sahu fled from one place to another but the Mughals followed him closely. His cattle drums, flags, elephants and a large portion of

(1) A-S II pp.195-98

(2) A.S.II. pp.206-8; T.S.f.61.

(3) A.S.II. pp.208-9; Lahauri I ii pp.217-21.

ammunition was captured. He had only two hundred followers with him, when he finally took refuge in Mahuli. Khan Zaman besieged Mahuli and was soon joined by Randola Khan. Pressed hard, Sahu submitted to the Mughals. Junair and six other forts which were held by him and the puppet Nizam Shah were handed over to the Mughals. The campaign against the Nizam Shahis thus ended in October 1636 A.D. Sahu went to 'Adil Shah, who bestowed Poona and Supa on him as his jagir. Khan Zaman returned successfully to Daulatabad and was rewarded by Aurangzeb. (1)

The surrender of Sahu marked the end of the existence of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. The state of Ahmadnagar was finally annexed to the Mughal empire after forty years' efforts by the imperialists. The Mughal border became closer to Bijapur and Golconda, which could easily be threatened at their slightest offence. Though two successful campaigns one against Gondwana (2) and the other against Baglana (3) were led after the submission of Sahu, yet they did not disturb the internal peace of the Mughal Deccan.

(1) Lahauri II, pp.225-30; Jalal ff.161-62.

(2) A.S.II. pp.219-20.

(3) A.S.II p.292; T.S.f.87; M.U. III. p.937
pp.561-64.

CHAPTER II.

GOLCONDA

Shahjahan's relations with Qutb Shah remained cordial on the whole except for the crisis of 1656 A.D. There were two main reasons for their good relations. First, Shahjahan acknowledged the gratitude of Qutb Shah, who gave him some help during his rebellion against his father. Second, Golconda was a small and weak state, the ruler of which was more submissive than 'Adil Shah to the Mughal emperor. The Mughals fully exploited Qutb Shah's political weakness, which ultimately resulted in the ruin of his state.

The first contact with Golconda under Shahjahan's reign occurred in April 1628 A.D. when Shaikh Muhay-ud-Din was despatched to Qutb Shah to inform him formally of the emperor's accession. The imperial envoy was given a warm reception at Haidarabad. On his return, in March 1631 A.D., the Shaikh was accompanied by ^{the} Golconda envoy Wafa Khan. The presents sent by Qutb Shah were accepted and Wafa Khan was rewarded. (1)

The presence of Shahjahan at the head of large armies in the south in 1631 A.D. to defeat the Nizam Shahis frightened Qutb Shah. (2) Shahjahan sent Shah 'Ali Beg to Golconda

(1) Lahauri II, p.356; Hadiqat-us-Salatin f.228.

(2) P.S. ff.206, 207a; B.S. f.237b (Baqar Khan, an imperial officer captured Mansur Garh, a Qutb Shahi fort without any difficulty. As the fort has been conquered without the prior permission of the emperor so it was given back to Qutb Shah.)

and demanded a large 'peshkesh'. Qutb Shah complied with the imperial farman. ⁽¹⁾ He further showed his submission by capturing and sending the relatives of rebel Jahar Singh to the emperor. Furthermore Qutb Shah refused to give assistance to Nizam Shah in 1632-33 A.D., when he was asked for it by 'Adil Shah. ⁽²⁾

It can be concluded that it was the fear of the imperial might which forced Qutb Shah to be submissive. Another possible reason could be the tender age of Qutb Shah. He was hardly twelve years of age, when he ascended the throne in 1626 A.D. He therefore wanted first to establish himself firmly before he could wield his sword with a powerful enemy like the Mughals.

Before going further, it is necessary to understand Golconda - Iran relations which had a direct bearing on the Mughal's relations with this state. It has been mentioned in the first chapter that Golconda adopted Shi'ism as early as 1507 A.D. and the names of the Imams were included in 'Khutba', which was read after the Shi'a style. In which particular year, the name of Shah of Iran was incorporated in the 'khutba' in Golconda, no specific mention has been made in the **C**hronicles. But it is recorded that the name of Shah of Iran was read in the Khutba in Golconda during the reign of Shahjahan. Akbar and Jahangir were not motivated by

(1) T.S. f.34b.

(2) Hadiqat us-Salatin f.264b; A.S.II. pp.157-58. T.S.f.70a.

religious sentiments in their desire to conquer the Deccan. Shahjahan was the first Mughal emperor who was partly influenced by the religious sentiments in his relations with Golconda. But the chief cause of Shahjahan's antipathy towards Qutb Shah was political. No strong power could allow its subordinate ally to have political relations with a foreign country hostile to itself. How then could Shahjahan tolerate Golconda acknowledging him as its overlord and at the same time continuing to read 'khutba' in the name of a foreign ruler? If he could alter the 'khutba' in his own name on political grounds, the religious change would be bound to take place automatically in Golconda.

When Shahjahan left Agra in September 1635 A.D., for the south, he sent 'Abdul Latif his imperial envoy to Golconda, demanding from Qutb Shah a large peshkesh and his full submission. The ruler was addressed as Qutb ul-Mulk and with such titles only suitable to a noble and not to a king.

The letter of Shahjahan to Qutb Shah has been mentioned in detail in order to understand the emperor's policy towards Golconda:

"To Qutb ul-Mulk, who is a well wisher and faithful to the Mughal emperor and on whom the royal favours have always been bestowed upon.

As I am the king of Islam and belong to Sunni faith, it is therefore incumbent upon me to enforce the laws of Shari'a in all those parts where my authority is

exercised and should remove apostasy. It has been *brought to my notice* that the Companions of Prophet (here it means only the first three Caliphs of Islam) are reproached in Golconda, while ^{the} Quran clearly praises them. If such innovations continue it would be legal for me to conquer your country. Furthermore, 'khutba' is read in the name of ^{the} Shah of Iran. How can it be, you acknowledge me as your overlord, while you read the 'khutba' in the name of a foreign ruler? You therefore should instead include my name in the 'khutba'. You should send the peshkesh regularly and pay the arrears. The peshkesh should be sent out of jewels, ornamented articles and famous articles like Dak Samundar and Bashir. A person is being sent to exact the peshkesh. If you did not send the peshkesh demanded before the New Year's celebrations and did not obey my commands, you would be responsible (1) for the consequences and your state would be annexed."

The letter persuaded Qutb Shah to submit. The chief reason was that Shahjahan was himself in the Deccan and any obstinacy by Qutb Shah in complying with the imperial farman, would result in drawing the Mughals into his own country. A warm reception was given to 'Abdul Latif. Qutb Shah himself advanced five miles to receive him. "Though the terms were

(1) A.S.II. p.148; P.S. ff.361b, 362a; T.S. ff.68b,69; Jamia ~~ul~~ Insha ff.107h - 109b. Jalal ff.159b, 160.

hard," says the contemporary Deccani author of Hadiqat-us-Salatin, "yet on the advice of his counsellors and ulemas, to avoid any bloodshed, Qutb Shah accepted them." (1) Qutb Shah stopped the practice of Shi'a rites officially; included the names of all the Four Caliphs in the khutba, which henceforth was read in the name of Shahjahan. During 'Abdul Latif's stay in Golconda, Qutb Shah went to the Jamia Mosque of his capital on Friday prayers to see that his orders were carried out. In order to give further proof of his sincerity, he struck a few rupees and 'ashrafis' in the name of Shahjahan and sent them to Agra through ^{the} Golconda envoy. (2)

The contents of ^{the} Ahd Namah (i.e. treaty) of 1636 A.D. will show the political status of Qutb Shah after this period. Qutb Shah promised that the terms of the Ahd Namah would be respected by him and his successors sincerely. They were:-

- (i) The names of the Four Caliphs would be included and the name of the Mughal emperor would be read in the khutba in Golconda. Qutb Shah promised to remain loyal to the Mughal cause.
- (ii) Qutb Shah would strike his gold and silver coins in the name of the emperor according to the specimens sent to the imperial court.
- (iii) [Qutb Shah used to pay an annual peshkesh of four lakhs of huns to Nizam Shah. Since the Nizam Shahi kingdom virtually ceased to exist, the Mughal

(1) Hadiqat-us-Salatin. ff.273b, 274a.

(2) A.S.II. pp.163-65; Lahauri I ii pp.177-78; P.S. f.368; M.L. I. pp.525-26.

emperor had the legal right to exact the peshkesh from Qutb^{SHAH}. But Shahjahan remitted half of the amount - and asked the remaining half to be paid by Golconda.]

Qutb Shah agreed to pay an annual peshkesh of two lakhs of huns with effect from the 9th regnal year. The balance of the past eight years together with the current peshkesh would be given either to the governor of the imperial Deccan or to any other person authorized by the emperor. The difference between the exchange value of Golconda and Delhi would be immediately deposited in the imperial treasury.

(iv) In case of aggression by 'Adil Shah, the Mughal governor of the Deccan should be instructed to help Qutb Shah; otherwise if 'Adil Shah exacted any money from him by force that amount would be deducted from the annual peshkesh due to the emperor.

(v) Qutb Shah swore on Quran, in the presence of 'Abdul Latif, the imperial envoy, that if he acted contrary to these terms, the emperor had the right to conquer his state.
(1)

The 'Ahd Namah, duly signed by Qutb Shah was presented to Shahjahan at Daulatabad in Safar 1045 A.H/April 1636 A.D. Qutb Shah also sent a large peshkesh through his envoy Shaikh Muhammad Tahir. The peshkesh included 100 elephants, 50

(1) Lahauri Iii, pp.177-80; P.S. ff.382b, 383; A.S.II.pp.188-89; and Jamia'ul-Insha ff.114b-115; T.S. ff.77b, 78a.

Arabian and Iraqi horses, jewels and ornamented articles -- worth Rs. forty lakhs. The emperor was pleased with Qutb Shah and sent him his portrait and a golden tablet with the terms of the treaty inscribed in it. Shahjahan wrote to Qutb Shah that he promised by God and the Prophet that as long as he (i.e. Qutb Shah) and his successors would respect the terms of 'Ahad Namah, the Mughal emperor and his successors would not do any harm to his state. (1)

The treaty of 1636 A.D., reduced Golconda to a tributary state of the Mughal empire. Whereas 'Adil Shah only submitted at about the same time after a great devastation of his country. Qutb Shah was overawed by the threat of Mughal force and submitted without war.

Aurangzeb was appointed governor of the imperial Deccan (which included Khandesh, Berar, Ahmadnagar, Payin Ghat and Balaghat etc) by Shahjahan before his march for Agra in August 1636 A.D. (2) The affairs of the Deccan during the eight years of the first governorship of the prince remained friendly. We hear an exchange of diplomatic missions between GolGolconda and the Mughals. Aurangzeb ^{was} the first to keep his representatives permanently at the courts of Bijapur and Golconda -- an institution which proved to be a great help to him during his second governorship of the Deccan.

(1) Lahauri I ii pp.177-80; P.S. ff. 382b, 383; A.S.II. pp.188-89.

(1) Lahauri I ii, pp.210-11; Hadiqat us-Salatin f.275a.

(2) A.S.II, pp.195-98; T.S.ff 61.

Relieved from the Deccan affairs in 1636 A.D., the emperor devoted himself chiefly to his conquests in the north-west. The Deccanis therefore enjoyed a period of about nineteen years when the new troubles arose and which eventually led to the Mughal invasions on both Bijapur and Golconda. During the nine years absence of Aurangzeb from the Deccan when he was re-appointed in 1653 A.D., as governor of that province, six governors succeeded him. Those were Khan-i-Dauran, Islam Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, Raja Jai Singh, prince Murad and Sha'ista Khan. (1) This rapid change of the administrators in the Deccan encouraged Qutb Shah to withhold the tribute. He could temporize with the imperial representatives who went to collect the tribute and thus caused delay in sending it. The emperor who far in the north-west was busy in his campaigns seemed to have taken no active interest in affairs of the Deccan. When the tribute fell in arrear for three years, Sha'ista Khan wrote a threatening letter to Qutb Shah in 1058 A.H/1648 A.D. (2)

The appointment of Aurangzeb to the governorship of the Deccan for the second time in 1653 A.D., marks the second and most significant phase of the Golconda history under Shah-jahan. Many modern writers have criticised Aurangzeb's

(1) Majma'ul-Akhbar f.512; T.S. ff.105a, 110.

(2) Marosilat-i-Qutb Shahi ff.1-3.

conduct of relations with the Deccan states and have attributed their downfall to his sectarian fanaticism.

To understand the Mughal relations with the Deccan states during the years 1653 A.D. - 1658 A.D. it is necessary to narrate briefly the court politics at Agra and other events which had a direct bearing on this issue. The Court of Shahjahan was divided into two hostile groups, each trying to gain the succession. One party was headed by prince Dara and the second by the able minister Sa'adullah in favour of his candidate Aurangzeb. Between these two groups, the emperor swung like a pendulum drawn by sentiment (1) or self-interest in opposite directions with varying force. This rivalry between his most beloved son i.e. Dara and his esteemed wazir, made Shahjahan almost as unhappy as the enmity between Abul Fazl and Salim had made Akbar. Aurangzeb and Sa'adullah were in close cooperation with each other and the latter helped the former on more than one occasion. There are many recorded occasions, when Dara (2) attempted to bring both Sa'adullah and Aurangzeb down in the eyes of his father. Dara's hatred towards Sa'adullah (3) was such that he was alleged to have poisoned him. Both

(1) Islamica 1925 I.p.430; Dara Shikoh by Bikrama Jit Hasrat pp.84, 86; 218, 219, 267. Dara Shukoh by K.R.Qanungo. p.180.

(2) Ruqqat-i-Alamgiri pp.36-38; M.L.Ip.738; Akam-i-Alamgiri p.40.

(3) English Factories-X.pp.65,66; Jesson wrote from Agra on 9th April 1656 A.D. and says how he (i.e.Sa'adullah) came by his sickness there runs many reports. Most men will have him poisoned by the prince. Robert Smith (an English gunner in the service of the Mughal) undertakes to set down the day the poison was given him, to wit, 2nd March; Manucci I, pp.225-26.

Dara and Aurangzeb were preparing themselves for the evil day, when the embers, which had been secretly smouldering would burst into an open conflagration. Aurangzeb therefore wanted an opportunity to equip himself and gather resources for that struggle. ~~He was waiting for that struggle.~~ He was waiting for that occasion, which would place him at the head of a large army, train his soldiers and provide him with the sinews of the coming war of succession.

In order to weaken the power of Aurangzeb, Dara patronized both Qutb Shah and Adil Shah and assured them of his help against Aurangzeb. This acknowledgement of Dara's patronage by both rulers gave offence to Aurangzeb. Dara, at the capital, misused his power. Qutb Shah and Adil Shah did not pay any attention to the instructions of Aurangzeb as they received imperial farmans direct from Agra. Aurangzeb even did not know the contents of these secret letters. He protested many times against that practice. But under the ⁽¹⁾ influence of Dara, Shahjahan did not listen to Aurangzeb. Once Aurangzeb wrote to Jahanara, the partisan of Dara in these words: If His Majesty has given me such a big province under my command, he should keep my position, so that I may not feel small in the eyes of the people and the rulers of the Deccan.⁽²⁾ But since Jahanara was also a supporter of

(1) Adab. f.32a. Muqaddama-Ruqat-Alamgiri pp.264-65.

(2) Adab. f.244a.

Dara, no heed was paid to Aurangzeb's request. Expediency demanded that Golconda and Bijapur should have friendly relations with the governor of the imperial Deccan, their immediate neighbour.

The failure of Aurangzeb in his two attempts in 1649 A.D. and 1652 A.D. to recapture Qandahar from the Persians (1) was a set-back to his military career. He was charged (2) by his father as being an incompetent commander.

Aurangzeb was therefore eager to retrieve his prestige as a general and was anxious to show that if given the full chance, he could still be counted amongst the best generals of the Mughal empire. Aurangzeb's personal motives were thus also working in the background into bringing Bijapur and Golconda down.

The emperor's desire for territorial expansion was the other cause of the invasions of Bijapur and Golconda. The Mughals conquered Balkh and Badakhshan in 1628 A.D. but (3) had to leave the occupied area after a stay of nine months. Shahjahan even aspired to capture Samargand and Bokhara but could not put his idea into practical shape. Retreat

(1) T.S. ff.83a, 158-59, 164-67; Waris ff.398-418, 423b, 424b; 453-459; North West Frontier policy of the Mughals pp.212, 213-18, 224-25, 230; The Relations between the Mughals and the Safavid Shahs of Iran pp.193-94.

(2) Faruki, p.9.

(3) A.S.II, 440-45; 462-67; The Relations between Mughals and Safavid Shahs of Iran, pp.186-88.

from Balkh followed by the three unsuccessful attempts (in 1649, 1652 and 1653 A.D.) to recapture Qandahar. Shah-jahan's attempt to form an alliance with Sultan Murad IV of the Ottoman empire, against the Persians, had equally failed. ⁽¹⁾ The expenditure on these campaigns together with fortification of Kabul and other strongholds in north-west cost nearly two hundred million rupees to the imperial treasury. ⁽²⁾ Since the Deccan states were secretly in league with the Shah of Iran, Shahjahan seemed to have compensated for his failure of Qandahar by the conquests of these states. Moreover the Deccan states were rich and could compensate ^{for} the financial deficiency to the imperial treasury.

In the light of this historical background, we have to find out whether the Deccan states themselves were responsible for their ruin or whether the Mughals invented excuses to fulfil their desire in annexing the states .

When Aurangzeb came to the Deccan in 1635 A.D. he found that agriculture and commerce had suffered badly. A new burden on the imperial treasury was put by an additional force of nine thousand soldiers, who were sent to the

(1) A.S.II. pp.319,321, 325, 333 III pp.130-132; 179, 185, 196; M.L.I. pp 574-5, 729, 731; Lahauri II, pp.595,602.
 (2) The North West Frontier Policy of the Mughals. pp.51-52.

Deccan during the past years. The mansab^bdars were promised cash to meet the additional expense but no extra money was given to them ⁽¹⁾ as the Mughals were already spending a lot on their north-west campaigns.

The delay caused by Qutb Shah in sending the annual tribute increased Aurangzeb's financial difficulties in maintaining administration of his province. He repeatedly sent ineffectual reminders to Qutb Shah. ⁽²⁾ Shahjahan suggested easy methods of payment, i.e. to pay half the tribute in cash and half in the value of elephants. But this was not even done by Qutb Shah. Aurangzeb further suggested allocation of some Golconda territory, the revenue of which to be collected by the imperial officers. ⁽³⁾ This suggestion also was not heeded by Qutb Shah.

The difference in the exchange value of the 'hun', caused another difficulty in the payment of the tribute. In 1636 A.D., when the tribute was imposed, it was fixed in huns. It seemed that the amount was to be paid in kind, which was to be reckoned in rupees by the Mughal experts. The price of the hun was four rupees in 1636 A.D. It means that in 1636 A.D., Golconda paid a tribute of two lakhs of huns, in kind worth Rs. eight lakhs. But gradually the value of the hun increased. First it reckoned at Rs. $4\frac{1}{2}$ and finally it was value at Rs. 5 in 1654. A.D. But Qutb Shah had been paying the tribute according to the old exchange rate of 1636 A.D. Taking advantage of Qutb Shah's

⁽¹⁾ Adab. ff. 26, 31, 24a, 45b, 46a; ⁽²⁾ Adab, ff. 66b, 67a.
⁽³⁾ Adab, ff. 68, 69, 70b.

commitment that he would always pay the difference in the exchange value, the Mughals asked him to clear the arrears caused by that difference ⁽¹⁾ ~~at~~ once. Thus a new burden of Rs. 20 lakhs was thrown on Qutb Shah, who was already suffering under the normal tribute, which generally fell in ~~ar~~rear.

Why was Qutb Shah not asked to pay the difference in the exchange value before? The court writers are silent on this point. But from the events of the past few years, it can be inferred that the Mughals needed money badly at this period to make up their financial deficiencies caused by their campaigns in the north-west.

⁽²⁾
The conquest of Karnatak by Qutb Shah was the other cause of antagonism between Delhi and Golconda. By the treaty of 1636 A.D., Qutb Shah had become a tributary vassal of the Mughals. The Mughals, being the paramount power, thus expected that their subordinate ~~should~~ obtain their permission before he could resolve to undertake any territorial expansion. Both Qutb Shah and Adil Shah had captured some parts of Karnatak without the so-called permission from the Mughal emperor. The Mughals therefore charged Qutb Shah with the violation of the treaty.

A brief account of Karnatak affairs will show that the Mughals took a weak stand on this issue. Whereas Arangzeb wanted Karnatak to become a part of the imperial Deccan in order to increase his own power; Shahjahan seemed to have

(1) Adab II. 57b, 70b; Sarkar I, p.213.

(2) Karnatak lay in the eastern side of southern India. It included the area from the river Krishna to Tanjore, beyond the Kaveri.

been satisfied in allowing Qutb Shah and Adil Shah to retain the conquered area if they shared the booty with him. But on the other hand, ^{the} zamindar of Karnatak proposed to pay a peshkesh of fifty lakhs of huns in cash, two hundred elephants and agreed to become an annual tributary of the emperor, if the latter helped him against Bijapur and Golconda. It was a good opportunity to strengthen his political power. He strongly recommended the request of (1) the zamindar but Shahjahan remained firm in his decision.

What prevented the Mughal emperor from annexing a territory, the ruler of which was ready to become his vassal? If we read *between* the lines, we come to the conclusion that the agents of Golconda and Bijapur influenced the emperor not to accept the appeal of the zamindar of Karnatak and assured him of a large share of the booty. In their attempt, they naturally would have used the influence of Dara, who was bitterly opposed to such an annexation to the Mughal province of the Deccan, which was under the command of Aurangzeb. It was only when the rulers of the Deccan states failed in sending the proposed booty that the emperor charged them with the violation of the treaty of 1636 A.D.

The other cause, which led to the eventual attack on Golconda was the affair of Mir Muhammad Sa'ed known as Mir

(1) Adab ff.43-45.

Jumla. He was a sayyid of Ardistan (Persia) and a diamond merchant. He came to the Deccan in 1630 A.D. and made a good name for his administrative qualities. Qutb Shah appointed him as his wazir. He was sent to Karnatak, a large portion of which he conquered in a short time. The occupied area was three hundred miles long and twenty five miles wide and was given to Mir Jumla in his jagir. The Qutb Shahi Karnatak yielded a revenue of forty lakhs rupees annually and had many diamond and gold mines. Mir Jumla's position was like a small king as he had a cavalry of five thousand of his own besides an additional force of four thousand Qutb Shahi horsemen at his service. His infantry numbered twenty thousand and had a large train of artillery and war elephants.⁽¹⁾

The strained relations between Mir Jumla and Qutb Shah provided an opportunity for the Mughals to win over the Mir. Qutb Shah became jealous of Mir Jumla's growing power and attempted unsuccessfully to imprison him. When Aurangzeb came to know of the situation, he informed his father and also instructed his agent (Hajib) Abdul Latif to assure Mir Jumla of better chances if he joined the imperial service.

(1) A.S.III. p.213; Waris f.500a; Bernier pp.116-17; English factories, X, pp.62-63.

Both Shahjahan and Aurangzeb were anxious to win over Mir Jumla. Shahjahan's sons had failed in recapturing Qandahar from the Persians. Mir Jumla had a brilliant military career, and the emperor therefore wanted to employ the Mir for his fourth proposed expedition, to retrieve the imperial prestige. (1) While Aurangzeb wanted to gain the confidence of Mir Jumla in order to use the latter's army and other sources both against Qutb Shah and Dara whenever the chance arose. On the earnest request of Aurangzeb, Shahjahan assured Mir Jumla of royal favours and instructed Aurangzeb to escort the Mir with an imperial contingent to Burhanpur. On the receipt of the imperial farman, Aurangzeb immediately sent a letter to Muhammad Amin, the son of Mir Jumla and also despatched Muhammad Momin to inform the Mir of the emperor's intentions. (2)

While these secret missions were going on between the Mughals and Mir Jumla, an incident, which transformed the situation occurred at Golconda. It was the imprisonment of Muhammad Amin and his mother by Qutb Shah.

The cause of imprisonment of Muhammad Amin has been wrongly interpreted both by Sarkar and Saksena. As this incident ultimately became the leading cause of the Mughal invasion on Golconda, it has been discussed at length.

(1) Adab f.138; English Factories, X.p.73; Bernier pp.22,23; Manucci, pp.237-38.

(2) Waris f.500b; Adab ff.88b,90a.

In the light of contemporary evidence, I have come to the conclusion that Muhammad Amin was imprisoned by Qutb Shah, when the latter came to know of Mir Jumla's secret correspondence with the Mughals. Sarkar and Saksena have attributed Muhammad Amin's arrest to his bad behaviour towards Qutb Shah. (1) Whereas Saksena does not quote any authority in support of his statement, Sarkar has chiefly based ^{his argument} on Ma'asir ul-Umara. According to Sarkar, "Muhammad Amin one day came to the court, reeling with drunkenness, fell asleep on the king's own carpet and soiled it in crop sickness. The long suffering king could not bear this crowning act of insult. His anger boiled over, and he threw Muhammad Amin and his family into prison and attached their property (21st November, 1655 A.D.)." (2)

Ma'asir-ul-Umara is not a contemporary chronicle but was completed in 1194 A.H/1780 A.D. while the incident took place in 1655 A.D. Moreover the abstract mentioned by Sarkar from Ma'asir ul-Umara, has not been quoted completely. If we read the full context, the statement of Sarkar^s proved to be wrong:

"They (i.e. the hostile party of Mir Jumla) turned Qutb Shah against Mir Jumla. Qutb Shah also adopted a different attitude towards his son Muhammad Amin, who was attached to the court. The reason of this antagonism was the uncivilized behaviour of Muhammad Amin. Due to his youth, wealth and the victories which his father had

(1) Saksena p.181; Sarkar I.p.226.

(2) Sarkar, I.p.226.

attained, Muhammad Amin became proud and crossed the limits of etiquette. So much so that one day he came to the court when he was drunk and slept on the royal carpet and vomitted on it. Mir Jumla who expected high favours from Qutb Shah on account of his splendid victory (i.e. conquest of Karnatak) became disappointed due to the indifference of Qutb Shah. In the 29th regnal year (of Shahjahan's reign), Mir Jumla sought help from Aurangzeb, who was then ~~the~~ governor of the Deccan. On the request of the prince, the emperor sent a letter to Qutb Shah through Muhammad Arif Kashmiri. In that letter, the emperor announced grant of mansabs of "panj-hazari (5,000) and 'do-hazari (2,000) to Mir Jumla and Muhammad Amin respectively. He ordered Qutb Shah not to interfere with them and their relations. As soon as Qutb Shah heard that news, he imprisoned Muhammad Amin together with his family members and seized their property."⁽¹⁾

Tavernier and Adab-i-Ālamgiri, the other two sources, which have been mentioned by Sarkar, don't give the same cause. as pointed out by him. According to Tavernier, the courtiers of Qutb Shah designed three or four times to ruin Mir Jumla but could not succeed. Muhammad Amin came to know of the plot against his father and informed him. Mir Jumla replied^{to} his son who then went to Qutb Shah. Muhammad Amin spoke boldly,

(1) Ma'asir ul-Umara III, pp. 531-32 .

reminding Qutb Shah of the services which his father did for him. The king became furious at the discourse of Muhammad Amin and imprisoned him together with his mother and sisters. (1)

It has been recorded in Adab-i-'Alamgiri that Aurangzeb informed his father that Qutb Shah imprisoned Muhammad Amin when he came to know of the royal favours to the Mir. The same cause has been mentioned in the Adab, when Aurangzeb informed AllahWardi Khan of the imprisonment of Muhammad Amin. (2)

Apart from the contemporary court chronicles such as Tawarikh-i-Shahjahani, Padshah Namah by Waris, 'Amal-i-Salih, the Deccani chronicle i.e. Hadiqat-ul-'Alam and the accounts of Bernier and Mannuci, are of the opinion that when Qutb Shah came to know of the grant of imperial mansabs to Mir Jumla and Muhammad Amin, he arrested the latter (i.e. Muhammad Amin). (3)

At the persistent request of Aurangzeb, Shahjahan wrote two letters on 14 Safar 1066 A.H./3rd December 1655 A.D. -- one to Qutb Shah and the second to the prince. To Qutb Shah, Shahjahan wrote that because Mir Jumla and Muhammad Amin had been granted mansabs of 5000 and 2000 respectively, so he should free Muhammad Amin. The emperor warned Qutb Shah that if he failed to obey his orders, his state would be

(1) Tavernier I.p.67.

(2) Adab ff. 57b, 163b, 164.

(3) A.S.III. pp.213, 221-22; T.S. f.187b; Waris f.508a; Hadiqat-ul-'Alam f.259; Bernier pp.18, 19; Manucci pp.231, 234.

ruined. While Aurangzeb was ordered to send his son Muhammad Sultan to Qandahar from where a note should be sent to Qutb Shah to release the captives. The army sent against Jatiga, the ruler of Chanda, was also ordered by the emperor to reinforce Muhammad Sultan. (1)

The letters of Shahjahan reached Daulatabad on 18th December. Aurangzeb despatched the imperial envoy immediately to Golconda along with his own note. Then he made preparations of war in case Qutb Shah did not obey the imperial farman. Hadidad Khan who had gone to fetch booty from DeNgarh, was ordered to reach Qandahar while Muhammad Sultan was instructed to proceed to Nander. (2)

Apprehending Dara's interference in favour of Qutb Shah, Aurangzeb hinted to his father that he should stand out against such interference. He further said that his mind was perturbed lest the cunning Deccanis might spoil the opportunity by offering costly gifts and that he may be asked to return after entering enemy country. He requested that the emperor therefore should pay no heed to the enemy's appeal. In the end, Aurangzeb informed his father that according to the imperial orders, he would encamp on 11th January 1656 A.D. (3)

(1) Adab ff. 57, 58a; A.S. III, p. 213.

(2) Waris f. 508a; Adab f. 58.

(3) Adab, ff. 59a, 63b.

The negligence of Qutb Shah in obeying the emperor's letter dated 3rd December and Aurangzeb's two notes provided an opportunity for the Mughals to ruin his state. Qutb Shah either underrated the impending danger or relied on the help of his allies, i.e. Adil Shah and Dara. The disobedience of Qutb Shah was reported to Shahjahan, who wrote another letter to him on 14th D1/24th December 1655 A.D. to release Muhammad Amin and send him to the imperial court with all his father's property. The emperor also wrote a letter to Aurangzeb on 29th December to the effect that he had written a second letter to Qutb Shah to release Muhammad Amin and hoped that his orders would be carried out. However in case Qutb Shah did not release ~~the~~ Muhammad Amin, Aurangzeb was ordered to march to Golconda to help the captives. (1)

To make the campaign successful, Shahjahan ordered Sha'ista Khan, governor of Malwa and other mansabdars such as Iftikhar Khan, Naseer Khan, Prithi Raj Rathore to reinforce Aurangzeb. The zamindar of Chanda was also instructed to join the invading army. (2)

Why was Aurangzeb receiving such encouraging letters from Shahjahan, when Dara and his party was present at the court to countermine his moves? The answer is that Sa'ad-ullah Khan had prevailed over the emperor and succeeded in getting the farmans issued in favour of his ally, i.e.

(1) WARIS f. 508^a; A.S.M. P.222; Adab f. 58, 59a.
 (2) T.S. f. 188a; A.S. 111, p. 222; Adab, f. 127a, Waris f. 508a.
 (2) Adab, ff. 122b, 123.

Aurangzeb. The fact is proved by a letter of Aurangzeb to Sa'adullah. The prince thanked the wazir for having issued the orders, which he *had long awaited.*

The cooperation between the allies is further illustrated, when Aurangzeb kept Sa'adullah informed of the progress of the campaign through his letters. (1)

Shahjahan's letters reached Aurangzeb on 7th January 1656 A.D. Aurangzeb was ordered that if Qutb Shah refused to obey the second letter of the emperor, he should advance to Golconda to release the captives. But it appears that Aurangzeb managed the despatch of a letter to Qutb Shah in the most diplomatic way in order to carry out a design of his own. By the letter, which he wrote to his father it appears that he sent the letter to Qutb Shah just before the return of Muhammad Mirak (who brought Shahjahan's letters to Aurangzeb) to Agra. The imperial courier was detained two or three days by Aurangzeb on the plea of giving him rest as he had come from Agra post haste. (2) Aurangzeb's aim in doing all this, was that the imperial messenger could inform the emperor that the prince had sent the imperial letter to Qutb Shah in his presence and the Mughals had not entered the Golconda territory by then.

(1) Adab, ff.122b, 123.

(2) Adab, 60a.

As soon as Muhammad Mirak left Aurangzeb's camp on 10th January 1656 A.D., Muhammad Sultan entered the enemy's country. The result was that the imperial letter was still on the way, when the Mughals had already penetrated far into Golconda territory. Waris also states that "due to his bad luck, Qutb Shah received the emperor's letter, when Muhammad Sultan had entered his state." (1) In the light of these facts, it is hard to believe the statement of Faruki that Aurangzeb ordered Muhammad Sultan to advance to Golconda when Qutb Shah had received both the letters of Shahjahan (i.e. dated 3rd December and 24th December respectively). (2)

The obstinacy of Qutb Shah in detaining Muhammad Amin and his mother brought ruin to his state. The Mughals entered Qutb Shahi territory on 10th January 1656 A.D., but it was not until 21st January, when Muhammad Sultan reached twenty miles from Haiderabad that Qutb Shah released the captives and begged pardon. (3) But Muhammad Sultan refused to listen to Qutb Shah's appeal in the absence of his father and continued his advance. Another pretext, that encouraged their march was that Qutb Shah had not yet released the property of the captives and thus did not fulfil the imperial farman completely. (4) The emperor was informed that Muhammad Sultan reached Haiderabad and would encamp near the tank of Hussain Saghir until the

(1) Waris f.508b.

(2) Faruki p.285.

(3) Adab.f.62b;

Waris 508b;

T.S.f.188b;

A.S. III.pp.222-23.

(4) Waris f.508b.

(1)
 arrival of Mir Jumla. Qutb Shah became harrassed with the rapid advance of the imperialists. He fled to Golconda and shut himself in the fort. The defence of Haidarabad was left to six thousand cavalry and twelve thousand matchlockmen. **But** the Mughals occupied Haidarabad. (2)

The story told by 'Aqil Khan Razi and also mentioned in a later chronicle i.e. Hadiqat-ul-Alam, with regard to Muhammad Sultan's trap to arrest Qutb Shah, does not seem correct. According to them, Aurangzeb wrote a letter to Qutb Shah that his son, Muhammad Sultan was going to Bengal via Golconda and Orissa, to marry the daughter of prince Shuja. He therefore should provide him full facilities in his state. The plan was that when Qutb Shah would advance to receive Muhammad Sultan, the latter would arrest him. But in the nick of time, the plan was disclosed. (3)

The story seems to be invalid for two reasons. First, Qutb Shah had been informed both by the emperor and Aurangzeb of the purpose of Muhammad Sultan's march towards Golconda. Before his advance to Golconda, Muhammad Sultan himself had written a letter to Qutb Shah to release the prisoners otherwise damage would be caused on his state. (4) Second, Qutb Shah knew the motive of Muhammad Sultan's march and that is why he released

(1) Adab, 62b. (2) A.S.III, p.223; Adab ff.62b, 63a;

(4) (Adab, ff.83b, 84a) Majm'a ul-Alkbar f.518a; Ma'asir ul-Umara III. p.533.

(3) Waqiat-i-Alamgiri pp.13,15; Hadiqat-ul-Alam f.259b; Elphinstone also supports the view of 'Aqil Khan Razi (Elphinstone pp.574-75).

Muhammad Amin, while the Mughals were still twenty miles from the capital. Bernier has also given a similar story with regard to Aurangzeb's own march to arrest Qutb Shah by deception, ⁽¹⁾ but in the light of the historical facts, his statement is also incredible.

The most interesting of all such stories is a letter of Aurangzeb mentioned in Adab-i-Alamgiri and which needs a minute examination. The letter contains secret instructions

(1) Bernier, pp.19-22. The traveller says that Mir Jumla wrote a secret letter to Aurangzeb in which he proposed a plan to capture Qutb Shah. Mir Jumla *wrote* that if he confided in him, Aurangzeb could seize both the king and his state. Mir Jumla explained that Aurangzeb should proceed by forced marches with four or five thousand men who could reach ^{HAIDARABAD} within sixteen days, spreading a rumour that an ambassador of Shahjahan being escorted and going to Qutb Shah. The Dabir ul-Mulk ~~through~~ whose medium the communication is always made to the king is ~~his~~ relation -- 'my creature and entirely in my confidence'. He would manage in such a way that Aurangzeb can arrive at the gate of Bhagnagar without arousing any suspicion. When the king advances to receive his credentials, he should secure his person, then his family and dispose him off in the manner Aurangzeb may deem fit. Aurangzeb advanced accordingly and Qutb Shah went forward to welcome the 'imperial ambassador'. But in the nick of time, the secret was disclosed and the king fled to Golconda.

My objections are: how ^{could} Bernier ~~could~~ know the secret correspondence between Mir Jumla and Aurangzeb? Second, the events will show that Aurangzeb reached Haidarabad on 6th February 1656 A.D., while Qutb Shah had already fled to Golconda fort on 22nd January 1656 A.D. Therefore the story told by Bernier is incredible.

by Aurangzeb to his son to capture and behead Qutb Shah. He wrote, "Qutb ul-Mulk is a coward, careless and shameless. You should show some courage to capture such a person. Give orders to Muhammad Beg to besiege his palace, with a large *force of* artillery. while Hadidad Khan and Muhammad Tahir should be sent to block all access to Golconda so as Qutb ul-Mulk may not escape. You should then *send* Muhammad Beg with a chosen contingent to Qutb ul-Mulk with the message that 'I have been expecting that you would call me to stay with you as the hospitality demands. As you have not done so, therefore I have come to Golconda myself.' After delivering this message, attack him immediately and if you could manage cut his neck off his head. You should remember that to achieve this end, cleverness and dexterity are required. I hope (1) you will value the opportunity and would act accordingly."

Faruki has attributed this letter to the bitterness of Aurangzeb's feelings against Qutb Shah and suggests the text as wholly ironical. (2) Faruki's conclusion seems to be over-estimated because Aurangzeb's other letter to Mir Junla also shows that the prince wanted to finish Qutb Shah and to send him 'to the wilderness of destruction'. (3) Sarkar regards the letter as an act of treachery on the part of Aurangzeb. (4) To finish the enemy in war by any means

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- (1) Adab ff.219b, 220a.
 (2) Faruki p.289 (footnote).
 (3) Adab, f.99a.
 (4) Sarkar I. p.252 .

cannot be called treachery, but rather cleverness and diplomacy.

Though Qutb Shah had sent a letter of submission to Muhammad Sultan, yet he continued to check the progress of the imperialists. An army of five thousand Deccanis appeared but was defeated by the Mughals. (1) Qutb Shah then sent Hakim Nizam ud-Din with two boxes of diamonds, two elephants with silver trappings to Muhammad Sultan. The envoy was detained by the prince as a hostage for the release of Mir Junla's property. When Qutb Shah came to know of Muhammad Sultan's action, he released Mir Junla's property on 29th January. It included sixty horses, eleven elephants and other goods. But still Muhammad Sultan would not listen to the appeals of Qutb Shah in the absence of his father. (2)

The main cause of Aurangzeb's delay in marching towards Haidarabad has been ignored by modern writers. It was the effort of Aurangzeb in persuading Mir Junla to join him in his secret plan for the annexation of Golconda. There are many letters of Aurangzeb recorded in Adab-i-Alamgiri, which show that he requested the Mir to come as early as possible from Karnatak. The reason was that Aurangzeb

(1) Waris, f.508b.

(2) Waris, f509a.

had not big cannons and other suitable siege equipment with him to bombard a mighty fort like Golconda. He therefore wanted to employ Mir's artillery and army to capture the fort. When Aurangzeb was informed by Mir Jumla that he could not come for a year on account of the collection of his property and provisioning forts in Karnatak, he was very perplexed. He urged that the Mir should keep in mind the need for speed in carrying out the scheme and asked him to inform the date of his arrival at Haidarabad. When Haidarabad fell to the Mughals, Aurangzeb wrote to Mir to march quickly (1) because his ultimate aim was to capture Golconda.

The other reason for Aurangzeb's delay was that 'Adil Shah was gathering his troops to assist Qutb Shah. When Sultan Muhammad reached Nander on 7th January, Aurangzeb was informed by his agent at Bijapur that 'Adil Shah was mustering his troops to help Golconda. Aurangzeb immediately wrote a letter to 'Adil Shah, *that* his action would mean ~~the~~ violation of the treaty. (2) At the same time, Aurangzeb also informed ~~to~~ his father of 'Adil Shah's movements. He again wrote to 'Adil Shah, who did not *pay heed to* the Prince's warning. (3) Before his march to Haidarabad on 3rd Rabi ii 1067 A.H./20th January 1656 A.D., Aurangzeb informed Shahjahan for the second time that a Bijapur army, numbering more than 15,000, under Afzal Khan was stationed twenty miles from

(1) *Adab* ff.99a. (2) *Adab* ff.60b, 190b, 191.
 (3) *Adab* ff.59b, 62.

(1)
Haidarabad.

The siege of Golconda began on 7th February 1656 A.D. after the arrival of Aurangzeb at Haidarabad on the previous day, i.e. 6th Feb. He left Daulatabad on 3rd Rabi ii/20th January and had come by forced march of
(2)

seventeen days. After making a reconnaissance of the fort he ordered batteries to be erected. A Golconda force of seventeen thousand appeared on the first day of the
(3) siege but was defeated by the Mughals. Many duels took place between the imperialists and the defenders, but the latter had to suffer defeat every time.⁽⁴⁾ The siege lasted from 7th February till 30th March.

There are various reasons that why Aurangzeb could not capture the fort, when he himself was conducting the operation. First, the Mughals could not bring heavy guns due to their rapid march. Though Aurangzeb after his arrival at Golconda, ordered ~~to~~ these guns to be brought from Ausa and Udgir, yet they did not arrive in time.⁽⁵⁾ Second, the imperial reinforcements under Shaista Khan, Rai Singh, and the zamindar of Chenda arrived late. Third, Mir Jumla on whom Aurangzeb was counting too much arrived at the imperial camp on 12th Jamadi ii/20th March, i.e. when
(6) the siege was in its last stage.

(1) Adab f.63a. (2) A.S.III.p.225; Adab f.60b; Ma'asir ul-Umara III, p.532; Waris f.509a.

(3) A.S.III, p.225; T.S.f 189b; Waris 509a.

(4) Waris f.509b; A.S.III, pp.226-27; T.S. f.190a.

(5) Bernier, p.21; Sarkar I.p.234.

(6) T.S. f 192 a, waris f 511a

Both Qutb Shah and Aurangzeb were trying to checkmate each other in diplomacy. While they were fighting in the south, they were also seeking the help of their allies at the imperial court. At this particular period, the position of Aurangzeb grew weak as Sa'adullah then was on his death bed and could not attend to the affairs of state. But Aurangzeb was hopeful and urged Sa'adullah to recommend the emperor to annex Golconda. ⁽¹⁾ The policy of the Mughals towards the Deccan states at this period thus became a bauble tossed from one to another of the warring factions in the course of their intrigues and counter-manoevres. An attempt has been made to discuss this point at length.

Qutb Shah adopted two methods to outdo Aurangzeb, i.e. to mollify him by offering costly presents and sending secret message to Dara to influence the emperor. Mir Fasih was sent by Qutb on 22nd Rabi ii/ 8th February to Aurangzeb with four boxes of jewels, five gold trapped horses and other valuables and begged forgiveness. Qutb Shah further told Aurangzeb that he was sending his mother to him to seek peace terms. But Aurangzeb declined the offer. Again we find that when the imperial reinforcements arrived, Qutb Shah became more discouraged. He then sent his son-in-law, Mir Ahmad to Muhammad Sultan and offered costly gifts. This attempt of Qutb Shah was equally rejected by Aurangzeb. ⁽²⁾

(1) A.S.111. p.226; T.S. f.189; ~~Ma'asir~~ Ma'asir ul-Umara. III. p.534.

(2) T.S. f.190a; A.S.111, p.227; Waris, f.509b.

While these offerings were made to Aurangzeb, Qutb Shah sent secret missions to Dara to persuade the emperor to raise the siege. The letter of Dara to 'Abdullah Qutb Shah will further reveal this fact. Dara acknowledged three letters of Qutb Shah written to the emperor, his sister (i.e. Jahanara) and one to him. Dara said that Qutb Shah's agent, Mulla Samad had had an audience with the emperor. In order to make Qutb Shah believe in his exertion in persuading the emperor, Dara wrote, "Mulla 'Abdul Samad will testify to the excessive and unflinching solicitude that I entertain for you; the fellow-feeling that I cherish for you will be further manifested when the Mughal forces will give up the siege of Golconda. Had you informed me of the course of events earlier, the matter would not have (I am
(1)
sure) taken so serious a turn.

Wealth and the religious bigotry were the two chief pretexts with which Aurangzeb exploited the feelings of

(1) J.B.O.R.S. 1940 part IV, p.295; *Morasilat-i-Qutb Shahi* ff.9b - 11: Qutb Shah acknowledged Ahmad Beg, the envoy of Dara. Qutb Shah wrote to Dara that he (Qutb Shah) hoped that Dara and Jahanara would have received the gifts sent from Golconda. Qutb Shah further stated that he was hopeful that his request through Dara would influence the emperor.

his father. The emperor had ordered ~~him to~~ march to Golconda simply to release Muhammad Amin and did not ~~give him~~ *give him permission* to capture the state. Now when Muhammad Amin was set free and the property of Mir Jumla was released, should Aurangzeb go back without achieving his aim, which could be attained easily? In order to arouse his father's desire for territorial expansion, Aurangzeb wrote him a letter. He stated that since he entered Golconda territory, he was surprised to see the fertile land, abundance of water, the air and the cultivation, which are beyond expression..... Not a single piece of land was without tillage. Such a revenue yielding country, which was better than any other part in the Mughal kingdom had fallen into the hands of such an ⁽¹⁾ *ingrate.*

Aurangzeb knew the religious sentiments of his father. In spite of the fact that Qutb Shah had promised in 1636 A.D. to practice Shari'a, he did not keep his promise. It was an opportunity for Aurangzeb to appeal to the sentiments of Shahjahan. He stated, "Qutb ul Mulk is a great oppressor. He does not practice Shari'a and has restarted innovations in Islam. He reproaches the companions of Prophet -- an act which is not less than heresy and infidelity It is therefore necessary for the king of Islam and a powerful ruler like him that such a ruler (i.e. Qutb Shah) should be punished to promulgate the Shari'a and save people from

(1) Adab ff. 59, 63b.

his oppression. Though many imperial favours have been bestowed upon him, yet he is ungrateful. He is inclined towards the Shah of Iran and is a staunch ally of him.

..... By the forces of Mir Jumla and the Mughals, Qutb *ul-Mulk* would be caught in between. He hopes that the emperor would order his destruction and the annexation of his state to gain reward both in this and the life hereafter."⁽¹⁾

Aurangzeb hinted that the emperor should not listen to Dara or Qutb Shah's appeal. He assured him that the campaign *would* be successfully finished and hence would cause happiness to the well-wishers of the Mughal empire and sorrow for the opponents. At another place he wrote, "Qutb ul Mulk has sent 'Abdus Samad to beg pardon. The emperor should not listen to his appeals but instead wait till the arrival of Mir Jumla at the imperial court. He should not allow anyone to interfere with the incident, which has arisen just by good luck for the benefit of the Mughal empire."⁽²⁾

It is now clear how the hostile parties manoeuvred to achieve their end. Should Aurangzeb forgive Qutb Shah who had joined hands with Dara? Qutb Shah had violated the treaty of 1636 A.D. He practised Shi'ism and

(1) Adab ff.63,64; The Life of Mir Jumla pp.75,76. Relations of Golconda in the seventeenth century, series II, Vol.LXVI p.9. says that in Golconda a Christian was more respected and protected than a Sunni Muslim.

(2) Adab, f.64.

maintained his relations with Iran secretly even after 1636 A.D. The letters recorded in Munshat-i-Tahir Wahid and Marasilat-i-Qutb Shah would show that Qutb Shah continued acknowledging the Shah of Iran and begged his help against the Mughals. (1)

(2)
The serious illness of Sa'adullah and the costly gifts offered by the agents of Golconda to the emperor brought an end to the siege. The wazir on whom Aurangzeb chiefly depended was suffering from his fatal illness. Dara's party took advantage of Sa'adullah's absence from the court and persuaded Shahjahan to finish the campaign. The emperor agreed to the proposal of Aurangzeb's opponents and sent a letter of pardon to Qutb Shah on 24th February, but ~~he~~ ^{Aurangzeb} withheld it for few days to make the best of the peace terms, which were being settled at that time. Shahjahan also approved Aurangzeb's device for extortion. The siege ended on 14th Jamadi ii 1067 A.H./30th March 1656 A.D. (3)

The following terms were settled between the parties.

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- (1) Munshat-i-Tahir Wahid ff.39-41a. Marasilat-i-Qutb Shahi ff.141b - 144a; I.H.C. 1941. pp.60-68; The Relations ~~between~~ the Mughals ~~and~~ the Safawid Shahs of Iran: pp.201-02; In 1639 A.D., Qutb Shah's aunt and some other ladies arrived at Qazwin and were granted an audience by Shah of Iran. In 1641 A.D., Hakim ul-Mulk, an envoy from Qutb Shah arrived in Persia along with the retiring Persian ambassador, Imam Quli Beg. In 1650 A.D., a Persian envoy came to Golconda on an English boat.
- (2) Adab f.107b.
- (3) Bernier p.21; Manucci p.235; Adab ff.58b, 59, 63, 64; Waris f.510; Marasilat-i-Qutb Shahi ff.8,9a.

'Abdullah Quth Shah agreed to:-

- (i) pay one krur of rupees as war indemnity. The amount would be paid half in kind and half in cash.
- (ii) pay the arrears of the annual peshkesh.
- (iii) give his second daughter in marriage to prince Muhammad Sultan.
- (iv) cede the district of Ramgir. (1)
- (v) the succession of Muhammad Sultan to the throne of Golconda after his death. (2)

The last stipulation of the treaty was kept secret by Aurangzeb and was not shown to the emperor. Some time later, when Shahjahan came to know of the truth, he charged Aurangzeb with lack of confidence, and the stipulation was excluded from the treaty. (3)

Qutb Shah swore on the Qu'ran in the presence of Muhammad Tahir and Shaikh Nizam ud-Din, the imperial envoys to remain loyal to the emperor and respect the 'Ahdnamah' i.e. treaty. (4) Aurangzeb sent a khil'at and letter of forgiveness of Shahjahan to Qutb Shah. Muhammad Sultan was married on 18th Jamadi'ii/14th April by proxy to the Golconda princess. At the request of the mother of Qutb Shah and the ladies of his own harem, Aurangzeb remitted Rs. ten lakhs out of the

(1) Waris f.511a; A.S.111, pp.227-28; Ma'asir ul-Umara p.534; T.S. f.191; Waqiat-i-Alamgiri p.15; Adab ff.71,72, 127b, 224a, 139a.

(2) English Factories X.p.65; Manucci p.235; Adab f.224a.

(3) Adab, f.224a. (4) Ibid. ff.71b, 72a.

indemnity. Two months later, a further reduction of
 (1)
 Rs. twenty lakhs was made by the emperor.

The Golconda campaign resulted in heavy financial loss to Aurangzeb. Before the commencement of the campaign, it was decided between Shahjahan and Aurangzeb that the former should have all the jewels and elephants while the latter will keep the cash out of the booty. Apprehending success, Aurangzeb borrowed twenty lakhs of rupees to manage the campaign and his soldiers pay was six months in arrear. But an exaggerated account of Golconda's agent that Aurangzeb and his son had received costly gifts from Qutb Shah and not mentioned in the report, turned Shahjahan against his son. Aurangzeb pleaded that those gifts were small and not worth mentioning. He further said that all the booty was shown to Khan Jahan and Mir Jumla, but Shahjahan was not satisfied. Aurangzeb then turned towards Mir Jumla and asked him to plead his case to the emperor. He said to Mir, "if nothing was gained out of the business, he should not lose anything at least." But Shahjahan remained firm in his decision and Aurangzeb had to deposit all the cash in
 (2)
 the imperial treasury of Daulatabad.

(1) Waris f.512b; A.S.III. p.229; J.B.O.R.S.1940; pp.273-74.
 (2) Adab ff.103, 104, 222b, 225a; 140a.

By the death of Sa'adullah Khan on 22nd Jamadi ii. (1)
 1067 A.H/7th April 1656 A.D. Aurangzeb lost his greatest supporter at the imperial court. He wished to fill the vacuum by Mir Jumla. (2) During the stay of Mir Jumla in the imperial Deccan (i.e. till 7th July when he left for Agra) Aurangzeb tried his best to gain his confidence and wished him to succeed Sa'adullah. Aurangzeb called Mir Jumla as 'babaji' (father) (3) and told him that he regarded him as his protector and guardian because his own father unjustly favoured Dara. (4) Aurangzeb wrote highly of him both to Shahjahan and Jahanara enumerating the administration abilities. When Mir Jumla ^{became} wazir of Shahjahan, Aurangzeb sent him letter of congratulations (5) and reminded him of his promises.

With the appointment of Mir Jumla as the wazir of the Mughal empire, the court intrigues regarding the Deccan states increased. Shahjahan was waiting for Mir Jumla to send him to Qandahar to lead the Mughal army. But Mir Jumla on his arrival presented a different scheme to the emperor. He wanted to ruin both Golconda and Bijapur to appease his anger against them. After offering jewels and valuables, Mir Jumla dilated on the benefits, which

(1) Waris f.523b; Majm'a ul-Akhbar f.517b.

(2) Adab ff.107b, 139b, 140a. Aurangzeb's letters to Mahabat Khan and Shah Namaz Khan to whom he wrote that he wanted Mir Jumla to succeed Sa'adullah Khan.

(3) Bernier pp.28,29.

(4) Adab, f.102; Bernier p.30 says that Mir Jumla vowed ardently for his indissoluble friendship for Aurangzeb.

(5) Adab.ff.100-101.

would accrue from the conquest of Golconda, whose precious stones were surely more deserving of the emperor's consideration than the rocks of Qandahar. He assured the emperor that he could easily extend the imperial border to Cape Cumari. (1) Letters of Aurangzeb to Shah Nawaz Khan and Mahabat Khan also indicate that Shahjahan, who was contemplating sending an army to Qandahar, changed his mind after the arrival of Mir Jumla at the imperial court. (2) Thus Mir Jumla succeeded in his aim of persuading the emperor to the conquest of the Deccan states.

Karnatak Affairs.

Peace had been made with Golconda but the Karnatak dispute remained unsettled. It caused trouble to the Mughals during the remaining years of Shahjahan's reign. Karnatak was conquered by Mir Jumla, the then wazir of Qutb Shah, who was its legal master. Qutb Shah gave Karnatak to Mir Jumla as his jagir. But Mir Jumla was bent upon retaining it even after his desertion to the Mughals. Aurangzeb was also interested in the Karnatak for which he had two motives. First, the retention of Karnatak under Mir Jumla would mean the supervision of a 'rich territory equal in wealth to the

(1) Bernier pp.22,23; Manucci, p.237; Hadiqat-ul-'Alam f.261a; Waqiat-i-Alamgiri p.16; English Factories X.p.73
p.73.

(2) Adab, ff.138a, 148a.

kingdom of Golconda', under him, being the governor of the Deccan. In other words the annexation of Karnatak by the emperor would strengthen his own position in the south. Second, Mir Jumla in his own selfish interest would have to depend on Aurangzeb for the administration of his jagir. This would mean cordial relations between Aurangzeb and Mir Jumla. Qutb Shah sought the help of Dara and offered fifteen lakhs of rupees as an additional annual tribute to the emperor if Karnatak could be given to him. Aurangzeb wrote to his father to postpone the decision till the arrival of Mir Jumla at the imperial court. Mir Jumla offered costly gifts to the emperor and won the case in his favour. (1)

The decision of Shahjahan to merge the Karnatak into the Mughal empire was unjust. Qutb Shah had given it in jagir to Mir Jumla, who afterwards had deserted his master. Bestowing of jagirs on their subordinates depended entirely on the good-will of the rulers. Only they had the legal right to give or confiscate the jagirs. The case of Mir Jumla is the only specimen, when the Mughals had ever demanded jagirs from the rulers, whose employees had left them and joined the imperial service. The reason, which encouraged Shahjahan to annex Karnatak was the political weakness of Qutb Shah, to whom he could dictate his requirements easily.

The continued efforts of Qutb Shah to trouble the imperial officers in the administration of the Karnatak,

(1) Adab f.63; Manucci pp.237-38; Hadiqat ul-Alam f.261a.

provided an opportunity for the Mughals to prepare another campaign against Golconda. Aurangzeb sent a Mughal contingent under Shah Beg Khan and Muhammad Hashim to Karnatak. But the Golconda army under 'Abdul Jabbar tried to expel the Mughals from the Karnatak. Qutb Shahi attempted to capture Gaman but were defeated. ⁽¹⁾ Adil Shah also took the opportunity and seized some parts of the imperial Karnatak and other local chiefs to regain their territory. Aurangzeb sent many warnings to Qutb Shah but they did not affect him. ⁽²⁾ In October 1656 A.D., ^{the} Golconda army seized an area of eighty miles. Mir Jumla, perturbed, wrote a letter to Aurangzeb, who turned the enemy out of the occupied area. ⁽³⁾ Aurangzeb was helpless to take an active measure against Qutb Shah without the permission of the emperor. Once he presented his weak position to Shahjahan stating that he had written many letters to Qutb Shah to desist from aggression, but hearing of His Majesty's lack of favour to him, he paid no attention to his letters. ⁽⁴⁾

Whereas Sa'adullah Khan was responsible for the commencement of the Golconda campaign, the operations in the Deccan after August 1656 A.D., were started by Mir Jumla. Aurangzeb urged Mir Jumla to persuade the emperor to sanction another war against Qutb Shah. The letters recorded in Adab-i-Alamgiri will show the efforts of Aurangzeb and Mir Jumla in achieving their aim.

(1) Adab ff.106b, 107a; 225b, 226a. (2) Ibid. ff.224b, 225a.
 (3) Adab. ff.225-226, 189b, 190a; The Life of Mir Jumla, p.96.
 (4) Adab, f.106a.

When the Golconda army penetrated eighty miles into imperial Karnatak, Aurangzeb wrote to Mir Jumla that the activities of the enemy were increasing and he should induce the emperor to allow him to send an army against the Golconda commander 'Abdul Jabbar. He further stated, "what we have lost against the Deccanis should be now regained."⁽¹⁾ When Mir Jumla replied to him that he was trying his best, Aurangzeb urged the Mir "to increase his efforts lest it becomes too late".⁽²⁾ Mir Jumla acted tactfully and convinced the emperor to make another war against Qutb Shah. Aurangzeb acknowledged Mir Jumla's efforts in his letter to Shah Namaz Khan. Aurangzeb wrote that Mir Jumla had obtained the permission of the emperor to send an army against Qutb Shah and had proved himself as his true friend.⁽³⁾ Aurangzeb had suffered during the last siege of Golconda from a lack of heavy artillery and did not want to repeat the same mistake. He therefore asked Mir Jumla to obtain permission from the emperor to use his artillery (which was still in the Deccan) in the coming war.⁽⁴⁾ From these facts, it is clear that Mir Jumla had managed another war against Golconda. But the death of 'Adil Shah on 4th Nov. 1656 A.D. diverted ^{the} Mughal's attention from Golconda to Bijapur.

(1) Adab ff. 225b, -227a.

(2) Ibid. f. 106.

(3) Ibid. f. 141a.

(4) Ibid. ff. 108, 109.

CHAPTER III.BIJAPUR

Akbar's preoccupations in the north and Jahangir's inefficiency gave a chance to 'Adil Shah to continue his hostilities against the Mughals. It was Shahjahan, who reduced Bijapur to a tributary state of the Mughals. As is clear from the previous chapter, ~~the~~ Shahjahan was busy with the Nizam Shahis from the beginning of his reign. Moreover, Bijapur was the most powerful Deccan state with which Shahjahan had to deal. He therefore had to adopt a conciliatory policy towards that state before he could attempt to measure his sword with 'Adil Shah. It was only after the submission of Fath Khan in 1632 A.D., that the Mughals were able to take an active initiative against the 'Adil Shahis.

We have now to examine the course of events during the years 1628 - 1632 A.D., when the Bijapuris took full advantage of the Mughals' ^{pre-}occupation with the Nizam Shahis. The 'Adil Shahis helped the Nizam Shahis secretly despite repeated Mughal warnings and tried to entrap the Mughals to defeat them. By mentioning such details, it is to show that the 'Adil Shahis were themselves responsible for drawing the Mughals into their country. They withheld peshkesh and incited the emperor by their treacherous and aggressive designs.

In 1630 A.D., it was decided that if the 'Adil Shahis helped the Mughals against the Nizam Shahis, they would get five Nizam Shahi forts in return. But the 'Adil Shahis changed their mind. They preferred to help the Nizam Shahis secretly so as to keep them as a shield against the Mughals for the safety of their own state i.e. Bijapur. When Dharwar was captured by the Mughals, Radnola Khan, the Bijapuri commander asked 'Azam Khan to hand over the fort to him as it was one of the five forts promised by the emperor to 'Adil Shah. 'Azam Khan rejected the request. He pleaded that the 'Adil Shahis had not kept their promise and the fort was captured entirely by the efforts of the Mughals. However, he promised that if in future the Bijapuris cooperated with the Mughals, he would recommend their request to the emperor. In order to test their fidelity, 'Azam Khan asked Randola Khan to encamp at Mandowah and to capture the Nizam Shahis if they fled to the Ghats. ⁽¹⁾

The treachery of the 'Adil Shahis is further illustrated by the fact that when the Nizam Shahis were pursued by the Mughals, 'Azam Khan asked Randola Khan to block their way to Balaghat. But Randola Khan evaded the request on the ground that he had not sufficient army with them to oppose the Nizam Shahis. He further stated that he would go to

(1) Lahauri II pp.345-46; T.S. ff.32b, 33a.

Nalderk and inform ~~the~~ 'Adil Shah about the situation and wait for his orders. The Bijapuri commander simply bided his time as terms for mutual help were being settled between the 'Adil Shahis and the Nizam Shahis at that time. The Nizam Shahis offered Sholapur to the 'Adil Shahis, who (1) promised to assist them actively.

In April 1631 A.D., the Bijapuris planned to defeat the Mughals by deception but failed. The plan was that they would pretend friendship to the Mughals and then to take them off their guard and attack suddenly. Randola Khan begged 'Azam Khan insincerely that if his master be pardoned, the Bijapuri would remain faithful to the Mughal emperor and that Shaikh Mu'een ud Din, the imperial envoy, who had been detained at Bidar, would be allowed to proceed. 'Azam Khan moved to Jitakobah, a place nearer to Bhalki, where the Bijapuris were encamped so as to be able to punish Randola Khan easily, should he turn traitor. According to his plan, Randola Khan advanced with six thousand soldiers and attacked the Mughals so severely that the latter suffered a heavy loss. The imperial officers such as Shahbaz Khan and his son were killed and many became captives at the hands of the Bijapuris. When 'Azam Khan came to know of Randola Khan's design, he attacked

(1) P.S. f.213a; T.S. ff.33b, 34a; Lahauri II pp.355-56; 358.

the Bijapuris fiercely and forced them to flee. The Mughals then retired to their own border but were pursued closely by 14,000 Bijapuris, who caused a great loss to them.⁽¹⁾

With the submission of Fath Khan in February 1632 A.D., the Mughals were able to punish the 'Adil Shahis for their treachery. Shahjahan deputed Asaf Khan to lead a large army against Bijapur. The army numbered more than 30,000 and included experienced soldiers like 'Azam Khan, Shaista Khan, Sayyid Khan Jahan and Raja Gaj Singh. The imperial army in Telingana was also ordered to reinforce Asaf Khan. The imperial commander was asked first to frighten 'Adil Shah to pay peshkesh and surrender Parinda: otherwise to capture Bijapur. The army left on 19th March 1632 A.D.⁽²⁾

The appointment of Asaf Khan in 1632 A.D., against ~~the~~ Bijapur, marks the first active phase of Shahjahan's relations with the 'Adil Shahis. After a stay of two days at Nander, Asaf Khan advanced towards Bijapur. In order to obtain provisions, an advanced guard was sent to capture Bhalki, which fell after a short resistance. On his way to Bijapur, Asaf Khan met Rizq Ullah, the 'Adil Shahi envoy who presented letters of submission from 'Adil Shah and Khawas Khan and a small peshkesh. No attention was paid to those letters as they were regarded a mere trick of 'Adil Shah to check the imperial advance and also because the envoy was not amongst the nobles. The Mughals therefore continued their march.⁽³⁾ They invested Gulburga, but

(1) Lahauri Ii pp. 350-51

(3) Lahauri Ii pp. 411. T.S.f. 39a; P.S.f. 242b; ~~Parinda in Bijapur~~

(2) T.S.f. 39a; P.S.f. 239; Lahauri Ii pp. 405-06, 412.

failed to capture ^{it}. They advanced and besieged Bijapur. (1)

The Mughals had to suffer during the siege of Bijapur from the inefficiency of Asaf Khan, who failed to match the diplomacy of the enemy. The Bijapuris purposely lingered over the siege by sending false missions to Asaf Khan, in order to make him believe that they were ready to make peace. Their purpose was to prolong the siege and thus force the Mughals to retire through shortage of provisions. First came Shaikh Dabir, the envoy of Kh^{was} Khan, the wazir, and presented some proposals to settle the peshkesh. But he was sent back as he had no credentials. Mustafa Khan and Mulla Ahmad were the next to send word to Asaf Khan. They promised to let the Mughals enter through their batteries but did not keep their word. The Persian ambassador to Bijapur also intervened but the Mughals paid (2) no attention to him.

Distrustful of the past conduct of the Bijapuris, Asaf Khan insisted ^{on} the personal appearance of Mustafa Khan and Khairiyat Khan as token of their sincere desire to make peace. Mustafa Khan came out of the fort and was received by Nasiri Khan. It was agreed that 'Adil Shah would pay a peshkesh of four millions of rupees, half in

(1) Lahauri, Ii p.412; P.S. f.242b; T.S. f.39a.

(2) T.S. f.39b; P.S.f.243; Hadiqat ~~ul~~ Alam f.242b; Lahauri I. p.415.

cash and half in kind -- pearls, ornamented articles and elephants. On the return of Mustafa Khan to the fort, Asaf Khan sent his own envoy 'Abdur Rahim with him, so as to get the proposals confirmed by 'Adil Shah. 'Abdur Rahim was sent back after three days with the promise that the agreement duly signed would be sent the following day, to the Mughals. Next day when the Bijapuri envoys came to the imperial camp, they submitted new proposals, which were also accepted by Asaf Khan. Before their departure, one of the Bijapuris deserted to the Mughals. He left a note, which indicated that Khwas Khan was merely gaining time and was not sincere in his proposals at all. (1)

The catastrophic famine prevailing at that period, in the whole of the Deccan, Gujrat and Malwa checked the Mughal progress. (2) Moreover, the Bijapuris had devastated the neighbouring area, to make it impossible for the invading army to procure provisions. The result was that crops were procurable at a high price but fodder was not available at all. The animals became so feeble that they became unfit for employment during the siege. By sending their missions to the imperial camp, the Bijapuris succeeded in their secret motive. They wanted to avoid the Mughal attack as far as

(1) Lahauri, ii.p.417; T.S. f.40a; P.S. f.243b, 244a.

(2) T.S. ff.29-32a; Lahauri Iipp.362-64; P.S. ff.198, 280, 289,

possible and at the same time to know the true position in the Mughal camp. The imperialists had to go as far as thirty or forty miles to collect provisions and the Deccanis inflicted heavy losses on them. They thus forced Asaf Khan to raise the siege. The Bijapuri numbering more than fifteen thousand pursued the Mughals as far as Sholapur and caused losses.⁽¹⁾

The campaign thus remained unsuccessful due to the inability of Asaf Khan, who entered the heart of the enemy's country without making proper arrangements for the supply of provisions. Adil Shah remained unshaken in his determination and did not pay the peskesh demanded by the Mughal emperor. As explained in ^{the last} chapter ~~five~~, Shahjahan returned to the north, after appointing Mahabat Khan to the government of the Deccan.⁽²⁾

Mahabat Khan's recent success over the Nizam Shahis made him believe that he could defeat the Bijapuris easily. But he had underestimated the strength of the Bijapuris. The state of Bijapur was a stronger political power and had more resources at her disposal than the Nizam Shahis. However Mahabat Khan suggested to the emperor that the army under him was tired and if new troops could be sent under a prince, Parinda, a Bijapuri fort could easily be captured. Shahjahan seemed to be convinced, though wrongly, by the proposal of Mahabat Khan, partly due to his brilliant military career in the past and partly because he was the man on the spot.

(1) P.S.f.244; Lahauri Ii pp.416-17; T.S. f.41a.

(2) P.S.f.248a; Lahauri Ii p.424; T.S.f.41b.

Prince Shuja was promoted to the rank of 10,000 'zat and sawar' and appointed to lead the Deccan army. A large (1) sum was assigned to meet the expense of the campaign.

After the arrival of Shuja in the Deccan in September 1633 A.D., the Mughals advanced to Parinda. First, Mahabat Khan ensured his supplies of provisions by establishing Mughal posts at Zafarnagar, Jalnapur, Shah Gadh and Bir. Thus he guarded the communication line between Parinda and the imperial centres at Daulatabad and Burhanpur. Khan Zaman was sent in advance to check any possible reinforcement to Parinda. (2)

The unexpected large scale 'Adil Shahi reinforcements for the besieged and the activities of Sahu against the Mughals made the task difficult for Mahabat Khan. When 'Adil Shah heard the imperialists' advance to Parinda, he sent Kishnaji Watu, Randola Khan and Murari Pandit at the head of large armies to Parinda. (3) In order to lessen the Mughal pressure on Parinda, Sahu and Murari Pandit went to Ahmadnagar to devastate that area. (4) Mahabat Khan was therefore caught in between. Assisted by the artillery of the besieged, Randola Khan led an attack on the Mughal camp. Many indecisive duels took place between the defenders and the besiegers and both the parties had to suffer. (5)

The siege dragged on.

(1) P.S. ff.300b. 301a; Lahauri II p.537-38; T.S. 54b.
 (2) Lahauri Iiip.36; P.S. f.320; (3) Lahauri Iii pp.36-37;
 (4) Lahauri Iii.p.36. P.S. f.323.
 (5) A.SII. pp50-55

The shortage of provisions delayed the Mughal progress. Mahabat Khan no doubt had made every effort in the beginning to maintain the supply, but the imperial posts, which were responsible for guarding the communication line were badly affected by the Bijapuri attacks. The Mughals therefore had to go to distant places to procure food material. The Bijapuris exploited the Mughal's weakness and increased their attacks on foraging parties. (1) Once Sahu attacked Lahrasp with 10,000 Nizam Shahis. Mahabat Khan arrived in time and forced Sahu to retreat after a fierce battle. But soon Randola Khan and Murari Pandit came with their armies and attacked Mahabat Khan so severely that none of the imperial contingent could ^{help} the other. Though Mahabat Khan's life was in utter peril, yet he fought courageously. When Khan-i-Dauran came to know of the situation, he hastened with his army to the help of Mahabat Khan. The imperialists were encouraged and forced the Deccanis to retire. (2)

The Mughals dug mines but the besieged countermined them. After a great difficulty, however a mine under the trenches of Allah Wardi Khan was complete, unknown to the enemy. When it was ~~set~~ on fire, it caused a breach so small that the Mughals could not enter the fort. The invaders became discouraged and slackened their exertions. (3)

(1) Lahauri I ii pp.40-42; (2) P.S. f.324; Lahauri I ii. pp.37-39.

(3) Lahauri Iiip.45; P.S.f.324.

The rivalry between Mahabat Khan and Khan-i-Dauran caused a further check to the imperial progress. Since Khan-i-Dauran had saved the life of Mahabat Khan, at the hands of the Deccanis, he repeatedly boasted of his valour and underrated him (i.e. Mahabat Khan). Mahabat Khan, who already had been antagonised by the failure of the siege, became more furious by the attitude of Khan-i-Dauran and treated his subordinates harshly. The result was that the imperial camp divided into two groups, each trying to obstruct the plan of the other. The Bijapuris took the advantage of the dissensions among the Mughals and caused heavy losses. Rainy season was fast approaching and Mughal position could be worsened. Under these adverse circumstances, Mahabat Khan preferred to retire to Burhanpur. The siege was raised on 8th May 1633 after seven months.

Failure of Mahabat Khan to capture Parinda was another set-back to the Mughal prestige. Mahabat Khan was strongly censured by Shahjahan for his inefficiency. Prince Shuja was recalled to the north with the bulk of his army, as whole of the Deccan was then under the grip of a terrible famine.

As soon as the immediate danger from the Mughals passed away, the Bijapuris started fighting against each other. The disaffection among the 'Adil Shahis nobles at such a critical time, when the Mughals were labouring hard to capture their state, indicates their approach to politics.

There seem two chief reasons for such behaviour. First, the Deccani nobles were convinced by the past instances, that in case of a final defeat, only the royal family would suffer and not ^{themselves} ~~they~~. If at all the Mughals annexed the state, they still had chances to get good 'mansabs' in the imperial service. Therefore the nobles were not necessarily enthusiastic for the existence of the dynasty. Second, the 'peshwa' or 'wakil' of 'Adil Shah had assumed so much power during the past years that the latter had become a puppet at his hands. The overweening power of the 'peshwa' created ^u jealousy among the nobles, who tried to throw him out of his office. ^vKhawas Khan, the proud and all powerful wakil of 'Adil Shah, imprisoned his opponent Mustafa Khan. But the supporters of the captive had ^uKhawas Khan murdered. Mustafa Khan was released and became the new peshwa. (1) He was a peace loving man. He realized the advantage of Bijapur in the submission to the Mughals. It would be shown in the coming pages, that with ~~the~~ coming of Mustafa Khan into power, the Bijapur policy towards the Mughals underwent a change.

The march of Shahjahan to the south in September 1635 A.D. marks the second phase of his relations with Bijapur. He had come at the head of a large army, chiefly to annex Ahmadnagar state. But 'Adil Shah's help to Sahu was a great menace to the Mughal success against the Nizam Shahis.

(1) F.A.S. ff.331-41; Hadiqat-us-Salatin, ff.267b - 270a.

Moreover 'Adil Shah withheld the 'peshkesh' despite the imperial warnings. These were ~~the~~^{the} two chief causes which obliged Shahjahan to take strong action against Bijapur. (1)

The emperor knew that his position in 1635 A.D. was better than that of in 1630 - 32 A.D; because all the chief strongholds of the Nizam Shahis i.e. Ahmadnagar, Daulatabad and others were under the Mughals. If 'Adil Shah still remained unshaken, he could send the army to devastate his state. Before Shahjahan could make use of force, he preferred to persuade 'Adil Shah to submit by peaceful means. He sent Makramat Khan to 'Adil Shah asking him to withhold his assistance to Sahu and to send a large 'peshkesh'. Sayyid Khan Jahan, Khan-i-Dauran and Khan Zaman were ordered to penetrate into Bijapur territory, if the mission of Makramat Khan failed. (1)
The imperial envoy left for Bijapur in December 1635 A.D.

The imperial letter, which includes both threats and concessions to 'Adil Shah, indicates Shahjahan's estimate of Bijapur's political strength. It would show that Shahjahan acknowledged 'Adil Shah's superiority over the other Deccani rulers but at the same time was eager to enforce his overlordship on him. One notable point in the Mughal chronicles of this period is that 'Adil Shah has always been mentioned as 'Adil Khan. Similarly in the letter, which Shahjahan sent through Makramat Khan, the ^{Bijapuri} ruler was addressed with the titles of 'Adil Khan, exalted Amir etc.

(1) A.S.II. pp.158-59; P.S. ff.363b, 364a.

Shahjahan wrote to 'Adil Shah that as Daulatabad and Ahmadnagar had been captured by the Mughals and two Nizam Shahs were prisoners of the Mughals, the question of the existence of the Nizam Shahi dynasty did not therefore arise. He should stop sending help to Sahu and other trouble makers. He was ordered to send peshkesh regularly as the late 'Adil Khan used to send. The peshkesh should be sent out of diamonds and famous elephants like Hanumat, Sarnak, Bakht Buland and Fath-i-Nauras. . If he obeyed his orders, Sholapur and the 'mahals' of Wanku, which previously belonged to Malik 'Ambar would be given to him. Finally, Shahjahan warned 'Adil Shah that if he did not submit, he would be responsible (1) for the destruction of his state.

The appointment of the large imperial armies made 'Adil Shah fear the consequences of any further resistance to the Mughals. The famine, which checked the imperial progress during the past years, was over and provisions could easily be procured. Moreover Mustafa Khan, unlike his predecessor, realized the weak position of 'Adil Shah and induced him to submit. 'Adil Shah changed his course reluctantly, though his sympathies were still with the Nizam Shahis. He secretly helped Sahu, while at the same time he gave a warm reception to Makramat Khan and advanced five miles to receive him. In order to give a false impression of his sincerity to the emperor, he even sent Mir 'Abul Hasan and Qazi Muhammad Sa'eed

(1) Lahauri I ii pp.125; 126 - 30; 147; T.S. f.68; P.S. ff. 360-61; Jalal f.159.

with a letter of submission and a meagre 'peshkesh' -- five
(1)
elephants and gifts worth one lakh of rupees.

The duplicity of 'Adil Shah resulted in disaster for Bijapur. When Makramat Khan reported to the emperor that 'Adil Shah was still helping the Nizam Shahis, in spite of the fact that he had offered his submission, the imperial commanders were ordered to ravage the state. (2) Khan-i-Dauran was ordered to advance with 12,000 troopers from Bidar; while Sayyid Khan Jahan and Khan Zaman were instructed to march from Sholapur and Aindapur. The armies devastated the enemy's country to such an extent that 'Adil Shah was forced to send a large peshkesh and sue for peace terms. (3) He sent another envoy i.e. Muhammad Hussain Sildozi to the emperor and begged earnestly for pardon. Makramat Khan also wrote to Shahjahan that 'Adil Shah now repented of his past conduct and was sincerely disposed to peace. The emperor then ordered his commanders to stop ravaging Bijapur any more. (4)

The treaty of 1636 A.D., concluded between 'Adil Shah and the Mughals is a landmark in the history of Bijapur. It reduced Bijapur to a tributary state of the Mughal emperor henceforth. As the contents of the treaty have been misinterpreted by some modern writers, they are given in detail, in order to clarify the position of 'Adil Shah after the treaty.

(1) Lahauri I ii.p.144; A.S.II, p.162; P.S.f.367b.

(2) Lahauri I ii, p.144; A.S.II, p.163.

(3) Lahauri I ii.pp.144-45; 154-55; A.S.II. pp.173-74; 178-79; 181-84; T.S. ff.71-72; P.S.ff.378b, 379a.

(4) A.S. II. pp.167, 174, 183; Lahauri I ii.p.67.

The imperial firman sent to Bijapur, in reply to 'Adil Shah's letter of submission, would show the inferior status of 'Adil Shah to the Mughal emperor. Shahjahan wrote: Your request reached the imperial court. It is manifest from your appeal that you have submitted and have promised to be obedient and send the peshkesh in future. We, therefore, have pardoned your faults and confirm the territory of late 'Adil Khan on you. If you carry out the following 'Ahdnamah God willing, we and our successors shall not cause any harm to you.

(1)

The terms settled were:

- (i) 'Adil Shah would be loyal and obedient in future to the Mughal emperor, whom he would acknowledge as his overlord. He would obey all the conditions laid down in the 'Ahdnamah without any hesitation.
- (ii) The Nizam Shahi kingdom henceforth would cease to exist and its territory would be divided between the Mughals and 'Adil Shah. Bijapur would respect the frontiers defined by the imperial officers.
- (iii) 'Adil Shah shall retain the old Bijapuri territory plus some parts of the Nizam Shahis -- Sholapur, the 'mahals' of Wanku, Parinda, Chakan, i.e. an area yielding twenty lakhs of huns. The remaining area of the Ahmadnagar kingdom would be included in the Mughal empire.
- (iv) A 'peshkesh' of twenty lakhs of rupees (to be paid partly in cash and partly in kind) would be sent by

(1) Lahauri, I ii. pp.167-74; A.S.II, pp.180-83; T.S.ff.75,76.

'Adil Shah through Makramat Khan.

- (v) As Qutb Shah had acknowledged Shahjahan as his overlord and promised to pay an annual 'peshkesh' therefore 'Adil Shah would respect the Golconda border and would not demand any money from Qutb Shah. Any dispute arising between Bijapur and Golconda would be referred to the Mughal emperor whose decision would be final.
- (vi) Sahu and Reehan Sholapuri should not be given refuge or service by 'Adil Shah, until they surrender Junair, Trambak, Raj Deohir, Trankalwari and other Nizam Shahi forts held by them. 'Adil Shah undertook to help the Mughals against Sahu and to deliver forts of Ausa and Udgir to the imperialists.
- (vii) Both the Mughals and the Bijapuris promised "not to give aid and comfort" to rebels against the other.

The 'Ahdnamah or Aman Namah as it is called in the chronicles bore the signatures of Shahjahan and 'Allami Afzal Khan, the then wazir of the Mughal empire. The imperial envoy Muhammad Hussain left Daulatabad in the first week of May 1636 A.D. for Bijapur to get the agreement ratified by 'Adil Shah.⁽¹⁾

The inferior position of 'Adil Shah vis-a-vis the Mughal emperor is further illustrated by his letter, which he sent in reply to the confirmation of the 'Ahdnamah. 'Adil Shah wrote to Shahjahan:

(1) A.S.ii.187, 195, 196; M.L.I. pp.531-52; T.S. 76b.

"The request of a faithful servant Muhammad
to the true caliph, Sahib-i-Qiran-i-sani....
I acknowledge the portrait, gifts and the 'Ahdnamah.
I have no words to express to Your Majesty for such a
beuntiful act. My sincerity and loyalty would further
be disclosed to the emperor through the imperial
(1)
envoys."

To give further proof of his submission, 'Adil Shah
sent a copy of an ode of Hafiz Shirzai. For example:

I take an oath on Quran that I am the slave of the
Shah (i.e. the emperor).

My eagerness to see you is beyond calculation.

My love is for no one but you.

The name of Shahjahan is a refuge for my life
and by (calling)his august name I overpower my enemies! (2)

After the confirmation of the agreement by 'Adil Shah,
(3)
Shahjahan left for the north in June 1636 A.D.

The treaty of 1636 A.D., turned 'Adil Shah into a
vassal of the Mughal emperor. Whereas Qutb Shah had acknowl-
edged Shahjahan just by the threats of the Mughals, 'Adil
Shah was forced to acknowledge him by sword. In the light
of the terms of the treaty, it is hard to agree with the
statements of Qanungo and Sarkar, that even after the
treaty of 1636 A.D., 'Adil Shah was ^{an} independent king. In the

(1) A.S.II. 2157

(2) M.U.I. 174; T.S. 76b, 77a; M.L.I.p.535. (1) ~~S.II.187~~

(3) 'Adil Shah made a request to the emperor that owing to the
large imperial armies in the Deccan, his subject ~~did not~~ go
to work due to the fear of loot or devastation. He there-
fore requested Shahjahan for an early @parture; A.S.II.
195; T.S. 78a; Jalal f.161a.

~~e~~ words of Sarkar, "the treaty of 1636 A.D. turned the king of Bijapur into a friendly ally of the emperor of Delhi; but left his sovereignty unimpaired. He had not become a vassal prince nor bound himself to pay an annual tribute." At another place he says, "Bijapur was not a vassal state but an independent and equal ally of the Mughal emperor."⁽¹⁾ The statements of both Qanungo and Sarkar are incorrect. A critical examination of the facts would show that 'Adil Shah was a vassal of the Mughal emperor, and not an independent king.

According to the treaty, 'Adil Shah's acknowledgement of Shahjahan as his overlord and his promise to remain submissive to the emperor, hardly leave any doubt to the fact that Bijapur was a vassal state. So far as the question of annual tribute is concerned, it needs a critical and detailed discussion of the term peshkesh used in the treaty. The item of Rs 20 lakhs to be paid by 'Adil Shal as 'peshkesh', has been translated both by Sarkar and Saksena as "a peace-offering of Rs.20 lakhs."⁽²⁾

The difficulty with the term 'peshkesh' is that it was used by the chroniclers very loosely. For example, princes or nobles when presented gifts to Shahjahan at different occasions

(1) Qanungo, p.193; Sarkar Vol.I.pp.253,263.
 (2) Sarkar,I, p.39; Saksena p.166.

have also been denoted as presenting peshkesh to the emperor. (1) But a study of other contexts will show that the term peshkesh has been taken as tribute and not as peace offering, specially when the rulers of subordinate states submitted it to the emperor.

(i) When Aurangzeb recommended ^{the} zamindar of Deogarh for the remission of tribute, he wrote to his father, ^{The} "Zamindar is loyal to the Mughals but he cannot pay the arrears of peshkesh. As Your Majesty has ~~not~~ remitted the arrears of ~~the~~ zamindar of Chanda, the arrears of the zamindar of Deograh should also be remitted. The zamindar of Deogarh has promised to deposit the fixed amount of peshkesh every year to the imperial treasury. (2)

(ii) In 1655, Aurangzeb requested his father that the petty state of **Chanda** (in the Deccan) should not be annexed as the zamindar had promised to clear the arrears of the annual peshkesh of the past years and to pay the annual peshkesh regularly in future. (3)

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- (1) P.S.f.362b; Khan-i-Dauran submitted an elephant as peshkesh to the emperor in 1058 A.H./1648 A.D. Lahauri I ii.pp.266-70: When Shahjahan went to Aurangzeb's house before his marriage, the prince offered a peshkesh of gems and pearls to his father.
- Ibid.p.284: In 1051 A.H./1641 A.D. Raja Satar Sal came from the Deccan and ^{presented} four elephants as peshkesh to Shahjahan.
- Ibid.p.333. On the celebrations of Nauroz in 1052 A.H./1642 A.D. Shah Nawaz Khan offered a peshkesh to the emperor.
- (2) Adab f.42a. (3) Ibid. f.60a.

(iii) One of the causes of the Mughal invasion of Bijapur in 1657 A.D., was that 'Adil Shah generally delayed (1) in sending the peshkesh.

There is no doubt that the chronicles don't mention any definite amount of peshkesh laid down on 'Adil Shah to pay annually, as was the case with Qutb Shah, but a few examples would show that 'Adil Shah was an annual tributary. I have tried to collect the data, when 'Adil Shah sent the peshkesh, after 1636 A.D., but I have come across very few years, when Bijapur sent it to Delhi. That is why we find the Mughals charging 'Adil Shah ~~for~~ not sending the peshkesh regularly.

(i) In 1048 A.H/1638 A.D., 'Adil Shah sent a peshkesh so small that Aurangzeb sent it back to Bijapur and reported the matter to his father. (2)

(ii) On 9th Sha'ban 1049 A.H/6th Jan. 1640 'Iwaz Khan, the Bijapuri envoy brought a peshkesh consisted of pearls, diamonds and ornamented articles worth Rs. 2 lakhs.

(iii) In 1053 A.H/1643 A.D. Sayyid Hassan brought peshkesh from Bijapur. (3)

(iv) On ~~his~~ 56th birthday celebrations ^{of SHAHJAHAN} i.e. 1055 A.H/1645 A.D., 'Adil Shah sent peshkesh of some Arabian horses, two elephants and other valuables. (4)

(1) ^{Adab} Ibid. f.80a; 223b.
 (2) Adab, 32a.
 (3) Lahauri I ii.352.
 (4) Ibid.p.421.

- (v) In 1061 A.H/1650 A.D. Muhammad Safi, the imperial envoy brought forty elephants, and other gifts as peshkesh worth Rs. 40 lakhs. ⁽¹⁾
- (vi) In 1064 A.H/1653-54 'Adil Shah sent an elephant worth Rs. 60,000 and other articles through his envoy. ⁽²⁾
- (vii) In 1066 A.H/1655 -56 'Adil Shah sent a peshkesh of four elephants, nine Arabian horses, two of them with golden traps and other goods, through his ambassador Sayyid Wali. ⁽³⁾

It should also be borne in mind that the letter sent to 'Adil Shah through Makramat Khan, demanded a regular peshkesh from 'Adil Shah. ⁽⁴⁾ I wonder how Sarkar and Saksena have translated the term peshkesh as 'peace-offering' in the case of 'Adil Shah, and tribute in the case of Qutb Shah when the same word has been used in the chronicles in both ^{the} cases. Moreover if it was a mere 'peace-offering', why did 'Adil Shah send the so-called peace-offering, even after 1636 A.D. when there was no war between Bijapur and Delhi till 1657 A.D. A peace-offering is always submitted to stop war and conclude peace. If 'Adil Shah was not a vassal prince but an equal ally and independent king, why then did Shahjahan not send any peshkesh to him even once? But the facts show that it was always Bijapur that sent peshkesh to Delhi and not Delhi to Bijapur.

(1) Waris. 444b. (2) A.S.II,192. (3) Waris 512b, 513a.
 (4) A.S.II.147.

In the light of this discussion it can be concluded that Bijapur was a tributary state and its ruler was a vassal of the Mughal emperor and not "an independent king." The Mughals, being the paramount power, therefore had every right to interfere in the internal and external affairs of their vassal state.

The treaty of 1636 A.D. resulted in peace and cordial relations for a long time between Bijapur and the Mughals. We hear of the exchange of good-will missions between Bijapur and Delhi and the peshkesh sent by 'Adil Shah to Shahjahan. During that period Shahjahan twice interfered in the internal affairs of Bijapur and 'Adil Shah had to submit. 'Adil Shah imprisoned his wazir Mustafa Khan in 1643 A.D. Since the wazir was pro-Mughal, Shahjahan demanded ^{his release from} 'Adil Shah. 'Adil Shah obeyed the imperial order. Mir Rajab, the 'Adil Shahi envoy, who was detained at Delhi due to that reason was then allowed to return. (1) Ever since 1636 A.D. 'Adil Shah had remained submissive to the Mughal emperor, who in return (2) conferred the title of Shah on him in 1648 A.D., whereas previously he was addressed as Khan. The conferment of title increased ^{the} vanity of 'Adil Shah. He started to hold his court outside the citadel; watched elephant-fights and gave the title of Khan Khanan to his chief noble. Shahjahan objected to these powers of 'Adil Shah, since the Mughals presumed the right of exercising such prerogatives only by themselves. He wrote a letter to 'Adil Shah to stop these practices. 'Adil

(1) F.A.S. ff. 399, 400. (2) Chahar Chaman-i-Brahman f. 73a.

(1) Shah submitted. This is another proof that 'Adil Shah was a vassal of the Mughal emperor who had the legal right to interfere in the administration of Bijapur.

As has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, after the treaty of 1636 A.D., with Bijapur and Golconda, the Mughals were relieved from their preoccupations in the south and took more interest in ^{the} affairs of the north west. Except these two small incidents mentioned above, there is no other significant feature between 'Adil Shah and Shahjahan recorded in the chronicles until the year 1656 A.D.

The third and last phase of Shahjahan's relations with Bijapur started during the second governorship of Aurangzeb, when the relations between the two states deteriorated and eventually led ^{an} attack on Bijapur.

The question of succession by 'Ali 'Adil Shah, after the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shah on 4th November 1656 A.D. was not the only cause of the Mughal invasion as has generally been thought. First, the peshkesh from Bijapur always fell in arrear. Once Aurangzeb pointed out this fact to Qutb Shah and said that 'Adil Shah had annoyed the emperor for not sending ~~the~~ peshkesh in time.⁽²⁾ Similarly on another

(1) Basatin us Salatin ff.324-26.

(2) Adab f.80a.

occasion, Aurangzeb wrote to Jahanara that 'Adil Shah promised to send a peshkesh of nine lakhs of rupees. But when the imperial agent went to collect he was sent back from Bijapur with the peshkesh worth four lakhs of rupees only. ⁽¹⁾ Second, 'Adil Shah built new forts in Junair and at other places on Bijapur - Mughal border. He provisioned these forts with men and arms. His only possible motive in doing so in the circumstances was to strengthen himself against the Mughals. Aurangzeb reported ⁽²⁾ the matter to his father and the forts were demolished. Third, during the Mughal invasion of Golconda in 1656 A.D., 'Adil Shah sent an army of 20,000 men, who were stationed twenty miles from Haidarabad. It was only through the vigilance of Aurangzeb that the 'Adil Shahis had to retire to Bijapur. ⁽³⁾ Fourth, the 'Adil Shahis ^{seized some} parts of Karnatak, ⁽⁴⁾ since it was conferred upon Mir Jumla by the emperor. Fifth and the last cause was the succession of 'Ali 'Adil Shah. As the question is very controversial it has been discussed in detail.

Muhammad 'Adil Shah died on 26th Muharram 1067 A.H/ 4th November 1656 A.D. Khan Muhammad, the Bijapuri wazir and Bari Sahibah, the widow of ~~Muhammad~~ 'Adil Shah enthroned 'Ali as the new 'Adil Shah. Aurangzeb was informed of all the happenings at Bijapur through his 'hajib' (i.e. agent) Muhammad Amin. The prince reported the matter immediately

(1) Adab f.223b.

(2) Ibid.f.186b.

(3) Ibid.ff.59b, 60, 62, 63, 190b, 191.

(4) Ibid f 105h, ~~105h~~

(1)
to the emperor. The Mughal sources challenge the legality of 'Adil Shah's succession and charge that he was not the real son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah but an adopted one: while the Bijapuris emphasize that 'Ali was the real son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah. Sarkar, Saksena and Elphinstone agree with the view of the Bijapuris. Sarkar says that since 'Adil Shah was an independent king, therefore the Mughal emperor had no lawful right to confirm or question the succession at

(2)
Bijapur. Apart from the court chroniclers, such as 'Amal-i-Salih, Padshah Namah by Waris; Adab-i-'Alamgiri; Twarikh-i-Shahjahani, even a Deccani chronicle Hadiqat-ul-'Alam and the European travellers like Thevenot and Tavernier are of the opinion that 'Ali was not the real son but an adopted son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah.

(3)
It was not after the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shah that the question of his succession arose in Mughal circles as Aurangzeb had already raised the matter with Shahjahan before his death. In a letter ^{to} Aurangzeb, Aurangzeb stated that he informed the emperor before the death of Muhammad that the

(1) Adab, ff.107b, 228b. (2) Sarkar I.p.263; Saksena p.167; Elphinstone pp.75,76.

(3) Tavernier p.73: "Adil Shah died without any child. Some years before the death of the king, the queen perceiving no possibility of having any child adopted a little boy, upon whom was all her affection, and caused him to be brought up in the doctrine of Haly's sect (Ali's sect i.e. Shia). The king upon his death had caused this adopted son to be proclaimed as king." Thevenot, pp.128, 129; Ali Adil Shah was an orphan, whom the late king and queen adopted for their son, and after the death of the king, the queen had so much interest as to settle him upon the throne. But he being as yet very young, the queen was declared regent of the king. A.S.III.p.235; T.S.f.195b; ^{HADIQAT UL-'ALAM} H.A. f.26/a; Adab ff.75b, 107b, 131a, 228b, 229a. Waris f.517b.

(1)
 latter had no son. Aurangzeb's letter to Mir Jumla also shows that Shahjahan was waiting the expected death of Muhammad 'Adil Shah (who was seriously ill) when confusion would arise and Mir Jumla would be sent to Bijapur to capture the state. Aurangzeb reported the matter to his father and said, "a boy of obscure parentage, 'Ali by name, has been enthroned". He urged his father to sanction war against Bijapur.
 (2)

There are only three Deccan chronicles which allege that 'Ali was the real son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah. There are Tarikh-i-'Ali 'Adil Shah: Basatin us Salatin and Tarikh-i-Bijapur. Now we have to examine the value of these chronicles with regard to this issue. Tarikh-i 'Ali 'Adil Shah was written by Sayyid Nur Ullah Qazi in 1076 A.H/1666 A.D., by the order of 'Ali 'Adil Shah, the then Bijapuri ruler, whose succession was in question in 1066 A.H/1656 A.D. Basatin us Salatin was written by Ghulam Murtaza in 1237 A.H/1821 A.D. i.e. a hundred and seventy one years after the incident of the dispute, using Tarikh-i-'Ali 'Adil Shah as one of its sources. Tarikh-i-Bijapur was written by Muhammad Ibrahim Zubairi in 1240 A.H/1824 A.D. Thus all the three chronicles are biased and were written to serve the cause of the Bijapuris. Therefore no value should be given to them specially with regard to the succession of 'Ali.

The above mentioned Deccani chronicles give the date of

(1) Adab f.75b.

(2) Faruki p.327; Adab ff.107b,109b.

birth of 'Ali 'Adil Shah as 16th Rabi in 1048 A.H/30th August 1638 and say, "the successor to the throne was born," and great festivities were celebrated. Similarly they mention *the* main events of his princehood. But none of these mentions the name of his mother. All three agree on one point i.e. after his birth, the baby was given to the care of Haji Bari Sahibah, the queen of Muhammad 'Adil Shah and sister of Qutb Shah, at her earnest request. ⁽¹⁾ So the baby was brought up under the care of the queen, Bari Sahibah. This fact casts further doubt upon the value of the Deccani chronicles. These chronicles were written after the incident i.e. 1656 A.D. but still failed to mention the name of the mother of 'Ali. When they could write the name of queen Bari Sahibah, who was regarded as the care-taker or the guardian of the child, what could prevent them mentioning the name of his real mother, when they were determined to prove him the real son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah? Even if the child of a Muslim was born of a slave girl and was recognised by the father, he according to the jurists had the legal right of succession. For example, Mamun and al Mu'tasim the Abbasid rulers, the ⁽²⁾ sons of Harun al Rashid were of slave girls. But there is no adoption in Islamic law, whether Sunni or Shi'a. Therefore an adopted son cannot inherit his father's property or succeed his throne.

(1) Tarikh-i-'Ali 'Adil Shah ff.14-19; Basatin us-Salatin f.74.
Tarikh-i-Bijapur pp.361-62.

(2) The Caliphate by Muir, p.475.

It is necessary to establish the fact that the Mughals being the sovereign power had the right to control the succession of their subordinate states. Raja Man Singh was an adopted son of Raja Bhagwan Das, but Akbar confirmed him to succeed the latter. Before his march to Ahmadnagar in 1591 A.D., Burhan promised to become Akbar's vassal in return for imperial assistance in obtaining the Nizam Shahi throne. (1) In other words, after the accession of Burhan to the Nizam Shahi throne in 1591 A.D., Ahmadnagar was legally a vassal state of the Mughals. After the death of Ibrahim Nizam Shah in July 1595 A.D., when the confusion arose among the four Nizam Shahi candidates for the succession, the Mughals also interfered. It has been shown in the third chapter ~~that~~ how Akbar gave superiority to Bahadur Nizam Shah over his other opponents and Chand Bibi and 'Adil Shah also agreed to the decision of the Mughal emperor. (2)

In the light of these facts, Shahjahan had every right to annex Bijapur or to confirm its succession on anyone whom he deemed fit.

Mir Jumla himself was not less responsible to bring war against 'Adil Shah. But Bijapur itself provided him with a motive for speeding the campaign. It has been narrated in the previous chapter, that since his arrival at the imperial court, Mir Jumla was trying to persuade the emperor to sanction war against Qutb Shah and he even succeeded in his attempt. But the coincidence of Ibrahim

(1) Burhan-i-Ma'asir f.153. (2) Adab f.107b.

'Adil Shah's serious illness with the expectation of confusion to be followed after his death changed the plan of the Mughals. An attempt has been made to show ~~the~~ how Aurangzeb urged Mir Jumla to persuade the emperor to sanction war against Bijapur and to what extent Mir Jumla succeeded in his efforts.

Inducing Mir Jumla to obtain Shahjahan's permission for an invasion, Aurangzeb wrote to him that he had reported the news of the death of 'Adil Shah's death to the emperor. He would sent some contingents to the imperial frontier, while he himself would wait in Ahmadnagar till the receipt of the royal orders and the concentration of the army. Aurangzeb further stated that he, Mir, Jumla, could achieve his ends by giving his wise counsels to the emperor. He should use all his influence to have the desire fulfilled. ⁽¹⁾ In another letter Aurangzeb urged Mir to an early start of the campaign and pleaded that if delay was caused, the new 'Adil Shah might strengthen his position ⁽²⁾ and such an opportunity might never occur again. In his other letters too, Aurangzeb made earnest appeals to his ally for an early start of war ⁽³⁾ against Bijapur.

Mir Jumla responded to Aurangzeb's requests and tried his utmost in persuading Shahjahan to allow a war against 'Adil Shah. He advocated the advantages to be obtained out of the war. Shahjahan was convinced by Mir Jumla's pleas and on 26th November 1656 A.D. sanctioned war. The emperor gave a free

(1) Adab f.107b. (2) Ibid. ff.111,112.

(3) Adab. ff.108, 112.

hand to Aurangzeb to settle the affairs of Bijapur as he thought fit. The emperor's orders were to conquer the state if possible otherwise to annex all those forts and the territory which originally belonged to the Nizam Shahis but were given to 'Adil Shah by the treaty of 1636 A.D. and to exact Rs. $1\frac{1}{2}$ krór (Rs. one krór in kind -- diamonds, elephants etc. and Rs. 50 lakhs in cash) as peshkesh from 'Adil Shah. Aurangzeb was further instructed to enforce the reading of the khutba and the striking of the coins in Bijapur in the name of the Mughal emperor. If the latter alternative was to be adopted, the prince was ordered to proceed to the conquest of Golconda. ⁽¹⁾ The officers who were asked by the emperor to reinforce Aurangzeb included Khan Jahan, Shaista Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, Mahabat Khan, Raom Satarsal, Raja Sujan Singh and Nasiri Khan. The reinforcements ⁽²⁾ sent to the Deccan numbered more than 20,000.

The confusion in Bijapur after the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shah, further weakened the stability of the state. The local zamindars and Sahu seized some parts of Bijapuri Karnatak. 'Ali 'Adil Shah, whose own position was not yet fully established in Bijapur, could not therefore pay any

(1) Waris f.517b; A.S.III. f.235; Adab ff.109b, 140b.

(2) Waris f.518a; A.S.III ff.235-36; Waqiat-i-Alamgiri p.16; Majm'a ul-Akhbar f.518a.

attention to Karnatak affairs. (1) Since the Bijapuris had heard of the mustering of the imperial troops in Ahmadnagar, became disheartened. Moreover the state itself was divided into different groups of nobles, who wanted to seize power (2) into their own hands.

Aurangzeb took full advantage of the disaffection prevailing in Bijapur and tried to seduce the 'Adil Shahi nobles by offering them money and high rank in the imperial service. Those who could not obtain power and place in Bijapur, were easily tempted by the offerings of Aurangzeb. They preferred to join the Mughal service, which was more stable than that of Bijapur. Those who deserted to the Mughals, included Ghazi Khan, the son of Randola Khan, 'Abdul Qadir, Shaikh Mustafa Junaidi and Haji Khan Miçana. (3) Aurangzeb ordered Multafat Khan, the governor of Ahmadnagar to give Rs 2,000 to each Bijapuri officer who brought a hundred men with him. He informed the governor that some Marhatha chiefs such as Babaji, Khur Khoji Bhonsala and others intended to come, so they should be given a warm (4) welcome by him.

With the arrival of Mir Jumla in the Deccan on 10th Rabi ii 1067 A.H/18th January 1657 A.D., Aurangzeb started (5) towards Bijapur. The fort of Bidar was the first to be invested by the imperialists. The fort of Bidar, which

(1) Adab, ff.110b, 111a; Ma'asir-i-Alamgiri p.33.

(2) Adab, f.75.

(3) Adab, f.110b. (4) Ibid. ff.173a, 175b.

(5) *Ibid* f.172b.

was regarded as one of the mightiest forts in Bijapur, was defended by Siddi Marjan, at the head of 1000 cavalymen and 4000 matchlockmen. Aurangzeb reached Bidar on 24th Jamadi i /1st March and besieged it the following day. In spite of the enemy's fire, the Mughals managed to take their cannons to the edge of the ditch. The besieged commander was shot dead by the imperial bullets and the defenders became disheartened. They surrendered the fort on Wednesday 23rd Jamadi ii/29th March. A large booty fell to the victorious army. It included twelve lakhs of rupees in cash; naphtha, corn and other things worth R.8 lakhs and 230 cannons. (1)

The Bijapuris tried to hinder the advance of the Mughals but were defeated. Khan Muhammad and Afzal Khan, mustered an army of 20,000 at Gulbarga to check the Mughals, who intended to proceed towards Kaliyani. But Aurangzeb rose equal to the occasion and sent Mahabat Khan with 15,000 cavalry. A fierce battle took place on 8th Rajab/12th April and the Deccanis suffered a heavy loss. The victorious army burnt the neighbouring villages of Gulbarga and looted the population. (2) Similarly Shivaji created trouble in Ahmadnagar and Junair. Nasiri Khan and Kar Talab Khan were sent against the Marhatha chief. The imperialists turned Sahu out of Mughal territory and followed him into his jagir of Poona and Chakna. He was forced to submit. (3)

(1) A.S.III.p.251; Adab f.172b, 173a; Majm'aul-Akhbar f.518a. Hadiqat-ul-Alam f.261b.

(2) A.S.III. pp.252-254; Adab ff.143a, 149b;

(3) Adab ff.94,95, 133; A.S.III p.258; Lane Poole pp.154-157
(Shiva rose at the cost of Bijapur.)

After defeating the enemy at Gulbarga, the road to Kaliyani was clear. Aurangzeb advanced from Bidar and besieged Kaliyani on 30th Rajah/4th May. The fort of Kaliyani was stronger than that of Bidar and the Mughals had to suffer heavily. While the besieged discharged fire continuously from above the fort-walls, the Bijapuri reinforcements hovered round the Mughal camp and retarded their progress. Once Mahabat Khan, who had only 2,000 soldiers with him was attacked by 20000 Bijapuris. But the reinforcements of the Rajputs forced the enemy to retreat. Similarly, ^{the} sons of Bahlol attacked the trenches of Mir Jumla, who held the field strongly. The Mughals reached the fort walls and bombarded it heavily. After a hard struggle of nearly three months, the imperialists succeeded in capturing the fort. Dilawar Habshi, the besieged commander surrendered the fort on 1st Zil Q'adh 1067 A.H/29th July and was sent back to Bijapur. Meanwhile the fort of Nilanga was also captured by the Mughals. ⁽¹⁾ News of the conquest of Kaliyani was sent to the emperor, who rewarded his commanders. Aurangzeb was sent a ruby, a special Khil'at, a 'phul-katash and two elephants. Mir Jumla, ⁽²⁾ Shahnawaz Khan, Nijabat Khan and Raja Rai Sal were promoted.

The intrigues of 'Adil Shah and Dara checked the imperial advance in the Deccan. After the fall of Bidar and Kaliyani

(1) A.S.III.p.260; Waqiat-i-Alamgiri p.17; Adab, ff.150b, 151a, 326; Hadiqat-ul-Alam f.261b.

(2) A.S.III., pp.261, 262.

the road was open to Bijapur, which was to be besieged next, and whole of the state would have fallen into the hands of Aurangzeb. Dara, who was from the beginning opposed to the campaign, was becoming more jealous of Aurangzeb's success.

He had previously sent his envoy Mulla Shauqi to Bijapur and assured 'Adil Shah of his help in persuading the emperor to stop the campaign. (1) But it appears as if Shahjahan

did not pay much attention to Dara's appeals at first.

After the fall of Kaliyani, 'Adil Shah became much frightened and despatched Ibrahim Khan Bachattar, post haste to Dara and requested him to increase his efforts to dissuade the emperor from going on with the campaign. (2) Dara, not for

the sake of 'Adil Shah but for his own motive, tried his best.

Persuaded by the earnest appeals of Dara, Shahjahan ordered Aurangzeb to end the war.

The war ended abruptly and Aurangzeb had to make peace in compliance with the emperor's orders. The terms settled were:-

'Adil Shah agreed to pay a peshkesh of one and a half crore of rupees; to cede Parinda, forts in Konkan and the 'mahals' of Wanku. (3)

The treaty was ratified by Shahjahan who later on remitted Rs. fifty lakhs out of the agreed peshkesh. The imperial officers who went to reinforce Aurangzeb were ordered

(1) Adab f.208a; (2) A.S. III. pp.262, 290 - 292.

Waqiat-i-Alamgiri pp.36-41.

(3) A.S. III. pp.262-63; Adab ff.193, 236a. Hadiqa-ul-Alam f.261b; T.S. f.193b.

to return to their previous duties, while Mir Jumla was asked to take possession of the forts to be ceded by 'Adil Shah and then to return to the imperial court. (1)

The campaign of Bijapur thus ended as the result of the intrigues of Dara. How did Dara manage to persuade the emperor to issue such an order? The reply is simple. Though Bijapur had supplied causes of its invasion yet the start of the campaign chiefly depended on Mir Jumla. It was Mir Jumla, who was present at the imperial court and had influenced the emperor to sanction the war. When ~~the Mir Jumla, who was present at the imperial court and had influenced the emperor to sanction the war.~~ When the Mir was away from the imperial court, busy in the operation of Bijapur, Dara tried hard and succeeded at last in persuading the emperor to end the campaign.

The illness of Shahjahan was another set back to the imperial cause in the Deccan. Shahjahan fell ill on 6th September 1657 A.D. and Dara took over the entire administration himself. ^{The} Whole of the Mughal empire was in a great suspense. (2) Meanwhile Dara sent letters to Mahabat Khan and Raja SatarSal and other imperial officers to hasten their march to Delhi. Both Mahabat Khan and Raja SatarSal left for Delhi without the formal permission of Aurangzeb. (3)

(1) Ma'asir-i-'Alamgiri p.3; A.S.III. p.263; Majm'a ul-Akhbar f.519a.

(2) Waqiat-i-'Alamgiri pp.18, 19; T.S. f.196a; 'Alamgiri Namah pp.217-18.

(3) Hadiqat-ul-Alam f.261b; Waqiat-i-'Alamgiri 17; Majm'a ul-Akhbar f.519a; 'Alamgiri Namah 29; A.S.III. pp.290-292.

Aurangzeb was eager to take the possession of Parinda and other ceded forts before the news of ^{the} illness of the emperor could reach 'Adil Shah. But unfortunately Aurangzeb's letter to Mir Jumla, containing information of the state of affairs at the imperial court fell into the hands of the Bijapuris. ⁽¹⁾

The 'Adil Shahis thus being encouraged became reluctant to fulfil the treaty. Mir Jumla tried hard to take Parinda but failed. The Bijapuris were neither ready to surrender the forts or to pay any amount of the peshkesh.

The development of the events at the imperial court, obliged Aurangzeb to give some concessions to 'Adil Shah. He was more eager to secure the throne for himself than to waste any further time in the settlement of Bijapur affairs. He left Bidar and arrived at Aurangabad on 11th Nov. 1657 A.D. In order to convince 'Adil Shah that he was favourable to him, Aurangzeb proposed new terms. He agreed to forfeit Parinda and other forts agreed by the treaty, together with a remittance of Rs. 30 lakhs, on the condition ^{that} 'Adil Shah remained loyal to him and supplied an army of 10,000 cavalry to serve under him. Aurangzeb promised that if he sent the demanded army, he would give him the title of Shah in recognition of his fidelity to him. ⁽²⁾ Similarly Aurangzeb wrote a letter to the queen-dowager of Bijapur, since she was regent of 'Adil Shah. In order to save his own position,

(1) Adab, f. 238b.

(2) Ibid. 191b - 193b; 236a.

Aurangzeb put the responsibility of the Bijapuri invasion on Mir Jumla. He said that it was due to his malignancy that great devastation was caused in Bijapur. He did not want to ravage the state or capture the Deccan. (1) But neither his letter to the queen-dowager nor his new proposals to 'Adil Shah worked out effectively. The Bijapuris knew that Aurangzeb was acting under the pressure of circumstances. They therefore exploited his weakness fully and did not listen to him. (2) The statement of 'Alamgir Namah that Dara wrote to 'Adil Shah secretly not to fulfil the terms of the treaty is probably correct, because Dara wanted to weaken Aurangzeb by any means he could. (3)

The failure of both the campaigns against Golconda and Bijapur thus rested on the shoulders of Dara. The Mughal policy in the Deccan, if it was such, became a play-thing in the hands of the rival parties at the imperial court. Shahjahan seemed to have no definite views on Deccan affairs, particularly during the last five or six years of his reign. He was inclined to favour Dara, who was the dearest of his sons to him but at the same time he did not want to ignore the affairs of the country. The Deccanis fully utilized the rivalries of the hostile groups at the imperial court and succeeded in keeping their dynasties alive for a little longer.

(1) Adab ff.65b, 66a. (2) Ibid. ff.113-115.
 (3) 'Alamgir Namah pp.83, 84.

CONCLUSION

Since ancient times rulers in India have attempted to create an empire covering the whole peninsula from the northern mountains to the southern sea, the obvious natural frontiers. But history records that the rulers of the north were more successful in this attempt than those of the south. Sultan 'Ala ud-Din Khalji was the first Muslim sultan who took an active part in bringing the south under the Delhi Sultanate. A similar attempt was made by Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq to bring the south under northern domination. But both these sultans failed to bring the southern peninsula permanently under the Delhi rule. The Mughal policy of conquering the south therefore can be regarded as a continuation of the traditional policy of the north attempting to dominate the south.

Akbar was the first Mughal emperor to cherish the idea of becoming overlord both of north and south India. The reigns of his two predecessors, Humayun and Babur, were almost wholly spent in extending the kingdom and suppressing their opponents .

The ruler of the north could only move to the south if his political economy in the north permitted him. When Akbar ascended the throne in 1556 A.D., his political position was weak and it was about forty years before he could establish himself completely in the north. After the conquest of Gujrat in 1572 A.D., the Mughal border

touched the northern border of the Deccan states. It seemed almost certain that Akbar would next move towards the Deccan but he could not do so owing to his pre-occupations in the north. Moreover he was not secure in the northwest, was threatened both by his brother Mirza Muhammad Hakim of Kabul and 'Abdullah Khan of Turan. It was only after the death of 'Abdullah Khan in 1598, that Akbar was in a position to move towards the south. Again we find that, when prince Salim rebelled at Allahabad in 1600, Akbar had to hasten from Asirgarh towards the north. Similarly at a later date in 1657, we find that prince Aurangzeb, who was ~~the~~ governor of the imperial province of the Deccan, had to leave the south for Agra in order to secure the throne.

Even while preoccupied in the north, Akbar did not ignore the affairs of the Deccan. He kept himself informed of southern affairs by exchange of diplomatic missions with the courts of the Deccan. It was during this period that he gave refuge to the Deccanis such as Khudawand Khan, Sayyid Murtaza, Burhan Nizam Shah and others. His motive in adopting such a policy was to prepare the ground for his future plan of subjugating the south.

Akbar had many reasons for conquering the Deccan. The Deccani rulers had acknowledged Babur and Humayan as their overlord, though temporarily. Akbar therefore wanted to enjoy the same rights as had been exercised by his forefathers.

The Deccan states were a refuge for imperial rebels. After the conquest of Gujrat in 1572, Akbar assumed the right to enforce his overlordship over the Deccan states since their rulers paid allegiance to the Sultan of Gujrat. Akbar wanted to push the Portuguese into sea. They had captured sea ports of Gujrat, which were regarded as his own possessions, since he was master of that province. The Portuguese made ~~agreements~~ *agreements* with other states and helped them actively against the Mughals. The safety of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and the sea trade entirely depended on Portuguese good-will. Akbar could only defeat the Portuguese by land, since the Mughals had no navy. But the Deccan states who were hostile to him, stood in his way. Akbar was therefore obliged first to conquer these states if he wanted to oust the Portuguese. The wealth of the Deccan states was a tempting inducement for Akbar to conquer them. These states had gold and diamond mines and they had also enriched themselves by the capture of the treasures of Vijayanagar state after 1565. Akbar wanted to be known as Chakravartin (i.e. overlord of whole of India), and this could only be possible if he brought both north and south India under his sway.

The political weakness of the Deccan states was the chief ~~cause~~ which encouraged Akbar and his successors to conquer them. These five states, namely Ahmadnagar (under

Nizam Shahis), Bijapur (under 'Adil Shahis), Golconda (under Qutb Shahis), Bidar (under 'Imad Shahis) and Berar (under Barid Shahis), were generally at war with each other for dynastic superiority. When these states came into existence there was no well established kingdom in the north. Babur and Humayun were so much occupied with their own difficulties that they had hardly any time to pay proper attention to Deccan affairs. The Deccan rulers therefore continued their mutual quarrels and failed to realise the danger caused by Akbar.

The nature of political allegiance in those days was another cause of the weakness of the Deccan states. Many nobles among the Deccani rulers had come from distant places such as Iran and 'Iraq and obtained high 'mansabs'. The native nobles opposed the foreign element and thus chaos reigned in the country. Moreover nobles, whether 'foreigner' or native, were not inspired with dynastic loyalty. They paid their loyalty to the person of a king rather than sincerely serving the cause of the state. Such people therefore could easily be seduced by another party if assured of better chances. For example during the siege of Asirgarh, Afzal Khan, the wazir of Bahadur Khan was in league with Akbar. Similarly, during the reigns of Jahangir and Shahjahan, Yaqut Khan, Adham Khan, Babu Jiv, Jadu Rai, Fath Khan and Mir Jumla, among other men, deserted their masters and joined

the Mughals, who assured them of high ranks.

Lack of leadership was another cause of the weakness of these states. The Deccan monarchies, like that of the Mughals, who were stronger than they, were based on ^{the} army. Such states could only stand on a firm footing if the ruler was strong enough to enforce his commands. Recruitment to the army was based on tribal basis. In other words, common soldiers paid their allegiance to their immediate officers. The presence of a strong ruler or a leader therefore was absolutely necessary to control his subordinates in order to run the government smoothly. For example, after the death of Ibrahim Nizam Shah in 1595, Bahadur, the legal successor to the Nizam Shahi throne, was hardly a year and a half old. The result was that the Ahmadnagaris were divided into four groups, each of which was trying to obtain supremacy with the support of its followers. Akbar took full advantage of their disunity and captured Ahmadnagar. Malik 'Ambar, peshwa or wakil of Nizam Shah, was an able leader. He gathered his followers into one body politic and recaptured half of the Nizam Shahi territory during Jahangir's reign. After Malik 'Ambar's death, the Nizam Shahi kingdom lacked an efficient leader and again fell a victim to internal disputes. The result was that the Mughals under Shahjahan annexed Ahmadnagar permanently in 1636.

The shifting of political alliance among the Deccan states was another cause of their ruin. Instead of uniting themselves against the common enemy, they even helped her. This shows that none of the Deccan states was sincere to the other but that all were selfish for their own gains. For example in 1624, both 'Adil Shah and Malik 'Ambar were eager to gain the support of the Mughals in order to overthrow each other. In 1636, 'Adil Shah agreed to cooperate with the Mughals against the Nizam Shahis in order to save his own state from further devastation by the imperialists.

Now we must consider why the Mughals took so long in capturing the Deccan states. They had started active military operations as early as 1595 but could not conquer more than one state, Ahmadnagar, until the year 1658 -- a period of sixty-three years. There seem to be four main reasons. First, an initiative by the emperor was an absolute necessity to advance the Mughal interest in the Deccan. Akbar was a successful warrior. He had reinforced the Mughal empire by conquering the whole of north of India, and was eager to extend his borders further in the south. He had taken the command himself in many battles in the north and similarly he took the command at Asingharh. The presence of emperor at the scene of war was necessary to create a spirit of unity and enthusiasm among his soldiers: otherwise they fell to mutual disputes and checked progress. We find that as long as Akbar was present in the south, the imperialists worked unitedly, and were thus able to capture

Ahmadnagar and Asirgarh. As soon as Akbar left for Agra in 1601, his lieutenants fell into mutual rivalries and lost ground to the enemy. The result was that at the death of Akbar in 1605, the Nizam Shahis had recaptured half their territory.

Jahangir was not a successful commander as a prince, and he never took command in person after his accession. More than once he was advised by his lieutenants to take the command into his own hands in order to remove disunity among the imperialists in the south, but he never did so. Jahangir's pussillanimity suggests that there was no strong continuous political doctrine held at Mughal headquarters governing relationships with the Deccan states. Pressure upon them was increased or relaxed according to the whims and the personal interests of powerful figures around the emperor. The Nizam Shahis took full advantage of the Mughal's lack of cooperation and we find that the Mughal border in 1628, at the death of Jahangir, was less advanced than in 1605, at the time of his accession. Shahjahan came twice to the Deccan and eventually annexed Ahmadnagar state to the Mughal empire and reduced Bijapur and Golconda to tributary status.

A second factor was the guerilla tactics of the

Deccanis. The Mughals were used to fighting in the plains and in pitched battles. The imperial army was heavily equipped and was not mobile, while on the other hand the Deccanis were light troops and swift in their movements. They would withdraw for some distance, drag the enemy into difficult hill passes, deliver a surprise attack, and retreat after inflicting heavy losses before the enemy took their positions. The geography of the Deccan was therefore a great obstacle to the imperial progress. The imperial generals like Khan Khanan, Asaf Khan, 'Abdullah Khan and many others failed to match strategy of the Deccanis. It took a long time, before the Mughals could learn the method of guerilla warfare.

A third factor was communications. The imperial bases were in Gujrat and Malwa. They could bring their reinforcements from Ahmadabad to Burhanpur or Daulatabad safely. But it became difficult for them to maintain their lines of communication from Burhanpur to Bijapur or any other distant place in the enemy's country. The Deccanis often succeeded in cutting the Mughal's communications and the result was that the imperialists had to retire through shortage of food and fodder. The imperial commander of Ahmadnagar had to surrender to the Nizam Shahis in 1610, only because the Mughals failed to send reinforcements.

The cause of the failure of Asaf Khan in 1632 and of that of Mahabat Khan in 1633 in the sieges of Bijapur and Sholapur was that they could not hold their supply line securely. The Deccanis increased their guerilla attacks and forced the Mughals to retire.

A fourth factor was the court intrigue which directly affected Mughal's relations with the Deccan states, particularly during the reigns of Jahangir and Shahjahan. Jahangir's unreserved love for his favourite wife Nur Jahan, threw the administration of Mughal empire at her mercy. She was helped in her task by a group of three persons, known as the Nur Jahan junta by modern historians. As long as harmony existed between the members of the junta, the Mughals were at least able to recapture their lost territory, if not make new conquests, in the Deccan, but once disunity arose they lost ground to the enemy. Nur Jahan had nominated Shahjahan as her candidate to the throne, while the rival group supported Khusrau. The junta therefore was chiefly concerned to prove the superiority of her candidate over the rival group. In this attempt, Nur Jahan exploited the Deccan campaigns as a means of enhancing the prestige of her candidate. The Deccanis took advantage of Mughal's disunity and drove them off many times.

The Mughals could have conquered Ahmadnagar state easily in 1617, but the preoccupations of the junta checked the imperial progress. The Deccanis had submitted and

bought off the Mughals by offering large sums. But the junta exaggerated Shahjahan's success, otherwise it would have been quite possible for the Mughals to annex the Ahmadnagar state since all its strongholds such as Daulatabad and Ahmadnagar had fallen into the hands of the imperialists and resources of the Nizam Shahis were exhausted. As soon as the Mughals retired to the north, the Nizam Shahis rallied, and after a period of about two years, they were able to advance as far as Mandu.

Jahangir's health was failing and Nur Jahan, in whose hands administration of the country lay was more interested in the immediate question of succession. She turned against Shahjahan in 1621 and nominated Shahriyar as her new candidate. When Shahjahan was sent to the Deccan for the second time, in 1621, he was eager to finish the campaign as early as possible in order to give more time to his interests in the north. The Deccanis once again bought off the Mughals. In order to obtain help from the Deccanis in his contest for succession, Shahjahan dictated light terms. His strained relations with Nur Jahan culminated in his rebellion in 1623. The rebellion continued for three years and the Nizam Shahis regained some parts of their territories. Even after the rebellion, the court intrigues continued and encouraged Khan Jahan Lodi to sell in 1627, the whole of Balaghat and the fort of Ahmadnagar for three lakhs of huns to the Nizam Shahis. To conclude, the Mughals in 1627 had hardly advanced beyond their

frontier of 1605.

During the later period of Shahjahan's reign, rivalry between Dara and Aurangzeb increased. Both the brothers were trying hard to secure the throne and thus the imperial court was divided into two groups. One was led by Dara, another by Sa'adullah on behalf of his candidate Aurangzeb. Whereas Aurangzeb, the governor of the imperial province of the Deccan, wanted to annex Bijapur and Golconda, Dara strongly opposed him. Being at the centre, Dara misused his power. He had private relations with Bijapur and Golconda and promised his help to the rulers of these states. Qutb Shah and 'Adil Shah therefore cared nothing for Aurangzeb's instructions. We have seen in the previous chapters that it was Sa'adullah, the wazir who influenced the emperor to sanction war against Golconda in 1656. When the wazir fell ill and could not attend to affairs of state, Dara got his opportunity, and persuaded his father to end the campaign. Similarly, it was Mir Jumla, an ally of Aurangzeb, who got the imperial orders issued for a war against 'Adil Shah in 1657. After the capture of Bidar and Kaliyani, Bijapur had easily fallen but the opposition of Dara checked the imperial advance. Mir Jumla was busy in the Deccan and Dara took advantage of Mir's absence from the court. He tried hard to persuade the emperor to finish the campaign and at last succeeded. It can be concluded that there was no definite policy of Shahjahan towards the

Deccan states, particularly during the last five years of his reign. The emperor had no independent views of his own during this period and swung like a pendulum between Dara and his opponents. The Deccanis exploited the disunity of the imperialists and kept their dynasties alive a little longer, until their states were finally submerged by Aurangzeb in 1686 - 87.

The Mughal court intrigues make a student of history believe that the Deccan policy of the Mughals was purely an extra-territorial luxury. They were not serious in their attempt to capture the states. The reason probably was that these states were not a threat to the Mughal empire. The Deccanis never tried to capture the imperial territory. All their energies were chiefly concentrated in recapturing the lost territory. Subjugation of the Deccan states was not an essential factor for the existence of the Mughal rule. Had it been so, at least the ruling dynasty, if not the imperial nobles would have more actively furthered the Mughal cause in the south. But they did not. This analysis of Mughal relations with the Deccan states, with their strong overtones of aristocratic factions and courtly manoeuvring suggests that, in order to deepen our understanding of the political character of Mughal rule, for the study of the Mughal nobles in politics is desirable.

The relations between the Mughals and the Safawid

Shahs of Iran affected the Mughal's relations with the Deccan states, particularly during the reign of Shahjahan.

Akbar was so preoccupied with northern affairs that he had hardly any time to interfere in the relations of the Deccan states with Persia. Moreover Akbar's Deccan policy was his own initiative and not influenced by outside pressure. The relations between the Mughals and the Persians became strained owing to the capture of Qandahar by the latter in 1622 but the imperialists chiefly concentrated on the suppression of Shahjahan's rebellion, which followed in 1623. The Deccanis therefore were relieved from any serious threat by the Mughals. Even after the submission of Shahjahan, the imperial court was so preoccupied with the immediate question of succession that it could not attend to the affairs in the south properly.

Shahjahan's Deccan policy seems to have been affected by Persian-Mughal relations. He ordered Qutb Shah to drop the name of the Shah of Iran from ^{the} 'khutba' and to include that of the Mughal emperor whom he acknowledged as his over-
(1) lord. Again we find that the failure of the three campaigns of the Mughals aimed at recapturing Qandahar

(1) This cause is omitted in Section III, Chapter II, by an oversight.

affected their relations with the Deccan states. Twice Shahjahan sanctioned invasions of Golconda and Bijapur in 1656 - 57 but on both the occasions the intrigues of Dara saved the Deccan states from annexation.

To conclude, the Mughal policy from 1556 - 1658 as we have seen, was on the whole a failure. Akbar had captured Asirgarh and Ahmadnagar by 1601, but the Mughals could not enjoy the fruit of their success. Akbar's lieutenants proved to be inefficient and we find that at the death of Akbar, the Nizam Shahis had regained a large portion of their state. The court of Jahangir was chiefly preoccupied with selfish intrigues and could not pay serious attention to furthering the Mughal cause in the south. Shahjahan was active with Deccan affairs until the year 1636, when he annexed Ahmadnagar and reduced Bijapur and Golconda to tributary status. During the last five yearw of Shahjahan's reign, the imperial court was an arena of political intrigues and the Deccan policy became a plaything in the hands of the rival parties. Thus the Mughal cause in the Deccan made little headway over a period of 102 years. In the next reign the south was for the first time subjugated, but the opportunity of building a lasting all-India empire was lost, and the conquest of the Deccan brought no strength to the Mughals. The whole history of Mughal relations with the Deccan states is thus mainly one of futile expense and wasted effort.

APPENDIX (A) -- Siege of Asirgarh.

(1)

Many modern writers have written about the siege of Asirgarh and have expressed their views regarding the accounts of the Jesuit Fathers. Among them Smith seems to be the greatest critic of the Muslim chroniclers and says that the court writers have concealed any treachery on the part of their master i.e. Akbar. They did not know or care what the Jesuit Father might send to Europe. Their business was to supply matter suitable for Indian readers. At another place, Smith says, "the detailed story told by the Jesuit author, which must be based on the letter of Jerome Xavier, is in my judgment literally true and deserving of acceptance as being the only authentic history of the events which led to the capitulation of Asirgarh."⁽²⁾

General Comments on the Portuguese sources .

The reader should bear in mind that Du Jarric is not the author of these letters but merely a compiler. In the

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- (1) Smith (Akbar the Great Mughal -- 272 - 300); Count Von Noer (Kaiser Akbar pp.360 - 363); T.W. Haig (Indian Antiquary 1918 pp. - 178 - 183); Rev. H. Heras, S.J. (Indian Antiquary 1924 pp.33-41); C.H. Payne (in his notes to 'Akbar and the Jesuits' pp.252 - 258); Ishwari Prasad (A Short History of Muslim rule in India, pp.390 - 92); Roy Choudury Makhanlal (The Din-i-Ilahi, Introduction pp.32 - 35); E.D. Maclagan (Jesuit and the Great Mughals, p.38); Binyon (Akbar pp.141-45); John Correia-Afonso (Jesuit Letters and Indian History pp.85-87).
- (2) Smith pp.276, 285; John Correia-Afonso, p.23. No sane judge of style would ever claim that they (Xavier's letters) are literally masterpieces. They are as a matter of fact, most unliterary.

preface of his 'Histoire', Du Jarric says that prior to the year 1599 A.D., he depended on a history in Spanish by Fr. Louys de Guzman, entitled 'the History of the Missions undertaken by the Religieux in the East Indies & the Kingdom of China.' He further says that for the events after 1599 A.D. (where the history of Guzman ends) he wrote to Fr. Fernand Guerreiro, who was then the Superior of the house of the Profes at Lisbon. Fr. Guerreiro sent him some books to help him to continue his writing of the 'Histoire'. Among the books he sent a history which was in ten books -- an account of what Fr. Xavier and other Religieux of the same mission had done in India. This was written by a Portuguese Father, Jean de Lucena. Du Jarric further states: I received a number of books dealing with what has taken place in these regions since the year 1600 A.D. from the letters which came therefrom by the said Father Fernand Guerreiro, who besides, supplying me with these and other aids and giving me much valuable advice has continued to put into my hands, the volumes he has published of the letters, arriving year by year from India, so that I am now in possession of all these down to the year 1606
(1)
A.D.

In other words, Du Jarric's account up till 1600 A.D. (which also covers the siege of Asirgarh) was based among the other authorities (i.e. Guzman, Fr. Xavier and others),

(1) C.H. Payne in the introduction of Akbar and the Jesuits. pp.26-29.

on the material supplied by Guerreiro. Du Jarric's account is therefore not entirely based on the letters of Fr. Xavier as Smith thought. Guerreiro had more access to the Jesuit Letters than Du Jarric. Smith is also mistaken when he says that Guerreiro who gives no details confirms du Jarric's (Sal Xavier's) statement that the capitulation was obtained by bribery."¹ In fact Du Jarric's account (with special regard to the siege of Asirgarh) is nothing more than the mere translation of Guerreiro's *Relaçam Annal das Cousas que Fizaram os Padres da Companhia de Jesu nas Partes da India Oriental.....*" part I.

The important feature of Guerreiro's 'Relaçam' is that it is generously based on the Annual Letters of the Jesuit Fathers to their Superiors at Lisbon. Guerreiro himself never came to India. He is not the author or ^{an} eye witness of those events. He is like Du Jarric, a compiler of those letters.

Regarding the features of the Annual Letters," John Correia-Afonso writes: The Annual Letters of the major administrative divisions of the Society -- the Provinces and the Missions -- were to a large extent written on the basis of information supplied by their constituent units -- the colleges and mission-stations. They thus make up a synthesis in which minor details are frequently omitted. Often too, the news, at first recorded in a residence away from the administrative centre, is reproduced at second-hand.

¹ Smith (foot-note) P. 282.

In these cases, the Annual Letters have consequently less authority than reports drawn up by the protagonists themselves: "The historical value of the General Letters," says Silva Rego, "is inferior to that of the personal ones. These represented the direct testimony of the missionaries themselves. Those giving the indirect testimony of the scribe, were evidently subject to his judgment."⁽¹⁾

Thus it can be concluded that the Annual Letters written by the Fathers to the Society, when published, had passed through many hands, who made changes according to their judgments.

With regard to the writing of Guerreiro, Rev.H.Heras has said: These yearly relations published by the Portuguese Jesuits were not ^{the} general account, based on the letters of the Missionaries, but consisted of a Collection of those very letters, each of them being published as a different chapter of the book, with the address and signature omitted. One can still recognise the different styles of the writers in the various chapters of the work, even in the Spanish translation. Moreover, some Missionaries speak of themselves in the third person -- as Fr. Monserrat does in his well known 'Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius' -- while others write in the first person. This means that the editor did not trouble to unify the work, but (fortunately)

(1) John Correia-Afonso p.26.

(1)
inserted the letters just as they stood.

As these letters were sent yearly to Lisbon, some of the events were written long after the incident. For example, the letter of F. Nicholas Pimenta S.J., on Magor to the General of the Society Fr. Claudius Aquiviva, in which he also describes the march of Akbar from Agra to Lahore and then to the Deccan in 1598 A.D., was written from Goa on Dec.21, 1599

(2)
A.D. While from another letter of Fr. Pimenta to Fr. Claudius Aquaviva, General Secretary dated Dec.1600 A.D., it is quite clear that Pimenta was not at Goa on Dec.21st 1599, as he left it on 13th Dec. 1599 A.D., for Chul. (3) Rev. H.

Hosten rightly concludes that at least the end of the letter (dated Dec.21, 1599 A.D.) was not written by Pimenta but by a secretary unless we suppose that Pimenta ante-dated it. (4)

The account of the Jesuit Fathers is not consistent. For example, they record that Ahmadnagar fell to the Mughals before Akbar's arrival at Burhanpur. While the historical evidence show that Akbar reached Burhanpur, (5) on 9th April 1599 and Ahmadnagar fell on 16th August 1600.

Though some of the statements of the Jesuit Fathers don't

(1) Indian Antiquary 1924 p.33.

(2) J.A.S.B. 1927.P.57

(3) Ibid.p.67.

(4) *ibid* p.57

(5) Du Jarric p.101.

agree with the Muslim chronicles, yet they cannot be discredited altogether. Sometimes Jesuit Fathers give useful information not mentioned by the Indian authors. The Portuguese account, to some extent, serves as a check on the Muslim chronicles if the latter wanted to conceal the truth of the event.

These were the general comments on the Portuguese accounts, now we turn to the actual facts and objections raised by the modern critics against the authenticity of the Muslim Chronicles on Asirgarh.

Among the modern writers, Smith and Rev.H. Heras, who have also given a detailed account of the siege of Asirgarh, have based chiefly on the Portuguese version, which according to my opinion is not wholly correct. Apart from the court writers, the Deccani chronicles also don't agree with the Jesuit account, though they sometimes slightly differ in details.

It appears from Smith's account that Muqarrab Khan was sent by his father for the first time, to Akbar to demand the release of Bahadur. But it is untrue. It has been shown in the previous pages that it was Muqarrab Khan, who conducted preliminary negotiations for peace terms and he also accompanied Bahadur when the latter appeared before Akbar. Therefore it is quite obvious that Muqarrab Khan was in the imperial camp and not in the fort as stated by Smith. It was because Muqarrab Khan had conducted the negotiations between the

besieged and the imperial court that Akbar preferred him in sending to his father to surrender. That is why his father (i.e. Malik Yaqut Sultani) reproached him that it was he who took Bahadur and gave him to the enemy and now he had come to demand submission.

Smith states that the father of Muqarrab Khan was an un-named Abyssinian, ⁽¹⁾ is incorrect. Haji Dabir, clearly ⁽²⁾ mentions that he was Malik Yaqut Sultani. Faizi Sirhindi ⁽³⁾ also gives the name as Sayyid Yaqub. Perhaps the word Yaqub is a mistake of the copy writer, who read ب in place of ق .

Smith's statement that Bahadur refused to write letters ⁽⁴⁾ to the besieged to surrender is wrong. Apart from the Muslim chroniclers, even Guerreiro and Du Jarric, the chief authorities of Smith's account clearly mention that Akbar made Bahadur write a letter to the defenders of the first line of fortification that on receipt of his letter, they should at once give entrance to the lord who was approaching ⁽⁵⁾ and whose coming was free from evil intent.

Smith's charge that "the business of Abul Fazl and Faizi Sirhindi as to supply matter suitable for Indian readers and that they hid their master's treachery and ⁽⁶⁾ concealed the final recourse to bribery" is an over-statement. Both chroniclers have mentioned that Bahadur

(1) Smith, p.278. (2) Z.W. p.87. (3) Sirhindi f.273b.
 (4) Smith p.279. (5) Du Jarric p.105; Guerreiro p.7.
 (6) Smith p.285.

appeared before Akbar on the condition that he would be allowed to return and the country would be restored to him. But he was detained by Akbar. Abul Fazl clearly mentioned that Bahadur was forced to write a letter to the besieged against his own wishes. Abul Fazl further mentions that treachery was employed by the besiegers to win over the besieged. Smith and John Correia-Afonso have relied on the translation of Akbar Namah by Beveridge. They have not taken full extract of the reference and seem to have been satisfied with the translation of "soothing words". While the full extract is: the experienced soldiers *secretly* busied in enticing the besieged by deceitful or fascinating words. They drew their hearts by sweet and kind words." (1) In the light of this discussion, it can be concluded that the court chroniclers did not conceal treachery of their master as mentioned by Smith.

Smith accuses Faizi Sirhindi of giving the wrong date i.e. 17th Safar/15th August, for the fall of Asir, instead of the correct date, which falls in the month of Rajab. (2) The critic remarks the statement of Sirhindi as absurd. The fact is that the absurdity does not lie in Faizi Sirhindi but in the translation on which Smith had to rely. I have consulted both the manuscripts of Faizi Sirhindi in the British Museum, and they give the date as 17th Rajab/

(1) A.N.III. p.780.

(2) Smith p.299; C.H.Payne in his comments on Asirgarh's chapter in Akbar and the Jesuits (p.256) has also relied on the translation of E. & D. Vol.VI. But he says that it is an oversight on Faizi's part.

12th January. The translation of Prof. Dowson in E. & D. Vol. VI is not correct. The words in the manuscript are:-

" در روز دوشنبه پنجم شهر رجب مردم قلع مطیح و متقاد شده "

i.e., on Monday the 17th Rajab/12th January, the besieged submitted and became submissive.

در روز دوشنبه پنجم شهر رجب مردم پادشاهی را بقلعه بردند و طیبیدانی قلعه را
باویا دولت سپردند -

"They took the imperialists into the fort on Monday the 17th Rajab/12th January and submitted the keys to the imperial forces." ¹ Thus the true reading of the manuscripts give the same month in which the fort fell. Faizi Sirhindi puts the date when ~~the~~ besieged started to climb down from the fort and not four or five days later when the fort was surrendered formally. Thus the statement of Faizi Sirhindi corroborates the statement of Abul Fazl. Abul Fazl also says that the besieged came down from the fort for four days and formally surrendered the fort on 17th January 1601 A.D. While Smith himself believes the statement of Abul Fazl with regard to the fall of the fort.

At one place Smith says: "It is impossible to reconcile the official statement brought about by the voluntary surrender of Bahadur Shah with Xavier's statement that he had been kidnapped several months earlier, and that during ⁽²⁾ his captivity the fort was surrendered by his officers."

Smith's statement is incredible. ~~in the light of the facts~~

(2) Smith, p. 284.

(1) Sirhindi (or. 169) f 273b; (or. 1666. f 224a)

~~mentioned above when~~ The court writers themselves state that it was not a voluntary surrender but Bahadur was detained and the besieged were cajoled to surrender.

But there is one point, which I suspect that the court writers have not mentioned which the Deccani authors have also a good reason to omit. That is, the request of Akbar, as mentioned by the Portuguese, to the Jesuit Fathers for their help against the garrison. Portuguese sources say that when Akbar failed to capture the fort by storm he requested Fr. Xavier to write to the Portuguese at Chiul to send artillery to him and that he would also write to them. ⁽¹⁾ Abul Fazl has admitted that guns were brought after the emperor's arrival, from Kaveil, Parnala and Ahmadabad but they were of no use. It is therefore quite possible that after the death of Malik Yaqut Sultani when the besieged still withheld the fort, the emperor would have made such a request to Father Xavier. It is also possible that the court writers either from hatred of the Portuguese or thinking the refusal of the Jesuit Father as an insult to the emperor, would have preferred not to mention the episode. Haji Dabir, who was in the fort did not know of such a request and therefore did

(1) Du Jarric, p.107; Guerretiro p.7. But both the sources say that as the Portuguese had concluded an alliance with ~~Khandesh~~ KHANDESH previously, therefore Xavier refused to meet the imperial demand.

not record it in his history. Moreover as the request was purely verbal, therefore Firishta, who was recording the events far from the seat of war could not record the request in his account.

In Smith's own words, "Fr. Xavier was a shrewd politician."⁽¹⁾ His aim to convert Akbar to Christianity failed and he had not hope for the success of his mission. It is therefore very likely that in order to cover his failure, he represented Akbar as an unscrupulous and a demoralized king, to his chiefs in Portugal. He therefore recorded the events the way he liked best and which would appease his own anger.⁽²⁾ It is to be noted that at one place, the word "barbarian" has been used for Akbar both in the accounts of Guerreiro and Du Jarric.⁽³⁾

The last point, which I would like to point out is that both John Correira-Afonso and Smith have stated that Haji Dabir's narrative confirms the Jesuit version on certain points.⁽⁴⁾ But in the light of the discussion, it can be concluded that Haji Dabir's account no doubt sometimes disagrees with the court writers in minor details but confirms them on the whole.

{1) Smith p.280.

{2) Smith p.277 says that the narrative of Du Jarric rests upon unquestionable authority.

{3) Guerreiro p.8; **DU JARRIC** p.107.

{4) John Correira-Afonso p.87; Smith p.300.

APPENDIX (B). Comments on some of the references.

(1) TABAQAT-i-AKBARI A general history of India from the Muhammadan conquest to the year 1003A.H/1594 A.D. written by Nizam ud Din Ahmad b. Muhammad Hakim ul Ha^{rw}i.

The author held high military commands under Akbar, having been first appointed Bakhshi of Gujrat in the 29th year of the reign and afterwards Bakhshi of the Mughal empire in the 37th year.

The Tabaqat-i-Akbari is also called Tabaqat-i-Akbar Shahi and Tarikh-i-Nizami. It is one of the earliest general history of India and the foundation of all the later works on the same subject. It deals with the conquest of Gujrat and Sind by Akbar in detail and throws light on Khandesh - Mughal relations.

. It discussed the mutual wars of the Deccanis and acquaints the reader of their political weakness.

For an account of early events, its sources included Tarikh-i-Yamini, Zain ul-Akhbar, Rauzat-us-Safa, Kharza'in ul-Futuh, Futuh us-Salatin, Barani, Tarikh-i-Muhammadi, Wa^qvi'at-i-Mushtaqi and ~~Waki'at-i-Mushtaqi~~ and Wa^qvi'at-i-Humayun Padshah. The present work is divided into a Muqaddimah, nine Tabaqahs and a Khatimah. The nine Tabaqahs are:-

- I. Sultans of Delhi
 - II. Kings of the Deccan.
 - III. Kings of Gujrat.
 - IV. Kings of Malwa.
-

- V. Kings of Bengal.
- VI. Sharqi Kings of Jaunpur.
- VII. Kings of Kashmir.
- VIII. History of Sind from Arab conquest 86 A.H. to 100 A.H.
- IX. History of Multan from 847 A.H/ to 932 A.H/.

(2) AKBAR NAMA by Shaikh Abu'l Fazl, surnamed Allami, son of Shaikh Mubarak Nagori.

Abu'l Fazl was born at Agra in 958 A.H/1551 A.D. He was introduced to Akbar in 981 A.H/1573 A.D., by his elder brother, the celebrated poet Faizi and soon became a friend and trusted adviser of the sovereign. He rose by degrees to a command of four thousand and was engaged in military operations in the Deccan, when he was recalled to the Court and murdered on his way thither, on 4th Rabi ul Awal 1011 A.H/1602 A.D. by the Bundela chieftain Barsang Deo, instigated by prince Salim.

The Akbar Nama is a detailed history of Akbar. Abu'l Fazl says in the preface that he wrote it by the emperor's order. His materials consisted, he writes, of private memoirs, which numerous persons were ordered to send in, of the official record, which had been kept from the 19th year of the reign, of the royal proclamation, and the letters and returns of the officers of the state.

From the point of view of this thesis, this is a

very useful work. It is one of our primary sources of the time. The author tells us about the emperor's hatred against the Portuguese, weakness of the Deccan states. Abu'l Fazl himself took active part in many of the battles including those of Ahmadnagar and Asirgarh. He is an eye witness to the fall of Asirgarh and boldly mentions the methods of besiegers in causing the besieged to desert.

The work is divided into three volumes.

A continuation of the same work appears a distinct title A'in-i-Akbari or the Institutions of Akbar. The A'in contains a detailed account of the royal establishments, the administration and the statistics of the empire, the creeds and the institutions of the Hindus.

The author has given a sketch of his own life at the end of the A'in.

(3) AKBAR NAMA by Shaikh Ilahtad Faizi Sirhindi, son of Asad ul-Ulama 'Ali Sher of Sirhind.

The author was attached to the service of Bakhsi ul-Mulk Shaikh Farid Bokhari. The latter having remarked that an historical work Waqiat-i-Mushtaqi, concluded with the period of Humayun and contained no notice of the important events of the reign of Akbar, desired the author to supply the deficiency. The result was the present work.

The work is written in a plain and unpretending style. The history is brought down to the capture of Asir and the subsequent return of Akbar to Agra in 1010/A.H./1601 A.D.

Though the work differs in detail with the Akbar Namah by Abul Fazl, with regard to the fall of Asirgarh, yet it agrees on the whole. It records an important interview between Shaikh Farid and Bahadur Khan of Khandesh before the siege of Asir. Moreover the author gives us some details of the calamity which occurred in the fort of Asirgarh during its siege.

I have used British Museum manuscript Or.169 (*sent at one point*
is, or P.344, I have also made use of B.M. Or.1666)

(4) MUNTAKHAB UT-TAWARIKH. A general history of India from the Muhammadan conquest to the 40th year of Akbar's reign i.e. 1004 A.H/1595 - 96 A.D. by 'Abdul Qadir Badayuni b. Mubarak Shah Badayuni. He was born at Badayun about 948 A.H/ He became a pupil of Shaikh Mubarak Nagori with whose two sons, Faizi and Abu'l Fazl, he entertained the most intimate intercourse, although he was impelled by his Muslim bigotry to denounce both after their death as arrant infidels. In 981 A.H/1573 A.D. he was presented to Akbar and enrolled in the number of learned men who attended the court. He was also one of the translators of Mahabharta and Ramayana.

Badayuni started his Muntakab as stated in its preface, shortly after the death of his friend Nizam ud-Din Ahmad, and concluded his work with the events of Jamadi ul Akhir 1004 A.H/ March 1596 A.D.

Although professedly based upon Tabaqat-i-Akbari, it contains much original matter and is interesting on account of the outspoken and often virulent tone in which the author

inveighs against Akbar himself and all those who departed from his own rigid standard of orthodoxy.

Badeyuni condemns the brutalities of Pir Muhammad, the imperial governor of Malwa, who went to Burhanpur in 1562 A.D. and sacked the town and tells us how far Akbar was inclined towards the Hindus.

(5) TARIKH-i-GUJRAT by Shah Abu Turab. It is a history of Muzaffar Shah II (932 A.H/1525 A.D) to the taking of Ahmadnagar b. Muzaffar Shah III (992 A.H/1584 A.D.) It was completed in 994 A.H/1585 - 86 A.D.

The author appears to have been a Sayyid, and he played, according to his own account, fully borne out by other historians, no inconsiderable part in the events of which he gives a circumstantial narrative. It was by his advice that 'I'tmad Khan, who wielded a disputed sway in Gujrat, wrote to Akbar to urge him to take possession of that province and he was the first to meet the emperor in his advances. He accompanied the emperor in his progress through Gujrat. He gives the activities of the Mirzas in Gujrat against the imperial rule. It is he who suggested Akbar to conquer the Deccan if he wanted to finish the refuge of the imperial rebels. Abu Turab died in 1005 A.H/1596 A.D.

The first part of the work deals with the history of Bahadur Shah, of his wars with Humayun and of his successors while the later half is entirely taken up with the account of the conquest of Gujrat by Akbar, and of succeeding events.

(6) MA'ASIR-i-RAHIMI. It is written by Muhammad 'Abdul Baqi and describes the pedigree, life and exploits of 'Abdur Rahim Khan Khanan's Gujrat, Sind and Deccan campaigns. It also throws light on the conquest of Gujrat by Akbar and Khandesh-Mughal relations during this period. It tells of the weakness of the Nizam Shahis and the subsequent penetration of the Mughals into the south.

(7) TUZUK-i-JAHANGIRI The Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri or Memoirs of Emperor Jahangir ~~himself~~. It is variously called, Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, Karnamah-i-Jahangiri, Waqiat-i-Jahangiri, Jahangir Namah and Maqalat-i-Jahangiri.

It was written by the emperor himself from his accession to the seventeenth year of his reign and continued under his supervision by Mu'tamiz Khan, from that date to the beginning of the nineteenth year. It was afterwards completed by Muhammad Hadi and brought down to the end of the reign.

Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri forms the prime authority for the study of Jahangir's reign and his personality. Full accounts of the riots and rebellions, wars and conquests are given. All the important appointments, promotions and dismissals are mentioned. Epidemics are vividly described. The inefficiency of the imperial officers against the Deccanis is

clearly mentioned by the emperor. The emperor's own daily life is revealed with candour and frankness, but a few incidents such as his revolt against his father and the circumstances of Khusrau's death being glossed over. The emperor praises Nur Jahan for his good administration and efficiency. The memoirs give us an account of prince Shahjahan's rise during the reign of his father. But when the prince rebelled, Jahangir's attitude changed towards him; and instead of his lofty titles, Shahjahan is referred to by the emperor as 'unfortunate'. Jahangir held Shahjahan responsible for the encouragement of the Deccanis, who profited during the rebellion and regained their territory.

(8) IQBAL NAMAH-i-JAHANGIRI by Muhammad Sharif entitled Mu'amid Khan. It is in three parts: the first deals with the history of Babur and Humayun, the second with the reign of Akbar and the third with the entire reign of Jahangir and the accession of Shahjahan. The first two parts are scarce but the third commonly known as Iqbal Namah-i-Jahangiri.

The author, a native of Persia, received in the third year of Jahangir's ^{reign} a military command and the title of Mu' ^amid Khan. He was subsequently attached to as Bakhshi to the service of prince Shahjahan, whom he followed in the Deccan campaigns in 1616 - 17 A.D. On his return to the court in the seventeenth year of the reign, he was appointed to carry on the Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri.

He was concerned in the affair of Shahjahan's revolt and was present at the imperial court when Mahabat Khan captured Jahangir in 1626 A.D. On many occasions, he writes with the authority of an eye-witness. As he completed his work after Jahangir's death, hence in the account of the last years, he writes as a partisan of Shahjahan and adopts a tone of bitterness towards Nur Jahan and her adherents. He rose to a higher rank under Shahjahan, attained the office of Mir Bakhshi in the tenth year of the new reign. He died in 1049 A.H./1639 A.D. For the first eighteen years of Jahangir's reign Mu'tam^ud Khan's style is very often the same as in Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri. Nevertheless he is one of the primary authorities for the period, which is not covered by Jahangir.

(9) MA'ASIR-i-JAHANGIRI. It is a history of the early life and reign of Jahangir by Mirza Kamgar Husaini. It was compiled in 1630 A.D. Kamgar Husaini grew in the service of Jahangir, whom as he states in the present work, he accompanied on one of his journeys of Kashmir. A comparison of Iqbal Namah-i-Jahangiri and Ma'asir-i-Jahangiri, will show the fact that both authors obtained their information from the same sources. Kamgar took an active part in the campaign against the rebel Khan Jahan Lodi. One of his sources is his uncle 'Abdullah Khan Firoz Jang, who was a commander under Jahangir.

The author records mutual rivalries of the imperialists in the Deccan, the activities of Nur Jahan junta, and does not hesitate in admitting the valour and efficiency of Malik 'Ambar. Like Mu'tam^ud Khan, he also adopts a hostile attitude in

recording the activities of Nur Jahan, as he was completing his work during the reign of Shahjahan who promoted him to a rank of 3000. In 1048 A.H/ 1638 A.D. he was appointed governor of Delhi and afterwards transferred to Thatta where he died in 1050 A.H/1640 A.D.

(10) PADSHAH NAMA by QAZWINI. This is a history of the early life of Shahjahan and the first ten years of his reign, written by Muhammad Amin Qazwini, son of Abdul Hasan Qazwini.

The author says in the preface, that he had migrated from Iran, his native country and had entered the imperial service in the fifth year of Shahjahan's reign. When Amin Qazwini submitted to Shahjahan an account of his Bundela campaigns, the emperor was pleased with his presentation and asked him to prepare a full history from his birth (Shahjahan's birth) to the end of his tenth year. The result was the present work to which the above title was given by Shahjahan. Although the author states that he had orders to prepare another volume containing the second decade of the reign, but we learn from other sources that the task was entrusted to other hands. 'Amal-i-Salih(I) says that Mirza Amin after being employed on Padshah Namah was transferred to the office of collecting intelligence.

The Padshah Namah is divided into three sections, called Muqaddimah, Maqalah and Khatimah. Being partial to his patron, the emperor, the author blames Nur Jahan for the cause of rebellion of his master. He gives an account of the

Mughals against the Nizam Shahis and the treaty of 1636 A.D. with Bijapur and Golconda in detail.

(11) PADSHAH NAMAH by JALAL TABATABA'I. An official record of the reign of Shahjahan from the beginning of the fifth year to the end of the eighth year, ~~by~~ Mirza Jalal ud-Din Tabatabai.

The history seems to be a reproduction of Padshah Namah of Amin, though the author gives sometimes few details, Like Amin, Mirza Jalal also follows his chronology based on the solar system. The work was completed in 1050 A.H/ 1640 A.D.

(12) PADSHAH NAMAH by LAHAURI. The official history of the reign of Shahjahan from his accession to the end of the 30th year of his reign. Jumadi I 1067 A.H. ~~written~~ by 'Abdul Hamid Lahauri.

The author says in the preface that he was living in retirement at Patnah, when Shahjahan, who admired the matchless elegance displayed by Abul Fazl in the Akbar Namah, upon being told that 'Abdul Hamid had mastered that style of composition, called him to the court and entrusted him to write the record of his reign. 'Abdul Hamid did not live to complete the work. He could finish only an account of the first twenty years of the reign, then he was prevented by the infirmities of old age. He finished the present work in Nov. 1648 and died on 30th August 1654 A.D.

Being a court historian, Lahauri's attitude towards Nur Jahan is harsh. He describes events in a more detailed form than Amin Qazmini. His account of the Mughal activities against the Nizam Shahis and the subsequent treaties of 1636 A.D. with Bijapur and Golconda have been described in full detail. His chronology is correct and from the historical point of view, the work is of great value.

(13) PADSHAH NAMA by WARIS. The work of Lahauri was continued and completed by his pupil Muhammad Waris. He has recorded the events of the third cycle of Shahjahan's reign. His account of the Mughal invasions of Golconda and Bijapur is of great help in forming a complete picture of the Shahjahan's relations with the Deccan states.

(14) TAWARIKH-i-SHAHJAHANI. It is written by Muhammad Sadiq entitled Sadiq Khan. The author begins from the time of Jahangir's death and goes on to the time of Shahjahan's confinement in 1658 A.D.

The author states in the preface that he had been attached as news-writer to prince Shahjahan in his campaign against Rana of Mewar (1022 A.H/1613 A.D.) and that he proposed in the present work to record briefly the events which he had witnessed from the prince's accession to his confinement, an event brought about, he adds, by the folly of Dara Shikoh.

At the time of Shahjahan's accession, Sadiq was raised to the office of Bakhshi and then appointed tutor to prince Shuja

whom he accompanied on his campaigns in Khandesh and Malwa. In 1648 A.D., he was made Daroghah of Ghusakhana or private audience chamber and from that time he seems to have remained in constant attendance upon Shahjahan. He followed the emperor to Kabul in 1650. He personally took part in the negotiations between Shahjahan and Aurangzeb after the defeat of Dara.

The account of Sadiq is one of the most reliable authorities of the period. He was an eye-witness to most of the events recorded therein, and being at the court he had an easy access to the official records. Moreover three of his uncles, ~~namely~~ Is'haq Beg, Amin Khan, and Baqi Khan held high posts in the government and were a great source of information to him.

With the exception of his patron, Shahjahan, the pen of Sadiq is impartial. He admires the valour and tactics of the Deccanis and admits the cause of the Mughal failure in recapturing Qandahar due to the inferior firearms of the imperialists. At the time of the defeat of Dara, he remained faithful with the emperor and comments severely on those who deserted the ailing sovereign to flock round the rebellious son.

(15) AMAL-i-SALIH. A detailed history of Shahjahan by Muhammad Salih Kambu. It was completed, the author says, after long delays in 1070 A.H./1659 A.D. The record of Shahjahan's death in 1076 A.H/1665 A.D. must therefore be a later addition.

The work includes a preface, an account of Shahjahan's predecessors from Jahangir upwards to Timur, and the reign of Shahjahan and his death in 1665 A.D. and a bibliographical notices on the eminent men of Shahjahan's period.

As Kambu was serving in the Imperial Records Department, he had access to first hand sources. But a critical study will show that except for a few details, his account is an abridgement of the other histories of the reign. He is no doubt partial to Shahjahan but he censors him regarding the murder of Khusrau.

(16) ADAB-i-ALAMGIRI. Letters written by Munshi ul-Mamalik Shaikh ^{Abul FATH} in the name of Aurangzeb, collected by Sadiq Muttalibi. The letters were compiled in 1115 A.H/1703 A.D.

The writer of the letters, Shaikh Abul Fath, of Thattah, was attached as Mir Munshi Walashahi to Aurangzeb before his accession. He received the title of Qabil Khan in the first year of the reign, retired from the office in the second and died in the fifth (1072-73 A.H/1661-62 A.D)

Contents: Letters written in the name of Aurangzeb during his princehood to Shahjahan, and nobles of the imperial government, an account of war of succession, letters written to Shahjahan during his confinement, and letters written for prince Muhammad.

The Adab gives a full account of the Mughal's relations with Golconda and Bijapur during both the governorships of Aurangzeb in the Deccan. It also throws light on the Mughal Mughals' relations with ~~the~~ other petty states in the south.

It contains letters of Aurangzeb to Sa'adullah Khan, Mir Jumla and Shahjahan, urging them for the annexation of the Deccan states. The account of the Mughals under Shahjahan, with Bijapur and Golconda, remains incomplete without Adab-i-Alamgiri.

(17) WIQIAT-i-ALAMGIRI by 'AQIL KHAN RAZI. It is a history of the first five years of Aurangzeb.

The work includes the early life of Aurangzeb, provincial governments assigned by Shahjahan to his sons, war of succession between the sons of Shahjahan.

The siege of Bijapur by Aurangzeb in 1657 and the letter of Aurangzeb to Shahjahan when the prince started to Delhi, charging Dara for the failure of the campaign, have been given in detail.

(18) HAFT GULSHAN. It is a general history of India from the earliest times to 1132 A.H./1720 A.D. written by Muhammad Hadi entitled Kamwar Khan.

The author served under Aurangzeb for some years and then retired to devote himself to his historical studies. He follows Firishta and for the later period Lub^{b-}ut-Tawarikh as his principal authorities. Haft Gulshan is divided, as its name implies, into seven -beds (Gulshan), some of which are subdivided into rose-bushes (Gulbun).

It deals with the different dynasties of the Deccan, Khandesh, Malwa and Gujrat and with the Mughals in India. It gives the causes of the Mughal penetration into the south
and the subsequent events.

(19) MIRAT-i-AHMADI. A history of Gujrat from the earliest times to the defeat of the Marhathas at Panipat in 1174 A.H/ 1761 A.D. It is written by 'Ali Muhammad Khan. He commenced the work in 1170 A.H/1756-57 A.D., the fourth year of Alamgir II. He says that from 1120 A.H./1708 A.D. when at the age of eight or nine years, he left Burhanpur for Gujrat, and had been constantly engaged in taking note of passing events and collecting historical information from trustworthy people.

The work supplies information regarding the relations of the Gujrat kings with the rulers of Malwa, Deccan and the Mughals. It gives the activities of the Mirzas against Akbar after and during the conquest of Gujrat and throws some light on the Portuguese-Mughal relations under Akbar.

(20) MA'ASIR ul-UMARA. by Samsam ud-Daulah Shahnawaz Khan Khwajfi Aurangabadi. The Ma'asir contains an account of the lives of great Amirs of the Indian empire from the beginning of Akbar's reign to the time of its completion.

Shahnawaz wrote the Ma'asir in 1160 A.H/1747 A.D. but the work was continued by his son, who completed it in 1194 A.H/ 1780 A.D. . Apart from the lives of the great Amirs the work also sometimes narrates historical events of the past years.

(21) MUNTAKHAB ul-LUBAB. A general history of India from the Muhammadan conquest to the reign of Muhammad Shah, ~~written~~ by Muhammad Hashim Khan, entitled Hashim 'Ali Khan, afterwards Khafi Khan Nizam ul-Mulki.

Muhammad Hashim was brought up in the service of Aurangzeb, who employed him in some political and military situations. He received the title of Khafi Khan from Muhammad Shah. Khafi Khan brought down his history to 1143 - 44 A.H/1770-71 A.D.

The first volume of Lubab which appears to be very scarce, contains a history of the Sultanate of Delhi. The second comprises a full account of the Timurides of India from 1526 A.D. to the reign of Muhammad Shah. The third volume treats the local dynasties of India.

Lubab sometimes adds information to Firishta and other accounts, otherwise it is an abridgement of the past histories.

(22) CHAHAR GULSHAN. A general history of India from the earliest times to 1173 A.H/1759 A.D. by Rai Chatarman.

The work is divided, as its name implies, into four sections called Chamans: I Subabs of Hindustan, II Subahs of the Deccan, III Itineraries from Delhi to various parts of India, IV Orders of Muslim and Hindu 'faqirs'.

Chaman II, contains a topographical account of the

subahs of the Deccan, i.e. Berar, Khandesh, Aurangabad, Bijapur, Golconda and Muhammadabad, followed by a history of the local dynasties namely Bahmanis, 'Adil Shahis, Nizam Shahis, Qutb Shahis, 'Imad Shahis, Barid Shahis, Siva and Sambha. It concludes with an account of the fortresses of the Deccan and notices on its saints.

The author records the dynastic wars of the Deccanis and their political weakness which encouraged the Mughals to capture their states.

(23) TARIKH-i-'ALAM-ARA-i-'ABBASI. A history of the life and reign of Shah 'Abbas I, with an introduction treating of his predecessors. Its author is Mirza ISKANDAR, known as MUNSHI, who completed the work in 1038 A.H/1628 A.D. It comprises a Muqaddimah and two parts termed sahifah.

It supplies the history of Qandahar which was a bone of contention between the Qizilbashs and the Mughals. The diplomatic missions between the two states have been mentioned and the possession of Qandahar in 1622 by the Qizilbashs has been regarded as their legal right.

DECCANI HISTORIES.

(24) INSHA SHAH TAHIR al-HUSAINI. It contains letters of Shah Tahir al-Husaini. Finding his life insecure at the court of Shah Isma'il Safawi, Shah Tahir came to India in 926 A.H/1522 A.D., upon the invitation of Burhan Nizam Shah, to the court of Ahmadnagar. He soon became the trusted friend and adviser of the king, who sent him on various political missions

to the courts of Gujrat, Khandesh, Bijapur and Golconda. He was a zealous apostle of Shī'a faith to which he gained over Burhan Nizam Shah in 944 A.H/1537 A.D. He died in Ahmad-nagar in 952 A.H/1545 A.D.

The Insha, contains some letters written by Tahir, partly in the name of Nizam Shah and partly in his own name. The letters included from Nizam Shah to Babur, Humayun, Miran Muhammad Shah of Khandesh, Khudawand Khan, the wazir of Sultan Bahadur Shah, and to others. These letters throw light on the mutual rivalries among the Deccan states and the weak position of Nizam Shah, who was forced to acknowledge Babur and Humayun as his overlords.

(25) BURHAN-i-MA'ASIR. A history of the Bahmanis and of the Nizam Shahis from 742 A.H/1341-42 A.D. to 1004 A.H/1595-1695 A.D., ~~written~~ by 'Ali b. 'Aziz Ullah Tabatabai.

The author stated in the preface that he wrote this work by command of the reigning monarch Burhan Nizam Shah (999 A.H/1590-91 A.D. -- 1003 A.H/1594-95 A.D) and that he commenced it in 1000 A.H/1591-92 A.D. a year expressed by the numerical value of the above title. The *Ma'asir* comes down to the later part of 1004 A.H/1596 A.D.

It is divided into three Tabaqahs.

I. dealing from 'Ala'ud-Din Hasan Shah (742 A.H/1341-42 A.D. -- 758 A.H/1357 A.D) to Taj ud-Din Firoz Shah who died in 825 A.H/1422 A.D.

II. Shahab ud-Din Ahmad Shah b. Ahmad Khan who died in 838 A.H/1434-35 A.D. to Mahmud Shah b. Muhammad Shah who

died in 904 A.H/1498-99 A.D.

III. Ahmad Shah Bahri (891 A.H/1486 A.D -- 911 A.H/1505-06 A.D.) to the year of Burhan's death.

From the thesis point of view, it is of a great value as this is the contemporary history of Burhan Nizam, who was placed to the Nizam Shahi throne by the help of Akbar. It deals with the dynastic wars of the Deccanis, Burhan-i-Ma'asir gives causes of the advance of the Mughals into the Deccan, sack of the town of Ahmadnagar by the imperialists, night attack of Abhang Khan and the breach made in the wall and the peace concluded between prince Murad and Chand Bibi in 1005 A.H/1596 A.D. The author states that he had been an eye-witness of the events therein recorded.

(26) TAZKIRAT UL-MULUK. It is written by Rafi'ud-Din Shirazi, who came to India in 1559 A.D. It is a general history of the Deccan, though the author has concentrated his attention chiefly on Bijapur. However the author sometimes gives information about the Mughals, Ahmadnagar and Golconda.

The work is characterised by a simple and vigorous style unencumbered with hyperbolic exaggeration or metaphoric bombast. The work was presented to Muhammad 'Adil Shah.

(27) FUTUHAT-i-'ADIL SHAHI. A history of the 'Adil Shahis of Bijapur from their origin to 1054 A.H/1644 A.D., ~~written~~

by Fuzuni Astrabadi.

It is divided into six 'Babs' (sections), treating of the following six reigns:- Yusaf 'Adil Shah, Isma'il 'Adil Shah, Ibrahim 'Ali, Ibrahim II and Sultan Muhammad. The last being much fuller than the preceding reigns, make together about two-thirds of the whole work. For the reign of Muhammad 'Adil Shah his authority is trustworthy, probably because he had access to the state records.

Fuzuni Astrabadi gives a detailed account of the Mughal activities under Akbar, Jahangir and the first thirteen years of Shahjahan's reign, discusses the relations between the Mughals and Bijapur up to the year 1641 A.D. His account with regard to the fall of Ahmadnagar and Asir, under Akbar, with the exception of a few minor details, agrees with the accounts of the court chroniclers.

(28) ZAFAR ul-WALIH BI MUZ AFFAR WA ALIH. It is an Arabic history of Gujrat ~~written~~ by 'Abdullah Muhammad b.Omar al-Meccii, al-Asafi, Ulughkhani known as Haji Dabir.

Haji Dabir was born in Mecca in 1540 A.D. He first came to India in 1555 A.D. and settled with his father in Ahmadabad. In 1559 A.D. he entered the service of his first master Muhammad Ulughkhan the Abyssinian, a prominent noble and general in Gujrat, In 1573 A.D., when Akbar entered Gujrat, the author's father was appointed by Akbar administrator of the 'Waqfs' or religious endowments, dedicated to Mecca and Medina. After the death of his father in 1576 A.D., he entered the service of another Gujrati

noble Saif ul-Muluk. Later on in 1595 A.D., he joined the service of Fulad Khan, a leading noble of Khandesh, who died in 1605 A.D. This, the latest date mentioned in the history, is also the year in which Akbar died, but no reference is made to this event.

The original manuscript, which is in Arabic, lies in Calcutta Madrasah, India. I have used its Arabic text, edited by E. Denison Ross, Vol.I. London 1910. The whole manuscript has been edited in three volumes. The first volume includes the history of Jaunpur, the conquest of the Deccan by the arms of Islam, bringing it down to 1605 A.D; the Sultans of Mandu and the life of famous wazir 'Abdul Aziz Asaf Khan.

When Bahadur Khan of Khandesh shut himself in Asirgarh, Haji Dabir was also one of the besieged. He is therefore an eye-witness to the events occurring in the fort. He supplies us with the information regarding Bahadur's character, the treachery employed by Afzal Khan, the wazir, who was in league with the Mughals, the calamity which occurred in the fort, and all events leading to the capture of Asirgarh by Akbar. He held Bahadur responsible for the fall of his dynasty because his harsh behaviour, turned the besieged against him and forced him to surrender. Haji Dabir's account is a great help in forming a true picture of the siege of Asirgarh. Zafar al-Walih does not agree with the Jesuit account but rather corroborates the Muslim chronicles.

(29) TARIKH-i-FIRISHTA. A general history of India from the earliest times to 1015 A.H/1606 A.D. with some later additions up to the year 1033 A.H/1623-24 A.D. by Muhammad Qasim Hindu Shah, commonly known as Firishta.

He was taken at an early age to India by his father Maulana Ghulam 'Ali Hindushah, who was finally appointed tutor to Miran Husain, the son of Murtaza Nizam Shah. Firishta grew up at the court of Murtaza Nizam Shah (972 A.H/1564-65 A.D. -- 996 A.H/1588 A.D) and held the post of captain of the royal guard. He had to leave the court of Ibrahim Nizam Shah, in 998 A.H/1590 A.D. due to the atrocities of Jamal Khan, the peshwa of Nizam Shah. He went to Bijapur and was called upon by Ibrahim 'Adil Shah (988 A.H/1580 A.D. -- 1037 A.H/1627 A.D) to write the present history, which he presented to his Majesty in 1015 A.H/1606 A.D.

Tarikh-i-Firishta is divided into a Muqaddimah, twelve Maqalahs and a Khatimah.

Muqaddimah deals with the tenets of the Hindus, their early Rajas and the first appearance of Islamism in India.

The Maqalahas deal with:-

- I. Sultans of Lahore and Gaznawids.
 - II. Sultans of Delhi.
 - III. Sultans of Deccan in six Rauzahs -- (i) kings of Gulburga, (ii) Bijapur, (iii) Ahmadnagar, (iv) Golconda (v) Berar, (vi) Bedar.
 - IV. Sultans of Gujrat.
 - V. Sultans of Malwa and Gujrat.
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- VI. Faruqi Sultans of Burhanpur.
- VII. Sultans of Bengal.
- VIII. Rulers of Sind.
- IX. The Samagan or Zamindars of Sind.
- X. Kings of Kashmir.
- XI. Account of Malabar.
- XII. Saints of India.

Khatimah gives description of India and an enumeration of the local rajas.

The history of Firishta informs us of the relations between the Sultan of Gujrat and the Deccan states, and gives a detailed account of their political weakness which encouraged Akbar, to penetrate into the south. Firishta tells us the selfish activities of the Ahmadnagaris before and during the siege of Ahmadnagar by the Mughals under Akbar. Regarding the fall of Asirgarh, his account agrees on the whole with his other contemporary Muslim Chroniclers, though differing in details. He mentions that he went to the Jamia Masjid of Asirgarh, after its capture by the Mughals. But his chronology is sometimes not free from faults and that can be checked by the contemporary accounts.

(30) BASATIN-us-SALATIN. A history of the 'Adil Shahis from their origin to the conquest of Bijapur by Aurangzeb, by Ghulam Murtaza, surnamed Sahib Beg.

The author gives a long list of his sources which include Tarikh-i-Firishta, Muhammad Namah, Tarikh-i-'Ali 'Adil Shah,

and 'Ali Namah.

The work is divided into eight sections and contains an Appendix. It was completed in 1237 A.H/1821-22 A.D. With regard to the legality of the accession of 'Ali Adil Shah II it is not authentic as one of its sources is Tarikh-i- 'Ali Adil Shah, which was written on the order of the monarch whose succession was in question,

(31) TARIKH-i-SULTAN MUHAMMAD QUTB SHAHI. A history of the Qutb Shahis of Golconda from their origin to 1027 A.H. by an unknown author. The author says that he was ordered by the reigning monarch Sultan Muhammad Qutb Shah to make an abridgment of a history of that king's predecessors written by a servant of the Qutb Shahis, not mentioned by name. The result was the present work. The earlier history, of which the present is an abridgement, is in all probability the work which Firishta was not able to procure, and which he ascribes to Shah Khwurshah, a native of Iraq.

The Tarikh is divided into an introduction, four books called Maqalahs and an Appendix. It throws light on the relations of Golconda with other Deccan states and with the Mughals and adds to the formation of Firishta.

(32) HADIQAT US-SALATIN. A history of Sultan 'Abdullah Qutb Shah, from his birth (1023 A.H/1614 A.D) to the end of the sixteenth year of his reign (1050 A.H/1640 A.D). Its author is Nizam ud-Din Ahmad b.'Abdullah ush-Shirazi us-Sa'idi.

From the accession of 'Abdullah (1035 A.H/1626 A.D) the events are recorded year by year in the pompous style of court-annals and with tedious prolixity.

It also records the Mughal activities under Asaf Khan in 1631-32 A.D. against Bijapur. Qutb Shah's relations with Shahjahan up to the year 1640 have been discussed. The author says that Qutb Shah agreed to the treaty of 1636 because he wanted to avoid the bloodshed of the Muslims.

(33) HADIQAT-UL-ALAM. A history of Qutb Shahis and of the Asafis or Nizams of Haiderabad by 'Abul Qasim b. Razi ud. Din ul-Musawi, surnamed Mir 'Alam. The author has based mainly on the Tarikh-i-Muhammad Qutb Shahi, Firishta and Khafi Khan but at times he also exhibits critical acumen in his choice of a more reasonable and convincing account from among the many versions of controversial topics. He agrees with the Mughal chronicles that 'Ali 'Adil Shah was an adopted son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah. Similarly he criticizes Aurangzeb that the annexation of Golconda in 1686 brought little glory to the Mughal rule.

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