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The domestic and foreign affairs of Egypt from 1876 to 1882

by

Ahmed Abdel-Rehim Mustafa

B.A., M.A.

Thesis submitted to the London University for the PH. D. Degree 1955.
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Abbreviations

'Abdīn The Egyptian Archives at the 'Abdīn Palace (now the Palace of the Republic).

'Abdīn, American, Reports of the American (U.S.) Consulate-General at the 'Abdīn Palace.

'Abdīn, Abraham, The reports of Abraham Bey, later Pasha, Isma'il's agent at Istanbul.

Al-Thawra al-'Orābiya, Al-Rafi'i, Al-Thawra al-'Orābiya wa'l-iḥtīlāl al-Ingilīzī.

Al-Waka'ī, Al-Waka'ī al-Miṣrīya.

B.B. Blue Books.

D.D.F. Documents Diplomatiques Français.

Encyc. of Islam The Encyclopaedia of Islam.

F.O. The Foreign Office Archives at the Public Record Office.


Khedivate Dicey, The story of the Khedivate.
Nin. Cent. The Nineteenth Century.

Q. d'Or. The French Archives at the "Section d'Archives" in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sabry, Genèse La Genèse de l'esprit national égyptien.

" Ismail L'Empire égyptien sous Ismail et l'ingérence anglo-française.


Secret history Blunt, Secret History of the English occupation of Egypt.
This thesis has developed from a project I originally had in mind of writing a study, in Arabic, on "The Egyptian Question from 1879 to 1882". I proposed submitting this as a thesis for a Doctorate of Philosophy to the Ain Shams University in Cairo. But finding that the data available in Egypt would add too little for the purpose to what had already been published on this subject, I decided that I should be well advised to consult the relevant British and French Archives. I accordingly applied for a period of study leave in order to visit London and Paris; and this was agreed to by both the Ain Shams University and the Egyptian Ministry of Education, who accorded me every possible facility.

I then, however, decided, instead of pursuing my original intention, to obtain leave to submit a thesis, in English, to the University of London, also on the Egyptian Question, but covering the years 1876 to 1882, since I considered that the events of the last four years of that period might thereby be more satisfactorily elucidated. Moreover, in view of the fact that the international aspect of the subject had already received much attention from historians, I also resolved to give particular weight in my study to its domestic side. Hence the title under which I present it.

I should like to thank my supervisor, Mr. Harold Bowen, for the help he has given me, particularly in the matter of putting my thoughts into English.
Between 1875 and 1882 Egypt stood at the cross-roads. During those years, various circumstances, domestic and foreign, combined to produce a crisis, by which her destiny in the ensuing age was decided.

The period was characterised by a growth of imperialist ambitions in the countries of Western Europe and of the enterprise of their capitalists in other parts of the world. Wherever the capitalist and the trader established an entry, the governments behind them exterted pressure through their diplomatic and consular agents. One area that offered them tempting scope was the Ottoman Empire, which was dealt a crushing blow at the Berlin Congress of 1878, and left even less capable of resistance to the Powers than before. The Sultan was then deprived of most of his possessions in the
Balkans and of some territory in Asia, and was obliged to yield up all but nominal sovereignty over Cyprus. Three years later, Tunis was occupied, and Egypt, too, stood in dire peril of a similar fate.

These disasters were deeply felt throughout the Moslem world, in which the Ottoman Empire had long constituted the leading State. At first, despair gave birth to a feeling of hopeless inferiority and enhanced Moslem ego-centrism and regression. Hatred of Europeans became all but universal—a sentiment that Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid sought to exploit in furtherance of his Panislamic schemes. Yet an enlightened minority preached the doctrine that in order to resist European aggression it was necessary for Moslems to adapt themselves to the spirit of the age by applying to their institutions a further dose of westernisation. Various schools of thought and policy were not slow to show themselves.

In Egypt innovation was soon seen to be most difficult in the field of social reform, since the forces of fanaticism and irrational conservatism were still very strong, and most of the efforts then made met with failure. Yet the clash itself had its impact on the rising generation and produced the results which are now at work in the whole Moslem world. It is sometimes wondered why the clash between the old and the new has been so prolonged in the world of Islam. The answer
is that the opposed forces have been too evenly matched for one quickly to overcome the other.

In the political field the impact of the West was felt with renewed force from the date of the Khedive Ismai\textsuperscript{îl}'s accession (1863). A sham assembly was first created by the ruler in order to facilitate the collection and levying of ever-increasing taxes, and then converted into the semblance of a parliament à l'\textit{européenne}, even though the overwhelming majority of its members were illiterate landlords. An energetic press, meanwhile, combatted both the arbitrary authority of the Khedive and foreign interference. The Egyptian people began to be aware of their right, as a nation, to rule themselves and escape from all alien domination. A National Party came into being; and as the army was the only governmental class which was mainly native, the National Movement took a military shape which was not accurately judged in Europe. A real Revolution was imminent in Egypt in 1881–82, the causes of which were not very different from those which produced the French Revolution of 1789.

Meanwhile, the politicians were active. First the privileged class of Turks and Circassians did their best to preserve the \textit{ancien \textsuperscript{r}égime} under which they were able to despoil the native population. They were opposed to the new European penetration, but had neither the courage nor the
force to defy it openly. Then, there was the moderate school of natives headed by Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Riyyāḍ (though each had his own means of realizing his point of view), who believed in enlightened despotism, backed, to some extent, by reasonable European moral support; and, finally there were the fatalists, headed by Nūbār (an Armenian by origin), who had no faith either in the ruler or in the ruled, and held that the best solution was a foreign, that is to say a British, occupation. Therefore when that occupation was in the end effected, it also found its supporters in the country, who were naturally always represented by the defeated Nationalists as pacifists and traitors.

While all was still in the melting pot, these clashes of opinion were not left to work themselves out unimpeded. The country's status - as a part of the Ottoman Empire - was guaranteed by the European concert, and Egypt's financial embarrassment had given England and France an opportunity to establish what amounted to a political condominium, which - exercised through the incessant interference of the two Governments - (as represented by their consuls and various other officials in the service of the Egyptian Government) - was hostile to the nascent Egyptian nationalism. Their joint policy was to support the Khedive in his arbitrary authority, to combat liberalism, and to support the forces of political
reaction. It was this clash between the Anglo-French condominium and the National Movement that led in the end to a British occupation, which, though ameliorating the material conditions of the rural classes, preserved the general character of the ancien régime, and delayed the evolution of Egypt for some decades to come.

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A truly objective study of the period, in which all the relevant information is duly weighed, has not yet seen the light, chiefly because the original Archives have so far been systematically examined only by writers who have perforce regarded its events solely from a European standpoint.

The objective study of such a period is comparatively difficult for many reasons:

In the first place, the material left by many of the dramatis personae is chiefly apologetic, while that left by onlookers, either active in a minor capacity or not active at all, is hardly less subjective.

Secondly, in all the literature concerning our period, the reader is confronted from the start with three clashing points of view; the Egyptian, the French and the English.

(A) The Egyptian standpoint has until recently been influenced by domestic considerations:

(1) The “sword and the gold” of the late Dynasty;
(2) The lack of any agreed judgment on domestic personalities and policies. This has been due partly to the fact that the forces that shaped Egyptian history in our period remained active after Egypt attained her independence, and partly to inherited falsifications of facts and to the opportunism that marked Egyptian public life from the thirties onwards;

(3) Even the most prominent and independent native writers have, for the most part, based their narratives on local data and printed material. In these productions, the international forces at work are largely ignored (in contrast to the works of European historians, who give so great a priority to the European standpoint as either partially or totally to ignore the Egyptian).

(B) The French writers are inclined either to attack the Egyptian National Movement, since it led to an exclusive British occupation, or else to praise it as a child of 1789, and to devote their attacks instead to perfide Albion.

(C) The early English narratives are generally efforts at justification, depicting the Egyptian movement as anything but liberal. It was indeed difficult for the writers to represent the Gladstonian Government as in fact suppressing liberalism even in a backward Moslem country. The English work that comes nearest to depicting the real state of affairs,
essentially uncritical though it is, and despite the low esteem in which it was held by Lord Cromer, is the narrative of Wilfrid Blunt. This does not mean that later attempts were not made to rectify this idée fixe. They seem, however, to have failed to impress the British public, largely owing to the influence of Cromer's *Modern Egypt* and of similar books written by such people as Sir Alfred Milner, Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir Edward Malet; and it is notable that, in 1954, John Marlow, (in his *Anglo-Egyptian relations, 1800-1953*), warns his countrymen not to repeat the fault of their grandfathers, by treating the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 in the same way as they treated that of 1881-82.

Thirdly: the Egyptian Archives from the reign of Tawfik have remained inaccessible for various reasons (though the Egyptian newspapers recently announced that they will soon be opened.) Moreover, even the earlier Archives have been so manipulated as to give a misleading picture of the policies of the Khedives.

Most of these difficulties have, I hope, as far as possible, been overcome in this essay which is, I believe, the first to treat the period critically on the basis of original material drawn from the Egyptian, British and French Archives.
(the last for the first time), and from the leading newspapers and periodicals appearing during the period in the three countries concerned.
Chapter I

Egypt after 1841

"Depuis [1841] l'Égypte... a cessé de menacer l'équilibre européen, mais elle a continué d'occuper une grande place dans les préoccupations des peuples, à raison des vastes intérêts qui gravitent autour d'elle."

C. De Freycinet, La Question d'Égypte, p. 98.

The settlement of 1840-41:

The crisis over Egypt, which occupied the attention of the European chanceries from 1839 to 1841, was to affect the political destiny of the Near East for years to come. Had the quarrel between the Sultan and his vassal been left to take its course, it might well have resulted in the collapse of the Ottoman and its replacement by an Egyptian empire. But European jealousies converted the dispute into an international question of the first importance. The result, through the success of Palmerston's diplomacy, was the Treaty of London of July 15th 1840, the Ḫaṭṭ ʿI-Sharīf of February

13th and the Ferman of June 1st, 1841, which between them decided the juridical status of Egypt until the eventual declaration of the British protectorate in 1914.

By the Ferman, Muḥammad ʿAlī's descendants were accorded an hereditary right to rule the country as simple governors, though with wider powers than those enjoyed by the other Ottoman Valīs. It was laid down that the Valī was a subject and a vassal of the Sultan, that the Egyptian was a part of the Ottoman army, that it would not exceed a strength of 18,000 men in time of peace, that the Valī should, as of old, send an annual tribute to Istanbul, that Ottoman law and treaties should apply to Egypt as an integral part of the Empire, that every new Valī should receive his investiture at Istanbul in person, and that Egyptian money should be struck and Egyptian taxes collected in the name of the Sultan. At the same time, Egypt's autonomy was otherwise complete, the Valīs having full power over the Egyptians in matters of administration, taxation, defence and jurisprudence.

In fact, the settlement achieved a general compromise which to some extent met the wishes of all concerned. Muḥammad ʿAlī kept Egypt for his dynasty. The Porte, provided that Egypt remained within the Empire, and limits were set to the Valī's authority, did not object to the principle of heredity. The great Powers maintained the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire without barring the way to European economic penetration.

Nevertheless, the settlement did not by any means prevent all parties from cherishing further ambitions. The concession of hereditary right could not but encourage the Valis to aspire to complete independence; the Porte might still hope to abrogate what Egypt had acquired when some opportunity presented itself; the participation of the European Powers in the settlement gave them the privilege of acting in future as arbiters and permitted them to meddle in both Egyptian and Turkish affairs.

With the settlement, there began a new phase in the Egyptian question separate from the general Eastern question. Weakened after the quadruple coalition against Muhammad *Ali, Egypt fell under the guarantee and control of the European concert. As a result of that tutelage, Egypt both suffered from and profited by European interference. On the one hand, the rights of extraterritoriality embodied in the Capitulations for the benefit of Europeans began more and more seriously to hamper the governmental machine in one way or another until their formal abrogation by the Montreux Agreement of 1937. On the other hand, by being guaranteed by the European concert, Egypt benefited

(1) This was guaranteed in the Convention of the Straits of July 13th 1841, to which the signatories were France, England, Russia, Prussia and Austria. Italy was associated in the guarantee later, by the Treaty of Paris (1856).
from the territorial protection given to the Ottoman Empire, which ensured that she could not be detached from the domains of the Sultan and annexed by any single European Power.

Owing to the indifference of the other Powers, whose main interest was in purely European affairs and who still considered the Egyptian question as an offshoot of the Ottoman, only referred to when opportunities arose for bargaining or compensation, the only Governments to which Egyptian affairs remained of prime importance were the Ottoman, the French and the British.

(1)
Franco-British rivalry:

Although England and France were Mediterranean powers with great interests in the Near East and Egypt, their aims were never identical. On the contrary, ever since Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition, there had existed between them that tense rivalry which was to be ended only by the "Entente Cordiale" of 1904, and which affected not only Egypt but also general European diplomacy to the greatest possible extent. That rivalry was really a continuation of the old antagonism in Canada and India, and the similar result of it was the decadence of French political influence.

(1) Etienne Vélay, Les rivalités franco-anglaises en Egypte (1876-1904) and Jean Darcy, Cent années de rivalité coloniale.
It is suggested by Sabry that the policy of both England and France after 1841 was to weaken Egypt, each hoping to lay hands on her before the other. The fact is, however, that Egypt was already weak and it was that very weakness which brought England and France face to face in the valley of the Nile, as her strength had before stimulated the collective interference of Europe during the Eastern crisis.

Up to 1841 France had aimed at making Egypt into an Eastern Belgium, having in Muḥammad ʿAlī a reliable "Leopold", the expansion of whose power meant for her the extension of French moral influence, and even after 1841 she still tried to subject Egypt to her exclusive influence and protection.

Being more sentimental than practical, the French always linked Egypt with historical recollections such as the crusade of St. Louis, the Capitulations, of which France considered herself the originator, Bonaparte's Near Eastern adventure, and France's political and technical support of Muḥammad ʿAlī. They always boasted of their "civilising mission", looking to Egypt as "an adoptive son of France" and even saying that, after the Nile, it was France who had made Egypt.

(1) Sabry (Sabri), Mohamed Ali, 542.

(2) Cf. Reinach, La politique opportuniste, 65. Also his Le Ministère Gambetta, 447. France also considered that the privileges accorded to Egypt in 1841 were due to her opposition to the Treaty of London.
In point of fact, the French language, even after the British occupation, was to remain the lingua franca of Egypt, and her second official language, at first after Turkish and later, from 1870, after Arabic. It was to France that Egyptian scholars were mostly sent, and it was France that furnished the rulers with most of their counsellors and experts. The construction of the Suez Canal, as the result of French initiative and enterprise, the supply of considerable loans to Sa'īd and Isma'īl and the installation in Egypt of a large French colony, all contributed to the French ascendancy, which reached its climax just before the fall of the Second Empire. Before 1870 France would have resisted any extension of British power in Egypt by all means at her disposal. That Egypt was in some special sense under the protection of France was throughout that period a tradition of French policy. Freycinet was to say with justice that "from the time of Napoleon onwards, France had never been indifferent to the affairs of Egypt for a single day." At times it even seemed to her that her prestige in the world was to be measured by


(2) In 1872 it numbered 17,000 and was second in size only to the Greek colony.

the role she played on the banks of the Nile, where it had been her constant policy to loosen the ties connecting Egypt with the Porte, in order, gradually and peacefully, to dominate the Valis herself.

Being aware of their country's weakness and isolation after 1871, French politicians found themselves compelled to seek a Franco-British détente, the result of which was the "Dual Control" of Egypt. A great number of French writers and politicians have attacked that policy, since it brought England and France face to face in Egypt without providing for any material safeguards to balance the inherent dangers. To this détente they attribute the unhappy events of 1878-1881 which ended in the British occupation and the decadence of French influence. On the other hand, other writers have defended it on the grounds that England already had interests in Egypt which were officially recognized, and that it was impossible for France either to act alone in Egypt or to oppose British policy. The inaction of France would have meant leaving the British to be the only masters of Egypt; and thus the détente was a very acceptable solution, allowing France to maintain her position in Egypt on the same footing as

England. This last suggestion is the nearest to reality. The condominium— as the Dual Control was generally called— was not the only cause of French failure in Egypt. The attitude of French representatives towards both Isma‘īl and Tawfīq was far from being cordial, and their aggressiveness—as compared to the amicable attitude of the British—resulted in the Khedives’ leaning towards the latter. Moreover, Republican France was notorious for her unstable governments; so frequently did her ministers and representatives abroad change that it was doubted if France had a foreign policy at all. This, compared with the stability of British policy regardless of any ministerial change, in addition to the aforementioned reasons—was the cause of French failure and British success.

On the other hand, British policy was conditioned, till the mid-seventies, by the traditional alliance with Turkey against Russia; at Istanbul, British representatives, such

(1) See Chaps. II, III and IV below.

(2) Christian Schéfer, D’une guerre à l’autre, v–vi. From 1876 to 1883, there were six French Foreign Secretaries: Decazes, Waddington, St. Hilaire, Gambetta, Freycinet and Duclerc, as against three British: Derby, Salisbury and Granville; and six French Consuls at Cairo: Des Michels, Godeaux, Tricou, De Ring, Sienkiewicz and De Vorges; as against three British: Stanton, Vivian and Malet.

(3) Freycinet does not suspect any "plan préconçu, ni desseins machiavéliques" on the part of England, during the period immediately prior to the occupation—See his Question d’Égypte, 331.
as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, exercised great influence over the Sultan and the Porte. Hence, the reestablishment of the status quo in Egypt according to the settlement of 1841, with its preservation of the Sultan's sovereignty, was agreeable to British interests in Egypt as a key-point on the highway to India. While maintaining adequately good relations with the Valis, the British were glad to see them maintained as vassals of the Sultan, and thereby safeguarded against any encroachment by France or other Powers. It was suspicion of French enterprise that caused Palmerston to oppose the realisation of the Suez Canal project, which was considered by him as an attempt on the part of the French to loosen the ties between Egypt and the Porte in order to pave the way for the establishment of a French protectorate.

From the day when the Suez Canal project was realized, it might have been logically presumed that Egypt was bound to pass under the control of the mistress of India at a time of growing imperialism. It is a common idée fixe with Egyptian chauvinist writers that England had had the occupation in mind ever since the Napoleonic expedition, in support of which

opinion they point to the Frazer expedition of 1807, though (1) this in fact had quite other causes. Muhammad Šabry, one of the best writers on the reigns of Muḥammad ʿAlī and Ismāʿīl, even argues that it was England's constant policy first to oppose Muhammad ʿAlī and later to depose Ismāʿīl, in order to weaken Egypt and lay hands on her African empire. But though some English individuals may have harboured such ambitions, British official circles never endorsed them. On the contrary, the British Government rejected the suggestions of Nicholas I on the eve of the Crimean War, of Napoleon III in 1856, and of Bismarck during the Russo-Turkish War, which all allotted Egypt to England as her share in the "sick man's" heritage. Until the late seventies, the British were content to keep the French from dominating Cairo, as they had kept the Russians from dominating Istanbul. But thenceforth, the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the debts of Ismāʿīl and the growth of Egyptian national opposition to foreign interference, which culminated in the so-called "Orābī Revolution"—all were decisive elements in causing the Liberal Government of 1880-85 to undertake the occupation, though it was contrary to Gladstonian principles.


(2) See for details Sabry (Ṣabri), Ismail, Mohamed Ali and Genèse.

(3) Generally referred to in European works as "Arabī". But since the Arabic spelling can be transliterated only as either ʿUrābī or ʿOrābī, I have preferred to adopt the latter transliteration.
In fact from 1880 there had occurred in England not only a startling uprising of new issues and new men, but a subtle change in the temper of politics and a new alignment of minds which altered the very texture of parties. Although a Liberal then displaced a Conservative Government, British foreign representation and the bureaucratic departments remained, for the most part, under the control of Conservatives who were inclined to advancing British interests everywhere regardless of the rights of others. For five years Gladstone sought unsuccessfully to stem the swelling tide of imperialism, but the task was hopeless from the start. British public opinion had been radically transformed since 1874 under the influence of the venturesome Disraeli. Books such as "Greater Britain" by Sir Charles Dilke (1868-69), and many others induced in the public a taste for annexation and devotion to the "Empire". Moreover, this new trend was greatly encouraged by the growth of capitalism and industrialism. Within the Liberal Cabinet itself there were members, such as Sir Charles Dilke, Lord Hartington and Joseph Chamberlain, who represented what they called Radical Imperialism and were soon to cause the resignation of Gladstone in 1882 because of their Irish and Egyptian policies. Their eagerness to impel the Cabinet into annexation was based on the

(1) While in opposition in 1878 Dilke had publicly advocated the annexation of Egypt. See Gwynn & Tuckwell, Life of Sir Charles Dilke, 53-4.
principle of compensation: a British occupation of Egypt to counterbalance the French occupation of Tunis. This made them opposed from the start to the policy of the Dual Control, and as their group was in firmer concert with the tendencies of public opinion than that of their opponents, their policy was decisive in the end and Egypt was occupied in 1882.

The Vālis of Egypt from Muḥammad ʿAlī to ʿIsāmālī

The settlement of 1841, despite its reduction of Muḥammad ʿAlī's power, had the effect of establishing his rule in Egypt even more firmly than before, and of ensuring its hereditary character. Like all the rulers of the country from the time of the fall of the Ancient Egyptian dynasties onwards, he and his descendants were of alien stock and never, up to the end, identified their interests with those of the people.


(2) Although the Liberal Cabinet decided from the first to observe the conditions governing the Control in letter and spirit and to endeavour, in concert with France, to secure the peace of Egypt and respect her financial obligations (See Joseph Chamberlain, Memoirs, 70), Gladstone himself criticized the Control (July 27th, 1882). Its establishment, he wrote, "was to bring foreign intervention into the heart of the country and to establish in the strictest sense a political control"; and it "has favoured the action of the disturbing parties, and has rendered necessary the series of steps which have brought your Majesty's Government into the present position." See John Morley, Life of Gladstone, III, 74, and Gladstone to Queen Victoria (July 24th, 1882) in Buckle, Letters of Queen Victoria, III.
Muḥammad ʿAlī and Ismāʾīl both indeed introduced a series of reforms. But the former thought of nothing beyond his army, as his means for realizing his great ambitions; while the chief aim of the latter was to pose as a monarch à l'européenne. The Egyptian people suffered during both reigns ruthlessness and oppression which can only be compared to that of the Mamluks. It must be noted that these two most prominent Valīs thought the Egyptians incapable of directing the native administration, since they believed that the natives did not possess the qualifications required for the higher official posts. For the bureaucratic routine work they were compelled to use them, but for the command of the army, as well as for most posts of executive authority in the civil service, they employed Turks or Circassians with a slight intermixture of Armenians and Europeans, and thus provided themselves with a reliable aristocracy, generally known as the "Turks", the "Circassians" or the "Arnaʿūds" and sometimes called "Mamluks" by the natives. This aristocracy, like the Valīs, despised the natives and formed a coterie that still preserved the Mamluk tradition of

(1) In his memoirs, ʿUrābī refers to what were alternatively called the "Circassian Princes" and the "Circassian mamluks" of the Khedivial family, who, as of old, had been bought and imported from the Caucasus and elsewhere. They received military training in the Citadel, after which they became officers. He also alludes to rumours that these Circassians cherished a hope of reviving the old Mamluk domination. Cf. his Kashf al-Sitār, I,153
regarding the Egyptians as an inferior race of mere manual workers. Their special interests, and the different links that tied them to the Viceroys furnished a certain kind of solidarity between the two vis-à-vis the natives. According to Sir Alfred Milner, they contributed a large proportion of the men upon whom the rank of Bey or Pasha was bestowed. A few of their families had been established in the country for generations, but the majority were immigrants or purchased "mamluks" (that is - slaves) of the Nineteenth Century. They were of the most varied origins - Kurds, Circassians, Turks from Algiers and Tunis, Turks from the Isles, Turks from Istanbul etc. Some of them were really not Turks at all, but Christians or even Jews, from different parts of the Levant, who had adopted the religion and fallen in with the habits of the dominant race. But, whatever their history, they were all contemptuous of the native "fellah", and, while being perfectly familiar with Arabic, they preferred to speak Turkish in social intercourse, and showed a superficial taste for European civilisation.

On the other hand, the natives composed the overwhelming majority of the population; but were neglected by their rulers.

(1) England in Egypt, 319 ff.

(2) According to the census of 1882, the population of Egypt numbered 6,715,000 natives and 91,000 foreigners.
Till the Revolution of 1881-2 no grave uprising took place against Egypt's tyrants. The real cause of this was the Egyptians' belief in fate. Hence, they blindly accepted the absolute authority of the ruler, the privileges of certain classes and the superiority of the Turks. The majority cared little about public affairs so long as nothing affected their creed, their traditions or their way of life.

Neither Muhammad 'Ali nor any of his direct successors really feared any general insurrectionary movement, simply because they never believed in the possibility of any genuine political aspiration among the native population. Down to the last days of Isma'il, Egypt seemed to be one of the last countries in the world in which a serious national movement was to be expected. This being the case, the Vālis were safe enough in pursuing their own line of policy, which was twofold: to exploit the people in order to obtain the money they needed to surround themselves with oriental pomp, and to withstand the Porte's efforts to regain what had been conceded in 1841. Meanwhile, the infiltration of Western thought and capital played a decisive part in the history of modern Egypt. The Vālis sometimes encouraged it, but they could not, even if they would, resist its influence in the remodelling of Egyptian society and thought.
Muḥammad ʿAlī's last years:

It is commonly said that the settlement of 1841 put an end to Muḥammad ʿAlī's activities. But while it limited his political action, his constructive efforts were still continued though on a lesser scale. His greatest pre-occupation was to resist the tendency of the British and French Governments to interfere unduly in Egyptian affairs, as guarantors, in the name of the settlement. While trying to treat the two Powers with courtesy, he sought to take advantage of their rivalry. Being always afraid of a British invasion, he collaborated with the French Government in fortifying Egypt's Mediterranean coasts. Similar fears of a Turkish attempt to abrogate Egypt's privileges made him increase his army above the limit fixed by the Fermans.

In order to ensure his autonomy Muḥammad ʿAlī laid hands on the British over-land and Nile communications which he bought and put wholly under Egyptian administration. When in 1846 the Suez Canal project was proposed to him, he did not — as is often stated — reject it out of hand. But

(1) See Sabry, Mohamed ʿAlī, Chap. XIII.

(2) He offered to put down the Cretan insurrection of 1841, and pointed out that a continued occupation of Syria would have allowed him to regenerate the Ottoman Empire from within. But England and France did not consider his overtures.
While hesitating for fear of British opposition, he insisted, as he had done earlier in 1834, on guarantees which would render the enterprise purely Egyptian; the capital being wholly native, and the technicians in the service of the Egyptian Government. Moreover, he spoke of Egypt's neutrality as a sine qua non of his participation, saying that the project was of general European interest.

From his long experience, "the adventurer of genius", as Lamartine called him, was convinced that reliance on France or any other European Power was futile. He thought that Turkish influence was less humiliating and easier to withstand than that of England and France. Hence his change of attitude towards Istanbul; and the establishment of better relations with the Ottoman authorities became the corner-stone of his policy after 1841. It offered a means of resisting Western pressure through the Suzerain Power.

*Abbas I and the growth of British influence (1848-54)

After the short regency of Ibrahim, Muhammad *Ali was followed on the throne by his grandson *Abbas who was both ruthless and fanatical. There thus began a gloomy reign in which schools were shut, academic institutions abolished, factories containing engines and other expensive material left to rot in a world of heat and dust; and the units of the fleet dismantled and sold to foreign countries. *Abbas was
suspicious of everybody, and inaugurated a system of espionage and the banishment to the White Nile of anyone who seemed to be dangerous or even prominent. An Albanian bodyguard accompanied him wherever he went; he spent much time with astrologers and fortune-tellers and indulged in the childish intimidation of foreign representatives by maintaining a tame tiger. His fanaticism led him to hate all Christians, especially the native Copts whom he excluded from the traditional posts they had held in the administration since the Arab conquest, and it was even said that he thought of banishing them all to the Southern Sudan. But his reign was a comparatively happy time for the fellahin. The absence of a large army made conscription unnecessary, and the corvée stopped automatically, there being no public works requiring it. Taxes were reduced and the monopoly system abolished.

As regards the West, Abbas would, if he could, have completely eliminated all European influence and sought to tighten relations between Egypt and the Porte. Although he


(2) A system of forced labour for the execution of public works. The inhabitants of all parts of the country were liable to be called out in any sudden emergency, as, for example, a high Nile.

(3) Rifaat (Rifat), The awakening of modern Egypt, 94.
had been his grandfather's favourite, he hated his attitude of
toleration towards Europeans and always said, "My grandfather
thought himself an autocrat. He was one to his subjects and
to his children, but to the Consuls of Europe he was no more
than a shoe. If I, too, must submit to someone, let me be then
the servant of the Caliph, and not of the Christians whom I
hate". He said too, "Europe has ruled in Egypt for a very
long time. The continuous struggle - to the detriment of the
Empire - between the Sultan and the Viceroy, sustained for the
profit of Europe, will lead only to the total ruin of the
Ottoman Empire, and thus Egypt's safety lies in ... [Istanbul]."

It was thus natural that under cAbbas relations between Egypt
and Turkey returned to be intimacy prevailing before the
battle of Navarino.

From its side, the Porte tried to take advantage of
cAbbas's attitude in order to strengthen the Sultan's hold on
Egypt. In 1850, orders were sent to cAbbas to introduce the
reform programme of the Tanzimat in its entirety, and to
suppress the corvée, use of the kurbāj and long military

(1) Elgood, The transit of Egypt, 55.
(2) Sabry, Ismail, 22.
(4) This word, meaning whip in Arabic, usually appears as Kurbash in English, Courbache in French. It had long been
the practice of government officials to force the peasants into
undertaking this forced labour, as well as to pay their tax
contributions, by ruthless floggings of the recalcitrant.
service. But although the settlement of 1841 had provided for the application of Ottoman laws to Egypt, and despite his policy of rapprochement with the Porte, ʿAbbas regarded this as unwarranted interference, and refused to comply even with the Imperial order. He argued that the inhabitants of Egypt had — from time immemorial — been accustomed to be beaten, and that if they were treated in accordance with the Tanẓimāt, they would presume that all punishments were completely abolished and consequently neglect the payment of taxes, quarrel with each other and sack the pilgrims on their way to Mecca. Hence, ʿAbbas asked that the Tanẓimāt should be adapted to "the manners and customs of the Egyptians and the traditions of their rulers." He even, as a precautionary measure, began to fortify Alexandria and to reinforce its garrison.

ʿAbbas was so much alarmed indeed that, against all his inclinations, he appealed to England for assistance. England responded and supported him against the Porte in Petersburg, Berlin and Istanbul, thereby earning the reward of a concession granted to an English company for the construction of the railway between Alexandria and Suez. This in turn, caused


(2) M.F. Shukry, Miṣr Waʾl-siyāda falaʾl-Sūdān, 31.
France to intervene with the Porte and represent cAbbas - who had already aroused annoyance by expelling all the French counsellors from his entourage - as having exceeded his rights by granting the concession before obtaining the Sultan’s consent.

In the end, in 1852, Fu’ād Effendi was sent to Cairo with instructions from the Sultan. A Ferman was issued, introducing the Tanzimat into Egypt in a modified form. Most of the Porte’s demands were complied with, their chief effect being a limitation of the Vāli’s absolute power of life and death over the Egyptians. cAbbas was rewarded for his complaisance by being granted, first for seven years and later for life, the right - which ran counter to the Tanzimat - to have condemned murderers executed, to exact forced labour and military service, and to exercise absolute control over the family of Muḥammad cAlī which, in his suspicious and despotic way, cAbbas had already treated with great severity. England gained great influence over cAbbas especially in his first years through her Agent, Colonel Murray. Not only was cAbbas as fearful as his grandfather of British naval power, and even the possibility of a British occupation, but he hoped, with British support, to obtain a change of the succession law whereby the pashālik should pass, by primogeniture instead, as hitherto, by seniority to his son Ilhāmī. On the outbreak of the Crimean War, when the European press openly discussed the possibility of a
British occupation, Abbas was much agitated. But England had already rejected the Tsar Nicholas's overture, and soon joined sides with Turkey against Russia. Abbas on this sent a contingent to Turkey which he addressed on its departure from Bulâk (the port of Cairo).

Sā'id and the Suez Canal (1854-1863):

It is generally said that Abbas was mysteriously killed. The fact is, however, that his sudden death was due to an apoplectic attack. The proclamation of Sā'id the heir-apparent as Vālī was delayed by an abortive attempt on the part of some of Abbas's officers to secure the succession instead to his son Ilhāmī, who was betrothed to a daughter of Abd al-Majīd by means of intrigue at Istanbul. But owing to the intervention of the British and French representatives Sā'id in due course succeeded on the throne with a remarkable reversal in attitude towards both Egyptians and foreigners. Having been prepared by his father, Muhammad ʿAlī, to serve in the navy, Sā'id had had the opportunity of real contact with the Egyptians, whom he liked and whose humorous attitude attracted him. He was the first Vālī to initiate a number of reforms for their sake, the most important of which was the law which provided for the

(1) Cf. my unpublished Ismāʿīl wa-falākātuhu biʿl-Bāb al-ʿAlī, pp. 4-5.

(2) F.O. 78/1036, Nos. 35 & 39, Bruce to Clarendon, dated July 17th & Aug. 13th, 1854.
distribution among tenants of the state lands, monopolised by Muhammad *Ali. The arrears of taxes owed by the fellahin to the state were cancelled, the commercial monopoly abolished, and the payment of taxes in kind, the internal custom duties and the collective system of taxes, all suppressed. Sa'id, too, forbade the slave trade and the use of the Kurbaj by administrative officials. It was really the golden age of the fellahin whose new status "gave an impetus to agriculture; the cultivation of cotton in particular received a strong stimulus."

Sa'id was greatly interested in the army. In his reign military service was reduced to one year, and that led to its popularity. All citizens were equal before the military law, and promotion from the ranks was allowed, thus enabling Egyptians of fellah origin to reach the highest military posts which had been reserved till then for the privileged Turks and Circassians. Sa'id encouraged native poets to compose national

(1) Muhammad *Ali imposed a system of tax collection whereby the inhabitants of a whole village, or even of a number of villages, were held collectively responsible for payment. This was a relic of the old Iltizam or tax farm; and it resulted in the more powerful personalities often contributing less than their due share.

(2) Like the emancipation of the serfs in Russia, the suppression of the corvée, the kurbaj and slavery in Egypt remained a dead letter, despite the enactment of laws and regulations, up to the British occupation, the powerful omdas (village majors) and their subordinates, called mashā'ikh al-balad, being reluctant to lose the advantages these institutions secured them over the ordinary fellahin.

(3) Rifaat, op.cit., 97.
anthems for the army, and for the first time the words "waṭan" (native country) and "umma" (nation) were used in literature in reference to Egypt. It must also be noted in this connection that Saʿīd was the first of the Valis to teach the Egyptians lessons in nationalism, and his speech at Kasr al-Nīl, referred to in ʿOrābī's memoirs, was one of the reasons that caused ʿOrābī to be conscious of his being a member of an Egyptian nation oppressed by alien rulers.

On the other hand, Saʿīd had been taught by European tutors, and in his boyhood had had European friends, among whom was Ferdinand De Lesseps, the son of Mathieu De Lesseps, the French Consul-General under Muḥammad ʿAlī. Being too trustful and apt to be deceived, Saʿīd was exploited by many Europeans. In his reign the number of foreigners was multiplied ten times as compared with that of Muḥammad ʿAlī's time. A great number of the new settlers were adventurers "of the type represented in fiction by Alphonse Daudet's "Nabab" whose sole object was to enrich themselves at the expense of the country". European capital also began to

(1) Sabry, 34. Ismail, 34.
(2) ʿOrābī, Kashf al-sītār, 15-16.
(3) Cromer, Modern Egypt, I, 23.
penetrate, seeking concessions and initiating foreign financial interests. Although the introduction of foreign capital is not objectionable as long as the sovereignty of the state is respected, the case under Sa'id was aggravated by the preponderance of the foreign Consuls-general acquired after the settlement. These Consuls, sheltering themselves behind the old Capitulations, not always being honest and sometimes partners with their nationals in immoral cases brought against the Egyptian Government, gave a new character to the old Capitulations. According to these, foreigners were exempted from taxation, not subject to native laws but judged in their Consular Courts, and the Egyptian police could not search the foreigner's domicile except by an authorization from his consulate. Hence, the smuggling of opium and tobacco, the cultivation of which in Egypt was prohibited by the Ottoman Government, took place on a large scale. Moreover, by intimidating Sa'id, dishonest foreigners obtained much money through their Consulates-General in the shape of indemnities for imaginary losses.

This general weakness of Sa'id cost Egypt much. It is not so surprising to see him give his old friend Ferdinand De Lesseps the Suez Canal concession in the very year of his accession, without any objection to the terms, which were detrimental to the interests of the country. Sa'id thought
that the realization of the project would lead to Egypt's prosperity, thus making it possible for her rulers to free themselves from Ottoman control, and to ensure the country's neutrality as a consequence of that of the Canal. Hence it seemed possible to him that the Powers would sanction the rights of the ruling family. He hoped in particular to win the support of Napoleon III for his dynastic ambitions by favouring this French project. This is the reason for the extraordinary episode of his sending a Sudanese battalion to help the French expedition in Mexico. But in its first phase the Canal scheme in fact produced the unexpected and unwelcome consequence of reducing the area of cultivation in Egypt and hence the revenues, owing to the forced employment on the Canal of thousands of fellahin. It was indeed this diminution of revenue, combined with Sa'id's extravagant expenditure, not only on the army, but also on the balls and other festivities to which he was addicted, that necessitated his obtaining the first European loan to Egypt from the Frühling-Goschen Bank.

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(1) *Abdin, American, Vol. II, Desp. No. 21 dated May 9th, 1855.
(2) Sabry, Isma'il, 71.
Isma'il's aims and policy up till 1875

Isma'il was the son of Ibrāhīm, and succeeded as Vālī in 1863. He was educated from the age of thirteen in Paris, afterwards visited Vienna, and was employed by Sa'id in various diplomatic missions, to the Pope, to Napoleon III, and to the Sultan. Sa'id also allowed him a share in public affairs at home. Before his accession, accordingly, Isma'il had acquired some knowledge of both East and West. He was also intelligent enough to understand Egypt's needs, and proved indeed to be a man of large ideas with extensive schemes for reform. But there was a sad lack of harmony in his faculties, especially between his intelligence and his character. Nor can his conduct be understood without an appreciation of the fact that his acquaintanceship with two utterly different "ways of life" had bred in him a sense of inferiority and a consequent urge to assert himself amounting to megalomania. This was stimulated above all by his consciousness of subordination to the Sultan, whose overlordship it became one of his chief aims to throw off. However much he might profess liberal ideas in his conversations with foreigners, the principle on which he acted was "l'état, c'est le Khédivé". Although he is sometimes referred to as an enlightened despot, and his authoritarian rule spoken of as a necessity in an age of transition, in practice his despotism was more evident than his enlightenment:
his reign was marked by many murders (such as that of al-
Mufattish) committed in cold blood; and there can be few
parallels in history to the wantonness with which he reduced
his subjects to misery and his government to ruin.

Isma'il's main ambition was praiseworthy. In order to
attain a position in which he could withstand foreign pressure,
he proposed to exploit the resources of the country and co­
ordinate and accelerate its economic development. But he was
tempted to undertake too much at a time and chose to realize
his aim by means of a return to Muhammad Ḥāfiz's system of
monopolies and the creation of companies (such as his
navigation companies and his sugar factories) chiefly financed
by himself. This, however, was to involve the State, since
its finances were hardly distinguishable in practice from his
own, in all the risks of commercial investment. Had Isma'il
been less vain and gullible, these risks might not have been
so great. But not only was his vanity in fact enormous,
one of his most cherished desires being to figure in the world
as the most splendid of princes; so were his love of pleasure,
his extravagance, and his inability to gauge the honesty of
those who offered him their services. The result was that he
was defrauded right and left by a host of flatterers and
doubtful entrepreneurs, and that his undertakings were so far
mismanaged that, far from making his fortune, they involved
him in heavy losses. Instead of learning from painful experience to be cautious, however, Isma'īl gambled ever more wildly, in attempts to recoup himself and maintain his prestige.

At the same time by these and other activities Isma'īl played a leading part in the transformation of Egyptian society. He built palaces, squares, gardens, railways, telegraphs, bridges, docks, harbours, and an opera-house. By himself adopting Western habits in dress and manners, he served as a model for his entourage and the upper classes of his subjects. He attempted indeed to create an aristocracy, mainly out of the Turks and Circassians who had long dominated Egyptian society, hoping thus to emulate the great courts of the West. He also encouraged both native and foreign artists and writers, his court being adorned by a native "Molière" (Ya'qūb Ṣanūṭa) and the singers 'Abdūh al-Ḥamulī and his wife Almaẓ, who sometimes accompanied him on his visits to Istanbul. Under his auspices education was encouraged and schools built; (on his succession there were only 185 public schools, but during his reign the number rose to 4,817, including one for girls).

All these undertakings of Isma'īl's stimulated Egyptian society into an unprecedented activity. They moreover attracted to Egypt reformers such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and his disciples, who were interested in the regeneration of the East,
and thus matured the intellectual movement which responded to the impact of the West.

The Suez Canal:

The two concessions granted to De Lesseps in 1854 and 1856 comprised a lease for ninety-nine years of valuable lands and mineral rights, with a right to the employment of forced labour for four-fifths of the work. The Egyptian Government further conceded the right of constructing a fresh-water canal taking its water from the Nile to Lake Timsah and then flowing southwards to Suez and northwards to the Mediterranean. The company was authorized to charge the natives for using the fresh-water canal and was exempted from paying any taxes or charges.

The defects of the two concessions are clear. The gravest was the conscription of labour. This caused the utmost misery among the people. "Not only were the fields deprived of their essential hands, but the men themselves had to leave their fields and families, and sacrifice their lives by exposure and underfeeding in marshy ditches." This provision of the concession was regarded by the Ottoman Government as justifying the Sultan in withholding his consent - an attitude in which he was supported by the British Government. Sir Henry Bulwer, the British Ambassador at Istanbul, took the opportunity of Isma'il's visit to the capital in 1863 to oppose it. (1) Hifaat, op.cit., 128-29.
the project. He prepared questions concerning the Canal which were to be addressed by the Porte to Isma'īl, who was invited to give a definite reply to them. It was expected that the answers would justify the Porte's objections, and that Isma'īl would consequently be ordered to stop the work in the Isthmus at once.

Isma'īl, however, was anxious not to offend the French who were backing the project in Istanbul as well as in Cairo, and after assuring himself of the support of the French Ambassador he avoided committing himself. Moreover, when he returned to Egypt, he signed two agreements with the Canal Company (on March 18th and 20th), according to which the Egyptian Government promised to dig the remainder of the sweet-water canal from Cairo to Wādī al-Tumailāt, the Company having dug the canal from the Wādī to Lake Timsah. Isma'īl's object, in concluding the two agreements was to put an end to the Company's possession of the sweet-water canal, and prevent it from laying its hands on the adjoining lands. The Company renounced its acquired rights, and the two parties agreed on a method for the discharge of the outstanding financial

Next, in April 1863 the Porte sent a circular Note to the Ottoman Ambassadors in Paris and London and to Isma'il. The Note stated that the Porte did not object to the project in principle, but stressed: (1) that the Canal should be neutral; (2) that no more forced labour should be employed on its construction; and (3) that an end should be made to the foreign colonization of lands on both sides of the sweet-water canal. The Company was allowed six months in which either to comply with these provisions, or to all further work in the Isthmus to the Egyptian Government.

In order to avoid Ottoman opposition (which was synonymous with British) and to appease France, Isma'il sent his eloquent spokesman, Nubar, to both the Ottoman and the French capitals. In Istanbul, Nubar put forward the Egyptian point of view to the Grand-Vizier and to the Western Ambassadors in such a way that the Porte issued a Note (August, 1863) which declared that it was not opposed to the project as long as this remained no more than a commercial

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(2) Sammarco, Précis de l'histoire de l'Egypte, IV, 153-4.
enterprise. Isma'il was allowed six months in which to come to terms with the Company; otherwise the Note of April would be valid.

In Paris, Nubar launched a successful press campaign against the Company, which, after rejecting the second Note, had invoked the protection of Napoleon III, requesting him to arbitrate. The company Board (sitting in Paris) asked for the arbitration of the Emperor. Isma'il agreed to arbitration in order to show European public opinion that he was not opposed to the Canal project; and on April 25th, 1864 an agreement was reached between him and De Lesseps, according to which the Company renounced its right to employ forced labour and to acquire land. A French Imperial committee considered the Company's claim for compensation, and in July 1864 the Imperial award mulcted Egypt to the fine of £3,360,000, of which £1,520,000 was in compensation for the corvée. The compensation enabled the Company to carry on the work by means of paid labour, mostly European. As a result of these negotiations, an Ottoman Ferman sanctioning this arrangement was conceded in 1866 and the Canal opened in 1869.

(1) Sammarco, Le Règne du Khédive Ismail, 72.

(2) Good accounts of the negotiations are to be found in the works of Hallberg, Douin, Sammarco and Seifeddean cited above.
Isma'il thus played his own part in the completion of the Canal. He had already declared at his accession that he was a "canaliste", but had made it clear that his object was to ensure that the Canal should be used for the benefit of Egypt, not Egypt for that of the Canal. It is obvious, however, that the Canal had in fact proved extremely expensive. In the field of events, its construction precipitated foreign intervention; and in that of finance, it is estimated that out of the total expenses of the project, which amounted to nearly £m. 16½, Egypt paid about £m. 15. Moreover the Khedive's shares were sold in 1875, while the country lost the revenues accruing in the past from the use of the overland route.

Complete autonomy:

Isma'il found in the venality of Sultan 'Abd al-Aziz (1862-75), and in the corruption prevalent in his Palace good opportunities for extending the privileges granted to Egypt by the settlement of 1841. He aspired indeed to complete independence. England and France, however, were always opposed to any abrogation of the Sultan's sovereignty. Isma'il had therefore to content himself with aiming at as complete an

(1) This became evident during his disputes with the Porte in 1867 and especially from 1869 to 1871. For details see Douin, op. cit., II; Sammarco, Règne & Précis; Gindī and Taqīr, Isma'il kamā tuṣawwiruhū al-wathā' ik al-rasmiya, 38; Politis, Un projet d'alliance entre l'Egypte et la Grèce en 1867; al-Ayyūbī, Tārīkh Miṣr fil-‘asr al-Khādāwi Isma'il Pāshā, I; and my unpublished Imā'il wa-alākātuhū bi‘l-Bāb al-‘Arż. 
autonomy for Egypt as was compatible with such subjection; and
by bribes and gifts sent from Cairo to Istanbul, and by means
of his personal relations with the Sultan through his frequent
visits to the Ottoman capital, he managed in due course to
obtain the privileges conceded to Egypt by the Ferma of 1866,
1867 and 1873, which gave him almost all he could hope for.

By the first of these the order of succession was changed
from seniority, as provided by the settlement, to primogeniture,
thus ensuring that he should be followed on the provincial
throne by his own son. As a consequence, both his brother
Mustafa Fadil and his uncle Abd al-Halim (generally known as
Halim Pasha) were excluded from the succession, and though
neither of these princes gave up hope, but usually living as
they did at Istanbul, continued to intrigue against Ismail
with the object of reversing this decree, their efforts, though
damaging to him, were unsuccessful.

By the Ferma of 1867 Ismail obtained the special title of
"Khedive" and the right of Egypt to conclude with foreign Powers
(1) Fadil was born in 1830 as was Isma'il. He went to Istanbul,
where, during the reign of Ismail, he held office in the Ottoman
Government more than once, and died in 1875.
(2) Halim was the youngest of Muhammad Alis sons. At the begin-
ing of Isma'il's reign they were on such good terms that
Halim was named regent during Isma'il's absence in 1863. Never-
theless Halim's popularity and his Masonic activities aroused
Isma'il's jealousy. He was expelled from Egypt in 1868 for
alleged conspiracy.
(3) The Persian word Khedivan (or Khediv, as pronounced in Turkish,
meaning "lord", was a title occasionally adopted by Moslem rulers
from early Islamic times. (Enc. of Islam, Art. Khedivan).
conventions relating to commerce, transit and police for foreigners. He was also permitted to initiate laws and regulations relating to the internal government of the vilayet. Incidentally this title of Khedive acquired by Isma'il was not a new one as since the time of Muhammad 'Alî, the Egyptian supreme dîwan surrounding the Valî had been called the Khedîvi dîwan, and the ruler himself was sometimes called Khedive.

But the formal grant of the title at this juncture was unfortunate, since it encouraged Isma'il to assert his sovereign dignity in the eyes of Europe by extravagant expedients.

The Ferman of 1873 confirmed all the privileges granted to Egypt and her rulers since 1841. It thus constituted Egypt's political "Charter" until 1923, when Turkey renounced all rights of sovereignty by the Treaty of Lausanne. Moreover the Ferman allowed Isma'il to negotiate and contract loans, and to increase his army and navy at will. It did thus endow the vilayet with all but complete autonomy. Thenceforward the Sultan's suzerainty was marked only by the following: that the

(1) Engelhardt, La Turquie et le Tanzimat, II, 91. Al-Rafî'î, 'Aqr Ismâ'il, 1, 82. He had also been distinguished by various other titles. See Deny, Sommaire des archives turques du Caire, 35 ff. and 69-74.

(2) A Ferman issued in 1869, during Ismâ'il's dispute with the Porte, forbade him to borrow without the previous consent of the Ottoman Government. The restoration of Ismâ'il's financial freedom consequently led to the disastrous loan of 1873. This was contracted for the sum of £m. 32, of which he received but less than £m. 20.
coinage still bore his name; that in the Friday Khuṭba his name was still cited before that of the Khedive; that the Egyptian tribute was still sent yearly to Istanbul; and that the Khedive still possessed no authority to appoint diplomatic representatives to foreign courts.

Familiar though the foreign representatives at Istanbul were with 'Abd al-'Azīz's mania for money, it astonished even them that he should thus sell virtually all control over such an important province as Egypt. But as the Ferman was not registered in the archives of the Porte, and only represented the Sultan's personal decision, its value remained questionable, since it might not be binding on the Ottoman Government.

Ismā'īl, however, sought to obtain for it the collective sanction of the Great Powers, requesting the Sultan to inform them of its contents. And in this too his wishes were met: on July 3rd the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a circular Note to the Ottoman Ambassadors in the great European capitals, in which were enclosed both the text of the Ferman and an identical (1) In 1874 Ismā'īl tried to obtain the consent of the Porte to his appointment of chargés d'affaires in the great European capitals. The Sultan refused on the ground that it would encourage Serbia and Roumania to demand similar rights. Ḥādī, Abraham; 8/42; Desps. dated Feb. 22nd, 25th & 27th, 1874 & 8/52, Desps. dated Dec. 9th & 20th, 1874. Also Ḥādī, American; Vol. IX, No. 225 dated July 2nd, 1874.

(2) See Douin, op. cit., II, 737-8.
telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in each capital. The Powers saw no objection to the Ferman. On the other hand they made no comment.

The autonomy of Egypt was thus achieved entirely by negotiations, without even a threat of war or bloodshed. How many pounds it cost the country, however, cannot be precisely estimated.

The Mixed Tribunals:

The defects of the Capitulations had been felt since the reign of Sa'id. In the first three years of Isma'il's reign incidents occurred that showed the jurisdiction of the foreign Consuls over their nationals to be sometimes unjust both to the government and to the people. Moreover, it encouraged crime by the protection it offered to foreigners. Hence the Khedive and his ministers wished, if they could, to institute a system of law applicable to foreigners resident in Egypt such as would render the Capitulations superfluous; and this aim was in due course attained by Nubar Pasha.

(1) See Chap. V below for the controversy over the validity of the Ferman.

(2) The tribute was raised from £T. 320,000 to 665,000. Sabry estimates the presents and bribes sent to Istanbul at £m. 20. See his Tarikh al-faṣr al-hadith.

(3) F.O. 78/1925; Stanton to Clarendon, dated May 1st, 1866, No. 47 cited in Abulleef (Abu'l-Lif), The Egyptian financial question and the reorganization of the Egyptian financial administration (1865-1885), 20.
Nubar, who was appointed as Isma'il's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1866, was a born diplomatist of Armenian origin. He was the only official who had enjoyed the favour of all the Valis from Muhammad 'Ali onwards. His diplomatic skill lay in his knowing exactly what was wanted, his understanding of the people with whom he had to deal, and in his ability to realize the different points of view from which the selfsame issue was seen by men belonging to various races, creeds and civilisations. In his view, the form of government most suitable to Eastern countries was absolutism, but on condition that the ruler should be subject to the law, that this should be supported by some authority independent of, and in the last resort, superior to, the will of the personal ruler, and that as far as Egypt was concerned, such support could only be provided by the presence of a powerful European element, whose authority the ruler could not venture to dispute.

By means of his eloquence Nubar succeeded in 1867 in convincing Isma'il of the necessity of the replacement of the Consular Courts by so called "Mixed Courts", in which Egyptian and foreign judges might jointly settle all civil and criminal cases in which foreigners were involved. Although his unpublished papers reveal that by the scheme, Nubar meant to

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(1) Dicey, The story of the Khedivate, 125. Dicey is the most reliable authority on "his friend" Nubar's policy. Nubar explained everything to him, and showed him his "memoirs" which have not yet been published.
revolutionize the whole judicial system of Egypt, yet his first and main object was to regulate the administration of justice for the privileged foreigners." (1)

Negotiations with this in view began that same year with the seventeen Capitulatory Powers and the Porte, mainly in Cairo, Istanbul and Paris. While England, Germany and Austria favoured the reform, the Porte and France were opposed to it. France considered herself the historic patron of the Capitulations, which, though antiquated and far from fulfilling their original defensive purposes, were yet sufficient to support French interests. The Ottoman Government was disquieted by the independent character of the negotiations carried on directly between Egypt and the Powers. Although similar attempts were being made by the Ottoman authorities to introduce the same reform elsewhere in the Empire, yet it was said at the Porte that the proposed reform in Egypt was a violation of Islamic law, which would not admit the trial of a Moslem by anyone of a different creed. It was moreover pointed out that the application of Russian law to the Khanate of the Crimea a century earlier had been the initial step towards its complete incorporation into Russia, and that a similar development might well occur in Egypt. (2)

(2) *Abdin, Abraham; 8/5, Desp. dated March 31st 1870.
In order to obtain Ottoman authorisation, which was eventually given in 1872, Isma'īl had to bribe the Sultan, the Grand-Vizier Mahmūd Nadīm Pasha, and the Russian Ambassador, General Ignatieff; and meanwhile the Franco-Prussian war had so far shaken France's prestige in the East that her opposition was no longer of much account. At the beginning of 1876, accordingly, Riyād Pasha (Nūbar being then in disfavour) was able to open the new Courts at Alexandria without even waiting for the arrival of the French judge who had been chosen to preside over them.

The Tribunals were composed chiefly of Europeans; and the judges were in practice nominated by their respective Governments. The laws applied in them were of course entirely different from the Shari'a; though the Shari'a could also be invoked in them. The languages used were French, English and Italian; Arabic, the language of the people, was not allowed. All the Capitulatory Powers, even those "having no subjects in Egypt", insisted on being represented in the judiciary. It is true that the establishment of these courts mitigated the "anarchy resulting from the Capitulations". But their effect was not exclusively beneficial. The new laws were unknown to the average fellāh, and the records of these Courts show that within six years of

(1) See Crabites, Ismail the maligned Khedive, and my Ismā'īl wa-'alakātuhū bi'il-Bāb al-ʿĀlī.
their establishment the amount borrowed on mortgage by fellahin \cite{1} from Europeans had reached, in round figures, £5,000,000. The Mixed Courts were empowered to deal with all cases in which the rights of foreigners were in any way affected by administrative acts. Moreover, since they were obliged to take cognizance of all new fiscal laws enacted by the State, the Courts maintained that no law modifying existing taxation could be valid without the consent of the Powers signatory to the Statute by which they were instituted.

According to one article of the latter, again, the Khedive and all the members of his family were liable to be tried by the Courts in cases involving the interests of foreigners. This was ipso facto a curtailment of Isma'il's powers - which he owed to Nubar. Nor was the latter unconscious of the fact. Muhammad 'Abduh writes in his memoirs, "Nubar had been considering the dethronement of Isma'il for a long time. I knew from a high authority that he wrote to one of his intimate friends on the day of the signature in Paris of the agreement relative to the Mixed Tribunals: "To-day, the first mine has been placed under the Khedive's authority, and I think it will explode one day."\cite{2}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{(1) Abulleef, \textit{op. cit.}, 24.}
  \item \textit{(2) Sabry, \textit{Ismail}, 318.}
\end{itemize}
The Chamber of Delegates (Majlis Shūrā Al-Nuwwab):

As Ismāʿīl was in many ways the most despotic of the Viceroy's, his creation of a Chamber of Delegates in 1866 has given birth to a great deal of speculation regarding his real purpose in this matter. The current interpretation is that Ismāʿīl set up this wholly dependent Assembly only so that he might pose as a constitutional ruler and thereby facilitate for himself the task of obtaining new loans from Europe. Landau, in his *Parliaments and Parties in Egypt*, attributes two other motives to Ismāʿīl: on the one hand a desire to secure a firmer control over the provincial notables, from whom the delegates were drawn, and on the other a wish to meet the very moderate criticism of his rule to which the recently founded bi-weekly *Wādiʿl-Nīl* had given utterance. At this period, however, public opposition to Ismāʿīl's rule, which only became vigorous after 1877, was surely too mild and infrequent to account for the move; and the real reasons for which he made it are more probably those mentioned in a report, dated September 3rd 1866, from Colonel Stanton, immediately after Ismāʿīl had raised a forced loan of £1,200,000. "I have been informed by the Viceroy", wrote Stanton, "that it is His

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His Highness's intention to summon shortly a meeting of the principal Sheikhs of the country at Cairo, for the purpose of submitting to them a statement of the financial situation of the country and of the engagements contracted by the Egyptian Government, with the view of consulting them, as to the means to be adopted, to enable the government to meet all these engagements. His Highness is under the impression that giving such publicity to the financial conditions of the country, will tend to increase public confidence in the government, and at the same time enable him whilst discussing the measures that are urgent at the present moment, to profit by any suggestion that may be offered for placing the taxation of the country on a more equitable footing.

It is evident from this that Isma'il did not intend by any means to create a parliament à l'européenne. He simply wished to win public sympathy and support by convening the principal people of the country and submitting the government's engagements to their consideration. He took precautions to keep the Chamber entirely under his control. It comprised seventy five members, only six of whom represented the great cities of Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta, and none of whom

(1) F.O. 78/1926. No. 86 quoted in Abulleef, op. cit.
were either civil or military officials. The Assembly could express only advisory opinions, which were then to be submitted to the Khedive for endorsement or rejection. The Delegates were elected for three years, and were forbidden to receive petitions. Isma'il alone could convene, prorogue and dissolve the Chamber.

Financial commitments:

For pure folly the record of Isma'il's loans is one without parallel in Egyptian history. Although an impression that Egypt was enormously wealthy was prevalent in the West, her resources were in fact too small and the country was too poor to meet the Viceroy's demands. Hence Isma'il, in whose hands all economic activity was concentrated, found himself tempted to borrow, even though he could do so only at a high rate of interest, with the result that by the latter part of 1875, he was indebted to foreign capitalists, mainly French and English, by nearly £m. 80, of which, however, he had actually received only a little more than £m. 50.

(1) Stanton remarked that no Sheikh would dare to vote for any candidate not approved by the government, and it would seem that this continued to be so for some years. Vide his Desps. Nos. 95 & 106 quoted in Abulleef, op. cit.

(2) Isma'il said on Feb. 5th, 1876, "Progress in Egypt, or even the carrying on of the country's business in a normal manner is incompatible with the maintenance of the usurious system under which our finances suffer...We have been exploités and unfortunately our necessities being no secret, we are still exposed to exploitations." Kingston, Monarchs I have met, II, 228.

(3) Farman, in his Egypt and its betrayal, 289, asserts that Egypt had by 1882 paid in interest as much as she had borrowed.
Apart from this, moreover, he had contracted internal debts and above all compromised the future finances of Egypt by offering subsequent exemption from the payment of half their annual land-tax to landowners who would pay the state six years' tax in advance - this advance payment being called *mukabala*. Many of the landowners had no ready money to make this payment and in order to raise it were tempted to mortgage their lands to usurers at a high rate in the hope that the eventual reduction of tax would enable them to repay the capital borrowed and the heavy interest and then enjoy the fruits of the transaction. This queer internal loan produced no more than £m. 5 at the beginning, but subscription soon became compulsory. According to an Egyptian statement issued in 1883, the sum paid by way of *mukabala* between 1872 and 1880 amounted to £E. 14,448,853.

Isma'il thus hurried Egypt to bankruptcy; and as in Morocco, Algeria, Tunis and Turkey itself bankruptcy was the prelude to foreign intervention. So compelling was the power of money that bankers and capitalists such as the Goschens, the Oppenheims and the Rothschilds were able to induce the Governments of great states such as England and France to change their previous practice and afford them official aid in the

(1) Abulfeef, *op.cit.*, 161.

(2) Ibid, 66.
collection of contractual debts - for up to this time the British Foreign Office had declared more than once that those who invested their money abroad did so at their own risk and could expect no aid from the Government.

The prelude to disaster in Egypt began on October 4th, 1875 when the Porte announced that for five years from January 1st, 1876 only half the interest on the Ottoman Public Debt and the coupons for its amortization would be paid in cash and that for the other half creditors would receive Treasury Bills bearing interest at 5%. This was tantamount to a declaration of insolvency by the Ottoman Government; and since the situation of Egypt closely resembled that of Turkey, the reaction on Egyptian credit was immediate: the bondholders were alarmed lest Isma'il should imitate his Suzerain and also declare his insolvency. By November 1875 the Egyptian Funds had fallen to 54 and the Treasury Bills were being discounted at 30%. There ensued a financial crisis which, owing to Anglo-French rivalry, turned political.

(1) The Times of October 5th, 1875.
Chapter II

"Haute Finance"
and
the Dual Control

"Finance is an important part of politics all the world over, but Egypt is the only country I am acquainted with where not only Finance but Accounts are politics."
Milner, England in Egypt, 56-7

Sale of the Suez Canal shares:

In November 1875 Ismā'īl was in need of funds for his second Abyssinian expedition, and, in his embarrassment, sought to raise a loan in return for which he offered his Canal shares (amounting to about 176,000), as security. Some French financiers formed a syndicate in Paris to put up the money, and applied for help to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. In due course, negotiations began between Ismā'īl on the one hand, and the "Maison Dervieu" of Alexandria and a "Société Générale, representing this syndicate, on the other. Having been informed of this by General Stanton, the British Counsellor-General at Cairo, Lord Derby warned M. Gavard, the French Chargé d'Affaires in London, that England was deeply interested in the Canal,
which she used more than other countries, and that in any case the British Government would do its utmost to prevent the Canal—on which England's most vital interests depended—from falling exclusively into foreign hands. (1)

France was then, as regards her foreign policy, suffering the effects of a "war scare". The Duc Decazes dared not risk losing the friendship of England; and the French negotiations with the Khedive were duly broken off. Lord Derby was not keen on buying the Khedive's shares. He thought that to do so would not only be unprofitable, but would embitter the relations of England with both France and the Porte. (2) Disraeli, however, took the matter in hand himself. On his own responsibility, during a parliamentary recess, he raised the necessary four millions from the Rothschilds; and on November 25th 1875, the contract with the Khedive was signed. (3)

The Times of November 26th brought the news to a startled British public. The opponents of the purchase in Egypt were convinced that so definite a commitment in

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(1) Q. d'Or., Angleterre; Vol. 770; No. 117, Gavard to Decazes, dated Nov. 20th, 1875.
(3) The money was paid on Feb. 4th, 1876, but Parliament did not authorize the purchase till August.
the Khedive's affairs, the loss of the Sultan's friendship, diplomatic entanglements with the European Powers, and all without tangible gains. But the British public in general, and the commercial classes in particular, loudly applauded Disraeli for having effected such a spectacular coup in such a brilliant manner; and *The Times* said that the enterprize gave England the right to interest herself closely in the management of the Egyptian finances and in Egypt's destiny, which could not be separated from the shadows that darkened the Ottoman Empire.

Across the Channel many Frenchmen were jealous of their neighbour's good fortune, and the Duc Decazes was the particular butt of attack, even being called on by the République Française to resign. The French considered the transaction as a moral defeat for their country, which reminded them of the disasters of 1870-71. They were afraid, moreover, lest the purchase should prove to be a first step towards the occupation of Egypt by England. In fact, viewed in the light of later events, it becomes evident that November 25th, 1875 marks the date on which the Anglo-French clash over Egypt opened.

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(1) Hoskins, op. cit., 473.
(2) *The Times* of Nov. 27th, 1875.
Bismarck approved of England's conduct, and the press, considering the whole affair as a consequence of Sedan, foresaw the embitterment of relations between the Western Powers. But Russia regarded the purchase with hostility. The Moscow Gazette denounced it in no faltering manner. It doubted the legality of the sale, holding that the Canal had been "seized"; that England had "pocketed" the key to the whole of Southern and Eastern Europe, and that she had "most certainly taken the lead in partitioning Turkey".

The Sublime Porte considered itself somewhat injured because its opinion had not been sought beforehand. After the purchase, attempts were made to induce it to interfere and cancel the transaction; and the question was submitted to the legal advisers of the Ottoman Government, who were obliged, however, to admit that in consequence of the Perman of 1873, the Porte had no authority to intervene in the matter. In reality, the Turkish politicians were powerless to oppose England, in whose hands they believed the political destiny of the Empire to lie, and so officially they were not even able to protest. In this connection, it may be noted that John Bright shared the Russian view: he considered the purchase as the initial blow directed against the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

(1) Q. d'Or. Allemagne: Vol.15; Saive to Decazes, dated Dec. 3rd, 1875.
(2) The Times of Dec. 9th and 10th, 1875.
(3) F.O. 78/2500; No.41 Confid., Stanton to F.O. dated Feb. 12th, 1876.
The Cave Mission:

On October 30th, 1875, Isma'Il had told General Stanton that "he was anxious to secure the service of some competent government official, thoroughly acquainted with the system followed in Her Majesty's Treasury, to assist the Minister of Finance in reforming the administration of that Department of the Egyptian Government".

On the 4th of November, Nūbar addressed a letter to Stanton explaining the Khedive's wishes more fully. From this letter it appeared that Isma'Il in fact wished for two officials to direct, one the receiving and the other the disbursing, divisions of the Finance Ministry under the orders of the Minister. (1)

The reply of the British Government was not received till two days after the purchase of the Canal shares. Lord Derby informed Stanton that he would send a "special mission" to Egypt to consider with the Khedive the advice he asked for in financial matters. It was to be composed of the Rt. Hon. Stephen Cave, M.P. and the Paymaster General, Colonel Stokes, Mr. Victor Buckley of the Foreign Office (as diplomatic secretary), Mr. W.H. White, Deputy Accountant General of the War Office.

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(1) F.O. 78/2538; Draft No. 1, to Cave dated F.O. Dec. 1st, 1875.
(2) The instructions given to Stokes ran thus, "...that you may assist and advise Mr. Cave in his duties as Envoy and that he may have the benefit of the experience of the country and people which you have gained during your previous employment in the Ottoman dominions.

Her Majesty's Government also desire that you should confer with H.M.'s Agent and Consul-G. in Egypt on the subject of the recent purchase, on behalf of Great Britain, of the shares in the Suez Canal heretofore

Continued.....
Office (as financial secretary) and Mr. A.C. Taylor of the Foreign Office (as attaché to the special mission.)

The names cited above and the previous functions of their owners show what importance was attached to the mission by the Foreign Office. Although Lord Derby had declared that the despatch of the mission "must not be taken to imply any desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt, but is of a purely friendly character dictated by the interest which this country has always taken in the welfare and prosperity of Egypt" (2), it is significant that, instead of the two officials suggested by Isma'il, a whole mission should have been sent. It seems possible that Dicey is justified in contending that it was Disraeli's intention to set up a direct protectorate over Egypt, on his own initiative, without consulting his colleagues and regardless of Lord Derby's hesitation and fear of new adventures. (3) The mission was to institute a preliminary inquiry, "whose result would enable Her Majesty's Government to determine whether they would accede to the Khedive's request for the appointment of an official as a financial adviser to the Egyptian Treasury".

(2) continued ....

Held by H.H. the Khedive and furnish a report on the position which H.M.G. will occupy as possessor of those shares and on any measure which it may be desirable to take in order to secure the full benefit of the purchase" (F.O. 78/2540; Draft dated F.O. Dec. 6th, 1875). Stokes soon began negotiations with Ferdinand De Lesseps for the settlement of the tonnage dues and for the future management of the Suez Canal.

(1) F.O. 78/2403; No. 98, Draft to Stanton, dated F.O. Dec. 6th, 1875.

(2) Ibid. Draft No. 97 to Stanton of the same date.

notes continued next page........
This was in fact a pretext for an investigation, in the course of which Cave hoped to collect information about Egyptian affairs that might be of interest to the British Government. Whether or not Disraeli would take further action was to depend on Cave's conclusions. It is interesting that Cave received no definite instructions, the Foreign Office preferring "to leave the conduct of your mission as far as possible to your discretion, relying upon you to be careful not to pledge them to any course of proceeding by advice or otherwise which might be taken to imply a desire to exercise undue interference in the internal affairs of Egypt." The Khedive, on his side, was invited to treat Mr. Cave with perfect frankness and afford him every facility for ascertaining correctly the position of the financial affairs of Egypt.

Although the French Ambassador in London sought to discover what reality might be behind the rumours circulating about the mission and its object, he failed to do so till the whole news was announced in the press. Indeed, the way in which he was treated by Lord Derby was not altogether friendly. 

from previous page ...

(3) Dicey, Khedivate, 138-141. Derby was against the purchase of the Canal shares, and his difference of opinion with Disraeli, which resulted in his subsequent resignation in 1877, occurred earlier than is usually supposed. Although a Conservative himself, Derby was all but a Liberal in his principles, and against new commitments and adventures.

(4) F.O. 78/2538; Draft No. 3 to Cave, dated F.O. Dec. 6th, 1875

above ...

F.O. 78/2538; vide No. 1, supra.

(2) F.O. 78/2403; No. 97, F.O. to Stanton, dated Dec. 6th, 1875.

(3) Angleterre, Vol. 770; d'Harcourt to Decazes, dated Nov. 27th, 1875.
The Porte was informed by the British Government of the despatch of the mission, which duly proceeded to Egypt, arriving on December 16th. From the first, Isma'Il showed himself opposed to the intended investigation. His real object in asking for British assistance in his financial difficulties had been to use it for further borrowing. He wished to obtain a public testimonial in the shape of a political report that should show him to be still solvent, and so to regain access to the European financial markets. He told Cave and Stokes at their first meeting that "he would not allow an examination such as the one which [we] had demanded; that he would rather forego his request, as his own independence might be, it now appeared to him, compromised". (1) At another audience, Isma'Il asked what England proposed to do for him that would entitle her to control his finances. Cave could not then "venture to say that Her Majesty's Government was prepared to establish such a claim". In his report of this meeting, Cave noted that if he was then authorized to state "that Her Majesty's Government would endeavour to facilitate the complete restoration of His Highness's credit, he thought that the Khedive would have considered that his question had been satisfactorily answered." (2)

Isma'Il was also alarmed lest the mission should be used as a pretext by other Powers, especially the Porte, for demanding official explanations or the sending of other

(1) F.0.78/2538; Teleg. from Cave to F.O. dated Dec. 25th, 1875.
(2) F.0.78/2539 A; No. 7, Cave to F.O. dated Jan. 15th, 1876.
missions to inquire into his internal administration. Consequently, he sent instructions privately to his Ministers to give no information to the British Envoy. Ismā'Il himself professed absolute ignorance about the finances of Egypt and referred all inquiries to his all powerful Minister of Finance Ismā'Il Ṣaddīq (surnamed al-Mufattish = the inspector), who did his best to conceal the chaos that reigned in the financial affairs of the country. The members of the mission were offered Khedivial palaces to live in. Official attendants surrounded them wherever they went; and they were constantly invited to parties given by the Khedive, who tried, by means of lavish festivities, to create a false picture of his own and Egypt's enormous wealth.

**International jealousies and French opposition:**

The presence in Egypt of the Cave Mission and its proceedings produced powerful repercussions both in Egypt and abroad. France saw in its despatch an attempt on the part of England at least to gain control of the Egyptian administration. Its activities were connected in Paris with the efforts of a Mr. Elliot, after the purchase of the Canal shares, to obtain concessions for the railways, the telegraph, the port of Alexandria, the customs and the Suez docks on behalf of British firms.

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(1). F.O. 78/2538; Teleg. from Cave to F.O.; dated Dec. 23rd, 1875.
Ismā'īl defended his sale of the Canal shares, saying that it was only a financial transaction having no other object, and added that he preferred to negotiate with English bankers, because they were ready to give him the best conditions. He saw in these English proposals "an easy, if not a particularly honest way out of his difficulties", and in face of the support he felt sure of receiving from the British Government believed he had little to fear from other Governments. He was, moreover, obstinate in refusing to attribute any political character to these projects, and declared that he considered them less dangerous to Egypt than a purely French control of the Suez Canal.

But Ismā'īl's reception of these British overtures evidently marked a change of attitude on his part in matters of finance, since up to the sale of the Suez Canal shares this had been pro-French. This was duly regarded in Paris as indicating a decline of French prestige and influence at Cairo, in face of which the Government could hardly maintain silence. The Republic was then less firmly established than it became at a later period; and any catastrophe which excited popular indignation in the then temper of the French nation might conceivably have led to a monarchical restoration.

(1) Q. d'Or., Égypte, Vol.57; "Mission Outrey" - Outrey to Decazes; Désp. dated Jan 12th, 1876.
(2) Ibid. from the same dated Feb. 12th, 1876.
(3) Ibid., dated Jan. 14th, 1876.
Decazes regarded these "engagements" entered into between Isma'il and England with deep suspicion. He was informed from Petersburg and Berlin that Musurus, the Ottoman Ambassador in London, had been instructed to offer England an exclusive influence in Egypt on condition that she would separate herself from the other five Great Powers and support the Porte in its resistance to any foreign or diplomatic intervention.\(^1\)

All this led to the despatch in turn of a French mission to Egypt. At the beginning of 1876 Outrey, formerly French Consul-General at Cairo, was sent, during the absence on leave of the actual Consul, as a Minister Plenipotentiary empowered to discuss political questions. The object of his mission was to counterbalance the activities of the Cave mission, to bring about its failure if possible, and to try and restore French influence to its preponderance of the period before 1870.

On this, the Italian Government followed suit, sending Senator Scialoja, the Deputy President of the Senate, and a former Minister of Finance, to watch Egyptian affairs, and to try and obtain something for his country in any possible arrangement. Nor was this all: the Austrian Government then acted likewise, sending a Mr. Mayr, who had at one time occupied the position of First Dragoman at Istanbul, and was

\(^1\) Q. d'Or., *Egypte*, Vol. 57; Decazes to Outrey, dated Jan. 14th, 1876.
then Counsellor in the Embassy at Petersburg, on special leave to Egypt.

Nūbār was not content with the proceedings of the Cave Mission. (He had said to Cave on his arrival, when he knew that his intention was to undertake an investigation into Egyptian finances, "Under these circumstances, I think you would have done better not to have come at all".)(1) He took the opportunity of the international jealousy thus displayed towards the Cave Mission to embark on intrigues with a view to preventing its success. He still favoured the co-operation of the European element with the Egyptian to the extent of proposing to Cave in his first conversation with him that "an Englishman of reputation and ability, coming out as Finance Minister, would find sufficient safeguards for the continuance of an influential position in his own character and in the fear which the Khedive would feel of the consequences entailed by his resignation". (2) But for the moment he was against any foreign interference or control, and he accordingly put it about among some members of the consular body that the mission was a failure. (3) Moreover, it happened that at this juncture he was in hopes, owing to his Armenian origin, of being appointed, by the Porte, as Vālī of the province of Erzerum, which it was proposed to

(1) Dicey, Khedivate, 135.
(2) F.0.78/2538; No.4, Cave to F.O. dated Dec. 25th, 1875.
(3) F.0.78/2500; No.1, Stanton to F.O. (marked Very Confidential), dated Jan. 1st, 1876.
make semi-autonomous on the footing of the Lebanon; and since his appointment was favoured both by the Russian Ambassador at Istanbul, the celebrated General Ignatieff, and the French Ambassador, Nūbār hoped to exploit his efforts against the mission in currying favour not only with the ambassadors but with the Porte itself. The Porte, however, refused Ignatieff’s request on Nūbār’s behalf and indeed the prosecution of this whole scheme, not wishing to add to its troubles in Europe by creating new difficulties in Asiatic Turkey. (1)

Nevertheless, as regards Egypt, Nūbār won over to his view the Russian, the German, the Austrian and the Italian Consuls-General, who all subsequently advised Ismā‘īl to be prudent and avoid falling under any exclusive influence. Similar advice and warnings came also from Istanbul, both from the Porte and from Ignatieff. (2)

Outrey, for his part, sought to frighten Ismā‘īl by saying that England was trying to obtain possession of Egypt, and that he ought consequently to refuse any English proposal for the lease of his railways, (3) referring to "cette série d’opérations qui ressemble trop à une vente au détail de l’Égypte à l’Angleterre." (4) Decazes instructed the Marquis

(1) F.O. 78/2500; Stanton to F.O. dated Jan. 29th and 78/2501; No. 114 Confid. from Stanton, dated March 31st, 1876 and F.O. 78/2539 A.; No. 22 Confid. Cave to F.O. dated Feb. 5th, 1876.
(2) Q. d’Or., Égypte, Vol. 57; Desps. from Outrey to Decazes dated Jan. 17th & 27th, 1876.
(3) The railways were a security for the great loan of 1873 contracted with the Rothschilds.
(4) Egypte, Vol. 57; Teleg. from Decazes to Outrey dated Jan. 12th, 1876.
D'Harcourt, the French Ambassador in London, to protest against the assignment of Egyptian resources to a private enterprise, and to show that France proposed appealing to all the European capitals to limit European intervention in Egypt strictly to financial matters. (1) He explained, in a despatch to D'Harcourt (2) about the object of Outrey's mission, that "Far from desiring to subject the Egyptian Government to the exertion of any foreign pressure whatsoever, we cannot but desire to see it equally free in its relations with the Powers. We do not demand in favour of our nationals, nor for ourselves, any advantage that is not common to all the other foreign colonies in Egypt and all the other Governments. This balance of influence, wisely maintained till now, is a safeguard for Egypt herself as well as for those who have interests in Egypt. We earnestly wish that it may not be disturbed, and that it may not be due to us if the negotiations now in progress between the Khedive and the capitalists of the different countries result in anything but their affirmation and consolidation".

Ismā'īl, however, still insisted that his negotiations with Cave and Elliot did not imply any diplomatic entanglement at all. When the Russian Consul-General, M. De Lex, offered him his assistance in resisting the attempt, which he insinuated was being made, to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt.

(2) Ibid - No. 25, Decazes to D'Harcourt, dated Feb. 4th, 1876.
of Egypt, he declined the proffered assistance, stating that there was nothing to justify the supposition that the British Government was desirous of interfering in the administration of the country.\(^1\)

As early as December 1875, Ismā'īl suspected the activities of Nūbār, who spoke to Cave in strong terms against the corvée, and the exaction of taxes in advance, as well as against large expenditure on the army. He said that the Khedive ought not to grow sugar, as foreign sugar could be sold at a lower price in the market.\(^2\) On January 4th, Sharīf Pasha was consequently nominated Minister of Foreign Affairs in place of Nūbār, who was now only to be Minister of Commerce instead of holding the two Ministries at once. Nūbār immediately tendered his resignation, since he understood that he was in disfavour. He told the French Consul-General he felt that he had lost the confidence of the Khedive, who would not listen to him when he advised him to be prudent and so avoid the evil results of the activities in which he was engaged, and who was surrounded and influenced by bad councillors who did not foresee events, and were thus leading the country to its ruin.\(^3\) Ismā'īl defended his action by

\(^{1}\) F.O. 78/2500; No.1 supra.

\(^{2}\) F.O. 78/2538; No.4. Cave to F.O. dated Dec. 25th, 1875.

\(^{3}\) Egypte, Vol. 58; No.46, Pellisier to Decazes, dated Jan. 8th, 1876.
accusing Nūbār of initiating both the Cave and the Outrey missions, of a lust for power, and of professing liberalism "in spite of his innate despotism" (2), and invited him to leave Egypt.

In fact the clash between Ismā'īl and Nūbār involved the whole future of Egypt, and the Khedive was mistaken in ignoring the advice his old assistant offered him, namely that he should rely on the Continental Powers and oppose any interference whatever in his own affairs. Had he done so, he might well have postponed the Anglo-French entente which overthrew him and prepared the way for the British occupation. He in fact soon understood the real object of the British Government in sending the Cave mission, and began openly resisting further attempts on Cave's part to impose suggestions on him, especially since these now took a mere personal shape. Cave wrote to Derby on January 5, 1876 referring to the mission as aiming at "obtaining economical administration of the finances", and enquiring whether he could promise Ismā'īl the assistance of the British Government in getting the Floating Debt taken up by a responsible firm. (3) He proposed that the Egyptian Government should institute a special administration, independent of the general finance administration, with a

(1) 'Abdīn, Finances; 38/5 - Janv.-Mars, 1876; F.O.78/2539 A.; Stanton to F.O. dated Jan.2nd, 1876; Egypte, Vol.57; Outrey to Decazes dated Feb. 6th, & Vol.58; No. 46 supra and F.O.78/2500; No.1. supra.
(2) Egypte, Vol.58; No. 46 supra.
(3) F.O.78/2539 A.; Teleg. from Cave to F.O., dated Jan.5th, 1876.
special superintendent and staff of employees; that one of
the two persons whom Isma'il had requested the British
Government to send out to reorganize his finances should be
the head of this new Control Department; and that certain
special revenues drawn from the land taxes, railways and
harbours, sufficient to provide for the payment of the
interest and the Sinking Fund on the Consolidated Stock,
should accrue to the funds of the new Department. He
further proposed certain stipulations to assure the full
payment of the annuities from which a reserve fund could be
accumulated, and the permanent establishment of the English
superintendent at the head of the Department. Isma'il, he
maintained, should include in the Decree setting up this
administration an undertaking not to raise any further loan
or contract any other financial engagements which might cause
a deficiency in the general revenues. (1)

Isma'il refused to comply with Cave's proposals for the
control of his finances which the latter regarded as essential
to any reorganization. (2) He defended his refusal by saying
that since he had first asked for the assistance in question,
matters had assumed a somewhat different shape. His original
request had been simple: he had only asked for certain
persons to be employed in the Finance Ministry just as

(1) Ibid., Teleg. from the same, dated Jan. 27th, 1876.
(2) Ibid., dated Feb. 10th, 1876.
anyone might be employed in other departments. But political importance had subsequently been attributed to his request for financial assistance. The Cave mission had excited much comment and had brought about the despatch of the Outrey and other missions, not to mention observations on the part of the Grand-Vizier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Porte. Basing his argument on this criticism and under the pretext of calming apprehensions, Ismā‘il accordingly asked Cave simply for one official to act as his Finance Councillor without being assigned any such definite functions as might create political jealousy. (1)

Thus Ismā‘il profited by the general situation to combat Disraeli’s designs, which simultaneously met with opposition in England both in the Cabinet and from the Liberals. On the 26th of January Cave received instructions to return home in order to confer with the Government without loss of time. (2) But he preferred to stay in Egypt till the arrival of Rivers Wilson, to whose appointment as financial Councillor the Khedive had meanwhile consented. Ismā‘il, however, urged Cave to leave the country because of the rumours to which his continued presence had given rise, since it was known that he had been recalled. The mission accordingly departed, on February 21st, and Cave contrived to meet Wilson in Paris, where they conferred.

(1) Ibid. No. 21, dated Feb. 5th, 1876.
(2) Ibid. No. 4, dated Jan. 26th, 1876.
The Cave mission was a failure. Cave had succeeded neither in initiating the financial control, nor in backing the negotiations of Elliot, since the railway project was finally dropped owing to French opposition.\(^1\) This failure can really be attributed to the policy of the Duc Decazes in sending out the Outrey mission.\(^2\) Nevertheless, although Cave had not been officially authorized to investigate the conditions of the Khedive's Ministry of Finance, he had received accounts and statistics from Egyptian officials which enabled him to supply a report on it. Nor was he misled by certain information he received not only from them but also from Isma'il himself.

The Caisse de la Dette Publique:--

After Cave's departure, Outrey and a group of French capitalists, presided over by Pastré of the "Anglo-Egyptian Bank", proposed to the Khedive the establishment of a State Bank in whose custody all monies received by the State should be lodged and from whose funds all payments due from the State should be disbursed. It was thought that if the management of the Bank were placed in the hands of officials nominated by England, France and Italy, such an arrangement would restore

\(^1\) *Egypte*, Vol.57; Outrey to Decazes, dated Feb.12th, 1876.

\(^2\) Cave intended to retire from the moment that Outrey arrived in Egypt, when the Khedive refused to give him the authorisation to begin his enquiries. But since his retirement would have meant a grave failure of British diplomacy, Stanton used all his influence in order to come to a rapprochement which would save appearances. (*Egypte*, Vol.57; Outrey to Decazes, dated Feb.6th, 1876.)
the credit of Egypt while also being acceptable to those Powers, since it would involve the assumption of no direct pecuniary responsibility on their part. The main purposes of this project was to consolidate the Floating Debt, mostly French, at 9% interest.

Decazes duly tried to obtain the cooperation of England in this enterprise. On the 14th of February he approached Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador in Paris, and explained to him that in his opinion "the only means of preserving the considerable interests of the French and English creditors in Egypt lay in a close entente between the two Governments". He laid stress on the advantage of a policy which would substitute a firm agreement for obvious or possible rivalry. (1)

The French project, however, was unacceptable to the British Government, to whom neither such a practical establishment of Anglo-French co-operation in Egypt, nor any internationalisation of the financial question was welcome. Lord Derby saw in the French proposals just what the French had seen in the English; namely an interference with Egypt's independence by means of an attempt to gain administrative control over the country. He therefore refused to name an English commissioner for the Bank, saying that "the arrangement proposed does not involve anything in the nature of a guarantee, either material or moral, on the part of the

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(1) Headlam-Morley, Studies in diplomatic history. 58.
Governments which might be parties to it". (1) England's abstention caused the Khedive to drop the project. (2)

Meanwhile, in order to counterbalance his consent to Wilson's appointment, Isma'il had asked the French Government for "a high official of the French Finance Department to assist in organising the Egyptian Finance Administration". (4) The French Government at once agreed to put at the Khedive's disposal a certain M. Villet, who had held high posts in the French Finance Department and had been sent in 1869 to Tunis as Director of the International Commission. Like Wilson, he was to be a Counsellor to the Khedive without having any definite duties assigned to him.

The British Foreign Secretary was annoyed at the appointment of Villet and instructed Stanton to tell Isma'il unofficially that it might lead to the recall of Wilson, who was already on his way to Egypt, and prove an impediment to arrangements which might otherwise be possible. (5) Cave himself thought that the application from the Khedive to

(1) Angleterre, Vol.771; Lyons to Decazes, dated March 26th, 1876.

(2) Isma'il later told Wilson that the French gentlemen, who were negotiating with him, declared the interest of their Government in the matter to be prompted by a desire to play a return match for the business of the Canal Shares. Cf. Rivers Wilson, Chapters from my official life, 86.

(3) Wilson occupied the post of "Controller General of the British National Debt". Although he had resigned his job, instructions were sent to Stanton to give him unofficial support and assistance. (F.O.78/2498; No.567 dated March 10th, 1876). It is therefore evident that Wilson's despatch to Egypt constituted a continuation of the objects the Cave Mission had in view. It was the Foreign Office that recommended his appointment. (Ibid, Draft No.29 to Stanton, dated Feb. 10th, 1876.).

(4) F.O.78/2449; Nos.152 & 162 sent respectively to Elliot and Stanton, dated March 15th, 1876.

footnotes contd. next page ....
the French Government "might do mischief." Moreover, the Rothschilds had by now also taken up the matter of the Egyptian Debt seriously and meant to communicate on it with Wilson as soon as he arrived in Egypt. (1)

During this period of antagonism between France and England, from which Isma'il tried to derive every possible advantage by widening the gulf that separated the two countries, we can observe the genesis of the Franco-Russian entente. In almost every case Russia sided with France, and Ignatieff spoke to the Grand-Vizier respecting the policy of England in regard to Egypt. The Grand-Vizier accordingly thought fit to write to the Khedive warning him against putting himself into England's hands, and advising him to show a greater inclination towards France. Stanton had reason to believe that advice of that nature had also been given to the Khedive by General Fadayeff, (2) who had come to Egypt in January, 1875, at the Khedive's invitation, to reconstruct the Egyptian army.

(5) continued from previous page...
F.O. 78/2498; Draft Teleg. F.O. to Stanton, dated March 13th, 1876.

(1) above... Ibid. Sir Stafford Pauncefoot to Lord Tenterden, dated March 13th, 1876.

(2) Fadayeff's appointment was due to the intrigues of Ignatieff. The Russians hoped that it would contribute to the disruption of the Ottoman Empire by enabling them in five or six years' time to utilize the Khedive's army against his Suzerain. But Isma'il employed these troops instead against the Abyssinians, who all but annihilated them. Cf. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans. 70.
When Villet arrived in Egypt, he brought with him a new project for a "Commission of the Public Debt", which would have no control over Egyptian finances, but would act simply as a receiver on behalf of the creditors, after the consolidation and unification of all the debts. Ismā'īl, after negotiations in which there took part Villet, Scialoja, Mayr and Outrey, agreed to Villet's project, since the payment of interest on his bonds could be no longer delayed and he was unable even to await whatever proposals on the part of the English capitalists Wilson might bring with him. When Wilson at last arrived, he did not in fact bring with him any tangible projects, but tried to make the consolidation and unification of the debts subject to the Khedive's agreement to the institution of a financial Control Department, as suggested by Cave.(1)

Ismā'īl, by accepting the French project, incurred the anger of the British Government, who had advised him to abstain from any hasty action, since proposals were being considered by the English financiers which might lead to a satisfactory settlement of his affairs.(2) On March 20th, Lord Derby informed him of his intention to publish the Cave Report. But Ismā'īl objected, saying that the information given to Cave was confidential, and solely for the

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(1) Sabry, Ismā'īl, 173.
(2) F.0.78/2498; Teleg. to Stanton, (marked Confid.), dated March 15th, 1876.
information of Her Majesty's Government. He considered
that if not preceded either by an arrangement with the English
financiers, or by the nomination of an English Commissioner,
any public discussion on the Egyptian finances must be
seriously injurious to his interests and would probably
prevent a satisfactory solution of his difficulties, which
were of the most pressing urgency.

On this, while the English public were still awaiting
the publication of the Report, Disraeli declared in the
House of Commons, on March 23rd — to Ismā'īl's annoyance —
that the Khedive "being aware of the disorder prevailing
in his finances, the situation of which was confused", had
asked for its non-publication. (1) This fell like a bombshell
on the bondholders, and at once produced a fall in the value
of the Egyptian bonds. Moreover, in order to dissipate the
doubts which had arisen, and on account of the situation
which had been created, Ismā'īl was obliged two days later to
request that the Report, which he had not seen, might be made
public as soon as possible and without any reservations.

The Report (2) was published on the 4th of April. Its
author remarked that Egypt was suffering from "ignorance,
dishonesty, waste and the extravagance of the East... and at

(1) Hansard, Commons, Vol.231 (1876), 639.
(2) Cf. The Annual Register, 1876 (London, 1877) 8-10, where
the text is given in extenso.
the same time, from the vast expenses caused by hasty and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilisation of the West." It was accurate in its account of the details of Egypt's revenues and expenditure, and its main suggestion was the consolidation and the unification of the debts on the basis of a moderate interest compatible with the resources of the country. It recommended the appointment by the Khedive of a person enjoying "general confidence" as the head of the "Control Department", which was to receive certain branches of the revenues direct from the collector and exercise a general supervision over the levying of taxes. By these means it could acquire the power to stop both frauds operated at the expense of the State Exchequer and extortions imposed on the fellāhin.

Ismā'īl now saw that he must seem to comply with the proposals put forward in the Report. But not wishing to place himself entirely in the hands of the English, he decided to continue negotiations with the French group, Scialoja, Mayr and Wilson for the eventual creation of the Caisse. France tried to secure the presidency for herself, and Outrey launched a campaign to that end with the Khedive, but in vain. Nor was Wilson, who aimed at the presidency for himself, while still acting in the capacity of an Egyptian official, any more successful, encountering a refusal on the part of the
other foreigners. (1) Wilson and Stanton accordingly left for England just as the Decree for the Caisse was published, on the 2nd of May. So did Villet, whom the Khedive ignored because of his previous conduct in Tunis, and had never thought of appointing to any Egyptian governmental office. (2)

On May 7th, Isma'il converted all his Floating and Consolidated debts into one debt of 91 millions at 7% interest on the nominal capital, with amortization in 65 years; and shortly afterwards charged Scialoja - who had obtained his confidence and devised a project for the organization of the Egyptian finances - with the task of effecting it, by way of a temporary mission. (3) Possibly he did this to avoid rousing the jealousy of England and France by appointing either a Frenchman or an Englishman.

Italy, France and Austria appointed Signor Baravelli, M. de Elignières and Herr von Kremer respectively as the first members of the Caisse. But the British Government refused to fall in with the arrangement, "as it was generally believed in London that Egypt's financial situation would not permit a consolidation at 7% interest", (4) and declined to nominate an English commissioner. (5)

(1) Egypte, Vol. 57; Desps. from Outrey during the first week of May, 1876.
(2) Ibid., dated May 9th, 1876.
(3) Ibid., dated May 14th, 1876.
(4) Angleterre, Vol. 772; No. 39 Confid., d'Harcourt to Decazes, dated May 12th, 1876.
(5) In order to secure the presence of an English representative on the Commission, Isma'il selected Capt. Evelyn Baring (subsequently Lord Cromer) as the British member of the Public Debt Commission. Baring arrived in Egypt on March 2nd, 1877.
The initiation of the Caisse at least put an end to the diplomatic warfare that had raged for about six months both among the various representatives of the Powers, and between them and the Khedive. (1) The Outrey mission had won a complete success; and Outrey was instructed to leave for France. But the first blow to Isma'il's authority had been delivered. Despite the moderation of the terms of the settlement, they clearly limited his freedom of action. Henceforward the foreign creditors would form a "state within the state", as it was for them, not for the Egyptians, to appoint the Commissioners, who, although in the beginning they were little more than receivers of the revenues assigned to the service of the Debt, as time went on came to act as supervisors, on behalf of the Powers, over the execution of the series of agreements which constituted the international compact regulating the finances of Egypt. It can be truly said that the crisis of 1881-1882 resulted from this initial move. (2)

The Anglo-French "rapprochement" and the "Dual Control":-

The financial arrangements embodied in the Decree of May 7th caused much dissatisfaction in France and England, and especially in the latter. Before the Caisse had commenced its work, however, the demand on the part of the

(1) Égypte, Vol. 57; Outrey to Decazes, dated May 29th, 1876.
(2) Freycinet, La Question d'Égypte, 160.
bondholders for a further inquiry into the financial position of the Khedive became too strong to be resisted. Meetings were held in both Paris and London urging the necessity of an independent investigation.

What frightened the French creditors, who had furnished the majority of the Floating Debt, was that, on the 8th of April, Isma'Il had suspended the payment of the interest due on the Treasury Bonds issued during his reign, encouraged, as he was, by the inaction of the Powers, till then, over the Ottoman Decree of October 1875, by which a similar default had been proclaimed. So hard was the French Government pressed for direct action and effective interference that Decazes was unable to remain silent. England, who owing to French opposition could not regulate the Egyptian finances on her own, was chiefly concerned to prevent France from interfering independently at Cairo. Lord Derby, therefore, began to reconsider the French offer of an entente, and in fact found himself compelled, although without coming to any official and irrevocable arrangement, to go to hand in hand with France as regards Egypt, the British Government consenting to the principle of such an understanding merely as the basis of an exchange of conversations and assurances between the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay. The way was nevertheless paved
for joint action, and the possible basis of an ulterior concert was laid down. The Duc Decazes chose, as his representative to negotiate with the Khedive, a certain M. Joubert, a well-known financier, while the English creditors chose G.J. Goschen (subsequently Lord Goschen), a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, who duly went to Paris to confer with the French creditors on a concerted line of action. Moreover the Baron des Michels was appointed at the end of 1876 to the French Consulate at Cairo, where he was to join Lord Vivian, who had recently been appointed British Consul-General, and with whom he had established friendly relations while they were together en poste in Bucarest. Des Michels was instructed, on his appointment, to postpone the Khedive's declaration of insolvency, and to induce him to invite Goschen and Joubert to proceed to a general liquidation.

After a resistance rendered futile by the new Anglo-French rapprochement, Ismā'īl accepted the "Goschen-Joubert mission", which arrived in Egypt in October 1876, and immediately began its inquiry into the financial condition of the country. But Ismā'īl was obstructive; refusing to furnish it with information or detailed accounts of either revenue or expenditure. The mission thus found it extremely

(1) Des Michels, Souvenirs de carrière, 112-13
(2) Ibid, 113.
difficult to arrive at the truth, every effort being made by the Khedive to throw dust in the eyes of the Commissioners. Moreover, at Isma‘īl’s behest, much opposition was offered, ostensibly on nationalist grounds, both by Isma‘īl Šaddīk and by Sharīf Pasha, the head of the Turkish party, to this foreign interference in the internal affairs of the country; and this so infuriated the Western Commissioners that eventually the Khedive contrived the assassination of Isma‘īl Šaddīk, whom Isma‘īl then tried to represent as being the cause of the whole financial trouble. He thereby avoided further investigation, which might have discredited him and reduced his authority, and paved the way for due agreement on the 18th of November.

The Khedivial Decree provided for the reduction of the capital of the Unified Debt to L.E. 59,000,000, with a rate of interest of 6 per cent, to which a Sinking Fund of 1 per cent was added. The railways and the Port of Alexandria, the revenues of which were to be applied to the payment of interest on the Preference Stock, were to be administered by a Board composed of two Englishmen, a Frenchman and two Egyptians. The arrangement further provided for the control of the Egyptian finances by an Englishman for revenue and a Frenchman for expenditure. Mr. Romaine and Baron de Malaret were subsequently selected as the first Controllers-General, as

(1) Rivers Wilson, op. cit., 95
(2) The tragic murder of Isma‘īl Šaddīk is treated of by almost all the contemporary writers. The fullest account is in Farman, op. cit., 213, 233.
(3) Cf. Freycinet, La Question d’Egypte, 162-164.
these officials were entitled; and General Mariott was appointed President of the Railway Board. The arrangement having thus been effected, Captain Baring was appointed English Commissioner for the Caisse.

On November 23rd, 1876 Isma'il convoked the Majlis or Chamber of Notables to discuss with them the new arrangement. When he opened the session, he referred to the decisions confirming the mukābala, and the arrangements made by Goschen and Joubert to deal with the Egyptian Debt. It is remarkable that the Khedive stated that the continuation of the mukābala depended on the confirmation of the Majlis, thus apparently granting it some part in the financial administration of the country. (1) Michels observed that the unanimity of votes in the Majlis in reply to the Khedivial speech, "showed clearly how little Egypt had progressed in parliamentary government". (2)

With the Decree of November 18th, 1876 there opened that phase in Egyptian history generally referred to as the condominium. The two Controllers, who had taken in hand the finances, - and so virtually the government - of Egypt, were absolutely equal in title, rank and payment. Their functions were equally important; and when the new arrangements were put into practice, it became evident that it was difficult to touch anything in Egypt without the agreement of the two Powers they represented.

(1) Landau, op. cit. 19-20.
(2) Egypte, Vol. 58; Des Michels to Decazes, dated Dec.2nd, 1876.
But it was evident from the beginning that this entente might well endanger the relations between France and Great Britain, since it was in fact "a marriage of convenience fraught with many liabilities", built on the unstable ground of rivalry. Des Michels considered the agreement as a great success for French policy, which thereby regained a great part of its ancient prestige. He added that France ought to be prepared for further developments and must exercise "more attention and prudence than ever before", and that "we may be sure that England will not in any circumstances admit any sign of the disappointment which she cannot but feel in seeing us, under the mask of financial engagements, enter on an equal footing with her into the political advantages which, fundamentally and inspite of every denial, she had certainly the ambition to acquire exclusively for herself".

This jealousy, which was especially shown on the French side, was cloaked by a mutual attitude of courtesy. France was attracted to the entente by her need of England in the face of her isolation since 1870-1871, whereas England needed French goodwill to counterbalance the Continental Dreikaiserbund concluded by Russia, Austria and Germany. She was content with the compromise as long as her men - although they were compelled to resign their offices at home; their

(1) Knaplund, Gladstone's foreign policy, 82.
(2) Egypte, Vol. 58; Teleg. to Decazes, dated Nov. 18th, 1876
(3) Ibid, Despt. (marked Particulière), dated Nov. 23rd, 1876.
appointment thus being unofficial - had the upper hand in the Egyptian administration. In fact, the post of the English Controller of income was more important than that of the French Controller of expenditure. The Khedive, out of genuine awe of England, and while still trying to set the two Powers at loggerheads and widen the gulf that separated them, inclined more towards England. He assumed an attitude of respect for the English officials who were, on the whole, more polite with him and less aggressive than the French.

One of the greatest defects of this compromise was that it ignored the state of the Egyptian people, while carefully protecting the interests of the bondholders. The unfortunate fellāhīn were constantly harassed by the tax-collectors, especially whenever the coupons became payable. Wilfrid Blunt, who happened to be in Egypt at the beginning of 1876, gives us this vivid picture: "It was rare in these days to see a man in the fields with a turban on his head, or with more than a shirt on his back... The country Sheikhs themselves had few of them a cloak to wear. Wherever we went it was the same. The provincial towns on market days were full of women selling their clothes and their silver ornaments to the Greek usurers, because the tax-collectors were in their villages whip in hand....We did not as yet understand,

(1) Blunt, Secret History, 11-12.
any more than did the peasants themselves, the financial pressure from Europe which was the true cause of these extreme exactions; and we laid the blame, as they did, on [Ismā'īl] and the Mufattish."

Feeling ran high against the Khedive, and when news came to the country in June 1876 of the deposition of Sultan 'Abd al-'Azīz, it was received with delight by the Egyptians as an example of the way in which an unpopular ruler, such as their own, might be got rid of. "The natives cursed his [Ismā'īl's] reign and wished for his deposition. Their dissatisfaction...[was] accounted for by the taxes, which... [increased] daily, and the violence of every sort used by the tax-collectors". The then French representative M. Pellisier, commented that, "Luckily for [Ismā'īl], his subjects are docile and patient; they are not such as might think of overturning his power."

The Russo-Turkish war and the Egyptian contingent:

According to the Fermāns, the Egyptian army constituted a part of the Ottoman forces. 'Abbās and Sa'īd had accordingly sent contingents to aid the Porte during the Crimean war. Ismā'īl, too, had helped the Sultan by sending his army to 'Asīr, to Crete, and, in 1876, to the Balkans to quell the riots in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As his forces

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(1) Pellisier to Decazes, dated June 10th, 1876
(2) Pellisier to Decazes, dated July 18th, 1876
(3) De Lex, the Russian Consul-General, had tried in 1876 to prevent Ismā'īl from sending his contingent to Serbia. (F.O. 78/2503; No. 230 Confid., Cookson to F.O. dated July 18th, 1876).
were still there when war between Russia and Turkey became imminent in April 1877, he was officially asked to increase them.

This time he found it exceedingly difficult to decide what he should do. He was torn between his fears of offending the Porte and his desire to meet the wishes of the European Powers. He saw that if the war were to break out, his position would be critical, since unless he was supported by France and England, he would certainly have to yield to the demands of the Porte, however extravagant they might be. The Egyptian contingent then in Europe amounted to about 9,000 men, and if Isma'il were called on to increase it when war broke out, he would find it difficult to do so, both from want of money and because, having disbanded a great part of his army from economic motives, he could hardly send many more soldiers abroad without almost denuding Egypt of troops. Moreover, his position in the country was by no means secure; he and his family were far from popular; and quite lately excessive taxation had provoked troubles in Upper Egypt which he had had to put down by military force.

To increase his embarrassment, he was warned by Des Michels not to send any troops to Turkey, "as the revenues of Egypt did not belong to him but to his creditors, with whom he had contracted solemn engagements which France expected him

(1) F.O.78/2632; Political No.83 Confid. Vivian to F.O. dated April 3rd, 1877.
(2) Ibid, Pol.No.97 Confid., Vivian to F.O. dated Apr.14th, 1877.
before all to fulfil." The Russian Consul-General M. De Lex, likewise warned him that any assistance to Turkey would probably be punished by Russia (who had by then already declared war) with reprisals such as a blockade, if not a bombardment, of Egypt's ports, and the stoppage of all her commerce. Isma‘il was greatly alarmed, since rumours had been circulating that a Russian fleet might appear via the Indian Ocean and bombard the Egyptian ports on the Red Sea.

But the pressure on Isma‘il from Istanbul was too heavy for him to withstand. France ought to have exerted pressure not at Cairo but at the Ottoman capital. All Isma‘il could do was to promise, on behalf of himself and of the Egyptian Government, not to touch the sums pledged to the European creditors, to keep all his financial engagements to them punctually, and to send to the aid of the Porte only such men as could be provided for by voluntary subscriptions and loans. The scope of such assistance was to be determined by the Chamber of Notables, who had been convoked for the purpose.

The Khedive in his speech of April 30th accused Russia of declaring war on the Porte; declared that Egypt must send troops; and, in concluding, asked the Notables to consider

(1) Ibid, Pol. No. 102 Confid. dated Apr. 22nd, 1877 (from Vivian)
(2) Ibid, No. 103, dated Apr. 23rd, 1877 (from Vivian)
(3) Ibid, Pol. Nos. 104 & 105 from Vivian, both dated Apr. 28th, 1877.
(4) Derby did not instruct Vivian to exert any pressure whatever over the despatch of the contingent.
(5) Vivian's No. 104 supra.
what sums were necessary for equipping the Egyptians corps. This special convocation of the Assembly showed its growing importance in financial matters. Before 1877 any ruler of Egypt who had need of funds for similar enterprises merely imposed additional taxes and increased his extortions.  

The Assembly passed an extraordinary tax amounting to ten per cent of all Egypt's taxes for the purpose. The contingent was organized and its command was given to Prince Hasan, the Khedive's third son. It left Alexandria on June 11th: between six and seven thousand men in ten Turkish ships conveyed by five men-of-war. The recruiting of this contingent produced serious effects in the Egyptian Sudān, since it involved a reduction of the local garrisons. This encouraged the inhabitants and the slave-traders to launch a revolt against the Egyptian administration. 

On the other hand, the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war encouraged Ismā'īl's hopes of attaining independence, by acquiring the good will of Europe, and especially England, in the event of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. He had assured Vivian that he would side with Great Britain in case of a war between her and Russia, and added that if Her Majesty's Government required it, he would be ready with a contingent of 40,000 Egyptian troops. Nevertheless,

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(1) F.0.78/2632. Incl. in Vivian’s Pol.No.115 dated May 4th, 1877.
(2) Egypte, Vol.59; Michels to Decazes, dated June 11th, 1877.
(3) M.F. Shukry, The Khedive Ismā’īl and slavery in the Soudan, 29
(4) Vivian’s No. 104 supra.
(5) F.0.78/2954; Teleg.No.102 Vivian to F.O. Dated Apr. 2nd, 1877. Compare this with Ismā’īl's difficulties mentioned above.
pending such a development, the Egyptian Government prepared to carry out the instructions of the Porte and apply to the Suez Canal the rules for the passage of the Straits. This meant stopping the passage of Russian men-of-war through the Canal, whilst allowing that of all other men-of-war, and all merchant shipping, Russian inclusive, subject to the right of search for contraband of war.

Talk of a British occupation:--

At the end of April a British fleet anchored at the entrance of the Suez Canal at Port Sa‘Id. Both Des Michels and Ismā‘il were much agitated by its appearance, and rumours of a possible British occupation began to circulate. Even Decazes was perturbed, in spite of Vivian’s denial, and Derby had more than once to repeat that England had no intention of occupying even the Canal, the action taken by the British fleet being merely intended to safeguard British interests in India.

At the same time, public opinion in England was in fact veering towards occupation as a counter stroke to a possible Russian acquisition of the Straits; and this policy was favoured for various reasons both by Bismarck, on the one hand, and Nūbār Pasha on the other.

(1) F.0.78/2632; Vivian’s No.114, dated May 4th, 1877.
(2) Egypte, Vol.59; Michels to Decazes, dated Apr.27th, 1877.
(3) Angleterre, Vol.774; No.26, D’Harcourt to Decazes dated Apr. 27th, 1877; Ibid, Vol.775; Nos.73,74 & 77 from D’Harcourt, dated Dec. 11th, 20th & 28th, 1877; Egypte, Vol.60; Desp# marked Confid. from Waddington to Michels, dated Jan.8th, 1878; and No.14 Confid., dated Jan.12th,1878, F.O. to Waddington.
Bismarck saw that a disintegration of the Ottoman Empire would give him an opportunity to reconstitute the equilibrium of Europe on its débris, without risk of a European war, and to affirm his hegemony on the Continent. Not only did he advise England to occupy Egypt, but he also expressed his anxious hope that she might be some day induced to add Syria, Crete and Cyprus to her Eastern possessions. Austria he advised to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and any other provinces of European Turkey she might fancy. Italy he was not much inclined to favour, but made it clear that he would not object to her acquiring a portion of Tripoli; and he offered to assist France in acquiring both Tunis, (in the hope that this would for the next few years divert her thoughts from Germany and revenge) and a sphere of influence in Egypt and Syria shared with England, if an understanding between the Western Powers were possible. To Russia he left the control of the Straits. Bismarck aspired, by showing this solicitude for British aggrandizement, to support his often repeated thesis that England and Germany were natural allies, and that an alliance between them would at the same time give the two Powers guarantees against Russia, and assure for Germany complete liberty against

(1) F.O. 244/304 Draft No.211 Secret, Russell to F.O., dated May 19th, 1877.
(3) F.O. 244/304; No.204 Secret, Russell to F.O. dated May 17th, 1877.
France. (1)

As for Nūbār, at that very time he happened to pay a visit to Berlin. From the date of the Cave mission Nūbār had been convinced that the magnitude of the debts contracted by Egypt during Ismāʿīl's reign rendered intervention inevitable; but he was determined, if he could, to prevent its being effected solely in the interests of the bondholders. Intervention would necessarily endanger if not destroy the independence of Egypt. He was, therefore, anxious that it should at least secure the well-being of the Egyptian people, and the best means for attaining this purpose, in his opinion, lay in either a British occupation or the establishment of a British protectorate. In Berlin he accordingly contended that such a development was to the advantage both of Egypt and the Khedive himself. Bismarck regarded his suggestion as a "very comprehensible" proposal, which England would do well to adopt, rather than come to blows with Russia over the latter's possible occupation of the Straits.

Nūbār next went to England to pursue his aim further. But in responsible circles his words fell on deaf ears, since Disraeli failed to see in the occupation of Egypt by England any real safeguard against the Russian danger, and

(1) D.D.F. First Series, II, No.141, Decazes to D'Harcourt, dated Feb. 7th, 1877.
(2) Dicey, Khedivate, 166-168.
(3) Dugdale, op.cit., 51-2.
(4) Hallberg, The Suez Canal, 270.
regarded Istanbul rather than the Suez Canal as the real key to the route to India. Lord Derby feared that such a move would not only cause financial complications and sacrifices, but also initiate a long period of enmity with France. Gladstone, then in opposition, explained his, and the Liberals', point of view in the clearest and strongest terms. They were opposed to the assumption by England of any form of responsibility on the Nile. He said, "Every scheme for the acquisition of territorial power in Egypt... is but a new snare laid in the path of our policy... The day which witnesses our occupation of Egypt will bid a long farewell to all cordiality of political relations between France and England."

At the same time, both in the army circles, and by all the officials of the Foreign Office, the India Office and the Treasury, Nubar's ideas were received in a most friendly spirit. Hence, though he complained that he could find no one in the Cabinet to give serious consideration to his plan, he was convinced that British public opinion favoured it and would shrink from no sacrifice in order to carry it through. He also got into contact with Edward Dicey, to whom he gave valuable information about the real situation

(1) Seton-Watson, Gladstone, Disraeli and the Eastern Question, 98.
in Egypt. Dicey, in due course, published a series of articles in The Nineteenth Century, in which the facts were so set forth as to prepare the British public if not for occupation, at least for a protectorate. "In plainer words", wrote Dicey, "the mere possibility that Russia may obtain the command of the Bosporus renders it a matter of urgent necessity to us to secure the command of the Isthmus route to India. In order to affect this, we must have the power of keeping the Suez Canal open to our ships at all times and under all circumstances, and, to secure this, we must acquire a recognized footing in the Delta of Egypt of a far more decided character than any we can claim at present."(2)

The Pall Mall Gazette, The Observer, and The Times spoke openly of the necessity of the occupation, and a great number of political personalities proposed that England should counterbalance the increase of Russian influence in the East by acquiring for herself in one way or another, a special influence on the banks of the Nile. This naturally aroused the fears of France, (3) as Derby had foreseen. He now, therefore, repeated what he had said

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(1) The Future of Egypt (Aug., 1877); Egypt and the Khedive (Dec. 1877) and Our route to India (June 1877).
(3) Angleterre, Vol. 775; No. 74. D'Harcourt to Waddington, dated Dec. 20th, 1877 and No. 77 from the same, dated Dec. 28th, 1877.
previously, but this time officially, He assured the French Government that the Anglo-French understanding, which had existed in Egypt for forty years, was a sure guarantee of the continuance of good relations between the two countries.

Waddington, Salisbury and the political "Condominium":

Before the Congress of Berlin there occurred changes both in the British Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay of great importance not only to the relations between the two countries but also to Egyptian affairs; namely the respective appointments of Robert Marquis of Salisbury (April 2nd, 1878) and of Waddington (December 13th, 1877). Just before they were made, D'Harcourt had noticed that England was not taking the newly concluded entente very seriously. Lord Tenterden, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, for instance, accused Des Michels of exaggerated zeal and of attributing unnecessary importance to trifling incidents; while Lord Derby stated that though England had no intention of occupying Egypt, he was quite prepared to acquire an exclusive influence there for his country and countrymen. Des Michels spoke of the perfect confidence that characterized his relations with Vivian in 1877. He applauded his amicable and cordial

(1) D'Harcourt's No. 77, Supra.
(2) Angleterre, Vol. 775; No. 73 Confid., D'Harcourt to Waddington, dated Dec. 14th, 1877.
(3) Egypte, Vol. 59; Particulière, dated May 11th, 1877, to Decazes.
attitude, and added that, "Vivian is personally a partisan of the Anglo-French entente in the Orient. Thanks to these happy circumstances, the Khedive's efforts to divide us have made on Vivian only a passing impression, and even the weaknesses of the Foreign Office in their good dispositions towards us have not always produced at Cairo such a sensible contre-coup as we might fear." Yet Des Michels noticed that Vivian's official language had lately been affected by the subtle spirit of Lord Derby, who was no such a partisan of full co-operation with France as were Vivian and Goschen themselves.\(^{(1)}\) Des Michels's relations with the Khedive and his Government were in fact anything but cordial, since he was an ardent exponent of the old doctrine that threats and coercion were the only weapons to use with Eastern nations, and his attitude was correspondingly aggressive.\(^{(2)}\)

Lyons, the British Ambassador in Paris, again, spoke of its being the possible aim of France to establish such a joint protectorate over Egypt as would fetter British independent action and counteract the preponderant influence of the British.\(^{(3)}\) He added that whereas, some time before, France had seemed to consider a British occupation as inevitable and to have been prepared even to acquiesce in

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\(^{(2)}\) F.O. 78/2631; Pol. No. 21, Vivian to F.O. dated Jan. 27th, 1877.

\(^{(3)}\) F.O. 78/2853; Pol. No. 61, Vivian to F.O. dated Mar. 8th, 1878.
it, she was now apparently on the watch for an opportunity of supplanting British influence by her own. Finally, Vivian doubted if a protectorate of Egypt shared with France would be either politic or practicable, since it would probably create nothing but jealousy and discord without affording any opportunity for harmonious action. (1)

It must be noted that the French owed entirely to themselves and to the hostile attitude assumed by their agents the loss of the influence they ought properly to have possessed in Egypt and the dislike which was entertained for them there. (2) On the other hand, the secret of British paramount influence in Egypt was the consistent policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the country after the failure of the Cave Mission. Isma'il trusted Vivian to the greatest possible extent, and he always told him of the ways in which Des Michels and other Frenchmen tried to impose French influence on him. Moreover, it was generally recognized that England, and not France, was the rising sun, both in Egypt and elsewhere in the East. Hence Isma'il's appointment of "Chinese Gordon" as Governor-General of the Sudán, and his signing with England the two agreements of

(1) F.O. 78/2853; Pol. No. 61 supra.

(2) F.O. 78/2634; Pol. No. 356, Vivian to F.O. dated Dec. 30th, 1877.
August 4th and September 7th 1877. The former of them stipulated that Ismā'īl should suppress slavery in all his possessions within seven years, and that he should give British ships right of search in the Red Sea. By the latter agreement again England recognized Egypt's sovereignty over both the Eastern Sudan, and all the territories on the Red Sea down to Cape Ghardafui. It is sometimes alleged that England recognized Egypt's sovereignty over these territories with the intention of laying her own hands on them if Egyptian control over them should later slacken. The fact is, however, that the British politicians were persuaded that an Egyptian administration would offer facilities for legal trade, by maintaining the existing ports on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and consequently lessen the evils of slavery. The Porte thought of protesting against Ismā'īl's granting to a third party rights which were not purely his own, since Egypt and all her possessions were still under Ottoman sovereignty. But the grave situation of the Ottoman troops in the Balkans, and Turkey's need of British assistance against Russia compelled the Ottoman Ministers to keep silent. (1)

The advent of Waddington was received with great satisfaction both in London and in Cairo, since he was known

(1) Vide my op. cit., pp 144-145.
to be Anglophile. He was of English origin, brought up in England, fully conversant with the English language and English ways, and was indeed held, whether justifiably or not, to be more English than French. (1) The change in Derby's attitude referred to, which occurred on the very day after Waddington's appointment, may indicate that the British Secretary hoped to regain the ground that England had lost to France owing to the obstinacy of Decazes.

The Khedive himself thought that the time had come to work once more for the abrogation of the agreement of the 18th of November, 1876, by bringing about a rupture in the Anglo-French entente. His plan, as usual, consisted in provoking jealousy and doubt between the two countries, by favouring one above the other. In May 1877 he had asked the British Government for an English official to be appointed as Inspector-General of Upper and Lower Egypt, with absolute control over administration and taxation. Nūbār, however, who was then in London, warned the Foreign Office that Ismā'īl's real aim was simply to try and escape from his financial responsibilities by both leaning on the British Government and bringing about a rupture between the Western Powers. Vivian was equally opposed to the Khedive's overture; and so was Lord Derby, who considered Ismā'īl to be in no

(1) Des Michels, Souvenirs de Carrière 163-4.
such financial position as would allow him to pay for the post. Lord Derby tried to soothe the doubts of France concerning the whole affair, but in vain;\(^{(1)}\) for Isma'il continued to approach the Foreign Office for the choice of the person in question.

In fact, however, far from being, as some French writers\(^{(2)}\) and politicians\(^{(3)}\) allege, so Anglophilic as to be ready to betray the interests of France, Waddington genuinely believed that it would be to the mutual advantage of the two Powers to exercise a joint influence and act in concert on a footing of perfect equality not only in Egypt but also throughout the Middle East and Mediterranean areas. He hoped thus to avert the fatal consequences resulting everywhere in the past from Anglo-French rivalry, and to create a guarantee of peace and union between the two countries.\(^{(4)}\) To him the entente was the guarantee, also, both of the privileged position of France in Egypt and of her close alliance with England. Thus, he based his Egyptian policy on "fair

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\(^{(1)}\) F.O. 78/2851; Draft No. 128; F.O. to Vivian (endorsed"seen by the Queen, Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury"), dated July 8th, 1878. Also Angleterre Vol. 775; Decazes to D'Harcourt dated Nov. 25th and 26th, 1877; Ibid, No. 73, Confid. from D'Harcourt dated Dec. 14th, 1877, and Egypte, Vol. 59; Partic. Des Michels to Decazes, dated May 11th, 1877.

\(^{(2)}\) Cocheris, op. cit., 78-80 and 83-84 and Plauchut, L'Egypte et L'occupation anglaise, 6.

\(^{(3)}\) Such as Tricou, Des Michels, De Ring, and the members of Parliament who attacked Waddington's policy in 1882.

protection for the French bondholders, fair consideration for the prosperity of Egypt, unity between France and England, on at least equal terms for France, and the exclusion, as far as possible, of the intervention of other Powers". (1) He then took an early opportunity to assure Lyons most emphatically that France wanted nothing for herself, and that she desired no acquisition of territory either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere; but whilst he disclaimed any desire of this nature, he showed in a most unmistakable manner that an occupation of Egypt by England alone would create a bitter feeling in France which would long impair the friendly relations between the two countries. (2) When the invitation was sent to him for the Berlin Congress, he hesitated to accept it, but agreed later to take part, on condition of the exclusion of Egypt, the Holy Lands and Syria as well as Western European affairs, from the discussions, because all these might open the door for new complications, and because he considered them all "questions avant tous françaises." (3)

Salisbury, for his part, had much the same inclinations as Waddington. As early as April 20th, he sent word to Vivian that "it is of considerable importance to us that the French Government should, as far as possible, be satisfied that we are co-operating with them heartily". (4) This co-operation

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(1) F.O. 141/124; No.817 Secret, Lyons to F.O. dated Aug.1st 1878
(2) Newton, Lord Lyons, I, 123-4
(3) D.D.F., First series, II, Nos. 262,267 and 482 dated March 7th and Dec. 8th, 1879.
(4) F.O. 78/2851; Teleg. to Vivian.
was also a necessity, which he expressed by saying, "When you have got a neighbour and faithful ally who is bent on meddling in a country in which you are deeply interested, you have three courses open to you: You may renounce, or monopolise, or share. Renouncing would have been to place the French across our road to India. Monopolising would have been near the risk of war. So we resolved to share". (1)

In the very week of his arrival at the Foreign Office he instructed Lyons officially (2) to inform the French Minister of Foreign Affairs that England had no desire either for any territorial establishment whatsoever in Egypt, or to interfere in any way with matters affecting the Khedivial dynasty. He emphasized his desire to continue co-operating with France in all sincerity. When he went to Berlin together with Disraeli, they both agreed with Waddington on "the firm and loyal continuation of the combined action of France and England in Egypt, for all that touched political and economic interests. (3)"

But Salisbury, like Derby, was careful not to pledge his Government to any recognition of a parity of influence with France in Egypt, since "any detailed engagements as to questions of administration could not be taken without

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(1) Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, II, 331-2
(3) Ibid, Copy, the French Cabinet to D'Harcourt, dated July 21st, 1878.
prudence, for each step must be taken as the necessity for it arises."(1) Thus in September 1878 he told Waddington that while England had no intention of establishing an exclusive footing in Egypt, "she must not be held to any promise if the Turkish Empire went to pieces". (2) In this connection it is interesting to note that he had written to Lord Lytton, then Viceroy of India, (3) in September 1876, during the revolt in Bosnia, that he did not "despair of being told to write to him for his best civilian to govern the new province of Egypt". (4) On August 10th 1878, Salisbury wrote to Lyons, "I told Goschen that we were very anxious to work with France, and that we intended to take no violent means of placing ourselves in a position which would make them subordinate. But I told him I nevertheless held faith in the English influence in Egypt drawing ahead - a result which in my belief depended not on any formal acts, but on the natural superiority which a good Englishman in such a position was pretty sure to show."(5)

With this entente arrived at in Berlin there was established what is generally called "the political condominium", which remained in being up to the British occupation. But like the "financial condominium" instituted earlier, in

(1) Newton, op. cit., 156.
(2) Langer, European alliances and alignments, 257.
(3) At that time Salisbury was Secretary of State for India.
(4) Cecil, Life of Salisbury, II, 83.
(5) Ibid, 334-5.
November 1876, it had its underlying elements of weakness, the chief of which was the rivalry which inspired the activities of the representatives of the two Governments in Egypt. The verbal entente arrived at in Berlin ipse facto entailed a parity of appointment in the Egyptian administration between the two Western Powers. It was thus decided to redistribute the positions to be held by Englishmen and Frenchmen, presumably to the detriment of the British. As we have seen, however, it was the intention of both Waddington and Salisbury to acquire preponderance for their respective countries in the long run, and consequently the English and French officials on the spot fell out more than once on the subject, since an agreed system for filling the various posts could hardly be come to. Isma‘îl with his tendency to prefer the British only added fuel to the flames; while the French officials proved more exacting than the British, who, thanks to Wilson's ability, had already established themselves, and were inclined to defend their acquired influence against French encroachment. From both sides there were thus attempts to enforce upon the Egyptian Government the engagement of foreign officials, and to induce the Khedive to concede the exploitation of enterprises such as the railways and navigation on the Nile to French and English firms. In the course of this silent antagonism, which was sometimes the subject of correspondence between the Quai d'Orsay and the
Foreign Office, the French officials in Egypt accused Waddington of giving way before the British in the name of the entente. Waddington in fact repeatedly ordered his representatives at Cairo not to quarrel with their English colleagues for filling the most important posts with their countrymen. (1)

We learn from Salisbury's correspondence that he was looking further ahead. What he expected and hoped for was not that the "condominium" should be perpetuated; he believed that this must eventually give way before the pressure of influential opinion in England for her assumption of sole responsibility for the control of Egypt. His conception seems to have been that England should give France a free hand in Tunis and that in consequence France, by concentrating her attention on the latter, would come to devote less energy than England to the affairs of Egypt.

The first harvest of this verbal engagement was reaped by the French while the Foreign Ministers were still in Berlin.

(1) In November 1878 the respective position of England and France in Egypt was as follows:-
(a) Parity in the Caisse and in the Khedivial Dā'ira.
(b) English administration of the Railways, the Telegraphs and the port of Alexandria; (In the last there were two English Directors and one French.)
(c) The whole financial administration lay in the hands of the English Controller, while the French Controller simply dealt with the expenditure.
(d) English administration of the Ports, the Lighthouses, the Post Office and the Customs.
(e) French administration of the Antiquities.
(f) The "Comité de Contentieux" contained two French lawyers
Salisbury sent to Wilson ordering him "to see that in all the financial appointments made in connection with his official inquiry,.... [the] French should receive an absolutely equal share". In April 1878, the payment of the half-yearly interest on the Public Debt of Egypt was about to fall due. The Commissioners, supported by Vivian, were anxious to allow its postponement in view of the country's manifest inability to meet it. The French Government, on the other hand, convinced that the Khedive and Egypt were really able to pay, insisted that the claims of the creditors should be satisfied, and consequently asked that instructions similar to those sent to Des Michels should be sent to Vivian. Vivian was in fact instructed to collaborate with his French colleague; and "by putting the screw once more upon the long-suffering fellahin" the May Coupon was punctually paid.

In the eyes of the Egyptians the condominium imposed upon Egypt in its second shape, under Waddington and Salisbury, - which, purely economic and financial as it was, is said to have been "without any parallel in history" - while its mere presence was enough to impair the prestige and authority of

(1) Blunt, op. cit., 37
(3) The Nile had been low that year, and an exceptionally severe winter had seriously damaged the crops. Famine was rife in Upper Egypt, resulting in the death of some thousands, and the salaries of the government officials had not been paid for some months.
(4) Sammarco, Précis de l'histoire de l'Egypte, IV, 344.
the native government, produced no compensating advantages to them. As Milner points out, the controlling Powers were not prepared to give the native government material assistance. Had they done so, the Egyptians might have accepted the Control as productive of an improvement in their lot. As it was, however, they perceived clearly enough that by this system the resources of their country were exploited wholly for the benefit of the bondholders, without regard to their own welfare. For the controlling Powers repeatedly thwarted the efforts of the government by vetoing every legislative or administrative reform calculated in any way to impair the interests of the foreign creditors. Native officials were dismissed and their places filled by highly paid strangers, "unacquainted with the language of the country, and, in a great number of cases, incompetent for any duty except that of drawing their salaries." Religion also played its part in the final failure of the "condominium", since not only was it difficult in principle for Moslems to feel any confidence in Christians, as the traditional enemies of their creed, but at that very time Russia appeared bent on destroying the last Islamic Power in Europe, while France, already long in occupation of Algiers, was then engaged in suppressing a movement of resistance by its Moslem inhabitants. It appeared

(2) Farman, op.cit. 234.
very much as if the Christian West had embarked on a new crusade, this time economic and imperialist, to subdue the whole Moslem world to its domination.
CHAPTER III

The European Ministry

"The Khedive swore by the blood of his father ... that he would not yield an inch, and we all swore by the blood of our collective eight parents that we would not give in."


The Commission of Inquiry:

(1) On January 17th, 1878 Vivian wrote that Egypt had paid to the creditors £S. 7,473,909, out of the annual income of the year 1877, which amounted to £S. 9,533,000.
problems, His Majesty might fix the programme for an inquiry and order the Porte to appoint the persons to conduct it. (1) He was preparing all the necessary financial documents for conveyance to Istanbul to that end. (2) Another course for Isma‘il was to canvass the support of British public opinion by representing the oppression of the fellahin as being really due to the rapacity of Europe. Isma‘il in fact followed both these courses at the same time. He gained to his cause not only certain influential personalities in the Porte, but also a member of the British Parliament, a Mr. Campbell, some publicists in London, and the British Controller-General, Mr. Romaine himself. (3)

Goschen was uncertain whether Isma‘il would abide by his engagements. He said that the Khedive’s true situation could not be ascertained without a serious and a complete inquiry into his income and expenditure. Until this had been carried out, no further sacrifices could be demanded of the creditors. He considered an entente between the French and English creditors, together with the official support of their Governments,

(1) Q.d’Or., Angelterre, Vol. 776; No. 21 dated Feb.6th, 1878, Waddington to D’Harcourt.

(2) Ibid, Egypte, Vol. 60; No. 12 Confid. dated Jan.7th, 1878, Des Michels to Waddington.

(3) Ibid, a Desp. marked Particulière & Confidentiel dated Feb.18th 1878 from Des Michels to Waddington.
to be an essential condition of holding the Khedive to the right course. (1)

Nubar was then resident in Paris, in exile, and was in close communication with all the parties by whom Egyptian securities were largely held. He went out of his way to advise that no demand for a reduction of interest should be entertained till steps had been taken to ascertain, independently, not only what the Khedive really owed, and what he could pay, but also how his embarrassments had been brought about. (2)

In the meantime Baron De Malaret, the French Controller, and Captain Baring, the British Commissioner for the Caisse, had proceeded first to Paris and then to London to discuss matters with Goschen and Joubert; and when Baring returned to Egypt in October 1877, he was prepared to consider a modification of the terms of the Goschen-Joubert settlement, but only as a result of a full inquiry into the whole financial situation, (3) to be undertaken by the Commissioners of the Public Debt. Isma'il replied that the powers of inquiry demanded by the Commissioners trenched upon his sovereign rights and would interfere with the government of the country. He was determined, therefore, to invite the

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(1) Q. d'Or., Angleterre, Vol. 776; No. 15 dated Feb. 15th, 1878, D'Harcourt to Waddington.


(3) Zetland, op. cit., 60-1. See above, 89-90.
Porte to send a delegate from Istanbul to preside over the Commission. Only with this safeguard could he allow the Commissioners to push their inquiries as far as they chose, or as the President would allow. However, Vivian on this advised Ismā‘īl not to invite the interference of the Porte in a question which related purely to the internal administration of his country; and Ismā‘īl in the end agreed, insisting only that the inquiry, if it was pressing and necessary, should be presided over by an Egyptian.

Vivian then wrote to the Foreign Office recommending that Her Majesty's Government should depart in some measure from their rule of non-interference, as affairs were becoming so entangled as to challenge the interference of all the foreign governments for the protection of the interests of their subjects. His general comment was that "unless something can be done, and that quickly, the Khedive and his government must inevitably drift into bankruptcy, with all the political complications that may result from it". The solution, in his view, lay in

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(1) F.O. 78/2634; No. 321 Pol. (marked Confid.) Vivian to F.O. dated Nov. 30th, 1877.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid, No. 331 Pol. from Vivian dated Dec. 7th, 1877.

(4) Ibid.
the inquiry on which he insisted and the need for which he reiterated. As a result, Lord Derby agreed to the principle of the inquiry, which should be "as full and complete as possible". (1)

The situation was in fact becoming daily more threatening owing to the cases brought against the Khedive by the creditors of the Floating Debt before the Mixed Tribunals. The Tribunals repeatedly gave judgment against the Khedive; but nothing was done to implement their rulings. Then on January 20th, 1878, the consular corps assembled; and after long deliberations, it was decided that every Consul should inform his government, on behalf of them all, that it was agreed, in the interests of the bondholders, that the Commission of the Public Debt should be transformed, by the authorisation of the Ports, and with rights of unlimited investigation, into a European Commission of Inquiry. Moreover, in the calculation of the State budget, which would result from this regulation, the Controllers-General should co-operate with the Commissioners. The regulations, once they were promulgated, would be executed by the European functionaries appointed according to the Decrees already in force, under the auspices of the interested Governments. (2)

(1) Ibid. No. 354 Pol. Confid.; F.O. 78/2851; No. 9 and F.O. 78/2630; Draft No. 172, all from F.O. to Vivian dated Dec. 29th, 1877, Jan. 16th, 1878 and Dec. 27th, 1877.

(2) Q.d'Or., Egypte; Vol. 60; No. 16 Direction Politique, Des Michels to Waddington dated Jan. 20th, 1878.
The German Consul-General appears to have been authorized to support this solution, and his language left no doubt as to the value he attached to its enforcement. (1) It seemed that Germany was prepared to intervene in Egyptian affairs in the interests of the German bondholders, this change of policy being presumably the result of Nubar's journey to Berlin, during which he discussed the situation of Egypt with Bismarck.

In February 1878, Waddington, who was always desirous of limiting any intervention in Egyptian affairs to the two Western Powers, addressed a communication to Derby on the subject of the various financial questions involved, and made the significant observation that if England and France did not exert themselves at once, the matter would slip out of their hands. This suggestion was not without its effect. Derby, in reply, went a little further than ever before, and stated that "Her Majesty's Government would be happy to co-operate with that of France in any useful measure not inconsistent with the Khedive's administration of Egypt."

But Des Michels was hostile to this principle. (3) He thought it unnecessary and only likely to help the Khedive in evading his engagements, which he should be compelled to

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(1) Ibid, Angleterre, Vol. 776; No. 29 Waddington to D'Harcourt, dated Feb. 18th, 1878.

(2) Dicey, Khedivate, 174. See above, 99.

(3) On March 28th Vivian wrote, "I cannot help suspecting that the counsels which guided French opinion in this matter were not prompted by any desire for the success of the Inquiry or for our continued popularity." F.O. 76/2853; Telegram to F.Q.
meet without regard to the condition of the country. Even when the principle of the inquiry was agreed to by his Government, he determined, so far as lay in his power, to make it essentially an attack on the Khedive. He and De Blignières (the French Commissioner of the Caisse), were so fully impressed with the idea that Isma'il was defaulding his creditors; they were so anxious to show that the country could pay all that it had engaged to pay; that it was difficult to make them look at the question from any other point of view. They also objected to the introduction into the Commission of the native element. But Vivian, Baring and Ferdinand De Lesseps (who was to be the chairman of the Commission when it was composed) were all of the opinion that this objection was not equitable.

Isma'il was naturally opposed to the inquiry, and, in an attempt to divide the two countries, he more than once repeated to the British Government his previous offer to appoint an Englishman as Inspector-General of Upper and Lower Egypt.

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1) F.O. 78/2854; No. 98, confid. dated Vivian March 30th, 1878.

2) Ibid, an Annex marked Private and Confid. to Vivian's No. 98 supra by Captain Baring.

3) Ibid, Nos. 78 and 79 from Vivian.

that he believed that Des Michels and the "French party" in Egypt were making use of Vivian to put him in a position which must involve his ruin, the Khedive's intention being apparently to bring about a misunderstanding between the Western Consuls. (1) Moreover, after hearing representations from the Consuls-General, though he agreed that, if an inquiry was to be proceeded with, representatives of the creditors must take part, he insisted that it should deal only with income. He even proposed a commission composed of Gordon Pasha, Ferdinand De Lesseps and an Egyptian, hoping to exploit the popularity of the two first in their own countries and to conduct the inquiry as he liked; and the British Government took up this idea, suggesting its adoption to France:— They also, they said, accepted the formation of a limited commission composed of Gordon and two delegates, the one English and the other French, each selected by his respective Government, on condition that the three should enjoy equal status and powers. Waddington, in turn, would have agreed to this arrangement, which would have involved joint action by the two Governments; but the French and British Agents on the spot considered it essential to include the members of the Caisse in the Commission, lest the

(1) F.O. 78/2634; No. 356 Pol., Vivian to F.O. dated Dec. 30th, 1877.
authority of the latter institution should be compromised. In the event, however, Gordon declined the presidency; and when Isma'il offered the task to a commission formed of De Lesseps, Wilson and the four Commissioners of the Debt, the British Government agreed. (1)

Germany and Austria - the latter with especial vehemence - declared that, while respecting the decision of the two Powers most interested in Egyptian affairs, they hoped, if concerted action by all the Powers should prove indispensable, that the Western Powers would not hesitate to call for the support of the European concert, and that the four Powers - joined by Italy if she liked - should collectively remonstrate with the Khedive, so that he might not aspire to divide them and would bow to their will. (2)

However, England and France preferred to act alone; and Isma'il accepted all that they agreed to. On March 30th he signed a Decree establishing the Commission, which was to be composed of De Lesseps (as President), Wilson, lent by Her Majesty's Government, (as first Vice-President), Riyād Pasha (as second Vice-President), (3) and the Commissioners

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(1) Q.d'Or, Angleterre; Vol. 776; Two Desps. from Waddington to D'Harcourt dated Mar. 21st and 22nd, 1878.
(2) Ibid. Allemagne; Vol. 23; No. 38 Confid., St. Vallier to Waddington dated Apr. 3rd, 1878 & Vol. 22; Note from Prince Hohenlohe to Waddington, dated Mar. 31st, 1878.
(3) The Decree omitted any reference to the respective offices to which Wilson and Riyād were appointed. F.O. 78/2851; Nos. 52, 55 & 58 all from F.O. to Vivian, dated Mar. 22nd, 23rd and 26th, 1878.
of the Debt.

From this date the era of direct European, or, more strictly speaking, Anglo-French, intervention may be said to have begun, since the Commission was, in effect, appointed to place the Viceroy upon trial. Its raison d'être was to ascertain whether Egypt could continue to pay the existing rate of interest on her debt, and if she could not, what amount she could reasonably afford to contribute.

According to Article III of the Decree, all Ministers and functionaries of the government were ordered to furnish the Commissioners, without delay, with any information they might demand.

After the signature of the Decree, Waddington told Germany that now the combination was agreed to, the Austro-German proposal to make a collective representation to Ismail had no object, but that the two Powers might reconsider it in case it became necessary in future to force the Khedive into allowing the inquiry its full scope and to make certain that it was effective. (2)

No sooner had the Commission begun its work, than De Lesseps went to Paris; and the real Presidency devolved on Wilson. "From that moment", according to Hanotaux, "the hands of England could be felt, stronger and more pertinacious

(1) Dicey, The Eg. crisis, 671-2.

than ever before, in Egyptian affairs". (1) Des Michels noticed the change in British policy resulting from the entente arrived at in Berlin. He saw that it was now concerned not only with the creditors and the financial situation, but with the very fate of Egypt itself. (2) He was in favour, in order to counterbalance the influence of Wilson and Salisbury, of proposing to the Powers assembled in Berlin that Egypt should be internationalized by extending the principle adopted over the Judicial Reform to the administration and the economics of the country. But seeing that his Government was "plus anglais que celui qui siégeait à Londres" and that it was clear that Wilson would be appointed as Minister of Finance, he soon left Egypt, never to return. (3)

What actually happened was that the Commission, cordially supported by the Western Powers, who advised the avoidance of extreme measures or demands such as might bring about the dethronement of the Khedive, began to investigate the financial administration. It summoned such Egyptian officials as it considered suitable to appear before it, and sent its delegates to the provinces to

(1) Hanotaux, Hist. de la France Contemporaine, IV, 384
(2) Des Michels, Souvenirs de carrière, 181
(4) F.0.78/2851; Dft. No.129 from F.0. to Vivian dated July 13th, 1878.
examine the situation on the spot. It was too evidently the master of the Egyptian administration. (1)

Ismā'īl had done his best to impede the earlier investigation carried out by Cave, Goschen and Joubert. But this inquiry, which was not only more rigorous but was concerned in large part with his personal affairs, was naturally even less to his taste. He complained to Vivian that the enquiries made of him by the Commission respecting the origin and acquisition of his Family Estates thinly veiled suspicions of fraud, which were personally offensive to him. The Commissioners, he said, were exceeding the powers granted to them by his own Decree, "dragging him through the dirt and discrediting his authority with evident intention of upsetting him, that this was contrary to the distinct undertaking which had alone induced him to agree to the appointment of the Commission, and that his prestige and position as Chief of the State should be respected". Vivian did his best to soothe


(2) They amounted to about a million acres of land, nearly one-fifth of the cultivable lands of Egypt. These had been bestowed by Muhammad‘Alī on the princes of his family, they and their administration being called the Dā‘ira al-Saniya (the distinguished domains). The Dā‘ira al-Khassa, on the other hand, dealt with Ismā‘īl's own lands, most of which he had acquired after his accession by various means. It is worth noting that the descendants of Muḥammad‘Alī had invariably shown a lust for amassing lands, due perhaps to the fact that they always had in mind that the founder of the dynasty had brought all the lands of Egypt under his direct control as ruler of the state.
Isma‘īl's anger and to combat the idea that the Commissioners were actuated by any feeling of personal hostility towards him. He pointed out to him that his resistance at each stage of the negotiations preceding the inquiry had irritated public opinion and eventually made its conditions much more stringent than they otherwise might have been. (1)

As early as June 1878 it was expected that the activities of the Commission would culminate in the appointment of Nūbār as a responsible Prime Minister. Nūbār was then in London, giving Salisbury his advice on the inquiry. He had previously conferred with Waddington in Paris. They both, so he afterwards stated to Dicey, advised him to use his personal influence at Cairo, once he was back there, to get the demand for the restitution of the Khedive's lands reduced to a comparatively small amount, as they were informed by their Consular Agents in Egypt that nothing would ever induce the Khedive to surrender the whole of his estates, though he might be persuaded to disgorge a substantial amount. It was Nūbār's idea from the beginning that the prime cause of Egypt's distress lay in the Khedivial estates and that their requisition by the State should be the corner-stone of any proposed reform. Salisbury, who might have induced

(1) F.0.78/2855; No.214 dated June 17th, 1878. Vivian to F.O.
the Khedive - through Wilson- to recall Nūbār, urged the latter, if appointed, not to press with undue severity upon the Viceroy, whom it would be undesirable to drive either to abdication or to a desperate resistance. Salisbury further discussed with Nūbār the question of the composition of his Ministry. He expressed an absolute objection to the appointment of a Frenchman to share Wilson's powers in any degree whatever, but saw no objection to a Frenchman's being appointed to hold some other portfolio.

The Formation of Nūbār's Ministry :-

The invitation to Nūbār to return to Egypt was sent by Prince Hasan, and Ismā'īl declared that his object in recalling him was merely to end the suspicions connected with Nūbār's alleged conspiracy. Nūbār had expected this invitation to take office. But before coming back to his adoptive country, Nūbār intended to secure some safeguards from the two Powers as well as from Bismarck. Hence his journeying between London and Kissingen before passing through Paris. This stimulated certain rumours

(1) Egype, Vol.60; Des Michels to Waddington dated May, 1878.
(2) & (3) F.0.78/2851; No.137 dated July 29th, 1878. F.0. to Vivian. (Italics are mine).
(4) Waddington's comment was that Nūbār's presence in the councils of the Khedive had always been the signal for the realization of the most artificial plans. Angleterre, Vol. 778; No.113 dated Aug. 17th. Waddington to D'Harcourt.
about the object of his contact with the German Chancellor; and Waddington was afraid lest it should result in the establishment in Egypt of an international directive body headed by Germany. It was feared lest Ismāʿīl should use this as a pretext for recovering his independence, together with a pecuniary settlement the arrangement of which would be facilitated by England. (1) But D'Harcourt soothed Waddington's fears by assuring him that Salisbury had told him that he knew nothing of Nūbār's visits to Kissingen except through the newspapers, and by expressing his confidence in Salisbury's sincere attachment to the entente. Nūbār's activities in the three capitals may be illustrated by what he told Edward Dicey of an interview he had with the Foreign Office, when he inquired how far he could rely on British support in the event of the Khedive's arbitrarily dismissing his Ministry. Salisbury's reply gave Nūbār to understand that in such a contingency he could count upon the active support of the British Government. (2)

Nūbār returned to Egypt on August 15th, after the Commission had made their initial report. This recommended the relinquishment by the Khedive of absolute power, the

(2) Dicey, Khedivate, 192-3
handed over of his family estates to the State, his
acceptance of a Civil List, and the introduction of
secondary reforms in the fiscal administration. Nūbār
agreed with the conclusions of the Commission and said
that if he was called to form a Ministry, he would choose
an Englishman (namely Wilson) as Minister of Finance,
with absolute power in all matters of appointment and
dismissal; a Frenchman for a minor post; and the best
available natives for the rest, thus imposing the authority
of the Ministry on the Khedive. (1)

Nūbār, as we have mentioned, was persuaded that the
main cause of the misery endured by the native population
was the appropriation of private lands by the Khedive,
purchased with the funds belonging of right to the State
and cultivated by forced labour. Before he left England,
he had become convinced that nothing except compulsion would
induce Ismā‘īl to surrender the lands he had appropriated,
and that if the lands were not surrendered, intervention
must follow as a logical necessity. As Nūbār was against
foreign intervention in itself, he resolved to bring
pressure to bear upon the Khedive and thus to adopt the
one expedient which might avert it. (2) This is why he
urged Ismā‘īl to accept the Commission's report in extenso.

(1) F. 0. 78/2855; No. 286 Confid. dated Aug. 22nd, 1878,
Vivian to F. C.
(2) Dicey, Khedivate, 168.
As Isma'il hesitated, Nūbār and Wilson threatened, if he did not accept it, to depart and leave the solution of the whole problem to the Powers. (1)

On August 23rd, Isma'il accordingly accepted all the conclusions of the Commission unconditionally, and on the 28th addressed a letter to Nūbār authorizing him to form a Ministry. In this letter, the principle of Ministerial responsibility was re-affirmed. "Dorénavant", Isma'il said, "Je veux gouverner avec et par mon Conseil des Ministres."

Thus ended the hard fight against the Khedive's authority. Nūbār seemed momentarily victorious, though he had in fact paved the way for the realization of Salisbury's policy of affirming British ascendancy in the country according to his view of the Anglo-French entente. (2)

We have spoken enough of Nūbār's conception of government in Egypt and of the extent of foreign interference he was prepared to admit. All his antecedents indicated that he was the last man to allow the reins of power to slip from his hands or to become the puppet of

(1) Vivian's No.286 Confid. supra.

(2) On August 27th Salisbury wrote to Vivian saying, "The measures in which these results have been obtained, and especially the fact that they have been accomplished with the application of exclusively English pressure, is highly creditable to the skill with which affairs have been conducted". F.0.78/2852; Dft. Teleg. No.162.
foreign control. He might make use of foreign pressure to squeeze the Viceroy and to lead him in the right direction, but the keystone of his policy was that Egypt should govern herself. Vivian doubted his readiness to admit the exercise of any permanent foreign influence except in so far as it might promote his own views and policy with respect to the government of the country. (1) Nevertheless, Nūbār recognized that the native element was neither sufficiently experienced to conduct the administration unaided nor independent enough to attempt to cope with the despotic authority of the Khedive. This being so, it was necessary, in his view, to look to a strong foreign government for assistance and support, and every consideration, in his opinion, pointed to England as the Power having a real and impartial interest in the welfare of the Egyptian people. (2) Hence, he would have preferred to form a purely Anglo-Egyptian Ministry, but was prevented by French jealousy. So, while leaving the door open for the French to enter the Cabinet, he offered the Ministry of Finance to Wilson, who was to perform the functions of the Controllers-General after the abolition of their posts.

(1) F.O.78/2855; No.228 Confid. Vivian to F.O. dated June 29th, 1878.

(2) Ibid, No.286 Confid. supra.
However, in his reply to the Khedive's invitation, and in his consent to form the Ministry, nothing was said about Wilson, possibly to avert public criticism and French interference. But France soon got to know of his intended appointment of Wilson, which tended to give both the Ministry and public opinion the impression that it was an attempt by England to take the lead in the Egyptian administration.

D'Harcourt told Salisbury that Wilson's appointment would appear to the French as leaving in an Englishman's hands financial questions which interested all concerned, and would destroy the parity of influence between the two countries. Moreover, although Wilson, as he said, enjoyed French confidence, it was feared that he might cause all the chief financial posts to be filled by his countrymen and depend exclusively on them. (1) D'Harcourt also observed that Salisbury, who was trying to conceal all signs of bringing pressure to bear on the Khedive, or of setting up a protectorate, was doing so chiefly - for there were other reasons - because of Egypt's relations with Turkey. (2)

Waddington, in fact, insisted that the parity of influence, which had existed between the two countries since the financial crisis, should be maintained; a fact to which he drew Nūbār's attention during his visit to Paris. He

(1) Angleterre, Vol. 778; No. 84 dated Sept. 4th, 1878, D'Harcourt to Waddington.
(2) Ibid, from the same, dated Sept. 13th, 1878.
instructed the French Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo, M. Raindre, to remind Nūbār of what he had told him and repeat that any French support or sympathy depended on the frank and loyal acceptance of that situation, and on what he would do for France in his Ministry. (1)

Just as Salisbury observed that "the Khedive has offered the Ministry of Finance to Mr. Wilson... purely in consequence of Wilson's personal merits, and without any suggestion on the part of Her Majesty's Government or any of their agents", (2) so Nūbār declared that he chose him not as an Englishman but as a competent official. He declined as a matter of right to admit that he was under an obligation to France or any other country, since to do so would amount to admitting and proclaiming the non-existence of the Egyptian Government as an independent entity and its supersession by a system of government quite unknown till then. (3) Nevertheless, although he left the door open for a Frenchman to become Minister of Public Works, he intended to maintain his freedom of action, which he thought to be necessary for the accomplishment

(1) Egypte, Vol. 61; Waddington to Raindre dated Sept. 5th, 1878 and Angleterre, Vol. 778; Draft of a Desp. to be sent by the Direct. of Foreign Affairs to Waddington for conveyance to D'Harcourt, dated Sept. 12th, 1878.
(3) Egypte, Vol. 61; Note from Nūbār to Raindre, dated Sept. 9th, 1878.
of his reforming mission. Hence he had no intention of entering into negotiations with the French Government either over the choice of the Minister of Public Works or over the scope of his duties. (1) Instead, he merely chose for that office his "friend" Monsieur Cauvet (the Director of Studies at the École Centrale in Cairo), and asked the French Government to agree to his appointment in a note in which he explained the importance of the Ministry of Public Works in a country like Egypt, whose life depended on irrigation, observing that it was in fact more important than the Ministry of the Interior. The French Government, however, wished instead to appoint M. Malaret. Nūbār disagreed, because Malaret had served in the diplomatic service before coming to Egypt and because that would open the door to Italian pressure, which had just begun, in order to secure an appointment for an Italian. Nūbār still insisted on the appointment of Cauvet, who had previously been an engineer. But Waddington, who was anxious to appoint a Frenchman with experience in Egyptian affairs without opening the door to Italian interference, decided instead on M. De Blignières, to whose appointment Nūbār had no objection. (2)

(1) Egypte, Vol. 61; Raindre to Waddington, dated Sept. 7th, 1878

(2) Egypte, Vol. 61; Particulière from Nūbār to Raindre dated Sept. 14th and subsequent Despatches from Raindre to Waddington.
This having been accomplished, Salisbury declared that he was "decidedly of opinion that the port of Alexandria should not be placed under the control of the French Minister". He thought that the existing railways and the Suez Canal harbours should also be excluded from the French Minister's control, but that, as a compromise, canals and other harbours and railways not affected by the Decree of November might be conceded to him. It would seem that Nūbār, who immediately transferred the direction of the ports and the railways to the Ministry of Finance, had promised Wilson and Vivian to do so, and was relying on British support to present France with an accomplished fact.

Long negotiations took place in both London and Paris about the division of duties between the two Ministers; and in the end it was agreed that:

1. The Ministry of Public Works should be responsible for the canals, the irrigation works, the railways, and the ports - except the port of Alexandria, which should come under the Ministry of Finance.

2. As for the railways, the Minister should assume the authority accorded to the Khedive by the Decree of November, 1876.

(1) F.O.78/2852; Dfts. Nos.181 & 182, F.O. to Lascelles dated Sept. 28th, 1878. Nūbār, on hearing of this stated, "I dreamt of Egypt's independence, but France and England have proved today that I was misled". Egypte, Vol.61; Raindre to Waddington, dated Sept.28th, 1878.
3. Financial regulations regarding lighthouses should be maintained and placed under the direct control of the Cabinet.

4. The Domains (the Khedivial lands relinquished to the State) should be placed under the direction of a special Board consisting of an Englishman, a Frenchman and an Egyptian, and responsible to the Cabinet.

5. The security of the Caisse and the continuation of the inquiry should both be provided for by a general agreement.

6. The Control should be abolished, but should be ipso facto reconstituted in case of the dismissal of either the French or the English Minister without the approval of his Government. (1)

In accepting these terms, Nūbār tried to ensure the good will of Italy and Austria by offering one minor post to an Italian, as Controller of Accounts, and another to an Austrian, as Assistant in the Ministry of Finance. (2)

Italy had used Waddington's pressure on Nūbār and his appointment of Blignières as a pretext for asserting a claim

(1) Égypte, Vol. 61; D'Harcourt to Raindre, dated Oct. 15th, 1878.

(2) These appointments were included in the Decree announcing the formation of the Ministry.
to the Ministry of Justice. Nūbār had categorically refused it, and Waddington also opposed it, in spite of the Quirinal's offer to unite with France against England's alleged intention to obtain a preponderant influence in Egypt. Salisbury saw that the matter must be left to the judgment of Nūbār himself. As England was on good terms with both Italy and France, he preferred to hold the balance between the two countries. But when, later, De Martino tried to use threatening language with Nūbār, Salisbury declared that the British Government's sympathies could not accompany the Italian Government if it exerted any pressure on him "to make such an appointment for the purpose of satisfying any supposed right of Italy to representation in the Egyptian Cabinet".

Austria had preferred a similar claim to the Egyptian Ministry of Education; but this met with the same objection in London, Paris and Cairo.

(1) Angleterre, Vol.778; Waddington to D'Harcourt, dated Oct. 8th, and Italie Vol.53; minute to the Marquis De Noailles, dated Oct. 28th, and a Desp. dated Oct. 30th from Waddington to De Noailles.

(2) Ibid. No.114, Brin to Waddington dated Sept.27th, 1878.

(3) F.0.78/2855; No.228. Vivian to F.0. dated Aug.23rd and F.0.78/2852; Drafts Nos.194, 195, & 196, F.0. to Lascelles, dated Oct.14th,1878.

(4) Ibid. Nos.215 & 216, F.0. to Lascelles, dated Nov.12th,1878.

(5) De Beust, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, merely asked for "une chaise" in the Egyptian Cabinet.
On October 14th, Nūbār officially announced the composition of his Ministry, after negotiations lasting for more than a month and a half. Meanwhile, Austria endeavoured to ensure that the Commission of Inquiry should not be dissolved without agreement between all the Powers represented therein. On October 17th, the Austrian Ambassador moreover presented a note (1) to Waddington in which Austria proposed the strengthening of the relations between the Cabinet and the Caisse on the basis of a regular and well-defined co-operation without any infringement of the independence of the Caisse, and the collaboration of the Commissioners in the decisions taken by the Cabinet concerning financial affairs. Waddington, however, refused the latter proposal, asserting that the knowledge of both Wilson and Blignières and their rigour during the Inquiry were safeguard enough for the interests of the creditors, and adding that if the new regime proved unworkable, a return would be made automatically to the arrangement of 1876 in extenso. (2)

On the other hand, although it had been intended that the Commission of Inquiry should suspend its activities after the formation of Nūbār's Ministry, it was now authorized to continue in being, in order to prepare regulations for

(1) Autriche, Vol. 524; No. 2407 Confd. Wimpffen to Waddington.
(2) Ibid, dated Nov. 14th, 1878.
—the proper maintenance of the public services. The Council of Ministers, "desirous of putting an end to the uncertainty prevalent in the administrative and financial legislation of Egypt, recognized the necessity of codifying and revising the laws and decisions actually in force. They therefore thought that this task would best be confided to the Inquiry Commissioners, the scope of whose study of the country makes them particularly fit for accomplishing such an important undertaking". On January 7th, a Decree provided for the continuation of the Commission without assigning a definite date for either the commencement or completion of its work, this being to prepare draft laws for presentation to the Council of Ministers. The same Decree also laid it down that no tax should be collected or any general administrative measure applied unless authorized by a law present to the Khedive for his sanction, and published in the Moniteur Égyptien. (1)

When Ismā'īl gave up his Family Estates, he accepted in return a Civil List granting him £300,000 a year, a sum later raised to £315,000. (Some of the Khedivial properties were ceded in Ismā'īl's reign, and others in Tawfīk's). (2)

Wilson had been authorized by the Government - just before the formation of the Ministry - to raise a loan on the

(1) Égypte, Vol.62; No.17, Godeaux to Waddington, dated Jan. 9th, 1879.

(2) Abulleef, op. cit., 130.
security of the Domain Lands, and for this purpose he undertook a journey to London, during which he established relations with the Rothschilds, with whom he duly arranged a loan for the nominal amount of £E8,287,500. The Rothschilds decided that the money thus provided would meet the interest due on the other debts, leaving £E3,228,225 at the Khedive's disposal. However, other creditors obtained judgments from the Mixed Courts, and before the formal deed of mortgage could be completed in favour of the Rothschilds, many of the other creditors were able to secure mortgages upon some of the lands concerned. A dispute ensued during which the Rothschilds refused to pay the residue and simultaneously obtained a judgment obliging the Khedive to pay the interest of the whole loan (i.e. not only upon the residue). As a result, on April 22nd, the Khedive issued a Decree excluding Governmental revenues from the authority of the Mixed Courts. (1)

The difficulties of the Ministry :-

The formation of Nūbār's Ministry marked the first effective blow ever directed against autocratic rule in the long record of Egyptian history. But the Khedive was still, in principle, the absolute master of the country.

(1) Cf. Abulleef, 132-3 and vide Chap.IV below. Though this loan was unobjectionable from the financial point of view, yet morally it was "a fraud more or less". Cf. Al-Rāfiʿī ʿAsr Ismāʿīl, II,91.
His Ministers were in theory appointed and dismissed at his own will and pleasure. Nor did his subjects possess the power, even if they had the will, to interfere in any way with his freedom of appointment and dismissal. The only way in which these Ministers could be called responsible was that they were responsible to the Khedive; and it was a further anomaly that, although he could not dismiss the Western Ministers, the Khedive could dismiss the Prime Minister. The system was indeed neither an autocracy nor a democracy, nor a constitutional monarchy (since there was no constitution) nor an oligarchy.

For various reasons the experiment of instituting such a government was doomed to failure. To blend together the different elements of which the Ministry had to be composed, to minimize the friction between their conflicting views, prejudices and interests, and to make the whole body work harmoniously together, required great tact, prudence and statesmanship. As the experiment was tried in a Moslem country, moreover, it was necessary also that the native element in the Ministry should fairly represent the feelings, views and religious prejudices of the natives; and as Egypt had hitherto known only personal and despotic rule, for which the new type of government was to be substituted, it was of the first importance for the maintenance of its authority that the head of the State and his Cabinet should co-operate.
Instead, however, neither Nūbār nor Wilson made any effort to conceal the strong personal antipathy both had always felt for Ismā'īl. Their aim was to deprive him of all authority, rendering him a mere figurehead. According to the American Consul-General, Egypt under this Ministry was "governed like a conquered province of India. The Khedive was rarely consulted, and the only duty that was left to him was to sign such decrees as were prepared for him." (1) Ismā'īl, on his side, while apparently giving way to the Ministry, and referring everything to his "responsible council of Ministers", continually chafed under the humiliation of his position and only awaited a favourable opportunity to take his revenge. It was evident that he still exercised a strong influence over the native officials, and that it lay in his hands to make the new regime succeed or fail. This was indeed recognized by the representatives of the two Governments, whose advice it was that the Khedive should preside over the sittings of the Cabinet in order to share the responsibility with his Ministers for everything that happened. (2)

The Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay accordingly insisted with Ismā'īl that "responsibility for the success

(1) 'Ābdīn, American, Vol. 15; p.141 - dated March 21st, 1879.
or failure of the new regime lay with him, that if it were opposed by those in power, or they showed a disposition to discredit it, the difficulties of Nūbār and his advisers would be enormously increased, and the responsibility for their failure would involve its promoters in the disastrous consequences that must result. (1) Ismā'īl replied to these threats by saying that as a "Constitutional Ruler", he could not fairly be held responsible for the success or failure of his Ministers, who were alone responsible for their acts; that to cast the responsibility upon him for the result of measures in the framing of which he was allowed no share was quite intolerable; and that if he was to be held responsible for their issue, he should have a voice in their preparation. (2)

Vivian, Blignières and Godeaux, on their side, earnestly urged Nūbār and Wilson to try and arrive at some better modus vivendi with the Khedive. But Nūbār and Wilson would not entertain the suggestion, holding that it would be a retrograde step, fraught with danger and likely to make the natives think that the Ministry had been compelled to restore to the Khedive a proportion of the power that had been removed from him. This division of opinion in the

(1) F.0.78/2852; Dft.No.229 to Vivian, dated F.O. Dec. 2nd, 1878, endorsed "seen by the Queen, Lord Beaconsfield & the Chancellor of the Exchequer" - F.0.195/249 No. 5 Confid. Vivian to F.O. dated Jan. 3rd, 1879, and Godeaux's No. 10 Dir. Pol. dated Jan. 2nd, 1879.

(2) F.0.195/249; No. 5 Confid. supra and F.0. No. 229 supra.
Western camp showed Ismā'īl that the Ministry was unlikely to receive from the English and French Consuls-General the sympathy and support that were naturally to be expected. He was aware also that Vivian, who took the leading part, openly condemned its policy. (1)

Apart from this antagonism between the Khedive and the Ministry, the latter was far from being popular. Nūbār failed to engage the full confidence and sympathy of the nation. By the Egyptian public, he was regarded as working for a British occupation, and as having been imposed on them and backed by foreigners while being himself an Armenian Christian adventurer, (2) who was known to the Moslem official class to have enriched himself at the public expense as agent of the loan-mongers of Europe, and to the fellāhīn as the author of the Mixed Tribunals which were especially odious to them as having subjected them more completely than any other agency to the Greek usurers. (3) Nūbār was unable even to speak Arabic properly while Wilson and Blignières not only had no knowledge of the language whatever, but also lacked any intimate acquaintance with the manners and customs of the country. How then, could this trio re-arrange the

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(1) Rivers Wilson, Chapters from my official life, 186-7
(2) According to a Turkish proverb, "When an Armenian rules the State decays -(Ermeni...vâzîr/ devlet düşer)."
(3) Blunt, op. cit., 45-6.
machinery of their departments and impress upon their subordinates the modus operandi they desired to introduce?

The Ministry's greatest misfortune lay in its formation at a time when the State Budget was so empty that the soldiers and the majority of the officers had not been paid their salaries for twenty months,\(^{(1)}\) and just after bad Niles in two consecutive years had increased the misery of the people. It was of ill-omen at the outset that the Ministry should have announced a new and heavy loan, the proceeds of which were not applied to any serious purpose. While Wilson was filling his Ministry with his countrymen, the pay of Egyptian officials was reduced. Schools were closed for reasons of economy; and some hundreds of officers were dismissed without being paid their arrears. When the army was decreased, it was said that Mubār and Wilson were paving the way for a delivery of the country over to the foreigners.\(^{(2)}\) In the provinces the farmers sold the harvest of 1878-9 for one-fourth of its value, in advance, while the cotton and wheat crops were still standing, in order to pay the taxes. Not a tax was reduced nor a demand remitted. On the contrary, the whip was wielded even more mercilessly than before in the villages, and an additional terror was introduced into

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\(^{(1)}\) Sharūbīm, op. cit., IV, 208.

\(^{(2)}\) F.0.78/2998; Nos.12-18, Borg, Legal Vice-Consul in Cairo, to Vivian.
the agricultural world by the institution of a new revenue survey under English direction, exceedingly expensive and quite futile, which was interpreted as the prelude to a still higher land-tax. Famine was still rife, especially in Upper Egypt. One of the English Commissioners, who went up the Nile in February 1879 to carry supplies to the inhabitants and to investigate their condition, wrote that the number of those who had died of starvation was not less than 10,000, and that many more might well suffer the same fate. He added that all this was the direct result of poverty arising from over-taxation. (1)

The wealthier classes were disturbed at Nūbār's attempt to fight the favouritism, oppression and corruption which had hitherto filled the pockets of many pashas to the detriment of the state revenues. It was rumoured, moreover, that the Ministry of Finance would increase the taxes on the *Oshri Lands, (2) on which the richer classes of proprietors were assessed at rates below the current value of their holdings, which had everywhere been much improved by good

(1) Farman, op. cit., 248.
(2) *Oshr in Islamic jurisprudence is the tenth or tithe levied for public assistance. It was laid down that it was to be paid on all lands irrigated by running streams, a half tithe being imposed on lands artificially irrigated. It would be out of place to go into the history of these lands; it is enough to record that in Egypt they all more or less fell under the direct control of the Valīs, who distributed them among their lieutenants and favourites, the latter thus paying less land-tax than ordinary farmers, who paid the Kharāj or ordinary land-tax. For details see Enc. of Islam, Art. *Oshr.
cultivation. This led to the arrival in Cairo of a great number of Sheikhs from the villages to declare that the country could not support the burdens laid on the shoulders of the natives, and to complain of the taxes and of the cruelty used in their collection. (1)

All this overshadowed the other activities of the Ministry, many of which were highly beneficial. Thus no one cared what Nūbār had intended when he devised a scheme by which natives might be entitled to the privilege of having justice done them in the Mixed as well as in the Egyptian Courts. Wilson's land-survey was really intended to preclude the assessment of the fellāhin by the arbitrary authority of the government officials. Nūbār, too, had endeavoured to enforce the liability of foreign residents to contribute towards the expenses of the State, though his efforts in this direction had been retarded by the opposition of the Consuls. Blignières had shown a determination to put a stop to the jobbery and corruption which had hitherto characterized the conduct of almost all public undertakings in the country. (2) The freedom of the press and of self-expression was secured, and the newspaper al-Watan, in its number of January 18th, 1879, wrote, "What increases our hope of a better future is the fact that we see groups

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(2) Dicey, Khedivate, 204 & The Egyptian Crisis, 686-7.
(1) Godeaux's No. 15 Dir. Pol. dated Jan 21st, 1879.
of farmers coming from their villages in order to complain of the old state of things. This is something quite new; as nobody, either humble or great, dared in the past utter a complaint. Wilson, during his visit to Lower Egypt, encouraged the people to present requests, in order that they should have justice". (1) Nearly a month later, this same newspaper published the criticism levelled at the Ministry in the Chamber of Notables, where Wilson was attacked for not having once been present in the Chamber. The Notables had twice asked him to present himself to discuss with them the question of taxes, especially the newly levied ones, but he did not even answer their request, and they naturally regarded this as a gesture of contempt and an insult. Blignières was more tactful. He sent his programme to the Chamber, but when he was asked to explain it, replied by saying that nothing he had written could be reviewed. Al-Watan's comment was that the conduct of the two Ministers was different from that of responsible Ministers in Europe, (2) and it frankly took the side of opposition together with al-Tijāra. The two newspapers were, in consequence suspended for fifteen days. (3)

(1) Quoted in Sabry, Ismail, 342.
The Fall of Nūbār:

The Ministry, having thus aroused widespread discontent, whilst its reform programme still remained for the most part unrealized, Ismā'īl saw that the time had come to take his revenge. The recall of Nūbār and the appointment of a responsible Ministry had averted the danger with which he had been threatened by the prosecution of the Inquiry; and as the concessions had served their purpose, it became his policy to get rid of them as soon as might be. He could now rely on public opposition, and still enjoyed sufficient prestige with the natives to direct it. Vivian was informed at this juncture that efforts were being made to incite some of the members of the Chamber of Notables to demonstrate against the Government, and he believed that it had been secretly fomented by agents, probably employed by the Khedive. He said that he had heard from a reliable source that the leading men of the Chamber had been secretly convoked and told that the Khedive would not be displeased to see them all oppose the measures of an administration which was imposed upon him and which was entirely in the hands of Europeans. (1)

Ismā'īl denied the accusation, but retorted that his position was becoming critical because he was not given any responsibility. (2)

(1) Vivian's Desp. of Jan. 11th, 79.
(2) Godeaux's No. 15 Dir. Pol. supra.
The blow that overthrew Nūbār came from the retired officers, who had been reduced to sad straits, having received no pay for twenty months. Rātib Pasha, the Minister of War, warned his colleagues against this danger, but in vain. The Ministry was imprudent enough to summon all the disbanded officers to Cairo at the same time, in order to deliver up their arms; for the officers took the opportunity to complain to the Chamber of Notables. On the morning of the 18th of February, they assembled - accompanied by four Delegates "mounted on their donkeys" - and led a demonstration of some 2,600 to Kasr al-Nīl, where both the Presidency and the Ministry of Finance were located. They were especially incensed at hearing that Wilson had called for forty English officers to aid him in his land survey, and by seeing on the very day of their demonstration pieces of furniture being carried to Wilson's private domicile, where a ball was to be given. On their way to Kasr al-Nīl, they saw Nūbār passing in his carriage and gathered round it (evidently to complain to the Premier), but were whipped off by the driver, with the result that Nūbār was attacked. When Wilson came on the scene on his return from the ʿAbdīn Palace, where he had met the Khedive, he ran to Nūbār's

(1) Al-Rāfiʿī ʿAsr Ismāʿīl, II, 203.
(3) Ibid, No.44, dated Feb. 28th.
assistance and threatened the officers with his stick. Being outnumbered, Wilson and Nūbār were mobbed and dragged to the Ministry of Finance, where they were confined. After some time, Ismā’īl appeared on the scene with Vivian and managed to disperse the rioters, but only after some shots had been exchanged between the officers and the Khedival guards, and some people had been injured.

That same afternoon Ismā’īl assembled the Consular Corps and told them unequivocally that he would not be responsible for public order unless he were given his proper share in the government of the country, and was allowed either to preside at the Council of Ministers himself, or to select a President in whom he had confidence. (1) He further required that Nūbār, whom he accused of sapping and undermining his authority, should immediately retire from the Ministry. When Nūbār was asked if he could maintain public order, he replied in the negative and tendered his resignation on the next day. "I", said Ismā’īl triumphantly, "can govern the people without a soldier. But a Ministry of foreigners of a different religion can only govern them with military force." (2)

It has been suggested by various writers (3) that Ismā’īl had a hand in bringing these events about, if not directly

(2) Farman, op. cit., 240.
by intrigue, yet at least morally by his continuous complaints against Nūbār and his Ministry. But not only do the reports of the French Consul-General show the sequence of events to have been as described above, but Lord Cromer, Sir Edward Malet, and the French Consul himself all assert that what had taken place occurred without any premeditation and was not probably due to any previous arrangement or intrigue. Supporters of the former interpretation do not reckon with the growth of Egyptian public opinion at the time. This was a new factor, quite independent of the Khedive, as we shall see. It is true, however, that Ismā'īl could have stemmed the tide if he had wished and that his passive attitude was responsible in some degree for what happened.

These events were rather a trial of strength, which led, in due course, to the self-assertion of the army and the subsequent "Orābī Revolution", as it was called.

The aftermath: -

The first reaction from Europe was highly encouraging to Ismā'īl. On February 21st De Martino informed him that the Italian Government entirely sympathised with his demand for a greater share in the counsels of his Ministers, and observed that the interest it felt in the safety of its many

(1) Modern Egypt, I, 79-80.
(2) Egypt (1879-83), 83.
(3) Godeaux's No.42 supra.
nationals in Egypt, who might be endangered by a weakening of the ruler's authority, led it to promise him its active and moral support. (1) At the same time the Italian Government again put forward its claim for the appointment of an Italian to an Egyptian Ministry in the event of any ministerial reshuffle, and the Italian Ambassador in London contended that the continued exclusion of Italy was a cause of weakness, whereas her presence would give great strength, to the Egyptian Government. (2) Waddington, however, insisted that no Europeans other than French and English should be admitted into the new Ministry. (4)

The Western Powers considered what had happened as a challenge to their prestige in Egypt, and they agreed to send warships to intimidate the Khedive. Instructions were sent to Vivian to support Wilson "thoroughly and without reserve". (5) Meanwhile, Ismā'īl was told that the two Governments could not lend themselves to any modification in principle of the political and financial engagements recently sanctioned by him, and that the resignation of Nūbār

(1) F.O.195/249; No.72, Vivian to F.O. dated Feb.22nd, 1879.
(2) Italie, Vol.54; De Noailles to Waddington, dated Feb. 26th, 1879.
(3) F.O.141/123; No.90, F.O. to Vivian, dated Feb.27th, 1879.
(5) F.O.141/123; F.O. to Vivian, dated Feb.20th, 1879.
was in their eyes only a question of personalities and could not be construed as a change of system. (1) Waddington made it known that he would like Nūbār to retain a portfolio in the Cabinet the Presidency of which he had resigned, "as he knew him to be attached to the regime that had been instituted and in a position to facilitate its continuance." (2)

Ismā'īl's reply was that "he would pledge himself to maintain intact the engagements he had taken in August last, and which constituted the character of the new scheme of administrative reform. With respect to his financial engagements, he could assure the two Consuls-General of his sincere desire to observe them, but he could not prejudice the decisions of his Council of Ministers in this point". (3)

When he was asked by the Porte to explain what had happened, he said that he had only told the French and English Agents his ideas on certain modifications in the actual system. (4)

Wilson was not content with the official apology - advised by Vivian - of Prince Hasan, the Commander-in-Chief, on behalf of the army and the Khedive. He insisted on the reinstatement of Nūbār, either as President or as a simple

(3) Modern Egypt, I, 88.
member of the Cabinet, and objected to Ismā'īl's inclination to act as his own Prime Minister. Wilson was supported in this attitude by Blignières and the Western Governments, since it was considered that the Presidency of the Khedive would constitute a danger to the liberty of action of the Ministers, the majority of whom were natives apt to be influenced by 'Efendina'. It was the Foreign Office that especially supported Nūbār, as "otherwise the Khedive will be like a horse who has succeeded in beating his rider and will never be safe for that rider to mount again". (1) Salisbury saw that the position of Wilson would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to maintain, unless Nūbār were re-admitted to the Cabinet in some capacity or another. The two Consuls proposed averting the danger of Ismā'īl's presiding over the Cabinet either by increasing the number of the European Ministers, in such a way as to place them in a majority, or by a compromise which would give those actually in the Cabinet a decisive supremacy, or by according them the right of an absolute veto. (2) Godeaux recommended the Khedive's taking a share in the public responsibility by presiding over the Cabinet himself. This, in his view, might win France the sympathy not only of the Khedive but also of the people,

(1) Newton, Lord Lyons, II, 156.
(2) Godeaux's No. 44 supra.
and place an obstacle in the way of the British projects, which were both imperilling the situation of France and exciting the natives to a dangerous discontent. It would, moreover, give the Cabinet the authority it lacked, and assure the service of the public Debt. Waddington would in fact have followed this line of policy but for his loyalty to the entente. 

Ismail was ready to agree to any measure that would bar the way against Nubar's return. He did not object to an increase in the number of the European Ministers, and proposed allotting one portfolio to an Italian. But he insisted that the presence of Nubar in the Cabinet in any capacity would undermine his prestige with the people, and opposed the veto, especially if it was to be declared by a public act. When the two Consuls told him that the co-operation of Nubar was necessary for the realization of the reforms, he replied that Egypt was not devoid of capable men who would work for the success of the regime instituted since August 28th, 1878. Nubar left the door open for his return by addressing a letter to the Khedive in which he explained that he did not wish to be forced upon him by the two Governments, and would refuse to re-enter the Ministry except

(1) Ibid.
after being assured of his confidence. (1) But Isma'īl replied to the two Consuls that he could not do otherwise than bow before the will of the two Governments. If they persisted in their demand for the re-entry of Nūbār, he had no power to resist. But he added that he felt bound to warn them beforehand of the consequences, so that they might not blame him hereafter if the new order of things should break down, or if disturbances should again occur. (2)

The French in general did not like Nūbār, who was believed to have said à propos the Judicial Reform after the French defeats of 1870, "If France resists, I will tread on her corpse," (3) and although Holynski, one of Nūbār's apologists, denies the truth of this allegation, attributing its invention to Isma'īl, Dicey, Nūbār's friend, maintains that the latter was anti-French and pro-British, not, however, without reason. Notwithstanding his French culture and education, the history of De Lesseps and the Suez Canal, the arbitral sentence of Napoleon III, and France's opposition to the Judicial Reform, had all convinced him that France was interested in Egypt solely in order to exploit her. Knowing his sentiments,

(1) Godeaux's No. 50 dated Mar. 5th, 1879
(2) Modern Egypt, I, 89.
(3) Égypte, Vol. 64; No. 2. Confid. Tricou to Waddington, dated July 11th, 1879.
(4) Holynski, Nūbar Pacha devant l'histoire, iii-iv.
(5) Dicey, Khedivate, 170.
accordingly, Godeaux suggested, and Waddington recommended, that the two Governments should not insist on Nūbār; and the Foreign Office reluctantly agreed.

The question of the relations that were to subsist between the Khedive and his Ministers was then discussed in London. Salisbury objected to the Council of Ministers' being presided over by the Khedive, and proposed the Presidency for Prince Tawfīk, the heir-apparent; and after discussions with Waddington the two Governments agreed to the following programme:

(a) The Khedive was not in any case to be present at Cabinet Councils.

(b) Prince Tawfīk was to be appointed President of the Council.

(c) The English and French members of the Cabinet were to have a right of absolute veto over any proposed measures.

(d) With these provisions the presence of Nūbār in the Cabinet was not essential.

In putting these proposals to the Khedive, the two Governments warned him that "any further difficulty or disturbance will be looked upon as the result of his action and the consequences will be serious to himself". (1) He replied to this warning by expressing his gratitude to the

(1) Vivian's No. 72 dated March 8th, 1879.
two Governments for listening to his objections against the re-entry of Nūbār into the Cabinet. He fully acknowledged the very serious responsibility that now devolved upon him for the success of the new order of things and for the prevention of disturbances, and he pledged his cordial and loyal support to his Ministers if, as he hoped, they would meet him in the same conciliatory spirit.

But another difficulty soon occurred when the Khedive wished to transfer Riyād Pasha, Minister of the Interior in Nūbār's Government, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Justice. The European members of the Cabinet resisted this, on the ground that the Khedive's object was to regain his hold on the provinces, which would be impossible so long as Riyād, whose outlook much resembled that of Nūbār, was Minister of the Interior. In their opinion, the continuance of Riyād as such was essential in order to control the agitation still prevalent among both the native Egyptians and the foreigners at prevalent rumours of Wilson's intention to declare Egypt insolvent. Vivian and Godeaux, on the other hand, considered that it would be inconsistent with the personal responsibility thrown on the Khedive to dictate to him the choice of his Ministers and the posts they should occupy. They suggested the appointment of Rāghib Pasha to the Interior, in order to
avert both Ismā'īl's annoyance and his proposed appointment of Prince Tawfīk to that Ministry, since this would be tantamount to the assumption of that office by the Khedive himself. The Sheikh al-Bakrī, who, as the Nakīb al-Ashraf, was of great religious influence, declared that Riyād was unpopular. Riyād himself was denounced in the mosques as a friend of the Christians; and Ismā'īl declared on March 19th that he would not agree to Riyād's holding the Ministry of the Interior on account of its responsibility for the preservation of order.

Salisbury sided with the European Ministers. He saw that whoever was made Minister of the Interior would have the means of continually thwarting the actions of the Ministers of Finance and Public Works: the cordial co-operation of all three was essential to the success of the financial administration; and it was indispensable that the collection of taxes should be in sure hands. Waddington in turn accepted Salisbury's view; and in due course, on March 20th, Ismā'īl declared that he had bowed before the will of the

(1) The Ashrāf (pl. of Sharīf - noble, exalted) are supposed to be the descendants of Muhammad. As a counterblast to the pretensions of the Shi'a the Ashraf were endowed with extravagant social and material privileges. Each Sharīf is still called Sayyid (squire), and in Egypt their Nakīb or chancellor until recently enjoyed a prestige equal to that of the Sheikh al-Azhar himself. It is quite noteworthy, however, that the Bakrī family, on whom the Nikābat al-Ashraf devolved in Egypt, are in fact descendants, not of Muhammad, but of Abū Bakr, the first Caliph.
two Powers and agreed to the maintenance of Riyād in his post, while at the same time repeating all his previous observations.

The last obstacle to the formation of Prince Tawfīk's Ministry, which had already been announced on March 10th, was thus overcome; and everything thus seemed to have been settled. But the principle that Ismā'īl should be excluded from exercising any political power had undergone no serious modification. As before, the European Ministers complained that he was rendering the governmental machine unworkable, and continued their defiance of him, while the native Ministers who had held office under Nūbār, Riyād, and 'Alī Mubārak, held constant consultations with Nūbār, who continued to be the real President. It was evident that a new crisis must soon occur.

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(1) *Modern Egypt*, I, 90-1 - Godeaux's No. 50 & other Desp's. dated Mar. 20th, 19th; Waddington's No. 36 to Admiral Pothuau, dated March 17th; and *Angleterre*, Vol. 799; Desp. from Lyons to Salisbury, dated Mar. 16th, 1879.
Chapter IV

The fall of Isma'il

"He fell a victim to the insolent abuse of power".

Cromer, Modern Egypt, I, 144

The growth of Egyptian public opinion:

In 1877 a new element entered into Egyptian affairs. For the first time public opinion became articulate. This was the consequence of some fifty years’ development, and it showed itself specifically in 1877 owing to various special causes.

During the reign of Muhammad ‘Ali for the first time for many centuries native Egyptians had furnished the rank and file of the Egyptian army.

The result of that innovation, the victories won by the Egyptian forces of Ibrāhīm Pasha in the Near East and the Sūdān, together with the introduction of a new type of education mainly connected with the army,


(2) A national army, manned by Egyptians, had never in fact been formed since the fall of the Ancient Egyptian Empire.
caused the native Egyptians to regain some of the self-confidence they had lost during centuries of alien domination. Missions were sent to Europe and European experts were invited to Egypt. Books were translated, and all these European influences gradually produced an Egyptian renaissance. Independently of this, moreover, when the hieroglyphs were deciphered and the science of Egyptology was created after 1821, the glory of the country in ancient times began to impress the Egyptians and make them think of their country as an entity on its own, though they still regarded it as a part of the wider Islamic world. Thanks to all this, to the impulse given to industry and culture, and to the reign of order and stability under Muḥammad ʿAlī, a sentiment of nationalism was brought into being, and a native middle class began to appear. It was headed by notable personalities in the fields of literature, architecture, military art, engineering and astronomy.

The reforms of ʿAbd Pasha marked another step in this evolution by giving the Egyptian middle class a wider opportunity in the bureaucracy. His law of promotion, moreover, allowed native Egyptians to aspire to the highest ranks in the army. Incidentally, among those promoted were ʿAbd al-ʿOrābī and his fellāḥ companions who were to lead the national movement

(1) Lists are found in al-Rafīʿī, op. cit.
against foreign domination.

Ismā‘īl was popular during the first two years of his reign. Taxes were moderate, and the country was prosperous owing to the rise in the price of cotton as a consequence of the American civil war. But injustice and oppression were not slow to show themselves. In 1882, 'Abd Allah Nadīm, the well-known orator, during the ‘Orābī Revolution, wrote a series of articles in his newspaper al-Ta‘if under the title "Egypt and Ismā‘īl Pasha". In an article on "taxes and the methods used in their collection", he paints a distressing picture of the sufferings of the fellāḥīn under the system of the "whip". Thus a woman, he says, was whipped to death because she refused to disclose where her husband, who was to pay a tax of 45 piastres (about 9 shillings), kept his money. In another article dated May 6th 1882, Nadīm discusses how Ismā‘īl acquired his estates, and the corvée system. "The peasants who did the corvée on Ismā‘īl’s lands or on those of his acolytes, had to bring their own food and farming implements", and were whipped during that forced labour. Like the French peasants

(1) Only two numbers of al-Ta‘if are to be found in the National Library at Cairo, those of April 29th and of May 6th, 1882.

(2) It must be noted that Turks, Circassians and Europeans were exempted from taxation. This was a relic of the old system. The Turks and Circassians were (or had been) ‘askarīs as opposed to rā‘āvā - i.e. state employees, who were never (as in Europe) first paid and then taxed (which is something of an absurdity). Foreigners (as musta‘mins) had never been taxed.
before 1789, the Egyptians under Isma‘īl were "taillables et corvées à merci". (1)

Military service was another burden on the peasants. Under Isma‘īl it again became compulsory, as it had been before the reforms of Sa‘īd. The soldiers were even used in building the palaces of the Viceroy and were underfed.

There was no public criticism of the Khedive's rule, since the overwhelming majority of the people were still both ignorant and illiterate. Sometimes, as we have seen, revolts took place, especially in Upper Egypt, but they were stamped out by force. Espionage was rife, and everyone who had the courage to oppose efendinā (= "our master", as the Viceroy was called), was either sentenced to death or banished to Fāzughlī on the Blue Nile, where he lived under close surveillance for the rest of his days.

In 1869, however, there began Isma‘īl's conflict with the Sublime Porte. (2) This was the result of his visit to Europe undertaken in order to invite various monarchs and politicians to the inauguration of the Suez Canal. During that visit, Isma‘īl, accompanied by his "Foreign Minister", Mūbarār, who discussed the Judicial Reform with the various

(1) Sabry, Genèse, 108. There was a fundamental difference, however, between the status of the Egyptian and that of the French peasants, since there was no real feudal system in Egypt.

(2) See my unpublished, Ismā‘īl wa-‘alākātuhū bi‘l-Bāb al-‘Ālī, Chaps. V & VI.
Chancellors and Foreign Ministers, tried to pose as an independent sovereign, regularly disregarding the Ottoman ambassadors, who had precedence of him at official meetings. On this, ʿAlī Pasha, the Grand Vizier, sent a circular Note to the Ottoman ambassadors in the great capitals impugning his conduct and reminding them of the status of Egypt as an Ottoman province and of its Vāli as an Ottoman official. Ismaʿīl's reply was to return to Egypt without visiting the Ottoman capital, as he had intended, or intimating that the Sultan's presence at the opening ceremonies would be welcome. On his return, he received a Vizierial Note from ʿAlī, accusing him of having involved the province in foolish expense by his frequent visits to Europe and his placing orders of armoured ships, an act that showed his intention of proclaiming his independence, and of his crushing the Egyptians with excessive taxation. The Note was translated into Arabic and displayed both on the doors of the various offices of the Government, of the Khedivial "Dā'ira", and on the walls of the main streets. The French newspaper Progrès Égyptien(1) of July 14th records that a number of Egyptians were seen reading the Note and commenting on its contents. "The passages referring to the excessive expenditure and the taxes that so crushed the people that they could bear them no more, were

(1) The Progrès was printed in Alexandria.
especially the subject of their comments". On September 15th, the Progrès Égyptien referred to a petition signed by 114 of the most prominent notables and sent to the Sultan, recording that copies of that petition, minus the signatures, had been stuck up on walls. On January 29th, 1870, the same paper announced that the government, possibly to out-manoeuvre the threats of Istanbul, had replaced a large number of the Turks and Circassians, employed in the principal public offices, by Egyptians. Thus, the first serious public criticism of Ismā‘Il's rule came from Istanbul. The Progrès Égyptien was the only newspaper that could comment on the Khedive's administration, since the few other newspapers were paid by him and for the most part published only what he would approve.

In 1877 four important factors played a decisive part in the growth of Egyptian public opinion. These were: (1) The Russo-Turkish war, (2) the presence in Egypt of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, (3) the inauguration of independent newspapers, inspired by Jamāl al-Dīn, and criticizing both Ismā‘Il's rule and foreign interference, and (4) public demand for a true constitutional regime, which, however, became strongly evident only in 1878-9.

The Russo-Turkish war, in which an Egyptian contingent was engaged, and which promised to affect the destiny of the whole Near East, greatly interested the Egyptians, who
eagerly awaited each item of news. It is even said that Jamal al-Dīn stopped his lectures and meetings for six months as a sign of his grief. (1)

Jamāl al-Dīn, (2) with his revolutionary and reforming ideas, together with his strong and inspiring personality, succeeded in a short time in surrounding himself with the cream of the Egyptian intelligentsia. He preached constitutionalism and the regeneration of Islam as a means for withstanding Western pressure and occupation. Fearing that Ismā'īl might interfere with his political activity, he got into communication with the Italian Freemasons and with them he inaugurated the "Grand Orient of Alexandria" of which in 1878 Syrian and Egyptian publishers such as Ibrāhīm al-Loğānī, Adīb Isbāk, Salīm Nākkāš, ‘Abd al-Salām al Muwailīḥī, and the two officers who led the Kasr al-Nīl demonstration, Latīf Salīm and Sayyid Nāṣir, became members. At a somewhat later date the English Consul at Alexandria, Mr. Borg, intervened and invited the members of the "Grand Orient" to approach the lodge "Kawkab al-Shark", i.e. Star of the East, which was dependent on the "Grand Lodge of England", and contained 300 of the Egyptian élite, among whom were Prince Tawfīk (the heir-apparent), Sharīf Pasha, Sulaimān Abāza Pasha, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, Sa‘d Zaghlūl, officers of the army, 'Olāmā', and members

(1) Sabry, Genèse, 126.

of the Chamber of Notables. This "Lodge", which contained representatives of the governing and educated classes, favoured the exchange of ideas among those who were in touch with political life, and the secrets of the government, and created among them a link of solidarity. This was the origin of the National Party, which was later on to play so important a part in Egyptian affairs. (1)

Jamāl al-Dīn was behind the "opposition press" which appeared in 1877, and was widely read by the people, who had grown more curious about events owing to the Russo-Turkish war and the growth of foreign interference. He thought of initiating a satirical newspaper in Arabic in order to criticize Ismā'īl's rule, and obtained the collaboration of Muḥammad ʿAbduḥ and Yaḥyā Kūb Ṣanūʿa. (2) Ṣanūʿa became the director, and was the first to write in the Arabic vernacular, being himself ʿAbū Naḍḍāra Zarkā (the man with the blue glasses) and attacking ʿSheikh al-Ḥāra" (Ismā'īl). ʿAbū Naḍḍāra won a great popularity, but was suppressed after the fifteenth number and Ṣanūʿa was exiled to France, where

(1) Sabry, Genève, 142-3. When the two officers were arrested after the demonstration, the "Lodge" assembled under the presidency of Jamāl al-Dīn, and sent telegrams to Ismā'īl and the Prince of Wales (the Great Lodge in London), asking for their release. The British Consul-General also exerted his good offices, and the two officers were set free. See loc.cit.

(2) See for Ṣanūʿa's biography: Ibrāhīm ʿAbduḥ, Al-subuṭ al-thāʿir.
he resumed publication and whence copies of his newspaper were smuggled into Egypt.

Jamāl al-Dīn also encouraged Mīkhlīl Ābd al-Sayyid who inaugurated al-Wāṭan (The Fatherland), which was a political and literary newspaper of conservative tone, supporting the National Movement both before and after the occupation, together with al-Tijāra (Trade), directed also by Mīkhlīl. Jamāl al-Dīn was also behind Adīb Ishāk, who directed Misr (Egypt), which published a series of articles in which the principles of nationalism were explained and moderate liberty called for. Misr was the first newspaper to use the expression "Misr al-Fatāh" (Young Egypt). (1)

These inspired newspapers began to occupy themselves particularly with two major questions: Foreign interference and absolutism. Unluckily for Ismā‘īl, the financial crisis lost him the control he had maintained over newspapers in the past by supporting them with subsidies. Moreover, a large number of publicists were Syrians, and consequently French protégés, who, unlike the native journalists, could invoke the French consulate in case of need. It is worthy of notice that these Levantine publicists had been encouraged by Ismā‘īl to come to Egypt. Owing to their education in the American and Jesuit colleges at Beirut, they were professed champions of human rights, and had for that reason been

expelled from Syria. In Egypt, they sowed the seeds of emancipation and campaigned for human rights. At first, they were in favour with Ismā'īl. But the latter was not prepared to allow the least criticism of his own actions, and when Bishāra Taklā the director of al-Ahrām (The Pyramids) referred to the money taken from the state budget and not accounted for, he would have been in grave danger but for the protection of the French consulate. (1)

The press took the opportunity of the formation of the Nūbār Ministry to fall on the ancien régime, and to express hopes for the establishment of better conditions in which the peasants, the native officials, and the public administration, should no longer suffer the abuses of the past. (2) When Wilson published a report on the financial confusion, al-Watan attacked Ismā'īl openly, complaining that, despite heavy taxation, the State was still bankrupt. Owing to the freedom the Nūbār Ministry allowed the press, Egyptian conditions before 1878 were described in detail. Wilson was applauded for paying the officials their arrears of salary and for contracting the Rothschild loan at a lower interest than had been obtainable before.

But, as we saw in the last chapter, the native press soon turned against the "European Ministry". Al-Tījāra

(1) Ibid, 5.
(2) Al-Watan of September 21st, 1878.
attacked Wilson's "ignorance in financial matters". (1) A vast campaign was waged for the opening of the Chamber of Delegates, to which the Ministry should be responsible. Al-Watan of December 28th, 1878, spoke of the necessity of a parliament in order to impose the rule of order and justice which alone could favour the organization and development of all the institutions of State. It argued that absolutist government made of the ruler an enemy of the people and stimulated foreign interference because of its weakness. It then announced that the Minister of the Interior (Riyāḍ Pasha) had convoked the Chamber, and reminded its readers that the Chamber had been an instrument of oppression in the service of the government, by supporting the creation of new taxes and the spoilation of the fellāhīn.

When the Assembly was opened on January 2nd, 1879, the press supported and encouraged its members, and reminded them of their duty to defend the nation's rights, and lessen the misery of the fellāhīn caused by the two bad Niles of 1877 and 1878. Suggestions made by the members were published, and attacks were launched against the errors of both the Khedive and the Ministry, and the privileges of the foreign officials. The Chamber was incited to assert itself, (2) to assume responsibility for taxation, insist on

(1) The numbers of Jan. 15th, Feb. 8th and April 10th, 1879.
(2) Al-Watan of Jan. 11th, 1879.
ministerial responsibility, and levy taxes on the foreigners, especially the two Ministers who received an annual salary of £6,000, from the budget of a nation alleged to be bankrupt. When the demonstration of February 18th took place, the officers were applauded and the legality of their cause maintained.\(^{(1)}\) The press also called for the unity of the government and the people in a parliament which should properly represent the nation, and for an "Egypt exclusively for the Egyptians".\(^{(2)}\)

**Egypt's Magna Carta**

The Chamber of Delegates was more opposed to the new Ministry than it had been to the previous one, and consequently the Ministry thought of its suppression. *Al-Watan* of April 5th called on the natives "to notice the conflict between repression and freedom". When Riyād Pasha went to the Chamber to declare the session ended, ‘Abd al-Salām al-Muwailihī said that the Delegates had been assembled for three months in order to give their opinion on financial matters in particular, but without any effect. He advocated that the Chamber should meet with or without the consent of the government. The Chamber endorsed al-Muwailihī's proposal; and Riyād retired after having said that he would

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\(^{(1)}\) *Al-Tiliāra* of March 8th and 13th, 1879.

\(^{(2)}\) *The Times* of April 16th and 28th, 1879.
refer what he had heard to the Khedive and the Council of Ministers. (1) The Cairo members went out to fetch snacks and blankets, and the majority of the Delegates spent that night and the following day and night in the Assembly hall. (2) The Chamber of Delegates thus asserted its independence and its resolve to voice the needs of the nation without regard to the wishes of Ismā‘īl.

Ismā‘īl was then preparing a financial plan independent of that in preparation by the Commission of Inquiry and Wilson, which contemplated the suppression of the mukābala. But when he discovered that his plan would irritate Wilson and the Commissioners of Inquiry, he felt in need of popular support, which did not betray him. The privileged classes, who resented foreign interference partly on national, but even more on personal, grounds, were not unwilling to act in concert with Ismā‘īl, who duly obtained, through the influence of Sharīf Pasha with the Notables, the signature to a public petition of all the most important personalities in the country: officers of the army, members of the Chamber of Delegates, chiefs of the religious corporations, Moslem, Christian and Jewish, and prominent Pashas. The signatories, however, took care not to be duped by Ismā‘īl. On the contrary, they

(1) Riyād denounced the Notables as "outlaws" and rebels, disloyal to the Khedive. Al-Wakā‘ī’ of March 27th, 1879.

(2) Abulleef, op. cit., 160.
stipulated that the country should have a real constitutional regime, that the absolutism of the Khedive should come to an end, and that the Chamber of Delegates should be elected and given the prerogatives of similar institutions in Europe.

The petition thus signed was presented to the Khedive on April 5th, 1879. It embodied the signatories' complaint of the unconstitutional conduct of the Ministry in disregarding the Chamber, a protest against both the declaration of Egypt as bankrupt and the intended revocation of the mukābala, and proposed a financial arrangement opposed to that contemplated by Wilson. Its main points were:

1. The removal of Europeans from the control of the finances;

2. The formation of a Ministry purely Egyptian and responsible to the Chamber of Notables;

and

3. An invitation to Ismā'īl to use his powers in dismissing the European Ministers and reconstituting the Control.

(It was thought that the return of the Control would limit foreign interference to financial affairs and bring an end to the political privileges acquired by England and France since the nomination of the two Ministers, besides avoiding a probable conflict with the Western Powers as a

(1) Arabic copies of the petition are to be found in both the British and French Archives (F.0.78/3002 and Egypte, Vol.62).

(2) Al-Tijāra of April 3rd, 1879 announces a meeting of prominent personalities to discuss the formation of a National Bank, in order to liquidate Egypt's Debt under a 28 years' plan.
consequence of the expulsion of the two Ministers.)

The European Ministers, on their side, complained that the Khedive was stirring up the religious sentiment of the natives against them, and actively engaging in intrigues having for their object the overthrow of the Ministry. But they would not admit the existence of any real national feeling, such as was noticed by the French Consul-General. (1)

On April 8th, Ismā'īl informed the foreign representatives that he was going to submit to them, for transmission to their Governments, a financial plan that represented the true wishes of the people. Wilson and Blignières went to him and presented a written protest in which they pointed out the contradiction between his action and the pledges he had repeatedly given to govern with and by his Council of Ministers. They dwelt on "the encouragement which he had given, without consulting his Ministers, to certain persons who, in supporting a financial plan which had been drawn up without the knowledge of his Ministers, were demanding a change of the present Constitution", and they denounced this attitude as being altogether inconsistent with his repeated assurances that he would give his Cabinet his complete and loyal support. (2) Ismā'īl paid no attention

(1) Quai d'Orsay - Egypte, Vol. 62; No. 66, Godeaux to Waddington, dated April 3rd, 1879.
(2) F.O.195/249; No.185, Lascelles to F.O. dated April 7th, 1879.
to this protest. He convoked the consular corps and delivered an address to them in the presence of the Egyptian notables, who had been assembled for the occasion. He said that "the discontent in the country had reached such a pitch that he felt bound to allay it by adopting radical measures". After summing up the national petition, he announced that Prince Tawfik, "yielding to the will of the nation", (1) had tendered his resignation, and was to be replaced by Sharif Pasha. Isma'il promised that he would continue to govern in accordance with the Rescript of August 28th, 1878, which had sanctioned ministerial responsibility, and that he would form a Chamber "dont les modes d'élection et les droits seront réglés de façon à répondre aux exigences de la situation intérieure et aux aspirations nationales." He then sent letters to Wilson and Blignières stating that "in obedience to the positive wishes of the nation, he had entrusted Sharif Pasha with the formation of a new Cabinet, which was to be composed entirely of Egyptians".

The new change caused a deep sensation in Egypt. It was regarded as the beginning of a new era, since the Khedive had reiterated in a public way his promise to give the country a real parliamentary constitution. Nevertheless,

(1) In the Council of Ministers Tawfik gave quite different reasons for his resignation. He said that ever since he had been President of the Council, "he had been kept completely in the background, and had not even been consulted in important matters by the other Ministers, and that he could no longer occupy so secondary a position."
the possibility of any such development met with some doubts, partly because Isma'il was notorious for breaking his promises, and partly because it was feared that his action would not lightly be forgiven by the two Powers, who might well take their revenge. But this was only a minority view. The majority, on the contrary, were optimistic, and expected that the Powers would respect the national will. (1)

The creditors, who had been frightened by Wilson's intention to declare Egypt insolvent, regained hope. The French colony in particular had special reason for satisfaction. It seemed to them that the overthrow of the Ministry was a political act mainly directed against England, especially since on the day after the fall of Tawfiq's Ministry, the French, but not the English, were invited to all the important functions. They hoped that France would regain all her past ascendancy in Egypt. (2)

Effect of the coup d'état:

England and France protested at the Khedive's action in the following terms: "......The breach of the Khedive's engagements and precipitate and causeless dismissal of Ministers whose services His Highness had solicited the Governments of England and France to place at his disposal, are not only at variance with the spirit of the reform of

(1) Sabry, Genèse, 161 - citing Muḥ. ʿAbduh's memoirs.
(2) Giffard, Les Français en Égypte, 169.
the 28th of August, but constitute a grave and apparently intentional discourtesy to friendly Powers". Ismā'īl was given a chance to put forward a "favourable interpretation of the conduct he has lately pursued", and to appoint the two Ministers; otherwise it would only remain for the two Cabinets "to reserve to themselves an entire liberty of appreciation and action in defending their interests in Egypt, and in seeking the arrangements best calculated to secure the good government and prosperity of the country". (1) Ismā'īl on this told the Western Consuls-General that even if he wished to restore the two Ministers, the public opinion would not allow it, that it was for the Council of Ministers to decide the question, and that he was going to refer it to them. (2)

It was thought that Ismā'īl had effected his coup owing to the encouragement of the Italian Consul-General, M. De Martino. (3) However, Depretis, the Italian Premier, denied this possibility, saying that he had sent the most precise instructions to Martino to be extremely reserved and prudent in his conduct, and to avoid anything which would in any way tend to impede or embarrass the regular working of the new administration. (4) It was also rumoured that the Grand-Vizier

(1) F.0.141/123; No.129, Lascelles to F.0. dated April 24th, 1879.
(2) Egynte, Vol.63; No.95, dated May 5th, 1879 (from Godeaux).
(3) F.0.170/269; Dft.No.177 Confid. Paget to F.0. dated April 25th, 1879. Godeaux denied that possibility, saying that the Khedive had dismissed the two Ministers only in compliance with national feeling. See his Despatch of April 9th, 1879.
(4) F.0.170/269; Paget's No.177 Confid. supra.
and the Ottoman Foreign Minister had congratulated the Khedive on his act, and that they had advised him not to agree to the restoration of the two Ministers. The Porte, on being asked, while they admitted having advised the Khedive to maintain the rights of the Empire,\(^{(1)}\) denied having congratulated him, but added that Wilson and Blignières, who had been personally employed in the Egyptian administration so that their knowledge might be utilised, had been properly dismissed as soon as it appeared that their activities had produced disastrous effects, and that their assistance in the Ministry had created such a deplorable impression in the country that the Khedive had been compelled to get rid of them.\(^{(2)}\)

Wilson protested to the Khedive that his financial project was not final, and that he had showed it to him in a confidential character.\(^{(3)}\) He and De Blignières still hoped that their Governments would impose them on the Khedive or else affect his dethronement.\(^{(4)}\) Godeaux was opposed to their return, since they had "alienated the prestige of the Khedive and the sentiments of the whole population".\(^{(5)}\)

The Egyptian Council of Ministers barred the way against their

\(^{(1)}\) F.O.141/123; Lascelles to F.O. dated May 15th, 1879.
\(^{(2)}\) F.O.146/2123; No.1, Incl. No.10, Caratheodory to Musurus, dated May 27th, 1879.
\(^{(3)}\) Godeaux's No.74 dated Apr. 9th, 1879.
\(^{(4)}\) Godeaux's No.85 Dir. Pol. dated May 5th, 1879.
\(^{(5)}\) Ibid.
return in an official Note addressed to the two Consuls-General. It was said that their return would entail grave consequences. On the other hand, Egypt would not refuse the service of Europeans, "on condition that they should comply with the habits, traditions and the religious feeling of the country". (1)

Sharīf, in order to avoid insistence by England and France on the reinstatement of the two Ministers, proposed the appointment to the Vice-Presidency of the Council of State, (2) newly inaugurated under his presidency, of an Englishman and a Frenchman, who would be admitted to the Council of Ministers as consultants on the draft laws proposed by the Council. (3) He also asked the two Governments to appoint two Controllers, and invited the English and French Commissioners of the Caisse, pending their appointment, to discharge the duties that would be assigned to them. The two Governments refused; and on April 10th the members of the Commission of Inquiry (4) tendered their collective resignation, protesting at the composition of the National Ministry, and observing in their protest that the financial reforms

(1) Ibid.
(2) "...dont la mission serait de donner des consultations sur tous les projets de loi qui devront être soumis par les ministres de Votre Altesse à la représentation nationale, de préparer les règlements d'administration publique, d'apprécier les actes de fonctionnaires dont l'examen lui sera délégué...."
(3) Egypte, Vol.63; Despt. from Godeaux dated May 11th, and his No.99 Dir. Pol. dated May 12th 1879.
(4) Riyād, who was hated for the part he had played with the Chamber, had been dismissed from both the Ministry of the Interior and the Vice-Presidency of the Commission of Cont'
could not be put into effect except by a Ministry in which the European element was represented. (1)

The intervention of Bismarck:

The report of the Commission of Inquiry (2) was published on April 8th, a day after the dismissal of the European Ministers. Then on April 22nd, Ismā'īl published his financial Decree, which decreased the interest of the Unified Debt from 7 to 6 per cent, thus compromising the Sinking Fund. This act was incompatible with the Law of the Mixed Tribunals, which provided for the non-promulgation of any financial law which would affect the rights of the foreign creditors without the consent of their Governments. The members of the Caisse protested against the Decree and brought a case against the Egyptian Government before the Mixed Tribunals.

On May 11th, the German Ambassador in London met Lord Salisbury and informed him that his Government, while "confidently leaving the defence of general European interests with which Germany identifies her own to the effectual care of the friendly forces most interested," feels itself bound to form its resolutions without delay for the defence of the sorely endangered authority of the Reform Courts as well as of the rights and interests of the Empire's subjects, and

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(1) This page...
Al-Rāfi‘ī, op. cit., II, 266.
(2) Modern Egypt, I, ChapVII in extenso.
take a firm position in opposition to the arbitrary proceedings of the Viceroy". (1) The German Consul-General at Cairo was instructed to protest against the Viceroy's recent Decree, which, in the judgment of the German Government, was "at variance with the Judicial Reform granted some years ago by the Khedive and to which Germany had an international right in exchange for the consular jurisdiction which she had surrendered". (2) This protest was handed to the Khedive on May 18th; and on the next day a similar protest was presented by the Austrian Consul.

As Bismarck had seemed quite disinterested in Eastern affairs, his sudden intervention in Egypt was surprising. Radowitz (the German Foreign Minister) asserted that Germany did not intend to meddle with the Egyptian political question, which was reserved for France and England, and that she wished merely to disprove the allegations of the Egyptian and Italian press that Germany's silence meant that she approved the Khedive's conduct and supported his opposition to Anglo-French influence in Egypt. (3) Bismarck himself, on the

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(1) F.O. 244/325; Translation, German Embassy to F.O.
(2) Ibid. No. 264, F.O. to Russell, dated May 13th, 1879. The Mixed Tribunals had protested more than once that their judgments in favour of the creditors of the Floating Debt had not been executed, (the German creditors having been awarded £150,000). The Consuls-General sent identical protests to their Governments.
(3) Allemagne, Vol. 28; No. 120 Confid., St. Vallier to Waddington, dated May 20th, 1879. The German protest came as a shock to Isma'il, since he regarded his ties with Berlin as having been particularly close ever since his son Hasan had gone...
other hand, laid stress on the weakness of the Western Powers in their dealings with the Khedive, which, he said, jeopardized the interests of Europe as a whole in Egypt. (1)

This German initiative would seem to have been to some extent due to the presence in Berlin of Nūbār, who was by now meditating revenge on Ismā'īl in the shape of his dethronement. (2) He may well have convinced Bismarck of the danger inherent in Ismā'īl's last Decree, which would be bound to complicate the situation in Egypt and threaten European peace. According to Blunt, however, Wilson told him that immediately on leaving Egypt he called on the Rothschilds and succeeded in alarming them about the Egyptian situation, and that the Rothschilds were so far convinced as to apply to Bismarck for intervention in order to prevent Ismā'īl from declaring his insolvency. (3)

On May 25th, a week after the presentation of the German protest, Bismarck told Odo Russell (the British Ambassador in Berlin) that he had obtained the agreement of the French, as well as of the Austrian Government, to similar action, and that he had called on the Sultan to remonstrate with the

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there to receive a course of military training. Hasan had further acted for some time as his father's representative in the German capital. Ismā'īl accordingly expected the Germans to give him their support, when he sought it in order to resist Anglo-French domination. Ibid., No. 129 Confid., St. Vallier to Waddington, dated May 30th, 1879.

(1) Ibid. Gontaut-Biron to Waddington, dated May 28th, 1879.
(2) This is emphasized by St. Vallier, the French Ambassador in Berlin, in a telegram he sent to Waddington on July 12th, 1879. (Allemagne, Vol. 29).
Khedive. (1) Under these circumstances he sincerely hoped that the Foreign Office would also lend him their powerful support in persuading the Khedive to "rectify the error he had committed".

As a matter of fact, however, the French at first declined to co-operate. Waddington argued that since the two powers had already taken strong measures to indicate their disapproval of the Khedive's recent proceeding, there was no need for them to join in the German protest. Moreover, to do so would interfere with the arrangement of the Rothschild loan. For a protest such as that made by Germany would impede the valuation of the securities against which the loan was to be granted, so that in making it the Germans themselves were acting against their own interests, since the loan was to be employed in paying off the Floating Debt, which was what they were chiefly concerned with. If France and England were to join in the protest, again, they would automatically pledge themselves not to admit any reduction on the Egyptian stocks; and to this France was not prepared to agree. (2)

The Italians also refused at first to collaborate in the German protest, since the Quirinal thought it inexpedient to protest against an act without having something else to propose in its place. They enquired, at the same time, whether

(1) F.O. 244/321; Draft No.259 (marked Confid.), Russell to F.O. dated May 25th, 1879.

(2) F.O. 146/2123; No.1, Inclos.12 & 13, Lyons to F.O., dated May 21st & 26th, 1879.
the state of affairs in Egypt did not render applicable to that country the principles of a general European finance commission such as had been agreed upon in the 78th Protocol of the treaty of Berlin in regard to the finances of Turkey. Count Tornielli - the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Depretis Cabinet - said that, as matters stood if the Decree of April 22nd was set aside, the Powers were faced with a blank. There existed, it is true, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, but it had never received official recognition, although it had been communicated by the Commissioners to the Khedive before they resigned, and the Decree of April 22nd had been issued to supplant it. As the two reports recommended reduction, why not, he enquired, cause both to be considered together by a commission of impartial persons who might extract the good from each and propose a scheme which might be acceptable to all the Powers. (1)

This refusal of Italy to join in the protest was attributed by Radowitz to a secret understanding between Isma'īl and the Italian agents, who had reasons for approving his conduct. (2)

The story was current, and may account for the Italian attitude, that in the days of his prosperity Isma'īl had lent a very large sum to King Victor Emmanuel on the security of the royal estates at Caserta. (3)

(1) F.C.170/272; Draft No.270, Paget to F.C., dated Rome June 12th, 1879.
(2) St.-Vallier's No. 129 (marked Confid.), dated May 30th, 1879.
(3) Dicey, Khedivate, 181.
Russia would likewise have preferred to keep herself aloof from any responsibilities in Egypt. Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian Foreign Minister—however, had promised the German Minister that Russia would support German representations in Egypt, but only as regards the authority of the Mixed Tribunals, and provided such Russian collaboration produced no further effect.\(^\text{(1)}\) Gortchakoff was in doubt about the German initiative, and agreed to collaborate with Germany only on condition that Waddington saw no objection to the German initiative.\(^\text{(2)}\)

In England Salisbury's policy of a closer entente with France was severely criticised both by the press and in parliament. For it was considered as responsible for the comparative deterioration of British influence in Egypt. That is why England also agreed to protest, despite the refusal of France, thus placing the French in an awkward position: for if they continued to hold back, they might well be suspected of harbouring secret ambitions. The German and Austrian press in fact began an anti-French campaign, accusing France of aiming at the annexation of Egypt.\(^\text{(3)}\) Hence on June 11th, four days after the presentation of the British protest, the French Consul-General was after all instructed

\(^{(1)}\) Plunkett's No.92 to F.O., dated June 13th, 1879.
\(^{(2)}\) Chanzy's Desp. to Waddington, dated Petersburg June 6th, 1879; another teleg. dated June 3rd; No.17 dated June 9th from Chanzy & desp. from Waddington to Chanzy dated June 7th, 1879.
\(^{(3)}\) St. Vallier's No.132 (marked confid.), dated June 7th, 1879.
to present his too. Russia presented hers on the 12th; and on the 15th Italy reversed her former decision and followed suit.

The Egyptian Government attested their respect for the objections of the Powers and for the obligations they had contracted in accepting the Judicial Reform, by paying the European creditors of the Floating Debt, including the creditors who had gained their cases, in full. The reply of the Sharif Ministry was that there were precedents for the issue of the Decree of April 22nd, but that the Government deferred to the will of the Powers. They now proposed to submit the dispositions of the Decree to the approval of the Powers, which, if granted, would make them binding upon Egypt. They would then be promulgated in another decree. (1) Isma'il, on his side, declared to Saurma - the German Consul-General - that he intended to execute honestly the judgments of the Mixed Tribunals, and to respect the rights of the European creditors and that, in consequence, the Decree of April 22nd had to be considered as a simple proposal submitted to the Powers in preparation for an arrangement to be concluded in concert with the other interested Governments. (2)

The German intervention was thus a complete success; and the Berlin circles were particularly satisfied to have succeeded where the Western Powers had failed. The semi-

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(1) F.O. 141/126; Vivian's Draft No. 74 to F.O., dated June, 1879.
(2) Allemagne, Vol. 29; St. Vallier's Teleg. to Waddington, dated June 14th, 1879.
official papers, in the German capital, pointed to the results of the firm and resolute action of Berlin, and compared it to the fluctuations, hesitations, and retreat of the Western Powers. (1) But when it was announced in the House of Commons, on June 16th, that Vivian had been recalled, the German politicians were afraid lest this indicated a misunderstanding between England and France, which, since Bismarck "looked upon an Anglo-French alliance as the basis of peace and order in Europe", was the last development they wished for.

The truth was that for some time before the presentation of the protests Anglo-French relations had deteriorated. Among the French there was a party who favoured strong action in Egypt, wishing for the appointment of an energetic agent who could be relied on to bully the Khedive. This was also the policy of Gambetta, who seized the chance of damaging Waddington by inspiring a number of articles on England in the French press. These took the line that France had been outwitted, and that Vivian, in pursuance of secret instructions from his Government, was working for the failure of the Anglo-French administration in Egypt, and for the establishment of exclusive British influence. (3) Lord Vivian had paid a visit to London in the middle of March; and his return at

(1) Ibid, St. Vallier's No.142, dated June 17th, 1879.
(2) Russell's No.412 to F.O. (marked Confid.), dated April 29th, 1880.
the end of April was commented on, both in Paris and in Cairo, as marking a change in British policy. The French Ambassador in London believed it to indicate a gradual shift away from the idea of violent pressure, and a preference on the part of Great Britain, at least for the time being, for the promotion of her interests rather by energetic diplomatic measures than by direct interference in the affairs of the Khedive such as she had indulged in earlier by appointing Wilson to the Ministry of Finance. (1) According, again, to a report in the Egyptian newspaper Kawkab al-Shark, Vivian now tried to convince the Khedive of the necessity of reinstating the European Ministers, but the Khedive replied that he could not defy nationalist feeling. (2)

Vivian in fact found that the violence of the French was so far defeating their own ends that the Khedive and his Government were now prepared, in order to secure the support of England, to make almost any concessions, short of such reinstatement, she might demand. (3) At the same time, it was of greater moment to the British Government to maintain amicable relations with France than to gain advantages for England in Egypt; and Bismarck's intervention had shown the Anglo-French entente to be dangerously fragile. It was

(1) Angleterre, Vol. 780; No. 41, Admiral Pothuau to Waddington, dated April 25th, 1879.
(2) Sabry, Genése, 156 - 7.
(3) F. 0.14672124; reprod. Vivian's No. 316 Pol. dated May 26th, 1879, and Incl. No. 19 dated May 29th.
accordingly agreed between the two Governments that something must be done to consolidate it and restore their joint prestige; and nothing less would satisfy Waddington and French public opinion than the deposition of Ismā'īl, whom they regarded as the real cause of all the trouble.

In pursuance of this policy, Godeaux, of whose moderation and impartiality Ismā'īl had spoken very highly, was replaced as Consul-General at the end of May, by a certain M. Tricou, who had earlier represented France in Egypt for some years but had been recalled in 1871 in compliance with the wish of the Khedive, who resented his aggressive attitude. Although Tricou did not in fact present his credentials until after the fall of Ismā'īl, who might well have declined to accept him, his appointment at this juncture was accordingly significant, as emphasizing the ill will of the French government towards the Khedive. Similarly, Lord Vivian, who had been sympathetic with Ismā'īl, was replaced by Sir Frank Lascelles, who worked in complete harmony with Tricou till Ismā'īl's dethronement.

The deposition of Ismā'īl:

In the course of these manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres, the Porte showed much concern over Egypt. Caratheodory Pasha - the Ottoman Foreign Minister - had tried to dissuade England from sending two ships of war to Alexandria to intimidate Ismā'īl. (1) He and Khayr al-Dīn Pasha - the Grand Vizier -

(1) F.O.146/2123; No.1, Incl.No.8, Caratheodory to Musurus dated May 24th, 1879.
seemed favourable to Ismā'īl, and considered the German protest as limited to the question of finance. They suggested that the Egyptian question should be discussed with the Porte, not with the Khedive, and that communication on the subject with France and England should be transferred from Cairo to Istanbul.

The Ottoman Government, in fact, tried to exploit the situation in Egypt in order to curtail the privileges acquired by the Viceroy since 1841. Sultan Ābd al-Ḥamīd sought also to turn it to his own advantage by obtaining a success that would impress the Moslem world and further his Panislamic ideas. Khayr al-Dīn was ambitious. He hoped to return to his native country, Tunis, either as Bey or as First Minister; but since both alternatives were difficult to realize owing to the objections of France and the reigning Bey, he aimed first at acquiring for himself the government of Tripoli, from which he could move to Tunis if circumstances allowed. His resignation, however, was refused by the Sultan, who kept Khayr al-Dīn in office both to please Europe, since Khayr al-Dīn was an enthusiastic reformer, and to bar the way against the return of Midhat. As regards Egypt, Khayr al-Dīn supported the candidature of Ḥalīm, who he hoped might prove useful to him in future. Both Ḥalīm and Khayr al-Dīn were more Arab than Turk (Ḥalīm's mother being of Arab origin). They were not

(2) F.C.146/2123; No.1, Incl.No.14, Lyons to Salisbury dated May 27th, 1879.
Turcophiles at heart, and showed sympathy with England and France only to further their own political ambitions. (1) Early in April 1879 Khayr al-Din told the French Chargé d'Affaires at Istanbul that the Sultan was ready to depose Isma‘ül in consequence of his rapacity and mal-administration and for the well-being of the Egyptians, and that he would replace him, according to the Ferman of 1841, by Prince Halîm, whose installation in Egypt could be rendered easy by Anglo-French moral support, especially if he was sent with a naval squadron, and given a regiment or two if required. (2) A simultaneous offer was conveyed to Sir Henry Layard on May 21st. This also mentioned the Sultan’s desire to get rid altogether of the family of Muhammad ‘Ali, who had thought of nothing but accumulating wealth, leading lives of dissipation, providing for their families and dependents, maintaining vast establishments, and squandering money either extorted from the unfortunate population or obtained by loan from Europe for their personal objects, while doing nothing for the well-being of the people or the improvement of the country. (3)

(1) Turquie, Vol. 426; Teleg. from Montholon to Waddington, (marked Très Confid. & Personnelle), dated April 10th, 1879.
(2) Ibid, Vol. 427; No. 109 (Fournier to Waddington), dated June 28th, 1879. Très Confid.
These proposals, which were forwarded unofficially in the name of the Grand-Vizier, were intended to test the inclinations of the Western Powers. It is known that if England and France had agreed, Isma‘il would have been deposed immediately, and the Ferman of 1873 cancelled.

Waddington and Salisbury thought that the moment had not yet arrived to resort to such extreme measures, which it would be prudent to hold in reserve till all other means of defending their interests in Egypt had failed. Waddington's reply to the Porte was that it was inopportune to discuss such a plan, since the Western Governments were disinclined to enforce it. When the Porte showed its desire to be invited by France to settle the Egyptian question, he replied that he could not interrupt the negotiations he was carrying on with the Egyptian Government, which were concerned with questions arising from the financial Control recognized by the Porte as lying within the Khedive's jurisdiction. Waddington was opposed to anything that would encourage the Ottoman Government to interfere in the management of the Egyptian finances. (1)

Salisbury was of the opinion that the substitution of Tawfiq or Halim for Isma‘il, to be followed by a compulsory liquidation of Egypt's liabilities, was the only hope of

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(1) Turquie, Vol. 427; Teleg. from Waddington to Montholon dated May 27th, 1879.
restoring prosperity in Egypt, and that it would be wiser to use the authority of the Sultan, whenever the time for interference came (because by his assistance the difficulties of the step would be very materially diminished); but he more or less shared Waddington’s point of view: it seemed to him that if the Ottoman Government intervened in Egyptian affairs, rather than settling, it would probably complicate them still further.

Prince ʿAlīm seemed to London and Paris likely either to prove too independent or too much under the influence of the Sultan. Moreover, it was feared in Egypt that his accession would not produce any benefit to the country. Having lived so long in exile and poverty, he would seek only to make up for lost time by enriching himself as quickly as possible, resorting to the very expedients employed by his nephew which had reduced the country to its present state.

The Western representatives at Cairo urged their Governments to remove Ismāʿīl and appoint a commission of liquidation; and meanwhile did their best not to encourage the illusions of the Khedive and his Government that there was some divergence of view between the English and French Cabinets.

As the Porte was still active in presenting its previous proposals, the two Governments agreed to advise Ismāʿīl to

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(2) F.O.141/126; Draft No.386 Pol., Lascelles to F.O. dated June 26th, 1879.
abdicate in favour of his son Tawfik. Instructions were sent to the two Western representatives, stipulating, in case Ismā‘īl agreed, that a suitable Civil List should be assigned to him and that the order of succession should not be disturbed. But in case he refused, it was stated that the two Powers would be compelled to address themselves directly to the Sultan, and that he would not be able to count either upon obtaining the Civil List or upon maintaining the succession in favour of Tawfik.

It was generally expected that the Khedive would refuse to abdicate. Nor, if he were summoned by the Sultan, at the instigation of England and France, was it thought likely that he would submit. Salisbury considered a joint occupation of any Egyptian territory on the part of the two Powers to be open to so many objections as to render it practically inadmissible, while armed intervention by either separately would be at variance with the understanding on which they had hitherto been acting together. (1) He hence decided to instruct Lascelles to tell the Khedive privately that the Porte was going to depose him, that the consultation of the two Powers would very likely end in a request to the Porte to do so, and that his best course was to abdicate in order to preserve the prerogatives of Egypt and the rights of his family. (2)

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(1) F.O. 146/2123; No.746 Confid. supra.
(2) F.O. 141/123; No.21 Most Secret, dated June 13th, 1879.
F.O. to Lascelles.
At the same time the two Powers were careful not to arouse any international jealousy by over-riding the Sultan and deposing Ismāʿīl by force. They informed Germany and Austria of the identical instructions sent to Lascelles and Tricou, and asked them to back the joint Anglo-French policy at Cairo. Salisbury thought it wiser to defer getting into touch with Italy and Russia until after the answer of Germany and Austria was known.

The French Ambassador in Berlin was doubtful whether Germany would collaborate, for two reasons: first, because she had succeeded in affecting a change in the Khedive’s attitude, and, secondly, because a telegram from Reuter’s agency announced at this juncture that Tricou was trying single-handed to force the Khedive to abdicate. The newspapers in Berlin considered this as an action directed more against Germany and England than against Egypt. But Bismarck was entirely favourable to the proposal, and was only awaiting Andrásy’s answer to give his formal consent.

Austria, who at that time was inclined to conciliate the Sultan in order to digest Bosnia and Herzegovina, and push her railways towards the Aegean, seemed willing to

(1) F.O.146/2124; No.773, Most Secret, F.O. dated June 19th, to Lyons & Ho. 774, Secret, also to Lyons dated June 19th

(2) Allemagne, Vol.29; St. Vallier to Waddington, dated Berlin June 20th, 1879.
back the Sultan's sovereignty over Egypt. The Austrian Government were irritated at seeing important decisions taken in regard to Egypt without their being consulted or informed beforehand. While they admitted the superior interests of the Western Powers, they considered that the position of Egypt was a matter of general European interest, defined by international acts, in any modification of which they had a right to be consulted. Yet Bismarck had his own means of influencing the Imperial Government of Vienna. On June 23rd the German and Austrian Consuls-General invited Ismā'īl to abdicate. Ismā'īl replied by reading a telegram from Istanbul forbidding him to make any definitive declaration or to abdicate without first consulting the Porte.

The German and Austrian replies thus being favourable, Salisbury and Waddington next approached Russia and Italy, observing that "the intervention of the Porte would have serious results as to the juridical situation acquired by Egypt". While Russia showed a great reserve regarding the voluntary abdication of Ismā'īl, she stated that, in her view, all

(1) Biovès, Français et Anglais en Égypte, 1881-2, 5-6.
(2) F.O.146/2411; No.1264 Confid. (Incl. No.4.), Elliot to Granville, dated Vienna, January 11th, 1882.
(3) F.O.141/126; Teleg. No.80, Pol. dated Lascelles June 23rd, 1879.
measures, whether financial or political, concerning Egypt, should be the subject of an understanding between the Powers and the Sultan, who had already complained to Russia at the direct nature of the Western negotiations with the Khedive. (1) Russia did not, in fact, favour united action by the two Powers in Egypt. She tried at Istanbul to ensure that the Sultan should neither depose Ismā‘īl nor effect his dethronement. The Russian object was to pose as a mediator between Turkey and the Western Powers, and perhaps regain the commanding position she had won at Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833. (2) Russia, moreover, like Austria, was trying to conciliate the Sultan in order to consolidate the new situation in the Balkans, and to strengthen her hold on her new acquisitions in Asia Minor. (3) The Grand-Vizier told Sir Henry Layard that the Russian party at the Palace were endeavouring to frighten the Sultan by warning him that if he countenanced the action of the Western Powers in Egypt to compel the Khedive to abdicate, the same fate would probably befall him. (4)

On the other hand, it was rumoured that a pact had existed between Ismā‘īl and the Emperor Alexander since

(1) F.O.146/2125; reprod. Plunkett's No.100 Confid. to F.O. dated June 15th, 1879, and a Teleg. No.42 Copy Secret from Walsham, dated Berlin June 28th, 1879.

(2) Turquie, Vol.427; Desp. marked Confid. Fournier to Waddington, dated June 27th, 1879 and another one from him dated June 29th.

(3) Russie, Vol.258; No.21 dated June 24th, 1879 Chanzy to Waddington.

(4) F.O.141/123; Layard to Salisbury, dated June 23rd, 1879.
1867, which stipulated that, in case of war, Ismā'īl should give money to the Tsar and immobilise the troops that must be sent to the Sultan's aid by Egypt according to the Fermans. Russia, in return, was to support Egypt's independence and the extension of her territory to Syria. (1) This, however, was not the first time the rumour had been heard of. It had gained currency whenever Ismā'īl was on unfriendly terms with the Porte: - in 1867 because of his intention to withdraw the Egyptian forces in Crete, and during his conflict with the Porte from 1869 to 1871. (2) In a conversation with Vivian on March 23rd, 1878, the Khedive ascribed these rumours, which he stigmatized as "utterly false and calumnious", to the intrigues of his enemies at Istanbul and in Europe; numbering among the latter Nūbār, who, he said, was a candidate under Russian encouragement for the Government of Eastern Rumelia. (3)

The attitude of the Quirinal was not much dissimilar from that of St. Petersburg. The Italian Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to invite the German Government to unite with Italy in protesting against the Franco-English proceedings concerning Egypt. The Quirinal "insisted on...

(1) Q. d'Or., Turquie, Vol. 427; No. 87 Confd., Montholon to Waddington, dated May 12th, 1879.
(2) Vide my unpublished Ismā'īl wa-'alākātuhū bi'l Bāb al-Ḥāl, Chaps. IV, V & VI.
(3) F.O. 78/2853; No. 86 Confd. Vivian to F.O.
unjust brutality of the Franco-English proceedings in regard to the Khedive, as this Prince declared that he was ready to give them satisfaction. It attributed the proceedings of the two Powers to jealousy of other Powers, notably Germany, whose initiative had been crowned with success, and Italy, whose interests in Egypt were disregarded. "Europe", added the Italian Note, "could not admit this Franco-English pretention to consider Egypt as a country where only their influence could be exercised to the exclusion of all others". (1)

Radowitz, the German Secretary, reminded Italy that only a day before presenting the Note, she had recognized Roumania without any consideration of Germany's desire to maintain the accord between the Powers and a firm attitude pending the execution by the Roumanian Government of the conditions fixed by the Treaty of Berlin (2) (concerning the religious toleration of the Jews).

Both Russia and Italy accordingly refrained from advising Ismā'īl to abdicate; and when the communications of the four other Powers were presented to the Khedive, he asked for some time to think the matter over. He hoped, by procrastinating,

(1) Q. d'Or., Allemagne, Vol. 29; No. 147 Confid. St. Vallier to Waddington, dated June 22nd, 1879.

(2) Ibid & No. 137, St. Vallier to Waddington, dated July 5th, 1879.
to profit by any possible difference of opinion among the
Powers, and to get backing from Istanbul. He had sent
Talcat Pasha, one of his men, to the Ottoman capital, provided
with private bribes to the Ministers and the Divan; and
although the Sultan would make him no promises, Ismāʿīl
remained optimistic because of information sent to him by
his agent, Abrāhām Pasha. (1) He even believed that England
had no wish for him either to abdicate or to be dethroned
by the Sultan, and had only advised him to abdicate because
she knew that the Sultan intended to depose him. (2)

In fact the Sultan and his Ministers were faced with a
dilemma. Suppose Ismāʿīl were deposed, and Egypt's
prerogatives cancelled, might not that be regarded by the
Moslem opinion as submission to the will of Europe and
damage the prestige of the Caliph by showing him to be a
tool in the hands of Christian public opinion? Moreover,
the same principle might also, they feared, be applied to
other vilāyets and other vālīs be dismissed by the will of
Europe. It would perhaps be better to back the Khedive in
his defiance of the Western Powers. On the other hand,
when the Ottoman Government had complained that the demand
made by the two Powers to the Khedive to abdicate had not

(1) Abrāhām was a brother-in-law of Mūbār and, like him, an
Armenian. He was appointed to Istanbul in 1870, and it was
through him that the millions of pounds squandered at the
Ottoman capital were delivered. From his dossiers in the
Abdīn Archives there is evidence that he was corrupt. Tricou
asserts that Abrāhām was won over to Prince Halīm's side.
(Évryte, Vol. 63; dated June 22nd 1879)
(2) Abdīn, Abrāhām, 8/76; Ismāʿīl to Abrāhām, dated June 25th, '79
been referred to it beforehand, it was told in reply that the advice given to the Khedive was in accordance with the previous Fermâns, which enabled them to maintain direct relations with Egypt concerning their interests and influence there. The Western Ambassadors were instructed to prevent the Porte from giving way to the Khedive and from encouraging him in his resistance. It was evident, therefore, that the two Powers were determined to get rid of him, and there was a possibility that they might even depose him without previous warning to the Porte - in which case the Sultan's position would indeed be humiliating. The matter clearly needed a prompt solution.

On June 25th, the Sultan convoked his Ministers and kept them in council till after midnight. He then gave Caratheodory carte blanche to send telegrams to Egypt in his name. Next day, accordingly, two telegrams were sent to the Western Ambassadors who were informed that the Sultan having long observed the misgovernment of Egypt by Ismâfl and his extravagance, had decided to depose him and had done so. Others in the same sense were sent to the "ex-Khedive" Ismâfl and to Tawfîk. The British Government did not regret the deposition, even though it was decreed thus suddenly before their opinion had been sought, since it solved a difficult

Ismā'īl had prepared for resistance. The army, which had been reduced to 6,000 men during the Nūbār Ministry, had since been raised to 30,000, and the military schools closed by Nūbār had been re-opened. Feeling in the army was against Ismā'īl, and although the officers had, of necessity, sworn to obey and to defend him, it was known that they were ready to do so only against England and France but not against the Sultan. Shahīn Pasha, the Minister of War, forced the notables of Lower Egypt to protest against Ismā'īl's abdication. Yet popular feeling in the country was against the Khedive. Muhammad ʿAbduh relates in his unpublished memoirs, that a short time after the fall of two Ministers, rumours were spread that the Khedive had sent orders to the Mudīrs (provincial governors) to send at once.

Continuing fn. (1) from previous page...

It was evident that the Sultan's policy, in encouraging Ismā'īl to resist, was to compel the Powers, who he saw were determined on his removal, to request the removal of the Ferman of 1873.

(2) Pears, Thirty years at Constantinople, 80

This page...
(1) F.O.244/331; F.O. to Walsham, dated June 26th, 1879.
(2) Egvnte, Vol. 63; No. 89. Godeaux to Waddington, dated April 25th, 1879.
(3) F.O.141/126; Dft. No. 386 Pol., Lascelles to F.O., dated June 26th, 1879.
(5) Quoted in Sabry, Genese, 161.
to the Da'ira al-Khaṣṣa (the Khedive's own household) a part of the money collected for the Ministry of Finance. "Many newspapers published the news, of whose truth I was assured by reliable witnesses. This incident," continued 'Abduh, "confirmed what had been said by the wise: that Ismā'īl could not keep his word. Hence, the country thought of his removal from the throne. The liberals informed the Chamber of Notables that they would support Prince Tawfīk, and after interviews between Jamāl al-Dīn, accompanied by many notables, and Tawfīk, the former insisted upon Sharīf's agreeing to the demand of the two Powers. He told them that the idea of resistance was foolish, since war for Ismā'īl would be hated by all classes including the army. Jamāl al-Dīn then went to the French Consul-General and told him that there existed in Egypt a National Reform Party, and that only Prince Tawfīk was capable of realizing the reforms needed by Egypt."

A general feeling of satisfaction prevailed in Egypt when it was known that Ismā'īl had been deposed by the Sultan. The notables and the 'Olamā' had supported him when he effected the "coup d'état", but only by way of protest against European interference. Nor did he receive any personal support to speak of in the press. Some newspapers, such as the Mirāt al-Shark, had even launched a campaign against all the princes of the family of Muhammad 'Alī, and
the governors appointed by Ismā'īl. Indeed the press in general hated him, considering him as the real cause of Egypt's misery, and attacked him widely once he was removed. (1)

So in the end Ismā’īl gave way without any resistance; and as the two Powers insisted upon his quitting Egypt immediately, he left the country two days later. He intended to go to Istanbul, but the Sultan refused him permission to live in the capital. So he went instead to Naples, where he stayed till 1887, then removing to Istanbul to spend his last days there, under constant watch by the Sultan's spies.

Throughout those years, however, Ismā’īl never gave up hope. From the very beginning he tried, through intrigues in Istanbul, to secure leave to return to Egypt. But at the request of Tawfīk, who never loved his father, the two Powers always refused to allow it, so that his deposition virtually marked the end of his political career. (2)

The Western Powers by their diplomacy thus jointly gained a predominant position in the country for themselves. (3)

(1) İbrahim Abduh, op. cit., 98-9

(2) F.O.141/124; No.208 dated F.O. August 5th,1879 and No.719, Incl.No.2.; Safwat Pasha to Layard dated Aug.12th,1879.

(3) On July 1st, The American Consul-General wrote, "We hear of great exaltation in France over their diplomatic victory and their revanche éclatante". ʾAbdin, American, Vol.16; No.308. Farman to William Ewart.
By concerted action they had overthrown the native ruler who had stood in their way; for 'Abd al-Hamīd had played but a minor role in the entire affair. The other Powers had stood by as interested spectators, lending their support to the Western Powers only when circumstances required it. It was, therefore, a foregone conclusion that the new Khedive would work in harmony with the Governments to whom he owed his position. Since they had placed him in power, they would henceforth enjoy a generally recognized right of interference in Egyptian affairs, and would now unquestionably support the new Khedive in such conflicts as might arise between him and his subjects.

This implied a new alignment of forces in Egypt, for Ismā'īl, in spite of his various faults, had in the end identified himself with the national feeling. However, different his point of view might be from that of the people, he had stood together with them against foreign interference.

June 26th 1879 was therefore rightly regarded in London and Paris as marking the commencement of a new era. But the situation then created was one fraught with danger, not only for Egypt but also for Anglo-French relations.
Chapter V

The Inauguration of Tawfik

"Je connais le caractère du Prince, et, quoiqu'il en dise, je suis convaincu qu'il subira de bonne grâce tel régime administratif qu'il nous plaira de lui imposer".

Quai d'Orsay - Égypte; Vol. 64; Tricou to Waddington, dated July 6th, 1879.

The new ruler:

Tawfik seemed both to the Western Powers and to the Egyptians to be far better than his predecessor. He had sided with the Opposition at the end of his father's reign, and, being a Freemason and one of Jamāl al-Dīn's disciples, he professed liberalism himself. He was the first of the Khedivial family to surrender his estates in compliance with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, hoping thus to do something for the good of his country. In his domestic life, he was content with one wife, dispensing with the traditional harem. He was a good Moslem, but neither fanatical nor superstitious.

Tawfik, however, resembled those Tsars who were promising on their accession, but later disappointed the hopes pinned on them. His upbringing was responsible
for the change. His mother was one of Ismā‘īl’s slave-
concubines, and he was never really respected either by
the court or by his father. Ismā‘īl indeed preferred all
his other sons to Tawfīk, and was not even enthusiastic
at his nomination as heir-apparent when Nūbār was negotiating
the Ferman of 1866 at the Ottoman capital, agreeing to it only
on the insistence of Sultan ʿAbd al- ʿAzīz, who hoped to effect
a similar change in Turkey in favour of his son, Yūsuf Izz
el-Dīn. (1) Tawfīk’s actions were jealously watched by his
father, who always limited his intercourse with the representa-
tives of foreign Powers; and it may have been for this
reason that he joined the Opposition and Jamāl al-Dīn and
professed liberalism. Moreover, although Tawfīk was
personally popular at first, the Egyptians could not forget
that he was his father’s son, and consequently looked upon
him with some suspicion. (2)

As early as 1879, a timid attempt was made to ask Tawfīk
to convene a new parliament constituted on more liberal lines.
On May 17th, Sharīf had submitted a draft constitution to
the Assembly; and a sub-committee was elected to examine
it. But the deposition of Ismā‘īl interrupted the

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(1) Vide my unpublished Ismā‘īl wa-‘alākatuhū bi’l Bāb al- ʿĀlī,
Chap. III.

(2) F.O. 141/126; Draft No. 386 Political; Lascelles to F.O.
dated June 26th, 1879.
proceedings of this committee; and when the Assembly met on July 6th, 1879, within a fortnight of Tawfik's accession, the Delegates were curtly told to disperse. (1) Tawfik was then seen to regard constitutionalism as a mere "décor de théâtre". He had convinced himself that the country was not ready for a constitutional régime, (2) and declined to accept the constitution presented to him by Sharif, saying that the representatives of the Western Governments would not agree to it. (3) Sharif, therefore, retired; and Tawfik, wishing to emphasize his sense of responsibility towards Europe, (4) took over the presidency himself.

As it was difficult for the Khedive to assume ministerial responsibility directly, however, after a month's trial the experiment had to be abandoned; and Riyad was then summoned from Europe, where he was still in exile, on the advice of the two Powers, (5) to take his place.

Tawfik's conversion to absolutism was chiefly due to foreign pressure. He was naturally of a weak personality, and at the beginning of his reign he was too fearful of the

(1) Al-Raficî, 'Asr Ismaiîl, II, 237
(2) Egypte, Vol. 66; No. 88 Dir. Pol., De Ring to Freycinet, dated May 24th, 1880.
(3) Al-Thawra al-Qâribiya, 30.
(4) Egypte, Vol. 64; Tricou to Waddington, dated Aug. 8th, 1879.
possible return of his father to Egypt to make any stand against the system of international administration, even if he had had the chance to do so. The dethronement of his father by the Western Powers taught him a lesson that impressed him for the rest of his days, and convinced him that the best way to preserve his throne was to rely on the West and do its bidding.

It must be borne in mind that the constitutional regime would have been detrimental to the objects of the condominium, since an Egyptian parliament would have, of necessity, to cope with the country's finances, and these were considered by the creditors to be much more the concern of Europe than of Egypt. The representatives of the condominium much preferred to deal direct with a docile autocrat. Tricou, who had proved very harsh with Ismā'īl, succeeded in dominating Tawfīk, on the one hand by frightening him with the bogey of British influence, and on the other by complying with the Khedive's desire to keep Nūbār away for the time being. For Nūbār now cherished hopes of a return to power. Even before the deposition of Ismā'īl, he had declared from his exile in Europe, that he would regain the presidency and even announced a programme of revenge. From the time of Ismā'īl's deposition press telegrams daily anticipated his restoration. This
provoked considerable alarm among both Egyptians and Europeans, and Tawfik asked Tricou to help him in keeping Nūbār away from Egypt. Tricou suspected Nūbār as an enemy of France and a protégé of both England and Germany, who aimed at bringing Egypt under a British protectorate. He therefore supported Tawfik's point of view; and Waddington assured him that he would keep Nūbār in France at least until December 1879. (1) Tricou told Tawfik that they had best discuss everything together privately, without bringing his ministers, or, especially, the Chamber of Delegates, into it. (2) His object, for which he worked with great energy, was to diminish the influence of England in Egypt and establish French predominance. But he adhered to the time-honoured system, contriving the maintenance in office of weak and incompetent ministers whom he could either frighten or cajole, obtaining placed and profits for his countrymen to the detriment of the subjects of other countries, and especially Englishmen, and exhibiting himself as the most important and influential of the consuls. (3)

(1) *Egypte, Vol. 64* No. 2 Dir. Pol. (marked Confid.), Tricou to Waddington, dated July 11th, 1879 - also Waddington to Tricou, Teleg. dated Aug. 6th, 1879.
(2) *Egypte, Vol. 53; No. 3 Dir. Pol.*, Tricou to Waddington, dated June 29th, 1879.
(3) F.0.141/124, No. 849 Secret, Lyons to F.0. dated Aug. 1879. It was the constant aim of the French to counterbalance the British supremacy in the Egyptian administration. Ever since the recall of Godeaux the French Consuls-General had repeatedly complained to their Government of the eclipse of French influence in Egypt. Hence their continued efforts to procure new appointments to their Cont'd....
He and Lascelles had pointed out to Tawfik on July 2nd, 1879, that it was of the greatest importance to Egypt to obtain the confidence of the Powers, that all his acts, more especially at the beginning of his reign, would be anxiously watched in Europe, and that it would be idle to hope for the restoration of confidence in Egypt if he were to remain surrounded by the very men (namely those of the Sharif Ministry) who had urged his father to resist the advice given to him by the Powers. Tricou added that if it was impossible for Tawfik to find ministers in Egypt, he would have to resort again to European administration. But Tricou was not in fact in favour of reconstituting the European Ministry, which would cause a conflict between the two countries because of the great personal influence exercised by Wilson. He therefore advised his Government to propose the reconstitution of the Control, since this,

continuing fn. (3) from previous page. ..

countrymen. The result was that by 1881, whereas the French had lost nothing, they had gained (a) absolute parity in the Control; (b) parity on the Railway Board and on the administration of the Telegraphs and the Port of Alexandria; (c) the editorship of the official newspaper, the Moniteur Egytien; and (d) control of the Ministry of public Works; - to say nothing of their acquisition of other minor posts. Egypte, Vol. 68; Monge to Hilaire, dated March 1881. Cf. Supra (112).

(1) above. . .

F. O. 141/126; Draft No. 402 (marked Private), Lascelles to F. O. dated July 2nd, 1879.
while averting that danger, would be enough to give real security to France. (1)

The **Fermān** of 1879:

One of the most pressing problems requiring solution at the beginning of Tawfik's reign was that of the privileges accorded to the Khedive by the **Fermān** of 1873. This had never been considered as final by the Porte. (2) The Ministers of Sultan Murād, during his short reign, tried indeed to repeal it; (3) and Midhat still wished to do so at the beginning of the reign of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, but met with opposition from the British Ambassador. (4) Nevertheless, when promulgating the **Irādā** deposing Ismā'īl, the Porte also promulgated another, repealing the **Fermān**, basing its action on the hypothesis that the Sultan had accorded it *motu proprio* and that its communication to the Powers constituted no undertaking to them, except insofar as, in virtue of the privileges the **Fermān** had conferred on the Khedive, he had carried through certain transactions with them. In the view of the Porte, the concession, as well

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(1) *Egypte, Vol. 64, No. 2 Dir. Pol.* (marked Confid.) and No. 7 *Dir. Pol.*, both from Tricou to Waddington, dated July 11th and 14th 1879.
(2) Cf. supra (49).
(3) *Abdīn, American, Vol. 12, No. 11*, dated June 7th, 1876.
as the revocation, of the Ferman ranked as acts of internal administration, by which the rights of the Great Powers remained unaffected. (1)

It was accordingly argued by the Grand-Vizier that the Ferman of 1873 had not been registered as a European convention, but was merely a decision of the Sultan's to be modified or abrogated altogether as he wished, without thereby in any way annulling engagements entered into as regards Egypt; that Europe could take no exception to its abrogation, since this merely restored the previous state of affairs in Egypt, provided for by the Ferman of 1841; that the deposition of Ismā'īl was at once a satisfaction offered to Europe and a popular measure in the eyes of the Egyptian people; and that it also enabled the Porte to vindicate its position as the suzerain Power. (2) All questions of detail were to be regulated by a new Ferman addressed to Tawfīk. If questions arose affecting the rights of a third party, the Porte would pay them due attention in order to avert any prejudicial effect, on condition, however, that the revocation of the Ferman of 1873 were acknowledged as an accomplished fact, not subject to any further review. (3)

(1) F.O.146/2126; No.841 (copy) Caratheodory to Musurus, dated June 28th, 1879.
(2) F.O.146/2125, No.632 (Incl.), Layard to F.O. dated June 27th and copy No.583.
(3) Copy in No. 841 supra.
The Istanbul newspapers regarded the revocation as the first manifestation of the Sultan's Panislamic policy, and proclaimed it to amount to a conquest of Egypt by the Sultan and the beginning of a new era.\(^1\) The semi-official newspaper \textit{Vakit} spoke of the despatch to Egypt of a commission of inquiry to examine the financial conventions concluded by Egypt with the Europeans and to study the conditions of the different loans; to devise a regulation of the Egyptian Debt such as would not affect the future progress of Egypt; to conclude an agreement with the creditors, and finally evaluate the properties and revenues pledged as a security for the Egyptian loans. The \textit{Vakit}'s conclusive comment was that "this will entail the absolute submission of Egypt".\(^2\)

Radowitz assumed that the Porte wished to compel the Powers to discuss the affairs of Egypt with it, and while being ready to give way on Egypt, would at first resist in order to obtain compensation in the delimitation of the Greek frontiers.\(^3\) The Porte was indeed encouraged to take this line by the attitude of both Russia and Italy. Thus Giers sent a circular Note to the Powers, declaring that Russia did not admit the international character of the Ferman\(^4\)

\(^1\) \textit{Turquie}, Vol.428; Fournier to Waddington, dated July 1st, 1879.

\(^2\) \textit{Turquie}, Vol.427; Teleg. from Fournier to Waddington dated June 29th 1879.

\(^3\) \textit{Allemagne}, Vol.29; No.150, dated June 1879 and two telegrams dated June 29th and 30th, 1879 - all from St. Vallier to Waddington.
regarding Egypt, except the Fermān of 1841. It was evident that Russia, while trying to challenge the condominium in the hope of dividing England and France and checking British influence in the East, aimed at obtaining for herself and the other Powers an equal share in the future control of the affairs of Egypt, by means of an international conference in Istanbul, in which she would side with the Porte. (1) The Italian attitude can be well understood in the light of Italy's relatively inferior position in Egypt, to which Italian public opinion was so sensitive that Martino was attacked by the Italian press for failing to exercise greater influence in the country. Instructions were accordingly sent to Count Corti, the Italian Ambassador in Turkey, to the effect that the Fermāns of 1866 and 1873 having been officially communicated to the Powers, and these Powers having taken notice of them, a situation had been created under European sanction, which, in the opinion of the Italian Government, could not be altered without the consent of the Powers to whom the Fermāns had been communicated. (2)

England and France, on the other hand, were against any scheme that involved the internationalisation of the Egyptian

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question, since it would evidently hamper the general liquidation contemplated by them when effecting Ismāʿīl's deposition and diminish the prestige of the new ruler chosen by them. But while the Foreign Office accepted what the Sultan had done, subject to reserves as to the other effects of the Irade; (1) Waddington took the lead in attacking the decision of the Porte, which had been taken without consulting the Western Powers. He suggested to Lyons that the two Governments should stand firm and withstand any attempt on the part of the Porte to reserve to itself any power to intervene in Egyptian financial affairs. He considered it of primary importance that France and Great Britain should maintain their right to contract financial engagements directly with the Egyptian Government without interference on the part of the Porte, and regarded it as particularly important to guard against the Porte's arrogating to itself any control over Egypt in the matter of loans, since that would simply mean "bakhshīsh" to the Ottoman Pashas, and moreover weaken the power already possessed by England and France of restraining Egypt from contracting further loans.

(1) F.O. 24½/331; F.O. to Walsham, dated June 26th, 1879. Fournier, the French representative at Istanbul, was convinced that Layard had provoked the Porte both to repeal the Ferman of 1873 and to place Wālim on the Egyptian throne. Turquie, Vol.427; Fournier to Waddington, dated June 24th, 1879.
Waddington, in combating the Porte's intention to interfere in Egyptian affairs by the revocation of the Ferman of 1873, relied, of course, on the controversial communication of the Ferman to the Powers, assuming that they had been so far made party to it as to render it binding on all parties concerned. (1)

But in the event the two Powers were faced with an accomplished fact, since the Ferman of 1873 had already been abrogated. Waddington, therefore, could conceive of no better course than to try and obtain for Tawfik a new Ferman, which should resemble in all its essential points the Ferman of 1873 and especially the clauses that authorized the Khedive to establish regular relations with foreign Powers. In this he obtained the concurrence of Salisbury, (2) and the good offices of Bismarck, who, while still admitting the special position of the two Powers in Egypt, regarded the Egyptian question as a matter of general European interest, and hence insisted that the new Ferman, after having been approved by England and France, and before being sent to the Khedive or put into force, should be communicated to Germany and Austria. (3)

(1) Ibid, Fournier to Waddington, dated June 28th,1879; Angleterre, Vol.786; Nos.91 & 92, from Waddington to Montebello, dated June 28th & 30th,1879; and F.0.141/123; No.741 (Incl.), Lyons to Salisbury dated July 15th,1879.
(2) F.0.146/2185; Waddington to Lyons, dated June 29th,1879.
(3) Allemane, Vol.29; Desp. dated June 30th and Nos.165 Confid. and 178, dated July 12th and 19th,1879 - all from St.Vallier & F.0.141/124; No.647, Layard to F.0., dated July 21st, 1879.
Negotiations were carried on at Istanbul between the Porte on the one hand, and the two Ambassadors on the other. But the Porte was warned beforehand that the new Fermañ should be communicated to the two Ambassadors before publication, and that it should be as like as possible to the Fermañ of 1873; otherwise the two Governments would not consent to it. The Porte agreed, and on July 19th the two Ambassadors were shown a draft of the Fermañ, which altered the rule governing the succession to the hereditary nashâlik by substituting Seniority for Primogeniture, and announced that "the Khedive would have the right of contracting such conventions as would not affect the political treaties of the Imperial Government provided they were communicated to the Porte before being promulgated." This, however, was rejected by the two Ambassadors, who insisted on the omission of these two reservations. Caratheodory agreed, only to be dismissed and in due course the negotiations were resumed, the Porte bearing in mind both the inclinations of the Sultan and the demands of the two Ambassadors. After a tedious consideration of projects and counter-projects, the two Ambassadors consented to the wording of the new Fermañ, in which there was left no single word that could bear a double meaning. On August 7th it was sent to Egypt and was also communicated to the representatives of Germany, Austria, Russia and

(1) Turquie, Vol.428; Fournier to Waddington, dated July 20th
The new Ferman (2) began by asserting the sovereignty of the Porte; declaring that all taxes should be collected in the name of the Sultan. The Tribute was fixed at the sum of 750,000 Turkish pounds struck in Egypt. The Egyptian army was not to exceed 18,000 men, whose ranks and insignia must comply with Ottoman usage; and the Khedive was not to build armoured men-of-war. Nor was he to contract new loans except in order to ameliorate the financial situation and then only with the consent of the creditors or their official representatives. The Khedive was not, on any pretext whatsoever, to "cede to others, totally or partially, the privileges conceded to Egypt." He was given the right to contract and renew arrangements with foreign Powers in matters of customs and commerce, and to come to arrangements with foreigners in matters related to internal affairs. (3) As a matter of courtesy the texts of all these agreements and arrangements were to be sent to the Porte before being promulgated. This latter stipulation did not imply in any way an obligation on the part of the Khedive to obtain the authority or sanction of the Sultan before the promulgation.

(1) F.O. 141/124; No. 693 Layard to F.O., dated Aug. 12th, 1879
(2) Al-Waka'i of August 16th, 1879.
(3) Waddington did his best to avoid giving the Porte any pretext for interfering in the affairs of Egypt over these arrangements. He was satisfied only when the Porte addressed a Note to the British and French Ambassadors embodying these proposals.
of conventions concluded by him, except in the case provided for by the Fermān itself, of their involving a violation of the political obligations and sovereign rights of the Porte. (1)

Waddington was satisfied with this result. "One can say", he commented, "that the difficulties raised in Istanbul over Egypt have been turned to her profit and to the affirmation of her autonomy. Her privileges have now been placed under the guarantee of England and France, as well as of the other Powers which have been called on to take part."

The Fermān was publicly read in the Citadel at Cairo on August 14th according to traditional usage. This also required that the Khedive should go to Istanbul in person in order to obtain the special and personal recognition of the Sultan by receiving his investiture. The two Powers, however, objected to the Khedive's visit to the Ottoman capital, since they presumed that it would cost Egypt a lot of money in the shape of presents to the Sultan and his entourage. Tawfīk's presence in Egypt was moreover of some importance, since there were various questions pending that required immediate solution. Although the Grand-Vizier insisted that Tawfīk would not have to pay even one nara in the form of a present, the two Powers insisted at the Porte that the

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Khedive's visit was inopportune; and it was consequently adjourned to a more tranquil moment. Tawfik himself wished to visit the Ottoman capital, and expressed his fears lest his declining to do so might create a bad impression there. He was not satisfied until it was clearly understood at the Porte that the postponement of his journey was made in deference to the will of the two Powers; but although he thought later more than once of journeying to Istanbul, he proved to be the only Egyptian Viceroy never to meet his Suzerain. (1) This, as well as the incident of the Ferman, showed clearly how far he was subject to the will of the two Powers.

Reconstitution of the Control:

According to the Decrees of November 18th, 1876 and of August 29th, 1878, the European Control of the Egyptian Finances was to be suspended so long as the two Ministers continued in office, on the understanding that it should be inso facto revived should either of those Ministers be dismissed without previous agreement with the Government of his own country. (2) Just after his accession Tawfik thought of reconstituting this regime, not for the preservation of

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(1) F.0.141/126; No.220, dated F.0. Aug.13th, 1879; F.0.141/126 Draft No.454 Pol. & Nos.640 & 482; & F.0.141/132, No.327.
the influence and rights of foreigners, but in order to render his Ministry purely Egyptian, since it was plain that he had to choose between the two Ministers and the Control. He accordingly intimated his intention to the Consuls-General, but made it quite clear that he expected to be consulted on the nomination of the Controllers, and indicated his fears lest, if the two former Ministers were chosen, they might be blinded by old grudges. (1) A letter to that effect was addressed by Sharif to the two Consuls, expressing the hope that, if Controllers were nominated in accordance with the Decree of November 18th, 1876, their functions would be limited to investigation and verification, and that they would not be invested with any administrative or executive powers. Tawfik likewise voiced both his objection to the nomination of any Controllers without previously defining their powers and functions, and his desire that the re-establishment of the Control should not imply any interference with the Egyptian administration. (2) He was actually opposed to the appointment of Controllers altogether, contending that the Control had been first established as a check upon his father, but that now there was no reason for it, because there was nothing to control, for he had nothing to hide: no large harem or other expensive oriental luxuries to keep

(2) F.O. 141/126; Draft No. 491, Lascelles to F.O., dated Aug. 1879.
up at the expense of the public welfare; that the Powers, in contributing so largely towards the bestowal of the government of Egypt upon him, must have done this because of their confidence in him; and that therefore they should now show that confidence by leaving him free to act according to his own judgment and ability. (1)

We have seen that after the deposition of Ismā'īl, it was apparently Tricou's idea that a Franco-British protectorate over Egypt should be established. The British Government tried to persuade France to leave Egypt alone; but Waddington would not agree. "You must think", he wrote, "that I am very short-sighted, if you imagine that I am going to surrender the vantage-ground we have gained in Egypt. The great achievement of my diplomacy has been the acquiring for France in Egypt of the influence on the administration of the country to which she is justly entitled, and this influence I am not going to throw away, because it does not suit England to follow our common policy". (2) Waddington accordingly took the lead in bringing about the reconstitution of the Control and throughout these proceedings succeeded almost invariably in maintaining the initiative. His object was to preclude a mere return to the former system, under which the French Controller was no more than a distributor.


(2) John Marlowe, op. cit., 105.
of the revenues, while the English had both the upper hand in arranging Egypt's financial policy and a direct control over the Egyptian administration. Waddington expressed his desire from the beginning that the two Controllers should have precisely similar titles and the same functions, and that the distinction, even though it had become entirely nominal, between the English Controller of Receipts and the French Controller of Expenditure, should be formally abolished. Regardless of the Khedive's wish to prevent the return of the old Controllers and so to destroy the conviction of the Egyptians that he was weak with foreigners, Blignières was sent to London to confer with the British authorities. Blignières was opposed to Vivian and spoke of his final recall, contending that it would be impossible for him to work harmoniously with Wilson, and, what was more important, that a "very English" type such as Vivian must inevitably lead to the undue growth of British influence over the Egyptian administration. Owing to the French Government's desire that he should be primus inter pares, he would prefer, he said, to have as his future colleague Major Evelyn Baring, who was "more agreeable". So gravely

(1) F.0.141/124; No.819 Secret, Lyons to Salisbury dated August 1st, 1879.
(2) F.0.141/126; Lascelles' Draft No.491; & Egypte, Vol.64; Despt. marked Confid. & No.12 Dir. Pol. Tricou to Waddington, dated Aug. 8th & 12th, 1879.
did he under-estimate that notable administrator, who was to prove one of the most capable of all the nineteenth century British proconsuls.

Austria and Italy regarded the reconstitution of the Control as an opportunity for the direction of a decisive blow to Anglo-French supremacy in Egypt. Von Kremer, the Austrian Commissioner of the Caisse, who was at Vienna on leave, persuaded the Austrian Government to propose either that a third Controller representative of Powers other than Western should be appointed, or that the Commission it was proposed to appoint should be empowered to liquidate the Egyptian debt. A selection of one or other of these alternatives was apparently looked upon by the Austrian Government as a question upon which their consent to the adoption of any liquidation scheme must depend.\(^{(1)}\)

Count Cairoli, the Italian Premier and Foreign Minister, remarked that the Commission of Liquidation, on which the Powers were to be represented, was concerned only with the past, and unless his Government was associated in the Control, they could have no security or guarantee for the future interests of their countrymen. He argued that the powers accorded to the English and French Commissioners were so

\(^{(1)}\) *Egypte*, Vol. 64; Copy - Salisbury to Lyons, dated F.O. Nov. 18th, 1879 & *Autriche*, Vol. 526; Exposé delivered by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires to Waddington, dated Aug. 22nd, 1879.
extensive that their action would be decisive in all matters connected with the Egyptian administration to the possible detriment of all other foreigners, and concluded by saying that it appeared to him "not a question of amour propre but rather of decorum". (1) At the same time General Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador in London, expressed the same point of view to Lord Salisbury, stating that the Italian Government proposed acting with Germany and Austria to obtain a share in the Control. (2) Similar overtures took place in Paris; but Waddington told the Austrian Ambassador positively and distinctly that France would not agree to the exercise by the Commission of Liquidation of any authority over the Controllers; (3) and in the project proposed by him (4) the Controllers were to be endowed with extensive powers of investigation into all public works. Salisbury for his part continued to consider it as of great importance on diplomatic grounds that England and France should maintain their right to appoint the Controllers in Egypt to the exclusion of other Powers. He thought that if the two

(1) F.O.170/280; No.594, F.O. to Paget, dated Dec. 22nd, 1879.

(2) F.O.141/124; reprod. of No.534 F.O. to Paget, dated Nov. 8th, 1879 & F.O. 170/272, Draft No.467, Paget to F.O. dated Dec. 9th, 1879.

(3) F.O. 141/124; reprod. of No.1174 Confid. Lyons to F.O. dated Nov. 26th, 1879.

(4) F.O.146/2185; a Confid. Despt. from Waddington to Lyons, dated July 15th, 1879.
Powers contented themselves with substantially what had been granted in 1876 without objection by any of the other Powers, and that if the Decree which it was now proposed to issue merely accorded the existing Controllers each an additional title and certain additional powers of inspection, there could be no danger of any questions being raised regarding their rights; whereas if France and England demanded something new, to which the consent of the Powers had not been implicitly given, they ran the risk of awakening the latters' jealousy. He therefore pressed Waddington not to abolish anything in the old Control, but simply to add to it whatever he wished, though he admitted that it would probably be prudent to allow some of the functions assigned to the old Controllers to fall into abeyance, with obtaining a formal Decree to this effect from the Khedive. He hence suggested the revival of the Control according to the Decrees of November 18th, 1876 and August 29th, 1878, on condition that the Khedive should be induced "at the request of England and France", to entitle the Controllers in addition "Inspectors-General", and give them certain extra powers of inspection. The two Governments might, he thought, at the same time let the Khedive know unofficially that they would instruct the Controllers to abstain "for the present" from any administra-
tive interference. (1)

These suggestions were agreed to by the French Government; and Tawfik was duly informed that the choice of the two Governments had fallen on Blignières and Baring, and that the two Controllers would abstain "pending new instructions" from interference in the Egyptian administration. (2) It was courteous of the British Government not to insist upon the appointment of Wilson. It abstained from insisting in order to please both the Khedive and the French. (3) On the other hand Tawfik told the French Chargé d'Affaires that he "had learnt with surprise and regret that the French Government had not thought fit to take any notice of his objection of the return of Blignières". (4) The French colony both in Cairo and in Alexandria also objected to Blignières and were even circulating a petition against his return, which was to be sent to the President of the Republic. They were prevented from doing so, however, by the French Agent.

(2) Ibid; Monge to Waddington, Desps. dated Aug. 8th (marked Confid.), 28th and 31st, 1879.
(5) Egypte, Vol. 64; Monge to Waddington, dated Aug. 4th, 1879.
It was thus clear from the beginning that Waddington had made a mistake—and one that was later to prove fatal to French influence in Egypt. Yet in insisting upon Blignièrè's appointment, he described him as "a faithful representative and a vigilant defender of French national interests, which were frequently...bound up...with the interests of Egypt herself", and "of an intelligence and patriotism sufficient to overcome the prevalent feeling in France that French interests in Egypt were not so well defended in the counsels of the Khedive, as to check the preponderating influence of the British". (1)

The Khedive reluctantly approved the choice. With the Decree appointing the two Controllers (issued on Sept. 4th), Mustafà Fahmi Pasha, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, issued a Note declaring that the Khedive, while accepting Blignièrè, was obliged to reiterate his protests. The conditions imposed upon him for the acceptance of the French Controller constituted a violation of the Decree of 1876, which gave the Khedive an absolute right in choosing and nominating the Controllers. (2)

Having been appointed, Baring and Blignièrè agreed that the system of direct government by Europeans was unsuitable in the then state of Egypt, and that it would be preferable

(2) Egypte, Vol. 64; Monge to Waddington, dated Sept. 4th, 1879.
for them to be accorded only general powers of supervision and inspection, in the expectation that their exercise of personal influence would be sufficient. (1) Yet since Austria was taking the lead in challenging the Anglo-French condominium, which, unlike the Caisse de la Dette Publique and the Mixed Tribunals, had never received the official recognition of the other Powers signatory to the international status of Egypt, it was extremely important, from this point of view, to ensure the whole-hearted adhesion of Austria to the ideas of the Western Governments, and to act in concert with her. Hence on their way to Egypt the two Controllers visited Vienna, where they found the Austrian Government still inclined to press for its original proposals. Austria thus formed with Italy and Germany a united front in favour of the suggestions of Von Kremer, the object of which was to bring Egyptian affairs under international supervision by linking the Control with the proposed liquidation. (2) Baring and Blignières failed to make the Austrian Government abandon its opposition altogether, but they succeeded in persuading it to drop its recommendation that a third Controller should be appointed. Moreover, they succeeded in soothing Austrian amour propre by promising to take the Austrian view

(1) Cromer, op. cit., I, 160.

(2) Allemagne, Vol. 30; No. 197; Autriche, Vol. 526; No. 96, and Desps. dated Oct. 23rd and 26th and Nov. 9th, 1879.
into consideration while discussing the question of the general Liquidation. (1)

Meanwhile, negotiations with the Egyptian Government for the Decree defining the functions of the Controllers were carried on by the two Western Governments. The latter agreed that the most ample powers of investigation were to be conferred on the two Controllers, but that they were not to be charged with any administrative duties. They were to have seats in the Council of Ministers with a sort of **voix consultative;** they might give their opinions, but could have no right to vote. It was stipulated in the final draft sent to the Khedive that the two Controllers might not be dismissed without the consent of their respective Governments. This meant the complete submission of Egypt to the Control, which was thus given a new and vital enlargement.

Riyād and Muṣṭafā Fahmī asked for certain modifications which, though not affecting the powers of the Controllers, were calculated to save appearances and to prevent hostile criticism. (2) Lascelles recommended the adoption of these suggestions to avoid antagonizing the Ministers and so preventing the establishment of a cordial relationship between them and the Controllers, without which it would have been

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(1) **Autriche**, Vol. 526; Nos. 11, 28, 29 and 112.

(2) F. O. 141/126, Draft No. 572, Lascelles to F. O. dated Oct. 31st, 1879.
almost hopeless to expect any satisfactory results. (1) To obviate any disagreement over the respective functions of the Controllers, these were left undefined, and in order to establish a satisfactory modus vivendi from the start, it was decided to accept the amendments asked for by the Egyptian Government. The Decree was duly published on November 15th, 1879. (2)

There thus began a period in which the Controllers were the real rulers of Egypt. Being the official representatives of England and France, they imposed their every wish on the Khedive, who was obliged to give them his confidence. The Egyptian Ministers were forced to give way; and it even proved difficult for them to make it clear, in the reports which they had the right to publish, that they were not responsible for measures insisted on by the Controllers.

The Egyptian press attacked the Decree very strongly, and Riyâd found himself obliged to suppress the Misr al-Fatâh, the Misr and al-Tijâra. (3) He himself admitted that the Control was repugnant to the Egyptians, since it was a sign of subjection and a want of confidence in the Khedive and his Government. (4) His aim in taking office under the

(1) Ibid. No. 573 of the same date (Oct. 31st, 1879) from Lascelles.
(2) E.B.B. Egypt, No. 2, 1879, 23.
(3) Ibrahîm 'Abduh, on cit., 107-108.
Control, as he assured Wilfrid Blunt, was simply to rescue Egypt from its financial misfortunes and redeem the Debt, thus getting rid as quickly as possible of foreign intervention. By accepting the conditions imposed by the two Governments, he hoped to secure benefits great enough to counterbalance their sentimental unpalatableness. He had hoped that the Control would act as a defence against the encroachments of all the other Powers and that in future he would have to deal only with England and France, with whom at every step he would be in constant and intimate communication through the Controllers and the Consuls.

"If the Controllers and Agents do not work in harmony", said Riyād, "the Egyptian Government loses a great part of the benefit which the Control is designed to give". He therefore asked Blignières to obtain from the two Governments a declaration that would define the responsibility of everyone concerned. Lord Lyons, however, while attaching the greatest importance to the complete and bona fide execution of the undertaking between England and France respecting Egypt, did not think it proper to make such a declaration, since "circumstances may not always continue as they are now, and contingencies might arise in which the present arrangements...

(1) Blunt, Secret History, 128.
(2) F.O.141/134; No.354 supra.
might not secure to England, in a sufficient degree, the special influence in Egypt which it might be essential that she would exercise. He therefore recommended to the Foreign Office not to enter in any form into a fresh engagement such as might pledge England more distinctly than was the case to the maintenance of the actual system or give a more permanent character to it. Consequently, nothing was added to the Decree of November 1879, which remained in force till immediately after the British occupation, when it was suspended to the detriment of France.

The Liquidation:

The action of the Western Powers in deposing Isma'Il was prompted by their desire for a general liquidation of Egypt's liabilities. As most of the creditors for the Funded and Floating Debts were English and French, Waddington suggested that the two Governments should take the whole affair in hand.

But Salisbury, while entirely rejecting Von Kremer's suggestions, which would tend to internationalize Egyptian affairs in general, also demurred to a dual liquidation. This can be explained by the attack on his policy in Parliament by the Opposition, who reproached him for being too much attached to France, and for having disregarded the true

(1) F.O. 141/141; No.274 Secret, Lyons to F.O., dated Jan. 25th, 1881
(2) Angleterre, Vol. 781; No.109, dated Aug. 9th, 1879.
political interests of England. (1) It was therefore agreed between the two Governments to give the liquidation an international character, without extending this to the sphere of the Controllers who, while maintaining friendly intercourse with the Commissioners of Liquidation, would conserve their independence. In the second place, it was agreed that the Commission should not be constituted as a permanent body, as had been proposed by Austria and Italy by way of compensation for the non-appointment of a third Controller.

Salisbury argued that the sole end of a commission of liquidation was to liquidate; that when that task had been performed, its mandate would be exhausted; and that if it were authorized to do anything besides liquidating, it would become a commission of a different kind, exercising new functions and operating on new subject matter. He also considered that a Commission representing five or six foreign and Christian Powers would be a body ill-qualified to govern Egypt, lacking as it would both any wide knowledge of the country and sympathy with the people. (2)

(1) Ibid. No. 8 Confid., Pothuau to Waddington, dated Aug. 14th & Vol. 782; No. 29 Confid. dated Oct. 6th, 1879 from the same. In Admiral Pothuau's opinion this criticism showed that the policy adopted by the French had been successful. He urged Waddington to pursue it with all vigour.
(2) F.O. 141/124; No. 1174 Confid. Lyons to F.O., dated Nov. 26th 1879 and No. 1434; Salisbury to Lyons, dated Nov. 29th & Egypte Vol. 64; Copy - Salisbury to Lyons, dated Nov. 18th, 1879.
The Khedive and his Government for their part were eager to institute the liquidation in order to regulate the debts, outlining a whole financial plan whereby the interest should be reduced to a rate which the revenues of the country could meet without the constant recurrence of a deficit; consolidating the public Debt; and proposing arrangements for the payment of interest; fixing the sum to be consecrated to it; and defining the relation between the creditors and the Government. The Egyptian Government thus admitted the continuity of the investigation begun by the Commission of Inquiry and the fulfilment of the ends contemplated in its initial formation, which had been postponed by Ismail's decisions of April, 1879. On the other hand, they wished to see the financial liquidation completed without recourse to an international commission; since they foresaw that it would be difficult in practice to delimit the powers of the Commissioners appointed by the five great Powers interested, and that even if especial care were taken to define them, they might well paralyse the Egyptian administration.

The two Controllers endorsed this point of view. At first they were averse from joining the Commission. But Salisbury remarked that the Commission was to be charged with the duty of determining absolutely for an unlimited time the

maximum sum out of the taxation of Egypt which the Egyptian Government was to be at liberty to appropriate to the public services of the country. This being the case, he feared lest an incorrect decision should be come to, and an injustice done to Egypt, unless a voice in the Commission, or a veto upon this one point, were given to the Controllers, who were thoroughly acquainted with the affairs of the Egyptian Government. He also proposed that the draft of the Khedivial Decree should include the words: "in any case the Commission shall be dissolved at the expiration of the delay therein specified". (1)

After agreement between the Western Governments on the draft Decree, it was submitted both to the Khedive and to the other Great Powers. Austria and Italy, however, were so slow in signifying their concurrence, that Riyād complained of the consequent delay to any improvement in the Egyptian finances, and the Controllers even threatened to resign for the same reason. (2)

Meanwhile Russia expressed her desire to take part in the liquidation. As Russia had no financial interests in Egypt, her motive was clearly political. Giers admitted that,

(1) Angleterre, Vol. 783; Note from Lyons to Freycinet, dated Feb. 7th, 1880.

(2) Egypte, Vol. 65; Ring to Freycinet, dated Feb. 4th, 1880.
while the material interests of Russia to be dealt with by
the Commissioners were unimportant, yet the action of the
Commission was likely to affect the procedure of the local
Tribunals, and that that would touch Russia closely. Moreover,
as Russia had assisted in establishing the existing constitu­
tion of Egypt, Criers resented her relegation to the insigni­
ficant position it was now sought to assign to her. (1) The two
Powers, however, refused this Russian overture, since she
"had declared before that she had no special interests in
Egypt". (2) Nevertheless, the law of the Mixed Tribunals
provided for the consent of the signatory Powers to every
financial law, and it was thus known from the beginning that
Russia would not consent beforehand to the regulations of
the Commission, and that she would reserve her opinion till
she was informed of them. (3)

In the end, the agreement of Italy, Austria and Germany
was conveyed to their representatives in Egypt towards the
end of March, and on the 31st of that month a Khedivial Decree
was issued, providing for the formation of the Commission of

(1) Angleterre, Vol. 781; No. 62, Montebello to Waddington dated
July 21st 1879 & Russie, Vol. 260, Copy, Giers to Kapnist
dated March 6th, 1880.
(2) F.O. 141/123; No. 260 dated March 27th, 1880 & F.O. 141/132
Incl. dated March 27th, 1880.
(3) F.O. 141/132; No. 165 Dufferin to F.O. dated April 2nd, 1880
& Egypte Vol. 56, Freycinet to Ring, dated April 11th, 1880
& Angleterre, Vol. 784; No. 104 Freycinet to Pothuau dated
April 15th, 1880.
Liquidation. The Commission was to be composed of two British and two French representatives and one representative of Germany, one of Austria, one of Italy and one of Egypt. (1) It was to investigate into the Egyptian finances, taking note of the observations of all interested parties; to enact a law defining the relations between the Egyptian Government and the Khedivial Dā'ira on the one hand, and the creditors on the other; and to define the way in which the Floating Debt was to be liquidated. The Decree also indicated which revenues were to be devoted in the budget to both the Funded and the Floating Debts, and the sum necessary for the needs and demands of the Egyptian Government. The Commission was given the right, in agreement with the Controllers, to supervise the realization of whatever decisions it took, and it was to be dissolved at a date not later than three months after the issue of the Law of Liquidation. The Khedive, on his side, agreed beforehand to promulgate the Law, which meant that the Egyptian Government consented to enact legislation imposed by the Powers, without being able, by adequate representation, to defend her interests. Although the

(1) Al-Waka'ī of April 4th, 1880.

The members were: for England, Wilson (the President) and Baring; for France, Lairyon d'Airolles & Baillague De Boghas; for Austria, Von Kremer; for Italy, Baravelli; for Germany, De Treskow; and for Egypt, Butrus Ghālī. In June, Sir Auckland Colvin replaced Baring, who was transferred to India, as Controller-General and member of the Commission. Baron de Vatsera also replaced Von Kremer, who was transferred to the Austrian Foreign Ministry.
Egyptian Government had declared their "willingness to accept anything that the Powers may agree upon", the two Western Governments agreed in the draft Decree to an amendment proposed by Riyād, which provided for the limitation of the sum assigned for the public expenditure in agreement between the Egyptian Cabinet and the two Controllers. (1)

The new Commission was the old Commission of Inquiry "writ large"; i.e. with extended powers and with the addition of a German representative. The draft of the Decree appointing it was drawn up by Baring and Blignieres after conversations with Salisbury, Waddington, Wilson and Vivian; namely the very persons who had taken the lead in the establishment and direction of both the Inquiry and the Control. Even the members of the Commission were nearly identical with those of the Inquiry and the Control, subject though they had been to the hostile criticism of the Egyptians at the end of Ismā'īl's reign. Tawfīk had objected in vain to the "unfortunate" appointment of Wilson, since "the feeling in the country would be strong against" him because of the "bad impression" he had left in Egypt, and since, at that juncture, it was "necessary to calm instead of exciting public opinion". (2)

(1) Angleterre; Vol.783; Freycinet to Lyons & Lyons to Freycinet dated Mar. 5th & 15th, 1880 & Lascelles' Tel, Nos. 146, 147, 148, 159 and 160 dated Oct. 21st, 22nd, 23rd & Nov. 10th, 1879.

(2) F.O. 78/3006; Teleg. No. 101, Lascelles to F.O. dated Aug. 8th, 1879 & F.O. 78/3003; Desp. No. 443 Pol.
Wilson himself on his arrival at the railway station in Cairo behaved with exaggerated hauteur, greeting the officials who received him with marked coldness. He then drove into the city, accompanied by Nūbār, who had recently returned to the country. Nobody failed to note this triumphal entry, and to connect it with the idea of revenge.

On March 31st the Consuls of the countries represented in the Commission signed a collective declaration stating that their Governments would agree to the Law prepared by the Commission, and would communicate it for their consent to the other States concerned in the Judicial Reform. On April 28th, the Quai d'Orsay (1) accordingly addressed a circular Note to the French representatives in the latter States explaining the course pursued by the two Governments on the ground of the importance of their interests in Egypt and the possession by their nationals of the most of the Egyptian Debt, which entitled them to preference in the formation of the Commission of Liquidation. He expressed his hope that the Governments addressed would follow the example of the five Great Powers and give their consent.

(1) On December 28th, 1879, Waddington was replaced as French Premier and Foreign Minister by Charles De Freycinet.
Spain gave her consent on May 15th, and Belgium on the 24th; and soon after Denmark, Holland, Portugal, Sweden and Norway followed suit. Greece, however, owing to the larger size of her colony in Egypt, raised some difficulties and showed herself anxious to occupy a seat on the Commission. Freycinet warned the Greek Government that its objection might injure its nationals in Egypt; and under pressure from both England and France Greece gave her consent to the declaration on June 27th, but reserved to herself the right to take part in all discussions that might lead to the modification of Egypt's international engagements.

The Commission meanwhile embarked on the task it had been assigned in the face of national opposition. As was to be expected from representatives of the creditors, it tended to secure all it could of the Egyptian revenues. In the words of the British Consul-General, Edward Malet, it was a case of "pull devil pull baker". "I have had my time more than taken up of late", wrote Malet on May 26th, 1880, "by the difficulty of bringing the Khedive's Government and the Commission into consequence of conflicting views. You may imagine that this has given annoyance and
trouble; he Riyād is furious. In addition, numerous intrigues are afoot to upset the Government; including threats against Europeans, which became so impertinent that De Ring [The new French Consul-General] and I were obliged to go to the Khedive together to represent the matter. In short, I shall be truly glad when the Commission is dissolved".

Rumours were circulating in fact that the Commission intended to revoke the mukābala; and the consequent public agitation was naturally exploited by the personal adversaries of Riyād such as Nūbār, and Sharīf, who was now considered as the chief of the "Old Turk" party. Students from al-Azhar demonstrated at the Commission’s meeting place and were only dispersed by the native police. Petitions were sent to Wilson asking for the non-revocation of the mukābala, on which Riyād arrested the signatories and banished their leaders to the White Nile. (2) Nūbār had collected signatures for the petition, profiting by the importance ascribed to him because of his relations with Wilson. His intention was to widen the gulf between

(1) Malet, Egypt. (1879-1883), 64.
(2) The Times of Dec. 8th, 1879.
the Commission of Liquidation and the Control. (1)
When an additional tax of £E 150,000 was raised on the Oshri Lands, two newspapers protested and were immediately suppressed. In the meantime the large salaries given to Europeans were again attacked, while the Italians, the Greeks, and the Syrians, who were anxious about their private and highly usurious debts, worked together to add fuel to the flames. Nor was the French colony any less excited. It had its own reasons for joining the opposition; namely the suppression of the French newspaper La Réforme, which had criticized Riyād's absolutism, and the resentment widely felt against Blignières, who was accused of Anglomania and of betraying the interests of the French colony by giving way to Wilson in the past. (2)

In the midst of these agitations, the draft Law of Liquidation was submitted to the Khedive, who passed it without amendment; and on July 19th it was published

(1) Erypte, Vol. 66; No. 82, Ring to Freycinet, dated May 24th, 1880.
(2) Ibid, No. 82 supra & No. 86 dated May 31st, 1880.
in the Wakā'. Thenceforward it constituted Egypt's Financial Code or Budgetary Charter. It is distinguished chiefly by being wholly the produce of foreign pressure. Thus for a second time in forty years Egypt had to submit to the collective will of Europe. As this had shaped her international status in 1840, so now it gave form to her financial life. (1)

The Law (2) unified all the debts, while decreasing the interest payable on them, which now ranged from 4 to 5 per cent. It practically provided for two budgets; one for the Government, and another for the Caisse. The fact that the sum assigned to the Administration (the Tribute excluded) only represented about 42% of the revenue is remarkable. It meant that the country was called upon to forego over 57% of her revenue, for sixty-one years, on account of the Tribute and the Debt Charge, which were both non-remunerative expenditure. It is also to be noted that whereas the whole Debt amounted

(1) Abulleef, op. cit., 138, & 142.
(2) Cf. Ibid, 143 ff.
to £95,005,063, out of which £78,565,210 were due to Europeans and the rest to Egyptians, the former group was secured as to its capital, while the latter was given about a 9% interest for fifty years, its capital being lost. Thus the two loans provided by Egyptians, the Rūznāma (which amounted to £9,000,000) and the Mukābala (which amounted to about £15m) were repudiated, the landowners being compensated by a promised deduction from the taxes payable by them of £150,000 a year for fifty years.

Moreover, the principle applied to the two Budgets was not the same. If the Budget of the Caisse showed any deficit, the Government was bound to make it good, whereas if the Caisse had a surplus, however large, the Government had no right to share it. On the other hand, if the Government had a deficit, the Caisse could not be called upon to make up the deficiency, while, if the Government had a surplus, the Caisse had certain contingent claim on it. Hence, the Caisse might claim assistance from the Government even when the latter had no surplus from which to furnish it.

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(1) The Rūznāma forced loan was raised in the provinces in 1874. Subscriptions had been invited for a loan of £5m., with interest at 9%, of which about £1,800,000 was actually paid into the Treasury. No bonds were ever delivered to the subscribers, and, up to the formation of the Commission of Inquiry, one instalment of interest only had been paid to a few favoured individuals. Cf., Modern Egypt, I, 53.

(2) Incl. in Malet's Desp. to Granville, dated Dec. 28th, 1880.
It is clear that there was no impartiality in the Commission's financial recommendations. The settlement was merely an expression of the foreign supremacy over the Administration. The Egyptian revenues could not henceforth be freely used. It was made virtually impossible for the Government to meet the requirements of the country or introduce any improvement into its vital institutions without first obtaining the consent of the Powers, who had already assented to the Law of Liquidation and authorized the Mixed Tribunals to consider it as binding on their respective nationals. This settlement, therefore, which was in every way the work of foreigners, was gravely deleterious to Egypt's well-being and imposed new and crushing restrictions on the authority of the Egyptian Government in the economic sphere. No Egyptian imbued with public spirit could fail to understand the real significance of this foreign interference. To the Egyptians it was clear that this interference, far from being designed to propagate European culture and civilisation in Egypt, had but an object: to gain easy profits at no matter what cost to those who produced them, and exploit a weak nation incapable unaided of resisting the pressure of the Great Powers. The Khedive and his Government, by giving way, were
seen to have betrayed the real interests of the country; and so the way was opened for an acute three-cornered struggle between the rising spirit of nationalism, the declining Khedivial authority, and the foreigners with their preponderating influence.
Chapter VI

Revolution

"لقد خلقنا الله آدمًا ولم يخلق عظامًا، وعظامًا خرائطًا الذي لداؤه إلادو
أنت أنت يزور وان تستثيد بعد اليوم"

Orābī to Tawfīk, on the 9th of September, 1881.

Orābī's Memoirs, I, 79.

"Ne raiiez pas ces choses-là. Tous les peuples ont eu leur aurore de liberté."

M. Gaillard in answer to Gambetta.


Opposition to Rivād Pasha:

Riyād was an honest, hardworking, straightforward politician. He was an excellent administrator; the best of his generation in Egypt. But he was over-tenacious of his own methods and too sanguine. Politically he was a conservative, his stock of ideas being limited in amount and mediaeval in character. However, he was not without a certain feeling for the common people, though

(1) "God created us free men, not goods and chattels. By God, other than whom no god exists, from this time forth we shall neither be inherited as property nor enslaved".


183 Mim ḫ, dh. xii., 183-x
it was "such as a feudal baron of the better sort might have had for the serfs on his estate". (1) Though a Moslem of Egyptian, and not, as sometimes said, of Jewish descent by origin, (2) he was a typical Pasha à la turque; deeply conscious of his merits and acquired prestige, self-confident, vain and autocratic.

During his term of office, which lasted roughly for two years, from September 21st, 1879 to September 9th, 1881, he worked in co-operation with, and under the advice of, the two Controllers, who were always behind the scenes. Riyād deceived both himself and others by attributing to himself the glory of everything that was done, even though this brought him personally face to face with native opposition to the Control. He achieved some reforms, abolishing the corvéé, the kurbāj and some thirty obnoxious taxes raised during Ismāʿīl's reign. The budget was drawn up in proper order according to the Law of Liquidation and the financial condition of the country seemed to be improving.

However, the harshness displayed by the provincial governors under his regime more than counterbalanced any good he himself achieved. He invested them with arbitrary powers, which they abused; sending people to prison and exiling them to the Upper Sūdān without trial. (3) This

(1) Milner, op. cit., 126-7.
(2) Al-Rafiʿī, loc. cit.
(3) Abulleef, 168.
eventually turned the people against Riyāḍ, who had in any
case been unpopular since the days of the European Ministry,
a fact of which Tawfīk was well aware; and he himself
knew he had all the upper classes against him for his
antagonism to the Chamber, his "submission" to the
West, and "his" suppression of the mukābala. The group
of injured land-owners, some of whom had already been com-
pelled to part with their lands, in consequence of the debts
they had contracted to pay the mukābala, was joined by
that of the discontented Pashas, headed by, though not in
alliance with, Sharīf and Nūbār. The aim of each was
either to supplant or simply to overthrow Riyāḍ, and there
were attempts on the part of the Turks and Circassians
supporting Sharīf to win Nūbār to their side. Whereas
Sharīf was in constant contact with the exiled Ismā'īl and
in vigorous alliance with the "Old Turks", Nūbār was
backed by no party at all. Nūbār, on the other hand,
while supporting the claims of the mukābalists in an
endeavour to win public opinion to his side, and thus
render his return to power more possible, was in close

(1) F.O. 78/3006; Vivian's Teleg. No. 20 to Salisbury dated
March 20th, 1879.
(2) Malet's Teleg. (marked "Private & Confid.") to Salisbury
dated December 11th, 1879.
(3) Abulleef, 161.
(4) Egypte, Vol. 64, Despt. marked Confidentiel & personelle,
Blightières to Waddington, dated Dec. 8th, 1879.
(5) Bemmelen L'Egyp te et l'Europe, II, 237.
touch with Wilson during the latter's presidency of the Commission of Liquidation. Indeed, so warm was the Englishman's personal friendship with Nūbār that it might even have provoked a ministerial crisis, since, in contrast, Wilson was unbending to Riyāḍ, who was duly resentful, and so careless of "the great blow which such a crisis would be to British policy" that he was cautioned by the Foreign Office to steer clearer of Nūbār. (1)

A month before Riyāḍ took office Jamāl al-Dīn had been banished from Egypt. Since his arrival at Cairo in 1871, Jamāl had been paid, and sometimes encouraged, by consecutive Egyptian governments. He had maintained close relations with both Tawfīk and Riyāḍ himself (the latter being a zealous Pan-Islamist). Tawfīk on his accession could count Jamāl and his disciple 'Abduh among his strongest partisans. But they on their side expected much of him and immediately reminded him of his former promises to give the Chamber a really representative character. (2) As we have seen, however, events had caused Tawfīk to revert to absolutism; and on Lascelles's advice, (3)

(1) Gran. Pap. (Private, 159); Letter from Malet to Granville, dated May 19th, 1880 and another one signed "T" (presumably Lord Tenterden) sent to Malet on June 2nd, 1880.
(2) Abulleef, 165.
Jamāl was suddenly arrested at midnight on August 24th, 1879, and forthwith sent out of the country, while, at the same time, 'Abduh was dismissed from the government service and sent back to his village with orders to abstain from any public activity.

There then followed the campaign against the press (1) which characterized Riyāḍ's regime. The native press was still attacking the condominium, and although it had been sympathetic with Tawfīk on his accession, it soon began to criticize his and Riyāḍ's submission to foreign interference. On Adīb Ishāk's launching a fierce campaign against the Controllers in his newspapers Misr and al-Tijāra, they were suppressed. So were Misr al-Fatāh and the French newspaper La Réforme, which sympathised with the national cause. The importation of periodicals published abroad such as al-Nahla, Abū Naddāra, Abū Suffāra, al-Ġāhira and al-Shark was banned. All this paved the way for the subversive activity of the "liberal" movement.

At the end of 1879, an Egyptian "National Party" signalized its public appearance by issuing on November 4th, twenty thousand copies of a manifesto which contained a well-defined programme for the rescue of Egypt from its troubles. (2) About the origin of this party and its

(1) For details see al-Thawra al-‘Arabiya and Ibrāhīm ‘Abduh, op-cit.
relations with the "fellāh" officers, the Palace and Prince Halīm, nothing definite is known. (1) It had certainly been formed by the end of the reign of Ismā‘īl, when Pashas such as Sharīf, Rāghib, and Shāhīn, who were in close touch with Ismā‘īl, had participated in its activities: from which it may be presumed that it was subject to "Palace" direction of some sort. Under Tawfīk, apart from the discontented native officers and their ambitious ally, Mahmūd Sāmī al-Bārūdī, there took part in the movement a group of injured landowners such as Suleimān Abāzā and Muhammad Sulṭān, and Pashas known to be still loyal to Ismā‘īl, such as ‘Omar Lūṭfī, as well as Sharīf and Shāhīn.

Similar aims were pursued by a group of intellectuals and educated Jews named Misr al-Fatāh, who published the above-mentioned periodical of the same name at Alexandria. This party had likewise been formed in the last days of Ismā‘īl, and it attracted the attention of the European press - especially The Times, - which was unsympathetic towards it. (2) A short time after Tawfīk's accession, Misr al-Fatāh published a "project of reforms presented to His

(1) Ḥay̲ām Landau (op. cit) gives quite reasonable, but rather indefinite suggestions. Cf supra.(17).
(2) Ibrāhīm ʿAbduh, op. cit., 107, Rashīd Rida, op.cit., I, 75 and al-Waṭan of Sept. 27th, 1879.
Highness Tawfīk I, Khedive of Egypt, by the Union of Egyptian Youths, and on December 18th, 1879 it reiterated its demand for detailed reform, and published a special booklet devoted to the problems of the freedom of the press.

Riyād tried in vain to trace the authors of the "manifesto" and of the "project". He tightened the watch on suspected leaders such as Sharīf, Sultān, and Abāza, and degraded Field-Marshal Shāhīn, who escaped to Italy and became a naturalized Italian. Many others were arrested or exiled. Indeed it looked as if sooner or later the malcontents would be forced into direct action against Riyād's authority.

Before considering this critical period further, however, we must take note of a personality who was henceforth to play an important part in Egyptian affairs - namely Edward Malet (afterwards Sir Edward Malet). His part is still controversial, even though Malet himself wrote a book (Egypt: 1879-1883), in which he defended his conduct.

Sir Edward Malet:

Malet was appointed British Consul-General and Minister Plenipotentiary at Cairo in October 1879. There he remained until after the occupation, for which, although

(1) In the "project" the causes of the sufferings of Egypt were summarized as follows: Absolutism; absence of law and equality before the law; lack of universal education; lack of a properly elected parliament with full powers; lack of proper sense of responsibility on the part of officials; the plague of usury; the lack of good regulations for the distribution of water; and the insufficient payment of native officials. Cf. Jerrold, The Belgium of the East, 116.

he tries to represent himself as a mere agent of his Government, he shares responsibility. For, in the first place, like other British representatives abroad, he was certainly allowed a certain freedom of action by the Foreign Office, and in the second, as we shall see, his recommendations were at times decisive. While acquiring a great influence over Tawfiq, he himself fell under that of Colvin, a typical colonial official of the Indian school. Both of them exaggerated facts in a systematic attempt to bring about a state of affairs which would convince the British public and Government that there was no alternative to military intervention in Egypt, so that, for instance, even Gladstone was induced to believe that the Egyptian National Movement was wholly military and, therefore, undeserving of sympathy.

It may be worth while here to refer to the first instructions Malet received from Salisbury immediately after his appointment, which ran thus:

"The leading aim of our policy in Egypt is the maintenance of the neutrality of that country, that is to say, the maintenance of such a state of things that no Great Power shall be more powerful there than England.

"This purpose might of course be secured by the predominance of England itself, or even by the establishment

(1) F.0.141/124; No.275 Secret, F.O. to Malet dated Oct. 16th, 1879. Italics are mine.
of the Queen's authority in the country. Circumstances may be conceived in which this would be the only way of attaining the object; but it would not be the best method. It could not in the present state of affairs confer any other advantages than opportunities of employing English people and introducing English capital and these would be outweighed by the responsibilities, military and financial it would entail. The justification of such a policy could consist in its being the only available mode of assuring the neutrality of Egypt towards us.

"With this object in view, it is obvious that we can have no jealousy of native rule itself. But it must not degenerate into anarchy, or perpetuate the oppression of recent years". Anarchy, owing to Egypt's international importance, would convince Europe that intervention was necessary, and that would mean occupation, which, if not by England, would be undertaken by another Power. For this reason "there is a value in the present relations between Egypt and the Porte, however anomalous they may appear to be. In case of extreme misgovernment, they furnish a machinery for changing the ruler, without any violation of diplomatic comity. They enable us to exercise a general control without taking over the government".
The broad lines inherent in these instructions were never absent from the mind of Malet, who in fact put them into practice in letter and spirit. Having undergone a long professional training, he proved an entirely competent public servant. His reports were most detailed and sometimes very long. Moreover, he was prudent, reticent, self-effacing and, by irreproachable courtesy not only to Tawfik, but to all around him, and by the wisdom of silence, he soon acquired the reputation of a subtle diplomat. Thus he succeeded, after only a few months in Cairo, in gaining the confidence of the Khedive and his men, over whom he came to exercise a very real influence. He became persona grata par excellence with Tawfik, to whom he played the part of guide, counsellor and friend; and therefore stoutly opposed any attempt to shake the Khedive's authority, lest this should weaken his own position with possible jeopardy to British interests. (1) Malet was accordingly to prove an important agent of reaction in the name of order and discipline, and the arch enemy of the National Movement.

The mutiny of the army:

Since the demonstration of the Kaṣr al-Valī in 1879,

(1) On Sept. 27th, 1881, Sienkiewicz wrote as follows: "Since... Tawfik is accustomed to bow to the demands of the English, they have always supported him, and perhaps will continue to support him for some time to come". (Egypte, Vol.70; No.36)
unrest and discontent had prevailed in the Egyptian army, a fact to which Baring had drawn Riyād's attention in vain.\(^1\) After the deposition of Ismā'īl, the Commission of Liquidation (presided over by Wilson, the victim of Kasr al-Nīl), insisted on a reduction in the size of the army by a governmental decree, according to which only from 450 to 500 officers were to be retained on the active list, while about 1,300 were retired on one-quarter or one-half of their salaries. Every three months acting officers gave place to some of these others, and consequently fell, as the others had fallen, into financial difficulties. Moreover, these changes were effected inequitably by favouritism - especially for the so-called Turkish class, who were never so retired.\(^2\) This favoured class included at that time wealthy Turks, connections of the Khedivial family, Court favourites, and a few of the sons of rich Egyptian landowners,\(^3\) who were all appointed to the best positions in the army and were favoured by promotion.

Then, as if this were not already enough to cause dangerous resentment, 'Osmān Rifkī, the Circassian Minister of War, submitted a military law which entirely debarred the native officers from promotion, in consequence of which

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\(^1\) Cromer, op. cit., \textit{xxix xli} \textit{xxxi} I, 174.
\(^3\) Landau, op. cit. 85.
a petition, signed by the famous Colonels 'Orābī, 'Abd al-Āl and 'Alī Fahmī, was handed to Riyād, asking for the dismissal of Rifkī. (1) The Cabinet, however, presided over by Tawfik, instead of considering the grievances of the army, decided to punish the petitioners. On February 1st, 1881, a court-martial was accordingly convened in the Kasr al-Nīl barracks (which housed the Ministry of War), and the Colonels were summoned under the pretence of preparing for the ceremonies to be held on the marriage of a certain Princess. But news of the proposed arrests had been communicated to the native officers by Riyād's wife — an Egyptian herself; (2) and the officers, who were thus prepared for the contingency, freed the three Colonels, and marched in a triumphal parade to the 'Abdīn Square, where they re-iterated their demand.

In face of this, the situation of the government was desperate, for the whole army, except for the few Circassians, sided with the Colonels. When the Khedive told the Western Consuls-General that he had no party in the army

(1) In his Kashf al-sitar (p.154), 'Orābī confuses the demands made early in 1881 with those connected with the demonstration of September of that year. There is no evidence that anything was asked for in January and February but the dismissal of Rifkī. Cf. Al-Thawra al-'Orābiya, 87 & Blunt, op. cit., 102 & 355.

(2) De Ring's No.19 supra.
on which he could rely for assistance, they advised him to dismiss Rifki rather than provoke a catastrophe. Al-Barudi (the Minister of Wakfs), who had played the part of a go-between during the incident, and who, though of Circassian origin himself, had won the favour of the army, therefore replaced Rifki in the additional post of Minister of War.

Baron De Ring:

During these events, the French Consul-General, Baron De Ring, took every available opportunity of imposing his own ideas both on the Control and the parties in Egypt, in order to increase French influence, which he thought to have been adversely affected by Waddington’s policy. (1)

Since his arrival at Cairo at the end of December 1879, De Ring had tried to give the Quai d’Orsay an unbiased judgment on men and affairs in Egypt. He was against the Anglo-French entente which made British influence paramount owing to the constant replacement of Egyptians by Englishmen in administrative offices. (2) This tendency

(1) Egypte, Vol. 65; Despt. (marked Part.) from De Ring to St. Hilaire, dated Feb. 29th, 1880.

(2) Egypte, Vol.64; No.1 Dir.Pol. - Many Englishmen were appointed to the Survey Department and the Mixed Board of Railways, which was also modified so as to give the Presidency to an Englishman and to suppress an Egyptian member. This modification, as well as some other appointments, were suggested by Malet. Lascelles’s Telegs. Nos.133, 142, 167 and Desps.442 Pol. & 444 Pol. - Malet’s Telegs. Nos.193, 194 and Desps.619 Pol., 687 & 714 Pol.
naturally brought about a collision between him and Malet who, since the end of 1880, had complained of De Ring's non-co-operation. Also De Ring alienated Blignières, the Khedive and Riyād, who all seemed to him to be pro-British. Gabriel Charmes (the correspondent of the Journal des Débats), who was in Cairo during the incident, affirms that the Colonels were encouraged by the dispute which had occurred some weeks before between De Ring on the one hand and Riyād and Malet on the other—a fact that bore out the rumour that England and France were no longer in agreement. The rivalry between the Agents of the two Governments was naturally noticed at once in Cairo.

The leaders of the native officers had tried before February 1st to get into touch with the two Consuls. Malet declined to meet them. But De Ring, who had been convinced ever since his arrival of the existence in Egypt of a real national party, tried to exert a pacifying influence on the officers by listening to their grievances, and received their deputies both before and after the mutiny. It is clear, however, from De Ring's despatches that he did not invite, or seek, a meeting with them, that he had politely advised them to mind their own business, and that,

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(1) Velay, op. cit., 41-2.
(2) F.0.78/3321; No. 48 dated Feb. 9th, 1881
when Ḍurābī told him that the army might insist on the dismis­
sal of the Riyād Ministry, he advised the malcontents to
be satisfied with their victory lest they be regarded as
mutineers and political conspirators.

The general observations on the situation(1) made by
De Ring, who was sure that he was a "better judge of what
should be done than the Minister for Foreign Affairs could
be at Paris", (2) are worthy of note. He regarded the move­
ment as due to spontaneous Egyptian national sentiment,
"neither engineered nor advocated by any of the Pashas
previously in power and directed against neither the inte­
grity of the Ottoman Empire, nor the Controllers, nor
Europeans in general, but against the.../"mamlūk" caste". (3)
There was no reason therefore to be hostile to it, and it
was better to advise the Khedive to depend on the mass of
his subjects, and settle the whole difficulty by re-appointing
the retired officers to posts either in the Egyptian adminis­
tration or in the Šūdān, and by putting an end to the humilia­
ting distinctions between natives on the one hand and Turks
and Circassians on the other.

To De Ring it appeared futile to back Riyād, and, in
disagreement with Malet and the Controllers, who supported

(1) Egypte, Vol.68; Nos.19, 22 & 23 Dir.Pol.dated Feb.4th,12th,
and 14th,1881.
(2) F.0.141/141; No.187 Secret, Lyons to F.O.,dated Feb.22nd,1881
(3) De Ring's No.19 Dir.Pol. supra.
Riyād, he thought it expedient to prepare for the latter's possible downfall, by canvassing the formation of a new ministerial combination which would offer equivalent, if not superior, advantages to England and France. He interviewed Prince ʿOsman (the son of Muṣṭafā Fādil), of whom he spoke highly and to whom he offered the Presidency of the Council. ʿOsman declined the offer, saying that he was persona ingrata at Istanbul and that he preferred not to involve himself in politics.

De Ring's suggestions were reasonable enough in the circumstances. Yet the two Controllers' authoritative temperament caused them to oppose à priori a movement they had neither provoked nor supported. They held that if Riyād was not backed, the discontented officers would continue to foment trouble as long as they believed they could count on the French Agent; the National Party would take courage; and partisans of the ex-Khedive and Prince Halīm would support anything that promised trouble. The Controllers were therefore ready from the start to use force in defeating any attempt that might be made to impede the joint authority of the Western Powers "represented by themselves rather than by the two Agents". They supposed that when the Egyptians realized that England and France were backing Riyād, the "soldatesque" would be intimidated.

(1) F.O.141/143; No.54, Malet to F.O. dated Feb.13th,1881.
and the movement collapse. But by thus staking everything on the maintenance in office by Riyād, the Controllers exposed themselves to the danger of being considered as enemies by any new Ministry, and of losing their prestige with the population.

In face of this opposition, which was naturally supported by the Khedive and Malet, De Ring failed to achieve his aim. A declaration was issued by the Khedive in the Moniteur Egyptien denouncing any rumour of ministerial change; and Malet assured Riyād that the British Government "was fully sensible of the merits of... government, and were anxious to assist... in every way that was in their power". He moreover rallied the other foreign representatives round him, in an attempt to isolate De Ring by a collective support of the Ministry, and urged Riyād, if he could, to break the union of the Colonels by applying a policy of "divide et impera". As a final blow to the French Consul-General, Malet again complained of his attitude; repeated his previous proposal that both De Ring and he should be recalled (being quite sure that the

(1) De Ring's No.22 Dir.Pol. supra.
(2) F.0.78/3321; No.48, Malet to F.O., dated Feb.9th,1881.
(3) F.0.131/134; No.74 Pol., dated Feb.11th, 1881.
(4) F.0.141/143; Draft No.48, Malet to F.O. dated Feb.9th,1881.
(5) Malet's No.5, dated Feb. 9th,1881.
British Government at least would not act on it) (1) and advised Tawfîk to complain to the French President of De Ring's conduct. (2) As a result, De Ring was recalled on February 22nd, and soon left for France, though assuring everybody that he would return.

The recall of De Ring created a stir among the French colony, who liked him and still hated Blignières for his supposed "Anglomania". A petition bearing hundreds of signatures was sent to the French President asking for De Ring's return. He was considered, it stated, to be the defender of French interests against the British "who have not ceased to supplant the French for two years". It was suggested that this petition should be discussed in the Chambre, when it was thought that the adversaries of Barthelémy St. Hilaire (the French Foreign Minister) would seize the opportunity of challenging him for having neglected the interests of France. (3) Nothing came of this, however, and De Ring was shortly afterwards transferred to Bucarest.

(1) The Foreign Office had declined the same overture before, lest it should cause outside observers to presume that there was a difference of opinion between England and France. (F.0.141/141; No.9). Moreover, Lyons now considered that, as a precedent, it would do nothing to promote Anglo-French harmony in the future. In his view England would gain no advantage, if she seemed afraid because her Agent had acquired a better position in Egypt than his French colleague. (F.0.141/141; No.187 Secret).

(2) D.D.E., First Series, IV, No.374 gives the text of Tawfîk's complaint to M. Jules Grévy.

(3) This petition is enclosed in Egypte Vol.68, and dated March 1881.

(4) The Times of March 30th, 1881.
The situation after the mutiny:

The prestige of the Khedive was adversely affected by the incident of February 1st, during which he had proved lacking in initiative and statesmanship. It is significant that whereas Isma'il had profited by similar circumstances to combat foreign interference, his son, on the contrary, acted on the advice of foreigners in a purely internal affair. Tawfik now determined to avenge himself on the rebels. But to gain time he sought to reconcile the officers, whom he assured on February 12th that "he had forgotten everything that had happened, and that he had forgiven them". (1) The government now increased the pay scales of both officers and men, improved their food, and decided to review and reform the existing military law and regulations. (2) However, talk was overheard in the Palace Harem that the three Colonels were to be poisoned; and again news of the decision was conveyed to them by Riyād's wife. (3) This made them so suspicious and alarmed that they surrounded themselves and their homes with faithful guards, and met frequently with other native officers in Orābi's house, presumably in secret and at night.

(1) Safwat, Al-Iṣhtilāl al-Ingilīzi li-Misr, 25.
(2) Wākā'i', April 21st, 1881.
Orābī had emerged after February 1st as a national leader. His strength lay in his sincerity, his audacity, his eloquence, his voicing of the national grievances, and in the legality of the cause he cherished. Although he was not educated enough to cope with high policy, yet he had a dominating personality that made it easy for him to win over the majority of the army, the only government class that was predominantly Egyptian. Its rank and file were taken from the fields— from the plough and the waterwheel, from the sugar factories and cotton plantations. If the popular excitement had expressed itself through the army, it was because, in the first place, the army was national in character, and, in the second, it was the only force in sympathy with the native population.

During May Orābī began circulating a petition asking for the enlargement of the army to the establishment of 18,000 men provided for by the Fermāns, and the creation of a representative Chamber, to which the government should be responsible and which would present the budget. The French Chargé d'Affaires (M. Monge) noticed that these ideas were making headway among civilians and that the efforts of the Ministry to divide the native officers, (1) as if they

(1) Egypte, Vol. 69, Desp. dated May 30th, 1881.
alone were dangerous, could not in any case achieve the end
in view, since, to quote his despatch, (1) the discontent
of the army "corresponds with the general discontent that
prevails throughout the country and has resulted from the
new administrative system, whose relative regularity hurts
so many private privileges".

This was true. The notables could never forget the
revocation of the mukābala and the taxation of the Oshri lands. In mid-February a great number of them had come to
Cairo to complain of the Riyād Ministry. But they were
merely told to return to their provinces, and strict orders
were sent to the Mudīrs to prevent any such movements in
future. (2) The high officials, whether of Arab, Circassian
or Turkish origin, and all those who had profited by the
ancien régime - including some European adventurers -
were still bent on demoralizing the European administration.
The European officials, whose number had been more than
doubled in less than five years, (3) and who were better
paid than the Egyptian, (4) still aroused the hatred and the
jealousy of the natives, especially the official class.

(1) Egypte, Vol.68; Desp. dated March 18th,1881.
(2) Ibid, No.24, Dir. Pol., De Ring to St. Hilaire, dated
Feb.16th,1881.
(3) It jumped from 504 before 1877 to 1,067 in 1882. Cf.
Abulleef, op. cit., 157.
(4) Whereas the Egyptian Ministers received £3,000 (£.E.?) a
year, the English and French Controllers each received £4,500.
Similarly whereas the average salary received by Egyptian offi-
cials in 1882 was £32 per annum, that received by European offi-
cials was between £291 and £303 - little more than one-tenth.
Cf. Abulleef, op. cit., 158.
According to M. Monge, they lived in a purely European atmosphere without any contact with the natives, of whose interests and views they were ignorant, judging everything according to European views and the policies of their respective governments. Whereas in general they despised anything that failed to correspond to whatever administrative practice they were used to, they were divided among themselves, and largely absorbed by the factional disputes of the various colonies, by personal conflicts, and by their activities on behalf of the national interests they represented.

The Egyptians' hatred of all foreigners - which had been originally provoked by European interference - was enhanced by European aggression. At the Congress of Berlin, although the Treaty of San Stefano was abrogated to the advantage of the Porte, a process was set on foot by which the Ottoman Empire was to be gradually partitioned. The occupation of Cyprus by England and of Bosnia by Austria (the latter in face of Moslem opposition) was followed by the enforcement of the Treaty in the Balkans, to the advantage of Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bulgarians, at Moslem expense; and the participation in this enforcement

(2) This hatred had been noticed by the British Consuls ever since 1873. In the beginning it was generally attributed to economic and religious causes, Cf. Landau, *op. cit.*, 73-4.
of Gladstone's Government, which had also started the war in Afghanistan, filled the Islamic world with consternation and alarm at such action on the part of England, the traditional friend of Turkey. From April 1881, the French began to occupy Tunisia, an operation said by St. Hilaire to be a "devoir sacré que les civilisations supérieures ont envers des nations moins avancées". (1)

All this, especially the fate of Tunis, gave the Egyptians a vivid example of European justice and methods, awakened them to the necessity of having a strong army which could be relied upon, and strengthened the nascent spirit of nationality and patriotism. While the Arabic press fiercely attacked the French, rumours spread that England would compensate herself in Egypt, and many believed that an understanding between England and France included permission to the former to do what she liked in Egypt. Riyāḍ was accused of intending "to sell Egypt to the English", and this contributed to the growth of national support for Črābī and his adherents.

Meanwhile Riyāḍ's position - which had been all but untenable since February (a fact of which his vanity made him unconscious) - was made still worse by his falling out with both the Khedive and the Control.

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(1) Bemmelen L'Egypte et l'Europe, II, 234.
(2) Egypte, Vol.70; No.26 Dir.Pol., from Sienkiewicz, dated Sept.13th, 1881.
Tawfīk thought that Riyād had now served his turn and was inclined to assume responsibility for the situation by removing his Prime-Minister and taking over the Presidency of the Council himself. (1) He had already occasionally attended the meetings of the Cabinet, where Riyād, who regarded the Khedive as a mere figurehead, and himself as "the Cavour or the Bismarck of Egypt", (2) invariably opposed him. When Colvin was away on leave in August, Riyād took the opportunity of acting on his own, without consulting the Europeans, hoping thus to win some popular support. Not only did he neglect to invite Blignières to the Cabinet meetings, but when Blignières wrote to him about some irregularities in the Ministry of Public Works, he tried to convince the public that the Controller had asked for the Minister of that department, ‘Alī Pasha Mubārak, to be replaced, and announced in the Waka'īf and the Moniteur that Mubārak enjoyed the confidence of the Khedive. The French newspaper Le Courier Egyptien, which sided with Blignières against Mubārak, was suppressed, and the Controller was about to protest to Tawfīk against Riyād, when the new French Consul-General, Sienkiewicz,

(1) The two Western Agents were of the opinion that the Khedive must assume a greater share of responsibility. When Colvin arrived at Alexandria on Sept. 8th he at once intimated to Sienkiewicz that it was urgent and necessary to concentrate all power in the Khedive's hands. (Egypte, Vol.69; Desp. dated Aug. 13th & Vol.70, No.29 Dir.Pol.)

intervened. Sienkiewicz regarded a breach between the Ministry and Control at this juncture as highly undesirable. He was not really in favour of Riyād. He supposed him to be backed by the English and to be ready, in case of new troubles, to ask for the despatch of a British squadron from Malta. But he was at the same time against attacking him, lest that should lead to a conflict with the British Agent. (1)

The demonstration of September 9th:-

In August, the Khedive dismissed al-Barūdī and replaced him by Dāwūd Yakan, (the Turkish Yegen meaning "nephew") his brother-in-law. Although the promised military reforms were neglected, Dāwūd took firm measures to restore discipline in the army and to curtail the activities of the Colonels. They were closely watched and spies dogged their steps wherever they went. Measures were also about to be taken to transfer the mutinous regiments from Cairo to the provinces, when rumours were circulated that the Khedive had obtained a fetwa (a religious decree) from the Sheikh al-Islām at Cairo convicting the Colonels of high treason.

By this time 'Orābī had won to his side the majority of the 'Olāma', the notables, and the chiefs of the Arab tribesmen, who all authorized him to speak in the name of the nation. (2)

While the Khedive, the consular corps, and the Controllers, were all at Alexandria, and during Malet's absence at Istanbul, preparations were accordingly made in secret for a general demonstration by the army with the object of submitting to the Khedive the following demands:

(1) The dismissal of the Riyād Ministry;
(2) The expansion of the army to 18,000;
and (3) The convocation of the Chamber of Delegates.

A communication was also sent to the Sultan, and it was understood that he did not disapprove of what was intended. The notables were summoned to Cairo, and were present in the ʻAbdīn Square on September 9th, when the army leaders duly addressed the Khedive in the name of the nation.

Malet and Cromer assert that the demonstration was due solely to the Colonels' fear for their lives, and that it was purely military. Rif'at, moreover, states that the third demand had not appeared in ʻCrabi's initial programme, but was added now at the instance, not of the Colonels, but of an enlightened circle of notables and Pashas and such English and French sympathisers as Blunt and De Ring.

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(3) Rif'at, op. cit., 181.
Yet, as we have shown, it is certain that ʿOrābī and his regiments had a wide backing among the people, that the constitutional demand had been included in ʿOrābī's programme, and that the constitutional Charter acquired by Egypt at the end of Ismāʿīl's reign, without any assistance from foreigners, had bred in the people a consciousness of their national existence to which their demands were due.

On September 9th, about 4,000 officers and men, with their field guns and ammunition, surrounded the Khedivial Palace. Tawfīk had failed to win to his side any of the regiments; even his bodyguard joined the demonstrators. Colvin encouraged him to appear before them, and prompted him in what he should say and do. Thus after Tawfīk had begun speaking personally to ʿOrābī, who was surrounded by a select guard with fixed bayonets, Colvin advised him against continuing such a discussion with a mere officer, and suggested that he should retire to the Palace, as he then did. The final outcome of the demonstration was that whereas, by the intervention of Cookson (the British Charge d'Affaires) the last two demands of the nation were shelved for further consideration, the Khedive agreed to dismiss Riyaḍ(2) and appoint Sharīf, the mutineers' nominee, as

(1) Malet, op. cit., 141-2.
(2) Riyaḍ gave up his resignation on Sept. 9th, and duly left for Europe on Sept. 14th.
President of the Council with power to nominate a new Ministry.

In the evening, Sienkiewicz and Cookson held a meeting with the Khedive at which Tawfīk told them that he had asked the Porte for twenty battalions, and in every respect showed himself inclined to prolong the crisis in order to make Ottoman military intervention inevitable. At this, Cookson suggested that Tawfīk should rather ask the Sultan to send a high commissioner to Egypt to re-establish discipline in the army; but Sienkiewicz was against any idea of Turkish or Anglo-French intervention, which he thought would only aggravate the situation. He was strongly of the opinion that the Egyptian crisis should be settled on the spot, and he did his best in the next few days, with the support of the consular corps, to induce Sharīf to accept the Presidency of the Cabinet.

The Sharīf Ministry:—

Sharīf at first hesitated to accept the Premiership at so critical a time. Moreover, 'Orābi insisted on the appointment of al-Barūdī and Muṣṭafa Fahmī, whom Sharīf was loth to accept, and the Colonels, in an interview with him indignantly refused his condition that the regiments invo-

(1) Both al-Barūdī and Muṣṭafa Fahmī had promised Sharīf at the beginning of Tawfik's reign that they would not accept office if his Ministry fell for any constitutional cause and had then broken their word. Cf. Kashf al-sītar, 238.
lved in the demonstration should be removed from Cairo.
Sharīf, in short, resented his nomination by an army in
revolt, whose chiefs were inclined to meddle in politics.
He was also afraid of Ottoman intervention, which seemed
more than possible in view of Malet's presence in the
Ottoman capital and the Khedive's appeal to the Sultan for
help. However, in the end the military promised to submit
to the orders of the government, and a deputation of the
notables guaranteed the obedience and political non-inter-
vention of the officers in future. (1) The two Western Agents
moreover assured Sharīf that "in case the army should show
itself submissive and obedient, the Governments of England
and France would interpose their good offices with the
Sublime Porte in order to avert from Egypt an occupation
by an Ottoman Army", (2) and they duly telegraphed to London
and Paris to ensure that the two Powers would resist
Ottoman intervention.

On September 14th, Sharīf accepted the Presidency and
the Ministry of the Interior, while al-Bārubdī and Muṣṭafā
Fahmī became respectively Minister of War and Foreign Affairs.
Sharīf made it clear in his letter to the Khedive that he had
taken office "in response to the wishes of the notables and
in compliance with the order of His Highness". He also
expressed his intention of promulgating an Organic Law,

(1) Waka'īr Sept. 17th, 1881.
(2) B.B. 1882-83; Nos. 10 & 12, from CoKson to F.O. dated
Sept. 14th, 1881. 
and of maintaining the European Control Department, which he considered to be necessary for a sound management of the finances. (1)

Sienkiewicz described what had happened as "une sorte de mouvement national", and "une révolution pacifique". He stated that it threatened Europeans in no way, since its leaders professed a respect for all existing engagements, but that what was called for was a purely Egyptian government, responsible for its acts. (2) The press received the Sharif Ministry very cordially, especially since its appointment followed on such dark days of persecution and suppression. (3) One of Sharif's first acts was to release nine hundred and twelve exiles who had been sent to the White Nile under the Riyād Government. The whole nation rejoiced at the formation of the new Ministry and considered it to be the beginning of a new era.

Sharif was known for his honesty and his moderate

(1) Waka'īe Sept. 17th, 1881.
(2) Egypete; Vol. 70; No. 26, Dir. Pol. dated Sept. 13th & Teleg. dated Sept. 17th, 1881, both from Sienkiewicz.
(3) Ibrāhim ʿAbduh, op. cit., 111.
(4) Al-Thawra al-ʿOrābīya, 149-150.
"nationalism", though he was a Turk by origin. His resignation from office in 1878, which he preferred to appearing before the Commission of Inquiry, his education at St. Cyr, his relations with the Nationalist movement, his formation of the "National Ministry", and his resignation for a constitutional cause all contributed to the high esteem in which he was held, and to his being considered as "a man with the welfare of the country at heart", in contrast to Riyaḍ, who was regarded as "England's man".

For a successful career, however, more is generally required than honesty and personal integrity of character. The popular judgment of a responsible politician sometimes depends on incidents which impress the public imbued as it is apt to be with fixed ideas. Circumstances may also play a decisive part in the attribution to a man, such as Sharīf, of a greater worth than he in fact deserves. In reality, Sharīf was no more than an "Old Turk", without any genuine sympathy with the nation. The value of his constitutionalism can be gauged by his complete subservience to Ismā‘īl, with whom he still remained in touch after his dethronement. Future events, moreover, were to show how soon he was to abandon it, breaking as he did with the Nationalists, joining the camp of the Khedive, and exhibiting himself in his true character as "loving ease and comfort,.../devoid/ of energy and liking
The opinions of foreign contemporaries support this estimate. Moberly Bell describes Sharif as being "without ideas, not without principles", (2) while Ninet says that he was "an amateur politician devoid of any initiative, accustomed to obey and never at any time in command of a really difficult situation". (3) Des Michels writes that he was "nul au fond", (4) Rivers Wilson that he was a man neither of an independent character nor of lofty intelligence; and Malet that "the exertion of dealing with a delicate state of affairs...was/painful to...him/". (6) From these quotations, by people of widely different points of view and convictions, it is clear that Sharif, who was naturally indolent and lacking in initiative, represented the "laissez-faire" side of Egyptian politics.

(6) Gran. Pap., Private (159), Malet to Granville, dated Nov. 7th, 1881.
Nevertheless, his acceptance of power solved a delicate problem. It was difficult at such a moment to find a better solution. Sienkiewicz, who was eager for Sharīf to form a ministry, although he was sure that it would not prove stable, was relieved that there should be a government at all.\(^{(1)}\)

Sharīf found support in every direction. He was welcomed by the natives, the "Old Turks", the British and French legations, and the army leaders. His first aim was to establish order by dispersing the military, and he therefore issued orders transferring 'Abd al-‘Āl with his regiment to Damietta and Ḍrabī to Ras-al-Wādī near Zagāzīg. Both accepted their transfers without demur, and by October 6th they had left Cairo. They did so partly because the military had promised to comply with the government's orders, but even more because an Ottoman mission had meanwhile arrived in Egypt.

The question of foreign intervention and "the Nizāmī mission":

‘Ḍrabī and Sharīf had assured the foreign Agents that "the interests of all subjects of friendly nations would be protected". Yet in spite of this and the relative tranquillity that followed on Sharīf's acceptance of power, although the necessity for armed intervention of any kind had not yet arisen, events in Egypt disquieted the European

\(^{(1)}\) **Egypte**, Vol. 70; Teleg. dated Sept. 13th, 1881.
public and Governments, the more so since it now appeared that the Porte would no longer remain inactive, both 'Orābī and Tawfīk having appealed to the Sultan for help and guidance. A new phase had evidently begun in the Egyptian question, which, although it had been a matter of concern to Europe in general ever since 1840, since 1878 had been mainly of interest to France and England.

We have seen before how much concern the Porte had shown since 1875 as regards Egypt. These latest events consequently produced considerable excitement at Istanbul; and this was unnecessarily increased by an order of the Porte that the local press should abstain from reference to Egyptian affairs. (1) At the Palace the crisis produced mingled feelings of alarm and satisfaction: on the one hand it was feared that the "bad example" of Cairo might possibly be followed at Istanbul, and on the other it was regarded as gratifying that the Sultan should have an opportunity for asserting his authority. (2)

From September 1881 until the British occupation, the Ottoman Government followed as regards Egypt a line of policy which lacked initiative and was consequently fatal to the Sultan's prestige. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd suspected that a plan was on foot for the establishment of a separate "Arab Kingdom" in Egypt and Syria. This ran counter to

(1) The Times of Sept. 15th, 1881.
(2) Ibid.
his Panislamic schemes, because, if realized, it would give the Ottoman Government a purely Turkish character, and so weaken the Sultan's title to the Caliphate. (1) He regarded the Egyptian problem solely from the standpoint of those schemes, hoping to profit by the struggle between the Khedive and the military. While condemning the revolutionary movement in Egypt in principle, "as it was not possible for him to allow a constitution to one province of his dominions and withhold it from the others", (2) and being obliged to support his vassal every now and then by public declarations, 'Abdal-Hamid nevertheless established secret relations with "Orabists" through a secret emissary, and was not opposed to a change of ruler in favour of the pretender Ḥalīm, who was ready to govern Egypt as a simple valī in accordance with the Ferman of 1841 and even for a term of no more than five years. (3) The Sultan's policy,

(2) F.O. 78/3285; No. 815 Confid. Dufferin to F.O. dated Sept. 19th, 1881.
(3) Turquie, Vol. 448; No. 134 Confid. Tissot to St. Hilaire, dated Sept. 25th, 1881. Ḥalīm assured Tissot that by relying on the Egyptians he would in the long run regain the privileges that had been granted to Egypt. In a declaration presented to the French Embassy, he professed his respect for the Control, the Mixed Tribunals, and the privileged situation acquired by Great Britain and France. He moreover denied being anything but an Egyptian in sentiment, - he was neither a Turk, nor an Englishman, nor a Frenchman. (Incl. in ibid.).
since he thus had a foot in both camps, was subject to
abrupt fluctuations, which still further confused the
internal situation in Egypt. Yet 'Abd al-Ḥamīd in fact
had no serious intention—chiefly because of financial
difficulties—of sending troops to Egypt in any case;
and this in the end enabled the British to effect their
occupation under the pretext of restoring order and support­
ing the Khedive.

'Orābī, according to Blunt, (1) "had no love for the
Turks, who had misgoverned Egypt for centuries, and would
not hear of interference from Istanbul in the internal
affairs of the country. But he made a distinction between
the Ottoman Government and the religious authority of the
Sultan whom as Amir-Al Mumenien /sic//Orabī/ was bound, as
long as he ruled justly, to obey and honour". The 'Qalama
and the officers recognized the Sultan's authority as
Caliph, in order that they might use his help in this
character in any struggle that might arise with Europe.
They admitted his sovereignty and his Caliphate as long as
he was not inclined to enforce his immediate authority over
Egypt. Another reason for 'Orābī's approach to 'Abdal-Ḥamīd
was his desire to avoid adding yet another opponent to those
with whom he was already faced at home. He had in fact
already addressed the Sultan on previous occasions, on one
of which he had stated that "Egypt was falling into the
hands of foreigners and being Christianized, and that, unless
(1) Secret history, 172-3."
the Sultan intervened, the country would soon share the fate of Tunis". (1) As for the last petition, signed by officers, "Olama" and notables, Prince Ḥalīm told the French Ambassador at Istanbul (M. Tissot) that it asked for his substitution for Tawfīk. (2) This however seems improbable for it is clear that Ḥalīm was trying everywhere to fish in troubled waters. But Blunt asserts that Ṙābaṭ had never been one of Ḥalīm's partisans. (3) Ḥalīm's conduct was also a subject of complaint on the part of Tawfīk, who had told ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd that he "had invited the officers to revolt by ordering a Jew to distribute revolutionary circulars among the officers, copies of which were sent to "Istanbul". (4) The Sultan for his part, did not like Ḥalīm, who was a Freemason, a constitutionalist in politics and, worst of all, a friend of the late Sultan Murād. (5) ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd in fact merely proposed to use him as a tool for the furtherance of his intrigues in Egypt.

(1) Cromer, op. cit. I, 194.
(2) Turquie, Vol. 448; Teleg. marked Confid., dated Sept. 13th; No. 134, Confid. supra and Teleg. marked particulière dated Sept. 14th, 1881 - all from Tissot.
(3) Secret history, 262.
(4) Sayed Kamel, La Conférence de Constantinople, 90.
(5) F.O. 141/152; No. 137 Confid. Dufferin to F.O. dated Feb. 26th, 1882.
At that juncture Malet visited Istanbul on his way back from England, where he had been on leave. He had persuaded the Foreign Office that by obtaining an audience of 'Abd al-Hamīd he could: put an end to the rumour of a possible British occupation; intimidate the military party in Egypt by advertising co-operation with the Sultan; and sound the Porte on its attitude to an Egyptian constitution. It appears that Malet was given no definite instructions, but that when in September he discussed the situation with the Sultan, 'Abd al-Hamīd received the impression that he spoke with full authority - Hence Lord Granville's comment that he seemed "to have gone rather far in his conversation with the Sultan". Lord Dufferin (the British Ambassador) also assured 'Abd al-Hamīd that "the remedy lay with His Majesty as Suzerain of the Khedive".

All this led to the Sultan's decision to send a special mission to Egypt, presided over by General 'Alī Nīzāmī Pasha, and composed of 'Alī Fu'ād Bey (the Sultan's private secretary) and three other officials of the Porte. There was a great

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(1) On July 28th, 1881, while Malet was in London, there took place at the Foreign Office the first meeting of a Committee "to consider the affairs of Egypt". It was headed by Sir Charles Dilke and Malet. Rivers Wilson, whom the Gladstone Papers represent as the expert counsellor of the Foreign Office on Egyptian affairs, was also called in from time to time for consultation. Cf. Gwynn & Tuckwell, The Life of Dilke, 451.


(3) Glad. Pap., Ms. 44173, Granville to Gladstone, dated Sept. 14th, 1881.
deal of speculation on the Sultan's reasons for sending this Mission. Tissot was convinced that his intention was to send an army corps, to be called the 8th, to occupy Egypt; to disband the Egyptian army altogether; to draft the Egyptian officers into Turkish regiments stationed in remote parts of the Empire; to depose Tawfik; and to replace him by an ordinary Turkish vâli appointed for five years. (1) Sienkiewicz regarded it as a part of a British conspiracy, the Porte being used for the furtherance of purely British ends, and exaggerated everything said or done either by the Khedive or the British Agents. He supposed that the Sultan might intend repeating what he had done before in Syria, when he sent Mushîr Fevzi Pasha there to enquire into Midhat's administration, and then ordered him by telegram to take over the government himself. (2) Rumours soon began circulating in Egypt that the Turks were about to intervene to re-establish order; and Sienkiewicz reported that the European communities were perturbed at the prospect. (3)

It has been suggested that Austria, Russia and Germany were all behind the mission, through which they hoped to

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(1) F.0.78/3285; No.816 Confid. Dufferin to F.O., dated Sept. 19th, 1881 & Turquie; Vol.448; Dep. from Tissot to St. Hilaire, dated Sept. 15th, 1881.
(2) Sienkiewicz had been French Consul at Beirut.
(3) Egypte, Vol.70; No.28 Dir.Pol., marked Confid. dated Sept. 19th, 1881 and subsequent Despatches exchanged between Sienkiewicz and the Quai d'Orsay.
internationalize the Egyptian question and to oust the condominium. Gladstone himself was suspicious of Bismarck's "intrigues". Yet there seems to be no evidence for anything of the sort. For reasons mentioned before, no European Power, except Italy, was, for the moment, in favour of Ottoman intervention in Egypt. Only Italy believed it might provide her with an opportunity of insinuating herself into the Egyptian administration, by asking for a revision of the condominium. Lord Granville, however, discouraged the Quirinal, pointing to the attitude of France and the unwillingness of his colleagues as a pretext, and similarly discouraging answers were received by Italy from Petersburg, Vienna and Berlin.

The mission was in fact sent simply in reply to Orābī's request. Later, during the proceedings against the military after al-Tall al-Kabīr, al-Bārūdī said that he knew that Orābī and the other officers had asked the Porte to send the mission with the intention of apprising the Sultan of the true situation in Egypt by means of petitions

(1) Gran. Pap. (124), Gladstone to Granville, dated Oct. 2nd, 1881.
(2) See Granville's Nos. 439 & 340 sent respectively to Ampthill and Thornton, dated F.O. Oct. 19th, 1881 & Angleterre, Vol. 793; A Circular from St. Hilaire to the French Ambassadors in the Great Capitals, referring to the good will of Austria
(3) F.O. 146/2421, this being a reproduction of Macdonell's No. 32, dated Rome Sept. 16th, 1881 to F.O. & No. 42 dated Walmer Castle Sept. 17th, Granville to Lyons and Angleterre, Vol. 792; St. Hilaire to d'Aunay, dated Sept. 24th, 1881.
(4) Biovès, op. cit., 31
submitted to the Ottoman delegates by the prominent persons in the country. Al-Bārūdī declared that he had informed the Khedive and Sharīf of the officers' intentions and had asked the latter to abandon them. He also remarked that the transfer of 'Orābī's and 'Abd al-Āl's regiments was intended to eliminate any contact between the mission and the militants among the officers. It is clear that 'Orābī, while willing to strengthen his own cause against the Circassians and the Europeans by an appeal to the Sultan, never thought that the appeal would be taken seriously. It is evident, too, that the Sultan would not have taken such a decision, involving as it did an interference with Egypt's privileged status, had he not been encouraged by Lord Dufferin and Malet.

The Porte declared that the object of the mission consisted simply in conveying to the Viceroy the Sultan's approval of the manner in which His Highness had succeeded in arranging matters in Egypt; that as intrigues were still being directed against the Khedive, the Sultan considered that the presence in Egypt of two functionaries from his Court would be taken as an indication of His Majesty's desire to maintain the existing state of things.


(2) See The Times of Sept.14th, where the Porte's intention to send an "expedition" is attributed to the insistence by Malet and Dufferin with the Sultan that something must be done.
and would at the same time strengthen morally the Viceroy's position". (1) Similar statements were made to Tissot by the Sultan, who added that "he considered, in view of Turkey's enormous interests, both in Egypt and in the Hijaz, that he had a perfect right to dispatch an emissary with compliments and advice to the Khedive". (2)

British policy consisted in maintaining tranquillity and good government in Egypt, the highway to India. The British Government was not in principle opposed to Turkish intervention, but would favour it only when its necessity had been clearly demonstrated. The Times(3) described it as "a disagreeable necessity", for which there was probably no help, approving of it only on condition that this re-assertion of Turkish authority was limited to the occasion which provoked it. Lord Granville defined his policy by saying, "We wish to act cordially with France without allowing her any predominance. We wish the Sultan to be convinced, if possible, that we much desire to maintain his present position in Egypt, though we will not consent to his interfering more than he has been accustomed to do with the internal order of Egypt". (4)

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(1) F.0.78/3285; No.865 Confid. Dufferin to F.O. dated Oct. 4th, 1881.
(2) Ibid, No.824, dated Sept.20th,1881.
(3) of Sept. 13th, 1881.
(4) Fitzmaurice, op.cit., I, 253.
Gladstone, as advised by Wilson, saw nothing against the despatch to Egypt by the Sultan, "if His Majesty was so disposed", and it was done with the consent of England and France, of a Turkish Commissioner carrying orders to the regiments to be disbanded, in order to support the Khedive's authority and aid His Highness with his advice. (1)

Barthelemy St. Hilaire was of the opinion that the Egyptian movement "was more national than it was supposed to be by the European public", and that the Egyptians had aspirations and unsatisfied needs that were very real, but confused and obscure. Although he did not deny the right of the Egyptians to express themselves, the difficulty, in his opinion, was to know how and to what extent it would be possible in practice to meet their aspirations and needs. Till then, so St. Hilaire thought, it was the task of England and France to guide Egypt in the right direction and resist any Ottoman intervention. (2)

There were a number of reasons for French opposition to the interference of the Porte in Egyptian affairs: namely (3) that it would compromise the "civilising and progressive mission" undertaken by England and France, and would

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(1) Knaplund, op. cit., 167 & F.0.146/2417; No. 7, Granville to Adams, dated Sept. 12th, 1881; & F.0.141/147; Adams to Cookson, dated Sept. 15th & F.0.78/3272; No. 686, F.O. to Dufferin, dated Oct. 3rd, 1881.
(2) Hist. de la nation égyptienne. VI, 471-2.
consequently be materially and morally harmful to their respective interests; that it would provide fuel for the Moslem "fanaticism", which would imperil France's position in North Africa, at a time when the second Tunisian campaign was being undertaken; and that the Ottoman forces might side, for religious reasons, with the natives, or, alternatively they might side with the Turks and Circassians against the natives, thus increasing the state of "disorder" in the country. It was also feared that the troops, if once landed, would be likely to remain indefinitely. Moreover, if the Porte were to intervene, the question would become a European one; for the Great Powers, who were guarantors, as parties either to the Treaty of 1840 or to that of Berlin, would not fail to claim their proper share in the settlement of the matter, to the detriment of the Anglo-French condominium.

In order to solve the problem temporarily St. Hilaire accordingly proposed that the two Governments should take moral action of a tranquilising character, insisting on the absolute necessity for perfect frankness between them and joint action on every occasion. (1) He rejected Granville's proposal regarding a Turkish General, and suggested instead,

(1) F.O.146/2417; (Egypt No.3 (1882), No.6 Adams to Granville, dated Sept. 11th,1881) and Angleterre Vol.792; No.88 Dir.Pol., Challemeel-Lacour to St.Hilaire, dated Sept. 13th,1881.
first the despatch of Turkish troops under the direction of an Anglo-French military Commission, and then the establishment of a joint Military Control, to be exercised by one French and one English General, who, as Egyptian officials similar to the Financial Controllers, would introduce discipline and order into the Egyptian army without assuming responsibility of any sort for the general situation in the country. (1) But Granville in turn rejected this proposal on the ground that it would not be possible for Sharif to consent to the appointment of English and French Military Controllers-General, whose arrival must soon entail either armed intervention or their humiliation. (2) He expressed his fears to Gladstone, arguing that much was to be said against such interference by England and France in the affairs of Egypt. (3) Sienkiewicz was of a similar opinion, stating that the appointment of Military Controllers would arouse the fury of the Egyptian army; create a state of panic among the inhabitants; and lessen the Sultan's

(1) F.0.141/147; Teleg. No.45, Granville to Cookson, dated Sept.15th, 1881 & F.0.141/142; No.809.

(2) F.0.141/147; Teleg. No.74 Confid., Malet to F.O. & Angleterre, Vol. 793; No.95.

(3) Gran. Pap. (124) - Granville to Gladstone, dated Oct. 4th, 1881.
authority in the country. He hoped that the situation would improve by itself without recourse to this expedient. For these reasons St. Hilaire's proposal was dropped.

Sharif told the two Consuls that he feared that the Niẓāmī mission (which arrived in Alexandria on October 6th) might be a first step towards Ottoman military occupation. He made it clear that he would prefer its stay in Egypt to be as short as possible. St. Hilaire had meanwhile persuaded the Foreign Office to take concerted action for its recall either in Cairo or in Istanbul; and since it was the policy of Granville and Gladstone to maintain a steady co-operation with France in Egypt, Tissot and Dufferin notified the Porte of "the regret and surprise of their respective Governments that so inopportune a step should have been taken without any communication in regard to it being made to the Ambassadors of France and England", asking further that the Ottoman mission should stay in Egypt as short a time as possible. On the other hand, the two Consuls-General were instructed "to recommend the Egyptian Government to receive the Turkish Envoys with due respect, but to oppose firmly any interference on their part in the

(1) *Égypte, Vol.* 70; *No.* 50 *Dir. Pol.* dated Oct. 17th, 1881
internal administration of the country". They were to inform the Khedive and Sharif that they had received instructions to assist His Highness in maintaining the "autonomy"(1) of Egypt as established by the Ferman, and that they were to use their good offices in case of necessity to restrain any attempt on the part of the Turkish envoys to control the action of the Ministry in its efforts to re-establish confidence in the country and discipline in the army.(2)

Sienkiewicz, however, was still convinced that this Turkish intervention was part of a British plan for military interference; and was profoundly suspicious both of Malet (who had returned to Egypt on September 18th) and of the Khedive's intentions of revenge. Although Sienkiewicz was against any European intervention in principle, since that would awaken the Eastern "fanaticism" he so much dreaded, he nevertheless recommended that his Government should send warships to the Piraeus in order to counterbalance any British move.(3) Barthelemy St. Hilaire, on the other hand, was convinced that the Chancelleries of

(1) "Independence" in the declaration submitted on Oct. 10th, 1881 to both Sharif and Tawfik. (F.0.141/144;No.281).

(2) F.0.141/142; Telegs. Nos. 187 & 188 and F.0.141/147; Teleg. No.55.

(3) Egypte, Vol.69; No.10 Dir.Pol. & Vol.70; Teleg. dated Sept. 10th, 1881.
the Dreikaiserbund were behind the Sultan's decision, and advised the British Government to send warships to Alexandria in order to check the Ottoman mission and to advertise the complete agreement of England and France on Egyptian affairs. When this was duly decided on by the two Governments, the Sultan was incensed, since not only was the decision not based on any treaty rights; it would also expose Alexandria and the Mediterranean coast to danger, was calculated to cause agitation and disturbance among the whole Arab population, and might very well lead to a general revolution. The Sultan added that perfect order existed in Egypt, and that if France and England persevered in their demonstration, he would be compelled to take "certain measures" as regards Egypt. Sharif was also against the sending of the warships, since it would provoke renewed agitation, cause him to be distrusted, and weaken his authority. He was afraid lest their arrival should be regarded as a political demonstration and delay the departure of the Ottoman envoys. The two Consuls tried to reassure him, Malet by saying that the object of the British Government was to prevent any panic among the population, and Sienkiewicz by saying that

(1) F.0.141/147; No.55 & Angleterre, Vol.793; No.282 & Egypte, Vol.70; Teleg. to Sienkiewicz, dated Oct.11th,1881.

(2) The word used of these measures in a conversation between Tissot and the Sultan's Secretary was "anomalous". (F.O. 141/147; Teleg. No.70, F.O. to Malet, dated Oct. 12th,1881).
that of France was to support him (Sharīf) against the Turkish mission. (1)

The two Ambassadors then agreed to advise the Sultan to withdraw the mission in order to prevent possible disturbances. (2) On October 13th, the Ottoman Government duly assured them that the Sultan’s emissaries, having accomplished their mission in Egypt, would leave the country in three or four days' time, and expressed its wish that the two Governments should withdraw their ships. Musurus observed to Granville that it was impossible for the Sultan to withdraw his mission in face of the menace implied by the presence of these ships. (3) It was therefore agreed, as a compromise, that the ships and the mission should leave Egypt on the same day; and their departure was fixed for October 19th. The British ship, the "Invincible", however, arrived two days later than the "Alma" sent by France, when the Turkish envoys had already left Alexandria; and it was represented to the Sultan by Mr. Sanderson - the dragoman of the British Embassy - that it was France who had been

(1) Sienkiewicz, however, was not convinced by this explanation. He believed that the sending of the ships would weaken the position of the Sharīf Ministry, aggravate the state of agitation, and strengthen the hands of the Turkish envoys. (Egypte, Vol.70; Teleg. dated Oct.11th,1881 & No.44 Dir.Pol.).
(2) F.O.141/147; No.71, Granville to Malet, dated Oct.12th,1881.
(3) Egypte, Vol.70; St. Hilaire to Sienkiewicz, dated Oct.16th 1881.
behind the whole affair. (1)

During its stay in Egypt, the Ottoman mission achieved nothing worthy of note. (2) The envoys were hurriedly taken to visit the army headquarters, where Nizâmi delivered a strongly worded speech, in which he reminded the military that the Khedive was the representative of the Sultan and that disobedience to the one was disobedience to the other. Nothing further indeed seemed necessary. The Colonels had shown prompt obedience by leaving for their new quarters; and discipline seemed to be restored in the army.

Public opinion, as a whole, was suspicious of the mission. Its stay caused widespread uneasiness in the country, where the prospect of any Turkish interference and occupation was greatly dreaded. The European colonies, like the natives, felt that the mission constituted, if not a danger, at least a threat to the interests and future of Egypt. (3) The military, on the other hand, used its presence to strengthen their own cause. Extremist newspapers such as al-Hijaz, al-Burhân and al-Iskandarîya, which

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(3) F. O. 141/144; No. 291 Pol., Malet to F. O. dated Oct. 17th, 1881.

(4) Egypte, Vol. 70; No. 43, Dir. Pol. from Sienkiewicz, dated Oct. 10th, 1881.
had all recently appeared and were inspired by personalities such as ‘Abd Allah Nadīm - the Mirabeau of the Egyptian Revolution - treated the mission moderately, saying that it was intended to protect Egypt against its "enemies". (1)

As for the foreign representatives, although none of them except the Russian M. De Lex, contacted the envoys, (2) Sienkiewicz noticed that Malet was pleased at their presence in Egypt. (3)

Apart from the avowed objects and the activities of the mission, there is evidence (4) that it entered into secret communications with both Tawfīk and the notables. It appears that Tawfīk was invited to refuse the constitution requested by the chiefs of the Egyptian movement, "as Egypt could not have a different constitution from that of the rest of the Empire", and to request the despatch of a Turkish military force in the event of new disturbances starting in Egypt - an engagement that the Khedive declared to be impossible. The notables on their side were asked to declare that they favoured the partition of Egypt into three vilāyets or distinct provinces, a project particularly favoured by the Sultan who thought of it in a personal way,

(1) F.O.78/3325; Incl. in No.270 Pol., dated Malet Oct.6th,1881.
(2) Egypte, Vol.70; No.51 Dir.Pol. from Sienkiewicz, dated Oct. 18th,1881.
since it would obviously diminish the importance of all three. The notables who contacted the Turkish emissaries seem, however, to have received the project coldly. But some fifteen or sixteen persons, officers, *'Olāmā'* and *māshā'īkh al-balad*, who were also received by the emissaries, declared that they were in favour of the replacement of Tawfīk by Ḥalīm, and only awaited instructions from the Porte either to submit a general petition or to provoke a general uprising. To their disappointment, the Sultan did not answer except by conferring on Tawfīk the diamonds of the Order called the *Imtivāzī Nīshānī*, which necessitated his paying a visit to the Ottoman capital.

Although in the Palace at Istanbul it was thought that the mission had proved more harmful than useful to the Sultan's prestige, Nizāmī, in his report on its achievements, asserted that the Arab population were attached to the person of the Sultan, and that the emissaries had received "despatches and deputations from the most remote places - even from Fez and Abyssinia". (2)

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(1) The correspondent of *The Pall Mall Gazette* wrote on Dec. 20th, 1881, "Its only important converts have been the Court or Turkish party, known here as the Circassians and some five-and-twenty... *Sheikhs* of the Azhar, who with... the *Sheikh al-Islam Muḥammad al-‘Abbāsī*, have for sometime past been the instruments of the reigning power. To these last the Sultan sent the presents and decorations, but the main body of the... *'Olāmā'* scouted his overtures, and were so incensed against... *al-‘Abbāsī* that they deposed him from his office in December and elected in his stead the representative of the most liberal party among them, *Muḥammad al-Imbābī*, supporter of National as opposed to Panislamic views in politics". Cont'd over...
As regards the idea of a separate Arab Empire, which we giving anxiety at Istanbul, the emissaries concealed the importance of the Arab movement from the Sultan. Yet Tawfik received a long despatch about it from the Porte; and one of the emissaries, Ahmad Rātib Pasha, who left Suez on October 21st for Jedda, after having met 'Orābī en route, was instructed to conduct special enquiries, with the object of discovering if there was any kind of alliance between the Arabs of Asia and Africa, and any special contact between them during the Pilgrimage. It is probable also that Rātib was instructed to observe how Midhat was faring in his exile in Arabia, and whether he was indulging in any propagandist activities among the Arabs. (1)

The Despatch of November 4th, 1881:

After the departure of the Nizāmi mission, Tawfik announced his intention of visiting Istanbul, in order to receive his Order from the Sultan in person, according to protocol. Sienkiewicz imagined this to be a means of preparing for Turkish military intervention: that Tawfik would return at the head of a Turkish expedition, and advised his Government to try and stop the visit, or at

(2) from previous page...

(1) this page....
least cause its adjournment, lest it should be regarded as a consequence of the mission. By joint advice from Paris and London Tawfik was accordingly dissuaded. (1)

The Khedive was still hostile to Sharif as an old and obedient servant of his father, suspecting him of intriguing for the latter's return; and, observing Tawfik's complete submission to Malet at that time, the Phare d'Alexandrie and the Arab press, using the most violent language, accused Malet openly of trying to bring about Sharif's downfall. The "Invincible", moreover, not only arrived late at Alexandria, but then remained there for some time, and to explain its presence the British Consulate thought fit to announce that the foreign colonies were in danger. This announcement together with the prevailing agitation more than sufficed to dissipate the calm that had ensued on the departure of the Ottoman envoys and the submission of the Colonels. Moreover, the French newspaper L'Egypte aggravated the state of unrest by publishing an article in which Muhammad was described as a "faux prophète", the result of which was the suppression of the newspaper and the departure of its editor, M. Laffon. (3) Although the native newspapers, which

had endured so much under Riyāḍ, seized the opportunity under the Sharīf Ministry of attacking the foreigners, whom it considered as the real cause of Riyāḍ's campaign against the freedom of the press, its general attitude was strongly nationalist but otherwise conciliatory. (3) It had every right to attack the privileges enjoyed by the foreigners in Egypt to the detriment of the national budget, and to reply to the accusations of the European press whether in Egypt itself or abroad. Al-Ḥijāz, however, did not follow the moderate line of the native press in general, but was so vehement in its campaign against Europeans as even to preach a "Holy War". (4) In compliance with remonstrations from Sienkiewicz, it too was accordingly suppressed. (2)

The internal situation was thus complicated by other matters besides the difficulty of the Colonels. Sharīf, it is true, was still able to maintain the Ministry owing both to his own prestige and to the support of the French representative, who was afraid lest his downfall would mean complete anarchy. But as Sienkiewicz wrote on November 8th, "during

(3) Ibid. Loc cit.
(4) The British and the French Archives contain a good deal of information relating to the Egyptian Press, especially the then newly inaugurated newspapers, which mostly disappeared after the British occupation and of which complete collections are not to be found in the public libraries of Egypt.
(2) ʿEgypte  Vol.71; No.64 dated Nov. 5th,1881. Sharīf enacted a law which limited the freedom of the press, and which has been enforced in ʿEgypt, more or less unchanged, ever since. - Cf. ʿIbrāhīm ʿAbduh, op. cit., 111-112.
these last days, every means has been used to shake his authority. The strangest rumours have been propagated; there have been attempts to frighten commercial and financial circles; the most alarming telegrams have been sent abroad; the resignation ofSharif has been announced, and hopes have been expressed thatSharif himself will renounce power. Destructive action of this kind would end in weakening the best possible government. The French Agent attributed every attempt made to weaken the Ministry to Tawfik's desire of regaining his authority and taking his revenge either by communication with Istanbul or by other means. He asserted that Malet was hostile to Sharif and that what the British desired was the downfall of the Ministry so that it might be taken over by Nubar, who was then again in Europe on a "dubious mission".

Malet, who knew well that mistrust of British policy was growing instead of diminishing, felt that the British Government ought to take some step that would have a calming effect on the public, and proclaim its true intentions.

(1) Egypte, Vol.70; No.55 Confid. supra.
(2) Nubar had offered his services to the military party, proposing that, if they would give him the premiership, he would direct the National movement himself. Orabi and his friends, however, rejected his offer, in view of his suspect antecedents. Cf. Orabi's Memoirs, I, 97-8.
(3) Cf. Malet, op.cit. 175-194, for the text of the Despatch and the correspondence relating to it. The text of the Despatch is also found in F.O.141/142; No.216.
Granville accepted his proposal and on November 4th sent him a famous Despatch, which was published on November 15th in the Egyptian press, being thus addressed direct to Egyptian public opinion. The chief points made in this Despatch were the following:

1. That the status quo should be preserved, and the ties that linked Egypt to Turkey maintained;

2. That the progressive reforms undertaken by the Egyptian Government should be encouraged, on condition of their not running counter to national traditions;

3. That the British Government had not afforded any special support to the Riyāḍ Ministry; (1)

and

4. That intervention was not contemplated except on the occurrence of a "state of anarchy".

Although Malet asserts that the effect of the Despatch on Egyptian public opinion was satisfactory, yet the silence of the French Government was interpreted in Egypt as proof of a certain discord between Paris and London, and it was feared that England was seizing the chance of acting alone. (2)

(1) Compare this with Malet's support for Riyāḍ during the mutiny of February. Vide ante, (269).

(2) Egypete, Vol. 70; No. 74 from Sienkiewicz, dated Nov. 22nd, 1881 & Hist. de la Nat. Eg. VI, 372-3.
Intelligent observers were struck by the phrase "state of anarchy", which in their view nullified the effect of the Despatch as a whole; since a government when declaring its policy to be contingent on such a state of affairs, clearly exhibited some arrière pensée. A "state of anarchy" is a vague term, which can be used according to circumstances. That Malet was inclined to think it highly imminent may be shown by his remark to Sienkiewicz that "Orabî's presence at Cairo at the inauguration of the Chamber of Delegates (which was to take place on December 15th) furnished "un état d'anarchie très caractérisé" by indicating that there was no government in Egypt. (1)

Malet, on his side, asserts that he redoubled his efforts to move quietly along on the path of reform, "trying to remedy abuses and building hopes for the future on the Chamber of Notables". (2) The inauguration of the Chamber was thus considered as a turning point in Egypt's domestic and foreign affairs, not only by the Nationalists but also by Malet himself, who repeats in his book, in the face of all that was said about his real intentions, that he was a zealous sympathiser with constitutionalism in Egypt.

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(1) Egypte, Vol. 70; No. 77 Confid., from Sienkiewicz, dated Nov. 28th, 1881.
(2) Malet, op. cit., 186.
Chapter VII

The Chamber of Delegates

and

The Joint Note

"Nous ne faisons pas de la démocratie pour l'exportation". Gambetta quoted in Reinach, Le Ministère Gambetta, p. 38

The resumption of parliamentary life:

In order to withstand foreign pressure, Ismā'īl had conceded Egypt's first constitution. But parliamentary life was not compatible with the influence acquired by the French and British; and thus the arbitrary power of the Khedive was restored under Tawfīk, and reaction, personified in the two Powers' nominee, Riyāḍ, supported. Yet the forces of liberalism are difficult to check, even though it may be easy for a time to stop the wheel of progress. Europe was defied in Egypt on European principles, and the genuine demand of the military for a constitution corresponded to the aspirations of the intelligentsia and the inclinations of the Delegates, who had sat in the former sessions during Ismā'īl's reign. Some of the latter had acquired a certain
skill in the use of parliamentary methods; they had seen the Assembly invested with new privileges; and they therefore supported ‘Orābī and encouraged him in effecting his coup de force.

Four days after the formation of the new Ministry, the Notables called on Sharīf, and submitted to him a demand for the convocation of a Chamber of Delegates to be "endowed with such rights as those of civilised European countries". (1) Sharīf forwarded the demand to the Khedive, and proposed general elections. He moreover demanded and obtained authority to submit the new draft Constitution, not to the Khedive, but to the Chamber. He was probably led to do this both by his experience at the beginning of Tawfīk's reign and by his discussions with the notables. The Khedive accepted all the proposals, and "thus the body representing the notables acquired the status of a National Assembly". (2)

It was evident from the start that the two classes which had been united during the events of September 1881 represented two clashing interests. The bourgeois and quasi-feudal notables were unwilling to go as far as the army, which was mainly composed of fellāhīn, and whose leaders, being all men of humble birth, proved to be more radical than the notables had expected.

(2) Abulleef, op. cit., 174.
Sharif was a wealthy Turk, far from genuinely sympathising with the fellāhin. He later said to Blunt, "The Egyptians are children and must be treated as children. I have offered them a Constitution which is good enough for them, and if they are not content with it they must do without one. It was I who created the National Party and they will find that they cannot get on without me. These peasants want guidance". (1) By convoking the Chamber, which would by degrees become the "legitimate exponent of the internal wants of the country", Sharīf hoped to deprive the army of the character "which it had arrogated to itself in the late movement". (2) He insisted that the Chamber should be convened according to the restrictive Law of 1866, while Orābī and many of the Notables were bent on putting into force the Law of 1879. (3) When, however, Sharīf threatened to resign, Orābī and the liberals gave way, though they made sure that the Chamber itself would discuss the Organic Law.

The elections began on November 10th; but, though quite free, only a small minority of the people - drawn wholly from the ruling class - were entitled to vote. The members

(1) That he spoke in this sense is confirmed by Rivers Wilson. Glad. Pap., Wilson to Gladstone, dated Sept. 8th, 1882. (Mss. 4475).
(2) Cromer, op. cit. I, 206.
of the 1881-2 Assembly were thus all Notables. (1) On December 26th, 1881, the new session of the Assembly was opened by the Khedive and his Ministers. Many people, both natives and foreigners, came up from the provinces to Cairo for the occasion. Ceremonies and banquets were held at Cairo and Alexandria; and prayers were said in mosques all over the country for the Chamber. (2)

After the Khedive's speech, and that of Sultān Pasha, the President of the Chamber, Tawfīk appointed the various officials of the Assembly. Sultān, who had supported Ḥarīb in September, seems even at that time to have had some secret contact with the Khedive as well, so that his appointment to the Presidency was acceptable to both Ḥarīb and Tawfīk. (3) Sultān was a fellāḥ by birth. He had begun his life as a peasant in the very village where he now held open house, a fact that rendered him very popular with the inhabitants of the Minya province, where he had amassed vast estates through being Inspector-General of Upper Egypt under Ismā'īl. Though deeply ambitious and somewhat given to intrigue, he was no politician. Having been repeatedly elected to the Chamber in the past, he was on good terms with Sharīf, Nūbar

(1) Ibid, 29.
(2) Kashf al-Sitar, 296.
(3) Landau, op. cit., 35.
and Riyād alike, thus being certainly no party man. He was generally of moderate and conservative views. (1)

Sir Edward Malet notes that the country seemed generally relieved by the meeting of the Chamber and that the Khedive and the Ministry were hopeful. He was quite sure that the country was passing into a constitutional phase. (2) On January 2nd, 1882, he wrote to Lord Granville, "the Khedive is cheerful in mood and taking a hopeful view of the situation. He spoke with much satisfaction of the apparently moderate tendencies of the Delegates and he expressed his belief that the country would now progress. The change was very noticeable, because His Highness had up to the time of the opening of the Chamber been full of misgiving, and I feared that this feeling was prompted not only by a mistrust of what the Delegates might do, but also by a dislike of the Chamber as an institution. His Highness appears, however, to have accepted the situation, and it is the more fortunate, since while he has qualities which may make him a very good constitutional Prince, he lacks those which are necessary in a despotic ruler". (3)

Sir Auckland Colvin, in contrast, took a pessimistic view of the new situation, because of the problem of the budget and the increase of the army which had already been mooted.

(2) The Gran. Pap. 160, Malet to Granville dated Jan. 2nd, 1882
(3) F.0. 78/3434, No. 3 Confid. These two letters of Malet's were unfortunately received by the Foreign Office on the 9th of Jan. after the Note had already been addressed to the Egyptian Government.
Formal consideration of this increase began in November 1881. The Controllers dealt only with the financial side of the question, showing that funds for the proposed increase did not exist. The British Government supported the Controllers and Sharif "sided entirely with the Control, and was equally resolved not to give way". This was also the line taken by Malet, who saw that the Control "would lose all consideration were it to yield further". However, on December 21st a compromise was reached by a reduction of the proposed expenditure on the army from £268,000 to £154,000. (1)

On December 26th, on the convocation of the Chamber, Colvin suggested that the two Governments, while the movement was in its infancy, should "authoritatively" state that while leaving full liberty to the Egyptians to frame what measures they pleased for their internal government, so far as these were not inconsistent with the status acquired by the Powers, the latter in no way renounced the material interest and the guarantees they possessed and that it was their intention to maintain them. He believed that if a clear announcement were not made from the first, much misunderstanding would arise, and that the relations between Egypt and the Powers would probably become more embittered.

in that case than if such a declaration were made when the
Chamber was only beginning its labours. (1) The Controllers
thus seemed in fact to favour the constitutional experiment
only as long as it did not amount to a threat to the Control
and to their acquired authority. However, in the end,
everyone professed respect for the Control. Sultan Pasha
directed the Notables' attention to its authority at the
opening of the Chamber. One of the principal 'Olamä'
declared that there was no desire to get rid of the Control
but that, on the contrary, they all considered it as a safe-
guard; (2) and even 'Orābī himself said later, after the
presentation of the Joint Note, that the Deputies ought
not in the circumstances to have the right to vote the
Budget. (3)

'Orābī appointed Under-Minister of War: -

At the beginning of 1882, 'Orābī was appointed Under-
Minister of War. The intention of the Ministry, which was
suspicious of his propagandist activities in the Sharkīya
province, (4) where he was stationed, was to make use of his
influence. The Controllers and Malet thought it better
that he should be inside than outside the administration; (5)
and though some people, who saw in him the real leader of
both the army and the National Party, hoped that his appoint-

\[(1)\] F.0.141/144; Draft No.389 Confid., Malet to F.0., dated
Dec. 26th, 1881. Compare this with Colvin's Memorandum of the
same date in which he professed sympathy with the revolution.
The Colvin Mem. is enclosed in Malet's No.389 to F.0. dated
Dec. 26th, 1882 (reprod. in F.0.146/2411).

See next page for rest of ff.
ment would attach him to the government, others merely took it as a sign of the government's weakness. Sienkiewicz for his part doubted whether the appointment would affect the general situation one way or the other. (1)

Blunt and Gregory:

The National movement had by this time won the overwhelming majority of the Egyptians to its side. As the Correspondent of The Pall Mall Gazette wrote, (2) "No greater mistake can be made than to accept the assertion that the movement is confined to the towns of Cairo and Alexandria. I have had occasion, during the last eighteen months, to visit many of the villages, and I may say with absolute certainty, that all the leading men, the Sheikhs, the mudirs (if not Turks), the various mufattishes - in fact all the people who influence the masses, are warm supporters of the National Party. The fellah certainly knows little about matters political, but his experience of the Turkish and European interference with his affairs makes him

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(2) Malet, op. cit., 208.
(3) Gran. Pap., 160; Malet to Granville, dated Jan.11th, 1882.
(4) Kashf al-Sitar, 269.
(5) F.0.146/2410 repro. Malet's Desp. of Jan.5th, 1882 to Granville.

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(1) Egypte, Vol.72; No.113 Sienkiewicz to Gambetta dated Jan.23rd, 1882.
(2) Jerrold, The Belgium of the East, 131-2. Blunt made observations similar to those of this correspondent in a letter to Gladstone, in which he answered certain questions addressed to him by the latter. (Glad.Pap.; Ms.14110 dated Feb.16th, 1882) This letter proves Cromer (1,279) to have been mistaken in stating that "Mr. Blunt was not in correspondence with any one connected with the Government".
view such interference as not an unmixed blessing. The Turks, by means of the Kurbash, extorted from him the last piastre possible, the Greek and Italian money-lender does the same by means of the Mixed Tribunals. Who can wonder at his supporting the sheikh of his village, and through him the National Party?"

Malet, whose chief aim was to maintain British influence, became convinced that there existed in Egypt the "first attempt of a Mussulman country at Parliamentary government". It therefore seemed best to him to accept the accomplished fact, and change his tactics accordingly; and through Wilfrid Blunt and Sir William Gregory he found a means of influencing the Nationalists and winning them to the British side. Of these two Blunt was a prominent orientalist and an ex-official of the British diplomatic service. He had a romantic admiration for the career of Lord Byron, to whose granddaughter he was married, and it became his ambition to link his name with the regeneration of Islam throughout the Arabic-speaking world from the Atlantic to the Tigris. Gregory was a notable member of the Liberal Party, who, however, had been forgotten by London while in Ceylon as Governor-General, and now thought of regaining his fame.

by some brilliant deed. (1) As we can see from his "Autobiography", he conceived that he might best serve British interests by putting an end to both the Control and the Anglo-French entente on the one hand, and, on the other, by offering *Orābī* the hand of friendship and the promise of support. (2) Subsequent events were to show that, whereas Blunt fought for Egypt alone, Gregory fought for England first and for Egypt second.

After the events of September Blunt and Gregory became the self-appointed advisers of the National Party. In agreement with Muhammad *Abdulh, they resolved for a propagandist press-campaign in The Times. On January 1st, 1882, an article appeared outlining the programme of the National Party; (3) and by this and other articles British public opinion was given a true picture of the situation. *Orābī* was represented in his true character of a reformer anxious to redress the grievances of his fellow-countrymen, as a champion of Egyptian nationality, and as a patriot desirous of establishing the independence of the country and of freeing her from foreign rule.

*Orābī* looked to England rather than France for sympathy in his struggle for freedom, and especially to Gladstone,

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(1) Dicey, Khedivate, 260.
who had shown himself the friend of liberty everywhere. He placed every confidence in Blunt and Gregory and sometimes left the initiative to them. Their press-campaign was successful at first in winning over to the cause of the National Party that section of the British public which was ready to sympathize with any persecuted nationality outside the British Isles. Gladstone himself, if only he had received consistent reports from Egypt, would probably have been won over to the Nationalists. "Egypt for the Egyptians", he wrote on January 4th, 1882, "is the sentiment to which I should wish to give scope, and could it prevail, it would, I think, be the best, the only solution of the Egyptian question". He suggested that if the "Orābī movement in Egypt was truly national, England and France should not oppose it, because this would lead to trouble. (1) At the same time, the reports of Malet and Colvin were contradictory, and hence Gladstone applied to Egypt the safe rule of "wait and see". The situation in Egypt, however, was soon after aggravated by the Note of January 6th, 1882, and Gladstone was at last convinced, especially by Malet and Colvin, that the movement was military, with all the demerits he hated in military regimes.

(1) Knaplund, op. cit., 15 & 171.
Unfortunately Gregory and Blunt helped to mislead Orabi by persuading him that Gladstone would never sanction single-handed British intervention. They exaggerated the jealousies which undoubtedly divided but did not paralyse the Powers; and Orabi was convinced that France would never agree to co-operate. All this had its repercussions in the attitude of the Nationalists, and in the resultant crises which led to the occupation. (1) Hence it is that many French writers argue that Blunt and Gregory were sent by the Foreign Office to excite the Nationalists and furnish an opportunity for British military intervention.

Although it is clear from various communications that Blunt and Gregory were at no point employed to carry out a special mission in Egypt, Sir Charles Dilke wrote in December 1881 that Malet was managing the Colonels through Blunt; (2) and this is confirmed by a passage in a letter of Malet's dated the 26th of that month. "It is also", he wrote, "to a certain extent, to our interest that the movement should develop...... with our assistance, and there is no doubt that at the present moment the National Party

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(2) Gwynn & Tuckwell, *op. cit.*, 259.
looks exclusively to England for help…… As the movement is one which, as far rumoured as I can judge, has taken too much consistency to be stopped, it is useful that it should be in some sense guided by a person of education and knowledge of the institutions in the world……"(1)

Blunt, (2) on his side, makes it clear that his support of the Nationalists was spontaneous and that he had tried to give the Europeans in Cairo a true picture of the whole situation. "Even Colvin," he says, "who had three months before given the Khedive the heroic advice to shoot Arabi, professed himself converted and half inclined to come to terms with the revolution". (3)

From all this it would appear that the aim of Blunt and Gregory - in their character as go-betweens - was to induce the Nationalists to be moderate and to achieve a modus vivendi between the revolution and the British Government, if possible in concert with Malet and Colvin, or independently if that seemed too difficult. Malet and Colvin were handicapped by their past antagonism to the National movement, and by the prevailing suspicion of Malet's intrigues. In the beginning the relations of all four were harmonious, but subsequently those between Malet and Blunt developed in

(1) Malet, op. cit. 208 and footnote in 211-12.
(3) In his Memorandum of December 26th 1881, Colvin in fact stated that it would be most "impolitic" to thwart the Egyptian movement, the national character of which he fully recognized. Vide the text of the Mem. in Cromer, op. cit., I, 218 ff.
such a way as to show that each had thought he was using
the other as a tool. (1) Their estimates of the situation
were quite at variance; and Malet even complained more
than once of Blunt's interference with the Nationalists.

Gambetta and the Joint Note:

On the opening of the Chamber a general calm descended
on the country, and all seemed likely to go on smoothly, when
the whole situation was completely changed by the misplaced
and unnecessary intervention of France and England. This
was chiefly due to Léon Gambetta, who had formed his "Grand
Ministère" on November 14th 1881, keeping for himself the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Gambetta, (2) (l'homme de la revanche) aimed in his
foreign policy at strengthening France's position abroad by
means of colonialism in North Africa, and the establishment
of a closer Franco-British entente on the Continent, to
which this colonial policy should be subordinated. He was
convinced that France, whose chief interests lay in the
Mediterranean, and England, whose chief concern, he thought,
was for the security of her Indian Empire, might act together
without danger to their respective interests. While

(1) Gwynn & Tuckwell, op. cit. 259.
(2) For Gambetta's policy vide: Hanotaux, Hist. de la France
Cont., IV, 744; Carroll, French Public Opinion and
foreign affairs, 91-2; Hippeau, Hist. Dipl. de la
Troisième République, 408; Geignerot, op. cit., 123;
Hist de la Na. Ég. VI, 376; Vélay, op. cit., 381;
Newman, Great Britain in Egypt, 52-69 & 84-88; Reinach,
Le Ministère Gambetta, 456-7, 383 & 412-13; Égypte,

(continued on next page ...)
regarding collaboration with England in Egypt as a necessary evil, and over-estimating the privileged situation of the two Powers there to the exclusion of the European concert, he at the same time took great care not to allow England any preponderance, and aimed indeed at restoring that of France by every means at her disposal. Gambetta had no regard for Egyptian nationalism, which he described as "Moslem fanaticism", "entreprises d'une solidesque casernée" and "chimères de révolution", and therefore "Egypt for the Egyptians" had but one meaning for him: "Egypt for England".

In order to strengthen the Franco-British alliance, which was the corner-stone of his political system, and which would be basically compromised by a single-handed British occupation of Egypt, Gambetta advocated an immediate intervention in Egypt with the object of putting an end to the National movement. Thus tranquillity was to be restored in Egypt before the movement became too strong to overcome, the Control to regain its solidity, and the entente to be cemented in the eyes of the whole world. What Gambetta desired was an Anglo-French occupation in which England should demonstrate with her fleet at Alexandria while France

continuing (2) from previous page ...
landed troops. (1) He decided secretly to oppose intervention on the part of Great Britain alone, since he was convinced that if the condominium were loyally served, it would save and strengthen the Anglo-French alliance.

The opening of the Chamber of Delegates furnished Gambetta with the opportunity of furthering his general policy. On December 15th, 1881, he told Lord Lyons that "he considered it to be extremely important to strengthen the authority of Tewfik Pasha. On the one hand, every endeavour should be made to inspire Tewfik himself with confidence in the support of France and England, and to infuse into him firmness and energy." (2)

Gambetta was more than a match for the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, who lacked resource and was content to deal with each particular situation as it arose, to overcome any immediate difficulty by which he was confronted, and to avoid commitments and responsibility. Granville was obliged to work with France, and he was aware

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(1) After his downfall Gambetta told Freycinet that a landing force, including 6,000 marines, had actually been assembled in Provence, ready to sail for Egypt at a few day's notice. Cf. Freycinet, Souvenirs, II, 214.

(2) For the negotiations relating to the issue of the Note, vide: Cromer, op. cit., I, 215 ff. & Malet, op. cit., 208.
that to do this he must renounce all idea of bringing the Porte into play in Egypt, but he was far from contemplating a combination with France such as would lead to joint military intervention. Being well acquainted with French policy he perceived Gambetta's object. "We certainly ought not to be the first to break with France", he wrote to Gladstone on December 15th, 1881. "They will propose joint occupation which is very awkward. I am not sure that it would not be better, hateful as it is, to insist upon Turkish occupation, under strict conditions". (1) But he could not answer Gambetta unfavourably, owing to the entente between the two Powers, and was obliged to concur in his plans, leaving him the initiative. On December 19th he replied to Gambetta's communication as follows: Her Majesty's Government also think that it is desirable that some evidence should be given of their cordial understanding; but that it requires careful consideration what steps should be taken in case of disorder again re-appearing."

Granville's consent to the French proposal implied a confirmation of the entente, and of the British engagement not to take action in Egypt without prior agreement with

(1) "The main advantage of this solution", wrote Herbert Bismarck to his father from London, "was that the Concert of Europe would not be disturbed by it, whereas any other might produce misunderstandings between the European Powers." Dugdale, op. cit., citing Die Grösser Politik, IV. Herbert Bismarck to Bismarck dated Jan. 7th, 1882."
France. There is no evidence, however, to support Blunt's\(^{(1)}\) argument that, in consenting to the Note, the Foreign Office was influenced by the fact that certain abortive negotiations were then in progress with France over the prolongation of a commercial treaty. Moreover, it seems that Granville was not Gambetta's dupe. He foresaw that the "Grand Ministère" would not long survive,\(^{(2)}\) and so agreed to Gambetta's proposal, while secretly intending to defer any consequent action as long as might prove possible.

When Granville received Malet's concurrence in the terms of the Note,\(^{(3)}\) as well as that of the Cabinet,\(^{(4)}\) he told Lyons to convey to Gambetta the British Government's assent, but with the reservation "that they must not be considered as committing themselves thereby to any particular mode of action, if action should be found necessary".\(^{(5)}\)


\(^{(2)}\) Granville hinted to this in a conversation with the French Ambassador, M. Tissot, on Oct. 30th, 1882.

\(^{(3)}\) The aforementioned Colvin Memorandum was conveyed by Malet only on the 30th of Dec., 1881.

\(^{(4)}\) Joseph Chamberlain opposed, but was in a minority. Cf. his Memoirs, 70-71.

This reservation in fact annulled its whole effect. Moreover, the explanatory language used by Granville on the one hand and Lyons on the other was not identical. Gambetta hence gained the impression that while Granville wished to avoid all speculation on possible joint action at a later date, all he was refusing was to consider himself committed by the identical declaration to the precise mode of such action. The French Ambassador in London, M. Challemel-Lacour, was therefore informed by Granville that the Note "ought not to be considered except as an encouragement to the Khedive, and a purely platonic encouragement which did not imply the promise of any sanction". (1)

The effect of the Note in Egypt:

The instructions sent to Malet on January 6th, 1882, which were identical with those sent to Sienkiewicz, ran thus:-

"Sir - You have already been instructed on several occasions to inform the Khedive and his government of the determination of France and England to afford them support against the difficulties of various kinds which might interfere with public affairs in Egypt.

"The two powers are entirely agreed on this subject, and

(1) Angleterre, Vol. 794: No 5, Gambetta to Challemel-Lacour, dated Jan. 7th & Nos. 1 & 3 Dir. Pol. from Challemel-Lacour to Gambetta, dated Jan. 9th & 17th, 1882. Challemel-Lacour regarded the British reservation as purely formal, but at the same time both pointless and untimely, since Gambetta had not yet mooted intervention in any form."
recent circumstances especially the meeting of the Chamber of Notables convoked by the Khedive, have given them the opportunity for a further exchange of views.

"I have accordingly to instruct you to declare to Tewfik Pasha, after having come to an agreement with M. Sienkiewicz that the English and French Governments consider the maintenance of His Highness on the throne, on terms laid down by the Sultan's firmans, and officially recognized by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee for the present and future, the good order and the development of general prosperity in Egypt in which France and England are equally interested.

"The two Governments, being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all cause of complications, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt, do not doubt that the assurance publicly given of their formal intentions in this respect, will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and which would certainly find France and England united to oppose them. They are convinced that His Highness will draw from this assurance the confidence and strength which he requires to direct the destinies of Egypt and its people".
The Note was naturally ill-received by the Egyptians. It clearly indicated that they were not to enjoy the full liberty they desired to frame such measures as they might wish for their internal government, even within the limits required by the Powers. Till the Note was presented, the Egyptian revolution had not reached a stage at which foreign intervention might be provoked. The Khedive had not asked the two Powers for assistance, or even for a promise of assistance. The allusion to "internal complications" meant the National movement, the army and the Chamber, and that to "external complications" meant the Sultan and his Panislamism, so that warnings were thus addressed to all parties. Nobody was aware of any reason why the Note had been delivered, and it was felt that so serious a step could not have been taken without deliberate calculation and must portend important developments. It was therefore assumed to mean that the Sultan was to be thrust still further into the background, that the Khedive was to become more plainly than ever the puppet of England and France, and that Egypt, sooner or later, in some way or other, was to share the disastrous fate of Tunis. Malet was considered

as an arch traitor, who had lured the Nationalists into believing that England was favourable to reform with the sole object of creating an excuse for intervention, and that he wished to play in Egypt the part played by Roustan in Tunis.

The leaders of the army considered the Note to be primarily directed against their movement. They assembled at the Ministry of War to discuss the situation and there they were joined by al-Bārūdī who, after having appeased their alarm and anger, went to the Cabinet and told his colleagues of the effect of the Note on the officers. The Ministers, headed by Sharīf, went to the Khedive; and it was agreed to communicate the Note to the Porte saying that they did not accept it. (1) The Notables, however, blamed the Khedive who, they thought, had requested Malet to obtain a declaration of this nature from the British Government, and Malet was forced into causing The Egyptian Gazette to publish an article on January 14th denying this allegation. (2) The general effect was to make all Egyptians conscious of the necessity of closing their ranks; and since the Note had indirectly given the impression that military intervention was impending, 'Orābī and the military were naturally in everybody's mouth.

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(1) *Orabi's Memoirs*, I, 110.
The Note was equally ill-received by the Agents of Germany, Austria and Italy who considered it to be directed against them. They accordingly called on Sharif, to whom they expressed their discontent at the exclusive role played by England and France. Sharif then called in turn on the two Consuls, and told them that the impression created by the Note had been most unfavourable. Firstly, he said, it was regarded as encouraging the Khedive to oppose reform; secondly its wording showed a spirit unfavourable to the Chamber by connecting the events of September with its opening; thirdly it indicated a desire to loosen the connection of Egypt with the Porte; and fourthly it contained a threat of intervention which nothing in the state of the country justified. He expressed the hope that the two Powers would make, as soon as possible, a further communication destroying such an impression, which he felt sure they had not intended to convey.

Sienkiewicz, however, was adamant and even repeated the threat of military intervention. When Sharif told him it was intended that the Khedive should reply to the Note, he vehemently opposed the idea, not on account of what the reply

(1) Ibid. & Teleg. dated Jan. 8th, 1882 from Sienkiewicz.
(2) F.O.141/159. No.7, Malet to F.O. dated Jan. 9th, 1882.
might contain, but as constituting a precedent. He contended that Egypt had only to listen to the advice of the two Powers and be silent.  

Malet, on the contrary, was critical of the Note. He confessed to Granville that he was so anxious to prevent intervention at all hazards that he would even prefer it if the Egyptians were left to manage their own country without the Control. He trusted that there might be a way out of the difficulty, for he owned to having a repugnance to wars engaged in on behalf of bondholders, and warned Granville that this one would only result in frustrating "the first attempt of a Mussulman country at parliamentary government".  

He tried to appease the fury of the Orabists through Blunt, in order to show Sharif that he was opposed to the Note, and suggested to Granville that its terms should be explained in a further communication. Granville on this instructed Lyons to propose this to Gambetta, urging that the following points should be made: that the purport of the Note had been misinterpreted, partly in consequence of comments made by the European press; that the British Government had in no way departed from the policy laid down in the Despatch of November 4th; that they were as much as ever averse from intervention.

(3) "C'est sur le parti dit national" observed Sienkiewicz, "que mon collègue fait actuellement exposer son action". Sienkiewicz's Desp., marked Confid., of Jan. 10th, 1882.
either by the two Powers or by others; that they looked upon the experiment of the Chamber with favourable eyes; that they wished to maintain the connection of the Porte with Egypt as far as was compatible with the liberties which had been accorded to Egypt; and that the object of the Note was to strengthen the government of Egypt and maintain the existing state of affairs. (1)

Gambetta, however, was utterly opposed to such a course, which he considered "ni opportun ni habile". He said that it behoved France and England to stand firm, lest any appearance of vacillation on their part should encourage the pretentions of the Notables to lay their hands on the budget, and argued that such interference on their part would inevitably lead to the overthrow of the arrangement made by the Liquidation Commission, the subversion of the Franco-British Control, and the ruin of the Egyptian finances. He was convinced, he said, that any explanation of the Note would increase the arrogance of the opponents of France and England and encourage them in their designs on the budget. (2)

Nevertheless, the difference of language and interpretation

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(1) F.O.141/158; No. 6, F.O. to Malet, dated Jan. 10th, 1882.

used by Malet and Sienkiewicz could not fail to be remarked by the Nationalists. (1) They were further encouraged, moreover, to defy the two Powers by the opposition offered by the Porte and the European concert to this action on the part of England and France.

The attitude of Turkey and the Continental Powers: -

On hearing that the Note had been presented, the Sultan was greatly alarmed and irritated. He complained to the other Great Powers, and sent a special envoy to Bismarck, who was then busy trying to increase German influence at Istanbul. Lord Granville hastened to assure his Ambassadors in the great capitals and at the Porte that there was no change in British views as expressed in the Note of November 4th regarding the Sultan's position in relation to Egypt, and that there was no truth in the newspaper reports that the French Government had proposed to the British or that the

(1) "La note commune", observed Gambetta, "perd en effet beaucoup de sa force si Granville écarte à priori absolument et quoiqu'il arrive toute idée d'une action future entre les Puissances......La note commune surtout m'aurait plus aucune utilité s'il arrivait à Malet de tenir au Caire le même langage que nous avons tenu Granville. Je persiste à croire que même en reservant les résolutions à venir, la note par elle-même seule était une résolution effective". (Angleterre, Vol.794; No.10 Dir.Pol., dated Jan, 19th, 1882, to Challemel-Lacour).
latter had agreed, to promise the Khedive material support. Granville further remarked that there were precedents for the Note in previous communications made on other special occasions, and that these had not been construed as either ignoring or implying doubts of the Sultan's sovereignty. (1) The Sultan and the Porte were not satisfied with this explanation, or with Gambetta's defence of the Note, whose purpose, he said, was to fortify the authority of the Fermāns by which Tawfīk ruled and to affirm the status quo. (2) A strongly worded protest was circulated to the Ottoman Ambassadors in the great capitals. After referring to its relations with Egypt, the Porte stated that there was nothing in the internal circumstances of that country to justify the step taken by France and England, and that if any such communication had been necessary, it should have been transmitted through the channel of the Porte. As it was, it constituted an infraction of the Sultan's sovereign rights over Egypt. (3)

Gambetta's desire to keep Europe out of his counsels and repudiate the claims of Turkey as a Suzerain Power thus landed him in an awkward position, not only in the

(1) F.O.78/3377; Draft No.13, Granville to Dufferin, dated Jan.9th, 1882 & F.O.141/152; No.78, dated Jan.19th,1882, F.O. to Malet.
(2) Egypte, Vol.72; Desp. dated Jan.18th, from Gambetta to Challemel-Lacour, Sienkiewicz and Tissot.
(3) F.O.78/3377: No.42, Granville to Dufferin, dated Jan.26th, 1882.
great capitals, but especially in his own country, where it was feared lest he should embark on an adventure abroad at a time when the Tunisian policy of his predecessors was still being vehemently attacked. Europe would no doubt have been silent in the presence of an accomplished fact; but her attitude in face of a mere declaration was one of manifest ill-humour. In Germany, Austria, Italy and Russia the authority of the Sultan was vigourously defended; and the language of the leading politicians of those countries gave the impression that if any action became necessary, they would prefer intervention by Turkey. (1) On February 2nd the four Powers sent an identical answer to the Porte's protest. They stated that they desired the preservation of the status quo in Egypt on the basis of existing European engagements and of the Fermans of the Sultans, and that they were of opinion that the status quo could not legally be modified except by accord between the Great Powers and the Suzerain Power. (2)

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(1) Allemagne, Vol.47; Nos.5, 10 & 13; F.0.146/2441, reprod. Granville's No.13 Confid. to Ampthill, Elliot's No.24 & Paget's No.16 Confid. to Granville; Italie, Vol.66; Nos.6 Confid. & 20; F.0.141/152; reprod. Thornton's Teleg. (dated Petersburg Feb.16th) & his No164 Confid.

(2) It was Russia who took the initiative in proposing the protest of the Continental Powers, and furnished them with its draft. (Turquie, Vol.450; No.28, Tissot to Freycinet, dated Feb.2nd, 1882 & F.0.141/158, No.24, F.0. to Malet, dated Feb. 4th, 1882) - See the text of the Note in F.0. 78/3381; Incl. in Dufferin's No70 to F.0. dated Feb.6th, 1882.
The Chamber of Notables and the voting of the budget:

'Orābī, as we have seen, agreed that the Chamber was not competent to vote the budget. But the immediate effect of the Note was to encourage the Nationalists to defy the Control. France and England had launched their threat without making any preparation to back it if necessary by force, and when afterwards it was seen that the two Powers were not ready to act, the fury their action had at first aroused gave place to contempt. The revolutionaries further clung to the hope that even were France and England allied, the opposition of the other Powers would come to their rescue; and the protests of the Porte(1) and the four Powers certainly tended to confirm this view. The Nationalists, moreover, were encouraged by certain "foreign agents", who, by pushing matters to extremes, hoped to give the Egyptian question a fully international character. From this time some of the more intelligent among the Nationalists began to consider turning Egypt into a sort of Oriental Belgium protected by all the Powers. Under the influence of this idea they convinced themselves that the only inter-

(1) Sienkiewicz was convinced that, since the presentation of the Note, the Sultan had turned against Tawfik, because the latter, instead of behaving as a devout PanIslamist should, had thrown in his lot with the Western Powers. 'Abd al-Hamīd had even written, he learnt, to 'Orābī, inciting him to dethrone Tawfik. Hence the courage displayed by the officers. (Sienkiewicz's Teleg. dated Jan. 30th, 1882).
vention possible was one by all the Great Powers combined, and that this would in the end turn to Egypt's profit. (1)

On January 2nd Sharīf had submitted to the Chamber his draft Organic Law, which provided that the Chamber should supervise the administration, control the actions of the Ministers, and enjoy exclusive rights in the levying of new taxes and the making of new laws. It is probable that this project owed its origin, not to Sharīf's initiative, but to pressure from the Nationalists. (2) For in relation to the Chamber's power to vote the budget, Sharīf now drew the Notables' attention to Egypt's international obligations, and told them that they had first to fulfil these, until the day came when they could rebuild their system and secure the confidence of the Powers. In present circumstances, therefore, the Chamber could not vote the budget; and consequently could neither initiate laws relating to finance nor discuss the tribute to the Porte. (3) The Chamber while discussing the draft law on January 10th, after the contents of the Note had been made known, demanded specific amendments giving its members greater freedom in the expression of ideas,

(1) Sienkiewicz's No. 120, dated Jan. 17th & his Teleg. dated Jan. 21st, 1882.
(2) Landau, op. cit., 35.
(3) The Waka'i, Jan. 4th, 1882.
a wider measure of control over the administration, and the right to vote that half of the budget which dealt with the revenues not specially assigned to the service of the Public Debt and the tribute. These ambitions were not wholly unreasonable. Freycinet, who was to replace Gambetta, held that "the movement ought to be guided, and an agreement come to, which, without compromising the interests of the creditors, should give the country, in some measure, the sentiment of self-government". (1) "The demand of the Chamber to deal with the non-assigned revenues", wrote Gladstone, "is not on the surface of it unreasonable.... If in this country there were given me the Spirit, Tobacco and Beer duties, I should not mind undertaking to provide for the National Debt, bearing all other Revenues and Charges on the House of Commons. If assigned Revenues may be insufficient, why not in that case ask for the required addition?". Granville was not wholly opposed to the demands of the Chamber either. On January 11th he sent word to Malet that the British Government "do not desire to commit themselves to a total or permanent exclusion of the Chamber from handling the Budget, but they consider that it will require to be dealt with cautiously in view of the pecuniary

(1) Freycinet, La question d'Égypte, 223.
(3) 188/132, Teleg. Ec. 9.
interests on behalf of which this country has been acting". (1) It seems that the British Government, as also were Malet and Colvin, (2) was desirous of reaching a compromise. They nevertheless agreed to certain objections raised by Gambetta, who was apparently in favour of precipitating a crisis in order to further his general policy in regard to Egypt. Although Gambetta seemed disposed to concur with the British Government in considering that there were certain measures of local administration in which advantage could be taken of the services of the Notables, he objected to their being given any authority over the higher police administration, the revenues of the Wakfs and the military budget. The British Government did not think fit to deal with the first two affairs, but agreed that the Notables should be refused any enlargement of their authority in respect of military expenditure, since this would "give them the power of arbitrarily increasing it without the consent of the Ministry and the Controllers". (3)

The Controllers had indeed acquired an ascendancy over the Egyptian administration that had not legally been provided for. Their influence could be felt in matters other than the purely financial, such as education, public works and the army. (4) They had naturally to oppose the claims of the

(1) F.0.141/152, Teleg. No. 8.
(3) F.0.146/2412, No. 121; F.0. to Lyons, dated Feb. 2nd, 1882.
(4) The Colvin Memorandum of July 1st, 1882.
Chamber in order to defend their acquired power. "This power", wrote Malet, (1) "de jure did not extend beyond the right of investigation and of giving advice. This was sufficient when they had to deal with a Ministry responsible to the Khedive; but it would become illusory if the Ministry became responsible to the Chamber; for there is no power to which the Controllers could appeal, if their advice were set at naught."

It was not easy for either Colvin or Blignières to abdicate his privileged position. "Cold and reserved, of harsh and forbidding manners, of unpromising appearance"; (2) Colvin was yet generally recognized as the real ruling spirit, not of the Control only, but of the Khedive and his Ministers. In fact, with equal ascendancy over Malet, the Khedive and Sharīf, he practically ruled supreme, and from September 1881 to the bombardment of Alexandria in July 1882 such power as the Khedive or England could exercise in Egypt was at his command. He began by conciliating 'Orābī; he invited him to dinner; he made him Under-Minister of War; he thought he could arrange all amicably. But after the presentation of the Joint Note, he found this was not so, and felt that the only other alternative was war.

Blignières was greatly hated in Egypt owing to his authoritative nature and his antipathy for the constitutional

(1) Desp. No. 69 dated Feb. 13th, 1882 to Granville.
(2) Moberly Bell Khedives and Pashas, 233.
regime, since it set a limit to his dictatorship. His complaints convinced the French Government that the demand put forward by the Chamber was merely a pretext, and that the real object of their policy was to weaken the Anglo-French Control. (1) Gambetta accordingly persuaded the Foreign Office to send identical instructions to the two Consuls-General "to insist upon Sharif's absolutely rejecting the pretentions of the Chamber as incompatible with the state of things established by international engagements with France and England." The two Consuls were warned in particular against accepting a compromise that had been proposed, to the effect that the right to vote the budget might be accorded and form part of the Organic Law, on condition that the Delegates voluntarily abstained from the use of it for three years. (2)

The fall of Sharif:

Sharif unofficially intimated to the two Consuls his desire that they should protest against the Notables' demands. (3) On January 27th they therefore presented him with a memorandum in which it was stated that the Chamber could not vote the budget without infringing the Decrees establishing the

(1) F.O.146/2411; No.88, Granville to Lyons dated Jan.24th,1882.
(2) Malet, op.cit., 239.
Control, and that an innovation of the nature proposed by the Chamber could not be introduced without the assent of the two Governments. This move was met, however, by an obstinate refusal on the part of the Chamber's leading members to come to any compromise. The crisis which thus began was in fact due to two factors: the interference of the two Powers, which was tantamount to an infringement of Egypt's right to adopt a constitutional system, more especially in that the Notables had professed respect for Egypt's international obligations; and the insistence of the Notables on maintaining the Chamber's rights in toto. This insistence was impolitic at that time, since the 1882 budget had been passed by the Khedivial Decree of December 22nd 1881, and some time must elapse before it would become necessary to consider the budget for 1883. Blunt had recommended moderation to the Nationalists, and advised them not to make any declaration concerning the budget before negotiating with England and France. This was also the opinion of Muhammad ‘Abduh, who said, "We have waited so many hundreds of years for our freedom that we can well afford now to wait some months".\(^1\) It would have been possible to evade the crisis or at least to delay it, but for the revolutionaries' lack of confidence in Sharif, and for the

\(^1\) Cf. Blunt, \textit{op. cit.}, 192 ff.
ambitions of the intriguing Barūdī, whose hope it was that he would become Prime Minister, and therefore counselled insistence on decision over the budget at once. (1)

The crisis took its final shape on February 1st. Sharīf had requested the Chamber, in a letter explaining the situation, to formulate a basis of negotiation with the Powers. The Chamber, however, insisted on the issue of a Decree sanctioning the Organic Law, with the vote of the budget vested in the Chamber; and on that day Sharīf was expecting a deputation from the Chamber to demand his compliance or resignation. It is evident that Sharīf, who had told Malet that he had no intention of resigning, (2) would, if he could, dissolve the Chamber, in order to put an end to the crisis. He was on firm ground legally in remaining in office without regard to the wishes of the Chamber, as long as the Chamber still functioned in accordance with the old règlement, which contemplated no ministerial responsibility, and provided that in case of a difference between the government and the Chamber the Prime Minister had the right to dissolve the latter. Sharīf, however, was unwilling to defy the majority of the Delegates, who had supported him ever since he had taken office. What brought the crisis

(2) Malet's No. 21 to F.O., dated Jan. 17th, 1882.
to a head was the action taken by ʻOrābī. He went to Sultan Pasha to say that he insisted upon the vote, and that if Sharīf refused, the Ministry must be changed. According to Malet, ʻOrābī threatened the Khedive, the Ministry and the Chamber; while Sienkiewicz asserts that he even threatened Sultan with death in an attempt to force him to convocate the Chamber and pass the Organic Law. (1) For these assertions there is no other evidence, however. (2) They were probably due to Sharīf, who aimed in making them at strengthening his position by a persuasive appeal to the two Powers. They can be better understood in the light of his intimation to the two Consuls that "the only issue from the situation was the immediate despatch to Egypt of a Commission from the Porte to be followed as soon as possible by a Turkish force". (3)

When the deputation from the Chamber called on Sharīf, he asked for some time to consider their amended draft Organic Law. The result was that on the following day the deputation called on the Khedive and requested a change of Ministry. They also presented a copy of the draft Organic Law, with the budget articles as drafted by the Chamber, and requested him to sign it, saying that the right to vote

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(2) This is contradicted by a declaration made by Sultan Pasha in the Waka'ī of Feb.20th, 1882, and by a letter dated Feb.6th that Blunt sent to Gladstone (Glad.Pap., Ms. 41000, folios 3, 4-8).
(3) F.O.147159; No.32 Secret, Malet to F.O., dated Feb.1st, 1882 and Sienkiewicz's Teleg. of the same date.
the budget was not one for discussion with foreign Powers. Tawfīk, however, dismissed them, saying that he would consider their request, and then consulted the two Consuls, who advised him to yield, "since he had no power behind him to rely upon in case of refusal". (1) Al-Bāruḍī, the nominee of the deputation, then at once formed a new Ministry, with 'Orābī as Minister of War.

Eclipse of the Khedivial authority and the Control:

"The coup d'état of the Egyptian Chamber", wrote Sienkiewicz on February 6th, (2) "can be considered as a reply to the Note of January 7th. We declared that we would maintain the status quo against all hazards, and this status quo has been profoundly modified. Therefore we are placed under the necessity of intervening or modifying our policy". Had Gambetta remained in office, there is no knowing what he would have done. But his fall on January 30th, which was a direct consequence of the Joint Note, encouraged the revolutionaries. They felt they had nothing to fear from his successor, M. De Freycinet, who instructed Sienkiewicz to "se tenir dans une réserve officielle, mais bienveillante, à l'égard du nouveau gouvernement". Nor did the British Government make any further move, perhaps because Granville

(1) Malet, op. cit., 256.
(2) See his Teleg. in Egypte, Vol. 72.
(3) Vide Freycinet, Souvenirs, II, 215.
did not consider the situation as one embodying "a state of anarchy" necessitating intervention. (1) Freycinet had immediately announced his objection to any Turkish intervention, (2) while in the British Cabinet only Lord Hartington was for Anglo-French intervention. (3)

The Sultan found in the new situation an opportunity to fish in troubled waters. At first he instructed the Khedive not to accept Sharīf's resignation, and stated that if he had already accepted it, he was to reinstate him and dissolve the Chamber of Notables. When Tawfīk answered that he was powerless to do either, the Porte insisted that a perfect entente must be maintained between the Chamber and the Ministry and that the discussion of the budget must be left to the Chamber. As for ʿOrābī, the Porte still remained in touch with him; and when everything was settled, ʿOrābī received a letter from the Grand-Vizier to the effect that his conduct was entirely approved. (4)

The formation of the new Ministry marked the final eclipse of the Khedivial authority and the victory of the revolution. Tawfīk had been unwilling to dismiss Sharīf

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(1) Biovès, op. cit., 66.
(3) Garvin, Life of Chamberlain, 445 & Gwynn & Tuckwell, op. cit., 456.
(4) F.O. 141/159; No. 43 Secret, Malet to F.O., dated Feb. 6th 1882 & Egypte, Vol. 72; No. 129 & Vol. 73; Teleg. & No. 151 from Sienkiewicz, dated Feb. 5th, Mar. 4th & 5th 1882.
and had no say in the choice of the new Ministers. The position of the Control was also weakened, since the Nationalists considered it merely as "l'une des garanties les plus efficaces pour les intérêts des créanciers." (1) When the Organic Law was discussed in the new Cabinet, the two Controllers were not summoned; nor was their advice sought on any plans whatever. In consequence the Controllers had now no means of knowing what the projects of the government were. In a Note addressed to the two Consuls on February 6th they strongly protested against the intentions of the Chamber, using indeed such language as produced a deplorable impression on the Egyptian public. (2) They stated that they could not accept the terms of the Ministry's programme submitted to the Khedive except under reserve, and demanded the right to put forward their opinion on all such questions of internal administration as affected the financial interests of the country. (3)

Nevertheless the Organic Law (4) was passed by the new Ministry on February 7th. The Ministers, who were prepared

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(1) The Moniteur Egyptien of Feb. 5th, 1882.
(2) The text is enclosed in Egypte, Vol. 72.
(3) A Note addressed on Feb. 8th to Mahmûd Pasha Samî, enclosed in Ibid.
(4) See the text in Blunt, op. cit. App. VI.
to compromise, suggested that the Controllers might be permitted to participate with them and with the Chamber *avec voix délibérative* in preparing the budget. (1) But by this time Colvin had completely changed his mind. He now found the Nationalists "impracticable" and assured Blunt that he "would do his best to ruin them", even if he had to advocate military intervention. (2) In a Note sent to the Prime Minister on February 12th, the Controllers again protested against the Organic Law, saying that "la véritable raison d'être du Contrôle est d'éviter, par une action sur la marche générale de l'administration, le retour des crises financières dont les créanciers auraient inévitablement à souffrir malgré l'affectation à leurs créances des gages spéciaux". Al-Bārūdī answered this Note by rebutting the Controllers' argument on the ground that "il y avait eu malentendu, certainement, aux provisions du décret du 15 novembre 1879". He asserted that the Controllers had in financial matters "les pouvoirs d'investigation les plus étendues sur tous les services publics".

(1) Sienkiewicz's Teleg. of Feb. 4th, 1882.
(2) Blunt, op. cit., 199.
(3) This misunderstanding arose from the difference of meaning between the word "control" and its Arabic equivalent "murākaba" which carries no implication of directing power and in so far falls considerably short of the English and French synonyms. Thus Article 19 of the Organic Law was translated as follows: "that the Deputies claimed the right of controlling the action of all public officials", whereas it meant only to stipulate that "the Deputies claimed the right of looking into the conduct of the officials". Again Article 24 was so worded in the French translation that it seemed to allow the Delegates the right of initiating the legislation, and was so telegraphed throughout Europe, whereas in reality it only stated that Parliament might request new laws and that the Ministry should attend to such requests, or give reasons for his refusal.
and that the Ministry had formally promised to ensure the strict and sincere execution of the legislative dispositions of which the Decree was a part and which regulated the country's Debt.

Nationalists as they were, the new Ministers aimed at getting rid of foreign officials as far as possible without regard to their nationality. Blunt persisted in his optimism, and declared that if Egypt were left alone, all would come right. He had arrived at the conviction that the Egyptians were quite capable of governing and administering their country, a view which was not of course shared by Malet, who now thought there was nothing for it but to withdraw the Control, which had become powerless.\(^1\) Blignières came to the same conclusion. Finding himself unable to effect any change in the attitude of the Ministry, and that consequently his continued presence in Egypt implied, falsely, that he was still in a position to defend the interests he had been appointed to protect,\(^2\) on February 6th he asked his Government to accept his resignation.

It was natural that the representatives of the other Powers should try, in view of this changed state of affairs, to challenge the privileged position acquired by the Western Powers. According to De Lex, the two Powers could not but

\(^1\) Gran. Pap. (160) Malet to Granville dated Feb. 20th, 1882.
\(^2\) Vélay, \textit{op. cit.}, 53.
recognise the Organic Law of February 7th, and acquiesce in the accomplished fact. (1) Saurma, the German Agent, said that if the authority of the two Powers was neutralized, Germany would have to reconsider the situation. In conjunction with Baron Kosjek, the Austrian Agent, he said that, since the Egyptian question had clearly to be discussed afresh, it should be examined by an assembly of the Great Powers; the Control suppressed; and its functions transferred to the Caisse, which possessed an international character. (2) Both the leaders of the National movement and the Ministers tried to establish more intimate relations with the Agents of Italy, Austria, Russia and Germany, while, in contrast holding aloof from Malet and Sienkiewicz. The four Agents viewed this change with no small satisfaction, since they had at last escaped from the insignificant role hitherto reserved for them. Sienkiewicz did his best to show that he was not hostile either to the Ministry or to the new institutions. He thought it only fair not to put obstacles in their way, but to allow them freedom to prove their worth. This was also the attitude adopted by Kosjek; while De Martino not only expressed his complete confidence in the leaders of the National movement, but was sure that only the Khedive was likely to offer opposition to the new order. (3)

(1) Bievès, op. cit., 69.
(2) Ibid, 70.
Preliminaries of the European conference on Egypt:

In view of what amounted to revolution in Egypt, Sienkiewicz expressed his doubt whether there now existed any means of preventing interference by other Powers in Egyptian affairs, especially owing to the effect of the new situation on the Law of Liquidation. Malet had told him more than once that the Egyptian question would now have to be considered by a European areopagus, and Sienkiewicz suspected that the British Government, by advocating this move, hoped to acquire a recognition by the other Powers of its special interests in Egypt. Sienkiewicz accordingly now recommended that the French Government should itself press for European intervention. (1)

Freycinet was a very different man from his predecessor. Whereas Gambetta, more impetuous and impatient, had been ready to disregard the views of the other European Governments, Freycinet was anxious, in framing his Egyptian policy, to obtain their advice and approval, and even a guarantee of their support. Gambetta had been imprudent enough to deliver the Note without notifying the other Powers, and their reaction had been such as to justify the uneasiness and opposition of French public opinion. The Powers could not but regard

(1) His Desp. of Jan. 21st & No. 126 Dir. Pol. dated Jan. 29th, 1882
Gambetta's proceedings as an open attempt to exclude them from a question which, being in law an Ottoman once, was clearly within their purview. They naturally, therefore, resented his behaviour; and the situation became difficult—indeed almost critical. Had Gambetta remained in power, he would doubtless have done his best, after the failure of the Joint Note, to resist the submission of the Egyptian question to the European concert, while conserving the entente, and taking due care in the meantime to respect the susceptibilities of the other Powers. Freycinet, however, was in favour of a European understanding over Egypt "which was the only means of making French public opinion accept a military expedition if circumstances imposed it". (1)

The new French Government was well regarded in England. Granville persuaded himself that Bismarck would approve whatever action in Egypt Great Britain might take, if the Porte were to attempt intervention. Once free of the influence of Gambetta, he no longer hesitated to submit the Egyptian question to the European concert. His motive was not—as is argued by most French writers—simply to further the designs of perfide Albion, but to overcome what had hitherto proved an insuperable obstacle to any satisfactory settlement; the obstinate hostility of France to any form

(1) Freycinet, Souvenirs, II, 228.
of Turkish intervention on the one hand, and that of his own Cabinet to a purely Anglo-French intervention on the other. He was well aware, also, that the other Powers were in favour of a Turkish rather than an Anglo-French intervention, provided it were effected under the auspices of the European concert, and that Bismarck in particular was against the creation of another Schleswig-Holstein in Egypt, since this might be fatal to European peace.

In answer to the Note of the four Powers, Granville proposed on February 6th that the two Governments should communicate with them, and ascertain whether they would be willing to enter into an exchange of views regarding the best mode of dealing with the affairs of Egypt on the following bases: firstly that the rights both of the Sultan and the Khedive should be preserved; secondly that the liberties of the Egyptian people should be secured in accordance with the Sultan's Fermans; and thirdly that the international engagements of the country should be strictly observed. The idea of intervention was not excluded from the communication. It was stated that "the case for discussing the expediency of an intervention has not at present arisen.....But should the case arise, Her Majesty's Government would wish that any such eventual intervention should represent the united action and authority of Europe. In
that event, it would also, in their opinion, be right that
the Sultan should be a party to any proceeding or discussion
that might ensue.\(^{(1)}\) Freycinet adhered to the proposal
with the reservation that it should be "understood that the
French Government reserve their adhesion to any military
intervention in Egypt, and that they will examine that
question when the necessity for any intervention shall have
arisen".\(^{(2)}\) Identical instructions in this sense were sent
to the representatives of the two Powers in the four Great
capitals (February 12th, 1882); and the effect was everywhere
favourable.\(^{(3)}\) Moreover, in order to win the good will of
the four Powers, by an appearance of defending their interests
in Egypt, Granville induced Freycinet to send a joint communica-
tion to the great capitals and to Istanbul protesting against
the Egyptian Organic Law and defending the Law of Liquidation
and Egypt's international obligations. In this protest
it was observed that, "It is obvious that it is not sufficient
to inscribe certain credits in the Budget in order to meet
the engagements of the Public Debt if the machinery for
insuring the realization of these credits is disturbed. The

\(^{(1)}\) F.0.146/2412, No.131, F.O. to Lyons, dated Feb.6th,1882.
\(^{(2)}\) Angleterre, Vol.794, Note from Freycinet to Decrais (Directeur des Affaires Étrangères), dated Feb.7th,1882.
\(^{(3)}\) Allemagne, Vol.47; No.21 - Russie Vol.266, No.12 &
\(^{(4)}\) This protest was originally designed to be a reply to the
Egyptian Premier's Note of Feb. 8th regarding the new
Organic Law. (See F.0.141/152; Annex to No.74 & No.58 -
F.0.146/2412 No.194.)
Law of Liquidation was framed with reference to a total organization to which its provisions were adapted, and certainly if it had been foreseen that the balance of authority was to be disturbed in the manner now contemplated, the Liquidating Commissioners would have insisted on framing more stringent guarantees for the preservation and collection of the revenues which they assigned as security for the debts. Article 34 of the Organic Law which treated of the Budget is quite inadequate to save the interests of the Creditors. What is necessary is not only that the obligations of the Law of Liquidation shall be recognized, but what provision shall be insured for their due fulfilment. The Note continued by remarking that, "Inasmuch as Egypt is not a separate or independent country, the 'primordial right' of the Egyptian people to control their own Budget cannot be invoked in view of the burdens and obligations which they have inherited, any more than their 'primordial rights' to settle all judicial disputes with foreigners in the native Courts, and as regards the right given to the Khedive by the...Ferman to manage the internal administration of Egypt - a right which cannot be contested. On the whole, therefore, the two Governments of England and France are of opinion that the functions of the Chamber should, at present, be confined to certain definite matters,
even finance, so far as possible, in respect of which they may undoubtedly render useful service, gradually developing their capacity for self-government, without risking a breach of the international obligations resulting from the Law of Liquidation and other Conventions". The four Powers did not see any objection to the limitation of the prerogatives of the Egyptian Parliament. The Cabinet of Berlin, which played the part of a deus ex machina, thought that it was above all essential - in view of "complications" in Egypt - to respect the entente of the two Powers and not to impede the action of England and France, who were directly interested, while admitting the co-operation of the other Powers. (1)

The die was thus cast, and it became clear that the fate of the Egyptian National movement was to be settled, not according to the will of the Egyptian people, but in response to the vicissitudes of European high policy. For the second time in half a century the European concert was called upon by England to settle the Egyptian question. In the first Muhammad 'Ali's Empire was brought to an end. In the second, Egyptian nationalism was defied and the country eventually occupied by British forces.

(1) Autriche, Vol. 35; Desp. dated March 20th, 1882, Duchâtel to Freycinet - Russie, Vol. 266; De Giers to Kapnist, dated March 30th & Copy of a Teleg. dated April 29th/May 11th from Giers to Prince Orloff - Allemagne, Vol. 47; No. 43, Courcel to Freycinet, dated March 27th, 1882.
Chapter VIII

The National Ministry

"From the beginning of our movement, we aimed at turning Egypt into a small Republic like Switzerland."

Muhammad 'Abduh to Blunt.
Blunt, op. cit., 344

Radical changes:
The Bārūdī Ministry "had behind it the living forces of the nation". (1) It was really a sort of Convention Nationale, enjoying the full support of the Chamber of Delegates, of which for the first time a prominent member, Hasan al-Sherīṭī, was appointed a Minister. The programme of this Convention was simply to ensure that Egypt should be governed exclusively for the Egyptians. The Egyptian Nationalists were not, in fact, against the Control as an institution. They merely wished to restrict it to its original financial functions. They were not in any way, therefore, opposed to its maintenance intact, or to the careful execution of its mandate, since by this they hoped to deprive England and France of any pretext for intervention.

(1) Egype, Vol. 73; No. 135 dated Feb. 14th, 1882, Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
The Ministry and the Chamber were above all eager for the introduction of liberal reforms, and would have effected radical changes had they been given sufficient time. The debates of the Chamber during the short period it sat (only from February 9th to March 26th), indicate what kind of reforms the members had in mind: improvements in agriculture and irrigation, the regulation of commerce, a reform of the judiciary, the institution of compulsory primary education, the regulation of pensions, and the passage of a new Electoral Law, which would permit the Egyptian Sudan to elect representatives. "It is quite remarkable that an Assembly, composed for the most part of landed proprietors or influential and moneyed people, showed such an interest in the welfare of the population as a whole and displayed such foresight."

The Prime Minister, Mahmūd Sāmī al-Bārūdī, was one of the original Constitutionalists of the time of Ismā'īl. Having travelled and taken part in different Ministries, he possessed greater experience and savoir-faire than his colleagues, who were ignorant of European languages and international affairs and had had only a limited experience

(1) Landau, op. cit., 34-5.
(2) It is true that Mustafā Fahmī had a thorough knowledge of French. This indeed was the reason for his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, although he was notorious as an opportunist.
of governmental bureaucracy, but were the only uncompromised persons the National movement could rely on. Though of Circassian origin himself, (1) al-Bārūdī was the greatest Egyptian poet of the nineteenth century, and his name is still connected with the renaissance of Arabic literature.

Orābī, for his part, was described in Europe as the mere "mouthpiece of a turbulent soldiery". But in reality he was quite different, a man of clearly defined views, whose main object, according to Sir William Gregory, was to institute "the reign of law as against the reign of pure despotism", who, far from being a fanatic in religion, was "a very liberal man" and looked on the Europeans as the friends and protectors of his countrymen against the Turks, whom "he hated with a just and holy hatred". To quote Sir William Gregory, he "was honest, patriotic, industrious and intelligent, but without much education and with no experience of public affairs". (2) Orābī was an enthusiastic admirer of the French Revolution, the history of which he had read with Saʿīd Pābha on the latter's pilgrimage to the Hijāz.

Nothing definite is known about his nationalistic activities during the reign of Ismāʿīl, but in his Memoirs he shows

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(1) He was said to be a descendant of Sultan Barsbāy. Cf. Orābī's Memoirs, I, 100.

(2) An Autobiography, 372.
himself throughout to have been conscious of the subjection of his own race to the privileged Turks and Circassians; this was brought home to him personally by his never being promoted during Isma'īl's reign. Despite the claims he makes in his Memoirs, his name in fact became well-known only in February 1881; and it is quite clear that personal interests had influenced both him and his colleagues in the course they pursued in September of the same year. The personal element has, however, invariably played a part in every movement of revolution or reform. In the Bārūdī Ministry ʿOrābī was the virtual leader, dealing with business other than the purely military. Both in his conversations with Foreign Agents and his speeches to the natives, he dealt with all kinds of questions relating to the finances and the administration of Egypt. He received and examined petitions, and even decided some of the disputes that often took place among the religious sheikhs. As a fellāh by origin, ʿOrābī was fully familiar with the sufferings of the fellāhīn. Unfortunately, however, he was more of a doctrinaire than a practical man. All that circumstances at first allowed him to do, at least was incessantly to preach a reform of the abuses that had for centuries occasioned the legendary misery of the peasantry. As a result, at least in the towns, the masses began for the first time to become class conscious.

(II) COVENT, X. INT., 2258.
For not only Orabī but also other orators continually harangued them to obtain their support for the new regime. This campaign took on a revolutionary colour. Thus an army officer on an occasion even told the peasants at Zagāzīg that the acres belonging to the landlords "were theirs by right". (1) As a consequence of this new trend, the lower classes as a whole, including soldiers, policemen, and simple workers in the towns, all began to be conscious of their own importance and to aspire to new conditions. But this does not mean, as was alleged, that the National Party "had but little support from the intelligentsia", nor that "most of its adherents were drawn from the most humble and ignorant classes". (2) It was in fact ardently supported by the new generation of students; and even persons such as Muhammad Abduh, who differed from the Orabists regarding the means by which the revolution should be effected, found that they must join them in the interest of the country. (3) It was hardly, indeed, a question of who was Orabist and who was not. For the revolution was all-pervasive, and as in its French example, the Egyptian had not only its Girondins and its Jacobins but also its defeatists and opportunists, who

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(1) Cromer, op. cit., I, 258.
(2) Égypte, Vol. 74, No. 211, dated June 26th, 1882, Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
(3) Osman Amīn, Muḥammad Abduh, 11-12 & Rashīd Riḍā op. cit., I, 147, 175 and 217.
preferred to wait on events before declaring either for the revolution or for the Khedive and his "Old Turks". Unfortunately, the Delegates, being for the most part quite ignorant, had neither the experience, the sense of responsibility, the disinterestedness, nor the public spirit, that might have rendered them the successful champions of Egypt's independence. (1) Some of them from the first were so afraid of the new radical trend that they declared that they "were duped". (2) Danger threatened also from another side. When it was proposed in government circles that an end should be put to the privileged status of the Arab tribesmen, who formed a civitas in civitate, by abolishing their exemption from the corvée, military conscription and the census, the heads of the various tribes met on April 8th, and declared that they recognized neither the Ministry nor the Chamber, and would defend their ancient privileges. The tribesmen of al-Wādī, especially, showed themselves hostile to ʿOrābī. (3)

The Ministry, therefore, devoted its chief attention to the army, which had been the particular object of favouritism in the past. About three hundred Turks and Circassians were dismissed the service because they were found to be above the retiring age; whereas the pay of the

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(1) Sienkiewicz's No.206, dated June 5th, 1882.
(2) Sienkiewicz's No.188, dated Apr. 23rd, 1882.
(3) Sienkiewicz's No.186 Confid.
rest, both officers and soldiers, was increased. The effective of the regiments was raised; and two new regiments were quickly formed. Supplies of ammunition were bought and fortifications inspected and strengthened. Such measures were to be expected from a "Ministry of National Defense", aware of the threats of foreign intervention incessantly launched by the European press both in Egypt and abroad. However, appreciating the delicacy of the situation, the Ministry sought to avoid all occasions of conflict with Tawfik - Egypt's heel of Achilles. The Khedive, whereas he had rarely been consulted by either Riyād or Sharīf, was now asked on every occasion for his opinion, and all important decisions were taken under his presidency. The Ministers also tried to secure the moral support of the French, against the contingency in particular of Ottoman intervention. Thus, although relations between 'Orābī and al-Ḥārūdī were apparently good, it was intimated to the French Consul-General that the following reorganisation was proposed: that 'Orābī should take over the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, that the other Ministers should be chosen from among the officials and the Delegates, and that a Council of State should be created, on which the European element should be well represented. Sienkiewicz was invited to state the conditions on which he would accept

this new ministerial combination, but he declined to proffer any advice, since he was still suspicious of "certaines personnes qui se dissimulent dans l'ombre". To him, "Orabi" lacked all practical sense and consistency of ideas and was merely a man "qui a pour lui le prestige d'un saint, les avantages que donne l'éloquence et la connaissance du Coran" and no more.

The resignation of De Blignières:

In March Freycinet accepted Blignières's resignation. The latter's position had in fact become very difficult: the role he had played; his personal opinions, openly expressed; his authoritative character; the obligations he was under to take part in the deliberations of the Ministry; and the publicity given to the Note of the 6th of February, which embodied his ideas; all necessitated his retirement. He was well aware of this, and ever since the fall of Sharif had expressed to Sienkiewicz his strong desire to return to France. His open declaration that the situation necessitated direct intervention rendered his presence at Cabinet meetings a continuous threat and resulted in his not being consulted by the Ministers. (2)

The news was favourably received by the Egyptian Government.


(2) Sienkiewicz's No. 162, dated March 19th, 1882.
the whole native population and the various foreign
residents in Egypt, including the French colony itself.
All the enemies of the preponderant Anglo-French influence
were satisfied with what they considered to be the collapse
of the Control(1) and the weakening of the entente.

Blignières's personal worth was universally recognized,
since for years his experience had made up for the instability
of French policy and the frequent appointment of new officials
as the Consuls-General in Egypt that resulted from it. As
an avowed partisan of the entente, he had been reproached
for his Anglomania, and Freycinet accused him of both "having
an exaggerated idea of the powers and functions of his
employment"(2) and of claiming too much independence in his
relations with the Consuls-General. Freycinet intended
to replace him by "a specialist less inclined to exercise
a political influence in Egyptian affairs". Instructions
were sent to Sienkiewicz as follows: (3) "The change in
the personnel of the Control should be for you an occasion
to assert yourself more definitely, since you are the only
representative of French policy in Egypt. Acquire the
sense of force which this situation gives you, and exert it

(1) "Ce n'est pas un homme qui disparait", comments Cocheris,
"c'est un système qui s'effondre". Cf. op. cit., 101.
(2) B.B., 1882, VII, Nos. 41 & 82, Lyons to F.O., dated Feb.
21st & March 15th, 1882.
(3) Egypte, Vol. 73; Desp. marked Personnelle, Freycinet to
Sienkiewicz, dated March 13th, 1882.
for the furtherance of French interests. Maintain frequent relations with influential personalities; take care of the French colony; and be a natural centre towards which eyes are turned and from which inspiration is sought. In brief, enhance, by your personal ascendancy, the prestige of France". Sienkiewicz immediately recommended the continuation of the Control, the suppression of which would otherwise mark the voluntary abdication of England and France. (1)

On the resignation of Blignières Lyons objected to "the weakening of what remained of the position and influence of the Controllers", and Granville complained to Tissot of not having been informed beforehand. He added that 'Orābī and the National Party had been trying to induce the British Government to withdraw both Colvin and Malet, but that this had been refused. Freycinet, on the other hand, tried to represent the incident as "une simple question de personne", declaring in the meantime that he was opposed to any idea of modifying the institution itself. (2)

Colvin remained for some time the only representative of the Control. Malet still hoped that by degrees he might regain influence. He was naturally as hostile as the

(2) B.B., 1882, VII, No.82 supra & No.89 from Granville to Lyons dated March 15th, 1882.
English Controller to the new Ministry, intent as it was on getting rid of foreign influence, and even intimated to Lord Granville that he would oppose it for that reason. (1) He and Colvin were both of the opinion that they were much better off with the Control despite the disadvantageous conditions under which it functioned than they would be if it were withdrawn. (2) The new French Controller, M. Brédif, (3) was neither a strong nor a reassuring man. To Colvin, he seemed to be "a man of conciliatory presence, supple, intelligent and ingenious, but had not the force or direct frankness of his predecessor". Colvin now ceased to keep himself in the background. In his first interview with Brédif, he outlined the new policy he proposed for the Control. It consisted of the following: What he proposed was to try establishing a modus vivendi with the Egyptian Government by arriving at a fresh understanding on its relations with the Control in its new position; or if that should prove impracticable, merely to observe and record such developments as bore on the finances, leaving the settlement of the main


(3) Brédif was Inspecteur des Finances et Directeur de la Compétabilité aux Affaires Etrangères.

question to a more propitious moment. With regard to his first point, Colvin assured Brédif that he might confidently count on his aid in arriving at any understanding, provided it were consistent with the terms of the Decree of November 1879 in which the functions of the Control were defined. It seemed to him probable, however, that the Egyptian Government would in practice insist on restricting those functions to a point that would leave the Control no raison d'Être. As for his second point, Colvin remarked that he quite understood that from a purely political standpoint, it might be valuable to maintain the Control, even as no more than a barometer for the Egyptian finances, its relations with the local Government being left an open question. "Should diplomatic negotiations be concluded on such a basis", commented Colvin, "I trusted that my Government would recognize the justice of leaving to me an option of accepting or declining my new duties. Brédif assures me that his Government attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of the Control and implies that the Caisse de la Dette is a secondary consideration".\(^1\)

\textbf{Ismā'īl, Ḥalīm and the Porte:}

The difficulties of the Barūdī Ministry were increased by the activities of Ismā'īl, Ḥalīm and the Porte, which all helped to aggravate the internal situation.

\(^1\) Ibid.
Since settling in Italy, Isma‘īl had never ceased to cherish a vague hope of returning to power, and constantly sent money to Egypt, where he still had adherents, not inside the National Party, but among the European functionaries and adventurers whom the National movement had deprived of their privileges, and the numerous Turks and Circassians who had enriched themselves during his reign, not to mention both Martino and De Lex, who had been personal friends of his. None of the Nationalists had any sympathy for him, and he on his side attacked Ārābī as an ignorant, incapable intriguer and law-breaker without either good faith or intelligence. Ismā‘īl also had partisans in Istanbul, where, although ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd had no sympathy for him, he could rely on those he had earlier "bought" by his bakhshish policy. After the presentation of the Joint Note, Ismā‘īl’s activities increased. He tried to make himself popular in Italy by distributing charitable donations, and by establishing personal relations with the Pope and the Court, which he exploited to enhance his own importance. He spent lavishly on newspapers, (2) which tried to represent him as the man to retrieve the situation. The Popolo Romano, for instance,

(1) Tawfīk intimated to Ārābī that Ismā‘īl had taken £13m. with him to his exile. Ārābī’s Memoirs, I, 55.

(2) Ismā‘īl subsidized al-Khilāfa, al-Ittāḥād, Abū Naddāra, al-Istiklal and the Phare d’Alexandrie, issued either in Egypt or abroad. He also paid for the inauguration of al-Zamān, which duly appeared in Egypt.
wrote in April, 1882, that "never has Egypt caused so much anxiety and given so much trouble to Europe as since the resignation of . . . . Ismā‘īl/. The reason of this is the total want of sovereign authority in Egypt". (1) It was clear, however, that unless he were backed by some Power, Ismā‘īl could not expect to derive any personal benefit from the confusion that would result from the overthrow of his son; and it seemed that no Power was seriously ready to support him, even though the Italian Court had managed to maintain good relations with him, the object of which was that Ismā‘īl should bring pressure to bear on Tawfīk so that the latter should support Italian interests.

On the other hand Prince ‘Abd al-Halīm, who also aspired to the Egyptian throne, had more reason to be hopeful. In Istanbul he had always been the candidate regarded as most suitable whenever a change of Khedive was spoken of. His wealthy sister, Princess Zainab, spent enormous sums of money in Egypt, where Halīm had adherents not only in the Azhar University, but also in the army and the National Party. (2)

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(2) Hasan Mūsa al-‘Akkād, who was in contact with both Halīm and the Crabists, and the Sheikh al-‘Adawi, were the most prominent of Halīm’s adherents. Cf. Broadley, How we defended Arabi, 359 ff.
Thus on March 5th, Sienkiewicz reported that propaganda in favour of Halîm had been so much intensified at Cairo, and even more at Alexandria, that Omar Lutfî Pasha (the Governor of Alexandria) found difficulty in stopping it. (1) Tissot, who had been French Ambassador at Istanbul before being transferred to London, was always a zealous supporter of Halîm; (2) and in his opinion the continuation of Tawfîk's rule was an impossibility, since his personal influence was gone; the army was implacably hostile to him; and he had no hold upon the people at large; whereas Halîm was intelligent, educated and conversant with European ideas and the political forces that directed the world. This had also become the conviction of Sienkiewicz and Freycinet, who thought that the one way in which the necessity of intervention in Egypt might be avoided was to establish there a government "which would be able to inspire respect and keep 'mutineers' in awe", as was clearly impossible under Tawfîk, whose incapacity, inertia, and want of courage had brought things to their actual pass. Overtures made by Freycinet in this sense were, however, declined more than once by England, who declared that she wished to abide by the declara-

(1) Sienkiewicz's No.151 dated March 5th, 1882.

(2) Tissot, whole still Directeur Politique in the Quai d'Orsay had been bribed by Ismâ'îl in connection with the Judicial Reform, a fact that may account for his enthusiasm for Halîm. (Gran. Pap. (160), Private, Malet to Granville dated June 6th,1882).
tion of January 6th. Lord Granville objected to such proposals on the ground that after the declarations of support so recently given to Tawfik in the name of Britain and France, it would be a breach of faith to abandon him, let alone to concert his removal without any new and more apparent cause than could be shown to exist. Moreover, it appeared to him that far from offering any reasonable guarantee of good behaviour, Halim would probably seek to secure the continued support of the Sultan by all the means at his disposal; and as for the Egyptian army, it might well sell its support to a new Khedive on terms that might be subversive of the Control or otherwise injurious to the country. Mancini (the Italian Premier) also had a poor opinion of Halim, regarding him as "the incarnation of the very worst type of the old Turkish School", to deliver Egypt into whose hands would be "to consign her to the fate of oppression, tyranny and degradation of the worst administered Turkish province", (1) while Kalnoki (the Austrian Foreign Minister) also favoured the maintenance of Tawfik, since the Powers had supported him, and because his deposition, together with the resultant change in the law of succession, would affect the status quo, the existing Ferman, and Egypt's

(1) F.0.78/3286; No.912 Confid., Dufferin to F.O., dated Oct. 14th,1881; F.0.146/2417; No.237 Most Secret, Lyons to F.O., dated March 13th,1882; F.0.146/2418; No.394 Confid. Granville to Lyons, dated April 11th,1882; F.0.146/2419; No.308, Lyons to Granville, dated April 14th,1882 & F.0.146/2427; reprod. Paget's No.170 dated June 2nd, 1882.
international engagements, and would be little calculated to give increased stability to her institutions. (1) Owing to the fluctuations of European diplomacy the cup was thus dashed from Halîm's lips at least twice. Nor would his succession have removed the causes of the Egyptian revolution, which was not to be ended by a mere change of ruler. On the contrary, it might well have culminated intrigues within the Khedivial family, with the possibility of still further complications. (2)

As for the Porte, it was still in communication with both the Nationalists and Tawfîk, its plain object being to widen the breach between the two camps and provide itself with an opportunity for intervention. On March 28th, the French Chargé d'Affaires at Istanbul wrote that a certain Sheikh Mahmûd had left for Egypt in order to converse with Orâbi' and to convince him that the Sultan would find it natural that Egypt should shake off the financial obligations contracted under Ismâ'îl, the Sultan's object being to win the sympathy of the National Party by flattering its aspirations, and, at the same time, to neutralize Ismâ'îl's intrigues. The Nationalists, on their side, used this contact with the

(1) Paget's No.170, supra.

(2) Prince Husain, the Khedive's brother, for instance, was actively intriguing at this time, but whether on his own or on his father's behalf is uncertain. (Sienkiewicz's No.151 supra.)

(3) Turquie, Vol.450; No.48.
Sultan to represent their cause as being legally recognized by the Sovereign, while nevertheless looking forward to the day when they would be strong enough to declare Egypt an independent republic. (1)

The Circassian plot:

During April the situation was greatly aggravated by the discovery of a conspiracy whereby the Ministers and chief leaders of the National Party were to be massacred and the ancien régime restored. The conspirators were Turks and Circassians, acting at the instigation of Ismā'īl through a certain Rātib Pasha (a Circassian) who was deeply hostile to the National Party. (2) As the conspirators were all military, a court-martial was convened under the chairmanship of Rāshid Pasha Ḥusnī (also a Circassian); and on April 30th judgment was pronounced to the effect that forty of the conspirators, including 'Osmān Rifkī, were to be degraded and sent to the southern Sūdān.

Whereas both Blunt and Muhammad 'Abduh maintain that the Government's allegations were true, not only Sienkiewicz and Malet, but also the Khedive himself, believed - on the contrary - that the whole affair was a fabrication of the Ministry, and that all the Turks and Circassians involved

(1) Blunt, op. cit., 347. Sienkiewicz wrote on the 11th of May that the Nationalists were by no means in favour of the Caliphate principle.

(2) Blunt, op. cit., 249 & 252.
had done was to complain of the "iniquity" of the new regime in dismissing some three hundred of them from the service. Tawfīk indeed showed marked sympathy with the accused, and since Malet was inclined to "profit by this incident in order to effect a crisis", the affair of the Circassians acquired some political importance, above all by providing the Porte with an opportunity of meddling in Egyptian affairs.

After their arrest the Turks and Circassians sent an appeal to the Sultan; and although the Ferāns were silent on the subject of the degradation of officers, the Grand-Vizier protested against the sentences and gave orders that the dossier of the whole affair should be sent to Istanbul. On this, whereas Tawfīk professed respect for the Sultan's privileges, the Ministers declared that there were no grounds for the Porte's interference. They invoked precedents, pointing to the example of Shāhīn Pasha to show that even high officers could be degraded without reference to the Porte, and besought the Powers to protect Egypt from being reconverted into a simple vilāyet. In order to restore calm, they asked the Khedive to exercise his right of pardon, on condition that the condemned should leave Egypt for whatever destination they preferred. Tawfīk refused to

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(1) Sienkiewicz's Desp. of May 2nd, 1882.
(2) Sayed Kamel, op. cit., 113.
(3) Sienkiewicz's Desp. of May 8th, 1882.
(4) Orābi's Memoirs, I, 128.
comply with these suggestions. Instead, without consulting the Ministers, he sent the dossier to Istanbul. By acting thus he contravened the usage observed since his succession, and forfeited Egypt's internal autonomy. He chose in fact to complicate the situation in the hope of precipitating an intervention that would give him the opportunity of avenging himself on all those who had humiliated him in the past. (1) Reports reached the British Embassy that the Khedive had asked the Sultan to send him troops and that the question of detaching some forces from Tripoli and Syria was being discussed at Istanbul. (2) Malet also suggested to his French colleague that an Ottoman Commissioner, backed by Anglo-French squadrons, would be sufficient to restore order. Sienkiewicz refused, as the Quai d'Orsay was still steadfastly opposed to Turkish intervention. In order to tranquilise the situation without resorting to Turkish intervention, Freycinet proposed that the Khedive should commute the sentence without waiting for an answer from the Porte, whereas Granville, on Malet's advice, asked for a full pardon. (3)

(1) Sienkiewicz's No. 196 of May 6th, 1882.
(2) F.O. 78/3397; Nos. 77 & 81 from Dufferin and Wyndham to F.O., dated May 8th & 9th, 1882.
(3) Sienkiewicz's No. 196 supra.
(4) B.B., 1882, VII, Nos. 145 - 8 & 153-5, exchanged between Granville and Malet from May 7th to 9th, 1882.
The Porte, while encouraging both the Egyptian factions, and inciting one against the other, appealed to the four Continental Powers to intervene for "the release of Rifki and the other Circassian officers from the severe treatment by which, it was thought, they were menaced by Orabi." These Powers responded cautiously, advising the Sultan "not to intervene in the Government of Egypt or to disturb European tranquillity without assuring himself of the disposition of the Western Powers".

On May 9th, Tawfik summoned the whole consular corps to a meeting to discuss the fate of the Circassians. The Consuls of the four Continental Powers kept silence, however, and left the proceedings to the Khedive and the Western Consuls. After deliberations in which Malet and Sienkiewicz defended their respective ideas on what decision should be taken, Tawfik followed those of Sienkiewicz, which were less extreme, and signed a Decree commuting the penalty to simple banishment, without waiting for the decision of the Porte.

On May 19th, accordingly, some of the Circassians were carried on a Russian ship to Istanbul, and Osman Rifki left for Syria on an Austrian ship. Tawfik's position was legally weak, since he acted in defiance both of the policy of his

(1) Turquie, Vol. 451, De Noailles to Freycinet, dated May 7th, 1882.
(2) F.0.78/3384; No. 346 marked Secret, Bufferin to F.O., dated May 9th, 1882 & F.0.141/158; Nos. 89 & 90, Granville to Malet, dated May 6th, 1882 & De Noailles's Desp. of May 9th, 1882.
Ministers (arrived at by proper procedure), and of the
advice of his Suzerain. All this underlined his virtual
subjection to the two Powers - and especially England.
The Ministers, who had already declared that they would
use force to prevent the landing of any Ottoman Commissioners
sent to examine the affairs of the Circassians, felt strong
enough to defy England and France in the person of their
protégé. On May 10th, al-Bārūdī told the consular corps
that the Council of Ministers "convinced of the impossibility
of an entente with the Khedive, and - at the same time -
being unable to tender their resignation", had decided to
convocate the Chamber of Notables (which was in recess), without
the co-operation of the Khedive. "The Chamber", continued
al-Bārūdī, "will have to take such measures as the safety
of the country necessitates. It will discuss all the
complaints raised by the Council against the Khedive, and
notably the most serious of all, namely that, without con-
sulting his Ministers, he has completely submitted to the
Porte". The Prime Minister added that the Chamber of
Notables would ensure the safety of the foreign colonies,
even in case of Turkish intervention.

On May 11th Tawfīk was unofficially notified by the
Council of Ministers that the Chamber had been convoked.

(1) al-Bārūdī failed to win over Sienkiewicz to the Ministry's
side in the affair of the Circassians. (Sienkiewicz's
Teleg. of May 10th & his Desps. Nos.199 & 200 dated May
10th & 14th, 1882).
Relying on Article 9 of the règlement of the Chamber (which empowered only himself to convene it while in recess) he intimated to the two Consuls that the assembly of the Notables was illegal, adding that the Grand-Vizier had made it known to him that the Sultan's Ministers unanimously approved his conduct. (1) This is borne out by the fact that on May 14th the Sultan sent a telegram to the Egyptian Ministers energetically blaming the convocation of the Deputies without the Khedive's authorization, declaring that the Sultan wished to see the status quo maintained, and asserting the rights of the Empire and the sovereignty of the Sultan. (2) The Notables, therefore, met "unofficially" at Sultan Pasha's house to decide the means by which an understanding between the Khedive and his Ministers might be restored. They also proposed to discuss a law defining the powers of the Khedive, since the delicate situation in which the country found itself had resulted from the non-existence of any law defining the respective powers of the ruler and his Ministers. (3) In the meantime propaganda on behalf of Halîm became more vigorous than ever before. He sent "Orâbî and his associates signed photographs together with petitions to be signed and sent to the Sultan, asking him to appoint

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(1) Sienkiewicz's Teleg. of May 11th, 1882.

(2) Turquie, Vol. 451; Teleg. dated May 15th, 1882 from Noailles to Freycinet.

(3) Sienkiewicz's Teleg. of May 13th, 1882.
Halim váli of Egypt. These petitions were circulated in
the Ministries under the auspices of al-Bārūdī. (1) Never-
theless, the revolutionaries had no special interest in
Halim (Orābī declared that it was time to get rid of the
whole family of Muhammad Alī). (2) They had no desire for
a new master; but dreamt of a President elected by the
Chamber, or at least of establishing a regency - headed by
Orābī or al-Bārūdī - which should rule in the name of Tawfīk;
son, Abbas. (3) Halim, for his part, was so sure of being
appointed Khedive, that he even laid down conditions. He
told the French Ambassador at Istanbul that if he were to
go to Egypt, he would not wish to be accompanied by Ottoman
troops, since this would damage his popularity. He was
opposed indeed to all armed intervention, whether on the part
of Turkey or of any other Power. Halim regarded all the
Fermans, except that of 1841, as futile, and stated that he
would be content with the title of váli. On the other hand
he was against the Porte's project of dividing Egypt into
three vilayets, and believed that the Egyptian question
could be solved merely by Tawfik's abdication, on condition
that the latter should be permitted to remain in Egypt. (4)

(1) E.B., 1882, VII, No.120, Malet to F.O. dated Apr. 22nd, 1882.
(2) Ninet, op.cit., 91 ff. Orābī informed the two Western
Consuls that he regarded the problem of the Khedive as a
purely domestic one, but assured them that neither he nor
the other Ministers had harboured the design of deposing
Tawfik. (F.O.146/2424; repro. Malet's No.261 Pol. dated
May 16th, 1882).
(3) Dufferin's No.108 dated May 19th & Sienkiewicz's Desp. of
May 11th1882.
(4) Turquie, Vol.451; De Noailles's Desp. of May 11th, 1882.
Further developments in Egypt, however, rendered any such hopes on Halîm's part entirely illusory. For Sultan Pasha was at this juncture so far intimidated by Malet's threats of European intervention, and so much affected by the personal jealousy that had grown up in his mind toward "Orābī, as with some thirty Delegates to go over to the side of the Khedive, though the large majority of the Delegates still remained faithful to the Ministry. (1) At the same time Malet urged the Khedive to resort to extreme measures. In any case Tawfīk now declined to have any further dealings with his Ministers; (2) and on May 16th Malet was able to write to Granville as follows: "An excellent ground has been chosen for the quarrel. We come in support of the Khedive, who, in his turn, is supported by the Chamber and the general voice of the people. Therefore there is no question of crushing honest aspirations of self-government. We have merely to liberate Egypt from military despotism." (3) Tawfīk and Malet seized every opportunity of spreading alarm and anxiety. The Egyptian Gazette published some very violent articles against "Orābī, which were displayed in the cafés; and, on the advice of Malet and Colvin, English families left Cairo for Alexandria.

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(2) Sienkiewicz's Desp. of May 12th, 1882.
(3) Gran. Pap. (160).
Malet even persuaded Tawfik to seek help from the Arab tribesmen; a plan to which the French Consul-General, however, who was unsympathetic to the Ministry and thought that any rapprochement between it and the Khedive would be detrimental to the latter's prestige and consequently inadmissible was strongly opposed. "To let into Cairo undisciplined 'bands!', he wrote, (1) "would mean the beginning of a conflict", and in which Europeans might be exposed to danger.

The naval demonstration:

Owing to the greatly exaggerated rumours circulated in Europe about the situation in Egypt, intervention began to be discussed again. This time the Foreign Office "wished to hold themselves free, if the necessity arose, to consider all possible forms of intervention and to choose that which was accompanied by the fewest inconveniences and risks". (2) The sending of three Generals was again proposed to France, but resolutely refused by Freycinet, who declared to the Chambre that as long as he was in power no adventure need be expected, and that France was concerned only with two things: the preservation of her "justly

(1) Sienkiewicz's No.200 & another Desp., both dated May 14th 1882. Malet had proposed the same in April, but was opposed by Sienkiewicz. (Sienkiewicz's No.186 Confid. dated April 16th, 1882).

(2) F.0.146/2423; No.504A. marked Confid., Granville to Lyons, dated May 8th, 1882.
privileged situation" and her "preponderating influence" in Egypt; and the presence there of a French colony, which, as an outpost of France, imposed on the French Government duties from which it was determined not to swerve. On May 12th, he suggested a naval demonstration for its "moral effect", the intention being to frighten the military in power in Egypt and bring about the fall of the Egyptian Ministry. Granville agreed at once. He was of the opinion that such a demonstration, although hardly sufficient in itself, might be useful as a support for the Commissioners, if they were sent. But he added that he saw no reason for objecting, if Turkey desired to be represented in the naval demonstration; and to this Freycinet would not agree; so that Gladstone and Granville duly dropped the proposal.

Freycinet had simply supposed that the presence of the squadrons at Alexandria would produce a direct effect even at Cairo, and that their arrival might disorganize the "revolutionary" party and make the Khedive master of the situation. He considered it undesirable to invite other Powers to send ships also, since that would amount to an abdication of the exclusive position enjoyed by France and enjoyed by France and

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(2) F.O.141/152; Extender No.121, F.O. to Malet, âted May 13th, 1882.
(3) No.535 dated May 15th, 1882, from F.O. to Lyons.
England, with which Europe appeared entirely content. In all this he miscalculated the situation, which was better judged by others. Knowing the feeling in Cairo, Malet feared that, unless the Sultan's implied co-operation were secured and made known, and he countenanced the action of the Powers from the first, there was a risk that the Chamber of Notables and the army, whom he had partially succeeded in splitting, might again coalesce and offer resistance, which otherwise, he thought, would be impossible. Malet added that the coming of the squadrons in support of the Khedive diminished the danger. Sienkiewicz was of the opinion that the demonstration, in order to be effective, should be understood in Egypt as a precursor of material intervention. He tried his best to bring about the fall of the Ministry before the arrival of the squadrons. On May 13th he suggested that the Khedive should for the time being maintain the Ministry while substituting another premier for al-Sārūdı. Sulṭān Pasha tried to win over the Ministers to this idea. But they declared that they were wholly united and would rather resign in a body; leaving all responsibility for public order to Sulṭān himself! Malet and Tawfīk were in favour of a completely new Ministry. But Sienkiewicz warned them that a Ministry not imcluding 'Orābī

(1) Malet's No. 128 dated May 14th, 1882 to F.O.
(2) Malet's No. 534, dated May 14th, to F.O.
(3) Egypte, Vol. 74; Sienkiewicz's Teleg. marked Confid. dated May 12th, 1882, to Freycinet.
would lack both force and authority, while being a threat to the security of the Khedive and the foreign colonies. He suggested that they should await the arrival of the squadrons, when it should be possible to intimidate the military leaders and induce them to leave Egypt. To effect this, some Ministry must be maintained in office; and so the refusal of the Ministers (1) actually caused the existing Ministry to survive the crisis for a while. On May 16th, Sienkiewicz wrote, "Calm is restored. I ought to admit that during the crisis, despite of excitation savamment combinées, no soldier at Cairo had committed any blamable act. Stringent orders were issued to this effect. The taxes are paid in regularly". (2) Yet at that very time Blunt, who was in London, excited the natives by a series of telegrams to Sulṭān Pasha, the Sheikh of al-Azhar, ‘Orābī, and others, in which he asked if the National Party were content with ‘Orābī. He also declared that Europe would occupy Egypt if the Nationalists remained disunited. (3) Blunt’s object, as he says, was to warn the Nationalists of what was being published in the British press concerning the defection of Sultan and his followers to the Khedive, and the capital made of this by Colvin and Malet, whose pronouncements were regarded as authoritative in Fleet Street. All those

(1) Muṣṭafā Fahmī, on being asked by Sulṭān to accept the Premiershhip, declined the offer.
(2) Sienkiewicz’s Despâtches from May 12-17th, 1882.
(3) Secret History, 270 ff.
interrogated by Blunt declared that 'Orābī enjoyed the full support of the nation - whereas this support was attributed by Malet and Sienkiewicz to intimidation. (1) How 'Orābī and his supporters could have intimidated the spokesmen of a whole nation is, however, hard to imagine.

Meanwhile, the British and French squadrons were on their way to Alexandria, where they arrived on May 20th. The news produced violent indignation at Istanbul, where the Sultan felt himself deeply injured by the action of the two Powers, who had thus, without warning, or consultation, despatched a formidable fleet to an Ottoman port, while enjoining him in harsh and stringent terms not to concern himself with an affair in which nobody was more deeply interested or had more certain rights than himself. The Porte had done its utmost to dissuade the two Powers in a friendly way from sending the ships, and now instructed the Ottoman Ambassadors to enlist the good offices of the four Continental Powers in effecting their withdrawal. So intense was the irritation of the Sultan, however, that orders were issued for the repair of certain Ottoman warships, and there was talk of ordering the Sultan's Mediterranean fleet to Alexandria. Meanwhile, a natural consequence of this Anglo-French intervention was a temporary reconciliation between

(1) Sienkiewicz's Desp. of May 17th, 1882.
Orabi and the Sultan, whom he had offended during the incident of the Circassians. It is evident that the two Powers had foreseen this contingency, and considered carefully the probable consequences, before requesting the Porte in such trenchant terms not to interfere in their schemes for restoring order in Egypt. Lord Dufferin recommended that the other European Powers should encourage the Porte to adhere to the moderate line of conduct it seemed inclined to follow in any case, "as any advice of a contrary nature would be most mischievous". He did his best to persuade Sa'ïd Pasha (the Grand-Vizier) to regard the matter in a proper light, not as a demonstration in any way inimical to the authority or the interests of the Sultan, but, on the contrary, as an effort to strengthen the hands of his representative, and to maintain his sovereign rights, the status quo, and all the existing international engagements. Yet at the same time Dufferin warned Sa'ïd that if the Sultan, in opposition to the Western Powers, vindicated his rights in the matter, the loss of Egypt might probably ensue. (1) The Sultan nevertheless complained to the four Continental Powers, (2) in much the same language as he had used after the presentation of the Note of the 6th of January.

(1) F.O.78/3377; Draft No.240, F.O. to Dufferin, dated May 15th & Dufferin's Nos.93, 362, & 96, dated May 11th, 18th & 19th (F.O. 78/3384).

(2) F.O.141/158; Dufferin's No.123, dated May 19th, with an Incl. containing the Ottoman Circular, which was dated May 17th, 1882.
Austria, Russia, and Italy, were all put out at the action of England and France, which had been decided on without previous consultation with the other Powers, and appeared to them to be inconsistent with the understanding that the affairs of Egypt were for the future to form the subject of European deliberation and concert. (1) Under pressure from the Italian public, who were deeply interested in Egyptian affairs and afraid of a repetition of the Tunisian "perfidy", the Quirinal resolved that, if a more active intervention took place, they must insist on taking part in it on the ground that by doing so they would exert a beneficial and moderating influence, and that all necessary measures must be taken for the protection of the Italian subjects. The Italian fleet was accordingly concentrated at Messina; and the Quirinal declared that an Italian squadron was ready for action. Lord Granville, however, was of the opinion that Italian intervention would rather complicate than help to improve the situation. (2) Bismarck still deplored the

(1) F.0.146/2425; repro. Thornton's No.167 dated Petersburg, May 17th/21st; F.0.170/320; Paget's Draft No.154 dated May 19th & repro. Elliot's Nos. 32, 22 & 245 A marked Confidential, dated May 16th & 30th, 1882.

(2) F.0.146/2423; No.155, F.0. to Lyons, dated May 16th, 1882.
joint Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, (1) believing that it would lead to disagreement and quarrels between the two Powers, which, "whatever might be said of his supposed policy, he would be glad to avoid". Yet he expressed himself as willing to accept and support any method of action upon which England and France might come to an agreement. While not feeling at liberty to separate himself officially from Russia and Austria, or assume an attitude at variance with theirs, he nevertheless recommended Sedad Allah Bey (the Ottoman Ambassador in Berlin) to advise his Government "not to exaggerate the supposed effect and consequences of the naval demonstration, but to abstain from interference and confide implicitly in the policy and good intentions of England and France". He moreover instructed the German representatives in Petersburg and Vienna to advise against any attempt to thwart Anglo-French policy in Egypt, and counselled the Sultan not to send the Ottoman ships then anchored at Suda to Egyptian waters. (2) The result was

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(1) Although Courcel had earlier written from Berlin that Bismarck was ready to support a European mandate to the Western Powers with the object of restoring order in Egypt. (Allemagne, Vol. 147; Courcel's Desp. to Freycinet dated March 1st, 1882).

(2) F.0. Nos. 181 marked Confid., 33 also marked Confid., 142 & 146 - all to Malet dated May 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 1882 & Amphill's No. 169 marked Secret dated May 20th, 1882 to F.0.)
that the three Powers, though they offered no opposition to this Anglo-French action, at the same time failed to bring pressure to bear on the Porte as was desired by the Western Powers. England and France at last awoke to their disregard of the Continental Powers; and on May 23rd an Identical (1) Telegram was addressed to their respective representatives at the great capitals and Istanbul to the effect that the events which had given rise to their determination to send the squadrons had occurred so suddenly, and the danger which seemed to menace their countrymen had been so pressing, that there had been absolutely no time for them to come to a previous understanding with the other Governments in question. The two Powers had gone to Egypt, it ran, "not to make a selfish and exclusive policy prevail, but to secure, without distinction of nationality, the interests in that country of the several European Powers, and to maintain the authority of the Khedive, .....as it has been established by the .......
\[Fermān\] of the Sultan recognized by Europe". The two Powers denied that they proposed to land troops or resort to a military occupation of Egypt, and asseverated that they intended, when once calm had been restored and the future secured, to leave Egypt to herself and recall their squadrons.

(1) F.0.146/2423, Extender Teleg. No.177, dated May 20th, from F.0. to Lyons & a circular Note dated F.0.23rd to the British representatives in the five Capitals (F.0.146/2424).
"If, contrary to their expectations", it was added, "a pacific solution cannot be obtained, they will concert with the Powers and with Turkey on the measures which shall have appeared to them to be the best". This circular produced a favourable change in the attitude of the other countries, which was attributed by Courcel (the French Ambassador in Berlin) to the action of Bismarck, who had advised the other three Powers to give France and England the support they had asked for and to counsel the Sultan publicly to support Tawfiq against the Ministers who had ignored his authority. (1)

The arrival of the squadrons caused a great sensation in Egypt. The wiser among the natives recognized that the action of the two Powers was not hostile, and that, in view of the attitude of the Continental Powers, they would hesitate before resorting to any political action. In a circular the Western representatives addressed to their subordinate Consuls, (2) the intention behind the demonstration was declared to be pacificatory and friendly. But the great majority of the Egyptians regarded it as a hostile action. From a letter addressed by Orabi to Blunt on May 21st, (3) we can arrive at a true judgment of the natives' attitude. Orabi wrote in one passage, "All the people in the country are grieved at the despatch of the French and English ships, and

(2) B.B., 1882, XI, Incl. 2 in No.126.
(3) Secret History, 279-80.
they look on this as a sign of evil intentions on the part of the two Powers towards the Egyptians, and as an intrusion into our affairs, without necessity and without reason; and truly the Egyptians have made up their minds not to give in to any Power which wishes to interfere with our internal administration. They are also determined to keep their privileges confirmed to them by the treaties of the Powers; they will never allow the least of these to be taken from them as long as they have life; and they will also try their hardest to watch over European interests and the lives of European subjects, their property and honour, as long as these keep within the limits prescribed to them by law.

The strangest rumours were circulated about the hostile attitude displayed by the natives towards foreigners, especially in the English press, with The Times, The Daily News, The Standard, and The Daily Telegraph in the vanguard. The newspapers seized every opportunity to publish fantastic reports, destined to increase the general uncertainty and excite the British public against the Egyptians. (1)

The fall of the Ministry:

When Sienkiewicz asked Freycinet what course he should take after the arrival of the squadrons, he received the following instructions. (2) "You should refrain for the moment

(1) Réséner, op. cit., 71
(2) Egypte, Vol. 74; Teleg. dated May 19th, 1882.
from busying yourself with detailed plans. Avoid referring to any particular measure, especially any that concerns the army, the opposition of which might be excited by anything seeming to be directed against it. Act with Malet as regards the following:

1. The Governments of France and England have no other object, in intervening in Egyptian affairs, but the maintenance of the status quo, and consequently the restoration to the Khedive of the authority that belongs to him, and without which the status quo is immediately threatened.

2. Advise the Khedive to take advantage of a favourable moment, such, for instance, as the arrival of the fleets, to dismiss the present Ministry and form a new Cabinet under ....Sharif Pasha or some other person inspiring similar confidence.

3. You may allow it to be understood, if everything passes off well, that indulgence will be shown to the officers compromised in the movement, that no injury will be done to their persons or property, and that they may keep their rank.

Similar instructions were sent to Malet, with the addition that he should be careful "not to say anything, which will prevent the individuals referred to from being ordered to leave the country, if desired by the incoming ministry". (1) Moreover, Malet suggested that it would be

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(1) F.0.141/152; No.129, Ext. Teleg. No.124, F.0. to Malet dated May 19th, 1882.
advisable for the Egyptian Government to be made aware of the fact that the Porte would, if necessary, intervene to restore order in the country. (1) To this the French Government objected, being afraid lest even conditional assent to such a step, if publicly announced at Cairo or Istanbul, might produce an explosion of public feeling in Paris. (2) Yet by a quite amazing shift of policy on Freycinet's part, he went on May 21st so far as to say that, though he was still opposed to Turkish intervention, he would not regard as such the despatch of Turkish forces summoned by England and France to operate under Anglo-French control and upon conditions specified by the Powers. Recourse might be had, on these terms, to the use of Turkish troops but only if it became advisable to land troops at all. (3) Granville concurred; but when he proposed on May 24th to obtain international sanction from the Powers for the possible despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt, which was still rejected by the French Cabinet, Freycinet insisted that no such step was necessary.

Immediately after the arrival of the fleet, an attempt was made to bring about the fall of the Ministry. Sienkiewicz

(1) Malet's No. 141 to F.O., dated May 19th, 1882.
(3) It seems that Freycinet agreed to this, under the impression that England was assured of the approval of Germany and the other Powers, and was ready, if she received a mandate from the rest of Europe, to act independently of France: (D.D.F., First Series, IV, Nos. 337, 339 & 341 marked Unconfid.).
did his best to achieve this without presenting the dual Note. He and Malet at first tried to make use of M. Monge, the French Consul at Cairo, who spoke Arabic, in order to persuade al-Bārūdī, ʿOrābī, Ṭulba, Maḥmūd Fahmī, and ʿAbd al-Āl to leave Egypt and remain abroad until they received permission to return, under guarantee that they should retain their possessions, their ranks, and their salaries, and that a general amnesty should be proclaimed. Monge, however, refused to co-operate; upon which Sultan was in turn approached for the same purpose. Malet insisted in the meantime that the Porte should issue a declaration strengthening the Khedive's position. The Porte accordingly issued a letter to Tawfīk in which it was said that the action of the two Powers was an ordinary measure, taken every year. Although in its language this letter was in general vague and obscure, it contained the proposition that if the two Powers had any proposals to submit, they should address them to the Porte direct, since this "would very certainly safeguard its rights". Dufferin protested, saying that, if the Porte thus complicated the situation, the ships would remain indefinitely. But Malet told his French colleague that they had to choose between intervention or an accord with the Porte on the propositions that were to be made to the Egyptian Government.

(1) B.B., 1882, VIII; Nos.38-47 & 49.
(2) Sienkiewicz's Teleg. dated May 22nd and F.0.78/3384; No. 381 marked Confid., Dufferin to F.0. dated May 23rd, 1882.
Sienkiewicz was strongly opposed to the second course. He told the Khedive that the effect of the Porte’s action was to make of him something less than a governor, by attributing to him the role of a mere transmitter of messages; and as a result of this move the Khedive agreed to disregard the second part of the Porte’s communication. Yet Sienkiewicz was still suspicious of Tawfik, who had all along declared his intention of moving to Alexandria, so that, if no peaceful solution could be found, he might there await the landing of Turkish forces. Tawfik was supported in this resolve by both Colvin and Malet. But Freycinet, acting on Sienkiewicz's advice, strongly opposed it on the ground that it would inevitably lead to the failure of all peaceful solutions, whereas if he remained at Cairo, there was hope that one might still be found. Instructions were consequently sent to Malet to dissuade the Khedive from moving to Alexandria.

On May 23rd Sienkiewicz had a conversation with ‘Orābī, during which the latter indicated that he would be ready to leave the country, but for the fear of his colleagues lest his departure should destroy the unity of the army, and expose them to the vengeance of the Khedive. He said indeed

(1) Sienkiewicz's Teleg. dated May 22nd, 1882.
that they had forbidden him to leave Egypt, and that they would be inclined to obey the decisions of the Chamber, if it were again convened. (1) Al-Bārūdī told Sultan that if the squadrons were withdrawn, Orābī and his colleagues would move to the interior of the country. However, the Notables and the ‘Olamā‘ rallied round Orābī; and military preparations became more active. (2) On this the two Consuls, foreseeing that the Government would object to any conditions officially submitted to them, on the ground that they ought to be referred to the Porte, decided not to lengthen negotiations the failure of which would complicate the situation. On May 25th they handed to al-Bārūdī, in his capacity of Prime Minister, an ultimatum in the form of a dual Note. This made three demands:—firstly the temporary retirement from Egypt of Orābī, with the maintenance of his rank and pay; secondly the retirement into the interior, under similar conditions, of ‘Alī Fahmi and Abd al-‘Al; and thirdly the resignation of the Ministry. The Note added that the two Governments would, if necessary, insist on the fulfilment of these conditions. It was said that its presentation had been suggested by Sultan, though he himself

(1) Sienkiewicz’s Teleg. dated May 23rd, 1882.

(2) Another Teleg. from Sienkiewicz of the same date.
denied it. The Ministers, on receipt of the Note, waited on the Khedive to ask what answer it should in his opinion receive, - to be told that he accepted its conditions. They then urged a reference to the Porte, to which the Khedive replied that it was an internal question, observing that it was strange that they, who had before complained of his failure to uphold the privileges of Egypt, should suggest such a course. On the 26th the Ministers accordingly resigned, though complaining that the Khedive, by accepting the conditions proposed by England and France, had acquiesced, and thereby contravened the terms of the Fermons, in foreign intervention in Egypt. (1) In a separate Note, the Ministers blamed Sultan "for playing a part to which he was not entitled, and for being the tool of the French Consul-General". (2) The two Consuls advised the Khedive to accept the Ministers' resignation at once; and when Tawfïk suggested summoning the principal Pashas and Notables to confer with him on the situation, Sienkiewicz made him promise to take the Presidency of the Council himself, in case nobody else should dare to do so. The French Consul's comment was, "The Egyptian question is far from being ended, but a great step

(1) Sienkiewicz felt sure that the attitude of the Egyptian Ministers indicated that they had no fear of immediate Ottoman intervention.
(2) Sienkiewicz's Telegs. dated May 26th and 27th, 1882.
has been taken......The Note of May 25th ceased to be valid from the moment when the Ministry to which it was addressed, disappeared'. Malet, on the other hand, told the Khedive that he no longer considered himself bound by the promises of indulgence offered in the Note of May 25th. That is why the comminatory terms of the Note, which Sienkiewicz considered to be indispensable, produced no effect. (1) Sienkiewicz was of the opinion that the letter addressed by the Ministers to the Khedive might well furnish a basis for negotiation between the two Powers and the Porte, the aim of which would be to obtain a formal declaration from the Sultan, approving the Khedive's conduct and blaming the Ministers and the army. Malet shared this view; but the immediate difficulty was to form a new Ministry. Sharīf declined to resume the Premiership, saying that the army must be disbanded, and Turkish forces called in to restore order. He also advised the Khedive to ask the Porte to send someone with an order to ʿOrābī, requiring him, in the name of the Sultan, to proceed to Istanbul. (2) On the 27th the officers and soldiers of the regiments of Alexandria and Cairo protested to the Khedive at the resignation of ʿOrābī. They also made it clear to him that they rejected

(1) Sienkiewicz's Desp. dated May 27th, 1882.
(2) Three other Despatches from Sienkiewicz of the same date.
the Note, but that if an emissary were sent to Cairo by the Porte with instructions from "the only authority they recognized", they would submit to the Sultan's authority. It is interesting to observe that the Khedive received congratulations from the Grand-Vizier on the resignation of the Ministry. Tawfik thanked him, and deferred to the will of the Porte, asking the Sultan to send a commission to examine the situation in its entirety, on which the Grand-Vizier requested him to apply officially. (1)

Re-instatement of `Orābī :-

The Khedive consulted the Western Consuls, who advised him not to re-instate `Orābī. But on the 28th of May Tawfik was besought to do so by a deputation consisting of the Coptic Patriarch, the Chief Rabbi, the Notables and representatives of the native merchant class, who then waited on the Khedive. (2) He therefore did re-instate him, and issued a memorandum stating that it had been done at the repeated requests of the population, and with the object of maintaining order and the tranquillity of the country. But this was to act in defiance of the wishes of England and France, against which the Porte, the Khedive and the

(1) Turquie, Vol. 451; Noailles to Freycinet, dated May 29th, 1882.

(2) There is no evidence that pressure was brought to bear on any of these people to make this appeal. Even Sienkiewicz and the other European representatives regarded `Orābī as the only man in Egypt capable of maintaining order, and therefore that it was best to restore him to office, so that he might be held responsible for doing so.
Nationalists thus combined. The re-instatement of 'Orābī indeed marks a reaction against the role that the two Powers had played in Egypt. The Note of May 25th thus entirely failed, notwithstanding its peremptory tone, to produce the smallest symptom of surrender. One of the first actions of 'Orābī on resuming office was to publish a declaration stating that now he had been re-instated, he guaranteed the security of the life and property of all the inhabitants of Egypt irrespective of nationality or religion.

This assurance was not given a moment too soon. For several days past a feeling of uneasiness had prevailed, especially in Alexandria. Reserves were called up and new troops enlisted, in order to bring the effective of the army to the maximum prescribed by the Fermāns. 'Orābī declaring that these measures were necessary to assure the security of foreigners. There was even much talk at this point of dethroning Tawfīk. Even Malet wrote as follows, "I do not think that it is possible to maintain .......[him] on the Khedivial throne. This is the sentiment nearly unanimous of the Egyptians and also of the Europeans". (1) Thus did Malet eat his words. For only a short time ago he had assured the Foreign Office that Tawfīk had "all the nation, but for the military, behind him". (2) Tawfīk had really lost

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(1) F.0.146/2425; reproducible Malet's No.170 (marked Confid.) to F.O. dated May 28th, 1882.
(2) F.0.146/2423; No. 534, F.O. to Lyons dated May 14th, 1882.
all moral prestige, and consequently the status quo, so much prized by the French and British, seemed to be threatened. The two Powers having alike suffered a blow to their prestige, saw that something must be done to restore it. In these circumstances, however, it was impossible to avoid having recourse to the European concert.

The alternative of a European Conference and a Turkish pacification:

The Joint Anglo-French Note of May 23rd had suggested that if no peaceful solution could be attained, France and England should confer with the other Powers including Turkey on what measures it might then be thought best to take. On May 25th Lord Granville proposed that the other Powers should be requested by England and France to join them in asking the Sultan to have troops ready to send to Egypt, this being so urgent that the British Secretary told the French Ambassador that it was of the greatest possible importance that no time should be lost, since delay would be certain to encourage the opposition in Egypt, and might also encourage the Sultan to take advantage of the situation thus created and carry matters beyond the point at which the two Powers could deal with them. Tissot was assured that the concord between the two Powers "would not receive a shock"; and on May 26th a draft of the suggested overture
was submitted to the French. (1) Freycinet, however, was still opposed to the idea of any Turkish intervention and now proposed instead that France and England should intervene on their own. He argued that the Porte was at the bottom of all the troubles in Egypt, and expressed the fear that if once the Sultan got his troops in the country, he would displace Tawfik and appoint Orābī or some such person in his place but as no more than a temporary governor, thus by degrees reducing Egypt to a mere province. In any event, France and England could feel no assurance that the Turkish troops would act in conformity with their views. Nor could they exercise any effective control over them; so that, if they invited the Sultan to send troops, the Powers might find themselves in the ridiculous position of having themselves "let the wolf into the fold". Freycinet said distinctly that if a satisfactory settlement was not now effected on the spot without any intervention, there seemed to be nothing for it but to send British and French troops to Egypt. He added that he understood from Bismarck that the latter saw no objection to this, provided that the two Powers acted as the mandatories of Europe. He defended this new shift in his policy by "the light thrown by the late events on the actions and aims of the Porte" and by "the

(1) F.01146/2424; Nos. 594 & 605, F.O. to Lyons dated May 25th & 26thm 1882.
explosion of public opinion against him produced in France by the mere report of his having assented to Turkish intervention". (1)

The Anglo-French concordat was thus threatened with a serious breach that was more than merely incidental. As we have noted on several occasions, the two Consuls-General were mutually suspicious. Nor were the instructions given to the two Admirals in command of the ships involved in the demonstration identical. Now that the tête-à-tête between the two Powers no longer seemed convenient, both agreed to invite the European concert to a Conference over Egypt.

In order to counterbalance the Gambettist call for energetic action, it was essential for Freycinet to represent that decision as making for "the peaceful solution which would be given to the Egyptian question". (2) England welcomed this separation from the embarrassing entente with France, which was the only Power opposed to Turkish intervention. It was thought in London that once the Conference was assembled, and made aware of the delicacy of the situation in Egypt, the Powers might agree that intervention of some sort was unavoidable, and consequently there would be no such risk as before in a wholly British intervention, if it became

(1) F.0.146/2425; No.71 marked Very Confid., Lyons to F.0., dated May 29th, 1882; & F.0.141/158; No.169 marked Secret F.0. to Malet, dated May 31st, 1882.
necessary, provided that England could ensure the moral support of the other Powers in advance. The Times of June 1st took the following line, "A Conference may be the last effort of diplomacy before a war; it is of no use while the belligerents are actually in the field....The situation, in fact, is not in the least affected by the proposal of a Conference. It is the temporary and not the ultimate solution which is important at this moment. Once let the 'insurrection' be subdued, and the Egyptian question will solve itself; but (1) no formal meetings of Ambassadors will subdue the 'insurrection'."

Invitations were accordingly sent by England and France to the other Great Powers; and special attempts were made in the meantime to induce the Porte to participate. The Porte, however, had already chosen another alternative. On May 26th the Ottoman Foreign Minister had said that if the Sultan was allowed to send a Commissioner to Egypt, it would soothe his irritation and salve his wounded pride, and that by this means the object of the Western Powers could be very well gained. "Aşim Pasha hoped that the two Powers would not imagine that any arrière pensée lay behind the Porte's suggestion, since, on the one hand, the Ottoman Government did not intend to thwart the policy of the two Powers in Egypt, nor, on the other, did it think of

(1) Italics are mine.
despatching Ottoman troops, since that would result in Ottoman forces fighting other Ottoman forces. (1) In order to face the Powers with an accomplished fact, an Ottoman Commission was hastily assembled under the presidency of Dervish Pasha in order to re-establish calm in Egypt and leave the idea of a Conference with no raison d'être. Marquis De Noailles, the French Ambassador at Istanbul, tried to bring pressure on the Porte to prevent the despatch of this mission. He told Sa'id Pasha (the Grand-Vizier) that it had many disadvantages: in the first place it would arrive too late; and in the second its despatch was an exceedingly serious step, since it would disarm the Khedive and imply that he was to blame at a time when he was in dire need of support. Noailles then added that, once the despatch of the mission was made known at Cairo, the military party, the resistance of which had been a revolutionary act, would say that the Commission had been sent by the Sultan to examine the Khedive's conduct and the situation in general, in order to pronounce judgment afterwards, and so deliver a sort of preventive accusation against Tawfik. (2) Nevertheless, the Commission left for Egypt on the 4th of June and arrived at Alexandria on the 7th.

(1) F.0.78/3397; Dufferin's Telegs. Nos. 104 & 105, dated May 26th, 1882.
(2) Turquie, Vol. 451; Noailles's Desp. of May 28th, 1882.
Dervişh had previously been governor of Salonica and Batum and had shown himself to be double-faced, corrupt and an intriguer, but talented, especially when in 1881 he was called on to quell a revolt in Albania. His Commission also included Ahmad Es'ad Efendi, the Sādin, or Guardian, of the Holy Cities, whom the Sultan kept at Istanbul and was in the habit of employing in his secret dealings with his Arabic-speaking subjects, consulting him on all matters connected with his Panislamic propaganda. (1) Ahmad Es'ad had already been sent to Egypt on three other missions and had to some extent "attached the Notables of Egypt, including Arabi, to the sacred centre of the Caliphate". He had been at Cairo at the end of the previous May, and on the 27th or 28th had sent a telegram to the Palace, announcing the despatch of the letter from 'Orābī, promising that the Egyptian troops would fraternise with any Ottoman force that might be sent. He arrived back at Istanbul at the end of May, carrying with him another letter from 'Orābī and one also from al-Bārūdī. (2) The mission further included some staff officers, whose functions were to ascertain what were Egypt's fortified points; whether there were or were not any fortifications at the port of

(1) Blunt, op. cit., 351.
(2) Two Desps. from Noailles to Freycinet, dated May 30th, 1882.
Alexandria sufficient to withstand aggression in case of the entry of foreign squadrons; the best way of sending troops in case of necessity; and how the expeditionary force could be guaranteed against opposition in case of resistance.

From the instructions given to Dervish it is evident that the object of his mission was to support the Khedive, to maintain the status quo, and to re-establish order and bring about a general pacification. In order to attain it he was authorized, if possible, to abolish the Assembly of Notables with the least possible delay, to cultivate the Consuls of Austria, Germany and Italy, and to try and create a rivalry between them and their English and French colleagues. He was furnished with a proclamation in which the will of the Pādishāh was made known, and was instructed to consult the Khedive on the best means of realizing the foregoing aim. He also had discretionary authority to arrest and even to send to the Südān "those persons from whom resistance was to be feared". Hobart Pasha, a British naval officer in the Ottoman service, told Lord Dufferin that the Sultan had asked his advice on the best means of sending troops to Egypt and that he had declared

(1) See App. I.
himself determined, if the Dervish mission failed, to put down the "revolt" by force. (1)

Lord Granville and Lord Dufferin tried to persuade the Ottoman Government to participate in the Conference "which would be summoned at Constantinople with the concurrence of the Porte". The latter were assured that nothing but Egyptian affairs would be discussed in the Conference; but it was made clear that "if the Sultan were to make difficulties and raise obstacles, it would be difficult to find arguments to meet the pressure that would be put upon...../England/ to take immediate and independent action in consideration of the pressing nature of the circumstances and engagements under which...../she/ lay". Lord Granville told Musurus Pasha that "it was out of the question that the Sultan should be left to intervene in Egypt and deal with it as he pleased, without security or due regard to the views of the Powers". He argued that since invitations to the Conference had already been sent out and accepted by the Powers, it was impossible to cancel it, and added that, in his opinion, it was to be hoped, as being desirable not only for the Porte but also for all those interested in the welfare of Egypt, that the Dervish mission would succeed in arriving at a satisfactory arrangement in

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(1) F.0.78/3397; No.123 (part marked 'Strictly Secret & Confidential') Dufferin to F.0. dated June 6th, 1882 & F.0. 141/162; No.120, Dufferin to Malet, dated June 4th, 1882.
accordance with the principles laid down by the Powers and the Sultan. The British representatives in the four Great Capitals were instructed to insist that the other Powers concerned should join England and France in pressing the Porte to accept the Conference. (1)

The Sultan declined the invitation for various reasons. The Turks had a profound dislike of European Conferences about Turkish affairs, partly because they considered European intervention in any form as a national humiliation, and partly because they knew from experience that Europe was always disposed to curtail and weaken rather than extend and strengthen Ottoman rule. The Sultan had hinted to Dufferin that he was afraid lest the question of Tripoli should be tacked on to that of Egypt. He said that he would accept a Conference in principle if it really became a necessity, but that until the results of the Dervish mission were known, he would strongly deprecate any such thing. In all probability, he said, the recommendations of a Conference would be either impracticable or opportune, and instead of strengthening Dervish's hands it would weaken them and deal a death blow to his prestige, since instead of appearing as the representative of the Commander of the Faithful, and as making known the latter's wishes to his Moslem subjects, he would have the air of a mere instrument

(1) F.0.141/152; Copy No. 293, F.0. to Dufferin, dated June 8th 1882 & F.0. 78/3378; Draft No. 280, F.0. to Dufferin, dated June 2nd, 1882.
of the Foreign Powers. (1)

Much publicity was given meanwhile to a display of unwonted activity in the Turkish dockyards. These were intended to give the impression that the Sultan was and resolved on sending troops to Egypt, were only a pretence. The Sultan's object was probably to irritate the French to whom such movement would be distasteful, against England. The Sultan's private secretary, moreover, told Lord Dufferin that, should the Conference take place, Turkey and England would agree beforehand on the settlement to be arrived at, thus being in a position to impose their wishes upon the other Powers. (2) In fact, as early as the middle of May, the French Consuls in Turkey had reported it as certain that orders had been issued to mobilize the reserve. There was also much activity at the Ottoman admiralty. All these preparations were of course connected with the Anglo-French naval demonstration, being primarily a feint destined to induce the two Powers to withdraw their fleets. But the Porte also wished to show that only the Sovereign Power possessed the right to restore order in Egypt, and to convince Europe and the


(2) Dufferin's Nos. 133 marked Confid. & 142, dated June 11th & 16th, 1882.
Islamic peoples that Turkey was ready for that task. (1) The Dervish mission:

Few people in Egypt welcomed the news that a Conference might assemble at Istanbul. Even the Agents of the four Continental Powers themselves seemed to be embarrassed at the idea and against it. Sienkiewicz, on the other hand, favoured it as a means of preventing Turkish interference. The mere threat of a Conference would at least, he expected, induce the Sultan to give the Dervish mission more definite instructions for the speedy restoration of order in Egypt, and in due course the Conference itself should be able to prevent the Sultan from acquiring, by direct interference, advantages that could affect the status quo. (2)

On arriving at Alexandria, Dervish declared to all the residents of Egypt, natives and foreigners, that he was the special envoy of the Sultan, "who has always at heart the welfare of his States and is unwilling to allow any infringement of the Imperial orders granting privileges to the Khedive". He called on the Egyptians to obey the Khedive as the Sultan's representative, supporting his appeal with some verses of the Kor'an. His arrival and the proclamation were greeted by the European colonies as heralding a settlement of the Egyptian question; while the Sheikhs who accompanied

(1) Turquie, Vol. 451, Noailles' Nos. 7 & 9, dated May 17th & 21st and other two Desps. dated May 18th & 19th, 1882.
(2) Egypte, Vol. 74; Sienkiewicz's No. 205 & another Desp. dated June 5th, 1882.
it lent the mission a religious prestige which offset that exploited by 'Orābī in his relations with the masses. (1)

On the other hand, whereas the Turks and Circassians were greatly in favour of Dervīsh, the Egyptians were rather for Es'ad. (2)

From his arrival up to June 11th, Dervīsh tried to suppress the revolution by threats of force. In his first telegram to Istanbul he represented the dispute between 'Orābī and the Khedive as having originated in an attempt on 'Orābī's part to induce the Khedive to place himself in opposition to the Porte. He admitted that there was a strong feeling in favour of 'Orābī, but flattered himself that he had in great measure succeeded in dissipating it.

In a conversation with 'Orābī and his colleagues Dervīsh told them that he was authorised to arrest them if they did not mind what they were about; to which they replied that they were not unsupported. Dervīsh then observed that he had half a mind to arrest them on the spot; but he eventually thought it more prudent to see first what the leading Egyptian Sheikhs had to say. Them, however, he also found hostile to his policy. They told him that the Arab tribesmen were with them and that 'Orābī was in the right.

One of them delivered a violent speech in the presence

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(1) Scotidis, L'Egypte contemporaine et Arabi Pacha, p. 83.
(2) Blunt, op. cit.; 305.
of Dervīsh, demanding the withdrawal of the fleets, the
deposition of Tawfīk, who "had invited them to come" and
the re-instatement of the late Ministry. Dervīsh dismissed
the Sheikhs, of whom only two, who were consequently
decorated by the Commissioner, sided with the Khedive.
Private meetings were held at Cairo denouncing Dervīsh,
and a monster meeting of the students was held in the Azhar
mosque to protest against the insult offered the Sheikhs.
Dervīsh then assembled all the leaders of the Arab tribes-
men and convoked an assembly of their "Great Council". But
on finding a large number of its members entirely opposed
to him, he told them that he might well take over the
Ministry of War and that the Sultan had sent him to protect
the Europeans, adding that at the first opportunity he would
arrest 'Orābī and send him to Istanbul. At a discussion
with the Notables, again, he informed them that they would
no longer be allowed to meet, and that his mission was to
consolidate the power of the Khedive. The Notables were
not unnaturally highly indignant. They insisted on the
preservation of their existence as an Assembly, and informed
him that they would never consent to the dismissal of 'Orābī
and his colleagues. Having discovered, accordingly, that
he was faced with a most formidable opposition, Dervīsh
suggested the despatch of Turkish troops to support him and assure the success of his mission. (1)

Sienkiewicz was alarmed at the possibility that Dervişh might either assume command of the army or become Minister of War and told Malet that there was a point beyond which he would be unable to approve or even to recognize the action of the Commissioner. It was, in fact, at this point that the interests of France and England diverged. England "required nothing more than the restoration of the status quo in Egypt upon a secure footing, and this object would be attained if the army were controlled by an officer of the Sultan without any further interference on the part of the Porte. The French Government, on the other hand, would resolutely oppose any such plan as a permanent method of maintaining order". (2)

Ahmad Es'ad himself complained of the high-handed attitude assumed by Dervişh. This, he said, was contrary

(1) See the copies of letters exchanged between Dervişh and the Porte in Dufferin's Nos. 443 & 444 both marked Confid., dated June 14th, 1882 (F.0.78/3385) - also Dufferin's No.139 to Malet dated June 13th, 1882 (F.0.141/162); and Malet's No.144 to Granville dated June 16th,1882. Also Sienkiewicz's Teleg. of June 11th & Cf Blunt, op.cit,307-8.

(2) F.0.141/155; Draft No.336, Malet to F.O. dated June 10th, 1882 & Sienkiewicz's Teleg. to Freycinet dated June 9th, 1882.
to the sentiments he himself had expressed and to the assurances which he had given in conformity with the wishes of the Sultan. Incidentally - Es'ad, in the course of his last mission, had obtained a petition, signed by some thousands of Egyptians, (1) including more than thirty members of the Chamber of Notables, requesting the deposition of Tawfīk, who, it was said, had invited the despatch of the squadrons, and was following the same policy as the Bey of Tunis in order to deliver Egypt over to England and France. The petition also declared that Orābī and his followers were ready to accept Ḥalīm, if the Sultan supported the National Party against England and France, and went on to state that Orābī could recruit and arm 100,000 men, but that if the Sultan agreed to any foreign intervention, he would lose Egypt. (2) It was on this account that Es'ad now complained that his influence with Orābī had been destroyed by his association with Dervīsh and that he was regarded as a traitor by Orābī and his partisans. He observed that it was extremely unwise of Dervīsh not to have tried to conciliate the military, inasmuch as they were "supported by the whole population", whereas Dervīsh had no military force at his disposal. Es'ad was opposed to the

(1) Sienkiewicz's Desp. of June 7th & Noailles's of June 4th, 1882.

(2) Sienkiewicz's Desp. of June 7th & Noailles's of June 4th, 1882.
despatch of troops, since it would be impossible to get
the two armies to act together, and concluded by observing
that it had become impossible to get rid of 'Orabi either
by persuasion or by force, and that Dervish had lost all
influence with others and all confidence in himself. (1)

From the separate and contradictory activities of
Dervish and Esad, we can gain an insight into the Sultan's
suspicious nature, which seemed to render him incapable of
giving his full confidence to any single individual. It
was always his policy to double one agent by another, intend-
ing that each should spy upon his colleague. Frequently,
moreover, as in this instance, the secret mandate given to
the one was in indirect contradiction of the official
instructions of the other. That the Sultan always had a
double object in view accounts for the complicated and
tortuous nature of his policy. He sought on the one
hand to expand and consolidate his direct temporal authority
as Sultan, and on the other to increase his vague moral
prestige as Caliph; and it happened that, in Egypt, the two
policies conflicted with each other, while both had to be
pursued in such a way as not to provoke direct foreign

(1) Dufferin's Nos. 442 & 457 both marked Confid. dated
June 14th & 16th, 1882 and Incl. in Dufferin's No. 427
Confid. dated June 9th, 1882.
intervention. Although, as we have seen, Dervīsh in fact met with complete failure, it was announced in Istanbul circles that, thanks to his vigorous action and his commanding position, from which England and France must use force if they were to dislodge him, the nominal influence of the Sultan had now become an actual power. (1) This being so, the convening of a European Conference on Egypt no longer had any raison d'être.

(1) The Times of June 15th, 1882.
Chapter IX

The riots and the bombardment of Alexandria

"I believe..... that some complication of an acute nature must supervene before any satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question can be attained and that it would be wiser to hasten it than to endeavour to retard it."

Malet to Granville, on May 7th, 1882.

cited in Malet, op. cit., 313.

The riots of June:

A state of anxiety had prevailed in Egypt since the French occupation of Tunis. The events of September, 1881, and the outrageous interference of the two Powers and their Agents, helped to accentuate that feeling; and rumours of every kind were rife. That hostility to foreigners should have become widespread among the natives was not, therefore, surprising, though religious fanaticism had little part in provoking it, whatever the European press may have alleged. Moreover it was only to be expected that this hostility should find vent in individual incidents, however careful the local authorities might be.
On June 11th a riot broke out at Alexandria. It continued for about four hours, during which a large number of people, both natives and foreigners, including a sailor of the British fleet, were killed, and the British Consul, Mr. Cookson, as well as the Italian, were insulted and wounded. As regards the origin of and responsibility for these riots, nothing definite could be ascertained. Orābī and his partisans were accused of having planned them, in order that, by coming to the rescue, they might show their importance, and assert "that there was only one Ruler in Egypt", namely Orābī himself. Similar accusations were also levelled against both the British and the Greek Consulates, who had armed the British and Greek colonies at Alexandria, immediately before the outbreak of the riots; and by this school of interpreters Malet himself is held personally responsible — a reasoning which they support by pointing to the fact that he had urged British residents to leave the country since "great events were at stake", and by his remark quoted at the head of this chapter.

(1) Estimates of what this number was differ widely.
(2) Royle, op.cit., I, 102; also Sienkiewicz’s Nos. 209 & 211, both marked Dir.Pol., dated June 12th and 26th, 1882. Dilke and Gladstone adhered to this, but were later convinced that they were wrong. Cf. Gwynn and Tuckwell, op.cit., 459-60 & 469.
(3) Among others; Réséner, op.cit., 32 & 39; Gaigneret, op.cit., 219 & Farman, op.cit., Chap.XXV.
None of these allegations seem to have any foundation in fact. In fact, the riots were a great grief to 'Orābī and his friends, since it was to their interest that the most perfect order should be maintained; and Blunt and Broadley, who were later to attend their trial, absolutely deny their complicity. Neither can Malet or the Consulate be held directly responsible, although the arming of the Maltese and Greeks certainly caused the riots to assume their extremely bloody character. If the riots were intentionally provoked at all, the persons most likely to have been responsible were the Khedive, Dervīsh Pasha, and 'Omar Luṭfī, who all had a special interest in getting rid of 'Orābī at all costs. (1)

In Egypt the riots created a state of panic, with the result that thousands, (2) not only of Europeans, but also of Christian natives, Copts and Armenians, and notable Moslems of Turkish origin, began to leave the country, the properties of the latter being confiscated. (3)

The Egyptian Government now proposed the appointment of a mixed commission, of equal numbers of Europeans and natives,

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(2) 20,000 as estimated by Dufferin. (F.0.78/3386; No.491 Confid. to F.0. dated June 24th, 1882.)
(3) Egypte, Vols. 74 & 75; Telegs. dated June 30th & July 1st from Sienkiewicz & No. 2 Dir.Pol. from Vorges dated July 7th, 1882.
under the chairmanship of an Egyptian, to investigate into the incident. Neither Sienkiewicz nor his colleagues, however, believed that such a commission would be of any avail, since "the witnesses would say nothing" and no Europeans could be induced to serve on it. He, Sienkiewicz, pointed out that the Prefect (Ma'mur) of Alexandria, who, with the Mustahfizin, or gendarmerie, were responsible for the butchery of Europeans in the Prefecture itself, instead of being arrested, had merely been transferred to the army, while the Mustahfizin all retained their posts. All that had been done was the expulsion from Alexandria of a number of the Arab tribesmen, who were believed to have indulged in looting during the riots. (1) The Consuls were all instructed, after Granville had so enjoined Cookson, not to attend the meetings of the commission. All held that the Egyptian Government was quite incapable of tracing the native criminals, and that it dared not undertake effective measures. (2) The consequence was that the commission, since its membership was wholly native, was unable to search the domiciles of suspected foreigners and so a complete investigation was rendered impossible.

(1) Sienkiewicz's No. 211 & Vorges's No. 2 Dir.Pol. supra.
(2) Vorges's No. 2 Dir.Pol. supra.
The French Consul-General nevertheless described the events of June 11th as "a simple émeute". Questioned in the Chambre on June 12th and in the Senate on June 13th, Freycinet compared the riots to "accidental events that sometimes occur in ports where people of different countries are herded together", and in particular to the quarrels which had before occurred in Marseilles between French and Italian workers. Yet accounts of the "massacre", a large number of which were due to the creative imagination of the different correspondents, "were published and republished in England, and on the Continent and the Egyptian newspapers owned by Europeans, until not only people in England and the Cabinet, but the mass of European residents in Egypt believed them to be true". Although Sir Charles Dilke assured the House of Commons that the riot had no political character, "the policy or rather no policy of the Government" was censured. In the House of Lords Lord Salisbury attacked the Government, and described the "naval demonstrations" as having demonstrated the impotence of Great Britain and the feebleness of her counsels. The Times called for immediate action in revenge for "the murder of British subjects and officers, and the brutal


wounding of a British Consul", and said that "both the national interests and the national dignity... were seriously compromised by the prolongation of a period of uncertainty and suspense". (1) The riots strengthened the hands of those in the British Cabinet who stood for an energetic policy, such as Hartington, Northbrook, Dilke and Chamberlain; and it was evident that Granville, Gladstone and Bright would "bow to the storm". Most of the "Jingo" element in the Cabinet had come to the conclusion that there was no National Party in the true sense of the word, and that Orābī was only a military adventurer whose chief aim appeared to be the increase of the numbers and pay of the military, and that it was evident that "his supremacy would very shortly bring about bankruptcy and anarchy." (2)

In the Ottoman capital the events at Alexandria created a feeling of disappointment in official circles, as it was thought that the event might compromise the success of the Dervīsh Mission, and lead to a renewal of the demand for the assembly of a Conference. When Granville tried to charge the Porte, "in ultimate resort", with responsibility for the events, in view of the presence of Dervīsh in Egypt,

(1) The Times of June 13th, 1882.
(2) Letters of Queen Victoria, Vol. III, 303; Life of Dilke, 459-61; Bright's Diaries, 485; & Chamberlain's Memoirs, 71.
Musurus answered by saying that neither the Sultan nor Dervişh could be held responsible, since there were no Turkish troops in Egypt to maintain order, and that the case might have however in fact been different if there had been. (1) The events of June did not lead to the immediate failure of the Dervişh mission, though this was expected not only by the Khedive, Malet and Sienkiewicz, but by the Ottoman Commissioner himself. (2) Dervişh merely adopted new tactics. On the one hand he sent to Istanbul asking for Turkish troops "in order to prevent any resistance on the part of the Egyptian army", a request in which he was supported by Malet and the Khedive; (3) and on the other he tried to establish a better modus vivendi with ʿOrābī and the National Party. He advised that the garrison of Alexandria should be reinforced, after which the third and fourth regiments were brought into the city, raising its strength to about 10,000 men. (4)

In the meantime, not only in Egypt, but in the estimation of the Moslem world at Istanbul and elsewhere, ʿOrābī acquired the character and position of a champion of the rights of Islam against the aggression of the "infidel"

(1) F.O.141/152; Copy No.322, F.O. to Dufferin, dated June 17th, 1882.
(2) F.O.141/155; Draft No.345 Confid., Malet to F.O. dated June 13th; B.B., 1882, Nos.17 & 22; Sienkiewicz's Desp. of June 12th & F.O.78/3386; Dervişh's Report enclosed in No.511 Confid. from Dufferin to F.O. dated June 29th, 1882.
(3) Sięnkiewicz's Desp's. of June 12th & 14th & Malet's Draft No.345 supra

See next page for ff.(4)......
Western Powers. According to Dervish, all classes in Egypt, including the Arab tribesmen, were united in his support. The religious sheikhs in the mosques and schools, acting on 'Orabi's orders, exhorted the Egyptians to arm themselves, saying that otherwise Egypt would be delivered over to Europe. Cairo, Alexandria and certain towns on the Nile, all consequently seethed with excitement, which was intensified by rumours, originating with the Khedive's servants, that he was preparing, in case of necessity, to embark on a foreign ship of war. The rumours that British troops might be sent to Port-Sa'id had resulted in the redoubling of preparations for resistance there. 'Orabi, in addition to the garrisons of Alexandria and Cairo, had at his disposal 30,000 Arab tribesmen, who now assembled on the Suez Canal. He laid mines near the mouth, and said that he would explode them if the fleet approached the entrance. Krupp guns were moreover expected to arrive any day from Germany. (1) At the same time the 'Olama' of al-Azhar issued a unanimous fetwa to the effect that if the Porte were to side with the Europeans, it should not

(4) from previous page... F.0.3386; No.473 Confid. dated June 19th to F.0.; Turquie, Vol.451; Noailles's Desp. dated June 24th & a Copy (of what purported to be a Confid. Teleg) Report addressed to the Palace by spies sent to watch Dervish's proceedings and enclosed in Dufferin's No.1527 Confid. (F.0.78/3387).

(1) this page... Incl. in Dufferin's No.527 supra.
be obeyed. They reached an agreement with the 'Olama' of both Tripoli and Tunis; and all tried to convince Esaad that the success and even the existence of the Islamic cause in North Africa depended on the maintenance of 'Orabi in command. Esaad in his turn hastened to advise Dervish in this sense; and since all the despatches reaching Yildiz from Tunis and Tripoli were in favour of 'Orabi, representing him as an essential figure of the Islamic movement, the 'Olama' of the Palace, who were supported by many influential personalities, also pronounced for him.

It is possible that when Dervish on the 15th of June sent the Sultan a despatch in which he declared that the assistance of 'Orabi was indispensable, he was aware that the way had already been paved in this manner. The Sultan began to feel that he would do better to compromise with 'Orabi rather than seek to enhance his own influence and prestige by an exhibition of force. He must not, he saw, risk being held to have coerced a Moslem population in the interests of England and France, since the only object of the latter, in the eyes of the Egyptians, was to maintain a system under which a parcel of European officials

(1) Noailles's Desp. of June 24th, supra.
were employed in sucking the life-blood of the province for their own benefit and for the benefit of sordid creditors. Orders, therefore, were sent to Dervish to come to an agreement with 'Orabi; and Dervish accordingly found himself compelled after all to resort to the line of policy recommended by Ahmad Es'ad. (1) Dervish was, at the same time, however, ordered to approach the Consuls, in order to concert with them a plan that provided for a reinforcement of the Khedive's position, such as might be submitted to the Conference as a solution of the whole problem. (2)

The Rāghib Ministry:

The Consuls-General at Cairo were all convinced that the situation was critical. All of them except Sienkiewicz regarded the sending of the Turkish troops as the only solution. On June 12th the consular corps assembled at the British Consulate, and all agreed that the maintenance of public order and security was of paramount importance. The Agents of the Triple Alliance were unanimous in admitting that the only means of preserving order lay in "recognizing and affirming..., 'Orabi's power"; and as the Western Consuls agreed, all six Consuls then went to Dervish to

(1) F.0.78/3386; Inc! in Dufferin's No.477 Confid. dated June 20th, 1882.
(2) Dufferin's No.473 supra.
demand that he should assume responsibility for public
order. Dervish, however, "having neither instructions
nor resources at his disposal", suggested a conference
with the Khedive in order to decide upon the measures to
be taken. A meeting was accordingly held that same
day at Ṣāḥib and Dervish, Esʿād, two other members of the
Ottoman mission, Sharif, ʿOrābī, and the six Consuls. Baron
Kosjek, the Austrian Consul-General, began by observing that
the question was not so much political as one of public
safety (which nobody but ʿOrābī could secure). Saurma then
enquired whether the Khedive could guarantee the safety of
the German colony, saying, "If you have the necessary means,
say what they are; otherwise you must confess that you can
do nothing." Dervish at first again declined all responsi-

bility, and while showing marked respect for Egypt's autonomy,
undertook, after order was restored, to ask for forces "to
assist ʿOrābī". Nevertheless, in the end it was agreed that
the Khedive and Dervish should guarantee public tranquillity;
ʿOrābī formally pledged himself to obey all the Khedive's
orders for its maintenance, and to put an end to the
agitation carried on in the newspapers and the mosques;
and Dervish said that he would assume joint responsibility
with ʿOrābī for the execution of the orders of the Khedive. (1)

(1) Egypte, Vol.74; Sienkiewicz's No.209 Dir.Pol. dated
June 12th, 1882.
It only remained to effect some ministerial combination, since Egypt had been without a Ministry since the resignation of al-Bārūdī and his colleagues.

Orders had meanwhile been sent to Dervīsh if possible to induce the German and Austrian Agents at Alexandria to effect a reconciliation between ʿOrābī and Tawfīk. The Italian Government also permitted Martino to join in this démarche; and though Bismarck, believing that ʿOrābī was now a power to be reckoned with, was at first inclined to support him alone, when Lord Ampthill (the former Lord Odo Russell), pointed out to him that British public opinion would not permanently acquiesce in arrangements for Egypt which would destroy the prestige of England and of Europe in the East, Bismarck acquiesced, remarking only that in accordance with "a request privately made by the Khedive and privately supported by the Sultan for advice", he was instructing Saurma to find out what could be done to conciliate the different parties and to avoid further trouble. In so doing he was merely acting the part of "honest broker", as on former occasions, and he hoped the Powers would instruct

(1) The Khedive, accompanied by Dervīsh, had left for Alexandria on the 13th of June; and so had the consular corps. Two days later he was ordered by the Porte to return to Cairo, in order to calm the foreigners' apprehensions. But the British Government intervened to spare the Khedive a further humiliation; and the Porte's order was consequently countermanded.

(2) F.0.78/3386; Dufferin's No.458 (Confid.) dated June 16th, 1882.
their Agents to lend their assistance and influence to Saurma. (1) It is evident that Bismarck, who was directing the policy of the four Continental Powers in Egypt, was desirous of bringing about a normal situation, at least in appearance, before the opening of the Conference. That Sienkiewicz for his part held that all was required before the opening of the Conference was the formation of a Ministry. But he then warned the Quai D'Orsay against interference by the four Continental Powers in Egypt, such as would "compromise French influence in an irremediable way", and reiterated a suggestion he had made more than once before; viz: the removal of Tawfik, who was not worth any bloodshed on his behalf, and whom England alone was ready to support by any means at her disposal. (2)

The Austrian and German Consuls-General were for the formation of a Ministry approved by Orabi, which would restore confidence. On June 17th indeed they threatened Tawfik with an end like that of his father, and pressed him to form a Ministry and even to reinstate the old one if necessary, giving him twenty four hours in which to comply

(1) F.0.146/2428; reprod. Ampthill's No.53 (Confid.) to F.0. dated June 19th, 1882 & F.0.141/152; reprod. Ampthill's No.234 Confid. to F.0. dated June 14th, 1882.
(2) Egypte, Vol.74; Desp. dated June 17th & No.210 Dir.Pol. dated June 20th, both from Sienkiewicz to Freycinet.
with their request. They then went to Malet and accused him of being responsible for the existing situation, and also met Dervīsh and rebuked him for his failure. Malet, like Sienkiewicz, abstained from any participation in advising the Khedive to form a Ministry. Both confined themselves to recommending that he should be guided by the suggestions of Dervīsh Pasha. (1)

The person recommended by the German Consul as President of the Council was Rāghib Pasha, who had already been suggested for the post to the Khedive by Sienkiewicz a month before. But Rāghib had then doubted his ability to induce 'Orābī either to resign or to leave Egypt; (2) and the Khedive only accepted him now under pressure from Saurma and Kosjek. Rāghib had occupied high ministerial positions in the past. Sienkiewicz states that he had been the president of the National (3) Party, and this may well be so, since in the public agitation preceding the formation of the first responsible Ministry of Sharīf, the National programme was drawn up in Rāghib's house. After the dethronement of Ismā'īl Rāghib had kept aloof from public affairs, thus being on good

(1) Malet, op. cit. 423.
(2) Sienkiewicz's No. 203 Dir. Pol., dated May 30th, 1882.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Cf. al-Tijāra of April 3rd, 1879.
terms with the military leaders to whom he had been well known before. After now accepting the offer, therefore, he proceeded to Cairo to confer with 'Orābī; and a Ministry was formed in which 'Orābī continued to be Minister of War. In the programme he drew up for his government, and which was accepted by the Khedive, and then conveyed to the Consuls-General, Rāghib made it clear that his Ministry intended to govern the country constitutionally, with a view to the promotion of Egypt's welfare. This programme was inspired by Nationalist ideals, and embodied items intended to rescue Egypt from the various difficulties that beset her. (1) The Ministry having been inaugurated, the Turkish Foreign Minister sent to thank the four Continental Embassies for the part their Agents had taken in the recent work of reconciliation in Egypt. (2)

The defeat of the Western Powers was even clearer on this occasion than it had been earlier when 'Orābī was restored to the Ministry of War. The Continental Powers seemed to have won the day. That this was so is evident from the last reports (3) of Siekniewicz, who was of the opinion that only absolutely necessary relations should be maintained with the new Ministry, and that, if it proved

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(1) Al-Thawra al-'Orābīya, 319-20.
(2) F.O. 78/3386; No. 466 Confid.; Dufferin to F.O. dated June 14th, 1882.
necessary to proffer indirect advice, this should be conveyed to no one but Rāghib himself. It was impossible, observed Sienkiewicz, to support Rāghib, as this *ipso facto* meant supporting Orābi and admitting both the accomplished fact and the weakness of the Western Powers. He therefore recommended military intervention, in order to put an end to the "military despotism"; weaken the Islamic movement in North Africa; and effect a final solution of the Egyptian question. This would strengthen the prestige and influence of France, as well as that of the Control, and consequently preclude the possibility of France's being isolated both in Egypt and in Europe. "If our influence in Egypt diminishes," he said, "this will have a far-reaching effect from the coasts of Syria to those of Algeria; everywhere it will be said we have retreated before an Arab adventurer. Our position will be weakened; and it is possible that the same story will be repeated against us in Tunis and Algeria, where the people are more dangerous than the Egyptians."

In support of this view, Sienkiewicz tried to minimize the strength of the Egyptian army. No one knew, he said, how much use it could make of artillery, but it would certainly be rendered more dangerous by the recruitment of new troops, if decisive measures were not resorted to at once.

The British Government, for their part, also favoured the course proposed by Sienkiewicz, namely to maintain
relations with the President alone, and only on questions affecting public safety; and Malet was instructed to act accordingly. (1) Gladstone himself was not averse from "direct communication with the de facto men", (2) such as was advocated by Freycinet, Bismarck (3) and Kalnoky. But the British Cabinet had persuaded themselves that the overthrow of the "military party" in Egypt was an indispensable prelude to any return of decently stable order. On June 26th the French Agent could feel that the attitude of the British representatives indicated that England intended taking action in the near future if not immediately. (5) Râghib also stated to the Italian Consul-General that whereas the English and the Turks were both enemies, to be equally resisted, the Egyptians had nothing against the French, "who indeed were with them". (6)

Colvin declined to attend any Cabinet meetings when invited by the Ministry, whereas both Brédif's inclinations and his instructions were to accept such invitations; (7) and since Colvin's attitude was backed by the Foreign Office, Freycinet countermanded his instructions to Brédif, and on June 23rd the two Controllers addressed identical Note

(1) F.0.141/152; No.185, Extend. Teleg. No. 268 dated June 20th, 1882, F.O. to Malet.
(2) Knaplund, op.cit., 181.
(4) Autriche, Vol.545; No.53, Duchâtel to Freycinet, dated June 22nd, 1882.

See next page for ff. (5), (6), (7) &
to the two Consuls - drafted by Colvin of course - pointing out that "vu la situation prepondérante d'Arabi Pacha", they could not take part in the Council of Ministers, as this would give "une grande autorité morale au parti militaire". This was the last identical declaration to emanate from the Control, though it continued to exist nominally until after the British occupation, when it was abolished. This was also the last time the two Powers co-operated in Egypt. From now on the Angle-French entente and condominium collapsed; and old jealousies and suspicions that had animated the two Governments before the initiation of the Control were revived. Sienkiewicz moreover was recalled at the beginning of July, (1) and his successor, De Vorges, was instructed to work against anything that might lead to military intervention. (2) Vorges immediately told Raghib that France had no intention of interfering with Egypt's autonomy; that she had an interest in maintaining the situation "which France had helped Egypt to acquire for herself"; that the French fleet had no hostile intention at all; and that France's object was Egypt's prosperity,

ff. from previous page...
(6) F.0.170/321A; Draft Cypher Teleg. No. 58, Paget to F.0., dated July 7th, 1882.
(7) Sienkiewicz's Desp. dated June 20th, 1882.

ff. on this page....
(1) Sienkiewicz's recall was due to his recommendation of immediate action. Giffard (op. cit.: 372) attributes it to Freycinet's preference for a more docile Agent such as Vogges.
the maintenance of respect for the treaties, and the security of the French nationals. To this Rāghib answered by showing himself very friendly to France, and asked the French Agent for assistance in winning over other countries to a similar policy of non-intervention. (1) Vorges also perceived that the decline of his country's position in Egypt had dated "from the time when she had given up opposing this or that Minister's presence in the Cabinet", and from this he argued that no advantage was to be gained from Brédif's ministerial position, this being "a concession to an ally, who makes us very small, and who.......knows very well how to forge ahead when we are not in a position to follow him." (2)

Almost simultaneously after having lived in a British warship for some time, Malet also left for Venice for genuine reasons of health, and not as is sometimes alleged because he was suffering from a "political fever". (3)

ff. (2) from previous page... Egypte, Vol. 75; No. 6 Div. Pol. dated July 3rd, 1882.

ffs. on this page....
(1) Ibid. No. 1 Dir. Pol. Vorges to Freycinet, dated July 30th, 1882.
(2) Ibid, Vorges's No. 2 Dir. Pol. dated July 7th, 1882.
Sienkiewicz's comment before his departure was that, whether or not he was ill, the real reason for his leaving was the great responsibility he bore, in agreement with the Khedive, for creating a crisis the results of which were unpredictable. However that may be, Malet, who was to have stayed in Venice for a week, remained there some time longer, and then went to England, only to return to Egypt a short time before the decisive battle of al-Tall al-Kabir. The British Agency was nominally left to Cartwright, Malet's locum tenens, but the real responsibility devolved on Colvin, although the Foreign Office thought it inconvenient for Colvin to combine the duties of the Acting-Agent and Consul-General with those of Controller-General. (1)

Assembly of the Conference:

Freycinet took the events of June 11th as a pretext for proposing to the British Government that the Conference should meet at once. Granville, however, was doubtful whether it was desirable to press the other Powers again on the subject of the Conference, since "a fresh application to them would not, if successful, much strengthen our position, whereas any rebuff might not improbably become..."

(1) F.0.141/152; No.187, F.0. to Cartwright, dated June 23rd, 1882.
known, and would have a weakening effect." (1) Instead, on June 16th, he suggested to the four European Cabinets that the Powers should simultaneously invite the Sultan to prepare the despatch of a military force to Egypt on the following conditions: That the troops should be placed at the Khedive's orders; that they should only be used for the maintenance of the status quo; that there should be no interference with the liberties of Egypt as secured by the Fermans, or with existing European agreements; that the troops should not remain in Egypt for more than a month, except at the request of the Khedive, and with the consent of the Great Powers; and that the reasonable expenses of the expedition should be borne by the Egyptian Government.

The French Cabinet, as we have seen, was steadfastly against any Turkish intervention in Egypt, and this British move consequently placed France in a delicate position. (2) Nevertheless, in order not to isolate France from England, Freycinet at the same time addressed a similar circular to the French representatives concerned. But whereas it was Granville's intention to submit to the Great Powers a firm proposal, which they were to discuss immediately, Freycinet regarded the French circular as no more than a draft.

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(1) F.O. 141/152; Copy No. 692A, Granville to Lyons, dated June 20th, 1882.
proposal which he hoped might be submitted to the Conference. The French were further perturbed by a report from Tissot, to the effect that some circles in England were convinced that the Sultan would refuse to send troops to Egypt in any case, and that the Conference would thus come to nothing, on which the British public, to whom such a check would be unacceptable, would force the Government to act. (1) This was the origin of the supposition that England had summoned the Conference in order to disguise her intended action. The fact is, however, that the British Cabinet, though aware of the existence of a united front on the Continent, actuated in particular by the inclinations of Italy and Russia, was not completely satisfied with the conduct of the French, and was not consequently prepared to let the situation in Egypt drag on indefinitely. It can hence be presumed that Granville intended to present the French with an accomplished fact, in the shape of a clear programme to be submitted to the Powers, to which the proceedings of the Conference, when convoked, might be limited.

The comment of certain newspapers in Berlin and Petersburg on the Western Powers' invitation to a Conference, was that it marked their complete failure to deal with Egyptian

(1) D.D.F. No. 402, Tissot to Freycinet, dated June 20th, 1882. The semi-official Vakit of Istanbul declared that if Turkish troops were to be sent to Egypt, the project of a Conference must be abandoned, the war-vessels withdrawn from Egyptian waters, and the expedition subjected to no conditions or restrictions. (The Times of June 5th, 19th & 20th, 1882.)
affairs otherwise than by force. Bismarck, moreover, found himself unable to support the British proposal to the Sultan to send troops to Egypt. He considered it "the height of tactlessness, typically Gladstonian", because in the first place, the conditions proposed were so restrictive that he could not take upon himself to ask the Sultan to accept them, and, in the second, the French Government had not yet acquiesced in the proposal. (1)

Lord Ampthill thought it possible that Bismarck had it in mind to retrieve his political reputation after the severe defeat his home policy had just sustained in the German Parliament, by some signal move in foreign policy, such as might increase the influence of Germany in Turkey and extend it also to Egypt. (2) But Ampthill also remarked that if England were compelled to protect her interests, Bismarck would side with her, because his sympathies "are always on the side of force". (3) As for the other Powers they were each still inclined to maintain the attitude they had taken up à propos the Joint Note of January 6th. Thus whereas Russia submitted her own conditions for the assembly

(1) F.0.141/162, No.258, repro. Ampthill’s Teleg. to F.0. dated June 19th, 1882.
(2) Taffs, op. cit., 314.
(3) Fitzmaurice, op. cit., 262.
of the Conference, which tended to convert the Egyptian
question into a general European one, (1) Austria seemed
still unwilling to accept the Conference without the
consent of Turkey; and Italy warned the Powers that
Turkish intervention, in the opinion of Martino, would
produce disastrous effects. At the same time, while
refusing assent to armed intervention on the part of
"certain Powers", Italy favour the meeting of a Conference
with a determined scope and purpose. (2) The Italian
Ambassador at Istanbul (Count Corti) spoke of the minis-
terial settlement in Egypt as not altogether delusive;
and Dufferin considered that Italy might be unwilling
to discredit an arrangement of which she had been one
of the authors. (3)

The Khedive tried to plead his cause in Vienna and
Berlin, instructing his aide-de-camp Count Della Sala,

(1) Russle, Vol.267; No.46, Jaures to Freycinet dated June
12th, 1882 & a Note dated June 18/30", Giers to Prince
Orloff & Nos.59668 - Jaures to Freycinet, dated July 5th
& 22nd, 1882 & F.0.141/152, Supplementary Annex to No.217,
F.0. to Thornton, dated July 6th, 1882. Kalnoky interпре-
sted the Russian circular (vide App.II) as having been de-
signed to strengthen the European concert to the detri-
ment of both the sovereignty of the Sultan and the inter-
est of the Western Powers.

(2) F.0.170/321A, Mancini to Menabrea & the latter to Gran-
ville, dated June 19th, 1882.

(3) F.0.78/3386; No.473 Confid. Dufferin to F.0. dated June
19th, 1882.
(a General in the Egyptian army) to complain of the attitude and language of the Austrian Consul-General, which, he declared, had been "most objectionable and injurious and calculated to strengthen the position of the military party". Apart from being received by both the Austrian and the German Emperors and their Foreign Ministers in the course of his mission, Della Sala met Sir Henry Elliot, then British Ambassador in Vienna; and his mission can be understood in the light of what he told the latter, namely that the new Ministry was "an affront to Europe", since it contained people responsible for the "massacres" of June. He also told him that "no permanent settlement could be effected in Egypt till the army was disbanded and its chiefs punished". This, he said, could only be effected by a foreign force, and he strongly urged that it should be a British one. (1)

While certain Powers, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, Holland and the United States, tried in vain to secure agreement to their participation in the Conference on one ground or another, and while the capitals of the Great Powers were still the scene of political activity on the subject, the Sultan remained rather against than in favour of the Conference. By refusing to participate, Abd al-

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(1) F.O.141/152; Copies Nos. 322 Confid., 325 & 270, Elliot to F.O., dated June 28/July 1st & Ampthill to F.O. dated July 8th, 1882.
Hamid hoped to show the Powers how angry he was at not having been invited from the start to the discussion of a question which concerned him more than anybody else. However, his private Secretary told Dufferin that he would accept it "in principle" if it really became a necessity, but not before the results of the Dervish mission were known. The allusion in the invitation sent to the Porte to the "prudent development of Egyptian institutions" had already excited the Sultan's suspicions that there was an intention to introduce into Egypt a state of affairs which would be incompatible with the Fermâns and therefore a modification of the status quo. What seems to have aroused his mistrust in particular was what he imagined to be the allusion to parliamentary government contained in the word "institutions". As to the sending of troops, the Sultan's view was that they should be sent as soon as Dervish had prepared the way for their arrival, so that they might be insinuated into the country without provoking a collision. He was most anxious that the Conference should not make a demand upon him for troops, as he would then have the appearance of sending them to Egypt at the dictation of Europe, which would render him

(1) F.0.78/3385; No.410 Confid., Dufferin to F.O., dated June 12th, 1882.

(2) F.0.78/3386; No.508, Confid., Dufferin to F.O. dated June 27th, 1882.
hateful in the eyes of the Moslems. On learning this, Dufferin made it clear that if the Sultan hesitated to send troops, "the intention had been framed of resorting to an armed occupation of Egypt other than that of Turkey."(1) He also warned the Sultan that if nothing was done, he might find "an Arabian Caliph reigning over an independent Egypt."(2) Yet all to no purpose. In order to divide the two Western Powers, the Sultan proposed to hand over to England the exclusive control and administration of Egypt, while reserving for himself only such rights of suzerainty as he still enjoyed over Cyprus. This Gladstone and Granville declined without even consulting the Cabinet, as "too violent an infraction of the cardinal principle of European concert", thereby annoying Queen Victoria, who was anxious for an individual British control at any price.(3)

Although, as we have seen, the Continental Powers were not whole-heartedly enthusiastic for the convocation of a Conference such as was desired by the Western Powers, it was in the end decided - anomalously enough, since the Porte

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(1) Ibid., No. 491 Confid. Dufferin to F.O., dated June 24th, 1882.
(2) Lyall, Life of Dufferin, 313.
(3) Morley, op. cit., II, 97-8; Life of Dilke, 463; Letters of Queen Victoria, III, 302; F.O. 141/162, repro. of Dufferin's No. 168 marked Secret & Confid. dated June 24th 1882; & F.O. 78/3386, Dufferin's No. 496, marked Very Confid. also dated June 24th, 1882.
had not given its consent - to hold one at Istanbul: and under the very eyes of the Sultan, in his own capital, to discuss the fate of one of his own provinces. Its first meeting took place on June 23rd, and was consequently attended only by the representatives of the six Powers. The chairmanship devolved on Count Corti; (the Italian Ambassador at Istanbul and the doyen of the diplomatic corps), although in fact Lord Dufferin took the lead in its deliberations. Dufferin knew exactly what he wanted: "to manage the Turks and conciliate the French", in order that, if British action became necessary, it would not be thwarted by either of those two Powers. It has been alleged that the British Government had already decided to take independent action unless Dufferin succeeded in obtaining agreement within a few days to Turkish intervention on the conditions previously stipulated. This, however, does not seem to be accurate, since Dufferin's instructions do not refer to anything more than the self-denying Protocol (see below), and to co-operation with his French colleague over the despatch of Turkish troops, merely stating that if this was

(1) Lyall, op. cit., 302.
(2) Biovès, op. cit., 184–7.
(3) F.0.78/3395, Teleg. No.290, Granville to Dufferin (endorsed seen by Lord Hartington), dated June 21st,1882.
declined by the Porte, "the Conference will be invited to concert effective means for the re-establishment of legality and security in Egypt." Moreover, in the latter case, the British Government presumed that "this invitation will be to ask the Powers to provide or sanction a military intervention other than Turkish under their authority." "It is true that on June 25th Granville and Gladstone decided to decline the Sultan's proposal for separate British action in Egypt, Gladstone saying two days later that there could be no separate action while the Conference was at work. (1)

As to the Protocol de Desinteressement, (2) which was


(2) F.0.78/3395; a circular addressed to the British representatives at the Great Capitals, dated F.O. June 17th, 1882. The draft Protocol was as follows: "The Government represented by the undersigned undertake in any agreement which may be made in consequence of their concerted action for the settlement of the affairs of Egypt, not to seek any territorial advantage, nor the concession of any exclusive privilege, nor any commercial advantage for their subjects which those of every other nation shall not be able to obtain." "On the draft of this circular there is a remarkable minute which runs thus "Would it not be as well to concur with the French Government as to a self-denying engagement? Any appearance of hesitation about it might be unfavourably represented, but all the Powers would join in it so as to prevent the French from so wording it as to place themselves on an equity with us. We have always admitted that the French have special interests in Egypt but we have never desired them to \textit{eodem verbis} as equal."
agreed to at the Conference on the 25th June, it had origi-
inally been suggested by Freycinet, and then agreed to
by Granville. At the Conference, it was submitted by
Corti in such a way as to imply that the Western Powers
were renouncing their special position in Egypt. He
contended that so long as the Conference was in existence
the provisions of the Protocol must remain in force, and
that no Power should act single-handed to the exclusion
of the other Powers. Granville saw no necessity for
such a declaration: "So far as Her Majesty's Government
are aware", he wrote, "there is no intention on the part
of any of the Powers to take immediate action except in
presence of an emergency", and added that "it might be
misunderstood and lead to endeavours to protract the
proceedings of the Conference indefinitely." In his
instructions to Dufferin, moreover, he stated emphatically
that "Her Majesty's Government could not pledge themselves
to abstain from separate action for an indefinite period.
On the other hand the effect of a Conference is to check

(1) Vide Granville's No. 290 supra & F.O. 141/162;

(2) Allemagne, Vol. 48; Courcel to Freycinet, dated
June 21st, 1882.

(3) F.O. 78/3387, Dufferin's No. 546 Confid., dated
July 4th, 1882, to F.O.
and put back any idea of separate action.\(^{(1)}\) Dufferin accordingly, in co-operation with the French Ambassador (Marquis De Noailles), added the phrase of "sauf le cas de force majeures", which was finally altered to "cas d'urgence", with the evident object of leaving full liberty of action for the two Powers on the occurrence of any emergency whatever, including "not only danger to the Suez Canal, but any other unexpected change in the political situation in Egypt, which might call for immediate action."

This alteration being agreed to at the Conference, the Western Ambassadors in fact regarded Corti's suggestion as modified by this "saving reservation", as not being of "any great significance".\(^{(2)}\) On the other hand Noailles was bound by a precise formula devised in Paris, which enjoined him, in case intervention were discussed at the Conference, to insist that it should be regulated in a manner which would not allow it to degenerate abusively into an occupation that could be prolonged in any way. His object was to transform Turkish intervention into one dependent on a mandate of the Great Powers, in such a way as to render Turkey the mandatory of Europe and the executant of her wishes. He was warned by Dufferin on

\(^{(1)}\) F.O. 78/3378; No. 349, F.O. to Dufferin, dated June 27th, 1882.

\(^{(2)}\) F.O. 78/3386; No. 509 Confid. dated June 28th, 1882 & F.O. 78/3387; No. 546 dated July 4th, 1882 - both from Dufferin to F.O.
July 1st that such a line would show the policies of the two Powers to have diverged. "If France failed us in the Conference", he said, "it would have a very bad effect." The result was that Noailles accepted the principle of Turkish intervention, and showed his willingness to say so at the next meeting of the Conference provided that the conditions attached to this Turkish intervention should not be "so feeble as to leave the Turks masters of Egypt, nor so obnoxious to the Sultan as to make it difficult for him to comply with the invitation of the Conference". On the 4th July Dufferin interposed with a form of words descriptive of the objects to which Turkish intervention should be directed; namely "the overthrow of the military faction; and the placing of the Khedive in a position to reconstruct a normal government." To this the other representatives agreed, adding the phrase "and to re-establish the status quo", and a collective invitation in this sense, drafted by De Noailles, was addressed to the Porte on the 15th of July. (1)

(1) F.0. 78/3387; Nos. 524B. Confid., 537 Confid., & enclosure in No. 602 Confid. - all from Dufferin to F.0. dated July 1st, 4th, & 15th, 1882.
The bombardment of Alexandria.

While the Conference was thus stultified by such slow and fruitless machinations, various incidents showed that the British Government was inclined to act alone. After the arrival of the Western fleets, the Egyptian authorities, as we have seen, had tried to strengthen the defences of Alexandria. In reply, since the end of May, the British fleet had been reinforced, and the Porte had been warned by Dufferin that such "hostile" measures might cause England to intervene. On June 5th, the Porte telegraphed to the Khedive enquiring about these military preparations and ordering him to stop them. The Khedive then communicated the Imperial orders to Ḥū[atī, and Ḥū[atī replied that such preparations were intended to calm the apprehensions of the people, who were terrified by the arrival of the fleets, but that he would stop them in conformity with the Imperial wish, hoping that the British fleet would then quit Egyptian waters. According to the report of the two Admirals, however, the work on the fortifications was later resumed, no doubt in conformity with the advice offered by Dervīsh Pasha. The Ṭāḥīb

(1) Al Waka'i' of June 6th, 1882 & B.B.; 1882, XI, No. 29, Annex 2 to No. 64; No. 100, Annexes 1 & 2 to No. 125 & Annexes 1, 2 & 3 to No. 126 - Correspondence exchanged between Cookson, Malet, Ḥū[atī, Seymour, Dufferin & Granville from May 30th to June 6th, 1882.
Cabinet had in fact asked the Porte to agree to its completion, and this came to the knowledge of Granville, who instructed Dufferin to enquire what reply the Porte proposed sending to the Egyptian Cabinet. He also told the French Ambassador that the British Cabinet reserved for itself the right to take whatever line of conduct might be thought advisable in the light of this reply.

On July 4th Dufferin was told that an Imperial order had already been sent to Egypt to stop all work in the fortifications. (1) Granville however, without waiting for this information, had already authorised the Admiral to open fire in case the Egyptian military authorities did not give him full satisfaction; and Vorges reported, on July 3rd, that the British were "seeking an occasion to provoke a conflict". Somewhat later; moreover, he wrote as follows: "The situation does not seem to me to be disquieting of itself, were it not for the English agents, who are inclined to push matters to extremes. Their haste in urging their nationals to depart seems to indicate but little confidence, and will lead to the disorganization of all the public services. From the day the foreigners leave Egypt everything will be in complete anarchy, since

the roads, the post-office, the telegraphs, and the water and the gas services— in brief, all the public services, are directed by foreigners. I believe that it is the intention of the English to make Egypt feel that she cannot live alone." (1)

In order to avoid the anger that isolated action by England in Egypt might provoke in France, Lyons proposed to Freycinet on July 4th that instructions similar to those sent the day before to Seymour should be sent to Admiral Conrad. Seymour had been instructed, before taking any hostile action, to invite the co-operation of the French Admiral, but "not to postpone acting on his instructions if his colleague declined to join in." (2) On July 5th the French Cabinet discussed the British overture, being aware, at the same time, of a telegram sent by Conrad in which he remarked that he had not been able to ascertain whether any new batteries had been constructed. The Cabinet in the end decided that they could not adhere to the proposed ultimatum; (a) because it would lead to offensive measures, incompatible with the attitude they had assumed at the Conference, (viz. the Protocol de Desintéressement); and

(1) *Egypte*, Vol. 75; two Despatches from Vorges to Freycinet dated July 3rd & 7th, 1882.

(b) because in such cases the Constitution forbade action without the prior authorization of Parliament. (1) The French Admiral was accordingly forbidden to take part in any hostile measures; and instructions were sent to him to withdraw his units from Alexandria, without quitting Egyptian waters, if the British ultimatum were presented to the Egyptian authorities. In taking these decisions the French Cabinet took into consideration the fact that nothing at that time threatened the French colony, and that far from guaranteeing their safety, any such unjustifiable aggression might only expose them to the dangers of war-excited Moslem fanaticism. In his instructions to Tissot in this sense Freycinet directed him to tell Granville that the French decision was in no way contradictory to the sentiments of friendship that bound France to England. (2)

The bombardment, despite its disregard of the Conference, was not calculated to isolate England, who felt that she had Bismarck behind her. For Münster had assured Granville that England ought in any case to take measures for the protection of the Suez Canal, and that while "intervention would be a simple and easier operation if undertaken in concert with or with the consent of Turkey", England, in case the Sultan refused to move and events made action necessary, "could not be expected to remain indefinitely with her hands

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(2) Cf. ibid.
Granville indeed, after discussion with Munster, thought that a bombardment would clear the air and accelerate a solution of some sort or another. He also thought it to be as well "for a strong country whose strength is maritime, that demonstrations should not be thought to be absolutely without a sting." (2)

On July 7th Seymour reported that the military commander of Alexandria had assured him that no guns had been recently added or further military preparations made. This statement had also been confirmed by Dervish Pasha. The Admiral reported that no signs of operations had been observed since the afternoon of the 5th, but that he would not hesitate to act if they were resumed. (3)

On that same day Forges assembled the Agents of the Great Powers, disregarding the Consuls of the other States for fear of indiscretion. "All the Consuls", he afterwards reported, "were astonished at the attitude of the English in not awaiting the decisions of the Conference." They wrote to Seymour asking him if he was satisfied concerning the question of the fortresses, and if not, whether he would allow time for Europeans to leave Egypt. They dwelt on the danger to which the Christian

(1) F.O. 146/2430; repro. No. 279, Granville to Ampthill dated July 5th, 1882.
(2) Gran. Pap., Private - Granville to Ampthill dated July 12th, 1882.
(3) F.O. 146/2430; No. 809, F.O. to Lyons, dated July 7th 1882.
natives might be exposed, and the grave loss of European property that must ensue, if he proceeded to a bombardment. They also agreed to invite their respective Governments to intervene in London with a view to putting an end to the situation, and finally observed that, in spite of the formal assurances given to the consular corps and to the British Admiral, and of the cessation of all military preparations on the part of the Egyptian authorities, the British military preparations continued. Vorges's comment was that the British "were searching for a pretext to intervene before the Conference took any decision."(1)

Ninet, an eye-witness, who had visited the forts of Alexandria every day in the company of important Egyptian officers, testifies on his honour that no further work on the forts had been carried out since the arrival of the Sultan's orders. But Sir Beauchamp Seymour, who is said to have aspired to a Nelsonian career, had shown his zeal in various ways. He watched events in Egypt eagerly, telling Lord Childers on February 6th that in his view the fall of Sharif was the commencement de la fin. On the 10th of July, in belief that work on the fortifications had been resumed,

(1) Two Despatches to Freycinet, dated July 7th, 1882.
(2) Ninet, Arabi Pacha, 141.
(3) Cf. Life of Childers, II, 87.
that the Egyptians had decided to block the entrance of the port of Alexandria, and that guns had been mounted on Fort Silsil, he gave notice to the Consuls resident at Alexandria that he would "commence action twenty-four hours after, unless the forts on the isthmus and those commanding the entrance to the harbour were surrendered." The demand for this surrender was "beyond his instructions", since he had only been authorized to invite the Egyptian authorities to "disarm" the fortresses; a fact for which he was afterwards, quoting his own words, "attacked alike by friends and by foes." (2)

On July 9th Cartwright had gone to the Ra's al-Tin Palace (at Alexandria) to request the Khedive, who had already been secretly informed by Rivers Wilson, on the instruction of Sir Charles Dilke, of the imminent bombardment, to withdraw to the safer Ramle Palace, or else to take refuge on board a British warship. He also searched for Dervish in order to hold him responsible for the safety of the Khedive. Failing to find him, however, Cartwright sent him a letter in that sense, together with a copy of the Note already addressed to him and to Râghib, stating that official relations between Britain and the Râghib Ministry were at an end. (3) Dervish

(2) Ibid. Ms. l4475, Seymour to Gladstone, dated Sept. 24th, 1882.
(3) Life of Dilke, 465 & Scotidis, op. cit. 154-56.
tried in vain to dissuade the British from starting the proposed bombardment, and on July 10th sent a written answer to Cartwright, in which he referred to the existing friendship between Britain and Turkey, and assured him that there had been no hostile military preparations, adding that logically no distinction should be made between the Khedive and his Government. (1) It may be noted that Tawfik himself had told Cartwright that if Egypt were attacked, he could not leave the country as had been suggested to him for his personal security. He only consented, on July 10th, to remove to the Ramleh Palace.

On the same date the British Government informed the Great Powers and Turkey of the delivery of the ultimatum to the Egyptian Government, adding that the threatened bombardment was "a legitimate act of self-defence, not entailing any consequences nor concealing any other designs on their part." But while Europe awaited the event with passive interest, the Sultan showed his anger by dismissing the Grand-Vizier 'Abd-al-Rahman Nūrî Pasha, who was replaced by Küçük Sa'îd Pasha (not to be confused with Sa'îd Pasha the late Foreign Minister). This delayed the Porte's reply to Granville's Note. It was only very late on the night of the 10th - 11th July that Turkey communicated her answer, in which the British Government was requested to postpone the bombardment. Moreover, the good offices of the United States were requested by the Porte.

(1) FO 141/184, Incl. in No. 334.
but refused by the British Government. (1)

In Egypt, an extraordinary council was held to discuss the ultimatum, in which there took part Rāghib, Ḥarīb, Dervīsh and the Khedive himself. The ultimatum was rejected on the ground that it constituted "a lasting humiliation for Egypt", since the forts and the fortifications "were intended to protect the port and the garrison, and were not to be destroyed by Egyptians, simply because a stranger who had his own ambitions on the country demanded it." (2) (3)

Ahmad Shafīk Pasha, an Egyptian contemporary historian, who was always well-informed, relates that the Khedive recommended prudence at this council and that Dervīsh was for removing the guns in order to let the storm blow over. Moreover, he adds that another member of the council drew Ḥarīb's attention to the fact that the Egyptian guns were of old design and would consequently be unable to resist the great modern armament of the British fleet. Consequently, he states, a delegate was sent to Seymour in order to ask him to withdraw his ultimatum, and to tell him that the Egyptian Government, in order to prove their good will, and to put an

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(1) F.O. 78/3387; Nos. 566A & 566B. - All from Dufferin to F.O. dated July 10th, 1882; & F.O. 78/3378; No. 394, F.O. to Dufferin, dated 12th July, 1882.

(2) Kashf al-Sitar, I, 168.

(3) L'Egypte moderne et les influences étrangères, 112-113.
end to the conflict, were ready to remove three guns from
the forts of Max, Sāliḥ and Silsile. According to Shafîk,
Seymour refused, demanding that all the guns should be removed,
and that the forts of Max, Al-ʻAjami and Bab al-Bahr should
be surrendered to him, otherwise fire would be opened the
next day. 'Although it was evident that the British Admiral
was resolved to act in any case, ʻOrābī imagined that his
ultimatum need not be taken seriously, supposing that for one
thing any such action on the part of the British would be
opposed by France; for another, that, once they landed, if
they succeeded in doing so, the British would be easily defeated;
and finally that in any case Seymour would not in fact dare
to bombard Alexandria for fear of repercussions in the Moslem
world as a whole. In this connection it may be noted that
ʻAbd al-Ḥamīd had apparently been exploiting ʻOrābī for the
furtherance of his Panislamic policy in North Africa. It
is even said that he had put ʻOrābī in charge of all his in-
rigues to that end, in an attempt to exploit the latter's
popularity in the Moslem world pending an opportunity for getting
rid of him. (1) A passage in an interesting telegram sent
by Dervīsh to the Porte on July 5th (2) reads as follows:
".....ʻOrābī declares that he has no fears of the English,
the first movement on whose side will entail other retaliatory

(1) Turquie, Vol. 451; No. 22, De Noailles to Freycinet, dated
June 28th, 1882.

(2) F.O. 78/3387: Inclosure in No. 569 (marked Secret),
Dufferin to F.O., dated July 10th, 1882.
movements such as will cause their ruin. According to the information which I have verified from other sources, these words of Orabi are not altogether without foundation; ..... There is no doubt that once a rifle is fired, the answer will be a general uprising of Islam from the heart of Africa to the extremities of India .... If the Conference takes a decision contradictory to the pleas of the Egyptian Ministers, and if the Porte adheres to it, it is evident that Egypt will be lost for us ....... Orabi's ascendency increases from day to day .... The Egyptians would sooner fight the foreigners than give way. The Egyptian army now numbers 29,000 men, and will be increased, if war is declared, to 100,000 men. The people feel secure on this account. Not only Tripoli, Benghazi, the Sudan and other distant countries, but especially Tunis and Algiers form a part of this "union". (1) The Egyptian Ministry were delighted with the communications I made to them in accordance with a supreme order, in which I declared that the Sublime Porte not only has no intention of sending troops, but is ready to fall in with the wishes of the Egyptians."

The French fleet withdrew to the Suez Canal, and the

(1) Reference to this "union" occurs more than once in this correspondence, and it possibly refers to a Panislamic "confrerie" in the Arab world, directed from Istanbul.
bombardment began early on the 11th of July. By the afternoon all the forts had been silenced, and the Egyptian army began to withdraw to the fortified position of Kafr al-Dawwar. The city, in which fire broke out late in the evening, was thrown into a state of wild disorder. The fire was attributed by the Egyptian authorities to the guns of the British fleet, though it was probably started in fact by the withdrawing army.

Orabi sent to Blunt on the 2nd of July saying, (1) "England may rest assured that the first gun she fires on Egypt will absolve the Egyptians from all treaties, contracts and conventions; that the Control and debt will cease; that the property of Europeans will be confiscated; that the canals will be destroyed; the communications cut; and that use will be made of the religious zeal of the Muslims to preach a holy war in Syria, in Arabia and in India .... Sermons on this subject have already been preached in the mosques of Damascus; and an agreement has been come to with the religious leaders of every land throughout the Muslim world. I repeat again and again that the first blow struck at Egypt by England or her allies will cause blood to flow through the breadth of Asia and of Africa, the responsibility for which will be on the head of England."

This letter, which arrived in London on the 16th of July, was sent by Blunt to Mr. Gladstone with a warning that the Egyptians "will burn their cities as the Russians burned Moscow.

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(1) Glad. Pap.; Ms. 144.100, Incl. in Blunt's letter to Gladstone, dated July 16th, 1882.
In 1812; and they will cut their canals as the Dutch cut theirs in 1672. It is the last desperate resolve of a people believing itself menaced with a return to servitude; and though I express no opinion as to its morality, I can vouch for the threat of destruction being deliberately made."

On July 12th Seymour landed sailors and marines from the fleet and asked the neutrals to form a police force in order to stop looting in the city. The Americans accordingly landed a hundred soldiers, but the Italians and the Austrians were disinclined to accede before consulting their Governments, and so were the French. Vorges feared that if French troops were landed they might be involved in fighting, since Orabi might well be tempted by the small size of the British force to return. He therefore engaged the commander of the "Alma" not to land troops before receiving orders from Paris.

The British bombardment of Alexandria may justly be deplored. It was undertaken in complete disregard of the Conference. Neither the Sultan, the Powers, nor the

(1) Cf. Orabi's Memoirs (1, 181), in which he says that an Egyptian officer had made preparations to burn the city down but that he (Orabi) had prevented him from proceeding with them.

(2) Most of the Powers had sent ships to Alexandria after the riots of June, with the object of facilitating the exodus from Egypt of their nationals.

Khedive had conferred on England the right to crush the Egyptian Revolution. Nor was the British action actuated by any "cas de force majeur", since neither were the Egyptian fortifications suddenly strengthened, nor did they in any way constitute a real danger to the British fleet. Not only had the Egyptians no intention of blocking the entrances of the port, but Granville himself had declared to Tissot that the Egyptian preparations would be useless in face of the ships of the two Powers. The very fact that the Egyptian forts were unable to resist more effectively shows how little real reason for the bombardment there was. All it in fact did was to aggravate the crisis, and pave the way for a military action by England independent of her diplomatic activity at the Conference, the whole object of which was thereby stultified.

In England itself the bombardment met with a mixed reception. In the House of Commons Sir Wilfrid Lawson (Liberal) declared that England had made war on Egypt without just cause and without provocation; that she had abandoned the principle of non-intervention which had brought the Liberal Government into power; that the Government had thrown over the concert of Europe and acted with fatal precipitation; that it was no concern of England's

(1) Cf. Sayed Kamel, op. cit., 244-50.
if the Egyptians preferred a "military despotism" or any other form of government; and that the despatch of the British fleet to Alexandria had provoked the "massacre" and produced all the evil consequences that had since ensued. (1) John Bright, Gladstone's colleague, "who in fundamentals stood closest to him of them all", (2) noted that the tone of the relevant deliberations in the Cabinet convinced him that, on the Egyptian question, he "must silently consent to much that...I must condemn, or be in constant conflict with.../his Cabinet colleagues/ and that there was nothing for [him] but to retire" - as he did. (3)

This, however, did not affect the policy of the British Government who were supported by the bulk of the Liberal Party in their policy of intervention. The Conservatives, for their part, did not object to the bombardment. On the contrary, some Conservative members were not content with it, and stood for further intervention. The press heartily supported the Government's action, and The Times began to call for a "protectorate", holding that the pax Britannica would do for Egypt what it had done for India, and that the

(1) Hansard, CCLXXII, cols. 162-198; Commons of July 12th, 1882.
(2) Morley, op. cit., III, 83.
(3) Bright's Diaries, 487.
British should assert their character as "trustees of civilisation", without much care for Europe. (1)

There thus remained no reason any longer to conceal the military preparations that had been begun in May.

On the 3rd of July Sir Garnet Wolseley, (who was to command the Egyptian expeditionary force) had submitted for the information of Lord Childers a plan of campaign for an advance on Cairo, in which he actually named the sopt, al-Tall al-Kabîr, where resistance would probably be offered. (3)

The British Government was influenced in its final decision by various other considerations. For not only was public opinion, and especially the opinion of such commercial circles as were interested in the Suez Canal,

(1) The Times of July 26th & 27th, 1882.

(2) F.0.141/142; Desp. marked Private & Confid. from Lord Tenterden to Malet, dated Nov.15th, 1881; Gran. Pap., 117, Letter marked Secret, Childers to Granville, dated Feb.7th, 1882; & Granville to Childers (marked Private) dated May 29th, 1882 & Fitzmaurice, op. cit., II, 265-6. As early as November, 1881, a certain Mr. Goldsmid had been instructed to collect information concerning the state of the Egyptian army and fortifications. The reports he sent to London were carefully examined by Wolseley and Childers in order to prepare for an expedition if required; and in the War Office Childers had "privately considered... all contingencies". On June 22nd Granville had intimated to Lord Spencer that intervention was inevitable.

(3) Life of Childers, II, 90.
strongly in favour of intervention; but the Government was anxious to retrieve its reputation in face of its failures in both the Transvaal and in Ireland. (1) As early as July 11th the Government had asked Parliament for military credits with a view to increasing the British forces in the Mediterranean; and on July 22nd Gladstone announced in the House of Commons that "we should not fully discharge our duty if we did not endeavour to convert the present interior state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict to peace and order". He openly stated, moreover, that "if every chance of obtaining co-operation on the part of other Powers is exhausted, the work will be undertaken by the single power of England."

The day before the Queen had agreed to the appointment of Sir Garnet Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief of the expedition, together with General Adye as Chief-of-Staff; and Gladstone had read a declaration in the House of Commons in which he said that 'Orabi was subjecting Egypt to military law and treating the British as "irreconciliable enemies". On the 24th he asked for a credit to enable the Government to intervene in Egypt with 17,500 land forces, including 3,700 infantry and a reserve of 3,100 men, ready to be sent at once.

(2) The Times of July 23rd, 1882.
On the 27th, the House of Commons voted the credit, which amounted to £2,300,000 by a majority of 256. It also agreed that the standing army should be increased by 10,000 men and that India should pay the expenses of the Indian detachment. (1)

A declaration of war was deemed unnecessary, since the British troops were going to Egypt as "friends of the head of the State", who was to be helped in re-establishing his "outraged authority". Co-operation with France was out of the question, since not only did the Queen object to it (2) - as also to co-operation with Turkey - but so did several members of the Cabinet, and especially Granville, who besides telling the Queen that England must take Egypt, (3) gave Tissot to understand that he would prefer co-operation with Italy to that with France. (4)

The old mutual suspicions between the Western allies had in fact assumed a new and a more dangerous character. The British believed that the French were eager to land at Port Said, and were planning a swift advance on Cairo, while the British Admiral had discovered that his French colleague had given false information regarding the number of French gun-boats in the Canal. (5) The French, on their side, were

(1) The Times from July 22nd-28th, 1882. It was hoped that the despatch of this Indian contingent would show Europe what remarkable military resources Great Britain disposed of in her Indian Empire. Cf. Life of Childers, II, 102.
(2) Letters of Queen Victoria, III, 300 & 313.
reluctant to co-operate with England behind the back of the European concert, and later on the fall of Freycinet left the way clear for a purely British intervention.
Chapter X

The Istanbul Conference

The effect of the bombardment:

(a) In the Moslem world: (1)

All over the Moslem world from the Atlantic to Arabia and Syria and even to India, and from the Sudân to Anatolia, Gallipoli and Macedonia, the British bombardment of Alexandria was viewed with deep anxiety. Europeans in general, and the British in particular, became the object of a deep hatred.

(1) F.0.78/3388; enclosure in No.672 & /3389; Enclosures in Nos.708, 732, & 733 & /3390. Enclosure in No.810 & F.0.146/2435; No.712 Confid. Extender No.293 & /2437, Enclosure dated Jedda Aug. 18th, 1882 - all containing reports from different British Consuls in various parts of the Moslem world. For Orâbi's activities regarding North Africa vide: Egypte, Vol.74; Sienkiewicz's Teleg. dated June 27th, 1882 & for his relations with the Mahdists in the Sudân cf. Biovès, op. cit., 247.
Everywhere there awoke sympathy for 'Orābī and his movement, which was sometimes fed by missionaries sent from Egypt to the different parts of the Moslem world. This was especially so in Syria, where there had already been signs of a "tendency to adopt the ideas of the National Party in Egypt".

(b) In Europe:

The bombardment had a mixed reception among the Great Powers. In Russia not only did the press attack England, but the Tsar was deeply irritated by this British "isolated action", which was "a veritable rupture of the European concert". (1) In Germany, whereas official circles maintained a strict reserve, and expressed no definite opinion either for or against the bombardment, the Berlin semi-official newspapers vehemently condemned the bombardment, and blamed Sir Charles Dilke for having declared in the House of Commons that the conduct of England had been approved by Germany and Austria. They insisted on the contrary that the German Government had expressed no such view, and dwelt on the discontent provoked in Paris by the British initiative and the antagonism that already divided the two Western Powers. (2) Hatzfeldt (the German Foreign Minister) later told the French Ambassador that the attitude of England might well produce

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(2) Courcel's supra.
grave complications among the Powers. He pointed to the alarm and irritation of Russia, who intended, he said, to put an end to the Conference if England did not alter her attitude. Hatzfeldt added that he had received disquieting news of the ferment into which Egypt had been thrown, which might well spread to other neighbouring countries, notably Syria. (1)

Elliot in Vienna tried to defend the bombardment on the ground that England had already become so far involved that it would have been difficult for her to withdraw. He also repudiated an article reprinted by the Vienna press from The Times, which called for a protectorate, maintaining that any such move would be contrary both to his Government's policy and to various declarations made on over twenty occasions by responsible Englishmen. (2) Kalnoky, though he referred to the bombardment as a disagreeable incident, hoped that it might produce no more than a passing effect; (3) and the German and Austrian representatives at Istanbul told Dufferin that any further measures taken by England would be covered by the reservation regarding "force majeure", and even urged that England should go ahead. (4)

(1) Courcel's No. 93 marked Confid. dated Aug. 2nd, 1882.
(2) Autriche, Vol. 536; No. 67, Duchâtel to Freycinet dated July 29th, 1882.
(3) D.D.F. 4th series, footnote to No. 416.
(4) F. O. 78/3388; Dufferin's No. 624 dated July 24th, 1882.
(5) F. O. 146/2431; reprod. Paget's No. 256 A. dated July 8th, 1882.
As for Italian reactions, before the bombardment both the Italian press and the Quirinal had shown marked sympathy for the Egyptian National movement. The *Opinione*, the *Diritto*, and the *Rassegna*, had all spoken of "Orābī as "the true champion of his country's independence and liberties", and denounced in unmeasured terms the intention they attributed to England and France of suppressing the Egyptian National movement, of which "Orābī was proclaimed the representative, for "selfish and ambitious motives". On July 5th Mancini had declared in the Chamber that it was Italy's policy to respect the national institutions of Egypt legitimately introduced, and that it was not to be supposed "that Europe wishes, or ought, beyond the limits of its rights, to interfere in the internal administration of Egypt rather than leave Egypt to the Egyptians."(1) It is not surprising, therefore, that after the bombardment had taken place, the whole object of the Italian press was to represent the policy of England "in the most odious and detestable light, as having in view the suppression of the Egyptian National Party for the purpose of re-establishing her own exclusive and preponderating position". Nor was the special favour accorded by "Orābī to the Italians during the exodus lost sight of in Italy.(2) On July 14th the Italian

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(2) Paget's No. 289, dated July 19th, 1882. About 950 Europeans, mostly Italians, had left Cairo to Ismā'īlīya under the protection of 40 Egyptian soldiers.
Government telegraphed to its Ambassador in London that "though it was ignorant of the facts relating to the bombardment..., it believed, according to the declarations made by the British Government, that this military operation had no other object than the disarmament of the forts of Alexandria, and that the settlement of the Egyptian question should be left to the Conference."(1)

In France the feeling with regard to England was reported by the British Ambassador "as good as would be expected, although the lapse of time must tend to revive jealousies and suspicions and to give scope for the exercise of adverse influences."(2) A French Minister stated that the Government was quite reassured, and that the British Cabinet had not taken them by surprise.(3)

(c) In Turkey:
The Porte joins the Conference:

At Istanbul the bombardment of Alexandria was viewed with alarm and severely criticized by the press. It showed unmistakably that England was ready to act alone. Moreover, after protesting of the bombardment and asking for the withdrawal of the British forces from Alexandria, the Sultan

(1) Scotidis, op. cit. 178.
(2) F.O.146/2435; Lyons's No.898 marked Secret dated Aug. 15th, 1882.
(3) The Times of July 12th, 1882.
decided to join the Conference. He was probably encouraged
to do so both by the attitude of Austria and Germany, and
by the presence at Istanbul of Baron De Ring. Ring had
been sent to the Ottoman capital in June by the French Govern-
ment ostensibly to advise, not the Sultan, but the French
Ambassador, and it appeared, at least to Mancini, to be
due to him that De Noailles in fact then revised his attitude,
since without actually opposing the project of Ottoman armed
intervention, he soon began raising various difficulties with
regard to the form of the communication to be addressed to
the Porte. Ring indeed considered himself as an authority
on Egyptian affairs, having, as we have seen, achieved some
success in his relations with the Nationalists, and accordingly
criticized both De Noailles and the Quai D'Orsay for failing
to appreciate where the real interests of France lay. In
his view the best solution of the Egyptian question would be
to appoint Halîm to the Viceroyalty; to come to an agreement

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(1) Allemagne, Vol. 49; Desp. from Courcel dated July 27th, 1882: Kalnoky attributed the bombardment to the Porte's failure
to take prompt action. He supposed that the despatch of
an Ottoman expedition would prevent a rising of the Moslems
against the Christians and check religious fanaticism.
(Austriche, Vol. 536, two Desps. from Duchâtel dated July


(3) F.O.170/321 A; A Draft No. 255 Confid., Paget to Granville,
dated July 7th, 1882.
with the National Party; and to soothe the susceptibilities of all concerned. It was inevitable that the presence of De Ring at Istanbul at this juncture should alarm both the English press and the British diplomatic representatives. It was rumoured that he would be chosen to act as French Agent in Egypt ad interim. "Considering the antecedents of De Ring.... in Egypt", commented Lord Lyons, "such a selection, if it were actually made, would have a strange significance. It would confirm insinuations that have been made, to the effect that M. De Freycinet is not altogether uninfluenced by important Frenchmen who desire to make terms with...Orabi" and especially M. De Lesseps whose confidence in the safety of the Suez Canal is very probably founded upon an understanding with...Orabi". (1)

Shortly before the bombardment, against the wishes of De Noailles, Ring was received by the Sultan, who duly out-witted him by encouraging him to speak in order to exploit his answers. Although 'Abd al-Ḥamīd had promised Dufferin not to send a delegate to the Conference, he declared, after he had met Ring, that the latter had caused him to revise his decision, and that he had taken Ring's advice as emanating from the French Government. He also told the German Chargé d'Affaires that Ring had advised him to enlist the good offices of

(1) F.0.146/2430; No.625 marked Secret, Lyons to F.0. dated June 25th, 1882. Freycinet assured Lyons that he had never contemplated the idea of 'Orabi's remaining in power in Egypt, and that, on the contrary, he had taken it for granted that whenever the Egyptian question was settled, 'Orabi must disappear. (Ibid; No.663 marked Secret, Lyons to F.O. dated July 4th 1882.)
Germany in order to obtain the agreement of France to inter-
vention. The Sultan further saw to it that this was repeated
all the embassy dragomans, and all who maintained contact
with the Palace to verify the news. The result was that
Ring was instructed to return to Bucharest.

The German Chargé d'Affaires at Istanbul (Hirschfeld)
attributed the Sultan's sudden change of purpose to the fact
that Ring had intimated to him that France wished to see a
compromise effected with the National Party, and that an
appeal would be made to Bismarck to enlist his good offices
for that purpose. (2) When Ring returned to Bucharest, he
said that the bombardment of Alexandria would justify the
Sultan in the eyes of his co-religionists in sending troops
to Egypt, since he would now seem to do so in order to rescue
Egypt from a Christian occupation - an excuse not previously
available. (3) As regards his meeting with the Sultan, he
admitted that the latter had spoken to him of his willingness
to see the Conference joined by an Ottoman delegate, provided
that the question of armed intervention, even by his own
troops, should not be mooted by the plenipotentiaries. (4)

(1) For Ring's mission vide: Turquie, Vol. 452 Desp., marked
Confid. & Particulière, Ring to the Director of Foreign
Affairs; Desp. marked Confid. Noailles to the same date - Fréycinet to Ring (via Noailles) dated July 9th
& Noailles to the Director of F.A. dated July 12th, 1882.

(2) F.0.78/3387; Nos. 559, 562A., 575 & 582 - all marked Confid,
Dufferin to F.0. dated July 6th, 8th, 10th & 11th, 1882.

(3) This was also the tone of the Vakit and the Hakikat, which
both launched a fierce campaign against England after the
bombardment. (F.0.78/3388; Enclosures in Dufferin's Nos.
637, 658 Confid., 667, 670 & 671)

(4) F.0.146/2432, reprod. Desp. dated Bucharest July 18th, 1882 -
White to Granville.
The Sultan opened his new campaign by remonstrating against the landing of British sailors and marines at Alexandria; and the Porte requested that they should be withdrawn, since the Khedive and Dervish were taking the necessary measures to secure order. The answer of the British Government was that the marines had been landed for the purpose of restoring order and as police, with no view to a permanent occupation. They would continue to be necessary for the defence of the Khedive, since the Sultan had taken no steps to maintain either his own authority or that of Tawfik. The reply concluded with the statement that the British Government was "sincerely desirous to maintain the present sovereignty of the Sultan over Egypt, but that if His Majesty takes no steps to vindicate his authority and objects to the provisional measures taken by us and other Powers, it will be difficult to find arguments for the continuance of the arrangement." (1) Dufferin, for his part, frightened the Sultan once again by referring to "a tendency among a certain section of politicians to settle the Egyptian question upon a basis of a native Arab Government to the exclusion of the Ottoman control." Abd al-Hamid countered this by remarking that any Arab government

(1) F.O. 141/153; No. 415 marked Confid. F.O. to Dufferin dated July 18th, 1882.
"would be as fatal to the interests of England as to those of Turkey, inasmuch as it would be in a position to work...[England] much mischief in India." Dufferin replied in turn that the interests of England and Turkey in Egypt were undoubtedly identical, and that in the presence of this danger it would be advisable that the two countries should form a secret and intimate alliance which would have as its aim, if not to diminish the existing rights of other foreign Governments, at all events to prevent their extension and further preponderance. In answer to this 'Abd al-`Hamīd said that the only thing that had induced him not to send troops to Egypt was the fact that Esad had told him on his return that Tawfīk's position was untenable, and that even if his position were to be restored by military force, it would collapse once that force was withdrawn, and so the present crisis would repeat itself.(1) The Sultan finally suggested the appointment of Halīm; on which Dufferin commented that "we should not purchase His Majesty's intervention at the price of sacrificing [Tawfīk]." (2)

On July 18th Sa'id Pasha, the Grand-Vizier, told the

(1) When Esad returned to Istanbul, he tried his best to dissuade the Sultan from sending troops to Egypt, on the ground that it would array public opinion against the Caliphate. He suggested that, if they were sent at all, they should support the National Party, and thus substitute the Sultan's authority for that of 'Orābi. Esad also seems to have urged the dethronement of Tawfīk. (F.0.78/3388; Incl. in Dufferin's No.645 Confid. dated July 24th,1882)

(2) see next page
Ambassadors of the Great Powers that Turkey had decided to join the Conference, and on the 24th he and Čaćić Pasha (the Foreign Minister) began to attend its sessions. (1) They immediately accepted the Note of July 15th and stated that the Ottoman Government was ready to send troops to Egypt as proposed therein, adding that "the actual foreign occupation" of that country should be abandoned immediately after the landing of Ottoman troops at Alexandria. (2) On the second day, the Ottoman delegates contended that Egypt was not in a state of revolution, and that the dispute between Orabi and the Khedive embodied no revolutionary manifestation against the Sultan. Moreover, were the Sultan to choose between the discontent of Europe on the one hand, and the maintenance of his prestige as Caliph in the Moslem world; on the other, he would not hesitate for an instant to choose the second alternative. The Sultan also objected that whereas Tawfik was an illegitimate and incompetent usurper, whose accession he had not sanctioned, and whose rulership it would be preferable to terminate rather than to confirm, Orabi, who had been provoked into a war, was in possession of all that was necessary to get the better of his enemies. (3)

=(2) Ibid; Dufferin's Nos. 666 Secret, 611 Confid. & 627, dated July 16th, 17th & 21st, 1882. (1) On this Corti at once relinquished the chairmanship in favour of Sa'id Pasha.
(2) B.o.F., 17, No. 487.
(3) Lyall, Life of Dufferin, 314. Orabi had sent letters to the Sultan (on March 18th, May 10th & 14th) expressing his loyalty, and showing his unwillingness to admit the interference of foreigners in Egyptian affairs. (F.O. 78/3389; Incl. in No. 715 Confid.)
In spite of this, at the session of July 26th the representatives of the Great Powers on Dufferin's initiative invited the Sultan to make a pronouncement in precisely the contrary sense, supporting the Khedive, and declaring 'Orābī, "who had been the subject of honorary distinctions by the Sultan", a rebel. The British Government, at the same time, made it clear that they "could neither withdraw their troops, nor relax their preparations", since "the prolonged inaction of the Sultan in face of a situation, such as that presented by the state of Egypt, has thrown upon this country in the general interest as much as in her own the burden which she has now undertaken to bear......for the protection of British interests and for the restoration of the Khedive's authority and of order in Egypt. Nor could she agree to the conditions laid down......[Viz.] to the Turkish declaration that the military reforms to be introduced in Egypt should be settled by an agreement between the Porte and the Khedive to the exclusion of the Powers." The British Government further demanded that the conditions attaching to the despatch of Ottoman troops should be defined in a satisfactory manner; that all ambiguity over this question should be avoided by means of a declaration issued beforehand by the Porte, and argued that since a Military Convention could only be entered

into between parties actually engaged in military operations, Great Britain, in the actual circumstances, could enter into a Convention only with the Porte. (1) Seymour was meanwhile instructed, if any vessel with Turkish troops appeared at Port Sa'īd, Alexandria, or elsewhere, to inform the officer in command with the utmost courtesy that he was awaiting information from his Government regarding the Military Convention to be concluded between Turkey and England for the co-operation of the former against the "rebels"; but that he had not received information that the Convention had been concluded; that the despatch of Turkish troops must therefore be premature and due to some misunderstanding; and that his orders were to request the officer in command to proceed to Crete or elsewhere and apply to the Turkish Government for further instructions, since he (Seymour) was precluded from inviting them to land in Egypt, and was instructed to prevent their landing if they declined to comply with that advice. (2)

This action on the part of the British Government was not unreasonable. For the Grand-Vizier had persisted in dwelling on the fidelity and devotion of "Orābī to his Sovereign, and had spoken of the proposed declaration as being not only useless but of such a nature as to aggravate the actual situation in

(1) F.O. 78/3388; Inclos. in No. 678 Confid. & /3396; Teleg. No. 292, F.O. to Dufferin dated Aug. 4th, 1882.
Egypt. He said that the Porte did not think that it would be advisable to issue the proclamation until the troops were actually landed. However, owing to the threats launched by Dufferin, Sa'id promised that the proclamation should be officially communicated to the British Embassy before the troops started, and should be issued before they landed. He then declared in the Conference that the proclamation would be submitted to the representatives of all the Great Powers. (1) At the same time, whereas Sa'id was in fact anxious to establish a close and loyal concert with England, since he saw this to be the only means of saving Egypt for the Sultan, and was supported in this attitude by 'Asim, most of the other Ottoman Ministers were intriguing against them on the ground that they were sacrificing Turkey to England. (2) Germany, who had been asked by England to use her good offices with the Sultan in supporting the proscription of 'Urabi a rebel, though she was inclined to do so only if the other Powers concurred, (3) did in fact with Austrian support, exert pressure on the Sultan to this end. The French Ambassador, on the other hand, did his utmost to induce the Porte not to agree to a Military Convention with England; and Dufferin presumed that it was probably France's object to prevent the despatch

(1) F.0.78/3389; Dufferin's Nos. 689 Confid. & 694 dated Aug. 1st & 2nd, 1882.
(2) Ibid; Dufferin's No. 749 Confid. dated Aug. 9th, 1882.
(3) Allemagne, Vol. 49; Courcel to Freycinet, dated July 27th, 1882.
of a Turkish force to Egypt altogether. (1) The Ottoman statesmen thus had some reason to expect that a misunderstanding would very soon arise between France and England, and that in that case the Porte would find an opportunity to interfere and secure for Turkey some final advantage.

The German Government was placed in a delicate position by their moves. For they had to be careful, not only to avoid all steps by which Germany herself might be entangled in existing complications, but also to use all their influence to hinder the outbreak of a general European war. (2) The best means of so doing, in the opinion of Berlin, was the observation of the strictest neutrality; and Hatzfeldt declared that every Power was bound to act in the Egyptian question according to its own interests, on the understanding that the final regulation of the question should rest with the Powers in concert. (3)

It was feared lest Russia, who had taken advantage of the Franco-Prussian war to abrogate some articles of the Treaty of Paris, might likewise take advantage of the present troubles to revive some of her old claims that had been refused by the Berlin Congress. (4) Russian public opinion thirsted

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(1) F.O. 78/3389; Dufferin's Nos. 713 Confid. & 714—both dated Aug. 4th, 1882.
(2) The Times of July 25th, 1882.
(3) Courcel's Desp. of Aug. 15th, 1882.
(4) The Times of July 15th, 1882.
for revenge on England, who had converted the Russian victory into a defeat by her insistence on the revision of the Treaty of San Stefano; and this could not be achieved except by the conversion of the Egyptian question into one in which all the Powers had the right to participate with a collective guarantee, and by opposing England's possible occupation of the Suez Canal, of which Russia might be in need to ensure her communications with Siberia. (1) The Russian newspapers were in general decidedly hostile to England, asserting that the British expeditionary force then being organized had for its sole object the acquisition of Egypt. (2) Giers was in fact annoyed at the cold reception accorded by all the Powers except France to the programme he had presented as a basis for discussion at the Conference. (3) He contended that the Conference had continued to discuss the Egyptian question in the void, whereas everything showed that England intended to settle it in advance by independent action. The negotiations seemed to him to serve no purpose but those of keeping up appearances and recording accomplished facts. The Russian Government was therefore resolved to continue its participation only if the Powers would agree upon a practical and well-defined course, to be followed with firmness and

(1) Wallace, Egypt and the Egyptian Question, 94.
(2) F.0.146/2435; reprod. Thornton's No.249 dated Aug.2nd,1882.
(3) Russie, Vol.267; No.70 Confid., Jaures to the Quai d'Orsay dated Aug. 3rd, 1882.
unanimity. The Tsar was even opposed to continued participation in any case. Nevertheless when the Porte declared its readiness to send troops to Egypt, Giers instructed Onou, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Istanbul, to join in the discussions, as long as they continued to appear capable of execution. (1)

The Russian attitude caused the British Government to wish for the Conference to break up, though they preferred "that its close should be brought about by the action of some other Power". (2) At this juncture, however, the previous instructions sent to Onou in the belief that England would refuse "the substitution of the Turkish troops for English intervention", were countermanded. For it then became clear that England had not in fact refused the co-operation of Turkey but that the difficulty lay in the fact that the Porte had not agreed to issue the proclamation desired by all the Powers, seeking instead to impose unacceptable conditions, such as the withdrawal of the British forces and the exclusion of Europe from any future settlement of the Egyptian army; and that England had merely wished to retain her liberty of action should these conditions be insisted on. (3)

The Turks now displayed great enthusiasm for the Conference. This, according to Hatzfeldt, was due to their fears lest they

should find themselves abandoned by Europe to face England in isolation. Hatzfeldt was against winding up the Conference, hoping that the Egyptian question might still be settled by the general agreement of the Powers rather than by British action. Another reason for which the Sultan wished to keep the Conference alive was that, by fomenting discord among the delegates, his representatives might cause the discussions to drag on while he sent troops to Egypt without any previous agreement with other Governments. His object, however, became evident to the delegates, who duly began to feel that it would be dangerous to allow the sittings to continue. For it was impossible to conceal the fact that military preparations were being made both at the Ottoman capital and in the provinces. Moreover the Sultan contracted a loan of £T.150,000, and was negotiating both for another loan of the same amount and for that of a further £T.100,000 from the bankers of Galata. It was rumoured that the feeling amongst the Turkish troops was in favour of ‘Orābī, and a Turkish officer was overheard assuring some soldiers that the Sultan was sending troops to help ‘Orābī against the British. There was in fact hardly less sympathy for ‘Orābī at Istanbul, where prayers were said for him in the mosques, than in Syria, Palestine and Tripoli, where his popularity was immense. The

(1) Allemagne, Vol.49; No.96 and another Desp. both from Courcel to Duclerc dated Aug. 11th & 15th, 1882.
(3) F.O.78/3389; No.691 Confid. Cf. Sayed Kamel, op.cit. 308 ff.
Sultan was even threatened with dethronement in an anonymous letter should he be weak enough to declare 'Orābī a rebel. (1)

The point of view of certain circles in Istanbul is reflected in a passage from the newspaper Havadis which supported 'Orābī, maintaining that absolute obedience was only due to the person of the Sultan. "As to the Khedive," it added, "there is no obligation to obey him in his quality of delegate of the Sovereign power, except in so far as he fulfils the conditions prescribed in the Ferman of his investiture....'Orābī is no more the subject of the Khedive than any other Egyptian, and we cannot declare him a rebel for not obeying the order of the Khedive, any more than we could declare a person rebellious who refused to obey the orders of the Bay of Tunis." (2)

The protection of the Suez Canal:

After the bombardment of Alexandria England attempted to soothe the susceptibilities of the other Powers to avoid exciting any rancour, especially in France and Italy, and to secure the sanction of the European concert to her separate action. Since the Suez Canal interested all the commercial Powers its protection against any possible encroachment on the part of the Egyptian army provided a good ground for expressing British fears and securing the goodwill of the other States concerned. On July 12th, accordingly, the British Government

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(1) Turquie, Vol.452; Noalles's Desps. of Aug. 5th, 16th, 26th & 28th, 1882.
(2) F.0.78/3387; Incl. in No.710.
suggested to the French that the two Powers should agree on a direct occupation of the Canal, with a view to its safety, since "the action of the British Admiral at Alexandria,.....coupled with the mission to Port-[Sa‘id] of the French Squadron,.....may be regarded by the Egyptian Government as indicating an intention.....to intervene", and may lead to attempts to obstruct the Canal". Any action for the protection of the Canal which might have to be taken was to be subject to the self-denying Protocol; the Great Powers and the Porte must either propose or sanction it; and it must be prompt. (1)

Freycinet could not understand the object of Granville's proposal. He accordingly suggested its presentation to the Conference, telling Lyons that the French Government had to submit it to the Chambre, and would agree to it only on condition that it secured a mandate from all the Powers. On July 15th his own Cabinet sanctioned this proposal; and Freycinet then sent to Tissot asking for Granville's concurrence, so that it might be submitted at once to the Conference. He also told Lyons that if the Porte refused either to answer the Note of the Conference or to countenance effective military intervention the Conference must be invited by the Western Ambassadors to define the exact mode of European intervention at once. (2) He contended that in order to obtain the sanction of the French

(2) Ibid. Teleg. dated July 13th, another Desp. marked Très Urgent, dated July 15th, & a third dated July 16th,1882 - all from Freycinet to Tissot.
Parliament to any active measures in Egypt, it would be essential for him to be able to show that he had at least brought the matter before the Conference at the earliest possible moment. He hoped that the British Government would co-operate in at once moving the Conference to depute England and France to guard the Canal forthwith, leaving it to them to decide for themselves, without further reference to the Conference, both the moment at which active measures should be taken and what those measures should be. He also said that the French Parliament was too much alive to the danger of France's being left without friends on the Continent to be willing to sanction the adoption by the Government of measures that had not been brought before the Conference, and that as soon as he had obtained his Parliament's consent, he would be quite willing for details regarding the part to be taken by each of the two Powers, to be arranged by competent French and English officers. He hinted, "but only vaguely and remotely", at the possible advantage to France and England of their intervening together in Egypt for the settlement of the whole Egyptian question. (1)

The French public was in fact greatly divided on the policy to be pursued as regards Egypt. No important group was prepared to support separate action by France, especially since Gambetta had been attacked as a danger to peace; nor were

(1) F.O.146/2432; No.728 (marked Private & Confid.) Lyons to F.O. dated July 15th, 1882.
those who were attached to the traditions of French influence in Egypt willing to permit England to act alone. (1) The controversy between Gambetta and Freycinet on Egyptian matters was continued in the press; and two currents of opinion formed themselves among the public, the one in favour of separating from England on the Egyptian question and following the lead of Germany, and the other (headed by Gambetta), of declaring without disguise for the English alliance. The latter party reproached Freycinet with subservience to Bismarck; whereas Freycinet, if his real opinions were to be gathered from the newspaper articles supposed to be inspired by him, though he adhered to the English alliance on certain conditions, was nevertheless ready also to act in certain contingencies in opposition to England. If he could have secured the backing of Parliament and public opinion, he would certainly have joined England in intervening. Failing that, he now regarded even Turkish intervention as a lesser evil than action by England alone. He could not develop this idea, however, well thought it might have served as a basis for an understanding with the Continental Powers against England, because the press, almost without exception, condemned the project. It was feared that the presence of Turkish troops in Egypt

(1) Carroll, French public opinion and foreign affairs, 92.
(2) F.O.146/2431; No.709 marked Secret, Lyons to F.O. dated July 11th, 1882.
would lead to the outbreak of a Holy War by France's Moslem subjects in North Africa. (1)

At the same time, Freycinet had reason to think it probable that whereas Russia and Italy would maintain that any Powers intervening in Egypt ought to have a distinct mandate from the Conference, Austria and Germany would declare that, although they had no wish to interfere with any Powers who might deem it necessary to send troops to Egypt, they were unwilling, since their own interests were not directly concerned, that such Powers should have a mandate from them. It would, therefore, he thought, facilitate matters with his Parliament if a regular mandate were given by the Conference, or even if a third Power, other than Turkey,—namely Italy—were associated with England and France. (2) Granville, who merely meant to show the readiness of the British Government to admit others, (3) consented to the participation of Italy and instructed Lyons to make the following proposals to the Quai D'Orsay:

that unless the Porte agreed to take immediate action, the British and French representatives should be instructed to tell the other Ambassadors, who had already received the Western proposals on the 19th of July, that England and France could no longer rely upon Turkish intervention.

and that, since they considered immediate action necessary to prevent further loss of life and continuance of anarchy, they intended, unless the Conference had any other plan, to devise with a third Power, if possible, such military means as might procure a solution; that they should ask Italy to be that third Power; that they should consult immediately on the division of labour;

and that the Suez Canal should be included in the general scheme of allied action.

Freycinet told Lyons that he would write to his Ambassador at Istanbul instructing him to propose in the Conference the co-operation of a third Power, and authorizing him to tell the Italian Ambassador that Italy would be very cordially welcomed by France and England as such. (1) Granville similarly asked the Italian Ambassador in London if Italy would be willing to join with England in military operations "of any kind" in Egypt, and if she would be equally ready to take part in a triple agreement with England and France; to which Menabrea replied (saying that it was a personal opinion), that Italy would be willing. (2) Granville also instructed Paget to inform Mancini that the British Government would

(1) Ibid., No.155, Lyons to F.O. dated July 23rd, 1882.

(2) F.0.141/153; reprod. No.246 marked Confid., F.O. to Paget, dated July 22nd, 1882.
welcome the co-operation of Italy "in a movement in the interior, which we are of opinion can no longer be delayed, and for which we are actively preparing, but in which the French seem disinclined to join."(1)

Italy was not herself eager to participate. Depretis, the Italian Premier, thought it would be more than ever necessary for Italy to have the formal sanction or mandate of Europe before joining England in intervention. He was firmly convinced, however, that the Turks had so much interest in acting loyally that they would give the required proof of good faith, which would relieve the Italian Government from having to take a decision regarding their own intervention.(2) Mancini, the Italian Foreign Minister, said that he desired to await the decision of the Conference to which the question of Turkish intervention had been submitted, especially as the Turks had accepted the Identical Note of July 15th without modification or reserve, and there were indications that they were already preparing to give it practical effect. Until it were proved that they were evading their obligations, it would be premature to contemplate any other form of intervention

Nothing in previous British policy had, in fact, prepared the Italian Government to believe it possible that England

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(1) F.0.146/2433; repro. Teleg. No.269, F.0. to Paget, dated July 26th, 1882.
(2) F.0.146/2434; repro. No.91 marked most Confid., Paget to F.0., dated Aug. 1st, 1882.
(3) F.0.146/2435; repro. Paget's No.325 marked Most Confid., dated Aug. 2nd, 1882 & F.0.141/153; Copy No.260, dated F.0. July 29th, 1882.
would cease to side with France in Mediterranean questions. The hope expressed by the Italians that she would join the recently concluded Italian-German understanding was in these days merely rhetorical. The Quirinal never imagined that the rupture of the Anglo-French condominium in Egypt offered Italy any chance of inducing Gladstone to depend on Italy and her allies. Moreover, as recently as the end of 1881 France had brought pressure to bear upon Italy, threatening her not only with a forward movement in Tripoli, but with direct hostility, if Italy took sides against France in Egyptian affairs; and Freycinet had further caused it to be known at Rome that France would look upon it as an act of hostility on the part of Italy if the latter were to assume in Egypt the position which belonged to France, and occupy without French participation any portion of Egyptian territory. (1)

As for Germany, Bismarck was against the issue of any mandate by the Conference, since that would place all Christian Europe in one camp, and the Moslem world in another. If England would not act alone, then let France, or Italy or some other Power act on its own responsibility. (2) As for the Canal the Sultan was better entitled than anyone else to undertake its protection; but if he was unwilling or unable to do so, the other Powers interested in the Canal might be

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(2) F.O. 78/3388; Dufferin's No. 6, B to F.O. dated July 19th, 1882.
justified in acting themselves. Germany, however, would decline to take any responsibility for their conduct, since she was resolved not to vote at the Conference for any modification of the existing Treaty arrangements. Bismarck was opposed to the co-operation of all the Powers in the issue of a mandate to some of them, and without the possibility of withdrawal. But if the Conference were to agree that all the European Powers should jointly protect the Canal for an unlimited period with equal rights, he thought that public opinion would favour such an arrangement, in which Germany would be ready to participate. (1) Münster nevertheless told Granville that England might depend on Germany's regarding whatever action she might take in the East with a friendly eye, although, in consequence of its relations with the other Powers, the German Government could not undertake to give her active support. (2)

As for Russia, Giers enquired what measures England thought it would be most expedient to take in order to guarantee security of navigation in the Canal, since Russian merchant vessels returning from China were on the point of passing through it, and further requested that the British Government should ensure their free passage. Granville's reply was that

(2) F.O. 146/2431; No. 311 marked Confid., Granville to Lyons, dated July 16th, 1882.
the British Government had asked the other Powers for their views on the protection of the Canal, but that they had none to give at that moment. He added that Admiralty reports on the situation in the Canal were reassuring. (1)

As a result Germany, Austria, and Russia, all declined to sanction the mandate, contending that the only object of the Conference was to regulate the intervention of Turkey, and that Great Britain and France consequently retained full liberty of action. On the other hand they held that the security of the Canal was of concern to all the Powers alike; and in due course, by August 1st, Germany, Turkey, Italy and Russia - all in turn - agreed to join in its collective protection. (2)

The fall of Freycinet:

The French Parliament began discussing the question of intervention on the 18th of July, and the next day the Chambre passed the necessary naval credits by a majority of 274. It is remarkable that Freycinet in his speech of July 18th, should have referred to the existence of a genuine national sentiment in Egypt, and to the fact that the French Government was not tied to existing arrangements for protecting the bondholders. (3). This caused Chamberlain to urge on Granville

(1) F.O. 141/153; No. 230, F.O. to Cartwright, dated July 17th, 1882.
a similar declaration in the House of Commons, to the effect
that England was not in any sense or degree hostile to the
establishment of representative government in Egypt. (1)

Then, when the French Parliament came to discuss the
military aspect of intervention it became evident that this
was viewed with disfavour by the Government. "The President
of the Republic and the Minister of War M. Billot", wrote a
British Attaché in Paris, "are strongly opposed to the exped-
tion, the latter giving as his reason that his troops are
neither physically nor morally fit for the work, and further,
that he was afraid he would lose half of his men from sickness
at that time of the year." (2)

On the 25th of July Freycinet accordingly informed Lyons
of the following. In the first place, he said, the French
Government was firmly resolved to separate the question of
protecting the Canal from that of intervention properly so
called, and consequently to limit their action to what was
necessary for the former object. Secondly, in their view the
protection of the Canal could be assured by the effective
occupation of certain points on its banks (one or two as far
as the French Government were concerned) - he mentioned 2,000
men as about the proper number for each point. Thirdly, the
French Government would abstain from any operations in the

(1) Gran. Pap., 117, Chamberlain to Granville, dated July 18th,
1882.

(2) Life of Childers, II, pp. 98-9. In June, Billot had told
the Chambre that unless 40,000 men were sent, the whole
detachment would be exposed to be lost "en détail".
interior of Egypt except for the purpose of repelling direct acts of aggression, and, if, therefore, the English troops thought fit to undertake such operations, they must not count upon French co-operation. Fourthly, the French would not occupy the above-mentioned points as long as the security of the Canal was not really threatened and the fresh-water conduits were not cut by the Egyptians. The French Chargé d'Affaires in London further told Granville that the French Government had no objection to a British advance if England decided to make it. (1)

Rumours meanwhile persisted in France that Germany was trying to involve France with England. Fear of Germany was combined with irritation at what was regarded as an impertinent attempt on the part of Bismarck to keep Freycinet in power (2) in order to bar the way to Gambetta's return. The result was that when the news arrived that the Conference had refused a mandate to England and France, the Ministry was defeated by a combination of the two extreme parties in the Chambre with the aid of the more timid members of the moderate groups. Freycinet's downfall was due to the fact that the policy of limiting French intervention to the protection of the Canal displeased too many deputies. On the one hand those who desired full intervention foresaw that France might be

(1) Ibid.
(2) F. O. 146/2435; No. 898 marked Secret, Lyons to F. O., dated Aug. 15th, 1882.
left to patrol the Canal while England fought in the interior of the country with the obvious intention of winning advantages for herself - a contingency that would be wounding to Gallic pride. On the other hand those who wished France to avoid full intervention feared lest by undertaking the protection of the Canal France might in fact be forced to go further. Advocates of a "revanche" for 1870, moreover, considered that France should keep her forces at home and continue the policy of "recueillement" and the reconstruction of her army. (1)

Although the French Chargé d'Affaires in London reported that the British Ministers appeared inclined to maintain a close alliance with France as of old, and although he denied as unfounded, the accusation that Great Britain cherished any design of self-aggrandizement, maintaining, on the contrary, that the British Government were ready to submit the ultimate regulation of the Egyptian question to the European concert; (2) the fall of Freycinet was a fatal blow to the Anglo-French entente. On August 8th, it is true, the new French Premier and Foreign Minister, M. Duclerc, denied that in refusing the credits necessary for the occupation of a part of the Suez Canal, the Chambre was doing more than passing "a measure of reserve and prudence, which was not abdication". (3) But the change in French policy was remarkable; and Forges, while considering Turkish intervention as a setback to the French, but not to the British, and one that had actually

(1) Sayed Kamel, op.cit., 180 ff.  (2) Angleterre, Vol.796; D'Aunay's Desp. dated July 31st,1882.  (See next page for (3)
begun, could not but accept it as a necessity, on condition, however, that it should be effected as promptly and energetically as possible, and that the Ottoman forces should withdraw once the Khedivial authority had been restored. In recommending this line to his Government, Vorges pointed to the impatience for action of the British, who were eager, while Turkey hesitated, to advance, and who might very well reach Cairo while the Sultan was still discussing the conditions of his own intervention. (1)

In an interview with the British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, Hatzfeldt stated confidentially, but with great frankness, that it would never do for France to continue her policy of inaction as regards Egypt, or to retire in any way from her position as one of the Great Powers. Courcel (the French Ambassador in Berlin), who was in favour of the joint action of England and France in Egypt, had always disliked the notion of Turkish intervention, but he told the British Chargé d'Affaires (Walsham) that it would be less distasteful to France if, as then seemed possible, "it took place under the guidance of England". Walsham argued that anything else might irritate Germany and give her an excuse for aiding and abetting the designs of those Powers who were jealous of the

(3) from previous page ....
F.0.146/2434: No. 179, Lyons to F.0., dated Aug. 8th, 1882.
(1) this page ...
Ezynè, Vol. 75; No. 6 Dir. Pol., dated July 30th, 1882.
leading position held by England and France in Egypt. (1)

Nevertheless, Dilke gave D'Aunay (the French Chargé d'Affaires) to understand that the French alliance existed no more, and that the British Government had instead turned towards Berlin.

The British occupation of the Suez Canal:

After the fall of Freycinet, the Conference took up a proposal put forward by the Italian delegate, and backed by Bismarck, for the protection of the Canal by means of a surveillance service, purely naval, in which all the Powers should participate. Dufferin immediately stipulated that "in case of emergency" any Power might land troops and occupy such points as it might be necessary to hold in order to ensure the safety of the Canal; and he furthermore declared that England must reserve for herself "entire liberty of action as to such military movements as may be necessary for the support of the Khedive against the rebels, under the conditions which have already been laid down in regard to intervention for that purpose." (3)

While Germany, Austria and Russia adopted the plan as it stood, accordingly, England adhered to it only with these reservations, while France reserved the right herself to determine the extent of her assistance. (4) In connection with

(1) F.O.146/2435; repro. Walsham's No. 70 Confid. to F.O. dated Aug. 12th, 1882.
(2) Allemarne, Vol. 49; Teleg. from Duclerc to Courcel, dated Aug. 19th, 1882.
(3) F.O. 141/153; No. 349, F.O. to Cartwright, dated Aug. 9th, 1882.
(4) D.D.F., 4th Series, No. 503.
the protection of the Canal, however, the question of its neutralization also arose; and this occasioned much further argument. It had never been defined by any international act. Nor did the relevant Ottoman pronouncements throw any clear light on it. Articles 14 & 15 of the Concession of 1856 stipulated that the Canal should always be open to merchant shipping without any distinction; and in 1869 Ali Pasha had informed the British Ambassador that the Fermān of 1866 had been issued on the understanding that the Canal would be neutralized. But during the Franco-Prussian war Great Britain had deprecated an Ottoman attempt to detain a French warship with a German prize; and both then and again during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 the British Government had shown itself hostile to the idea of neutralization, lest in any further war British ships might be denied passage.

An especially fervent advocate of neutralization was Lesseps himself, who urged the French Government to press for it. He supported his plea by quoting Orābī, who had written to him maintaining that "it is the duty of the Governments to protect the Canal and to permit no one to interfere with it as long as the Power with which we are at war makes an attack on it. Security and tranquillity are now reigning at Port-Said. No Power has the right to land troops, and should

any Power do this, it will openly violate treaties and will not have respected the rights which security demands." (1) However, much inclined the French may have been to listen to Lesseps's advocacy of Orābi's cause, they were deterred by British opposition, and merely besought the British Government to be patient with a man whose reputation and popularity in France were so great. (2)

Then, before the Conference had reached any conclusion on the neutralization issue, on August the 2nd British naval forces occupied Suez, the British Government declaring that the Khedive still possessed executive rights over the Canal and had empowered the Commander of the British naval forces to land troops for its protection. (3) Dilke announced at the same time that he had no reason to believe that the Conference "will control or interfere with" this military action on the part of England. (4)

Lesseps's furious comment was that he would with his own hands kill the first Englishman who dared to land at Ismā'īlīya. (5) It seems that he had entered into some sort of agreement with Orābi whereby the latter promised to respect freedom of navigation in the Canal. (6) Blunt states (7) that

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(1) F.0.146/2435; Seymour to Admiralty, dated Aug.3rd, 1882.
(3) Hallberg the Suez Canal, 265.
(4) Hansard, Vol.CCLXXIII, Col.958 (Commons, Aug.7th,1882)
(5) Life of Childers, II, 106.
(6) Hallberg, op. cit., 265-6
(7) Secret History, 300-I.
Crâbî strenuously opposed the advice of his colleagues who wished to block the northern end of the Canal, and that he had informed Lesseps that the Egyptian Government would not violate its neutrality. He himself appears to have credited the repeated assertions of Lesseps that, if he left the Canal alone, the British would not dare to violate its neutrality for fear of angering the other Powers, and that not a single English soldier would disembark without being accompanied by a French soldier. It is probable that, after the British occupation of Suez, and later of Ismâ'îliya, the Egyptian revolutionary Ministers did think of obstructing the Canal. This, however, was prevented by the swift action of the British in the Canal zone.

The British landings also roused public opinion in France itself. The French newspaper *Le Siècle* declared "the English have seized on the Suez Canal like thieves", and the *Telegraphe* was scandalized at "the high-handed robbery committed in Egypt". The tone of the public Press in Vienna was likewise "one of extreme hostility". The Governments of the Powers on the other hand took the event more calmly. The Austrian *Chargé d'Affaires* in London told Granville that his Government thought that, as soon as the question respecting the Suez Canal was settled, and the British Government had

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2. F.O. 146/2435; reprod. Elliot's No. 408 marked Confid., to F.O. dated Aug. 10th, 1882.
come to an arrangement with the Porte respecting operations in Egypt, the Conference should suspend its sittings, on the proposal of the President, till after the conclusion of military operations. He added that on the re-establishment of order in Egypt, the definitive settlement of its future administration should be the matter of agreement among all the Conference Powers, as had been suggested by Dufferin on the 30th of July, and that Germany, Italy and Russia were in agreement with the view of his Government. Granville's answer was that the British Government concurred. During the military operations and at their close, they would of course make all such arrangements as the interests involved might appear to require, but adhered to the declaration that the definitive settlement must be referred to the united Powers of Europe. (1)

The Conference, while taking note of the British occupation of the Canal, continued to discuss the Italian project, which was also accepted by Turkey. In the meantime Spain, Portugal and Holland had all made overtures to join in; and the discussions continued to be conducted only by the representatives of the Great Powers. (2) On the 29th of August, the

(1) F.0.146/2435; repro. No.236, F.0. to Elliot, dated Aug. 11th, 1882.
(2) F.0.146/2435; repro. No.86 Confid. Morier to Granville, dated Ildefonso Aug. 7th, 1882; F.0.146/2436; repro. Thornton's No.259, dated St.Petersburg Aug.15th; and Paget's No.435 dated Aug.17th, 1882 & F.0.141/153; Copy No.68, Walter Baring to F.0. dated Lisbon Aug.23rd, 1882.
Conference endorsed a complementary proposal, submitted by Count Corti, to the effect that "the Commanders of the naval forces on the spot should be charged by their respective Governments to limit the actions deemed necessary for the enforcement of the project agreed to by the Conference"; and instructions in this sense were duly sent to the Admirals of the naval units actually in the Canal (namely the British, the French and the Italian). The Italian Admiral was empowered to enforce the decisions of the Conference by any means at his disposal, with discretion to co-operate with his colleagues without reference to his Government. The French Admiral, on the other hand, was accorded neither this power of initiative nor authority to accept the resolutions agreed on with his colleagues without first consulting Paris. (1)

There was little reality, however, in all this. For in the meantime the most important points on the Canal had actually been occupied by the British forces. (2) Sir Garnet Wolseley, moreover, had already begun action "in support of the authority of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the Firmans of the Sultan and existing international engagements", and on the pretext of suppressing "a military revolt" in Egypt.

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(1) Sayed Kamel, op. cit., 300-302.
(2) Port Said, Ismailiya and al-Kantara were all occupied on the 20th of August, 1882.
Chapter XI
Occupation

_Egypt and the bombardment:_

On the 11th of July Raghib Pasha wrote from Alexandria to all the provinces as well as to the administrative departments at Cairo that war had begun between the Egyptians and the British, and that Egypt was therefore to be ruled by martial law. (1) England, according to Orābī, had begun the war, for which the Egyptians had been unprepared. (2)

Having learnt that the Khedive and his entourage had been delighted at the bombardment, the military commanders decided to besiege the Ramle Palace, and to place Tawfīk under arrest. Four hundred cavalrymen and an infantry regiment were accordingly ordered to undertake the operation; but when Tawfīk sent Sulṭān Pasha and two Ministers to ask Orābī to recall them, he did so, only the Khedivial bodyguard

(1) Orābī's Memoirs, I, 178.
(2) Ibid, 176.
being left to protect the Palace. (1)

The exodus from Alexandria had begun on the eve of the bombardment. The native emigrants were in a deplorable state of panic and misery. In their confusion they left everything behind them, and, according to Ninet, were heard to curse Tawfiq, 'Orabi and the British alike. (2) In the provinces and at Cairo the sufferings of the refugees inflamed the people against both the Khedive and the Christians of all sorts. As a result, there ensued massacres of Christians at Tanta, al-Mahalla al-Kubra, Damanhur, Zagazig, and elsewhere. At Cairo, however, the vigilance of the Prefect prevented the occurrence of similar incidents. (3)

On the 12th of July the Egyptian army began to evacuate Alexandria instead of giving battle to the few English marines who had been landed. They withdrew to Kafr al-Dawwar, a few miles distant. The next day Tawfiq summoned the princes, the chief government officials and such notables as were loyal to him, and conferred with them on the attitude to be adopted in view of the occupation. (4)

Dervish advised that the Khedive should move to Suez.

(1) Al-Thawra al-'Orabiya, 374-6.
(2) Ibid, 382-3.
(3) Ibid, 382-3.
(4) 'Orabi had requested Dervish to leave Egypt., (F.O. 78/3387; No. 551 Confd., Dufferin to F.O. dated July 5th, 1882), and the latter was compelled to quit on the 18th of July, after his mission had met with complete failure.
Others suggested that he should return to Cairo. Seeing which way the wind was blowing, and which side was the stronger, however, Tawfik sought help of the British Admiral. "This was the prince", wrote an Englishman, "who had given precise orders to resist the action of the British fleet and to proclaim war throughout the country".

**Civil war:** By the 15th of July all the Egyptian forces had evacuated Alexandria, leaving the Khedive and the Ministers behind. Tawfik returned to Rāṣ al-Tīn, where he remained under the protection of the British fleet. A British force provided him with an additional bodyguard, and a special dragoman was appointed to facilitate communication between him and Seymour, Colvin and Cartwright. Seymour then issued a proclamation which he declared his intention of maintaining order by authorization of the Khedive. He also brought pressure to bear on Rāḥib to address a letter to him impugning 'Orābī's conduct. On July 19th Tawfik asked Colvin to invite the British authorities to begin

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(1) Newman, op. cit. 109-8

(2) 'Orābī's Memoirs, I, 182.

(3) Misr li'l-misriyīn, V, 126.

(4) Ibid, 127.
military action without delay; and on the 23rd the official Moniteur announced 'Orâbî's dismissal and accused him of being the cause of the bombardment; of having evacuated Alexandria and withdrawn to Kafr al-Dawwâr, thus blocking communication between Alexandria and the hinterland; of impeding the return to Alexandria of its inhabitants; and of continuing military preparations and refusing to go to Râs al-Tîn in person in response to the Khedive's orders. This announcement further vindicated the good will of the British and warned the nation not to side with 'Orâbî, who was replaced as Minister of War by 'Omar Luṭfî. (2)

The British meanwhile sought a rapprochement with the Râghib Ministry. Without having conferred with Brédif, Colvin telegraphed to London for authorization to attend the Cabinet meetings. He did so with the intention of making the Egyptian Government exempt the British forces from all custom charges in connection with the occupation. Brédif did not object, since it was evident that opposition would be fruitless. (3)

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(1) B.B. XVII, No. 324; Cartwright to F.O. dated July 19th, 1882.

(2) Ibid, Desps. exchanged from July 21st to 25th, 1882 between Granville and Cartwright – Nos. 361, 378 & 537.

At this critical moment of Egypt's history many of the officials, notables and Pashas, (including Sultan), who were at Alexandria, sided with the Khedive, while others at Cairo and in the provinces remained passive, waiting to see which side would win. Everyone who bore a grudge against either the Nationalists or the military joined the Khedive's camp.

Many of the old National Party deserted Orābī with the result that some of them, who preferred to stay at Cairo, were the object of suspicion and watch; and the Circassians condemned in April returned to place their services at the Khedive's disposal.

Rāghib's conduct was still compatible with the national line he had pursued before. He perhaps thought that by remaining in office he might do some service to his country. He told Vorges that Orābī was the master of all Egypt and that he (Rāghib) was seeking a way out of the crisis. At the same time he asserted that Orābī was ready to retire to his lands, which may show that there was some kind of understanding between the Nationalists and the military leaders. Vorges, however, would not guarantee anything. He said that it would be better for Orābī to retire to France, where he would be safe, and that if he proceeded to Port Said he would be

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(2) Ibid,
received there by the French Admiral. Râghib indeed sought to secure a guarantee for Ḥūrâbî's life, but Vorges declined to give one, regarding the "Ḥūrâbî regime" as an insurrectional government. He sent, however, to the French Consul at Port Said instructing him to maintain friendly relations with the governors nominated in the Suez Canal region by Ḥūrâbî, without maintaining any official relations with them, only recognized government, pending new orders, being that of the Khedive. (1)

Ḥūrâbî, for his part, in reply to the Khedive's accusations, reminded him of the council presided over by him on the 11th of July. He asked him to send Râghib or any other Ministers to confer with him at Kafr al-Dawwar, but indicated that military preparations and the "Holy War" were to go ahead, and professed his enmity to the British. He moreover sent to Yaʿqûb Sâmi, the Under Minister of War at Cairo, inviting him to convene a general assembly of the leading personalities, who would review the whole situation, and decide what should be done as regards the Khedive and for the good of the country. He had already sent a circular to the provinces and to the ministerial departments at Cairo noting that the Khedive, having taken sides with the British, was no

(1) Ibid., Vorges's No. 7 Dir. Pol. dated Aug. 6th; a Desp. (marked Très Confid.) dated July 25th; and another dated July 29th, 1882 - all from Vorges.
Ya'kub immediately convened a council composed of the Under-Ministers and high ranking-officers, in order to impose government by martial law and a press censorship. This council, Al-Majlis al-'Urfī, as it was called, thenceforth continued to control affairs up to the occupation. At the same time its primary object was to discuss the whole situation with the proposed general assembly. On the 17th of July, accordingly, there assembled at Cairo about 400 men, including some princes of the ruling family, the Sheikh al-Islām, the Kādī al-Kudāh, the Muftī, the most prominent of the 'Olama', the religious chiefs, Moslem, Jewish and Christian, some leading landowners, the most prominent personalities in the central administration, some Mudīrs, Kādis and merchants, and a few of the members of the Chamber of Notables. The letters that had been exchanged by the Khedive and 'Orābī as well as by the latter and Ya'kūb Sāmī were read out. Although the Wākā'ī, which was published at Cairo and was now in the hands of the Orabists, asserts that the assembly unanimously agreed to continue military preparations, and invite the Ministers to return from Alexandria to explain the real position of the Khedive, it is possible that, as Royle states, the
assembly, on a proposal by the Coptic Patriarch, deferred any further decision pending the despatch of a delegation to the Khedive to ask him "what truth there was in the charges of the Arabists", and whether all the Ministers were really in prison as had been stated. (1) Having conferred with ʿOrābī at Kafr al-Dawwār, the delegates proceeded to Alexandria, where they in turn conferred with the Khedive and the Ministers on the 23rd of July. When they returned to Cairo, they told the Majlis that the Khedive was nothing but a captive in the hands of the British; whereupon the general assembly met again; its members now being more numerous. After discussions, during which it was debated whether a fetwa should be issued declaring the Khedive an apostate, the assembly decided that "in consequence of the occupation of Alexandria by foreign troops, of the presence of the British squadron in Egyptian waters, and finally of the position taken up by ʿOrābī Pasha for the purpose of repulsing the enemy", ʿOrābī was to be upheld as Minister of War and Marine, entrusted with the general command of the Egyptian army and full authority in all that concerned military operations, and that the orders of the Khedive and

(1) The Egyptian Campaigns, I, 200-201. 
α) Some of the delegates including ʿAlī Pasha Mubārak, preferred to stay at Alexandria.
his Ministers were to be regarded as "null and void". In his character of Ḥāmid Himā al-Diyār al-Misrīya (the defender of Egyptian territory), Orābī demanded that one-fifth of the male population of every province should be summoned to Kafār al-Dawār. All old soldiers of every description were called upon to serve again; horses and provisions were everywhere requisitioned for the army; and al-Bārūdī was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the army corps stationed in the neighbourhood of the Suez Canal. (1)

The Sharīf Ministry:

Malet arrived at Alexandria on the 10th of August; and in due course Colvin left. Malet's first pre-occupation was to form a ministry to replace that of Rāghib, which was pro-Nationalist. Sharīf had in fact been invited to form a ministry as early as the last week of July, but had always rejected the offer, insisting as a sine qua non, in spite of the views he had held earlier, on the necessity of an immediate military intervention of some sort, now preferably Turkish. Sharīf also showed himself disposed to disband the Egyptian army and replace it with volunteers or mercenaries - the method employed by Muhammad ʿAlī before recruiting the Fellāhin for military service. While

inclined towards the British, and at the same time "accused
of a certain pusillanimity"; Sharīf, according to Vorges,
"had in Egypt a considerable position". When he hesitated
to assume ministerial responsibility, a great number of
his French acquaintances supported him, "hoping to hold
him in reserve for a time when French influence could be
more freely asserted and wishing to prevent him from taking
charge of the government at a time of much repression".
Sharīf, who was married to a French lady (the daughter
of the well-known Colonel Séves), and who was known to be
pro-French, regretted the abstention of France, but under
the pressure of circumstances, was liable to be more
Anglophile than was welcome to the French. Malet immed-
iately embarked on negotiations with Sharīf and persuaded
him to drop most of his reservations. He pressed him to
accept such Egyptians "of eminence", as Nūbār and Riyād,
"whose names and capacity were well-known". That Malet
should have sought to bring together three personalities so
widely different in their political outlook and temperament
is evidence of his venturesome nature. His aim was to
rally round the Khedive during the occupation the most
prominent Egyptians at hand.

(1) Vorges's Desp. of July 24th & his No. 5 Dir.Pol. dated
July 27th, 1882.
(2) Vorges's No. 5 supra & his No. 9 Dir.Pol. dated August
14th 1882. Riyād was then at Geneva, and then visited
Paris on his way to Egypt.
Sharīf, on his side, expressed to Malet his hope that no change would be made which would involve the removal of Colvin, "of whose advice and assistance he stood in the greatest need." He also "spoke in terms of the highest admiration of England for coming to the assistance of Egypt in the hour of her need, observing that without this timely aid the country would have been lost to civilisation for generations". As regards the Chamber of Notables, whose Organic Law Sharīf considered to have been "wrung from the the Khedive by force, and consequently......[to possess] no legal vitality", his own plan was to dissolve it and then to induce the Khedive to promulgate a fresh Organic Law of his own, which would deprive the Chamber of all power over the budget and make no mention of ministerial responsibility. Sultān Pasha, when consulted on this, was opposed to the dissolution of the Chamber, but suggested the expulsion and trial of the "disloyal" deputies who had sided with Orābī. Malet was not in favour of this suggestion, saying that "the difficulties we have got into.......[have been] in great measure created through not keeping within the law" (1). He preferred to retain the existing Chamber and to make it

(1) Italics are mine.
alter its own Organic Law in accordance with Sharif's wish. (1) However, the question was not urgent, since the Chamber was in recess, and this idea was never in fact followed up. The Chamber itself was converted after the occupation into a quasi-parliamentary institution, which, however, had no real authority and accordingly had no influence on Egypt's progress in the ensuing generation.

Malet conducted the talks for the formation of the new Ministry in complete disregard of his French colleague. It was evident that he considered the inaction of France as ipso facto annulling the entente. Nor was this all: Malet also spoke in strong terms against the neutrality of the Suez Canal, and rumours began to circulate regarding the suppression of the Control. Although The Egyptian Gazette tried to deny the supposition that this rumour was originated by the British, Vorges was convinced of the contrary: he knew very well that Malet was opposed to the Control, which was to France the point d'appui of all that was left of her influence. Vorges also records another rumour: that Egypt was to be proclaimed independent on the ground that the Sultan had already deserted his vassal. Although Vorges was not unfavourable to Egypt's independence

(1) Cf. Malet, op. cit., 444-5. Vorges, however, states that Malet was inclined to oblige the Chamber of Notables to abandon a portion of its privileges, and that, by so deciding, "was against Cherif's well-known ideas". Vorges's No, 10 Dir. Pol. dated Aug. 14th, 1882.
in principle, since it would suit French interests, he could not approve it at that juncture, since he foresaw that in practice it would place Egypt in the hands of the British. It was to this proposal that he attributed Riyâd's agreement to collaborate with Sharîf, despite their former rivalry. Riyâd learnt of it while still in France, and though he at once agreed to co-operate with Sharîf before deciding on the independence issue, he wished to consider it personally in Egypt. All these rumours caused Vorges to recommend to his Government the recognition at the Conference of the independence and neutralization of Egypt under the collective sanction of all the Powers.

Sharîf in Vorges's view "showed a great feebleness of character" in allowing Riyâd to be imposed upon him. On the other hand Nûbâr's candidature was dropped; for by at first insisting on both Riyâd and Nûbâr, Malet succeeded in imposing the less objectionable of the two. Malet also pressed Sharîf, much against the latter's inclination, to forego the Presidency of the Cabinet, leaving it to Tawfîk himself. On August 19th the new Ministry was announced and on the 28th the Khedivial Decree was issued, Sharîf being appointed President without portfolio and Minister.

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of Foreign Affairs, Riyād Minister of the Interior, ʿOmar Luṭfī Minister of War. All the other Ministers were Riyādists, Sharīfists or Tawfikists, and it was wondered how much an orchestra, lacking all harmony, as it did, would play for Malet.

Vorges was told of the new ministerial combination when it had already been effected. The Ministers called upon him according to an old usage, and the Khedive told him of the new Ministry a day before he announced it to the other legations. This, however, was by now a matter of mere courtesy. Vorges's reports at that juncture are full of gloom: he confessed that Malet's policy had at last been successful to the detriment of France. Malet had in fact become the deus ex machina in the drama of the Khedive and his clique: Tawfik continued as Khedive de jure, but the ruler de facto was Malet, who thus paved the way for his more successful and celebrated successors, Lord Cromer.

Turkey, England and the Military Convention:

Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived at Alexandria on the 15th of August, and immediately opened his campaign. Skirmishes first took place between the Egyptians and the British near

(1) Vorges's No. 11 Dir. Pol. supra
(2) Vorges's Nos. 12, 13, 14 & 16 - all marked Dir. Pol. and dated Aug. 23rd, 28th & Sept. 4th & 6th, 1882.
Kafar al-Dawwar. But Wolseley’s plan was to invade Egypt via the Suez Canal, and he had high hopes of ending the campaign in the shortest time possible with a single blow. Orabi was warned by Blunt that the occupation would begin not from Alexandria but from the east, and an Egyptian defence line was hurriedly built at al-Tall al Kabir. Suljan Pasha was sent both to strengthen the hands of the rulers nominated by Tawfiq in the territory newly occupied by the British and to try and gain the support of the Arab tribesmen of the Sharkiya province.

According to news reaching Vorges from Port Sa’id, the Egyptian army was a prey to great disorder. The volunteers knew nothing of warfare, being all but entirely untrained, while the regular troops were not greatly different from those who, though trained by Europeans, had been heavily defeated in Abyssinia and had shown no great efficiency during the Russo-Turkish war. Nevertheless, all were resolved to fight till the end, and some foreign officers of liberal views from various parts of Europe offered their services to Orabi. Men were also enlisted in Turkey for service in Egypt—either for or

(1) Blunt, (op. cit. 40ff), also refers to a similar abortive mission of a Mr. Palmer, Professor of Oriental languages at Cambridge, who was killed in the neighbourhood of Gaza before proceeding into the Sharkiya province.

(2) It was during the Abyssinian war that the Egyptian officers first thought of a revolutionary manifestation.

(3) Vorges’s No. 9 Dir. Pol. supra.

(4) Ninet, op. cit. 221-2.
against the Khedive. The British, however, gave warning
that any non-Egyptian combatant that might fall in Wolseley's
hands would be put to death; and this had its effect.

British military action in Egypt was supported by
negotiations with the Porte for a Military Convention. It
was thought in London that co-operation, or even the semblance
of co-operation, with the Porte would probably put an end to
the turmoil prevalent in the Moslem world and in Mādīa, and
might induce ʿOrābī to submit. Since some European Powers,
especially Germany, were in favour of the Convention, England
was inclined to advertise her regard to the sovereign rights
of the Sultan. It is evidence of Dufferin's ability that
throughout the negotiations, the main object of which was to
gain time till ʿOrābī had been defeated, he continued to
secure complete liberty of action for his Government, without
wounding the susceptibilities of any foreign Power, that by
watchfulness and dexterity he successfully prevented the
Turks from wriggling out of the conditions and restrictions
his Government thought it necessary to impose upon them.

(1) Vorges's No. 13 Dir. Pol. dated Aug. 28th, 1882
(2) Biovès, op. cit., 225.
(3) Life of Childers, II, 113.
(4) "I have understood from Lord Granville", wrote Malet to
Wolseley, "that Wilson was only to start with a view to
arranging details with you after the signature of the Con-
vention and I presumed that this was to gain time." F.O.
141/166; Desp. dated Sept. 6th, 1882.
(5) Lyall, op. cit. 318-19 & The Times of Aug. 7th, 1882.
The Sultan, as usual, found himself in a dilemma. To accept co-operation with England would be to recognize her right of interference, whereas to refuse would most probably result in her acting alone. At first Abd al-Hamid imagined he could count on international jealousy to save his face, hoping, if a convention were agreed to at all, to submit it to the Conference: a proposal which according to Kalnoky was "altogether unreasonable and such as no Government, including Russia, would for a moment listen to.... if they were in the same position as that now occupied by England." (1) Abd al-Hamid's hopes were not, however, without any foundation, having in view the traditional grudges of Russia and Italy. Moreover, there is evidence that De Noailles, possibly irritated, as was Courcel, at his Government's abstention, was trying to thwart the Anglo-Turkish negotiations, at least unofficially, (2) while the Austrian Ambassador showed himself at the moribund Conference to be "the defender, even the chevalier, of the Sultan." (3) In face of this England attempted to soothe the anxieties and jealousies of the Powers. Sir John Walsham, for example, contended in Berlin that his Government, which aimed at no

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(1) F.0.141/153; reprodu. Elliot's No.426 Confid. dated Aug. 23rd 1882.
(2) F.0.78/3390; No.790, Dufferin to F.0. dated Aug.17th, 1882.
(3) Turquie, Vol.453; No.57, Noailles to Duclerc, dated Sept. 20th, 1882.
advantage for herself, remained faithful to her previous declarations concerning the status quo in Egypt. He spoke of a collective control of Egypt by all the Powers, presided over by England and France, and spoke to the French representative of a close Anglo-French entente, assuring him that once order was restored in Egypt, the country would be left to itself. (1) At the same time it is evident that England was all but isolated in Europe during her Egyptian campaign, and that only Bismarck supported her action, though he could not commit himself officially by any declaration because of his system of existing and proposed alliances on the Continent.

In addition to the dilemma with which he was confronted regarding Egypt, the Sultan was perturbed by the warnings he received from the 'Qalāmā and the partisans of Panislamism that co-operation with England against "the defenders of Islam" would inevitably produce a bad effect on the mass of the Egyptian people, as well as on the Syrians and the Arabs, and might enable 'Orābī to obtain the dreaded fetwa proclaiming the dethronement of the Calif. (2) Inflammatory language had in fact been used in the mosques of Istanbul in regard to the affairs of Egypt; the preachers abusing

England in unmeasured terms and inciting the people to take up arms against the Christians in defence of Islam. (1)

Nor was this all. A warning was sent (2) to the Sultan by thirty prominent Sheikhs of al-Azhar; and to these the Sultan had addressed himself, expressing his hope that the Egyptians would abstain in future from sending re-inforcements to Orabi, and that the Sheikhs themselves would induce Orabi to lay down his arms in the name of the religious law. The answer of the Olama, who had consulted with the Notables, was firstly that they would obey the orders of both the Khedive and the Sultan only in so far as they were compatible with the religious law; secondly that they would continue to regard Orabi as the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian military forces as long as his actions were also not in contradiction with the religious law; thirdly that the Egyptians would lay down their arms only when the British army had evacuated Alexandria and the other territory it had occupied, and then only on condition that the terms of peace should be conveyed beforehand to the Olama and the Notables; and fourthly that they were all unanimous in requesting Tawfik's dismissal. The Sultan was also warned that if he sent troops to Egypt the Egyptians would

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(1) F.0.78/3390; Dufferin's No. 809 Confid. dated Aug. 21st & Incl. in Ibid.

(2) Turquie, Vol.452; Annex No.1 to Noailles's No.43 Dir.Pol. dated Aug. 19th, 1882.
judge his actions by the precepts of the Kor'ān, and that
he should not send Dervīsh back to Egypt, lest he should
repeat his previous errors and involve the country in further
ruin. "The question", ended the letter, "is one rather of
the salvation of Egypt than of the person of 'Orābī". 'Abd
al-Ḥamīd was further alarmed at the prospect of an entry
into Cairo by the British as victors, in case they should
then act on the principle of beati pessidentes. Such a
contingency might have been avoided if 'Orābī could have
been induced to surrender, but in face of the obstinacy of
the 'Olamā', the Porte again resorted to negotiations with the
British. The first encounters between the British and
Egyptian forces showed that the latter would be unable to
make a stand for long. It accordingly appeared to the
Porte that if a few Turkish battalions were after all now
sent to Egypt and quartered there, their presence might at
least restrain the British from pursuing their ambitions
too far. On August 27th an agreement was even reached
between the Porte and Dufferin ad referendum, (1) after
laborious negotiations during which the Foreign Office
even considered handing Musurus his passport and instructing
Dufferin to return to London without taking leave. (2) "So

(1) For the course of the negotiations see F.0.78/3379 in
extenso - see also F.0.141/152; extender No.437 dated
Aug. 31st, 1882 from F.0. to Malet, Vide App. III for the
Draft Convention.
(2) Gran. Pap.;(118); Incl. Teleg. (marked Private) from the
War Office to Granville dated Aug. 9th, 1882.
far as this country's interests are concerned", commented The Times\(^{(1)}\) regarding the conclusion of the Convention, "we have steadily maintained that the presence of the Turks in Egypt, under no matter what conditions, must be highly embarrassing and detrimental." Northbrook and Childers, who had insisted before that Dufferin should be instructed on no account to sign the Convention until the proclamation against Orābī was actually issued, nor to commit himself to any admission that Turkish troops might possibly be landed at Alexandria,\(^{(2)}\) now attacked the Convention on the ground that the Khedive and his Ministers were against it.

Tawfīk in fact said that if the "rebellion" were to collapse through the intervention of the Sultan, his own position would become untenable, and he could never hope to regain his authority in Egypt. He was sure that the British forces would not require any assistance and he earnestly hoped that they would do the work alone. For he believed that any other solution would certainly prove impermanent, and would leave a smouldering fire of fanaticism which would blaze up when the country was evacuated by England. People would consider the Sultan as victorious, and Orābī would probably submit to him in order to show himself as a champion.

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\(^{(1)}\) The Times of Aug. 29th, 1882.

\(^{(2)}\) Gran. Pap., (118) - Childers to Granville, dated Aug. 9th, 1882.
of Islam who had held back the British till other Moslem forces arrived. (1) Malet shared the Khedive's fears, and saw that the co-operation of Turkish troops would no longer bring England any advantage, especially since the Egyptians would now have no cause to believe that the Sultan was really anxious to help the British. (2) Childers even instructed Wolseley not to allow the landing of any Turkish force at Alexandria, unless he and Seymour should consider it advisable on strategic grounds when the time came. (3) Granville and Gladstone, however, viewed the question differently, since it had now assumed a political rather than a military character. (4) Granville therefore instructed a certain Captain Rice to proceed to Egypt and place himself at Seymour's disposal to assist in making the necessary arrangements with the Turkish commanding officers for the operations likely to be carried out by the Turkish forces in concert with the British under the military Convention about to be concluded. (5)

(1) F. O. 141/155; Draft No. 599, Malet to F. O. dated Sept. 5th, 1882.
(3) Gran. Pan., (118)-Childers to Julian Pauncefote, dated Augs. 31st, 1882.
(4) Glad. Pan., Ms. 44174, two letters exchanged between Granville and Gladstone dated Sept. 7th, 1882 & Gran. Pan. (118), Granville to Childers, dated Sept. 7th, 1882.
(5) F. O. 141/153; F. O. to Captain Rice, dated Sept. 1st, 1882.
The Sultan, for his part, was now prepared to take any step to remove British misgivings. If England would allow his troops to land at Alexandria, instead of sending 5,000 men, he was ready even to reduce the number to one or two thousand, to be disposed in accordance with the wishes of the British Commander, the troops themselves being as much under the control of the British Generals as in the Crimea. (1) On September 6th, moreover, the proclamation against 'Orābi (2) was published at Istanbul, in contradiction both of 'Orābi's hopes and of the Porte's previous intention to issue it only after the Turkish forces had landed in Egypt. Moreover, despite a previous agreement with Dufferin that it would be issued in the name of the Sultan, it was issued in that of the Ottoman Government; and the published version of the Military Convention likewise bore some amendments intended to save the Sultan's face in the Moslem world.

In acting thus the Ottoman Government achieved no advantage and satisfied nobody. When Dufferin went to the Porte to sign the Convention, he insisted that before signing it he must have time to compare the text of the

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(1) F.0.141/162; No.539, F.0. to Malet, dated Sept. 1st,1882. (2) F.01141/153; No.305, F.0. to Malet, dated Sept.10th,1882.
Proclamation with the earlier draft and communicate with his Government. Moreover, as Seymour and Wolseley had recommended that the Foreign Office should procrastinate as long as possible, instructions were duly sent to Wolseley to the effect that if Orābī were to submit before agreement had been reached with the Turkish Generals on the place of landing, he (Wolseley) must refer back to London, whilst at the same time tendering his advice. For Childers insisted that, if allowed to land at all, the Turks should do so only at a place or places where they would be least able to interfere with the subsequent negotiations. At Istanbul and in Egypt the Proclamation was ill received, since the people knew that, until quite recently, Orābī had been receiving encouragement from the Porte, while they themselves had been taught by the inspired native press to sympathise with the Egyptian movement and condemn the action of England. They could scarcely be expected, therefore, to applaud the adoption of a precisely contrary line without some preparation.

(1) The Times of Sept. 8th, 1882.
(2) F.O.78/3396; Teleg. No.573, F.O. to Dufferin, dated Sept. 9th, 1882.
(3) Gran. Pap. (118), Copy enclosed in a letter dated Sept. 9th, 1882 from Childers to Wolseley and subsequently sent to Wolseley.
(4) The Times of Sept. 11th, 1882. The semi-official Vakit, which launched a fierce campaign against England, was suppressed in compliance with Dufferin's complaints. (F.O.78/3390; No.825, Dufferin to F.O. dated Aug.23rd, 1882)
Al-Tall al-Kabîr:

On September 13th Wolseley won his easy victory at al-Tall al-Kabîr. It was no great triumph for the British; being due chiefly to the inefficiency of the Egyptian leaders in general and ʿOrābî in particular. On learning that the army had been routed, and finding that the members of the Majlis were above all anxious to spare Cairo the damage inflicted on Alexandria, ʿOrābî immediately lost heart. So inactive did he remain indeed that a large number of French writers have represented his defeat as the result of previous understanding with Wolseley, - a theory first put forward by al-Ahram in December 1882, for which there is no evidence whatever, but which has nevertheless tarnished ʿOrābî's reputation. A letter addressed to the Ottoman Council of Ministers (1) by fifteen of the Egyptian ʿOlama after al-Tall al-Kabîr attributes ʿOrābî's swift capitulation to the enmity displayed towards him by the Porte, which had left their warnings unheeded. But at the same time the letter expressed the amazement and doubts of its readers at the fact that even before his trial began ʿOrābî had obtained a guarantee that his life and property should be spared. It was in fact the British Government who insisted that he should not be sentenced to death in any case.

(1) Turquie, Vol. 4, 53; Incl. bearing no date.
presumably in order not to alienate Egyptian feeling. But their insistence was misinterpreted in the light of the twenty minutes' duration of al-Tall al-Kabir, and Orabi's deliverance of his sword to the British forces at the gate of Cairo. Orabi immediately lost much sympathy even among his followers, whose disappointment was enhanced by his manifest cowardice during the trial. Orabi's end was a sad one. When he returned from his exile in Ceylon, he was a broken man, who had lost his sight. He was mocked by some, misrepresented by others, and revered only by a few. Yet, inspite of all this, Orabi's figure is one that will endure in Egyptian history. He was the first to preach the doctrine of "Egypt for the Egyptians", and though rather a theoretician than a practical man, was the first fellah to support Liberalism and freedom in the long-oppressed valley of the Nile.

The Khedive, in contrast, was more than satisfied with the "brilliant success" achieved by Wolseley, and said that there now no longer existed any pretext for the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt or the conclusion of the Military Convention. According to Malet, (1) the Khedive and his Ministers, who were unaware of the exact stipulations of

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the Military Convention, would have been greatly astonished had they known that the Convention provided for a simultaneous evacuation of the Ottoman and British troops, the more so because they were counting upon the moral support which would be afforded by the presence of the latter throughout the operation for reconstructing the Egyptian army and the civil administration. It was evident that if the Turks were to remain in Egypt as long as the British, there would be room for intrigues that would indefinitely prolong the settlement of such intricate and difficult matters. (1)

The result was that immediately after al-Talî al-Kabîr instructions were sent to Dufferin to take the line that there was no longer any need for the Turkish force, since the problem was already solved. (2)

The triumphal entry of Tawfîk into Cairo, accompanied by Wolseley, the Duke of Connaught and Malet at the head of the British forces, was symbolic. It was followed by a declaration of loyalty on the part of many of the hesitants, a parade of the British occupying force, a British monetary gift to Sulṭān Pasha, and other gifts from many notables to the British leaders. There soon ensued the trial of

(1) Ibid.
(2) Ibid, No. 573, F.O. to Dufferin, dated Sept. 15th, 1882.
the Nationalists and the purge of the administration. Then Lord Dufferin came to Egypt on a special mission to lay the foundations of a new regime, and Tawfiq wrote to Gladstone thanking the British Government, on his own behalf and that of the Egyptian people, for restoring order, and expressing his hope that with British advice and guidance, Egypt would attain to prosperity and happiness. (1)

Al-Tal al-Kabîr aroused wide echoes in Europe, as well as affording the British public an opportunity for rejoicing. The Foreign Governments congratulated Queen Victoria; not least the French. Nevertheless all were anxious about Egypt's fate. Giers, though he did not share the anxiety of the French Ambassador over the possible growth of British influence in Egypt, (2) immediately reminded England of the Protocol de Désintéressement, and of the declarations previously made by responsible British politicians. Kalnoky spoke of the re-assembly of the Conference, which had been suspended sine die since August 16th, in order to come to a final settlement of the Egyptian question. (3) In spite of the official compliments of the French Government, the French Republican newspapers spoke contemptuously of the

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(1) **Hoffman**, Vol. 75; No. 10, March 1st, Haymer, dated March 12th, Glad. Pap., Ms. 44,479; Tawfiq to Gladstone, dated Feb. 27th, 1883.

(2) **Russie**, Vol. 267; No. 78, Jaures to Duclerc, dated Sept. 19th, 1882.

(3) **Autriche**, Vol. 536; No. 84, Duchâtel to Duclerc, dated Sept. 20th, 1882.
feebleness of Europe, and Duclerc instructed the French
Charge d'Affaires at Cairo, M. Raindre, to try, in the
ensuing transitional period, and preserve the débris of
French influence as far as possible, to maintain good
relations with the British representatives, as well as with
those of the other Powers, and not to make any promises
that might jeopardise French influence in the future. He
expressed his fervent hope that the Conference would restore
the status quo ante 'Orabi; i.e. that the Anglo-French
condominium, as a political and a financial regime, should
be reconstituted. (1) Yet this was a mid-summer night's
dream; France and Europe at large were confronted with an
accomplished fact; and France had to pay the penalty of
her shifting policies and of the weakness of her Republican
Governments.

Lord Granville spoke of the success not only of England,
but also of Europe, at al-Tall al-Kabir. "If Sir Garnet
Wolseley had suffered any serious check or reverse;" he told
the French Ambassador, (1) "Europe would have been placed in
a difficult and rather humiliating position. On the other
hand, if the conflict had dragged out for a considerable
length of time, difficulties of all kinds would have cropped

(1) Égypte, Vol. 75; No. 49, Duclerc to Raindre, dated
Sept. 12th, 1882.
(2) F.O. 146/2437; repro. No. 1078, Granville to Plunkett,
dated Sept. 13th, 1882.
up and the interests of the country itself would have suffered severely." But that was, of course, far from being the end of the matter. The British press, especially The Standard and The Times were already calling for a protectorate. This seemed to Gladstone worse even than outright annexation, which was also in the air. At the same time it was clear to him that the situation was now such as to necessitate further intervention, and the question was raised whether England should not try and prepare Egypt for self-government. (1) Whatever might be decided on, it was evident that her task would prove far from easy. For it would have to be carried out not only amid continued international complications but also in the face of national opposition.

Thus ended a tense phase of Egyptian history, which from its very beginnings had promised grave consequences. The debts of Isma'il and Sa'id, together with the building of the Suez Canal and the conflicting interests of the Great

Powers in Egypt, had thus finally combined to precipitate foreign intervention and subject the country to alien rule.

This foreign intervention gravely retarded the natural development of the Egyptian renaissance, which was not altogether incomparable with that of Europe in the nineteenth century, conditioned though liberalism and nationalism in Egypt were by religious traditions and Oriental manners and customs, with the result that they were misrepresented in Europe. The European public interested in Egyptian affairs was at first much confused, and soon became divided into two hostile camps: a minority of sympathisers on the one hand, and on the other an overwhelming majority mainly affected by other considerations. The latter group included professional politicians, bondholders of the Egyptian Debt, and others who were convinced, in the manner of Kipling, that East and West could never meet. Unluckily the Agents of the Great Powers and the correspondents of the leading European newspapers, who were not always well-informed, often depicted the state of affairs in Egypt in a misleading fashion. The result was that the European Governments in general failed to recognize the legitimate aspirations of the Egyptians to an equitable form of government, and hence after the events of September 1881 foreign intervention of one sort or another became all but inevitable.
Great Britain had had every chance of guiding instead of suppressing the Egyptian National movement. Ever since Bonaparte's expedition the rulers of Egypt had shown marked awe of British power. Muḥammad ʿAlī, ʿAbbās and Iṣmāʿīl were all in turn obsessed by the nightmare of a British occupation, to avoid which they did all they could to win British good will. The Egyptian people, on the other hand, were in general better disposed towards the British than towards any other European race. For the British had proved the least given to usury and exploitation, and by their reserve could not but win the respect of the natives, who had even expected "al-Wilson" (as Rivers Wilson was commonly called) to perform the miracles of Moses for their benefit, by lessening their misery and limiting the power of their Pharaoh. ʿOrābī himself pinned all his faith to an Englishman, and had high hopes of gaining the sympathy of both Gladstone and the British people. Unfortunately, however, the Liberal Cabinet received inconsistent reports from Cairo, while its own members were not all of one mind. Faced as it was, therefore, with the fluctuations of French policy, it yielded to the pressure of public opinion and in the end resorted to military occupation.

Thus was Great Britain enlisted in the support of a ruler, who although Malet might represent him as deserving
of all sympathy and encouragement, had in fact by his weakness and despotic propensities earned the contempt and hatred of his people. Had Great Britain rather recognized and guided Egyptian Nationalism, the outcome might have been very different. Anglo-Egyptian relations might have been saved many years of pain and perplexity; and there might never have been an Anglo-Egyptian "problem" at all.
APPENDIX I (1)

The Instructions given to Darwish Pasha


Art. II. La susdite mission sera composée de différentes classes de personnes ayant pour chef Son Exc. Dervish Pacha. Il est nécessaire que dans le personnel de la mission il y ait des officiers d'État Major parmi les plus capables dont les fonctions et les devoirs seront ceux de constater: 1° quels sont les points fortifiés de l'Egypte; 2°, si dans le cas de l'entrée des flottes étrangères dans le port d'Alexandrie il y a ou non des fortifications capables de repousser l'agression; 3° Quel est le meilleur moyen d'expédier

(1) F.O. 78/3387; incl. in Dufferin's No. 535 Conf. dated July 2nd, 1882, to F.O.
des troupes dans le cas qu'une telle nécessité tiendrait à surgir; 4e Comment le corps expéditionnaire pourrait être garanti de l'agression en cas de résistance et enfin de rapporter tous les jours le résultat de leurs observations à leur chef Son Exc. Dervish Pacha.

Art. III: Son Exc. Dervish Pacha en arrivant en Égypte aura une entrevue avec le Khédive et recevra les Chefs et Notables de l'Égypte. Pendant cette entrevue il leur dira dans un langage approprié à la circonstance que leur obéissance au St. Caliphat ne saurait qu'être avantageuse à leur pays et propre à assurer leur salut et prospérité et que sa mission n'ayait que ce but et requiert leur assistance.

Art. IV: Il persuadera aussi les Ulémas et les Notables, et lorsqu'il constatera que les relations entre Arabi Pacha et le Khédive ne sont pas mauvaises seulement en apparence d'une manière simulée, mais qu'il existe entre eux une dissidence réelle qui pourrait être cependant conciliée, il devra travailler pour en affectuer la conciliation. Cependant si cela n'est pas possible, il devra déclarer d'une manière catégorique, aux officiers de l'armée, qu'en conformité des ordres de Sa Majesté
Impériale, il assume la direction du Ministère de la Guerre pour un certain temps afin d'assurer la tranquillité publique. En cas que tous les officiers y acquiescent, il devra immédiatement se mettre à la tête des affaires en plaçant les officiers de sa mission provisoirement dans des postes où ils puissent remplir leurs fonctions. Il constatera alors qui sont les auteurs de tous ces troubles et les fera arrêter l'un après l'autre, de même qu'en vue de la tranquillité publique, il expédiera Arabi Pacha à Constantinople.

Art. V. Son Exc. Dervish Pacha n'agira que d'accord avec le personnel de sa mission. Dans le cas qu'il trouve à propos de destituer un ou tous les ministres du Khédive, il aura la permission et le pouvoir de le faire immédiatement si la Porte a été déjà prévenue. Cependant, pour procéder à de pareilles mesures, il faut au préalable qu'il acquière un ascendant incontesté, vu des devoirs de la mission c'est aussi de constater quelle est la source des troubles actuels et qui en sont les fauteurs.

Art. VI: Il s'empressera d'abouiller la chambre des Notables, si cela est possible, et il fera punir, après jugement, ceux qui ont causé la révolte. Quoique les privilèges de l'Égypte aient été accordés avec les concours des
étrangers. Son Exc. le chef de la mission considérant que le Sublime Porte a toujours le pouvoir de les annuler ou de les modifier, toutes les fois qu'il trouvera qu'un de ces privilèges a besoin d'être modifié ou réformé, en informera par télégramme la Sublime Porte, mais avant de rapporter ainsi l'opportunité de la modification qu'il croirait à propos de proposer il devra obtenir le consentement unanime des membres de sa mission.

Art VIII: Le chef de la mission de même qu'il aura le pouvoir de correspondre avec tous les directeurs des Départements de l'Egypte, est également tenu d'assister à la délibération de toutes les affaires petites ou grandes auprès du Khédive ......

Art X: Le devoir principal de la mission c'est de rétablir la confiance du contrôle ainsi que de la tranquillité de l'Egypte, et de se rendre compte, une à une, des plaintes des Consuls. Il a plein pouvoir de correspondre sur toutes choses avec les Consuls Etrangers soit que cela concerne leur personne ou leurs fonctions et dans le cas qu'il lui arrive de tomber en désaccord avec un des Consuls, il en enverra un rapport détaillé à la Sublime Porte.

Art XI: Son Exc. Dervish Pacha peut bien quand il le croit à propos et que le cas et les circonstances l'exigent
modifier ou bien renforcer ses pouvoirs, mais il ne le pourra jamais en outrêpasser les limites. Lorsqu'il aura constaté qu'il ne pourra pas réussir dans sa mission sans l'expédition de troupes, il est tenu de réunir immédiatement le personnel de sa mission pour établir avec eux quel est le montant de troupes à requérir, d'où devrait on le faire marcher; cette mesure pourraient elle ou non causer une révolte et augmenter l'anxiété de la publique, et enfin tous les détails qui concernent un mouvement militaire.

Art. XII: Il est naturel qu'auessi longtemps que les flottes étrangères se trouvent dans les eaux de l'Egypte elle ne puisse pas être délivrée des intrigues étrangères, c'est pourquoi il devra recommander la prohibition du part d'armes aux habitants et aux particuliers en général, et il devra aussi intimer à tous les fonctionnaires du Caire et d'Alexandrie la nécessité d'avoir l'œil ouvert sur tout acte des étrangers et d'agir avec beaucoup de circonspection.

Art. XIII: Tout autant que les flottes étrangères y sont présentes, il ne faudrait pas donner motif aux Consuls à une correspondance officielle, seulement en vue de créer une rivalité et de s'attacher les Consuls de l'Allemagne, d'Autriche et d'Italie; il faudra en apparence les inviter à des délibérations non-importantes, et dans le cas qu'ils donnent un conseil de promettre qu'on le prendrait en considération.
Art XIV: Vu des devoirs de la mission c'est aussi d'entrer en correspondance avec les Consuls dont les flottes se trouvent dans les eaux de l'Egypte, dans le cas où la tranquillité serait rétablie et l'object de la mission accomplie pour demander que les flottes soient elcignées......
Appendix II

The Russian Circular on the Conference

St. Petersburg, le 18/30 Juin, 1882.

(1) Avant tout maintien du concert européen, aucune solution ne doit procéder que de lui.

(2) Autant que possible rétablir et consolider le status quo.

(3) Il est désirable que pour y arriver l'action morale suffise - En pareil cas, les résultats devraient en être registrés par la Conférence de manière à donner une nouvelle confirmation européenne au droit public de l'Égypte.

(4) Si elle ne suffit pas, le concert des Puissances doit seul prononcer sur les mesures à prendre; elles ne doivent être exécutées qu'en vertu de son autorité et sous son contrôle.

(5) Si la Porte insiste à ne pas participer à la Conférence, les Puissances devraient s'entendre sur le meilleur moyen de lui faire accepter leurs décisions.

(6) Si une intervention matérielle est indispensable, la plus légale et la moins dangereuse serait du Sultan, mais en vertu d'une délégation de l'Europe et avec les garanties nécessaires pour que le but assigné ne soit pas dépassé.

(7) Si le Sultan s'y refuse et que l'Angleterre et la France se croient obligées d'agir, soit collectivement soit isolement, ce devrait être également après entente avec les Puissances, par leur délégation, et avec un programme nettement défini. - Le
précédent de l'intervention militaire de la France en Syrie pourrait être consulté. Les Puissances pourraient faire accompagner l'expédition par des commissaires spéciaux.

(8) Quant au but final de l'intervention, il devrait être le rétablissement du status quo, mais ce status quo a des inconvenients révélés par l'expérience : peut-être jugera-t-on nécessaire de le modifier sur quelques points si rattachant principalement à la position du gouvernement égyptien vis-à-vis des gouvernements étrangers et les actes par lesquels il s'est engagé. En admettant en principe l'obligation de respecter ces engagements contractés on peut reconnaître l'opportunité d'y rapporter des modifications consultées de part et d'autre.

Les inconvenients du contrôle exclusif anglo-français ont été revelés par les faits - Vouloir les perpetuer par la force serait faire une course douteuse - Peut-être trouvera-t-on possible et justé de donner un caractère non-exclusif mais international à ce contrôle - Il acquerrait ainsi plus d'autorité morale et plus de garanties contre les abus personnels des agents.

La commission de liquidation et les tribunaux mixtes ont ce caractère international et fonctionnent bien.

Peut-être aussi trouvera-t-on juste de restringre ce contrôle dans les limites, qui garantissent les intêrets étrangers, sans constituer une ingérence dans l'administration
du pays.

Toutes ces questions devraient faire l'objet d'une discussion détaillée en Conférence.

(1) F.O. 141/152; Supplémentary Annex to No. 217 from F.O. to Thornton dated July 6th, 1882.
The Proposed Military Convention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original British proposals</th>
<th>Original Turkish counter proposals</th>
<th>Text as accepted by the Ottoman delegates</th>
<th>Modifications subsequently suggested it is to be presumed by H. Imp. Majesty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The army of Egypt having revolted against the authority of H.H. the Khedive, as established under the Firmans of H.M. the Sultan, and the Treaties existing between the Sublime Porte and other Powers; and H.M. the Queen having resolved to cooperate with His Majesty in the suppression of the rebellion and the re-establishment of order, their said Majesties have seen fit to conclude a convention for the purpose, and have named as their plenipotentiaries ...... (names) ...........

Article I

His Imperial Majesty the Sultan shall furnish a force of men of all arms, ranks and services successivement, et selon les besoins, sur les

L'armée d'Égypte s'étant revolée contre l'autorité du Khédive, établi par les Firmans de S.M. Imp. le Sultan, et les Traites existant entre la Sublime Porte et les autres Puissances, S.M. Brit. ayant résolu, d'accord avec S.M. le Sultan, de réprimer cette révolté, et de rétablir l'ordre en Égypte, Leurs dites Majestés ont décidé de conclure une Convention Militaire et ont nommé à cet effet .......

Article I

Le Gouv. Imp. Ottoman enverra successivement, et selon les besoins, sur les

Le Gouv. Imp. Ottoman, ayant l'intention d'envoyer un corps d'armée en Égypte
complete, with supplies of ammunition, food and transport to co-operate with the force now being despatched to Egypt by Her M. and shall maintain the same complete in all respects as long as it shall remain in Egypt. Should His Imp. M. desire at any time to increase his force, it shall be the subject of further agreement between the High Contracting Parties.

**Article II**

It being desirable that the place at which the Turkish troops would land should be determined beforehand, it is agreed that they shall disembark: (Ad Referendum de part et d'autre)
Article III

As it is absolutely necessary that the operations to be undertaken should be under one direction, it is agreed that the Turkish troops after disembarkation shall make no movements or disposition of any part of the troops without the previous assent of the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces.

_article IV_

As soon as the occasion for which the troops of Her M. and of the Sultan have been despatched to Egypt is passed, the troops of both the High Contracting Powers shall evacuate the country. The

Article III

Le Commandants-en-chef, des deux corps d'armée, s'entendront, au préalable, sur les mouvements et opérations militaires des troupes Imp. Ott. (Projet intermédiaire près ad referendum)

...toutefois les deux corps d'armée devant opérer séparément en cas ou le Commandant-en-chef Ott. viendrait à constater que ses troupes ne se trouvent pas en nombre suffisant dans les localités occupées par elles, il arrêtera les opérations militaires jusqu'à ce qu'il reçoit les renforts nécessaires.

_article IV_

Aussitôt que les motifs qui ont provoqué les mesures militaires en Egypte auront cessé d'exister, l'évacuation des troupes respectives aura lieu. Toutefois les forces Ott. auront la faculté, s'il est jugé nécessaire, de prolonger leur séjour en Egypte, à la suite d'une entente entre
evacuation by the Turkish forces shall be simultaneous with that of the British forces.

**Article V**

In order to facilitate the communications between the two armies, it is agreed that an English officer of rank shall be attached as Commissioner to the head-quarters of the Turkish forces.

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