POLITICS AND THE STATE IN PAKISTAN

1947 - 1975

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THE ABSTRACT

The aim of the thesis is to locate the origins and discuss the development of the modern state in Pakistan. The subject is examined from two perspectives: a) the state's development from colonial times as a structural relationship between economic power and public authority; b) the state as a focus of the power struggle between various groups and classes. In other words, this approach seeks to analyse the Pakistan state both as a product and initiator of capitalist development, and as a structure which, while representing the interests of the ruling classes, enjoys a position of relative autonomy.

In the thesis, the evolution of the Pakistan state has been traced from colonial times through the early post-independence period to the populist phase of the 1970s. There is considerable continuity in the locus of power between these three periods. At the same time, however, new class alignments emerged after the ending of formal British control, and the mode of operation of the state changed considerably, particularly as a result of efforts to promote 'modernization' through agricultural and industrial development. These changes produced new contradictions between regions and between classes. In the 1970s, a populist attempt to overcome these contradictions led to an acceleration of the trend towards the centralization of state power. The first part of the thesis therefore examines each of the three periods in turn, and attempts to show the development of the state in Pakistan and its relationship to society.

The second part of the thesis moves from the macro to the micro-level, and sets out to show how the interaction of state and society within the framework of 'modernization' produces differing patterns of district politics. Two districts of Punjab are used as case studies to illustrate the operation of the 'state-in-the-field'. Faisalabad is taken as an example of a 'developed' district, and Attock of an underdeveloped. In this way the thesis attempts to take an integrated view of the politics of the Centre and Periphery in Pakistan.
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I would like to refer to the PPP's underlying structural continuity. I present a phenomenology of change which derives its meaning from the popular phase of the PPP movement at the beginning of the 1970s. Historically, the pre- and post-independence periods and the context. I shall trace the process of change both in institutional and spatial to them.

As the organizing principle of capital has been that of independence of change processes of change, the institutional evolution of the state in British India in Pakistan a developmental role defined in terms of a planned resource-input process of change, the institutional continuity of the state from the colonial period, the degree and kind of the transformation on the eve of independence emerges as an important determinant of the subsequent operations of capital. Or for that matter in the class basis of the state?

How far can the question of regime change, for example, from between these two aspects of change in Pakistan's short history.

If we look at the institutional continuity of the Pakistan state from the operations of capital, or for that matter in the class basis of the state, it has passed through various phases of rapid industrial and agricultural development which have brought about new classes and groups in the society. My interest lies essentially in the relationships between these two aspects of change in Pakistan's short history.
role in the anti-Ayub and the 1970 election campaigns and its initial years in power as containing the potential of a mass movement. For me then the question is what was the nature of the persisting tension between the Bhutto government on the one hand and the 'dominant' classes of Pakistan i.e. the landlords, the bourgeoisie and the middle classes, on the other. It will be argued that the state in Pakistan enjoys a potentially autonomous position vis-a-vis the classes and is thus quite capable of defusing such radical movements as the PPP. By the end of 1975, the PPP had lost its movement character and had been effectively absorbed in the traditional power structure of the country. I shall therefore limit my observations upto 1975 when the change came to a virtual halt.

In spatial terms, the differential pattern of developmental activity in various localities has brought about a segmental model of political ecology in the country. I shall trace the structural aspects of the state authority in the 'field' and relate it to the society both in developmental and under-developmental contexts. Together they represent the totality of the state action in its various manifestations. It will be argued that the mode of organisation of the political conflict at the local level can be defined in terms of capital's differential penetration and the corresponding patterns of authority emerging from the state's regulatory activity.
CHAPTER 1
TOWARDS A MODEL OF THE STATE IN THE THIRD WORLD

Introduction

In the present chapter we shall discuss the contemporary theoretical formulations dealing with the political life of societies with a view to evolving a model of the State in the Third World. We shall first look at the general approaches to the conceptualization of the state and then try to specify certain elements which make up the authority structures of the Third World states in the historical context of the post-war era. In the course of our discussion we shall argue in favour of a particular set of variables for the analysis of countries like Pakistan.

The location of structural presence of the state in a changing society is highly problematic. Most modernization theory focuses on structural complexity as being the key variable. It includes complexity in production and marketing, geographical expansion, increased efficiency and relative openness of transactional activity, multiplex group references of individuals leading to a 'groupist' feeling, and 'an optimum level of differentiation, such that dysfunctional consequences are minimized' and structures are 'structurally linked'. State-building therefore becomes a logical necessity, conceived in terms of increasing the organisational efficiency of bureaucracy to maintain political order. What it does not conceptualize is the nature of this authority, i.e. in whose favour it is exercised and how and why. The answer to the question of end-purpose of the use of state authority is often sought in the teleological concern of the 'agents of modernization' symbolized by the state itself. Not only that the foundation of political power is thereby equated with the state apparatus, but the latter is also given a potentially modernizing role in its mode of operation on the so-called traditional society. Both state and society are thereby conceived as monolithic entities. In other words the class character of the state is completely
ignored. Indeed the existing authority structures are sanctified through a heightened concern with political stability and order. The issue of inhibitive constraints over people's capacity for organised political participation is expediently put aside.

The origins of this concern with authority-building can be located in post-liberal democratic thought. The classical theory of liberal democracy was based essentially on the Enlightenment belief in man's rational faculties. It visualized men as political animals deserving equal rights to influence political decisions. J. S. Mill considered public participation in the political process as morally desirable. However, by the turn of the present century, political mobilization of the general masses was increasingly distrusted. Democratic theory was re-cast in terms of a leadership responsible for maintenance of order in the civil society. The representative institutions were, in Mosca's words, 'the expression of a social influence and a social authority'. Weber on his part favoured the 'Plebiscitarian leader-democracy' whereby the charismatic leader infuses the aims and mobility into the bureaucratic structures of the modern society; he considers it politics with a calling.

In this way, theoretical formulations of democracy moved away from the participatory models towards what Michels called the 'Iron Law of Oligarchy', which he considered to be a structural constant of all organised societies.

In the post-war era, C. Wright Mills formulated the model of potential power in America based on 'institutional proximity', i.e. the interchange of 'commanding roles' between individuals 'at the top of one dominant institutional order with those in other.' Thus real power is concentrated in a few history-making hands, belonging to the corporate community, the military establishment and the political directorate. In this model, only the cognisable authority structures are taken into consideration while the real exercise of power in terms of articulation of the interests of various classes and groups is absent. However,
subsequently, certain studies of community power emerged which took up these issues. They followed two distinct approaches: a) the reputational approach like that of Floyd Hunter, generally leading to a model of a pyramidal structure of power; b) the decision-making approach like that of Robert Dahl, establishing the presence of a popularly-based articulation system of the American government. According to this 'all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of making decision.' There exists therefore a consensus on fundamentals between various social structures, e.g. family, church, business and government.

These approaches, especially Dahl's pluralist theory, elaborate the elite bargaining process to the generic concept of politics itself. Generally the focus is on the dominant individuals who are already in control of the legislative committees, bureaucratic institutions and interest groups, and who thus manipulate public support in favour of their own policies. The basis of their power is either unexplained or justified in terms of their political expertise as against the general population which is considered apolitical due to primate concerns of daily life such as family, education and social commitments. No reference to structural constraints over issue-formation and public participation is found. Indeed, the selection of issues in these studies depends heavily on their empirical verifiability and quantifiability, and not on their political significance, a fact which renders them subservient to their respective research methodologies.

The elite approach to political power is reflected in most of the literature on modernization. Thus, the Western educated elites in the Afro-Asian countries are accredited for creating nations out of tribes. After this elite atrophied, along with their political parties, the military and bureaucratic elites preserved the unity of these societies. This overwhelming concern with stability has generally led to adoption of praetorian models for the developing societies.
political crisis is understood to be essentially an elite crisis which is therefore to be resolved at that level. It warrants against the 'unregulated admission of all groups to nearly equal participation'\textsuperscript{14}. In view of the likely naked conflict between social forces a transitional tutelary phase is prescribed.\textsuperscript{15} According to this view, people are still dominated by tradition; therefore the state must take the initiative for modernizing the society.\textsuperscript{16} This approach grossly underestimates the way in which the authority structures of the government prevent social grievances from becoming overt issues. In fact in a typical Third World country an election campaign tends to assume the character of a movement precisely because that is the only opportunity for the people to give vent to their suppressed grievances.

The modernization theory conceptualizes the state in terms of structural functionalism based on a system model. While pursuing a multi-disciplinary approach it considers the state as a political expression of the national society, and therefore focuses on the performance of public institutions in keeping the social fabric intact. The specificity of political activity is lost in the way stress is laid on the integration and continuity of the social order as a whole.\textsuperscript{17} According to this approach, the phenomenon of change can be explained as a function of the system itself, without special regard to the particular historical contexts of individual societies. It does not take into account the fact that development of productive forces in the recent centuries has differentially infused various states with new economic and administrative functions which are clearly outside the purview of the pre-modern states. Moreover, the historical time of each society's integration into the world economy and the precise nature of this integration are crucial variables for understanding the exact make-up of forces impinging on the state. For example, the Western states consolidated themselves at a time when the world economy was relatively much less integrated and therefore had a much less inhibiting influence over their growth than
in the case of contemporary Third World states, which have to operate according to the rules of the game set in the earlier periods.

Apart from this time dimension, the world capitalist economy has a space dimension as well. It is 'external' to the territorial state, in the sense that its operations transcend the national boundaries. By contrast most modernization theory is based on the analytical autonomy of the state, without taking into consideration this external variable as a formative factor. Of course certain exceptions to this general pattern stand out, e.g. Rigg's model of exo/prismatic and endo/prismatic societies and Kautsky's model of modernization from within and modernization from without. But their dichotomous approaches remain analytically marginal to their theoretical frameworks which are firmly set within autonomist-classificatory explanations of development. We shall argue in Section I, that the global expansion of capitalism has incorporated all the societies and has radically changed the character of states everywhere, and that therefore we must focus on specific patterns of relationship between capital and state.

The second section deals with the issue of structural relevance of the state for various classes in a Third World society. In it we shall discuss both the mechanism for articulation of the class interests and the way the conflicting demands of these classes are reflected in the internal differentiation of the state. Unfortunately, the Third World state has not been usually understood in this way. Instead it is conceived in terms of tradition/modernity dichotomy. Thus, in a perceived contradiction with the historical West where modernization looks to be a self-propelling process, the political factor in the contemporary Third World itself is considered to be the initiator of modernization. In this way, the holders of the state power, with the bureaucracy at its centre, are conceived as the modernizing elite battling with the traditional elite in their respective countries. This leads to a situation of 'fossilized conflict' between the two, which is considered the malady of the Third World today. According to this approach,
the real conflict revolves around the issue of capturing state power. However, no analysis of the nature and composition of this power is found in this theory. What lies at the heart of the problem is the relationship between the state, with its monopoly over the use of force, and the social classes which extend their compliance willingly or grudgingly as the case may be, or alternatively refuse to do so in certain circumstances with a view to overthrow it.

Outside the mainstream of modernization theory Huntington has taken up the question of political change in the Third World in terms of social control and maintenance of the existing order. He finds a situation of political decay and not of political development being typical of the so-called developing countries. According to him this phenomenon is rooted in the inadequacy, and relatively slow emergence of modern institutions. Consequently, he lays great stress on increasing the governing capacity of the governments in the Third World. However, in doing so he considers the state as being coterminous with the state apparatus. He sees organisational maturity as the final goal of political modernization. The rationale is that the modern bureaucratic apparatus of the Third World state, having typically descended from the colonial system, would keep the social fabric of the society intact.

Such a view implies that the state is a force operating on society from outside. When an individual is recruited to a government position the organisational ethos of the state bureaucracy is supposed to govern his behaviour, symbolizing a complete break with the 'traditional' society. Also, this approach conceives the role of state only in negative terms, i.e. as a controlling body and not in its positive role as articulator of class interests. Huntington, therefore, shares with other modernization theorists a dichotomous conception of state and society whereby the former acquires the status of a reified structure removed from, and operating upon, the latter. As we shall argue, the patterns of class support of a state are directly related to the mode of organization and operation of its authority.
The relationship between class and state therefore needs to be studied in the context of their two-way interaction at the point of real exercise of authority, i.e. the local level. This is the subject of the third section of this chapter. The shifts in the class bases of the state are the direct outcome of changes within and between the classes as a result of new economic and social inputs in the society. Due to various factors related to supply structures of capital and labour, the pattern of development remains highly differentiated within a country. This leads to the emergence of different modes of existence for various classes, and, in their interaction with the state, to the emergence of different patterns of authority in different localities. The aggregate of these interacting patterns forms the state itself. In other words a class does not act in unison, nor does the state. The individuals and groups of certain classes operate at the local level, where they meet certain members of the local machinery of the centralized state and together bring about certain patterns of authority. The latter administers its policies of resource allocation, labour supply, provision of investment opportunities and other forms of economic and political regulation. In view of the highly heterogenous class structures of the Third World societies, not least-as we shall discuss - because of the differential impact of modernization, these local patterns of authority often represent quite different, even contradictory, social processes. Together they act as constituent parts of the social whole and shape the direction of political events as well as give a structural form to the state-in-action.

Unfortunately, the integrationist bias of the development theory has led to a common tendency to gloss over these structural differences between regions, and relies on aggregate data. It is argued that we must take into consideration the complexity of politico-economic processes within the locality and the way these bring about specific class and group pressures on the provincial and national level politics. Indeed, the locality is the most useful unit of social space to measure the changing relationship...
with the local self-government and rural development respectively. It will be argued that the district administration inhibits the growth of mass participation in almost every field of public activity. All developmental activity, therefore, ends up serving the already privileged individuals and groups in the locality. This has been possible because the bureaucratic polity of Pakistan has constantly refused to allow a structural role to the masses in a specifically political sense.

Having outlined the state's monopolistic hold over political initiative, we shall then move on to social and economic changes, in the locality in an overall developmental context. Therefore, the final section deals with the changing structural relationships at the grassroots level in Pakistan at the end of the 'decade of development' under Ayub. First, we shall study the emerging pattern of horizontal alliances through the expanding rural-urban linkages, leading to 'class' politics. Then we shall discuss the way the new politics was manifested through the ideological conflict between Islam and Socialism. Our focus will be on the role of Islam in an urban milieu where it has symbolized the politics of reaction against the progressive forces. Finally, we shall try to locate the origins of the emergent political stratum, responsible for mobilizing the masses against the statist parties and groups, persecuted at the hands of the district administration in one form or the other.

Section 1: The District Administration.

We have already discussed the origins of the colonial state in India and the emergence of the district as the unit of territorial administration of land revenue. In this section, we shall outline some structural aspects of district administration, and its increasingly complex dealings with other public agencies. It is argued that the role of various departments in the onward march of modernization is more controversial than appears at first glance. The significance of local
between the primary social structures and the secondary organisations.

In the final section we shall deal with the practical issues of research related to the project in hand. First of all, the potentialities of our theoretical framework for application to Pakistan will be considered. This will be followed by a review of the resource material and other relevant literature on Pakistan. Finally, we shall discuss the issues of organisation of the present thesis and chart out a plan in that perspective.

Section 1: Capital and State

The thesis of the present section is that the modern state is the most effective channel through which capital is regulated, accumulated and realized. As such, it is an organic part of the capitalist system itself, both in the developed and underdeveloped countries. A study of the state in the Third World, has to take into account the specific form of capitalism in these societies, even where indigenous capital has not developed and only Western capital is operative. In other words, this state is the specific form of organisation of what Amin calls peripheral capitalism. Its structure has most typically descended from the colonial state apparatus which itself was based on the metropolitan state. The emergence of the state in the Third World can therefore be located in a) the emergence of capitalism and the modern state in the West, and b) the structure of peripheral capitalism.

FIGURE
State and Capital

In this figure:

A = Central capitalism          B = State in the Capitalist Society
C = Peripheral capitalism       D = State in the Third World
It is clear that capital (A) enjoys the status of the prime mover, operating on the other instances (B, C and D). In this process, it undergoes considerable change itself because of various patterns of resistance by these instances. For each subsequent level the previous instances act jointly, thereby bringing forth a hierarchy of determinants, while at the same time producing various patterns of resistance and adjustment from the other end. The following lines of interaction can be located:

2. B-C, B-D
3. C-D

Thus, A, B and C together are involved in shaping the structure of the state in the Third World. In this section we shall discuss a) the way the state in capitalist society emerged as an integral part of capital, and b) the way the state in the Third World emerged as a result of the combined operations of the metropolitan state and world capitalism.

**State in the Capitalist Society**

The modern state in the capitalist societies of the West emerged in the 15th and 16th centuries. Its juridico-political structure reflected the changing relations of production as characterized by the displacement of peasant labourers from the land. It thus institutionalized the new wage relationship between the producers and non-producers by making both of them juridical subjects. On the one hand it robbed the dominant class of its direct ruling capacity; on the other hand it freed labour from the feudal bondage. It brought about an 'objective structure of the labour process' by establishing a homology between the relations of property and of real appropriation.

The modern state's 'objectivity' rested essentially on a source of legitimacy not directly identifiable with any one individual, group or class. In other words, it was based on popular sovereignty, whereby,
The people is itself erected as a principle of determination of the state, not as composed of agents of production distributed in social classes but as an accumulation of individual-citizens. Thus, a juridical equality underlined the new subordination to the state. In other words, the legitimacy of the new state was based on its claim to rule in the interest of the society as a whole. It eliminated the old forms of social and political hierarchies based on religious/ethnic claims. The previous (feudal) state's operational limits effectively ended where the suzerainty of local landlords started, a fact often concealed under the domineering style of the great empires. However, the old stratification system acquired a new basis in property relations as sanctioned by the new bourgeois state. The emergence of a prototype capitalist state from the 15th to 17th centuries, the so-called absolutist state, effected a transition from feudalism to capitalism long before the bourgeoisie actually took control of it. This state of transition emerged as a centralized institution under strong monarchs, and expressed the exclusive and 'strictly public dominance', in short sovereignty, over a territorial entity.

As the representation of the capitalist class in the state increased thereby modifying its absolutism, it assumed a relatively non-interventionist role vis-a-vis the market, especially in England. The whole ideology of laissez faire was rooted in the need of private capitalism to limit the exercise of state power to the basic function of reproduction and maintenance of the existing system of capital formation and labour supply. However, as there emerged monopoly capitalism at the turn of this century direct state regulation has been increasingly employed in the service of this basic function, adding the element of conscious planning and, in the face of the emergent counter-system of communism, careful sectoral allocation of resources as well. In this sense, the modern state is an 'economic reproduction institution.' As such, it reflects the 'structural dominance of capital' on the one hand and
the structural dependence of wage labour on the other.\textsuperscript{29}

Before we continue with the discussion of modern state, we must outline our understanding of capitalism as it defines this state. For Marx, capitalism is characterized primarily by commodity production, i.e. production for market more than for use. It therefore presupposes the existence of an exchange-market where commodities can be bought and sold, including the 'productive' commodity, the labour.\textsuperscript{30} For capitalist production to take place, therefore the 'freeing' of (peasant) labour from its bondage to the erstwhile feudal owners of land which was the only means of production, was the crucial pre-requisite in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. For example, the pre-capitalist political system of England comprising both the military power and legal authority, brought about the preconditions for the emergence of capitalism in the form of accumulated surplus from the woollen industry as well as from the increased ground-rent enjoyed by the landlords.\textsuperscript{31}

According to Dobb, subsistence economy instead of production for the market, and the direct, 'compulsory' mode of extraction of surplus from the peasant-producers, instead of exploitation through the market mechanism were the basic features of 'feudalism. The feudal state, in turn was characterized by 'political decentralization' in the form of local overlordships.\textsuperscript{32} For Anderson this 'parcellization of sovereignty' provided the structural base for feudalism.\textsuperscript{33} Both internal and external factors have been put forward as possible explanations for the dissolution of this feudal social order.\textsuperscript{34} Although petty commodity trade existed in other areas of the world, the money thus accumulated did not always lead to capital formation, because the surplus was not used to bring about agricultural or industrial innovations through dispossessing labour of its means of production and then buying its productive power.\textsuperscript{35} This could not be achieved in the absence of a strong central authority which would centralize the surplus and overpower the local rulerships of landlords over peasants.\textsuperscript{36} In England and Western Europe of the 16th
century, the emergent 'absolutist' state did exactly this, i.e. eliminated the local sovereignties, turned the labouring classes into its own subjects and assumed the functions of an organiser and unifier of capital under free enterprise. By thus freeing labour from feudal obligations, and commodifying it, as well as objectifying the rule of law, it helped bring about a pattern of generalized commodity production. In other words, it became an organising principle of the whole process of accumulation of capital, over and above the individual capitalist's lust for profit.

There emerge periodic realization crises owing to lack of a perfect conjunction of various factors like supply of labour, means of production and the demand structure of the market. In consequence, overproduction and/or underconsumption can set in. These crises, in the form of bankruptcies, devaluation of assets, unemployment, etc. strain the resources of the capitalist system and its organising principle, the state, leading to adoption of counter-measures. The new strategies include investment in new spheres of activity, creation of new social needs, controlling the rate of the reproduction of labour or, what is most relevant for our present purposes, expanding geographically. 37

The spatial context of capital's expansion involves the problems of realization of value. The larger the circuit, the greater is the movement of commodities from factory to market and greater is the number of non-producing intermediaries involved, i.e. the bankers, dealers, inspectors, evaluators, etc. Capitalists are concerned about reducing both cost and time of transport and communication which may eat into their profits and can be lost in absence of a centralized authority structure to secure its safe turn-over. This factor defines the requisite function of the modern state as a regulator of market forces. This state therefore subordinates individual or group interests to the 'active hegemony of the directive and dominant group, thus abolishing certain outmoded autonomies.' 38 In as much as regulation of transport and communications eludes the financial capacity of individual firms and involves maintaining the inter-group and inter-personal relations at a workable level, the modern state is indispensable for the development of the forces of production. In this process the imperative to accumulate
surplus implies the imperative to overcome spatial barriers. In view of capital's generalized commitment to speeding up the velocity of its own circulation, i.e. the structural need to accumulate capital, there emerges first the national market directly controlled by the state and then an international credit system sanctioned by the authority of the parent states of the expansive capital.

One way of securing the capital's interests abroad has been the territorial expansion of the state itself in the form of colonial rule. This happened when a foreign state either refused to act as agent for penetration of capital or lacked the capacity to carry out this function. Alternatively, the foreign states were coerced into making suitable changes in their authority structures by the sheer logic of superior productive forces represented by capitalist enterprise. The structure of the colonial state in turn is to be analysed in terms of functions required by that capital. The metropolitan state brought about an institutional re-arrangement in colonial societies based on its own model. Therefore there took place that grand process of 'export of institutions' in the form of transplantation of the legalized patterns of politico-administrative behaviour of the metropolitan countries to the colonial societies; also this process lent the character of constitutionality to the colonial state. In this way it helped bring about a 'legitimate' international order of constitutional states, with an inherent function of breaking down the political frontiers between world capitalism and territorial society. Thus it can be maintained that capital and state have grown together in the modern world.

We can now summarize our observations about the modern state in relation to the capitalist world by using a six-fold division of its functions set out by Robin Murray.
1. Guaranteeing of property rights, backed by forces of law, the police and the armed forces;
2. Economic liberalization through the abolition of restriction on the movement of goods, money or people;
3. Economic orchestration, i.e., planning and regulation of the productive circuit itself;
4. Provision of key inputs of production i.e. labour, land, capital, technology and infrastructure;
5. Intervention for social consensus, 'to mollify the most disruptive effects on and exploitation of non-capitalist classes';
6. Management of the external relations of the capitalist system.

Capital and State in the Third World

As we have noted the process of capital accumulation has a structural tendency to expand to newer regions. Many issues have arisen about the precise mechanism of capitalism's dependence on external markets as well as on external sources of cheap labour and raw material. Rosa Luxemburg saw the destruction of the 'natural economies' of the non-capitalist world at the hands of the Euro-centric capitalism almost as a canonical necessity of the accumulation process. By so doing, capital gains access to productive forces like minerals and agricultural land, liberates (peasant) labour from bondage to landlords and introduces a commodity economy in these societies. The classical Marxist view in general ascribed a progressive role to capitalism as it breaks open the pre-capitalist societies and releases their productive forces, as it did historically in the West. However, in the post-war era, such a view has been increasingly described as a myth. The new approach sees capitalism as a world force which, at the same time that it developed the West, underdeveloped the rest of the world.
For Baran for example the crucial factor in the process of capital's expansion abroad is the need for realization of surplus value. Following Rosa Luxemburg, he maintains that there is a chronic problem of lack of demand for manufactured goods at home; but this forces capital to penetrate the 'natural economies' and underdevelop them by extracting their surplus. This process has been going on since the days of mercantilist capitalism and has brought about a capitalist order everywhere. Frank elaborates this point in the historical context of Latin America. While largely ignoring the definitional problems of capitalism, he posits that it has brought about a bipolar system of metropolitan centre and peripheral satellites whereby economic surplus is expropriated from the latter by the former. This relationship is also operative internally, i.e., between the national metropolis and provinces and between city and countryside etc. Underdevelopment is generated therefore by economic development itself and is not due to the survival of archaic institutions as maintained by certain modernization and even Marxist theorists who stress the dual structure of the underdeveloped economies, composed of modern and traditional sectors. The Third World, then was very much a part of the capitalist system-although at the wrong end - from the moment capitalism emerged on a world scale in the 15th and 16th centuries. The Third World states therefore are mere 'lumpenstates' functioning as effective instruments of the lumpen bourgeoisie's policy of lumpen development.

A whole generation of writers from Latin America has elaborated this 'dependency' thesis in an attempt to explain how the 'satellites' are linked to investment and decision-making structures located in the core countries. The common stress of the 'Dependencistas' is laid on the Third World's response to the penetrative world market. This market force seems to be sovereign, dominating the societies wherever it reaches, while the national states play the role of transmission stations and boosters of its impulses. Its 'incorporation drive' intensifies the circulation of people, ideas and goods between towns and countryside
and national and international society. 50

How can the Third World countries then break the shackles of dependence on the West? Certain variations of Dependency theory such as the so-called 'diffusion model' sponsored by the Economic Commission for Latin America find the answer in import-substitution industrialization and international economic agreements for preferential commodity prices, etc. for the Third World. 51 This view has provided an academic base for the demand for a new international economic order by the Third World governments. The key factor seems to be the contradictions of reproduction of their respective ruling classes, especially as they lack a viable economic base and are therefore unable to accumulate capital. 52

By contrast, Frank has shown that the so-called 'national bourgeoisies' of the Third World have no inherent contradiction with the metropolitan capital and are in fact an integral part of it. Amin further explains the process of development of underdevelopment with reference to the distortions in the Third World economies towards export activities, i.e. 'extraversion'; this, results from the superior productivity of the West which a) keeps the wages down in the Third World, b) leads to the hypertrophy of the tertiary sector, c) focuses on extraction of profits by the corporate sector and d) produces extreme income inequalities. 53 The unequal specialization imposed by foreign capital emerges as the key factor in shaping the 'peripheral capitalism' whereby the productivity differential between the two is reproduced as the 'sectoral unevenness in productivity and transmission of the price structure from Centre to Periphery'. 54

While underdevelopment theory established that relations between societies were analytically more significant than their internal dynamics, it was for Wallerstein to see in them a regular pattern of exchange which constituted the world capitalist system itself. While concentrating on the core instead of periphery, the world system perspective considers the world as the only meaningful unit of analysis and infuses it with full systematicity having its own structural constants like core-periphery, the international division of labour, and the world system of nation-states.
In Wallerstein's model, the totality of the world system transcends its components, i.e. relations of exchange, and becomes a reified structure as in Althusserian Marxism. This exchange can take place between societies having alternative modes of labour control like slavery, share-cropping/tenancy or wage labour. In other words it is the position of a society in the world capitalist system—whether in the core, semi-periphery or periphery—and not its specific class structure which has the supreme analytical value.

The Frank-Wallerstein model has drawn considerable criticism. First of all, it conceives capitalism at the level of exchange, i.e. trade, and not production; in addition the state is characterized as manager of international trade and not as organiser of production at home, which is its basic function. The production relations are not to be dismissed in favour of a universal labour control mechanism. Thus, capitalism should be defined in terms of wage relationship; as this is still very limited in the Third World countries, they cannot be considered to be capitalist. Also, even though a world capitalist system has now definitely emerged its origins cannot be located as far back as the 15th and 16th centuries; instead the incursion of capitalism in the Third World is more recent and still not complete. Even some of the colonial empires were not capitalist at the time of their entry into these societies. The latter responded differently to different forms of penetration of capital such as the commodity export form, the merchants' capital form or the Imperialism proper; the result was export orientation of economy, reinforcement of the existing system of coercion or commodification of labour, respectively. However, in every form, the local capital accumulation has taken place via the metropolis. The world market thus emerges as an international production relation 'derived' from the reproduction of the metropolis rather than simply a collection of exchange economies.
The role of the state is usually minimized in theories of underdevelopment and world system. They emphasize the manipulative power of capitalism and rule out the factor of social actors such as class or state. The structural constants of world capitalism are given a superdeterministic role. On the other hand, a case can be made for a role for the 'collaborators' in various colonial societies who possessed or developed a local political base in service of the regulated import capital. Especially, the post-independence state is geared towards mollifying the disequilibrating effects of realization of cost-profit rationality of the market. It tries to rationalize its own activities in terms of 'inter-subjectivity' of those governing and those governed. However, it does so within the framework of 'structural imperative' of capitalism which is the basis of its economic calculation and which governs the outcome of this calculation both for individual enterprise and the public sector. In other words it transmits the dynamics of international division of labour to the national level.

According to Wallerstein's formulation, the Third World state's behaviour differs from that of the state in the developed countries, both capitalist and communist, in the realm of apportionment of surplus to the workers, to the cadres (middle classes) and to the outside world. Thus, in the capitalist societies, the cadres are rewarded by the state for taking risks through business enterprise while the workers wages are kept low. Under the socialist alternative, rewards are kept for the productive workers while the flight of capital abroad is effectively checked. In the Third World the pressures of the internal cadres and the outside world are too great, and that of the workers too weak, to accrue any significant amount for collective well-being. Although this model leaves much to be desired by way of analysis of the mechanism of state control, its great merit lies in defining the state in terms of the relative productive strength or weakness of the society.
It is the capital's enormous productive capacity which makes Warren see an inherently progressive trend in the current phase of world capitalism. According to him, the post-independence nation-states are forced to industrialise under the popular pressures for higher living standards, and the inter-imperialist and the super-power rivalries provide an opportunity to do exactly that. 66 It is argued, however, that the existence of popular pressures in the Third World, at least to a sufficient level, is extremely doubtful. In the same way reducing the logic of world capitalism to inter-state rivalries is unjustified. Galtung's structural theory of Imperialism likewise manifests a one-to-one relationship of harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre nation and the centre in the Periphery nation; it does so without fully disaggregating the forces operating at both ends. 69 Both Warren and Galtung follow a model of horizontal link-up between Imperialism and the Third World in general, ignoring the fact that both are historically and structurally linked up in an unequal way. The moment a country takes a 'nationalist' line, effective retaliation follows in the form of diplomatic pressure, increased transfer of profits abroad, pressure for payment of debts and the forced devaluation of currency. 68 The state in the Third World is thus a cushion against the breakdown of structural imperative of capitalism; it operates to secure net returns to foreign capital. Therein lies the importance of the international state system.

However, what interests us most here is the inexorable tendency of the Third World state towards centralization. It is argued that in a typically post colonial society, the metropolitan bourgeoisie which is the ultimate ruling class operates only by proxy, i.e., through the bureaucracy. The latter, even while promoting the emergent local bourgeoisie, tries to advance public sector involvement in the investment projects. These trends towards state capitalism are the results of the dominance of foreign capital and the weakness of local
capital. It can be argued that this centralization is ingrained in the
capitalist development in the Third World. Both import-substitution
industrialization and 'Kulakization' subsequent to agricultural reforms
involve expansion of market, protectionism and input-provision, thus
necessitating a more active and increasingly centralized state regulation
of the economy.

One specific form of state capitalism which has been sometimes
tried in the Third World takes the form of populist regimes based on
mass movements. A populist state can obstruct the process of ruthless
accumulation of capital (profit-making) by individual enterprises for
the fear of likely pressure from the working classes: it tries to promote
the public sector, without however undermining the institutional bases
of capitalism. The enterprises in the public sector are no more than
'bearers of capital' with a different organizational base. However,
often 'populism' involves the capacity of the economic wherewithal
for a possible income re-distribution in favour of the working classes.
As in Peron's Argentina, such attempts often put the interests of the
privileged classes in jeopardy and provoke a counter-offensive. Not
infrequently the populist regimes are followed by military/dictatorial
regimes which are often committed to suppress the working classes.
This fate befell Iran's Mosaddaq, Guatemala's Arbens, Ghana's Nkrumah,
Camodia's Sihanouk, Chile's Allende and Pakistan's Bhutto. A lack
of appreciation of the structural presence of capital in their societies
seems to characterize the populist regimes. In Wolpin's words:

And as such, these nationalizations, rent controls and wage
increases initially provoked ad hoc responses by property-
owning classes. Their political representatives denounced the
measures as irresponsible and 'communist', while the owning
classes instinctively began a process of capital disinvestment.
Tax evasion, capital flight, hoarding, lay-offs and inflation
are ubiquitous concommit-ants to the initiation of serious
reform efforts.
More often than not the populist state's commitment to a modicum of egalitarian social emancipation is successfully resisted by capital.

However, the overthrow of a populist regime does not automatically reverse the process of centralization of state power. In fact, often the reverse is true. State capitalism remains the religion of the Third World bureaucracies. And the metropolitan capital does not always insist on maintenance of strict property relations and other conditions stressed by the classical protagonists of capitalism. Often the Multinationals can manage to smuggle out profits in many other ways. Indeed, a limited expansion of the public sector positively helps their operational activities. Multinationals prefer to deal with regional monopolies even if organized in the name of state. The interventionist state in the Third World, furthermore, provides security to foreign investments through granting preferential tariffs, licences and finance, regulating the prices of inputs or outputs, and providing infrastructure, transport facilities and a cheap labour force. Multinationals choose to operate in joint ventures with these states even when the latter remain the juridical owners, a fact which for example characterized the capital inflow in Tanzania after it took nationalization measures in 1967.

In view of these observations, we can maintain that the state in the Third World is capitalist for all purposes, because it has inherited both structures and functions of the capitalist state. This state operates within the 'structural imperative' of capitalism. Also, the state capitalism of the populist variety, contrary to its professed aims, merely increases its dependence on the metropolitan capital. The nature and direction of change in the state vis-a-vis capital, however, can be understood only through the analysis of its varying class supports at home, along with their different ideological standpoints for or against capital's dynamics. We shall take up this discussion in the following section.
Section 2: Class and State

We have noted in the introduction of this chapter that most studies of the state have conceived its role as an entity existing outside the society. In the pluralists' 'market model', the state plays a neutral role in the 'free' competition between the contending interest groups, while no mention is made of the historical-structural aspects of class domination. In the elite approaches, which have profoundly influenced modernization theory, the state symbolizes the progressive role of the modernizing elites, while operating on the society almost independent of the existing social and political forces. Overall the state emerges as the principle of social order and public consensus. As our findings will show in the following chapter the state is far from being an honest broker in the fight between rival interest groups, nor is it simply a force working for the good of society in general. Instead, its power is derived essentially from the power of the dominant classes in whose interest it rules.

The classical Marxist position considers the state as 'a legal and political superstructure based on the economic sub-structure of the society'. In the post-war resurgence of Marxist thought, however, the issue of specificity of the political realm has occupied an important place. Some of the questions which have arisen in this context are: Whether states are mere allocators of value to the ruling classes or do they have an autonomous presence of their own. What is the nature of their relationship with the dominated classes and how do they keep them from challenging their authority? How far do the structural mechanisms of the Western and Third World states differ from each other in terms of their class character and forms of articulation of class interests?
Relative Autonomy of the State

At the heart of the problem lies the issue of conceptualizing the exact nature of the political domain of social activity vis-a-vis the economic classes. Gramsci was the first Marxist in the modern Western tradition to question the economic determinism thesis of classical Marxism. He attaches a considerable importance to the ideological superstructures of late capitalism which accordingly needed revolutionary strategy based on the idea of a 'war of position' for undermining the cultural support structures of the capitalist state. In the background of the emergent Eurocommunism in the 1960s and 1970s such ideas provided a rationale for independent action by the Communist party leaderships.

Althusser developed the notion of a society as a complex totality which contains four different levels of social practice viz. economic, political, ideological and theoretical, each of which develops in a particular 'time' relatively autonomous and independent of the 'times' of the other levels. Poulantzas, in the same vein, stresses 'the role of the state as a specific instance, a regional structure, of the social whole.' While the Stalinist orthodoxy continued stressing the development of productive forces which would finally lead to transformation of class relations, both the Western Marxists and the non-Western revolutionaries such as Mao and Castro increasingly believed in the primacy of politics. Such voluntarist socialism led to cultural revolutionism of the late 1960s, thereby largely rejecting the mechanical determinism of an earlier era.

Poulantzas opposes the conception of state either as an instrument of bourgeoisie or conversely as a self-willed subject as in modernization theory. Instead, it should be seen as 'a relation or more precisely as the condensate of a relation of power between struggling classes.' This helps us understand the nature of the social classes as represented within the state apparatus. Theirs is not an 'external relation'. Instead, they reproduce 'internal contradiction within the state' Indeed, 'class
contradictions are the very stuff of the State. To understand the policy outcome of the state's decision making for or against certain classes, we have to analyze what takes place within the state. However, that does not mean that the state is devoid of an apparatus unity. Its unity is written into its hierarchic-bureaucratized framework which consecrates and reproduces the existing order by effecting 'a (variable) game of provisional compromises between the dominant and dominated classes'. While the presence of the dominant classes is institutionally guaranteed within the state, that of the dominated classes is likewise institutionally subjected to their hegemony. That is why even capturing the 'state power' for a while cannot concede any benefits to the latter without a radical transformation of the state itself. The former shifts the centre of real power from one apparatus to another as soon as it seems to be swinging to the other side. It can be maintained therefore that the state is not a monolithic organisation. Its various branches and levels represent competing interests in such a way that they reproduce the larger society within the state's centralized apparatus.

While considering the capitalist class as the dominant class in a Western society, Miliband asks,

Whether it exercises a decisive degree of political power;
whether its ownership and control of crucially important areas of economic life also insures its control of the means of political decision making in the particular environment of advanced capitalism.

His answer emphasizes the patterns of recruitment to the government office through elite educational background, 'links of kinship and friendship' and co-option of the lower class officials, if any, into the elite system committed to preservation of the private enterprise. He locates the class origins of various government functionaries in a bid to show the overall class character of the power-wielding institutions of the state. Poulantzas, in a famous debate with Miliband, objects to the Miliband's reduction of the whole issue to 'interpersonal relations' whereby individuals emerge as social actors mobilized by subjective motives. He would rather search for the structural roles, i.e. the
objective co-ordinates that determine the distribution of agents into social classes and the contradictions between these classes. However, while doing so he does not discuss the way the class interests are represented in the state nor the internal dynamics of the economic, political and ideological structures, nor in fact their inter-relationships. He was criticized for pursuing 'a form of omnipotent structuralism' amounting to a taxonomic fury, and for relying heavily on symbolic function of the concepts at the expense of their theoretical functions. Miliband criticizes Poulantzas' reduction of state power to 'the power of a determinate class' for its adherence to the very economism which he seeks to refute, thereby confusing the whole issue of relative autonomy of the state. On the other hand, both Miliband, and following him Alavi as we shall see later, conceive the relativeness of autonomy as simply a qualification of freedom of action with a restriction. By contrast, for Poulantzas this autonomy is 'relative' to 'the structural constraints of the system' This autonomy is actualized in its role as 'political organizer and unifier' depending on the 'precise conjuncture of the class struggle at any one time.'

We have seen in the last section how the state in the Third World inherited its structural dynamics from the metropolitan state. The colonial state comprised the civil and military bureaucracies which entered into various compromises with the previously dominant tribal/feudal classes. A certain 'collaborative mechanism' underlay these compromises whereby these classes were co-opted into the colonial system. Later, an indigenous capitalist class emerged, which largely followed the dictates of this system. In Alavi's formulation, the state in the Third World, mediates between the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of them all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production.
This state enjoys a 'distinct relative autonomy' in as much as it appropriates a substantial proportion of the economic surplus in the name of development which provides the bureaucracy with an independent material base in the society.\footnote{96} Alavi maintains that such autonomy is distinct because the post-colonial state apparatus is overdeveloped vis-a-vis rest of the society as it was initially created to subordinate all the indigenous classes rather than for serving any of them.\footnote{97} This view has been contested by Colin Leys from an empirical point of view.\footnote{96} He says that a new structure of class antagonisms had emerged in the colonies by the time of independence; therefore the post-colonial state cannot be interpreted in terms of its initial functions. Also that it has expanded much more after independence than before, and that its share of national income is even lower than that of the Western states. It can be argued that this criticism does not deal with the structural aspects of the state and relies merely on quantitative description of state functions. In fact the overdeveloped nature of this state should be understood not at the level of subjugating the indigenous society but in terms of its structural transformation in the context of the emergence of a bourgeois revolution. The metropolitan capitalist class had transformed the feudal state in the West from inside, and had only later emerged as the dominant class there. On the other hand, it enjoyed the status of a ruling class in the colonies from the very beginning. Thus the colonial state is the very structural constant of an unabashed capital accumulation process. It is therefore 'structurally' more developed than the indigenous dominant classes which were either effectively transformed by it (as in the case of landlords), or were born after the penetration of capital in the colonies under the aegis of the metropolitan state (as in the case of indigenous bourgeoisie).

Alavi ascribed ruling capacity in the Third World to three classes, implying an understanding among them as equal partners. That imputes
a level of strength to the two indigenous classes which is out of all proportion in view of the supreme determinate power of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, as we have discussed in the previous section. In fact, in a majority of the African countries an entrepreneurial class is emerging only now, while the stratum of landlords was never a part of their social texture. Freyhold points to this when, following Poulantzas, she considers the state bureaucracy and politicians as constituting the governing class which is conditioned in many ways to act according to the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie which is therefore the ruling class; certain 'supportive classes' help the latter uphold the state in exchange for accommodation of their interests.

Both Alavi and Freyhold consider the metropolitan bourgeoisie to be a class internally operative in the Third World. This involves stretching the notion of class too far. A class is based on a certain stratum of individuals occupying a place within a society not outside it. We have seen earlier how the private and public capital from the metropolitan centres operates in the Third World by proxy i.e. through the state apparatus. Its actions are mainly limited to the economic field. It does not constitute a stratum of social actors/citizens in the society at large either at the sociological or at the political level. Indeed, the very externality of the metropolitan capital, directly or indirectly, helps establish an authority structure based on locally available human resources even where the previous classes are not fully transformed. In Venezuela, for example, the class of patriziat, the group within the ruling class whose political power is not primarily based on property but rests on their position in socio-political institutions, is inherently weak. It is therefore dependent on (external) capital for which it provides an internal base. Similarly, the class of 'nizers' (from Africanizers) in countries like Tanzania constitutes the nascent petty bourgeoisie which has stepped into power after independence, and has inherited the reproduction dynamics of the colonial state. It is therefore much more useful to conceive the 'structure' of world capitalism as subsuming the local class structures in various societies than to formulate the notion of a metropolitan bourgeois class existing within the latter.
The relative autonomy thesis has been criticized by Fred Block on the grounds that it is not possible to show the specific historical circumstances when 'capitalists are unable to keep the state from achieving full autonomy' or, alternatively, 'to identify concrete structural mechanisms that prevent the state from exceeding its normal authority.'

He objects to an analysis of state in terms of the 'intentionality of class actors' which is inherent in the relative autonomy thesis. Instead, he locates state power through the Weberian concept of state monopoly over the means of violence, whereby the state managers-as self-interested maximizers-force compliance on the society within particular class contexts which condition the exercise of that power.

While operating in the world capitalist system, comprising a world market and a competitive state system, these state managers try to strengthen the accumulation process as the 'means to buy off political challenges for state power.' In the 20th century, especially during the period of war and depression, the state managers often ditched the class power of capitalists by regulating more and more sectors of economy till the latter lost its capacity to resist any more after a certain 'tipping point' was reached of which the obvious case is fascism. The states - in this sense the governments - are therefore potentially, and not only relatively, autonomous vis-a-vis the classes.

While Block stresses the positive pursuit of interest maximization by the state managers, Draper focuses on the political ineptitude of the capitalist class as leading to the division of labour between itself and the bureaucracy. He maintains that no other ruling class is so profusely criss-crossed with internal feuds between conflicting interest groups as that of capitalists. While analysing the 'hypertrophy of the executive' he explains how the bureaucratised state machinery takes a life of its own, whereby like Caliban to the ruling class's Prospero, it strives for as much independence from its master as possible. In other words the bureaucracy thrives on the exhaustion of class struggle.
The power of the state is manifested through its managers' manipulative efforts to secure their operational autonomy vis-a-vis the social classes. This autonomy is sought and actualized at two levels: the 'social functionality' of the state bureaucracy, i.e., the function of meeting the reproduction demands of the society on the one hand, and the individual officers' status interests committed to fighting over the distribution of state income on the other. In other words, the state bureaucracy is the king-pin of the state's relative autonomy.

The State Bureaucracy

The legal-rational bureaucracy established a structural presence in the Third World during the colonial period. It was based on the legal constitutional structure of the European bureaucracy as well as on the demonstrable military superiority of the colonial power usually symbolized by the presence of modern army units. The recruitment pattern of both civil and military bureaucracies took roots in the local society towards the end of colonial rule. We have observed in the previous section how the colonial state emerged as an organic part of peripheral capitalism. Rather than owning the productive resources on a private juridical basis, the state bureaucracy controls them on a constitutional basis, which is why its actions enjoy a quantum of legitimacy denied to other groups and institutions.

The policy biases of the post-independence state bureaucracy can be traced not only in its class character, which is manifested through its recruitment pattern but also in its post-recruitment socialization. On the one hand, as bearers of state authority, the (military) bureaucratic oligarchy reduces the political parties to the role of mere brokers who manipulate public relations in their favour and thus function as a legitimacy factor. On the other hand, it manages to establish itself firmly in broad sections of the economy in the name of development planning and management of public sector.
Especially in the absence of capitalist and landlord classes in Africa, it has been named bureaucratic bourgeoisie, because both political power and control over property are vested in the same hands, with the result that the main contradiction is now between itself and the working class. A useful distinction has been suggested between the two sections of bureaucracy, between those in charge of the public sector's industrial and commercial concerns whose market behaviour is governed by profitability (on the lines of the management of larger private enterprises) and the state bureaucrats proper. Following Block, we can maintain that this 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' operates essentially in a 'post-tipping point' framework, whereby no effective opposition is forthcoming from any quarter.

Riggs has pointed to the bifocal nature of bureaucratic power in the Third World countries consisting of a narrow legal authority on one hand but wide informal control through a vast network of clientele relations on the other. His analysis focuses on the mechanism rather than direction of bureaucratic intervention in the market operations, which brings about a 'quasi-market', i.e. a situation of price indeterminacy; this in Riggs' Bazzar-Canteen model, means an additional factor of production in the form of transactional security sanctioned by the bureaucracy. He finds the rational-legal character of this 'prismatic' bureaucracy rather diluted in a blend of traditional and modern ethos; here the primary/secondary institutions called 'clerks' operate in the poly-communal society, which is again a blend of folk and urban traditions. It can be observed that Riggs' approach is largely derivationist as it judges the Third World bureaucracies against the higher rational-legal standards of the developed' bureaucracies. This essentially teleological approach to the Third World limits the structural relationship between the bureaucracy and its client groups to the allocation of resources by the former to the latter; there is no mention of the way this bureaucracy derives its power from certain classes and groups in the society.
For our purposes, Rigg's special contribution is that he cautions us not only against the dichotomous conception of modernizing bureaucracy/traditional society but also against an understanding of bureaucracy at the level of formal organisation whose latent functions often clash with its manifest roles. We can add that this bureaucracy must be distinguished from the state itself and its power should be located not in the self-evident bureaucratic supremacy but in its complex class character. The issues of relative autonomy of the state or, alternatively, of state managers/dominant class(es) dichotomy therefore become central for our analysis. In other words, the bureaucracy in the Third World occupies a more central position in the state than its counterpart in the West, not in quantitative terms but in structural terms. That leads to perpetual crisis of political legitimacy because of the inherently unstable position of the non-bureaucratic institutions such as political parties, trade unions and other interstitial groups. The question therefore is not of supremacy of the executive (with its bureaucratic core) over legislature and judiciary, but of the absence of institutionalised patterns of seeking legitimacy from the general masses.

**Legitimacy**

How can the state in the Third World typically manage to rule without an elaborate mechanism of seeking mandate from the ruled? The ideological propaganda is often the dominant form of manipulation of dissent here. In general, all states face the problem of legitimation. In the capitalist state for example, the ideological apparatuses use the religious sentiment, the 'supreme' integrative' and stabilizing force' of nationalism and the memories and symbols of the collective past to bring about a national consensus of opinion on maintenance of the existing democratic social order. In the case of post-independence Third World states the real dichotomy exists between the ideologized political culture inherited from the nationalist movement couched essentially in a non-statist framework and the largely unchanged organisational ethos of the colonial state itself.
Nationalism, in Karl Deutsch's words revolves around the ability to communicate more effectively and over a wider range of subjects. This communication ability underlies effective channelling of multiple issues of various localities. Various class segments, among them small capitalists, junior officials of the government, the workers and peasants, try to organise themselves on a national scale so as to influence the political process at that level. The nationalist leadership then emerges as the organising principle of these sporadic movements and restrains them by channelling them into constitutional demands made on the colonial state. In this process nationalist ideology emerges as the conglomerate of local primary identities. The educated middle class then is strategically placed to move into government at independence and take over the existing state apparatus.

The legitimacy of the colonial state resided outside the colonial society, in the sense of an understanding between the rival colonial empires based on delimitation of one another's legitimate areas of interest. The emergent world state system therefore legitimized the nation state's domination over a certain territory allowing it a certain form of organised violence at its disposal. In other words, the colonial state's administrative structure acquired 'legitimacy' prior to the non-statist institutions, both historically and structurally. It is this form of legitimacy which is bequeathed to the post-colonial state, as characterized by internalization of a host of citizen orientations like rule of law, respect for the impersonal, 'systematic' and organised authority of the state enforcing property relations, production/distribution relations and monopoly over adjudication. Such legitimacy or in Gramsci's words hegemony, is manifested through the production relations of the society which are born in the process of production.

Critical theory locates the absence of organized revolt in class power relations by situating them in an elaborate value system often inherited from the pre-modern era. Especially Habermas has discussed the question of legitimacy in the context of governments' crisis management capacity based on a substitutive relation between the fiscal
resources at its disposal on the one hand and cultural sources of motivation in the society on the other. Therefore, it can be argued that ideology provides only a framework for, and does not itself determine, the general conformity. The 'invisible' forces of market, based on property relations, impinge on an individual's choices. He does not see any realistic alternative without running a great risk. In other words, conformity arises out of the existential conditions in a situation of scarcity, which is raised to a general level of acceptance by ideology.

The post-colonial state seems to be strong in preserving this legitimacy, especially in contrast with those Third World societies which were not colonized. The rule of law as administered by the state bureaucracy through its hierarchically organised structures enjoys absolute legitimacy. But then how to explain the permanent constitutional crises, military take-overs and other forms of political instability? According to Huntington the low level of institutionalization is responsible for atrophy of political parties etc. Likewise Riggs blames the absence of non-bureaucratic strongholds in the society for creating this situation. However, we propose to discuss this matter in terms of legitimacy. No bureaucracy can rule in its own name, nor will it willingly like to do so, because its legitimacy is essentially based on a non-popular basis which absolves it of direct responsibility to the masses. During the muddled period of post-independence 'politics of nationalism', the political leaderships often fail to retain the confidence of bureaucracy because the latter increasingly distrusts the former's capacity to preserve the state's legitimacy in the eyes of general masses. Especially the rapid developmental activity creates great distribution crises in the form of expanding regional and class inequalities, resulting in the collapse of the constitutional-juridal system. The (civil) bureaucracy looks towards its 'natural' complementary organisation, the military, to provide legitimacy. Underneath the
apparent political instability, we see a relatively stable pattern of domination by bureaucracy as a political reproduction institution. The only real challenge to its hegemony emerges through a populist movement, which reintroduces mass participation into the society as a legitimate political resource.

The Populist State

The Populist movement is essentially the product of wider social changes consequent upon the penetration of capital in the production relations. Most often it leads to further state-centeredness in the society. The post-independence development process usually concentrates on import-substitution industrialization followed by the capitalization of the agrarian economy. Both strategies aim at production-maximization in aggregate terms. A purely economistic approach is followed based upon a cost/benefit rationality, whereby the process of labour displacement from the traditional sectors is accelerated. The capitalists buy the productive power of this labour considering it as a factor of production subject to supply and demand. Rapid urbanization ensures abundant supply and therefore cheap cost of labour. For the latter, however, there is a subsistence level of income which must be ensured, to be defined in terms of caloric minima and other minimum securities of clothing and shelter rather than the logic of demand and supply. As industrialization gains momentum the entrepreneurs' profits soar high while the emergent labour class remains extremely insecure with no organisational strength to back its interests. As the industrial relations deteriorate the opposing class interests increasingly involve the state for their realization. A parallel crisis in agrarian relations, often in the wake of farm mechanization following agrarian reforms, also involves the state for mediation. In this way the interventionist state, as the crystallization point of class interests
in general, centralizes all operational powers in its own hands.

This 'state gigantism' which thrives on the breakdown of all types of class power in general is known as Bonapartism in the Marxist literature, after Louis Bonaparte, Napoleon III. Following the aborted June Insurrection by the proletariat in France in 1851 Bonaparte had ascended to power on the shoulders of the bourgeoisie, the army, the petty bourgeoisie, the lumpen-proletariat and the small-holding peasants; under him the process of autonomization of the state took a giant leap forward. However, Bonapartism survives only in a situation of unresolved conflict till a new balance is restored between the dominant and dominated classes. One can doubt how far the Bonapartist model explains the Third World state's inexorable march towards autonomization vis-a-vis the social classes. As a concept, Bonapartism does not fully explain the institutionalization of power within the state. The role of many a Bonaparte can be reduced to personal rulership of the patrimonial variety in which they command the support of a closely-knit circle of followers, with only passive links with the masses at large whose main function remains to provide legitimacy periodically.

While Bonapartism provides a framework for the relative immobility of social classes in the face of a strident state machinery it cannot however analyze the specific mode of governing encompassing all interaction between the state and society. This phenomenon is better expressed through the concept of populism. This term originates from the North American populism and the Russian Narodnikism of the late 19th century and points to the rural responses to the centralized urban financial and marketing institutions of capitalism. Under populism, the supremacy of people's will is the highest standard for political behaviour. A relationship is thereby established between the leader and the led, via a pseudo-participation of the latter through large rallies etc., unmediated by the institutions. A marked ideological ambiguity characterizes populism which shuns analyses of government
policies or party programmes. This non-institutionalized contact between the two means that a populist regime rules through demagogy, relying on such clandestine means as the use of intelligence police. While suggesting a general orientation of the government towards facing the gross problems of class inequality, the populist ideology is fiercely nationalistic and anti-Imperialistic. Accompanied by measures of nationalization and collectivization, this ideological stance is apparently meant to rectify the repression on the working classes under the previous regimes. Such nationalism moves against those who are directly linked with the foreign capital, the so-called compradores; but the apparent hostility against the kulak farmers is without teeth.

While Bonapartism highlights the structural autonomy of the state and populism focuses largely on the mechanism of its control, the term 'intermediate regimes' has been suggested by Kalecki for describing a state where the lower middle class and rich peasantry act as the ruling classes, operating in the framework of state capitalism. The lower middle class, according to him, comprises those who have a little income from jobs, augmented sometimes by rent from small property holdings. Their interest therefore lies basically in the state's expansion of jobs and by corollary in the enlargement of the public sector. The rich peasantry on the other hand supports this regime for the fear of displacement from land in case of unfettered private capitalist development; it also looks for new opportunities within the state enterprise. Such regimes pursue a policy of public expenditure covering either infrastructural sectors like irrigation, power, transport and communication or direct management of big industry, banking and insurance, and even the wholesale trade. This regime's multiple class base evokes contradictory opposing pressures: for example, the rich peasant would try to secure as high price as possible for its marketed surplus. The regime would do so only at the risk of alienating its support base among the lower middle classes. It ends up usually with
providing large subsidies which in turn may eat up its investible surpluses. In addition, it has to provide jobs to a growing body of candidates without any comparable rate of growth in production as well as keep the prices of the public sector products low so as to legitimize its takeover of industries in the first place. Both these problems adversely affect the rate of capital accumulation by the state and finally make it even more dependant on the metropolitan capital than previously. The state's role as employer far exceeds that of developer. The 'intermediate regime' model is then ideally suited to explain the relationship between class and state under populism.

These observations show that the state action is conditioned by the 'structural imperative' of capitalism, despite the jargon to the contrary. In other words, the state cannot be used by the Bonapartist/populist/intermediate regimes as an instrument of policy favouring the working classes. The fact that mass mobility is not organised means that the only institutionalised force in the country, i.e. the military-bureaucratic state apparatus, continues holding the initiative and in certain cases strikes back with full ferocity. While attempting to answer the question whether the colonial state should be smashed or used for bringing about a socialist society, John Saul favours the latter option, especially in the case of post-Arusha Declaration Tanzania under Nyerere. However, our findings show that it is futile to expect such results from this state precisely because, being the condensate of the present class structure, it cannot but be a true reflection of that fact. It can be argued therefore, that the three typical historical forms of state in the Third World, the colonial, the post-colonial and the populist, can be explained in terms of their varying class supports. These variations are the product of an encounter between the one-sided capitalist accumulation process in the world and the multiple class structures in these societies struggling to strike a balance within and between themselves and the former. The role of
the state in this process is in turn contingent upon its accumulated strength in the form of institutionalized practices with which it holds the social classes together in a meaningful sense.

Section 3: 'State-in-the-Field'

Most modernization and elite approaches draw heavily on a natural theory of nationalism which considers the nation-state as the ideal expression of man's social existence. Weber idealized the nation-state as a pre-ordained unit through which human progress is summated. Later the systems approach was modeled essentially on the nation-state as an ideal unit of analysis, whereby its maintenance became almost a canonical necessity. The nation-state is conceived as a definitional category which not only initiates change internally but also can bring any change-induced dysfunctional outcomes back to functionality. Parallel to the subjective patterning of priorities by the Third World governments, the political development theorists have also highlighted the problem of integration in developing countries. Weiner, for example, enumerates five types of integration as being the inherent features of modernization, namely national, territorial, value, and elite-mass integrations, and integrative behaviour. The nation-state thus emerges as a functional imperative which renders all other units-tribal, ethnic, or territorial- inherently inimical to the goals of modernization, which are themselves largely derived from the historical evolution of nation states in Europe.

It is argued here that such teleological concern with national integration grossly underestimates the relevance of the locality where real action takes place. Indeed, the sociopolitical values are operative in a final sense only in the framework of localized social space even in the most centralized regimes. Locality need not be the same thing as periphery. Indeed, here we can observe the actual pattern of application of the government rules as flowing from the Centre. Here the critical variable is the delivery of services in the locality, i.e. whether it is controlled by the agents of the centralized state or by the
local representatives. The locality is therefore the real point of organised production and thus the real indicator of penetration of capital in the society.

As the requisite function of any society is to evolve authority structures to exercise power to transfer a part of surplus production to the dominant class(es), all its local interpersonal and inter-group relationships have to conform to the dictates of state power. Locality then is also the indicator of scale and intensity of institutionalization of political power. In this section, therefore we shall discuss the varying patterns of the state-in-action in the locality, with reference to (i) the ecological contexts of development (penetration of capital), (ii) the meeting of state, city and countryside in the locality, (iii) the local clientele structures, and (iv) the changing role of village factions and kinship ties.

Political Ecology of Development: A Dichotomous Model

As discussed in section I, world capitalism subsumes the supply structures of both labour and capital in the Third World. It does so by introducing the motor force of cash economy which dislocates the structural mechanism of the local society. A variety of class segments - landlords, petty traders, 'paraprofessionals' and the more enterprising artisans - are increasingly co-opted into the national and international markets. They acquire access to the new economic and political resources like Western education, participation in different administrative/legislative bodies, monopoly over understanding and operation of the new codified law and recruitment into the civil and military services of the colonial state. These extra village status differentials, backed by the newly established articulation channels of the state machinery bring about a qualitative increase in the power of the propertied classes. The inter-class inequalities are thus
structurally redefined.

In this process, the new state emerges as the strongest articulating force with its standing bureaucratic order acting both as arbitrator and initiator. While it regulates the opening of the indigenous societies to the penetrative capital, it reorganises the centres of power in various localities. The more capital expands, the more the state institutions proliferate. The modern state is therefore expansionist in nature, in the sense that it is structurally, and not only historically, part of expanding capital characterized by new hierarchical structures, new regulatory patterns of economy, new sanctions against violation of laws and new laws themselves. It is thus more than an 'agent of modernization', i.e. more than a means to an end, but rather a part of the structural expansion of the whole society over time.

A persistent feature of the expansion of capital and state in the Third World societies is its differential character. In some places it is substantial, in others only marginal, or even minimal. The attendant processes of development in education, communications, industrialization, urbanization etc., assume a spatial character. These are space-forming in that they shape and structure the conditions of social interaction in the economic, political and administrative fields; these are space-contingent in that they depend on the existing spatial-infrastructural framework, which in turn depends on the previous locational decisions. It is argued that the attributes of development tend to concentrate around one or more selected places and establish a self-generating momentum there which then multiplies the impact of a given social investment. The initially favoured regions generate backwash effects further amplifying the existing inequalities, by transferring resources from the peripheral areas in the form of outmigration of productive labour, entrepreneurs and capital. There emerge sharp regional disparities due to this 'circular and cumulative causation' which, according to Myrdal, continues operating 'even if the original push or pull were to cease after a time'.

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As a result of this uneven pattern of development, a typical Third World country contains a hierarchy of spatial structures. Many port cities rose to immense significance, some of them even becoming capitals of their respective countries, because of their closer involvement in the world economy as entrepots. Consequently they received the largest investment in infrastructural as well as industrial/commercial sectors, which in turn gave them a competitive advantage over inland cities in terms of higher earning capacity. Here the emergence of an indigenous bourgeois stratum and a professional middle class operating through the commercial, financial, and communication institutions forces a certain reorganization of the state institutions somewhat along the pattern of metropolitan states. These increasingly take up the functions of input provision for industrial production, organization of import/export trade, standardization of goods and protection of highways. The emergent educated/commercial middle classes are placed in the strategic position of communicating with the hinterland and organizing various local oppositions there into a grand coalition under the nationalist movement. They mediate between the largely uninitiated masses of less developed regions and the centralized state bureaucracy, and thus acquire the nationalist leadership. In contrast to the rest of the country, these port cities often evolved a democratic participatory political system even though limited to municipal, judicial and guild-representational spheres, mainly because of the top-heavy presence of the locally-based British interest seeking direct representation in various government bodies.

However, despite their immense economic significance and sometimes even political importance, these port-cities do not represent the mainstream socio-political and demographical trends. They are usually marginal to the massive currents of social change in the rest of the country, which contains two types of society. On the one hand there are areas of agricultural
development. Here the state-sponsored irrigation and infrastructural projects underlie the process of integration into the world economy by producing exportable commodities. Especially in the post-independence period the subsidized inputs lead to changes in production structures in the locality, involving the problem of pressures on the old tenurial system in the form of eviction of tenants from farms, urbanization and sometimes peasant militancy. These areas attract the maximum resource-input under the Green Revolution strategy, and, wherever they produce industrial raw material as well, become the centre of large-scale manufacturing industry. On the other hand there are poor agricultural areas, where capitalist penetration stops short of initiating changes in the production relations due either to topographical reasons or to the political arithmetic of the state. They are simply allowed to stagnate. The whole of the country falls roughly into these two categories.

We can study these categories with the help of Migdal's dichotomous model of the freeholding village and the corporate village which for our present purposes, can be easily identified with the relatively developed and underdeveloped areas respectively. The former is beset with insecurities of market participation, i.e. slump in the prices of cash corps, inflationary pressure on the agricultural inputs, as well as the middleman's exploitative role. Moreover, rising agrarian incomes are spent in the urban sector for purchase of manufactured goods. At the production level, farm mechanization disturbs the traditional labour structures. Finally, the city-based bureaucracy penetrates the countryside to provide services of various kinds and regulate the extraction of surplus. A new direct state peasant relationship emerges thereby in the context of the larger economy, which erodes the transactional boundaries of village life.
On the other hand, the structure of the corporate village remains largely endogamous and communal. It is immersed in the local complementary economies based on regional networks. Here, the few rural-urban linkages are monopolized by a coterie of landlords. There is an established pattern of long-distance and semi-permanent migration of the younger generation to the more developed regions which leaves the local power structure virtually intact, especially as state interference remains minimal in the absence of any large public or private investment. Following Frank's model, these areas can be considered to be located on the 'periphery' while the former areas constitute the 'centre'.

The political structure of the locality, be it central or peripheral, is inherently incomplete, in the sense that it provides a focus for the network of roles which derive their significance only with reference to the centralized state. Both operate within the nation-state system. When the process of indigenization (Africanisation, Indianization etc.,) of services took place in the later years of the colonial period, the educated middle classes from the 'developed' regions entered the state bureaucracy in large numbers, while the underdeveloped regions remained unrepresented at that level. However, as the pace of constitutional development gained momentum, the local representatives from the 'peripheral' areas were often the members of big landlord families who were handpicked by the government, first for nomination and later for election. Most of the early ministerships gravitated towards them. By contrast the representatives from the 'central' areas were often small men, with limited economic and political resources. However, these areas commanded far greater hold over policy making on the strength of their being what Morris Jones a 'catchment area' for recruitment of the bureaucratic elite. The 'feudal' connection of the colonial/postcolonial state has been limited, mainly to legislatures,
and in a different context, to the army. In that sense it has represented a vested interest of backwardness. The modern state bureaucracy is usually averse to radical changes in the peripheral areas and is favourably inclined to keep the power base of the big landlords intact. Both the central and peripheral localities therefore derive their meaning from the larger polity to which they contribute in different ways, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The Locality: State, City and Countryside

As we have outlined above, a locality is an area unit where the authority structure of the state meets and defines the socioeconomic forces represented by the prevalent class relations. It is argued that the most significant unit of locality in the colonial framework is the district. Here, large population aggregates and ecological regions came into contact with each other and with the local government machinery. A process of organisation of social relations around the differentiated and complementary roles of the local bureaucracy set in whereby each tribe, sect or faction sought access to the government officers. Such contacts were structured around a basic gap of communication between the institutions of the modern state and the indigenous society. The district officers represented the state authority in the locality which was deliberately manipulated across this gap. When the demand for political articulation was intensified, local self government was seen as a way of bridging this gap. However, it was soon engulfed by the independence movement and thereafter it was weakened both operationally and organisationally.

In the post-independence period, the district administration continues to be the hub of government machinery. As the development activity expands in certain localities, newer groups and classes emerge in the spheres of industrial production, commerce, transport and finance. These groups grab the new 'opportunity structures' flowing from the government policy and thus become 'a central part of the infrastructure of the district life'. They thus become a support structure for the state. However, as noted earlier, this
process brings about fission of the older societal order with a certain 'freeing' effect on the labour. Capital being highly organised, the newer groups and classes increasingly tend to organise themselves to operate within it. But the growth of new centres of organisational power in the locality symbolize the potential for resistance to the government authority by competing for resources needed by the state for maintaining political control. It is argued therefore that the more a locality is developed, the more the organisational activity emerges in the form of trade unions, professional associations, and the like, which manifest a potential challenge to the state.

Typically, the district contains a few towns and a large number of villages all around. The towns have usually been at the centre of market-place systems of peasant societies from pre-modern times, which, despite the general assumption to the contrary, included trading networks based on the use of cash transactions. However, as we have suggested in the first section, these trading relations did not lead to accumulation of capital. Instead, the colonial state reorganised the existing markets as instruments of economic regulation to meet the demands of world capitalism. This brought about a change in urban spatial structures.

The functional specialization of urban land-use, for example, resulted in the separation of work-place from home, work from nonwork, productive from recreational activities, representing an all encompassing spatial differentiation. The colonial urban settlement was usually law and order oriented and therefore did not generate industrialization like its counterpart in the West, except in a few port-cities. A civil station typically housed officials of district administration from Revenue Department, Police, Magistracy, etc., and symbolized the concentration of power in the locality in their hands. It was typically without any
working class element which was therefore not a part of its spatial organisation in the form of 'working class housing'.

Only a few port-cities and the major nodal centres started having industrial activity in the later years of colonialism. However, they have gained considerable momentum after independence. They attract large numbers of peasants from all around in search of employment in the industrial/commercial sector, especially in the localities where farm mechanization is undertaken by rich farmers, thus rendering them landless. Many artisans and small owners also migrate to cities and invest their meagre savings in small-scale industry, based on the supply of cheap labour from the family sources. Consequently rural-urban linkages expand which are increasingly structured around the exchange of labour supply from the countryside with the cheap manufactured goods from the city. The chain reaction of this process finally brings about a situation where the urban and the rural class structures are defined in terms of each other. The more a locality is integrated in this sense, the more the urban influence sets in, leading under the auspices of organised labour activity, to an increasing consciousness of class and of the ideological contexts of the larger politics. Thus a transition takes place between, in Wolfe's words, 'societas' where the principle of kinship embodies all or most strategic relations and 'civitas' where the wider economic and political contexts guide the functions of kinship. In this way, the kinship ties become the 'orienting thread and conduit of mobility'.

We can thus distinguish between the peasant social structures of the central and peripheral localities on the basis of the level of incursion of rural-urban linkages which lead to emergence of class and ideology as the manifest idiom of politics. The development activity in the countryside is characterized essentially by 'the increasing influence of market relations, the draining-off of labour and capital, the professionalization of agriculture, the spread of mass products and mass culture and by anomie'. In other words the urban sector overtakes the
rural sector, because of its advantages of capital concentration and high productivity. In the face of this situation, the older structures of relationships between the district administration and landlords on the one hand, and between the latter and peasants in general on the other are grossly disrupted. This leads to the emergence of horizontal alliances between classes across the urban-rural sectoral gap. This is in marked contrast with the peripheral locality where developmental activity is only marginal and therefore those relations more or less continue along the established pattern of low-level rural-urban linkages.

**Patron-Client Relations**

Lemarchand and Legg define political clientelism as 'a generic trait of political systems regardless of their stages of development, involving personalised and reciprocal ties between actors with unequal resources.' This model expands the definition of clientelism to include almost every political transaction between the two unequal individual or group participants without any structural interference. Such a situation is possible only in the closed systems like the acephalous tribal society of the Swat Pathans where each transaction is complete in itself. However, in a peasant society the state has a constant structural presence in the local patron-client relations between the landlords and the poor peasants. These structures are not a replica of the landlord-tenant relations. The difference lies in the fact that the clients are not necessarily directly dependent on their patrons for their livelihood, as in case of tenants instead, they enjoy a modicum of transactional freedom and are only structurally manipulated into a subject position.

Contrary to the consideration of clientelism as voluntary exchange, legal/customary obligations and political pressures play a great part in it. The flow of resources from the centralized state into the locality not only structures its relations with the national
society but also reshapes the local power structure by redefining it through its own authority structures. Personal relations with the officials of district administration assume the highest social value. Indeed, the 'power' of landlords - and increasingly those from the commercial and industrial classes - is judged in terms of their credibility with the district administration itself. This power is realized in terms of facilitating official procedures in various departments, interference in the judicial process, getting a share in the scarce resources being distributed for development, and in various other ways.

As the capital inflow increases, the local society becomes more differentiated and the clientele structures expand considerably to include the relatively less privileged individuals emerging as patrons in their own right. The parallel process of labour recruitment, which involves both long and short distance migration eventually loosens these structures and leads to organisational activity. The district administration, accordingly, depends more and more on the clientele structures to stunt the growth of class mobilization. In this context, the party-directed patronage, i.e. institutionalized clientelism in terms of the nation-wide party apparatus assumes a significant role to keep this essentially unequal transactional system going. Accordingly when these dichotomous role-sets come into contact with formal structures like parties they operate through such social brokers who are increasingly represented by the so-called 'nation-oriented institutions'.

In other words, clientelism should not be conceived for our purposes as an alternative mode of analysis against class analysis, it should rather be considered an expression of it. There is no natural exchange of values between the patrons...
and clients. Instead, questions like in whose interest the whole system is moving and in what way these interests are being safeguarded in the locality become pertinent. The key variable is, thus, the way the clientelistic ties support certain class interests as expressed through the particular stage of development of the local society. 167 For example, these ties are dominant, both in expression and in meaning, in the peripheral locality where the network personalized relationships are the channels of interest articulation. In the developed locality, this operates in the form of hierarchically structured power blocs within complex organizations like political parties, trade unions and professional associations. The need to channel the institutional activity along the prescribed lines make the post-colonial state patronize the strategically-placed individuals so as to defuse attempts at organized political action. Clientelism is even deliberately organized so as to cut through and weaken efforts towards forming 'class parties'. 168 Often these governments consider electoral politics dysfunctional because it tends to disrupt the established order.

Factions

The patron-client relations are one of the many ways of recruitment to factions which are the most pervasive form of peasant politics, especially in the South Asian societies. Many theses have been advanced to explain factions in terms of their internal composition, their specific political function, and their relations with the broader political framework, especially political parties. What interests us most here is the way economic, administrative and constitutional developments tend to change the context in which factions operate and thereby bring about new patterns of social and political organisation.
Factions represent the vertical segmentation of peasant society. This pattern of differentiation of interest in turn symbolizes its low 'classness'. Factions are hierarchies led by landlords who control political and economic resources and on the basis of that command the support of a large number of people in the village. The major form of factional support in the rural areas is the economic dependence of tenants on their landlords, while others, e.g. middle peasants, interstitial groups like barbers, ironsmiths and other village functionaries operating on the basis of jajmani system, as well as village shopkeepers, are recruited into factions. The factional support is contingent not only upon the leader's resources but also on the availability of rival patrons, which is why the leadership of factions usually ends up in the hands of those commanding maximum resources in the locality. The external boundaries of factions can be defined in terms of a meeting point between the leader's resource-bound capacity to keep retainers and the need to enlarge the support base. Internally a faction can be differentiated between 'core' and 'followers' depending on whether the clients' relations with the leader are deep and multiplex or merely transactional and one-to-one.

Factions are usually considered as an organic part of the peasant society in the Indian environment. For example, Lewis conceptualizes their role essentially as kinship groupings which regulate the interpersonal relationships within the stable boundaries of the village. Nicholas ascribes to them a definite political function of organizing conflict in a disintegrating society. The argument necessarily rests on the peculiarity of the Indian society in cultural terms. The common assumption is that India is a factious society, an argument allegedly based on an orientalist psychologism. This is the result of conceptualizing factions as a structural constant of the Indian society.
Nicholas argues that factions are a phenomenon of rapid social change. In fact, the reverse is true. Factions typically operate in a relatively immobilist frameworks and not in one of rapid change where, instead, a horizontal pattern of class politics tends to overtake the vertical pattern of factional politics. As new economic opportunities emerge, new expanded class interests are formed whereby the relevance of the factional mode of organisation goes down and the density of network of kinship ties supporting these factions is diluted. The structural cohesiveness of factions is contingent upon the absence of rival means of livelihood. In other words, far from being the organizing principle of peasant social structure, factions and their formative features such as kinship ties are the expression of the prevalent relations of production in the society which are manifested through land tenure, property laws and adjudication processes.

Indeed, kinship ties can be the conduit for re-organisation of factional groups along the horizontal pattern of lineage system, as in the case of the caste-like institution of birad-ri. In this context, the kinship ties assume a different class character. The vertical landlord factions are therefore not a universal feature of the peasant society. It is dominant in the underdeveloped areas but is on the decline in the relatively developed areas within the peasant societies. In the former situation political parties behave as conglomerates of factional alliances which bring more resources to the organisation than they receive from it and therefore provide the basis for the latter's weakness. In the latter situation, however, the brokerage function of factions is gradually eroded, so that secondary organisations like political parties flourish which seek to change the existing mode of articulation of interests based on factional alliances. A relatively progressive idiom is increasingly used to bring about such a change, while the kinship ties operate through such relatively flexible and sometimes even egalitarian structures as birad-ri. In this situation political
organisation of local conflict outgrows the earlier form of struggle between rival personality cliques which have been treated as independent variables by writers like M. 179 Instead, class and ideology constitute the content of new politics even where form remains the same.

In that sense at least factions are really a function of the relationship between the village and the larger society. Peasants constitute only a 'part-society' and, being dependent on the larger market operations which drain off its capital and labour, they tend to evolve mechanisms for collective security. 180 These mechanisms change according to the changes in the production/distribution relations. The pattern of this change is however circumscribed by the specific institutional/constitutional channels allowed by the state. Indeed, the encapsulation of the peasant society by the state emerges as the strongest factor in determining the forms of peasant organisation. For example, the colonial state divests the old feuding tribes of the violent means of settling disputes and channels them along the new legal-constitutional frameworks covering larger area units. 181 The most important unit of government, i.e. the district, also emerges as the organizing unit of political factions

We can now summarize our findings in this section by observing that in a typical Third World country, there exists an uneven pattern of development, with a variety of corresponding forms of political structure. Therefore, the locality, as defined by the district boundaries, emerges as a very important unit of research for our present study. The central locality differs from the peripheral locality both in its local authority structure and in its relationship with the state at large. In the framework of local politics we can point to these differential patterns in the following terms:

a) The level of integration of state, city and countryside in the central locality is much higher than in the peripheral locality. This integration is characterized by i) the institutional proliferation of the state, ii) the multiplication of rural-urban linkages, and iii) the multiplex relationships with the larger state and society.
b) Patron-client relations, especially of the factional variety, constitute the dominant mode of political activity in the latter, but are of only secondary importance in the former.

c) Political organisations play a structural role in the former but are only marginal in the latter.

d) Class politics and ideology play a more manifest role as a locality moves from the periphery to the centre.

Section 4. From Theory to Empirical Research

In view of our discussion of various aspects of the state in the Third World in the previous sections, we can now draw an outline for our study of Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan in more than one way merits research as a typical example of political change in the post-war era. As Brahanti has summarized, its political crises are characterized by constitutional breakdowns, experimentation with a variety of politico-administrative frameworks, border wars with India and successive military coups d'état. Again typically, the overall thrust of development activity has been at the centre of all government policy-making. A previous generation of scholars concentrated on constitutional development, focusing on such issues as provincial autonomy, religious minorities, the Islamic character of the polity and the juridical powers of various branches of the government. This approach was based on consideration of the role of formal institutions as the right kind of material for research, along with an implicit teleological concern with the Westminster model. In the 1960s, the influence of modernization theory became increasingly visible in the works related to the economic, administrative and political structures of Pakistan under Ayub Khan. The new scholarship tended to stress the modernizing role of the civil and military bureaucratic elite governing Pakistan not only for initiating economic development through an ingenious
mechanism of resource allocation but also for taking up the task of political institution-building at the grassroots level. The Ayub system elicited praise from scholars like Huntington, Ziring, Braibanti, Feldman, Vorys, Papanek and Wilcox. The subsequent crisis of unity between the two wings of the country was considered largely in terms of breakdown of the political system and crisis of national integration.

Our discussion in the previous sections shows that our enquiry into the state of Pakistan requires a study of its precise structural roots in terms of the specific alignment of social forces. Alavi has argued that underneath the apparent political instability of Pakistan there lies a structural continuity in the dominant role of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy, which has sought legitimacy through various constitutional frameworks. We shall argue that the regulation and planning of development activity by the state apparatus is conditioned by its specific structural presence in relation to capital, class and locality. It is proposed firstly to look into the long gestation period of the Pakistan state in British India, secondly to discuss the pattern of structural changes after independence, and finally to analyse the populist movement of the Pakistan People's Party at the beginning of the 1970s, which represents a 'second-wave revolution' in terms of a shift in the class bases of the state.

The present study is based on a variety of academic and non-academic sources, and theoretical as well as empirical works. These can be specified as following:

a) Government publications. These include the published records of the governments of British India and Pakistan, government notifications, various commission reports, district gazetteers and unpublished records;
b) English and Urdu newspapers from India, Pakistan and Britain

c) The pamphlets of political parties, trade unions and peasant organisations.


e) Interviews with i) present and ex-government officers, among them central secretaries and judges, ii) politicians and former party office holders, iii) members of professional associations such as Chambers of Commerce, District Bar Associations, the Pakistan Lecturers Association, and the Punjab Union of Journalists, iv) petty government officials like patwaris, kanungo, school teachers and office clerks in various departments, v) trade union leaders, vi) tenant leaders.

As to the organisation of the thesis, it is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the problems of theory-building and contains the present chapter. Part II has three chapters dealing with the colonial state of British India, the postcolonial state of Pakistan, and the populist phase under Bhutto, respectively. In Part III, the focus is on micro-level politics. It also contains three chapters: Chapter V deals with the general framework of district administration and local government and politics; in Chapters VI and VII we shall trace the patterns of political change in the two districts of Faisalabad and Attock respectively, as examples of relatively developed and underdeveloped localities. This is followed by the conclusion.
NOTES:


7. Ibid. p.19.

8. In Hunter's Study, the informants were asked to identify the most influential people in the community for the purposes of decision-making; then this list was presented to the experts from various walks of life, representing the different religious, commercial, colour, age, sex and professional groups, to further select the top leaders; in the third stage, these top leaders were directly interviewed by the researchers only to find a remarkable degree of interrelatedness among them. See Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, (New York, 1963) pp.81-2.


16. Ibid., p.5.


25. Ibid., p.32.

26. Ibid., p.123.

27. Ibid., p.162.


29. Ibid., 153-4.


34. For both types of explanations, we can look at Europe's transition from feudalism to capitalism in the pages of Economy and Society, later reproduced in R. Hilton (ed.). The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London, 1980). Both Hilton and Dobb suggest that during the course of the relatively unfettered commodity production in the 15th century, sufficient surplus was retained by the small producers through securing independence of action from the feudal lords. (pp. 25, 2, 7, 59). The displaced peasantry, in turn, ensured 'the existence of cheap labour for hire'. For Sweezey, on the other hand, the crucial factor was the increased burden of revenue on the peasants imposed by the feudal lords (pp. 39-43). Instead of contempt for serfs or sub-infeudation or war and brigandage being the cause of it, he thinks that the rapid expansion of the urban-based trade brought into the local markets a great supply of goods, from the eleventh century onwards. This in turn created a crisis in the feudal production system by shaping the needs of the feudal lords along the lines of exchange economy. This pressure to buy from without generated a pressure to sell. Thus, the old system of production for use was subsumed under the new system of production for exchange. Near the epicentre of this exchange economy, therefore, we find a certain 'freeing' effect on the peasant labourer, as he now enjoyed an alternative source of livelihood in the nearby towns. By contrast, the new 'periphery' of this exchange economy experiences an intensification of the old forms of exploitation so as to extract more revenue to buy more; p. 46.


36. S. Amin, op. cit., p. 33.


43. See for example, several contributions in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (eds) Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972)


46. Ibid., pp.138.


54. Ibid. p. 215.
60. Ziemann and Lanzendorfer, op. cit., p. 155.
63. Pearse, op. cit., p. 75.
69. Amin, op. cit. p. 345.


74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., pp. 81, 83.


77. Haara and Smith, (eds) op. cit., p. 238.


79. Poulantzas (1973) op. cit., p. 246.


81. Ibid., p. 74.


83. Ibid, p. 132.

84. Ibid. p. 140.

85. Ibid. pp. 142-3.


87. Ibid. pp. 56-61.


96. Ibid., p. 56.
97. Ibid., p. 41.
100. W. Hein and K. Stenzel, op. cit., pp. 93, 97.
103. Fred Block (1978), op. cit., p. 28.
105. Ibid., pp. 232-4.
107. Ibid., pp. 318-320.
114. Ibid., pp. 167-169.
115. Ibid. p. 81.
116. R. Miliband (1979), op.cit., pp.179, 185-8-
120. Hoare and Smith (eds.) op.cit.p.272.
122. Huntington, op.cit., ch.I.
129. P. Worsley, 'The Concept of Populism', ibid., pp.240,244.
133. Ibid. pp.1191-2-.
134. Ibid., p. 1192-3.
135. Ibid., p. 1193.


140. Ibid. p.22.


143. Ibid., pp. 159-60.


146. Ibid, pp.52-55.


151. Ibid. p.219.

153. Ibid. p. 317.


158. Ibid. pp 11-12.


161. J. S. Migdal, op. cit. p. 188.

162. Shanin, 'Peasantry as a Political Factor', in (ed), op. cit., p. 249.


166. Lemarchand and Legg, op. cit., p. 154.

168. Ibid., p. 149.


177. Alavi, (1973) op. cit., pp. 31-32.

178. Fledburg, op. cit. p. 158.


Some of his observations are as follows:

1. Pakistan has had four constitutions (1947, 1956, 1962, 1973) within a quarter of a century.

2. Pakistan experimented with four distinct politico-administrative set-ups e.g. five provinces (1947-55), two provinces (1955-70), five provinces (1970-71), four provinces (1971-).


See for example, G. W. Chaudhary, Constitutional Development of Pakistan (Lahore, 1959), and Democracy in Pakistan (Dacca 1963, Mushtaq Hussain, Government and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi 1959), Keith Callard, Pakistan A Political Study (London, 1957).


CHAPTER II

STATE IN BRITISH INDIA: PAKISTAN'S COLONIAL HERITAGE

Introduction

In the present chapter we shall take up an enquiry into the structure and mode of operation of the colonial state in India. A parallel concern will be the ways and means by which the emergent Muslim leadership was inducted into this state. It is argued that colonialism played a decisive role in India's transition from medieval to modern times in that it brought about entirely new structural relationships between state and society. On the one hand it provided the state with new functions of regulating and planning the economy and with a new bureaucratized machinery to perform these functions. On the other hand, it created the nation-state itself, which was based on a new concept of citizenship, new modes of political participation and by corollary new territorial definitions of nationalism. It is not possible therefore to analyse the politics of Pakistan without first understanding the nature and function of the colonial state apparatus which it has inherited and kept almost wholly intact.

The politics of colonial India has been studied in various contexts, often by authors adhering to different, even contradictory viewpoints. The first generation of post-war historians, especially from Cambridge, focused mainly on the role of the emergent elite groups in the Indian society as being crucial for organising an all-encompassing nationalist struggle. This role was conceived in terms of the elite's attempts to adjust with and respond to the new politico-administrative framework and carve out a position for itself in it through mass mobilization based on charismatic leadership, political uses of ideology and organisational activity. Indeed, Kedourie
considers nationalism itself to be an importation from the West which impelled the frustrated indigenous elite to create a mass following and thus defeat its masters on way to political independence.  

The elite approaches largely suffered through ideological agnosticism in the sense that both imperialism and nationalism were defined in terms of ideological factors largely at the cost of exclusion of economic and social factors. They also tended to put all the political initiative securely in the hands of elite groups and thus reduce the role of large masses to the status of mere objects of their wills to be manipulated as and when they desired. Thirdly, these approaches helped create the myth of a monolithic nationalism, whereas different localities and regions had produced distinctly different patterns of political behaviour which defied the yoke of a unitary model for explaining nationalism.

Following these objections in the reverse order, we can observe that the so-called national studies were followed by a generation of regional studies in the Indian environment. It was claimed that different regions brought about different types of issues, class structures and leadership patterns which have an intrinsic explanatory value. David Washbrook on Madras, Broomfield on Bengal, Ravinder Kumar on Maharashtra and Pandey on the UP stand out as examples of regional scholarship. However, their terms of reference continued to be dominated by the concept of elites, even though some of them showed concern for the local patterns of agricultural production and the corresponding class structures. The obverse of elite theory is the approach which stresses the role of the subaltern classes and groups constituting the mass of the labouring population and the intermediate strata in town and country — that is, the people. Here the subaltern classes represent the 'demographic difference' between the total Indian population and the elite. Such a simple calculation manifest an idealistic concern with the 'politics of people' as 'an autonomous domain' of social activity. This approach largely depends on an arbitrary use of the existing terminology and leaves almost all its analytical tools untheorized.
Coming finally to nationalism, we find the emergence of a huge mass of literature dealing with the 'freedom movements' of India and Pakistan in the form of elaborate eulogies of its leaders and nationalist organisations. What is conveniently forgotten is that this subjective phenomenon called nationalism has an objective context which defines it, i.e., world capitalism. Even where this factor is taken into consideration it is usually tailored to meet the 'nationalist' needs of accusing the erstwhile colonial power of an acute economic drain from India on one-to-one basis. The mature historical studies, especially in the Marxist tradition, would rather concentrate on the structural transformation of the Indian economy under colonialism which put it in a subservient position vis-a-vis the world capitalism. In the same way, the institutional transformation of the state would be analyzed with reference to penetration of capital into the Indian economy and the corresponding changes in the class structures. In the present chapter we shall largely concentrate on both of these aspects.

On the other hand, this chapter is not meant to be a history of Muslim nationalism in India, nor merely an account of administrative/constitutional development. Instead, this is a study of the nature and direction of structural changes in the Indian statehood itself, as effected by the colonial rule. In view of the fact that various regions of India evolved different politico-administrative traditions, we shall concentrate only on those areas which provide the territorial base for politics in Pakistan of today. The Punjab province of British India stands out as the most typical example of Pakistan's political heritage, because:

i) it contains 56% of the population in today's Pakistan;  

ii) even in united Pakistan it was the strongest province in terms of recruitment to the highest jobs in bureaucracy and army. In that capacity it set the dominant trend in the country's politics.
iii) the NWFP formed a part of the Punjab throughout the second half of the 19th century, when important structural changes were being introduced in the province. Our analysis will therefore equally apply to these two provinces, which together contain three-fourths of the population of Pakistan today. In any case, the focus of our enquiry is not on the evolution of provincial administration in colonial India, or its relations with the Central government, but the way the authority of the new state came into contact with the general masses. Therefore, our focus will be largely on the colonial state as it operated in the environment of Punjab, and not the Punjab government itself, which, however, undoubtedly remained the principal agency through which this state actualized its role in the province.

Some of the questions to which we have addressed ourselves in the present chapter are: Whether, and if so in which way, the state structure in British India was subsumed under the dynamic of capital. What was the division of power between various authority-holding institutions of this state. Whether, and if so how, the colonial regime determined the political attitudes of its successor regimes in Pakistan in general. An attempt has been made to answer these questions in this chapter. In Section I we shall look at the structure of the precolonial state and the direction of change in it prior to colonialism. In Section II we shall study the emerging relationship between capital and the colonial state. In Section III we shall look into the changing patterns of interaction between the state and various classes. In Section IV we shall analyse the institutional set-up of the new state. In the final section an enquiry into the mode of entry of the Muslim leadership into this state will be taken up against the background of the emergence of middle classes and the problem of associating them with the exercise of state authority.
SECTION I: India Before Colonialism

Many long-held notions about pre-colonial society in India revolved around the village community which was considered to be self-sufficient, with a division of labour based upon the caste system which had remained unchanged throughout recorded history. In Metcalf's familiar words, 'these village communities, like' "little republics", having nearly everything that they can want within themselves... last where nothing else lasts'. This image of a self-perpetuating, static society not only excluded the possibility of a strong urban sector in medieval India but also denied the existence of individual rights in landed property there: it considered all land as being the property of the ruler in a final sense, although communally held and operated at the production level. It was argued that the absence of private property of the European feudal type in India hindered the emergence of classes and therefore in the absence of any technological advance, no class conflict erupted. Contemporary researches, however, would lead us to believe otherwise: that India had a relatively advanced level of urbanization, in the sense both of the existence of large cities and of a high ratio of urban-rural population; that Indian history is dotted by numerous peasant revolts showing the vigour and not the passivity of society; and that individual rights in land did exist and the government dealt directly with the peasant for revenue payment, which was the 'remuneration of sovereignty' and not a rent for the use of royal property. However, such property rights were subservient to (i) the collective functioning of the village community, which had the right to apportion land to individual cultivators, and (ii) the public duty of cultivation enforced by the state.
The village surplus was marketed in the towns on an individual basis, but towns had nothing to offer in return by way of trade; instead they paid with the money which they extracted by way of revenue. The need for a common financial pool and its administration in the village as well as for a common platform against the state's exploitative measures helped maintain the boundaries of village community intact and its leadership crystallized throughout ages. Most of the village peasantry belonged to the same caste, probably because of the tribal conquests of the past, which further added an element of solidarity among them. The system whereby each peasant was supposed to pay the low caste functionaries at harvest-time for their services throughout the year - the so-called Jajmani system - 'militated against commodification of their services and against the peasant himself looking for alternative sources'. Indeed, the lower castes enjoyed no better than a semi-servile status, 'involving a kind of bondage to a particular community of caste peasants or zamindars'. These facts have forced a reconsideration of pre-colonial India somewhat along the lines of European feudalism, and at the same time the abandoning of the earlier concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production.

Localized Power Structure: the Role of the Zamindar

The village zamindars have generally been considered the basis of the Moghul imperial system. While the assessment of revenue in both the taluqa (zamindari) villages and the raiyati villages was done by the pargana officials, it was the zamindars who were held responsible for the full realization of the assessed revenue. In the former areas, they were usually descendants of the initial conquerors who therefore demonstrated enough potential ability to extract revenue from a recalcitrant peasantry for the
government to appoint them for that purpose. In the latter, the Panchayati system, with its main function of adjustment of accounts for revenue payment produced over time, a class of big men, Muqaddams, Choudharies, Deshmukhs, who acquired the office of headman and became zamindars in their own right. Their power depended, in the last resort, on the armed support of chieftains or superior landlords to keep the peasants subordinate to themselves. In the eyes of the state, their power was essentially rooted in their indispensable role as revenue collectors. Thus, despite their mutually contradictory interests in a greater share of peasant surplus, in the long run the zamindars generally came off even better than their political masters. In the face of an extremely oppressive revenue demand by the imperial system, they either transferred the burden to the peasants or else took up arms against the government and forced the peasants to serve as soldiers. In practice the zamindars often chose to severely persecute the peasantry rather than go to war with the government. Such persecutions led to frequent peasant migrations to distant lands, and the danger of dwindling revenues forced the government to depend still more heavily on zamindars; to survive, the system had to protect their localized autonomy. In the zamindar then we see, within the larger framework of authoritarian state machinery, the centre-point of a virtually sovereign localized power structure.
Although the Indian state under the Moghuls had developed elaborate institutions to meet the administrative problems of such a large society, its performance remained contingent upon the support of the local elites, especially, for revenue collection; more often than not its predatory bureaucracy let a variety of settlements flourish in all parts of the empire. Authority relations were based essentially on the direct application of force rather than on a centralized system of rule application and rule adjudication. The reach of the superiors' arm was the only touchstone of real authority, tempered, in lesser cases, by customary law. Thus the pre-colonial state in India lacked both in depth and in breadth; on the one hand, it had built more power than real authority and therefore had to resort to use of force again and again, while its legitimacy remained dormant in the absence of elaborate legal machinery; on the other hand, it failed to penetrate into large areas under its nominal jurisdiction and therefore had to surrender a good part of its 'Khalisa' lands to win over chieftains. It thus further distanced itself from the point where authority was exercised by the primary and intermediary zamindars.

**Marketization**

Since Akbar, the cash basis of revenue payment necessarily involved market participation by the peasant. Being usually unable to raise enough surplus to sell in the town-market, he would turn to the moneylender for credit to pay his revenue which usually amounted to
half of the produce and sometimes had to be paid in advance of harvesting. Sometimes a loan was given in cash while repayment was demanded in kind. This enabled the usurer to trade in agricultural produce by first fixing an arbitrary price and then converting it into merchandize for the larger market. In this way a new class of grain dealers-cum-merchants-cum-money lenders emerged slowly in 17th century India. It led, on the one hand, to the growth of a number of small townships, functioning as mandis (grain markets), and on the other hand, to the growth of a money economy in general. The latter phenomenon involved i) artisans, especially weavers, who were financed by these merchant-money lenders, though production itself continued to be on a household basis; ii) the petty traders who were paid in advance through bills of exchange (hundis) and were thus held captive to the interests of the moneylender. Unlike the English 'putting out' system whereby the merchants themselves provided raw material and even implements of production, here it was essentially a forward dealing system 'under which merchants received a down payment on the signing of a formal contract, and they in turn undertook the prior financing of the producers'.

These usurious practices underlay the cash nexus in India, while cities functioned as the 'redistributive central places', where the village surpluses were marketed and paid for out of whatever the urban-based authorities could extract in the form of revenue. When an increase in agricultural prices took place, the balance... could be restored only by an increase in the land revenue collections'.

In other words here was a system based not on the sovereignty of a market structure with its own price settling mechanism independent of non-economic coercive forces, but on the politico-military force of the state as manifested through the localized power structure. Despite the growing commercial-mindedness of the Moghul nobility in the 17th century, market functioning remained essentially subservient to
the interests of the aristocracy, who chose 'to control prices and
to monopolise such specific spheres of trade as they considered
profitable to themselves'. However, the same fact also meant
that extensive market operations were the order of the day, which
accrued profits to the money-minded aristocratic families, who
were therefore ready to extend protection to trading activities,
especially on the West coast.

Indeed, an elaborate hierarchy of markets had emerged
during the 17th century, increasingly tied to the export trade. Chaudri
describes a threefold division of Indian markets in spatial and
functional terms, viz. the great seaports, the so-called 'primal nodal
markets' of Surat, Masulipatam and Hugil; regional commercial
entrepots like Patna, Banaras, Agra and Lahore; and local single-
commodity markets. Each of them contained such roles and functions
which catered for the needs of local market, wholesale spot market
and wholesale forward market. Already the level of prices was
adjusted according to supply and demand, supported by a 'nexus of
credit relationships' which helped reduce any price fluctuations due to
disequilibrium between them. However, increasingly the locus of
the Indian market system tended to be outside the country as the volume
of international trade rose and the great banking firms of India reorientated
their activities, to serve the European commercial interests.

The importance of these bankers (Sahukars, Shroffs, and Mahajans)
for the Moghul imperial system cannot be overstressed. These firms
often provided loans to individual officers of the government, invested
in production factories (Karkhanas) and huge construction projects,
as well as dealing in bullion and jewellery; sometimes they acted as
state treasurers in various provinces of the empire. By the 18th
century, their new role as revenue collectors was rapidly expanding.
They provided credit and cash to the tax farmers, who then surrendered the right of collecting revenue from a prescribed area to these bankers as security or mortgage. However, during this period the increasing political incompetence of the regime to safeguard their interests forced these trading and banking communities to buy protection from the regional powers as well as the foreign traders; the latter became their clients towards the latter part of the 18th century.

Not only did the Europeans' intrusive market interests increasingly absorb all the available financial resources of the country: they also diverted the flow of manufactured goods away from their traditional markets throughout the Eastern world, towards the European countries. It has been suggested that most of the contemporary Eastern empires, like the Safavid, Uzbek, Ottoman and Moghul, capitulated to the new market forces emanating from the West during the 18th century. By destroying the old caravan trade with central Asia, and thus the attendant revenue, these new channels of trade undermined the financial position of the feudal rulers. The position was exacerbated by the price rise that followed from increased bullion flows. The rulers were forced to use greater coercion in extracting higher levels of taxes leading in turn to rebellions, incessant wars and finally direct or indirect subjugation to the West. In the case of India, the corporate economic behaviour of East India Company can be contrasted with the traditionally decentralized and fragmented local markets. This difference only accelerated the process of the latter's capitulation to the former.

To sum up, we can say that the social structure of pre-colonial India was characterized by virtual sovereignty of localized power structures based on village zamindars. The village boundaries were jealously guarded as a security mechanism against the urban-based political forces. Towns existed mainly as a function of the system of revenue extraction. They lacked any productive role in the local
economy and lived off the production of the rural sector. Indeed, the prevalent revenue structure kept the rural economy subservient to the urban consumers' demand on a non-market basis because the latter were generally represented by the functionaries and retainers of the court. This absence of commodity production for market was largely responsible for aborting the process of capital accumulation by the local trading communities of India which were therefore rendered marginal to the global economic currents.

However, even before colonialism the Indian economic and political forces had started undergoing a structural change under the impact of the increasing international trade in and around the Indian Ocean.

Section II. Capital and State in India

The process of colonial expansion in India continued for almost a hundred years starting from the mid 18th century. By the time the British arrived in Punjab, they had already developed a fairly widely operative institutional set-up for administration of the colonial society. Its operations drew upon its structural relationships with the emerging world capitalism, whose dynamics it transfused into India. In other words, the precise nature of the government in Punjab was shaped by the institutionalized practices of the British government elsewhere in India for one hundred years.

As noted above, East India Company's organized power overcame the dissipated local sovereignties and by the same token their Indian counterparts in trade. Under colonialism, the erstwhile secondary role of external trade assumed a new importance, gradually dominating the existing market relations. Indeed, early administrators served conspicuously as market functionaries because that was their original calling. The colonial regime changed the mode of market operations in a qualitative sense by introducing a unified currency system, expanding communications, standardizing commodities and protecting goods transport throughout the country and abroad. The consequent social disjunction between classes created political problems in the
form of contradictory pressures on the government which led to increasing state interference in the market processes. Together, these two positions defined the state's role in British India.

State as Promoter of Capitalism

A controversy exists about the theory of economic drain from India under the British rule. However, our main interest at present lies not in Indo-British economic relations as such, but in the structural transformation of the Indian economy as effected by the British, especially up to the First World War by which time the state in India had evolved a fairly autonomous structural presence of its own. Two distinct phases of official policy can be outlined: the East India company monopoly period (1757-1833) and the era of Free Trade (1833-1922). The former is characterized by the establishment of law and order in the British Indian territories which enhanced a sense of security in the imbursement of cash and transportation of goods from one place to another. For example, the formidable role of currency in circulating commodities on a fairly standard basis was soon realized and attempts were made to grapple with the bimetallic currency system inherited from the pre-colonial days. In the same period, we see the early banks of India emerging out of the Agency Houses, especially in the Presidencies. At first, they had a high failure rate because the Treasury Bills by which money was raised were liable to depreciation in the market, and by the combination chiefly of Native brokers, were often at a heavy discount. Consequently government intervention had to be invoked and later on the government became a shareholder and co-director of the new Bank of Bengal in 1806 - a tradition which was subsequently followed elsewhere.
In this period the East India Company's monopoly over Indian trade was increasingly attacked by rival trading interests, backed by Adam Smith and other economists. From 1813 to 1833 there was a gradual liberalization of the prevalent pattern of trade during which the basis of the future Indian economy was largely established. By 1827 cotton textiles from Lancashire accounted for almost one-third of the aggregate value of British exports to India. The Free Traders lobbied their way through the Parliament and finally got the Free Trade Act passed in 1833. It was followed by an organized flow of capital into India and consequently the rapid maturation of financial institutions, especially banking and agency houses. The first stirrings of capitalism in India emerged in such fields as indigo, tea, coffee and coal-mining, soon followed by the manufacture of cotton and jute goods. Almost all these activities were regulated and controlled under the Managing Agency System which replaced the earlier agency houses. Under this system, entrepreneurial, financial and managerial functions were handled by a single business organization which ran many concerns. Gradually, the European firms acquired a monopolistic hold over the export trade in Bombay. Their credit-worthiness in the new banking system far surpassed that of the exclusively indigenous firms. Likewise, their expertise in long distance international financial dealings, sometimes described as 'superior business aptitude', was boosted up by the increasing use of telegraph in all communications with their European headquarters. In other words, integration in the world economy became the most significant measure of strength or weakness of corporate interests in India.

Under the Free Trade policies huge foreign investment flowed into large public projects such as canals, railways, ports and roads. Many of these projects were however ill-planned and mismanaged, ending up in financial disaster. Their 'failure' gradually eroded the
overriding influence of the British capitalists over the Indian government, especially after it came directly under the British crown in 1858. In the last quarter of the 19th century, however, the Indian economic nationalism emerged as a major rival contender for influence over the financial policy of the Government. The issue of tariff-free import of cotton textiles into India became a hotbed of controversy between the emergent Indian bourgeoisie and the British Free Traders. It was reflected through the correspondence between Governor General Northbook and Secretary of State for India Lord Salisbury, each responding to the pressure nearer at hand.

The Government of India followed the Ricardian concept of international trade based on the principal of comparative advantage. It was committed therefore to development of agriculture in India and that of manufactured goods in Britain. Thus it pursued the dual policy of imposition of tariff duty on Indian exports to England and reduction of import duty on the British goods entering India. This had disastrous effects on the indigenous industrial base of the Indian society.

Indeed the state in India not only facilitated the operations of the market, it also guaranteed its expansion. During the latter years of the 19th century, British capital was heavily invested in income yielding assets like irrigation. Also, all private undertakings in railways were given a public guarantee of 5% return which amounted to £50 million in 1900. This enormously expanded India's infrastructural base without any corresponding expansion of manufacturing industry. Instead, railway was used to link up the interior to the nearest shipping ports for import of manufactured goods from Britain and export of raw materials from India. In other words, the state was called upon to serve the interests of the metropolitan capital in the most crucial areas of local economy.
A direct outcome of these policies was the differential pattern of penetration of the local society by the state and capital. The port cities of Bombay and Calcutta, with Madras as a poor third, together commanded 70-80% of all Indian imports and exports and nearly 70% of the total circulation of government currency notes. Through wholesale trade, they acquired a firm hold on the large upcountry. They also provided the first genuinely pan-Indian political leaderships. As we shall discuss later, the Punjab came to be firmly established in the new economic system as the agrarian base of commodity production. Here, almost all of the investment went into communications and irrigation, leaving very little for industrial development. This in turn determined the pattern of class formation in the province. A vigorous landed middle class from the canal colony areas joined hands with the landlords of North West Punjab to secure their dominant position against the urban interests. They shared with the state an over-all commitment to maintenance of status quo and thus emerged as its natural allies.

At the national level, however, the Government had to face the increasingly vocal economic nationalism of the emergent commercial bourgeoisie. This revolved around such issues as the ever-rising 'Home Charges', increasing debt servicing over British investment in large public projects, a constant depreciation of the exchange rate of the rupee and not least closing of silver mints in 1893 which led to issuance of token currency, thereby making the state the sole arbitrator of value. As a result the Secretary of State acquired supreme financial leverage in the form of authority to sell Council Drafts for sterling in London to be met by the government in India. Later, immediately after the First World War, the government took out huge amounts of money from India, rising to Rs. 52 crore, between 1920 and 1923 alone—a measure which was alleged to be designed to drain the Indian resources, stunt its industrial growth by divesting it of capital formation and thus
reduce it to a market for cheapened British goods. All along, the standard government response was that it was only letting the natural forces of world economy take their own course.

It can be observed that during the Free Trade era, the colonial state emerged as an integral part of world capitalism. It re-orientated the Indian economic forces in a way that helped the British capital to accumulate. In doing so, however, it gave rise to the retaliatory forces which sought to indigenise the state by putting pressure on it to be autonomous of British capital and also to actively intervene in the market operations to turn its tide generally in favour of India. The state's role as promoter of capitalism was not only universally accepted but was invoked incessantly in support of various regional and communal groups.

State Autonomy and Interventionism

From 1922 onwards state in India marched rapidly towards autonomization and assumption of an interventionist role. The official opinion largely favoured state intervention because that promised to solve many of the continuing ills of industry. It could update the emerging capitalists on matters of commercial changes, start pioneer factories, employ research staff, open technical institutes for training, provide banking facilities and could take up large public works like hydro-electric power generation. All this meant new institutions to regulate market operations which, it was alleged, militated against the accepted government policy of laissez faire. It was feared that state would only distort the market's perfect allocation of resources to sectors where they could be most productively used. A counter argument stressed the already strong role of the state as the largest employer of labour and recommended further protective and regulatory measures for the ailing Indian industry. Moreover, the First World War brought home the fact that state intervention was necessary to make Indian industry technologically self-sufficient. The
need for an autonomous industrial base with some defence potential was acutely felt, leading to assumption of an industrial policy by the government committed to establish a firm footing on the Indian soil, and make it independent of the deterministic control of the international market. The Indian Fiscal Commission 1921-22 recommended a policy of protection for selected industries and the establishment of a permanent Tariff Board for that purpose, as well as the elimination of a general system of imperial preferences save in a certain number of commodities to be referred to the Indian Legislatures.66

Indeed, state intervention in industry was one of the few issues on which both the government and the Indian nationalists saw eye to eye with each other. The latter, while operating through the new channels of organised opinion like the Chambers of Commerce, the Indian National Congress and the Bombay Millowners Association pressed the government to take up a support function for achieving economic autarky for India. Lower down, provinces in general tended to seek protection from the state against the emergent bourgeoisie from the Presidencies.67 During the negotiations leading to the 1919 Reforms a big controversy erupted as to whether industry should be a federal or a provincial subject; finally it was put on the concurrent list.68 The Punjab, followed by other Muslim majority provinces, was particularly apprehensive of encouragement of private industry because of its domination by the Hindu commercial interests; rather it favoured the public sector because it was more likely to reserve a certain proportion of jobs for the minorities.69

The way to state intervention was opened by British capital's increasing vulnerability. The latter was rooted in i) the wartime efforts of the government to apply rigid controls over all capitalist operations, ii) the 1919 reforms which put industry on the list of transferred subjects to be run by the Indian ministers, and iii) the Great Depression of 1929-33. As for the first, when the postwar
retracement set in, war-time collectivism was increasingly criticised by the British capitalists. Their managing agencies demanded resurgence of the spirit of free enterprise and decontrol of industry in general, while opposing any schemes of import-substituting industrialization which would have put their stakes in international trade in jeopardy. However, the pressure from various indigenous groups opposed a reversal in policy.

From 1919 onwards, the government under dyarchy alienated a large number of British Officers. In all 350 officers preferred to resign rather than serve under the local ministers. This led to a general lack of confidence in business activity which in turn dried up the foreign sources of investment. Successive imperial crises of war and depression severely disrupted the precarious balance between London and Delhi, whereby the latter won a considerable degree of operational autonomy. The role of the Indian state as guarantor of British capital underwent a radical change as it sought to adjust with Indian nationalism. In consequence, a process of withdrawal of capital from India set in. Between 1931 and 1937 alone Rs. 371.30 crores flew outside, 90% of which was private and thus could not be guaranteed through state action.

In a parallel process, the financial institutions of the Indian government came to full maturation in the same period. Between 1920, when the Imperial Bank of India emerged and assumed some functions of a central bank, without however powers of note issue, and 1935 when the country's first central bank, the Reserve Bank of India, was established, we can observe a gradual process of autonomization of the Indian state. In other words the state in British India came to play a more mature role than had been accorded to it till then in the process of capital accumulation. As it outgrew the overall dominance of the metropolitan capital, it was increasingly identified with the rising indigenous capital in whose interest it intervened in the market.
Section III. State and Society: A New Relationship

In the last section we pointed to the way the capitalist dynamics subsumed the colonial state in India. As it did so, it brought about a new source of legitimacy in the society, in the form of the state's capacity and willingness to function as a mediator between the contending social forces. It thus radically changed the relationships within and between various social classes and the state. The British mind evaluated the Indian society against their own on the basis of a society's ability to establish political stability for commerce to flourish and property to be protected. 74

It inherited the idea of property as an unqualified and absolute possession from Roman Law which was later elevated to the status of a Law of Nature by Locke. As such property became the dominant social value even above the crown or intermediary landlords, whereby its safeguard, inheritance; transfer or sale was protected by the civil state. 75 These ideas were first applied in India in the form of the Permanent Settlement system under which landlords' traditional rights in land were turned into ownership rights by the sole adjudicating authority of the state; in this way the fate of the civil state was bound up with property holding once and for all. 76 The government's monopoly over administration of justice, along with the elimination of the rights of feudal lords to exact custom duties from the inland trade and their magisterial powers, paved the way for the emergence of the state as an entity superior to and distinct from the zamindars. The new approach to property transformed the class structure of the agrarian society in India by giving inalienable possession of land to zamindars and consequently dispossessing the tenants.
The British sense of property was closely related to a conception of wealth as production. The British 'organizing concepts' revolved around the 'improving landlord' with a commitment to the 18th century British pattern of estate management, based on application of various implements of production like communications development and labour employment for profit maximization. In this model, secondary institutions like estates, firms and churches played a dominant role. By contrast, the Indian society was still largely structured by primordial loyalties of family, caste and village where instead of profit orientation, search for security against the disruptive role of the outside forces was the dominant concern. This led to a permanent struggle between various factions to expand their power base by recruiting more and more people to their side, under what is described as a land-to-rule model.

While India came under the production-oriented British rule, the government policy was undergoing a consistent utilitarian influence throughout the 19th century further pushing it towards ruthless developmentalism. The official thinking stressed that 'when a cultivator becomes impoverished and by his inability to cultivate his land properly deprives the community of what it is capable of producing, the land may get into the hands of someone better able to turn it to advantage.'

This development orientation was couched increasingly in the form of institutional penetration of the society by the state. Its most striking example is the famous land administration systems viz the Permanent Settlement system, the Ryotwari system and the Mahalwari system. In a parallel process, we see the management of agricultural development, especially in the Punjab, through expansion and administration of railways and irrigation canals, which radically changed the institutional framework of the agrarian society. Both these factors played a formative role in establishing new relationships between state and society in India.
The first experiment of the British with the land administration of India was the Permanent Settlement (Zamindari) System of Bengal. However, many of its intended results were aborted most significantly improvement of agriculture. These followed a discussion of how burdensome were the non-productive exactions from the direct producers. This led to the famous controversy about the exact nature of land revenue, i.e. whether it was a tax or rent. The miserable experience of the Zamindari system in Bengal, whereby permanent property rights were given to landlords, pushed the utilitarians, led by James Mill, to consider state landlordism as a crucial factor in the rural economy which had a right to absorb a share up to the whole of the rent. Indeed, it was claimed that Indian agriculture remained largely untaxed under land revenue. Unlike other taxes, land revenue was carefully excluded from the jurisdiction of civil courts as also from all legislation. Nor was it adjustable to the government needs so easily because of long periods between settlements. Instead, revenue was to be considered a proportion of rent for the land which is the crown property in a final sense. State protection and development of communications and other factors of production help increase productivity of land which therefore attracts demand. Land being in limited supply, such demand increases its rental value. Thus, such an increment is earned not by individual effort but by state's overlordship. Therefore, society had a right to this unearned income in the form of rent and yet it would not eat into the productive capital surplus at all. Such a doctrine imbibed the spirit of contemporary British conceptions of property, e.g., its free saleability, use, and mortgaging. It was feared that restrictions over landed property would only reduce its value and consequently the capacity of the landholder to pay revenue.
In this way, between the last quarters of the 18th and 19th centuries, the state in British India moved from the position of a passive spectator of the changing agrarian relations to the one of determining their general thrust. Under the Zamindari System, it had left all residual powers of exaction from land to the Zamindars with a view to encourage them to maximize production. It withdrew from the scene completely to let the market forces take over. Later, however, the protagonists of the Ryotwari System stressed the right of state interference with private rights under a system of periodical settlements. The state's share in all future increases in land revenue would thus be fully safeguarded. Yet, the uneconomical 'aggregate-to-detail' procedure of this system soon led to a consideration of the role of middleman. Therefore, in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, and later Punjab, the Mahalwari or Village System was introduced under which either single individuals like Taluqdar or village brotherhoods were given the responsibility for collection of revenue. When the British took over Punjab this Village System was transplanted there. However, as the revenue system of Punjab under the Sikhs differed from the contemporary Village System of the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, the latter's application in this province was problematic in many key areas.

After annexation, the British found three types of land rights prevalent in the Punjab: i) Superior proprietors, ii) Inferior proprietors, and iii) the Occupancy tenants. Revenue payment was the basis of a title to landholding. If the ownership par excellence lay with the superior landholder, he was responsible for payment of revenue while the inferior owners would thereby become occupancy tenants, with a permanent right of cultivation. If it was the inferior owners who won recognition, the superior proprietors would be privileged to demand a quit-rent. A third situation arose when both the superior
and inferior owners were entitled full and limited proprietary rights respectively. A decade after the annexation, the government declared a minimum of 12 years of unhampered cultivation necessary for acquisition of occupancy rights. This move largely favoured landlords who now enjoyed a high level of security and could, and in the event actually did, replace a great number of tenants. These settlements were withdrawn in 1863, causing a great upheaval among the landowners. However, they later succeeded in getting it reversed through the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1867. Elaborate codification covering rent leases, ejectment, inheritance etc. was taken up in the Land Revenue Act of 1871, which also legalized all settlements completed till that date. As almost 60% of cultivable land was held by peasant proprietors, tenancy as such remained a lesser problem in the Punjab than elsewhere in India. The 1887 Punjab Tenancy Act in fact barred all further inquiries into the status of tenants. Later under the 1893 Act, government tenants in the canal colonies were protected from attachments or sale in execution of decrees.

During the last years of the 19th century, some decline of proprietary cultivation occurred. The land under it came down from 13.2 million acres in 1891-2 to 12.66 million acres in 1900-1. The cases of tenant turnover amounted to 29,062 in the same decade. This change towards increasing tenancy was a result of the state-aided irrigation projects, carrying practical certainty of a much larger share rent from land protected by canals. This further pushed landlords to a mere rent-receiving role. Indeed, the better the lands—as in canal colonies—the greater was the ratio of rents-in-kind to cash rents and therefore the faster the substitution of leaseholders by the sharecroppers; finally, by the end of the first quarter of the 20th century, half of the cultivated land in Punjab had come under tenancy. We can observe the peasants' preference for a secure supply of foodstuff based on what Chayanov called a strategy of minimum risks. This only signified the fact that peasants were shrewdly conscious of the en-capsulating effect of the rapidly expanding cash economy and sought to avoid participation in it as a security mechanism.
In this way, the landlord-tenant relations took a long stride away from the traditional pattern in the sense that both the landed property and the tenurial relations were sealed permanently by the legitimizing force of the state. By corollary, it meant that the landless tenants did not have any rights per se to be recognised, by the state, unlike the previous tradition of the customary law; only their duties were recognised in connection with their tenurial contracts and also whatever rights they earned in their capacity as lessees. In other words, participation in the new state system, from whatever underprivileged position, was compulsory for survival in the new Indian society. In the same way, the state-sponsored development in the production base of Punjab society created a new class of dependant peasantry whose subject position was a function of the new property relations rather than a manifestation of the earlier ideological factors.

A related problem was the increasing importance of the official position on the nature of land revenue. Its application in Punjab led to emergence of a market in land which in turn effected a net transfer of landed property from zamindars to moneylenders. Indeed, the application of rent doctrine to the Punjab was problematic from the beginning. This doctrine operated in North India under the net produce formula. Under this, specimen rent rates were constructed by converting rental payments in kind into money-rates per acre. However, the Punjab tenants from the Sikh period had been revenue-sharers and not rent-payers. Thus imaginary rental values had to be created with revenue assessed at a rate not exceeding half that value. As proprietary rights increasingly defined the agrarian relations, the credit of the money lender expanded accordingly; now it was based on the security of ascertained rights in land, replacing largely the old crop-bound mode of money-lending. A long period had to pass before the real meaning of the new property-bound credit came home to the peasant community. It meant that land could now be sold
for payment of debt. Credit was given protection by law, especially after the regular courts were established in the Punjab in 1874-5, which generally favoured the relatively more articulate money-lender against the illiterate cultivator. However, the root-cause of money-lending i.e. the peasant's need for cash to pay land revenue remained outside their jurisdiction. In the beginning the role of creditor was considered even progressive and the 'application to the improvement of the land of the capital of the monied classes' was canonized as 'the outcome of an irresistible economic law'. Consequently, a market in land propped up with a price-hike far in excess of a comparable increase in the government's revenue demand. It has been argued that by fixing the land revenue as proportion of rent, i.e. 55% of net produce, the government created private rent property, the difference between rent and revenue demand, which gave new commercial value to land.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price : Rs.</th>
<th>Multiplier of Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1875-76</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-81</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885-86</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-91</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Ever after the Deccan Riots of 1875, the likely political consequences of dispossession of a large portion of peasantry from land by the moneylenders throughout the Punjab had alarmed the administration from time to time, but interference with free enterprise proved to be too big a stride to take. For some time it resorted to
enforcement of the 1852 Pre-emption Act to save the cohesion of the village community.\(^9^4\) It was noted that the new proprietors and mortgagees failed to improve land and most of them turned into mere rent-receivers.\(^9^5\) Even while the Alienation of Land Act of 1900 came into operation to prevent land from going to non-agriculturist classes, the land market itself continued to flourish. Some 967,000 plots were sold between 1896-7 and 1916-7, involving 3 million acres of cultivated land and 33 crores of rupees.\(^9^6\) The number of mortgages increased from 10.5% of all cultivable land in 1920-I to 11.5% in 1931 and 12.1% in 1934.\(^9^7\) The inexorable laws of political economy worked to marketize agrarian relations much to the displeasure of the government, who always considered a stable peasantry to be a guarantee for the maintenance of the Raj.

However, the Government's actions to provide protection to the landholding classes could succeed only if it had chosen to circumvent the currently operative dynamics of capital and the property relations based on it. But that would have amounted to negation of the very raison d'etre of the colonial state itself. It therefore could not go beyond taking mere legislative measures in its attempt to safeguard the landowners' interests. However, certain urban-based groups of people thwarted all such attempts, especially the trio of moneylenders, lawyers and the lower revenue staff, most of whom belonged to the Khatri and Arora castes. The lawyers at the district and tehsil level used their legal muscle to restore the money owed to the moneylenders, which often led to dispossession of land by the mortgagee. The Patwaris often forged the entries relating to mortgages in their records of rights so that they or their relations could use them as evidence in civil suits expropriating their peasant debtors.\(^9^8\) The inherent peasant dependence on credit in the context of Indian agriculture outgrew all attempts at putting hurdles in the way of market operations.

Even more significantly, it was established that the judiciary and
bureaucracy were the core institutions of the new state in matters of property relations and inter-group transfer of resources. The legislatures, on the other hand, played only a secondary role in the exercise of state authority.

In the light of these observations we can safely conclude that the class structure of Punjab underwent a radical change under the new state system which introduced new sources of legitimacy in the fields of property, law and bureaucratic organisation of the governmental authority. The access to the state institutions was manipulated by the government on a differential basis, contingent in a final sense upon the market's determining role. Therefore such new axes of power as the lawyer patwari-moneylender could and did emerge against the express wishes of the government. On the other hand, the landlords sank into an effete status of rent receivers operating as built-in depressors of development much against the government's hopes. In structural terms, the state was no longer a collection of sub-soveriegnties. Instead, it established an institutional presence everywhere in the form of a unified legal code and a homogeneous though internally differentiated - machinery to operationalize it. By the time, representative government was introduced in 1921, all major legislation on land had been finalized, leaving the task only of clearing up localized or superficial issues for the ministers of the transferred subjects. Indeed, no major step was taken towards re-chartering the relationships within and between the social classes and the state upto 1947.

Administration and Development: the Punjab Experience

Parallel to changes in the institutional relationships between state and society, we see an ever increasing process of resource input into various sectors of economy in the Punjab which rendered all economic and political initiatives in the hands of the state. Starting from protective measures against famine, it, took up largest public
projects in railways, irrigation canals and the subsequent land colonization. As a result, new productive forces emerged, mainly in the agricultural sector, which bound the state increasingly with the day-to-day economic performance of the society as a whole. Especially in the agricultural sector, the deep bureaucratic inroads established a firm control of the government over the production—distribution process and over the way the rural society should be organised.

The successive famines in Punjab in the late 19th century triggered off a search for protective measures against the periodical food shortages which threatened to destabilize the peasantry. It was considered to be a problem of food distribution from parts of the country which had surplus production to those which suffered from scarcity. Initially the Government favoured provisional measures of food transportation and was thus committed to expansion of railways, especially because the foreign investors preferred swift profits it yielded to the delayed returns from canal irrigation projects which were meant to increase food production. The Famine Commission Report of 1898 however, turned the tide in favour of irrigation projects, followed by a propaganda campaign for investment in canals, led by Sir Arthur Cotton. However, railway spending accounted for no less than £266 million in contrast with only £24 million for irrigation by the year 1902, after which the former sharply declined.

In the following decade, the protective function of canals was largely overtaken by their productive role as the earlier irrigation projects started yielding handsome profits. A new forward policy was launched, based on the Report of the Irrigation Commission in 1903. Capital outlay in the canal projects increased sharply till it reached the figure £2.86 million for the year 1911-12. Indeed Punjab's share in the total Indian public investment in irrigation
upto 1919-20 was as high as 40%, while it commanded 50% of the total increase in irrigated land in the country. The expansion of cultivable area under irrigation totally changed the production base of the province.

TABLE
Area under Irrigation in the Punjab: Acres

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1887-8</td>
<td>2,341,103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-6</td>
<td>11,852,849</td>
<td>506 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gulshan Rai, Agricultural Statistics of the Punjab 1901 to 1935-6, Board of Economic Enquiry Publications No. 52, 1937, p.11

Various reasons for the government's wholehearted pursuit of irrigation and the subsequent colonization of lands have been described viz the need for a firm and expanding revenue base, army supplies of livestock and agricultural produce, release of population pressure of the central districts, settlement of disbanded Sikh soldiery, and no less 'reformatory grants to depressed and criminal tribesmen. From 1887 to 1920, grand canal projects took a lot of government money and attention, in a big feat of social engineering. The new lands were 'opened up' through various departments' concerted efforts put into roads, railways, post and telegraph offices, water supplies, drainage and sewerage disposal, market towns, cotton ginning factories—all linking the countryside with the great ports.

Colony towns were located every 20 miles or so along the railroad, feeding 100-200 villages around. Within a village provision was made for mosque, temple, school, dispensary, pond, bridge, grove of trees for shade, firewood and timber, police station, and sometimes functional (menial) castes, as well as village homesteads. While menial castes were not allowed to buy land, and the original inhabitants were allotted only half of what the settlers' majority acquired on an average, the higher grantees were allowed, even encouraged,
to buy in open sanction. At least 24,000 acres were thus appropriated by such landlords who had each initially been allotted between 6 and 20 acres of land. Such land-grabbing was far in excess of its full utility, leading to leases and thus to landlord parasitism. All along we see a government with a largely anthropological vision working in favour of establishing the 'little republics' - the self-sufficient village communities neatly delimited, and then 'provided' by the natural leaderships in the form of upper class grantees of land.

However, such 'nativization' of the European principles of social organisation was only a part of the larger process of commercialization of agriculture, which had 'opened up' Punjab to the world market and created a particularly favourable climate for cash crops. Indeed, as the years passed, Punjab's increasing foreign trade in agricultural produce dichotomized the local crop pattern. Those crops whose demand and supply, and therefore prices, were linked up with the export market mostly attracted the irrigated land, while those with only a local market were grown increasingly on the non-irrigated land. The former consisted of cash crops in general while the latter were mostly foodgrain except for wheat. Between 1901 and 1966 the canal irrigated area under cash crops increased by 16.4%, while that under foodgrain decreased by nearly as much i.e. 16.2%. In other words, the world market increasingly assimilated the relatively more productive assets of the canal colonies in its orbit of operations. In a comparison between wheat and other foodgrain crops like jowar and bajra with their international and local markets respectively, it was noted that the prices of the latter passed through greater fluctuations than that of the former. This trend was augmented by two other factors: firstly, wheat was grown mostly on irrigated lands with an assured and regular supply of water, while other foodgrain crops were grown on un-irrigated land with a highly irregular pattern of water supply. Secondly the railroad communications were more developed in the irrigation areas growing wheat than in the latter, thus ensuring a stable market situation there.
The metropolitan capital gradually encapsulated the local market operations through the intermediary functions of various financial and administrative institutions. In this the role of the local-dealer cum-moneylender emerged as a key factor. He took the risk of operating in the international trade via big merchants and bankers who had no control over forward trading and supply of credit. Any move in the international sphere could and did squeeze the moneylender, whose credit shrank correspondingly, although nothing happened in the narrow sphere of peasant's economic activity to justify such an action. To cover the 'risk', moneylender bound the credit with his choice of cash crops; the peasant, concerned with his family's subsistence and thus oriented more to security than profit had perforce to grow a crop commanded by his creditor, whose own dealings were then secured; this 'manipulated restriction' of peasantry from participating in a free market, despite being subsumed by it, gave it a subservient role vis-a-vis the world economy. In other words 'the revenue-rent-credit nexus... served as a transmission belt between the capitals of the world and the remotest villages.' Capital entered the peasant economy in a determinate capacity, and not as a factor of economy. For an agrarian economy already stratified by differential access to state-sanctioned resources such opening to market under the so-called free enterprise could only lead to further inequality of a kind of 'market-control feudalism'.

The irrigation-based development activity in the canal colony districts of South West Punjab brought about a new pattern of landholding, an advanced cash economy, a price hike in land and a relatively high growth-rate in population. Most of the colonists came from the central Punjab districts of Jullundar, Amritsar and Lahore, and certain
areas of Rawalpindi division. They were allotted plots ranging from 12 and half to 100 acres. In 1924-5, the area under holdings of 25 acres and more amounted to 66.5% of the whole canal colony area. This meant that it contained a fairly large spectrum of prosperous peasantry.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Less than 10 acres</th>
<th>More than 10 acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gujranwala</td>
<td>60 %</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisalabad</td>
<td>35 %</td>
<td>65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahiwal</td>
<td>64 %</td>
<td>46 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: Landholding Pattern in Canal Colonies

Source: Calvert. The Size and Distribution of Agricultural Holdings in the Punjab Board of Economic Enquiry Punjab, (Lahore, 1925), pp. 16.17.

The pattern of relatively large landholdings in the canal colonies produced a fair amount of marketable surplus. Faisalabad district alone exported 150,000 tons of wheat in 1920. It also helped produce a propensity to consume among the local surplus producers which provided a market for the manufactured goods from abroad. The result was a high circulation of cash on the economy which in turn led to speculation in land. A general rise in the price of agricultural land followed. While an acre cost Rs. 10 before colonization, it now cost nearly Rs. 600 in most colonies, and Rs. 1200 in the Chenab colony. Finally, this great economic momentum attracted people from all around which led to rapid growth in population.

Table: Population Growth in Canal Colonies: Thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faisalbad</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahpur</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahiwal</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multan</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As we shall discuss in detail in chapter VI, the colonists had to deal directly with the government institutions through their differentiated functional units. This often bred a feeling of helplessness among the individual peasants against the highly powerful and complex government machinery. Some of the problems of colonization were: the inaccessibility of irrigation water to the area at the tail-end of canals; the overlapping authority of Irrigation and Revenue Departments, the retroactive legislation; the levying of huge fines for failing to meet the government's deadlines for various dealings; and sudden increases in the water charges. The cumulative effect of these grievances showed itself in the form of large-scale peasant movements like the Punjab disturbances of 1907. In addition, the widespread indebtedness often led to alienation of peasants from their land. Between 1891 and 1921 as many as 420,000 owner-peasants or 11% of the total were expropriated. That itself was a constant source of peasants' frustration with the existing laws as well as with the law-enforcing agencies.

This situation can be compared with the non-irrigated areas viz Hoshiarpur, Gurdaspur, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and Attock districts, and the Salt Ranges. Here, the average landholding was very small, 90% being less than 10 acres. The average surplus was only worth Rs. 18 per annum. But even that was eaten up by the moneylenders because the average interest was as high as 37½%. In the absence of any marketable surplus, there was no pressure for expansion of communications. In consequence contact between village and town was scant. This left the clannishness of the rural community in these
districts almost intact. This meant that the landlords continued dominating the local economic and political scene. Indeed ever since 1919 the non-irrigated areas of West Punjab have constantly returned members of the big landlord families to the legislatures, comprising almost 70% of all those elected. 120

It is clear therefore that agricultural development created absolute regional disparities in the colonial Punjab. That was reflected in the difference between the village structures of the irrigated and non-irrigated areas which closely approximate Migdal's dichotomous model of free-holding and corporate villages respectively. 121 The former was fraught with market insecurities, inflationary pressure on manufactured goods as well as the emerging direct relationship between peasants and the state. Here, the landowners continued buying land out of their profits from marketing of surplus production. However, such expansion of landed property was not matched by efforts towards land improvement because most of their additional land was leased out to tenants, which led to both physical and functional landlord absenteeism. In other words, the public investment-induced development produced a rent made from application of hydraulic technology on land 'once and for all'. In this way, the State resources invested in land in the form of irrigation projects turned it into a 'permanent' capital for the landowners. Their counterparts from the un-irrigated area, in turn, suffered through a relative disinvestment in land.

While the allotted lands in the colonies were gradually appropriated by individual landholders, the administration of the life-line of the whole new production structure, i.e. irrigation canals remained in the hands of the state, as did other parts of the infrastructure e.g. railroad communication. In fact the state directly employed a very large number of people and thus had a big stake in keeping the control of the infrastructural sector in its own hands. Between 1850
and 1940, for example, railways in India employed at least half the number of all industrial workers at any time. In 1947, when Pakistan inherited its share of industrial establishment—a mere 9%—the largest share in it was controlled by the transport industry, which included engineering works like locomotives and shipping workshops. This manifests the extent of the state's direct manipulative and directive role in the local economy.

A corollary of the preoccupation with agricultural development on the part of the state was the neglect of the urban sector, especially industrialization. Whatever little capital emerged in the industrial sector in Punjab came largely from the middle classes e.g. from the savings of professional men and the profits made at either Bombay or Karachi by the cotton dealers. While deploring the mix-up of politics with commerce, the Punjab Chamber of Commerce vainly continued trying to build up the confidence of the business world in the Punjab. There was a remarkable rise in the wages of labour in the first decade of this century. The prevalent rates were generally higher than in the adjoining districts of the U.P. This was presumably due to the high ratio of absorption of the agricultural labour on land in the years when land colonization was in full swing. As we shall see shortly, this dominant role of agriculture in the economy of Punjab along with a paternalistic bias towards peasant society in the state thinking was to determine its political structure in future.

Section IV: Structure of the New State

The Indian Government under the British rule was far from monolithic. Even though it was organized in the shape of a pyramid with a centralized control over the large bureaucratic base, it was in A.O. Hume's words, 'a great, cruel, blundering machine running on by its own weight... even the driver being incapable of directing its course.' The general direction of the way the authority of the
state was exercised at various levels was determined, at least internally, by a chain of supervisory authorities, at each higher step. Yet considerable dissent continued appearing from the lower levels from time to time. Therefore, a situation of constant dialogue between various areas of the government emerged which gave a supra-personal objective status to the new state machinery. This situation was radically different from such non-colonial societies as Afghanistan, Iran, and Nepal, where the state machinery continued on a pre-modern structural basis allowing only one-way flow of information and decisions from the royal court downwards.

This 'structural tension' existed both in vertical and horizontal relationships between the government institutions. Typically, the higher officers did not like the way the 'amateur bench' in the lower courts tried to overreach itself in interpretation of law. Likewise the district officers often chose to ignore the spirit, if not the letter, of the regular policy orders from the provincial secretariat. Great tension existed between the provincial and central governments in India. In the same way, communication between the Indian government and London often betrayed lack of confidence in each other. Invariably, the government nearer the actual territory of administration claimed to know things at first hand and condemned the higher gentlemen 'whose chief function is negative criticism.' The higher-ups, who were usually old men, even retired as in the case of India Council in London, in turn brought forth their past experience of working at lower positions to back their arguments.

The working of the state was therefore increasingly based on the collective administrative wisdom gathered in years and from all parts of the country. The officers in the districts performed an excellent feedback function through networks of friendship with each other and with those in the secretariat, much in the tradition of Wellesly's Kindergarten of the early 19th century. Expert opinion about various
regions evolved into concepts like Oudh Construct, Panjub Creed or Sandeman System. The names of the best Punjab hands e.g., Lawrenence, Inbetson, Young, Calvert, Darling and Brayne provided guidelines for future administrators in various fields. All this amounted to an in-built bureaucratic mechanism for resisting all 'unmanaged' change. Complaining of the ICS's die hard conservatism, Lord Curzon once remarked that any reform 'sends a cold shiver down their spine'.

Having outlined the internal differentiation of the state in British India we shall now discuss its origins in revenue administration, its establishment of the rule of law in the country, its institutional paternalism and the process of replacement of the British state functionaries by those from India.

State as Revenue Administration

The State in British India was largely shaped by revenue administration. Its most formidable unit i.e., the district was the product of the exigencies of revenue collecting translated into geographical, demographical and economic terms. The boundaries of the district militated against any 'natural' growth of localities. Instead, they either lumped together disparate ethnic groups or divided them into parts which were then oriented towards different district headquarters. The nature of land revenue system in turn determined the mode and extent of state penetration. It was minimal under the Zamindari system but maximum under the Ryotwari system, at least in operational terms because of the need for annual assessment of each peasant's output. Under the Punjab system village was the basic unit of revenue assessment, and settlement operations were taken up after long periods of time. This created the need for an elaborate structural as distinct from merely operational presence of the state in the field.
The Punjab revenue administration was based on a three-tier system of authority based at the sub-district, district and supra-district levels. The most important was of course the middle tier, especially in a non-regulation province like Punjab. Originally, the Bengal Regulations of 1793, the Cornwallis Code, laid down separation of powers between the judiciary on the one hand and revenue administration and magistracy on the other. It introduced definite legal principles to guide executive action, gave an outline of the rights and duties of government officials, delimited the operational jurisdiction of each department and individual and subjected the arbitrary executive will to law which was exercised by separate courts of justice. These regulations were later extended to Bombay and Madras which together with Bengal came to be known as Regulation Provinces. However, gradually, a shift toward concentration of all powers in the hands of district officer took place. It was this tradition which descended on Punjab, under which revenue department reigned supreme. In fact initially the revenue administration was directly responsible for policing as well. Even after 1861, when the police service grew into a distinct branch of government it was kept under the overall magisterial control of the revenue administration. Many other departments viz. Irrigation, Agriculture, Veterinary, Co-operatives and Survey departments were initially created to meet the needs of the Revenue department itself.

Lower down, we find the foundations of state authority in the form of such revenue officials as tehsildar, kanungo and patwari. The tehsildar enjoyed limited police and magisterial powers from the beginning; the patwari who was called dulwaee under the Sikh rule was given in-service training and was paid out of a Patwar cess over the land revenue of villages in his circle, the kanungo audited the latter's accounts. The village headman responsible for revenue collection, the lumbardar, was a non-official functionary who was paid a 'pachotra' a 5% cess on
government revenue. This innovation was however resented by the peasants. Previously they had looked upon him as their equal. Now, being taxed to pay him and with a summary court to back him for realization of his dues, they became conscious of the external source of his power i.e. the state machinery. While the government tried to discourage the division of pachotra into many lumbardars so as to keep their leadership roles intact, it also created the institution of chief headman (Ala Lumbardari) in 1864 for creating a permanent leadership class. The attempt was however aborted due to widespread factionalism which led to appeal after appeal in the court. In terms of the local power structure the revenue officials and lumbardars behaved as principals and not as mere agents in the process of acquiring and using power. Their own power was related to their function of keeping records of landholding and assessment/collection of revenue which, when used selectively between individuals, could and did tip the balance in favour of some landlord factions against others. That clearly shows that the village class differentials were increasingly defined in terms of the extralocal sources of power. In other words, the colonial state's formal and informal structures of authority at the district and sub-district levels gave a new meaning to the existing class structure through legal protection of property and contract.

While the district machinery of revenue administration thus emerged as the focus of state authority, the Board of Revenue at the provincial level had all the powers to investigate punish or summon the local revenue officials. Soon however the burden of appellate work in Punjab and elsewhere created the need for an intermediary office, the Commissioner, between the district officer and the Board of Revenue. Together these appellate bodies have functioned as the final arbiter of financial relations between the revenue paying peasantry and the state.
The urban sector in colonial India was equally structurally linked up with the state through its financial liabilities. Thus, imposition of Income Tax in 1860-1, followed by Licence Tax in 1867-8, brought the emerging urban middle class directly under fiscal management. Despite the initial unpopularity which involved political hazards, these new measures became part of the financial infrastructure of the land revenue administration, till in 1922 the Central government assumed direct responsibility for income tax.

It is clear, therefore, that the authority of the state came to the masses through its revenue bureaucracy, which ran the system through taxation and controlled its operations through the rule of law. Politically, its role has been inherently conservative in the sense that it basically re-validated the hereditary claims to land through its legal machinery. Indeed, in a non-Regulation province like Punjab the revenue administration was not answerable to any other authority in the country, including the judiciary. In that respect the revenue administration had a decisive impact on the state's political links with the property-holding classes who were inextricably involved in dealing with the district bureaucracy. A policy of selective patronage of the local elite groups or individuals by the revenue officers often wrought fundamental changes in the composition of local political leaderships. On the other hand, the district administration has functioned like an estate management, acting for the state which behaved like the supreme landlord. In that capacity it took up public functions like management of schools, canals, roads and other infrastructural projects and thus bought the loyalty of its subjects through its capacity to deliver various services.

The Rule of Law

We shall now briefly mention the role of the so-called rule of law in British India in providing new rules of game for regulating the relationships of various social classes with each other and with the Government. As noted earlier, the new state monopolized dispensation
of justice and thereby robbed the local leaderships of their dispute-settling authority. In the immediate post-Annexation period, the Punjab government introduced a universal application of law and built an efficient apparatus to back it. This led to a large number of persons being jailed for different crimes. In the year 1853 alone 10,000 people were put behind the bars involving great financial burden. Later a greater stress was laid on the fine system in an effort to cover the fiscal aspect of judicature. By introducing a uniform codified law in the country it externalized the sources of legitimacy for the locality. A series of measures were taken like passing the Specific Relief and Easement Acts which permitted the interference of the Civil Courts in the social and economic life of India in forms devised originally for 18th century English society. It so happened that the property-based classes acquired a new legitimacy through the dispute-settling mechanism of the judiciary. By the years 1927, 1928 and 1929, for example, the number of cases filed in Punjab averaged 224,802. The state thereby played a significant role in re-stratification of the rural society. Indeed law had changed the ruler-subject relations in a very real sense because the state need no more sit idle until a case propped up between the two contending parties. Instead, it behaved now as plaintiff, invoking the machinery of justice against public offenders.

The new legal system was structured around a huge gap between the conceptual framework inherited from the West and Indian social practices. Therefore the field for interpretation of law was extremely wide. This created a need for the intermediary role of lawyer, who as qualified doctor of law performed the necessary interpretative function. Over time he became very well-integrated in a complex relationship between individuals and groups vying for local hegemony. In this framework, the lawyer exploited his monopoly over interpretation of law as a political resource in the crucial power game both at the local and higher levels. His powers were distrusted by the government circles which accused him of 'setting aside the clear direction of the law by special pleading'. As we shall see later the lawyer-politicians of
India mobilized their respective clienteles in a fight against the British government. At the same time however, they defined the nationalist movement in strictly legal-constitutional terms and thus left a lasting influence over the way political movements were organised.

To understand the way the rule of law contributed to re-stratification of the society we must look at the methods of instrumentalizing it in service of the vested interests of the local society and the way it increasingly put all power in the hands of those wielding legal powers. In Punjab, the Deputy Commissioner was placed at the head of a triple court i.e. magisterial, revenue and judicial. His older title of collector was thus abandoned. The general result of this concentration of legal powers in one person was that he represented the government as a mini-ruler, providing the public with a simple and personal system of rule. In other words, the rule of law tended to create such bureaucratic roles in the Punjab districts which monopolized the principle of legality and rendered all non-bureaucratic activity suspect in the eyes of the state.

The wide interpretative powers of the state functionaries kept the rule of law flexible in service of personal and political expediency. The most powerful politicians duly recognised the formidable influence of this joint complex of power, right from the D.C. to the magistrates and tehsildars, and tried to capitalize on it for various purposes. Feroz Khan Noon describes the way the lower revenue and police officials coerced people into offering themselves for recruitment during the First World War, threatening them with the use of Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code which gave them powers of preempting a likely violent clash between village factions by arresting them. They thus tried to make a record of war services and claimed reward on that basis. The exercise of rule of law in the locality was thus deeply embroiled in the factional politics in its mode of operation.
according to the support of state functionaries made available to selective groups.

At a broader level, law defined the religious, caste, tribal and professional groups as permanent categories and thus created sociological anomalies. For example, once separate provision for the Mohammadan and Hindu Laws were codified on the strength of ancient scriptures and/or customary law and brought into operation in the courts, it could not but help contribute to Muslim separation in the end. Likewise, we have noted how the Land Alienation Act of 1900 contributed to emergence of the dichotomy of urban and rural interests in the Punjab which kept both the Congress and the Muslim League out of the provincial politics till shortly before partition. It can therefore be concluded that the rule of law was the strong arm of the state which it used for pursuing its policy objectives.

**Bureaucratic Paternalism**

The state in British India largely incorporated the ethnocentric attitudes of the British official classes. Especially in Punjab it established the tradition of strict patriarchal rule. Almost 85% of the British officers came from a middle class backgrounds with deep roots in public school tradition of a generalist, humanitarian and philosophical education which inculcated a 'leadership spirit' among them. They had an overall tendency to dislike the shift of roles and functions between classes and groups of men. They visualized a 'state in which property does not change hands... in which a rigid caste system keeps each man to his own function.' Thus the state was guided by the public interest as conceived by the guardian, bureaucrats who distrusted public will as being irrational and uninformed. Procedural safeguards were established to present any infringement by non-officials of the bureaucrats' monopoly over articulation of the public interest. Not only did these measures conserve the institutional ethos of bureaucracy in control of key posts in various government departments, it also nurtured 'attitudes of aloof superiority to the masses.' Such an anthropological vision of the Indian civilization encouraged a petition-mindedness and a view of an omniscient government among the people. Thus, the half-educated
destabilizing urban elements in the local society who aspired for a share in running their own government were considered 'totally incapable of ruling and would not for an instant be tolerated by the people of India as a whole'. In other words, the government saw its role in terms of an altruistic concern with the uplift of what it considered to be the caste-ridden, religiously divided, illiterate, warring and superstitious masses.

As we have noted earlier, Punjab was a non-Regulation province where the doctrine of separation of powers was distrusted from the beginning. Instead, the Governor General-in Council made laws for it in his executive capacity. For some years it was put under the direct control of a Board of Administration. At that time it lacked any legal identity and was considered a political appendage of the government of India. Even after it was put under a Chief Commissioner in 1853-4, it remained a preserve of the executive who disliked the representation of local interest at any level. In addition, for more than half a century the Punjab services were dominated by the military civilians instead of the covenanted civil servants like elsewhere, ostensibly to control the primitive tribes inhabiting this rugged territory. The government provided, so to speak, 'protection' to people in exchange for their absolute obedience. At least up to 1903, many deputy commissioners came from the North Western Provinces and the Bengal army whose pre-occupation with law and order was rooted in their ignorance of the area, which committed them to establish a fool-proof system in the province, without allowing any independent bodies of opinion to interfere in the business of the government. While in the older provinces the spread of education had produced elements of professional middle classes, in Punjab their growth was relatively poor and so was their political pressure. That meant that Punjab was ruled more bureaucratically than any other major province in India.
The fact that Punjab was devoid of any mass-based ethnically-oriented provincial 'nationalism' and instead was increasingly a hotbed of controversy between the three communal groups of Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus rendered the initiative in the hands of government in its capacity as the final arbiter. It therefore emerged as an efficient administrative agency, responding more to the dictates of the government of India than to the public pressures at home. Indeed, even after it gradually outgrew the direct administrative control of the Centre, it retained a high degree of institutional integration with it, which was not seriously disrupted even after provincial governments were installed in 1921. By contrast the provincial governments of Bombay and Bengal had all along enjoyed the privilege of direct communication with London from the Company's days onwards, much to the dislike of the central government. Therefore, they enjoyed a certain amount of supra-bureaucratic operational autonomy which was denied to Punjab. According to what came to be known as the Punjab creed 'the only freedom of which the people of the country had been deprived was freedom to murder and oppress each other, to burn widows and torture peasants'. Punjab was therefore governed by a ruthless bureaucratic regime under what is euphemistically called a paternalistic rule.

Indigenization of the State

The last quarter of the 19th century saw a gradual concentration of state power in the hands of the British elite service cadres. The increasing problem of associating the local middle classes with the business of the state forced the government to accommodate them in advisory councils and in the lower ranks of services. The subsequent history of India can be looked at from the perspective of increasing indigenisation of the state through these two channels, viz i) growth of legislatures both in the sense of enfranchisement of larger section of population and acquisition of greater legislatory power ii) Indianization of services. In a parallel process the institutional
control of Westminster over Indian policy making was progressively diluted. These processes were however far from unilinear, especially as they tilted the balance still further in favour of bureaucracy.

By the middle of the 19th century, the covenanted Services had emerged as the esprit de corps of the British administrative structure in India. This service was based increasingly on the principle of competition in merit, especially after the first examination was held in 1853. The incessant demands for recruitment of Indians into this service by various associations were finally acceded to by Indian Civil Service Act of 1861. Soon after, however, various measures was taken to close the doors of this service to the Indians at least in practice. In 1879, a Statutory Service was created exclusively for Indians to be filled by nomination. Such a move frustrated their educated class, especially from the Presidencies, although it was hailed by such backward communities as the Muslims as being the only way to enter the administration. Under the recommendations of the Aitchison Commission, this service was replaced by the Provincial Civil Service which was given a quota of high posts like district judges, joint magistrates and district officers, thereby adding another junior cadre to the existing state apparatus. The new service lowered the Indian status still further. In 1915, following the Islington Commission's proposals, four classes of public services were formed in order to accommodate the rising pressure for Indianization. This four-fold service structure was to last upto 1972 in Pakistan.

Throughout the period of these structural changes, the provincial governments continued opposing the principle of open competition for entry into the services. They feared that the 'natural' leaderships of Indian society would be divested of their traditional role by the relatively free-wheeling university educated urban middle classes. While the former were content with entering into a
concord with the state to maintain the status quo, the latter had their ambitions set on the state itself. The government thus used the method of nomination to bring forward the backward regional, tribal and religious communities and thus to contain the radical ambitions of the more highly qualified elements in the services. Towards the end, however, the merit base of administrative services had been universally accepted in principle, although in practice nominations remained an effective method of patronage of selective groups of people. We shall see later how the Indianization of services played a very significant role in alienating the Muslim middle classes everywhere.

The problem of associating the Indian middle classes with the exercise of state authority arose in another, even more crucial, context i.e. that of the legislative power. The need was stressed for institutional arrangements for articulating the interests of middle classes through the principle of representation in legislative bodies. As early as 1859, the questions of costly and intricate system of judicature, separation of powers, exercise of justice irrespective of race and creed, opening of public services to Indians as well as educational expansion were taken up by such bodies on the British Indian Associations in the presidencies. The government responded by devising ways and means to accommodate them within the existing framework of the state. From the 1861 Councils Act, through the 1893 Councils Act down to the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 there took place a steady expansion in the indigenous representation in the state.

By the turn of this century, the educated middle class had expanded and diversified too much to be satisfied with the crumbs of lower ranks in services. There was a growing challenge from the middle class 'representatives' who demanded that the British spell out their intentions in India. The message was brought home to the government by the successive political movements during the first quarter of this country. However, all along the government favoured
expanding local representation by nomination rather than by direct
election. It was observed that in Punjab, 'Many native gentlemen of
position and ability, who dislike presenting themselves as candidates
for election, will be found ready to be appointed by nomination'. 162
The 1909 Advisory Council in Punjab contained only 5 elected members
out of a total of 24. This situation compared poorly with, for example,
Bengal and Bombay where 26 out of 48 and 21 out of 42 members
respectively were elected, signifying the constitutional backwardness
of Punjab. 163 Like elsewhere, the government had insisted that
surrendering the principle of responsible government to the nationalists
could only mean an end to the Raj. This demand was therefore long
considered seditious. 164 Finally, the fear of failure, if not the
will to succeed, forced the government to concede the right of at least
partial self-rule to the Indians.

Under Dyarchy Punjab's political leadership was captured,
as expected, by the representatives of landlord class who were
deliberately promoted by the bureaucracy and who therefore played
a largely collaborative role in the running the government. The
fact that the working of the Transferred subjects was
influenced by the senior bureaucrats in charge of the Reserved
Subjects and that they also shaped the attitudes of the legislators in
general was widely resented by the nationalists. 165 As a result the
local ministers tended to shy away from the senior civil servants
and the D.C.'s who were placed directly under the Governor, and
instead relied increasingly on their own departmental officers. As
mentioned earlier this tension led to the early retirement of a large
number of British officers. This anomaly continued until after
the 1937 elections when the civil service came under the control of the
home secretary who was himself answerable to the minister in
charge. However, even in this so-called autonomy period, the
elected ministers preferred to deal with the non-ICS officers who were
considered more amenable to political pressure. Both were bound by
a common distrust of the ICS.
The ICS reacted to all this in a very characteristic way. It increasingly sought to centralize all the residual powers in its own hands. For example, during the First World War it secured the provision of special tribunals for trying 'disloyal' Indians, especially the Sikhs in Punjab. The Rowlatt Act was likewise designed to answer the fears of the British elements in the Civil Service regarding its safety under the 1919 Reforms. Indeed, both the civil servants and the British commercial interests were given viceregal assurances to dispel the fears aroused by constitutional development in general. The brutal oppression at the Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar was the result of perceived 'need for producing a sufficient moral effect' of the state authority on the public. Even when the 1935 India Act provided provincial autonomy, the governors were given veto power over all legislation including powers to suspend the elected government itself. Below the province, the field was open for centralization of bureaucratic powers in the hands of a few civil servants. Thus, it was increasingly pressed that all administrative departments should be made responsible to the D.C. as the final authority. In other words, the period of legislative development in late colonialism was also, and even more significantly, the period of centralization of supreme executive powers in the hands of higher bureaucracy. By the time the British left, they had amassed all real power in the hands of top civil servants.

During the first quarter of this century the state in India took big strides towards indigenization. While it was recruiting ever increasing number of officers from amongst the local talent, it also built up its own reproductive mechanism. 1922 first time ever the ICS examination was held on the soil of India. By 1926, finally, the Indian Public Service Commission was fully operational. It seems that the state apparatus in British India had already become potentially autonomous, at least in operational terms, long before the Congress
and the Muslim League leaderships got the final British verdict on Indian independence. The already Indianized bureaucracy had a head start by almost a generation. In addition, its institutionalized practices were firmly based on the rule of law itself, which lent it a degree of legitimacy far surpassing that of any other political or economic institution. Especially Punjab was the epitome of a bureaucratic stronghold. No doubt its governmental structure was to prove most intolerant of any non-bureaucratic public activity in future.

Section V. Political Structure of the Pakistan Movement

We shall round up our discussion of the evolution of the Indian state up to 1947 in this chapter by considering in brief the economic political and ideological aspects of the movement among the Muslims of India for their own separate country. We shall note that their movement for Pakistan was largely an external phenomenon for the areas now comprising Pakistan even up to the middle 1940's. It is no surprise, therefore, that the mode of entry of Pan-Indian politics into the Muslim majority provinces played a decisive role in shaping the political institutions of the new state of Pakistan. In other words, the peculiar structure of the Pakistan movement has to be understood in order to appreciate the specific structural and policy orientations which it lent to the governmental apparatus of the areas now comprising Pakistan.

In the post-1857 period, fears about the dwindling position of the Muslims in the new political framework of British India impelled the Muslim aristocracy of Northern India to search for ways and means of safeguarding its interests. Gradually a spirit of selective accommodation of Western education and its social reformist content as well as of commitment to political conservatism pervaded this community in the last quarter of the 19th century.
From Sir Sayed onwards the Muslim leadership was increasingly wedded to the principle of exclusive dealings with the British government in India. It shied away from the Congress whom it considered a Hindu body. The landmark of Muslim separation was the Simla Deputation of 1905. On the one hand it paved the way for the formation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906. On the other hand, it led to the concession of separate electorates for the Muslim community in the 1909 reforms, which thus guaranteed its representation in the legislative councils.

From the very beginning, Muslim politics was dominated by the aristocratic families. Only 11 out of 35 members of the Simla Deputation were not titled. Indeed, the original membership qualifications of the Muslim League included the ability of 'reading and writing with facility' and an income of not less than Rs. 500 a year. Most of this Muslim League leadership came from the Muslim-minority areas. In fact, only 5 out of the 33 members of the Simla Deputation and only 8 out of the additional 35 members of the Muslim League nominated at its 1906 session at Karachi, belonged to the future Pakistan areas. This elite group generally reflected the preponderant position of the Muslims of UP in educational professional and the government employment sectors. It therefore focused all its energy on securing a comparable weightage in terms of political representation from the government. Its strategy revolved around selective accommodation of the British views on political issues, in contrast with the increasingly mobilist character of the All-India Congress in the 1920's and 1930's.

The year 1937 proved to be crucial for political ascendancy of the fledgling Muslim League party. While the Congress emerged as a national party in the provincial elections of 1936-7 and formed ministries in 6 provinces, the Muslim League had lost everywhere. However, it
also became clear that the Muslims rejected the Congress claim to represent it. The latter could win only 26 out of 482 Muslim seats in comparison with the Muslim League's total of 109; of these however, only 2 came from Punjab and 39 from Bengal, the rest being from the minority provinces. It was not difficult for Jinnah to realize that his real chance lay in the Muslim majority provinces both to acquire a foothold in the government and to provide a territorial base for the demand for Pakistan. First the Muslim League entered into political alliances with the provincial leaderships and then, having failed to achieve its purposes, decided to mobilize the masses directly for the cause of Pakistan. In doing so, it profoundly affected the pattern of interaction between the authorities and the political forces in that new constitutional and institutional arrangements were brought into action. For analysis of this situation we shall dwell on the mode of entry of the All-India Muslim League into Punjab and the parallel process of changes in the framework of government authority prior to partition.

Crystallization of Muslim Interests: The Punjab experience

The communal issue was rooted partially in the unequal distribution of the Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in different sectors of the Punjab society and partially in the way these communities were differentially affected by the administrative preferences and class legislation of the government. For example, the sectoral distribution of these communities was grossly unbalanced.

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<td>Rural-Urban Ratio of the Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
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<td>Urban</td>
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Source: Satya M. Rai, Partition of the Punjab, (Bombay, 1965), p.28
In this situation the legislation against moneylenders, most of whom were from the Hindu urban trading castes, meant that the Hindu community in general accused the government of making common cause with the Muslims in order to weaken them. Once the advisory councils were introduced, the issue of proper representation of the three communities further plagued their mutual relationships. For example, the Sikhs claimed that they contributed as much as 40% of land revenue in the province but got only 8 seats out of 54 on the basis of separate electorates. A great anomaly existed in the election system itself which worked against genuine representation of the Muslims: the electorate for the legislative council consisted of the members of the local government institutions where the Hindus outnumbered the Muslims. Thus, in all the three Muslim constituencies of the Western, Cis-Sutlej and Central Punjab, Hindu electors wielded majority of votes which was greatly resented by the Muslims. The Hindus in turn took exception to the fact that 7 Muslims were nominated to the Legislative Council as against only three Hindus and two Sikhs.

There were other areas of inter-communal disaffection, especially the questions of education and government jobs. By the late 19th century, the Muslims already constituted 56% of the population in Punjab, but their share in English Arts colleges and English secondary schools was only 18.2% and 33.1% respectively. Between 1902 and 1921 the average proportion of Punjab Muslims among the educated stood at 44.4%. This situation was reflected in their representation in jobs. For example, in 1909 they occupied only 36% of all government jobs despite their majority in the province.

### TABLE

**Ratio of Hindus and Muslims in Services**

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<tr>
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<th>High Posts Deputy Collectors</th>
<th>Sub-Deputy Collectors Sub-Deputy Magistrate</th>
<th>Education Department</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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Especially after 1919, when limited powers of patronage were acquired by the local politicians there was an overall spurt of education through communally oriented denominational institutions. It was noted that the number of Muslim students increased more than the Hindu and Sikh students combined. It can be maintained that the process of Indianization of services led to inter-communal strife to such an extent that no solution could be found for it at the level of party politics. Especially among the Muslims the greatest concern was with getting minimum quotas of jobs in various sectors as was recommended by the Harto Committee Report. The same demand echoed in Jinnah's 14 points and was taken up by the All-India Muslim Conference in 1929. In Punjab a movement was launched with the support of the Unionist Party in 1929 which demanded 56% of all high posts according to the ratio of Muslim population in the province. In the same way, we hear Mian Iftikharuddin opening the issue in the Legislative Assembly for fixing a suitable quota of jobs for the Muslims. In due course, demands followed for proportional representation of Muslims in Medical Colleges and Municipal Committees etc. Indeed, various Muslim biradris/caste-associations also joined this clamour for jobs.

It can be argued that the Muslims were basically oriented to a politics of accommodation with the government in the face of superior professional and commercial middle classes of the Hindus. So much so that the government employment ate up almost all the urban educated talent among the Muslim, leaving party politics mainly for the landlords. As we shall see this lack of orientation for political career among the urban Muslims of Punjab was to cost the politicians of the post-independence Pakistan dearly because their contradiction with the bureaucracy was presented as rural-urban dichotomy in which the former represented tradition and the latter modernity.
The All-India Muslim League leadership entered Punjab in two phases: first through an understanding with the local political forces, especially the Unionist Party and second through direct political activity from 1942 onwards, which while undercutting that party led to the Muslim League victory in the 1945-6 elections. The first phase can be divided into the pre and post 1937 periods. In the former the central Muslim League focused on the terms where it had established a tiny base for itself and sought alliances with such urban parties as the Ahra'rs and Ittehad-e-Millat. In the latter period, the party tried to establish itself in the rural areas through an alliance with the Unionists.

The Punjab Muslim League comprised a few urban middle class elements like Barkat Ali, Iqbal and Khalifa Shujauddin who were 'nationally' oriented in their political outlook in a grand confrontation with the Congress. They tried to create a Muslim identity in the province largely defined in terms of anti-Hinduism, pan-Islamism and later the demand for Pakistan under the overall leadership of Jinnah. For some time they were in close touch with the Majlise-Ahrare-Islam and the Majlis-e-Ittehad-e-Millat, the two parties which represented the fundamentalist Islam of the petty bourgeoisie from the Muslim-minority districts of the East Punjab. These were the political adherents of the Khilafat movement and Islamic revivalism in general, who were influenced in varying degrees by the Shah Waliullah's Wahabist movement and the Deoband seminary. Their anti-imperialist-jihad sentiment could not countenance the Unionist Party's pro-government and non-communal policies, a fact which first created sympathy for the relatively less secular Muslim League and then seeing it less ready to commit itself to a purely religious cause led them away from it. The results of 1937 elections however exposed the political impotence of the three parties when they managed to win only two seats each out of 87 Muslim seats while the Unionist Party alone gained 73 seats. The flaw in the Muslim League strategy was all too clear. It had to come to terms with the Muslim landlord class of Punjab to play any meaningful role in the country's politics.
Ever since the 1919 reforms, the Punjab landed interests had dominated the provincial government, especially after Sir Fazle-e-Hussain had gathered them under the banners of the Unionist Party in 1922-3. The Muslims in this party had posed a great challenge to the All-India Muslim League at various points. Hussain, for example, prompted the local Muslim League stalwart Mohammad Shafi to oppose Jinnah tooth and nail on the question of boycotting the Simon Commission which in the end led to the formation of a secessionist group called Shafi League. He also convened an All Parties Muslim conference in 1929 at Delhi under the chairmanship of Agha Khan, mainly to undercut Jinnah in his struggle for seeking accommodation with the Congress on the issue of acceptance of the Nehru Report by the Muslims. The death of Hussain in 1936 followed by the ascent of Sikandar Hayat to presidency of the Unionist Party and its victory in the 1937 elections changed all that. While Jinnah sought help from Sikandar in his struggle for the common cause of Muslims in India, the latter could afford to make conciliatory gestures in exchange for the League's non-interference in the Punjab affairs. The Sikandar-Jinnah Pact of 1937 thus started an era of uneasy compromise between the two which lasted up to the death of Sikandar in 1942. Their common fear was the Congress organisational and financial capabilities to penetrate the province's politics. Sikandar saw in it a possibility that the urban youth of both the communities would join the Congress which would disturb the inter-class and inter-communal balance achieved through the struggle of a whole generation of the Unionists. Along with that it sought to contain the rabid communalism of the Muslim League in Punjab which threatened to disturb its delicate inter-communal partnership.

The pact provided much needed support to the Muslim League for its pan-Indian politics. However, it eclipsed the party within Punjab in many crucial areas from which it learnt its lessons and exploited them in the 1945-6 elections. The provision that the candidates in future elections would fight on the Muslim League ticket
and then join to form the parliamentary group of the Unionist Party clearly militated against the pressure of a parliamentary Muslim League group.\textsuperscript{191} Sikandar gradually managed to remove the original office workers of the Punjab Muslim League, replaced Iqbal by Nawab Mamdot as its president, got it disaffiliated from the Central Muslim League with the active connivance of the latter after it had nominated 19 members for the All-India Muslim League without including any unionists in it, and finally manipulated the non-recognition of the Muslim League branches set up by the original party workers by the \textit{Mahmudabad Committee} of the Central Muslim League.\textsuperscript{192} It was clear that Jinnah preferred to establish a support base for the Muslim League among the landlord elite even at the expense of his own party cadres. However, in the end the Unionist Party's Muslim members always owed their allegiance to their own party and thus frustrated the Muslim League's attempts to penetrate provincial politics through back door.

After Sikandar Hayat's death in 1942 the Muslim League Unionist alliance came under increasing pressure. The central importance of Punjab in any future scheme for establishment of Pakistan was realised afresh by the League leadership after the Pakistan Resolution of 1940 at Lahore. Also, the Muslim League's ascent to ministries in Bengal and Sind had given it a new confidence. On the other hand the Shahpur Maliks ascendency to power in the form of Khizr Hayat Tiwana's premiership in Punjab alienated the earlier Sikandar Hayat-Daultana-Shahabuddin faction whose younger generation sought accommodation with the Muslim League instead.\textsuperscript{193} Finally, after Khizr Hayat's formal expulsion from the League in 1944 a whole hearted attempt was made to spread the message of Islam and render Khizr and his Unionist associates apostates in the eyes of the public. The Islamic propaganda helped link the 'secular' leadership of the League with the landlord-pirs of Punjab who followed great sufi orders of Chishtia, Qadria and Sohrawardia attached with a network
of shrines throughout the countryside. These pirs issued fatwas in favour of the League candidates in the 1946 elections. Jinnah also constituted a committee of pirs consisting of big landlords of Punjab with a view to cash in on the popular religious sentiment.

In the elections the League won 75 seats against the Unionists' 13 thus completely reversing their earlier performance in the 1937 elections. Even then the Muslim League total fell short of majority which was needed for formation of the ministry. Instead an Akali-Unionist-Congress ministry was installed under the continuing premiership of Khizr Hayat. However, within a few months mass demonstrations staged by the Muslim League brought the ministry down and the way to Partition was finally opened.

These observations make it clear that it was the new constitutional framework which channelled and shaped the inter-party conflict. The electoral contest was firmly based on the rule of law as enshrined in various legislative measures and sub-legislatory actions of the civil administration during the colonial period. Ever since the introduction of representative institutions early this century, a process of political organisation of the masses had started which culminated in the emergence of a constitutional state the legitimacy of the old administratives practices was now tied up with the constitutional provisions of rights and duties, increasingly linked-up with public opinion.

Even the indolent sun-dried, cross legged votary of faith who only a century ago was mocking the stars in the flights of transcendental religion is now busily engaged in drawing analogies of government from the English constitution and proclaiming from house-tops doctrines or party shibboleths which his forefathers would have shuddered to listen much less to entertain.
This constitutionality of the state, however, took different shapes in different regions of India. In Punjab, as noted earlier, the provincial government was more directly integrated with the Central government than elsewhere. The same tradition continued in the NWFP after it was carved out of Punjab in 1901. Sind separated from Bombay as late as 1936 and had yet to develop an operationally autonomous provincial government, while Baluchistan remained a chief commissioner's province. Likewise, in East Bengal a new governmental structure had to be built in Dacca from scratch. In sum, Pakistan inherited weak and unstable provincial governments easy to fall a prey to the machination of a carefully orchestrated mass campaign against them. We have noted how the All India Muslim League outmanoeuvred and finally discredited the Unionist Party's government in Punjab. In fact, it was the part of a general process which started from Bengal in 1942-3 and culminated with the referendum in the NWFP immediately before partition.

We can now outline the general features of structural changes within the emergent state of Pakistan as effected by the Pakistan movement itself. First of all, during the movement the Muslim League mobilized immense street power which i) forced the coalition government of Punjab under the Unionist leadership to resign despite its parliamentary majority, ii) won recognition of the legitimacy of Muslim separation from the British government in the form of the latter's readiness to partition India. This street power was however limited to urban areas. A very large section of landlords had already jumped on the bandwagon of the Muslim League and provided it a much needed support base in Punjab. The rural masses therefore remained outside the sphere of direct political mobilization which meant that the faction-based landlord politics remained intact in the countryside. That also meant that landlords' interest articulation
channels through the district administration and higher bureaucracy remained operative on the individual basis. The Muslim League had just taken over the Muslim landlords' support base of the Unionist Party. It did not however reach an organisational level where it could command their allegiance to party discipline.

The mobilization of urban masses was carried out in the name of Islam under the charismatic leadership of Jinnah. The structure of the colonial state did not provide any role for either ideology or charisma. The introduction of these new political resources accompanied the process of indigenisation of the state. As we shall discuss in the next chapter, these resources provided the ideological infrastructure of the post-colonial state of Pakistan. They lost their mobilizational character and became sources of legitimacy for each government, symbolizing the status quo rather than change. The instrumental character of the role of ideology can be gauged from the fact that it was the secularist leadership of the Muslim League rather than the religious parties or Ulama in general who led the struggle for a separate homeland for the Muslims. On the eve of independence Jinnah testified to the continuation of the secularist character of the state of Pakistan by assuring its people: 'You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State.'

We have also noted that the emergent Muslim middle class was oriented essentially to job-seeking in the government sector both in army and bureaucracy and shunned political career. A bureaucratic job was considered most prestigious among the Muslims. This fact can be attributed to weakness of the Muslim bourgeoisie and professional middle class, especially lawyers. The position was exacerbated due to the Muslim League's lack of administrative experience in the Punjab and NWFP which forced it to depend on the available official wisdom, reinforcing thereby the rigid bureaucratic rule in the country.
We can now summarize our observations in this chapter as follows:

1. The penetration of capitalism dismantled the old system of localized sovereignties in India.

2. The state in British India was an organic part of capital.

3. This state increasingly became autonomous and interventionist, in the sense that:
   a) it became arbiter of relations between different classes, and
   b) it assumed a direct economic role in the society.

4. It passed through a long gestation period of objectification based on a) the rule of law,
   and b) the rule by alien bureaucracy. That lent it a potentially autonomous character vis-a-vis the indigenous classes.

5. The non-bureaucratic institutions were weaker, less mature, and less developed than the bureaucratic institutions of British India.

6. The state of Pakistan inherited regions of comparatively less constitutional development and more direct bureaucratic rule.

7. Pakistan was created by a political leadership based on areas outside Pakistan, which variously cajoled, co-opted or defeated the erstwhile popular leadership in the provinces comprising Pakistan.

8. Both in ideology and in pattern of class support, Muslim League politics was much more conservative than the Congress. Pakistan was therefore destined to shy away from the mass participatory models of politics and drift increasingly to military-bureaucratic rule.
NOTES


5. For example, of regional literature by these and other writers, see ibid.


7. Ibid., pp. 8, 4.


9. See for example the controversy over interpretation of the Indian economic history in the special issue of Economic and Social History Review (1968).


11. Ibid.


13. For example, Marx argued that, due to insufficient rain, large irrigation works were necessary, which were possible only through kingly power and wealth; hence all land was the King's property. Marx and Engels, On Colonialism, (Moscow, 1974) p. 37.

15. S. Naqvi, 'Marx on Pre-British Indian Society and Economy' Indian Economic and Social History Review, 1972, p. 408.


17. Ibid, pp. 123, III.


19. Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 1966, p. 327; 'The possessors of zamindari rights were not possessors of a visible article of property, like any other, but of a title to a constant share in the product of society' Habib, op.cit., p. 159.


22. Indeed as early as the inter-war years, 'At the discussions held in Tbilisi and Leningrad in 1930-1, the existence of Asiatic Mode of Production was denied and it was transformed into an Asiatic Variety of Feudalism', Y. Vorga, Quoted in Naqvi, op.cit., p. 387. Also Alavi, 'India: Transition from Feudalism to Colonial Capitalism, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 1980, pp. 371-2.

23. Nurul-Hasan distinguishes between three types of zamindars viz. chieftains (mansabdars), intermediary zamindars, and primary zamindars. However, in our discussions, primary zamindars in the taluka (zamindari) villages and the intermediary zamindars from the raiyati villages would be considered 'zamindars' in the sense used here.


27. Ibid. p. 163


29. 'The wide difference between the land revenue claims, represented by the revenue-rates (dasturs) and the estimated net realization (jama) of the Moghul ruling class' indicates zamindars' greatly inflated share of the present surplus. Shirin Moosvi, 'The Zamindars' Share in the Peasant Surplus in the Moghul Empire - Evidence of the Ain-e-Akbari Statistics,' Indian Economic and Social History Review, 1978, p. 359


31. 'The Khalisa, or more properly Khalisa -i- Sharifa, comprised the lands and sources of revenue reserved for the imperial treasury'. Habib, op.cit., p.259.

32. Ibid, 394.

33. Ibid. p.395.

34. Satish Chandra, 'Some Aspects of the Growth of a Money Economy in India during the Seventeenth Century' Indian Economic and Social History Review, 1966, p.326

35. Ibid, pp.325-6.

36. K.N. Chaudhury, 'Markets and Traders in India during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,' in Chaudhury and Dewey(eds.), Economy and Society, (Delhi, 1979) p.159

37. Habib, op.cit., p.89.


41. Ibid, p.159

The problem of European purchasing power for the Indian goods in the absence of a comparable demand for European goods in India was largely met by pouring in precious metals. Thus between 1708 and 1760, 75% of the 36.8 million pounds worth of 'exports' from England to India consisted of gold and silver bullion. See Alavi, op. cit. (1979) pp. 19.

There are obvious limits to our analysis, as no definite answers have yet been provided to such pertinent questions as 'long-term trend of real per capita output, relation between farm output and population growth, the extent of the decay in any of the native arts and crafts, the savings-investment capital-output ratios and aggregate time series of employment, money and real wages'. W. J. Mackernon, 'Economic Development in India under the British Crown 1858-1947,' in A. J. Youngson, (ed) Economic Development in the Long Run, (London, 1972) p. 133.

The presence of a bimetallic currency system in India inherited from the pre-colonial days, created difficulties as both gold and silver were not only means of exchange but also articles of commerce. Their market value often disagreed with their currency value for a variety of reasons, including the flexibility of freight charges, the localized shortage of supply of one or the other metal, and the rise and fall of coinage fee. Finally, in 1835, a monometallic currency was established, based on silver.


Ibid.


56. Ibid.

57. Ibid. p. 259.

58. There are different views on the extent of disastrous effects of the government's financial policy in the form of de-industrialization of India. According to Colin Clark, between 1881 and 1911 the number of workers employed in manufacture, mining and construction fell from 35% to 17% of the country's total workforce, leading to their ruralization. Thorner disputes the authenticity of these figures, although he indirectly supports the thesis of worsening lot of workers as both agricultural and manufacturing sectors stagnated between 1881 and 1931 while the population rose by 100 million. He thinks the major part of de-industrialization took place in the previous years - a position which Alavi seems to support. D. Thorner and A. Thorner, *Land and Labour in India*, (London, 1962), pp.70,77; Alavi, op.cit., (1979), p. 20.


60. Ibid.


62. 'Although some of India's trade surplus was met by the import of treasure, most of it was balanced by the sale of Council Bills'. B.R. Tomlinson, 'Monetary Policy and Economic Development: the Rupee Ratio Question 1921-1927', in Chaudhury and Dewey (eds.) op.cit., p. 198
63. Ibid. pp. 201, 204.


65. Ibid., p. 223

66. However, Indians in the Legislative Assembly twice voted down the provisions about Imperial Preferences, but were overruled each time by the Government of India. 'Report of the Indian Fiscal Commission, 1921-2, pp. xv-xvi. (EIP: pp. 607-8).


68. Ibid., p. 242.

69. Ibid., pp. 256-7

70. Ibid., pp. 246-7

71. Hugh Tinker, 'Structure of the British Imperial Heritage' in Ralph Braibanti, ed. Asian Bureaucratic systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, (Durham, 1966), p. 61


74. Ainslie T. Embree, 'Landholding in India and British Institutions' in Frykenberg, (ed.), op. cit., p. 35.

75. Ibid., pp. 37-41.

76. Ibid., pp. 49.


81. Ibid., p. 83.
82. Stokes, op. cit., p. 85.
85. Ibid., p. 151.
87. Ibid., p. 197.
89. Net produce was "the surplus which the state may yield; after deducting the expenses of cultivation, including the profits of stock and wages of labour" Directions for Settlement Officers, 1844, quoted in Stokes, op. cit., p. 104.
90. Ibid., pp. 105
92. Ibid., p. 5.
94. 'When a proprietor was compelled by necessity to sell, these agnates should be offered the opportunity of advancing the money required, and thus saving what is really their own property'. C.A. Roe, Tribal Law in the Punjab, (Lahore, 1895), pp. 82-3.
95. Douie, op. cit., p. 5.
96. Calvert, op. cit., p. 220.
97. Ibid., p. 200


101. Siddiqui, op.cit., p. 84.

102. Hirashima, op.cit., p. 256.

103. Siddiqui, op.cit., p. 77.

104. Ibid, P. 141

105. The value of Punjab's annual wheat export increased from £1,000,000 in early 1890's to an average of £6,000,000 between 1919 and 1925. See Malcom Darling, The Punjab Peasant: In Prosperity and Debt, (Oxford, 1925), p.132.


108. Ibid.


110. Ibid., pp. 8.

111. Such 'feudalism' thrived on non-economic sources of power in the locality but was constrained by the larger economic forces.


114. Ibid, pp. 208.

115. Darling, op.cit., pp. 129.


118. Calvert, op.cit, (1925) pp. 16-17.
119. Darling, op.cit., p.78


124. Ibid., pp.23-4


131. Lord Curzon to Lord Hamilton. 4. June 1903. (EIP: p.73)


133. Ibid., p.17.

134. Bingle, op.cit., pp.7-10

135. Lord Curzon to Lord Hamilton, 4 June, 1903. (EIP: p.73).


137. From R.M. Dane, Esquire, Settlement Officers, Gurdaspur, to the Commissioner and Superintendent Lahore Division, No.162. July 9, 1887.

139. Lai, op. cit., p. 372

140. Ibid., p. 373


142. Darling, op. cit., p. 68.


144. Trevaskis, op. cit., (1928), p. 299


146. Ibid., p. 75.


151. Ibid. p. 206.


153. Lord Minto to John Morley on the Congress and Muslims, 4 Nov., 1906 (EIP. 78).


158. Ibid. p.57.

159. Seal, op.cit., p. 182.

160. Ibid., p.183.

161. Petition of the British Indian Association to the House of Commons, 1859 (EPI: pp.99-100).

162. From the Hon'able MrE,D. MaclaganICS, Chief Secretary to Government of Punjab and its Dependencies to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department 6 July, 1908, Append.D,para41


166. Report of the Commissioners appointed by the Punjab Sub-Committee of Indian National Congress, (New Delhi, Reprint,1976), p.25

167. Ibid., p.25.


169. Zainul Abed in, Local Administration and Politics in Modernizing Societies: Bangladesh and Pakistan, (Dacca, 1975) p.337.

170. S. Shamsul-Hasan (ed.), Plain Mr. Jinnah... (Karachi, 1976) Appendix I, pp.299-301.

171. Ibid., p. 298

172. By the time the Muslim League held its first session at Karachi, 2 members of the Simla Deputation had died; ibid., pp.301-303.


177. Later, two more seats were allotted to them but then total was also raised to 58. See Satya M. Rai, op. cit., pp. 32-3.


179. Ibid., p. 24.


184. Ibid., p. 124.
186. Ibid. pp.129-131

188. A.H. Batalvi quotes a question asked from Jinnah about the (future) position of Awan birad. ri in Pakistan; Jinnah snubbed it due to its irrelevance and also due to his own ignorance of what the word Awan meant. See, Iqbal Ke Aakhir do sal (The last two years of Iqbai), Urdu, (Karachi, 1961), pp.39-40.


191. Ibid., pp.21-22
192. Ibid., pp.25-32.
193. Ibid., p.36.


195. Ibid., p.490.


CHAPTER III

STATE AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT: PAKISTAN 1947-1968

Introduction:

In the previous chapter we discussed Pakistan's inheritance of a state apparatus from British India along with its institutionalized relationships with various sections of the society. We also noted how the Muslim League leadership managed to lead the Indian Muslims to the goal of a separate homeland. In the present chapter the focus is laid on the way the new state adjusted to the realities of independence and committed itself increasingly to modernization in economic, political and administrative fields. In theoretical terms, we shall enquire as to what happens to the state when it acquires independence.

As noted earlier Pakistan presents a typical case of the permanent political crisis which currently besets the Third World. It has been studied variously in terms of constitutional breakdowns, military intervention in politics, regionalism and Islamization. On the other hand, it is clear from our discussion of state formation under colonialism in the previous chapter that a) the modern state is an organic part of capital, and b) that its institutional and operational powers were destined to expand after independence and maximize the productivity of locally available resources. The allocation of these resources to various groups and classes provides the foundation upon which the whole infrastructure of the state is built. It not only points to the specific nature of the understanding between various class interests but also provides a clue to the potential autonomy of state in the form of its capacity to appropriate a large proportion of national income and then use it as a lever of power. This leads us to a consideration of the efforts by various classes and class segments to get representation in the state and thus win as great a part of social value as possible.
The framework for an enquiry of this type is provided by the general commitment to development by the Third World states. Often, however, this commitment is conceived in terms of altruistic motives of the state to modernize the traditional societies, as we have noted in our discussion of modernization theory in Chapter I. In reality, the development funding is pre-ordained to serve those regions and classes which are already relatively more integrated in the wider capitalist system. In other words, we must consider the push effect of the contending social forces' claims to shares in the national resources. The term 'development' ought therefore to be defined in terms of objective market forces as they are operative in the interest of certain classes enjoying state protection, as against its usual meaning stressing the pull effect of the governmental and international institutions' policy objectives.

Sometimes the interest formation of these classes is itself considered a result of the pull effect of nationalism which is supposed to have politicized various groups in the society and committed them to make demands on the government. By contrast, we shall argue that a) these demands are the cause and not the effect of nationalism, and b) the development process cannot be understood as a one-to-one relationship between a pressure group and the government. Rather, these demands are the product of the 'structural imperative' of capitalism with its differential impact on regions and classes.

Commitment to development is thus commitment to a philosophy of development based on the principle of maximum productivity of investment which in practical terms means resource-allocation to the already 'developed' regions and sectors of the economy.

Indeed, development can be considered the very raison d'être of the state in Pakistan. It was the bureaucracy's religion under the colonial government and it got new impetus in the post-war modernization thrust emanating from the West in general. As we have noted in the
previous chapter, the British government conceived its role in India as a modernizing force, with the mission to deliver it from backwardness. In economic terms, this meant penetration of capital into the local society, with all its attendant processes of commercialization of agriculture, industrialization and new relationships between the state and social classes. In political terms this meant a paternalistic rule, immersed in a constitutional vision of 'progressive realization of responsible government'. All along a generalized approach to 'moral and material progress' was discernible ranging from religious reform to provision of technical education and sanitation. Later in Chapter V we shall discuss how local self government was introduced in India to initiate a learning process in the art of self-help and realization of public duties and rights among the general masses. Also village uplift and Panchayat system were sponsored and village co-operatives were established to encourage social and economic organisation on modern lines. Finally, from 1941 under the new policy of colonial development, the British government undertook various public projects to promote employment and social welfare at the grass roots level.

Apart from Pakistan's bureaucratic heritage of development orientation, various other pressures had emerged during the last phase of the nationalist movement and on the eve of independence. As noted earlier, a large amount of British capital was withdrawn in the inter-war years which needed to be compensated from alternative sources. The war effort during the 1940s further created a general consciousness among the government circles that a modern technological support base should be provided to meet the needs of the large standing army. The partition holocaust further created immense pressures on the government to create jobs and develop productive forces in general to settle the millions of refugees in their new homeland.
The subsequent cessation of trade with India finally pushed the government in a big way to take up radical measures to achieve economic self-sufficiency. During the two-way migration across the borders with India, immense damage was done to urban property and agricultural harvests, and huge gaps in manpower supply emerged. It is no surprise therefore that as the dust of nationalism settled down in the first decade, the institutional infra structure of the government was increasingly preoccupied with the preparation and implementation of development plans.

This chapter covers the first two decades of Pakistan's history after independence. This relatively long period contains apparently different politico-administrative context and such sharp dislocations in the governmental structure as the abrogation of parliament in 1954, military coup d'etat in 1958 and promulgation of the 1962 constitution. However, in a fundamental sense there exists a continuity of power structure throughout this period, i.e. in the way the state of Pakistan continued to be organised around its bureaucratic core. This is amply manifested by its pursuit of modernization of the governmental machinery on the one hand and its monopolistic regulation of the economy on the other. All along it retained, and further expanded, the potential capacity to override any other groups or institutions in the society especially in the core years of development, i.e. from 1955 to 1965.

The first two sections of the present chapter deal with the two coterminous processes of gradual decline of the political dynamics of nationalism and the emergence of a bureaucratic polity in Pakistan respectively. In the last three sections an attempt is made to analyze the developmental role of the state. The third section deals with the way the bureaucracy tried to improve its own organizational efficiency and resist all reform efforts. The fourth section deals with the industrial policy and its major impact on the existing framework of social relations in the urban milieu. The fifth section analyzes agriculture, and agrarian relations in general.
Section I. From Nationalism to Statehood

A close look at the state in Pakistan reveals the essentially constitutional nature of the whole process of transfer of power in India. Throughout the half century preceding independence both the Congress and the Muslim League had formulated their political demands strictly in constitutional terms, and had carried out their intermittent mass movements without openly threatening the established system of the state. While the end was the attainment of self-government for India, the means were clearly defined in terms of non-violence in both the camps. The independence movements started in the last quarter of the 19th century with the demand for meaningful participation in the legislative bodies of the government and expansion of franchise. It ended by acquisition of fully responsible powers by the legislatures which were now elected by an increasingly expanded franchise. The creation of Pakistan itself was finalized only after ratification of the partition plan by the respective legislatures of the constituent provinces of Pakistan. The transfer of power involved detailed description of the rights and duties of various governmental institutions and functionaries as secured through successive constitutional reforms, culminating with the 1935 India Act as amended in 1947.

The main political actors inherited by Pakistan were such political parties which were represented in the legislatures through elections. All along the operational dynamics of electoral politics continued pruning away those parties which aimed at such extra-constitutional changes in the prevalent state system as revival of the Islamic rule in India. Thus, the Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam, the Majlis-e-Ittehad-e-Millat, the Khaksar Tehrik, and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind variously used extra-parliamentary methods to rally the support of their mainly urban constituency. On the other hand, the Muslim
League, along with the Congress, was essentially constitutionalist in outlook. As the franchise expanded considerably after the 1935 reforms to include the broad masses of towns and villages, the Muslim League's secular leadership took to the use of primordial loyalties of caste and religion to win the elections. The legitimacy of the Muslim League's claim as representative of the Muslim India depended finally on its good performance in the 1946 elections. Both Jinnah's charisma and the ideological force of Islam were successfully harnessed for the relatively more mundane objectives of the electoral victory, the partition of India and the consolidation of the new state of Pakistan after independence.

In Weber's definition, the holder of charisma 'demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission'. Kedourie interprets the charismatic personality mainly in terms of millenialism as operative through a semi-divine command over the followers. Many historians of the nationalist movements tend to adhere to this metaphysical conception of charismatic leadership being responsible for creating nations out of disparate groupings. For example, Pakistan was considered 'the creation of a man, Jinnah'. By contrast, we shall argue that it is the specific nature of the class structure of late colonialism which produces the phenomenon of a national leader as an integrater of disparate social causes. The term 'charisma' is therefore used here in a secular sense, especially as Jinnah shied away from claiming any divine or mystical sources of inspiration. After independence, the role of Jinnah was largely shaped by the nature of his induction into the state and the way he mediated between the contending individuals, groups, parties and classes. This in turn had a tremendous effect on the way the authority of the new state was exercised.
Jinnah chose to be the first Governor General of Pakistan after independence. This step vested all powers in the hands of the top executive post which was not directly responsible to the constituent Assembly. As Sayeed has shown, Jinnah was empowered to adapt and modify any part of the 1935 India Act up to March 31, 1948, (later extended by one year); the advice of ministers was not binding on him; he could overrule the prime minister's orders in the matter of choice of ministers, or in any other business related to the cabinet, he could declare emergency in the country and legislate for any province or otherwise takeover the whole provincial administration; in fact his constitutional armoury was better equipped than even the viceroys of British India. Sayeed also used the term 'viceregal system' to denote the centralization of all executive powers in the hands of Jinnah.

While it greatly helps us to enquire into the juridical powers of Jinnah as Governor General of Pakistan since these powers were frequently used, of much greater significance is the way the use of these powers gave a definite shape to the country's politics. Being at the same time the Governor General, the president of the Pakistan Muslim League and the president of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Jinnah was posed at a critical juncture of the state machinery from where he could legislate for almost everything within the national boundaries. But as an old and ailing man he was more a prisoner of his high posts than their incumbent. The real power constantly drifted towards his confidants among the higher bureaucracy, both British and Pakistani. These bureaucrats, especially Ghulam Mohammad Ali, Iskandar Mirza and Colonel A. B. Shah in the centre and all the chief secretaries in the provinces made decisions in Jinnah's name and this established a highly centralized bureaucratic rule in the country. Jinnah kept secret channels of communication open with the provincial governors who prepared dossiers on politicians in their
respective areas and sent to him. He in turn took action against the recalcitrant politicians. In this way the weight of Jinnah's 'charisma' was employed in favour of the administrative wing of the new state and against the non-bureaucratic institutions and individuals. As we shall see, both political parties and legislatures badly suffered under this situation.

Apart from Jinnah's constitutional and supra-constitutional powers, the new government drew heavily upon the ideological source of the Pakistan movement, i.e. the Two-Nation Theory. It was a classical case of religion providing a number of options to the political leadership who could then selectively expose the general masses to propaganda aiming at metaphysical goals. The undercurrent of real political issues was thus mystified by the All India Muslim League leadership which gave a new meaning to Islam as the source of a separative identity. It was very characteristic of Jinnah to perceive the separate nationhood of the Muslims on the basis of a conception of Islam as a historical civilization and not as a universal and prescriptive code of life:

We are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and tradition, attitudes and ambitions, in short we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of International law we are a nation.

On the eve of independence, as noted earlier, Jinnah declared the new state to be free of any religious shackles. Later when the ulema stressed the sovereignty of Allah and a commitment to implementation of Shariah to be enshrined in the constitution, the Pakistan government conceded this demand so far as it remained merely symbolic and was
Indeed, after the Board of Talimat Islamia declared that the head of state was the trustee of the interests of the Millat, it was only too clear that the new state could depend on Islam as a source of legitimacy. Gradually, the term Pakistan Ideology replaced the Two-Nation Theory as the raison d'être of the state of Pakistan. Under Ayub period, Islam was increasingly sponsored as the national ideology, as a principle of unity between the two wings of Pakistan and as a flexible code of life befitting every age. 'Our mind is the mind of Islam', declared Ayub, 'which is capable of expressing the language of the modern mind... the language of science, the language of economics and language of current affairs'. In fact, this language manifested the self-image of Ayub as bearing a commitment 'to restore the nation' to its destiny through a highly paternalistic rule.

In sum the politics of nationalism bequeathed two highly charged sources of legitimacy to the people of Pakistan, i.e. the charismatic leadership of Jinnah and the Islamic ideology. The underlying bureaucratic structure of the state monopolized them and increasingly used them to discredit the political parties and generally the whole parliamentary process. It is very instructive to see the way the latter institutions atrophied in the post-independence period, after a half-century of general expansion under colonialism.

Parties and Legislatures

The history of the breakdown of Pakistan's parliamentary system in the late 1950's and the general weakness of its political parties is well known, and therefore, our observations are limited mainly to the extent that the parties and legislatures of Pakistan in this period define the sociological basis of the new state. The political parties in the Third World have usually been discussed in organisational
terms, thereby variously referring to nationalism, low institutional level and, patron-client relationships. These approaches generally ignore the specific pattern of relationship between the state and society in the Third World. We propose to approach the issue not through organisational theory but through the framework of non-bureaucratic politics of a) elections, and b) formation of representative governments in the elected assemblies. During the elections, the parties' behaviour is circumscribed by the mode of political transaction at the constituency level as manifested through the relationship between the landlords or other party ticket-holders on the one hand and the organisational/ideological core of the party represented by the urban-based cadres on the other. In the post-electoral framework the so-called political representatives of the masses operate in a system of allocation of resources dominated by the bureaucracy at all levels of the government.

What is often not fully realised is that nationalism, while aggregating various sections of the population under one banner, gives birth to a peculiar type of political party which is distinguishable from rival parties previously existing in the field. For example in Punjab, the Unionist Party exclusively represented the rural interests while most of the Islamic parties were exclusively urban-based. The former operated essentially through individual relationships with the British bureaucracy even while formally organised in the form of a club of landlord factions. Their political demands were based largely on the pragmatic calculations of on the one hand desirability to continue relations of mutual dependence with the administration and on the other hand the likely outcome of political conflict between the latter and the urban middle classes. The urbanites' purely ideological political stance reflected their acute social powerlessness and political impotence in the colonial framework. What nationalism did was to forge a link between the two at an organisational level as mediated by Jinnah with the use of latent ideological resources of Islam. In this
process, the Unionist Party's lack of an urban base and the Islamic parties' lack of a rural base proved to be disastrous for them whereby they increasingly conceded victory to the Muslim League.

In the post-independence period, relatively more stable political parties were characterized by varying types of rural-urban linkages, which in turn shaped their ideological make-up. The Muslim League, for example, contained both the landlord factions and the middle class/petty bourgeois sections from the urban areas within its fold. Its character as a mass movement was limited to cities, while in the villages it depended on factional alliances between landlords. The urban party cadres provided a popular base for the Muslim League through street corner speeches, pamphlets, containing party programmes, mass processions which sometimes involved hand-to-hand fighting with the police and political opponents, as well as forced occupation or burning government property. They were thus highly suspect in the eyes of the incumbent party governments which were usually dominated by landlords. When the Muslim League split into factional groups, the latter's political credibility largely depended on how much of urban party cadres each of them inherited.

The typology of internally/externally created parties points to their origin either in the previously existing legislative groups as in the case of the older parties of the West or in the wider political arena outside the legislatures as in the case of socialist and religious parties in the west and nationalist parties in the colonies. This typology has to be modified to apply to the post-colonial framework of politics in as much as it can incorporate the rewards of winning an electoral majority in terms of the unhindered use of state power. In Pakistan, for example, this power has frequently evaded even the party in government. The latter can be termed 'official' party
as against the 'combative' parties outside the government, according as the state trusted (and then co-opted) or distrusted any or all of them.  

Soon after Jinnah's death, the Muslim League was divided into many splinter groups usually around single personalities. Starting with the Azad Pakistan Party and Jinnah Muslim League (later merged into the Awami Muslim League), the ex-Muslim Leaguers had founded 9 out of a total of 13 parties by 1949. All along the twin processes of the ascendancy of the executive over the legislative and of the administration over politics in general rendered the ruling Muslim League party into an effete institution. Once the restriction over the holding of party office by cabinet members was lifted in October 1950, enabling Liaqat Ali Khan to become the president of the Muslim League, successive prime ministers held that office in turn. The fact that the latter were either bureaucrats or their nominees meant that party careers increasingly depended on bureaucratic patronage rather than organisational strength.

Indeed, the internal composition of the Muslim League was so blatantly factionalised that the organisational hold over party members was almost non-existent. Even if the party recommended a specific policy measure, it fell on deaf ears. For example when the Agricultural Reforms Committee of the Muslim League recommended abolition of hereditary jagirs and various cesses, property rights for the occupancy tenants, provision of security of tenure and replacement of share cropping by cash rental, the provincial and central working committees of the Muslim League as well as the provincial and central governments all shelved them on various excuses, finally abandoning them altogether. The party intelligentsia, which was relatively more progressive, and provided the bulk of urban party workers carrying on mobilizational campaign in the name of party, was increasingly frustrated. The top leadership often sacrificed
them in the interest of keeping as many rural factions within the
fold of the party as possible. The continuous postponement of
general elections in Pakistan rendered the use of party cadres more and
more irrelevant.

In the absence of inner organisational strength of political
parties, the government could manage to allure certain factional
groups away from them and create artificial majorities in the legislatures
or reduce the existing ones. For example, the threats of cancelling
the bus-route permits of the members of West Pakistan Assembly
forced certain Muslim League factions among them to join Khan Sahib's
Republican Party and thus save his ministry from collapse in the face
of the former's refusal to accept him as leader of the House. The
essentially factional nature of political parties made them vulnerable
to offers of sharing power with the rival parties having widely differing
ideological standpoints on various issues and also with the representatives
of the chambers of commerce, the army and the bureaucracy as in
the 'cabinet of talents' in 1955-56. Later, Sohrawardy, Chundrigar
and Noon successively headed such coalitions of which their own
parties constituted only a minority. In an electoral context, the
faction-based leaderships gave birth to horizontal power blocks competing
for party tickets; there were as many as 800 applicants for 192 seats in
the 1951 Punjab elections. Those who did not get tickets often defected
from the party, fought elections independently and if successful were
welcomed back in the party.

The formal arena for politics remained the central and
provincial legislatures which contained many pockets of party
support. However, their representative character became
more and more suspect because of continuous postponement of
elections. The underlying political game involved seeking support
from the members of the legislatures and establishing coalitions:
From 1951 onwards, the top post of Governor General was occupied
by the bureaucrats who were instrumental in bringing about parliamentary
coalitions to support their nominees for prime ministership. In
1954, they virtually staged a civilian coup d'état by abrogating the
Constituent Assembly altogether. When finally voting for the second
Constituent Assembly took place in 1955, only 14 members from the
first Constituent Assembly were re-elected. The bureaucrats overnight
created the Republican Party from out of its members and those of the newly constituted West Pakistan Assembly.

The legislative wing of the government was further marginalized in terms of the relatively insignificant time it spent on dispensing its official business, both in the pre- and post-1958 periods. Its working sessions were few in number and extremely brief in duration.

**TABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislature</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Working days</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituent Assembly I</td>
<td>1947-54</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituent Assembly 2</td>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly 1</td>
<td>1956-58</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly 2</td>
<td>1962-65</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly 3</td>
<td>1965-69</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: H. Kizilbash, *Legislatures and Foreign Policy in Pakistan*, South Asia Institute, University of the Punjab (Lahore; n.d.) p. 12., Table 1.

As can be observed from the Table, the average length of sessions rose higher in 1955-6, only to legitimize the constitutional engineering undertaken by the bureaucracy, involving gigantic projects like formation of the One-Unit and passing the 1956 Constitution. It rose again following Ayub's promulgation of the 1962 Constitution which involved many amendments in order to make it more palatable for the political wing of his government. In other words, the legislatures were instrumentalized by the administrative core of the state of Pakistan to legitimize its rule whenever needed. Normally, however, considerable procedural limitations were imposed to divest the legislatures of their potential power. Almost whole of the session time was consumed by the government bills, leaving very little time for the private bills and resolutions. The interval between introduction and final approval of the government bills, even when dealing with such big issues as
instituting the Industrial Finance Corporation, the Agricultural Finance Corporation, the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and the Karachi Development Trust, was extremely brief. Moreover out of 283 bills introduced from 1947 to 1954 only one was circulated for eliciting public opinion and only 14 were referred to select committees. As for private bills, notices were given for 111, but only 28 were actually introduced and only three were finally passed. Out of 56 adjournment motions, only 4 were allowed to be discussed.

The major executive rules and regulations were altogether outside the scope of national legislature. As early as 1950 the legislature had abdicated power in favour of the executive in such matters as sanctioning of the building of Karachi Industrial Estate costing Rs. 10 crores. While the Constituent (later National) Assembly passed 160 laws between 1947 and 1958 the Governor General alone issued 376 major ordinances. The 1962 Constitution further limited the powers of legislatures; its Articles 41 and 42 took the passage of governments' recurring expenditure away from its jurisdiction, leaving to it only the control over 'new expenditure' which averaged only 7.5% of the total expenditure and was to be defined as such by the executive. In sum, the new state increasingly followed the colonial pattern of direct bureaucratic rule and rendered the political leadership effectively useless.

Refugees

As noted earlier, historically the Muslim League had had a strong footing in the Muslim minority provinces of India, whereas the majority provinces, which later became Pakistan, were exposed to its overwhelming influence as late as the 1940s. That factor was reflected in the composition of the top leadership of the party. In 1946-7, for example, only 10 out of 23 members of the Muslim League Working Committee belonged to the future provinces of Pakistan. In Dec. 1947
when the executive committee of the Pakistan Muslim League met in Karachi, 160 out of its 300 members were refugees. Both Jinnah and Liaqat themselves came from outside Pakistan along with their close colleagues and followers from Bombay and the UP. Their dominance of the political scene was also reflected in the way they were inducted into the legislatures. For example, six migrant leaders, including Liaqat Ali Khan, got elected from East Bengal in place of the existing members who voluntarily resigned in their favour. Likewise special seats were created in the West Punjab Assembly to accommodate the Muslim representatives from East Punjab, which were later transformed into double-member constituencies for the 1951 elections.

Political historians of Pakistan have often mentioned this overwhelming political weight of the Muslim League's migratory leadership in the new state. However, generally they have ignored the significance of the mass of refugees in the constitutional, economic or administrative development of the country. They are mentioned mainly with reference to problems of rehabilitation. Only Burki has recently included this phenomenon in his dichotomous model of insiders and outsiders. Unfortunately however, his analysis is based on wrong empirical data and simplistically conceived contradiction between refugees and locals. For example, he claims that the majority of refugees were urban; he sees in this factor clash between two systems, i.e. the 'rigidly hierarchical', 'tightly organised', 'archaic', and paternalistic indigenous system on the one hand and the 'participating', 'loosely clustered', modern' and largely liberal economic and political system of refugees on the other.

It is argued that refugees were far from a monolithic group. Instead, their disparate origins in various regions of India and the pattern of their dispersion over whole of Pakistan make than a highly differentiated group.
### Place of Origin and Place of Settlement of India Refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>North West</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>7226584</td>
<td>5785096</td>
<td>701317</td>
<td>18010</td>
<td>160374</td>
<td>95181</td>
<td>464218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>27988</td>
<td>16501</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>1538</td>
<td>3011</td>
<td>6311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Bengal</td>
<td>699079</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>670735</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>2967</td>
<td>20773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>616906</td>
<td>217649</td>
<td>19874</td>
<td>11107</td>
<td>119158</td>
<td>49579</td>
<td>197560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>5,1,126</td>
<td>31375</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>1637</td>
<td>17114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>52,81,194</td>
<td>5566</td>
<td>5566</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>5404</td>
<td>17175</td>
<td>105541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>5,50,291</td>
<td>4320</td>
<td>4320</td>
<td>4745</td>
<td>32064</td>
<td>21046</td>
<td>116899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol. I, Report and Tables

MAIN STREAMS OF MUHAIJRIS (FIGURES IN THOUSANDS) MAP 2.4

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Map showing the main streams of Muhajirs from different regions to various parts of India.
It is clear that 97.5% of the refugees in West Punjab (i.e. 71.2% of the total) came from East Punjab including some from Rajasthan states and Jammu and Kashmir, while only 2% came from U.P. Therefore, the refugees were not outsiders for the system of government and politics in Punjab; instead, they were shaped by the same broad social and administrative traditions as the locals. The same was true about the bulk of refugees who came to East Bengal. Only in Sind (including Karachi) a very high proportion of refugees i.e. 27% came from the U.P. This ratio was more than 13 times higher than in Punjab. In addition, nearly 13% refugees came to Sind from Bombay and Gujerat. In this way, Sind presents a different picture from Punjab, although the predominant number of refugees in the latter set the overall pattern in the country.

The scene in Punjab presents a curious blend of problems related to rehabilitation over evacuee property, local-muhajir conflict, and sectoral/demographic changes.

TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>In-comers</th>
<th>Outgoers</th>
<th>Debit/credit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W. Punjab</td>
<td>63,86,000</td>
<td>38,08,000</td>
<td>+ 25,78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>7,67,000</td>
<td>9,43,000</td>
<td>-176,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>-66,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>2,68,000</td>
<td>-2,48,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71,73,000</td>
<td>50,85,000</td>
<td>+20,88,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The refugees accounted for almost a third of Punjab's population after partition. Their settlement involved large scale allotment of the evacuee property left by the outgoing Hindus and Sikhs which outvalued the comparable property left by them in India. For example, the former left about 6.6 million acres of agricultural land compared with only 3.4 million acres left by the latter. Prior to partition, the former owned 80% of the industrial capital and about 75% of the urban immovable property. The allotment of the 90% of evacuee property to the
incoming refugees became a hotbed of controversy among the locals. Many of them were ejected from houses, shops and factories which they had occupied immediately after the departure of the Hindus and Sikhs. On the other hand, those who had good connections in the government circles got multiple allotments in their names.

Both urban and rural refugees tended to settle in towns. By 1951, Karachi, Hyderabad, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Sargodha and Sukkhar already had refugee majorities, while in Lahore Rawalpindi, Multan and Sahiwal refugees accounted for more than 40% of the population. These urban refugees emerged as the support base for the refugee leadership of the Muslim League in its attempts to avoid holding elections. In the absence of a local constituency in the country at large elections would have meant the latter's exit from the political scene altogether. It is no surprise that the refugee middle class took overwhelmingly to the bureaucratic careers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Locals</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Bengal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karachi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pakistan Public Service Commission, Report, Rules, Question Papers, Table of Results etc: Pamphlet of the Combined Competition Examination (Karachi, 1951)

Thus being merely 10% of the total population, the refugees claimed 58.5% of seats in the highest stratum of the central services of Pakistan. A survey in the early 1960's disclosed that 34.5% public
servants were not resident of the Pakistan areas in 1947; moreover, 3/5ths of them were already in service at that time which meant that they were now occupying relatively senior positions in the government. Also 1764 out of 3121 refugee public servants i.e. 56.6% came from UP, Delhi and East Punjab only, i.e. the areas of traditional Muslim hegemony who also dominated the Muslim League and the Pakistan movement. Later it was shown that no less than 55% of jobs in Foreign Service of Pakistan were held by the Urdu-speaking refugees alone who were only 3% of the total population.

The government was fully responsive to the refugees' rehabilitation. Both the Central and provincial governments jointly established the Pakistan Punjab Refugee Council for this purpose. The Central government made a grant of Rs 12.5 million to the Punjab government and extended development loans worth Rs 80 million. 42 satellite towns were built in West Pakistan, accommodating 80,000 refugee families. A new Rehabilitation Tax was instituted and various credit agencies were opened to help them start business and build houses. In the rural areas the guzara scheme was launched which made a large number of temporary allotments of agricultural land to refugees.

The phenomenon of refugees played a decisive role in shaping the general political attitudes in Pakistan. The trauma of migration involved sacrifices in life and property and generally raised the level of political consciousness of the refugees. For example it led to particularism in trade unionism manifested through Muhajir Workers Unions in some sectors of industry, notably railway and textile. Similarly, the Muhajir League of the NWFP made representations demanding exemption from court fee for the refugees. At the national level, their hatred for India provided a support base for the anti-Indian stance of the governments foreign and defence policies. As they were in majority in many important cities they wielded extra weight in public opinion. Their sense of rootlessness, made them ever more dependent on the ideological resources of the new nation. A general
deification of the state followed, which considered factional quibbling among landlords, movements for provincial autonomy and demands for general elections as opposed to the raison d'etre of Pakistan. Especially, the middle class urban refugees provided all-out support to the state in its pursuit of such goals as Islamic Constitution, Urdu as national language and One-Unit for West Pakistan. Especially in Punjab, the refugees symbolized and enhanced Islamic spirit, rabid anti-communism, uncompromising hatred for India, apathy towards electoral politics, and intolerance for 'parochial' demands of other provinces for greater participation in the state's affairs. 57

We can conclude from our observations in this section that Jinnah's charisma and appeal of the Two-Nation Theory/Ideology of Pakistan greatly favoured the bureaucratic establishment; that political parties atrophied and legislatures went down in the face of its superior organisational power; and that refugees tended to reinvigorate the process of concentration of power in the hands of bureaucracy. All these factors paved the way for bureaucratic ascendancy in Pakistan.

Section 2: Emergence of a Bureaucratic Polity.

In this section it is argued that the state apparatus in Pakistan enjoys virtual monopoly over all organisational activity in the society; this gives it a tremendous advantage over all other contenders for a public role. We shall also discuss the involuted paternalism of the bureaucracy, especially as it has acquired a new momentum in the process of resource allocation for development. Finally, we shall analyze the role of judiciary in the upkeep of bureaucratic dominance in Pakistan.
We have observed how in the transition from nationalism to statehood the bureaucracy managed to capture political office after a few years of back-stage manoeuvring. Riggs has analyzed a similar situation in Thailand under the rubrics of bureaucratic polity. Here the 1932 military coup d'etat had placed the 'commoner officials in the cockpit of power'; they were generally more responsive to the interests of their bureaucratic subordinates than to outside forces, and served repeated terms in office. As for parliamentary rule, it was the cabinet which controlled the Assembly and not vice versa. The former had an effective constituency in the bureaucracy at whose pleasure only it could remain in office, while the latter's constituency lay in the parties and the electorate which were redundant. The limited parliamentary control over finance, the incessant proliferation of administration staff and over-centralization of decision-making power in the hands of the executive were some of the prominent characteristics of this polity.

In Pakistan, a similar political structure emerged after independence which was dominated by the bureaucracy even while working under the political ministers. The Cornellius Report reminds us that the position 'which has tacitly been accepted since the introduction of representative government viz. that the secretaries are the brains of the ministers is one which defeats a fundamental purpose of the Constitution namely that the power and authority of the State shall be exercised by the chosen representatives of the people'.

Recognising the power of the bureaucrats La Porte described them as qualitative power holders, variously 'influenced' by politicians who then were the quantitative power-holders in the sense of wielding voting strength. By contrast, we shall argue that the real strength of bureaucracy lies in its monopoly over all socio-political organisational activity. Apart from the military, it is usually the most highly institutionalized organisation in the Third World.
Monopoly over Organisation

For Huntington, the key variable in political development is the specific level of institutionalization of socio-political organisations defined in terms of coherence, adaptability, complexity and autonomy. However, there is a conceptual tension implicit in this set of indices. For example, complexity of institutions is disruptive of coherence, as is also autonomy; this leads to pluralization of social groups. On the other hand complexity can undermine autonomy itself. Although Huntington pursues his analysis of modernization essentially in processual terms he ends up by giving us such indices only one of which, i.e. adaptability, is a performance variable, all others being structural variables. For these variables to be meaningful, we have to place them in an overall structural context of the political system which developed during the colonial rule.

The source of institutional maturity of the Pakistan state's administrative body lies essentially in its historically established legitimacy in the country. This legitimacy drew variously upon the complex characteristics of the supreme authority of Westminster, upon its legal and constitutional relationships with the dominant classes of the Indian society in the form of rights of property and private enterprise, and finally upon its capacity to safeguard itself with the help of its armed wing, i.e. military as a last resort. As a result, the legal hierarchical structure of bureaucracy, its constitutionally-sanctioned roles and the tenurial security of individual officers lent the organisational sub-structure of the state in Pakistan such quantum of rational collective will, which far surpassed that of any other organization in the society.

The state of Pakistan inherited an attitude of intolerance towards the existence of any public organisation outside itself. In the official view any organised public activity automatically symbolized
the emergence of rival centres of power, capable of putting constraints on the state's manoeuvrability. It represented the potential for mass mobilization in the form of street power. Whatever limited operational legitimacy was accorded to the Muslim League (and Congress) by the colonial government, was due to recognition of the fact that it commanded sufficient street power to make the automatic compliance of the public impossible. It was then duly co-opted into the state on the eve of independence. After that the Muslim League became the spokesman of the state in discrediting other non-statist parties commanding varying degrees of street power. In the given constitutional framework of politics, elections were the only way through which this power could be manipulated by the parties. No doubt, the state of Pakistan constantly shunned general elections and thus took this most vital resource of all political parties out of politics altogether.

Under the Ayub regime, an ambitious attempt was made to create a social contract between state and society by co-opting locally privileged individuals into the lower rungs of administration through the Basic Democracies. By thus localizing political activity within 80,000 small constituencies, the government tried to further curtail the organized mass participation in politics by de-linking parties from the general electorate. The intermediary role of politicians and political parties was reduced to a farce. The two requisite features of Pakistan's political parties viz., landlords and the urban cadres were completely separated from each other. While the former became the victims of extreme localization of politics, the latter lost the social weight of landlords. As a result, all organised activity disappeared from public life, despite the continuing formal existence of a score of political parties. We can maintain, therefore, that the specific type
of political parties in Pakistan were a function of the overall structure of the state and not vice versa.

In addition to such indirect methods of political manipulation, the government often used more direct ways of controlling organised public activity. Extensive use of intelligence reports, frequent imposition of section 144, prior official sanction for instituting any public body, and even restricting the use of such 'private' public places as the outer chamber (baithak) of lumbar dar, were all meant to discourage the maturation of institutional forms of public opinion. While the government of Pakistan thus scaled down the organisational input into the political life, on the output side it monopolized representation of public interest through a complex system of periodical reports, memoranda and policy advices. Such pervasive distrust of any expression of public will at a non-bureaucratic level could not but affect the public confidence in its capacity to influence government policies, further hampering the growth of public organisations.

The official class was structurally unable to co-exist with public figures operating from public platform and seeking to raise issues which could be detrimental to the carefully established politico-administrative order. Instead, official opinion doted on the principle of good government which was allegedly based on a much higher rationality than that of the aggregated public will.

This distrust of public representatives was reflected in the bureaucratic monopoly over top level decision making. For example, the vital decisions about Pakistan's entry into CENTO and SEATO were taken jointly by Ayub Khan, Ghulam Mohammad and Sir Zefrullah Khan while the prime minister Mohammad Ali Bogra, who was also the president of the ruling Muslim League party, was simply by-passed.
Even more significantly, the legally objectified status of the administration was instrumentalized against the political activists. Thus the Governor General instituted the PRODA Act in 1949 against those governments and politicians who were found guilty of various kinds of corruption. This Act was a hanging sword over the heads of politicians. Almost a dozen ministers and ministries had been dismissed by 1958. After Ayub came to power the PRODA was replaced by the EBDO which was equally lethal. In one year's time about 150 former ministers, deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries and 600 members of the previous central and provincial assemblies were being investigated under this Act. Ayub's hatred was not limited to politicians; it included all other activities which were in one way or the other related to politics.

**Involuted Paternalism**

In bureaucratic parlance of Pakistan, politics has been just another name for instability, systemic disruption and disunity. Any demand for change in the existing political order was considered dysfunctional. For example, the Munir Report recommended suppression of crises preferably before they become national issues. It chided the D.C.'s and the S.P.'s for not treating the 1953 anti-Ahmadya riots as a simple matter of law and order. In other words, the people had to be protected against themselves, i.e. against their own destructive faculties. It is not for nothing that since independence 90% of the time the D.C.'s have imposed Section 144 in at least one part of the country. The career requirements of administrators are such that they win merit for controlling districts and are penalised for failing to do so. Indeed the 'demonstration effect' of this strategy can be noted from one author's claim that 'the press and mass media no longer offer a forum for radical dissent', from which he deduced that all was well in Pakistan.
In this way, the state re-established its own guardian role in the society after a brief period of nationalist struggle which had opened the floodgates of mass participation. An ethos of elitism permeated bureaucratic thinking; democracy, in the words of Iskandar Mirza, 'required education, tradition, breeding, and pride in your ability to do something well'. Indeed, bureaucratic paternalism acquired idyllic proportions when the role of a development officer was termed as 'custodian of the rural communities' morals as well'. Leadership, faith in one's destiny and mission to save the nation were the constant referents of Ayub Khan's rhetoric:

My task, as I saw it was to set up institutions which should enable the people of Pakistan to develop their material, moral and intellectual resources and capacities to the maximum extent.

This attitude was equally shared by the CSP who stood at the apex of the bureaucratic structure, and had monopoly over 'correct' thinking; it was noticed that almost every one of them had comprehensive, extensive and self-sufficient formula for Pakistan's salvation.

The bureaucratic polity of Pakistan was thus an involuted form of the paternalistic rule of the colonial bureaucracy. This involution came from applying new sources of legitimacy to maintenance of the political order of a previous era. The state, increasingly eschewed the language of public participation in the name of nationalism. The bureaucratic creed that masses cannot represent themselves so they must be represented, took a further leap into ideological obscurantism. While the colonial regime used the constitutional language of progressive realization of responsible government for this purpose, the state of Pakistan defined goals in term of fulfillment of national destiny often couched in Islamic ideology. The former's development orientation was limited to improvement of the socio-economic conditions of rural life, while the latter took up the task of development of the productive forces of the society, especially in the large scale manufacturing
sector. Both however detested the role of non-bureaucratic institutions
and sought to localise politics under their firm paternalistic
control. The political process thus moved towards the local
self-government model under the system of Basic Democracies
establishing the over-all directive control of the bureaucracy.

The bureaucratic polity of Pakistan had its strategic
base in the army, while refugees provided the social base,
especially in the urban sector, and Basic Democracies served as
its institutional base. The military wholeheartedly put its weight
in its favour and safeguarded its guardian role in the society. From
early on, the Pakistan military was politicized as it was called upon
to assume a decisive role to bale out the government from various
internal crises. For example, during the language riots of East Bengal
in 1952, the Martial Law of 1953 in Lahore, and the Jute Operation
of 1953 in Dacca, the military came down very heavily on the protagonists
of popular causes and became the law-enforcing agency of the central
government. In the 1956 food crises in East Bengal, the Centre condemned
the KSP government there for its incapacity to handle the situation and
rendered all distributive functions into the hands of army. Again in the
1957 anti-smuggling drive, the so-called Operation Closed Door, the
army was entrusted with the job of clearing out all illegal trade across
the borders despite its political cost of alienating large numbers of the
Awami-League supporters. The army leadership had a simple one-
language one religion—One Unit approach to the nation's problems.

ethnic, cultural and racial aspirations of people were rejected
in one sweep as 'abstract reasons'.

As commander-in-chief General Ayub worked under seven
prime ministers; he was included in the 'cabinet of talents' for a brief
period and was reportedly invited by the Governor General Ghula
Mohammad to take over the country. The next Governor General
Iskandar Mirza had been Defence Secretary and a long time friend of Ayub. It is therefore reasonable to accept Ayub's assertion that he acted as a buffer between the politicians and the armed forces. Indeed it was common among the senior civil and military officers to have close personal relations and thus develop a relatively harmonious outlook to the nation's political and administrative problems. The 1958 coup seems to indicate the joint effort of civilian and military bureaucrats to forestall the installation of a popularly-based government under Sohrawardy as a result of the coming election in 1959.

After bestowing legitimacy on the bureaucratic hegemony, the military leadership recalled its troops from the public eye and was content with winning some of the top jobs for itself, including presidential and cabinet posts, chairmanships of public corporation and accommodation of 14 of its officers in the Civil Service of Pakistan. In other words, Ayub's military regime was essentially civilian in the sense that all major administrative work was carried out by the civil bureaucracy as before. For example, out of 280 members of 33 commissions of enquiry established under his rule, the bulk, i.e. 42.1% belonged to the civil service, with only 6.4% from military, 5.7% from judiciary and the rest from various professional and non-professional groups. Thus, we can maintain that the military regime of Ayub provided only individual ascendancy to the generals, but enhanced the overall corporate security of the civilian bureaucracy in the governmental framework. In other words it freed the bureaucracy of the need to seek a mandate from the masses. Military intervention in politics thus became the requisite feature of the bureaucratic polity in Pakistan.
A major feature of this polity has been the cult of national unity at the expense of local differentiation in popular opinion. Jinnah's intransigence on the issue of national language is well-known. He ignored the compromise formula reached between the chief minister of East Bengal Khawaja Nazim-ud-din and the Action Committee for Bengali as National Language and also dismissed the East Bengal Assembly resolution on that issue. The grand design of One-Unit was formulated and imposed on the provincial governments of West Pakistan with full severity. Islam, Urdu and other ideological symbols were used to promote national unity. The Ayub government established the Bureau of National Reconstruction to coalesce all the divergent linguistic, sectarian and social groups into a cohesive nation. However, its clandestine methods of keeping police spies and informers and allocating funds for 'secret services' soon started irritating public opinion. In the constitutional context, this cult of unity was conceptually embedded in the need for a strong Centre and a very strong chief executive, representing the focal point of authority.

**Political Role of Judiciary**

The government in Pakistan has been well-guarded by a system of law which consists of verbose details about each minute political and administrative matter. In the latter years of colonialism in India the bureaucracy continued piling up safeguards against encroachments on its power by the two nationalist parties, i.e. the Congress and the Muslim League, with their own mutually contradictory claims. The India Act of 1935, for example, included the minutest details of administrative jurisdiction to satisfy these two 'highly sensitive and suspicious clients' which led to elaborate prolixity of later constitutions of Pakistan. On the one hand this process equipped
the bureaucracy with constitutionally sanctioned rights and duties in more details and in a greater number of areas than ever before. On the other hand it greatly increased the task of higher judiciary to interpret, regulate and apply these laws in the society. In various way this process ended up with the judiciary having to play a much more complex role than previously and thus variously influence the shaping of the state system in independent Pakistan.

From the beginning of colonial rule, the lower courts were inextricably linked to the overall executive responsibility of the district officers. They therefore functioned as the handmaid of local administration. After independence, public pressure was brought against the old system, and both the constitutions of 1956 and 1962 promised separation of executive and judicial powers as soon as possible. However, the bureaucracy's strong opposition has been too strong to allow that. We shall discuss the impact of this combination of powers at the local level in Chapter V. Suffice it to say here that the lower court's operational effect has been mainly in the field of law and order and property relations, in their capacity as the legal arm of the district administration.

The upper levels of court system have been relatively free from direct bureaucratic or political control. The high courts in the provinces and the Supreme Court of Pakistan have maintained their separate character mainly because structurally they were not part of the bureaucracy. In this capacity they have been able to look after individuals' fundamental rights, primarily through the writ jurisdiction but also through the use of ultra vires doctrine which sought to check the excercise of power in excess of legal authority.
Pakistan inherited the British judicial structure as it was operative in the non-presidency towns, where the machinery for writ jurisdiction was relatively less developed. Only one writ, i.e. the Habeas Corpus, was provided in section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Punjab, protecting individuals from unlawful detention. During the Second World War the High Courts took frequent recourse to this section. Not surprisingly they were accused of 'interfering' in the administration. The relations between the two wings of the state were strained off and on. Other writs e.g. Mandamus, Prohibition, Certiorari and Omo Warranto, all of which dealt with intra-bureaucratic discipline were instituted in the legal structure of Pakistan through an amendment to the 1935 India Act as late as 1954.

The Habeas Corpus writ has been a thorn in the side of the bureaucracy. Article 170 of the 1956 constitution provided full writ power to the High Courts, which applied retrospectively through a ruling of Justice Kayani. Consequently, the number of writ applications increased remarkably after the constitution came into effect. The bureaucracy took a grim note of it and criticised the judiciary for thus operating like a state within the state. On the judiciary's part it was a matter of correcting 'the incorrect assumption that the body of persons constituting the public service is itself the State'.

Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution sought to curb the powers of writ jurisdiction by not using the specific legal terminology. It not only took the service matters of the defence forces out of its jurisdiction, but also restricted judicial consideration of terms and services of government employees to only those specified in the constitution. After great pressure from the legal quarters, the
Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1963 finally declared 31 laws and ordinances to be justiciable while still excluding another 40 enactments. 94

There exists an elaborate body of legal provisions to safeguard the bureaucracy's tenurial security, jurisdictional matter and maintenance of various perquisites and privileges. 95 Litigation on various service matters have abounded throughout Pakistan's history. It has involved such matters as governmental powers of dismissal of its employees, payment of arrears for those re-instated through a court decision and promotion, transfer, and encadrement of the incumbent officers. The Supreme Court of Pakistan was more compassionate towards the government employees and tried to strike a balance between the interests of officers and the state at large. However, the official thinking in general grew increasingly more conservative. Proposals like giving writ powers to district judges in the cases of non-gazetted civil servants, barring students from seeking writs and letting judges instead of division benches to dispose of writs petitions were legion. 96 What is instructive for our purposes is that the bureaucratic state in Pakistan tried to increase its stranglehold over the society essentially through the instrument of law. In other words the legal structure of Pakistan is the basic source of state power and is not merely the product of successive governments' capricious moves, as it is often made out to be by politicians. 97

Indeed the government of Pakistan has applied restraint in its efforts to control the institutional autonomy of judiciary in contrast with its outright defamation and even abrogation of political parties. In other words, the state machinery has been sensitive to preservation of its own institutional ethos whose legality was guarded by the judiciary. For example after the military coup of 1958, appeals against the Martial Law orders were not allowed for sometime, nor was any action taken under the Security Act to be challenged in civil courts. However, soon military courts were withdrawn and the Supreme Court and other courts were
re-constituted and the government pledged to work, 'as near as
may be to the previous constitution',98

While the higher judiciary's role in legal matters dealing
with individual rights has been rather critical of the government,
it has generally shared the bureaucracy's distrust of parliamentary
politics. While avoiding a detailed account of the constitutional
crises in Pakistan we want to point out that the state in Pakistan
has a constitutionally sanctioned legal base. The fact that the
longest running constitution of Pakistan, viz the 1962 Constitution,
was drafted outside the parliament effectively made the judiciary
the final judge of the constitutionality of a law through its powers
of interpretation.

Section 3: Administration, Development and Reform

In the previous section we outlined the political aspects
of the relationship between the government and the public in
Pakistan. It was observed that the state bureaucracy tended to
dominate the whole political system from top to bottom which was
directly related to the parallel process of underdevelopment of
political institutions, parties and legislatures. A whole group of
balanced growth theorists, including Pye, La Palombara and Riggs,
ascribe the latter phenomenon directly to the bureaucracy's over-
development.99 They stress the institutional imbalance between
bureaucracy and all other social and political groups as the cause
of political underdevelopment. Others like Brabanti, and Sigelman
claim that bureaucratic development is the precondition for
modernization as it represents collective rationality.100 In the
present section we shall deal with some of the crucial questions
related to this issue in the context of administrative structure,
organisational objectives, and processes of self-reproduction
of the bureaucracy in Pakistan.
As an authority directly responsible for the rule of law in the country while at the same time not being answerable to any sovereign body outside itself, the Pakistan bureaucracy legitimates its rule largely as the agent of modernization. Almost as a canonical necessity, it is conscious of the need for continuous improvement in its own organisational structure. It inherited the relatively complicated administrative structure of British India. This structure was internally divided into services, cadres and classes. These were: (i) the generalist administrative services like the CSP, (ii) the functional services like Audit and Accounts and (iii) the specialist services like Health and Engineering. Within each service, a hierarchy of four classes existed, with different appointing and dismissing authorities in each case, different levels of responsibility and power, as well as different conditions of service. Moreover, there was a functional division between the secretariat and field services, and a horizontal division between the central and provincial services.

At the heart of this complex bureaucratic rule lay the move towards re-organisation of superior services on all Pakistan basis. Previously, officers were assigned to provinces on a permanent basis and were deputed to the Centre at the latter's demand. By contrast, the provinces now borrowed officers from the Centre under a tenure system. The control of provinces over these deputed officers was limited, especially as the functions transferred to provinces were also administered by these 'central' officers. In practical terms, this manifested the complete distrust of provinces by the centre, which was rooted in the former's recent anti-Muslim League stand, especially in Punjab and NWFP. This step towards unitarianism contravened the federal basis of Pakistan's political system.
The dominant position of the CSP over the 'all Pakistan services' was based on the system of reservation of high posts. This policy of reservation was a British response to pressure for Indianization of services. It evolved as a strategy for surrendering some superficial, subordinate, and operational manoeuvrability to the newly emerging technical services and departments while at the same time 'reserving' the policy making authority and the veto power for the Civil Service which was still overwhelmingly British. According to the CSP (Composition and Cadre) Rules of 1954, 66% of the higher posts, including secretaries, joint secretaries and deputy secretaries at the Centre and in provinces, and commissioners and deputy commissioners, had been reserved for the CSP cadre. Thus, in 1964, 89% of the Central government secretaries, 66% of the provincial secretaries, 75% of the divisional commissioners and 51% of the district officers belonged to this cadre. A further reservation of 60% of jobs in the Economic Pool gave it effective control over all administration. Additionally, the CSP officers got ex-cadre posts in training institutes, public corporations and enquiry commissions. The centralization of power in the hands of top bureaucracy was given enormous push in 1948 by the creation of a new post of secretary general in the Centre. This not only supervised the work of secretaries of all eight government ministries but also incorporated the secretaryships of cabinet and Establishment divisions. The entire government was thus centralized in the hands of one person, Chaudhary Mohammad Ali, who was the only person ever to occupy the post. Chaudhary firmly established the rule of generalist bureaucracy in the country.

Previously, secretaries had kept their 'advisory' capacity by furnishing their ministers with data and other information based on both experience and expediency. The 1935 act changed all that.
The new approach gave secretaries direct access to the supreme executive head, while the Indian ministers, would be mainly defending the government decisions in the legislature. Even though these powers of direct access to governors were not meant to be operative, they provided the precedent for the CSP. Thus, the state of Pakistan was increasingly identified with the CSP bearing the emblem of honest brokerage between the contending ministerial and parliamentary interests. After a while, ministers became so helpless that they could not even transfer the CSP officers from one place to another.

On the services side, the specialist-generalist controversy is as old as the colonial administration itself. The CSP have claimed all along to have a governmental outlook which is all pervasive and 'integrated' in contrast with the specialist's 'parochial' outlook. They have kept aloof from the non-CSP cadres within the bureaucracy to which they have granted access only as a privilege and not as a right. The Civil Service's links with other services are mainly of two types: institutional and supervisory. Its institutional links are both vertical i.e. in the case of the Provincial Civil Service, and horizontal i.e. in the case of Police which is an all-Pakistan service. Both work as extension of the CSP, performing their collective role as a law and order bureaucracy. Especially, the Central Intelligence Department (CID) is responsible for political intelligence. It also provides counsel, prepares dossiers on political leaders, workers, financiers and supporters, gauges public opinion and suggests ways and means of handling the political issues. Apart from these institutional link-ups, the CSP has supervisory functions over all other departments and technical projects.

We have noted that the CSP and the non-CSP Services of Pakistan were critical of politicians' so-called factional, selfish and corrupt practices. Like other bureaucracies Pakistan's
bureaucracy had devoted considerable time and energy in self-portrayal as a non-political organisation. Thus, the 'neutral' and 'anonymous civil servants have all along enjoyed non-liability for malfeasance, even when they were engaged in the most political of all functions i.e. allocation of scarce resources. Now, as Bernard Schaffer points out, public policy is all about procedures of resource allocation which therefore need the contribution of the maintenance man who keeps it all going by using the techniques of simulation satisficing, simplification and defining jurisdicalional areas. He manages to do so by de politicising this highly political activity in the name of rationalistic innocence.

In Pakistan this ideology of bureaucratic equity has enjoyed a special popularity due to the existing pattern of recruitment practice which tend to favour precisely those sections of the population who are given to a certain level of deification of the state. For example, a study in the early 1960s showed that 81.2% officers came from an urban setting either originally or via educational careers; in the case of the CSP, only one among 31 had ever lived in a village. These urban officers looked at the rural population in terms of tradition-modernity dichotomy. Thus, the traditional society had to be developed and administered by the urban-based 'modern' state machinery. Moreover, the fathers of 66% officers were salaried employees, mostly of the government itself, others being landowners, (15%), business (10.7%) and professionals (5%). This service background of the majority of officers fostered a certain rootlessness among them because of their fathers' frequent transfers across regions and provinces, which led to their lack of participation in the local issues. Often they enjoyed government housing and had access to subsidized government stores and to services of men junior to them in hierarchy. These things militated against their integration into the local community, and made it easier for them to adore such supra-local entities as state and religion. They hated all politics which, according to them, was based on 'parochial' loyalties.
Hatred for politics and a conscious preference for the so-called non-political approach can also be located in the officers' commitment to straight careerism. Most of them were the first generation of 'officers'. For example, the fathers of 69.3% class II officers and 59% class I officers did not study beyond school level. They had therefore a very petty bourgeois view of state as being the principle of absolute legitimacy in a Hegelian sense. Not surprisingly, hatred for all public men, and all mass activity like strikes and demonstrations, have been the articles of faith for these officers.

While the bureaucracy's strategy of de-politicization, thus draws upon the pre-recruitment socialization of its individual members, it assumes an even more de-politicized attitude towards the public at its service giving end. It thus incorporates the public through a system of rationing access to the scarce resource allocated by itself which makes people behave as mere applicants. Such structural and procedural incorporation can be related to a high degree of general acceptance of the bureaucracy's claims to its 'objective' character, based on hierarchy, expertise and institutional maturity. Its legitimacy is reflected through the norms of the rule of law, the commitment to development, and apparently non-partisan delivery of services to the public.

Politics of Administrative Reform

Dozens of reports, memoranda and plans have been produced demanding an overhauling of the administrative structure in Pakistan. Most of them aimed at dismantling the Civil Service monopoly over all decision-making organs of the government. However, the Civil Service has managed to put all such reformist proposals into cold storage. The story of administrative reform in Pakistan is one of resistance to reform. The CSP have enjoyed such legal and institutional power that the politicians have all along feared reprisals from them and have thus avoided pursuing the demand for reforms too far. Indeed, all reformist proposals
coming from non-bureaucratic channels were frowned at. Only those proposals which were recommended by the intra-bureaucratic organisations, like the Administrative Re-organisation Committee, were considered legitimate, and parts of them were put into practice; these were based on ideas of career officers from within the establishment, and were rooted in the so-called generations-old administrative experience. For the purpose of understanding the real power of the bureaucracy of Pakistan, we have to see how incessant efforts at carrying out reforms were taken up and were then thwarted by CSP.

A preoccupation with self-perpetuation has been the hallmark of the personnel management policy of the present administrative set-up. The focus of the higher bureaucracy has been on keeping up its recruitment standards and keeping down the number of cadre strength which has led to an 'official predestinationism'. It was proposed by Professor Egger in 1953 that structural inequality between the various central services should be removed and all the superior services should be unified into a single Civil Service. This demand was endorsed later by Prof. Gladieux and others. The issue of the generalist's dominance over technical personnel, won considerable attention. The lack of rapport between the two, the former's 'breadth without depth' and the overall inflexibility of services, cadres and classes were severely criticized. Professor Gladieux recommended removing the personnel management from the hands of the Civil Service and creating a new Pakistan Public Service Board for that purpose, to be headed by an active non-civil servant. The First Five Year Plan also criticized the existing barriers between the civil service and other functional services like Police and Audit and Accounts, and those separating it from specialist services like Engineering and Health, and recommended their elimination. It was pointed out that the greatest obstacles in the way of the much needed administrative change were the secretariat system and the personnel management policy. As the political requirement of reservation of all the secretariat posts for the Civil Service no longer existed after independence, it was demanded that
they should be open to officers of all the services. Many recommendations have also been made for overhauling the system of district administration. These have mainly focused on (i) the elimination of exclusive appointment of civil servants to the post of deputy commissioner and (ii) putting an end to centralization of all power in his hands. Professor Gladieux recommended the creation of a new post of District Development Commissioner to be recruited from all the services, with power and status of an ADM. Later, the Cornellius Report recommended that instead of convergence of all administrative functions in the hands of district officer, an administrative tribunal should control the district administration, consisting of the district heads of all the departments.

The Cornellius Report represents a real watershed in its proposals for administrative reform in many crucial areas. It recommended the revival of the old system of provincial encadrement of officers and their subsequent allocation to the Centre. It also recommended a lower status for the generalist secretaries than that of the heads of departments who came from the corresponding technical and specialist services like engineering, medicine and education etc. Most significantly it proposed disbanding the present system of reservations for the CSP in the Economic Pool. In a radical break with earlier reform proposals it recommended disbanding the CSP cadre itself. It suggested that no further recruitment into this cadre should take place and the present civil servants should be absorbed into various specialized agencies of their choice and experience.

The CSP members of the Cornellius Enquiry Commission presented a minority report which was very characteristic of the way they looked at these proposals. In their view, (i) these were the most drastic changes introduced anywhere in the world, which, when implemented, would create a psychological upheaval and a scramble for promotions and selections, (ii), the present system had stood the test of time and (iii) the administrative leadership and co-ordination
was itself a specialized function for which only the CSP were qualified. \(^{130}\)

Its role in preservation of the social order was the main defence of the Civil Service against all criticism. It has pointed all along to its service giving nature i.e. the instrumentality of its role. None of the reforms mentioned above were ever allowed to be implemented. The bureaucratic polity of Pakistan has disallowed public representatives from meddling in the affairs of the bureaucracy which has incessantly talked of keeping such sublime goals as development 'out of politics'. Such goals provided legitimacy to the routinized supremacy of bureaucracy. It has frequently taken recourse to the colonial structure of legal institutional traditions which have mostly survived the nationalist phase intact. Indeed cases of adherence to protocol measures as old as the immediate post-Annexation period in Punjab are not hard to come by. \(^{131}\)

It can be observed that the most potent opposition to bureaucratic hegemony emerged from within the bureaucracy. This symbolizes the extent to which inter-bureaucratic conflict monopolized politics in Pakistan. Different branches of the government represented different social groups. The state thus emerged as the only available arena for struggle between them. The boundaries of this arena were jealously guarded through the merit-based recruitment methods, exclusivist communication channels and super-confidentiality of the office-files. \(^{132}\) The government enjoyed absolute monopoly over all public information.

Development Administration: Structure and Training

Commitment to development as an explicit government policy emerged in the last years of the colonial government. The Tottenham Report of 1945-6 recommend the renunciation of 'the old conception of government as a regulatory, policing and taxing mechanism' in favour of one as the nation's common instrument for expanding its social and economic welfare. \(^{132}\) As early as 1948 a Development Board was
created for co-ordinating nation-building schemes. Throughout the 1950s various schemes were put up to re-orientate the generalist oligarchy, the CSP, towards development problems: these led to the formation of the Administrative Enquiry Committee in 1951, and the Economy Committee in 1953. The ethos of the 1955 Colombo Conference further spread a general spirit of developmentalism. Successive measures were taken to proliferate the administrative machinery according to its expanding functions, so that by the time the Second Five Year Plan was launched, the government had established a moderately sophisticated planning machinery for development.

At the top of this machinery was the National Economic Council (NEC) which consisted of the President, provincial governors, relevant ministers, Vice Chairman of the Planning Commission of Pakistan and heads of the PIDC and WAPDA. It reviewed the overall economic position of the country, approved the five-year plans and sanctioned annual development schemes. One step lower, the Economic Committee of the Cabinet supervised implementation of economic policies and sanctioned development schemes pending the NEC approval. Most important however, was the Planning Commission of Pakistan which was directly responsible for preparing the five-year plans, periodically assessing national resources, devising schemes for their most efficient use, and setting priorities for their allocation; it also carried on economic research. The Projects Division prepared and distributed reports on the progress of projects, including periodic digests, 'to measure performance against promise' and 'to identify the causes of delays and difficulties'.

The provincial governments at Dacca and Lahore had their respective planning and development departments. While constitutionally the division of powers between the Centre and provinces remained unsettled, the general assumption prevailed that the provinces were mere executing agencies of the Centre; the latter formulated policies and was responsible for 'adaptation of general objectives and plans to provincial conditions.' The provincial CSP officers shared more with their colleagues at the Centre than with their compatriots from
other provincial services. After considerable intra-bureaucratic in-fighting the heads of various technical departments were given limited autonomy, both financial and procedural, although its scope was limited in practice as their overlapping functions continued favouring the former set-up. While much philosophizing took place about the 'pivotal role of the mobilization of the people's imagination and energies'. and vital development funds were channelled through Basic Democracies, all development planning and allocation of resources remained the government monopoly.

The actual experience of development administration led to some improvement in procedural methods. For example, the system of several layers of the subordinate secretarial staff was replaced by a single section officer with the rank of undersecretary, as originally recommended by the Tottenham Report and later by Professor Egger as well. Also, as dependence on foreign exchange increased, and a consolidated foreign exchange budget was needed, steps were taken to make such budgetting a continuous process.

However, the most significant development in the administrative set-up, which made qualitative changes in the absolute control of the state over all development activity, was the rapid proliferation of semi-autonomous public corporations. Pakistan inherited a few public corporations concerned with improvements of towns, railways and ports. The number of these organizations including the State Bank of Pakistan, the Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, the National Bank of Pakistan and the PIDC reached 13 by 1958. Under Ayub, they enjoyed a rapid growth, and gave his regime the character of a government by public corporations. Ironically, these new bureaucratic strongholds were formed to avoid the gruesome routine of regular administrative departments run by the same bureaucracy. The regular departments were considered full of repetitious, non-growing experience, dotted with unnecessary checks and balances. The autonomy of public corporations was more formal than real as their day to day business remained linked up with the regular departments, and
in some cases they ended up with doing mere extension work for them.

Politically the new trend was greatly advantageous to the Ayub regime which now enjoyed 'freedom' from ministerial scrutiny. Any questioning into the affairs of these corporations was beyond the legislative jurisdiction and could be done only under a separate commission of enquiry. While most of the top jobs in the corporations were reserved for the CSP, some of their headships fell to the military generals. Together they turned public corporations into employment agencies for their kith and kin, because of their powers of ad hoc appointment of officers delegated from other departments. In this way, a huge patronage network emerged within the bureaucracy, which increasingly became synonymous with the political system itself. In such a system, there was no effective feedback mechanism. All communication between subordinates and their superiors was formalistic and evaluative in the form of periodic reports, etc. 140

The establishment of public corporations has been solely due to the bureaucratic initiative in which legislatures did not play any role. 141 Moreover, the higher administrative jobs in public corporations have been created more rapidly in Pakistan than the CSP cadre itself. That means that the latter's mean administrative status rose higher, amassing more power into its hands than previously. 142 The financial power of the corporations can be gauged from the fact that no less than 55% of the total public sector allocations was reserved for them alone. 143 Thus in both administrative and financial terms, the Civil Service managed to control the nation's resources completely.

The structural issues of self-reproduction have been conceived in term of bureaucracy's institutional development. In other words, manpower planning was generally considered the panacea for administrative ills. Pakistan has thus become a classic case of an administrative ideology of preparation and trusteeship. 144 Many administrative training institutes have emerged here like elsewhere in the Third World which have produced an ideology-laden goal set in the language of national
development; this hides the latent objectives of the maintenance of bureaucratic predominance. Most characteristically in these institutes, attention is diverted from what will be achieved (the outcome) to what is being done, (the course performance) and then from what is being done to how it is being done: syndicates or cases, particular methods, the particular language that an institution has developed, like the mixing of participants from various authorities and countries.  

In Pakistan the administrative structure is characterized by the bureaucracy's self-cultivated 'secure instrumentality' which has internalized the public service ethos through its structural projection. In a post-independence situation, an increasing development dynamism, characterized by foreign assistance, the conception, implementation and evaluation of development projects, and the overall infrastructural expansion, is grafted on the colonial state apparatus thus producing what is called 'technologizing professionalizing syndrome'.

The training of development administration in Pakistan is based on (i) the acquisition of the best available material in the country, (ii) the training of successful candidates in the entry examination as gateway to service, (iii) in service training or re-training during the career. The concern for the educational background of the CSS candidates, for example, was shown as early as 1950-1. It was noted that apart from their poor expression both in English and Urdu, they lacked originality and logical thinking, and expressed ideas which were hackneyed and debased. It was recommended that the educational authorities should upgrade their product and check deterioration in their educational standards. In 1953, Professor Egger had recommended the opening
of training colleges for in-service training. Two years later, an Institute of Public and Business Administration was established at Karachi University, financed by the International Co-operation Administration (later USAID) and advised by the Pennsylvania University.

However, more than the pre-entry educational, and even overall social, background, officers are shaped by a rigorous post-recruitment socialization. In fact the more organised an institution, the less relevant is the social origins of its members because they imbibe the ethos of the organisation more intensively. The training programmes for public administration are important indicators of the bureaucracy's efforts to stay ahead of all other institutions in the society. In the beginning, the Civil Service was more concerned with keeping its historically established role intact. The Civil Service Academy was established at Lahore in 1949 largely to compensate for the loss of training facilities in England on the eve of independence. It aimed at developing probationers into well-rounded personalities, who would be well-versed in law and public administration and would be imbued with a guardian ethos. The pattern of residence and messing as well as of meeting together in classrooms, playing fields, group discussions etc. integrated them into a cohesive group, shedding any 'parochial' prejudices in the process. The main functions of a district officer e.g. co-ordination, revenue administration and law and order have been the essential part of educational texts and discussion programmes. The Finance Academy at Walton had similar features, with a heavier dose of 'functional' courses.

During the 1950s, administrative training was oriented towards developmentalism under the U.S. influence. In 1957, the University of Southern California trained 105 Pakistani probationers and subsequently got involved in Pakistan's administrative programmes on a more regular basis. Under its guidance an Administrative Staff College was established at Lahore in 1960, with heavy American assistance. This college was meant for training only the higher
bureaucrats. Later, in 1961, three National Institutes of Public Administration were established in Lahore, Dacca, and Karachi, financed and partly staffed by the Americans. The main stress was on management which was defined as 'the most economic use of Men, Money, Material and Time with a view to achieving a given objective or a set of objectives.' These institutes trained the lower ranks of bureaucracy already in service and were thus extensions of the Administrative Staff College. Likewise, the experiment of Village-Aid administration, which was launched in the 1950s, brought out the ineffectiveness of the existing administrative machinery for rural development. Subsequently, the scheme for establishing Rural Academies at Peshawar and Comilla was sponsored by the visiting Michigan University Survey Team in 1956, for training both government and non-government agencies and for undertaking research.

Under Ayub, Pakistan experienced a rapid proliferation of administrative training institutions, especially during the Martial Law years (1958-1962). These institutions were sponsored and financed by the now firmly established bureaucratic regime in close association with the American government and universities. This institutional links-up with the West further strengthened the relative standing of bureaucracy at home undermining the growth potential of legislatures. However, it must be emphasized that the formalistic aspects of training tended to predominate its educational content because the real powers lay outside these training institutes. The career prospects depended on forces other than training e.g. family connections and regional/tribal/caste loyalties etc. In other words, developmentalism was merely the self-image of the Pakistan bureaucracy, not its source of power. In fact, the broader power structure of the society, as reflected within the training institutes, generally militated against the evolution of a responsible and healthy tradition of administrative training in Pakistan.
Despite these difficulties, however, the Third Five Year Plan (1965-1970) proposed establishing one institute and four regional centres for training the junior staff, providing for O and M-cum-training agencies, and extending the existing O and M units to the provincial secretariats, with an allocation of Rs. 10 million. It clearly indicates that all planned development can be considered as bureaucratic development. Indeed the Pakistan experience shows that all administrative training is a manifestation of 'the ideology of insidedness', in as much as it serves the purpose of bureaucratic self-perpetuation through idealistic projection of its developmental aims and objectives.

Section 4: Economic Strategy: The Case of Industrialization

Having outlined the institutional aspects of the state in Pakistan we can now look at the development strategies formulated and implemented by the planning machinery and the way they increased the state's involvement in the structural relationships of the society. In the present and following sections we shall discuss the Pakistan government's concrete developmental effort in the two most important sectors of the economy, i.e. industry and agriculture. The object of this discussion is to outline the precise relationship between the state and capital in the context of the latter's increased penetration into the Pakistan society.

There are opposite views as to who, between the bureaucracy and bourgeoisie actually dominates the national economy of Pakistan. The Soviet writers and the old stalwarts of the Communist Party of Pakistan follow the orthodox line of class analysis and thus conceive the bureaucracy as the organizing principle, and therefore subservient to the national bourgeoisie. In this view, class is an independent variable and bureaucracy a dependent variable. By contrast, Alavi and others stress the relative autonomy of the state as represented by the civil and military bureaucratic oligarchy. Our analysis of the state in Pakistan supports the thesis implicit in the latter formulation, especially as elaborated by Freyhold, that the post colonial state exists as a
function of world capitalism which regulates and intervenes in the national economy according to the levels of class representation within the state. After the collapse of colonialism, a rejuvenated attempt of the metropolitan capital to penetrate the Third World societies is reflected in the latter's national bureaucracies' commitment to the 'religion' of development. 163

This overall development orientation can be related to the bureaucrat's understanding of social crises at the input level while at the same time the existing class structure is taken as a given in policy formation. In other words, the goal of maximization of production is largely conceived at a non-social level, i.e. at the level of capital's employment of factors of production in a factory situation rather than at the level of changing social relations of production. More often than not such a policy leads to concentration of capital and labour in new productive centres, thus increasing differentiation between regions and classes.

In this process the state acquires an increasing hold over the whole process of capitalist penetration. On the one hand, the metropolitan capital, as symbolized by the Multinationals, the individual rich countries and international agencies like the IMF or World Bank, relies heavily on the state for its security of investment and returns, as a result of which the nation state system acquires further legitimacy. On the other hand, locally, the state enjoys monopolistic powers over the regulation of access to the metropolitan capital for selected groups and classes through such measures as foreign exchange control, protectionist policies and licensing system. That directly leads to an organisational spurt within the bureaucracy to deal with increasingly specialised fields of administration. Therefore, the planned development inherently favours the already predominant role of bureaucracy.
In Pakistan no major industrial legislation originated in the parliament. Whatever was forthcoming in this field was the result of presidential or Martial law ordinances. The developmental process which included formation of plans, scheduling industrial investment and allocation of foreign exchange, thereby affecting size, location, and ownership of industrial enterprise have been the preserve of the Planning Commission, the Department of Investment, Production and Supplies, the Licensing Boards and the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. In other words, the laws of motion of such 'planned' economy bore a heavy stamp of the pattern of structural differentiation of the bureaucracy. For example, no appeal could be made against the dictates of these institutions to any outside authority. Instead a hierarchical structure of an internal review system existed in various departments, which gave an appellate authority to their respective higher officers. They in turn used it as means of control and self-aggrandisement in their dealings with the business community. Thus, government contact with the 'interest groups' was not at the policy-making level, i.e. the level of input, but was rather at the level of output. This factor automatically legitimized the law-making authority of the state. The justiciability of administrative actions in the courts was limited to non-policy matters, and even among them to 'quasi-judicial' issues pertaining mainly to procedural matters.

In other words, even though the judiciary had an elaborate set of rules to protect the interests of the private sector against the state-imposed inequities, its jurisdiction was essentially limited to an extremely formalistic interpretation of the government's decisions.

Even when the non-governmental agencies were consulted for the economic policy-making the final draft seldom included their proposals. Emigration of many Hindu entrepreneurs, who played leading roles in various commercial organisations, meant that Pakistan's emergent business group had a weak organisational base.
This group consisted of the recent immigrant traders from the coastal cities of India with no periodical publications, few research programmes, and little political campaigning for its goals. Mostly they relied on off-the-stage, informal, person-to-person and 'corrupt' relations with the bureaucracy. Such practices enhanced the latter's sub-legislatory powers enormously.

A word of caution is necessary against reading too much into policies themselves, which did not always produce the planned results. The effect of policies favouring the domestic production of some and discouraging that of other goods was limited. In many cases, for example, what proved to be the most significant factor was whether the raw material was domestically produced as in cotton textile industry or was imported from abroad, as in engineering industry. However, economic policy did play a crucial role in directing the flow of resources in inter-sectoral and inter-class terms, which is the subject of the present enquiry. Among the 'givens' of economic policy in Pakistan—private proprietorship of the means of production, enhanced 'guidance' and control by the State, the import-substitution nature of industrialization and an increasing role of foreign aid can be counted as determinants of growth strategy.

**Capital Formation in Pakistan**

The state took initiative in industrial planning from the very beginning. The cardinal principles of official thinking can be summed up as: (i) functional inequality (ii) development in terms of large scale manufacturing industry, (iii) commitment to foreign aid and (iv) the need for direct and/or indirect state involvement. Following these principles, the Pakistan government subsidized the emergence of indigenous bourgeoisie. It did so, as Naseem has summed up:
by providing all inputs to below their opportunity costs: cheap labour (through cheap wage goods and curbs on unionization), cheap capital (by providing low-interest loans from public financial institutions), cheap machinery (by giving import licences to import machinery), and cheap raw materials - mainly jute and cotton (by making them artificially cheap through export taxes and over-valued exchange rates).

The story of Pakistan's industrial development therefore is one in which the state bureaucracy has adopted various ways and means of promoting capital formation in the industrial sector. However, even more significantly, it is availability of national capital and the situation of the global market which underlay the bureaucratic manipulation of national economy. Therefore our model does not adhere to the underdevelopment theory which denies the existence of any national boundaries for capital. Instead following Warren, it can be maintained that the state operations have greater explanatory value than that of bourgeoisie in the post independence Pakistan because it broke through the monopolistic hold of the erstwhile Imperial power. By the same token the government sectoral preferences wield far greater influence over the indigenous production relations than is conceded by the dependencistas.

More specifically, we can look at the directive sole of the Pakistan government vis-a-vis the national economy. The government has had a monopoly over investment in the infrastructural sector, for example transport, communication, power generation and canal irrigation, and has expanded its activities in all these spheres. Although public sector contributed less than 15% to GNP, investment in this sector almost doubled every five years:
Some government departments, like Railways were traditionally well-staffed and could take effective doses of new investment. Elsewhere, the scope of ambitious investment programmes exceeded the capacity of existing departments, accelerating in the end the emergence of public corporations, as discussed earlier. However, it was more in the realm of private sector that the government's role can be fully appreciated in the overall drive towards modernization. Most significantly, the government promoted functional inequality between classes, so as to induce higher savings and thus higher investment in industry. Conception of development in terms of large scale manufacturing sector led to a growth rate of modern industry ranging between 10 to 15% annually during 1950-65, far surpassing the annual GNP growth rate of 3.5%.  

The government's industrial policy passed through different phases which serve as indications of the potentialities of Pakistan's market economy. In September 1947, the government showed immense keenness to establish an industrial base in the country. Many incentives like favourable fiscal policy, protected market and subsidised import of machinery were forthcoming, all essentially oriented to encourage private capital to go into the large-scale manufacturing. Early in 1949, Pound Sterling was devalued vis-a-vis dollar which made many currencies of the sterling area follow suit, including India with whom Pakistan had the bulk of its trade. Pakistan refused to devalue its currency and subsequently used the overvalued exchange rate of rupee to subsidize the import of capital

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**TABLE**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monetized Investment</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>2030</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>7450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

goods from abroad against the money earned from thus cheapened agricultural exports. In other words, a net transfer of resources from agricultural to industrial sectors was manipulated through the foreign exchange control system.

An important event in Pakistan's early history was the Korean boom in 1950-1, when scramble for purchase of raw materials in the grim shadow of war in Korea produced windfall profits for Pakistani exporters of jute and cotton who accumulated vast amounts of capital. Consequently, a great demand for imported goods emerged and a liberal import policy was followed. Once the new consumer market was established and capital was accumulated for industrialization, the way was ready for imposing tight control over imports in the interest of import substitution. The post-boom deficit in foreign exchange forced the government to take precisely such measures. Drastic cuts were imposed on imports of primary goods, bringing sometimes to a quarter of their earlier level. East Bengal which was the chief foreign exchange earner was hit especially hard, eventually leading to the Muslim League debacle in that province in 1954 elections. After the decline in exports in 1952 strict import controls were imposed by the government. Its refusal to devalue the currency meant that the rupee became overvalued in relation to foreign currencies, to which only limited access was available via the government's financial institutions. During the Six-year Plan (1951-57) this selective access to foreign exchange was granted to those who already had some potential savings and had a presumably higher propensity to invest. The so-called migrant trading communities, with their Korean profits, took the initiative. The first flurry of industrialization took place in textiles, because of domestic availability of raw material. Extremely high rates of
profits were reaped in the presence of tight import control, which were then re-invested in industry. A comparatively liberal fiscal policy, including tax holidays and generous price policies for the 'infant' industries combined with its 'corrupt' and ineffective enforcement, led to widespread tax evasions. This, according to Papanek, produced the initial capital for Pakistan's entrepreneurs.

As elsewhere in the Third World, import substitution was the basis of industrialization in Pakistan. A protected market against foreign competition, provision of raw material from local resources and subsidized import of industrial machinery were the basic principles of this approach. However, two conditions underlying this initial phase of industrialization in Pakistan, namely the protected market and provision of foreign exchange for purchase of capital goods from abroad at reduced rate became exhausted in the late 1950s. The main reason was the persistently stagnant agricultural sector which not only kept the consumer demand limited to the urban middle classes, but also claimed big chunks out of the foreign exchange earnings by way of food imports for the burgeoning population along with a correspondingly shrinking share for the manufacturing sector. All along, the government's direct control system over almost all spheres of economic production continued unabated. In Papanek's words, the government issued licences for each import order and thus determined what specific commodities could be imported, by whom, from what currency area and at what time.... what investment and what production would take place, where, and by whom.

Profit controls, labour legislation, continuing war-time price controls, rationing of scarce commodities, all led to elaborate decisions pertaining to the rapidly expanding circuit of economic operation. The technological needs of the new industrial units and their foreign exchange demands were scrutinized by the generalist civil servants, whose
incompetence in these matters produced bizarre cuts, delays, and distributive distortions in the economy. Consequently the 'insecure' businessmen overstocked raw materials, over-drew foreign exchange, and over-installed industry at least by one third; by 1958 such distortions had cost Rs. 650 million, i.e., 15% of all industrial assets, pinching much harder the smaller as against the larger entrepreneurs and the late-comers against the early-comers. The direct state regulation had its un-economic costs spread far and wide.

After the first decade, the direct control system started giving way to an indirect one under the influence of the Planning Board, (later the Planning Commission). Market allocations, i.e., monetary incentives, rather than direct 'official' allocations started calling the tune of economic activity, especially by means of the Export Bonus Scheme and the new export duties and subsidies. All foreign exchange earned by exporters was surrendered to the State Bank of Pakistan at the artificially overvalued exchange rate, which meant a net loss to traders when compared with a "free trade" situation. To compensate for this, and then enable this compensation to be used for industrial development, import permits were issued equivalent to a fraction of the value of their exports. These permits, called Bonus Vouchers, were saleable in the open market and fetched a premium of 120 to 150 percent, because of the undervalued foreign currency, thereby adding 30 to 40% value to all exports. This scheme boosted up exports enormously, and played a major role in class formation by changing the pattern of inter-sectoral and inter-regional transfer of resources.

During the 1950s, for example, the licensed imports were reserved only for the 'legitimate' users, i.e., the big industrial houses, which made extra profits by selling extra stocks while underutilizing their manufacturing units. In the 1960s the Bonus Voucher scheme reversed
this process by letting new entrants into the field, many of them being small producers and exporters who earned Bonus Vouchers for imports and sold them in the open market. People in the vast areas of the Punjab, thus accumulated capital and installed industrial units, competing with the previously established industrial nexus of Karachi-Hyderabad. Various other measures were taken to liberalize controls; thus, free lists of many items were issued by the government and certain other items were put on the Open General License, while still others were dealt with under a certain 'cash-cum-bonus' system which needed a proportion of the import bill to be paid out of Bonus Vouchers.

As is clear, licence rather than price mechanism remained the dominant feature in the world of marketing throughout Pakistan's history. The autonomy of the state was unquestioned. It had associated itself 'officially' with the private capital as early as 1952. Through the operations of the Pakistan Industrial Corporation (PIDC) it helped the latter penetrate into the relatively insecure areas like East Bengal, by first installing industry and then surrendering its assets to the private sector. The leading industrial houses enjoyed a predominant representation in the Board of Directors of PIDC, and invested in its projects heavily. Indeed it has been claimed that PIDC was a front organisation for the private sector itself. The private capital enjoyed all the advantages of a government project, especially those related to procedural matters. In the absence of a large consumer market, the first investors into large-scale manufacturing industry soon monopolized the market and through interlocking directorships of various projects managed to concentrate industrial assets in a few hands.
The process of capital accumulation depended initially on the re-investible profits earned from the Korean boom which accounted for at least 48.2% of all investment. With the exhaustion of the domestic market and drying up of foreign exchange resources, industrialization slowed down in the late 1950s. It took a re-birth after Ayub came into power, when more and more foreign capital was channelled through PIDC, ADBP, and other financial institutions as well as through the commercial banks.

TABLE
Sources of Capital Investment: Millions of Rupees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five Year Plans</th>
<th>IDBP</th>
<th>PICIC</th>
<th>NIT</th>
<th>Banks</th>
<th>Insurance</th>
<th>ICP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (1955-60)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>364.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.1%) (10.6%)</td>
<td>(96%)</td>
<td>(2.3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (1960-65)</td>
<td>782.9</td>
<td>344.2</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>1803.3</td>
<td>116.0</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(25.1%) (11.1%)</td>
<td>(2.2%)</td>
<td>(57.9%)</td>
<td>(3.7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (1965-70)</td>
<td>993.3</td>
<td>849.0</td>
<td>171.0</td>
<td>2500.0</td>
<td>190.0</td>
<td>229.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20.1%) (17.2%)</td>
<td>(3.5%)</td>
<td>(50.7%)</td>
<td>(3.9%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is clear that until 1969/70 most of the loans advanced through these institutions went to Big Business; 71% PICIC loans amounted to Rs.2.5 million and more, while NIT and ICP, which specifically aimed at raising savings from the middle classes ended up with following the same pattern. Here was a classic example of the application of the strategy of functional inequality, whereby the small producers were squeezed to provide capital for the uppermost stratum of Pakistan's emergent bourgeoisie.
The credit institutions, especially, the PICIC and IDBP, played a decisive role in bringing foreign capital into the country. Indeed, foreign input was the major factor responsible for the second industrial spurt in the early 1960s. In the official thinking shortage of capital lay at the heart of poverty problem in Pakistan. It stressed that in the absence of growth of productive forces, no capital formation could take place from domestic sources, and as most of the industrial projects were capital intensive, they needed a series of complementary investments. Foreign assistance, it was argued, could provide answer to all these problems by making capital available straightaway and shifting the burden of development to future generations. Its advantages included utilizing foreign resources on deferred payment and avoiding the need for high-cost ineffective industries becoming a permanent drag. This economic approach was a major part of the training of the public administrators.

Pakistan received less than 1% GNP as foreign aid in the early 1950s; at the end of Second Five-Year Plan the same commanded 6% share of a much enlarged GNP. In 1960-1 29% of total imports were financed from foreign aid; this share rose to 39% in 1969-70, despite deferment of aid commitments after the 1965 war with India. The increasing dependence on foreign aid should be placed against the continuing crisis of foreign payments. Out of 23 years between 1947/8 and 1969/70, Pakistan had an unfavourable balance of trade for 17 years. A situation of single country domination emerged as US aid accounted for 52% of the total aid received by Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s; nearly 40% of it came from the Pakistan PL480 aid programme which consisted of commodity loans. Thus, out of the total US economic assistance of $4.25 billion between 1952 and 1970, only $2.25 billion reached the investment sector.

A lot has been written about the problem of foreign aid to the Third World including Pakistan. We only want to point out that: (i) the state institutions of Pakistan have been primarily oriented to negotiate penetration of the metropolitan capital into the country, (ii) this capital went into the non-developmental projects of keeping the large
populations from starvation, malnutrition and disease. In other words, much capital went into staving off the political crisis facing the state. (iii) while theoretically the state acquired great powers of manipulating the available international capital after independence, its operational manoeuvrability continued shrinking as more capital entered into its infrastructural base and limited its choices within the context of free enterprise. Contrary to Warren's thesis, independence further integrated the state of Pakistan with the metropolitan capital.

Politics of Industrial Labour

The strategy of industrial development in Pakistan focused on production maximization rather than increase in employment which was supposed to follow automatically. The First Five Year Plan ended up with a net increase of 2 million unemployed during the 1950s. The Second and Third Five Year Plans equally failed to stem the tide of increasing unemployment. While the value added of industrial production more than doubled between 1949-50 and 1969-70, the total employment increased only by 63% which meant that the growth in civilian labour force was largely uncatered for. The main reason for this imbalance was the constantly increasing capital-labour ratio because of the installation of increasingly capital-intensive industry. In consequence labour's factor share industrial production fell from 0.247 in 1959 to 0.206 in 1969-70, whereas the gross value added per worker increased in real terms by 68% during the same period. In this way the gains in labour productivity were expropriated mainly by the capitalists.

The overall income-generating effect of industrialization continued to widen the gap between mean rural and urban incomes which ensured the supply of industrial labour from the rural areas.
Table

Mean Rural and Urban Incomes 1963: Rs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural areas</th>
<th>14560</th>
<th>373</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban areas</td>
<td>5680</td>
<td>515</td>
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</table>


The better showing of the urban sector should be seen in the context of its larger income inequalities, because of higher concentration of the ownership of means of production in cities. During the 1950s, there took place a net decline of 4% in the real wages of labour (8% in the cotton textile industry). After that the effect of unionisation on the wage structure could be observed in selected cases. Following the large-scale labour strikes during 1963 and 1964 the average real wages rose from Rs. 80.93 to Rs. 94.07 for 1964-5, commanding an increase of 13.5%. Even though the recession set in the industrial sector following the 1965 war which ate up this increase, trade unions emerged as a strong factor in shaping industrial relations of the country.

The new state was born without a set of institutionalized practices in the field of industrial relations. The first tripartite labour conference was held in February 1949 between the representatives of the government, employees and the employers to formulate a policy on the workmen's compensation, payment of wages, working of trade unions, industrial disputes, minimum wages, health insurance and provident fund etc.

A long series of standing committees, draft bills, suggestions and inter-departmental communications followed during the following decade with scant legislation in the end. Occasionally the matter surfaced in the Constituent Assembly but did not produce any results. Under Ayub, the Minimum Wage Ordinance was issued which appointed the Minimum Wage Boards to regulate wages on subsistence level, while a Standing Rates Committee did the same function for the public sector. In these circumstances, trade union activity emerged mainly as an ad hoc
movement trying to steer its way through the multitude, of obsolete laws and practical difficulties in the factory situation.

We shall discuss the local-level trade-union politics in Chapter V. At present we aim to look at the aggregate situation. Between 1951 and 1964, the number of trade unions almost doubled but their membership rose only by one quarter. This multiplication of unions being unsupported by equal rise in membership, has cost them heavily in terms of their nuisance value. The membership pattern of trade unions was extremely skewed. For example, almost 70% of unions had a membership below 300, while 5 large unions in the public sector, transport, railways, post and telegraph etc., accounted for more than a third of all membership in the mid 1960s. The private sector remained relatively free from the militant labour action.

Trade Unions in Pakistan have been fragmented in organization and individualistic in styles of leadership. The fact that 80% of the industrial labour during the 1960s consisted of the first generation of rural migrants militated against the emergence of a proletarian outlook in the factory situation. The continued urbanisation created abundance of labour which further weakened their bargaining power. No doubt, the situation of initial settlement of the incoming labour in the workers’ community lent the latter far greater significance in shaping the contours of the trade union movement than the factory situation itself. Moreover, these incoming workers were dispersed in and around cities in many localities consisting of factory quarters, urban slums and peri-urban villages which later developed local leaderships often hostile to each other. As we shall see later, these features of Pakistan’s industrial labour have kept it from emerging as a class capable of influencing the government policy in any meaningful way. By the late 1960s when industrial growth was on the wane and labour displacement effects of Green Revolution increased pressure on the urban sector, the urban working class became increasingly politicized, a phenomenon to which we shall return later.
Section 5: Economic Strategy II: Agricultural Development

Many studies of agrarian economy in the Third World focus on the input-output model, based on empirical data related to individual farmers' responses to market forces. Here, peasant behaviour is understood in voluntarist terms of cost-benefit rationality. In Pakistan, as elsewhere, these studies have provided the main theoretical basis for a whole range of agricultural policies. Usually this takes the form of production-maximization approach which centres on provision of subsidized inputs in the agricultural sector. The historical structural aspects of the production relations are largely ignored. As a result agricultural development has failed to take off, and there have emerged new and unforeseen consequences like eviction of tenants from land, rural-urban migration and new structural inequalities within the peasant community.

We shall argue in this section, and again in Chapter VI which deals with the agrarian change in a canal colony district, that rural development in Pakistan can be understood in the perspective of peasant differentiation whereby a new polarization emerges between the capitalist farmers and the agricultural labourers. This development takes place within the larger context of the country's power structure. This theme has emerged in Michael Lipton's model of the 'non-disimp-overishing development' of the Third World. He traces the roots of perpetuation of rural poverty in the urban bias of the policy makers via taxation and price twists. In Lipton's formulation, the most important class conflict in these countries is 'between the rural classes and the urban classes'. Thus, the interests of villagers are opposed to those of the 'urban industrial employer-cum-proletariat elite', i.e., the gainers from dear and cheap food prices respectively. However, as our analysis shows, the urban bias is much more than a matter of policy making alone. It will be shown for example how the urban-rural linkages involved multi-dimensional transactional relationships. Contrary to the focus of the protagonists of
methodological individualism on the role of 'political middlemen' between the so-called modern and traditional sectors, we shall concentrate on the emergence of the new structural relationships. The urban-rural linkages assume a structural character because of a higher degree of interdependence between various levels of production/distribution in the locality. In this relationship the urban sector enjoys a superordinate position in the sense that it is both a conduit for penetration of capital in the agricultural production as well as a centre for production of consumer and capital goods. In other words, the urban bias is a manifestation of the changing relationship between capital and labour, whereby the former is emerging as the dominant factor of production. Thus, we shall argue against Lipton's assertion that the basic contradiction in the Third World lies between capital and countryside and not between capital and labour, and that analysis of classes there should be related to the rural/urban dichotomy and not to means of production.

In this section, we shall elaborate the intra-sectoral class differences in the context of agrarian change in the 1960s, and discuss the relevance of the emerging rural urban linkages for the power structure in the country. Our observations support Lipton's thesis to the extent that industrialization takes place by squeezing the peasants. However, it is to the differentiation thesis that we owe our final debt for building the model of rural class polarization and the subsequent peasant political mobilization in Pakistan.

Lenin looked at the process of penetration of capital into Russian agriculture in terms of the emerging contradiction between the rural bourgeoisie and the rural proletariat i.e. "allotment holding wage workers." Later, Chayanov, and following him a whole generation of post war scholars stressed the idea that peasant economy involves an intrinsic social relation which in a broad framework of cyclical mobility, operates through self-exploitation of labour. Our position in the following analysis takes cognisance of Chayanov's observation about the specific
household form of peasant reproduction. But as we have noted in our study of capitalist penetration into Indian agriculture in the colonial days, the autonomy of this process has been disrupted once and for all. In other words while the formal organisation of agricultural production still rests on the old household farm, the larger forces of capital and state have encapsulated them and turned them into 'wage-labour equivalents', or 'disguised proletarians'.

The agrarian question in the Third World has usually been tackled at two levels: (i) Institutional change. This includes land reform and such other forms of rural engineering as cooperatives or agrovilles. In this model, the state intervention in the rural sector is direct and usually in response to the demand for land re-distribution. Often, however, this strategy failed in the face of powerful landed interests. (ii) Technological change. This represents the state intervention in the market. The state subsidizes agricultural inputs to make it possible for a large number of peasants to maximize their output from the field. This strategy not only avoids interfering in the existing class structure but actually ends up supporting the rich farmers. In this section we shall discuss first Pakistan government's handling of the issue of land reform and then the Green Revolution strategy. In the end we shall analyze the social and political consequences of these policies.

Land Reform

The pattern of landownership inherited from British India was extremely skewed. In Punjab for example, about 80% of owners held around 30% of the cultivable area, while 0.6% of them owned more than 20% of land, in holdings of 100 acres or more; in the NWFP, 12.5% of the area was owned in holdings of 500 acres and more; in Sind, 1% owned 30% of land in holdings of more than 500 acres. In the whole of Pakistan 65% of owners owned about 15% of land in holdings of less than
While 0.1% owned the same amount of land in holdings of more than 500 acres each. Widespread peasant unrest existed in areas of high tenancy, where movement against severe landlord extractions was, severally led by the Punjab Kisan Sabha, Sarhad Kisan Jirga and Sind Hari Committee. The Agrarian Reforms Committee of the Muslim League had proposed in 1949 the abolition of jagirs, lowering of rents, provision of tenurial security and abolition of illegal cesses extracted from tenants. The Ministry of Agriculture on the other hand proposed that one thousand acres was a suitable limit for land ownership in the irrigation areas. The Daultana reforms of 1951 sought to restore tenurial security for occupancy tenants, and to redress other grievances pointed out in the Muslim League Committee's report, including putting a ceiling of 50 acres on all landholdings fixing the tenant's share at 70% of the produce. These measures had little effect on the agrarian structure. The Draft Plan of the Planning Board (later Planning Commission) proposed ceilings of 150 acres, 300 acres and 450 acres respectively for irrigated, semi-irrigated and non-irrigated lands; it however left its final judgement subject to further study. The 1959 reforms finally, ended up with a ceiling of 500 acres for irrigated and 1000 acres for non-irrigated land, with exemptions for orchards, charitable institutions, and livestock farms; it provided the rights of inheritance, transfer by gifts, compensation for the resumed land, abolishing of jagirs (replaced by monetary grants in case of charitable institutions), security of tenure under certain conditions etc., and consolidation of land in economic holdings.

The 1959 land reforms were announced to be based on the principle of promoting the productivity of land. On the one hand, consolidation of small parcels of land scattered in different villages was taken up vigorously, resulting in consolidation of 11 million acres by 1967/68. On the other hand, the absentee landlords, with landholdings in excess of their production capacity, were considered a drain on the economy, because of the close relationships between form of tenure and operational size. Land reforms aimed at providing at all levels incentives conducive to
greater production doing away with the 'feudalistic elements'. Thus, transfer of land to so-called more productive hands, through a 'harmonious changeover' can be considered as a trade-off between the state and landlord proprietors for maintaining the status quo, by regulating the tenurial conditions and gearing the new pattern towards agricultural growth.

145,825 tenants or small owners i.e. 7.5% of the 1,936,081 landless tenants gained land as a result of the 1959 reforms; obviously it had little influence on the tenurial pattern because the percentage of landowners rose from 72.5 to 74.6% of all cultivators while tenancy lowered from 47.6 to 44.1% Thus, only marginal significance can be attached to land reforms. The number and proportion of farm households below subsistence level by tenurial status remained as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenurial Status</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owners</td>
<td>1,201,000</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners-cum-tenants</td>
<td>294,000</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants</td>
<td>1,359,000</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,854,000</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SM Naseem, 'Rural Poverty and Landlessness in Pakistan, in ILO, Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia, (Geneva 1977), p.48

Burki claims that 20% of the total land owned by middle farmers in 1969 had changed hands only in the previous decade, as a direct outcome of the 1959 reforms, most of it coming from the big landlords. Elsewhere, he shows that productivity increased to the maximum in the group of middle farmers owning 25 to 50 acres, which enjoyed maximum rent increase
of 33.6% between 1958/9 and 1968/9, compared to 19.3% and 11.3% for the owners of 50-100 and 100-300 acres. This view has been contested by Alavi who maintains that a formidable category of landlords kept all economic initiative in their own hands and stunted any efforts at encroachment on their dominant position in the countryside. The continued, even expanding, influence of landlords was also manifested in a high degree of tenant-turnover, which created insecurity among the latter. Indeed, a high proportion of marketed produce belonged to the sharecroppers, who would otherwise be less prone to cultivate for market owing to scarce family food resources. This was due to the tenants' heavy indebtedness to landlords which forced the former to sell their produce to earn cash for repayment of debts which ate up all their productive resources. In other words the sharecropping system of production itself operated as a form of tax on tenant farmer's consumption.

We can maintain that Burki's view, that the new middle class farmers aligned themselves with the state bureaucracy and thus divested landlords of their political influence, does not hold ground in view of the continued hold of the latter over production resources. Therefore, the land reforms' analytical value is rather limited, because their influence over the rural class structure was certainly far from crucial.

The Green Revolution

The typical Third World experience of agricultural development revolves around the bureaucracy's concentration on the short-term solutions of the more pressing problems at hand, for example food shortage and unemployment. That often leads to a crash modernization strategy based on commercializing agriculture. Under this so-called 'bi modal' strategy, it first opts for the efficient choice and then compensates for the subsequent mal-distribution through a tax-transfer mechanism. Large rural works programmes are then needed to offset the massive unemployment thus created.
In (W) Pakistan the average growth rate of major crops was 2.3% in the 1950s which jumped to 5.4% in the next decade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(West) Pakistan Agricultural Performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Share In GNP</th>
<th>Per Capita Income (Agriculture)</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949/50</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>Rs.214</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959/60</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>Rs.197</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>Rs.278</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The internal prices of agricultural goods remained overall static in this period. Agricultural exports foreign exchange earnings were surrendered at the official rate, which meant provision of cheap raw material for the local industrialists as well as low-priced foodgrains for the industrial labour, thus keeping industrial profitability very high. While the large-scale manufacturing sector enormously gained from a 'subsidized' rate of exchange for import of capital goods the implicit exchange rate continued falling for the agricultural sector causing a net flow of resources to the industrial sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Terms of Trade vis-a-vis World Prices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agricultural Terms of Trade vis-a-vis World Prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951/2 - 1953/4</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/3 - 1954/5</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953/4 - 1955/6</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954/5 - 1956/7</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955/6 - 1957/8</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/7 - 1958/9</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The regime constantly sought to placate its political constituency in the urban sector. The prices of cereals were distorted in favour of urban consumers against the rural producers. Such indirect methods of affecting the inter-sectoral terms of trade via market mechanism were preferred to such direct methods as raising land tax. Indeed, land revenue continued to be below 12% of the government's total tax-revenues, despite 56% contribution of the agricultural sector to GNP. Because of the Indus Basin Project, huge areas came under cultivation which benefited big landlords as well as the civil and military bureaucracy. While the average agricultural output remained static, the area under cultivation expanded from 24.7 million acres in 1948-9 to 28.1 million acres in 1956-7; that extra appropriation of land offset the adverse sectoral terms of trade for landlords and the big government allottees, finally transferring the burden to small landowners.

Having considered the broad framework of the Pakistan governments' price and foreign-exchange policies, we can now look at the changing pattern of resource input into the agricultural sector. From 1955 to 1962 imports of foodgrains took a large chunk of foreign exchange, amounting to an average of Rs. 1,000,000 per year. Various bureaucratic controls such as restrictive zoning of surplus areas and compulsory sale of food-grain to the government came under attack. With increasing supplies of foodgrain at hand under the PL 480 programme, a decontrol policy was finally adopted, with an accompanying strategy of agricultural development based on supply of subsidized agricultural inputs.

Agricultural development in (W) Pakistan has been largely irrigation-based. This strategy was indeed a function of various historical choices which had shaped the agrarian structure of Punjab. For example against all government expectations, the number of private tubewells increased from 1,300 in 1959/60 to 6,000 in 1963/4 to a further 9,500 in 1968/9.
The increased and assured water supply made intensive cultivation possible, lending to a more flexible choice of crops. Through support prices for agricultural produce, large-scale public investment and expanded credit facilities, the terms of trade started moving in favour of agriculture by the early 1960s. Agricultural growth, however, tended to gravitate towards areas where both surface and underground water was available, in some cases almost doubling. By 1968, 66% of tubewells were installed in the canal colony areas which in turn, attracted 62% of all tractors; 20% tractors went to areas with only canal water, while 10% to those with only tubewell water. 70% tubewells were installed by farmers with holdings of 25 acres or more and only 4% by the two-thirds who less than 13 acres.

Tractorization has been the main feature of farm mechanization in Pakistan. It increased the average size of farms from 45 to 109 acres, i.e. a 142% increase, about 80% of which was either rented or purchased land, at the expense of tenants and small peasants. Likewise, the total displacement of manpower by tractors was enormous. Labour-use per cropped acre in both paid and unpaid (family) farms dropped by some 40% by 1968 when there were already 19,000 tractors. Nor did it increase cropping intensity by any considerable measure, except for the medium-sized farms ranging from 25 to 50 acres.

However, it was the new seed varieties which really catalyzed the process of the Green Revolution. From 12,000 acres under Maxi-Pak in 1956/6, the area expanded to 5 million acres in 1968/9. Thus, production of wheat jumped from 3.8 million tons in the early 1960s to 6.3 million in the late 1960s, i.e. increasing by 65%. Likewise, the production of rice rose by 75%. Huge imports of seeds were sanctioned and distributed by the government. Fertilizer use also rose from 6.6 thousand tons in 1955/6 to 189.2 thousand tons in 1967/8, with 116.3 thousand tons increase in the year 1966/7. In the same way, the area under plant protection increased from 3.67 million acres in
Pakistan in 1959/60 to 11 million acres in 1967-8. The overall contribution of various factors to agricultural production is as follows:

**TABLE**

Factor Endowment of Green Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Endowment (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant Protection</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


All along the Government played a crucial role in procurement and marketing of 'inputs' from abroad. A reduction of $50 million worth imports of industrial raw material was carried out so as to imports for agricultural growth.

**TABLE**

Agricultural Subsidies for the Year 1967/8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Subsidy (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesticides</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td>2 Rs. per maund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural machinery</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Apart from subsidies, the public sector investments in the three areas of power, water and roads trip-led from 1955 to 1960, and trip-led again from 1960 to 1965; one-third of the total public investment was reserved for irrigation alone in the year 1964-5. The government sponsored rural electrification as well as credit facilities made it possible to install private tubewells, while various subsidies and support prices helped continue the trend even after the 1965 war with India which led to freezing of foreign exchange subsidies.
The eventual 'failure' of Green Revolution in production terms has attracted criticism. In a comparative study of East and West Punjab, it was found that the skewed distribution of economic resources in the latter hampered its growth process tremendously. Here market imperfections in labour and capital, as manifested through concentration of land ownership and large number of landless labour were responsible for less than optimal use of available resources. In other words, the landless and poor peasants did not find the desired levels of employment on big farms, while the credit market imperfections meant that big farmers could not secure working and fixed capital to effect a productive balance between agricultural inputs, labour and land. Moreover, the government's policy was ineffective in shaping the producer's choice, because the commodity-specific nature of subsidies created anomalies in the pattern of transfer of resources from crop to crop. Also, its guaranteed price of wheat at Rs. 17.00 per maund heavily increased the government's procurement cost of Rs. 360 million. The government's borrowings from banks thus squeezed credit for private sector. The pattern of capital's penetration into the agricultural sector not only committed the state to a definite set of policies but also indirectly helped its support classes. For example, agricultural development brought substantial increase in the cash component of the cost structure which must be realised by bringing agricultural produce to the market. This produce involves the question of distribution among the producers and thus that of tenurial relations. 67% of land was cultivated by tenants and part-owners in Punjab paying rents in cash or land. In the former case, cash had to be realised through selling in the market, while in the latter case marketable surplus was a function of consumption by the rent-receivers; thus both were a function of the capitalist market.

The state's role can be understood as a mediator between capital formation on the one hand and dissipation of the old tenurial structure on the other. Most of agricultural development was processed through the
the technical or supply wings of the government machinery. The underlying assumption was that its extension services will lead the 'progressive' farmers in development projects. The production strategy remained wholly bound by input-output calculations, while their effect on the complex tenurial relations were considered the unforeseen consequences of development to be tackled later. Meanwhile, the capitalist penetration of Pakistan's society differentiated peasantry which broadened the framework of class conflict, as we shall see below and again in the specific case of Faisalabad district in Chapter VI.

Class Formation in Rural Sector

The state in Pakistan brought about such inter-sectoral and inter-class transfer of resources through its rural development strategy that the whole power structure of the rural society underwent a mutational change. The direction of this change was towards a generalized pattern of dichotomous class interests. By and large, the rural inequality was more visible and widespread than the urban inequality. The rich farmers enjoyed the supply of agricultural 'inputs' on favourable terms. Water, which was the most important 'input' was made available to those who could afford 'lumpy' investments in tube wells, and could approach the government's credit agencies on the strength of their 'property. As many as 87% of private tubewells in Gujranwals and Multan districts- the typical tubewell area - was installed on farms over 25 acres. These farmers also sold water to the neighbouring smaller farmers whose crop-pattern was thus adjusted to these new sources of water supply. In many case, the tube-well owners stopped selling them water when it was direly needed and in the end bought off their land. Even otherwise, selling water itself meant a net transfer of income from the lower to upper farmers which amounted to a 25% profit in the latter's tubewell installation cost. As for credit for 'inputs', the purchase of fertilizer required payments to Patwari to secure affidavit certifying tenurial or ownership status, an audience
with the bank officer, sometimes involving bribery, and payment of 'black-market' prices to the vendors. The first two were in the nature of fixed costs, regardless of the size of loan, which was therefore too costly for the small farmer, leaving the door open for the big farmer.

Tractorization further enhanced the economic dependence of the poor peasantry on big farmers. This process turned a sizeable number of these working on family farms into wage labour, whereby the erstwhile rent-receivers became employers, 'freely' buying labour power. This process exposed the peasants to grave market insecurities, and pushed them to towns in large numbers. Especially, in the case of big farms, where this process was only partial, a sizeable number of tenants remains tied to marginal lands on reduced holdings, as a source of tied labour for harvesting and other purposes; they represented a captive labour market, controlled by landlords. The eviction of tenants assumed a critical position in its impoverishing thereby increasing the class differentiation in a structural sense.

The new class structure cannot be understood merely in income terms. For example, the large profits from bumper crops were re-invested in tractors and tubewells and they increased landlords' assets on a permanent basis which a short term income model would hardly show. Typically, these assets became income-yielding in a year or two by reducing the fixed costs of production; by the same token they raised the comparative cost of the non-mechanized farms operating in the same neighbourhood. The land price usually adjusted to the marginal productivity of the most efficient farms which meant a sharper increase in land price than in its average productivity. This factor was responsible for a decreasing rate of return for the investment in land, especially for the small farmers who could not afford mechanization, and, in the end, sold or rented land to big farmers.
The rural-urban migration was one of the direct outcomes of agricultural development. It pushed different classes out of village for various reasons. The rich farmers settled in nearby towns in pursuit of a better standard of living. The smaller farmers were forced off the land due to the increasingly negative effects of mechanized farming. Many of them invested their meagre resources in agro-based small engineering projects in the towns located in rich farmlands. Their network of grains-stores, dyeing plants, machine shops and other input distribution functions contributed tremendously to growth of small towns. These towns grew at the rate of 5.8% per annum compared to 4.6% for large cities. The density of these towns was higher in the 'intensive' irrigation areas of the Punjab and Frontier, but was lower in the 'extensive' irrigation areas of Sind. There towns were like 'transmission belts' around the countryside, with burgeoning economic dynamism, related to small scale industry. They soon assumed functions of market towns and occupied a focal position in all urban-rural transactions. At the same time, they catered for the 'secondary' level engineering needs of the large scale industry, providing it with stopgap mechanical goods, produced with a labour intensive production process. By the late 1960s, the spin-offs from large-scale manufacturing sector and the Green Revolution had produced a sizeable town centred economically mobilized petty bourgeoisie section of the population conscious of bigger economic currents, tightening noose around them while at the same time preserving their newly established economic position.

The landless labourers preferred big cities to small towns for migration, hoping for more employment opportunities in the industrial sector. Unlike the middle peasant-turned-petty bourgeoisie they lacked capital and were soon to join the ranks of urbanized peasantry ranging from the unemployed to various types of employed labour. The destruction of the old pattern of family farms at the hands of Green Revolution paved the way for polarization of groups of classes which belonged to both urban and rural sectors.
Together, the industrial and agricultural development strategy of the Pakistan government created such vast disparity between different strata, that it started casting its shadow on the so-called stability of Ayub system in the late 1960s. Already, the average household income of Rs. 201 p. month was not reached by 68.7% in 1963-64; in 1968-69, 77% of them fell short of the then average of Rs. 271 p.m. The income of the poorest 10% of households declined from 2.6% of (W) Pakistan GDP in 1963 to 1.8% in 1968-9. The country's rural population below the poverty line fell from 72% in 1963-64 to 64% at the start of Green Revolution in 1966-67; from there it increased to 68% in 1969-70 and 74% in 1971-2. The increased impoverishment of the large masses as a result of 'development' was thus rooted in the structure of economy where a) the concentration of economic surplus was in a few hands whose consumption pattern affected the rate of accumulation, b) the access to organised capital market was strictly controlled by the state which favoured its support, c) the capital intensive farming displaced labour from land, d) the capital continued flowing from the rural to urban areas, e) the public capital formation in the infrastructural sector, e.g. irrigation, electricity, transport etc., largely helped private capital formation. In contrast with the purely economistic models which conceive the market mechanism as an independent variable, we can observe that the state intervenes actively in the process of price formation and transfer of resources between classes.

We can now conclude this chapter by observing that the state in Pakistan continued to be essentially bureaucratic in nature. The politics of nationalism, riding over Jinnah's charismatic leadership and the appeal of Islamic ideology, stunted the growth of non-bureaucratic institutions within and outside the government e.g. political parties and legislatures. The mass inflow of refugees, especially in urban areas, provided the social support for Pakistan's bureaucratic polity.
new state monopolized all forms of public activity and established an involuted pattern of paternalistic rule in the country. On the one hand it preserved the broad structural features of the colonial state and successfully resisted all attempts at bureaucratic reform. On the other hand it took up developmentalism as its new source of legitimacy, largely under the U.S. influence. It thus sought to modernize its administrative institutions in accordance with the needs of planning and implementation of development projects. Man-power planning became the state's self-image as an agent of modernization. Its development strategies in the industrial and agricultural sectors served to enhance its own resource-base and increase the power of bourgeoisie and landlords vis-a-vis the urban and rural working classes respectively. By the late 1960s, both the absolute and relative, impoverishment of the latter created a severe political crisis which we shall discuss in the next chapter.
NOTES:


3. The voting in favour of Pakistan was carried through in the Legislative Assembly of Sind on 26 June 1947, in the Jirga of British Baluchistan on 3 June, and in the Muslim part of the Bengal and Punjab assemblies on 20 and 25 June respectively. In the NW F.P. and district-Sylhet of Assam, however, the issue was decided in a referendum on 6 July.


8. Ibid.; following him this term has been employed to describe the political system of Pakistan by various authors. See for example, Rudolph: and Rudolph, 'Generals and Politicians in India', Pacific Affairs, 1964 p.7. and Maleeka Lodhi, 'Bhutto, the Pakistan Peoples Party and Political Development in Pakistan 1967-1977, Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1980 p.18. The latter however, expands the term to include the whole colonial apparatus from the viceroy to the district offices which was neither unique to Pakistan as she claims nor limited only to the top level of government as the term 'viceregal' implies.


15. Ibid. p. 169.


19. For example, S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Boston, 1968).


21. There was always a tension between the party cadres and landlords. The farmer brought out the Muslim League manifesto in 1946, advocating land re-distribution. The latter banned the manifesto in 1950. See Ganovsky and Polanskaya, op. cit., 114.


23. F. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston, 1964), p. 137.


26. Ibid. p. 63.


28. Ibid., pp. 43-4.

29. Although provincial legislatures were still weaker than the central legislatures, they did have a relevance for the final power game in the capacity of an electoral college for the first and second Constituent Assemblies as well as for the One-Unit Assembly of West Pakistan.


32. Ibid. p. 97.

33. Ibid., p. 98.

34. Pakistan Constituent Assembly, Debates, 11 April 1950, p. 790.

35. Muneer Ahmed, Legislatures of Pakistan, (Lahore 1960)


37. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 223.

38. Rafiq Afzal, op. cit., p. 41.


41. For example, Sayeed, op.cit., pp 288-293.


44. In 1941, West Punjab's population was 15.8 million of which 74.7% were Muslims; it rose to 20.8 million in 1951. At partition, it lost about 4 million and gained six, which was thus slightly less than one-third of the population of Punjab at that time. Gankovsky and Polanskaya, A History of Pakistan (1947-1958) (Lahore, n.d.) p. 98. Keessing Contemporary Archives, 1947-1974, p. 4.

45. Vakil, Economic Consequences of Divided India (Bombay, 1950) p. 133

46. Ibid.


50. Ibid, p. 44.

52. Sayeed op. cit., p. 373.
54. More about gazara scheme in chapter VI.
56. Pakistan Constituent Assembly Debates, 31 March, 1953, p. 980.
58. A majority of the refugees interviewed by me subscribed to these views, among them civil servants, lawyers, businessmen, small shopkeepers workers and even peasants.
60. Ibid., pp. 331, 328-9, 358.
65. Ibid. p. 37.
66. Interview with Mubashar Hasan, the former Secretary General of Pakistan Peoples Party and ex-Finance Minister 1971-1974.
68. R. Braibanti, 'Civil Service of Pakistan: A Theoretical Analysis' in ibid., p. 192.
72. Ibid.
73. For example, Ayub detested that class of ulema who were openly engaged in politics and not those God-fearing people who have served the country by teaching the Quran...' op. cit., (1967) p. 201; Ayub also issued statements against lawyers, intellectual and students' participation in politics.


77. Iskander Mirza, quoted in Sayeed op. cit., p. 76.


90. For example see article 30, part III, *Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (Karachi, 1956) which was later accommodated in the 1962 Constitution.

94. Sayeed, op. cit., p. 120.


97. Interview with Mubashar Hasan, ex-Finance Minister of Pakistan.


103. 159 posts were encadred in 1959 in this 'Pool', while 125 were filled by 1967; Pakistan Ministry of Information, Twenty Years of Pakistan, (Islamabad, 1968-69), pp. 105-6.


111. Ibid. p. 58.

112. Pakistan, Public Service Commission, Report, Rules, Question Papers, Table of Results etc. Pamphlet of the Combined Competition Examination, 1951, p. 1-3.

113. B. Schaffer, op. cit., p. 12.

114. Albert, Gorvine, 'Administrative Reform' in Birkhead (ed) op. cit. p. 189.

115. During Professor Gladieux's research, officers' non-co-operative attitude was all along noticeable, ibid. p. 189.

116. Ibid. p. 195.


120. Ibid, paras 55, 72, 106.


125. Cornelius Report, op. cit., paras, 6.8, Chapter VII.

126. Ibid para, 12, Chapter IV.

127. Ibid, para 15, Chapter VII.

128. Ibid, para 3, Chapter XII.

129. Ibid para 16, Chapter VII.


131. For example a circular was issued by the Commission of Sargodha Division on 30 April 1969, regarding 'protocol on the Arrival/departure of Divisional Commissioner' which simply reproduced the Punjab Consolidated Circular No. 1 of 1858. Report of the Working Group, op. cit., p. 146.


136. Ibid. p. 105.

137. Ibid. p. 113.

138. Some of the more significant public corporations were: PIA, IDB, AEC, ADB, PICIC, PIDC, OGDC, CDA, Public Service Commission, Tariff Commissions, Export Promotion Bureau, Refugee Rehabilitation Finance Corporation.


141. Birkhead, *op. cit.*, p. 120.


153. Both staff and advice came from the Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University and the Administrative Staff College at Henley-
on-Thames. It borrowed the latter's syndicate methods comprising syndicates of 10 or so numbers who were then directed by staff; from the former it took seminar system focusing on policy making.


158. Ibid. pp.297, 290-1.

159. Pakistan, Planning Commission, The Third Plan, pp. 175, 176, 179.

160. See B. Schaffer, op.cit., p.11, for explication of the concept of 'insidedness'.

161. For example, Gankovsky and Polanskaya tend to neglect the structural aspects of the state in Pakistan and focus on classes as self-evident political actors, Y. Gankovsky and Polanskaya op.cit. Also see Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive, (Penguin, 1983), for a new-born orthodoxy.


164. For example, no major legislation about labour took place between 1942, and 1958 or indeed , from the Wages Act of 1936 to the Industrial Disputes Ordinance of 1959. Likewise, the Foreign Exchange Act of 1947 and Import and Export Control of 1950 were both purely 'bureaucratic initiatives'. Al Fritchler, 'Industrialists and Governmental Process in Pakistan,' Ph.D. thesis, Syracuse University, 1965, pp.112, 208-9, 117.

165. Ibid., p.200

166. Ibid. pp.219 -222 and 225-6.

167. Vorys, op.cit., p.95.

168. There were such institutions as Indian Industrial Conference 1905; Indian Commercial Congress 1915; after merger of the two in 1920, a new Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce was found in 1927, of which a small portion fell to Pakistan areas, without its (Hindu) leadership. As for their representation in the legislatures is concerned, the Indian Act of 1935 allocated only 2 seats for Sind, and for Bengal (most of them presumably going to Hindu bourgeoisie) only 1 for Punjab, See Fritchler op.cit. pp.187-88.
174. It is strange that Burki thinks that this industrial strategy removed the government's guiding hand from industrial sector altogether. See Burki, op. cit., (1980) p. 19.
175. Pakistan was expected to earn Rs. 130 crores through trade in export, while its total imports valued Rs. 102 crores, leaving a net balance of Rs. 28 crores against the previous year's deficit of Rs. crores. The Dawn 20 January, 1951. An Indian visitor called Pakistan 'a veritable El Dorado' and 'The Mecca of monetary crops'; The Dawn 19 January 1951.
176. Textile piecegoods worth Rs. 18 crores were imported in eight days, i.e. from 1 June to 8 June, 1950, ibid.
177. Papanek, op. cit., p. 16.
179. See Rashid Amjad, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan, (Lahore, n.d.).
183. Ibid. pp. 119-121, 123, 124-5.

186. Out of 32 houses 17 met 48.9% of sales in West Pakistan, out of which only 8 controlled 39%. 11 houses controlled 63.1% of sugar production, 4 houses controlled 60% of fuel and power industry; 4 houses controlled 46.3% of cement sales; 6 houses sold 17.8% of chemicals; 2 houses produced 69.1% of paper, 7 houses accounted for 56.1% of machinery (engineering), see ibid, p.50.

187. Ibid. p.60.

188. Ibid. p.68.

189. The former worked in association with many international institutions like the International Finance Corporation and the Commonwealth Development Finance Company Limited. It has many foreign shareholders. It managed to get credits from such institutions as the World Bank. This money was then pumped into the private sector in Pakistan.


192. Lewis, op.cit., p.35.


194. A Dogpunar,

195. Ibid.p.217.

196. Ibid. p.43.

197. Second Five Year Plan, op.cit., p.36, 132


200. Ibid. pp. 149-50.

201. Ibid., pp. 151-153. In 1963-4 as many as 153 strikes place involving 109,142 labourers and 902,288 man days lost; corresponding figures for the previous year were 87,59,855 and 268,386, the latter two figures being the highest till that time.

202. M. Shafi, Eleven Years of Labour Policy (Karachi, 1959)

203. Pakistan, Constituent Assembly Debates, 3 April, 1953, p. 1180.


207. For example, See M. Moerman, Agricultural Change and Peasant Choice in a Thai Village (Berkley, Calif. 1968) as a typical case.


209. Ibid. p. 13.

210. Ibid. p. 67.


212. Lipton, op. cit., pp. 66-7.


214. Lenin, 'The Differentiation of the Peasantry' in ibid, p. 132.


216. J. Harris, Introduction to Part Two, ibid., p. 125.


222. The Dawn 1 January, 1952.


224. Ibid.


230. Nulty, op. cit., p. 36.


Imports of foodgrains increased from .041 million tons in 1947-48 to 0.743 million tons in 1958-9, while per capita food consumption decreased from 14 to 13 ounces per day (for whole of Pakistan; Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Twenty Years of Pakistan (Islamabad, 1967) p.151.


255. Ibid. p. 334.
256. Nulty, op.cit., p.86.
257. Gotch and Brown, op.cit. p.5.
259. Income Studies, for example, tend to leave this wealth aspect outside their research framework, and thus even conclude that a decline in income inequality has taken place. Khandkar, 'Distribution of Income and Wealth in Pakistan', in R. Ahmed op.cit. p.82.
263. Ibid. pp. 760 - 1.
265. Ibid. p. 115.


268. Ibid. p. 249.
CHAPTER IV
TOWARDS RADICAL POLITICS: PAKISTAN 1968-1975

In many countries of the Third World which got independence after the Second World War, the initial post-colonial period is followed by mass mobilization seeking to change the power structure of the country in favour of the under-privileged groups and classes. John Kautsky, has described these phenomena as 'second-wave revolutions of modernizers'. According to him, the achievement of independence actually means the disbanding of the old aristocratic-colonial order and the emergence of a regime of modernizers who govern in the name of people. While a new balance of political forces is thus achieved, the march towards modernization, centred on industrialization, spreads large-scale unrest among the lower classes who demand the fulfilment of the 'promises' advanced by the first generation of modernizers. A new set of modernizers then emerges on the political scene, who articulate these new interests and by doing so use them as a political resource in a bid for power. However, even the second revolution is too weak to upset the 'balance of forces' in favour of the emergent lower classes, because 'either newly mobilized elements have already become too strong as they had in Mexico, or traditional elements remain too strong as they did in Turkey, to be pushed aside by the modernizers.'

We have already discussed in Chapter I that the terms such as modernizers are too general. For example, the class-based economic and political power of the modernizers' does not come out from this approach, nor does it analyse the composition of the state power in the Third World societies. However, the significance of Kautsky's model for our purposes lies in its conceptualization of the 'second-wave revolution' as a (necessary) historical phenomenon following independence. In Pakistan's case, the political phase starting with the anti-Ayub movement and including the 1970 election campaign and the initial years of the Bhutto government, represents a second-wave revolution in the country's
history. In this period, the fall-out of the Ayub's 'decade of development' de-stabilized the state and rendered all effective power in the hands of Bhutto as the elected leader of (W) Pakistan. Bhutto depended heavily upon the symbols of, and the social goals set by, the independence movement, and by doing so gave them a new meaning. In the end, however, the whole movement lost momentum as a new balance of forces emerged largely on the older lines.

We shall analyse Pakistan's second-wave revolution not in terms of Kautsky's modernization thesis but in those of populism, intermediate regimes and Bonapartism as discussed in Chapter I. The central issue of our discussion will be the internal transformation of a Third World society such as Pakistan and the way the state undergoes change as a direct result of the so-called developmental activity in the contemporary framework.

The first section of this chapter focuses on the mode of transfer of power from Ayub to Yahya via the mass demonstrations. Section II will deal with the two and a half years of the Yahya regime in which a realization of the nation's potential for political revolt forced the Pakistan government to assume a relatively liberal stance towards national issues, even though such 'liberalism' was strictly contained within the old framework. Various reforms were announced in the fields of industrial relations, education, administration, and politics. The holding of the first general elections in Pakistan in 1970 remains by far the most important feature of this transitional phase. On the one hand it restructured the pattern of dispersion of power in the country's political institutions. On the other hand, it rendered the legitimacy of the old bureaucratic polity suspect in the public eye in the presence of the winning political parties viz. the PPP and the Awami League. The third section therefore deals with this election politics. Here, we shall discuss the broad ideological and leadership patterns prevailing in Pakistan at that time. We shall focus on Bhutto and the rise of the Pakistan People's Party against the background of the 1970
election. After the transition period comes the era of radical changes under Bhutto which is the subject of the next two sections. Thus in the fourth section we shall study the content and style of 'Bhuttoism' in its early phase, while in the fifth section we shall take up an enquiry into the emergence of the new synthesis of forces under Bhutto. In the final section, an attempt is made to determine Bhutto's role in re-shaping the state system of Pakistan.

Section 1. From Ayub to Yahya Via the Masses

The political objectives and style of the new government can be fully understood only in the light of the anti-Ayub movement which preceded it and the pattern of transfer of power from Ayub to Yahya. The anti-Ayub movement was apparently started on November 8, 1968, by some students in Rawalpindi against alleged police repression. Bhutto lent his support to it from the beginning. Soon, it spread to all towns and cities, and, at least in East Pakistan, to the country-side as well. In West Pakistan student movement was largely fragmented and localized, whereas in East Pakistan a Student Action Committee was responsible for co-ordinating the activities of student organisations. The student's demands gradually expanded to include the political issues of constitutional change, lifting of the emergency and release of prisoners. Again, in East Pakistan, the physical proximity in towns and villages led to a great spillover of public fury into the countryside, where the village population turned on the unpopular police officials, rent collectors and village council chiefs, sentencing them to instant punishment in hastily organised people's courts. The 11 points of the Student's Action Committee in East Pakistan were taken up by the Awami League, along with its own 6 points forming thereby a grand alliance with the large student body on a broad programme focused on the issue of provincial autonomy. Following that, the Awami League's previously city-bound popularity spread to the country-side through the students catalytic role. In West Pakistan, however, the mass mobilization did
not extend beyond small towns, and was less directly related to party directed leadership. Here, the old guard parties entered in January 1969 into a hasty alliance, the Democratic Action Committee (D A C), and tried to assume the leadership of the movement in the name of democracy, as translated into the two demands for parliamentary form of government and election on the basis of adult franchise. By February, the industrial sector came to a complete halt through the incessant strikes against what was described as the 'economic feudalism' of the Ayub regime. Troops fired on a procession of 4000 people defying curfew in Dacca. The next day the army was also called out in Lahore and Karachi. On 17th February Ayub Khan lifted the 41 month old State of Emergency as a concession to the opposition. Finally, the Round Table Conference, held between Ayub and DAC representative in the middle of March, agreed on meeting the latter's two basic demands. However, it proved to be suicidal for both of them. The DAC lost its 'legitimacy' in the eyes of masses in favour of the two non-participants, Bhutto and Bhashani, except for Mujib who returned disillusioned from the conference and was saved from the charge of a sell-out to the government. On the other hand, Ayub fell a prey to his inability to contain the mass upsurge, leading to the re-imposition of Martial Law on 25th January 1969.

Various questions arise at this point: was Ayub's overthrow a matter of months or years? Was it a consequence of junta disunity, or were there wider social and economic factors involved? Why did it result in another military intervention, instead of a 'constitutional' solution? It will be argued in the following pages that the movement had been simmering for more than a year and that it was the peculiar role of the civil and military oligarchy in the power structure of Pakistan which prevented any non-military solution which would have surrendered the political initiative to the 'outsiders'.
Almost two years before the overthrow of the Ayub regime, a food crisis had set in, due to a scarcity of wheat flour and vegetable ghee in villages and small towns. Many arrests were made especially in the more densely populated villages, where high pressure on land led to individual cases of militant activity. The 1965 drought, followed by the war and the suspension of foreign aid and then the two consecutive years of bad harvest in 1965/6 and 1966/7, all created a recession in the market towns, adversely affecting the petty traders in agricultural produce as well as lawyers whose business shrank almost to nothing. In this essentially small-town unrest the detenus were predominantly students (48%) and lawyers (31%). This movement continued in areas outside the mainstream of development activity in 1967/1968, and then moved to the cities at the end of the latter year, when Bhutto provided political organisation and leadership.

What then of the 'developed' areas and various sections of the urban middle classes? Burki has claimed that the middle farmers, the urban middle class and the intelligentsia served as the initial constituency of Ayub Khan, but despite economic gains, they were gradually excluded from political power under the system of Basic Democracies and the regime's increasing reliance on landlords and the bourgeoisie; all this forced them to move towards Bhutto. It can be argued that this description of 'classes' is more arbitrary than real, because it does not refer to the pattern of production relations. It is misleading to conceive classes as political actors, 'moving from one political camp to another'. Only the politically mobilized sections of the classes (and also groups) can be ascribed such voluntarism. As we shall argue, 'middle classes' support was in fact consistently denied to Bhutto, who therefore chose to mobilize the lower classes in his support.
Was it, then, the urban consumer who was the 'odd man out' caught between profiteer-businessmen and the prosperous landlords, in an environment allowing very low levels of political participation, and who therefore launched the movement against Ayub. Or was the industrial labour's increasing militancy, operating under the 'gherao-jalao' strategy of Bhashani which was the real cause of Ayub's fall. On March 17, as many as 2.5 million workers went on strike at the call of the Workers Action Committee. Sayeed argues that it was the deterioration of the law and order situation in the large urban centres which prompted the military to immediate action.

Other explanations talk of disaffection within the ruling groups of Pakistan as the real cause of Ayub's problems. Thus, it is suggested that the cuts in the defence budgets for 5 years prior to 1965 war, the controversial Tashkent Declaration of 1966 and possibly the emergence of rival leadership in the person of Air Marshall Asghar Khan had alienated the top military hierarchy. Likewise, Feroze Ahmed focuses on the contradictions between various exploitative classes and institutions as being responsible for Ayub's downfall; he outlines various contradictions between the Islamic fundamentalists and the monopolist bourgeoisie, between the bureaucracy and the army, between the monopolist and non-monopolist bourgeoisies and between the bureaucracy and the monopolist bourgeoisie. In this approach the whole subject is treated at a philosophical level, because the classes and sub-classes remain ill-defined. As noted earlier, classes and institutions cannot be considered as self-evident political categories; instead, they must be shown to be politically mobilized in pursuance of their interests. Secondly this approach does not take into account the vanguard role of workers, students and lawyers in the whole movement, and erroneously assumes that it was only a conflict within and between the dominant classes and institutions.
It has also been suggested that Ayub did not commit the full weight of state power to quell the street violence. Thus, The Economist saw in him a 'moderate man in vision, in self-esteem, in boldness' who would not unleash unbridled violence against the general masses. On the other hand, according to Feldman, Ayub paved the way for another Martial Law, whetted by Yahya's ambitions for power, through a deliberate, 'logical' and carefully organised Martial Law. Underlying both these suggestions is the fact that the state machinery kept a low profile and that the street violence remained relatively limited. Indeed, Tariq Ali lamented that the Students Action Committee did not declare Dacca a liberated city at a time of complete withdrawal of the government's law-enforcing agencies from the streets. The futility of such a view is rooted in two false assumptions: a) that the movement was 'revolutionary' in its character, and b) that the state had finally collapsed. The almost complete absence of resistance to Yahya's imposition of Martial Law testifies to the fact that the movement lacked an aim content and a political organisation, and it was essentially reactive in character.

Can we, therefore, argue that the change was limited to reproducing the Ayub system without Ayub and his Basic Democracies? In other words, was it a succession within a Garrison State, i.e. an 'internal' change of guards among the 'specialists in violence, who had themselves initially rose to power after displacing the specialists in civil administration. We can only partially agree to this position because not only did a significant change take place in the whole outlook of the military establishment, but also the re-imposition of Martial Law served to ensure, and not curtail, the civil administration's autonomous exercise of power. In fact, the civil bureaucracy's vested interest in keeping Bonapartism alive among the generals was manifested through their offer to serve under the new junta almost by dictation.
Yahya's ascent to power symbolized many significant changes:

i) Unlike the leaders of the 1958 coup, who held the previous parliamentary system responsible for Pakistan's gravest ills and thus chose to disenfranchise the public through the system of Basic Democracies, the 1969 coup was born out of a general consensus on reverting to the pre-1958 system.

ii) Unlike the previous generation of generals, who were British-trained and were thus groomed to believe in the guardian role of the state as inherited from the colonial times, the new generation was mostly urban-based, U.S. trained and oriented to developmentalism.

iii) The massive anti-Ayub movement made the new junta realize the need to seek and maintain power by creating a political constituency for itself. Certain carefully selected social groups and political parties became the target of their political strategy. This was unlike the Ayub regime which sought to rule in a national capacity.

iv) Still more significantly there emerged a division among the army generals between the 'hawks and the doves'. The former represented many officers and most of the rank-and-file who came from the rain-fed areas of northern Punjab which had not benefited from the industrial and agricultural development of the 1960s. The anti-Ayub movement prompted the 'hawks' to apply pressure on the government to crush the corrupt bureaucrats, profiteering businessmen and the exploitative landlords. On the other hand, the 'doves' who came from the urban middle class and from the relatively developed areas in general tried to contain their militancy by withdrawing army units from active civilian administration within months.27

It can be argued that the new regime generally tried to outgrow its dependence on the bureaucracy and sought advice from outside the conventional sources of official wisdom. Especially the two commanders-in-chief of the air force and the navy introduced an air of 'populist'
liberalism in the government by bringing in 'whiz kids' from the professions, most of whom were less encumbered by knowing in advance what can't be done' than were their bureaucratic counterparts. For some time decisions were made without consulting the usual bureaucratic sources of experience. The new thinking tried to move away from the previous strategy of economic maximization in favour of a social welfare orientation. In reaction, the Planning Commission assumed an air of detachment from the new establishment in a bid to ignore the ad hoc advisers from outside the bureaucracy. The new recommendations were simply put aside, ostensibly for lack of funds.

The Yahya regime moved fast to placate the two most active groups in the movement against Ayub, viz. the students and labourers. In July, new educational proposals were announced and generally welcomed by the public. However, the Planning Commission and the central Ministry of Finance refused to lend their support to them; the latter's refusal was indeed crucial. However, in the final announcement of the Education Policy, a block allocation of Rs. 17 crores was made to cover the various schemes related to technical education, higher education, agricultural education, training and higher emoluments for teachers and curriculum development.

Later as governor of West Pakistan, Nur Khan reversed a previous decision by Governor Musa, who in his ex-officio capacity as chancellor of all provincial universities had appointed the provincial education secretary as secretary to himself. The new decision separated the two offices. That was interpreted as an attempt to outgrow the need for expert advice, and was generally disliked by the bureaucracy. In a parallel development, the English-medium Christian missionary schools were derided for spreading elitism and were publicly held responsible for creating an 'alien' class; an enquiry was ordered into their affairs. In this plethora of issues, most of which did not relate directly to educational improvement, the education policies and measures remained there for window-dressing, while their substance soon melted away. In the end, the vast student body in whose names all this policy making was taken up stood even more alienated than before.
This one-sided approach was also discernible in the government's labour policy. Nur Khan brought changes in the realm of trade union activity, settlement of disputes, wage structure, and labour welfare measures. The structure of industrial relations changed accordingly. Previously the conciliation and judicial powers were vested in the same hands, but now three separate services were created, viz, the Registrar of Trade Unions, the Conciliation and Mediation Service and the Inspectorate. The inspecting teams were not given any legal status, and thus lacked authority over employers. Also the teams consisted of officials of the labour department itself, under the chairmanship of the D.C. which was hardly practical for the task in hand. Conflicts over matters of interest arising out of the market relationship, e.g. working conditions, labour's share of production, congeniality of place of work, etc., were left to the two sides concerned. Also it was decided 'to remove the restrictions on the right of workers to strike and the right of employers to lock out'. In other words, the principle of free enterprise was allowed to work freely, with the worker's conditions essentially determined at the level of factor prices. However, the provision of minimum wages and the removal of the requirement for the 'recognition' of trade unions by the employer as a prior condition for its legitimate functioning, as well as the extension of the right of association to the security services were significant steps forward.

Nur Khan's labour policy was opposed by the Planning Commission for being too radical. In reality however, the government had legislated in an important sphere of public activity without getting the employers' and employees' agreement to the basic tenets. Therefore, the policy gave good, but inoperative laws, which failed to win the hearts of its target groups. In fact the labour had to go to streets against the continued victimisation of workers, and arrest of union leaders in Lahore and
Karachi. This shows the acute lack of understanding between the so-called whiz kid reformism and the labour.

In the area of civil administration, the government chose to eliminate the more visible signs of bureaucratic oppression by dismissing 303 'corrupt' officers. A permanent, high-power committee was instituted to enquire into corruption cases and declarations of movable property from the president down to joint secretaries. The government also took the unusual step of publishing the 1962 Cornelius Commission Report and creating another Pay Commission under the same chairman. Although the confidence of the civil bureaucracy was badly shaken due to these arbitrary steps its structural features such as internal differentiation, 'collective' nature of policy making and internal review system meant that it had the capacity to dispense with the services of any number of individual officers and yet retain its institutional integrity.

For some months after the coup, the power structure of the state in Pakistan was polycentric. The central secretariat continued to wield the formal authority over initiating, checking and approving economic and administrative policies. Within the headquarters of the Chief Martial Law Administrator military officers filtered the cases coming from the Secretariat and became de facto super-secretaries. Some of the attached members of the Secretariat, the so-called 'whiz kids' operated with the support of Air Marshall Nur Khan and Rear Admiral Ahsan. Meanwhile, a coterie of generals emerged at the centre, which managed to monopolize all power in their own hands and to cut Yahya's links both with his own headquarters and with the civilian arm of his government. Finally, all decisions were taken in the name of the civilian cabinet, which was installed in September 1969. This polycentrism allowed a situation of relative tolerance to emerge. The new regime was committed to change while at the same time maintaining its structural continuity.
As against other reforms, the so-called 'political' reforms were more real and effective. In Ziring's view, it was during this shift towards political reforms that all the other reforms began to break down. The Yahya government's political strategy revolved around keeping the initiative in its own hands, while at the same time following the broad lines of strategy agreed by all parties at the Round Table Conference. It took considerable pains to give an image of neutrality in the elections, though behind-the-scenes manoeuvring continued to forge an alliance of the statist parties.

On the two issues of a parliamentary form of government and the one-man-one-vote basis of new elections which had been agreed by all the parties in the Round Table Conference, Yahya could ill afford to go back. The break-up of the One-Unit was, however, a bold step, judging from the old guard composition of the junta itself. It has been suggested that Nur Khan and others sought to take the wind out of the sails of the regionalist parties of West Pakistan and thus undermine their possible partnership with East Pakistan against Punjab. Meanwhile, the diehard conservatives like Generals Sher Ali and Umar tried to forge unity among the rightist parties and 'discredit' the politics of the left as being un-Islamic. A civilian cabinet was installed which was made to scapegoat for decisions made by the Military Council of Administration. Through all these measures, the state sought to re-establish its authority after the large-scale movement against Ayub, while at the same time keeping the momentum of change as low as possible.

The period between December 1970 and December 1971 is better known for the East Pakistan crisis than for its ramifications for the residual state structure in (West) Pakistan. The marginality of the Eastern wing for the state of Pakistan became clear in this crisis. Provincial autonomy remained anathema to this state. It is no surprise that the government reverted to the old game of 'recruiting' unrepresentative, centralist elements from East Pakistan as MNA's and MPAs. This facade could no longer sustain the integrity of the state. The only other
force, Bhutto, was squarely neutralized for sometime. However, he tried to improve his 'acceptability' to the state on crucial moments such as the initial military crackdown in Dacca, the scramble for East Pakistan parliamentary seats, and the Indo-Pakistan war. On the one hand he kept up pressure on the regime for the transfer of power to the elected representatives of the country. On the other hand, he strenuously tried for, and finally succeeded in creating, a constituency for himself within the military high command, which staged a coup in his favour immediately after the debacle in East Pakistan.

Section 3: The 1970 Elections and the PPP’s Rise to Power

The anti-Ayub movement cost the participants in the Round Table Conference their legitimacy in the public eye. The only exception was Mujib-ur-Rehman, who openly declared his disillusionment with the conference. Only Bhashani and Bhutto stayed away from it. The former’s alleged betrayal of the movement, as in the elections of 1965 when he had supported Ayub ostensibly due to the latter’s anti-Imperialist and pro-Chinese policy, combined with his overall inconsistent policy directives to the party cadres, finally cost him public credibility. Only Bhutto in the West and Mujib in the East retained untarnished public images.

The anti-Ayub movement also set the trends for incorporating public demands into party manifestos. Almost all the parties stressed welfare aspects of the (capitalist) economy, (and reforms), selective nationalization and popular control over bureaucracy. This sudden upsurge of party lines on various popular issues was clearly a 'stop-gap measure against an expective revolution'. However, there was a clear division between political parties. On the one side, there were the so-called Pakistan Ideology parties which favoured restoration of the 1956 Constitution, inter-wing parity. One Unit for West Pakistan and Islam as the guiding principle in all matters legal, constitutional and political. They incessantly invoked Islam as the Pakistan Ideology to stem the tide of leftist/liberal propaganda. Except for the Jamat-e-Islami, these parties lacked an organised group of party workers at
the constituency level. They depended heavily on the press media which were dominated by the rightists, with or without official blessing. The most common form of political activity among them was forming alliances between factional groups of various parties.  

The parties in the second category were more issue-oriented and favoured participatory politics in general. The most conspicuous among them were the PPP as well as various splinter groups of the NAP (Bhashani and Wali groups). The Bhashani faction succumbed to bitter ideological conflicts over issues of strategy, especially of the electoral path to socialism. The Wali faction was stripped of its urban-based radicalism, and was gradually reduced to its old landlord factional base. The PPP, however, approached the rural and urban masses through the oral tradition of corner speeches, sittings in the 'baithaks' of the labour leaders, public addresses in the urban slums, mobile loudspeakers and the like. The local party branches in the districts, were often not known even to the party bosses. Their spontaneity lent the character of a movement to the party, aiming at overall change in the system.

The support base of the PPP has been widely researched as we shall see shortly. Our present observations are therefore limited to broad projections of some of the findings in this field. Most of these studies have related the anti-Ayub movement to the rise of the PPP in the 1970 elections. For example, according to Burki, the movement started from rural town lawyers and businessmen and then moved to large cities, where the industrial labour, the urban unemployed and students joined in. However, he ascribes the leadership of the anti-Ayub movement to middle classes in general, which is misleading. A more concise and accurate analysis of the movement and the PPP support base emerges from Philip Jones' work. He has traced the recruitment pattern of the party in various active groups. Foremost
among them were the erstwhile NAP-Bhashani cadres who shifted their allegiance to the PPP during the anti-Ayub movement; later the labour strikes of November/December 1969 largely discredited the NAP and made it possible for the emergent labour-oriented leftist organisations to join the PPP. Various trade unions and professional associations came out openly in favour of the PPP as the election date approached near. The pro-PPP student movement had its origins in the 1964-5 presidential elections, i.e., the so-called COP coalition, the NSF Karachi group and the new 'Tashkent generation' of student radicals. Finally, the labour strikes of 1969 and the 1970 peasant conference at Toba Tek Singh, though originated independent of the PPP, helped swell its ranks subsequently.

Based on these observations and our analysis of social change in the previous chapter, we shall argue that the PPP support was clearly based on class lines. We can outline four major groups:

a) The dissidents from the NAP, the Awami League and other socialist liberal political groups, and the old-style communists all found a platform in the PPP as a way out of their political wilderness. Most of them belonged to the middle-class intelligentsia, with a training in organised political activity. This large student-lawyer-journalist-professor segment of the population in the big cities provided an organized force of party cadres, responsible for party propaganda. This intelligentsia came from various 'alienated' sections of the middle classes which on the whole opposed the PPP.

b) As noted in the previous chapter, the process of industrial and agricultural development during the 1960s together produced many low-grade employees, small shopkeepers, depot-holders, and owners of small repair workshops in the towns of Punjab and Sind; this petty bourgeois stratum was to emerge as the backbone of the party. The
relative social ascendancy of this petty bourgeoisie during the Ayub period, partly due to the Basic Democracies as we shall discuss in Chapter VI, exposed them to constraints imposed by the system at large. They were to mobilize the 'tonga-wallas, rickshaw wallas and labourers for whom', Bhutto alleged, 'Governor Musa has shown contempt.'54

c) The expanding number of skilled labour force, mechanics and the transport workers in the big cities saw in the PPP an alternative to the previously active socialist parties amidst them. These parties had only localised support groups, were too ideological to take up the day-to-day issues of industrial relations and most of all lacked a 'national' leader such as Bhutto.

d) The middle peasant sections of the Green Revolution areas were not only denied access to agricultural inputs but made dependent on the big farmers as a class. The real PPP revolution in terms of votes took place here, as the middle peasant made a common cause with the landless peasantry both of whom were being thrown to the market insecurities.

In addition, the marginal groups of various kinds flocked to the PPP. For example, religious minorities e.g. Ahmadis, Shiites and Christians, saw in it a way out of the cultural oppression of the Sunni majority. Also, in Sind, Bhutto brought an assortment of landlords into the party who maintained their regionalist opposition to the Karachi-Punjab axis of power. In the same way, the lesser biradris, the weaker factions and the educated unemployed joined the PPP in various localities mainly to outgrow their respective underprivileged positions.
It can be noted that the political attitude of each class and group was defined by its position relative to the power structure of Pakistan. The analysis of the PPP's internal composition in terms of ideological positions of certain individuals ranging from extreme left to extreme right tends to obscure the extent of political articulation of these various groups in the real world of policy-making. Indeed, it can be argued that the PPP intelligentsia evolved an ideological synthesis which claimed that 'all divine religions were originally socialist religions,' and 'Jehad is the struggle to form a system of Government in which basic needs of the people are fulfilled.' Underlying this ideological amalgamation of Islam, Socialism and Democracy and a populist commitment to 'All power to the people,' Bhutto's powerful personality worked to project an eclectic approach in all ideological matters so as to accommodate the marginal supporters of the party while at the same time keeping open the doors of post-electoral alliances with other parties.

There is a broad consensus of opinion about the Yahya regime's real motive behind the holding of elections which was to let a plethora of parties be represented in the Assembly, none with a clear majority; the military junta would then be able to play a brokerage role and thus stay on in power. The incidents of violent clashes between workers of different parties suggested that a situation of multi-pronged front was emerging; this clearly encouraged the regime to go ahead with the elections. In addition, the multiplicity of candidates for each seat obscured the direction of general mobilization. These were as many as 460 contestants for 80 National Assembly seats of Punjab; the situation was even worse in the smaller provinces. The fact that the government was not a declared party in the elections meant that a situation of broad coalitions of pro-and anti-government political parties could not emerge, unlike the previous elections.
The 1970 elections are very significant indicators of political change in Pakistan. They exposed the fallacy of the state bureaucracy's claims to represent the 'general will' of the masses. They also destroyed the support base of the three Muslim Leagues each of which claimed to be the real creator of Pakistan. The long absence of electoral process from the political scene of Pakistan had left the old political parties in darkness about their relative standing in the country, and about the real appeal of Islam in the public at large. In the belief of being the national parties, they fought the majority of seats in all the regions of the country and thus overextended themselves. In contrast, the PPP and AL were more modest in horizontal expansion, and yet their campaign was much more intensive. In the following table, the low ratio of successful candidates from the older parties in comparison with the high ratio of the PPP and AL indicates their largely differing approach to the elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>All Pakistan</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awami League</td>
<td>94.11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>.79.48</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML (Q)</td>
<td>6.76</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>41.17</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML (Council)</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>14.OO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML (Convention)</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAP (Wali)</td>
<td>9.37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUP</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relatively high participation levels (66.48% in Punjab, 58.44% in Sind) reflected the eagerness of the masses for change. For a long time after the anti-Ayub movement, the political scene remained unclear. It was the electoral mobilization which brought the undercurrent of political trends to surface. We shall therefore argue against KB Sayeed's view that the mass urban demonstrations are very good indicators of political development. Instead, it was the emergence of the new mass-based party cadres during the year-long election campaign which wrought a fundamental change in the country.

To a large extent, the election result re-structured the politics of Pakistan. Most significantly, people voted on issues and for parties, and thus brought about a political community based on mass participation. Instead of 'nationalizing' politics, the elections in fact regionalized the appeal of main political parties, not only along the two wings but also along provincial lines within West Pakistan itself. Thus Punjab and Baluchistan became the exclusive preserves of the PPP and NAP respectively, while in Sind and NWFP their respective leadership positions were accepted. The second position of certain parties in the provinces also became evident. Thus the PML (Council) in Punjab, the JUP in Sind, the JUI in Baluchistan became recognisable political forces. In the NWFP, however, the PML (Q), the NAP, and the JUI all enjoyed political support. Moreover, during the short period between national and provincial elections the leading parties generally tended to lose in favour of the runner parties, as the latter forged hasty alliances against the winners of the National Assembly election. The much larger number of independent candidates in the provincial elections (1, 112 for 300 seats, as against 203 candidates for 138 National Assembly seats) also cost the leading parties.
### Table

Percentage of Regional Party Seats to Total Regional Seats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PPP</th>
<th>QML</th>
<th>PML Council</th>
<th>PML Convention</th>
<th>JUI</th>
<th>JI</th>
<th>JUP</th>
<th>NAP</th>
<th>Indep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>75.60</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>62.77</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>8.88</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sind</td>
<td>66.66</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>46.66</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>11.66</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>38.88</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>5.55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.66</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Apart from the regionalization of politics, the 1970 elections introduced a new pattern of political leadership. A significant outcome of the elections was the emergence of a whole new generation of politicians. Except the NWFP, where it merely ossified the old conflicts, everywhere electoral mobilization provided legitimacy to a new leadership. In Baluchistan and Sind, however, the overriding passion was hatred for the Punjabi and Muhajir dominance of politics in Pakistan. It was only in the Punjab that the struggle assumed a clear class character, especially in the relatively 'developed' areas.

Most analyses of the PPP victory in the 1970 elections have stressed the modernization factor. The Report of the Pakistan Economist Research Unit (PERU), for example, divides Punjab into the developed and underdeveloped districts which were also the PPP's heavy vote and light vote areas. The argument is that the
relatively more modernized districts have been de-stabilized and are easily available for radical propaganda by a party of change like the PPP. Thus, higher population density leads to pressure on land and therefore to acceptance of radical solutions. According to this view, a high ratio of tenant-farmers, and of large farmers indicates the tied peasant vote; high road mileage means economic and social contacts between the city and countryside; literacy is the vehicle of enlightenment; and the ratio of urbanization points towards a protest vote against feudalism.

As the Report accepts, the application of the same modernization criteria to Sind is futile, because here the PPP got its maximum votes from the relatively more backward areas of the province, while it got only a quarter of its votes from Karachi, the most developed city of Sind and Pakistan. The modernization thesis was then expanded to cover the NWFP, by considering the NAP and JUI as leftist parties. This is rather misleading because NAP was gradually shorn of its radicalism after the urban leftist intelligentsia from Punjab and Sind left it in the safe hands of the Frontier Khans, while the JUI's composition was even more reactionary, apart from its primitive militancy against imperialism.

In Burki and Baxter's modernization thesis which is limited to Punjab, the tehsil serves as the basic unit of analysis. They include both the level and the rate of growth of modernization. Thus, it was in the higher growth areas more than the lower growth (even if developed) areas that the PPP got the maximum number of votes. While they distinguish between urban and rural tehsils with the help of more or less the same indicators as were used in the PERU study, and with the same explanatory value attached to them, they further divide the rural tehsils into advanced and backward, using such additional indicators as rural electrification and ratio of land under tube-well irrigation. The urban and the advanced rural tehsils voted heavily for the PPP.

The modernization thesis, however, not only grossly neglects the role of political organization and mobilization of the masses,
raising the modernization process to an independent variable, its logic also divides the parties along an arbitrary line between Left and Right as seen through the eyes of the Islamabad bureaucracy. It clearly ignores the respective class supports and the local leadership patterns of political parties. By contrast we shall argue that the character of the constituency-level power structure is crucial for understanding, the emergent political structure which therefore demands a consideration of the constitutional framework encapsulating the electoral process. The delimitation process either consolidated or cut across the hold of traditional elites according to whether it coincided with the administrative boundaries of tehsils and/or districts, or not. In the former, which can be called the 'administrative' constituencies, the brokerage role of the traditional elite vis-a-vis the state-in-the-field and the masses remained intact. Our of 27 National Assembly constituencies in Sind, and all 4 in Baluchistan were based on complete tehsils and/or districts, which is a measure of the continued hold of the traditional axes of power between the local tribal/landlord leadership and the local bureaucracy. On the other hand, the political situation in Punjab and the NWFP, with only 13 out of 82 and 4 out of 18 constituencies so based respectively, was much more fluid and progressive. Especially, the roles of the PPP, were entirely different in Punjab and Sind. It symbolized a revolutionary change in Punjab where it remained a status quo party in Sind. It is argued therefore that the electoral framework was a contributory factor in the liberalization of political system at the constituency level.

Also, the 1970 elections brought forth political parties from outside the orbit of the hitherto 'legitimate' structure of politics. In other words, the state's own client parties were defeated. The new forces were themselves divided between the 'autonomy' parties (the NAP and Awami League) and the 'leftist' PPP. The state first struck at the Awami League as it represented an 'alien' political force in Pakistan in the sense that it was quite removed from the traditional
catchment area of the military bureaucratic leadership i.e., Punjab and Karachi. The PPP, instead, was elected from the Punjab and Sind; it could not be antagonized that easily. The war with India further brought the government and the PPP together. With the loss of East Pakistan, and under the shadow of his electoral mandate, Bhutto finally made himself acceptable to the state, through a mini-coup in the president's house on December 20, 1971. On Bhutto's part, acceptance of the army's 'legitimate' structural role in the state was instrumental in his own rise to power.

Section 4: Bhutto's Radical Reforms

Bhutto's assumption of power was an unusual phenomenon in Pakistan's history on more than one account. He was the first ruler of the country to enjoy a popular mandate, and thus commanded an authority hitherto unknown. However, it must be pointed out that he became president through a coup d'etat and not as a consequence of an institutionalized or phased process of transfer of power. In other words, the legitimizing effect of his victory in the 1970 elections (in West Pakistan) was limited and at best remained a potential and not actual power in the eyes of the state. The combined effect of the progressive character of the PPP on the one hand and the general discrediting of the old system under the military, culminating in the public humiliation of defeat in East Pakistan on the other, was a public readiness for change in the direction of Bhuttoist populism. Finally, the continuation of Martial Law ensured that radical reforms could be undertaken without any effective opposition because the political parties were still trying to adjust to the new system, concentrating only on demands for lifting Martial Law. Consequently, the politics of reforms largely by-passed the politics of opposition which started posing challenge to Bhutto only later in 1972.
In the beginning, the new government sought to placate the demands of its own constituency, especially industrial labour, the urban intelligentsia and students. For weeks after Bhutto's takeover, the militant activity of the organised labour in Karachi and Lahore spread alarm among the entrepreneurial sector. Under militant trade union leaders who believed that people's rule had arrived, workers resorted to the encirclement of managers, getting them to agree to increased wages. Bhutto's new labour policy was an attempt to meet these demands half-way. This policy was largely based on the Yahya reforms. It provided relatively liberal measures for labour involvement in factory management, a share in annual profits, speedy court hearings, social benefits and extension of labour organisation to small-scale industrial units. These reforms were along the line of the existing labour laws and were to be implemented through the existing administrative structure, a fact which must be remembered when evaluating the structural significance of the reforms. The new policy was deliberately vague on the issue of strikes, except that the strike notice period was reduced from 21 to 3 days. The new shop-steward system and the widening of the scope of workers' councils created parallel centres of powers to the trade unions themselves. While provisions for medical facilities, low-cost housing and children's education were made, no new or old departments were held responsible for their implementation. No measures against the investors' option for capital-intensive machinery were taken to stop labour redundancies. The outdated oppressive labour laws of the 1930s, which gave arbitrary powers of termination of workers' service to the employers, were allowed to function as before, ostensibly as a safety valve, against a possible escalation of the labour movement. Most of the labour in the private sector, therefore, remained unhappy and prone to strike, forcing the government to take non-economic measures by mobilizing the state's law-enforcing agencies. Firing on striking workers took place 15 times in 1972, 26 times in 1973 and 32 times in 1974 in various industrial cities of Pakistan. Section 144 was frequently imposed to prevent labour processions; for example, in Karachi it was lifted for only 160 days during a period of four years.
The millowners, on the other hand, complained of additional costs of Rs. 400 per worker per annum as a result of labour reforms. Overall the cost of reforms was estimated at Rs. 50 crores to the employers, i.e. 12.5% of the current wage bill; in the textile industry alone, the reforms cost Rs. 12 crores. While the Bhutto regime thus gravely antagonized the commercial and industrial entrepreneurial groups, it failed to curb their established links within the state apparatus itself, as well as with certain political parties which, despite their poor showing in elections, had massive representation in the bourgeoisie. The regime also failed to co-opt the labour movement into the system and chose instead to smash its organisational strength. Both the measures cost the ruling party its mass credibility, which was the single most valuable source of its legitimacy. In fact recourse to use of the Federal Security Force against labour militancy soon became the norm.

The new government's education policy, like its labour policy, was based on Nur Khan's homework. However, it was much more utopian than its predecessor, and therefore its record of success was much poorer. Some of the most fantastic goals which the new policy set for the following 8 years were: establishment of 276,000 literacy centres, provision of 225,000 additional teachers, a third each to be recruited from the existing training institutes, the general stream of education, and the newly created National Literacy Corps which was to be drawn from locally available unemployed persons and university students; the opening of 2,200 additional 'units' for science teaching at the secondary level, and 700 units at the Intermediate level, with comparable figures of 3500 and 1600 for technical education. Many new educational institutions were opened. New universities at Sukkar, Saidu Sharif and Multan were opened, while the Jamia Islamia at Bahawalpur, Agricultural College at Tandojam, NED Engineering College at Karachi and the Engineering College at Jamshoro were all raised to university level. The National Book Foundation, the National Curriculum Bureau Service Corps (for college youth), as well as the educational research units attached to ministries, provincial departments,
district offices, and the educational institutions themselves were all ambitious as well as naive products of the new government's modernization vision, responding to no visible public demands. 

By contrast the nationalization of 178 private colleges and 3,693 private schools was in direct response to a popular demand and helped a large section of teachers who were underpaid and overworked. Politically, it had the advantage of eliminating this important catchment area for radical intelligentsia variously involved in party politics and trade union movement. Their new status as government employees automatically barred them from politics. Conversely, state control of higher education led to expansion of its patronage powers in the employment-starved educated middle class.

The nationalization measures were taken over the heads of the students, whose own demands were not met. Instead, the new university laws further tightened government control over the universities. Also, by creating the new post of prochancellor, who was to be appointed by the education ministers at federal and provincial levels, the government sought to increase its administrative hold over students.

The government's approach to the new health policy was equally utopian. It was claimed that Pakistan's colonial health system aimed at dispensation of services to the 'indigent sick', and that it was basically 'charity-oriented'. A new 'community medicine' approach was proposed and the public ill-health was condemned as an 'accompaniment' of poverty-culture. The new health policy envisaged a vast network of basic health units in the rural and urban areas linked with the health centres at tehsil and district headquarters. The goals set for 1980 in terms of the number of graduate doctors per 1000 population and the hospital beds and the introduction of low charges were quite unrealistic. In another move, the Drugs (Generic Names) Act was passed under which the manufacture, import and sale of drugs under brand names was prohibited, in order to bring the prices of medicines down. The doctors, chemists and foreign pharmaceutical companies lobbied heavily against the scheme and finally succeeded in stopping it altogether. By contrast, the increase in the number of undergraduate
medical colleges from 7 in 1971 to 14 in 1975, and their capacity from 900 to 3,877 was largely welcomed by the urban middle class everywhere. 86

Most of these reforms were policy-specific rather than structural. However, certain other reforms aimed at more intensive changes. Land reforms, for example, sought to re-shape agricultural production process, although it remained based on the existing property laws. Lowering the ceilings on landholdings from 500 and 1000 acres, in the irrigated and non-irrigated areas, to 150 and 300 acres respectively, without any payment for the resumed land, shook the foundations of generations-old landownership patterns and the structure of power and privileges attached to them. The purpose was 'the production of more food and fibre, to feed and clothe the rapidly growing population, to provide new materials for industry.' 87 It was argued that small holdings led to more intensive cultivation under Pakistan's labour-surplus conditions and therefore to higher overall production. We have seen that the current institutional set-up (with the district administration as its kingpin) favoured large farmers who could command access to credit and irrigation water, as also to other inputs. 88 This power structure remained operative under Bhutto, at least in its essence. Thus, soon after Bhutto's announcement of land reforms, all the provincial assemblies passed amendment acts to provide for various concessions to the landowners, thus keeping the average land ceilings quite high. In three years, 4.6 lakh acres of land were resumed most of which was uncultivable; it benefitted only 53,458 tenants, i.e. 2.6% of all tenants. 89 The resulting overall income redistribution was between Rs. 47.5 and Rs. 58.6 crores. 90 The new laws covered tenurial relations and were intended to shift the burden of revenue and seed provision entirely to the landlords, with only water charges in the irrigated areas to be shared by the tenants. However, they resulted in a shift towards the contract system involving the payment of rent in the form of a fixed amount per acre; thus land and not produce became the new measure, of rent, increasing risks thereby for the tenants. 92 It can be said that instead of stopping 'the polarization
of the rural society, the agrarian reforms further destabilized the rural scene, not least because of the steps 'taken to publicize widely the rights of tenants as enunciated in the reforms through various media to raise the level of their consciousness'. When pressed by the rising peasant militancy, the government chose first to strengthen the police force, and then to recruit the landlords into the PPP, in an attempt to restore the old balance.

As noted earlier, the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan had long been the focus of public criticism, and all efforts at administrative reforms were successfully thwarted by its elite group—the CSP. One of the firmest commitments of the PPP was to curb their power. In August 1972, Bhutto announced the merger of all civil services, introduced a relatively egalitarian system of training and replaced about 600 service grades, cadres, classes and scales with a unified structure of 22 grades, to ensure, at least in theory, an equal opportunity for upward mobility and horizontal movement between services based on merit. The previous constitutional safeguards for the civil servants were removed, subjecting them to normal legislative enactment. A new Service Tribunal was established to redress their grievances pertaining to terms and conditions of service. The powerful position of the planning commission was scaled down to that of a division in the Finance Ministry. The service labels were also changed (thus for example, Civil Service became the DMG= District Management Group) in an attempt to dismantle its elitist identity.

However, beyond these organisational reforms, Bhutto chose to strike at the power of the bureaucracy through two strong measures: firstly, he dismissed 1300 officers from service on corruption charges and secondly, he introduced the system of lateral entry. The former had a stunning effect on a large number of government officers, but the latter was meant to be of more significance in a structural sense. Here was a way to penetrate the unilinear structure of the services through recruitment to relatively high positions without passing the Public Service Commission's examinations. Much has been written about lateral entry being a device to recruit the PPP-oriented people into services who were not necessarily suited to their jobs. A closer look, however, shows that of all the 514 lateral entrants between
1973 and 1975, 90% were from within the bureaucratic apparatus (61.4% from civil services, 16.3% from army, and 12.4% from the educational sector). In a final analysis, lateral entry seems to have been an intra-bureaucratic phenomenon, which had only marginal success in creating a pro-PPP constituency within the state apparatus, the more so because 470 out of 514, i.e. 91.44% of such officers were recruited into the Secretariat and Foreign Service Groups, both of whom had only marginal policy-making importance in the country. The Government's measures to curb the power of the former CSP in favour of the Secretariat Group in the key ministries do not seem to have been successful.

While Bhutto sought to scale down the power of the Civil Service, his reliance on the police increased sharply during the reform years. Bhutto chose to control the people, who 'came out on the streets on the least pretext', with 'a first class reserve force', because in his view 'once the armed forces intervened they play the game according to their own rules'. While the existing special police establishments were thus re-invigorated, a new Federal Security Force (FSF) was created, well-equipped with modern armory 'to enhance the hitting power impression'.

**TABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure on Special Police Establishments and FSF: RS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Establishments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Security Force</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In view of the fact that the FSF soon developed the character of an instrument of political repression, by means of murder of opposition leaders as well as general gangsterism, it can be argued that the PPP's radicalism had initiated a process of disintegration of the essential social base of the state, i.e. its structural relationship with the dominant classes. By thus weakening the old clientele structures between state and society, Bhutto created a certain 'freeing effect' on the large rural and urban masses, whom he subsequently tried to contain through the police.

In the economic field, the most devastating reform was the nationalization of 32 units in 10 basic industries, followed by the elimination of the old managing agency system in the rest of the private sector, through which control over the industrial sector had previously been concentrated in a few hands. Next year another 26 units producing vegetable ghee were nationalized. Soon after, insurance and the banking system came under state control, thus completing the process of centralization of industrial and finance capital in the public sector. Gradually, a new Board of Industrial Management (BIM) was constituted under the chairmanship of the Federal Minister for Production. Later, 10 new corporations assumed the responsibility for the 10 basic nationalized industries. It was claimed that the nationalized sector excelled in areas other than profit-maximization, e.g. payment of government dues, facilities for labour, and responsiveness to genuine consumer demands.

Although Rashid has argued that considering sizeable industrial and commercial wealth still left in the private sector, not much was nationalized, the potential danger of further nationalization dried up all investment channels and brought the manufacturing growth rate down to 3% by 1974-5. The government created the National Development Finance Corporation (NDFC) to mobilize savings from the private sector but with no visible gains. It was only in the public sector that industrial investment increased from Rs. 17.9 crore in 1969-70 to Rs. 25.0 crore in 1972-3, Rs. 47 crore in 1973-4 and Rs. 109.6 crore in 1974-5. The demand for nationalization seems to be an aspect of the classical hatred of socialists for capitalism. However, in a mixed economy
like Pakistan, it only served to strengthen the hands of the already
dominant bureaucracy with its own biases towards entrepreneurial
groups.

To some such as Burki, these economic reforms were a
function of the perceived need of the Bhutto government to satisfy its
c constituency. However, we shall argue that the new regime's
policies were rather inconsistent, and were made according to the
bureaucratic perceptions of the day-to-day economic situation.
The new investment climate was decidedly in favour of the small
entrepreneur who had long been denied access to import licence;
now an industrial plant costing less than Rs. 200,000 was freely
importable. The exchange reforms which did away with the
multiple exchange rates through devaluation of currency by 134%
also seemed to run in favour of the surplus-farmers of the Punjab
and Sind except for the new export duties and the pricing policies of the
government, especially in the realm of agricultural inputs. A
combination of contradictory policies, for example, withdrawal of
subsidies on agricultural inputs, particularly on fertilizer, support
prices for certain crops, a liberal credit policy, as well as a
tractor import policy meant that the advantages flowed towards rapidly
mechanizing farmers. Not only did the internal redistribution of
income between large and middle farmers remained limited, overall the
inflationary trend hit the lower classes hard.

In other words, certain factors were outside the control of
the government, e.g., the world-wide economic recession of
1972-4, the abnormal increase in world oil prices, which raised
Pakistan's oil bill from $85 million in 1973-4 to $385 million in
1974-5, the heavy floods in Punjab and Sind in 1973, and the post-1971
increase in defence expenditure. Consequently, the rate of inflation
rose from an average of 3 to 4% in the 1960s, to 20% in 1972 and 1973,
then slowed down due to strong monetary and fiscal measures. Over-
all Bhutto's explicit failure in checking the price-hike cost him mass
popularity among the working classes.
We can sum up the economic performance of the first half of the Bhutto regime by observing that it cut the economic power of the industrialists and enhanced that of the middle class; yet it failed to stop the large-scale disinvestment in the manufacturing sector which curbed production growth and squeezed the middle and lower classes economically. It thereby failed to create a middle-class political constituency and to retain its lower class support. This meant that power stayed with the bureaucracy through the expansion of its institutionalized presence in the society and the administrative centralization of economic decision-making. The bureaucracy's style however formidably changed. Its relations with Bhutto and the PPP members in the government were increasingly personalized and started reflecting the corresponding factional groups in the party. We have also noted that the bulk of reforms were announced, and implemented, under the Martial Law and the Interim Constitution, i.e. under a political formula which allowed little opposition from the quarters which were hardest hit. That forced the latter to search for a political platform in the existing opposition parties, especially the Jamat-e-Islami. In the following section we shall discuss how Bhutto tried to centralize all power in the hands of the state and eliminate all potential opposition.

Section 5: Bhutto and the Centralization of the State

In this section, we attempt to analyze the centralizing trends in the exercise of power by the Bhutto government. We shall divide our discussion into three parts. First, we shall analyze the party politics in the Bhutto period. Second, we shall trace the direction of constitutional change under Bhutto. Thirdly, the role of the PPP in the power structure of the country will be analyzed.
Bhutto and Opposition: the Party Politics

Bhutto inherited two traditions of political opposition; one was from within non-governmental institutions and groups which enjoyed recognition from the state, the other was from outside the 'legitimate' political community which was often persecuted by the state. The former included the breakaway parties and factions from the umbrella nationalist organisation Muslim League and individual groups from within the power-wielding groups like the army, the bureaucracy and the refugees. Their territorial base was limited to the Punjab and the cities of Sind. Ideologically, Islam (with variations like Pan-Islamism, fundamentalism, revivalism and Islamic constitutionalism), political unitarianism (strong centre, One-Unit) and anti-communism, anti-secularism and anti-Indianism/Hinduism dominated their political programmes. The three Muslim Leagues, the PDP, the Jamat-e-Islami, the JUP, the JUI-Markazi and some other smaller groups and individuals were, therefore, the 'insiders', whom we can call the statist parties even though some of them were never in the government. There were indeed some socialists within the Muslim League tradition, for example Danial Latifi, Mian Iftikharuddin, Mazhar Ali Khan, Mahmud Ali Kasuri and even for a time Daultana whose legitimacy though controversial was accepted. They were scions of feudal families but they had their own small constituency among the urban radical intelligentsia. Some of them eventually found their way into the Punjab wing of the NAP and after the NAP split of 1967 joined the PPP as part of Bhutto's grand alliance of radicals and Sind landlords against the statist parties. These parties then emerged as the major opposition of Bhutto once he got into power.

The second type of opposition came from the so-called autonomous parties. They included Wali Khan from the NWFP, GM Sayed from Sind and the triumvirate of Bizenjo, Mengal and Marri from Baluchistan.
These parties variously included socialist jargon in their party programme, mainly as a concession to the radical party cadres. Issues like an 'independent' foreign policy, constitutional safeguards against governmental oppression and, most of all, full provincial autonomy dominated their politics. With the ascent of Wali Khan to leadership of the NAP, urban radicals from the Punjab and Karachi grew weaker and the landlord-tribal factions from the NWFP and Baluchistan took the party wholly into the autonomist camp. This was anathema for the Pakistan state and what it had stood for in the three decades of its history. After the 1970 elections, when Yahya Khan developed close ties with the 'rightist' parties during the military operation in East Pakistan, Bhutto entered into a tripartite accord with the NAP and JUI in an atmosphere of increasing insecurity for the non-statist parties. Later, Yahya banned the NAP for its alleged anti-Pakistan role. One of the very first acts of the Bhutto government was to lift this ban and make an offer to the NAP and the JUI to join the federal government. However, in the absence of assurances that decisions would be taken in cabinet after due consultation and that collective responsibility would be equally matched with collective power, this offer was not taken seriously. Bhutto finally chose to let the NAP and JUI form governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan, counterpoised by the inclusion of the NAP's arch-enemy, Qayum Khan, in the federal cabinet as Minister for the Interior.

Initially, the main opposition to Bhutto came from the statist parties and groups. Bhutto saw his real opposition in the CSP, businessmen and industrialists, landlords, and retired army and civil officers. As discussed earlier, these hard-core non-party statist groups had opposed Bhutto in the elections, and now tried to contain his radicalism from within the government, although only partial succeeding in it. Secondly, a party based opposition gradually emerged playing on the ideological dichotomy of Islam versus socialism. The Urdu/Sindhi controversy, which led to murderous riots in Karachi
in 1972, was fully exploited by the Jamat-e-Islami and the JUP,
(both led by the Urdu-speaking muhajirs) as well as by the
industrialists who chose to divide the trade union movement along
linguistic lines. Bhutto's political strategy revolved around
keeping the opposition parties from forming an alliance among
themselves. Various cells were also formed within the ministries
to control the relatively volatile non-party groups like students, ulema,
lawyers and workers. The backbone of the party-based opposition,
however, remained the landlord factions from both Punjab and Sind,
assembled together in the United Democratic Front (UDF) under Pir
Pagaro. It was again the typical case of all opposition uniting against
the government. The Pir's elaborately structured power base with a
large following among the Hurs in five districts, including 7000 trained
(though formally de-mobilized) guerillas, presented a formidable
challenge to Bhutto. Legal suits against his prominent khalifas, more
intensive and harassing police patrolling in the Hur villages and pursuit
by the Income Tax Department were initiated to crush him politically.

The opposition from the non-statist parties was largely in
response to Bhutto's strong-handed tactics. The formation of the NAP-JUI
governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan in 1972 was considered a
temporary concession to Bhutto's erstwhile allies in adversity. No
opposition party-based provincial government had survived that along
(10 months) in Pakistan's history. Interference of the centre in
provincial matters was rampant. Even tehsildars were allegedly posted
and transferred on orders from Islamabad. The latter constantly tried
to undermine the NAP-JUI's ability to govern. High PPP officials
toured the NWFP and Baluchistan, and condemned the NAP's initial
'treacherous' role in the Pakistan movement. The alleged unlawfulness
of the NAP governments was publicized with reference to a 'London
Plan' involving Wali Khan, Mujib and Daultana. In the aftermath of a
massive find of Iraqi arms in Islamabad, allegedly destined for Baluchistan,
and the internal disturbances in its Las Bela district, Bhutto finally
decided to disband the Baluchistan government; this was followed by the resignation of the NWFP government in protest. 1973 became a year of intense political conflict between the erstwhile partners of the tripartite accord; at the same time, the centre sought alliances with various factions represented within the two provincial legislatures. There seemed to have been a step backwards to the practice of the dismissal of provincial governments by the centre which had been followed from Jinnah to Iskandar Mirza during the decade before Ayub's takeover.

In September 1974, an amendment to the Political Parties Act of 1962 was passed, empowering the government to dissolve any political party for treasonable offences. The case had then to be referred to the Supreme Court within 15 days. It seems by that time Bhutto had decided to take up the task of crushing the NAP for good, using the judiciary in this process. When questioned why he did not take stronger measures to crush the pro-autonomy Jiya Sind movement, Bhutto characteristically refused to 'extend our action beyond the dimensions of the problem.' By contrast he chose to crack down heavily on the trans-Indus provinces. It can be argued that the Pakistan state, in the process of incorporating Bhutto's radicalism, prepared him for the same role which his predecessors had taken up, i.e. harking back to the old anti-statist position of the NAP-factions at the time of independence. The NAP leadership was put to jail immediately after the murder of Hayat Mohammad Sherpao, the senior minister in the NWFP cabinet and the top PPP personality in the province. Later, in a lengthy trial by a special tribunal in Hyderabad, the supreme court declared that the NAP had committed treason.

Political opposition in the Third World is usually condemned to an illegitimate status. In Pakistan the Muslim League governments and later the Martial Law regime of Ayub had often used their legal muscles against the political opposition. Under Bhutto this process was accompanied by a complex political game which eroded the mass popularity of its victims. While the judiciary was more ruthlessly used than ever before, at the same time Bhutto sought to discredit his
opponents in the field, largely using his radical political stance. His 'socialism' thus became an effective tool in eliminating political opposition from the field, in the end centralizing all power in the hands of the state.

Bhutto and the Constitutional Politics

Bhutto shared with his predecessors a preference for a strong centre and predominance of the executive within the state apparatus; that was reportedly responsible for Mahmud Ali Kasuri's resignation as Federal Law Minister. Indeed as early as 1962 when he was the bright star of Ayub's cabinet, Bhutto had presented him with an elaborate proposal for taking Pakistan towards the goal of a non-party state by eliminating the opposition's so-called obstructionist politics from the system altogether. However, in view of the fact that the parliamentary form of government had emerged as the largest single demand during the anti-Ayub movement and subsequently Bhutto's own position was based on elections carried out under the parliamentary framework kept Bhutto away from falling into the quagmire of another experiment with the constitutional structure of the country. Initially, a constitution committee was formed, which included some opposition members led by Wali Khan. After a great discussion about some controversial issues, Bhutto finally managed to get his constitution through. It vested great powers in the hands of prime minister. For example, a vote of no-confidence in the prime minister was made subject to so many hurdles that it would have been well-nigh impossible to remove him from power. The opposition, especially the NAP, whose governments were then being disbanded in Baluchistan and the NWFP, finally accepted the constitution with all its authoritarian provisions, because they feared that the only alternative would be a presidential system, in which the relevance of legislatures would be considerably reduced. Also, from their decidedly minority position, removal of the prime minister was in any case an academic question.
The legal tightening of the 'noose' around the opposition was soon taken up by Bhutto through the passage of such laws which would neutralize the judiciary's traditional function of safeguarding fundamental rights. Free availability from the High Courts of bail before arrest was often criticized as an obstruction in the way of lawful exercise of authority by the Government. In fact, during the two and half years after the constitution was passed, the Government carried through four amendments. The first two dealt with the recognition of Bangladesh and declaration of the Qadianis as a religious minority. The third amendment was moved under the shadow of Sherpao's murder, allegedly, by elements who were on the rampage with outside help and encouragement, to slice off NWFP and Baluchistan. It facilitated and expanded the jurisdiction of the constitution's preventive detention clause (Article 10). Previously, there was a provision for a six-monthly renewal of an Emergency by joint session of parliament; the new amendment limited the latter's powers only to putting an end to Emergency by voting, once it had been imposed. At the same time, two bills were passed by the National Assembly, one allowing detention of MNAs and MPAs during sessions, and the other providing for a party to be declared illegal for engaging in anti-state activities. The fourth amendment was even more crucial: this barred the High Courts from granting bail to a person detained under a preventive detention law; a person could be detained even during the proceeding of Habeas Corpus. It also barred the High Courts from granting stay in recovery of public revenue beyond 60 days, a move which had clear political overtones because of the possibility of its selective implementation. The amendment also curtailed the working of the legislatures themselves. Gaps of up to two days were to be considered as working days, so as to beat the original provision of 130 and 90 minimum working days respectively for the National Assembly and Senate. The intolerance for even a minimal show of parliamentary criticism was thus totally obvious. All these measures were clearly meant to stifle whatever opposition might emerge from any quarter. We can look at them as attempts at restructuring the law-enforcing agencies, in such a way as to instrumentalize the colonial legal structures in favour of the populist state.
The People's Party's movement into power was effected at three levels. At the centre, the Prime Minister's Secretariat and the cabinet assumed formal policy-making authority; they were variously 'advised' by the ministries mainly about things which could not easily be done. After the initial flurry of radicalism, the latter gradually re-emerged and assumed increasingly decisive role in policy formation. At the provincial level, where implementation of policies involved more complex administrative procedures, and where the power of the PPP's second command was at best derivative, the party depended on the regular channels of state authority. People from distant villages and towns swarmed the residences and offices of provincial ministers and MPA's to get things done. The consequent 'directives' to officers from various departments and directorates of the civil secretariat sometimes grossly interfered with administrative autonomy. Half-measures like controlling the entry of the general public into the secretariat at certain hours of the day did not appease the rank-and-file bureaucracy, for whom this flood of public demands was an entirely new thing to contend with. And yet the sheer nature of governmental procedures, bound by rules and regulations, meant that the initiative remained in a final sense, safely in the hands of officers.

At the third level, i.e. the district and sub-district administration the authority of the government was on a much better footing, even though stylistically more 'obliging' than before. The local party chairmen of mohallas, towns, and rural council areas enjoyed the authority to declare individuals as bona-fide for many administrative purposes, e.g. entitlements to ration depots, licences for arms, and the local distribution of scarce commodities such as cement. They soon developed friendship ties with the officers, especially from the police, which helped them rise in social status. This process brought forth an entirely new crop of notables in the
locality. While at the federal level, the party seemed to be in full command of policy-making and at the provincial level it tried to extract as many favours as possible from the bureaucracy, at the local level it operated as a privileged applicant for governmental favours. In other words bureaucratic structure of Pakistan was least disturbed at its service-giving end.

Organizationally, the party remained weak. No general conference was called after the largely celebratory conference of March 1972 for the whole of the Bhutto period. There was no proper forum inside the party to receive feedback from below. There were two rival groups in the party: one was represented by the organisational/ideological group which included J.A. Rahim, Mubashir Hasan and a large number of leftist intellectuals, the other group included the landlord factions which increasingly dominated the party organisation manifested through the ascent of Nasir Ali Rizvi and Mohammed Hayat Tamman to the offices of secretary and deputy secretary generals of the party. Philip Jones calls the two sides 'ideologicals' and 'politicals'. Maleeha Lodhi has described the internal division of the PPP along two separate lines of conflict: the 'factionalism of principle' which indicates the ideological conflict between the left and the right; and the 'factionalism of interest' which points to the recurrent pattern of internal feuds between coalitions of landlords. These categories help us understand the formal patterning of the PPP's internal contradictions. But, as we have shown in Chapter I, factions are a typical mode of articulation of power in a peasant society encapsulated by the modern state. In this case, landlord factions were subsumed under the PPP's class-oriented organisational and ideological standpoints and fought hard to retain as much of the older power structure in the locality as possible.

There is a general consensus of opinion that factionalism was detrimental to the organisational strength of the party.
Lodhi described the PPP in power as a patrimonial-clientele party and its factionalism as being distinct from the Muslim League 'owing to its interplay with Bhutto's patrimonial authority.' As a superb 'power craftsman', Bhutto followed the strategy of factional manipulation which inhibited the institutionalization of the PPP. As against Lodhi's stress on Bhutto's patrimonialism, Jones focuses on the division of power within the party between the 'inner cell' which was ultimately loyal to Bhutto and the 'party cell' which concentrated on party-building. While we agree with their underlying argument that the party suffered through a lack of organization due to Bhutto's monopoly over political initiative, there remains the need to point to the change in the style of articulation of interests through the party organization, which characterized the new era.

Under Bhutto, a fundamental change took place in the clientele structures operative at the local level. Previously, the function of brokerage between the state bureaucracy and the local 'patrons', e.g. lawyers, landlords, trade union leaders, factory managers etc., operated essentially at a non-institutionalized level. Now, increasingly, this function was taken over by the PPP, which also incorporated the group contradictions between its members. This process put considerable strains on the party organisation. In other words, the fact that the PPP was the first effective channel of party-directed patronage in Pakistan's history and that it was thus used by individuals and groups often directly conflicting with each other meant that the party was destined to remain at a low level of organisation. What is still more important is that the PPP's operational capacity was limited by its organisational goal to instrumentalize the state rather than smash it.

Section 6. State Emerges Su-preme

In the present section we shall compare and contrast different approaches to Bhutto and the PPP movement in a bid to define its role vis-a-vis the state in Pakistan. It will be argued that these approaches,
even while throwing light on significant aspects of political change in this period, provide only partial explanations. These approaches to the Bhutto phenomenon are variously couched in the theoretical frameworks of populism, Bonapartism, intermediate regime, fascism and patrimonialism. We shall discuss these approaches in an attempt to characterize the specific changes in the power structure of Pakistan during this period.

First of all, Bhutto's movement has been defined in terms of populism by K B Sayeed. As noted above, both the leadership and programme of the PPP was anti-capitalist and was committed to nationalization of industries and financial institutions. Incessant exaltation of the 'people' can be observed throughout Bhutto's electoral and post-electoral rhetorics; to him, 'It is the people who are my real teachers' and 'no power on earth could keep me away from my people.' When Bhutto assumed power, labour started settling old scores with their employers, believing that the millenium had arrived. Prisoners went on hunger strike, expecting that the jail doors would be flung open 'now that the people are running things'. New and old institutions prefixed 'people' to their titles, as in Peoples Open University, and the Peoples Work Programme. The Awami Hakumat (People's Government) did everything ostensibly in the name of people, be it passing the budget, opening a new road, inaugurating new institutions, or announcing reforms. The Awami Adalat (people's court), Awami libaas (Peoples suit), Quaid-e-Awam (Peoples' leader), Awami Marakaz (Peoples centres) and Awami Policies became the constant points of reference under Bhutto's rule. Like Peron of Argentina he asked for mass votes in public meetings on such national issues as the release of Mujib, the recognition of Bangladesh and his visit to India. Sometimes, open kuchehries(courts) were held by him, especially in Sind, where 'small men' from towns and villages presented their grievances against the local landlords or low-grade government functionaries and instant orders were issued for justice to be done.
Bhutto projected Islamic Socialism as the ideology of People's Party. He compared promiscuously his socialism with African socialism, Arab socialism and Scandinavian socialism, conceived in vague terms as a pro-people government policy which would plan 'to end predatory capitalism and to put socialism into motion'. He was shrewd enough to see the popular appeal of Islam so he tried to weld it to his socialism showing great ideological vagueness in so doing. According to him, 'Islam preaches equality and socialism is the modern technique of attaining it'. By socialism, he meant doing away with the economic mismanagement of the country by the bureaucratic mafia, in collusion with the Big Business, which had resulted in scarcities of different articles of mass consumption. Provision of basic needs e.g. food, cloth and shelter, was therefore, the cornerstone of his party programme.

Bhutto depended heavily upon the symbols of, and the social goals set by, the independence movement and by doing so gave them a new meaning. He declared that Pakistan was created 'to end exploitation, and that Jinnah created it not for the capitalists, but for the poor people. 'Pakistan' he said quoting from Jinnah, 'should be based on the sure foundations of social justice and Islamic Socialism which emphasize equality and the brotherhood of man. While addressing the civil servants, he borrowed Jinnah's words, 'You are not rulers, you do not belong to the ruling class. You belong to the servants. A PPP document stressed that Pakistan was not established 'so that Azans would be announced on loudspeakers and cows could be slaughtered one after the other'. By so re-defining the 'original' goals of the state, Bhutto tried to 'popularize' its legitimacy base.

In view of these observations, can we describe Pakistan under Bhutto as a populist state? It can be argued that populism as a term depends heavily on the apparent mobilization of and demonstration by the masses, without analyzing their political goals. Populism as an
analytical tool can lead to over-estimation of the spread of popular involvement and mass level of consciousness, and to an erroneous assumption of a unity of view among the populace. Historically, as well as in the contemporary world there are many examples of popular movements leading to entirely different political consequences. Some culminated in the overthrow of capitalist state in a communist revolution while others were simply anti-colonial movements led by 'bourgeois' leaders such as Gandhi who aimed at capturing the state power, instead of destroying it. The character of the mass mobilization of the populist variety therefore would remain unclear unless it is explained what particular class aims the movement is pursuing, which in turn would determine the nature of any change in the state apparatus. For example, populism can lead us to underestimate the leader's continuing reliance on the existing state bureaucracy. We have noticed how Bhutto, while trying to establish a non-institutionalized contact with the masses, increasingly depended on the intelligence gathering activities of police officers. Bhutto and other PPP stalwarts often issued orders to SP's and DC's, sometimes without the knowledge of the Inspector General of Police or Home Secretary. The consequent trend towards authoritarianism and petty oppression cannot be explained in terms of populism.

Was Pakistan under Bhutto then a fascist state as claimed by Eqbal Ahmed? Many leftists in Pakistan accuse Bhutto of following a talk-left-act-right policy when he was in power. Clearly, the Bhutto government had some of the classical features of fascism such as concentration on marshalling resources in service of nationalistic and developmental goals, 'extensive bureaucratic control of productive processes', and a 'unitary', integral and ideological party' under a 'Great Helmsman' as well as an 'ideologized political culture'. We have noted how Bhutto tightened the noose around the opposition, hankered after a one-party state and stressed discipline. As against the typical leftist bias for considering objective conditions as the true makers of history, Bhutto stressed such subjective conditions as individual (and even collective) disposition to make revolution, 'the motor force of ideas in it and the self-sacrificing adherence of a goodly section of the population'. Bhutto increasingly identified himself
with the state and became intolerant of all non-governmental initiatives, mainly at the cost of his own party cadres. He distrusted any organisation-based activity such as various elections of trade unions, university or college unions or professional associations like the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists, the Bar Council or the College Teachers Association; every effort was made to influence the election results in favour of the government.  

However, it is the increase in the observable power, rather than in the real authority of the state which is so typical of governments like Bhutto's. Under it we do not find a well institutionalized system of mass control, through well-developed communication system addressing a literate population, which has been a significant feature of fascism in the historical West and Japan. By contrast, Pakistan's power structure rested on the informal, clientistic relationships at the base level between the formalized institutions of the state and the landlords (and increasingly also the bourgeoisie) which have performed a very effective control function. Under the mass mobilization between 1968 and 1975, only a partial dismantling of these clientele structures took place. At least, the state-centredness of these structures remained intact. This meant that the need for exercise of naked oppression was never so great, as for example, in the neighbouring Iran where the old power structure crumbled down in the face of large-scale social and economic changes leading to re-institutionalization of the oppressive wing of the state. Some writers maintain that Bhutto's personality itself contained fascist tendencies. Salman Taseer for example sees Bhutto as a two-faced man, a tyrant on the one hand and a sympatheiser with the popular causes on the other. Burki sees Bhutto's 'fascism' as rooted in his feudal-hierarchical origins from a backward region of a backward province and the insecurity of birth by a woman of low origins. However, such psychological reductionism fails to analyze the change in structural relationships between the state and society under Bhutto.

On the other hand, the 'Gret Helmsman' approach has
found expression in Ziring and following him Lodhi, both of whom maintain that Pakistan's political system almost guarantees the rise of a single personality. Lodhi, as mentioned earlier, has characterized Bhutto as a patrimonial leader and a manipulator of factional conflict, distinct from his predecessors. By contrast, we shall argue that both Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza, the last two governors-general of Pakistan, had also had their patrimonial network in the bureaucracy as well as among the numerous parties and party factions represented in the legislatures. They manipulated these groups in the same way as Bhutto did. On the other hand the distinctness of Bhutto's leadership lies in the fact that he enjoyed a legitimacy rooted firmly in the mass support. It is hard to come by any other political figure in Pakistan's history who dominated the state system in quite that way. After Jinnah and Liaqat both of whom were the product of the Pakistan movement in British India, the political system of Pakistan did not produce any great leader. The only candidate for this status can be Ayub Khan, who rose to power because of his status as the C-in-C of the Pakistan army. Bhutto was the first and the only leader to emerge as a direct outcome of the mass-level political process. His role, therefore, must be conceived in terms of the wider power struggle between contending groups and classes in Pakistan. K. B. Sayeed described Pakistan under Bhutto as a Bonapartist state:

'The effectiveness of such a state depends upon how the leader manipulates or brings under control certain institutions like the bureaucracy and the army and mobilizes and controls the economy and some of the nascent classes represented in it'.

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Comparing Pakistan's situation with that of the middle 19th century France, as described by K. Marx in 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', he noted that Bhutto ensured that different sections of population in Pakistan, the landlord, the small peasants, the tenants and the artisans, looked up to him as the supreme benefactor. He argues that Bhutto came to power when all other political forces were weakened; he therefore assumed a mediating role, while dominating each of them separately. The Guardian said about Bhutto, more or less the same thing:

'When faced with an independent institution or social group—whether it was big business, the judiciary, the press, the Baluchi Aristocracy, the Punjabi middle class or even his own party—Mr. Bhutto's instinct has been either to take it over, or if that was not possible, to destroy it'  

It was alleged that Bhutto preferred a 'corrupt' state to an honest one, if only because he could use it more easily. However, in Bhutto's own view, under his popularly elected government, committed as it was to the uplift of the common man, 'the question of exploitation by the State does not arise'. To him, the state machinery was a tool to deliver goods to the masses and it was in this respect that the Ayub system had finally failed. Bhutto's deification of state then differed from his predecessors' in the sense that he conceived it as a symbol of popular will and not as expression of rationality of the modernizing bureaucracy.

It is important therefore to focus on the popular base of the state under Bhutto. We have observed in this chapter how the kulak farmers and the lower middle class provided the crucial support to the new regime, leading a loose alliance of the underprivileged classes and groups in general. In this sense, the Bhutto government approximates the model of intermediate regime; it contains all the major features of that model as discussed in chapter I, e.g. expansion of public sector, creation of new jobs, provision of large subsidies, lack of investible surpluses, low-growth economy and the state's functioning as employer increasingly at the expense of its role as developer. While populism and Bonapartism point to Bhutto's role as the mobilizer
of masses and the arbiter between classes, and patrimonialism indicates his relationships with the powerful individuals in the government and the party, the concept of intermediate regime provides us with the answer to the question of changing relationship between class and state under the Bhutto regime.
NOTES:


2. Ibid. p. 197-8.


6. DAC comprised the Muslim League (Council), Jamat-e-Islami, Awami league (6 points), Awami league (8 points), Nizam-e-Islam Party, NAP (Wali), and NDF.


8. However, the government quickly armed itself with 6 ordinances through which it maintained some of the Emergency powers; see *The Asian Recorder*, March 16-April 1, 1969.

9. Bhutto compared the junta's abhorrence for the 'outsiders' with the colonial tradition of hatred for the natives; ZA Bhutto, *Political Situation in Pakistan*, (Lahore, 1968), p. 41


17. Ibid, p.150.


24. Only isolated incidents occurred after 25 March, as in Baluchistan where one labour leader was shot dead and 5 wounded when the police fired on the striking miners. The Times, 3 April, 1969.


26. It so happened that Ayub's personal secretary Fida Hassan appointed himself and A.R. Khan, the former Defence and Home Minister, and Arshad Hussain, the former Foreign Minister, as advisors to the new president, General Yahya. The top military officers came to know about the announcement half an hour after it had been circulated to the national press; they then hastily withdrew it. The Times, 1 April, 1969.


29. R.H. Edward 'A Slightly Longer View,' in ibid, p.17.

30. Soon, the Manpower Commission sought its own dissolution, and was subsequently disbanded on August 14, 1969, allegedly because it was bypassed during the formation of the New Education Policy. Within days, Nur Khan and his Education Secretary Usmani left Islamabad to new assignments, see Aftab Ahmed's comments in ibid, p.7.


These services assumed quasi-judicial functions to ensure that the constitution of the unions was in accordance with the laws to contain industrial strike and to check if regulatory laws were being observed by the employers.


36. The new policy provided for the first time a three-scale minimum wage structure, i) Rs. 140.00 p.m. for Karachi ii) Rs. 125.00 p.m., in other industrial areas, iii) Rs. 115.00 in all other areas. A major step was taken to rationalize multiple unions. Thus, the union enjoying the backing of largest members of employees was considered the collective bargaining agent, (CBA), and could also nominate workers' representatives on the Works Council, Board of Trustees of the Provident Fund and the Worker Participation Fund; outsiders were allowed to hold up to 25% of offices in trade unions, ibid, pp. 4, 2, 3.


38. The move was considered truly radical by Wilcox, who thought that Pakistan was left now indeed in the hands of politicians and Allah; Asian Survey, 1970, p. 77.


43. The Pakistan Times, Nov. 21, 1970.

44. Fazlul Kadir Chaudhary of the PML (Convention) declared that Islam was in danger, The Pakistan Times, 2 Jan. 1970; Moodooi demanded that those against the Pakistan ideology should be barred from participating in elections, The Pakistan Times, 16 Jan. 1970; for Qayum, there was no room for 'foreign' ideologies in Pakistan, The Pakistan Times, 4 Jan. 1970.

45. For example, four parties, the Nizam-e-Islam party, the Awami League (West Pakistan), the Justice Party and the NDF merged into one party, the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP). The Muslim League (Qayum) and the Aslam Jiwana group of the ML (Convention) merged together. Likewise, the ML (Council) formed separate electoral alliances with the Sind United Front and the Khuhro group of Sind.


48. Ibid. p. 48.


50. Ibid., p. 492.

51. Ibid., p. 300.

52. Ibid., pp. 421-2, 431-2.

53. The PPP's search for the support of the Left was noted early in 1968, see *The Washington Post*, Jan. 11, 1968.

54. Z. A. Bhutto, Speech at Hyderabad, *Let the People Judge*, PPP documents (Series 2), p. 32.


56. See, for example, KB Sayeed, 'How Radical is the Pakistan People's Party', *Pacific Affairs* 1975/6, p. 45, and Burki, op. cit. (1980), pp. 51-2; thus curiously Mairaj Mohammad Khan from the extreme left, Mubashar Hasan from the left of centre, Pirzada from the right of centre, and Kausar Niazi from the extreme right, all belonged to the urban middle-class intelligentsia.


59. The famous PPP quartet read: Islam is our religion, Democracy is our polity, Socialism is our economy, All power to the People.'


61. Bloody clashes took place variously between the PPP and Jamat-e-Islami, the PPP and the three Muslim Leagues, the Jamat-and Awami League, the Jamat and the JUI, the NAP (Bhashani) and the NAP (Wali).

Regional concentration was an asset not a liability. For example even though the JI got 8.8 lakh votes in comparison with the NAP's 4.6 lakh and the JUI's 3.3 lakh, its vote effectiveness was only 15% against the latter's 48% and 41% respectively. See PERU, op.cit., p.8.

Out of 75 former MNA's from West Pakistan, only 12 survived, 10 in National Assembly and 2 in provincial Assemblies; for breakdown see C. Baxter, 'Pakistan Votes, 1970,' Asian Survey, 1971, pp.216-17.

Karachi is the only district of Pakistan with a per capita income of more than Rs. 800 p.m., S.M. Naseem, Underdevelopment, Poverty and Inequality in Pakistan, (Lahore, 1981), p.238.

The new policy raised workers' shares in annual profits and their representation in factory management, provided for compulsory bonus, free education for one child of each worker by the employer (and for his other children by the state) and 'free' medical care. Shop stewards could now operate in the smallest production units. Instead of fixing minimum wages, therefore, increases in real incomes was the declared aim of the government. Later, in 1973, a second wave of reforms increased the net involvement of workers still further.


77. Ibid.


80. Ibid. pp. 13, 25-7, 39-40; a new University Grants Commission was established, (with the Inter-University Board operating as its nucleus), to act as a buffer between the government bureaucracy and the university administration, pp. 13-14.


82. Pakistan, Ministry of Films and Publication, Health Problems and Health System in Developing Countries, (Islamabad, n.d) p. 2.

83. Ibid.

84. A health scheme was finalized to provide a network of 709 basic health units, each for 8 to 10 thousand people, with rural health centres (maintaining 10-bed hospitals) all by 1980; the number of graduates in the government service was supposed to increase from 1,438 to 6,908 and the doctor-population ratio to drop to 1:4500. Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Pakistan: Reforms and Development. (Islamabad, 1974), pp. 21-22.


86. Ibid., p. 100


90. Herring and Chaudhary, op. cit., p. 269.


95. The NAP accused Bhutto of installing the 'fascist individuals' from the PPP as lateral entrants, see La Porte, op. cit., p. 1102; also Pakistan, White Paper on the Performance of The Bhutto Regime, Vol. II (Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions), Islamabad, 1979)

96. C.H. Kennedy, 'Analysis of the Lateral Recruitment Programme to the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan 1973-9' in Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, (1980, p. 46), Against the grossly inflated number of 2,796 officers as claimed by Zia regime (White Paper, vol II, ibid, p. 159), or even against Burki's figure of 1374 for 1973-77 (Burki, 1980, op. cit., p. 102) Kennedy's figures seem to be more reliable.

97. Ibid., pp. 46-7.

98. The Government tried to ensure that 'more officers belonging to the Secretariat Group, not belonging to the former CSP should be sent to the provinces', by transferring the CSP officers to the Centre or spreading over different ministries save key ones. Annexure 10, p. A32-3, Vol. III, Pakistan, White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vol. III, (Islamabad, 1979), Annexe 10, pp. A32-3.


100. Ibid. Annexe 29, p. A73.

101. Ibid. pp. 24-34.

102. For comments on managing agency system, See Gustafson, 'Economic Reforms Under the Bhutto regime', in JH Korsen (ed) op. cit., p. 83; also, The Pakistan Times, (editorial), 18 January, 1972.


104. Rashid Amjad, Industrial Concentration and Economic Power in Pakistan (Lahore, n.d.), p. 123; also Gustafson op. cit., p. 82.


106. Ibid, p. 46.


111. **The View Point**, Lahore, 14 August, 1975, p. 16.


115. **Pakistan, White Paper Vol. III** (op. cit.) Annex 10. Bhutto's note also includes the Qadianis, his erstwhile electoral allies, among his opponents, presumably because their status was the current issue under discussion in the National Assembly.


118. Ibid, Annexe 3.

119. Ibid., Annexe 7.

120. **The Viewpoint**, Lahore, Interview with Mufti Mahmud, op. cit., p. 9.

121. **Pakistan, Information and Broadcasting Division, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; Interview to Asia Observer,** (Dec. 24 1975) **Islamabad, n.d.** p. 10.

122. See Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, **The Supreme Court Decision: The Beginning of the Pakhtoonistan Movement**, (Islamabad n.d.).


127. Various White Papers published after 1977 by the Pakistan Government on the previous regime of Bhutto contained a detailed, though prejudiced account of Bhutto's 'constitutional autocracy'.


130. Ibid.

131. Ibid., pp. 11,13,14:

132. The following remarks are based on personal interviews with the PPP and non-PPP political workers and leaders, in Lahore, Faisalabad, Attock and Rawalpindi districts.

133. P. Jones calls the two sides as 'politics' and 'ideologicals', op.cit.pp128-9.


137. Ibid., pp.379-82.


141. Z. A. Bhutto, Let the People Judge, (Speeches), PPP series 2 (Lahore n.d.).


145. Ibid.p.11.

146. Bhutto, Affidavit to High Court 1968-9, in K. Hassan and J. Jalal, (eds.) Awakening the People, (Bhutto speeches)p.204.


148. Pakistan, Department of Films and Publications, President Bhutto's Address to the National Assembly, 14 April 1972, (Islamabad n.d.) p.13.

149. Quoted in ibid., pp.41-2.

150. Quoted in ibid., p.18.

151. Haneef Ramay, 'Nazria Pakistan' (Ideology of Pakistan), Urdu, PPP Series, (Lahore n.d.)


158. For example Bhutto tried to keep the Barna group from getting elected to the union of journalists(PFUJ), Pakistan Government, of White Paper op.cit. 1979. Annexe 15,pA54.


162. Lodhi, op. cit., p. 85.

163. Ibid. p. 380.

164. Sayeed (1980) op. cit., p. 89.

165. Ibid., p. 94.


167. Ibid.


CHAPTER V
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Introduction

As we discussed in Chapter I, a correct understanding of the structural relationship between the state and society in Pakistan requires an analysis of both the macro-and micro-level patterns of authority. In part II, we analyzed the macro-level political ecology of development defined as subsumption of the indigenous labour processes under capital. It was shown that the functioning of the modern state in Pakistan was based on the 'objective' sources of legitimacy, e.g. the rule of law and the hierarchical structure of modern bureaucracy. In part III we propose to study government and politics at the district level. Thus while the present chapter deals with the general issues related to the exercise of power by the state in the locality, the following two chapters will be concerned with two specific areas, one as example of rapid growth and the other as example of stagnation.

This chapter is divided into four sections. In Section I, we shall take up a detailed study of the structural framework of district administration. Till now, we have only indirectly pointed to the significance of local bureaucracy and the lower administrative staff for the local power structure. Now we shall describe both the formal and informal aspects of the district administration and the way it has brought about various clientele structures in the towns and villages. We shall concentrate on the respective roles of the law and order bureaucracy, the lower revenue staff and the district courts on the one hand and the so-called nation-building departments on the other, in creating a formidable power for the state in the locality.

In Section 2 and 3 we shall consider the ways and means through which the state has sought to formally associate the broad masses with
state machinery in stunting the growth process, in contrast to its professed aims needs to be a part of our enquiry.

The district administration is the total function of government in the district. The D.C. is the pivot of general administration. He is the district magistrate, collector of revenue, development officer and the co-ordinator of all the departments represented at the district level. At a more conceptual level, he is the guardian of the right of private property as well as its stability and improvement. In addition, he is the custodian of state property.\(^1\)

Normally, there are about 30 departments in a typical district, two-fifths being the regulatory departments and three-fifths being the so-called nation-building departments. The civil and criminal courts, the Revenue, Police and Excise and Taxation departments dominate the first category, while the Irrigation, Education, Agriculture, Co-operatives, Industries, Health and Local Government are some of the better known departments in the second. The regulatory (law-and-order) function originated in the need of the colonial government to curb local resistance and is increasingly considered anachronistic in the post-independence period.\(^2\) However the fact remains that this is the real source and symbol of the governmental authority in the district and is feared most by the masses.

**Law and Order Bureaucracy**

The administration of law and order includes the D.C.'s office, the magistracy and the police. Under the 1860 Penal Code, the executive and magisterial functions have been combined at the level of district administration and below. The Criminal Procedure of 1898, as amended and adopted subsequently, combines the police and magistracy; it lays down the whole procedure of police information, investigation and prosecution, till the case is brought to the court of a magistrate (class I, II or III) or alternatively to the court of sessions. Thus emerged the
trio of power-wielding authorities at the local level, with three-way structural rivalries between i) the D.C. and the magistracy, ii) the D.C. and the Police Department, and iii), the magistracy and the Police Department.

The D.C. in his capacity as district magistrate distributes criminal work among the subordinate magistrates. He can transfer cases from one magistrate to the other, and is the appellate authority in cases decided by the latter. Moreover, he is responsible for annual evaluation of the performance of subordinate magistrates. Much ill-will has resulted from this institutionalized subordination of the magistracy to the D.C. This subordination is not merely functional. It has deeper roots in the service structure itself. The magistrates belong to the Provincial Civil Service (PCS). They have to spend a lifetime to get incremental advances and yet remain marginal to the highest authority structure in the district and bow before relatively young and inexperienced CSP officers. The situation was particularly irritating for them because, while functioning also in the capacity of district magistrates or, session judges, the CSP officers were found to be handicapped for want of knowledge of, or experience in, the civil law. Indeed, most of them were not even law graduates. Not surprisingly it was sometimes suggested that the criminal work should be taken from the D.C., and should be carried out through a prosecuting staff composed partly of lawyers and partly of police officers and a body of courts. In the same way, the wielding of magisterial powers by the tehsildar, who is essentially a revenue officer, was also criticised.

The D.C. also controls the executive wing of the magistracy which is the police department, headed by the Superintendent of Police (SP.) The entire district police force from SP, DSP, circle inspectors, sub-inspectors down to constable is in principle at the disposal of D.C. This fact has caused considerable disaffection among police officers, who have tried from time to time to wriggle out of their institutional subordination to the D.C. After independence, the politicians from the ruling parties found in the police relatively pliable and obliging partners.
in local power politics and tried to boost up its functional autonomy. For example, when Zakir Hussain was Home Minister in the early 1960s, the D.C. was divested of his powers of writing the annual confidential report on the efficiency of police officers. However, for all practical purposes, the D.C.'s superior administrative powers have ensured that the police organisation remains by and large a necessary tool in his hands to keep the law-and-order situation under control.

Powers entrusted to the police are governed by the principle of its functional subordination to the magistracy. In most of the non-cognizable offences, where direct prevention of crime is not involved, the police have no jurisdiction prior to the magisterial orders for search, arrest, interrogation and the like. Those arrested have to be produced before a magistrate within twenty-four hours. Thus, police as a ministerial officer of the court, have no powers for conviction or release of persons. There is an inherent structural tension between the police and the magistracy: while the former is anxious that no criminal escapes punishment, the latter ensures that no innocent is punished. In this way, both aspects of public conscience, i.e. maintenance of public order and preservation of private liberty, are, in theory, administered through the joint efforts of the police and magistracy, under the Ombudsman role of the D.C./D.M.

This system of dispensation of justice is based, however, on cumbersome procedures and involves huge expenses and wastage of time. After the First Information Report (F.I.R.) is entered in the police station diary, police investigations are held to collect evidence and the statements of the prosecution witnesses are collected. If necessary, the magistrates can remand the accused, after which he is challaned and, depending on the nature of the offence, summons or warrants are issued by the competent magistrate. An offence punishable with death or transportation for life is usually referred to a committing magistrate, who, after hearing the prosecution and the defence, decides whether or not the case should be committed to the
court of sessions. There, the public prosecutor conducts the case, the assessors give their verdict and the session judge gives his judgement on the basis of that verdict.

Most of the 'corruption' in the judicial process is rooted in these multiple stages of enquiry and prosecution. The local power structure plays a significant role in these procedural matters, which include the recording of witnesses, postponement of the dates of hearing, grants of unnecessary adjournments, application for transfer of cases and so on. The various branches of the D. C.'s office and the lower staff of the magistracy and police thus represent an area of administration which is fully responsive to the local wire-pullers. In view of the rampant corruption it was recommended by the Law Commission that committal proceedings should be abolished altogether and cases sent directly from police investigation to the sessions courts. No action however was taken on this recommendation. Such corruption, in a final sense, renders a useful function for the local state machinery by providing the locally powerful groups with a channel for interest articulation in the absence of representative institutions.

District as Revenue Administration

As noted earlier, the revenue department of the district administration is in many ways the state itself. It has numerous functions related to property in land and its uses, e.g. record of rights, land transfers, registers of revenues due and paid, accounts of periodic legislative measures and reforms affecting the pattern of landholding or tenurial relations, settlements of different types of soil and different uses of land right to excise duties and irrigation rates as well as landlord-tenant relations. The D. C. is the head of the revenue department in the district; beneath him tehsildars and naib tehsildars in charge of tehsils. Each tehsil is further divided into kanungo circles, each headed by a field kanungo. Finally each kanungo circle is divided into patwar circles of about 8000 field numbers each, under the charge of a
patwari. The office kanungo is the tehsildar's revenue clerk, while the Sadar kanungo supervises the work of both the field and office kanungos. 11

The tehsildar is the last non-local, and non-vernacular official at the bottom of revenue administration, with second or third class magisterial powers. While the D.C. meets the local landlords at a purely impersonal level, the tehsildar's assimilation into the rural matrix has an operational character. He is directly responsible for land administration and being at a distance from the seat of district administration has certain discretionary powers which he can use to oblige the dominant factions. The preparation of the revenue assessment reports which affects the well-being or otherwise of individual landlords depends heavily on the goodwill of tehsildars. He manipulates the lower staff, especially the patwari to bend the rules, obstruct the application of rules against certain people or implicate certain others in false cases. This process lends special powers to the patwari, who then emerges as the key person in the lower revenue staff.

The patwari represents the vernacular base of an English-language government hierarchy. This fact, combined with his complete monopoly over revenue records, makes him a formidable barrier between the locality and the state. He can be an effective agency for safeguarding the interests of selected individuals by influencing the documents in his control. Being himself a local person typically from a small landowning family, the patwari works with the grain of the local power structure. A study in the 1960s showed that he succumbed to the pressure of individuals in the following descending line: landlords, revenue officers, lumberdars, members of union councils, chairman of unions councils, military personnel, relatives of government officers, and friends. 12 In other words, various pressures work on him to interfere with the proper functioning of government in his sphere, 13 in
exchange for which he enjoys security of service and posting at a particular place and good relations with the powers that be; and he earns money too. The patwaris have to prepare records of upto 43 kinds, ranging from land tenure and sales of land to statements of taccavi loans, diseases and allotment of land to refugees; 11 of them were added after independence. What gave the patwari a still more central place in the rural framework was that he had to submit reports and returns to upto 55 departments in some cases; 15 of them were added after independence accounting for more than half of his total work-load.

The patwari is the lowest government functionary to be paid from its treasury. The lumbarbar, who is directly responsible for revenue collection, and is the chief executive of the village administration, is paid out of the village revenue. His office is hereditary. While one hears demands for making this office elective, it is feared that such a change would undermine his authority and de-stabilize the rural structure by making him responsible to the people. It is preferred that he belongs to the upper stratum of landowners to inspire respect from the people. Recently, new grants called Haq-ul-Khidmat were made to lumbarbars in acknowledgement of their services. When the lower revenue officers go on tour, it is the zamindars, patwaris, lumbarbars and previously chairmen of union councils who together make arrangements for their boarding. They are the clients of the revenue officers, so to say, who manage to safeguard their interests through establishing a structural relationship between themselves and the government functionaries at the sub-district level, in which hosting the latter plays a central part.

District Courts and Local Power Structure

Underlying these structural relationships is the legal basis of the state which relates the revenue officials, police functionaries and the magisterial staff to the local landed property owners. We have
already discussed how law is the strongest legitimizing force behind the district administration. In addition to the formal body of laws there has emerged a large mass of subsidiary legislation being continually enforced in the form of executive orders. In fact the Law Commission stressed the need for 'pruning of the dead wood from the legislative forest from time to time.'\(^{19}\) The fact remains however that this 'forest' has provided the arena for power struggle at the local level. There is a whole army of para-professionals in the field of litigation operative around the office of lawyer, who is thus placed at the centre of a two-way traffic between the law-enforcing agencies of the state and the litigant public. The structural changes in property ownership have led to a big rise in litigation over the last century about inheritance, shares, transfers, mortgage, redemption of mortgage, sales, leases, boundaries, revenue free grants, irrigation supplies, tenancy, pre-emption and so on. That has put the lawyers at the centre of property structure of the society and therefore of its power structure.

The much abused procedural laws keep the lawyer in close contact with the lower revenue staff. Indeed, the patwari's monopoly over land records has made his visit to the courts indispensable for deposing evidence in civil and criminal cases. Each patwari is supposed to have links with one to ten lawyers.\(^{20}\) There have been such examples when on one occasion he sided with the plaintiff and on another with the defendants of the case.\(^{21}\) The fact that the patwari's office was not hereditary and a majority of patwaris came from the families of agriculturists\(^ {22}\) meant that they were deeply enmeshed with the factional politics of the area. They are instrumental in creating the clienteles of the legal practitioners of the district courts who themselves had their affinal or agnatic links with the rural factions. This fact has been largely ignored in discussions of factions in South Asia. It was this opportunity of 'legally' articulating the interests of their 'client' factions which led to emergence of so many lawyers from the landed elite as politicians in their own right.
We have already referred to Rigg's model of bifocal power of the state, comprising the manifest laws and the informal clientele structures around the positions of authority. Pakistan's district courts present the best example of this dual structure. Here, two systems operate in the name of law, one formal, the other informal, represented by the district administration and the legal profession respectively. We have seen how the police and magistracy function as the executive wing of state authority while the D.C. is the mini-ruler of the district. Indeed, D.C.'s office plays the most expansive role; it has about 20 full-fledged branches functioning like automata, seldom letting the D.C. 'bother' about the routine matters, which are run according to the internal 'politics' of the office, led by its Superintendent. 23

On the other side, there is the legal profession which, contrary to its professed aims of making justice available to everybody has ended up with-making access to law highly selective. That has sometimes led the authorities to regard 'lawyers as an incubus on the system of justice.' 24 In wider sociological terms, the lawyers' chambers collectively present an institution which is highly sensitive to the tremors in local power structure. Its strength lies in its structural openness for all kinds of pressures. Typically, the lawyer's office is full of 'paraprofessionals' such as Munshis (clerks), touts, and chronic litigants. 25 The last category includes Rassagirs who go in and come out of jails frequently, depending on their patron's access to authorities which also means the show of political muscle by their particular faction. Rassagirs are the symbol of landlords' class power in the locality underlined by the latter's capacity both to save their clients from the clutches of law and to implicate their adversaries in some legal suit. 26 In this 'unlawful' legal activity, touts play an intermediary role between law-enforcing institutions and the litigants. Indeed, toutism has been condemned as cancer of the legal system and Bar Association was exhorted to take action against
it. But, as is clear from our discussion, this grey area of administration of justice has a great political significance, and therefore cannot be dealt with in isolation from the local power politics. Munshis, finally, provide the essential 'inside' link with the lawyers' chambers and thus complete the trio on the unofficial side of district courts.

FIGURE
The District Court's Informal System in Pakistan

A) D.C. office  
B) Police Inspectors  
C) Magistracy  
D) Rassagirs  
E) Lawyers' clerks  
F) Touts  
XY) Lawyers

The district court is therefore a classic case of the state being an arena for power struggle in the locality. The 'rule of law' is practically inverted here. The people spend money and time and energy for promoting their contending interests through the legal battles. In a structural sense, this process dissipates all the pressures on the authority system of the state and, in fact, reinforces the latter's legitimacy. Following our argument in Chapter I, we can say that the state in Pakistan is a condensate of respective class powers, and the working of regulatory departments of the district projects this character very clearly.

Nation-Building Departments

After our discussion of the working of the so-called 'ruling' departments in the district, and their close links with the local power-holders we can now look at the political role of the so-called nation-building departments. Most of them were established in the last decades of colonial government. The Rowlands Report of 1946 especially recommended a shift of attention to the development
of human and physical resources. After independence, they acquired greater significance. Their departmental organisations vary in their structural pattern and strength of staff from district to district, according to their functional relevance in different areas. Their territorial jurisdiction is usually, if not necessarily, coterminous with the district, while some functional overlapping between them has also been observed. As the financial significance of land revenue has declined, the development functions have gradually overtaken the traditional functions in political importance. The new functions involve more written work, conference proceedings, preparation and evaluation of development programmes and large-scale budgeting than ever before. The powers of the D.C. have accordingly expanded because of his involvement in decision-making in matters of setting priorities and allocation of resources for various sectors, and in supervising development projects.

Structurally, the nation-building departments operate through their extension services. For example, in the case of agricultural administration, it was argued that farmers would progress if the agronomists gave advice about how to increase their productivity.

Whatever the intrinsic merits of this approach, however, the farmers in villages of Pakistan seldom saw the agricultural extension staff; whenever they did, the latter failed to provide them with the basic agricultural inputs. The pattern of functioning of these departments points to the governmental stress on ambitious institution-building without providing physical, technological and most of all, marketing infrastructures to back their programmes. In a final sense they depended on the law-and-order bureaucracy. For example, the primary measures which the Agricultural Bank and the Agricultural Development Finance Corporation took to recover the overdue payments of debt in half-yearly instalments meant that the borrower was threatened not with a civil suit but with recovery through the land revenue procedure as an attachment, including the possibility of arrest.
The nation-building departments of the district administration generally lack authority. Only proximity to the regulatory departments (or functions) can lend prestige to them. In other words, their operational autonomy is a negative rather than a positive factor in the existing framework. This lack of authority has been compounded by the relatively junior status of comparable officers from these departments. For example, in one study, it was found that out of 17 district heads of the nation-building departments only three belonged to class 1, a status enjoyed by the heads of all major regulatory departments.  

The real developmental work conducted by these departments costs much less than the expenditure of the top-heavy institutional set-up itself, relegating the whole exercise to an ingenious expansion of bureaucracy.

### TABLE

Budget of 4 Nation-Building Departments of Lahore District, 1963-64: Rs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Total Budget</th>
<th>Establishment Allocation</th>
<th>Field Allocation</th>
<th>Expenditure Per Head</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4,56,000</td>
<td>4,35,000(95.4%)</td>
<td>21,000(4.6%)</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>46,45,919</td>
<td>45,90,914(98.8%)</td>
<td>55,005(1.2%)</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>9,77,050</td>
<td>8,76,700(89.73%)</td>
<td>100,350(10.27%)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operatives</td>
<td>2,11,186</td>
<td>1,97,146(93.35%)</td>
<td>14,040(6.65%)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The nation-building departments have guarded their development role against challenges from two different quarters. Firstly they have tried to stress the efficacy of their agricultural extension services through which results of scientific research are brought to the farmer. They
have opposed the encroachment of community development projects such as the Village-AID, the Rural Works Programme and the Integrated Rural Development. Indeed the First Five-Year Plan censured the departments for working on parallel lines with other agencies and asked them to extend co-operation to the V-AID programme at all levels. However, in actual practice, the bulk of funds made available to community development programmes finally reached the nation-building departments mainly through the D.C. working as the permanent Programme Director in the district. Long technical experience, an inbuilt prejudice against all public initiative and the established relations with landlords and professional middle class all favoured the nation-building departments in keeping the initiative firmly in their own hands.

The second challenge came from the opposite side viz. those favouring corporate management. The Agricultural Development Corporation was established on the strong recommendation of the Food and Agricultural Commission. It distrusted the older departments and proposed instead to inject the 'element of package deal and project compactness and thoroughness' into the agricultural administration. We have noted in chapter III how the official thinking on government by public corporations gave birth to a whole new style of administration characterized by jurisdictional overlapping, procedural muddle and increased corruption. After the initial breakthrough, the public corporation failed to put any dent in the traditional strongholds of development administration.

As against the regulatory departments which depend on law as their most effective instrument in the framework of the local power structure the nation-building departments' potential source of power is the development budget, which is used to barter privilege for money. Thus, money budgeted for the Education Department for purchase of equipment for sports, laboratories and libraries goes into buying sub-standard items. The PWD officers use budgeted material and human resources for domestic services. The office clerks are notorious
for exacting 'speed money', especially in handling applications for jobs. The relevant authorities signing contractors' bills for big projects ignore the use of sub-standard materials, in exchange for 'commission'. In fact, the very powers of officers of keeping huge government deposits in the banks fetch benefits of various kinds, like providing jobs to their relatives or extending cheap loans to them for constructing their bangalows.

We can now outline the combined effect of the regulatory and nation-building departments of the district administration on the general public. The former's functions are extractive, which they exercise by further extorting the public through their intensive institutional network down to the village level. The meeting between state and society at that level has an overall demoralizing effect on the public.\(^{37}\) The development departments on the other hand eat into the government funds at the input level and meet the people at the service-giving end. The fact that they do not have any branches below the tehsil means that this aspect of the state activity is merely formalistic.\(^{38}\) The government has tried to meet the demand for public participation in local decision making by creating a network of local government institutions where traditionally the representatives of the local bureaucracy and the public have met each other. Although, these institutions wield considerably less power than even the nation-building departments, they have provided an opportunity to the locally powerful groups to have access to the district administration. As the development funds started flowing towards these institutions, it assumed a renewed significance in the local power structure. Therefore, in the following section we shall look at the way the local self-government has developed and played its part in the maintenance and even enlargement of the privileged structures in the locality.
In the post-independence period, the local self-government has been usually considered the means through which community development programmes are carried out. However, the two originated in different historical circumstances which were at least half a century apart from each other. Both are supposed to pursue different goals viz. political participation and socio-economic development respectively. They emerged under separate institutional thrusts. Sometimes one disappeared for extended periods of time while the other continued or otherwise both functioned side by side as rival bodies; occasionally they were merged together. In the present section we shall focus on the local self-government which will be followed by a discussion of rural development. At the end of the next section we shall evaluate their specific importance vis-a-vis the state in Pakistan.

Historically, the local self-government institutions were created for a variety of reasons. Initially it was the need for financial devolution due to lack of funds at higher levels, which led to the first Municipal Act of 1862. Within two years, 49 Municipal Committees were established in the Punjab. A further push came from the 1864 Lawrence Resolutions for the development of urban areas. Sind had got district and Taluka-level local Committees after the Bombay Local Fund Act of 1869 was passed. On such early experiments throughout India was based, finally, the famous Resolution of Ripon in 1882, which laid down the aims of local government as 'political and popular education' even if no 'improvement in administration itself was planned.' Under this resolution, the earlier conception of local government as locally financed and relatively autonomous urban administration bodies, gave way to a broader programme of the state's political link-up with the emergent local leadership through the District Boards. The Punjab District Board Act of 1883 provided for two-thirds of the members to be non-official, with not less than half of them being landowners. As for the administrative work itself,
it was noted that even after 20 years the 'actual work is done by the official element'. The real significance of district boards was political and not administrative. They provided a channel for co-opting the landed class into the state system.

The second major feature of the 1882 Resolution was the government's manifest ambition to revitalize the traditional executive-cum-judicial institution of the village Panchayat which had atrophied in the face of the establishment of district administration under the colonial state. However, this move was much more idealistic than other structural innovations. As discussed in chapter II, the pre-colonial localized power structure, which was based on landlords, had given way to the new intrusive state machinery which became the ultimate source of legitimacy and the sole executive-cum-judicial authority down to the village-level. This process divested the panchayats of all power to apply sanctions under the customary law. In the new circumstances, the landlords' power was contingent upon the favour of the new state as represented by the district administration. When the district boards were established, the landlords quite obviously became interested in them, leaving the panchayats to stagnate. These developments sealed the fate of every move for revival of the panchayats for a hundred years to come.

The different patterns of evolution of various local government institutions are very good indicators of the relative strengths of locally powerful groups and classes vis-a-vis the state bureaucracy. While the district boards became a conduit for the articulation of rural interests, and the panchayats never took roots and remained mere husks, the municipalities had a qualified success in their administrative activities in the urban areas. From the era of the oil lamp, the open well and the sweeper, early this century, and despite a drive towards administrative centralization under Lord Curzon, newer functions like water supply, drainage system and, later, electrification were assumed by these municipalities. The Decentralization Commission
of 1907 laid emphasis on creating more executive staff in the municipalities. Structurally the municipal committees were more 'advanced' than the district boards. After the introduction of Dyarchy, under which local government became a transferred subject, the former retained three fourth representative element (except in 5 cases), against the latter's two third; and all of them had elected chairmen in contrast with the official chairmen of the latter in 26 of 29 districts. A rapid process of structural expansion of municipalities followed. Gradually they attracted many nationalist elements comprising the urban wing of political parties who brought in with them factional and communal influences. Working as subsidiary organisations of the nation-building departments the municipalities became foci of group conflict in the towns and cities. The district boards, however, remained the breeding ground of the new crop of national and provincial politicians, who formed their extended factional ties in their respective districts. As for panchayats, even half a century after their introduction in the Punjab, 75% of the villages remained without them; after independence plans were underway to extend them to the rest of Punjab and also to Bahawalpur and the NWFP. Given its extremely narrow base of operational jurisdiction as well as its small electorate, local self-government failed to emerge as a serious rival in any sense to the district administration.

Under political pressure in the early post-independence period various steps were taken to ensure structural maturity of local government by a) introducing adult franchise in local bodies, b) abolishing the nomination of members to these bodies, c) providing for election of chairman, and d), establishing village councils. On the other hand, there were three distinct pressures working against this popular enthusiasm for local self-government. Firstly, the local bodies were generally underpaid and over-worked, and their services were outside the main career lines. In the Punjab, for example, school teachers threatened to strike over the issue of provincialization of education; in the NWFP, the government took away both primary education and
public health from the local bodies. Similarly, the First Five Year Plan asked for the development of provincial cadres for secretaries, scientific officers, assessors of properties, accounts officers and other employees of the local bodies. In this way, pressure was brought to bear against the growth of local self government. Secondly, in general the bureaucracy resented any move towards increasing the powers of local government. It cultivated a general aloofness towards it after the withdrawal of official chairmanship and nominated members, considering that now it was doomed to failure. In cases of reported corruption or inefficiency of the local bodies, it hastened to recommend and almost always achieved their super session and took over their functions. Even where this did not happen the functions of local bodies being concurrent with those of the nation building departments, the latter took up big projects and responsible tasks, while the former were restricted to 'lighter' jobs, seeking technological and financial help and planning advice from the latter. In other words a kind of patron-client relationship was established between the two; the officers had the resources at their disposal to discredit any local government in office, or otherwise reward it, depending on its 'autonomous' or 'co-operative' behaviour respectively. This had an inhibiting influence on the growth of local bodies.

Finally, contrary to the general assumption, the political parties in government also hindered the growth of local government. On the one hand the landlord politicians opposed the extension of the panchayat system to their village because they saw it as a potentially de-stabilizing factor. On the other hand, the ruling parties tended to make an abuse of the district boards because it was here that they tried to keep or increase their factional followings at the local level. If the district board was dominated by elements from the opposition, the minority of henchmen of the ruling party got the board superseded, thus undermining the power of the rival faction by pushing new elections
as far as possible into the future. Alternatively, if the district board was in the hands of the ruling party it sought to perpetuate itself, again by constantly avoiding elections. The interval between elections in some districts ranged as high as 16, 21 and 22 years.

The pattern of interference of the provincial government in the district boards elections revealed not only how the political parties continued to be dominated by the local landlord factions even after independence, but also how the whole power structure in the district, including the D.C., the S.P., the MNA's and MPA's, down to the tehsildar, patwari and rassagirs could be mobilized in favour of the ruling party. It did the local governments gross disservice, because it provoked the bureaucracy to claim that 'the supremacy of political power has already weakened the forces of Rule of Law'. Characteristically, local government was identified with the 'territorial non-sovereign community possessing legal rights and necessary organisation to regulate its own affairs'.

As the political institutions atrophied, giving way to a bureaucratic polity, the local bodies took up new roles as conduits of developmental activity. Under the Village-AID programme, these bodies became the channels of bureaucratic paternalism. It was increasingly felt that the current level of extension services was not sufficient, and a well-trained corps of village workers must be raised who would 'guide' the rural people in the self-help projects. However, by the end of the 1950s, few of the original protagonists of the Village-AID programme remained optimistic. Finally, after the cessation of the American aid for this programme in 1961, it was suddenly wound-up, and merged into the Basic Democracies which had already been established in 1959.

Basic Democracies

Initially, the system of Basic Democracies was devised as an instrument of political control. In the early 1960s the rapidly growing capital input into the small development projects turned the elected Basic Democrats into local-level entrepreneurs. This
vast new social stratum, also provided the popular support base for the Ayub system. But then, having experienced the administrative bottlenecks, they got disillusioned and later emerged as the grassroots level political leadership of the PPP.

The Basic Democracies had a four-tier hierarchical structure of Union Council/Committee, Tehsil Council/Town Committee, District Council and Divisional Council. 80,000 Basic Democrats in both the wings also served as the electoral College for the Assemblies and the President. It was an ingenious method, whereby members at each tier were selected out of those at the lower level. The Ayub government had great hopes that a new leadership would develop in the upper tiers of the system. The higher the tier, the greater was the representation of the bureaucracy. In the beginning, half of the union council members were nominated by the D.C., who relied on his revenue, police, and community development staff to determine their eligibility. Generally, the 'B.D.'s represented the class of average middle farmers owning less than 100 acres of land. The chairmen of union councils were as a rule educated, owned more land, tended to be members of interest groups more frequently, commanded more political information and were members of political parties in a higher ratio than the B.D.'s. Higher up, 96% of the District Council's elected members were themselves, or had a near relative as, B.D.'s. This shows that the organisation of B.D. system was highly coterminous with the social class structure along factional lines. By formalizing the tutelary powers of bureaucracy at each level, the regime considerably limited the manoeuvrability of landlord factions. It eliminated whatever little autonomy the local government had previously, by replacing the wholly elected bodies with part-elected, part-nominated ones, and their elected chairmen with the D.C.'s. Over and above these chairmen there were the so-called 'controlling bodies' which were authorised to veto or alter the local councils' decisions.
It was only after the Rural Works Programme came into operation in East Pakistan in 1962-3 and then in West Pakistan in 1963-64, that development funds were made available to the Basic Democrats in large amounts. Under this programme (to be discussed later) a great stress was laid on formulation of development projects at the local level. Thus, the Union Councils received various proposals for development schemes from the hastily formed Ward Committees, and made plans accordingly; the Tehsil Council assessed them and forwarded them to the District Council for approval. Schemes involving more than Rs. 50,000 had to be approved by the Divisional Council. After approval, the implementation of plans was carried out by the project committees, usually headed by the Union Council Chairmen. It was this hold of the B.D. 's over actual spending of funds which finally boosted their status enormously, because it involved hiring labour, giving contracts, buying material and having regular contact with the government departments.

These were the privileges which attracted much keener public interest in the 1964 elections than was the case in 1959. While as many as one-third seats in the Western wing remained uncontested in the latter, in the former there were only 6.8% such seats. The 1964 elections were fought by the rising medium-sized farmers in much greater numbers than before. ²⁶ Also, the B.D. 's and the Union Council chairmen got involved in the larger economy, buying up cash crops in the village and selling them in the town markets. ²⁶ The traditional role of the biradri system among the middle farmers assumed a new function; they spread the benefits of this new political significance of the B.D. 's to their kith and kin. They emerged as brokers between the district administration and their own new 'clients'. In this way the state tried to create a vested interest. ²⁷ This new approach focused on the emerging patterns of rural leadership; it remained at the centre of all bureaucratic thinking for more than a decade. ²⁸
However, it is easy to confuse the economic with the political role of the B.D.'s in the rural areas. For example, it was claimed that the Basic Democracies strengthened the medium-sized farmers by undercutting big landlords and creating a new demand structure for the former.\textsuperscript{69} S.J. Burki's whole thesis of the middle-farmer strategy of the Ayub government revolves around this notion.\textsuperscript{70} However, as we have discussed in Chapter III, the middle farmer thesis does not hold ground. In fact, the agricultural development created new structural inequalities. In this situation, the lower tiers of the B.D. system provided a channel for expressing the mass grievances. The Basic Democrat's role should be understood less as an articulator of rural interests and more as a political mobilizer of peasantry, precisely because he was exposed to the larger powers of the state through his new brokerage role, in which he stood to be the loser.

Seen in the development perspective, the Basic Democracies' role was promotional and demonstrative, and largely geared to the infrastructural projects. But the flow of agricultural inputs, despite the professed claims of the government, was decidedly in favour of those who had capital for lumpy investments in tractors and tube-wells, as we have discussed in Chapter III. Many of them had connection with members of the National and provincial assemblies, and could influence the plan allocations for import, production and distribution of the agricultural inputs and extension of credit at the policy making levels. That also gave them individual power to curry favours from the extension staff of various departments. The B.D. member who was typically a middle farmer could neither influence policy making nor extract privileges from the local bureaucracy, with whom otherwise he had clientelistic relations.

The Basic Democracies failed to penetrate the traditional administrative structure at the grass-roots level, nor did they have any institutionalized power over it. Thus, a patwari or a lumbardar continued to enjoy a higher status than a B.D. member and exposed
the impotence of the public representatives at that level. In matters of irrigation water supply, credit or rural electrification the hold of the regular departments was complete. Thus, the political role of the middle peasants and petty bourgeoisie in the urban areas as represented by the B.D. remained parochial, in the sense that it was truncated at the district level, with no institutionalized access to the provincial legislative/administrative bodies. In the absence of stable party rule, various landlord factions continued articulating their interests through applying their individual influence both at local and higher levels.  

In addition to Basic Democracies, many other institutions emerged at the local level which had overlapping functions leading to the phenomenon of over-institutionalization, especially in the big cities. These agencies included improvement trusts, development authorities, housing societies, model town and satellite town committees, and various public corporations providing extension services. In one case, for example, as many as 19 authorities were approached to give approval for plans detailing new gas pipelines for the city. Procedural complexity made developmental work move extremely slowly. A typical example is provided by the case of a development project in Sialkot. Here the District Development Committee met under the chairmanship of D.C. and decided to make Charval a pilot model village. To implement this decision, a special meeting of the Agricultural Sub-Committee was called, again presided over by the DC, which decided to constitute a Farming Co-operative Society for solving the problems of cultivation in the village. The Society then requested the district council to give Rs. 2 lakhs from out of the Rural Works Programme fund to start the programme by sinking 10 tubewells. Such circumlocutious procedure in the end served as means through which the powerful groups could influence the official allocation of resources.
In the absence of regular party channels, the local government institutions performed the interest articulation function for the Pakistan state. There were many cases when these institutions recommended various policy measures to the regular departments in matters of local interest. For example, the District Council of Lahore asked WAPDA to increase the supply of power to tubewells from 12 to 18 hours to offset the effect of the prevalent drought causing shortage of canal water; failing in that, it recommended to the provincial government to divert the upper Chenab Canal water to Ravi Marala Link for a week every month; it also demanded appropriate measures from the authorities to control water-logging in Kasur and to drain out saline water from tehsil Chunian. Likewise the District Council of Sahiwal demanded an Industrial Estate of its own; and its counter-part in Lahore tried to tackle its problems of agricultural marketing, by forming sub-committees for each tehsil, which in turn recommended seven market committees for the seven towns in the district. The contractual relationship between the municipal committees and the public corporations sometimes involved shady transactions, which remained un-detected or otherwise unresolved due mainly to the procedural complexities.

The foregoing remarks make it clear that the municipalities and district councils enjoyed a proximity to the district administration and therefore had a share in the local administrative work which was denied to their union-level counterparts. But, as we discuss later, the district headquarters and other towns were undergoing rapid demographical professional, and economic changes, which brought forth new groups often semi-organised, which found the B.D. system unsatisfactory for channelling their grievances. By the end of the 1960s, the system had outlived its utility as a popular base for the state because it failed to contain the popular unrest and in certain cases even became a conduit for mobilization of masses against Ayub. Under Yahya, the B.D. system came to a formal end.
When Bhutto took over, he announced elections to the local bodies to be held on 15 March 1972. Holding of these elections under Martial Law was, however, opposed by certain political sections. Later, the elections were postponed indefinitely and were never held throughout the Bhutto period. It can be observed that despite Bhutto's incessant claims to rule in the name of people, the latter's participation in the state was kept strictly at a non-institutionalized level. Bhutto consistently showed intolerance of local bodies, as against Ayub's bureaucratic regime which had tried to establish a structural link with the local leaderships. It can be argued that the state in Pakistan has traditionally sought to keep its local clientele structures intact and has attempted to operate through them via the local government institutions. On the other hand Bhutto's party-based government faced two problems: the local party workers resented the emergence of a rival hierarchy in the form of local government; and the landlord factions at the top of the party feared mass mobilization at the grass roots level and tried to rule through bureaucracy as much as possible. It is not surprising, therefore, that Bhutto shied away from the local bodies elections, even when the protagonists of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) declared a need for them. Instead of developing local self-government institutions, he chose the rural development alternative and tried to involve in it the local PPP cadres. However, as we shall see in the following section, the rural development strategy depended wholly on the bureaucratic initiative and, in the absence of local self-government institutions, became even more state-centred than before.

Section 3. State and Rural Development in Pakistan

We have seen how the local self-government played a specific structural role in the political system of Pakistan, by establishing the state's clientelistic ties with the privileged individuals and groups in the locality. In the post-independence period, such ties have grown both in number and strength largely due to funds and privileges.
made available through the strategies of community development in a rural milieu. In the following pages it will be argued that these strategies, like the local government institutions have served as channels of bureaucratic paternalism in Pakistan.

Historically the whole idea of community development emerged as recently as the inter-war years, at least in the Indian sub-continent. During the power struggle between the colonial bureaucracy and the emergent national leadership both sides championed the cause of the poor masses in their own characteristic way. While the nationalist leadership mobilized them along utopian/romantic conceptions of the pre-industrial village India, as conceived by Gandhi and Tagore, the colonial bureaucracy sought to offset their influence over peasants through a 'pragmatic' solution, which focused on the rural uplift. The large-scale rural unrest after the First World War and the spectre of the Russian Revolution threatened a revolutionary ferment from below, which might dismantle the whole edifice of the colonial system. Rural development was considered a partial answer to this problem.

In the Punjab, two officers have left their names for their intensive efforts towards village uplift. One was Malcolm Darling, who worked against the vicious circle of peasant indebtedness for a quarter of a century; the other was F.L. Brayne, who led the rural reconstruction programmes on the self-help basis. The latter's influence has persisted among the Pakistani bureaucrats ever since. His approach was based on a culturist analysis of the peasant mind. According to him, rural backwardness was rooted in the residues of 'tradition' among the farmers, characterized by lazy habits, lack of thrift and fatalistic attitude. The answer lay in equipping them with the new techniques of production, efficient standards of behaviour and most importantly a modern state of mind. This approach led to rapid expansion of bureaucracy into new fields. Various nation-building departments emerged to meet the local needs in communication, health
`agricultural credit, animal husbandry etc. 'Modernization' of the peasant society thus became the official religion aiming at educating the farmers to take up self-help projects, and helping them with technological and other extension services.

After independence both the extension service and community development aspects of Brayne's initiative got renewed significance under the U.S. influence. On the one hand, the extension agents of the state were considered necessary for providing the primitive farmer with modern techniques based on scientific research, for supplying 'inputs' and for shaping the marketing structure in the locality. On the other hand, the community development approach focused on the multi-purpose village-level social worker who would act as a catalytic agent to modernization in the capacity of the philosopher-guide. As for the role of the extension services of the nation-building departments of the district administration, these agencies were engaged in providing material resources; the community development approach, on the other hand, tried to improve the so-called 'human situation'. It is not surprising, therefore, that the post-independence community work was taken up by the state in an extremely paternalistic way, committing itself 'morally' to the uplift of the illiterate and un-initiated rural masses with the help of 'Dehati Suurat'.

**Village Agricultural and Industrial Development (V-AID)**

In 1952, following the Sufi Report on rural development, a Village Agricultural and Industrial Development (V-AID) programme was launched, with the partnership of the American International Co-operation Administration (later US-AID). The main objectives of the programme as outlined in the First Five Year Plan, were to raise rural incomes through improved farming and cottage industries, to create a spirit of self help among the villagers and to expand the community services in rural areas. The programme was organised around the basic unit of the development area, comprising 150 to 200
villages, under a Development Officer, helped by two supervisors; in each area there were about 30 village-workers, each in charge of 5 to 7 villages; they were entrusted with the tasks of providing initiative and leadership at the local level, acting as liaison between the villagers and the specialists from the technical departments helping them fix priorities according to the former's felt needs and the latter's technical and financial resources. Training institutes were opened for village workers, while provision was made to establish two administrative training academies for the Development Officers, specialists and government administrators. A direct consequence of the four-fold increase in the number of the development areas, as provided for in the First Plan period, was that the nation-building departments started seeing the V-AID as their rival, especially as it took away huge funds from them. It has also been suggested that by pursuing the programme so vehemently the strong refugee element in the government tried to help the refugee settlers on land, as 82 out of 93 proposed development areas contained high ratios of refugees.

In one of the V-AID development areas near Peshawar, the Pakistan Academy of Rural Development, Peshawar, was closely involved for sometime and later published a report based on its experiences, called *The Dynamics of Development in a Pakistani Village*. Some of the gruesome lessons which it learned in the process testify to the inhibitive influence of the landlord-based power-structure and the stultifying effect of the state machinery at the local level. One obvious failing on the part of the policy-makers was their non-realization of the disruptive effects of the externally sponsored 'modernization' on the village. The discrepancy between the felt needs of the people and the government's professed aims was demoralizing, especially as most of the issues were related to malfunctioning of the state machinery itself. The issues which confronted the V-AID development officials in the village were never described to them during their training period.
One big issue was, for example, the compulsory acquisition of land by the government; apart from its under-pricing and delayed payment, the latter continued charging land revenue from the previous landowners - a practice which could typically continue up to 20 years after transfer of ownership; the Academy staff followed up the case from the naib tehsildar, tehsildar, patwari, kanungo, again to naib tehsildar, tehsildar, and then to the D.C. for finally issuing the orders of transfer of lands; the next round for re-imbursement of revenue, again, passed through all these stages, this time including the commissioner; it never progressed beyond the stage of suggestion that the matter had to go up to the Board of Revenue. When a proposal for converting a well into tube-well came up, mainly to provide clean drinking water to the village, the civil Surgeon had to be approached; he referred the matter to the District Health Officer who, first forwarded it 'wrongly' to the Public Works Department, and then sent to the Public Health Engineering Department; there it was revealed that part-responsibility must lie with the (West) Pakistan Sanitary Board. Meanwhile the Union Council recommended that the well should be 'donated' by the owners, for which patwari was contacted to produce the deed of transfer, which then had to be registered by the Registrar; all along factional strife continued over who would run the tube-well after donation.

It is clear from these examples that the state's authority structure had a crippling effect on the Village AID programme. Usually, the government officers had direct links with local power structures which militated against even a minimal re-distribution of social investment. The Village AID programme was therefore a non-starter and as we shall see the fate of the subsequent programmes was no different.
The Rural Works Programme

The Rural Works Programme which followed the V-AID programme was an improvement in the sense that it was engrafted upon the already existing Basic Democracies system, which filled the institutional gap between the village and the district administration. It was based on the so-called Comilla approach, centred in the East Pakistan Academy for Rural Development at Comilla. In 1961, the Academy set up a farmers' organisation at the Thana level, acceptable to, and workable by, them; village co-operatives were formed for community action, grouped into Thana Co-operative Federation. In due course, they started training courses in utilization of inputs, procuring finances from the government and hiring out machinery. They sought to utilize the surplus labour directly with minimum capital expenditure. The primary objective was to build strong and viable institutions as expressed in the continuing paternalistic idiom, of doting on 'building people' and trying to break the insulation of village by building roads and establishing mass media. It was claimed by the 'father' of the Camilla approach that this Co-operative Federation brought 'the village representatives out of a stagnant atmosphere. The village has a tendency to fall back to regress, but if we had a body of workers this regression or resiling would not occur.' The Comilla approach discarded the old-help formula and recognised that the village needed economic stimuli of all kinds from outside (meaning the government). The rural administration was brought down to the Thana level where a Thana Council was formed out of the officials from the departments of Health, Education, Agriculture and Co-operative on the one hand, and the chairmen of the local union councils on the other; the Federation of Co-operatives, finally, energised the whole programme at the village level.

After the 'success' of the Comilla pilot project, the government decided to spread it throughout East Pakistan in 1962-3 and then extend it to West Pakistan the following year. The programme was backed by supplies of food under the P.L. 480 programme; Rs. 100 million and Rs. 150 million were allocated for (West) Pakistan for 1963-4, and 1964-5 respectively, out of which 75% was to be spent by the Union Councils and
25% by the District Councils. Because of the fact that the lion's share of public funds went to the Basic Democrats which represented the medium-sized farmers it was much disliked by the landed elite, who were mainly represented in the District Councils. However, such abundance was short-lived, because funds started leaking to the nation-building departments which were much better equipped with technical know-how and long experience in the field. Within two years, they consumed 40% of the funds originally earmarked for the Rural Works Programmes. Under their auspices a new class of government contractors emerged equipped with technical and financial resources to do the reconstruction projects far more efficiently than the B.D.'s, becoming thereby a new support base for the Ayub system. As it was the D.C. who finally controlled the allocation of these funds, it all ended up with the reinforcement of the hold of the orthodox bureaucracy over the nation-building departments.

If we look at the expenditure pattern, a shift to the large-scale and the more directly productive sectors started taking place; thus half of the Third Plan allocation of Rs. 1000 million for (W) Pakistan went to link roads, and a quarter to irrigation. In other words, the whole programme assumed a supportive function for the elite-farmer-based strategy of Green Revolution which displaced or impoverished the large number of tenants and accelerated the process of urbanization. Not surprisingly, after the mass urban demonstrations against Ayub in 1968/9, a major shift of policy took place; the Fourth Plan allocated no less than Rs. 250 million (out of a total Rs. 450 million) to (W) Pakistan for the Urban Works Programme to be channelled through the municipal committees.

In the final analysis, we can see certain improvements in the B.D./RWP over the V-AID programme; the low-paid and ill-trained guide-philosopher was replaced by an elected Union Council; the old village council was replaced by the larger Union Council area incorporating more than one village and thus avoiding direct factional pressures. Previously, the state could ill-afford to support the village worker against its own superior and much more entrenched relationship with landlords, but now the Union Council enjoyed a legitimacy of its own,
on the basis of direct elections by the people. It is interesting to note that while the Union Councils carried out the planning-cum-implemention functions, the Tehsil Council became a chess-board of factional politics among the chairmen of Union Council and thus developed a role as guardian of the status quo. Higher up, while the District Council got engaged in selective development functions, the Divisional Council evolved a pro-status quo role. The essential dependence of the RWP on government funds and the 'political' significance of landlords for the government ensured that these two bottle-necks, i.e. the Divisional and Tehsil Councils, kept all the disrupting effects of community development in check.

People's Work Programme (PWP) and Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP)

During the Yahya period, a re-thinking of the whole idea of community development produced a Pakistani version of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), which was fast emerging as development orthodoxy. An area comprising ten Union Councils of Lahore Tehsil was selected for the Shadab Pilot Project. After Bhutto came to power, the new programme was taken up with great fanfare; later the existing institutional infrastructure of BD/RWP was merged with it. While the IRDP was formally launched by Bhutto on 1 July, 1972, a separate announcement by the Planning and Development Ministry followed soon after about starting a People's Work's Programme (PWP) which was largely an adaptation of the earlier Rural Works Programme. After that came Agrovilles. All three programmes worked side by side, aiming at virtually the same targets of rural development which had been covered by the previous programmes. While Agrovilles soon atrophied, the other two continued.
The PWP had its 'populist' features, as did the regime itself; thus the whole village population acted as Village Assembly, which made proposals and entrusted their planning and implementation to the Village Committee, which in turn sent the plans to the Halqa Committee for security. Above that, People's Works Committees were formed, which included members of National and provincial assemblies. This was a new feature altogether, as political party elements came to be associated with rural development for the first time in the history of Pakistan. However, the new pattern was no different from its predecessors in that it usurped all power of the local Project Committees in due course. An enquiry into PWP affairs revealed, for example, that most of the funds made available to the Sind province were consumed by the non-developmental expenditure, that the capital cost for employment per head (one of the chief aims of the programme) exceeded Rs. 13,000 and that a complete absence of organisational base at the village level undermined its credibility. Finally, the programme was merged into a new Ministry of Social Welfare, Local Government and Rural Development.

The IRDP was better organised than the PWP and was more ambitious in its aims. Its two pilot projects, Shadab and Daudzai, started early in 1972, after which it soon expanded to the whole of Pakistan. The IRDP tried to combine all the salient features of earlier programmes, with a stress on the 'total' approach. It was defined as 'a multi-dimensional, intersectoral programme designed to provide an institutional arrangement in rural areas aimed at achieving greater advance towards rural development in general, and agricultural development in particular, with an initial thrust on raising agricultural productivity. The area-unit of operation was called the 'Markaz', which was smaller than any existing administrative unit, to which level the government departments were to be brought down and at which their activities were
to be co-ordinated. On the other hand, village associations were to be formed and then federated at the Markaz level; new local government institutions were to be introduced later as co-ordinating agencies. This was to be achieved 'by intensification, diversification and commercialization of agriculture through a social Co-operative system under a total approach'. There were put together four different elements at the Markaz level: the Government departments, headed by a Project Manager, the Village Farmer's Co-operative Association federated at the Markaz level, the Market Committee and private enterprise both in agriculture, i.e. supply of inputs and services, and in small-scale industry. Development Assistants, Technical Assistants, Co-operative Inspectors and Sub-inspectors were attached to many project areas.

However, the fact remains that only 137 Marakaz were established in the whole of the Bhutto period, which indicates that the programme did not move beyond the experimental stage. Even the existing Marakaz often lacked Markaz complexes, full representation of departments, adequate departmental budgets and even basic equipment and facilities. Attaching the Co-operative to the Marakaz only led to a feeling of parallelism between the two; in the Punjab and the NWFP, the IRDP simply duplicated the functions of co-operatives and the engineering departments in the Mar-kaz areas; in fact, integration of functions could not possibly be carried through successfully without any organised structure of encadred project managers with formal authority over departments. The level of people's participation sank lower than before, as no local government institutions existed to back the whole programme. Also, entrusting public functions of community development to the farmer's co-operatives, which were there to cater for their private economic needs, simply could not bring about the envisioned result. Such confusion of functions of a farm organisation with those of local government pervaded the IRDP, like all its predecessors.
It is clear from our discussion that a spirit of bureaucratic paternalism has pervaded all the rural development strategies in Pakistan just as it has pervaded all the local self-government institutions in the country. The basic philosophy has revolved around 'modernizing' the people through teaching them good things about living conditions, production techniques and co-operative methods. On the one hand, such a thinking led to the opening of various training institutions where a select number of individuals from villages were 'educated' in the modern ways of doing things. On the other hand, this new education was disseminated throughout the country by following a pilot-project replication model. Thus, certain areas were selected for experimenting with each new rural development strategy, with an artificially inflated resource-input from the government side, which resulted in breeding false confidence in its efficacy. This training institutions-cum-pilot project approach can be related to an in-built mechanism within bureaucracy to enhance individual service careers, in the context of the post-independence official creed of development. One often hears a senior civil servant in one of the air-conditioned offices of Islamabad Secretariat boasting about turning Pakistan into a granary of Asia, or when in a less boisterous mood, making the country a first-class welfare state, if only he could get an area to try his model out.

Such an approach leads to an understanding of state and society as symbols respectively of modernity and tradition. The latter is largely conceived as an object of policy-making by the former, as if operating from outside the society itself. This assumption about the neutral capacity of the state has caused great confusion in conceptualizing the role of the local government institutions and rural development strategies. Although development planning rested with the centralized agencies, an essentially market-based development strategy was followed which ensured the flow of farm inputs in response to the forces of demand and supply. Thus, instead of those who were intended to benefit from the rural development programmes, it was those who could raise capital for 'lumpy' investments in tubewells and tractors, purchase
the increasingly less subsidized fertilizers and the high-velocity seeds and have a privileged access to the institutional credit who benefited from the government's policies. The development of the infrastructural sector, which directly contributed to the elite farmer-based strategy of Green Revolution, presents a classic case of subsidizing private capital formation through public funds, while at the same time de-capitalizing the subsistence peasantry. This way the state in a typical Third World country effects extreme inequalities between classes.

Up to this stage of our arguments in this chapter we have observed that, structurally, the state in Pakistan is at its strongest at the district level. Here, in addition to its formal institutions, it has sought to cultivate informal clientele structures through the local government institutions and community development strategies. In doing so it assumed responsibility for training people in modern ways, for planning for them and for overcoming resistance from any quarter. There has been more or less consistent pattern of thought underlying these programmes which is an indicator of the Pakistan bureaucracy's intellectual source in the Western theories of modernization, development administration, and community development.

The common argument behind these theories is that the only way to modernize the so-called traditional societies of the Third World is through government initiative. Thus, the state should not only guide the rural masses into the ways of fulfilling their felt needs but also teach them what their needs should be. Batten, for example, while attacking the 'felt-wants theory' has made a case for 'directive change' on the ground that people cannot want possibilities which they don't know and 'the more backward they are the less able they are to formulate ideas for their own betterment'. A case for direction, even coercion, by the state is made by Tomasetti, because, according to him, 'there would be few instances in which an entire village rationally and advisedly seeks the complete and sudden revolution in its culture.' Such views are based on erroneous conceptions of peasant economic behaviour, which as we have tried to show is contingent upon the local power structure, which, in turn, is subsumed under the
the district administration. Indeed, the absence of a theory of state in much of the literature on local self-government and community development reduces the whole question to an apolitical level. It is thus conceived largely in terms of 'moral' exhortation to help the poor. Thus, while giving 'Reasons for Adopting the "Directive Approach", Long and Winder consider it 'necessary for the state to give formal recognition and sometimes direct political support to the worker or poorer groups. What is not fully realized is the fact that the state's administrative machinery at the district level applies severe constraints over the growth of meaningful local government and community development institutions.

Section 4: The Changing Pattern of Local Politics

In the previous sections we have discussed how the mode of operation of the state-in-the-field is intertwined with the local power structures. As the institutions of local self-government and rural development were established, the role of politicians and political parties was largely ignored. However, as we have seen earlier, political parties had variously provided popular platform to factional conflicts, economic issues and ideological movements for more than half a century. They were thus part of the socio-political infrastructure of the locality. While the Ayub government underestimated their relevance as articulation channels and continued relying on the district administration and such new set-ups as the Basic Democracies and the Rural Works Programme, the political parties constantly struggled to get back into the system through parliamentary system based on adult franchise. It is very instructive to see how social and economic changes were reflected in the political activity before and after the 1970 elections.
In this section, therefore, we propose to look at the sources of political change at the district level outside the bureaucratic groups and institutions. We shall analyze the phenomenon of increasing rural-urban integration in the economic sphere across sectoral lines and the way the rightist forces tried to counter the perceived challenge from the left mainly at the level of Islamic ideology. That will set the context for our understanding of the pattern of transition in local politics from vertical to horizontal lines of action.

**Rural-Urban Integration**

We have already noted how the Green Revolution profoundly affected the rural occupational structure, especially, the way the surplus-producing farmers were increasingly involved in the agricultural marketing in the mundi towns. A major problem lay in the unequal exchange between the growers and the arhtis (commission agents). To start with, there are all sorts of disincentives for the average growers to operate in the urban-based markets of agricultural produce independently. They have to incur various expenses for transport, the processes of weighing, straining and filling. They lose a substantial amount in the name of thalla (the disposable waste). There remains the problem of finding a suitable buyer in the market from a potentially weak position because the farmer is anxious to avoid additional expenses involved in staying overnight in the town or in taking merchandise back home. Due to all these factors, the farmers prefer to surrender the merchandise to the arhtis at their own doorsteps at below the market price, and thus bear a constant grudge against them.

The Food Development of the district administration likewise prefers to buy wheat from arhtis for its procurement stores. If the farmers try to sell directly to the government they receive cold behaviour from the officials under various excuses. Sometimes work is suspended because of the staff's absence from office, thus delaying
purchase and preparation of bills, and forcing the sellers to visit the place many times. Sometimes godowns are full, so the farmers have to wait for many days. In addition, the merchandize is under-weighed by at least one seer on the ground that the wheat would dry by the year's end. Usually 3% of the payment is withheld pending final analysis of the wheat which, in the absence of any receipts leads to further loss. All this means that the average farmers fall back on the arhtis even where the government is the buyer of agricultural produce. Only big farmers have been able to overcome this problem because of their ability to move merchandize on motorized vehicles and their sufficient storage capacity. On an average, however, the surplus-producing farming areas have produced such rural-urban transactional relationships which grossly disfavour the cultivators.

The real financial hold of the arhtis over the farmers is more than can be observed at first sight. Usually they withhold payments to farmers for long periods of time or pay them in instalments, while using that money to advance loans to big farmers. In this way the district administration, the arhtis/grain-dealers and the upper stratum of farmers all have their interests bound with each other. On the one hand, the government has generally restricted the farmers' capacity to operate freely in an already imperfect market; thus, for example excise duty is imposed on moving sugar-cane away from the 'sugar area'. Other such local monopolies include tobacco and cotton, all of which severely limit the average farmers' capacity to assert their economic rights. On the other hand the rich farmers/landlords are represented on such intermediary organisations as the Tobacco Board where they can bargain on an individual basis. Some of the landlords are arhtis as well, while others have their own rice husking mills and grinding/sowing plants. Indeed, the trader-landlord-miller all in one has been the typical product of and the contributor to the Green Revolution. This alliance of the upper strata from both rural and urban sectors essentially
favours the latter in the background of increased communications between the two. 116

The Green Revolution also pushed various sections of the population out of the village for different reasons and to different destinations; contrary to general opinion, the medium and small farmer households outnumbered artisans and tenant-landless labourers. 117 Many have invested in agro-based industries and small engineering workshops in towns in the rich farmland area. The emergent network of husking mills, machine-shops and other input-distribution centres cater for the needs of mechanised farming and the motorised transport of agricultural marketing. Consequently small towns grew faster at 5.8% per annum than the big cities at 4.6%. 118 In contrast to the rainfed areas of North Punjab where long-distance migration is the norm, thus keeping the rural-urban linkages weak, 119 the typical pattern in the Green Revolution areas is the short distance migration within the district, thereby contributing to strong rural-urban linkages. In many cases only the young members of the family migrate to town while others stay behind, living off their urban earnings and visited by them frequently. Others leave the village for good and become the petty bourgeoisie of nearby towns. Prior to the 1970 elections, such elements started putting pressure on the system for expansion of educational, medical and communications facilities. Daily newspapers carried their complaints about the lack of high schools and intermediate colleges, or where these existed, about lack of staff, sports equipment and students hostels. 120 While migration to the towns disembedded them from their peasant background, the insecurities of the urban environment led them to see the government as a potential provider of services, in which the latter seemed to fail constantly.

The most explosive linkage between the urban and rural sectors was established through the migrant labour-force of the emerging centres of large-scale industry. Different groups of workers searching for security in the urban contexts with varying degrees of internal cohesion
interacted with each other within the broader framework of industrial relations. These groups emerged around various kinds of primordial loyalties. In the following chapter we shall have the occasion to discuss how the residential pattern and areas of origin internally divided the labour community of Faisalabad city. As most of the large-scale industry grew up on the margins of cities it strongly influenced the urban links of the peri-urban villages from where many of the workers come from. These workers have been involved in the factional power struggle of the villages and through them local landlords have often managed to build a support base in the trade unions. In this way, they have operated as a necessary factor in industrial relations. 121

These observations point to the new alignment of forces in the locality which tended to outgrow sectoral limitations. The working classes of both the urban and rural sectors experienced the increasingly integrated hold of the dominant classes in their respective spheres, aided in general by the state institutions. We have discussed in the previous chapter how this new 'class' politics was accompanied by a parallel spread of socialist ideas in the country. As opposed to that, urban middle classes and orthodox sections of the petty bourgeoisie grew increasingly puritanical in outlook. They developed an organisational base for Islamic politics in the urban milieu, distinct from the landlord-pir politics mentioned earlier, both in its class basis and in its mode of operation.

Islamic Politics in the Urban Milieu

Most analysts of the religious politics in Pakistan tend to ignore the organised activity of commercial middle classes in general and the lower middle class in particular as the real source of its power. The former consisted mainly of the small-scale entrepreneurs who emerged on the scene because of industrial growth under Ayub. As the official strategy favoured big capitalists, the former increasingly organised themselves as pressure groups. Thus, we hear power looms
unions demanding quotas of cotton and silk-yarn, stopping the textile mills from making coarse cloth and lowering the prices of other implements of production in general. Various commercial groups formed their separate associations e.g. Cloth Merchants Associations, Saraffa Associations, Sooter Mundi Associations, Timber Merchants Associations and the like. Most of their members were of exclusively urban background many of them recent refugees from India. During the rapid growth of the 1960s they experienced the inhibitive influence of the big capitalists and the bureaucracy in general, and hated, the 'corrupt' 'immoral', un-Islamic and dictatorial system of the country. On the other hand the lower middle class elements organised themselves along the trade union lines; some of these unions were the Municipal Committee Teachers Unions, District School Teachers Association. The District Subordinate Senior English Teachers Association and the United Front of Insurance Workers.

While caught in the massive currents of economic activity threatening their older security mechanisms such as biradri, they conceived of politics largely in moral/ideological terms. They usually complained that the rulers were deviating from the 'original' aims of the establishment of a pure Islamic society in Pakistan, with some form of democratic participation. The mohalla mosque played a significant role in organizing movements around such issues as Ayub's enactment of Family Laws Ordinance, or the controversial decision of the Ruet-Hilal Committee in 1967 to perform Eid on Thursday as against the ulema's verdict for Friday. By the 1960s almost all urban mosques were equipped with loudspeakers which proved to be a very effective device for a political campaign. Every mosque has been supported by a charity fund, collected from the relatively more prosperous people in the mohalla, mostly middle class businessmen. They are responsible for the maintenance of the Mullahs (Imam, Muazzin, and cleaner, along with their families), who had in turn close links with, and were sometimes directly recruited from, the religious institutions, such as Jamyia Rashidia in Sahiwal, Madrasatul Ulum in Multan, and Jamiya Ashrafia in Lahore. These institutions were funded by the same commercial interests and the lower salariat class. Off and on, the ad hoc Islamic associations propped up and took up moral issues of concern in
Thus, the Anjuman Naujawan-e-Islam of Faisalabad appealed to President Ayub to check the move of the central educational authorities to allow dancing and singing in the name of cultural shows. These localized religious institutions bound the emergent petty bourgeois sections with the large number of clergy and students of Islamic teaching centres. In the anti-Ayub movement the former were instrumental in bringing the latter on to the streets in their thousands.

In the period leading to the 1970 elections, we can see these Islamic institutions emerging everywhere in Pakistan. Each denomination tried to establish its own organisation and espouse various social and particularistic causes ranging from condemnation of the Auqaf department for patronizing ulema from rival sects to demanding girls' colleges for the local community. However, their real significance lay in the fact that they provided platforms for political parties. Thus, the Muslim League Council leaders addressed a meeting arranged by a certain Bhalwal Anjuman-e-Mufad-e-Ama. The JUP announced from the platform of the Shakkargarh Sunni Conference, that the JUI was like a shop, with a signboard for the Taj Company's Korans but selling Puran Bhagat tales, that the followers of the Peoples' Party were non-believers and that Bhashani was a Maulvi on the surface but a guerilla inside. The political parties thus used these urban religious organisations as a propaganda base.

There have been important differences between the rural and urban 'religious' politics. The latter was based essentially on secondary organisations composed of fundamentalist followers of religious 'schools' financed by and therefore playing the politics of the new commercial middle class and the orthodox petty bourgeoisie. By contrast, the former was closely interwoven with the factional mode of politics among landlords which at least in the Green Revolution areas, was being overtaken by the processes of de-peasantization, and urbanization, thereby weakening the piri-muridi relations considerably. In the framework of local politics, this shift from the 'rural' to the 'urban' politics of
Islam manifested a corresponding shift in the class basis of the leading role in the pro-status quo politics from the landlord-pirs to the urban middle class, as symbolized by the rise of the Jamat-e-Islami.

From Vertical to Horizontal Politics

We are now in a position to analyze the political map of the district as it was being re-drawn in the late 1960s. The most significant indicator of the nature and direction of political development at this time is the changing composition and functioning of the political parties. We have already defined the traditional framework of Pakistan's political parties as collections of landlord factions, each with an urban wing of party intellectuals. Here we shall look at the way these parties have absorbed political elements from outside the factional groupings, thus expanding their base horizontally.

We have noted in Chapter II how the post-1920 constitutional framework led to organization of politics in the shape of factional alliances across the province. Typically, factions worked as marriages of convenience between big landlords and their followers. Increasingly, however, they were subsumed under the biradri ties which emerged as a major factor in the consecutive elections of the Punjab Legislative Council. Many biradri councils were organized on a provincial basis to increase political solidarity among members of the same 'caste'. In the 1937 elections, the Unionist Party's victory depended considerably on this political resource. It chose the influential members of various biradris as party candidates. Later this strategy was successfully used against them by the Muslim League in the 1946 elections. In time the Rajput Councils, Arain Anjumans, Jat Associations etc, came to wield considerable power; they even published periodical gazettes to co-ordinate the ongoing activities of their members scattered across the province. This pattern continued to operate in the provincial elections of the early 1950s. Under Ayub, biradris, incorporated new rural-urban linkages, but got weakened in the process because of their members' geographical mobility, and new ideological forces. In the 1970 elections, the traditionally dominant biradris generally fought on the tickets of the Muslim League
and various religious parties, while the lesser biradris managed to enhance their radical image by fielding candidates for the PPP. Elsewhere, because of some local issues like the immigrant problem in Sialkot, as many as 8 candidates from the Gujar biradri alone representing various political parties contested against each other. In other words, a transition was taking place in which factions was being replaced by biradri as the essential unit of political organisation. The latter allowed considerable manoeuvrability to its individual members unlike the former.

The second component of political parties, the urban intelligentsia, also underwent change. Previously they 'guided' and briefed the party workers on the ways and means of influencing public opinion, and tried to bring out the distinct features of their respective parties. However, during the 1950s and 1960s a slow and imperceptible change occurred whereby a whole new political stratum emerged at the grass roots level with experience of public life in various capacities. Firstly, there was a huge army of V-AID workers who had been trained in the government institutes for welfare jobs, but were then de-mobilized. Landlords disliked their de-stabilizing role in the villages. The Basic Democracies/ Rural Works programme further introduced a large number of new individuals into public life, among them sub-contractors, labour-suppliers, B.D. members and office-holders of the Union Councils. There were others who thrived whenever there was a big government project in the vicinity, but after its completion were deprived of this source of income which created bitterness among them. The small towns were full of disgruntled students who got education only to find themselves nowhere. Their ranks were swelled by the disillusioned ex-party workers of various persuasions. Away from the mainstream political activity, lesser socialist/communist parties had been active on different fronts for 20 years; among them the Pakistan Communist Party (banned 1954), The Punjab Kissan Committee, The Sind Hari Committee, The Sarhad Kissan Jirga, and later the Pakistan Socialist Party (CR Aslam group), the Mazdoor Kissan Party, the Dehi Mehnat-Kash Mehaz, the Mutthahida Mazdoor Mahaz, the Pakistan Labour Party (Bashir Bakhtiar group)
and other groups of revolutionary workers had remained locally involved in different areas under extremely harsh conditions. Many of them were lawyers, working on the legal front for the peasantry and industrial workers who were suffering under the trumped up criminal cases filed against them by landlords and industrialists. The rural migrants living in urban slums had evolved their own communal leadership patterns.

All these categories of 'public' men with soft or hard ideological positions started organizing the People's Party branches in their respective areas of activity, which were often unknown to the party high command. Like the Pakistan movement in the middle 1940s, the PPP elections campaign became a popular movement in 1970, with the same type of committed (and relatively 'autonomous') local party cadres, and with the same ideological vagueness. It is argued here that, in a final sense it was the emergence of this widespread local level political stratum, which brought about a whole-hearted conversion of the people to the 'cause' of the PPP. Within the party organisation, the older alliance of landlord factions-urban intelligentsia was replaced by the new alliance of the urban intellectuals and the new urban/rural political stratum including the middle peasants, students, 'outsiders', and worker-leaders in general. The erstwhile power-holding groups of landlords, the industrial/commercial bourgeoisie and the expanding middle classes in general perceived their new collective contradiction with this new alliance of social forces and variously backed the so-called statist parties in the 1970 elections. Between the elections and the actual rise of the PPP to power, they usually depended on the local bureaucracy to contain the militant opposition of the pro-PPP elements.

It was natural that after coming to power, the PPP's local leaders sought to re-order the relationship between the district administration and the general public. Riding on the wings of legitimacy by the popular mandate, the local PPP leaders considered the District Administration as the biggest block in the way of articulation of public
demands. In less than two months, the government department in three Punjab districts received 200,000 applications to redress various grievances, with recommendations and directives attached by the local PPP leaders. The threats of public beating of 'non-cooperative' officers abounded, and some were even carried out.

The Bhutto government soon realized that the grass roots level militancy could create a serious political problem for it. Already students had occupied four colleges in Lahore in the first months of the PPP government and the prisoners in Multan and other jails had gone on strike for various reasons. Bhutto tried to stop his governing capacity from going down. In his speech on labour reforms, he chided industrial labour for acts of gherao. Police firing on workers in Karachi and the arrest of the local PPP-labour leaders in Faisalabad, including Mukhtar Rana, in an industrial dispute involving the murder of an industrialist, finally set the direction in which the PPP high command wanted to channel political activity.

The reforms induced polarization of class interests between those who stood to lose under Bhutto, e.g. industrialists, landlords, trader/commission agents, doctors/pharmaceutical companies etc., and those who hoped to gain, i.e. the underprivileged classes in general created a gap which could hardly be filled by the local party organisations, except by coming into conflict with the state machinery. Bhutto chose to smash the power of the new political stratum by recruiting the older political stratum of landlord-politicians into the party ranks. This way he was able to slow down the change in local authority structures while trying to provide greater benefits to his support base among the medium-sized farmers and the radical sections of petty bourgeoisie. This grand design of de-politicization of the relatively mobilized masses focused on increasing the control of state's executive wing in almost every field of social life. By 1974/75, the radical elements in the locality had lost their voice, if not necessarily their membership of the party, while the District Administration had emerged supreme in exercise of authority, at least in essence if not in style.
NOTES:


4. Pay and Services Commission Report, op.cit. p.89

5. Ibid., p.101.


7. Ibid. p.200

8. For a detailed account of Pakistan's legal system, see A.K. Brohi, The Fundamental Law of Pakistan.


13. Patwaris can get more revenue assessed than is actually due, show uncultivated portion of land as cultivated, make change in the record of ownership of land, distort correct measurement at the time of demarcation, avoid entering the names of rightful claimants after the death of a person, place obstructions to the payment of land revenue in instalments and give wrong valuation of property at the time of issuing solvency certificates. See ibid., p.62.

14. Ibid., pp.73-5.
15. Ibid., pp.82-85. Patwari's activities range now from dealing with the older departments of Police, Agriculture, Forests, Fisheries, Jail and Post Office to new departments of Rehabilitation, Border Police, Administrative Staff College, Small Industries and Cantonment Boards.


18. S.M. Haider, op. cit., 110.


30. There were seed farms but without a system of later multiplication of seed by the registered growers. The new Agricultural Engineering Directorate did not have any contact with the extension staff. There was an Animal Husbandry Department but it did not have any conception of interaction between the crops and the livestock, nor did it establish any organised disease control service. The Irrigation Department, which is a near-regulatory department in its operations, did not develop any elaborate advisory service, nor any research into the relations between various crops and irrigation. Ibid, pp. 159 and 169-173.
31. Ibid. p. 185.

32. Anwar Tehmasap, 'Structures and Functions of Nation-Building Departments,' in Inayatullah, (ed.) op.cit., p. 77


36. The following examples have been taken from Syndicate A (Sajid Javed Akbar et al.) Report on A Study of the Re-organization of District Administration in Pakistan, in, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development Peshawar, op.cit., 22-23.


38. Ibid., p. 45. Also see appendix I for organizational presence of various departments in the district.


42. Aslam Abdullah Khan, 'Local Government-Its Growth and Role in Development,' in Pakistan Administrative Staff College, op.cit., p. 12.


44. For example, the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, The Punjab Small Town Committee Act 1922, The Panchayat Act 1921, The Municipal Executive Officers Act 1931, the NWFP Municipal Committee Act 1923, The Sind Act VII of 1938 and X of 1940 etc.,


49. First Five Year Plan, op. cit., p. 104

50. Ibid. p. 104; By 1951-52 all the 6 District Boards and 9 Municipal Committees in NWFP had been superseded, some from the early 1940s, ibid., p. 104; 24 out of 34 district governments stood superseded in 1957. Muneer Ahmed, op. cit. p. 2.


52. Masudal Hasan Report, quoted in Abedin, op. cit., p. 158.


54. See for example, A. M. Khan Leghari, Report on the Sargodha District Board Elections 1952-3 (Lahore, 1955) pp. 12-28, 42. The irregularities included gerrymandering constituencies, arresting the rival intending candidates before filing papers, rejection of nomination papers on flimsy grounds, forced withdrawals of nominations, threats of cancellation of arms licences, stealing horses, diverting the canal water, charging land revenue in excess, arranging a vanguard party of Rassagirs for terrorizing the voters (called 'jhurloo Party') all with passive connivance of the D.C. and relatively more active help of the S.P., pp. 13-28, 42.

56. Ibid. p. 58.


58. For example, see Manzoor Ilahi, 'Village-AID Approach' in S.M. Anwar (ed.) Selected Papers on Rural Development in Pakistan (Peshawar, 1979), pp. 57-8.


60. Inayatullah op. cit. p. 51.

61. Ibid. pp. 58-60. The members of the Union Councils were called B.D.'s in common parlance.
62. Ibid., pp. 64, 65, 66, 78, 94.
68. 'The emerging patterns of rural leadership' seem to be a constant concern of many syndicate reports written by trainee officers; see Report of Syndicate D, etc. in Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, op. cit. (1976).
70. S. J. Burki, 'The Development of Pakistan's Agriculture: An Interdisciplinary Explanation' in, Stevens, Bertocci and Alavi (eds.) Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan (Hawaii, 1976), pp. 304
73. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 6 January, 1967.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. For example, a case was reported about the defalcation of Rs. 15 lakh during the transference of Rs. 1.5 crore between the Lahore Municipal Corporation and the PWD Public Health department in connection with Lahore Drainage and sewerage scheme, which was financed by the former; a probe committee was appointed by the Divisional Council which referred the matter to the Basic Democracies Department of the Provincial secretariat for arranging audit of accounts, and there it rested for years to come. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 5 January, 1967.


80. A. H. Khan, op. cit., pp. 4-5.


82. Ibid., pp. 73-4, 79.

83. Akhtar Hameed Khan describes them as the two new approaches. However, they need not be separated from the latter; in fact, both were present in Brayne's study in an embryonic form. See A. H. Khan, op. cit., pp. 3-7.

84. This is the sub-title of Brayne's book (op. cit.) meaning the 'Village Socrates', in Hindustani.

85. The First Five-Year Plan 1955-60. op. cit., p. 211.

86. The First Plan allocated Rs. 352.95 million to the 19 established departments all dealing with Agriculture in (West) Pakistan, but a total of Rs. 144.10 million was earmarked for the V-AID and Rural Development alone, ibid. p. 280.


88. There was a case of building a road, for example, for which there were two options. The Eastern Link would have joined the hujra of one factional leader with the main road, while the Western link would have the same for the other. Consequently, all the work on road construction had to stop for months. At stake was the increased contact of one or the other faction with the government officers and the outside forces in general, which would have followed the road building. Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Dynamics of Development in a Pakistani Village (Peshawar, 1963) p. 48.
89. Ibid. pp. 61-2, 110-112.
90. Ibid. pp. 101-103.
93. Ibid. p. 28.
94. Ibid. p. 28.
97. S. J. Burki, op. cit., p. 4.
98. Ibid. p. 7.
99. Ibid., p. 9.
100. The Third Five Year Plan, op. cit., p. 515.
102. Shoaib Sultan Khan, Rural Development in Pakistan (Delhi, 1980) p. 47.
103. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
106. Ibid. p. 18.
108. Ibid. pp. 16-17
111. F. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston, 1964) p. 119.
117. Haider, op. cit., p. 9. table I.
120. See The Nawai Waqt, 6 July, 1970, for situation in Mian Channun, (District Multan).
121. As we shall see later, these relationships were crucial for constituency level support patterns in electoral context, interwoven with party politics.
122. The Nawai Waqt (Lahore) 22, August, 1969.
126. The Nawai Waqt (Lahore), 1 July, 1970.

127. The Nawai Waqt (Lahore).


129. Ibid. pp. 4, 12.

130. For example, for 20 years Tarrar family dominated the local politics in Hafizabad; now the constant losers, the Bhatti, and Bhuknika families, gained victory in the 1970 elections, The Nawai Waqt, (Lahore) 25 August, 1970.


Introduction

The previous chapters have discussed the evolution of the state in Pakistan both in the colonial and in the post-independence periods. It has been shown first that in general terms the state in Pakistan has consistently represented the interests of the dominant social classes, and second that its capacity to control and coerce has been conditioned by the penetration of capital into the society and by its own involvement in this process. It would be expected, therefore, that 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' regions of the country would show different patterns of relations between the bureaucracy and social groups, and within local society itself. In this and the following chapter we present two case studies, one of a 'developed' and one of an 'underdeveloped' district, to attempt to show the differences that have emerged.

The two districts, Faisalabad and Attock, had to be chosen on a purposive basis. It was decided at the beginning to choose both case studies from Punjab on the following grounds:

i) Both districts to be studied should have experienced the same provincial approach to government and administration.

ii) Apart from the fact that 57% of the population of Pakistan is located within Punjab, it has been the political centre of gravity of the country since independence.

iii) As the political centre of the country, its provincial politics have lacked the ethnic dimension which has characterized the politics of the other three provinces; this allows us to study the structural relationship between economic development and political change unmediated by other conflicts.
Alavi has divided the districts of Punjab into four categories: the rich old settled areas, the canal colony districts, the poor old settled areas, and the western arid region. The first two can be counted as developed and the second two as underdeveloped. From the former we have selected a canal colony district for study on the ground that all the rich old settled districts are in one way or another special cases. In the canal colonies, on the other hand, we see a clear pattern of transformation of a predominantly nomadic society into an agricultural community based upon state-controlled irrigation schemes. They are therefore ideal areas for the study of the impact of colonial institutionalization of government at the district level.

Among the canal colonies, it was decided to select Faisalabad on the grounds that it is the most highly developed colony, and since independence has been the centre of the 'Green Revolution'. It has also seen a spectacular rise in industrial production in the past three decades. Unlike other canal colony districts it also lacks a dominant landlord class. It is therefore easier to study the expansion of horizontal forms of political organization in this district.

The plan of the chapter is to outline a chronological phase of the district's development, and within that phase to present the totality of political life and the factors accounting for change. In Section I therefore, we shall trace the pattern of transformation of the relationship between the state and society under the impact of the colonial government's policies of colonization on the newly irrigated lands. In Sections 2 and 3 respectively, we shall analyze the politics of industrial and agricultural development in the post-independence Pakistan. In the final section, an attempt is made to characterize the Bhutto phenomenon in its impact on the power structure of the district in various capacities.
Section I: Political Transformation under Colonialism

Faisalabad (until 1 September 1979, Lyallpur) district lies between 30°35' and 31°50' latitudes north and 72°66' and 73°40' longitudes east. It is roughly rectangular in shape, with an average breadth of 45 miles, an average length of 107 miles, and a total area of 3516 square miles. Geographically, the district comprises the southern portion of the Rachna doab called the Sandal Bar and is an alluvial plain of recent geological origin. In its natural state, it was a vast tract of wasteland studded with sand dunes and fit only for nomadic cattle grazing. Annual rainfall averages only 11 inches. It is, however, ideally suited for canal irrigation, and today three branches of the Lower Chenab canal, viz. the Rakh, Jhang and Lower Gogera, command the whole district. In all, 79.15% of the district's land, or 1.78 million acres, is irrigated. There is also an extensive road and rail communication network.

Faisalabad district was created out of parts of Gujranwala, Jhang and Sahiwal (then Montgomery) districts in 1904, in order to administer the recently established Chenab canal colony. Before the coming of the canals, the sparse population consisted of nomadic cattle graziers who travelled throughout the Sandal Bar, usually in large groups called jans. Among them, certain tribes, notably the Bhattis, the Viraks, the Kharrals and the Sials, held a privileged position. In return for providing protection to the jans, they received a 5% levy (pawanji) on all sales of cattle, and their clan leaders (the sadar tirni-guzars) were responsible for the payment of a grazing tax (tirni) to the government. These clan leaders were therefore the pivotal figures in the local political structure.

When the British took power from the Sikhs in the mid-nineteenth century, they at first maintained the existing system of controls. The sadar tirni-guzars maintained their pivotal position as zaildars or tribal chieftains. Gradually, however, as the British consolidated their position, major changes were introduced. In the first place, the greater degree of stability under British rule encouraged the growth of quasi-permanent settlements called rahnas or jhoks, which in turn enabled the colonial state to penetrate more directly than before into the...
locality. A record of cattle was kept by the government, and a distinction was made between cattle grazing on government land and cattle grazing within village boundaries. After 1874, the government-owned jungles were divided up and the revenue rights over them were let on annual leases. At first these leases were taken up by former sadar tirni-guzars; later, when the basic unit of allocation was changed from a collectivity of villages, called chak, to each separate village in 1884, they went mostly to the village lumbardars.  

In one sense, therefore, the position of the sadar tirni-guzars was undermined by the consolidation and extension of the colonial administrative machine, but in another it was greatly strengthened. The government continued to rely on them as key figures in the maintenance of law and order. As police stations were established in the area, the thanedars came to rely heavily on the local zaildars as go-between, many of whom were previously sadar tirni-guzars. Without their help, the thanedars' task would have been impossible. In return for their services, the zaildars were allowed considerable latitude in their own affairs; in fact, almost all of them were rassagirs, who received and safely disposed of the stolen cattle brought to them by their retainers. They could also exploit their relationship with the government to protect or secure advantage for their clients. Although no longer semi-independent chieftains, the zaildars assumed a new role as brokers between the state and their erstwhile tribal followers.

In the absence of settled agricultural communities, the whole area was overrun by the nomadic tribes. Only a small amount of revenue was collected from scattered well assessments and harvest leases on kasht barani. Thus, tirni continued to be the main source of government revenue, as did the administrative structure based on it.

The Chenab Colony

This quasi-tribal system, similar in many respect to that used by the British in other parts of the Punjab to control its frontier
areas, was completely transformed in the wake of the introduction of canal irrigation in the late nineteenth century. Inundation canal systems had already existed in certain parts of the Punjab from pre-colonial times, but they were inadequate to protect the population against periodic famines. A network of new canals which could systematically tap the Punjab rivers, backed by a railway network, seemed to officials to be a way not only of protecting against famine but also of raising revenue. One of the most ambitious and successful projects was the Lower Chenab canal. Opened as an inundation canal in 1887, it was extended in 1889 and 1891; when completed in 1892 it irrigated 157,197 acres, and by 1902 the area had expanded to 1,829,169 acres. From early on, the project was highly profitable, and during the first quarter of the twentieth century, the accumulated surplus revenue account came to Rs 296,925, eight times the original cost.

Colonization of the area began in 1892. The proprietary villages of the original inhabitants occupied only a small part of the irrigated area, and the remainder was government jungle which could be allocated at official discretion. In so doing, the government kept in mind both the objective of increasing agricultural production to the maximum and the political advantages that could be gained by the allocation of land to selected groups. The strategy followed was to allocate the majority of the land to existing cultivators from the crowded districts of eastern and central Punjab. Typically, these colonists were given a square of land on a twenty-year government lease. Interspersed among these holdings were medium and large allotments, the former intended to supply a yeoman class and the latter to introduce a gentry element. Both yeomen and gentry holdings were seen as means of rewarding past loyal services to the raj and as a way of providing the raw new society with political, social, and economic leadership. By 1904, nearly 90% of the 1,813,000 acres on three branches of the Lower Chenab Canal had been allotted to peasants, yeomen and capitalists. As expected, the crown land sold in auction also went to capitalists.
TABLE

Colonization of land: Stratification Pattern in 1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Auction</td>
<td>14627</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Purchasers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalists</td>
<td>39174</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeomen</td>
<td>142406</td>
<td>7.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>1344954</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1601161</td>
<td>88.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Abstracts of Proceedings of the Meeting of the Legislative Council of the Punjab, 28th February, 1907, PIF, p. 300.

Although landlords preferred to rent out their land to sharecroppers, thus partly defeating the intentions of the government, this pattern once established remained largely unchanged up to independence. At the time of the last settlement in the 1930s, 54% of the total area was cultivated by the actual holder of the land, and the average size of cultivated holding ranged between 10 and 18 acres, while the gentry and yeoman holdings accounted for only 14% of the allotted area. 10

The Administrative State

In 1904 Faisalabad remained an almost entirely rural area, but the relation of state and society there had been drastically changed. The nature of the irrigation system meant that an elaborate system of control had to be employed to regulate the allocation of water and to levy irrigation charges. Although it is possible to conceive of these functions being handled privately, either on a commercial basis or cooperatively, in the circumstances of colonial India it was inevitable that the Irrigation Department should be a government agency. Beyond this, the increased revenue yield and the fact that the majority of farmers were crown tenants led to a considerable expansion of the bureaucratic rule. The
Irrigation Department was the revenue assessing agency for almost the whole district. The administration was, to say the least, top-heavy; the grantees had to pay five separate charges, including revenue, water-rate, and a consolidated cess comprising local rate, patwar fund and lumbardari fee. It is no surprise that Faisalabad was considered the 'spiritual home of the Punjab Irrigation Department'.

The political attitudes of the Faisalabad peasantry were largely formed in response to the character of colony administration. We can divide its history into three distinct periods: a) colonization proper, 1892-1906, b) executive and legislative changes 1906-1912, c) assimilation in the district administration from 1912 onwards. The first period is characterized by unabashed social engineering at the hands of colonization officers. The Government Tenants Act (Punjab) of 1893 aimed at 'simplifying' the administration of canal colonies, thus putting the grantees firmly at the receiving end in almost every sphere of life. Previously the grantees signed a lease deed with the government but under the new rules they were subjected to arbitrary allotment by the colonization officers. All sums due to the government in respect of a tenancy were to be recoverable as arrears of land revenue, thereby disallowing any recourse to the institutions of civil justice. The subsequent colonization of the Jhung and Gugera branches in Faisalabad strictly followed the statement of conditions issued by the government for those specific purposes. The desire for land was so keen among the peasants that they were ready to accept every condition as far as it allowed acquisition of land by them. This gave the government a free hand in imposing strict regulations in all matters of colony work. Its initial proprietary rights in the allotted agricultural land and residential sites made it immensely powerful in its dealing with the in-coming colonists.
Beyond these necessary means of control, however, the government in the canal colonies saw itself as taking a positive role in promoting the economic and social welfare of its tenants, not least because increased prosperity would lead, at every resettlement of the revenue, to higher income for itself. The high point of bureaucratic paternalism was reached in the second period (1906-12) with the introduction of the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Bills in 1906. Under this measure, an elaborate penal system was introduced, including fines with retrospective effect, confiscation of standing crops and expropriation from land altogether, for violation of various colony regulations. Fines alone amounted to Rs. 300,000. Transfer of property by will was forbidden, and a strict system of primogeniture was established in order to prevent the proliferation of non-economic holdings. At the same time, the jurisdiction of the courts was barred from cases of attachment or sale of tenants' rights or interests. No suits could lie against any public servant for anything done by him in good faith under this Act.

This Act provoked widespread disturbances, led by the Bar Zamindar Association of Faisalabad, in which many capitalist and yeomen grantees took a leading part. Large protest meetings were held at Faisalabad, Sangla, and Gojra with attendance varying from 2000 to 12000. It was a reflection on the local zamindars' organisational capability, considering that there was no precedent for public activity in the whole province and that Faisalabad was a predominantly agricultural area. Newspaper columns and sheafs of petitions emerged as new channels for expression of public grievances. The protesters maintained that the new bill contravened the previous contracts and was therefore unconstitutional; in addition, it legitimized the unauthorized proceedings of officers. Finally, the withdrawal of the bill by the central government symbolized the fact that the days of benevolent despotism were over, and that articulation of rural interests through lobbying had to be accommodated within the current bureaucratic system.
In the third period (1912- ), we see a gradual assimilation of the colony by the district administration, whereby the colony work was transferred to the regular staff of the Revenue Department. However, many features of the colony administration persisted for a long time and were responsible for an almost complete stranglehold of the government over a variety of social and economic sectors in the locality. For example, the government remained the leading proprietor in every abadkari village; while 1,254,875 acres were held in proprietary rights, 1,509,529 acres were still held under various other tenures controlled finally by the government. In addition, the latter owned the unallotted waste, water-courses, and building sites allotted to shopkeepers, tenants, and menials. Finally, various departments of the district administration e.g. Agriculture, Irrigation, Revenue, Public Works Department, Co-operatives and the Police, directly managed the affairs of the emergent agrarian society in Faisalabad thereby making the zamindars entirely dependent on the vicissitudes of the government. We can see that the latter increasingly assumed the role of an estate manager in the Chenab Colony.

The working of the lower staff of revenue administration in Faisalabad particularly bore the mark of colony administration. The revenue-paying capacity of the farmers was directly related to agricultural productivity, which in turn was closely tied up with the canal management, marketing situation, and communications structure. Therefore the patwaris in the Chenab Colony lacked the crucial position in the local power structure which their compatriots from some other districts enjoyed, not least because the whole system of record keeping was centralized in the Irrigation Department. This divested the patwaris of their manipulative power and reduced them to mere government clerks.

The position of lumbar dars and zalidars was not radically different from the patwari. On the eve of each settlement, a flood of applications poured in for the post of lumbar dar, prompted mainly by the factious feelings among the colonists based on their competing primary ties. Apart from the old proprietary villages of janglies where the
original chaudris continued as lumbardars, generally the Faisalabad lumbardars came from the leading peasant grantees with no inherent claims to social superiority. Their main resource was agricultural enterprise, which in the midst of a competitive and largely egalitarian peasantry could not enable them to assume the semi-autonomous role played by their counterparts in certain older districts.

Peasants and the State

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that agrarian relations were the area of greatest potential conflict in Faisalabad. There was friction between the colonists, anxious to maximize their individual welfare and resentful of a paternalistic administration, and the state, mindful of its wider economic and political interests. As mentioned above, the 1906 Act had set off widespread disturbances throughout the canal colony districts. Although the government in part attributed them to 'outside agitators' it recognised the need for concession and withdrew the Act. Among the Sikh population, the Ghadar movement had some impact during the First World War, but otherwise, skilful management by the government and the presence in Lahore of Unionist ministers minimized the occasions for discontent.

We have observed that the district administration in Faisalabad developed a direct relationship with the local society. The government was convinced that given a careful administration of the colony lands, a fairly large amount of revenue could be raised and a big surplus produced. The idealists among the bureaucracy were committed to develop a neat, healthy and productive peasantry across the whole colony. In this situation where the role of intermediaries was kept to a minimum, peasants responded by sending petitions direct to the government, with or without the help of media campaign and mass protests. A zamindar's visit to the tehsil or district headquarters or some Assessing Officer's visit to a particular neighbourhood could elicit a host of applications to seek redress of various local grievances. This petition-mindedness symbolized the fact that the general masses of Faisalabad district had,
by now, internalized the new government regulations. It also meant that the process of rural interest-formation had gone a long way, and every legislative or administrative encroachment on these interests was fiercely resisted by zamindars.

For example, a series of agrarian issues in the inter-war years sparked off large protests in Faisalabad district. Sometimes the government could get away with it, but other times it was forced to make or amend laws and introduce policy changes to accommodate the restive elements in the locality. For example, when the prices of wheat and American cotton rose steeply in the post-World War I period, accruing large profits to the farmers, official thinking considered that the large public investment in canals gave it a right to a greater share in these profits. Therefore, the 1922-3 settlement of the Jhung and Gugera branches increased the revenue demand by 47% (Rs. 17 lakhs). Peasants protested against the revenue increase but the generally favourable economic conditions kept their opposition within bounds. However, in a different situation, they fought the government tooth and nail. Thus the auction of crown lands in 1926, 1927 and 1928 was followed by the great depression of 1929-30 which ate away the zamindars' resources and resulted in confiscation of 23299 acres out of a total of 35228 acres for non-payment of instalments towards purchase of land. Peasant unrest was acute and widespread. The government tried to appease the peasants by giving a concession to restore land in smaller pieces by paying within certain time limits. The expiry of the prescribed dates was again followed by protest leading to further extensions and this process was repeated many times upto 1936, when most of the auction purchasers finally got land. The same pattern emerged when the Government imposed a levy in the village shop sites in 1923; the matter dragged on for a decade, punctuated by mass campaigns and petitions for softening the conditions of rent payment and acquisition of proprietary rights which constantly forced the government to retreat in steps.

At the heart of this conflict lay individual property rights. The government had sole authority over definition and selective application
as well as delineation of the process of acquisition of these rights. Consequently, every matter related to property i.e. its sale, purchase, lease, inheritance, transfer, maintenance, taxation and planning, depended on one or the other government department at the district level. Indeed, the process of acquisition of proprietary rights by the grantees dragged on till the 1930s, almost forty years after the colonization began.

The 1930 depression made it clear that the peasant agriculture of Faisalabad, the Punjab Government, and the international economy had become closely interwoven. The slump in agricultural prices ate into peasant resources and spread general unrest among zamindars, despite the special remissions allowed by the government out of revenue demand. Zamindars campaigned for early commencement of settlement operations on the basis of current low prices. The government tried to postpone the assessment till prices were stable, but finally bowed to public pressure. A sliding scale system was introduced in Faisalabad after 1935. Out of the assessed revenue of Rs. 9,153,223, sliding rate remissions accounted for almost one-third, i.e. Rs. 3,913,156. However, zamindars' suspicion of settlement officers was at its peak during the assessment. There were many incidents of refusal to take canal water, insults to the subordinate Irrigation Officers, non-co-operation with the settlement staff and even assault on a police party. Zamindar Committees were formed to protest against the introduction of the sliding scale system which was thought to be prejudicial against zamindars, because the assumption of high computation prices did not refer to the prevalent market prices. Likewise, the remodelling of canal outlets by the Irrigation Department was widely interpreted as a way of reducing the supply of water. This permanent lack of confidence between the government and zamindars can be ascribed to the absence of suitable mechanisms for articulation of rural interests in the form of broad-based political parties, which could hold together the forces of continuity and change.
In addition to the conflict between the peasants and the state, another area of potential conflict was the rural-urban dichotomy which, in a surplus-producing district like Faisalabad, was to reflect the conflict between growers and sellers of agricultural produce, along with an overlapping communal division. The canal colonies were intended purely as means of increasing agricultural production. In 1904 Faisalabad district had only one urban centre with a population over 5000. This was the eponymous district town, which had been established in 1896 as a market centre and administrative headquarters. In both capacities it developed modestly but steadily in the following half-century. Various administrative and judicial buildings were put up, and in 1924 the famous agricultural college was established. Wholesale markets emerged in timber, hides and skins, salt, wheat and cotton. Agricultural processing industries soon followed, and in 1934 the city's first textile mill was established. In 1947, there were in the district 44 ginneries, 6 flour mills, 5 oil-expellers, 5 engineering workshops, and one textile mill.

A marked feature of Faisalabad city and of the other smaller urban areas that gradually developed was the disproportionate presence of the Hindus compared to the Muslims and Sikhs. As the table shows, their concentration in the towns was over twice that in the district as a whole. Although they were slightly outnumbered in the towns by the Muslims, they dominated the trade and industry of the district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Ratio of the Three Communities per Thousand in 1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hindus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Population</td>
<td>180.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td>409.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PDGLD (1912) Vol. XXXI (Lahore, 1913)
As against the Hindus' domination of the tiny urban sector, the agricultural land was largely held by the Muslims (58%) and Sikhs (31%), the Hindus being a poor third (6%). Although the political parties were rather late-comers on the local scene, once the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms were introduced, the Muslims and Sikh zamindars generally supported the Unionist Party. The Hindu population, however, generally supported either the Congress or one or other Hindi communal parties. The prevalence of self-cultivation in the district, a phenomenon that had been deliberately encouraged by the government, meant that within the rural sector itself there were no sharp conflicts of interest.

**Politics of Biradris**

The fact that Faisalabad district was by and large a middle peasant area meant that its rural social structure was relatively egalitarian and therefore not conducive to factional politics which by definition required the presence of rentier-landlords and the landless peasants. Here, typically, the peasant political activity was organised around the conflict between rival biradries of zamindars. After the old zaildars had been displaced by the incoming colonists, even among the gentry there were few individuals who were on a par with the great landlords of the old settled districts. The peasants who elsewhere would have been their clients were mostly tenants, dependent on the local officials rather than their feudal landlord. One reason behind the prevalence of biradri as the dominant form of peasant organisation in Faisalabad was the recent immigration of colonists from Eastern and Northern districts of Punjab. The process of implantation of substantially compact colonies of various communities retained, and even strengthened, the biradri ties, as security mechanisms in the highly competitive Chenab Colony. Based on the relatively prosperous landowning peasantry, biradri became the most typical form of political participation at the grassroots level. Among the Muslim rural population, Jats, Arains and Rajputs were the leading biradris.
The predominance of biradri profoundly influenced the shaping of the political structure in Faisalabad. Here the factional conflict was not on the scale of some other districts, which were in the mainstream of Punjab politics. That is why during the long years of the Unionist Party hegemony from the mid-1920s to mid-1940s, this district was very much in the background. On the other hand, the multiplicity of peasant groups on the basis of caste, religion, area of origin and type of grant (e.g., peasant, military, camel or lum bardari) tended to reinvigorate the institution of biradri as a unit of organisation both large enough to wield some real power but small enough to be coherent, given the current levels of communication and landholding.

The relatively high level of prosperity among the Faisalabad peasantry was instrumental in creating a strong class support for biradri politics in the new electoral framework. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms enfranchised 4.9% of the district population, which was nearly double the provincial average (2.58%). Likewise, competition between the rival candidates was multipolar and flexible as against the 'older' districts where a rigid bipolar factional struggle was the norm. For example, the two Legislative Council seats in Faisalabad were contested by 6 candidates in 1920, 11 in 1923 and 7 in 1926; in comparison, the Attock seat had only one candidate in 1920, and two each for the later elections.

In the same way, given the continuing focus on safeguarding rural interests, which coincided with the larger political struggle between the Hindus and Muslims, the Faisalabad zamindars were relatively more alive to wider ideological issues than the landlord factions of older districts. Faisalabad was sucked into pan-Indian politics in the 1940s, and considerable enthusiasm was aroused here by the Muslim League's campaign for Pakistan. This capitalized on the latent communal tensions mentioned above. In 1942, the annual session of the League was held in Faisalabad city which aroused considerable enthusiasm. We have noted that the Faisalabad peasantry
had been restive ever since the early colonization period. It had provided the mass base for all the major movements. But, in the controlled electoral framework under British India, provincial politics was dominated by the big landlord families of the older districts. Especially, after these families joined the bandwagon of the Muslim League, Faisalabad drifted into the backwaters.

Overall, the colonial state in the guise of the Punjab government succeeded in maintaining a highly controlled political environment in Faisalabad. As elsewhere in the province, however, the government was anxious to encourage a certain amount of elite involvement in routine administration through the institutions of local government. A district board with some elected members had been introduced at the time of the district's creation; by the time of the last pre-independence elections in 1935-36, the number of elected members had increased to 38, although there were a substantial number of nominated members in addition. Besides, the D.C. continued to be chairman until 1947. Although on paper it appeared that the board had a wide range of functions relating to local affairs, the checks and controls that were imposed on them left them with very little real initiative. In any case, it is doubtful whether even the will was there among the majority of members, content as they were to leave power in the hands of the bureaucracy. The position with respect to the municipal committee in the district was slightly different. Although subject to considerable official control here the elected element was larger, and their range of effective functions somewhat greater. They soon emerged as arenas for the communal activity, but their effective power was rather limited.

In this section we have observed that Faisalabad district rose from a nomadic land to one of the most developed agricultural area in Punjab. Large-scale colonization of the newly irrigated lands completely transformed the local power structure and brought about new patterns of authority. The following table gives a general idea about the development process in the district.
### TABLE

**Development of Faisalabad District; 1905/6 to 1930/1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1905-6</th>
<th>1910-11</th>
<th>1915-16</th>
<th>1920-21</th>
<th>1925-6</th>
<th>1930-31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>552021</td>
<td>857711</td>
<td>857711</td>
<td>979463</td>
<td>979463</td>
<td>1151351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated Acres</td>
<td>1335308</td>
<td>1405222</td>
<td>1632001</td>
<td>1493595</td>
<td>1434232</td>
<td>1540647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Revenue (Assessed): Rs.</td>
<td>1285913</td>
<td>3571385</td>
<td>5152306</td>
<td>5377543</td>
<td>7611680</td>
<td>5449082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Suits (No.)</td>
<td>2998</td>
<td>4036</td>
<td>5903</td>
<td>4129</td>
<td>6073</td>
<td>7285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Suits (Value) Rs.</td>
<td>359321</td>
<td>738132</td>
<td>1430461</td>
<td>2027632</td>
<td>6525014</td>
<td>5124005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities (Income) Rs.</td>
<td>122051</td>
<td>251410</td>
<td>302777</td>
<td>481729</td>
<td>659325</td>
<td>628122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensaries (Patients)</td>
<td>65805</td>
<td>104057</td>
<td>177012</td>
<td>194932</td>
<td>225807</td>
<td>566593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools (Students)</td>
<td>2483</td>
<td>7422</td>
<td>18607</td>
<td>25664</td>
<td>47942</td>
<td>72131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PDGLD (1935), Vol. xxv, Part B, (Lahore, 1936), Table 1, p.11.

As compared to 108.6% growth in population between 1905-6 and 1930-31, the area under irrigation in the district rose only by 15% in the same period, whereas the burden of land revenue increased from Rs. 0.963 per acre to Rs. 3.536 per acre. On the one hand there was 243% rise in litigation and a staggering 1426% rise in the money involved in it which was an indication of the potential of conflict due to frequent transferability of land. On the other hand, we see a steady expansion in the public services, indicated by 414.63% rise in the income of municipalities, 761% rise in patients treated in the dispensaries, and 2805% increase in the number of students. This reflected a new pattern of demand and supply of welfare services. All along, Faisalabad remained a model district for the colonial state to administer, and one which played no sustained part in politics of any description. The state had penetrated deeply into the fabric of society, but Faisalabad was still par excellence an 'administered area'. It was only after the changes brought about by independence and partition that political activity began to mature and to reflect the real condition of the district.
Section 2: Urban and Industrial Growth in Post-Independence Period

Faisalabad district was profoundly affected by the political turmoil which accompanied the partition of India. One third of its population migrated to India in 1947, while it attracted a very large number of incoming Muslim refugees. The subsequent economic and demographic changes brought about new tensions in various sectors of local society, leading to new group alignments. In this process, the nature and scope of the government's administrative machinery was radically transformed, as it involved itself increasingly with the management of economic growth as well as with the containment of its disruptive effects on the district's social and political order. These changes were even more significant in the urban sector, especially in Faisalabad city, thereby giving it enormous lead over the rest of the district. In the common bureaucratic parlance, Faisalabad came to be called as 'urban' district, to distinguish it from the 'rural' districts like Attock and Mianwali. The 'urban' character of the district lay in the predominant role of trade and industry in the economic and administrative fields, even though it contained a more productive cropping pattern and a more progressive peasantry than the so-called rural districts. In the present section, an attempt is made to analyse the political consequences of rapid urban growth in the specific case of Faisalabad city.

Pattern of Growth

In demographic terms, Faisalabad city grew by 156.2% between 1941 and 1951, as compared with a 54% increase in the overall district population. Through-out the 1950s, the rate of growth of the urban population in the district was 8 times that of the rural population, with an even higher rate for Faisalabad city proper. This phenomenal expansion of Faisalabad and other towns continued in the 1960s,
TABLE

Population Growth of Faisalabad District

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<tr>
<td>Faisalabad District</td>
<td>2152863</td>
<td>24.7</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>4241785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>51.1</td>
<td>3188769</td>
</tr>
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<td>573081</td>
<td>83.74</td>
<td>1053016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faisalabad City</td>
<td>179144</td>
<td>137.37</td>
<td>425248</td>
<td>93.61</td>
<td>823343</td>
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At the heart of urban growth lay the rapid industrial progress of Faisalabad city. In 1947, there was only one industrial unit, the Lyallpur Cotton Mills, which had an installed capacity of 55752 spindles and 1114 looms with an investment of Rs. 232 lakh; in addition there were 63 small manufacturing units. After the establishment of the Kohinoor and Crescent Textile Mills in 1950 by the Sehgals and the Chiniotis respectively, a host of textile and other industrial units emerged, till by the mid-1960s Faisalabad became the most industrialized city of Pakistan after Karachi. Although textiles remained at the core of industrial expansion, other investment areas included beverages, fertilizers, vegetable ghee, jute mills, sugar mills, plywood and bagasse board, pharmaceuticals, agricultural machinery as well as re-rolling and textile machinery. A total of more than 3000 industrial units accounted for 20% of the total built-up area in the city and employed 75% of its total urban work force of 65,000 in 1965.

The relatively advanced agrarian structure of Faisalabad played a crucial role in its industrialization. Thus, the local production of cotton provided a firm base for the cotton textile industry. The presence of cotton ginning factories and the elaborate agricultural marketing structures greatly facilitated the supply of raw cotton for spinning and weaving. Similarly the extensive railroad network linking the countryside with Faisalabad city led to the emergence of markets for
the manufactured goods of the local industry. In this way, the city
drew upon the relatively developed economic infrastructure of the
district from pre-independence days

As the large-scale manufacturing sector took giant strides
in Faisalabad city, the small scale industry also expanded on its
fringes, partially dependent on it and partially independently. In two
decades, there emerged about two and half thousand small industrial
units, employing 14000 workers. The power-loom industry took the
lion's share; it produced towels, bed sheets, and coarse cloth in
general and its small 'factories' were strewn all around the residential
colonies. Hosiery has been the main cottage industry, usually located
within the residential quarters. Many petty merchants, especially
Sheikhs, operate at this level, as do a few artisans, transport
workers and recent migrants from the country-side who have managed
to accumulate a small amount of capital. These people have a more
direct experience of labour in their day to day production cycle than
the large-scale manufacturer, the average number of workers being as
little as 5. They are even more ruthlessly committed to containment
of labour militancy than the latter. In the framework of local politics
they represent the religious extreme within the rightist parties.

It is interesting to note how the forces of market and state
have shaped the spatial structure of the city. Faisalabad, which is
often called the Manchester of Pakistan because of its textile
industry, also followed the latter's concentric zoning pattern of horizontal
expansion. Its central business district, with eight bazaars meeting at the
famous Clock Tower - girdled all around by the Circular Road - housed
major whole-sale markets and about 50% of the shops in the city.34 This
pattern can be compared with that of mid-19th century Manchester as
described by Engels.35 Manchester's central commercial centre was
half a mile long on each side. Over time it was abandoned by the
original residents. The 'money aristocracy' passed through its thorough­
fares without seeing misery prevalent on both sides. In Faisalabad
also, the half-mile square business district bustles with a hectic
business activity which tends to spill over to the adjoining areas on all sides. Because of extreme geographical proximity all the important business firms keep a direct and often personal link with each other and with the retail buyers and sellers of manufactured goods. The Clock Tower area has, therefore, overtime approximated the situation of a perfect market.

The residential colonies which grow up all around the eight bazaars after independence, have followed a crude stratification pattern. The Model Town, Gulberg and Jinnah Colony, in its vicinity, and People's Colony and Batala Colony at a distance, were built by the private sector, although planned and 'developed' by the Government. Farther away, the latter constructed some residential quarters for low-income refugee families in Ghulam Mohammad Abad, Samanabad and D-type colony. Industrial land-use developed along the link-roads, e.g. Sheikhupura Road, Samundari Road, Jhung Road, and Sargodha Road - within a five mile radius of the Clock Tower. Around these factories large concentrations of hovels and huts emerged, called Kachi abadis. Here the industrial workers formed the nucleus around which various groups of the self-employed and unemployed gathered. The haphazard character of the industrial location was reflected through the expansion of Kachi Abadis in different parts of the city. In the following pages we shall attempt to show how Faisalabad city's growth drew essentially upon the entrepreneurial activity of certain trading communities, which also brought about a spatially stratified society in the locality.

The Refugees

Among the various factors responsible for Faisalabad's emergence as an industrial city, the great exchange of population in 1947% played an important role. 63% of Faisalabad's population migrated to India leaving behind a considerable gap in trade, banking and agro-based industry. Subsequently, the huge influx of refugees drastically
changed the demographic composition of the city. They included a veritable cross section of the small trading communities from the East Punjab towns of Jullundar and Amritsar, e.g. Kashmiris, Khojas, Gaubas and Pirachas. Most of them were previously shopkeepers, skin and hide merchants, wholesalers, contractors and depot-holders. Certain self-employed artisan families from the agricultural castes of Ludhiana and Batala also settled in Faisalabad; many of them were Arains who, as market-gardeners, had gained experience of urban business and thus managed to establish workshops and foundries. Finally, the two big industrial houses of Sehgals and Chiniotis, though originally from West Punjab, came from Calcutta and Delhi where they were mainly engaged in export trade. Together, they initiated a remarkable entrepreneurial activity in Faisalabad.

Others among the refugees from East Punjab included a) such petty bourgeois sections as retailers, commission agents, teachers and 'para-professionals'; b) the urban poor i.e. day-labourers, transport workers and the unemployed and c) the poor peasants. Among the last category, many failed to get agricultural land allotted to them and thus 'preferred to stay on in the city to get free from the yoke of chaudhiris once and for all.'37 They formed the vanguard of recruitment to what later became a formidable working class population of the city. In this way both the employers and employees of the emergent industrial sector were engrafted on the city from outside. As the following table shows, within four years, the refugees accounted for 83% of Faisalabad's population. Later, however, when business activity expanded and attracted a large number of people from within the district and the country at large, their ratio in the local population went down, even though their absolute numbers continued increasing.

| TABLE  
Refugees in Faisalabad City |
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
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<td>% of the Total</td>
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<td>% of the Total</td>
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A crucial factor in Faisalabad's industrial development was the refugee entrepreneur-s' close links with the government which was committed to a policy of rapid industrialization based on favourable monetary and fiscal measures. Initially, the Urdu-speaking refugee leadership of the Muslim League provided economic incentives mainly to the trading communities from Bombay who helped industrialize Karachi in the immediate post-independence years. Later, however, the rise to power of such East Punjabi financial bureau-rats as Ghulam Mohammad and Chaudhary Mohammad Ali gave considerable advantages to their coethnics in the West Punjab towns and cities. In addition, the centre's need to have a political constituency in the Punjab, especially as the spectre of general elections loomed large, ensured a rising share for the Punjabis in the country's expanding industrial wealth. Therefore, Faisalabad was the prime candidate for industrial expansion, not least because it contained a large number of refugee entrepreneurs.

Administrative Activity

All along the government spearheaded Faisalabad city's march towards economic progress. This led to institutional proliferation on an enormous scale. Three main areas of administrative activity can be outlined. First of all, the government took up general promotional activities like transport surveys and analysis of the civilian labour force mainly through the recently established office of the provincial Directorate of Industries in Faisalabad. The same office issued licences and controlled the overall industrial and financial activity. Other institutions followed like the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports,
the Trading Corporation of Pakistan, the Industrial Development Finance Corporation, the Export Promotion Bureau, the Investment Promotion Bureau, the Registrar Joint Stock Companies and the like. The long-winded procedural work involved in dealing with these offices gave them enormous powers of selective patronage and extraction of bribes. In addition, the lower staff, which was often recruited from Faisalabad itself, became a formidable channel for the articulation and advancement of commercial interests because of pre-existing biradri loyalties and/or clientele structures. The state machinery therefore stratified the emergent society of Faisalabad according to the capacity of each individual or group to articulate its interests through the available channels.

The second area of administrative activity revolved around the government's fiscal measures and charges for various public services like railways, tele-communications, and electric and gas supply for the industrial sector. Here, corruption was less endemic but where it occurred it was on a larger scale than in the promotional agencies, because it involved avoiding direct payments to the government. Such a situation encouraged toutism in and around the departmental offices, and thus established an 'invisible' relationship between industrialists and government officials. However, unlike the promotional institutions which thrived on the state's role as a provider of the implements of capitalist production, the regulatory agencies also exercised coercive power against private capital.

As against these two functions which related essentially to the management of capital, the third area of administrative activity was concerned with the management of labour. The district labour department under a joint director has been responsible for implementation of the labour laws. Being directly involved with this important factor of production the labour department officials developed a vested interest in the perpetuation of industrial conflict. Most of them were on the pay roll of industrialists, along with their counterparts from the Police and Excise departments. An overall commitment to
the status quo has characterized their political role in Faisalabad city. Sometimes they have encouraged the 'outsiders' in the trade union movement to mobilize labour on certain issues or establish rival unions, so as to increase the price of their services to the millowners. Overall, they have enjoyed a central position in the web of labour relations in which the industrialists, trade unions, individual workers, police, magistrates, legal practitioners and Labour Court officials have all become involved in various capacities. As we shall see, the official involvement in labour relations on the one hand has deterred labour from outgrowing its own class position economically and ideologically through the legal and procedural structures of the state, and on the other served the entrepreneurial class by saving it from the rigid application of laws.

Rise of the Bourgeoisie

As the combined force of district administration and the merchant/industrialist class promoted the economic progress, the local power structure underwent internal changes. We have noted earlier that there were no big landlord families in Faisalabad to challenge the emergent bourgeoisie. In fact, the local zamindars already had a strong tradition of participating in commercial transactions; they dealt with traders in cash crops in the market towns, with those running processing industries like ginning factories and flour mills as well as with the government's food procurement agencies. A few active lawyer-zamindars were no match for the enormously resourceful industrialists and were soon marginalized in the city's politics. The massive influx of refugees had already destroyed whatever entrenched power blocks existed from pre-independence days. All these factors helped base the power structure of Faisalabad on the new industrial wealth of the emergent entrepreneurial class.
When the industrial units were established all around the city, various distribution agencies for their products started emerging in the eight central bazaars around the Clock Tower. This gave the millowners tremendous powers of patronage as they could pick and choose the dealers in their own products. Among them were many of the new allottee (refugee) zamindars, especially from the Arain biradri. However, the majority of them belonged directly to the refugee commercial biradris, collectively called Sheikhs, including Gaubas, Khojas, Chawalas and Pirachas. Many of them migrated twice, first settling elsewhere in the Punjab and only later shifting to Faisalabad, once economic activity gained momentum there. They increasingly dealt in processed raw materials for industry and other implements of production. By the beginning of the 1960s, many had already started their own auxiliary/small scale industries. They thus played second fiddle to the big industrial houses for whom they performed various functions on both the input and the output sides of the production cycle, leading to new patron-client relations. In the elitist mode of operation of the parliamentary politics in the 1950s, such patronage structures opened the way for the politically ambitious Sehgals to control the leading figures of the locality as they operated from the platform of, first, the Muslim League and, later the Republican Party.

On the other hand, at the more direct level of appointments for various jobs in industry, the patron-client relationships were more individualistic and were geared essentially to a trade-off between the authority of a public office and the job offer from the management of mills for the kith and kin of the respective holders of this authority. The millowners thus managed to create a whole group of clients among the officials of various departments, members of central and provincial
legislatures, political workers as well as employees and trade union leaders of their own mills. As these were underlined by carefully thought-out transactional relationships, these patronage structures were couched strictly in the dynamics of capital. They represented the powers of the state in terms of cash economy. The employment-creating industrial progress, therefore, created a new political resource in Faisalabad which subdued all other social groups and classes to the domineering role of bourgeoisie. Its practice of outright bribery bound the interests of individual government officials to itself. Individuals, in various government departments and also the District Boards, the Municipality, and the District and Labour Courts came to be known as the henchmen of either the Sehgals or the Chiniots. These bilateral patron-client relationships kept the wheels of capitalist economy moving through the jungle of administrative procedures.

The local industrialists made a bid to control the political organs of the state in the 1951 elections of the Punjab Assembly. Their greatest strength in terms of electoral politics lay in the fact that they commanded the votes of their fast expanding workforce. In the prevalent conditions of job insecurity and lack of any organisational base for trade union activity, the latter readily 'sold' their votes and took part in bogus voting in their thousands. The industrialist group financed the campaign of the Muslim League candidates Mir Abdul Qyum and Sheikh Mahboob Ellahi who eventually won the elections. Apart from providing huge funds to them, the millowners used their workforce for bogus voting on an enormous scale. Thus, the former was mainly 'supported' by the Lyallpur Cotton Mills workers while the latter won on the strength of the Kohinoor Textile Mills' workers. The near-serf position of industrial workers, who were still small in number and largely unorganised made them behave like urban counterparts of tenants. A virtual absence of class consciousness characterized their political behaviour as mere objects of their employers' will, despite cases of individual dissent here and there.
This new pattern of worker-use became even more pronounced in the municipal elections of 1956. The Municipal Committee had been given first-class status in 1949. In 1951, however, it was superseded, and it remained so until the first post-independence elections in January 1956, i.e. 21 years after the last elections. The elections were marred by large-scale bogus voting of scandalous proportions. All the tactics which had been employed in the Sargodha District Board elections in 1953, as discussed in the previous chapter, were used unabashedly. Thousands of workers personated genuine voters, many of them more than once at the same polling station; out of them 528 persons were arrested from whom the police recovered mill attendance cards which showed them on duty. 

Both active and passive connivance by the district administration was starkly obvious. Many presiding officers, in fact, facilitated the whole process of personation by giving the goondas of the Sehgal group free access to the electoral rolls inside the polling station; from these they got the numbers of the uncast votes, on the basis of which bogus voters were sent in. Even those who could not give their (impersonated) father's names were allowed to vote. Some boxes contained more ballot papers than the number shown on the electoral lists. When the results came out, the Sehgal group won a clear majority, and their henchman Sheikh Bashir Ahmed became the president of the Faisalabad Municipal Committee.

There followed a country-wide furore over the election malpractices. The District Bar Association of Faisalabad passed a resolution demanding an enquiry into the matter. Dr. Khan Sahib, the Republican Party Chief Minister of West Pakistan, first conceded the holding of an enquiry but then balked over the whole issue. He could ill-afford to lose the support of industrialists who were the patrons of many of his own party's MPA's and had direct links with the top bureaucracy, including Iskandar Mirza. We can observe that the shift in the industrialists' support from the Muslim League to the Republican
Party followed the ascendancy to power of the latter both in the centre and the province.

After the imposition of Martial Law in 1958, the intermediary role of politicians was eliminated. The unabashed bureaucratic rule that followed tended to disregard the zamindars. In its pursuits of economic development along the lines of import-substituting industrialization, the bureaucracy favoured and helped the entrepreneurial groups, both big and small. While the Sehgars and Chiniots saw a special rise in their status, the emergent commercial middle class, including the cloth wholesalers, yarn merchants, transporters, exporters and importers from the central bazaars, provided an economic base for developmental activity. In due course, the orthodox sections of petty bourgeoisie, the retailers, the foremen and overseers of various industrial units and the petty officers of different public or commercial institutions as well as the ulema emerged as the ideological supporters of the bourgeoisie and the commercial middle class.

These two classes together formed the core of right-wing political activity in Faisalabad. They were dispersed in different political parties according to biradri ties, patron-client relations and individual ideological predilections. In the early 1950s, the Muslim League enjoyed a firm support base in the city. Its local leaders were 'public men' of little importance in provincial politics, who had no weight in the city's power structure either. Its MPA, Mir Abdul Qayum, for example, belonged to the District Bar and had no urban or rural property to boast of. During the Martial Law years of the Ayub regime, those on the right of the centre thrived on the greatly expanded entrepreneurial activity and developed a big stake in the 'stability' of the government. Consequently, a majority of them supported the Convention Muslim League in the 1965 elections for President and the National and Provincial assemblies.
Chaudhary Mohammad Ali, the leader of the Nizam-e-Islam Party, mobilized considerable support among the Arain biradri of Faisalabad city. But, the local Muslim League stalwart, Zahid Sarfraz, gradually won a stronger constituency among both the Arain and assorted sections of the Sheikhs, even though in electoral terms he turned out to be an all-time loser. Among religious parties, the orthodox ulema of the JUI enjoyed the support of the 'business' refugees from Doaba Bist Jullundar, who had a long tradition of pro-Daoband, pro-Ahrar-e-Islam political and religious activities. The JUP was more popular among the 'liberal' petty bourgeois sections from Amritsar. The JI's support was thinly spread over a spectrum of the middle class professionals and students as well as the lower sections of the salariat. Overall, their ideological battles over the Islamic nature of Pakistan's constitution dominated their political activity, which was characterized by hostility to such demands as provincial autonomy, labour reforms and holding of general elections. After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, economic recession hit the city very hard. Criticism of bureaucracy became the rallying ground against the Ayub regime. In this crisis, the local base of the state itself started shifting away from the industrial-commercial class.

In opposition to this alignment of rightist forces in Faisalabad city, a 'liberal-progressive' stratum existed among certain sections almost from the beginning. The great onrush of East Punjabi urban refugee entrepreneurs alienated a section of local zamindars, especially the abadkars, who were increasingly marginalized in the framework of local politics. A new contradiction emerged between zamindars and non-zamindars, which sometimes took the form of a class conflict, as the former tried to create a support base in the trade union movement of Faisalabad city. Among them were included persons like Habibullah Saadi, an ex-Khaksar leader, whose vision of Islamic egalitarianism impelled them to publicly support the cause of industrial labour, and offer refuge to certain trade union activists under persecution by the police at the behest of millowners. Other forms of help included public criticism of the employers' ruthless tactics, use of biradri links in the government departments of Labour, Police and Magistracy to redress the
workers' grievances as well as provision of funds both for the dismissed workers and for their organisational activity in general.

After the 1958 coup, the zamindars rapidly declined in social importance as the new regime committed itself to support the industrialists whole-heartedly. In the emergent set-up of power politics, the latter clearly outcompeted the former and sought to ride over the state machinery. We look at one such example in which the local power wielding groups and institutions competed with each other. That will give us a clue to the new alignment of forces in Faisalabad. Sehgal bought 48 squares of agricultural land and built a model farm on it, using the most modern technology. They behaved like feudal lards of yore, harassing the neighbourhood and coercing others into compulsory deals with them. In one such dispute about purchase of land, one Hakim Dilbar Rana sided with their opponents. The Sehgal tried to put pressure on him, and threatened to freeze his account in the United Bank. However, Hakim went ahead with delivering evidence against them in the court. He was murdered soon after, allegedly by a gang of the Sehgal's goondas, led by one Faiz Gundawala. Subsequently, there were attempts to hush up the matter by both press and judiciary. One journalist, Mahi, who tried to cover the case in his paper Kohistan was assaulted. It was widely known that Justice Yaqub Ali of the Punjab High Court had specially 'ordered' the newspapers not to publish the Sehgal's name.

On the other hand, the kinsmen of the late Hakim Rana approached General Bakhtiar Rana, the Deputy Martial Law Administrator to help his biradri fellows against the Sehgal. At the local level, many journalists, trade union leaders and lawyers organised a resistance movement and demanded full press coverage of the case in the papers. Finally, the Nawai Waqt and Imroze obliged. The SP had his own contradictions with the Sehgal. The day before President Ayub, who was touring Faisalabad, was to dine at the Sehgal, the SP's men 'managed' to arrest
Saeed Sehgal while he was armed, thus pre-empting pressure either from the D. C. or higher police officers. The scandal was so big that Ayub had to cancel his dinner. The forces involved in the Sehgal episode variously drew upon, i) class contradictions, ii) biradri ties, iii) the patronage structures established both in the district administration and at the higher levels, and finally, iv) the potential autonomy of the state.

Various sections of the petty bourgeoisie emerged in Faisalabad in the 1950s and 1960s. Those relatively more productive among them, i.e. the artisans, the self-employed, the journalists, insurance workers, school teachers, and retailers were gradually mobilized in favour of an overhauling of the system. As distinguished from the orthodox petty bourgeoisie mentioned earlier, this 'radical' section took part in the politics of industrial relations from the platform of various leftist political parties. Some of them had even brought out an Urdu weekly Insaaf (justice). Its editor, Shams, wrote a pamphlet Char Darwesh (four sages) in Urdu, in which he attacked the actions of four individuals; in particular he lashed the local ADM's corrupt practices and the Sehgals' bullying tactics. Shams was murdered soon after, allegedly at the Sehgals' behest. However, no elaborate judicial enquiry into the affair was made. The general apathy of the district administration towards such acts of goondajism continued unabated. As against this radical petty bourgeoisie, the orthodox section of that class found itself on the same side of the fence with the bourgeoisie in the name of anti-communism. Towards the late 1960s, both sections of petty bourgeoisie were increasingly sucked into the politics of industrial relations, albeit on opposite sides.

Politics of Trade Unionism

To outline the pattern of political participation by the industrial labourers of Faisalabad, we have to look at their recruitment methods and their employment conditions which both initiate and contain their
organisational activity. Usually, the recruitment takes place outside the mill gates where job-seekers from the surrounding villages and the city proper gather early in the morning. At this stage, three persons are involved: the labour officer/jobber of the mill who examines the candidates; the supervisor of the concerned section with an employment vacancy who has a say in 'passing' them, and a guarantor for the candidate's good behaviour from within the mills, a mechanic, a foreman, an overseer or anyone else from the lower management staff. This procedure ensures that the latter can win jobs for their clients' kith and kin, or biradri fellows. Their need to keep this channel of privileged access open enforces a certain obligatory 'discipline' upon clients. This makes the task of the existing militant trade unionist very difficult, because the new workers cling to their benefactors for a considerable time.

The terms of employment are almost always arbitrarily settled by the employers, because the workers' bargaining position is extremely weak. Under the Ayub regime, it was ordered that the new Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance of 1960, which replaced the 1946 Act, should be displayed outside various sections of the mill, so that the workers would know what they were opting for. However, the practical utility of such measures was nullified by the situation of acute unemployment, especially after the eviction of large numbers of tenants from their lands during the Green Revolution. The cumulative pattern of workers' insecurities differs from mill to mill, depending on the situation of residential accommodation, distance from the villages, job classification (i.e. substitute, provisional or casual) and the degree of administrative repression in such procedural matters as entitlement to rest intervals, payment of bonus, paid holidays, occupational hazards and pension gratuity. Any combination of these insecurities provides the breeding ground for the labour unrest which under specific conditions can lead to organized action.
Trade union activity in Faisalabad started in the early 1940s in the Lyallpur Cotton Mills, and was organised by a few members of the Communist Party of India, led by Baba Pathe Chik and Ghulam Mohammad Kalloo. However, it was only in the late 1950s that real organisational activity developed among the workforce, mainly because the percentage of industrial labour had increased tremendously in the previous two decades. While in 1941 agricultural and industrial workers accounted for 35.7% and 7.4% of the city's workforce respectively, in 1961 the corresponding figures were 12.5% and 49.8%, an almost seven-fold increase in the proportion of industrial workers in Faisalabad's total workforce. If we take into account the phenomenal population growth in the two decades, the real increase was almost forty-fold. That factor brought about a qualitative change. Previously, there were only a few mills, and the management had an all-pervasive hold over the workers. By the 1960s the workers in all the mills were in regular contact with one another and with the 'outsiders', (political party workers and other sympathetic elements among the lawyers, journalists and landowners) as well as with the Labour Department itself, thereby learning the rules of game. The workers became conscious that they had a common cause and that ways and means existed to fight for it.

The industrial workforce of Faisalabad has been internally divided along the lines of a) area of origin and b) residential pattern, giving birth to shifting patterns of alignment within the labour movement. As for the area of origin, the workers fell into three main categories: the Indian refugees, the up-country migrants and the natives of Faisalabad district. Initially, an absolute majority of the workers in Lyallpur Cotton Mills consisted of the Urdu-speaking refugees from India. In the 1960s, however, the non-migrant workers already accounted for 30 to 40 percent of the mills' workforce. The early predominance of refugee workers was responsible for a certain organisational maturity and
pragmatism in trade union activity. Mainly because these workers had a longer experience in this field in and around Dehli from pre-independence days.

The workers from the Northern districts of the Punjab have suffered from the added pressures of continuing family obligations back home. They brought with them attitudes of passive hostility against the landlord oppression which were engrafted on their new relations with the millowners. On the other hand, workers from the surrounding villages have been less militant; in many cases they own or cultivate a small piece of land, rear livestock and are engaged in cottage industry. Inflation and job insecurity therefore press comparatively less on them than on the migrants. This internal division of Faisalabad's labour community, however, assumes a meaningful character only when seen in the overall context of the composition of local workforce.

While the area of origin plays a significant part in the organisation of labour politics, its importance diminishes with every day that passes. On the other hand, the workers' residential pattern has a decisive impact on their day-to-day understanding of their own class position, their emerging leadership patterns and their organisational capacity. As noted earlier, nearly one-third of the labour force commutes daily from the surrounding villages within a radius of 10 miles around Faisalabad. Although less militant than certain other groups, the commuter workforce has played a very significant role in spreading class consciousness in the countryside in the 1960s. Therefore, their long-term political role has been decisively mobilist. In contrast, those who find accommodation in the mills residential quarters generally suffer from an acute sense of insecurity derived from the risk of being evicted. Their combative strength therefore has been much lower than others, especially as their contact with other social groups remains minimal.
Finally, it is the slum dwellers who have been the real backbone of labour militancy in Faisalabad. The slum areas, popularly called kachi abadis are clusters of hovels and huts which were constructed by the inmates themselves on state land near various factories. The biggest among them is the Kachi-Basti (Factory area) outside the Lyallpur Cotton Mills. It is a low-lying area, with nearly a hundred ponds of dirty water, heaps of filth and no drainage system. Electricity and Sui gas are almost unknown. Water comes from the community hand pumps. Many of the inmates keep buffalos and cows within the living quarters, which usually consist of one or two rooms only. The same situation obtains in other kachi abadis, in Haji Abad, Akbar Abad, Mustafa Abad, Mai-di-Jhuggi, Bole-di-Jhuggi, Negehban pura, Jhung Road, Ghulam Mohammad Abad and various other places around the city. The government has tried to impose a slum clearance and resettlement policy from time to time and allotted plots to some of the residents in other places but nothing worked. Some of the security mechanisms in the kachi abadis, characterized by the primary ties of language, caste, biradri or area of origin, kept the residents firmly rooted in their respective communities. Other considerations like proximity to the place of work also militated against moving elsewhere. Although the industrial workers constitute a majority here, these Kachi abadis include elements from all occupations, e.g. artisans, retailers, mechanics, hakims, mullahs, midwives, students, teachers, beggars, domestic servants, vendors and a large army of the unemployed. The internal differentiation of these mini-societies is characterized by the existence of community leaders who usually have permanent jobs in some government office or industrial/commercial concern. Among them are creditors, rentiers, dadagirs (urban counterparts of rassagirs), shopkeepers, and 'penny capitalists' with investments in transport, or residential/shop sites. Many ex-employees/'outsiders' residing in these slums forged a link between trade unionism and the larger working class movement in the late 1960s, to which we shall return later.
The emergent labour force of Faisalabad was thus divided along various lines related to areas of origins, residential pattern, and to a lesser extent, biradri loyalties. In the Nishat Mills, for example, the conflict between local and non-local workers played the leading role. Among the predominantly non-local workers of the Crescent Mills, the main groupings emerged on the basis of the area of origin, variously called the Jhelum biradri, the Pindi biradri, the Mianwali biradri etc. In the Kohinoor Mills, it was the Arain/Rajput controversy which underlay the politics of trade unionism for a long time. The workers from various kachi abadis developed their own factions, which muddled with industrial relations inside many factories. Together, these primordial ties kept labour activity pinned down to sectarian conflicts. While generally class consciousness increased among the workers, their political organisation still followed traditional patterns.

The task of political articulation of Faisalabad's working class problems has been carried out essentially by the 'outsiders'. Many outsiders have had their political links with the NAP and later the Mazdoor Kisan Party (MKP) and the Pakistan Socialist Party (PSP). Their revolutionism and strike-orientation often isolated them from the ongoing pragmatic struggle of the workers. Also at the ideological level, their 'scientific socialism' proved too pedantic and apparently 'atheistic'. Increasingly, however, the younger generation of 'outsiders' was influenced by the post-partition political culture of Pakistan, laden with the spirit of Islam and nationalism. Many of them were previously the progressive minded workers of the opposition parties. Islamic Socialism, therefore, became the raison d'être of the new left in the city represented by 'outsiders' such as Mukhtar Rana. We shall discuss this change in the local level trade-union leadership in Section 4.

Till now we have concentrated on the political significance of the demographic and industrial growth of Faisalabad city alone. The same kind of processes took place in other cities of the district which had
smaller numbers of industrial units and were far less exposed to
the politics of industrial relations. Kamalia, for example, emerged as the
second largest city in the district mainly because it had a relatively
autonomous rural base of its own, away from the pull of Faisalabad.
Jaranwala city, the third largest city housed many mills as a spillover
effect of industrialization of Faisalabad, and proximity to, and direct
railway link with, Lahore. Likewise fast growing town of Gojra is
situated on the main commercial route linking Faisalabad and Jhung
districts by road, and Faisalabad and Multan districts by rail. The
growth of Samundri is, again, a spillover effect of Faisalabad, while
Toba Tek Singh has merely stagnated.

Our findings in this section point to various factors which were
responsible for Faisalabad's phenomenal industrial growth, e.g. its
relatively advanced agricultural infrastructure, the absence of big
landlords, the influx of refugee entrepreneurs and the government's
commitment to a policy of rapid industrialization. These factors
brought fundamental changes in the structure of local politics. On the
one hand, the loci of power shifted from the rural to the urban sector
in two senses: the emergent industrial-commercial class introduced
a new political resource into the locality in the form of its patronage powers
based on industrial wealth, and the district administration drew its
strength increasingly from the management of the urban economy. On the
other hand, the role of industrial labour changed from being a mere
object of the employer's will in the early 1950s to playing a central
part in the politics of the late 1960s, especially through the increasing
rural-urban linkages. This brought forth a new political stratum which
was to lead the working-class population of Faisalabad in the confrontation
with the bourgeoisie through the turbulent years of the anti-Ayub movement
and the 1970 elections.
Section 3: Agrarian Change in the Post-Independence Period

In section I of this chapter we discussed the tremendous rise in the government's regulatory and manipulative powers vis-a-vis the emergent peasant society of Faisalabad in the pre-independence period. It produced a direct but diffuse relationship between the two. After 1947, such issues as refugee settlement and, later, provision of implements of agricultural development re-inforced the same trend, creating thereby a situation of generalized involvement between state and society. Secondly, the Green Revolution, while enriching a substantial number of farmers, resulted in the impoverishment of a very large number of peasants who were forced either to continue living in the villages on reduced holdings or to migrate to cities. In both cases the pressure on the rural social structure was enormous. Finally, the phenomenal industrial and commercial growth of Faisalabad city, as discussed in the previous section, re-defined the urban-rural linkages in the district. The urban sector tended to encapsulate the rural sector, largely because of its stronger links with the national and world market forces in general. In this section, therefore, we shall discuss the political consequences of the increase in i) the state-centredness of the rural power structure ii) the economic strength of the rich farmers as a result of Green Revolution, and iii) the involvement of the urban sector in the countryside from a position of strength.

State as Arbiter, Regulator and Creator of Landed Property

The story of agriculture in the district is almost identical with that of canal irrigation. 84% of its soil is classified as good/very good irrigated land. Water is supplied from 1664 miles of canals to the village farmlands through countless distributaries. The whole district is divided into chaks, each commanding an area ranging from 348 to 1044 acres. The whole area is irrigated through the outlets each with a flow of 2.84 cusecs per thousand acres. As we noted earlier, the significance of the canal-based water supply has been crucial for
agricultural development in the Punjab, and Faisalabad is its most typical example. Due to this high production value of canal water, the farmers are absolutely committed to its supply, even if they have to resort to illegal activities like breaking the outlets, making cuts into the rajbahs (distributaries), and diverting canal water into the water-courses by blocking the flow of water into others' fields. All this frequently leads to factional feuds, resulting in years of litigation.

At the heart of the problem lies the ultimate control of the Irrigation Department over canal waters which are the life-line of the local peasant society. Faisalabad has inherited a structural subjugation of the latter by the former from the colonization days early this century. The system of scheduling the water-turns through opening the outlets on individual farms, called warabandi, has been the subject of bitter wrangling among the farmers. Here again recourse is finally taken to intervention by the Irrigation Department, which usually draws up a permanent system (pacci warabandi). Arbitration by this state agency in individual peasant disputes, on top of the existing farmework of district courts, renders all initiative firmly in the hands of bureaucracy.

Indeed, the whole system of canal management contains many areas of potential conflict, as we have discussed in Section I. Those farmers, for example, whose lands are located at the tail-end of canals, especially in Toba Tak Singh tehsil, have perforce to make greater efforts than the upland farmers, for cleaning and maintenance of the common water-courses; even then they get less water than is allotted to them. The small farmers in general are in a permanently underprivileged position vis-a-vis the big farmers. At the heart of the matter lie the corrupt practices of the local bureaucracy which over time have become the basis of long-term relationship between the district administration and zamindars. Consequently, the question of scarcity of canal waters has been at the centre of a smouldering peasant movement ever since the late 1930s, when the Kisan Sabha Committees were first formed in Faisalabad district. A generalized oppositionist stance has characterized the political attitudes in the South-Western parts of the district, mainly comprising Toba Tek Singh tehsil which is situated at the tail-end of canals.
The government's firm hold over the local peasantry acquired a new lease of life after the partition of India, which was accompanied by a large-scale exchange of population. The enormous task of settlement of refugees on the evacuee lands provided opportunities for personal gains to the officials of the newly created Rehabilitation Department and, through the network of horizontal relations within the officialdom to most other departments as well. Initially, Mian Iftikharuddin, the Rehabilitation Minister of the Punjab had announced a Gozara (subsistence) scheme under which a minimum of one acre per person and a maximum of 8 acres per family were to be temporarily allocated to the immigrants, from the evacuee land left by the outgoing Hindus and Sikhs; in Faisalabad district this amounted to 638,254 acres. However, in 1949, 'claims' were invited from the refugees on the basis of the property they had left behind in India, and from 1952, this land was re-allotted to people with 'bonafide' claims, with a maximum limit of 2000 produce index units. In this process, many of those who had temporary allocations were rendered landless, while others acquired quite large holdings. Thus, a sort of land reform in reverse took place, in which connections with the district administration, especially with the rehabilitation department, played the most crucial role. Almost in one go, the refugee-dominated bureaucracy of Pakistan created a new propertied class of middle farmers from amongst the refugees of Faisalabad district, whose stake in the prevalent state system, was, therefore, enormously increased.

The original colonists of disparate origins had hardly been welded into a cohesive community, when the influx of refugees tore it apart, introducing new political resources based largely on acquisition of landed propert. At the village level, the 1947 allotments of land to refugees caused disaffection among the already settled colonists (abadkars), as well as the locals (janglis) wherever they existed, giving birth to new factional alignments between the three groups. A high incidence of violence followed. The fight for lumbarāri positions between the rival factions among the refugees centred around the capacity of each candidate to get fertile lands allotted to his followers. After the re-allotment of land started in 1954, these factional feuds took on a new lease of life, shattering the relatively cohesive village community.
altogether. In this grand process of bestowing land on some and taking it away from others, the real power continued to slip into the hands of the district-level officers from the Revenue, Irrigation and Rehabilitation departments.

In addition to the evacuee property, 490268 acres of the government lands were available for allotment in 1947. Various allotment schemes were taken up in the following years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resettlement of Ejected Tenants</td>
<td>41220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grow More Food</td>
<td>15671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakhilkari Area</td>
<td>94431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangla Dam Evacuees Resettlement</td>
<td>17228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbardari Mule Breeding</td>
<td>17162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallantry Award</td>
<td>12154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarbela Dam Scheme</td>
<td>9516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>223548</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Deputy Commissioner Faisalabad, PDGFD (Faisalabad, 1980), pp 184-5.

Apart from the first category, all other schemes were entirely without mass pressure, a fact which gave the district administration a monopoly of initiative. In other words, the local machinery of the state maintained a direct stake in landed property, using it as an instrument of policy. If we take into account the total allotment of the evacuee and the government lands, i.e. 638012 and 223548 acres respectively, then the district administration of Faisalabad was directly responsible for creating a very large landowning stratum occupying 45% of all agricultural land in the district. Such enormous powers of appropriation, similar to those enjoyed by the colonization officers at the turn of the century, turned the district into the epitome of bureaucratic rule.
The Rural Class Structure and Green Revolution

Our second area of investigation is the agrarian change in Faisalabad. This district moved towards high production technology about the mid 1960s, when the government turned to agricultural sector whole-heartedly, once the import-substituting industrialization had saturated and food shortage had become a chronic problem. The new phase has been described as capitalist farming following a definition of capitalist farms as units based on hired labour, producing commodities for sale in the market for profit.\(^{60}\) Ashok Rudra characterizes the capitalist farmer as one with a tendency to a) cultivate his land himself, b) use hired labour, c) use farm machinery, d) sell his produce in the market, and e) organise his enterprise with a view to getting the maximum return on his investment.\(^{61}\) The emergence of capitalist farmers in post-independence Faisalabad district shows that an analysis of agrarian capitalism cannot be divorced from its historical context, because only in those districts where capital was already operative in the infrastructural, commercial and agro-based industrial sectors that capitalist farming took roots.\(^{62}\)

We have already noted that Faisalabad district inherited a predominantly self-cultivating peasantry from the colonial period. It had an average farm size of 8.87 acres in 1960.\(^{63}\)

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
 & No. of holdings & Area \\
\hline
Holdings of 5 acres and less & 40 & 11 \\
Holdings between 5 and 25 acres & 53 & 65 \\
Holdings of 25 acres and above & 7 & 24 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Pattern of landholding in Faisalabad district: 1960}
\end{table}


The element of big landlords present in many older districts of Punjab was largely absent from Faisalabad. Indeed, only 13 land owners in the whole district were affected by the 1959 land reforms, and together they surrendered only 1826 acres.\(^{64}\) We have noted how the profit motive and market orientation defined the very basis of the whole colonization
experiment. Even though the prevalence of hired labour was rather limited and the use of farm machinery was relatively unknown, the structural prerequisites for a breakthrough into the capitalist form of agricultural production already existed in Faisalabad district in the form of the social relations of commercial agriculture.

The Green Revolution of the 1960s drew upon the use of both mechanical and biological technologies. The use of chemical fertilizers was negligible in 1960 and the use of new seed of dwarf wheat was still largely unknown; in 1972 both had risen enormously.

| TABLE |
| Use of Biological Technology: Comparison between 1960 and 1972 |
| Manure / Fertilizer: % of Total Cropped Area | Mexi-Pak Wheat: % of Total Wheat Area |
| 1960 | 18 | -- |
| 1972 | 82 | 86.5 |


Only 1319 farm households, i.e. a mere 0.6% of a total of 217432 households reported using tubewells and pumps in 1960s. Tractor use was not even mentioned in the Agricultural Census of 1960. However, by 1972, the use of mechanical technology had greatly expanded, giving birth to new stratification patterns in the rural population. The use of high-yielding seed and fertilizer depended on a large expansion in water supply from tubewells; at least 10% of the irrigated area depended exclusively on tubewells, while on a still larger area they provided water jointly with canals and other sources.
It is clear that there was a huge gap between the number of users and owners of the new agricultural machinery; there were 13.48 users of each tubewell, and 32 users of each tractor. The use of farm machinery became widespread in the 1960s. Thus, 51.6% of all farms used tubewell facilities, while 41.8% of them used tractors. Significantly, the table shows that a very high proportion of those owning the farm implements, i.e. 95.7%, 95% 100%, 78.5% and 93% respectively belonged to the category of farmers owning 12.5 acres or more. In other words the ownership of agricultural machinery tended to be concentrated in the upper strata of farmers, whose installed capacity far exceeded their need. A new pattern of enterprise emerged based on hiring out the machinery and/or selling water from the tube-well. The owners’ incentive after having spent a lump sum on the purchase of machinery, was comparatively less pressing than the non-owning users' critical dependence on its use for sowing, irrigating, harvesting, winnowing, threshing and transporting the crop. Both were connected through an unequal exchange between their needs, in which the latter participated from a position of weakness. In consequence, the new contractual relationships between the sellers and buyers of farm services increased the dependence of the latter on the former as a function of the capitalist agrarian economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Power driven Blade</th>
<th>Power driven drill</th>
<th>Power Sprayer</th>
<th>Private Tubewell</th>
<th>Private Tractors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All users</td>
<td>3518</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>97967</td>
<td>79471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All owners</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>1478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users owning less than 12.5 acres</td>
<td>1318</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>62471</td>
<td>49329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners owning less than 12.5 acres</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1486</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users owning 12.5 acres and above</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>35496</td>
<td>30142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners owning 12.5 acres and above</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5422</td>
<td>2304</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This new functional dependence of the non-owners of agricultural machinery was compounded by a structural squeeze perpetrated on the landless by the landowners in the form of full or partial resumption of land for self-cultivation. There followed important changes in the structure of land tenure during the 1960s which consolidated the commercial gains of zamindars in the form of a more direct control over the whole production process. The landed property became less and less encumbered by such rights as those of tenants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Owner Cultivators</th>
<th>Owner-cum-tenants</th>
<th>Tenants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farms: 1960</td>
<td>217432</td>
<td>113425</td>
<td>31579</td>
<td>72428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms: 1972</td>
<td>189896</td>
<td>90104</td>
<td>55900</td>
<td>42892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area; acres 1960</td>
<td>1928776</td>
<td>915398</td>
<td>363233</td>
<td>650145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area; acres 1972</td>
<td>1915574</td>
<td>720891</td>
<td>750809</td>
<td>443874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table shows that even a small property in land could fetch a secure tenancy from the renting farmers as in the case of owner-cum-tenants. In other words, the structure of rural economy was such that property in land became the highest social value. It has often been pointed out that the Green Revolution transformed the social relations of production along capitalist lines. What is less often noted is that property relations were also transformed both legally and economically. In the legal sense, landed property became increasingly unencumbered as tenancy rights were thrown off, 'freeing' it from its structural links with a previous mode of production. Property could now easily be turned into capital and vice versa. In the economic sense, it robbed a vast number of tenants of their
only 'rightful' relationship with the agricultural economy, the only alternative being abandoning agricultural production altogether. In other words, while landed property acquired the status of unencumbered capital, peasant labour was marginalized still further in the framework of the rural economy, with only meagre chances of absorption into the urban economy. This process resulted, finally, in 'freeing' the two sides from their mutual obligations. Both now tended to see their own and each other's roles in the wider context of a capitalist economy.

Rural-Urban Integration

Our third area of investigation is the relevance of the urban economy for the agrarian changes. A majority of the contemporary studies on peasant societies have analysed their political behaviour largely with reference to the changing class relations within the rural population itself. They have stressed the Green Revolution-induced insecurities as the basis of peasant restiveness.\(^6\) It is argued here however, that unless there exists strong urban-rural linkage in the locality, encompassing various classes, the Green Revolution would not induce mass unrest in any recognised form. Almost everywhere, the industrial and commercial expansion is based in cities which are in most cases also the administrative headquarters for their respective localities. The urban sector behaves as a conduit of national and international market relations. The strength or weakness of the urban-rural linkages is therefore the measure of economic integration of the locality with the larger society, and by the same token a means of enlarging the arena for struggle between various groups and classes.

This struggle is facilitated by the means of transport. From 1947, a revolutionary change occurred in Faisalabad in this sector. Previously the bullock-carts bore the main burden of transport between towns and countryside; in Faisalabad city's case, for example, half a
day's journey by these carts from and to the village covered a maximum of 10 miles each way. Its 'urban field' was therefore limited to a radius of 10 miles on all sides. With the introduction of buses and trucks, and during the Green Revolution period tractor-trollies in their thousands, the city's urban field has expanded to nearly 50 miles on each side. The rural-urban integration has therefore taken a giant stride forward in terms of both numbers of travellers and frequency of their travel.

This horizontal expansion depends basically on the level of exchange of material goods and services between the city and countryside. For more than half a century, the latter has marketed its surplus production in wheat, cotton and other crops in Faisalabad city and other market towns. The phenomenal increase in the urban population and rapid growth of cotton industry both demanded speedy marketing of various agricultural products. There are ten regulated markets in the district which cover grain, vegetables, fruit and livestock. Commission agents and brokers are the main market functionaries. They also store the sellers' grain, extend credit to them and sometimes are responsible for transportation of grain over longer distances. The two sides however, operate in different ways in the wider financial world. For example, in Faisalabad tehsil, a study showed that farmers got only 16.4% of their credit from the institutional agencies (and the rest from non-institutional sources), as against the commission agents who got 98.35% of their credit from the commercial banks. This indicates the two different financial 'worlds' in which the two sides moved, the latter being invariably stronger because of its base in the stable financial institutions of both the state and the capitalist economy. The growers resent the economic power of this non-producing stratum from the urban centres and have always reared a passive hostility against them.
This unequal relationship between growers and buyers is compounded by the presence of multiple levels of exchange between them which not only accumulates profit for the latter but also adds considerably to the cost of agricultural produce for the ultimate consumer/industrial processor. In the marketing of cotton for example, transactions take place at three levels. 64.3% of all sales take place in the primary village markets these sales mainly cover the small quantity of marketable surplus which it is too costly to transport to the market. Out of all the sales at this level almost half go to the itinerant dealers and the remainder equally to the village shopkeepers and beoparies (petty traders). At the level of secondary markets in mundi towns the commission agents are the main market functionaries. They buy 87.5% of the crop assembled by the itinerant dealers. Increasingly they have been buying directly from those producers who have considerable amounts of surplus and can afford the transportation costs. 42% of these commission agents were reported to have provided financial facilities to zamindars, 59% of them over-night lodgings, 6% seed and 2% fertilizers. At the final stage, the ginners purchase 86% of raw cotton through these commission agents.

Such elaborate trade links dominated the agricultural sector of Faisalabad district which is characterized by small peasant holdings, financial dependence on the non-agricultural sector and failure to organise. A move towards forming development co-operatives to enhance the growers' bargaining powers vis-a-vis buyers was considered, whereby the erstwhile credit co-operative were to assume marketing functions to secure the interests of their members. However, the relatively small number of these members, their meagre resources, and the absence of any organisational links with the market committees militated against any fruitful outcome.

Apart from marketing food and cash crops, the countryside supplies milk and vegetables to the towns. The perishable nature of both commodities ensures that their supply zone would be in the vicinity of the consuming urban centres. In Faisalabad city's case for example, milk is usually brought on the train from nearby villages in the morning while vegetables are bought on bullock carts overnight. The village
population in these areas has been very sensitive to the tremors of the urban economy and have been the first to respond to its demands. It is from these villages that the expanding industrial sector of Faisalabad city, and, later, of Jaranwala and Gojra, has recruited most of its labour. As noted in the previous section, these workers commute to factories on their bicycles from within a radius of 10 miles around the city. In this way, the supply zones of milk and vegetables and the labour catchment area coincide with each other, each governed by the day-return journey by rail, bullock-carts and bicycles respectively. The cumulative effect of participation in the urban economy from a position of weakness in these three fields, and of taking part in trade-union activity, was the peasant workers' awakening to the stranglehold of the commercial-industrial class.

The urban sector not only utilizes the raw material and man-power resources of the countryside, it also sells both manufactured goods and 'services' to the latter. The existence of a surplus-producing agriculture in the district has ensured that a large number of people have the purchasing power to buy common necessities from the city. The enormous number of the industrial workers residing in the villages has been responsible for expanding the market for the city's manufacturing sector. Finally, as the new bumper crops started emerging in the late 1960s, the farmers accumulated huge profits, a big portion of which went into buying luxury items like electric goods, furniture, motorized vehicles, china crockery and thousands of other household goods. As a result Faisalabad city enjoyed an economic boom, especially in small-scale industry largely catering for the needs of the emergent class of rural consumers, causing inflation and an unprecedented rise in the prices of general commodities.

Agricultural innovations in both research and technology involved the cities as much as the countryside. The Agricultural University of Faisalabad released major new varieties of Mexi-Pak wheat and ISS, AC 134 and B557 cotton which revolutionized the production...
pattern. Two super-phosphate manufacturing plants were installed by the National Fertilizer Corporation at Faisalabad and Jaranwala. In 1972-3, they sold super-phosphate and sulphuric acid worth Rs. 2,34,23,925 to the farmers, which was a remarkable feat considering the fact that chemical fertilizer was an unknown commodity a decade earlier. As farm mechanization gained momentum various industrial units emerged for manufacturing sugarcane-crushers, chaff cutter, gears, iron pans, wheat threshers, disc harrows, cultivators and many spare parts of agricultural machinery. At the beginning of 1970s, both the urban and rural economies of Faisalabad district had become integrated at many levels. The rural-urban linkages increased both in number and size of transactions between the two sectors, especially between their propertied classes via entrepreneurial activity. The parallel process of increasing linkages between the urban and rural workforce, as noted earlier, only pointed to the emergence of broad categories of exploiters and exploited in the consciousness of the working population.

Finally, the pattern of land-use by the expanding industrial sector ever since the early 1950s has had a devastating effect on the social fabric of the peri-urban villages. As the industrial units encroached upon them, there followed turnover of land, leading to a progressive rise in its price and changes in land use from agriculture to industry. In this way, many small peasants were thrown out of land who were thus compulsorily urbanized. In the case of one such village, Dhudhiwala, which is adjacent to Faisalabad city, in 20 years the number of land transactions increased 10 times and the amount of money by 6 times, while the area involved in each transaction declined drastically. At the same time, the number of landlords increased by 50%.

### TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Landholders</th>
<th>Transactions</th>
<th>Area: Acres</th>
<th>Money/Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1936-7</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-7</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>119533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout the 1960s this process of industrial encroachment on adjacent villages continued alongside the major highways, i.e. Lahore Road, Sheikhupura Road, Chiniot Road and Jhung Road. Such a pattern of urbanization by cooption of villages into the urban circuit accelerated the disarticulation of peasant social structure. The enormous speculation in land and the relatively higher profit that could be derived from its industrial use provided the inner logic of the whole process. Many zamindars turned into small shopkeepers, vendors, or industrial workers, in some cases retaining a small footing in land. It was this encapsulating character of the urban sector which transformed the peasant perception of the outside world from a remote and separate reality to an aggressive intruder into his own sphere of activity, riding on the back of the local state machinery.

In view of these observations, we can conclude that Faisalabad's rural power structure was increasingly shaped by its links with the world outside. Most of the studies of agrarian change in the Third World have concentrated on the class structure within the village, with only a marginal role assigned to other factors, if at all. In our view, such an approach does not take into account the increasing subsumption of the rural economy by the urban-based market forces. We have tried to show in this section how the post-independence agrarian change, especially during the Ayub regime, had a larger context than generally ascribed to it. In political terms such a change created an 'urbanized' peasantry in both functional and structural senses, which widened the horizontal links between towns and countryside, and thus created a larger arena for political struggle between classes.

It is clear that Faisalabad's agricultural development was rooted, in a final sense, in the private enterprise as sanctioned and promoted by the state. If we compare this situation with the impact of the local self-government/rural development approaches on the rural sector, the limited scope of the government initiative in this field becomes very obvious. As noted earlier, the District Board/Council of Faisalabad, where the upper stratum of landowners was represented,
gradually lost its significance in the local power structure. In 1960-61 the Board's income stood at Rs. 12,139,754 and the total expenditure at Rs. 8,688,006, of which development expenditure accounted only for Rs. 1,56,065, i.e. 1.8%. A considerable rise in the number and scope of development projects under the Basic Democracies next year led to a development expenditure of Rs. 2,005,638, i.e. nearly 15% of the increased total expenditure, a level maintained throughout the 60s. The older wholly-elected District Board took a reactionary turn when it was system replaced by the new part-elected part-nominated (60 and 25 members respectively) District Council. On the other hand, the previous 5 local committees constituted under the V-AID scheme, were replaced by 218 Union Councils which covered the 1364 villages in the whole district. Altogether, 1726 projects were taken up under the new system up to 1968, with a total cost of Rs. 18,713,856 of which 75% was spent on roads, education and water supply. Thus the local government's developmental efforts remained confined to infrastructural sector, largely in the service of rural interests.

By the 1960s, we see Faisalabad district reaching a level of heightened and many-pronged political activity between and within the urban and rural sectors, as underlined by the increasingly tense inter-and intra-sectoral relationships. As for the new pattern of functional inter-dependence within the peasant classes which resulted from the Green Revolution, we observe an emergent structural subordination of the small peasants to both rich farmers and the industrial-commercial sector of the towns. This situation therefore does not necessarily follow a straight farm mechanization-eviction of tenant-urbanization model.

Section 4: The Bhutto Phenomenon

In the previous two sections we discussed how after independence the increasingly penetrative state machinery, urban entrepreneurial activity and the Green Revolution together produced a fundamental
change in the social relations of production. While examining urban and rural development we tried to show the analytical relevance of the inter-sectoral linkages. On the one hand, we see the emergence of an industrial-commercial group as the strongest politico-economic force in the district, with a large footing in the auxiliary sector of small industries, transport, mechanized farming as well as markets of all sizes in urban and rural areas. On the other hand, the working class organisational activity took an increasingly horizontal shape and was geared towards a commitment to change in the established power structure. The expanded exchange of goods and services between the city and the countryside created an extended arena for political activity in Faisalabad district. The cumulative effect of these developments, especially during the post-1965 economic recession and the continued gap of public representation at the political level was general unrest among the masses. In 1968, Faisalabad emerged as one of the leading districts in the anti-Ayub movement.

In the present section we shall discuss the way this restiveness was harnessed by the emergent populist force of the PPP. We shall first locate the pattern of recruitment of the local PPP cadres in 1968/69, who were responsible for organizing the workers' resistance movement against Ayub. Secondly, we shall analyse the process of electoral mobilization of the district population in 1970. Finally, an attempt will be made to characterize the political consequences of various reforms taken up by the PPP regime from 1972 to 1975.

**Emergence of Working Class Politics**

Faisalabad emerged as one of the most developed districts of the Punjab by the end of the 1960s. In Burki's scheme of modernization indicators, we find Faisalabad tehsil in the fourth position among the urban tehsils of Punjab. The first three tehsils viz. Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Multan, are the headquarters of provincial, national and divisional administrators, which have enjoyed extra inputs in the form of a large
service sector. Faisalabad tehsil, therefore, emerges as a pristine example of private enterprise-induced modernization. The other three tehsils of the district occupied eighth, ninth, and tenth positions in the Punjab and came in the category of advanced rural tehsils. However, these indices show the extent of the general social mobilization, not its political orientations, which is our present concern. For that purpose we have to locate the activist forces which brought about the 'revolution through the ballot' in the 1970 elections when all the national and provincial assembly seats in the district were captured by the PPP, an uncommon feat even in the 'developed' districts. As described in the previous chapter, it was the whole new political stratum which mobilized the general masses from the platform of the PPP which effected such a radical change.

The first stirrings of dissatisfaction with the Ayub government in Faisalabad, as elsewhere, were noted on the eve of the 1964/5 general elections for President and National and Provincial assemblies. Prior to them the B.D. elections had drawn considerable interest from amongst the petty bourgeoisie and the medium-sized farmers in general, due mainly to the large funds made available to the local government institutions under the Ayub system. The B.D.'s developed a considerable stake in the continuation of the system in contrast with the local stalwarts of the combined Opposition Parties (COP) who were committed to dismantle the whole edifice. Also, the relatively limited number of the B.D.'s (only 3504 in a district of 2,683,838,) exposed them to direct pressure from the district administration.

The 1964/5 elections created several political anomalies at the local level. The tempo of the election campaign in general favoured Miss Fatima Jinnah heavily, but it was President Ayub who won the majority of the B.D. votes at all the polling stations, except Toba Tek Singh. The representative nature of the B.D. system thereafter became suspect in the public eye. On the other hand the COP presented neither a united policy nor an obvious leadership. The only consensus
it reached was about the choice of the presidential candidate. In consequence, the majority of the COP political cadres, among them students, lawyers, workers, petty bourgeois elements and the middle peasants, simply disintegrated in the aftermath of the election. Those among them who showed considerable tenacity both in their disillusionment with the existing party structure and in their resolve to fight against the system were the first to join the PPP.

A parallel source of popularity of the party was Bhutto's anti-Indianism. Faisalabad district had large sections of refugee population who were intensely committed to a strong anti-Indian stance. The 1965 war with India further encouraged militant nationalism, among the fast expanding orthodox and progressive section of the petty bourgeoisie. When Bhutto emerged as a hawk after the Tashkent Declaration, he found a ready constituency for himself in Faisalabad among the emergent political stratum which was desperately looking for an outlet.

However, the most crucial role in political change in Faisalabad, was played by the strategic inter-relationships established in a spatial context both within and without the district. Apart from the rural-urban linkages emerging within the district, as mentioned earlier, the links between Faisalabad and the provincial capital, Lahore, expanded enormously. New train services between the two cities, provided a day-return journey to travellers from each side, while the motorized traffic on the road increased many times over.

The strikes in the Punjab textile industry in 1963 and the West Pakistan railway strike in 1967 expanded the organisational links between the trade union leaders from many cities, especially from Karachi, Hyderabad, Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan. Some trade unionists had to change their area of operation from one region to the other. For example, when Mukhtar Rana was banished from Karachi for his trade union
activities, he landed in Faisalabad. He first opened a bookshop in Bhawana bazaar, but afterwards started a People's Academy in which regular classes were held and seminars were given on the organisational techniques of a broad-based workers' movement. Many students from the Government and Municipal Colleges, who were usually members of the only progressive student organisation, the National Students Federation (NSF) with its links with the NAP, attended the Academy, as did various labour leaders, artisans, small shopkeepers and lower employees from public transport sector and various government services. The new academy thus became the conduit for transfer of ideas about a revolutionary reform in the system from the urban to rural sector via the migrant labour.

The veteran trade union leader, Saleh Niazi, also came from outside Faisalabad. Previously he had been active in the northern towns of Mianwali, Bakkar, Liaqatabad, Laiya and Sargodha. He settled in Faisalabad in the early 1960s and soon became the central figure in the local politics of industrial relations. His continued leadership in unions of different industries at different places made him the conduit of inter-regional trade union activity. In addition to leading several trade unions in mills of Faisalabad he became president of such big labour federations as the Pakistan Road Transport Workers Federation at Lahore, the Punjab Textile Workers Federations at Faisalabad, the Mazdoor Ittehad Committee in the Sargodha region, as well as such large trade unions as Pakistan (Bus) Transport Workers Union at Lahore. Thus trade union activity developed expanded territorial and inter-industrial organisation linkages focused around central figures like Saleh Niazi. By the late 1960s, these linkages were already assuming a political character in the sense of a consciousness of disgust with the prevalent form of class relations. The anti-Ayub movement brought in many 'outsiders' who were not so ideologically oriented as their predecessors from the Communist Party and the splinter groups of the NAP. They showed considerable skill in organising mass rallies of workers as well as the lumpen-proletariat comprising the recent full/part time rural migrants to press for their demands.
We can divide the new labour leadership of Faisalabad into three categories. The first group consisted of trade unionists like Saleh Niazi, who had peasant backgrounds. They developed leadership qualities in their respective communities through exposure to the outside world in the form of education, army service and/or some petty business enterprise like oil or concrete supply contracts. Despite their relatively unsophisticated manner this leadership enjoyed the enduring confidence of their followers within the framework of industrial relations, mainly because of sharing their class origins. However, like Mirza Ibrahim, Bashir Bakhtiar and other veteran labour leaders of the Punjab, Niazi was denied a leadership role in the wider political context. This dichotomy between factory politics and the general politics of the locality remains a feature of trade unionism in Faisalabad to this day, preventing the possibility of the emergence of an autonomous base for industrial labour in the political system.

The second category of professional trade unionists was represented by the rapidly emerging labour leader Sabiha Shakeel. An overall commitment to moral and legal fairness has characterized her leadership. She is based in the largely Urdu-speaking workforce of the Lyallpur Cotton Mills. The emphasis is placed on the skilful use of labour courts and other legal provisions for securing the recruitment of labour strictly on merit, and struggling for workers' rights. She favours imposing strict discipline on the labour itself. While Sabiha's leadership enjoyed the qualified support of the labour department, the industrialists and some rightist political parties, her followers in fact supported the PPP in the 1970 elections, as the campaign gradually took a class line. Thus Sabiha's leadership was not fully accepted outside the framework of trade unionism. It was only the third category of trade unionists, i.e. the group of intellectuals like Mukhtar Rana, who provided the political leadership to the working class movement. They discarded the use of scientific socialism as their ideological platform and called for a new approach to the labour problem grounded in the indigenous culture. Their biggest asset was their link with the PPP which
provided them with a certain legitimacy in the wider context of provincial and national politics. Locally, they had contacts with the non-industrial workforce as well as the non-working population through their work in the Kachi abadis. They worked outside the narrow framework of trade unionism.

The 1970 Elections

In the second phase of political transformation in Faisalabad, the election campaign played a crucial role. The PPP's campaign not only differed sharply from its rivals on the right, it also competed with such parties as the Pakistan Socialist Party, which were far less pragmatic in their approach to current problems. For example, Rao Mahroze Akhtar and Chaudhary Fateh Mohammed, the president and secretary general respectively of the latter's sister-organisation, the (W) Pakistan Kisan Committee, addressed a meeting in Toba Tek Singh where they announced their struggle against 'monopoly capitalism' and 'feudalism'. By contrast, the PPP chairman of Faisalabad invited the Governor of Punjab to visit the looms and see the plight of the slum dwellers in the city. Later, when Bhutto visited Faisalabad, he addressed a high public gathering in Iqbal Park and assured the people of his party's commitment to free education for children, food, clothing and shelter for all, and Islamic Socialism as the only way possible to redress the grievances of the workers of Faisalabad mills against their employers. Bhutto also addressed the District Bar Association where he made a plea for unity among the lawyers, journalists, politicians, workers, and citizens. In August that year, he made a whirlwind tour of the district, addressing huge rallies every where; in Toba Tek Singh he condemned the postponement of elections to December 7; in Kamalia, he announced that people would not vote for capitalists and feudal lords; in the Kachi Abadi of Faisalabad city he assured the people of their legal right to possess land. Thus, the message was delivered that the millenium had arrived. When the JUI candidate and the biggest industrialist of Faisalabad, Rafiq Sehgal, visited the Batala Colony on the invitation of the chairman of the local Union Committee, he was received with black flags and abusive slogans raised by the pro-PPP workers amid cries that a change had occurred and that the era of capitalism was over.
In the elections, the PPP won all the National and Provincial assembly seats in the district. Some of the factors responsible for this pattern of voting were the PPP's 'externality' for the local power structure, Bhutto's credibility as a national leader, and the 'movement' character of the general elections. Both in the urban and rural areas a large number of the PPP cadres represented an outside force meddling with the existing relations of exploitation in the industrial and agricultural sectors. In doing so, they carried with them the strength of a 'national' leader, Bhutto, who had proved his tenacity while in government and was considered 'naturally' fit and capable of re-entering the government and delivering the goods to the masses. In other words the peasants and industrial workers took the great risk of annoying the landlords and the millowners only because Bhutto, along with his all-encompassing movement, seemed to be capable of riding the powerful machinery of the government and turning it in their favour. In this process, the provision for secret ballot helped them vote according to their own choice in a moment of fearless encounter with the powers that be. Also, their capacity for 'independent' voting was helped by the fact that the industrial workers from more than a hundred mills came into contact with each other and with the large section of middle and poor peasants. Together they opted out of the orbit of influence of bourgeoisie and rich farmers, largely because of the mobilizing force of the PPP.

In the ensuing struggle for power between Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto in March 1971, Bhutto felt the need for a 'show' of force. It was decided in a conference of the PPP's MNAs and MPAs that if Bhutto's negotiations with the other two parties did not show positive results, the mills should be taken over by the workers. The only organised pro-PPP labour force existed in Faisalabad. Following Bhutto's orders from Dacca the Faisalabad workers staged an abrupt take-over of the mills. In the subsequent round-up more than a thousand workers were interned. Afterwards when Bhutto visited them in jail, he publicly denied any involvement in the whole affair, alienating a large section of workers in the city.
Their defiant mood kept the sentiment of revolt simmering almost from the moment the elections were over. As the PPP's chances of taking over power in a united Pakistan looked remote, throughout the year 1971 the persecution of labour increased at the hands of local bureaucracy and millowners who were out to take revenge. During this process, the PPP high command could not provide any protection to its political cadres/labour leaders in Faisalabad. In the same way, the stories of peasant persecution by rich farmers continued pouring in. It was against this background that Bhutto assumed power in December 1971, and embarked on an ambitious programme of reforms.

The PPP in Power

Soon after the PPP government was installed, the organized labour of Faisalabad tried to assert their position in a direct encounter with the millowners, and indirectly with the government machinery. Instead of remaining a passive support base for the regime, the workers demanded fulfilment of the election promises. They chose to demonstrate their power in individual cases of gharao, i.e. by encirclement of the mill-management till it agreed to certain conditions under duress. Such 'extremism' was not tolerated by the Bhutto regime. Mukhtar Rana, the celebrated labour leader and PPP MNA, was arrested and later unseated from the National Assembly. In the following by-election for his seat, his supporters mustered considerable strength behind his sister against the PPP's official nominee, Afzal Randhawa, who finally won the seat. The earlier labour solidarity was completely shattered in the wake of this new militancy, matched by the strong-handed measures of the regime. As Bhutto's nationalization scheme left the whole textile sector untouched (which was predominant in Faisalabad), local labour did not experience any structural change in industrial relations unlike the situation in Karachi. The government, however, worked hard at the trade-union level. The local MNAs, MPAs and party office-holders became actively involved in industrial relations. In the Crescent Textile Mills, the PPP leader Nargis Naeem and the PPP MNA Afzal
Randhawa were successfully sponsored by the millowners in the election for the presidentship of the Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA) union. Such readiness to become politically involved distinguished the Bhutto regime from the earlier periods.

In the district at large, the new era created a generalized tension between the administration and the local PPP officials. In an address to the Awan group of the party, the officiating chairman of the district PPP warned the local officers that in case of their non-co-operation with the PPP workers they would be beaten in public. However, there was only one such case, when the ADM of the Toba Tek Singh was publicly beaten. The government tried to re-vitalize the rural sector by injecting funds under the People's Works Programme. Under this Rs. 87,70,100 were allocated in 1974-5, out of which 72.1% were actually spent. The tax on profession was abolished in 1973 by the District Council and the ratio of its development expenditure to total expenditure was raised from 15.7% in 1972-3 to 24% in 1973-4, reaching 41.58% in 1975-6.

From 1972 onwards, the city and district of Faisalabad presented a tense political situation. On the one hand the labour unrest had, in theory at least, assumed a definite political character. On the other hand, a combination of the government's policies of outright suppression of militant labour leadership with readiness to play the political game of mass mobilization and recruitment contained this militancy within the framework of industrial relations. In the rural areas the continuing eviction of tenants gained pace, because of the landowner's fear of expropriation from their own lands, in case the new government gave ownership rights to the occupiers of land. In sum the general mobilization of the rural and urban masses in Faisalabad from 1968 to 1975, created a citizenry which was alive to the larger political context of local issues and had the potential of waging a struggle in pursuit of
their aims. But, as has been indicated, within two years, the PPP regime had managed to adjust the political system of Pakistan to the new pressures, through an elaborate system of political bargaining.

We are now in a position to summarize our observations in the present chapter. Here, an attempt has been made to analyse the changing modes of articulation of power in Faisalabad district. It was shown how, since the advent of the colonial state, the tribal leaders of the old nomadic society of the Sandal Bar lost much of their semi-autonomous role in the locality and took up new positions as clients of the district administration. Later, the investment of metropolitan capital in the Lower Chenab Canal was channelled through the new financial institutions, controlled by the colonial bureaucracy. In addition, the Irrigation Department emerged as the watchdog of the government's economic interest through an elaborate system of distribution of irrigation waters and extraction of revenues. Finally, the new judicial system defined and operationalised the new property relations which became the conduit for penetration of capital in the district. In this way, the modern state system was both instrumental in, and the beneficiary of, capital's entry into the Chenab Colony. Soon, this capital assumed a structural character underlying the whole agrarian production process on a permanent basis 'managed' by the state.

The surplus-producing agrarian economy of Faisalabad district produced specific forms of interaction between the peasants and the state, characterized by a directness of administration largely unknown in the non-colony areas. It also led to an overall atomization of the local society in which there were no mediating public organisations like political parties. All effective control was thus exercised by the bureaucracy. In the absence of landlord factional groupings, the district remained largely unrepresented both in the Unionist Party and the Muslim League. On the other hand, it provided a fertile ground for mass movements around the economic, political and ideological issues.
In the post independence period, Faisalabad city experienced rapid industrial growth. The existing social and economic infrastructure attracted large capital input, especially from the refugee trading families. The emergence of large-scale manufacturing industry was accompanied by the influx of migrant workers from the surrounding countryside and the Northern districts of Punjab. The majority of them settled in the Kachi abadis on high-rent land in and around the centre of the city. Such squalor in the midst of prosperity became a constant source of worker militancy and a fast spreading sense of class solidarity among the city's working class population. In this situation, the PPP functioned as an outside force producing a certain 'freeing' effect on the political consciousness of workers.

In a parallel process, the Green Revolution vastly expanded the agricultural production base of the district. However, in so doing, it produced structural subordination of the (middle) peasant users of agricultural implements by their (medium and rich farmer) owners, caused impoverishment / eviction of tenants and increased the role of such factors of production which involved wider transactions. In a situation of increasing rural-urban integration these structural inequalities were defined in terms of access to various urban-based government authority structures and market-forces. In this way the rural strata were inextricably linked up with the corresponding urban classes to forge major horizontal alliances across the sectors.

At this stage, we must look at the meaning of 'development' itself as it applies to Faisalabad district. During the so-called 'Development Decade' from 1959/1960 to 1968/1969, per capita income of Faisalabad district grew only by 38.7% in current prices as compared with growth rates of 55.6% and 101.1% for the least developed districts of Attock and Mianwali. If we take into account the actual decline in the real incomes of the industrial workers, as discussed in Chapter III, then the question is how to account for 208% growth, i.e. a net increase of Rs. 265.4 million in the actual value added in large scale manufacturing sector in the same period. The relevance of the question increases when we notice that Faisalabad district had 10 times and 8 times the value added in large scale industry and major crops
respectively, but only 4 times the population, of Attock district. The only way to explain it is through pointing to extreme concentration of wealth in the upper strata, leading to both absolute and relative impoverishment of the rural and urban working classes, along with the new structural inequalities suffered by the 'productive' petty-bourgeoisie and middle peasants. As for social indicators of development in general, Faisalabad district made a poor showing even in comparison with Attock district.

### TABLE
Social Indicators of Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electrification (1972) KWH/Person</th>
<th>Students (1971) per 1000</th>
<th>Hospital-beds (1970) per 1000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faisalabad</td>
<td>102.93</td>
<td>91.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attock</td>
<td>158.89</td>
<td>104.30</td>
</tr>
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</table>


While the benefits of rapid growth did not filter lower down the massive entrepreneurial activity in Faisalabad city and the general consolidation of market relations in the district at large produced new relationships of dependence and new income inequalities between classes across the boundaries of rural and urban sectors. The PPP's movement heavily drew upon this rural-urban integration by forging an informal united front of the middle and poor peasants from the countryside and the radical section of petty bourgeoisie and the industrial labour/lumpen-proletariat from Faisalabad city.
NOTES


2. The old settled districts of Lahore division have been at the cross roads of much wider political currents than those operating at the district level. For example, Lahore has long been the centre of provincial and even national politics and is therefore a poor indicator of local politics as such. Most of Sheikhupura's development is due to the spill-over effect of Lahore itself. The spread of large-scale industry in Gujranwala is too recent to help us draw a picture of the district's political life from a historical prespective. As for Sialkot its credentials as a 'developed' area are suspect: moreover, the presence of a large number of refugees from Jammu and Kashmir has exercised a major influence on its politics which makes it a rather atypical district as a whole.

3. Previously, such colony districts as Sargodha, were considered for a study of local politics, mainly because of their dominant landlord families which provided many politicians. See for example Saghir Ahmad, Class and Power in a Punjabi Village, (Lahore, 1977)pp35-5. However, notwithstanding its importance for a study of factional politics, this area lacks an explanatory value for the rapidly changing politics. It contains a dying pattern of landlord-tenant relations whereas the direction of change is decidely towards a horizontal expansion of economic and political organisation, of which Faisalabad is the most typical example.


7. These irrigation schemes were generally ill-administered and suffered heavily from irregular rains. Severe famines of 1851-2, 1860, 1868-9 were seen as the consequence of these drawbacks. See P.W. Paustian, Canal Irrigation in the Punjab. (New York, 1968,)pp.24-5.

11. The five charges were:
   i) Abiana i.e. water-rate levied by the Irrigation Department,
   ii) Land revenue at the rate of half rupee per acre,
   iii) the owners' rate (Khush Hasyati), at Rs.1 per acre,
   iv) Malikana, for the government's proprietary rights, at 4 annas per rupee of land revenue for 10 years and 6 annas for the next 10 years.
   v) A consolidated cess of 4 annas per rupee of land revenue, out of which patwar fund was later abolished. See ibid., p.15.

12. Ibid., p.5.

13. 'Abstract of the Proceeding of the Meeting of the Legislative Council of the Punjab,' 28th February, 1907, PIF, p.301.

14. The new fines were levied for such crimes as unauthorised cultivation of, or encroachments on, the government lands and maintenance of sanitary conditions. See Section 25 and 26, of the Colonization of Government Title and Local Lands (Punjab) Act, 1907, PIF, pp.348-9.


17. From E.D. Maclagan ICS, chief secretary to Government of the Punjab and its Dependencies to the Secretary to the Government of India, Legislative Department, 29th April, 1907. PIF,p.73.


20. Ibid., p.29.

21. Ibid., p.29.

22. SK Kirpalani, op.cit., p.48.

23. Ibid., p.50

24. Ibid., p.4.
25. Ibid., p.53.


27. SK Kripalani op. cit. p.8.


29. Ibid. (Memorandum), p.48.

30. Both the Colonization Officer and tehsildar who sat on the administrative committee of Faisalabad municipality were dropped in 1914; the D.C. became its ex-officio president and remained so till 1949. However, the ratio of the elected members grew rapidly from zero in 1897 to 12 out of 15 in 1923 and 21 out of 26 in 1939. The functions of the municipality were more distinctly separated from the general administration than those of the district board, which lent it a sort of sub-structural autonomy.


34. Ibid. p.90


37. Interview with Mr. Shamim Ahmed Khan, ex-MPA of the PPP.

38. Interview with the trade union leader Saleh Niazi.

39. Interview with the trade union leader Mukhtar Rana.

40. Ibid.

41. Memorandum Presented to the Hon'ble Chief Minister, West Pakistan by the Citizens of Lyallpur, April 1956, p. 3.

42. Ibid., p. 2.

43. Ibid., p. 4.

44. Ibid., p. 4.

45. The story was related to me by Mukhtar Rana.

46. The veteran trade union leader Saleh Niazi boasted to me that he often managed to take the new recruits away from the jobbers' orbit, but cited many difficulties on the way, of which mention has already been made.


48. Interview with Mrs. Sabiha Shakeel, the leading trade unionist of Lyallpur Cotton Mills.

49. Information gathered from various trade union leaders and workers during my stay in Faisalabad.

50. The outsider is social worker-cum-intellectual-cum-philanthropist. On the one hand he helps the labour through its 'legal' battles against the government which is perceived as the super-backer of the industrial management. On the other hand, he brings his own wider intellectual approach, rooted in his original party line, and thus tries to bend the essentially pragmatic struggle of labour towards attainment of political goals. Thus, while in the short run he could establish his credentials with the trade unions through his help in matters of dealing with complex state machinery in the long run his class-based idealism and wider political affiliations contrasted with the narrower and more mundane ends of the working class as a whole.

52. Ibid., pp.110-111.


54. Ibid., pp.57-8.


61. Ashok Rudra, 'In Search of the Capitalist Farmer', in ibid, p.45.

62. See, for example, U. Patnaik, 'Capitalist Development in Agriculture', in ibid., p.56-7. However, she lays stress on emergence of rural proletariat in India in the later colonial period, while we are concerned mainly with the structural changes as such.


64. Information obtained from the Colony Office, District Courts, Faisalabad.

66. Ibid., table 26, p.192.

67. This ratio is calculated from the number of tubewells and tractors owned, i.e. 7264 and 2505 respectively, which slightly differ from that of the owners. See Pakistan Census of Agriculture 1972, (Lahore, 1977), pp.502, 509.

68. See for example, the papers in the Peasant Seminar, Area Study Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1973-77.


74. Ibid.

75. PDGFD (1980) p.133.


77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., p.231.


80. Ibid.

81. Pakistan Election Commission, National Assembly Election Results, (Rawalpindi, 1965, pp.36-38.
82. Mukhtar Rana, a refugee from Hoshiarpur, started his career as a political worker of the Khaksar Tehrik. He was a lecturer in Municipal College Faisalabad in 1961, when he left for Karachi, to return after a few years as an established trade unionist. He trained workers, students and activists from Kachi abadis in the art of political agitation.

83. Saleh Niazi, an ex-army man, belongs to Mianwali district. During the Second World War, he spent some time with S. Bhattacharya's Azad Hindustan Fauj. On return he started supplying concrete to a PIDC sponsored building project of a fertilizer factory in the early 1950s. Later he organised the factory workers' unions there. Other unions from the nearby towns also sought his leadership and so his name 'travelled' to Faisalabad, where he finally settled. He is based in the Crescent Textile Mills.

84. From the pre-independence days, it has been geared towards forming federations of unions. They are first formed independent of individual trade-unions at the plant and then invite the latter to join their ranks. These federations behave as 'reserve' banks of potential strikers for bargaining with the management. In an event of strike, individual unions seek the support of federation which tries to 'guide' them in preparing action plan, negotiates with the government authorities in case of arrest of their members and this way spreads a consciousness of the common worker 'cause' across the country.

85. Interview with Saleh Niazi.

86. Sabiha Shakeel, an Urdu-speaking Muhajir, is the leading trade unionist of Lyallpur Cotton Mills. In the late 1960s she attended Mukhtar Rana's Academy. She joined the Tehrik-e-Istiqhal in 1972 and rose to be its vice president. She is a moralist in politics and a professionalist in trade unionism.

87. Interview with Sabiha Shakeel.

88. Interview with Mukhtar Rana.

89. The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 2 January 1970.

90. The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 3 January 1970

91. The Pakistan Times (Lahore), 31 January 1970.
92. Ibid.

93. The Nawai-Waqt (Lahore), 28 August 1970

94. The Nawai-Waqt (Lahore), 30 July 1970

95. Interview with Mukhtar Rana

96. Ibid.


98. A union acquired the status of Collective Bargaining Agent after winning more votes than any other union in the elections.

99. The Nawai-Waqt (Lahore), 26 February 1970

100. PDGFD (1980), p.232

101. Ibid., p.204.


103. Ibid., p.344.

104. Ibid., pp. 338, 344, 346.
CHAPTER VII
ATTOCK DISTRICT: A CASE OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT

Introduction:

As we discussed in Chapter I, the expansion of capital and state in a peasant society divides it into two main categories, viz the freeholding and corporate villages. The former is characterized by a relatively high level of integration in the national market and authority structures of the state. The latter is more restricted in its operations. In our dichotomous model of political ecology of development, these categories represent the central and peripheral localities respectively. As a locality moves from the periphery to the centre, its predominantly factional mode of political activity is replaced by the party-based politics of class and ideology. On the other hand, if a peripheral locality remains stagnant, it continues representing the 'feudal connection' of the state, thus performing the role of a vested interest of backwardness. In the previous chapter we discussed Faisalabad district as an example of central locality. In the present chapter we shall focus on Attock district as an example of peripheral locality.

Attock is one of the most backward districts of the country. Being wholly dependent on rain, it was largely by-passed by the Green Revolution. Nor did it industrialize in any significant way. On the other hand, its big landlord families have produced many politicians who played leading roles in the national and provincial assemblies. Also, the fact that it has been an army recruitment area for half a century lends it a special significance in view of the consistently predominant role of the military in Pakistan politics. In the following three sections we shall trace the three distinct periods of political development in Attock district, viz, the colonial period, the post-independence period up to 1968 and the period between 1968 and 1975.
Attock is the northernmost district of Punjab. It was created in 1904 by taking three tehsils from Rawalpindi district, viz. Attock, Fatehjang and Pindi Gheb, and one tehsil, Talagang, from district Jhalum. Originally, its headquarters lay at Attock Fort; in 1906 they were shifted to a new town, Campbellpur, ten miles off the Grad Trunk Road. However, the district itself continued to be styled as Attock up to 1960, when the apparent anomaly was removed by naming it Campbellpur as well. In 1978, both the district and the town were renamed Attock. Initially the district had an area of 4178 square miles; however, 22 villages from Attock tehsil and 98 villages from Fatehjang tehsil were ceded to Rawalpindi district in 1958 and 1961 respectively. The total area is now 3780 square miles. The climate is extremely hot in summer and cold in winter, with only 13" annual rainfall. The main Karachi-Peshawar railway line passes through the district headquarters at Attock.

The topography of the district is fairly variegated and its administrative division into tehsils and revenue circles corresponds closely to the natural divisions. Thus Attock tehsil contains three distinct terrains: the extremely fertile Chhach plain; the predominantly stony Sarwala tract, and the mainly flat Nala tract to the north of the Kala Chitta hills, which is crisscrossed by the Haro river and numerous other raviness as well as by many barren hills. The two tehsils of Fatehjang and Pindi Gheb consist of the central plateau which is a 70 by 40 miles arid plain, together with the Sil-Soan Circle in the south-east of Fatehjang, which contains fertile river rain areas where cultivation takes place with the help of wells, the mountainous Makhad area in the South-west of Pindi Gheb, which allows few patches of cultivation, and the Jandal tracts in the west of Pindi Gheb, which contain fine sandy soil suitable for gram. Finally, the Talagang tehsil is a high-lying plateau, skirted by the Salt Range in the south; apart from small portions of fertile land under the watersheds, the whole of the tehsil is barren.
Section I: Landlords and the Colonial State

The real history of this district is tribal.² Although many invading armies before and after the Moghuls passed through it, the whole area south of the Kala Chitta hills remained somewhat off their track. The successive waves of tribes, Janjuas, Khattars, Awans, Alpials, Ghebas and Jodhras, swayed the area one after the other. Finally, they were confined to their core areas in which they have remained the dominant landholders to this day. Being too distant and too difficult to traverse, as well as too poor to offer prospects of revenue, this area remained relatively unadministered by successive governments. Under the Sikhs, revenue was collected by appraisement, not through the Kardars as in some other districts but through the tribal chieftains themselves. This left their position as 'rulers' virtually intact, even though nominally they were placed under the Sikh dominion. This factor was further responsible for retaining the solid blocks of landowning tribes throughout the district. During the Second Sikh war of 1848-9, all of these tribes sided with the British; their leading families therefore benefited enormously from the Annexation in the form of extensive revenue assignments and by 'recognition' of their political importance in their respective areas. This clannishness of the population must be considered when analysing the local power structure and the mechanism for articulation of the dominant interests in the locality.

The whole area extending to the Salt Range is known as Awan-kari, because of the numerical preponderance of the Awans. When the district was formed in 1904, they accounted for 32.5% of its population dispersed throughout the area; however, in Talagang tehsil they were 83% of the population and have retained this predominance ever since.³ Pindi Gheb tehsil is divided among four tribes: the Johdras in the south-east and centre, the Sagri Pathans in the Makhad area along the Indus river, Awans in a tract between the two and the
Khattars in the north-east. In Fatehjang tehsil, Ghebas own almost the whole of Gheb circle, the Khattars hold the Nala circle, the Alpials dominate the Sil Soan circle, while miscellaneous Rajputs sway the area in the extreme east on the borders of Rawalpindi district. Lastly, in Attock tehsil, Chhach is a predominantly Pathan area, while Sarwala and Nala circles are divided mainly between the Pathans, Khattars, Gujars, Sheikhs and Awans. In this way, the whole area is divided into tribal blocks.

Under the British administration, new factors emerged which not only re-defined the tribes' relationship with the government but also favoured certain families at the cost of others. Among these factors, the almost universal acceptance of the legitimacy of the new government was most important. The tribal chieftains thus assumed a new juridical status vis-a-vis the government, sealed by awards and various rights connected with revenue collection, local administration and property holding. The rise and fall of certain leading families now depended on their adherence to the new rules of the game, which seriously impaired the relatively autonomous hold of the tribal chieftains in their respective areas. Under the Sikhs, many of them had acted as farmers of revenue and enjoyed 'plenary authority over life and property'. They frequently committed excesses against the populace, while no special offices for dispensation of justice existed outside Lahore. The new government followed a rigorous programme of general pacification under which the possession, sale and manufacture of arms were prohibited. The disarming of the tribes led to elimination of the use of force as a dispute-settling mechanism. Instead, the new government monopolised the dispensation of justice, based on a penal code, applicable to all and sundry, irrespective of the social standing of individuals. In this process, the tribal chiefs' power was transformed into a 'feudal' influence on the local state machinery, operating through the D.C.'s political calculus,
Some families were granted exemption from the Arms Act as recognition of their political importance. Their legitimacy thus demonstrably acquired an external dimension. Many landlords learned the dynamics of the new system and rose to prominent positions, as in the case of the two leading families of the Maliks of Shamsabad and the Hayats of Wah, about whom we shall have more to say later. Those who did not adjust to the new rules of game went down both in social status and political significance.

Land Tenure

The revenue arrangements of the new government created a relatively permanent basis of landlord ascendancy in the form of regular settlements. Tenures were defined largely on the basis of popular opinion which recognised the big families as owners of large tracts of land. Some, like the Maliks (Jodhras) of Pindi Gheb, shied away from taking up revenue assignments, as they failed to realize that the new revenue assignments would give them inalienable rights and were not a mere continuation of the cumulative Sikh assignments.

The 1907 District Gazeteer of Attock divided the village tenures into three categories:

- Zamindari estates are those owned by a single proprietor, or in common by more than one; pattidari villages are those in which each proprietor owns not the particular fields which he holds, but a specific ancestral share in the whole estate; bhachara villages are those in which every man is owner of only as much land as is in his possession.

Although very few villages contained only one type, yet each village was known after its predominant character. Most of the zamindari villages belonged to the big landlord families, e.g. Ghebas in Fatehjang, Jodhras in Pindi Gheb, and Khattars in Nala Circle of Attock tehsil. The large owners were generally harsh towards their
tenants, the Khattars of Fatehjang being especially notorious. Some rents were simply too large for the tenants to pay, as in the Kot and Khunda estates, but their full realization was not actually intended, rather it helped keep the tenants in permanent obligation to the landlords whose position was safeguarded by the contractual nature of landlord-tenant relations under the new settlement. The pattidari tenure existed mainly in Attock tehsil, especially among Pathans and Khattars, while almost all Awan villages in Talagang tehsil were bhaichara estates. In these villages, big landlords were the exception rather than the rule; this factor was responsible for a relatively less rigid pattern of political dominance by big landlords in these areas.

The colonial government lent a juridical status to the conflicting claims to property in land as well as tenurial rights. It created, thereby, a very complex tenurial structure in the district, for whose existence a constant interference by the state machinery became almost a prerequisite. For example, the proprietary tenures included, i) the talukdari right for the erstwhile ruling families, ii) the ala malik (superior ownership) and the adna malik (inferior ownership), iii) the Chaharam allowance for the revenue assignees of the Sikh period, iv) the inam, i.e. a grant-in-land, and v) the malik kalbza, i.e. the inferior proprietary tenure, with less than full rights. Similarly, the tenurial rights included i) the makarridars, who were the most privileged tenants, with a fixed rent rate and power of alienation, ii) the occupancy tenants, and iii), the tenants-at-will. Absolute rights in property provided the base-line for this complex structure, whereby those who had ownership rights increased their hold over tenants. In the middle 1920s, only 39% of the cultivated land was tilled by the owners while 61% was tilled by tenants, 44% of it by tenants-at-will.
These figures indicate the extent of vulnerability of the peasantry in the district. Moreover, the rent was usually paid in kind, which was a sign of the absence of involvement of the market forces and hence of any disruptive influence on the complete landlord hegemony in the villages. The only area where cash rents were known was Chhach, where they were paid for 26% of the cultivated land. Accordingly, participation in the wider cash economy was widespread and landholding pattern was relatively egalitarian, in comparison with the rest of the district where big landlord families predominated.

These families not only exacted more rents than the average they also imposed many cesses on the tenants, for example haqq-bahoi, i.e. payment for the kammis, hakam-bad, in recognition of the erstwhile 'rulership' of the tribes, haqq-darwaza, for the so-called common fund, and pucch bakri, i.e. a goat at the marriage of a tenant's daughter. Against this background, we can understand how deeply entrenched and rigid agrarian relations were in Attock district. Essentially, the power of the landlords lay in their success in keeping the existing rural structure intact. Many cesses, for example, were retained less for financial reasons than to demonstrate where the actual power lay. These cesses mostly enjoyed statutory protection. In other words, the legitimacy of 'feudal' power was sanctioned by the state.

Finally, we must consider the peculiar spatial structure of villages in this district to understand the inherent vulnerability of the peasantry. Everywhere except Attock tehsil small patches of fertile land were scattered at great distances from each other along ravine channels where wells could be sunk, or under the watersheds where small embankments could hold some water. Here, small hamlets had emerged around peasant homesteads, which also ensured a supply of manure from the cattle. In the usual residential pattern the main body of landowners lived in the central abadi, while the tenants lived all around this in small hamlets, called dhoks. Not only did the residential segregation symbolize the class differences between landlords and tenants,
it also hampered the growth of a strong village community which would restrain the former's ruthlessness. In this situation, recourse to physical attack on the tenants was considered an attractive proposition by the landlords to bring them into line, and was carried through many times at different places. The absence of a change in the structure of the rural economy has guaranteed the continuation of this pattern.

Stunted Growth Pattern

The lack of growth in the rural sector, which was the only production base of the district, led to stagnation in other sectors as well, and was reflected in the extent of army recruitment. Some demographic changes were also due to government legislation. For example, in the decade after the enactment of the Land Alienation Act of 1900, the largely urban Hindu community of Attock district decreased by 53.2%, while the Sikhs increased more than six times. It seems that once the alienation of land to the non-agriculturist stopped, the erstwhile Hindu moneylenders were forced to look for alternative careers in business elsewhere, as Attock did not offer any prospects of trade. In general the communal make-up of the district was no different from the rest of the Western Punjab, with a disproportionate number of Hindus in the towns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>The Communal Representation per 1,000 in Attock District:1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural population</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PDGAD, Vol. xxxiv 1912, (Lahore, 1913), table 16, p. xxvii
It is clear that 29.47% of the Hindus lived in towns in comparison with only 4.11% of the Muslims and 16.4% of the Sikhs. Overall, however, the non-Muslim population was less than 10% and was therefore no serious challenge to the dominant Muslim landlord families even up to 1947.

Indeed, Attock district was largely free of the Hindu-Muslim tension arising from the question of land alienation. In the 1926-7 settlement of the district, it was found that the situation of landed property was relatively stable. In fact, more land had been redeemed than mortgaged in the quarter of a century since the previous settlement, especially in Pindi Gheb and Talagang tehsils.

TABLE

Land Alienation in Attock (% of Cultivated Land): 1923-7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sold</th>
<th>Mortgaged</th>
<th>Redeemed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attock</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatehjang</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pindi Gheb</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallagang</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>9.425</td>
<td>10.525</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The relatively minor problem of land alienation to moneylenders however, did not mean, that the problem of agricultural debt did not exist in the district. In fact, it was more acute than in the neighbouring districts. Thus, in 1925, the amount of debt in the district was 18 times the size of land revenue, compared with 8 and 13 times for Rawalpindi and Jhelum districts. What happened is that while the Land Alienation Act of 1900 eased the moneylenders out of business, it replaced them with the landlords. The latter were not so interested in expropriating the peasants from their meagre landholdings as in keeping them politically subservient. They provided credit to their kinsmen and factional followers, and in this way strengthened their clientele structures.

We have noted how the introduction of property turned the existing tenurial system in the area into a rigidly stratified class structure
backed by the new judicial system. In this situation, the introduction of the new institutions of local self-government provided the landlords an opportunity to create a public life for themselves where there was none before. In terms of power however, local self-government remained on the margins of the district administration. Many members of the district board and municipalities were directly nominated by the district administration. In other words the initiative to establish and put into operation the local self-government institutions came almost exclusively from the government. The Attock District Board started working in 1904 with 46 of its 55 members nominated, while the rest were ex-officio. The District Board derived its income from school fees, cattle fairs, ferries across the river, cattle ponds and a small share (less than 5%) of the land revenue. Its main expenditure was on maintenance and repairs of some water-works, bridges, roads, schools, dispensaries and veterinary services. The same functions were provided for the towns by the municipal institutions. A balanced communal representation was aimed at in the municipalities. The number of elected representatives gradually increased after the 1919 reforms, when franchise qualifications for both electors and candidates were lowered, which resulted in the expansion of local political activity. At least in the early stages, these institutions served as springboards for the aspirant politicians from the landlord families, even though local self-government was responsible for an extremely small part of public administration.

While the rapid agricultural development of the central Punjab and colony districts led to considerable peasant mobility in the first quarter of the 20th century, the social framework of Attock and other barani (rain-fed) districts remained completely unchanged, not least because of their static agricultural sector. Nearly 90% of the cultivated land in Attock district (913760 acres) was dependent on rain; the rest was irrigated by wells (3%), canals (1%), river floods (1%), and other means, including drainage of the village and embankments. There were some
well-tracts in Chhach (where 15% of the total cultivated area was under well-irrigation), Anhar at Tamman in Talagang, the Sil Soan valleys of Fatehjang and Pindi Gheb Sil. Canal irrigation was confined to the Nala circle in Attock tehsil, and accounted for only 7310 acres in the whole district in 1907. In fact, during the depression of 1930-31 the net revenue from agriculture dropped to Rs. 543758 from an earlier level of Rs. 850 128, a decade before. All along the stagnant agricultural sector kept the peasantry at the brink of starvation and years without rain led to widespread famine and forced mass emigration.

As this destitute peasantry searched for alternative means of livelihood the district towns were the unlikeliest places to look for jobs. The district had a tiny urban sector, in population less than 5% of the total. Apart from manufacturing snuff and shoes in small quantities, the towns presented a desolate picture. Only Chhach had regular contact with the outside world, in the sense that many persons went abroad for work even as far as Australia, Cape Colony, East Africa and New Zealand; on return they would 'build pukka houses, buy better clothes and add butter and meat to their frugal diet'. Other towns of the district had nothing to offer.

In these circumstances it was natural that following the military recruitment drive after the First World War, Attock emerged as a major catchment area. By the year 1928-29, military pensions alone in the district accounted for Rs. 399000. In comparison, the total revenue demand of the government stood at Rs. 753874 in 1929. In other words, more than half of the revenue could be paid straight from the money pouring in from the government coffers. By contrast, the military pensions for the whole of the Punjab for that stood at Rs. 1390400 which was less than 15% of the total revenue demand. There was thus a huge amount of direct cash input into Attock district which made it dependent on the external resources while the local resources remained relatively undeveloped.
By 1939, Attock had 4114 pensioners, the fourth highest number in the future West Punjab. This factor increased the dependence of the local peasantry on state funds, especially in the southern tehsils from where most of the recruitment took place. The transformation from a near-serf status in the villages to army's rank-and-file bound the peasant soldiers ideologically as well as economically with the destiny of the state. The remittances of the serving army men and the pensions and other mandatory services provided to the ex-servicemen functioned as a guarantee against any non-conformist behaviour. If anything, the former soldiers could only resist the forces of change in this social order. Only in a few cases, the ex-army men rose to be the leaders of their respective villages on some local issues.

To understand the real extent of stagnation of the district life, we should now look at the overall growth pattern of various sectors.

| TABLE Development of Attock District, 1905/6-1930/1. |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                 | 1905-6          | 1910-1          | 1915-6          | 1920-1          | 1925-6          | 1930-1          |
| Population      | 464430          | 519273          | 519273          | 512249          | 512249          | 583960          |
| Cultivated Acres| 913760          | 1074461         | 1098069         | 1077369         | 1059353         | 1068320         |
| Irrigated Acres | 31017           | 36677           | 38005           | 38843           | 38008           | 37875           |
| Land Revenue    | 600904          | 672803          | 673213          | 673614          | 713672          | 733924          |
| (Assessed) Rs.  |                |                |                |                |                |                |
| Civil Suits (No.)| 2417           | 3878           | 4376           | 5015           | 9136           | 4570           |
| Civil Suits (Value) Rs. | 426906          | 479747         | 682725         | 634502         | 242564         | 1057608         |
| Municipalities (Income) Rs. | 27687          | 38820           | 59807          | 265899         | 121586         | 126222         |
| Dispensaries (Patients) | 266900          | 173552         | ---            | 192155         | 196386         | 342654         |
| Schools (Students) | 5025           | 6849           | 7844           | 12479          | 18991          | 46785          |

In the quarter of a century covered by the table, population increased by 25.7% and cultivation by 16.9%. The share of irrigation in overall cultivation remained almost static as did land revenue which stood at Rs. 0.65 and Rs. 0.68 per acre for 1905-6 and 1930-1 respectively. The minimal social welfare base had expanded considerably, however, in terms of schools, dispensaries and the income of municipalities. In comparison with Faisalabad district, the population growth was meagre, the rise in land revenue was minimal, and the increase in the amount of money involved in civil suits was far from significant. In other words, the rural structure of Attock district remained more or less unchanged.

**Landlord Factions and Electoral Politics**

Till the implementation of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in the form of the 1920 elections to the Punjab Legislative Council and the subsequent formation of government under the Dyarchy, the landlord families mainly operated at the district level. Their interests were articulated through the D.C. who maintained direct links with the leading families of the district in an individual capacity. After 1920, the need to form and retain factional support among the potential rural voters led to the formation of broad-based groups inside the Punjab Legislative Council. This process was heavily influenced by the urban versus rural dichotomy of interests in the province. The arena of political activity now extended beyond the district boundaries, and, by the same token, beyond the district administration. The politicians got involved in a reckless pursuit of patronage, grabbing jobs for their relatives, promoting educational and professional opportunities for their constituents and keeping the 'dysfunctional' role of the nationalist politics of the Khilafatists and Swarajists out of the way.

This process was given a further push by the Government of India Act of 1935. The increased number of seats and the enlarged electorate meant widening, and at the same time diversifying, the
pattern of factional alignments. Previously, when the whole of *Attock district* comprised one (Muslim rural) constituency, there was a straight fight between two factions, the Maliks of Shamsabad and the Hayats of Wah, in which the latter managed to establish itself in provincial politics. Later, however, a second constituency was created in the district which gave birth to a new conflict between the Pir of Makhad and Jodhra families on the one hand and the Awan families, especially of Tamman, on the other, the latter being under the influence of the Awan chief, the Nawab of Kalabagh from Mianwali district.

The relative position of the leading families in the local power structure was heavily influenced by the order of their link-up with the new system of government. For example, those who were granted big landed properties in the beginning were subsequently favoured for nomination to local self-government institutions, and later to the provincial legislatures as well. The services of the Hayats of Wah and the Maliks of Shamsabad, and the Awan Maliks of Talagang tehsil in providing large recruitment for the army during the First World War were crucial for their rise in the coming years. The nomination of their members to various positions in the government legitimized their leading role in the locality which they successfully exploited in the coming years first of limited and then expanded franchise. Those who came first in the political field had a great advantage over others.

The electoral framework increasingly channelled the existing tribal link-ups into factional alignments. While there was only one candidate for the Attock constituency in the 1920 elections of the Legislative Council, from 1923 each election was fought by the two rival factions of Hayats and Shamasbad Maliks. The electors came to the polling stations by villages or in large parties of factional supporters with bands playing. The old tribal relationships acquired a new relevance in this process. Each factional grouping had a hierarchy of clientel structures operating inside it. The fact that each representative institution wielded different social and political authority in terms of territorial and departmental jurisdiction was responsible for differentiating the factions internally. Thus, a clear distinction existed between the two categories of landlords
who aspired for careers in Attock District Board and the Punjab Legislative Council respectively, usually belonging to the same faction.

The ever-expanding constituencies for the higher legislative bodies ensured a progressive provincialization of the erstwhile local factions. Indeed, district Attock emerged as a stronghold of the Unionist Party. It gave to the party its strong man, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, who became the first premier of Punjab in 1935. He joined the Noon-Tiwana group of Sargodha and the Daultanas of Multan in forming a strong group of landed interests, within the framework of the Unionist Party. That, in turn, strengthened the position of the Hayats at home. Interestingly, their Khattar tribe was by no means socially ascendant. In fact, generally Khattars claimed Rajput origins through a relationship with the Awans, and many did return themselves as Awans in the census, even though the latter did not always accept. A high position in the tribal hierarchy alone was therefore not sufficient to give a particular shape to local politics. It was the structure of the new electoral framework specifying the minimum qualifications of the candidates and voters in terms of land revenue assignments and income tax payments, that organised the local politics of Attock in the form of factions.

The big landlord families of Attock combined their might with that of landlords from other districts to safeguard their class interests. Between 1923 and 1927, when the fourth settlement operations were going on in the district, their representatives in the Punjab Legislative Council succeeded in getting an undertaking from the government that the ratio of revenue to net assets would be lowered from one half to one third. This, despite the fact that the Land Revenue (Amendment) Bill was still under discussion and was eventually passed only after the settlement operations in Attock district were complete. In this way, the revenue assessment of Attock, Fatehjang, Pindi Gheb and Talagang tehsils was based on as much as 69%, 65% 68% and 100% of the third net assets respectively. Indeed, the final estimate of the third net assets declared by the government was even lower than that brought out by the settlement, the former being Rs. 923681 against the latter being Rs. 838903.
This 'feudal' influence was not limited to the revenue legislation in the province but was increasingly applied to the field of employment in the government sector, especially to compensate for the gross under-representation in it of the Muslims. In this context, the spread of higher education also became a political issue. Sir Sikandar Hayat had a degree college sanctioned for Attock which started functioning in 1924. Before then only two cities of Western Punjab, Lahore and Rawalpindi, had degree colleges. In Attock's case, it was a big jump over the heads of more developed districts of central Punjab and canal colonies, largely because of the local 'feudal' influence, as it operated in provincial politics. Getting the sanction for a college for one's own district became a vote-catching device, used by the big landlords in the Unionist Party, most notably in Attock, Jhung and Gujerat districts.

As party politics gained importance, cracks appeared in the erstwhile identity of interests between the state bureaucracy and landlords. The government favours were now reserved only for those who supported the 'king's party' in the legislatures, in this case the Unionist Party, while non-conformist political behaviour was penalised. For example, the Pir of Makhad went into eclipse as he ventured into politics from the platform of the Indian National Congress, which he had joined under the influence of the Khan brothers; consequently, he found himself embroiled in an acute political conflict with the Nawab of Kalabagh from the adjoining district, who was a staunch Unionist. The Pir was convicted of a murder plot against the latter and had to spend two years in prison. In the same way when Shaukat Hayat left the Unionist Party to join the Muslim League in 1944, and thus managed to be on the right side of the new government at the time of partition, the Maliks of Shamsabad remained with the former for which they paid dearly after independence in the form of relative powerlessness vis-a-vis the district administration. The law-and-order machinery of the government was to prove immensely
powerful in determining which political party the landlord families of the district would and should join.

In this section we have outlined the significant aspects of the social and political transformation of district Attock under the impact of colonial rule. The landholding tribes which previously held the whole area under their autonomous control now depended on the mode of operation of the new state system for maintaining their hegemony, which now had to be exercised in an altogether different manner. Among the new rules of game were the legitimacy of the new 'absolutist' state with its constitutional/institutional structure, its recognition and protection of inalienable property rights and its monopoly over dispensation of justice through the district administration. Under the new system, tribal corporateness acquired a new meaning as group support for the ambitious tribal chiefs in the context of provincial politics. At the mass level, the stagnant agricultural economy was responsible for turning the district into a catchment area for recruitment into the army. The widening scope of the representative institutions under the constitutional reforms channelled the activities of landlords into faction-building for electoral purposes. In this way Attock district produced some leading political families who became involved in the wider politics of the province and nation.

Section II: Continuity and Change in the Post-Independence Period

The partition of India in 1947 left Attock relatively untouched. Its population increased by only 12.13% between 1941 and 1951 as compared to 14% and 15.7% during the previous inter-censal periods. It seems that the district lost its Hindu and Sikh population without attracting incoming Muslims from India to settle here. This trend continued for another decade after which it reversed, due, this time, to internal reasons.
### TABLE
Population Growth Pattern in Attock District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Population</td>
<td>690301</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>700331</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>981734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>71910</td>
<td>70.58</td>
<td>122669</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Emigration to Karachi and other districts of the Punjab in search of work in the fast-expanding industrial sector accounts for the small increase in population during the 1950s. In the 1960s, however, both internal and external factors led to an immense rise in population, among them, the shift of the capital of Pakistan from Karachi to Rawalpindi only 45 miles away from Attock city, leading to expansion of the communications network into Attock tehsil; the repair projects along the G.T. Road linking Rawalpindi with Peshawar passing through Attock tehsil; the expansion in the few industrial concerns at Hasanabdal, Lawrencepur and Wah, again, in Attock tehsil, and, of course, the natural increase in population, once industrial expansion in Pakistan came to a virtual halt after the 1965 war with India and emigration largely ceased. As a result, Attock tehsil developed rapidly. 21.1% of its population lived in towns in 1972, in comparison with only 8.3%, 8.1% and 7.2% in Fatehjang, Pindi Gheb, and Talagang tehsils respectively. In other words, proximity to the world outside the district, reinforced by the railroad network, played a key role in 'development' of this one tehsil, while the rest of the district stagnated.

**Agrarian Relations**

In general, the overwhelmingly rural character of the district has survived to this day. Its political representation at the provincial level continues to be monopolized by the landlords because of the absence of any significant professional middle class to challenge their power. In the sphere of landlord-tenant relations, however, some stirrings could be observed from the time of the 1945/6 elections, when a general atmosphere of hope for a progressive Pakistan was created.
by the Muslim League propaganda against the Unionist Party. The Muslim League manifesto promised large-scale re-distribution of land, once it was elected to power. Afterwards, the activities of the All India Kisan Sabha and, later, the Pakistan Communist Party influenced the small number of peasant activities in the district whose ranks had recently been swelled by the demobilization of soldiers after the Second World War. Ghulam Mohammad of Langar in Fatehjang, an ex-soldier, started organizing tenants against the oppressive hold of landlords in the Khattar area. Conflicts revolved variously around questions of payment of cesses, distribution of harvest and ejectment of tenants. In 1949, the tenants of Langar waged a struggle against the increase in provision of green wheat for the landlords' cattle from a donkey-load (4 to 5 maunds) to a camel-load (10 to 12 maunds). 50 henchmen of Malik Mahmood Khan Khattar of Trek raided the tenants' houses past midnight in a crushing blow to end the struggle. A case was registered against Malik and appeals were made to the highest level, including the prime minister Liaqat Ali and the speaker of the Constituent Assembly Maulvi Tamizuddin Ahmed. Subsequently, a commission was instituted under Malik Feroze Khan Noon and at his initiative an Act was passed in 1950 whereby all the cesses were declared illegal. When the 1951 elections drew near, the Daultana-led Punjab Muslim League committed itself to giving ownership rights to the occupancy tenants. In Attock, Qazi Ghulam Mohammad, the tenant leader who had by now gained a considerable reputation among the lower peasantry, opposed the official Muslim League candidate, Sardar Mumtaz, as an independent candidate, and finally lost to him in a close contest.

The Punjab Tenancy (Amendment) Act of 1952 gave ownership rights to occupancy tenants, on payment of various multiples of kind rents, roughly equivalent to 20 times the cash rent. However, decisions on some of these cases were still pending in 1980. The revenue administration is closely linked with the landlords, leading to delays or clear non-compliance with the government orders. The lower revenue staff especially, recruited from the local area often on the 'recommendations' of the landlords themselves, or otherwise, patronized by them after recruitment, serves virtually as their extension service. The latter's favours include security against transfer to remote places,
and apprehension in cases of corruption. In every legal case
related to land, the kanungs and patwaris are required to produce
the Record of Rights and khasra girdawari (showing the contract
between landlords and tenants) which have acquired a legal status
through the four settlements of the last hundred years. This gives
the revenue staff immense bargaining powers because they can
delay the production of or can otherwise tamper with, the relevant
documents. The tenants are usually misled about the real terms and
conditions laid down in the khasra girdawari. Any demand on their part
to corroborate the contents of the contract from other sources is resisted
both by landlords and the lower revenue staff. It is therefore not
uncommon to find the land cultivated by tenants to be entered as self-
cultivated in the papers. No doubt the peasant perceives the rule of law
as an ultimate source of power accessible to landlords through their
command over economic resources, operating in the form of clientele
structures.

Landlords do not give any receipt for their share from the
production, because this is 'considered' highly insulting to them. In
practical terms, this is a sword hanging over the heads of tenants as
a guarantee of their 'good' behaviour, failing which they can be sued in
the court for not giving the landlords their share in the production. To
punish particularly recalcitrant tenants, the landlords tamper with the
girdawari entries with the help of the patwaris, so as to show the tenants
responsible for cultivating more lands than is actually the case, usually
including the unproductive outlying tracts, and thereby claiming a higher
share of production. This way, both the revenue laws and the administrative
machinery for enforcing these laws have kept the dominant position of
landlords immune from immediate danger.

The law-and-order wing of the district machinery, helps
landlords almost as a structural necessity. Most importantly, Section
144 is imposed during the harvest season so as to avoid conflict on the
fields. After harvesting the fruits of their year-long labour, the tenants
are anxious to get hold of the landlords or their agents as soon as possible
to divide the crop and appropriate their own share with the least possible exposure to the forces of nature. The landlords on the other hand back their exaggerated claims by delaying the distribution process under various excuses, trying to weaken the tenants bargaining power. This often brings them to a high pitch of frustration. It is widely believed that Section 144 is imposed by the D.C. at the landlords' initiative. Law tends to freeze the situation, and thus works against the interests of tenants. Cases are registered under section 188 against those violating section 144; the latter, when proved guilty, either pay a fine of Rs. 100 to 200 and/or go to jail for one to two months. 39 The failure to give the landlord his share in production often ends up in issuance of a 'decree' for payment of Rs. 2000 or sometimes even more, with no other alternative available except going to jail.

The weakness of the peasant struggle in Attock district can be ascribed to the continued hold of the legal/administrative framework over tenurial relations which had been inherited from the colonial times. The district administration's commitment to maintenance of social order, augmented by the exercise of landlords' influence through the legislatures or the higher army ranks, was responsible for keeping this district free from organised peasant struggle. It is no surprise that Attock was the only district in the whole of Punjab with no branch of the Kisan Committee even up to 1965. 40 As the whole district was a non-surplus producing area, there were no elaborate market links between the towns and countryside, nor across tehsil/district boundaries. This kept Attock district away from the mainstream of political life at the mass level, even though its landlord families continued operating in provincial and national politics.

The Tenancy (Amendment) Act of 1952 had given ownership rights to the occupancy tenants, increasing the number of revenue assesseses manifold, especially in Attock tehsil. In many individual cases, the assessment dropped to as little as fraction of paisas; for lumbrardars it was not paying to collect such meagre amounts and 134 of them resigned in the following years, their work being taken up by the regular revenue staff. 41 This effort at land reforms therefore was not only extremely limited in scope, but also expanded the role of the state
functionaries in newer areas of administration. Later, in the 1959 Reforms, surplus land beyond 36000 produce index units, with exemptions for gardens and meadows upto 8000 produce index units each, was resumed from the landlords on payments of Rs. 5 per unit.

**TABLE**

Impact of Land Reforms of 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tehsil</th>
<th>No. of affected Landlords</th>
<th>Land Resumed Acres</th>
<th>No. of Benefiting tenants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attock</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2110.66</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatehjang</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45610.72</td>
<td>2581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pindi Gheb</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5573.13</td>
<td>2825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talagang</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>771.46</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (District)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>54065.97</td>
<td>6325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Both Attock and Talagang tehsils were relatively unaffected by the 1959 reforms but in Fatehjang tehsil, the local Khattar landowners had lost their 'political' representation after almost four decades because of the 1958 imposition of Martial Law. Here each landlord surrendered 4561 acres on an average, as compared to the district average of 1689.5 acres. In contrast, in Faisalabad district was only 140.5 acres per landowner. This gives a clear idea of the overall social dominance of landlords in Attock district. Most of the surrendered land was, however, uncultivable. This meant that the landlords' monopoly over the productive land remained intact, and so did their political importance. Indeed, in many cases, land was surrendered only on paper, while some cases of transfer of ownership rights to the occupancy tenants were still continuing ten years after. In Chhach, for example, the latter had failed to buy the rights within the stipulated time and the surrendered land was restored to the original owners.
Underdevelopment of Agriculture and Industry

Attock district ranked 39 among 51 districts of (W) Pakistan in agricultural productivity. Only 60% of the 1,846,296 acres included as farm area were actually cultivated in 1960, with the average farm size being 10.77 acres. 76% of the farms were of less than 12.5 acres, covering a total of 25% of the farm area, while 24% farms were of 12.5 acres and above, containing 75% of the area. Only 3.4% of the whole cultivated area was irrigated, 75% by wells and only 19% canals. The fact that 37417 farms of all sizes reported irrigation on 37332 acres, with an average of less than one acre, meant that only small patches of land, within larger farms could be irrigated, while the rest of the area was still dependent on rains. During the 1960s, when elsewhere enormous expansion took place in water resources, Attock's water resources actually declined. It had only 28978 irrigated acres in 1972 which were 8354 acres less than in 1960. Out of this, only 7336 acres were included under 5045 fully irrigated farms; the rest, i.e. 21642 acres were under 16773 partially irrigated farms reporting a cultivated area of 183240 acres. Thus, the relative situation was more or less the same, while in terms of area, the irrigation facilities had actually shrunk. Likewise, there was little progress in the use of fertilisers and new seeds. In 1960, manure was used on 85886, i.e. 15% of the net sown area, while chemical fertilizer accounted for only 25098 acres, i.e. 4.4%. In 1972, 36262 acres, i.e. 4% of the cropped area, were fertilized. Only 19774 acres, i.e. 3.4% of the area under wheat cultivation, the most important crop in the district, were sown with Mexi-Pak seed, the rest being still under Desi varieties. The district did not partake in the government's strategy of agricultural development, which largely concentrated on the districts of central Punjab and the canal colonies.
TABLE
Household Reporting the use of Implements of Green Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Power Driven Blade</th>
<th>Power Driven Drill</th>
<th>Private Tubewells</th>
<th>Private Tractors</th>
<th>Power* Sprayers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All users</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>17332</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All owners</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users owning less than 12.5 acres</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>13801</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners owning less than 12.5 acres</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users owning 12.5 acres and above</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>3531</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owners owning 12.5 acres and above</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Power Sprayers were exclusively owned by the government.

It can be observed from the table that, compared to Faisalabad, Attock had a minimal share in the agricultural development of the 1960s. Out of 91513 farm households in the districts, only 1% benefitted from tubewells and 19% from tractors. Each tubewell catered for the needs of 5 households, while each tractor served 67.7 households on average. Small irrigable pieces of land from a large number of farms were tilled with the help of tractors which is why so many household were registered as using tractors. Therefore, as far as the demand side of the peasant agriculture is concerned there did not emerge a new generalized contractual relationship between the non-owning and owning users of mechanized implements of farming as happened in Faisalabad and other 'developed' districts. This was the more so, because the ownership pattern was not completely biased in favour of the landowners of 12.5 acres and above; thus only 60% of power-driven blades, 58.6% power-driven drills, 53.5% tubewells and 78% tractors belonged to that stratum. A large number of emigrant workers, most of them small landowners, bought agricultural machinery from their outside earnings and rented it out to the farmers in their villages. They thus became the agents of the market in the local economy, even though they lacked the class power of capitalist farmers. In other words, while the
economic base of the locality became more and more dependent on the vicissitudes of the larger national and international economy, the pattern of class relations between landlords and tenants did not alter.

Attock district has throughout failed to win development resources. On the one hand it suffered when the Government of Pakistan heavily subsidized the import of industrial machinery during the 1950s at the cost of the agricultural sector. On the other hand, even when the government turned to adoption of the Green Revolution strategy in the 1960s, the rain-fed areas, including Attock district, were completely neglected. Thus, while Attock's agricultural production base did not expand, it had to absorb the inflationary pressure generated elsewhere. The trend continued as the absolute dependence on cash earnings increased via the remittance from abroad, cash incomes from the industrial sector elsewhere in the country and regular pay from the enlarged Pakistan army. Here, we see a classic case of the 'invisible' forces of the market impinging on the locality which saw no changes in its immediate sphere of experience and therefore blamed the immorality and dishonesty of the rulers for ruining the society at large.

The district has a very tiny industrial sector. There was only the Attock Oil drilling station at Khaur and the cement factory at Wah at the time of partition. In 1972, 14 industrial units were registered, which accounted for a mere 0.5% of the number of factories in the whole of Punjab. Almost all of them, including two tobacco factories, two cotton textile mills, four concrete gypsum products units, a glass manufacturing unit, a pumps and compressors manufacturing unit, and a woollen textile mills, were situated alongside the G.T. Road. The Lawrenchpur Woollen Textile Mills was the most important unit among them. Starting as a concern of the Punjab-Co-operative Department in 1954, it was subsequently purchased by the Dawood Industries, who have constantly expanded its production capacity ever since. The majority of its 2000-strong work-force is from outside the district.
indicates the insignificant nature of the spillover effects of this limited industrialization on the rest of the district.

The cement factory at Wah started its operations in 1921 with only one kiln of 110 metric tons capacity per day. Its production capacity increased constantly, till by 1971 5 kilns were producing 1285 metric tons daily. The Pakistan government acquired its management in 1965 in a bid to have a complete monopoly over the production of cement in the country in the aftermath of the war with India. The abundance of clay and limestone deposits in this area has ensured a continued supply of raw material for the industry. Likewise, the oil drilling station at Khaur has been in operation since 1926. However, in the last half-century, no appreciable progress has been made in the production of oil; after the formation of the Oil and Gas Development Corporation, considerable effort has been made to dig exploratory wells in the area, but the overall results have been meagre. All other factories in the district are situated at Hasanabadal. This town is nearer to Rawalpindi city than to any town in Attock district and is only at a stone's throw from the two industrial towns of Wah and Taxila. That is why the industrial concentration at Hasanabadal has not contributed to the economic life of the district at large, both because it has produced only meagre employment opportunities and because it is oriented towards centres of economic activity outside the district.

Attock seems fairly well endowed with minerals, especially in the Kala Chitta Range, but these are less explored than claimed. Reserves of fire-clay are reported to be about 46.61 million tons, strewn with flint clay here and there. Limestone is abundant, as are thick beds of dolomite. There are 28 oil wells in operation, producing 1313000 barrels a day. Apart from these, granulated sand from Lawrencepur has become famous in recent years for its good quality as construction material and is exported to the rest of the country up to
Karachi. However, as a whole the district has not attracted investment either from within Pakistan or abroad. It therefore, remains tied to a stagnant agricultural economy.

**Politics of Army Recruitment**

It is clear from these observations that Attock has neither the agricultural nor the industrial resources to feed its population. The only outlet for its youth, apart from emigration to distant areas in the country and abroad, is military service. Thus the army continues to enjoy a strong base in Attock. An army career lasts for 21 years (previously 18 years). Thus, men retire from the army when they are about 40 years of age, and have to face the insecurities of life in mid-career. In 1980, there were 112,353 registered ex-servicemen in the district, more than in any other district of Punjab except Rawalpindi. In other words, one in every five men in Attock was receiving an army pension. The District Armed Services Board of Attock is responsible for disbursement of their pensions every month, and provides a limited number of jobs as clerks, drivers, transport mechanics and signals men in various sectors of the local economy, and arranges for financial aid to their widows and other dependents. The Board also plays a role at the time of discharge from the army, as also in domestic problems like fixing the amount to be sent home from a soldier's pay, inheritance and/or distribution of land, and other related matters. Ex-servicemen are especially favoured for management positions in industrial and commercial concerns, because of their allegedly strong-arm approach.

Considerable progress has been made towards improvements in the pay structure of the army's lower ranks. A jawan now starts at Rs. 350 p.m. plus free accommodation, rationing, clothing and services of washermen, cobblers and barbers. Previously, the Rawalpindi recruitment office operated in Attock as well, but now all army units have been ordered to recruit directly. Thus, on the one hand military recruitment provides security against starvation from lack of resources.
On the other hand, the relative impoverishment of Attock in the era of the Green Revolution has led to widespread frustration among the soldiers both in and out of service, generating a certain cynicism about the whole purpose of achieving independence from the British and establishing a homeland in the name of Islam.

The district has also produced many army officers who have risen to occupy high positions in the army. Indeed, the district boasts of having produced a number of generals, including General Sarfraz, who was in charge of Lahore sector in the 1965 war with India, General Akhtar Hussain, General Abdul Ali Malik, and General Sharif (later to become the chairman joint chiefs of army staff under Bhutto), as well as General Iqbal. Most of them come from modest origins, sometimes 'helped' and patronized by the big landlords. Some of them are sons of Subedars or those of similar rank and have thus inherited the tradition of army service from the colonial period. Under the combined effect of 'feudal guardianship' and upward social mobility, these generals are on the right of the spectrum of official opinion. They are the spokesmen of the rank and file in the army in their concern with the dishonest practices of the civilian officers and politicians. They seek reform through disciplinarian action against the 'miscreants' and oppose the lenient approach of the more moderate and urbane (and middle-class) military officers. It was this category of generals which ascended to the corridors of power after the decline of the latter, a change symbolized by the appointment of General Tikka Khan as Chief of Staff in 1972. Many of them do not belong to a propertied class; therefore they do not come back to Attock after retirement but settle in and around the cantonment areas of big cities. Their absence from Attock's public life has ensured that this kind of radical challenge to the local power holders would not emerge under the garb of Islamic fundamentalism.
As far as recruitment policy at the local level is concerned, the government has shown considerable reluctance to provide opportunities for higher education. It is feared that young men would not then offer themselves for recruitment as jawans but would aspire for officer grade. Although the literacy rate among males of 10 years and above in Attock district in 1972 was 31.5%, which was slightly higher than that for Faisalabad (30.2%), the ratio of students registered in colleges and university to those in primary schools was 50% less here than that in the latter.\(^4\) While the big landlord families sometimes resent losing potential tenants to the army, they share the government's fears of the destabilizing effects of education and have opposed any moves in that direction.

**Landlord Factional Politics**

The dominant landlord families continued to represent the district in the national politics of Pakistan under successive civil and military regimes. Attock's political history, therefore, revolves around the internal shifts of power within the established network of factions. For a decade after independence, the Khattar group of Hayats continued to dominate the local political scene, largely because of its leadership role in the Muslim League just before the partition of India. The progressive erosion of the position of the Muslim League in the 1950s cost the Hayats and their allies in the district dearly. After Ayub came into power, there was a lull in political activity for some years. However, when he enacted the 1962 constitution and later allowed the formation of political parties under great pressure from his political supporters in the National and Provincial Assemblies, the Hayats found themselves in opposition (Council Muslim League) while their factional rivals gained political importance. In this way, the Malik Aslam group of Chhach, the Maliks of Khunda from Pindi Cheb and the Maliks of Tamman from Talagang, along with a lesser group of Sayyeds of Mirza village near Attock town, were installed in power by joining the Convention Muslim League. In fact both Malik Hayat Tamman and Malik Allah Yar Khan of Khunda became ministers in the West Pakistan cabinet. Their henchmen wielded great power at the district level, especially with the police, magistracy and the revenue...
department. They also opened many branch offices of the Pakistan Muslim League (Convention) which thereby assumed the functions of a screening agency for forwarding applications, 'recommending' favourable treatment for certain cases in these departments and promoting the career of the more pliable lower officials in the district administration.

On the other hand, the Hayat group of the Council Muslim League, which included the Pir of Makhad, Malik Muzaffar of Gharibwal, the Nawabzadas of Pindi Gheb, the Sardars of Kot Fateh Khan, Khanzada Taj Mohammad Khan of Chhach and Sardar Mumtaz, lost their 'power' over the district administration. The system of Basic Democracies denied them the opportunity to mobilize wider sections of the population in their own favour. Their commitment to the restoration of parliamentary system should be understood therefore, in the perspective of the absolute ascendancy of the bureaucracy at the local level under Ayub Khan. The 'feudals' had long been accustomed to use their legislative/parliamentary position as a lever to control the resources of local bureaucracy. Once denied that power, they took up an opposition stance and struggled for parliamentary elections on the basis of adult franchise. Malik Shaukat Hayat led the opposition against Ayub Khan from the platform of the Pakistan Muslim League (Council). In this role, he won general acclaim in Attock, which helped him and his group in the 1970 elections.

The continuous hold of the big landlord families over the political structure of Attock district was rooted in the absence of any large-scale agricultural development which might have created new social strata and disrupted the tenurial relations under the labour-displacement effects of farm mechanization. As it remained a non-surplus producing area, hardly participating in the national market, no interest formation could take place among the growers of food or cash crops in Attock. No new
towns emerged either as centres of distribution for the implements of agricultural production or as centres of agricultural marketing. The existing towns provided neither jobs nor services to the surrounding countryside. The tiny industrial sector presented no appreciable workers' problem. There is no labour court to date; the Rawalpindi Labour Court (the Punjab Labour Court No. 6) serves the whole Rawalpindi division. There are no industrial workers' communities as in Faisalabad. Apart from one regular workers' colony at Khaur, most of the workers live in the villages surrounding the industrial units. The district has been singularly free of major strikes, largely because of absence of large concentration of workers in urban localities.

In this situation the rural-urban linkages did not develop sufficiently enough to mobilize the peasantry along political issues of wider relevance. The pattern of rural-urban migration was entirely different from that of Faisalabad district. Here the emigrant labour went to the industrializing cities of the Central/South West Punjab or lower Sind and did not visit their families for considerable periods of time. This long-distance migration pattern prevented the growth of rural-urban linkages which had radicalized the peasantry in the areas of short-distance migration like Faisalabad.

The rural power structure in Attock therefore continued to be based on landed property. At the mass level, such government functionaries, as the patwari, the forest guard and the school teacher, have enjoyed privileged positions as a function of the system. The patwari exploits his obvious monopolistic hold over the interpretation of the landowners' claim to property as well as regulation of the tenurial relations; the forest guard receives faslana (share from the harvest) in exchange for letting the peasants graze their livestock in the forest and cut fire-wood from it illegally- the school teacher makes his students do unpaid work on his lands and also receives haq-ul-khidmat (remuneration for his noble service), from their parents. Their
'exploitative' practices are protected by their relatively permanent position as government servants. They can be transferred or censured only by the district heads of their respective departments, who in turn can be approached only by the big landlords. Therefore the internal logic of the power structure has further entrenched the positions of these three officials as clients of the big landlords, for whom they rendered valuable services both within the framework of electoral politics, and by socializing students into their traditional roles.

Prior to the 1970 elections, there was little organisational activity in the district. The older political parties existed as mere coalitions of landlord factions. The Council and Convention Muslim Leagues, especially, represented the two rival factional groups of Hayats and Maliks respectively. Their political conflict was reflected in the Bar Association, where Sardar Mumtaz Ali Khan of the Khattar group and Sayed Haidar Shah of the Malik group alternated as unopposed presidents. The majority of pleaders are Sheikhs who have fairly dispersed clienteles and enjoy considerable respect. As a group they have held the balance between the two rival groups in Bar politics, but have not been able to assert themselves as an independent group. As medium-sized landholders, their political loyalties have sometimes gone against the big landlord families. In fact the PPP found its earliest converts from their ranks. In 1970, Sheikh Karim Bakhsh, the city president of the PPP fought for the presidency of the Bar but lost, owing to lack of support from the Sheikhs, the majority of whom were, and remained in the latter years, against the PPP. Overall, the Bar Association only mirrored the factional politics of the district but could not become the arena for the new politics of 'issues', symbolized by the PPP movement. Outside the Bar, the Attock Services Club has been the informal meeting place for lawyers, landlords and officers of various departments, its chairmanship usually being in the hands of one of the landlord families.
During the Ayub period these families were largely eclipsed. The bureaucracy ruled supreme at the district level, there being no directly elected members of parliament who would have represented a non-bureaucratic power base in the area. The institutions of local government were equally under the thumb of the district administration. The District Council of Attock replaced the old District Board in 1960. Out of its 38 members, 16 were officers of various departments, 12 were representative of union councils, town committees and cantonment union committees and 9 were appointed by the commissioner. The ratio of nominated to elected members was 25 to 12. The latter was increased to 40 by 1966 in a bid to increase mass participation. Yet the fact remains that the official members of the district council enjoyed the backing of their departmental authority and resources while the elected members merely looked to them for 'guidance' and policy support, especially as they did not represent any organized opinion in the district and merely reflected the factional strengths of various landlord groups.

Occasionally one comes across the local members of larger professional organizations like the Punjab Medical Association; their role is purely symbolic. Only the Pakistan Lecturers Association has had a fairly large membership mainly among the staff of the Government College, Attock. However, there is no real policy-oriented activity. One third of the staff was locally-based, with part-time involvement in petty commercial family concerns or matters related to agricultural land. A third of the staff were not happy with their posting in Attock and were always trying for transfer. Professional activities are therefore not considered significant and political attitudes are largely unformed.

The student community of Attock has been remarkably docile and politically far less committed than its counterpart in Faisalabad. Deference for age and authority is too great a part of the socialization
of students to allow a militant movement of the left or the right to emerge. Religion has been socially very powerful, but not politically so, both inside the campus and in the district at large. There are few followers of the Islami Jamiat-e-Tulba, the student organisation of the Jamat-e-Islami; instead the Anjuman Tulba Islam, the student body of the JUP, enjoys popular support. This indicates the prevalence of the sufist tradition of landlord-pirs instead of the urban-based Islamic fundamentalism found in cities like Faisalabad. Only a handful of students belong to the 'leftist' NSF. The majority of the students come from Chhach, where emigrant workers can afford to send their children to school and college out of their foreign earnings, while the rest of the district is grossly under-represented. Big landlord families' children go to the Chiefs College at Lahore and are not therefore part of the local student community. In this situation, it is no surprise that students did not provide any base for the popular movement against Ayub Khan.

In short, no public or professional organisations has ever contributed to the political structure of the district. Generally speaking, if political leaders came largely from big landlord families, with or without a footing in the district Bar, the party workers came from such tiny petty bourgeois groups as press correspondents from the Attock Union of Journalists. The Jamat-e-Islami has enjoyed support among those sections which are not directly productive, e.g. shopkeepers and teachers, while the artisans (locksmith, gunsmiths, ironsmiths) the menial classes and a few ex-armymen generally supported the radical slogans of the PPP.

Section 3. The Bhutto Phenomenon

The anti-Ayub movement of 1968-9 in Attock district was largely an elitist phenomenon. Being a stronghold of both the Council and
Convention Muslim Leagues, which represented the two rival factions of landlords, this area provided the party 'leaderships' in the conflict rather than producing a contradiction between the street power of the masses and government authority, as in Faisalabad and other 'developed' districts. The movement neutralized the political role of the Convention Muslim League faction in Attock, although the district itself had remained relatively calm. In 1969 and 1970, the third political factor in Attock emerged on the scene in the form of the PPP. Its self-proclaimed chairman Ashiq Kalim, was a young man who had attended the party convention at Lahore called by Bhutto in December 1967. In that convention, the delegates' from various districts were asked to organize the party in their own areas. When he came back, Ashiq Kalim started asking his friends in adversity, the angry young men from the District Bar, insurance agents, shopkeepers, students, to get together in fortnightly meetings and discuss the political issues. The whole thing functioned like a club, in a very irregular and haphazard way, until the election campaign started from January 1, 1970. Election to the party office took place by mutual consent without any interference from the party high command which did not have any idea who was who in the district. Information about the activities related to Bhutto and the PPP elsewhere reached the Attock branch only through the national press. In other words, the organizational link between the local and central PPPs was at the bare minimum level, which meant that the former operated fairly autonomously from the latter in its political transactions within the district itself.

As the 1970 elections approached, political activity revolved around electoral alliances between the established political operators of Attock, while the PPP moved on the margins, especially as Bhutto failed to visit the district until late August. On 31 August, while on his way from D.I. Khan to Gujerat, he made stopovers at Talagang, Khaur and Fatehjang. In his address to gatherings at these places,
he promised to bring prosperity to the poor, the labourers and peasants and denied any intentions to impose the Russian or Chinese system on Pakistan. Bhutto's visit got a favourable response from the workers of Attock Oil Company at Khaur, as well as from those of Lawrencepur and Hasanabdal. However, he failed to make a serious dent in the local power structure, which was dominated by the big landlord families from outside the PPP.

Attock district comprised two national and five provincial constituencies in the 1970 elections. Both the national seats were won by the Council Muslim League; Shaukat Hayat defeated Malik Aslam of Shamsabad, while the Pir of Makhad defeated Malik Allah Yar Khan of Khunda. However, in a surprise performance the PPP candidates won the second highest number of votes in both the seats, the candidate against Shaukat Hayat being none other than Ashiq Kalim, the founder-president of the district PPP. The success of the PPP in (W) Pakistan as a whole influenced the results of the provincial assembly elections 10 days later, whereby the PPP won two out of five seats; the other three seats went to the ML (Council) viz. Malik Muzaffer of Gharibwal, Khanzada Taj, and Nawabzada Fateh Khan Khattar.

The 1970 elections made it clear that the underlying pattern of factional alignments involved three levels of political activity: i) the battle between two political parties, the Council and the Convention Muslim Leagues; ii) the tribal/biradri ties and iii) the traditional rivalry between the two landlord factions of the Hayats and the Maliks of Shamsabad. For example, both Shaukat Hayat and the Pir of Makhad were the Council Muslim League members, as were three of the successful candidates for the provincial assembly, all of whom opposed the Convention Muslim League faction, dominated by the Awan Maliks. The Khattar votes in the Pir's constituency were pledged to him because of Shaukat Hayat's tribal/biradri ties with them. On the other hand
historically the Pir of Makhad had sided with the Jodhra politicians against the Awans of Tamman; thus, he helped Johra Malik Muzaffar of Gharibwal to defeat Hayat Tamman of the Awans in the provincial elections; Malik Muzaffar in turn worked for the Pir's success in the National Assembly elections against the Awans.

In both the southern tehsils, the PPP got votes from the urban centres, which were small, and few and far between. It got more than 50% votes from both Pindi Gheb town and Khaur, and slightly less than 50% from Talagang town. The PPP influence was largely confined to small shopkeepers, artisans, lawyers. Many of them were ex-soldiers whose past exposure to the world outside their immediate locality had made them conscious of the larger issues. The same was true for the villages from where large numbers had gone out either for service in the army, or employment in industry. However, the relatively higher political consciousness of towns was not transmitted to the countryside due to the absence of any two-way communication between them. The towns did not offer employment, merchandise, or better living conditions, and in many cases, even road links with the countryside did not exist. The Pir of Makhad is known to have opposed the idea of a link road for his own village. He also opposed the idea of opening a college in Makhad, which was then opened at Chhab.

The PPP in Power

Under the PPP regime, district Attock underwent significant changes in the area of landlord-tenant relations, the mode of articulation of power through the local bureaucracy, the organisational activity of the local party branches and finally the composition of the party itself. First of all, the land reform was conspicuously an anti-landlord measure. The ceiling for landholding was fixed at 12,000 produce index units, with an additional grant of 2,000 produce index units for tubewells or tractors. These reforms were declared against the background of the PPP election programme for bringing down the size of landholdings.
and thus re-distributing the excess land among the tenants. Considerable
government and party propaganda preceded the reforms which radicalized
the poor peasantry of Attock.

### TABLE
The Land Reforms of 1972 in Attock District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Affected Landowners</th>
<th>Area Resumed (acres)</th>
<th>Tenants Benifitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attock tehsil</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3622.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatehjangt tehsil</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7047.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pindi Gheb tehsil</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15864.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talagang tehsil</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4883.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attock district</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>31458.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the two central tehsils, especially Pindi Gheb where 587 acres per landlord were surrendered, landlord-tenant relations worsened considerably. However, it speeded up the process of farm mechanization among the affected landlords who more than compensated for their loss of land by enjoying the favourable credit policies of the Bhutto government and by renting out machinery to the lesser farmers. Many transfers had taken place only on paper. Thus, on his tour of Attock in January 1975, Bhutto was presented a petition by Ghazi Ghulam Mohammad at the head of a tenants’ delegation in an open Kutchehry about the non-implementation of land reforms in full. Bhutto enquired from Raza, the chief of the Punjab Land Commission about the truth of the matter, and when he balked over the question, suspended him forthwith.

In November 1975, Bhutto announced exemption from payment of land revenue for all landowners holding upto 12.5 acres of irrigated land or 25 acres of unirrigated land. In case of those owning more land than this, land revenue was actually increased two to three times. As Attock
was a predominantly unirrigated area, and as it had a large number of owners of small pieces of land, a considerable number of landowners benefited from the new government policy. Overall 29587 peasants were exempted from the payment of land revenue, leaving only 17723 landowners for whom land revenue was reassessed; eventually this reform caused a decline of Rs. 138885 (i.e. a 22.44% decrease) in the district land revenue. The bureaucracy showed reservations about the efficacy of these reforms both because of their arbitrary nature which militated against the erstwhile 'normal' pattern of bureaucratic paternalism and because of their cost to the national exchequer. For the landlords these reforms brought new economic pressures which were largely responsible for their initial antipathy to the Bhutto government.

In the framework of district administration, Bhutto's party based government, with a clear popular mandate behind it, enjoyed a quantum of legitimate authority which was denied to the otherwise locally dominant landlords. The latter suffered a loss of power at two levels: the district administration, and the National and provincial assemblies. Especially their age-old structural relationships with the former came under severe pressure, as the formal authority of the public representatives was established over the government officers. Moreover, the PPP represented a spectrum of mass public opinion which was visibly against the domineering role of bureaucracy. Once Bhutto was in power, the party cadres showed considerable resentment against the continuing power of bureaucracy. On the other hand, the long-term centralizing tendency within the party high command strengthened the direct control system in the locality. A weakened bureaucracy was therefore considered easier to use as an instrument against the non-compliant individuals and groups from within and outside the party. Subsequently, the state apparatus was increasingly used to sponsor the
'cause' of the lower classes as well as radical groups in the district against the conservative landlord leadership from the opposition parties. Indeed, the Bhutto regime showed its willingness to take risks in radicalizing peasantry in the relatively underdeveloped areas outside its main support base as in the case of Hashtnagar in the NWFP.

In this situation, the Attock landlords faced an acute dilemma. The PPP's professed war against their power and privileges was brought to their doorsteps after Bhutto's rise to power. Some tenant leaders actually operated the platform of the PPP, among them Bostan of Dhok who led the tenants' struggle against the Malik's of Khunda. The influence of the small number of the PPP office holders was greatly increased in the district courts and various departments of the district administration, because of belonging to the party in power. The landlords were not only deprived of their crucial link with the latter, they were now faced with the general thrust of the latter's executive and judicial activities against themselves as a class. In this situation, the rivalry between landlord factions could soon be rendered meaningless unless their common class interests could be safeguarded, which had initially afforded them a predominant place in the local power structure. The worsening landlord-tenant relations soon forced many of them to seek refuge in the PPP itself, so as to be able to exert pressure on the revenue department and magistracy. Under their influence, the PPP's role in Attock became more and more instrumental in containing the mass mobilization which was created by itself in its struggle to win the popular mandate in the 1970 elections.

When the PPP came into power, Ashiq Kalim, the president of the Attock branch, was made advisor for Local Bodies and Social welfare to the governor. However, allegedly for being neither an MNA nor an MPA, he was soon thrown out of this assignment after the 1973 Constitution came into operation. On the other hand, Waheed Akhtar, a promising young lawyer from Attock was elected to the Senate on the
the PPP ticket. It was the part of a gradual process in which representation of the original party cadres took a turn away from the ideological die-hards to the more pragmatic elements, signifying a shift of power from the 'socialists' to the 'Bhuttoists' within the party. This process also facilitated the accommodation of the landlords entering the party.

The fact that Bhutto relentlessly sought allies in areas where his support was thin presented an ideal opportunity for the Maliks' factions. This group had lost ground on account of its close identity with Ayub Khan, and had been routed in the 1970 elections. The majority of them knew Bhutto as a former colleague in the ML (Convention) from Ayub days which facilitated their rapport with him in the new set-up. They had nothing to lose by joining the new party, but everything to gain, especially re-entry into a political career, and a say in the district administration, which could be used to safeguard their individual and class interests. Their accommodation of the leftist idiom of the party was facilitated by the gradual 'purge' of the more recalcitrant cadres like Ashiq Kalim or of well-known tenant leaders like Bostan. Hayat Tamman, who had been defeated by Malik Muzaffar of Gharibwal of the ML (Council) in the provincial elections, rose to be Bhutto's special advisor on political affairs. In that capacity he established a vast clientele network both within and outside Attock district.

The Hayats took more time to adjust to the new political framework. Their party, the ML (Council), had only 6 seats in the National Assembly, two of them from Attock district. Shaukat Hayat's credentials as a relentless crusader against Ayub Khan's autocratic rule won him general respect among the politicians. When the PPP came to power, the ML (Council) again found itself in opposition. Shaukat Hayat played a significant role in the constitutional negotiations of 1972-73
as the first opposition leader in the National Assembly. However, nearer home his position was more insecure. The ML (Council) had won both the national assembly seats and three of the five provincial assembly seats, and yet it found itself utterly powerless in face of its rival faction which had ascended to power by joining the PPP, despite its electoral defeat. The day-to-day difficulties with the district administration, especially in land tenure and police matters, squeezed the followers of the ML (Council) faction in general. They exerted pressure on Shaukat Hayat and others to join the PPP. One by one, Khanzada Taj of Chhach, the Pir of Makhad, Nawabzada Fateh Khan and Malik Muzaffar of Gharibwal joined the PPP and thus became a counter-force against the ex-ML (Convention) faction within the PPP. By 1975-6, Shaukat Hayat had softened his criticism of the Bhutto regime, while his 'friends' within the PPP paved the way for his entry into the party.

In this way, by the middle 1970s, the Attock PPP came to comprise three distinct groups; two of them, the Tamman group and the Khattar group, belonged to the landlords, while the third group was composed of the party workers. The emergence of the third group introduced a structural change in the district. Set in the context of district politics as a whole, the internal politics of the PPP reveals the actual nature of the change in the local power structure. On the one hand the landlords were faced with the populist thrust of the Bhutto regime as exercised through the militant party workers. On the other hand, the latter's radicalism revolved mainly around the issue of the 'jagirdari' system in Attock district, by which they meant the powerful influence of landlords over their tenants as well as the general masses, exercised with the help of district administration. However, the party cadres had also increased their power vis-a-vis the local bureaucracy on individual basis, sometimes resulting in upward mobility, which largely took the wind out of their sails.
It was then the politics of the political stratum in the form of organisational pressures from the PPP which re-directed the activities of the powerful state apparatus in the district. The populist thrust of the PPP movement not only shook the foundations of the old clientelistic relationships between the big landlords and the local bureaucracy, it also increased the level of integration of Attock district into national politics through the party rule. The machinery of district administration was used by the centre, as embodied by the PPP high command and the central/provincial secretariats, to coerce the landlords into accepting the new situation as a fait accompli, especially in the field of tenurial relations. The entry of both the landlord factions of Attock district into the PPP signified the fact that the centralized state had greatly expanded in Attock, under its new guise of class politics. The new class definitions of political activity undermined the relevance of both factional rivalry and tribal corporateness. The new era was characterized by organisation based power, in this case, of the PPP.

After joining the party, Attock landlords were active mainly on two fronts. Firstly, they availed themselves of the opportunities offered by the Bhutto government's agricultural policy which provided assistance to the lesser farmers in general and those from less developed areas in particular. A generous credit facility and supply of agricultural machinery on cheap loans were the highlights of this policy. A Punjab Barani Commission was established which made elaborate proposals for increasing agricultural production in the Northern districts at public expense. In this way, Attock landlords were able to integrate themselves with the big farmers' interest group which operated at the national level in favour of a generous import policy for agricultural inputs, support prices for many crops, liberal credit schemes and various other privileges. Secondly, they exerted enormous pressure to re-establish links with the district administration, this time on the basis of the party rule. Hayat Tamman, as special adviser
to Bhutto for political affairs, 'purged' the party of the ideologues by using the police dossiers on the local party workers. At the same time, he appointed the 'leading' members of every district on the key posts of the local party branches. Attock district, therefore, provided a new leadership for the PPP whose influence successfully countered the radical trends elsewhere especially the relatively more developed districts. In this process, the PPP's organisational base crumbled down, and the 'centrality' of the district administration in the locality was restored.

In this chapter, we have discussed the politics of Attock district in the context of a) three historical phases of the state, the colonial, the post colonial and the populist; b) comparison between developed and underdeveloped areas; and c) Centre-periphery relations. We can conclude by observing that Attock's political structure has been increasingly integrated into national politics. It did so in the form of absorbing the liberal/radical trends from the more developed areas extending its own conservative/reactionary political tradition to the latter, mediated through an increasingly centralized state.
NOTES:

1. PDGAD (1907), pp.1-6
2. Ibid, pp.37-42.
3. Ibid., pp.63-66.
5. Ibid., p.37.
6. At the turn of the century their chief representatives were Zaildar/provincial Darbari, and extra-assistant commissioner respectively. See L.H. Griffin, Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab (Lahore, 1940), pp.270,277.
7. For example, the Khan of Makhad was embroiled in constant feuding with the Shakardara Maliks across the Indus river and the Parachas of Makhad who had expanded their trade links upto Central Asia, largely in pursuance of old tribal/feudal objectives of maintaining a stranglehold over the whole area. Gradually his fortunes declined and the Pir of Makhad replaced him as the leading figure among the Saghri Pathans. See Ibid., p.258.
10. Ibid., pp. 216-217.
11. Ibid., pp.217-224.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p.180. Also interview with the tenant leader, Qazi Ghulam Mohammad of Langar in Fatehjang.
15. See, for example, PDGAD (1907), pp.47-8.
16. PDGAD (1913), table 16, p.xxvi.

19. Thus Pindi Gheb municipality had 4 Hindus and 4 Muslims nominated, while Hazro municipality had 5 and 4 respectively, Ibid., pp. 251-3.

20. Ibid., p. 90.

21. PDGAD (1907), pp. 130-5.

22. PDGAD (1933), table 24, p. 1xxiv.

23. Ibid. table 44, p. cxxxii-iii.


27. Ibid., p. 28.

28. The Hayat family of Wah has been consistently represented in the legislative councils/assembly since 1921. Sir Sikandar Hayat, its leading figure, variously occupied high positions as the member Legislative Council (1923-30), member Executive Council (1930-35), Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, (1935-36), leader of the Unionist Party and the first premier of Punjab (1936-42). His son Shaukat Hayat was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly on his father's death in 1942, became a minister in Khizr Hayat Tiwana's cabinet for a short while, got re-elected on the Muslim League ticket in 1946 elections, and became a minister in the (W) Punjab government after partition. He was a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan at the same time. See Craig Baxter, 'The People's Party vs. the Punjab "Feudalists"', in J.H. Korson, (ed.), *Contemporary Problems of Pakistan*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 11-12.


Similarly, Colonel Abid Hussain had a government college sanctioned for Jhung in the same year, and later Sir Fazle Ali was instrumental in opening the Zamindara College of Gujerat in 1939.


Interview with Qazi Ghulam Mohammad, the tenant leader from Langar, Fatehjang tehsil.

Ibid. The Information about the cases under Section 188 was corroborated in an interview with Syed Zahid Bokhari, Advocate District Bar of Attock, although the exact number of cases could not be found.

Chaudary Fateh Mohammad, Pakistan ke Zar'i Masael or Kisan Tehrik, Agricultural Problems of Pakistan and the Peasant Movement (Urdu), (Lahore, n.d.), p.9.


Ibid.

Ibid. table 17, p.294.

Ibid.

49. Ibid. table 25, p.183.


52. Ibid. table 41, p.325.

53. See ibid. table 1, p.1, for total number of households.

54. These ratios are based on the actual number of tubewells and tractor viz. 190 and 256, which slightly differ from that of the owners. See ibid., tables 66, 67, pp.500, 507.

55. Population Census of Pakistan (1972), op.cit., p.5.

56. Interview with the Manager, Lawrencepur Woollen Textile Mills Ltd.

57. PDGAD (1980) op.cit., pp.149-150.

58. Information from the District Armed Services Board, Attock.

59. Interview with Major Tasadduq Hussain, Head of the District Armed Services Board, Attock.

60. Ibid.

61. For example, Malik Iqbal Khan of Khunda, an uncle of Malik Allah Yar Khan was the patron and guardian of General Iqbal, the present joint Chiefs of staff in Pakistan.


63. General Tikka Khan belonged to Gujar Khan tehsil of Rawalpindi district, which, together with Attock and other 'poor old settled districts' formed a region of destitute peasantry with a long tradition of military recruitment.


66. Interview with Mr. Waheed Akhtar, Advocate, formerly PPP Senator from Attock.

67. Dawn (Karachi), September 2, 1970.

68. Philip Jones, op. cit., table 41, p. 582.

69. Ibid, pp. 583-4. The veteran tenant leader Qazi Ghulam Mohammad of Langar who joined the PPP in 1969, was also an ex-soldier. He was recruited in 1932; he fought in the Second World War in Rome, and later on the Libyan front, where he was captured by the Germans; he was shifted to France from where he fled.

70. PDGAD (1980) op. cit., p. 187.

71. Interview with the tenant leader, Bostan.

72. Interview with Sardar Mumtaz Hayat Khan, the uncle of Shaukat Hayat, many times president of the Attock Bar Association, and ex-minister. He insisted that one was forced to be a PPP member to get 'justice' from the district bureaucracy and judiciary. He quoted the example of the local tehsildar who had invited between five and six hundred guests to his daughter's wedding, including the whole district bureaucracy whereas the law barred banquets of more than 50 people. In contrast, a banquet at the Sardar's house, where the number of guests slightly exceeded 50, was reported and a notice was duly served on him.

73. Even the procedure of joining the party involved a show of superiority of one's own faction. For example, Governor of Punjab, Sadiq Qureshi had presided over the function in which the Malik's announced their entry into the PPP. Now the Khattar group insisted that Bhutto himself should come if Shaukat Hayat was to join the party.
CONCLUSION

We set out to analyze the politics and the state in Pakistan after independence. We started from the premises that modernization theory has failed to provide the answer to the question of the nature of the state authority. While it concentrates on the modernizing role of the state bureaucracy in the Third World, it largely ignores the source of the latter's legitimate power. Moreover, it derives its meaning from the system's approach which shares with the classical marxist theory a tendency to downgrade the specificity of the political domain of social activity. It thus focuses mainly on the question of systemic equilibrium, political stability, social order, institutionalization of political mobilization and various cultural diffusion models. On the other hand the 'conflict' approach leaves out the most pertinent questions of the structural aspects of the state and concentrates on groups in action only.

What we have done is to tackle the whole issue at two different but interrelated levels. On the one hand we have outlined the historical roots of the Pakistan state in British India. While the expanding metropolitan capital penetrated into the Indian society, it dismantled the old social order based on localized power structure of landlords. In its place, a modern centralized state emerged largely as the organizing principle of the new social order which was increasingly based on the mode of operations of peripheral capitalism. Among the more significant features of the Pakistan state's colonial heritage were the specific types of rule of law and rational-legal bureaucracy. Property provided the base-line for the operations of the colonial state in service of private enterprise.
On the other hand these historical observations have been largely set in a structural framework. Thus, we have analyzed the colonial state's institutionalized relationships with the local society. We have discussed them both at the formal and informal levels of interaction. In this way, we have elaborated the bifocal nature of the state power in British India. Its legal framework provided it with a level of 'objectification' which was denied to the non-colonial societies. On the other hand, it had established informal clientele relationships with the erstwhile dominant tribes and landlords. These clientele structures were an important part of the formation of the state and have distinguished the colonial from the non-colonial societies.

Pakistan emerged as a legitimate holder of this power structure. Such political institutions as parties and legislatures which had emerged on the crest of nationalist movement soon atrophied in the new state's drive towards centralization of all power in the hands of bureaucracy. The emergent bureaucratic polity of Pakistan gave birth to a classical model of unhindered capitalist development. When the state grew increasingly powerful in pursuit of developmental goals, its operations remained strictly within the 'structural imperative' of peripheral capitalism. The new market activity represented a highly decentralized control device which while 'freeing' more and more people from the older economic framework, co-ordinated their economic behaviour along the dynamics of capital. The development of productive forces in Pakistan from the middle 1950's to the middle 1960's put immense pressure on the old relations of production through both structural and absolute inequalities. That in turn led to changes in the mode of articulation of power in the society. We have discussed how the state bureaucracy re-stratified the society of Pakistan by sanctioning unequal access to resources on the basis of the existing property structure, both in agricultural and industrial sectors. The government constantly intervened on the behalf of the dominant classes for the maintenance of industrial and agrarian relations on an even keel.
Development was therefore not only the development of certain groups and classes at the expense of certain others but also of the state at the expense of all the non-statist groups and institutions.

The populist movement of the early 1970's thus represents the political dimension of the large-scale social disarticulation as a direct result of market-induced polarization of classes. The subsequent action of the working classes strove to beat the encapsulating power of capital by asserting as its productive base. I have argued that the PPP movement had a certain 'freeing' effect on the political consciousness of the underprivileged classes between 1968 and 1975. The anti-Ayub movement shook the confidence of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy to rule the country through demagoguery. However, it was the year-long election campaign of 1970 which crystallized the public grievances into definite demands, although their ideological manifestations remained unclear. The campaign acquired a movement character largely because of the absence of any broad-based channels of articulation of interests. The subsequent rise of the PPP to power and its ambitious programme of reforms led to a level of centralization of all power in the hands of the executive wing of the government, while at the same time taking away the judicial and constitutional safeguards of the dominant classes' interests. The need for revival of the bureaucratic polity, which was never far below the surface was felt increasingly. The PNA movement after the 1977 elections, followed by the military takeover has been quite typical of the scene elsewhere in the Third World wherever such populist/intermediate regimes have intervened in the ongoing process of capitalist development in a bureaucratic framework.

We can distinguish the state structure of Pakistan from its neighbouring countries of Afghanistan and Iran on the one hand and
such remote neighbours within the Third World as Vietnam
Campuchea, Algeria, Angola and Mozambique on the other.
The former countries were never colonized and have retained a state structure
which is closely identified with their ruling classes. They have
thus failed to evolve an 'objectified' authority structure, relatively
free of the domineering hold of the local ruling class. The rapid
developmental activity in these countries led to their total collapse
in the end, as the movement from below swept the modern 'overlayer'
of their traditional societies. Similarly, the ex-colonies of the
maritime empires other than the British failed to evolve such
clientele structures at the grassroots level which would have
provided cushions against the popular movements. In both these
types of countries, the state could not face up to the disarticulating
effect of the developmental process. On the other hand, we have seen
in the context of Pakistan that such rapid industrial and agricultural
changes ended up, first, in the change of guards at the top, symbolized
by Ayub's replacement by Yahya and second through the absorption of
the PPP radicalism by the state. Both the legal base of the government
rule and its far-reaching structural roots in the locality in Pakistan
distinguish it from other states within the Third World.
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