THE BACKGROUND AND EARLY LIFE
OF
AN LU-SHAN

by
Edwin G. Pulleyblank

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The thesis here presented is the result of three years and more of research undertaken at the School of Oriental and African Studies. My first acknowledgements therefore must be to the Chinese government for the scholarship by which I was first able to come here and to the School for appointing me to its staff and so enabling me to continue what I had begun.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1 -- INTRODUCTION .............................................1
Introduction 1, previous work on the subject 3, sources 4, arrangement etc. 9.

Chapter 2 -- THE ORIGINS OF AN LU-SHAN AND HIS HISTORICAL DEBUT .......................................................... 10
Translation from An Lu-shan Shih-chi 10, An Yen-yen real father of A L-s 12, An families 13, their Sogdian origin 16, A L-s considered self a Sogdian 17, memorial by ShaoYieh 19, mythical elements in CTS biography of A L-s 22, A L-s's name 22, biography of Shih Ssu-ming 24, cult of An and Shih 25, A L-s's place and date of birth 27, An Yen-yen among the Northern Turks 28, youth of A L-s,29, with Chang Shou-kuei at Yu Chou 30, disgrace of 736,33.

Chapter 3 -- THE BACKGROUND OF THE REBELLION OF AN LU-SHAN -- ECONOMIC ................................................................. 36
Introductory 36, not a peasant revolt 36, floods of 754 37, reforms at beginning of Hsian-tsung's reign 40, 'runaway households' 41, 'equal field' system 43, land grabbing 44, Yu-wen Jung's measures 46, criticisms 48, later measures against migration 49, transport 50, neglect during 7th century 51, moves to Lo-yang 51, early reforms under Hsian-tsung 52, P'ei Yao-ch'ing 52, proposal of 730 53, of 733 54, result of reform 55, 'equitable grain-purchase' 55, later grain transport 56, Wei Chien 57, Yang Ch'ung-li 57, Yang Shen-ch'in 58, Wang Hung 58, Yen Kuo-chung 58, summary and comment 59.

Chapter 4 -- THE BACKGROUND OF THE REBELLION OF AN LU-SHAN -- POLITICAL ........................................................... 61
Difficulty of disentangling political picture 61, of knowing about lower classes 61, merchants 62, Buddhists and Taoists 64, divisions in governing class 64, the 'within' 65, struggles of Hsian-tsung in gaining his throne 65, relations with his brothers 67, revolt of 722 68, fall of Empress Wang 69, character of Hsian-tsung 70, military favourites and their fall 70, eunuchs 71, the 'without'--aristocrats and literary gentry 73, theories of Ch'en Yin-k'o 74, pre-eminence of literati at beginning of Hsian-tsung's reign 75, Yu-wen Jung 77, conflict with Chang Yieh 78, exile of Yu-wen Jung 81, ministry of Tu Hsien and Li Yuen-hung 82, ministry of Yu-wen Jung 82, fall of Yu-wen Jung 84, Hsiao Sung and P'ei Kuang-t'ing -- Yan Hsin 85, ministry of Chang Chiu-ling, P'ei Yao-ch'ing and Li Lin-fu 85, character of Li Lin-fu 88, fall of Chang Chiu-ling 91, dictatorship of Li Lin-fu 93.

Chapter 5 -- THE BACKGROUND OF THE REBELLION OF AN LU-SHAN-- MILITARY .............................................................. 95
The fu-ping system 95, advantages 97, and weaknesses 98, armies at the capital 99, Northern Armies 100, decline of the Guards 102, reform of Chang Yieh 103, decline of Northern Armies 104, coup of 752 -- eunuch

Chapter 6 -- THE SPECIAL SITUATION IN HO-PEI.............................118
Natural advantages 118, antagonism of Ho-pei and Kuan-chung 118, not due to aristocratic families 119, dating back to Northern Ch'i? 121, economic decline 121, lack of defence 122, invasions from 696-8 123, memorial of Ti Jen-chieh 123, fierce spirit of Ho-pei people 125, new defences 125, improved economic conditions 126, An Lu-shan's court 127.

Chapter 7 -- AN LU-SHAN UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP OF LI LIN-FU

Fall of Chang Shou-kuei 128, promotions of An Lu-shan 129, visits to the capital 131, development of Li Lin-fu's dictatorship -- Niu Hsien-k'o 133, Li's efficiency 134, Li Shih-chih 135, other aristocrats 136, intrigues 137, the Crown Prince 139, purge of 746 141, fall of Yang Shen-ch'in 143, of Wang Chung-ssu 144, Yang Kuo-chung 145, An Lu-shan from 744-7 147, Li Lin-fu's efforts to control frontier commanders 148, new policy of using barbarians 150, anecdotes about An Lu-shan and Li Lin-fu 151, An Lu-shan and Li Lin-fu 151, and the emperor and Yang Kuei-fei 152, birthday of 751 153, Li's new antagonists 154, A L-s's expedition against the Khitan in 751 155, Yang Kuo-chung and Chien-nan 156, fall of Wang Hung 157, intrigues of Yang Kuo-chung against Li 159, A-pu-ssu 160, death of Li Lin-fu 161, his posthumous ruin 162, conclusion 162.

Notes on Chapter 1..........................165
" " " 2..........................165
" " " 3..........................166
" " " 4..........................204
" " " 5..........................213
" " " 6..........................230
" " 7..........................236

Appendix I -- A COMPARISON OF THE TEXTS OF THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES FOR THE BEGINNING OF AN LU-SHAN'S BIOGRAPHY. 245
Appendix II -- CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION FROM SUI TO T'ANG..........................250
Appendix III -- TWO DECREES RELATING TO YU-WEN JUNG'S K ATTEMPTS TO REGISTER MIGRANTS.259
Appendix IV -- TWO MEMORIALS BY 'PEI YAO-CH'ING ON TAX TRANSPORT..................................268
Appendix V -- THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF CHIEF MINISTERS AND FINANCIAL OFFICIALS DURING HSUAN-TSUNG'S REIGN.283
REFERENCE LIST OF WORKS CITED IN THE THESIS..........................300
SHORT GLOSSARY OF OFFICIAL TITLES..........................308
MAPS

Sketch map of the North-eastern Frontier..............31,129
Sketch map of the Water Transport Route..................269

In an envelope at the back

MAP I -- The T'ang empire
MAP II -- Northern and Central China in the T'ang Dynasty

TABLES

Genealogical Table of the An Families.....................14
The Texts of the Principle Sources for the Beginning of
An Lu-shan's Biography....................2 sheets facing..245
Population by Households in Sui and in T'ang.............250
Population by Individuals in Sui and T'ang...............250
Chief Ministers under Hsian-tsung.........................283
Financial innovators under Hsian-tsung....................284
An Lu-shan is not a name which is familiar to most non-Chinese. Even to most Chinese it presents hardly more than a figure of romance. Yet the tremendous consequences which his career had for the Far East entitle him to a place among the great makers of human history. Before him China was a vast, unified empire, extending its power far beyond its frontiers. After he raised rebellion it was a shattered and bruised remnant, confined to its own borders, pressed by invaders without and harassed within by parasitic and lawless armies over which a eunuch-ridden central government exerted a precarious suzerainty. The T'ang dynasty never recovered from the blow and in spite of temporary revivals, relapsed into greater and greater disunity until it dissolved into the so-called Five Dynasties period. Never again did a native Chinese dynasty reach the summit of glory from which An Lu-shan rudely pushed the emperor Hsuan-tsung and his brilliant court in 755-56.

For this An Lu-shan has not unnaturally been made into a titanic villain. He is pictured as in every way gross and vile, a rough barbarian soldier of the meanest origins who gained the confidence of the emperor by subtle flattery only to use his position of great trust for a treacherous attempt to despoil his benefactor of his throne. The legend was not long in developing and it is therefore difficult to
penetrate through it to the man beneath. It has been part of my intention to attempt this task and I hope the reader will feel that the glimpses of the man An Lu-shan which I am able to give him are no less interesting than the lineaments of the legendary monster.

The other part of my intention, and indeed the major part, has been to reconstruct the historical background in which An Lu-shan appeared and to explain as far as possible the true nature of his rebellion and the reason why it was able to have such devastating consequences. I am under no illusion that this has been accomplished in any complete or final way. Much more must be known of the history of the centuries before and after before this can even be thought of. Nevertheless it is hoped that the present study will make the rebellion a good deal more comprehensible than it has been hitherto and also provide a substantial foundation for future researchers in this and related subjects.

The first volume, here presented as a thesis, takes the story only as far as the end of the year 752, about three years before the outbreak of the rebellion. It sets the stage for the events which finally precipitated the conflict. It is hoped subsequently to add a second volume dealing with the outbreak of the rebellion and its course until the defeat of An Lu-shan's last successor, Shih Ch'ao-lung in 762.
No monograph study devoted to the rebellion of An Lu-shan has previously appeared in Chinese, Japanese or a western language. This is less surprising than it might seem, for the canvas of Chinese history is so vast and the number of investigators so few that large portions must remain un-illuminated for a long time to come. The rebellion has of course been given cursory treatment in every general history of China. But even ignoring the many who have done nothing but relate the romanized legend, generally in garbled form, the casual critical attention that has been given to the subject by western sinologists has not been of much value. Without intensive study of the sources it was impossible to exercise criticism except to reject those parts of the traditional story which did not seem reasonable or to construct, more or less out of thin air, another legend in accordance with more modern preconceptions.

On the other hand really valuable suggestions for this study have come from Chinese and Japanese scholars who have worked on the T'ang period. My debt to the greatest of living T'ang scholars, Professor Ch'en Yin-k'o, will be particularly evident. His remarks on An Lu-shan's origins in T'ang-tai Cheng-chih Shih Shu-lun Kao were helpful and above all his suggestive theories about the social structure of T'ang provided the key for the solution of many problems. Reference to the works of other Chinese, Japanese and western scholars will be found in the notes.
Nothing in the above remarks should of course be taken as a reflection on the works of Messrs. R. des Rotours and E. Balaze, which, though they do not bear directly on the rebellion, are of fundamental importance for any westerner studying the history of the T'ang period.

Sources

The principal extant sources for the life of An Lu-shan are his biographies in the Old and New T'ang Histories, and his separate biography in three chapters, known as the An Lu-shan Shih-chi 安禄山事略 (Traces of the Deeds of An Lu-shan), a ninth century work by an author, Yao Ju-neng 姚汝能, who is otherwise unknown. In addition there is the material contained in the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien 諸侯列紀 and its associated commentary on sources, the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien K'ao-i 考異 (hereafter referred to as the K'ao-i). All these works are wholly derivative from earlier sources which now no longer exist in independent form. Quotations, some of them quite extensive, are however given in the K'ao-i.

In my article entitled the Tzyjyh Tongjiann Kaoyih and the Sources for the Period 736-763 I have shown that such quotations can sometimes be used to reveal the origins of the works which we now possess. I there mentioned that Chapter 200A of the Old T'ang History, which contains the biographies of An Lu-shan and Shih Sau-ming 史思明, as well
as those of their sons and two other leading rebels, appeared to be derived from the *Su-tsung Shih-lu*\(^3\) and that the An Lu-shan Shih-chi and the corresponding chapter in the *New T'ang History* (ch. 225A) were derived from the same source with the addition of other materials. It now remains to demonstrate this in more detail.

In Appendix I a passage from the *Su-tsung Shih-lu* which appears in the *K'ao-i* is compared with the corresponding passages in the Old and *New T'ang Histories* and the An Lu-Shan Shih-chi. It will be seen that apart from abridgment and some changes of wording, the Old *T'ang History* differs very little from the *Shih-lu*. Two small additions of substance to the *Shih-lu* text, one of them demonstrably erroneous and the other possibly so, were probably the result of misunderstandings on the part of the editor of the Old *T'ang History*.

The following additional passages in the *K'ao-i* are relevant:

(1) *K'ao-i* under T'ien-pao 13/1/chi-hai quotes a passage from the *Su-tsung Shih-lu*, the contents of which appear in CTS 200A.2.a in abbreviated form but with very similar wording. The An Lu-shan Shih-chi \(^\phi.2.b\) follows the *HeHan-tsung Shih-lu* for the incident in question.

(2) *K'ao-i* under Chih-te 1/5/jen-wu quotes the *Su-tsung Shih-lu* as saying that the battle of Chia-shan \(^\frac{\text{1}}{2}\) was fought on the jen-wu day of the sixth month. CTS 200A.3. also says the sixth month but does not mention the day. According to the calendar used by Ssu-ma Kuang (*Ch'ian Li*\(^4\)) and also according to Hoang, *Chronologies Neoméniques* the jen-wu day was the 29th of the fifth month. It would appear therefore that the *Shih-lu*
was in error and that the Old T'ang History merely copied this error. It is possible of course that a different calendar was in use at the time but in any case the biography did not differ from the Shih-lu.

(3) K'ao-i under Chih-te 2/12/chia-tzu states that the Old biography gives the number of horsemen engaged in a certain battle as 3,000 whereas the Shih-lu, which Ssu-ma Kuang follows, says 5,000. In fact the biography of Shih Ssu-ming in CTS 200A.7.b gives the number as 5,000 in all editions available to me. See however Chu King Yueh II.2.6.16.b, which gives the figure 3,000, cf. Ts'ang T'ang Shih Chhi-ho Chhi 86.26.a.

(4) K'ao-i under Chih-te 2/12/i-ch'ou, second note, quotes the CTS 200A.7.b regarding the titles given to Shih Ssu-ming when he went over to T'ang in 757. In stating that he was made Ho-pei Chieh-tu Shih! 河北節度使 , the biography appears to have run together the two titles, Ho-pei Ts'ai-fang Shih and Fan-yang Chieh-tu Shih. The T'ung-chien which here follows the Shih-lu gives the title as Fan-yang Chieh-tu Shih. This is evidently merely a copyist error in the Old T'ang History.

(5) K'ao-i under Ch'ien-yuan 2/1/ch'i-ssu states that in giving a certain general's name as Chou Chih 章 他 it follows the Shih-lu. The Old T'ang History as quoted in the K'ao-i and in ch. 200A.8.a gives the name as Chou Chih 章. This again is evidently merely a copyist's error.

(6) K'ao-i under Ch'ien-yuan 2/3/jen-shen states that the T'ung-chien is here following the Shih-lu. CTS 200A.8.b records the same events but more briefly than the T'ung-chien.


(8) K'ao-i under Shang-yuan 2/3/wu-yin quotes a fairly long passage from the Shih-lu which appears with a few abridgments and changes of wording in CTS 200A.9.a. The only difference of substance is that the Shih-lu said 'several tens of thousands' where the Old T'ang History has 'several thousands!'. This is evidently a copyist's error.

(9) K'ao-i under Shang-yuan 2/3/chia-wu says, 'Here I follow the Shih-lu and the Old biography', implying
that they were in agreement. The T'ung-chien here gives an abridged version of CTS 200A.9.a.

(10) K'ao-î under Shang-yüan 2/3/chia-wu, second note, quotes a passage from the Shih-lu from which CTS 200A.9.b is abridged.

Under K'ai-yüan 24/4/hsin-hai, second note, and K'ai-yüan 29/3/i-wei the K'ao-î cites the biographies in question without reference to the Su-tsung Shih-lu. This does not necessarily mean that the matter did not appear in the Shih-lu. The K'ao-î is quite unsystematic in the way it cites its sources.

The above examples can leave no doubt that almost everything which appears in chapter 200A of the Old T'ang History comes from the Su-tsung Shih-lu. This is important because the Su-tsung Shih-lu was composed during the reign of Tai-tsung (763-79), that is, only shortly after the suppression of the rebellion when feeling against the rebels was still very high. This is clearly reflected in the slanderous character of much that appears in their biographies, as will be brought out in Chapter 3.

It will be seen from Appendix I that the An Lu-shan Shih-chi reproduced the Shih-lu rather more fully than did the Old T'ang History. Apart from this however Yao Ju-neng did a thorough job of gathering together all the material on An Lu-shan which was available at the time he wrote. There is evidence in the K'ao-î that he used the Hsia-yan-sung Shih-lu⁵ (Example (1) above), the biography of Chang Chiu-ling in the T'ang-shu of Liu Fang 柳芳⁶ (now incorporated into the Old T'ang History) (see K'ao-î under K'ai-yüan 24/4/hsin-hai), the T'ang Li⁷ 唐歷 (see K'ao-î
under T'ien-pao 14/3/kuei-ssu), the Chi-men Chi-luan 前門記亂 (see K'ao-i under T'ien-pao 14/11/chia-tzu and compare ALSSC [1969, 6.b) and probably other works as well. In addition he utilized documents such as edicts and epitaphs to which he presumably had access in the History Office. He also included a good deal of anecdotal material of doubtful value and did not always harmonize his sources -- a fact which enhances the value of his work as a source book.

The biography in the New T'ang History has also enlarged the material in the Shih-lu by additions from other sources, usually the same ones as those used by Yao Ju-neng in the An Lu-shan Shih-chi. Occasionally however it contains matter not found elsewhere of whose origin we have no clue. This does not usually give an impression of reliability and I shall therefore rarely have occasion to refer to it.

Other material relative to the early life of An Lu-shan are contained in the Basic Annals and other biographies of the Old T'ang History and in various collections of documents such as the Ch'üan T'ang Wen 全唐文 and the collected works of individual writers. Of particular importance is the unique collection of letters sent from the government to its frontier commanders and to foreign rulers between 733 and 736 which is contained in the collected works of the then Chief Minister Chang Chiu-Ling (Ch'ü-chiang Chi 曲江集).

The general sources for the history of the period are
well known and I refer the reader to the works of M. des Rotours.

The Wade-Giles system is used for the transcription of Chinese words. The characters for proper names are given at the first occurrence.

The translations of titles are in general based on those of M. des Rotours in *Traité des Fonctionnaires*. In a few cases I have adopted another translation which seemed more convenient. A short glossary is included at the end to identify the translations of frequently occurring titles. In the case of less common titles, the Chinese is included in the text. In general I have not attempted to translate purely honorific titles and sinecures.

In place names I use the following conventional translations: province — tao 誕; prefecture — chou 蛋 or fu 福; commandery — chün 前; county — hsien 潭. In the case of the commanderies which replaced prefectures from 742 to 758 I retain the prefecture name — e.g. Yu Chou, not Fan- yang 河 阪 Chün. The T'ang provinces and prefectures are shown on Maps I and II. Unless otherwise indicated I have used the *Chung-Kuo Ku-chin Ti-ming Ta Tz'u-tien* for the identification of place names.

When dates are given merely with the year, or with the year and a numbered month, the Chinese lunar calendar is intended. The year number is that of the western year which corresponds to the greater part of the Chinese year in question. Only when the month is given its English name is the western calendar intended.

References to the *Tzu-chih T'ung-chien* (TCTC) are given not by chapter and page but by date in the following form: year period--number of year--month--day of the cycle of sixty. In the case of the most frequently occurring year periods, K'ai-yüan (713-741) and Tien-pao (742-755), the western year number is not indicated, but for other year periods it is inserted.
CHAPTER 2

THE ORIGINS OF AN LU-SHAN AND HIS HISTORICAL DEBUT

The following is a translation of the beginning of the longest of An Lu-shan's biographies, the An Lu-shan Shih-chi. It gives the fullest account of his early years which we possess and as I have shown it reproduces most accurately the earliest biography of An Lu-shan, that in the Su-tsung Shih-lu. (The doubly indented portions occur as original commentary in the text.)

"An Lu-shan was a 'mixed barbarian' (tsa-hu 雜胡) from Ying Chou. His childhood name was Ya-lo-shan 雅老山. His mother, of the A-shih-te 阿史德 clan, was a Turkish (T'u-ch'ieh) shaman. She had no son and prayed to Ya-lo-shan. The god answered and he was born. On that night a red light shone by his side, all the wild animals howled round about. Astrologers saw the beam of a star of evil magic (yao-hsing 妖星) fall on the tent.

At the time Chang, Duke of Han, sent men to search for his tent. They did not catch him so they killed old and young alike. Lu-shan was hidden by someone and escaped.

There were innumerable omens and marvels. His mother thought he was divine and so called his name Ya-lo-shan. The Turks (T'u-ch'ieh) call their god of battle Ya-lo-shan.

He was orpahned young and went with his mother to live among the Turks. His mother later married Yen-yen 任偃, the elder brother of the western barbarian (hu胡) General An Po-chu 安波注.

The epitaph of An Lu-shan which Shih Ssu-ming ordered the rebel-appointed History Officer Chi-i 氏儀 to compose states that his grandfather's personal name (hu胡) was I-yen 爲偃. It does not agree with this.

At the beginning of K'ai-yüan (713-41) Yen-yen's clan was ruined. The son of the western barbarian General An Tao-mai 安達眉, Hsiao-chieh 孝節, and the sons of An Po-chu, Ssu-shun 蘇順, and Wen-ch'ên 文暄 should read: Yuan-chen 元徹, fled from among the Turks. Tao-mai's second son, Chen-chieh 沈哲, was Adjutant (Pieh-chia) of Lan 蘭 and received them. Lu-shan was in his teens. Since
they had come with his elder brother Hsiao-chieh. Chen-chieh made a pact of brotherhood with Lu-shan and Ssu-shun. Thereupon he adopted the surname An, according to the memorial of Kuo, Prince of Fen-yang 稳陽, requesting the exculpation of An Ssu-shun, his (i.e., An Lu-shan's) original surname was K'ang, but it does not provide details.

and the personal name Lu-shan.

When he grew up he was a vicious thief, cruel, full of wiles, and clever at reading men's thoughts. He understood nine [read: six] barbarian languages. He became a middleman for the barbarians in the frontier markets. When Chang Shou-kuei 姜守珪 was Military Governor (Chieh-tu Shih) of Fan-yang 防陽, Lu-shan stole a sheep and the crime came to light. He was pursued and caught. When they were about to beat him to death, Lu-shan shouted, "Does the Ta-fu (i.e., Chang Shou-kuei who held the rank of Yu-shih Ta-fu, President of the Censorate) wish to destroy the Two Barbarians, the Hsi and the Khitan? Yet you kill a brave soldier." Shou-kuei marvelled at his words and his appearance. So he pardoned him and kept him to serve in front of the army.

Thereupon he and Shih Ssu-ming 史思明 both became reconnaissance officers. From earlier days An Lu-shan was acquainted with the hills and rivers, springs and wells. Once with three or five horsemen under him he captured several tens of Khitan. Shou-kuei admired him more and more. Every time he was given more troops, he would double the number of enemy caught. He later became Shou-kuei's lieutenant (p'ien-chiang 偏將). Wherever he turned he was victorious. Shou-kuei accordingly adopted him as a son.

For his military prowess he was promoted to the rank of Auxiliary General of the Left Mounted Guard (Yuan-wai Tso Ch'i Wei Chiang-ch'un 邊外左騏衛將軍 -- should probably read hsiao 輝 'courageous' instead of ch'î 變) with the office of Commissioner for Attacking in Front of the Encampment (Ya-ch'ien T'ao-chi Shih 前 討擊使).

To add to this interesting, but, from a historian's point of view, unpromising narrative we have a number of sources other items of information from various which enable us to separate the myth and dubious anecdotes from the factual material and so finally to trace a shadowy, but con-
ving outline of the truth. The first question that arises is that of An Lu-shan's parentage. We are fortunate in being able to ascertain what he himself believed, or claimed to believe, on the subject.

Farther on in the An Lu-shan Shih-chi a decree of the year 748 is quoted in extenso, conferring posthumous honours on An Yen-yen, the man who in the above passage was named as An Lu-shan's adoptive father. It reads in part as follows: "He Yen-yen was for long famed as a brave warrior on the Gobi. He was capable of begetting a noble scion, who truly possesses great abilities.... who commands the garrison in Yu and Chi (i.e. the northern frontier of Ho-pei) and sternly drives out the vile savages...." It goes on to say in metaphorical language that even though An Yen-yen was on the other side and therefore deserved censure rather than praise, his fault was excused by the virtues of his son. There is certainly no suggestion here that An Yen-yen was anything but the actual father of An Lu-shan.

That he was thought to be the actual son of An Yen-yen seems also to be the implication of the short, enigmatic reference in the An Lu-shan Shih-chi to the epitaph written for An Lu-shan by order of his successor as rebel emperor, Shih Ssu-ming. This epitaph mentioned his grandfather's given name, I-Yen. It could hardly have done so if his real father had been unknown and it is natural to assume
according to the epitaph this father was Yen-yen. (Is there some connection between the names I-yen and Yen-yen?) Unfortunately Yao Ju-neng, the author of the An Lu-shan Shih-chi, who elsewhere remarks that the epitaph is not worthy of attention because of its rebel origin\(^\text{17}\), tells us nothing more of what the epitaph does say but he does add significantly that it disagrees with his own account. Unless therefore An Lu-shan for some motive successfully concealed his true origins both from the emperor and from his own followers it seems clear that he was really the son of An Yen-yen. Further evidence in confirmation of this view will be presented below and the question of the origin of the divergent account in his biographies will be discussed.

But first what can we discover about the An family in which all sources are agreed that he grew up? Two families of An’s are in fact mentioned in the above passage, one consisting of An Tao-mai and his two sons Hsiao-chieh and Chen-chieh, the other consisting of An Yen-yen, his younger brother Po-chu and the two sons of the latter, Ssu-shun and Yü-ch’en. Of these An Ssu-shun and his brother later attained high rank in China and are well known in our sources.\(^\text{18}\) The relationship between An Ssu-shun and An Lu-shan was recognized and apparently never questioned until some years after both were dead. The older generation were less prominent and Ssu-ma Kuang seems to have had no
An Tao-mai
Hsiao-chieh

Genealogical table to show the relationships of the members of the two An families. The surname is put in brackets where it is not clear whether the person in question ever used it (see below). The surname is omitted for sons of those who certainly used it.

knowledge of them. Yet both An Tao-mai and An Po-chu achieved high rank in the Chinese army and in mentioning them An Lu-shan’s biographer was not merely adding two meaningless names to his narrative, he was referring to two persons who, he assumed, would be familiar to his readers and would serve as points of reference for their less well-known relatives.

An Tao-mai first appears, as far as I have been able to discover, as Deputy Commissioner for the P’ing-ti 冬秋 Army in 697. In the first month he successfully repelled an attack by the Kagan of the Northern Turks on Sheng 聖 Chou, a frontier prefecture on the west bank of the Yellow River near the present Tokto in Sui-juan. Later in the same year, no doubt in recognition of this success, he held the rank of Commander (Tsung-kuan) in the expedition of Wu I- tsung 武存量 against the Khitan invaders of Hopei. I have found no further reference to him and it is possible that he
died soon after.

We are told that An Tao-mai's second son, Chen-chieh, held the post of "Vice-Prefect" of Lan Chou early in the reign of Hsian-tsung (713-56). We may assume that he had entered on a military career in the footsteps of his father. His functions in this frontier district of Ho-tung were probably chiefly of a military character.

The other son of An Tao-mai, Haiao-chieh, referred to in the New Ti'ang History as the 'lost son' (wang-tzu 亡子), had perhaps been captured in the wars against the Northern Turks or had at some time found it convenient to change sides. He had apparently kept up some communication with his brother for he was able to find him in time of need. (It should be noted that while An Tao-mai had a personal name which does not make sense in Chinese, both his sons had names of conventional Chinese type, 'Filial Continence' and 'Pure Continence'. Evidently An Tao-mai had not been sinicized to begin with but had become so sufficiently to give his sons Chinese names.)

An Po-chu can also be found in other sources. In 742 he was Commissioner in Charge of All Foot and Horse (Tu-chih Ping-ma Shih 都知兵马使) under the Military Governor of Ho-hsi, with the rank of Grand General of the Yu-lin Army (Yu-lin Chün Ta Chiang-chün 翼林軍大將軍), the same rank as that held by An Lu-shan at that time. In this capacity he led an expedition which defeated two
Tibetan armies. Serving under him were his son, An Ssu-shun, and a certain An Chen, who is no doubt his other son, Yüan-che. It is interesting to note that another of his officers was Ko-shu Han 航, who later became the great rival of both Ssu-shun and Lu-shen. (Again we may note that the father retained a barbarian name but gave his sons Chinese names.)

In the An Lu-shan Shih-chi both An Tao-mai and An Po-chu are described as being hu chiang-chün 胡將軍. In the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien, hu has been changed into T'u-chüeh 窮厥 'Turk', and more recently M. des Rotours has translated the phrase as 'général Turc'. This is erroneous. Though hu is occasionally used vaguely to mean barbarians in general, in T'ang sources it usually refers to the western, Indo-European peoples of Central Asia in contrast to the Turkish peoples of the northern and northwestern steppes. This is especially true when the terms hu and T'u-chüeh are contrasted and although here the contrast is not explicit, it is probable that the adjective hu was placed in front of the titles of the two men to indicate that, although they were associated with the Turks they were hu, 'western barbarians', and not Turks. Moreover the term Chiang-chün is never merely the equivalent of chiang, 'general' in the generic sense. It denotes specific ranks in the Chinese military system. An Po-chu we know to have held the rank of
Grand General (Ta Chiang-chün) and An Tao-mai must certainly have been at least a General when he was Commander in the expedition of 697.

There are even more compelling reasons for believing that the An families were not Turkish but Central Asiatic. There is firstly the surname An. An was the Chinese name for Bukhara and persons from that region who came to China commonly adopted An as their surname. Indeed the Chinese works on surnames indicate no other origin for this surname than the western country of An or An-hsi 安西 (the precise connotation of which varied in different ages). Most persons of that surname who occur up to and through T'ang can be connected, nearly or remotely with that country.24

There is moreover clear proof that An Lu-shan himself was considered to be and considered himself to be of mixed Turkish and Central Asiatic stock. This is the obvious implication of the term 'mixed barbarian' (tsehu) used to describe him in the An Lu-shan Shih-chi — the Old T'ang History has more explicitly 'western barbarian of mixed race' (tsa-chung hu-jen 齊種胡人). A seemingly true anecdote shows clearly how strongly An Lu-shan felt about his racial origins. By the year 752 both An Lu-shan and An Ssu-shun were important Military Governors. The other most important Military Governor was Ko-shu Han, who, as we have seen, had formerly served along with An Ssu-shun under An Po-chu. There was a long-standing grudge between
An Ssu-shun and Ko-shu Han, and An Lu-shan shared his cousin's feelings. The emperor disliked this state of affairs and in the autumn of 752, when all three were at the capital, he had his chief eunuch, Kao Li-shih, invite them to a banquet in an effort to smooth things over. Unfortunately it had the opposite result. Ko-shu Han was the son of a chieftain of the Ko-shu tribe of the Türgäs who had married a woman of the royal Yü-ch'ih family of Khotan. As the Old T'ang History reports it:

"He [An Lu-shan] suddenly said to Han, 'My father was a western barbarian (hu), my mother was a Turk (T'ü-chüeh); your father was a Turk, your mother was a western barbarian. I am of the same race as you. Why can't we be friends?' Han replied, 'The ancients used to say, 'It is a bad omen if a wild fox (hu, an unfortunate pun on hu + 'western barbarian') barks at his lair, for he has forgotten his origins.' Must I not make every effort to do so (i.e. to be friends with you)?' Lu-shan thought [Han] was disparaging his hu [origin]. He became very angry and cursed Han saying, 'Does a Turk dare to act thus?' Han wished to reply but Kao Li-shih gave him a look and stopped him."

The Khotanese were an Indo-European speaking people like the Sogdians. It is natural therefore to assume that in the above episode An Lu-shan used the term hu in its common T'ang dynasty meaning to denote the Indo-European speaking peoples of Central Asia in contrast to the nomads.

To sum up, it seems plain that the An families were of Sogdian origin and that An Lu-shan himself was a half-breed between Sogdian and Turk. This again points to An Yen-yen as his real and not his adoptive father, though it is, of
course, theoretically possible that his actual father was another Sogdian. This is in fact the implication of another document referred to briefly in the passage translated at the head of this chapter.

It is memorial sent on behalf of the famous general, Kuo Tzu-i, in an attempt to clear An Ssu-shun's posthumous reputation. An Ssu-shun had apparently quarreled with Lu-shan before the rebellion and had even accused his cousin of rebellious intentions. For this reason he was not at first executed, as would normally have been the fate of such a close relative of the rebel. He was merely deprived of his post as Military Governor of Shuo-fang and appointed President of the Ministry of Works (Kung-pu Shang-shu) at the capital where he could be watched. Unfortunately for him, his old enemy, Ko-shu Han, soon afterwards became Commander-in-Chief of the armies defending the capital from the rebels. Ko-shu Han used his position to exact vengeance on his old rival, and on a trumped up charge of having communicated with the rebels, had An Ssu-shun and his brother, Yuan-chen, put to death and their families banished to the far south.27

Kuo Tzu-i had been An Ssu-shun's chief lieutenant and replaced him as Military Governor.28 He evidently had a regard for his former superior and after the rebellion attempted to obtain for him a posthumous exoneration. The memorial was written for him by a certain Shao Yueh29 who had served
under Shih Ssu-ming and his son, Shih Ch'ao-i 史朝義, when they were rebel emperors. When Shih Ch'ao-i was finally defeated in 762, Shao Yüeh surrendered and was pardoned. He attracted the attention of Kuo Tzu-i and for a time served on his staff. Because of his earlier association with the rebels, therefore, one might think that his statements should receive some consideration.

The memorial recounts in eulogistic terms the services which An Ssu-shun had performed for the Chinese government and claims that he was the victim of an intrigue. Besides this, however, it tries to dissociate him from all relationship to the rebel. It says:

"An Lu-shan was a shepherd of lowly origins. His original surname was K'ang 康. He came from among the Northern Barbarians to seek refuge in China. An Ssu-shun's late father, An Po-chu, had pity on him because he was poor and orphaned, and received him into his house. When he grew up he gave him the surname An."30

Here, one might think, is a striking similarity if not exact correspondence with the story of An Lu-shan's origins given in his biography. Perhaps we must reconsider our verdict.

It will be noted, however, that Shao Yüeh has suppressed all reference to Yen-yen and to the fact that An Po-chu and his sons had once lived among the Turks. Though it is not surprising that he should try to make out as good a case as possible for the man he is defending, it means that we must be cautious about accepting his statements. The suspicion arises that the whole story is a fabrication. If,
as seems possible, Yen-yen never came to China, or at least did not live long after his arrival, it would have been natural for An Lu-shan to be brought up by his uncle, and evidence may have existed in China when Shao Yüeh wrote to show that he had lived in An Po-chu's household. Since the earlier part of the story had taken place among the Northern Turks, no way existed of checking its truth or falsity.

Moreover, if Shao Yüeh had been trying to find an alternative surname for An Lu-shan, no choice would have been more likely than K'ang, the Chinese name for Samarkand. In the case of most persons of that surname whom one meets in T'ang, there is some sort of evidence suggesting that they were of Sogdian origin. Curiously enough, it happens that there was also a tribe named K'ang among the Northern Turks, but I know of only a single case where the surname as used in China is traced thence. Taking into account the obvious tendentiousness of Shao Yüeh's story we cannot seriously use it to upset what is well supported by other evidence.

There still remains the remarkable fact that two apparently independent accounts of An Lu-shan's origins agree in making him an orphan. This can I think be explained. It is quite likely that in claiming that An Lu-shan was an orphan, Shao Yüeh was bringing back with him an echo of the
myth of his divine birth which had been growing up among the rebel armies. A difficulty still remains, however, for the Old T'ang History, which does not contain the obviously supernatural elements of the An Lu-shan Shih-chi, also states that An Lu-shan was orphaned young. But is the Old T'ang History entirely free from mythical elements? Or did its source, which is also one of the principal sources of the An Lu-shan Shih-chi, namely the Sū-tsung Shih-lu, already contain the myth, which was later largely removed in the preparing of the Old T'ang History? A careful comparison of the texts of the Old T'ang History and the An Lu-shan Shih-chi makes the latter alternative seem the most probable. But there are still more tangible reasons for thinking that mythical elements do appear in the Old T'ang History.

The first, which concerns the interpretation of An Lu-shan's original, non-Chinese name, also provides further proof, if that is any longer necessary, of his Sogdian origin. The forms given for this name are Ya-lo-shan 大月山 (ancient pronunciation: at-lāk-šan) and Afl -lo-shan (ancient pronunciation: ā-lāk-šan). These are obviously related to his Chinese personal name, Lu-shan (ancient pronunciation: luk-šan). Prof. W. Henning has very kindly pointed out to me that all three forms are good transcriptions of the common Sogdian name, Roxšan (literally: 'bright'), a common Iranian root

"best known in the form Roxana, the name of the princess of
Samarkand who became the wife of Alexander the Great. The additional vowel at the beginning is a common feature of Chinese transcriptions of foreign words beginning with r. A later form of the same word, the Middle Persian ṭoṣan, was transcribed as wu-lu-shen. Moreover a certain K'ang A-lu-shan (ancient pronunciation: a-luk-san) occurs as a character in a Buddhist story which appears in the collection Hua-yen Ching-chuan Chi, made by a monk of Sogdian descent, Fa-tsang (643-712). This K'ang A-lu-shan was said to have lived in Wan-nien County (part of Ch'ang-an) and after a brief visit to the nether regions in 680, to have devoted himself to works of Buddhist piety. Though again the surname K'ang could conceivably indicate a Turk, the fact that the man was a Buddhist, lived at Ch'ang-an, and appeared in a story edited by a Sogdian leaves not the slightest room for doubting that he was a Sogdian and that here too we have a Chinese transcription of the name Roχsan.

It is therefore clear that the Old T'ang History is mistaken in saying that Ya-lo-shan was a Turkish word meaning 'battle'. Since in the An Lu-shan Shih-chi this interpretation of the name is intimately linked with the myth of his birth, it seems obvious that it was so also in the source from which the biography in the Old T'ang History was derived. A difficulty arises from the fact that a different interpretation of Ya-lo-shan has been put forward by M. L. Bazin
and Prof. W. Eberhard. By assuming a metathesis of $s$ and $k$ they have equated *at-lâk-san* with a form *atlasgan*, reconstructed from modern Turkish\(^3\). This form would be a participle of the reciprocal form of the verb *atla-* meaning 'to leap', 'to hurl oneself'. It would therefore give a fair equivalent for the Chinese interpretation of the name as a Turkish word meaning 'battle'. This hypothesis would not of course easily explain the form *a-lâk-san*, nor is it likely that in forming a Chinese given name on the basis of *atlasgan* the verbal root *at* would be dropped, leaving a meaningless flexional termination. (Prof. Eberhard and M. Bazin seem to have supposed that the surname An was also derived from Ya-lo-shan but this is impossible in view of the other Ans whom we have met.)

If, however, M. Bazin and Prof. Eberhard are right in postulating an old Turkish form *atlasgan*, this word, though having no real connection with Ya-lo-shan, Lu-shan etc., might explain the Chinese interpretation of it. If we imagine that a Turk serving in An Lu-shan's army hit upon a resemblance between his leader's name and some Turkish word meaning something like 'war' or 'battle', this folk-etymology might very well have attached itself to the myth growing up about him.

If we look now at the biography of Shih Ssu-ming in the same chapter of the *Old T'ang History* as that of An Lu-shan and like it based on the *Su-tsung Shih-lu*, we again find
statements that are clearly elements of myth. It begins as follows:

"Shih Ssu-ming's original name was Su-kan. He was a Turkish western barbarian of mixed race (T'u-chüeh tsa-chung hu-jen) from Ning-i in Ying Chou.... He was from the same village as An Lu-shan and was born one day earlier. Ssu-ming was born on the last day of the year, Lu-shan on the first. When they grew up they were good friends and were both famed for their bravery. Ssu-ming first served the T'e-chin, Wu Chih-i. Whenever he was sent out to reconnoitre the enemy, he would always return with prisoners. He too understood six barbarian languages and along with Lu-shan was a middleman in the frontier markets."

The resemblance between the stories of the two men is very striking, too striking to be mere coincidence. There seems to be a clear attempt to connect the two heroes. They were both later associated in a cult in the northeast frontier region and it is likely that the myth was connected with that cult. In 773 the Military Governor at Wei Chou, who had formerly served under the rebels, had to be bribed with the offer of a high title not to build a temple to the 'Four Sages', i.e. An Lu-shan and his son, and Shih Ssu-ming and his son, who had in turn been rebel emperors. As late as 821 a Military Governor sent out from the capital to Yu Chou found that An Lu-shan and Shih Ssu-ming were popularly known as the 'Two Sages'. His attempt to extirpate this custom by destroying their cenotaphs contributed to a revolt which broke out in the army.

One of the elements in Shih Ssu-ming's biography which strongly suggests a cult is the statement that one was born
on the last day of the year and the other on the first. As it happens an independent tradition exists of An Lu-shan's birthday which enables us to check this story. The Tzu-chih Tung-chien K'ao-i twice quotes a passage from the An Lu-shan Shih-chi concerning the birthday celebrations of An Lu-shan in 751, as stating that his birthday was the twentieth of the first month. The present editions of the An Lu-shan Shih-chi give the date as the first day of the month, but the text has probably been harmonized to conform to the mythical birthday which is also mentioned in the same work.

There does not in fact seem to be any reliable evidence to suggest that the relationship between the two men was especially close even up to and after the outbreak of the rebellion. Shih Ssu-ming was always much inferior in rank to An Lu-shan before the rebellion and was only one among several leading rebel generals in the early stages. He was not one of the inner circle of conspirators who advised An Lu-shan. We shall therefore be on safe ground if we bring under suspicion every statement about the early life of one which is repeated about the other. Sometimes statement which are true of one are not true of the other, sometimes they are purely mythical with regard to both.

Returning to the main argument, we can now have no further doubt that the Su-tsung Shih-lu, on which the biography of An Lu-shan was based, contained the myth which we find in the An Lu-shan Shih-chi. The editor of the Old
T'ang History removed most of it but left some things, such as the interpretation of the name Ya-lo-shan and the statement that he was an orphan, which were not obviously fabulous. The last objection is therefore removed to supposing that An Lu-shan was the actual son of the Sogdian Yen-yan.

A word must now be said about An Lu-shan's place of birth. If we admit that he was the son of Yen-yan, there seems nothing to connect him with Ying Chou on the extreme north-east frontier of China. It is true that the place of origin given in a man's biography does not necessarily, or even usually, indicate his place of birth. It merely indicates his family home. But while it is not quite impossible that Yen-yan was descended from Sogdians who had taken up residence at Ying Chou, it is highly unlikely. It seems much easier to suppose that An Lu-shan's birth was placed at Ying Chou because that was where he achieved his fame and where he was an officer for over twenty years, and because the myth grew up in that region. It is moreover possible that Shih Ssu-ming was actually a native of that region and that An Lu-shan was thought to have been born there through cult association.

The date of An Lu-shan's birth can be fixed with reasonable certainty. According to the An Lu-shan Shih-chi (based here on the epitaph composed for An Lu-shan at Shih Ssu-ming's command?), he was fifty-five years old
(Chinese style) when he died in the first month of the second year of Chih-te (757). Assuming his birthday to have been the twentieth of the first month, he must have been born on the tenth of February, 703.

An Lu-shan’s father, Yen-yen, was a Sogdian soldier of fortune in the army of the Northern Turks. His mother was a woman of the noble A-shih-te clan. This clan was second in importance only to the A-shih-na clan to which the kagans belonged. In the resurgence of the Northern Turks in the latter half of the seventh century we always find an A-shih-te associated in the leadership of the tribes. Indeed A-shih-te Tonyuquq, who had the Chinese personal name Yuan-chen, was the principal adviser of Kutlug Kagan, the founder of the second empire of the Northern Turks, and of his two successors, Kapagan Kagan and Bilgä Kagan. He has been considered as the chief architect of this empire. To have a woman of this clan to wife, Yen-yen must have been, we may assume, a person of some importance.

Sometime after 713 however he and other Sogdians lost their favourable positions and had to flee to China. It is obvious what was the cause of this change of fortune. In 716 Kapagan Kagan died. His nephew, Kuï-tegin, killed Mo-ch’os sons as well as most of his close relatives and advisers and proclaimed his own elder brother Kagan. Even Tonyuquq was in danger for a time. Yen-yen and his assoc-
iates must have been involved in this 'purge' -- indeed it is not improbable that Yen-yen was killed and that An Lu-shan was saved by his uncle.

If Yen-yen had not already died, he cannot have lived long after coming to China. An Lu-shan was now thirteen or fourteen. Our sources tell us nothing of his life in the next seventeen years -- nothing, that is, which can be counted as reliable. The traditional account as it appears in the passage translated at the beginning of this chapter would have us believe that he was a good-for-nothing scape-grace, living by his wits in the north-east frontier region, becoming thoroughly acquainted with its topography and different racial groups, sometimes making a living as an interpreter in the markets, and finally being caught as a common thief. Much of this is also told of Shih Ssu-ming and on the basis of the criterion we have established, we must immediately suspect it for that reason. It is a common feature of hero-myths that the hero is rather wild in his youth until the time comes when he is to prove himself and win his crown. This may be the source of some of the stories. Some may be merely malicious slander. Again as in the case of the association with Ying Chou, some of the details may actually have applied to Shih Ssu-ming -- for instance, the statement that he acted as an interpreter in the markets. Intrinsic probability is against any of the details' having applied to An Lu-shan himself.
After coming to China it is probable that the Ans soon became soldiers in the Chinese army. An Po-chu and his sons eventually reappeared in the north-west and they may have gone there fairly soon after their arrival. An Lu-shan, being still a boy, no doubt stayed in his uncle's household for a time. When he was old enough he too must have become a soldier. There he seems to have attracted the attention of Chang Shou-kuei who was Military Governor of Lung-yu from 729 to 733. When Chang Shou-kuei became Military Governor of Yu Chou in 733, An Lu-shan appears as his lieutenant.

For several years the Khitan and Hsi tribesmen had been in revolt on the north-east frontier under the leadership of a certain K'o-t'u-kan. A great expedition had been sent out against him in 732, had won a victory and won over part of the Hsi. K'o-t'u-kan had merely retreated into the hinterland, whence he soon re-emerged to ravage the border. In the spring of 733 he defeated a Chinese army and killed the tactical commander. Chang Shou-kuei, who had previously distinguished himself against the Tibetans, was sent to relieve the situation.

We are fortunate in possessing some of the letters which were sent to Chang Shou-kuei from the central government during his period of office at Yu Chou. One of them, which must date from the winter of 733-34, that is not long after his arrival in his new post, is addressed jointly to Chang Shou-kuei and An Lu-shan. It praises An's courage.
and military prowess in fulsome terms and says in effect that with such a strategist as Chang Shou-kuei and such a commander as An Lu-shan the job of defeating the rebels will be very simple\(^54\). (It must be noted that An Lu-shan is not mentioned in a despatch from the former Military Governor at Yu Chou announcing a victory over the Khitan in the fourth month of that same year (733)\(^55\). He could hardly have had such a reputation by the end of the year if he had been in Ho-pei before Cheng Shou-kuei's arrival and had not played a conspicuous part. He must therefore have arrived with Chang Shou-kuei.)

It was probably at this time, though the date is not precisely stated, that An Lu-shan received the first office of which we have record. He was made Commissioner for Attacking in Front of the Encampment (Ya-ch'ien T'ao-chi Shih).
This office is nowhere described but T'ao-chi Shih seems to have been the next grade of Commissioner below that of Military Governor (Chieh-tu Shih). He also held the rank of a General in the Guards. He was not Chang Shou-kuei's highest ranking subordinate — Wu Chih-i, who held the title of Military Governor of P'ing-lu but was under Chang Shou-kuei's orders, was his superior. But it is clear that he was one of Chang Shou-kuei's chief lieutenants and probably the brightest star among them.

This is consistent with another reference to him which we find in a letter from the Chinese Emperor to the King of Silla in the spring of 735. Early in 733 Silla and China had co-operated in attacking the state of Po-hai. The expedition sent north from Silla had ended in disaster because of heavy snow storms. The King of Silla had now sent an envoy asking permission as a feudatory to establish garrisons on the Yalu River. The advantages which, he argued, would come from this were that he would be able "To meet the attacks of Po-hai and co-operate (literally: look at one another from afar) with An Lu-shan." The Chinese Emperor graciously consented to the establishment of garrisons but there is no indication that An Lu-shan ever did co-operate with Silla against her northern neighbour. Soon afterwards peace was established between China and Po-hai and we hear no more of trouble in that quarter.

The operations of Chang Shou-kuei against the Khitan
were successful. By the sixth month of 734 he had inflicted a defeat on them and soon after managed to sow dissensions among them which led to the assassination of K'ou-t'u-kan. Though we have little definite evidence of An Lu-shan's part in these events, it is clear that he was prominent in them. There may be some truth in the statement of his biographer that he distinguished himself by successfully leading raiding parties and taking prisoners. A short memorial of congratulation sent by the Chief Minister Chang Chiu-ling to the emperor speaks of An Lu-shan as having, "again killed and captured some of the enemy". This memorial speaks of the barbarians as beginning to fall out among themselves and would therefore seem to date from a time shortly before the death of K'ou-t'u-kan at the end of 734.

We next hear of An Lu-shan in less glorious circumstances. After the death of K'ou-t'u-kan, his assassin, Li Kuo-che, was invested as King of the Khitan. A former follower of K'ou-t'u-kan, Nieh-li, then killed Li Kuo-che. That year, 735, the Turks attempted an invasion of the territory of the Hsi and the Khitan. To the satisfaction of the Chinese the two tribes co-operated in resisting them. As a reward Nieh-li was invested as king. This success may have encouraged the tribesmen to attempt a further revolt, or some unknown circumstance may have provoked them. Early in 736, while Chang Shou-kuei was on a visit to the capital,
both tribes again threw off their allegiance to China. An Lu-shan led out a force against them. He suffered a severe defeat with many casualties. When Chang Shou-kuei returned he blamed An Lu-shan for over-confidence and for attacking without sufficient forces or adequate preparation. He wished to execute him, but as he was such an important officer he applied to the capital for permission. This was granted.

When he was about to be beheaded, An Lu-shan cried out, "The Two Barbarians (i.e. the Hsi and the Khitan) are not yet pacified, yet you can bear to kill a brave officer. Is this how you show forethought?" Chang Shou-kuei's initial anger had probably by now subsided and he no longer wished to be rid of his protégé. He therefore informed the emperor that he had reversed his decision. The emperor accepted Chang Shou-kuei's report and confirmed the pardon of An Lu-shan. One of the Chief Ministers, Chang Chiu-ling, was a bitter enemy of the military class. In 735 he had successfully opposed the rewarding of Chang Shou-kuei with a Chief Ministership. His downfall later came when he opposed the advancement of another military man, Niu Hsien-k'ang. On the present occasion he strongly urged the execution of An Lu-shan. This was remembered after the rebellion broke out and earned him a posthumous reputation for prescience.

An Lu-shan was sentenced to be deprived of his rank for the time being and to take command in 'white clothing'.
Before the end of the year he had redeemed himself. Presumably his titles and ranks were then restored to him\textsuperscript{66}.

We hear little of his activities for the next few years. The source which has preserved so much first-hand information for the period with which we have been dealing in the form of letters from the government to the frontier, now fails us, for Chang Chiu-ling, in whose works they appear, was dismissed at the end of 736. The letters sent under his successors have not been preserved\textsuperscript{67}.

When we next hear of An Lu-shan in 740, he begins to come out more and more into the full light of history and it is necessary now to pause and consider the sort of China which formed the background for his subsequent career.
CHAPTER 3
THE BACKGROUND OF THE REBELLION OF AN- LU-SHAN -- ECONOMIC

In order to understand the career of An Lu-shan after he reappeared from obscurity in 740 it will be necessary to inquire at some length into the situation in which China found itself at that time, that is, into the historical movements which prepared the way for his rise to power and into the causes which lay behind them. To trace these causes to their origins would unfortunately require a knowledge of many details of the history of the preceding centuries which are as yet obscure. As it has not been possible to go fully into many of these questions -- indeed it would have led far beyond the scope of the present thesis to have done so -- some of the conclusions here presented must be provisional in character. Nevertheless it is hoped that certain main lines have been sketched in which may provide the starting point for further investigations.

I shall deal first with the situation of China as a whole, or rather in its aspect as a unified empire, devoting a chapter each to economic, political and military factors. Chapter 6 will give special consideration to the northeast frontier area of Ho-pei, which differed in some important respects from the rest of the country.

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The theory sometimes expressed that the rebellion of An Lu-shan was, at least in part, one of those all-too-frequent peasant uprisings brought about by hunger and
desperation, is quite without foundation. It has recently been the fashion to see all the great rebellions of China as motivated by class struggle and some historians have been ready to seize on the slightest hints in order to turn An Lu-shan's rebellion into an agrarian revolt.²

It has been easier for these misconceptions to arise because Chinese historiographers have tended to emphasize natural disasters closely preceding troubles in the human sphere, in the belief that they constituted warnings from heaven.³ We therefore hear a good deal in our sources about various calamities which befell China immediately before the outbreak of the rebellion. The greatest of these was a period of continuous rain in the capital province of Kuan-chung, and to a lesser extent around Lo-yang and T'ai-yüan, in the autumn of the year 754. Considerable hardship is said to have been caused by the destruction of crops, leading to a public distribution of grain from government stores.⁴

Such an excess of yin over yang was later, and perhaps even at the time, taken as a sign of the dominance exerted over the emperor by his favourite, Yang Kuei-fei 楊貴妃, and her family. The evil portent was used to force the
resignation of the second Chief Minister, Ch'en Hsi-lieh 陳希烈, who had made himself objectionable to the all-powerful Yang Kuo-chung 楊國忠. After the rebellion the ominous significance of the floods was emphasized. Thus the dismissal of another man from the post of Governor of the Capital was alleged to have been in order to make him a scapegoat for the disaster, but in this case there is good reason to suppose that the allegation was a later invention to cover up a less creditable reason for his dismissal. Again we are told in the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien that a certain Pang Kuan 彭 incurred the displeasure of Yang Kuo-chung by memorializing about the floods, but this incident is not mentioned in Pang Kuan's biographies and is presumably a later anecdote. The displeasure cannot have been very severe for he was soon promoted from the provinces to a post at the capital. Another illustration of the way in which historians discovered portents of disaster in the years before the rebellion is provided by the statement that in the spring of 754 when Yang Kuo-chung was invested with the high office of Ssu-k'ung his robes were splashed with mud. Even if such an incident had occurred it would hardly have been recorded at the time and it must have been 'remembered' later for its ominous significance.

The question whether the portentous suggestion in the floods and the hardships caused by them must be left for further consideration. We must remember that such disasters
were of fairly common occurrence in the best of times and that in this case large-scale measures were taken to relieve famine. The crucial question in the present context must be whether any connection can be traced between men made desperate by the famine and the forces which An Lu-shan led southward to attack Lo-yang. I have found none. The floods are mentioned only in connection with Kuan-chung and to a lesser degree Lo-yang and T'ai-yüan. There is no mention whatsoever, there or in any part of the empire, the sort of small scale banditry which was usually the first stage in agrarian revolts. Most conclusive of all, the armies of An Lu-shan were by every indication hardened and experienced frontier soldiers, many of them non-Chinese, no ill-trained mob of desperados. It was the imperial armies which were often made up of raw recruits. There is no suggestion that the peasants were at all eager to help the rebels, though they are occasionally mentioned as helping the loyalists. They were probably, in general, the victims equally of both armies, intent only on saving their own lives, those of their wives and children, and as much as possible of their crops, houses and other scanty belongings. It is only towards the end of the rebellion that we hear of banditry of the classic type. In 762 peasants in the lower Yangtze valley were driven to desperation by the exactions of tax-gatherers trying to fill the war-depleted treasury and to supply
grain for the armies\textsuperscript{12}. They fled to the hills and raised a revolt which demanded the attention of one of the leading generals of the time. But this peasant unrest was the result rather than the cause of the rebellion.

We must look deeper for the genuine economic factors underlying the rebellion. We shall find them in the economic policies which the central government adopted during Hsüan-tsung's reign and their repercussions on the economic and political structure of the nation and on military policy.

When the emperor Hsüan-tsung ascended the throne in 712, one of his first tasks was to strengthen the finances of the government by eliminating the parasitic horde which had fed upon it during the previous reigns. Especially after the abdication of the Empress Wu in 705, a large part of the revenues had found its way into the pockets of powerful princes, princesses and other favourites. They had, moreover, further increased their own fortunes at the expense of the state by selling offices in large numbers and procuring the enrolment of Buddhist and Taoist monks and nuns, whereby the persons concerned escaped from the tax-rolls, if they did not actually receive state support. On the accession of Hsüan-tsung the revenues of princes, princesses and the like were drastically cut, many supernumerary officials were eliminated and large numbers of monks and nuns were laicized\textsuperscript{13}. These measures naturally
had the approval of the Confucian literati and are given the highest commendation. But the emperor's vigorous policies did not stop there. Throughout the first thirty and more years of his reign measures were introduced and energetically applied to eliminate waste and inefficiency and to increase the flow of taxes to the capital. This centralization soon impinged on the interests of the landed class of the south and east, and roused bitter opposition which is reflected in the strong disapproval that we find in the histories for these policies and the men who furthered them.

These financial reforms were made possible and necessary by the changed economic situation of China. Since the beginning of the dynasty an economic revolution of the greatest significance had taken place. Unity and peace had brought about both a great increase in trade between south and north and a great agricultural expansion of the south. This latter change was accompanied by large-scale migration from the north. In the process of this revolution much new wealth was created which began to crack the seams of the nation's social structure. Moreover the assumptions on which the fiscal structure of the empire had been based were no longer valid.

The first problem which attracted the attention of the financial reformers was that of the so-called 'runaway households', or 'immigrant households'. During the last decades of the 7th century and the first decades of the 8th
we find many references to this phenomenon -- peasants who had left the districts in which they were registered and either disappeared or settled on unoccupied land in other areas. Our sources are unfortunately vague as to the details of this movement, especially as to the geographical areas affected. It would seem that various causes were at work, especially in the north-east and the north-west, encouraging peasants to leave their homes and seek their fortunes elsewhere. In the north-east we know that there were both natural disasters and invasions. In 681 we hear of peasants affected by floods on the lower Yellow River being granted permission to go south. Far more important were the Khitan and Turkish invasions of that region, especially those of 697-81. Not only did peasants flee from the invaders but also from military service in the imperial armies and from the harsh treatment they received at the hands of the imperial commander who repelled the invaders. From Kuan-chung too, and from parts of Honan close to Lo-yang, peasants fled to escape service in the fu-ping militia.

We are largely left to infer the destination of these migrants but the great increase in the population of the Yangtze valley and farther south during this period can leave little doubt that a large number found their way to those regions. The attraction of new land remote from the power of the central government and the danger of invasion
must have been a positive incentive to the peasants of the north to move in addition to the pressures we have mentioned. It is clear that a large proportion of them found their way to new agricultural land, for when measures were taken to re-register them, unregistered land 'of equal amount' was also recovered. And though there was some incipient banditry in Ho-pei after the troubles of 697-8, there was nothing approaching open revolt. Something of that sort would certainly have resulted from such a large movement of peasantry if there had been nothing to draw them off into constructive pursuits.

The concern of the government therefore was not due, or not mainly due, to fear of violent uprising. Their chief anxiety was to keep the peasants enrolled on the local registers so that they should not escape taxation, corvée and military service. Under the basic land law of T'ang, the so-called 'equal-field' system, the basic taxes and corvée were levied per adult male (the land being theoretically equally distributed so that all had equal capacity to pay). This clearly required the keeping of accurate records and careful provision for this was made in the regulations. There were also severe legal restrictions on the sale of land and the free movement of the peasants. The migrations of which we have been speaking were largely in direct contravention of these regulations and tended to throw the whole tax-collecting machinery into disorder.
Furthermore it was often in the interests of the local officials responsible for seeing that the peasants were registered, who of course belonged to the land-owning, and especially at this time, the land-acquiring class, to fail in their duty and to keep the immigrants off the tax-rolls. While there is much obscurity about the extent to which the 'equal field' system ever, even at its beginning under T'ang Wei, functioned as an instrument for redistributing land or preventing the encroachment of the large land-owner on the small, and it is clear that large land-holdings always existed, it nevertheless appears from the fact of their being displaced that at least in north China there were many independent peasants in the early years of the T'ang dynasty. But around the end of the 7th century and during the first half of the 8th we frequently hear general complaints and particular instances of estate building. It seems to have had the proportions of a vast new movement, induced no doubt by the great increase in wealth which occurred during the long period of internal peace which followed the establishment of T'ang.

Some of the land-grabbing was done within the law -- there were convenient loopholes in the rules preventing peasants from disposing of their holdings, and the wealthy person, often a money-lender or local official, could exert many pressures on the peasant to give up his title. Much was completely illegal. Uncultivated land or land vacated temporarily because of invasion or famine might be seized
and enclosed or records might be falsified. Thus free peasants were often turned into tenants -- and disappeared from the registers -- even if they remained on their holdings, and if they left or were driven off, it was even more probable that they would become tenants or hired labourers when they settled elsewhere. 26

We have only the scantiest indications of the regions in which this development principally took place. One was probably Ho-pei, the province most affected by invasion. Another was undoubtedly Chiang-nan, where there was the greatest influx of population and where tenancy had perhaps been more common since the time of the Southern Dynasties. 27 One of special interest was Kuan-chung where officials, eunuchs, princesses and other newly-rich were eager to obtain estates near the capital. Such estates tended to be used less for agriculture than for incipient industrial purposes by means of water-mills 28, or simply as pleasure resorts. 29 This tendency was probably partly responsible for the great decline of Kuan-chung as a food-producing area during T'ang.

The appearance of these newly enriched landlords is obviously connected with a further tremendously important phenomenon. In the next chapter it will be shown how the new examination system was used as a political instrument by the Empress Wu in order to break the power of the old north-western aristocracy which had held power under T'ai- tsung. Through it the literary gentry, chiefly from the east
and south, became the dominant element in the officialdom. There can be little doubt that much of the new blood was provided by families enriched through land-grabbing. Thus new estates, which were seriously interfering with the government's tax-collecting, were to a considerable extent the economic foundation on which depended the very officials whom the government relied upon to stop the abuses.

It was not therefore pure, disinterested love of the peasantry which prompted the great outcry among the literati when in 724 Yü-wen Jung proposed sending out Censors as special commissioners to register unregistered households. We shall see who this man was and what class of society he came from in the next chapter. For the present we shall merely note that he was the first of a series of much condemned financial experts who carried through revenue-increasing schemes on behalf of Hsüan-tsung.

Yü-wen Jung first made proposals concerning the problem of runaway households at the beginning of 721 when he held the post of Examining Censor. As a result of his representations a decree was issued that all unregistered families should report within one hundred days and be enrolled either where they were or in their former homes. Defaulters were to be sent to frontier districts. Yü-wen Jung was appointed special commissioner to carry out this decree and he soon requested the appointment of nineteen assistants who were given the acting rank of censors for this purpose. The men appointed were all minor officials of the capital or
neighbouring counties. In 724 ten more special censors were created. The T'ung-tien says of the twenty-nine men, "They were all noted scholars. In this affair there was an unparalleled excellence in the men chosen as commissioner's assistants. Later many of them attained prominent positions." Nevertheless their efforts did not please the officialdom as a whole.

In 721 they are said to have uncovered many fraudulent practices but it would appear that they were not really very very successful, for in 724 new methods were adopted. The compulsion of 721 was abandoned in favour of inducement. Persons who voluntarily gave themselves up were offered six years of all taxes on the payment of a fee of 1500 cash. It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the value of this sum at that time. From the decree appointing Yü-wan Jung as commissioner it appears that payment in kind was accepted. Since we have no information as to how generously this was interpreted and what method was used to compute the value, we cannot easily estimate the special difficulties to the peasant in paying the fee. Nevertheless it would seem that a good bargain was offered to the peasant. Six years' taxes, including the value of his compulsory labour, were certainly worth much more than 1500 cash. Moreover the peasant thus obtained title to the land he was tilling and was freed from the threat of government and from the illegal exactions of officials and landlords. When families were registered in
a new locality their names were to be struck off the lists in their former localities which would stop the practice of the officials' collecting extra taxes from the neighbours of runaways to make up for the loss. Even the strongly biased biography of Yu-wen Jung reports that when he went from place to place proclaiming this edict to the people, many shed tears of gratitude.

This time a considerable success was achieved. Over 800,000 families were registered 'with an equal amount of land' (t'ien i ch'eng shih 田興稱是). Over a million strings of cash were collected. It was decreed that the money should be applied as capital to the Price-stabilizing Granaries (Ch'ang-p'ing Ts'ang 常平倉) which had been newly re-established. The purpose of these granaries was to buy above the market price in times of abundance and to sell below the market price in times of scarcity in order to help the peasants. Though the capital of these granaries often came to be used rather for making loans at extortionate rates of interest, it is likely that at this time, being newly re-established, they were functioning to some extent as intended. Thus the money taken from the people was applied to their benefit -- at least to a greater extent than if it had merely passed into the treasury or been taken from them in rents and extortions.

Nevertheless it was in 724, not 721, that criticism was first voiced against the activities of the commissioners. It was alleged that this registration was a grievous burden
on the people, that it led, for instance, to local officials' registering established households as immigrants in order to curry favour, that it was being carried out to feed the superfluous bureaucracy at court. Though this criticism may have been partly justified, the real cause of the complaint clearly seems to have been that these special commissioners, responsible directly to the throne, were able to by-pass the regular officialdom and to prevent them from concealing their own and others' irregularities. Moreover with the inducements offered in 724 the peasants themselves were enabled and encouraged to escape from the oppression to which they had been subjected. The complaint against taking authority out of the hands of the regular officials is implicit in the memorial sent up by Huang-fu Chiung at this time, but it is most clearly stated in the judgment delivered on Yu-wen Jung's policies by Ssu-ma Kuang, following here the T'ang writer Su Mien: "From this, the hundred officials (i.e. those of the regular bureaucracy) lost their functions". It was a measure of centralization most unwelcome to the provincial officials.

Yu-wen Jung's measures did not end the problem of migrant families. We hear from time to time of measures to deal with them, sometimes with leniency, sometimes with severity. In 730 P'ei Yao-ch'ing, of whom more will be said presently, made proposals which were much harsher than those of Yu-wen Jung. He proposed conscripting the vagrants on to state farms and it would appear
that he attempted to carry out this measure in 734 or 735 when he was Chief Minister. No adverse comment is reported but the scheme was dropped after his dismissal in 736. Again we know that vagrants were frequently conscripted as soldiers for the new permanent frontier armies which were being established during this period. There is some indication that the migration had considerably diminished in the years immediately before the rebellion. A decree of 749 has these words, "According to our information, the vagabonds are gradually returning [to their homes] and the number of wandering beggars who have not gone back is not great". Apparently the efficient centralized dictatorship of the latter half of Hsüan-tsung's reign had some success by one means or another in curbing this movement. The pressure to build estates continued undiminished, however, and with the disorders caused by the rebellion the migrations reappeared in aggravated form.

Another problem which was attacked by the financial experts was that of transport. One of the great achievements of the ill-famed Yang-ti of Sui was the construction of the Pien Canal connecting the Yellow River with the Yangtze. The Sui dynasty had other great canals to its credit as well. The importance of this water transport system in later times has led people to suppose that it had the same importance from the outset and even to consider
it the economic foundation on which T'ang power rested. Nevertheless it appears that the system was largely neglected till near the end of the 7th century and only achieved its great prominence after the reforms introduced in the reign of Hsuan-tsung.

The reason for this comparative neglect was that in the reign of T'ai-tsung (627-49) the needs of the court, which was much smaller than it was a century later, were not so great, and the revenue which could then be obtained from the south was also much less than it later became. The amount of grain shipped into the capital province of Kuan-chung each year during this period was later estimated at only 200,000 shih. A hundred years later it was regularly five to ten times that amount and sometimes much more. This being so, the grain obtainable near at hand in Ho-nan and southern Ho-pei was probably sufficient to supply the normal needs of Kuan-chung during T'ai-tsung's reign and indeed there is evidence to show that during the seventh century cloth was regularly sent from the Yangtze region instead of grain.

In the latter half of the seventh century the needs of the court and the army became more pressing. As a result the government was frequently moved from Ch'ang-an to Lo-yang since the great productive areas of the lower Yellow River plain and the south were much more easily accessible to the latter city. Nevertheless no thoroughgoing attempt was
made to improve the transport system.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed the junction of the Pien Canal and the Yellow River was blocked for some years at the beginning of the eighth century and no transport could get through.\textsuperscript{54} There are other indications that tax-transport along the Pien canal was extremely inefficient until well into Hsüan-tsung's reign.\textsuperscript{55}

Hsüan-tsung established his main capital at Ch'ang-an but at first found it necessary, as his predecessors had done, to move to Lo-yang from time to time if there was a bad harvest in Kuan-chung.\textsuperscript{56} In view of his strong centralizing policies however and of the greatly increased wealth of the south it was to be expected that he would make stronger efforts than his predecessors had done to increase the flow of taxes. Early in his reign we hear of various attempts to improve the tax-transport\textsuperscript{57} and to put a stop to corruption among officials, who had ample opportunity for peculation on the long slow journey from south to north.\textsuperscript{58} Yu-wen Jung himself undertook improvements in the water transport from Ho-pei when he was Prefect of Pien Chou (modern K'ai-feng) in 727.\textsuperscript{59} The strongly biased biographer states that he was not very successful in spite of a large expenditure of forced labour but he must have pleased the emperor for he was soon brought to the capital and made Chief Minister.

The man who was responsible for the fundamental reforms which altered the whole situation was P'ei Yao-ch'ing.\textsuperscript{60}
This remarkable man has been spared the obloquy attached by the historians to the other financial experts though in his policies he was certainly one of them, perhaps the greatest. Perhaps because he had been a child prodigy and was rather more of a scholar than the others, perhaps because he was personally incorruptible and was dismissed along with Chang Chiu-ling, the hero of the literati, when Li Lin-fu became dictator, he did not become identified with Yu-wen Jung and his successors. Yet Yu-wen Jung had once recommended him and his chief assistant in his transport reforms, Hsiao Chiung, was later closely associated with Li Lin-fu.

He first made his proposals for reforming the transport system in 730 when he sent a long memorial describing the inefficiency of the existing system. The chief reason for this inefficiency was, he felt, the fact that each boat had to make the entire journey from its home district to Lo-yang and back again. This resulted in long delays because different parts of the route were navigable at different seasons. It also resulted in much congestion on the waterways in the navigable seasons. Nearly a full year was taken for a boat from south of the Yangtze to reach the Eastern Capital. In this time the living expenses of the boatmen and pilfering along the route had used up most of the cargo. As a remedy he proposed establishing a relay system with granaries at the junctions between each section of the route. Boats
would then go only as far as such a junction, discharge their cargoes and return. When the next section of the route became navigable, boats would be hired to continue the journey. This he felt would result not only in an increase in the amount of grain transported but also in a saving to the treasury on the 'foot-money' (chüeh-ch'ien 乍 vows ) which people of each district were required to furnish for the transport of taxes.

As an additional means of increasing the revenue, P'ei Yao-ch'ing advocated appropriating the contents of the Public Granaries (I-ts'ang 穆倉 ) which existed throughout the empire as a precaution against times of need. They were supplied by an acreage levy of two sheng per mou which was not regarded originally as a tax but as a sort of compulsory saving. From time to time during the latter part of the seventh century the contents of these granaries had been appropriated by the government but early in Hsüan-tsung's reign this practice had been stopped along with other abuses of the previous reigns. P'ei Yao-ch'ing maintained that in the damp climate of the south the grain so stored did not keep long in any case. He proposed exchanging the coarse unrefined grains in these granaries for lighter, more easily transportable, refined grain and shipping it to the capital.

This memorial was not immediately acted upon but in the autumn of 733, when the emperor was about to move his court to Lo-yang because of a crop failure in Kuan-chung, P'ei
Yao-ch'ing made a similar proposal, extending it to transport as far as Ch'ang-an. This received approval, he was made Chief Minister, and granaries to implement the scheme were set up in the following year. In three years time 7,000,000 shih of grain were transported to Ch'ang-an with a saving of 300,000 strings of cash in expenses. In the autumn of 736 the emperor returned to Ch'ang-an and thenceforth remained there.

Indeed the reform was so successful that it was not necessary to continue it in full force. In 737 after the dismissal of P'ei Yao-ch'ing the dangerous 'northern route' along the Yellow River from the mouth of the Lo River to Shan Chou (see sketch map on page 268) was temporarily abandoned in favour of the safer land route from Lo-yang to Shan Chou. The transport of grain was stopped altogether from the most distant regions. The price of grain in Kuan-chung had been depressed by the huge influx of grain from the east and two measures were introduced to deal with this surplus. The cloth tax of Kuan-chung, a region not suited to silk production was henceforth to be converted at market price into grain. To make up for this, the grain tax of inaccessible parts of Ho-pei was to be converted into silk. In addition public buying of grain was introduced in Kuan-chung. This practice, known as 'equitable grain-purchase' (ho-ti and 未) became a great abuse in later times when it usually meant forced sales to the government at low
prices. At its inception however its intention was to help peasants who were adversely affected by the low price. It would appear that it had long been a practice in the north-west for supplying the army and we hear of it also in other frontier regions.\textsuperscript{68} It is difficult to say whether it retained its beneficent aspect in all these places and to the end of Hsüan-tsung's reign.

After 737 according to the New T'ang History 1,800,000 shih of grain were transported annually to Ch'ang-an. This was found to be more than enough and was reduced by 100,000 shih.\textsuperscript{69} However we are also told that after 742 Wei Chien transported 4,000,000 shih per year\textsuperscript{70} and according to the T'ung-tien the yearly amount in 748 was 2,500,000 shih.\textsuperscript{7} There was now no difficulty in obtaining sufficient food for the capital and the efforts of P'ei Yao-ch'ing's successors were applied more and more to bringing in the silks and other luxury goods of the south.

Further attempts continued to be made to improve the transport system, particularly the costly route from Lo-yang to Ch'ang-an, but the details need not detain us.\textsuperscript{72} The policies of the men responsible for filling the exchequer in the latter years of Hsüan-tsung's reign must however be briefly discussed. Three men are singled out by the historians for special condemnation for misleading the emperor into schemes of profit. They are Wei Chien, Yang Shen-ch' in,\textsuperscript{74} and Wang Hung 王鈞.\textsuperscript{75}
Wei Chien became Prefect of Shan Chün (Shan Chou) in 742 with the additional office of Commissioner for Land and Water Transport (Shui-lu Chuan-yün Shih 水陸轉運使).

Of his policies the Introduction to the Monograph on Food and Money in the Old T'ang History says:

"Wei Chien modelled himself on the policies of Yu-wen Jung and Yang Shen-ch'in. Accordingly he asked that the tax rice from Chiang-nan should be 'again' transported, that the coarse grain in the Public Granaries in the prefectures and counties should be sold for light goods, that rich households should be assigned to look after boats and that if there were any delays or losses it should be charged to the 'boat households'. In the Kuan-chung Transport canal he dug the Kuang-yün harbourage so as to bring in 4,000,000 shih from east of the mountains each year. The emperor considered him able and he too became high and prosperous." 77

In 743 he presented a great pageant of boats from all parts of the empire in his specially prepared artificial lake at Ch'ang-an before the emperor and all his court. Each boat displayed the fine products of its region. This pageant and his success in filling the treasury brought Wei Chien much fame and honours from the emperor. 78 In 744 Li Lin-fu, who was jealous of Wei Chien's prestige, had him promoted to President of the Ministry of Punishments but stripped of his commissionerships. 79

He was replaced by Yang Shen-ch'in, the son of Yang Ch'ung-li 楊崇禮, who had been in charge of the Imperial Treasury (T'ai-fu 太府) for many years in the first half of Hsüan-tsung's reign and had distinguished himself for his strictness in demanding the exact quality
and quantity of tax goods. When Ch'yang-li retired in 732 Yang Shen-ch'in was appointed to succeed him. He continued his father's strict practices and is criticized for over-zealousness by the historians. Conjointly with his treasury office he held ranks in the censorate and in 743 was made Inspector of the Capital District (Ching-chi Ts'ai-fang Shih 京畿探訪使). His financial policies after he replaced Wei Chien in 744 are not described. He is criticized in general terms for strictness in demanding taxes and for grinding down the people in order to enrich the treasury.

Wang Hung held various posts in the Board of Finance and the Censorate in the years 736 to 746 and after the ruin of Wei Chien and Yang Shen-ch'in by Li Lin-fu became the chief financial expert of the government. He is criticized for similar practices to those of Wei Chien. His chief innovation was the practice of paying revenues directly into the emperor's private purse without passing through the Board of Finance. He claimed that these goods had been received in addition to the normal taxes. This wholly deplorable practice is blamed by the Chinese historians for leading Hsüan-tsung into irresponsible extravagance. Such disregard of proper book-keeping naturally also enabled Wang Hung to become a very wealthy man.

Yang Kuo-chung, the cousin of the favourite, Yang Kuei-fei, and dictator after the death of Li Lin-fu, 130
also held many financial commissionerships. His regime must however await a later treatment.

How far can we follow those Chinese historians who have laid a large part of the blame for the rebellion on the financial policies of these men? As we have seen there is no evidence that these policies resulted in actual peasant upheaval, though, of course, it is impossible to estimate how much bad feeling against the government they may have caused. Probably of greater importance was the estrangement of the literati from the court and the rise of Li Lin-fu's dictatorship, of which these financial policies formed one aspect. This will be further discussed in the next chapter. From the standpoint of the economic life of the country as a whole Hsian-tsung's centralization was probably beneficial in that it stimulated trade and the growth of an exchange economy. On the other hand the Chinese historians are probably not altogether wrong in emphasizing the very harmful, corrupting influence it had on the emperor and his entourage.

Many important aspects of the economic life of China at this time have been passed over or only briefly mentioned. If this were intended as an economic history of the period, it would of course be necessary to go into them more fully, but I have confined myself to those matters which seem of
crucial importance for an understanding of the background of the rebellion. One special aspect, the furnishing of supplies to the army, will be dealt with in Chapter 5.
A difficult problem for the student of any period of Chinese history is the attainment of a proper understanding of the complicated web of political life at the capital. We can be sure that in the stories of such matters which we are told much has been suppressed and much that has been recorded is tendentiously presented if not actually false. Much of the detail of such intrigues can never be known. The most we can hope to do is to discover what the contending groups were, to analyse their conflicting interests — if they were more than mere cliques around personalities — and to relate, if possible, the victories and defeats of these groups to the larger historical events which were going on at the same time.

A preliminary desideratum for a study of the conflicting interests within the governing class would be a thorough analysis of the social, economic and geographical divisions among the people as a whole. For this, however, we have far fewer data than for the history of politics and moreover the analysis of these data has not been carried out to the extent one would wish. We must therefore attempt to study the contours of the visible upper classes with little exact knowledge of the vastly more numerous submerged classes on whom they rested. Indeed much of our knowledge of the sub-
merged part of society must come by inference from what we can perceive in the actions of the government and the governing class. So although we must remember that the condition and interests of the governed must always have been a factor in the conduct of government, we can only occasionally see this influence at work.

This is particularly true of the lowest classes, slaves, peasants and city poor. It requires some qualification, perhaps, with regard to the merchants on the one hand and the Buddhist and Taoist clergy on the other. It is evident that the role of merchants in the economic life of the country was considerable and growing, though we have only meagre references to them in our sources. It is extremely likely that merchant wealth was often invested in land and thus eventually used to purchase an entry into the landed gentry.¹ Further, there is evidence that later in the dynasty the legal restriction on the entry of the sons of merchants into official positions was somewhat relaxed.² I cannot say, however, in the light of my present knowledge, whether this was true in the first half of the eighth century, or, if so, to what extent it affected the composition of the literati. I know of no case in which an official is stated to have come from a merchant family, but this would no doubt have been concealed.

We occasionally hear of individual merchants becoming associated with officials, no doubt providing them with
capital in return for protection and other favours.³ The traditional philosophy of government frowned on the activities of merchants which were called 'branch' (i.e. 'non-essential', 'frivolous') in contrast to the 'root' activities of agriculture. Merchants, therefore, were always of uncertain status. They might at any time be victims of repressive legislation and their accumulations of capital were a constant temptation to governments in need of funds.⁴ Though on at least one occasion we hear of merchants successfully demonstrating as a body against unpopular legislation,⁵ it would seem that they found it most effective to attach themselves to individual officials or eunuchs. There is also a possibility that there was a special relation between the literati of the south and the merchants of the same region. At least we occasionally find such literati defending the interests of the southern merchants.⁶ In general we may say that although it is extremely difficult to detect and still more so to prove, the influence of merchant interests on government is a factor which cannot be entirely disregarded.

One point of special interest concerning the merchants is that they were often of Sogdian origin -- not only in China's external trade but in her internal trade as well. We hear of 'Central Asiatic merchants' (shang hu 胡), many of them with obviously Sogdian names, at important trading centres throughout China.⁷
The influence of Buddhist and Taoist priests on the government in some periods of the dynasty is plain enough. The reigns of the Empress Wu and her two successors provide outstanding examples of this. The reign of Hsüan-tsung, however, began with strong restrictive measures against the monks and though in the later years of his reign the emperor showed considerable favour to Taoism, one can see little evidence of political influence wielded by priests in his reign. Nor do we hear of much conflict after the first few years between the economic interests of the Buddhist and Taoist churches and those of the government.

Within the governing class itself there were a number of conflicts of interest. The dominant note in the period with which we are dealing was the struggle between the court or 'within', centred around the emperor, and the bureaucracy or 'without'. There was also a conflict between the older aristocracy of Northern Chou, Sui and early T'ang, centred on Kuan-chung, and the new literary gentry, mostly from the east and south, who sought promotion through the examination system. Coinciding to a large extent with this division there was an economic conflict of interests between Kuan-chung and the capital on the one hand and the east and south on the other. This has been treated in the last chapter. Besides these sources of division which stand out clearly there were no doubt others less easily discernible, and always there were cliques based on personal rivalries.
In what follows I shall first describe what appear to be the main interest groups, beginning with the court circle, and I shall then proceed to a discussion of the way in which their conflicts worked themselves out in the politics of the first half of Hsüan-tsung's reign.

Apart from the emperor himself, the chief groups to be distinguished among the within at this time were the harem, the imperial family (including more or less distant relatives of the Li surname), the eunuchs, and a particular group of military favourites, some of whom had originally been household slaves. The imperial relatives by marriage (wai-ch'i 外戚) belong from one standpoint to the court circle and from another to the aristocratic section of the bureaucracy.

The relations between Hsüan-tsung and his family must be understood against the background of the troubled period of intrigues in which his life was spent from his birth in 685 until his assumption of power in 713. After deposing first his uncle, Chung-tsung, and then his father, Jui-tsung, his grandmother, the Empress Wu, had ruled alone during most of his youth. In 705 a coup restored Chung-tsung to the throne but he soon fell under the influence of a clique consisting of his Empress Wei, his sister, the An-lo Princess, and others, including members of his mother's family. In 707 his son, the Crown Prince, attempted to seize power with the help of the Northern Palace Army, but although the
conspirators managed to kill some members of the clique, they were eventually crushed and the Crown Prince committed suicide. In 710 Chung-tsung died, allegedly poisoned by the Empress Wei, who now tried to follow in her mother-in-law’s footsteps and rule by herself. This time however Hsüan-tsung, with the collaboration of his aunt, the T'ai-p'ing Princess 太平公主, and the assistance of the Northern Palace Army, successfully restored Jui-tsung to the throne. A struggle next developed between Hsüan-tsung, who was made Crown Prince, and his aunt, who had great influence over her brother, the emperor, and wished to continue the tradition of female control of the government. In 712 in answer to the appearance of a comet (and perhaps as a result of pressures which have not been revealed to us) Jui-tsung elevated his son to the rank of emperor, but at the insistence of his sister, did not completely retire from power. He retained authority in certain key matters such as the appointment of Chief Ministers. The struggle between the new emperor and his aunt became intense. It was finally resolved by another in 713 coup/after which the Princess was compelled to commit suicide and Jui-tsung became Retired Emperor in fact as well as in name.9

Hsüan-tsung was only the third son of Jui-tsung and had obtained his pre-eminent position as a result of his active role in restoring his father. In view of this and the climate of the times it was natural that he should fear
plots from members of his empress's family, from his own brothers and from interested cliques outside which might try to use some member of his circle to get rid of him. On the other hand he was anxious to put an end to the atmosphere of intrigue within the imperial household and, with himself in firm control, to make it a strong, united centre for the state. He therefore would not allow members of the imperial family to associate freely with the outside world, particularly with the officialdom. His younger brother, Prince Fan 節, had literary and artistic tastes and drew around himself a coterie of poets and painters, besides others whose attraction was of a purely convivial nature. This was an infringement of the rules. In 720 P'ei Hsü-chi 裴虛己 10 was convicted of associating with the Prince and of consulting prophetic books. He was banished to the far south and other persons who had been familiar with the Prince were sent out to provincial appointments. Prince Fan himself, however, was not molested. The emperor is reported to have said, "My brother is my dear friend. Whatever fate brings, there will never be any difference between us. It is only that these ambitious fellows forced themselves upon him. I will never blame my brother for trifles."11 Similarly in 725 Wei Pin 章賓, the brother-in-law of another of the emperor's brothers, Prince Yeh 楚, was accused of dealing in prophecies. He was flogged to death and an associate was banished to the far south. Again neither the Prince himself nor his wife
were involved.\textsuperscript{12}

This policy of dealing severely with suspected intriguers from outside but turning a blind eye to members of his own family who became involved with them, Hsüan-tsung continued, with one or two important exceptions, throughout his reign. Nevertheless a close watch was kept on the princes. In 721 princes who were serving as provincial governors were all summoned to the capital.\textsuperscript{13} In the eighth month of the following year a decree was issued forbidding members of the imperial family, the empress's family and the imperial sons-in-law to visit any persons except their closest relatives, and forbidding fortune-tellers of all kinds to enter the houses of officials.\textsuperscript{14}

That such precautions were not unwarranted was shown when a few days after this decree a coup was attempted. The emperor was residing at Lo-yang. An officer of the Guard at Ch'ang-an tried to set up his own son on the throne, claiming that he was a son of Shang-ti (i.e. 'the emperor who died prematurely'), the son of Chung-tsung whom the Empress Wei had set on the throne as her puppet after her husband's death. (Such at least is the story of the official history and it is unlikely that Shang-ti had any children, for he died in 714 at the age of 17 (Chinese style) after having been in captivity since 710.) The conspirators, aided by part of the Northern Palace Army, the praetorian guard which was constantly involved in such coups, invaded the
palace looking for the Viceroy (Liu-shou 留守), Wang Chih-yin 王志賢, but before they found him the soldiers turned on their leader and beheaded him. Wang Chih-yin had meantime died of fright but other officials soon restored order.15

As was to be expected in view of recent history, Hsüan-tsung did not allow his Empress Wang or her family any undue influence on affairs. She and her father had special claims on his favour for their part in the final coup which secured his throne, but it would appear that this favour was shown through gifts and honorific titles rather than through allowing them any political power. And the protests of officials were effective in keeping even the former within bounds.16 Empress Wang, however, was childless and after a time the emperor, who was showing favour to another concubine, Wu Hui-fei 武惠妃, had thoughts of replacing her. In alarm she consulted magicians and obtained a charm to assist in making her fruitful. This was discovered and was the signal for her degradation and death. Her relatives were also harshly dealt with.17 This was the first occasion on which the emperor acted against members of his own household. Later, as we shall see, his passion for the Concubine Wu again caused him to forget his wise policy. The influence of his later favourite, Yang Kuei-fei, is also notorious. Yet in spite of the indirect influence of these women and their relatives and supporters, it seems clear
that at least until near the end Hsüan-tsung remained master in his own house and did not allow his wives to interfere directly in the government.

Something should be said about the character of Hsüan-tsung himself. It is extraordinarily difficult to get a reliable picture of such a ruler, who has become identified with the glories and disasters of the period through which he reigned. Judging from the external course of his career we can say that he must have been a man of cool foresight, tenacious purpose and resolute energy to have won his way to power in the confused and dangerous situation of his youth. These same qualities are evident in the firmness with which he insisted on his reforming policies during the first half of his reign. Later it would appear that the foresight became clouded by grandiose dreams of military glory and the energy was turned to sensual delights or dulled by ease, flattery and increasing age. A humorous, attractive personality seems to shine through the many anecdotes we have of him, and we can easily believe it when we are told that he was beloved by his intimates. In both his virtues and his faults we find him well suited to symbolize the great epoch which bears his name.

One further conflict within the court circle must be treated here. It had been the control of part of the Northern Palace Army which had enabled Hsüan-tsung to deal first with the Empress Wei in the coup which set his father Jui-
tsung on the throne, and secondly with his aunt, the T'ai-p'ing Princess, in the coup which inaugurated his own reign. These men thereafter formed a special group within the Northern Army and were the recipients of many favours. This gave rise to much arrogant and licentious behaviour among them. The leader of this group was Wang Mao-chung, whose father had been a Korean rebel and whose family had in consequence been made state slaves. Wang became the slave of Hsüan-tsung while he was still a prince and along with other similar slaves was made his personal soldier. After Hsüan-tsung's accession he was given rich rewards in wealth and honours. He received several important military appointments, but at this time the emperor was not willing to allow his favourites to interfere with the business of government. When, therefore, he was led to believe that Wang Mao-chung had ambitions of rising still higher, it was the signal for the downfall of the whole faction. In 731 Wang, his sons, and a number of high-ranking generals associated with him were suddenly degraded and sent out to provincial sinecures. Soon after orders were sent to Wang to commit suicide.

The blame for compassing the ruin of these men is laid by the official histories on the eunuchs. While this body had played a minor role in the seventh century, they too had come into favour through their association with Hsüan-tsung and other members of the imperial family in the troubled
times of the Empress Wu and her sons. Hsüan-tsung's centralizing policies also made it natural for their power to increase. The chief of them, Kao Li-shih, was the friend and confidant of Hsüan-tsung throughout his reign. It was by him that the foundations were laid for the eunuch power which became so strong in the latter half of the dynasty. The exact nature of the eunuch power at this time and its influence on the course of events is naturally very obscure, since most of it went on in secret. What inside the palace and was recorded was mostly by literati who had every wish to blacken the eunuchs. Nevertheless it is quite probable that there was jealousy between these two groups of favoured ones and that the eunuchs would use any opportunity to attack the guardsmen. The military aspect of this struggle will be discussed in the next chapter.

After the ruin of their rivals the eunuchs continued to grow in power. It is clear that some of them became very wealthy. Yet in general there leader Kao Li-shih was a faithful and devoted servant of his master. There was never any question of his dominating Hsüan-tsung as later eunuchs managed to do to their rulers. Moreover, though he sometimes had influence in advancing men, his political horizon was limited and it may be doubted whether he ever interfered in matters of high policy.
Turning to the 'without', that is, to the holders of civil office and of administrative office in the army, we find two clearly discernible, though not always sharply defined groups. The objective criteria which can be used to distinguish these groups are aristocratic birth on the one hand and advancement through the examination system on the other. I shall therefore refer to them as the 'aristocrats' and the 'literati'. (For the latter I shall sometimes use the terms 'literary gentry' or merely 'gentry'.) This differs somewhat from the usual lumping together of the whole bureaucracy under the terms 'gentry' or 'literati', but certainly for the first century and a half of the T'ang dynasty the two groups were far from identical in outlook and were often in sharp conflict.

It must of course be noted that persons belonging to minor branches of aristocratic families, or to families which were in disfavour, that is, persons who could not get office through hereditary privilege, might seek advancement by examination and identify themselves with the literati. Even aristocrats of literary tastes who had hereditary privilege might incline to the side of the literati. On the other hand some persons of more or less humble origins who had passed through the examination system might find it more profitable to be hangers-on of the aristocrats or the court than to try to advance the interests of the literati as a whole. Geographical lines added further complications,
for literati from the north-west often found more in common with the aristocrats, who were predominantly from that region, than with the bulk of the literary gentry who came from the east and south. When we add to this the factors of personal friendships and antagonisms, it will be seen that the picture is one of great complexity.

Professor Ch'en Yin-k'o has contributed more than anyone else to the understanding of this problem. He points out that in the reign of T'ai-tsung high office was largely in the hands of a hereditary aristocracy consisting mainly of the leading families of the Northern Chou and Sui dynasties and centred on Ch'ang-an and the capital province of Kuan-chung. Many of these families, of which the imperial Li family was one, were of non-Chinese origin and all were interrelated by marriage and had a military tradition. The fu-ping militia system, of which more will be said in Chapter 5, was originally intimately connected with them. To these families were added the imperial families of the defeated southern dynasties, Liang and Ch'en, and occasionally the descendants of other prominent men, particularly ones who had distinguished themselves in the wars by which the dynasty was founded.

By the early years of Hsuan-tsung's reign, Professor Ch'en continues, these families had been largely ousted in favour of literati recruited by means of the examination system and coming mainly from the east and south. This
he contends was the result of a deliberate policy on the part of the Empress Wu who wished to weaken the old aristocracy and to find support from another class. Professor Ch'en says of this, "Thus the replacing of the Li-T'ang dynasty by the Wu-Chou dynasty [the Empress Wu changed the name of the dynasty from T'ang to Chou in 691] was not only a political alternation, it was in truth also a social revolution. And if one considers it from this point of view, the replacing of Li-T'ang by Wu-Chou was of far greater importance to the mass of the people than the replacing of Yang-Sui by Li-T'ang." 25 While this is perhaps overstating the case, and while it requires further detailed investigation before it can be considered to be on a firm foundation, it appears to embody an important truth and much in the situation as it appears in the early years of Hsuan-tsung's reign finds a ready explanation in this theory.

It is a striking fact that most of the great ministers of the first half of Hsuan-tsung's reign were officials who had come up through the examination system and who had served under the Empress Wu. Several of them had already been chief ministers in her reign. In spite of this they receive the highest praise from the Chinese historians. Two in particular, Yao Ch'ung 姚崇, and Sung Ching 宋璟, were held up as model ministers. 26

A table of all Hsuan-tsung's Chief Ministers up to 737 together with notes on the origins of such as are not dealt
with in the text is presented in Appendix V. Quite often we find that parents and grandparents had held minor provincial posts in the neighborhood of their ancestral homes. These Chief Ministers were of course only a tiny fraction of the whole bureaucracy, which had increased enormously since the beginning of the dynasty; and there can be little doubt that most, though not all, of these men had also advanced through the examination system. It would seem that there existed a class of gentry, undoubtedly everywhere based on land-owning, though possibly differing widely in structure throughout the empire. They were wealthy enough to provide education for their children and the examinations opened for them a royal road of advancement. If this advancement reached the highest ranks it brought with it hereditary privilege for the sons and thus a new aristocratic family might be founded. Often however the family lapsed once more into provincial obscurity after it had enjoyed the reflected glory of one of its sons.

For the early years of his reign, Hsian-tsung entrusted the government to such men and they brought a very characteristic morale into political life. Though antagonisms of persons and cliques might be intense, defeated enemies were usually treated mildly. They were generally sent out to provincial posts — often quite important ones — and might hope to return to replace their rivals in the next reshuffle. Thus politics became a relatively gentlemanly game with
resemblances to the situation in a parliamentary system where the opposition and the government agree on the basic rules and take turns in holding power.

On the other hand Hsüan-tsung's reign began as a reaction against the period of the Empress Wu and it was only natural that aristocracy should be more in favour. When moreover the literary gentry of the east and south began more or less openly to oppose Hsüan-tsung's financial centralization, the opportunity was presented for members of the old Kuan-chung families, who had no sympathy with the landed interests 'outside the passes' to win back their place of influence in affairs. From the appearance of Yü-wen Jung in 721 until the inauguration of the dictatorship of the aristocrat Li Lin-fu in 736, the political life at the Chinese capital consisted mainly of the struggle between this intrusive aristocratic element and the established order.

The first of the aristocrats who clashed openly with the ascendant literary gentry was Yü-wen Jung. He was a descendant of the imperial clan of Northern Chou. He passed no examination as far as we are told, but presumably obtained his first small office through hereditary privilege. Throughout his career his attention was turned to economic matters and his policies have already been discussed.

In 724 after the adoption and success of his second proposal for registering migrant families, Yü-wen Jung was
was made Vice-President of the Board of Censorate. The following year he was in addition made Vice-President of the Ministry of Finance. With these two important posts and the favour he had won from the emperor by his financial measures he was one of the leading members of the officialdom who might well expect advancement to the very highest rank.

The Chief Ministers at the time were Yuan Ch'ien-yao and Chang Yueh. Both had passed examinations but they had somewhat different backgrounds. Yuan was from an old Toba family and both his grandfather and his father had held high office. His father had however died in disgrace in the time of the Empress Wu's power and Ch'ien-yao had been forced to seek advancement by his own efforts. After the accession of Hsüan-tsung his path had been smoothed by the fact that he was related by marriage to Chiang Chiao, another aristocrat who had become a personal favourite of Hsüan-tsung. He was a cautious, unobtrusive minister who, by avoiding controversies and cliques, managed to remain in office for nine years through successive changes of ministry. Though no exception to the rule that Chief Ministers were examination graduates his sympathies were aristocratic and he helped to introduce and support Yu-wen Jung.

Chang Yueh, on the other hand, who had held important posts under the Empress Wu, was the scholar-minister par excellence, a poet and stylist of note with a great contempt for those of no literary attainments. His family background
was not in the least distinguished. From the outset he vigorously opposed Yu-wen Jung’s measures and took no pains to conceal his personal dislike of the man.

The first clash came in 725. That year the emperor made a pilgrimage to Mount T’ai to perform the solemn sacrifice on its summit. Chang Yüeh was in charge of many of the arrangements for this and was accused of allotting all the best offices to his own friends. Moreover in the distribution of rewards and honours, whereas the civil officials who took part were given real promotions and material rewards, military officials were merely given honorific ranks. This naturally gave rise to much bad feeling and Yu-wen Jung secretly proposed to the emperor that to ensure fairness in making appointments, a committee of ten examiners should in future meet within the palace to examine the qualifications and test pieces of the candidates (Under the constitution appointments were in the hands of a committee of three examiners (san-ch’üan 三金全) consisting of the President and two Vice-Presidents of the Ministry of Civil Office. We are not told who these functionaries were at this time but the implication seems to be that they were appointees of Chang Yüeh.) This measure was adopted temporarily though it was rescinded the following year. Chang Yüeh replied by suppressing memorials sent up by Yu-wen Jung and others of his faction.

Yu-wen Jung now struck at Chang Yüeh through his post on the Censorate. In this he was associated with two other
censors. One, the President of the Censorate, Ts'ui Yin-fu 崔殷甫, had a reputation as a severe and upright official—he has a biography in the chapter on Good Officials (Liang-li 良吏) in the Old T'ang History. He was not like Yü-wen Jung a member of the Kuan-chung aristocracy but belonged to the great Ts'ui family of Ho-pei which had equal or greater aristocratic pretensions though it had not enjoyed the same privileges in the time of T'ai-tsung. Some members of this and other great families of 'East of the Mountains' had to seek advancement by examination and were merely part of the literati. Yin-fu however passed no examination and presumably obtained his first post through family connections. He had no reason to love Chang Yüeh for Chang had opposed his appointment as President of the Censorate because he lacked literary attainments.

The third man who was associated with Yü-wen Jung in this affair was Li Lin-fu, who now makes his appearance in political life for the first time. His background and character will be discussed below. In 726, while holding the office of Vice-Principal of the University of the Sons of State, he attracted the notice of Yü-wen Jung who had him made his colleague as Vice-President of the Censorate.

In the fourth month of that year Ts'ui Yin-fu, Yü-wen Jung and Li Lin-fu indicted Chang Yüeh on charges of receiving bribes, misusing authority for his own ends, and consulting astrologers at night. The last mentioned charge
was probably the most serious. Fear of black magic was very strong and many men were ruined through real or false charges of dealing in it. Chang was arrested and a number of high officials, including Ts'ui Yin-fu and Yuan Ch'ien-yao, were ordered to investigate his case. It would seem that the charges were substantiated, but the emperor did not wish to deal harshly with his old minister. The blame was therefore shifted on to underlings, several of whom were degraded. Wang Ch'ing was arrested and a number of his associates were ordered to investigate the case. It would seem that the charges were substantiated, but the emperor did not wish to deal harshly with his old minister. The blame was therefore shifted on to underlings, several of whom were degraded. Wang Ch'ing, with whom Chang had consulted about foretelling the future, was beaten to death but Chang himself was merely dismissed from the office of Chief Minister, retaining his other honours.

Yu-chen Jung and his colleagues were alarmed for fear Chang Yüeh would be re-instated and would attack them. In 727 therefore they pressed further charges against him. The emperor however felt that they were acting as a faction and though Chang Yüeh was ordered to retire, Ts'ui Yin-fu and Yu-chen Jung were dismissed from the Censorate. Ts'ui was ordered to go home and look after his aged mother, but after a year returned to the Presidency of the Censorate and continued to have a distinguished career until his death in 736. Yu-chen Jung was sent out as Prefect first of Wei Chou in southern Ho-pei, where he was put in charge of famine relief, and then of Pien Chou. His activities there have already been mentioned. In 728 he returned to the capital as Vice-President of the Ministry of Finance and in the
following year became Chief Minister.\(^{45}\)

Between the fall of Chang Yüeh in 726 and the elevation of Yü-wen-Jung in 729 there was a ministry composed of three men. Yuan Ch'ien-yao remained and was joined by Tu Hsien 杜暹, a typical literatus from the east\(^{46}\), and Li Yüan-hung 李元紘, a man of aristocratic origin who took an interest in the economic welfare of Kuan-chung and seems to have been a supporter of Yü-wen Jung's policies.\(^{47}\) This ministry was not a success. Tu Hsien and Li Yüan-hung constantly disagreed. Though we are not told on what matters, we may perhaps assume that the conflicting interests of literatus and aristocrat were involved.

At the end of 728 a fourth Chief Minister was appointed in the person of Hsiao Sung 虢通, who was then Military Governor of Ho-hsi. When Hsiao returned to the capital all three former Chief Ministers were dismissed and Yü-wen Jung and P'ei Kuang-t'ing 裴光庭 were appointed to replace them.\(^{48}\) A ministry thus came into being in which all were of aristocratic background though the other two were not sympathetic to Yü-wen Jung.

Hsiao Sung was a descendant of the imperial family of the Southern Liang dynasty. The family had settled in Ch'ang-an where they were treated with honour by the Sui and T'ang rulers. Sung's great-great-uncle had been a Chief Minister under Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung. He had himself first received a small provincial appointment by hereditary privi-
lege and though he is said to have been slighted for his lack of literary attainments he rapidly rose in rank, holding various posts in the capital and the provinces. In 727 he went out to Ho-hsi as Military Governor and won fame and glory by defeating the Tibetans. There is no record that he took any interest in finance.49

P'ei Kuang-t'ing was the descendant of a Northern Chou family and the son of a noted general under the Empress Wu. Because of his father's position he was shown favour by Empress and became a pupil in the Hung-wen 弘文 Academy. In the period 705-6 he passed the Ming-ching examination and though his career was retarded because of his association with the Wu family, he held a number of offices at the capital after Hsüan-tsung's accession.50 Having passed an examination he seems to have considered himself something of a literatus and to have associated with that class. Fundamentally however he was opposed to the examination system, for during his period of office he introduced a system of promotion by strict seniority, thus removing the opportunity which had existed for a scholar or literary man to obtain unusual advancement by trying special examinations. (This system was officially abolished after his death.51)

For a short time Yü-wen Jung was the dominant member of this ministry. He enjoyed the emperor's confidence and even his unfriendly biographer has to approve the appointments he made. But he had against him the ill-will of the literati as a whole and the particular hatred of the friends
of Chang Yüeh. His fall was rapid. After being in office only three months he was found guilty of having encouraged a censor to attack the powerful Prince of Hsin-an 頌. For this he was once again sent out to a provincial post. This time his enemies were not content with administering a temporary setback, they were determined to see that he should never again have a chance to meddle with financial schemes. P'iei K'uang-t'ing, who was also at this time President of the Censorate, accused Jung's son of corruption and Jung of having a faction (tang). Jung was exiled to a small post in the far south. The next year he was further charged with having misappropriated large amounts while he was Prefect of Pien Chou. He was deprived of all office and banished to an unhealthy district in present Kuang-hsi. There he contracted a fever, but he was compelled to remain and soon died. The emperor posthumously created him Prefect of T'ai Chou in recognition of his earlier services.

After Yü-wen Jung's dismissal the emperor is reported to have said to his ministers, "You all told me that Jung was an evil man and I have dismissed him. Now the revenues are insufficient. What are you going to do about it? How will you assist me?" No one had any reply to make. Though the charges that were brought against Jung were perhaps true, corruption on a larger or smaller scale was a constant feature of Chinese political life and the bringing of such charges and especially the severe punishment were certainly due to party malice. The hatred engendered by his policies
was apparently of a different order from the antagonisms of groups or individuals within the literati.

After the dismissal of Yu-wen Jung, P'ei Kuang-t'ing and Hsiao Sung continued to be Chief Ministers until the former died in the third month of 733. They seem to have been antagonistic to one another though we are given no details of the specific differences between them in regard to policy. When P'ei Kuang-t'ing died, Hsiao Sung recommended a certain Wang Ch'iu, who had passed through the examination system but was also of a distinguished family and married to a daughter of the emperor Chung-tsung.55 Wang Ch'iu refused to accept the office and recommended instead another literatus of a Kuan-chung family, Han Hsiu, who was appointed.56 We are told that Han had previously seemed a mild, complaisant man. Now however he asserted himself vigorously and he and Hsiao Sung constantly disagreed even to bickering in the emperor's presence.57 Before the end of the year both were dismissed and two new ministers were appointed. The following summer they were joined by a third.

During the fateful course of this new ministry the conflict between the literati and the financier-aristocrats was at last resolved. But for the moment an attempt was again made to combine members of both groups in one ministry. P'ei Yao-ch'ing and Chang Chiu-ling, both of whom we have met before, were the first two to be appointed. Chang Chiu-ling was a literatus of the purest kind and a former associate
of Chang Yüeh. We have already seen how he was opposed to military men and how he advocated the execution of An Lu-shan in 736. He came from a family in the extreme south whose members had held provincial appointments in their native region but had not previously entered the metropolitan bureaucracy. Having himself advanced by means of the examination system he was a vigorous and conscious defender of his class and an inveterate enemy of those who sought advancement by other means. In contrast P'ei Yao-ch'ing was a follower of Yu-wen Jung and soon to become one of the greatest of the financial reformers. His rather more favourable treatment by the literati has however already been discussed. The third Chief Minister was Li Lin-fu.

Li Lin-fu has already been briefly introduced but it may be well at this point, when he is about to become the most important figure in our story, to give some further consideration to his background and character. As a member of the imperial clan he of course belonged to the highest ranks of the Kuan-chung aristocracy. He entered official life through hereditary privilege and was no friend of the literary gentry. They have revenged themselves by recording anecdotes to show his imperfect knowledge of characters. The fact that he could hold the office of Vice-Principal of the University would nevertheless seem to indicate that he had some scholarly proficiency. In any case he possessed qualities which were much rarer among the Chinese of those days than
a knowledge of obscure expressions or the ability to compose in the balanced style. He had a passion for order and system. Even his unfriendly biographer in the Old T'ang History remarks on the efficiency of his administration. We shall presently have occasion to discuss some of the many reforms which he introduced to this end. It is perhaps not insignificant that he was proficient in music, an art frequently associated with mathematics. As against this genius which made his work of real benefit to the government there were negative qualities which have been largely stressed by the historiographers. With his passion for order went ambition and the love of power, and he turned his keen mind to unscrupulous intrigues. The subtle, indirect means he used to strengthen his position and weaken his opponents have become legendary.  

Apparently he was not degraded in 727 along with his colleagues of the Censorate, Yü-wen Jung and Ts'ui Yin-fu. After that time he held in succession the offices of Vice-President of the Ministry of Punishments and Vice-President of the Ministry of Civil Office.  
His promotion to the dignity of Chief Minister is attributed by the histories to an intrigue with the emperor's favourite. Yet it would seem that by holding such offices he was already eligible for this advancement, especially since his former association with Yü-wen Jung would influence the emperor, though not the literati, in his favour. Added to this of course a favourable word from the favourite concubine of the emperor
would have been of assistance and I shall return presently to the quid pro quo which he is said to have offered her.

This ministry lasted three years, from the winter of 733 to that of 736. During this time P'ei Yao-ch'ing was preoccupied with his economic reforms and is not usually mentioned in connection with the bitter controversies which raged between the other two. In one instance however he sided with Li Lin-fu and other critics against Chang Chiu-ling. Soon after taking office Chang Chiu-ling made a proposal which is very startling to modern minds. He proposed that private persons should be permitted to engage freely in coining money. In fact this would have done little more than legalize an existing situation. Because it was expensive to make coins with the primitive techniques in use, the government never circulated enough to meet the requirements of trade. Moreover copper was needed for many other purposes and, because of the government monopoly, was worth more when melted down than in the form of money. Consequently, in spite of threats of severe penalties, the private manufacture of debased coins made mostly of iron and tin was very prevalent, and by a well-known economic law this still further increased the scarcity of good coins, which were hoarded or melted down.\(^2\) The area in which private coining was most practiced was the Yangtze valley, for though this was a great trading area it was far from the government mints and the cost of transporting the bulky copper cash further increased the difficulty of supplying it with good money.
Repeated efforts by the government to buy up the debased coins and to prevent counterfeiting were quite without avail. This is not the place to go fully into the vexed problem which troubled the government throughout the dynasty without finding a solution. It seems evident however that in advocating freedom for the people to make coins, nominally requiring them of course to maintain a certain standard, the southern literatus, Chang Chiu-ling, was espousing the interests of the southern merchants. As his unsympathetic northern critics pointed out, it would have been even more difficult to prevent bad coinage from circulating under such a system. They also showed in their arguments the traditional prejudice against merchants in favour of the 'root' activity, agriculture. The emperor deferred to these criticisms and the matter was dropped.63

The clashes between Chang Chiu-ling and Li Lin-fu have been dramatized by the historians, for in them was rightly seen a turning point in the reign of Hsuan-tsung. Chang was desperately fighting to maintain the position of the literati, to such an extent that his attitudes often seem narrow and intransigent. We have already seen how his contempt for military men led him to oppose the pardon of An Lu-shan. It had previously led him to oppose and successfully prevent the rewarding of Chang Shou-kuei with a Chief Ministership for his victories over the Khitan64 though successful generals had quite often been so rewarded earlier in the dynasty.
Similarly he opposed rewarding another general, Niu Hsien-k'o, who had won a name for himself by careful and efficient management of his stores. The following conversation is said to have taken place between the emperor and Chang Chiu-ling about this matter, which, even if not true in detail, illustrates very well the attitude of the literatus. Li Lin-fu had recommended Niu Hsien-k'o to be Chief Minister and Chang Chiu-ling had expressed his strenuous opposition.

"The emperor said, 'You hate Hsien-k'o because he comes from a humble family. What sort of noble clan are you from?' Chang Chiu-ling said, 'Since I am a poor, unconnected man from the south (Ling-hai), I am not the equal of Hsien-k'o who was born in China proper. But I have been accustomed to frequent the administrative offices of the capital and have had charge of decrees for years. Hsien-k'o has been a minor official on the distant frontier and has no acquaintance with books. If you entrust him with high office, I fear you will displease public opinion.'"

In another controversy the rivalry between literatus and aristocrat is not so evident. Chang Chiu-ling appears rather as the advocate of justice and stability, while Li Lin-fu appears as the ambitious, unprincipled intriguer. It is however perhaps significant that in the intrigue by which the Empress Wu obtained ascendancy in Kao-tsung's harem eighty years before, it was the still powerfully vested aristocratic faction led by T'ai-tsung's brother-in-law, Chang-sun Wu-chi, which defended stability, whereas the men who supported the empress were members of the new, still insecure, literary gentry. I have already referred to the story that Li Lin-fu obtained his elevation through
the support of the emperor's favourite. She was the same Wu Hui-fei whom we have met in connection with the ruin of the Empress Wang. The Crown Prince was the son of another concubine, and the Concubine Wu was anxious to have him set aside in favour of her own son. The story is that Li Lin-fu promised to help her to this end in return for her recommendation. He fulfilled her wishes at least to the extent of not interfering when charges were brought against the prince, though it would be useless at this distance of time to attempt to sort out the true and exact story of the intrigue from the varying accounts of uncertain authenticity which we have received. The Concubine Wu persuaded the emperor that the Crown Prince and two other princes, sons of other women, had banded together and were plotting to kill her son. Abandoning his earlier policy of maintaining the unity of the imperial family, and yielding to the persistence of his favourite, the emperor wished to have them removed, but when he broached the matter to the Chief Ministers, Chang Chiu-ling strongly resisted. The emperor, whose conscience was probably not very clear, therefore did nothing while Chang remained a minister.67

The end of the ministry did not come as a result of a direct clash of the principals. Hsiao Chiang, who had been P'ei Yao-ch'ing's chief assistant in his transport reforms and was closely associated with Li Lin-fu, was made President of the Ministry of Finance. He was no scholar and a friend of Chang Chiu-ling, Yen T'ing-chih.68
who was Vice-President of the Grand Imperial Secretariat (Chung-shu Shih-lang), reported mistakes he had made in reading characters. For this Chiung was sent out to a provincial post. Li Lin-fu then attacked Yen T'ing-chih. The husband of Yen's divorced wife was being tried for bribery and Yen attempted to defend him. Li Lin-fu had this reported to the emperor with the suggestion that Yen was showing partiality. The emperor felt that the accusation was correct. When Chang Chiu-ling tried to defend his friend he only involved himself in the charge of partiality.69

The emperor was probably glad of the opportunity to divest himself of a minister whose qualities he respected but whose stubborn opposition had grown wearisome. Chang was made Vice-President of the Right of the Department of Affairs of State (Shang-shu Yu Ch'eng-hsiang), a post nominally of high rank but in fact a sinecure. We are not told that P'ei Yao-ch'ing was in any way involved in the affair but he too ceased to be Chief Minister, becoming Vice-President of the Left.70

In their place was appointed Niu Hsien-k'ao, the general whose rewarding Chang Chiu-ling had opposed. P'ei Yao-ch'ing remained at the capital as a respected elder statesman until his death in 743. Chang Chiu-ling was less fortunate. In the spring of 737 an Examining Censor, Chou Tsu-liang, made a foolhardy remark to another man, criticizing Niu Hsien-k'ao and connecting his name with an old prophecy of disaster. When this was reported, he stood his ground.
in the emperor's presence. For this he was publicly flogged and banished. He died on the road.\textsuperscript{71} Li Lin-fu made use of the fact that Chang Chiu-ling had recommended Chou to further discredit his old enemy. Chang was accordingly sent away from the capital as Deputy Prefect of Ching 章 Chou.\textsuperscript{72} Though he never returned to the capital, he was not entirely cast aside by the emperor, for in 739 he was made Count of the Shih-hsing County, (始興縣伯) with a revenue of 500 households.\textsuperscript{73} He died in 740.\textsuperscript{74}

From this change of government in 736 until his death in 752 Li Lin-fu was virtual dictator. Niu Hsien-k'o was completely subservient to him and never ventured to interfere in matters of policy. There was at first no violent persecution but the aristocratic faction was now firmly in the saddle and it was soon made clear that the criticisms of the literati were no longer welcome.\textsuperscript{75} Henceforth they could only hope to get ahead as hangers-on of Li Lin-fu, or some other aristocrat. Outwardly a smooth, efficient calm replaced the turbulent surface of political life. It was some time before, as we shall see in Chapter 7, the straining forces beneath again broke violently through.

It should be clear from what I have shown that the dictatorship of Li Lin-fu was not merely the result of clever intrigues, but the end of a long struggle between two divergent sets of interests. Nor was the emperor's part in it, as the Chinese historians suggest, merely that he grew
tired of being opposed by outspoken ministers and allowed himself to be deceived by the smooth-spoken and agreeable Li, though this may have played a part. From the beginning he was determined to have a strong, centralized and financially sound government and had inevitably turned for support to those who could and would create it for him. He found them among the weakened and probably much impoverished aristocracy of Kuan-chung. For a time he endeavoured to make them work within the existing framework of government by the scholar-gentry but in the end found compromise to be difficult if not impossible. At last he placed power firmly in the hands of one of the aristocrats. The use and misuse made of that power contributed very much to the situation out of which came An Lu-shan's rebellion.
CHAPTER 5

THE BACKGROUND OF THE REBELLION OF AN LU-SHAN -- MILITARY

In the two preceding chapters I have dealt with the economic and political factors which created the situation in which the rebellion of An Lu-shan broke out. In searching for the more immediate causes which made possible and provoked the insurrection we must turn to the new military situation which had arisen in the century since the beginning of the dynasty. For it was by taking advantage of his position as commander over large permanent armies in regions remote from the direct control of the central government that An Lu-shan was able to attempt to conquer the country for himself.

The military strength of T'ang, like that of its predecessors, Northern Chou and Sui, was originally based on the so-called fu-ping 府兵 militia system. The real nature of this system has been the subject of much disagreement almost from the time of its disappearance in the eighth century until the present day. It certainly soon became the object of much idealization because of its association with the golden age of T'ai-tsung. The accounts of the dynastic histories are infected with this and in any case give only a brief, schematized picture which tells us little of how it really worked. It is not necessary here to go into a detailed discussion of the organization or the many problems that arise about its origin and develop-
ment. It will be sufficient to give the following general outline.

A total of about 600 militia units were established at various places, each consisting of from 800 to 1200 men. They were taken on strength when coming of age (twenty-one years Chinese style) and remained until age sixty. Militiamen themselves, but not their families, were exempted from taxes and corvée. According to the regulations, men from large and well-to-do families were chosen by preference. It would seem that originally membership was restricted to members of the upper classes and during early T'ang was an honour to be coveted rather than an impost to be shunned. The units had permanent officers who were responsible for the training in the off-season of agriculture and for commanding the men when they were sent to their various duties.

The chief of these duties was to serve a month at a time by rota as part of the emperor's guard at the capital. The frequency of such service was graded by the nearness to the capital, so that those within 500 li served one month in five, but those beyond 2000 li served only two months in eighteen. (It is likely that the very distant units never sent men to the capital but were only used for other purposes.) This system was less absurd and unworkable than it might appear, since (as will be seen from Map IX) the militia units were not distributed equally throughout
the Chinese empire. About one-fifth of them were within the metropolitan prefecture (Ching-chao Fu 京兆府) itself and over 400 (about two-thirds) were within 500 li of Ch'ang-an or Lo-yang. There was also a small concentration around the Northern Capital, T'ai-yüan, but most of the remainder were scattered along the frontier and were no doubt intended solely for border defence.

While serving at the capital the militiamen were distributed among twelve guards of the emperor and six guards of the Crown Prince. They were not primarily intended to perform ceremonial functions or to guard the palaces, for which special formations existed. They formed rather a formidable, well-trained army always ready to be dispatched to any quarter where the need arose. The guards had a permanent set of officers of their own, though it seems that militia officers accompanied their men to the capital and performed some functions there.²

The militia units were also required to send men to serve for periods of three years in frontier posts and to send contingents in case of a special expedition, though for both these purposes men were also recruited from other sources. Officers for expeditions were appointed temporarily from guards officers.

It is possible to make certain general comments about this system:

(1) The Fu- ping organization meant at the same time a concentration of military power around the capital and a
division of that power into a large number of small units, thus allowing the centre to dominate the provinces and hindering individual commanders from becoming so strong as to threaten the government's authority.

(2) Because the militiamen were still attached to the soil and were engaged in agriculture when not on duty or in training, the burden on the government of providing for the army was considerably reduced. On the other hand, since picked men were enlisted upon reaching maturity and remained soldiers for the rest of their active lives, a certain professional standard could be achieved. It is probable that this standard was originally encouraged by the fact that service in the militia was a privilege of the aristocratic and well-to-do classes, carrying with it a certain prestige even for the simple Guardsman, who was called 'officer in attendance' (shih-kuan 侍臣), and besides, the opportunity of rising to high rank and honour through prowess in battle. The officer cadre came from the sons of the same great Kuan-chung families that furnished the high civil officials of the state. These families had a military tradition dating at least back to Northern Chou and many of them were the descendants of former nomads.

(3) It is evident that this system was based on certain assumptions and was inherently unstable if any of them ceased to be valid. It required a high morale among the rank and file and a continuance of the honour in which they
were held, so that the well-to-do families would continue
to seek service for their sons. It required that the
militiamen should not be kept away from their homes too
long. Otherwise agriculture would suffer and new supply
problems would be created. Ultimately, moreover, the ad-
vantage of never having large formations under a commander
for any length of time would be lost. It was therefore
best suited to a dynamic and uniformly successful offensive
policy of brief victorious campaigns rather than to a static
defence. This was in fact the situation for the most part
in the reign of T'ai-tsung. When the situation changed,
the system did break down and had to be replaced by various
expedients.3

It will be convenient in discussing these developments
to treat separately the capital and the frontiers.

(a) Armies at the Capital

From the beginning the armies at the capital were only
partly composed of men from the militia units. To each of
the twelve guards formed from militiamen were attached
what might be called cadet corps, composed of youths chosen
from prominent families by hereditary privilege.4 Moreover
besides the twelve guards of the emperor and the six of the
Crown Prince, there were two pairs of special guards for
the emperor (with two corresponding pairs for the Crown
Prince), which performed special duties. They were the
Ch'ien-niu 千牛 Guards, composed of sons of the highest
ranking officials and nobles, and the Gate-Watch Guards (Chien-men), about whose composition less is known, but who seem to have been specially picked from the other guardsmen for permanent service.

Even apart from these sections of the Guards proper which were more or less permanently at the capital there was another separate force known as the Northern Army. It was stationed in the Imperial Park north of the palace whereas the Guards, called by contrast the Southern Barracks (Nan-ya 南衙), were stationed to the south of it. This force was first made up of men who had accompanied Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung on their first campaign from T'ai-yüan to Ch'ang-an, and who volunteered to remain in the army when the time came for demobilization. As the older men died off their places were filled by sons and nephews and so the army came to be called the Army of Fathers and Sons (Fu-tsu Chun 父子軍). In 638 they were called the Left and Right Encampments (Tso Yu T'un-ying 左右屯營) and known as the Flying Horsemen (Fei-chi 飛騎). In 662 the name Yu-lin 翼林 Army was given to them.

The importance of the Northern Army in the history of the first half of the dynasty has been pointed out by Professor Ch'en Yin-k'o, who shows that control of it or failure to control it determined the success or failure of every palace coup attempted up to the reign of Hsüan-tsung. This importance he attributes to the way in which the palace
was constructed and the strategic position of the main northern gate. It would seem that, realizing the importance of this post, the T'ang sovereigns did not feel safe in entrusting it to the guardsmen but wished to have there men specially attached to their persons. If this was their intention, their efforts were frequently in vain for the Northern Armies on several occasions participated in palace revolutions, turning against the person they were supposed to be protecting. In fact, being permanently at the capital, they were much more likely to develop praetorian arrogance and to engage in political intrigues than the guardsmen doing their month's turn of duty.

Some at least of the original Northern Army were personal slaves of the Li family, for T'ai-tsung chose a special bodyguard from amongst them and we are elsewhere told that these men had been household slaves or prisoners of war. They were called the Hundred Cavaliers (Po-chi  предприятия). They wore a special uniform and formed a mounted escort for the emperor on hunting expeditions. Under the Empress Wu their number was increased to one thousand and under Chung-tsung to ten thousand. By some means Hsüan-tsung was able to get former personal slaves into this body and to win over others of the soldiers to his side, and it was this that enabled him to carry out the coups which secured his power. The privileged position which this won for these soldiers has already been discussed.

Under the Empress Wu the Northern Army had already
begun to overshadow the guards. The prestige of the simple guardsman diminished so that the formerly honourable term of 'officer in attendance' became a term of abuse. Instead of being used for military duties they were often treated as slaves to be sent to do menial tasks for important personages. In consequence the well-to-do families avoided this duty in every way possible, leaving it to the poor or paying substitutes. The poor could not afford the expense of serving a month at a time at the capital and providing their own food, so they ran away to swell the ranks of migrant peasants. Moreover officers of the guards and of the Northern Armies were no longer chosen from among militia officers but were appointed from among the relatives of high officials and favourites. Professor Ch'en suggests that this was part of the Empress Wu's deliberate policy of weakening the Kuan-chung aristocracy, with whom the militia system was so closely bound up.

Because of the way militia service was avoided, it became increasingly difficult to fill the ranks of the guards at court. Since the ceremonial functions were largely performed by special formations, no one seems to have been greatly worried by this situation. With armies needed urgently for frontier defence far from the capital and no internal threat the desirability of having a large force always at the capital to overawe the provinces was no longer obvious. Nothing was in fact done to remedy the
situation until in 722 plans were being made for the great sacrifice on Mount T'ai which was finally performed in 725. Then it became apparent that the Guards were insufficient to provide a proper escort and the Chief Minister Chang Yüeh made proposals for a drastic reform.

Early in 723 when the emperor was on his way to visit the Northern Capital, T'ai-yüan, he stopped at Lu. In honour of his stay there before he became emperor, he proclaimed five years' remission of taxes for the people and enlisted from among the youths a force known as the Permanent Guard of the Emperor (Ch'ang-its'ung Su-wei). Later in the same year this force was incorporated into a larger force of 120,000 men, called by the same name, which was recruited at Ch'ang-an from former guardsmen, vagrants and others. They were first divided into two tours of duty serving six months at a time but later into six, serving two months at a time. In 725 they received the name of K'uo-ch'i and divided up among the Guards. The reform was very short-lived in effect. The K'uo-ch'i were soon placed under the Northern Army and the Guards, except for certain specialized corps, thereafter existed only in name. In 749 a decree was issued formally ending the calling up of men from the militia units to serve in the capital, though the militia organization continued to exist on paper and may have functioned in some form or other on the frontiers.

Even the Northern Armies did not remain an effective
military force during the remainder of Hsüan-tsung's reign. The conflict between their leaders and the eunuchs has already been discussed. After the death of Wang Mao-chung in 731 we hear little of this army. It is probable that the emperor viewed it with some suspicion, remembering the part it had played so many times before and fearing that a sense of grievance might easily turn it against him. Moreover the needs of the frontier made it difficult to keep a large force at the capital. In spite of indications which we have in some texts that members of these armies were supposed to be exempt from frontier service, we hear of K'uo-ch'i, now under the Northern Armies, being sent on an expedition against the Tibetans. It would appear that the emperor had some real reason to doubt the loyalty of the Palace Armies for they later mutinied when he was fleeing from Ch'ang-an in 756 and mutinied again on two occasions while he was in Ch'eng-tu.

Earlier in 752 a coup was actually attempted of which only meagre details are given and about which much has clearly been suppressed. One suspects that it was an attempt to set aside Hsüan-tsung in favour of the Crown Prince. The coup was unsuccessful, partly perhaps because of the weakness of the Northern Armies at that time, but also because of the presence of a new factor in the military picture, a small force commanded by eunuchs. It is referred to as the Flying Dragon Palace Army 飛龍禁軍, and four
hundred of its men under the direction of Kao Li-shih captured the rebel leaders. Within the palace grounds there was a stable known as the Flying Dragon Stable, which was in charge of eunuchs. Presumably this force was first recruited in that connection. I have found no other mention of this body of men, though one might expect to hear of it at the time of the flight from Ch'ang-an. Its existence in 752 was a portent for the future, when the eunuchs held the emperor prisoner by means of their control of the Palace Armies.

This subsection may be fittingly concluded by a description of the state of the armies at the capital immediately before the rebellion which was probably written down about a half century later.

"At the end of T'ien-pao (742-56), because there was great peace in the Middle Plain, the emperor cultivated the arts of civilization and abandoned military preparation. He had the spear and arrow points melted down in order to weaken the valiant knights of the empire. Thereupon any one who carried warlike arms was punished and any one who kept prophetic books was executed. Any one who practised archery committed a crime. When worthless youths became soldiers their elders repudiated them and would not associate with them. Only in the frontier districts were large bodies of troops maintained. In the Middle Plain arms and weapons were stored away to show that they would never again be used. Men grew to old age without hearing the sound of war. The men of the Six Armies [an old expression for the emperor's armies] and all the Guards were all 'white-clothed' fellows from the market place. The rich carried on trade in coloured silks and lived on fine food. The robust played the 'horn game', at tug-of-war, at lifting poles and iron weights (?) and day after day neglected the arts of war. When an emergency arose their knees shook and they were incapable of carrying arms. It was no mere case of ill-fortune
that after this rebels took advantage of the situation to revolt."^25

(b) The Frontiers

The military organization for control of the frontiers and warlike operations beyond the frontiers in the time of T'ai-ai-tsung and the early part of Kao-tsung's reign consisted of two sharply differentiated parts. On the one hand there was a large number of permanent small units scattered along the frontier under the general supervision of the local Governors (Tu-tu) and Prefects. To this part of the organization also belonged the troops of the Protectorates (Tu-hu-fu 都護廢) located in barbarian territory. The exact strength of this part of the organization is impossible to determine but it seems not to have been very great^26—certainly nothing like the immense manpower concentrated on the frontiers by the time of An Lu-shan. Men from the militia units served in these garrisons for a period of years at a time and it is probable that other methods of recruitment were also used, especially for the remote regions of Central Asia, to which, for example, convicts might be banished.^27

The other part of the organization consisted of expeditionary armies (hsing chün 行軍) created temporarily as the need arose. These too were made up partly of militia-men, but in addition there were frequently barbarian allies and also conscripts from the parts of the empire not included in the fu-ping system.^28
The smallness of the permanent garrisons, the quick successes of the armies in the field, the contribution of manpower made from other sources and the continuing high prestige of the militiamen all combined to keep the system working without any obvious strain for some time. Under Kao-tsung however not only did the system begin to break down at the capital as has been described, but it was also found inadequate on the frontiers. Firstly the Korean campaigns were long, slow and costly, keeping the men away from their homes for years at a time. Then threats began to appear in the north-west and north, first from the Tibetans and then from the Northern Turks, which could not be withstood by the small isolated outposts nor quelled in a season by an expedition.

To meet this new situation larger units known as 'armies' (chün) became for the first time a regular feature of frontier organization. The first to be set up were in the north-west in 678 but later more and more were established till in an enumeration of 742 forty-seven were named. An army could range in size from 500 men to 33,000 men, though the former figure was exceptionally small. In addition there were smaller units known as shou-cho which were normally around 1,000 men, and other establishments known as 'forts' (cheng), etc. These new units were no longer intended merely to keep a watch on the barbarians, deal with minor raids and hold out till assistance came in the case of large-scale invasion. They were to be permanently
ready to do the jobs formerly performed by the expeditionary armies. By the end of the seventh century the Armies in a given area were being combined for shorter or longer periods under over-all commanders and in the reign of Hsiian-tsung these became a regular institution with the title of Military Governors (Chih-tu Shih 節度使). Meanwhile the earlier small garrisons were not immediately done away with but gradually diminished in importance. Even as late as 732 expeditionary armies were occasionally sent out to assist the permanent armies. Finally in 737 under Li Lin-fu a definitive form was given to the new organization which had been evolving as a result of many gradual steps taken to meet immediate situations.

Before this consolidation a number of expedients were adopted to meet the pressing manpower requirements. It is not necessary to discuss this whole development in all its detail and I shall merely indicate in a general way the nature of the solutions attempted and the part they played in the system which ultimately resulted. Up till 737 the basic method of recruitment continued to be conscription for a period of service which appears to have varied somewhat in length but which averaged three years. This conscription was not confined to militia units, though the militiamen continued to play a more important role in the frontier armies, where the junior officers continued to hold militia ranks, than they did at the capital.
Beside entailing much hardship on the peasants and causing them to run away to avoid it, this method of conscription was not very satisfactory from the point of view of the efficiency of the frontier forces. It meant that men who had just had time to be properly trained and hardened into soldiers were constantly being replaced by raw recruits. Moreover it required a good deal of administration and wearisome travelling back and forth. Efforts were frequently made therefore to induce or compel conscripts to remain for a further period of service. Such men were called chien-erh 健兒 'veterans'.

Those who could be induced to remain permanently and settle with their families on the frontier were known as ch'ang-ts'ung chien-erh 長從健兒 'long-service veterans' -- or simply as chien-erh. Another method of providing long-service troops was to send convicts to serve in the frontier armies. This method seems to have been particularly favoured in the far west. Unregistered families were also sometimes compelled to settle on the frontiers and provide men for the armies.

In Ho-pei and Ho-nan at the time of the Khitan invasion of 697 a new kind of militia was created. They were called t'uan-chien 團結 or t'uan-lien 團練. They resembled the fu-ping in that they practised agriculture and trained as soldiers in the off-season. The burden was considerably less than that of the fu-ping however because they were not required to serve at the capital and were not
called upon to provide their own food while in training. They were under the control of the Prefect and his senior subordinate filled the position of their actual commander. There are few details of how this system actually worked. It seems that some of the units originally established in Ho-pei were later suppressed, others were turned into Armies still retaining certain features of their militia origin. It is not clear whether they actually went to the frontier to fight or remained in their own localities as a reserve line of defence, but there are certain indications that the former was sometimes the case. 39 Similar militia units were also established in the north-west, in Szechwan and in three prefectures near the capital. 40 The purpose of the last mentioned is nowhere indicated. There is nothing to show that they provided men for the capital armies and there is no mention of them when the rebels threatened the capital in 756.

In 737 when Li Lin-fu was Chief Minister a decree was issued that the Military governors should discuss with the central authorities and determine permanent establishments for all the frontier armies and garrisons. Thereupon the required numbers of men should be recruited from among the conscripts and unregistered households as permanent soldiers who should be given land and settled with their families in the areas in which they were serving. 41 The following year a further decree was issued announcing that the permanent enlistment of frontier soldiers had now been com-
pleted and abolishing the practice of sending conscripts to
the frontier. Conscripts still at the frontier (presumably
those who had not volunteered to remain permanently) were
to be allowed to return home. Although conscription was
still resorted to in cases of need it ceased to be a
regular institution.

The creation of large armies on the frontiers consist-
ing of permanent professional soldiers had profound effects
on government policy. The change must have meant a consider-
able improvement in the quality of the T'ang armies. The
presence of such forces and their greater efficiency en-
couraged an aggressive foreign policy. This was pursued
vigorously, particularly in the north-west where the Tibetans
remained a serious threat. In the later years of Hsüan-
tsong's reign in spite of some set-backs the Chinese armies
were not only able to successfully push back the Tibetans
from the frontiers but were also able to re-establish the
position in Central Asia which they had largely lost at the
end of the previous century and to take the Tibetans in the
rear. In this period too both the Western and the Northern
Turks disappeared as powers on the steppe, though they were
soon to be replaced by the allies of the Chinese, the Uigurs.
In the north-east, though the government wisely refrained
from costly Korean adventures, the Khitan were driven back
into their own territory and no longer threatened to overrun
Ho-pei. In the south-west too, aggressive adventures were
attempted, which however failed miserably owing, it would seem, to faulty generalship and the nature of the country. (The far south presented a special situation which was of minor importance and is therefore ignored throughout this chapter.)

In part these aggressive policies were encouraged by genuine necessities of frontier defence, in part by the exuberance of victory and the emperor's desire for glory. They were also stimulated by the desire of commanders and soldiers alike to win renown and rewards for themselves. The government was lavish in bestowing rewards on officers and men in the years immediately before the rebellion.

Tu Yu 杜佑 describes the situation as follows in the preface to the section on the army in the Tiung-tien:

"When Hsiian-tsung came to the throne, the country had long enjoyed peace. The empire was calm and orderly. Wealth was abundant and strength was great. After K'ai-yüan 10 (732) - generals who won glory on the frontier strove to enlarge the boundaries in order to please the emperor. They tried to wipe out the Hsi and the Khitan, to expel the Man [south-western barbarians] and Tibetans. When they lost an army, for ten thousand lost they reported one; when they defeated the enemy, for one captured they reported ten thousand. As their favour and rewards were high, so their arrogance grew. Ko-shu Han controlled two groups of armies in the west, An-Lushan controlled three in the north-east. Even the conscripted soldiers all received official ranks and the accumulations of the commanderies and counties [i.e. of the whole empire] were squandered on salaries."

He adds in the commentary:

"At the beginning of K'ai-yüan (713) the annual frontier expenditure was approximately 2,000,000 strings of cash. By the end of K'ai-yüan (741) it had already reached 10,000,000 strings. By the end of T'ien-pao
(755) it had again increased by four or five million. According to the regulations of the Ministry of War those who take part in defeating the enemy or perform military services are rewarded according to a fixed scale and those who hold offices are one or two in ten. After T'ien-pao (742) the frontier generals, relying on their favour, asked for the creation of offices. Both at Sui-ch'eng 猿城 Fu at I 隨 Chou /in Ho-peî/ and in An-t'ai 安塞 Fu at Fang 环 Chou /in Kuan-chung/ over 1,000 offices of the rank of kuo-tou 果毅, pien-chiang 別将, and the like were created in single edicts. One can judge the rest from this. Even in the ranks there were none in plain clothing. In every one of the more than forty commanderies of Kuan-fu (i.e. Kuan-chung), Shuo-fang, Ho- hsî and Lung-hsiu and the more than thirty commanderies of Ho-peî there were government granaries. The larger ones held 1,000,000 shih, the smaller ones, not less than 500,000 shih. They provided the salaries of officials sent out from court (hsing-kuan 行官). By the end of T'ien-pao they were all exhausted. Such was the ruin brought upon the empire!46

While we know that his description of the exhaustion of the nation's granaries on the eve of the rebellion is somewhat exaggerated46, Tu Yu was no doubt right in stressing the supply problem created by the new frontier armies. We are less well informed than we could wish as to how this problem was met. As far as food-supply was concerned, in most areas this continued to be provided, wholly or in part, by means of t'un-t'ien or by 'equitable purchase' (ho-tî)47, in addition of course to the local taxes.48 Several times during the half century between 678 and 737 we hear of the establishment of new t'un-t'ien by military commanders.49 The need to have men to work them was an additional reason for wishing to have permanent soldiers on the frontiers who could settle with their families and combine the functions of peasant and soldier. Efforts were also made to increase
civilian population of the frontier regions.

It was not practicable to transport grain to the north and north-west as a principal means of providing the armies but this too was resorted to on occasion. Besides this it was necessary to transport larger and larger quantities of money and textiles to clothe and reward the troops and to pay for the grain obtained by 'equitable purchase'. On the one hand this increased the need of the government for imports from the east and south. On the other hand the great increase which was achieved encouraged larger military establishments and more lavish treatment of them.

The north-east was exceptional in that it was even more easy to supply from the south than was the capital itself. The effect of this will be discussed in the next chapter.

While the military expansion on the frontiers under Hsüan-tsung was greatly assisted, and indeed only made possible by the economic centralization carried out at the same time, it was in itself a centrifugal tendency which in the end turned into a disintegrating force. The story of how this came about is the story of the outbreak of the rebellion and is begun in Chapter 7. Something should be said here however of the reasons why the frontier commanders remained for a long time under the control of the central authorities.

The commanders of the older expeditionary armies were drawn from Guards and militia officers, and the command
of the larger permanent frontier establishments (the Tu-tu Fu and the Tu-hu Fu) was in the hands of members of the regular bureaucracy, often of course specially chosen for proved military talents. While the Kuan-chung aristocracy were in the ascendancy there was no sharp dividing line between civil and military careers. (It must be noted of course that many barbarians served as generals in the Chinese armies, usually under the command of a Chinese.) As the frontier forces grew and the expeditionary armies became permanent there was no change in the principle of selecting commanders. The change in the civil officialdom which resulted from the increased importance of the examination system had much less effect on the military side where the old aristocracy continued to be prominent, but even there several members of the new literary gentry emulated their aristocratic predecessors by alternating between civil and military office. This was particularly true at the highest level of military command.

The result of this was that until near the end of Li Lin-fu's dictatorship the Military Governorships were held by men, whether of aristocratic or gentry background, who had their ambitions centred on the capital, that is, who hoped to use military success as a stepping stone in a political career. They were thus not tempted to seek to create positions independent of the court. Moreover they were frequently moved from place to place so that they had
little opportunity to take root.

At the same time the lower ranks of the officers were being increasingly filled by professional soldiers, both Chinese and non-Chinese. As long as Chinese power was in the ascendency they were usually well satisfied with the rewards of the service but there was clearly a danger here. We do in fact hear of one or two abortive revolts in smaller and more remote outposts where professional officers tended to replace 'political' officers at an earlier date. According to regulations subordinate officers were also supposed to be moved about after a period of years which became shorter as the rank increased but it seems clear that this prudent rule was gradually relaxed and forgotten.

One special arrangement designed to enable the central government to control the frontier commanders was the institution of 'controllers' (chien-chün). From the beginning of the dynasty whenever an expedition was sent out a censor accompanied the general in command to ensure that he acted lawfully and reported truthfully. The 'controllers' sometimes performed meritorious services but were often a hindrance to the effectiveness of the general's plans. The Empress Wu at one time stopped the practice and it is probable that the reason we find Military Governors under Hsüan-tsung holding ranks in the Censorate was to enable them to be exempted from having censors attached to them. About 737, or perhaps the practice was introduced of sending eunuchs as 'controllers'
Under Hsüan-tsung this practice never seems to have been universally followed — Kao Hsien-chih 高仙芝 had a eunuch with him on his famous campaigns in Central Asia 56 but I have found no mention of any eunuch attached to An Lu-shan. This institution later became one of the main pillars of eunuch strength but it was apparently of subsidiary importance at this time.
CHAPTER 6
THE SPECIAL SITUATION IN HO-PEI

One can readily see that Ho-pei possessed natural advantages which made it a suitable starting point for An Lu-shan's attempt to conquer China. It was remote from Ch'ang-an so that the Military Governor could build up independent strength without interference. On the other hand, it was even closer than Kuan-chung to the main grain-producing areas. Though it did not have the defensive strength of Kuan-chung, it possessed an unobstructed invasion route to Lo-yang and the south. In later centuries, as a result of changes which cannot be gone into here, it replaced Kuan-chung as the region on which strong dynasties were based, and Peking took the place of Ch'ang-an. That this shift was not yet accomplished is shown by the history of the rebellion itself in which Kuan-chung was still the key strategic position, but already the north-west was declining as a food-producing area and becoming difficult to supply and An Lu-shan's attempt was a portent of things to come.¹

There were other more important reasons in the immediate historical situation why it was from this region that the rebellion sprung. Though the mythical story which places An Lu-shan's birth on the north-east frontier is not borne out by careful research, it does contain a truth of its own. It was fortuitous that An Lu-shan came to that region but it was not fortuitous that he was able to use it as a base.
On the contrary there is much to suggest that it was Ho-pei
that used An Lu-shan. In him, we may feel, the people of
the north-east found a focus for old aspirations and a
symbol for their separate consciousness vis-à-vis their
rulers in Ch'ang-an. After his death this feeling was
enshrined in the cult and myth concerning which we have
received a few distorted fragments of information.

The suggestion that Ho-pei was estranged from the rest
of China has been sketched by Professor Ch'en Yin-k'ao
and developed in more detail by Mr. Ku Chi-kuang. While I
cannot accept all the evidence mustered by the latter, he
has on the whole presented a convincing case and much of
what follows depends on his researches.

In one particular I cannot feel that he is right. He
suggests that the antagonism between the originally partly
barbarian Kuan-chung aristocracy, led by the imperial
family, and the race-proud, native Chinese aristocracy of
'East of the Mountains', led by the so-called 'Five Surnames',
was an important factor in alienating the north-east from
the government at Ch'ang-an. These families of the east did,
it is true, suffer from a certain amount of restrictive
legislation early in the dynasty through the efforts of the
emperor to curb their aristocratic pretensions. This
legislation appears to have been largely a dead letter;
however, and it certainly did not prevent members of these
families from taking an active part in political life. We
have already seen that some were able to advance through family connection, while others, like the rest of the literati, made use of the examination system. I have found no evidence remotely suggesting that these families took part as an anti-T'ang clique during the rebellion. Whatever disdain they felt for the upstart imperial house did not prevent them from accommodating themselves to the new regime. Many of them had moved to the capital and had only a remote connection with Ho-pei. ⁴

Even Mr. Ku has noted that Ho-pei gave assistance to princes of the Li family who revolted against the Empress Wu⁵, and that the Khitan, in their invasion of 696-7, used the demand for the restoration of the deposed Chung-tsung as propaganda. It was certainly at least in part a result of this that in the face of the even greater menace of the Turkish invasion of 698 Chung-tsung was restored to the post of Crown Prince and made Commander-in-Chief of the expedition to Ho-pei. Thereupon, we are told, there was no difficulty in getting recruits, though men had previously come forward very slowly. ⁶ It does not appear that Ho-pei had any special dislike of the Li family as such.

Mr. Ku seems to be on safer ground in suggesting that among the people of the north-east there existed an antipathy to being governed from Ch'ang-an dating at least from the beginning of the dynasty. This antipathy, he maintains, was repaid with suspicion by the central government and increased by the discrimination that resulted.
Separatist sentiments may even have gone back to the time of Northern Ch'i. During most of the sixth century Ho-pei had been an independent state with its capital at Yeh （forty li west of present Lin-chang Hsien in Ho-nan). It had initially been much more wealthy and powerful than the other northern state in Kuan-chung, a situation which had previously existed under the united Northern Wei dynasty. Ho-pei was then a prosperous and populous agricultural region and the centre of Chinese culture in the north. Moreover there was peace and trade with its north-eastern neighbour, Kao-kou-li. After Ch'i was conquered by Chou and after Chou's successor Sui had united the whole empire, the flow of trade from the south passed by Ho-pei to the north-west. Then Sui attacked Kao-kou-li. The reasons for the ensuing intermittent war which lasted for three-quarters of a century and proved so costly and pointless to China are obscure. It is not impossible however that the court at Ch'ang-an felt a danger in the existence of close relations between Ho-pei and its north-eastern neighbour. If the people of Ho-pei were indeed hostile to being ruled from the west, there might have been danger of their seeking support from Korea. However this may be, and it is largely conjecture, the state of enmity between Kao-kou-li and China must have seriously interfered with trade across southern Manchuria and have further tended to turn northern Ho-pei into an economic backwater. The establishment of Chinese
power in north Korea in the reign of Kao-tsung was followed by large-scale depopulation there and for some time there can have been little profitable trade with the disorganized and exhausted remnants. China's trade with Korea probably then passed mainly across the sea from Shantung to the friendly state of Silla.

In the civil wars at the end of Sui it was the warlords of the north-east who put up the longest resistance to T'ang. Mr. Ku Chi-kwang has stressed this and has cited passages to show that T'ai-tsung had a dislike and suspicion of men of that region.

It is remarkable in view of the Korean wars of the seventh century that the defences of Ho-pei were in fact very much neglected as compared to the rest of the country. Mr. Ku has pointed this out and regards it as further evidence that there was mutual suspicion between Ch'ang-an and Ho-pei. He has contended that out of fear of putting military strength into the hands of men of that region practically no fu-ping militia units were set up in Ho-pei at the beginning of the dynasty. This cannot be wholly maintained, but there were never more than forty-six units in Ho-pei including eight in the south at Huai Chou which belonged rather to the region around the Eastern Capital. This was in sharp contrast to the situation in Ho-tung, a province favoured because of its association with the founding of T'ang, which had 163 fu, a number only
exceeded by Kuan-chung. It was of course consistent with
the general principle of the fu-ping to concentrate strength
near the capital. But there can be no doubt that the govern-
ment neglected the defence of this region in comparison to
that of the north and north-west, with the result that during
the last quarter of the seventh century nomad horsemen were
several times able to penetrate quite deeply into the pro-
vince. Finally in 696-8 first the Khitan and then the
Turks were able to make large-scale invasions.

The story of the invasions of 696-8 throws much inter-
esting light on the situation in Ho-pei and its relations
with the central authorities. Whether in genuine collaboration
or through fear and inability to resist, some towns of Ho-pei
submitted to the invaders without a struggle. Some, it
seems, even gave them active assistance. After the Khitan
had withdrawn, more because of a Turkish attack in the
rear than as a result of the efforts of the Chinese armies,
the Chinese commander, a member of the Empress Wu's family,
treated the alleged collaborators with great severity. When
this was discussed at Lo-yang some felt that the traitors
had got what they deserved but others thought that Prince
Wu was merely trying to cover up his own shortcomings as
a commander. The result in Ho-pei was to create a
situation of near peasant revolt.

In 698 Ti Jen-chieh was made Commissioner for
Pacifying Ho-pei. He sent up the following memorial:

"I have heard that at court some maintain, 'Only when
the Khitan caused trouble did one know who was loyal and who disloyal. Some may have been coerced, some may have followed willingly, some accepted offices from the pretenders, some invited them and gave them comfort, some were related to the barbarians (chien wai-tsei), some were native Chinese (t'u-jen). Though their conduct was different, at heart there was no distinction. Now it is my sincere belief that from of old the brave and warlike men 'East of the Mountains' have valued a proud spirit. For a momentary slight they will go to their deaths without looking back. Recently because of military exigency there have been grievous exactions. Their household economy has been completely ruined and some have even run away. They strip their houses and offer their fields for sale but no one buys. If they count their possessions they find nothing but four bare walls. On top of this the officialdom has taken advantage of the situation to seek for gain. They grind the people to the bone and have no pity in their hearts. They construct walls and lakes and prepare armament. The prefectures and counties exact ten times the labour that the military emergency requires. The officials demand it on the set date without mercy. Their flesh smarts under the blows of the cudgels. In their trouble and danger they do not follow the rules of correct behaviour. In their sore lot they take no joy in living. If they see any way of profiting they will go to it only hoping to postpone death....

"Now the criminals will not, I think, be in their homes, but will be sleeping in the dewy grass, living in the fields and hiding in the hills and marshes. If you pardon them they will come out; if not, they will become outlaws. The bandits 'East of the Mountains' have gathered because of this....

"I hope that you will grant an extraordinary pardon to all the prefectures of Ho-pei and make no inquiries." 

By a policy of clemency Ti Jen-chieh successfully calmed this dangerous state of affairs and prevented it from flaring up into large-scale banditry or open revolt. It is clear nevertheless that these invasions did not improve the sentiments of the people of the north-east towards the government and that they greatly stimulated migration (see page 42). References to this region at the end of the seventh
century and the beginning of the eighth constantly mention vagrancy and lawlessness.\(^\text{15}\) This never became serious in itself, being largely drawn off by migration to the south or enlistment in the frontier armies. Yet it must have left some mark on the memories of the people.

Many other documents besides the memorial of Ti Jen-chieh mention the fierce, proud spirit of the people of Ho-peï.\(^\text{16}\) No doubt the relative economic backwardness of the region in the seventh century helped to prevent the softening which, we are told, sapped the strength of the regions around the capital. In the latter part of T'ang Ho-peï was noted for its partial barbarization and Professor Ch'en Yin-k'ao is probably right in suggesting that this had already begun before the rebellion.\(^\text{17}\) On inscriptions set up in praise of the good government of local officials in Ho-peï around this time it is typical to find references to the establishment of schools and the suppression of lawlessness and vagrancy.\(^\text{18}\) This partly reflected the ancient, traditional reputation of Ho-peï, but often actual conditions seem clearly to have been in the writer's mind.\(^\text{19}\)

The invasions of 696-8 forced the government to change its attitude to the defence of the north-east. The establishment of local militia (t'uen-chien) units in this region has already been mentioned and new frontier armies were also subsequently established. Yet even by 718-20 Chang Yüeh, then Governor of Yu Chou, complained that the armies of Ho-peï
were much smaller than those of Ho-tung though the need was as great. Later to meet the recurrent Khitan menace more and larger forces were set up and by the time An Lu-shan was Military Governor there was no lack of military power facing the nomads.

This in turn improved the economic situation of the province, not only by ensuring freedom from invasion but by the very presence of the armies. Supplies began to flow in to feed, clothe and reward the troops. Some military agricultural colonies (t'un-t'ien) were established, but as the region could be supplied from the south even more easily than Ch'ang-an, it became the practice to ship in large quantities of grain, partly by sea, partly by canal. Other goods would be shipped in too and dispensed to the troops, and this wealth in turn would bring new prosperity to the frontier.

Conditions of external trade were also improved, for China was unable to maintain her hold on northern Korea and a new state, Po-hai, replaced Kao-kou-li. The Chinese did not attempt to reconquer their lost domain and although there were some frontier skirmishes in 732, lasting peace existed from 737. Goods could thus pass once more across southern Manchuria. It is interesting to note that in the reconstruction of Ying Chou in 717, provision was made for Sogdian merchants to be sent to the new city.

Yet in spite of the improved conditions and the greater
care shown for them by the government in Ch'ang-an; the
people of Ho-pei no doubt still remembered their old griev-
ances. Probably the parents of many of the men who formed
An Lu-shan's armies had been driven off their land by
invasion or the rapacity of land-grabbers. And the immediate
dispenser of the new wealth was not the emperor at Ch'ang-an
but the Military Governor at Yu Chou. Unlike other frontier
commands Yu Chou could obtain its supplies directly from
the source without passing through the capital. After An
Lu-shan became established there, he held a sort of secondary
court, less brilliant by far, no doubt, than Hsian-tsung's,
but impressive to his unsophisticated soldiery and people.27
It became the focus for malcontents of various kinds as well
as for the vaguer separatist aspirations of Ho-pei. The
way in which An Lu-shan made use of this position to build
up his strength will be discussed in Volume II in the
account of the years which immediately preceded the rebellion.
CHAPTER 7
AN LU-SHAN UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP OF LI LIN-FU

In the spring of 737, that is the year after An Lu-shan's disgrace, Chang Shou-kuei defeated the Khitan at the Na-lu Mountains 拉陵山. ¹ This appears to have brought about a lull in the fighting though not a definite peace. The following year two subordinate generals from Yu Chou urged Wu Chih-i, the Military Governor at Ying Chou, to attack the Hsi north of the Shiramuren River and prevent them from gathering in their harvest. When he refused, they forged an order from Chang Shou-kuei and forced him to obey. After an initial success the expedition was defeated. Although Chang Shou-kuei had not authorized it he attempted to cover up its failure and reported that a victory had been won. From some source or other the court heard that this was a false report and a eunuch was sent to investigate. Chang Shou-kuei bribed the eunuch to lay the whole blame on Po-chen-t'o-lo 伯真陵羅, one of the generals who had forged the order, whom he compelled to commit suicide. This crime came to light, the eunuch was brutally executed and in the summer of 739 Chang Shou-kuei was degraded to Prefect of K'uo Chou (in present Che-kiang) where he died the following year.³ He was replaced by Li Shih-chih 李碩之, a member of the imperial clan.⁴

An Lu-shan apparently had no part in this scandal.
The North-east Frontier

which opened the way for his promotion. In 740 he was Commissioner for Foot and Horse of the P'ing-lu Army, that is, second-in-command on the military side. At this time Wang Hu-ssu 王斛斯, who had formerly been Military Governor of An-shi in Central Asia, was made his immediate superior at P'ing-lu, replacing Wu Chih-i. In the eighth month of that year a victory over the Hsi and Khitan was reported from Yu Chou. We are given no details but it is quite probable that the Military Governor, Li Shih-chih, remained in strategic control at headquarters while Wang Hu-ssu and An Lu-shan were in tactical command of the operation. There seems to have been a careful avoidance by the historians of mentioning any meritorious achievement on the part of An Lu-shan.
In 741 Li Shih-chih was recalled to the capital and Wang Hu-ssu took his place. An Lu-shan advanced to Deputy Military Governor at Ying Chou. This was not in any way a surprising promotion since he was already second-in-command, but the author of his biography attributes it to his success in flattering the Inspector-General of Ho-pei and bribing his entourage. No doubt the biographer discovered the report of the Inspector-General and on the self-evident premise that such a villain could never have been honestly recommended, assumed that he had deceitfully curried favour. An Lu-shan no doubt showed himself in as favourable a light as possible and gave presents where he thought they would do good -- such was the practice of the times -- but there can be no doubt that in himself he made a very good impression on many persons both as a general and as a man.

On the sixth day of the first month of the first year of T'ien-pao (742) P'ing-lu was elevated to an independent Military Province and An Lu-shan was made Governor. It would seem that he was still to some extent under the surveillance of the Military Governor of Yu Chou (now called Fan-yang), for it was partly on the recommendation of P'ei K'uan, who replaced Wang Hu-ssu in 742, that An Lu-shan became Military Governor of Fan-yang when P'ei returned to the capital. Meanwhile we hear practically nothing of events on the north-east frontier. In the first
month of 743 a Khitan embassy was received at Ch'ang-an, which may indicate that it was a period of peace. In the same month An Lu-shan himself came to court and was received in high favour. He was given the honorific rank of Grand General of the Brave Cavalry (P'iao-chi Ta Chiang-ch'un 驃騎大將軍). He was again at court at the beginning of the following year. (It is not clear whether he had remained throughout 743 or whether, as is much more probable, he had come on a second visit. On his departure in the third month of 744 he was made Military Governor of Fan-yang, his first independent command. As a send-off he was given a state banquet attended by officials of the third rank and downward.

We are told two anecdotes about his visits (or visit) to Ch'ang-an. One can be shown to be quite false and need not concern us, but the second is well substantiated and may serve to illustrate his position at this time. He seems to have given the impression of a simple, unsophisticated, blunt and thoroughly loyal soldier, with no political attachments. Later he was accused of having deliberately cultivated this appearance, but though he afterwards became skilled in dissimulation and intrigue, on these early visits the appearance may have corresponded with the reality. In Selection Examinations of 744 there was a case of gross favouritism. Chang Shih 張師, the son of Chang I 張燧, who was Vice-President of the Censorate and a man
much in the emperor's favour, was given first place although he was known to be illiterate (pu tu shu 不讀書).

Although this caused a good deal of resentment no one dared say anything about it because Li Lin-fu himself was President of the Ministry of Civil Office and so responsible for the Selections. A former Magistrate of Chi Hsien (that is, the metropolitan county of Yu Chou) persuaded An Lu-shan to speak of the matter to the emperor. The emperor then called together all the candidates and conducted a personal examination of them. Chang Shih turned in a blank sheet. He became the laughing stock of Ch'ang-an and both he and his father were degraded. The two Vice-Presidents of the Ministry were sent out to provincial appointments but Li Lin-fu had not personally presided over the examinations and so escaped responsibility.¹⁵

One wonders whether An Lu-shan realized the implications of the step he took, which could not have been of any obvious advantage to him and which might have been very dangerous if Li Lin-fu had taken it as an attack on himself. At that time there was a subtle struggle going on between the dictator and the junior Chief Minister, Li Shih-chih, who had formerly been An Lu-shan's chief at Yu Chou, and especially when we are told that it was a former Magistrate of Chi Hsien -- hence a mutual acquaintance of An Lu-shan and Li Shih-chih -- who suggested the move, we seem to see the shadow of an intrigue of which An was probably completely
unaware. Li Lin-fu did not apparently resent this action. He probably accepted An Lu-shan as a simple, non-political soldier, a type of man particularly valuable to him when his power was being threatened by the intrigues of other high-placed aristocrats.

We must now turn aside once more from the personal career of An Lu-shan to trace the development of the political situation after the establishment of Li Lin-fu's dictatorship in 736. Niu Hsien-k'o, the man who became Li Lin-fu's colleague, was of very humble origins. He came from Kuan-chung. Although his father and grandfather were both given posthumous titles after his elevation, there is no mention of their having held any office during their lifetimes. He himself first became a minor official in a county. The Magistrate valued him highly and later took him along as an assistant when he became Commissioner for Agricultural Colonies in Lung-yu (Ying-t'ien Shih). In this frontier post Niu Hsien-k'o distinguished himself in warfare as well as in his civil occupation, and after being an Assistant (Plan-kuan 官) to successive Military Governors, was himself made Military Governor of Ho-hsi in 729. In 736 he was transferred to Shuo-fang. His successor in Ho-hsi sent in a very favourable report on the state of the army stores which gained him a considerable reputation at court. It will be remembered that when it was a question
of rewarding him for this Chang Chiu-ling expressed his opposition and incurred the emperor's displeasure.

It will be readily seen that a man with such an obscure background, with no experience at court and no connection with any of the cliques and factions of the governing class, was no person to take an independent stand in opposition to Li Lin-fu. It would appear that he confined himself largely to administrative matters, where his scrupulous and methodical practices suited Li Lin-fu's own ideas, and strictly avoided any controversy with his senior colleague to whom he owed his advancement. One innovation is credited to him, the practice of government buying of grain to supply the capital (ho-ti) which has already been mentioned in Chapter 3. Since this practice had long been in use in the north-west, he probably learnt of it while serving there.18

Li Lin-fu's administrative efficiency is given grudging praise even by his usually unfriendly biographer in the Old T'ang History. To him is attributed the commentary to the administrative code known as the T'ang Liu Tien completed in 738 or 739.19 Though others had laboured on the work before him and though the attribution of a work to a Chief Minister was sometimes merely complimentary, it is not inconsistent with the rest of our knowledge of him to assume that he had a considerable part in the actual preparation of the book. We have already seen how he reformed the military system and he was also responsible for codifying
the tax regulations. Other examples could be given of the increased order and efficiency on which Li Lin-fu always insisted.

For the first few years his dictatorship showed a mild but firm countenance. It was no longer possible for the literati to send up criticisms of the government to the emperor. Though there was no regulation, such as a later dictator tried to introduce, that all such memorials had to pass through the hands of the Chief Ministers, those who attempted to make remonstrances soon found themselves relegated to unimportant provincial posts. There was no terror, however. The literati could no longer hope to rise to supreme office or real power but if they behaved themselves and supported Li Lin-fu they might still attain to high positions. Revenue-increasing policies were still actively pursued, generally under the direction of aristocrats. Aristocrats also held many of the high posts in the frontier armies. It was from among these members of his own class that a threat to Li Lin-fu's power eventually appeared.

Niu Hsien-k'ou died in 741. The man who replaced him was Li Shih-chih, who, as we have seen, had been for a time Military Governor of Yu Chou. He was a member of the imperial clan who had made his way by hereditary privilege. He was, in fact, more closely related to the emperor than was Li Lin-fu. There was thus no suggestion of a return to govern-
ment by the literary gentry, but Li Lin-fu can hardly have welcomed his new colleague with open arms. Li Shih-chih was not a man to be overawed by his distant relative or to accept willingly an inferior position as the low-born Niu Hsien-k'o had done. Although we are given no information as to the circumstances surrounding this appointment, we must feel that it was against the wishes of Li Lin-fu and that it is evidence that the emperor was still capable of taking an independent line. He may have been disquieted by the concentration of power in Li Lin-fu's hands and have wished to create a counterbalance. Or we may suspect that other members of the aristocracy, or perhaps the eunuchs, in a desire for personal power or in a genuine fear of the evil consequences of Li Lin-fu's dictatorial rule, intrigued to bring about Li Shih-chih's appointment.

In any case Li Shih-chih soon became the rallying point for ambitious men of the aristocratic faction who found their paths blocked by Li Lin-fu, and a game of subtle intrigue began between the two. The most important ally of Li Shih-chih was Wei Chien, the financial expert whose policies have already been discussed. By his success in replenishing the treasury he had won the personal favour of the emperor and he was independent of the dictator. Another associate of these two of whom we know less was Huang-fu Wei-ming, the Military Governor of Lung-yu, who had won renown by successful warfare against the Tibetans. Other
aristocrats, less closely linked with the above three but
ultimately involved in the same ruin, were P'ei K'uan, who
after ceasing to be Military Governor of Fan-yang in 744
became President of the Ministry of Finance as well as of
the Censorate, and P'ei Tun-fu, who in 744 commanded
a successful expedition against pirates off the coast of
Chekiang and returned to become President of the Ministry
of Punishments. The fact that these men were able to win
promotion without Li Lin-fu's support illustrates the
growing threat to his authority.

The initial moves of the antagonists were indirect and
showed little sign of the savage outcome that was to be.
We are told of a subtle trick whereby Li Lin-fu discredited
his colleague in the eyes of the emperor. After suggesting
to Li Shih-chih to tell the emperor of the existence of gold
deposits in the sacred Mount Hua, Lin-fu explained to the
emperor that he had long known of these deposits but had
kept silent because he knew the emperor would not wish to
disturb the holy mountain. On the other hand I have
suggested that the exposure of the selections fraud in 744
may have been an attack on the dictator by his opponents.
For the most part our sources only mention intrigues carried
out by Li Lin-fu, perhaps because they were the only ones
that succeeded but also no doubt because the historians
were eager to blacken Li Lin-fu's character in every possible
way.
During 744 and 745 we hear of a number of ways in which Li Lin-fu is said to have undermined his opponents' position. In 744 P'ei K'uan was relegated to a provincial post as a result of personal dissensions between him and P'ei Tun-fu which the dictator is alleged to have stirred up. The following year P'ei Tun-fu was appointed to the important but unattractive post of military commander in the extreme southerly province of Ling-nan. When he delayed in taking up his appointment he was degraded to a lesser provincial post. That same year investigations into the administration of the Ministry of War were carried out under the direction of law officers who were faithful henchmen of Li Lin-fu. About sixty minor officials of the Ministry were induced to confess to misdemeanours; after, it is alleged, hearing the frightful screams of two of their number being interrogated. They were all pardoned without punishment. The real object of the move was to attack Li Shih-chih who was President of the Ministry of War. Finally in the ninth month of 745 Wei Chien was subtly attacked by a promotion to the post of President of the Ministry of Punishments. At the same time he was deprived of his post as censor and his financial commissionerships through which he had obtained his favour. They were transferred to another aristocratic financier, Yang Shen-ch'ien, who at that time was hand in glove with Li Lin-fu.

Thus it might seem that by such underhand, but largely
non-violent means the dictator was successfully worsting his rivals. At the beginning of the following year however the situation suddenly changed. From this time onward a merciless attack was launched against the whole faction centred around Li Shih-chih which ended in the deaths of most of them. Many details of this purge will forever remain obscure. It is clear that to a considerable extent the historians who wrote down the story some eleven or twelve years afterwards were unable or unwilling to add very much to the official versions given out at the time -- except of course to lay all the blame at the door of Li Lin-fu and his henchmen. It does seem possible, however, to follow the main course of events and perhaps occasionally to see dim glimpses of what was going on behind the scenes.

To understand the real or alleged conspiracy in which Li Shih-chih, Wei Chien and the others were involved we must go back to events which took place soon after the rise of Li Lin-fu to power. Reference has already been made to the desire of the Concubine Wu to get rid of the Crown Prince and have her own son elevated in his stead, and to the help which Li Lin-fu is said to have promised her in return for assistance in attaining power. Soon after the dismissal of Chang Chiu-ling the Crown Prince and three other princes were degraded and then ordered to commit suicide. But the Concubine Wu did not long enjoy her triumph for she died within the same year, haunted, it is said,
by the ghosts of the murdered princes. 30 Nor was her son in the end made Crown Prince.

The position was left vacant till the sixth month of 738 when the emperor's third son, the future Su-tsung, was elevated to that dignity. We are told that Li Lin-fu opposed this decision and favoured the Concubine Wu's son and that it was Kao Li-shih who persuaded the emperor to appoint the older man. 31 Though it is impossible to say how much truth there is in such tales and how much has been made up later, it is probable that there existed or grew up antagonism and fear between the heir to the throne and the dictator. The charge which recurs again and again in the purges of 746 and 747 is that of conspiring to depose the emperor and enthrone the Crown Prince.

We must not entirely discount the possibility that there may have been a real conspiracy. After all such coups had happened before in T'ang, the last time being when Hsian-tsung himself came to power. Li Lin-fu's enemies, beaten and discouraged at the game of intrigue, may have despaired of removing him by lawful means and may even have genuinely felt that Hsian-tsung, increasingly engrossed in his pleasures and withdrawn from state business, was no longer fit to govern. Wei Chien's sister was the Crown Prince's wife so that Wei may have had an additional reason to hope that he would profit by a change of rulers. This was certainly used as a weapon with which to attack him.
On the other hand the Crown Prince himself came through the bloody events unscathed. It would seem that although the emperor was persuaded that others had treasonable intentions, he either did not believe that his son was personally implicated, or was determined to follow his earlier policy of protecting the members of his own family so as not to stain his reign with the second removal of a Crown Prince.32

Whatever may have been the true facts about the existence or non-existence of a plot or the embryo of a plot, there is no doubt that Li Lin-fu and his henchmen made ruthless use of the supposed conspiracy to further their own interests and ruin their enemies. In the first month of 746 Huang-fu Wei-ming was at Ch'ang-an, in triumph after defeating the Tibetans. He was made Military Governor of Ho-hsi in addition to the post he already held at Lung-yu. It would seem that he attempted to make use of his position of high favour to criticize Li Lin-fu to the emperor and to praise Wei Chien. But Li Lin-fu had his spies on the watch and soon Yang Shen-ch'in reported that on the night of the full moon the Crown Prince had visited Wei Chien's house and that Wei Chien had met Huang-fu Wei-ming at a Taoist temple.33 Li Lin-fu reported this to the throne saying that it was highly improper for a frontier general to have such relations with a relative of the heir to the throne and alleging a plot to set aside the emperor in favour of his son.
Wei Chien and Huang-fu Wei-ming were taken into custody and examined by trusted followers of Li Lin-fu. Even so the evidence was inconclusive and they were merely sent out to the south as provincial prefects. Li Shih-chih was not for the moment implicated but he became frightened and asked to retire. In the fourth month he was replaced by Ch'en Hsi-lich 陳希烈, a man of undistinguished background who had attracted the emperor's attention through his learning in Taoist texts. He continued to be Li Lin-fu's subservient colleague until the latter's death in 752.

The brothers of Wei Chien now made a very foolish move. They attempted to plead their brother's case, calling on the Crown Prince as a witness. The emperor's suspicions were further aroused. Wei Chien and his brothers were banished to the far south and other relatives and intimates were given various degrees of banishment. Li Shih-chih's request to retire may now have seemed to have been an admission of guilt, for he was also sent out to a provincial sinecure. Among the persons degraded as associates of Wei Chien were P'ei K'uan, who was already holding a provincial post, and Li Ch'i-wu 李齊物, a member of the imperial clan who had made improvements in the water transport between Lo-yang and Ch'ang-an. The Crown Prince in alarm asked to be divorced from his wife and this was granted.

His troubles were not over, however, for in the twelfth month Tu Yu-lin 杜有鄰, the father of the Crown Prince's
first ranking concubine, was accused by his son-in-law, Liu Chi 柳勳, of dealing in prophecies. If Liu Chi hoped in this way to gain the favour of Li Lin-fu, he was sadly mistaken, for he and an associate Wang Tseng 王曾 39 were arrested along with Tu Yu-lin and 'investigated' by Chi Wen, 吉溫 Li Lin-fu's principal agent in the Censorate. They were all found guilty of conspiracy and beaten to death. No details are given of the charges against them but it is evident that they were connected with Wei Chien and implicated in the plot to enthron e the Crown Prince. 40 Not only were many of their own connection executed or banished to distant places but an infamous censor, Lo Hsi-shih 羅希時期 39, was sent out from the capital with orders to put to death Wei Chien, Huang-fu Wei-ming and many others including Li Shih-chih and P'ei Tun-fu. 41 P'ei K'uan escaped, but though his request to become a Buddhist monk was refused, he henceforth devoted himself to religion and avoided politics. 42 Perhaps as an offering to placate heaven for this blood-letting, a decree was issued in the first month of 747 abolishing the punishments of hanging and decapitation. 43 Flogging with the heavy bamboo was retained however and proved an effective substitute.

During the purges of 746 Yang Shen-ch'in was the most prominent of Li Lin-fu's assistants. It would seem that he now began to take an independent line or was suspected of doing so. In the eleventh month of 747 charges were
brought against him of secretly possessing prophetic books. This was an especially serious charge against him for he was a descendant of the house of Sui and it was asserted that he was hoping for a restoration of that dynasty. Chi Wen and the others were able to discover or manufacture evidence and Yang Shen-ch'în and his brothers were forced to commit suicide.44

About the same time Li Lin-fu attempted to implicate another frontier general, Wang Chung-ssu 王承嗣，in a plot to enthrone the Crown Prince. Wang Chung-ssu was the son of a general who had died heroically early in the reign of Hsüan-tsung. In order to honour him the orphan was brought up in the imperial palace and became intimate with the princes, among them the present Crown Prince. He subsequently insisted on becoming a frontier general in order to avenge his father's death and he became one of the most eminent commanders of the time. After the dismissal of Huang-fu Wei-ming he had succeeded the latter as Military Governor of Lung-yu and Ho-hsi, and as he already commanded Ho-tung and Shuo-fang, he had for a time the unprecedented distinction of combining four commands at once. Soon afterwards at his own request he was allowed to divest himself of Ho-tung and Shuo-fang.

In 747 however he displeased the emperor by advising against an attack on a stronghold at the eastern end of Kokonor which the Tibetans had captured from the Chinese
some years previously. Another officer, Tung Yen-kuang 杨应光, was put in charge of this expedition and Wang Chung-ssu was ordered to send troops to assist. Wang was uncooperative and when the expedition failed, Tung Yen-kuang blamed him. Li Lin-fu thought this was a good opportunity to ruin a powerful man and attack the Crown Prince so he produced a witness who stated that Wang Chung-ssu had once been heard to say something about helping the Crown Prince to the throne. Wang, who had been summoned to the capital, was arrested and interrogated, but Ko-shu Han, who was his second-in-command, pleaded for him and this time the emperor was not persuaded of the existence of any conspiracy. No action was taken against the Crown Prince and Wang Chung-ssu was merely relegated to a post in the south-west. He died, apparently of natural causes, in 749. 45

Besides the henchmen we have already mentioned such as Chi Wen and Lo Hsi-shih, during the purges Li Lin-fu had found a new instrument in the person of Yang Kuo-chung, a second cousin of Yang Kuei-fei, who had shortly before become the emperor's favourite. 46 A casual glance at the biographies of both himself and his cousin suggests that the Yangs were of rather humble origin, but it is clear that, though not noble, they were a family of moderate eminence. Kuo-chung's mother was the grand-niece of Chang Hsing-ch'eng, a Chief Minister under T'ai-tsung, and the sister of Chang I-chih 张易之, the notorious favourite
of the Empress Wu. Although these Changs were also not noble, it must have been a considerable honour to marry into them.

Kuo-chung's own father was only a minor official. According to his by no means friendly biographer, as a young man Kuo-chung was unscholarly and given to drunkenness and loose living. He was despised by his family and neighbours and in resentment took up a military career in Szechwan. There he presumably met his second cousin, the future Kuei-fei, who lived in that province during her early years. He is accused of having seduced another of his cousins there.

He managed to establish himself and received minor civil and military posts. He obtained the patronage of a wealthy man of the province, Hsien-yü Chung-t'ung, who later obtained an office on the Military Governor's staff. After Kuei-fei became the emperor's favourite, Hsien-yü Chung-t'ung and the Military Governor decided to make use of Kuo-chung to secure themselves at court. So they furnished him with funds and sent him as a courier to the capital. Once at Ch'ang-an he renewed his acquaintance with the rest of his family and was given the post of Examining Censor.

He was not at this time in any position to challenge the powerful Li Lin-fu and he chose rather to show himself completely subservient. He vigorously acted his part as a law officer in the various 'investigations' of 746-7. It was only later when he had consolidated his strength...
that he dared to intrigue against the dictator.48

An Lu-shan was not directly involved in any of the tragic events of 746-47 though they profoundly affected his subsequent career. We have only meagre details of his life during this period. The fact that he had been recommended by P'ei K'uan and had been wittingly or unwittingly involved in what appears to have been an intrigue by Li Shin-chih's clique against Li Lin-fu was not held against him. In the spring of 745 Chinese princesses were given as wives to the kings of the Hsi and the Khitan.49 Whether because they were displeased with their wives, or because, as is vaguely alleged, An Lu-shan provoked them, or for some unknown reason, in the autumn of the same year they put to death their princesses and revolted.50 An Lu-shan crushed this revolt and in 746 new kings were invested by the Chinese emperor.51

In 746 a certain Hsi Yu who, whose biography is that of an exemplary literatus52, was Commissioner for Demotion and Promotion for Ho-pei. Inexplicably, as it seems to An Lu-shan's biographers, he gave An Lu-shan a high recommendation, though we are not told in what terms.53

At the beginning of 747 An Lu-shan was given the additional distinction of President of the Censorate. The real meaning of these ranks in the Censorate held by frontier governors is not made clear. A possible interpretation has
been suggested above (p.116). At any rate it certainly did not mean that he presided over the Censorate at the capital. At the same time his two wives were both given the title of Lady (Fu-jen 夫人). From this we may infer that he had himself already been ennobled, probably as Count of Liu-ch'eng 柳城 County, the title which he held in the summer of the following year. We are not expressly told that he was at court at the beginning of 747 but the winter was the favourite season for visits to the capital and it is probable that he went there to receive his new honours. There is no indication that he had been there since 744.

Thus far his advancement had been due to his own merits as a commander, to the favourable recommendations he had received from his superiors and from inspectors, and perhaps more than anything else to the new policy in regard to frontier commanders which Li Lin-fu was gradually introducing. With his astute insight into the realities of power, Li Lin-fu had early realized the importance of controlling the frontier armies and the dangers to his own position of having potential rivals acquire glory through military exploits. Thus, before the dismissal of Chang Chiu-ling he had already obtained for himself the post of President of the Ministry of War and we have already discussed the reforms which he introduced in the frontier organization.

Soon he tried to bring the most important commands more
closely under his personal control. When Niu Hsien-k'o became Chief Minister in 736 he did not give up his post as Military Governor of Shuo-fang. This was not unprecedented as Hsiao Sung had retained the Military Governorship of Ho-hsi for a short time after becoming Chief Minister in 726. Moreover Shuo-fang was the closest frontier province to the capital and the previous holder of the post, the Prince of Hsin-an, had after 734 combined it with the office of President of the Ministry of War and had resided at Ch'ang-an. In 738 Li Lin-fu made use of this president to have himself made Military Governor of Ho-hsi and Lung-yu, which he controlled through deputies, one of whom, Hsiao Chiung, we have already met in connection with the fall of Chang Chiu-ling. At the same time Niu Hsien-k'o was made in addition Military Governor of Ho-tung.

This arrangement persisted for only two years, for in 740 both Niu Hsien-k'o and Li Lin-fu ceased to be Military Governors in absentia. Though we know nothing of what lay behind their resignations, they may perhaps be taken as the first sign of the attempt to undermine Li's power on the part of other aristocrats. Li Lin-fu's fears of rivalry from successful generals were soon realized. Li Shih-chih and P'ei K'uen acquired merit in the north-east, P'ei Tun-fu in his campaign against the pirates, Wang Chung-sau and Huang-fu Wei-ming in the north and west.

When he had crushed these contenders Li Lin-fu was
naturally unwilling to allow a fresh group of ambitious aristocrats to rise up on the wave of foreign conquests on which the emperor had set his heart. In An Lu-shan he could see the way to a solution -- a solution for his immediate personal problem but one which in the end proved disastrous for China. An Lu-shan, it no doubt seemed to him, was the ideal Military Governor, a pure soldier, unschooled in political intrigue and incapable because of illiteracy of holding high civil office. After the fall of Wang Chung-ssu therefore, Li openly advocated a policy of appointing barbarians as Military Governors. He claimed that they were better fighters than the Chinese through being accustomed from infancy to the hard frontier life.\(^{59}\)

Hsüan-tsung, eager for glory and by this time weary of state affairs and willing to entrust the government to his minister, consented. Wang Chung-ssu was replaced in Ho-hsi by An Lu-shan's cousin An Ssu-shun, and in Lung-yu by Ko-shu Han, the half-breed Turk whom we have met in Chapter 2 as An Lu-shan's rival. In the smaller and more remote western command of An-hsi the Ch'iang barbarian, Fu-meng Ling-ch'üan, had already been Military Governor since 742, and when he was replaced in 747 his successor was the Korean Kao Hsien-chih. The situation in Pei-t'ing from 748 on is not clear.\(^{61}\) In the two central frontier provinces of Shuo-fang and Ho-tung Chinese commanders were retained for a time but in 750, the former, and in 751, the latter,
received barbarian governors. Only in Chien-nan where Yang Kuo-chung had special interests did the general rule not apply.

In these circumstances it was to be expected that Li Lin-fu would be strongly in favour of An Lu-shan's advancement as the shining example of the advantages of his policy. We have two or three anecdotes of the relationship between An Lu-shan and the dictator which, though of doubtful authenticity in detail, may perhaps be taken as lifelike. It is said that when An Lu-shan received the dignity of President of the Censorate he presumed on his position to show small respect to Li Lin-fu. To teach him manners Li arranged to have him present at an interview along with the financier Wang Hung, who also held the position of President of the Censorate. When Wang was summoned to come forward, he moved with quick steps, bowing very low. An Lu-shan became very much alarmed and slowly bent double his own vast frame. The only difficulty with this story is that Wang Hung did not become President of the Censorate until 750, three years after An Lu-shan's appointment.

There are other stories to show the great respect which An had for Li Lin-fu. It is said that whenever An spoke to the dictator he would sweat profusely with anxiety. Once they met in a government office on a cold winter's day and when Li Lin-fu observed the state he was in, he made him sit down and wrapped his own cloak about him. Thereafter
when An Lu-shan was back at his post of command, he was always in fear and trembling over the reception his requests would receive from Li Lin-fu. A certain courtier is said to have delighted Hsüan-tsung by mimicking his anxious questioning of the returning envoy. All these stories agree in the general picture they give of an unsophisticated soldier standing in awe of the smooth and subtle dictator. They suggest that An was not yet the cunning plotter he is supposed to have become.

Other anecdotes illustrate his relationship to the emperor and his favourite. He appealed to them as a grotesque clown. He had become enormously fat and with his gaucherie in matters of court etiquette provided much amusement. Later, people saw in this a mask deliberately adopted to hide his treacherous intentions, but at least in the year 747 it is possible that in failing to recognize the Crown Prince or in bowing first to Yang Kuei-fei in the presence of the emperor he was genuinely ignorant. No doubt he learned quickly and in later years capitalized on the effect of his buffooneries to secure in the emperor's personal favour a refuge against the more uncertain powers outside the palace.

We hear nothing of his activities following his return to his post later in 747. The frontier seems to have been peaceful for the Hsi sent an embassy in 749 and the Khitan in 750. In the summer of 748 his title of nobility
was raised to that of Kuke and his father received posthumous honours. In 750 he received the unprecedented honour for a general of being made a prince, a title usually restricted to members of the royal family and to foreign potentates. Perhaps the fact that he was not of Chinese descent made it easier for him to be given it. Shortly afterwards the civil Inspectorship of Ho-pei was added to his appointments. During this time we are not told that he visited the capital but it is quite probable that he was in Ch'ang-an when some of these honours were conferred upon him.

In 750 hostilities again broke out. Some sources accuse him of deliberately provoking them, and while this may be a slander not based on any evidence, it was not unusual in the China of those days for a general to stir up trouble in the hope of gaining glory. That autumn he presented 8,000 Hsi prisoners at court. His arrival was the signal for still greater rewards and honours. The emperor had a new house built for him, richly furnished at his personal expense. When he arrived, the Yang family went outside the city to meet him. The emperor personally gave him the highest possible mark in the annual Examination of Merits (k'iao けん). He received the privilege of minting coins in five furnaces set up in his jurisdiction.

On his birthday in the first month of 751 he received rich gifts and also favours of a more intimate kind, for he was adopted as a son by Yang Kuei-fei. On the third day
afterwards she and her ladies, to their own and the emperor's great amusement but to the scandal of future historians, wrapped his huge hulk in baby clothes and went through a burlesque of the ceremony of washing the new-born infant. This incident and vaguer allegations concerning the freedom with which he entered the women's quarters of the palace have led the romantically minded to assume that a love affair grew up between Yang Kuei-fei and her 'son'. To disprove this idea is of course impossible, but it is too grotesque.73

When he returned to his post in the second month, he was made in addition Military Governor of Ho-tung.74 He had thus reached a dizzying pinnacle of glory and power with command of the whole eastern half of the northern frontier of China proper.

Meanwhile the political situation at the capital had subtly altered. Though outwardly Li Lin-fu had quelled all opposition, he had not been able to prevent those who had been his instruments from conceiving ambitions of their own. There was the financial expert Wang Hung, the 'police chief' Chi Wen, and above all Yang Kuo-chung. The latter in particular, though outwardly obsequious, was secure in the emperor's favour and beginning to conduct secret intrigues against his rival. In 749 Hsiao Chiung and another of Li's henchmen were ruined, allegedly through Yang's contriving.75 The secret twistings and turnings of these plots can never
be known but it seems that at some time An Lu-shan, having advanced further in his political education, began to participate.

When An Lu-shan returned to his post in the spring of 751, he prepared a great expedition against the Khitan. In the eighth month he set out in personal command of 60,000 men gathered from his three commands. The Hsi, who had been vanquished the previous summer, were compelled to send 2,000 horsemen to act as guides into barbarian territory. The expedition advanced rapidly for over 1,000 li to the T'u-hu-chzen River土護真 (present Lao-ha River). There they ran into rain but An led them on by forced marches for another 300 li, hoping to surprise the Khitan. When he came upon their encampment, the bowstrings of his army had become soaked and useless. Nevertheless he insisted on attacking. When battle was joined the Hsi horsemen revolted and attacked the Chinese in the rear. Caught between these two forces and without the use of archers, An Lu-shan's army was completely routed. The majority fell as casualties. An Lu-shan himself was nearly killed by arrows and only managed to escape with his son and a small number of personal retainers.

He reached Shih-Chou 師 in safety. There he met the Commissioner for Foot and Horse of Ho-tung, and a Turkish prince named Ko-chieh 吾解 who was serving as an officer under the Chinese. Being in need of a scapegoat An Lu-shan promptly laid the blame for his failure on them
and had them both executed. Shih Ssu-ming, who was Commissioner for Foot and Horse of P'ing-lu, was more fortunate. After the battle he fled into the hills and only after about twenty days, when he had gathered together about 700 of the scattered soldiers, did he venture to appear. An Lu-shan welcomed him cordially but Shih is said to have remarked to someone, "If I had appeared earlier, I should have been beheaded along with Ko-chieh." Meanwhile reinforcements had arrived from P'ing-lu and, joined to Shih Ssu-ming's force, they were able to drive off the Khitan who had advanced to besiege Shih Chou. 76 Once again, as in 736, An Lu-shan had brought disaster on himself through arrogant overconfidence but he was now so high in the emperor's favour that he suffered no punishment, not even a diminution of his titles, as a result.

The year 751 was one of military setbacks for China. In the far west was fought the celebrated battle of Talas, in which the Arabs and their allies put an end to the triumphant career of the Korean general Kao Hsien-chih. 77 In the southwest the Military Governor of Chien-nan, Hsien-yü Chung-t'ung, lost an army of 80,000, mainly through illness, in an invasion of the new state of Nan-chao. 78

The last mentioned adventure is of particular importance because of its political significance. Yang Kuo-chung, having originally come to the capital from Chien-nan, had retained ties with his former friends and had helped the advancement.
Hsien-yii Chung-t'ung. For a number of years China had been on good terms with Nan-chao and had even encouraged its rise to a position of dominance in Yün-nan as a counterweight against the Tibetans. Now however the advantages of this policy were thrown away and on a slight pretext an army was sent to try to conquer the country. The natural inference seems to be that Yang Kuo-chung and his friends were trying to build up a position of prestige and power in Chien-nan to offset the positions achieved by An Lu-shan and the other Military Governors.

It may have been in realization of a growing centrifugal tendency that in the first month of this same year Li Lin-fu had made himself Military Governor in absentia of Shuo-fang, thus reviving the policy which he had tried out in 738-40. In the eleventh month Yang Kuo-chung profited by this example to have himself made Military Governor in absentia of Chien-nan. By now he had become bolder in his opposition to the dictator and more open in his ostentation of the favour he received from the emperor. His independent position rested not only on the fact that he was second cousin to the emperor's favourite, but also on the financial commissionerships which he had known how to accumulate. In this respect he was second only to Wang Hung who, since the death of Yang Shen-ch'ìn, had become a person of great wealth and honour through control of finance.

In the summer of 752 the balance of power was further
altered by the elimination of Wang Hung. This came about as a result of a conspiracy in which his half-brother, Wang Han 韓, was involved. A friend of Han's, Hsing Tsai 鄭, whose position is not indicated, planned to make use of the Ten Thousand Cavaliers to assassinate Yang Kuo-chung and the Chief Ministers, Li Lin-fu and Ch'en Hsi-lich. It is quite likely that after the pattern of such coups, it was intended to set aside the emperor and replace him, presumably with the Crown Prince. No suggestion of this however appears in our sources, which were for the most part written either when the Crown Prince had become the emperor Su-tsung or during the reign of his son Tai-tsung. Two days before the date set for the uprising the plot was revealed. The emperor ordered Wang Hung, who was President of the Censorate, Governor of the Capital and Inspector of the Capital District, to arrest the conspirators. Fearing that his brother would be with Hsing Tsai, Hung sent word to warn him and delayed in sending officers to make the arrests. When the officers finally arrived, Hsing Tsai and his followers fought their way out. They were then engaged in a running fight by a body of soldiers led by Wang Hung and Yang Kuo-chung, but, as mentioned in Chapter 5, were in the end only captured through the intervention of a force from within the palace under the eunuch Kao Li-shih.83

Although evidence was produced showing Wang Han's complicity the emperor was at first inclined to deal lightly
with him and to overlook altogether the fact that Wang Hung was related to him. (As a brother of a traitor, he would of course have been culpable.) But he wished Wang Hung to confess his brother's crime and to plead for mercy. He asked Yang Kuo-chung to hint as much to Hung. Hung was afraid that he would merely be saving his own skin at the expense of his brother's and hesitated to comply. Meanwhile Ch'en Hsi-lich, the junior Chief Minister, accused Hung of being involved in the plot and before Hung's memorial of abasement was delivered a decree had been issued ordering him and his brother to be tried by Ch'en Hsi-lich and Yang Kuo-chung. In the investigation it was revealed that the Wangs had earlier had dealings with a fortune-teller and had arranged two murders in order to keep it secret. Hung was ordered to commit suicide, Han was beaten to death and their immense wealth was confiscated.84

The chief beneficiary of Wang Hung's ruin was Yang Kuo-chung who was given all Hung's offices and commission-erships in addition to his own.85 By now Yang was clearly the chief contender for Li Lin-fu's power and the struggle between the two became more open and more intense. It seems evident that at that time most of the other leading men in the country, among them Ch'en Hsi-lich, Ko-shu Han, Chi Wen and An Lu-shan, were supporting Yang Kuo-chung against the dictator. According to our sources Li Lin-fu originally advised the pardon of Wang Hung, probably wishing to
keep him to counterbalance his more dangerous rival. They also say that Yang Kuo-chung and Ch'en Hsi-lieh were the chief agents in furthering Hung's downfall. We are even told that in their investigations of the Hsing Tsai conspiracy, Ch'en and Yang obtained accusations linking Li Lin-fu with the plot, although it is also clear from our sources that the plot was officially believed to have been directed partly against him. The accusation, if made, had no result.

At about the same time Yang was able to attack Li from another quarter. In the third month of that year (752) An Lu-shan set out with an army of 200,000 to avenge his defeat of the preceding autumn. He had previously obtained permission from court to receive the co-operation of a contingent from the province of Shuo-fang under the command of a Turk by the name of A-pu-ssu. Not without reason in view of the fate of his fellow countryman Ko-chieh, A-pu-ssu feared for his life and objected to being placed under An Lu-shan. He therefore begged to be excused and when this was refused, he rifled the granaries and storehouses of Shuo-fang and fled north into the desert with his tribesmen. When A-pu-ssu failed to arrive to join the expedition, An Lu-shan returned to his base. Since Li Lin-was nominally A-pu-ssu's superior, Yang Kuo-chung and Ch'en Hsi-lieh tried to have him held responsible, and Ko-shu Han added his voice against the dictator. Although the charges were not for the moment pressed, Li was forced to
resign from his post as Military Governor of Shuo-fang.  

Though it was evident that Li Lin-fu's power had been seriously undermined, he was not yet overthrown. He made one more attempt in a typically subtle way to get rid of his chief rival. He arranged to have requests come from Chien-nan to have Yang Kuo-chung take personal charge of the armies there and then added his own voice in support of this. The emperor agreed and Yang was ordered to proceed to his post. Before going he had a tearful interview with Hsüan-tsung in which he expressed his fear that Li Lin-fu was trying to ruin him. The emperor soothed him and promised that he would soon be recalled.

But Li Lin-fu was nearing his end. He was taken ill and that winter when the court went, as was the custom to the Hot Springs, near Ch'ang-an, he had to be carried on a litter. As his illness grew worse, a soothsayer said that he might be cured if he saw the emperor's face. In spite of the objections of his court, Hsüan-tsung insisted on seeing him. The sick-bed was carried out into the courtyard and the emperor appeared on a tower at some distance. Next day Yang Kuo-chung returned from Chien-nan and visited his bedside. It is reported that Li Lin-fu "wept and entrusted him with the future", whereupon Yang Kuo-chung, with his face bathed in sweat, replied that he would not dare so to presume. Very soon afterwards Li Lin-fu died. He had retained at least the appearance of power to the end and was given appropriate posthumous honours. Yang Kuo-
chung promptly succeeded to his position as Chief Minister.\footnote{39}

For one last sordid act of vengeance the forces which had combined against the dictator remained united. Yang Kuo-chung revived the absurd charge that Li had been a party to the revolt of A-pu-ssu. An Lu-shan had won over some of A-pu-ssu's men into his own army and he induced a number of them to bring evidence supporting this charge. We have thus one concrete instance to support the allegation that An had been one of the anti-Li coalition. This time the charge was accepted and all the pent up fury of nearly twenty years of suppression was let loose on the dictator's corpse and his unfortunate relatives. His coffin was opened, the riches with which he had been prepared for interment were stripped from him and he was buried as a commoner. His sons and other relatives were banished to the far south, a punishment which was frequently the equivalent of a death sentence.\footnote{90} A surprising tribute to his career appears in the Old T'ang History:

"From the time he became Chief Minister he always acted in accordance with the laws and the sons of the gentry had no road of advancement except through the proper channels. Thus he occupied the highest place for twenty years and both at court and in the provinces all turned aside their gaze and feared his authority. When Kuo-chung's slanders brought about his ruin, the whole empire felt it to be unjust."\footnote{91}

The death of Li Lin-yu was the signal for the letting loose of all the forces of disintegration which had been maturing within his imposing structure of centralized power. It marked the real close of the brilliant epoch of Hsuan-
tsung, a period not only famous for the transient glories of its military successes and the luxury of its court, but also graced by some of the greatest aesthetic achievements of the Chinese genius -- the poetry of Li Po, the painting of Wu Tao-tien and Wang Wei, to mention only the most illustrious names. Much of this material and cultural achievement was undoubtedly based on the political and economic reforms carried out for the emperor by Li Lin-fu and his predecessors and assistants. But the foundation was too fragile, too much depended on individual men; too many of the stabilizing influences in the constitution had been sacrificed in the desire for efficiency. With a tragic fatality, as it seems to us now, the gigantic effort to turn the vast Chinese empire into a centralized state degenerated into the satisfaction of personal ambitions and desires of grandeur. At the same time it had induced increasingly powerful centrifugal tendencies which every effort at ruthless suppression only made stronger, more conscious and more cunning. The façade was about to crumble away.

Now the time had come for An Lu-shan to step on to the stage in the role of an avenging nemesis, a colossal principle of destruction which the dictator's system had nurtured in spite of itself. Under Li Lin-fu An had been an awed and obedient servant of the regime, but he adopted no such attitude to the successor. For the next three years he and
Yang Kuo-chung engaged in a struggle of ever increasing intensity, while the ageing, pleasure-loving emperor, though half-conscious of the danger, tried to ignore what was happening. As they intrigued and manoeuvred at court, each attempted to build up military strength on the frontiers. In the latter sphere An Lu-shan was already much better established and the efforts of Yang Kuo-chung to create a position in Chien-nan comparable to his in Ho-pei were grossly mismanaged and completely ineffective. But at the capital An Lu-shan was inevitably worsted. In the end he decided that his only course lay in armed intervention and in December 755 he took that course. The story of these events and of the rebellion itself will be treated in the second volume of this work.
NOTES

Chapter 1


4) See des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.78.


6) ibid., pp.448-457.

7) ibid., p.459.

8) ibid., p.461.


Chapter 2

1) Tsa-hu, or tsa-chung hu-jen 雜種胡人 as in CTS 200A, would most naturally be taken to mean 'hu barbarian of mixed race'. Since, as is shown in Chapter 2, An Lu-shan's father was a Sogdian and his mother a Turk, this interpretation fits very well. In T'ang-tai Cheng-chih Shih Shu-lun Kao, p.23, however, Professor Ch'en Yin-k'o, who has been at pains to demonstrate An Lu-shan's racial origins, tries to show that the term is synonymous with chiu-hsing hu 'Sogdian'. The same story about a group of Sogdians who lived at Ch'ang-an after the rebellion of An Lu-shan under the protection of the Uighurs is told in a number of parallel passages. In some (HTS 217A.7.b; TCTC Chien-chung 1(780)/2/chia-wu) they are called chiu-hsing hu, but in CTS 127.2.b they are called tsa-chung hu. Though the same persons are referred to, it seems hardly necessary to regard the two terms as precisely synonymous. No doubt many of these Sogdians had intermarried with the Uighurs. Or tsa-chung might in this case mean 'mixed' in a social sense rather than racially.

A further instance which Professor Ch'en does not quote seems at first sight favourable to his hypothesis. According to the Geographic Monograph of the Old T'ang History, T'-wu 伊吾 Commandery (Hami) was seized by 'mixed barbarians of the western regions' (hsi-yü tsa-hu 西域雜胡) at the
end of Sui (CTS 40.36.b). On the other hand Hami was then under the Tōbūs and there may well have been racial intermingling. (See Chavannes, Documents sur les T'oukiue Occidental, pp.21 and 169)

2) CTS 200A.1.a and HTS 225A.1.a read 'Ying Chou Liu-ch'eng 柳城'. Liu-ch'eng was the hsien and town from which Ying Chou was administered. In 696 Ying Chou was overrun by the Khitan (see p.123). According to CTS 39.26.b it was re-established at Yu-yang 漁陽 Hsien in Ho-pei) in 705. HTS 39.12.b dates this in 699, but as the Chiu T'ang Shu gives the date 705 for the return to the frontier of several 'protected' (chi-mi 簡発) prefectures which were overrun at the same time as Ying Chou and which had been moved to Ho-nan, it seems likely that Ying Chou was moved back at the same time. Ying Chou was re-established at Liu-ch'eng (present Ch'ao-yang 朝陽 Hsien in Jehol) in 717. Since An Lu-shan was born in 703, he cannot have been born at Ying Chou Liu-ch'eng. This is an additional reason for believing that this part of the biography comes from a myth. (Cf. p.27).

3) Chang Han Kung is Chang Jen-yüan 仁愿 or Jen-tan 仁旦 (biographies in CTS 93 and UTS 111). He became Governor (Tu-tu-fu) of Yu Chou sometime between the intercalary 10th month of the 1st year of Shen-kung (697), when Ti Jen-ch'ieh left that post to become Chief Minister, and the 8th month of the 1st year of Sheng-li (698), when he is mentioned as occupying it (see TCTC under these dates and CTS 6.6.a). He is mentioned again as holding this post in the 4th month of Ch'ang-an 2nd year (702) (see TCTC). On the day chia-wu of the 12th month of the same year Li To-tso 孫佐 was appointed to that post (TCTC). If our date for An Lu-shan's birth is correct, that is the 20th day of the 1st month of Ch'ang-an 3, then Chang Jen-tan was no longer in Yu Chou at the time of his birth. Since the legendary character of the story is obvious, the matter is of no consequence.

It is ironical that Chang Jen-yüan's corpse was later ordered to be mutilated because his grandson Chang T'ung-ju served under An Lu-shan (ALSSC 1.1.b).

4) In the text as it stands the final character of the title shih-kuan is repeated as if the man's surname were Kuan. When this epitaph is again referred to a blank is left for the surname (ALSSC 1.2.a). The edition of the UsUeh-hai 誠北 Hai-pien leaves no blank in either case, as if the man's name were Chi T. It seems clear that the man's surname was unknown to Yao Ju-neng.

5) From 618 to 649 the post of Pieh-chia was second highest in a prefecture (chou or tu-tu-fu). After that
the name was changed to Ch'ang-shih 長史. In 675 the post of P'ieh-chia was re-established, nominally between that of Prefect or Governor and Ch'ang-shih. In reality it was a purely honorary appointment held by princes closely related to the emperor. After 711 other persons were sometimes appointed to this post and had actual functions. In 719 the policy of reserving it for members of the imperial family was restored, though former appointments were not immediately cancelled. After this we occasionally hear of non-royal persons being appointed to this office, but always as a form of banishment, that is, they ceased to be active officials (chih-kuan 駙官) and became officials without function (san-kuan 散官). (See des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p. 722) Thus only for a period of eight years or a little more could An Chen-chih have held the post of P'ieh-chia as an active appointment, and it is a striking confirmation of the accuracy of the biography in this detail that it was during those eight years that he was supposed to have held it.

6) Lan Chou, north of present Lan Hsien in Shansi, was an important frontier post. See des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p. 794, and Appendix VI.

7) Kuo Fen-yang is Kuo Tzu-1 who was made Prince of Fen-yang. (See biographies in CGS 120; HTHS 137)

8) Chiu T'ang Shu and Hsin T'ang Shu read 'six' (see Appendix I). 'Nine' is apparently a confusion with the expression 'the languages of the nine barbarians' (chiu-i-chih 凡鬼之言語 ) in which 'nine barbarians' is an old expression for the barbarians of the east and is not to be taken as having any numerical sense, at least in T'ang. This expression occurs in ALSSC p. 74. Miao Ch'i'an-sun 維恭孫, the editor of the Ou-hsiang Ling-shih, took this as evidence that 'nine' was the correct figure but it seems more likely that 'six' has been changed by attraction. (see An Lu-shan Shih-chi Chiao-chi appended to the An Lu-shan Shih-chi in the Ou-hsiang Ling-shih).

9) Hu-shih ya-lang 互市牙郎. The hu-shih were markets set up by government authority for trade between barbarians and Chinese. (Cf. des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, pp. 78 and 475) Hu San-hsing's commentary to the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien (under K'ai-y'ian 24/4/hain-hai) explains ya-lang as follows: "Ya-lang means tsang-k'uai (middleman'), 'interpreter' -- see Tzu-tu-hai). The prices of goods going north and south are settled through his mouth and afterwards trade is carried on." The term is therefore similar to 'ya-shang 亞商', 'ya-jen 亞人', 'ya-k'uai 亞槐', all meaning 'broker', 'middleman'.


10) Biographies in CTS 103; HTS 133.

11) P'ien-chiang is not a title. I take p'ien to have the meaning tso 'assistant' (see T'zu-hai). In passages referring to the same period An Lu-shan is also known as Chang Shou-kuei's p'i-chiang 將 (CTS 99.7.b, biography of Chang Chiu-ling) or fu-chiang 勝 (Memorial by Sun T'ieh Wen-yan Ying-hua 566.5.a -- see note 67 below), which are equivalent expressions. Fu-chiang and p'ien-chiang are used in this sense in CTS 93.6.b, biography of Wang Chiu-shih, where they refer to the deputy of a Commander-in-Chief (Yuan-shuai).

12) It would appear that there was never at any time during T'ang a guard known as Ch'i Wei. The expression Ch'i-Wei, however, does occur in one or two places where it seems to be a mistake for Hsiao Wei. (See des Rotours, Traite des Fonctionnaires, p.506 n.2)

13) In the development of the new system of frontier commands around the beginning of the eighth century, besides the various titles to refer to the supreme commander of a region which gradually became normalized into Chieh-tu Shih (p.226), a number of lesser titles with the character shih 'Commissioner' appear, gradually displacing the older titles belonging to Expeditionary armies (hsing-chun 行軍) such as Commander (Tsung-kuan 總管). The exact organization is nowhere described and it seems clear that there was considerable variation in usage at different times and places. In the years immediately before the rebellion the highest grade of Commissioner below Chieh-tu Shih was Ping-ma Shih 將馬使. Thus in 742 An Po-chu held the title of Tu-chih 都督 Ping-ma Shih of Ho-hai, in which capacity he led an expedition against the Tibetans while the Military Governor (Chieh-tu Shih) remained behind in strategic control (see note 21 below). Many other examples could be given. Sometimes the Ping-ma Shih was also Deputy Military Governor (Chieh-tu Fu-shih 副使) (see p.237). Instead of one Ping-ma Shih in overall command (Tu-chih) there might be two, one of the left and one of the right (see the organization of Kuo Tzu-i's army in TCTC T'ien-pao 14/12/kuei-mao).

T'ao-chi Shih occurs much more seldom. There is some indication that it was earlier than Ping-ma Shih and later died out. The T'ang Liu Tien does not mention Ping-ma Shih but refers to T'ao-chi Shih in a rather obscure passage about the number of attendants (ch'ien 僕) and messengers (p'ieh-tsou 別奏) which various grades of Commissioners may have. It says, "As for Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners for Attacking (T'ao-chi), Defending (Fang-yu 防夷) and Foraying (Yü-1,詣夷), let them have three fewer attendants and two fewer messengers (?) according to their ranks (p'in 性) Than Grand Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners (Ta-shih 大使 and Fu-shih 副使)." (ch.5.9.b) From this it would
be natural to suppose that T'ao-chi Shih was, at the time the passage refers to, the grade next below that of Military Governor (Chieh-tu Shih) here called not by the title Chieh-tu Shih but by the older title Ta-shih). Fang-yu Shih occurs later as a type of independent commander of lesser importance than a Chieh-tu Shih — des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, pp.673, 712-715. I have not met the term Yu-1 Shih in actual use.

One early instance of T'ao-chi Shih seems to indicate an independent commander of smaller importance than a Chieh-tu Shih (or its equivalent), i.e. something like Fang-yu Shih but probably a little higher. The famous eunuch Kao Li-shih was presented to the court by the T'ao-chi Shih of Ling-nan during the reign of the Empress Wu (CTS 134.3.b). Before 756 Ling-nan was a frontier province of lesser importance which did not have a Chieh-tu Shih. In most sources the commander in Ling-nan before 756 is called Ching-lleh Shih (CTS 96.7.a, biography of Sung Ching. See also Appendix VI) but the full title was Ching-lleh T'ao-chi Shih (HTS 69.4.b, Fang-chen Piao; Yen Lu-kung Chi 10.4.b, inscription in honour of Sung Ching). It is not clear whether T'ao-chi Shih was original and Ching-lleh Shih was added later. Units known as Ching-lleh armies were among the frontier establishments which appeared around the end of the seventh century, being later incorporated into the Military Provinces of the Chieh-tu Shih. Ching-lleh Shih appeared in the full titles of some Military Governors. (See Appendix VI). Ching-lleh Ta-shih was an early equivalent for the later Chieh-tu Shih (see p.226).

In 718 a number of tribal chiefs of the Nine Surnames (T'ol's) confederacy who had come over to China were given the titles of T'ao-chi Ta-shih under the Chieh-tu Shih of Ho-tung (then called T'ien-ping Ch'un Chieh-tu Shih 天兵軍節度使) (See TCTC K'ai-yüan 6/2/wu-tzu; Ch'Uan T'ang Wen 21.18.a, I Wei Chou Heng-yeh Ch'un yu Tai Ch'un Chih 移尉州情況於代事(副)) Presumably the title of Grand Commissioner was given to them because they were barbarian chieftains. The General Grand and Deputy Grand Commissioner for Attacking of the Vanguard (ch'ien-feng 前鋒) Yüeh Kao 輝高 who took part in an expedition against the Khitan under the Military Governor of Yu Chou in 733 was perhaps similarly a barbarian chieftain commanding his own tribesmen, for Yüeh is not a Chinese surname. In this expedition he was under the Ping-ma Shih of Yu Chou. (Wei Yu Chou Chang-shih Hsieh Ch'u-yü P'o Ch'i-tan Lo-pu 薛楚玉戰裨臨 節 (破), Wen-yüan Ying-hua 647.13.a)

Apart from these cases and that of An Lu-shan I have only found the title Deputy T'ao-chi Shih. In the same expedition of 733 a certain Lu Shun 路順 held this title with the rather low rank of Kuo-i 穀 (at highest, 5th degree 4th class). Wang Chung-su held this title along with the post of Acting Governor of Tai Chou and the rank of Tso Ling-chun Wei Lang-chiang 左領軍倉郎將
A little later he was Governor of Tai Chou and Deputy Military Governor of Ho-tung (see Ch'ü-chiang Chi 9.12.a and note 54 p.179). In 742 Ko-shu Han was Deputy T'ao-chi Shih in the expedition referred to above in which An Po-chu was Tu-chih Ping-ma Shih. His rank is not mentioned.

T'ao-chi Shih was evidently lower in rank than Ping-ma Shih, for when An Lu-shan held it he was only a General, whereas in any case that I have found in which the rank of a Ping-ma Shih is mentioned, it is Grand General. On the other hand the fact that full T'ao-chi Shih and Ping-ma Shih do not occur together suggests that they may have been alternative terms as far as function was concerned, though of different dignity. In any case all indications are that, apart from Wu Chih-i, who was Military Governor of the Ping-lu Army though under Yu Chou (see p.237), An Lu-shan was Chang Shou-kuei's highest officer.

The expression ya-ch'ien prefixed to An Lu-shan's title is presumably equivalent or similar to ch'ien-feng 'vanguard', but I have not found it elsewhere.

14) Besides being the name of the T'ang prefecture administered from present Peking, Yu Chou was an ancient name for northern Ho-pei and southern Manchuria. Chi was the name of the capital of the state of Yen of the Chou period, also located at modern Peking. In T'ang Chi Hsien was the metropolitan county of Yu Chou. The two names are here combined to form a literary expression for the northeast frontier.

15) 近偃...名早雄於沙漠，先生令我，實受長才....

作鎮幽燕爾清陽眉（ALSSC p. 6.b). Farther on it continues, "To proceed from the leaf /i.e., An Lu-shan/ to the root /muwing/ i.e. Yen-yen/ is to glorify /An Lu-shan's/ virtue of making amends for his father's fault." 白葉流飛根皇義之德。Kan ku 幹實 refers to a passage in the I Ching: "Kan fu chih ku幹父之壺", where kan is explained as 'shan善', i.e. 'good', 'make good', and ku as 'shih是', i.e. 'fault'. (See Tzu-hai under kan; I-Ching A, no.13, p.13 in Chou I Yin-te; Legge, Yi-King, p.95)

16) T'ang pronunciations: iet-ihn and ien-ihn (Karlgren, Grammata Serica). Professor Henning has been unable to identify these names as Sogdian.
17) ALSSC 下.12.a.

18) Neither has a biography in the official histories. The An Su-shun mentioned as taking part in an expedition in 714 in CTS 8.5.b and 103.6.b cannot be the same man.

19) TCTC Shen-kung 1 (697) I/kuei-hai; HTS 4.9.a. On this army see des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p.792.

20) Wei Ho-nei Chun Wang Wu I-tsung P'ing Chi Chou Tseih

Ch'i-tan teng Lo-pu 为河内郡王武威宗于冀州贼契等露布，
Chang Yen-kung Chi ch.13, p.139.

21) Ho-hsi P'o Fan-tseih Lo-pu 河丙破Não告露布

Wen-yiian Ying-hua 648.2.a. This is undated but cf. TCTC T'ang T'ao y2/kungten

22) Traité des Fonctionnaires, p.712 n.4.

23) Numerous examples could be cited. See those indexed under hou in Chavannes, Documents sur les T'ou-kiue Occidentaux. An Lu-shan's rebels are often called chieh-hu 素胡 (Cf. CTS 10.3.a, 120.10.b and the other examples quoted by Ch'en Yin-k'o, T'ang-tai Cheng-chih Shih Shu-lun Kao, pp.21,22).

Chieh is the name of a tribe of the Hsiung-nu in the post-Han period. Earlier in T'ang it was used in various compound expressions as a literary expression for barbarians of the north-east such as the Khitan (Cf. chieh-hu and jung-chieh 菁羯 in CTS 93.2.b; jung-chieh in Lun Shan-sheng Chun Ta Tsung-kuan Ch'ung 翰神礦軍大總管功士, Chang Yen-kung Chi ch.11, p.122; chieh-hu and chieh-lu 留胡 in Fa-tsan Ho-shang Chuan 法藏和尚傳, Tai-shao Tripitaka 50, p.233.3 (written later but referring to this period)) (I am indebted to Dr. A. Waley for the last of these references).

Since An Lu-shan came from the north-east and had many Khitan in his armies, it was quite natural for the term to be applied to his rebels, especially since it was a rather vague, literary term.

Professor Ch'en has also found a small number of cases in which An Lu-shan's soldiers are referred to as che-chieh 槃羯 (loc.cit.; see HTS 192.b.a; CTS 104.4.b). In the latter example the term chieh-hu is used shortly afterwards and Prof. Ch'en therefore assumes that the two terms are synonymous. This cannot be accepted. Che-chieh, which also occurs in the form chieh 素 (both forms pronounced tsia-kipt in T'ang -- see Karlgren, Grammata Serica), is found in a number of texts as the name of certain soldiers in the Sogdian cities of Central Asia. It has been identified by Marquart with the Persian chakar 'servant', which in Sogdian had the special sense of 'warrior', 'bodyguard' (Cf. Chavannes, op.cit., p. 313). The fact that the term che-chieh is used of An Lu-shan's men is probably evidence of the presence of Sogdians among the rebels, perhaps even
of his own Sogdian origin, if we suppose that he himself applied it to some of his soldiers, but the much more common term chich-hu gives no such evidence.

As far as I am able to trace, the first scholar to suggest a Sogdian origin for An Lu-shan was Kusunok in Shinagakon Mokon, in honour of T. Nait5, 1936, pp.321-26. Somewhat different grounds for the same hypothesis were put forward by Hsiang Ta in Tiang-tai Ch'ang-an yu Hsi-yu Wen-ming, pp.31 and 30 n.36, in 1933. Professor Ch'en has come to the same conclusion, again from somewhat different evidence and apparently in complete independence.

24) See Tiang-chih, ch.26, p.454.1. Professor P. A. Boodberg has said, "It is well known that most of the Chinese history trace their origin to K'ang-chu, the full name for K'ang -- Samarkand and that the clan derives its name from An-hsi -- Parthia" (Two Notes on the History of the Chinese Frontier, HJAS I (1936) p.281 n.32). See the numerous examples in the works of Kuwabara and Hsiang Ta cited above. Professor W. E. Henning has recently shown that Sogdians resident in China used the surnames An (Bukhara) and K'ang (Samarkand) in letters written in their own language (The Date of the Sogdian Ancient Letters, ECOAS XII (1948), 603.n.2).

25) According to his biography in CTS 104, Ko-shu Han came from a family of chiefs of the Ko-shu tribe of the Tung-i and adopted that tribal name as a surname. A similar name, Ku-shu, occurs in HTS 43B.6.b (Ti-li Chih) as the name of a tribe of the Tung-i. For a possible interpretation of this name see W. Eberhard, Remarks on Siralaya, Oriens I.2 (1943), p.220. Ko-shu Han also has a biography in HTS 135.

26) Cf. HTS 221A 11.a and Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiine Occidentaux, p.126. This surname is often transcribed Wei-ch'ih, but see Tz'u-hai.

26a) CTS 104.6.b Compare HTS 135.1.b; ALSSC T.11.b. Ti'ai-r'ing Yü-lan 559.9.b quotes the beginning of this story (not translated in the text) from the "Ti'ang Shu". The text begins nearly as in the Chiu Ti'ang Shu but contains a few extra characters. It then inserts a passage not contained in the Chiu Ti'ang Shu about the preparation of a peculiar dish of which Ko-shu Han was fond (See W. Eberhard, Oriens I.2 (1948), pp.220-21). This passage appears as a commentary to the text in the version of the An Lu-shan Shih-chi, and, with verbal alterations, in the Hsin Ti'ang Shu. The most natural inference would probably be that the text of the story as it appeared in the Ti'ang Shu of Liu Fang was like that of the Ti'ai-r'ing Yü-lan, but was abridged by the editors of the Chiu Ti'ang Shu. This would provide a definite instance contrary to the hypothesis put forward by me in...
BSQAS XIII pt. 2 (1950), p. 462 ff., that the Chiu T'ang Shu took over Liu Fang's work intact. It is however remarkable that the An Lu-shan Shih-chi abridges the T'ai-p'ing Wu-lan almost exactly as does the Chiu T'ang Shu (the text of the Ou-hsiang Ling-shih edition is rather corrupt but that of the Hsien-hai Lei-pien shows this very clearly) and that the long omission of the Chiu T'ang Shu is contained as if it were separate. Since we know that the T'ai-p'ing Wu-lan was very lax in its manner of citing its sources and included other works besides Liu Fang's under the name 'T'ang Shu', it is possible that it is here quoting another work such as the Hsien-tsung Shih-lu or the T'ang Li (Cf. BSQAS XIII pt. 2, (1950) p. 463). The way in which the An Lu-shan Shih-chi records the story definitely suggests that a version in the form of the present Chiu T'ang Shu already existed in the time of Yao Ju-neng.

27) CTS 104.8.a (biography of Ko-shu Han); TCTC Chih-te 1/3/ping-ch'en.

28) TCTC T'ien-pao 14/11/ping-tzu.

29) Biographies in CTS 137 and HTS 123.

30) 安禄山牧羊小啜著姓康。自北塞来投中夏。

31) Unlike the surname An, K'ang is given a Chinese origin (T'ung-chih 28, p. 470.3), but see note 24. The K'ang tribe among the Northern Turks presents an intriguing problem. The only explicit reference to it of which I am aware is in the epitaph of a certain K'ang A-i-ch'ü Ta-kan (Tarkan) 康阿巢弟嘉干 (Yen Lu-kung Chi 9.7.a). This man came over to the Chinese at the time of the break up of Turkish power during Hsiao-tsung's reign and served as a frontier general. For a while he was in An Lu-shan's rebel army but he came over to the imperial side in good time and rendered meritorious services. According to the funeral inscription, the K'angs were one of the "Twelve Surnames of the Northern Turks." (The expression "Twelve Surnames is less frequently met with as an ethnic designation than "the Ten T'aoshen", referring to the Western Turks or "the Nine T'ibis", referring first to the Töbi and then to the Uigurs, but see AlSSC 1.1.b) His ancestors back to his great-grandfather were said to have held high rank among the Turks. There is nothing outwardly to suggest that the K'angs were anything but another Turboalan tribe, but Hsiang Ta (op.cit., p. 14) is led by the surname to suggest that they were originally Sogdian. There is in fact good evidence that Sogdian influence was very strong among the Northern
Turks early in the seventh century. Thus, the last great Kagan, Hsien-li, who was defeated by T'ai-tsun in 630, was said to have caused disaffection among his own people by his partiality for the hu (CTS 194A.4.a,b; T'ung-tien 197.5.a). Even more interesting is a sentence omitted by the Chiu T'ang Shu but preserved in the T'ung-tien. Both texts read, "When Hsien-li was defeated, his tribes either fled to the Hsien-yen-t'u (Syr-Tardus) or to the Western Regions (Central Asia) and many came and surrendered." The T'ung-tien goes on, "The chiefs and notables who arrived were all made generals and given court ranks. In the fifth rank and upward there were over 100 of them. They were nearly half the officers at court. Only the Che-ch'ieh did not come." (cf. note 23) (T'ung-tien 197.6.a; cf. CTS 194A.6.a). Six protected prefectures subsequently set up in the Ordos region were known as the Liu Hu Chou (Yian-ho Ch'un-hsien T'iu-chih 4.8.b; cf. HTS 37.8.b; CTS 38.17.b), though they were said to have been composed of surrendered Turks. When they revolted in 721 they were led by a man named K'ang Tai-pin. It seems very probable that at least the chiefs were descendants of Sogdians who had joined the Turks and turned nomad. (TCTC K'ai-yuan 9/4; CTS 8.9.b) The leaders who are mentioned all had Sogdian surnames such as Ho 何, Shih 石, An and K'ang. They also had Chinese given names. K'ang Ai-ch'u Tarkan on the other hand had a given name which appears to be Turkish -- at any rate is certainly not Chinese. His father's name Hsieh-li-fa is certainly Turkish. If he was ultimately of Sogdian origin his family had become thoroughly Turkicized. Curiously he is called in his epitaph 'a man of Liu-ch'eng'. The only explanation I can suggest for this rather strange statement is that his tribe had, while under Chinese administration been attached to Ying Chou (see note 2). Since An Lu-shan was also said to have come from Ying Chou, Hsiang Fa concludes that he too must have come from the same family. This might seem reasonable if we did not have to reject Shao Yüeh's testimony, but, as it is, I think one can very well explain An Lu-shan's connection with Ying Chou on other grounds. It is difficult to believe that, if Shao Yüeh's statements were true, no suspicion should have arisen that An Lu-shan and An Ssu-shen were not related until so long afterwards, or that Shao Yüeh could then have found reliable evidence to prove his case.

32) See Appendix I.

33) TCTC K'ai-yuan 24/4/hsin-hai.

34) 古惑盧訥 (Ancient pronunciation: "uo-luo-siên"). See Waldschmidt and Lenz, Die Stellung Jesu im Manichäismus,
No such prefecture is known from T'ang times. It may have been a 'protected' prefecture attached to Ying Chou which disappeared after the Khitan invasion of 696.

No biography. He was in charge of the semi-independent military district of P'ing-Lu while Chang Shou-Kuei was Military Governor at Yu Chou. See T'ang Fang-ch'en Mien-piao: p.231 (Erh-shih-wu Shih Pu-pien, vol IV, p.7513) and pp. 32 and 129 in this book.

40) CTS 200A.6.a Compare HTS 225A.7.a; ALSSC r.12.a; TCTC K'ai-yüan 24/4/hsin-hai.

41) TCTC Ta-li 8 (773)/10/chia-ch'en.

42) HTS 127.5.a; biography of Chang Hung-ch'ing 張弘靖

43) K'ao-i K'ai-yüan 24/4/hsin-hai, 2nd note, and T'ien-piao 10/1/chia-ch'en. ALSSC r.9.a says that the birthday celebrations were held on the first day of the first month (so also the edition of the Hsiieh-hai Lei-pien). It is probable that the present text of the An Lu-shan Shih-ch  has been altered to bring it into harmony with the mythical basis been.
birthdate which is also mentioned in ALSSC 9.12.a.

44) M. des Rotours, assuming that An Lu-shan was born
on the first day of the year, calculates his birthday January 20, 703. Traité des Fonctionnaires p.714

45) Men with this surname are mentioned frequently as
chiefs holding Chinese appointments during the period in
which the Northern Turks were submissive to T'ang. See
HTS 43B.1.b, under Ting-hsiang Tu-tu-fu 定襄 and A-te阿德新 Chou; 43B.4.a, under Shun/漢 Chou; 43B.6.a, under Kao-lan 寇蘭 Chou. TCTC Hsien-ch'ing 5 (660)/4/wu-ch'en; ibid.
Lin-te 1 (664)/1/chia-tzu. It was a member of this family who led the first revolt of the Northern Turks in 679 --
CTS 194A.8.b; TCTC T'iao-lo 1 (679)/10/.

46) Cf. A. von Gabain, Steppe und Stadt im Leben der

47) While Mo-ch'o was extending his empire westwards,
Kul-tegin made at least two invasions into Sogdiana -- in
701 and 711. (Cf. Chavannes, Documents sur les T'ou-kiue
Occidentaux, p.288.) It is tempting to suppose that An
Yen-yen joined the Turks on the first of these occasions.
If he was an important acquisition for the Turks -- per-
haps bringing over troops or territory with him -- it
would have been quite natural for him to be given a
noble Turkish lady as a bride -- just in time for her to
bear him a son early in 703! (But were there Sogdians with the
Northern Turks much earlier? see note 71.

48) CTS 194A.12.b, 13.a.

49) The Hsin T'ang Shu states explicitly that Yen-yen
brought An Lu-shan to China and the Chiu T'ang Shu clearly
implies that Yen-yen came with the other refugees. Reasons
for not regarding these statements as necessarily authoritative
are given in Appendix I. The decree giving Yen-yen posthumous
honours (page 12) makes no mention of his coming to China
which might have been considered a point in his favour. If
he had come to China it would have been more difficult for
Shao Yüeh to ignore him (page 20). At any rate, unlike his
younger brother, he did not become an officer in the Chinese
army and was much less well known -- which would suggest that
he did not live long in China.

50) A well known example is King Henry V, whose wild
To judge by An Lu-shan's case it is not always necessary,
as Lord Raglan suggests, for about fifty years to elapse
after a hero's death for a myth to develop.
51) Ancient: $k'\hat{a}-t'\hat{u}-\hat{a}t-k\tilde{a}n$. The form $K'\hat{o}-t'\hat{u}-\hat{y}u$ (ancient: $k'\hat{u}$) also occurs but $K'\hat{o}-t'\hat{u}-\hat{k}an$ seems preferable. This form is used throughout Ch'\u-chiang Chi (see 8.10.b; 11.2.a; with the variant ch'u for k'o (ancient: $k'\hat{u}$), 9.2.b; and elsewhere)\textsuperscript{1}\textsuperscript{2}, in CTS 8.19.a and consistently in the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien. CTS 8.16.a has the obviously erroneous T'u-k'o-han, no doubt through confusion with the title k'o-han 'kagan'. This error suggests that kan rather than yu is correct. $K'\hat{o}-t'\hat{u}-\hat{y}u$ occurs in CTS 103.5.a, 199B.6.a, THY 97, p.1718, and elsewhere.

52) CTS 8.17.a; 76.3.b; 98.11.a; 199B.6.a; TCTC K'ai-yüan 20/1/\textit{fiao} ff.

53) CTS 8.17.b; 103.2.b; 199B.6.b; TCTC K'ai-yüan 21/intercalary 3/\textit{kuei-yu}. See also Wei Yu Chou Ch'ang-shih Hsüeh Ch'u-yu P'o Chi'tan Lo-pu (张柔 equation 兩方使駱彝) Wen-yüan Ying-hua 647.13.a ff., which reports a later victory at the end of the fourth month and refers to this defeat.

54) This despatch reads in part as follows: "To Chang Shou-kuei and An Lu-shan. From of old the Two Barbarians (i.e. the Hsi and the Khitan) have depended on one another like the cart and the splice-pieces. Now that the Hsi have been defeated and rendered harmless (lit: 'have scarcely a bite left') the Khitan are alone and weak. How can they maintain themselves ...... We rely on you to estimate your opportunities and patiently plan their capture. How much the more since An/ Lu-shan's loyal courage and military abilities surpass the human..... Beginning of winter, becoming cold..."

Unfortunately, like all the despatches in this collection, this letter has no indication of the year in which it was sent, only the rather vague indication of the season and weather at the end. A terminus post quem is provided by the appointment of Chang Shou-kuei in the summer of 733 and a terminus ante quem by the death of K'o-t'u-kan at the end of 734. On this basis the letter could date from either the beginning of winter in 733 or the beginning of winter in 734. If the latter date were correct, there would still be an outside possibility that An Lu-shan could have created his reputation during the year 734, though it would still be almost incredible that he could have been discovered by Chang Shou-kuei in the way the legend relates and then have risen in a year's time to be his chief lieutenant...
If, as I believe, the former date is correct, it proves conclusively that An Lu-shan was already a person of consequence when Chang Shou-kuei arrived in the north-east. It is therefore worthwhile examining the rather complex evidence, made up of items which are individually inconclusive, which makes it practically certain that the correct date is 733.

(a) It would be strange if a letter written in the autumn of 734 did not contain some reference to the defeat inflicted on the enemy in the summer of that year (TCTC K'ai-yüan 22/6/jen-ch'en), but there is nothing in this dispatch to suggest such a reference.

(b) This dispatch seems to go together with the one which immediately precedes it in the collection, addressed to Chang Shou-kuei alone, and the next two but one, addressed, one to the 'surrendered'Hsi', the other to K'o-t'u-kan and his followers urging them to submit. The weather indications for these progress from 'autumn, weather already cold', to 'end of winter, very cold'. They have the appearance of being a series of letters sent soon after Chang Shou-kuei had arrived and before he had actually commenced operations.

(c) All four dispatches envisage a situation in which the Hsi have surrendered but the Khitan are still in revolt. The Hsi surrendered in 732. There is no definite statement that they again revolted but there are a number of indirect indications that they did revolt early in 734 and remained in revolt until the submission of the Khitan. Therefore the four dispatches can only have been written in the autumn and winter of 733-34. The indications are:

(i) Various references to the victories of Chang Shou-kuei in the summer and autumn of 734 suggest that the Hsi were included in the enemy. Note the two memorials by Chang Shou-kuei, Ch'ing Tung-pei Chiang Li K'an Shih Chi Kung-te Chuang 華東北邦支列在記功儀壯 (Ch'ü-chiang Chi 13.12.a), and Ho Hai Ch'i-t'an P'ing Tzu Li-erh K'uo-ch'ing Yu Ch'i Chuang 皆重於丹並白離思願勝期朝命 (ibid., 14.2.a). The K'ai-yüan Ch'i Kung-te Sung 聯案功記 (ibid., 1.5.b) is less explicit, but says, "The two camps lost heart," where erh-t'ing seems to be equivalent to the term 'liang-fan', which is commonly applied to the Hsi and the Khitan.

(ii) The king of the Hsi who surrendered in 732 was named Li Shih 孫 計 was given the title of Kuei-i Wang 助義王. The king of the Hsi who appears in the dispatches after the death of K'o-t'u-kan was called Li Kuei-kuo 孫 計 and had the title of Kuei-ch'eng/Wang (Ch'ü-chiang Chi 9.3.a f.). It is natural to assume that the change of ruler was connected with their revolt in 734. The account in T'ang Hui-yao 96, p.1719, may refer to this but is evidently in some confusion. It says, "Shih died. His son Yan-ch'ung again revolted. He was hard pressed by Chang Shou-kuei of
Yu Chou and again submitted. He was created Huai-hsin Wang. A woman of the Yang clan, related to the imperial house, was created the I-fang Princess and given to him in marriage. Yen-ch'ung killed the princess and again revolted.  

A woman of the Yang clan, related to the imperial house, was created the I-fang Princess and given to him in marriage. Yen-ch'ung killed the princess and again revolted.

Li Yen-ch'ung was king of the Hsi in 745, in which year his marriage and the subsequent revolt took place (CTS 9.6.b). He cannot have been the direct successor of Li Shih since Li Kuei-kuo intervened. May we conjecture that it was Li Kuei-kuo who was the son of Li Shih who revolted and was forced to submit by Chang Shou-kuei, or perhaps, that he was the chief who was set up to replace Li Shih's revolted son?

(iii) What is probably a direct reference to the uprising of the Hsi in 734 occurs in a dispatch addressed to Hstieh T'ai (apparently commander in Ho-tung) in Ch'il-chiang Chi 8.1.b. It is of course undated except for the weather report 'becoming warmer' which suggests that it was in the spring. Since the Hsi and Khitan were again in revolt in the spring of 736, it might belong to that year, but then we should not expect the Hsi to be mentioned alone. All other dispatches referring to this latter revolt speak of the two tribes together (see note 65). The Khitan were in revolt in 734 but as the Hsi had previously surrendered, the new factor in the situation was their revolt and it would have been natural for it to be the subject of communications with the frontier commanders. Moreover by a somewhat complicated argument it can be shown that Hstieh T'ai can hardly have been the commander in Ho-tung in 734. Hstieh T'ai, who has no biography, is mentioned as a general in the north-east during the early years of K'ai-yüan (CTS 199B.6.a). His office at the time of the dispatch is not mentioned but he must almost certainly have been an independent commander to have received a letter direct from the court. One of his subordinates mentioned in the dispatch was Wang Chung-ssu (CTS 103.7.a) who in 733 became Acting Governor of Tai Chou (CTS 103.7.a). This post carried with it the office of Deputy Military Governor of Ho-tung, for a letter to him exists which is so addressed (probably in 735 when his chief was the Prince of Hsin-an who was Military Governor of Ho-tung but resided in Ch'ang-an) (Ch'il-chiang Chi 9.12.a). Hstieh T'ai must therefore have been the Military Governor of Ho-tung who preceded the Prince of Hsin-an. The date of the Prince's appointment to this post is not given but he held it in the fourth month of the 24th year of K'ai-yüan (CTS K'ai-yüan 24/4/jen-ch'ou). His successor was Wang Shu (T'ang Fang-chen Mien-piao, p.76). Allowing therefore for the outside possibility that Hstieh T'ai may have come between the Prince of Hsin-an and Wang Shu just at the time when the Hsi were in revolt in 736, it seems almost certain that
he preceded the Prince of Hsin-an and was there in 733, but not in 736.

One final difficulty remains about the dating of the four dispatches. Chang Ch'i-ch'ing was only appointed Chief Minister on the 14th day of the 12th month of K'ai-yüan 21 (February 2, 733) and before that he had been in mourning for his mother. It would therefore seem impossible that he could have been responsible for letters dating from the late autumn or the beginning of winter of 733. Before retiring into mourning, however, he had held the rank of Vice-President of the Grand Imperial Secretariat (Chung-shu Shih-lang) and been in charge of decrees (Chih Chih-kao), in which capacity he may very well have written such documents. The actual date of his retirement is not recorded. It must have been later the 25th day of the 5th month when he received the appointment as Chung-shu Shih-lang, and was probably only shortly before he was commanded to return to office. (For exact dates of his appointments see the Appendix (fu-lu attached to his collected works.)

55) Wei Yu Chou Ch'ang-shih Hsüeh Ch'u-yü P'o Ch'ü-itan Lo-pu 莫耕撰 周全盛 引自 章著 各年 十月 帖 他
Wen-yüan Ying-hua, 647.13.a. This is undated and the victory reported is not mentioned elsewhere, but there is in it a clear reference to the defeat earlier in 733. It also states that the Khitan have been in revolt for four years. They revolted in 730 -- four years before 733 counting inclusively.

56) See note 13.

57) CTS 199A. 11.b; 199B.11.b; TCTC K'ai-yü'an 21/1/keng-shen; TFYK 975.11.a.

58) The letter in the Ch'i-ch'ing Chi has Hung 江
River. No such river is known in Korea. Ts'e-fu Yüan-kuei 11.11.b reports the return of the envoy from Silla reporting the setting up of the boundary. It has 渔, an obvious mistake for P'ei 潘, the Yalu.

59) Ch'i-ch'ing Chi 9.2.a. The season and weather report at the end says "end of spring, already warm". The letter can be dated with certainty to the year 735. The envoy from Silla reporting thanking the Chinese emperor for permission to set up the new boundary arrived in the sixth month of K'ai-yüan 24 (736) (TFYK 971.11.b). We cannot imagine that the letter to Silla could have been sent in the spring of the same year. Moreover in the letter are mentioned the deaths of two Silla envoys "Chin I-chih and Tsu-jung 金義東及祖榮. The first of these is evidently the same as Chin I-chung/who arrived in
the first month of the twenty-third year (735) (TFYK 971.10.b) and the second is the same as the Ch'ing-huang Chin Jung who died in the second month of that year (TFYK 975.16.a).

60) Envoys from Po-hai came in the third month of K'ai-yüan 23 (735) (TFYK 971.10.b). In 737 the King of Po-hai died and his son was invested with full honours by the Chinese court (CTS 199B.11.b). The Ts'e-t'u Yuan-kuei records many embassies from Po-hai in the following years. It would seem that peace was also established between Po-hai and Silla, for Silla continued to send envoys and there is no further mention of trouble from that quarter.

61) CTS 8.19.a; 103.5.a; 199B.7.a; TCTC K'ai-yüan 22/6/jen-ch'en; K'ai-yüan 22/ ええでえでえでえでえでえでえでえで, n.b. K'ao-i. Cf. also the letter to K'o-t'u-kan's assassin, Li Kuo-che, in Ch'ü-chiang Chi 11.1.b.

62) Ch'ü-chiang Chi 14.2.a. The congratulatory memorial of Sun T'í quoted in note 67 may also come from this period.

63) TCTC K'ai-yüan 23/end of the year, and K'ao-i; CTS 199.B.7.a; THY 96, p.1718; Ch'ü-chiang Chi 8.11.b; letter to Chang Shou-kuei; 9.2.b, letter to Nieh-li; 9.3.a letter to the king of the Hsi, Li Kuei-kue; 9.3.b, letter to Li Kuei-kue; 9.4.a, letter to Wu Chih-i; 9.4.b, letter to Nieh-li; 9.5.a, letter to Chang Shou-kuei. A memorial of congratulation referring to the eastward invasion of the Turks in 735 also contains a mention of An Lu-shan. A report had come from Wang Chung-ssu, the Deputy Military Governor of Ho-tung, to his chief, the Prince of Hsin-an, who resided at the capital (see note 54, p.179), that the Hsi had seen a body of horsemen north of Ch'ih Shan (north of the Shira-muren in Manchuria — see sketch map. Cf. Aoyama, Shien Rekidai Chimei Yoran, p.368 and p.407 (Tai-nung Wei) My location of this mountain on the sketch map is based on the position shown for the Tai-nung Wei in Shina Kyöki Enkakuru, Map 15. Cf. Chapter 7, note 1.) The Hsi took them to be marauders (presumably Turkish). On receiving this report the emperor surmised that it was in fact An Lu-shan's roving force. Enquiries were made from Yu Chou and the answer came that the emperor had guessed correctly. Chang Chiu-ling then wrote a memorial congratulating the emperor on his perspicacity. (Ho I Sheng-liao Ch'ih Shan Pei Wu Tsei...Chuang 号依聖料夫山北無賊...状, Ch'ü-chiang Chi 14.4.b)

64) Hsien-tsung Shih-lu, quoted in K'ao-i under K'ai-yüan 24/4/hsin-hai. Compare the words with which, according to his biography in the Su-tsung Shih-lu and the works based on it (see page 10 and Appendix I, also K'ao-i, loc.cit.), An Lu-shan is supposed to have answered Chang Shou-kuei when
caught sheep-stealing. Ssu-ma Kuang argues from this that one of the stories, the sheep-stealing one, must be false. It is quite likely that the words reported represent in essence ones actually used by An Lu-shan and quoted by Chang Shou-kuei in his letter asking that An should be pardoned. There seems to be a reminiscence of them in the letter from the emperor confirming the pardon. See Ch'ü-chiang Chi 9.6.b, letter to Chang Shou-kuei, and note 65.

65) My reconstruction of these events differs in a few details from that of Ssu-ma Kuang (TCTC and K'ao-i K'AI-yÜAN 24/4/hsin-hai). They were not recorded in the Su-tsung Shih-lu and do not appear in An Lu-shan's biographies in the official histories. Slightly divergent but complementary versions appear in CTS 99.7.b (biography of Chang Chiu-ling) and the HsÜan-tsung Shih-lu as quoted in the K'ao-i, loc.cit. A version also appears in the An Lu-shan Shih-chi, ch. 1.1.b.f. A source not used by Ssu-ma Kuang, but which must receive consideration because of its early date, is the memorial inscription of Chang Chiu-ling composed by HsÜ Hao in 767-8 (Ch'ü-chiang Chi, fu-lu 15.b ff. The date of composition is not given but HsÜ Hao then held the title of Military Governor of Ling-nan which means that it must have been written in 767 or 768 -- see T'ang Fang-chen Nien-piao, p.186).

In order to show how I have come to my conclusions and because of the interesting light which it throws on the way in which the Chinese historiographers worked, I give below the relevant passages from all the source materials.

(a) HsÜan-tsung Shih-lu, "Fourth month, hsin-hai. Chang Shou-kuei sent a memorial: 'Lu-shan, in commanding his troops, broke the regulations and brought defeat and discredit on the prestige of our arms. I beg that I may condemn him to be beheaded in accordance with military law.' This was allowed. When Lu-shan was about to be executed, he shouted in protest, 'The Two Barbarians are not yet at peace but you can bear to kill a valiant officer. Can this be the extent of your strategy?' Because Lu-shan had always been successful in taking prisoners, Shou-kuei heard his words, he pardoned him and reported it."

(b) CTS 99.7.b, biography of Chang Chiu-ling, "At the time the Military Governor of Fan-yang, Chang Shou-kuei, arrested his lieutenant (p'i-chiang -- see note 11), An Lu-shan, and sent him to the capital, asking that he be judged by the court for being defeated in an attack on the Hsi and Khitan. Chiu-ling memorialized against him, saying, 'When Jang Chu led out his army, he had to execute Chuang Ku (see Shih-chi 64.p.43). When Sun Wu was giving instruction in warfare, he also beheaded the favourites of the harem (see Shih-chi 65.p.244). Shou-kuei's command over his army must be enforced, Lu-shan
ought not to escape death.' The emperor specially pardoned him. Chiu-ling memorialized, saying, 'Lu-shan is the son of a wolf, with an untamed nature. His face shows that he is rebellious. I beg that he be executed for his crime, in the hope that future troubles will be avoided.' The emperor said, 'Don't falsely slander a good and loyal man because of the old story of how Wang I-fu knew Shih Lo. I-fu is the tzu of Wang Yen, an important minister of the Chin dynasty. Shih Lo was the founder of Later Chao, one of the ephemeral states in north China in the 4th century. There is a story that when Shih Lo was a youth he visited Lo-yang and was seen by Wang Yen. Wang Yen could tell by his face that he was destined to cause trouble and tried to have him arrested, but he got away. Later Wang Yen was in command of an army which was defeated by Shih Lo. He was captured and, after refusing to serve under his captor, was executed (Chin Shu 104.16 and 43.9.17). So he freed him and let him return to his post." It should be noted that this episode is recorded after the twenty-first year and before the twenty-third. It is also anachronistic in calling Chang Shou-kuei Military Governor of Fan-yang.

(c) The An Lu-shan Shih-chi gives approximately the same account as (b) but does not say that An Lu-shan was sent to the capital and adds that when the emperor pardoned him he ordered that he should be deprived of his insignia of rank and redeem himself in 'white clothing'.

(d) The inscription by Hsü Hao reads, "The Ping-lu general An Lu-shan came to court bringing a memorial. Chang Chiu-ling saw him in the hall of the imperial ancestral temple and considered that he would certainly cause rebellion in the Middle Land. He strongly urged that he should be executed. The emperor said, 'Don't think you can judge Lu-shan the way that Wang Yen judged Shih Lo. How can you say such a thing?' Soon after An Lu-shan was defeated by the barbarians while on military operations. Chang Shou-kuei asked that he should be treated according to military law (i.e. executed). The request was detained inside the palace and was not carried out. Chiu-ling protested, saying, 'When Jang Chü sent out his army he had to put to death Chuang Ku. When Sun Tzu was giving orders he also beheaded the favourites of the harem. If Shou-kuei's memorial is not false, Lu-shan ought not to avoid death.' He strongly urged the execution two and three times but in the end the emperor did not agree."

The contemporary documents we have dealing with this matter are the following letters to the frontier. They are arranged in what must be their chronological order and only relevant passages are quoted. They give a useful check on the narrative accounts and add some details not included elsewhere. They have been partially used by Ssu-ma Kuang.
(e) To Chang Shou-kuei (Ch’u-chiang Chi 9.7.b) -- no weather report. "Yesterday (or 'a short time ago') Shih Su-ming left and has been given instructions. Chao K’an has just arrived and we know it all in detail. An Lu-shan and the others damaged the prestige of our arms and took no proper consideration so that they brought loss upon us. It is right that they should be executed."

(f) To the Officers and Men of P’ing-lu (9.8.b) -- beginning of summer, becoming hot. "... Recently, without taking proper forethought, An Lu-shan carelessly made light of the enemy and rushed out without looking about him. So he brought death to his men.... The execution of An Lu-shan was because he made light of the enemy to an excessive degree. Do not because of this be timid so that you fail in your future undertakings."

(g) To Wu Chih-i, Commissioner of P’ing-lu (9.8.a) -- beginning of summer, becoming hot. "We entrusted with an important garrison to pacify and gather in the Two Barbarians. Effective control lies in this -- to know all their movements. Yet when the bandits were about to rebel and were plotting hither and yon, you still paid no heed to it and indeed brought things to this pass. You also allowed An Lu-shan to rush out heedlessly so that he injured the prestige of our army. That you did not keep strict discipline shows that you were caught unprepared in this affair. How can later repentance make up for the disaster of one morning. Yet because you have been loyal and diligent and are, moreover, an old servant, we shall completely overlook the matter in spite of your fault."

(h) To Chang Shou-kuei (9.7.a) -- after spring, becoming hot. "... An Lu-shan was courageous but lacking in foresight, and so he ended in disaster. The supplies of clothing and arms were captured and the prestige of our army was injured. If one judged him on the charge of making light of the enemy, he ought to receive a severe sentence. Yet we have heard that at the beginning he fought bravely and that he killed some of the enemy, and besides, the rebels are not yet destroyed. [Note the reminiscence of the words An Lu-shan is supposed to have used at his impending execution. It is the rule of war to adopt what is expedient. Therefore we shall not discard him for a single defeat, for we wish to receive the benefit of his future achievements. If we do not give him a light punishment, there will be no cautionary example. He shall for a time cease to hold his former office. Let him take command in white clothing. You should again carefully consider the actual situation and we trust you to deal with him in accordance with the circumstances...."

(This must be later than (f) in which An Lu-shan's execution was assumed. 'After spring' might after
all be later than 'beginning of summer'.

(i) To Chang Shou-kuei (9.5.b) -- end of summer, extremely hot. "... Recently, because you were on a visit to court, the administration was relaxed. The two Bandits took advantage of the absence and one after the other revolted. Your deputy lieutenant (p'i-chiang), acting without a plan, made an attack with insufficient forces. Thereupon he suffered defeat and injured our martial spirit."

The Hsüan-tsung Shih-lu, which, we are told, was based on such memorials, edicts and other documents as could be gathered together after the rebellion (see Pulleyblank, BSOAS XIII (1950), p.457), has the highest initial claim to reliability. It is not contradicted in any way by the documentary evidence and I accept it as the framework for my reconstruction.

The biography of Chang Chiu-ling disagrees with it in one important particular. It says that Chang Shou-kuei sent An to the capital for the emperor's decision. In order to reconcile this with the Shih-lu Ssu-ma Kuang supposed that Chang Shou-kuei was afraid to take the responsibility for reversing the decision after he had received permission from the emperor to execute An Lu-shan and therefore sent him to the capital. If this had happened we might expect to find some mention of it in (h) which proclaims his pardon, but there is nothing. It seems altogether a rather unlikely procedure. Ssu-ma Kuang felt himself forced to this conclusion because the words with which Chang Chiu-ling attacked An Lu-shan refer to his personal appearance, and therefore seem to apply that he saw An. Even if the words are not, as is probable, a later legend, he might easily have seen An Lu-shan at the capital on a previous occasion.

The biography of Chang Chiu-ling was in all probability included in the T'ang Shu of Liu Fang, which was completed in 759 or 760, several years before the Hsüan-tsung Shih-lu (see Pulleyblank, op. cit., p.467 ff.). Are we justified in rejecting out of hand its explicit statement? Fortunately a comparison of its account with that of the epitaph by Hsü Hao suggests how the error may have crept into the biography. The inscription does not give the story quite as in the Shih-lu but agrees with in omitting any mention of An's being sent to the capital. It includes approximately the same words attributed to Chang Chiu-ling but refers them to two different occasions. Illustrating Chang Chiu-ling's prescience and insight into An Lu-shan's nature, it says that on an earlier occasion when An Lu-shan had come as an envoy, Chang had immediately recognized him for a villain and urged his execution. It is quite incredible that a minister should have recommended the killing of a high ranking officer for no other reason than that he did not like his face! But stories of prognostication such as that of Wang Yen and Shih Lo were common and in the atmosphere of
hatred surrounding the rebel during and after the rebellion, it is just the sort of story that grew up. (A similar story about Chang Chiu-ling's prognostication of An Lu-shan appears in ALSSC t. 124 and HTS 11.2611 a. It was rejected by Ssu-ma Kuang on grounds of inconsistency -- see K'ao-i loc.cit.) It is probable that the biography and the epitaph were based on the same source -- perhaps the hsing-chuang, 行狀 once contained in Chang Chiu-ling's works but now lost (see W8n^hc?tiir¥ t*unjj^k 1  cto HJb.ii-a). Liu Fang or whoever wrote the biography felt the incredibility of the first anecdote and so combined it with the story of An's defeat in order to make it more plausible.

The epitaph diverges from the account of the Shih-lu by saying that Chang Chiu-ling's protests arose because the emperor did not agree to Chang Shou-kuei's original request to execute An Lu-shan. We know that permission was first granted from document (f). Apparently Hsü Hao or the writer of the work on which he based himself knew of Chang Shou-kuei's original request and of Chang Chiu-ling's protests but not the whole story. He therefore assumed that Chang Chiu-ling was protesting that the first request had not been granted.

The An Lu-shan Shih-chi seems to have made combined the accounts of the Hsüan-tsung Shih-lu and the biography of Chang Chiu-ling and to have made reference at least to document (h).

None of the narratives mentions the fact stated in (i) that Chang Shou-kuei was visiting the court when An's defeat took place. (i) and (g) suggest that An Lu-shan and Wu Chih-i were jointly in charge of affairs in Chang's absence and give further indication of An's high responsibility at the time.

A word must be added about the a document which appears in some modern editions of the works of Chang Chiu-ling, purporting to be the memorial in which Chang recommended An's execution (See Ch'U-chiang Chi, edition of the Ssu-pu Pei-yao 10.10. a). It gives a quite divergent account of the episode but is clearly a forgery pieced together from the various words which Chang was supposed to have used at one time or another against An Lu-shan. It does not appear in the edition which I quote, that is, the Ming edition reproduced in the Ssu-pu Ts'ung-k'an. Its false character was recognized by the Ch'ing scholar, Wen Ju-kua (Ch'U-chiang Chi K'ao-cheng 15.37. a, appended to the edition of Ch'U-chiang Chi in the Kuang-tung Ts'ung-shu). It was probably forged, along with a few similar memorials by, Chang Chen-wei 張振文, a descendant of Chang Chiu-ling, who published an edition of his ancestor's works in 1734. (The preface of the Ch'U-chiang Chi K'ao-cheng is dated 1792.)

66) A dispatch to Chang Shou-kuei with the weather
"Autumn, weather becoming cool", reads in part as follows, "In order to wipe out their former shame, An Lu-shan and Yang Ching-hui have fought heroically. Amid the spear points and arrows both received wounds. When we think of their loyalty how can we fail to give encouragement. We have already given separate instructions. Yang Ching-hui was not otherwise mentioned in connection with this affair. His name occurs again as a general under Ko-shu Han in the northwest in 747 (CTS 104.6.a).

67) One mention of his name which may possibly date from the time after 736 occurs in a memorial of congratulation sent on behalf of the Chief Ministers by Sun T'i (Wen-yulan Ying-hua 566.5.a). It reads in part, Chang Shou-kuei reported that his deputy general, An Lu-shan, had defeated the Hsi bandits within the boundaries of T'an Chou, taken prisoners, cut off heads and captured horses amounting to several thousand." It is not impossible that this was written between 733 and 736, for in 733 Sun T'i was appointed to the Ch'i-hsien Tien as a Redactor and Compiler (Chi-hsien Hsiu-chuan). In 736 he became Secretary in the Grand Imperial Secretariat (Chung-shu She-jen), an office in which he might equally well have composed such a memorial. He remained in this office until he retired in mourning for his father, probably in 738 or 739. (See his biography, CTS 190B.19.a). I have found no mention of any episode in the histories to which this memorial might refer, or which can enable it to be dated more accurately.

Chapter 3

2) E. Hauer, for instance, aid in 1924, "Zufälligerweise herrschte in diesen Jahren gerade in Mittelchina infolge von Dürre und Überschwemmungen eine grosse Hungersnot, welche die Desperados für Revolutionszwecke lieferte." (Die Vierte der fünf grossen Heimsuchungen Chinas, OZ XI (1924) p.193. It is only fair to add that Hauer was only dealing with the rebellion of An Lu-shan incidentally, but the way in which he seized on the suggestion that there had been famine and reached a totally wrong conclusion is typical of the treatment of the rebellion by western scholars.


4) CTS 9.10.b; 37.8.b (Wu-hsing Chih); TCTC T'ien-pao
but not elsewhere it is recorded that there were also long rains in the autumn of the previous year which led to the issue of 100,000 shih of cheap grain from government stores. There may be an oblique reference to this in a decree issued in the first month of T'ien-pao 14 which says, "Since two years it has been somewhat different from the former years of plenty. We have heard that there has sometimes been insufficiency. Recently we opened the granaries and sold grain cheaply..." It seems most natural to suppose that two years here means T'ien-pao 12 and 13, but it might conceivably mean 13 and 14 in view of the Chinese method of counting inclusively.

In any case it is clear that the really serious harm was done in 754. See note 9 below on the relief measures taken.

6) Li Hsien was Governor of the Capital in 754. According to his biography (CTS 112.5.b) he was degraded to the post of Prefect of Ch'ang-sha because Yang Kuo-chung hated him and put the blame for the rains on him. According to the T'ang Li he was made Prefect of Ling-ling in the summer of 755 in order to appease An Lu-shan for the secret arrest and killing of certain of his household at the capital by Yang Kuo-chung's agents. The Tzu-chih T'ung-chien mentions the part played by the Governor of the Capital but does not mention Li Hsien by name or say anything about the Governor's being punished. In a note in the K'ao-i Ssu-ma Kuang states that he is following the Su-tung Shih-lu. He rejects the account of the T'ang Li because of the inconsistency with the biography of Li Hsien. The Su-tung Shih-lu also had an account of this affair which said nothing of the Governor of the Capital. The explanation is probably that when the two Shih-lu were being written, Li Hsien was a powerful official and it would not have done to suggest that he had acted as an agent for Yang Kuo-chung, but that by the time the T'ang Li was
written he was dead. His eulogistic biography was probably based on a hsing-chuang prepared by some close friend or associate. An Lu-shan Shih-chi 3.a has an account of the affair which appears to combine those of the Shih-lu and the T'ang Li. (See K'ao-i T'ien-pao 14/4/after kuei-ssu; Pulleyblank, BSOAS XIII (1950) p.468.)

7) TCTC T'ien-pao 13/9/- and compare the biographies of Fang Kuan in CTS 111 and HTS 137.

8) CTS 9.10.b.

9) According to CTS 9.10.b, 1,000,000 shih of grain were issued from the T'ai Ts'ang (the main government granary at Ch'ang-an) to be sold cheaply to the poor. The decree of the first month of T'ien-pao 14 (755) which is cited in note 4 shows that even more was done. After saying that some grain had already been issued from the T'ai Ts'ang it ordered that at the capital 1,000,000 shih should be issued, at Loyang 300,000 shih, at T'ai-yüan 300,000 shih, at Cheng Chou 200,000 shih, at Ju Chou 200,000 shih, at Huai Chou 100,000 shih and at Shan Chou 20,000 shih. The price at the capital was to be ten cash per sheng below the market price, elsewhere it was to be ten cash per tou below market price. This issue of grain was not merely to relieve famine victims. It was also intended to provide seed grain and additional provision was made to that end. (TFYK 105.26.a)

10) I have found two brief mentions of what appear to be popular uprisings in the thirty years before the rebellion. On the day keng-yin of the fifth month of the 13th year of K'ai-yüan (725), "A magician-bandit (yao-tsei ) Liu Ting-kao led his faction (tang ) and invaded the Lo Gate by night. They were all caught and beheaded. (CTS 8.12.b; TCTC K'ai-yüan 13/5/keng-yin)

In 736 "Liu Chih-ch'eng a magician (yao-jen ) of Li-ch'uan burnt the Pieh Bridge across the Wei River, at present Kan-pei Chen, which is ten li north-east of present Li-ch'uan Hsien, North of the capital, made a revolt at the head of a mob. He intended to march quickly on the capital. The officials of Hsien-yang Palace burnt the Pieh Bridge to cut off his way. The mob scattered and ran away. The officials of the Capital Prefecture captured and beheaded them all." (CTS 8.19.b) TCTC K'ai-yüan 24/6/ ping-wu reports the incident in somewhat different words, adding, "the people of the village(s) ran away and told the hsien officials."

There does not seem to have been any gate known as the Lo at either Ch'ang-an or Lo-yang during the T'ang dynasty.
It was, however, a popular name for one of the northern gates of the old Han city of Ch'ang-an, Shui-ching Gate (Shui-ching Chu 19.10.a). The Han city had remained in use during the northern dynasties until the new city was built in Sui. Thereafter it formed the north-west corner of the Forbidden Park (Chin Yüan 聖鑾) which lay to the north of T'ang dynasty Ch'ang-an (see the plans reproduced in des Rotours, Le Traité des Fonctionnaires, Appendice II, from the T'ang Liang-ching Ch'eng-fang K'ao 明成芳婚). It is presumably this Lo Gate that is meant in the first passage. It was, perhaps, permanently blocked up and not guarded in the same way as the other gates of the palace and city -- at least this might explain how the rebels were able to penetrate it. It is a remarkable coincidence that the leaders of both these abortive uprisings had the same surname. When one notices that this surname was Liu, that of the imperial house of Han, and, if my identification of the Lo Gate is correct, that one of the revolts seemed to be directed towards the old Han capital, one is tempted to allow oneself to speculate and to imagine that there was here some sort of secret society at work, aimed at a restoration of the Han -- as secret societies worked to restore the Ming under the Manchus. There is of course far too little evidence to let us know anything certain about the real nature of these uprisings. They do not seem to have had much popular support and nothing similar is mentioned between 736 and the outbreak of An Lu-shan's rebellion.

11) See for instance CTS 187B.8.a, biography of Chang Hsüeh, and TCTC Chih-te 1 (756)/4/chia-wu.

12) See TCTC Pao-ying 1 (762)/chien-yin 廉寅 month/wu-shen; 8th month/ch'i-ssu; CTS 11.2.b; 110.5.a, biography of Li Kuang-pi 劉光輝.

13) It would be tedious to present here all the evidence concerning the disordered state of the government at the beginning of Hsüan-tsung's reign and the measures of reform which were taken after his accession. The following are a few of the principal references. (a) On the extravagance of the princesses and favourites see CTS 183.10.a ff. (b) On moves against Buddhism see THY 47, p.836; 49, p.860. (c) On sale of offices see des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, pp.250-257. See also Tzu-chih T'ung-chien K'ai-yüan 2 passim, for the early reforms.

15) A number of the documents relating to this phenomenon have been translated by E. Balázs in Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte der T'ang-Zeit, MSOS xxxiv (1931), pp. 27-30.

16) TFYK 490.10.b.

17) See page 123.

18) In a memorial of the year 695 Li Chiao said of this problem, "Now the people of the empire are running away for different reasons, some to avoid garrison duty, some in order to seek food." (THY 85, p. 1560 -- the whole memorial is translated by Balázs, loc. cit.) In 715 Wei Ts'ou objected to a plan to enlist men from Kuan-chung for an expedition to An-hsi on the grounds: "Now the populace of Kuan-fu (i.e. Kuan-chung) had long been running away. We have inherited the depopulated condition of these earlier times, and the land is even now not yet filled up." (CTS 103.1.b.) Under the Empress Wu there was a deliberate effort to replace Ch'ang-an by Lo-yang and in 691 "several hundred thousand families" were moved from Kuan-chung to supply Lo-yang (CTS 6.4.a).

19) See p. 48.

20) See pp. 124-125.

21) There is a large literature on the subject of the chün-t'ien system. For the T'ang regulations see Balázs, op. cit., p. 44 ff. A summary of the development of the system from its beginnings under Northern Wei up to T'ang together with an interpretation according to traditional ideas will be found in Chen Huan-chang, The Economic Principles of Confucius and his School II, pp. 510-523. N.B. also T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'ü Ch'ing-yüan, T'ang-t'ai Ching-chi Shih, p. 14 ff.

22) See Balázs, op. cit., p. 10 ff. Population and land registers dating from the T'ang period have been recovered in Tun-huang -- showing, incidentally, that at least by the end of the seventh century the peasants of that region had far less land than they were legally entitled to. See N. Niida, Tosei Hōritsu Bunsho no Kenkyū, p. 650 ff., and L. Giles, A Census of Tun-huang, T'oung-pao XVI (1915), p.


24) Professor W. Eberhard in Das Toba-Reich Nord Chinas, p. 212, doubts that the chün-t'ien regulations of 486 were of any effect as a land reform and he omits all reference to
them in his new *History of China*. One may feel that this judgment fails to take into consideration the fact that the law of 486 provided the basis for the fundamental land law of all the succeeding northern dynasties and one may suspect that the final word has not yet been said. It would be presumptuous for one who has not studied the sources for the Wei period to offer an alternative judgment, but one cannot help feeling surprise to find that Professor Eberhard persists in the illusion that the chün-t'ien regulations of T'ang, which were merely adapted from those of the preceding dynasties, meant a new land division (op.cit. p.203). T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'ü Ch'ing-yüan were undoubtedly right in treating the T'ang regulations as a reaction from those of Sui in favour of the land-owning classes (T'ang-t'ai Ching-chi Shih, p.16). Nevertheless there clearly must have been many small proprietors in north China in the seventh century. Was this an inheritance from the Northern Dynasties or was it the result of unofficial division of the land during the widespread peasant revolts at the end of Sui? The answer to this important question cannot be obtained by studying the official codes, but only, if at all, from the most careful searching of the evidence from all types of sources.

25) Balázs, op.cit., p.78 ff.; T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'ü Ch'ing-yüan, op.cit., p. 47 ff. The practice was officially frowned upon. Yu-wen Jung damaged the career of Lu Ts'ung-yüan 亱 from 亱 by insinuating to the emperor that he was amassing estates. The historiographer is clearly sympathetic to Lu and not to Yu-wen. (CTS 100.9.a)

26) For a vivid, outspoken picture of the way in which officials and other wealthy persons created estates for themselves, see TFVK 495.24.a, quoting a decree of 752 (cited by Niida, op.cit., p.91).

27) On tenancy in the Southern Dynasties see Chin Shu 26.8.a (Shih-huo-Chih, translated by Lien-shen F'ang) HJAS 14(1945-47)141-185) and Sui Shu 24.4.a (Shih-huo Chih).

28) See Balázs, op.cit., p.36 ff.; Ch'üan Han-sheng, T'ang-Sung Ti-kuo yü Yun-ho p.4.

29) T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'ü Ch'ing-yüan, op.cit., p.48 f.

30) The sources for Yu-wen Jung's measures or 721 and 724 are as follows:

(a) THY 85, p.1562, under the date K'ai-yüan 9/1/28, mentions a memorial by Yu-wen Jung urging the investigation of tax evasion. It then states that he was appointed commissioner to carry this out. Cf. TFVK 486.14.b ; T'ung-tien 7.3.b records this under the first month of the same
year. CTS 105.1.a does not mention any date.

(b) TCTC K'ai-yüan 9/2/1 quotes a decree issued at the request of Yu-wen Jung (presumably (a)) ordering the court to discuss the question of runaway households.

(c) TCTC K'ai-yüan 9/2/t'ing-hai quotes a decree (more fully given in CTW 22.6.b) ordering runaway households to give themselves up within 100 days or be conscripted for frontier service. It then states that Yu-wen Jung was made special commissioner to look after this and that many frauds were exposed. (What then follows is evidently taken over by mistake from the year 724. See (j).)

(d) T'ung-tien, loc.cit., which records everything under 721, states that Yu-wen Jung was promoted to Ping-pu Yüan-wai Lang (Auxiliary Secretary to the Ministry of War) and Shih Yu-shih (Censor in Attendance). CTS 105.1.a states that he was 'twice promoted (ts'ai ch'ien 非') to these posts which suggests a lapse of time, but again no date is mentioned.

(e) THY, loc.cit., states that Yu-wen Jung had 19 assistants appointed in 721 and gives their names. It then states that in 724 he had ten more assistants appointed, and again gives the names. T'ung-tien, loc.cit., merely states that 29 assistants were appointed and gives the names. CTS 105.1.a only mentions the appointment of ten assistants with no indication of how long it was after Yu-wen Jung's first appointment as commissioner.

(f) T'T'yiK 70.11.a contains a decree of K'ai-yüan 12/6/jen-ch'ien appointing Yu-wen Jung, who then held the posts of Ping-pu Yüan-wai Lang and Shih Yu-shih, to be Commissioner for Encouraging Agriculture (Chuan-nung Shih). This decree is quite different in tone from that of 721 which peremptorily ordered the people to give themselves up. It does not specifically state the tax remission offer proposed by Yu-wen Jung but clearly implies it. (See Appendix III).

(g) T'ung-tien mentions the tax remission proposals but does not indicate that they belonged to 724 rather than 721. Cf. CTS 48.1.b and 105.1.a where no date is indicated.

(h) THY does not mention the tax remission proposals. Under 724 it quotes a memorial of Huang-fu Chiung opposing Yu-wen Jung's activities. CTS 105.1.b also quotes this memorial but mentions no date. T'ung-tien mentions the memorial without quoting it. These sources also refer to the opposition of Yang Ch'ang 阳常 641 .

(i) THY under 724 describes the success of Yu-wen Jung's efforts, stating that 800,000 households were registered. Cf. also T'ung-tien, loc.cit.; and CTS 48.1.b; 105.1.b.

(j) The Tzu-chih T'ung-chien records the tax remission offer, the appointment of ten commissioners, the opposition of Huang-fu Chiung and the registration of 800,000 households all under K'ai-yüan 9/2/t'ing-hai. This is evidently based on the biography of Yu-wen Jung (CTS 105) which gives no precise dates and thus misled Ssu-ma Kuang or his collabor-
ator into supposing that all belonged in the same year.

(k) Under K'ai-yüan 12/8/chi-hai the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien records the appointment of Yu-wen Jung as Vice-President of the Censorate and Commissioner for Settling the Populace (Chu-se An-chi Hu-k'ou Shih). (Cf. also TFYK 486.14.b.) It then repeats the figure of 800,000 households as the number registered in that year, and mentions the opposition of Yang Ch'ang.

31) T'ung-tien 7.3.b, commentary. THY 85, p.1562, says the same thing in slightly different words.

32) So CTS 105.1.b; T'ung-tien 7.3.b; TCTC K'ai-yüan 9/2/t'ing-hai. CTS 48.1.b gives the number of years as five.

33) A string of 1000 cash weighed 6.4 pounds (chin), i.e. about 4.35 Kgs. or 9.6 lbs. A comparison with the present day value of this amount of copper would, of course, be quite meaningless. A better idea of the relative value for those days is perhaps given by the fact that the total money allowances for an official of the lowest grade (the ninth p'ing) amounted in 736 to 2,367 cash. This was in addition to a salary in grain. Clearly 1500 cash was no very great sum, at least at the capital. A comparison based on contemporary prices is very difficult. See note 35.

34) See Appendix III.

35) The principal taxes levied annually on the peasant were: (a) Grain Tax (Tsu) -- 2 shih; (b) Textile Tax (Tiao) -- 2 chang (20 Chinese feet -- ch'ih -- of standard width) of silk or one-fifth more of hempen clot; plus three ounces (liang) of silk floss or three pounds (chin) of raw hemp; (c) Corvée (Yung) -- twenty days per year which might be commuted for silk at the rate of three ch'ih per day, making 6 chang for the whole twenty days. In addition there were the Local Tax (Ti-shui) of two sheng per mou for supplying the I-Ts'ang (see note 61) and the Money Tax (Shui Ch'ien) also called the Household Tax, Hu Shui) levied on households according to a property classification in nine grades (see T'ao Kuo Hsi-sheng and Ch'u Ch'ing-yüan, op.cit., p.146 ff.). It is impossible to estimate the amounts of these two taxes per individual and since it is moreover not made entirely clear that the new registrants were excused them, they must be left out of consideration.

The prices that are mentioned during this period are all extremely low and are used as evidence of the great prosperity of the country. For instance we are told that in 725, the year in which Hsuan-tsung sacrificed on Mount T'ai, the price of refined grain (mi) at the capitals was 13
to 20 cash per tou, while at Ch'ing Chou and Ch'i Chou (in Shan-tung) it was only five cash -- only three cash for unrefined grain (su 薪). At the same time silk was only 210 cash per piece (p'j g ) of two chang. (See TCTC end of K'ai-yuan 13; T'ung-tien 7.4.a; CTS 8.1.3.a.) Even at this extremely low valuation a year's taxes in silk, including labour commutation but omitting the three ounces of floss, would have been worth 840 cash. The grain tax would have been worth from 60 cash to 400 cash. Including the value of the floss, and possibly the Land Tax and Money Tax as well, the total value of a year's taxes must have, at the very minimum, approached 1500 cash. Much would of course have depended on the season of the year in which the valuation was made. The prices we are given were clearly minima intended to impress. An attempt to discuss price fluctuation in the T'ang dynasty has been made by Ch'Uan Han-sheng in an article entitled, T'ang-tai Wu-chia ti Pien-tung 唐代物價的變動, City D 11 (1947) pp. 101-148.

36) CTS 105.3.a.

37) CTS 105.2.a.

38) The amount collected in fees should evidently have been 1,200,000 strings of cash (1,500 x 800,000). CTS 48.1.b; 105.1.b; HTS 5.3.b and 134.1.a; and TCTC K'ai-yuan 12/8/ch'i-hai all say "several million strings". THY 85, p. 1563, has "cash one million 銭萬串 " . This may be a round figure for the actual total, the character for 'strings' (min or kuan) having dropped out. On the other hand the 織 character shu 'several' may have dropped out in front in which case all sources would be in agreement. "Several million must be considered as merely equivalent to "a very large amount".

39) CTS 105.2.b. For an account of these granaries see Balázs, MSOS xxxv (1932) p.66 ff.

40) Huang-fu Chiung's memorial making these criticisms appears in CTS 105.1.b and THY 85, p.1562. XXXIXXtranslated by Balázs, MSOS xxxv (1932) p.29.

41) CTS 105.1.b; THY 85, p.1562.

42) TCTC K'ai-yuan 17/9/ before jen-tzu and see note 83.

43) THY 85, p.1563. T'ung-tien 7.3.b attributes this memorial to Yu-wen Jung and is followed in this by Ch'Uan T'ang Wen, ch.30.1.24 It does not really fit in with Yu-wen Jung's other proposals and was probably a companion piece to P'ei Yao-ch'ing's first memorial about transport in 730.
44) Yu-hai 177.23.b quotes a passage now lost, from the T'ang Liu Tien on military colonies (t'un-t'ien). (Cf. des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p.127 n.2.) It states, "In K'ai-yuan 23rd year (735) commentary adds that one text says 22nd year/ over 100 colonies were also set up in Ch'en, Hsu, and Shou Prefectures in Honan Province. In the 25th year it was decreed that they were disadvantageous and together with 340 ch'ing at Ch'ang-ch'un Palace, north-west of Ch'ao-i County in T'ung Chou, Kuan-chung, where there was an agricultural colony (ying-t'ien). See Yuan-ho Ch'un-hsien Tu-chih 2.13.a and THY 59, p.1038. they should be divided up among the poor people." The establishment was during P'ei Yao-ch'ing's term of office as Chief Minister and the abolition of the colonies, like the suppression of the 'Northern Route' for grain transport -- another of P'ei Yao-ch'ing's innovations came immediately after his dismissal at the end of 736. See p.55.

45) Besides the decree of 721 (see p.46) and the definitive arrangements for permanent frontier armies of 736-37 (see p.110) a decree was issued in 727 (TCTC K'ai-yuan 15/2/i-mao) that any migrant family that settled in a district after the registration by the Commissioner for Encouraging Agriculture (i.e. Yu-wen T'ung and his assistants) must pay the year's taxes in the ordinary way and must be sent first if there should be any call for men to go to the frontier. In 728 (TFYK 70.12.b) or 733 (TFYK 486.33.b) a decree permitted migrant families, if they wished, to settle on the frontier where they would be given fertile lands and permanent freedom from taxation.

46) THY 85, p.1564; TFYK 487.19.b

47) Cf. the decree of 752 referred to in note 26.

48) See W. Bingham, The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty.

49) The principal advocate of this theory has been Chi Ch'ao-ting in Key Economic Areas of Chinese History. Treating the whole T'ang period as a unit, he has projected back the conditions in the latter part of the dynasty to the beginning. Surprisingly, this theory is quoted with approval by Ch'ien Han-sheng in T'ang-Sung Ti-kuo yu Yü-ho, p.11, though much of the evidence he has brought forth shows that the importance of transport from the south came to the fore only at the end of the seventh century.

50) See Appendix IV.

51) What is perhaps the one of the earliest references to Chiang-huai as a tax-bearing region of special importance
occurs in a memorial of 697, at a time when there was a special need for grain from that region because of the invasions of Ho-pei by the Khitan. Ti Jen-ch'ih stated, "Now there is famine East of the Passes (i.e. in Ho-pei, Ho-nan and Ho-tung), people are running away in Shun (i.e. Chien-nan) and Han (i.e. Shan-nan). In 'chiang and Huai there are unceasing exactions." He then went on to propose that grain transport from 'chiang and Huai should be stopped. (CTS 89.4.aff.; cf. TCTC Shen-kung 1 (697)/intercalary 10th month/chia-yin.) This would seem to indicate that it was an extraordinary war measure to bring grain from the Yangtze. See also the memorial of Ch'en Tzu-ang sent about this time, Shang Ch'un Kuo Chi-yao Shih 十軍國機要事, Ch'en Po-yü Wen-chi 8.13.a. There is evidence that it was normal in the seventh century to exchange the grain tax for cloth in the Yangtze region. (See note 65.)

52) These movements and the reasons for them are thoroughly discussed by Ch'üan Han-sheng, op.cit., p.20 ff. It should be noted that in his preoccupation with the importance of the Chiang-huai region as a grain supplier, Mr. Ch'üan seems to ignore the fact that Lo-yang was also much closer than Ch'ang-an to the whole Yellow River plain. In normal times Ho-nan and southern Ho-pei probably provided the bulk of the grain in the seventh century, while silks and other luxury goods were brought in from the south. With the increasing needs of the army on the north-eastern frontier (see p.126) and especially after the rebellion when the north-east was in the hands of semi-independent warlords the Yangtze region did indeed become the chief supplier for the capitals.

53) Two occasions are mentioned in the seventh century on which efforts were made to improve the difficult water transport route to Ch'ang-an. The crux of the difficulty was the San-men 三門 gorge below Shan 三剖 Chou on the Yellow River. In 656 Ch'u Lang 原琅 suggested cutting out a passage at the San-men to enable land transport to be used around it. Six thousand soldiers were set to the work. It was completed but proved impractical. (HTS 53.1.b; THY 87, p.1595.) Some time later, presumably still in the seventh century, Yang Wu-lien 杨務廉 had a gallery made along the side of the rock by which boats could be hauled upstream. Many labourers lost their lives through being pulled into the water but it would seem that the scheme was not found very effective or long continued. (HTS 53.1.b; Ch'ao-yeh Ch'ien-t'ai 2.15a, cf. Ch'üan Han-sheng, op.cit., p.19.) Besides this we hear of a number of canal works in other regions, for instance at Ch'i'en Chou (Feng-hsiang) and Fu) west of Ch'ang-an in 672 (TFYK 497.8.a), at Yu Chou in northern Ho-pei in 650-55 (ibid.), at Wei Chou in southern Ho-pei about the same period (ibid.), from Ts'ao Chou and Yen 克
Chou in eastern Ho-nan to Pien Chou (HTS 38.4 b). This last example in particular shows that the Yangtze region was not yet considered as the main source of supply.

54) "In 714 the Governor of Ho-nan (i.e. of the Prefecture at Lo-yang), Li Chieh, memorialized, 'Between the [Yellow River and the Pien canal] is the Dike of Duke Liang. For years the dike has been in ruins and transport cannot get through.' He sent out labourers from Pien Chou and Cheng Chou to dredge it. With little effort it was soon accomplished. Public and private interests considered it advantageous." (CTS 100.2. a, CTS 49.1.a and THY 85, p.1687, have 'east of Pien Chou' instead of 'between the Yellow River and the Pien'. This is evidently a mistake since the mouth of the Pien was west of Pien Chou.) The geographical section of the T'ung-tien has this to say about the Dike of Duke Liang; "Ho-yin Hsien.... In K'ai-yüan 23 (735) the territory of three counties, Ssu-shui, Jung-tse, and Wu-ch'in, was divided up and Ho-yin was set up east of the trans-shipping platform (shu-chang) to facilitate transport. It was set up by the President of the Imperial Chancellery, P'ei Yao-ch'ing. The Pien Canal is 250 paces south of the county seat.... The River-mouth Dike (Ho-k'ou Yen) is twenty li west of the county seat. It is also called the Dike of Duke Liang. This is because Wen-ti of Sui, in the seventh year of K'ai-huang (587), sent Liang Jui to rebuild the former Han dike and block the Yellow River from entering the Pien." (T'ung-tien 177.3.a) Ho-yin County was situated east of present Kuang-wu County in Ho-nan. (This county was in fact absorbed into Ch'eng-kao County in 1935 but it is still shown in Ting Wen-chiang et al., Chung-hua Min-huo Hsin Ti-t' u, 1934, probably.)

The Dike of Duke Liang, therefore, was a rampart extending for some distance in the narrow neck of land between the Pien and the Yellow River near their junction. There was always a danger of the flooding Yellow River's breaking down this barrier and flowing into the Pien. (Cf. Sung Shih 93.1.a, Introduction to the Monograph on Rivers and Canals). This had apparently happened towards the end of the seventh century or in the early years of the eighth and had left the junction of the canal and the river impossible. (I have found no earlier reference to the work of Liang Jui. See also CTS 123.1.b, biography of Liu Yen.)

In 726 a certain Liu Tsung-ch'i blocked up the old entrance of the Pien, then in the territory of Ssu-shui County, and made a new entrance downstream in the territory of the adjacent Jung-tse County by opening the Dike of Duke Liang. This is simply explained on the assumption that the dike extended for some distance
and was not confined to the place of junction. The new passage was not a success. It silted up and the next year the old passage had to be restored. (CTS 49.1.a; TFYS 497.9.b; TCTC K'ai-yüan 15/1/hsin-ch'ou)

55) See the memorial of P'ei Yao-ch'ing translated in Appendix IV. In the tenth month of 721 a decree was issued denouncing corruption among the officials in charge of transport convoys and forbidding them to try to collect the amounts necessary to make up for their depredations and losses from the peasants who had originally paid the taxes. (TFYS 487.17.a) It is quite probable that this was a result of Yü-wen Jung's first tour of inspection in that year.

56) See Ch'üan Han-sheng, opcit., p.25 ff.

57) Besides repairing the entrance of the Pien Canal, Li Chieh improved land transport from Lo-yang to Shan Chou by establishing relay stations (T'ung-tien 10.4.a). There was also the abortive attempt of Liu Tsung-ch'i (see note 54).

58) See note 55.

59) What he precisely intended is not clear. His biography in the Old T'ang History says, "He presented a memorial request ing that the old routes of the Nine Rivers of the Tribute of Yü should be used to open up paddy (i.e. irrigated) fields and benefit the people. Moreover one could invest the interest the funds for land transport and the government would get the profit." (CTS 105.3.a) The courses of the Nine Rivers of the tribute of Yü lay throughsouthern Ho-pei and northern Ho-nan (present Shan-tung) but there was much disagreement as to where they been precisely. Probably this was only a grandiose description for a canal scheme east from Pien Chou. Cf. TCTC K'ai-yüan 16/1/ping-yin.

60) P'ei Yao-ch'ing has biographies in CTS 98 and HTS 127.

61) See CTS 105.3.a.

61a) See Balázs, MSOS xxxv (1932) p.67 and Hamaguchi, To no Chizei nitsuite 寄於地 Zealand, TOYO Gakubu 20 (1932) p.138 ff. See also Tao Hsi-shen and Ch'ü Ch'ing-yüan, T'ang-tai Ching-chi Shih, p.142 ff.

62) THY 88, p.1613; TFYS 49.6.b, decree of 716. Cf. Yu Ta-k'ang, Tu Kao Li-shih Wai-ch'uan Shih 'Pien Tsao', 'Ho-ti' chih Fa 讀高力士外傳譯‘變造’和諧之法,
63) See Appendix IV.

64) See Appendix IV.

65) On the abandonment of 'northern transport' see T'ung-tien 10.4.a. In the sixth month the following decree was issued: "The two Transport Commissioners of Ho-tung and of Shan Chou regularly transport 1,800,000 shih of refined grain (m) per year. Recently this has already been reduced by 800,000 shih. Since the amount of refined grain in the T'ai Ts'ang at Ch'ang-an is more than enough to cover expenses, and since our aim is to give ease to the people and we do not wish to cause us burdens, let the 1,000,000 shih to be shipped this year also be stopped." (TFYK 498.18.b) CTS 49.2.b and THY 87, pp.1587 and 1597 state that 1,000,000 shih were transported in 737. They evidently base themselves on the first reduction that was ordered and ignore the second reduction. I have not found the decree ordering the first reduction but see the decree of the third month quoted in note 66 which was evidently issued about the same time. In the ninth month a further decree was issued suspending shipments of grain from Ho-nan and Ho-pe to the Han-chia Granary at Lo-yang and the T'ai-yan Granary at Shan Chou. (TCTC K'ai-yüan 25/9/kuei-yao) See also note 67. The editor of the Hsin T'ang Shu mistakenly interpreted the abandonment of the 'northern transport' as follows: "When Yao-ch'ing was dismissed as Chief Minister, because the 'northern transport' was very difficult, only 1,000,000 shih of grain reached the capital each year. In the twenty-fifth year (737) accordingly the 'northern transport' was abandoned." (HTS 53.2.a)

66) On the third day of the third month the following decree was issued: "The cloth taxes of Kuan-chung (tiao -- regular cloth tax, and yung -- cloth paid in commutation of forced labour) are no small levy. Since there are few silk worms and mulberry trees, the land produces only vegetables and grain. The peasants always have to sell their grain cheap and buy cloth dear. Their loss is exceedingly grave. Moreover Chiang and Huai suffer the burden of converting their stores of coarse grain into refined grain to be transported (pian-tsao -- see Appendix IV) and the trouble of the increased transport along the river route. Whenever the 'foot-money' is calculated, it is multiplied several-fold. This year we are at peace and all things are abundant and plentiful... From now on, for the cloth taxes and tsu-k'o (累課 -- the fees paid by certain groups of persons with special duties in case they were not called upon to perform them. See T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'ü Ch'ing-yüan, op. cit., p.163 ff.) of the prefectures of Kuan-chung let coarse grain be exchanged for fine at the prevailing..."
price and let it be transported to the capital to supply the needs of the revenue. In places which are distant so the grain cannot be transported, let it be stored there to provide food for the nearest army. In those parts of Hopei where there are no waterways, let the grain tax be changed for silk to make up for the cloth taxes (tiao-k'ou) of Kuan-chung. Let the appropriate authorities make a clear itemized schedule in accordance with our intention."

THY 33, p.1533. Cf. T'ung-tien 6.1.b; T'ang Ta Chao-lung III; and Yu Ta-kang, op.cit., p.84; TFYK 487.18.a

67) A decree of the day wu-tzu of the ninth month of this same year ordered that in both the Eastern Capital District (Tu-chi 劉弟) and Kuan-chung commissioners should offer three or four cash per tou above the market price and buy up from each region three or four million shih. At the same time the grain tax from Chiang and Huai was to be stopped for this year. (TFYK 502.5.b) On the stopping of grain transport from Chiang and Huai see also the decree of K'ai-yüan 25/9/kuei-seu quoted in the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien and referred to in note 65. On the introduction of ho-ti see also TCTC K'ai-yüan 25/9/wu-tzu and T'ien-pao 3/12/kuei-ch'ou; TFYK Kao Li-shih Wai Chuan p.78; Yu Ta-kang, op.cit., pp.75-76.

The stopping of grain transport from Chiang and Huai did not mean that the grain-tax of those regions was remitted. According to regulations promulgated in the same year the grain-tax of all the prefectures of Chiang-nan was to be changed for cloth and sent to the capital (T'ung-tien 6.1.b). Professor Ch'en Yin-k'o has pointed out that this had already been the practice in the seventh century. We know this because a piece of cloth has been excavated in Central Asia inscribed, "One piece of grain-tax cloth of Chu Po-liang of Mei-shan Village, Hsiun-te Area, Hsin-an County, Wu Chou (present Chuly'sien in Chekiang)" and dated the 11th month of the tisings year of Kuang-chai (684). (See Sir Aurel Stein, Innermost Asia vol. III, Plate CXXVII and the translation by Dr. Lionel Giles, ibid. vol. II, ch.xiv, sec.iii, Appendix I.) Professor Ch'en also points out that this was a practice carried on during the Southern Dynasties and thinks that it was carried over when China was reunited. (Sui T'ang Chih-tu X'mm X'mm Yüan-ylan Lihe-lun Kao p.114)

68) See Ch'en Yin-k'o, op.cit., p.110 ff. It was practised on the frontier of Ho-tung in the time of Kuan-chung in 749 were: Kuan-chung --509,347 shih; Ho-tung 110,229 shih; Ho-
-202-

Ho-tung -- 110,229 shih; Ho-hsi -- 371,750 shih; Lung-yu -- 143,104 shih.

69) See the decree of the third month of 737 quoted in note 65. The New T'ang History says: "When Ts'ui Hsi-i 虜斯是 was Transport Commissioner for Ho-nan and Shan he transported 1,800,000 shih yearly. Afterwards because there was an excess of grain stored in the T'ai Ts'ang the yearly amount transported was decreased by 100,000 shih." (HTS 53.3.a) Ts'ui Hsi-i became Governor of Ho-nan (Ho-nan Yin) in 738, and presumably also transport commissioner. Earlier he had been one of P'ei Yao-ch'ing's assistants. Before coming to Lo-yang he had been Military Governor of Ho-hsi and had suffered a defeat at the hands of the Tibetans. He died of chagrin not long after his transfer. (TCTC K'ai-yüan 26/5/ping-shen; see also Appendix V)

70) HTS 53.2.b.

71) T'ung-tien 10.4.a. It is also stated here that when Li Chieh reformed the land transport from Lo-yang to Shan Chou in 714 the amount annually transported was 800,000 shih. This gives a measure of the tremendous expansion which had taken place in 34 years.

72) One may note: (a) the efforts of Li Ch'i-wu in 741 to improve the passage at the San-men Gorge (THY 87, p.1598; CTS 49.2.b; T'ung-tien 10.4.a); (b) two attempts to improve sections of the Pien canal system made by Ch'i Huan (CTS 190.B.16.a; THY 87, p.1597); (c) further improvements in the relay system for land transport from Lo-yang to Shan Chou made by P'ei Hui 費 in 750 (T'ung-tien 10.4.a). Cf Ch'Uan Han-sheng, T'ang-Sung Ti-kuo yu Yun-ho p.35 f.

73) Biographies in CTS 105, HTS 134. See Appendix V.

74) Biographies in CTS 105, HTS 134. See Appendix V.

75) Biographies in CTS 105, HTS 134. See Appendix V.

76) In 584 under Sui Wen-ti the Wei River was canalized from its junction with the Yellow River to Ch'ang-an. Since then however the canal had silted up and Wei Chien had to re-dig it. Later it again silted up and was not in use at the end of the eighth century. (T'ung-tien 10.4.a)

77) CTS 48.1.b. Cf. CTS 105.4.a; TCTC T'ien-pao 1/3 and 2/3 jen-tzu; CTS 9.5.a,b. T'ung-tien 10.4.a dates the appointment of Wei Chien in 744. This is probably a result
of a substitution of the character san for yulan, for the character nien is used for 'year' although the character tsai was officially used from the third year of T'ien-pao. THY 87, p.1587, and CTS 49.2.b erroneously date Wei Chien's appointment in 743. They also say that he replaced Hsiao Chiung, but Hsiao Chiung ceased to be Transport Commissioner in 736 (see page 91) and the previous Prefect of Shan Chou and Transport Commissioner was Li Chi-juu. (TCTC T'ien-pao 11/hsin-wei; CTS 9.5.a) See also TFYK 507.10.b and 508.19.a,b; Balazs, MSOS xxxv (1935) p.44.

78) CTS 105.4.b.

79) See page 138.

80) CTS 105.5.b; 48.1.b; TCTC K'ai-yuan 21, end of the year. On Yang Ch'ung-li's origins see Appendix V.

81) CTS 48.1.b; 105.6.a.

82) "According to the old regulations the emperor and the Six Palaces (a traditional term for the harem) all had ranks from high to low and their allowances were graded accordingly. T'ang law followed on from Chou and Sui. Concubines and palace ladies had high and low positions and according to their ranks they were given wherewith to pay for clothes and cosmetics so that they might wait upon the emperor in his apartments. When Hsuan-tsung had been on the throne for many years, concubines who received the royal favour were given many rewards and gifts. He did not wish to be always going to the Left and Right Treasuries (Tso-yu T'sang) to get the goods. Wang Hung perceived the emperor's wishes and each year presented money and treasures by the million to be placed in the Palace Stores (nei-k'u) in order to give free rein to the emperor's munificence. Hung said that this was goods over and above the regular yearly amounts and was not extorted from the people. Hsuan-tsung thought that Hung had the art of enriching the country and could give profit to the royal funds, so he showed him more and more favour." (CTS 105.8.a) Cf. TFYK 510.12.b and CTS 48.1.a.f.

The Treasury of the Left had charge of silks, the Treasury of the Right had charge of gold, pearls, jade, etc. (Cf. des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, pp.434, 440-41.) They were under the Court of the Imperial Treasury (T'ai-fu Ssu). Among the eunuch offices listed in the T'ang Liu Tien was a Nei-fu which had charge of the precious goods within the palace (ch.12.17.b) and according to T'ung-tien 27.2.a the Director of the Nei-fu was in charge of receipts and disbursements of the Palace Stores (Nei-k'u). The New T'ang History.
HTS 51.4.b states that Wang Hung paid these goods into the Ta-ying Stores 大盈庫. It is clear that this was the name of a storehouse within the palace, for during the rebellion in 758-9, when Ti-wu Ch'i 漢第五通 was Revenue Commissioner (Tu-chin Shih), he had all the tax goods paid into the Ta-ying Palace Stores內庫 and put under the charge of eunuchs in order to prevent the depredations of the soldiers who were stationed at the capital. This system was maintained until 780 then at the request of Yang Yen, the taxes were again paid first into the regular Treasury Stores (Ts'ang-k'u藏庫). (THY 59, pp. 1015-16) cf. ——— HTS 51.4.b This confirms the surmise of M. des Rotours as to the significance of the term 'ts'o ts'ang-k'u', which "sous tout reserve" he takes to mean the stores belonging to the Office of the Treasury of the Left (Tso Ts'ang-Chu) (Traité des Fonctionnaires, p. 314, n. 1).

83) For instance, Su Mien 蘇冕, who in 804 completed the Hui-y ao which became the basis of the T'ang Hui-y ao (see des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p. 92), after stating summarizing the official structure of the bureaucracy and stating that if each did his own task diligently everything would be all right, commented as follows: "When vicious ministers talked extravagantly of profit in order to curry favour, then many commissions were established to show them honour. They exploited the poor people in order to increase the revenue. They presented inflated figures in order to demonstrate their sincerity. The emperor became arrogant and fell into greater and greater extravagance. The resentment of the people combined and brought disaster. "These practices caused the emperor's officials to hold positions but to be deprived of the duties belonging to them, to receive large salaries but to be of no use. Yu-wen Jung first began it. Yang 郭立新 [Shen-ch'in] and Wang [Wang] followed in his tracks. Yang Kuo-chung finally brought about the rebellion."(THY 78, p. 1439) Cf. p. 49 and note 42

Chapter 4

1) See T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'ü Ch'ing-yüan, T'ang-tai Ching-chi Shih, p. 48.

2) In his essay Haing Nan 行難, 'On Doing What is Difficult', Han Yu 范文生 speaks of a high official who has recommended various people for office. The official is represented as criticizing himself for advancing the sons of merchants and clerks, but Han Yu replies that if the men themselves were worthy of office, one should not take into account their origins. (Han Ch'ang-li Chi ch. 11, ts'e
3, p.68) This shows that while aristocratic prejudice persisted it did not always in practice prevent the advancement of members of the lower orders into the bureaucracy, and that there was enlightened opinion favourable to this.

2) The Sogdian K'ang Ch'ien. See note 1.

3) In 730 the following decree was issued, "The classification of the households of the empire has not been equitable. It must be adjusted to the actual situation. Recently rich merchants and great tradesmen have often associated with officials and sought their influence in order to be placed in a low classification. From now on this must not be repeated. . . . " (THY 85, p.1557; TFYK 486.15). See also the examples cited by T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'u Ch'ing-yuan, op. cit., p.97.

4) They were frequently milked for contributions and forced loans during the rebellion. See T'ung-tien 11.3.b.

5) In 752 an order was issued for the buying up of counterfeit money. The merchants of Ch'ang-an were strongly opposed to this. At this time Yang Kuo-chung was Commissioner for Coining Money. He met a crowd of merchants in the streets and promised to speak on their behalf. As a result the measure was modified. See CTS 9.9.b and TCTC T'ien-pao 11/2/keng-wu.

6) See pp.88-89.

7) When Ying Chou was re-established in 717 special provision was made for the settlement of Sogdian merchants there (see page 126). When Ch'u Chou and Yang Chou were sacked in 761, thousands of shang-hu were killed (TCTC Shang-yuan 1/end of the year). A striking example of how high a Sogdian merchant could rise was provided by K'ang Ch'ien, a shang-hu who during T'ien-pao was Protector (Tu-hu) of An-nan and an associate of Yang Kuo-chung. During the rebellion he provided funds for the state and was made President of the Court for the Reception of Foreigners (Hung-lu Ch'ing). He was later executed on a charge of having communication with the rebels (HTS 225A.7; TCTC Shang-yuan 2 (761)/chien tsu month/t'ing-hai). It is quite likely that the K'ang Yün-chien, who was sent in 757 to levy contributions on the merchants of Chiang and Huai was a Sogdian (T'ung-tien 11.3.b). See also T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'u Ch'ing-yuan, op. cit., p.98.

8) One of the Chief Ministers from 746 to 754 was Ch'en Hsi-lieh who first attracted the attention of Hsüan-tsung through his knowledge of the works of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. At the time, however, the real power was firmly in Ch'in.
in the hands of Li Lin-fu and later Yang Kuo-chung, and Ch'en had little to do with affairs.

9) These various coups have been studied by Professor Ch'en Yin-k'o in T'ang-tai Cheng-chih Shih Shu-Lun Kao, pp. 42-49. See also O. Franke, Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches, II, pp. 423-429.

10) P'ei Hsii-chi has no biography. According to the Genealogical Tables of Chief Ministers, HTS 71A.20.1, his father was Ch'i-shih, a second cousin of Ch'iu-tao who was a Chief Minister under Wu Hou (brief biography in CTS 86.5.b). These P'ei's were an old and noble Kuan-chung family. They frequently married into the imperial clan as can be seen by the number of those in the genealogical table who were Fu-ma Tu-wei -- husbands of princesses.

11) CTS 95.5.a; TCTC K'ai-yüan 8/10/wu-tzu.

12) CTS 95.6.a. TCTC K'ai-yüan 8/10/wu-tzu relates this along with the story of Prince Fan under K'ai-yüan 8/10/wu-tzu.

13) TCTC K'ai-yüan 9/12/jen-ch'en.

14) TCTC K'ai-yüan 10/8/chi-hai.

15) TCTC K'ai-yüan 10/8/chi-mao; CTS 8.10.b; 100.8.b, biography of Wang Chih-yin.

16) In 719 when the empress's father, Wang Jen-chiao died, Sung Ching successfully opposed undue elevation in his grave mound. (CTS 96.7.b; TCTC K'ai-yüan 7/4/jen-wu)

17) CTS 8.12.a; 51.10.a, biography of Empress Wang; 133.14.a, biography of Wang Jen-chiao; TCTC K'ai-yüan 12/7/ch'i-mao. See also TCTC K'ai-yüan 10/8/before chi-hai. The political implications of the degradation of the Empress Wang have been discussed by Yu Ta-kang. He suggests that Chang Yüeh, who was associated with the Wu family, was supporting Wu Hui-fei against the Empress Wang. The evidence is scanty and the matter remains highly conjectural. Li Lin-fu, who was later a supporter of Wu Hui-fei, was at this time among Chang Yüeh's enemies and Chang Chiu-ling, who had been closely connected with Chang Yüeh, later strongly opposed the aspirations of Wu Hui-fei. See CYYY 6.1 (1936) p.96 ff.

18) See Ch'en Yin-k'o, loc.cit.

19) Biographies in CTS 106, HTS 121.
20) CTS 8.16.b; 106.12.a ff.; TCTC K'ai-yüan 19/1/ jen-hsiu. The biography of Ch'i Huan in CTS 190B.15.b ff. represents Huan, who then held the post of Vice-President of the Ministry of Civil Office, as secretly advising the emperor to substitute Kao Li-shih for Wang Mao-chung as his confident. Whatever truth there may be behind the story, as it is told it is strongly suggestive of hindsight. In any case such a conversation would not have been committed to writing at the time and must have been passed around as gossip or lain dormant in someone's mind for some time.


22) Very different views of Kao Li-shih are given by his biography in the Old T'ang History (ch. 184) and by his separate biography, the Kao Li-shih Wai Chuan, composed by a certain Kuo Shih 郭是. The Ch'üan T'ang Wen contains an inscription for a stupa composed by a Kuo Shih, who was "a eunuch, Judicial Inspector of the Supreme Court of Justice during the period Ta-li (766-779)". (ch.441.2.a). He was undoubtedly the same Kuo Shih who wrote Kao Li-shih's biography and the fact that he was an eunuch goes far to explain the eulogistic tone of the work. Kuo claimed to have obtained his information from Kao Li-shih himself when they were both in exile. (See Pulleyblank, BSOAS XIII,2 (1950) p.459 n.5.) I see no reason for doubting this statement, though he undoubtedly worked his material up so as to give the best impression and to suggest that his hero had had foreknowledge of the disasters ahead. Professor Rideout dismissed the work as historically worthless and a fiction (op.cit., p.68 n.12). I can, however, find only one gross error of historical fact and that appears to be an interpolation. A conversation is reported between Kao Li-shih and Hsian-tsung in the first year of Pao-ying (762) when the old emperor was dead and Kao was in exile or dead. (p.231) This anecdote interrupts the chronological sequence of the biography and is contradicted by the biography itself, which makes it quite clear that Kao never saw his old master after his exile. Apart from this the work contains many probable seeming details which are not found elsewhere and which could hardly have been invented by a forger. Ts'ai-tsung is referred to in the work as the 'present emperor', which means that it must have been completed before 780. It appears in the Bibliographical Monograph of the New T'ang History (ch.58.1/ b ) and much of it has been incorporated into the New T'ang History's biography of Kao Li-shih (ch.207) and into the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien, though Ssu-ma Kuang does not happen to cite it in the K'ao-i. See also Yu Ta-kang, Tu Kao-Li-shih Wai Chuan Shih, 'Pien-
23) See CTS 184.3.b, 4.a, biography of Kao Li-shih.

24) On his reputed influence in advancing men see CTS 184.3.b; 186B.2.b, biography of Chi Wen*; ALSSC .3.b; CTS 200A.5.a f., biography of Kao Shang*.


26) See for instance CTS 96.9.b, historian's comment on these two men.

27) Wittfogel, History of Chinese Society, Liao, pp. 457-459, presents some statistics on the relative proportions of officials who came up through the examination system as compared to those who gained office by hereditary privilege. Completely divorced as they are from any analysis of the social structure of T'ang and having no relation to any organic periodization of T'ang history, the figures can have little meaning. Two samples are taken, one consisting of 111 officials of the highest rank from the whole of the T'ang dynasty, the other consisting of 153 officials of all ranks, mostly from the eighth century. In the first sample 77.5% have an examination record in their biographies in the New T'ang History, 16.2% have no record as to their method of obtaining office and 6.3% obtained office through hereditary privilege. In the second sample 27.4% had an examination record, 60.8% had no record of their method of obtaining office and 11.8% obtained it by hereditary privilege. The second sample is particularly deceptive because it includes military as well as civil officials and includes a whole chapter of the New T'ang History devoted to the members of the imperial clan. It also includes the biographies of sons of officials on an equal footing with the main biographies. In some cases this is justified, when the son achieved a really high office. In many cases however the son would not have had a biography if his father had not had one. All these factors tend to lower the number of examinations recorded and increase the number of those for whom hereditary privilege is indicated. Even if one accepted his figures, one would find it a little perverse of Dr. Wittfogel to interpret the results as showing the importance of hereditary privilege in T'ang. When we consider that the examination system had only properly begun in T'ang and that society under its predecessors, Northern Chou and Sui (but with reservations in regard to the latter), had been dominated by aristocracy. It would seem more significant to emphasize the inroads which the examination system was making on the aristocracy.
28) Biographies in CTS 105, HTS 134. See Appendix V.
29) TCTC K'ai-yüan 12/3/chi-hai.
30) TCTC K'ai-yüan 13/2/keng-shen.

31) Chiang Chiao was the grandson of Chiang Mo who played a conspicuous part in the founding of the dynasty and received high honours from Kao-tsu and T'ai-tsung. Earlier ancestors had served under Northern Wei and Northern Chou. The family came from Shang-kuei, south-west of present T'ien-shui in Kansu. Chiao's own father became a general in the Guards under the Empress Wu. Chiao attached himself to Hsüan-tsung while the latter was a prince and assisted in the intrigues which led to his accession. He was accorded extreme intimacy and favour but came to ruin in 722 when he was accused of revealing secrets which he had learned inside the palace. He was ordered to be beaten with the heavy bamboo and banished. He died on the road. He was then over fifty. Yüan Ch'ien-yao was connected to him by marriage for his grand-nephew was Chiang Chiao's son-in-law (CTS 106.1.a, biography of Li Lin-fu). Yüan made no attempt to defend him and was criticized for it. Later the emperor relented and awarded Chiang Chiao posthumous titles. (CTS 59.9.a; HTS 91.7.b; TCTC K'ai-yüan 5/7/keng-tzu and 10/8/i-hai)

32) Biographies in CTS 99, HTS 127. See Appendix V.
33) Biographies in CTS 97, HTS 125. See Appendix V.
35) CTS 97.9.b; TCTC K'ai-yüan 13/12/chia-hsü; T'ung-tien 15.4.b; THY 74, p.1339; des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.260 ff.
36) des Rotours, op.cit., p.213.
37) On these great families of 'East of the Mountains' see p.119.
38) Ts'ui Yin-fu has biographies in CTS 185B and HTS 130. His first official post was that of Ping-ts'ao Ts'ang-chün in the Yu-ch'ien Guard of the Left. He passed no examination and was not a scholar. Although there is no definite indication as to how he got his start in official life there can be no doubt that it was due to his family connection. His father's highest rank, as far as we are told, was county magistrate and his grandfather had been Hsi-ma in the household of the Crown Prince, an office which was only of the fifth degree, fourth
class. He was not therefore entitled to hereditary (yin) privilege under the ordinary rules. Since, however, he belonged to the proud Ts'ui clan of Ch'ing-ho he probably had high-place relatives at court by marriage if not by blood. The Guards were especially the preserve of aristocracy (see p.99). Ts'ui Yin-fu subsequently held a post in the Censorate in which he offended the powerful T'ai-p'ing Princess by protesting against the malpractices of a Buddhist favourite of hers. For this he was sent out to a minor post in Chien-nan. After Hsüan-tsung's attainment of power he was summoned back to the capital and held a succession of important posts until he became President of the Censorate in 726 in spite of Chang Yu'en's protests.

39) Biographies in CTS 106, HTS 223A. See also p.86 and Appendix V.

40) CTS 8.13.a; 97.9.b, biography of Chang Yu'en; 105.3.a, biography of Yu-wen Jung; 185B.8.a, biography of Ts'ui Yin-fu; TCTC K'ai-yüan 14 /2/ting-ssu ff.

41) CTS 8.13.b,14.a; TCTC K'ai-yüan 15/1/1-ssu; and the other places in note 39.

42) HTS 134. . ; TCTC K'ai-yüan 16/1/chia-yin.

43) See page 52 and ch.3, note 59.

44) CTS 105.3.a; HTS 134.1.b;.

45) CTS 8.15.a; K'ai-yüan 17/6/chia-hsi.

46) Biographies in CTS 98; HTS 126. See Appendix V.

47) Biographies in CTS 98, HTS 126. See Appendix V. The evidence that Li Yuan-hung was a supporter of Yu-wen Jung's policies is as follows. (a) He was made Vice-President of the Ministry of Finance in 725 after the dismissal of Yang Ch'ang (CTS 98.7.b). Elsewhere we are told that Yang Ch'ang had opposed Yu-wen Jung's measures and that this was the real reason for his dismissal (CTS 185B.7.b and see ch.2 note 30). (b) In 722 the 'official lands' (chih-t'ien 賜田) of Kuan-chung, which were to provide official salaries, were abolished and given over to 'poor households who returned after running away' (THY 92, p.1669). This appears to be part of Yu-wen 'ung's efforts to solve the problem of the migrants. Later it was proposed to
this on the grounds that the land would have to be taken away from peasants who were already tilling it and that men would have to be conscripted to till the land, thus taking them away from their private occupations. It would seem that Li Yuan-hung was thus defending the interests of agriculture in Kuan-chung and of the treasury; for it would be to the advantage of the treasury to have all the grain taxes paid into it and then distributed as salaries to the officials rather than that to have certain grain automatically set aside for official salaries.

48) CTS 8.14.b, 15.a; TCTC K'ai-yuan 16/11/kuei-ssu
and 17/6/chia-hell.

49) Biographies in CTS 99, HTS 101. See Appendix V.

50) Biographies in CTS 84, HTS 108. See Appendix V.

51) See des Rotours, Le Traité des Examen, pp.262-5

52) Li Hui, Prince of Hsin-an信安王李徽, was a great-grandson of T'ai-tsung. After the restoration of Chung-tsung, he was given appointments and titles, and under Hsüan-tsung he served in various capacities, chiefly as a provincial governor. In 727 he was made Deputy Grand Chieh-tu-Shih of Shuo-fang and soon afterwards he was made in addition President of the Ministry of Rites. (Biographies in CTS 76, HTS 80) On Wu-wen Jung's embroilment with the prince see CTS 105.3.b; TCTC K'ai-yuan 17/9/jen-tzu and K'ao-i. The nature of the charge against the prince is not indicated, nor whether it was justified.

53) CTS 105.3.b; TCTC K'ai-yuan 17/ after 10/wu-wu.

54) TCTC loc.cit.

55) Biographies in CTS 100, HTS 129.

56) Biographies in CTS 98, HTS 126. See Appendix V.

57) CTS 98.10.b; 99.5.b; TCTC K'ai-yuan 21/10/ after wu-tzu.

58) Biographies in CTS 99, HTS 126. See Appendix V.

59) Biographies in CTS 98, HTS 127. See page 53 and Appendix V.

60) See also Appendix V.

61) CTS 106.1.a.

63) CTS 8.18.b; 48.7.b; THY 89, p.1625 ff.; T'ung-tien; TCTC K'ai-yüan 22/3/keng-chen; T FYK

64) TCTC K'ai-yüan 23/before 3rd month.

65) TCTC K'ai-yüan 24/11/before wu-hsun.

66) See TCTC Yung-hui 6 (655); O. Franke, Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches II, p.411 f. Chang-sun Wu-chi was the brother-in-law of T'ai-tsung and had been one of the chief counsellors throughout his reign. Most of the men associated with him in protesting against the change of empress were also aristocrats. The officials who supported the Empress Wu were men like Hsü Ching-tsung 許敬宗 and Li I-fu 李義府 (CTS 75; HTS 223A) who were not from Kuan-chung and had advanced through their literary talents. By a curious coincidence it was again a woman of the Wu family who was at the centre of the trouble. Wu Hui-fei was the daughter of the Empress Wu's cousin, Wu Yu-chih 武攸之 (CTS 51.10.a). The empress whom the Empress Wu replaced had the surname Wang as had the empress whom Hsüan-tsung degraded in 724, but they did not belong to the same family.

67) According to the biography of Li Lin-fu in the Old T'ang History, Li had adulterous relations with the wife of P'ei Kuang-t'ing, who was also of the Wu family. When P'ei died his widow tried to get Kao Li-shih to use influence on behalf of Li Lin-fu. This Kao was afraid to do but he arranged it so that Li Lin-fu was the first to inform Han Hsiu of his elevation to the Chief Ministership. In return Han Hsiu recommended Li Lin-fu on his own retirement. Ssu-ma Kuang rejects this story on the grounds that it was out of character for Han Hsiu and that P'ei Kuang-t'ing's widow could hardly have dared to try to help her lover in that way. These grounds do not seem very substantial but on the other hand we have no evidence to show that the story was not wholly or partially malicious gossip. (See CTS 106.1.b; TCTC K'ai-yüan 22/4/after jen-ch'en and K'ao-i) The alliance between Li Lin-fu and Wu Hui-fei is mentioned in these same places and also in CTS 107.2.a, biography of the degraded Crown Prince. The story of the attempt of 736 to incriminate the Crown Prince and his brothers is told in CTS 107.2.a f. and more briefly in 106.1.b f. See also TCTC K'ai-yüan 24/11/ after wu-hsun.

68) Biographies in CTS 99, HTS 129. On Hsiao Chiung see Appendix V.
71) The versions of the story differ slightly. According to CTS 103.6.a, biography of Niu Hsien-k'o, Chou Tzu-liang first privately remarked to Li Shih-chih, who was then President of the Censorate, that Niu Hsien-k'o had no ability and quoted an old prophecy which he connected with Niu's name. Li Shih-chih told the emperor, who tried Chou in person. Chou spoke out with complete boldness and was condemned to be flogged and banished. He died a short distance from the capital. The version adopted by Ssu-ma Kuang comes from the Hsian-tsung Shih-lu and alleges that Chou, who was a censor, indicted (t'an? p) Niu Hsien-k'o. (TCTC K'ai-yüan 25/4/hsin-yü and K'ao-i) Other much briefer accounts appear in CTS 9.1.b; 99.7.b; and 106.2.b. Ssu-ma Kuang was probably influenced by Li Shih-chih's good reputation and did not wish to believe that he was involved in this affair which later literati had come to look upon as a courageous attempt to expose a worthless minister.

Hu San-hsing's commentary (TCTC loc.cit.) quotes from the Chiu Wu-tai Shih an old prophecy about the surname Niu which had been current since the time of the empress Wu.

72) TCTC K'ai-yüan 25/4/chia-tzu; CTS 99.7.b.

73) Ch'ü-chiang Chi, fu-lu 14.a,b.

74) See the epitaph by Hsü Hao, Ch'ü-chiang Chi, fu-lu 19.b; CTS 99.8.a.

75) TCTC K'ai-yüan 24/end of the year. See also p. 135.

Chapter 5

1) The only comprehensive treatment of the fu-ping system in a western language is that of M. des Rotours in the introduction to Traité des Fonctionnaires et Traité de l'Armée, which is however not free from misunderstandings. It has also been extensively studied in modern times by Chinese and Japanese scholars. Even so it is clear that the sources have not been exhausted and certainly the problems are not all solved. My summary is based on the work of M. des Rotours and on the following works: Hama-guchi Shigekuni, Fuheissei Shinsaisei e; Shigaku Zasshi 41, (1930) pp.1255-1295 and 1430-1507; K. Hino, Tōdai Hanshin no
2) T'ang Liu-Tien 5.4.b mentions various sorts of junior officers who served more or less permanently at the capital. They were then said to 'attend permanently' (Ch'ang Shang). On the other hand officers from the militia units might accompany their men to the capital and continue to exercise some control over them. Cf. T'ang Liu Tien 5.7.a; T'ang Li Shu-i 7, p.54.

3) Although it appears that under Northern Chou the system was not as later a militia of the peasantry, being then primarily composed of non-Chinese, during the wars which led finally to the re-unification of China under Sui many peasants were enlisted and permanent mobilization led to difficulties just as in the seventh century. The system did not collapse entirely as it did under T'ang but it required a thorough reorganization. (See Pei Shih 11.15.a; Sui Shu 3.4.a; Tu Ch'ia, T'ang Fu-ping K'ao, p.7)

4) cancelled.

5) M. des Rotours says of the Ch'ien-niu Guards, "Nous ne savons donc pas de quelle manière se recrutaient ces Gardes chargées plus spécialement de la surveillance des portes du Palais; peut-être, à cause de leurs fonctions à l'entrée du Palais, devait-on les recruter parmi les eunuques?" (Traité des Fonctionnaires, p.xxxiv) It is, however, quite clear that they were composed of sons of the most noble families (T'ang Liu Tien 5.5.a,b; THY 71, p.1286. This is also implied in THY 65, p.1128 --cited by M. des Rotours, p.223 n.1). Li Lin-fu and Li Ch'i-wu, another member of the imperial clan, were only two examples of men who began their careers in this Guard (see Appendix V).

M. des Rotours is also puzzled as to the nature of the San-wei, which I have called cadet corps. They, like the Ch'ien-niu Guards, were recruited from the sons of high officials and there was a careful gradation of honour among the various units, the Ch'ien-niu being the highest (T'ang Liu Tien 5.5.b,6.a). Being sons of high officials the members of these corps held mandarinal rank. This does not mean that they were officers, since a p'in (read p'ing).
was only a means to an office and not an office itself. After a certain period of years members of these corps were entitled to apply for civil or military office (T'ang Liu Tien 5.5.b). The corps may be considered as a military equivalent to the university which provided literary training for the sons of high officials.

6) The suggestion of M. des Rotours that the Gate-watch Guards were made up of eunuchs (the passage quoted in the previous note was applied both to the Ch'ien-niu and the Gate-watch Guards) is somewhat better founded but not wholly acceptable. There are definite cases on record in which eunuchs were officers in this Guard. The most notable example is that of Yang Sau-hsin (楊寶善) who led several expeditions against the southern barbarians in Hsian-tsung's reign (CTS 184.2.b; HTS 207.1.b). On the other hand there are cases in which it is equally clear that officers of this guard were not eunuchs. Among the associates of Wang Mao-chung who were involved in the ruin of Wang Mao-chung in 731 (see p.71) were two general of the Chien-men Guard (CTS 106.12.b). It is hardly likely that they were eunuchs since the affair was the result of a clash between the military favourites and the eunuchs. The Tu Pin-k'o (杜亨) who was General of the Left Chien-men Guard in 714 (TCTC K'ai-yüan 27/7/i-wei) was later Prefect of Ling-chou (TCTC K'ai-yüan 39/jen-sun a post, and other examples could be cited. A passage in the T'ang Liu Tien, ch.5.6.b, states that members of the San-wei who showed ability might within their prescribed period of service be made junior officers (chu-shuai 将帥 or hsiao-wei 校尉) in the Gate-watch Guards. As for the other ranks of this guard, the T'ang Liu Tien, ch.5.5.a, also indicates how some at least were chosen. Forty 'permanent guards of great height' (ch'ang-jen ch'ang-shang 長人長上) were assigned to these guards. (Cf. des Rotours, op.cit., p. 542 n.2.) It is not made clear from what class of men these men were chosen. The passage follows closely on a passage relating to fu-ping Guardsmen and to various officers and guardsmen who served more or less permanently at the capital. It is natural to suppose that these tall men were also chosen from the Guardsmen — or might be so chosen. There is no suggestion that they were eunuchs.

7) T'ung-tai, Ch'eng-chih-Shih Shu-lun Kao, p.39 ff.
8) T'ung-tien 28.4.b states that the Hundred Cavaliers

7) THV 72, p.1291; des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, pp.833-35, 556.

9) T'ung-tien 28.4.b states that the Hundred Cavaliers were chosen from the Flying Cavaliers, that is, the members of the first Northern Army set up by T'ai-tsung in 638. So also THY 72, p.1291 and HTS 50.5.b (translated in des Rotours, op.cit., p.334-6). According to the Yeh-hou Chia-chuan (Yu-hai 21.b ff.) this work, a family biography of Li Pi (CTS 130; HTS 139), no longer exists integrally. It was written by his son Fan, probably in 826, and originally contained 10 chuan. See HTS 58.12.a; 139.7.b), however, a northern army was established by Kao-tsu from veterans of his original army from T'ai-yuan who volunteered to remain in service. This text also states that Kao-tsu first chose a Hundred Cavaliers from among them and that T'ai-tsung continued the same practice. This passage has been rather awkwardly incorporated into the text of the Monograph on the Army in the New T'ang History and this has led M. des Rotours to suppose it to be a duplication of what follows (op.cit., p.334). Some texts also place the creation of the T'ang fu-ping organization in the reign of T'ai-tsung in 635, but, as Mr. Tu Chi'a has shown, the system was in operation from the beginning of the dynasty (T'ang-tai Fu-ping K'ao p.12 ff.). It is possible that amended regulations were issued in the reign of T'ai-tsung for the various military formations but it is entirely likely that the Northern Army, which like the fu-ping had formed part of the Sui system, existed from the beginning of the dynasty.

CTS 106.11.a, biography of Wang Mao-chung, says, "Earlier, in the period Chen-kuan (627-49), T'ai-tsung chose 100 brave youths from state slaves and prisoners of war (fan-k'ou)and that the use of such persons as soldiers was not inconsistent with the ethos of the time is shown by the institution of pu-ch'ü military retainers of private persons who occupied a position intermediate between slaves and free men. (See Balázs, MSOS xxxv(1932) p.3 and Wittfogel, History of Chinese Society, Liao, p.66 n.32)

In 707, after the unsuccessful coup by the Crown Prince in which this force was involved (TCTC Ch'ing-lung 1 (707)/7/hsin-ch'ou), an order was issued abolishing the use of household slaves (hu-nu) in the Ten Thousand Cavaliers (THY 72, p.1292). This suggests that others besides Ts'uan-tsung tried to advance their own interests by getting slaves into this special corps of the Northern Army. The prohibition did not prevent him from accomplishing his ends.

The Tzu-chih T'ung-chien, Ch'ing-yun 1 (711)/6/jen-tau, combines the account from the biography of Wang Mao-chung
with other sources concerning the origin of the Hundred
Cavaliers. M. des Rotours has translated from this passage
as follows, "...choisit des gens braves et courageux parmi
les familles de fonctionnaires et parmi les gens des
pays tributaires." The term kuan-hu, however, does not
mean households of officials but a type of state slaves (See
Balazs, MSOS xxxv (1932) p.3; THY 86, p.1569; T'ang Liu
Tien 6.12.a). I take fan-k'ou to mean barbarian prisoners
of war (sheng-k'ou 生口).

10) THY 72, p.1292, HTS 50.6.a state that the change
from the Thousand Cavaliers to the Ten Thousand Cavaliers
took place in the reign of Jui-tsung but see CTS 7.6.b,
T'ung-tien 28.5.a, TCTC Ching-lung l(707)/9/jen-hsü and
des Rotours, op. cit., p.836 n.5.

11) See CTS 106.11.a; TCTC Ching-ytn l(711)/6/jen-ch'én
and p.71 above.

12) This process is described as follows by the Yeh-hou
Chia-chuan:
"At the time there had long been peace. From the reign
of the Empress Wu, the generals of the various Guards had
largely been appointed from among the empress's relatives
of no ability and from barbarians who had submitted. But
the junior officers of the Guards (wei tso chih kung
衛佐之
官) were made up of fu-ping militiamen doing their tour of
duty and were temporary. (This appears to be the sense of
for
it may be corrupt.) Sons and younger brothers of important courtiers reached attractive
positions near the throne (taking ets in 次 位, as in 次官) as soon as they entered service, and often without much
delay obtained control of strategic points. The generals
feared the power of their elders 誰 who had got them their
positions/ and let them do as they pleased.

Since the establishment of the militia units (fu),
because they served their tours as personal guards of the
emperor, the Guardsmen had been honoured with the title of
'officers in attendance' (shih-kuan 侍官), denoting that
they attended and guarded the Son of Heaven. At this time
the junior officers of the Guards (wei tso) were all lent
out to the families related to the emperor by marriage
(wai-ch'i) to do menial service as slaves. So when people
of the capital cursed they called one another, "Office r in
attendance". At the time the wealthy people East of the
Passes (Kuan-tung -- should it not read Kuan-chun) were
very proud in spirit and were humiliated by this treatment.
There were even some who burnt their hands and feet to avoid
service in the militia. Those who did their tour of duty were the poor and weak who were hired to go. After this the fu-ping first became weak." (Yu-hai 138.20.a,b)

Part of this passage appears in slightly abbreviated form in Monograph on the Army in the New T'ang History (des Roturs, p.782) but is placed as if it refers to the time immediately before the rebellion of An Lu-shan. Here it clearly refers to conditions at the end of the seventh century and the beginning of the eighth.

13) In 709 Su Kuei 順 愉 sent a memorial to the throne in which he said, "Now the price of food grain (粟) has soared and the people have not enough. I have seen some of the soldiers of the emperor's guard who have gone as much as three days without food." (CTS 88.10.b)


15) CTS 8.11.a; TCTC K'ai-yüan 11/1/keng-ch'ên.

16) Hsing Lu Chou Ch'ih 十光州刺, Ch'üan T'ang Wen 35.8.b.

17) TCTC K'ai-yüan 11/11/wu-tzu; HTS 50. (see des rotours, op.cit., p.775); THY 72, p.1298; Yu-hai 138.21.b (Yeh-hou Chia-chuan); CTS 97.9.a, biography of Chang Yüeh. TCTC K'ai-yüan 10/before 10/kuei-ch'ou also records Chang Yüeh's proposals. This is evidently a mistake in dating resulting from the imprecision of the biography of Chang Yüeh on which it is based.

There is nothing in the Monograph on the Army to indicate what was the nature of the 'Permanent Force of Lu Chou'. M. des Roturs therefore cautiously surmises that there had previously been a permanent army at Lu Chou (p.xlii and p.775 n.3). Its creation earlier in 723 is, however, described in the decree cited in note 16.

18) CTS 8.12.a; THY 72, p.1298 f.; TCTC K'ai-yüan 13/2/i-hai; HTS 50.3.a (des Rotours, p.776 and n.4).

19) Cf. THY 72, p.1299; T'ang Li T'ien 5.7.a,b; des Rotours, p.778 n.2 and pp.xlviii-xlxi; Hamauchi, op.cit., p.1481 ff.

20) THY 72, p. 1299; TCTC T'ien-pao 8/5/kuei-yu; HTS 50. (des Rotours, p.xlix and p.782). Titles from the fu-ping system continue to appear in the frontier armies. See for instance p.113. The passage quoted there would suggest that they had become largely emptied of real content.


22) The first famous occasion ended in the death
death of the Chief Minister Yang Kuo-chung and the emperor's favourite, Yang Kuei-fei (See TCTC Chih-te 1 (756)/6/ping-shen). For the later occasions while Hsüan-tsung was in Ch'eng-tu see TCTC Chih-te 2 (757)/1/ping-yin and 7/wu-shen.

23) See p.159.


26) K. Hino, Tōyō Gakuhō 26,4 (1939) p.507, gives a table of the numbers of chen 章 and shu 布, which existed at various periods. He gives no sources for these figures and while I have been able to discover the sources for those of K'ai-yüan and T'ien-pao, I have not found his authority for those which he assigns to the time of T'ai-tsung and Kao-tsung. He states that at that period there were 450 chen and 590 shu and on that basis estimates that the strength of the frontier forces was about

This would not in any case take into consideration any forces which were under the direct control of the Tu-tu and Tu-hu.

27) M. des Rotours, op.cit. pp.xlii-xliv, gives anumber of indications which suggest that, as in other dynasties, convicts might be sent to the frontier to be used as soldiers. It is in fact not necessary to be so tentative. See for example CTS 104.3.a where it is related that the maternal grandfather of Peng Ch'eng-ch'ing, 封常清 committed a crime and was banished to An-hsi where he guarded the gate of a city. See also HPS 221A.5.a, translated by Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiue Occidentaux, p.107, which relates that after the founding of Hsi Chou and An-hsi Tu-hu-fu at Turfan in 640, "Chaque année on y envoyait mille soldats; on punit des coupables en les mettant en garnison."

28) The use of barbarian allies in the T'ang armies is too familiar to require demonstration. The use of conscripts or volunteers not from the fu-ping system has been largely ignored by students of T'ang military history. Hamaguchi mentions it but does not stress it and looks upon it as an extraordinary measure. It would, however, seem to have been quite usual in the case of a major expedition. In T'ai-tsung's Korean expedition of 644 we hear of 40,000 soldiers from Chiang-huai and Ling-hsia (i.e. Ling-nan), regions in which there were scarcely any militia units. Along with them were 3,000 'enlisted soldiers'.
(mu-shih ±) from Ch'ang-an and Lo-yang. (TCTC Chen-kuan 18 (644)/11/chia-wu) A little farther on the same text reads, "At that time the brave soldiers who from far and near answered the call for recruits (ying mu) could not be counted". In contrasting the popularity of his expedition with the unpopularity of that of Sui Yang-ti, Tai-tsung is reported to have said, "When we call for ten men we get a hundred; when we call for a hundred we get a thousand" (ibid. end of the year). Here the term mu seems clearly to imply voluntary recruitment for the one expedition. M. des Rotours usually translates the terms mu and chao-mu as 'enrôler / d'une façon permanente/ (see op.cit., pp.xl, li, lli, 672, 774) but there does not seem to be any implication of permanence in the terms themselves. Enlistment in the fu-ping might be called mu (THY 72, p.1292) but something else is clearly implied in this case.

The regulations of the XX T'ang Lu Shu-i imply that such men, i.e. those who did not belong to the fu-ping, might be sent on an expedition. In ch.7 (ts'eg p.28) the text of a law reads, "All those who in registering Guardsmen (Wei-shih) likewise soldiers on expedition (cheng-jen) are not fair in their selection ..." The explanation of the sense (Shu-i) adds, "The commentary to 'registering Guardsmen' says 'likewise soldiers on expedition'. "Likewise soldiers on expedition' means those who are not Guardsmen who are enlisted (mu) and sent for the occasion."

M. des Rotours translates this as follows, "L'Explication du sens dit: 'L'expression tcheng-jen designe des gens qui ne sont pas envoyés a la capitale comme soldats de la Garde (wei-che) et qui sont enroîlés pour une expédition temporaire." (p.xxxvi-xxxvii) He thinks it probable that, although the text does not specifically say so, the cheng-jen here referred to came from the militia units (p.xxxix). It would seem to place a smaller strain on the text to suppose that cheng-jen meant men who were not from militia units.

The following passage appears in the T'ang Liu Tien, "When all the prefectures of the empire send soldiers, let them enlist (mu) men who are able and brave from the prosperous families with numerous adult males.... Let volunteers (i-cheng che) be made into separate units and not be placed in the camps of the enlisted men (mu-jen)" (ch.5. 7.b). I translate i-cheng che as 'volunteers' on the analogy of i-ping or i-chun which literally meant an army which had risen up to defend the cause of justice. This passage is also lacking in clarity but taken with the other passages above, it seems to envisage a system whereby expeditions would consist partly of men conscripted specially for the occasion, partly of men who joined voluntarily. Moreover it seems clear that the conscripts here referred to were not militiamen, for (1) the militiamen were not
under the control of the prefectures, (2) in saying "all the prefectures of the empire" the text must envisage something wider than the fu-ping system which was geographically very limited, (3) the sending of militiamen on expedition had already been referred to (5.7.a).

See also the following note in which an expedition is described which seems to agree with this description.

29) In 664 Liu Jen-kuei 劉仁軼, the commander in Korea, sent a memorial complaining of the conditions in the army. He said, "I have observed that among the enlisted men (ping-\textit{mu}) many are ill and weary, few are strong and brave. Their clothes are tattered. They think only of returning westward. I asked them, 'Formerly when we were west across the sea, I saw all the peasants answering the recruiting call, eager to join the army. Some asked to provide their own food and clothing. They were called 'volunteers' (\textit{cheng}). Why are you soldiers not like this?' They all said, 'The government today is not what it was then and men's hearts are also different. Formerly when there were expeditions east and west, if a man died in the emperor's service, there was always a decree of condolence and posthumous ranks and titles. Sometimes the dead man's offices and titles were given again to his son or younger brother. All those who crossed the Liao Sea were given promotion in honorary rank. Since the fifth year of Hsien-ch'ing (660) the men on expedition (cheng-jen) have many times crossed the sea but the officials make no record of it. Nor does any one make enquiries for the dead. Whenever the local authorities send men as soldiers, the strong and wealthy pay money to the recruiting officers and run away and escape. The poor, even though they may be old and weak, are sent...'. I also asked them, 'In former times soldiers stayed on garrison duty for five years and could still maintain themselves. Now you have only spent one year. Why are you like this?' They all said, 'When we first left our homes we were told only to provide ourselves with one year's equipment. Now it is already two years and we have still no prospect of returning...'. (TTC Lin-te 1 (664)/10/keng-ch'en. A fuller version of the memorial is given in CTS 84.3.b) It is not possible to go into all the implications of this interesting memorial here.

30) The Yeh-hou Chia-chuan states, "Kao-tsung first appointed Liu Jen-kuei as Commissioner for Defending T'ao-ho 河障 as a precaution against the Tibetans. This was the first occasion on which armies were stationed on the frontier." (Yu-hai 138.20.a) This appointment was in 677 (CTS 84.4.b). In that year were established the Ho-yuan 海原, the Mo-men 莫門 and the Chi-shih 赤石 Armies (Yu-an-ho Chün-hsien T'u Chih 39.22.b; THY 78, p.1427; and Appendix VI).
Mr. Tu Ch'ia maintains in contradiction to this that a few armies existed from the beginning of the dynasty (T'ang-ch'u Chen-ping K'ao, pp. 30-31). The evidence is, however, not very clear and it seems probable that any armies that may have existed before 677 did so only for a short time. The authors of the T'ang Lu Shu-i (completed 653) evidently understood by 'army', 'expeditionary army' (hsing-ch'un 行軍) as opposed to the permanent garrisons (chen-shu). Ch. 16 (ts'e 3 p. 32) contains a law which begins "Any person at a place where an army is stationed or at any garrison or outpost, who on his own authority releases men serving on expedition or on frontier duty (cheng fang jen 防人)...." The Shu-i adds, "At any a place where an army is stationed" means 'at a place where an expeditionary army (hsing-ch'un) is stationed'.

The evidence for the existence of armies before 678 is as follows:

(a) "T'ien-shan 天山 Army. Established at Hsi Chou. This was once the kingdom of the former kings of Ch'ü-shih 楚 in Han times. The land is very fertile. Its name was changed to Kao-ch'ang 皋疆. It was established in the fourteenth year of Chen-Kuan (640)." (THY 78, p. 1429)

This passage is ambiguous because we know that Hsi Chou was first established in 640 and it would be quite natural to assume that it is this and not the establishment of the T'ien-shan Army that is meant. According to HTS 40.10.b, Ti-li Chih, the T'ien-shan Army was established in 714. In the account of the establishment of Hsi Chou in 640 there is no mention of the T'ien-shan Army. (See Chavannes, Documents sur les Tou-kiue Occidentaux, p. 107).

(b) "The Ch'ih-shui 赤水 Army. Established at the west wall of Liang Chou. It was originally the Ch'ih-niao 水島 Garrison (chen).... In the second year of Wu-te (619), seventh month, An Hsiu-jen 安休仁 submitted with this territory and thereupon the army was established. None of the great armies exceeded this in size." (THY 78, p. 1428)

This passage appears to contradict itself, since it first says that the Army was originally a garrison and then that it was established as an army when the territory submitted to T'ang in 619. According to HTS 40.9.b the Ch'ih-shui Army was originally the Ch'ih-niao Chen and the Ta-tou 大斗 Army was originally the Ch'ih-shui Shou-cho 頭 扶 . The Ch'ih-shui Shou-cho became the Ta-tou Army in 728 but no date is given for the change from the Ch'ih-niao to the Ch'ih-shui Army. (Cf. Yüan-ho Chün-hsien T'u Chih 40.2.a) There is no mention of the creation of any garrison or army at Liang Chou in the account of the surrender of this territory in CTS 55.3.b, biography of Li Kuei 李軌, or in TCTC Wu-te 2/5/keng-ch'ien.

(c) "Mo-li 墨離 Army. Originally this was in the old country of the Yüeh-chih. The army was established there
during Wu-te (618–626)" (THY 78, p. 1428)

Other sources do not give the date of the establishment of this army.

(d) "The Yu-men Army. Over 200 li west of Chiu-ch'Uan Commandery (Su Chou). During Wu-te, Yang Kung-jen 楊恭仁 established it." (T'ung-tien 172.1.a,b. So also Yuan-ho Ch'U-hsien T'u Chih 40.2.b. Cf. des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p. 801) According to HTS 40.10.a and Yuan-ho Ch'U-hsien T'u Chih 40.8.b it was established during the period K'ai-yuan (713–741) after the Tibetans had overrun Yu-men Hsien in Su Chou. There is no mention in the biography of Yang Kung-jen (CTS 62) of the establishment of this army. According to THY 78, p. 1428, it was established in 718.

In reading through all the accounts of frontier wars in the Tzu-ghih T'ung-chien between the years 640 and 678 I have found no mention of these four armies or of any except expeditionary armies. In (a) it seems clear that Mr. Tu has misinterpreted the passage. In (b) and (d) the evidence is conflicting and only in (c) do we have an uncontroverted, but unconfirmed, statement that an army was established before 677. On the other hand it seems difficult to brush aside the three separate statements that armies were established in the reign of Kao-tsu. Now we know that in 619 twelve armies were set up in Kuan-chung over the fu-ping. They were suppressed in 623 but restored again in 625 when the Turks were menacing. The date of their final suppression is not give but they did not form part of the regular organization later in the dynasty. (See T'ung-tien 28.1.b; CTS 1.5.b; TCTC Wu-te 2 (619)/7/-. See also THY 72, p. 1291; HTS 50, . ; where however the date is erroneously given as 620 as is pointed out by M. des Rotours, op.cit., p. 757 n.3. For the suppression and re-establishment see also TCTC Wu-te 6 (623)/2/keng-wu; Wu-te 8 (625)/4/hsin-hai; des Rotours, p. 760) It is possible that along with these twelve armies in Kuan-chung a few armies were set up on the western frontiers. If this guess is correct, it may be significant that in (b) above the surrender of Liang Chou and the establishment of the Ch'ih-shui Army are dated in the seventh month of 619, the same month in which the twelve armies were set up in Kuan-chung. We know from elsewhere that An Hsiu-jen submitted in the fifth month. (See TCTC Wu-te 2 (619)/5/-)

31) See Appendix VII des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, H.786-819

32) The meaning of the term Chieh-tu Shih has been the subject of much conflicting testimony and interpretation. M. des Rotours, in Les grands fonctionnaires des Provinces etc., pp. 287-88 and Traité des Fonctionnaires, p. 656 n.2, has presented two alternative Chinese explanations,
neither of which he feels able to accept as satisfactory. The first (quoted by the Tz'u-yüan from the Hsiao Tu-shu Chai Ts'ao-lu, a work written by the Ch'ing scholar, Hung Liang-chi 洪亮吉, which I have been unable to consult — but see San-kuo Chih-kuan Piao p.93, written by his son Hung I-sun 鄭文釗) connects the term with an official post known as ch'ieh-tu which was created under the state of Wu of the Three Kingdoms (221-264 A.D.). (See San-kuo Chih 64.2.a) This official had to do with controlling army stores and M. des Rotours translates the term in this case as 'réglement les dépenses avec économie'. There is no evidence of any connection between this office and that of Chieh-tu Shih under T'ang. The second explanation is that of the Monograph on the Army (HTS 50.4.b) which says, in the translation of M. des Rotours, "A partir de la période Yong-hui (656-657) les gouverneurs généraux (tou-tou) qui étaient en même temps commissaires impériaux tenant les emblèmes de commandement (che-tch'ê-tsie 使持 уд) commencèrent à être communément appelés tsie-tou-che. Cependant ce ne fut pas encore la titre officiel." (p.388) M. des Rotours goes on to say, "Malheureusement cette explication est incomplète, car elle ne rend pas compte du caractère tou度; on ne peut donc expliquer ce titre que par une confusion entre le titre ancien de tsie-tou et l'expression tch'ê-tsie. C'est peu satisfaisant...." (p.656 n.2)

The real origin of the term is not, however, quite so obscure as this would make it appear. It is clear that it was indeed related to the fact that the Chieh-tu Shih had the insignia of command called ch'ieh, but it is equally clear that it was not directly connected with the terms Ch'ih-chieh and Shih Ch'ih-chieh. The ch'ieh insignia originally entitled the Prefect (Ts'e-shih, a more important office in Han than in T'ang) to put to death offenders on his own authority (T'ung-tien 33.2.b). The term Shih Ch'ih-chieh first appeared in the Wei dynasty of the San-kuo Period when it conferred on the holder the right to put to death any one from a 2000 bushel man down. At the same time the title Ch'ih-chieh conferred the right of putting to death commoners. During military operations it carried the same rights as the Shih Ch'ih Chieh possessed normally. There was also a title Chia-chieh which in time of war carried the peacetime rights of a Ch'ih-chieh. (T'ung-tien 33.2.b) At the beginning of T'ang, however, all governors of Tsung-kuan-fus (the same as the later Tu-tu-fus) had the appellation Shih Ch'ih-chieh and all prefects that of Ch'ih-chieh. Later all prefects were given the appellation Shih Ch'ih-chieh Chh'un-shih 使持節諸軍事. These titles did not, however, give their possessors the right of carrying out the death penalty without higher authority. (T'ung-tien 33.2,b) Thus as pointed out in the article Setsudoshi in the Toyo Rekishi Daijiten, Shih Ch'ih-chieh had become a purely honorific designation and was held by persons who had none
of the authority of a Chieh-tu Shih. The connection of the two terms seems to have been first made in the T'ang Hui-yao which says, "After Yung-hui (650-56) Governors (tu-tu) were appointed with the designation Shih Ch'ih-ch'ieh. This was the same as Chieh-tu Shih. Those who did not carry chieh were not Chieh-tu Shih." (78, p.1425) The T'ung-tien on the other hand merely compares the Chieh-tu Shih with the old (Wei and Chin dynasty) title of Ch'ih-chieh Tu-tu. "He the Chieh-tu Shih has the same responsibilities as the ancient Chih-chieh Tu-tu, the Four Colonels (Chung Lang-chiang) of the Southern Dynasties, and the Grand Commander (Ta Tsung-kuan) of an expeditionary army in the present dynasty." (32.5.a) It definitely states, however, that the term was connected with the possession of the chieh insignia, for it says, "In every province commissioners were appointed to regulate those in their region.-- (commentary) That is, the Ts'ai-fang Shih and Fang-yü Shih, etc. --In frontier regions where there are barbarian invasions they were in addition given banners (ching) and insignia (chieh) and called Chieh-tu Shih." (32.4.b) (cf. T'ang Lui Tien 5.8.b)

This clarification still leaves the compound chieh-tu unexplained. Now both tu and chieh can have the meaning 'to regulate' and, approaching the question freshly, one might assume that the compound simply meant 'to regulate' or 'to command'. In fact the compound chieh-tu does occur in this sense. This meaning is given in Kanno's Jiren and in the Töyö Rekishishi Daijiten (article Setsudoshi). The latter, after rejecting the two suggested interpretations of Chieh-tu Shih, advocates this as the most probable origin of the title. This explanation is not in fact inconsistent with a connection with the chieh insignia. One might translate the compound, 'to regulate with the chieh insignia'.

All doubt disappears when we discover that in early T'ang the compound chieh-tu frequently occurs to denote the authority wielded by the supreme commander of an expedition. This fact has curiously been overlooked by most investigators of T'ang military history (but see Tu Ch'ia, T'ang-ch'u Chen-ping K'ao, p.35). The most common form in which we find the term is in the expression 'shou ch'i chieh-tu 受其節度', 'take their orders from him', applied to subordinate commanders in relation to a supreme commander. See for instance: TCTC Chen-kuan 8 (634)/12/hsin-ch'ou; 9 (635)/8/keng-ch'en; Wu-te 1 (618)/10/keng-ch'en; CTS 194A.7.b. etc. The earliest example I have come across refers to the year 547 (Chou Shu 15.5.b, biography of Li Pi 孫異). The actual date of the first use of the term as a title has also been disputed (See des Rotours, Les grands fonctionnaires des provinces, etc., pp.271-74). In general the sources agree that it was in the year 711 or shortly after and the disagreements are of little consequence. Mr Tu Ch'ia
accepts this as the real beginning of the title in the sense in which it is generally known but has brought forward one passage in which, on his interpretation, it occurs with a rather different meaning as early as 639. The Ch'ien T'ang Wen 156.18.b contains the text of an inscription written by Hsieh Yen which reads as follows: "...聖厚大使...慕容寶節度副使朝散大夫任雅相等秉奉明詔...

As interpreted by Mr. Tu this would read, "In Chen-kuan 13 (639)... the Grand Commissioner of Holy T'ang, Mu-jung Pao, and the Deputy Chieh-tu Shih, the Ch'ao-san T'fu Jen Ya-hsiang, and others respectfully received the enlightened decree to convey a letter of investiture...." It seems, however preferable to take chieh-tu as a verb and read, "The Grand Commissioner Mu-jung Pao, having authority over the Deputy Commissioner, the Ch'ao-san T'fu Jen Ya-hsiang, and others...." If Jen Ya-hsiang's title had indeed been Deputy Chieh-tu Shih, we should expect to find Mu-jung Pao called Chieh-tu Shih or Grand Chieh-tu Shih. Moreover these commissioners were ambassadors, not military commanders, and if Mr. Tu's interpretation were correct this would be a unique instance of a quite aberrant use of the term.

Before the adoption of the term Chieh-tu Shih a number of other terms such as Chu-ch'un Ta Shih 維軍大使, Ching-luen Ta Shih 經略大使, Chen-shou Ta-shih 鎮守大使, were used to denote a similar function. Besides these titles a number of lesser commissionerships (shih 使) were replacing or supplementing the older titles connected with the expeditionary armies, such as Commander (Tsung-kuan) etc. This development cannot be discussed here in detail. (Cf. Chapter 2 note 13)

33) For a discussion of this question see Hamaguchi, Fuheiyori Shimappai e, pp.140 and 141 ff. 仆±

34) The literal meaning of chien-erh is 'stout fellow'. The Tz'u-hai equates it with chuang-shih 'hardy soldier'. It is translated by M. des Rotours as 'soldat permanent'. This does not seem to be quite exact, though they were often in fact permanent soldiers. The term evidently implied experienced soldiers as opposed to new recruits and I therefore translate it as 'veteran'.

35) See des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p.672 n.1 and compare pp.xli and lii. He has translated several texts to illustrate this development. Since, however, my interpretation of them differs slightly from his I shall partially retranslate them here. T'ang Liu Tien 5.7.b reads, "Text/ In all the armies of the empire there are 'veterans' (chien-erh).--Commentary/ Formerly the 'veterans' in all the armies all served a limited period of years."
Their coming and going by rota was very burdensome. In the twenty-fifth year of K'ai-yüan (737) a decree was issued .... (see des Rotours, loc.cit.) Yeh-hou Chia-chuan reads, "As for those who garrisoned the frontiers, according to the old regulations they were changed after three years. Later because of the trouble of going to and fro, the authorities enlisted those who were able to remain another three years, giving them twenty pieces of stuff. This was called 'recruiting' (chao-mu, cf. note 28). Then all the armies were ordered to enlist such men and they were called 'veterans' (chien-erh). At the end of K'ai-yüan Li Lin-fu was Minister. He further asked that all the armies should recruit veterans for permanent service (chao-mu ch'ang-tien chien-erh 召募長征健兒)...." (Yu-hai 138. 1:1; des Rotours, loc.cit.) See also Hamaguchi, p.1473.

36) See p.46; Chapter 2 note 45; p.110.

37) See p.46; Chapter 2 note 45; p.110.

38) "In Wan-sui-t'ung-t'ien 1 (696), ninth month, it was ordered that in the prefectures East of the Mountains lying near the frontier Wu-ch'i 武騎 Militia units (t'uan-ping 團兵 ) should be set up. In Sheng-li 1 (697), twelfth (la-yueh 拉月), twenty-fifth day, Wu-ch'i militia units were set up in Ho-nan and Ho-pe to defend Mazenka against Mo-ch'o (the Turkish kagan). Every 150 families between them provided fifteen men and one horse." (THY 78, p.1438) F. Okazaki in an article entitled Tokei jodei ni tsuite, which I have been unable to consult, first suggested the identity of these units with the later T'uan-ch'ieh units. This is strongly confirmed by an inscription of 697 in which the T'uan-ch'ieh Shih of Yen Chou (in Ho-nan) is mentioned. (Chin-shih Ts'ai-pien 53.16.b; Tai-yueh Kuan Pi 岐岳觀碑. Cf. Hamaguchi, op.cit., p.1467)

39) Hamaguchi has argued ingeniously and convincingly that the T'uan-ch'ieh units originally set up in Ho-pe were in 726 transformed into five armies at I Chou, Mo Chou, Ch'ang Chou, Ting Chou and Ts'ang Chou, still retaining part of their nature as militia units. (op.cit., p.1490) It is unnecessary to reproduce his whole argument but two texts which he quotes would in any case give a glimpse into the actual working of the T'uan-ch'ieh troops in this region. In TCTC T'ien-pao 14/12/jen-yin it is reported, "An Lu-shan sent Chang Hsien-ch'eng 張獻誠 to lead 10,000 T'uan-ch'ieh troops of the five commanderies of Shang-ku 上谷 (I Chou), Po-ling 博陵 (Ting Chou), Ch'ang Chou, Chao Chou) and Wen-an 安 (Mo Chou) and besiege Jao-yang." Later, under the day ping-wu,
it is reported that during the siege of Jao-yang, when Imperial troops were expected to come from the west to the relief of Ho-pei, a loyalist prefect at Ch'ang Chou sent an envoy to Chang Hsien-ch'eng to say, "Your troops are largely local militiamen (T'uan-chieh). You have no heavily armoured and first-rate troops. It will be difficult for them to face the hardened soldiers from west of the mountains." These passages seem to show that, at least in Ho-pei, the T'uan-chieh militiamen were under the Military Governor of the frontier since An Lu-shan was able to use them.

40) T'ang Liu Tien 5.7.b; translated by des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p.672. Cf. TCTC K'ai-yüan

40) T'ang Liu Tien 5.7.b; des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p. lii ff.


42) "The enlistment of permanent expeditionary soldiers (cheng-ping 仁兵) is nearing sufficiency. From now on garrison troops (chen-ping 靜兵) are not to be sent. Those who are already there are to be allowed to return." (TCTC K'ai-yüan 26/1/ting-ch'ou)

43) In particular the conscription carried out by Yang Kuo-chung for his campaigns in Szechwan. See T'ung-tien

44) Chien-keng 錯莽. The term belongs to the Han dynasty and was not current in T'ang. It originally meant poor persons who hired themselves out as substitutes for others who were called upon to serve in the frontier armies. Here it must be taken simply as a literary expression for the private soldiers in the frontier armies.

45) T'ung-tien 148.1.a.

46) Note for instance the large amounts issued from government granaries for famine relief in 754-5 (See page 39 and Chapter 2, notes 4 and 9). See also TCTC Chih-te 1 (756)/3/jen-wu, based on Yen Shih Hsing-chuang (Yen Lu-kung Chi 4.3.b), where the amounts of goods in the granaries and storehouses of Pei Chou in southern Ho-pei are described.

47) See page 55 f. and Chapter 3, note 68.

48) See for instance the decree of 737 by which
grain not required to be sent to the capital was ordered to be left in the local granaries for the benefit of the nearest army. (See Chapter 3 note 66)

49) On the system of military colonies (t'\un-t\'i\en) in T'ang see Balázs, MESOS xxxiv (1951) p. 73 ff.; T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'\ua Ch'ing-y\'an, T'ang-t'ai Ching-ch\i Shi\h, p. 28; des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p. xxviii and p. 126. Numerous cases of the setting up of t'\un-t\'i\en on the frontier from the beginning of the dynasty onward are listed in Y\u-hai 177.21. a ff.

50) In 715 when Kuo Ch'\ien-k\uan 鄭慶瓘 was organizing an expedition of 10,000 men from Kuan-chung to An-hsi, he asked that the men should take cooked food with them. (TCTC K'ai-y\an 3/11/t\ing-y\u; CTS 103.1.b)

51) cancelled.

52) In 731 a censor was sent to investigate a charge of corruption against the Governor of Sui-chou in southern Chien-nan. A Commander (Tsung-k\uan) under the Governor ambushed the censor. Help arrived and the Governor was put to death for rebellion. The Governor's name was Chang Shen-su 張善素. There is nothing to show who he was or what his background. His Commander was called Tung Yuan-li 童延禮. Tung is a surname which occurs very frequently in the names of Ch'\iang barbarians in T'ang times. (See Ts'en Chung-m\ien, CYYV 20 (1947) p. 124; Ch'\i-chiang Chi, letter to the Ch'\iang chiefs in T\ang; Hsi Chou, etc. (10.2.b) and other letters to this area)

Presumably Tung Yuan-li was a barbarian chieftain enlisted into the Chinese service who attempted to take the law into his own hands when his chief was threatened with prosecution.

Another frontier revolt which is even more obscure occurred in 734 when Liu H\uan 劉俠, the Military Governor of Pei-t'\ing of whom nothing else is known, revolted and was executed. (CTS 8.18.b) Some letters to frontier governors from about this time appear in the Ch'\ua-chiang Chi which refer to this affair, but they are not very enlightening. See letters to the Military Governor of An-hsi, Wang Hu-ssu, (8.2.a), to the Governor of Hsi Chou, Chang Tai-pin 張楚憲, (8.2.b), to the officers and men of Pei-t'\ing (8.3.b) and to the Commissioner for the I-wu Army Chang Ch'u-pin 張楚憲 (8.3.a). In the last mentioned letter there is a suggestion that Liu Huan had tried to get the co-operation of the Sha-t'o Turks.

53) T'ang Liu Tien 5.9.a.

54) TCTC Ch'\ui-k\ung 3 (687)/end of the year. T\HY 65; p. 131.
55) According to T'ung-tien 29.3.a the practice began after 732 but THY 65, p.1131, gives 705 as the year of its introduction.

56) Pien Ling-ch'eng (1727-1814) was the eunuch 'controller' with Kao Hsien-chih both on his famous expedition into the Pamirs (see CTS 104.1.b and Chavannes, Documenta sur les Tou-kiue Occidentaux, p.152 n.1 -- Chavannes does not make it clear that he was an eunuch) and later when he was sent to Shen Chou to oppose An Lu-shan at the beginning of 756. When he and Feng Ch'ang-ch'ing retreated to the T'ung-kuan it was Pien Ling-ch'eng who brought the order for their deaths and who is blamed for having the order made. (CTS 104.4.b ff., biography of Feng Ch'ang-ch'ing; TCTC T'ien-pao 14/12/kuei-mao)

Chapter 6

1) The Ch'ing Scholar Chao, 賽雪 (1727-1814) expressed this in rather unscientific language when he spoke of the rebellion of An Lu-shan as a sign that the 'imperial effluence' (wang ch'i 汪氣) of Ch'ang-an was moving to Peking. (Nien-erh Shih Cha-chi. ch.20 (vol.II p.17), Ch'ang-an Ti-ch'i 留安地氣).


3) TCTC Chen-kuan; 12/1/i-wei (638); THY 83, p.1528; A. Waley, Po Ch'i-i, p.51; cf. Ku Chi-kuang, op.cit., p.207 f.

4) The section on 'Climate and Customs' (feng-su 風俗) under Chi Hsiang (the ancient province covering Shansi and most of Ho-pei) in T'ung-tien 179.5.b comments thus on the people 'East of the Mountains' (i.e., east of the T'ai-hang range as opposed to those in Shansi, the T'ang province of Ho-tung). "Since the destruction of Northern Chi, the gentry (i-huan shih-jen 衣冠士人) have mostly moved to Kuan-nei (equals: Kuan-chung). Only artisans, merchants and 'music houses' (yuheh-hu 絲絃) have filled up the cities. As a result the people are glib-tongued and even to the present are fond of litigation." Dr. Waley (loc.cit.) also remarks that the wealthier and more successful members of the Five families had probably moved west but feels that their poorer and less successful relatives may have remained and nourished resentment. It may be so but I have found no evidence for it. Something no doubt related to the aristocratic pretensions of the Five Families, the pride
of the Ho-pei people (see page 125), probably contributed to the rebellious sentiments of the region. But that is not the same thing as saying that 


6) According to the Ch'ao-yeh Ch'ien-ts'ai, when the Khitan leader was besieging Yu Chou in 697 he sent a message to the Chinese court, saying, "Why don't you bring back our Prince of Lu-ling (i.e. Chung-tsung)?" This story is also related in TCTC Sheng-li 1/ after 2/i-wei (698). The Ch'ao-yeh under this date quotes a slightly longer version of this story from the Ch'ao-yeh Ch'ien-ts'ai and it is clear that the latter is the sole ultimate authority for it. The story is in both works explicitly connected with the restoration of Chung-tsung as Crown Prince. There is other clear evidence to show that the troubles in Ho-pei were one of the chief reasons for this restoration. It occurred just at the most dangerous time of the Turkish invasion of 698, when Mo-ch'o's men had penetrated deep into Ho-pei and taken Chao Chou. (CTS 6.6.b; TCTC Sheng-li 1 (698)/9/jen-shen) The restored Crown Prince was immediately made Commander-in-Chief of the Ho-pei Expeditionary Army (TCTC Sheng-li 1/9/chia-hsü). The effect this appointment is said to have had on recruiting may involve rhetorical exaggeration but is probably not wholly unfounded. (TCTC loc.cit.; Ch'ao-yeh Ch'ien-ts'ai loc.cit.; CTS 186B.8.b, biography of Chi Hsü) (cf. Ku Chi-kuang, op. cit., p.209, n.34.}

The Ch'ao-yeh Ch'ien-ts'ai was written by Chang Cho 張凝, a noted litterateur of the time of the Empress Wu. He was a Chin-shih of 679 and lived well into the reign of Hsüan-tsung. He was thus a contemporary of these events. This work originally contained twenty (HTS 58.2.a., L-wen Chih) chüan and in addition there was a work on the same name called the Ch'ien-ts'ai Pu-i, which several versions seem to be now current, none of them all complete. The one included in the Ssu-k'u Ch'üan-shu and the edition of the Ts'ung-shu Chi-ch'eng, based on the Pao-yen T'ang Pi-chi, contain six chüan. The author of the article mentions that a few matters from late T'ang appear in the work and suggests that they must have been incorporated into the work from the Pu-i. Although the jottings and anecdotes are frequently concerned with omens, dreams and other marvels, there is much that seems to be reliable. (CTS 140.9.b, biography of Cho's grandson, Chien; Ssu-k'u Ch'üan-shu Tsung-mu 140.2.a and 135.2.b (on another work by Cho, the Lung Chin Feng Sui P'an 龍筋鳳髓))
7) CTS 5.2.b states that in 669, 28,200 Korean families were moved to Chiang-huai (i.e. Chiang-nan and Huai-nan), Shan-nan and the region west of Chang-an. Cf. THY 95, p. 1709. T'ung-tien 7.3.a and TFYK 486.12.a give the much larger figure of 697,200 families and this is accepted by T'ao Hsi-sheng and Ch'ung-yuan in T'ang-tai Ching-chi Shih, p.15 and p.31 n.4. The pen-chi of the Chiu T'ang-shu (loc.cit.) gives 697,000 households as the total population of the conquered territory and the figures given in the T'ung-tien and the Ts'e-fu Yulan-kuei are probably the result of a confusion with this.

8) See Ku Chi-kuang, op. cit. pp.206-7. The places cited by him in support of this contention are HTS 97.1.b, biography of Wei Ch'eng, TCTC Wu-te 4 (621)/7/ting-mao, and after ku-jyu, Chen-kuan 1 (627)/end of the year (cf. CTS 78.6.b, biography of Chang Hsing-ch'eng), Chen-kuan 18 (644)/11/jen-shen.

9) See Ku Chi-kuang, op. cit., pp.201-203, and T'ang Che-ch'ung Fu Kao Chiao-pu, Erh-shih-wu Shih Pu-pien, vol. IV, pp.7643-4. Tu Ch'ia, T'ang-tai Fu-ping K'ao, pp.17-20, shows that references to militia units in Ho-pei are found on inscriptions dating from early in the dynasty. Mr. Ku has recognized this for two units (p.203, n.18) but Mr. Tu shows that at least sixteen existed before 730, the year in which Mr. Ku thinks the bulk of those in Ho-pei were established, and that several are attested in the seventh century. Mr. Ku's argument is based primarily on a passage in the Hui-yao (i.e. the work by Su Mien which formed the basis for the T'ang Hui-yao—see des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.92) contained in Yu-hai 138,13.b, which says that fu-ping were not established in Ho-pei because of the bravery of the people. It probably merely means that fewer fu were established than might have been expected. It does not seem necessary here to deal with the rest of Mr. Ku's argument which has been examined by Mr. Tu.

10) See Ku Chi-kuang, T'ang Che-ch'ung & Fu K'ao Chiao-pu, pp.7658 and 7660, and Map I.

11) The following invasions of Ho-pei are recorded in the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien:

(a) T'iao-lo 1 (679)/10/. The Northern Turk, A-shih-te Wen-fu 古史德温偉 revolted at Shan-yü Tu-hu-fu. He defeated an army led against him and then raided Ting 定 Chou in Ho-pei. They left or were driven off by the prefect, Li Yuan-kuei 孫元九, Prince of Huo 奧. It is significant that a man of the prefecture was executed for plotting with the Turks and that others were pardoned. It is further significant that armies were sent to camp at the two strategic points between Ho-pei and the rest of China, namely the
Ching-ching 井陉 Pass from Ch'ang Chou into Ho-tung, and the Lung-men 龙门, the main ford across the Yellow River. The Turks in conjunction with the Hsi and the Khitan also raided Ying Chou but were driven off.

(b) Hung-tao 1/7/keng-wu (683). Turks under their Kagan Kutlug raided Ting Chou and were again driven off by Prince Huo. Fifth month, 謇胥, Kutlug raided 黄州 and killed the prefect.

(c) Ch'ui-kung 3 (687) 7/ping-chen. Kutlug raided Ch'ang-p'ing 常平, a county under Yu Chou.

12) The sequence of events in this affair was briefly as follows:

696 -- The Khitan king Li Chin-chung 李顯忠 and his minister, Sun Wan-jung 孫萬鍾, revolted from the oppressive and inhumane government of the Chinese governor at Ying Chou and captured the city. An expedition was hastily sent out against them but the Chinese were twice heavily defeated near P'ing Chou. The Khitan captured seals of command of the general and sent a forged order for reinforcements. These were ambushed and the whole army was lost. The court was now in great alarm and ordered the enlistment of slaves and convicts into the army and the establishment of local militia units in Ho-pei. The Kagan of the Northern Turks, Mo-ch'o, fearing the rise of another nomad power on his flank, now offered peace to the Chinese, promising to put down the Khitan. This dubious assistance was gratefully accepted. Mo-ch'o then raided the Khitan's rear base and took prisoner the wives and children of the chiefs. Meanwhile Li Chin-chung had died. Sun Wan-jung led his forces into Ho-pei, took Chao Chou and Ying Chou and then retired.

697 -- Sun Wan-jung defeated the vanguard of another Chinese expedition 黃 near P'ing Chou. The main body did not dare to venture out from Yu Chou and the Khitan sacked towns round about. Another Chinese force was coming up in the rear but the commander, Wu I-tsung, a relative of the empress, was afraid and did not dare advance beyond Tsang 薩 Chou. The Khitan advanced and took Chao Chou. Meanwhile Sun Wan-jung had sent envoys to Mo-ch'o to persuade him to join forces and attack Ho-pei. Instead Mo-ch'o made the envoys guide him to Sun's newly built secret stronghold in Manchuria. This Mo-ch'o captured and with it all the loot which the Khitans had taken on their campaigns. When news of this reached Sun Wan-jung, his Hsi allies revolted and they with the Chinese army routed the Khitan. The Khitan and Hsi then 黃 submitted to the Turks. Wu I-tsung treated the people of Ho-pei with great cruelty on the grounds that they had helped the rebels but others pleaded for clemency.

698 -- Mo-ch'o rejected a Chinese embassy and himself invaded Ho-pei. He took Kuei Chou, T'an 蘭 and Ting Chou and then went on to besiege Chao Chou. The city was
surrendered to him by the Deputy-Prefect (Ch'ang-shih). An expedition was sent against Mo-ch'o under the titular command of Chung-tsung, who was restored to the position of Crown Prince. Mo-ch'o massacred his prisoners and went back north of the Gobi desert without molestation. Ti Jen-chieh was made Commissioner for Pacifying Ho-pei and managed to bring peace to the province by exercising strict discipline over his army and showing clemency to the people.

13) TCTC Shen-kung 1 (697)/6/hsin-mao ff.

14) CTS 89.5.a. Cf. TCTC Sheng-li 1 (698)/10/kuei-mao.

15) See for instance Appendix III.


18) Cf. Chao Chou Ying-t'ao Ling Li Huai-jen Te-cheng Pei 趙州魏陶令李懷仁德政碑, by Chang Chia-chen 張嘉臣, Ch'üan T'ang Wen 299,18.a; Inscription by Hsiu An-ch'en 徐安臣 in honour of the good government at T'ien Chou of T'ien- chen 前陳, Ch'üan T'ang Wen 305.5.b.

19) For the traditional reputation of the people of Ho-pei see Shih Chi 12.9/19-30 (compare Han Shu Pu-chu 28.64.b) and Sui Shu 30.2.b, Ti-li Chih. Cf. Nancy Lee Swann, Food and Men in Ancient China, p.p. 441-442.

The inscription written by Wang Wei 王維 in honour of the good government of Miao Chin-ch'ing 萬卿 of Ho-pei in the years 744-6 seems to attribute the same sort of character to the Ho-pei people but does so in allusive terms derived from ancient stories about the province. By itself, therefore, it would not provide very reliable evidence about the actual conditions at that time. (Wang Tso-ch'eng Chi 22.1.a)

20) After being dismissed from the Chief Ministership in 713 Chang Yüeh was successively Prefect of Hsiang Chou, of Yuëh Chou and of Yu Chou. In 719 he was transferred to Ping Chou (T'ai-yüan). He must therefore have been in Yu Chou in 718 and possibly a year or so before. (CTS 97.8.a) While he was prefect of Yu Chou he sent a memorial concerning the military situation in which he said, "Although the Nine Surnames (i.e. the Thibö confederacy which had surrendered in 716 (TCTC K'ai-yüan 4/6/kuei-yü) and been placed under Ping Chou in 718 (TCTC K'ai-yüan 6/2/wu-tzu) are attached to Ping Chou yet they are very close to Yu Chou. If there is an uprising what may not occur? I know very well that the forces at Yu Chou are small and weak. If
one wished to marshal them suddenly they would not be effective. There is no adequate provision of grain stored in the city. I am truly concerned lest the situation become critical. (Chang Yen-kung Chi 9, p.107).

21) When Sung Ch'ing-li 重慶禮 re-established Ying Chou in 717 he opened over 30 military colonies (t'un-t'ien) (TCTC K'ai-yuan 5/3/keng-hsun). Later Chang Yüeh requested that t'un-t'ien should be established in Ho-pei (Ch'ing Chih T'un-t'ien Piao 請置屯田表, Chang-Yen-kung Chi 9, p.98). He was probably in Yu Chou when he wrote this which would place the date around 718 (see note 20).

22) After 739 the Military Governor of Yu Chou bore among his titles that of Commissioner for Sea Transport for Ho-pei (Ho-pei Hai-yun Shih 河北海軍使) (THY 78, p.1429). Two poems of Tu Fu 杜甫 refer to the transport of supplies across the sea to the armies at Yu Chou. The poem Hou Ch'u Sai 後出塞 (Tu Shao-ling Chi Hsiang-chu 4 (Ts'e 3, p.19)) contains the stanza

Florence Ayscough: "Sail clouds pass over Liao Sea, Laden with keng rice, pearl rice, from East Wu. Openwork silk gauze from Yüeh, as well as pure white silk of Ch'ü Shine bright on the backs of chair-bearers and low menials." (Tu Fu, p.185) The poem Hei Yü 舍怨 (Ch'üan T'ang Shih 8.33.b) contains the stanza 供給屯軍, 劢門轉粟帛, 灑海陵蓬萊, "In Yu and Yen great armies were maintained and laborious it was to supply them. From Wu-men (Su 汝 Chou, present Wu Hsien) were transported grain and silk, carried over the sea across P'eng-lai (the mythical island in the Gulf of Po-hai)." Cf. Yu Ta-kang, CYYV 5.1 (1935) pp.84-85.

23) In 707 Chiang Shih-tu as Prefect of Ts'ang 湖南 Chou 忻 redraw an old canal parallel to the sea to avoid the dangers of sea transport. (THY 87, p.1596) In 740 the Prefect of Wei 魏 Chou, Lu Hui 劉時 brought a canal from the Pien Canal to Wei Chou for the transport of goods from Chiang-huai, presumably on their way to the north-east frontier. (THY 87, p.1597)

24) TCTC K'ai-yuan 22x 20/9ji-ssu; CTS 199B.11.b.

25) CTS 199B.11.b.

26) CTS 185B.5.a, biography of Sung Ch'ing-li.

27) ALSSC a 10.a.
1) According to Aoyama, Shina Rekidai Chimei Yoran, p.490, Na-lu Shan was in the territory of the To-yen Wei of the early Ming dynasty. This in turn was 'north of the Shira Muren' (p.387). I base my location of this mountain on the accompanying sketch map on the position shown for the To-yen Wei in Shina Kyôiki Enkaku, Map 15. Cf. Chapter 2 note 63.

2) It is not clear whether or not this obviously barbarian name should be divided into a surname Po and a given name Chen-t'ou-lo. The same man is referred to as a courier in a letter written by Chang Chiu-lung from the court to Wu Chih-i at Ying Chou, which must date from early 736. (Ch'U-chiang Ch'tt-chiang Chi 9.11.11.)

3) Biographies in CTS 99, HTS 131. See Appendix V.

5) The edition of the An Lu-shan Shih-chi in the Ou-hsiang Ling-shih, which I cite, omits the character ping in Ping-ma Shih, but this is supplied both in the edition of the Hsieh-hai Lei-pien and in the Chiu T'ang Shu. On the office of Ping-ma Shih see Chapter 2 note 13.

6) Wang Hu-ssu has no biography. His given name Hu-ssu was a double surname of barbarian origin which appeared in Toba Wei and Northern Chou (Yuan-ho Hsing-tsuan Ssu Chiao-chi, pp. 940-41). There were Wangs among the Kuan-chung aristocracy and it therefore seems quite likely that Wang Hu-ssu was the descendant of a Kuan-chung family, of barbarian or partly barbarian origin, who took up a military career. For documentation on his career see T'ang Fang-chen Nien-piao, Brh-shih-wu Shih Pu-pien pp.7507,7513 and 7383.

7) TCTC K'ai-yüan 28/8/chia-hsiu.

8) The An Lu-shan Shih-chi states that he was given the title of P'ing-lu Ch Ch'ien Chieh-tu Shih, the Chiu T'ang Shu pen-chi says P'ing-lu Ch Ch'ien Chieh-tu Fu Shih, while the biography merely says P'ing-lu Ch Ch'ien Shih. The K'ao-i quotes the T'süan-ts'ung Shih-lu as saying that he was Ch'ien Chieh-tu Fu Ta-shih. The K'ao-i argues that since An Lu-shan was made Ch'ien-tu Shih of P'ing-lu in 742 of Yu Chou and was now made Prefect of Ying Chou and Commissioner for the P'ing-lu, Po-hai and Hei-shui Armies, Fu Ta-shih must in any case be corrupt since this was a
title used by the actual Chieh-tu Shih when an imperial prince was given the honorary title of Chieh-tu Ta-shih. Moreover there was no Hei-shui Army and the Po-hai Army, if it existed at that time (see des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, pp.789-90), was under Yu Chou. Ssu-ma Kuang plausibly supposes that An Lu-shan was Deputy Chieh-tu Shih of Yu Chou at the same time as he was Ping-ma Shih of P'ing-lu and interprets the new title as Commissionaire des forces armées Chieh-tu Army P'ing-lu Chun Shih, Liang-fan, Po-hai, Hei-shui Ssu-fu Ching-1ueh Shih 千戸軍使兩蕃勃海黑水四方經略使 while the latter being a title held by the commander at P'ing-lu (see THY 78, p.1430). Ssu-ma Kuang argues that since we are told that P'ing-lu was only elevated into a Chieh-tu province in 742, An Lu-shan cannot have been made P'ing-lu Chun Chieh-tu Shih in 740 and, moreover, that the T'ang Hui-yao (loc. cit.) must be in error in saying that Wang Hu-ssu was a Chieh-tu Shih at Ying Chou. There is clear evidence, however, that the commander at P'ing-lu, although under the control of the Military Governor at Yu Chou was, at least sometimes, known as Chieh-tu Shih of the P'ing-lu Army before 742. For instance Wu Chih-i was so addressed in a letter of 736 (Ch'iu-chiang-Chi 9.1.b ). Wu T'ing-hsieh 千戸軍使, in T'ang Fang-chen Nien-piao, Erh-shih-wu Shih Pu-pien IV p.7514, points out that the term P'ing-lu Chieh-tu Shih occurs before 742 and thinks that the apparent fact that P'ing-lu was sometimes under Yu Chou is explained on the supposition that at certain times the two posts were held by the same man. It seems quite clear, however, that even when there were separate appointments, as in the case of Wu Chih-i, P'ing-lu was subordinate to Yu Chou. This may have been shown by the fact that we usually find the term P'ing-lu Chun Chieh-tu Shih, Military Governor of the P'ing-lu Army, before 742. Although the evidence is conflicting, it seems natural to suppose that An Lu-shan, who, as Ping-ma Shih of P'ing-lu and Deputy Military Governor of Yu Chou, was already second-in-command at Ying Chou, stepped into Wang Hu-ssu's place when the latter moved up to be Military Governor of Yu Chou.

9) CTS 200A.1.b; ALSSC 1.2.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 1/1/jen-tzu.

10) Biographies in CTS 100, HTS 130. His family came from southern Shansi where they were an illustrious family (chu-hsing 家姓). His father was a minor provincial Prefect but Ku'uan seems to have begun his career without passing an examination. He was one of the assistants who carried out Wu-wen Jung's registration of vagrants in 721. Later, in 733, P'ei Yao-ch'ing had him made Vice-President of the Ministry of Finance. Thereafter he was Governor of Ho-nan, the Eastern Capital, and then of T'ai-yüan, the Northern Capital, before going to the north-east.
13) An Lu-shan was certainly at the capital in the spring of 743, when he helped to reveal the selections scandal. (TCTC T'ien-pao 2/1/-; see note 15). He must also have been at the capital in the spring of 744, for a state banquet was given in his honour when he left to take up his new post as Military Governor of Fan-yang. (ALSSC L.2.a; HTS 225A.1.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 3/3/ch'i-ssu) There is nothing in the sources to indicate that he had been back to his post in the meantime (CTS 200A.1.b abbreviates to such an extent that it appears to date with his coming to court in 742), but it seems improbable that a frontier commander would be allowed to remain for over a year at the capital and we probably have to do with two separate visits.

14) ALSSC L.2.b and TCTC T'ien-pao 2/1/- record that when An Lu-shan came to court in 743 he reported that in the seventh month of the previous year there had been a plague of purple insects which had eaten the sprouting grain. He had prayed that if he were not loyal, the insects should eat his heart; but that if he were loyal, the insects should be dispersed. Suddenly a flock of birds with red heads and blue bodies had appeared and eaten the insects. He begged that this should be reported to the History Office and Hssien-tsung graciously consented. Such a bizarre proof of loyalty would probably have served to rouse suspicion rather than to ally them. In fact it is clearly a later attempt to illustrate the perfidy of An Lu-shan's character. In the Wu-hsing Chih of the Old T'ang History (ch.37.11.b) it is reported that in Kuei Chou (south-west of present Kuei Hsien in Kuanghsii) in 744 purple insects had been eating the sprouts when a flock of red birds flew from the north-east and ate them. This is much too close to be coincidence and has evidently furnished the basis for the anecdote about An Lu-shan.

15) CTS 113.1.a,b; ALSSC L.2.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 2/1/-

16) CTS 103.5.b ff. Cf. Appendix V.

17) CTS 103.6.a; TCTC K'ai-yüan 24/10/t'ing-mao. A letter from the government congratulating Miu Hsien-k'o on the state of the stores is included in Ch'iu-chiang Ch'i 8.3.b. Chang
Li-chen 張利貞, who was sent to investigate the report about Niu Hsien-k'ou, later recommended An Lu-shan when Ho-pei Ts'ai-fang Shih in 741 (ALSSC 2.2.a).

18) See Chapter 3 notes 67 and 68.


20) THY 59, p.1020; 58, p.1011; HTS 51.3.b

21) In 766 Yen Chen-ch'ing sent a memorial of protest against a proposal of the dictator Yuan Ts'ai that all memorials on public affairs should pass through the hands of the high officials. Discussing past practice, he said, "T'ai-tsung... established a Regulation for Guarding the Gates (Ssu-men Shih 士門式): 'If there is any man without a gate pass (wu men-ch'i無門籍) who has an urgent matter to report, let the officers in charge of guarding the gate (chien-men ssu) and the bodyguards (chang-chia仗家) bring him in without hindrance, that abuses may be prevented!... After T'ien-pao Li Lin-fu's power became greater day by day, if any official memorialized without first asking the Chief Ministers, he would attack him on some pretext. But even so he did not dare openly to restrain the officials and order them to inform the Chief Ministers." (CTS 128.7.a; Yen Lukiung Chi 2.3.a)

22) Huang-fu Wei-ming has no biography, and I do not know whether he belonged to a noble family. In 730 he had held the office of Companion (Yu友) to Prince Chung, the prince who had now become Crown Prince (TCTC K'ai-ying K'ai 18/9/ting-ssu). In 732 he was a colonel (lang-chiang) in the Left Guard. He was appointed acting Censor in Attendance and Commissioner for the Ch'ang-ch'un Palace (where there were agricultural colonies --ying-t'ien. See Chapter 3 note 44). (THY 59, p.1038) In 742 he had become Military Governor in Lung-yu (TCTC T'ien-pao 1/12; cf. T'ang Fang-ch'en Nien-piao, Erh-shih-wu Shih Fu-pien [p.7500].

23) P'ei Tun-fu has no biography. He appears to have had some connection with P'ei K'uan and it is quite likely that he belonged to one of the noble P'ei clans. There is a curious conflict of evidence about P'ei Tun-fu's suppression of the pirates. According to the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien he was transferred from the post of Governor of Ho-nan (ie. Loyang) to deal with the pirates in the second month of T'ien-pao 2. He reported victory in the fourth month of the same year. According to the pen-chi of the Chiu T'ang Shu (9.6.a) however, he died in the second month of T'ien-pao and the credit for the victory over the pirates is given to the Prefect of Nan-hai Commandery (Kuang Chou, i.e. Canton). P'ei Tun-fu is mentioned several times after this in the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien with circumstantial detail and
also in CTS 100.12.b, biography of P'ei K'uan; CTS 99.9.b, biography of Li Shih-chih. Moreover the pen-chi itself again mentions him at the beginning of T'ien-pao 6 (9.7.a)! It seems that the report of his death in 743 was greatly exaggerated.

24) CTS 99.9.a; TCTC T'ien-pao 5/1/i-ch'ou.
25) CTS 100.12.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 3/12/kuei-ssu.
27) TCTC T'ien-pao 4/6/hsin-hai; CTS 186B.2.b, biography of Chi Wen. Cf. the decree of admonition given to the 3 officials of the Ministry of War.
28) CTS 105.5.a; TCTC T'ien-pao 4/9/kuei-wei.
29) TCTC K'ai-yüan 25/4/i-ch'ou; CTS 9.1.b; 107.2.a; 106.2.b.
30) TCTC K'ai-yüan 25/12/ping-wu; CTS 9.1.b; 51.10.b; 106.2.b.
31) TCTC K'ai-yüan 26/6/keng-tzu; CTS 9.2.a; 10.1.a; 106.2.b.
32) See p.66 ff.
33) This is how the study is reconstructed by the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien T'ien-pao 5/1/i-ch'ou. CTS 105.5.a, biography of Wei Chien, merely mentions a meeting between Wei Chien and Huang-fu Wei-ming. CTS 106.3.a, biography of Li Lin-fu, says that Yang Shen-ch'in reported to Li Lin-fu a visit of the Crown Prince to Wei Chien. CTS 106.5.a says that Yang Shen-ch'in reported a meeting between all three. It is perhaps more likely that this last is correct and that the T'ung-chien merely joined together the first two accounts. However, according to the K'ao-i, Ssu-ma Kuang was here following the T'ang-li, so he may have had additional information.
34) CTS 9.6.b; 105.5.a; TCTC T'ien-pao 5/1/i-ch'ou.
36) CTS 9.6.b; 97.12.a, biography of Ch'en Hsi-lieh; 106.2.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 5/4/keng-yin. Cf. Appendix V.
37) TCTC 5/7/ping-tzu; CTS 9.6.b; 99.9.a; 105.5.a. TFKK1589 contains the decree of T'ien-pao 5/7 degrading Wei Chien. The ostensible charge is receiving bribes.
38) CTS 112; HTS 78. Cf. Appendix V

39) I have found no other information about Tu Yu-lin, Liu Chi and Wang Tseng.

40) TCTC T'ien-pao 5/11/after i-ssu; CTS 9.7.a; 106.3.a; 186B.3.a, biography of Chi Wen. The decree ordering the punishment of Liu Chi and the others is in T'ang Ta Chao-lin-

41) TCTC T'ien-pao 5/12/chia-hsü ff.; CTS 9.7.a; 106.3.a; 186B.5.a, biography of Lo Hsi-shih. The biography of Wei Chien (CTS 105.5.a) states that Lo Hsi-shih caused Wei to commit suicide in the tenth month of T'ien-pao 5, that is before the trial of Liu Chi et al. In the twelfth month of that same year Lo Hsi-shih was sent to apprehend Li Yung at Pei-hai Commandery (Ch'ing Chou, present I-tu Hsien in Shantung). It is perhaps not impossible, but hardly likely, that he could have made the journey down to Ling-nan and back in less than two months. I therefore follow the other sources in placing the death of Wei Chien after the trial of Liu Chi.

42) CTS 100.3.a.

43) CTS 9.7.a; TCTC T'ien-pao 6/1/wu-tzu.

44) TCTC T'ien-pao 6/11/hsin-mao; CTS 9.7.b; 105.6.b; 106.3.a; 186B.3.a; T'ang Ta Chao-lin decree ordering the death of Yang Ch'en-ch'i

45) TCTC T'ien-pao 6/10/after chi-yu; CTS 103.6.b, biography of Wang Chung-ssu; 104.6.a, biography of Ko-shu Han. Wang Chung-ssu also has a biography in HTS 133. See also the memorial inscription in Chin-shih Ts'ui-pien 100. In TCTC T'ien-pao 6/1/wu-yin a story is told of how Wang Chung-ssu once accused An Lu-shan of rebellious intentions. While Military Governor of Ho-tung he allegedly once asked for co-operation from An Lu-shan's army. An Lu-shan failed to arrive and Wang Chung-ssu reported his suspicions to the emperor. This story does not appear in the Chiu T'ang Shu biography. It is certainly a later invention.

46) According to the Genealogical Tables of the Hsin T'ang Shu (71A.34.b), the biography of Yang Kuo-chung in the HTS 206 and TCTC T'ien-pao 4/3/kuei-mao, Yang Kuo-chung and Yang Kuei-fei were second cousins. The epithaph of Kuo-chung's father seen by Wang Ming-sheng (see note 47) said that Kuo-chung's grandfather was Chih-ch'i'en, who was also Kuei-fei's grandfather, thus making them first cousins. Wang Ming-sheng argues that this was a deliberate deception in order to make his relation-
ship to the favourite closer. ([Shih-ch'i Shih Shang-ch'i] Meh, 85, pp. 92-96.)

47) There is no doubt the basis of a story that Yang Kuo-chung was an illegitimate son of Chang I-chih which Ssu-ma Kuang quotes from a collection of anecdotes called the T'ien-pao Ku-shih and rightly rejects ([K'ai T'ien-pao 9/10/before keng-ch'en]. HTS 206.) states that Kuo-chung was Chang I-chih's issue (ch'iu) and thus seems to accept the story. HTS 106.4.b states that he was Chang I-chih's nephew and this is confirmed by the inscription written for his father Hsün ya by Hsün-tsung himself and set up in 753. The inscription stated that Hsün's wife was from the Chang of Chung-shan 明, where Chang I-chih's family came from. I have not found this inscription published entire but it was seen and discussed by Wang Ming-sheng 王明생 (1722-98). See [Shih-ch'i Shih Shang-ch'i] Meh 86, pp. 92-96.

47) HTS 78, biographies of Chang Hsing-ch'eng and his sons. They also have biographies in HTS 104.

48) Yang Kuo-chung's original name was Chao 陳. He was given the name Kuo-chung by the emperor in 750 (T′CTC T'ien-pao 9/10/keng-ch'en). T′CTC Yang Kuo-chung has biographies in HTS 106 and HTS 206. The account of him here given is based on the Chiu T'ang Shu and on the Tzu-chih Chung-chien, T'ien-pao 4/8/kuei-mao which has added considerably to the former, apparently from the T'ang Li and other sources. (N.B K'ao-i)

49) HTS 9.6.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 4/3/jen-shen; TFYK

50) HTS 9.6.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 4/9/after kuei-wei; ALSSC 1.3.a.

51) TCTC 5/4/kuei-wei; HTS 199B.8.b; TFYK

52) HTS 190B, biographies of writers (Wen-yüan 文苑); HTS 128. His name Yu was the same as that of Tai-tsung and he is therefore sometimes referred to by his Tzu Chien-hou 章.

53) ALSSC 1.3.a; HTS 200A.1.b.

54) HTS 200A.1.b; ALSSC 1.3.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 6/1/wu-bin.

55) See p. 82.

57) CTS 9.2.a; 106.2.b; TCTC K'ai-yüan 26/1/jen-ch'en; 2/i-mao; 5/1-yu; and cf. T'ang Fang-ch'en Nien-piao, Erh-shih-wu Shih Pu-pien IV pp. 7503, 7500, 7358.

58) TCTC K'ai-yüan 28/11/ and CTS 9.3.b record the end of Niü Hsien-k'ou's Military Governorships. Li Lin-fu's biography (CTS 106.2.b) speaks as if he held Military Governorships until 742, but in 740 Kai Chia-yün was appointed Military Governor of Lung-yü and Ho-hsi (TCTC K'ai-yüan 28/6/–).

59) TCTC end of T'ien-pao 6; ALSSC 1.3.b; CTS 106.3.b.

60) The Yüan-ho Hsing-tsuän says of the surname Fu-meng, "It was originally a surname of the Western Ch'iang.... Now (i.e. at the beginning of the ninth century) there are many of this surname in Hua Chou and T'ung Nü Chou (east of Ch'ang-an). They sometimes change the surname to Ma 玛." (Yüan-ho Hsing-tsuän Ssu-Chiao-chi p. 230). Fu-meng Ling-ch'a is sometimes referred to as Ma Ling-ch'a. He has no biography. See CTS 104, biography of Kao Hsien-chih; TCTC Chih-te 1 (756)/4/ting-wu, with commentary of Hu San-ssu; T'ang Fang-ch'en Nien-piao, Erh-shih-wu Shih Pu-pien V p. 7507–8.


62) In 750 An Ssu-shun was made Military Governor of Shuo-fang (TCTC T'ien-pao 9/3/kuei-hai) and in 751 An Lu-shan was made Military Governor of Ho-tung (see p. 155).

63) ALSSC 1.3.b; CTS 200A.1.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 10/2/ting-ch'en; HTS 134. An Lu-shan became President of the Censorate in 747 (p. 148), Wang Hung in 750 (HTS loc. cit.).

64) ALSSC 1.4.a; CTS 200A.1.b; TCTC loc. cit.

65) ALSSC 1.4.a; CTS 200A.1.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 6/1/wu-yin. These stories with various modifications and accretions appear in several collections of anecdotes.

66) TFYK q7(1.7.a

67) TFYK q71.19.a

68) ALSSC 1.6.a; CTS 9.8.a.

69) TCTC T'ien-pao 9/5/i-mao; ALSSC 1.6.b; CTS 9.8.b.

70) TCTC T'ien-pao 9/8/ting-ssu; ALSSC 1.7.a.

71) TCTC T'ien-pao 9/10/–. The T'ung-chien here relates a slanderous story, also contained in
CTS 200A.2.a, that An Lu-shan habitually captured large
numbers of barbarians by inviting them to feasts and drugging
their wine. This motif is very common in Chinese history.

72) TCTC T'ien-pao 9/10/hsin-wei;

73) TCTC T'ien-pao 10/1/chia-ch'en; ALSSC I .7.b ff.

74) CTS 200A.2.a; TCTC T'ien-pao 10/2/ping-ch'en;
ALSSC I .9.b.

75) TCTC 8/6/hsin-hai; CTS 106.5.b.

76) CTS 200A.2.a; ALSSC I .10.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 10/8/.

77) TCTC T'ien-pao 10/4 after 4/jen-wu.

78) TCTC T'ien-pao 10/4/jen-wu; CTS 197.7.a.

79) CTS 197.xxx 6.b, 7.a; TCTC K'ai-yüan 26/9/ping-shen;
Chü-ch'ang Chi 3.0.a and 11.4.a; letters to the Military
Governor of Chien-nan, Wang Yu 呉.

80) CTS 9.9.a; 106.3.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 10/1/ting-yu.

81) CTS 9.9.a; 106.5.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 10/11/ping-wu.

82) Hsing Tsai was the son of 楚王攻, but neither
father nor son has a biography. One small piece of evidence
suggesting that they may have been connected with the
Crown Prince is the fact that in 737 Hsing 楚 was promoted
from the post of Tsan-shan Ta-fu, which was an office of
the fifth grade in the household of the Crown Prince (CTS 9.1.b

83) On this force see page 105.

84) CTS 105.8.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 11/4/i-yu; 4/wu-tzu;
CTS 9.9.b. The decree sentencing Wang Hung and his brother
is to be found in T'ang Ta Ch'ao-ling 25.

85) TCTC 11/5/ping-ch'en.

86) CTS 106.5.b.

87) TCTC T'ien-pao 11/3/; 4/keng-tzu; CTS 9.9.b;
106.3.b; 106.5.b; ALSSC I .11.a ff.

88) CTS 106.6.a; TCTC T'ien-pao 11/10/chi-hai.

89) CTS 106.4.a; TCTC T'ien-pao 11/10/chi-hai and i-mao;
CTS 9.9.b.

90) CTS 9.10.a; 106.4.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 12/2/kuei-wei.

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### APPENDIX I -- TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An Lu-shan Shih-chi</th>
<th>Chiu T'ang Shu</th>
<th>Hsin T'ang Shu</th>
<th>Su-tsung Shih-lu</th>
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**Notes**

2. The edition of the Hung-hai lei-pien has 个, while that of the Ch'ing Ling shih has only 當. The sense requires 當 as in the Chiu T'ang Shu.
A COMPARISON OF THE TEXTS OF THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES FOR THE BEGINNING OF AN LU-SHAN'S BIOGRAPHY

The text of the passage from the beginning of the An Lu-shan Shih-chi which is translated at the beginning of Chapter 2 is set out on the accompanying table together with the principal texts which parallel it. These are

1. Chiu T'ang Shu (Old T'ang History) ch.200A.1.a,
2. Hsin T'ang Shu (New T'ang History) ch.225A.1.a,
3. Tzu-chih T'ung-chien K'ai-yüan 24/4/hsin-hai,
4. a fragment of the Su-tsung Shih-lu as quoted in the K'ao-i under (3).

From a careful comparison of these parallel texts the following conclusions emerge:

1. The relevant portion of the text of the An Lu-shan Shih-chi is almost identical with the fragment from the Shih-lu. The wording in the Chiu T'ang Shu is changed slightly in a few places but is essentially the same as the Shih-lu. In only one material respect does it differ. It dates the episode in the twentieth year of K'ai-yüan. It is clear from the discussion in the K'ao-i (loc. cit.) that the Shih-lu did not contain this date. Since Chang Shou-kuei did not come to Yu Chou until the twenty-first year, the date would be impossible, as Ssu-ma Kuang points out, even if the episode were not legendary. One is forced to the conclusion that the editors of the Chiu T'ang Shu added this date to the story as told in the
Shih-lu. If the text of the *An Lu-shan Shih-chi* faithfully reproduces the Shih-lu, it stated that Chang Shou-kuei was Military Governor of Fan-yang. This name for the military district only came into use after 742 and in the *Chiu T'ang Shu* Fan-yang has been corrected to Yu Chou. Presumably the date was added at the same time and an error made in the calculation of the beginning of Chang Shou-kuei's period of office.

(2) The rest of the text of the *Chiu T'ang Shu* is very close to the corresponding parts of the *An Lu-shan Shih-chi*, though the wording is sometimes not identical. The *Chiu T'ang Shu* and  has evidently abridged the text in places. From the evidence of (1), together with the other passages dealt with in Chapter 1, I assume that the *Chiu T'ang Shu* is based almost exclusively on the *Su-tsung Shih-lu*. It follows therefore that where the *Chiu T'ang Shu* seems to abridge the *An Lu-shan Shih-chi*, the latter more fully reproduces the Shih-lu.

It remains to deal with (3) the portions of the *An Lu-shan Shih-chi* (chiefly the supernatural elements -- I ignore Yao Ju-neng's citations of other documents) which are entirely absent from the *Chiu T'ang Shu*, and (4) the few items in the *Chiu T'ang Shu* which are not in the *An Lu-shan Shih-chi*.

(3) In giving the explanation of the name Ya-lo-shan, the *Chiu T'ang Shu* uses a sentence which is identical with the *An Lu-shan Shih-chi* except for the omission by the
former of one significant character. "The Turks call
\[the god of\] battle Ya-la-shan." This is highly suggestive.
Evidently the editor of the Chiu T'ang Shu had the myth
before him in his source but would not accept obviously
supernatural elements. I have shown in Chapter 2 that this
conclusion is supported by other evidence. Sung Ch'i 宋祁, who was responsible for the biographies in the Hsien T'ang
Shu, was less rationalistic.

(4) Besides minor changes of wording the Chiu T'ang
Shu contains two additions of substance to the text as it
appears in the An Lu-shan Shih-chi.

(a) The An Lu-shan Shih-chi makes no mention of
Yen-yen's going to China but the Chiu T'ang Shu (and the
Hsien T'ang Shu) state clearly that he did. We know that
the An Lu-shan Shih-chi in general preserves the text of
the Shih-lu more accurately than the Chiu T'ang Shu but
it too does make slight changes and omissions. We cannot
therefore say positively on that basis alone that the
Chiu T'ang Shu has added the characters 及延 in line 13.
On the other hand it may be plausibly argued that the
Chiu T'ang Shu's editor may have added these characters in
the interests of (supposed) clarity. The story of An Lu-
shan's supernatural birth and the true account of his arrival
in China existed side by side in the Su-tsun Shih-lu. Though
obvious discrepancies were no doubt removed, it would not
be surprising if they should not harmonize entirely.
When the editor of the *Chiū T'ang Shu* read, "Because they came with his elder brother, Chen-chieh felt grateful and made a pact of brotherhood with Lu-shan and Ssu-shun", he may have felt that a person of such obscure origin as Lu-shan could not have commanded such attentions in his own right. So he assumed that it was because his step-father, Yen-yen, whom he supposed to have come with the party, and to make the text more understandable he added the words "and Yen-yen" after "elder brother". With this addition in the *Chiū T'ang Shu* and no explicit statement that Yen-yen did not come to China, it would not be surprising that Sung Ch'i, who was much freer in his handling of his sources, stated explicitly that Yen (Sic) brought An Lu-shan to China. This rather elaborate conjecture would at least have the advantage of agreeing with the suggestions (admittedly nothing more) from independent sources that Yen-yen did not come to China—namely, (a) the omission of any reference to his coming in the decree conferring posthumous honours on him (p.12), (b) the fact that the memorial of Shao Yüeh (p.20) could ignore him completely and say that An Lu-shan had been adopted by his uncle An Po-chu.

(b) The *An Lu-shan Shih-chi* omits the story that An Lu-shan was afraid to eat his fill because of Chang Shou-kuei's dislike of his fatness. There seems to be no good reason why Yao Ju-neng should have omitted this story if he had known of it but on the other hand it fits without a break into the narrative in the *Chiū T'ang Shu*
and it is moreover difficult to imagine that the editor of the Chiu T'ang Shu went outside the Su-tsung Shih-lu for this one trivial anecdote. It is possible that it has dropped out of the An Lu-shan Shih-chi in the course of its transmission.

The text of the Hsin T'ang Shu has been included as an illustration of the way in which Sung Ch'i treated his sources. The Tzu-chih T'ung-chien, though drastically abridging the text, contains the important variant 阿 for 在 in An Lu-shan's boyhood name.
### APPENDIX II

**CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION**

**FROM SUI TO MID-T'ANG**

**Table I -- Households**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Sui</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>T'ang</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-chung</td>
<td>906,121</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>819,195</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho-nan</td>
<td>2,679,440</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>1,836,561</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho-tung</td>
<td>867,340</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>630,511</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho-pei</td>
<td>2,215,325</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>1,487,503</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shan-nan Tung</td>
<td>526,803</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>324,844</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shan-nan Hsi</td>
<td>156,669</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>285,483</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lung-yu</td>
<td>165,474</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>121,413</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huai-nan</td>
<td>404,481</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>390,583</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang-nan Tung</td>
<td>162,261</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1,101,450</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang-nan Hsi</td>
<td>132,407</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>605,254</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ien-chung</td>
<td>10,000x</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>29,433</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chien-nan</td>
<td>361,769</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>937,124</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ling-nan</td>
<td>371,701</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>383,980</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>9,069,791</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8,958,334</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table II -- Individuals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Sui</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>T'ang</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Average Household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-chung</td>
<td>4,830,000</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>4,654,766</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho-nan</td>
<td>14,290,000</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>11,278,695</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>6.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho-tung</td>
<td>4,630,000</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>3,723,217</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ho-pei</td>
<td>11,820,000</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>10,230,972</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>6.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shan-nan Tung</td>
<td>2,760,000</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1,530,825</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shan-nan Hsi</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>984,624</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
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<td>Lung-yu</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>536,361</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huai-nan</td>
<td>2,360,000</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>2,275,380</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.82</td>
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<td>Chiang-nan Tung</td>
<td>990,000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>6,715,977</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>6.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiang-nan Hsi</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
<td>1,683,972</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ien-chung</td>
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<td>.1</td>
<td>159,779</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chien-nan</td>
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<td>3.4</td>
<td>4,099,826</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ling-nan</td>
<td>1,110,000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1,161,149</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>46,800,000</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>51,035,543</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table I shows side by side the population by households for the height of the Sui dynasty in or around 609 and for the height of the T'ang in the period 742-755. Table II shows the number of individuals in the T'ang census set side by side estimated totals for individuals in Sui. Un-
fortunately the number of individuals is not given for each commandery in the Sui census. In the preface to the Geographical Monograph (Ti-li Chih) of the Sui Shu, in which the census appears, however, the following totals are given for the year 609: 8,907,546 households, 46,019,956 individuals. This gives 5.16 as the average size of a household. If we apply this to the total of 9,069,791 households obtained by adding together the figures under the separate commanderies, we get approximately 46,800,000 for the total number of individuals. It is possible that the census recorded in the body of the monograph does not date from 609 -- it is even possible that all the figures are not from the same year. Alternatively one might suppose that the figures given in the preface were incomplete. In any case the discrepancy is less than 2% and it seems reasonable to assume that 9,069,791 households represented about 46,800,000 individuals.

A more difficult problem arises when we attempt to decide how this population was distributed among the provinces. Any decision must be somewhat arbitrary. On grounds which I shall attempt to justify below I have adopted the following procedure. (a) For the southern and peripheral provinces, i.e. Lung-yu, Chien-nan, Shan-nan, Huai-nan, Chiang-nan and Ling-nan, I have used the average household sizes which are revealed in the T'ang census. (b) I have made no attempt to postulate any difference in average household size among the four main northern provinces of Kuan-chung, Ho-nan,
Ho-tung and Ho-pei. I therefore divide the remaining individuals among them on the basis of the number of households in each. This gives an average household size of 5.33. It will be seen that the percentage relationships of the provinces are only slightly altered as compared with the percentages calculated on the basis of households alone.

The following conclusions can be drawn from these two tables. (1) The populations of all the northern provinces had decreased from Sui to T'ang. That of the capital province of Kuan-chung had decreased least, by about 4%. Ho-pei had decreased by about 14%, Ho-nan and Ho-tung by about 20% each. These estimates may, of course be individually distorted by the failure to take into account differences of family size among the four provinces. Thus one might suggest that Ho-pei, which had the highest family size under T'ang and where we have reason to believe that family feeling was particularly strong, had more than 5.33 individuals per household under Sui. Knowing as we do, of the disturbances there at the end of the seventh century we might expect it to have accounted for a rather higher proportion of the loss of population in the north.

(2) Chiang-nan as a whole was nearly five times as populous in 742-55 as in 609. The most spectacular growth was in Chiang-nan Tung where the population had increased by 870%. The south-western province of Chien-nan had also grown tremendously to about two and a half times its former
(3) The far southern province of Ling-nan had remained almost stationary.

(4) The relative balance of population between south and north had completely altered. In Sui over three-quarters of the population had lived in the four provinces of Kuan-chung, Ho-nan, Ho-tung and Ho-pei. By the middle of T'ang they represented only about 58%. In Sui the Chiang-huai region had only accounted for about 10% of the population and Chiang-nan alone for less than 5%. In mid-T'ang the two together made up about 25% of the whole and Chiang-nan alone, over 20%. Chien-nan had increased from 3.4% to 3%.

If we look at the distribution of population within the northern provinces, we see even more clearly the agricultural decline of certain regions. While the population of Kuan-chung as a whole had decreased slightly, the Capital Prefecture (Ching-chao Fu) itself had increased from 308,499 households to 362,921 although it covered a smaller area. According to our system of reckoning it had increased by about 290,000 individuals. Whereas under Sui it had contained less than one-third of the households of Kuan-chung, in mid-T'ang it contained 44%. (In terms of individuals it contained about 42% in T'ang.) On the other hand the total population of the two outlying prefectures of Yen and Tan, which together occupied the territory of the Sui commandery of Yen-an, had decreased from 53,939 households to 34,059. The greater need for imports of food...
to supply the larger urban concentration and to make up for the smaller number of producers is easily understandable.

Places of strategic importance on the frontier had been maintained at about the same level as under Sui, e.g., Ling-wu Commandery 靈武 of Sui with 12,300 households corresponded to Ling Chou of T'ang with 11,456.

In Ho-nan, the Eastern Capital had only slightly fewer households -- 194,746 as compared to 202,230. But the two prefectures of Teng 侍 and Lai 萊 in Shan-tung had together only 49,268 households as compared with 90,350 in Sui. In northern Ho-pei the prefecture of Heng 順, though greater in extent that Heng-shan 常山 Commandery of Sui, had decreased from 177,571 households to only 54,633. The frontier itself, however, had been kept populated, for the prefectures of Yu 余 and Kuei 鬼 which together corresponded to Ch' 丞 Commandery of Sui had only slightly fewer households. The dot maps prepared by Mr. H. Bielenstein in his article The Census of China during the Period 2-742 A.D., though based on a different method of estimating the size of the household in Sui, illustrate more clearly than can such piecemeal comparisons the changes in population distribution within the provinces from Sui to T'ang. It is impossible to compare all the commanderies with corresponding prefectures because of the radical changes in the areas covered by many of them.

In his excellent article, which is of fundamental importance, Mr. Bielenstein has used a different method of estimating the numbers of individuals in Sui which seems to me unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. For the whole region south of the Yangtze and for Szechwan he has used the ratio 6.3 derived from the census of the area immediately around Nanking in the Sung Shu, relating to the year 464. For the north he has graphically computed multipliers for large unitary areas from the figures for 140 A.D given in the Hou Han Shu and those of mid-T'ang.

The most serious objection to Mr. Bielenstein's method is that it results in a total population for Sui of 54,000,000 which is 8,000,000 or 17% more than the total given in the preface to the Geographical Monograph of the Sui Shu. In justification he argues firstly that the population of Sui must have been greater than that of T'ang because of the disturbances at the end of Sui and the later troubles in Ho-pei, secondly that gross figures given without detailed distribution by districts are unreliable because uncheckable and must be completely disregarded. With regard to the first argument it may be wondered whether the great prosperity and peace enjoyed by China as a whole during the first half of T'ang would not have more than made up for the troubles of particular regions, and still more whether the wars of the sixth century must not have been a greater deterrent to population growth than what happened between 609 and mid-T'ang. With regard to the second argument,
one must feel that however unreliable a gross figure for population may be, a figure based entirely on a priori assumptions is even more uncheckable and unreliable. Moreover the figure for households given in the preface to the Geographical Monograph is not greatly different from the total obtained by adding up the separate figures in the body of the monograph, which should give us greater confidence in using the total for individuals.

His grounds for using the multipliers he chooses are not easy to accept. It is surely very dubious to assume a uniform development in the north over the long period 140 A.D. to 742 A.D., even if, as he maintains, the disturbance to the population of the north during the period of division was much less than is generally supposed. For the south the ratio 6.3 is not unsatisfactory for Ch'ieng-nan itself but is demonstrably unsound for 'Ling-nan. With scarcely any more households than in Sui the average size of household in T'ang was only 2.98. If therefore we assumed a family size of over 6 for Sui it would mean that the population of the far south had decreased by about 50%, as is in fact shown by Mr. Bielenstein's maps. There is no warrant for this. Mr. Bielenstein asserts that the size of household must have been greater in the south in Sui than in T'ang because of the immigration which had taken place. He assumes that the principal factor in determining the size of household was the newness or oldness of the
family in that region. However important this factor may have been at certain times and in certain places, it is surely not legitimate to disregard all the other social and economic factors which must have played their part. In the present case it is clearly inapplicable, for in mid-T'ang Chiang-nan had the second highest ratio of individuals to households although it had had a tremendous increase in population, presumably much of it by immigration. On the other hand Ling-nan, the population of which had hardly changed, had the lowest ratio of all. It may be that immigration was a factor in causing the low family size of 4.37 in Chien-nan and that therefore the increase was not as great as I estimate; but Lungyu, with approximately the same average family size, had decreased considerably in population. One therefore hesitates to place much reliance on the principle.

My own method is admittedly arbitrary. It is offered in no absolute sense, but only as an adjustment to the figures as given by households so as to enable what is perhaps a slightly better comparison between the Sui and T'ang distributions. In any case the main conclusions which I have drawn here and in Chapter 3 will not be seriously invalidated by any reasonable treatment of the figures. They are indeed largely those of Mr. Bielenstein.

Remarks on the Tables

The T'ang figures are those of the Hsin T'ang Shu as
presented by Balázs, 1930 xxxiv (1931) p. 14, and checked as to the addition by me. As far as possible I have arranged the Sui figures according to the T'ang provinces, but in the following cases where a Sui commandery occupied territory in two or more T'ang provinces I have been forced to divide the totals arbitrarily between the T'ang provinces as follows. (1) Po-hai 鄭海 Chün -- 122,909 households divided equally between Ho-nan and Ho-pei. (2) Wu-tu 鄭土 Chün -- 10,780 households, two-thirds to Lung-yu and one-third to Chien-nan. (3) Pa-tung 鄭東 Chün -- 21,370 households, 1,742 to Ch'ien-chung, 2,258 to Shan-nan Hsi, 17,370 to Shan-nan Tung. (4) Chiang-tu 山 Chün -- 116,524 households, 75,000 to Huai-nan (because of the city of Yang Chou), 40,524 to Chiang-nan Tung. (5) Pa 鄭 Chün -- 14,423 households, 7,000 to Chien-nan, 7,423 to Shan-nan Tung.

It is possible that the division in (4) is too generous to Huai-nan and that the apparent slight decrease in the population of Huai-nan from Sui to T'ang is unreal. Otherwise the errors introduced by this procedure cannot be very serious.

The figure of 10,000 given for Ch'ien-chung must be considered the roughest approximation. Of the five commanderies which corresponded to this T'ang province, the figures for one are missing altogether (T'ang-k'o) and another was only partly contained in the province (see (3)).
APPENDIX III

TWO DECREES RELATING TO YU-WEN JUNG'S
ATTEMPTS TO REGISTER MIGRANTS

I -- A Decree of 721

The following decree appears in Ch'Yan T'ang Wen 22.6.b where it is undated. It is however clearly the one which the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien resumes briefly under K'ai-yuan 9/3/t'ing-hai (see p.193 (c)). It was issued when Yu-wen Jung was sent out for the first time and represents the attempt to deal sternly with the migrants.

A Decree to Prohibit Runaways in all the Prefectures

Our dynasty honours military prowess as its forefather and civilization as its ancestor. It has multiplied enlightenment and harmony. It has pacified the world to its uttermost limits and provided a great shelter for the people. The Great Virtue worked alone; it released the heavenly power and provided a beginning. The Perfect Way has no name; it united with our imperial forebears and showed the way. Of itself it pacified the realm and standardized the cart tracks and the script. If all within the six directions has been at peace for over one hundred years, it is because our military and civilizing work was inaugurated by the celestial spirits.

I inherit The task of defending the glorious destiny and I continue the great succession. I fear that I cannot extend the earlier splendour or shed lustre on the profound plan. Day and night I am in terror, overlooking
the abyss. When can I ever cease to meditate earnestly upon the Way and to seek for good government even asleep and in my dreams? I follow men's desires and ever concern myself with the masses of the people. I bend myself to my tasks and always have pity on any creature who fails to find his place.

But, since, when laws are long in force they decay, and when laws decay they are infringed, to establish laws is the first requisite in governing a country and to en-register the people is one's task in order to save them. Since we have been in a state of peace, people have become very indolent and dishonest. The laws of the state have sometimes become slack and frauds among the peasants have indeed multiplied. Now, wherever the calendar extends, the lands of our subjects and vassals have no beyond. Yet though the population has grown, the tax revenues show no increase. Men all heedlessly leave their native places and band together to wander in idleness. Sometimes powerful men provide refuge. Sometimes criminal officials make them sacks and bags to hold their loot. The running away grows year by year and the corruption spreads day by day. The prefecture and county officials do not show mercy and the districts and neighbourhoods suffer the harm.

In spite of my shallow virtue, the fault lies on me. It is not only that the superior officials do not exercise government and the junior officials do not keep the law. If the longer there is peace the more one relaxes, then the
defences of the country will fall into ever greater disorder. Now we wish to get rid of the non-essential branches and return to the root, to block up the evil and set right the virtue, so that laws may have their establishment and men may know their direction. In these circumstances we shall have pity on the helpless and destitute, excuse unpaid debts, open the way of self-renewal for the people and cause the utmost benevolence to be extended.

In every prefecture the men who have run away to escape military service shall all be permitted to give themselves up within one hundred days of the day on which this decree arrives, and in accordance with the regulations shall everywhere be enrolled by households.

Those who wish to remain shall be entered directly on the registers and shall be subject to taxation and other imposts according to the regulations for new registrants. In addition the officials shall get in touch with their native places and stop the levying of taxes, etc., there.

As for those who wish to return to their place of registration, and those who, according to the regulations, may not be enrolled where they have settled, when they have given themselves up let a clear record be made and let their original places of registration be informed by letter without waiting until the men themselves are sent. Allow them to wait till after the gathering of the harvest and then be sent back.
Any who wish to return at once shall be allowed to do so. When they arrive in their native districts, this year's taxes and corvée shall be excused them.

If there are a hundred or more households in one group, let an official be sent from their original place of registration to receive an invoice by households.

If any do not give themselves up within the allotted time, let them be immediately taken and sent to distant frontiers and made peasants. Let the members of their families who have followed them into flight also be sent.

As for officials or private persons in the prefectures and counties who allow them to remain within the boundaries after the allotted time or in any matter do not completely comply with this law, let the appropriate authorities make a clear prohibition against it.

As for the collection of tax arrears, of loans of food or seed grain, and of the Land Tax (ti-shui), if demands have previously been sent but not yet paid, let everything before the twelfth month of K'ai-yüan 7 (719) be excused. Concealment and fraud by officials are excluded from the amnesty.

We shall cause all ordinances to be renewed and all lands to enjoy forgiveness; the people to return to their tasks and the officials to perfect their craft. Do all you functionaries be diligent in your offices so that the precepts of the former kings may be followed and the path of govern-
ment may be made firm. Proclaim this near and far that our will may be made known.

Notes

1) The standardization of the written language and of weights and measures, including the width apart of wagon wheels, were among the reforms of Ch'ing Shih-huang-ti, the creator of the first unified Chinese empire. (See E. Chaurettes, Les Memoires historiques de Sa majeste IV. Later these tasks were used as a metaphor to describe the work of founding a new dynasty.

2) The regulations for new registrants were as follows: "As for full adults (ting) who are newly entered on the registers, if they are registered in the spring, let them pay both taxes (k'ao) and corvée (i-fu); if they are registered in the summer let them be excused taxes but pay corvée; if they are registered in the autumn, let both taxes and corvée be excused. (Those who fraudulently conceal themselves in order to escape taxes and corvée shall be subject to the full levy no matter whether they are registered early or late (in the year") (T'ang Liu Tien 3.13.a. Cf. T'ung-tien 6.2.a; Niida, Törei Shu-i p.680.)

3) This presumably refers to the following regulation: "All who live in thickly populated districts may move to thinly populated districts. All who live at a distance from the capital may move nearer. All who live in regions with light corvée may move to regions with heavy. (Those within the Capital Districts (ch'ün-fu) may not at pleasure dwell outside the Capital Districts. Those who live in counties of the capital city may not live in other counties. Those in prefectures where there are militia units (ch'ün-fu) may not live in prefectures where there are no militia units.)" (T'ang Liu Tien 3.10.a; Niida, op. cit., p.237) It was also laid down that if people had two registrations the order of choice should be as follows: (1) frontier prefectures, (2) prefectures in Kuangtung, (3) prefectures with militia units, (4) the earlier registration. (T'ang Liu loc.cit.; Niida, op.cit., p.236)

4) Ling appears to have a technical sense of a list or invoice of goods (in this case persons) given to the official placed in charge of a convoy. Cf. TFK 487. decree of K'ai-yüan 9/10, "When tax grain and cloth (tsu-yung) are sent from the various prefectures of the empire, on the day the convoy leaves the prefecture, an invoice (ling) is provided according to the amount. If, when the convoy reaches the capital the amount in the shipment does not agree with the invoice and there is a deficiency, ...."
5) Ti-shui was the name for the tax of 2 sheng per mou used to provide grain for the T-ts'ang. See page 194, note 35 and page 54.

II -- Decree of 724

The following decree is dated K'ai-yüan 12/6/jen-ch'en in TFYK 70.11.a. In T'ang Ta Chao-ling 111 it is dated in the fifth month. The tone of this decree is quite different from that of 721. Inducement to the peasant has taken the place of threats and peremptory commands.

Decree appointing Commissioners for Encouraging Agriculture

in order to give ease and comfort to the population

He who possesses a state must make men the foundation. To strengthen the foundation he must make food the first consideration. For this reason the former kings strove to keep the three seasons (i.e. spring, summer and autumn); the early sages therefore distinguished the five types of land (shan-lin 山林 'wood and mountain', ch'uan-tse 川澤 'rivers and marshes', ch'iu-ling 丘陵 'hill', yüan-shih 原隰 'level and moist', fen-ven 坡衍 'alluvial') --see Chou Li Ch'eng-i ch.18, ts'5591). The way to encourage agriculture certainly lies in this.

I have been in command of policy and governing the calendar for scarcely more than one cycle of twelve years. In caring for my myriad tasks I have been late for my meals and have dressed before dawn. Thus have I earnestly striven, never daring to take my ease.

In recent years though there has been a certain abundance in the harvests, we still fear that land is not fully utilized and that many of the people have abandoned their occupations. The wandering beggars have not all returned; *Some commentators treat these as ten types of land, but see P'ei-wen Yün-fu under 丘, p.1686.2, quoting Ch'un-ch'ing Ch'ü初 657.52.2 and 53.
the grain-bearing fields are not uniformly cultivated. Because of this we are deeply distressed and have decided to send out commissioners to show mercy to the registered families that have run away and to inspect the extent of the wide fields.

Now this running away of the peasantry has causes of long standing. In the periods T'ien-t's'e 天册 (i.e. T'ien-t's'e-wan-sui 坐卐 - 695, 9th month, to 696 last month) and Shen-kung (697) the Northern Ti and Western Jung (i.e. the Khitan and the Tibetans, who were also invading the Chinese frontiers in Kang-su) made trouble. In the wakes of large armies there are always lean years. Flood and drought followed one another. Furthermore running away was then very common and from that time became a great evil. Even to the present we suffer from it.

Now it was because they could not help it that they left their relatives and abandoned their own districts. They were in extremities and thereby looked for an escape; immediately their lands were enclosed by landowners. They not only risked punishment under the abandoned law, but also their livelihood. While they wander they are in constant fear, but if they return they have no means of support. Under this accumulation of danger and difficulty they become confirmed vagrants. Sometimes they stop under the protection of others; sometimes they hire themselves out to earn a living. Their hopes of returning home are in vain; their plans of going back to their native places are not fulfilled.
I humbly bear my great task and foster the myriad people as my children. I have not cultivated my virtue as I ought and this evil does not mend. I have been oppressive to the people and driven the chariot of state with rotten reins. I am truly distressed about it. Since it is deeply to my blame, I have taken thought to lay open the road for the people to make a fresh beginning.

Now all those who have up to now run away shall be permitted to give themselves up. If they are able to apply themselves to the fields and to put their energies to ploughing and hoeing, let them till uncultivated fields wherever they are to be found. Let a fee be collected in the produce of the locality (this seems to refer to the fee of 1500 cash which each new registrant was required to pay) but let not the officials of the prefectures and counties send them on military or corvée duty. Their regular taxes (tsu-yung) shall be entirely remitted. If they do not appear within the allotted time, or after this again run away from the customary path; or if they treat this measure as an expedient (?) and not as a fixed law; this will be to hinder our sincerity and good faith, this will be to bring into confusion the order of our state. Thereupon the appropriate authorities must apply stern punishment.

Moreover there are many difference in the climate and soil throughout the empire. The land has not the same requirements and customs are also not the same. It is
right that we command the Vice-President of the Ministry of War and Censor in Attendance Yu-wen Jung to combine with his other offices that of Commissioner for Encouraging Agriculture and to go about inspecting the provinces and giving comfort to the populace. Let him everywhere consult with the officials and the people. If there are any taxes, corvée or other imposts which are disadvantageous for the people, let him make appropriate decisions after considering the circumstances, and thereafter report them. Let him strive to gather the people in peacefully and not to cause any disturbance. Whenever he has to deal out rewards or punishments, let him exercise the utmost loyalty and justice. Wherever he goes let him show this to the people to convey our anxious concern on their behalf.
P'eí Yao-ch'íng sent two celebrated memorials on this subject, one in 730, the other in 733. The text translated below is principally that of the T'ung-tien 10.3.a. In addition I have compared the following versions with it: (1) TTYK 498.16.a ff. (apparently based on the T'ung-tien), (2) CTS 48.1.b (first memorial and summary of the second), (3) CTS 98.11.b (second memorial), (4) Yuan-ho Ch'un-hsien T'u-chih 5.8.a (summary of the first memorial), (5) THY 87, p.1587 (summary of events), p.1596 (second memorial), (5) THY 87, p.1587 (summary of second memorial).

In the eighteenth year of K'ai-yüan (730) Hsüan-tsung asked the delegates to the imperial assembly (ch'ao-chi shih 朝集使) about matters of public interest. The Prefect of Hsüan Chou, P'eí Yao-ch'íng, offered the following as advantageous:

"The population of Chiang-nan has gradually increased. From the stores of its granaries only tax grain and tax cloth (tsu-yung) are taken, nor is there any conscription for service in military expeditions or frontier defence (cheng-fang 征防). Because it is far over land and water, transport is difficult and irksome. Though much labour is expended, the government stores are not filled. I have myself seen that the tax grain and silk, etc. (tsu chi yung-tiao teng 租及庸調等) sent by each prefecture leave the home prefecture in the first or second month on the way up north. When the boats reach Yangchou and enter the lock gate (tou-men 托門) they find the water shallow and already begin to have delays. They must wait a month or more. Only in the third or fourth month can they cross the Huai and enter the Pien. They usually find the
The Water Transport Route

Pien Canal dried up and again the boat transport must halt. They first reach the River Mouth (Ho-k'ou 河口) in the sixth or seventh month. There they find the Yellow River in flood. Since they cannot enter the River, they must again wait for one or two months until the River level drops, before they can go up the River and enter the Lo. Then the Transport Lo (ts'ao-lo 洛漕) is dried up and the boats are crowded in the narrow. Stoppages and delays in the conveyance of tax goods gives rise to extreme difficulty and annoyance. If one calculates the time taken from Chiang-nan to the Eastern Capital, the days of waiting are many and the days on which it is possible to travel are few. Since the food for the crews is always insufficient, it gives rise to conversions and shortages.
"Moreover the people of Chiang-nan are not familiar with the Yellow River. One must always hire instead river pilots (ho-shih 河師) and hands (shui-shou 水手). This is an added expense.

"It is my humble opinion that the ancient laws of the state and the models perfected by former dynasties were chosen and laid down for their suitability that they might be handed down to all eternity. At the River Mouth was originally established the Wu-lao 武倉 Granary³. The boats from Chiang-nan did not enter the Yellow River but immediately stored their cargoes in the granary. At Kung Hsien was established the Lo-k'ou 離石 Granary⁹. The boats from the Yellow River did not enter the Lo River¹⁰ but immediately deposited their cargoes in the granary. Then it was sent on by stages, as it was convenient, to the Ho-yang 河陽, Po-yai 柏崖¹², T'ai-yüan 太原¹³, Yung-feng 永豐¹⁴ and Wei-nan 渭南¹⁵ Granaries. When the water was navigable, then they transported it to the next stage. When it was not navigable, they put it for the time being into the granaries. The boats from a distance were not delayed. There was no trouble about spoilage and loss. It was twice as advantageous as transporting from a long distance in years of scarcity.

"Now if we again establish the Wu-lao, Lo-k'ou and other granaries, when the boats from Chiang-nan reach the River Mouth, they can immediately return to their home prefectures. The boats can be used again for transport and the saving in foot money (chüeh-ch'ien 腳錢) will also be gained."
"Furthermore, if one changes the coarse grain of the Public Granaries (I-t's'ang) of Chiang-huai for finer grain and ships it to the capital, one will get one or two million more shih per year. The Public Granaries of Chiang-huai are mostly in low, damp places and cannot store grain for long. If there are no boats to transport it, after two or three years the colour changes. The means of making gifts or loans is wasted and there is no benefit to the state or to private persons."

His memorial did not receive attention.

In the twenty-first year (733) Yao-ch'ing was Governor of the Capital. Rain at the capital damaged the crops and the price of grain leaped up. Yao-ch'ing memorialized: "I have heard that when the sage kings of former dynasties also had troubles and anxieties from time to time, they extended their benevolence even more, and so revived the state and saved the people. Therefore all men looked to their virtue and the historical documents recorded their excellence. It is my humble opinion that Your Majesty is full of the most profound wisdom and humanity and anxiously exerts itself over the affairs of state. If there is a slight dearth, you extend down sincere compassion and personally take measures to relieve the distress. If High Heaven sends down a warning (literally: 'mirror'), He will again extend blessings."
again extend blessings. 20 This is to make sage virtue more illustrious through suffering a small misfortune.

"Now since the Imperial Carriage is going on inspection in the east and the hundred functionaries are following in its train, if important ministers are sent out immediately in all directions to distribute what has been previously accumulated in the T'ai Ts'ang (the main granary at Ch'ang-an) 21 and in the region around the capital (San-fu = 辛 22), there will be enough for one or two years. If transport from the Eastern Capital is increased to supply Kuan-fu (i.e. Kuan-chung), and the Imperial Carriage waits to return westward until there is a good supply, then everything will be taken care of.

"The state and the imperial heritage are, in my opinion, based on the capital, the place to which all countries pay homage and which a hundred dynasties do not change. Yet because the land of Ch'in (the ancient state of Ch'in was in Kuan-chung) is narrow and the grain produced is not great, in case of any flood or drought there is immediately a scarcity. Formerly Chen-kuan (627-649) and Yung-hui (650-655) the amount of salaries was small. Each year not more than one or two hundred thousand shih were transported, yet there was enough to satisfy expenditure. Because of this the Imperial Carriage was long able to rest in peace.

"Now we have long enjoyed peace 23 and the national expenditure has gradually increased. Though the
amount transported via Shan and Lo each year is several times what it formerly was, there is still a deficiency. Your Majesty has frequently proceeded to the Eastern Capital in order to go to where there are stores. You have planned for the benefit of the state and have not feared the wearisome toil. You have acted out of deep concern for the people. How could it be that because of this Instrument, you would not wish to go?

"If we can increase the transport via Shan and bring into the capital granaries enough grain so that there is always two or three years' supply, then there will be no fear of flood or drought. Now the adult males who pay taxes in the empire are about 4,000,000. Each pays one hundred cash to provide for cartage between Lo-yang and Shan Chou and fifty cash to provide for the building of storage vaults (ying chiao). It is paid into the Court for Supervising Agriculture (Ssu-nung Ssu) and to the prefectures of Ho-nan (Ho-nan Fu, seat at Lo-yang) and Shan Chou to provide for their expenses. As for tax grain, each is required to pay 'foot money' for sending it to the Eastern Capital according to the distance. From the Eastern Capital to Shan the River route is difficult and dangerous. Since land conveyance is used, there is no means of expansion. If we can open up River transport and change land for water, then there will be a surplus in what is paid in which will amount to tens of thousands. Moreover the grain-tax boats from Chiang-nan have to
wait the water level before they can proceed. Everywhere, therefore, there are stoppages, and since the delays last for days and months, they give rise to secret pilfering. I ask that at the River Mouth a granary be established to receive the tax grain from Chiang Tung. Then let the boats of Chiang-nan return. From the River Mouth let the grain be divided, some entering the Lo, some the Yellow River. Let the officials themselves hire boats for the transport. Where those that follow the River reach the east side of the San-men, let a granary be established. Since the stream is there dangerous, let a way be opened along the mountains on the river bank and let the grain be transported in carts for ten or so li. West of the Sanmen also establish a granary. Whenever a granary is reached, let the grain be unloaded and stored. When the water is navigable, let it proceed. When the water is shallow, let it stop. It will little by little reach the T'ai-yüan Granary at Shan Chou and then go up the River and enter the Wei. There will no longer be delays. The saving will be many tens of thousands.

"I was formerly Prefect in Chi Chou, Ting Chou and Chi Chou and I made enquiries about past practices. The Former Han dynasty made its capital in Kuan-chung and after many years Sui also established itself at the capital. Along the River they both had old granaries and therefore their national expenditures were always met. If you act in accordance with this, you will profit greatly from it."
The emperor was greatly pleased and soon after made Yao-ch'ing Vice-President of the Imperial Chancellery (Huang-men Shih-lang) and Chief Minister (T'ung Chung-shu Men-hsia P'ing-chang-shih). It was decreed that the Prefect of Cheng Chou, Ts'ui Hsi-i, and the Vice-Governor of Ho-nan (the Eastern Capital), Hsiao Chiung, should examine the old granaries where grain was stored by stages from Chiang-huai to the capital. Besides, Yao-ch'ing was made Commissioner for Transport to the Capital from Chiang-huai and Ho-nan (Chiang-huai Ho-nan Chuang-yun Tu Shih). Thereupon Ho-yin Hsien and the Ho-yin Granary were set up for the first time. In Ho-ch'ing Hsien the Po-yai Granary was set up. East of the San-men, the Chi-chin Granary was established. West of the San-men, the San-men Granary was established. The mountain on the north side of the San-men was cut open for eighteen li and a land way made to avoid the rapids. From Chiang-huai the boats sailed north-west along the Hung-kou. The cargoes were all deposited in the Ho-yin Granary. They waited for the proper water level and transported on to the Han-chia Granary at Lo-yang. Men familiar with the River were also found and grain was sent on to the T'ai-yüan Granary at Shan Chou. This was the so-called 'northern transport'. From the T'ai-yüan Granary, the grain was floated along the Wei to supply Kuan-chung. In three years 7,000,000 shih in all were transported and 300,000 strings of cash were saved in 'foot money'.
1) At the beginning of each year an assembly (ch'ao-chi) was held at the capital which the Prefect or another high official from each prefecture was required to attend. The delegates brought the special tribute (kung) of their regions, including the examination candidates. (See des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.170 n.2)

2) Present Hsuan-ch'eng 許侯 Hsien in An-hui. The previous year Yu-wen Jung, in his brief time as Chief Minister, had recommended P'eitao-ch'ing to be Vice-President of the Ministry of Finance (CTS 105.3.a). According to his biography he was appointed Prefect of Chi Chou in 725. From there he was transferred directly to Hsuan Chou (see the inscription composed in honour of his government of Chi Chou by Wang Wei, Wang Yu-ch'eng Chi 21.3.b). Presumably Yu-wen Jung's downfall came before P'ei's appointment at the capital took effect, for he was still Prefect of Hsuan Chou in 730.

3) TSYK, CTS 49 and Yilan-ho Ch'un-hsien T'iu-chih have substantially the same introduction, but with slight differences of wording.

4) According to regulations of 737, taxes in textiles (tieng-yung) were collected during the eighth month and sent to the prefecture in the ninth. (Tieng Liu-Tien 3.12.a; Tiung-tien 6.1.b; Niida, Torei Shui p.667) Grain tax (tsu) was collected in after the harvest. Transport of grain was to begin in the eleventh month and to be completed to the capital in the first. That which was to be sent only to the prefecture had to arrive before the end of the twelfth month. Special provision was made that regions in Chiang-nan might ship the grain in the fourth month because of the drying up of the waterways in the winter. In that case shipping was to be completed by the end of the fifth month. (Tieng Liu Tien 3.12.a Tiung-tien 6.1.b; Niida, op.cit., p.608) It is not clear whether these were the precise regulations in force in 730.

5) Rainfall in the lower Yangtze region is at its lowest from September to January. It gradually increases from February until its maximum in June. (Cressey, China's Geographical Foundations, p.294) In the Yellow River plain the rainy season is more sharply pronounced and later, only reaching its height in July and August. (ibid. p.168) The lunar months were usually between one and two months later than the corresponding solar months. Thus according to P'eitao-ch'ing, the boats were only able to get as far north as the Huai River in April or May and could only reach the Yellow River in July or August. (See also note 7)

6) Just before its final eastward bend the Yellow
River receives the waters of three important tributaries, The Fen, the Shensi Lo and the Wei. As a result below the *m'ung-kuan* it is liable to very sudden increases in volume from melting snows in spring or violent rains in summer.

7) In 606 in connection with Sui Yang-ti's rebuilding of Lo-yang a canal was dug running parallel to the Lo for over sixty li from the centre of the city to a point west of Yen-shih Hsien where it rejoined the Lo. The intention was to avoid the rapids and shallows of the Lo and enable tax boats to go right up to Lo-yang. In Sui this canal was called the T'ung-yüan Ch'üan (Ho-nan Chih 3:24.a; T'ang Liang-ching Ch'eng-fang K'ao 5, p.187. HTS 38.1.b erroneously states that it was made at the same time as a new anchorage for tax boats, the Hsin-t'an 新潭, in 701) In T'ang we find the canal variously referred to as Lo-ts'ao 洛沼, Ts'ao-lo, Ts'ao-ho, Ts'ao-shui, Ts'ao-ch'ü

(See the Plan of the Eastern Capital in des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires).

During the period K'ai-yüan the flood waters of the Lo or its tributaries, the Ch'en and the I several times broke into the canal and made it overflow its banks, causing much damage (CTS 38.7.b ff.). On the fourteenth day of the seventh month of K'ai-yüan 14 (August 26, 726) this resulted in the sinking of tax boats from Yang Chou, Shou Chou, Kuang Chou, Ho Chou, Lu Chou, Hang Chou, Ying Chou and Ti Chou, carrying a total of 172,896 shih of tax grain. It is interesting to note that of the prefectures mentioned five were in Huai-nan, two in north-eastern Hopei and only one, Hang Chou, in Chiang-nan. In the sixth month of the eighteenth year (July 1 to 29, 730) the same thing happened. On that occasion boats from Yang Chou, Ch'u Chou, Chi Chou and T'ang Chou were involved. With the exception of Yang Chou which figured in both disasters, the prefectures named on the second occasion were, as we might expect, all much closer or more directly accessible to Lo-yang than those of 726. This agrees very well with P'ei Yao-ch'ing's claim that boats from Chiang-nan did not usually arrive until the eighth month or later.

T'ung-tien and CTS 49 here read Ts'ao-lu 程 but I follow TFYK and Yüan-ho Chün-hsien T'u-chih in reading Ts'ao-lo.

8) According to the early Ch'ing geographer Wu-lao was another name for the Ho-k'ou 紫穀 Granary at the entrance of the Pien Canal from the Yellow River (Tu-shih Fang-yü Chi-yao 47.61.b). He gives no source and I have been unable to find any statement as to when it was set up. Presumably it was established after the digging of the Pien Canal under Sui Yang-ti. Wu-lao is for Hu-lao 惠牢, hu being a T'ang taboo. Hu-lao was the name of the town in which was located Ssu-shui 萧水 Hsien until 741, when the county was moved south-east to its present location.
The junction of the Pien and the Yellow River was in Su-shui Hsien before the establishment of Ho-yin Hsien in 734.

9) This was established as the Hsing-lo Granary after the accession of Yang-ti in 605. (Sui-shu 24.16.b; cf. T'ang Liu Tien) It was already called the Lo-k'ou Granary when Li Mi, the famous contender for the throne at the end of Sui, used it as a base. (Sui-shu 24.19.a) As its name indicates it was located at the junction of the Lo and the Yellow River.

10) CTS 49 reads Ts'ao-lo but Lo River is evidently preferable in this case since the Ts'ao-lo did not reach right to the Yellow River.

11) A Ho-yang granary was established in Lo Chou (the prefecture of Lo-yang) in 583 (T'ung-tien 10.3.a; Sui-shu 24.13.b). According to Ku Tsu-yü this was located north of Yen-shih Hsien. Ho-yang, 'north of the river', must in this case mean 'north of the Lo River' and not, as in the case of Ho-yang Hsien, 'north of the Yellow River'. Ho-yang Hsien was established in 596 under Huai Chou (Ho-nei Chün) (Sui-shu 30.12.a). It was located thirty li south-west of present Meng-ch'in Hsien on the north bank of the Yellow River. Presumably the original Ho-yang Granary was used before the digging of the Transport Lo in 606 (see note 7) at the highest navigable point on the Lo. In 670 a Ho-yang Granary was again set up (THY 88, p. 1612) but was suppressed in 722 (THY 88, p. 1613). Two other granaries established in 670, the Po-yai and the Yuan Hsien (see note 12), were located along the Yellow River and it is most probable that this Ho-yang Granary was not located as the Sui granary of the same name but in Ho-yang Hsien, where the Hsin-lo Granary had been set up in 637 (Sui-shu 24.16.b).

12) The town of Po-yai was located 60 li west of present Meng-ch'ing Hsien. In 673 it was made a separate county for a short time but for most of T'ang it formed part of Ho-ch'ing Hsien, the seat of which was located fifty li south-west of present Meng Hsien. (HTS 38.2.a) The Po-yai Granary was also established in 673 (THY 88, p. 1612; cf. T'ung-tien 177.3.a). It was suppressed in 722 along with the Ho-yang Granary and a granary at Yuan Hsien (present Yuan-ch'ü Hsien, east of Shan Chou on the Yellow River) (THY 88, p. 1613 -- where 0 is erroneously written 0). The suppression of these granaries in 722 was no doubt because the abortive efforts to make use of the water route to Shan Chou which had been made in the latter half of the seventh century had failed to make these granaries of any use.
13) The T'ai-yüan Granary was at Shan Chou. Sui established the Ch'ang-p'ing Granary there in 583 (Sui-shu 24.13.b; T'ung-tien 10.3.a). According to Ku Tsu-yü it was re-established in 647 (?) (text reads Chen-kuan 31)(Tu-shih Fang-yü Chi-yao 48.3.a). I have not discovered his source for this statement but if it is correct it is a striking illustration of the small importance attached to importing grain into Kuan-chung in the early years of the dynasty. In T'ang there was a Direction (chien) for the T'ai-yüan Granary under the Ssu-nung Ssu (des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p.423; T'ang Liu Tien 19.10.a). See also Yuan-ho Chün-hsien T'u-chih 6.3.a.

14) The Yung-feng Granary was thirty-five li north-east of Hua-yin, i.e. at the junction of the Wei and the Yellow River(Yuan-ho Chün-hsien T'u-chih 2.10.a). It was established under Sui in 583 as the Kuang-t'ung Granary (Sui-shu 24.13.b; T'ung-tien 10.3.a). According to Ku Tsu-yü the name was changed at the beginning of Yang-ti's reign (op.cit. 54.7.a). It was already known as the Yung-feng Granary when Kao-tsu's army entered Kuan-chung in 618 (Sui-shu 24.19.b; TCTC I-ning 1 (617)/wu-wu).

15) Wei-nan Hsien lies approximately half-way between Hua-yin and Ch'ang-an. There was a granary there in Sui but I have not discovered when it was established (T'ang Liu Tien 19.10.a). Sui had the Ch'üng-ye Palace there and this granary was perhaps established in connection with it (Yuan-ho Chün-hsien T'u-chih 1.15.a).

16) To pay for the expense of transporting tax goods to the capitals 'foot-money' was charged on each prefecture. The amount was based on the weight of the cargo, the distance and difficulty of the way and the type of transport used (i.e. whether pack animal, wagon, boat, etc.) (T'ang Liu Tien 3.15.b). It would seem that this money was contributed only by certain of the wealthier households but it is not clear just how these families were chosen and how the amounts were assessed. (See T'ung-tien 6.1.b, CTS 105.8.a. After an amnesty of 745 b. which the year's taxes were remitted Wang Hung asked that the 'foot-money' should still be charged and used to buy light goods. It is alleged that he charged excessive amounts and his biography states, "The households of high property classification (kao-hu 高記) in the home prefectures who were made 'foot officers for grain and cloth taxes' (tsu-yung ch'üeh-shih) all had their family fortunes ruined." Cf. also the 'boat households' mentioned in connection with Wei Chien (p.57).) As against this the regulation as quoted in the T'ung-tien 6.1.b stated that the 'foot-money' was to be paid by the families which paid cloth tax (yung-tiao) and Japanese regulation based on the T'ang law even added the word 'equally' (chün 均) (Nuida, Tōrei Shūi p.668). Perhaps the practice of charging
only the wealthier households was an innovation of the financial reformers.

17) Pien-tsao also occurs in the forms hui-tsao and che-tsao. They are used as technical terms to signify the changing of goods collected in taxes for other goods desired by the government. "All gold, silver, precious goods, figured silks and gauzes (ling-lo 纡羅) shall be obtained by exchanging cloth taxes (chye-yung-tsao i tsao yen 折庸調以造 素)". (T'ang Liu Tien 3.15.b) "Grain tax of all the prefectorates of Chiang-nan shall all be exchanged for cloth (ping hui-tsao na 並造 素 " (Regulation of 737 in T'ung-tien 6.1.b) The practice of converting grain stored in the Public Granaries, which was unhulled and therefore bulkier, into hulled grain and transporting it to the capital had been carried on in the seventh century but stopped in 716 (CTS 49.6.b; THY 88, p.1613). Pien-tsao and hui-tsao, in particular, came to stand for this practice and is so used by P'ei Yao-ch'ing.

It should be noted that when su 稗 and mi 米 are used in connection with this practice and elsewhere in T'ang texts they do not refer to kinds of grain. Su originally meant any grain with the outer husk still on it whereas mi meant the kernel without the husk (See Chung-hua Tzu-tien). In the decree of 716 the character ts'ao 杵, which also means unhulled grain, is used instead of su. This has suggested to Mr. Yu Ta-kang that there was some connection between the character ts'ao and the character tsao in pien-tsao. The frequent use of tsao in other combinations and in contexts that have nothing to do with grain seems to preclude this. (See CYY 5,1 (1935) p.78) Apart from this Mr. Yu's remarks on the practice are very useful.

18) According to CTS 49, 98 and THY 87, p.1596, as he was about to leave for the Eastern Capital the emperor summoned P'ei Yao-ch'ing and asked his advice. THY gives the date as the twentieth year (732) but this is simply a textual error.

19) This introduction to the memorial does not occur in T'ung-tien. I insert it from CTS 98.

20) I add this sentence from CTS 98.


22) The San-fu were the three Han dynasty commanderies of Ching-chao 京兆, Ping-i 河西 and Fu-feng 河東 which corresponded in T'ang to Ching-chao Fu, T'ung-chou, Hua 花 Chou and Ch'i 岐 Chou (or Feng-hsiangfu 涛翔) and occupied the Wei valley.
23) CTS 98 omits "we have long enjoyed peace!"

24) CTS 98 omits "via Shan and Lo each year".

25) I follow CTS 98. T'ung-tien and TFYK have lai-wang instead of pu wang.

26) Inserting su from CTS 98.

27) According to T'ung-tien 7.4.a there were 8,208,321 tax-paying individuals in the empire in 755. Did P'ei Yao-ch'ing perhaps refer only to those responsible for shipping grain via the water route — i.e. excluding Lung-yu, Kuan-chung, Ho-tung, Chien-nan, Ling-nan, frontier regions of Ho-pei and probably most of Shan-nan?

28) An obscure passage in T'ang Liu Tien 3.18.a seems to refer to a levy to pay for land transport from Lo-yang to Shan Chou. If I understand it rightly, it states that for each part of the route fifteen cash are to be paid by each taxpayer. The route was divided into eight stages by Li Chieh in 714 (T'ung-tien 10.10.a).

29) T'ang Liu Tien 19.9.a under T'ai-ts'ang Shu says "As for paying the expenses of granaries and vaults, let the taxpayers (shu-je n ) also provide for them". I have not found any other mention of the amount levied.

30) This seems to imply that each taxpayer paid 'foot-money' and not just certain households. Cf. note 16.

31) The land transport of grain from Lo-yang to Shan Chou was carried out each year from the tenth month until the end of the twelfth — i.e. in the winter when the roads would be dry. The government hired ox-carts for the purpose. (T'ang Liu Tien 3.18.b) Li Chieh improved the route in 714 by dividing it into eight relays and in 750 P'ei Hui divided each of these again in two. (T'ung-tien 10.10.a)

32) CTS 98 ends the memorial here, merely summarizing the remainder as, "I hope that you will establish granaries in order along the water route". T'ung-tien and TFYK continue on to the end and CTS 49, which merely contains a summary of the memorial up to this point, also gives the full text after this.

33) Evidently a copyist's error for Hsian Chou. See p.268.

34) T'ung-tien omits ch'ien. I add it from TFYK and CTS 49.

35) No biography. See Appendix V.

36) No biography. See pp.53, 91, 150, 155 and Appendix V.
37) I insert Chiang-huai Ho-nan from CTS 49; THY 87, p.1597.

38) CTS 49 dates this in the eighth month of K'ai-yüan 22 (734). THY 87, p.1596 adds Fourteenth day. On Ho-yin Hsien see p.198 note 54. These two texts, which are closely parallel, begin after the memorial with the establishment of Ho-yin Hsien and present the story in a different order from the T'ung-tien. T'ung-tien 177.3.a dates the establishment of Ho-yin Hsien in the twenty-third year and CTS 38.21.b (Ti-li Chih) gives the date as the twentieth year but these are evidently merely copyist errors. The Yuan-ho Ch'un-hsien T'u-chih and HTS 39.4.a agree in making the date the twenty-second year.

39) I have found no other indications about the Chi-chin Granary.

40) CTS 49 and Yuan-ho Ch'un-hsien T'u-chih have Yen Granary instead of San-men Granary. This name presumably came from the Salt Lake (Yen Ch'ih) to the north and one wonders if this granary later played a part in the organization of the salt monopoly but I have found no other indications about it.

41) Hung-kou was the name of a Ch'in dynasty canal from the Yellow River to Ta-liang (T'ang Pien Chou, present K'ai-feng). It later formed part of the Pien Canal and is here used as a literary name for the latter.

42) CTS 49 says 400,000, but all other texts have 300,000. THY adds in explanation that it cost 1,000 cash to convey two hu (equals two shih) of grain from Lo-yang to Shan Chou by land and that this accounted for the saving. CTS 49 reads shih for ch'ien but Hsu San-hsing points out that this must be wrong (under TCTC K'ai-yüan 21/9/ after jen-wu).
THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF CHIEF MINISTERS AND FINANCIAL OFFICIALS DURING HSÜAN-TSUNG'S REIGN

Table I -- The Chief Ministers from Hsüan-tsung's attainment of power in Hsien-t'ien 2/7/52 (Sep. 5, 713) until the outbreak of the rebellion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Appointment</th>
<th>Date of Dismissal</th>
<th>Ar.</th>
<th>Ex.</th>
<th>Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Wei Chih-ku</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>K2/5/48</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Chang Yüeh</td>
<td>K1/7/12</td>
<td>K1/12/50</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Liu Yu-ch'iu</td>
<td>K1/8/30</td>
<td>K1/12/50</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Yao Ch'ung</td>
<td>K1/10/41</td>
<td>K4/12/36</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Lu Huai-shen</td>
<td>K1/12/51</td>
<td>K4/11/16</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) (Hsüeh No)</td>
<td>K2/1/21</td>
<td>K2/7/27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Military)</td>
<td>K14/2/14</td>
<td>K16/11/25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to 12/18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Yuan Ch'ien-yao</td>
<td>K4/11/33</td>
<td>K4/12/36</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Sung Ching</td>
<td>K4/12/30</td>
<td>K8/1/18</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Su T'ing</td>
<td>K4/12/30</td>
<td>K8/1/18</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Chang Chia-chen</td>
<td>K8/1/18</td>
<td>K11/2/46</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) (Wang Chün)</td>
<td>(Military)</td>
<td>K11/4/1</td>
<td>K11/12/57</td>
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<td>HN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K11/6/7</td>
<td>K24/1/28</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) Li Yuan-hung</td>
<td>K14/4/54</td>
<td>K17/6/11</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13) Tu Hsien</td>
<td>K14/9/26</td>
<td>K17/6/11</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) Hsiao Sung</td>
<td>K16/11/30</td>
<td>K21/12/54</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15) P'ei Kuo-ch'ing</td>
<td>K17/6/11</td>
<td>K21/12/54</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>HT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16) Wei-wen Jung</td>
<td>K17/6/11</td>
<td>K17/9/49</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17) Han Hsiu</td>
<td>K21/3/51</td>
<td>K21/12/54</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18) P'ei Yao-ch'ing</td>
<td>K21/12/54</td>
<td>K24/11/39</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
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(Table I cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period of Activity</th>
<th>Ar.</th>
<th>Ex.</th>
<th>Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>Chang Chiu-ling</td>
<td>721/12/54 - 724/11/39</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>LN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>Li Lin-fu</td>
<td>724/7/3 - 752/12/22</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>Niu Hsien-k'o</td>
<td>724/11/39 - 742/9/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>Li Shih-chih</td>
<td>723/3/14 - 746/5/3</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>Ch'en Hsi-chie</td>
<td>742/9/34 - 752/12/23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>Yang Kuo-chung</td>
<td>734/7/0 - 754/9/14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>Wei Chien-su</td>
<td>734/9/14 - 757/4/6</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Dates in the first line are given in the Chinese calendar -- year of the year period, month, day in the cycle of sixty. K -- K'ai-yüan; T -- T'ien-pao; C -- Chih-te. Dates in the second line are the equivalents in the western calendar given in the order year, month, day. An entry in the fourth column headed Ar. (Aristocrat) means that the man in question belonged to the Kuan-chung aristocracy. An entry in the fifth column headed Ex. means that the man in question is known to have passed an examination. The province of origin is indicated in the sixth column by the following abbreviations: KC -- Kuan-chung; HN -- Ho-nan; HP -- Ho-pei; HT -- Ho-tung; LN -- Ling-nan.)

Table II -- Men prominent as financial innovators during T'ien-hsin-tsan's reign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Period of Activity</th>
<th>Ar.</th>
<th>Ex.</th>
<th>Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(26) Li Chieh</td>
<td>713-714</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27) Chiang Shih-tu</td>
<td>705-721</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>HP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(28) Yang Ch'ung-li</td>
<td>713-733</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(29) Yu-wen Jung</td>
<td>721-729</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(30) P'ei Yao-ch'ing</td>
<td>733-736</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31) Hsiao Ch'ing</td>
<td>734-736</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(32) Ts'ui Hsi-i</td>
<td>734-738</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(33) Li Lin-fu</td>
<td>734-752</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>KC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(34) Niu Hsien-k'o</td>
<td>737-742</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KC</td>
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<tr>
<td>(35) Ch'i Huan</td>
<td>737-742</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>HP</td>
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<tr>
<td>(36) Li Ch'i-wu</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>KC</td>
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<td>(37) Yang Shen-ch'in</td>
<td>742-747</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>(38) Wei Chien</td>
<td>742-745</td>
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<td>KC</td>
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<tr>
<td>(39) Han Ch'ao-tsun</td>
<td>742-743</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>KC</td>
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<tr>
<td>(40) Wang Hung</td>
<td>741-752</td>
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(A number of names of persons associated with financial reforms for whom no information is available have been omitted.)
The same remarks apply to the last three columns as in the case of Table I.)

Biographical notes

(1) Wei Chih-ku 魏知 古 (Biographies in CTS 98, HTS 126; genealogy in HTS 72B.27.b)
   a. Born Chen-kuan 20 (647); died K'ai-yüan 3 (715).
   b. Place of origin: Shen 貢 Chou Lu-tse 陸澤 Hsien, Ho-pei (north of present Shen Hsien). According to the
   genealogical table the family place was Lu-ch'eng 樂城 Hsien, also under Shen Chou (north of present Shu-lu /Ksie n).
   c. Ancestry: no ancestors mentioned.
   d. Examination: Chin-shih ca.636.
   e. First office: not mentioned.
   f. Career: He held a number of civil appointments at
   the capital under Empress Wu. During 701-5 he was Secretary
   in the Grand Imperial Secretariat and also attached to the
   household of the Prince of Hsiang 恆, the future Ju-tsung.
   Under Chung-tsung he went into mourning for his mother and
   later became Prefect of Chin 襄 Chou (Ho-tung). After Ju-tsung's
   accession he was recalled to the capital and soon
   made one of the Chief Ministers. He supported Hsiian-tsung
   against the T'ai-p'ing Princess and so continued in office
   in the new reign. In 714 he was dismissed because of the
   enmity of Yao Ch'ung.

(2) Chang Yüeh 張悅 (Biographies in CTS 97, HTS 125; see
   also the epitaph by Chang Chiu-ling in Ch'ü-chiang Chi
   genealogy in HTS 72C.2.a. Cf. des Rotours, Traité des
   Fonctionnaires, p.12 n.2.)
   b. Place of origin: Lo-yang. More remotely Ho-tung and
   Fan-yang (Ho-pei).
   c. Ancestors: Father's highest office was Vice-Registrate
   of a county in Ho-tung. No office is recorded for his
   grandfather. His great-grandfather was a Scholar (Hsüeh-shih)
   in the T'ung-tao Kuan 俊道館 under Northern Chou. His family
   was not included in a book on leading families compiled in
   the latter part of Hsiian-tsung's reign -- even after his own
   eminence and after one of his sons had been married to a
   daughter of the emperor. (See Shih Chien-wen) Chi 10 p.130
   Yü Ta-kang in CYY 6(1936)
   d. Examination: Specially decreed examination in 689.
   e. First office: Collator to the Crown Prince (T'ai-tzu
   Chiao-shu 校書).

(3) Liu Yu-ch'iu 劉 六尤 (Biographies in CTS 97, HTS 121;
   genealogy not included in the Hsien T'ang Shu.)
   a. Born Yung-hui 6 (655); died K'ai-yüan 3 (715).
   b. Place of origin: Chou Wu-ch'iang 華江 Hsien
   in Ho-pei (present hsien).
   c. Ancestry: No ancestors mentioned.
   d. Examination: Specially decreed examination in 698.
(4) Yao Ch'ung in (Original name Yuan-ch'ung 元崇. Also known by his tsu Yuan-chih 元之. Biographies in CTS 96, HTS 124; see also inscription in his honour by Chang Yüeh, Chang Yen-kung Chi 15, p.157; genealogy in HTS 74B.7.a. Cf. des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.254 n.1.)
   b. Place of origin: Lo-yang. Family came from Shan-jü Chou, Ho-nan, more remotely from Wu-hsing 武興 (present Hsien in Chekiang).
   c. Ancestry: Father was Governor of Sui Chou (southern Ch’i-nan), grandfather and great-grandfather held provincial posts under Sui.
   d. Examination: Hsia-pi-ch’eng-chang 下第成章 (examination by special decree).
   e. First office: Granary Administrator (Ssu-ts’ang 司糧) of P’u Chou, Ho-nan.
   f. Chief Minister under Empress Wu and Chung-tsung. See des Rotours, loc.cit.

(5) Lu Huai-shen 魯懷慎 (Biographies in CTS 98, HTS 126; genealogy in HTS 73A.41.b.)
   a. Born ?, died ca.716.
   b. Place of origin: Ling-ch’ang 靈昌 Hsien in Hua Chou, Ho-nan. Earlier from Fan-yang 定陽 (i.e. Yu Chou), Ho-pei.
   c. Ancestry: Belonged to one of the great families of 'East of the Mountains'. Father was only Administrator of Finance (Ssu-hu Ts’an-ch’un 司戶司農) of T’ang Chou (present Ch’ang-sha in Hunan). Earlier ancestors had held office under Northern Wei and Northern Ch’i. (Eberhard: Family 63, Das Toba-Reich Nordchinas, xxx p.58)
   d. Examination: Chin-shih.
   e. First office: not recorded.
   f. Career: Held offices in the Censorate under Empress Wu and Chung-tsung. Under Jui-tsung he became Vice-President of the Imperial Chau cellery. In 713 he became Yao Ch’ung’s colleague as Chief Minister. Yao Ch’ung was the dominant member of the ministry.

(6) Stéphane Hsüeh No 薛訥 (Biographies in CTS 93, HTS 111; genealogy
a. Born ca. 650, died K'ai-yüan 8 (720).

b. Place of origin: Lung-men 龍門 Hsien, Ho-tung (west of present Ho-chin 河津 Hsien).

c. Ancestry: Father had a brilliant military career under T'ai-tsung and Kao-tsung. Earlier ancestors held high office under Northern Chou and Sui. (Eberhard: Family 34, op. cit., p. 40)

d. Examination: none recorded.

e. First office: Magistrate of Lan-t'ien 蘭田 Hsien in the Capital Prefecture (present Hsien in Shensi).

f. Career: Military career. Made Chief Minister for a short time in 714 when in charge of an expedition against the Khitan.

(7) Yuan Ch'ien-yao 源乾曜 (Biographies in CTS 98, HTS 127; genealogy in HTS 75A.47.a.)


b. Place of origin: Lin-chang 林昌 Hsien, southern Ho-pe (south of present Hsien in Honan).

c. Ancestry: Remotely related to the Toba imperial house. Father was President of the Ministry of Punishments (then called Su-hsing T'ai-ch'ang-po 司刑太常伯) under Kao-tsung but suffered banishment. Earlier ancestors held fairly high office in Sui and more remotely were prominent in Northern Wei. (Eberhard: Family 99, op. cit. p. 76)

d. Examination: Chin-shih.

e. First office: not recorded.

f. Career: Under Jui-tsung he was Governor of Liang Chou in Liang-yu. At the beginning of Hsüan-tsung's reign he was recommended by Chiang Chiao, to whom he was related by marriage (see pp. 78, 205), and was given office at the capital. He was promoted to Vice-President of the Ministry of Finance and Vice-President of the Censorate. In 716 he became Chief Minister for a short time but was dismissed along with Yao Ch'ung. For the next three years he was Governor of the Capital and Viceroy (Liū-shou 留府) while the emperor was at Lo-yang. In 720 he again became Chief Minister. On his dismissal in 729 he received a sinecure of high rank and died two years later.

Although his family did not come from Kuan-chung, his marriage connections and, perhaps, his ultimate non-Chinese origin seem to link him with the Kuan-chung aristocracy.

It is possible that the family had been settled in Ch'ang-an since Sui.

(8) Sung Ching 宋景 (Biographies in CTS 96, HTS 124; see also the inscription in his honour by Yen Chen-ch'ing in Yen Lu-kung Chi 10.3.a; genealogy in HTS 75A.45.b. Cf. des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p. 253 n. 2.)

a. Born Lung-shuo 3 (663), died K'ai-yüan 25 (737).

b. Place of origin: Nan-ho 南霍 Hsien in Hsing-feng Chou Hsien in Hopei (east of present Ch'i-tse 江澤 Hsien in Hopei).
c. Ancestry: Father was only Administrator of Finances (Ssu-hu Ts'an-chün) in Wei Chou, southern Ho-pei. Remote ancestors held fairly high office in Northern Wei and Northern Ch'i. (Eberhard: Family 71A, op.cit., p.62)

d. Examination: Chin-shih in 679 or 680.

e. First office: Wei at Shang-tang 翼 Hsien, Lu Chou Ho-tung (present Ch'ang-chih 柴 Hsien).

f. Career: see des Rotours, loc.cit.

(9) Su Ting (Biographies in CTS 88, HTS 125; genealogy in HTS 74A.40.a. Cf. des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.261 n.2)


b. Place of origin: Shih Wu-kung 翼 Hsien, Kuan-chung (south-west of present Hsien).

c. Ancestry: Father Kuei was Chief Minister under Chung-tsung and Jui-tsung. He was a descendant of Su Tao, one of the chief architects with Yu-wen T'ai of the civil organization of Western Wei and Northern Chou. Other ancestors held high office under Sui and a great uncle had married into the imperial family. He was therefore a Kuan-chung aristocrat, but with a strong literary tradition.

d. Examination: Chin-shih; also specially decreed examination in 705 (THV 76, p.1387).

e. First office: Wei of Wu-ch'eng 晉 Hsien (25 li south of present Wu-hsing 順 Hsien in Chekiang).


(10) Chang Chia-ch'en 張嘉貞 (Biographies in CTS 99, HTS 127; genealogy in HTS 72C.3.a.) (666)

a. Born Ch'ien-feng 1, died K'ai-yuan 17 (729).

b. Place of origin: I-shih 順 Hsien, P'u Chou, Ho-tung (present Hsien). Earlier family came from Fan-yang, Ho-pei.

c. Ancestry: Father was Vice-magistrate (Ch'eng 翼) of Ch'eng-chi 奉紀 Hsien (east of present Ch'in-an 奉 Hsien in Kansu); grandfather was a fu-ping officer. More remote ancestors held minor provincial posts.

d. Examination: Wu-ching 武經; around 686.

e. First office: Wei of P'ing-hsiang 南 郡 Hsien, Ho-pei (present Hsien).

f. Career: Dismissed from his first office because of an offence and sent home. During 701-5 was recommended by the Inspector of Ho-tung and appointed Examining Censor. After receiving promotion at the capital he was sent out to the provinces. Early in Hsian-tsung's reign he was Prefect of P'ing Chou (T'ai-yuan) and he became Military Governor of the T'ien-p'ing 天兵 Army when it was set up there in 717. In 720 he was made Chief Minister after the dismissal of Sung Ching and Su Ting. In 723, because his brother had been convicted of embezzlement, he was dismissed and made Prefect of Vu Chou. He later held anumber of other provincial posts.
(11) Wang Chun (Biographies in CTS 93, HTS 111; genealogy in HTS 72B.23.a)
   b. Place of origin: Lo-yang; formerly Ching-ch'eng Hsien, Ho-pei (60 li north-east of present Chiao-ho Hsien); remotely from Liang Chou, Lung-yu.
   c. Ancestry: Father was Wei of Ch'ang-an Hsien; grandfather was a provincial prefect. More remote ancestors were princes under Northern Wei.
   d. Examination: Ming-ching.
   e. First office: Wei of Ch'ing-yüan Hsien in Ho-pei (present Hsien).
   f. Career: Became a censor. Then held a number of provincial posts. He held several military commands and in 723 was made Chief Minister for a short time while holding the post of Military Governor of Shuo-fang. He did not come to the capital. The same year he was degraded to Prefect of Ch'i Chou in Huai-nan. In 726 he again became Military Governor of Shuo-fang.

(12) Li Yuan-hung (Biographies in CTS 98, HTS 82; genealogy in HTS 72A.23.a)
   b. Place of origin: Wan-nien Hsien (part of Ch'ang-an). Under Northern Wei the family had lived at Huai Chou in Ho-nan.
   c. Ancestry: Family was originally of Hsiung-nu origin. They submitted to Northern Wei and were given the surname Ping. Members of this family held high offices and titles of nobility in Northern Chou and Sui. Yuan-hung's great grandfather Ts'an was an important general in Kuan-chung at the end of Sui who came over to T'ang and received high honours. Because the surname Ping infringed a T'ang taboo and to do him honour, the surname was changed to Li. Yuan-hung's grandfather held high offices and was ennobled as duke under Kao-tsung. His father was a Chief Minister under Empress Wu.
   d. Examination: none recorded.
   e. First office: Administrator of the Army (Ssu-ping) at Ching Chou in Kuan-chung.
   f. Career: After a number of promotions he became Administrator of Finances for the Capital Prefecture where he opposed Buddhist monasteries which, under the protection of the T'ai-p'ing Princess, were building water-mills. He was sent out to the provinces. At the beginning of K'ai-yüan he became Magistrate of Wan-nien Hsien (part of Ch'ang-an) where he carried out the destruction of water-mills. In this he was defending agricultural interests. He became successively Vice-President of the Ministry of Works, of the Ministry of War and of the Ministry of Civil Office. In 725 he replaced Yang Ch'ang as Vice-President of the Ministry of Finance (see page 210 n.47). The following year he became Chief Minister. After his dismissal he became Prefect of Ts'ao Chou in Ho-nan. He retired on account of illness.
(13) Tu Hsien (Biographies in CTS 98, HTS 126; genealogy in HTS 72A.12.b.)

a. Born sometime before 680, died K'ai-yüan 28 (740).

b. Place of origin: P'ü-yang 陽 in Ho-nan (south of present Hsien).

c. Ancestry: Father rose to the office of Auxiliary Secretary of the Ministry of Civil Office under the Empress Wu, but retired for fear of the informers who were then terrorizing the officialdom. An uncle held important provincial offices and was made a marquis. Earlier ancestors had held provincial offices under Northern Wei, Northern Ch'i and Sui.

d. Examination: Ming-ching.

e. First office: Administrator (Ts'an-ch'un) in Wu 楚 in Chiang-nan Tung.

f. Career: Received a recommendation which brought him to the capital where he became a censor. In 716 he was sent on inspection to Pei-t'ing and An-hsi. He rose to fairly high posts at the capital and then was sent out as Deputy Grand Protector of An-hsi where he achieved success against an alliance of the T'ürgas with the king of Khotan. In 726 he was recalled and made Chief Minister. After his dismissal he held a number of posts in the provinces and at the capital.

(l4) Hsiao Sung (Biographies in CTS 99, HTS 101; genealogy in HTS 71B.3.b. Cf. des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.264 n.1)

a. Born ca.669, died T'ien-pao 8 (749).

b. Place of origin: probably Ch'ang-an. Originally Chien-k'ang, the capital of the Southern Dynasties (present Nanking).

c. Ancestry: Was a great-great-grandson of Ming-ti of the Later Liang dynasty. After the suppression of this dynasty the family moved to the capital and received high titles of nobility from Sui. A great-great-uncle was Chief Minister under Kao-tsu. Sung's father's highest office was Deputy Prefect of Yu Chou (present Chungking) but his grandfather had held high office at the capital.

d. Examination: none.

e. First office: In 705 he was made Administrator (Ts'an-ch'un) at Ming Chou in southern Hsien.

f. Career: By the end of Ju-itsung's reign he had become Palace Censor in Attendance (Tien-chung Shih Yü-shih) and after the accession of Hsüan-tsung he was made Secretary in the Grand Imperial Secretariat. His colleagues did not regard him highly because he lacked literary attainments but he was valued by Yao Ch'ung. He advanced through several offices to Vice-President of the Ministry of War. In 727 he was made Military Governor of Shuo-fang and then promoted to President of the Ministry of War and Military Governor of Ho-hsi. Among his officers were Chang Shou-kuei, P'ei K'uan and Niu Hsien-k'o. He managed to sow dissensions among the Tibetans and brought about their defeat. He was appointed
Chief Minister while still there but returned to the capital soon afterwards. After his dismissal he held a number of sinecures of high rank.

(15) P'ei Kuang-t'ing (Biographies in CTS 84, HTS 108; see also epitaph in Ch'U-ch'i-ang-Ch'i 9.3a; genealogy in HTS 71A.14.b. Cf. des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.263 n.1)
  a. Born I-feng 1 (676), died K'ai-yüan 21 (733).
  b. Place of origin: Wen-hsi Hsien, Chiang Chou, Ho-tung (east of present Hsien).
  c. Ancestry: His father Hsing-chien was a famous general under Empress Wu. His grandfather was also a general and a duke. Earlier ancestors had held very high office in Northern Chou and more remotely the family had been prominent in Northern Wei. (Eberhard: Family 68, op. cit., p.61)
  d. Examination: Ming-ching in 705. (His father was also a Ming-ching but got office through privilege!)
  e. Career: In 708-9 was degraded to a minor provincial post because he was son-in-law to Wu San-asu, the disgraced favourite. He was soon recalled and held posts in a prince's household and in the Guards. He then entered civil office and rose to Vice-President of the Ministry of War. In 729 he was made Chief Minister and remained there till he died.

(16) Yu-wen Jung (Biographies in CTS 105, HTS 134; genealogy in HTS 71B.48.b. Cf. des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.260 n.4.)
  a. Born ?, died K'ai-yüan 18 or 19 (730 or 731).
  b. Place of origin: Wan-nien Hsien (part of Ch'ang-an).
  c. Ancestry: Related to the imperial house of Northern Chou. Ancestors held titles of nobility under Chou and Sui. His father was only Deputy Prefect of Lai Chou, Ho-nan. (Eberhard: Family 96, op. cit., p.76)
  d. Examination: none.
  e. Career: Early in K'ai-yüan became Registrar (Chu-p'u 主簿) of Fu-p'ing under the Capital Prefecture (north of present Hsien). He attracted the attention of successive Governors of the Capital including Yuan Ch'ien-yao. For the rest see Chapters 3 and 4.

(17) Han Hsiu (Biographies in CTS 88, HTS 126; genealogy in HTS 73A.12a.)
  b. Place of origin: Ch'ang-an
  c. Ancestry: His father reached a minor post at the capital and an uncle became Secretary in the Grand Imperial Secretariat. Earlier ancestors were provincial officials and nobles in Northern Chou and Sui. Family earlier prominent in Northern Wei. (Eberhard: Family 25, op. cit., p.38)
  d. Examination: Three examinations established by special decree, the last in 713 (see THY 76, p.1387).
e. First office: not mentioned.
f. Career: After his first examination he held provincial posts. After the third he was given office at the capital. When he was appointed Chief Minister in 733 he had risen to the post of Assistant of the Right of the Department of Affairs of State (Shang-shu Yu-ch'eng). On his dismissal in the same year he became President of the Ministry of Works. After 736 he held a sinecure of high rank.

(18) P'ei Yao-ch'ing 裴耀卿 (Biographies in CTS 98, HTS 127; see also inscription in honour of his government of Ch'ü Chou in Wang Yu-ch'eng Chi a1.1.a ; genealogy in HTS 71A.7.a. )
b. Place of origin: not indicated (Ch'ang-an?).
c. Ancestry: Father was Prefect of Pin-ch'ü Chou and Ning Chou in Kuan-chung. More remote ancestors served Northern Wei, Northern Ch'i and Northern Chou.
d. Examination: Boy's examination (T'ung-tzu Ch'ü 僧子舉).
e. First office: At about age twenty he was appointed Rectifier of Characters in the Imperial Library (Mi-shu Cheng-tzu 正字).
f. Career: He was attached to the household of the Prince of Hsiang, the future Jui-tsung. After the accession of Jui-tsung he became Registrar (Chu-pu) of the University of the Sons of State. Early in Hsian-tsung's reign he became Magistrate of Ch'ang-an. In 725 he was made Prefect of Chi Chou. For the rest see Chapters 3 and 4 and Appendix IV.

(19) Chang Chiu-ling 張九齡 (Biographies in CTS 99, HTS 126; also inscription in honour by Hsü Hao and other documents in the fu-lu of Ch'ü-ch'ü Chü; genealogy in HTS 72C.8.a; Cf. des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p.257 n.2.)
a. Born Hsien-heng 4 (673) or I-feng 3 (678), died K'ai-yuan 28 (740).
b. Place of origin: Ch'ü-chi-chiang 楚江 Hsien in Ling-nan (present Hsien); more remotely from Chiang-nan.
c. Ancestors: Father reached the post of Vice-Magistrate of So-lu (301i south of present Hsin-hsing 新興 Hsien in Kwangtung). Other ancestors and relatives held minor posts in Ling-nan.
d. Examination: (1) Chin-shih; (2) Specially decreed examination in 713 (THY 76, p.1387).
e. First office: After his Chin-shih was made Collating Secretary (Chiao-shu Lang 校書郎).
f. After his second examination he advanced rapidly until in 723 he was Secretary in the Grand Imperial Secretariat. He was a close friend of Chang Yüeh and when the latter fell he went out to the provinces. After the death of Chang Yüeh he was recalled to the capital and advanced to Vice-President of the Grand Imperial Secretariat. In 733 he retired in mourning for his mother but was immediately recalled to become Chief Minister. For the rest see Chapter 4.
(20) Li Lin-fu 李林甫 (Biographies in CTS 106, HTS 223A; genealogy in HTS 70A.4.2). Cf. des Rotours, Traité des Fonctionnaires, p.201 n.1.
   b. Place of origin: Ch'ang-an (?).
   His father only reached a minor provincial post.
   d. Examination: none.
   e. First office: Junior officer in the Ch'ien-niu Guard.

(21) Niu Hsien-k'o 那玄偓 (Biographies in CTS 103, HTS 133; genealogy in HTS 75A.47.b.)
   b. Place of origin: Ch'un-ku 郑县 in Ching-chou, Kuan-chung (present Ling-t'ai 邑 县 in Kansu).
   c. Ancestry: none recorded as having held office.
   d. Examination: none.
   e. First office: clerk in a county (hsien hsiao li 縣小史).

(22) Li Shih-chih 李希之 (Biographies in CTS 99, HTS 131; genealogy in HTS 70A.11.b.)
   b. Place of origin: Ch'ang-an (?).
   d. Examination: none.
   e. First office: In 705 he was made a Colonel in the Left Guard (Tso Wei Lang-chiang).
   f. Career: Governed various prefectures, then became Governor of Ho-nan. He was President of the Censorate and in 729 was made Military Governor of Yu Chou. For the rest see Chapter 7.

(23) Ch'en Hsi-lih 陈希烈 (Biographies in CTS 97, HTS 223A; genealogy not included in the tables.)
   a. Born ?, died Chih-te 2 (757).
   b. Place of origin: Sung-chou, Ho-nan (south of present Shang-ch'iu 南丘).
   c. Ancestry: none mentioned.
   d. Examination: none mentioned.
   e. First office: not recorded.
   f. Career: He was renowned as a scholar and was brought into the palace to assist Hsian-tsung in reading the I-ching and Lao-tzu. He replaced Chang Chiu-ling as head of the Hall of Worthies (Chi-hsien Yuan 集賢院) and acted as personal secretary to Hsian-tsung. Li Lin-fu recommended him to replace Li Shih-chih. See Chapter 7.

(24) Yang Kuo-chung 杨国忠, original name Chao-yi (Biographies in CTS 106, HTS 206; genealogy in HTS 71A.34.b (n.b. pp.241-242 notes 46 and 47). Cf. des Rotours, Le
(25) Wei Chieh-su (Biographies in CTS 108, HTS 118; genealogy in HTS 74A.21.B.)

a. Born Ch'ui-kung 3 (687), died Pao-ying 1 (762).
b. Place of origin: Wan-nien (part of Ch'ang-an).
c. Ancestry: Father was Governor of T'ai-yüan and a duke. Earlier ancestors were nobles under Northern Chou and Sui.
d. Examination: According to the Hsing T'ang Shu he passed the Chin-shih degree. The Chiu T'ang Shu says "Hsüeh-k'o t'eng ti" which presumably means that he passed an examination held at the university where he was no doubt a pupil.
e. First office: During 707-9 he was appointed Administrator (Ts' an-chü'n) in the household of the Prince of Hsiang who later became Jui-tsung.
f. Career: Held a succession of offices mostly at the capital. In 750 he was made Vice-President of the Ministry of Civil Office and in 754 became Chief Minister. He followed Hsüan-tsung in the flight to Ch'eng-tu. After the succession of Su-tsung Hsüan-tsung sent him to serve the new emperor but he soon retired.

(26) Li Chieh 李傑 (Biographies in CTS 100, HTS 128.)

a. Born ?, died ca. 718.
b. Place of origin: Fu-yang 阜陽 Hsien, Hsiang Chou, Ho-pei (present Hsien). Family ultimately from Lung-hsi (i.e. Lung-yu).
c. Ancestry: We are given no information about his immediate ancestors who were probably undistinguished. He belonged to a branch of the great Lung-hsi Li clan and at least one ancestor, Li 賴 Pao-chih 獻之, was prominent in Northern Chou.
d. Examination: Ming-ch'ing.
e. First office: Administrator (Ts' an-chü'n) of Ch'i 齊 Chou.
f. Career: He held a succession of offices under Empress Wu and rose to Auxiliary Secretary in the Ministry of Civil Office. As Inspector of Shan-nan he energetically tried to stop land grabbing by the wealthy and to return migrants to their homes. In 712 he was made Prefect of Shan Chou and Commissioner for Land and Water Transport. In 713 he was transferred to Governor of Ho-nan. It was while holding these offices that he undertook his reform of the land trans-
port between Lo-yang and Shan Chou and his improvements to the Pien Canal. In 715 he became President of the Censorate but was later sent out to a provincial post as the result of an intrigue.

(27) Chiang Shih-tu (Biographies in CTS 185B, HTS 100)

a. Born ca. 650; died K'ai-yuan 11 (723).

b. Place of origin: Weihsien Ho-pe (35 li west of present Ta-ming Hsien).

c. Ancestry: no information.

d. Examination: 'Ying-ch'ing.

e. First office: Wei of Tan-lin Wang Hsien (mistake for

f. Career: In 705 he was made Prefect of I Chou in northern Ho-pe, as well as Commissioner for Finances and Agricultural Colonies (Chih-tu Ying-t'ien Shih) for Ho-pe. He improved the fortifications and dug a canal to avoid the dangers of sea transport. In 711 he became President of the Court for the Direction of Agriculture (Csu-nung Ch'ing). In 713 he succeeded Li Chieh as Prefect of Shan Chou and improved loading arrangements. When Ying Chou was restored in 717 he was made Commissioner for Agricultural Colonies etc. In 718 he was appointed Governor of Ho-chung Prefecture (P'u Chou) in Ho-tung, where he improved the extraction of salt from the great salt lake. In 720 he was made Prefect of T'ung Chou in Kuan-chung. He improved irrigation and established agricultural colonies. In 721 he was ordered to undertake the organization of a salt monopoly but there was so much opposition that the matter was dropped.

(28) Yang Ch'ung-li (Brief accounts in CTS 105, HTS 134; genealogy in HTS 71B; 30.a.)

a. Born ca. 643, died 735 or 736.

b. Place of origin: Ch'ang-an.


d. Examination: none mentioned.

e. First office: not recorded.

f. Career: During 701-705 he was Secretary in the Ministry of Civil Office. After 705 he held a number of prefectships. In 713 he was made Vice-President of the Court of the Imperial Treasury (T'ai-fu Shao-ch'ing). He was later promoted to President and remained in charge of the Imperial Treasury until his retirement in 733 aged over 90 (Chinese style).

(29) Hsiao Ch'ung (No biography)

a. No information about his birth or death.

b. Place of origin: unknown.

c. Ancestry: no information. Related to Hsiao Sung?

f. Career: During 701-705 he was Secretary in the Ministry of Civil Office. After 705 he held a number of prefectships. In 713 he was made Vice-President of the Court of the Imperial Treasury (T'ai-fu Shao-ch'ing). He was later promoted to President and remained in charge of the Imperial Treasury until his retirement in 733 aged over 90 (Chinese style).

(29) Hsiao Ch'ung (No biography)

a. No information about his birth or death.

b. Place of origin: unknown.

c. Ancestry: no information. Related to Hsiao Sung?

d. Examination: none mentioned. Probably not.

e. First office: no information.
f. Career: In 734 he was occupying the post of Vice-Governor of Ho-nan (Ho-nan Shao-yin 少尹) when P'ei Yao-ch'ing made him his assistant. He later replaced P'ei as Transport Commissioner (See page 275 and THY 87, p.1599) In 736 Li Lin-fu made him Vice-President of the Ministry of Finance but Yen T'ing-chih and Chang Chiu-ling had him sent out as Prefect of Ch' i 行 Ch'ou (Kuan-chung). (See page 91) From 738 to 740 he acted as Li Lin-fu's deputy as Military Governor of Ho-hsi (p.150). About 742 he was Governor of Ho-nan (CTS 186B.2.b; ALSSC 彩.3.b). Later he became Governor of the Capital Prefecture (ibid). He was ruined through Yang Kuo-chung in 749 (CTS 106.5.b; TCTC T'ien-pao 8/6/hsin-hai).

(30) Ts'ui Hsi-i (notobiography).
 b. Place of origin: unknown.
 c. Ancestry: no information. Did he belong to one of the branches of the Ho-pei Ts'uis?
 d. Examination: no information.
 e. First office: no information.
 f. Career: As Wei of Wan-nien Hsien (part of Ch'ang-an) was made an assistant by Yu-wen Jung in 721 (CTS 187B.1.a; THY 85, p.1562 -- where his surname is erroneously given as Ts'en 任 ). In 734 he was prefect of Cheng Ch'ou and was made an assistant by P'ei Yao-ch'ing (p.275). In 736 he was appointed Military Governor of Ho-hsi (CTS 103.6.a). In 738 in consequence of a defeat by the Tibetans he was transferred to Governor of Ho-nan and died soon after (See page 202).

(31) Ch'i Huan (Biographies in CTS 190B, HTS 128; genealogy in HTS 75B.4.b)
 a. Born ?, died ca.746.
 b. Place of origin: T-feng 彼 Hsien, Ting 遠 Chou, Ho-pei(present Ch'i 禮 Hsien).
 c. Ancestry: Father was only a hsien Magistrate; grandfather was Prefect of Kuang 光 Ch'ou, Huai-nan. The only earlier ancestors mentioned are very remote and of doubtful authenticity.
 d. Examination: Specially decreed examination (CTS), Chin-shih (HTS). Also a selection examination.
 e. First office: After the selection examination he was made Administrator of Justice 訟司 (Ssu-fa; 大Ts'an-chtn) of P'u 落 Ch'ou, Ho-tung.
 f. Career: He was a good stylist and was favoured by both Yao Ch'ung and Chang Yleh. Consequently he rose rapidly until in 724 he was made Vice-President of the Ministry of Civil Office. He became a close friend of the eunuch Kao Li-shih and gained the confidence of the emperor. He was degraded to a lowly provincial post, however, for revealing palace secrets. After gradual promotion he became Prefect of Jun 綱 Ch'ou in Chiang-nan-tung in 737 as well as Inspector of Chiang-nan-tung. He attempted to improve
a portion of the transport canal there. He later became Prefect of Pien Chou and made an unsuccessful effort to improve a southerly stretch of the canal. Li Lin-fu had his conduct investigated and had him dismissed. In 742 he was given a sinecure at Lo-yang.

(32) Li Ch'i-wu 李聲物 (Biographies in CTS 112, HTS 78; see also the inscription in Yen Lu-kung Chi 9.3.a; genealogy in HTS 70A.29.a)
   b. Place of origin: Ch'ang-an(?).
   c. Ancestry: He was a great-grandson of a cousin of Kao-tsu. His father and grandfather rose to the rank of prefect.
   d. Examination: none.
   e. First office: In the Ch'ien-niu Guard.
   f. Career: He held a succession of offices, mainly in the provinces. He distinguished himself by the strictness of his administration. By 741 he had risen to Prefect of Shan Chou. He made a cutting at the San-men to facilitate transport. He was promoted to Governor of Ho-nan. At the fall of Li Sa-h-chih he was degraded to a more distant post but was not killed. After the death of Li Lin-fu he was recalled and held a number of high offices at the capital.

(33) Yang Shen-ch'ing 杨慎(CTs 105, HTS 134, genealogy in HTS 71B.30.a)
   b. Place of origin: Ch'ang-an.
   d. Examination: none recorded.
   e. First office: Magistrate of Ju-yang Hsien (present Ju-nan Hsien in Honan).

(34) Wei Chien 裏 (Biographies in CTS 105, HTS 134)
   b. Place of origin: Wan-nien (part of Ch'ang-an).
   c. Ancestry: Father was only a provincial Prefect. He was closely allied to the imperial house by marriage. His elder sister was married to Hsuan-tsung's brother, Prince Yeh, and a younger sister was married to the future Su-tsung. His own wife was a daughter of Chiang Chiao (see pp.78, 209). Related to Wei Chien-su?
   d. Examination: none recorded.
   e. First office: not mentioned -- it is implied that it was by privilege.

(35) Han Ch'ao-tsung 韓朝宗 (Biography in HTS 118, brief notice in CTS 101.8.b)
   a. Born ?, died ca.746(?).
b. Place of origin: Ch'ang-an.
c. Ancestry: Father, who took the Hsiu-ts'ai degree, was a prominent official early in Hsüan-tsung's reign. Great-grandfather was a general and held a title of nobility. Related to Han Hsiu?.
d. Examination: none recorded.
e. First office: not mentioned.
f. Career: As Commissioner of the Left (Tso Shih-i 左拾 之) he protested against Jui-tsung's abdication. He held various provincial posts. In 743, as Governor of the Capital, he improved the canal way from the west to bring in timber for the city (THY 87, p. 1598). In 744 he was sent out to a provincial post because of the crime of a man whom he had recommended. He was further degraded when it came to light that he had bought a house in the mountains in fear of a time of upheaval. He had been associated with Li Shih-chih and his fall was blamed on Li Lin-fu. (Cf. CTS 99.9, a, 105.7, b, 106.3, a)

(36) Wang Hung王鉞 (Biographies in CTS 105, HTS 134).
b. Place of origin: Ch'î 翹 Hsien, T'ai-yüan Fu (south-east of present Hsien).
c. Ancestry: Hung was an illegitimate son. His father reached the office of Secretary in the Grand Imperial Secretariat. His grandfather was a noted general.
d. Examination: none recorded.
e. First office: In 722 was Wei of Hu 處 Hsien in the Capital Prefecture (present Hsien). (May not be his first office.)

Remarks:
(1) The preponderance of Kuan-chung aristocrats, or at least of non-literati, among the financial experts stands out clearly. There are four notable exceptions. P'ei Yao-ch'ing is the most outstanding. His activities are probably to be explained on grounds of personal inclination. He was in any case probably from Kuan-chung. Ch'î Huan was clearly an opportunist and his efforts at canal improvement were in the hope of mending his fallen fortunes. Li Chieh and Chiang Shih-tu came before the period when the conflict between the literati and the aristocratic experts had taken shape and apparently both had a personal bent for practical activity.

(2) The history of the Chief Ministers in the early years of the reign suggests that before the conflict between the Kuan-chung aristocrats and the literati came to the fore there had been an antagonism between literati of old family and those with more obscure background. On the one side would be men like Yao Ch'ung, Lu Huai-shen, Yüan Ch'ien-yao, Sung Ch'ing and Su T'ing while on the other would be Chang Yüeh, Wei Chih-ku, Liu Yu-ch'iu and Chang Chiu-ling. This would
possibly explain the strong personal antagonism between Yao Ch'ung and Chang Yüeh. A more detailed study reaching back into the previous period would be necessary to substantiate this hypothesis.
REFERENCE LIST OF WORKS CITED IN THE THESIS

Abbreviations

ALSSC — An Lu-shan Shih-chi
AM — Asia Major
BMFA — Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities
BSOAS — Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CTS — Ch'i T'ang Shu
CYYY — Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology (Academia Sinica) — (Kuo-li chung-yang yen-chiu yuan) Li-shih yu-ven yen-chiu so chi-k'an 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊
HJAS — Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
HTS — Hsin T'ang Shu
MSOS — Mitteilungen des Seminars für orientalische Sprachen
OZ — Ostasiatische Zeitschrift
SPPY — Ssu-pu pei-yao
SPTK — Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an
TCTC — Tzu-chih T'ung-chien
TFYK — Ts'e-fu Ylian-kuai
THY — T'ang Hui-yao

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Kao Li-shih Wai-chuan 考力士外傳 -- 1 ch., by Kuo Shih. In Shin Tu Shösetsu 華厳
- 392 -

K'ao-i -- see Tzu-chih T'ung-chien K'ao-i
Liang-ch'ing Hsin-chi 賛京新記 -- originally 5 ch., by Wei Shu 萬氏 (d. 757). Part of one chüen recovered from Japan. Ylh-ya T'ang 原野堂 T'ung-shu, mid 19th century.

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T'ai-p'ing Yuan-yü Chi 太平寰宇記 -- 200 ch., by Ylh Shih 原史, completed ca. 980. Edition with pu-ch'éh 補闕 ch. and preface by Hung Liang-chi 洪亮吉, 1805.

T'ai-p'ing Yu-lan 太平御覽 -- 1000 ch., by Li Fang 李舫 and others, completed 983. SPTK.


T'ang Liang-ch'ing Ch'eng Feng K'ao 唐兩京城坊考 -- 5 ch., by Hsi Sung 徐淙, preface dated 1810. T'ung-shu Chi-ch'eng.

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SHORT GLOSSARY OF OFFICIAL TITLES

(This glossary is intended as a key to titles and terms translated in the text. It does not include, therefore, titles for which the Chinese is already given in the text.)

Auxiliary Secretary (of a Ministry) - Yuan-wai Lang 億外郎
Censor - Yu-shih 御史
Censurate - Yu-shih T'ai 侍御史
Censor in Attendance - Shih Yu-shih侍御史
Chief Minister - Tsai-hsiang 宰相
Commander (of an expeditionary army) - Tsung-kuan 總管
Commander-in-Chief - Yuan-shuai 元帥
Commissioner for Demotion and Promotion - Ch'u-chih Shih 翰林
Commissioner for Foot and Horse - Ping-ma Shih 彈馬使
Commissioner for Land and Water Transport - Shui-chuan 眾轉運使

Count - Po 寶
Governor - Yin 泰府
Governor of the Capital - Ching-chao Yin 宣尉
Grand General - Ta Chiang-chun 太將軍

President (of a Ministry) - Shang-shu 尚書
President of the Censorate - Yu-shih Ta-fu 太府
Prince - Wang 王
Princess - Kung-chu 公主
Protector - Tu-hu 副都護 (of a Protectorate - Tu-hu Fu 府)
Retired Emperor - Shang-huang 上皇
Secretary (in a Ministry) -- Lang-chung 郎中
Secretary in the Grand Imperial Secretariat -- Chung-shu
She-jen 中書舍人
Special Commissioner -- Shih 使
University of the Sons of State -- Kuo-tzu Chien 国子监
Vice-Prefect -- Pieh-chia 别驾
Vice-President (of a Ministry) -- Shih-lang 侍郎
Vice-President of the Censorate -- Yü-shih Chung-ch'eng 中丞
Vice-President of the Grand Imperial Secretariat -- Chung-shu Shih-lang 中書侍郎
Vice-President of the Imperial Chancellery -- Men-hsia
Shih-lang 侍郎
Vice-Principal of the University of the Sons of State --
Kuo-tzu Ssu-yeh 国子司業
Viceroy -- Liu-shou 留守
The Tzyjh Tongjiann Kaoyih and the Sources for the
History of the Period 730-763

By E. G. Pulleyblank

Western scholars have, on the whole, neglected the Tzyjh Tongjiann Kaoyih. Its existence and its importance as a landmark in Chinese historiography have been briefly mentioned by several, but none, so far as I am aware, has seriously used it. Chinese scholars have, as one would expect, used it a good deal. Nevertheless, they have generally confined themselves to drawing on it for the elucidation of particular points. While this was undoubtedly the purpose for which it was originally intended, it can have for the modern student another very valuable function. By a careful analysis and comparison of the different entries, it is possible to get a great deal of otherwise unobtainable information about the sources of the Tongjiann and their interrelation.

To undertake such an analysis for the whole of the Tongjiann or even for the whole of the Tarng dynasty would be a task far beyond the scope of the present article. I shall, in fact, confine myself largely to the period 730-763 though I may occasionally step beyond those limits. This period is chosen because it includes the careers of An Luhshan and Shyy Syming, which I am engaged in studying. This short period, however, comprises about one-seventh of the whole Kaoyih.

Forty-eight works are quoted in this part of the Kaoyih, twenty-two of which appear to be still extant. They range in size and importance from the Jiow Tarngshu to a poem by Lii Bor. I shall first list some of the more important of these, giving in each case notes, whether derived from the Kaoyih or from some other source, on the origin and nature of the work. I shall then give separately an analysis of the Jiow Tarngshu in relation to these sources. I have asterisked extant works.

I. WORKS QUOTED BY THE KAOYIH

(1) *Jiow Tarngshu* 唐史書

The final compilation of the Jiow Tarngshu under Liot Sheu and the subsequent history of the text have been described by M. des Rotours, and

1 See for instance, O. Franke: *Das Tse tshi t'ung kien und das T'ung kien kung mu,* etc., in *Sitz. d. preuss. Ak. d. Wiss.: phil.-hist. kl.* (1930), pp. 103-166. Franke apparently based his remarks on the *Syhshu Chyuanshu Tsoongmu* and had not seen the work itself, for he said: "Wie nicht anders zu erwarten ist, erfahren wir im Tse tshi t'ung kien sehr vieles was in den amtlichen Chroniken gar nicht oder weit kürzer erwähnt wird. Wie es freilich mit der Glaubwürdigkeit in jedem Falle bestellt ist, können wir so wenig beurteilen wie bei den Darstellungen des Tso tshiam: beides geben uns die Quelle nicht an aus denen sie schöpfen und von den 322 Werken die Seu-ma Kuang benutzt hat erfahren wir nicht einmal die Titel" (p. 112, my italics). It is unfortunate that he had not seen the Kaoyih, for it would certainly have radically altered his opinion of Syman Guang as a historian. I need scarcely add that the Kaoyih is not once mentioned in his *Geschichte des Chinesischen Reiches.* On the Kaoyih see des Rotours: *Le Traité des Examens,* p. 19.

*R. des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens,* pp. 64 ff.
I shall not repeat the story here. What he says, however, about the works on
which the historians under Liou Sheu based their work needs considerable
amplification, and correction in some details.

The most important of these pre-existing works was a Tarngshu in 130
chapters.¹ (Unless otherwise specified it is to this work that the term Tarngshu
in this article will refer.) It still existed in Song times as a separate work, and

¹ Cf. STS. 58. 2. b. (Yihwen Jyh 良文志), CWTMJS. 2. 5. b. Besides this work in 130
chapters, the Shin Tarngshu mentions another Tarngshu in 100 chapters and two works called
National History (GwoShyy 國史) in 106 chapters and 113 chapters respectively. The work in
113 chapters is evidently that of Wei Shuh (see below). That in 106 chapters is evidently the one
referred to by Yu Shioulih in his report on the burning of the History Office at Chorng-טn in 756.
In a memorial dated the 27th day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of Jyhder (757) he stated
that among the books destroyed were “The National History (GwoShyy) in 106 chapters, the
Kaiyuan Shyrluh 開元實錄 in forty-seven chapters, the Court Diaries (Chijjihuyu起居注)
and other works 3,682 chapters” (JTS. 149. 1. b.; THY. 63, p. 1095; TFYG. 556. 19. a.). In the
Yihwen Jyh of the Shin Tarngshu there also appears a Kaiyuan Shyrluh in forty-seven
chapters (STS. 58. 7. a.) and Kaiyuan Chijjihuyu in 2,682 [sic] chapters (STS. 58. 6. b.). It is
evident that the Shin Tarngshu merely derived its information from this memorial and affords
no evidence of the existence of these works after the fire. It is not clear what work the Tarngshu
in 100 chapters referred to. It might have been the one by Sheu Jingtzong or the work projected
by Wu Jing (see below), or again, if we suppose that the figure 100 is a mistake for 110, it might
mean either the work of Liou Jyi and Wu Jing or that of Nlou Fengjyi (for all these works see
below). Only the work in 130 chapters is included in the Chorngwen Tzoongmuh, and it is clear
that this was the only one of the four which actually survived as a separate work at the end of
the Tarng dynasty.

² The Chorngwen Tzoongmuh was a catalogue of the works in four official libraries begun in
the period Jijingyow (1034–1037) and completed in 1042. The official responsible was Wang
Yauhern 王養臣 and among the numerous collaborators on the task was Ouyang Shíow
歐陽修. The work, when finished, contained sixty-six chapters. During the Southern Song,
in 1142, a work in one chapter was published under the same title, consisting merely of the
titles of the books in the original work with an annotation if they were no longer in the imperial
libraries. The intention was to use this list to aid the search for lost books throughout the empire.
Only the abridged version has survived in integral form, but many quotations from the original
are to be found, particularly in the Yuhhao and the Wenshiann Tongkao. In 1799 Chyan Torng
銘酮 and four others collected these scattered quotations and inserted them under the titles of
the abridged version. This work they published under the title of Chorngwen Tzoongmuh Jyishyh 纂釋
(WSTK. 207. 1. b., and Chorngwen Tzoongmuh Jyishyh, author’s introduction).
chapters. We cannot discover the name of the author of the remaining sixteen chapters.

Concerning the first stages of the work the following additional information is provided by the Shyytong 史通 2 written by Liou Jyji 劉知幾, a colleague of Wu Jing and one of the great names in Chinese historiography:

"When the Great Tarng Dynasty had received the mandate, during the periods Yihning and Wuuder [617-626], the President of the Board of Works (Gongbuh Shangshu 工部尚書) Uen Dahyea 溫大雅 first composed the Dah Tarng Chaonyeh Chiijijuuh 大唐創業起居注 in three chapters. 3

"After this the Master of Works (Sylkong 司空) Farng Shyuanling 房玄齡, the Grand Secretary of the Imperial Chancellery (Jeishykjong 給事中) Sheu Jinqtzong 許敬宗, and the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Publications (Juhtzuoh lang 著作郎) Jinq Boh 敬播 in succession produced histories of the chronicle type under the name of shyriluh 真錄 (true records) up to the time of the third emperor. We still possess these works. 4

"At the beginning of the period Jenguan [627-649], Yau Sylian 姚思廉 first composed basic annals and biographies and roughly completed thirty chapters. 5

1 這兩卷原載於開元。凡一百一十卷。後因燒竄本。更加手削刊。去酈吏傳。為紀志列傳一百一十二卷。至德乾元以後。史官於休烈又增蕭宗紀二卷。而史官命狐efault. continued. 
with Yu Jyhning 劉志騫, Linqhwu Derfen 林德藩, the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Publications (Juhtzuoh lang 著作郎) Liou Yiinjy 劉胤之, Yang Renching 楊仁卿, and the Court Diarist (Chiijiu lang 起居郎) Guh Yiin 顧胤, took over this old work and continued it with later matters, making a further fifty chapters. Though one might criticize it as wordy and uneven, it occasionally had merits.1

"During the period Longshuoh [661-663] [Sheu] Jinqtzong was again in charge of the History Office, with the rank of Second Preceptor to the Crown Prince (Taytzyy Shaoshy 太子少師). He added to the previous work, making in all 100 chapters.2 Such things as the basic annals of Gautzong 高宗, the biographies of notable officials of the Yeonghuey period [650-655] and of the barbarians of the four quarters were largely his work. He also began a draft of ten monographs but stopped before they were half finished. In this work of annal-biography form [Sheu] Jinqtzong sometimes deceitfully catered to the ruling powers of the time, sometimes unscrupulously paid off private grudges, and in all matters of praise and blame failed to give a true account. He was as like Wey Borchii 魏伯起 as Jang Herng 張衡 was like Tsay Iong 蔡邕.3

"Afterwards the Diarist of the Left (Tzuoooshyy 左史) Lii Renshyr 李仁實 continued it, composing the biographies of Yu Jyhning, Sheu Jinqtzong, and Lii Yihfuu 李義府.5 Whether recording words or events, he always exhibited a forthright brush. It is a pity that he died young, leaving his work unfinished.

"In the period Charngshow [692-693] the Vice-President of the Board of Rites (Chuenguan Shyhlang 春官侍郎) Niou Fengjiyi 牛鳳岐 composed another Tarngshu in 110 chapters, starting from Wuuder [618-626] and T h i s w o r k  i n  e i g h t y  c h a p te r s i s r e f e r r e d t o i n t h e S h i n T a r n g s h u Y i h w e n J y h a s t h e W uuder Jenguan Leangchau Shyg 武德貞觀兩朝史. It did not appear in the Chornween Tzongmuh, nor is it quoted by the Kaoyih. In all probability it did not survive the suppression by Niou Fengjiyi (see below). The T'sehfuu Yangwui mentions eighty-one chapters. No doubt the additional one consisted of prefaces, table, etc. (STS. 68. 2. b.; THY. 63, p. 1093; TFYG. 554. 30b.).

The persons here mentioned have biographies as follows: Jaangsuenu Wuji, JTS. 65. 4. a., STS. 106. 1. a.; Yu Jyhning, JTS. 78. 1. a., STS. 104. 1. a.; Linqhwu Derfen, JTS. 73. 6. a., STS. 102. 10. a.; Liou Yiinjy, JTS. 190 上; Yang Renching, no biography; Guh Yiin, JTS. 73. 8. a., STS. 102. 11. b.

1 For more details concerning this work, see THY. 63, p. 1093, TFYG. 554. 30b, 556. 14b. ff., 562. 8b. ff.

2 Borchii is the tzyh 字 of Wey Shou 魏書, the author of the Weyshu 魏書. Liou Jyji has nothing but ill to say of his history (see Shytyong Tongshyh 12. 24b. ff.). With regard to him and the Weyshu, however, see J. R. Ware: "Wei Shou on Buddhism", Young Pao, vol. 30 (1933), p. 100.

3 Jang Henng and Tsay Iong were writers of the Later Hann dynasty. According to the Shangyun Sheawaluo 商芸小說 Tsay Iong was conceived on the day Jang Henng died, and afterwards was so like Henng that people thought he was a reincarnation (see Shytyong Tongshyh 12. 32. a.).

4 Lii Renshyr has only a biography of twenty-nine characters in the Jioo Tarngshu and still less in the Shin Tarngshu, JTS. 73. 8. b., STS. 102. 12. a. Additional details about his work on the history are given in THY. 63, p. 1092.
ending at the year Horngdaw [683].¹ Fenqi was deaf and dumb, stupid and incapable, yet he rashly ventured to compose the great record of a whole dynasty. His whole work was based on the shingjuang行为状² of private families. But the accounts of the men of the time were seldom distinguished in character. Sometimes they used language as lofty and ornate as poetry, sometimes they used a style as simple and bare as a document. Yet he put everything down in order without emendation. In what he wrote himself, he tended to the humorous, the vulgar, the marvellous and the extravagant. In recording events he was confused and disordered. How could one therefore find anything admirable in reading his chapters? When one unravels his sentences one does not understand what they are about. Soon after, all the works of Yau, Sheu, etc., were gathered in so that only his should circulate. Because of this the records of the early acts of our royal house were almost completely lost.

¹ During the period Chang-an [701–704] I, together with the Admonisher to the Emperor (Tungqian Dalifu正諫大夫) Ju Jingtzer朱敬則, the First Secretary in the Bureau of Titles of Nobility (Syfeng Langjong司封郎中) Shyu Jian 徐燾, and the Omissioner of the Left (Tzuo Shyryih左拾遺) Wu Jing 吳兢, received a command to compose another Tarnghshu, and completed eighty chapters.³ In the first year of Shernlong [705], together with [Shyu] Jian and [Wu] Jing, I further composed the Tzertian Shyrlyh則天實錄(True Record of the Empress Tzertian, i.e. the Empress Wu 武后)¹ in thirty chapters. The corruption of the old histories is as

¹ Nio Fenqi is no biography, nor have I found any reference to his work except here and in the passage below from the Jyishyan Juhjik. In 680 the dynastic name had been changed to Jou 周. This book by Nio Fenqi was no doubt intended to be the final and complete history of Tarnh.

² The shingjuang (literally “report on conduct”) was a biographical notice made on the death of a military or civil official by some colleague and sent to the History Office. Several of these survive, either in the collected works of the man who wrote them (e.g. the works of Harn Yuh翰瀚 contain two, the works of Jang Yueh one) or in the Wenguan Inghwa文苑英華. Unfortunately, however, the majority have disappeared. (See THY. 63, p. 1090, for the regulations in regard to them.)

³ The order for the writing of this history appears in the Tarngh Hueyshu 63, p. 1094, dated the 1st day of the 1st month of the 3rd year of Chang-an (22nd January 703) (see also TFYG. 554. 17a). I have found no mention of the presentation of the work. Wu Jing is discussed below. On Ju Jingtzer, see JTS. 90. 2. b. On Shyu Jian see JTS. 102. 7. a.; STS. 199. 2. a. See also Shytyong Tongsysh 10. 12. a. (自敍) on Liu Jyji’s association with these men. The restoration of Jotzong to the position of Heir to the Throne in 698 and the abandonment of the plan to change the dynasty may have been the reason which necessitated this new history.

⁴ This Shyrlyh was presented on the 9th of the 6th month of the 2nd year of Shernlong (23rd June 706) (THY., loc. cit.). It was revised by Liu Jyji and Wu Jing in the early years of Shyuyuzong and presented on the 14th of the 11th month of the 4th year of Kaliyun (2nd December 710). It is quoted in the Kaoyik and appears in the Chornguyen Tsongmuth—presumably in its revised form. According to the Tarngh Hueyyaw the first version was in twenty chapters, the second in thirty. One text of the Shytyong also says twenty. The Shin Tarnghshu Yihwen Jyh only includes one work in twenty chapters. The Chorngyen Tsongmuth and the Wenhsiau Tsonglao also give the figure twenty. The most convincing explanation is given by Chaur Gongwu衆公武 in the Jiunjai Densou Jyh, 郡齋讀書志, 2. p. 12. b. (see also WSTK. 194. 1b). He says that the first work contained thirty chapters but was reduced to twenty in the revision. In view of Wu Jing’s passion for conciseness, this is more likely than what we are told by the Tarngh Hueyyaw.
confused as a tangled rope, and only after a year did we manage to complete it. Though the words are not praiseworthy, and the facts recorded are often incomplete, I hope that they may still provide a basis for future editing.”

The diffidence with which Liou Jyji referred to his own work is not to be explained merely by modesty. In 706 he offered to resign and sent an outspoken letter to his superior in which he complained bitterly of the interference he and his colleagues had received from the numerous high officials who had been commissioned to superintend the work. Wu Jing, too, was dissatisfied and proceeded to compose a history secretly in his own home. During the early years of Shyuantzong's reign he continued to hold the post of Historiographer, along with various minor posts. In 726, when about to retire in mourning for a parent, he reported to the throne:

"Previously, during the years of Charng-an and Jinqlong [701-710], while holding the posts of Court Diarist and Omissioner of the Left, I was in addition commissioned to write the national history. At that time Wuu Sansy, Jang Yihjy, Jang Changtzong, Jih Chuunuoh, Tzong Chuukeh, and Wei Uen one after the other superintended the work. The character of [Wuu] Sansy and the others was evil... Therefore, concealing my intention, I composed a separate Tarngshu in ninety-eight chapters, and a Tarng Chuenchiou in thirty chapters. I kept them hidden in my own house. Though more than twenty years have gone by, I am still pruning them and they are unfinished... They begin with the thirteenth year of Dahyeh [617] and end at the fourteenth year of Kaiyuan [726], third month, so the complete record of our royal house is contained in them. Since I intend to complete this work in my own house, I dare not fail to report it. Moreover, since the number of rolls has become rather large, and the work of copying is very difficult, I hope that you will, as a special favour, grant me a few calligraphers, and also paper and ink. On the day I set aside my brush I shall send the work to the History Office.”

After this memorial Wu Jing was immediately sent first to the Hall of Worthies (Jyishyan Yuann), then to the History Office, in spite of the

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1 Shudong Tongshih 12. 30a. ff.
2 See JTS. 102. 4. a. ff.; TFGY. 559. 5b. ff. Abbreviated versions of this memorial appear in THY. 64, p. 1106; STS. 132. 1. b.
3 A Tarng Chuenchiou in thirty chapters by Wu Jing is listed in the Shin Tarngshu Yihwen Jyh (58. 3. b.). This seems to be a case in which the Yihwen Jyh took the intention to write a book as evidence for its having existed. No such work appears in the Chorngwen Tzongmuh.
4 THY. 63, p. 1098 (see also TFGY. 556. 17. a.). The Jioe Tarngshu biography of Jing does not contain this memorial, but summarizes a rather similar one which he is supposed to have presented on his return from mourning in 715. The text of this memorial appears in TFGY. 554. 33. b. ff. At first sight one would naturally suppose that it was the same event, wrongly dated in one case. The texts of the two memorials are quite different, however, and I do not think it at all impossible that he reported his work on two occasions. After the earlier memorial, according to the Jioe Tarngshu, he was given the post of Admonisher to the Emperor (Jiansyih Daifu 諫議大夫) and his former post of Historiographer. No doubt the first memorial was to ensure that he should get a post in the History Office on his return from mourning one parent, as the second was to ensure his being allowed to work on his history while in mourning for the other parent. The Shin Tarngshu biography briefly records both cases.
fact that he was in mourning. However, he seems to have suffered from a constitutional defect which prevented him from completing his work. His biography in the *Jiou Tarngshu* says: "In narration of events he was concise and pithy, so that men used to praise him. In later years he erred on the side of over-brevity. When the National History was not yet finished, in Kaiyuan 17 [729], he was sent to Jingjou 荆州 as Senior Administrator (*Symaa 司马*). He was allowed to take along the draft of his history. The President of the Grand Imperial Secretariat (*Jiongshu Ling* 中書令) Shiau Song 前者, who was in charge of the History Office, asked that his work should be sent for. Sixty-five chapters were obtained . . . Though he was now in his decline, he still aspired to the office of Historiographer. Yet he could only walk doubled over, and Lii Linfu 李林甫 did not employ him because of his age. In the eighth year of Tianbao [749] he died in his own home, over eighty. After Wu Jing died his son presented over eighty chapters of Tarng history composed by Jing. The work was very faulty and not equal to that of his prime." 1

This judgment of his work is important for our present purpose because it was in all probability written by Leou Fang 柳芳, the friend and collaborator of Wei Shuh 魏鶴, of whom we must next speak. It therefore probably indicates to some degree the extent to which Wei Shuh must have drawn on the work of Wu Jing. For Wei Shuh continued the *Tarngshu* and finally completed a work in 112 chapters 2 which was at last considered a satisfactory history. After having spent some time in the Imperial Library (*Mihger 秘閣*) Wei Shuh was appointed to the History Office in 730. He held this office continuously till the end of the reign of Shyuantzong. In the *Jyishyan Juljih 集賢注記* (Notes on the Hall of Worthies—*Jyishyan Yuann*), which he completed in 756, Wei Shuh had this to say about his own work and the work which preceded it:

"In the History Office there were formerly the National History

1 According to the *Shin Tarngshu* this was a banishment for having offended in something he wrote. I do not know whether this is merely an assumption of the author of the *Shin Tarngshu* biography.

2 The efforts of Shiau Song (biographies in *JTS.* 99. 4. b; *STS.* 101. 3. a) to speed up the work on the history by appointing a larger staff are mentioned in the *Shin Tarngshu* biography of Wei Shuh (132. 7. a) and more fully by Wei Shuh himself in the *Jyishyan Juljih 集賢注記* as quoted in the *Yuhae* 46. 42. a. The effort seems to have been a failure—a case of too many cooks. Wei Shuh then continued alone or with fewer helpers.

3 Lii Linfu (see *JTS.* 106. 1. a, *STS.* 223 上 5. a) was Chief Minister from 734 till his death in 752.

4 *JTS.* 102. 11. b. (cf. *STS.* 132. 6. a; *TFYG.* 562. 3. b.).

5 His *Jiou Tarngshu* biography says that his work consisted of 112 chapters plus one chapter entitled *shylyih 史列* (presumably a sort of preface setting out the plan of the work). This explains the figure 113 in the *Shin Tarngshu Yihwen Jyh* (58. 2. b). The *Teckfuu Yuanguen* 566. 18. b. erroneously says 113 chapters plus a *shylyih in one chapter.*

6 This work in two chapters was described by Chaur Gongwuu as follows: "Written by Tarng Jyishyan Scholar Wei Shuh. Shuh was in the *Jyishyan* [Yuann] for forty years. In the year *biingshen 貞申* of Tianbao [766] he gathered all the facts about the establishment of the *Yuann*, the traditions of the *Yuann*, the successive writing of history and the names of Scholars of the court of Shiamming 老明 (Shyuantzong), and made a very good narrative" (*WSTK.* 202. 2. a., quoting a fuller version of *Jiunajai Dwenshu Jyh* 2 下 5. a.).
and the *Tarngshu* composed by Linqhwn Derfen. Both were in the form of annals and biographies. Linqhwn finished with the period Jenguan [627-649]. Niou Fenqjyi continued it up to Yeongchwen [682]. When Wu Charngyuan 吳長垣 1 was in the History Office, he also composed another *Tarngshu* in 110 chapters. It extended down to the beginning of Kaiyuan [713]. Wei Shuh interwove the two works, added material after the period Chweigong [685], and tried to complete another work of annals and biographies.” 2

There are some small discrepancies here with the account of the *Shyytong* :—

1 Linqhwn Derfen is here stated to have composed both a *Tarngshu* and a *Gwoshyy* in annal-biography form. This is unlikely and is suggested nowhere else. Generally speaking, *Tarngshu* and *Gwoshyy* 3 are used interchangeably. It seems probable that Wei Shuh found the work mentioned in one place as *Tarngshu* and in another place as *Gwoshyy*, and conscientiously recorded both as different works. He did not, of course, see the work. It had been destroyed by Niou Fenqjyi. (2) The *Tarngshu* in 110 chapters attributed to Wu Jing is puzzling. It is evidently the same work as that referred to in the *Chorngwen Tzoongmuh*. The number of chapters mentioned and the terminal date do not, however, agree with those of any of the works referred to in other sources. It seems probable that the information in the *Chorngwen Tzoongmuh* on this point also comes ultimately from Wei Shuh. The editors of the Song catalogue no doubt merely took what information they could find about a book from the prefaces and from an examination of the book itself. The most likely place to have the record of facts about the work of Wei Shuh himself would be the preface to his 112-chapter work. (We must then suppose that Leou Fang did not write a preface—he may have been already in disgrace before the book was presented—and that Yu Shioulieh and Linqhwn Hwan wrote prefaces or short notes recording what they had done.) If it is correct to suppose that both sources come independently from Wei Shuh himself, then his statement must carry considerable weight. We cannot then accept the opinion of the commentary of the *Shyytong* 4 that the work in 110 chapters referred to in the catalogue consisted of the *Tarngshu* in eighty chapters completed by Liou Jyji, Wu Jing, and others in the period 701-704 plus the *Tzertian Shyrluh* in thirty chapters, completed by the same historians in 706, since it would not then have reached down to the period Kaiyuan [713]. Moreover, if the *Tzertian Shyrluh* was of the normal type it must have been in chronicle (biannian 纪年) form and could hardly have been considered as part of an annal-biography type work. On the other hand, it is quite clear that Wu Jing never finished his private *Tarngshu*—in any case

1 Wu Jing was ennobled as Viscount of Charnyuan Shiam 長垣縣子 (*JTS*, 102. 11. b.)

2  For example the *Tarngshu* of Leou Fang is called *Gwoshyy* in his biographies (see below).

3 *Shyytong Tongshyh* 12. 32. a.
it was to have contained only ninety-eight chapters. The only explanation which I can offer is that at some time during the early part of Kaiyuan Wu Jing in his official capacity composed or assisted in the composition of a continuation to the eighty-chapter work. We may compare the revised versions of the Shyrluh of Gautsong and Wuuhow prepared at the same time. It is rather surprising, in that case, that it is not mentioned elsewhere, particularly in the memorials of Wu Jing.

No date is given for the completion of Wei Shuh's work. It seems that it had not yet been presented when the rebellion of An Luhshan broke out in 755, for among the books destroyed in the burning of the History Office (see note 1, p. 449) was only a National History in 106 chapters. I take this to mean an incomplete copy of Wei Shuh's work. He himself kept hidden the complete work and thus saved it from destruction. After the recovery of the capitals in 757 he presented his work. Meanwhile, however, he had disgraced himself by accepting a post under the rebels. For this he was banished to Yujou 汊州 (present Chungking) where he soon after died. His merit in having saved the national history was later rewarded by bestowing on him the posthumous title of Grand Imperial Councillor of the Right (Yow Sawnchi Charnsgyhyg 右散騎常侍).¹

The story of the Tarnyshu is now taken up by the biography of Leou Fang:

"In the reign of Suhtzong, he was historiographer. Together with Wei Shuh, who held the same office, he was ordered to continue the National History composed by Wu Jing. Before preparations were complete, [Wei] Shuh died. [Leou] Fang continued on [Wei] Shuh's plan and completed a National History in 130 chapters. It began with Gautzuu [618–626] and ended with Chyanyuan [758–759]. However, in relating the events from Tianbao onwards, he was quite without principle or design, and did not take care in discriminating his material. The work was not praised by historians. Yet [Leou] Fang was industrious in recording matters and untiring in his attention to detail. Coming as he did at the time of the rebellion of An Luhshan and Shy [Syming], he found the national history scattered and lost. He set down what he could find out, but most of it was defective." ²

Two points in which this account disagrees with the earlier sources demand attention. (1) This account says that Leou Fang was ordered to assist Wei Shuh in continuing the history. We know, however, that Wei Shuh was banished and can never have worked on the history after the rebellion. There may be confusion here with the fact that Leou Fang worked under Wei Shuh in the History Office before the rebellion. Or we may suppose that a decree pardoning Wei Shuh and ordering him to work on the history was issued but failed to reach him in time.³  (2) The Chornqwen Tzoonmuh states that the Tarnyshu consisted of 130 chapters including two chapters of Suhtzong basic

¹ *JTS.* 102. 12. b.; *STS.* 132. 7. a.; *THY.* 63. p. 1095.
² *JTS.* 149. 13. a. (compare *STS.* 132. 10. a.).
³ Leou Fang was also convicted of having collaborated with the rebels. He was banished beyond the frontiers but was apparently soon pardoned. (*An Luhshan Shyhi* 下 1. b.)
annals composed by Yu Shioulieh. If this is so then the Tarngshu completed by Leou Fang can have had only 128 chapters. There is, of course, no way of settling this question with certainty, but since the editor of the Chorngwen Tsoongmuh probably derived his information from an examination of the book itself, I am inclined to accept his statement. The biographer of Leou Fang probably knew that the existing Tarngshu consisted of 130 chapters and did not realize that two chapters had been added since Fang finished his work.

The work done by Yu Shioulieh and Linhwwu Hwan on the Tarngshu is not mentioned in their biographies. There seems no reason to doubt the statement that Yu Shioulieh composed the Sihtzong basic annals. Linhwwu Hwan's work and that of any others who may have come later probably consisted in adding such things as the notices on the sons of persons who already had biographies in the Tarngshu. As we shall see below, there is evidence to show that there was no large-scale revision of the text.

The other sources of the Jiow Tarngshu, namely the shyrluh, will be treated separately, as they are separately quoted in the Kaoyih.

(2) *Shin Tarngshu 新 唐 書.

I shall not say much about the Shin Tarngshu. It was a thorough revision of the Jiow Tarngshu in the light of some of the same additional sources as those used by Symaa Guang. The Kaoyih, therefore, often enables us to ascertain, or at least to guess, where the Shin Tarngshu derived some statement which disagrees with the Jiow Tarngshu. There are, however, many cases in which Symaa Guang quotes the Shin Tarngshu as his ultimate source.

(3) Shyuantzong Shyrluh 玄宗實錄.

Four shyrluh are quoted by the Kaoyih during the period in question. The Shyuantzong Shyrluh was composed by Linhwwu Hwan, whose work on the Tarngshu we have already mentioned. He worked under the supervision of the Chief Minister Yuan Tzay 元 裁. The Shyrluh consisted of 100 chapters and was presented in 768. The biography of Linhwwu Hwan says of it:

"He was diligent in his narration, but after the great rebellion the court diaries (chiijiujuh 起 居 注) were lost. Although in writing the events of Kaiyuan and Tianbao [713–756] Linhwwu Hwan got together the literary works of every one [possible] and set down the edicts and memorials composed by them, not thirty or forty per cent of the biographical records of notable ministers were included. Because the omissions were too numerous later persons did not call it a good history."  

Earlier, during the period Kaiyuan (713–741), the famous poet and chief minister, Jang Yueh 張 説, had composed a shyrluh of the early years of Shyuantzong's reign called the Jin Shang Shyrluh 今 上 實 錄 (True Record

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1 Their biographies are: Yu Shioulieh JTS. 149. 1 a.; STS. 132. 1 a.; Linhwwu Hwan JTS. 149. 3 a.; STS. 102. 12 a.
2 Cf. des Rotours, Le Trait de l'Examen, pp. 55–64.
3 See STS. 68. 7 a.; THY. 48. 5 a. The latter quotes the Jongshing Shunuh (see note 3, p. 460).
4 On the chiijiujuh see des Rotours, Le Trait des Fonctionnaires . . ., p. 200.
5 JTS. 149. 3 a. (Compare STS. 102. 12 a.; THY. 83, p. 1005; TTYG. 566. 19 b.)
of the Present Emperor), in twenty chapters.\(^1\) This had evidently been con-
continued, for as we have already seen (note 1, p. 449), a \textit{Kaiyuan Shyrluh} in forty-
seven chapters was among the books lost in the burning of the History Office.
I cannot determine whether or not these works or any part of them survived
somehow, to be incorporated into the \textit{Shyuantzong Shyrluh}.

(4) \textit{Suhtzong Shyrluh} 肅宗實録.

The \textit{Suhtzong Shyrluh} in thirty chapters was also composed in the reign of
Daytzong, under the supervision of Yuan Tzay. The actual historian or histori-
\n\noanists who worked on it and the date of completion are not recorded.\(^2\)

(5) \textit{Daytzong Shyrluh} 代宗實録.

The \textit{Daytzong Shyrluh} in forty chapters was also composed by Linqhwu Hwan.\(^3\) It was not, however, completed while he was in the History Office.
When he was sent to Jyijou (present Jyi-an Shiann in Kiangsi) in 789, he was allowed to continue work on it in private and in 807, two years
after his death, his son presented it to the throne.\(^4\) The work was criticized
as follows:

"In selecting and rejecting material he completely failed to use the
proper principle. Moreover, there were many omissions. Noteworthy
ministers such as Farn Goan 房琯 had no biography, and outspoken
critics like Yan Jenching 颜真卿 were omitted."\(^5\)

One generally supposes that \textit{shyrluh} were in chronicle form, as is, for instance,
the only one which survives from the Tarng dynasty, that of Shuenntzong
順宗.\(^6\) It is therefore at first surprising to find biographies mentioned in
connection with them. Mr. Arthur Waley has kindly pointed out to me that
works known in Japanese as \textit{jitsuroku} 實録, e.g. the \textit{Sandai Jitsuroku},
frequently contain biographies of important persons after the dates of their
deaths. The Japanese, no doubt, copied the Chinese practice. The above
quotation indicates that the \textit{Daytzong Shyrluh} contained biographies, and we
have conclusive proof from the \textit{Kaoyih} that this was so. On one occasion it

\(^1\) \textit{STS.} 58. 7. a. Jang Yueh’s writing of history is mentioned in his biographies (\textit{JTS.} 97. 6. b.;
\textit{STS.} 125. 4. b.), and in the \textit{Tarng Huyawu} 63, p. 1099, but I have found no other mention of this
specific work. If any part did survive the fire it must at any rate have ceased to exist as a separate
work. It is not quoted in the \textit{Kaoyih} and does not appear in the \textit{Chorngioen Tzoongmuh}. The
Harvard-Yenching Index to the \textit{Taypyng Goangjih} contains one reference to the \textit{Shyuantzong Shyrluh}.
The editors say that it was written by Jang Yueh, referring to the \textit{STS} \textit{Yihwen Jyh}.
There can be no doubt that the quotation (\textit{Taypyng Goangjih} 186. 3. b.) is from Linqhwu Hwan’s
work.

\(^2\) \textit{STS.} 58. 7. a.; \textit{OWTMJS.} 2. 13. a.; \textit{YH.} 48. 5. b. (quotes Jongshing Shumuh). Yuan
Tzay was Chief Minister from 762 to 777 (\textit{JTS.} 118. 1. a.; \textit{STS.} 145. 1. a.).

\(^3\) \textit{STS.} 58. 7. a.; \textit{OWTMJS.} 2. 13. a.; \textit{YH.} 48. 5. b. (quotes Jongshing Shumuh).

\(^4\) See biographies cited above.

\(^5\) Included in the works of Harn Yuh 韓愈 (\textit{Harn Changli Jyi, wayji} 外集, 1-5).
refers to a biography in this *shyrluh*.¹ The way in which the *Shyunzong Shyrluh* is described suggests that it too contained biographies, and when the emperor Shiamntzong 慈宗 read the *Suhtzong Shyrluh* he complained that "the biographies of great ministers were much given to empty praise".²

(6) *Jiannjong Shyrluh* 建中實錄.

This work in ten chapters, which dealt with the period of the accession of Dertzong 德宗 in 779 till the tenth month of 781, need not concern us here, since there are merely two short quotations from it in the *Kaoyih* during the period under discussion. Its author was Sheen Jihjih 沈既濟.

(7) *Tarnglih* 唐曆.

Far and away the most important work remaining to be discussed is the *Tarnglih*, a work in forty chapters by Leou Fang.⁴ After discussing his completion of the *Tarngshu*, his *Jiow Tarngshu* biography continues as follows:

"During the period Shanyuan [760-761] he was convicted of an offence and banished to Chianjong 黄中 [the Tarng dynasty province divided at present among south-west Hupei, south-east Szechwan, northern Kueichow and western Hunan].

"It happened that the eunuch Gau Lihshyh 高力士 ⁵ had also been banished to Ujou 巫州 [present Chianyang Shiann 黃陽 in Hunan] and they met on the road. [Leou] Fang asked [Gau] Lihshyh about affairs of the Tynjiajih Tongjiann Kaoyih 459
inside the palace of which he was in doubt. [Gau] Lihshyh spoke about political matters of Kaiyuan and Tianbao [712-756] and [Leou] Fang made verbatim notes. Moreover, as the National History had already been completed and sent for presentation to the emperor, it could not be altered. So he composed separately a Tarnglih in forty chapters, recording under each date what [Gau] Lihshyh had said.”

His Shin Tarngshu biography states more specifically that the work was in chronicle form. It adds this criticism: “Although it recorded much different information, it did not establish a proper standard of praise and blame and was censured by all true scholars (juru 諸儒).”

According to the Jongshing Shumuh the Tarnglih began with the year 617 and ended with the eighth month of Dahlih 13 [778].

Whatever adverse criticism there may have been, we have the word of Lii Daw 李德 that the Shin Tarngshu and the Tzyjyh Tongjiann used most of the material contained in it. This is confirmed as far as the Tongjiann is concerned, by the numerous quotations in the Kaoyih. It is possible also in several of them to see evidence of Gau Lihshyh’s information.

The Tarnglih was sufficiently highly regarded to call for a continuation by imperial command. This work, called Shiuh Tarnglih 續 唐 圾, was composed by a group of scholars under the Chief Minister Tsuei Guitsorng 禄 龜 從, and was presented to the throne in 851. It carried the history down to the year 820.

This calendrical work, composed by Liou Shisoou 劉 義 史, exists as part of the Tzyjy Tongjiann Muhluh 目 錄 (see des Rotours : Le Traité des Examens, p. 78). It is referred to in the Kaoyih when it is necessary to verify the occurrence in a given month of a given cyclical day. In the bibliographical chapters of both the Jiow and the Shin Tarngshu appears a work called Charnglih in fourteen chapters with no indication of the author or date of composition. Was Liou Shisoou’s work related to this?

(8) Charnglih 長 历.

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(9) An Luhshan Shyhji 安 隗 山 事 迹.

This work is discussed in des Rotours : Le Traité des Fonctionnaires et le Traité de l’Armée, p. ciii. I have so far discovered no means of dating this

1 JTS. 149. 13. a.
2 STS. 132. 10. a.
3 Quoted in the Yuhhoe 47. 27. b. The full title was Jongshing Goanger 館 閣 Shumuh. After the short edition of the Chorngwen Tzoongmuh had been published and had presumably had some results in the finding of lost books, this catalogue was made under the editorship of Chern Kwei 周 魏 and presented in 1178 (see YU. 52. 42. b.; WSTK. 207. 4. b.).
4 WSTK. 193. 1. b. I have not discovered what book of Lii Daw’s Maan Duanlin is here quoting. Lii Daw was the author of the continuation of the Tzyjy Tongjiann known as Shiuh Tzyjy Tongjiann Charngbian 續 資 治 通 历 長 編 (see des Rotours, Le Traité des Examens, p. 83).
5 See for example, Kaoyih 13. 11. b (4), in which lively detail is added to a story in the biography of Jyi Uen 吉 尋 by a description of what took place at the house of Gau Lihshyh.
6 Jongshing Shumuh quoted in the Yuhhoe 47. 27. b. An earlier continuation of the work had been begun by Tsuei Shiuann 鄭 銀 but not completed. See also JTS. 176. 13. a. (Biography of Tsuei Guitsorng), STS. 132. 9. b. (Biography of Jiang Jie 蒋 介).
7 JTS. 46. 20. b.; STS. 58. 5. a.
work with any accuracy. It is in any case later than 805, since it uses the posthumous title of Dertzong. In the main, like the Jiow Tarngshu biography of An Luhshan (see below), it is based on the Suhtzong Shyrluh. The author, Yau Rumeng 姚如能, did however consult several other sources, notably the Shyuautzong Shyrluh, the Shyuautzong Shing Shuu Jih, the Jihmen Jihluann (see below), and the Tarngshu biography of Jang Jeouling 張九齡.

(10) Herluoh Chuenchiou 河洛春秋.

This work in two chapters was written by Bau Sheii 包 謂.1 He was the son of Bau Chun Yue 包處邃, who, at the outbreak of the rebellion of An Luhshan, held the post of Administrator of the Finance Bureau (Syhuh Tsanjiun 司戶參軍) in Jawjou 趙州 (present Jaw Shiann 趙 in Hopei). To judge by the quotations in the Kaoyih,2 Bau Sheu wrote this account of the rebellion partly to glorify the part played by his father, and Symaa Guang on two occasions rejects his statements as showing partiality. The work was, however, an account of the rebellion apparently independent of the History Office (this is clear from the inaccurate dating in the Herluoh Chuenchiou, apart from many other divergences from the official works), and based at least partly on first-hand information. Symaa Guang used its material on many occasions.

(11) Jihmen Jihluann 前門紀亂.

The author of this book, according to the Kaoyih, was Pyng Jyhmeei 平至美.3 Nothing else seems to be known either about the author or about his book. It does not appear in the bibliographical chapters of the Jiow Tarngshu, the Shin Tarngshu, or the Songshyy 宋 史, nor in the Yuhhac, the Wenshiann Tongkao, or the Chornngwen Tsoongmuh Jyishyh. It appears from several long quotations to have been an account of the events in Fannyang 范陽 (present Peiping), the heart of the rebel power, during the rebellion of An Luhshan, and the author shows a familiarity with the local geography and the chief personalities which suggests that he was probably an eye-witness of at least some of the events he described.

(12) Shyuautzong Shing Shuu Jih 玄宗行蜀記.

In the bibliographical chapter of the Shin Tarngshu this work was said to consist of one chapter by Sonq Jiuh 宋巨.4 The Kaoyih also calls the author Sonq Jiuh.5 In the Jiunnjai Dwushu Jyh 郡齋讀書志, however, Chaur Gongwu 趙公武 had this to say of it: “Three chapters. Composed by Lii Kuangwen 李匡文, Sonq Jiuhjou 宋巨周, and Sonq Jiubor 宋居白 of the Tarng dynasty. Originally [Lii] Kuangwen recorded down to the death of Shiaiming 孝明 [the emperor Shyuautzong] and [Sonq] Jiuhjou’s record ended at his return to Chang-an. Each was better in places than the other. [Sonq] Jiubor united the two records, making Sonq’s the basic text and splitting up Lii’s as commentary. He put the two prefaces at the beginning and added to it from other sources.” 6 Unfortunately, I can find no further information

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1 STS.58.5.6.; CWTMJS.2.21.6.; WSTK.195.6.6.
2 See Kaoyih 14.6.6. (2); 14.11.a. (1).
3 STS.58.5.6.; cf. CWTMJS.2.22.a.
4 STS.58.5.6.; cf. CWTMJS.2.22.a.
5 Kaoyih 14.3.6. (3).
about any of these writers, and have no means of dating either the first two works or the final combination. The work used by Symaa Guang and that listed in the Shin Tarngshu was presumably the original work by Sonq Jinhjou. As I have already said, it was certainly earlier than the An Luhshan Shyhji, which quotes from it.

Some of the other works quoted by the Kaoyih are important for particular points, but as they do not affect the following argument I have omitted them.

II. Analysis of the Jiow Tarngshu

The most important results to be obtained from the Kaoyih concern the Jiow Tarngshu, which will always remain the earliest and most primitive source now available to us for the bulk of our information about the history of the Tarng dynasty. To complete the analysis which I shall begin here would require a careful study of the whole Jiow Tarngshu with the Kaoyih and other relevant material. The results obtained for a limited but important period may, however, be of interest.

In the period under discussion the Kaoyih contains no quotation from the Tarngshu as such. Moreover, in a more hurried examination of the Kaoyih, from the beginning of the dynasty to 730, I have found no quotation from it. There is a quotation which is introduced by the words "Tarngshu Jyh 唐書志" (Tarngshu Monograph) but on examination this was found to appear word for word in the Monograph on Ceremonial (Liinyih Jyh 禮儀志) of the Jiow Tarngshu. Since the Tarngshu must certainly have been available to Symaa Guang (for it appears in the Chorngwen Tzoongmuh and, moreover, was not noted as missing in the Southern Sonq short edition) it would be natural to suppose that it did not differ in any material respect from the parts of the Jiow Tarngshu which it covered; in other words, to suppose that the editors of the Jiow Tarngshu merely incorporated the Tarngshu without change into the Jiow Tarngshu.

Direct evidence that in certain places at least the Jiow Tarngshu contains the actual words of the Tarngshu has been adduced by Tsern Jianngong 傑建功. In the biographies of Tarng Lin 唐臨 (ch. 85) and Prince Tzer, (Lii) Shangjin 蕭上金 (ch. 89), the expression "the present emperor" (jin shanq 今上) is used, referring to the Emperor Shyuantzong (712-756). In the biography of Dow Uei 賀威 (ch. 61. 7. a.) the words occur: "From Wunder (618-626) to the present, the Dow family have twice been relatives by marriage of the emperor 賀氏自武德至今再為外戚." The second empress of the Dow family during the Tarng dynasty was the empress of Rueytzong and the mother of Shyuantzong. It is therefore natural to suppose that "to the present" refers to the reign of Shyuantzong, when Wei Shuh was

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1 Kaoyih 10. 3. a. (3).
2 Jiow Tarngshu Jiaokann Jih, preface 5. b. Note also the evidence gathered by Chyan Daluhhin 錦大昕 (Niann-ell Shyy Kaoyih 57, p. 96), to show that the words of Tarng historians were taken over unchanged.
writing. Finally, at the end of the biography of Liou Rengoi 劉仁軌 (ch. 84, 5, b.) occur the words: “The historian Wei Shuh says...史官韋述日.” One could add to this list the biography of Peir Guangtyng 李光庭 (ch. 84) at the end of which appears Wei Shuh’s comment.

On the other hand, were there parts of the Tarngshu which were not incorporated into the Jiow Tarngshu? In a recent article, Mr. Ts'en Chung-mien 崔仲勉 1 maintains that a large proportion of the passages collected by Tsern Jianngong in the Jiow Tarngshu Yihwen 逸文 2 were never part of the Jiow Tarngshu but came from the work of Wei Shuh et al. He has made an irrefutable case for refusing these passages a place in the Jiow Tarngshu but has, in my opinion, been less successful in showing that they are from the work which I have been terming the Tarngshu. Most of the passages come from the Taypyng Yuhlaan, where they are introduced by the words “Tarngshu”. They date from the beginning of the dynasty to the reign of Shitzong 僖宗 (874-888), though they are very scanty after the reign of Wentzong 文宗 (827-840). Mr. Ts'en had apparently overlooked the account of the continuation of Wei Shuh’s Tarngshu by Leou Fang. He therefore supposed that the sixteen chapters whose author was unknown to the editors of the Chormquen Tsoongmuh dealt with matters from the end of Wei Shuh’s work in Kaiyuan 嘉年 down as far as the period Dahjong (847-859). Apart from the fact that sixteen chapters would have provided small room in which to cover a period of over 100 years, we know that these sixteen chapters were completed by the year 760.

Mr. Ts'en himself suggests that the Taypyng Yuhlaan may have included other works besides the Tarngshu and the Jiow Tarngshu in the term “Tarngshu”. 3 He points out that no shyrluh is quoted as such by the Taypyng Yuhlaan—nor such works as the Tarngshu. He therefore supposes that the term “Tarngshu” is used by the Taypyng Yuhlaan in a wide generic sense to include histories of the Tarng period.

The Kaoyih provides clear evidence that shyrluh, at any rate, are so included. In the Jiow Tarngshu Yihwen appears a passage about a man called Tzang Shiranq 唐希譚. 4 This man has no biography in the existing Jiow Tarngshu, so in the Jiow Tarngshu Yihwen it is called a part of the lost biography of Tzang Shiranq. It happens, however, that the Kaoyih quoted from a biography of this man in the Daytzong Shyrluh. 5 There can be little doubt that the passage in the Taypyng Yuhlaan also came from this shyrluh.

3 The carelessness of the Taypyng Yuhlaan in naming the works it quotes is pointed out in the preface to the Taypyng Yuhlaan Yiinder, Introduction, pp. 10-11. Five quotations from the “Gwoshyy” or “Tarng Gwoshyy” also appear in the Taypyng Goanjih. (see Taypyng Goanjih Yiinder, Yiinshu Yiinshu Yiinder, pp. 23-4.) The editors of the Index assume that they come from the work of Wu Jing. Since, however, one of the quotations deals with events in the ninth century, this is clearly impossible. No doubt the same considerations apply as in the case of the sister work, the Taypyng Yuhlaan.
4 Jiow Tarngshu Yihwen 11. 11, b., quoting Taypyng Yuhlaan 237. 7, a, (2).
5 Kaoyih 16. 4, b, (5).
In another case a passage attributed to the "Tarngshu" in the Taypyng Yuhlaan appears to come from the Dah Tarng Shinyeu 大 唐 新 語. Tsern Jianngong himself pointed out that the passages in the two works were identical except for minor textual variants. One might, of course, suppose that the Dah Tarng Shinyeu here drew on the Tarngshu. The event in question, however, is recorded in somewhat different words in the Jiow Tarngshu, in the biography of Su Liangsyh 蘇 良 聲. In the passage from the Taypyng Yuhlaan and the Shinyeu the event is dated vaguely in the time of Gautzong, but in the biography it is in the time of the Empress Wuu. In the Tzyjh Tongjiam and the Tongdean 通 録 it is dated more precisely in the fourth month of the third year of Chweigong (688), also in the reign of the Empress Wuu. Tsern Jianngong thought that the passage came from the Monograph on Food and Money (Shyrhuoh Jyh 食 貨 記) of the Jiow Tarngshu, but there can be little doubt it is merely a garbled version originating in the Shinyeu, or in some other equally unofficial source from which the latter copied.

With two reservations, therefore, which I shall explain below, I am of the opinion that the Tarngshu was incorporated without change into the Jiow Tarngshu. These reservations apply firstly to the monographs and secondly to the special biographies at the end of the Jiow Tarngshu, namely such chapters as those on Good Officials (Lianglih 良 吏), Women (Lieh neu 列 女), Recluses (Yiinyih 隱 逸), and on foreign countries.

I shall now deal individually with the various parts of the Jiow Tarngshu which I have been able to study, in an effort to ascertain the source of each part.

(1) Monographs

The existing Jiow Tarngshu contains eleven monographs in thirty chapters. There is no direct evidence to show what monographs the Tarngshu contained—only the statement of the Chornqewn Tzoonmuh that it did contain monographs. The Shyytong once mentions the figure ten, but as this is in connection with the early work of Sheu Jinqtzong it can hardly be regarded as evidence with regard to the work of Wei Shuh and Leou Fang. The figure ten is, however, likely in itself, since all previous official histories which contained monographs had either eight (Shyyjih 史 記, How Hannshu 後 漢 書, Song Shu 宋 書, Nan Chyishu 南 齊 書), or ten (Hannshu 漢 書, Jinnshu 晋 書, Weyshu 魏 書, Sweishu 魏 書). Jaw Yng's 趙 嶽 memorial of the fourth month of 941, outlining his plan for the Jiow Tarngshu, also mentions the number ten, although he gives the names of only nine of his proposed monographs. If we are to assume that he had the Tarngshu in mind at the time, we must suppose that

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2 JTS. 75. 2. b.
3 TJK 204. 1. b.; Tongdean 33. 1. b.
4 Wuuday Hueyyaw 18, p. 228 ff. This memorial is discussed by M. des Rotours in Le Traité des Examens, p. 65.
either a Monograph on Food and Money (Shyrhuoh Jyh 食貨志) or a Monograph on Carriages and Dress (Yufwu Jyh 傢服志) did not form part of the Tarngshu.

Evidence from another quarter, however, suggests that certain, if not all, of the monographs may have been completely rewritten. Among the "yihwen" collected by Tsern Jiaanong are a number referred to in the Taypyng Yuhlaan as coming from the Tarngshu Guanpiin Jyh 官品志. No such monograph exists in the Jiow Tarngshu and all the passages differ from the existing Monograph on Officials (Jyhguan Jyh 職官志). Tsern thinks that they were probably from the Tarngshu of Wei Shuh. This seems not unlikely, in view of the fact that the existing Monograph on Officials is based on the Tarng Liow Dean 唐文典, which was only completed in 738 or 739. It would, of course, have been possible for Wei Shuh or Leou Fang to draw on the Tarng Liow Dean and discard their old draft monograph, but I suspect that they did not do anything so drastic. The passages from the "Guanpiin Jyh" generally appear in the Tongdean, which no doubt copied from the Tarngshu.

The one passage which I have so far seen which definitely quotes the Tarngshu of Wei Shuh may have come from this monograph. It is quoted by Mr. Ts'en Chung-mien in the above-mentioned article. It occurs as commentary in the Tarng Hueyjaw and refers to an innovation in connection with the selection of officials. The passage occurs almost word for word in Jiow Tarngshu biography of Tarng Jeau 唐皎 but, significantly, with no mention of the date. In the Tarng Hueyjaw it is dated the eighth year of Jenguan (634), and has a slight variation in wording which makes it more appropriate to a monograph than to a biography. It begins: "In 634 Tarng Jeau was Vice-president of the Board of Civil Office (Lihbuh Shyhlang). Since the selections . . .", whereas the passage in the biography begins: "In the period Jenguan (626-649) he was promoted to Vice-president of the Board of Civil Office. Previously the selections . . ." Since this passage does not appear in the existing Monograph on Officials, it probably came from the earlier Guanpiin Jyh.

As far as the other monographs are concerned, I have found little evidence either for or against their having belonged to the Tarngshu. The Kaoyih is not much help in regard to monographs, which it seldom quotes. I shall only add the further remark that since, in any case, material would have had to be added under each individual topic in each monograph, the inducement to rewrite completely must have been greater than in the case of basic annals or biographies, which could generally be copied without change.

(2) Basic Annals

The basic annals of two emperors—Shyuantzong and Suhtzong—come into consideration in the period I am discussing. For the first of these, that of
Shyuantszong, there is conclusive proof that it formed part of the Tarngshu—
as, of course, we should expect. In the Kaoyih there is a considerable number
of instances noted in which the Shyuantszong Shyrluh disagreed in the matter
of a date from the Shyuantszong beenjih. In some cases no other work is quoted,
but in others the Tarngih is cited as well, almost always in agreement with the
beenjih and never with the Shyrluh. In several cases it is possible to prove that
the beenjih is in error, since the day is referred to by a term of the sexagenary
cycle which did not appear in the stated month.\(^1\) Since the Tarngih follows
the dating of the beenjih, it seems natural to assume that Leou Fang, when he
came to write the Tarngih, merely followed the chronology of the already
completed Tarngshu without referring to the corrected chronology of the
Shyrluh, even though the Shyrluh was written before he finished the Tarngshu.
Nor did Linqhwu Hwan, in his additions to the Tarngshu, apply the corrections
from his Shyrluh. This evidence confirms what we already suspected, that there
was little or no revision of those parts of the Tarngshu which were incorporated
into the Jiow Tarngshu.

Was the Shyuantszong beenjih written by Leou Fang or did part of it appear
in Wei Shuh's work? Wei Shuh himself was not explicit on this point. He said:
"It [Wu Jing's work] extended down to the beginning of Kaiyuan. Wei Shuh
interwove the two works, added material after the period Chweigong [685]
and completed a work of annals and biographies." My interpretation of this is
that Wei Shuh's work also largely stopped at the beginning of Kaiyuan and that
his additions applied only to the later period covered by Wu Jing's work.\(^2\) Chyan

\(^1\) In the following cases Jiow Tarngshu beenjih disagrees with the Shyrluh, but the Tarngih
is not mentioned: Kaoyih 13. 9. a. (1); 14. 4. b. (2). In the following the beenjih and Tarngih
agree as against the Shyrluh: 13. 6. a. (4); 13. 11. b. (1) (there is a slight divergency between
the Tarngih and the beenjih but it is probably a copyist error: beenjih has 12th month, where
Tarngih has 11th); 13. 12. b. (2); 13. 12. b. (3); 14. 2. a. (4); 14. 2. b. (1); 14. 6. a. (5).
In the following cases the Charnghih is cited as evidence that the Shyrluh is correct and the Tarngih
and beenjih wrong: 14. 2. b. (2); 14. 5. b. (3). The latter case is interesting because, according
to the Shyrluh and the Charnghih, the 17th day of the 12th month of Tianbao 14 was the day
shinchour, whereas according to the Tarngih and Hoang: Concordance des Chronologies
Néoméniques, the 16th was the day shinchour. I have been unable to discover which is correct.
In 15. 3. b. (1), the Shyuantszong Shyrluh and the Jiow Suhzong beenjih state that the first day
of the 8th month of the 2nd year of Jyhder (757) was the day goeiwey; the Tarngih, Jiow
Shyuantszong beenjih, Suhzong Shyrluh and, in this case, the Charnghih as well, agree with Hoang
in making the first day of the month the preceding day renwuu. This is also an indication that
the Shyuantszong beenjih and the Suhzong beenjih were done independently. A group of cases
in the years 730 and 731 shows a somewhat different pattern. In Kaoyih 13. 3. b. (2) Symaa Guang
remarks that the year 730 of the Shyuantszong Shyrluh shows marked disagreement with other
sources, leading him to suppose that it had been lost from the original work and later badly
restored. He quotes four instances of divergent dating in this year and the next in all of which
the Tarngih and beenjih disagree with the Shyrluh, and in two of which the Charnghih supports
the beenjih and Tarngih. They are Kaoyih 13. 3. b. (2); 13. 3. b. (3); 13. 4. a. (2); 13. 4. a. (3).
They cannot, of course, be applied to the present argument. To complete the story, in 14. 2. a. (6),
13. 6. a. (1), and 13. 12. a. (1) we have instances in which the beenjih and the Tarngih disagree.
In the last of these, the Shyuantszong Shyrluh gives yet a third version. In the second, the Shyrluh,
Tarngih, and Charnghih all differ from the beenjih—it appears to be a mere copyist error in the
beenjih. In the first, the Shyrluh is not mentioned.

\(^2\) But see p. 463 above for evidence that Wei Shuh wrote the biography of Peir Guangtyng,
who died in 733. This is less damaging to my hypothesis than it might seem, for this biography
formed an appendix to that of his father, Peir Slyngean.
Dahshin 魏大昕 was also of the opinion that Wei Shuh's work ended with Rueytzong, for he said: "The National History of the first five emperors of Tarn [Gautzun, Taytzong, Gautzong, Jongtzong, Rueytzong] passed through the hands of Wu Jing and Wei Shuh. They were careful and strict in making their work concise." This is his explanation why "the earlier and later parts of the Jiow [Tarnshu] basic annals are not the same in the matter of concision. Up to and including Rueytzong, the style is concise and methodical. From Minghwang, Suhtzong, and Daytzong onward, it becomes gradually more profuse." 1 Without regarding it as proven that Wei Shuh had no part in the writing of at least the first years of Shyuantzong's reign, we can assume that the bulk of this beenjih was written by Leou Fang.

There seems no reason to doubt that the present Suhtzong beenjih consists of the two chapters written by Yu Shioulieh combined into one. It bears no such close relation to the Tarnshu as does the Shyuantzong beenjih. On the other hand it bears quite a close relation to the Suhtzong Shyrluh, a fact which is not surprising since both were written in the History Office at about the same time.

In the period I have studied, the Kaoyih contains a single quotation from the Daytzong beenjih. It would be rash, therefore, to venture any conclusions about it.

(3) Individual Biographies

The following table will outline the more certain of the conclusions which I have been able to reach about the sources of the various individual biographies in the Jiow Tarnshu. I venture no opinion about the biographies in the chapters listed below apart from those of the persons actually named.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Chapter</th>
<th>Name of Person</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) 53-109</td>
<td>All except some &quot;attached&quot; biographies</td>
<td>Tarnshu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) 107</td>
<td>Sons of Shyuantzong</td>
<td>Partly Tarnshu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) 109</td>
<td>阿史那社爾: 契苾何力; 黑齋常之; 李多祚</td>
<td>Tarnshu (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) 110</td>
<td>李光弼</td>
<td>Daytzong Shyrluh (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) 111</td>
<td>李梉</td>
<td>Suhtzong Shyrluh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) 116</td>
<td>Sons of Suhtzong</td>
<td>Daytzong Shyrluh (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) 120</td>
<td>郭子儀</td>
<td>Daytzong Shyrluh partly based on Suhtzong Shyrluh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) 128</td>
<td>頜氏行狀, not Daytzong Shyrluh</td>
<td>Suhtzong Shyrluh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) 200</td>
<td>安祿山; 安慶绪; 高尚; 孫孝哲; 史思明; 史朝義</td>
<td>Suhtzong Shyrluh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Nianwei Shyy Kaoyih 57, p. 971.
I shall now briefly discuss the evidence for the above conclusions.

(a) If one makes a list of the years of death of persons who have biographies in the Jiow Tarngshu 1 (excluding "attached" biographies) it soon becomes apparent that the most likely place for the division between the material from the Tarngshu and that added from the shyrluh is chapter 106 (disregarding for the moment chapter 107, which is discussed in (b) below). None of the persons with biographies in chapters 53–106 died later than 758; with the exception of chapter 109 (see (c) below), none of the persons with biographies from chapter 108 onwards died earlier than 758. It is difficult to find evidence about these biographies as unambiguous and clear-cut as in the case of the beenjih. In the biography of Yang Gwojong 楊國忠 (ch. 106), however, occurs a passage which also appeared in the Tarnglih, somewhat amplified but with several of the same expressions. It describes how, in the summer preceding An Lulishan's rebellion, Yang Gwojong had his agents arrest several members of An Lulishan's clique at the capital. The same incident was differently described in the Suhtzong Shyrluh. The three versions are placed side by side below. I have underlined those parts of the Jiow Tarngshu and Tarnglih versions which are identical.

The An Lulishan Shyhji 2 also contains a text, almost identical with the Jiow Tarngshu but with the addition of the name Lii Fanglai 李方來, which appears in the Tarnglih and the Shyrluh, and the name of the Governor of the Capital (Jingjawyiin 京兆尹) Lii Shiann 李巖, which is mentioned in another part of the quotation from the Tarnglih, but not in the Jiow Tarngshu biography. The An Lulishan Shyhji may have added these details from the Tarnglih, which had itself enlarged the account of the Tarngshu. The text of the Jiow Tarngshu is in any case defective, since the character 之 of the name Jenq Arngjy 左鸞之 3 has been dropped out. It is possible that the name of the third man

1 The last to die in the chapters before 107 were Wei Shuh 韋胡 (chapter 102), in 787 or possibly early 788; Geahu Hamm 喬胡 (chapter 104), in 756; Yang Gwojong 楊國忠 (chapter 106), in 756. On the other hand, the dates of death of those in chapter 108 were: Wei Jianmu 萬見目, 762; Tsuei Yuan 崔圓, 768; Tsuei Huann 崔煬, 768; Duh Horngjimn 杜鴻漬, 769.
2 ALSSJ. 中 3. a.
3 The Syhpoh Buggum edition of JTS, has Jeng Mao 鄭曇. I here follow the Baenah 百衲 edition of the JTS, in the Syhpoh Tsangkan. The latter edition, however, shows still further corruption in that it telescopes the two names Lii Chau 李超 and An Day 安岱 into Lii Day 李岱.
arrested, Lii Fanglai, has been similarly lost through a copyist’s error. One might suppose that the editors of the Jiow Tarnghshu had here slightly abbreviated the Tarnghshu, eliminating for some unknown reason all mention of the Governor of the Capital, Lii Shiann. The alternative explanation that Leou Fang added to the Tarnghshu this information which he had left out of the Tarnghshu becomes the more probable when we realize that Lii Shiann was a powerful official during the time that the Tarnghshu was being completed (757–759). After Lii Shiann died, in 766,1 Leou Fang could feel free to mention his part in the affair. One cannot exclude the third possibility, that the text was deliberately mutilated while Lii Shiann was in power.

Space will not permit a detailed discussion of the other passages in the Kaoyih which have a bearing on these biographies. I have not, however, so far discovered any evidence definitely conflicting with the hypothesis that they all came from the Tarnghshu, with additions at the end in some cases but with no revision of the main text.2

Can we go further and find the dividing line between the work of Wei Shuh and that of Leou Fang? Assuming as we did before that Wei Shuh’s work came down to the beginning of Kaiyuan, an obvious though less clear-cut dividing line occurs at chapter 95, the sons of Rueytzong. This division is rendered more likely when we observe that there are twelve chapters from chapter 94 to chapter 106, about the number of chapters we should expect to be devoted to biographies in the sixteen new chapters which Leou Fang added. (The existing Shyuantzong beenjih contains two chapters, and if we add chapter 107 and a chapter on Cruel Officials, this makes up the number sixteen. No such calculation could pretend to exactness, however, since we do not know whether or not chapters have been combined as in the case of the Suhtzong beenjih. Nor can we be certain that a chapter on Cruel Officials was added by Leou Fang.)

I have not studied the Kaoyih for the whole period covered by chapters 95–106, and cannot say whether any evidence would be forthcoming on their source.

1JT S. 112 states that he died in the seventh month of the second year of Yeongkang 永康. This is clearly a mistake for Yeongtay 永泰. The correct reading occurred in one of the copies compared by Tsern Jianngong (Jiow Tarnghshu Jiawhann Jih 43. 7. b).

2 In the case of the biography of Jang Jeouling 張九齡 (JT S. 99. 8. a.), the passage at the end of the biography which states that when Shyuantzong was in Szechwan he gave Jang Jeouling the posthumous title of Sytwu 司徒 must be an interpolation. Other sources state that Dertzong bestowed this title in the period Jiannjong (780–783) and the bei-ming 碑銘 written for him by Shyu Haw 徐浩 while Jyeduhshyh 節度使 (Military Governor) of Lingnan (present Kwangtung, etc.) does not mention this title. Shyu Haw was Jyeduhshyh from 767 to 768 (see Tarngh Fangjmn Nianbeau, pp. 186 and 187). Symaa Guang (TJT J. 218. 12. b., with Kaoyih as commentary—the Sythchh Shongkann edition of the Kaoyih is defective here, see 14. 13. b. (2)) also treats this as an error on the part of the Jiow Tarnghshu. It follows that the passage in the Jiow Tarnghshu cannot have been in the Tarnghshu of Leou Fang and must have been added, either by the editors of the final Jiow Tarnghshu or at an earlier date—possibly when the biography of his grandson, called great-grandnephew in the JT S. biography, but see “beenjuan” 本傳 in the Chiujiang Jyi and the additions at the end of his grave inscription, Chiujiang Jyi, fuhluh 附錄, 11. a. ff., where Jeouling’s grandsons all have the character Jonq in their names) Jang Jonqfang 張仲方, who died in 837. This is in any case not an interpolation or alteration within the body of Jang Jeouling’s biography.
Chapter 107, containing the biographies of the sons of Shyuantzong, cannot have existed complete in its present form in Leou Fang's Tarngshu. Several of the biographies contain matter later than 758. Nevertheless, there are grounds which make me think that an incomplete chapter on the sons of Shyuantzong was written by Leou Fang. In 737 the Crown Prince Ing 瑩 and Princes Yau 瑯 and Jiu 瑳 were all deprived of their ranks and ordered to commit suicide. In the heading of chapter 107, the word shuhren 庶人 (commoner) is prefixed to their names. In 762, after the death of Shyuantzong, however, their titles were restored. This is recorded in the biography of ex-Crown Prince Ing 瑩 and the corrected titles are used throughout the body of the chapter. The only reasonable explanation seems to be that the chapter was begun when they were called “commoners” but imperfectly revised later. The great bulk of the material in the chapter comes from before 758. Generally the only event later than that date which is recorded about any of the princes is his death—in many cases not even this is mentioned. The Kaoyih three times refers to this chapter but affords no evidence as to its source.

Chapter 109 presents a puzzle. It consists of the biographies of seven generals of barbarian origin whose deaths range over a period from 646 to 779. My guess is that it originally formed a chapter among the classified biographies at the end of the Tarngshu, including, when Wei Shuh completed his work, the first five, who had all died before the beginning of Kaiyuan. The remaining two, who died in 759 and 779, were probably added by Linqhwu Hwan or another member of the History Office. When the editors of the Jiow Tarngshu came to complete the work they took over this chapter unchanged, but for some unknown reason placed it here rather than at the end. It is not quoted in the part of the Kaoyih I have examined.

The evidence for deriving the biography of Lii Guangbih 李光弼 from the Daytzong Shyrkhu is purely inferential in character. Since he died during the reign of Daytzong he could be expected to have had a biography in the Daytzong Shyrkhu. Moreover, the events recorded in his biography concerning the reign of Suhtzong differ markedly from the Suhtzong Shyrkhu.1 Since those two shyrkhu are the most likely places for the Jiow Tarngshu editors to have derived their information, it is natural to suspect that this biography came from his biography in the Daytzong Shyrkhu, or was abridged from it, for we know that the editors treated the material from the shyrkhu with much greater freedom than they seem to have treated the Tarngshu itself (see (i) below).

The biography of Lii Shian can be assigned fairly definitely to the Suhtzong Shyrkhu. We are given in one place a quotation from the Daytzong Shyrkhu regarding Lii Shian and in another a quotation merely called shyrkhu biography.2 These quotations fit naturally together and relate an event which is recorded in his Jiow Tarngshu biography but in quite different words. In the former case the passage in the Kaoyih ends with the words: “Here I

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1 See Kaoyih 16. 2. b. (2); 15. 8. a. (4); 16. 11. b. (2); 15. 12. a. (4); 16. 1. a. (3); 16. 6. a. (11).
2 Kaoyih 15. 11. a. (1); 15. 10. b. (2). Cf. JTS. 112. 5. b.
follow the *Suhtzong Shyrluh*, and the Old [Jiow, i.e. *Jiow Tarngshu*] basic annals and biography.”¹ The passage in the *Tongjiann* can be completely derived from the *Jiow Tarngshu* biography of Lii Shiann with one or two small details from the basic annals of Suhtzong.² The *Suhtzong Shyrluh*, therefore, must have been identical with the existing biography, and was presumably the source from which it was derived.

(f) Two references to chapter 116, the sons of Suhtzong and Daytzong, occur in the part of the *Kaoyih* I have examined. In one case, three of the sons of Suhtzong are given different names in the *Suhtzong Shyrluh* from those used in the biography. (It is interesting to note that the *Suhtzong beenjih* agrees with the *Shyrluh* in one case, with the biography in another, and gives a name different from either of them in a third.)³ In the second instance where the biography is referred to, it differs from the *Suhtzong Shyrluh* in the details of the *coup d’état* at the end of Suhtzong’s reign.⁴ In this case it is stated to agree with the *Daytzong Shyrluh*. Both these quotations are consistent with the hypothesis that the material on the sons of Suhtzong was derived from the *Daytzong Shyrluh*.

(g) This biography contains a long comment by “the Historian Peir Jih 蘇泊”. 劜 should read 炎 (cf. *Jiow Tarngshu* Jiawann Jih 44.13 b). Peir Jih 蘇泊 was Chief Minister from 808 to 810 and was in charge of the composition of the *Dertzong 德宗 Shyrluh*.⁵ Guo Tzyyyih died in 781 and should therefore have had a biography in this *Shyrluh*, since Dertzong reigned from 780 to 805. There are several cases in which a passage from the *Suhtzong Shyrluh* is quoted from which a certain passage in the biography of Guo Tzyyyih has clearly been copied directly or derived by means of condensation.⁶ I infer from this that those parts of Guo Tzyyyih’s biography which lie in the reign of Suhtzong were pieced together from the accounts of his campaigns appearing in that *Shyrluh*.

(h) We know, from the criticism of the *Daytzong Shyrluh* quoted above, that it did not contain a biography of Yan Jenching. It is strange that it should have been expected to have, for he died in 785, in the reign of Dertzong. In any case we know what was the ultimate source of the bulk of his biography. It was the *Yan Shyh Shingjuanq 顏氏行狀* written by In Lianq 殷亮, his cousin.

It was evidently regarded as something different from the ordinary run of

¹ See for example *Kaoyih* 15.10 b. (1), and compare in connection with *TJTJ* 221.2 a. and *JTS* 120.3 a., line 4 ff. (beginning 二月史思明). In the account of this battle Symae Guang says that he is following the *Shyrluh*, rejecting the account in another work, the *Bin Jyh 邪志*. The account in the *Tongjiann*, though fuller, is almost identical with the biography in the details which the biography contains.

² *JTS* 10.10 b. and 112.5 b.; *TJTJ* 221.8 a. Space will unfortunately not permit me to set these texts side by side and discuss their relation in detail.

³ *Kaoyih* 15.8 a. (5); cf. also *JTS* 10.7 a. and b., and chapter 116. *TJTJ* 220.11 a.

⁴ *Kaoyih* 16.4 b. (5).

⁵ *JTS* 148, biography of Peir Jih; *YH* 48.6 a.; and *STS* 62, Tzaeshiang Beau 宰相表.

⁶ *JTS* 10.10 b. (1), and compare in connection with *TJTJ* 221.2 b. and 3 a. and *JTS* 120.3 b., line 4 ff. (beginning 二月史思明).
shinqjuanq, for it circulated as a separate book. There is no indication of when it was written, but we may presume that it was shortly after his death. A comparison of its text with that of the Jiow Tarngshu biography of Jenching shows that at least three-quarters of the biography consists of a condensation of the Shinqjuanq. I have found no source for the remaining material. If the biography was made up not long after his death, the extra material may have come from evidence of persons still alive. Some of it, such as the details of his appointments, could have been obtained from the archives of the History Office; much of the rest appears to be court gossip.

(i) The evidence is overwhelming that these biographies are nothing more than a condensation of biographies in the Suhtzong Shyrluh. In the many quotations the disagreements between the Shyrluh and the biographies are few and trivial, consisting of no more than textual variants. The Shyrluh generally has a somewhat fuller text, showing that the editors of the Jiow Tarngshu have condensed it. No doubt in many of the places where the An Luhshan Shyki j is fuller than the biography it is reproducing the text of the Shyrluh.

(4) Classified Biographies
Although there are several interesting points which come out of the Kaoyih with regard to the classified biographies even in the part with which I am dealing, in general the question should receive a wider treatment. I shall, therefore, say very little about them. I shall merely mention one piece of evidence which has already been noted by Chinese scholars to show that at least the Chapter on Recluses, chapter 192 (Yiinyih 隱逸) was not taken over unchanged from the Tarngshu. In the biography of Yang Yan 楊炎 it is stated that the name of Yan’s father, Yang Boh 楊播, appears in the Yihren Juann 逸人傳. He has no biography in the present Yiinyih Juann and, moreover, the title of the chapter is not identical. The grandfather of Wuu Yuanherng 武元衡, Wuu Pyngi 武平, is also stated to have a biography in the Yihren Juann, but does not appear in the present Yiinyih Juann.

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(4) Harn Changli Jyi 韓昌黎集. The collected works of Harn Yuh 韩愈. Edition of SBBY.

1 See STS. 58. 11. a. The work appears in Yan Luugong Jyi 14. a. ff. Compare his biographies in JTS. 128. b. ff. and STS. 133. 4. b. ff. The name of the author of the Shinqjuanq is given in the Shin Tarngshu and the Kaoyih in Jonqronq 慎仲容, but the editor of the Syhbuh Beyyaw edition shows that this was impossible, since In Jonqronq was Yan Jenching’s maternal great-granduncle. The Songshyy Yihwen Jyh gives the author’s name as In Lianq. (See Yan Luugong Jyi 14. 9. b.; Songshyy 203. 10. a.)
2 I hope to demonstrate this in detail in my work on An Luhshan. See for example Kaoyih 13. 6. a. (5).
3 JTS. 118. 6. b. and 158. 1. a.


(8) *Jiunnjai Dwushu Jyh* 傳賢書. 郡齋譜書志, by Chaur Gongwuu 社公武. First published 1151. Edition of the *Syhshu Tongshu* Tsongshu [TCK] (hereafter abbreviated as *SBTK*), in which it is given the fuller title of *Jiunnjai Shiansheng Dwushu Jyh*.


(12) *Songshyy* 宋史. Edition of *SBBY*.

(13) *Tarng Hueyyaw* 唐會要 (abbreviated as *THY*). Edition of the *Guoshuye Jibeen Tsongshu* 國學基本叢書, Commercial Press.

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(15) *Tarng Fangjih* Nianbeau 唐方鎮年表, by Wu Tyngshieh 倪廷祿. Included in the *Elshyrwuu Shyy Buubiann* “九五史補編”, published by the Kaiming Shudiann 開明書店, Shanghai, 1936.


(22) *Tzyjyh Tongjiann* 質治通鑑. Abbreviated as *TJTT*. Edition of *SBBY*. Contains the Kaoyih as commentary.


(27) *Yan Lwongong Jyi* 颜魯公集. The collected works of Yan Jenching 颜真卿, together with biographical and critical notices on his life, his writings, and his calligraphy. Edition of *SBBY*.


Other Works
P. Hoang, Concordance des Chronologies Néoméniques, Shanghai, 1910.

Throughout I use the word chapter as a convenient translation for *jiuann* 卷 or *pian* 篇.
MAP I — THE T'ANG EMPIRE

Boundaries of provinces (according to HTS) ........

Commands of Military Governors (Chih-ta Shih) ....

Prefectures (Chou) - (green) ....

Modern great wall ........

Number of Ch'ing militia units in each prefecture shown in green. Numbers outside brackets are those in HTS Ti-li Shih; those inside brackets are the ones given by Ku Chi-kwun in T'ang Cheh-chung Fu. Ku Chao-ku. The latter are included only when they exceed the figures of the HTS.
MAP I
MAP II. -- NORTHWEST AND CENTRAL CHINA IN THE T'ANG DYNASTY
(A -- western half; B -- eastern half)

Prefectures (Chou) • Prefectures (Fu) "part of the Shi wall"
Superior prefectures (Chou) • Prefectures (Chou) "part of the Shi wall"
Counties (Hsien) • Prefectures (Chou) "part of the Shi wall"
Great Wall (Modern) • Prefectures (Chou) "part of the Shi wall"

Yellow River (T'ang course) • Prefectures (Chou) "part of the Shi wall"
Other waterways shown are modern.

Frontier organization before 755:

Commands of Military Governors (Chieh-tu Shih) • Prefectures (Chou) "part of the Shi wall"
Seal of Military Governor • Prefectures (Chou) "part of the Shi wall"
Army (Chuan) • Prefectures (Chou) "part of the Shi wall"
dp

Prefecture with military unit attached • Prefectures (Chou) "part of the Shi wall"

N.B. These indications given for the location of armies, etc., are often very vague or even conflicting. The positions shown on the map therefore are often merely approximate. The purpose is to show the situation in 755 and I have therefore attempted to show all the changes of name and location before that time.