POLITICS AND AGRARIAN CHANGE AMONG THE
PLATEAU TONGA OF NORTHERN RHODESIA,
C. 1924-63

by

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ABSTRACT

The Tonga Plateau was the main area of white settlement in Northern Rhodesia and in the 1920s many Africans there were moved into reserves on poor land which soon became overcrowded. At the same time, official restrictions were placed on the marketing of farm produce by the African population which supplied part of the Copperbelt market. Such grievances, together with settler pressure for closer union with Southern Rhodesia, prompted Africans in the area to form some of the earliest political associations in the territory. By the late 1940s, there was a small group of highly commercialised Tonga farmers. The Government tried to enlist the support of this elite with a scheme for 'Improved Farmers', but it was only partly successful and rules for land conservation antagonised the great mass of small scale African farmers. From the first, the plateau provided substantial support for the country's first nationalist party, the A.N.C. However, the party's leaders regarded the area, with its income from commercial farming, primarily as a source of funds and its organisation on the plateau was poor and several influential Africans declined to lend it any active assistance. The Improved Farmers, for instance, preferred their non-political Farmers Associations. This brought on them accusations of collaboration with white oppression which only increased their alienation. After the 1958 split in the A.N.C.'s leadership which led to the formation of U.N.I.P., the A.N.C. came to be more closely identified with the Southern Province (and its political centre-point, the Tonga plateau), which area provided its most consistent support. U.N.I.P. had the disadvantage of being rooted on the
Copperbelt where few Tonga lived or worked. Besides, most of its leaders were long-standing urban residents and the Tonga had doubts about committing rural claims to such people. This lack of affinity with the Copperbelt partly ensured the A.N.C.'s continued popularity on the Tonga plateau.
NOTES ON SOURCES

The following abbreviations are used in this account:

Z.N.A. Zambia National Archives.
P.R.O. Public Record Office.
L.M. Livingstone Museum
A.C.J. Arthur Creech Jones.
M.M.R.S. Mount Makulu Research Station.
Z.M.R. Zambesi Mission Record.
PREFACE

In many ways the Tonga plateau is a crucial area for the study of economic and political change in Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia. It is therefore curious that hitherto it has received very little attention from historians. There has of course been some very important anthropological work but neither the pre-colonial nor the colonial history of the area has been covered. In this study, I attempt to fill in at least a part of this wide gap in Zambian historiography with a survey of various aspects of socio-economic and political change in the area during the colonial period.

The Tonga plateau is an important part of the Southern province. It occupies a prominent position within the framework of Northern Rhodesia's history of racial conflict. It was a major centre of European settlement during the Colonial years. The extent of white settlement in the area raises several interesting questions. How did the settler population come by the vast tracts of land that were reserved in the area for its occupation? What was the reaction of the African population that was dispossessed of land in several areas to accommodate the white immigrants? How did the Colonial Administrations handle the problems generated by the uprooting of several sections of the African population? These are just a few of the questions which will receive attention in this discussion.

1See Bibliography for the anthropological studies carried out by Elizabeth Colson.
The Tonga plateau also happens to be the centre of African commercial farming activity within the territory. The area has often been referred to as the granary of Northern Rhodesia. During the period under survey, local African grain production was to expand considerably and, because the area's European farmers saw this expansion as a threat to their operations, the Administration was to place restrictions on African enterprise. We will be examining the reaction of African farmers to these constraints which operated not only between the races but also within the African farming community after the introduction of an Improved farming scheme in 1946. We will also see how this Government sponsored scheme promoted divisions within the local African population that were to frustrate efforts to unite the Africans of the plateau for political action during the 1940s and 1950s.

Henderson has drawn attention to the need for an assessment of the role of the Tonga farmer in the politics of the African National Congress (A.N.C.). I will be examining the political activities that centred around settler demands for closer political union with Southern Rhodesia. In this connection, I will highlight the political reaction of Africans on the plateau to the challenge of settlerdom as seen in these demands and in the general operation of the colour-bar. Congress' activities on the plateau in the period before and immediately after the declaration of

the Central African Federation in 1953 receive much attention. Among other things, we will see how responsive the various Chieftaincies on the plateau were to Congress' programme and how the movement failed to capitalise on the potential reserves of goodwill it enjoyed in the area because of its poor organisation. Although Congress won the support of the grass-roots, it failed to attract the active support of several influential Africans on the plateau. We will see why this was so and how much it limited the movement's effectiveness in the Chieftaincies concerned.

Throughout the discussion of political activities, an attempt is made to see the Tonga plateau within a very general framework of territorial African protest against white rule. Up to 1958, the Southern province operates none too conspicuously alongside the other provinces of the territory in support of the A.N.C. In that year, a major split developed within the A.N.C.'s leadership. The effects of this development on Tonga support for the leaders who continued to serve within the A.N.C. are examined as are the circumstances of the second split of 1963 in which Tonga members of the Congress leadership were much more directly involved. It is hoped, among other things, that this study will succeed in highlighting the importance of the Tonga plateau's contribution to the nationalist struggle in the then Northern Rhodesia while at the same time serving as a contribution to the growing literature on African reaction to various aspects of Colonial rule.¹

I have made use of both documentary and oral material in
the preparation of this study. Before proceeding to Zambia for
eleven months of archival and field research, I consulted various
sources in the United Kingdom. Apart from work done at the Public
Records Office and the British Museum on Colonial Office and
Missionary archives respectively, I spent some time on a small
collection of material at the Society of Jesus Headquarters in
London. This provided some insights into the early work of the
Jesuits among the plateau Tonga. Rhodes House Library in Oxford
also carries a collection of private papers as well as correspondence
between the A.N.C. and certain individuals who were interested in
colonial politics. The Fabian Colonial Bureau was also in touch
with the Congress leaders and Rhodes House has some of this
correspondence.

In Zambia, my archival work was done in five main centres:
the National Archives of Zambia, the Livingstone Museum, the library
of the Mount Makulu Research Station, the Institute of African
Studies, University of Zambia, and the home of the Rev. Fergus
Macpherson. In the National Archives, which operates a twenty
year rule over its collection, I was allowed access to material
only as recent as 1954. This explains why the official material
used in Chapter VII is less detailed than that in the other chap-
ters. The National Archives was my main source of documentary
evidence. The Livingstone Museum carries some interesting docu-
ments on the British South Africa Company period and certain as-
pects of Tonga pre-colonial history. The Library at Mount Makulu
has a very comprehensive collection of Agricultural reports and the
Institute for African Studies keeps a manuscript collection that provides some information concerning the formative years of colonial rule on the Tonga plateau. The Rev. Fergus MacPherson was kind enough to allow me the use of a private collection of A.N.C. material which was extremely helpful in my search into the political activities of the late 1950s.

My field research was devoted to recording reminiscences from Informants in nine of the plateau's Chieftaincies, viz. Monze, Chongo, Ufwenuka, Chona, Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala, Siamusonde, Mwanza and Siamandu. The choice of Chieftaincies was largely dictated by the fact that key informants (some of whom had been mentioned in the documents) were living in these areas. These Chieftaincies also happen to be centres of African commercial farming activity and, in some cases, of European settlement. I was convinced that the oral material collected from villages in these Chieftaincies was capable of providing a representative picture of the situation on the plateau during the years under survey. Informants ranged from a few Chiefs, Headmen and some small scale cultivators to prominent local political organisers and successful commercial farmers. Some Informants who have for various reasons left the plateau for some other province were traced and interviewed. Most of my Informants were Africans (the European population having declined considerably since independence) but I was able to interview some long-standing white farmers and traders around Monze and Choma. Settler Informants gave accounts that echoed, in many ways, the reminiscences of the Africans I interviewed. Most interviews were done in Chi-tonga with the aid of an interpreter but several Informants also spoke
English. On the whole, the oral material collected on the plateau gave a wider and deeper dimension to the documentary evidence.

I wish at this stage to record my appreciation of the assistance I have received from various sources during the course of this study. I am very grateful to the Central Research Fund of London University and the Authorities of the School of Oriental and African Studies for part financing my research trip to Zambia.

I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Andrew Roberts of the School of Oriental and African Studies who supervised the study from conception to fruition and whose inspiration and guidance I found invaluable. I gained a lot from his firm grasp of Zambian historiography and his very penetrating critique of the material. In Zambia, I enjoyed the hospitality of several households, too numerous to mention individually, which provided my assistant and myself with food and shelter during the course of our motor-biking between villages. To all these people who were only too eager to help a stranger in need I will always be in debt. I am particularly grateful to Mr. Martin Mooba, who physically introduced me to the plateau and was very instrumental in securing for my benefit the services of Mr. Evans Chongo, who became my research assistant. Without Evans' knowledge of local geography and his tactful handling of suspicious Informants my task would have been infinitely greater. For his devotion to the study throughout my stay in Zambia I thank him.

Throughout my stay on the plateau I was attached to the household of Mr. Jimmy Mwale. It is perhaps to Jimmy that I owe my biggest debt. For the interest he took in my work and the lengths to which he went to make me a member of the household, I
will be for ever grateful. This list will be incomplete without mention of Messrs. Amos Walubita, Samuel Sibanda, Patrick Sikawala, Wallace Munangandu and Y. Nampindi, who unfailingly responded to my many demands on their time and resources.

I wish also to thank the Rev. Fergus Macpherson and family for the kindness they extended to me while I was in Lusaka. I learnt a lot from Rev. Macpherson's rich knowledge of political developments within the territory and profited immensely from various documents he placed at my disposal. I am deeply grateful to Prof. Rowe-Evans, Mr. Mubanga Kasahoki and the staff of the Institute for African Studies, University of Zambia, for all the help I received in connection with my transport and accommodation problems while in Lusaka. My thanks are also due to Drs. Robin Palmer, Neil Parsons, Keith Rennie and Le Roy Vail of the University's History Department for the keen interest they showed in my work while I was in Zambia. Dr. Vail was even kind enough to read part of the manuscript and he made several useful suggestions. I also thank Professor Cherry Gertzel of the University's Politics Department for drawing my attention to various publications I might otherwise have overlooked. I am deeply grateful to Professor Roland Oliver of S.O.A.S. whose recommendation led to the award of a bursary from the African Education Trust of Covent Garden, London. I will be for ever grateful to Mrs. D.H. Herbert and the other members of the Trust for financing my stay in London during the final months of writing. My thanks also go to Mrs. Nina Fuller who painsstakingly typed the material. Lastly, I wish to record my debt to

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all my various informants without whose cooperation this work might have been impossible. If the account presented here should go some way in meeting their oft-repeated demands for a record of the Colonial experience of the Tonga, one of my desires would have been fulfilled.

M. R. D.-F.
Chapter I

THE BACKGROUND: THE PLATEAU BEFORE 1924

As one moves away from the comparatively higher lands around Lusaka into the area of Mazabuka and beyond, one cannot help being impressed by the gently undulating plains of the Southern Zambian plateau. For the most part, it is rather flat country covered with savannah bushes and open plains or damboes with the south-west more heavily wooded than the north-east. In a number of areas, the vegetation is made up of scattered trees and bush mixed with light savannah grass. Towards the east, the land descends in an escarpment as it approaches the waters of the Zambesi. Although there are a number of streams and rivers in the area, the Kafue is the only one with a perennial flow, a number of them having dried up within living memory. The lands of the Tonga plateau covered in this study extend for some 7,450 square miles between latitudes 16° and 17° and are about 3,000 to 4,000 feet above sea level.

The plateau experiences three distinct seasons. The rainy season begins about the end of October or the beginning of November and usually lasts into March. The rainfall is highly variable in spread and duration and it is not unusual for closely situated neighbourhoods\(^1\) to experience different amounts of precipitation during the same season. The unreliability of the area's rainfall explains the importance the inhabitants have always attached to their various rain-shrines and the respect they accorded their successful rainmakers.

The rainy season is closely followed by the cold season which lasts from about April to the end of August. Next comes the hot

\(^{1}\)These are groups of villages.
season which, at times accompanied by drought conditions, lasts until the coming of the rains. Maximum temperatures on the plateau range from about 75°F in June/July to about 94°F in October as the rainy season approaches. Minimum temperatures range between 35°F and 40°F in June/July and rise to between 59°F and 64°F during the rains.

The Ecological Survey of 1936\(^1\) identified three principal soil types on the lands of the plateau with high variations in fertility from area to area. Most parts are covered by the sandy, leached soils of the plateau type which separate from each other the more fertile Upper Valley and acacia-thorn soils. The plateau soils are light textured and they derive from metamorphic and acid igneous rocks. The Upper Valley and acacia-thorn types are of a medium to heavy texture.

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Linguistically the term 'Tonga' has been used to describe a group within the Central Bantu Zone which includes the Tonga, Lenje, We, Ilala, Totela and others.\(^2\) The Tonga share strong cultural links with their neighbours and there is a striking root similarity between the languages these people speak. The ancestors of the Tonga appear to have been in their present area since early in the second millennium A.D. In the light of what we know about Tonga social organisation, especially the ease with which newcomers to the society are absorbed into the clan and kinship structures,\(^3\) we can assume

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\(^2\) E. Colson, "The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia", in E. Colson and M. Gluckman (Eds.), Seven Tribes of British Central Africa (Manchester, 1951), p. 98.

\(^3\) See E. Colson, "The Assimilation of Aliens among the Zambian Tonga", in
that the people of the plateau as we know them today grew out of various immigrant groups which moved into the area over a period of several centuries. These immigrants from various areas were absorbed into the social system and their various cultural backgrounds were submerged in this cultural melting pot. The existence of a plethora of dialects within the Tonga group could well be a reflection of the varying degrees of differential development of the constituent peoples. Tonga informants who today talk in terms of a general migration of Tonga peoples into the plateau may well be groping for a bond to unite originally diverse groups.1

The plateau Tonga are a matrilineal people who trace their descent to a putative ancestress. Age grades and lineages do not feature prominently in their social organisation but clans which are widely dispersed and lack any corporate existence or leadership are recognised. By far the most important social group to which the individual pays loyalty is the kin group. This is a group that represents his interests in marriage and other social arrangements and it also offers him protection whenever he is wronged.

In the nineteenth century the plateau Tonga were organised on a highly localised basis in neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods, made up of a number of villages, varied in size and the more popular the Ulaanyika, or neighbourhood head was, the larger the neighbourhood was likely to be. The Ulaanyika was, in the majority of cases, the first man to establish a homestead in that particular locality or a descendant of his family. He was not a Chief in the

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1 This paragraph has benefitted from discussions with Tim Matthews who has recently carried out research on the valley Tonga and their relations with the plateau Tonga and other neighbouring peoples.
commonly accepted sense of the word. He had no retainers and enjoyed the regard and attention of those around him only for so long as they were prepared to put up with him. If his ability to succour them in times of need, or protect them during an inter-neighbourhood skirmish diminished, he lost the support of his following, who would begin to think of tying in their fortunes with a more successful Ulaanyika.

Where, however, the Ulaanyika combined this secular authority with the ritual powers of a Sikatongo (the power of rain-making, for instance), his chances of retaining the regard of his following were substantially increased. In the majority of cases, the offices of Sikatongo and Ulaanyika were held by different individuals. These officials were always of the same lineage and their claims on these positions were justified by the argument of original settlement in the area. However, as well as the ritual office of Sikatongo there was that of Basangu. The holder of this office was usually an individual who might not be a traditional office-holder but who was possessed by a spirit and, as a result, came to acquire some ritual power. The office of Basangu was the chief means by which a commoner could exercise power in the religious and, to a more limited extent, the secular sphere.¹

During the 19th century the most widely acclaimed of ritual leaders was Monze, the rain-maker. As well as Monze, there were a number of influential Ulaanyika and Sikatongo on the plateau, Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala, Chongo, Moyo and Siamusonde being among the most prominent. Each of these office-holders enjoyed the respect of the people living in his area and they all appear to have operated

¹For a detailed study of Tonga social organisation, see the various studies of Elizabeth Colson.
for the most part, independently of Monze. Some of them were rainmakers in their own right and their ability to aid those around them had attracted a lot of people into their neighbourhoods. Others, like Siamusonde, who lacked ritual powers, had local rainmakers in their employ. The majority of the Ulaanyika were not therefore directly dependent on Monze and they did not see themselves as Monze's subordinates.\footnote{Various interviews on the plateau.} Later attempts by the Colonial Authorities to put Monze in a position of seniority over them were therefore to be stoutly resisted by some of their number, as will be seen in the next chapter.

In pre-Colonial times, land was for the people of the Tonga plateau a free resource. It was in plentiful supply and every member of a neighbourhood had the right to occupy or abandon a plot whenever he so desired. This situation encouraged the practice of shifting cultivation. Land was neither inherited nor sold and newcomers to the plateau were always welcome to land that was not already being formed.

The Tonga practised a simple hoe culture and maize, millet and sorghums were the principal crops cultivated. The men took an active part in the raising of these crops and the tending of groundnuts, beans, peas, pumpkins and various other cucurbits was left to the women who always kept little gardens of their own.

Most families prepared their new plots with the help of friends and neighbours who would first settle in for the traditional beer drink before moving over to the land to stump and burn. Actual cultivation however was, in the main, the responsibility of the family. With
the approach of the planting season, the land was fired and the ash left to settle on it. When it was time for planting, the field was hoed and the seeds thrown in.

In addition to farming, most families raised cattle and small stock, mainly sheep and goats. The work of herding the cattle rested on the men and boys and this task was particularly important during the cropping season when wandering animals could do damage to crops. During the dry season, most areas suffered from inadequate grazing and, in certain parts, farmers practised transhumance to the pastures of the Kafueflats. Cattle featured prominently in the social system and was widely used in bridewealth payments, especially in the Western Chieftaincies. It also played a major role in puberty, funeral and other ritual occasions when a certain number of animals would be slaughtered depending on the wealth of the individuals involved. There were various other uses of cattle. They supplied milk which was consumed as food and also made into butter for use as an unguent. They provided hides which served as mats and thongs for making rope. Animals were seldom slaughtered for food. The consumption of meat was restricted to those times when animals died of natural causes or were slaughtered for ritual purposes.¹

¹For detailed information about the general role of cattle among the Tonga, see E.Colson, "The Role of Cattle among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District", Rhodes Livingstone Journal, XI, pp. 10-46.
Traditionally, the people of the Tonga plateau belong to that group of societies which has variously been described as 'stateless', acephalous or 'amorphous'. There is very little to suggest that they developed, at any time, a centralised form of political organisation. It is difficult to discuss the activities of the plateau's peoples before the 19th century, for not only is there a dearth of documentary evidence, but also Tonga traditions for this period lack the necessary depth. It appears that during the early 19th century the plateau Tonga lived in fairly large settlements and were mainly engaged in the peaceful pursuits of farming large areas of land and raising cattle.\(^1\) This halcyon phase of Tonga history did not survive the early years of the century for their seeming prosperity attracted the attention of raiders from as far afield as Southern Rhodesia and Barotseland. These invaders plundered their villages persistently into the 1890s.

One of the earliest raiders on the plateau was Pingola, who, it seems, was motivated not so much by a desire to capture cattle or slaves but by sheer adventurism. His raids started around 1820. Pingola, who is said to have come from the North-East, usually carried on his missions large numbers of smiths' bellows which he used to heat his arrow heads before shooting. He raided extensively 'devouring oxen, cows and calves, without retaining a single head'.\(^2\)


\(^2\) Ibid.
During the late 1830s, Sebituane of the Kololo, fresh from his encounters with the Bechuana tribes and the Matabele, arrived with his army on the banks of the Zambesi. After successfully outwitting the valley Tonga Chiefs who were intent on killing him, he over-ran the villages of the Tonga. Sebituane is said to have captured 'so many cattle that his people were quite incapable of taking any note of the sheep and goats'. He plundered 'all the high lands towards the Kafue and settled in what is called a pastoral country'. However, Sebituane's attempt to make a permanent base in the area around Kalomo was frustrated by the advance of Mzilikazi and his Ndebele impis. A new spell of raiding thus began. Makololo and Ndebele booty hunters made a common raiding ground of the Tonga lands and when the power of the Kololo collapsed in 1864, the Lozi, under their great warlord, Santebe, took their place.

Although the Tonga enjoyed some peace between the late 1860s and mid-1880s, the raiders returned shortly after to continue the plunder. The main perpetrators of the raids that took place during the late 1880s and early 1890s were the Ndebele and the Lozi. Barotseland was at this time in the throes of a political revolution and the lands of the Tonga attracted those refugees whose claims to power had proved unsuccessful. Once they had recovered from defeat, these exiles began to use their hideout as

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1Livingstone, op.cit., p.86.
2Ibid.
3People still talk of Santebe's raids, especially in the area of Chief Siamusonde, which has the unique reputation of having defeated the warrior's forces on one of his raids.
a base from which to attack their rivals in the Lozi homeland.\(^1\)

One such exile who settled among the Tonga during this period was the ex-King, Mwanawina, who was deposed in 1878 during the struggle which brought Lewanika to power. Mwanawina collected around himself some Chikunda slave dealers and elephant hunters who were living among the Tonga and together they attacked Sesheke. Although this assault, which was a failure, did not result in a counter-offensive into Tonga country by Lewanika's army, a subsequent effort by another Lozi exile in 1888 provoked such a response.

In that year, Lewanika sent his forces after the retreating army of Maracinyan (Moransiane Sitwala), who had once been in charge of Sesheke. Maracinyan's army was, apparently, mainly made up of Tonga sympathisers who lived around his base.\(^2\) The pursuing Lozi army, having failed to inflict any serious punishment on Maracinyan's men, turned in frustration on the surrounding Tonga villages and raided for cattle and slaves. On his arrival at the kraal of Monze after the Lozi army had departed, the traveller, Selous, found the rain-maker 'bewailing the loss of his cattle which had all been carried off about two months previously'.\(^3\)

It did not take the Tonga long to realise that their Lozi as well as their Chikunda guests were a liability they could ill afford. Like some of the Lozi, the Chikunda appeared to have designs

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\(^2\)These reportedly came from the Kanchomba area and they usually teamed up with Maracinyan in terrorising the more distant Tonga. *Ibid.*, p.39.

\(^3\)F.C. Selous, *Travel and Adventure in South-East Africa* (Bulawayo, 1972), p.211.
on Tonga cattle and crops. Cases of cattle theft proliferated. Because they lacked the necessary military skills to confront and evict their unwanted guests, the Tonga had recourse to the Ndebele who they knew to be extremely capable fighters.\(^1\) Emis­
saries were sent to Lobengula with requests for assistance. The Ndebele king in return despatched an impi to Tonga country but once they had succeeded in routing the enemies of the Tonga, the Ndebele troops turned on the herds of their hosts and gathered as much booty as possible to add to the gifts they had received for their help. The Ndebele army returned home in triumph and for sometime the Tonga were left alone. This period of tranquility did not however last very long for the Ndebele found the urge to capture some more cattle from the Tonga irresistible. In 1889 and 1890, they returned to Tonga country. They routed many villages and there was much suffering especially in the areas around the escarpment. The Ndebele are said to have killed and maimed several people and many slaves and cattle were taken. The Tonga refer to this raid as Ngwalungwala war.\(^2\)

In 1892-93, the Tonga again suffered considerable hardship at the hands of the Ndebele who devastated several villages in the eastern part of the plateau before turning south towards Choma. Here, tradition has it, they came across pots containing medicine for the prevention of smallpox. Not knowing what was in the pots, they smashed them open and unleashed an epidemic to which several

\(^1\)Colson, "A Note...", *op.cit.*, p.39.

\(^2\)Ibid., p.40. Also interviews on the plateau.
of them succumbed on the way home. Those who survived name this place 'Imbiza zi nga bulawi' - 'The place where pots should not be broken'. The Ndebele raid of 1892-3 was the last they carried out in Tonga country for colonial rule was soon to be established in Southern Rhodesia, limiting the scope for such activities.

What then were the consequences of the various raids on the Plateau Tonga?

The incursions appear to have caused much disruption and chaos among the Plateau Tonga’s southern and south-eastern neighbours, viz., the Toka-Leya and the Valley Tonga. They also fell rather hard it would seem on that section of the plateau’s population that lived in the eastern areas adjoining the escarpment. The raids of the Ndebele were for the most part concentrated in these areas which were more accessible to their armies by virtue of proximity. The Tonga population in the western parts of the plateau appear to have escaped the brunt of the Ndebele attacks although they suffered more at the hands of the Lozi who were very active in the villages around Bwengwa, Mapanza and Mbeza. However, because the Lozi raids were fewer and also, apparently, less devastating than those of the Ndebele, the western areas survived the incursions, on the whole, much better than the escarpment peoples. The cattle population in the west was much higher on the eve of Colonial rule than that in the east, chiefly because the latter area lost more cattle to the

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1This incident is widely spoken of on the plateau.

2E. Colson "A Note...", op.cit., p.35.
invaders.¹ Farming activity generally appears to have suffered less disruption in the Monze and surrounding areas than in the escarpment regions of the plateau, as will be seen presently.

Livingstone's description of the Tonga in 1855 as 'a nation scattered and peeled' whose population had undergone much decline and whose people were hiding in the hills in large numbers seems, on available oral evidence, to describe more the situation in the escarpment country than that obtaining in the Monze and adjacent areas close to the Ilala.²

In both the eastern and the western parts of the plateau, the raids undermined the traditional patterns of settlement. Before the raids began, the Tonga maintain that they used to live in large settlements.³ During his visit to the plateau in 1855, Livingstone observed the remains of some of these settlements which had all been abandoned for a new mode of residence. A life of insecurity had forced the Tonga into small widely scattered villages, a pattern of settlement adopted in order to give alarm should any enemy appear.⁴

The socio-economic and political organisation of the Tonga before the imposition of Colonial rule should therefore be reviewed

¹E. Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester, 1962), p.141. For several years after the raids, cattle did not feature in bridewealth payments in the eastern areas. Goats and chickens were used instead. See Ibid., p.142.


³Interviews with Nacob Hundyanga and others in the neighbourhood of Chief Monze's village, 22.11.73.

⁴Livingstone, op. cit., p.554. The Seventh Day Adventist Missionary, Anderson, was given similar reasons when he asked about the pattern of settlement on arrival among the Tonga in 1899. See W.H. Anderson, On the Trail of Livingstone (California, 1919), p.165.
against this background of outside harassment. It must be pointed out, however, that although they suffered from external attack, the people of the Tonga plateau were never subjected to the political control of their adversaries. The Lozi appear to have enjoyed a measure of political control in the Toka-Leya areas around Kalomo before European rule was established, but this control did not extend to the area north of Muzoka. The Lozi King's authority does not appear to have had any impact in the areas north of Siachitema in Toka-Leya country. The Tonga did not regard the Lozi as overlords. The tributes that were sent periodically to the Lozi Paramount by Monze and other Tonga leaders were, apparently, despatched with much reluctance. This disinclination to pay homage to the Lozi King increased in the late 1890s when European rule was about to be established. Harding tells us that in 1900 when he met Monze, the rain-maker questioned Lewanika's right to tribute in the following words.

'Why should I pay tribute to Lewanika when I am under the White Queen? Does Lewanika pay tribute? I am a Batoka; I lay my presents at the feet of the white chief.'

In the same year, B.S.A.C. officials also commented on Monze's reluctance to meet any tribute obligations to the Lozi King:

1 Under Colonial rule, the Lozi Paramount was to station various Indunas among the Toka Leya. It is not very clear whether he did this at any time before the British came. For the activities of these Lozi Indunas under the B.S.A.C. Administration, see BSI/31 and BS2/186, Z.N.A.


'King Lewanika ... still collects tribute from the Matoka who pay very reluctantly. They prefer to consider themselves under the direct rule of the British South Africa Company, Monze being most emphatic on this subject, and saying that as he and his people work for us his tribute is accounted for in that manner.'

Despite Monze's opposition, the payment of tribute to the Lozi was to continue for some time. Various secular and ritual leaders among the Tonga who aspired to political office under the white Administration saw fit to maintain their links with the Lozi Paramount. This, presumably, was a way of legitimising their positions and enhancing their status.

19th Century Tonga Agriculture

Although certain sections of the Tonga plateau suffered periodic attacks from outside forces during the 19th century, there is evidence to show that agriculture flourished in several parts of the plateau during this period. Because the raids were not evenly spread, some people were free to carry on their farming activities, safe from the incursions that were disrupting living conditions in other parts of the plateau. The people in the western and north-western areas appear to have been particularly fortunate in this respect.

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1 B.S.A.C. Reports 1898-1900, p.99.

2 Ken Vickery of Yale University has carried out very detailed investigations into the pre-Colonial agricultural situation among the Tonga. In the writing of this section I make use of various insights he has provided us in his Aspects of Plateau Tonga Economic History, a mimeographed paper presented to the History Seminar of the University of Zambia on the 10th January, 1974. I also rely here on the various contributions of Elizabeth Colson.
Livingstone's accounts of this period refer to the large quantities of food with which the Tonga welcomed him. Such hospitality, though perhaps indicative of the relief the Tonga felt at the approach of peace, could hardly have occurred in a situation where farming activity was at a virtual standstill because of foreign invasion. When he arrived among the Tonga in 1855, Livingstone reported that 'Great numbers of people came from all the surrounding villages with presents of maize and masuka'.\(^1\) At the village of Monze, he was supplied 'most liberally' with maize, earthnuts, corn, a goat and a fowl.\(^2\)

Although the documentary evidence is very sketchy, one can, with the help of oral information, construct a fair picture of what the agricultural system of the Tonga was on the eve of Colonial rule. There was an abundance of land and every member of a neighbourhood had the right to occupy or abandon a plot whenever he so desired. Because it was in plentiful supply, land was neither inherited nor sold and newcomers to the plateau were always welcome to land that was not being farmed, so long as they made their intentions known to the local Ulaanyika and could find a sponsor within the neighbourhood.

The Tonga practised a simple hoe culture. Finger millet and sorghum were the main staples but by the mid-19th century maize was also grown. Production was mainly for subsistence but some families grew more than their subsistence needs in order to have a reserve.

\(^{1}\)Livingstone, *op.cit.*, p.551.

on which to fall during poor seasons. At such times, a family had to meet both its requirements as well as those of needy kinsmen, some of whom may have travelled for miles in search of food. Since they had a lot of land, Tonga farmers did not adopt intensive cultivation methods. The traditional system was one of shifting cultivation with the widespread use of heat and ash from burned trees and branches. Gardens were moved around as the fertility of the soil declined and long fallow periods were observed to allow the soil to regain its fertility.

In the absence of a regular commercial demand for their crops, the majority of the area's farmers did not aim at producing large supplies and they tended, on the whole, to cultivate small gardens. Agricultural practice also tended to vary with vegetation and soil conditions. Vickery has pointed out that gardens in the south-western parts of the plateau, where the relatively poorer plateau soils predominate, were usually smaller than those in the north-east. Because the south-western areas were heavily wooded, stumpng was always very hard work here and this tended to limit the size of gardens. New gardens were usually about $2\frac{1}{4}$ acres in size and were extended annually at the rate of $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 acre. Because of the relatively poor quality of the soil in this part of the plateau, garden sites were changed more frequently than in the north-east. Most gardens tended to be exhausted in the space of 2-4 years.\(^1\)

In contrast, the north-eastern part of the plateau was for the most part covered in the more fertile Upper Valley and Transi­tional soils. For miles the land here is mainly open rolling country.

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\(^1\) Vickery, 'Aspects...', *op.cit.*, p.4.
interspersed with damboes, requiring much less effort in clearing than the south-west. Farmers generally tended to avoid the heavily wooded areas in spite of the fact that some of them had very rich Upper Valley soils. Gardens in the north-east tended to be larger (about 5-6 acres on average) and the inherent fertility of the damboes and surrounding plains meant that garden sites could be cultivated for much longer periods before the soil was exhausted.¹

Most Tonga families kept large bush gardens (usually some distance from their homesteads), as well as smaller village gardens. Work in the bush gardens was usually carried out by the husband, his wife or wives and their children. This was the primary work team. Their individual roles were apportioned according to a none too rigid traditional division of labour. The clearing and stumping of the land was usually performed by the men and boys. The male members of the family also assisted with planting although this task as well as that of weeding usually fell to the women and girls. In the majority of cases, the women and girls planted the seeds, undertook the hoeing and were assisted by the menfolk in the job of harvesting. When a family had to tackle a job which required more hands than they could manage, work parties were usually called in. Workers were rewarded with meals and beer and there was always an understanding that such assistance would be reciprocated in the future if the need arose.

Apart from the main bush garden from which the family's main

¹Ibid., pp. 4-5.
supplies came, it was the responsibility of every husband to clear a village garden for his wife. Evidence on the rights of women to dispose of the crops they grew in their own gardens is rather conflicting. Some Informants claimed that husbands had to be consulted before gifts could be made from such gardens but this was denied by others. It does appear, however, that the gardens of wives were simply subsidiary sources of supplies. The raising of groundnuts, beans, peas, pumpkins and various other cucurbits was often done in these smaller gardens although these crops could also be grown in the main garden.

Although I saw more about the impact on the plateau of labour migration in search of wage employment in Chapter III, it may be helpful at this stage to look briefly at the effects of early migrations on Tonga agriculture. Round about the 1890s, large numbers of Tonga males began to travel from the plateau to the southern territories and other parts of what became North-western Rhodesia in search of wage employment.\(^1\) Labour migration among the Tonga did not however pose the sort of problems it created among the Lozi and the Bemba.\(^2\) Most of the men were never away for very long periods and their trips were usually timed in such a way as not to coincide with the entire duration of the planting and harvesting periods when the need for their services would be greatest. Many worked only during the inter-cropping season so as to be available to perform any strenuous tasks which the women and girls may find too demanding.\(^3\)

\(^1\) B.S.A.C. Report, 1898-1900, p. 94.

\(^2\) See G. Wilson, 'An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia', Rhodes Livingstone Papers, Nos. 5 and 6, 1941-2.

\(^3\) Interviews with Jacob Hundyanga (22.11.73), N. Muyovwe (6.6.74) and other older Informants on the Plateau. Hundyanga's father made several trips to Rhodesia and South Africa before he settled down to full-time farming.
Besides, in those sections of the north-eastern parts of the plateau where the land was mostly rolling country with lots of damboes and where, as a result, very little clearing was necessary, the absence of the men would have been much less of a problem. In the more heavily wooded south-western areas, their short absences may have been slightly more burdensome on those at home.

The cattle population of the plateau on the eve of Colonial rule was not very high, due to the raids, but, on the whole, the western areas appear to have had more animals than the east.\(^1\) This, as already pointed out, may have been partly due to the fact that the raids fell more heavily in the escarpment regions of the plateau. The rinderpest epidemic of 1896, which many people still remember vividly, also contributed to this decline. The ownership of cattle was vested in individuals. In disposing of his herds a man was expected to be cognizant of his obligations ro his kinsmen for it was his duty to assist them with cattle whenever they were required to meet bridewealth and other social obligations.

Pre-Colonial trade

Vickery has recently argued that because of the prevailing climate of invasions on the plateau during the 19th century, it is unlikely that the area witnessed during this period, the intense trading activity of which Miracle has written.\(^2\) Archaeological

\(^1\)E. Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester, 1962), p.141.

research in the Southern Province has provided us with an idea of the sort of goods that were produced and exchanged in the area during the Iron Age. Although there does not appear to have been an overall cultural continuity between the plateau and the area further south which has been more intensely worked by archaeologists, excavations at Lochinvar and Kangila have revealed very interesting data. Apart from pottery traditions, some iron and copper workings have also been unearthed. Hoes, arrowheads, axes and other metal tools, either produced locally or imported, were very much in use during this period.

My investigations into Pre-Colonial trading activities revealed that some of the Ulaanyika, notably Monze Mayaba and certain others around the neighbourhood, organised small caravans periodically and these are said to have traded as far as the Lozi and Lenje. Groups of traders, acting on their own accounts, also went among the Valley Tonga, Totsa, Soli, Chikunda and Ila. These trips were not however always organised on a regular basis. Among the items traded by the Tonga were animal skins, cattle, ivory, slaves and salt. They took in exchange fish, tobacco, guns, slaves, hoes, axes etc.

Trading activity within the plateau was on a very limited scale. The Tonga never established market places as such but this is not to say that there was no inter-neighbourhood trade. There

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2 Interviews with Jacob Hundyanga and other Informants in the Monze area.
were no full-time craftsmen, but pots, baskets, ropes and other artifacts were exchanged between the villages. Grain was always changing hands between kinsmen and neighbours and there was usually a considerable grain traffic in periods of famine or external attack.¹

The Tonga did not look on their cattle as a regular commercial asset to be traded for profit. The social value of cattle tended to weigh more heavily than the economic. This is not to say that cattle was never sold in Pre-Colonial days. European cattle traders from the southern territories were very active on the plateau during the 1890s. Many were eager to re-stock their herds after the rinderpest epidemic of 1895-6. They were not always well-intentioned. In 1899, the traveller, Stevenson-Hamilton, commented on some 'low class traders' who had been operating in the Monze area during the previous year. This was almost certainly a reference to cattle traders.² Such behaviour, coupled with the derisively low prices they sometimes offered for animals, may partly explain the reluctance of the Tonga to trade their stock during this period.³ Nevertheless, there was a certain amount of cattle trading. During the late 1890s, we are told of traders with donkey wagons who traded along the Zambesi river and then northwards towards the plateau. These wagons usually returned to Bulawayo with cattle, sheep, skins and curios.⁴ Informants in the Monze area remember these trading caravans which were usually

¹Interview with J. Hundyanga, 22.11.73.
²W. P. R. Wallis (ed.), Barotseland Journal of James Stevenson Hamilton (London, 1953), pp. 229-30. Some Tonga informants told the author that the B.S.A.C. was invited into the plateau to put an end to the activities of these traders.
³Interviews with Jacob Hundyanga (22.11.73) and Judah Bbuka (15.12.73). Both informants told the author of several farmers who refused to sell cattle because the prices were too low.
⁴B.S.A.C. reports, 1898-1900, p.91.
accompanied by guides recruited in the Zambesi valley.

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In 1855 when Livingstone visited the Tonga plateau, he reported that the African population was badly in need of peace and was very enthusiastic about his plans to bring white men into the area to live among and teach the people. He wrote:

'All expressed great satisfaction on hearing my message as I directed their attention to Jesus as their Saviour, whose word is "Peace on Earth and good-will to men". They of course did not understand the full import of the message, but it was no wonder that they eagerly seized the idea of peace. Their country has been visited by successive scourges during the last half century...'

Some forty-four years later, a group of white men, perhaps not the type that Livingstone had in mind, were to move into the plateau to establish a new order. The area was absorbed into the British Empire. How did this happen?

Although the Lozi never established effective control over the greater part of the Southern plateau, Lewanika regarded the tribes of the Ila-Tonga group as his subjects and he looked upon their lands as being under his protection. In 1890, he had received a visit from Lochner, the representative of Cecil Rhodes, head of the British South Africa Company (B.S.A.C.) whose task it was to gain for the company the lands to the north of the Zambesi river. Lewanika's desire at the time for protection from a group of hostile Lozi Chiefs to the south-east of his capital, led him to sign a concession with the Company which promised him the protection he sought. He was also to receive a salary of £2,000 a year and the Company promised to undertake development projects such as the building of schools and the making of roads etc. in his area. In return the Company was granted mining rights over Barotseland. Lewanika later tried to repudiate this concession.

1 Livingstone, op.cit., p.553.
after a trader, George Middleton, had raised doubts about it, but this did not stop the British Government from recognising the Company's rights of protection over Barotseland in 1891. Having established formal relations with the Lozi Paramount, the B.S.A.C. began to take a closer interest in the rest of his 'domain'.

There are two main accounts of the circumstances surrounding the coming of the Company's pioneering column into the Tonga plateau. One states that the Tonga actually requested the protection of the B.S.A.C.'s police and that the establishment of a fort by the pioneering column was in response to this invitation. This account states that, after the 1896 risings against the B.S.A.C. in Southern Rhodesia and the rinderpest of the same year, a number of unscrupulous cattle dealers crossed the Zambesi to purchase cattle from the Tonga. The price of cattle was very high at the time and these dealers did not hesitate to cheat their hosts whenever they could. Because they were not getting reasonable prices for their stock, Monze Mayaba decided to send three men to Bulawayo to ask the B.S.A.C. police for protection from the dealers. As a result of this, the Company despatched a pioneering column to the plateau and it pitched camp on the west bank of the Mulonga Noma river, which was close to Mayaba's village.¹

Other accounts reject this story of an invited occupation force. They argue that the pioneering column came into the plateau without the consent of the people. It is said to have moved in with

¹Cl/8/7/2m Z.N.A. Moreau to D.C.Mazabuka, 11.12.35, and interviews.
with big guns and established its base at Moonya Hill. The leaders of the column then sent for Mayaba but not before one of the guns had been fired to attract attention and exhibit its capability. Mayaba came with a number of Ulaanyika and Sikatongo and a handful of local villagers. He was asked by the white officers to make a choice between war and peace. The leader of the column placed on a table a cob of maize and a bullet and he asked Mayaba to choose between the two. Mayaba chose the cob to signify his desire for peace and, there and then, he agreed to the pioneering column’s request to build a fort in the area. 

The accounts of the circumstances surrounding the B.S.A.C.’s entry may differ but there is no doubt that the Tonga were in no position to offer any resistance to the newcomers. The pioneering column came in well armed and the inscription on a plaque which marks the site on which the Company established its first base on the plateau, makes this quite clear. Among other things, it states that 'a moat with earth ramparts mounting maxim guns at the corners enclosed a small strong point'. Armed as it was, the column must have been regarded as a force capable of offering the Tonga the protection from raiders they badly needed. This consideration must have weighed heavily with Mayaba and others when they consented to its presence. The British South Africa Company’s base at Moonya Hill country, established by one Captain Bury in 1898, was named Fort Monze. It was approximately ten miles north-east of Kalomo and within a mile of Monze Mayaba’s village.

The Company’s Administration

Under the B.S.A.C., the territory of Northern Rhodesia was,

1Interviews with J.Hundyanga (22.11.73), N.M.Muyovwe (6.6.74) and others. At the site where the B.S.A.C. first pitched their camp, informants pointed out the line of fire of the Company’s maxim gun.
up to 1911, partitioned into two parts, North-western and North-eastern Rhodesia. A resident Commissioner from Zomba was the Administrator of the North-east and the North-west came under the British High Commissioner, who had his headquarters in Cape Town, South Africa. Up to 1907, Major Coryndon was in charge of North-west Rhodesia. He parcelled out the area into three districts under District Commissioners. These were responsible, among other things, to protect the welfare of the African population, to keep population records and to control the police units in their various districts. After the imposition of taxation on the African population, the Commissioners were also charged with its collection. The plateau Tonga were within the Batoka District and F.V. Worthington, based at Kalomo, was their first District Commissioner. The district was divided into five sub-districts: Kalomo-Choma, Mapanza, Monze, Buni and Sijoba. The officials who were placed in charge of the sub-districts were at first called Collectors, but this title was subsequently changed to that of Native Commissioner. The first group of Collectors to be appointed were C. Hazell to Mapanza, W. Tilney to Buni, M.C. Cox to Sijoba, J. de C. Dillon to Monze and R.I. Hughes to Kalomo-Choma. The affairs of the Tonga plateau were, at first, managed from Fort Monze but in 1904 the Headquarters was transferred to Khaunga. In July 1905 it was moved again to Magoye and in 1922 to Mazabuka, when part of the Gwembe valley was added to it.¹

¹ KSP 3/1, Z.N.A. Kalomo District Notebook; also W.F. Stubbs, "Southern Province Historical Manuscripts", Institute of African Studies, University of Zambia, Manuscript Collection.
The chartered company's administrative policy was one of direct rule. The Administrative Officers made all the main policy decisions and, as far as possible, supervised their execution. However, because it lacked sufficient staff, the Company had to recruit prominent Tonga to serve as approved Chiefs and Headmen. Monze Nchete, the leading rain-maker, was requested to point out those section heads who, in his view, were capable of serving in the new roles of Chiefs, Divisional Headmen and Headmen. He singled out all the prominent Ulaanyika and Sikatonga within the population. Each recognised Chief was required to supervise a Chief-taincy and had for his assistants Divisional Headmen who were heads of groups of villages and Headmen who supervised single villages.1

The Chiefs were responsible for 'the general good conduct of the natives under their charge' and were expected to report all criminal activity and outbreaks of disease or epidemics among their people or animals. They nominated the local Headmen and were expected to discourage such practices as witchcraft and divination and to control human and livestock movements within their various areas. In this connection, they had to notify the Native Commissioner of all applications from newcomers who intended to reside in their areas.2

Perhaps the most problematic of the Chiefs' duties was that of

1 Up to 1919, there were about 116 districts on the plateau, each under a Headman. In 1919 these areas were grouped into larger enclosures and placed under Chiefs. See E. Colson, Marriage and Family among the plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia, (Manchester, 1958), p. 10.
2 BS2/7, Z.N.A. High Commissioner's Notice No. 68 of 1908.
recruiting labour from the villages whenever the Administration requested it. The recruits usually served as porters, construction workers and road makers. The Chiefs frequently encountered opposition from their people when they sent their messengers out on recruitment drives. This was because in the majority of cases labourers were not paid for their services and were thus reluctant to come forward. On a number of occasions the Chief's messengers would forcibly conscript those who were unwilling to offer their services gratis. This was Cibalo, a practice which was to have wide repercussions in the coming years. In the early years of its administration, some Company officials criticised the practice of forced labour on the plateau, but theirs was clearly the minority view.¹ Most officials saw nothing wrong in the use of involuntary labour. In fact whenever difficulties were encountered in the recruiting of labour, they would accuse the Chiefs of not trying hard enough.² At times, Chiefs were punished for failing to produce the required number of men. In April 1914, Hughes, the Magistrate of the Kalomo sub-district, imprisoned a local plateau Tonga Chief, Mapanza, and his Headman Siwanze, for about 10-13 days because they had failed to provide, on time, twenty-eight carriers required for an official tour. When eventually the twenty-eight men arrived at the Boma, they were made to work for several days and sent back to their villages without pay.³

¹The Secretary for Native Affairs was very critical of the practice especially after the introduction of taxation. See BS2/187, Z.N.A. Secretary for Native Affairs to D.C., Batoka, monthly report 1907.
²Interviews with J. Hundyanga (22.11.73) and N. M. Muyorwe (6.6.74).
³BS3/68, Z.N.A. Confidential despatch from McKinnon to High Commissioner, 24.2.14. An official inquiry into Hughes' conduct led to the exemption from taxation for life of Mapanza and others who had suffered imprisonment at the hands of Hughes for similar reasons.
The Headmen who served the Company were responsible to the Chiefs and were required to draw attention to 'any unusual occurrence in their sub-districts ... and assist the messenger and other officials ... whenever called upon to do so! It was their duty to 'prevent the settlement of fresh villages or the removal of existing villages in their districts, without the consent of the Native Commissioner....'\(^1\)

Due to the lack of personnel, the Company's officials did very little touring and the Chiefs and Headmen operated, on the whole, with very little interference from Company officials. In most local matters they were allowed a free hand but their authority was slightly restricted in the judicial sphere for they were not empowered to punish offenders; this was the province of officials. As in the days when they were Ulaanyika or Sikatongo, some Chiefs continued in the role of sitting over inter-neighbourhood and village disputes but their opinions and views continued to have no more weight than those of other commoner 'council' members.

On the whole, the people acknowledged their position as the Administration's spokesmen and looked on them as defenders of their interests. The Chiefs appear to have settled down in their new roles with much enthusiasm. In 1915, an official noted that 'the assistance of Indunas and Headmen has been freely given to the Government when they have been called upon'.\(^2\) Another wrote in 1916 of their reputation 'for prompt and effective response to all calls made on them'.\(^3\)

\(^1\) BS2/7, Z.N.A. High Commissioner's Notice, No. 68 of 1908.

\(^2\) ZA 7/1/2/3, Z.N.A. Report for Magoye sub-district for year ending 31st March, 1915.

\(^3\) ZA 7/1/3/3, Z.N.A. Annual report for Batoka District for year ending 31st March, 1916.
Once its Administration had been established, the B.S.A.C. proceeded to exploit the labour potential of the plateau. To company officials, the value of North-western Rhodesia as a whole lay primarily in its ability to serve as a labour reserve, supplying manpower to Southern Rhodesia, which territory was the company's real concern. There was much movement of labour to Southern Rhodesia during the late 1890s as white labour agents endeavoured to meet the needs of the railway contractors and mining officials of that territory. Many people from the plateau who went down during this period were never to return, for they established resident communities or joined those already in existence around the various work centres. A number of Tonga labourers also made the trip further afield to South Africa during this period.

Company officials reporting on various activities between 1898 and 1900 noted that the people of the Batoka plateau north and north-east of the Victoria Falls as well as those living in the Zambesi valley, supplied the bulk of Northern Rhodesian labour employed in the mines of Matabeleland. They believed 'that with a more intelligent and energetic system of labour agency, the supply might be trebled'.¹ Harding, the Acting British Resident in the area, observed in 1899 that although there was some reluctance to go down south, due primarily to the Tonga dislike of organised recruitment drives, but also to harsh conditions encountered on the way, several men were still travelling down to Rhodesia for employment. He wrote:

¹Report of the British South Africa Company, 1898-1900, p.94.
'The men even at this distance find their way to Bulawayo and Salisbury for work. I was constantly meeting boys who had just returned from Southern Rhodesia or were going down, but they objected to being taken down in a mob by an Agent. Being improperly fed on the journey some of them run away, some die en route and only a certain percentage arrive at Bulawayo. Those who desert return to their barracks and prejudice their brothers and friends against going down.  

The introduction of taxation on the plateau was to quicken the flow of labour to the south. Unfortunately, there are no reliable figures of labour migration during this period. The Company's records are not helpful in this respect, while very few records have survived of the labour recruiters who were active on the Tonga plateau at this time. In any case recruitment figures alone would not, of course, indicate the total scale of Tonga labour migration. It is therefore difficult to quantify the flow of wage earners from the Tonga villages during the early years of Company rule.

During discussions on the timing and the rate of tax to be imposed on the Tonga plateau, local officials appear to have had no qualms about the Tonga's ability to meet this new obligation. In 1902, Coryndon had argued that the 'great majority of the natives living within the triangle which forms the Batoka plateau are not only quite aware that the time is near for the payment of the tax but are perfectly willing to pay it when it is proclaimed'. He therefore saw 'no reason why the first payment should not be made to be due in July, 1903'. He argued further that 'the Batoka are a timid and law abiding tribe and have absolutely no cohesion, so that there will be no chance of organised opposition.' In 1901 the Administration had started to compile a census of every man, woman and child within the District. Having acquired this information, it now decided to introduce taxation and the actual collection of the tax began in 1904.

Until 1911 when the territory was united, North-western and North-eastern Rhodesia operated under different tax levies. The former

1 Ibid., p.98.
2 BS2/36, Z.N.A. Coryndon to Secretary, B.S.A.C., London, 3.3.02.
3 Ibid. Coryndon to High Commissioner, 30.5.05.
area had an annual poll tax of 10/- and there was an additional 10/- tax on men with more than one wife. The North-east had an annual tax of 3/-. However, after 1914, the entire territory came under a poll tax system and the rate in the North-east was gradually increased.

To get the Chiefs to encourage their people to meet their tax obligations, a system of badge awards to deserving Chiefs was initiated in August 1905. According to the rules governing the award, 'no Induna should receive a badge unless by the 31st December of the year in which the tax falls due, 95% of his people have paid their tax in full'. The badges were in two sizes. The larger one was to be awarded to a Chief whose people paid £50 or above in tax, the smaller one to Chiefs whose people paid less than this amount. A Chief who won an award had the right to retain it for a year. When it was time for the tax to be collected, he surrendered his badge to the Collector and got it back only if his people paid 95% or more of the amount due. The Company had no doubts that this system of awards 'would ensure continued effort on the part of the Induna to retain his badge'.

To meet their tax obligations, more men began to leave the Tonga villages in search of employment in the Southern territories. In 1912 we hear of the so-called 'Bulawayo fever' as more

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1. In 1929 the plural wives tax was abolished but there was an overall tax increase of 2/6d, bringing the rate in the North-west districts (excluding Balovale where it was 7/6d) to 12/6d and 10/d in the North-eastern district. ZA 4/3, Z.N.A. Confidential Memorandum on native policy.

2. ZA 4/3, Z.N.A. Confidential Memorandum on native policy.

3. BS2/76, Col. II, Z.N.A. Coryndon to High Commissioner, 30.5.05.

went down south to serve on white farms in particular, 
rose, work in the mines having become very unpopular and, attract-
ing very few workers.\textsuperscript{1} The effects on local agriculture of this 
seemingly large out-flow of males is an open question. In certain 
areas, notably Ufwenuka and Chona, it appears to have coincided with 
a period of famine which lasted from about 1914 to about 1919. In 
April of that year, Catholic missionaries in the area commented on 
the fact that crops grown by Africans had been very poor for some 
five years.\textsuperscript{2} One is however in doubt as to the real reasons of 
this apparent decline in output. Was it due to weather conditions 
or the absence of the men? Or did the problem really arise from 
the lack of up to date agricultural implements as the missionaries 
seem to suggest.\textsuperscript{3} We do not have similar accounts of famines 
for other parts of the plateau and this makes it difficult to 
speculate on the general situation in the area. The Ufwenuka and 
Chona famines could well have been a very localised problem, 
considering the climatic variations on the plateau.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1}The Tonga developed an aversion for work underground during the 
early years of Company rule and this had a lot to do with the 
high death rates in the mines. The death rate of North-west 
Rhodesia miners in the Southern Rhodesian mines was 38.76 per 
thousand in 1907-8 and the figure rose to 42.68 in 1908-9. The 
death rate did not begin to fall until around 1913. See M.Gelfand, 
99 and 106.

\textsuperscript{2}Zambesi Mission Record, Vol. VI, No. 84, April 1919, p.135.

\textsuperscript{3}Zambesi Mission Record, Vol. V, No. 74, October 1916, p.395.

\textsuperscript{4}See Chapter I, p.\textsuperscript{-a}.\textsuperscript{a.
The overall initial response of the African population to the Company's tax policies was quite encouraging. Between the middle of October 1904 when collection began on the plateau and the end of January 1905, over 2,000 people had paid their tax 'willingly and without compulsion'. Officials recorded only 500 defaulters 'from various minor causes'.

As the tax net was expanded, however, it ran into opposition in some of the Chiefdoms. In 1905, Tonga Chiefs in areas close to the Ila joined their neighbours in resisting the tax demands of the Administration. According to the reports, the leaders of the protest among the Tonga was one Siahkamolo. The B.S.A.C. had to despatch a patrol made up of eighty policemen and a maxim gun under the command of Colonel Colin Harding, Commander of the Barotsese Native Police, to the area. Harding took with him one Captain Hodson and a regimental sergeant-major and with this force he was able to contain the resistance for a while. By 1908 there were more tax protests and it was reported that some of the Tonga had not only refused to pay their tax but were prepared to 'fight the Government'. Lewanika, the Lozi Paramount, had to intervene and

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1 BS2/76, Vol. II, Z.N.A. Coryndon to High Commissioner, 30.5.05.
2 BS2/234, Z.N.A. Harding to Imperial Secretary, 10.3.05.
counsel the Tonga to be loyal to the Administration. This wave of anti-Administration activity was certainly not unconnected with the work of certain prophet figures who operated in the Monze sub-district during this period. In 1909, one such figure is said to have told the Tonga 'that they should all go to sleep for five days when he would awaken them by firing a pistol and they would then see that all the officials and their messengers were dead. The Kafue bridge and the railway would be done away with and all the property of the officials and messengers would be divided among the people'. This prophet figure won a number of supporters in the area and one of his disciples was even arrested by the Native Commissioner of Magoye.

Apart from these pockets of protest, the majority of the population who fell within the taxable category met their tax obligations without much ado. This led the Company to contemplate a tax increase on the plateau, which seemed to be relatively better off than most parts of the territory. In 1905, Coryndon suggested an increase of 10/- for the Batoka District for he was 'convinced that the very great majority of the natives in this district are perfectly capable of paying the full amount, one pound'. He drew attention to the amount of maize that was being sold by various Tonga villages to the railway contractors. He pointed out that the construction of the railway had been in progress for six months and that approximately 3,000 men were working on it at wages ranging between 10/- and £1 a month in addition to rations. The railway contractors were also providing half pay to workers 'while travelling from their homes to their work and back'. He further observed that the peace provided by the Administration's presence had given a
boost to local agriculture and pointed out that the Administration alone was purchasing 'not less than 800,000 lbs of grain (4,000 bags) from local natives, besides the needs of the railway contractors, travellers and permanent residents...'. Coryndon was fully convinced that 'the Batoka people have in every degree as good facilities and opportunities for earning a pound a year as in many districts of Southern Rhodesia and far better facilities than in some...'. As such, he saw nothing wrong in increasing local taxation. It appears that the Company accepted Coryndon's suggestion and did in fact increase the tax on the plateau to one pound. This new rate was not however maintained for long and it was subsequently reduced, perhaps because of local opposition.

**Tonga Agriculture and the work of the Missionaries**

As we have just seen, the beginnings of European enterprise on the Tonga plateau provided a market for local African cultivators, who were quick to respond. Such commercial activity was something of an innovation for Tonga agriculture had been much disrupted during the 19th century and was in effect confined to cultivation for subsistence. However, the transition to produce for the market was very gradual. Most Tonga farms were very small and few produced much maize for sale over and above their subsistence requirements. It is probably fair to suppose that the condition of agriculture on the plateau as a whole in 1905 closely resembled the following report on farming patterns in one Chieftaincy:

21,280 people, £2,443.10/- was collected in 1905; £3,499.10/- in 1906; £3,447 in 1907; £3,757.10/- in 1908 and £3,612 in 1909. See BS2/145, Z.N.A.

1BS2/76, Vol. II, Z.N.A. Coryndon to High Commissioner, 5.6.05.

Unfortunately there are no comparable figures for an earlier period with which one can check this estimate.

2Ibid.

3Most of the older Informants remember the days of the £1 tax.
'The fields were merely little scratches of ground hardly noticeable. Particularly good spots in a vilay, the tops of large ant heaps, a few hundred square yards under a big musangu tree - such were the fields. The grain grown was mostly kaffir corn and a very poor kind of mealies with small grains of various colours on very small cobs, a few patches of monkey nuts and a few pumpkins were all the Batonga grew. 

The most significant change in Tonga agriculture under Company rule was a matter not so much of commercial expansion, as of technical improvement in certain Chieftaincies. This was largely due to the work of missionaries who arrived on the plateau during the early years of the century. In 1902, Frs. Moreau and Prestage of the Society of Jesus had travelled from Empandeni in Southern Rhodesia to the plateau with a view to getting the necessary approval for the commencement of mission work among the Tonga. Livingstone in 1855 had described the Tonga as a people 'humbled by the scourgings they have received', who were, as a result, 'in a favourable state for the reception of the gospel'. This had yet to be proved. The visitors were received by Monze Nchete who was 'flattered with the idea of having Missionaries at his village'. They told Monze that before they could embark on work in the area, they would like to take some Tonga youths down to their mission in Chishawasha for instruction. Monze was delighted at this request and offered four boys including his son, Bbinya, who was about thirteen and of 'exceptional intelligence'. The other three were Haatontola, about

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1 J. Moreau, "The Chikuni Mission, How it came to be started in 1905", p. 29. Held at the Mission's Chikuni Headquarters. Moreau was probably referring to Ufwenuka chieftaincy.

2 Livingstone, op. cit., p. 554.

3 Cl/8/7/2, Z.N.A. Moreau to D.C. Mazabuka, 11.12.35.
17 and the son of Monze's sister; Jahaliso, the son of Lisho, an adviser to Monze; and Jojo, the youngest in the group, who was the son of a man in the Chief's village. Before the party left for Chishawasha, the Jesuits received a grant of land from Monze in a place called Rusangu, but in their eagerness to return, they failed to peg the area or put any marks of claim on it. On their return in 1905, they found that the Rusangu area had been occupied by Pastor Anderson of the Seventh Day Adventists (S.D.A.), who had made a similar trip in 1903 to see Monze. Anderson received a total of 5,275 acres at sixteen cents an acre, and his Church was given ten years in which to pay with no interest charge. The Jesuits had to move further south to an area called Chikuni where, on a plot of 10,000 acres containing a population of 300 Africans, they began their work in 1905.

Although in the very early years the majority of the African population kept its distance from the mission stations, a number of curious villagers came forward to find out what the work of the newcomers was all about and offer whatever assistance they could. The missionaries needed men to help with the erection of buildings and so some of these Tonga males, who were not keen on travelling away from home in search of employment, turned to the local alternative. In starting Chikuni mission, Moreau and others seem to have enjoyed much local support. Moreau himself tells us that 'the people were

2"Recordings from interviews in later life with the Boys who accompanied Fr. Moreau to Empandeni Mission Station in 1902." Part of the Jesuit mission material in the possession of Fr. Max Prokoph of Lusaka.
3Anderson, op.cit., p.179.
4Sec/Nat/201. Z.N.A. Moreau to D.C. Mazabuka, 11.4.35.
very willing to help - Men cut poles, women cut grass and brought it in heavy bundles on their heads, men dug out clay, women brought water...¹ and in less than three weeks the buildings had all been erected. The new religion held some fascination for a number of villagers but the overall response left the missionaries in no doubt that 'material advantages are more readily appreciated than purely spiritual ones...'.² In the absence of widespread polygamy and drunkenness, the churches were convinced their work would thrive.³ The population, on the whole, did not oppose Christianity. According to one observer, 'they adopted it too lightly and sifting and screening were needed all the time'.⁴

In the early days the churches made few converts among the Chiefs and Headmen. Their links with the rain shrines and other elements of Tonga ritual appear to have been very strong. One very prominent figure, however, who showed much interest in the early work of the S.D.A. Church was the Headman Chikonka, who lived a few miles from the mission's station. He gave Anderson and his colleagues all the assistance they required and became so dedicated a convert that he surrendered the village dancing drum to the church. 'We have stopped dancing in our village', he said on presenting it, 'we don't use this any more so I give it to you.' There were many converts in his village and 'a feeling of sacredness and quiet'

²ZA 7/1/2/3, Z.N.A. Report for Magoye sub-district for year ending 31st March, 1915.
was said to have reigned over it on sabbath days.¹

Although the missions devoted some attention to the teaching of various subjects, their curriculum focussed heavily on craft practice and agricultural instruction.² Their widespread use of the plough and draught oxen was to revolutionise local agriculture when the practice filtered through to the Tonga villages. In 1908 Anderson had 41 students in the Mission's boarding house and eight of them were in a position to pass a grade four examination in reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, geography and the scriptures.³ They had also undergone basic agricultural training. The mission had its own farm on which students gained experience in the use of the plough and the cultivation of local crops and fruit trees. At Rusangu in 1908, there were over 400 fruit trees and vines. The mission was self-sufficient in the production of vegetables, and cabbages, radishes, beets and lettuce were all being produced. All work on the farm and the farm buildings was done by the students and Anderson had had no cause to hire any workers, apart from a mason who came in to help put up the buildings.⁴ By 1915 it was compulsory for all students to spend about six hours daily in the manual training workshops of the school, under the supervision of qualified instructors.⁵ As Rusangu expanded, so did the work of

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¹F.M. Robinson, "True Riches", African Division Outlook (hereafter A.D.O.), Vol. 25, No. 8, April 15, 1927.
²Almost all the educational work done among the Tonga during the early decades of Colonial rule was carried out by the missions, the Administration bearing no direct responsibility. After the investigations of the Phelps-Stokes Commission of 1924, the Administration was to set up an African Education Department, and the first grants-in-aid were made. See Prokoph, "Chikuni, 1905-1955", op.cit., p.13. See also Trevor Coombe, "The Origins of Secondary Education in Zambia. Part I, Policy Making in the Thirties", African Social Research, No. 3, 1967, p.174.
³Advent Review and Rabbath Herald (hereafter, A.R.S.H.), October 29, 1908.
⁴Ibid.
⁵ZA 7/1/2/3, Z.N.A. Report for the Magoye sub-district for year ending 31st March, 1915.
the S.D.A. mission on the plateau. By 1923, out-schools had been opened as far afield as Kasikile, Munenga, Banakaila and Bwengwa.¹

At Chikuni, Father Moreau gave far more attention to vocational and agricultural instruction than to purely academic training. This approach was very much in keeping with Livingstone's argument that concern for the welfare of adherents should be the missionary's first priority. Moreau argued, as Livingstone would have done, that Tonga welfare and living conditions had to be taken care of, before a missionary could turn to nurturing the minds of his adherents.² In 1914, he had forty students who were receiving instruction in brick-making and agriculture.³ The overall contribution of the missions in the field of agriculture was to have a lasting impact on Tonga farm practice, as will be seen later.

Land Alienation

In 1898, Lewanika, the Lozi Paramount, had granted to the B.S.A.C. 'the right to make grants of land for farming purposes in any portion of the Batoka or Mashukalumbwe country to white men...' and the Company had, in turn, promised 'that the native lands, villages, cattle posts, gardens and fountains shall in no way be interfered with...'.⁴ The B.S.A.C. did not secure Lewanika's permission to make land grants on its own to non-natives in the area under the king's protection until 1904.⁵ Between 1898 and 1904 the Lozi king insisted on personally approving all applications for land.

¹ZA 7/1/6/3, Z.N.A. Mazabuka sub-district report for year ending 31st March, 1915.
²Perhaps this explains why his nickname 'Siabulemba' ('the good gardener') gained much wider currency on the plateau than the other two: 'Banza Kunda' ('He who reads while he walks') and 'Mukampaila' ('He who walks majestically').
³ZA 7/1/3, Z.N.A. Magoye sub-district report, 1914.
⁴IN/1/8/1, Z.N.A. Memorandum on native rights, by F.V. Worthington, Secretary for Native Affairs.
⁵Gelfand, op.cit., p.128.
The first European to receive a plot of land from the Company in North-Western Rhodesia was one H.F. Walker, who, in 1902, was allowed an area of 8,000 acres for himself and two sons, in the area around Kalomo.¹ This was at a time when the European population was a mere handful. In 1901, the entire European community in North-west Rhodesia numbered thirty-seven; four of the number were policemen, three were Civil Servants and there were thirty missionaries and farmers.² The railway which was being constructed by the Mashonaland Railway Company reached Wankie in September 1903, crossed the Zambezi below the Victoria Falls in 1904 and reached Broken Hill in 1906. Three years later, it reached the Congo border land and thus linked up with a railway from Elisabethville, in Katanga province. Up to 1910 land was very easy to come by for the Company was asking only 3d an acre for land which was more than twenty miles from the railway and 1/6d an acre for land within twenty miles of the line. After 1910 these prices were raised to 1/- and 2/6d respectively,² for by then the expanding copper mines of Katanga provided a market for farm produce from Rhodesia. Several Europeans were now attracted to settle near the railway, producing maize and raising cattle for the Katanga market.

Lewanika had given the Company permission to alienate land in the Tonga areas without adequately consulting Monze and the other traditional leaders on the plateau. This was to create

¹E5/7 Acc. No. 2/2927, Livingstone Museum.
²Gelfand, op.cit., p.128.
difficulties. When the B.S.A.C. began to hand over large plots of land to white settlers on the Tonga plateau in 1903, Monze Nchete came out in open opposition to the new policy. Up to this stage, the Tonga had not opposed the idea of the Administration taking up some land on which to establish buildings for its purposes, or of Missions settling down among them to teach the people. The handing out of land to traders and settler-farmers was however a new phenomenon, and the Tonga feared that once this had started, it would lead to further land alienation as successive waves of immigrants entered the territory.

African opposition to land alienation forced the Administration to seek the help of the missionaries. When Pastor Anderson arrived in Kalomo in 1903, it seems he had not by then made up his mind as to where the S.D.A. would base their mission work. It was the 'Chief Official' at the Kalomo Headquarters who suggested that the missionary should settle among the Tonga. According to Anderson,

"The reason he wanted us to go there was that old Monze, the chief rain doctor of the Batonga, had started a rebellion the year before and they desired a missionary located in his district to keep watch over him. The late Mr. Cecil Rhodes once told me that he found missionaries to be much better for keeping the natives quiet than soldiers and certainly a good deal cheaper. So the Administration desired us to settle near the restive Chief ... and report any disorders that might occur in his district."¹

Monze's military capacity certainly increased somewhat during the first few years of Company rule. From being a Sikatongo who used to rely very heavily on Ndebele support to protect his following, he was by 1903 a Chief who had under his control 'a body of

¹Anderson, op.cit., p.173.
men armed with rifles'. These men were in his direct employ and he is said to have drilled them every morning and evening in the presence of his admiring villagers. He regarded them as his police. One informant told the author that Monze knew his handful of guards would be no match for the Company's troops and maxim guns. Yet he hoped that by refusing to cooperate with the labour and other demands of the local officials and surrounding himself with a body of armed men, he would have registered the point that the Tonga would rather die in a confrontation with the Company's police, than lose their lands to white settlers. I came across no evidence of any clash between Monze and the Company's forces and it appears that the Administration's move in 1903 to disband Monze's guard after disarming them took care, for a time, of the threat posed by the Chief.

In 1904, Monze decided to make a protest trip to England to report to the King the land appropriation measures that were being inflicted on his people by the B.S.A.C. The Chief seems to have got his inspiration from the trip Lewanika had made to England in 1902 to attend King Edward's coronation. Monze thought that one of the reasons for Lewanika's visit was his desire to present a petition in which the conduct of the Company in Barotseland was called into question. To finance his trip, Monze went around the

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1 BS2/113, Z.N.A. D.C. Kalomo to Administrator, 22.6.03. Informants said that Monze's guard was made up of about fifteen to twenty men.

2 Interview with Jacob Hundyanga, 22.11.73.

3 BS2/113, Z.N.A. D.C. Kalomo to Administrator, 22.6.03.

4 This was gathered from various interviews on the plateau.
villages collecting money by giving people the impression that he had been instructed to collect taxes. He is said to have raised £600 before he was arrested by officials and brought down to Kalomo. At his trial he pointed out that 'he had collected the money with the idea of going to Bulawayo and England...'. Monze is said to have called several witnesses to testify on his behalf, 'but the evidence of the first three or four was so damaging to his case, that he declined to produce any more, exclaiming "What is the good, they will not say those things which I have told them to say".' The Chief was found guilty and sentenced to two years imprisonment which he served at Kalomo and Gwembe.

Once Monze's threat had been contained, the Company carried on as before providing land for settlers who needed it. By the 31st March 1909, fifty-eight farms had been taken up by settlers mainly in the Batoka district, especially around Kalomo, Choma and Pemba. A number of farmers came into the area from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa but few had the capital to make their farming activity worthwhile. The majority of those from Southern

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1 BS2/42, Z.N.A. Despatch from Kalomo Boma to Lewanika, 19.1.04.
2 Ibid.
3 BS2/311, Z.N.A. Report on opposition to taxation in the Gwembe sub-district, by F.V. Worthington. On his release from prison in 1906, Monze was told to build his new village near the Magoye Government Station, his original lands having gone, in part, to a settler called Faulkner. He lived in Magoye until 1910 when he was allowed to return to his old area and he established a new village some three miles from his original homestead. See, Worthington, "Report on Native Reserves", University of Zambia's Institute for African Studies Manuscript Collection. Also G/04, Livingstone Museum, Political Institutions of the Tonga and other History by D. Ncheta.
4 The Tonga have recorded the circumstances of Monze's arrest and subsequent imprisonment in a song. See Appendix.
5 BS2/137, Z.N.A. Report for the two years ending 31st March 1909.
Rhodesia were attracted by the comparatively liberal land policy which the Company was operating here at a time when the practice of attracting settlers to Southern Rhodesia through free grants of land had come to an end. The Jameson era in Southern Rhodesia during which such grants were common had come to an end and that territory’s Administration had passed into the hands of Grey, a Director of the B.S.A.C., and Milton, a Civil Servant from the Cape. The new officials accused their predecessors of having alienated too much land to the settlers. They criticized the big land owners and, in 1903, called on them to surrender a third of their holdings.  

This land squeeze forced a number of white settlers across the Zambezi into North-western Rhodesia. Within the Magoye sub-district there were 114 Europeans in 1911-12, twelve traders, two officials, thirty farmers, five missionaries, 13 railway workers and 12 others.  

By 1919 with the end of the war, the number had risen to 303 and it was 397 in 1924 in the newly established Mazabuka sub-district which included part of the Gwembe valley.

The amount of land granted to individual settlers for farming or trading purposes on the plateau varied with their means, but on the whole, the land grants tended to be quite large. In 1919 the

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2 KDB 6/6/1, Z.N.A. Magoye sub-district Annual report, 1911-12.


4 ZA 7/1/7/3, Z.N.A. Report for Mazabuka sub-district for year ending 31.3.24.
smallest plot of land awarded to a settler was in the region of 1980 acres, the largest, which went to two brothers, being over 10,000 acres. All lands in the railway area were alienated in freehold and this was a sufficient bait for undercapitalised farmers who looked forward to running their farms by employing labour-intensive production methods.

To make way for the railway line, several Tonga villages were evicted from their sites and their inhabitants had to open up new homes in other areas of the plateau. Africans were also turned off lands required for white settlement. These evictions caused much social disruption in the affected areas and they were to bring Company officials into conflict with some of the African villagers. The Chartered Company officially recognised the villager's right to compensation in the event of his eviction from lands he had stumped and developed. In a number of cases on the plateau, though not in all, villagers who were evicted during this period received some money by way of compensation. When, for instance, in 1913 land was required for white settlement in the Munanpamba and Mugwali areas of Sianjalika Chieftaincy, compensation at a rate of £1 per hut and 5/- per acre was awarded to the villagers involved. Until 1921, the rate of compensation was purely discretionary and local Company officials had full powers in deciding how much a village about to be evicted should receive. They assessed the so-called 'native rights' in the area concerned by making estimates of the


value of property on it, viz. huts, fruit trees etc. and from this calculated how much should be paid in compensation by the intending settler. In 1921, however, mainly it would seem because of opposition from villagers who considered compensatory payments too inadequate, it was decided that a uniform rate of 10/- an acre was to be paid to all. It was also agreed that in cases where the land had been developed, something extra should be added to the basic rate.\(^1\) A total of £474,10/- is said to have been paid in compensation during the course of that year.\(^2\)

While compensatory payments were quietly received and lands duly vacated in some areas, in others African farmers refused to consider the Administration's request that they should move off their lands and accept some money for this. In the majority of cases, this strong attachment to the land was due to its proven fertility. Farmers were also reluctant to move into areas far away from rivers as this would pose all sorts of problems regarding their general farming activity and the availability of dry season grazing for their cattle. Strong ritual attachment to lands where reputable Sikatongo and close relatives had been buried, was yet another reason why moving away was so unpopular. Besides, no village looked with enthusiasm at the prospect of having to clear and stump new fields, especially in cases where the fertility of their present lands was far from being exhausted.

\(^1\)ZA 2/2, Z.N.A. District Circular No. 2, 1921.

\(^2\)ZA 7/1/5/3, Z.N.A. Magoye Annual report for year ending 31st March, 1921.
In 1920-21, the Company experienced much difficulty in getting Chief Mwanachingwala and his people to hand over part of their lands to Messrs. White and Symons, both of them ex-soldiers who wanted to settle on the plateau. The villages in question were in the Chalimbana and Munenga areas and the soils in these parts were widely known for their fertility. When he was approached by one Griffin on behalf of the Administration, the Chief explained that the graves of their dead were in the area and that they intended to continue living close to them. He suggested that Symons and White should be given land around Mazabuka or Kaleya, so that his lands which were already heavily populated could be left alone. As the officials persisted in their demands that the area should be cleared, Mwanachingwala laid down conditions under which he would be prepared to quit the area. He demanded that his people who were living on the northern side of the Magoye should be allowed to retain their lands for one more year, during which time they would seek out and prepare new fields. He also asked that those of his people who could not abandon their lands at the end of the 1921-22 harvest should be allowed to retain those lands and serve as tenants to the incoming settlers. This did not meet the approval of the officials who had already drawn attention to the 'very selfish and obstinate attitude' that the Chief and his people had adopted throughout the discussions. They insisted that the Chief should move and collect compensation. To this ultimatum,

1 KDB 1/3/6, Z.N.A. Interview with Mwanachingwala and others near his village, 29.21.

2 Ibid. Magistrate to D.O. Livingstone, 11.1.20.

3 Ibid.
Mwanchingwala defiantly replied in 1921, 'If the Government drive us away, we must go, but money, no: we will not take any money at all. We will not sell our land.'

In the same year the old men of the Chieftaincy, under harassment from Company officials, lamented the losses of land the Tonga had suffered since the arrival of the Europeans. They reflected upon 'the large area from Mazabuka right down the Magoye and on along the Kaleya over which they used to roam, hunt and graze their cattle in the dry season and asking where could they go today—every bit of this old land was now occupied by whites and now the whites were at their very doors, so much so that the cattle of both had now to share the scanty water of the Magoye.' The land losses suffered by the Tonga during the Company years, though smaller in comparison with what was to come under Crown rule, engendered much ill feeling on the plateau. By taking their land, the source of their livelihood, the Administration seemed bent on impoverishing the Tonga for whom shifting cultivation was a way of life. To the Tonga family that had lost the fertile plot of land it had occupied for many years, the settler and the Administrator were nothing but unscrupulous land-grabbers who had no concern for the welfare of the African population.

The B.S.A.C. and the settlers' demands

From the earliest days of white settlement it was quite obvious that at some stage the labour needs of the settler farmers would clash with those of the Administration. Both groups were intent on

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2 *Ibid.* After a period of indecision during which White and Symons were even advised to withdraw their claims to the area (see KDB 1/3/6, Z.N.A. District Commissioner to Secretary, Livingstone, 19.10.24), Mwanachingwala and his people left the area.

3 Interviews on the plateau.
making maximum use of the available labour supply but whereas the farmer needed men to work locally, the Company concerned as it was about the Southern Rhodesian economy, was more inclined to directing the labour flow southwards across the Zambesi. A Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (R.N.L.B.) had been formed in August 1903 in Southern Rhodesia for the recruitment of labourers needed by the agricultural and mining interests of that territory. By a proclamation of 1907, the Administrator of North-western Rhodesia granted to the R.N.L.B. a virtual monopoly over labour recruitment within the area under his jurisdiction. The Bureau had its Agents stationed across the Zam­besi and these employed runners who went into the villages to secure the recruits. Local settler-farmers never took kindly to the operations of the Bureau for they saw in its activities a direct threat to their labour supply. Although the Bureau undertook to supply their requirements, they were convinced they could make better arrangements on their own.

Up to 1910, the Company, under pressure from the local settler farmers, refused to allow the R.N.L.B. Agents to recruit within the farming districts. This restriction however did not meet the demands of the farmers who wanted a total ban on the R.N.L.B.'s activities within North-west Rhodesia. In 1910 an official was forced to take a closer look at the circumstances surrounding the labour situation in the area and he discovered that the white farmers' complaints about an inadequate labour supply were by no

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1Gelfand, op.cit., p.98.
means general. There were farmers who had no labour problems, while 'others can find few to take service with them...'. He concluded that 'the cause of the shortage of which employers complain must therefore be due to the uninteresting nature of the work, the low wage offered, or inconsiderate treatment, probably a combination of all three.' He found out that 'the majority of natives prefer 9 months on a mine in Southern Rhodesia to six or even three on some farms in North-west Rhodesia.'

By 1913, the situation had changed considerably in the Bureau's favour. The restriction on its activities in the farming areas had been lifted, mainly because of persistent pressure from the South. Between April of that year and March 1915, its Agents recruited 486 labourers from the Magoye sub-district for work in Southern Rhodesia. The Bureau's runners began to show too much enthusiasm for their work and the Native Commissioner observed in that year that 'they exceed their instructions and forcibly recruit labour since their remuneration entirely depends upon the results of their recruiting.' Local settler farmers repeatedly called the Company's attention to the activities of the Bureau and its failure to meet the needs of the local farming community while despatching large

1Ibid. Whereas wages offered locally tended to fluctuate sharply from time to time, R.N.L.B. wages were relatively more stable. In 1914 local wages for labourers who worked in a settler's house, garden or farm were between 10/- and 30/- a month. By 1916, most employers were offering something between 5/- and 7/6 a month. In 1919 the local rate was between 7/6 and 10/- and only artisans were able to make between £2 and £3 a month. At the same time, the R.N.L.B. was paying 18/- a month to adults, 12/6 to adolescents and 8/- to young boys, consistently up to 1927. See ZA 2/1/1/3; ZA 2/1/4/3; ZA 2/1/4/3 and ZA 1/918/4/1, Z.N.A.


3ZA 7/1/2/3, Z.N.A. Report for Magoye sub-district for year ending 31st March, 1915. Because the R.N.L.B. supplied the greater part of its recruits to the mines, the majority of Tonga labourers who disliked work underground made the trip to the south 'independently of the Bureau'. What happened in 1913 when the Bureau's activity was at a standstill, was by no means an isolated instance. See ZA 7/1/1/3, Z.N.A.

4ZA 7/1/1/3, Z.N.A.
numbers of labourers to the South. As Tonga agricultural production expanded, some white farmers found it increasingly difficult to attract local labour from the villages into wage employment. More villagers were now giving more attention to cultivating grain and raising cattle than before and most of those who offered their services did so only for short periods during the inter-cropping season.

Encouraged by the success which the Administration had in the recruiting of involuntary labour, some of the settler-farmers, apparently out of frustration, were to make similar demands on the African villagers living near their farms. The reluctant and, at times, hostile villagers were usually told that the Administration had given the farmer carte blanche as far as the recruiting of labour from areas that adjoined his farm was concerned. This dubious authority was made to look like a condition of the purchase of his land. Although a few farmers succeeded in getting away with this practice, the Company officials did all they could to discourage this competition for scarce labour which they faced from the settlers. In December 1920, for instance, a settler in the Pemba area complained to local officials that an African driver who lived at Headman Malama's village had refused to work for him, even though the Headman had advised him to take up the job. In his frustration the settler asked: 'Can I rightfully demand his labour, and in case of his refusal, can I bring him before you?' The District

1 See petition of North-western Rhodesia Farmers Association to High Commissioner, 4.8.19 in BS3/138, Z.N.A.

2 This was pointed out in various interviews on the plateau.

3 KTC 1/1/2/2, Z.N.A. Knox-Little to Assistant Magistrate Magoye, 1.12.20.
official in his reply explained, unequivocally, that the people of Malama's village were no tenants of the settler concerned and so he had no right to call on the driver to work for him.¹

Such incidents only increased the settler farmers' problems. They were having to rely heavily on labour from Barotseland and even this source was of irregular flow. Petitioning the Administration, they argued that 'the requirements of Northern Rhodesia should have first consideration and receive preferential treatment by the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau...'.²

Dissatisfaction with operating conditions led the settlers to contemplate acquiring political power. They were convinced that they had to organise themselves if their interests were to be protected. In June 1908, Leopold Moore, a leading settler spokesman who lived in the Livingstone area, suggested that a Landowners and Farmers Association as well as a Chamber of Commerce, should be formed. This met the approval of the majority of local plateau farmers who had for some time been toying with the idea of forming some organisation to represent farmers' interests. Moore, who was a chemist by profession, was not however to enjoy the confidence of the farmers for long. His opponents, among whom was a leading Mazabuka settler, Tom King, accused him of showing far more interest in the activities of the North-western Rhodesia Commercial Association which was formed in March 1909 and they clamoured for an Association that would be geared specifically towards the defence of farming interests.³

¹Ibid. Assistant Magistrate Magoye to Knox-Little, 4.12.20.
³As was to be revealed later, the reasons for this opposition to Moore went deeper than this. His unwillingness to contemplate Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia in the years before the Lord Passfield 'Paramountcy' Memorandum came out, was more fundamental.
As a result of this pressure, the North-western Rhodesia Farmers Association was formed in 1912. The Association under the leadership of one Colonel Gibbons, had clear political goals and its members were determined to gain a voice for farmers in the making of policy within the territory. Apart from labour problems, the farmers had other grievances to which the Company seemed indifferent. At a meeting in Kalomo in July 1912, the Company came in for indictment over its failure to provide more than two veterinary surgeons for the entire North-western Rhodesia. It was accused, in this connection, of 'a total lack of any organisation to combat disease...'. The farmers demanded that three additional veterinary surgeons should be appointed and they called for the setting up of an efficient Veterinary Department. They also made it clear that, with the exception of the demands they were now presenting, their association had resolved to make no further requests on the Chartered Company but rather to seek political representation for the territory's farmers. This settler drive for representation was checked by the outbreak of the war, but it was to gather momentum once the war ended. In 1918, the Company had to give in and an Advisory Council was established which consisted of five unofficial members drawn from the settler community. The Council had no executive or legislative powers. Its function was mainly to advise the Company 'on any proposed legislation affecting European interests and on the more important regulations required under any proclamation

1BS3/392, Vol.1, Z.N.A. Resolutions adopted at a meeting of the North-west Rhodesian Farmers Association held at Kalomo, 27.7.12.
issued by the High Commissioner'.

The concession of an Advisory Council only whetted the settlers' appetite for more power and the Company came in for even more violent criticism. The Company was regarded as a stumbling block which had to be removed if the goal of Responsible Government for the territory or Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, objectives which a number of settlers had long set their sights on, were to be achieved. In a leader in the Livingstone Mail of 7th March 1919, Leopold Moore had this to say about the Chartered Company's record:

'It is well known that all who have settled in this country came here against the wishes of the Chartered Company which has done absolutely nothing during a space of 15 years to advance the interests of the settlers, but has left no opportunity, legitimate or illegitimate, of scheming for present or ultimate profit for its Shareholders.'

Moore was determined to see the territory rid of this 'old man of the sea'.

Opposition to the Company's Administration among local plateau settlers mounted during the early twenties. At a meeting of settlers in Mazabuka in 1912, one observer noted that 'there was a unanimous wish that the B.S.A.C.'s Administration should be terminated at the earliest possible moment....'. The decision of the British Government to withdraw the Company's Administrative rights over Northern Rhodesia in 1924 and to introduce an Administration under the Crown, was certainly not unconnected with this settler opposition to the regime.

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By the time of the handing over of power from Company to Crown, several important changes had taken place on the Tonga plateau. The area was now, irrevocably, being drawn into the money economy and the African population was beginning to react to the demands that this new development made on it. Under the rule of Europeans, new social positions, unknown in the traditional system and heavily dependent for their legitimacy on the new dispensation, had begun to emerge. The first chapter in the land question which is so central in the area's colonial history, had been enacted and the small settler community was already beginning to show signs of restlessness and unease. The settlers were already making demands which were a pointer to the sort of activities that would engage their attention in the years ahead. Perhaps, we should first turn to an examination of the formative years of the Crown Administration to see, among other things, what major changes there were in land policy.
Chapter II

LAND ALIENATION AND ADMINISTRATION, 1924-1937

The Genesis of Land Policy

The first Governor of Northern Rhodesia under the Crown Administration was Sir Herbert James Stanley. Stanley had spent the greater part of his career in Southern Africa and was well known for his strong pro-settler views. His ideas on the role that settlers could play in the development of the territory were to have a great influence on the Administration's land policy. Stanley and his closest aides shared that optimistic settler dream of which Hellen has written. This was the conviction that some time in the future there would be a large influx of immigrants into the territory. To prepare for this, they believed the administration had an obligation to reserve large tracts of land which would be required as ranches and farms by individual farmer-settlers as well as companies. The lands of the Tonga plateau, among others, were therefore the focus of much attention during the early years of Crown rule.

The creation of native reserves

In 1913, the British South Africa Company had toyed with the idea of delimiting reserves on the Tonga plateau and had even discussed this issue with Chief Monze and seventeen Headmen at a meeting held in the Chief's village. Monze seems to have responded with


2 V.W. Worthington, "Report on proposed native reserves, 1913", Institute for African Studies (University of Zambia) manuscript collection.
some enthusiasm to the suggestion. He is reported to have said:

'It is good news. We shall all be glad when we know where we are to live. Farmers are coming to settle all around us. They come to look at our lands and say, "this land is good, we shall settle here". We are accused of grass burning and where we used to graze our cattle we are told it is now the property of a white man.'

The Colonial Office was however at that time determined not to be rushed into conceding a reserves policy. It insisted that no delimitation of reserve boundaries should be embarked on before the Rhodesia native reserves commission, under Coryndon, had reported. When the war broke out, the native reserves idea was shelved for the time being. After the war, the company began once again to call for the creation of reserves. It was now being supported in its demands by certain settlers and missionaries. Some of the latter were alarmed by the way the Administration was dispossessing the indigenous population of its lands to meet the needs of incoming settlers. The majority of the established settlers who were now calling for reserves were those who were having problems with Tonga villages close to their farms. Like the missionaries, they demanded the division of the lands of the plateau into black and white residential areas. The missionaries believed that such a division would protect the land rights of the African population and prevent the suffering that accompanied large scale evictions. The whites on the other hand were arguing for reserves mainly because of the desire to create a settler zone where local Africans would operate only at the settler's pleasure. In a speech

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Ibid. The reference to grass burning was the Tonga practice of setting fire to the bush while hunting for game.
at the Northern Rhodesia Missionary Conference of 1924, one of the speakers summed up missionary opinion on the question of native reserves:

'It should be remembered that much of the unalienated land is unsuitable for cultivation....In view of this, the conference is strongly of the opinion that no more land should be alienated without the express sanction of the Governor until a reserves commission has reported and the needs of the native peoples are fully met.'

When some of the territory's leading officials added their voices to this clamour for reserves, the possibility of their creation became much more real. Governor Stanley was convinced of the need for a reserves policy to regulate the position of the settlers and he argued in 1924 that the 'present uncertainty about native reserves cannot but produce a feeling of insecurity among the natives and have an unsettling effect on their minds.'

He talked the Colonial Office into agreeing with his view and, between 1924 and 1927, Native Reserves Commissions were set up in the territory to examine the land situation in all three areas where settlers had taken up residence.

The Commission which examined the land situation along the line of rail was set up in July 1926. The members were P.J. Macdonnel, a Judge of the High Court, J. Moffat Thomson, a District Commissioner who later became Secretary for Native Affairs, and H.P. Hart, a local farmer. The Commission sat in the Mazabuka District in October 1926 and it heard evidence from white settlers, mainly farmers, and local chiefs. The farmers were divided on the question of whether reserves were necessary or not. F.P. Goodson, who had been farming

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2C.O, 795/41726, P.R.O. Stanley to Thomas, 10.8.24.
in the Mazabuka area since October, 1919, argued that the creation of reserves was in the interest of both the African and European communities. He explained that 'native cattle ... are a danger to European herds on account of disease ...' and was convinced that 'native stock can be better looked after if the people are in reserves'. He drew attention to the heavy capital expense that the fencing of land to keep out cattle involved and added that since few settler-farmers were in a position to afford this, reserves were the necessary answer. Others who favoured the creation of reserves and who apparently had had difficulties with their Tonga workers condemned local labour as inefficient and untrustworthy. They argued that the movement of villages away from the borders of their farms would not affect their labour supply. One of these farmers, from Nega Nega, told the Commissioners: 'I do not get 10% of them to work for me and they steal crops especially in bad seasons and this more than outweighs any benefits to settlers'.

On the other side, arguing against the need for reserves were a number of settler-farmers who seemed to have got on well with Tonga villagers living near their farms, but whose main interest in the residence pattern of the African population appeared to derive from their labour needs. One of them, from Mazabuka, told the Commission: 'Most of my labour is local ... say 60% of it ...'

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1 C.O. 795/18, P.R.O. Native Reserves Commission, 1926 (Evidence), Vol. II.

2 Ibid. Evidence of D.J. Gray. Many settler farmers were loath to employ Tonga labour except as a last resort because the average Tonga labourer, being so close to his home, was always taking time off to attend social functions in the village. The incidence of cattle theft was also higher on farms with predominantly local labour. Labourers from the Eastern province were very common on settler farms, especially those growing tobacco, for the 'Easterner'
I am almost surrounded by Simonga and his villages and I have no trouble with them. I don't want the villages moved as I get my labour from them and they go home at nights, but if they are moved 10-15 miles, I might not get them to work.\(^1\)

Another went even further in revealing his views on what the future settlement pattern should be. He told the Commissioners:

'I am not in favour of native reserves as a general rule... they will retard the progress of the country. At a later date, certain native reserves will be necessary but not in a wholesale way... wherever there is land suitable for Europeans, move natives off and wherever there is land unsuitable for Europeans, let the natives remain... My labour is 75% local labour to 25% from a distance.... There are drawbacks to villages near a farm but the labour is a great benefit.'\(^2\)

So long as surrounding villages could continue to supply the cheap labour these undercapitalised farmers had become so dependent on, they saw no need for reserves. Africans living on lands adjoining white farms were notorious for their habit of starting bush fires during their game drives, but even this the farmer was prepared to put up with, if proximity to these villages guaranteed his labour supply.\(^3\)

The Commission took evidence from twenty-two Tonga Chiefs, representing an estimated 46,044 people, on the 9th October. One after the other, the Chiefs outlined the reasons why they did not want to be moved from their lands into reserves. Mwanachingwala, speaking on behalf of his 77 villages, told the Commissioners:

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\(^1\)C.O. 795/18, P.R.O. Native Reserves Commission, 1926 (Evidence), Vol. II, Evidence of C.A. Harvey.

\(^2\)Ibid. Horace Isley's evidence.

\(^3\)Ibid. Evidence of C.A. Harvey.
'I was first told to move to the west of the Magoye river and I have done it and I do not want to move again. I am unable to move again.... I want to stay at Magoye. I know I am in trouble and I and my people will die as we have no good "Bwana" (white man or official) to look after us. When I was moved before from east of the Magoye, I was told I would not have to move again. I ask why I have been troubled by Europeans like this.'

Mwanachingwala was not alone in this situation where he was being asked to move again after he had received assurances that his tenure was secure. Sianjalika, living on the banks of the Ngwezi river to which he had been moved in 1913 from his original home, was quick to point out: 'Mr. Griffin told us we were to stay where we were and we would never be moved and Mr. Willis told us too'.

Chief Naluama, representing his twenty-seven villages, also had his reasons for not wanting to move. He told the Commissioners: 'Mr. Willis moved us already from Bell's farm and Molyneux's farm and east of there are only hills and they are full of baboons and the cattle will die and baboons eat our crops (sic)'.

One striking point that emerged from the evidence of the various chiefs was the view that the white man was going back on his word after assuring them that after their first evictions they would never be troubled again. It mattered little to them that the decisions of the earlier years had been taken by Company officials who were, perhaps, no longer in the employ of the territory's Administration. To them, it was simply a question of the white man failing to honour his obligations to the African population. The

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1Ibid. Evidence of Mwanachingwala.
2Ibid. Evidence of Sianjalika.
3Ibid. Chief Naluama's evidence.
Commissioner's work was widely discussed in the villages and the fear of being displaced once more engendered strong opposition in several areas. The District Commissioner observed that 'the attitude of the local natives to the proposals was frankly hostile' and he predicted that 'it will be no easy matter to convince them of the necessity for the reserves'.

The Commission in recommending the creation of reserves along the line of rail provided for a total of sixteen reserves to cover an area of 24,874,000 acres. For an estimated African population of 268,000, it recommended an allowance of 93 acres per head or a density of 6.89 persons per square mile. It reserved for non-African occupation 23,682,000 acres of Crown land of which 2,980,636 acres had already been alienated. By so doing, it made more than adequate provision for the large settler influx which so many believed would take place during the coming years. In reporting, the Commissioners explained that they were guided by six main considerations:

1) Reserves are to be situate in country away from the railway line but where possible with "lanes" or "corridors" giving access to it.

2) They are to be homogeneous and not intermingled with areas of European settlement.

3) They are to be tribal, so that no part of a tribe is cut off by intervening land from the remainder.

4) They are to be permanent and perpetual.


3This was to remain a dream for settler immigration during the ensuing years did not approach anything like the scale envisaged by these officials.
5) They are to be suitable and of sufficient size.

6) They shall be an indivisible part of a general scheme for the improvement and civilisation of the native. ¹

Although the Commissioners talked of only six main considerations that had guided them in the delimitation of the reserves, there can be no doubt that the proven fertility of the lands around Mazabuka, Magoye and Choma was a major consideration in their decision to exclude large parts of these areas from the native reserves created on the Tonga plateau. In the Chieftaincies of Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala, Siowe and Siamaundu, in particular, the soils were known to be very fertile and ideally suitable for grain production. There were in these Chieftaincies, wide belts of fertile upper valley and acacia thorn soils. Not surprisingly, these Chieftaincies became the principal centres of land alienation on the plateau and the reserve boundaries were worked out with such precision that they bypassed all the lands that officials and settlers were keen on reserving for white occupation in these areas. ²

On the recommendations of the reserves commission, four reserves were delimited to accommodate the plateau Tonga and neighbouring peoples. They varied in size and population density. The Ilala Tonga reserve No. XIII was the largest covering an area of some 4,992,000 acres as compared with reserve No. X which was designed to accommodate only about 7,300 people within an area of about 472,000 acres. ³ All the reserves were situated away from the line of rail, the centre of commercial activity and the Commissioners tried

² See Map 1, p. 75.
³ See Sir Alan Pim, Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the Financial and Economic position of Northern Rhodesia, Appendix VIII.
to justify this by arguing that the native from his simple wants and standard of life is under little or no handicap if at a further distance from the railway and the market it provides. He will still be able to sell whatever he produces at advantage to himself. ¹

The creation of reserves was officially recognised by the Northern Rhodesia (Crown Lands and Native Reserves) Order in Council of 1928. Those sections of the African population that were not already living within reserve boundaries were called upon to move into the nearest reserve. The majority of the Tonga Chieftaincies were already within reserve boundaries but there were a number of villages, such as those under Chiefs Siowe, Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala which were in areas that were now considered Crown land. Such villages were therefore asked to move. Coming as it did after the suffering occasioned by evictions during the days of company rule, the decision to resettle these villages within the newly created reserves incensed the African population in the affected Chieftaincies. In several areas this sense of grievance developed into strong hostility to the native reserves policy. Some villagers simply refused to move into the reserves. Whenever the Administration’s officials encountered such hostility from people who would not vacate their lands, they employed coercion and this, invariably, yielded the desired result. Villages of uncooperative farmers were burnt to the ground and recalcitrant Headmen were summoned to the Boma (as the Administration’s offices were called) and whipped with sjamboks. Informants pointed out to the author that this practice of burning

¹Report of the Native Reserves Commission, op.cit., p.70. This myth was to be later exploded as African producers anxious to take advantage of higher market prices on the line of rail, moved out of reserves to squat on unoccupied lands adjoining the railway.
villages and beating Headmen and others who would not yield, started with the Crown Administration.  

I was told of three villages in the Sianjalika area whose inhabitants on refusing to abandon their lands had their huts and crops fired by the Boma messengers acting on official instructions. These were Siamekone, Milimo and Mpesu villages. Like Mwanachingwala, Chief Sianjalika stoutly resisted attempts to force his people off lands they had cropped for many years. When his people were asking in 1920 to vacate the area of Dora Farm which had been alienated to a settler but remained unoccupied for a long time, the Chief proved most uncooperative. Not only did he insist on his people's right to the area but he was also later on to encourage them to squat on it after some of them had been evicted.

In the Monze Chieftaincy, Konje and Moomba villages were razed to the ground in the mid-twenties, the former because an adamant Headman Konje is said to have told an official who demanded that he should clear his people from the area, that the land belonged to his people, and that he was therefore not prepared to listen to any such instructions. Konje was arrested, sjamboked and imprisoned for about two weeks at the Boma for being so bold.

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1 Informants distinguish between the BSAC and Crown periods by talking about the periods before and after the Governor's arrival.

2 Interview with Naul Moonga, 29.4.74.

3 K.D.B. 1/3/6, Z.N.A. Assistant Magistrate to D.C. Livingstone, 23.5.20.

4 See Chapter III.

5 Interview with N.M. Moyouwe, 6.6.74.
Informants also referred to the burning of huts in Headman Shimonga's village in Chief Mwenda's area. Shimonga is said to have been a very popular Ulaanyika before the Europeans came and he was one of those called by Monze to Moonya Hill to meet the pioneering column in 1899. Shimonga gave in to the demands of his people who were against his willingness to move out his area as requested by the Administration. One Siantuba was the leader of the protest group and he ended up in prison after the area had been burnt.¹

In most parts of the plateau, Africans received the news that they should vacate their lands for settler occupation with strong opposition. They were now being asked in the majority of cases to hand over their lands without compensation since the Commission had ruled that compensation should be awarded only in special cases. The Commissioners had argued that by reserving land for African occupation they were recognising the African's right to the land and, to them, 'the payment of monetary compensation weakens that right'. They maintained that as a result of the reserves policy 'natives move from land where their title was less to that in which it is more secure'. The security that these new lands afforded was adequate compensation. The Commissioners recommended compensation only in cases where a settler required land in an area where new fields had recently been cleared or where a private company needed land for development purposes. In cases where the land was needed 'to erect roads or public buildings or to open mines' no compensation was to be offered to the evicted villagers.²

¹Interview with William Kazoka, 26.4.74.
In the absence of compensation, some Chiefs and their people decided on confrontation with the Authorities. In May 1930, Mwanachingwala who was being asked to move his villages across the Magoye river to the west was described as 'Somewhat of an obstructionist and anti-Government'. The Chief objected to moving across the Magoye and pointed out that the soils on the other side were very poor. He repeatedly spurned invitations from local officials to discuss the movement of his people at the Boma and is said to have refused to provide the carriers needed by touring officials.

The Commissioners had paid little attention to Chiefs' boundaries in the delimitation of the reserves and in a number of cases, villagers were being asked to break their ties with Chiefs under whom they had lived for years and to tie in their fortunes with those of the areas to which they were asked to move. This, in some cases, meant forgoing the advantage of living in a neighbourhood under a proven ritual leader of whose rain-making ability the people had come to be fully convinced.

In 1930, commenting on the pace of movement into reserves, the District Commissioner noted that 'little headway has been made in getting natives to go into reserves. They are most reluctant to move and water seems scarce where land is good; no real migration can be made until this is provided for. One great obstacle to movement is that people of one Chief will not willingly go into the

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1 ZA7/4/12, Z.N.A. Lloyds Tour report, May 1930.
2 Ibid.
3 Interview with Job Michello, 28.6.74.
"country" of another.\footnote{1}

In spite of various pressures exerted on the African population there were over 20,000 people still living on Crown and alienated lands in 1932 with approximately 54,000 already within reserves.\footnote{2} It was reported in that year that 'generally speaking, movement into reserves is not popular with those concerned and difficulty is being experienced in getting them to select sites to be occupied by them during the ensuing year'.\footnote{3}

The large size of the African population outside the reserves were partly due to the fact that a number of Africans were already moving out of reserves by the late twenties to occupy lands that lay unused.\footnote{4} It was also due to the settler-farmers' practice of so-called 'Kaffir-farming'. Farmers encouraged labourers to reside on their farms and entered into sharecropping relations with them. Some even collected rent from their tenants in the form of cattle.\footnote{5} One farmer in 1933 had about 75 tenants on his land.\footnote{6} This practice substantially undermined the efforts of officials to get the Tonga to enter and live in the reserves.\footnote{7}

Attempts in 1933 to evict certain villages of Chief Siowe which were on Crown land eight miles from Mazabuka, ran into considerable opposition from the Chief and his people. Siowi, about eighteen, was

\footnote{1}{KDB 6/1/1/3, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Report, 1930.}
\footnote{2}{ZA7/1/15/3, Z.N.A. Provincial Annual Report, 1932.}
\footnote{3}{Ibid.}
\footnote{4}{The dynamics of this movement of squatters will be examined in the next chapter.}
\footnote{5}{Native Affairs Report, 1933, p.13.}
\footnote{6}{Ibid.}
\footnote{7}{The practice was not illegal. A Natives on Private Estates Ordinance passed in 1937 sought to regulate the position of African residents on white farms. It tried to discourage squatting and protect African}
in 1933 the youngest chief on the plateau, having succeeded to his position during his student days at Rusangu (S.D.A.) Mission. The Chief is said to have been 'subjected to protests stormed into his ears by his various Headmen and encouraged to make an absolutely firm stand against moving into the reserve,...

The villages involved were situated along the edge of the Kafue Flats, in an area where the soils were known to be 'extremely fertile' and where 'with the minimum of agricultural labour, they provide themselves with enough food to employ the maximum amount of time in contemplating their numerous and well fed cattle,...' They were now being called upon to exchange these lands for the poorly watered Monzwe area in reserve XIII where wells and dams had to be provided to make the area habitable.

There was even a more fundamental reason for the refusal of these people to move into the reserve. For many years, the Monzwe area had been regarded as a 'no man's land' between the Tonga and the Ila and Siowe's people were naturally reluctant to move into an area where they believed their tenure would be questionable.

A number of Headmen in the Chief's area, notably Kabanji and Sintume, decided to organise the people in protest and, if necessary, confrontation with the Administration's officials. Kabanji, who was very influential in the area, is reported to have told an official 'that he was going to sit in his village, while his huts might be burned round him and he himself shot down perhaps by soldiers, but labourers by laying down tenancy rules. See Sec/Nat 203, Z.N.A.

1 ZA 7/4/39, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 6, 1933.
2 Ibid.
3 KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office Report, 1933.
4 KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office Report, 1933.
nothing would induce him to move out as he knew the country across the Magoye and he would only die of hunger there.\(^1\)

In the ensuing protest in Siowe Chieftaincy, the Chief himself went on a hunger strike and he threatened to hang himself.\(^2\) His people were very much behind him. The Administration, fearing an uprising, decided to act with much firmness. The ringleaders, Kabanji and Sintumwe, were arrested, sjamboked and detained at the Boma for some time.\(^3\) This seemed to have weakened the resistance for it was later reported that 'all the villages concerned had removed either into reserves, or into "yellow" areas situated some distance from alienated land and unlikely to be required for settlement in the future'.\(^4\) Other areas which might have been contemplating resistance to the Administration's reserve policy appear to have taken their cue from the way the Siowe case was handled and the movement of people into reserves progressed without much incident from this time on.

By 1933 large areas of land which the Tonga had occupied for centuries had been cleared of their villages and reserved for white settlement. A total of about 2,190 square miles of land had been alienated on the Tonga plateau.\(^5\) The fertile plains of Maunga in Sianjalika Chieftaincy and Chisobu in Mwenda's all passed out of African hands.\(^6\) In the Mazabuka and Magoye areas, evicted villagers

\(^1\)ZA 7/4/39, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 6, 1933.
\(^2\)KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
\(^3\)Interview with William Kazoka, 26.4.74.
\(^4\)KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
\(^5\)Hellen, op.cit., p.128. For a fairly comprehensive list of villages that were evicted, see Appendix.
\(^6\)Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74.
were already opening up new fields in the hilly areas to which they had been forced. In September 1933 the Provincial Commissioner was, in fact, moved into congratulating his District Commissioner for his success in moving the Tonga into reserves 'with the minimum of friction and without losing the goodwill of the natives concerned'. In the absence of production statistics for this period, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which Tonga crop production was affected by the twin policies of land alienation and the creation of reserves. There are hardly any reliable records of African maize output for individual areas on the plateau before the late 1930s. Nevertheless, the move, in certain cases, from fertile and relatively treeless areas into hilly, heavily wooded reserves must certainly have made the farmers' task more difficult, if it did not directly reduce his output.

With the native reserves now a reality, the Administration looked forward to a massive settler influx. A settler who applied for land was required to pay an initial deposit which was a tenth of the assessed value of the land. After making this deposit, he received a permit of occupation. He then had to pay, over the next five years, six per cent of the remaining nine tenths of the purchase price. If at the end of the five years he had fulfilled the land use requirements of his permit of occupation, he then had two options open to him. He could either pay the balance of the assessed value of the land, thus securing a certificate of title, or decide to spread the repayments over a period of fifteen years with a six per cent annual interest. Officials were convinced that on the terms they were offering, the settler population was bound to increase substantially during the coming years to cover all the lands reserved for white occupation.

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1 KSB 1/7/2, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner to D.C. Mazabuka, 19.9.33.
2 See Chapter II, p. 66.
From Direct to Indirect Rule

It was on the Chiefs that officials had laid the responsibility for moving the people into reserves. They were the main links between the Administration and the people and the amount of responsibility they were called upon to shoulder increased considerably under the Crown Administration. In the newly established reserves, it was their charge to maintain the populations of their various areas in a mood conducive to easy administration.

In 1927 Sir James Crawford Maxwell had succeeded Herbert Stanley as Governor of the territory. Maxwell had earlier served in Nigeria and the Gold Coast and he firmly believed in the Lugardian policy of Indirect Rule. His appointment to Northern Rhodesia strengthened the chances of this system of Administration being introduced in the territory. In 1929, Indirect Rule was officially introduced although the practice of using Chiefs and Headmen in the running of the provincial administration was nothing new. By the Native Authority Ordinance of that year, the 1916 Proclamation for the Administration of Natives was repealed and the territory's Chiefs were now organised within a structure of Superior and Subordinate Native Authorities. The Paramount Chiefs of the various African peoples were recognised as Superior Authorities and the ordinary Chiefs were the Subordinate Authorities. In areas where a Paramount Chief as such had never existed in the traditional system, the Superior Authority was made up of a council of all the Chiefs, each Chief retaining the right to recognition as a Subordinate Authority in his own area. The Native Authorities were empowered to make rules and orders for the administration of their various areas and could arrest people who contravened their rules.
The ordinance also conceded some judicial authority to the Chiefs. Courts were set up to be administered by a Chief or sub-Chief and they were allowed the right to handle cases on their own. In their absence, Assessors, usually Headmen, who were selected by the Chief and approved by the Provincial Commissioner, presided. A court of appeal, presided over by the Paramount Chief to review cases from the lower courts was also provided for.\(^1\)

In 1936 another Native Authority Ordinance was passed which allowed the Native Authorities to raise revenue and incur expenditure on schemes for improving the welfare of their people. They were allowed to collect court fees, bicycle and game licences and court fines and although responsibility for tax collection was not delegated to them, Native treasuries received 10\(^{0}\)/o of the taxes raised locally.

Before the passage of the 1929 Ordinance, the Administration invited Chief Monze to identify those Chiefs who deserved to be recognized as leaders of the Tonga. This was mainly an economy drive for the Administration was anxious to rid itself of the plethora of Chiefs that the B.S.A.C. had recognised. The Company had itself been in this position in 1918-19 when it had decided that for reasons of economy and efficiency in Administration, some of the Tonga Chief-taincies had to be amalgamated. This decision resulted in a number of ritual and secular leaders who had been prominent in the traditional system and had served as Chiefs up to 1918, being reduced to the position of Headmen. These included Chona, and Chongo.\(^2\)

\(^1\) KSB 1/8/1, Z.N.A., Provincial Commissioner to all District Commissioners, 18.10.29.

\(^2\) Interview with N.M. Muyovwe, 6.6.74.
This map shows the principal Chieftaincies after 1938.
Crown Administration, on Monze's recommendation, now reinstated Chongo as Chief but Chona continued to serve as a Headman under Chief Mwanza. A total of 21 Chiefs were finally recognised on the plateau by 1938. The Administration withdrew its recognition of two prominent Chiefs, Chisuwo and Siowe. In Siowe's case, his conduct during the evictions of the early thirties seems to have told against him. The most likely reason for Chisuwo's failure to gain recognition seems to have been his failure to identify with the work of the Catholic Mission. The mission took strong exception to Chisuwo's interest in the un-Christian Muchape movement which indulged in sorcery and divination. Father Moreau is said to have played a very active part in getting Chisuwo replaced by the less controversial Ufwenuka who had always been very interested in the mission's work.

Administrative problems of the 1930s

The Administration's first opportunity to test what goodwill it enjoyed in the newly established reserves grew out of the issues of Chief Monze's position as Paramount Chief and that of getting the people to accept the need for cattle-dipping tanks in the reserves. The Administration's recognition of Monze as Paramount Chief of the plateau Tonga was, for many years, strongly opposed by some of the leading Chiefs, among them Mwanachingwala, Siamusonde, Chongo, Sianjalika and Siowe before his deposition. Siamusonde was the most uncompromising of them all.

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1 *Ibid.* Chona was elevated to the rank of Chief in 1937.

2 These were Monze, Mapanza, Singani, Mwanachingwala, Siamaundu, Sianjalika, Nabuzoka, Naluama, Moyo, Mwenda, Ufwemuka, Mwenza, Chona, Chikanta, Munyumbue, Simuyobi, Chongo, Macha, Siambukululu, Namuswa and Siasikabole.

3 In 1935, Chisuwo sent a letter to the Boma at Mazabuka asking for permission to use the Muchape diviners in his area. See KSB 3/1,
Kulumbwa Siamusonde, the first in this line of Chiefs, was born of Ila and Tonga parents and he became Ulaanyika over an area made up of Tonga people, who were in the majority, as well as some Ila and Mulundwe. In pre-colonial times, Kulumbwa had won some fame through the successful resistance his area put up against the Lozi raider, Santebe. His forces enjoyed the singular honour of having once defeated the dreaded warrior's army in an encounter around Bwengwa. Because of his superior military capabilities, Kulumbwa is said to have received several requests from the Monzes, Mayaba and Nchete, to help them defend their lands but it is not clear whether he ever obliged. He was not known for any ritual powers, such as that of rain-making, but Informants pointed out that he never relied on the rain-making abilities of the Monzes. He had his own rainmaker, one Chipani Mukunkube.

When, therefore, the Administration decided to recognise Monze as Paramount, Siamusonde at first refused to serve under him although later, under pressure from the Authorities, he was to accord the Paramount nominal recognition. His argument was that Monze's credentials as a ritual leader were not enough to merit his new status. He told the D.C. that in the past Monze was in fact his subordinate. When he was invited to meetings summoned by Chief Monze, he usually excused himself by saying that he recognised only

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1 The Mulundwe are people of Ila and Tonga parentage.
2 Interview with Franklin Kaluwe, 18.12.73.
3 The martial spirit of the Siamusondes was to continue into the Colonial period and was clearly demonstrated in an incident in 1932 when the Chief despatched men armed with spears to bring an offender who worked
the authority of Lewanika and the Government. Siamusonde had several boundary disputes with Monze, many of which remained unresolved and it appears that he now feared the Paramount might use his new position to settle these problems in his favour.

Chiefs Siowe, Chongo and Mwanachingwala also refused to recognise Monze's authority for a long time. They saw the position as the creation of the Administration, which it was, and felt no obligation to submit to it. By 1929 the Monzeship had lost its mystical power as a result of the appointment to the office of people who were known to have no spiritual powers. After the death of Nchete in 1915, Petro Hamanjanji had been nominated as heir to the Chief's wives and he later became Chief Monze. This succession was heavily disputed for it was widely known that Petro lacked the necessary powers for the position. When in 1918 Petro died, many people were convinced that he had been struck down by the fury of Mayaba and Nchete whose spirits were objecting to the people's attempts to secularise what had started as a purely ritual office. Petro's successor did not, however, possess the powers his predecessor lacked. He was Longwani Munanzuki, one time messenger at the Kalomo Boma who later became a truck driver for a white store keeper to trial at his court. (See ZA 7/4/30, Z.N.A.)

The present Chief Siamusonde and a few other Informants in his area told the author that Kulumbwa obliged the Monzes on two occasions, but Informants in the Monze area maintained that it was only the Ndebele who assisted the Monzes, occasionally, in defending their lands.

Interview with Chief Siamusonde, 12.12.73.

KDB 1/5/8/2, Z.N.A. Memorandum attached to despatch from D.C. Mazabuka to Provincial Commissioner, 21.7.31.

These disputes which Informants say had started in the pre-colonial period, continued into the 1930s. See Z.A. 5/2/2, Z.N.A.
Cooke, a labour agent of the R.N.L.B. Longmani had very little support in the Chieftaincy. A touring official in 1932 observed that he was 'associating himself with a collection of undesirables'. He discovered that the Monze had no real influence over his own people and the Subordinate Authorities 'especially those of mixed Ila-Tonga origin like Mwanachingwala and Siamusonde'.

The diminution of the spiritual potential of the Monzeship was a major factor in the refusal of certain Chiefs to recognise the Paramount. Also significant was the Monze's failure to take a bold stand against the native reserves policy. His seeming acquiescence to it was regarded as a virtual sell-out to the new forces, a strategy to ensure the continuance of his position as head of the plateau's Chiefs. Siowe, Mwanachingwala and Chongo repeatedly abstained themselves from meetings summoned by Monze during the thirties, and the D.C. once noted 'that it is impossible to influence them at present, through that medium'. Like Siamusonde, they told officials that 'they looked to Barotseland not to Chief Monze for leadership'.

Monze protested repeatedly to the Boma officials about the attitude of these Chiefs 'claiming that they were Batonga and should acknowledge him', but this hardly improved the situation.

\*Ibid.
\*Ibid.
\*It is significant that two of his leading opponents, Siowe and Mwanachingwala were Chiefs who had openly challenged the reserves policy.
\*KDB 1/5/8/2, Z.N.A. D.C. to Provincial Commissioner, 11.2.31.
\*KDB 6/7/3, Z.N.A. Quarterly report for period ending 31.3.31.
\*KDB 6/7/5/2, Z.N.A. D.C.'s tour Feb.-March 1931. Even as late as 1953, the Administration's attempt to get Chief Monze recognised as...
The Veterinary Department's policy of introducing dipping tanks for cattle in the reserves during the early thirties led to even more violent anti-Government behaviour on the part of some of the plateau's Chiefs and their people. European settlers had reported to the Department on several occasions the dangers of disease to which their cattle were exposed from roaming African herds which, from time to time, trespassed on their farms. In a bid to solve this problem while improving animal husbandry in the reserves, the Administration decided to construct dipping tanks in the reserves and, although dipping was not to be compulsory, it was hoped that the Chiefs would persuade their people to use the new facilities.

Dipping was greeted with mixed feelings on the plateau. In the Ufwemuka and Chona Chieftaincies, the local Catholic Mission exerted its influence on the surrounding population and the people in these areas took to the dipping tanks with enthusiasm. At Chikonka village in the Ufwemuka area it was reported in 1930 that 3,836 head of cattle were dipped in a single week, the average weekly figure being in the region of 3,238 head. The dipping programme enjoyed similar success in Siamaundu Chieftaincy which was under a very energetic Chief.

The situation that prevailed in these Chieftaincies and a few others stood in marked contrast to that obtaining in the Siamusonde, Mwachingwala and Sianjalika areas. Although they were said to

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2In 1932, Siamaundu was described as 'young, intelligent and well mannered' and was considered 'perhaps the most promising Chief in the district'. (KDB 6/7/5/3, Z.N.A. Fleming's tour report, Nov.-Dec. 1932). As will be seen in succeeding chapters, this Chief Siamaundu
to have cooperated willingly with the Administration 'in most other matters',\(^1\) the Chiefs of these areas were most uncompromising, even anti-Government, when it came to the question of cattle dipping. When in 1930 the Siamusonde area received its first dipping tank, the Chief is reported as having said 'that he could not thank Government for the tank as he did not want it...'.\(^2\) His people had always practised transhumance, taking their herds during the dry season to the Kafue flats. They were brought back only after the land had been fired in preparation for the new cropping season. This practice ensured, in the words of a report, that seasonally the herds went 'down to country cleansed of ticks by flood and they return to country cleansed of ticks by fire'.\(^3\) The people here therefore saw no point in using the Government's dipping tanks.\(^4\)

Their refusal also appears to have been connected with an underlying distrust, in this and other neighbouring areas, of the Administration's intentions. Local officials had told the Chiefs that no dipping fees would be charged. They knew the African farmers needed this kind of assurance as a number of them had been across to Southern Rhodesia where levies were made on African cattle that passed through dipping tanks. This assurance did not however dispel

\(^{(Munde)}\) who succeeded to the position in 1933, was to give the Administration much support in its various land development policies during the thirties or forties.

\(^1\) ZA 7/1/15/3, Z.N.A. Provincial Annual report, 1932.
\(^2\) KDB 1/5/8/1, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs, 19.9.30.
\(^4\) In 1930, an official commenting on the strong feeling in the Siamusonde Chieftaincy wrote: 'One thing is perfectly obvious and that is that Siamusonde's attitude is unanimously and wholeheartedly endorsed by his people. One sensed that even if Siamusonde did wish to fall in line with Government policy he would meet with considerable opposition from his own people.' See KDB 1/5/8/1, Z.N.A. D.C. Mazabuka to Provincial Commissioner, 4.10.30.
the doubts and suspicions of the African farmers who feared that, at some future date, they would be called upon to pay for the use of their cattle had made of the tanks. Governor Maxwell had commented during an Indaba in May 1929 on the subject of dipping fees, and his words seemed to have lingered in many minds.

'At first I do not propose to ask you to pay for the dip. The Government will give you this and then when your stock improves and you get enhanced prices, the question of payment for dip will be looked into. You will be able to pay when you get better prices...'

If in the future they would have to pay for the use of dipping tanks they had never asked for, the farmers saw no point in using the facility. No amount of reassuring by officials who insisted that fees would never be charged could get these people to reconsider the issue. Many still had fresh in their minds the grain relief activities of 1924, when the Administration had distributed grain in the Magoye area to relieve the hardship caused by the poor harvest of that year. Many families had received maize on the understanding that it was free and there had been a lot of disagreement when some people were later called upon to pay for what they had received. Suspension of the Government's word was therefore deep-seated. One Chief in fact explained to an official the main reason for his refusal to use the dipping tanks. Reporting their conversation, the official noted that 'the chief stumbling block is that he and his people are unaccustomed to acts of lavish generosity on the part of

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1This is a meeting between officials and the African people.

2KSB 1/1/1, Z.N.A. Indaba held at Mazabuka, 215, 29.

3KDB 1/5/8/1, Z.N.A. D.C. to Provincial Commissioner, 4, 10, 30; also K.D.B. 6/7/3, Report for quarter ending 31st December, 1924.
the Government and all fear that there must be some "catch" in the present scheme.... 1

The fear that cattle may die if passed through the tanks was also a major factor in the reluctance of the people (especially those of Siamusonde) to use the facility. On a European farm in the Lochinvar area, a few miles from Siamusonde's village, a large number of cattle had died during the late twenties and the surrounding African population had come to the conclusion that dipping was the cause of the deaths. 2

In spite of opposition, the Veterinary Department was determined to get all the Tonga chiefs and their people to dip their cattle. 3 Administration pressure on the Chiefs to accept the dipping scheme, however, produced further opposition. Siamusonde tried to put the officials off by claiming that he had received all his cattle from Lewanika and that, since Lewanika did not dip his cattle, he saw no reason why he should. 4 When this failed to work, labourers employed by the dipping teams in his area were threatened with violence and many of them, out of fear, gave up their jobs and returned to their homes. 5 After a tour of the area in 1930, the District Commissioner wrote: 'I do not know the reason why, but natives in this district have openly told me that they distrust the word of the Government'. 6

1 ZA 7/3/12, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Quarterly report, 31.3.30.
3 Although Siamusonde was the most intractable of the Chiefs during the early thirties, even Monze had refused to take any interest in the dipping programme. See Native Affairs report, 1932, pp. 12-13.
4 KDB 1/5/8/1, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs, 19.9.30.
5 Ibid. Secretary for Native Affairs to Provincial Commissioner, 15.9.30.
6 KDB 1/5/8/1, Z.N.A. D.C. to Provincial Commissioner, 17.11.30.
Under pressure from the Central Provincial Administration which was determined to see Siamusonde punished for his behaviour, the District Commissioner pondered the fairness of such an action and found himself coming down on the side of the Chief:

'It is true that Siamusonde's attitude and equally that of his people is obstructive in the sense that he knows the wishes of the Government and he does not follow them out, but on the other hand, the question of dipping is non compulsory ... All Siamusonde has done is to take the word of the Government at its face value. He was told he could dip or not as he pleased and he says he prefers not to.'

Siamusonde's continued intransigence and the hostility of his people to the Administration however forced the D.C. later on to recommend sterner measures. On a tour of the area in March 1931, he commented on 'the unfriendly attitude of the people' which was seen in 'the exorbitant price of food charged to Government officials'.

This unfriendliness had been clearly demonstrated during a meeting he had had with Siamusonde, at which he invited him to a meeting to discuss Chief Monze's position. The Chief's behaviour gave the District Commissioner much offence. When he was told of the proposed meeting, the D.C. wrote, 'he interrupted with an emphatic "Pê" /.\u0110/=.\u0110/. I explained that this was an order from myself as D.C., not from Chief Monze. He said "Pê. I will not go." I replied that it was an order of the Government. Siamusonde turned his face aside and made a contemptuous spitting noise. There could be no doubt about the insubordinate nature of the gesture.'

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1 Ibid.
2 In spite of pressure from local officials, Siamusonde refused to allow women to divorce their husbands whenever they wanted to (ZA 7/4/30, Z.N.A., Facey's tour report, May–June, 1932). Neither would he obey orders from the Boma to get his people to establish proper villages instead of building their huts at random. (KDB 1/5/8/3, Z.N.A., District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 3, 11, 32).
As a result of this incident, the D.C. recommended the withholding of the Chief's subsidy for some time. By September 1932 when Siamusonde's attitude to the Administration appeared to be deeply influencing the behaviour of other Chiefs, notably Siamalika, Mwanachingwala and Simonga, the Governor ordered an inquiry into his conduct.¹

In the Mwanachingwala area, opposition to the Administration during the 1930s appears to have sprung largely from the land losses which the people of the Chieftaincy had suffered at the hands of the white officials. By 1930, Chief Mwanachingwala had acquired a reputation for being anti-Government. In 1932 he seemed even less willing to cooperate with local officials. During a tour of his area in December of that year, a local official found the Chief 'childishly and wilfully obtuse'.² Like Siamusonde's, his people practised transhumance and so they were just as indifferent to the cattle-dipping policy.

Sianjalika's case was somewhat different. His people had never taken to the practice of transhumance, yet they shared as strong an aversion to the dipping scheme as Siamusonde's. Chief Sianjalika's objections derived partly from the fear that fees would later be demanded, but it appears that he was not only against this particular policy of the Administration, but was, in a way, telling the officials to take their hands off his area. In 1932, at a meeting with Wickins, the D.C., he again emphasised his opposition to dipping and on being asked whether he needed any dams or wells in his poorly watered area,

¹KDB 1/5/8/3, Z.N.A. Acting Chief Secretary to Provincial Commissioner, 29.9.32 I found no evidence of the outcome of the inquiry. It appears that the Chief got away with a few words of warning.

he replied in the negative. It was only after two of his Headmen had appealed to him that he accepted the offer of two dams on the Kabolongola, a tributary of the Ngwezi river. Local officials also experienced much difficulty in getting Sianjalika to move those sections of his people who were living on Crown and alienated lands into reserves. A District officer touring the Chief's area in 1932 commented on his 'mule-like obstinacy' and regretted the fact that he was so uncooperative since 'he is one of the few strong Chiefs in the district'.

The performance of the majority of the Tonga Chiefs after the creation of the reserves and the official introduction of Indirect Rule gave the Administration much concern. Islands of opposition to Government policy were developing and Chiefs were failing to live up to that reputation for 'prompt and effective response to all calls made on them'. A few were now decidedly hostile to the Administration.

In 1934, Mwanachingwala and Siamusonde were described as 'useless and obstructive'. The people in their areas were said to 'possess all the shortcomings of bastard Ba-Ila tribes' and were 'badly controlled'. The official saw 'no hope for any improvement as long as their present Chiefs are in power'.

In the general exercise of their duties, a number of Chiefs were being, increasingly, found wanting. With the noticeable exception

4One official even suggested that the Administration should consider the possibility of deposing Sianjalika and Siamusonde because of their opposition to dipping. See ZA 7/4/30, Z.N.A. Jalland to Chief Secretary, 4.1.33.
5See Chapter I, p.28
of Chief Siamaundu (Mondeh) none of the plateau Tonga Chiefs had consistently favourable reports on his conduct during the thirties and early forties. There were reports of Chiefs who were 'inclined to be independent and not to assist the Government...'.¹ Some of the younger Chiefs were said to be showing 'keeness and progression' but the older ones had as their main object 'a peaceful life'.² The majority of the Native Authorities were taking no initiative in the running of their various areas and when the Boma officials were not around, they showed very little interest in the affairs of Government.³ The Southern provincial report for 1937 noted that 'apathy and lethargy are more distinguishing attributes of Chiefs than interest and industry', and it added that 'in the Mazabuka District, the record is peculiarly bad'.⁴

While the apathy shown by Tonga Chiefs during the thirties might have been partly due to the fact that they were finding themselves unequal to their present responsibility, having had nothing like it before white rule, their lack of zeal and in some cases open opposition was certainly not unconnected with the misery and frustration that the reserves policy had bred in certain Chieftaincies. During the thirties, the limitations of the native reserves commissioners were becoming glaringly apparent. A commission that contained no trained Agriculturalist and whose decisions were made without the benefit of reports on African farm practice or surveys of African

¹ZA 7/13/2, Z.N.A. Provincial Annual report, 1930.
²The Chief who was after the 'peaceful life' was presumably the type that was reluctant to carry out contentious policies (such as the conscription of involuntary labour) which would bring him into conflict with his people.
³KDB 6/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
lands, could hardly be said to have been well placed to make the sort of recommendations it did.

The reserves Commissioners and a few local officials had stressed the need for the development of the reserves. Frank Melland, a farsighted and outspoken District Commissioner of this period, had noted in 1926:

Moving the natives (many of whom have already been moved once) into reserves is bound to increase the self consciousness that already exists, a feeling born of the instinct of self preservation...; it is essential that schemes to help the native should come into force simultaneously with this forced upheaval, not merely to be promised as a sequel to such movement.'

Melland emphasised the need for better water supplies, the provision of access roads to the railway and 'definite assistance in agriculture and stock raising'.

Little came of whatever plans the Administration had, during the thirties, for developing the reserves. The Depression virtually wiped away the Agriculture Department which, in any case, since its inception, had preoccupied itself almost entirely with the problems of settler farmers. There were twenty-three officials serving under the Department in June 1932 and only five had escaped retrenchment by 31st December, 1933. An agricultural research station which had been established in Mazabuka was closed down as its specialist staff was reduced to only one officer. The waterboring team completely disappeared. It had sunk a few wells and boreholes in

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1 Melland had served in Bembaland and also in Kasempa and he was one of the few officials who openly criticized the colour-bar. See, Frank Melland, "Is the colour-bar to spread north?", The African Observer, Vol. 7, No. 3, July 1937, pp. 60-64.


3 Ibid.

some of the reserves, but these proved to be far from adequate.
Large areas of poorly-watered land were left uninhabited as
populations concentrated in the less arid areas. In 1938, Captain
Campbell, a Pemba settler, representing the Southern Electoral Area
in the Legislative Council, told the Council of 'large areas where
for 30 or 40 miles, you can go through the reserve without a drop
of water and hardly see a native'.

The situation in a number of reserves on the plateau was close
to critical during the 1930s. In the Sianjalika area in 1934, the
Chief's 76 villages covered an area of some 500 square miles. Com­
menting on the land, a touring official observed that 'at least 65/o
is uncultivable owing to hills....' The reserves Commissioners
had pledged themselves to establishing reserves that were 'suitable'
for African habitation but surveys of the reserves during the 1930s
strongly questioned their suitability. The Pim Commission of 1938
reported that 'in none of the reserves can the position be described
as satisfactory. Some reserves are definitely inadequate and re­
quire enlargement'. The Bledisloe Commission that followed Pim's
stressed the need 'for the progressive execution of a systematic
programme of development as envisaged by the Commissioners by whom
they were originally demarcated'.

The fact that the Administration had alienated far more land
than could be effectively occupied by the settlers who received them

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1 See Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates (hereafter
Hansard) 12th December, 1938, No. 31, Col. 184.
3 Pim, op.cit., p.73.
had been obvious since the late 1920s. In 1928 it had been reported that a third of the lands alienated in the Mazabuka sub-district were in the hands of absentee landlords 'who contribute nothing to the present cost or work of development in this territory'. In the circumstances, it was suggested that a tax be levied on alienated lands whose owners left them undeveloped and unoccupied. In the same year, Father Moreau of the local Catholic Mission, had criticized the Administration for allowing people to have very large farms. He called for a more equitable distribution of the land and condemned what he considered land wastage as seen in ranches and large farms. Moreau criticized the pattern of land distribution which the territory was adopting and he called for smaller land holding. This was how he saw it all:

'A few thousand white landowners each of them owning an estate far too large to be cultivated up to its bearing capacity and one million natives segregated (the very word suggests a leper settlement) in reserves will never make this a prosperous country; but several millions of small landowners cultivating their own farms will work wonders.'

In 1929, reports indicated that there were in the Mazabuka District seventeen privately owned farms which had been previously occupied but whose owners had deserted them. These farms were quite substantial in size. In the Kaleya valley, two of these farms were 10,188 and 7,266 acres in size and they were said to be on 'good agricultural land'. Another which had been sold to one F.H.

1KDB 6/1/1/1, Z.N.A. Report for year ending 31.12.28. The B.S.A.C. had reported in 1911 that of 550,000 acres of land taken up by Europeans in North-Western Rhodesia only about 7,792 acres were under crops, 419 acres being used as orchards and some 4,863 acres lying fallow. See ZN.A. Report for year ending 31.3.11.


3Ibid., p. 260.

4This was partly to do with the Depression, as will be seen presently.

5KDB/1/3/7, Z.N.A. D.C. to Provincial Commissioner, 14.8.29.
Lowe in the area close to the Kafue river, was 5,629 acres and it contained excellent pastures.1

A number of companies had also received large grants of land which they failed to occupy. The Northern Rhodesia Cotton Company had purchased 12,496 acres of good ranching land in the vicinity of the Kafue and Nega Nega rivers, lands from which Chief Mwana­chingwala's people had been evicted. For a number of years, the land lay unused. A cattle and land company bought 8,415 acres in the area west of the Monze railway station, which it never bothered to occupy.2

The South African Township, Mining and Finance Company with Headquarters in Johannesburg, had purchased, during the early twenties, sixteen estates in the Kaleya valley and in the area of the Magoye and Ngwezi rivers. These were lands drawn from the Mwana­chingwala and Sianjalika Chieftaincies and they totalled some 37,997 acres. The area was described as 'good agricultural and ranching country' but these lands were 'locked up, unused for many years'.3

During the years of the Depression, the Administration was not only faced with the problem of handling vast areas that lay unoccupied and were attracting squatters, it also had a problem finding bidders for available Crown Lands. In 1930, there were 127,000 acres of 'good farming and ranching land' available for purchase in freehold in the Mazabuka District, but no settlers to take them.4 Farmers

1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
who had already taken up land were leaving to find work on the 
Copperbelt and the Railways and they left their farms 'uncultivated 
or run by neighbours'. The European population in the District 
which was estimated at 470 in 1929 had dropped to 456 by 1931. 
By 1934, it had suffered further reduction and was reported to 
be 443 persons.  

Faced with the situation in which there were a number of un-
suitable and poorly-watered reserves, on the one hand, and fertile 
unoccupied lands on the other, some local officials suggested that 
the pressure of the reserves should be eased by the granting of 
plots to African farmers on unoccupied farms. At the Provincial 
Commissioners' Conference of 1934, a motion strongly critical of 
the existing land situation was tabled and passed unanimously. 
'All provincial Commissioners' are said to have 'depreciated the 
existing instructions by which large tracts of unoccupied land were 
being reserved from native occupation, although there was no pros-
pect of their being required for European occupation.'  

The demands and the condemnations of the Administration's 
land policy brought no substantial changes in land distribution 
during the thirties. It was the problems that developed with the 
expansion of African commercial farming that were to force the 
Administration, during the forties, into a review of land policy. 
It is to these problems that we now turn. 

2 See KDB 6/1/1/2; KDB 6/1/1/7; ZA 7/1/14/3, Z.N.A. 
3 KDB 6/7/5/4, Z.N.A. In 1938, the District Commissioner called 
for 'some system of native smallholding... ...' and suggested that 
'some of the unoccupied farms in European areas might be used'. 
D.C.'s notes on Tour report No. 6, 1938. 
4 ZA 1/9/15/1, Z.N.A. Extracts from minutes of Provincial Commissioners' 
Conference of May, 1934.
The simple hoe culture of the Tonga underwent a radical change during the years of Colonial Rule. While working on the farms of settlers within the territory or further south, or in training or employment at local mission stations, scores of Africans gathered ideas which they took back to their villages to revolutionise local agriculture. The tedious and time-consuming practice of preparing a small plot of land with a hoe soon gave way to the fairly widespread use of more up to date farming implements which enabled certain individuals to crop much larger acreages than they had ever done before.

The Catholic and Seventh Day Adventist Missions on the plateau took a keen interest in Tonga agriculture. They were very active from about 1910 onwards, in advertising the value of the plough, although their efforts appear to have been concentrated largely on the villages which bordered on their stations. This meant, in effect, parts of Ufwenuka, Chona and Monze Chieftaincies. In the remaining parts of the plateau, African farmers appear to have acquired their knowledge of the use of ploughs mainly from settler farmers whom they served as labourers, either within the territory or in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Some of the early migrant workers returning home from the Southern territories are said to have brought ploughs with them but most purchased ploughs locally: many bought second-hand ploughs from their white employers.

In advertising the value of the plough on his farm, the European settler made a significant contribution towards stimulating agricultural improvement among the Tonga.
The commitment of some of the local missionaries to improving the farming methods of their adherents appears to have been very strong. Father Moreau's deliberate neglect of academic for agricultural training did not quite meet the approval of the higher authorities of his church. In a letter from Salisbury in 1925, he was told:

'... one of the complaints made against you by practically all those who have been with you at Chikuni is that you have been more a farmer than anything else and that on account of the farming, you have not spread out as you might have done...'

Moreau had farming in the blood. He was born in La Bruffiere, Vendée, of Breton peasant parents. Caught up as he was in Africa in a situation where the ox and plough, two of the fundamentals in the agricultural system in which he was raised, were unknown, he went all out to advertise their worth.

Moreau's enthusiasm was shared by his S.D.A. counterparts at Rusangu. Local villagers who had connections with these missions, as well as those who had observed, at close quarters, the agricultural practices of settler-farmers, were the pioneers of plough cultivation in the Tonga villages. Moreau's use of oxen on the lands of Chikuni impressed the cattle-keeping Tonga, who had never conceived of using their animals in this way. Many sent their bulls to the priest to be yoked and trained and he was allowed to use them for a while before returning them to their owners.

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1BY/3/220, Brown to Moreau, 16.2.25. Read at Society of Jesus Headquarters, Farm Street, London.

2Among the Tonga readers Moreau wrote was "Joni Milimo", which focussed on agriculture. The others were "Joni Mukampaila", on village hygiene, and "Tobias" and "The Valiant Woman", in which he praised domestic virtue.

3See Moreau, "The Chikuni Mission - How it came to be started", Read at the Chikuni Mission in Zambia.
The first African to purchase a plough in the Tonga area did so in 1914.¹ He was followed by many others equally determined to take advantage of his implement's potential which Moreau once vividly described:

"... a furrow one foot broad and 200 yards long turned over as quickly as a man can walk it and if you repeat that 36 times, you have 4860 square yards, or one acre, of ground nicely turned over... do that in one day without much fatigue ... Do many people imagine what work it meant to turn over 4860 yards of ground, even at a shallow depth of ½ inches? It meant 174,960 strokes of the hoe, reckoning ¼ strokes to the square foot. If you want to go down 8 inches as a good plough will do, you have to double the number of strokes."²

The Tonga took very easily to the plough and I was told that there was hardly a village without one by 1931.³ Perhaps the main attraction of the plough for the Tonga farmer was its labour saving value. Because the handling of oxen was generally reserved to men,⁴ the farmer and his male helpers were usually responsible for both the clearing and the ploughing of the land. With the adoption of the plough it was now possible for the men to spend less time in preparing their fields for planting, and this meant that more time could be devoted to hunting, fishing and wage-employment. There are no reliable figures for labour migration during the early 1920s but several Informants claimed that men were

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²Moreau, "The Chikuni Mission...", op.cit.

³Interview with H.Yates-Jones, 17.5.74.

⁴This practice continued throughout the Colonial period. See E.Colson, Marriage and Family among the Plateau Tonga (Manchester, 1958), p.109.
leaving the reserves in large numbers during this period in order to earn some money to purchase their first ploughs. The women-folk were very instrumental in getting their husbands to seek employment for they were constantly comparing the time spent by their families in preparing the land with that of families that owned ploughs. Men who could not afford the cost of a plough came to be looked upon as failures and many went out to work to prove they were not.¹

Although there is hardly any documentary evidence to support this, most Informants maintained that they experienced an increase in yield when they used ploughs in their cultivation. This is difficult to ascertain for the increase in output may have come about as a result of the larger fields that could now be cropped and may not have represented an improvement in yield per acre cultivated. However the belief that ploughing increased output gained wide currency on the plateau and increased the plough's attraction.

A moderate increase in maize prices during the mid-1920s also appears to have acted as an incentive towards adopting the plough. By 1926, some African farmers were being paid 8/- for a bag of maize.² This was an improvement on the market situation prevailing in the early 1920s when 5/- appears to have been the highest sum offered.³

In the northern and north-eastern parts of the plateau where

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¹ Interviews with William Kazoka (23.4.74) and Nelson Muyovwe (6.6.74).
² KDB 6/7/1, Z.N.A. Annual report for financial year ending 31st March 1926.
³ Interview with Jacob Hundyanga, 22.11.73.
farmers had to do very little stumping because of the relatively tree-less nature of the vegetation, the plough was quickly adapted. In the more heavily-wooded south-western parts of the plateau, its adoption was more gradual. The adoption of the plough created the need for draught oxen. Although several families on the plateau kept their own oxen, many had no cattle of their own. These tended to rely on kinsmen and neighbours for animals during the ploughing season. Some owners charged rents of up to 7/- a day for the use of two animals, but a farmer who was prepared to wait until a neighbour or relative had completed his ploughing usually got oxen free. Those who herded cattle for the more wealthy farmers were allowed the use of animals in their keep and some even made money by renting out some of these animals. In the villages, oxen came to be valued more highly than cows. Young men who were building herds of their own tended to start off with oxen and only after they had acquired enough did they turn to buying cows.

The opening of the Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt in the late twenties and thirties provided local farmers with markets for the sale of surplus produce. The Roan Antelope and Nkana mines came into production in 1931. By 1933 the Nufulira mine was also in

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1As late as 1945, Allan and others discovered that 33% of the families covered in their survey of seven Chieftaincies had no cattle at all. See W. Allan et alia, "Land Holding and Land Usage among the Plateau Tonga", Rhodes-Livingstone Paper, No. 14, 1945, p. 155.

2Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74.

3For details of cattle herding among the Tonga, see E. Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia: Social and Political Studies (Manchester, 1962), pp. 132-141.

4This came out in various interviews on the plateau.
production. The mines attracted a lot of labour and their food requirements gave a boost to African farming. These requirements were for maize. Millet, sorghums and other grains continued to be grown but only for subsistence. African maize production, the bulk of it coming from the Tonga plateau, had been calculated at about 15,000 bags annually between 1915 and 1920. This number had doubled by 1927\(^1\) and was some 33,000 bags by 1932-33.\(^2\)

In the years before the Depression affected produce prices, farming on the plateau was quite a rewarding enterprise. Many Tonga farmers were quick to respond to the demand for maize. By the late 1920s, that portion of output in excess of subsistence requirements which one may regard as a 'normal surplus' during the mid-1890s had become a regular part of the farmer's production, deliberately cultivated to meet the rising demand.\(^3\) Apparently, most farmers continued to operate on a small scale although in the north-eastern areas, farms tended to be relatively larger. The conditions that Trapnell and Clothier were to describe in 1933 were, apparently, already in existence.\(^4\) Because of land alienation, there was now less land than before and shifting cultivation as carried out in the pre-Colonial period was becoming slightly more difficult.

\(^1\)Agriculture Department Annual report, 1928, p.6.

\(^2\)Sec/A,G/69, Z.N.A., Anonymous minute. There are no figures for African agricultural production on the plateau per se during these years.

\(^3\)The 'normal surplus' refers to that amount of food produced as a famine reserve which in good years is not required for subsistence. See W.Allan, *The African Husbandman* (London, 1965), p.38.

In the southern parts of the plateau where farms were usually smaller and where the hoe was still widely used in several areas, land shortage was not yet a critical problem. But in the more advanced north-eastern areas, the pinch was already being felt in certain Chieftaincies. More farmers were investing in ploughs and those who could not afford ploughs of their own borrowed from relatives or neighbours. Some were renting ploughs, with owners charging between 2 and 3 shillings a day.

By the late 1920s, with the expansion of maize production, the rate of labour migration from the plateau declined. Fewer men than in the days of the 'Bulawayo fever' were seeking employment outside the territory and most tended to go away only during the dry season when there was little farming activity. Many wage-earners had, apparently, succeeded in securing work locally. While some served on European farms on the plateau, others found jobs as labourers or domestic servants in the three main townships, viz. Mazabuka, Monze and Choma. With their places of employment so close to their villages, many found time during the weekends to visit their homes. During such visits they usually attended to strenuous tasks on their farms with which the womenfolk could not easily cope. Local agriculture did not as a result suffer because

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1 The cost of a plough appears to have ranged between £1 and £2.10s. up to the early 1950s. Interviews on the plateau.

2 Interviews in the Monze and Chongo Chieftaincies. By the early 1930s some farmers were asking £1 a day for the use of one plough and a span of oxen. See Native Affairs Report, 1932, p.18.

3 See Chapter I, p.31.

4 Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74.

5 This practice of dividing one's time between farming and wage employment was described in several interviews on the plateau.
of their involvement in the wage economy. In fact, most wage-earners continued to be target workers who went out in search of jobs only when they were in need of money for some specific purpose such as the purchasing of cattle or some farm equipment. Although there are hardly any reliable figures of a comparative nature for the rate of labour migration during the earlier years of the century, the author got the impression from interviews that in the years immediately preceding the Depression and after, far fewer men were leaving the villages for work than in the early 1920s. By 1929, settler farmers were complaining that annually it becomes more difficult to obtain a sufficient quota of labour locally...

Commercial farming brought its rewards and induced in several areas a strong stay-at-home attitude. Writing in 1930 about the plateau's adult population which must have been in the region of 37,668 persons, an official made the following observations.

'Although work is plentiful, it does not appeal to the local native. The reason for this is not difficult to understand. The local native is comparatively rich. He owns, somewhere near 100,000 head of cattle, nearly 1100 cycles, 45 wagons and 58 scotch carts have been registered during the year. He finds it suits him better to sell his surplus cattle and grain and thus fulfill the small obligations

1This, perhaps, partly explains why so many Africans from other parts of the territory (notably the Western and Eastern Provinces) and from Nyasaland, obtained work in the townships during this period and came to feature prominently in the socio-political activities of these centres (see Chapter V, ) On average, the 'Aliens' were far more stable in their jobs than the Tonga.

2KDB 6/1/1/2, Z.N.A. Annual report on Mazabuka District, 1929. This reluctance to leave the village was to continue after the Depression. In 1947 it was reported that 'owing to the homing nature of the population and to the fact that comparatively few go away from their villages for really long periods, the effect on village life caused by the absence of male members of the tribe is not serious in most parts of the Southern provinces.' See Native Affairs report, 1947, p.70.

3This is a figure supplied in 1929. It estimated the adult male population of the Tonga plateau to be 17,291 and the adult female 20,377. Officials also counted 17,582 male children and 15,114 female children. See KDB 6/1/1/2, Z.N.A. Annual report on Mazabuka District, 1929.
he has rather than to hire out his labour.\textsuperscript{1}

During the late 1920s there was also a large demand for cattle from individual traders and Agents of the mining companies. Tonga farmers were constantly under pressure to sell some of their stock. In 1928, the Provincial Commissioner had this to say about Tonga use of cattle:

'Natives sell a certain number of cattle every year to traders but they do not in the majority of cases regard their stock as an article of trade. Possession of cattle is rather a thing to be proud of.'\textsuperscript{2}

In the following year, he returned to the subject and observed that African farmers 'prize their cattle very highly and are not anxious to sell them'.\textsuperscript{3}

The seeming reluctance of Tonga farmers to part with cattle during this period should be examined more closely. In several parts of the plateau at this time, farmers were still engaged in re-stocking their herds which had suffered severe depletion during the 19th century raids. This was particularly the case in the eastern Chieftaincies where the raids had fallen most heavily.\textsuperscript{4} Besides as Fielder has pointed out in the reference to the neighbouring Ha, a farmer's ability to sell cattle on a regular basis would depend on his having acquired a reasonable number of cattle which would make him self-sufficient in this commodity. Until he reaches this 'take-off' position

\textsuperscript{1}KDB 6/7/3, Z.N.A. Quarterly report for period ending 30th September, 1930. In 1929, it was reported that an African in the Mazabuka district had bought a motor car. See KDB 6/1/1/2, Z.N.A. Annual report on the Mazabuka District, 1929.

\textsuperscript{2}Native Affairs Report, 1928, p.12.

\textsuperscript{3}Native Affairs Report, 1929, p.11.

\textsuperscript{4}See Chapter I, pp.11-12.
his sales would be irregular and mainly limited to times of real
need. The adoption of the plough also meant that more animals were
now being used to provide draught power in the various villages.
The Tonga farmer's willingness to part with his cattle during
this period was also naturally influenced by the prevailing range
of stock prices. These appear to have been very low and unattractive
from the mid-twenties onwards. Several Informants gave low prices
as the reason why farmers restricted their sales of cattle mainly
to periods of drought when cattle was traded in order to purchase
grain.

Although few Tonga farmers were trading cattle on a regular
animals
basis, many were sold at the periodic sales organised by the Govern­
ment and individual traders. There were a few Headmen and large
scale cultivators in the Chongo, Monze, Siona and Siamusonde
Chieftaincies who had relatively large herds of 40 animals and over
and they tended to sell more often than the rest. In 1923, which
was a bad year for the harvest, animals were purchased from the Tonga
for between 15/- and £3 a head for mature cows and oxen. In that
year alone, a total of 2,000 animals were traded in exchange for
grain. In 1929, the District Commissioner reported that at the last
stock sale organised in Pemba, 1,500 head of cattle were brought
forward to be purchased at the rate of £5 to £8 for oxen and 33/6d to

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1 R. J. Fielder, "The Role of Cattle in the Ila Economy", *African

2 Tonga Headmen usually kept large herds, part of which they loaned
to kinmen and friends. This was a way of gaining influence and
popularity. See W. Allan et alia, "Land Holding and Land Usage
Among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District", *Rhodes Livingstone

3 Z.N.A. Mazabuka Sub-District Report, 31.3.23.
35/- per 100 lbs weight for slaughter cattle on the hoof.¹

By the early 1920s, a few large-scale farmers who employed wage labourers, had begun to emerge. One of these was Theodore Kachesa. He had worked for some time in the Wankie coal mines and later became a driver for a Barotseland transport firm. On leaving the firm, he worked for a while with Father Moreau as house servant and farm hand and began farming on his own just before the outbreak of the 1914 war. Although a member of the Catholic Church, Kachesa had never been to school.²

Very few farmers in the twenties or thirties operated on a scale comparable to Kachesa's. In 1924 he had on the farm which he was running in partnership with his friend, Jahaliso, two cultivators, three ploughs, a modern weighing machine and a mealie planter. He had in his employ 21 workers, each receiving a monthly wage.³ In 1923 out of a 23 acre plot he produced 200 bags of maize. By 1930, his output was some 800 bags and by this time he had built himself a brick house and was using 'up to date American tools' and a large mortising machine.⁴ By 1934, Kachesa had on his farm a 150 acre fenced paddock, two large dams, a wheelwright's shop, a store and a dairy. His bank balance, at this time, was said to be far better than those of some settlers and his maize farm, at 130 acres, far larger than his neighbours.⁵

¹ZA 7/1/12/3, Z.N.A. Batoka Province Annual Report, 31.12.29.
²KSB 3/4, Z.N.A. District Notebook entry.
⁵G.O. 795/71, P.R.O. Report on problems of Agricultural Development among the Batonga of reserve XI, by C.G.Trapnell, 31.1.34. Also KSB 3/1, Z.N.A. District Notebook entry.
In the Pemba area, C.G. Trapnell, an official of the Administration, described, in 1934, the operations of another of these large scale farmers. He had 'two Kimberley brick two roomed buildings' on his land, 'an implement shed, two log grain stores, three ploughs, a cultivator, a planter, a wagon, a water-drum mounted on a sleigh and a private dam.' Like Kachesa, this farmer was an employer of labour and he paid his men between 8-10 shillings a month. Unlike Kachesa, he had had no mission training and, in fact, spoke no English.  

By 1933 there were 'in most villages... two or more substantial men or groups of men, who cultivate up to twenty five acres of maize and employ up to six people at an average wage of 8/- per month.' Most of these labourers employed on an annual basis were Tonga villagers, mostly unmarried young men who had not yet established households of their own. Therest were Africans from other areas within the territory, chiefly the eastern and western provinces. Although the large-scale farmer employed wage labour he continued to rely on the assistance he received from young boys, most of them kinsmen, whom he attracted into his household. These boys did not receive regular wages but they were fed and clothed by the farmer and they usually received some help from him with their marriage payments when the time came. In most cases, these young men and the farmer's family constituted the primary work force.

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1 Trapnell, C.G., 'Reports on problems of Agricultural Development' - op. cit.
2 KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
3 ZA 5/2/2, Z.N.A. Minutes of Provincial Commissioners Conference of 1931.
on the farm since most adult labourers tended to stop working for someone else once they established their own households.¹

Most of these large scale cultivators, the Mulimi Simpindi ('farmers for profit') as they were called, seem to have raised the capital for developing their lands by selling their cattle, often amidst strong opposition from members of their matrilineal groups. Such opposition was quite common in the eastern parts of the plateau where the relative scarcity of cattle made regular sales somewhat unpopular.² Unlike their counterparts in the western parts of the plateau, most matrilineal groups in the eastern areas tended to regard their small herds as an insurance to be turned to only in times of dire need. Such occasions would be periods of bad harvests when cattle will perforce be exchanged for grain or times of social need such as marriages, funerals or some such ritual ceremony.³ Group members normally frowned on the practice of trading cattle on a regular basis simply because a kinsman needed some money for a third plough or a second cultivator. Because a number of the Mulimi Simpindi resisted this social pressure, they were to find themselves very unpopular within their kin groups, with some relatives accusing them of being self-centred. This, coupled with the fact that many of them had moved from their original homes in the eastern Chieftaincies to the west where land was in greater

¹Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Samuel Sibanda and other large-scale cultivators.
²See Chapter I, pp.11-13.
³This came out repeatedly in interviews carried out in the Ufwenuka, Chona, Mwanza and Monze Chieftaincies.
supply, accentuated their individualism and strengthened their loyalty to their immediate households.  

A question that must be looked at at this stage concerns the methods by which the Mulimi Simpindi acquired the relatively larger farms which they cultivated. In most cases these farmers merely took up their own fallow land. Others extended their farms by expanding cultivation into virgin bush which was part of the common pool. Up until the mid-1940s when soil conservation measures came into effect, a resident farmer who was extending his cultivation was under no obligation to inform his Headman of his intention except in such cases where the new plot adjoined a neighbour's fields. In cases where a dispute might occur, the Headman had to be informed and it was his duty to examine the plots and decide on an arrangement that was mutually acceptable. Failing this, the parties would have recourse to the Chief of the area. This latter step was apparently, rarely resorted to.

Other large scale cultivators extended their farms by moving out of their original homes either into unoccupied lands within the reserves or into alienated lands which were not being farmed. As will be seen presently, Theodore Kachesa, whose farming activities we have just discussed, belonged to the latter category. Farmers

1 This East to West migration continued throughout the Colonial period. See E. Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia: Social and Religious Studies (Manchester, 1962), p. 175.

2 Interviews with Ellison Milambo and other large scale farmers.

3 The author was told by Informants that most problems connected with the land were handled by the local Headmen.

4 The squatter problem is examined later in the chapter.
who moved into hitherto unoccupied areas within the reserves (such as Keemba Hill) did so after first securing the permission of the local Chief. Such lands which were usually in arid areas, required some initial capital investment to make them habitable. In most cases, wells had to be sunk since there were no rivers or streams nearby. Few farmers could afford to do this. However, once villages had been established in the area, the Chief's authority receded into the background and all future applications for plots in the area were handled by the local Headmen. It must be stressed that the Headman in this and other cases acts purely as the custodian of the land. He could not distribute it as a gift for it was not his to give. His authority over land distribution was derived from that of the Chief and ultimately, the District Commissioner. Although Kachesa and a few others had leases to their lands, most Mulimi Simpindi (like the rest of the population) held their lands under the rules of communal tenure. Informants claim that demands for the introduction of freeholding were common from the 1930s onwards. Farmers wanted the security of tenure which freehold titles would bring but the Administration, mindful of the outcry this would provoke in settler circles, resisted these demands.

On the whole, the extension of acreages by the Mulimi Simpindi during this period appears to have gone unchallenged by most of the

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1 W. Allan et alia, op.cit., p.93.
2 Interviews with Samuel Sibanda, 18/11/73 and Ellison Milambo, 10/2/74.
population. One reason why land disputes were rare was perhaps the fact that the large-scale cultivators were a small fraction of the population. We have no figures for this period but a study carried out in 1945 was to estimate the size of this group of farmers as seen in the area surveyed as only 13% of the total population. Another reason why land disputes were rare was that most families on the plateau lacked the means with which to expand their cultivations. Some Informants explained that they were quite content to continue producing the surplus they required from small gardens which their immediate families could handle on their own. However, the lack of capital to purchase equipment or to sink wells appears to have been the main constraint on acreage expansion.

In 1931, the Northern Rhodesia copper industry suffered a severe slump. This was due, in part, to the world wide depression but also because of the glut in the world copper market. The mines of the Copperbelt were forced to lay off workers as

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1 W. Allan, et alia, op. cit., p.93. The author had difficulty in getting files of Native Authority proceedings which would have shed more light on this question.

2 Interviews on the plateau. These Informants admitted though that their attitudes changed by the late 1940s and early 1950s as the profitability of maize farming encouraged acreage expansion in a situation of increasing scarcity of fertile land.
plants were closed down. The Depression checked the expansion of Tonga farming for a while as maize prices dropped from around 8/- for a 200 lb bag\(^1\) to between 3/6 and 5/-\(^2\). In areas like Siamusonde and Chongo which were some distance from the railway and the main trading stores, farmers were reduced to bartering all their produce for goods, whereas hitherto they had received at least part of their payment in cash.\(^3\) In 1934, the marketing problems posed by the Depression forced Chief Siamundu to go to Lusaka in an effort to secure a grain contract for his people. The Chief however returned without success.\(^4\)

The cattle market was also affected by the slump. Prices plunged downwards and in 1931 farmers were parting with their animals for £2.10s. a head,\(^5\) while others received bicycles in exchange for bulls.\(^6\) In 1932 it was reported that only 780 head

\(^1\)KDB 6/7/1, Z.N.A. Annual report, March 1926.
\(^2\)KDB 6/1/1/7, Z.N.A. Annual report, 1934.
\(^3\)Interviews in the Monze and Sianjalika Chieftaincies.
\(^4\)KDB 6/7/5/3, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 5, 1934. African farmers hardly ever succeeded in getting grain contracts during this period. In 1933 the Provincial Commissioner had pointed out that 'the native farmer receives little or no assistance in producing and selling his grain crops. Most contracts, including Government contracts, specify farm grown grain \(\text{i.e. grain produced by settler farmers}\)' See KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner's report, 1933.
\(^6\)Ibid.
of cattle were sold during the year as compared with 2,558
in 1931. There was very little money in circulation and in
1934 the Provincial Commissioner wrote: 'It is unfortunate
that so much of the cattle and maize trade is carried on by barter.
Every meeting held with the Chiefs has produced requests that the
stores should be compelled to offer cash.'

Although the majority of Tonga farmers continued to produce
maize for the market, a number turned to seeking wage employment
in the townships and on settler farms. White farmers, caught in
the throes of the Depression, were, however, hardly in a position
to afford even the low wages they had been paying. Wages dropped
to as little as 5/- a month, the supply of labour being far in
excess of the demand. When to the rigours of the Depression were
added, in 1933, the hardships that came with a period of drought,
the labour market was flooded to a record level. There were re­
ports of 'labourers ... willing to work for food only' and others
who had 'left their villages in hundreds to seek work and have
returned without success...'. In 1933 it was estimated that
75% of Tonga tax payers were at home in the villages, living
'by the sale of cattle and maize'. The same report went on to
say that out of a total of about 15,920 tax payers only 1,973
were found to be in wage employment outside the reserves, the number

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1Native Affairs report, 1932, p.19.
2KDB 6/1/1/7, Z.N.A. Annual report, 1934.
3KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
5Ibid.
going out to work in the mines 'being very small'. Revenue from taxation dropped sharply as the number of defaulters grew. In 1925-26, the Administration had collected some £10,025 from Tonga taxpayers. This amount had fallen to £8,008 in 1931 and in 1934 it dropped even further to £7,888. This period of austerity produced prophet figures and in 1933 it was reported that 'two or three men from other districts went through the villages telling the people that the Americans were coming and that they need not pay tax'. They did not get very far, however, and were arrested by the Native Authorities.

It was not until about 1935 that the territory's economic position improved. The mines which had been closed by the pressure of the economic collapse had resumed operations and the new mine at Mufulira, which came into operation in 1934, was now in active production. The Copperbelt market again presented itself and Tonga farmers joined other producers in renewed efforts to supply its requirements in farm produce.

1 KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.

2 The reduction in the tax rate on the plateau and some of the other areas from 12/6d to 10/- a head was not conceded until the latter half of the Depression. See ZA 4/3, Z.N.A. Confidential Memorandum on Native Policy in Northern Rhodesia.

3 KDB 6/7/1, Z.N.A. Annual report, March 1926.

4 ZA 7/1/15/3, S.N.A. Provincial annual report, 1932.


6 KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933. The visitors appear to have been influenced by the doctrine of Watch Tower preachers such as are known to have operated in various parts of the territory during this period. See D.H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia (London, 1964).
The Squatters

The growth of African commercial farming brought with it a serious squatter problem. During the Depression a number of European farmers abandoned their lands and some Tonga villagers who lived in poorly watered or overcrowded reserves that were close to these farms moved in to take their places. They did not pay much attention to the official status of the lands they were occupying and, in a number of cases, squatters established themselves on European farms and contiguous tracts of Crown land. Marked preference was shown for lands that were near the railway for proximity to the line of rail commercial centres meant much higher maize prices than could be obtained in the reserves.

A number of these squatters were farmers who had plans for farming on a large scale and who found the land situation in the reserves too limiting. Theodore Kachesa, who has already been mentioned, and those who lived with him on the Rusholme Settlement, fall into this category. Kachesa moved in and occupied part of a farm which had been purchased and subsequently abandoned by one Mr. Rusholme. For a number of years there was a fierce debate as to whether he should be evicted from the land or allowed to stay under a leasehold tenure. Father Moreau, who considered Kachesa 'an object lesson of industry', appealed on his behalf, asking that he be granted individual tenure 'on the same conditions as land is acquired by Natives in the Transkei...'. After much

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1 KDB 1/3/5, Z.N.A. Moreau to Acting Administrator, 10.10.23.
vacillation, the Rusholme area was surveyed by the Administration and, in 1935, Kachesa and other squatters in the area received annual leases which were terminable on either side by 3 months' notice. They were requested to pay 3d an acre in annual rent and 'it was covenanted that improvements would become the property of the Crown unless removed within one month of the termination of the lease' and the land 'was to be used for agricultural purposes only' with 'no assignment or subletting without the Crown's permission...'.

The Rusholme case was just one of two treated in this way, the other being the Mujiga Matabelø Settlement. In most other cases, squatters were evicted and returned to their reserves.

In 1932 there were reports of some 400 villagers with about 4,000 head of cattle, who were squatting on lands belonging to the Central Research Station at Mazabuka. They were accused of felling trees without restraint and their herds were reported trespassing on the Research Station's pastures and infecting its cattle with ticks.

Evictions were not always easy to carry out, for once they were installed in their new lands, some squatters stoutly defended their assumed right to stay on it. In 1933, officials reported that some 4,500 squatters who had moved out of reserve No. XIII

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2 For detailed material on the Mujiga Settlement, see KSB 3/1, Z.N.A.; also KDB 1/3/4, Z.N.A.
3 KDB 1/3/5, Z.N.A. Letter from the Central Research Station, 4.8.32.
4 Some of the Chiefs encouraged squatters to stay on lands they had been asked to leave. In 1947 it was reported that "Sianjalika's deputy in particular and the rest of the Chiefs in general have been passively resistive on the vexed subject of ousting squatters from Crown lands..." See Sec"Nat/90, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Newsletter, 4th Quarter, 1947.
had been forced back into the reserve 'after much difficulty'. The squatters had resisted eviction by the Boma Messengers and it was only after the ringleaders had been arrested that they decided to move away, some taking up residence as tenants on settler farms. In certain areas, the local officials, after evicting Tonga squatters, allowed other squatters of non-Tonga origin to occupy the same lands. The favoured squatters were mostly from Nyasaland. This discriminatory treatment of squatters embittered relations between the Tonga squatter and the official. Reporting on a tour of November 1940, an official drew attention to the keen resentment 'felt by local natives who were originally removed from their land' only to discover that the Government now permits foreigners to squat on the same lands.

At their Conference of October 1934, District Commissioners were very critical of the practice of Africans living outside their reserves. They 'accepted the principle that it is not desirable that natives should be allowed to live on private estates, whether with the agreement of the landlord or not, if they are not in his employ'. They stressed the need for Native Authorities to keep an eye on their people and to prosecute them if need be for unlawful residence. The squatter problem was however to continue into the 1950s.

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1 Native Affairs report, 1933. In 1947, a settler-farmer reported that on impounding the cattle of squatters on his land, the life of his wife was threatened. A European builder who was erecting a house for him had to stop work because his staff deserted him after the squatters had threatened the lives of anyone working for the settler. See Sec/Nat/209, Z.N.A. Jenkins to Secretary, Department of Lands, 8.10.47.

2 The squatters involved in this encounter were mainly from Chief Mwanachingwala's area. Interview with Naul Moonga, 29.4.74.

3 KDB 6/7/5/4, Z.N.A. Tour report, No. 9 of 1940. The favoured squatters were allowed on the land in most cases by absentee landlords. In return for keeping an eye on the land and preventing other squatters from
The introduction of maize control

The farming activities of squatters and other Africans living in the reserves gave the settler community and the Administration much concern during the 1930s and was to lead to the introduction of a policy of maize control. In 1935, an Agricultural Advisory Board was formed 'to advise the Government on all matters of agricultural production and its relation to local consumption and export'. One of the first problems to exercise the minds of the Board members was the growing scale of African maize farming.

During the late twenties and early thirties, the territory's demand for maize had been greater than its producers could supply and maize had to be imported from Southern Rhodesia to meet the rising demand. A total of some 174,000 bags of maize were imported during this period. The introduction of a flat rate on maize from Southern Rhodesia created problems of competition for local settlers and there were several demands for protection from dumping. When in 1931 Foot and mouth disease broke out in Southern settling on it, they were allowed farming rights. Ibid.

Ibid.

ZA 1/9/172/a, Z.N.A. Minutes of District Commissioner's Conference, October 1934. This cooperation was not always forthcoming. In 1947 a Cadet complained of 'the weak and vacillating policy of Chief Sianjalika, who has not carried out the numerous orders for eviction or has allowed squatters to return after being evicted by others...' See Acc 21/43, Z.N.A. Maddocks to Officer in charge of Northern Rhodesia Police, 29.12.47.

Hansard, 1st May, 1935, No. 24, Col. 7.

Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Maize Control Memorandum, by C.J.Lewin, Director of Agriculture, 11.4.34.

In 1932, the Administration's Chief Secretary commented on the rather paradoxical situation of a settler population calling for protection from Southern Rhodesian farmers while at the same time arguing for Amalgamation with that territory. See ES/1, Z.N.A. "Position of the Cattle Industry", Interview with His Excellency, 20.1.32.
Rhodesia and the Union's Customs Agreement was suspended, local producers gained a respite from Southern competition and from now on, focused more on the problems posed by African competition. In 1933, there was an exceptionally good crop and, by this time, the crunch of the Depression was already being felt. Local demand collapsed and the Northern Rhodesia Co-operative Society which controlled 80% of settler produced maize, had to export over 70,000 bags at a low price. Settler farmers received only 6/- a bag compared with 10s. 10d the previous season. African production was increasing and settler producers who had already been advocating such the need for maize control, as was being operated in Southern Rhodesia, intensified their demands. In 1932, various meetings had been held by farmers at Chisamba, Lusaka and Mazabuka to discuss the subject of maize control. After their discussions they concluded that ‘... the deplorable condition in which producers find themselves as a result of their produce being sold... at prices below the cost of production, the necessity of envisaging the prospect of export overseas and the importance of all producers and holders of grain bearing a share of the burden of export...’ made the need for maize control inescapable. At a Maize Conference held

1 Later, Northern Rhodesia's maize producers were protected from dumping by Southern Rhodesia's producers by a 'Gentleman's Agreement'. This made it impossible for maize from the south to be sold at less than 12/6d a bag. See Report of the Maize sub-committee, 1935. Library of Mount Makulu Research Station (M.M.R.S.).

2 Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Memorandum on Maize Control.

3 Ibid. Minutes of meeting of North-Western Rhodesia Farmers Co-operative Society, 5.12.32.
in Livingstone in March 1933, attended by officials and farmers' representatives, there was a majority vote for maize control.¹

Advocates of the policy had, however, to contend with the opposition of C.J.Lewin, the Director of Agriculture, who had taken a close look at the Southern Rhodesia Maize Control system and was convinced that control, on the same lines, would not be in the interest of the general farming community. In 1934, he wrote:

'In the long run, it [Maize Control] will inevitably benefit one section of the producers at the expense of another. The one pool system would benefit the low cost producers (i.e. the large growers and natives), the two pool system would benefit temporarily, at least, the majority of producers but would ruin the efficient farmers who have concentrated on maize production.'²

The Administration however decided to turn the matter over to a maize sub-committee which was appointed by the Agricultural Advisory Board at its meeting of 8th March, 1935. The Committee was charged 'to consider the question of the marketing of maize in Northern Rhodesia and to submit proposals'.³ After examining the situation, the Committee recommended Maize Control. Its views were very much in consonance with general opinion in the Legislative Council. Members of the Council argued stoutly in favour of Maize Control for many considered the measure vital for the protection of the settler farmer. Charles Knight, representing the Southern Electoral Area, believed that failure to adopt

¹R1/4/AG/1/1, Z.N.A., Livingstone Maize Conference, 6th March, 1933.
²Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Memorandum in reference to proposed maize control, 4.2.33.
³Maize Control Memorandum, op.cit.
maize control would 'mean the elimination of the European farmer in this country...'. Other members tried to justify the Committee's suggestion that the African's share of the internal market be restricted to a quarter of it, by arguing that this was necessary to help African producers against themselves. They believed that to encourage African producers to expand their production was simultaneously to encourage them to exhaust the fertility of their lands through overcropping. Captain Brown, representing Midland, had this to say on the subject:

'O one point which has been forcibly brought to the sub-committee's notice is that if natives persist in their present methods of cultivation, in a few years, owing to soil erosion, there is a great possibility of a considerable reduction in the production of maize. Therefore, it is obvious that the natives must not be rashly encouraged to increase their crops. The effect of this would be to ruin their gardens, rendering them useless in a short time, with little or no gain to themselves and untold loss to the territory.'

The Council had no doubts over the issue of Maize Control and it therefore passed, unanimously, the Maize Control Ordinance No. 20 of 1935, which sought to protect white producers from the threats posed by African competition.

Maize Control came into operation on the 1st May 1936. A Maize Control Board was established and it was given the right to

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1Hansard, 19th November, 1935, No. 25, Col. 71.
2Ibid., Col. 68.
3Ibid.
4Agriculture Department Annual report, 1936, p.4.
purchase and trade all maize at fixed prices. Two pools were established, one for African, the other for white producers. European producers were offered much higher prices for their maize than their African counterparts. The internal market was divided between the races, the settlers having three-quarters of it, the Africans the remaining quarter. The fixing of this ratio was based on a review of average African maize sales during the three years leading up to control. It was found out that, during this period, African producers supplied only about one quarter of the traded maize. This was quite an under-estimate of African maize production as some officials, who demanded a review of the ratio, and the Pim Commission were to point out later. At the Provincial Commissioners Conference of 1936, District Commissioners criticized the ratio as inequitable for, in their view, 'the natives had not been allotted a fair share of the maize pool and they considered that the natives' share should be half'.

The Pim Commission was to criticize the ratio even more strongly as it demanded that it be reconsidered. It argued that maize purchased by traders was not a true reflection of African production and was, therefore, not an acceptable basis for the calculation of a ratio estimate. Traders, it explained, had purchased only as much African maize as they were sure of disposing of on the local market, since export facilities were not open to them. The Commission also criticized the Board for failing to deduct that substantial part of settler grown grain which was exported for,

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by taking this to be part of the settlers' output in the local market, it gave white producers an exaggerated lead.¹

The Maize Control Boards area covered the plateau Tonga regions stretching from Mazabuka to Choma, the Sala areas of the East Mumbwa District, the Lenje of South Broken Hill District and the Soli of East Lusaka District. Control provided for the dumping of any maize surplus on the world market and in the event of either pool failing to fulfil its quota, the other, if in excess, was allowed to supply the shortage and receive credit for the part it met.² African farmers had three main options for trading their maize. They could surrender it to the Board, as Europeans did, in return for a participation certificate. This meant that they received payment from the Board in instalments, the final payment being made at the end of the pool year, after the Board had made all sales, closed its books and deducted its expenses from gross proceeds. Alternatively, they could dispose of produce for ready cash to traders or to the Board's staff at its local depots. The last option was however extended only when the Board suspected Traders of offering inadequate sums for grain.³ The majority of farmers in need of ready cash, or the goods and cash that some traders offered, went in for the last two options. Observations carried out during the first two seasons of Maize Control revealed

¹Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Director of Agriculture to Chief Secretary, 21.9.38. Also Sir Alan Pim, "Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia", p.228.


³Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. "Pamphlet on Maize Control for distribution to Natives".
that the majority of African producers did not insist on cash payments for their maize, once they had received enough to pay their taxes and make some savings. Towards the end of the buying season, few farmers sold their produce to the Maize Control Board where only cash payments were made, the majority preferring the traders who gave both cash and goods. African farmers appear to have preferred the traders to the Control Board because the trader bought maize that was less than a bagful if that was all the farmer could supply. The Control Board, on the other hand, insisted on full bags. Another factor making for the trader's popularity was the fact that the Board charged about 7d a bag whenever the farmer had to purchase a new bag, unlike the traders who accepted grain at a fixed price, albeit at times in goods, no matter what sort of bag it was brought in.

The rising demand for grain during the mid thirties gave an added impetus to African maize production. Assured for the first time of an export outlet and ready cash for the maize they produced, African farmers stepped up their production and large turnovers were traded at the Maize Control Board's depots and at trading stores. In the 1936/37 season the Board acquired some 234,680 bags of African grown maize of which 158,666 bags had been purchased by traders for £41,674. A total of 76,014 bags were purchased by the Board direct from African growers and for this they received about £19,184, an average of

1Sec/AG/51, Z.N.A. "The Establishment of buying depots for the Maize Control Board in Native Reserves and suggesting resulting competition with Traders", by H.E.T. Benson.

2KDB 6/7/5/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 4, 1936.
about 5/3d a bag. Total African and European production was nearly three times the requirements of the local market. The Board had to export 158,000 bags of the European crop and some 80,000 bags of the African.

The greater part of this African maize came from the Tonga plateau. This increase in production was of course due not only to the provision of an export outlet but also to the higher prices offered for maize following the revival of business activity after the Depression. Maize prices had risen from between 3/6d and 5/-d a bag in 1934 to 6/-d a bag in 1936-37. An African Boma clerk, Mwendaweli Lewanika, who made a tax collection tour of the Monze/Chisekei and Pemba areas in October 1936, made the following report:

'They sold their grain to the Maize Control Board for which they received cash in return and they seemed to appreciate it very much. There were hundreds and thousands of bags sold in this way not only to the Board but also to the local traders. Traders paid cash but sometimes goods. Natives brought this grain in new bags and sometimes in old bags and they transported them in wagons, sleighs and the like. Some of it was brought by women and children who carried it in baskets on their heads. This grain was generally sold to the trader and seldom to the Maize Control Board, who charged a fee for a new bag... From what I have heard natives say and from personal knowledge, the Maize Control Board has brought great benefit to the natives. Some of them who own big gardens have gained £50 to £100 this year which means a great deal to them.'

1Sec/AC/38, Z.N.A. Maize Control Board's report for 1936-37 season.


3Sec/AG/38, Z.N.A. Memorandum on Maize Control.

A Tonga farmer in a letter to Mutende, the African newspaper, in 1936 captured the feeling of the time when he wrote, 'This is a blessed year.' In the bumper harvest of 1936, about 117,000 bags of African produced maize were traded in the Mazabuka District and, in the following year, 92,802 bags left the reserves for the market.

Farming activities between 1936 and 1946.

The Maize Control Board had been set up primarily because of concern about the turn-over of African producers in the reserves and the fear that they would over-supply the market and force white producers out of business. The output of both European and African producers during the greater part of the late thirties and early forties, however, failed to live up to the glut proportions which had been envisaged and the Control Board never acquired, during these years, the surplus it was set up to regulate. The efforts of African and European producers to expand their maize outlay did not prove as rewarding as expected and total output failed, repeatedly, to keep pace with an ever rising commercial demand.

The expansion of the Copperbelt during the years after the Depression provided the largest market for maize and cattle and total consumption almost doubled between 1935 and 1940 as the mines

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1. Agriculture Department Annual report, 1936, p.4.
3. In his report for 1952-53 season, the Chairman of the Maize Control Board was to observe: 'It is quaint to recall the object for which it [the Maize Control Board] was established, for it has never once had to carry it out.' Maize Control Board report, 1952-3, p.3.
4. In 1937, the Copper mines purchased 80% of the beef sold in the territory. See Sir Alan Pim, op.cit., p.253.
continued to attract more workers.\(^1\) The supply of maize, however, failed to keep pace with this expansion even though on the Tonga plateau, for instance, more producers were taking to full-time farming as reflected in the decline in labour migration.\(^2\) This fall in output was mainly caused by a series of bad harvests due to adverse weather conditions beginning in the 1937-38 growing season. There was very little farm expansion during this period and in 1938 the average family unit on the plateau was estimated to be only 6 acres,\(^3\) in spite of the widespread use of the plough.\(^4\) European growers within the territory suffered the additional handicap that the Government denied them the loans for which they had repeatedly been asking.

\(^1\) Agriculture Department Annual Report, 1940, p. 1.

\(^2\) In 1938, the Provincial Commissioner noted; 'Comparatively few seek work outside the Territory and those that do, return to their homes at frequent intervals, therefore the problem of emigrant labour is not a serious one in the Southern Province. There is no perceptible effect on the birth rate and farm production is increasing.' See Native Affairs Report, 1938, p. 37.

\(^3\) Native Affairs Report, 1938, p. 2. It appears as though the six-acre farm was, at this time, the ideal size for a farmer and his family to handle on their own without having to raise much capital or employ extra labour. This however needs further investigation.

\(^4\) In 1945, W. Allan and others were to point out that the use of the plough had not resulted generally in larger plots being cultivated. See W. Allan et alia, op. cit., p. 113.
Many of them were forced to reduce the acreages they cultivated.\(^1\) By 1940, white producers found themselves incapable of supplying the 260,000 bags of maize which their quota of the internal market required.\(^2\) The Agriculture Department's report for 1939 commented on 'the decline in European and Native production \(\text{Which}\) has coincided with a remarkable increase in local consumption...\(\text{This}\)', it continued, 'has turned a substantial export surplus into a deficit which has had to be made good by imports.'\(^3\) Total production within the territory dropped from over 500,000 bags in 1936 to 217,000 bags in 1939, at a time when domestic commercial consumption had increased from just over 200,000 bags annually to about 340,000 bags.\(^4\) The decline in local production and the cost of maize imports

\(^1\)In 1936 European producers planted some 13,541 acres; 14,442 acres in 1937; 14,031 in 1938 and only 13,465 in 1939. See relevant Agriculture Department Annual reports.

\(^2\)Agriculture Department Annual report, 1940, p.l. European production for sale to the Control Board declined sharply between 1936 and 1939. It was 114,518 bags in 1936; 110,729 bags in 1937; 89,430 bags in 1938 and 80,162 bags in 1939. It rose to over 202,000 bags in 1940, dropped to 120,000 bags in 1941 and was just over 146,000 bags in 1942. See relevant Agriculture Department Annual reports.

\(^3\)Agriculture Department Annual report, 1939, p.3.

\(^4\)Ibid.
forced the territory into maize rationing in 1943\(^1\) and again in
1947.\(^2\) African sales to the Maize Control Board showed a steep
and continuous decline between 1936 and 1939. During the latter
year, there was a partial revival but 1941 sales were the lowest
yet. Thereafter, sales rose gradually and in 1945 exceeded
200,000 bags (see Table I).

**Table I**

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>110,729</td>
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</tr>
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Compiled from various Agriculture Department Annual reports.

* 26,000 bags of this total were a carry over from the previous season.

\(^1\) Agriculture Department Annual report, 1943, p.1.

\(^2\) Government notice No. 59 of 1947 asked 'every employer of
African labour who provided his ... employees or their dependents
with rations comprising maize or maize meal ... to reduce every
ration by one quarter'. Maize Control Board Annual report, 1946-
47, p.10.
Meanwhile, Tonga farmers had begun to grow another cash crop. The expansion of African maize cultivation in the early and mid thirties gave rise to some concern in the Agriculture Department which was aware of the dangers of monoculture. In 1935, it began to give serious thought to the promotion of a rotation crop. The crop they decided on was cotton. This was quite a reversal of policy for the cultivation of this crop by Africans had been discouraged in the past by an Agriculture Department which saw cotton and tobacco as crops best left in the hands of white producers.¹ On the Tonga plateau, officials of the Agriculture Department embarked on a propaganda campaign aimed at getting more African farmers to plant cotton. They had very little success outside the Siamaundu and Sianjalika Chieftaincies. In the former area the number of cultivators rose from 4 in 1935 to 30 in 1936.² By the start of the 1936-37 season there were 100 cotton growers in the area and 7 in the Sianjalika area.³

Cotton, however, lacked the appeal of maize. It was not only a non-subsistence crop but, unlike maize, its cultivation required a great deal of the farmer's attention, especially for weeding the young crop in its seedling stage. Not only was it more profitable to grow maize, but the risk factor in the cultivation

¹In 1931, Moffat Thomson had written in a despatch: 'The Agriculture Department is not particularly anxious for natives to cultivate cotton and tobacco for export, because of the danger of introducing cotton pests and the production of a tobacco so poor in quality that it would get Northern Rhodesia a bad name on the overseas markets'. See ZA 5/2/2, Z.N.A. Moffatt Thomson to Chief Secretary, 21.12.31.

²Agriculture Department Annual report, 1936, p.10.

³Ibid.
of cotton was higher in that the crop was prone to attack by pests. For instance, whereas in the 1936 season, the highest cotton yield in the Siamaundu area was 260 lbs and the mean 179 lbs per acre, a severe attack of the stainer (Dysdercus fasciatus) during the 1937 season, depressed the cotton output considerably. The highest yield in that year in the Siamaundu area was only 91 lbs per acre, the mean being some 24 lbs. Although the situation improved in 1938 when a record average yield of 416 lbs was reported, a number of would-be producers were discouraged from growing the crop. As a result, groundnuts and beans which were 'equally saleable and more popular' continued to serve farmers as rotation crops, with a handful of farmers resorting to cotton occasionally in cases where the soil was judged incapable of yielding an adequate maize return. In 1939, the Agriculture Department, presumably reacting to the poor response to its campaign, decided to abandon its cotton promotion campaign although it continued to maintain small experimental plots in its demonstration gardens.

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1Agriculture Department Annual Report, 1936, p.9.
2Agriculture Department Annual report, 1937, p.9.
3Agriculture Department Annual report, 1938, pp. 6-7.
4Agriculture Department Annual report, 1939, pp. 6-7.
5Agriculture Department Annual report, 1938, p.8.
6Agriculture Department Annual report, 1939, p.7.
The overcropping of maize in certain parts of the reserves was quite a serious problem for the Agriculture Department during the late thirties and forties and, as will be seen later, it was to be forced into promoting a soil conservation and improved farming campaign. As maize monoculture increased, the soils, over certain parts of the reserves, were becoming ever more unproductive and as yields declined, African farmers were going further afield in search of fresh lands. In 1933, Traphell and Clothier, in the course of their Ecological Survey, described the agricultural practices of the Tonga. In the southern areas, they observed very little change for most farmers were still operating largely on traditional lines. The heavily wooded nature of the area restricted the use of the plough and many families were still using the hoe. Sorghum was still the main food crop grown although the commercial demand for maize was making its cultivation more popular. In their bush and village gardens, families continued to produce bulrush and finger millet, sweet potatoes, cassava, groundnuts and various legumes. A bush garden was usually cultivated for about three years and then rested for between one to three years. After it had regained some of its lost fertility, it was again worked for a further two years before being allowed a further fallow period of about twenty years or more.

In the more northern areas, particularly in areas of transitional and acacia-type soils, they discovered that farming practices

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1 See relevant sections of the Report of the Ecological Survey, *op. cit.*
had moved further away from the traditional pattern. Because the land in these areas was comparatively more fertile and required relatively less stumping, large-scale maize farming with the use of ox-drawn ploughs was more popular. Fallow periods were much shorter than in the south and some fields were in a state of almost continuous cropping. Most farmers were responding to the demand for maize by putting more land under the crop. Consequently they grew less of the other traditional rotation crops. In most areas, maize had supplanted sorghum as the staple crop.

By 1937, when the findings of another survey were made known, it looked as though the problem of overcropping in certain sections of the southern and south-central parts of the plateau was becoming almost as critical as in the north. This survey was done on 23 farms in the Siamandu area where the standard of maize cultivation was slightly higher, partly because of the influence of the local agricultural station. The investigations revealed an average maize yield of $3\frac{1}{2}$ bags per acre and observed that whereas good thorn or dambo soils were capable of yielding over six bags to the acre after several years of cropping, the light transitional soils, 'the most commonly cultivated soils of this area', gave initially a very good yield, but thereafter output declined sharply under sustained maize cropping. Some farmers working transitional soils were found to have realised some $9\frac{1}{2}$ bags to the acre in their second year, and only two bags by the eighth. Some of these farms were even yielding as little as a quarter or half a bag per acre after a few years cropping.\(^1\) Such evidence convinced administrative officials of the urgent need to check overcropping,

\(^1\)Agriculture Department Annual report, 1937, p.12.
especially in the light of the inherently poor quality of most of the soils in the reserves.

Although no statistical evidence appears to exist on this, it does seem that the number of families involved in commercial farming on the plateau, increased considerably between 1939 and 1945. A survey of African maize production in the fourteen Chieftaincies of the plateau revealed in 1945 that for the 1943-44 season an estimated 17,000 families produced for sale to the Maize Control Board some 107,818 bags of maize.\(^1\) According to the survey, 9,095 of the families studied, who farmed primarily for subsistence and produced for sale an average of four bags each on farms that were usually less than 24 acres in size, turned out about 36,380 bags. 2,431 families in the 'smallholder' category, i.e. farmers who sold between 11 and 100 bags and whose farms were usually over 24 acres in size, produced for sale to the Board about 55,913 bags. The third group, that of large-scale farmers, an estimated 69 families with holdings ranging between 40 and 200 acres or more, sold about 15,525 bags. The survey estimated that about 5,405 families sold no maize at all during the season.\(^2\) This was not a true reflection of the size of the subsistence farming category, if one can even talk of one at this time, for the survey was carried out at a time when

\(^1\)The Maize Control Board received 115,000 bags of maize from African producers throughout the territory during this season (see Agriculture Department Annual report, 1944, p.1). That 107,818 bags of this total should come from the plateau producers alone, gives an idea of the scale of this area's contribution to total African maize production.

\(^2\)See Allan et alia, "Land Holding and Land Usage among the plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District", Rhodes-Livingstone Paper, No. 14, 1945, p.84.
the plateau was just beginning to pull through a succession of poor seasons and farmers who would otherwise have traded grain were having to use their maize mainly for domestic consumption.\(^1\)

Another study carried out on the plateau during the 1950s later revealed that the plateau Tonga farmers of Mazabuka and north Choma Districts produced about 70\(^{\circ}/_o\) of the maize grown by African farmers along the line of rail.\(^2\)

Maize farming brought relatively substantial cash rewards to many of the large scale farmers and it is estimated that some of them had gross cash incomes of between £600 and £1,000 in the years between 1946 and 1950.\(^3\)

To the vast majority of African farmers who were confined by residence rules\(^4\) introduced in 1938 to much smaller gardens and who lacked the capital to make the necessary investment in farming equipment, the return from maize sales was not as rewarding. Farmers in the latter group were convinced that their lot would only improve if the Administration made more land available to them. The Administration, on the other hand, was determined to see the African farmer improve his farming methods on his existing plot. As a result, no positive action was to be taken to grant more land to Africans till 1947.

Instead, attention was focussed on the long neglected problems of African land settlement, land use and tenure and these were to be investigated during the mid-1940s. The solutions arrived at were to have serious repercussions on the development of African commercial farming and on the growth of a political awareness on the Tonga plateau.

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\(^1\)See C.E. Johnson, "African Farming Improvement in the Plateau Tonga Maize Areas of Northern Rhodesia", *Agricultural Bulletin*, No. 11, 1956.

\(^2\)Johnson, op.cit., p.4.


\(^4\)This is discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter IV

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS
OF TONGA AGRICULTURE

During the 1940s, the Administration attempted to regulate the land problems which had arisen out of the expansion of African maize production on the Tonga plateau. The subject of land usage was fundamental in this exercise and this area being the centre of African grain production, it was considered vital that the work of land rehabilitation should start here. The measures adopted to combat the twin problems of land misuse and soil depletion were to have wide ranging socio-political repercussions throughout the area.

The expanding demand for maize which came with the revival on the Copperbelt exacerbated the land settlement problems facing the Native Authorities in the reserves. The problem of village disintegration had first manifested itself during the years of the Depression, when large groups of villagers began to drift out of reserve boundaries to establish homesteads in unoccupied alienated or Crown lands. Even within the reserves it became increasingly difficult in the early thirties to contain farmers within their villages. Headmen, whose responsibility it was to keep an eye on the movement of people into and out of their villages found great difficulty in performing this function. According to one report, there were two main classes of Africans who were involved in this

1 In 1946 it was reported that conservation work in the Southern Province has been confined to some fourteen of the plateau Tonga Chiefdoms which form the core of the native maize growing area and constitute, from a purely economic point of view, the most important native area of the territory. See Agriculture Department Annual report, 1946, p.6.
practice of establishing homesteads outside the boundaries of their villages. One was the tax dodger, the other the ambitious farmer who, caught up in a situation where the supply of good land was slowly dwindling, was determined to get as much of it as he could while the going was good.¹

The splintering of a number of Tonga villages gave the Administration much concern for local officials were convinced that dispersed settlements would lessen 'the control of the Headmen, and therefore of Native Authorities, that crime is likely to go undetected in such small settlements ... and the Authority of the Chief is likely to be impaired generally'.² The steadily expanding market for maize exacerbated the problem of village disintegration for farmers now became very eager to put as much land as possible under maize. This led to the widespread fragmentation of holdings as cultivators expanded out of their villages, some, at the same time, retaining their original homesteads and farms. A class of Tonga farmers who were producing up to 600 bags of maize a season was beginning to emerge and, within this group, the desire to live outside the orbit of day to day social obligations to neighbouring kinsmen was slowly becoming apparent. A number of these large scale cultivators had received their education at the Seventh Day Adventists' Rusangu mission or at the Catholics' Chikuni Headquarters. Several of them had later served as teachers under these missions or as clerks to the Plateau Tonga Native Authority and had

¹KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.
now retired to the traditional vocation of farming. Because they tended to settle in areas that had been hitherto uninhabited, such as Keemba Hill, they came to possess very large farms which they operated by employing both family and wage labour. These farmers kept very few dependants and were thus in a better position than most to cater for the needs of their immediate families.¹

In 1937, the Provincial report commented on the growing individualism which was becoming so pronounced not only among the large-scale cultivators but also within the ranks of the less well-to-do:

'Veh tendency towards individualism continues and is due to a number of different causes. Maize control has engendered a demand for large acreages and is responsible for the growth of a class of Native farmers; the individual now acquires and retains wealth, instead of sharing it with the community; the educated are dissociating themselves from the illiterate and the Christian from the pagan.'²

It now appeared as if the egalitarian character of Tonga society was being further undermined as a result of contact with the new economic and social forces that were operating on the plateau. New social groupings were forming for the introduction of the money economy and western education encouraged the individual to branch out on the road to self improvement.³ Tonga society was already producing its quota of teachers, pastors, traders, clerks etc. and a local literati as distinct from the majority of uneducated farmers was already blossoming. In the changing social climate, it was hardly surprising that the old way of life was being challenged in several areas. An official who toured the Mwanachingwala, Monze and Chongo areas in 1938 observed that 'the old sanctions have broken down and the new freedom

¹Interviews on the plateau.
³See Chapter IV, pp. 185-187.
has brought with it something very like licence. The people he encountered were 'generally rich in cattle' and he found 'small settlements ranging from one to two huts to a dozen or so... widely scattered over the reserve'. He discovered that the 'nominal Headmen' had little influence and 'got the impression, especially among the younger men and women... of disrespect for authority and dislike of restraint in any form'.

To check this tendency towards a proliferation of homesteads and the continued erosion of the authority of Chiefs and Headmen, the Administration got the Native Authorities to pass, in September, 1938, the Ten Tax-payer rule. This provided that any villager who did not intend to continue as part of the village under which he was registered, and decided to move out, should secure nine other people to reside with him in the new area of his choice. Only if there were ten people in the new settlement, would it be recognised as a village. New settlements which contained anything lower than the prescribed ten villagers, were to be disbanded and their occupants sent back to their original homesteads.

The recognition of their right to live wherever they chose pleased the Tonga farmers immensely and a number of new villages were established. Mambo village in the Gohnwe area, Kazembe village around Siatontola and Mponggo village in Chief Chongo's area are just a few of the new villages that were established after 1938.

In the new and old villages the expansion of maize cultivation imposed a heavy toll on the land. The greater part of reserve land was made up of poor plateau soils and the more fertile tracts of Upper Valley and

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1KDB 6/7/5/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 7 1938.
2KDB 6/7/5/2, Z.N.A. S.D.Facey's tour report, May-June 1932.
3Interviews on the plateau.
acacia/thorn soils were few and far between. The lands of the reserves were being subjected to much pressure, with very reduced fallow periods as farmers were neglecting the traditional crop rotations in preference for maize monoculture. This, coupled with the existence of very large herds, especially in some of the Chief-taincies to the west of the railway and of erosion-prone sloping lands in Chieftaincies on or adjoining the escarpment, raised serious problems over both arable and grazing land. Lewin, the Director of Agriculture, noted in 1936 that 'ploughing has increased considerably...
The native has become hard of hearing if not deaf to offers for his cattle...'.

Even before the introduction of maize control, some touring officials had observed and commented upon some rather disturbing features of Tonga farm practice, during the late twenties and early thirties. In 1934, C.G. Trapnell had spent some time observing the farming methods of a number of villages in Chief Siamaundu's area in reserve No. XI. His investigations revealed that African producers were taking to large scale farming and forsaking the traditional rotation of crops. He observed the tendency to expand in search of fertile land, as farmers left the 'traditional dense bush and woodland cultivations' for 'hook-thorn damboes' and 'open transitional country'. Farmers were expanding in this way, shifting 'ten and twenty acres cultivations', because the lands into which they moved demanded relatively little stumping. But, as Trapnell pointed out, the practice of shifting cultivation augmented 'land shortage in belts already densely populated.'

\footnote{Agriculture Departments Annual report, 1936, p.4.}
His report vividly described the transformation in farm practice that was taking place in this area and which was not very unlike what was happening in some of the other Chieftaincies:

'The valuable Tonga cow pea or kaffir bean is... being given up in the larger open bush cultivations. More maize is now grown than kaffir corn, European strains being grown more extensively for sale and early maturing native strains for home consumption only. The cultivation of finger millet, originally important, disappears as the dense bush areas are left. Its cultivation, dependent on ash, is now only practised as an accessory to stumping. The tendency is thus towards pure maize cultivations. All gardens except the finger millet, sweet potato and some legume gardens are now ploughed.'

In several areas over-cultivation and overgrazing led to soil erosion. This was particularly acute in the Chieftaincies towards the Gwembe valley, where the hilly nature of the land made it easily susceptible. The uphill and downhill ploughing of maize lands, in these areas, produced innumerable furrows and large areas were slowly rendered useless.

The type of African transport that was being widely used also contributed to the problem of erosion. Although some of the richer farmers owned scotch carts and wagons, the majority of Tonga producers settled for wooden sledges, which were much easier

3 Some of the richer Tonga entrepreneurs hired out their scotch carts for the transporting of maize at the rate of 1/- a bag. If oxen were also required, they charged 1/6d a bag. See KDB 6/7/5/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 5, 1938.
to come by and involved virtually no maintenance cost. The sledges did a lot of damage to the land as they were pulled along by oxen with their loads of maize, building poles and firewood.\(^1\)

The deteriorating land situation in several of the reserves forced the Administration to take a closer interest in the problems of African agriculture. Up to the mid thirties, the attention of the Agriculture Department had been solely concentrated on the problems of settler farming. The Department, suffering from heavy retrenchment during the years of the Depression, had studiously avoided involvement in African farming activity.

In 1933, Lewin, its Director, had written that 'in the interest of the territory as a whole, while no artificial obstacles to the entry of the native into the maize market should be imposed, no direct encouragement should be given.'\(^2\) African producers were left to their own designs and the hopes of the 1926 Reserves Commissioners for the supervised development of African farming in the reserves, were not realised. There was no policy for the development of African farming and this was admitted by Lewin in 1933, when

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\(^1\)Sledges were also used to transport women and children on shopping visits to the stores at Monze. See KDB 6/751, Z.N.A. Tour of Native Commissioner Hinds, May-June, 1927.

\(^2\)Sec/AG/47, Z.N.A. "Memorandum on the future policy and organisation of the Department of Agriculture", 9.8.33. In 1931, the Director of Agriculture had attempted to justify the lack of agricultural assistance to Africans along the line of rail with the following remark: 'If the whole of this local market were taken by the native (as it might well be, with the exception of a very few commodities, should deliberate attempts be made to foster the production of crops for this purpose), the European population would be rapidly driven off the land and it is hard to see how the individual native would greatly be benefitted, for his share of the proceeds would be infinitesimal'. See Agriculture Department Annual report, 1931, p.16.
he wrote: 'No organised attempt to deal with the problems of native agriculture has been made in Northern Rhodesia; in fact its vast field is practically unexplored.'

The problems posed by African farming in the mid-thirties, however, made it impossible for the Department to continue its detachment. In 1936, its officials tried to analyse African farming methods with a view to introducing a more conservative agriculture. In the annual report for that year, they wrote:

'More land is ploughed (and usually inefficiently ploughed) than can be adequately cultivated. The native has not been able to solve the problem of weeding large acreages - a problem which did not arise when he was content with sound home cultivation. Where he has attempted to maintain the fertility of his soil with kraal manure, this has merely accentuated the weed problem. Finally, the demand for large gardens has led to ploughing of land which should have remained unbroken. The solution of his problems lies in "better crops from smaller acreages".'

In 1936, extension work started on the plateau in a bid to arrest a deteriorating land situation. The Kanchomba station was opened in the area of Chief Siamaundu some twelve miles from Pemba and the so-called 'Kanchomba System' of farming was adopted. The Siamaundu area was the one of which Trapnell had written in 1934 and the presence, here, of a very co-operative Chief in the person of Jakras Mondeh Siamaundu, made the choice of area almost obvious. The Kanchomba system, for soil conservation, involved the use of kraal manure or compost and a basic rotation of crops. The Agriculture Department employed local farmers to demonstrate on their

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1 Sec/AG/47, Z.N.A. Memorandum on the future policy..., op.cit.
farms the value of the new system.

The missions, which had shown great interest in the development of local farming, were brought in by the Administration to help with the soil conservation programme. The Chief Education Officer, P.S. Tregear, and the Agricultural Officer, Kanchomba, J.N. Clothier, co-operated closely in the establishment of the school gardens programme. In various schools, demonstration gardens, supplied, at first, with equipment and manure by the parents of pupils, were established. The work of supervising these gardens was initially in the hands of the Agriculture Department's staff but as demands rose, African Agricultural Assistants trained at Kanchomba were attached to the various missions.

In June 1937, the Governor appointed a committee 'to consider the most practicable means of combating erosion, particularly in the Southern Province' and in September, the Secretary of State in a despatch urged the Administration to embark on a programme for the improvement of African agriculture. This seemed to have goaded the Director of Agriculture into releasing a memorandum containing plans for the improvement of African farming in January 1938.

Emphasis was to be laid on that part of the territory which he referred to as 'the Area', and which was made up of parts of reserves Nos. XI and XIII, in the Tonga areas, as well as two other

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1 Later as parents recognised the benefits of scientific farming, they became less generous with their manure and implements. By 1948, the Agriculture Department had to provide school gardens in the Monze and Magoye areas with oxen and implements. See Agriculture Department Annual report, 1948.

2 Sec/AG/47, Z.N.A. Secretary of State's despatch No. 489, 23rd September, 1937.

3 Among plateau Tonga Chieftaincies in 'The Area' were those of Naluama, Sianjalika, Mwanza, Sianaumdu, Moyo, Mwanachingwala, Chongo, Monze and Siamusonde.
reserves outside Tongaland. The area was said to be responsible for producing $\frac{4}{5}$ of the native maize and $\frac{2}{3}$ of the native cattle offered for sale... in the territory. These valuable lands had, therefore, to be protected from ruin. Lewin knew that the soil conservation programme was bound to run into some opposition from local farmers. He realised that difficulties were sure to be encountered in pushing through a programme of improved farming methods which was 'not likely to have any appeal whatever unless and until the native realizes that he can make money by their adoption...'. But he was fully convinced of the need for anti-erosion works, such as contour ridges, if 'the fertility of land which has been protected from erosion must be maintained'. He called for an air survey of the Area 'to map the gardens ... to record where erosion is most serious or likely to become most serious and to note where groups of gardens could be protected by small communal schemes...'.

On the question of whether farmers should be compelled to cooperate with the soil conservation programme, Lewin's stand was quite clear. He wrote: 'As far as the native farmer is concerned, it is suggested that he should not only be compelled to allow the organisation to carry out such conservation works as are necessary on his land but thereafter that he should be compelled to keep them in repair'. Herein lay the seeds of the confrontations that were later to bedevil the soil conservation programme.

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1 Sec/AG/47, Z.N.A. "Memorandum on the work of the Agriculture Department", by C.J. Lewin, 25.1.38.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
THE AREA

(adapted from Ecological Survey Soil and Vegetation Map)
Within the Siamaundu area, the response of African farmers to the Kanchomba system was rather cautious at first but the influence of the Chief, who was a keen farmer himself, gradually brought some people round to 'Kolozia's ideas. By 1937-8, the work of the Kanchomba Instructors began to yield fruits. One of the local demonstrators was a farmer called Kalebe. He received a year's training at Kanchomba after which he was appointed a Demonstrator on his farm which was just about 6 acres in size and situated on sloping ground which was already showing signs of sheet erosion. Kalebe's garden was divided into four sections by contour ridges and, with his family, he cropped the land under the following rotation pattern: 'Maize (manured or composted); Maize (unmanured); Cotton and groundnuts; Maize interplanted with cowpeas'. For the 1937-8 season, which was a poor one, Kalebe's farm was reported as having 'stood out like an island in a sea of poor crops'. At the Kateya Agricultural Show of 1938, he won the first prize for maize, the judges of the competition being 'local farmers who were unaware of his identity'. In the following year, several farmers turned up at the Kanchomba station with requests for contour ridges and grass strips on their lands and they also showed willingness to follow the principles of the Kanchomba system. Twenty of them were selected and the Agriculture Department's report for 1939, commenting on their progress, observed

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1 In 1933, Chief Siamaundu was reported as having 'no less than seven crops in his lands'. See KDB 6/1/6, Z.N.A. District Office report, 1933.

2 'Kolozia' was the Tonga version of Clothier, the name of the Chief Agricultural Officer at the Kanchomba station.

3 Agriculture Department Annual report, 1938, p.13.
that '... the results are most encouraging and the wide scatter of improved gardens cannot fail to pave the way to general improvement'.

By 1941 there were about 119 farmers practising the Kanchomba system, the majority coming from Chief Siamaundu's area, with a few from the neighbouring Chieftaincies of Monze, Ufwenuka and Chona. Official ideas about improved farming were beginning to capture the imagination of a section of the farming community and some of the Chiefs, notably Siamaundu, began to punish people who refused to heed the advice the Kanchomba station offered. In 1941 it was reported that 'up and down hill ploughing has ceased over wide areas thanks to the prompt dealing with offenders by the more enlightened Native Authorities'.

The main attraction of the Kanchomba system appears to have been in the radical increase in yields it showed. A sample survey of turnover before and after certain farmers had adopted the system was carried out in 1940. It revealed that, before adoption, they realised an average yield of something in the region of 436 lbs per acre, whereas after practising rotations, their production rose to some 1,176 lbs to the acre.

The impact of the Kanchomba system up to 1940 was very limited. The majority of farmers outside Chief Siamaundu's area never heard about it and they continued to farm uninfluenced by its new ideas.

1Agriculture Department Annual report, 1939, p.10.
2Agriculture Department Annual report, 1941, p.2.
3Ibid.
4Agriculture Department Annual report, 1940, p.4.
In 1940 it was, however, decided to spread the system and agricultural stations were opened at Monze and Magoye. By the end of that year, some 64 miles of contour ridges and 18 miles of grass strips had been laid out, mainly in the Chisekesi and Pemba regions of Ufwemuka and Siamaunder Chieftaincies. These works protected about 3,700 acres of farmland. The Agriculture Department had also embarked on the demarcation of permanent grazing and forest areas. By the end of 1940, about 8,700 acres had been assigned to these categories. Of this, some 600 acres were badly situated gardens which were on erosion prone sites and whose owners were told to cease cultivating them.

The Agriculture Department's land improvement drive also covered the question of African transport. Efforts were made to discourage the use of sledges and a sledge tax was even contemplated although it was never imposed, partly because of the spirited opposition of some of the Chiefs, notably Sianjalika, and their people. The existence of a wheel tax of 5/- per wheel on scotch carts and wagons, appears to have discouraged a lot of farmers from going in for these vehicles and increased the popularity of sledge transport. The Kanchomba station endeavoured to meet the needs of the bigger farmers for wheeled transport and at its 1939 Agricultural Show, vehicles ranging, in price, from £9.10/- to £18 were

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1 In 1950 and 1952, Agricultural Stations were opened at Mapangazia and Mapanza respectively.

2 Agriculture Department Annual report, 1940, p.4. Between 1940 and 1944, 44,300 acres of cultivated land was protected by contour ridges and grass strips in the Southern province (see Agriculture Department Annual report, 1945, p.7). By 1947, the area under protection was some 62,000 acres. Agriculture Department Annual report, 1947, p.9.

3 KDB 6/7/5/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 6, 1938.

4 Sec/AG/51, Z.N.A. Minute by one K.B., 4.11.36.
put on display. Few farmers were, however, prepared to go to such expense and it was reported that 'enquiries were many but money was short and buyers were coy'.

A pamphlet containing improved farming instructions, compiled by the Rev. A.M. Jones of St. Marks College, Mapanza, and Mr. Lewin, the Director of Agriculture, was published in 1944 and made available to interested farmers and schools. It provided information on such subjects as the maintenance of contour ridges, the protection of land from furrows, the preparation of manure, the use of green manure and the protection of harvested crops from pests.

In the same year the Plateau Tonga Native Authority was induced into passing the 7th of January law which prohibited the planting of maize or corn after the 7th of January in any year. This was designed to check the enthusiasm of undercapitalised producers who depended on the use of their neighbour's ploughs and whose lands were always cultivated very late in the season, when the cereals had very little hope of coming to maturity. It was hoped that the law would encourage the planting of beans which was usually carried out at the end of the formal maize planting period.

To enforce this and other conservation orders, a force of Land Messengers was recruited, trained and handed over to the Native Authorities, who met their wages out of a grant from the Maize Pools Stabilization Fund. The problem of enforcement was to be a

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1Agriculture Department Annual report, 1939, p.10. Although the Plateau Tonga Native Authority gave an undertaking to discourage the use of sledges, it achieved little success. Sledge transport is still widely used.

2See "Agriculture for Africans in the maize belt of northern Rhodesia", M.M.R.S.

3Agriculture Department Annual report, 1944, p.5.

4Ibid.
crucial one for the future for the conservation programme was not expected to be popular with the African farmers. Some scholars have even questioned the need for such a policy during the 1940s. How serious, for instance, was the problem of land misuse? How widespread was the overcropping and overcultivation that officials referred to, considering the fact that most African farmers were operating on a small scale? Baldwin has even argued that the problem of overcropping must have been exaggerated or the ability of African farmers to improve their farming methods underrated since we know that agricultural output in Northern Rhodesia showed a substantial increase during the 1940s and 1950s. An area that had suffered widespread land misuse could hardly have recorded such returns. Because we do not have reliable production statistics for the Tonga plateau's African farmers, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which grain output was affected by land misuse over the years. There was obviously a measure of overcultivation in some of the reserves but this was largely the work of a small fraction of the area's population. Besides, as the 1937 survey had indicated, different soils responded in different ways to continuous cropping. Whereas this practice may have presented a serious threat in areas with poor plateau soils, it would have had far less serious repercussions, at least in the short-term, in those areas covered in rich Upper Valley and thorn soils. Although it was in the long-term interest of Tonga agriculture that farming methods should be improved, there was, perhaps, a need for a more selective application of the conservation policy. This is however a question that requires further investigation.

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2 See above, p.130.
The work of the land survey commissions.

The work of three land survey commissions which operated within the territory in the forties brought about a number of policy changes in the soil conservation and land distribution situations on the plateau, which made quite an impact on certain sections of the Tonga farming community. The first of these concerned itself with the problems of land allocation review, as the Administration attempted to ease the pressure on lands in the reserves of the territory by making available to the African population some of the lands outside reserve boundaries.

The idea of demarcating Native Trust Lands within the territory had been introduced around 1935 by Sir Hubert Young, the then Governor, who had introduced a similar measure in Nyasaland in 1933, while he was Governor there. Young's proposal received the approval of the Secretary of State in 1937 and both the Pim and Bledisloe Commissions of the late thirties supported the call for providing more lands for African occupation. With the outbreak of war in 1939, the Native Trust Lands idea was shelved but in 1942, a Land Commission was set up to survey the possibility of dividing lands that were not already alienated or declared as reserves, into Crown Land and Native Trust Land. The Commission, in the course of its travels within the Territory, heard evidence from settler and African representatives on the Tonga plateau. The Tonga Chiefs, who struck the Commissioners as 'the most intelligent and progressive that they had met', drew attention to the pressing need for more land for African occupation and they 'all wished to be

1ZA 4/3, Z.N.A. Confidential Memorandum on Native policy in Northern Rhodesia.

allowed back as far as possible to that land which they formerly used to occupy. Chiefs Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala and Siamaundu pointed out that their areas were overcrowded. They also stressed 'the shortage of water ... and asked if something could not be done to improve the position'. The Commissioners found the land situation in the Tonga reserves very unsatisfactory. Reserve No. XI which contained the peoples of some seven Chiefs, including some of the relatively densely populated villages of Sianjalika and Siamaundu, was in a pretty serious condition. A tour of the reserve convinced the Commissioners that 'the arable proportion is certainly appreciably less than the fifty per cent upon which the Native Reserves Commission based their calculations'. Due to the shortage of good land, 2,960 of Chief Moyo's people had moved out of the reserve to squat on Crown land and the survey revealed that there was 'certainly no room for them in the reserve'. In reserve No. XII they observed 'definite congestion in Mwanachingwala's area' and large numbers of squatters living outside the reserve in the Pemba Forest area and around the Siatontola dam. In all, the Commissioners estimated that some 16,300 villagers were living as squatters outside their reserves.

The bulk of the local settler community was not well disposed to the idea of giving more land to the Africans and this came out clearly in evidence, oral and written, presented to the Commission.

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
G. S. Joseph, a local farmer who was once Director of the Rusangu Mission, in his letter to the inquiry, wrote: 'No good purpose would be served by bringing the natives into closer contact with European farmers. Owing to the carelessness of natives in allowing cattle to stray, there would be considerable trouble between native owners and Europeans'. He went on to argue that by allowing Africans to settle on land that was very close to the railway, the values of these lands would depreciate and that 'any policy to bring natives out of the reserves, where they belong, and allow them to destroy more land on the watershed along the railway line is detrimental to the best interests of the country'.

In spite of settler protests, the Commission, after completing its work in 1944, recommended that a total of 5,739 sq. miles of land be provided as Native Trust land in the Mazabuka District although it was made quite clear that such lands must be unsuitable for settler occupation and must not include any mineral deposits. Squatters were not to be evicted from Crown land 'except in cases where their continued presence is actually harmful to the land'.

The Commission had been charged to make 'full provision... for the agricultural requirements of the natives and for their access from Native Trust land and Native reserves to existing and prospective railway lines and main roads'. It therefore recommended the provision of three corridors to the railway, at Nega Nega, Tambero and Pemba. This proposal met with strong criticism from

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1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
the settler community, for farmers maintained that 'they did not want to see the area between Nega Nega and the Kafue become Native Trust land' and they pointed out 'that the vacant land by Tambero Siding was supposed to contain excellent tobacco soil and they regarded tobacco as a most important crop for the Europeans, particularly in view of the uncertainty in respect of the future of maize as a European crop...'. The Commissioners' decision to include in Trust Lands a 195 sq. miles area which they called Area 4, to the south west of Pemba, provoked even stronger criticism from local settler farmers who regarded this area as extremely rich tobacco lands. A Commission, made up of settlers and a few officials, which was at this time examining the future of the European farming industry, strongly criticized this and other aspects of the Trust land proposals. Its members feared that 'the final and irrevocable limitation of European settlement to so small a proportion of the country will obviously designate Northern Rhodesia as "a black man's country" in which the European will hold so restricted a place that the policy of complementary development which Government has so lately professed... will be definitely abandoned.' They called on the Administration to give up the Trust land idea.

When the Legislative Council debated and passed into law the Native Trust Lands Ordinance in 1947, the controversial Area 4, south-west of Pemba, was left out of the bill pending an enquiry into settler claims. However, after an investigation into the area which was already occupied by some 4,867 squatters, the

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1 Ibid.

2 Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the Development of the European farming Industry (Lusaka, 1946), Appendix I.

3 These were 2,385 of Chief Siawaundu's people, 2,026 of Chief Monze's
Commissioners' recommendations were approved and the area became Trust land.

The Trust Lands Ordinance, while maintaining that these lands were basically designed for African occupation, provided that in conditions where the taking up of land by non-Africans within the Trust land areas would not lead to friction such allocations should be allowed, on the condition that no more than 6,000 acres were alienated in this way in any one province.¹

The creation of Trust lands in the Tonga areas² did not radically alleviate the land shortage problem, for some of the areas that were declared Trust land were already being occupied by squatters, whose rights of occupancy were now acknowledged. The lack of water in some of the demarcated Trust lands made people reluctant to move into them. The soils over the greater part of

¹Sec/S.L./118, Z.N.A. General Notice No. 416 of 1948. This provision allowing non-Africans to take up land grants in the Trust areas was to come under heavy attack from the politicians of the late forties and fifties.

²After the creation of Trust lands, the land distribution situation in the Mazabuka District was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Type</th>
<th>Area (square miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust Land</td>
<td>1,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Reserves</td>
<td>3,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Research Station</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European farms, townships, railway reserves, etc.</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the entire territory, the figures were as follows by the late 1940s:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Type</th>
<th>Area (square miles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native Trust Lands</td>
<td>170,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barotseland</td>
<td>45,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Reserves</td>
<td>50,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alienated land</td>
<td>6,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crown lands</td>
<td>10,550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See Acc 21/43, Z.N.A. Pamphlets on land situation printed in 1949).
the Trust lands were hardly any more fertile than those in the reserves. A few of the large-scale farmers were able to get plots in the Trust lands, but these lands were no real substitutes in quality for the more fertile Crown lands and unoccupied alienated farms they had set their sights on. Africans on Trust lands held their lands under customary tenure arrangements as obtained in the reserves and Headmen exercised just as much authority over land distribution here as in the reserves. The main distinction between Trust lands and reserves appears to have been in the fact that the Agriculture Department, whenever possible, maintained some kind of control over farming practice in some of the newly settled areas, as will be seen later. The tenure of farmers in Trust lands was, however, no more secure than those in the reserves and demands for tenurial security and the provision of more land for African occupation were to be continuously expressed in the forties and fifties.

The need for an intensification of the soil conservation programme and for a general review of Tonga land settlement rules, was revealed by the other two land survey Commissions which operated simultaneously on the plateau in 1945. One was a Land Tenure Committee, which was chaired by Sir Stewart Gore-Brown, who since 1938 had been representing African interests in the Legislative

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1 The Agriculture Department estimated that excluding Barotseland and the various game and forest reserves within the territory, only 70% of the soils in the native reserves and Trust lands were 'good' for agricultural crops. It considered only 27% of these soils really "cultivable". See J. Hadfield, "Aspects of African agrarian economy in Northern Rhodesia", Agriculture Department Bulletin, No. 17 (Lusaka, 1960), pp. 2-3.
MAP 3.

LAND DISTRIBUTION ON THE TONGA PLATEAU AND ADJOINING AREAS AFTER 1947

Native reserves
Native trust land
European occupied & crown land

0 km 50

N
Council. The Committee had been asked to investigate the existing systems of land tenure in the territory and to make recommendations for bringing such systems into line with modern requirements, if this should seem desirable... In its investigations on the plateau, the Committee observed that the practice imposed by the Administration, which required villagers to apply to their Headmen for residential plots within villages, was not being followed and that the ten tax payer rule had encouraged much village disintegration. Tonga villages were reverting to the traditional 'Katongo' system of settlement where 'in the matter of land, individuals seem to have taken what they required for themselves and their families without reference to anyone else'. It was no longer practicable, therefore, to insist on the village being the smallest administrative unit. The Committee was of the view that administrative changes had to be made to accommodate this popular desire to break out of village boundaries. The establishment of Parishes was therefore recommended in an attempt to provide a residential situation that approximated closely to the traditional Katongo system. The Committee argued that Parishes would be ideal here, for the Katongo '... which still exists is in fact a ready made parish...'.

A Parish was to consist of a number of villages and parish boundaries were to be drawn 'with due regard to kinship ties or

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1 Sec/Nat/205, Z.N.A. Land Tenure Committee report. (Lusaka, 1945).
3 Ibid.
natural features...'. Within a Parish, a villager, unrestricted by the ten tax payer rule, was to be allowed to move his homestead from village to village at will, so long as he fulfilled the minimum building requirements laid down by the Native Authority orders. If he intended to move from one Parish to another, he had to get permission from the Native Authorities who would see to it that he be registered under his new parish.\(^1\) Parish registration was therefore to take the place of village registration and the ten tax payer rule was to be revoked.\(^2\)

The question of providing land for African farmers who were operating on a fairly large scale also received attention from the Land Tenure Committee. The need to accommodate these so-called detrabilised Africans on leasehold plots outside the reserves, under individual tenure conditions, had apparently been recognised for a long time but little progress had been made in effecting it. In 1936, the Provincial Commissioner had discouraged the idea by explaining that there was no guarantee that Africans would not misuse any Crown lands they were offered through over-ploughing.\(^3\)

His view was not widely shared by other officials who saw, in the plan, one way of regulating the squatter problem and utilising lands that lay unused.\(^4\) In 1938, Lewin, the Director of Agriculture, was

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\(^1\) Sec/Nat/210, Z.N.A. Chief Secretary's despatch to all Provincial and District Commissioners, on the parish system.

\(^2\) The ten tax payer rule was revoked on 22nd October, 1945 but Chiefs continued to insist on residence within village boundaries. See Sec/Nat/205 for Chief Secretary's relevant despatch.

\(^3\) Sec/AG/43, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 31.8.36.

\(^4\) See KDB 6/7/5/4, Z.N.A. District Commissioners comments on tour report No. 6, 1938.
forced to consider this problem of culling progressive farmers out of the reserves. While agreeing 'that large scale native farmers ... could be encouraged to move out of the reserves into tenant settlements sited on vacant farms in Crown land', he cautioned that 'only one such settlement should be established... and that it should be sufficiently near the Agricultural station at Pemba to enable fairly close supervision to be maintained.\(^1\)

Little however materialised from this policy projection and in 1940 the Legislative Council was told of the difficulties which the Agriculture Department had encountered in bringing the proposals to fruition. The Department, it was pointed out, had found great difficulty in getting suitable lands for the scheme as these could be acquired only by expropriation of private property or negotiations with owners willing to sell. The Council was told that there were doubts as to whether Africans would be willing to pay for the use of such lands for since 'it is possible ... for a native to acquire the right to cultivate large areas of land in the reserves for which he pays nothing ... he would be unlikely to be willing to go out and pay rent outside the reserve'.\(^2\) This doubt was not borne out by the author's field interviews for a number of Keemba Hill informants, in particular, explained that they would have agreed to pay if only the lands were made available to them.\(^3\) In fact, in 1942, a group of farmers on the plateau, described as 'the more

\(^1\)Sec/AG/47, Z.N.A. Memorandum on work of the Agriculture Department.
\(^2\)Hansard, 22\textsuperscript{nd} January, 1940, No. 35, Col. 268.
\(^3\)Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Gideon Mankapwi, Sixpence (Chelo) Kahulukutu and other large scale cultivators of this period.
educated natives and messengers*, laid their demands before the Land Commission and requested that they be allowed to occupy lands 'lying immediately to the north of the block of European farms on the west of the railway at Kaleyia Siding'. The Chiefs were in favour of the demands so long as the new farms were not within the reserves.¹

In 1944, a Land Tenure sub-committee of the Legislative Council had recommended conditions under which African farmers along the line of rail should hold land outside the reserves. They were to be allowed no less than 200 acres each and no more than 1,000 acres. The farmers were to utilize no more than 20% of the land for cultivation, the rest to be reserved for grazing cattle. They were to desist from felling trees at random and were to observe anti-erosion and improved farming rules. It was stated that except with the consent of the Crown, buildings should be 'limited to a dwelling house for the tenant, two huts for dependents and, per 100 acres of holding, one labourer's hut'. Tenants who were evicted were to receive compensation not exceeding £35 on a 200 acre holding or £100 on a 1,000 acre plot and any other compensation for development of the land had to be based 'on the assessment of the agricultural officer'. Tenants were required to pay a capital qualification of about 10/- an acre, whatever the size of the holding.²

When, in 1945, the Land Tenure Committee embarked on work in the Tonga areas, it was instructed to concentrate, specifically,

²Sec/Nat/204, Z.N.A. Report of the Native Land Tenure Sub-committee (Lusaka, 1944).
on problems of land settlement for ex-Askari and ... advanced Africans...', the latter being local large scale farmers. The Committee endorsed the recommendations of the Sub-committee for the resettling of advanced Cultivators on lands outside the reserves and suggested that such settlements should preferably be located on Native Trust lands and should be 'under strict agricultural control'.\(^1\) Plans for the transfer of these farmers out of the reserves into new settlements were, however, to be shattered by the recommendations of a Land Usage Survey Commission, which also carried out its investigations at this time.

The Land Usage Survey team, made up of three agriculturists and a sociologist, examined, fairly closely, the state of Tonga farming in the forties and the impact of the Kanchomba system on local farm practice.\(^2\) Reports on the shortage of land in some reserves had been quite common during the late thirties and forties. The effects of land alienation were being increasingly felt in some of the reserves, notably Sianjikika and Mwanachingwala. It was becoming quite clear that the extension work of the Agriculture Department was failing to meet the problems raised by the growth of African commercial farming. In 1941, Captain Campbell, representing the Southern Electoral area, had tabled a motion in the Legislative Council requesting 'that Government should take steps to stop the deterioration and exploitation of the land'.\(^3\) He drew attention to over-cultivation and over-stocking, in a number of areas, with resultant soil erosion and singled out two Tonga

\(^1\) Land Tenure Committee report, op. cit.


\(^3\) Hansard, 18th March, 1941, No. 39, Col. 318.
Chiefs whose people occupied a total area of about 100,000 acres and kept on it some 20,000 head of cattle. These problems were especially acute in areas that were comparatively densely populated, such as Mwanachingwala, Sianjalika, Monze and Chongo. These areas also happened to be among those with the heaviest cattle populations.

From investigations carried out in seven of the Tonga Chieftaincies, the survey team observed that the problems of overstocking and land misuse due to maize monoculture were not being adequately tackled by the Kanchomba system, as then implemented. The team observed much indifference to the work of the conservation demonstrators. It was clear that 'although many of the demonstrators' gardens attain a high standard and are strikingly superior to those around them, the Tonga are not impressed and they have been influenced little if at all'. Very few of the demonstrators were showing any real dedication to the scheme. The survey revealed that 'many of them, after completing the four year period for which they are paid, tend to allow their gardens to degenerate and even to abandon their improved housing for a dilapidated hut'.¹ The survey team enumerated a number of factors which in their view were responsible for the failure of progressive farming ideas to take root. Among these they listed the obligations of kinship which deprived the individual of some of the fruits of his effort and thus discouraged him from using his capital to improve his holding. The lack of equipment and organising skill, widespread...

¹"Land Holding..." etc. report, op.cit., p.3.
apathy and the suspicion and distrust of the Administration which land alienation had engendered in a number of areas, were some of the other reasons that were offered.

To combat the situation, a number of recommendations were made. Agricultural Officers were to embark on propaganda campaigns to allay Tonga suspicions and more emphasis was to be placed on establishing and maintaining school gardens. A closer inspection of cattle:land ratios, in various Chieftaincies, was called for, as a step towards checking overstocking. The Land Tenure Committee's recommendation of Parishes was supported. The proposal to take advanced farmers out of the reserves was, however, rejected. The survey team suggested that these farmers, who were only a small proportion of the population, were to remain within their areas to 'provide a valuable object lesson to others, both in agricultural methods and standard of living'. They argued that 'removing them would mean culling the best from the District'.

It was recommended, instead, that their holdings be surveyed and registered over the years and that they be made to follow the Kan-chomba system.

Those farming on a much smaller scale were to be grouped into so-called Social-Agricultural units. These were to be made up of a village or a group of villages, within a parish framework, whose inhabitants were willing to farm on cooperative lines. There was to be 'no serious break with traditional land tenure...' and

1 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
land required for cultivation within the units was to be divided into plots and farmed under the rules of the Kanchomba system. The communal ownership of farming equipment was also recommended.

What then was the outcome of the recommendations of the various land survey commissions? Nothing substantial came from the advocated parish system. The Tonga Chiefs opposed the creation of Parishes, in spite of the popular support their people showed for it. They saw in the scheme an attempt to encourage their people to evade their control as they established homesteads at random, within the new Administrative units and they feared the scheme would substantially undermine their authority. There was also the fear that with the formation of parishes, the movement of cattle, from one area to the next, would be restricted.

The Department of Native Education also had its reasons for not wanting the Parish plan pushed through. The Central Advisory Board of the Department explained to the Chief Secretary 'that it viewed with grave concern the splitting up of villages into small units as seriously hindering educational and social work and discouraging the development of a corporate life, besides being a hindrance to any form of progress'.

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1 The Chairman of the Land Tenure Committee had made note of the enthusiasm of the rank and file for the parish system. See Sec/Nat/204, Vol. II, Z.N.A. "Note on meetings in the Tonga country...", by Gore-Brown, 22.3.46.

2 Sec/Nat/210, Z.N.A. Chief Secretary to all Provincial and District Commissioners, 16.12.47.

3 This was Chief Chongo's main fear. See Sec/Nat/366, N/0834, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 6, 1949.

4 Sec/Nat/210, Z.N.A. Director of Native Education to Chief Secretary, 5.8.37.
There was only one serious attempt to implement the Parish plan and this was in Chief Siamaundu's area. In 1947, the Provincial Newsletter reported that all Chiefs, except Siamaundu, were opposed to the Parish system. Siamaundu was reported as having 'gone to the opposite extreme and put up concrete proposals for three parishes and ... permitted a few people to leave their villages already...'. By 1948 there were five Parishes in his area.

Efforts to establish Social Agricultural Units also failed to make any headway. An attempt to implement the group farming idea in the Chalimbana area near Magoye in 1945-6 revealed that, while some farmers welcomed the Administration's efforts to ease congestion in some of the reserves, they were not prepared for the commune that the Administration had in mind. The Mbiya settlement, as the experimental area was called, was established on 2,000 acres of Native Trust land, which adjoined an area that was 'densely populated and heavily overstocked...'. The Agriculture Department maintained a firm hold over immigration into the area and by the end of 1948, when settlement was completed, there were 'thirty four families representing a population of nearly 200 with over 400 head of cattle...'. According to Informants, the selection of farmers

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1 Sec/Nat/90, Z.N.A. Newsletter for 1st quarter, 1947.
2 Hansard, 16th March, 1948, No. 60, Col. 190.
3 Agriculture Department Annual report, 1948, p.12.
4 Ibid.
for the new settlement was based mainly on their interest in the Kanchomba system and those who were using manure and observing basic rotations were given preference.¹

The cultivable land was divided into two blocks and these were further divided into four fields, protected by contour ridges. Each family on the settlement was given a strip of land in each of the four fields and officials hoped that cooperative farming would be practised, while farmers retained individual ownership of their crops. The settlement did not, however, measure up to this expectation and there were reports of farmers being 'strongly individualistic'² and showing much preference for cropping their holdings individually. The Agriculture Department subsequently abandoned this cooperative farming experiment, although resident farmers were allowed to retain their lands and it was hoped that they would continue observing the Kanchomba rules.

The Administration's inability to solve the land problem created by commercial farming and, in particular, its failure to meet the demands of the large scale farmers for land outside the Trust lands and reserves, caused much discontent. The breakdown of plans to make more land available caused a lot of ill-feeling, especially in areas like Keemba Hill, where large scale cultivators had organised a number of delegations to the Boma at Mazabuka, to lobby officials on this issue.³ It was not going to be easy for

¹Interviews with Naul Moonga (29.4.74) and Thomas Chingīla (30.4.74).
²Agriculture Department Annual report, 1948, p.12.
³Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74. Chief Siamaundu had even proposed in 1946 that his treasury would bear part of the cost of buying back some of the alienated land, if the Government would supply the rest of the capital. See Sec/Nat/204, Vol. II, Z.N.A. Gore-Browne’s "Notes on Meetings in the Tonga country...", 22.3.46.
these farmers to forget the disappointments of this period.

Commenting on the need for a re-orientation of Tonga farming methods, the Land Usage Survey had noted:

'The only possible solution is the general adoption of a conservative agriculture which will effectively check the present process of land degeneration and bring about a progressive increase in the crop bearing capacity of the arable land.'

The need for supervised farming controls had now received more emphasis than at any time before. This was to lead to the launching on the plateau of an Improved Farming Scheme, which took the soil conservation programme a stage further, while promoting more social division within the farming community.

The rise of the Improved Farmer

The Improved Farming Scheme, which was inaugurated on the plateau in the mid forties, was a direct outcome of one of the recommendations of the 1945 Land Usage Survey Team for the improvement of Tonga agriculture. Conscious of the problems involved in getting farmers to observe a conservation programme which offered no direct financial rewards, the team recommended a system of differential prices which was to be used to attract farmers who were willing to practise the Kanchomba system. It was suggested that 'all members of a community who have adopted the system ... and who are carrying it out to the best of their ability and resources, should be entitled to receive a higher price for the maize

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1"Land Holding and Land Usage... etc.", report, op.cit., p.3.

2For a detailed discussion of the scheme, see C.E.Johnson, "African Farming Improvement in the Plateau Tonga Maize Area of Northern Rhodesia", Northern Rhodesia Agricultural Bulletin, No. 11, 1956.
they sell and the difference should be at least 50%. This, they argued, would be a way of punishing the poor farmer to encourage the good.  

The Administration accepted this proposal and during the 1946-47 planting season officials were sent round the reserves to acquaint Tonga farmers with the principles of the Improved Farming Scheme and those interested were called upon to register under it.

A farmer who joined the scheme was expected to cultivate his land according to the rules of the Kanchomba system. He had to use kraal manure on one quarter of his land and follow a crop rotation of maize (manured), maize, legumes, maize. He was expected to practise weed control and maintain the contour ridges or grass strips which Agriculture Department might instal on his lands. Periodic visits for the purposes of farm inspection and for offering advice would be paid by Land Messengers and other members of the Department's staff and farmers whose lands, when inspected, met the required standards, were to receive a certificate, which entitled them to receive a cash bonus on every bag of maize that came out of their improved plots.

The Administration financed the general programme of soil conservation, and the payment of bonuses, out of a price stabilisation fund which had been started in 1935 with maize control. African producers who sold their maize to the Board had received a price that was somewhat below the real value of the maize and this levy was paid into the fund. As a result of the stabilisation fund, it

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2 Ibid.

3 An Agricultural Training School for Africans was to be opened at
now became possible to pay the Improved Farmer the full price of his crop without any deduction, while the money withheld from the 'non Improved Farmer', went towards meeting these expenses. The scheme was, therefore, according to Johnson, 'one of compulsory saving imposed on the unimproved farmer while the maize price is high, the improved farmer being exempted'.

The scheme met with some enthusiasm in several reserves on the plateau and especially in the Ufwenuka, Chona and Siamaundu Chieftaincies, but generally, the reception was one of grave caution. In the Ufwenuka and Chona areas, the influence of the Missionaries on the surrounding populations caused many farmers to register with the scheme in its very early days. Jojo Chisenge, who was one of the four youths Moreau had received from Chief Monze in 1902, explained that 'Kolozia' was never seen in the Ufwenuka area, although he made frequent trips to Monze, Chongo and other areas to explain the workings of the scheme. In the Ufwenuka area, according to Jojo, it was the priests of Chikuni who, at church gatherings, persistently emphasised the merits of the scheme.

Monze in 1949 and in 1950 the first group of students who had completed the 18 month course were appointed African agricultural assistants and employed on the soil conservation programme. See Agriculture Department Annual report, 1949, p.5; also Agriculture Department Annual report, 1950, p.14.

1 This term used to denote the farmer who did not register with the Scheme. The term 'unimproved farmer', which Johnson and others have used in references to this category of farmers is a misnomer, considering the fact (admitted by Johnson) that a number of these were farming with up to date, 'improved', methods.

2 Johnson, op.cit., p.11.

3 Interviews on the plateau. In the Siamaundu area, the enthusiasm of the Chief and the impact made by the Kanchomba system ensured the scheme some success.

4 The Tonga rendition of Clothier, the name of the Chief Agricultural Officer at the Kanchomba station.

5 Interview with Jojo Chisenge, 16.11.73.
The offer of cash bonuses was the main attraction for most villagers and farmers who joined the scheme came from all the three farming categories that the 1945 Land Survey had identified, viz., the 'Farmer', the 'Smallholder' and the 'Subsistence Cultivator'. The scheme attracted both the educated and the uneducated, the Church member as well as his non-Church-going neighbour.

Most Tonga farmers however decided to have nothing to do with the scheme and this attitude was to continue for a number of years. In an area with a population of over 16,800 males, there were only 95 Improved Farmers in 1946-47, 303 in 1947-48 and 362 in 1948-49. Some of the large-scale farmers who had had connections with Father Moreau and Pastor Anderson considered the scheme a waste of time, for they were fully convinced that the missions had taught them all there was to learn about Improved Farming. One of these farmers on being asked why he didn't join the scheme retorted: 'How could I join this, when I already knew farming. We were already improved.'

Theodore Kachesa, whose farming operations in the twenties and thirties had given officials and missionaries so much to be proud of, never registered with the scheme. His son explained

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1 The survey team, operating on the plateau at a time when the harvest was poor, had grossly exaggerated the size of the subsistence farming category, i.e. farmers who sold 10 bags of maize or less (they estimated this to be 85% of the farming population). See Allan et al., op. cit., p.1. Johnson (op.cit., p.7) later pointed this out. See also Chapter III.

2 Johnson, op.cit., p.8.

3 Interview with John Hauma Nyiimba, 19.11.73. This response was encountered in several other interviews with Catholic and S.D.A. Informants.
that he used to boast about his success in his meetings with Clothier and other Agriculture Department Officials, and was always inviting them round to his farm, so that they could see what he had achieved without the aid of any scheme. His success made Kachesa very independent and a touring official once recorded that 'he neither willingly submits to any local Chief nor takes much account of the Agricultural Officers'. The scheme's rigidity, and its emphasis on periodic farm inspection, was another reason why it failed to catch on. Farmers strongly disliked this interference from Agricultural Staff and those who joined the scheme even recommended a system wherein established Improved Farmers would be exempted from further inspections once they had been in the scheme for some time. This was never conceded.

The rules of the scheme meant very hard work, weeding the land and maintaining the contours, and as Morgan-Rees later pointed out, the farmer was not often sufficiently compensated in the yields from his improved plot. The majority of Tonga farmers had not seen the need for contour ridges or grass strips on their lands. On this question an Informant explained:

"When Kolozia came, he tried to give us advice on good methods of farming. He introduced ridges in our fields. After the ridges were made, people were forced to keep them clean. We did not like this."

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1 Interview with Peter Kachesa, 22.11.73.
3 Johnson, op. cit., p.17.
5 Interview with Stephen Ngandu, 22.11.73.
To compel obedience to the contour-ridging policy, heavy fines, in some cases as much as £3, were imposed on farmers who failed to clean or damaged ridges. This only made the soil conservation policy more unpopular and the Improved Farming Scheme more strongly detested.

Perhaps the most significant reason for the smallness of the scheme's membership, in the years up to 1949, was the existence of a general climate of suspicion and distrust of the Administration's motives, in the various reserves. This was created by the policy of land alienation. Farmers, especially in areas like Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala, which had suffered much land loss, had strong doubts about the seemingly altruistic nature of the scheme and feared that it was a cover for planned land takeovers in the future. One farmer, who not only stayed out of the scheme, but campaigned in his section of Sianjalika Chieftaincy against it, had this to say on his people's fears:

'The White Man had taken large areas of our land without paying us and we now feared they were going to pay us and take even larger pieces....'

The 1945 land survey team had worked within this atmosphere of suspicion, especially in the Sianjalika area. Tonga farmers had a deep feeling of insecurity over their land tenure and feared that, in spite of the land alienations of the past, Europeans were determined to take some more. When the survey team started measuring

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1 Allain et al., op.cit., p.69.
2 Chief Mwanachingwala clearly voiced this suspicion in the twenties when he said: "Even if we leave this land here and give it to white men and find a good place and get good crops, you will again come and say, 'We want this land, go out, we want it.'" See KDB 1/3/6, Z.N.A. Interview with Mwanachingwala and others near their village, 2nd-3rd September, 1921.
3 That is, payment in the form of bonuses. Interview with Naul Moonga, 29.4.74.
gardens and counting cattle, many suspected that they would soon be dismissed from their lands, which Europeans were only waiting to occupy.¹ In certain areas, farmers were openly hostile to the investigation.² The survey team observed that because of this fear of land loss, the Tonga 'deliberately do not want to show that they have fruitful lands'.³ A scheme which emphasised higher yields was, therefore, unlikely to succeed in such an atmosphere. To the majority of farmers, there seemed to be only one way of solving the land problem, and this was to make more land available for African occupation.

The early history of the Improved Farming Scheme in the Keemba Hill area of Chongo Chieftaincy was slightly different from that of the rest of the plateau. This area was first settled in 1924 by two teachers of the Rusangu S.D.A. Mission, Gideon Mankapwi and Matthew Kasuku, who were due for retirement. They started farming in the area in 1928.⁴ During the mid thirties, there was a major dispute at the Rusangu Mission between the authorities and resident Tonga and Ndebele teachers and pastors, who were accused of keeping very large herds of cattle on the mission's lands, thereby substantially reducing the grazing available to the

¹Allan et al., op.cit., p.69.
²This strong opposition was encountered at Keemba Hill. Ibid., p.35.
³Ibid., p.67.
⁵From the late 1920s onwards, some Ndebele students who had been trained at the S.D.A.'s Mission in Bulawayo, took up appointments at Rusangu and other S.D.A. mission stations on the Tonga plateau.
Mission's animals. The authorities told the Africans that they
would have to reduce their herds or move off the mission's
lands. Unwilling to destock, the Tonga teachers and pastors
decided to take up farming in the Keemba Hill area\(^1\) and by
1942, there were over 12 individual plot holders in the settle-
ment.\(^2\) The S.D.A. farmers here operated on a much larger scale
than the surrounding African population and they invested far more
in farming equipment than the rest of the African community.\(^3\)
Sheltered from some of the demands from kinsmen they would other­
wise have had to face in their home areas, the farmers here were
able to raise more capital for investment, employed wage labour
and kept around only a few kinsmen who helped in the running of
their farms. They belonged to a church that did not look too kindly
on the extended family system because, it claimed, the system en­
couraged laziness and parasitism. Their church also preached a
very strict moral code, discouraging practices like smoking and
drinking, among its members. As a result, most S.D.A., and those of
Keemba Hill in particular, tended to live in relative frugality and,
as a consequence, made quite a success of farming.\(^4\) The Keemba

\(^1\)Interviews with Amos Walubita (12.11.73), Samuel Sibanda (18.11.73)
and Ellison Milambo (10.2.74). The Ndebele teachers who left Rusangu
at this time went over to settle in the Mujiga area of Mwanza Chief­
tancy.

\(^2\)Tour report No. 4, 1951, op.cit.

\(^3\)An inspection tour of Sixpence Chelo Kahulakutu's farm, in the
settlement, by an official in 1951 revealed the following farming
implements on the estate: 1 disc plough, 5 cultivators, 2 planters,
2 disc harrows, 1 tractor, 1 wagon, 1 spring harrow, 1 two furlough
plough, 1 single plough, 1 tractor cultivator, 2 grinding machines,
1 drilling machine, 1 wheel barrow, 1 pit saw, 15 chains, 4 drilling
balls, 4 shovels and 8 picks. Others in the settlement, like Paul
Siamusiya and Ellison Milambo, had comparable collections. See Tour
report, No. 4, 1951, op.cit.

\(^4\)This was pointed out by the 1945 survey team which, however, grossly
underplayed the success and achievements of farmers of other de­
nominations, notably the Catholics. See Allan et al, op.cit., p.178.
Hill community, because of the quality and size of its maize output, was even allowed the unique privilege of participation in the European pool of the Maize Control Board. This meant that from 1942-3, when the concession was granted, farmers in the settlement became Registered Maize Producers and received the same price for their produce as European farmers.\(^1\)

However, in 1946-47, when the Improved Farming Scheme was inaugurated, the farmers of Keemba Hill were deprived of their places within the European pool and were forced to fall in line with the rest of the African farming community.\(^2\) This caused much dissatisfaction in the area and robbed the Improved Farming Scheme of whatever chances it had of making an impact here. Out of a total of some 25 large scale farmers in the area, only 14 registered with the scheme up to 1949.\(^3\) Agricultural Staff made several trips to Keemba Hill in the hope of stimulating interest in the scheme, but these did not achieve the desired results.\(^4\) Their expulsion from the European pool lingered for long in the minds of the farmers and influenced their future behaviour in all dealings with the Administration.

The Improved Farming Scheme worked without any major policy change until 1949. Seasonal bonus payments were consistently on the

\(^1\) Tour report No. 4, 1951, \textit{op.cit.} \\
\(^2\) Ibid. \\
\(^3\) Ibid. \\
\(^4\) Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74.
increase and in 1949 about £2,236 was paid out to registered farmers in the maize area.\(^1\) In the 1946-47 season, the bonus paid was 4/- a bag but, for the 1947-48 season, an attempt was made to make the scheme more attractive. Two types of bonuses were now to be observed. Improved Farmers who produced more than 6 bags of maize an acre received a higher bonus of 9/- a bag, while those whose output was less than 6 bags received 4/-.\(^2\) There was, however, a more comprehensive review of the scheme in the following season.

In 1949-50 the Administration decided to review the rules of the scheme, in an attempt to regulate certain anomalies within it. One of these was the problem of estimating the precise crop output of an Improved Farmer's holding, an estimate that was necessary if unscrupulous scheme members were not to receive bonuses on maize that came out of unimproved plots. The second main problem was that, with the post-war expansion of maize production, the Kanchomba system was proving inadequate as a measure of soil conservation. The system emphasised the use of kraal manure, but with the growing reduction of pastures as more grazing land was farmed, the dangers of over-reliance on kraal manure were being slowly revealed. It was, therefore, decided that the rules should be revised to provide for the use of fertilisers and green manure and also for the creation of two grades of Improved Farmers.

To qualify for the first grade, a farmer had to observe a rotation in which he used only two of his four plots for maize,

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\(^2\)Ibid.
the remaining two to be cropped with legumes. He had to plough in one of the legume crops as green manure and the maize cultivated after the green manure crop was to be treated with fertiliser.

He was also required to use kraal manure on the maize he cultivated after the legume crop. Continued attention was to be paid to weed control and stumpin and he had to set up a part of the maize crop in stooks. Ploughing during the cold season was also required.

The second grade was very much like the first except that green manure was not insisted on, a legume crop allowed in its place and the use of fertiliser was not compulsory.

In 1950 a special 'Smallholder' grade was created to meet the requirements of the small scale farmer who had no trouble maintaining his land on kraal manure and who was therefore reluctant to radically reduce his maize outlay to allow for green manure. He was allowed, under the scheme, to devote three of his plots to maize and one to legumes, but he had to use kraal manure on two of the maize plots and fertiliser on the third. The smallholder's improved plot was not to exceed ten acres.

The bonus system was changed to allow payment per acre of Improved land, rather than per bag, although the bonuses to the first grade farmer and the smallholder were calculated to be equivalent, on average, to the bonus per bag that had been offered till now. The bonus was lower for the second grade farmer. A scheme for the distribution at subsidised prices of wheeled transport was embarked on and the distribution of green manure seed and fertilisers to Improved Farmers was also undertaken. To check the movement of squatters to the lands that were nearer to the commercial centres on the railway, where higher maize prices were paid, the
Administration decided to equate line of rail and reserves maize prices. A rural marketing organisation of the Maize Control Board was also established, in the hope of improving marketing facilities. The general conservation drive was expanded and the development of water supplies, through the provision of weirs and dams, was stepped up.

To finance the new measures, an African Farming Improvements Fund was established. The money that had accumulated in the maize pools stabilization fund was now transferred into the new fund. A Committee on which African farmers were represented was set up to administer the fund, although it was given no special instructions as to how money from the fund should be disbursed. How then were the 1949-50 proposals received on the plateau? What reaction did these provoke among the Improved Farmers and the vast majority of farmers who had avoided enrolling in it?

The review of the scheme substantially undermined the confidence many Improved Farmers had put in it, in spite of the doubts and fears expressed by their more cautious neighbours. To many, the imposition of more stringent qualifications without consultation with farmers was yet another case of the white man failing to honour his obligations to the African community. One farmer, who immediately resigned from the scheme in 1949 told the author:

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1 By 1938 the Agriculture Department had constructed 33 dams and sunk 34 wells in the Mazabuka District, but only 13 dams and 11 wells were in really good condition (see Pim Financial Commission report, p.67). Of the 146 dams and weirs built in the Southern Province from 1947 onwards, 70 were in the Mazabuka District but, as was pointed out at the time, 'the provision of water supplies in the Tonga country has not kept pace with the demand'. See I.H. Muchangwe's "Tonga Land Utilisation Survey, Mazabuka District", M.N.R.S.

2 Johnson, op.cit., p.10.
"We had allowed ourselves to be treated like fools by the Bwanas /white men/ and our brothers and friends who never joined were laughing at us for our mistake. We had trusted people they had told us not to trust."¹

Large scale farmers were particularly annoyed by the new rule which provided that Grade 'A' farmers should cultivate only two plots of maize, at a time when the bonus paid out had risen from four shillings a bag in 1946-7 to nine shillings in 1947-8.² It was at this time very much in the large scale farmer's interest to expand his maize production to take advantage of rising bonuses. The review caused a lot of ill-feeling among these producers.

At Keemba Hill in 1949, large scale farmers were still smarting from the expulsion from the European pool which they had suffered. Although some of them had become Improved Farmers, it was observed that they 'never at any time took much interest in the Improved Farmer Scheme...'.³ In 1948 dissatisfaction among farmers in the area over the treatment they had received at the hands of the Administration's officials came to the notice of Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, who represented African interests in the Legislative Council. Gore-Browne had visited the area and had listened to the farmers' complaints.⁴ His attempts to get them reinstated in the

¹Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74.

²Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Gideon Mankapwi and Sixpence (Chelo) Kahulukutu.


⁴Hansard, 22nd June, 1948, No. 61, Cols. 318-319.
European pool were, however, unsuccessful. When the 1949 review was announced, Keemba Hill’s Improved Farmers replied by deregistering from the scheme. At the end of 1949, of the fourteen Improved Farmers in the area, only one (Sixpence Kahulukutu) was still in the scheme.¹

Among the majority of small-scale cultivators who were in the scheme, the reaction to the review was not so dramatic. The acreage bonus system secured for them a reasonable bonus, regardless of the number of bags they produced even in poor seasons, and so the change of bonus emphasis from bag to acre did not pose any great threat to their cash returns.²

Following the 1949 review, membership of the scheme which had been on the increase since 1946 declined sharply. In the Monze area, where there were about 172 Improved Farmers in 1948-49, only 80 registered for the 1949-50 season.³ The total membership of the scheme dropped considerably. For the 1948-49 season it was 362; it dropped to 262 in 1949-50.⁴ Several farmers who had been thinking of joining the scheme were put off by the review, especially when they saw some of its dozy defenders deregistering from it.⁵

¹Tour report No. 4, 1951, op.cit. Seven of the area’s 145 farmers were to join Sixpence in the scheme in 1951. See Sec/Nat/366, Z.M.A. Tour report No. 7 of 1951; also KSB 3/1, District Note-book. Tour report No. 4 of 1951.

²Interviews with a number of small scale farmers.

³Howard, op.cit.

⁴Johnson, op.cit., p.9.

⁵Interviews revealed this.
In the years after the review, the scheme continued to win new members, most of them attracted by the offer of wheeled transport at subsidised prices, although, as before, the majority of farmers stayed clear of it. As will be seen later, the politicians of the fifties played a major role in further promoting this aloofness and in working up feeling against the general soil conservation programme. The Improved Farmers cultivated, on average, much larger holdings than the majority of non-Improved Farmers. In most cases they expanded their holdings simply by taking up resting land, at times in poorly watered areas, where they had to sink wells at their own expense.\(^1\) A number of them preferred to live at least three miles from their villages\(^2\) and they contributed more than any single group within the farming community to village disintegration and farm land fragmentation. The amount of land they cultivated was always directly related to the extent of land alienation in the Chieftaincy, with farmers in areas like Monze and Chongo farming much larger areas than their counterparts in, say Mwanchingwala and Sianjalika.\(^3\) The Improved Farmer kept more cattle, on average, than the non-Improved Farmer,\(^4\) and, chiefly because

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\(^1\) Morgan-Rees (op.cit.) in 1955 discovered that only 35\(^\circ\) of the land farmed by the Improved Farmers in a sample survey had been acquired by inheritance or transfer. 65\(^\circ\) of it was acquired by bush clearance.


\(^3\) See Johnson, op.cit., p.20.

\(^4\) Johnson observed during his survey that all the Improved Farmers had some cattle and that 90\(^\circ\) of them had six head or more. He also observed that about 30\(^\circ\) of the non-Improved Farmers had no cattle at all and that nearly half of them had less than six head. See Johnson, op.cit., p.21.
of implement subsidies, his farm was also, on the whole, better equipped.¹

African Farmers Associations

To promote and protect the interests of the African farming community the Improved Farmers formed Farmers Associations in the late forties. The idea appears to have originated from Keemba Hill and the late Pastor Samuel Chilumbi, a local resident, was identified as having conceived it. Chilumbi got Chief Benjamin Chongo who, like him, had studied at Rusangu, to support his plan and, with Nelson Liyanda, another Keemba Hill farmer, they approached officials with their plan to start an African Farmers Association. After officials had given their consent, a constitution was drafted and the Monze African Farmers Association was inaugurated.²

The Association's Constitution provided for an executive to run its affairs and stipulated that only Improved Farmers or non-improved farmers who were aspiring to membership of the scheme, should be allowed to become members.³ No formal subscriptions were asked of members, the main reason being the fear that subscriptions might be interpreted as some kind of tax and this would

¹Ibid., p. 21.

²Interviews with Samuel Sibanda (18.11.73), Nelson Liyanda (9.12.73) and Lazarus Chiabi (14.5.74) provided most of the material on the activities of Farmers Associations, there being virtually nothing on this in various archives. Their accounts were later checked against those of less prominent Association members.

³This proviso was included mainly because the Association was designed to bring advanced cultivators together and organisers believed the Association would be in a stronger bargaining position if its membership was thus restricted.
make the Association unpopular. The organisers settled instead for voluntary contributions and these were used mainly to meet the travelling expenses of Executive Officers whenever they made trips to meet Administration Officials. Branches of the Monze parent Association were opened at Pemba, Mazabuka, Nega Nega and Bwengwa.¹

At Association meetings, which were held once monthly, although emergency meetings could also be summoned, discussions centred chiefly on maize and cattle prices and on demands for better water and communications facilities in the reserves. The Improved Farmers saw themselves as the spokesmen of the general farming community and at meetings demands for more dams and wells, better roads and higher prices for produce were quite common. Various petitions were prepared on these subjects and presented to officials at the Mazabuka Boma, although, according to Informants, these did not achieve very much.

The Administration used the Farmers Associations as an intermediary in its dealings with the general farming community and unpopular policies were, at times, channelled through them. Several efforts, for instance, were made to win support for the soil conservation programme and for cattle dipping, by campaigning through the Improved Farmers.²

The Agriculture Department showed much interest in the activities of the Farmers Associations and this increased when after

¹An Association was also formed much later in the Demu area of Siamaundu Chieftaincy. The Organising Secretary, L.H. Chiabi, informed the Administration in November 1951 of its formation. See Acc 75/25, Vol. II, Z.N.A. Chiabi to D.C. Mazabuka, 27.11.51.

²Interview with Nelson Liyanda, 9.12.73.
the formation of the Natural Resources Board in 1949, Conservation Committees were set up in some areas of the plateau, notably Monze and Siamaundu Chieftaincies, and some Improved Farmers were invited to serve on them. Local officials received invitations to most meetings of the Farmers Associations and representatives from the Veterinary and Agriculture Departments usually attended, pen in hand, to make notes of African demands, while assessing the mood of the farmers' leaders. On the whole, the Associations got on well with the Administration and, by 1949-50, 'sitting fees' of £8 a time were being paid to the main Monze Association out of the African Farming Improvement Fund to provide refreshments for members at meetings and, later, at their ex-hibitory Farmers Days.

The only Farmers Association I encountered, on the plateau, which was strongly critical of Administration policy was that formed in 1947 at Keemba Hill. The founder of this Association was Ellison Milambo, a retired Headmaster of Rusangu primary school, whom an official once referred to as 'the staunch leader and protagonist' of the Keemba Hill settlement. Milambo and others decided on the need for a local Farmers Association after they had been expelled from the European maize pool. The role of their Association was

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1 The Natural Resources Board was set up 'to exercise general supervision over natural resources, to stimulate public interest in conservation, to recommend appropriate legislation and to ensure co-ordination between the various bodies concerned'. See S.M. Makings, Agricultural Change in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia, 1945-65 (Stanford, 1966), p.229.

2 Interview with Nelson Liyanda (9.12.73) who for a number of years (about eight in all) was leader of the Monze Association.

3 Native Affairs report, 1948, p.59.

4 Tour report No. 4, 1951, op.cit.
to be that of a watchdog on the Administration, especially its Agriculture Department, and for this reason they maintained very little official contact with the Monze Association which was always on fairly good terms with the Administration. An official once described the Keemba Hill Farmers Association as one 'which carefully avoids any contact with the Agricultural Department',¹ and the Association's activities, mainly of a protest nature, did little to endear its members to local Administration officials. Administration officials were never invited to meetings of the Association and 'sitting fees' were never offered to its members.²

In 1948, in a letter to the District Commissioner, Mazabuka, and copied to the Secretary for Native Affairs and Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, the Association showed clearly the watchdog role it intended to play. In the letter, the question of increased improved farming bonuses for the 1948 season was raised and the Association's determination to see that African farmers received what they deserved, was unequivocally stated. It read, in part:

'The Association held its meeting on 22nd March 1948, to hear the report from the Secretary of African Farmers Association, as instructed by the Secretary of Native Affairs to inform all members ... After a considerable discussion the Association decided it necessary to write and inform the Government officials that we as members of African Farmers Association will simply watch as to how the Agriculture Department is going to work on the estimation of the African farmers. And if there will be injustice, the Association shall

¹Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 16, 1953.
²Interview with Ellison Milambo, 20.2.74.
The Improved Farmers and their Associations were to take on much greater significance during the fifties. With the rise of nationalist politicians who openly criticised the Administration and anything associated with it, the Improved Farmers came under strong pressure. How they fared under this barrage of criticism and how successful the organisers of the Improved Farming scheme were in retaining their confidence during this trying period will be seen later on.

The rise of the Improved Farmer took the process of social differentiation on the Tonga plateau one stage further. Although it may be difficult to talk of class formation in the area, various social groupings emerged under white rule. By the late 1940s, the egalitarian character of Tonga society still noticeable on the eve of colonial rule had been modified considerably. Apart from the growth of a political hierarchy of Chiefs, Headmen, Councillors etc., economic forces and the spread of western education encouraged the emergence of a group of individuals whose knowledge and success in farming allowed them a slightly higher standard of living than the rest of the African population. Out of a population largely made up of subsistence farmers in the mid-19th century, a peasantry

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1}}Acc 75/25, Vol. I, Z.N.A, Ellison Milambo to D.C., Mazabuka, 28.3.48.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{2}}Ken Vickery has drawn attention to the difficulties of studying 'Class formation' on the Tonga plateau. See his paper, "Aspects of Plateau Tonga Economic History", p.1.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{3}}This term is used in the sense in which it was discussed by Saul and Woods in T.D. Shanin (Ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies (Bucks, 1971), pp. 103-114.
had emerged by the late 1920s and there were several teachers, artisans, pastors, traders etc. by the early 1930s. Several of these men were to play leading roles in the political activities of the African National Congress. By 1945, about 15% of the plateau's farmers were producing grain and selling cattle on a fairly large scale. One may be tempted to see these farmers, the Mulimi Simpindi as they were called, as a class thrown up by economic forces and occupying a well-defined social position within the society. Such a conclusion would however be incorrect for the Mulimi Simpindi were never a class in isolation. They were subject to and the majority accepted the authority of the Chiefs and Headmen. Their higher standard of living did not make them an exclusive group capable of generally exploiting the less well-to-do majority. Because they did not control vast expanses of land, which may have given them a greater influence on the plateau, they were forced to operate more in a 'primus inter pares' position within the farming community. Few had enough land to be able to operate anything like the landlord-tenant relationship which some settler farmers indulged in. The absence of any great disparities in income between the Mulimi Simpindi and his not so rich neighbour also meant that there were no radical differences in life-styles. As Jones has rightly pointed out,


2Colson has drawn attention to the tendency for some of the wealthy farmers to bypass the Native Authority Courts and seek satisfaction from the Officials in the District Office. This was not, however, a common occurrence. See E. Colson, The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester, 1962), p.227.
the large-scale farmer lacked 'the pre-eminence, the corporate right which is not open to everyone, and the recognition of general superiority operating over an area much wider than one sphere of knowledge or skills.\textsuperscript{1} The Mulimi Simpindi's inability to amass a substantial fortune may have been due to the fact that his wealth attracted needy relatives who sought him out no matter how distant his homestead was. He was never totally free of the demands of his poorer relatives. His individualism as seen in his preference for living at some distance from his kinsmen and his demands for the right to make Wills (a direct threat to the matrilineal group) may have outraged many relatives, but this did not, in most cases, lead to a break in family ties. Poorer kinsmen continued to look up to him for assistance and at his death, they claimed the greater part of the inheritance. The Mulimi Simpindi, with a few exceptions, were therefore very much a part of the general social stream, albeit a reluctant part.\textsuperscript{2}


\textsuperscript{2} Social differentiation has continued on the plateau in the post-independence period and the large-scale African farmers of today, several of whom have acquired huge farms that once belonged to white settlers are very much on the way to constituting a class. Their possession of substantial farms on State lands is deeply resented by the poorer sections of the community. The author did not however investigate this question in any detail.
Chapter V

THE GROWTH OF AFRICAN POLITICS

The Settler Factor

So far this study has concentrated for the most part on economic and social change on the Tonga plateau. We must now try to see how these changes were reflected in political developments in the area. African life on the plateau was affected by certain issues such as Amalgamation, around which crystallised European political ambitions. This chapter will look into certain aspects of the amalgamation controversy and will also examine the circumstances surrounding the formation on the plateau of African Welfare Associations and the first African Congress in Northern Rhodesia, during the 1930s. The formation of these African associations has to be viewed against a background of settler political opinion and activities during this period.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, various attempts were made to secure the closer union of the two Rhodesias. The British South Africa Company (B.S.A.C.) considered that amalgamation would strengthen its political position. In its efforts, particularly between 1915 and 1917, the Company failed to carry with it the majority of the settler populations of the two territories, who, for various reasons, were not prepared to forego their political ambitions in the interest of a united Rhodesia. The British Colonial Office was in no mood to force the issue through

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and its reluctance to press the settlers into acceptance of the B.S.A.C. recommendations was to lead some of the Company officials to accuse it of indifference when the proposals were rejected by the elected representatives of the Legislative Council in Southern Rhodesia.\(^1\) This defeat was not however to spell the end of the Amalgamation movement. In Northern Rhodesia, a substantial part of the white farming community had always supported the idea of Amalgamation. Under the Crown Administration, these farmers, joined after 1930 by some of the white traders who had hitherto opposed Amalgamation,\(^2\) were to champion the cause of closer union with Southern Rhodesia. They were convinced that only a united Rhodesia would guarantee their socio-political dominance over the African population while at the same time protecting their economic interests. All too conscious of their political insecurity in the midst of a large and burgeoning African population, the settlers were to resort to the discriminatory practices that were being used against Africans in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Various measures were adopted to keep African advancement in check. Among other things, the education of the African was restricted and checks were placed on his physical as well as his occupational mobility.

Various pass laws similar to those operating in the southern territories were to be introduced. These attempts by the settlers to consolidate their political supremacy forced the African population, which was chafing under the discriminatory laws, to search

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 522.

\(^2\)The opposition of the white traders of Livingstone was partly due to the fear that local business would suffer in an Amalgamated Rhodesia, since a number of civil servants would have to leave. There would therefore be fewer customers. Ibid., p. 507.
for representation of its interests. Africans within the
territory were not completely unaware of the realities of sett­
ler rule in Southern Rhodesia and they were determined that
Northern Rhodesia should not be handed over to the political con­
trol of the Government across the Zambesi. In the Welfare Associ­
ations formed by the Africans themselves during the 1930s and also
in the African representative Assemblies that were later sponsored
by the Administration, African representatives came to grips with
the problems of settler domination throughout the 1930s and 1940s.
On the Tonga plateau where in 1937 the very first African Congress
within the territory was formed, these political activities brought
to the fore a number of African immigrants, mostly from Nyasaland
and the Western province, whose contribution to the inchoate
African protest movement was to be quite significant. Under the
influence of these 'Aliens', who were comparatively better educated,
the indigenous Tonga were to be gradually mobilised into a local
challenge of settlerdom.

The majority of the settler immigrants saw in Northern Rhodesia
a territory which, with proper handling, could be moulded into that
'white man's country' of which the Duke of Connaught had spoken in
November 1910. During a visit to the territory, the Duke had made
the following remark in reply to an address of welcome presented
by the settlers of North-western Rhodesia: 'You have come here to
stay and future generations will tell their children and children's
children of the names of those who first made Rhodesia into a
white man's country and will teach them to be grateful to that
greatest of pioneers from whom the country takes its name'. 1 The

1 BS2/137, Z.N.A. General report for year ended 31st March, 1911.
settlers on the Tonga plateau, mainly farmers and traders, were an active and influential group within the general white community. A Mazabuka Settler Farmers Association was formed around 1908 in order to give voice to settler political opinion. Some of the older African and settler farmers on the plateau today still remember its prominent members; Tom King, Major Darling, Horace Ilsley, D.J. Gray, N. Micklem, Norris Dent, Tim Haslett, Ben Woest and a few others.

The majority of the early settler farmers had been attracted to the territory by the very favourable terms on which vast amounts of land could be acquired. Very few of them had any substantial capital, the majority looking forward to getting financial assistance from the British South Africa Company's Administration. This, however, was hardly forthcoming, for the Company's main concern was the protection of the financial interests of its shareholders. The settler community thus became very critical of its administration\(^1\) and looked increasingly towards Southern Rhodesia, where farmers were comparatively better off. Settler-farmers came to see Northern Rhodesia's future as part of some political union with Southern Rhodesia and demands for Amalgamation between the two territories were quite common in Farmers Association meetings by 1918.

In 1919, the North-Western Rhodesia Political Association (N.W.R.P.A.) was formed. The Association was meant to take over the political responsibilities which the Farmers Associations had

\(^1\)See Chapter I.
been shouldering, and its membership was to include Civil Servants, Railwaymen, Farmers 'and everybody who has any interest... in the future destiny of this territory.'¹ There was much talk, at this time, about changing the Government of Northern Rhodesia and the settlers intended to use their new Association to exert some influence on the discussions concerning the territory's future. They began to complain about the inadequacies of the Advisory Council and to insist on their right to 'assume control of their own destiny through a popularly elected Council'.² In the very year of its inception, the Association established formal contact with certain members of the Legislative Council in Southern Rhodesia, to sound out their views on possible Amalgamation between the two territories.³ The replies from the south showed that there was very little support for any Amalgamation plan, for most of the settlers believed that 'Northern Rhodesia had everything to gain... from such a union. Besides, there were, within the N.W.R.P.A., itself, certain influential members who were seriously questioning the wisdom of amalgamation and who considered responsible Government a better alternative. This group was led by Leopold Moore, a very influential settler-spokesman, who also served on the Advisory Council.⁵

¹See The Livingstone Mail, 28.3.19, in BS3/443, Z.N.A.
²BS3/443, Z.N.A. Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, South Africa, 12.5.19.
³The Association contacted prominent members of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council, among them, Messrs. Longden and Jobling. See Ibid.
⁴Ibid. Southern Rhodesia's politicians feared that Amalgamation, while lacking in economic attraction, would also delay the granting of Self-Government to the territory.
⁵See Resident Commissioner to High Commissioner, 12.5.19, BS3/443, Z.N.A.
The settler farmers of the Magoye area, led by Tom King and Tyndale Roscoe and those around Mazabuka, very much under the influence of a local farmer, Haslett, were firmly opposed to Moore's stand, and at various meetings held in Mazabuka, they passed resolutions condemning the responsible Government proposals. When, however, a conference of 'leading settlers' was held at Mazabuka, in October 1921, to discuss the territory's future, the majority of those present favoured Crown Colony Government over Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia or South Africa. During the 1922 election of members to the Advisory Council, the question of Amalgamation was put before the electorate and, while 310 voters favoured it, 1,417 voted against it. It soon became clear to the Administration that in spite of the demands of the farmers, the greater part of the settler community preferred a form of Crown Colony Government, operating around a local Legislative Council. The Amalgamationists had lost the first round for, in 1923, after a referendum, Southern Rhodesia received Responsible Government and in July of the same year the Northern Rhodesia Advisory Council requested that the territory be declared a Crown Colony. This was granted in 1924 and a Legislative Council was established.

The early years of Crown rule did not quite provide the sort of changes that would have mollified the Amalgamationists. Hopes that farming conditions would show some improvement under the new

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1M. Gelfand, Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the Charter (Oxford, 1961), p.139.
2BS3/509, Z.N.A. "Proceedings of a Conference held at the Court House, Mazabuka on Sunday October 2nd, 1921".
3Gelfand, op.cit., p.140.
Administration were not realised and it was not long before frustration in settler circles produced a torrent of criticism of government. Commenting on the state of the settler farming community in 1925, the District Commissioner observed "a mood and an outlook caused by a trying and disappointing time'. He could only hope that 'it should prove to be temporary' although he feared 'it may be a distinct factor for some months to come'.

Representatives of the various Farmer Associations within the territory had presented, in 1923, a Memorandum outlining some of the questions to which farmers were hoping the new administration would give urgent attention. Among these, they listed the need for a Land Bank, 'conducted in a similar manner to that in operation in the Union of South Africa, to assist in the development of the Agricultural industry'. They stressed the need for the re-establishment of the Agriculture Department, 'with a fully qualified technical... head in addition to the cotton expert' and the upgrading of veterinary services so as 'to combat the unknown cattle diseases which are causing enormous losses among the livestock in the country...'

In spite of settler representations, the services provided by the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments continued to fall below farmer requirements and the credit facilities open to them were far from adequate for their needs. In the absence of a Land Bank, settlers received loans from an Agricultural Loans Board and also

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2 BS3/458, Z.N.A. "Memorandum from Elected Delegates representing the Central Farmers Association, the Southern Farmers Association, North-Western Rhodesia Farmers Co-operative Society, Cattle Owners Associations etc..."
3 The Administration did not provide a Land Bank. In 1929 it was reported: 'His Excellency considers the establishment of a Land Bank premature...'. See Carter to Chief Secretary, 16.4.29, in Bl/4/FIN/6/1, Z.N.A.
from the North-Western Rhodesia Co-operative Society. The Board provided loans for investment in dipping tanks, fencing, the erection of farm buildings, the importation of stock from abroad and for similar development needs. It was not, however, easy to qualify for any of these loans, for the security the Board requested, viz. the title deed to the farmer's land, was one few farmers could afford, until they had resided in the territory for some time. The Co-operative Society's terms were less demanding but it offered much lower sums than the Board.\(^1\)

The loss of the Katanga market during the early 1920s created serious marketing problems for the territory's farmers. After the first world war, the expansion of mining activity in the Congo had provided a large market for the maize and cattle traded by the Northern Rhodesia farmers. The Congo maize market was however lost in 1923 when the maize price in Northern Rhodesia dropped to 6/6d a bag. Although beef exports continued for a while, the opening of the Congo to Southern Rhodesia's cattle farmers in 1922 after the spell of East Coast fever in that territory had ended, gave the Southern Rhodesians a virtual monopoly of the cattle trade.\(^2\) To add to the farmers' difficulties, the labour problems posed by the recruiting activities of the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau

\(^1\)In the late forties, farmers were to request that 'the loan arrangements administered by the ... Cooperative Society ... be extended... in that the length of terms given might be increased and ... the amount available to an individual at any one time... be increased to a maximum of £1,000...'. See Memorandum of Mazabuka Farmers Association, Sec/Dev/42, S.N.A.

\(^2\)See Sir Alan Pim, "Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and Economic position of Northern Rhodesia" (1938), pp. 210-211.
(R.N.L.B.) continued to disrupt his supply of labourers. The frustration of the settler farmer during these years can be clearly seen in a letter sent to the Administration in 1927 by S. Harris Wroth, one of the leading settler spokesmen on the plateau.

'It is with very great regret I feel compelled to write complaints at any time but as an old farmer and cattle breeder of 40 years experience, I think it my duty to point out to Government, the hopeless state of affairs in connection with the Veterinary Department... in this district. Cattle have died all round here this season of skin disease and as far as I can see, no real effort has been made to tackle the problem. I asked our Vet. why some of these cattle were not taken to Chilanga and experimented on and, of course, got the usual reply "No facilities". If that is so, what is all the money spent in connection with veterinary research? ... The Vet. doesn't feel the loss, neither does it affect his personal comfort. The poor devil of a farmer is told by the Government he is having a big sum of money spent on him every year... and he should feel very grateful for such services.'

Caught up in a situation where a number of them were in no position to meet the interest payments on their lands, settlers increasingly complained of their needs being neglected by the Administration. More and more they compared their situation to that of their counterparts across the Zambesi in Southern Rhodesia who, on the whole, enjoyed much better services from their Agriculture and Veterinary Departments as well as more flexible credit terms. This gave rise to renewed demands for Amalgamation, for the farmers were convinced that their situation would only improve

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1 Competition for labour between the R.N.L.B. and the territory's farmers had started during the days of Company rule. See Chapter 1, pp. 49-55.

2 B1/1 A.1506, Z.N.A. S. Harris Wroth to Chief Secretary, 10.7.27.

3 In 1927 farmers owed the Administration some £8,474; this sum was made up of £6,233 in respect of the purchase price of land alienated under permit of occupation and £2,241 in respect of lease rents owing'. Knowing the financial situation of most farmers, the Administration had to consider the possibility of writing off the debts. C.O.795/16 (P.R.O.), Governor to Colonial Office, 4.2.27.
if they gained access to the technical and financial assistance offered by the Southern Rhodesian Authorities. Apart from the purely economic considerations, there was apparently the popular political argument that the settler community would be better placed to meet the threats that might emanate from the African population if Northern Rhodesia was amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia and its larger white population. The limited white population in the North would cease to be a real problem for, in the amalgamated Rhodesia, the whites of the South would be actively involved in the affairs of the northern territory and would do all they could to protect settler interests by resisting African demands for political equality. The settlers' monopoly of political power would therefore be fully guaranteed.

The Hilton Young Commission

In 1928 the Hilton Young Commission, which was investigating the possibility of closer union of the British dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa, arrived on the plateau. Settler farmers were quick to seize the opportunity to make their views known. In a memorandum, jointly submitted by a Lusaka and Mazabuka delegation, the settlers made it clear that they were 'totally opposed to any form of Federation with the north until Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia is an accomplished fact'. The Memorandum

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2. Representing Mazabuka were four prominent farmers: T. King, L.J. Marston, G. Burdett and H. Ilsley.

3. Bl/3/36, Z.N.A. Memo. of evidence to be given by the combined Lusaka and Mazabuka delegations to the Hilton Young Commission.
listed the reasons why such Amalgamation was felt to be in the territory’s interest. It emphasised the ‘superiority of the Veterinary and Agricultural facilities in Southern Rhodesia’, and pointed out that with Amalgamation ‘Land Bank and other specialised loan facilities will be available’. Settler farmers found particularly attractive the fact that ‘Southern Rhodesia possesses dairying, pig, fruit, poultry, sheep, sericulture, cotton plant, tobacco breeding and dry-farming experts’, whereas in Northern Rhodesia there were ‘no such facilities’. Amalgamation, they concluded in their enthusiasm, would ‘relieve the British Government of all financial liability for Northern Rhodesia and the development of its resources will no longer be at the mercy of changes in the home political situation’.¹

Although evidence heard by the Commission weighed heavily in favour of Amalgamation, its members were not to be easily swayed. They rejected any possibilities of Federation between the territories outright because of the fear that it ‘affords no solution of the problems of the non self governing Dependencies in the Northern group’ and also because they were convinced that a self-governing Southern Rhodesia would try to dominate the union. Amalgamation was also ruled out because of African opposition to it in various parts of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.²

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¹Ibid.
The years of the Depression gave added impetus to the drive for Amalgamation. The period saw the ruin of a number of settler farmers, who had to abandon their farms to go southwards or join the public service as produce prices fell and loans became ever more scarce. Those who continued to farm during the slump complained that although 'individual cases of farming prosperity occur ... the farming population certainly does not increase, disappointment and dissatisfaction are rife and have their inevitable effect in retarding economic progress'. They drew the Administration's attention to the much healthier Administration/Farmer relations that obtained in the Southern territories, where 'governments closely and continuously associate themselves with every branch of farming production...'. To end the uncertainty, the Authorities were called upon to outline 'a clear, public and unequivocal statement of their attitude and intention with regard to the presence in Northern Rhodesia of a permanent farming community...'.

The controversy generated by the publication, in 1930, of the Passfield Memorandum, was to quicken the momentum of the Amalgamation drive. Passfield, the Colonial Secretary, maintained in this memorandum that Britain was determined to pursue the policy which was created for Kenya in 1923, viz. 'that the interests of the African natives must be paramount and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict,

1Sec/61/33, Z.N.A. Memorandum to Chief Secretary from the Northern Rhodesia Farmers Association, 11.3.30.

2Memorandum on Native policy in East Africa, Cmd. 3573 (London, 1930).
the former should prevail.¹ This was the biggest official threat that settlerdom had ever faced, for its implementation would have subverted the work which the segregative policy of containment had done and was still doing. To say that African interests were to be paramount when in conflict with that of the whites was to make irrelevant the instruments of social control which had been imported from the South and introduced with strong settler support to ensure settler dominance over the other races in the territory. For instance, by 1930, apart from the native reserves policy, the pass system which rigidly regulated the movements of Africans in areas of European settlement, especially the townships along the line of rail, was already in force. The various townships were under the control of Town Management Boards which were dominated by the settlers. The Boards saw to it that African movement within the Townships was kept under constant check. The line of rail towns were considered European areas and the African was allowed urban residence only if he was in the employ of the Government or some other private employer. Africans who were not so employed were considered loafers and whenever the local police toured the locations in which urban Africans lived, those who failed to produce evidence of gainful employment were ordered back to the reserves.²

² This harassment of Africans, some of whom were classified as loafers, even though they were engaged in petty trading in the locations, was to be taken up by the Mazabuka Welfare Association during the mid 1930s. (See KDB 4/2/4, Z.N.A. Minutes of a meeting of the Mazabuka Welfare Association held on 23rd February 1934). Some of the Association's activities are discussed later on in this chapter.
Within the townships, Africans had to carry identification certificates. Up to 1930, this certificate took the form of a pass for all Africans. While visiting relations or working in the townships they were required to carry the pass, especially at night, and failure to produce the document when it was requested by an officer of the law usually brought fines of up to £10 or the equivalent in imprisonment. As from September 1930, Africans working in the townships were allowed to use their certificates of employment (Chituna) as a pass. Life in the townships was strictly organised on colour-bar lines. Africans in these areas were, by 1930, already experiencing a variety of discriminatory practices in the Post Offices, eating places, shops, butcheries and other public places where the races were likely to come into contact.

In the prevailing atmosphere, the Passfield Memorandum was therefore strongly criticized by the settlers. Meetings were called at Mazabuka and Choma on the plateau and in other parts of the territory, at which settler leaders outlined the dangers in the declaration and the need to challenge it. In protesting against the Memorandum, the settlers argued that the British Empire should be 'primarily concerned with the furtherance of the interests of British subjects of British race and only thereafter with other British subjects, protected races and the nationals of other countries...' They maintained that the British Government's intention 'to subordinate the interests of civilized Britons to the development of

1 Interviews in various Chieftaincies on the plateau.

2 ZA2/2, Z.N.A. Official circular No. 1191/64 of 29th May, 1930 on the subject of native registration.
alien races whose capability of substantial further advancement has not been demonstrated, appears to be contrary to natural law.\textsuperscript{1}

Demands for Amalgamation with the South were renewed, for more than at any time before, settlers felt a need to tie in their fortunes with their counterparts across the Zambesi. A number of settlers who had, till now, not quite made up their minds about the wisdom of Amalgamation, decided, at this stage, that Amalgamation, in spite of its disadvantages, would definitely procure that security which the whites needed. They therefore decided to support the Amalgamationists. One very prominent settler in this group of converts was Leopold Moore, perhaps the most outspoken settler in the territory at this time.\textsuperscript{2}

Attempts by the Governor of the territory, Sir James Maxwell and his successor, Sir Hubert Young, to reassure the settlers that the Passfield Memorandum did not mean any radical change in the Colonial Office's policy, failed to rid settlers of their suspicions. After the election of 1935, a motion was introduced in the Legislative Council demanding the union of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. It was, however, defeated by the official majority. This setback, however, only strengthened the resolve of the Amalgamationists. In January 1936, all the elected members of the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly met with representatives of the three political

\textsuperscript{1}See Correspondence with regard to Native Policy in Northern Rhodesia, Cmd. 3731 (London, 1930).

\textsuperscript{2}Leopold Moore was to move a motion in favour of Amalgamation between the two territories, in the Legislative Council on 1st June, 1938. See Hansard, No. 30, Col. 280.
parties of the Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly at the Victoria Falls. The attitude of the Southern Rhodesians to Amalgamation with the North had changed considerably for, with the expansion of copper mining in Northern Rhodesia after the Depression, the territory seemed at last capable of offering something to her partner in union. At this Victoria Falls meeting, the two sides agreed to a resolution which declared that 'the early amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia under a constitution conferring the right of complete self-Government is in the interests of all the inhabitants of both Colonies.' Increased demands for Amalgamation were to lead to the appointment of a commission of enquiry under Lord Bledisloe, in 1937, to investigate the possibilities of closer union. However, before examining the work and recommendations of this commission as well as the political activities of the forties, it is necessary, at this stage, to examine the initial African reaction on the plateau to the settler challenge.

**African Welfare Associations on the plateau**

The challenge posed by the settlers during this period was anxiously taken up by some members of the African population in the townships of the plateau. The townships were a meeting place for Africans from various areas within and outside the southern province. During the slump of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the African population in the townships was to increase considerably. Faced with the social problems of the urban areas, these Africans decided to

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form Associations to present their grievances to the Administration. The immigrant population was to feature prominently in these efforts at political organisation.

During the years of the Depression, farming on the plateau suffered a serious slump and the number of migrant labourers leaving the reserves in search of wage employment in the townships of the territory and further south into Rhodesia, increased considerably. Most of the able-bodied men were attracted to the main townships, Mazabuka, Monze and Choma in particular, where there were possibilities of employment, mainly unskilled, with the railways and in various Departments of Government. The majority of migrants had little or no education and they served, mainly, as messengers and odd job labourers. A few who had been educated at local missions to Std V or VI level served as clerks and also in minor supervisory jobs. The townships also attracted many Africans from outside the Southern province, most of them coming from the Western and Eastern provinces and from neighbouring Nyasaland. Quite a large percentage of the Lozi and Nyasalanders who took up jobs in the townships had acquired a comparatively higher standard of education than their Tonga counterparts. Many of them, therefore, qualified for clerical jobs and were often the leaders of African opinion in the various townships. In the African Welfare Associations that were formed on the plateau during the early 1930s, these immigrants, several of whom had lived on the plateau for many years, were to play a very prominent role. They were also conspicuous in later

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1See Chapter III, p. 110.
efforts to organise Africans in the reserves for political action as will be seen presently. With some of the plateau's Chiefs already mentioned, these immigrants pioneered the cause of African protest on the Tonga plateau during the 1930s. At a time when the vast majority of the local Tonga were facing up to the economic realities of the Depression, these immigrants, several of whom were lucky to retain their jobs in the townships, in spite of the slump, found time to address themselves to the social problems that had beset the African community. Although their activities never attracted much local support, they were to provide some of the inspiration behind the formation of a Northern Rhodesia African Congress in one of the Chieftaincies of the plateau in 1937.

By the late 1920s and early thirties, African workers in the two main townships on the plateau, Mazabuka and Choma, decided to organise themselves into Welfare Associations to protect their interests. These Associations were to address themselves to the grievances of the African population which had accumulated with the years. They would then make representations to the Administration in the hope that action would be taken to alleviate the situation. African Welfare Associations were by no means a new idea in 1930. There had been several Welfare Associations in Nyasaland, the original impetus for their formation came from Livingstonia. These

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1 See Chapter II.
2 Ibid.
Associations had no immediate imitators in Northern Rhodesia but in 1912 a group of Africans who had been in contact with Livingstonia decided to start a welfare association at Mwengo in the northern part of the territory. After functioning for some time, the Mwengo Association collapsed around 1914, although it was to be revived later.\(^1\) In 1930 about five Nyasa Civil Servants formed a similar Association in Livingstone\(^2\) and the Mazabuka Welfare Association which was formed on the Tonga plateau in July 1930, derived its inspiration directly from the Livingstone movement.

The Mazabuka Association was formed as a result of the efforts of William Mhone, a clerk of the Native Education Department, who on his transfer from Livingstone to Mazabuka was requested by the leaders of the Livingstone Association to examine the possibility of starting an Association there.\(^3\) On arrival Mhone, who was a Nyasalander, contacted a leading Lozi resident, Josiah Imbowa. Josiah, who was the son of the Lozi Induna, Mbowa, was at the time a clerk at the Central Research Station.\(^4\) At a meeting held at the Nakambala Compound in July 1930, the Association was inaugurated and from its inception its executive was dominated by immigrant Africans. The Association had a number of Tonga members but, according

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\(^1\)Cook, op. cit., pp. 106-111. See also "Autobiographical sketch" by Donald Siwale, in Africa Social Research, No. 15, June 1973, p. 366.
\(^2\)Cook, p. 125.
\(^3\)Sec/Nat/323, Z.N.A. Mazabuka Welfare Association to Provincial Commissioner, 23.9.30.
\(^4\)Ibid. Minutes of meeting of Mazabuka Welfare Association, 22.5.31.
to Informants, they did not show any strong commitment to its programme and their attendance at meetings was very irregular. One Informant gave the following explanation: 'They/Tonga members/ attended meetings on Sundays when they were not going home to the village to visit their relatives. They paid their subscriptions regularly but few would sit in front at meetings. Most of them were usually at the back. Few said anything.'

This reluctance to get too deeply involved in Association activities could, perhaps, partly be explained by the fact that most, if not all of the Tonga members, were target workers who were in the township but not of it. Most of them regarded their stay in the urban environment as a sojourn during which they would accumulate as much capital as possible to take back to their villages for the improvement of their farming activities. Very few considered themselves long term residents. The vast majority therefore maintained a very superficial interest in the local Welfare Association whose programme tended naturally to focus more on urban than rural problems. The Tonga in the township were quite content to leave the task of managing the Association in the hands of the enthusiastic immigrants and it is significant that the fourteen executive members elected to run the Mazabuka Association in 1931 were all immigrants. In June 1931, a Welfare Association was officially inaugurated in Choma. Here again the immigrant

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1 Interview with Nelson Liyanda, 9.12.73.
2 Sec/Nat/323, Z.N.A. Mazabuka Welfare Association Meeting of 22.5.31.
population was allowed a monopoly of executive positions, the local Tonga content to play a subordinate role.¹

At Association meetings members highlighted their various grievances which arose from the treatment Africans, in general, were receiving in the townships. An Association meeting held in Mazabuka in July 1931 started off with a member tabling a motion condemning the way African customers were being treated at the local butcheries. He pointed out that Africans were not allowed to purchase meat of their choice in the butcheries and that in most cases they had to content themselves with bony, even decomposing meat, which was handed to them through hatches, as they were not allowed into the shops.²

Another drew attention to the molestation Africans suffered at the hands of whites when using the townships' pavements and suggested that 'it would be a good thing if streets were enlarged so as to allow natives a space in which they could walk in safety and away from fear and danger of traffic'. There was also a great deal of dissatisfaction over the abuse of Africans by whites at the Mazabuka railway station. The practice of man-handling and insulting ticket-buyers was strongly condemned.³

Mabers also criticized those settlers who insisted that African cyclists should always dismount when they came across a white cyclist and those officials who forced Africans to take off their

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¹Sec/Nat/333, Z.N.A. The Choma Association was formed, apparently, around August, 1930, but official recognition was first sought in 1931. See Amafumba's letter in appendix.

²Sec/Nat/323, Z.N.A. Minutes of meeting held on 31.7.31.

³Ibid.
shoes before entering Government offices.¹

The Choma Association, which met more regularly than the Mazabuka body,² discussed at meetings problems very similar to those of the Mazabuka Africans. Some of its members were however slightly more radical than their Mazabuka counterparts. For instance, in August 1930, Richard Amafumba, a resident Lozi, addressed a letter to the members of the Kafue Native Warfare Association, as he called it, in which he emphasised the need for Africans to shake off their cowardice and unite. 'Cowardice', he wrote, 'is a defect, a deficiency, a blight, and has its roots in all that which makes for deterioration and depravity of humanity.' He stressed the need for increased awareness among Africans:

'If you keep reading various papers, you will be assured of the struggle that is now going on in the world among nations for complete freedom. As we do not aspire for freedom in every sense [sic], we will not be a free people ... Do you realise the position in which you are? Do you realise that the death is staring us in the face, economically, industrially and otherwise Oh! my Africans, there is no use crying to be redeemed by Americans from the Exterior without having interior foundation of strength [sic].

He called for alertness, for 'Great Britain is bringing her own doom, so be watchful ...'. In conclusion, he expressed the hope

¹Ibid. Minutes of Association meeting held on 22.5.31. Members also criticized the practice of prosecuting unemployed Africans, who were accused of being loafers though they engaged in petty trading, as well as the illtreatment of African customers at the Townships' beerhalls. See KDB 4/2/4, Z.N.A. Minutes of meeting held on 23.2.34.

²Sec/Nat/333, Z.N.A. Minutes of Association meeting, 15.8.31.
that all Association branches within the territory would participate in this indispensable co-operative movement by subscribing to this powerful effort toward the industrial emancipation of our race. 1

The Administration kept a close watch on the discussions of the Welfare Associations2 and, especially, on the activities of influential Africans, like Amafumba, who were the leaders of African opinion in the townships. It is interesting to note that, by August 1931, Amafumba had been arraigned on a charge of stock theft and sentenced to two years imprisonment,3 a very heavy penalty, it seems, for such a crime in those days. 4

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1 ZA 1/11/1, Z.N.A. For full text of Amafumba's letter, see Appendix. One detects a strong Ethiopianist element in Amafumba's ideas. His reference to Americans was presumably a criticism of the effects of contemporary Watch Tower preaching. Watch Tower did not, however, attract much support on the plateau. It had a few members in the Nakambala compound in Mazabuka who organised meetings and sold tracts but they made hardly any impact. In 1937 the work of the Watch Tower adherents was described as 'laudably uncontroversial and unobtrusive'. See ZA 7/1/17/3, KDB 1/5/11 and KDB 6/1/1/6, Z.N.A. Also Native Affairs report, 1937, p.38.

2 For instance, the Secretary for Native Affairs instructed in the thirties that 'the Amalgamation of the two Rhodesias is a political matter which native employees of Government should not be permitted to discuss' and, he went on, 'I would suggest that the Welfare Associations delete the subject from their Agenda...'. See, Sec/Nat/332, Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Secretary (undated).

3 Sec/Nat/333, Z.N.A. Comments by the D.C. Kalomo on Choma Welfare Association Minutes.

4 Informants told the author that offenders of this sort usually received sentences ranging from 6 months to 1 year.
Josiah Imbowa of the Mazabuka Association was also under official surveillance during the early thirties, because District officials were convinced he would be a bad influence on Africans. In a despatch to the Governor, one official noted: 'I think that at Mazabuka, the leading spirit, Josiah Imbowa will be definitely a nuisance. He is related to the Barotse royal family, he is extremely intelligent and, I fear, entirely disloyal.'

Imbowa's influence within the Association, however, continued to grow and by the beginning of 1933, he had led so many delegations of protest to the Mazabuka Boma, that he was recognised by both whites and Africans as the undisputed leader of the African community. He was now clearly a threat to the Administration and so, in July 1933, he was transferred to Mkushi, in the Central Province.

The members of the Welfare Associations came under much pressure from their kinsmen who lived in the reserves and who had problems and grievances of their own which they wanted the Associations to articulate. These were essentially rural problems, connected with farming activities. Several Association members, who still maintained their ties with their villages in the reserves, felt that the Associations could do something about rural grievances,

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1Sec/Nat/323, Z.N.A. D.M. Kennedy to Governor, 13.10.30.

2Ibid. Minutes of Mazabuka. Welfare Association meeting, held 4.10.33. The 'transfer' weapon was repeatedly employed by the Administration to break the Association. In 1933, a Mazabuka delegate to a Conference of Welfare Associations all over the territory told of the loss, since 1932, of 'prominent members' through transfer. As a result, 'We have at present a small number of members who are interested in the Association', he told the gathering. See Sec/Nat/311, Z.N.A. Proceedings of General meeting of United African Welfare Associations, 10-11th July, 1933.
by way of representations to the Administration, so that living conditions in the reserves could be improved. At a meeting of representatives of several Welfare Associations, held at Kafue in July, 1933, a motion demanding that 'the Government should be requested to permit our Association's wings to stretch out in the villages for the common good of the people',¹ was passed unanimously. When, however, the text of this resolution reached Moffat Thompson, the Secretary for Native Affairs, he made it quite clear that the Administration was not prepared to see the Associations extending their activities into the reserves. In a despatch to the Chief Secretary he wrote: 'I recommend... that the Welfare Associations be told definitely once and for all that they are not permitted to carry on their activities in the villages, that Native Authorities, under the guidance of District Officers, are much more capable of attending to their own affairs than any group of alien or detribalised natives and that disciplinary action will be taken against the members in Government employment of any Association that ignores this warning.'²

Provincial Commissioners were accordingly informed through a despatch from the Chief Secretary in September, 1933, that Associations would only enjoy the Administration's recognition if they restricted themselves to looking after 'the non-political interests of detribalised natives resident in the various townships' and gave up any ideas of speaking 'on behalf of

²Ibid. Secretary for Native Affairs to Chief Secretary, 25.8.33.
the people in the tribal areas.\footnote{Ibid. Chief Secretary to all Provincial Commissioners, 4.9.33.}

The Administration also singled out the most influential group of Africans within the Associations, viz., the Civil Servants, for special mention. Their views expressed at Association meetings were becoming a source of great embarrassment to officials. It was the Civil Servant, for instance, who was always spearheading discussions of such sensitive subjects as Amalgamation, an issue the Administration wanted Africans to let alone. The excesses of the Civil Servant had, therefore, to be curbed. At a meeting with the District Commissioner in September 1933, members of the Mazabuka Association were told quite bluntly that Government employees should not address their meetings any more, although they were free to attend and offer advice in the background.\footnote{KDB 4/2/4, Z.N.A. Minutes of meeting of Mazabuka Welfare Association held on 3.9.33.}

The Administration's clampdown on the activities of Welfare Associations on the Tonga plateau had a two-fold effect on the local African population. It killed much of the interest that town dwellers had shown in the Association's activities. Attendance at meetings dropped sharply by the end of 1933 and the District report for 1934 observed that 'the Mazabuka ... Association... is very inactive as none of the members are very interested'.\footnote{ZA 7/1/17/3, Z.N.A. Annual report, 1934.}

Officials were now convinced that the Administration's efforts to check the rapid politicization of the Associations had been a success.
In 1934 it was reported that 'the tendency of African Welfare Associations to develop into political bodies with members of the Native Civil Service in their van has ceased'. The second major effect of the clampdown on Welfare Associations' activity was the development, within the rural areas, of a realisation of the urgent need for a representative organ, that would span both urban and rural areas. In 1937 an attempt was made to supply this need for, in March of that year, the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (N.R.A.C.) was formed in the area of the widely respected Chief Benjamin Chongo.

The Northern Rhodesia African Congress (N.R.A.C.) of 1937.

The N.R.A.C. was formed in Chief Chongo's village, during celebrations to mark the award of a Certificate of Honour to him by the Administration. The founder members of the Congress were five farmers, all of them ex-teachers, who were living in different parts of the plateau. They were Ellison Milambo, of Keemba Hill, the retired Headmaster of Rusangu Mission primary school; Samuel Sibanda, a resident Ndebele of Mujika; Daniel Muhwahwi, a farmer in Chief Monze's area; George Kaluwa, a resident Nyasalander who lived at Manenga in Chief Mwanachingwala's area, and Gideon Ndan-dala Mankapwi, a farmer in Chief Chongo's area. Apart from Kaluwa

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1KDB 6/1/1/7, Z.N.A. Annual Report on Southern Province, 1934.
2Chongo had been described in 1936 by an official as 'the best and most capable chief whom I have yet come into contact with ... and the most enlightened'. In 1935 he had served, for a while, as Deputy for Chief Monze. See KDB 6/7/5/3, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 2, 1936 and Sec/Nat/196, Vol. II, District Veterinary Officer to D.C., Mazabuka, 15.6.35.
3This was in recognition of his services during the inoculation campaig of 1935 to combat Foot and Mouth disease. Sec/Nat/196, Vol. II, Young to Ormsby-Gore, 29.7.36.
4Milambo was the leader of the Farming Community at Keemba Hill and Head of the local Farmers Association. See Chapter IX, pp. 183-185.
5The author had interviews with all three surviving members of this Congress: Milambo, Mankapwi and Sibanda.
who was a Methodist, the others were all members of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. With the exception of Mankapwi, all had had direct experience of the conditions under which Africans lived in Southern Rhodesia, either while they were undergoing teacher training at the S.D.A.'s Solusi Mission in Bulawayo or while in local employment. As a result, they returned to Northern Rhodesia fully apprised of the frustrations settler policies had created among the Africans of that territory and their decision to form a Congress was, in the main, prompted by a determination to protect Northern Rhodesia's Africans from a similar fate. This was how one of the surviving founder members put it: 'We had seen what it was like to be a slave in one's country. You had all the worst jobs, all the poor, sandy land and you were kicked and pushed around. Africans in Southern Rhodesia were nothing but slaves to the bwanas. We did not want this to happen to us.'

The two immigrant founder members of the Congress, Kaluwa and Sibanda, appear to have played a major role in getting the movement started. The author was told by the surviving founder members of the Congress that Charles Kaluwa, the Nyasalander, was the main driving force behind the N.R.A.C.'s formation. Kaluwa, whose father had settled on the plateau as a trader and farmer, was educated at Waddilove in Southern Rhodesia and he later trained to become a teacher. After working in various schools in Bulawayo and Salisbury he returned to Northern Rhodesia and was later to become the first

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1 Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.4.

2 Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Gideon Mankapwi and Samuel Sibanda.
African Headmaster of the Jeanes school in Mazabuka. For a long time he was also to serve as an Assessor in one of the Native Authority Courts. By the time of the N.R.A.C.'s formation Kaluwa had apparently given up teaching and was actively engaged in farming a plot he owned in Munenga while at the same time operating a little store. He was widely respected on the plateau for his education and achievements and people remember him as a persuasive speaker and a brilliant organiser. In spite of his popularity, Kaluwa appears to have been quite conscious of his awkward position as an immigrant in a Northern Rhodesia Congress. According to informants, this was the main reason why he insisted on Milambo becoming the movement's President, although the other founder members wanted him to occupy that position.

Sibanda, the Ndebele founder member of the N.R.A.C., was the son of Jacob Detsha Sibanda, an immigrant who had accompanied Pastor Anderson of the Seventh Day Adventists when he set out from Southern Rhodesia to begin missionary work among the Tonga. The young Sibanda received the greater part of his education in Bulawayo and he later qualified as a teacher. After teaching in Bulawayo for a year, he returned to Northern Rhodesia where he taught at the Rusangu (S.D.A.) Mission for some time before taking up farming. Sibanda's control of the English language was very

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1 Interviews on the plateau. Also, N/0001/2/8, Z.N.A. Confidential Correspondence on George Kaluwa and Chief Kpezeni, 6.11.52, and evidence collected by Lord Bledisloe's Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission. Cmd. 5949 (London, 1939), Vol. IV, part A.

2 Interviews.

3 While he was Headmaster of the Jeanes school he spent a lot of time organising various social activities for African children and adults on the plateau. Interviews.

4 Interviews with Sibanda (18.11.73), Mankapwi (28.11.73) and Milambo (10.2.74).

5 Interviews. Also BS3/458, Z.N.A. District Commissioner Mazabuka to
much above the local average and it was on him that the main responsibility for the drafting of the N.R.A.C.'s constitution fell.¹

After their constitution had been drafted, the Congress' members organised themselves into an executive. Ellison Milambo became the President with Sibanda as Vice-President. Kaluwa occupied the position of Secretary-General with Daniel Muhwahwi as his deputy. The post of Treasurer went to Gideon Mankapwi. Although the Congress' founders were full of praise for some of the policies of the Northern Rhodesia Government,² they had no doubts about the need to keep a wary eye on the Administration. In their constitution, they spelt out the aims of their movement. These were:

'(a) To keep and promote the welfare and interests of Africans in Northern Rhodesia.

(b) To assist in every way necessary the Government and Mission bodies in Northern Rhodesia, for the good of the country.

(c) To enquire and report any matter tending to injure the welfare and interests of Africans in Northern Rhodesia.

(d) To keep in touch with all Congress meetings and Welfare meetings in Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and South Africa.'³

¹Interviews.
²They expressed their gratitude over the Jeanes school in Mazabuka, the Trades school in Lusaka, the Maize Control Board, the Native Authority system and the Administration's Health facilities. Sec/Nat/348, Northern Rhodesia African Congress to D.C. Mazabuka, 25/6/37.
³Ibid. Constitution of the N.R.A.C. For full text, see Appendix.
The Administration was here being asked to recognise a movement which, though initially organised in a small part of the territory, was designed to protect Africans throughout the country while, at the same time, maintaining contacts with African Associations in some of the neighbouring territories. The link with the Southern territories, in particular, was decisive in the movement's formation. The fact that much of the inspiration came from the South can be clearly seen in the repeated rendition, by the S.D.A. primary school choir and the people present of the song 'Baiti-lani-na-nazi, Ba Ka Congress', at the movement's inauguration, a song which, among other things, paid tribute to Mafukuzela, who was a spokesman for African rights in South Africa and had made trips abroad to win support for his people's struggle for their political rights. The Northern Rhodesia African Congress drew much inspiration from the African National Congress of South Africa and its founders believed that their movement would come to perform similar services for the territory's African population.

In an attempt to strengthen the N.R.A.C.'s position and enhance its appeal, the Congress' founder members appealed to various influential Chiefs on the Tonga plateau for support. They met with a warm response for the Chiefs who, on the whole, had very little education and who saw this as a good opportunity to join

1 See full text of this song in the appendix. That the S.D.A. primary school choir under its African leader, Job Koko, was rendering songs with strong political undertones as early as 1937 was, perhaps, a pointer to the leading role the African members of the church were to play in the politics of the plateau.

2 Mafukuzela could well have been a praise name for Clements Kadalie, a Nyasalander who started the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of South Africa in 1919. Or perhaps it was used in reference to James Gumede or Pixley Seme, leaders of the African National
cause with the more educated villagers. Among the Chiefs who gave their support to the movement were Monze, Mwanachingwala, Chongo, Siamusonde, Sianjalika, Mwanza, Siama undu and Chisu wo. The Congress leaders then decided to approach the Administration for official recognition of their movement. A delegation, headed by Milambo, left Keemba Hill, the official home of Congress, to see the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, R. S. Hudson. According to Milambo's account of the meeting, Hudson tried to discourage the Congress idea by telling the delegation of its political connotations. He warned the farmers against getting involved in political activity, advised them to leave the job of protecting African interests in the hands of the Chiefs and Native Authorities and told them not to be 'troublesome'.

The Administration had no intention whatever of recognising the Congress and this was clearly revealed in an anonymous minute written by an official on the matter. After condemning the Southern province's 'system of Intelligence ... in regard to Native Affairs' for not getting news of the inaugural March meeting of the Congress till June, he wrote:

'This Congress appears to cut right across the scheme of local Self-Government through the tribal Authorities. It is unfortunate but understandable that the Chiefs did

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1 There was, at this time, some strain in relations between the Chiefs and the more educated villagers. In 1937, it was reported: 'The educated Native is beginning to ask himself what is the purpose of education when those holding the highest posts remain themselves uneducated. Conversely, the elderly and ignorant Chief is diffident in passing judgement upon Natives more knowledgeable than himself.' See Native Affairs Report, 1937, p. 39.

2 Sec/Nat/748, Z.N.A., Northern Rhodesia African Congress to District Commissioner, 25.6.37.

3 Interview with Milambo, 10.2.74.
not realize that they were putting themselves in the hands of a Super Authority who would dictate to them and endeavour to get between them and Government. I recommend that the Congress shall not be recognised. All its functions can be carried out by the Native Authorities which a member of the Congress can help as an individual..."1

Thus, under the pretext that it was out to protect unsuspecting Chiefs, who had no idea of what they were letting themselves in for, the Administration refused to recognise Congress. Officials argued that the movement 'would interfere both with the policy of controlling natives in tribal areas through Native Authorities and of obtaining the views of natives in non-tribal areas through Native Councils...."2

Because it had failed to gain the necessary official approval, Congress' activities were substantially curtailed and it became impossible to organise meetings openly or to go around recruiting new members. However, contrary to the official view that Congress had been dissolved or was dormant by the end of 1937,3 the leaders of the movement and a few close supporters continued to meet, occasionally, under cover, in Chief Chongo's home to discuss ways and means of combating the problems facing the African population.4 Settler demands for Amalgamation, so persistent during the late thirties, featured prominently in these secret meetings. Whenever Administration officials came round on tour of their various areas

1 Sec/Nat/348, Z.N.A. Anonymous Official's comments on N.R.A.C.
2 Ibid. Acting Chief Secretary to Provincial Commissioner, 12.8.37.
4 Interviews with Sibanda, Milambo and Mankapwi.
Congress officials would, individually, acquaint them with African opposition to the settler proposals. The Movement's leaders were still together in 1938 when the Bledisloe Commission of Inquiry arrived to hear evidence on the plateau and three of them appeared before the Commission to condemn Amalgamation. Congress, however, finally collapsed during the early years of 1939, partly because its members saw no point in carrying on a movement that could not operate openly and was not recognised by the Government, but also because of certain personal disagreements between the immigrant and Tonga members.  

The Bledisloe Commission and after

African attempts on the Tonga plateau to organise themselves to meet the challenge they faced from the settler minority had thus come to nought by the time that the Bledisloe Commission arrived on the plateau in July 1938. The Welfare Associations had succumbed to the pressures exerted on them by the Administration and discontent and frustration continued to be widespread among Africans in both urban and rural areas of the plateau. The settlers too, had their share of frustration, for the British Government's refusal to give in to their demands for Amalgamation meant that they risked losing their socio-political dominance within the territory.

The mood of the African population, during the late thirties and forties, was clearly reflected in their reaction to mounting

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1 Interview with Ellison Milambo (10.2.74).
settler demands for Responsible Government or Amalgamation. In the evidence they gave before the Bledisloe Commission and in letters to officials on the subject, the Chiefs and their people were to explain the reasons why they were so passionately opposed to Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.

In anticipation of the Commission's arrival on the plateau, District officials were instructed to sound the views of the Chiefs and their people on the settlers' Amalgamation proposals. In their replies the Chiefs of the Tonga plateau voiced their objections to any form of union with Southern Rhodesia and advanced various reasons for this. Chief Mwanza informed the District Commissioners of the strong objections of his people to closer union: 'We people of this country cannot manage the laws of Southern Rhodesia...'; he wrote. Chief Moyo, in his letter, explained, 'My people have refused to be joined to these countries... All my people have refused to join Southern Rhodesia to people who shed... blood when they first faced with Englishmen. We are women and we refuse. My people refused even to join to Nyasaland...' Other Chiefs went even further than this and pointed out the loss which the African populations of the South had suffered as a result of settler rule. Chief Chongo, for instance, drew attention

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1Sec/E.A./11, Z.N.A. Chief Mwanza to D.C. Mazabuka, 30.5.38.
2Ibid.
to the privations under which Africans were living in Southern Rhodesia, something he had himself observed while in employment in the territory. He wrote: 'All good lands were taken by white people, the natives were given only sandsoil, so they don't get enough food.' Besides, he noted, cattle dipping, a very controversial subject on the plateau, was compulsory in Southern Rhodesia and taxes for bicycles and dogs were higher than in Northern Rhodesia. He touched also on the popular Tonga fear that with Amalgamation there would certainly be an accompanying influx of Afrikaner Immigrants. He wrote: 'We have got our own guns and spears so we enjoy ourselves to kill game as we like. So if we join, "Dutch" farmers will come and disturb us on our living and they will take all the lands...'

The Chief compared the state of the Civil Service in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia and criticized the latter because it provided employment for only a handful of Africans. In Southern Rhodesia, he wrote, 'all the important jobs are occupied by white people, they don't allow natives hold important jobs. If you go in office in Southern Rhodesia, you will find only white people, this shows that Southern Rhodesia people are having bad treatment.'

The leading figures of the 1937 Congress movement, joined by two prominent residents of Mazabuka Township, also wrote to

1Judah Bbuka, The Chief's Assessor and close friend for many years, told the author of Chongo's trips to Southern Rhodesia. Interview 15.12.73.

2Sec/EA/11, Z.N.A. Chief Chongo to D.C. Mazabuka, 2.6.38.
District officials, condemning the Amalgamation demands. They had all had direct experience of living conditions in the Southern territories, for varying periods of time,¹ and so could talk confidently of the Southern territory's Pass laws, higher taxes and prosecutions of farmers who failed to dip their cattle.²

The letters sent to local officials on the Amalgamation issue clearly showed how alive African migrants had been to the social situation prevailing in the South and how rich their experience was of African living conditions in the territory. This had engendered a remarkable political awareness in many areas. The Native Affairs report for 1938 commented on this growing consciousness. It noted: 'It is not generally realised the extreme interest that natives take in political questions, particularly those who move outside the territory for the purpose of seeking employment and who come into contact with other forms of Government. On their return to their villages, they undoubtedly discuss their adventures abroad, and no doubt, discuss the treatment they have received and the laws they are required to comply with, comparing them favourably or otherwise with the Government in this country.'³ What the migrant

¹Kaluwa had served in Bulawayo and Salisbury as a teacher for 10 years; Sibgnda, as a student and teacher in Bulawayo for 5 years; Milambo, as student and teacher in Bulawayo for 2 years; Kalindawqlo as medical orderly in Bulawayo for 14 years, and Inyama as Police Kaseni in Mafeking and Bechuanaland. See, Record of oral evidence to Bledisloe Commission, Vol. IV (Part A).


³Native Affairs report, 1938, p.29.
labourer had found across the Zambesi had made him aware of the
certainty that the Africans' condition in the north was slightly better
in certain important respects. He was, therefore, determined
to resist any attempts to force the standard down to the Southern
Rhodesia level.

African objections to closer union clearly centred around
the land question. There was the fear of losing more land not
only to incoming Afrikaner settlers, but also to the enemy of the
past, the Matabele, who they believed would seize on Amalgamation
as an excuse for moving northwards. Colonial rule had not com­
pletely resolved the differences between the Tonga and Ndebele.
The resident community of Immigrant Ndebele at Mujika, in Chief
Mwanza's area, were at loggerheads with the surrounding Tonga
population for the greater part of the twenties and thirties. The
Ndebele at Mujika occupied an area of about 10,500 acres of
land and for this they paid rent to District officials at a rate
of 1d per head of cattle and 3d per bag of crops reaped, annually.

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1 See, Capt. Campbell's speech in Legislative Council on 6th June,
1939, during discussion of Bledisloe report. Also Native Affairs
report, 1951, p. 67.

2 Speaking before the 1926 Reserves Commission, a settler-farmer,
talking about the Mujika Matabele, said: 'These people are a
pest. They have so trodden down the local native that the local
Chief is frightened of them.' (See Evidence of H.C. Savory in
Native Reserves Commission evidence, Vol. II). Vaux wrote later:
'Disputes and quarrels between the Matabele and the indigenous
Tonga over land and grazing and water rights had been continual
since 1921' - H. Vaux, "Unusual Aspects of Native Land Tenure
in Mazabuka District", Northern Rhodesia Journal, No. 2, Vol.
II, 1953.

3 KSB 3/1, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Notebook.
Because they paid rent for the land, they demanded the right to exclusive use of it and strongly resented any Tonga interference.

The Tonga, on the other hand, were always accusing the Ndebele of failing to behave like guests, of regarding the lands they occupied as their own and of chasing off Tonga cattle, grazing in their pastures. Touring officials who openly described the industrious Matabele farmers of the area as superior to their Tonga neighbours, did nothing to defuse the tensions operating in the area. The District Commissioner, for instance, wrote in 1930 after a tour of the Mujika settlement: 'I found all these people of a superior type and I consider they are an asset to the country, obviously industrious and an example to indigenous natives as to what can be done.'

Amalgamation was, therefore, undesirable, if, among other things, it was to mean the loss of more land to Immigrants, black or white. More than their fear of the possible extension of harsher

1 Ibid. Entry by Cadet C.J.W.Fleming.
2 Interview, on 18.11.73, with Samuel Sibanda, a resident Ndebele, whose family has lived in Mujika for many years.
3 KDB 1/3/4. D.C. Mazabuka to Provincial Commissioner, 5/2/30. This practice continued into the fifties. In 1953, an official commenting on the Mujika Matabele, wrote: 'It is quite refreshing to meet these people of a higher civilization .... It is perhaps unfortunate that they have not intermarried with the Tonga in order to introduce some better blood into the Tonga tribe'. See Tour report No. 18, 1953 in Sec/Nat 366, N/0834/4, Z.N.A.
discriminatory laws from the South, the likelihood of further land loss, strengthened African determination to fight the settlers' Amalgamation proposals.  

By the 15th July, 1938, when the Bledisloe Commission arrived in Mazabuka to record the views of African and settler representatives, it was a foregone conclusion that Africans would reject the settlers' demands. Three prominent Chiefs, Naluama, Siamuanda and Chongo, represented the plateau Tonga Native Authorities before the Commission and with them were five other representatives drawn from urban and rural areas within the District. Among these were the President, the Vice President and Secretary-General of the unrecognised 1937 Congress movement, who, after making several representations to the officials in Mazabuka, had been allowed to state their views about Amalgamation before the Commissioners. Again, they criticised the proposals and the Chiefs did the same.  

As was expected, the settler community came out strongly in support of Amalgamation. The Northern Rhodesia Traders Association branch in Pemba held a meeting on May 29th, 1938 at which they passed

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1 In 1943, Capt. Campbell, representing the Southern Electoral Area, was to tell the Legislative Council of a deep feeling of insecurity among natives as to the land they occupied. See Hansard, 1st December, 1943, No. 46, Cols. 365-366.

2 The Mazabuka District representatives were not all 'urban natives' as the Record of Oral Evidence (op. cit.) would have us believe.

3 Interviews with Sibanda and Milambo.

4 See Record of Oral Evidence, op. cit.
the following resolution unanimously: 'This meeting requests the Royal Commission to recommend to the Imperial Government that amalgamation between the two countries is imperative at the earliest possible moment, and compatible with the mutual interests of both Natives and Europeans.'

Farmers' representatives repeated their reasons for advocating Amalgamation and some of them took advantage of the Commission's presence to criticize the Administration for failing to respond to their calls for assistance. Harris Wroth, one of the leading farmer spokesmen around Mazabuka, condemned what he regarded as 'a system of Government which appears to be only concerned with seeing the mines get their good supplies as near the cost of production as possible'. He criticized the Administration for being 'apathetic' and for consisting of 'temporary officials who hold no interest whatever in the territory and nothing in common with settlers or progress'.

After weighing the evidence heard on the plateau and other parts of the territory, the Commissioners, in their report, drew attention to the remarkable differences between native policy in Northern and Southern Rhodesia. They highlighted the existence in the southern territory of various forms of racial legislation such as the Industrial Conciliation Act, which virtually excluded Africans from skilled employment in certain vocations. They,

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1 ZP/2/1/8, Z.N.A. Northern Rhodesia Traders Association to Secretary, Royal Commission, 2.6.38.

2 Sec/ZA/10, Z.N.A. S. Harris Wroth to Secretary, Royal Commission, 1938.
therefore, 'accepted the idea of Amalgamation in principle but refused to recommend it... because of the racial policy of Southern Rhodesia and because of African opposition to the idea'. The Commissioners were convinced that 'if so large a proportion of the population of the combined territory were brought unwillingly under a unified Government, it would prejudice the prospect of cooperation in ordered development under such a government'.¹ They did, however, recommend increased cooperation between the territories and, for this purpose, urged the setting up of an Inter-Territorial Council to co-ordinate the existing services of the three territories and to plan for the region's economic development.

The Commission's rejection of the settlers' demands only served to infuriate the white farmers. Their spokesmen repeatedly criticized the Administration and the Commission for paying attention to African views on the subject of Amalgamation. At Farmers Association meetings, there was talk of settler interests being subordinated to that of the Africans. In June 1939 Leopold Moore, one of the settlers' most outspoken representatives in the Legislative Council, cautioned a colleague during the Council's discussion of the Bledisloe Report, for bothering to pay attention to African fears about Amalgamation. He told the House: 'There is not one intelligent native in this country. Their opinion is not worth anything at all. In fact, they do not understand the problem which was shown in the evidence they gave ... Well, the Natives have got

no grounds for liking or disliking it [The Amalgamation proposals].
We are running the show and we shall be running it for at least a
generation and possibly two or three.¹

This was not the first time that settler leaders were dis-
playing such contempt for African opinion. As early as 1921,
during Amalgamation discussions in Mazabuka, Tom King, a leading
local farmer and member of the North-western Rhodesia Political Associa-
tion, had argued that there was no need to consult Africans on the
question of Amalgamation. He maintained that since no such con-
sultations had been carried out before the Amalgamation, in 1911,
of North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia, he saw no reason why
Africans should be consulted over the question of closer union be-
tween the Rhodesias.² His views were to be re-echoed seventeen
years later by another farmer leader, Harris Wroth, when he said:
'I cannot see why so much importance is given to native opinion on
the question of Amalgamation as I think there are only a very, very
few natives who take the slightest interest in the matter and in
my opinion it is the voice of the Missionaries speaking for natives
and pushing forward their private opinions as to what natives
should ask for...'.³

The settlers strongly resented the fact that obstacles were
being put in their way by the Colonial Office and local Administration
officials. To them, the concern that was being shown for the views

¹Hansard, 6th June, 1939, No. 33, Col. 501.
²BS3/509, Z.N.A. L.F. Moore to Resident Commissioner, Salisbury,
4.10.21.
³Sec/EA/10, Z.N.A. S. Harris Wroth to Secretary, Royal Commission,
- 1938.
of the African population was in a way the practical implementation of the Paramountcy Doctrine. The report of the Bledisloe Commission did not, however, discourage them from the pursuit of their ambition. If anything, it strengthened their determination to strive towards the creation of that 'White Man's country' which was their ultimate goal. During the war years, settlers continued to put pressure on the British Government and the local Administration, for Amalgamation and their representatives tabled a number of motions on the subject in the Legislative Council.¹ On each occasion, the motion was rejected, with settler representatives of African interests and Government officials voting against them. By the end of the war, Amalgamation was still just a dream.

The Assemblies of the forties

The war years also saw attempts by the Administration to provide representative assemblies for the territory's African population, where their leaders could air their views within earshot of Government officials. The Bledisloe Commission of inquiry had stressed the need for the representation of African interests in the Legislative Council and had also called for the creation of African representative bodies.² In 1938 the Administration went some way in meeting these recommendations by appointing Lieutenant-Colonel Gore-Browne, a settler in the Northern Province, to represent African interests in the Legislative Council. In the same

¹ For some of the Amalgamation debates, see Hansard, 18th March, 1941; 25th November, 1943 and 28th August, 1945.

year, Urban Advisory Councils were established on the Copperbelt. Some Administration officials returned to their argument in 1936 that Welfare Associations 'were not representative of all classes of natives' and that they 'represented chiefly the views of the Intelligentsia'. They proposed that representative councils, which would be more widely based, should be set up in areas that were outside the control of the Native Authorities. The Administration now accepted these proposals and it agreed to the creation of Urban Advisory Councils in all the major urban areas. Africans who sat on these Councils were to be appointed by the District Commissioner. It was hoped that the Councils would serve as the 'eyes, ears and mouth' of the District Administration. Once they had been created, these councils, quite amenable to control by officials of the Provincial Administration, became the legitimate centres of African political discussion.

In 1943-44, the Administration's experiment with representative councils for Africans was pushed a stage further when regional councils, one in each province, were established. The need for these councils had been argued quite persuasively in the Legislative Council by the member representing African interests, Gore-Browne. The Administration saw the Provincial Councils as they came to be called as an insurance against the growth of African nationalism.

1Sec/Nat/311, Z.N.A. Provincial Commissioner's Conference, 1936.

2Sec/Nat/75, Z.N.A. Minutes of first meeting of the Nkana Native Advisory Committee, 11.11.38.

In the words of Rotberg, the Administration, by according to the members of Provincial Councils 'a measure of verbal freedom ... believed that together with the urban Assemblies, they would provide an alternative sufficiently meaningful to satisfy the political passions of refractory Africans'.¹ In 1946, it was decided to establish a third Council, the African Representative Council (A.R.C.), to round off the Administration's conciliar experiment. This decision was largely a reaction to the racial tensions that were mushrooming within the territory, as African representatives in various provincial Councils began to give priority to the discussion of political subjects at their meetings. Apparently the A.R.C. was expected to bring the cream of the African leadership throughout the territory, under one roof, thus making it easier for the Administration to keep a check on the various stirrings within the African population. The Provincial Councils had the responsibility of electing members to the A.R.C. and representation was weighted heavily on the side of the rural areas. The role of the A.R.C. was to be purely advisory and this was spelt out quite clearly by the Governor at the opening of the Council's first session in 1946.²

The representative Councils, on the plateau and elsewhere, did not quite live up to the expectations of the officials who had created them. In flagrant disregard of official surveillance, their discussions which verged, for the most part, on the political

¹Rotberg, op.cit., p.200.
²African Representative Council proceedings, No. 1 (1946), cols. 3-4.
criticized both settlers and Administration. Increasingly, they laid stress on the rights of Africans and need for their protection from settler designs. Most of the talking in these Assemblies was being done by Africans who were no strangers to political debate for, in several parts of the country, including the Tonga plateau, the newly created Councils absorbed a number of those who once worked, or were still engaged in African Welfare Associations.

In Mazabuka, the Urban Advisory Council which presumably was established in the early 1940s did not excite much interest during its early years of operation. This was, perhaps, due in part to the fact that the collapse of the local Welfare Association had bred much disillusionment. It could also have been a result of the feeling that an Assembly initiated by the officials could achieve very little for Africans. Anyway, by the mid forties, in the absence of an active Welfare Association, local leaders who sat on them used the Councils to register their views on a plethora of subjects concerning race relations. Issues such as the colour-bar situation in the township, and Settler demands for Amalgamation and Responsible Government tended to dominate their agenda and frequently recurred in the minutes of their discussions. Repeatedly, members criticized what they considered the settler strategy of moving towards Amalgamation through the attainment of Responsible Government.

1There is hardly any documentary evidence on its activities before the mid 1940s. There are therefore doubts about the actual date of its creation.
One of the most persistent critics of the settlers was Esau Tembo. He was an immigrant from Nyasaland who had lived in the Mazabuka area for several years during which he had taken a keen interest in the problems of the African community. Tembo was at this time a store keeper and he also operated a tea-room in the Mazabuka township area. After serving in the Urban Advisory Council for a while, he was to work his way up through the Southern Provincial Council into the African Representative Council. Tembo was the architect of the Mazabuka Urban Advisory Council's resolution of the 11th April, 1948, in which settler demands for Responsible Government were strongly opposed. The Council gave the following reasons for its rejection of the proposals:

1. Government will have no power and full power will be in the hands of settlers of which many of them are anti-Africans.

2. The new scheme will bring domination of white people over Africans as it is the case of Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, where Africans are deprived of their privileges.

3. The ruling from the Colonial Office that Amalgamation is impracticable was a great shock to white settlers but was a great relief to Africans. The new scheme of Government is a trick or bait to Amalgamation.

4. The Colonial policy to train colonial dependencies politically and give them responsibility of ruling themselves, which Africans of this territory would have in future, will be stamped down. The power of African Chiefs or Native Authorities will be abolished. Immigration of white people will be encouraged and Africans will have no land.

5. We are satisfied with the Colonial Government from which African interests are safeguarded. The letter of appeal from Sir Stewart Gore-Browne and a letter of challenge from the Honourable R. Wglenesky forcing Africans to accept the Constitutions of Self-Government are unanimously ignored.\(^1\)

\(^1\)Sec/Nat/104, Z.N.A. Enclosure in Minutes of 5th Meeting of Southern
The atmosphere was hardly different in the Southern Provincial Council. Here, Mazabuka District representatives, drawn from both the rural and urban areas, teamed up with those from other Districts within the province, to discuss the grievances of the African population and examine the political issues of the day. From the Plateau Tonga Native Authority, Chiefs Sianjalika and Chongo were selected to sit on the Provincial Council and represent the interests of rural Africans in Mazabuka District. Together with two of the most articulate Africans on the plateau at this time, viz. Esau Tembo and Amos Walubita,¹ they worked hard to highlight their people’s grievances. These covered a host of subjects. The Chiefs and other members of Council were united in condemning the virtual monopoly which Indian traders enjoyed in the reserves, mainly because Africans who applied for trading licences were having great difficulty in securing them from District officials.² Africans who succeeded in getting trading licences were reported to be having great difficulty in purchasing goods at wholesale prices from European traders. This was strongly

¹Amos Walubita served the Plateau Tonga Native Authority for many years and was later to sit in the A.R.C.

²Sec/Nat/104, Z.N.A. Meeting of Southern Provincial Council, 14th-15th June, 1945.
condemned, Esau Tembo observing in 1944 that 'there is too much colour bar, although Africans have the same money'.

Various grievances arising from the colour-bar were discussed at meetings. Members demanded the substitution of the word 'native' by the honorific Bantu prefix 'Ba', in the addressing of correspondence to Africans. Many took strong exception to the settler practice of referring to elderly Africans as 'boy'. They criticized discriminatory treatment in shops, at the railway station, at the butcheries and even at the Boma where 'Africans sit all the morning waiting for their business to be attended to, but the white man is attended to as soon as he comes'. This kind of treatment, they argued, left Africans with 'the general feeling that this is all due to the black skin...'. Esau Tembo repeatedly appealed for African unity, within the territory, to meet the problems of settler domination. He stressed the need for a clearly defined African leadership. In June 1948 he told his colleagues that the African people of Northern Rhodesia 'should be united into three groups under the leadership of Babemba, Balomzi and Angoni...' because, he pointed out, this alone would rid the African cause of the 'many cooks who spoil the soup...'.

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1 Acc/90/37, Z.N.A. Meeting of Southern Provincial Council, 30.5.44. This difficulty was even brought to the attention of the Legislative Council by Capt. Campbell. See Hansard, 10th August, 1944, No. 48, Cols. 250-251.

2 Sec/Nat/104, Z.N.A. Meeting of the Southern Provincial Council, 14th-15th June, 1945.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. Meeting of Southern Provincial Council, held 1st-2nd June, 1948.
In the African Representative Council members from the Tonga plateau\(^1\) played a very active part in the struggle for better conditions for the general African population. As will be seen later, criticism of settler land and other policies was common within this body, in the late forties and fifties. Political issues tended to dominate the discussions of the A.R.C. and, in December 1946, a member of the Legislative Council described their debates as 'a little hysterical and a little fanatical'.\(^2\)

Virginia

By the end of 1946 it was quite clear that the majority of Africans in the various representative assemblies within the territory were chafing under the controls which the Administration exercised over these bodies. In the Urban Advisory Councils and the A.R.C., for instance, the Agenda for meetings had to be submitted in advance for official approval and the Secretary for Native Affairs had the right to strike off subjects whose discussion he considered undesirable. Even more frustrating to Africans was the fact that the Administration appeared to be paying very little attention to the demands that were being made at Assembly meetings. In June 1946, Esau Tembo confessed to this frustration which his electorate in Mazabuka felt. He told the Provincial Council: 'The people I am representing at Mazabuka told me that it was useless to send me to this Council to report

\(^1\)During the forties and fifties the most articulate of these were Esau Tembo, Amos Walubita and Peter Habumbu.

\(^2\)See Hansard, 3rd December, 1946, No. 56, Col. 71, Speech by Major McKee.
their views, when the fruits of the words which were spoken last
year had not yet been seen.\(^1\)

This feeling of purposelessness was not confined to the
Southern Provincial Council. There was mounting frustration through­
out the territory over the ineffectiveness of the new Assemblies
and African leaders felt a pressing need for some medium, unham­
pered by official control, which would express the views of the
African population. The late forties, therefore, saw attempts at
reviving the Welfare Association in several parts of the territory,
including Mazabuka. To achieve that African unity which many de­
sired, African leaders came up with suggestions for the Amalgamation
of the various Welfare Associations within the territory, to form one
Federation. This was no new idea. In July1933, when representatives
of various Welfare Associations met at Kafue, during the Rhodes
and Founders Days holidays, the suggestion had cropped up and had
been accepted by all present. When, however, the African leaders
approached the Administration for permission to form a Federation
of African Societies, the idea was discouraged outright. The Governor
had instructed that 'it should be pointed out ... to the Welfare
Associations that their value is in their representation of local
interests and that any amalgamation such as they propose would be
liable to defeat the main object of these Associations'.\(^2\) Permission
was, therefore, withheld. In 1946, however, the political climate
had changed considerably and Africans were far less quiescent
than they were in 1933. When, therefore, in May 1946, representatives

\(^1\)Sec/Nat/104, 3rd Meeting of Southern Provincial Council, 10th-12th
June, 1946.

\(^2\)Sec/Nat/321, Z.N.A. Governor to Chief Secretary.
of fourteen Welfare Associations met at Broken Hill and decided to make another attempt at forming a Federation, the Administration appears to have considered it impolitic to try and stop them. The Federation of African Societies was formed at this meeting and a new era in African political organisation began. Although one official dismissed the Federation as a 'movement ... conceived and controlled by a group of disgruntled intelligentsia ... who have found themselves on the wrong side of the fence for one reason or another...',¹ no serious attempts were made by the Administration to stop the movement from operating.

With the formation of the Federation of African Societies, the Welfare Associations, at last, realised their ambition of articulating rural as well as urban grievances. Unlike the majority of the individual Welfare Societies whose members were drawn almost entirely from urban residents,² the Federation attracted people who lived in the rural areas. To them the Federation was an ideal platform for the articulation of the grievances of the maize and cattle farmers as well as the needs of urban wage earners.

Delegates from the rural areas had attended the Broken Hill Conference. Among those, George Kaluwa, the farmer who had served

¹Sec/Nat/353, Z.N.A. Anonymous official minute, on formation of Federation of African Societies, to Secretary for Native Affairs, 29.10.46.

²Of the fifteen members covered in a survey of the Mazabuka Welfare Association in 1935, five were clerks. There were two artisans, six traders and storekeepers, a teacher and a messenger. These were all urban residents. There was not a single farmer from the reserves. See Sec/Nat 311, Z.N.A. Acting Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 4.12.35.
as Secretary-General to the Congress formed in 1937 in Chief Chongo's area. Also present was another farmer, Nelson Liyanda, living at the time at Keemba Hill. Kaluwa played a major role in getting the Federation started and he became its organising secretary.\(^1\) Liyanda was also elected to the Executive as Treasurer, which post he held until July 1948.

During its first few months of operation, the Federation made several attempts to gain official recognition. Its leaders also lobbied the Administration for five seats on the A.R.C. These efforts, however, never succeeded.\(^2\) Over the years, the Administration's refusal to accede to these and other political demands of the Federation caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among the Federation's members. As settler demands for Responsible Government and Amalgamation increased, in 1947-8, African leaders began to think seriously of forming a political party. One incident which, perhaps more than any other, induced the Federation's leaders to declare the Federation a Congress was the declaration by Gore-Browne in January 1948 of his support for Responsible Government. Gore-Browne had served as a representative of African Southern Province officials tried to discredit Kaluwa, and the Federation with him, by accusing him of having obtained goods under false pretences in the past. (See Sec/Nat/353, Z.N.A. Anonymous Minute No. 21; also Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 30.9.46). However, it was later revealed that it was Kaluwa's late father, with whom he shared the same initials, who had committed the offence. Acc N/0001/2/8, Z.N.A. Confidential Correspondence to the Colonial Office on the background of George Kaluwa and Chief Mpezeni, 6.11.52.

\(^1\)Southern Province officials tried to discredit Kaluwa, and the Federation with him, by accusing him of having obtained goods under false pretences in the past. (See Sec/Nat/353, Z.N.A. Anonymous Minute No. 21; also Provincial Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 30.9.46). However, it was later revealed that it was Kaluwa's late father, with whom he shared the same initials, who had committed the offence. Acc N/0001/2/8, Z.N.A. Confidential Correspondence to the Colonial Office on the background of George Kaluwa and Chief Mpezeni, 6.11.52.

\(^2\)The Government said that it 'could not afford' to recognise the Federation officially. See Sec/Nat/353. Minutes of meeting with the Secretary for Native Affairs, 19.12.46.
interests in the Legislative Council for many years and his conduct had earned him the respect and admiration of many Africans. When he joined those settlers who were demanding Responsible Government, Africans felt betrayed.

Gore-Browne's statement provoked sharp criticism from Welfare Associations as well as from the official representative Assemblies. In the Southern Provincial Council, Mazabuka District representative, Amos Walubita, and others demanded that he should resign his seat as an African representative in the Legislative Council and be replaced by an African.¹

At the third annual general meeting of the Federation of African Societies, held in Lusaka in July 1948, at which George Kaluwa, Nelson Liyanda and Essau Tembo were among representatives from the Tonga plateau, steps were taken towards the creation of an African political party. After condemning settler demands for Responsible Government, Amalgamation and Federation, the movement's membership demanded that the country be made 'a protectorate in the truest sense of the world...'.² The idea of forming a Northern Rhodesia African Congress, born on the Tonga plateau in the mid-thirties, was now revived and the Federation was transformed into an organisation bearing the same name. Although the leaders of the movement hastened to assure the Administration that Congress was not an anti-Government organisation, it was quite clear from the Constitution they adopted that they intended to play a very active role.

¹ Interviews with Milambo and Sibanda. Later confirmed in interview with Walubita, 12.11.73. Africans were not allowed into the Legislative Council till late 1948; the first two African members made their maiden speeches on the 24th November of that year. See Hannard, No. 62, Cols. 219-221 and 224-225.

² Sec/Nat/353, Z.N.A. Minutes of meeting between Secretary for Native Affairs and Officers of the Federation of African Societies, 29.6.48.
role in safeguarding African interests within the territory. The Constitution expressed their determination 'to promote the educational, political, economic and social advancement of the Africans in full co-operation with the Government ... and to serve as a mouth piece of the Africans...'.

The formation of Congress posed serious problems for the Administration. For some time it was at a loss as to whether it should disregard the new movement or try to come to terms with its unwelcome existence. In July 1948, the Secretary for Native Affairs expressed his views on the situation to his Provincial Commissioners and stressed the need for official channelling of this growing African consciousness. He wrote: 'They [The Africans] are entering a difficult phase of race consciousness and it is more important than ever that we should hold their trust and confidence and maintain the closest contact with all classes not excluding the rising middle class. We may deplore the fact that this class is becoming politically-minded but we cannot ignore it and must take every opportunity to retain its trust and to guide it into safe channels...'.

As late as September, 1948, the Administration had still not arrived at a definite policy regarding the Congress movement. One official's view was that the Administration 'must avoid snubbing

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1 Sec/Nat/353, Z.N.A. The Constitution of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress. For full text of Constitution, see Appendix.

2 Sec/Nat/109, Z.N.A. Secretary of Native Affairs' Quarterly Newsletter (17.7.48) to Provincial Commissioners.
the members, but at the same time do nothing to give the Congress official recognition as a representative body which it is not. He believed that many of the movement's supporters were 'well meaning members of the Intelligentsia' but a number of them were 'politically ambitious' and had 'rather wild ideas'. He warned however that unless Congress was 'carefully handled it will be a focus for political agitation and... might become an embarrassment...'.

The Administration had already placed restrictions on the activities of African Civil Servants within the Welfare Associations; it now extended these restrictions to the new Congress. In November, 1948, in reply to a letter from the Congress' Secretary General in which he sought clarification of the position of African Civil Servants within the new movement, the Administration made its views quite clear. Although it was prepared to allow Civil Servants to join the Congress, it pointed out that they should not become office-bearers nor should they participate in political discussions. In the coming years, very few Civil Servants were to take much notice of these constraints.

By the end of 1948, Northern Rhodesia's African population had at last secured the vehicle of expression which many had been longing for. The representatives of African farmers on the Tonga plateau had participated effectively in organising both the Federation of African Societies and the Congress itself. What

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1 Sec/Nat/333, Z.N.A. Anonymous Minute to Governor, 25.9.48.
happened in 1948 was, in a way, the fulfilment of the dream of 1937. George Kaluwa, the main architect of the Congress of 1937 became the new Congress' first deputy treasurer.¹

The people of the plateau now looked up to the Congress movement, under its leader Godwin Lewanika Mbikusita, to take up their grievances, in both the urban and rural areas and attempt to win the desired solutions. We enter into a fuller discussion of Lewanika's position in the next chapter but it should be stated here that he was a Lozi who had close connections with the privileged royal household of Barotseland. Congress which was essentially a protest movement bent on changing the status quo was thus led by a scion of a ruling family which, more than any other, had a vested interest in preserving the status quo. In the next chapter we shall see how Lewanika responded to the challenge presented by this paradox.

¹Sec/Nat/353, Z.N.A. Nebulyato to Secretary for Native Affairs, 17.9.48.
Chapter VI

THE POLITICS OF FEDERATION

The political life of Northern Rhodesia was to be dominated during the years following the publication of the Bledisloe Commission's Closer Union report by a highly charged campaign for Federation. The Commission's rejection of outright Amalgamation and the British Government's acceptance of its proposals were to force the settler population into the pursuit of a more acceptable alternative, which would still achieve their main objective of Closer Union. In this, they ran into a great deal of opposition from an African population which was on the threshold of its Nationalist struggle against Colonial rule. Although very little has been said about it, the Africans of the Tonga plateau played a fairly active part in standing up against not just the settlers, who were intent on consolidating their political dominance, but also the Administration, which was showing itself incapable of resisting settler pressures.

The settler campaign was led by their elected representatives in the Legislative Council. In 1946, the leadership of the settler unofficial members of the Legislative Council changed hands. Gore Browne, whose position as representative of African interests made it impossible for him to vote with other unofficial members in favour of Amalgamation, was replaced by Roy Welensky, an uncompromising opponent of Colonial Office rule. Welensky was widely known for

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1 When, for instance, Welensky introduced a notion in the Legislative Council in November 1943 in which he called for Amalgamation, Gore Browne, though leader of the unofficial members, had to vote against it to register African opinion. This was an undesirable situation for the majority of the official members favoured Amalgamation. See Hansard, 25th November, 1943.

2 See Hansard, 3rd November, 1964, No. 56, Col. 60.
his views on Amalgamation. He had stoutly supported motions calling for Closer Union with Southern Rhodesia and had revealed, on a number of occasions, his firm opposition to the Government that governed from '8,000 miles away'.

During Welensky's visit to London in July 1948, he discovered that there was hardly any likelihood of the British Government assenting to the Amalgamation proposals of Northern Rhodesia's settlers. In fact, the Colonial Secretary at this time, Arthur Creech Jones, appeared to be determined to check the speed at which power was being transferred into the hands of the settlers. Creech Jones was, however, aware of the benefits that would accrue from closer economic cooperation between the Central African territories and, according to Welensky's account, he hinted that a loose Federation might be acceptable to the British Government. At the Commonwealth African Conference held in London in October, 1948, Welensky succeeded in convincing Sir Godfrey Huggins of Southern Rhodesia that Federation could still be a way to Amalgamation and ultimate Dominion status. The leaders of the settler populations of the Rhodesias thus agreed to change their tactics.

In February, 1949, at a meeting at the Victoria Falls, settler representatives from the Rhodesias and Nyasaland affirmed their

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1See Welensky's speech in favour of Responsible Government. Hansard, 9th March, 1948, No. 60, Col. 22.


3Ibid., pp. 25-30.
commitment to the pursuit of Federation and a Committee was set up to draft a Federal Constitution. In November of the same year, Welensky tabled a motion in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council, calling on the British Government to allow the creation of a Federal structure in Central Africa. Unlike previous occasions when officials in the Legislative Council, who were drawn from the Administration, had always voted against the settlers Closer Union demands, they abstained from this vote. This was their way of saying that the Government had an open mind on the question and was still awaiting official directives from London. Only five members of the Legislative Council, two African and three whites, opposed the motion.

By the beginning of 1950, settlers in both territories were becoming desperate over the British Government's unwillingness to meet their political demands. This reluctance on the part of London was, as will be seen shortly, closely connected with continued African opposition to the idea of Closer Union. In Southern Rhodesia, Huggins began to threaten to take his territory out of the Central African Council, which had been responsible for coordinating a number of cooperative ventures between the Central African territories. Welensky and Huggins continued to press the Colonial Office to convene a meeting to examine their Federation proposals. These pressures forced James Griffiths, who had replaced Creech-Jones as Colonial Secretary, and Patrick Gordon-Walker, the

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1 See Hansard, 24th November, 1949, No. 66, Cols. 322-349.

2 The Central African Council which had no Executive powers was formed in 1944 to promote the cooperation advocated by the Bledisloe Commission.
Secretary of State for the Commonwealth, to agree to the appointment of a Committee of Central African and British Civil Servants to examine the feasibility of Federation. The twenty-seven officials of the Committee concluded that Closer Union would confer substantial advantages on the territories. They also recognised African opposition to the settlers' proposals and, therefore stressed the need for 'adequate provision for African representation and adequate protection for African interests...'.

To protect African interests, they recommended certain safeguards, including an African Affairs Board.

The Committee's recommendations fired the imagination of some of the officials in London and kindled some hope among the settlers of Northern Rhodesia. Those in the Southern Province who, with the exception of a few Afrikaner farmers, had remained solidly behind the drive for union with Southern Rhodesia, welcomed the report with cautious optimism. In a confidential Memorandum to the Secretary for Native Affairs, Phillips, the Acting Provincial Commissioner, detailed this reaction in June, 1951:

'Reactions amongst Europeans to the proposals can be summed up briefly - they are good, but do not go far enough. It is said that the Government Officials who took part in the discussions, have been more progressive and bolder than anyone expected, but that the limitations imposed on them by their official outlook still made them err on the side of caution.'

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2 Touring Officials were to comment, during the early fifties, on the indifference shown in political matters by 'narrow Nationalists from South Africa', who, it appears, were more interested in Union with South Africa, by now a remote possibility. See Sec/Net/366 N/0834/3, Z.N.A. Tour reports Nos. 9 and 12 of 1952.
3 N/0001/2/3, Vol. 1, Z.N.A. Phillips to Secretary for Native Affairs, 28.6.51.
He reported that although the Southern Province settlers were now willing to discuss Federation, it was 'Amalgamation rather than Federation' which was 'the ultimate object'. While supporting the acceptance of the Committee's recommendations, they insisted that it should be 'regarded only as a temporary - very temporary stage in the progress towards full unity.' To them Federation was 'only... a means to an end'.

In September 1951, the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretaries visited Central Africa to observe the general reaction to the proposals of the Conference of Officials. During his tour of Northern Rhodesia, Griffiths encountered strong African opposition. Although his efforts to get African leaders to the Victoria Falls for a discussion of the Federation proposals succeeded, he could not persuade them to agree to Federation. The Victoria Falls Conference of the 18th-21st September ended with the release of a statement which pledged the four Governments involved to the principle of Federation, based on partnership between the races. It also included an undertaking by the Africans present to consider the Federation proposals once a policy of partnership had been defined and stressed the need for further discussions at a Conference to be held in 1952. The Labour Government was not, however, to have the opportunity of fulfilling its pledge. In the General Elections of October, 1951, it was defeated by the Conservatives. Oliver Lyttleton (later Lord Chandos) who now assumed the office of Colonial Secretary, was to have far fewer doubts

1 Ibid.
than his predecessor as to the wisdom of Federation.

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Meanwhile, Northern Rhodesia's African population continued its firm opposition to the political demands of the settlers. The Northern Rhodesia African Congress, under the leadership of Mbiokusita Lewanika, the erstwhile President of the Kitwe Welfare Association, on the Copperbelt, was the official mouthpiece of African protest. Lewanika led his Executive in discussions with Administration officials, at which African demands were presented and the reasons for African opposition put across. At one such meeting, in December, 1948, the Congress leaders raised a number of issues pertaining to African political representation and African welfare. Congress demanded representation on the Executive Council and the African Representative Council and complained about the very low salaries offered to educated Africans who served in the Native Authority Councils. They condemned the Std VI Education policy which 'only served to retard a boy's education by making him spend two years in Std VI instead of one year', and demanded a more equitable distribution of scholarships for studying abroad.

In the political sphere, Congress rejected outright the settler proposal of partnership between the races in a Federation. Its leaders believed that Federation would inevitably lead to Dominion status, which would mean the loss of Colonial Office protection of

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1Sec/Nat/352, Z.N.A. Meeting between Secretary for Native Affairs and a delegation of the AFRICAN CONGRESS, 28.12.48.
African rights. Robinson Nabulyato, the movement's Secretary General, summed up Congress' views on the matter in December, 1948, when he wrote: 'Partnership ... is a ladder for Europeans in Northern Rhodesia to climb on us'.

When in 1949, Arthur Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, visited Northern Rhodesia, Lewanika presented him with a petition detailing Congress objections to Federation. He replied by assuring the Africans that the British Government would not stint in its 'solemn obligation' to protect them. 'We shall honour the responsibilities we have entered into and shall not transfer our responsibilities or abrogate them', he told an African gathering in Lusaka. Congress' dependence on London increased after the important Federation vote of 1949. The abstention of the Official members of the Legislative Council from the vote raised serious doubts in the minds of Congress' leaders over the ability of local officials to protect African interests. The action of the officials was seen as a sell out and the British Government was, from now on, looked on as the only possible ally the Africans could trust in their fight against the settlers.

Under Lewanika's leadership, Congress operations were mainly confined to the urban areas. Whatever efforts were made to organise

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1 Ibid. Confidential Memorandum drafted by Robinson Nabulyato at a meeting of the African Congress, on December 28th, 1948. The public utterances of settler leaders like Welensky was to confirm Africans in this view. In 1950 Welensky was reported as saying during a discussion of the Partnership proposals: 'As far forward as I can see, the European, with his energy, initiative and capital, will be the senior partner'. See Bulawayo Chronicle, 13th April, 1950; also African Weekly, 22nd March, 1950.

Africans in opposition to Federation were concentrated, for the most part, on Lusaka and the towns of the Copperbelt. Although there was much anti-Federation and anti-settler feeling in the rural areas, the Congress leadership did not seriously address itself to the question of branch formation in these areas, to serve the needs of the farmers and migrant labourers who spent most of their lives away from the townships of the line of rail. On the Tonga plateau, for instance, there was a great deal of discontent among Africans, arising mainly from dealings with settlers and local officials and, as will be seen presently, certain chiefs and their people were already registering their disapproval of white rule by withholding their cooperation on various matters. Yet, up to 1951, there were no official Congress leaders on the plateau, charged with the responsibility of canalising this discontent. The leaders of the 1937 Congress movement followed Congress' activities closely during this period, but in the absence of encouragement from Congress Headquarters, they could do little to organise mass protest against Federation in their various areas.¹

By 1951, some Congress members began to take a more radical view of the political situation. In the various provinces of the territory, several politicians who were to play leading roles in the nationalist struggle were beginning to make their impact on the political scene. Perhaps the most outspoken and dedicated of

¹This inability to organise the movement locally was admitted by all three surviving founder members interviewed by the author.
Politicians on the Tonga plateau at this time was Job Michello. Born in Pemba, Michello had lived for many years in the Munenga area of Kwanachingwala Chieftaincy. A Seventh Day Adventist, he had undergone teacher training at the Solusi Mission in Bulawayo. After a brief spell of teaching in Southern Rhodesia, he returned to Northern Rhodesia and taught at the Rusangu mission school for some time before giving up teaching in 1945. He then became a building contractor and was also involved in selling poultry to the Copperbelt.\(^1\)

Other Africans in the plateau who shared Michello's radical view of the political situation included Ellison Milambo and Amos Walubita who have already been mentioned.\(^2\) There were also Job Mayanda, an S.D.A. of Chief Chongo's area who was an ex-teacher of Rusangu mission; Simon Maambo, also an ex-teacher of Munenga; Peter Mwiinga, an S.D.A. businessman at Mapangazia; Peter Habumbu, another S.D.A. who left teaching to serve the Plateau Tonga Native Authority and Simon Mulindi, of Mutama in Chief Monze's area, also an ex-S.D.A. teacher.\(^3\)

These men were among the leading members of the Congress leadership on the plateau and, as we can see, they were largely drawn from the local literati. They had all received some training

\(^1\)Interview with Job Michello, 19,6,74.

\(^2\)See Chapter V.

\(^3\)Interviews on the plateau.
at one of the local mission schools and a few had proceeded to qualify as teachers or pastors. They were the most vocal group within the African community and their knowledge of English made them the natural spokesmen of their people in dealings with the white Administration or settlers. Because of their education, they commanded much respect among Africans on the plateau. By 1950, most of them had given up their jobs with the local missions and were devoting their time to farming and/or trading. Some, like Ellison Milambo, were by this time very successful farmers. They had a considerable influence on the local Chiefs and Headmen, some of whom had been their colleagues at school, and since they belonged to the same churches, they came together very often at church gatherings. The social base of the Congress movement on the plateau could therefore be said to have consisted of two main strata: the Tonga literati and like-minded Chiefs and Headmen on the one hand and the rank and file, mainly small-scale farmers, on the other.

The challenge to Mbikusita Lewanika's leadership of the Congress movement in 1950-51 was to come from these articulate politicians on the Tonga plateau and elsewhere within the territory. Many of them regarded Lewanika as a moderate, who was incapable of leading Congress in a strong challenge of the settlers and whose views always verged on some kind of compromise.¹

¹Interview with Job Michello, 28.6.74.
Perhaps because of the sort of political ambitions he had, the Congress leader was always very restrained in his criticisms of the Administration. He was as it were determined to do nothing that would bring his name into disrepute and jeopardise his claims to high office in his native Barotseland. Several Congress members found the President's public utterances most embarrassing. For instance, in July 1951, he gave the Congress' Annual Conference an insight into the way he wanted the movement's members to carry on the struggle against Federation. He told them: 'Fight does not mean using abusive language, making fiery speeches and passing strongly worded and threatening resolutions which mean nothing and which cannot be carried out.'

He condemned confrontation and assured the audience of the effectiveness of passive protest. 'You need not worry, there is great hope that African opinion on anything, properly interpreted to Government, will be heard with sympathy', he assured the audience. This was exactly the kind of approach that most African politicians had come to regard as futile. For many, the time was ripe for fiery speeches and threatening resolutions.

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2. Ibid.
African politicians and their supporters on the Tonga plateau found Lewanika's views on Immigration particularly disturbing. Although he shared their opposition to White Immigration, he seemed to look more kindly on African Immigration from the South. During the July Conference, he had made the following remarks: 'We do not believe that European peasants can make a living on average Northern Rhodesia soils. We should oppose any scheme of picking out the best land at present unoccupied to give to them. If peasants are to be brought in to cultivate part of the Native Trust lands, we should prefer that they should be Africans from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa who have been dispossessed of their own tribal lands.'

To the people of the plateau, this altruism, which could easily lead to increased immigration of the despised Matabele and other Africans from the Southern territories, was tantamount to a betrayal of trust. They were determined that the lands of the plateau should remain the property of the African population and if they were unwilling to share it with white settlers, they were no less opposed to offering plots to Africans from across the Zambesi.

Most Congress supporters therefore began the search for a more militant leader. In 1951, they found one in the person of Harry Mkaumbula, an Ila, whose people's lands adjoined the Tonga plateau.

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1 Ibid.

2 Interviews with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74, and Job Michello, 19.6.74.
plateau. Job Michello and other politicians of the Southern province joined forces with Congress politicians from other provinces to secure his election as President, during the Annual Conference of July 1951. ¹ Nkumbula had previously served as a teacher with the United Missions on the Copperbelt and had risen to the position of Headmaster. After a spell of training at the Chalimbana Teachers Training College and at Makerere College in Uganda, he went to England on a bursary in 1946. He, however, neglected his studies, involving himself in the political debate on Central Africa's future, among other things, and, in 1950, he returned to Northern Rhodesia without successfully completing his studies at the London School of Economics. He joined the Congress movement in the same year and, in 1951, was appointed Chairman of a Congress Working Committee as well as the Movement's organising Secretary. Although he didn't succeed in doing much organising, he quickly distinguished himself as a tough talker, ² and as a leader fully aware of the problems of the rural as well as the urban areas and determined to articulate them.

By taking a keen interest in such rural problems as white immigration and agricultural discrimination (which are discussed later on in this chapter) Nkumbula had won the hearts of the people of the Tonga plateau, among other rural Africans. As Congress' organising Secretary, based at Maala, in Ila country,

¹Michello who had met Nkumbula several times while he (Nkumbula) was the Secretary of the Director of Education at Mazabuka, was one of the movers of his nomination.

²This comes out quite strongly in a letter Nkumbula sent to Marjorie Nicholson of the Fabian Bureau in November 1950, in which he said, among other things: 'Colonialism is a thoroughly wicked business - its present form discredits all the English persons in the eyes of the Colonials and their sympathisers. Why not do an honest job? Shoot us all or leave us alone.' See FCB 101/3/11.
he had had a number of meetings with local Southern province Chiefs and some of their people, during which he showed much concern over these twin problems. In 1950 he had written, in strong terms, to Marjorie Nicholson of the Fabian Colonial Bureau on the subject of Afrikaner immigration. He wrote:

'With regard to South African settlers, I am in the blue as to the reply of the Secretary of State. How many are they? They must be 3/4 of the white population in the Protectorate. They are arriving every day, almost without exception. The Boer Trek of 1836 is being revived. What has happened to our treaties of protection? The Boers are now being protected against us by the Colonial Government. Our treaties are dead letters.'

In the same letter, he also raised the vexed question of differential produce prices, a problem which, as will be seen presently, for long exercised the minds of the Chiefs and people of the Tonga plateau. He wrote:

'No explanation has been given why there is a discrimination in the price of livestock owned by Africans and Europeans. All cattle owned by Africans are non-grade and sell at a different price from those owned by Europeans - yet the price of meat at the butcheries is the same for all cattle... This all boils down to the protection of Europeans against the supposed protected African native.'

Once Nkumbula had succeeded to the Congress leadership, he attempted for the first time to transform the movement into a truly national one, reflecting the views of both urban and rural Africans. Nkumbula changed the name of the movement in 1951 from the Northern Rhodesia African Congress to the African National...
Congress and, in 1952, he appointed the first Provincial Organizing Secretaries. The work of directly involving the Chiefs and people of the various provinces had officially begun. Job Mayanda was appointed Provincial Organising Secretary in the Southern province. Mayanda lived at Keemba Hill in Chief Chongo's area and his appointment only increased the importance of this settlement as the centre of African political organisation on the Tonga plateau.

* * * * *

Major grievances of the plateau's African population

Mayanda's appointment was warmly welcomed on the Tonga plateau for at last it seemed Congress was going to address itself to the grievances of the people and highlight their needs before the Administration. The grievances arose as much from settler actions as from those of the official Administrators. Most of the grievances centred around the land question. Land Alienation had created a great deal of resentment within the African population and the people were fully convinced that Federation would only result in further land loss to incoming settlers. That settler farmers had come into possession of the most fertile tracts of land was deeply resented and this had come out, quite strongly, during the inquiries of the land tenure committee of

1946. An African witness who appeared before the Committee during its sittings on the Tonga plateau had complained bitterly:

'I do not understand this land question... I cannot understand this matter of Crown land and Native Reserves. What is reserved for Natives? An aeroplane flew over his land, making a map of it. When good land was found, it was European land. When a steep hill was found, we were told it belonged to us. It is for this reason we are puzzled, as to what is a reserve and what is not. To us native reserve means where the soil is poor and Crown land where it is rich. Our population has increased to the stage where we have no land because Europeans have taken the best from us. I ask if it was not a mistake to let them do this. I do not ask that they should be driven away. They are here and they will stay, but it was a mistake to let them come.'

Africans were worried over the insecurity of their land tenure and were particularly resentful of the fact that Europeans could, if they wished, hold leases in the Native Trust land areas. Reporting in 1946 on his observations on the Tonga plateau while serving on the Land Tenure Committee, Gore Browne had warned that 'the present day African resents the fact that Europeans have in many cases got all the best land and that he himself is now feeling the pinch'. He pointed out that 'the further fact that in certain instances the land is not being used adds to this resentment'.

In a number of Chieftaincies, touring officials observed, throughout the fifties, cases of serious land shortage and resultant overcrowding. As the human and cattle populations rose, especially in Chieftaincies like Chongo, Siamaundu, Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala, the pressure on arable and grazing lands increased and sheet
and gully erosion resulted. During a tour of the Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy in 1949, the District Commissioner had observed an uneven distribution of water ... excessive grazing' and a 'mal-distribution of population'. He also noted that 'the European farms on the south-eastern boundaries occupy not on the whole very efficiently the best land and have pushed the original occupants out into the swamps'. He observed much overcrowding, 'the land above the flood level... scarcely sufficient for the population'. The average density was about 44 persons to the square mile and he noticed that 'every pocket of arable land is tilled'. The land situation in the Mwanachingwala area was to worsen during the early fifties, with some 8,200 people and about 23,000 head of cattle occupying an area of about 85 square miles in which overstocking was said to be 'rampant' and 'large scale erosion' quite common. In the neighbouring area of Chongo Chieftaincy, the land situation, though not as acute as in the Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala Chieftaincies, was hardly better. A report on the area in 1953 observed that 'virtually all the grass has been grazed away' and 'great areas of erosion surround the

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1 Moffat Leg. Co. speeches of 2nd July 1951.
2 Sec/Nat/366, Vol. II, Z.N.A. "Notes on meetings in the Tonga country...", 22.3.46. For drawing attention to this problem, Gore Browne had to face a motion of censure from his colleagues. See Hansard, 6th and 7th May, 1946, No. 54, Cols. 3-104.
3 Sec/Nat/366 N/0834, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 2 of 1949.
4 Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 12 of 1953.
During the late forties and early fifties, farmers in areas that were experiencing land shortages began to fence the few unoccupied plots around. These areas experienced a race for land that had never been known before. Because of the attractions of maize farming, African farmers began to think in terms of storing up land for the future. In several Chieftaincies, Improved Farmers reacted to the bonus change of 1949, by increasing the number of acres they cultivated, to ensure that the bonus payments they received would not drop sharply because of the change. In 1950 it was reported that 'the astute few are increasing their holdings at the expense of the apathetic majority'. Officials considered this a serious problem for 'not only are land shortages thus aggravated but land grabbers are occupying more land than they can farm by improved methods'. The Native Affairs report for 1951 disclosed that both Improved and non-Improved Farmers were equally involved in the race for land. While pointing out that the Improved Farming system had led to larger acreages being

1 Ibid. Tour report, No. 16 of 1953.
2 See Chapter IV, p. 175-177.
3 S.M. Makings, Agricultural Change in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia 1945-65 (Stamford, 1966), p. 220.
5 Ibid.
cultivated, it noted that 'many unimproved farmers also have extensive holdings... the most remarkable example... a trader and nominated Councillor who farms 425 acres with a tractor...'. The report explained that 'the maize boom has got to a point when pressure on the land can definitely be felt, but it will not be long before a class emerges which cannot get land even for subsistence agriculture because it is all earmarked'. The 'land-grabbers' referred to here were those large-scale cultivators who fenced in virgin bush for future use. This was quite common in the Chongo and Siamaundu Chieftaincies. Although this practice may have been resented by those small-scale farmers who had plans to expand their operations some time in the future, there appears to have been no great outcry against it. Neither is there evidence to suggest that the farmers involved secured the permission of the Native Authorities before fencing these plots. The Chiefs and Headmen appear largely to have turned a blind eye to their activities, partly for political reasons as we will see presently.

In a situation where land available for African settlement was being rapidly taken up, needy farmers could not resist the temptation to move out of the reserves into unoccupied alienated or Crown lands. The squatter problem, therefore, increased during the late forties and fifties. There was much land lying fallow. In 1943 Gore-Browne told the Legislative Council of 800,000 acres of land along the line of rail which had been alienated but still remained unoccupied and undeveloped.

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1 Native Affairs report, 1951, p.70.
2 Ibid.
3 See below, pp.277 and 334. However, when by 1959 the practice of fencing land had increased considerably, the Native Authorities began to give thought to the land tenure implications of such actions. We do not, however, know what decisions were made. See Native Affairs report, 1959, p.68.
4 See Hansard, 31st May, 1943, No. 45, Col. 153.
When, however, some African farmers from the reserves of the plateau moved in and occupied these lands, the Administration replied by evicting the majority of them.\(^1\) Between 1944 and 1952 some 7,530 African squatters were evicted from various farms they were occupying within the Mazabuka District.\(^2\) This caused much ill feeling. In 1950 an official commenting on the problems of squatter eviction from Crown lands wrote: 'It now appears to have been a grave mistake to have allowed occupation of unalienated Crown lands by Africans to continue until the lands were leased. A thorough going eviction should have been organised at the time the Crown lands were demarcated. The subsequent evictions, small in themselves but continuing over a period, have instilled into the African mind the idea that Government and the European settler attach no importance to African land rights and are prepared to ignore previous undertakings...'\(^3\)

The land problem was therefore central in the grievances of the African population of the Tonga plateau. As will be detailed shortly, it was to be exploited, though perhaps not sufficiently, by Nkumbula and other Congress leaders, in their efforts to win support for Congress' challenge of the settlers' proposals. A movement which promised to safeguard the land rights of the African population, stood a fairly good chance of being heard in the area, for most Africans had lost all faith in the Administration's willingness to respond to their land needs. The 1951 report summed it up quite well when it said: 'The question of land takes precedence of all others when the African is thinking politically, and it must be said that the year 1951 witnessed a decided diminution of his faith in the good intentions of his European neighbours and indeed of the Government.'\(^4\)

\(^1\) Some were overlooked if the land they occupied was not particularly fertile and, therefore, not likely to attract speculators. Interviews on the plateau.
\(^2\) Hansard, 17th July, 1952, No. 73, Col. 501.
\(^4\) Native Affairs report, 1951, p.65.
The land scarcity problem apart, there were other allied grievances, on the plateau, which the politicians were to work on during the Federation struggle. Most of these had their roots in the agricultural and labour policies of the Administration as well as in the ill-treatment suffered at the hands of local settler farmers. There was a fair amount of agricultural discrimination. As already pointed out, the Agriculture Department consistently offered higher prices for the produce of white farmers and in spite of repeated representations by the African Farmers Associations, nothing was done to provide a more equitable price structure. The majority of African Farmers disapproved of the existence of the African Farming Improvement Fund to which all African producers contributed but from which only a few derived direct financial benefits.

There was also much racial discrimination in the application of the soil conservation rules of the Agriculture Department. While African farmers were forced to observe the rules of improved husbandry or face court fines, European settler farmers, in several areas, violated these rules with impunity. In the 1930s, for instance, when African Chiefs and their people were being pressurised into the observance of cattle dipping rules, it was reported that

1 See Chapter IV, p. 177.

2 In 1942 Capt. Campbell had told the Legislative Council that Africans on the plateau wanted to know what was being done with the Stabilisation Fund (which later became the African Farming Improvement Fund). See Hansard, 17th September, 1942, No. 43, Col. 180.

3 See Chapter II, p. 86.
'there has been no attempt on the part of the European cattle owners to take advantage of the dipping ordinance'. The dipping of cattle owned by Europeans was purely a discretionary matter. When in the forties and fifties, the Agriculture Department embarked on its Improved Farming drive, African farmers who failed to observe soil conservation rules were punished for committing breaches of the rules at a time when certain European farmers were doing the same and getting away with it. In 1950, for instance, it was reported that 'there is no doubt that many non-native ... growers in the line of rail areas are paying little or no attention to the conservation of soil and fertility. In the non-native areas ... the area under green manure is only a fraction of what is [Fig7 should be to maintain fertility].

In 1951, the Agricultural Supervisor in Monze, wrote about 'large numbers of African farmers in the reserves' who had been 'convicted during the season because of violation of the Native Authority's Agricultural laws'. 'In the majority of cases', he wrote, 'the maximum penalties have been imposed'. Most offenders had been found guilty of 'ploughing up and down the slope of a hill despite directions by the Agricultural Assistants to follow the contours as near as possible where grass strips or contour ridges have not yet been marked'. The Supervisor, however, noticed that Africans were not alone in committing this offence.

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1 See Governor's Address to Legislative Council, 13th March, 1931, Hansard No. 13, p.13.

2 Agriculture Department Annual report, 1950, pp. 10-11.
He drew attention to 'two near-by European farms' where 'lands have recently been "broken" near the roadways leading from the reserves and the ploughing and planting of crops is quite obviously up and down the slope of the hill without any regard whatsoever for soil conservation'. He pointed out that 'African cultivators who have been punished for this same offence have been quick to notice this bad practice and ... have been asking the African assistants why Europeans are being allowed to continue this practice while the Africans are being dealt with so severely.' It was, he said, 'becoming increasingly difficult to get the Africans to understand the necessity of rotating their crops when some... Europeans who are purported to be "leaders", plant maize in the same lands for a known period of seven years in succession'.

In conclusion, he observed that 'the time is obviously coming when these differences can no longer be overlooked and there is a danger that they may be used to good effect as political capital'.

Apart from agricultural discrimination which affected everyone, the majority of African farmers found the soil conservation rules too burdensome. Most of the contour ridges had been installed without the prior approval of the farmers concerned, who were now being asked to maintain and keep them clean. This many objected to. Soil conservation was seen as an escape from the problem of land inadequacy, which African farmers believed could only be solved when more land was made available to them, especially the vast tracts which European farmers were not making any use of.

\[1\] Acc/75/25; Vol. II, Z.N.A. Agricultural Supervisor to Senior Agricultural Officer, 12.2.51.
In 1946, during the sittings on the plateau of the Land Tenure Committee, Gore Browne had observed that 'the cleaning of contour ridges was objected to...'.\(^1\) In 1948, the Agriculture Department reported that 'most conservation work is looked on as an unnecessary disturbance causing hard work, imposed on the people by Government against their will...'.\(^2\) In the Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy, which had suffered much land alienation and was relatively overcrowded by the late forties, officials reported in 1949, 'a stubborn refusal to accept improved methods of Agriculture'.\(^3\) Although an Agricultural Station had operated in the area for 8\(^1/2\) years, it had made 'very little impression on the Mwanachingwala people'. Officials observed very strong resentment of settlers in the area and their investigations led them to believe that 'the feeling of being arrogantly dispossessed is perhaps more marked here than elsewhere in the District'.\(^4\)

The soil conservation programme was also opposed vigorously in the Mapangazia and Keemba Hill areas. When, in 1950, the Agriculture Department attempted to salvage the 'badly over-cultivated and overgrazed' Mapangazia area, 'passive resistance had to be broken down'.\(^5\) At Keemba Hill, in Chief Chongo's area, in 1951,

\(^1\) Sec/Nat/204, Z.N.A. Vol. II, Gore Browne, 'Notes...' op.cit.

\(^2\) Agriculture Department Annual report, 1948, p.?  

\(^3\) Sec/Nat/366 N/0834, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 2 of 1949.

\(^4\) Ibid.

19 farmers protested against the installing of grass strips on their farms without their permission by ploughing over them.¹ This group of protesting farmers was led by Ellison Milambo, the leader of the area's Farmers Association.²

The farmers of the plateau repeatedly criticized the Administration's attempts to regulate their cropping operations through the 7th of January law.³ They considered the date too early and demanded that the restriction be lifted.⁴ The Administration's efforts in 1949 and 1950 to get the people on the plateau to grow cassava 'as a stand-by crop for use in lean years'⁵ met with very little success. Farmers saw no point in preparing for famines which did not occur on the plateau as often as in the Zambesi valley. Certain Chiefs, notably Siamusonde and Sianjalika,⁶ and their people refused to set up nurseries and the Agriculture Department later abandoned the idea.

African farmers also had their differences with white farmers on the plateau. Complaints about the very high pound fees imposed by settler farmers on straying African cattle⁷ continued into the

¹KSB 3/1, Z.N.A, Mazabuka District Notebook, Tour report, No.4, of 1951.
²See Chapter IV, p.183.
³See Chapter IV, p.147.
⁴See Chapter IV, p.147.
⁵Sec/Nat/w04, Vol. II, Z.N.A, Gore Browne, 'Notes...'. The Rev. Nightingale, representing African interests in the Legislative Council, also drew attention to this opposition of Africans to the 7th of January law, and recommended that the date of planting maize should be controlled not by the Calendar but by the weather'. See Hansard, 5th April, 1946, No. 53, Col. 405.
⁶Native Affairs report, 1949, p.73.
⁷Interviews in these Chieftaincies.
⁸See, for instance, the complaints of Mwanachingwala's people in District Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs, 5.9.21, in KDB 1/3/6, Z.N.A.
late forties and fifties, for the majority of white farms were still unfenced. The Chiefs 'complained that scarcely any farms were fenced nor the boundaries marked in any way. Under these circumstances it was impossible for them to know when they, or their cattle were trespassing and alleged trespassing often resulted in the impounding of their cattle... They urged that Government should compel Europeans to fence their farms."

The problem of forced labour (Cibalo) was yet another of the main grievances of the African population, a problem which derived directly from the relative scarcity of voluntary as well as wage labour. By the early fifties, it was reported that the majority of Tonga adult males were at home in the villages, engaged in various agricultural pursuits. Most of those who were still leaving the reserves in search of wage employment came from the poorer Chieftaincies to the east of the line of rail. It was reported that in the latter areas between 30 and 40% of the able bodied males were at any one time engaged in wage employment. However, in the cattle owning areas, the number of wage earners dropped to as little as ten per cent of the adult male population. Many men stayed in the villages also because of the hardships they were likely to suffer if through failure to obtain alternative employment, they found themselves working on the farms of some of the less tolerant settler farmers. A number of these used whips (sjamboks) on their employees, whenever they erred, and apart from the pain this inflicted, many potential farm

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2 See Native Affairs report, 1951, p.76.
workers considered this most humiliating. In 1948, a Mazabuka District Farmer, C.T. Kelly, was reported as having chased some of his farm employees on horseback and having beaten them with a sjambok. In 1952, a District Official made notes on the subject of labour illtreatment during a tour of some white farms east of the Magoye river. He wrote: 'It is indeed a pity that at least two of these farmers were allotted farms bordering on the native reserve. According to their own statements, their treatment of the African leaves much to be desired. One farmer literally boasted to me that he caned the son of one of the Chiefs and took him back to his father personally'.

To avoid such treatment, most young men stayed at home, only to find themselves victims of cibalo from time to time. The forced labour problem in the forties and fifties did not arise as much from the labour needs of the settler farmers as from those of the Administration. Although in the earlier years of white settlement some farmers had attempted to use the Administration in the acquiring of involuntary labour, these had had very little success and, as a result, had settled down to the employment of regular wage labourers. The Administration, however, continued to require free labour for such tasks as road construction, the building of Government offices and porterage when officials were on tour, even though

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1 Interviews on the plateau.
3 Sec/Nat/366 N/083/3, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 12 of 1952. The ill-treatment of African labourers by some settler farmers was, apparently, not a new thing.
4 See Chapter I, pp. 57-58.
this was very difficult to come by. Whenever labour was needed, Chiefs had to send their messengers (kunasus) into the villages to round up the required number of able bodied males. People on the plateau today still talk about the excesses of some of the Kunasus, many of whom seldom hesitated to use their sjamboks and knobkerries on unwilling recruits. The recruiting drives, in the forties and fifties, of the Kunasus Hagwagwa and Maila in the Chisuwo area of Ufwenuka Chieftaincy and of Lutaka (Sianjalika Chieftaincy) and Halube (Mwenda Chieftaincy) are still remembered with much shaking of the head. In spite of assurances from the Administration that Cibalo would end in 1946, it continued well into the mid fifties, on the plateau and in other parts of the Southern province.

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From the foregoing discussion, it becomes clear that by the time that Job Mayanda began his job of organising the Congress movement in the Southern province, there was a great deal of strong anti-settler and anti-Administration feeling in several parts of the plateau. Isolated pockets of resistance were beginning to emerge. Many Africans on the plateau believed that their problems would increase under Federation and were therefore determined to oppose it. In 1950, the Southern Provincial Commissioner commented on 'the new wave of unity that had appeared in the Southern Province,'

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1In 1930, for instance, it was reported that 'there is practically no labour offered voluntarily but all Government's requirements have been filled without much difficulty'. ZA 7/3/14, Vol. I Z.N.A. Quarterly report for period ending 30th September, 1930.

2Interviews on the plateau.

3See Gore Browne, "Notes...", op.cit.

4Interviews on the plateau.

5As late as July, 1953, Nkumbula brought to the attention of the Fabion Colonial Bureau, the existence of Cibalo in the Gwembe valley. See FCB 101/2/5.
something that was hitherto unknown...'. He remarked that 'the feeling of unity which the need to resist Federation has evoked may be a good thing if it can be steered away from Nationalism'.

Frustration over living conditions gave rise to an attitude of non-cooperation in some of the reserves. Although the majority of the area's Chiefs avoided any confrontation with the Administration, some were, by 1951, already showing their determination not to do some of the Administration's bidding. In 1951, when 19 farmers at Keemba Hill ploughed over the Agriculture Department's grass strips, Chief Chongo, in whose area they lived, refused to prosecute them. A District Official, commenting on the impasse, noted: 'Chief Chongo had shown reluctance to prosecute them and I had to draw his attention to his duties... I have always suspected that Chief Chongo has shown partiality and that his evasion of responsibility is at the root of more trouble than Keemba Hill intransigence'.

At about the same time, Chief Siamusonde also refused to prosecute 32 villagers, in his area, who had moved out of their villages and established new homesteads in areas outside the jurisdiction of their Headmen. In spite of pressures from the Mazabuka Boma, Siamusonde remained adamant and, in the end, officials had to send their kapasus to burn down the houses of the offenders.

1 Sec/Nat/66P N/0006/3, Vol.IV, Provincial report on the Southern Province, 1950. The majority of Africans had, for instance, never been united in support of the Administration's schemes such as cattle dipping or contour ridging.

2 KSB /1, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Notebook. Tour report No. 4 of 1951.

3 Interview with Franklin Kaluwe, 18,12,73. Also Unpublished M.A. thesis of M.Muntemba, "The Evolution of Political Systems in South-Central Zambia 1894-1953", P.180, University of Zambia.
The Plateau Tonga Native Authority was also, by 1951, refusing to respond to some of the proposals of the Administration. This new radicalism which was making itself felt within the Native Authority was no doubt connected with the 1948 reorganisation of the Native Authority System within the territory. The Administration, in an endeavour to involve educated Africans in the work of the Native Authorities, allowed, among other things, for the nomination or election of 'Progressives' to sit in council with the Chiefs.\(^1\) Traditional Councillors were replaced by five progressives who had taken an 'interest in matters concerning the Welfare of the tribe and progress in general'.\(^2\) The new members were known as 'honorary Councillors', not to be confused with the Departmental Councillors, who also took their places in the Native Authorities for the first time in 1948, and were responsible for carrying out various departmental duties. Although the new rules stated quite clearly that the Progressives 'would take no executive part in the government of the individual Chief's areas',\(^3\) they came to wield a great deal of influence within the Native Authorities to the extent that, in 1949, it was reported of the Mazabuka District that 'there is a certain fear among the Chiefs that their powers are being usurped by the Councillors.'\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Sec/Nat/271, Z.N.A. Minutes of a meeting of the Plateau Tonga Native Authority, 24.6.48.

\(^2\) Native Affairs report, 1948, pp. 57-58.

\(^3\) Sec/Nat/271, Z.N.A. Minutes of a meeting of the Plateau Tonga Native Authority, 24.6.48.

\(^4\) Native Affairs Report, 1949, p.70.
This fear of being overshadowed did not however persist for long. The Chiefs were quick to realise that little would be gained in a confrontation with the more educated newcomers and so, in a number of areas, they were, during the early fifties, allowing the Progressives free rein within the Native Authority Councils, especially in the formulation of policy dealing with such sensitive issues as soil conservation. In 1951 the Native Affairs report on the Southern Province commented on this new development within the Native Authority.

'The most striking feature was the consolidation of their positions by the non traditional elements, the Departmental and Nominated Councillors. They took the lead in discussion at every meeting and far from being jealous, the Chiefs appeared to acquiesce in their leadership and in some cases to be content to take a back seat. The concentration on politics rather than administration during the year no doubt had something to do with this. But one cannot but suspect that the Chiefs regard the newcomers as having providentially taken over some of the more distasteful of the Chief's own duties, leaving them to sit back and enjoy the privileges of Chieftainship.'

Although during the late forties and early fifties, a few of these new Councillors were to eschew any serious involvement in protest politics, the majority were politically inclined and very influential. It would not be wrong to say that a number of hitherto indifferent Chiefs who were later to play an active part in the activities of the Congress movement were influenced by these Councillors. Among the most influential were Simon Mulindi, "

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1Native Affairs report, 1951, p.67.

2One of them, William Kazoka, was even to move a motion calling for the banning of the A.N.C. on the plateau, during the late fifties. See Chapter VII, p.34.

3Mulindi was dismissed from the Native Authority in 1953 for his political activities and 'for querying decisins of the Native Authority and the Government'. See SEC/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Mazabuka District report for 1953.
of whom mention has been made before; Chugwa, Chief Sianjali's energetic junior councillor of the late forties; Peter Habumbu, another of the plateau's young politicians of whom mention has also been made. These were active Congress members and their activities within the Plateau Tonga Native Authority and in the Mazabuka District in general, were to force District officials into the conclusion that 'many of the progressives are more interested in politics than in development'.

That the politically-minded Councillors within the Plateau Tonga Native Authority were getting their way in a number of things was seen quite clearly in the Authority's refusal to cooperate with the Administration on certain crucial matters during the early fifties. When the Native Authority was called upon to aid the administration in solving the land-grabbing problem of these years, the Chiefs and Councillors showed very little interest. An official commenting on the situation observed that 'the Native Authority appreciates the situation and has twice debated proposals to secure an even division of communal land, and have twice evaded the issue and sought a facile popularity by implying that Government must have foreseen the difficulty when land was alienated to Europeans'.

1Sec/Nat/366 N/0834; Z.N.A. Tour report No. 12 of 1949.
2Habumbu retired temporarily from the Native Authority in 1950 (see Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/3; Z.N.A. Tour report No. 3, 1952), but later resumed his position from which he was to be suspended in 1957 mainly because of his political activities as a Congress Deputy Provincial President in the Southern Province. See Chapter VII.
3See Native Affairs Report, 1952, p.72.
Around 1950 the Plateau Tonga Native Authority (P.T.N.A.) also began to take action over the virtual monopoly of retail trading in the reserves which was enjoyed by European and Asian traders. For long, a number of Africans with plans for the setting up of retail stores in the urban and rural areas had encountered great difficulty in securing trading licences and many had given up in frustration. To protect the rights of the African population, established traders on the plateau began to think in terms of an African Traders Union. In March 1945, about thirty of the licensed African traders in the Mazabuka District formed the Mazabuka African Traders Association. They explained that they planned 'to start in a small way by organising joint purchases of trade goods from wholesalers' and 'hoped eventually to develop into a Wholesale Cooperative Society...'. The Association's members approached the Native Authority for protection of the interests of African traders and this the Chiefs and Councillors willingly offered by making it almost impossible for intending non-Africans to trade in the reserves. In 1950 the District Commissioner commented on the increasing refusal of the P.T.N.A. to allow more European traders into the reserves: 'The Native Authority still continued to prevent the expansion of European trade in the reserves. The ostensible reason is a wish to foster African trade but there is no concealment of the political argument, that since Europeans have taken up

1In June 1945, Esau Tembo told the Southern Provincial Council of the case of 25 Africans who wanted to open up trading stores but could not secure licences because the Administrators insisted that they should wait until the Askaris came back from the war. See Sec/Nat/104, Z.N.A. Meeting of Southern Provincial Council, 14th-15th June, 1945. Also Chapter V.

2We have few details about the membership of this Association, but it appears that Esau Tembo and some of the other immigrant traders around Mazabuka were deeply involved in its activities. See Chapter V, p. 235.

farmland once occupied by the Batonga, they must stay where
they are and keep out of the reserves'. The Chiefs, especially
Mwachingwala, repeatedly refused to make land available for
the building of new European stores and, as a result, European
retail trading in the reserves suffered a marked contraction during
the fifties.

It can therefore be seen from the foregoing that although,
for the first four years of its existence, the Congress movement
had made no serious attempts to organise Africans, on the Tonga
plateau, for protest against white rule, there was by the end of
1951 much grass root political awareness in the area. Although
deriving mainly from the grievances that Africans had, this alert­
ness was also partly the result of Nkumbula's trips to the plateau
during the first few months of his election as Congress President.
No stranger to the majority of the area's Chiefs, he addressed
several meetings of Chiefs and their people and expressed concern
for the problems of the African population. This departure from
the days of Mbikusita Lewanika's leadership was to engender a
lively political consciousness in the Mazabuka District. This did
not escape the attention of District officials. In 1951, the
District Commissioner wrote: 'The issues arising from the question
of Closer Association of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland has had
a profound effect upon everyone and is likely to last. The poli­
tical structure culminating in Representative Council which before

1Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. III, Z.N.A. Mazabuka District Office
report, 1950.

was just a new toy of the professional intelligentsia has become a real machine for a real purpose, known about and to some extent understood by even the most remote backwoodsmen...¹.

It now remained to be seen how efficient the African National Congress, under its new leadership, would be in organising this mass consciousness to serve the needs of its struggle against Federation.

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When Harry Nkumbula assumed the leadership of Congress in 1951, there was no organising machinery to inherit. Years later a Congress Secretary-General writing of this period was to make the following remark: 'When Mr. Lewanika left there was nothing handed over to the new President. There were no books of accounts no files, no office, no branch and not a single registered member'.²

Congress' new President now had to address himself to the problems of organising the movement, especially in the rural areas where very little had been done. In keeping with its image, the new Congress leadership called for more radical political activity in the rural areas. The Freedom Newsletter, Congress' bulletin, called in February 1952 for the extension of mass action from the Copperbelt towns to those 'along the line of rail and then to the rural areas...' 'The bravest and most militant leaders', the paper

²See Kenneth Kaunda's speech, as Congress Secretary General, during the 7th Annual Conference of October, 1956. FCB 105/1.
urged, 'must be elected; the appeasers, the stooges and those who are scared of losing their jobs or their trading licences must be removed from leading posts' for 'Freedom has never been won under leadership of cowards /sic/'. To the Congress leaders the rural areas were first and foremost a source of funds. They did not see themselves as setting out systematically to politicize the people living in the reserves. Whatever administrative machinery was set up in the villages was to be geared primarily towards the raising of badly needed funds. The A.N.C. branch Chairman and Secretaries who were to be appointed in the various chieftaincies on the plateau did hardly anything besides collect money.

In December, 1951, the Congress leaders spelled out their proposals for the African challenge to the Settlers Federation Campaign. They had decided that the struggle should be waged on both the home front and in London and they now requested financial support for a planned delegation to the United Kingdom. The movement's officials were determined to attract the support of the fairly well to do Chiefs and farmers in the rural areas, especially those on the Tonga plateau, the centre of African commercial farming activity. In wooing this support, Nkumbula and his officials emphasised Congress' concern about the status of African Chiefs and the various problems connected with African farming in the rural areas, especially the prime issue of land

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1 FCB 101/3/136. Freedom Newsletter, 17.2.52.
alienation. To counter the official propaganda that Congress was solely the work of the African Intelligentsia and that the African Chiefs were indifferent to the movement's activities, Congress sought to involve the Chiefs directly in its anti-Federation campaign. The Chiefs were called upon, in December 1951, 'to lead an All African delegation to England, to speak of our protection for which you signed treaties with the British Government'. They were informed that 'going to England requires money' and were implored to tell their people 'to give money for this battle' from which they stood to gain since 'Congress believed in 'the preservation of the Chiefs' status'.

Nkumbula knew that land loss through alienation was a sore point in the reserves. In December, 1951, he criticized this policy of the administration in very strong terms, during a meeting of Congress' Working Committee: 'The worsening race relations has been brought about by the schemes designed to rob the African of his rights to the ownership of his land. In actual fact, he has been robbed of his land by his benevolent protector. What legal rights has His Majesty's Government to dispossess the indigenous African of his land? Hundred thousands of Africans have been removed from the most fertile and arable lands... back into infertile and remote areas in order to make room for land grubbing white settlers \(\text{sic}\)."
Congress' overtures met with much success on the Tonga plateau. Most of the Chiefs and their people contributed towards the expenses of the 1952 delegation and were very pleased to discover on its return that the question of land alienation had been taken up with officials in London. In his report on the delegation's activities, Nkumbula told the Chiefs and their people that the delegates did everything they could 'to inform the British public how the Protectorate Government is taking land away from the Africans and that the Africans wanted that land given back to them'. He explained that they had stressed the point that these lands 'were sold to white people by the Government without the owners knowing anything about it'. He also informed them that Congress had 'placed this matter in the hands of a distinguished lawyer in London' and that he was 'going through the whole land question in Northern Rhodesia'. In conclusion, he stressed the need for financial support if Congress was to succeed in its campaign for the restoration of African land rights. He told the Chiefs: 'a great sum of money to settle this matter in the Rhodesian and English courts will be necessary. So please raise more money. Each one of you with your people should have a target of £500...'.

Local Congress leaders on the plateau reacted promptly to the President's appeal. Job Mayanda, from his Headquarters at

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1 The General President's report on the 1st Delegation to Britain to campaign against Federation. July, 1952, A.N.C. Files, Macpherson Collection.
2 Ibid.
3 Congress' Solicitors were: Messrs A.C. Bryden and Williams, of 53 Victoria Street, London, S.W.1. See President's Statement on the White Paper of January, 1953. A.N.C. Files, Macpherson Collection.
4 The General President’s report on the 1st Delegation..., op.cit.
Keemba Hill, issued instructions to Congress supporters, in the various reserves of the plateau, for the formation of branches of the movement. A few meetings were arranged in some Chiefs' areas and, according to Informants, no Chief on the plateau refused Congress permission to organise in his area, although, as will be seen presently, some showed more enthusiasm than others. Congress branch officials went about the reserves collecting money for the movement and, at times, even claiming that they were employees of the Government, sent out to collect a special levy.

In October 1952, a District Assistant on a tour of European farms east of Mazabuka, reported that a certain amount of money collecting has taken place among African workers and unfortunately it would appear that Government was quoted in some areas as Authority for the collection. On the farm of J.C. Shenton, he was told that 'one African collected money dressed in some sort of a uniform resembling that of a District Messenger and told the employees of Mr. Shenton that the collection is a special levy imposed by the Government.' It appears that wherever Congress officials suspected a reluctance to contribute to their coffers, they employed the habit and the voice of the acknowledged Authority to achieve their objective.

During the course of Congress' policy of non-cooperation in the face of the Settlers' Federation demands, which was already

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2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.
being implemented in the sit-ins and boycotts on the Copperbelt townships and in Lusaka, was officially introduced on the Tonga plateau. Congress' principal target here was the soil conservation programme, especially its Improved Farming Scheme.

**Congress' programme of non-cooperation on the Tonga plateau**

Although the 1949 review of the Improved Farming Scheme had checked its expansion,¹ the number of farmers enrolled in the scheme rose from 262 in the 1949/50 season to 450 in 1950/51.² For the 1951/52 season, there were 706 registered Improved Farmers.³

The majority of African farmers within Mazabuka District still had their doubts about the scheme but there was a small, but fairly well to do, minority, who found the attraction of bonus payments irresistible. The message of the Congress movement, stridently anti-Government and anti-Settler, appealed almost instantly to the majority of non-Improved Farmers but few Improved Farmers were prepared to jeopardise their positions within the scheme by openly associating with a movement that was so passionately opposed to the Administration and its policies.

During the late forties and fifties, most Improved Farmers therefore showed more interest in the nonpolitical activities of their Farmers Associations.⁴ In Association meetings, they eschewed political discussion and concentrated on passive protest.

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¹See Chapter IV, pp. 177-180.


³Ibid.

⁴There were however a number of Improved Farmers, like Amos Wqilubita and Gideon Mankapwi (of the 1937 Congress movement) who were prominent 'Congressmen'.

whenever there was cause to approach the Administration on such questions as produce prices and poor communications in the reserves. Although a number of them contributed, in secret, to Congress' coffers and occasionally attended Congress meetings, they did not play an active part in the movement's activities during this period.

Because the Improved Farmers got on well with the Administration and some of the settler farmers, who would even give them loans and invite them to such social gatherings as weddings and christenings, they fell foul of Congress organisers and non-Improved Farmers and their families. To these people, the Improved Farmers were nothing but collaborators with white oppression. Many openly accused them of this. Within the local Congress movement there were strong doubts about the sincerity and the loyalty of Improved Farmers who attended Congress meetings. Many believed they were only there to take word to the Administration. Very few Improved Farmers were allowed into the Councils where policy decisions were made. Indeed, up to the declaration of Federation, very few Improved Farmers were elected to Executive positions in the Congress branches on the plateau.

The majority of the Improved Farmers responded with a stoic indifference to the attacks and criticism that emanated from the ranks of local Congress officials and their supporters. A district Cadet on tour of the Ufvenuka area in the fifties observed, "the

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1 Interviews on the plateau. A.D. Jones in his article "Social Networks of Farmers among the Plateau Tonga of Zambia" in A.C. Lloyd (Ed.), The New Elites of Tropical Africa (O.U.P., 1966), also makes this observation.

2 Interviews on the plateau.
indifference of those converted to systems of improved agriculture for the welfare of those who have not seen the light'. The District Commissioner, commenting on this observation, elaborated on the circumstances surrounding the operation of the scheme on the plateau:

'The Improved Farmer is regarded with suspicion... The common view shows him as a tribal enemy either building up the fertility of the land so that European Farmers can find it worthwhile to appropriate the land or salving the conscience of the government in making less land produce more and thus deferring the day when more land must be reserved for African occupation.'

In June 1952, Congress' campaign to win the support of the uncommitted Improved Farmers began. The movement was very much in need of their financial support. Local Congress leaders were determined to bring the Improved Farmers into active membership of the movement. They held up the Farmers Associations as ineffective protest organs which stood no serious chance of gaining for African farmers the changes they sought and enjoined the Improved Farmers to fuse their Associations with the Congress movement.

The relatively heavily populated Sianjalika Chieftaincy, which had suffered a great deal from land alienation, was one of the main areas where Congress did a great deal of campaigning against the Improved Farming Scheme and allied matters. Local officials knew that they stood a very good chance of being heard

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1Sec/Nat/366, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 9 of 1951.
2Ibid.
here. The Chief was a very active Congress supporter. When in
July 1952, Congress wanted to hold a public meeting in his area,
he was very instrumental in getting the people together. This
meeting which was held, allegedly, at Harry Nkumbula's instruction,
was addressed by local politicians, all of whom were members of
the Seventh Day Adventist Church. According to the Provincial
Agricultural Officer's account of the meeting, the following in­
structions were given to the people in connection with Congress' policy of non-cooperation:

1. Taxes should not be paid, cattle should not be
sold over the Veterinary scales or be allowed
to be inoculated against anthrax or quarter evil.

2. None should join the Improved Farmers' Scheme.
All Improved Farmers should stop taking any advice
from the Agricultural Department.

3. All Africans should oppose all conservations methods and marking of grass strips in their new
gardens.

4. The people should plough and plant as they like.¹²

Money was collected at the meeting, 'for the purpose of
paying a European lawyer to bring a case which they hope will
evict the Europeans from the Ngwesi River' and to work up feel­
ing against Federation, the people were told that after union
with Southern Rhodesia had been achieved by the settlers, African
'cattle will be taken away ... and all the Africans would be
castrated by the Europeans'.³

The Provincial Agricultural Officer condemned 'the kind of
propaganda and threats that are being put over at meetings which

¹N/0001/2/8, Z.N.A. Provincial Agricultural Officer to D.C.
Mazabuka, 12.8.52.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
are sponsored by the Chief' and pointed out that 'this has happened at other areas besides Sianjalika's...'. He called on the Government 'to take a strong hand and state what its policy will be in a case of non-cooperation...' and even suggested that 'maize buying depots be closed ...' should opposition to the Agriculture Department persist.¹

Congress' Charter of non-cooperation which its leaders on the Tonga plateau had expounded in the Sianjalika area was cited at meetings in other Chieftaincies and although it made hardly any impression in some areas,² it succeeded in stimulating further opposition to the settlers and the Administration in other parts of the District. The central Congress leadership did not leave the campaign against the Improved Farming Scheme entirely in the hands of organisers on the plateau. Harry Nkumbula himself played an active part in it. In August 1952, in an address to a Chiefs and Delegates Conference organised by Congress in Lusaka, he condemned the differential pricing system of Agricultural produce and attacked the Improved Farming Scheme. He criticized a situation wherein African producers not only received lower prices for their produce, but were forced to contribute towards an Improvement fund, from which only a few derived direct financial benefits. He argued that the farming bonus system, looked at carefully, offered no bonus at all and was a case of outright trickery. He told the

¹Ibid.
²Notably Ufwenuka and Chona Chieftaincies.
gathering: 'Most of these Improved Farmers in the Maize controlled area produce an average of 200 bags for each crop season which they sell at a loss of 12/9d per bag. This means that each of these farmers puts into the ... Fund an average of £125. From this sum, he is paid the £50 bonus. The answer is that he has actually received no bonus. The £50 bonus he has received is part of the money he has lost.1

In spite of Congress' criticism of the scheme, the majority of the Improved Farmers, skeptical of the movement's propaganda, continued to operate within the scheme. To the annoyance of Congress officials, they also persisted in running their Farmers Associations independently of the Congress movement. There were, however, a few who gave in to Congress' call and deregistered from the scheme. In the Sianjalika area, for instance, it was reported in November 1952, that of the area's 100 Improved Farmers, many will not qualify for bonuses because of 'the sudden opposition to the purchase of fertiliser of which a little under half the bags ordered were not taken up by those who ordered them'. 2 District officials believed that this was 'partly due to the unfortunate propaganda from certain emissaries of Congress' which had raised 'a lot of doubt ... in the minds of many Improved Farmers as to the security of their tenure'.3 To further undermine confidence

1Presidential Address to the Chiefs and Delegates Conference held in August 1952, A.N.C. Files, Macpherson Collection.

2Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/3, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 10 of 1952.

3Ibid.
in the Improved Farming Scheme (I.F.S.) and stampede members into deregistering from it, Congress, it was reported, had also put about 'untrue stories ... that some headmen had evicted Improved Farmers and that Government had seized some of the land and implements of an Improved Farmers [sic] who died recently...'.

Apparently, Congress' propaganda against the I.F.S. in the Sianjalika area went down quite well. The author's interviews in the area revealed that even within the local Improved Farming group, whose membership rose from 100 in 1952 to 132 in 1953, only a few were seriously committed to the scheme, the majority participating in it simply because it was the surest way to the acquisition of equipment at subsidised prices. The Chief himself, an active politician, who skilfully combined his positions as Administration representative and Congress leader and who, in 1949, had got most of his people to boycott the scheme, registered under it in 1952. Neither he nor the majority of Improved Farmers in his area participated in the activities of any Farmers Association. In fact, most Informants were agreed that no such Associations were formed, in the area, and that Improved Farmers interested in Farmers Associations had to join the Monze branch. The local Congress branch, based in the Chief's village, was said to be quite 'militant' and it appears to have enjoyed

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1 Ibid.
2 Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 9 of 1953.
3 Ibid.
4 The District Commissioner remarked, in 1952, on the Chief's ability to 'run with the hare and hunt with the hounds'. See Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/3, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 10 of 1952.
7 Ibid.
much support from both Improved and non-Improved Farmers.

A number of farmers also deregistered from the I.F.S. in the Monze Chieftaincy during the early fifties. The area was in the fifties under the radical Chief Mugodi Monze, an incessant critic of the Administration who was to be deposed during the Federal years. Congress' campaign against the I.F.S. here met with a great deal of success. In 1952, of 61 villages visited during an agricultural survey, only 106 men in a total male population of 1224 were Improved Farmers. In March of the following year, a touring District Official counted only 30 Improved Farmers in the Monze area, 'some 50 having left the scheme for various reasons...'. One farmer who had left the scheme explained that he had been disturbed by rumours 'that the land was to be handed over to the Europeans when Federation came about'. In his report for 1952, the Provincial Commissioner commented on the campaign of non-cooperation which Congress was waging on the plateau in connection with the I.F.S. He observed that although the number of Improved Farmers who registered within the province for the 1952/53 season had risen above that of the previous season, there were political and other setbacks to the scheme 'towards the end of the year, when many Africans who had ordered fertilizers were misled by lies and refused to take up their order...'. He pointed out that although 'both the Provincial Administration and the

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2 Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 5, 1953.

3 Ibid.
Agricultural Department have worked hard to counteract such lies' in 'Monze and Kanchamba, the numbers/ of Improved Farmers/ have fallen considerably...'.

The S.D.A. settlement at Keemba Hill, the official Headquarters of the Congress movement in Mazabuka District, was another area where African farmers defiantly resisted the Administration's policies. The area's disenchantment with the Administration had increased over the years and the majority of its farmers took gladly to the Congress movement. Congress policy of non-cooperation was studiously observed by many in the area. In 1951, when some Keemba Hill farmers refused to observe the rules of the soil conservation programme, District officials talked about the need for firmness in handling the dissenters. The Provincial Commissioner minuted:

'The point is clear and that is that the farmers must not be allowed to gain the impression that they are outside tribal control and can flout agricultural orders.... In effect, we should try conciliatory measures, but it should be made quite clear to the men concerned that if they do not play their part, there will be no hesitation in employing much sterner measures'.

As Keemba Hill's intransigence increased during the years leading up to Federation, so the Administration continued to insist on the need to get this group of educated and progressive farmers to set an example, through compliance with the soil conservation programme, for the rest of the African population to follow. Ellison Milambo, the leading spokesman of the settlement

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1Native Affairs report, 1952, pp. 75-76.
2See Chapter IV.
and a strong Congress leader, vividly remembers the activities of these years. He told the author: 'They tried to get us to agree to contour ridges and we refused. Then they brought grass strips but again Mayanda and Michello warned us not to agree. Bwanas from the Boma in Mazabuka came to see us several times and although some people agreed to join the scheme, and care for ridges, most of us refused. We had planted for many years without ridges. We did not want them now.'

Officials were not however to be put off by this uncompromising attitude. In January 1953, a touring official again raised the controversial question of enrolment with the I.F.S., while at Keemba Hill. He was jeered at and derided by the area's confident and successful, though non-Improved, Farmers. In his report he noted, inter alia: 'Some of the Keemba Hill farmers said they would become Improved Farmers provided I could show them an improved farm on the hill with superior crops to their own; unfortunately this was an impossibility at this time of the year in this particularly fertile area...' Keemba Hill's opposition to white rule and its policies was to continue into the years of Federation, as will be detailed later. It came to feature even more prominently as Congress' brain centre on the plateau.

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1 Interview with Ellison Milambo, 10.2.74.
2 Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 1 of 1953.
The Capricorn Africa Society on the Plateau

A very significant feature of the anti-Federation campaign in Mazabuka District, during the early fifties, was the clash between Congress officials and supporters on the one hand, and Africans suspected of being sympathisers with the Capricorn African Society, on the other. The Society was started, in 1949, by Colonel David Stirling, the 'Phantom Major', who had distinguished himself in fighting the Germans. Stirling tried to bring the liberal whites and Africans of Central Africa into an organisation designed to foster racial harmony. The movement aimed at creating a society in which there would be 'no discrimination on racial grounds' and where opportunities would be 'open to all and human capacity and merit will be the only criteria for responsible participation in public affairs'. The movement employed African and European Agents, who went about its business, recruiting interested moderates who were in favour of racial partnership in a Central African Federation. This recruiting was not however carried out in a very scrupulous fashion, and in a number of cases, over-enthusiastic Agents of the movement forwarded names of Africans whose support they believed they had enlisted, though, in fact, these people had no intention of joining the movement. The Capricorn Society condemned the strident nationalism of the African National Congress and, as a result, it brought on itself frequent attacks from Congress leaders at all levels. Congress was always on the lookout

1FCB 108/1/69, Circular on the Capricorn Africa Society.

2Nkumbula was claimed as a sympathiser in 1952 by an Agent Abel Nyirenda and the Congress President had to make speeches and write letters to clear his name. See, FCB 101/3/215, Nkumbula to P.Sikota, 12.11.52.
for moderate Africans, whom it believed were victims of the Capricorn Society's propaganda and, as one would expect, a number of people were accused, during the early fifties, of being in sympathy with the Society because they did not participate actively in Congress' activities.

On the Tonga plateau, in the early months of 1953, when the campaign against Federation was very much under way, charges of collaboration with the Capricorn Society were quite frequent. Things came to a head in March of that year when local Congress officials accused Chief Mwanachingwala (Chisoma), a long-standing Congress supporter, of sympathy for the Capricorn movement. The accusation was prompted by the fact that the Chief, in spite of pressures from Congress, refused to ostracise a well known Capricorn supporter who lived in his Chieftaincy. The man involved was one Frank Kaluwa. He was the brother of George Kaluwa, the Congress official, and had lived in Southern Rhodesia for a few years. In 1952, Harry Nkumbula had accused Frank Kaluwa of pretending to be a member of the African National Congress and claiming that he had been authorised by the Congress President to have food and drinks at the Chilambwe tea-room on credit. Kaluwa resided in the Munenga area of Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy and had openly admitted that he was a member of the Capricorn Africa Society. Local Congress leaders were angered by the fact that

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1 The accusation and harassment of Chief Mwanachingwala that followed might not have been unconnected with Mwanachingwala's role in a land dispute involving the Congress leader George Kaluwa. This dispute is mentioned later in this chapter.

Chief Mwanachingwala not only permitted Kaluwa to reside in his area but also encouraged him to pay visits to his house. Because they associated openly with Kaluwa, the Chief and his son, Peter Chisoma, were accused of deserting the Congress movement.¹

A protest meeting was held by Congress at the Munenga Mission, about four miles south of the Chief's village on the 1st March, 1953. Job Michello, who until February 1952 had been Congress' Branch Secretary in the Munenga area, but was now serving as 'Accountant-General'² in the movement's Lusaka office, was present at this meeting. A vehement critic of the Administration and settlers, Michello had by this time acquired a reputation for being 'a well known hothead'.³ He was one of those Congress politicians on the plateau who had regularly attended Native Authority meetings and had attempted to influence the Chiefs and Councillors in their deliberations, in spite of the fact that they had no right to speak at these meetings.⁴

With Michello at the Munenga Mission meeting were four prominent local Congress leaders, Wilson Chimbulu, Enoch Mundunda, Simon Maambo and Moses Nam-Weleba. According to a report on

¹N/COO1/2/10 Z.N.A, Confidential despatch from D.C. Mazabuka to Provincial Commissioner, 4.3.53.
²Michello was given responsibility for supervising Congress' contacts with the rural areas, especially in financial matters.
³N/COO1/2/10, Z.N.A, Confidential despatch from D.C. Mazabuka to Provincial Commissioner, 4.3.53.
⁴Ibid. As will be seen later, Congress was to make much use of the Native Authority meetings, on the plateau, to make its views known during the Federal years. See Chapter VII.
the meeting," Maambo supported by ... Michello said that there were four or six Capricorns in the Munenga area and asked for suggestions as to what should be done with them. Congress supporters present demanded that 'they should be killed'. Maambo then stood up and said, Federation would not come' and supported the view that 'the members of the Capricorn must be killed'. This evoked a response of 'Down with them' from the crowd. One Congress supporter, Aron Chileshe, 'then got up and said that the Chief should be taken away because he has joined the Capricorn'. Next, the Headmaster of Kalama School, a fellow called Kamwa, suggested that Congress members should approach the Chief and discuss with him his supposed membership of the Capricorn Society. Jacob Nangamba, a teacher at Munenga, then 'said that the headmen of the Chief were very foolish' and 'suggested that they had a meeting to see the Chief... about changing his Councillors...'. 'These remarks', the report continued, 'met with the approval of the people.' It was at this stage that Maambo insisted that Congress should choose new Councillors for the area without consulting the Chief. He argued that he was the local organising secretary of the Congress and that he, therefore, had the right to assist in the choosing of Councillors. The meeting then proceeded to choose three new Councillors. After a while, Sixpence Monga, a farmer from Chiwala's village, Judith Bumba and Wilson Chimbu were chosen. According to Informants, all three new Councillors were

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1N/0001/2/10, Z.N.A. Confidential despatch from D.C. Mazabuka to Provincial Commissioner, 4.9.53.
Seventh Day Adventists and local farmers. Chimbulu had served as a Mission teacher for several years and Bbumba had even undergone teacher training at the S.D.A.'s Solusi mission in Bulawayo, after which he taught in Salisbury and Johannesburg for some time.¹

The meeting ended in commotion with the people calling for the death of the Chief's son, Peter, and Maambo accusing him of 'selling the country to the Europeans'. He also accused Peter and his father 'of having been given a lot of money by the Capricorn movement...'.²

Although Chief Mwanachingwala and his son repeatedly denied the accusation that they were members of the Capricorn African Society, the local Congress movement lost confidence in the Chief's leadership and tried to have him deposed. A dispute had for some time surrounded the Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy, in which a strong Congress supporter, Nathan Kabunda, son of Nabimba, one-time Chief of the area, challenged the claims of the present incumbent.³

Kabunda, who was a very prosperous farmer,⁴ had tried unsuccessfully on previous occasions to win official Congress support for his claims. He had, however, made no impression on a Congress leadership which saw no point in opposing a Chief whose support for the movement was without question. Things however changed when Chief Mwanachingwala came under accusations of sympathy with the Capricorn movement. The official Congress branch now offered its support to Kabunda. Enjoying the backing of his clan and Congress,

¹Interviews in the Mwanachingwala area and with Job Michello, 19.6.74.
²N/CO01/2/10, Z.N.A. Confidential despatch, op.cit.
³Interview with Job Michello, 19.6.74.
⁴During the Agricultural Survey of 1945, Allan and others reported that Kabunda had some '220 acres of cultivation', the 'farmer with the largest acreage... encountered'. See Allan et alia, "Land Holding etc...", Rhodes-Livingstone Paper, No. 14, 1945, p.110.
Kabunda now filed a case against Chief Mwanachingwala in the Plateau Tonga Native Authority. He claimed that the Chief had no rights to the position, because he was not a native of the area. He argued that the Chief had come from Chief Sindaambwe's area towards the Gwembe valley and that he was not a pure Tonga but a Goba. After hearing both sides, however, the Native Authority upheld Chief Mwanachingwala's claims and Kabunda was later to be asked by the Chief to leave the area.

Congress' activities in Chief Mwanachingwala's area aroused much interest among the Chiefs and farmers on the plateau, especially the moderates who had always had their doubts about the movement's motives and real objectives. Many Chiefs now began to fear for their positions which seemed threatened by a movement determined to press the claims of its own candidates against Chiefs of whose loyalty it was in doubt. Indeed, it was reported in 1953 that in four Chieftaincies on the plateau, Congress 'caused considerable annoyance' by attempting to champion the claims of 'rivals of the Chiefs' and 'disappointed candidates'. Such behaviour on the part of some Congress officials and supporters left many Chiefs in doubt as to the wisdom of supporting a movement that seemed as capable of harassing its own sympathisers who

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1 Interview with Job Michello, 19.6.74.
2 This was during the late fifties. See C.M.N. White's Land Tenure Report on the Tonga Plateau (Southern Province), M.M.R.S.
3 Mwanachingwala must have been one of them.
4 Officials believed that this would alienate the Chiefs from Congress. In the same report, the D.C. noted: 'Fortunately this had the effect of making clear to the Chiefs generally what were the true aims of Congress - namely their own self advancement at the expense of the Chiefs and this in the end had an adverse effect on Congress ambitions. See Sec/Nat/66F N/006/3 Vol. IV, Mazabuka District Annual report, 1953.
had fallen out of favour, as it did the white man.

Concern among moderates became even more acute after the A.N.C. Southern Provincial Conference of May, 1953, at which Congress made attempts to strengthen its organisation within the Southern province and improve on its campaign against Federation in the area. It was attended by 25 Chiefs from within the province and 7,000 people.¹ Most of the leading Congress officials on the plateau were present, among them Michello, Mayanda, Maambo and Milambo. Meetings were opened with the chanting of Congress songs, most of them in praise of Nkumbula, and the use of popular slogans like 'Muntu Omwe-Kusala Komwe' (one man, one vote).² Congress used the occasion to raise more funds for the land suit, which was still in the hands of London solicitors, and for other expenses. An estimated 100 head of cattle were donated by Congress sympathisers to help defray expenses.³ A very important feature of the Conference was the attempt made to capture Improved Farmer support by inviting Paul Mulendema, the President of the African Farmers Union⁴ to address the gathering and appeal for more involvement in Congress' activities.⁵

Equally significant were Congress' attempts to strengthen its protest network during this conference. Under the direction of Job Michello and Job Mayanda, Congress ran a seminar for

²Some of these songs are supplied in the appendix.
³"A Statement on the Imposition...", op.cit.
⁴This was an attempt at Federating all African Farmers Associations within the territory. Mulendema was a successful farmer in the Central Province.
⁵Interview with Job Michello, 19.5.74.
Southern province organisers. 'Suggestion boxes' were provided so that participants could make their ideas known. The Congress leadership briefed organisers on various aspects of the non-cooperation struggle and despatched fifteen teams, each made up of two organisers, to various parts of the province to acquaint Congress branches with the new strategies.¹

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Congress and the Chiefs

The Chiefs of the plateau reacted in various ways to the activities of the Congress movement. Although every one of them allowed the movement to organise branches and hold meetings in their areas, and placed no serious obstacles in its way as some of their counterparts in other provinces were inclined to do,² their commitment to its programme varied from area to area. Most of the plateau's Chiefs were moderates, who, while supporting Congress, did not lose sight of the fact that they held their positions at the pleasure of the Administration. Most of them contributed to Congress' coffers and found time to attend its conferences,³ but few ventured to speak publicly in favour of the movement's anti-Government programme. There were two clearly discernible groups of Chiefs: the one, outspoken and very pro-Congress, the other largely indifferent to the political turbulence which Congress' activities were generating. In the former group were

¹Interviews with Ellison Milambo (10.2.74) and Job Michello (19.6.74).

²Certain Chiefs in the Northern Province were repeatedly reported to the Central Congress leadership because of their harassment of Congress officials in their area. This continued into the late fifties (see FCB 103/1/47). Provincial President, Northern Province to Provincial Commissioner Kasama, 2.10.57). Lozi Chiefs in the Western Province also opposed the movement for a number of years.

³For instance, at the Congress Conference held in Lusaka in August 1952, thirty-five of the ninety-two Chiefs present were from the Southern Province. See Report on Congress Conference of August 1952, A.N.C.Files, Macpherson Collection. All Chiefs on the plateau attended this conference.
Chiefs like Chongo, Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala, Monze (Mugodi) and Naluama and in the latter and clearly the smaller group, Chiefs like Ufwenuka and Chona.

Former Congress leaders who were interviewed by the author spoke highly of the support, both moral and financial, which they received from Chiefs like Chongo during the anti-Federation struggle, but observed that the Ufwenukas and Chonas were always more lukewarm in their support.⁴ Chief Ufwenuka (Malila) who died in 1951 never overcame his suspicions about Congress 'bona fides'. His successor, Wilson Hakamba, did not find much time for Congress either, perhaps a result of the fact that his claims were being strongly challenged by people whom he believed enjoyed Congress' backing. Hakamba was subsequently replaced by the Native Authority after serving as Chief for less than a year and Shadreck Nyanga became Chief Ufwenuka. He showed a little more interest in Congress' activities than his predecessor but, as one Informant explained, 'he did not do much'.²

In the case of Congress' failure to make an impression on Hameja Chona, who was head of the Chona Chieftaincy for a number of years before he was killed by a lion in the 1960s, it was very much a conflict between the forces of change as typified by Congress and those of continuity as seen in the old Chief. Apart from other reasons for not taking Congress seriously, the Chief had no faith in Nkumbula's leadership and he regarded the

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¹ Interviews with Congress officials.
² Interview with Paul Mwiindwa (15.8.74) and others in the Ufwenuka area.
Congress President and his aides as inexperienced and over-adventurous young men. He believed strongly that nothing could be gained through the course of action Congress was advocating.\(^1\)

Although it is dangerous to generalise on this point, the evidence of Chiefly support for Congress on the plateau seems to suggest that, in the majority of cases, Chiefs and people in areas that had suffered much land loss were more forthcoming in their support for the movement than those who had not been deprived to the same extent. For instance, the Mwanachingwalas and Sianjalikas, whose areas had lost vast tracts of land to incoming white settlers were dedicated to the Congress programme, while the Ufwemukas and Chonas, who, apart from the land taken up by missionary societies,\(^2\) lost nothing to white farmer settlers, continued to be very lukewarm in their support of political protest into the sixties.\(^3\) Congress' non-cooperation programme tended to have more appeal in the former than in the latter areas. Unlike the case in the Sianjalika area, where many Improved Farmers participated openly in Congress' activities, the majority of the 115 Improved Farmers in the Ufwenuka area by 1953\(^4\) showed no real...

\(^1\)Interview with Chief Chona, 28.4.74.

\(^2\)The Chona Chieftaincy lies on the escarpment and is very hilly. The Ufwenuka area also slopes down to the escarpment.

\(^3\)Describing the Ufwenuka/Chona area in 1963, Muchangwe wrote: 'Politically, the area has been comparatively quiet. There are no strong branches of either the main African parties. Much of this is due to the influence of the Missions but largely due to the presence of an intelligent and energetic Chief who is generally liked by his people for being a firm and ... impartial administrator ...'. See I.H. Muchangwe, "Ufwenuka/Chona Regional plan", p.4., M.M.R.S. The relatively low population of the Chona area might also have been a factor in its lack of prominence in the protest movement.

\(^4\)Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 9 of 1953.
interest in the movement. Although there was a 'feeling of dissatisfaction' in their ranks, which, in 1953, some Congress officials tried to exploit, the area's Improved Farmers remained steadfast in their preference of Farmers Association to Congress.

The Administration was for long perturbed by the support that the majority of the Mazabuka District Chiefs were giving to the Congress movement. Many of them were openly associating with the movement in disregard of Administrative fiat. The Government was determined to attract the allegiance of the Chiefs and to win them away from the Congress politicians. During the early fifties, no pains were spared to achieve this end. In July, 1952, when the various Chiefs within the territory were on the verge of leaving their respective Chieftaincies to attend the Congress Conference that was scheduled for August of that year, the Secretary for Native Affairs issued directives to all Provincial Commissioners on the subject of Chiefly involvement in non-official activities. Among other things, he emphasised that Chiefs were 'integral parts of the Native Authority' and 'as such they should not normally leave their districts without the knowledge and consent of their District Commissioners'. He also stressed that 'a Chief travelling to attend ... a Congress meeting should be regarded as taking local leave' and 'should not be considered eligible for any travelling allowances from his Native Treasury or Central

1Ibid.
Government funds. District Commissioners were instructed to 'take full advantage of this journey by their Chiefs to meet them both before and after their meeting' so that 'any misapprehension' can be corrected 'and in particular any mistake in fact... set right.' The Administration was determined to take no chances in ensuring that any further persuasion of Chiefs by Congress would not succeed.

On the Tonga plateau, this determination to undermine the rapport between Chief and Congress was seen quite clearly in July 1952. The occasion was a land dispute involving George Kaluwa, the Congress official. The land in question, a 50 acre plot, had been leased since September 1935 by the late father of Kaluwa. The Kaluwa family's claim to the land was now being contested and they were being threatened with eviction by the Administration, acting through Chief Mwanachingwala. Local District officials saw this as a marvellous opportunity to promote a rift between Congress and the Chief, who was a known supporter of the movement. The District Commissioner regarded Kaluwa as 'politically one of the most dangerous Africans in this district' who 'from being a mere district organiser of Congress... is now a member of the Central organisation and frequently accompanies Nkumbula on his journeys.' He was, therefore, very pleased by the prospect of a confrontation between the Chief and the Congress leader. He minuted: 'Provided that the move /to evict Kaluwa/

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1N/0001/2/5 Vol. I, Z.N.A. Secretary of Native Affairs to Provincial Commissioners, 23.7.52.

2N/1305, Vol. I, District Commissioner's annexure to Tour report No. 7 of 1952.
comes from the Native Authority and is initiated by Chief Mwanachingwala, I regard this as an excellent opportunity to develop a split between the Chief and Congress. The intimidation which will undoubtedly follow Mwanachingwala's action should bring home to him and to his fellow Chiefs the type of persons with whom they are dealing.1

During the August 1952 Congress Conference, the Secretary for Native Affairs again attempted to attract the Chiefs away from the politicians, telling them, among other things, that the monies they contributed to the movement's funds were only being frittered away on luxuries for the Congress officials. He did not quite succeed in this, for, if anything, most of the Chiefs only reaffirmed their commitment to Congress objectives.2

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Throughout 1950-3 the African National Congress maintained its campaign against Federation. Although there was much political activity in urban areas such as Lusaka and the Copperbelt, there was hardly any organised protest in the townships of the Tonga plateau. Congress knew that the townships of the plateau would not produce as much money as the reserves which contained the bulk of the African population. Its local organisers therefore concentrated most of their fund raising efforts on the villages. Like their counterparts in the other provinces, the members of the Southern

1Ibid.
Provincial Council continued to express their opposition to Closer Union.¹ In the African Representative Council, the mood was even more uncompromising, with members like Walubita even indicating a willingness to die for the African cause.² African opposition was not, however, to deter British Parliamentarians at Westminster from approving the Federation bill. On the 24th of June, 1953, the House of Commons voted by 188 to 164 in favour of the creation of a Federation in Central Africa. On the 1st of August, 1953, the Federation came into formal existence.

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Congress' campaign on the plateau and elsewhere had proved unequal to the persistence of the settlers and their sympathisers in Britain. In retrospect, the Federation campaign on the plateau revealed some of the organisational deficiencies of the Congress movement. It had failed to tap efficiently the potential reserves of goodwill that conditions on the plateau had placed at its disposal. Its very organisational strategy was in error. Although the Congress leadership which assumed responsibility in 1952 encouraged the formation of branches of the movement in the rural areas, formal registration of branches did not commence till 1954.³ The movement took African support, outside the ranks of the Improved Farmers, for granted and only the barest minimum

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¹The views of Walubita and others can be seen in the record of the Council's meeting of 22nd August 1952, N/2212/1, Z.N.A.

²In January 1951 Walubita said, among other things: 'The Africans will fight for their interests in the Council and in all Councils where such liberty is given. I would end this speech by saying a Latin proverb: 'Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori' - it is not inglorious to die for one's country.' See AFRICAN Representative Council debates, 25th January, 1951, No. 5, Cols. 186-187.

³See Secretary General's address to Annual Conference of October 1956, in FCB 103/1.
of attention was paid to the all important problems of politiciza-
tion at branch level. For instance, it was only after the
declaration of Federation that Congress addressed itself to the
question of printing and selling membership cards, one very
rewarding means of raising funds, while promoting a feeling of
belongingness among the people.

Before the Southern Provincial Conference of May 1953,
Congress had never taken to organising meetings on any systematic
basis. Apart from the occasional summons to meet in the villages
of Chiefs of proven sympathy, such as Sianjalika, the local leader-
ship allowed the indifference of the Ufwenukas and the Chonas to
limit its operations in these marginal Chieftaincies. Partly
as a result of the campaign of abuse directed at Improved Farmers
and their Farmers Associations, and for other reasons already
enumerated, the moment never enjoyed the active support of the
majority of Improved Farmers. Nor did its pursuit of vendettas
against unfavoured Chiefs improve its appeal among skeptical moder-
ates.

Nkumbula's leadership, though attractive to the majority
among Africans, failed to inspire confidence / certain influential
Africans on the plateau. His love of the good life, clearly
manifest in the years before Federation, caused many to doubt
his ability and question his commitment. Many believed that the
money Congress raised went, in substantial part, towards servicing
the desires of the President-General. His apparent lack of frugal-
ity caused much resentment. In August 1953 workers on a European
farm near Mazabuka were, reportedly, dissatisfied with the fact
that Nkumbula always preferred to reside at the house of one Mr.
Valant, an Indian storekeeper of Lubombo, whenever he was on tour of the Mazabuka area. They pointed out that this was wrong and demanded that 'Nkumbula should stay with his own people'.

During the years of Federation, Congress was to identify some of the weakness in its organisation and efforts were to be made to rectify them.

The Federation - to the end of 1957.

The declaration of a Federation of Central Africa was greeted with mixed feelings by Congress supporters throughout the territory. In many areas it produced a striking ambivalence. On the plateau and elsewhere, Congress' failure to avert what now looked like the inevitable, created much disillusionment. African moderates who had taken no active part in the struggle against Federation now talked of the futility of the exercise and commiserated with those who had allowed themselves to be talked into participating in a cause that was bound to fail. Many an Improved Farmer who had refused to be influenced by Congress' propaganda and had persisted in supporting the local Farmers Associations, reflected on how wise a choice he had made. Certain Improved Farmers who, under pressure from Congress, had deregistered from the I.F.S., began to have second thoughts about the wisdom of their actions. There was much heart searching among farmers in this group, especially as the Administration, determined to consolidate its

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1Sec/Nat/366 N/0874/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 13 of 1953.
gains, embarked on the novel action of offering loans for development purposes to registered Improved Farmers.¹ Many of these farmers were to find the temptation to re-register with the scheme irresistible. Although for the 1952/53 season, the number of farmers had dropped considerably, Congress' propaganda against this scheme being one of the main reasons, registrations with the I.F.S., in some areas, were to show a sharp upturn during the early years of Federation.² In areas like Ufwemuka Chieftaincy, certain Improved Farmers who had left the scheme and their Farmers Associations during the years leading up to Federation to join the Congress movement, now gave up their positions within Congress and reverted to their former activities. A very prominent case was Paul Mwiindwa, who had served for some time as Congress Branch Secretary in the area.³

The Central Congress leadership was quite aware of the danger of supporters losing faith in the raison d'être of the movement and, to arrest a growing tendency towards backsliding, it decided in October 1953 to reaffirm the movement's commitment to a policy of non-cooperation without violence. The non-cooperation programme was defined as 'Thou shalt not cooperate with anybody in any scheme which is detrimental to African interests'.⁴ It called for the 'withdrawal of African labour from European farms' and 'farm building contractors engaged in building houses for

¹During the first two seasons of the loan scheme, nearly £1,500 was paid out to Registered Improved Farmers. Native Affairs report, 1952, p.91.

²Between 1953 and 1956 Improved Farmer figures for Monze area rose from 196 registered farmers to 373; in the Magoye area, from 190 to 256; in the Mapangazia area from six to eighty-five. See Southern Province 'Stocktaking', 1960, M.M.R.S.

³Interview with Paul Mwiindwa, 21.11.73.

European Immigrants'. It also demanded the continuation of the anti-colour-bar campaign in hotels, restaurants, public lavatories, churches, post offices, shops etc. The Congress leadership pledged itself to the pursuit of the following objectives:

i) Increased enrolment of Congress men and women.

ii) More integration or combination of all African organisations in the Protectorate.

iii) Need for creation of a Central African National Council, i.e. the African National Congresses of Central Africa should be brought together to achieve their common objective.

iv) ... the establishment of a regional Pan African council for Africa south of the Sahara.\textsuperscript{1}

The Declaration of Federation brought the townships of the Tonga plateau into active participation in the non-cooperation effort. In the years preceding Federation, the Congress leadership, in both the urban and rural areas, had concentrated their campaign efforts mainly in the rural areas of the plateau. Now it was decided to bring the local townships within the network of urban protest. During the final months of 1953 Congress supporters were instructed to boycott the shops of Europeans and certain Asian traders.\textsuperscript{2} The Administration did not however allow

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{2}Interviews with Michello and other Congress leaders revealed that there were a number of Asian traders who sympathised with the African cause. A number of them were to play an active part in Congress during the Federal years. Among these were the Naiks of Magoye and Pemba, the Patels of Monze, Pemba and Choma and the Desais of Bwengwa and Pemba.
this form of protest to go very far. Its officials rounded up and imprisoned a number of the local Congress leaders involved in the campaign, among them Naul Moonga, a leading organiser who lived in the Sianjalika Chieftaincy.

In certain Chieftaincies, the non-cooperation campaign, very much under the direction of the farmer/politicians of Keemba Hill, became even more intense under Federation. Congress continued to attack the Improved Farming Scheme using 'the propaganda that the land was only being improved in order to hand it over to Europeans'. Local Congress leaders encouraged people to destroy contour ridges and grass strips. Labour boycotts, which the Central Congress leadership had advocated in June 1953, were now, for the first time, officially organised among African workers on the plateau's European farms. Farm workers in various Chieftaincies were urged to withdraw their labour. Congress argued that by withdrawing their labour, Africans would succeed in crippling the operations of settler farmers who would then have no alternative but

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1 Sikalumbi Manuscript, op.cit., p.76, and Interviews with Naul Moonga (29.4.74) and others.


3 Ibid.

4 In June 1953, Nkumbula had issued the order: 'There is no need for any able-bodied African to sell his labour to a white man for wages. I have given six months notice to all African working population to get ready for gardening during the next rainy season. ... Get back to the land before the land-grubbing settlers have taken the last inch of your soil.' FCB.101/3/248. A statement on the imposition of Federation by the President-General, 2nd June, 1953.
to abandon their farms for eventual African occupation.¹

As in the case of the anti-Improved Farming campaign, Congress' appeal to farm workers met with varying degrees of success. The appeal made no impression in the majority of Chieftaincies.²

However, in areas like Mwenda, Mwanachingwala and Sianjalika, where Congress was comparatively quite popular, there were reports of labour withdrawals. Between November and December, 1953, the District Commissioner made a tour of Chief Mwenda's area, 'generally considered to be one of the worst for Congress agitation'³ and the home of such Congress leaders as Paul Mwene, Seth Sialube and Peter Mwiinga. His tour was mainly directed towards 'showing the flag again in the area and firmly asserting Government and Native Authority Control...'. He observed 'a considerable drift of farm labour back to the reserves, sponsored by Congress...' and noted that 'in the case of several farms on the Chief Mwenda and Sianjalika borders, the exodus has been such that these Settler farmers are desperately short of labour and profoundly worried...'.⁴

The Congress leaders on the plateau also promoted an Agricultural produce boycott, in a bid to 'starve the Copperbelt',⁵

³Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/4, Tour report No. 20 of 1953.
⁴Ibid.
the territory's industrial power house. African farmers were
told not to sell their cattle and this resulted in a marked
contraction in the number of animals offered for sale; whereas,
in 1952, three thousand and five head of cattle were sold to
individual traders, only 2,065 were offered for sale in 1953.
At sales organised by the Veterinary Department, 5,621 head of
cattle were sold in 1951, but only 2,825 in 1952 and 1,201 in
1953. 1 A District Officer who toured Chief Chongo's area between
September and October, 1953, accused the farmers of Keemba Hill,
who were 'against the Government', of organising the cattle boy­
cotts as well as preventing 'the sale of poultry when destined
for the Copperbelt'. 2

Rumour played a very significant part in the non-cooperation
campaign during this period. When, during the final months of 1953,
there was an outbreak of trypanosomiasis in the Bansakaila area
of Chongo Chieftaincy, the Veterinary Department experienced a
lot of difficulty in getting local African farmers to bring their
cattle forward for inoculation. This was mainly due to the work
of the Keemba Hill politicians who put it about that Veterinary
officials were trying to carry out a destocking exercise in dis­
guise and were therefore injecting poison with the vaccines. 3 In
several other areas where cattle diseases were to show up during
the Federal years, belief in this rumour was to make inoculation

1 Ibid.
2 Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 16 of 1953. Maize was
not apparently included in the embargo.
3 Ibid.
work extremely difficult, as will be seen in the next chapter. 

Leemba Hill was also very instrumental in the dissemination of the poisoned sugar story\(^1\) which led to a decline in sugar consumption in many households during this period.

If Congress was posing problems for the Administration, so also was the Plateau Tonga Native Authority (P.T.N.A.). The majority of the Chiefs and Councillors in Council continued to refuse the Administration their support in the handling of problems connected with African land use and soil rehabilitation. Native Authority support was far from forthcoming for the Administration's intended destocking and land-use restriction programmes. The District Office report at the end of 1953 commented on this situation: 'The members of the P.T.N.A. almost completely refuse to see the need for better and more restricted use of the land and motions to reduce cattle numbers to the holding capacity of the land or to control the opening up of further land for arable have to come from Government and are regularly turned down by the members of the Native Authority.'\(^2\)

The Mapangazia soil conservation programme\(^3\) also ran into bottlenecks created by the N.A. The majority of the Chiefs and Councillors refused to give an undertaking to enforce the soil conservation rules that were necessary for the carrying out of the land reclamation scheme. Although after a visit to the site 'several of the more intelligent members expressed themselves as

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\(^1\)Ibid. It was rumoured that the Administration wanted to wipe out the African population by selling them poisoned sugar.


\(^3\)Mentioned earlier in this chapter.
satisfied of the need for the scheme and stated that they would persuade the Native Authority to make the necessary rules', it was reported that 'they failed ... due to suspicion of Government's motives'. In the end the Government had 'to proceed with the implementation of the scheme on its own'.

The Chiefs under Federation

Although the majority of the plateau's Chiefs and Headmen continued to eschew any direct confrontation with the Administration some, who had struck out in active support of Congress during the years before Federation, were to persist in their involvement in the movement's activities, during the Federal years. The Administration continued to court the Chiefs for their support and to win them away from Congress. As will be seen in the next chapter, certain Chiefs who turned out to be too intransigent, were deposed.

In 1953, Chief Sianjalika, a fervent Congress supporter, was presented with a coronation medal. This was reported as being 'greatly appreciated' and the District Commissioner believed that 'the award... has... strengthened his loyalty'.

Chief Benjamin Chongo continued to be the most articulate Congress supporter among the Chiefs. He was very active in organising the movement in his and neighbouring Chieftaincies and had campaigned openly for financial support of Congress' land suit. During

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1 Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. IV, Mazabuka District Annual report for 1953.
2 Ibid.
3 At the Congress Conference of August 1952, Chief Chongo had told his fellow Chiefs and others present: 'We are to dig out all what we have been burying for years to support our land rights case.' See Minutes of Chiefs and Delegates Conference, August 1952. A.N.C. Files, Macpherson Collection.
the Congress Provincial Conference of May 1953, which was held in his village, he had left no one in doubt as to his firm commitment to the movement's objectives. In December 1953, during a Pan-African Conference organised by Congress, Chief Chongo reaffirmed his faith in a non-violent struggle under Congress' leadership. Among other things, he said: 'To my own thinking... I take the Congress as the only organisation which will push the people of this country to freedom... We know fully well that our fight for freedom is not by guns, but by an honest word of mouth.'

The Chief's open involvement in the activities of the Congress movement was quite an embarrassment to the Administration. In October 1953 it was reported that 'one of the largest Congress meetings ever to be held in the territory was held... at his village', an obvious reference to the Provincial Conference of May, 1953. The Provincial Commissioner who regarded Chief Chongo as 'the outstanding Congress adherent among the Chiefs in the Province', got the District Commissioner to keep a close watch on his activities. He was even prepared to recommend that the Chief's Certificate of Honour be withdrawn, should he persist in his political activities. This, he believed, 'might bring him to his senses'.

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1 Restrictions placed by the Administration on the entry of invited delegates to the Conference, robbed it of several representatives from neighbouring African countries.

2 Minutes of Regional Pan-African Council held in the Ex-Askaris Memorial Hall on 10th-11th Dec. 1953. A.N.C. Files, Macpherson Collection.

3 Sec/Nat/366 N/0834/4, Z.N.A. Tour report No. 16 of 1953.

4 Ibid. Provincial Commissioner to Secretary for Native Affairs, 30.12.53.

5 Ibid.
During the first four months of the Central African Federation, the African population on the Tonga plateau was very much divided on the question of continued opposition to the settler and the Administration. Moderate Chiefs and farmers, some of the latter already reaping the financial rewards of Federation in the loans policy of the I.F.S., were prepared to give the settlers' partnership proposals a try. On the other side was Congress and its supporters, pledged to the destruction of a Federation that was still in its infancy. Congress had lost some of its members who saw no point in continued opposition, but the majority of the population continued to believe in and support its goals.\footnote{An estimated £4,000 was collected for Congress within the Mazabuka District in 1953. See Mazabuka District Annual report, 1953. Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3, Vol. IV, Z.N.A. Congress concentrated its fund raising efforts in the reserves of the plateau where the wealthy African farmers lived. See Chapter VI, p.} It had suffered defeat in its campaign to prevent the formation of a Federation. Now it was determined to make the Federation unworkable. On the Tonga plateau, the articulation of its continued opposition was to lead, among other things, to the deposition of prominent Chiefs, mass arrest of defiant supporters, even confrontations with the mobile police.
Chapter VII

CONGRESS AND THE SOUTHERN PROVINCE UNDER FEDERATION

This chapter will examine African protest on the Tonga plateau during the Federal years up to the end of the 1950s. As I have already stated in the introduction, the material on which this chapter is based suffers from a lack of depth since I was unable to consult any records in the National Archives more recent than 1954. Needless to say, certain conclusions reached at this stage will have to be revised later on as we become more knowledgeable, but a tentative discussion of the events of these years cannot be postponed for a future date in an account such as this. It is important, for instance, that we should continue to examine for the post-1953 period, the nature of the support given to the African National Congress by the people of the Tonga plateau, support that was to be put to the test in 1958 when various tensions which had been operating within the Congress leadership surfaced to divide the movement's leaders. From 1958 onwards the Congress movement though enjoying some support in various parts of the territory, including parts of the Copperbelt, Eastern and Luapula provinces, came to be increasingly identified with the Southern province from which it drew its most consistent support. As in the pre-Federation period, the Tonga plateau was to continue to be the hub around which this support revolved.

The early years of Federation saw a determined effort by liberal whites such as John Moffat, a Member representing African interests in the Legislative Council, to foster better race relations in Northern Rhodesia. The events of the final months of
1953 had left even the most indifferent observer of Northern Rhodesian politics in no doubt as to the refusal of the African National Congress' leadership to accept a Federal arrangement which to them was only a step away from Dominion status and virtual independence from Colonial Office control. There was therefore an urgent need to reassure the African population that conditions under Federation need not be as bad as their leaders feared. If the Federation were to have any chance of proving itself, the African leaders and their supporters had to be convinced of the Settlers' willingness to implement racial partnership. The Settler had to disprove the popular belief that Federation would only mean the consolidation of European political domination and the entrenchment of the colour bar. When therefore in July 1954, Moffat moved in the Legislative Council what was to become the 'Moffat Resolutions', he gave formal expression to this desire to mollify an already outraged African population.

Moffat, in sentiments that echoed the views of certain liberal settlers within the territory, called for the removal from each race of the 'fear that the other might dominate for its own racial benefit' and urged a change 'from the present system of racial representation in the territorial legislature towards a franchise with no separate representation for the races'. Until such time as the desired form of political representation is achieved, he called for the introduction of 'special arrangements' in the Executive and Legislative Councils to ensure that 'no race can use either the preponderance of its numbers or its more advanced stage of development to dominate the other for its own racial benefit'. In conclusion, Moffat expressed the view that 'every lawful inhabitant of Northern
Rhodesia has the right to progress according to his character, qualifications, training, ability and industry, without distinction of race, colour or creed.¹

The Moffat Resolutions were very well received in the Legislative Council, where the majority of members were, seemingly, determined to use the opportunity to register their willingness to work for better race relations. Only one of them refused to vote in favour of the proposals.² Once they had been accepted by the Legislative Council, the Administration proceeded to give the Resolutions wide publicity. For maximum effect, the text and a prepared summary of Moffat's speech were printed in English and in the four official vernacular languages and then distributed throughout the various provinces of the territory.³ How then were the overtures of the white community received by the African leaders and their supporters? How willing, for instance, were those Africans on the Tonga plateau who had participated actively in the protest movement, to accept the hand of compromise which was now being extended in their direction?

The Moffat Resolutions rang hollow in the ears of most of the African leaders. Unaccustomed to taking too seriously the seemingly liberal pronouncements of some of the Settler leaders over the years, they saw no reason why they should now. Many believed that the tabling of the Resolutions was purely a ruse aimed at undermining the Congress movement which was slowly recovering

¹Hansard, 29th July 1954, No. 82, Cols. 616-617.
²Ibid.
³Northern Rhodesia Colonial Reports, 1954, p.3.
from the demoralising effect of the declaration of Federation.

Harry Nkumbula, the Congress' leader, believed that although
there was a handful of well-meaning settlers within the territory,
who sincerely believed in the sentiments expressed in the Re-
solutions, the majority were offering no more than lip service
to them.¹ He therefore called for an intensification of the non-
cooperation campaign in both the urban and rural areas to demonstrate
the fact that the African community was far from reconciled to the
existence of the Federation. As far as Congress was concerned,
little had changed. The Federation was an imposition and was not
therefore to be suffered in silence.² Throughout the fifties, Con-
gress was to openly organise Africans in various parts of the territory
in continued opposition to the Administration and the Settler minority.

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In the Mazabuka and the newly created Choma District³ of the
Tonga plateau, opposition to the soil conservation policies of the
administration continued during the course of 1954. Although in
certain chieftaincies, District Officials reported 'unsolicited re-
quests from African farmers for contour ridges...', the Plateau Tonga

¹It must have been very difficult to judge, for instance, the sin-
cerity of a Member like Rendall, who in April of the same year
had been arguing strongly in favour of 'discriminations that we
must have because of physical and moral reasons'. See Hansard,
15th April, 1954, No. 81, Col. 94.

²Interview with Harry Nkumbula, 20.1.74.

³In November 1953, the Choma District was created to reduce Ad-
ministrative pressure within the Mazabuka District. The new District
was made up of Choma Township and the areas of five Chiefs, pre-
viously within the Mazabuka District. See Sec/Nat/66F N/0006/3,
Native Authority (P.T.N.A.) 'as a body ... continued to give no 
support'. Commenting on the attitude of the Chiefs and Councillors 
in his annual report for 1954, the Provincial Commissioner explained 
some of the difficulties his administration was experiencing from 
this quarter. He pointed out that the Native Authority was deter­
mined to repeal its own rule which placed 'the responsibility for 
the cleaning and upkeep of contour ridges, where they pass through 
individual gardens on the owner' and had failed 'to see that a con­
tour ridge filled with grass and bushes ... is useless'.

The Administration also failed in trying to persuade the 
P.T.N.A. to restrict the use of land on the plateau in a bid to arrest 
the land grabbing problem. The Provincial Commissioner also high­
lighted this difficulty in his 1954 report. He explained that when 
the Government asked the Native Authorities 'to make an order to pro­
hibit the opening up of any further land for cultivation in certain 
Chiefs' areas which were already overcropped, they refused and said 
their sons must always have new land.

Throughout 1954, the efforts of the Agriculture Department's 
personnel to get African farmers in Chieftaincies with high cattle 
populations, such as Chongo, Sianjalika and Siamanu, to sell some 
of their herds and thereby reduce the pressure on available grazing, 
were repeatedly jeopardised by Congress propaganda. Congress leaders 
warned farmers against allowing themselves to be cajoled into parting 
with their vital cattle wealth, which was their only insurance against 
destitution. Members of the African Representative Council rejected

2 Ibid., p. 91.
3 Ibid.
a motion which had been placed on the Council's agenda by the Administration, in which officials sought their approval for the introduction of regulations 'to control the grazing of cattle in native reserves and native trust lands by those who had rights in these areas'. \(^1\) W.F. Stubbs, the Secretary for Native Affairs, reported that the African representatives refused to accept the motion 'largely because it was the firm opinion ... that all native trust land should be converted into native reserves', \(^2\) a view that had been formally expressed before, only to be rejected by the Administration. \(^3\)

Although in certain parts of the plateau, the momentum of African opposition to the Federation was maintained during the course of 1954, overall protest activity in the area was, for the most part, half-hearted. Local congress organisers continued to call for an intensification of the non-cooperation struggle for they realised that many were beginning to acquiesce in the Federation. The ranks of the moderates continued to swell with fresh additions of those who had come to accept that the Federation was there to stay. \(^4\) The widely publicised arrest in March 1954 and subsequent imprisonment for three years of two Congress officials who had addressed a meeting in Mazabuka and had called for an escalation of protest activity, did much to lower morale. \(^5\) As already pointed

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\(^1\) Ibid., p.5.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) In August 1953, Sokota had raised the question in the African Representative Council only to be told by Bush, the Secretary for Native Affairs, that the Government was not prepared to recommend such a change. See African Representative Council debates, 14th August, 1953.

\(^4\) Interviews with former Congress organisers on the plateau.

out, the number of Farmers registered with the Improved Farming Scheme (I.F.S.) rose sharply during the early years of Federation and there was a concomitant upsurge in the activities of local African Farmers Associations. One informant who for many years was a member of the I.F.S. told the author that Improved Farmers in general were quick to spot the advantages of Federation. Unlike previous years when periodic shortages were not unknown, they now had no difficulty in getting spare parts for their farm machinery at reasonable prices. In addition, the loans that were being granted by the I.F.S. meant that ambitious Improved Farmers could now expand their operations and, thereby, increase their profits from maize production. Many of them therefore turned a blind eye to the politics of Congress which they considered sheer humbug.

Towards the end of 1955, Kenneth Kaunda, the Secretary-General of the A.N.C., who with Harry Nkumbula, the movement's president, had just completed a term of imprisonment for possession of banned literature, decided to make another attempt to strengthen Congress' position within the territory. Like the other Congress leaders, Kaunda was rather disappointed by the movement's performance. It had been very difficult to sustain enthusiasm for the programme of non-cooperation in the various provinces, for with several provincial

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1 See Chapter VI, p. 239, fn. 2.

2 Interview with Miles Musumbwe, 20.11.73. Musumbwe even lamented the recent closure of the border with Rhodesia which has caused periodic shortages of various consumer goods including farm machinery and spare parts. One could detect throughout this interview, a longing for a return to the economic conditions operating during the Federal years.

3 The publication in question was Africa and the Colonial World, copies of which had been sent by Fenner Brockway, a British Member of Parliament, to the Congress leaders. Kaunda and Nkumbula were sentenced to two months imprisonment with hard labour for this offence.
organisers serving prison terms for their involvement in boycotts and other acts of protest, branch registration and organisation had declined considerably. Although financial contributions towards Congress' expenses continued to flow in from certain areas, the overall response left much to be desired. To revitalize the African protest movement, Kaunda and other Congress leaders now sketched out a five year growth plan for the A.N.C.

To attract more members into the movement, Kaunda, in a circular distributed throughout the territory some time in 1955, highlighted Congress' goals. Among other things, he reaffirmed the movement's determination to secure the franchise for all Africans and to continue the struggle 'against colour discrimination in public places...'. Congress would continue to press the Administration to allow Africans to occupy 'higher posts ... in the Protectorates and Federal Civil Services and in military and police forces according to merit...' and was determined to put an end to 'all intimidation and ill treatment of Chiefs and their Native Authority servants by the Government'. Kaunda called on Africans throughout the territory to 'fight against the final stage of this dreadful monster, Federation, which is intended to be a Central African Dominion...' and he emphasised the Congress' view that Northern Rhodesia should remain a protectorate 'under the direct control of the Colonial Office until

1In July, 1955, for instance, the people of Chongo and Mwenda Chief-tancies on the plateau, contributed £112.5s.6d. and £101.5s.3d. respectively, towards Congress' land suit which was being handled by London solicitors. See Congress News Circular, Vol. VI, No.1, 25th July, 1955, Macpherson Collection. In the end Congress had to abandon the land case on the advice of its solicitors.

we are ready to participate fully in the running of our protectorate's affairs'. In conclusion, he urged Africans who were not members of Congress to join the '105 Chiefs, 500 Native Authorities' servants, 3000 village Headmen and 37,000 men, women and children' who were already registered members.¹

The appeal from the Congress Secretariat led to a resurgence of political protest in several parts of the territory. In the Northern Province, for instance, by the end of 1955, there were six action groups of Congress operating in the various Chiefs' areas. These itinerant politicians incited the people against touring white officials as well as local Chiefs who had refused to identify with Congress' objectives.²

In the Southern Province, there were also signs of renewed protest. Congress officials on the Tonga plateau made much of the Federal Government's decision of February 1955 to evacuate some 29,000 Africans who lived on the northern bank of the Zambesi in the neighbouring Gwembe District, and resettle them elsewhere to make way for the Kariba Hydro-electric scheme.³ An estimated 925 square miles of the District were to be flooded in the construction of a dam. The valley Tonga people who were affected by the decision opposed the idea of the move, for some of them were being asked to move long distances to new sites. The situation was ripe for exploitation by local politicians. The Gwembe Tonga Native Authority had, however, imposed a ban on Congress activities in the area.

¹Quoted in Ibid., pp. 65-66.
³Interviews on the plateau.
since 1953. In the circumstances, the ban did not deter some of the local Congress organisers who were in touch with Job Michello and other Congress leaders on the plateau, from stoking the fires of protest in the affected parts of the Gwembe District. In various meetings on the plateau, Congress leaders joined cause with the valley Tonga people. They accused the Administration of seizing yet more African land and of imposing further hardship on the African population. They argued that an Administration which could deprive so many people in the Gwembe District of their ancestral lands would have no compunction in taking over some more land on the plateau, at some future date, especially that of Improved Farmers who had been deceived over the years into accepting piecemeal payments (i.e. bonuses) for their lands.¹

Throughout the latter half of 1955, Congress Officials on the plateau made frequent appearances at meetings of the Plateau Tonga Native Authority (P.T.N.A.). The most prominent of these officials was Job Michello, who was now back at Munenga in Chief Mwanachingwala's area after a tour of duty in the Lusaka offices of Congress. Whenever the P.T.N.A. was in session, Michello and some of his colleagues, notably Simon Masambo, Ellison Milambo and Job Mayanda would attend and try to influence the Chiefs and Councillors. At every possible opportunity, they would make their unsolicited views known to the annoyance of white officials present. When, for instance, in November 1955, the Native Authority discussed the Administration's proposals for the introduction of grazing fees of 6d per head of cattle owned by Africans on the plateau, these 'Congressmen' campaigned

¹Interviews in various Chieftaincies.
against the idea both in and out of the Native Authority's meetings. Job Michello had had direct experience of the operation of grazing rules in Southern Rhodesia while he was teaching at the Solusi mission. He had seen the way in which Ndebele farmers who defaulted in the payment of their grazing dues were treated by the Rhodesian officials. In the majority of cases, some of the cattle of defaulters were seized by the mounted police until dues were paid and farmers who could not raise the required sums parted with some animals for good. Local Congress leaders were therefore determined to prevent similar harassment from occurring on the Tonga plateau. They added their protests to that of the majority of Chiefs and Councillors who were also against the idea and, in the end, the Administration had to withdraw its proposal.2

After the grazing fee controversy, local District officials tried to discourage Congress leaders from attending P.T.N.A. meetings. The Chiefs and Councillors were asked to pass a resolution which would deny Congress officials access to Authority meetings. Although some of their number supported this line of action, the majority of African representatives within the P.T.N.A. opposed it. The District Administration therefore decided to introduce the 'red ribbon' system. A red ribbon was installed around the seats of the Chiefs and Councillors and all Africans who were outside this demarcated zone were forbidden from participating in the Authority's deliberations.3 The Congress intruders now deprived of the right

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1 Interview with Job Michello, 19.6.74.
2 Interview with Ellison Milambo (10.2.74) and Job Michello, 19.6.74.
3 Interview with Job Michello, 19.6.74.
to air their views resorted to heckling whenever they disapproved of something, and this brought them some stern rebukes from District officials. Within the Native Authority itself, there were a number of ardent Congress supporters to whom now fell the task of making the movement's presence felt in the Authority's activities. The uncompromising attitude of some of these Chiefs and Councillors was a major bottleneck for District officials who needed their support for the successful execution of Administration policy in the area.

In his annual report for 1955, the Provincial Commissioner observed that 'the Plateau Tonga Native Authority did not have a good year'. He drew attention to meetings which were 'marred by obstruction and political harangues from a few Councillors who bitterly opposed any suggestions emanating from Government'.

The small group of educated young Africans on the plateau who were a very influential part of the Congress' vanguard, also came in for special mention in the report on political activities during 1955. Unlike the much older Congress leaders like Milambo, Michello and Mankapwi, who had had very little post primary education, many of the younger men who were now taking an interest in Congress had undergone some secondary training. Some of them had studied at the Canisius College, a junior Secondary School established by the Catholic Church at their Chikuni mission in 1949 and others at another junior Secondary School run by the Universities Mission to Central Africa.

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1 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Northern Rhodesia Colonial Reports, 1949, p.38.
in Mapanza, from 1950 onwards. Some of the local students had even ventured further afield to study at the Munali Training Centre, a Government school in Lusaka which for a long time was the only Institution providing full secondary education for Africans. Although while in training students were discouraged by some of the Authorities, such as those at Canisius College, from taking part in political discussion, many could not resist the temptation to join in once their studies were completed. They infused a radical spirit into Congress' activities and created a lot of problems for the District Administration.

Commenting on the relative calm that had prevailed within the Southern province during the course of 1955, the Provincial Commissioner noted that 'only in Mazabuka and to a lesser extent Choma Districts was there political activity which took the form of opposition to measures and proposals necessary for the general improvement of the Native Authority area'. He went on to explain that 'while the great mass of people throughout the province are little interested in external politics, the more educated young men are now suffering from the growing pains of the socially teen-aged which are generally painful both to those who suffer them and to those with whom they live.'

During the latter half of the year, these educated young men had been very conspicuous in Congress' efforts to expand the network of A.N.C. branches on the plateau and the rest of the Southern province. Attempts were made to open up branches in hitherto neglected areas

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1 Northern Rhodesia Colonial Reports, 1950, p.40.
2 Father Max Prokoph, who was Principal at Canisius College between 1940 and 1951, told the author that the students were not even allowed to read newspapers like Mutende and the Bantu Mirror, because these papers focussed too much attention on political matters. Interview with Max Prokoph, 1.8.74.
3 Native Affairs Report, 1955, p.78.
like Ufwenuka and Chona which had not evinced much interest in the movement's activities. The persistence of local organisers was to give the Southern province the highest number of registered A.N.C. branches within the territory by early 1956. In November 1955, there were only thirty registered Congress branches in the entire Southern province as compared to 35 in the Eastern province, 24 in the Central province, 20 in the Western province and 7 in the Northern province. However, by March 1956, the Southern province was to take the lead with thirty-eight registered branches.

The Congress movement had to intensify its operations within the African population if it was to thwart the Government's determination to undermine its position. For to counter Congress' propaganda, especially the widely popularised description of the Administration as a callous Authority which had no real concern for the welfare of the African community, the Government tried to meet some of the long standing demands of the African people, during the early years of Federation. The granting of loans to Improved Farmers was one aspect of this strategy. So too was the decision taken sometime in 1955 to provide loan facilities for African traders within the territory. As we have noted, African leaders on the plateau had repeatedly criticized the conditions under which retail trading in the reserves was undertaken and the virtual non-existence of credit facilities for African enterprise had even been highlighted during


2 *Congress Circular*, Vol. II, No. 3, 31st March, 1956. Macpherson Collection. The figures for the other provinces were as follows: Eastern - 35; Central - 30; Western - 24; Northern - 11; and North-Western - 2.

3 See Chapter V, pp. 136-7.
a general debate in the Legislative Council by Captain Campbell, the representative of the Southern Electoral Area which covered the Tonga plateau.¹ On the 7th June, 1955, a motion 'that Native Authorities should be authorised to grant loans to deserving traders and businessmen when funds permit', was passed in the African Representative Council with only one abstention.² As Congress continued to whip up support by emphasising the Administration's indifference to the needs of African-entrepreneurs, the Government decided it was time to act. An amendment to the Native Authority Ordinance was passed in the Legislative Council empowering some of 'the more wealthy Native Treasuries ... to allocate some of their funds towards helping private enterprise to develop in their areas....'³ The Administration also contributed directly to the Traders' loans fund by making available the sum of £15,000 to assist needy businessmen.⁴

The granting of piece-meal concessions by an Administration bent on sabotaging Congress' platform only served to inspire the A.N.C. leadership into demanding more anti-Government activity in both the rural and urban areas. On the Tonga plateau, Congress organised more meetings in the reserves, during the course of 1956, than it had ever done before⁵ and in spite of the fact that some

¹See Chapter V, p.232, fn.1.
³The Secretary for Native Affairs' foreward to the Native Affairs Report of 1955, p. III.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Interview with Michello and other Congress organisers.
of the local leaders were still in prison, township boycotts of certain shops and eating houses were resumed. In April 1956, officials organised shop boycotts in Mazabuka and Monze townships and a number of Indian traders, who were known to ill-treat African customers, were affected. The boycotts were not, however, well organised and so they lasted for just a few days before they were called off.

In the rural areas of the Tonga plateau, one of the Administration's proposals that was vehemently opposed by the local Congress movement during the course of 1956 was the planned land usage survey. The survey was expected to cover some 53,000 acres of land in the area around Monze and its main object, according to the Agriculture Department, was 'to collect field data as a basis for regional land use planning in an endeavour to obtain a better balance between arable and grassland'. A similar survey had been carried out in 1945 by a team of Agriculturists and a Sociologist. That survey team had operated in an atmosphere of strong suspicion of its real intentions and areas like Keemba Hill had been openly hostile to its investigations. The fears of the African farmers that they were going to be deprived of some more land after the completion of the survey had, however, proved groundless for no such land alienations occurred. When, however, the Administration mooted the idea of yet another land usage survey in 1956, Congress officials

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1 Harry Franklin, a Member for African Interests, pointed this out in the Legislative Council. See Hansard, 24th July, 1956, No. 88, Col. 748.

2 Native Affairs Report, 1956, p.81.


4 See Chapter IV, pp. 160–163.
told the people that in contrast to 1945, the Administration was now searching for more land for prospective immigrants from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The survey, they argued, would certainly be followed by the appropriation of a sizeable amount of land to accommodate the incoming whites.\(^1\) Congress' version of the intentions behind the survey fired the imagination of African farmers, who, in a situation of increasing land shortage, were determined to keep the lands in the reserves in African possession. With Congress, they denounced the proposed land usage survey and packed the A.N.C. meetings summoned on the plateau to discuss the Administration's intentions. In one such meeting organised by 'the younger elements among the plateau Tonga',\(^2\) some time in 1956, the land usage survey was said to have been discussed in a very noisy atmosphere. Officials also reported similar 'disorderly mass meetings', organised by Congress in the other Chieftaincies.\(^3\)

In his annual report for 1956, Gervas Clay, the Southern Provincial Commissioner, observed that while the year was 'quieter ... than usual ... African extremists' activities still interfered with development whenever possible...', although most Africans in the province have not allowed themselves to be 'led astray by political claptrap'.\(^4\) He noted that political extremists had been particularly active in the Mazabuka District. Here, he continued, 'political

\(^1\)Interviews.
\(^2\)Native Affairs Report, 1956, p.84.
\(^3\)Ibid.
\(^4\)Native Affairs Report, 1956, p.73.
reactionaries ... tried to impede constructive measures for the
good government and welfare of the people in furtherance of their
partisan interests'. Things were to be no better during the succeeding year.

During the course of 1957, Congress leaders and their supporters
in several Chieftaincies on the plateau maintained the current of
protest. Within the Mazabuka District, the land usage survey con­tinued to run into difficulties, especially in areas where Congress
was well organised. In certain Chieftaincies where Congress had no
real footing, the survey progressed unhampered and agricultural
and demographic data were obtained from an area of approximately
4,000 acres. However, in the remaining 49,000 acres that were also
to be investigated, the survey team ran into a great deal of opposition.
This forced the administration to put an end to the survey. In his
1957 annual report, the Provincial Commissioner explained that 'the
proposed land usage survey for the Mazabuka District, first sug­
gested by the African Provincial Council was abandoned after strong
and determined opposition had been organised against it and the survey
which depended on the cooperation of the people, had no legal backing
to push it through'.

The A.N.C. and the Improved Husbandry Scheme.

Congress also campaigned against the Cattle Improvement Scheme
(C.I.S.) which was introduced in various Districts within the terri­
tory some time in 1956. This was to be the corollary of the Improved

1 Ibid.
3 Native Affairs Report, 1957, p.78.
Farming Scheme. The need for a scheme of this nature had been stressed by Johnson in his report on a survey carried out between 1953 and 1955 on Improved Farming activity on the Tonga plateau. Johnson had written, inter alia:

'The major effort has been concentrated on the arable lands and no place has yet been found in the Improved Farming scheme for the improvement of animal husbandry or for the arrest of the deterioration of pastures caught in a pincermovement between extension of cultivation and multiplication of stock.'

The new scheme was basically a destocking measure, a projection of the cattle culling order which the Administration had put into effect in certain parts of the territory during the early months of 1956. In the Mazabuka District, for instance, Veterinary Department Officials branded some ninety-two head of cattle under the order between March and June, 1956. Of these, one was disposed of at a Government sale, two were purchased by local buyers and orders were given by the Officials for the rest to be slaughtered. This the farmers concerned had done very reluctantly.

The C.I.S. was thus introduced at a time when a number of farmers in the Mazabuka District were still smarting from losses they had suffered as a result of the compulsory culling order. To register with the C.I.S., a farmer had to own a bull that was approved by the Veterinary Department's Officials, and he was also

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1 C.E. Johnson, 'African Farming Improvement in the Plateau Tonga Maize Areas...', Agricultural Bulletin, No. 11, p.45.


3 Ibid.

4 Interviews
required to have 'an adequate kraal and a calf house...'. Once a member, he was under an obligation to have his herd inoculated annually against anthrax and quarter-evil and even more importantly, he was to dispose of 4% of his stock every year. A member of the scheme who satisfied all the stipulated conditions was to receive a cash bonus for his efforts.¹

A scheme of this nature was bound to excite doubts and create misapprehension in the African farming community on the Tonga plateau. Cattle had always been of special significance in the social system operating in the area.² Although it was now fairly common practice for farmers to sell an animal or two when they felt the need, few could afford to part with animals on a regular basis.³ Most farmers kept small herds of less than fifteen animals and their ability to sell any of these was limited by the demands of kinsmen for assistance with marriage and other social payments. A scheme that insisted on compulsory sales could hardly be expected to appeal to a farmer who kept a small herd. When, therefore, the Veterinary Department's staff explained to cattle owners that membership of the new scheme would impose on the individual an obligation to sell a few animals every year, the vast majority of African farmers in the area, among them several Improved Farmers, refused to register with the C.I.S. Local Congress leaders were to exploit this reluctance to part with cattle in their campaign against the scheme. In meeting after meeting, they amplified the threats that were now being posed by the white Administration to the very foundations of African property.

¹Native Affairs Report, 1956, p.79.
³See Chapter III, pp.101-103.
Another factor which contributed to the lack of enthusiasm for the C.I.S. was the fear that was being expressed at this time that the Improved Farming Scheme was soon to be terminated. Local Congress organisers did a lot to feed the fires of speculation on this subject. It was put about that the C.I.S., which would be a lighter burden on Administration funds was designed to eventually take the place of the much more expensive Improved Farming Scheme, whose membership and level of bonus payments had risen sharply with Federation beyond all official expectations (see Tables I and II). The number of Improved Farmers continued to rise in spite of the fact that the rules of the scheme were now more rigidly enforced with the result that Improved Farmers were having to reduce the size of their improved gardens. This is seen quite clearly in the sharp fall in cultivated acreage of improved gardens in the 1957/58 and 1958/59 seasons, although weather conditions were also partly to blame. Congress urged Africans who had registered with the

Table I. Number of Improved Farmers in the whole of the Southern province and acreages cultivated between 1953 and 1959 in their improved gardens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planting season</th>
<th>Number of farmers</th>
<th>Total Acreage cultivated in improved gardens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953/54</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954/55</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955/56</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>18,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/57</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>19,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957/58</td>
<td>1,438</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958/59</td>
<td>2,208</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from various Agriculture Department Annual Reports and Native Affairs Report for 1959.

1 Native Affairs Report, 1957, p.79. See also Chapter IV.
2 See Table I.
3 Weather conditions were particularly bad during the 1957/58 season, although things improved in the following year. See Native Affairs Report, 1958, p.69.
Improved Farming Scheme (I.F.S.) to deregister before the whites abandoned them.\(^1\) Although African representatives in the Legislative Council were being urged to lend their voices in support of the I.F.S., Nkumbula, the Congress leader continued his attacks on the scheme. At the seventh Annual Conference of Congress held in Lusaka in October 1956, he criticized the structure of the I.F.S. and accused the Authorities of confining the use of the African Farming Improvement Fund to a small section of the African population, which alone enjoyed direct financial assistance from it. He told the gathering:

'There's a fund known as the African agricultural Improvement fund ..... This fund was built and is still being built from money accruing from sales of African produce, mainly maize. When this fund reached the target of some £300,000 the ... Government started employing European agricultural experts, built up agricultural stations, employed an army of ill-trained African Agricultural Assistants, bought tractors, jeeps, cars etc. But no African farmer has benefited from this fund except a few they are giving bonuses. The fund has not been used for subsidising the African peasant farmers.'\(^2\)

Congress' continued denunciation of the I.F.S. and the widespread feeling that its leaders could be right in their speculations as to the scheme's possible termination, raised doubts in the minds of many farmers who would otherwise have registered with the C.I.S.

When in November, 1957, Watmore, the Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, hinted in the Legislative Council on the Administration's plans to phase out the Improved Farming bonus system in the future, he confirmed the fears of many and, in a way, sealed the fate of the Cattle Improvement Scheme in the Mazabuka and Choma

\(^1\)Interviews on the plateau.

\(^2\)FOB 103/1/item 15. President's speech at the Seventh Annual Congress Conference of October, 1956.
### Table II.
Bonuses (per acre) paid out to Improved Farmers in the Southern province between 1954 and 1959.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planting Season</th>
<th>Grade I Farmers</th>
<th>Grade II Farmers</th>
<th>Total amount paid out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954/55</td>
<td>27/-</td>
<td>17/-</td>
<td>£15,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955/56</td>
<td>27/6</td>
<td>18/-</td>
<td>22,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/57</td>
<td>27/6</td>
<td>18/-</td>
<td>24,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957/58</td>
<td>27/6</td>
<td>17/-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958/59</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from Agriculture Department Annual reports.

Watmore drew his colleagues' attention to the rapid rise in the number of Improved Farmers and pointed out that as at November 1957, there were about 1,100 such farmers in the Southern province. He went on to explain that 'as these increase in number, so will the levy and the Improved Farming bonus fall away because the necessity for the levy will diminish as the number of men who are Improved Farmers are established'. In other words, a stage will be reached when there will be so many Improved Farmers in the Southern province who were cultivating their holdings in the manner the Agriculture Department has been advocating since 1936, that there will be no further need for the I.F.S. This, apparently, had been administrative thinking all along. But was it shared by the

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1. *Hansard, 7th November, 1957, No. 93, Col. 131.*
Improved Farmers?

Congress seized on Watmore's words and at meetings after meeting in the Chieftaincies of the plateau, they were amplified, embellished, even distorted to serve the ends of the non-cooperation programme. Local Congress officials described the Administration as consisting of officials who had no genuine interest in African welfare and who could not be relied upon to honour their commitments to the African population.

Commenting on Congress' activities on the plateau during this period, one Improved Farmer told the author:

'Those who were in the Improved Farming Scheme were told to get out now, before they lost their land to the Boers who were coming when the bonuses ended. Many Improved Farmers were worried, some wanted to leave the scheme, but many did not listen. We were sure Congress was cheating us and we refused to believe them.'

Another, a Congress Official, said:

'We worked hard from village to village, finding the Improved Farmers and telling them the bad news. Many people believed us. They did not want the whites to take their land. They agreed to stop taking bonuses.'

In the prevailing atmosphere, the Cattle Improvement Scheme did not stand a chance. In spite of the persistence of the Veterinary Department's Staff, it failed to make much of an impression either in the Mazabuka or the Choma District. In his annual report on the Southern province for 1957, Gervas Clay, the Provincial Commissioner, observed that 'the Cattle Improvement Scheme in Mazabuka made no progress and only limited success is reported

1 Interviews.
2 Interview with William Kazoka, 26.4.74.
3 Interview with Paul Cifula Maambo, 30.4.74.
from Choma where nine applicants have been accepted.1 In fact, not surprisingly, the scheme came to enjoy more success in areas like Kalomo District, where the Toka-Leya Native Authority had imposed a ban on Congress activity. In areas where Congress was still allowed to operate, it made no headway. In his annual report of 1958, the Provincial Commissioner had this to say about the response to the C.I.S.:

"The... scheme appears to have made considerable progress in the Kalomo District and eighty-eight more cattle owners applied to register during the year. In Mazabuka and Namwala this scheme has not however been so successful."2

The beginnings of the anti-inoculation campaign

At the same time that Congress was opposing the Cattle Improvement Scheme, its organisers on the Tonga plateau were also involved in a campaign directed at sabotaging the efforts of the Veterinary Department's personnel who had the responsibility for inoculating African cattle against disease. African farmers were warned by A.N.C. organisers against putting their animals at the disposal of unscrupulous officials who had been instructed to sterilise the cows and kill the bulls.3 Congress was here exploiting the deep seated distrust of the Administration which existed in the area, a feeling that dated back to the first two decades of the century when a number of farmers were evicted and re-evicted from their lands, in spite of official promises that their tenure would be permanent.4 Talking about the anti-inoculation

1Native Affairs Report, 1957, p.80.
3Interviews.
4See Chapter II, pp.61-62.
campaign that was now being waged, an Informant in the Pemba area told the author that,

'The people were told that the white men wanted to kill all their cattle so that Africans will only need land for growing maize. White men from Southern Rhodesia and South Africa will then take over fertile portions of the former grazing lands and even some lands in the reserves.'

Although several African farmers were skeptical of Congress' prognostications, some believed them and so supported the movement's call for a boycott of the inoculating teams. In several parts of the plateau, during 1957, African farmers under Congress' influence defied instructions from Veterinary Staff and refused to present their herds for inoculation. In November 1957, Mr. Watmore, the member for Agriculture and Natural Resources, told the Legislative Council of two Chiefs in the Mazabuka District and one in the Choma District who were 'entirely uncooperative' on the subject.

Some time in 1957, African opposition to cattle inoculations in the Makuyu area of Monze Chieftaincy resulted in an assault on a local District Official. The Official in question who was popularly known as 'Siabukombe' had, apparently, been sent to the area with a few messengers to induce protesting farmers to observe veterinary rules. He failed to get the farmers to produce their cattle for inoculation and in his frustration, he is said to have used strong words in showing his contempt for their behaviour. This led to some heated exchanges and in the end the farmers grabbed hold of his land rover and would not let go. Some Headmen had to intervene and this

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1 Interview with William Kazoka, 26.4.74.
2 Hansard, 7th November, 1957, No. 93, Col. 175.
3 This Official's name could have been Grantham or Griffiths. Africans called him Siabukombe because he was rather thick set.
secured the release of the vehicle, which then proceeded to Mazabuka. Here, apparently, 'Siabukombe' informed the District Commissioner, H.T.Bayldon, of what had transpired. Bayldon who was nicknamed 'Chamulangula' by the African community because of his fiery temper, then ordered a detachment of the mobile police into the area to arrest the ring leaders. After this display of authority, farmers in the area gave up their struggle with the Veterinary Department and for a while, normalcy was restored.

An attempt to ban the A.N.C. on the Tonga plateau

As African opposition to the Federation increased under Congress supervision, many Settlers as well as moderate Africans began to call for the banning of the movement. This was nothing new. Similar appeals had, for instance, resulted in 1953 in the imposition of a ban on Congress activity within the Kalomo and Gwembe Districts of the Southern province. Many Africans had come to accept the finality of the Federation and were intent on making the most of what was being offered. This group saw no point in continued opposition to the Federation and was very much in favour of a clamp-down on the protest movement.

In July 1954, John Gaunt, the member for Midland, had argued in the Legislative Council for an investigation of Congress' activities. There had been several reports of incidents in which Congress agents molested certain members of the public who were not identifying with

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1 Interviews with Miles Musumbwe (20.11.73), N.M.Muyovwe (6.6.74) and in the Makuyu area.

2 Informants explained that he was given this name, by which a local alcoholic beverage was also known, because of his irascibility. The author was also told that on more than one occasion, Bayldon came close to trading blows with the staunch A.N.C. supporter, Chief Chongo.

3 Interviews.
its aspirations and Gaunt felt that it was time that the Administration addressed itself to the problem. He called for the appointment of a select committee 'to inquire into the Constitution, finances and activities of ... Congress' and to 'report... to the House its findings together with any recommendations it may deem desirable to make as a result of its investigations'. Gaunt, who, it appears, was regarded by his colleagues as somewhat of an extremist, later withdrew his motion after the Chief Secretary had assured him of the Administration's determination to protect peaceful citizens against Congress supporters.

By July 1956, the threat posed by Congress anti-Government activities appeared so great that a similar motion was tabled in the Legislative Council by Mr. Rendall, the member for Ndola. He called for support for the view that

'Council considers the activities of the A.N.C. to be of a character to warrant Government taking such steps as are necessary to enable it to give this House full information on the Constitution, aims and motives of the A.N.C. and to give assurances that its activities will not be permitted to subvert the peace and good order of the Territory and all its peoples.'

During the ensuing debate, the African members of the Legislative Council boldly admitted their membership of Congress and they condemned the motion as unnecessary. It was, however, quite obvious from the tenor of the speeches made by their white counterparts, that Congress' nuisance-value was well appreciated.

At provincial level, Administration Officials were equally

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1 Hansard, 29th July, 1954, No. 82, Co. 679.

2 He was the leader of the Dominion party. Mulford, op. cit., examines the framework of party politics in Northern Rhodesia during the Federal years.

3 Hansard, 18th July, 1956, No. 88, Col. 502.
concerned about the disruptive effects of the A.N.C.'s propaganda. As the movement's activities continued unchecked, so it became more difficult to obtain compliance with Administration rules and orders. Many District Officials thought the answer was to ban the movement. In the Mazabuka District, H.T. Bayldon ('Chamulangula'), the District Commissioner at the time, who had been in several confrontations with local Congress Officials,\(^1\) attempted to secure the banning of Congress by working through African moderates in the Plateau Tonga Native Authority (P.T.N.A.). A motion calling for restrictions to be placed on Congress' activities within the Mazabuka District was tabled by William Kazoka, the Chairman of the Native Authority, at a meeting held on the 26th April, 1957. Kazoka, who had never shown much enthusiasm for Congress' activities, was a long standing Improved Farmer. During the forties he had served the P.T.N.A. as its first Departmental Councillor for Agriculture, Forestry and Water Development and, by 1953, he was the representative of the Choma area in the African Representative Council.\(^2\) In his motion, Kazoka recommended that 'in view of recent disorders and prevailing lawlessness, an order be passed curtailing the activities of members of the African National Congress'.\(^3\) The motion was strongly criticised by some of the Chiefs who accused Kazoka of doing the white man's bidding. According to a report on the meeting, four Chiefs supported the motion, while

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\(^1\)Interviws with Ellison Milambo (10.2.74), Job Michello (19.6.74) and others.

\(^2\)During the Federal years, Kazoka was to successfully contest the 1959 elections as a candidate of the United Federal Party.

\(^3\)Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the Mazabuka Area Council held on the 26th April, 1957. Privately held.
six others joined by four Councillors opposed it. After much recrimination, the motion was amended to read:

'(a) An order be made that no meeting may be held in any Chief's area before the Chief has given permission for such a meeting.

(b) Any person holding a meeting without the Chief's consent is committing an offence.'

In its amended form, the motion was subsequently carried.

But even more significant than the final vote which saved Congress from an outright ban was the atmosphere surrounding the Native Authority's discussion of the Kazoka motion. Apparently, the discussion of the motion lasted for two or three days. During the debate, Peter Habumbu, who was the Deputy provincial President of Congress and also the P.T.N.A.'s Councillor for public works, was suspended from the Native Authority. It appears that Habumbu had strongly opposed the discussion of any motion which sought to restrict Congress' operations within the District. He was therefore being deliberately obstructive. Word of Habumbu's suspension and the possible banning of Congress went around the various reserves and on the eve of the final day's discussion of Kazoka's motion, a very large group of Congress supporters gathered in Monze with the intention of proceeding to the P.T.N.A.'s chambers the next day to hear the final verdict. As they waited,


2Minutes of 3rd meeting of Mazabuka Area Council, op.cit.


4Ibid.
the A.W.C. supporters chanted Congress songs and shouted various Congress slogans. Some of them called for a show-down in the event of the Native Authority imposing a ban. Cifula Maambo, a local Congress Official who was directly involved with the crowd, gave the author an insight into its mood:

'Our people were very angry. They said bad things about Kazoka. They hated him because he was the friend of Chamulangula. They said he was a Capricorn member who had been given a lot of money by the bwanas to help kill Congress. Some wanted to burn his house. Amos Hicilaba of Namwala and myself had to talk to them not to do anything. We were happy when Kaunda came.'

On the day of the final discussions, the Administration, fearing for the safety of Kazoka and others who favoured the ban, despatched a unit of the mobile police to stand guard outside the Authority's chambers. This action was taken in spite of protests from some Chiefs.

According to Kaunda, the Congress Secretary-General, who arrived on the scene on the day before the final vote was taken, the mobile unit was made up of 'sixty-five fully armed' police who carried guns, tear gas and batons. That they were so armed is a clear indication of the Administration's estimation of the threat posed by the assembled supporters. The mobile unit was assisted by ten District Office messengers. However, although according to Kaunda's report, the general 'feeling was tense', there were no incidents on the day the Chiefs and Councillors voted in favour of

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1 Interviews.
2 Interview with Paul Cifula Maambo, 30th April, 1974.
4 Ibid.
an amendment. The Central Congress leadership had recognised the need for restraint and this was why it had despatched Kaunda to Monze to keep an eye on the A.N.C. supporters. Kaunda addressed the 'thousands' who had gathered in Monze and he 'managed to persuade them to observe the weapon of non-violence'. On the morning of the meeting, 'only a few hundreds were allowed to go near the meeting place...'.¹ By midday, they were informed of the result of the vote and, thereafter, they dispersed to their various villages amid chants of 'One Man, One Vote'.²

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Having successfully weathered this attempt to ban its operations, the Plateau Tonga Congress Movement was now determined to exploit the fresh mandate it had just received. During the latter part of 1957, its supporters took to harassing local Settler farmers. There had been isolated reports in the past from white farmers who complained of Africans who carried out acts of sabotage on their farms such as burning their maize crops or wrecking farm machinery. However, these had been few and far between. But during the final months of 1957, these reports became more frequent. On the 28th November 1957, Mr. Carlisle, the Member for the South-Western Electoral Area which included the Tonga plateau, told his colleagues in the Legislative Council of the serious problems facing Settler farmers in the Southern province. He explained that the A.N.C. had been 'very active' in the Mazabuka and Monze areas. In these areas, he

¹Ibid.
²Interviews with Paul Cifula Maambo and others.
continued, 'lawlessness prevails' and 'unlawful acts are being perpetrated...'. 'In many cases', the member pointed out, 'the perpetrators if apprehended claim to be members of the African National Congress.'¹ He went on to spell out some of the acts of sabotage that were being carried out on European property by Congress supporters who seemed to have no fears of possible detection and subsequent punishment:

'Boundary fences are cut, snares are set and valuable stock injured or destroyed and on occasions when you are fortunate enough to apprehend anybody, he is quite truculent about saying that he is a member of the African National Congress.'²

The harassment Carlisle described was in no way restricted to Settler farmers. Local provincial officials, even District Officers, were molested as well. Carlisle told of an incident involving the District Officer at Monze who was prevented from carrying out his duties by militant Congress supporters in the Monze Chieftaincy. He explained that 'when the District Officer... went out on a routine inspection... on the Lochinvar road, the Africans in the area refused to allow him to carry out his inspection and sent him back to his headquarters.'³

In his report on political activities within the Southern province during 1957, the Provincial Commissioner, Gervas Clay, described the year as a 'turbulent one...' during which 'troubles arose from the hurly-burly of a young and vigorous country growing

¹Hansard, 28th November 1957, No. 93, Cols. 900-901.
²Ibid.
³Ibid.
up where politics are boisterous and too often ill directed. He commented at some length on the anti-inoculation campaign waged by Congress throughout the year in the Mazabuka and Choma Districts as well as in the neighbouring Namwala District. He cited figures to show the extent of cattle loss sustained by some African farmers who, in spite of this, would still not avail themselves of the available veterinary facilities:

'In general, 1957 was a disappointing year. In Mazabuka and to a more limited extent in Choma and Namwala, the disaffected politicians worked up considerable feeling against the blanket inoculations for anthrax and quarter-evil which resulted in these being rejected by almost the whole of Mazabuka District, by the people of Mapanza and Singani areas in Choma District and Nalubamba in Namwala District. In these areas there have been heavy losses, particularly in areas of Choma where the latest census figures show a drop of 1,085 head. Figures are however hard to obtain since the owners are for various reasons reluctant to disclose them.'

The anti-inoculation campaign on the Tonga plateau continued into 1958, when it was waged with even greater persistence, especially in the Choma District and the Mwanachingwala area of Mazabuka District. In his annual report for 1957, the Provincial Commissioner had drawn attention to what he considered 'a general feeling of uneasiness' in the Choma District. This uneasiness came to a head during the early months of 1958 as groups of farmers, under Congress' influence, expressed their support for the programme of non-cooperation by refusing all services offered by the Veterinary Department. The local Native Authorities came under pressure to prosecute offenders.

1 Native Affairs Report, 1957, p.75.
2 Ibid., p.80.
3 Ibid., p.75.
As a result, several farmers made appearances in Chief Siamamundu's court to answer obstruction charges. Many had to pay court fines. In one area, however, farmers who were found guilty of wilful refusal to present their animals for inoculation, were incited by local Congress leaders against paying their fines. Congress saw in the situation the makings of yet another major challenge of the Administration's authority. When local District Officials issued instructions for the arrest of the farmers concerned, they resisted and refused to be taken in. The Provincial Commissioner then decided to despatch two platoons of the Northern Rhodesia police to the area. On arrival, the armed policemen toured the villages in search of the ring-leaders. They encountered opposition from some of the farmers who had barricaded the roads leading to their villages. To dislodge them, tear gas was used and, according to Informants, some of the protesting farmers were beaten with truncheons.

The District Administration's display of authority broke up the farmer's resistance. Twenty of them were then arrested for the part they had played in the disturbances. Once the protest organisers had been detained, the Veterinary Department's team was able to carry on with its inoculation programme and an estimated 27,998 head of cattle were subsequently treated against trypanosomiasis.¹

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The modus operandi of the Northern Rhodesia Police's mobile unit as seen in the Choma encounter and in previous engagements on

¹Native Affairs Report, 1958, p.71.
the plateau, came under strong criticism from the local African population. In various other parts of the territory, its conduct was being equally deplored. In June 1958, the African Representative Council discussed the harassment perpetrated by this arm of the Government. Mr. S. Mununga from the Luapula area called on the Council to deplore 'the manner in which the police and police mobile unit continue to ill treat members of the public'.

He was supported by several of his colleagues who were equally horrified by the heavy-handedness of the police officers. Even African moderates within the Council who had on occasion sought the assistance of the mobile units in coping with Congress extremists in their areas, agreed that the police had behaved with excessive zeal. One such representative, William Kazoka, from the Tonga plateau, explained that although he appreciated 'the work of the police and the mobile unit...', he disapproved of the tactics they employed. He went on:

'I come from a province where there are times... where I being a member of the Native Authority in cooperation with the Provincial Administration, we call upon the mobile unit... to deal with such situations [sic]. I have watched instances of this nature going on in my own province. I have seen people molested, I have seen the cattle wandering about the country-side, the owners taken away and others taken to several hospitals in the territory because they have been molested by the police for no other reason, simply because these people have had no time to decide whether they agree with a Government order or the police instruction [sic].

Although up against a police force which was so unrestrained in its handling of Africans opposed to the policies of the Government,

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1 Debates of the African Representative Council, 17th June, 1958, No. 17, Col. 390.

2 Mentioned earlier in this chapter in connection with the attempt to ban Congress from operating in the Mazabuka District.

3 Debates of the African Representative Council, 17th June, 1958, No. 17, Col. 396.
the Congress leaders on the plateau were determined not to be intimidated. It was becoming more difficult to get people to risk imprisonment and physical injury in confrontations with the Authorities, but this did not weaken their determination to continue the struggle against the Federation. In areas like Monze, Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala, Siamusonde, Chongo and a few others, where Congress was very popular and so relatively well organised, the protest campaign continued to be quite rewarding. It was not the same in less responsive Chiefdoms like Ufwenuka and Chona, and Congress tended to pay very scant attention to such areas during the late fifties.\(^1\) As we have already seen, the problem of land shortage was more acute in some Chiefdoms than in others, for land alienation had been very uneven.\(^2\) Congress' message which centred principally on its challenge of the Administration's land policy was therefore more readily understood in Chiefdoms such as Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala where population densities were relatively higher and land shortage a more serious problem than in Ufwenuka or Chona.

Within the Mazabuka District, the anti-inoculation campaign as well as that directed against the Improved Farming Scheme were at their most disruptive during 1958 in the Mwanachingwala and Chongo Chiefdoms, two of Congress' principal strongholds. As we have seen already, the Mwanachingwala area, as a result of extensive land alienation and population increase, had developed a very serious land shortage problem by the early forties.\(^3\) During the Federal years, this problem was exacerbated, as the local human and cattle populations continued to increase. There was also an accompanying influx of immigrants who had abandoned their homes on the escarpment. Most of the newcomers came into the area from the poorer Chiefdoms to the east of the line of rail. In 1957, the Provincial Commissioner had commented on this development which was forcing some of Chief Mwanachingwala's people into abandoning their homes:

\(^{1}\) Interviews with Ellison Milambo, Job Michello and other local organisers.
\(^{2}\) See Chapter VI, pp. 261-263.
\(^{3}\) See Chapter VI, pp. 304-305.
Within the District there is a population movement from east to west, where land is more easily available. There is also a movement out of the District by some of Chief Mwanachingwala's people over the Kafue river into Mumbwa as they suffer from considerable flooding in their own country annually during the rains and land is in very short supply.¹

The hardship and inconvenience engendered by land scarcity bred much dissatisfaction in the Mwanachingwala area. This feeling was turned to good account by Job Michello and other Congress officials who lived in the area. They brought the anti-inoculation campaign into Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy. In June 1958, Chief Mwanachingwala, under Congress influence, instructed his people against allowing local veterinary officials access to their cattle.²

Unfortunately for the Chief and his supporters, the majority of the Chiefs and the Councillors in the Plateau Tonga Native Authority had come, by this time, to appreciate the need for rigid enforcement of inoculation rules.³ The cattle losses that had occurred during the earlier anti-inoculation campaigns might have convinced them that such demonstrations of opposition to the Administration were not in the farmer's interest. Most farmers in the District were aware of the risks involved in this kind of protest, which was why only a few participated in it.

When the District Commissioner asked the Native Authority to handle the Mwanachingwala anti-inoculation protest problem, it decided to stand firm. The Chiefs and Councillors recommended that, in the event of continued opposition, Chief Mwanachingwala should be

¹Native Affairs Report, 1957, p.77.
²Native Affairs Report, 1958, p.67.
³During 1958, the Native Authorities Inoculation Order was to be invoked at least 17 times to compel African farmers to put their animals at the disposal of the Veterinary Department's staff. See Native Affairs Report, 1958, p.71.
fined and suspended and the inoculation order carried through.

Faced with an ultimatum from a source from which they expected
sympathy, Chief Mwanachingwala and his people gave in.¹

Another fairly similar situation in which the Plateau Tonga
Native Authority displayed its reluctance to lend any further sup­
port to protest action, occurred in Chief Chongo's area during
the course of 1958. In that year, 'the piecemeal individual farm
approach to conservation was discontinued...,' and the Agriculture
Department's staff began to concentrate on so-called 'planned
areas'.² Four such areas were demarcated on the Tonga plateau in
1958, viz. the Upper Kaleya Grazing Scheme, the Mpongo conservation
scheme, the Mulundu-dima scheme and the Ngwezi rehabilitation
scheme which was to cover some 49,376 acres of land.³

When, however, the Conservation officers began work in the
Mpongo area, in Chongo Chieftaincy, they ran into strong opposition.
Farmers from eight villages around Mpongo and Kambaza decided to
show their disapproval of the Administration's land policies by
opposing the Conservation effort. The Headmen of these villages,
all of them ardent Congress supporters, had been very active in
fomenting this opposition. For almost a week, the work of the
conservation team was held up as protesting farmers threatened
physical injury to anyone who would attempt to survey their farms
or instal contour ridges on them.⁴ However, like the Mwanachingwala

¹Ibid., p.67.
²J.H. Muchangwe, Tonga Land Utilisation Survey (Lusaka, 1960),
³Ibid.
⁴Interviews.
dissidents, these demonstrators had taken the support of the Native Authority for granted. When news of their protest action reached the Native Authority Council, only a handful of the Chiefs and Councillors sympathised with their cause. The majority insisted that the conservation measures should be enforced because they were in the interest of the community. The resistance however continued in spite of the Native Authority's ruling. The District Commissioner therefore issued instructions for the arrest of Simon Mpongo, Jeremiah Kambaza and the other six protest leaders, who were subsequently sentenced to six months imprisonment.\(^1\) This put an end to the resistance. Two years later, Ignatius Muchangwe,\(^2\) speaking in his capacity as an official of the Department of Agriculture, was to look back at the way the protest over the Mpongo scheme was handled and was to commend the methods used. During a survey of the area, he remarked that 'public opinion has since changed and the area is now one of the best conserved in the district and is an example of where sterner measures applied at the right time pay dividends \(^{\text{sic}}\).\(^3\)

In both the anti-inoculation campaign in the Mwanachingwala area and the soil conservation protest in the Mpongo area, one striking fact had emerged. Moderate opinion was beginning to prevail in the Councils of the Plateau Tonga Native Authority. The moderates may have failed in 1957 to get the Congress movement

\(^1\)Muchangwe, op.cit., and interviews.

\(^2\)Muchangwe, a Tonga, after serving as Principal of the Monze school of Agriculture, was to become the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture. See Kelvin Mlenga, ed., Who's Who in Zambia, 1967-68 (Lusaka, 1968), p.59.

\(^3\)Muchangwe, op.cit.
banned on the plateau, but the line of action followed by the Authority in these incidents demonstrated quite forcefully that they were not a spent force. If anything, they were succeeding in their determination to establish the Native Authority's independence of the protest movement. No longer was Congress to expect its unqualified support for the non-cooperation programme.\(^1\) Kazoka, the Native Authority's Chairman, a firm supporter of the Improved Farming Scheme (I.F.S.), which he had helped to propagate while he was the P.T.N.A.'s Agricultural Councillor, was really making his presence felt in the Authority's deliberations. According to Informants, he was one of the very few Africans who got on well with H.T. Bayldon ('Chamulangula'), the Provincial Commissioner.\(^2\) Bayldon appears to have used the Native Authority Chairman to influence the Chiefs and Councillors. Kazoka did not succeed when he tried in April 1957 to persuade his colleagues to ban Congress from the Mazabuka District, but he was to be more successful in his efforts to get them to stand up for the Administration's Improved Husbandry Schemes. By 1958, it appears that the number of Improved Farmers within the P.T.N.A. had increased somewhat and, as will be seen presently, the Chiefs were becoming less vociferous in their criticisms of the Administration. The Improved Farmers within the Native Authority were reaping the benefits of the I.F.S. and had little sympathy for those who turned their backs on the loans and bonuses to be got from the scheme, simply because they wanted to

\(^1\) Although the Native Authority had never openly supported Congress, its policies over the years, with a few exceptions, had been very much in consonance with the A.N.C. programme. This was no mere coincidence.

\(^2\) This was not denied by Kazoka when interviewed.
continue prosecuting a struggle which they seemed incapable of winning. At a time when the Administration was responding so well to the Improved Farmers' requests for more financial assistance\(^1\) to help them expand production to meet the rising demand for maize occasioned by the industrial boom on the Copperbelt, it seemed to such farmers in the Native Authority utter folly to continue opposing the Government.

A Congress official of this period tried to explain to the author the disillusionment and frustration which the virtual loss of Native Authority support engendered in the ranks of the local Congress leadership:

'In the past, all the Chiefs had helped us. Some worked harder and gave more money and help than the others. But no one had tried to oppose us. Now many of them were listening to Kazoka, who was the very good friend of "Chamulangula" [Bayldon, the District Commissioner]. They now began to oppose us. Only Mugodi, Chongo, Mwanachingwala, Siamusonde, Sianjalika and Mwenda were still for us. We were worried very much by this but we still continued to fight.'\(^2\)

There was no doubt that a number of Chiefs on the plateau and elsewhere within the territory were, by 1957, beginning to reconsider their support for the African National Congress. This was hardly surprising in a situation where the Administration was becoming much less squeamish about the use of its power to depose Chiefs.

In the past, various provincial officials within the Administration had urged their superiors to employ what was widely believed to be the ultimate sanction in the handling of errant Chiefs, viz. outright

\(^1\) See Table III.

\(^2\) Interview with Paul Cifula Maambo, 30.4.74.
dismissal. The Secretaries for Native Affairs, over the years, had however counselled tolerance and had recommended instead such actions as the withholding or the threat of withholding subsidies while investigations were being carried out. Yet even in cases where such investigations confirmed the guilt of the Chief in question, the Administration, in the majority of cases, confined itself to a reprimand, dismissing only those it considered chronic subversives.

On the Tonga plateau such investigations into chiefly conduct had been carried out in the thirties. They were occasioned by the passionate opposition of Chiefs Siamusonde, Sianjalika, Mwanachingwala and Siowe to the cattle dipping programme of the Veterinary Department. Although District officials had called for the deposition of some of these Chiefs, no such action was taken, although there was little doubt as to guilt. However, in the 1950s, things were to be different. Largely unsuccessful in its attempts to woo the Chiefs away from the Congress movement, the Administration now resorted to depose Chiefs who took a keen interest in the A.N.C. programme.

In January 1957, Chief Naluama, an ardent Congress supporter who had taken a very active part in the movement's activities in his area as well as in other parts of the plateau, was deposed. The Chief's involvement in Congress politics had been commented upon in the provincial annual report of 1953, when he was said to have 'cooperated considerably' with the protest movement and had given very little time to his official duties. In

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1See Chapter II, pp. 80-86:

spite of several warnings from the Mazabuka Boma officials, he had refused to dissociate himself from the anti-Government activity in his Chieftaincy. Officials were, by 1957, firmly convinced that the Chief was the principal instigator of these actions.

Having deposed the uncompromising Chief Naluama, the Administration got the Plateau Tonga Native Authority to see to the appointment of a new Chief in the area. It was soon quite apparent that the new Naluama had learnt a lesson from the way in which his predecessor had been treated. It is significant that during the anti-inoculating campaigns of 1957, he not only suppressed the operations of Congress politicians in his area but also demonstrated his loyalty to the Administration by extending an invitation to the Veterinary Department's inoculating team. This was very heartening for local officials who were up against anti-inoculation protest in 'almost the whole of Mazabuka District...', and a special note was made of this in the Annual Provincial Report of 1957. The Provincial Commissioner explained that 'the one bright spot in the Mazabuka District was that when quarter-evil broke out in the area of Chief Naluama, the most recently appointed Chief in the District, he asked the Veterinary Department for inoculations and had the support of his people in his request'. Predictably, this did not meet the approval of the local Congress leaders. But, the report continued, 'when inoculations were provided, attempts by politicians to dissuade the people were firmly dealt with by the people and

those accustomed to issuing threats suddenly found themselves threatened
and wasted no time in asking for protection.\(^1\)

Some time in 1959 another, and this time more significant, deposition of a Chief took place in the Mazabuka District. The victim was Mugozi Monze. Although he was referred to as 'Deputy Chief Monze' in the 1959 annual provincial report,\(^2\) other evidence seems to suggest that he had been functioning in the position of a regular Paramount Chief of the plateau Tonga.\(^3\) From his home at Katimba, the Chief had played a very prominent role in the politics of the African National Congress and had contributed a great deal to the development of a radical militancy in several parts of his Chieftaincy. The Makuyu anti-inoculation incident referred to earlier in this chapter happened just a few miles from his village. On that occasion, his reluctance to condemn the actions of the protesting farmers or to intervene on 'Siambukombe's' behalf can have left District officials in no doubt as to where his sympathies lay.

Under the influence of the Chief and other local Congress organisers, the Monze area had moved into the front line of protest politics on the plateau, rivalling established bastions like Chongo, Sianjalika and Mwanachingwala. In his annual report for 1958, the Provincial Commissioner had drawn attention to the political ferment in the Monze area. He reported that although 'Africans in rural areas generally have not evinced a great deal of interest in politics... centres such as Monze show more interest of course'.\(^4\) For failing

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\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)Native Affairs Report, 1959, p.66.

\(^3\)Interviews.

\(^4\)Native Affairs Report, 1958, p.66.
to restrain Congress organisers in his area, Mugodi Monze was summoned by the District Commissioner, H.T. Bayldon ('Chamalangula') to the Mazabuka Boma on several occasions to face stern reprimands. According to Informants, it was after one such encounter between the Chief and Bayldon that the final decision was taken to depose him.

The immediate background to the fateful meeting was a disagreement between a Mrs. Lombe, who was the Organising Secretary of the Congress' Women's League in the Mazabuka District and Bayldon. Mrs. Lombe had travelled to Mazabuka from her home in the Chisekezi area to obtain permission from the District Commissioner for the holding of a series of meetings by the Women's League. She had met Bayldon a number of times before on Women's League matters, and the District Commissioner had, apparently, never disguised his contempt for both Mrs. Lombe and her husband, John Lombe, who was also an active Congress organiser in the Chisekezi area. Mr. Lombe had migrated to the Mazabuka District from Bembaland in the Northern Province and it appears that Bayldon had, on a number of occasions, attempted to coerce the Lombes into severing their connections with the protest movement, by waving over their heads the threat of repatriation to the Northern Province. If this threat was to be ever implemented, Bayldon would need the support of the Chief in whose area the Lombes lived, viz. Mugodi Monze. This was hardly forthcoming, Mugodi being such a staunch 'Congressman'.

When, however, on this occasion, Bayldon, apparently reluctant to meet Mrs. Lombe's request, was insulted by the Women's League Organising Secretary, the District Commissioner demanded that Chief

1Interviews in Monze Chieftaincy.
Monze should expel the Lombes from his Chieftaincy. This the Chief refused to do. He is said to have told the District Commissioner that he would only ask the Lombes to leave if orders were issued by the Administration for all European settlers to vacate the lands they occupied in the Mazabuka District. This remark, it seems, was the last straw. A few weeks later, Mugodi Monze was deposed 'on the grounds that his administration had been inefficient for some years...'. A local farmer who was a member of the Improved Farming Scheme and who had in fact served as an Agricultural Assistant in the conservation programme, was appointed and approved by the Plateau Tonga Native Authority to succeed him.

Congress leaders at both central and provincial level were outraged by the Administration's recourse to deposing Chiefs. By January 1957, a total of six Chiefs, including Naluama, had been deposed in various parts of the territory, mainly, Congress believed, because they had shown sympathy for the protest movement. A few more were to follow. The central Congress leadership felt itself under an obligation to protect these Chiefs who had risked their positions in supporting its programme. In meetings throughout the territory, Congress officials condemned the Administration's actions. Harry Nkumbula, the Congress President, wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs, demanding an explanation of the reasons behind the depositions.

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1The author got the most comprehensive account of the disagreements between the Lombes and the District Commissioner from Mrs. Ruth Jere, one time Southern Provincial Secretary of the Congress Women's League, in an interview on the 13th July, 1974.

2Native Affairs Report, 1959, p. 66.

3Ibid., and interviews in Monze Chieftaincy.

4FCB 103/2/item 3. Congress Circular Vol. III, No. 3, January, 1957. Unfortunately, we do not have the exact dates of the depositions.
the dismissal of the Chiefs.\(^1\) This, predictably, did not achieve anything. In spite of added protests from villagers in the Chieftaincies concerned, not one of these Chiefs was reinstated.

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Although it had suffered a number of reverses, the Congress leadership on the Tonga plateau endeavoured to maintain the rhythm of protest. In March 1956, Kenneth Kaunda, the Congress Secretary-General, had referred to the Mazabuka District as Congress' 'strongest hold in the Southern province'.\(^2\) The movement's leaders were determined to do all they could to sustain this vital support. In the trying conditions of the fifties, this was no easy task.

In the first place, the number of improved farmers continued to rise. Between 1957 and 1959, the size of the Improved Farming community in the Monze area increased from 374 to 725. In the Magoye area, their numbers rose from 257 to 492. Around Mapangazia, it increased from 124 to 321 and in the Kanchomba area, from 180 to 314.\(^3\) Those who were now registering with the scheme were not being attracted so much by the bonuses offered as by the rather generous loans policy it operated. As Table II has shown, the level of bonus payments did not rise very much during the fifties but, in comparison, the amount of money available for loans to registered farmers was increasing annually (see Table III). As farmers developed

\(^1\)Ibid.

\(^2\)Congress Circular Vol. II, No. 3, 31.3.56.

\(^3\)Southern Province 'Stocktaking' (Lusaka, 1960), p. 41. M.M.R.S.
more interest in the I.F.S., so they paid more attention to the non-political activities of their Farmers Associations and isolated themselves from active involvement in the anti-Government programme of the local A.N.C. movement.

The majority of the Chiefs were also becoming less willing to associate openly with the protest movement and the support of the rank and file was waver ing visibly. Although Congress persisted in organising meetings on the plateau, during which local leaders would try to bolster morale by spicing their speeches with such slogans as 'Nkumbula Chipwaye Ci Federation' and 'Muntu-omwe, Kusala Komwe', the crowds were growing smaller. Local Congress leaders were fully conscious of this sagging morale in certain Chieftaincies and they appealed to the President-General to make more frequent appearances on the Tonga plateau, an area whose support, material and otherwise, Congress could not afford to lose. Nkumbula's frequent visits to the plateau in the mid and late fifties were therefore as much a fund raising effort as an attempt to strengthen the movement's appeal, in the light of the provincial Administration's determination to induce the Plateau Tonga Native Authority to ban its operations in the District.

The work of revitalization that was undertaken in the Mazabuka and Choma Districts from the middle of 1957 onwards was to yield handsome dividends. The Congress leadership on the Tonga Plateau continued to capitalize on the Gwembe Tonga resettlement scheme,

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1 Interviews with local Congress organisers.

2 The first called on Nkumbula to destroy the Federation. The second was the Tonga version of 'One Man, One Vote'.

3 Kaunda had reported on these trips to the South in Congress Circular, Vol. II, No. 3, 31.3.56.
Table III: Loans given to Improved Farmers in the Southern Province, 1953-58.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planting Season</th>
<th>Total sum provided</th>
<th>Amount actually loaned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953-56</td>
<td>£2,000</td>
<td>£1,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>5,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prepared from Department of Agriculture Annual Reports.

mentioned earlier in this chapter, especially during the course of 1958 when African refusal to vacate lands that were needed for the creation of a dam resulted in Chief Chipepo’s area of the valley, in an armed confrontation with the mobile police, in which eight Africans were killed and thirty-four wounded.\(^1\) Congress maintained its attack on the practice of land appropriation and repeatedly reminded the people on the plateau of the insecure nature of their land tenure. At various meetings in the reserves the people were told that Congress was determined to stand up for their land rights and they were urged to give more support to the movement’s activities in their various Chieftaincies.\(^2\) Overall branch involvement began to improve especially around 1959 when the threat of another review of the Improved Farming Scheme (I.F.S.) forced scores of hitherto indifferent Improved Farmers into joining

\(^1\)Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the recent deaths and injuries caused by the use of firearms in the Gwemba District... (Lusaka, 1958), p.19.

\(^2\)Interviews.
the local Congress branch. The I.F.S. was beginning to cost the Administration too much and the revenue on which it was run was being sharply outstripped by expenditure. Commenting on the sharp increase in the number of Improved Farmers during the fifties, the 1959 Annual report noted that this 'will mean a very great increase in the amount of money to be paid out in bonuses and the work involved in supervision would tax the available Agricultural Staff'. It went on to say that the increase in expenditure 'is considerably greater than the revenue that the fund can be expected to receive...'. In the circumstances, the Committee administering the scheme therefore 'decided to reduce the amount of acreage bonus paid to Improved Farmers and to limit the number of years a farmer could draw this bonus to five'. It also reduced the amount used under the scheme in subsidising Scotch carts1 (see Table IV).

The policy changes that were now being made in the running of the I.F.S. were to the majority of Africans a vindication of the A.N.C.'s fears and doubts about the scheme. It now looked as though the Congress leaders were right after all when they said that the Administration would one day abandon the Improved Farmer. Local Congress organisers exploited the news of the planned review and local support for the movement began to show a welcome increase. Enthusiasm for the A.N.C. programme on the plateau showed signs of growing to pre-Federation's proportions. As will be seen presently, this support in the Southern province for the African National Congress was to be crucial in the years that lay ahead.

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1Native Affairs Report, 1959, p.70. The scheme was finally terminated in the early sixties.
Table IV: Official Expenditure on the Improved Farming Scheme in both the Southern and Eastern Provinces, 1954-57.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items of Expenditure</th>
<th>1954-55</th>
<th>1955-56</th>
<th>1956-57</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bonus to Improved Farmers</td>
<td>£27,716</td>
<td>£34,987</td>
<td>£36,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies on carts, fertilisers, seeds etc.</td>
<td>£29,102</td>
<td>£20,625</td>
<td>£40,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil and Water Conservation works</td>
<td>£28,391</td>
<td>£27,616</td>
<td>£22,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grants to Native Authorities</td>
<td>£1,360</td>
<td>£4,950</td>
<td>£1,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Expenses</td>
<td>£728</td>
<td>£1,270</td>
<td>£2,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrecoverable Loans</td>
<td>£106</td>
<td>£68</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>£87,403</td>
<td>£89,516</td>
<td>£103,973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compiled from Agriculture Department Annual Reports.

Meanwhile, in the Representative Assemblies, within the territory, African leaders, joined occasionally by a few white sympathisers, were unrelenting in their criticism of conditions under the Federation. The Administration's persistent refusal to convert all native trust lands into native reserves as demanded by an African population which was worried by the fact that portions of the trust lands could be alienated to European settlers, was one of the main-springs of criticism. Repeatedly, the Administration's officials stated, unequivocally, that there was going to be no change in the status of the trust lands. In a reply to a motion passed in the African Representative Council on the 12th October, 1954 on the subject, the Administration explained that 'while the
Government will keep under constant review the Native Trust Land Order in Council to ensure that the interests of Africans are fully safeguarded, there can be no question of the conversion of Native Trust Land into Native Reserves.¹

This rather blunt statement of official policy was not, however, to deter African Representatives from raising the subject again in the council, three years later. The occasion was the visit to the territory of Allan Lennox-Boyd, the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Mateyo Kakumbi from the Central Province, speaking on behalf of his colleagues, told the British Government official of the misgivings that Africans still had about the land situation. Among other things, he said:

'We... wish to draw your attention to the question of land, particularly land which is classified as native trust land. The African population of Northern Rhodesia is increasing and land, under the present category of native reserves is becoming small. The insecurity arising from rights of occupancy granted to non-indigenous people in native trust land makes it unsafe for the indigenous people who are occupants of native trust land. We therefore find it necessary to request Her Majesty's Government to consider converting native trust land into native reserves.'²

This appeal was, like the earlier ones, unsuccessful. Such an apparent disregard of African views only served to confirm the African leaders in their view that the interests of the African population would never be adequately safeguarded in a Federal situation. Many of them were, by now, firmly convinced of the need for Northern Rhodesia's secession from the Federation. This they believed would leave the Administration more time to address

¹African Representative Council debates. Replies to motions carried at the 3rd session of the 3rd Council. See Appendix.

itself to the territory's problems. It would then also be able to take decisions concerning the African population, independently of Southern Rhodesia's influence. The African leaders argued that the conditions under which Africans lived and of which they had been complaining over the years, had shown no improvement. A Commission appointed to probe allegations of racial discrimination in commerce had reported in 1956 that it found 'indisputable evidence that discrimination is being practised in some shops and in some similar business premises, solely on grounds of colour'.

Contrary to official and settler promises, there was no real partnership between the races.

On the 13th June 1956, Mateyo Kakumbi from the Central Province introduced a motion in the African Representative Council condemning the settlers and the Administration for failing to implement true partnership. He called on the Council to deplore 'the failure to implement the partnership policy by the Federal and Territorial Governments on which Federation was imposed on the British protected persons of Northern Rhodesia' and to call 'on those concerned and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to find immediately a policy which will be acceptable to all races'. The motion was unanimously carried.

In October 1956, Kenneth Kaunda talked of the partnership of 'the slave and the free'. To the majority of Africans, partnership was just an empty sound, the Federation a mockery of their rights.

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1 Report of the Committee appointed to investigate the extent to which racial discrimination is practised in shops and in other similar business premises (Lusaka, 1956), p.2.


Although the majority of the Territory's whites disagreed with
the African assessment of Federal conditions, a few agreed that
the Africans had some kind of a case for complaint. In June
1957, Harry Franklin, who had once served in the Legislative
Council as representative of African interests but who was now the
Member for Education and Social Services, highlighted some of the
issues which, in his view, made for continued African opposition
to the Federation. 'From the African people's point of view',
he explained, 'I cannot see yet any benefit, though it is early
days I agree. I can see the great increase in the cost of living
due to the Customs Act having been drawn up avowedly to increase
customs on items particularly of African consumption. I can see
the importation of Greeks and Italians for the railways and ...
various other things that have happened which have not conduced
to give the Africans their faith back over Federation'.

Two years later, Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, now in retirement
from the Legislative Council which he left in 1951, expressed in
a letter to Arthur Creech-Jones, his friend of many years, his
views on partnership as seen within the Federation. It was quite
clear from his comments that he too saw little for the African popu-
lation to be sanguine about. He told Creech-Jones that 'things...
seem to be going from bad to worse. "Partnership" is of course
just moonshine and no one really intends to do anything about it.
Paternalism is as far as the majority of even genuinely liberal-
minded people get'.

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1Hansard, 24th June, 1957, No. 92, Col. 206.
2Northern Rhodesia Colonial Report, 1951, p. 4.
Calls for the Territory's secession from the Federation increased during the early months of 1957. These demands were prompted not only by African disenchantment with operating conditions but also by the renewed determination of John Gaunt and his supporters to get the British Government to concede self-government to the settler minority, thereby paving the way for the creation of a Dominion.\(^1\) In the African Representative Council and in various Provincial Councils, a motion, whose text could well have been drafted by the Congress leaders, was tabled during the course of 1957. In it, the African spokesmen impugned the political motives of the settler leaders. Robinson Nabulyato, representing the Southern province, moved the motion in the African Representative Council. It called on members to say 'that because of the political moves which are springing up to overthrow Colonial Office Trusteeship in Northern Rhodesia and because the African population... was and is opposed to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, this Council demands the secession of Northern Rhodesia from the Federation'.\(^2\) The motion was well supported.

During the course of its sittings in 1957, the Southern Provincial Council also discussed a motion worded in exactly the same way. This debate, according to Gervas Clay, the Provincial Commissioner, 'produced the fire and the crop of wild statements which appear so depressingly frequent whenever this subject is raised'.\(^3\)

\(^1\)In March, 1956, John Gaunt had tabled a motion before the Legislative Council in which he called for self-government. See Hansard, 23rd March, 1956, No. 87, Col. 684.
\(^2\)African Representative Council debates, 7th June, 1957, No. 16, Col. 150.
\(^3\)Native Affairs Report, 1957, p.77.
In the absence of any far-reaching changes in the political situation, African opposition to the Federation was to continue into the sixties, forcing the Administration into conceding piecemeal Constitutional reforms which were to lead eventually to African majority rule. However, the African National Congress' central leadership was not to survive the strains of these years as a united force. During the final months of 1958, the prevailing tensions within the movement's leadership care surfaced to cause a major split.

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During the mid and late fifties, Harry Nkumbula's leadership of the Congress movement came in for much criticism from other Congress leaders. They accused him of neglecting his duties and of visibly weakening in the face of white opposition. He appeared to be becoming too dictatorial in his handling of Congress matters and too intent on strengthening the office of President-General at the expense of the rest of the Congress Executive. Things came to a head on the 24th October, 1958. Kenneth Kaunda, Congress' very influential Secretary-General, walked out of a Congress meeting for good and took some of the movement's principal organisers with him. Mulford has examined at some length the immediate and predisposing reasons for this split within the Congress movement. However, for the purposes of this study, it is important to look briefly at the

1 See Mulford, op.cit., for an account of the activities leading up to Independence in October, 1964.

2 Mulford, op.cit., pp. 73-76.
situation in the Southern province and the Tonga plateau in particular, to see what effects, if any, it had on local political loyalties.

If anything, Congress' fortunes in the Mazabuka and Choma Districts improved after Kaunda and his supporters had left to form the rival Zambia African National Congress (Z.A.N.C.). For many people in the area, it was purely a question of choosing between 'Mwana wa cisi'\(^1\) i.e. Nkumbula, and the much more distant Kaunda. Kaunda's chances of success here were not helped by the fact that he was surrounded by so many Copperbelt-oriented politicians and Trade Unionists, almost all of whom had spent the greater part of their lives working for wages in an urban environment. The average African on the Tonga plateau was not going to commit his claims into the hands of a group of people, the majority of whom had been forced by circumstances to take up permanent residence in a Copperbelt town, and whose dealings with the rural areas were largely confined to periodic visits to assess the political situation or to see the odd relation. Such men, to him, could hardly be expected to articulate the problems of the rural areas with the cogency of an Nkumbula, who, in spite of his deep involvement in the Central Congress organisation based in Lusaka, appeared to take as much interest in the conditions operating in the rural as in the urban areas.

This was a fundamental disadvantage for Z.A.N.C. for even past history had shown that there was hardly any real affinity between

\(^1\) Literally, 'Child of our country'. Nkumbula's position on the plateau was helped substantially by the cultural and other ties between his people, the Ila, and the Tonga, their neighbours.
the people of the Tonga plateau and those of the Copperbelt and adjoining areas, on whom the politics of Kaunda's party was now rooted. The orientation of the Africans of the Mazabuka and Choma Districts had always been more southward, than northward, looking. On the subject of labour migration, for instance, more Africans from the plateau went down to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, than to the Copperbelt, where they were conspicuous by their absence. The Pim Commission had highlighted this fact quite clearly in its 1938 report. Ohadike has also commented on the dearth of Southern province wage labour in the copper mines. Although during the late fifties and early sixties the number of people leaving the Mazabuka District for work in the copper mines was to rise somewhat giving the District an overall share of 47.09% of the amount of labour that left the Southern province between 1940 and 1964, the rate of flow continued to be very low compared with other parts of the territory. For these years, it was only 0.51% as compared with average flow rates of about 8.90% in the North-Western, 12.72% in the Northern and 5.03% in the Central province.

Even if we are to allow for the almost universal dislike of the Southern province's people for mine work, their numbers were not any more significant in the Industries, Government Departments and mines put together. Compared with the Western Provinces

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2P.O. Ohadike, "Development of and Factors in the employment of African Migrants in the Copper Mines of Zambia, 1940-1966", Zambian Papers, No. 4, 1969, p.10. Ohadike gives the flow rate as the average annual flow (1940-64) of mid-date male population 15 years or more.
10.60°/o representation, the Central's 9.56°/o, the Eastern's 13.76°/o and the Northern's 22.62°/o, the Southern province registered only 4.67°/o of the total migrant population in Copperbelt employment between 1956 and 1962. Perhaps this helps to explain one of the other considerations that informed the decision of the Congress leadership on the plateau, to carry out a 'starve the Copperbelt' campaign during the early months of the Federation, to demonstrate their continued opposition to the Government. A campaign of this nature could hardly have failed to affect the Copperbelt's African population, though primarily designed to hit its white counterpart. It would appear that the smallness of its representation on the Copperbelt was a crucial factor in the plateau Tonga Congress leadership's willingness to sacrifice a measure of African interests on the Copperbelt, for the furtherance of the A.N.C.'s cause.

Kaunda's failure to attract from Nkumbula's ranks any of the leading African politicians from the Mazabuka and Choma Districts, who had served the A.N.C. at national level and had won some kind of territorial recognition for such services, was yet another reason for Z.A.N.C.'s lack of penetration on the Tonga plateau. Although these men were few in number, their contribution to the protest effort had been quite significant. Amos Walubita, for example, had distinguished himself in the African Representative Council during the early fifties as an uncompromising opponent of the settlers' partnership proposals. He had served on the delegation of four

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1 Ohadike, op.cit., p.11.
2 See Chapter VI, pp.314-315.
3 To cite an occasion, on the 24th January 1951 Walubita said in the African Representative Council: 'I do not know what the word
African representatives to the Closer Association talks held in London in April/May 1952 and, like his colleagues, had expressed his opposition to Federation by refusing to participate in the deliberations.

Another, George Kaluwa, who was elected as the first deputy treasurer of the revived Congress in 1948, and who later served as Secretary General when Robinson Nabulyato gave up the job, was one of two Congress representatives who went on a protest trip to London in October, 1952. Kaluwa was also one of the thirteen members appointed to serve on Congress' first supreme Action Council, formed in February 1952, to co-ordinate the non-cooperation programme.

Job Mayanda, another prominent politician from the plateau, who was in fact the first Provincial President of Congress, had won a seat on the National Executive as Deputy Treasurer at the Congress elections of August 1953. His close associate, Job Michello, after years of service with the Central organisation, was to rise to the position of Secretary-General. Ellison Milambo, the outspoken farmer/politician of Keemba Hill, had also served the movement at

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Partnership stands for in the political advancement of this country. How can you have a partner with whom you do not share things. I am sure ... that this word is just something used to shut the mouths of Africans and we are not partners at all.”

See African Representative Council debates, 24th January, 1951, No. 5, Col. 123.

^1 Kaluwa travelled to London with Chief Mpezeni of the Eastern province.

^2 ACJ 22/4/84. Freedom Newsletter, 1, III, 4-352.

national level in a number of minor roles. During the late fifties, he served for a time as Chairman of Congress' National Assembly,¹ while, at the same time, he was a member of the movement's 5-year Development Plan Committee.²

The Tonga plateau was not therefore without its quota, albeit a small one, of experienced politicians. Kaunda's break-away movement did not, however, sufficiently impress any of these to win their support. Every one of them continued to support Harry Nkumbula after 1958. As a result, Z.A.N.C., became, for the rank and file within the Mazabuka and Choma Districts, the party of outsiders. Although in the townships of the plateau, the Immigrant population made up of resident Nyasalanders, Ngoni, Lovale, Bemba, Lozi etc. was, at times, to veer towards Kaunda, the bulk of the Tonga population in the townships and the reserves consistently refused to identify with Nkumbula's opponents. This could well have been their way of showing disapproval of Z.A.N.C.'s more radical approach to solving the people's problems. Of the two parties, the A.N.C. was decidedly the more moderate group. The people of the Tonga plateau may have believed that the African stood a better chance if his interests were represented by moderates who steered clear of prison and whose hostility to the Administration did not make them totally unacceptable to the whites. As election results even after Independence were to prove, the Tonga plateau remained firmly behind Nkumbula, whose charismatic appeal among the grass roots could hardly be exaggerated.

²Sikalumbi, op.cit., p.121.
The majority of the area's Chiefs continued to give the A.N.C. their support, although more behind the scenes than openly.

It is important to note that one of the first Chiefly families to openly identify itself with Kaunda's United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.), the successor of Z.A.N.C., was the Chonas. The old Chief Chona had himself shown no real interest in Congress activities, but by 1959 Mainza Chona, his son, had returned home after successfully completing his legal studies in England. Mainza joined Congress and served under Nkumbula for a while, but the two did not get on, mainly because of personality differences and disagreements over priorities. A disillusioned Mainza Chona challenged Nkumbula for the leadership of the party in September 1959 and, with the support of some of Nkumbula's Executive members, he became President of a splinter group within the A.N.C. This splinter movement was subsequently outlawed by the Administration because, it was argued, it failed to comply with certain rules governing the registration of societies. Mainza Chona then left the A.N.C. for U.N.I.P., of which he became President in November 1959. Before he left Congress, Mainza had attempted to write Nkumbula's epitaph during the Annual A.N.C. Conference of October, 1959. In emphasising his opposition to Nkumbula's leadership of the A.N.C., he called on the Territory's African population to withdraw its support for the Congress leader and urged more support of Kaunda. 'We want someone of the nature of Mr. Kaunda - strong, fearless and selfless', he told the delegates, 'the name of Nkumbula should be forgotten.

1 A few more were to follow after independence.

2 See Chapter VI, p. 303, A/n. p. 304; n. 3.
except for his past service.' Continuing his attack, he said:

'You should know him as Provincial President of the Southern province. Before I stop ... I should tell you frankly that my opinion is that he is absolutely finished. He is now best suited for armchair politics. Under no circumstances is he prepared to go to jail for freedom's sake. He thinks the battle is already won. Nkumbula is an active talker but a negative doer.'

This brave indictment of the Congress President General, not wholly without substance, led many on the Tonga plateau to denounce the Chonas as traitors and defectors. In many parts of Mazabuka and Chona Districts, Mainza Chona and the rest of the Chona family are yet to be forgiven for that speech.

The 1963 split in the A.N.C.

Although Nkumbula succeeded in holding together the rest of the Congress leadership after the 1958 split, opposition to his leadership was to gain strength both within and outside the Congress Executive during the early sixties. Job Michello, who was by this time the movement's Secretary General, Mayanda and others who had spent so much of their time in organising Congress' activities in the Southern province and in Lusaka were finding it very hard to continue their work under Nkumbula's leadership. The Congress leader's love of the good life was increasing and it was widely believed that part of the funds provided by Congress' sympathisers in the Congo had been employed on non-party matters. In

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1 FCB 107/2/96, Mainza Chona's Address to the A.N.C. Conference of October, 1959.

2 Interviews.
the aftermath of the 1962 elections which produced an A.N.C./
U.N.I.P. Coalition Government, Nkumbula shamed his party by
betraying a willingness to work with the settler-dominated United
Federal Party (U.F.P.), once the African coalition had failed
to work, as he believed it would. These activities grossly
undermined Nkumbula's credibility. A substantial section of the
Congress leadership came to the conclusion that the movement would
be much better off without the President-General.

During the months of April and May 1963 various attempts were
made to deprive Nkumbula of some of his authority. New rules for
the running of the A.N.C.'s headquarters were issued by the move­
ment's publicity bureau. Michello was called upon to take over some
of Nkumbula's responsibilities and, together with the National Chair­
man, to play a more active part in the formulation of policy. Quite
predictably, Nkumbula refused to accept the new measures. The
President-General's disregard for their wishes forced the dis­
enchanted members of the Congress Executive closer to the Mukuba
pressure group, another anti-Nkumbula faction within Congress. This
group formed by a number of clerks, traders and teachers from the
Central and Southern provinces had repeatedly underlined the need
for a reform of Congress' organisation, both at Headquarters and
provincial levels, to curb the growing authoritarianism of the
leadership and to further enhance the involvement of the rural areas
in the protest effort. Its members, in a veiled attack on Nkumbula
and others like him, had condemned the behaviour of party officials
who drank alcohol while on duty.

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Mulford, op.cit., p.304.
The reformist zeal of the Mukuba group and its allies within the national Executive failed to produce any significant change in the Congress President and his supporters. Congress was now once again divided within itself. In August 1963, Job Michello, after suffering molestation at the hands of some young supporters of Nkumbula, who accused him of being disloyal and over-ambitious, resigned his position as Congress Secretary-General and announced the formation of his own party, the Peoples Democratic Party (P.D.P.).

Michello’s new party never amounted to much. In fact, after trying unsuccessfully to get the funds and the electoral support he needed to make the party a serious proposition, he was to dissolve the movement and resume his old position within the A.N.C. This later merger, more a marriage of convenience than anything else, does not, however, detract from the significance of the 1963 split. The very fact of the P.D.P.’s formation was a significant milestone in the A.N.C.’s history. If one can be permitted to regard the split within the A.N.C. in 1958 when Kaunda, Kapwepwe and others left the movement, as the 'Bemba split', that of 1963 was very much a 'Tonga split'. For the first time, some Tonga politicians who had consistently supported Nkumbula were in open disagreement with him. The seemingly monolithic character of the post-1958 Congress leadership was now, on closer inspection, to reveal sharp internal divisions and an almost Kaunda-like disenchantment with Nkumbula’s leadership. Michello, Mayanda and others who

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1 Interview with Job Michello, 1967.
were now leaving the A.N.C. had worked for many years as Congress
organisers in the Southern province and they had come to believe
that they were capable of maintaining a following of their own
within the province, irrespective of whether they continued within
the A.N.C. or not. However, as the events of the succeeding months
were to prove, they had over-estimated their popularity and under-
estimated the charismatic appeal of Nkumbula. Like Kaunda's
party, U.N.I.P., Michello's P.D.P., though headed by a Tonga, came
to be regarded by the rank and file in most parts of the plateau
as the work of over-ambitious young men, who were debunking Nkumbula's
ideas and strategies, when they themselves had nothing more positive
to offer. Although the P.D.P. was to make some narrow inroads among
the plateau's middle class, viz. its relatively well to do farmers,
the ex-teachers the clerks etc., several of whom had worked in
close association with Michello and Mayanda over the years, it failed
to challenge successfully the belief that 'Nkumbula can do no
wrong' which was so prevalent among the grass roots. Despite
hostile P.D.P. propaganda, Nkumbula's standing on the plateau re-
mained remarkably high. To most people in the area, he was still
the embodiment of the spirit of African resistance. The speeches
he had made before them in the past left scarcely any doubts about
this. Many were therefore prepared to overlook his foibles, which,
to them, were dwarfed out of recognition by his achievements. The
'true' Congress, viz. Nkumbula's A.N.C. continued to be the accepted
representative of the interests of Africans on the Tonga plateau.
Its charismatic leader and, perhaps to a lesser extent, its per-
formance in the past, appear to have won for it the right to lead
the struggle against Federation and white overrule. In the new
Zambia, its primacy in this area was to continue for many years. It is not without significance that in the December 1973 General Elections, following the declaration of a one-party state in Zambia, each candidate who won a seat on the Tonga Plateau was formerly a prominent member of the A.N.C.¹

¹The author was in Zambia during the elections.
CONCLUSION

From the material presented in this account, we can begin to see some of the factors that made for the popularity of the African National Congress (A.N.C.) in this part of Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia. The root cause of African opposition in the area to both the settler and the Administration appears to have been the loss of land suffered by certain sections of the African population through the appropriation policies of the British South African Company (B.S.A.C.) on the one hand, and of the Crown Administration, on the other. The latter Administration set aside substantial acreages of fertile land to meet the needs of a settler population which it believed would in time become much larger. This hope led officials to carry out a reserves policy, which in many areas turned the local population off fertile tracts of land into reserves, most of which were badly watered and made up of soils of relatively low fertility.

The very fact of large-scale land alienation, in several cases without compensation, the rather brutal methods of eviction, and the Crown Administration's failure to honour the promises of B.S.A.C. officials who had said that, once evicted, a people's right to continued residence in an area would be respected, created a great deal of distrust. This was to harden into opposition to Government policies during the thirties. The opposition of Siamusonde, Siowe and other Chiefs to the dipping rules of the Veterinary Department during the early 1930s should not be dismissed as the conservative reaction of unprogressive Chiefs and their people. For as some officials of the time acknowledged, this resistance to Government policy derived from an anti-Government feeling.
which, though few of the officials could admit it, was a direct reaction to the land and forced labour policies of the Administration.

In spite of the discriminatory land policies which affected several Chieftaincies on the plateau, the African population was quick to adopt the plough agriculture which was widely practised by the settler farmers and enthusiastically encouraged by the local missionaries. In the absence of official policy to develop African agriculture, African farmers were, for the most part, left to their own devices. The Catholic and the Seventh Day Adventist Missionaries were very helpful in this connection, but their work was mainly concentrated in the reserves that adjoined their Mission stations. The work of the poorly-staffed Agriculture Department was up to the mid-1930s almost wholly focussed on the needs of the small settler-farming community. The Department lacked the resources with which to provide white farmers with the financial and other facilities they required. And so while it attempted to placate a settler community that considered itself neglected by providing whatever assistance it could, the Department isolated itself from the problems of African agriculture. The rapid expansion of African maize production on the Tonga plateau during the early decades of the century therefore occurred without any official support from the Administration.

During the early decades of Colonial rule African agricultural production in the area expanded to record levels to service the growth of the Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt in the years before the Depression and afterwards. This expansion in output was not,
however, to go unchecked. The Administration came under pressure
from under-capitalized settler-farmers, who were frustrated by the
unwillingness of the local male population to abandon maize farming
in the reserves for the less rewarding task of agricultural wage
employment. The Government was pressed into introducing discrimin­
atory agricultural controls, not very unlike those employed in
Southern Rhodesia. Maize Control, which came into operation in
1936, was designed to protect the settler-farmer against African
competition. However, contrary to official expectations, the new
device failed to check African production, which continued to rise
in good seasons, at a time when European producers were having a
lot of difficulty in supplying the internal market, three-quarters
of which was now reserved for them. The Maize Control Act turned
out to be an unnecessary piece of legislation, for the maize sur­
plus that its originators had envisaged never occurred.

There was also an element of the protective device in the
Improved Farming Scheme. It appears that officials hoped, among
other things, that the rules of the scheme would act as a restrain­
ing force on African farmers, making it impossible for them to crop
very large areas. Yet, its demonstrative value apart, the scheme
never made much of an impression and its membership never reached
10% of the plateau's African population. This was hardly sur­
prising in an area that was so suspicion-ridden. Non-Improved
Farmers were penalised through cash levies for refusal to belong
to the scheme and the monies got from them were used to subsidise
the Improved Farmer and the general conservation programme. The
use of the levy was counter-productive for not only did it further
alienate the non-Improved Farmer, it also discouraged the adoption of the measures the scheme was advocating.

Meanwhile the grievances of the urban and rural populations had forced Africans to form Associations to represent their interests in discussions with the Administration. Because of the comparatively low standard of education on the plateau and the lack of familiarity with the workings of such Associations, alien Africans, mostly from Nyasaland and the Western province, who had migrated into the area, were to play a prominent organising role in both the Welfare Associations and the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (N.R.A.C.) formed in 1937. Although their enthusiasm within the latter body was to excite the jealousy of their Tonga counterparts and precipitate the movement's premature collapse, they made a more durable contribution to the activities of the Welfare Associations and, much later, to those of the N.R.A.C of 1948 which later became the A.N.C.

Although it never amounted to much, the N.R.A.C. of 1937 should not be dismissed lightly. Its very formation was an event of immense political significance within the context of later Nationalist developments. Kaluwa, a Nyasalander, was the brain behind the Congress' formation. Like the other founder members, he had observed conditions in Southern Rhodesia at first hand and had come to realise the urgent need for a Congress on the South African model. This movement would seek to protect not only the interests of Africans on the Tonga plateau, but of all the African peoples within the Territory. The Territorial outlook of the N.R.A.C. and its Pan-Africanist aspirations are a remarkable
commentary on the political consciousness of its founder members.

The settler population's enthusiastic pursuit of Amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, a campaign which it had to win in order to consolidate its socio-economic and political dominance over the African population, ruffled the political sensibilities of the subject population during the late thirties and forties and set the stage for the even more fiercely contested Federation campaign. Settler dominance, underpinned by the colour-bar, was very much a reality even before the Depression. Socio-political and economic segregation was already a fact and an African population such as that on the Tonga plateau which was so close geographically and otherwise to the reality of settlerdom on the other side of the Zambesi, knew only too well that African living conditions in Northern Rhodesia ran the risk of deteriorating to the Southern Rhodesian level under Amalgamation. This informed awareness of the conditions under which Africans lived in Southern Rhodesia explains the almost fanatical zeal with which the Chiefs and their people opposed the idea of closer union, be it Amalgamation or Federation.

Nkumbula's A.N.C. did not, however, exploit this protest potential effectively. The Tonga plateau was to the Congress leaders, first and foremost, a source of funds.\(^1\) Whatever attempts were made to organise the movement in the area were restricted to the barest minimum that would ensure the uninterrupted flow of funds into the Congress' Headquarters. So long as the scatter of local branch Chairmen and branch Secretaries was able to convince the people to contribute towards the meeting of expenses, the movement's leaders felt themselves under no compulsion to organise the people in a systematic way. This perhaps explains the failure of Congress to

\(^1\) Although Congress made use of some of the plateau's officials in its central organisation, their recruitment was a secondary issue. See Chapter VII pp. 379-381.
generate enthusiasm for its programme in those Chieftaincies where the absence of extensive land alienation and allied grievances made the local populations less inclined to participate in the protest effort. Had Congress endeavoured to galvanise the potential support for its programme which existed in the various Chieftaincies the response of the people would have been much more lively. Considering the virtual absence of any serious organizational strategy, the overall response was remarkable.

One group that Congress had the greatest difficulty in influencing was the Improved Farmers. Although the movement was to succeed in attracting some of the more adventurous of these farmers, the majority refused to be tempted by the anti-Government activity of Congress into jeopardising their positions within the scheme. The Farmers Association, a non-provocative and law abiding body, was fostered by the Administration, through moral and financial support, to serve as a countervailing force to Congress. Having deprived the A.N.C. of the active financial support and the organising abilities of the fairly well to do Improved Farmers, the Provincial Administration believed that it would succeed in weakening the movement's standing on the plateau. It was helped in its attempts to isolate the Improved Farmers from the general current of protest by the campaign of vilification which some of the A.N.C.'s supporters promoted against these farmers. On the whole, the official strategy succeeded for, in its pre-1953 campaign against Federation, Congress received very little active support from the plateau's Improved Farmers.

One group of A.N.C. supporters that stood out quite prominently in the party's machine on the Tonga plateau was the African members.
of the Seventh Day Adventist (S.D.A.) Church. Their observance of Saturday as Sabbath made it very difficult for them to enter regular wage employment and the majority of their number therefore tended to be self-employed and rather successful farmers. Their economic independence not only served to widen the gulf between them and the European settlers, it also provided the springboard that launched several of them into frontline activity in the politics of protest. The founders of the 1937 Northern Rhodesia African Congress were mostly S.D.A. As early as 1937, the choir of the S.D.A. primary school at Rusangu was rendering songs with a political undertone at public gatherings on the plateau. Keemba Hill, the centre of A.N.C. organisation on the plateau in the pre-Federal and Federal years, was an S.D.A. settlement. While producing the plateau's only anti-Government Farmers Association and the first Provincial President of the A.N.C., the area's opposition to the Improved Farming Scheme was the rallying point of attacks on the Administration's agricultural policies throughout the 1950s. In several Chieftaincies of the plateau, S.D.A. Congress organisers were very active throughout the period under discussion, in the implementation of the non-cooperation programme.

In all this political activity, the popularity of the A.N.C. among the grassroots on the plateau has to be seen in its right perspective. Although there were a number of factors which went to determine how responsive an area was to Congress' message, the most significant appears to have been the extent of land loss the

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1 See Chapter V, p. 118.
area had sustained. On the whole, Chieftaincies that had suffered extensive land alienation tended to be more receptive to the Congress organisers than those less affected. The people of the former areas were also much less inclined to participate in the Administration's soil conservation programme and its Improved Farming Scheme, even in the days before the A.N.C. embarked on its campaign to discredit these policies.

The Tonga plateau played a much more prominent role in the A.N.C. campaign against Federation between 1951 and 1953 than has been hitherto acknowledged. Although the area might have been un-productive of the sort of large-scale protest incidents that were to be seen on the Copperbelt, in Lusaka, and in the Northern and Luapula provinces, the financial support it gave to the A.N.C. had very few, if any, parallels within the Territory. Nkumbula, Kaunda and others were quite aware of the value of this support which they sought to maintain by giving some prominence at Congress Conferences and in Congress Circulars to the vexed problems of agricultural discrimination and land distribution, subjects that were central in the grievances of the plateau's peoples. The continued indifference of the majority of the Improved Farmers did not dissuade the Congress leaders at Headquarters from further efforts to win their support. They knew only too well how much Congress stood to gain financially if it succeeded in attracting the Improved Farmer. They were therefore always urging A.N.C. members on the plateau to restrain their criticism of the Improved Farmers (and their Farmers Associations), for this was a group the Congress leaders knew they could not afford to isolate permanently.
After the Federation had been declared in 1953, Congress made an effort to strengthen its position on the Tonga plateau. For the first time, it started to organise meetings on a fairly regular basis and it embarked on the sale of membership cards. These activities were, however, confined for the most part to those Chieftaincies where the A.N.C. was already popular and where its programs had been very well received. The movement could hardly be said to have broken new ground during the fifties. Building on its experience of the pre-Federation campaign, the Congress leadership on the plateau appears to have divided the area into 'viable' and 'non-viable' zones. Since the greater half of the plateau was in the viable zone, the Congress leaders tended to concentrate their efforts in the more obviously receptive areas, doing very little to bring the less enthusiastic Chieftaincies into line.

This tendency of the local A.N.C. to streamline its operations and pool its resources during the fifties could also have been a reaction to conditions that were operating to reduce its effectiveness in the area. The loans policy operated under the Improved Farming Scheme was attracting more farmers to the scheme and making it all the harder for Congress to break the hold of the Farmers Associations. The majority of the Chiefs, fearing the very real threat of deposition, were now much more restrained in their support of Congress and few were bold enough to identify openly with its protest activities. In the Councils of the Plateau Tonga Native Authority, the Moderates were calling for the imposition of a ban on Congress activity. Under all these pressures, the Congress leaders appear to have resolved to hold on to those areas that had responded positively to their appeals and to sacrifice the more
marginal Chieftaincies.

Congress also tended to over-concentrate its activities in the reserves of the plateau, during the pre-Federal and Federal years, giving very little time to organising protest action in the Townships. This seems to have been the result of two main factors: the relative smallness of the African population in the Townships and also its inherent instability which meant that very little money could be raised from this section of the African community for Congress purposes. Apart from the alien African population, the majority of town dwellers were 'target workers' who were never in the Townships long enough to become a part of the African community. Congress therefore left the work of articulating urban grievances largely in the hands of its members who sat in the Urban Advisory Councils, the Provincial Council and the African Representative Council. The District Administration and the settler controlled Town Management Boards kept a watchful eye on the movement's activities within the Townships and Congress leaders who attempted to incite the people usually ended up in prison. Whatever attempts were made to organise protest action in the Townships were therefore limited to a handful of rather poorly organised shop boycotts, most of which failed to make any impact.

The A.N.C. split of 1958 thus occurred at a time when the local Congress movement, hardly noticeable in the plateau's Townships, was endeavouring to consolidate its position in those Chieftaincies where it was already most popular. Kaunda's decision to leave Congress did not arouse much interest in the plateau. The Congress Secretary General was well known to local A.N.C. organisers but his activities in the area had not brought him into much contact with the rank and file in the various Chieftaincies. To the majority
of A.N.C. supporters here, he was simply 'Nkumbula's deputy'. His legitimacy, as far as they were concerned, derived from his direct association with the Congress leader. Operating independently of Nkumbula, he lacked such authority as he had hitherto enjoyed on the plateau.

The lack of social affinity between the people of the Tonga plateau and those of the more northerly areas who were the mainstay of Kaunda's breakaway movement, was also a factor operating in Nkumbula's favour. Z.A.N.C. and, later on, U.N.I.P., were seen as the work of 'townsmen', most of them long-standing urban residents who took only a casual interest in the affairs of the rural areas. There was consequently a reluctance to entrust Trade Unionists, Copper-miners and other Copperbelt worker/politicians with the responsibility of articulating rural grievances from which they seemed so distant.

From 1958 onwards, the A.N.C. came to be regarded as the party of the Southern Province, although it also enjoyed some support in certain other parts of the territory. The majority of the people of the Southern province, attracted principally by Nkumbula's past record and perhaps also by the less militant posture of his Congress, consistently rejected the 'foreign' politics of Z.A.N.C. and its successor, U.N.I.P. Although Kaunda was to get some support from the alien African population in the Townships, from some of the Chiefs and a handful of the more successful farmers, the grassroots remained steadfastly loyal to the A.N.C. and its President. In the late forties and early fifties, Nkumbula had been very outspoken in his criticisms of the settlers' monopoly of political power and authority. He it was who had reversed the

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1 The author did not have time to examine this interesting development more closely.
cautionary trend of Mbikusita Lewanika's leadership to replace it with one that was much more assertive of the rights of the African population. Under his leadership, various problems of the rural areas which had been obscured by Lewanika's preoccupation with urban protest had come to the fore. Land alienation, settler immigration, forced labour, agricultural discrimination and related problems were subjects about which Nkumbula showed much concern. He was always raising them at meetings with Administration Officials and at various Congress Conferences and other gatherings. This show of concern for their problems endeared the Congress President to the Tonga plateau's peoples and pre-empted their loyalty.

When in 1963 Job Michello left Congress to form the Peoples Democratic Party the stage was set for a struggle in which Nkumbula's popularity on the Tonga plateau was being challenged by a Tonga politician who was no newcomer to Congress politics. Through his activities on the plateau, Michello had become somewhat of a local hero and the members of the Congress Women's League had referred to him in several of their praise songs. In spite of this Michello's new party was unable to build on the store of goodwill its leader had come to enjoy. The P.D.P. was seen, not as a party in its own right, but as a splinter group from the A.N.C. Michello came to be widely regarded on the plateau as a power-seeking and over-ambitious politician who left Congress because he had failed to oust Nkumbula from the Presidency which he coveted. So whereas Z.A.N.C., and U.N.I.P. failed to make an impact on the Tonga plateau mainly because their leaders were so distant, the P.D.P. failed because
its leaders, though well known locally, appeared to be motivated by sheer ambition and a profound contempt for Nkumbula's leadership which many here believed was both mature and effective. Michello, Mayanda and others were pre-judged as having nothing new to offer. Their place was by Nkumbula's side. Like Kaunda, their authority on the plateau was greatly diminished when they operated independently of the A.N.C.'s President General. This support for the A.N.C. in the Southern province continued into the 1970s and was a major obstacle in the drive to establish a one-party state.

This study has been mainly concerned with outlining the contribution of Africans on the Tonga plateau to the Nationalist struggle in the years leading up to 1958. The succeeding years were to be marked by the growing political insularity of the area within the context of Nationalist politics. The people of the Tonga plateau did not play an effective part in the politics of U.N.I.P. which finally led to the attainment of Independence in October 1964.

As a result of pre-occupation with commercial farming, the Tonga were largely isolated from the industrial areas within the territory which served as a meeting place for people from different provinces. This social isolation easily gave way to a political parochialism as reflected in the area's continued support of the A.N.C. after the split that led to U.N.I.P.'s formation. Whether the A.N.C. after 1958 was a sectional party or not may be a debatable point¹ but there is no doubt that the party drew its most substantial

¹Molteno has argued that the A.N.C. cannot be considered a sectional party since it enjoyed minority support in parts of the Western, North-Western, Eastern and Central Provinces as well as in the Southern province. See R.Molteno, "Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics: A study of sectionalism", in W.Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia (Manchester, 1974), p.72.
and consistent support from the Tonga plateau which was the centre of its organisation in the Southern Province. This continued support of the A.N.C. by the vast majority of people on the plateau was not simply a demonstration of tribal loyalty to those leaders of the movement who came from the Southern Province. It was more a recognition of their ability to articulate specific rural grievances of which they had first-hand knowledge and experience.

Although the A.N.C.'s dominance on the Tonga plateau was to continue for many years, one must not overlook the very important in-roads that were made into its support in the area by the opposition U.N.I.P. in the years preceding Independence and after. U.N.I.P.'s initial campaign efforts in the area failed to make much of an impression, partly because it was appealing to a peasantry whose economic interests were largely undifferentiated. Admittedly, there were a few individuals at this time who were farming on a large scale but because their farms were not as large as the settlers, they were able to meet their capital requirements out of profits and Government subsidies as mediated through the A.F.I.F.\(^1\) By 1964, however, this situation had changed considerably. As the granting of Independence became inevitable, some of the settler farmers began to think of selling their farms and leaving the territory. Many did before and after Independence. This meant that several African large-scale farmers on the plateau who had set their sights on these farms for some time could now actually own them. Because most lacked the resources with which to purchase these properties outright, they had to come into the new U.N.I.P. Government's favour, if they were

\(^1\)See Chapter IV, p. 177.
to qualify for financial assistance. During the 1960s, a number of Chiefs, Headmen and large-scale cultivators who were in need of Government assistance therefore abandoned the A.N.C. for U.N.I.P. This perhaps partly explains the swing to U.N.I.P. in the Southern province of some 15 per cent in the 1964 General Elections.\(^1\) Apparently, pressure was also brought to bear on local farmers by U.N.I.P. organisers who were determined to make a headway within the province. Farmers in need of capital to run their new holdings had to give practical demonstration of their support for the new Government. Molteno has drawn attention to the fact that in several parts of the Southern province, in the years after Independence, the offer of official credit to many a farmer was conditional upon his producing a U.N.I.P. membership card.\(^2\)

In the years leading up to the declaration of the one-party state, the A.N.C. therefore lost several of its prominent organisers on the Tonga plateau as their economic interests drove them into an alliance with the ruling party. Quite a number of them were to hold leading positions in the U.N.I.P. organisation on the plateau, although they do not appear to have made much impact at National level until quite recently. The vast majority of small-scale farmers who couldn't even raise the initial capital that would qualify them for Government financial assistance for the purchase of settler farms, however, continued, perhaps out of frustration, to support the A.N.C.

\(^1\)R. Molteno, *op. cit.*, p.71.

\(^2\)Ibid., p.98.
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II The Livingstone Museum in Zambia has a collection of British South Africa Company material concerning the Tonga plateau.

III Rhodes House, Oxford, keeps a collection of Fabian Colonial Bureau and other private papers concerning political developments on the plateau and the rest of the Territory.
Notes on Principal Informants

George Barclay

Judah Baku
Farmer of Chongo village, Chongo Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu. One time Adviser and Assessor to the late Chief Benjamin Chongo. Age: approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 15.12.73

Lazarus Chiabi

Thomas Chingila

Chief Chona
Jojo Cisenge
Farmer of Ufwenuka Chieftaincy. Had gone down to Rhodesia while a youth in the charge of Pastor Anderson of the S.D.A. church. Jojo was directly involved in the founding of the Rusangu S.D.A. mission.
Age: Approx. 80 years. Interviewed: 16.11.73

Jacob Hundyanga
Of Liso village, Monze Chieftaincy. Oldest informant interviewed. Witnessed arrival of B.S.A.C. pioneering column on the plateau. Worked in a factory in Bulawayo during the 1920s.
Age: Approx. 100 years. Interviewed: 22.11.73.

Peter Kachesa
Farmer of Peter Mainza village, Ufwenuka Chieftaincy. Son of the late Theodore Kachesa, one of the most successful African commercial farmers on the plateau. (See Chapter III, p. 103.)
Interviewed: 23.11.73

Franklin Kaluwe
Farmer of Momba village, Chongo Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu and Solusi, in Bulawayo. Became Headmaster at Rusangu in 1936. Was a prominent A.N.C. branch organiser in the Chongo area during the 1950s.
Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 18.12.73.

Simon Kazembe
Farmer of Kazembe village, Monze Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu. Trained as tailor at Solusi in Bulawayo. Ex-Improved Farmer and member of the local African Farmers Association. During the 1950s
he was A.N.C. chairman of the Katimba branch.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 28.11.73.

William Kazoka
Farmer of the Pemba area. One time Agricultural Councillor of
the Plateau Tonga Native Authority and member of the African Re-
presentative Council. Ex-Improved Farmer and member of the African
Farmers Association. Was directly involved in attempts to ban the
A.N.C. from the Tonga plateau. (See Chapter VII, p. 356).
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 23.4.74 and 26.4.74.

Nelson Liyanda
Farmer of Namalyo farm, Sianjalika Chieftaincy. Educated at
Rusangu and Waddilove in Southern Rhodesia. Ex-Improved Farmer
and, for about 8 years, leader of the Monze African Farmers
Association.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 9.12.73.

Paul Cifula Maambo
Farmer of Maambo village, Chongo Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu.
Deputy provincial president of the A.N.C. during the 1950s.
Age: approx. 65 years. Interviewed: 13.12.73 and 30.4.74.

Gideon Ndandala Mankapwi
Farmer of Chuungu village, Chongo Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu.
Founder member of the 1937 Northern Rhodesia African Congress. Ex-
Improved Farmer. Later, A.N.C. branch organiser.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 28.11.73.
Job Michello

Businessmen of New Kamwalla Section, Lusaka. Educated at Rusangu and in Solusi, Bulawayo. Later taught at Rusangu. In 1951, he was elected A.N.C. deputy chairman in the Munenga section of Mwanachingwala Chieftaincy, his home area. Played an active part in Congress activities at local and national level (see Chapter VII, p. 380). Became Acting Secretary-General of the A.N.C. in 1959 and was later confirmed as Secretary for the movement. Was returned unopposed to the Legislative Council in 1961. In 1962, he served as Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources after the formation of the Coalition Government. Left the A.N.C. in 1963 to form the Peoples Democratic Party but later rejoined the movement.


Ellison Milambo


Age: Approx. 80 years. Interviewed: 10.2.74 and 23.6.74.
Bruce Miller
Settler farmer of Choma area. Born in Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, in 1930.
Interviewed: 18.5.74.

Naul Moonga
Farmer of Munampamba village, Sianjalika Chieftaincy. Prominent A.N.C. organiser in this Chieftaincy. Arrested for his political activities in 1962 and imprisoned for about nine months.
Age: Approx. 50 years.
Interviewed: 29.4.74.

Josiah Mukulumwa
Age: Approx. 60 years.
Interviewed: 28.11.73.

Miles Musumbwe
Owner of Sunrise Farm, Chisekesi. Educated at Rusangu. One of the earliest Agricultural Demonstrators on the plateau. Ex-Improved Farmer who supported the A.N.C. behind the scenes.
Age: Approx. 60 years.
Interviewed: 20.11.73.

M. Muvovwe
Headmaster of the Pemba primary school. Quite knowledgeable in the early history of the plateau.
Age: Approx. 60 years.
Interviewed: 6.6.74.

Paul Mwiindwa
Farmer of Chikonka village, Ufwenuka Chieftaincy. Educated at Rusangu. Ex-Improved Farmer and Chairman of Ufwenuka branch of the
African Farmers Association. In 1953, was appointed Chairman of the A.N.C. branch in the Ufwenuka area but he gave up his political activities during the Federal years and returned to active involvement in the local Farmers Association.

Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 21.11.73.

Esau Mwiinga
Farmer of the Bansange area of Ufwenuka Chieftaincy. Educated at Chikuni and Rusangu missions. Joined the local A.N.C. in 1952 and in 1956 was appointed Branch Secretary in the Bansange area.

Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 23.11.73.

Fr. Dominic Nchete
Of the Roman Catholic Church, Mazabuka.

Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 25.4.74.

Stephen Ngandu
Farmer of Chisuwo village, Ufwenuka Chieftaincy. Worked under Father Moreau at Chikuni as a farm hand. Went to Southern Rhodesia in 1923 and stayed for five years before returning home. Was taken twice on cibalo (forced labour).

Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 22.11.73.

Harry Nkumbula
Member of the Zambian Parliament. Farmer President-General of the A.N.C. (See Chapter VI, pp. 25-39)

Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 20.1.74.
John Heuma Nyimba
Farmer of Chiyobola village, Monze Chieftaincy. Three times victim of cibalo (forced labour). Worked for some time as labourer in Bulawayo before the First World War.
Age: approx. 70 years. Interviewed: 19.11.73.

Max Prokoph
Prelate to Roman Catholic Students at the University of Zambia. Was Principal of Canisius Secondary School, Chikuni, from 1940-51.
Age: Approx. 65 years. Interviewed: 1.8.74 and 14.2.74.

Chief Siamusonde
Descendent of Kulumbwa Siamusonde, prominent opponent of the Colonial Administration during the 1930s.
Age: approx. 70 years. Interviewed: 12.12.73.

Samuel Sibanda
Farmer of Mujika settlement, Mwanza Chieftaincy. Educated in Southern Rhodesia. Worked in Bulawayo for five years. Founder member of the 1937 Northern Rhodesia African Congress.
Age: Approx. 60 years. Interviewed: 18.11.73 and 12.5.74.

Amos Walubita
organiser (see Chapter VII, pp 379-380) For many years, an active member of the local African Farmers Association. Widely travelled in Europe and the Caribbean on Agricultural and Political business. During the 1950s was Secretary of the Improved Animal Husbandry Scheme and member of the Board of African Agriculture. In the early 1960s was elected Provincial President of the A.N.C. and in 1964 gained a seat in Parliament.

Age: Approx. 55 years. Interviewed: 12.11.73 and 22.4.74.

H. Yates-Jones
Settler farmer of Matapeta farm, Choma. Has lived in the territory since 1920. Ex-member of the Settler Farmers Association, Choma branch.

Age: Approx. 70 years. Interviewed: 17.5.74.
### APPENDIX I

Some of the villages evicted on the Tonga plateau during the early years of Colonial rule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Villages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Around Mazabuka</td>
<td>Kabanje, Namulonga, Sinkope, Mpesu, Choolo, Mkaika, Siowi and Lukoso villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Lubombo:</td>
<td>Ncheeya, Ntimpula, Mukwiza and Nanga villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Dambilo and Kayuni:</td>
<td>Sibaale, Macha, Hakwamba and Munacaande villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Magoye:</td>
<td>Sianjalika, Chipembele, Mwiigasompa, Nakweza, Simonde, Simonga, Munampamba, Silweenga, Chipolokoto, Hankunyanga, Mweemba, Haangoba and Chimbwali villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Choma:</td>
<td>Haalembo, Hanankafu, Chiyoolo, Seepande, Mutentalika and Choma villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around Chisekesi:</td>
<td>Chingila, Munamunungu and Hantumbu villages.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*I am grateful to various Informants, and particular to Fr. Dominic Nohete of Mazabuka for the information used in preparing this list.*
Appendix II

Text of Richard Amafumba's letter
(See ZA 1/11/1, Z.A.A.)

The Secretary
M.R. Kaluverarjan
E.S. Kaphe

Dear Sir,

The following are some extracts from my letter. I refer to the parent body and shall be much pleased if you would submit it to your members of your Association.

We are now calling upon each and everyone that has a desire to perpetuate the ideals of self-improvement and manhood rights. The Branches are now opened and going on. Concerned, and thereby conspicuously few things, if any, in this world which do more harm than "cowardice". It is a defect, a deficiency, a blight, and has its roots in all that which makes for deterioration - depravity of humanity, fear or doubt, or even false imagination transforms a man: he becomes a coward with ability to see things contrary to forms & nature peculiar to them. But there is
A reason for concordance, for imagination (false or ideal) for a man to yearn for certain things will invariably happen. "Be not deceived: God is not mocked, for whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." If you keep reading various papers, you will be assured of the struggle that is now going on in the world among nations for complete freedom. As we do not aspire for freedom in every sense, we will not be a free people. I am glad to use my pen to write these lines on behalf of this great work of Native improvement. Associations, so I wish to impress this on your minds. Do you realize the position in which you are? Do you realize that the wealth in sharing no in the face economically and industrially otherwise? If my Africans here in no war crying to be redeemed by Americans from the captivity, without having interior foundations and strength will my Africans to support ourselves. Now there fore I wish to speak to you again chairman, secretary, members of my Association regarding preparedness. This word means to stretch forward few weeks we have remained divided as we have been in the past, it is but to hold ourselves steady.
for the Coming of our Lord Jesus Christ to hold
ourselves in holy unity so that we can easily overcome
our mistakes. Great Britain is bringing her own down
to be watchful. "Prepare not means to be
by language, race or colour, but to be ready for
examination at the hands of stronger nations.

If you read in Isaiah's 66th Chapter, you will
find these words:— "I saw one coming from Babylon,
and again it is said:— Behold! I will send my
messenger before you." This means that we must,
be ready for him to come with us. So it is important
to prepare ourselves to emigrate before we shall be made
otherwise flee from our presence. And therefore, it is hoped
that all our branches in every part will participate
in this indispensable co-operative movement by
subscribing to this powerful effort toward the
industrial emancipation of our race.

Dear Secretary, will you please forgive me
for using high terms in this letter?

I am, Sir,
your obedient servant,

[Signature]
Hon. Sect.
Nov. 14th 1918
Bowal Branch.
APPENDIX III

The Constitution of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress of 1957. (See Sec/Nat/58, Z.N.A.)

Name: (i) The meeting shall be known in its dealings as the Northern Rhodesia African Congress (N.R.A.C.).

(ii) Object

(a) To keep and promote the welfare and interests of Africans in Northern Rhodesia.

(b) To assist in every way necessary the Government and Mission bodies in Northern Rhodesia, for the good of the country.

(c) To enquire and report any matter tending to injure the welfare and interests of Africans in Northern Rhodesia.

(d) To secure cooperation, just and fair treatment of Africans and development of the country.

(e) To keep in touch with all Congress meetings and Welfare meetings in Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, South Africa.

(iii) Membership: Membership to the Northern Rhodesia African Congress shall be open to any member who is over 25 years of age and if necessary any member wishing to enrol himself or herself as a member of the N.R.A.C., who is below 25 years of age, may make application through the President to the Executive Committee for admittance.

(iv) Admission to membership. Every member before enrolment shall be needed to have good knowledge and understanding of the aims of the N.R.A.C., failing this no admission to membership shall be open.

1b) Every member after acquiring good knowledge and understanding of the aims of the N.R.A.C. shall pay in an admission fee of 2/- every year until 5 years reaching the total sum or 10/- when he or she shall be recognised as a full member of Northern Rhodesia African Congress.

(v) Subscription: Every member of the N.R.A.C. shall be asked to pay the sum of 6d every month making a total sum of 6/- every year for subscription.

(vi) Frequency of meetings: Meetings of the N.R.A.C. shall be summoned at each time thought necessary by the Executive Committee.

(vii) Officers: The Northern Rhodesia African Congress shall have the following as its officers and through them only shall all
matters be taken into consideration: President, Vice-President, General-Secretary, Asst-General Secretary, Treasurer and Executive.

(viii) **Executive:** The Executive shall govern the N.R.A.C.; It shall be made of all officers in section vii and to members of the N.R.A.C.

(ix) **Minutes:** Minutes of all the proceedings of the meetings shall be kept by General Secretary and read at each meeting and signed by the President.

(x) **Voting:** All resolutions discussed in meetings shall be put to a vote.

(xi) **Procedure:** (a) The Congress has made it its law that at its every meeting, an opening devotional sermon should be conducted by a clergy; if a clergy is not get a member of any denomination will be asked to conduct the opening devotional sermon.

(b) The meeting after the sermon will go in its business. The Secretary will read the minutes and after the President will give his presidential address.

(xii) **Alteration of Constitution:** No alteration of constitution shall be made in any meeting without consulting the Executive.
APPENDIX IV

The Constitution of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress formed in 1948 (Sec/Nat 353, ZNA)

Name: This body shall be called "The Northern Rhodesia African Congress".

Objects: (a) To promote the educational, political, economic and social advancement of the Africans in full cooperation with the Government, Native Authorities, Missionary Societies, the African Representative Council and such other organisations which have the welfare of Africans at heart.

(b) Apart from Government Institutions, the Congress shall be a mouth-piece of the Africans irrespective of sex or social stand.

(c) To break the tribal bars by endeavouring to foster the spirit of unity among Africans so that no one tribe shall feel inferior or superior in the eyes of the Congress.

Membership: (a) Active membership shall be open to:

(i) Native men and women of Northern Rhodesia at home and abroad.

(ii) Alien Africans and Euro-Africans who are residents of Northern Rhodesia and take an active interest in the development of the country.

(b) Associate membership shall be open to Europeans and Asians of goodwill towards the Africans.

(c) The Congress shall have its branches as members and any other body that wishes to affiliate shall be at liberty to do so, e.g. Northern Rhodesia African Farmers Association; African Drivers Association; African Trade Unions; Welfare Societies etc.

(d) Individuals wishing to become members shall be required to apply to the General Secretary enclosing a membership fee of 1/6d for ladies, 1/- for students and 2/- for men.

Subscriptions: (a) The annual subscriptions for active members shall be 5/- for male members, 2/6d for female members and 2/- for students.

(b) The annual subscription for the affiliated bodies shall be 20/-.

(c) Associate members shall subscribe according to their generosity.
(d) Donations from all sections of the public shall be appreciated.

(e) The financial year shall be from August 1st to May 30th of each year.

Office Bearers: President, Vice-President, Secretary, Vice-Secretary, Treasurer and Vice-Treasurer.

The Executive Committee: shall consist of President, Secretary, Treasurer. Any other four members appointed at annual conference.

Terms of Office: Office bearers shall be elected every year at the Annual Conference.

Meetings: (a) The Congress shall meet once a year, preferably in July.

(b) The Executive Committee shall meet once a year but twice in the case of an emergency.

(c) The place and date of meetings shall be determined by the General Conference.

Convening Meetings: (a) The Secretary shall convene the meeting at the instance of the President.

(b) Visitors who are invited by the Congress to attend the annual conference shall participate in the debate but shall not vote.

(c) Members of the public who are not invited to attend the General meeting shall neither participate in the debates nor shall they be allowed to vote.

Amendments and Alterations: The Constitution shall be altered, amended or nullified at the meeting of the General Conference whose quorum shall be two-thirds majority of the members actually present.
APPENDIX V

Some of the Songs that were quite popular on the Tonga plateau during the Colonial period

I
Mwami Monze Imwami wesu
Wakazila ku lwisi
Nakasika ku Demu
Waka kala kasyonto

Nakalonga ku mudi ca Demu
Wakalala ku Gonde
Nkwaka janva mukuwa
Imukuwa Munali

Ba Munali ba mupa ingwadi
Aku mwambila kuti
Kuya Kuboola bantu
Abo bantu batauba

Mwami Monze wakalomba ingwadi
Yakuya kwi Ingilandi
Kuya kulomba kuti
Tulelwe ba mangisi

Elyo bami ba Boma bakati
Ulayanda lumamba
Baka musenga lino
Imyaka limusanu.

English translation:

Monze, our Chief came from the sea to Demu and stayed there for a short time. When he left Demu, he came to Gonde where he met the first white man, Munali [Livingstone]. Munali gave Monze a letter and told him that more white men were coming. Monze asked for permission to go to England to seek the Queen’s protection. The white officials said that he was asking for trouble. Monze was arrested and imprisoned for five years.

II
Baiti-lani-na-nzi. Ba ka Congress
Bayanda ku gwasya nyika yokwesu
Icili mu musinze mupati
Sena mula kuyanda kusalala?
Amucilile kasimpe ka Mwami
Mucite mbidi luyando lwakwe.

A mutelele nyonse
Kasimpe ka kwe Jesu
Amuka Kambauke
Kubuntu bako boonse
Tuyanda bantu bali
Mbali Mafukuzela
Why are members of Congress organising themselves? They want to help our country. Our country is still under great Darkness. Do you want to be clean in your hearts? Follow the word of God and do what pleases the Lord.

Listen all of you to the word of God. Go and preach his word to all his people. We want people who are as determined to fight for freedom as Mafukuzela who crossed the great sea to fight for his people.

What shall we do, sons of Africa? Let us all come together and we shall be as strong as cement in our struggle for freedom. Let us work until we succeed.

III

Harry Mwaanga, Nkumbula,
Harry Mwaanga,
Nkumbula Wazumanana, Wazumanana
Mwiingilandi, ngoyu wazyila mwele nyika,
Wazumanana muya makuusa baamba,
Ngilisi, Harry Mwaanga.

Harry Mwaanga, Harry Mwaanga. Nkumbula is fighting our cause in England. Here he comes from the edges of the world. He is not afraid to go to the white man. He is not afraid of the one who speaks English. Harry Nkumbula.