

"IBN TAIMIYA AND HIS PROJECTS OF REFORM"

A T H E S I S

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the University of London.

FACULTY OF ARTS

by

SERAJUL HAQUE

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Ibn Taimiyya and His Projects of Reform

A B S T R A C T

The object of this Thesis is to investigate the views and teachings of Ibn Taimiyya, so far as they can be determined from his works. For convenience of handling, the material is grouped in six chapters, which deal successively with his activities as exegete, traditionist, jurist, social reformer, theologian and philosopher.

In each chapter, after a list of the available treatises of his relevant to the subject, his methods of treatment and doctrinal conclusions are examined, and typical examples adduced. In a final chapter the general character and direction of his teachings are summed up, and a list of his extant works and of the books ascribed to him is added in an appendix.

Although several writers have touched upon Ibn Taimiyya's activities as a precursor of the Wahhābī revival, no systematic examination of his work has previously been made, and the present thesis modifies in several respects the views hitherto expressed as to his doctrines and his position as Islamic reformer.

ABBREVIATIONS AND REFERENCES

(Titles of books and pamphlets quoted once only, are given in full in the foot-notes.)

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- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| Abū Dā'ūd | Sunan Abū Dā'ūd, Cawnpur, 1345-46 A. |
| Aghānī | Abu'l-Faraj al-Isfahānī: Kitāb al-Aghānī, Būlāq, 1284-85 A.H. |
| Aghnides | Nicholas P. Aghnides: Muhammadan Theor of Finance, New York, 1916 A.D. |
| Aḥsan al-Wadī'a | Muhammad Mahdī al-Mūsawī: Aḥsan al-Wadī'a fī tarājim ashhar mashahīr mujtahidī al-Shī'a, Baghdād, 1347-48 A.H. |
| A'lām | Khair al-Dīn al-Zirkilī: A'lām, Cair 1927-28 A.D. |
| Arabic Literature | Prof. H. A. R. Gibb: Arabic Literature, London, 1926 A.D. |

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- Dārimī Musnad Dārimī, on the margin of al-
Muntaqā min akhbār al-Muṣṭafā, Rahmānī
Press, Delhi, 1337 A.H.
- De Boer T.J. De Boer: The History of Philosophy
in Islām, London, 1903 A.D.
- Dic. of Techn.
Terms Muhammad ʿAlī al-Tuḥānawī, Dictionary
of Technical Terms, Calcutta, 1854-62
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Leipzig, 1884 A.D.
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Enc. Islām

Encyclopedia of Islām.

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Farmer

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translated into German, München, 1875

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Al-Fath al-Rabbānī fī tartīb Musnad
al-Imām Aġmad b.Ĥanbal al-Shaibānī w
Bulūġ al-Amānī, Cairo.

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al-Raḥman min anna qul huallāh aḥad ta'
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- J A O S Journal of American Oriental Society.
- J A Journal Asiatique.
- J R A S Journal of Royal Asiatic Society.
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Ris.

Risāla

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Z.D.M.G

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CHAPTER I

TAFSIR

According to Ibn Battūta who personally met Ibn Taimiyya in Damascus, the latter left a complete tafsir of the Qur'an named al-Bahr al-Muhit, composed in the prison of Damascus in forty volumes. ⁽¹⁾ This report is also supported by Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani in his Durar al-Kamina, but unfortunately we know nothing more about this commentary. What we have at our disposal relating to this side of Ibn Taimiyya's activities amounts only to about a dozen small treatises that have come down to us.

The treatises at our disposal are not enough to enable us to form a definite general opinion on his hermeneutics, but it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that his tafsir was aimed against the rationalistic interpretation of Razi and Zamakhshari, the semi-mystical views of al-Ghazali and the mystical explanations of the sufis in general. In his exegesis he also vehemently refutes all the philosophical interpretations of the Jahmites and other minor groups (Hishamiya, Kullabiya and Dirariya) ⁽²⁾

(1) Rihla I, 216, Prof. H.A.R. Gibb, Travels, p. 67.

(2) See Chapter on Philosophy, p. p 183 sq

In refuting the philosophical interpretations he does not seem to be well-equipped as his main arguments for the purpose are :

(a) That such and such interpretations did not exist during the days of the Prophet or his followers.

(b) That the philosophers themselves were not unanimously agreed upon such and such problem.

In a word, he always tries to subordinate ‘aql to naql Traditions that fulfil the conditions of sihha, he accepts for his exegesis but sometimes he gives his own interpretation to a ḥadīth without any regard to the views of other commentators. Where tradition fails him he is not averse to putting forward an interpretation based on the external meaning of the words. Zāhirite he cannot be call

-
- (1) There is a great similarity between the Zāhirite and the Hanbalite doctrines in point of accepting the literal meaning of the Qur’ān and the Sunna. The outstanding difference between the two Schools is that the former does not accept qiyās, analogy, as one of the four principles that determine the recommendations of the Sharī while the latter does. The Zāhirites, as against the Official belief, did not think it necessary to attach themselves to any of the four Schools established by the early Muslims. In other words, they rejected taqlid, blind following and derived their views from the texts independently. The principal representative of the Zāhirites was Ibn Hazm, a theologian of Spain who died 456 A.H.

but still when there is no similar verse in the Qur'ān or relevant tradition in Hadith on which to base the interpretation of a particular verse, he acts as a Zāhirite and accepts the literal meaning.

The General character of Ibn Taimiyya's tafsīr

Ibn Taimiyya's exegesis of the Qur'ān is more homiletic than exegetic. This is perhaps because, as we know from Ibn al-Imād, he obtained his father's position as a Khatīb in the Jāmi' of Damascus where he interpreted the Qur'ān from the pulpit every Friday and took several years to explain the chapter of Nuh.⁽¹⁾ His forty volume commentary was also of this type, in all probability.

The small treatises are:-

1. Tafsīr al. Mu'awwidhatain.⁽²⁾ This is a commentary on the last two chapters of the Qur'ān, Sūras cxiii and cxiv in 6 and 5 verses respectively. In it he argues against certain interpretations of the grammarians, though they have been accepted by such commentators as Zamakhsharī, Ṭabarī etc.

-
1. Qur'ān Sūra lxxi, consisting of twenty nine verses only.
 2. M R K II. 180 - 202.

2. Tafsīr Sūrat al-Ikhlās, Cairo, 1323.

A commentary on Sūra cxii which consists of four verses only. His homiletic tendencies are shown by the fact that he devoted to these four verses 195 pages, whereas Zamakhsharī confined his exposition to 35 lines only and Tabarī to about 6 pages.

3. Tafsīr Sūrat al-Kawthar

(2)

A commentary on Sūra cx in 3 verses.

4. Tafsīr Sūrat al-Nūr, (Cairo, 1343 A.H. in 125 pages). A

commentary on the xxiv th Sūra, consisting of 64 verses, directed against the views of the commentators and the Sūfi in explaining the word Nūr as referring to God. (3)

5. al-Risāla al-'Ubūdiya.

A commentary on the verse يا ايها الناس اعبدوا ربكم Sūra II, 19 in 42 pages, (4) illustrating his mystical tendencies in the description of the grades of haqīqa, reality and fanā fillā

6. Risāla fī darajāt al-yaqīn, (5)

1. See also no 10 on the excellence of this Sūra.

2. An Urdu translation by al-Hilāl Book Agency, Lahore, 1344 A.H.

3. This commentary has also been published on the margin of Jawāmi'al Bayān fī tafsīr al Qur'an. Lith. Delhi, 1294

4. MR pp 2 - 44

5. MRK, II, 146 - 151

A commentary on the expressions Haqq al-yaqīn (Sūra LVI, 95) 'Ain al-yaqīn (Sūra cii,7 and 'Ilm al-yaqīn (Sūra cii,5).

7. Al-Iklīl fi'l-mutashābih wa'l-ta'wīl. ⁽¹⁾ Here he differentiates between ta'wīl, interpretation and tafsīr, explanation and argues that it is the ta'wīl of the equivocal verses that has been forbidden and not their tafsīr.

8. Al-Tibyān fī nuzūl al-Qurān. ⁽²⁾

On the meaning of nuzūl, descent or sending of the Qur'ān in refutation of the Jahmites and the Kullābites who interpreted the word as khalq, creation and i'lām bih, information respectively. In his opinion nuzūl must be understood as is understood by the Arabs, otherwise it might lead to an unlawful conception that the Qur'ān has been revealed in a language other than Arabic.

9. Tafsīr āyat لا اله الا انت سبحانك انى كنت من الظالمين Sūra xxi,87.

Here he tells us that faith in the oneness of God and confession of sin committed are the hikma, significance of the forgiveness of God. ⁽³⁾

1. M.R.K, II,2-35.

2. Ibid,218-230

3. This occurs in his Majmū'at Fatawā,II,256-303. See Appendix A, No.58.

10. Kitāb Jawāb ahl al-‘ilm wa'l-īmān bi taḥqīq mā akhbara bihi Rasūl al-Rahmān anna qul hu allāh aḥad ta'dil thuluth al-Qur'ān, Cairo, 1329. Berl. No. 2435. On the excellence of the Sūrat al-Ikhlās mentioned above. Here he argues that a reading of this chapter of the Qur'ān is equal to one third of the whole book in merit. He devotes 205 pages to this topic.

11. Risāla Unzila al-Qur'ān 'alā Sab'at aḥruf, in Khams rasā'il Nādira, Cairo undated. A treatise on the saying of the Prophet انزل القرآن على سبعة احرف in which he argues that the seven canonical readings are not identical with the aḥruf in which the Qur'ān is said to have been revealed.

12. Risāla fī Sujūd al-Qur'ān ⁽¹⁾ Berl. No. 3570.

A treatise on Sajda, prostration that must be observed after reciting certain verses of the Qur'ān.

Criticism of the Grammarians We are told that Ibn Taimiyya studied the Grammar of Sībawaih (d. 177/ 793) and mastered the system of Arabic syntax. ⁽²⁾ But according to 'Asqalānī (d. 852/ 1448) he strongly disapproved of the Grammar and its author, and so he incurred the displeasure

1. This has not yet been published and could not be consulted.

2. Fawāt. I, 36, 1.4

of his contemporary Abū Haiyān. In the course of his discussion with Abū Haiyān on Sibawaih's Grammar he made the following remark. "Sibawaih was not the Prophet of Syntax nor was he infallible. He committed eighty mistakes in his book which are not intelligible to you."⁽¹⁾ "Asqalānī states further that Ibn Taimiyya severely criticised Sibawaih in his Commentary al-Bahr,⁽²⁾ but since this work has not come down to us, the exact nature of this criticism remains unknown. However from a study of the fragments of his commentary that are at our disposal we find that Ibn Taimiyya is not averse to accepting an explanation offered by a grammarian in regard to a Qur'anic verse when it coincides with his own interpretation. Thus in conformity with Tabarī⁽³⁾ (d.310/922) and Zamakhsharī⁽⁴⁾ (d.538/1143) Ibn Taimiyya interprets the word falaq⁽⁵⁾ in the meaning of maflū a thing opened, just as qabḍ has the meaning of maqḍū, and cites the opinion of the grammarian al-Zajjāj⁽⁶⁾ (d.311/923

1. Durar I.153

2. Ibid

3. Tabarī, Tafsir xxx, 225

4. Kashshaf II, 1644

5. Qur'an, Sura ciif, 1.

6. Ibrāhīm b.Sarī b.Sahl, Abū Ishāq al-Zajjāj. See Suyūṭī. Bughya p 179 sq.

who said, "When you think over the creation, it will appear to you that most of the things emerge by infālāq, splitting such as vegetables from the earth and water from the clouds. In conformity also with both Jabarī and Zamakhsharī, Ibn Taimīya cites an Arab proverb هذا ابيض من فلق الصبح و فلق الصبح "This is clearer than the splitting or spreading of the dawn. At the same time he definitely disapproves, though without mentioning their names, the interpretations of the above two authorities when he rejects the interpretation of Jabarī⁽³⁾ and Zamakhsharī⁽⁴⁾ who said on the authority of a tradition narrated by Abū Huraira that the word falaq may also mean a name in Hell or a poison in it.

When, therefore, the opinion of a grammarian does not coincide with his own view, he rejects it altogether. His principle in doing so seems to be what has been laid down by him in his book al-furqān⁽⁵⁾ that when the Prophet's own interpretation is available philology etc. should totally be

1. M R K, II, 180, 1.8

2. Jabarī xxx, 225. Kashshāf II, 1644. M R K, II, 180

3. xxx, 226

4. Kashshāf II, 1644

5. Furqān H.B. p.19 (M R K I, 19)

disregarded in explaining a tradition or a verse of the Qur'an. This is why, he adds, the fukahā, (the learned linguists) divided nouns into three groups:-

- (i) Some are defined by the sharī'a such as salāt and zakāt.
- (ii) Some are defined by luḡha, philology such as shams and qamar
- (iii) Some are defined by 'urf, social custom such as qabd, acceptance in transactions.

The following example illustrates his method in detail. In sūrat al-nās, Farra (d.207/822) and Zajjāj gave two different explanations of the grammatical construction of the verses:-
(1)

بِسْمِ شَرِّ الْوَسْوَاسِ الْخَنَّاسِ الَّذِي يُوَسْوِسُ فِي صُدُورِ النَّاسِ مِنَ الْجِنَّةِ وَالنَّاسِ

Farra is of opinion that بِسْمِ الْجِنَّةِ وَالنَّاسِ is bayān of al-nās in بِسْمِ شَرِّ الْوَسْوَاسِ and that the meaning is therefore:
اعوذ من شر الوسواس الذي يوسوس في صدور الناس الطائفتين من الجنة والناس

i.e. I seek protection of God...."from the evil of waswas, devils who give evil suggestions to the hearts of man who are of two kinds namely jinn and men." Here nās, in his opinion, has been applied to jinn as in the verse
(2)

1. Sūra civ, 4 - 6

2. M-R-K Sūra lxxii, 6

وانه رجال من الناس يعوذون برجال من الناس "and that person

from among men seeking protection through some persons from among jinn" Here Farrā takes both jinn and men as nās just as in two other verses (Sūra lxxii.I, xlvii, 28) they have been called nafar, (people, company of men) which suggests that the word nās can be used both for men and jinn.⁽¹⁾

The above interpretation of Farrā, though approved by Tabarī as well as by Zamakhsharī,⁽²⁾ is rejected by Ibn Taimiy⁽³⁾ on three grounds.

(a) The word al-nās is so clear and evident in its meaning (i.e. applied to human being) and it has been used so many times in the Qur'an that it does not stand in need of any explanation or classification, such as has been given by Farrā.

(b) Granted that Farrā is right, the words من الجنّة والناس would be an explanation of the word waswas which would then mean that satans give evil suggestions to the hearts of men and jinn, but as a matter of fact nobody knows if the satans give evil suggestions to the jinn and tradition is silent about it.

1. M R K, II, 185

2. xxx, 229, 1.17

3. Kashshaf II, 1642

(c) How can the word al-nās include both men and jinn? How can a thing be a part of a thing from which it has been distinctly separated? That is, according to Farrā's interpretation, the word al-nās becomes a qasim (a thing distinctly opposed to) of al-jinn, and again he takes the word jinn as a nū', species of al-nās. This/exactly like an absurd expression أكرم العرب بمن العجم والعرب (honour the Arabs ~~for~~ the from the Arab and the 'ajam, non-Arabs). (1) That the Qur'an has applied the term rijāl both to men and jinn equally is not a proof that nās has been applied to both of them. Again, it is only with some taqīd, limitation that sometimes nās is applied to jinn, such as (Some persons from among the jinn came) but one cannot say جاء ناس and mean thereby that some jinn came. (2) According to Zajjāj the construction of the sentence أعوذ من شر الوسواس الذي هو الجنة ومن شر الناس That is, he takes الجنة as bayān of waswās and al-nās as ma'tūf to waswās. It then means: I seek protection (i) from the evil of the waswās who is a jinn, and (ii) from the evil of men.

1. M R K. II. 185

2. Ibid

3. M R K. II. 186

Ibn Taimiya disapproves the above construction also for the following reasons.

(a) The evil caused by jinn is greater than the evil caused by men. There is no reason why men should ask protection of God from the evil of all men and not from the evil of all jinn.

(b) waswasa comes from both men and jinn. Why should men seek protection of God from the waswasa of jinn and not from that of men?

(c) When there exist two nouns before the ma'tūf it is preferable to take the nearer one as ma'tūf 'alaih provided that there is no proof against it. Therefore here it is preferable to take al-jinn the nearer noun and al-nās as its ma'tūf 'alaih and not al-waswas which is separated from it.

Now the construction of the sentences, according to Ibn Taimiya, is that بِالناس والجن is bayan to waswas and the meaning is as follows: اعوذ... به شر الوساوس الخناس التي

أعوذ... من الجن والناس 'I seek protection from the evil of satans from among jinn and men who whisper into the heart of men. In support of his opinion he cites the following verse:⁽¹⁾

1. Sūra vi, 112

وكذلك جعلنا لكل نبي عدوا شياطين الانس والجن يوم ننفخهم الى الوغى
 "Thus have we given an enemy to every Prophet - satans among men and among jinn; tinsel discourses do they suggest one to another in order to deceive."

يوسوس in the above verse he takes as يوسوس and that satans are of two kinds - satans from men and satans from jinn both of whom give evil suggestions to the hearts of men from which people have been asked to seek refuge in God. He moreover concludes from it that it is not necessary that the satans should be visible at the time of wagwasa. On the contrary he cites the Qur'anic verses (1) and a saying of the Prophet (2) in his argument that the satans may be visible on some occasions in human forms. He further maintains that no one is free from wagwasa and even the Prophet himself was subject to it though it had no effect upon him. (3)

1. Sura VIII, 50; lix. 16

2. M R K, II, 184

عن ابي ذر: قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم: شياطين الانس والجن تلت اولادنا من شياطين قال نعم - شر من شياطين الجن *

3.

عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: ما منكم من احد الا وقد وكل به قيين من اللاتة وقينته من الجن فقالوا يا اباك يا رسول الله قال واياي صلى الله عليه وسلم وفي رواية فلا يا من الا بخير *

M R K, II. 84

His independence in interpretation Influences of other commentators are not easily traceable in his commentary. He writes as has been pointed out in a homiletic manner and ve seldom acknowledges the authority of any commentator. In one place he expresses his opinion, probably because he was the beginning an adherent of the Hanbalite School, that the commentaries of the Imām Ahmad and Ishāq b. Rahawaih⁽¹⁾ are the best.⁽²⁾ Among other commentaries he sometimes approves of Tabarī, for he appreciates Tabarī's ingenuity in sifting traditions transmitted through Kalbī and Abū Ṣālih from Ibn 'Abbās, most of which in his opinion were spurious. He warns his readers not to go through the commentaries left by Muqātil and Kalbī or by his predecessors, Baqī b. Muhammed al-Andulusī,⁽³⁾ 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Ibrāhīm al-shāmī and 'Abd al-Hamid al-Kashshī etc.⁽⁴⁾ Towards the commentary of Zamakhsharī he seems to have had no such regard. For exam

1. Abū Ya'qūb Ishāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Tamīmī, a tābi'ī d. 238/852. For his biography see Ta'rikh B. vol. VI. 345.

Wafayāt I. 264

2. Al-Nūr. p. 121.

3. It is probably Baqī b. Mukhāllad

4. Al-Nūr. p. 121

in explaining the word ghāsiq in the verse ⁽¹⁾ بِسْمِ شَرِغَاسِقٍ إِزْأَوْقِبِ
 Zamakhsharī says, among other things, the word may also mean ⁽²⁾
 the moon when it enters into eclipse and becomes dark.
 Zamakhsharī bases his interpretation on a tradition that once
 the Prophet seized 'Āi shā's hand and said: تَوَدَّى بِاللَّهِ مِنْ شَرِّهَا
فَانَهُ الْغَاسِقِ إِزْأَوْقِبِ which (according to Zamakhsharī) means, "seek
 protection of God (O. 'Āi sha) from the evil of this moon,
 because it is al-ghāsiq when it falls into eclipse." Ibn
 Taimiyya who accepts the authenticity of this tradition, does
 not agree with Zamakhsharī's interpretation. The difference
 between their opinions is as follows.

Ibn Taimiyya interprets the word ghāsiq in the meaning of
 moon and waqub in the meaning of spreading its light over the
 world, because the Prophet, in his opinion, asked 'Āi sha to
 seek protection of God from the evil of the moon when it
 spread its light and not when it was in eclipse, ⁽³⁾ whereas
 Zamakhsharī takes ghāsiq as the moon and waqub as entering
 into eclipse. ⁽⁴⁾

Neither Ibn Taimiyya nor Zamakhsharī gives any direct
 evidence for their assertions in support of their inter-

1. Sūra ciii, 3

2. Kashshaf II. 1644

3. M R K. II. 181

4. Kashshaf II, 1644.

pretation of this particular tradition. Both of them draw their conclusions from their individual explanation.

On occasions, however, he also criticises Tabarī's commentary. Thus in accordance with a saying of Ibn 'Abbās Tabarī explains ⁽¹⁾ the word nūr in the light verse ⁽²⁾ as "guide of the inhabitants of the Heavens and Earth", but Ibn Taimiyya rejects this interpretation on two grounds.

(a) This tradition is da'if, weak and not accepted by the early Muslims.

(b) Had it meant guide, there would be no necessity for the word Hādī referring to God to be repeated in the Qur'ān. ⁽³⁾

Ibn Taimiyya further rejects the views of the 'ārifūn, saints who held that nūr here means the light of the heart of the Sādiqūn, those who attained to sainthood after fulfilling the orders of the Sharī'a, for in his opinion whatever has been handed down by the saints in this connection is nothing but empty homiletic expressions. Abū 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Sulamī often related such reports some of which are fair and

1. xviii, 105, 1.2.

2. Sūra xxiv, 35

3. al-Nūr. p.111

(1)
some false.

The opinion of Ibn Taimiyya in this connection is that it is not obligatory to give an interpretation of the word nūr in the verse referred to above, because the general body of the Muslims, the Scholastics, the jurists and the sufis did not offer any explanation of the word. Abū Sa'īd b. Kullāb, a forerunner of the Ash'arites held this view and opposed the attempt of the Jahmites to interpret it. Abū Bakr b. Fūrak, ⁽²⁾ he adds, related this in his book of the Maqālāt of Ibn Kullāb and Ash'arī. ⁽³⁾

Tirmidhī and Ibn Māja report that al-nūr is one of the beautiful names (asmā' ul husnā) of God, but this too he considers a mistake. The above narrative of Tirmidhī and Ibn Māja is not derived from the Prophet himself, but from some of his followers and cannot be relied upon. ⁽⁴⁾ Again al-nūr must not be taken as opposed to al-yulma, darkness, as God is mu nazzah, free from being called by an antonym.

1. al-Nūr p.112

2. Abū Bakr Muhammad b. Hasan, d.416/1025. See Wafayāt, II, 279. He was a prominent Mu'tazilite. See also Brockelmann, suppl. p.277

3. al-Nūr. p.114

4. al-Nūr. p.114

5. Ibid. p.118

It is, however, remarkable that Ibn Taimiyya does not refer to Ghazālī's view that it is quite possible to give a symbolic interpretation of the word nūr here. "The real light" say Ghazālī, "is Allāh; and the name 'light' is otherwise only predicated metaphorically and conveys no real meaning."⁽¹⁾

In commenting on numerous other passages, Ibn Taimiyya combats several popular or accepted views, and puts forward his own interpretation. Some typical examples may be quoted here.

(1) He does not accept the view of those who profess that Muslims are originally just.⁽²⁾ In his opinion the children of Adam are all originally unjust and ignorant, as it is stated in the Qur'ān⁽³⁾ *انه كان ظلوما جهولا* The mere utterance of the Shahādātāin⁽⁴⁾ does not turn men from injustice and ignorance.⁽⁵⁾

(2) The meaning of qasas in *نحن نقص عليك احسن القصص*⁽⁶⁾

1. Gairdner. p.45 - 52

2. Ibn Taimiyya does not mention against whom it is directed. Most probably they are the Murji'ites.

3. Sūra xxxiii, 72

4. *لا اله الا الله* and *محمد رسول الله*

5. Ikhlas. p.64

6. Sūra xii, 3.

Here Ibn Taimiyya does not object to the view of the grammarian Zajjāj who says that qasas here stands as masdar, infinitive. In his opinion it is a noun with the meaning of khobar, naba' or hadith. He points out that some unlettered men have wrongly taken the word as plural qissa whereas in that case it ought to have been qisas and not qasas. Certain commentators have foolishly mentioned this wrong version in their books and have endeavoured to justify it in various ways, but without avail. Ibn Taimiyya cannot allow that the Qur'an consists of qissa, fables. He, therefore, explains that ^{من القصص} (1) does not mean that the chapter of Yusuf is the best of the stories in the Qur'an, rather it is the best of all ikhbar (information) that has not been mentioned therein, for Joseph's story cannot be compared to the stories of Moses, Noah, Abraham, etc. who were far superior (2) to Joseph in excellence.

(3) The Beautiful names are not restricted to ninety nine alone as is generally understood by the Muslims. The number ninety nine indicates an unlimited number. The Prophet never confined them to that number. (3)

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1. Sura xii
 2. Jawab.ppl5-19
 3. al-Nur, p.116

(4) The Qur'ān says in several places ⁽¹⁾ that the Heaven and the earth and whatever is between them were created in six days. Tradition says that Adam was created last of all on Friday which indicates that the creation began on Sunday. But on account of a wrong report from Imām Muslim it is generally believed that the earth was created ⁽²⁾ on Saturday.

(5) Some people are of the opinion that in the verse ⁽³⁾
 ما تقدم من ذنبك ليغفر الله ما تقدم من ذنبك وما تأخر
 mean the sin committed by Adam and the words ما تأخر mean the sin that will be committed by the followers of the Prophet. But this explanation cannot stand for the following reasons.

(i) According to the mufasssirūn and the muhaddithūn this verse was revealed at the time of the truce of Hudaibiya but the sin of Adam, as is known, was forgiven long long before this incident

(ii) Adam himself was a Prophet and those who believe in the impeccability ('isma) of the prophets, do not

1. Sūra xxv, 60; xxxii, 3, 1.37

2. Ikhlas. p.16 sq. Wasila. p.81.

M F, V (Bughya) p.48 sqq.

3. Sūra xlviii. 2

distinguish in this matter between Adam and Muhammad.

(iii) The Qur'an declares in several places that no one will be held responsible for the sin of another; ⁽¹⁾ how then can the sins of Adam or of the followers of Muhammad be forgiven to Muhammad?

(iv) It is stated in a genuine tradition that when the verse was revealed the companions asked the Prophet, "This is for you, but what is for us?" Consequently the following verse was revealed. "That He may bring the believing men and the believing women into gardens ⁽²⁾ beneath whose trees the rivers flow."

(v) It is certain that there is no evidence that God has forgiven the sins of all followers of Muhammad. How absurd it is to argue that the words ⁽³⁾ ما تأخروا عن ذنوبك mean that their sins have been atoned for.

The foregoing arguments of Ibn Taimiyya clearly show that he is against the accepted doctrine of the sinlessness

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1. Sūra vi, 164; xvii, 16; xxxv, 19; xxix, 9; liii, 39.
 2. Sūra xlviii, 5
 - 3, Karīma, p.100 sqq.

(isma) of the Prophets ⁽¹⁾ and his argument No IV indicates that he is also against the creed of the Muslim community that Prophet Muhammad was impeccable.

(6) That the verse ⁽²⁾ الزاني لا ينكح الزانية was abrogated by the verse ⁽³⁾ والمحصنات من النساء is a false conception.

Similarly those who interpret the words ينكح in the above verse as referring to sexual intercourse are wrong.

What is exactly meant by the verse is that no mu'min (believing man), can marry a woman guilty of fornication and no believing woman can marry a man guilty of the same.

If they do so, he or she will be guilty of fornication, because it is the niya, intention that counts and not the fi'l, action. When he or she does not disapprove the forbidden action of his or her consort, it is as if they

are both guilty of it, and both will be responsible for it.

In support of this Ibn Taimiya quotes two traditions from certain companions whose names he does not mention here.

1. Abu Hanifa says in his Fiqh Akbar I; والانبياء علم كلام منزهون p.22. See also عن الصنائع والكنائس والكفر والقبائح وكانت منهم زلات al-Fisal, IV, 2 - 25, Taftazani. p.136 and Ali-al-Qari p.25 sqq. This dogma seems to be a later development in the Muslim community with differences of opinion as to

the precise extent of the idea. See Wensinek. Creed., 217 - 218

2. Sura xxiv. 3
3. Sura iv. 28

(a) من غاب عن معصية فرضها كان كمن شهدها أو فعلها

One who is absent when a sin is committed, but condones it, is as one who witnesses it or does it.

(b) المرء على دين أخيه (1) A man is judged by the company he keeps.

(7) The Seven Ahruf and the canonical readings. In his risāla Unzila al-Qurʿān ʿalā Sabʿat ahruf, (2) Ibn Taimīya points out that the seven canonical readings of the Qurʿān are not identical with the seven ahruf in which the Qurʿān is said to have been revealed according to the saying of the saying of the Prophet انزل القرآن على سبعة احرف

The first to collect the seven readings was Abū Bakr b. Mujāhid who flourished during the first part of the 3rd century A.H. at Baghdād. The motive that actuated him to do this was to collect the popular readings of the five cities, namely Mecca, Medīna, Syria and the two parts of Mesopotamia, where knowledge of the Qurʿān and tradition developed, and he made these equal to the number of the seven ahruf mentioned above in the tradition. Neither Mujāhid nor anybody else ever considered them to be identical with the seven ahruf. On the other hand, these seven readings are not the only readings. For example, one ma

1. For both the traditions see al-Nūr. p.28

2. Printed in Khams Rasā'il Nādīra, Cairo undated

prefer the reading of Ya'qūb al-Khadramī who was not one of the seven qurrā, to the reading of Hamzah whā was one of them. (1)

Ibn Taimīya however does not furnish us with the seven exact readings of the Qur'an. He simply gives us a few instances of the variant readings saying that they are like اقبل - علم - تعال etc. which do not contradict one another in meaning. Sometimes, he adds, one reading does not convey the meaning of the other, but in that case both the readings can be conveniently fitted there in, such as عزير احليما - عفور احيا provided that a verse of rahma (mercy) be not replaced by a verse of 'adhāb, punishment.

Scientific and Biological Interpretations

In interpreting the verse (2) لم يلد ولم يولد Ibn Taimīya maintains that any sort of creation needs the cooperation of two principles. The fire that is generated by the friction of two flints is the resultant of the two acting together, in other words, the joint-product of the two. One who conjectures, for instance, that the air that exists between t

-
1. Ibid. p.44 sq.
 2. Ibid. p.44. sq.
 3. Sūra, cxii, 3

two flints turns into fire owing to its heat without any mādda, matter coming out from them, is wrong. Fire cannot be produced unless there be some matter issuing from the two flints by friction. Besides, friction itself cannot produce fire. It is the tinder placed under the flints that catches fire and whatever issues as the result of the friction must be a heavy substance which goes down and creates fire in the tinder. Had it been the air that brings fire it would naturally go upwards and not downwards. Similarly trees do not originally possess any fruit in them. The fruit is the result of the association of two matters one from within and the other from outside. i.e. from another tree. (1)

Further the whole animal kingdom may be classified into two broad divisions (i) حيوان متولد animals produced through couples and (ii) حيوان متولد (2) animals produced from water, fruits, vinegar etc.

Moreover not only the creation of a'yan but also the creation of a'rād, accidents and sifāt, qualities depend on the association of two principles, corresponding to male and female. (3)

1. Ikhlas. p.24

2. Ibid. p.21

3. Ibid. p.40. 1.17

The Mutashābihāt and the pseudo-principles of the Jahmites.

In regard to the mutashābihāt, equivocal verses of the Qur' Ibn Taimiyya is of opinion that it is allowed to call certain verses mutashābihāt only when they appear to contradict other verses of clear meaning but not when they contradict expressions coined by any group of persons. The Jahmites, the Qadarites, the philosophers, the esoterics and all those who followed them, invented certain words and expressions, both affirmative and negative, as infallible principles which they held, must be believed and on which they constructed their systems. With the help of these pseudo-principles they interpreted the Qur'an and the Sunna as far as they could leaving out the interpretation of the texts that seemed to them ambiguous. (1)

According to a report handed down through the pious ancestors and the companions, some are of opinion that there is a full stop (وقف تام) after the words (2) وما يعلم تأويله إلا الله which means that nobody except God knows the interpretations of the mutashābihāt verses. Even the Prophet and Gabriel were ignorant of it. (3) Among the later Scholastics Abu'l Ma'ālī

1. Ikhlas, p.63 sq.

2. Sūra III,5.

3. Ikhlas, p.98

4. d.478/1085, teacher of al-Ghazālī. See Ibn al-Athīr X,95, Brockelmann, I,388.

in his later years and Ibn 'Aqīl⁽¹⁾ in many of his books, did not attempt to interpret the mutashābihāt though two other theologians, namely Abū Muhammad b. Kullāb and Abū 'l Hasan b. Zāghūnī argued for the 'Uluw of God and called it an intellectual attribute⁽²⁾ صفة عقلية

Despite his acknowledgement of the mutashābihāt Ibn Taimiyya emphasises that there is nothing in the Qur'an that goes against reason and perception عقل وحسب. The difficulty that arises in explaining these mutashābihāt is relative one. The Qur'an is شفاء للصدور 'cure for the hearts' and it cannot be contrary to reason although in some specific points the mysteries of prophecy (أسرار النبوة) remain hidden from human reason and thereby people fall into doubts and misgivings out of which came polytheism and other dissensions.⁽³⁾

Moral and Ethical value of the Qur'an. Finally it should be observed that unlike Baidāwī (d.691/1291) who always quotes some tradition, genuine or apocryphal, at the end of each chapter, Ibn Taimiyya tries to find out some moral and ethical value in the chapters of the Qur'an

1. d 513/1119 A mu'tazilite of Baghdād.

2. Ikhlas. p.100

3. Ibid. p.64

In sūrat al-mu'awwidhatain God teaches men how to invoke His assistance for removing the external and internal evils that beset them. Sūrat al-Falaq directs them how to believe in rabb al-Falaq, the Lord of the dawn, who brings out the bright morning from the dark night and, consequently, is powerful to protect them from all external evils that overtake them like the darkness. Sūrat al-nās teaches them that God is رب الناس the Lord of all men, ملك الناس King of all men and الله الناس the God of all men who alone can rescue them from all evils arising from themselves through the evil suggestions of the devils. ⁽¹⁾

Sūrat al-Kawthar he considers to be a prophecy of the destruction of the enemies (the heathen Arabs) of the Prophet. Amongst the enemies of the Prophet he includes those Muslims who dislike any of the rites of the Prophet or abandon them for the sake of pleasing their leaders, Shaikhs, etc. The Muslims who prefer musical instruments to the recitation of the Qur'an are also among the enemies of the Prophet. ⁽²⁾ The Sūra, he adds, suggests that ibādat, worship, is of two kinds (a) Relating to the body (badanī) and (b) relating to property (mālī) The former is prayer (ṣalāt) and the latter nusuk.

1. M R K, II, 182 sq.

2. al-Kawthar p.26 sq.

sacrifice of animals in the name of God. These two ⁽¹⁾ ibādā are the best of all means of approaching God.

Like other mufassirūn, Ibn Taimiyya considers the Sūrat al-ikh̄lās as one third of the whole Qur'an in merit. On this topic he left a book

كتاب جواب اهل العلم والايان بتحقيق ما اخبر به رسول الرحمن من ان قل هو الله احد تعدل ثلث القران

(2) consisting of 206 pages. Here

quotes the opinion of Qādī 'Iyād, al-Māzarī (ʿAbd allāh) and others who held this view. (3) That a reading of this Sūra is

equal to the reading of one third of the Qur'an is testified by traditions narrated both by Bukhārī and Muslim, (4) and this

is because, he maintains, the Qur'an has been divided by God into three divisions. (i) Ahkāmī, injunctions, (ii) al-wa'

wa'l wa'id, promises and threats, (iii) al-asmā wa'l-sifāt (5) names and attributes. This sūra contains the third. In

this ^{conclusion} point Ibn Taimiyya disapproves of Ghazālī's view that the Qur'an may be divided into six parts, three of which are

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1. Ibid. p.34 sq.
 2. Cairo 1325.A.H.
 3. Jawāb p.121.
 4. Ibid. p.3
 5. Ibid. p.9

muhimma, important and the rest tawābi, complementary, sūrat al-ikh̄lās belonging to the first group. Ibn Taimiyya gives two reasons for his own view. 1. Ghazālī's opinion contradicts the authentic tradition narrated by Bukhārī and Muslim. 2. "The Qur'ān is Kalām, speech which may reasonably be divided into three classes, namely about (i) the creator, (ii) the created and (iii) creation. (1)

In addition to the examples of Ibn Taimiyya's method of interpretation discussed under the foregoing heads, it should be noted that many of his views on points of law, philosophy etc, and of his refutation of what he holds to be heretical views are based upon his exegesis of the relevant passages in the Qur'ān. These will be discussed in the appropriate chapters.

1. Jawāb. p.120

CHAPTER II

HADITH

كل حديث لا يعرفه ابن تيمية فليس بحديث

"Every tradition that is not known to Ibn Taimiyya is no tradition", was a remark made by Dhahabi⁽¹⁾ in regard to Ibn Taimiyya's vast knowledge of tradition. In fact all his books and pamphlets are full of hadiths, and it would be no exaggeration to say that if all his writings were sifted and classified, the traditions he quotes would form the major part of them.

In view of this it seems strange that, except for a few rasā'il, Ibn Taimiyya has left no book on or about tradition. His grandfather 'Abd al-Salām Ibn Taimiyya made a collection named al-Muntaqā min Akhbār al-Mustafā⁽²⁾ in which he selected traditions from Bukhārī, Muslim, Tirmidhī, Ibn Māja and the Musnad of Ahmad b. Hanbal. Our author, however, may have thought it unnecessary to make any separate collection since all oral traditions had already been committed to writing. He, therefore, engaged in criticism of the narrators and the narrations, and utilised the traditions which he regarded authentic for the purpose of enjoining religious observance.

1. Fawāt, I, 38. 1.23. Shadharāt, vi, 82, 1.19

2. Rahmāniya Press, Delhi, 1337 A.H.
It contains 336 pages.

The following short treatises written by him deal with hadīth or the science of its interpretation.

1. Arba'una Hadīthan. pp 39.
~~Published by Muhibb al-Din al-Khatīb, Cairo, 1341 A.H.~~
2. Al-Kalim al-Taiyib pp.99, Cairo, 1349 A.H.
3. Risāla fi l-Kalām 'Ala al-qussas
 Majmū'at Rasā'il al-Kubrā, II, 336 - 344
4. Risāla fi'l Kalām 'ala al-Fitra, M R K II, 317 - 334
5. Raf'al malām 'an al- a'imma al-A'lām
 (1)
 Majmū'at Rasā'il pp 55 - 83

In addition to the above treatises he left a few other small pamphlets devoted to the interpretation of the Prophe sayings:- (a) انزل القرآن على سبعة احرف (b) تشد الرجال الا
 (c) الى ثلثة ساجد etc. which do not concern u here, because they deal either with the exegesis of the Qur or with Theology, religious custom, etc. Further his risā Khilāf al-Umma fi'l-ibādāt, (Cairo, 1347, pp 6 - 30) con- tributes something to his treatment of hadīth.

Shaikhs and Teachers of Ibn Taimiyya. Before entering a discussion of Ibn Taimiyya's treatises on tradition and hi

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1. This is separate from the Majmū'a mentioned in No. 3.
 It has been edited by Sayyid Muhammad Badr al-Dīn,
 Cairo, 1323, A.H.

treatment of the traditionists, some mention should be made of the teachers with whom he studied hadith and from whom he narrated.

According to al-Kutubī he studied hadith under more than two hundred Shaikhs, but al-Kutubī mentions only sixteen of them in his Fawāt.⁽¹⁾ Al-ʿAsqalānī mentions five⁽²⁾ and Ibn al-ʿImād six.⁽³⁾ From Ibn Taimiyya's own statement in his Arbaʿūna Hadithān,⁽⁴⁾ however, it appears that his Shaikhs were more than forty in number, though far less than the exaggerated number of al-Kutubī.

The following list contains the names of all the shaikh mentioned in the Arbaʿūn.

(Names arranged according to the serial number of tradition. Dates of hearing the tradition as supplied by himself have been noted after each serial number.)

1. 667 A.H. Zain al-Dīn Abu'l ʿAbbās Ahmad b. ʿAbd al-Dāʿim.⁽⁵⁾
b. 575, d. 668.

1. Fawāt I, 35

2. Durar I, 144

3. Shadharāt VI, 80

4. See the asnad of the Arbaʿūn mentioned above

5. Fawāt, I, 46. s.v. Ibn ʿAbd al-Dāʿim al-Maqdisī

2. 667 A.H. Kamāl al-Dīn Abū Naṣr ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd al Nuṣʿim b. al-Khidr b. Shibl b. ʿAbd al-Harīth
(1)
b.589. d.672
3. " Taqī al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Ismāʿīl b. Ibrāhīm
(2)
b. Abī'l-Yusr al-Janūkhī, b. 589- d.672.
4. " Saif al-Dīn Abū Zakariya Yahya b. ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān b.Najm b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Hanbalī,
(3)
b.592.d.672.
5. " Abū Muḥammad Abū Bakr b.Muḥammad b.Abī Bakr b.
(4)
ʿAbd al-Wāsiʿ al-Harawī, b.594,d.673.
6. 669 Zain al Dīn Abū-l ʿAbbās al Muʿammal b.Muḥammad
b. ʿAlī b.Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Maṣṣūr b. al-Muʿamm
al Bālisī b.602, d.677
(5)
7. " Raḥīd al Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b.Abī Bakr
Muḥammad b.Muḥammad b.Sulaimān al-ʿAmirī.
(6)
d.682

1. Shadharāt V, 338

2. Ibid, V, 338, Fawāt, I, 12 sq. He is known as "Musnid al Shām."

3. Shadharāt V,340

4. Arbaʿūn p.10

5. Shadharāt V, 360

6. Ibid. V.381.

8. 668 A.H. Kamāl al Din Abū Zakariya Yahya b. Abī Mansūr
b. Abī l Fath b. Rāfi⁽¹⁾ b. 'Alī al Harranī b. al-
Sairafi. d.678.
9. " Jamal al-Din Abū l Faraj 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Sulaf
b. Sa'id b. Saulaimān al Baghdādī b.585, d.670
10. 675 Sharaf al-Din Abū 'Abd allāh Muhammad b. 'Abd
al Mun'im b. 'Umar b. 'Abd allāh b. Ghadir b. al-
Qawwās al Tā'ī b.612, d.682. ⁽³⁾
11. " (a) Abū 'Abd allāh Muhammad b. Badr b. Muhammad
b. Ya'ish al-Jazari, d.675 ⁽⁴⁾
(b) Zainab bint Ahmad (see No.40)
12. " Zainal Din Abū Ishaq Ibrahim b. Ahmad b. Abī l-
Faraj b. Abī Tahir b. Muhammad b. Nasr known as
Ibn al-sadiid al-Ansari al-Hanafi, d.677 ⁽⁵⁾
13. 674 Kamāl al Din Abū Ishaq Ibrahim b. Ahmad b. Isma
b. Faris al-Tamimi al Sa'di b.596, d.676 ⁽⁶⁾

1. Shadharāt V.373

2. Ibid. V. 332

3. Ibid. V. 380

4. Arba'un p.14

5. Manhal No 7

6. Arb'un p.16

14. 675 A.H. Zain al-Din Abu'l 'Abbās Ahmad b. Abi'l-Khair Salama b. Ibrahim b. Salama b. al-Haddād al-Dimishqī b.609, d.678⁽¹⁾
15. 677 (a) Amin al Din Abu Muhammad al Qasim b. Abi Bakr b. Qasim b. Ghanima al-Irbili, b.595, d.680⁽²⁾
(b) Abu Bakr b. Umar al-Mizzi al Hanafi⁽³⁾
b. 593, d.680.
16. 667 Shams al Din Abu Muhammad Abd allah b. Muhammad b. 'Uta b. Hasan al-Hanafi (a pupil of Ibn Tabar zad)⁽⁴⁾ b. 595, d.673.
17. " Qadi al-Qudat Shams al-Din Abu Muhammad Abd al Rahman b Abi Umar Muhammad b Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Qudama al-Maqdisi, al Hanbali⁽⁵⁾
b. 597, d.682
18. " Majd al-Din Abu Abdallah Muhammad b. Isma'il b. 'Uthman b. al-Muzaffar b. Hibat allah b. 'Asa al Dimishqī b.587, d.669⁽⁶⁾

1. Shadharat V, 360

2. Ibid. V. 367

3. Ibid V, 370

4. Ibid V, 340

5. Manhal 1386, Brockelmann I, 399

Shadharat V, 373

6. Ibid. V, 331

19. 680 A.H. Shams al-Dīn Abū Ghānā'im al Muslim b. Muḥammad
b. Muslim b. 'Allān al Qaisī, b, 594, d.680 (1)
20. 676 'Imād al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad 'Abd al-Rahīm b Abī'l
ṣighar b. al-Saiyid b. Sā'igh al Ansārī
(2)
d. 689
21. 680 Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b Ismā'īl b. Ibrāhīm b. Yahyā
b. 'Alawī b. Al-Husain al Darajī al Qurashī
(3)
b.599, d.681
22. Najīb al Dīn Abū'l Murhaf al-Miqdād b. Abī
Qāsim Hibatallāh b. al Miqdād b. Abī al-Qaisī
(4)
b.600, d.681
23. 682 Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad b. 'Amīr b. Abī Bakr
(5)
al Ghasūlī d.684
24. 681 Fakhr al Dīn Abū'l Hasan 'Alī b. Ahmad b. 'Abd al-
Wahid b. Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Ismā'īl
b. Mansūr b. al-Bukhārī al Maqdisī,
(6)
b. 596. d.690

1. Shadharāt V, 368

2. Arba'ūn P 21.

3. Shadharāt, V, 383

4. Ibid. V. 383 (Date of hearing not given)

5. Arba'ūn p.24.

6. Shadharāt V, 414

25. 684 A.H. Abu'l 'Abbās Ahmad b. Shaibān b. Taghlib b.
Haidara al-Shaibānī b.599, d.685 (1)
26. 681 Abū Yahyā Ismā'il b. Abī 'Abd allāh b.Hammād
b.'Abd al-Karīm al'Asqalānī (2)
27. 680 Kamāl al-Dīn Abū Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahīm b.'Abd
al-Malik b.Yūsuf b. Qudāma al-Maqdisī (student
Ibn Tabarzad] d.680 (3)
28. 668 Zain al-Dīn Abū Bakr Muḥammad b Abī Tāhir Ismā'īl
b'Abd allāh b.'Abd al-Muḥāsīn al.Anmāṭī
b. 609, d. 684 (4)
29. 681 Shams al-Dīn Abul Faraj 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Ahmad
b.'Abd al-Malik b. Uthmān b.'Abd allāh b. Sa'd
al Maqdisī b. 606, d.689 (5)
30. 680 Najm al-Dīn Abul 'Izz Yūsuf b. Jaqūb b. Muḥammad
b.'Alī al-Mujāwir al-Shaibānī b.601, d.690 (6)
31. 668 Jamāl al-Dīn Abū Ḥamid Muḥammad b.'Alī b. Mahmūd
b Ahmad
/ b.'Alī b. al-Ṣabūnī (Shaikh of Dārāt-Hadīth al-
Nūriya) b. 604, d.680 (7)

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1. Shadharāt V, 390
 2. Arbā'ūn p.26. Durar I, 144
 3. Shadharāt V, 366
 4. Arbā'ūn p.27
 5. Shadharāt V, 408
 6. Ibid V, 417
 7. Ibid, V, 369

32. 680 A.H. al Jamāl Ahmad b. Abī Bakr b. Sulaimān b. al-Hamawī d. 687 (1)
33. 684 (a) Shams al-Dīn Abū Ghālib al-Muzaffar b. Ab al Samad b. Khalīl al-Ansarī d.688 (2)
- (b) Abū Muḥammad Abd al Raḥmān b. Ahmad b. Ab al Fāqūsī d.682 (3)
34. 682 Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū Hafṣ Umar b. Muḥammad b. Abdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Abī Asrūn al. Tamīmī al Shāfi'ī b.599, d. 682 (4)
35. 679 Nafīs al-Dīn Abūl Qāsim Hibat allāh b. Muḥammad b. Alī b. Jarīr al Hārithī al-Shāfi'ī d.680 (5)
36. 681 Shams al-Dīn Abū Abd allāh Muḥammad b. al-Kamāl Abd al-Raḥīm al Hanbalī (Son of Kamāl al-Dīn No. 27) b. 607, d.688 (6)
37. " Sitt al Arab bint yahyā b. Qāimāz b. Abd allāh al Tājiya al Kindiya b. 599, d. 684 (7)

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1. Shadharāt V, 400
 2. Arba'un p 31
 3. Ibid
 4. Shadharāt V, 379
 5. Arba'un p.33
 6. Shadharāt V, 405
 7. Ibid, V, 385

38. 681 A.H. Ummal-‘Arab Fātima bint Abi’l Qāsim Alī b. Abi Muhammad al-Qāsim b. 598. d. 683. She was a pupil of Ibn Tabar zad. ⁽¹⁾
39. Umm Ahmad Zainab bint Makki b. ‘Alī b. Kāmil al-Harrānī b. 598, d. 688. ⁽²⁾
40. 684 Umm Muhammad Zainab bint Ahmad b. ‘Umar b. Kāmil al-Maqdisiyya b. 601, d. 687. ⁽³⁾

The names given by al-‘Asqalānī are Nos. 1, 15, 17, 19 and 24 of the preceding list and those given by Ibn al-‘Imād Nos. 1, 3, 8, 15, 17 and 18. Al-Kutubi ⁽⁶⁾ gives Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 27 and 39.

The above statement shows that Ibn Taimiyya began to hear traditions at the early age of five, for he was born in 662 A.H. and the date which he gives for the earliest traditions quoted in the Arba‘ūn is 667 A.H. It would appear also that the materials of the Arba‘ūn were already collected in 684 when he was twenty three. We are told further that these forty traditions were read by al-Dhahabi ^{at a meeting} ~~by~~ Ibn Taimiyya.

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1. Shadharāt, V, 383
 2. Ibid. V, 404.
 3. Arba‘ūn, p. 36.
 4. Durar, I, 144
 5. Shadharāt, V, 373
 6. Fawāt, I, 35.

at which Amīn al-Dīn alwānī al-Hanāfī⁽¹⁾ (d.735 A.H.), the transmitter of the Arbaʿūn⁽²⁾ was personally present on the 17⁽³⁾ of Jumāda II, 721 A.H. (i.e. 5 years before Ibn Taimiyya's final imprisonment in the citadel of Damascus and 7 years before his death there, for he was imprisoned for the last time in 726 and died in 728)-

It is noteworthy that among the teachers whom Ibn Taimiyya mentions in the Arbaʿūn were four women.⁽³⁾

Of all the above mentioned teachers it is difficult to pick out anyone to whose influence can be ascribed the extraordinary spirit exhibited by Ibn Taimiyya for the reform^{ma} of religious and social customs. It is true that amongst them are four Shaikhs namely (i) Ahmad b. Abd al-Dā' (ii) Ismaʿīl al Janūkhī, (iii) Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī and (iv) Fakhr al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Ahmad,⁽⁴⁾ who were renowned for their learning and writings, but it can hardly be said that Ibn Taimiyya was influenced by them. Had they shown any of the same unusual and reformatory spirit, we should have expected to find some reference to the fact in the biographical materials relating to them.

1. ʿAsqalānī Durrar, III, 293, No.783

2. Arbaʿūn p.3 (Introduction)

3. i.e. Nos. 37, 38, 39 and 40.

4. i.e. Nos. 1, 3, 17 and 24 in the above list.

It is evident from his own works that he was most strongly influenced, though even that only partially, by the works of the Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal whose Musnad he is said to have studied several times in his younger days, ⁽¹⁾ and in defence of which he fought to the last. ⁽²⁾ It is most probable his ultra-Hanbalism and the degradation of the Muslim world caused by superstitious beliefs and other infiltrations that were responsible to a great extent for the direction which his teachings were to take.

Subjects and summary of Ibn Taimiya's risālas on tradition.

His first treatise namely Arba'ūna Hadīthan is his only book on hadīth in which he gives us the full chain of narrators though it was not necessary for him to do so, since these traditions are to be found in the older books of tradition. He did so, as it appears, only to acquire the status of a Muhaddith, that is to say, of one who collected traditions from various authorities as a tālib al-ʿIlm. This was a not infrequent practice among the later muhaddithūn Nawawī, for example, did the same.

The compilers of Arba'ūnāt, as is wellknown, frequently made their collections of traditions on a specific subject

1. Fawāt, I, 35

2. See below p. 63 sqq.

and those collected by Ibn Taimiyya relate mostly to wa'd promises, ⁽¹⁾ wa'id threats, ⁽²⁾ and encouragement to seek knowledge. ⁽³⁾ They also include, however, the tradition of hanin al khashaba, the miraculous lament of the timber upon which the Prophet used to lean while delivering the Friday sermon, before the erection of a minbar, pulpit. ⁽⁴⁾

The second treatise, al-kalim al-Taiyib in 96 pages containing 64 chapters, is a record of formulas uttered by the Prophet on different occasions, such as at the time of eating, drinking (water), going to bed, looking at the new moon and so on.

His third risala fil-kalam 'ala al-Qussas consisting of nine pages only is a collection of his opinions about 43 narrations from the prophet handed down through the Qussas, story tellers. ⁽⁵⁾ Ibn Taimiyya's view of these traditions is that they are either false, defective in isnad or the saying

1. Arba'un p.15, 21, 32

2. Ibid, p.11, 14, 18

3. Ibid. p.22

4. Ibid. p.20

5. Some humorous stories of the Qussas are related by Guillaume in The Traditions of Islam p.82 annotation.

(1)
of ordinary people. In one passage he accuses the
Imām al-Tirmidhī of having narrated a tradition from these
Qussas in his Jami. This is a saying ~~fre~~ attributed to
Prophet انا مدينة العلم وعلي بابها "I am the city of knowledge;
'Alī is its gate." He regards it as a spurious tradition
though only the learned people know this. In another passage
he does not contradict the report of the Qussās who said that
the girls of the Banī al-Najjār played music with the duff
(tambourine) to the Prophet when he reached Medina for the
first time after leaving Mecca. He simply says that the
playing of the tambourine by women was customary at marriage
during the days of the Prophet.

(4)
His fourth risāla fil kalām ala al-fitra contains
his views on the tradition: كل مولود يولد على الفطرة "Every child
is born ^{in the} ~~on~~ fitra." The contention is on the meaning of t

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1. M R K, II, 337, 1.18. The significance of this criticism will be seen in dealing with Ibn Taimiya's defence of Ahmad, b. Hanbal's Musnad.
 2. Ibid, II, 338
 3. See Salvador Daniel, The Music and Musical Instruments of the Arabs. p.221 sq.
 4. This risāla was collected by Shaikh Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Hanbali 'who wrote on the pestilence of 775/1373, Brockelmann, II, 76) in which Ibn Taimiya's views on the tradition are related.
See M R K II, 317 - 334. cf. Ibn Qutaiba, Mukhtalaf al-Hadith. p.159

word fitra. Abū Huraira Ibn Shihāb, Majāhid, Qatāda and according to one report, even Ibn 'Abbās, 'Ikrima and Imām Ahmad were of opinion that fitra here means dīn al-Islām. But in Ibn Taimiyya's view it means the knowledge of the existence of one creator. (1) We find the same view expressed by him in a work preserved in manuscript in Berlin. (2)

His fifth risāla Raf'al malām. Though this risāla is an apology for the early leaders and it contributes to the method of iftihād, it supplies us definitely with the principles which he adopted in investigating hadīth and its sciences.

IBN TAIMIYYA'S PRINCIPLES OF HADĪTH - CRITICISM

1. Indications of authenticity:

(a) The report may contain in itself some indication whether it is genuine or false. For example, if one man or two report that the imām of the city mosque has been publicly murdered and all the others are silent, it will at once be understood that the report is false. Because the murder of the imām during a Friday prayer such an incident as must naturally be reported by every one present there. Similarly if one man or two of a certain city inform us that there is in their country

1. M R K II, 329

2. No. 1995, fol. 54/a.

a mine of gold or silver to which every one goes and takes as much as he can, we shall naturally disbelieve them. On the other hand, it is also impossible to imagine that all people will agree upon telling a lie in such matters, because human nature does not allow one to tell a lie unless there be some special personal interest - truth in human beings being as natural as their other necessities of life. ⁽¹⁾

(b) The ijmā', ⁽²⁾ general consent of the community authenticates a tradition. ⁽³⁾

(c) Reports from early leaders in general who never told a lie are authentic. ⁽⁴⁾

(d) Reports from the rightly guided Caliphs and from Ibn 'Umar, Ibn Mas'ūd, Ubaiy, Ma'ādh, Abu'l Dardā etc. who never concealed facts are also authentic. ⁽⁵⁾

In the above classifications of the indications the reports of the fourth group of persons overlap those of the third. Probably Ibn Taimiyya lays special stress upon the narrations of the Caliphs and a few others mentioned there, and considers that the reports handed down

1. Khilāf al-Umma p.13 sqq.

2. Ibn Taimiyya limits ijmā' to that of the Sahābīs, as will be shown later on.

3. Khilāf al-Umma p.15 sq.

4. Ibid. p.16

5. Ibid. p.16 sq.

from them are among the most authentic traditions.

(2) Reasons for the rejection of traditions by the
'ulamā' (1)

By the above indications, among other things, Ibn Taimiyya has shown his firm belief in the honesty of the early 'ulamā'. Hence it is necessary for him to show that if the 'ulamā' have said anything contrary to a genuine tradition, there must be some excuse ('udhr) for it. Such excuses may be divided into three divisions. (2)

(a) Absence of confirmation whether a particular ḥadīth is rightly attributed to the Prophet.

(b) Absence of confirmation whether it actually refers to a particular problem.

(c) Knowledge of abrogation of the order contained in a particular tradition.

In order to explain these excuses he suggests ten causes (ashāb) by reason of which the 'ulamā' rejected a tradition. (3)

(1) Ignorance of a tradition. For example 'Umar did not know that a wife inherits the blood money (diyyah) of her husband until he was informed about it in writ-

1. By the 'Ulamā', he means in this passage the sahāba.

2. Raf' al Malām in M.R. p.53

3. Ibid pp 55 - 63

ing by one Dahhāq b. Sufyān.

(ii) Weakness in the chains of guarantors. i.e. an irregularity in the chain or the obscurity or bad memory of one of the guarantors.

(iii) Difference of opinion in regard to a weak tradition. i.e. the 'ulamā' rejected a weak tradition because they failed to arrive at a unanimous decision.

(iv) Difference of opinion in establishing conditions for sifting the traditions.

(v) Forgetfulness, nisyān. For example 'Umar forgot the order relating to purification by sand or dust (tayammum) for a major pollution (janāba) and gave a contrary decision when he was asked about it. The story goes that a man once asked Umar what a musāfir should do about his prayers in the state of janāba where there was no water for washing (ghusl). "He must postpone his prayer until he obtains water" replied Umar. "O commander of the faithful, do you not remember" retorted 'Ammār, "that once while in charge of the camels we required washing for janāba, and I wallowed like the wallowing of the mule (thinking that when the rubbing of hands and face with dust could suffice for wāḍi', ab-lution in the absence of water, why should one not rub the whole body with dust in order to purify it from the impurity of janāba) but as for you, you did not pray.

After we came back, we asked the Prophet about it and he struck the earth with his hands and rubbed his face and hands with it, saying, 'this alone will suffice you'." Hearing this 'Umar was startled and replied disapprovingly, "O 'Ammār, fear God." "If you so wish, I shall not narrate it to anybody again," was the reply. 'Umar suddenly remembered the incident and rejoined, "Never mind, O 'Ammār, I authorise you to narrate it."

Thus the Caliph 'Umar forgot a tradition which he himself had known and gave an opinion contrary to it, but when 'Ammār reminded him of it, he accepted it as correct.

On another occasion 'Umar committed a blunder when he said, addressing the people, "If anybody increases the dowry above the dowries of the Prophet's wives or daughters I shall cancel it." At once a woman stood up and protested, "Why dost thou deprive us, O commander of the faithful of the privileges given to us by God?" and recited the verse of the Qur'an: "If ye be desirous to have one wife in the place of another, and have given one of them a qintār make no reduction from it." ⁽¹⁾ Hearing this 'Umar withdrew his words and accepted her rebuke. ⁽²⁾

1. Sūra iv, 24.

2. M R p.60

(vi) Difference of opinion among the ‘ulamā in regard to the meaning of strange or dubious words such as the legal terms muzābana, muhāqala, mukhābara, mulāmasa and munābadha (1) Such difference of opinion may also be found in regard to the general meaning of a tradition. For example, both Bukhārī and Muslim narrate that in the year of the Khandaq the Prophet said to his companions "Let no one say his (‘asr) prayer but in (the quarter of the) Bani Quraiza". This order of the Prophet was understood by the companions in two different ways. (a) Some took it to be an order not to pray at all on their way and actually they did ^{not} pray when the time of prayer ^{came} (b) Other took it as an order to hasten to the place as quickly as possible, and they performed their prayer on the way when the time came. But the Prophet did not disapprove the action of either group. (2)

Bilāl bought two sā‘s of date for one out of ignorance. The Prophet ordered him to cancel the contract (bai‘) without scolding him for doing an action of usury. (3)

~~An interesting example.~~ In accordance with the verse

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1. See Hidāya Kit. al-Buyu (vol.III)
 2. M R p.64 sq.
 3. Ibid p.65
 4. Sūra II, 183

relating to the rules of fasting, "Eat and drink until ye can discern a white thread from a black one", 'Adī b. Hālim and a number of companions thought that it meant a white and a black thread consequently 'Adī used to take out two threads, one white and the other black from his bed and eat at night (in Ramadān) until he could distinguish the white from the black. Hearing of this, the Prophet said to 'Adī in a bantering tone *إِنَّ وَسَارَكَ إِذَا الْعَبْرُ بِيضًا أَمَا صَوَّرَ* *بياض النهار وسواد الليل*. "Surely your bed must be wide. It only means the brightness of the day and the darkness of the night." But he did not blame 'Adī for his mistake in breaking the rules of the fast. But on one occasion the Prophet was very naturally displeased with certain persons who advised a patient with a wound on his head to perform a major ab-
(1)
lution, as a result of which he died.

(vii) Refusal to accept an indication (dalāla) on some principal. That is, one knows what the traditions indicate, but does not accept them as genuine because of some other principles which are stronger than the indications
(2)
themselves.

(viii) Contradictory views on indications (dalālal),

1. M R p.65

2. Ibid p.61

such as some holding the tradition to be general (ʿāmm) and others to be particular (khāṣṣ), or some that it is absolute (mutlaq) and others that it is limited (muqayyad) (1)

(ix) Conviction of the weakness, abrogation or misinterpretation of a tradition. (2)

(x) Contradiction of a tradition by something that indicates its weakness, abrogation or interpretation in a way which is rejected by others. For example, the Medinites with the exception of a small group preferred their long established custom to a genuine tradition of the Prophet:

المبتايات بالخيار ما لم ينفردا "The buyer and the seller have the option of revoking the contract as long as they are not separated. This tradition apparently suggests خيار المجلس "option of revoking on the spot" but the Medinites held that this order had been overridden by their own practice of not allowing any option after the contract was completed. (3)

1. M.R p.61 - 62

2. Ibid. p.62

3. The khiyār al-majlis is a controversial problem among the jurists. The Hanafites are of opinion that after after the ijāb, declaration and qubūl, acceptance, a sale becomes binding and neither party has the option of revoking except by reason of ʿaib, defect, called khiyār al-ʿAib (Hidayā III, 44 - 52) or of its not..... (cont.)

IBN TAIMIYA'S TREATMENT OF MINATORY TRADITIONS

According to the view of certain sections of the jurists, which Ibn Taimiyya attributes also to the salaf in general, a khobar wāhid ⁽¹⁾ accompanied by a menace and handed down

having been inspected, called khiyār al-ru'ya (Hidāya III 40 - 44) and they interpret the words مالم يتفرقا as مالم يتفرقا بالاقوال (so long they do not separate themselves by words). They maintain that the word mutabā'iyā'in can only be used to the buyer and the seller as long as they are talking over the transaction and not after they finish it even though they may be standing on the spot. This interpretation supports the practice of the Medinites. But the Shafi'ites say that so long as the buyer and the seller are on the spot they have the right of revoking the sale. They interpret مالم يتفرقا بالابدان as مالم يتفرقا 'so long they do not separate themselves physically.' Hidāya III, 25.

1. Lit. "solitary narrative" but technically as opposed to Khabar Mutawātir. It includes mashhūr, 'Azīz, Gharīb and other sub-branches. See Nukhba, with Nuzha p.1, Nuzha, p.8 (published by Capt. Lees). See also 'Abdullah Taunkī's edition. p.15.

by reliable persons, must be followed in regard to the prohibition contained in it; but so long it is not proved to be qat'ī, absolutely sure, it must not be said that he who rejects it will be liable to the menace described therein.⁽¹⁾

To this Ibn Taimiyya adds that a wa'id cannot be rejected for want of an absolute proof. The seven readings of the Qur'an, on account of their not being stamped as Khabar Mutawātir, have been kept out of the Qur'an, but in spite of that no one can deny their existence. In other words, the absence of evidence does not prove the absence of a thing itself. On this ground he attacks the Mutakallimūn for refusing to believe in theoretical matters on the ground that they have not been corroborated by sure proofs.⁽²⁾

What he aims at by his strange arguments is that the minatory traditions must be accepted as genuine, but that those who disregard them will only theoretically be liable to the menace contained therein. Because if we actually apply the menace to one who rejects the minatory tradition, we must accuse some of the a'immat al-Islām who

(1) M.R.p.68.

(2) M.R.p.69.

rejected them.

To give examples:

(a) In one tradition the Prophet cursed the givers and the receivers of usury and those who witnessed or wrote deeds of usury. In another tradition he forbade excess and delay (nasiy) in business transactions, calling them usury. But though the latter tradition was known to devout Muslims like Ibn 'Abbās (d.68/687), Tā'ūs (d.105/723), Sa'īd b. Jubair (d.94/712) and 'Ikrima (d.13/634), they disregarded the tradition and sold one ṣā'⁽¹⁾ for two making the usury⁽²⁾ (of excess) lawful.

(b) The Prophet cursed the presser of wine (mu sir) and him who drinks it. He is also reported to have said "Every drink that causes intoxication is khamr."

'Umar too made the same statement from the pulpit in front of the 'emigrants' and the 'helpers', but in spite of that the Kufan 'Ulamā (the Hanafites) maintained that drink other than wine made from grapes was lawful: they regarded nabīdh made from dates as lawful and drank it.

1. A measure of dates etc.

2. M R, p.69 sq.

Ibn Taimiyya pleads for these Kufan Ulama as well as for Ibn 'Abbās and others for their rejection of the wa'id traditions, saying that they had some reason or some interpretation which justified their doing so. (1)

Uncompromising nature of Ibn Taimiyya's Interpretations of Traditions.

(a) Ibn Taimiyya admits that the books on the exegesis of Qur'an and on Maghāzī, etc. contain authentic traditions. But in interpreting the Light verse' he refuses to accept a tradition narrated by Ibn 'Abbās and cited by commentators like Tabarī, Zamakhsharī, and Rāzī, in their commentaries. He does not boldly declare that Ibn 'Abbās' tradition, Light means the guide of those who are (3) (4) (5) (6)

1. M R. p.70

2. Waṣīyat al-Kubrā, M R K, I, 275

3. Sūra xxiv, 35

4. xviii, 105

5. Kashshāf, II, 953

6. Hafātih VI, 394 1.23

in the Heavens and the earth," is false nor does he take it as authentic. The arguments that he advances are that the above tradition of Ibn 'Abbās is a weak one, that this is not the only tradition that has come down to us from him on this topic, and that most of the salaf did not accept the tradition. ⁽¹⁾ But what the other traditions are and which of the salaf rejected the tradition, he does not tell us.

(b) In explaining allegorical traditions he deviates from his general maxim of bilākaif interpretations

He admits that the Prophet used parables (mathal) in relation to the Divine Attributes, such as "God's Throne" is situated on the 'arsh like a ring thrown in a desert land." ⁽²⁾ He also admits that the Prophet said, "When you stand for prayer, God is in front of you. So do not spit in front of Him." But in explaining these sayings, Ibn Taimiyya says that in giving the parable, the aim of the prophet is to express the permissibility and possibility jawāz and imkān of it but not to draw any actual comparison between the creator and the

1. al-Nur, p.112 sq.

2. M R K I,459 *مخلة المقاة بارخ ظلاة*

(1)
 created. Because the Prophet once said, "Every one of you will see his Lord privately". "How can that be, O Prophet of God, as He is one and we are so many?" asked Abū Razīn (a companion). "I will give you a parable of this" replied the Prophet, "by a sign of God, Lo, this is the moon, everyone of you sees it privately and it is a sign from among the signs of God, while He Himself is greater than them all."⁽²⁾

In regard to the prohibition of spitting in one's prayer Ibn Taimiyya is definite that it does not mean that God is in front of the worshipper in a wall etc. Here he explains that if one assumes that the salaf took this tradition in a sense other than its literal meaning, he is right. He himself takes it in the sense of muḥmal, equivocal and condemns those who took it in the meaning of ẓāhir, literal.⁽³⁾

Here we observe that

(1) in spite of the explanation of the aforesaid moon

1. M R K I,459

المقصود بالمقش بيان جواز هذا وأمكانه لا تشبيهه الحال بالمخولق

2. M R K I,459 sq.

3. For the technical terms ẓāhir, muḥmal and Mutashābih see Tawdīh p.148 sqq.

parable offered by the Prophet and (ii) the permissibility of interpretation of the tradition regarding spitting that he himself gives, he does not commit himself and thus avoids coming to a compromising conclusion.

IBN TAIMIYA'S CRITICISM OF THE TRADITIONISTS

I Classification of Muhaddithun

Ibn Taimiya classifies the early Muhaddithun according to their capacity for scrutinising the traditions as follows:

(i) al-Bukhārī (Abū 'Abdallāh Muhammad b. Ismā'īl, b.194/809, d.257/870) is by far the best and most critical of all collectors of traditions. Al-Tirmidhī (d.279/892) pays a high tribute to Bukhārī for his investigations. In order to avoid misconceptions Bukhārī habitually includes all variations in the chain of guarantors and in their wordings as well.⁽¹⁾

(ii) After al-Bukhārī comes al-Muslim, d.261/874. Though he committed certain mistakes in narrating

1. Wasīla p.81

the hadīth al-kusūf, ⁽¹⁾ hadīth khalaq al-Ard ⁽²⁾ and about Abū Sufyān's desire to marry the Prophet's daughter Umm Habība, he is better than al-Tirmidhī, al-Dāraquṭnī (d.385/995), Ibn Manda (d.395/1004), al-Ḥakīm (d.405/1014), ⁽³⁾ etc.

(iii) Al-Tirmidhī ⁽⁴⁾ and Ibn Māja (d.283/896) stand in the third grade.

(iv) The fourth position is held by Abū Ḥatim b. Hibbān al-Bustī, d.354/965.

(v) The fifth and last position is held by al-Ḥakīm ⁽⁵⁾ (d.405/1014) Though most of his narrations are authentic, he is the weakest of them all in the science of scrutinising traditions.

(1) Muslim narrates that the Prophet made the prayer of kusūf in 3 and 4 bowings (rukū' s), but as a matter of fact he made only 2 rukū' s and that also only once in his life on the day on which his son Ibrāhīm died. Wasīla. p.81

2. See Chapter of Tafsīr. p.20

3. Wasīla p.81

4. Ibid

5. Muhammad b. 'Abd allāh al-Ḥakīm al-Nisabūrī b.321/933. Brockelmann. I,166

In addition to the above classification, Ibn Taimiyya mentions the names of the Muhaddithūn according to their special aptitude for collecting traditions relating to different topics, and he also gives certain names of persons who failed to scrutinise traditions rightly.

(a) Collectors of traditions on the theological doctrines of the Sunnīs.

Bukhārī, Abū Da'ūd (d.275/888), Nasā'ī (d.303/915) Ibn Maja (d.283/896), 'Abd allāh b.'Abd al-Rahmān al-Dārimī (d.255/868) 'Uthmān b.Sa'īd al-Dārimī (d.282/895), Abū Ḥasan al-Dāraqutnī (d.385/995), Abū 'Abdāllah b.Manda (d.395/1004), Abu Nu'aim al-Isbahānī (d.403/1038), Abū Bakr al-Baiḥāqī (d.458/1065) and a few others. (1)

(b) The following Muhaddithūn collected traditions as jurists and considered them as the basis of religion.

Mālik b.Anas (d.179/793), Ahmad b.Ḥanbal (d.241/855), Shāfi'ī (d.204/819), Bukhārī, Ishāq b. Rahawaih (d.238/852), Abu Dā'ūd, Sufyān b. 'Uyayna, (d.198/813), Yahyā b. Sa'īd al-Qaṣṣībī (d.198/813) Wakī' b. al-Jarrāh (d.197/812), Muḥammad b.Ja'ir al-Ṭabarī (d.310/923) etc. (2)

1. (al-Wasiyat al-Kubrā) M R K I, 275

2. Wasīla. p.84

(c) Scholars who criticised ḥadīth and Muhaddithūn.
 Abu'l Hasan al-Dāraqutnī (d.385/995), Abū Ḥaīm
 al-Bustī (d.275/888), Ibn Ḥazm (d.456/1063),
 Abū Bakr al-Baiḥaqī (d.458/1065) etc. (1)

(d) Traditionists who are given to narrating
 whatever they come across without investigating
 whether it is Saḥīḥ, Ḥasan or Da'īf.

Abū Nu'aim al-Iṣṭabānī (d.430/1038) who describes the
 excellence of the Caliphs in a special book, as well
 as at the beginning of his Hilyat al-Awliyā. (2) Abu'l
 Shaikh al-Iṣṭabānī who narrates on excellence
 of good deeds. (3)

From the above classification of Muhaddithūn we
 may conclude that Ibn Taimīya (i) does not accept the
 popular opinion as to the six saḥīḥs and (ii) distin-
 guishes traditionists pure and simple from the jurists.

Abū Dā'ūd who receives no recognition from him for
 scrutinising traditions, has been accused along with
 Timidhī of narrating unauthentic traditions. He, of
 course, gives Abu Da ud the credit along with Nasā'ī

1. Wasīla. p.84

2. Cairo, 1351 A.H. in 2 vols.

3. Wasīla, p.83 sq.

and others of collecting traditions on the principles of ahl al-Sunna.

II Criticism of Transmitters

In criticising the transmitters of hadith Ibn Taimiyya always depended upon the criticism of early traditionists belonging to the Sunnite group only. He did not (rather could not) show any new method in this art nor did he go against the transmitters held by earlier authorities. Here are some examples.

(a) Ismā'īl b. Abbān al-Ghanawī who reports from Sufyān al-Thawrī (d.198 A.H.) who narrates from Shā'bi, is in his opinion a downright liar. The reason is that Imam Ahmad used to narrate from him (Ismā'īl) but when he discovered some apocryphal traditions in his narrations, he ceased to narrate from him altogether. Moreover Bukhārī, Muslim, Dāraqūṭnī, etc. treated him as matruk, rejectable. Abū Hātim, Ibn Hibbān and others disapproved of Ismā'īl's conduct. (1)

(b) In the above list of the grades of the traditionists, we find that Ibn Taimiyya considers Abū Nu'aim al-Izbahānī (d.430 A.H.) as a confused narrator. Ibn al-Athīr supports this in his Usd al-ghāba. (2)

1. Wasīla p.85

2. vol.III, 46

(c) Mūsa b. Abd al-Rahmān is a liar. Abū Ahmad b. 'Adī disapproved of his conduct in narrating traditions. Abū Hātim called him a dajjāl, imposter. (1)

III Defence of Ahmad b. Hanbal

Finally it is interesting to examine the arguments with which Ibn Taimiyya defends the Musnad of Ahmad b. Hanbal against the commonly accepted charge of containing a large number of spurious traditions. We have already seen that he was born and brought up in a Hanbalite family and read the Musnad of Ahmad b. Hanbal several times. Although the acceptance of Ibn Hanbal's traditions in their totality was by no means binding upon the adherents of the "Hanbalite School", yet Ibn Taimiyya's reverence for the Imām himself and his teachings naturally led him to give the Musnad as high a position as possible - if not quite on a level with al-Bukhārī and Muslim, at least equal to al-Tirmidhī and Abū Dā'ūd.

He begins with an account of a discussion between Abu'l 'Alā al-Hamadānī and Ibn al-Jawzī on the question whether the Musnad of Ahmad b. Hanbal contained any apocryphal traditions or not. The former expressed his opinion that it contained no such traditions at all, where

1. Wasīla. p.83

as the latter demonstrated that it did. To Ibn Taimiyya these two opinions are not contradictory, because according to Ibn al-Jawzi's standard all unsound traditions that have been narrated through mistake (unintentionally) should be considered موضوع whereas according to Abu'l 'Ala and his followers, only those traditions should be called موضوع which though known to be unsound have been intentionally (1) narrated.

Ibn Taimiyya argues, therefore, that the Musnad contains only unintentional apocryphal reports. (2)

He adds also that Imam Ahmad kept his Musnad free from the unauthentic narrations of such persons as the teachers of Kathir b. 'Abdallah b. 'Amr, from whom both Abu Da'ud and Tirmidhi narrated traditions. Moreover, the criteria of authenticity in the Musnad of Ahmad are better than those of Abu Da'ud. (3)

He admits that it was al-Tirmidhi who first classified the diverse traditions in his Jami' under three heads Sahih, Masan and Da'if. (4) But, in his opinion, the standard maintained by Imam Ahmad in classifying the traditions

1. al-Wasila. p.75 sq.

2. Ibid.

3. Wasila. p.76 sq.

4. Ibid. p.78

is superior to that of al-Tirmidhī, because, according to Tirmidhī Hasan are those traditions which have been transmitted through different chains of guarantors who are above suspicion and which (traditions) are not shādhah, whereas Imām Ahmad considers all such traditions as da'if though he quotes them in arguments. This is why Imām Ahmad has given examples of such da'if traditions by accepting the narrations of Amr b. Shu'aib, Ibrāhīm al-Hijzī etc. (1)

Ibn Taimiyya puts forward another justification of Imām Ahmad's recording of weak traditions. He says that it is not allowed to prescribe any religious duty with the help of a weak tradition. But if some action be authenticated by legal proof and, in addition, its excellence be reported by traditions handed down through weak chains, it is allowed to narrate such traditions as long as they are not discovered to be untrue. The guiding principle in doing so, he suggests, is that the amount of recompense for a good action is unknown, and if there be any report (tradition) to determine it, it is not proper to deny it without reason. (2)

1. Wasīla p.78

وَأول من عرف أنه قسم الحديث ثلاثة أقسام - صحيح وحسن وضعيف هو أبو عيسى الترمذى في جامعه
والحسن عنده ما تعدد طرقه ولم يكن في روايته منهم وليس بشاذ - ففقد الحديث وأمثاله يسمى
أحد ضعيفا ويصح به ولهذا مثل أحد الحديث الضعيف الذى يصح به حديث عمرو بن شعيب و
حديث إبراهيم العجزي ونحوهما -

2. Ris al- ibadat. M R M. V.95

CHAPTER III

LAW

Books available on Law.

1. Risāla al-nīya fi l-ṭahāra wa'l-ṣalā, etc. M R K, I, 241-256, written in 725 A.H. In this work Ibn Taimīya argues that it is not necessary to utter a formula of 'intention' before beginning one's ablution or prayer, etc. One who does so is doing an action of innovation. ⁽¹⁾
2. Risāla al-halāl, M R K, II, 36-52. A fatwā regarding the opinion of certain jurists on the lawfulness of riza derived from state revenue, because during Mansur's time the booty was not properly distributed, consequently it became (and has ever since remained) impossible to distinguish between legal and illegal sources of revenue. In this connection he mentions an interesting story (which he considers to be false) that Ṣālih, son of the Imām Aḥmad ate no home-made bread after he was appointed a Qādī. Once (it is said) when his people had prepared it for him and he refused to partake of it, they threw it in the River Tigris whereupon Ṣālih stopped eating the ⁽²⁾ fish of the river.

1. M R K. I, 242.

2. M R K. II, 37.

3. Bayān al-Hudā min al-ḍalāl fī amr al-hiṭāl, M R K, II, 152-166. This is on the appropriateness of religious and social observances according to lunar calculations.
 4. Risāla fī Sunnat al-Jumā, M R K, II, 167-179. A fatwā in reply to the question whether the Prophet or his companions or those who came later on said any prayer on Fridays just after the first ādhān (call for prayer). Ibn Taimiyya holds that the present custom of two ādhāns at the Friday prayer was not in vogue during the Prophet's time. After the Prophet took his seat on the pulpit for the sermon on Fridays, Bilal called the ādhān and no body said any prayer after it, during the sermon. Of course, the companions, he adds, used to say a prayer when they entered the mosque on Fridays, but they never limited it to any particular number of raka'āt, bowings on the basis of which the authorities of the four schools recommended a definite number, some two and some four.
 5. Al-'Uqūd al-Muharrama, M R K, II, 203-216. A fatwā on certain wrong practices which may become right in special circumstances. For example, to say one's prayers in a house occupied by force, to slaughter animals by instruments obtained from others unjustly, or to cook food with fuel seized from others unlawfully, are all
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forbidden, but if the wrongdoer makes due reparation to the man he has wronged, all these actions cease to be
(1)
wrong.

6. Risāla fī ma'na al-qiyās, M R K, II, 217-276. This has also been published along with Fuṣūl fī'l-qiyās of Ibn Qayyim by Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, under the title of al-Qiyās fī'l-gharḥ al-Islāmī, Cairo, 1346. A fatwā as to whether mudāraba, musāca etc. are in agreement
(2)
with analogy or not.

7. Al-Kalam fī raf' al-Hanafī yadsih, M R K, II, 346-353. A fatwā relating to the conduct of a Hanafī who lifted his hands (which is against the code of his School) at every ruku', while bowing and rising. Ibn Taimiyya argues that not only is it not unlawful for a Muslim, to whichever School he might belong, to raise his hands in his prayer at every ruku', but that it is even com-
(3)
mendable.

8. Risāla fī manāsik al-Hajj, M R K, II, 355-400. Here he describes the rites of pilgrimage. On page 356 he mentions that the ignorant Arabs called a well at

1. M R M, II, 210

2. This will be fully discussed in the section on qiyās.

3. M R K, II, 347; M. Fatawā, II, 375 sqq.

Wādī al-‘Atīq, the well of ‘Alī (Bīr ‘Alī) in the
(1)
belief that he fought the jinn there.

9. Tanawwu‘ al-‘ibādāt, on the variety of forms of several religious formulas such as tashahhud, tarjī‘ fi’l ādhān, jahr bi’l-Qurān (loud recitation of the Qur‘ān) in supererogatory night worship etc. M R, 84-93.
10. Al-mazālim al-mushtarika, on showing justice to the non-Mulsims in collecting taxes from them according to the Qur‘anic injunction. "Stand up as witness: and let not ill-will at any, induce you not to act uprightly. Act uprightly. Next will this be to
(2)
the fear of God."
11. Risāla fi- ahkām al-Safar wa’l- iqāma, on religious observances while on travel or in a settled condition. M R K, II, 2-100.
12. Al-madhhab al-Ṣaḥīḥ fi mā jā‘ min al-nuṣuṣ fi waq‘ al-jawā‘ih fi l-mubāya‘at wa’l-damānāt wa l-mujarat, on sale, indemnity and wages. M R M, V, 208-232, quoted from the 31st part of Kawākib^a-durārī, preserved in the Maktabat al-Zāhiriya. Damascus.

1. See also Rihla I, 295.

2. Sūra V, 11.

13. Risāla Khilāf al-Umma, Cairo, 1347 A.H. 2nd edition.
On certain principles of Law and Tradition.
14. Mas'ala fi suyūd al-Qur'ān, Berl. No.3570.
15. Mas'ala fi sujūd al-Sahw, Berl. No.3573.
16. Risāla fī awqāt al-nahy wa l-nazā' fi dhawāt al-asbāb
wa ghairiha. Berl. No.3574. (1)
17. Kitāb fi usūl al-Fiqh, Berl, No.2309.
18. Al-farq al-mubīn bain al-ṭalāq wa' l yamīn, Leid. 1834.
19. Bāb al-ṭahāra, Leid. 1835.
20. Qā'ida fī 'Adad raka'at al-Ṣalā. Berl. 3571.
21. Fatwā given in 708/1308 in Egypt on diverse points
relating to prayer. Berl. 3572.
22. Iqāmat al-dalīl fī ibtāl al-tahīl, Lied. No.4665. (2)
An extract by Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Ḥanbalī, Berl.4665.
23. Majmū'at Fatawā in 5 vols. containing 2459 pages, on
exegsis, tradition, jurisprudence, theology etc.
Cairo, 1326-29.

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1. This Ms. ought to be termed a book on fiqh for it deals
entirely with fiqh with the principles on which he base
his arguments. Moreover, I suspect the words ابن أبي القاسم
written at the beginning to have been added later on by
some body else other than the copyist.
 2. This occurs in full in M.Fatawā III (2nd part) p.2-266.

In his younger days Ibn Taimiyya studied law under his father, ⁽¹⁾ and gave legal decisions while he was still in his teens. ⁽²⁾ The jurists of all Schools, it is said, also benefited from his vast knowledge of law. ⁽³⁾

Although an adherent of the Hanbalite School, he did not hold to it on many points. In the year 719, for example (when he was 58 years of age) he gave a fatwā on divorce, in consequence of which he was forbidden to give fatwās for a time. ⁽⁴⁾ Other instances will be given below.

Ibn Taimiyya's methods in deciding points of law are determined by his views on Tradition and method of handling the Hadīth, as discussed in the preceding chapter. This will be made clear in the following discussions of his attitude towards legal principles and typical points of law.

IJMĀ'

Ijmā' literally means 'agreeing upon' but in the Shari'a it means the agreement of the mujtahids on any matter of the faith in any age after the death of the Prophet. Such agreements become a hujja for their own and

1. Shadharāt, VI, 81.

2. Fawāt, I, 36, 1.14. Shadharāt, VI, 81.

3. Fawāt, I, 36.

4. Durar, I, 149; Fawāt, I, 41.

all succeeding periods. This agreement could be expressed in speech (called ijmā' al qawl), or in action (known as ijmā' al-fi'l), or by silence (considered as ijmā' al-sukūt) (1)

Ibn Taimiya admits ijmā' but in a narrower sense. That is, he accepts the ijmā' of the companions and even then on condition that it does not contradict kitāb and Sunna. Therefore he suggests that before accepting the decisions of ijmā' one must investigate the problems (2) thoroughly.

The reasons why he rejects the ijmā' of others than the companions are (1) that once 'Umar despatched a letter to Qadī Shuraih, in which he ordered Shuraih to abide by the Qur'an in his decisions; in case the Qur'an did not help him in the matter, he should search in the Sunna for it, and if even the Sunna failed to decide it, he should

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1. See Prof. Maddonald's article idjmā' in Enc. of Islām; see also Ṣadr al-Sharī'a: Tawdīh, p.339 sqq. and also Dic. of techn. terms. s.v.; Aghnides. pp 60-66.
 2. M R K, I, 208-215. By investigation he means the examination of the hadīth material and secondly the nature of the alleged ijmā', which will be made clear by his classifications of the statements of the companions.

follow the agreement of the companions on the question.

(ii) When Ibn 'Abbās could not decide a case by the Qur'an or the Sunna, he followed the opinion of Abū Bakr and 'Umar. (1)

After basing his argument on the above principles, Ibn Taimīya classifies the statements of the companions into four grades. (2)

- (i) A statement that does not contradict a nass and which was evidently known among the companions and nobody objected to it. This he calls ijmā' iqrārī. (3)
- (ii) One that was not widely known among the companions, but which is known to have passed without contradiction. This he calls a hujja, proof, which must be followed.
- (iii) One that was not widely known among the companions and which met with contradiction. This must not be accepted as a hujja which is universally agreed upon.
- (iv) One about which it is not known whether other companions agreed upon it or not. This must remain in suspense, but if there be any Sunna against it, it must be rejected and the Sunna acted upon.

(1) M R K, I, 215-216

(2) Wasīla. p.100

(3) This is also called ijmā' al sakūt or al-taqīrīr mentioned above.

The above classification seems to be theoretical, for he does not give us any concrete examples of these classes

When an ijmā' contradicts a nass, Ibn Taimiyya continues there must be another nass with the ijmā' to supersede the previous one. A Sunna cannot abrogate the Kitāb. A verse of the Qur'ān can only be abrogated by another verse (1) not by ijmā' or Sunna.

QIYĀS

Ibn Taimiyya accepts qiyās, analogy as one of the four (2) fundamental principles (uṣūl) of Islamic law, but he argues against certain processes of analogy adopted by (3) the Imam Abū Hanīfa, in his treatise fī ma'na al-qiyās. This work confirms the statement made above, while at the same time it makes clear his opinion that qiyās is subordinate to the literal meaning of the scriptures.

The definition of qiyās given by him is as follows.

Qiyās means the combining of two similar things and the differentiation of two dissimilar things. The first

1. M R K, I, 216 sq.

2. Ibid. I, 208

3. Ibid, II, 217-276

is called qiyās al-tard and the second qiyās al-ʿaks. (1)

In a valid analogy, the cause (illa) by which the ruling (ḥukm) is attached to the basis (asl or maqīs ʿalaih) must be found also in the farʿ or maqīs (thing compared) without any contradiction that may oppose the application of the ruling to the maqīs. (2)

(1) M R M. II, 217

مثل ان تكون العلة التي علمت بها الحكم في الاصل موجودة في الفرع
من غير ما حيز في الفرع يمنع حكمها +

(2) This is more clearly expressed by Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa in his al-Tawdīh p.360. "Qiyās in Sharīʿa means the process of transferring the ḥukm (ruling) from one thing to another on account of the same illa (cause) which exists in both, and which is not based solely on lexical arguments. The first is called asl (root) or maqīs ʿalaih (thing compared with) and the second maqīs (thing compared). For instance, nabīdh has been forbidden by some jurists because wine is prohibited. Wine is forbidden because it causes drunkenness, and because this drunkenness is also caused by nabīdh, the prohibition of wine should be applied to nabīdh which must, therefore, be declared forbidden."

Having stated his view on qiyās he declares that there is no accepted practice in Islām which is against qiyās, and that it is not a necessary condition of a valid qiyās that every scholar should know its validity. Indeed it may sometimes appear contrary to his own conception. (1)

In order to appreciate his arguments it is worth while to take a few problems from his treatise on qiyās (2) in which he attacked the Hanafite reasoning, and to discuss how far he was justified in censuring the Hanafites.

According to Abū Hanīfa in business transactions there

1. M R K. II, 218

فليس في الشريعة ما يخالف قياسا صحيحا لكن فيها ما يخالف القياس الفاسد وليس من شرط
القياس الصحيح المعتدل ان يعلم صحته كل واحد من ارب شيئا من الشريعة مخالف للقياس
فاما هو مخالف للقياس الذي انعقد في نفسه ليس مخالف للقياس الصحيح الثابت
في بعض الامور +

2. M R K, II, 217 - 276

are certain practices such as ⁽¹⁾ mudāraba, ⁽²⁾ musāqab,
⁽³⁾ muzāra'a, etc., which though they cannot be declared

- (1) "Mudāraba signifies a contract of co-partnership, of which the one party (namely the proprietor) is entitled to a profit on account of the stock (ra's al-māl); he being denominated rabb al-māl or proprietor of the stock; and the other party is entitled to a profit on account of his labour; and this last is denominated the mudārīb (or manager) inasmuch as he derives a benefit from his own labour and endeavours." Grady. p.454.
- (2) Musāqab. This is a contract between two men, one of whom takes charge of the fruit-trees of the other man on condition that the crops shall be divided among them on specified terms.
- (3) Muzāra'a. This is a contract between two persons one being a land lord and the other a cultivator, in which both agree that whatever is produced by cultivation of the land shall be divided between them in specified proportions.

lawful by analogy are considered lawful by virtue of istihsān.⁽¹⁾ Ibn Taimiyya does not contradict the result of this istihsān but seeks to prove that none of those practices ^{is} ~~are~~ contrary to analogy and that Abū Ḥanīfa is wrong in his reasoning.⁽²⁾

He points out that Abū Ḥanīfa unreasonably makes the above transactions contrary to analogy by comparing them to ijāra, hire in which the ‘iwad, thing received in exchange, is unknown and ‘amal, labour and riḥ, profit are not defined.⁽³⁾ In his opinion these transactions are

- (a) purely of the type of mushārahāt, sharing in a business.
- (b) they have nothing to do with mu‘āwadhāt, mutual exchange in which the exchanges should previously be specified and
- (c) the object in them is not the labour but the

(1) E.I. s.v. Istihsān (supplement)

(2) Berl. No.4592 fol.57 (b) sqq; Majmū‘at Fatawā III, (2nd part) p.305; Ris. fī ma‘na al-qiyās M R K II, 218

(3) For a detailed description of the Hanafite reasoning see Hidāya, Kit. al-Buyū‘ under each chapter of mudāraba, musācāt, etc.

(1)
wages.

Further, in mudāraba the proprietor (rabb al-māl) does not intend to gain the labour of the employee. For instance, a land-owner employs a man to plough his field on condition that they will share the crop between them. If the crop is destroyed by a flood the labourer gets nothing for his labour and the land-owner cannot expect anything from the labourer for his seeds or land. The employee expects the benefit of his labour and the employer that of his money or property, whatever the benefit be, they will divide it between themselves. This is why Ibn Taimiyya suggests that in mudāraba it is forbidden to assign the crop of a particular part of the land to either of the parties, for it will hinder them from acting justly. (2)

The problem of ijāra Abū Ḥanīfa considers it to be baī' al ma'dūm, the selling of non-existing goods, but a transaction which has been made lawful contrary to analogy (by means of istihsān). Ibn Taimiyya contradicts him and says that it is in full agreement with analogy. (3)

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1. M R K.II, 218-219
 2. M R K.II, 219-220
 3. M R K.II, 237-253

His argument is that ijāra is a special kind of transaction recommended by the Prophet, in which it is not necessary (though/^{Abū}Hanīfa thought otherwise) to present the mabī'a on the spot. The reason why selling of non-existing goods has been made unlawful, is that it is sometimes deceptive, as when a thing is sold which cannot be delivered, ⁽¹⁾ but ijāra though it resembles bai' al-ma'cūm, is not deceptive at all - it is a contract of ordinary mutual exchange. Such a contract cannot be void simply on the ground that its usufruct is non-existing. Neither the Qur'ān nor the Sunna forbids it. On the contrary there is a hint of the lawfulness of such a contract in the Qur'a in permitting the hiring of nurses for suckling. ⁽²⁾

1. M R K. II, 246. For example to sell a run-away slave.

2. M R K, II, 237 sq. Qur'ān, Sūra lxxv, 6-7.

وإن تعاسرتم فتدفع له أخرى لينفق ذو سعة من سعته +

The above verses which permit suckling by foster-mothers have been explained away by the Hanafite jurists in several ways. They did not hold it to be selling of non-existing goods, for some of them were of opinion that the remuneration that a nurse receives is not the exchange of her suckling but for taking care of the babies and so on. Hidāya Kit. al-ridā'

As regards the practice of mudāraba, Ibn Taimīyah notes that it is not a new thing in Islām. It had already been in existence in the days of ignorance, (fi l-Jāhiliya). The Prophet himself in his early age made a contract of mudāraba with Khadija in her business, and the companions too did the same among themselves. After the advent of Islām, the Prophet maintained this practice and thus it was authenticated by the Sunna. ⁽¹⁾

Dissolution of marriage by desertion.

During the days of ‘Umar a man left home with an instruction to his wife that in case he should not return within four years, she could marry another. The man did not return and his wife married another, but a few days after the new marriage, her former husband appeared. ‘Umar decided the matter by giving him the option of taking back his wife or taking the mahr and leaving her to the new husband. This decision of ‘Umar did not appeal to many and the jurists declared it contradictory to analogy. ⁽²⁾ Some companions rejected the opinion of ‘Umar completely and

1. M R K. I, 211-212.

2. M R K, II, 271. According to Shāfi‘ī she is the wife of the first husband and according to Mālik of the second.

said that if a judge decided a similar case on the precedent of 'Umar's decision, his ruling must be disregarded. But in Ibn Taimiyya's opinion 'Umar's decision was right and in full agreement with analogy, because it is based on the sound principle of suspending a contract when a man disposes of another's property without his consent, and giving the owner the choice of either confirming the contract or making it null and void, so long as the commodity (mabī'a) is in a proper condition. Therefore, in this particular case the former husband, if he chose, might be content with taking back the dowry (mahr) and letting the contract stand, or he might take back his wife who had not yet been separated from him. (1)

In addition to Ibn Taimiyya's treatise on qiyās we have another pamphlet written by his pupil, Ibn Qaiyim on the same theme, (2) in which we find more than forty questions all of which are dealt with exactly on the same lines as those adopted by his teacher, though he brings into his risāla more curious problems than those discussed

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1. In this case his wife would have to return the dowry of the second man. M R K, II, 271-276
 2. Al-qiyās fi' l-shar' al-Islāmī, Cairo, 1346.

by Ibn Taimiyya.

From these two treatises it is clear that neither Ibn Taimiyya nor his pupil Ibn Qayyim disagrees with the Hanafites in their decisions. The only point in which they disagree is that they do not accept certain technical terms of qiyās namely istihsān, istishāb and istiṣlāḥ adopted by the Hanafites and Shāfi'ites. They seem to have misunderstood the spirit with which the Hanafites called the problems in question contrary to analogy. Abū Hanīfa and his followers when they speak of qiyās mean by it al-qiyās al-Jalī (an analogy readily understood by every body) because they divided qiyās into two classes, namely (i) al-Jalī and (ii) al-Khafī. The latter has been named istihsān, istiṣlāḥ and istishāb. So whenever they find any problem that does not come under the category of al-Jalī they call it Khilāf al-qiyās (contrary to analogy). Under these circumstances Ibn Taimiyya and his pupil seem to have been labouring under a misapprehension in composing such treatises against the Hanafites. The Hanafites may not be wrong in declaring mudaraba etc. contrary to analogy according to their own standpoint. For example, in regard to mudaraba, the argument as to whether it is ijāra or mushāraka is only hairsplitting.

That the arguments used by our author and his pupil are mere asrār (remote causes) is also manifested in the writings of Ibn Qayyim, for in the course of his arguments he repeatedly tells us that such and such problems are intelligible only to those who are acquainted with the mysteries of the Shariā.⁽¹⁾

A few striking fatwās

‘Asqalānī tells us that Ibn Taimiyya disagreed with the four imāms on several questions of jurisprudence⁽²⁾ but he did not enumerate them. The following examples may be quoted from the Majmū‘at Fatawā.⁽³⁾

(1) Juice of plants etc. may be used for wuḍū, minor ablution.⁽⁴⁾

(2) It is lawful in performing the ablution not only to wipe shoes and feet but even to wipe over anything

(1) Fusūl p.135,138,201,216,217,220 etc.

(2) Durar I, 158. 1.13

(3) Vol.IV,(2nd part). pp 2-220; cf. Nawwāb Siddiq Hasan Khān Bahādur, Ithāf al-Nubālā (in Persian) Cawnpur, India, 1288 A.H. pp 216-17.

(4) Kitāb ikhtiyārāt al-‘ilmiyya p.3. in M.Fatawā Vol.IV.

which cannot be put off easily. (1)

(3) There is no limit to the length of time during which the khuff (inner shoes) may if necessary continue to be wiped (instead of making a full ablution). While travelling to Egypt Ibn Taimiyya himself did so. (2)

(4) It is lawful to wipe lafa'if (anything like socks covering the feet). (3)

(5) It is allowed to perform daily and jum'a prayers after tayammum (a formal ablution with fine sand) if there is no time for ablution with water. (4)

(6) There is no fixed period for haid (menstruation), tuhr (legal purity) and avās (the age at which menstruation stops.) They may vary according to one's nature.

(7) One who has missed prayers intentionally need not perform them anew. He should say plenty of optional prayers instead. (6)

1. Kitāb ikhtiyārāt, l.c. pp 7-9.

2. Ibid. IV, 7 (M.Fatawā)

3. Ibid, IV, 7

4. Ibid. IV, 12

5. Ibid. IV, 16.

6. Ibid. IV, 16-17.

(8) In order to benefit from the concession of Qasr (shortening of prayers) it is not necessary to make a journey of any specified distance, for it depends solely on local customs (العرف)⁽¹⁾

(9) Ablution is not necessary for making a prostration after reciting the verses that require it.⁽²⁾

(10) Raf' al yadain (lifting of hands at every rukū') is not unlawful for any one, to whatever School he might belong.⁽³⁾

The underlying principle in giving such fatwas seems to be that Ibn Taimya does not follow any restriction laid down by the jurists in certain problems of jurisprudence. He goes back to the early sources (Kitāb and Sunna) and interprets them in a wider way so as to derive the full benefit of the privileges ^{allowed} recommended by them.

1. M R M.II, 2-100 specially pp 5-7 and 79-80.

2. M R.IV,35.

3. M.Fatawā. II, 375 sqq. The Hanafites never lift their hands like this in prayer. They consider it unlawful.

CHAPTER IV

RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND SOCIAL CUSTOMS

Books available on Religious Practices and Social Customs.

1. Ziyārat al-qubūr wa l-istinjād bi l-maqbūr, M R, pp.103-122: against the practice of visiting tombs.
2. Ris. Shadd al-rihāl or Ris. fi ziyāra Bait al-Maqdas, M R K, II, 53-63. A fatwā against the practice of visiting the tombs of the Prophets and saints. (1)
3. Ris. al-istighātha, M R K, I, 470-475
4. Ris. fi al-Samā' wa l-raqq, M R K, II, 278-315; a treatise against the music and dancing of the Sūfīs.
5. Ris. al-Shafā'a al-Sharīya wa'l-al-tawassul ila allāh, M R M, I, 10-24; on the illegality of asking the assistance of the Prophet after his death.
6. Ris. Ahl al-Suffa. M R M, I, 25-60. In this treatise he corrects some misconceptions regarding the 'people of the bench' and their activities, and about the so-called

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1. On account of this risāla he was thrown into prison at Damascus whence he never returned alive. See Fawat I, 41. This subject is dealt with also in his fi manāsik al-Hajj (M R K, II, 395) - see Chapter no.8.

groups of saints known as Ghawth, Qutb, Qalandariya, rijal al Ghaib, etc.

7. Ris. Libās al-futūwwa 'inda al-Sūfiya, M R M, I, 147-160, arguing that the so-called libās al-futūwwa⁽¹⁾ has no origin in Islām but is an innovation.
 8. Mas'alat al-ghība, M R M, V, 105-112. A fatwā on the illegality of speaking about the absent in a manner that may offend them.
 9. Ris. al-'ibādāt al-Shariya, M R M, V, 81-104.
 10. Al-wasiya al Ṣuḥrā, M R K, I, 231-240. A testament made on the request of one Abūl Qāsim b. Yūsuf b. Muḥammad al-Tujībī al-Ṣibtī on faith (imān) and actions (a'māl).
 11. Al-Wasiya al-Kubrā, M R K, I, 262 - 317. The large testament issued to Shaikh Abu'l Barakāt 'Adī b. Musāfir al-Umawī and his followers, on faith, actions and the belief of the Ahl al-Sunna. It also provides us with some material regarding tradition.
 12. Qā'ida jalīla fi'l-tawassul wa'l-wasīla, 3rd edition 1345 A.H. pp.2-155. A book on the illegality of taking an intermediary between God and man in this
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1. M R M, I, 149. About the meaning and derivation of the word futūwwa see p.151 sq.

world. The Prophet might be considered so only as long as he was alive.

13. Munāzarat Ibn Taimiyya lidajā'ilat al-rifā'īya, M R M, I, 121-146, against the Rifā'īya darwishes.
14. Al-Sūfiyya wa'l-fuqarā, Cairo, 1928 A.D. (second edition on the meaning of Sufism, its grades. etc.
15. Al-Radd 'ala al-Nusairiyya, M R, 94-102. A fatwā against the customs of the Nusairi inhabitants of Syria. (1)
16. Ris. al-hisba fi'l-Islām. M R, 35-91. On law and order in Islām.
17. A treatise on the prohibition of pilgrimage to the tombs of the Prophets. Berl. 4047.
18. Mas'alat al-ziyāra, a treatise on the same subject written in 710/1310, Münch, 885/2.
19. His defence against the attacks made on him on account of the above two pamphlets. Münch 885/7. (2)
20. I'tibār fi l-nahy fi'l-nikāh, Berl. 4664.

1. This has been translated by Guyard in J A S, 6, 1871. XVIII, 158; Salisbury translated it partially in J A O S II, 1851. 257.

2. The title suggests that it contains his opinion on some prohibition of marriage. In his other writings he does not appear to have said anything against marriage, though we do not know if he himself ever married.

21. Qā'ida fi l-mu'jizāt wa l-karamāt. M R M, V, 2-36.

It shows that he believes in the miracles of the Prophets and the walīs. Here he refers to Abū Nu'aim's Dalā'il al-Nabuwwa, Ibn Ishāq's Sira, Bukharī's Sahih and Ahmad's Musnad.

22. Al-Wasita bain al-khalq wa'l-Haqq, M R, 45-54. In

it he says that the Prophets and the mashā'ikh (religious guides) may be taken as wasā'it, intermediaries for guidance to the path of God. But to make of the Prophets, the mashā'ikh or the angels intermediaries for the removal of troubles and anxieties of the world, ⁽¹⁾ is heretical.

23. Risāla al-ijtimā' wa l-iftirāq fi'l-halaf bi l-ṭalāq, Cairo, 1342, on the oath of divorce, edited by Muhammad 'Abd al-Razzāq Hamza, pp. 24. The edition supplements the fatwā of Ibn Taimiyya with the opinion of Ibn Hazm.

1. M R.p.46

PILGRIMAGE TO TOMBS AND INVOCATION OF SAINTS

One of the most insistent points in Ibn Taimiya's programme for the reform of Islām was his protest against the cult of the Prophets and saints, pilgrimage to their tombs and various superstitious beliefs.

According to Kutubī it was on account of his condemnation of Ziyāra (pilgrimage to tombs) that our author was finally imprisoned in the citadel of Damascus where he died (1) and it is with this campaign that his name and reputation have ever since been linked.

It is quite against the injunctions of Islām, says Ibn Taimiya, ^{to make a journey} to visit the tombs of Sufīs, Walīs or even Prophets, and to do so in an act of shirk, (polytheism). In support of this he quotes a number of verses from the Qur'an (2) and concludes that to ask assistance from a

1. Fawāt I, 42.

2. Sūra XVII, 58 sq. "Say: call ye upon those whom ye fancy to be gods beside Him; yet they will have no power to relieve you from trouble, or to shift it elsewhere. Those whom ye call on, themselves desire union with their Lord, striving which of them shall be nearest to Him: they also hope for His mercy and fear His chastisement." Again Sūra XXXIV.21. "Say: call ye

Sufi or a wali is worse than to ask gods and goddesses for the same. Those who do so are kuffar, infidels. When a man asks from the dead something which only God can give, such as healing of sickness in himself or his cattle, or provision from an unknown source, or money to pay his debts, all such requests are illegal. Only God should be approached for such aid. Similarly it is not lawful to ask an angel, a shaikh or even a Prophet to pardon sins or to help in vanquishing an enemy. The Prophet advised Ibn 'Abbās to ask God when he required anything and all his disciples followed this advice to such an extent that none of them asked anybody even to pick up his whip when it had slipped from his hand. (1) Nevertheless, Ibn Taimiyya sanctioned the visitation of tombs but only under the following conditions.

(a) If the visitor prays for the dead in the same manner as Muslims do in salāt al-Janāza, prayer

upon those whom ye deem gods, beside God; their power in the Heavens and in the Earth is not the weight of an atom - neither have they any share in either; nor hath He a helper from among them."

over the bier.

(b) If the visitor seeks some benefits from God alone.

For each of these indications Ibn Taimiyya has a tradition:

(a) The Prophet taught people what to say at the time of visiting tombs. ⁽¹⁾

(b) He said: "He who blesses me once, God blesses him ten times." ⁽²⁾

Consequently visitors to tombs may be classified in three broad divisions. ⁽³⁾

(a) Those who ask the dead to do a thing for them which is beyond human power.

(b) Those who maintain that if such and such a dead saint prays for them, God will consider it more favourably than when they themselves pray.

(c) Those who go to a tomb and say: "O God, do such and such thing for us by the rank or blessing that this dead man holds before you."

Of the above three classes of visitors the first is

1. M R.p.106

2. Ibid. p.106.

3. Ibid. pp 106-112.

سلام علیکم اهل دیار قوم مؤمنین الخ

guilty of shirk, the second though not guilty of shirk is guilty of impiety (fisq) while the third acts contrary to the practice of the companions and their followers. (1)

Towards the third class of visitors Ibn Taimiyya is somewhat lenient though he disapproves of their actions. He cites a few opinions in favour of the practice but does not definitely tell us that such a thing must not be done by a Muslim. (2)

The principles on which Ibn Taimiyya based these judgments are to be found in his discussion on Shafa'ah, meditation.

It is permissible, he says, to have recourse to an intermediary so long as he is living, to invoke the Divine assistance. For example, during the lifetime of the Prophet, when there was a scarcity of rain, people asked him to pray to God and there was rain, but after his death when a similar need arose they did not go to his grave. Instead they went to 'Abbās, the cousin of the Prophet who

1. M.R. pp.106 - 112

2. Ibid. p.112. The reason of his silence here is a hadith narrated by Ibn Māja;

اللهم انى استلكت بحجى السائلين عليك و بحجى ممثلى هذا

and a verse (xxx,46)

وكان حقا علينا نصر المؤمنين

was still alive and said: "O God, we used to seek Thy favour through Thy Prophet when we were suffering from drought, and now we ask Thy favour through the cousin of our Prophet, so do Thou give us rain."⁽¹⁾

But what Ibn Taimiyya vehemently condemns is the custom of coming to the grave of the Prophet or a Shaikh and asking his assistance for the removal of a calamity. He who does so is a mushrik, polytheist. It is God alone who can do good to men and remove evils from them. Qur'ān says:

"If God lay the touch of trouble on thee, none can deliver thee from it but He: and if He will thee any good, none can keep back His boons."⁽²⁾

"The mercy which God layeth open for man, no one can keep back; and what He shall keep back, none can afterwards

1. M R.p.113. There is a tradition that once while the Prophet was busy with his sermon in the mosque at Medina a man stepped in and said: "O Apostle of God, animals have perished and the paths are blocked (on account of severe rain), please pray to God to stop it. The Prophet prayed and the rain stopped.

2. Sūra x.107.

send forth." (1)

A believer must hope for the mercy of God, fear Him alone, and pray to Him sincerely. The Prophet being best of all, did not allow any of his followers to address him as yā saiyidī or yā rasūl allāh when he was in trouble (asking the Prophet to remove his troubles) and nobody did so as long as the Prophet was alive nor after he died. He advised the Muslims to call on God alone, and bless His Prophet and the members of His Prophet's family. Besides he taught them several du'ās, invocations, but there is nothing in them that indicates istinjād bi'l-Nabīy, seeking help through the Prophet. (2)

The Prophet did not allow his followers to show him any undue reverence as it might lead them to polytheism.

1. Sūra xxxv, 2.

2. M R.p.114. A later scholar Yūsuf al-Nabhānī attacked Ibn Taimiyya about istinjād bi l-Nabīy in his Shāhid al-Haqq fi'l-istighātha bi saiyid al-khalq, Cairo, 1323 A.H. but this book has been refuted by one Abu'l Ma'ālī al-Shāfi'ī in his Ghayat al-Amānī fi l-radd 'al al-Nabhānī, Cairo, 1325 in 2 vols.

Ibn Taimiya adopts the view that the worship of idols, Wadd, Suwā', Yaghuth, Ya'ūq and Nasr mentioned in the Qur'an ⁽¹⁾ arose out of such reverence paid to the dead. ⁽²⁾ This is why the Prophet forbade the Muslims to show him respect even by standing, much less by prostration. ⁽³⁾ Once Mu'adh b. Jabal, after returning from Hira, prostrated himself to the Prophet, whereupon he asked Mu'adh in surprised tone: "What is this, O Mu'adh?" In order to justify his action Mu'adh replied, "In Syria, I found people prostrating themselves to their religious heads, and they informed me that they got it from their Prophets." "They have lied, O Mu'adh," replied the Prophet, "had I ordered anybody to prostrate himself to anyone, I would have ordered a woman to prostrate herself to her husband on account of his great right over her. ⁽⁴⁾ O Mu'adh, would you prostrate yourself

1. Sūra lxxi, 22. Ibn Taimiya here notes that in explaining this verse Ibn 'Abbās said that between Adam and Noah there passed two centuries in which people followed Islām, but then they turned polytheists when they began to show honour to the graves of the pious.

2. M R.p.116

3. Ibid. p.116

4. Ibid. p.116

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to my grave?" "No," replied Mu'adh. "Do not do so," said the Prophet, (1) On another occasion the Prophet said, "Do not honour me as the Persians ('Ajamis) do to each other. He who is pleased to be respected by people by their standing, should choose his residence in Hell." (2)

The only true doctrine of Intercession, according to Ibn Taimiya, is that on the day of Resurrection it will be permitted to Muslims to ask the Prophet Muhammad for his intercession. Nobody is allowed to ask him for the same in this world. Once a munāfiq, hypocrite, began to give trouble to the Muslims. Abū Bakr being impatient called the Muslims and said, تورا بالنسخت برسول الله من هذا المنافق "Let us go and ask the Prophet for his assistance against this munāfiq." Hearing this, the Prophet said, انه لا يستغاث بي واما يستغاث بالله "Assistance must not be asked from me. It must be sought from God." (3)

In order to strengthen his argument, Ibn Taimiya skilfully quotes against the Sūfis the dicta of their own forerunners. Abū Yazīd Bistāmī used to say: "Asking for

1. M R.p.116

2. Ibid.

3. M R K.I,472.

succour by a creature is like one drowning man asking another drowning man for help." (1) Similarly a renowned saint of Egypt, Abū 'Abdullāh al-Qurashī used to say: "To ask help of a man is like one prisoner's asking help of another." (2)

The practice of kissing the graves and rubbing the face over them are also forbidden. No one should kiss even the tomb of the Prophet. (3)

It follows from what has been said that Ibn Taimiyya held it illegal to make a pilgrimage to the tomb of the Prophet if it is made for the purpose of seeking succour from it. (4) The opposition to Ibn Taimiyya's attack on ziyāra in orthodox circles may be judged from the fact that al-Subkī, one of his greatest contemporaries refuted it in his *Shifā' al-Siqām fī ziyārat khair al-anām*. (5)

1. M R K.I,474

2. Ibid.

3. M R.p.116

4. See also *Minhaj* I,132 sq; M F.II, 185.

5. Haiderabad, 1315 A.H. But this book has also been thoroughly refuted by Ibn al-Hādī in his *al-Sarim al-munkī fī l-radd 'ala al-Subkī*, Cairo, 1319. For Ibn al-Hādī, see al-Dhahabī, *Tadhkira*, IV,290.

Our author's opinion on this point is expressed in detail in the following works.

1. Ris. fī-ziyāratī Bait al-Maqdas, M R K, II, 53-63.
2. Miḥāj al-Sunna I, 132 sq.
3. Majmū'at Fatawā II, 185 sq.

In these works he holds strictly to the literal meaning of the saying of the Prophet:

لا تشد الرحال إلا إلى ثلاثة مساجد - مسجد الحرام ومسجدى هذا والمسجد الأقصى

"Journeys must not be made except to three mosques (a) The mosque at Mecca (b) the mosque at Medina and (c) the mosque at Jerusalem."

Subkī divided his Shifā into ten chapters. In the first he enumerated 15 sayings of the Prophet in favour of visits to the tombs of the Prophet, such as, "He who visits my tomb, my intercession will surely go to him." In the second chapter, he cites traditions that indicate the same view though not so explicitly. But these traditions were in turn criticised and rejected by Ibn al-Hādī mentioned above. The hadīth, "He who visits my tomb etc." is in his opinion a false tradition whose chain of authority is open to criticism, and so on.

In the opinion of Ibn Taimiyya only these three mosques have been accepted by the Prophet as the object of journeys on account of their excellence over all other mosques and places of prayers. (1)

SAMĀ'

Ibn Taimiyya's views on samā' and raqs (2) are based on the belief that they have no place in Islām, but are all innova-

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1. For the views of the different a'imma on this tradition see Badhl al-Majhud, Part I, 203 of vol.III.
 2. M R K, II, 278-315. This treatise is not an independent pamphlet by our author. It was collected by Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Munbiḡī al-Hanbalī (Brockelmann II, 76) from the fatwas of our author and Ibn al-Jawzī (pp 295-303).
Cf. I. J. Talbīs, p. 245 sqq. 237 sqq. 244 sqq. (Cairo, 1340) For Ghazālī's opinion on the topic see Ihya II, 236 sqq. (Cairo 1348) which has been translated by Prof. Macdonald in J R A S, 1901, pp 705 sqq.
Cf. Abū Ḥafṣ 'Umar al-Suhrawardī, 'Awārif al-ma'ārif on the margin of Ihya l.c.

ations and against the Shari'ah.

Sama' (1) originated in the last part of the second century A.H. But Imam Shafi'i (2) holds the view that it was the free thinkers, zindiqs (3) who first introduced taghbir (recitation of poetry etc.) at Bagdad, in order to distract (4) people from listening to the Qur'an. Ibn al-Jawzi also (5) refers to it in his Talbia.

Unlike al-Ghazali, Ibn Taimiya attaches a literal meaning to the word Sama', as 'hearing' and divides it into two classes.

(a) The lawful Sama'.

(b) The unlawful Sama'.

The lawful sama' is to listen to the verses of the Qur'an and to sermons, whereas the unlawful one is the music of the darwishes including mukā and tasdiya (whistling)

1. M R K.II.287

2. See Huart, Les zindiq en drôt Mussulman, II, Congress of Orientalists, III, pp 69 ff. Enc. of Islām, s.v. Zindik.

3. Zamakhshari, Asās al-Balāgha II, 103. See also Lane, s.v. taghbir

4. M R K.II,287

5. P.245.1.3.

and clapping). The Qur'an sanctions the lawful *Samā'* and forbids the unlawful one. (1)

The tradition in favour of music of the darwishes narrated by Maqdisi and Suhrawardi (2) is false. They narrate that once a beduin recited two lines (3) of a poem in the presence of the Prophet who was so charmed with it that his mantle dropped down from his shoulders (on account of ecstasy) whereupon Mu'awiya said, "How excellent is your sport!" "O Mu'awiya," replied the Prophet, "he who does not show his love at the remembrance of his beloved is not a noble man." Another tradition that reveals the same kind of falsehood is related by Muhammad b. Tahir al-Maqdisi. Once when the poor were told the good news that they would enter Heaven before the rich they became mad with ecstasy and tore their clothes into

1. M R K, II, 282.

2. 'Awārif II, 253-55.

3. The lines are

فلا طبيب لي ولا راقى
فغده رقتي وترتقى
قد لست حية الهوى كبدى
ألا الجيب الذي شفت به

"The viper of love has stung my liver (heart) and no physician nor charmer can cure it, except the beloved through whom I was wounded. With him is my charm and theriac." 'Awārif, II, 254.

pieces. Gabriel came down at once and said, "Your Lord wants His share of these." He then took a rag from those torn pieces and suspended it to the Throne of God. (1)

Moreover the Prophet never allowed his disciples to assemble together to listen to song accompanied by hand-clapping or beating of the qadib,⁽²⁾ wand or duff,⁽³⁾ tambourine. Nevertheless, he allowed women to beat the duff on happy occasions like marriages, etc. They were further allowed to clap during prayers in order to warn the iman when he committed mistakes.⁽⁴⁾ So beating the duff and

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1. M R K.II, 282. cf. 'Awārif I.c.II,255. The allegation against Suhrawardī that he accepted such an absurd tradition appears to be unfounded. It will be seen from 'Awārif II,255, that though Suhrawardī narrates both these traditions through al-Maqdisī, he admits that these reports are unauthentic.
 2. Qadib is a primitive instrument for determining the measure. Farmer. Hist. of Arabic Music, p.16, 74.
 3. See Salvador Daniel. The Music and Musical Instruments of the Arabs. p.221.sq.
 4. See Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, Kit. al-Ṣalat, b. man dakhala liya' umma al-nāsa; Muslim, kit al-Ṣalat. 1.22. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Tajrīd. Co. No.33.

clapping of hands were permitted to women, but wherever a male attempted to sing with the duff etc. he was scornfully given the title of mukhannath (effeminate) and the (male) musicians as makhannith.⁽¹⁾

The Prophet and the early Muslims never attended any musical performance. Nowhere in the Hijāḥ, Syria, Yaman, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Khurasān and Spain was there anyone

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1. M R K, II, 284. Farmer quotes this story in his History of Arabian Music. p.45 sq. He says, "the first male professional musician in al-Hijāḥ belonged to a class known as the mukhannathūn, (sing. mukhannath) who were evidently unknown in pagan times. These people were an effeminate class who dyed their hands and affected the habits of women. The first male professional musician in the days of Islam is generally acknowledged to have been Tuwais, the mukannath and indeed, it is said that in al-Median, music had its origin among the mukhannathūn." But Farmer adds, "this is probably a canard of the legists."

among these people who ever encouraged it. ⁽¹⁾

Ibn Taimiyya however quotes the tradition narrated by 'Ā'isha that on the occasion of an 'īd festival her father (Abū Bakr) came to see her. He found her listening to the songs of two Ansār girls who were singing to her the events of Yawm al-Bu'āth. ⁽²⁾ He did not like it and said:
 ابنور الشيطان في بيت رسول الله "Art thou with the flute of Satan in the house of the Prophet of God?" The Prophet, who had his face turned to the wall of the house, remarked, "Let them sing, O Abū Bakr, for every community has a festival and this is our Muslim festival. ⁽³⁾

1. M R K, II, 282: M R M, I, 38

2. Day of Bu'āth famous for the battle between two tribes, Aws and Khazraj in the pre-Islamic age. Bu'āth was a place two miles away from Medina or a place in the district of Banī Qurayza. See E.I. s.v. Bu'āth; Aghānī, xv, 163, 164, xiv, 95. M. Buldān, I, 670

3. M R K, II, 285. Hasā'ī narrates this hadīth (kit. al-īdān) and tells us that the two girls were singing with the duff. Bukhārī (kit. al-īdān, b. 2; kit. al-manākib, b. 14) and Muslim (kit. al-īdān fasl 4) report that at the time when 'Ā'isha was listening to the songs of the two girls, the Prophet entered the house and lay down on

Ibn Taimiyya's explanation of this hadith is that to listen to music was not the habit of the Prophet or his disciples and this is why Abū Bakr called it mazmūr al-shaitān, "flute of the devil"; but that a man commits no sin if he hears music accidentally, because the Prophet himself heard it in his house accidentally. ⁽¹⁾

It would appear therefore that Ibn Taimiyya is much stricter in his judgments on Sama' than is Ibn al-Jawzi ⁽²⁾ who asserts that we must first look to māhiyat al-shay, the essence of a thing and then call it haram, makruh etc. The word sama', he adds, may have several meanings such as ghinā' al-Hajjāi, or music of the pilgrims describing Ka'ba, zamzam, etc. to listen to which is mubah. Similarly the music of the soldiers and the music called Hudā ⁽³⁾ come under the same head.

As in his argument against visitation of tombs, Ibn Taimiyya strengthens his case by quoting the opinions of the jurists and Sūfī Shaiḫs.

his bed turning his face away.

1. M R K.II.285

2. Talbīs, 237.sq.

3. Farmer. p.25, 29; Talbīs p.238.

Abū Hanīfa and Mālik disapproved of samā⁽¹⁾ more strongly than did Shāfi⁽²⁾ and Ahmad. Imām Ahmad and sages like Ibrāhīm b. Adham⁽³⁾, Fudail b. 'Iyād⁽⁴⁾, Mārūf al Karkhī⁽⁵⁾ and Abū Sulaimān al-Dārānī⁽⁶⁾ did not utter

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1. M R K.II.296
 2. A famous sūfī of Balkh, d.161/777. See Fawāt I,3.
Enc. of Isl. s.v.
 3. A sūfī contemporary of Harūn al-Rashīd . He started his life as a member of a robber band but then turned a perfect sūfī after he heard a man reciting the verse of the Qur'ān, Sūra lvii, 15. He died in 187/802. I.Khall.I, 415. Enc. of Isl. s.v.
 4. Abū Mahfūz Ma^rūf b.Firūz d.200/815 or 201/819. A sūfī of Christian origin who accepted Islām in the hand of 'Alī.b.Mūsa al-Ridā. He was a teacher of Sarī al-Saqatī I.Khall.II, 104; Nicholson. Let.Hist. p.385-86 and 388.
 5. 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Ahmad b. 'Atiyya al-'Anasī, d.225/839. I.Kh.I.276. Fawāt I.251.
 6. Abu'l Hasan Sarī b. al-Mughallis al-Saqatī, maternal uncle of Abu'l-Qāsim al-Janaid, a student of al-Karkhī d.256/869 or 257/870 at Baghdād. Wafayūt, I,200.

samā'. Those who enjoyed samā' and spread the custom of listening to it were all originally men suspected of mandāqa (free thinkers), such as Ibn al-Rāwandī, (1) al-Fārābī (3) Ibn Sīnā, and others. Al-Fārābī himself was a renowned musician. (4) His experience with Saif ad-Dawla whom he made weep, laugh and then sleep by means of his music, is known all. (5) Two other great saints, namely Shaikh 'Abd al-Qādir and Shaikh 'Adī after whom the Qādirī and the 'Adawīy

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1. Abu' l-Husain Ahmad b. Yahya b. Ishāq d. 245/859. Wafayāt, I.27.
 2. Abu Nasr Muhammad b. 'Uzalaq b. Tarkhān, the greatest philosopher of Islām before Avicenna, d.339/950. Some of his treatises have been published in Haidarabād, Deccan. Enc. of Islām. s.v. Arabic Literature. p.63.
 3. Abu 'Alī al-Husain b. 'Abdallah b. Sīnā. b.370/980. in Isfahān d.420/1029. Wafayāt, I,152. Enc. of Islām. s.v. Arabic Literature. p.73 sq.
 4. Saif al-Dawla Abu' l Hasan 'Alī b. 'Abdallah b. Hamdān ruler of Aleppo. b. 308/915. Wafayāt, I,364; Nicholson Lit.Histo. pp.269-71 and 303-7.
 5. For the whole statement see M R K.II, 287-288.

orders were established did not attend Samā'.⁽¹⁾ Junaid
 Baghdādī who used to attend samā' in his early years aban-
 doned it when he became old. Junaid used to say,
 "He who uses music as
 an artificial aid is liable to fall into sin and he who
 meets it accidentally finds relief in it."⁽³⁾ Ibn Taimiyya
 notes that samā' consists of the description of love, union
 and separation, all of which may be applied to God and
 friends alike. This is why Junaid forbade it to be taken
 up earnestly as it might mislead one.⁽⁴⁾

1. M.R.K. II, 296.

'Abd al-Qādir b. 'Alī b. Zangī Dost, a preacher and
 sufi. Fuwat, II, 2. Enc. of Isl. s.v. 'Adī b.
 Musāfir born near Ba'labakh. d. 557/1162 or
 555/1160.

2. M R K. II, 296

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

RAQS

Ibn Taimiyya's treatment of raqs dance in his risāla
fi' l-samā' wa' l-raqs ⁽¹⁾ is very short and is directed mainly
 against the dancing darwishes of the Mawlawiyya fraternity.

He was asked to give a fatwa about a man who liked
 the music and dance of the darwishes and composed some
 verses in defence of them. ⁽²⁾

In reply he condemned the verses saying that they were
 against the Sharīf and that the comparison of those who
 approved of samā' to Moses was foolish. ⁽³⁾

1. M.R.K. II, 278-315

2. Ibid. p.312. The verses are:

فغلبهم بن اجل ذلك سلام	انكروا رقصا وقالوا حرام
والزيم الشرع فالسمع حرام	اعبد الله يا فقيه وصل
عند قوم احوالهم لا تلام	بل حرام مبدى ثم حلال
جانب الطور جذوة وكلام	مثل قوم صفوا وبن لهم
فحرام على الجميع حرام -	فاذا قبل السماع بلهو

3. M R K. II, 312

Raga cannot be declared lawful because of the following verses.
(1)

"And do not walk in the land exultingly"

"But let their pace be medium"

"And the servants of the God of Mercy are they who walk upon the earth softly."

Moreover neither the Prophet nor any of the early Muslims ever danced in their life. The Muslim worship consists of rukū' and sujūd with a calm and quiet mind. However, if a man is overpowered by ecstasy and dances unconsciously, he may be excused, provided that he is very careful about the cause of his ecstasy. If the ecstasy, continues Ibn Taimiyya, comes through unlawful causes, he is accountable for it. Such a man may be compared to one who drinks wine although he knows that it will intoxicate him. Again, it must not be imagined that lawful ecstasy can come when he is drunk, because when drunkenness itself is prohibited how can its effect (i.e. ecstasy) be lawful? (2)

Ibn Taimiyya does not reject all sufi practices as

1. Sūra xvii, 39; xxxi, 18; xxv, 64.

See also M R K, II, 298

2. M R K, II, 298

heretical but reserves his condemnation for three classes of Darwishes noted for their extravagance and non-Islamic practices.

(a) The Qalandariya. These people are ignorant and misguided. They do not follow the true religion. It is false to say that their leader Qalandar lived during the time of the Prophet. According to Abū Ḥafṣ al-Suhrawardī, their original ancestors were a saintly tribe in Persia, but then, in course of time, they gave up obligatory religious duties and committed unlawful actions like the sect of the 'Maḥamatiya' who concealed their good deeds and made a show of irreligious actions.

(b) The Rifa'iya.⁽²⁾ These people call themselves

1. M R M, I, 52

2. This fraternity was founded at Baghdād by Abū 'l 'Abbās Ahmad b. 'Alī al-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Abi 'l- 'Abbās Ahmad Rifa'ī who died in 578 A.H. "In his lifetime he gathered a large body of disciples, whom he incorporated in an order in 576 the members being in community under a Shaikh, to whom they owed unquestioning obedience, but having also, like other orders, a number of lay adherents." See O'Leary, p.195 and Macdonald, Muslim Theology, p.267.

Faqīrs and sāliks, whereas they are ghulāt, extremists, and innovators. Some of them are even polytheists and unbelievers. They pay little attention to the Shari'ah. They make unlawful pretensions and claim to work miracles such as treading on fire, swallowing serpents and turning of things into saffron, sweets and honey. Some of them ultimately turned good Muslims after repenting of their unlawful actions. (1)

Once our author had a munāzara, discussion with these Darwishes who claimed that the orthodox could not perform the miracle of entering fire while they themselves could do it easily. He himself witnessed the leader of the Darwishes walking through fire without being injured. But later on it occurred to him (Ibn Taimiyya) that there must be some trick in their doing so. After performing an istikhāra, (2) Ibn Taimiyya gave a counter challenge that he was ready to plunge into a flaming fire along with them if they would only wash their bodies with vinegar and hot water before entering the fire. The

1. M R.M I,122, cf. O'Leary, p.197.

2. An optional prayer recommended by the Prophet to be said before undertaking an important thing. It is said before going to bed.

Darwishes and their chief were startled at being detected in their trick of rubbing the body with medicines like frog-oil, the inner skin of oranges and Talc stone as protections against fire, and did not appear again. (1)

(c) The Futuwwa Darwishes and their Daskara Assembly (2)

A certain class of Darwishes attend an Assembly of their own called Daskara and clothe one of their members with a garment called libās al-futuwwa. In this assembly they have a curious custom of drinking salt water by turns and uttering all sorts of uncouth words. They believe that the Prophet, having been offered a garment by God, gave it to his son-in-law 'Alī b. Abī Tālib with an instruction to give it to anybody he chose. Ibn Taimīya considers all these superstitious and unlawful. They have no foundation in Islām. Moreover, the word futuwwa was interpreted by many shaikhs كفارة الاخلاق good conduct or ترک ما نهي لما تخشى giving up of agreeable things for things feared, in accordance

1. M R M.I, 129-136

2. For the origin and development of this group of darwishes see "Die Islamischen Futuwaabunde" by Franz Taeschner in Z.D.M.G. N.F. Band XII, Heft 1/2 (1933)

with the verse of the Qur'ān, "Remember when Moses said to his servant (fata)....."⁽¹⁾

Discussion of the terms applied to classes of Sūfis

Terms accepted by Ibn Taimiyya as acceptable:

1. Walī, 'friend of God' as against 'adu, His enemy. All Muslims (says Ibn Taimiyya) who guard themselves against evil may be called "friends of God." They may be of two classes: (a) ^{al}/muctasid, moderates and (b) al-muqarrab, honoured ones. The Qur'ān bears testimony to this. "Surely the friends of God - they shall have no fear nor shall they grieve. They who believe and fear God - for them are good tidings..."⁽²⁾
2. Faḡīr. Early Muslims applied this word in anti-thesis to ghanī, rich. Later Muslims meant by it a sālik, spiritual guide or a sūfī, both of which, (sālik

1. Sūra xviii, 59. M R M.I.147-152. This refers to the story in the Qur'ān about Moses' journey with his servant, and his murder of a young boy, and his making a hole in the boat of a man who helped them in crossing a river and so on. See Sūra xviii. 59 sqq.
2. M R M.I.40. Sūra x, 63. See Prof. Nicholson: Mystics of Islām, p.122sqq.

and sufi) in the opinion of Ibn Taimiyya, may also be applied to a siddiq, a wali or a saliḥ.⁽¹⁾

Terms which he regards as misinterpreted by the Sufis.

1. Ghawth, a term applied to the chief of the saints who is said to reside at Mecca. The word ghawth or ghiyath in his opinion, should be applied only to God who is the ghiyath al-Mustaghithūn, i.e., the helper of the seekers of help. It is polytheism to maintain that the people of the world may seek help of three hundred saints, and the three hundred, in their turn, from the seventy, and these from the forty, who again have recourse to the seven, the again to the four who finally carry the petition to the ghawth.⁽²⁾

2. The four Awtād, (sing. watad, lit. a peg.) Sometimes a peg may mean a man through whom religion and faith are strengthened, but there is no justification for limiting their number to four only.⁽³⁾

1. M R M.I,45. Sūfiyya, p.22-24

2. M R M,I,48. This seems to be an arbitrary and imaginary theory of the mystics. cf. Ibn al-‘Arabī, Futūḥ al-Makkiyya, chapter 73 and 383.

3. M R M.I,49. See Mystics of Islām p.124.

3. The seven Aqṭab (sing. qutb. lit. the fixed point round which the sky revolves). This term may mean a man who is like a 'pole' in religious and worldly matter (1) but it is wrong to maintain that they are only seven.
4. The four Abdāl, (sing. Badal, substitute). The Abdāl are not mentioned in any genuine tradition though people often assert that when a noble man dies, another (2) man is raised in his place to continue his work.
5. Khātam al-Awliyā. the seal of the saints. This empty term was first introduced by Muhammad b. 'Alī al-Ḥākim al-Tirmidhī. Afterwards people like Ibn Ḥamawīya, Ibn 'Arabī and others claimed it for themselves in rivalry (3) with the Khātam al-Anbiyā, the seal of the Prophets.

1. M R M, I, 49 See Mystics of Islām p.123sq

2. Ibid. 49-50

3. Ibid. 51.

ANTI SHI'ITE POLEMICS

Strongly as Ibn Taimiyya condemned the errors (as he regarded them) of the Sufis, it is a mistaken view that this was the main object of his public activities. His most bitter attacks were directed against the Shi'ites. The eradication of shi'ism from Islam was one of the main points in his plans for reform. This is well-exhibited in ~~his-plans-for~~ the title and contents of his kit. Minhaj al-Sunna al-Nabawiya fi naqd kalam al-Shi'a wal-Qadariya. This book consisting of 1156 pages was written in reply to a pamphlet ⁽¹⁾ composed by a leading theologian of the Mongol period, Hasan b. Yusuf b. 'Ali b. Mutahhar al-Hilli, who died in 726 A.H. two years before the death of our author.

Although neither al-Hilli's arguments nor Ibn Taimiyya's ⁽²⁾ replies depart materially from those of their predecessors we may nevertheless summarize the main heads of his argument against the Shi'ite doctrines.

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1. Minhajal-karama fi ma'rifat al-Imama. See I O L.Loth. 471 ff.50-60. This pamphlet which consists mainly of the doctrines of the Ithna 'Ashariya sect, was dedicated to Uljaitu Khan (r.703-716) of the Ilkhan family.
 2. As Ibn Taimiyya himself points out in criticising al-Hilli's statements. M.Sunna. I,171 sq.

1. Is the bai'a, oath of allegiance to an imam, essential for every Muslim?

In the opinion of Hilli every Muslim has to give allegiance to an Imam in pursuance of a saying of the Prophet:

"He who dies without knowing the imam of his time dies a pagan death."⁽¹⁾

Ibn Taimiya rejects this view and declares the above tradition to be spurious. In his opinion the genuine hadith narrated by Muslim on the authority of Nafi' is that when Yazid became Caliph and his army had defeated the dissident Medinians at the Harrā, 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar came to 'Abdallāh b. Muti' who had rebelled against Yazid, and narrated to him the following saying:

من خلى يد من طاعة لقي الله يوم القيامة لا حجة له ومن مات وليس في عنقه بيعة مات ميتة جاهلية *

"He who withdraws a hand from obedience will meet God on the day of resurrection without any defence. He who dies owing no allegiance dies a pagan death."

This tradition, continues our author, affirms the duty of allegiance to a Muslim ruler even though he be an oppressor. It cannot be cited in support of the Shi'ite imama. Even if it be granted that the Shi'ites are right

1. Ms. I O L.Loth.471. f.52/a.sq.

in their interpretation, it does not help them in support of their theory, because it was they who refused allegiance to the commonly accepted Caliphate after the Prophet. Moreover, their present imām, Muhammad b. Hasan al-Muntazar, according to their superstitious belief, went into hiding in the cell of Samurra in 260 A.H. ⁽¹⁾ since when nobody has seen him or heard about him for more than four hundred years; so how absurd it is to give allegiance to a fictitious and invisible person. ⁽²⁾

2. Nature of the Imāma. The Shī'ites regard the imāma as a divine institution. They maintain that God appointed the imāms to succeed the Prophet as leaders of the Muslims. ⁽³⁾ Hilli here accuses the Sunnites that

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1. According to Mustawfi. p.47, it was in 264/874, see Donald The Shī'ite Religion.p.245. For the description of the hidden imām, see p.226 sq.
 2. M.Sunna, I,27 sq.
 3. The ithnā 'ashariya, among the Shī'ites, hold that 'Alī received the divine nomination as a successor of the Prophet with full powers, and then Hasan, Husain, Zain al-'Abidin Muhammad b.'Alī al-Bāqir, Ja'far al-Ṣādiq, Mūsa b.Jafar al-K 'Alī b.Mūsa al-Ridā, Muhammad b. 'Alī al-Jawwād, 'Alī b.

they do not maintain that the Prophet nominated a successor. Ibn Taimiyya objects that the accusation is unfounded because some of the Sunnis do believe that the nomination of Abū Bakr as an imām and Caliph was made by an implicit order of the Prophet. The dispute was only as to the nature of this order. According to Qādī Ya'la, it was by a definite statement. The traditionists, the Mu'tazilites and the Agh'arites accepted this. Others said that it was through (النصر الخفي والشارة) a tacit and an implied direction. Hasan al-Basri and a group of traditionists subscribed to this view. There is another opinion that it was contained in the Qur'an⁽¹⁾ and the Sunna. Bukhari narrates from Jabir b. Mut'im that once a woman came to the Prophet. The prophet asked her to see him again on some other occasion. "If I come and do not find you?" asked the woman. "Then go to Abū Bakr,"

Muhammad al-Hadi, and al-Hasan al-'Askari one after another. M. Karāma. fol. 50/b and 56/a.

1. Ibn Taimiyya does not cite any definite verse in this connection. This probably he refers to Ibn Hazm who has given Qur'anic citations in favour of the Caliphate of the four "rightly guided Caliphs", in his ^{al-Fis} *Ḥilal*, (Cairo) IV, 89.

replied the Prophet. Besides this there are other reports from Hudhaifa b. al-Yaman, Abū Huraira, Abū Bakr b. Mālik, Abū Bakra, Jabir and 'A'isha that indicate the nomination of Abū Bakr. (1) Ibn Taimiya shares the above opinion and points out that the narrations cited by the Shi'ites regarding the vice-regency of 'Alī have all been manufactured. (2) He refutes the views of the Rāwandiya sect who held that the Prophet nominated 'Abbās as his successor. (3) He repeatedly mentions that Abū Bakr was the best and the fittest man for the Caliphate as he was much liked by the Prophet. It was Abū Bakr who led the prayer during the last illness of the Prophet, and the Prophet once said his prayer behind Abū Bakr. Both Bukhārī and Muslim were of this opinion. In support of his opinion, Ibn Taimiya cites the opinion of Ibn Haym who dealt with this problem in his Milal, (4) and approved of the view of those who said that Abū Bakr had been nominated by the Prophet as his representative. (5)

1. M. Sunna. I, 134-35.

2. Ibid. 136

3. Ibid. cf. Ibn Hazm, *al-Milal*, IV 75 sq. (Cairo, 1347-48.)

4. *Kitāb al-Milal wa l-nihal*, AL-Fisal, IV, p. 72 sqq. M.S. I. 136. sq. *anna*

5. M. Sunna. I, 135. sq.

3. Was Abū Bakr elected by ʿUmar with the consent of some other? Ibn Taimiyya's answer to this is that the Sunnites never believed in any such report. It was, in his opinion, a certain theologian⁽¹⁾ who introduced a new theory that the imāma might be settled by allegiance of four persons, while others opined that it could be done by two or even by one. Abū Bakr was elected by common consent of the muhajirūn and the ansār, but then if ʿUmar or anybody else gave his hand first of all, it did not mean that he was selected by only one person because every allegiance (by stretching hands) must have preceded or succeeded the other. Similarly, though Abū Bakr nominated ʿUmar as his successor, the latter received the general allegiance. In the same way all Muslims accepted ʿUthmān as their Caliph though ʿUmar had appointed a shūra (Council of six persons).⁽²⁾ The claim of the Shīʿites that ʿAlī was elected by common consent, whereas Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and Uthmān were not, is meaningless. One who knows early Muslim History knows well that the allegiance given to Abū Bakr, ʿUmar or ʿUthmān was far greater than that given to ʿAlī.⁽³⁾

1. M.Sunna I,141. Ibn Taimiyya does not mention who he was.

2. Ibid.I,141,43. cf. Mawardī, pp.5-7

3. M-Sunna, I,143.

4. Does Qur'an or Sunna support 'Ali's claim to the Imama after the Prophet?

Hilli asserts that both the Qur'an and the Sunna support 'Ali's superior claim over all others to the imama. He gives forty citations from the Qur'an⁽¹⁾ and twelve from

1. The following verses, in the opinion of Hilli were revealed in connection with 'Ali's claim.

1. Sura V,60	17. Sura IX,20
2. " V,71	18. " LVIII,13
3. " V,5	19. " XLIII,44
4. " LIII,1	20. " LXIX,12
5. " XXXII,33	21. " LXXVI,
6. " XXIV,36	22. " XXXIX,34
7. " XLII,22	23. " VIII,64
8. " II,203	24. " VIII,65
9. " III,54	25. " V,59
10. " II,35	26. " LVII,18
11. " II,118	27. " II,275
12. " IX,96	28. " Every verse beginning with
13. " XIII,8	29. " XXXIII,56
14. " XXXVII,24	30. " LV,19-20
15. " XLVII,32	31. " XIII,43
16. " LVI.10-11	32. " LXVI,8.

(1) the Sunna But Ibn Taimiyya rejects the interpretation given by the Imamiyya to all of them and says that the Imamiyya are wrong in stating these arguments for the imama of 'Alī. They are either false or have nothing to do with 'Alī's claim of leadership. (2)

Let us now take a few instances.

(1) The first verse cited by Hilli, Sūra V, 60. "Verily, your protector is God and His Apostle, and those who believe, who observe prayer, and pay the alms of obligation, and who bow in worship."

Hilli asserts that the above verse was revealed about 'Alī and he cites a tradition in support of it, narrated by Tha'labi. (3) Ibn Taimiyya considers this a down-right falsehood, for Tha'labi is not trustworthy. He is a ḥāṭib lail

33. Sūra LCVII, 6.

37. Sūra XX, 30

34. " XXV, 56.

38. " XV, 47

35. " IX, 120

39. " VII, 171

36. " II, 40

40. " LXVI, 4

1. For the tradition cited by Hilli see M.S. IV, 80-110. also cf. M. Karāma foll. 56/A.

2. M. Sunna IV. 2-110. M. Karāma foll. 56 sq.

3. IV, 2.

(1)
(confused one) in transmitting traditions.

(2) The second verse. Sūra V,71.

"O Apostle! proclaim^a all that hath been sent down to thee from thy Lord: for if thou do it not, thou hast not proclaimed his message at all."

In support of his claim that the above verse was revealed about 'Alī, Hillī narrates a tradition on the authority of Abū Nu'aim and an interpretation of the verse given by Tha'labī.⁽²⁾

Ibn Taimiyya considers this also quite false. Expert muhaddithūn, he says, are agreed that the Hilya of Abū Nu'aim which describes the excellencies of the Caliphs, is full of spurious narrations. His opinion about Tha'labī's⁽³⁾ knowledge has already been mentioned.

(3) The first tradition cited by Hillī is as follows. A large number of people have narrated that when the verse, "But warn thy relatives of nearer kin"⁽⁴⁾ was revealed, the Prophet invited the children of 'Abd al-Muttalib to the house of Abū Talib. They were forty in

1. Ibid. p.4. See. M.Karāma. fol.56/a

2. See Minhāj IV.9. See also Donaldson.p.4 sq.

3. See also M.Sunna IV,9-15

4. Sūra, IV,80

number. He gave them a feast and conveyed to them the message of God and 'Alī's claim to the successorship. (1)

Ibn Taimiyya rejects the tradition, for it does not occur in any recognised Sunnī collection. (2)

(4) The second tradition. Hillī says that according to a Khabar Mutawātir when the verse بلع ما انزل اليك من ربك was revealed, the Prophet addressed the people at Ghadir Khumm (4) and said of 'Alī من كنت مولاه فعلي مولاه "Whoever has me as his master has 'Alī as his master." (5)

Ibn Taimiyya argues that it is chronologically absurd, because the verse in question was revealed during the earlier days at Medina while the alleged event of Ghadir Khumm took place on the 18th of Dhul Hajja, year 9. Moreover, on the 9th of Dhul Hajja it had already been declared, "This day have I perfected your religion", (6) so how could the verse be revealed again a few days afterwards on the 18th of the month. (7)

1. M.Sunna.IV,80. M.Karama fol.57/6

2. Ibid. IV,80-84

3. Sūra V,71

4. Donaldson pp 466

5. M.Sunn.IV.80-84 cf.M.Krama. O L.foll 54/a, 56/a

6. Sūra V,5

7. M.Sunna.IV,84-87

6. Who was the inventor of Jafr and Bitāqa and who were the Ikhwān al-Safā?

Ibn Taimīya disapproves the Shi'ite view that Ja'far b. Muhammad al-Ṣādiq was the inventor of the science of jafr (divination) and bitāqa (science of letters). Some of the Shi'ites, he adds, erroneously believed that Ja'far wrote the Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Safā but this view cannot stand for chronological reasons. Ja'far died in 148 A.H. while the book was written by some one during the 4th century A.H. when the 'Ubaidīya dynasty flourished in Egypt and built the city of Cairo. The book on the other hand, describes the Ismā'īliya doctrines and the condition of the Muslims under the Christian subjugation on the Syrian coast after the 3rd. century A.H. (1)

7. Was Shahrastānī biassed against the Imāmiya sect?

Hillī says that Shahrastānī was biassed against the imāmī's, but Ibn Taimīya rejects this statement and points out that Shahrastānī was rather pro-Imāmī, for he used in his writings books of Shi'ite writers like Abū 'Īsā Al-Warrāq, Abū Yahyā etc. He also dedicated his book Kitāb al-Milal wa l-Nihal to a Shi'ite chief. (2)

1. M.Sunna.I.231

2. Ibid. III,207

In addition to his polemic against Saint-worship and S̄ism, Ibn Taimīya made a strong protest against several other practices current in his time.

(1) Tahlīl Ibn Taimīya is not against the institution of tahlīl (1) as prescribed by the verse of the Qur'ān:

"But if the husband divorce her (a third time) it is not lawful for him to take her again, until she shall have married another husband; and if he also divorce her, then shall no blame attach to them if they return to each other, thinking that they can keep within the bounds fixed by God.

But what he condemned most was the existing practice of his time, which did not exist in the early days of Islām. The correct interpretation of the verse, he suggests, is that a man may remarry his thrice divorced wife only

(a) when another man marries her in his own interest and not with an evil intention of making her lawful for the first husband, and

(b) then the man either dies or divorces her on account of any unbearable trouble between them.

In support of this explanation he quotes a number of

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1. To this particular topic he devoted pp 2-266 in his Majmū'at Fatawā, III (2nd part)
 2. Sūra II, 230. M R. III. 4.

traditions and opinions of the companions. He also gives us the opinion of the jurists, Shafī'ī, Ahmad, Mālik, etc. who disallowed tahlīl, as understood by the common people. He moreover quotes the first tradition of the Bukhārī,

انما الاعمال بالنية

in support of his arguments, and asserts that if a man does even a good action with evil intention, he commits sin. (1)

1. M R.III.4-22. Prof.Maddonald makes the following statement of the misuse of tahlīl, and the protest of Ibn Taimiyya. to it. "...and the custom," he says, "has grown up, when a man has thus divorced his wife in hasty anger, of employing another to marry her on pledge of divorcing her again next day. Sometimes the man so employed refuses to carry out his contract; such refusal is a frequent motif in oriental tales. To avoid this, the husband not infrequently employs one of his slaves and presents him to his former wife the next day. A slave can legally marry a free woman, but when he becomes her property, the marriage is annulled, ipso facto, because a slave cannot be the husband of his mistress or a slave woman the wife of her master. It is to Ibn Taimiyya's credit that he was one of the few to lift up their voices against this abomination." Theology. p.276.

What he drives at by this is that the Qur'ān permits a divorced wife to be remarried only under the afore-said conditions laying stress on the point that there should not be any intention of divorce in the second marriage on the part of the woman or the man, in order to make her lawful for the first husband.

2. Al-halaf bi'l-talāq a fatwa on the oath of divorce

If a man swears with a threefold formula to divorce his wife if he should do or not do a certain thing, his words will not be counted as halaf bi'l-talāq and his wife will not be divorced in case of his violating the oath (hanath). It will, according to Ibn Taimiya, involve him in a mere توبة (1) an atonement of oath. This view corroborates the opinion of Dā'ūd Zāhiri, Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn Zaid al-Mālikī and Ibn Yūnus al-Shāfi'ī on the question. (2) Ibn Ḥazm quotes a tradition

1. Halaf bi'l-talāq, pp 2-20. For an expiation of oath one has to feed two poor persons or to clothe them or to set free a captive. But he who cannot carry out any of the three orders, must fast three days. See Qur'ān, Sūra v, Ibn Taimiya. M.Fatāwā, II, 79.

2. Ibid. pp 20-24

from Tā'ūs (d.106 A.H.) that the latter considered such an
 oath as a farce. ⁽¹⁾

3. Begging must be stopped, but if a man asks something
 must be given to him. The Qur'an says, "And as to him that
 asketh of thee, chide him not away." ⁽²⁾ The Prophet discour-
 aged begging. Once he said, "It is better to go with a rod
 and gather fuel than to ask for alms, which he may or may
 not get." Abū Bakr never asked anybody for even to lift
 a thing that had fallen from his hand. ⁽³⁾

He further quotes the following aphorism against begging

استغن عن شئت تكن نظيره وافضل على من شئت تكن اميره واحتج الى من شئت
 تكن اميره +

"If you want to be like one, be independent of him. If you
 want to lord over one, do good to him. If you want to be
 captive of one make yourself dependent on him." ⁽⁴⁾

1. Halaf bi l-ṭalāq, p.22 l.11.

2. Sūra xciii, 10

3. al-'Ubūdiya M.R.p.18

4. Ibid. p.19

CHAPTER V

THEOLOGY

Ibn Taimiyya's attitude towards theology and philosophy

After going through his treatises on theology and philosophy we can easily form an opinion that our author had no respect for either of them. We cannot, therefore, call him a theologian or a philosopher in the truest sense of the term.

In his Minhaj⁽¹⁾ he boldly declares that theology and philosophy have no place in Islām, and that theologians like al-Jawaini⁽²⁾, al-Ghazālī⁽³⁾ and al-Shahrastānī⁽⁴⁾ who devoted their life to these sciences,

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1. vol.III, 68.
 2. Imām al-Haramain, Abu'l Ma'ālī- 'Abd al-Malik b. Yūsuf, d.478 A.H. The greatest theologian of the 5th cent. A.H., teacher of al-Ghazālī. See Muslim Theology, p.212. Brockelmann I,388.Ibn al-Athīr x, 95.
 3. d.505. See his biography in J A O S, xx, II; Muslim Theology p.215 sqq; Brockelmann I,419 sqq; De Boer, p.154 sqq. Regarding the remark made about Ghazālī that he gave up theology and philosophy in his later life is correct.

cont.

ultimately understood their drawbacks and returned to the Qur'ān and the Sunna. Shahrastānī, he adds, confessed that it was folly to discuss theology. Al-Rāzī, in his opinion, contradicts himself in matters of theology and admits his perplexity.

"Scholastic theology", says Ghazālī, "could not consequently satisfy me nor heal the malady from which I suffered." Similarly philosophy and philosophers he reproaches with strong terms. "All in spite of their diversity, are marked with the stamp of infidelity and irreligion" and so on. See C. Field, The Confession of al-Ghazālī. p.22, 24 sqq. Muslim Theology p.229. "In his Tahāfut", says Prof. Macdonald, "he had smitten the philosophers hip and thigh..." See also Munqidh. p.8.

4. Abu'l Fath Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm, the principal historian of the religions in the oriental middle ages, b. in Shahrastān in Khorasān in 469/1076. See Shadharāt, IV, 149. See Enc. of Isl. IV, 263

In the Minhāj ⁽¹⁾ he further cites the opinions of Imām Ahmad and Abū Yūsuf who said that he who would seek knowledge by the help of Kalām would turn an atheist. Here he mentions an ^{opinion} instruction of Imām Shāfi'ī that theologians should be beaten with shoes and palm branches.

In his tafsīr Sūrat al-Ikhlās ⁽²⁾he ~~/XXXXXXXXXX~~ tells us that the salaf and other leaders tabooed theology, for it was vanity, falsehood and saying of unfitting things about God. ⁽³⁾

1. I, 181, 1.23.

2. p.62 sq.

3. But amongst the later thinkers Ash'arī (d.330 A.H.) defended theology by his ris.fī istiḥsān al-Khawḍ fi'l Kalām (Haidarabad, 1323 A.H.) In it he supports the theories of haraka, motion, sukūn, silence, jism, body, 'arad, accident, ijtimā', union, iftirāq, separation etc by the help of the Qur'ān. He further asserts that it had been an unlawful thing to discuss theology the Prophet must have prohibited it by some express injunction. In his opinion, all religious orders, be they relating to conduct or belief, have been based on rational arguments and thus it is not unlawful to enter into discussion of them.

(1)
 About the Jahmites Imām Ahmad expressed his opinion that they told untruth about God by what they denied to Him, and spoke about Him with ignorance. Abu'l 'Abbās (2)
 b.Suraj disapproved of the theories of atoms and accidents: once in answer to a question in Kalām he said "Unitarianism to the vain people is to enter into the discussion of atoms and accidents." The words atoms and accidents did not exist in Islām during the time of

1. The leader of this group Jahm b.Şafwān "was put to death at Marw about the end of the reign of the Umayyads (Ṭabarī.ed. de.Goeje, II, 1924) Description of his dogmatic views have reached us in the form of a number of more or less heretical doctrines. (Baghdādī, Farq, p.16,19 etc. al-Shahrastānī I, 60, Kit. al-Intisār, index, p.232.) Their lack of coherence is due to the fact that Djahm does not entirely accord in his doctrines with any of the well-known schools...." Wensink, Muslim Creed, p.119 sqq. For further information about Jahm see Ashārī, Maqābāt index. Ibn Qulāiba, Ikhtilāf fi'l lafz, Cairo, 1348
2. Ahmad b. 'Umair b. Suraj, Ta'rikh Baghdād, IV, 289 A'lām, p.57.

the Prophet. It was the Jahmites and the Mu'tazihites
 (1) who first invented them, Ja'd b. Dirham being mainly
 responsible for it. This Ja'd was executed by ^{lbn} Abd-
 (2) allāh b. al-Qasrī at Wāsit on account of his kalām.
 The story goes that before executing Ja'd 'Abdallāh
 stood on a pulpit and addressed the people saying,
 "O men, offer your sacrifices to God. Surely I am
 offering my victim in the person of Ja'd who says that
 God did not take Abraham as His friend, nor did He
 speak to Moses. God is far above what Ja'd attributes
 to Him." He then got down from the pulpit and cut off
 (3) Ja'd's head.

Hillī asserts in his Minhāj al-Karāma (4) that 'Alī
 was the originator of theology. Ibn Taimiyya declares
 it false and that 'Alī could not go against Kitāb and
Sunna. Moreover none among the 'companions' or their
 followers ever discussed the phenomenal nature of the

1. Dhahabī, Mizān, I, 185. No.1443, Ibn Hajar, Lisān

2. 105, No.427

2. Khālid b. 'Abdallāh b.66, d.126. Arnold, p.59

3. Ikhlas p.63,1.5 Ba'labakkiya. p.392

4. fol.58/b. I O L.

world as derived from the origination of bodies. He repeats that theology came into existence at the end of the first century A.H. It was Ja d b. Dirham and Jahm b. Safwān who introduced it, and eventually the students of 'Amr b. 'Ubal like Abu'l Hudhail al-'Allāf etc. carried it on. The aim and object of 'Amr and Wāsil in propagating the above theory was to introduce into Islam the idea that God's power is not unlimited and that sinners will abide in Hell for ever.

It is evident from the foregoing statements that Ibn Taimiyya generally uses Kalam in its pre-Asharite sense of "Mu'tazilite Theology".

Another point that strikes us is that in spite of this condemnation of theology, Ibn Taimiyya was compelled in the course of his teaching career and in his public controversies to examine and pronounce on many questions of theology.

We cannot definitely say from whom our author inherited such a spirit of discarding theology and philosophy. None of his teachers mentioned in the chapter of Hadith were remarkable as theological writers or were said to have discarded theology and philosophy. However, before entering into the discussion of his so-called theology, we shall enumerate his surviving treatises with a short

1. MSunna IV, 144 sqq.

note on each. One thing that we should remember here is that Ibn Taimīya is hopelessly unsystematic in his treatment of a subject. Just as we do not possess a single comprehensive book from him on Tafsīr or Hadīth, so in theology or Philosophy we have nothing of the kind. Problems of theology and philosophy are scattered throughout his writings most of which, according to al-Kutubī's enumeration⁽¹⁾ have not yet come to light.

Books available on Theology

1. al-Risālat al-‘Arshīya, M R K I, 257-61; published also in M R M, IV, 107-38 with some additional material at the end. It deals with the problem whether the Throne of God is Kuriy, spherical or not.
2. al-‘Aqīdat al-Wāsitiya, M R K, I, 387-406. This contains his views on some common problems of Kalām, such as faith in God, His Attributes, His Apostles, His Book, torture in the grave etc.
3. al-Munāzara fi’l ‘Aqīda al-Wāsitiya, M R K, I, 407-13. A discussion on the above risāla.
4. al-‘Aqīda al-Hamawiya al-Kubrā, M R K, I, 414-469. A reply to a question sent from Hama in 698 A.H. on divine attributes.⁽²⁾

1. Fawāt I, 42 sqq.

2. See. Fawāt, I, 40.

5. Ris. al-qadā' wa'l-qadar, (about fate and predestination)
M R K. II, 80-86
 6. Ris. al-ihtijāj bi l-qadar, M R K, II, 87-145. This deals with an allegorical tradition that Adam and Moses had a controversy over fate and predestination.
 7. Şifāt allāh wa uluwuhu 'Alā Khalqih. M R M, I, 186-23
On the attributes of God and His superiority to His creation.
 8. Madhhab al-Salaf al-qawim fī taḥqīq mas'ala Kalām allāh al-Karīm. M R M, III, 2-164. This is a collection made by Sayyid Rashīd Riḍā, the edition of al-Manar from the fatwās of Ibn Taimiyya and his other books.
 9. Tafṣīl al-ijmāl fīma yajib ʿAllāh min Şifat al-Kamāl. M R M, V, 38-80. This is a fatwā in which he attacks the Jahmites, the Muṭazilites and the philosophers on the doctrine of divine attributes.
 10. Aqwam mā qīla fī l-mashīya wa'l-hikma wa l-qadā; wa'l-qadar etc. M R M, V, 114-70. A fatwā given by him in 714 A.H. on God's will, contrivance (قَدَر), fate and predestination.
 11. A commentary on the saying of 'Imrān b.Ḥusain: "Kāna Allāh wa lam yakun Shaiy qablah" M R M, V, 172-95.
Nothing existed before God. Time, accidents and mov
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ments have their beginnings. They are not eternal. God created the heavens and the earth in six days.

12. Qā'ida fī jam'ī Kalimat al-Muslimīn. M R M. V, 197-206. Unlike the ordinary Muslims here he does not apply to the Khawārij the term of Kāfir (heretics) because 'Alī, Sād b. Abī Waqqās etc. who fought them did not call them so. (1)
13. Sharh al-'Aqīda al-Isfahāniya, Cairo, 1329, attached to his Majmū'at Fatawā, vol,5, pp 2-152. A commentary made by him in 712 A.H. on al-'Aqīda al-Isfahāniya of Shams al-Din Muhammad b. al-Isfahāni. b.612. d.677.
14. Mas'ala fī qurb al-'Abd ila al-Rabb. Ms. India Office Library. Delhi Coll. Arb. 1857. A treatise on the propinquity of men to God.
15. Burhān Kalām Mūsa, with Urdu translation, India Office Arabic tract 2452, Litho, 1879. On God's speaking with Moses.
16. Al-Kalām 'Alā Haqīqat al-Islām wa'l-Īmān. Ms. Berl. No.2089. (3)

1. M.R.M. V. 200.

2. It deals with both Kalām and Philosophy.

3. I could not utilise this Ms. It is dubious for it mentions the year 733 and Ibn Taimiyya died in 728.

17. Al-‘Aqīda al-Marrākushiya. Berl. No.2809. Composed in Egypt in 712 A.H. It is a pronouncement on a controversy between two Spanish Mālikites on the question of God's istāwā, settling down on the Throne.
18. Mas ala al-Uluw. Berl. No.2311. (1)
Gotha No. 83 III, Munich No.885 IV,
19. Al-‘Aqīda al-Tadmuriya, Berl. 1995. A fatwā on tawhīd and Divine attributes.
20. Su‘al li Ibn Taimiyya, along with the Ms. of al-Tadmuriya (no.19) in Berl. It has been published with Ibn Qayyim's Hadī al-Arwāh. It gives a decision in the controversy of two Shāfi‘ites one of whom said that he who did not believe in God's being in Heaven was in error, while the other maintained that God did not exist in one place particularly.
21. Majmū‘at al-Tawhīd. Lith. Brit.Mus. or No.14516. c.33. A restatement on the usual lines of the doctrine of tawhīd.

1. This also I failed to utilise. According to Brockelmann II, p.104, this treatise deals with a question put before him by two Shāfi‘ites quarrelling on the problem of God's whereabouts. (Perhaps identical with No.20)

22. Sharh Hadīth al-Nuzul, Amritsar, India, 1314. Out of print. See Sarkis.
23. Kit al-Imān. See Sarkis.
24. al-Ris al-Qubrusiya. Berl. No 885/3. A letter to the King and the nobles of Cyprus that they should treat prisoners well, together with the principles of Islām and its relation to Christianity with some accurate quotations from the New Testament. (1)
25. Ris. fī. sifat al-Kamāl. India Office. Loth 467/2 (2)
26. Su'āl ba'd ahl al-dhimma min al-yahūd fi'l-qadā'wa'l qadar. Berl. 2481. A question put by a Jew in 8 ṭawīl verses regarding predestination to which he replied ex tempore in the same metre.*
27. A qaṣīda on free will, Berl, No.2482.*
28. A poem in refutation of an anonymous poem, the author of which tried to be excused of his disbelief by saying that it was predestined by God. Brit.Mus. 984/1. (Cod. Orient. 10)
29. A reply to a question whether a man can do good by his free will. Leid. 2019*

1. This treatise may also be taken as a treatise on politics. See Brockelmann II, 104, No. 12

2. It has also been published by Sayyid Rashīd Ridā in M R M V, 38-80.

* I could not utilise these ^{works}. Their particulars have been gathered from Brockelmann, II, 104.

30. Sharh Hadīth, Abi Dharr, in Khams Rasā'il Nādira, Cairo, undated. It deals with a hadīth Qudsi in which God declares that there is no injustice in Him while mercy is His necessary characteristic.
31. Al-Risāla al-Ba'labakkiya, in the Majmū'at al-Rasā'il collected by Muḥ^ḥ al-dīn Ṣabari, Cairo, 1328 A.H. pp. 390-436. It deals with the eternity of the Qur'^{ān} and its being the word of God alone. He attacks here the Mu'tazilites, the Philosophers and the Ash'arites for their interpretation of the words muzul al-^āār'^{ān} and sifāt allāh, attributes of God.

Among his available books on theology whose dates of composition are known (i.e. Nos. 4, 10, 13 and 17) the earliest one (i.e.No. 4) was written in 698 A.H. when he was thirty seven and the latest one (i.e.No.10) in 714, when he was fifty three.

The earliest one, al'Acīda al-Hamawiya al-Kubrā was dictated, according to Ibn al-Hadī by our author in the interval between the zuhr and 'Asr prayers of one day. On account of this risāla he was once put to trial but
(1)
was acquitted.

Nos. 27 and 28 show that he had some facility in versifying, though not to a degree which calls for remark.

1. quoted by Kutubī, see Fawāt I,40, Durar I,145

Discussion on Divine attributes with reference to his refutation of Mu'tazilite and Jahmite views.

According to Ibn Taimiyya's opinion it was Ja'd b. Dirham who first professed that God is not on His Throne, and that istawā⁽¹⁾ means istawlā. That is, God is the master of His Throne (and not that He settled upon it.) This idea was then taken up by Jahm b. Safwān (d. 128 A. H.) Consequently a new system of scriptural interpretation became popular at the close of the 2nd century A.H. at the hand of Bishr b. Ghayāth al-Marisi⁽²⁾ (d. 218 or 19 A.H.) and his followers.⁽³⁾

In his Minhāj, he further states that the Mu'tazilite doctrine of Divine Attributes was publicly preached during the last part of the 3rd century A.H.⁽⁴⁾ and then Shi'ite

1. Sūra xx. 4.

2. Wafayāt I, 113. He was the founder of the Marisiyya sect. (His doctrines have been given by I. Khall) A'lam, I, p. 47. Enc. of Isl. s.v.; see also Maddonald. Muslim Theology. p. 155

3. M R K. I. 425-26.

4. Minhāj-al-Sunna. I, 172, 1.6. The date is Ibn Taimiyya'

doctors like Mufid, ⁽¹⁾ Musawi ⁽²⁾ and Tusi ⁽³⁾ adopted it.

The dogma of the eternity of God/^{in the form} that He exists without His attributes is the dogma of the Jahmites and the Mu'tazilites. In regard to God's knowledge, power

1. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Nu'mān al-Mufīd,
teacher of Al-Ṭūsī b.336. d.413.

See his biography - Muḥammad Mahdī al-Musawī,
Aḥsan al-Wadī'a, II,240 sq.

2. Sharīf al-Riḍā al-Musawī.

See Yāqūt, Dictionary, V,174.

3. Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. 'Alī al Ṭūsī called Shaikh al-Tā'ifa
d.460. Author of Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq, Istibṣār and
Fihrist of Shī'a books.

Browne. Lit. History of Persia. IV,405

4. Jahm's absolute tawhīd "was the denial of His (God's) eternal qualities. The Kur'an could not be uncreated, for an uncreated Kur'an would be a second eternal being side by side with Allāh. Nay even the knowledge of Allāh, being originated (muḥdath) could not be admitted in the sense of prescience. In this respect, Djahm comes near to the Mu'tazilite position from which he was in other respects, as a pure Islamic thinker, far removed." Wensinck, Muslim Creed. 121

seeing, hearing etc. the older ultra Imāmī sect was downright anthropomorphist, while subsequent generations went further and denied the existence of all Divine attributes. ⁽¹⁾ The Karrāmites believed in anthropomorphism. The Sunnites were unanimous in declaring that God was totally unlike men in His essence, qualities and actions. The traditionists, the hermeneutists, the Ṣūfīs, the four jurists and their followers, never believed in anthropomorphism. The accusation that has been levelled at jurists like Malik, Shāfi'ī, Ahmad and their followers is based on sheer misunderstanding. These jurists in affirming the Divine attributes never maintained that they resembled ⁽²⁾ bodily forms.

The Imāmī sect was with the Jahmites and the Mu'tazilites on the dogma of Divine attributes. The word Qadīm relating to God on which the above groups argue has not received a place among His beautiful names, though the word awwal is there. Awwal does not signify that God alone existed without His attributes from eternity and pre-existence. The attributes that are always associated with God indicate only one God. The Sunnites do not

1. M.Sunna. I. 172-74

2. Ibid.

maintain that God's eternity needs some additional eternal essence. The statement that the Divine attributes are additional to His essence is to be taken in the sense that they are additional to the concept of the essence held by the nufāt (deniers of God's qualities) and not in the sense that there is in God an essence denuded of attributes and attributes separate from and additional to the essence. ⁽¹⁾ For example, whenever an attribute is attached to a mahall, substrate its relation is established with the object itself and not with anything else. When a thing associated with blackness and whiteness is set in motion, it is sure to move with those two qualities alone and not with anything else. God to whom are attributed speech, volition, love, anger and pleasure must actually be associated with all of them, without any additional qualities that have not been ascribed to Him. One who is speechless, motionless, or inactive cannot be called mutakallim, speaking, mutaharri moving or fā'il doer. So to attribute to God life, power, knowledge etc. without associating them with Him as the Jahmites, the Mu^ctazilites and the Shi^f'ites do, indicates that He lives without life, is powerful without power and knowing without knowledge. The Qur'ān and the Sunna abound with proofs that God is associated with His attri-

1. M.Sunna I,177 sqq.

butes. Similarly in terms of language, when one says that a man is qā'im, standing or fā'il, doing, it means that his state of standing or acting is associated with him. (1)

From this and what follows it is evident that in spite of his endeavour to refute anthropomorphism, Ibn Taimiyya could not safeguard himself against the same; and so, as we shall see, he had to suffer a great deal.

Divine attributes with special reference to his
alleged anthropomorphism

Ibn Taimiyya's two pamphlets namely (i) al-'Aqīdat al-Mamawīyat al-Kubrā and (ii) al-Wāsiṭiyya raised the public suspicion that he was an anthropomorphist. He taught that God has hands, feet, face etc. and that He is settled on His Throne. "Then He must be possessed of tahayyuz, spatial character and inqisām, subject to division was an objection. "I do not admit that spatial character and divisibility are the essence of bodies" retorted Ibn Taimiyya. (2)

Ibn Battūta states that once when he attended the Friday service at Damascus, he heard Ibn Taimiyya addressing

1. M. Sunna I, 178

2. 'Asqalānī, Durar, I, 155

the people saying, "Verily God descends to the sky over one world (from heaven) in the same bodily fashion that I make this descent," and slipped down one step of the pulpit. A Mālikite doctor objected to it but/^{as} Ibn Taimīya had some followers there, there broke out a quarrel between them. Ultimately the case was referred to the Sultān with other allegations against Ibn Taimīya and he (Ibn Taimīya) was thrown as a prisoner in⁽¹⁾ the citadel of Damascus.

But when we examine other accounts of his teaching, we find that he is against anthropomorphism and contradicts his own views expressed above.

"Whoever considers God," says Ibn Taimīya, "to be similar to the body of men or an originated thing to be similar to Him, is telling untruth about God. He who maintains that God is not a body and means by it that no originated thing is similar to Him is right though the word body as applied here is an innovation."⁽²⁾

We should say of God what He has said of Himself or the Prophet has said about Him. The salaf affirmed to

1. For the full story see Gibb, Travels, p.67 sq.

2. Berl. No.1995 fol.54 (b)

Him attributes bilā kaif, without asking how, and without tamthīl, similarity, tahrīf, alteration or ta'tīl, divestment (1)
Him of His attributes.

Besides, we have also other evidences in his Tafsīr Sūrat al-Ikhlās and the Minhaj al-Sunna that he preached against anthropomorphism and often ridiculed the anthropomorphists. In the Minhāj he accuses the Shī'ites and the mystics of introducing such a doctrine (anthropomorphism) and claims that Ibn Hazm, Shahrastānī and others agreed (2)
with him.

His 'Aqīda al-Hamawīya (3) does not clearly prove that he was an anthropomorphist. It rather shows that his views on anthropomorphic verses of the Qur'ān were identical with those of the Ash'arites. He believes in "God's

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1. Berl. 1995. fol 2(a) cf. Ibn Taimīya's treatise al-Hamawīya (M R K. I, 428) where he repeats the opinion of Ahmad b. Hanbal. In p.439 he quotes from Abū Sulaimān al-Khattābī's Kit.al-Ghunya .

On ta'tīl see the article Tashbīk by Strothman in the Enc. of Isl.

2. M.Sunna. I. 238
3. M R K. I, 414-469

settling down on His Throne" as it befits Him, without any resemblance to human action. He quotes the opinion of the salaf who, in his opinion stood between ta'tīl and tamthīl (1) as mentioned above.

In his Tafsīr Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ Ibn Taimiyya examines and rejects the two opposed theories about anthropomorphism

(a) The followers of Hishām b. al-Hakīm, Muhammad b. al-Karrām believed in gross anthropomorphism.

(b) The followers of Jahm b. Safwān Abu'l Hudhail al-'Allāf and others totally denied the meaning of such texts.

Both the parties advanced arguments from Sūrat al-Ikhlāṣ. The former explained the word samad literally as الذي لا جوف له "one who has no belly or hollowness", while the latter interprets it as الذي لا يجوز عليه التفريق والانقسام "one who should not be separated or divided" on the assumption that had He been a body He would certainly be a combination of atoms, matter and form. It is right to hold, he adds, that God is not a combination of parts and is not liable to be divided or separated as it goes against His being samad but it is wrong to say that God was scattered and combined or that He was a combination with the possibility of some

of His parts being separated like a human body. (1)

An examination of the above discussion on anthropomorphic texts shows that Ibn Taimīya believed neither in gross anthropomorphism nor in the total denial of it, owing to which, it appears, Prof. Macdonald has expressed ⁽²⁾ that Ibn Taimīya "was an anthropomorphist, but of what exact shade is obscure."

The right conclusion of the matter is that Ibn Taimīya was both for anthropomorphism and against it. In refuting the Jahmites, the Mu'tazilite and Imāmite conceptions of the Divine attributes, we have seen him constantly falling into anthropomorphism but while interpreting the anthropomorphic texts, we have found him protecting himself against being called an anthropomorphist by adopting the Ash'arite creed of bilā kaif, though without acknowledgment. It is his great misfortune not to be able to give one decisive view on the question.

Divine Wisdom and motives of God's action.

All Muslims, says Ibn Taimīya, have agreed that to God must be ascribed al-hikma, wisdom, though they differ

1. Ikhlas 56-57

2. Muslim Theology. p.274

in their interpretations of the word hikma. By this word some theologians meant God's knowledge of human activities as they would come to pass, and they concluded from this that God is 'knowing' 'willing' and 'powerful'. What the general body of the Sunnite doctors (including Ibn Taimiyya himself) hold is that God is wise in His creation and dispensation في الخلق والامر and that His wisdom does not mean volition (irāda) for in that case everyone with volition, be it good or bad, would be called hakim (wise). The hikma of God, therefore, includes in the Sunni view, all that is concerned with His creation and dispensation and with the knowledge of their ultimate results which are all good (mahmud). This hikma, continues Ibn Taimiyya, has been affirmed by the Mu'tazilites, their followers from among the Shi'ites, and also by the general body of the exegetes, the jurists, the traditionists, the sūfis and the theologians. ⁽¹⁾

Motive. Does God act for any illa? This is a controversial question. Ibn Taimiyya accuses the Jahmites, the Ash'arites and some of the followers of Malik, Shāfi'i and even of Ahmad (but not from among the Hanafites) of maintaining a wrong theory that there is no لام التبديل

1. M. Sunna I, 34.

(1. of cause) in the Qur'an and that God does not act for any reason. He does not find any harm in assuming a motive for God's actions. ⁽¹⁾

His opponents argued that if God acts for a particular cause then that cause must be dependent on another cause and in this way it will bring an endless chain (tasalsul) or it will prove that God is incomplete in Himself, because He needs a reason for doing an action. ⁽²⁾ In reply he argues that the Mu'tazilites who believe in 'cause' give an abstruse reply and that the answers of other authorities in this connection can be disputed. What he himself thinks a fitting reply is given in the name of the Sunnites. God acts for causes. He likes a thing and is pleased with it (ويرضى) but His liking or pleasure is other than His volition. (irāda). The Mu'tazilites and most of the Ash'arites maintain that God's pleasure and volition are the same. The general body of the Sunnites hold that God does not like heresy and sin nor is He pleased with them though they are included in His volition just as all creations good and bad are within His volition. God is the creator of all

1. M Sunna I,35

2. Ibid.

worldly things, both the good and the evil, ⁽¹⁾ for there is some hikma in His creation, though it may be intelligible only to a few persons. He replies to the objection of the "endless chain" by arguing that this applies only to past events. When God does a thing by reason of His hikma, the hikma ⁽²⁾ is still in existence after the action is done. As to the second objection of the incompleteness of God in acting for a cause (illa), God is the author of all objects,

1. "Mu'tazilite dialecticians had doubtless asserted that God can do nothing evil, and nothing irrational"

De Boer. p.137.

Ibn Sina is of opinion that..."everything exists through God's appointment, both the good and the evil, but it is only the former that meets with His glad approval. Evil is either a non-existent thing, or, - in so far as it proceeds from God, - an accidental thing." De Boer.p.13

2. M.Sunna.I.35. He ~~still~~ ^{on} goes/to argue that such a hikma may be cause of another (future) hikma, which is thereupon brought into existence by God.

including the causes themselves, and as all things are followed by non-existence, it cannot be imagined that God is in need of any other thing in His actions. ⁽¹⁾

Divine Justice. Does God act unjustly?

There is a hadīth qudsī, narrated by Abū Dharr in which God says that He has made zulm, oppression, unlawful to Himself. In explaining this tradition Ibn Taimiyya points out that the true meaning of this tradition remained hidden to all those who discussed ^{the problem of} qadar (power of God) and divided themselves into two groups. One party deny qadar and have gone so far as to say that God is not the creator of human actions, and that He does not want from His servants except what He has commanded. To these extremists, Ibn Taimiyya assigns the Mu'tazilites. The second party who are the scholastics,

1. M.Sunna.I.35

2. For the full tradition see Sharh Hadīth in Khams Rasa il. p.2 sq. According to Ibn Taimiyya this tradition received high praise from Ahmad b.Hanbal who made a remark *هذا اشرف حديث للاهل الشام* and from Abū Idrīs al-Khawlānī who used to kneel when he narrated it. Sharh Hadīth p.26.1.7

affirm qadar but maintain that zulm in God is impossible and such a thing cannot exist. As a result of such discussions fantastic doctrines of itima' al-diddain, possibility of the union of two contrary views, ja'1 al-jism al-wahid fi makanain, possibility of having one body in two places arose among them. (1) 'Mercy' (rahma) is a necessary characteristic of God and 'oppression' (zulm) (2) is inconceivable in Him. In support of this Ibn Taimiya (3) (4) cites a verse of the Qur'an and a tradition.

Predestination

The problem of Qada and Qadar (order and predestination) (5)

1. Sharh Hadith (in Khams Rasā'il) p.4.
2. Ibid. p.13
3. Sūra VI,54. كتب ربكم على نفسه الرحمة
4. Sharh Hadith. p.16 إن رحمتي تغلب غضبي
5. So I translate as suggested by Ibn Hazm (d.456) Kit.

al fisal.III,31. Qadar from which is derived qadariya (a section) ^{group of thinkers} may either be taken (i) as the power of God to determine human actions or (ii) as the power of men to determine their own actions. The qadariya were the pre-Mu'tazilites who first of all took to theological discussion and built certain dogmas regarding God's power,

is one of the most puzzling questions in Muslim Theology. Theologians have given us different views but none of them seem to have arrived at a decisive conclusion.

Here we shall discuss a fatwā given by our author with regard to the faith of a class of predestinarians (1) who in accordance with the Qur'ān and the tradition

contrivance, etc. But the later Mu'tazilites differed from them and maintained that man has certain power over his actions. This was, as suggested by Shahrastānī because they wished to escape from the condemnation in the sayings ascribed to the Prophet: al-qadarīyatu majūhādhihi'l-umma, and al-qadarīyatu khusamā allāh fi'l-qad i.e. the qadarites are the Zorastrians of this community. They are the opponents of God in qadar or in other words they claim to possess a rival power to that of God. See Shahrastānī, Milal, I.50. See also Enc. of Islām.s.v. Qadariya. H.Lammens. Islām, p.49. cf. Ibn Qutaiba, Mukhtalaf al-hadīth. pp 96 sq. Prof. Nicholson. Lit. Hist. p.224. ann.1.

1. See M R K.II.80. The verse is ⁱⁿ Sūra xxi,101. "But they for whom we have before ordained good things, shall be far away from it (hell)." For the tradition, see Muslim Sahih, Kit.al-iman. b.38 "man qāla lā ilāha illa allāh

maintained that everything was decided by God - the happy being fated to be happy and the wretched to be wretched even when he was in his mother's womb, and that man had no power over his actions.

In refutation of the views of the afore-said pre-destinarians Ibn Taimiyya puts forward six arguments ⁽¹⁾ of his own:

Rational

1. One of this School will accept qadar as an excuse for sin in all men or he will not accept it. If he does not, the problem does not arise, and a man will surely be accountable for his sins. If he takes it as a plea (for committing sin) it will be impossible for him or any one of his School to live in peace in the world - he must patiently bear the oppression of others and willingly surrender himself to the tyranny of the wicked nay even to be separated from his family, and killed by

dakhala al-janna in another version the words, "wa in zana wa in saraq saraq" have been added which mean that one who utters the formula la ilaha etc. will go to heaven even though he commits adultery or theft.

his enemies for the simple reason that all these have been predestined to him by God and he has no right even to lift a finger against them. But as a matter of fact there is none among them who would submit to any of these dangers. (1)

(2) When according to their views everything is predestined and no one has any power of action, it becomes evident that Iblīs (Satan) Pharaoh, the family of Nūh and Hūd, and all those whom God destroyed on account of their sins, were innocent and God had no right to destroy them. (2)

All agree to maintain that this is a blasphemy.

(3) We believe in qadar but we do not regard it as a hujja, excuse for sin, for such a plea is unacceptable. Had it been so, Pharaoh, etc. would have been excused, and الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر "order for doing good and prohibition of committing sin", would vanish from the world, and chaos and disorder would prevail everywhere instead. (3)

Religious

(4) God knew the affairs. He wrote them down as they would come to pass. He knew that such and such perso

1. M R K.II,81

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. p.82

would do good or evil and He wrote it down accordingly. (1)

(5) According to those against whom the fatwā was directed, God is bound to treat alike His friends and His enemies, the people of Heaven and of Hell, but as a matter of fact He draws a clear distinction between one group and the other. (2)

(6) Both Bukhārī and Muslim narrate that once the Prophet was asked about qadar. He replied, "There is none amongst you but that his seat has been assigned to Hell or Heaven." "O Messenger of God, should we not then cease to work and resign ourselves to the Book of God?" was an inquiry. "Nay, work ye, for every one is divinely assisted in doing what has been created for him", replied the Prophet. (3)

Ibn Taimiyya then proceeds to supplement these arguments by discussing specific questions.

(a) Was Adam responsible for eating the fruits of the forbidden tree?

Adam was responsible for eating the fruits of the for-

1. M R K.II.83

2. Sūra xxxv, 20 sq, xxxviii, 27 and xlv, 20.

3. M R K.II,82. see Bukhārī Kit.alqadar. b.3.

cf. Muslim, kit. al-qadar. b.i.

bidden tree, and by so doing he committed a sin. Those who maintain that Adam did not commit sin on the assumption that a sin is not predestined, contradict the scriptural statements. ⁽¹⁾ Such people should be brought to repentance and in case they object to repent, they must be executed. Had the assumption of the opponents been correct Iblīs, Pharaoh, etc would not have been counted as sinners nor God was justified ⁽²⁾ to destroy them.

(b) Have men power over their actions?

Yes, they have power over all their actions, otherwise God would not distinguish the able from the unable when He says, "Fear God, then, with all your might." ⁽³⁾ "And the pilgrimage to the temple, is a service due to God from those who are able to journey thither." ⁽⁴⁾ So those who are of opinion that man has no power over his actions are liars. That God supplied man with the faculty of will and agency (al-mashya wa'l-fi'l) has been proved by the following verses. "Verily this is no other than a warning to all creatures; to him among you who willed to walk in a straight path: but will

1. Qur'ān, Sūra, xx, 119

2. M R K. II, 84

3. Sūra lxiv, 16

it ye shall not, unless as God willeth it, the Lord of the
 worlds ⁽¹⁾ and so on. ⁽²⁾

What Ibn Taimiyya intends to impress upon us by men's power over their actions, is that God is the creator of men their power, volition, agency etc., but as He is omniscient He recorded their actions as they would stand even before they were committed. Men's conduct is the cause of recompense or punishment - one who takes poison knowing full well that it is fatal, will surely die or fall ill. So he who commits a forbidden action supposing that it has been predestined to him, will surely reap its consequences which have been known and recorded by God already. ⁽³⁾

④. Sūra III.91

1. Sūra, lxxxii, 27 sqq.

2. M R K.II,84

3. M R K.II.85. Here he puts forward his arguments for predestination just like the Ash'arites though he does not acknowledge it. His first proposition that men have power over their actions gives us the impression that he does support the qadarite view to some extent, though eventually he rejects it by saying that men cannot avoid the decree of God which He already passed either for or against them. So the problem still remains to us as an enigma.

(c) Why was Adam expelled from Paradise? Was it not predestined? This problem has been handled by several authorities ⁽¹⁾ in the light of an allegorical tradition. The tradition runs as follows: "Adam and Moses disputed with each other. Moses said, "O Adam, thou art the father of the people whom God created with His Hand, and into whom He breathed His spirit, and to whom He caused His angels to prostrate themselves in obedience. Why hast thou caused us and thyself to be driven out of Paradise?" Adam replied: "Thou art Moses to whom God addressed His words, Himself speaking to him and for whom He wrote the Tawra, - tell me how long dost thou find it to be, before I was created, that God wrote in it (Tawra) and Adam disobeyed his Lord, so he was disappointed?" "Forty years," replied Moses. "There

1. M R K.II.87, Bukhārī Sahīh, Kit.al-qadar, b.10
 Muslim, Sahīh, Kit. al-qadar, b.2. narrated through seven chains of authorities and different wordings; al-Sā'atī; al-Fath al-Rabbānī (Musnad Ahmad) I,127; cf. also the English translation by E.E.Salisbury - Muhammadan Predestination and Free will in the J.A.O.S. vol.VIII. pp.139-41

upon" said the Prophet (Muhammad) "Adam defeated Moses in the dispute."

According to Ibn Taimiyya the above tradition has been the cause of some wrong theories. Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī⁽¹⁾ and his followers reject the tradition altogether, for in their opinion it goes against the mission with which the Prophets have been sent to this world. Others say that Adam defeated Moses in the dispute, because he was the father of Moses, and a son naturally does not blame his father, and so on.⁽²⁾

Besides the above opinions, Ibn Taimiyya gives us other different explanations of the tradition in question. But what he approves is the opinion of Ibn al-Muzaffar al-Sam'ānī who said that the tradition is intelligible only to those of advanced religious experience. The dispute in question, says Sam'ānī, was only for the Prophets like Adam and Moses who knew the Divine Truth, and were competent to discover the mystery.⁽³⁾ Others have no right to discuss it.

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1. A leading Mu'tazilite of the 3rd Cent. A.H. Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. d.303, teacher of Abu'l Hasan al-Ash'arī. see references in 'Ash'arī, Maqālat, index.
 2. M R K.II.88 sqq.
 3. M R K.II.89 sqq.

The preceding arguments of Ibn Taimiyya show that he holds the same view here as he holds in the question of predestination. That is, the emergence of Adam from the Paradise as a ruler to the earth had already been predestin⁽¹⁾ by God, and Adam had been given the power of remaining in the Paradise permanently by not touching the forbidden fruit although it was known to God that Adam's effort to remain⁽²⁾ there would be of no avail.

Prophet's Parents: Will they get salvation?

The Prophet cannot intercede for one who does not believe in him. Abraham's father will not have salvation though Abraham pleaded for him. In regard to Prophet's parents, 'Abdallāh and Āmina people differed in their opinions, whereas he (the Prophet) cannot save any of his⁽³⁾ relatives who died as infidels.

Here we mark the consistency of Ibn Taimiyya in main-

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1. Sūra II, 28. "Verily, I am going to place in the earth a ruler (khalīfa) "
 2. M R K.II, 89.
 3. Wasila.

taining an old doctrine which now has become unpopular. (1)

1. Imam Abū Hanīfa says in his *Fiqh Akbar* (p.15 Lahore, undated) that the Prophet's parents died as infedels ^{ماتوا على الكفر} but he is silent as to whether they will get salvation or not. Suyūṭī left, as far as I know, five treatises on this topic, saying that the Prophet's parent though they died as infidels, will be saved. In one of these treatises (namely the 4th mentioned below), he says that the Prophet's parents were given life a second time in order to accept the faith, (īmān) and they did so. The treatises which have all been published in the Da'irat al Ma'arif Press, Haidarābād in 1334 A.H. are as follows:

1. *Masālik al-Hunafā fī Wālidai l-Mustafā*. pp.64
2. *al-Daraj al-Munifa fī l-Ābā'il-Ṣharīfa* pp.19
3. *al-Ta'zīm wa'l-minna fī anna abawai Rasūl allāh fī'l-Janna*. pp 51.
4. *Maṣhr al-'alamain al-munifain fī ihyā'l-abawain al-Ṣharīfain* pp.19
5. *al-Subul al-Jahīya fī'l-ābā'il. 'aliya*, pp18.

But Mulla 'Alī al-Qārī says in his commentary on Fiqh Akbar (p.131. Delhi, 1325 A.H.) that he refuted all the arguments of Suyūṭī in a separate pamphlet (which I do

The Prophet and the Angels: their creation.

In refutation of a common belief that the Prophet was created by nūrallāh, the light of God, Ibn Taimiyya asserts that he was created from what all human beings were created from. He further cites a tradition from al-Bukhārī that the Prophet said, "Surely God created the angels from nūr, light and the satan Iblīs from ^{من نار} smokeless fire, (1) and Adam from what you have been created from."

He further rejects, as anonymous, a tradition which says that the world was created for the Prophet Muhammad, and that had God not created him, He would not have created the Arsh (2) Throne, Kursi Chair, heaven, earth, the sun or the moon.

Angels: their number and form.

According to the message of the Prophets, the angels are innumerable. Abu'l Barakāt and Rāzī endeavoured to prove (3) by philosophy.

Regarding their form the mutakallimūn differed. Those who were influenced by philosophy maintained that angels

not know) by citations from the Qur'an and Sunna.

1. M R M.I.154

2. Ibid. I.155-56

3. Ikhlaṣ.p.85

were mere ‘uqūl, intelligence, and nufūs as maintained by
 (1)
 the peripatetics.

Ibn Taimiyya himself is not definite whether angels have physical forms or not. He simply repeats the report of the Prophets that they are innumerable and that they were created from nūr, light as mentioned above.

Impeccability of the Prophets

The Sunnites are unanimous that all Prophets are sinless in communicating the "revelation" to the people. On the question whether they were liable to shortcomings, some said that they were so, and that once God cancelled the words of the Prophet Muhammad which were suggested to him by the devil while others maintained that the Prophets were not liable to any sort of errors. (3) Ibn Taimiyya himself believes that they were human beings and were liable to errors which bore significance in teaching men how to retrieve their errors.

1. Ikh̄lās p.85.

2. -Ibid.

3. Sura, xxii, 51.

4. M.Sunna I.130

4. Ibid.

The Qur'ān: is it created or eternal?

It was Ja' d b. Dirham and Jahm b. Safwān who first introduced the heretical opinion that the Qur'ān was created (makhlūq) ⁽¹⁾ Ibn Taimiyya repeatedly asserts that according to the salaf the Qur'ān is the word of God, uncreated (al-Qur'ān kalam allāh, ghair makhlūq) ⁽²⁾

In this problem he accuses a section of people who, in accordance with the view of the salaf maintain that the Qur'ān is uncreated, but go a step further and interpret the words ghair makhlūq as qadīm, eternal. He considers this innovation which, in his opinion, resulted from their controversies with the Mu'tazilites and the Kullābites in defining the uncreatedness of the Qur'ān, for such a theory was unknown to the salaf. ⁽³⁾

Wahy

Ibn Taimiyya admits the commonly accepted view as to

1. Jawāb. p.74. Ba'labakkiyya p.391

2. Ibid, p.74,82,84,87 etc.

3. Ibid. p.87, cf. Fiqh Akbar I. 10

(This is against Abū Hanīfa)

the three forms of revelation. ⁽¹⁾ But to these he adds a fourth, namely revelation common to all (al-wahy al-mushtarak) both Preophets and others. This he derives from a saying of 'Ubāda b. Ṣāmit ~~that~~ and from the verses in the Qur'ān which speak of revelation to other than prophets, ⁽²⁾ that God speaks with His servants in their dreams. It is this common revelation which those of the philosophers who perceived it perceived in prophecy, such as Ibn Sīna and others. For Aristotle and his ancient followers do not deal with prophecy.

The cause of his antipathy towards Aristotle seems to be (according to his own statement), that it was Aristotle who was mainly responsible for introducing the theory of "Eternity of the Heavens", while his predecessors Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras and Empedocles believed in ⁽³⁾ بمشورة الله (the origination of the form of heaven).

1. See I.O.L.Delhi Coll. Arb. 1857. fol.122 a and b.

Revelation may be received in (i) a waking state as well as in dreams, (ii) from behind a veil and (iii) through angels. (Qur'ān, xvii, 50)

2. Sūra v,3. Sūra xxviii,6.

3. Qur'ān, xvii,50.

Grades of Haqīqa (truth)

In His Risālat al-⁽¹⁾ Ubūdiya Ibn Taimiyya distinguishes two grades of Haqīqa.

(i) ^{حقیقة ذنیة} Natural truth, the knowledge of God as the Creator and the sustainer which is acquired from the observation of natural phenomena.

(ii) ^{حقیقة دینیة} Religious truth achieved through the worship of God and obedience to Him and to His Prophets.

The first kind is accepted and experienced by believers and non-believers, pious and sinners alike, and even the devil Iblis, has it. ⁽²⁾

This classification is used by Ibn Taimiyya for the purpose of grading and criticising certain groups:-

(a) Heretics like Ibn ⁽³⁾ Arabī (d.638/1240) Ibn Sab in (d.667/1278) ⁽⁴⁾ and their followers could not understand the true spirit of the two kinds of haqīqa mentioned above and believed in the theory of wahdat al-wujūd, oneness of existence, and held, in their folly,

1. M R.PP.2-44

2. Ibid. p.5

3. Muḥi al-dīn b. al-ʿArabī born in Murcia in Spain in 551/1165

4. ʿAbd al-Haqq b. in Murcia in 613/1216

that they were both ‘ābid, worshipper and ma‘būd worshipped

(b) The second group whom Ibn Taimiyya calls by the name of al-fāḥir, sinners, believe in حقیقۃ کونیۃ. These are the followers of Iblis and the infidels.

(c) The third group who are satisfied with a partial حقیقۃ کونیۃ lack faith in and love of God in proportion to the deficiency of their grasp of حقیقۃ دینیۃ. This is a dangerous stage at which many seekers after spiritual truth (سائلون) have been bewildered, and innumerable shaikhs of the first order have fallen into errors as already pointed out by ‘Abd al-Qādir Jīlānī. (2)

(d) The fourth group maintain that command and prohibition are intended only for those who have not grasped the حقیقۃ کونیۃ and that as soon as they grasp it, they belong to the special group to whom command and prohibition cease to apply. These people give a false interpretation to the verse of the Qur’ān (3) واعبد ربك حتى يأتيك اليقين "Adore your Lord till al-yaqīn comes to you," by maintaining

1. M R.p.8. 1.22

2. Ibid. p.6.

3. Sūra xv, 99 According to Baidāwī, Zamakhsharī etc. al-yaqīn here means death.

that when one attains to al-yaqīn, certitude, which they explain as *حَقِيقَةٌ كَرْنِيَّةٌ*, he is released from command and prohibition. They falsely declare themselves to be the followers of the Prophet and to be the friends of God, *أَوْلِيَاءُ اللَّهِ*, whereas they disregard all religious observances. They describe their innovation as *حَقِيقَةٌ* and the way to it as *سُلُوكٌ* in which one is not bound by command or prohibition but only by experiences and observations. To Ibn Taimiyya these people resemble the Jahmite who gave to their innovations the name of *حَقَائِقٌ عَقْلِيَّةٌ* intellectual truths in utter disregard of the Book and the Sunna

CHAPTER VI

PHILOSOPHY

Treatises available on Philosophy

1. Ma'ārij al-Wuṣūl, M.R.K., I, 180-217; also in M.R. pp.2-24. It is a refutation of the doctrines of the philosophers and the Qarmatians that the Prophets did not understand the realities of the Divine sciences, and that they could lie in certain circumstances.
 2. Al-Irāda wa'l ʿaḥd, M.R.K., I, 318-386. A treatise on God will and order.
 3. Marātib al-irāda, M.R.K., II, 64-79. On the grades of the Divine Will.
 4. Ibtāl waḥdat al-Wujūd, M.R.M., I, 61-120. On the absurdity of the doctrine of Pantheism, (lit. Oneness of Existence).
 5. Ḥaqīqat madhhab al-ittihādī'īn in M.R.M., IV, 2-102. On Pantheism, collected by Saiyid Raḥīd Ridā from the *rasa'il* of Ibn Taimiyya, Cairo, 1349 A.H.
 6. Muwāfaqat Ṣaḥīḥ al-ma'qūl li Ṣaḥīḥ al-manqūl. On the concordance of rational and scriptural arguments. In the margin of Minhāj al-Sunna, Būlāq, 1321-22 A.H. In it he
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7. A letter to al-Malik al-muaiyad (Abu'l Fida' Isma'il).
India Office Library, Delhi Collection, Arb.1857, fol.
121-25, on certain philosophical discussions.
8. Bughyat al-murtād fi'l radd 'ala al-muta-falsifa wa'l
Qarāmita wa l-Bāṭiniya, also known as al-Sab'iniya,
Cairo, 1329, and also attached to his Majmū'at Fatawā,
vol.V, 2-140 (2nd in order). Here he refutes the
doctrines of incarnation and oneness of existence.
9. Kit.al-tis'iniya fi'l radd 'alā al-tawā'if al-malāhida
10. wa'l-zanādiqa wa l-Jahmiya, along with his Risāla
al-tis'iniya in one collection (sec.Sarkis). The
latter is available in his Majmū'at Fatawā, vol.V,
2-288.
11. Al-Radd 'ala Falsafat Ibn Rushd , pp.127-140, attached
to Falsafat Ibn Rushd consisting of his (i) Fasl
al-maqāl and (ii) al-Kashf 'an manāhij al-Adilla⁽¹⁾
pp.2-126. Cairo, undated. In it he refutes the
philosophical views of Ibn Rushd expressed in his
al-Kashf

1. These two treatises of Ibn Rushd have also been edited
along with a third one by Müller, Thalāthat Rasā'il li
Ibn Rushd, München, 1859; translated into German, München
1875.

A few other books though not directly on philosophy, contribute much to an understanding of his views on Philosophy.

12. Minhāj al-Sunna in 4 parts. Būlāq, 1321-22. This book is directed against the Shī'ite doctrines. (1)
13. Tafsīr Sūrat al-ikh̄lās Cairo, 1323. (2)
14. Kit. Shaikh al-Islām ila Naṣr al-Manbīhī, M.R.M. I, 161-183. A letter to al-Manbījī d.719. written in the year 704/1304 attacking the doctrine of Pantheism. In it he strongly condemns the views of Tilimsānī, (d.690) calling him the most mischievous of the people, repeatedly. Here he does not spare (i) Ibn 'Arabī, (d.638) (ii) Ibn Sab'īn (d. about 667)

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1. See chapter of Religious Practices p.120
 2. See chapter of Tafsīr p.4.
 3. See also Macdonald, Muslim Theology.p.277
 4. A follower of Ibn 'Arabī. See Fawāt I,178
 5. Just as Ibn Taimīya disliked Tilimsānī so also Tilimsānī disliked Ibn Taimīya. The reason why such a misunderstanding arose between them was probably on account of Ibn Taimīya's contempt of Ibn 'Arabī with whom Tilimsānī studied. See Durar IV,392. No.1076; also vol.I,147.

(iii) Ibn al-Fārīd (d.632) for their approval of
(1)
Pantheism.

In order to refute the views of the philosophers, Ibn Taimiyya has to tackle the theories of atom, body, similarity of bodies (tamāthul al-ajsām), the manner of resurrection, and to show that all these are innovations in Islām, and the scholars have failed to come to any agreement about them.

His arguments on these subjects are as follow:

(1) The atom. This theory was held by most of the Scholastic theologians including the Jahmites, the Mutazilites and the Ash'arites. Nazzām too is reported to have maintained that an unlimited number of atoms (2)
(جواهر لا نهاية لها) formed a substance.

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1. Nos.12 to 14 have also been mentioned in relevant chapt
 2. Ikhlas p.21. This is a confusion of the author. Naz never believed in the atomic theory. He had rather a curious idea like that of Hishām that colour had length breadth and depth like those of a substance. Al-fisal V,42. cf. Pines: Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomenlehre, p.10 sqq.

Some of the above atomists held that bodies were combinations of atoms existing by themselves and that God does not destroy any of them. He destroys only the accidents (a'ra namely their union (ijtimā'), their separation (iftirāq), their motion (ḥaraka) and their rest (sukūn). Others maintained that the atoms are phenomenal - God created them ex-nihilo, and once they had come into existence they are never destroyed, though accidents may be. This view was held by most of the Jahmites, the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites. Most of them, further, believed that it was supported even by agreement. Ibn Taimiyya rejects the theory on the following grounds. (1)

(a) It is an innovation. The early Muslims knew nothing of it.

(b) The theologians are not unanimous; some of them totally deny the existence of atoms and the composition of bodies from them.

(c) Ibn Kullāb and many others of different parties namely the Hishāmīya, (2) the Dirārīya, (3) the Karrāmīya (

1. Ikhlas p.21

2. Milal I, 50

3. Ibid. I, 63

4. Ibid. I, 79

and the Najjāriya ⁽¹⁾ - did not accept the theory of the atom. That Ibn Kullāb did not accept this theory has also been mentioned by Abū Bakr b. Fūrak ⁽²⁾ in his Maqālat Ibn Kullāb. ⁽³⁾

(ii) Body.

(a) The theory of body is not founded on a firm basis. Some are of opinion that a thing that is definite or of dimension is called a body, while others say that it is a combination of two atoms, whereas some people maintain that it is a combination of four atoms or more up to the number thirty two. ⁽⁴⁾ Besides the above, a class of philosophers hold that bodies are formed not of atoms but of matter and form, ⁽⁵⁾ whereas many other scholastics and

1. Ibid. I, 61; Nihāyat al-Iqdām, p. 341, 242 etc.

2. Abū Bakr Muhammad b. Hasan, d. 416 A.H. see Wafayāt, II, 279. He was a prominent Mu'tazilite, who gave rational interpretations of the anthropomorphic traditions in his Kit. Mushkil al-Āthār. On the Mss. of this work see H. Ritter, Islam, 17.256.

3. Ikhlas p. 21 This book is no longer extant

4. Sūrat al-Ikhlas p. 69 sq.

5. Ibid. p. 70

non-scholastics like the afore-said groups of Hishāmīya, Kullābīya and Dirārīya reject the theories of 'atom' and body, and profess that bodies are neither a combination of atoms nor of matter and form. Imām al-Haramain (Abu' l Ma'ālī d.478)⁽¹⁾ who is reported to have transmitted the theory of ^{the} atom as a theory accepted by ijmā', himself doubts it, and along with him Abu' l Hasan al-Basrī (d.436) al-Rāzī (d.606)⁽²⁾ too entertained doubts about it. The early leaders⁽³⁾ of Islām never maintained such theories.

(b) The similarity of bodies. This is a popular theory among the Muslim philosophers. The upholders of this theory profess that all bodies of any kind, are at bottom like one another, because they are the combinations of atoms which are themselves like one another. The⁽⁴⁾ difference in them is the difference of accidents. Ibn Taimīya rejects this theory, firstly on the ground that it

1. He is 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Abd allāh b. Yūsuf al-Juwainī.

See Al-A'lam, II.p.598. Macdonald, Muslim Theology p.212 sq.

2. Ibn Taimīya does not say in what book they did so.

3. Ikhlas p.70

4. Ibid. p.22

has been refuted by Rāzī and Āmidī and also by most intelligent people; and secondly because Ashārī rejects this theory in his Kitāb al-Ibāna, because it is a theory of the Mu tazilites; ⁽⁷⁾ thirdly because the upholders of the theory in accordance with the principles of the Jahmites and the Qadarites maintain that to each individual body God gives accidents peculiar to itself. According to them the species (ajnās) cannot change from one to another. A body does not turn into accident nor one species of accident into another species of it. Because were they to hold that bodies are created (i.e. phenomenal) and all created things turn from one to another, it becomes necessary to hold that species too are changed. These people further assert that all things are atoms preserved in the matter (māddal), and on the basis of this theory they were divided into two parties. One party maintained that the atoms of which a body is constituted will be destroyed and then created afresh, while the other maintained that the parts of a body are separated but will again be united in the next world. Unfortunately, this party has to answer a riddle. If a man is eaten up by

1. I have not found this statement in the Ibāna. Perhaps Ibn Taimiya has confused this work with another.

an animal (say a fish) and then the animal is eaten up by another man, then how would he be raised on the day of resurrection? In reply, some of them said that in the human body there are certain parts that cannot be dissolved and in these parts there will be nothing of that animal which has been eaten up by the second man. Ibn Taimiyya objects to this and points out that according to the Scientist (uqalā) there is nothing in the human body that cannot be dissolved; ⁽¹⁾ and that according to the salaf, the fukahā and the general view, one body turns into another by losing its identity completely. ⁽²⁾

(c) Does motion (haraka) prove the origination of bodies?

Philosophers among the Jahmites and the Mu^ctazilites

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1. For the whole discussion see Ikhlas p.22 sqq.
 2. Ibid. p.24. On the basis of this jurists discussed a problem whether an impure thing may become pure when it is changed to another; for example, if a pig falls into a salt-mine and becomes salt, will it be lawful for a Muslim to use the salt?

have argued about the origination of bodies (hudūth al-ajsā) from the story of Abraham who refused to call the stars, the moon and the sun his rabūb, Lords. (1) They held that Abraham did not worship these heavenly bodies simply on the ground of their 'motion' and 'shift' (الحركة والانتقال), suggested by the word ufūl in the Qurān, (2) In other words they maintained that motion and shift are the distinctive signs of the origination of bodies. (3)

Ibn Taimiyya rejects this theory on the following grounds

(a) No such theory was maintained by the Muslim philosophers nor is there any indication anywhere that Abraham's people ever thought so. Why Abraham's people worshipped the heavenly bodies may be attributed to their superstitious beliefs, like those of the Kaldāniyūn,

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1. For the full story, see the Qurān, Sūra VI, 76 sqq.
 2. Sūra VI, 76-77
 3. M.Sunna. I. 197 sq.
 4. M.Sunna. I. 197 sq.

the Kashdāniyūn ⁽²⁾ and the Hindus, ⁽²⁾ that they would bring the good luck and save them from evils. This is why Abraham said, "o my people, I share not with you the guilt of joining ⁽³⁾ gods with God."

(b) A linguistic cause. To the Arabs the word ufūl means setting (of the sun, moon etc.) and being covered by veils. They did not mean by it 'motion' and 'shift' as understood by these philosophers.

(c) A scientific cause. 'Motion' and 'shift' in the heavenly bodies always exist. There was no reason for Abraham's ascribing the same to them only at the time of

1. This is a mistake of the author. They are not separate groups. Both are the same nation being called by the Hebrews Kashdīm, and the Greeks Chaldæans, the former being with s and the latter with l, due to Assyrian orthography.

2. In this connection Ibn Taimiyya refers to a book written by one Abū 'Abd allāh b. al-Khatīb al-Rāzī on sorcery, talisman and invocation to stars. (السحر والطلبية ودعوة الكواكب) M. Sunna, I, 197

3. Sūra vi, 78 انى برى مما تشركون

their disappearance. He could realise 'motion' or 'shift' even before they disappeared from the sky. It was on account of such a misinterpretation that Ibn Sīna arrived at a wrong conclusion that "الافول هو الاعماد وكل ممان انزل" "disappearance is possibility of existence and everything the existence of which is possible is liable to disappearance."

To sum up, what Ibn Taimiyya maintains here is that the theories of atom, body and similarity of bodies are (i) all innovations,⁽¹⁾ (ii) the general body of the theologians gave many contradictory opinions about them,⁽²⁾ (iii) the theory of indestructible atoms as held by the philosophers goes against the agreement of the 'ulamā that one thing may turn into another,⁽³⁾ and that (iv) the atoms have no existence just as the intellectual atoms (الجواهر العقلية)⁽⁴⁾ of the peripatetics are mere conjectures.

The actual cause of the divergence of opinion among the ulama, as suggested by Ibn Taimiyya, was their invention of

1. M.Sunna I,181; Bayān Mawāfīqa+Sharīh al-ma'qūl p.23.

(on the margin of M.S.I.)

2. Ikhlas p.72

3. M.Sunna I.182

4. Ibid.

certain equivocal terms. For example, what is an indivisible atom? It is obvious that most intelligent people have failed to conceive of it. Those who are supposed to have understood it could not prove it and those who were said to have proved it had to take shelter under long and farfetched (1) interpretations. It is definitely known that none of the companions nor their successors nor any one prior to them in natural religion (fiṭra), ever spoke about indivisible atoms. Naturally, therefore, it cannot be suggested that those people ever thought about the word 'body' and its being an assembly of atoms. Moreover, no Arab could conceive the idea of the sun, the moon, the sky, the hills, the air, the animals and the vegetables being combinations of atoms. Was it not impossible for them to conceive of an atom without any dimension? The traditionists, the mystics (2) and the jurists never thought of such doctrines. The word jism, body, in the Qur'an and the Sunna is used in meanings different from those understood by the philosophers sometimes it means body and sometimes the quality of

1. Ikhlaṣ p.72 sq.

2. Ibid. p.74

(1)
body.

The proverb "hād̄hā ajsam min hād̄hā" is used by the atomists to support their theory but what it means is a matter of doubt. According to a report this is not a genuine Arab saying. The Arabs did not mean by it that a thing was bigger than the other, because it was a combination (2) of a greater number of atoms than the other.

(III) The doctrine of resurrection.

According to Rāzī and his followers God will create new bodies of men on the day of resurrection and their souls will return to them. This is ^{be} the/cause the object of resurrection is only to punish the souls, and it matters little if the body be this one or some other. (3) To Ibn Taimīya this (4) theory goes against the explicit statement of the Qur'ān

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1. Ikh̄lās p.75. Sūra II, 248; lxiii, 4. "and (God) hath given him increase in knowledge and stature." "When thou seest them their persons make thee marvel."
 2. Ikh̄lās p.73
 3. Ikh̄lās p.23
 4. Such as Sūra xxiii, 16

which says that these earthly bodies will again be created. He accuses the theologians of having followed the Jahmites and the Qadarites in the doctrines of creation, resurrection first day and the last day.⁽¹⁾ In short, Ibn Taimiyya believes, as against the philosophers in a physical resurrection and urges that just as God is able to create men, fruits and fire in this world from matter, so also He is able to create men again in flesh and blood with the same nature as they hold in this world.⁽²⁾

IV. The Necessary Cause. Here Ibn Taimiyya refutes the philosophical interpretation of *الموجب بالذات*. He says that if by 'Necessary Cause' the philosophers mean an existence which has no will and no power, then such an existence bears no meaning, nor has it any significance externally, much less then can it be necessarily existing. Philosophers like Ibn Rushd and others contradict themselves in their discussion of this problem. They postulate at the outset a final cause *غاية* and then other final causes to assist it in creation (*خلق*) which needs volition. And since they interpret the final cause as mere knowledge

1. *Ikhlas* p.23 sq.

2. *Ibid.* p.24

and the 'knowledge' as the 'knower' it becomes totally absurd and contradictory *غاية الفساد والنتائج* because we know necessarily that volition (*irāda*) is not identical with knowledge, nor knowledge with the knower. To these philosophic heterogeneous expressions may take only one meaning: by knowledge they mean power or volition, by attribution they mean the attributed just as by knowledge they mean the knower by the powerful they mean power, by volition the volitient and by love the lover. Granted that there is a Being with 'will' (*مشيئة*) and 'choice' (*اختيار*) then it is impossible for such a being to create this universe, because such a 'necessary cause' needs its own causes and cannot be independent. (1)

Rejection of the theories of (i) *Ḥarakat al-Falak*,
(ii) *Nāmūs*, and (iii) *Mumkin*.

(i) Ibn Sīna and his followers in trying to compromise between Prophecy and Philosophy invented the theory of 'Ḥarakat al-Falak' (movement of the sky). They maintain that the heaven moves in obedience to the 'First Cause'. (*الأولى*) To them the word *ilāh* (deity) means a leader in obedience to

1. M. Sunna I, iii

whom the sky moves; and their highest philosophy is to remain obedient to their leader. The chapter of Maqālāt al-lām (Book L) in Aristotle's Metaphysics supplies us with such descriptions.⁽¹⁾

(ii) The Philosophers believed in 'Nāmūs'. By 'Nāmūs' they meant universal government of the world invented by wise men for the welfare of the world and in order to check oppression. Those amongst them who acknowledged Prophecy, maintain that all religions were of the type of this Nāmūs brought to the world for the common good. Ibn Sīna was one of those who held this view. Besides, in accordance with their grades of practical philosophy, they considered the 'ibādāt, acts of worship, sharī'ah, revealed laws, and ahkām injunctions as moral, domestic and civil laws.⁽²⁾

Ibn Taimiyya strongly opposes both of these theories. (i.e. Ḥarakat al-Falak and Nāmūs) and condemns the philosophers for their vain attempt. He pronounces them all to be far from the truth and stigmatises Aristotle (d.322 B.C.), the first teacher as the most ignorant of men who knew nothing of God though he was well versed in Physics.⁽³⁾

1. Ikhlas p.79

2. Ibid. p.79 sq.

3. Ibid. p.80

His arguments in condemning the Aristotelian philosophers are the following:

(1) They did not believe in God. Aristotle himself knew nothing of Him.

(2) They did not believe in the Prophets, their Scriptures and in the angels.

(3) They were the greatest polytheists. They busied themselves in the discussion of astronomy, worshipped the heavenly bodies and built their images. (1)

(iii) The scholastics are of opinion that every mumkin possible thing is either mutahaiyiz, occupying space or qā' m bi'l-mutahaiyiz existing ^{that which occupies} in/space. Ibn Sina and his followers, Shahrastānī, Rāzī etc. in affirming an existing thing different from these, postulate humanity, animality or such other generic groups. To Ibn Taimiya these generic groups exist only in the mind, and he observes that people objected to such theories when the philosophers wanted to prove a thing which was beyond imagination or which existed by itself imperceptibly. He further disapproves the theory that all existing things must be seen with the eyes of perceptible by the senses. (2)

1. Ikhlas p.80
2. Ibid. p.85 sq.

Can 'Direction' ^ajiht be applied to God?

How far is Ibn Taimiya justified in saying, as against the philosophers, that God is above us in Heaven?

"Upwards and downwards do not signify place, but the predicament where, just as 'yesterday and to-day' do not signify time, but the predicament when".⁽¹⁾ In this case it does not contradict the dialectics of Ibn Taimiya who protests against those who say that God cannot be in any direction, because it signifies a place, and one who is in a place must be created. In his opinion those who say that God exists in some direction, meaning thereby that He is in some existing place, are in the wrong; but if by 'direction' they mean some non-existing thing above the universe (^{al-}ala then they are right, because above the universe there is nothing but God.⁽²⁾

1. Aristotle's *Organon* p.18 (London. 1877)

2. M.Sunna, I,250. For Razi's view about the theory of 'the Direction' see his Lubab al-Ishara, p.61 (Cairo, 1326) According to one of his interpretations, direction is a theoretical matter (^{بن}المعقولات) which has no practical existence either in respect of motion or indication.

Then what is the Throne of God (‘Arsh) and why do men raise their hands upwards when invoking the assistance of God? This is because, according to the Qur’ān He is upon His Throne and the angels bear it. ⁽¹⁾ The early philosophers erroneously believed that the Throne meant the ninth heaven (الفلك التاسع), because the astronomers could not discover anything beyond it. They further maintained that this Throne was the cause of the movements of the other eight heavens. The ninth heaven was also called by them al-rūh, spirit, al-nafs, soul or al-lauh al-mahfūz, preserved Tablet, and sometimes al-‘aql al-fa‘āl, active intellect, and so on. They further compared this ninth heaven in its relation to the others, with the human intellect in relation to bodies and their activities. ⁽²⁾ All such theories are, in the opinion of our author, mere conjectures without any foundation. ⁽³⁾ Here he quotes a tradition in defence of his belief that the ‘Arsh is above all the heavens which are above the earth, and is in the shape of a qubba, dome. ⁽⁴⁾ He further argues: gran

1. Sūra xl.7

2. M R M.IV,106-8

3. Ibid. p.116

4. On the authority of Abū Da‘ūd, narrated by Jubair b. Muṭ‘a

Ibn Taimiyya here seems to have quoted this tradition of

that the 'Arsh is round and it envelops the whole creation it must be on top of all existing things from any direction and a man will naturally turn his face upwards when asking for God's favour and not downwards or in any other direction. One who looks to any of the heavens in any directions except upwards must be counted a fool, and what is to be said of a man who seeks God's favour but looks in any directions other than upwards? Because upward is nearer Him than any other directions, right, left, front, backward. Supposing that a man were to intend to climb the sky or anything that is upwards, he must begin from the direction that is over his head; no sensible person will ever advise him to rend the earth and then go downwards because that is also possible for him. Similarly he will not run to his right or left, front or back and then climb, though that is also equally possible for him to do. (2)

doubtful authenticity, because this tradition has not been accepted by all authorities. See annotation by Rashīd Ridā in M R M, IV, 114 sq.

1. This is a part of the famous question put to Ibn Taimiy whether the 'Arsh is Kuriy, round or not. M.R.K.I 257 M R M, IV, 106 sqq.
2. M R M. IV. 124-26

Pantheism

By the time when Ibn Taimiyya appeared with his polemic against all sciences and religious experiences whose origin he had failed to trace to early Islam, Pantheism occupied the mind of a number of refuted Muslim Scholars. Of these he mentions Ibn 'Arabī, (d.638/1240) Ibn Sab'īn (d.667/1268), Ibn al-Fārīd (d.577/1181) al-Hallāj (executed in 309/921) (1) and a few others.

In answer to a question based on sayings of the above pantheists our author gave a fatwā in which he assailed all of them, right and left. Pantheism, according to him, is based upon two wrong principles which are against Islām, Christianity and Judaism; and are contradictory to national and scriptural arguments. (2)

1. M.R.M.I,61-66

2. M R M.I.66. cf. Newton H.Marshall (M.A.Ph.D.) Theology and Truth, pp 137 sqq. He says, "And yet Christianity is not a Pantheism, For Pantheism (e.g. the Indian Philosophy and the teaching of Spinoza, to which we may add that of Mr.Bradley) reaches Unity by denying the finite while the absolute religion, which Christianity proves itself to be, sees the finite pass into, and gain its true individual being by virtue of, God."

(a) Some of the pantheists who profess the doctrines of hulūl, incarnation, ittihād, unification or other closely related doctrine like 'Unity of Existence', maintain that 'Existence' is one, though there are two degrees of it.

(i) Necessary in the creator, and

(ii) contingent in the creation.

To this group of pantheists Ibn Taimiyya assigns Ibn 'Arabī, Ibn Sab'īn, Ibn al-Fārid, Tilimsānī, etc. Of these Ibn 'Ar distinguishes between wuḡūd and thubūt, (Existence and affirmation) saying that 'substances' do exist in 'Adam (non-being) independent of God, and that the existence of God is the existence of the substances themselves: the Creator needs the substances in bringing them into their existence, while the substances need him for obtaining their existence which is the very existence of himself. (1) Al Qūnawī (d.673 A.H.) (2) and his followers made a distinction between الإطلاق والقيود, the general and the special. They maintained that the necessary one is the existing thing in general, unconditioned. To Ibn Taimiyya these are fantastic imaginations, because what is general in conception

1. M R M.I. 67.

2. Muhammad b. Ishaq. For his Mss. see H V K B.B. No.3027

(1) must be definite in individuals. If it is argued that the general (الطلق) is a part of the definite, then the creator must be a part of creation. Now the part cannot create the whole and necessarily the creator cannot exist. Similarly the theory of Ibn Sina and his followers that the creator is 'Existence' in so far as absolute, (3) is absurd, because this too, like the former, exists in mere imagination.

(b) Ibn Sab'in and his followers hold that the necessary and the contingent ^{الممكن} الوجود الواجب والوجود are like matter and form. Ibn Taimiya considers it absurd and contradictory. In his opinion it leads to the theories of incarnation and unity of existence. These people are the pantheists who failed to conceive the divine attribute called al-mubāyana li'l makh-lūqāt, different from originated things. They knew that God exists and thought that His Being is the same as His Existence, just as a man looks to the ray of the Sun and calls it the sun itself. (5) In this connection, Ibn Taimiya quotes

1. M.R.M. I. 67 1.

2. Ibid.

3.

4. M.R.M.I.67 sq.

5. M R M.I.68 sq.

فأهو على في الأذهان لا يكون في الأعيان إلا عينها
البارى هو الوجود المطلق بشرط الاطلاق -

a saying of Shaikh Junaid Baghdādī (التوحيد افراد الحدوث عن القدم)
 "Belief in the unity of God is to separate the quality of
 origination from that of eternity," and emphasises his
 statement that there must be a distinction between the crea-
 tor and the created: they cannot be one and the same. (1)

In order to score off the Pantheists still more heavily
 he used the weapon of ridicule in such stories as the
 following:

(1) Once Ibn 'Arabī met a disciple of his in خلوة
 'solitude with God'. The latter was called by nature
 but he could not attend to it, as wherever he looked he
 found God. (2)

(2) Once Tilimsānī and Shirāzī were passing by a dead
 scabby dog. "Is this also from God's essence?" asked
 Shirāzī. "Is there anything besides Him?" replied
 Tilimsānī. (3)

(3) If there be no existence except the existence of
 God, it becomes necessary to hold that the words of men,
 their eating and drinking, their marriages, their heresi-

1. M R M.I.102

2. M R M.I.104-5

3. Ibid. p.105

and their other evil actions are all the very existence of God. One who takes these as the attributes of God is undoubtedly the greatest heretic and the most erring one. Ibn 'Arabī, the leader of these heretics said

وكل كلام في الوجود كلامه + سراد علينا نثره ونظامه

"Every word in the existence is His word, be it in prose or poetry."⁽¹⁾

Criticism of individuals

So far Ibn Taimiyya's attacks have been made on general principles of Pantheism, but he also criticises individuals on its different aspects.

(1) Ibn 'Arabī

According to him the non-existent is a positive thing even in its state of non-being.⁽²⁾ He further maintains that the existence of these things is the existence of God Himself, they are distinguished by their essential characters which persist in the void, and are united with the existence of God, who knows them. This is also the theory of the Mu tazilites and the Rafidis. Abū 'Uthmān al-Shahhām⁽³⁾

1. M R M.I.112 M.Fatawā V (Bughya) p.90

2. المعدم شيئ ثابت في العدم

3. He is also known as Abū Ya'qūb al-Shahhām. See al-Farq p.163

the teacher of al-Jubbā'ī was the first man to speak about in Islam. These people argued in favour of their theory that had there been nothing in the void, there would not have been any difference between (i) things known and related of and (ii) things unknown but talked about. That is, distinction, in their opinion, can exist only between positive things. Such a theory is absurd according to Ibn Taimiyya. (1)
The Sunnite mutakallimūn called these people heretics.

All Ibn 'Arabī's theories generally revolve round this point. Regarding the above doctrine of Ibn 'Arabī, Ibn Taimiyya makes a remark that the Jews, the Christians, the Magians or even the heathens never maintained such a faith. He, therefore, calls it a pharaonic theory which had also been held by the Qarmatians. (2)

Ibn 'Arabī's theory, continues Ibn Taimiyya, reveals two things when analysed.

- (1) انكار وجود الحق Denial of the existence of God.

1. M R M.IV.6

2. Ibid.IV.17

(ii) انكار خلقه لمخلوقاته Denial of His creating
(1)
creations.

Besides, according to our author, Ibn 'Arabī maintains that ولاية (friendship with God. i.e. sainthood) is better than نبوة prophethood, and that ولاية will never come to an end, whereas Prophecy has been finished. He is said to have recited:

مقام النبوة في برزخ
فوق الرسول ودون الوالي

"The position of Prophethood is in a barzakh (intermediary stage), a little above the apostle, but below the wali,
(2)
saint.

Here Ibn Taimiyya gives various expositions of the pantheistic theories of Ibn 'Arabī, but he does not supply us with any definite reply save that (i) he considers Ibn 'Arabī's theories absurd and (ii) that a critic cares little for such theories. He compares Ibn 'Arabī to a deaf and dumb man and quotes the verse of the Qur'an⁽³⁾ "Deaf, dumb, blind: therefore they shall not retrace their steps from error

1. M R M.IV.17

2. Ibid. IV.58. cf. Muslim Theology. p.263

3. Sūra II, 17. M R M.I.7.

and (iii) that the affirmation of a thing in theory is not like the affirmation of it in practice. ⁽¹⁾

(2) Tilimsānī (d.690/1291) ⁽²⁾

He is a devil to Ibn Taimiyya who does not care a fig for his knowledge and personality. He accuses Tilimsānī of misleading a pious man at Jerusalem named Abū Ya'qūb al-Maghribī who used to say, "The Existence is one, and that is God. I do not see the One non God." ⁽³⁾

Tilimsānī does not discriminate between essence ^{ماهية} and existence ^{وجود} nor between a general thing and a definite one ^{معين}. He considers creations as parts of God. ⁽⁴⁾

As before, Ibn Taimiyya tries to score off his opponent by citing a report of Tilimsānī's death-bed recantation, on the authority of a friend who had been told by a certain person (who was known personally to Ibn Taimiyya) that he sa

1. M R M.I.8

2. Brockelmann I.258. Fawāt I,228. See also F.Krenkow's article 'Tilimsānī' in the Enc. of Isl.

3. M R M.I.105

4. Ibid. p.23

Tilimsānī at the time of his death in a very perplexed condition and asked him, "What makes you sigh?" "For the fear of passing away (i.e. death," replied Tilamsānī. "Glory be to God," said the man, "should a man like you be afraid of death? You called in your disciples and presented them to God within three days?" "Ah, all that is gone (1) I do not find any reality in it now," was his reply.

A forged tradition of the pantheists.

According to our author, the foundation on which the pantheists build is a saying of the Prophet. "There was God and nothing was with Him, and He is now as He was (before)."⁽²⁾ But the second part of this tradition, "He is now as He was," is a forgery. The Prophet never uttered these words. All traditionists are agreed on this point. It was some of the later Jahmite theologians who added it to the first part of the tradition and then it fell into the hands of the pantheists. The genuine tradition that has been narrated by Bākhārī on the authority of 'Imrān b. Husain from the Prophet is, "There was God, and nothing

1. M R M.IV.91

2. Ibid. IV.93

كان الله ولا شيء معه وهو الآن على ما عليه كان

was before Him. His Throne was on the water, and He wrote the record of everything to be. Then He created the heaven and the earth. (1) By the words 'He is now as He was', the Jahmites deny the Divine Attributes, such as His sitting on the Throne, and coming down to the sky over our head. They hold that in eternity God was not sitting on His Throne and He is now as before. He cannot be on the Throne as in that case He suffers change and renewability. (2)

Ibn Taimiyya's reply to the above theory, which he gives in the name of the Sunnites, is as follows:

(1) The renewable is a subsidiary relationship between God and the throne. Ibn 'Uqail calls it 'states'. It is agreed by all Muslims that such relationships can exist because they do not involve change. (3)

(2) Though His sitting on the Throne needs change of one condition to another, it is just like His nuzūl, descent taklīm, speaking (with Moses) and His coming down in a form (Ṣūra) on the day of Resurrection. (4)

1. M R M. IV. 94

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. 94 sq.

4. Ibid.

That the forged part of the tradition (i.e. He is now He was) is against Kitāb, Sunna, Ijmā' and Qiyās,⁽¹⁾ may be proved, according to our author, on the following grounds.

(1) Qur'ān says that God is with His Servants,⁽²⁾ and to be with one indicates that there are two separate things; not the same as pantheists do believe.⁽³⁾

(2) God forbade men to associate another God with Him.⁽⁴⁾ He never prohibited them from taking the worldly things as His creations or men as His servants, which indicates that He is single in His Lordship. He never said that 'there is nothing existing except Him', 'He is naught but He', or 'there is nothing with Him except Him.'⁽⁵⁾

(3) When God existed, according to the opponents, without anything with Him, it means that the heavens, the earth and all other things were created afterwards. Now if God is

1. Ibn Taimiyya uses here i'tibā' which means qiyās. M R M.

IV.96,1.5

2. Sūra lvii.4

3. M R M.IV.96

4. Sūra xvii, 41.

5.

لا يوجد الا هو - ولا هو الا هو - ولا شئ معه الا هو

M R M.IV.97

later as He was before, the result is that created things do not exist along with Him. One who holds such a theory is heretic.⁽¹⁾

(4) According to a genuine tradition God existed before all things. Then He wrote the record of all things to be. Now, if God was and nothing else was, and then He wrote what was to be (as tradition says); if there is still nothing, what is the difference between God writing and God before He wrote? The pantheists say that He is the writing and the Tablet.⁽²⁾

Has Pharaoh got salvation?

A group of the pantheists believed that Pharaoh was a believer (mu'min) and that he was not cast into Hell. In support of their view these pantheists advanced the following Qur'anic verse. "Bring ~~in~~ the people of Pharaoh into the severest punishment."⁽³⁾ They said that according to this verse, it was "the people of Pharaoh" who were punished

1. M R M.IV.97

2. Ibid

3. Sura xl.49

and not Pharaoh himself. (1)

Ibn Taimiyya objects to the above interpretation of the pantheists and says that Pharaoh is included among "his people (āl)" according to all learned authorities. The Qur'an bears testimony to it when it includes Lot among his people (āl) in the verses, "when the sent ones came to the family of Lot, he (Lot) said, 'Ye are persons unknown to me.' (2) Similarly, there is another verse that proves that Pharaoh was included among his (āl) family. The verse is: (3) "To the people of Pharaoh also came the threatenings."

Ibn Taimiyya's Theory of Knowledge

Grades of Knowledge According to certain expressions of the Qur'an, Ibn Taimiyya divides knowledge into three classes (i) ilm al-yaqīn, (ii) ain al-yaqīn and (iii) haqq al-yaqīn. Ilm al-yaqīn is like the knowledge of a man who has been informed by a trustworthy person about some honey in a certain place and ain al-yaqīn represents the knowledge of a man who has seen that honey. Hence the knowledge of the latter is

1. M R M.IV.98

2. Sūra xv 61-62

3. Sūra liv, 41. M R M.IV.99.

better than the knowledge of the former. The Prophet said
 ليس الخبر كالمعاين "The bearer of the news is not like the
 seer". Haqq al-yaqin is like the knowledge of a man who
 has tasted that honey himself and realised its sweetness.
 The third kind of knowledge is the best of all and to this
 class, adds Ibn Taimiya, belongs the ecstatic and emotional
 knowledge of the saints (ahl al-ma'rifa) This is why the
 Prophet said: "He who combines three things in him finds
 the sweetness of iman. They are

- (i) love of God and His Prophet above all other things
- (ii) love towards humanity for the sake of God and
- (iii) abhorrence of return to Kufr, infidelity after
 having been saved from it as much as one fears to be
 cast into Hell-fire. ⁽¹⁾

In this connection he cites also a tradition from Muslim:
 "He who is pleased with God as his Lord and with Islam as
 his religion and with Muhammad as His Apostle, tastes the
 sweetness of iman" ⁽²⁾ But he adds, ⁽³⁾ the sweetness of iman
 thus enjoyed by a mu'min varies in accordance with the grade
 of knowledge mentioned above.

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1. Bukhari. Sahih kit. al-Iman 1.9. M R K. II. 146
 2. Muslim, Sahib, kit. al-iman 1.9
 3. M R K. II. 146-147

In the first grade it is the sweetness of a mere report gathered from one's trustworthy Shaikh or from what is heard from the personal reports of the 'Arifūn, saints, in whom there is found some sign that indicates the sweetness they enjoy.

In the second the believer himself observes with his eyes the emotion and ecstasy of the sūfīs though he lacks the personal experience of the same.

In the third he personally experiences the ecstasy and emotion of which he has heard from his shaikh.⁽¹⁾

Similarly he proceeds,⁽²⁾ the knowledge of the next word as conceived by a believer may be classified as follows.

(a) Knowledge based on the reports of the Prophets about it or on the proofs of the existence of the same

(b) Knowledge of what one reads in the Scripture about the promises and threats with one's own eyes.

(c) The certitude when one will actually see the righteous enter into Heaven and the sinners cast into Hell. On this point, the Qur'an says, "Then you will most surely see it with the eye of certitude."⁽³⁾

1. M R K.II.146-147

2. Ibid.II,147

3. Sūra cii,7

On the basis of the above mentioned grades of knowledge Ibn Taimiyya holds the opinion that all human beings may be divided into three classes in regard to all matters that occur in their mind or concern them outwardly. ⁽¹⁾

As an illustration of the enjoyment of the sweetness of imān, Ibn Taimiyya says that the heart of a believer, when it is filled with imān, becomes so closely attached to it that it will not separate itself from it, even for a moment, for it derives from it indescribable cheerfulness and joy. In support of this view he quotes a remark attributed to the Muslim Byzantine King Heraclius ⁽²⁾ in whose days the Prophet died.

Once in the course of his enquiries regarding the preaching of Islām Heraclius asked Abū Sufyān whether any man proved an apostate after once accepting the faith. "No" replied Abū Sufyān. "And such is belief, imān when its cheerfulness mixes with the heart none can make it discontinue." ⁽³⁾ was the King's reply.

1. M R K.II.147

2. In Arabic Hiraql or Hirqil.

3. M R K.II.148

وكذلك الإيمان إذا خلطت بشائسته القلب لا يسخط احد

Ibn Taimiyya then cites some verses of the Qur'ān⁽¹⁾ and concludes that love of God is the supreme love and that love of all other things is subordinate to it.⁽²⁾

On the ground of the same classification of knowledge three stages can be distinguished also in the realisation of tawhīd, belief in one God, ikhlas, sincerity, tawakkul, resignation to God and du'ā ila allāh, prayer to God.

(a) To listen to the Qur'ān and the Sunna in connection with them, (i.e. tawhīd, ikhlas etc.)

(b) To see personally their results on men.

(c) To experience their essence personally; that make a man a sincere believer and protects him from all sorrows of wordly allurements.⁽³⁾

1. Sūra xiii, 35, iii, 29 ix, 125

2. M R K, II, 149

3. Ibid, p.150

CHAPTER VII

THE GENERAL CHARACTER AND DIRECTIONS OF IBN TAIMIYA'S TEACHINGS

Although Ibn Taimiyya left about two hundred and fifty
(1) works, it cannot be said that he deals in a systematic
manner with any single topic. (2) Our investigation has
shown that his views can often be fully understood only by
piecing together fragments from several treatises, but on
the other hand it will generally be found that he is con-
sistent in his principles.

The main principle on which he bases all his teaching
is "Go back to the Book of God and the Sunna of His Prophet.
Beyond this there is nothing but bid'a, innovation, fiṣq,
impiety, shirk, polytheism and kufr, infidelity. This
principle underlies his arguments, whether in regard to
dogmatic or legal problems, as, for example, when he refus

1. See Appendix.

2. Possibly his refutation of the Imāmī doctrine in
Minhāj al-Sunna may be excepted, but its discursive
tendencies and repetitions are characteristic of
Ibn Taimiyya's style.

to explain "equivocal" verses in any meaning, because the early Muslims were silent about them, and to accept later legal ijmā'⁽¹⁾ and restrictions upon Qur'anic ordinances, or in regard to the religious practices of his time. In interpreting the texts he is a literalist, and clings to the old doctrines, even though they are opposed to the current belief of his time. For instance, he accepts the literal meaning of the verse containing dhanbaka (your sin, i.e. of the Prophet) and brings forward several arguments, which prove, as against the accepted theory of the Muslims, that the Prophet was not impeccable (ma'ṣūm)⁽²⁾. He rejects likewise the later belief that the Prophet's parents were given life a second time in order to accept the faith and to be saved from the torment of the Hell-fire, because of the contradiction which this involved with the literal meaning of the Qur'anic text.⁽³⁾ Together with this he exhibits a critical spirit in his investigations. He does not accept certain traditions as genuine even though

1. See Chapter on Law, pp.73-75.

2. Supra pp 20-22.

3. Sūra ix, 114.

they are reported by canonical collectors. He does not hesitate to point out the mistakes of the early leaders whenever he finds them to have misunderstood the true meaning of traditions or of verses of the Qur'ān. He relates instances of wrong judgments on the part of the early caliphs and maintains his own opinion as against them. But it should be observed that his object in doing so was not to glorify himself or to criticise these early leaders, but to find out the true solution of a problem. He has a profound respect for them all, which has been well exhibited in the title and contents of his Raf' al-malām 'an a'immat al-a'lām (Removal of blame from the great leaders).⁽¹⁾ Moreover, in his Minhāj,⁽²⁾ he repeatedly quotes traditions from the Prophet forbidding ill feelings against the early leaders of Islām.⁽²⁾ Therefore the view expressed by Goldziher, "So scheute er (Ibn Taimīya) sich auch nicht, die ersten Chalifen offen

1. M R, pp.55-83.

2. M.Sunna I, 153 sqq. These were directed in the first place against the Shī'ite abuse of Abū Bakr and 'Umar.

zu tadeln, 'Omar zick er eines Fehlers, von 'Alī sagte er, (1)
 das er in 17 Fragen eine irrige Entscheidung traf",
 cannot stand. True it is that Ibn Taimiyya mentions the
 mistakes of 'Alī (2) as well as of 'Umar, (3) but he never does
 so in order to injure their prestige, but either in the
 course of his own investigation of hadīth materials, or in
 defence of the Sunnis against the exaggerations of the Shi'

Similarly his principles do not allow him to accept
 the popular view as to the six authentic collections of
hadīth although he quotes from them all. Of all the
 canonical collections the Sahīh of Bukhārī alone escapes
 his criticism. He finds mistakes in the Sahīh of Muslim,
 and criticises the Jamī' of Tirmidhī in several ways. He
 has a special regard for the Musnad of Ahmad b. Hanbal and
 endeavours to assign a high position to it. (4)

In Law also, though he accepts Qiyās as one of the

1. Die Zahiriten, 188, 190, Z.D.M.9, 52-156,

Brockelmann II, 102.

2. M. Sunna IV, 137.

3. supra pp 47-49.

4. " pp 64-66

fundamental principles of Islamic Law (subject to the provision that it must be applied subject to the literal meaning of the texts), ⁽¹⁾ he criticises the methods employed by Abū Hanīfā, even when his own investigations lead ⁽²⁾ to the same results.

His | Right of Private Judgment. ^{His} The critical attitude and independence in legal matters ⁽³⁾ are amongst the most striking characteristics of Ibn Taimiyya. He does not maintain like other authorities that the door of ijtihād has long ago been closed, and though he does not claim the title for himself in any of his extant works, yet the opinion of his contemporaries and of subsequent generations was that he acted as a mujtahid, as has been well said by Prof. Macdonald, "But from time to time individuals appeared who moved either by ambition or by objection to fixed positions, returned to the earliest meaning of ijtihād and claimed for themselves the right to form their own

1. supra p. 75

2. " pp. 77-82

3. " pp. 85 sqq.

opinion from first principles. One of them was Ibn
Taimīya.⁽¹⁾"

In regard to this right of private judgment Ibn Taimīya asserts that two groups of mujtahids will not be pardoned for their wrong judgments. They are the self-opiniated and the careless. In proof of this, he quotes the saying of the Prophet, "Judges are three, two in Hell and one in Heaven. The one in Heaven is he who knows the truth of a matter and gives his decisions accordingly. As for the two who are in Hell, one judges ignorantly and the other, though he knows the true affair, acts contrary to it." The rest deserve recompense in spite of their errors, because it is difficult to give right judgments in all matters.⁽²⁾ His principles of Hadīth criticism well demonstrate his own system of handling the traditions before exercising his own judgments, and show clearly the circumstances under which a mujtahid will be excused for

1. Enc. of Islām s.v. idhtihād. See also Die Zāhiriten pp.188 sqq.

2. Berl.No.4592 fol.47/a, See also Raf'al-malām in M R.pp.64 and 69.

his errors or be liable for them. (1) He further notes that it is not necessary for a mujtahid to be acquainted with all traditions, because if such a condition be laid down for ijtihād not a single mujtahid would be available in the community. (2)

We may justly give Ibn Tīmīya the credit for his honesty of purpose in searching for the truth unfettered by the chains of taqlīd, blind following of authority. Often he cuts through the casuistical reasonings of the jurists and comes back to simple arguments from first principles supported by examples from tradition. An example of this is his argument on the dissolution of marriage by desertion, (3) in which the jurists do not abide by the decision of the Caliph 'Umar, while in his opinion 'Umar's decision was absolutely right and in full agreement with analogy. (4)

The same principles and methods determine his

1. supra pp.45 sqq.

2. M R, p.58

3. supra pp.85 sqq.

4. " pp.82 sq.

attitude towards theology and philosophy. These he regarded as harmful innovations. He quotes an opinion of the Imām Shāfi'ī that theologians should be beaten with shoes and palm branches,⁽¹⁾ but while replying to theological questions he cannot help adopting theological terms, though often taking shelter under irrelevant arguments. The theories of atoms and accidents are innovations, and the theories of body and similarity of bodies have no foundation in Islām. There is no indication of them in the Qur'ān or in the Sunna. Moreover the upholders of these theories namely Abu'l Ma'ālī, Abu'l-Hasan Basrī and Imām Rāzī were themselves in doubt about them. God is settled on His Throne, but it is unlawful to interpret the manner in which He is therein. The doctrine of "Eternity of God without His Attributes" was the cause of denying the Divine Attributes. He is quite at a loss to explain the theory of the "Divine Justice", and takes it to be a secret seldom understood by human beings. In the problem of predestination, he holds the Ash'arite view though he does not

1. supra p.137

(1)
acknowledge this in any of his writings.

From his method of discussion it is obvious that in Theology and Philosophy he is able to put up an argument only by referring everything to the Qur'ān and the Sunna, declaring the rest to be innovations and maintaining silence when in difficulties. He can, further, oppose by flat denials, and accusations of heresy without reasoning the matter out. But he has very little idea of the real nature of these problems. He endeavours, however, to conceal this by introducing irrelevant arguments and trying to ridicule his opponents. (2)

As a practical reformer Ibn Taimiyya's activities are based on his conception of the usages of the primitive Islamic community, and aimed at restoring the old ways and customs, especially as against the practices associated with the Ṣūfīs.

He preaches against the commonly accepted doctrine of intercession (Shafā'a). Even the Prophet Muḥammad cannot intercede for one except on the day of Resurrection by

1. supra pp.152 sqq.

2. See specially Pantheism, supra, pp.200-212

the permission of God. (1) Consequently it is unlawful to make journeys (shadd al-rihāl) to visit the tombs of the Prophets and the saints with a view to entreating their blessings and favours. (2) The music and dance of the dawishes are against the injunctions of Islām and both are to be condemned. Amongst other practical reforms which he urged, the most striking is his condemnation of the practice of tahlil of his time. He makes some allowances in halaf bi' l talāq by suggesting only an atonement of oath (3) in case of hanath (breaking the oath).

Finally it is extremely difficult to say anything about the personal character of Ibn Taimiyya. He was not a social man. His whole life was full of struggles and efforts for reform and the reward that he received was bitter hostility and imprisonment. He was once forbidden

1. supra p.99

2. " p.93 sq. It is a mistaken view that "Ibn Taimiyya is against the practice of Ziyāra, visitation of tombs, for that is permitted by the Sunna.

3. supra pp 131-133

by royal edict from circulating the fulwa of halaf bi'l talāq, but he boldly said, "I cannot conceal the truth." Consequently he was imprisoned in the citadel of Damascus. He was a fearless fighter but, unfortunately, had no power of reconciliation. The words "innovation", "polytheism" and "unbelief" were constantly on his lips. Unlike al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd⁽²⁾ his extreme conservatism prevented him from making any compromise between the later ideas and the earlier ones. This characteristic of his seems to convict him of obstinacy and a narrow vision of things. He cared very little for personal happiness and was ready to accept even physical torture in preaching his own opinion. He did not stop writing even in his prison and probably the greatest shock that he ever received was to be deprived of paper and ink in the prison. We are told that more than two hundred thousand people were present at his funeral,⁽³⁾ which shows

1. Fawāt, I,41

2. For al-Ghazālī's liberal views see his Ihya' and for those of Ibn Rushd see his Falsafa (Cairo, undated).

3. Fawāt, I,41

that Ibn Taimiyya exercised a great influence over the mob though the 'Ulamā' of his time were opposed to his plans of reform. He had no doubt a very sincere desire for the reformation of Islām but because he tried to bring about a radical change at once both in theories and in practice, his efforts seemed to be wasted. But the events of later years showed that they had not perished entirely, for after lying dormant for four hundred years they were to bring forth a new movement in Arabia, which, under the name of Wahhabism, is one of the most vital elements in the life of Islām to-day.

APPENDIX A

A LIST OF IBN TAIMIYA'S BOOKS HITHERTO PUBLISHED

Majmūat al-Rasāil, Collections of treatises.

(a) Majmūat al-Rasāil al-Kubrā in two volumes consisting of 875 pages, Cairo, 1323 A.H.

Vol. I

1. Ris. al-Furqān bain al-haqq wa'l-bāṭil.
 2. " Ma'arij al-Wuṣūl.
 3. " Tibyān fī nuzūl al-Qurān.
 4. " al-Waṣīya fī'l-Dīn wa'l-dunyā also known as al-Waṣīyat al-Sughrā.
 5. " fī'l-Nīya fī'l-ʿIbādāt.
 6. " fī'l-ʿArsh hal huwa kuriy am lā.
 7. " al-Waṣīyat al-Kubrā.
 8. " al-Irāda wa'l-amr.
 9. " al-ʿAqīdat al-Wāsiṭiya.
 10. " al-Munāzara fī'l-ʿAqīdat al-Wāsiṭiya.
 11. " al-ʿAqīdat al-Ḥamawīyat al-Kubrā.
 12. " fī'l-Istighātha.
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Vol.II

13. Ris. al-Iklīl fi'l-mutashābih wa'l-ta'wīl.
14. " al-Jawāb 'an qawl akl al-halāl muta'adhhar.
(1)
15. " fī ziyārat Bait al-Maqdas.
16. " fī marātib al-irāda.
17. " al-Qadā' wa'l-qadar.
18. " fi'l-ihtijāj bi'l-qadar.
19. " fī Darajāt al-yaqīn.
20. " Bayān al-hudā min al-Dalāl fi amr al-hilāl.
21. " fī Sunnat al-Jum'a.
22. " fī tafsīr al-Mu'awwadhatāin.
23. " fi'l-ūqūd al-muharrama.
(2)
24. " fī ma'na al-qiyās.
25. " fi'l-sama' wa'l-raqs.
26. " fi'l-kalām 'ala al-Fiṭra.
27. " fī ajwaba an aḥādīth al-Qussās.
28. " fī raf' al-Hanāfi yadaih fi'l Salāt.
28. " fī manāsik al-Hajj.

1. Also published in J A O S Vol.56, No.1 by Mathews, C.D.

2. It also occurs in Fuṣūl li Ibn Qaiyim, Cairo, 1346 A.H.

(b) Majmūat Rasāil (pp.122 91), Cairo, 1323, consisting of nine treatises.

30. Ris. al-^Ubūdiya.
 31. " al-Wasīta bain al-Khalq wa'l-Haqq.
 32. " Raf'al malām ^{an} aimmat al-a'lām.
 33. " Tanawwu'l-ⁱbadāt.
 34. " fi'l-radd ^{ala} al-Nuṣairiya. (1)
 35. " fi ziyārat al-qubūr.
 36. " Ma'ārij al-Wuṣūl. (2)
 36. " Mazālim al-mushtarika.
 37. 2 Hisba fi'l-Islām.

(c) Majmūat al-Rasāil wa'l-masāil, Cairo, 1341-49 in five volumes containing twenty one treatises in 866 pages.

Vol. I

38. Ris. fi hijr al-jamīl wa'l-Ṣafḥ al-jamīl, etc.
 39. " fi'l-Shafāat al-Shar'īya wa'l-tawassul ila Allāh bi'l-a'māl wa'l-ashkhās.
 40. " fi Ahl al-Ṣuffa wa'l abātil fihim.

1. This treatise has been translated ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ by Guyard JAP S 6, 1871, XVIII, 158; Salisbury, JAOS. II, 1851 p. 257sqq

2. A repetition of No. 2

41. Ris. fī ibtāl Waḥdat al-Wujūd.
 42. " " munāzara Shaikh al-Islām li dajājila al-Baṭā-
 'ihīya.
 43. " " libās al-Futuwwa 'inda al-Sūfiya.
 44. " ila al-Nasr al-Munbijī.
 45. " fī sifat allāh wa'uluwwuḥu 'alā khalqih.
 46. " fi Fatawā (on legal and ethical decisions)

Vol. II

47. " al-Qāida al-jalīla fi ma yata'allaqu bi aḥkām al-
 safar wa'l-iqāma.

Vol. III.

48. Kit. madhhab al-salaf al-qawīm fī taḥqīq mas'alaṭ Kalām
 allāh.

Vol. IV.

49. Haqīqat madhhab al-Ittiḥādī'in.
 (1)
 'Arsh al-Rahmān.

Vol. V.

50. Ris. fi'l-Mu'jizāt wa'l-Karamāt.
 51. " tafṣīl al-ijmāl fī mā yajib lillāh min sifat al-
 (2)
 kamāl.

1. A repetition of No.6, in the 1st collection.

2. Identical with a Ms. in the India Office Lib. Loth.467.

52. Ris. al-'ibādāt al-Shar'īya wa'l-faraq bainahu wa bainah
al-bid'īya.
53. Futya Shaikh al-Islām fī mas'ala al-ghība.
54. Fi fi'l- al-mashya wa'l-hikma wa'l-qadā' wa'l-qadar etc.
55. Ris. fī sharḥ ḥadīth 'Imrān b. Ḥusain "Kāna allāh wa
lam yakun shaiy qablah.
56. Qā'ida fī jam'ī kalimat al-Muslimīn.
57. al-Madḥab al-ṣaḥīḥ al-wāḍiḥ fī mas'ala wad' al-jawā'ih.
58. Majmū'at fatawā in five volumes, Cairo, 1326 A.H.
It contains his Ikhtiyārāt al-'Ilmiya, Sharḥ 'Aqīdat
al-Isfahāniya etc.

Besides the above-mentioned collections we have
the following independent books left by Ibn Taimīya.

59. al-Ṣarim al-Maslūl 'ala Shātim al-Rasūl, Haiderabād,
1322 A.H. consisting of 592 pages.
60. Qā'ida Jalīla fi'l-Tawassul wa'l-wasīla, Cairo, 1345 A.H.
pp.155.
61. al-Kalim al-taiyib min adhkar al-Nabiyy, Cairo, 1349 A.H.
(1)
pp.99.

1. Also published in Berlin, 1914 A.D. See British Museum,
14521, b.45 or. Section.

62. Ris. al-ijtimā' wa'l-iftirāq fi'l-ḥalaf bi'l-ṭalāq, Cairo, 1342 A.H.
63. Tafsīr Sūrat al-Kawthar. (An Urdu translation, Hilal Book Agency, Lahore, 1344 A.H.)
64. Tafsīr Sūrat al-Ikhlās, Cairo, 1323 A.H.
65. Tafsīr Āyat Karīma : لا الدلائل سبحانه انى كنت من الطالبين
(An Urdu translation, Hilal Book Agency, Lahore, 1928 A.H.)
The original in Majmūat Fatawā, II256-303.
66. Kitāb Minhāj al-Sunnat al-Nababiya fī naqd kalām al-Shī'a, Būlāq, 1321-22 A.H. in four parts, pp.1156.
67. Muwafāqat Ṣarīḥ al-ma'qūl li Ṣaḥīḥ al-manqūl, on the margin of Minhāj al-Sunna mentioned above.
68. Tafsīr Sūrat al-Nūr, Cairo, 1343 A.H. pp.126.
69. Jawāb an Law (A study on the particle Law, if) published in al-Suyūṭī, al-Ashbāḥ wa'l-Nazīr, Haidarabād, 1317, III, 310.
70. Kitāb al-radd'ala al-Naṣāra. (Brit. Mus. Cat.no.865,1.)
71. al-Jawāb al-Ṣaḥīḥ liman baddala Dīn al-Masīḥ, Cairo, 1322 A.H. in four volumes.
72. Al-Furqān baina awliyā al-Raḥmān wa awliyā al-Shaitān, Cairo, 1325 A.H.
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73. al-Risāla al-Ba'labakkīya in Majmūat al-Rasāil published by Muḥyī al-Dīn Ṣabārī, Cairo, 1328 A.H.
74. al-Jawāmi' fi'l-Siyāsa al-Ilāhiya wa'l-Āyāt al-Nababiya Bombay, 1306. (Out of print).
75. Kitāb Jawab ahl al-ilm wa'l-īmān bi taḥqīq mā akhbara bihī Rasūl al-Raḥmān min anna Qulhuallahū ahad ta'dil thuluth al-Qur'ān, Cairo, 1325 A.H. (vgl. Revue Africa, 1906, s. 267; Berl. 2435).
76. Arbaūna Ḥadīthan, Cairo, 1341 A.H.
77. Sharḥ Ḥadīth Abī Dharr in Khams Rasāil Nādira, pp. 86, Cairo, undated.
78. Fatawā fi qawl al-Nabiy :
in the Khams Rasāil mentioned above.
79. Risāla khilāf al-Umma fi'l-ibādat, Cairo, 1347 A.H.
80. al-Risāla al-Qubrasiya, Cairo, 1319 A.H. Berl. 885/3.
81. Fawāid mustanbita min Sūrat al-Nūr, on the margin of Jawāmi'l-Bayān fi tafsīr al-Qur'ān by Ṣafadī. See Sark
82. al-Masāil al-Murdāniya, Damascus, 1333 A.H.
83. al-Ṣūfiyat wa'l-Fuqarā, Cairo, 1328 A.H. (Second edition)
84. Sharḥ Ḥadīth al-Nuzūl, Amritsar, India, 1314 A.H.
85. Majmūat al-Tawḥīd, Brit. Museum. or. 14516, c. 33.
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BOOKS IN MANUSCRIPTS.

India Office Library.

86. Mas'ala fī qurb al-'abd ila al-Rabb. Delhi Collection, Arabic, 1857.
87. Risāla ila al-Malik al-Muaiyid Abū Fida' Ismā'īl, Delhi Collection, 1857.
88. Burhān Kalām Mūsā (lith) with Urdu translation, Vern. tracts. Arab. 2452.

Stadt. Berlin.

89. al-Kalām 'ala Haqīqat al-Islām wa'l-Īmān, No. 2089.
90. al-Qā'idaḡ al-Marrākushīya, No. 2309 pp. 95/b - 119/b.
91. Mas'alat al-'Uluw, No. 2311, Gotha, No. 83, III; Munich no. 885, V.
92. Risāla fī Sujūd al-Qurān, No. 3570.
93. Risāla fī Sujūd al-Sahw, No. 3573.
94. " " Awqāt al-nahy wa'l-nizā' fī dhawāt al-asbāb wa ghairiha, No. 3574.
95. Kitāb fi Uṣūl al-Fiqh, No. 4592. foll. 102/b.
96. Iqtidā' Sirāt al-mustaqīm wa mujānabat aṣḥāb al-jahīm, No. 2084.
97. al-'Aqīdat al-Tadmuriya, No. 1995. It also contains Sūāl li Ibn Taimiya on Theology.
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LEIDEN

98. Naqd Ta'sīs al-Jahmiya, No. 2021.
 99. Kitāb al-Farq al-mubīn bain al-ṭalāq wa'l-yamīn, No. 1834.

Bib. Nat. Paris.

100. Kitāb al-Siyāsa al-Shar'īya fi islah al-rā'ī wa'l-ra'īya, No. 2443-2444.
 101. Mas'alat al-Kanāis, No. 2962/2.

Bodl. Libr. Oxford.

102. Takhjiil Ahl al-Injil. Cat. II, 45.
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APPENDIX B.

(Books on Different Topics Ascribed to Ibn Taimiyya)⁽¹⁾

TAFSIR.

1. Qā'ida fi'l-isti'ādha .
2. " " Basmala.
3. al-Kalām 'ala al-jih̄r bi Basmala.
4. Qā'ida fī iyyāka na'budu wa iyyāka nasta'in.
5. Tafsīr of verse no.7 of Sūra II.
6. " " " 171 " " VII.
7. " " " 8 " " V.
8. " " " 16 " " III.
9. " " " 16 " " II.
10. " " " 81 " " IV.
11. " " " 124 " " II.
12. " " " 256 " " II.
13. " Sūra al-Kāfirūn no. cix.
14. " " Lam yakun " xcvi.
15. " " al-Qalam " lxxviii.
16. " " Yūsuf " xii.
17. " " Tabbat " cxi.
18. " al-Bahr al-Muḥit̄.⁽¹⁾

1. See Chapt. of Tafsīr p.1 and 3

USUL

19. al-Irādāt al-Misriya 'alā al-fatwā al-Ḥamawiya in four volumes.
20. Sharḥ awwal al-Muḥaṣṣal.
21. " bid' 'aṣḥar masa'il min Abba'un of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.
22. Ta'arud al-'aql wa'l-naql in four volumes.
23. Jawāb mā awradahū Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-Sharīshī. (2)
24. " al-Ṣaḥīḥ raddan 'alā al-Naṣāra in four volumes.
25. Minhāj al-Istiḳāma.
26. Sharḥ awwal Kitāb al-Ghaznawī fi Uṣūl al-Dīn
27. al-Radd 'alā al-Nuṭq.
28. Zawājir laṭif.
29. al-Radd 'alā al-Falsafa in 4 vols.
30. Qā'ida fi'l-Qaḍā' al-wahmiya.
31. " fi qiyās mā lā yatanāha.
32. Jawāb Risāla al-Ṣafadiya.
33. " ba'd al-Falasafa anna mu'jizāt al-awliya quwan nafsānīx
34. Ibtāl al-ma'ādd wa'l-radd 'alā Ibn Sīna.

1. This includes uṣūl in general not in particular.

2. Perhaps identical with no.70 in Appendix A.

35. Sharḥ Risāla Ibn 'Abdūs fī Kalām al-Imām Ahmad fī'l-Uṣūl.
36. Thubūt al-Nubuwwa 'aqlan wa naqlan.
37. Qā'ida fī'l-Kulliyāt.
38. Risāla ilā ahl Tabarastān wa Jīlān fī khalq al-Rūḥ wa'l-Nūr.
39. Risāla azhariyat al-Qadariya al-Baghdādiya.
40. Ajwabat al-Qurān wa'l-Nuṭq.
41. Ibtāl Kalām al-Nafsāni.
42. Jawāb man ḥalafa bi'l-talāq al-thalāth. (1)
43. al-Qurān ḥarf wa ṣawt.
44. Ibtāl al-ṣifāt wa'l-uluw wa'l-Istawā in 2 vols.
45. Ris. al-Muwakikisiya (2)
46. Ṣifat al-Kamāl wa'l dābiṭ.
47. Jawāb fī'l-istawā wa ibtāl ta'wīl al-istawā.
48. Jawāb man qāla la yakun yamkunu al-jam' bain ithbāt/ala ^{al-ṣifā} zahiriḥā ma' nafi al-taḥbīh
49. Ajwaba kawn jiht al-samāwāt kuriy wa sabab qasḍ al-qulūb ⁽³⁾ al-uluwwa.

1. Probably identical with No.62 ,Appendix A.

2. " " " No.51 , " "

3. " " " No.6 , " "

50. Jawāb kawṅ al-shaiy fī jiht allāh ma' kawnihi laisa
bi jawāhir wa lā'ard.
51. Jawāb hal al-istawā wa'l-nuzūl ḥaqīqa.
(1)
52. Sharḥ Ḥadīth al-nuzūl.
53. Mas'alat al-Irbiliya.
54. " al-nuzūl wa'khtilāfihi bi'khtilāf waqtiḥ.
55. Bayān ḥall aḥkāl Ibn Ḥazm
56. al-Kalām 'ala naqd al-murḥid.
57. al-mas'alat al-Iskandariya. fi'l-radda 'ala al-ittihādiya.
58. Jawāb fī liqā'allāh.
59. " ru'yat al-nisā rabbahunna fi'l-janna.
60. al-Risāla al-Madaniya.
61. Jawāb wa radd 'ala lisan malik al-Tatār.
62. Qawā'id fī ithbāt al-radd 'ala al-Qadariya wa'l-Jabariya.
(2)
63. al-Radd 'ala al-Rāfiḍa wa'l-Imāmiya in 4 vols.
64. Jawāb fī ḥaqq irādat allāh li khalq al-khalq.
65. Tanbih al-rajul al-āqil 'alā tamwih al-mujādil.
66. Tanāsi'l-shadā'id fi'khtilāf al-āqā'id.
67. Kitāb al-Imān.
68. Sharḥ ḥadīth Jibrīl fī ḥadīth al-imān wa'l-Islām.

1. Perhaps identical with No.84, Appendix A.

2. " " No.66, "

69. 'Iṣmat al-Anbiyā.'
70. Mas'ala fi'l-'aql wa'l-rūh.
71. " fi'l-muqarribin hal yas'aluhum Munkir wa Nakir.
72. " hal yuadhhab al-jasad ma'al-rūh fi'l-qabar.
73. al-Radd 'alā ahl Kisrawān.
74. Fī fadā'il Abī Bakr wa 'Umar 'alā ghairihima.
75. Qā'ida fī tafḍīl Mu'āwīya wa fī 'ibnihi Yazīd.
76. Kitāb fī tafḍīl ṣālihiāl-nās 'alā sā'ir al-ajnās.
77. Mukhtaṣar fī kufr al-Basriya fī jawāz qitāl al-Rāfida.
78. Fī baqā'l janna in refutation of Taqī al-Dīn Subkī's view.

(1)

Books on Uṣūl al-Fiḥ

79. Qā'ida aqwāl al-Fuqahā in 2 vols.
80. Qā'ida kulli ḥamd wa dhamm
81. Shumūl al-nuṣuṣ lil aḥkām.
82. Qā'ida fi'l ijmā'.
83. Jawāb fi'l ijmā' wa'l khabar al-mutawātir.
84. Qā'ida fī kaifiyat al-istidlāl 'ala al-aḥkām.
85. Qā'ida fī mā naṣṣa min ta'ārud al-naṣṣ.

86. Qā'ida fī taqrīr al-qiyās.
87. Qā'ida fī'l-ijtihād wa'l-taqlīd fī'l aḥkām.
88. Qā'ida fī'l-Istiḥsān fī wasf al-'Umūm.
89. Qā'ida fī anna al-mukhtī fī'l-ijtihād lā yāthim.
90. Jawāb hal al-Qādī yajib 'alaih taqlīd madhhab mu'ayyin.
91. " fī tark al-taqlīd fī man yaqūlu madhhabī madhhab
(1)
al-Nabīy.
92. " man tafaqqaha fī'l-madhhab.
93. " taqlīd al-Hanafī al-Shāfi'ī fī'l-matar wa'l-witr. (2)
94. al-Fath 'ala al-Imān fī'l-Ṣalāt.
95. Tafdīl qawā'id madhhab Mālik wa ahl al-Madīna.
96. " a'immat al-arba'a wa mantāza bihī kullu wāhid min
hum. (3)
97. Qā'ida fī tafdīl al-Imām Ahmad.
98. Jawāb hal kāna al-Nabī qabla al-risāla Nabīy.
99. Jawāb hal kāna al-Nabīy muta'abbid bi Shar' min qablih.
100. Qawā'id ann al-nahiy yata-allaqu yaqtadī al-madādd.

1. Perhaps identical M. Fatāwā, II, 386.

2. " " " , II, 387.

3. The title shows his great respect for the Imam Ahmad. Cf. Chapter of Hadīth pp. 63-65.

(1)
BOOKS ON FIOH

101. Sharḥ al-Muḥarrar fī madḥhab Aḥmad in 4 vols.
102. Jawāb masā'il waradat min Isfahān.
103. Masā'il min Baghdād.
104. Masā'il waradat min Zar'.
105. Masā'il waradat min Wajna.
106. Masā'il durrat al-muḥīya fī fatawā Ibn Taimīya.
107. al-Mardāniyat al-Ṭarablisīya.
108. al-Qā'ida fi'l-miḥāh.
109. Tahārat bawl mā yu'kalu lahmuhu.
110. Jawāb masā'il waradat min Ṣalt.
111. Qā'ida fī ḥadīth al-qullatain.
112. Qā'ida fi'l-istijmār wa'l-taḥīr.
113. Jawāb al-istijmār ma' wujūd al-mā'.
114. Nawāqid al-waḍū.
115. Qawā'id fī 'adam naqd al-waḍū bi lams al-nisā'.
116. al-tasmiya 'ala al-waḍū.
117. Khata'l-qawl bi jawāz al-mush'ala al-khuffain.
118. Jawāz al-mush'ala al-khuffain.

119. Tahrim dukhul al-nisā' bilā mi'zar fi'l-hammāma
120. Dhamm al-wawasa.
121. Jawāz tawāf al-ḥā'id.
122. Taisir al-ibādāt li arbāb al-durūrāt bi'l-tayammum wa'l-jam' bain al-ṣalatain.
123. Karāhiyat al-talaffuz bi'l-niyya.
124. Karāhiyat taqdim bast sajjāda al-muṣallī qabla maj'ih.
125. al-Kalim al-taiyib fi'l-rak'atain qabla al-Jum'a.
126. al-Qunūt fi'l-ṣubḥ wa'l-witr.
127. Tarik al-mathānī wa kufruh.
128. al-Jam' bain al-ṣalātain fi'l-safar.
129. Ahl al-bid' hal yuṣallā khalfahum.
130. Ṣalāt ba'd ahl al-madhāhib.
131. Tahrim al-samā'.
132. Tahrim al-shabāba.
133. Tahrim la'b bi'l-shatranj. *
134. Tahrim al-hashīshat al-maghribiyya.
135. al-Nahy'an al-muṣhāraka fi a'yād al-Naṣāra. (1)
136. Qā'ida fī miqdār al-kaffāra bi'l-yamīn.
137. Qā'ida fī anna al-mutallaqa bi'l-thalāth la tahillu illa bi nikāḥ zawj thānī. (2)

1. Perhaps identical with M.Fatawā II, 79-81.

2. " " " III (2nd part)

* Most probably identical with the one preserved in the 'Umūm Library, Stambul. See Murray: His article on Chess in J.R.A. 1937, p. 70.

138. Bayān al-ḥalāl wa'l-ḥarām fi'l-ṭalāq.
139. Jawāb man ḥalafa lā yaf'alu shai'an 'ala al-madhāhib
al-arba'a thumma ṭallaqa thalāthan fi'l-ḥaid.
140. Lumḥat al-muqtataf fi'l- farq bain al-yamīn wa'l-
(1)
ḥalaf.
141. Kitāb al-ṭahqīq fi'l-farq bain ahl al-yamīn wa'l-ṭaṭlīq
142. al-Talāq al-bid'ī la yaqā'.
143. Masā'il al-farq bain al-ṭalāq al-bid'ī.
144. Manāsik al-Hajj fi hajja al-Nabīy.
145. Maqālāt al-'Ālam fī mas'ala ḥudūth al-'Ālam. (See I.O.L.
Delhi Coll. No.1857.

1. Perhaps identical with No.62 in Appendix A.