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THE THEORY OF NEGATION IN INDIAN LOGIC

by

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ABSTRACTS

This thesis is concerned with the problems of negation as they appear in the logical writings of India. In the first chapter, after discussing the paradox of negative judgment, - how can a negative judgment be descriptive of a positive reality, - we have tried to present the problems discussed mainly in the early writings of the realist systems, namely, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of the Bhāṭṭa school. The realists advocated the acceptance of a real Non-existence as a corresponding object of a negative judgment. I have suggested that in advancing this theory they also relied upon their doctrines of negative emancipation and their principle of causality - "the not-pre-existent-effect."

The second chapter is devoted to the theories of the Buddhist and the Prābhākara logicians. According to these logicians the paradox can be solved by explaining negation in terms of the positive factors involved in it.

In the third chapter I have tried to show that the principle of double negation appears to be first applied in India by the Buddhist logicians and that the use of double negation is at least as old as the theory of logical discrimination or Apoha. That is that the affirmation of A implies the denial of not-A.

I have also investigated the problem of 'mutual-absence' versus 'constant-absence' and have discussed complex types of

negation which are unique to the later (neo-Nyāya) writings of India.

The fourth chapter is concerned with the epistemological problem: How do we know the absence of a thing?

⁹
We have presented Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's realistic solution that the absence being real must be known by an independent negative means of its own called "Negation" (abhāva). After having investigated the Buddhist theory that the knowledge of absence is only an inferential judgment I have pointed out that the inferential principle of 'anupalabdhi' or Non-perception is originally a Buddhist one and that the view, upheld by some modern scholars, that it was originated by Kumārila, is wrong. Lastly I have tried to describe the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory according to which all negative cognitions are perceived through a unique relation between the absence and the locus which is in direct contact with the sense organs.

The first part of the fifth chapter forms a short introduction to the Buddhist theory of Apoha. In the second part a complete English translation of the Apohasiddhi of Ratnakīrti is provided.

In the pages under the heading of 'conclusion' I have surveyed the problem of negative judgment and have tried to compare some Indian and Western theories of negation.

DEDICATED

GURUBHYAH SĀSTRAKRDBHYASCA

TO

THOSE SCHOLARS AT WHOSE FEET I STUDIED

AND

TO

THOSE ON WHOSE WORKS THIS VOLUME IS BASED.

D.S.

P R E F A C E

In this work various Indian theories of negation are discussed. Therefore, its title should read "Theories of Negation in Indian Logic", rather than "The Theory of Negation in Indian Logic."

They comprise, especially, the views developed by the philosophers of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and the later Buddhist logical schools. Apart from a few incidental references, the Sāṃkhya, Vedānta and Jaina theories concerning negation have been left out of the present study. Jaina logic in particular is interesting, containing in its later philosophical treatises many original elements. However, owing to limitations of time and space we were unable to investigate this vast subject at the present stage of our research, and include it in these theories.

No independent work on Indian negation has yet come to light. Dr. J.F. Staal informed me that a few years ago a thesis on Negation (abhāva) was submitted to the Hindu University of Benares. However, no further information could be obtained about its exact title, contents, and specific nature. Generally speaking, in most of the modern works on Indian logic and philosophy we find a partial treatment of the subject. I said the treatment is 'partial' for two reasons. (1). Negation is not studied in all its aspects, especially the aspect

of its importance for some cardinal principles of the different systems of Indian philosophy. (2). When discussing the theories of non-Buddhist schools such as the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist view of negation is not taken into consideration whereas in fact the latter influenced the former immensely. This partial treatment, I believe, has been the main cause of many illfounded theories concerning negation in ^{the} modern publications on Indian philosophy and its history. Here, I have in mind three well-known theories which are upheld by prominent scholars of our time: (a). The theory that ^{the} non-existence (abhāva) as a category (padārtha) was not originally propounded in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems and that it was a later addition; (b). The theory that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa did not postulate 'abhāva' as an objective entity (vastu^u or prameya); (c). The theory that "non-perception" (anupalabdhi) as the reason (hetu) of negative cognition was posited by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, himself. Rather, it was under Buddhist influence, incorporated by his followers. In the present work I have tried to show that the three theories, mentioned above, are not correct.

In advancing my theories I have adopted two methods: (1). The discovery and application of new facts; (2). the interpretation of these facts in the context of other relevant cardinal principles of the systems. This was necessary because it seems that the logical and ontological status of 'abhāva'

is not clearly expressed in the early Nyāya, ^{the} Vaiśeṣika and ^{the} Mīmāṃsā texts. For instance, the realist view of negation is analysed here in the light of the causal 'asatkārya' theory, i.e. the theory of the "non-pre-existent effect", as well as with regard to the doctrine of negative emancipation (mokṣa). For the latter is defined as "duḥkā^t-tyantābhāva", the absolute absence of pain. The Buddhist view of negation is studied with reference to the Buddhist theories of Inference (anumāna) and logical Discrimination or Opposition (appha). Moreover, in order to avoid misinterpretation of the distinct views of negation, a special attempt has been made to compare each of them with the opposing theories of the other systems. For instance, the realist Bhāṭṭa, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika theories are mutually compared, as well as with reference to the Buddhist theories.

In general, on the question of negation, the Indian philosophical systems are divided into two main groups, viz., ^{the} Realist and ^{the} Idealist. The first group consists of the systems in which absence is conceived as a real non-existence (abhāva) and as such as a real object (prameya) of its corresponding negative cognition (abhāvadhi). In spite of their mutual differences, the Nyāya, ^{the} Vaiśeṣika and ^{the} Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā systems belong to this group.

The second group comprises the later Buddhist logicians and the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsikas who reject the objectivity ascribed

to negation by the realists. According to the idealists a negation is based on an inferential judgment and the cognition of absence of a thing is only a logical synthesis (vikalpa). Absence of a perceptible (dṛśya) thing is inferred from its non-perception (anupāślabdhi) and from the perception of something else, viz., the bare locus (bhūtaalamātra). The suggestion of the perception of the thing negated remains as an imposed mental situation (dṛśyatvabuddhau samāropāt).

In the present work I have utilized some of the most important works on Indian logic available to us to-day. Thanks to modern explorers and investigators such as Sylvain Lévi, G. Tucci, Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, and others, several fundamental Buddhist Sanskrit texts, supposed to be lost, were discovered in Nepal and Tibet. For the study of Buddhist logic the most important texts were the ones by Dharmakīrti (c.700 A.D.) and its commentaries, re-discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in Tibet. They include the "Pramāṇavārttika" and the commentaries by Karṇakagmin on the first chapter, and by Prajñākaragupta on the remaining three chapters. Dharmakīrti wrote his own commentary called "svavṛtti" on the first chapter only. Only a few leaves of this auto-commentary were found by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in the monastery of 'Sa skya' in Tibet. However, he tried to restore the complete Sanskrit text from the Tibetan translation. This he published together with the valuable sub-commentary of Karṇakagomin called "svavṛtti-tīkā". (See

Bibliography). Recently, a far more correct new edition of the "svavṛtti" has been published by Professor Raniers Gnoli (see Bibliography). This edition is based on MSS. discovered after Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana had published his edition. (See PVS., G. ed. p. XXXVII.)

These volumes are full of very interesting material concerning logical and philosophical problems. There are several quotations of Dignāga referred to by Dharmakīrti in the svavṛtti and commented on by Karṇa-kagomin in the svavṛttitīkā. Since the original Sanskrit text of Dignāga's own work, the "Pramāṇasammucaya", has not yet been discovered and H.N. Randle's 'Fragments from Dignāga' was published before the discovery of the svavṛtti, these quotations give important information on Dignāga's logical theories. These Buddhist texts are very difficult and have not yet been translated into modern languages. However, especially the works of Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Frauwallner are of immense importance for the understanding of these difficult texts. My present research is mainly based on the three texts mentioned above.

In addition to the analysis of the Buddhist theory of negation, viz., the theory of "non-perception" (anupalabdhi) I have given a full translation of a very difficult logical treatise, called the "Apohasiddhi".

It was written about 1050 A.D. by Ratnakīrti who was one of the last Buddhist logicians of India. In it the author refuted the Brahmanical opponents who rejected this theory of logical Discrimination or Opposition. The text is very difficult, inasmuch as Ratnakīrti does not clarify many issues, taking it for granted that they were well-known by the contemporary logicians. According to Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky, it is "Lacking in clearness". (Cf. BL. II, p. 404) Moreover, it may be "a summary of a bigger work of Jñānaśrīmitra, viz., the Apohaprakaraṇa". (Vide, A. Thakur, RN., Int. p. 13 n. 1; E. Frauwallner, WZKM, vol. 38, 1932, pp. 229-234; and the Review of RN. by J.W. de Jong in the Indo-Iranian Journal, vol. IV. 1960 pp. 196 f.)

Prof. A. Thakur has recently edited twelve essays of Jñānaśrīmitra, under the name "Jñānaśrīnibandhāvalī" which he found in the collection of Sanskrit MSS. brought back to India by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana from various monasteries in Tibet. Although the work has been printed it is still awaiting its official publication. On my request Prof. Thakur was kind enough to forward to me his proof-copy of the Apohaprakaraṇa, one of the twelve essays of Jñānaśrīmitra. I received it after

I had completed my translation of the Apohasiddhi. However, after having compared the two texts, I agree with Thakur's view that the latter work is a summary of the former. We must also keep in mind that we have internal evidences to believe that Jñānaśrīmitra was the teacher (guru) of Ratnakīrti. (Cf. Thakur, R.N., Int. pp. 19-20).

There are two editions of the Apohasiddhi: the first was edited by Haraprasad Shastri in the 'Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts', published in the Bibliotheca Indica Series, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1910; the second was recently edited by A. Thakur, in the 'Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī' (the twelve essays of Ratnakīrti), Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1957. There are only a few deviations in these two editions. My translation is mainly based on the first edition which is abbreviated by AS. Significant differences in the texts have been pointed out in footnotes. The second edition is abbreviated by RN. To facilitate further research on the theory of Apoha a separate selected bibliography of this subject has been added.

✓ I do not suppose that I have said the last word upon the problems of the negative judgement in Indian logic.

However, by pointing out some of the difficulties of Indian philosophy and logic concerning negation, I hope to have given an impetus to further research on this topic. If this study at all succeeds in rousing some controversy among the academic investigators of Indian philosophy, I would deem my labour rewarded. For as it is said in an Indian logical maxim: "through controversies we arrive at Truth" (vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhaḥ).

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CHAPTER I

- Sections:
- I. THE PARADOX OF THE NEGATIVE JUDGMENT;
 - II. THE DOCTRINE OF NEGATIVE EMANCIPATION;
 - III. MEANING OF THE TERM "PADĀRTHA" OR CATEGORY;
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 - VII. KUMĀRILA'S CONCEPTION OF ABSENCE.

Section I. The Paradox of the Negative Judgment.

Of all philosophical problems, perhaps, the most complex is that of Negation, for its very character needs explanation and that entails many irreconcilable epistemological and metaphysical difficulties. If it were a matter of pure logic, we could have evaded those problems, for the logician can afford to "disregard the meaning and objective reference of a proposition, but the epistemologist cannot".¹

1. "Epistemology is intermediate between pure logic and metaphysics. Whereas logic deals with the formal aspects of knowledge and metaphysics with the nature of reality, epistemology is concerned with the knowledge of reality. The logician may disregard the meaning and objective reference of a proposition, but the epistemologist cannot." L. Wood, The Paradox of Negative Judgment, PR., Vol. XLII, No. 4, 1933, p. 414. See also on the relation of pramāṇa and pramēya, J. Sinha, HIP., Vol. I, p. 456; S. Radhakrishnan, IP., Vol. II, pp. 43-45.

The Paradox of the Negative Judgment implies the following question: How can a negative judgment be descriptive of a reality that is admittedly positive? All judgments refer to some reality and the negative judgment is no exception to this rule.¹ The difficulty arises from the fact that a reference is made to an object in the negative judgment, while reality is understood as exclusively positive.² In the assertion 'the book is on the table' we can perceive the presence of the book on the table as a positive fact. But in the judgment 'the book is not on the table' we certainly do not perceive any negative object on the table as the absence of the book per se. The question is: What is the object of this negative judgment? Is it the (positive) book or the (negative) absence of the book? The paradox lies in the negative judgment and its objective. Since a reference is made to a reality in the judgment, that which corresponds to it is either a negative or a positive fact. A negative entity does provide an appropriate object for the negative judgment but the very notion of such an entity seems almost a contradiction in terms.³ And if we do not accept a negative entity, we

1. M. Hiriyanna, *Studies.*, p. 138.

2. In Buddhist logic the terms existence and reality "are convertible and mean ultimate reality." Th. Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, Vol. I, p. 69; *NB.*, I.15.

3. L. Wood, *loc. cit.*, p. 413.

shall have to conceive the negative judgment as an affirmative assertion. 'A positive rendering of the negative judgment'¹ will be necessary.

Among the Indian thinkers, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas² and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas,³ being pluralistic realists, posited a negative entity as the object of the negative judgment. The schools of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā and the Buddhists were inclined to render it as a 'complex of affirmative judgments' which refers to some positive entity.

-
1. That means negation is "equivalent to a complex of affirmative judgments." Hiriyanna, *Studies.*, p. 147; See also L. Wood, *loc.cit.*
 2. On the relation between the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems C. Kunhan Raja writes:- "The two systems of Indian Philosophy, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, developed on parallel lines until they merged into a single system. The Nyāya system tried an analysis of the Universe as thought content, in order to arrive at the truth of the Universe. It started with postulating the means of knowledge and fourteen other topics that have a bearing on this analysis. Thus they postulated sixteen topics or padārthas. The Vaiśeṣika system attempted an analysis of the Universe as denotations of words and they postulated seven divisions of the Universe like substances, qualities, and actions. The synthesis came when thinkers began to deal with the seven divisions of the Universe, as understood through the four means of knowledge. This stage marks the beginning of what may be called the Navya or later Nyāya. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is the basic work in this new phase of the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system in India." Introduction to *Caturdaśalakṣaṇi* of Gaṇādhara, pp. V - VI. See also Sinha, *HIP.*, Vol. I, pp. 277; Bhaduri, *Metaphysics.*, pp. 3-5; Radhakrishnan, *IP.*, Vol. II, pp. 31-32.
 3. For the study of the relation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas see Faddegon, *V. System.*, pp. 16-17; Th. Stcherbatsky, *BL.*, Vol. I pp. 22-27.

However, the position of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is unique inasmuch as he postulated subjective as well as objective negation.¹ With regard to the means (pramāṇa) of its apprehension he differed from all other systems of Indian philosophy. According to him negation is itself a means of its cognition just as perception and the other pramāṇas are instrumental in the cognition of a positive fact.²

In Indian philosophy, with an exception of Buddhist logic, the paradox of the negative judgment is primarily an epistemological problem. For that reason, the problem of negation is raised by the authors of Indian philosophical writings mainly together with other epistemological problems concerning perception (pratyakṣa).³ Yet it is important to note here that the postulation of negation as an entity by the orthodox (āstika) schools, viz., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas is also obligatory for their metaphysical doctrine of emancipation (apavarga or niḥśreyasa) and the pluralistic theory of the 'not-pre-existent-effect' (asatkāryavāda).⁴

1. Stcherbatsky, *ibid.*, p. 389; *infra*, pp.

2. The question of the means of cognition of the negative entity will be discussed in the fourth chapter and Kumārila's view concerning the negative entity in the end of this chapter.

3. Vide, *infra* n. 72 p. 43 n. 3.

4. I have followed Hiriyanna's rendering of the term asatkāryavāda.

Section II. The Doctrine of Negative Emancipation

Just as all other Indian philosophical writers, Gotama and Kaṇāda, the presumed authors¹ of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sūtras, proclaimed Emancipation (mokṣa or apavarga) as the ultimate aim of their respective doctrines. "Salvation is the goal which both Gotama and Kaṇāda promise the people as the reward of a thorough knowledge of their respective systems."²

However, according to their views, the conception of emancipation is something negative, a negative situation. Gotama said that hindrance in accomplishment [of desire] is pain (duḥkha), and an absolute absence of pain is the state of emancipation.³ No one is all powerful to achieve an absolute fulfilment of one's desires. So long as we have not acquired the knowledge of reality (tattva-jñāna) we are led by false notions of happiness and desires that are like a mirage. "Removal of false notions, faults, activity, birth and pain in a successive order", said

-
1. There are some uncertainties about Gotama's authorship of the Nyāya sūtra and Kaṇāda's authorship of the Vaiśeṣika sūtra. Cf. Radhakrishnan, *IP*, Vol. II, pp. 36 n. I, 178-179.
 2. Bodas, *Int. Tr. Sam.*, p. XVII. See also *NS.*, I. 1.1-2; *VS.*, I. 1.1-2.
 3. *NS.*, I.1.21-2: 'bādhānālakṣaṇam duḥkham. tad-atyantavimokṣo 'pavargah.' See also, N. Sāra., (1922), p. 98: 'ātyantikī duḥkhanivṛttiḥ puruṣasya mokṣa iti.'

Gotama, "ultimately leads to Salvation".¹ On this ground, probably, at a later stage Udayana (984 A.D.) claimed that there was no controversy about this conception of emancipation. "In fact all philosophers hold the same opinion on this matter that the emancipation is the absolute negation of pain (ātyantika-nivṛttiḥ)".²

Samkara Miśra (1600 A.D.),³ who wrote the commentary Upaskāra on the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, explained the emancipation as 'the antecedent non-existence of pain' (duḥkha-prāgabhāva rūpam). This means that it is brought about by the neutralisation of the cause of pain.

Kaṇāda enumerates six categories which are to be known for the attainment of emancipation.⁴ Knowledge of these "predicables" (padārthas)⁵ is the means of the

-
1. NS., I.1.2. 'duḥkha-janma-pravṛtti-dosa-mithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadantarāpāyād apavargah'
 2. 'niḥśreyasam punar duḥkhanivṛttir ātyantikī. atra ca vādinām avivāda eva.' Kir., p.41. There are three major commentaries on the Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda, viz., Kiraṇāvalī of Udayana (984 A.D.), Nyāyakandali of Śrīdhara (991 A.D.) and Nyāyalīlāvati of Vallabha or Śrīvatsācārya (1200 A.D.) cf. Vindhyeśvarīprasāda Dvivedin, Introduction to PBh. with NK., pp. 20-22; Keith, Atomism., pp.31-32; Sinha, HIP., pp. 278-9.
 3. V. System., p. 17
 4. VS., I.1.4.
 5. For further explanation of the term padārtha see infra pp. 33-36.

Highest Good (niḥśreyas). The six padārthas are:

- 1). Substance (dravya),
- 2). Attribute (guṇa),
- 3). Action (karma),
- 4). Generality (sāmānya),
- 5). Particularity (viśeṣa) and
- 6). Inherence (samavāya).

Kaṇāda does not include negation (abhāva) as a seventh category in the aphorism. But Śaṅkara Miśra commenting on the sūtra refers to Gotama (NS. 1.1.2) and says that the statement (abhidhānam) of "the non-existence of the effect [following] from the non-existence of the cause, strengthens the idea of salvation as having the form of the antecedent non-existence of pain."¹ Cessation of pain does not necessarily mean 'annihilation'; rather, it means, 'non-production', and thus apavarga is said to be the antecedent non-existence of pain (duḥkha-prāgabhāva).

At this stage, we do not intend to examine the problem of emancipation fully. We only wish to indicate to what extent the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika thinkers were confronted with

1. Upaskāra, on the VS. I.1.4. "Gautamīya dvitīyasūtre.....
kāraṇābhāvāt kāryyābhāvābhidhānam duḥkha-prāgabhāva-
 rūpam eva muktim dradhayati." Cp. Nandlal Sinha in the
 Sacred Books of the Hindus, p. 10).

the question of negation in relation to apavarga. Whether it is 'the antecedent non-existence' or 'an absolute non-existence' of pain can be a matter of discussion. However, one thing is certain and that is that this system contains the doctrine of negative emancipation.¹ It is important to note here that in the Nyāya-sūtra (1.1.2. and 21-2) the idea of emancipation in the form of negation is for the first time systematically expressed.²

It is this doctrine of emancipation, I believe, which makes it imperative for this system to posit Negation as an entity or category (padārtha). However, according to Hiriyanna, it is the conception of non-existence (abhāva) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that makes it possible to put forward such a view of a negative emancipation.³

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1. cf. Hiriyanna, *Outlines.*, p. 263; (Apavarga is) "negative and consists not in the attainment of happiness, but in the removal of pain."
 2. It is also a matter of discussion whether this system, being negative in its concept, is pessimistic. Prof. H. Ui thinks it is not. "The Vaiśeṣika's concept of emancipation seems to be negative, as in the case of other systems, although the system is not at all pessimistic." *Daś Sāstra.*, p. 74.
 3. *Essentials.*, p. 102: "so far as the nature of the goal of life is concerned, the Indian systems may be divided into two classes - those which conceive of it merely as one of absolute freedom from misery, and those which take it as one of bliss also. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is of the first type: and its conception of non-existence (abhāva) allows it to put forward such a view of the goal, for, according to it, the absence of misery is not the same as the presence of bliss."

One of the arguments, in support of the negative entity or category, postulated by the followers of this system, is based on this conception of salvation. It is argued: "If negation is not accepted as separate or different (from the positive entity, then, the idea of) salvation would be impossible to establish."¹ Most probably there would have been no acceptance of negation as an entity on a par with the positive entity (bhāva), if the emancipation had not been defined thus. "One can easily see why Naiyāyikas attach so much importance to abhāva, having due regard to its close relation to the Nyāya conception of mukti."²

However, Gotama, like Kaṇāda, when enumerating the categories, evidently did not mention negation. He said: "It is the knowledge of the real essence (or true character) of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of the Highest Good :- 1). The means of Right cognition; 2). The objects of Right cognition; 3). Doubt; etc."³ Further in the Nyāya-sūtra twelve things are

1. "atiriktābhāvanamgikāre mokṣasyāsādhyaatāpattēśca."

N.Kaust., ; p.123.

2. Kuppaswami Sastri, Primer., pp. 61-62.

3. NS.I.I.I., 'pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhant-avayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vada-jalpa-vitanda-hetvabhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigrahasthānam tattva-jñāna-niḥśreyasādhigama Bodas' comments are noteworthy. "Gotama begins by enumerating 16 topics, which have been erroneously called padārtha. These topics are not a classification of all sublunary things or categories. They look like headings of so many chapters in a treatise of logic." Tr. Sam., p. XIV.

enumerated as the objects of cognition (prameyas)¹ but again the entity of negation is missing. Vātsyāyana, the first commentator on the Nyāya-sūtra said, here, that beside these twelve there are some other objects of cognition (prameya) which are not mentioned in the aphorism and he names the six categories already enumerated by Kaṇāda in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra.² Nearly all Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors, including Udayana, have accepted this six-fold division with the additional category of negation.³

In the Nyāya-sūtra as well as in the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, apavarga or niḥśreyas is included as one of the objects of cognition (prameya), in spite of the fact that negation as such is not mentioned together with the other (positive) categories. In the Nyāya-sūtra emancipation is the twelfth prameya in the series. And as we have seen in the preceding pages, the conception of emancipation is negative in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. Thus it may be posited that negation is indirectly mentioned in the sūtras in the form

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1. NS. I.1.9. 'ātma-śarīr+endriy+ārtha-buddhi-manah-pravṛtti-doṣa-pretyabhava-phala-duḥkh+apavargas tu prameyam'
 2. 'asty anyad-api dravya-guṇa-karma-samānya-viśeṣa-samavayaḥ prameyam tad bhedena capariśamkhyeyam.' NBh., I.1.9. For the study of the relation of Vātsyāyana and VS. see Radhakrishnan, IP., II, p.179 n.1.
 3. cf. infra. pp.52-54. For the exception see p.55

of apavarga. In the later writings of the syncretized Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the term 'abhāva' appears as 'padārtha' while 'apavarga' disappears from the list of categories.¹ An explanation is given that since 'apavarga' is the negation (dhvaṃsa) of pain, i.e. of a negative form it falls under the category of Negation (abhāva).²

Introducing the first aphorism of the Nyāya-sūtra (which has already been mentioned above), Vātsyāyana explains the reason why negation is not mentioned in it. He makes a few remarks that "the means of apprehension that reveals existent things also reveals what is non-existent."³ For instance, by means of a lamp at a certain place we perceive some visible objects while some other visible objects are not perceived there. Now, if the other objects were also existent they would have been perceived by us. Thus absence of things is also cognised by the same means by which we cognise their presence. Commenting on this

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1. cf. Lak., p.1; ~~SM.~~ Tr. Sam., sūtra 2; PM., p. 36. SM., karika 2; SP., p. verse 2.
 2. TSC., p.86. 'apavargasya duḥkadhvaṃsarūpasyābhāve.' Taking 'antarbhavat' from page 87.
 3. 'sataḥ prakāśakam pramaṇam asad api prakāśayati.' NBh., p. 2.

section of Vātsyāyana Dr. Randle writes: "The problem is that of the negative judgment; and the reason why it is raised here is not apparent, seeing that a section is devoted later on to dialectical difficulties in connection with the apprehension of absence or non-existence."¹

Perhaps it was felt that the absence of all reference to non-existence or negation in the enumeration of the sixteen categories in the first sūtra needed some explanation."²

Randle is right that in the second chapter of the Nyāya-sūtra the problem of the negative judgment has been dealt with and that the "apprehension of absence or non-existence" is one of the "dialectical difficulties". But there are two distinct problems concerning the negative judgment, (a) epistemological as well as (b) ontological.³ In the later writings of Indian Logic, as we shall see in other pages of the present work, these two problems have become more

1. Randle refers to NS., II. 2.7-12.

2. E. Schools., p. 54.

3. S. Mookerjee, *Flux.*, p. 409: "There is a wide divergence of opinion among philosophers regarding the nature and status of negative judgment and the problems can be studied with profit by way of division into an epistemological and a metaphysical aspect."

explicit, that is the former (a) is treated as a pure logical or dialectical and the latter (b) as a metaphysical problem.¹ It seems to me that Vātsyāyana had the metaphysical problem in mind at the time of introducing the first sūtra. He was aware of the fact that immediately after the first aphorism, Gotama used the term "apāya" expressing negation.²

If negation were not to be explained prior to the first sūtra, then, the emancipation could not possibly be defined as 'the non-existence of pain' in the second sūtra.

Similarly, Uddyotakara (600 A.D.), the commentator on the commentary of Vātsyāyana i.e. the Nyāyavārttika, explained that since non-existence (abhāva) is cognised by the same instrument by which we apprehend existence (bhāva), it is not necessary to mention negation in the aphorism separately. By mentioning merely positive categories, negation is propounded by implication.³

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1. Practically in all Indian logical writings wherever 'abhāva' occurs, it is discussed together with other problems concerning the pramāṇas. (cf. infra n. 72).⁴³⁴⁻³ This indicates its epistemological and logical characters in Indian philosophy.
 2. NS.I.1.2. The term 'apāya' literally means 'absence after destruction.' Thus, 'absence of pain after its destruction' is mokṣa.
 3. NVT., p. 10.

Vāscaspati Miśra (841)A.D.), commenting on Uddyotakara, observed that this explanation is necessary for the negative conception of emancipation. He said: "Some one might argue: 'negation is useful (or necessary - upayoga) for the idea of emancipation, (but since it is not mentioned as an object of cognition) how should we understand it?' To this he (Uddyotakara) said: 'By the stating of positive categories, negation is also taught'.¹

Now, the reason why Vātsyāyana and following him Uddyotakara, raised the question of negation, at the very beginning of his commentary, is evidently not the "dialectical difficulties in connection with the apprehension of absence or non-existence", as supposed by Randle.² I believe that the metaphysical difficulties in connection with the definition of emancipation prompted the commentators to raise the problem of negation prior to the first sūtra that listed only the positive categories.

The doctrine of negative emancipation received criticism from thinkers belonging to the schools of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā and Advaita-Vedānta. We have said

1. "atha nihśreyasopayogābhāvaḥ kuto 'vagantavya ity ata aha. bhāvopadeśaḥ evābhāva upadiṣṭo bhavatīti."

NVTT., p.34.

2. cf. supra p.28n.2.

that emancipation was defined by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as an antecedent and absolute non-existence of pain, and that, therefore, it became necessary for them to posit negation as a separate category. However, the Advaitin thinker finds the argument absurd. For him the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers are rather like 'children' in need of reform.¹

Sadanandayati, in his versatile work, attacked the theory of salvation put forward by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The salvation, according to the Advaitin, is the state of being in Bliss (sukha) after having acquired Knowledge (vijñāna) through realisation of the identity of the self with Brahman and thus discarding nescience (avidyā).

As a matter of fact mokṣa is the state of Self in its real state, that is Brahman itself.² Brahman is "the Eternal (nitya) Bliss (ānanda) and Knowledge (vijñāna)."³

Moreover the view that apavarga is merely the "non-existence of pain" but not positive Happiness is wrong. The Advaitin

1. Advaitabrahmasiddhiḥ p. 146. For the view of Advaita Vedānta the reader is referred to Radhakrishnan, IP., II, pp. 636 ff; Advaitabrahmasiddhiḥ of Sadanandayati, pp. 144 ff.
2. Radhakrishnan, op.cit., p. 639 n.4. where he refers to Śaṅkara.
3. Advaitabrahmasiddhiḥ, p. 144-5; 'nityam vijñānam ānandam Brahma', p. 145.

argued that a person is free from pain even when he is asleep. After one's death or in the end of the universe (pralaya) there is complete cessation of pain. In all such cases there is a state of non-existence of pain but without turning into happiness; let alone the Highest Bliss (mokṣa).¹

To be precise, the Advaitin argued, salvation must be posited as the state of happiness. The very word 'happiness' negates the existence of pain; on the other hand, 'non-existence of pain' does not necessarily convey the idea of happiness. To be more explicit, in the attainment of salvation there must be something which goes beyond the mere destruction of pain, i.e. something positive.²

For negation, being negative, can be destroyed subsequently by the presence of its counter-positive (pratiyogin). By the subsequent presence of pain, antecedent absence of pain - i.e. the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's salvation (mokṣa) - may also be destroyed. Whereas mokṣa is accepted by all

1. *ibid.* p. 198; 'sukha-kāle duḥkha-abhāvasya niyatatvāt, duḥkha-abhāva-kāle ca susupti-pralaya-adau sukhasy-abhāvac ca.'

2. *ibid.*, 'kasyacid atisāyasya bhāvarūpasyaiva.'

philosophers as eternal and something not destructable.¹

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas endorsed this Advaitin view. They rejected the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that negation must be a positive entity because without it the concept of mokṣa would not be valid. The Prābhākaras maintained that emancipation cannot be a mere negative state, inasmuch as it is the manifestation of eternal happiness.²

Thus it is clear that according to early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika negation is also a metaphysical problem. In order to substantiate their doctrine of negative emancipation they postulate negation in terms of ontological reality. On the other hand, the Advaita Vedāntins and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas assert that emancipation itself is positive. Hence, in their system negation has no ontological value.

Section III. Meaning of the term "Padārtha" or category

The term 'padārtha' literally means the meaning of a word. Thus anything capable of being expressed by means

1. Ibid., pp. 198-9; 'mokṣasya ca sarvavādibhir avināśitv-abhyupagamāt.' p. 199.

2. N. Kaust., p. 137; 'nityasukhābhivyakter eva mokṣatvopagamāt. In this passage Puṇatamakara presents Prabhākara's view.

of a word, i.e namable - is a padārtha. Athalya comments: "The term is used even more loosely than the word category in Europe, and often-time implies nothing more than topics to be treated in a book."¹

However, the enumeration of padārthas, by Kaṇāda covers the entire range of phenomena, real and unreal, perishable and imperishable, and even "intrinsically real" (svātma-sat). Hiriyanna rightly observed: "It (VS.) divides the six positive categories it postulates into two classes - one consisting of the first three which are sat (real) because of the universal sattā attaching to them (sattā-sambandha) and the other consisting of the last three which are described as svātma-sat or "intrinsically-real". They (the latter) are neither in Time nor in Space and are independent of both. The former are characterised by borrowed being; the latter, on the other hand, are in their own right. This distinction is remarkably like that between subsistence and existence; and as samavāya is one of the last three padārthas and saṃyoga, as a guṇa, is one of the first three, the description we have given of them is quite in accordance with the basic

1. Tr. Sam., p. 75.

principle of Vaiśeṣika philosophy."¹ We are, here, not concerned with the question of Samavāya. I have quoted Hiriyanna only to show the extent of Kaṇāda's categories. In fact, they include all that can be expressed by word and hence all that can be thought of and spoken of. Dr.G.Jhā said: "The enumeration of these categories is meant to be a complete analysis of the entire universal scheme."² Therefore, it may be rather surprising to a student of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika System that Gotama and Kaṇāda did not explicitly mention negation together with the other categories, whereas the later writers of the syncretist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system recognize 'abhāva' as a category.

Section IV. The necessity of a Negative Category for the Pluralistic Theory of Asatkārya.

Udayana, explaining Reality (padārtha), said:

"Reality is that which is namable; (and) it is twofold: existence (bhāva) and non-existence (abhāva). Existence is that object of our cognition which is free from being the

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1. Hiriyanna's description is not very clear. Studies., p.111; also Bhaduri, Metaphysics., pp. 16-7.
 2. PBh. Translation by Jhā, 1.2.1., foot note 1, p. 15.

object of a negative judgment (nañ artha)".¹

The term 'padārtha' is used here in the sense of Reality. At the same time it means category or entity. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika whatever can be spoken of is an entity or reality and that can be either negative or positive. Just as the object of an affirmative judgment is a positive entity, the object of a negative judgment is a negative entity. Udayana clearly states that a positive thing cannot be the object of a negative judgment. In other words what we assert in the proposition "the pot is on the ground" is a positive fact, viz. the presence of the pot. This is a perceptual experience. Similarly, the negative judgment "the pot is not on the ground" is also a perceptual datum which refers to the factual situation, viz. 'absence of the pot on the ground'.²

According to various scholars³ Udayana in particular gave a new turn to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika developments by postulating

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1. 'abhidheyah padārthah. sa dvividhah, bhāv-abhāva-bhedāt. tatra nañ-arthaviśayatva-rahita-pratyayaviśayo bhāvah.' Lak., p.1.
 2. This view of negation is generally held by all the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika writers. cf. vastuto bhutale ghaṭo nastiti mayā dr̥ṣṭam ity anubhavād.....pratyakṣameva abhāvasya yuktam. N. Kaust., p. 159; Atomism., pp.78-79. IPP., pp. 77-78.
 3. Among these are C. Bulcke, Bhāduri and Ui, Bodas and Satkari Mookerjee whose views are discussed below.

the (positive) ontological reality of negation. In contrast to the authors of the Nyāya-sūtra and Vaiśeṣika-sūtra he included it in the series of basic padārthas.¹

In this respect Mr. C. Bulcke asserts: "Udayana is the first to call NON-BEING (abhāva) a category."² The fact that Gotama and Kaṇāda did not mention negation as a category, led to the view that negation received recognition most probably after Udayana. Bhāduri writes: "Kaṇāda and Praśastapāda mention only these six positive categories, which are believed to cover the entire sphere of reality, including the object and subject of thought and even the process of thought itself. A seventh category, viz., negation or non-being (abhāva), has been put forward by the later exponents of the school. Negation as an additional ontological category implies the fact of the absence of something, a fact believed to be as real as a thing that exists."³

Prof. H. Ui wrote: "The later Vaiśeṣika, subsequent to Śivāditya and Udayana, acknowledged non-existence as a seventh category. Non-existence is affirmed in the Vaiśeṣika-

1. see supra pp. 23-25.

2. Theism., p. 11.

3. Metaphysics., p. 3.

sūtra, but it is not a category." And further again he said: "Asat (-abhāva, non-existence), is mentioned in Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 9.1.1-10. Whether the author of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra regards asat as a category or not can be judged from the context. The first section (āhnika) of the eighth chapter (adhyāya) explains the first stage of laukika-pratyakṣa, the second section mentions its second stage, then come the sūtras 9,1,1-10 (asat), and the remaining part, 11-15, explains al^alaukika-pratyakṣa. The second section of the ninth chapter expounds laingika and ārṣa-siddha-darśana, etc. It is hardly doubtful that the author does not regard asat as a category, nor an entity, but asat is only a form or principle of recognition."¹

However, it is clear that Bulcke's opinion cannot be accepted. For, the Daśapadārtha-Śāstra written by Maticandra, and translated by Professor Ui into English dates from approximately 600 A.D., that is, more than 300 years before Udayana (984 A.D.).² In this work already abhāva is included as a padārtha. This fact seems to have

1. Daś Śā., pp. 72 and 183.

2. ibid p.1; see also pp. 9-10. This work was "translated into Chinese by Yuan Chwang (Huen-Cwan or Hiuen Tsang) in 648 A.D." p.1. The Sanskrit original of this work has not yet been recovered. Prof. Ui published a critical translation from the Chinese into English in 1917.

been overlooked by Bulcke as well as by Prof. Ui himself, who fails to point this out. The sequence of the ten categories propounded by Maticandra is as follows:

"Substance (dravya), Quality (guṇa), Action (karma), Generality (sāmānya), Particularity (viśeṣa), Inherence (samavāya), Potentiality (śakti), non-potentiality (aśakti), Commonness (sāmānya-viśeṣa), and non-existence (abhāva)."¹

Bodas even went further by saying: "Nor should it be supposed that the whole system (NV.) as conceived later is to be found in these books (NS. and VS.). Many doctrines now looked upon as cardinal principles of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, are conspicuous by their absence in Kaṇāda's work, such as, for instance, Abhāva as a seventh category, the last seven qualities and the doctrine of Viśeṣa."² Satkāri Mookerjee also holds a similar opinion.³

The above quoted theory of modern scholars is acceptable only as far as it means that negation is missing from the sūtras where the (positive) categories are enumerated.

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1. Ibid., p. 10., and p. 183. Notice the 'sāmānya-viśeṣa' category which is not found in the VS. and PBh.
 2. Tr. Sam., p. XXIII.
 3. Flux., p. 409.

But I do not agree with them who are of the opinion that the authors of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sūtras did not regard negation as an entity or a category.

In substantiation of this theory I wish to present the following arguments.

First of all, as mentioned above, Gotama and Kaṇāda defined emancipation as the state of negation of pain. If they intended to give no recognition to negation as an ontological reality their conception of emancipation (niḥśreyasa) should have been defined differently, that is in a positive form; rejection of the reality of negation and acceptance, as real, of negative emancipation are contradictory propositions. For, if negation would not be real, how then could "Mokṣa", that is, the highest Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika goal be defined as negative.¹

Secondly, in my view, the authors of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sūtras regarded negation as an entity, for they believed in the theory of asatkārya.² The theory of the 'not-pre-existent-effect' (asatkārya), is the most significant characteristic of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realistic

1. cf. supra, section II, pp. 22-30.

2. The doctrine is supposedly very old and is found in the Upaniṣads. Sinha, HIP., I, p. 40 and n.1.

system. According to this doctrine "the cause always precedes the effect, and the latter has no existence until it is brought into being."¹ An effect is produced for the first time out of the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) and is an entity entirely different from its cause. Cause and effect are intimately related but not identical. Effects are non-existent (asat) previous to their production.² Thus prāgabhāva, "the prior non-existence". (viz. of the effect) is an accessory or efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa). The effect comes into existence after the destruction of prior non-existence. The very term 'effect' indicates the idea of its antecedent non-existence (asatkārya). Everything becomes existent only after its creation. This implies the destruction (i.e. end) of its own prāgabhāva or antecedent non-existence.³

1. Keith, Atomism., p. 202.

2. cf. N.C.B. Bhattacharya, Int. to Sapt. XIII to XIV.

3. Tr. Sam., I.29: 'karyam prāgabhāva-pratīyogī; Kuppaswami sastri, Primer., pp. 207-8; Bhāduri, Metaphysics., pp. 313-318; Hiriyanna Essentials., p. 88; J.C. Chatterji, Hindu Realism, pp. 21-54; NS., IV.1.16-18. Against "this obviously creationist position," philosophers of the Sāṃkhya school hold the doctrine of Satkārya, the theory "that the effect exists beforehand in the cause." cf. Bhāduri, op.cit., pp. 306 ff; Sinha, HIP., I, pp. 399 ff.

Thus in accordance with this theory, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika "was constrained to admit the non-existence of the individual before its production and after its destruction. But along with this he was bound to ascribe eternal existence to the Universal."¹

Gotama described two kinds of negation; 1) Antecedent-non-existence (prāgabhāva), and 2) Posterior-non-existence (pradhvaṃsābhāva). The former consists of the absence of a thing prior to its coming into existence and the latter of the destruction of a thing after it has come into being and now has ceased to exist.² "This argument rightly connects negation with becoming; it is impossible to conceive of 'becoming' without the notion of 'not yet' (antecedent non-existence) and 'no longer' (subsequent non-existence)."³

On the other hand Kaṇāda divided negation into four kinds which we shall discuss later on. But here, we shall refer only to the aphorism of the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra which describes the prāgabhāva. Kaṇāda said that so long as an effect is not produced out of its causes, no action and

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1. Gopī Nātha Kavirāja, Saraswati Bhawan studies, Vol.I, p.39 n.1. The realist view of the universal is diametrically opposed to the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha or the Abstract Universal which we reserve for a later chapter.
 2. NS., II.11.12. 'prag-utpatter abhāvopapatteśca'. cf. NBh., there on.
 3. Randle, E. Schools., p. 330.

attributes can be predicated of it (effect) and therefore it is non-existent (asat) prior to its creation.¹

Prof. Ui's statement² that Kaṇāda does not regard asat as a category and that "it can be judged from the context" seems to be unsatisfactory. The fact, that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras 9.1.1-10 dealing with negation (asat), occur after the discussion of the laukika-pratyakṣa or the ordinary perception does not provide a strong argument in support of Ui's theory. We have stated above (see pp. 17-18) that negation in the present context is primarily an epistemological problem. And for that reason, nearly all treatises dealing with Indian logic analyse the problems of negation, not only in terms of pure logic, but especially with regard to the epistemological aspects, i.e. the nature of the pramāṇas.³ Therefore, the matter of "context" is hardly relevant here. For, according to the commentator

1. VS., IX. 1.1, 'kriyā-guṇa-vyapadeśābhāvāt prāg-asat.' Nandalal Sinha's Translation, published in the Sacred Books of the Hindus, is used in this work.

2. see supra, pp. 37-38.

3. cf. NS., II.11.2-12; VS., IX.1.1-10; PBh., p.225; N.Kaust., pp.150-165 'abhava' is discussed under 'Perception'; in Śl. Vart., Ś.Dip. and N.Lilāvati., pp.544-579; the Abhava chapter comes after arthapatti (presumption); for Buddhist logic it is a logical problem. NB., II. passim; PVP., pp.215-230, 631-639; PVST., pp.29-57, 85-88; see also infra Chap. IV, V.

Samkara Miśra four kinds of abhāva are mentioned in the VS. IX 1, 1-10, (see pp. 49-50) and he points out that they are all objects of perception.¹ Professor Faddegon observes: "According to the Upaskāra (commentary) Sūtra IX. 1.2. refers to Dhvaṃsa or posterior non-existence; this interpretation is in complete accordance with the meaning of Sūtra IX.1.1. Both formulate the asatkāryavāda of the Vaiśeṣika."²

Faddegon also rightly observes that "the acceptance of the asatkārya-vāda was quite a logical result of the Vaiśeṣika table of categories."³ However, there is some controversy about the authenticity of these sūtras since Praśastapāda in his Bhāṣya did not explain them. He mentioned negation only as one of the forms of inference.⁴ Faddegon suggested two possibilities: either the sūtras did not exist in Praśastapāda's dislike of the asatkāryavāda is evident from the fact that he "only accidentally mentioned" it in the Bhāṣya where it is considered a settled tenet of the Vaiśeṣika system.⁵

1. See infra pp. 49-50

2. V. System., p. 120.

3. Ibid., p. 30.

4. PBh., III., 2. (32), p. 225.

5. Faddegon, op.cit., p. 29

I support the second suggestion for we know for certain that Praśastapāda was very much influenced by the logical writings of Dignāga.¹ And the latter, being a Buddhist, in keeping with the doctrine of momentariness (kṣaṇika) opposed the theory of asatkārya.

Kuppuswami Sastri, too states that the theory of asatkāryavāda "involves the idea that the effect is invariably preceded by its antecedent non-existence."² The study of this doctrine makes it clear that the whole asatkāryavāda depends on the acceptance of non-existence as a category. It is to be noted here that also the Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas (Bhāṭṭa school), believe in the theory of asatkārya,³ consequently they too posit Negation as a category.⁴

Moreover, the pluralistic conception of Reality entails negation. Inasmuch as these three realistic schools viz. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭa, postulate several categories (padārtha) the recognition of the ontological character of abhāva is the direct logical result. Unless it is accepted as such, the delimitation

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1. Keith, Atomism., pp. 99 ff. See Ch.IV, n.149 with for further references.
 2. Primer, p.200 (Tar.Sam., 39) 'kāryam prāgabhāva-pratīyogī'; NK., p. 230, 'prāgabhūtasya paścād-bhava utpadaḥ.'
 3. Prof. Dalsukh Malwaniya, NASVT., Introduction, p.123.
 4. The Mīmāṃsakas' view is discussed below pp.61-78

even of the positive categories will not be possible. Śrīdhara, explaining the difference between mutual negation (itaretarābhāva) and absolute negation (atyantabhāva) stated that the former applies to finite entities only (svarūpasiddhāyor eva) whereas the latter is a negation not limited by time and space (deśakālānavacchinnaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ). Thus, unless the positive character of absolute negation is postulated, the formulation of the six basic categories (padārtha) becomes invalid, because beyond these six "there is Nothing".¹ Furthermore, without the acceptance of mutual negation no distinction between these categories is possible. This view is propounded e.g. by the Navya-nyāya (Neo-nyāya) logician Viśvanātha who in his Siddhāntamuktāvalī observes: "abhāvatvam dravyādiṣaṭkānyonyābhāvattvam".² According to this view, "abhāva" has a logical function as well as an ontological character.

The category of negation, as a factor of delimitation is indispensable for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭa

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1. Cf. NK., p.230: 'itaretarābhāvo hi svarūpasiddhāyor eva gavaśvayor itaretaratmatapratīṣedhaḥ. atyantābhāve tu sarvatha asadbhūtasyaiva buddhāv-arōpitasya deśakālānavacchinnaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ yathā ṣaṭpadārthebhyo nanyat-prameyamastīti. yadi catyantābhāvo neṣyate ṣadeva padārtha ity ayam niyamo durghaṭaḥ syat.'
 2. SM., I.12; IP., Vol.II, p.220 Sinha HIP., Vol.I, p. 348.

Mīmāṃsaka philosophy of realistic pluralism.¹

It should be noted that no scholar has suggested that Gotama and Kaṇāda the authors of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika sūtras did not accept the theory of asatkārya. Nor has anyone suggested that this theory should be considered as a 'later invention' or "addition" to the system; on the contrary the theory is very old and has received recognition in the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika sūtras.² Hence, I believe that the authors of the aphorisms did not intend to deny the status of an entity or category to Negation.

And my last argument is that both, Gotama and Kaṇāda, ostensibly defended 'abhāva' as an object of knowledge (prameya) and as an ontological reality (padārtha). Gotama refers to the view that Negation is not a means of knowledge (pramāṇa)³ because no negative entity is established as its object. To this he replies that a negative entity (prameya) is an established fact, just as any positive fact; therefore, also abhāva is real, even though it is not a pramāṇa.⁴

1. ^{Sinha} ibid. pp. 350, 450.

2. See supra. pp. 41-43

3. The question of Abhāva as a pramāṇa, we reserve for the fourth chapter.

4. NS., II.11.7-8; 'nābhāva-prāmāṇyam prameyāssiddeḥ.' 'lakṣiteṣv-alakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvad alakṣitanam tat-prameya-siddhiḥ.' See also sūtra 10.

Vātsyāyana, commenting on these sūtras states that there are numerous instances of negative prameyas. By way of example he explains a particular case mentioned in Sūtra II, II, 8 (See ^{p.47}~~p.47~~).

A number of (e.g.) pieces of cloth are marked, and a number are unmarked: someone is told to fetch the unmarked pieces and is able to do so because the unmarked pieces (by way of contrast) become objects of cognition just by not being marked.¹

As mentioned above² the other type of negation includes prāgabhāva and pradhvaṃsābhāva. Thus a twofold division of abhāva is established in the Nyāya Sūtra.³ The early Nyāya theory is as follows: Negation is accepted as a prameya, but not as a pramāṇa, it is inferential rather than immediately perceptual.⁴

However, later logicians defined negation in terms of perception. To them it had the character of being an object of sense-perception.⁵ Bertrand Russell analysing

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1. NBh., on II, 11.7-8: athāyam artha-bah utrād arthaikadeśa udahriyate. (the sūtra II.11.8.) tasyabhavasya siddhyati prameyam; katham (?) lakṣiteṣu vaśaṣṣu....ubhayasannidhavalakṣitāni vāsaṃsya nayeti prayukto yeṣu vaśaṣṣu lakṣaṇāni na bhavanti tāni lakṣaṇabhavena pratipadyate, pratipadya canayati.
 2. NS., II.11.12 quoted above n. 68, ^{p.42 n.2}.
 3. NBh., (CSS.1925 ed.), p.359: "abhāva-dvaitam khalu bhavati"; See also NVT., thereon; Randle, E.Schoole., p.330 n.1.
 4. cf., NS.II.11.2; Randle., loc.cit., p.329.
 5. See Chapter IV.

a similar case of negation observes that "we judge" the absence.¹ He clearly accepts its inferential character. However, he does not define it (in the passage quoted in footnote 1) as a "prameya", which seems to be the more consistent view.

The early Vaiśeṣika theory is expressed as follows:

"An existent thing is an entity different from a non-existent thing, inasmuch as actions and attributes cannot be predicated of the latter."²

Things are limited by their beginnings and their ends. All predicates, and actions refer to their "thingness" only. They are not possible either before the production or after the destruction of the things.³

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1. Cf. Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, (5th Impression 1956), pp. 73-74 "Suppose you are told "there is butter in the larder, but no cheese." Although they seem equally based on sensible experience, the two statements "there is butter" and "there is not cheese" are really on a very different level. There is a definite occurrence which was seeing butter, and which might have put the word "butter" in your mind even if you had not been thinking of butter. But there was no occurrence which could be described as "not seeing cheese" or as "seeing the absence of cheese". You judged this, you did not see it; you saw what each thing was, not what it was not. To judge "this is not cheese", you must have the word "cheese", or some equivalent, in your mind already. There is a clash between what you see and the association of the word "cheese", and so you judge "this is not cheese". " (Underlined words are in italics.)
 2. VS., IX.1.3. 'asataḥ kriyā-guṇa-vyapadeśābhāvād arthāntaram'. This definition is with reference to the previous sūtra in which "sat" is discussed. It expresses the pradhvaṃsābhava.
 3. VS., IX.1.1. 'Kriyā-guṇa-vyapadeśābhavat praḡ asat.'

Thus, unless the reality of the prior and posterior negations is accepted, the use of such words as past, present and future, antecedent and subsequent, beginning and end is not possible.¹ "The whole view of abhāva is based on the metaphysical conception of the Vaiśeṣika. If things simply exist and do not become, i.e. non-exist, then all things would be eternal. If antecedent non-existence is denied, then all things and their movements should be regarded as beginningless; if subsequent non-existence is denied, then things and their activities will be indistinguishable; and if absolute non-existence is denied, then things should be regarded as existing always and everywhere."²

Indeed, in the Nyāya- and Vaiśeṣika-sūtras 'abhāva' is defined by the terms "prameya" and "artha".³ Although negation is a logical rather than an ontological category there is a clear tendency to regard it as "something existent".⁴

1. N.Kaust., p.147; 'nanvevam dhvamsapragābhāvāṅgikāre ādyatva caramatva vartamanatva bhaviṣyatvatitātva purvatvottaratvanan anugatanirvacanam aśakyam'; Aptā-mīmāṃsā, verse 10: 'kāryyadravyam anādi syat pragabhavasya nihnave. pradhvasasya ca dharmasya pracyate' nantatam vrajet'; and cp., Śl. Vart., Ab., verses 5-6; Mālavāṇīya, Notes, NASVVT., p.232.
2. Radhakrishnan, IP., II., p.221. For other two types of negation viz., absolute (atyantābhāva) and reciprocal (anyonyābhāva) See VS., IX.1.4-10; Sinha., HIP., I, p.347. According to Sankara Miśra's commentary Upaskara, these sūtras contain four types of negation. See also Randle, E.Schools, p.330, n.1.
3. NS., II.2.8. and VS IX.1.3; See also Sinha, op.cit., p.227.
4. Radhakrishnan, op.cit., p.220.

However, with regard to the view, propounded by many scholars¹ viz. that the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika Sūtra did not regard negation as a padārtha, because it is not included as such in the lists of the positive categories, we may examine the explanations given by Śrīdhara and Udayana. Udayana observes in this respect: "Negation is not mentioned separately, although it has its own independent character (svarūpa), simply because by stating its counter-positive negation is (implicitly) mentioned. (But it is not mentioned) not because it is not an entity; since antecedent and posterior negations are intended to be explained in (the sections) dealing with Creation and Destruction (that is asatkārya) and reciprocal and absolute negations in the discussion concerning Difference (vaidharmya)".²

The main contention is that "Negation is a cognition which depends upon the apprehension of its counter-positive."³ This means that negation can be known only with reference to its negatum. Therefore, Udayana and Śrīdhara rejected the

1. vide supra pp. 37-39.

2. 'abhavas tu svarupavan api prthak noddistah pratiyogi-nirupanadhina-nirupanatvat. na tu tucchatvat. utpatti-vinasa-cintayam pragabhava-dhvamsabhavayor vaidharmye cetaretarabhavatyantabhavayos tatra tatra nidarsisyamanatvat Kir., p. 38. See also Faddegon, V. System., p. 120 on VS. IX.1.1-2.

3. Sivāditya, Sapt. p. 65., 'pratiyogi-jñānādhīnajñāno 'bhāvaḥ'

validity of the objections against the recognition of negation as a category (padārtha). Śrīdhara declared: "Negation is not mentioned separately (in the Vaiśeṣika sūtra), simply because it is dependent (for its cognition) upon Bhāva (i.e. the six positive categories), and not because it is unreal.¹ The same point has been expressed by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara from whose works the two authors derived much knowledge.² However, this explanation does not seem satisfactory to V.S.Athalye. He is of the opinion that "This is more like an apology for the non-mention of abhāva in the original sūtra than an argument for recognising it as a separate padārtha."³ I find it difficult to agree with Athalye. As we have pointed out above - in spite of the fact that negation is not included as such in the list of padārthas - it is defined as a "prameya" an object of cognition, and this implies its nature of a category (padārtha).⁴ Udayana and Śrīdhara emphasised the fact that it is the specific character (Svabhāvaviśeṣa) of negation itself which prevented it from being included in the list of positive categories.

1. NK. p. 7, 'abhāvasya prthagānupadeśaḥ bhāva-pāratantryān-
natvabhāvat.'

2. cp. NBh., (KSS.), pp. 10-12., and NVT., pp. 9-10.

3. Tr. Sam., p. 102. Athalye refers to Udayan's passage which is quoted above p. 51 n.2.

4. NS. II.2.7.-8; VS., IX.1.3; supra pp. 42, 47, 49.

With the exception of Śiromaṇi¹ nearly all Navya-Naiyāyikas (Neo-Nyāya system) recognised *abhāva* as a category. So does Śivāditya Miśra (1100 A.D.) who in his treatise 'Saptapadārthi' or the 'Account of the seven Categories', specifically enlists negation as the seventh category in addition to the six mentioned by Kaṇāda.²

In the seventeenth century Paṇḍita Venīdatta wrote an important and critical 'Defence of the Categories' or 'Padārtha-maṇḍana' in answer to the 'Padārtha-Tattva-Nirupāṇa' of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1500 A.D.). The latter had refuted the Vaiśeṣika account of the categories. At the end of his treatise Venīdatta gave a list of categories and said: "These are the only four positive categories."³

The use of the words 'eva' and 'bhāva' in the text is very significant, for the author in his general treatment of

1. See *infra* pp. 54-55.

2. Sapt., Sū., 2. 'te ca dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyābhaveṣu saptaiva'. See also Annambhaṭṭa, 'Tr.Sam.' I.2.

3. PM., p.36. 'vastutas tu dravya-guṇa-karma-dharmāḥ catvara eva bhavapadārthāḥ.' Generality and particularity are intended by the term 'dharma'. Introduction, p.3 "sāmānya-viśeṣayor dharmapadena grahaṇam." and text pp. 9-10. Notice the use of the term "dharma" instead of the two *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* categories postulated by the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers. This seems to me an influence of the Buddhist 'Apoha' doctrine. cf. *infra*. Chap. V.

the the categories included also negation. The editor, Gopāla Śāstrī Nene, in his introduction rightly observes that this author accepted five categories, vis., Substance (dravya), Attribute (guṇa), Action (karma), Universality and particularity (dharma), and Negation (abhāva).¹ Venīdatta's treatment of the categories reflects the manner of Gotama and Kaṇāda. The two Sūtrakāras enumerated only positive categories but indicated by implication that abhāva is a category.² Venīdatta did the same but made it more clear by saying "these are the only (eva) four positive (bhāva) categories."³

In Navya-Nyāya, the system of the seven categories including negation "appears to be accepted by Gaṅgeśa and Mathuranātha, as it certainly is by Viśvanātha."⁴ Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, however, in his 'Padārtha-Tattva-Nirūpaṇa' denounced the traditional Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system

1. PM., Introduction p.1: "anena granthakṛtā hi pañca padārthāḥ svikṛtāḥ. te ca dravya guṇa karma dharmābhāvaḥ." On page 12. (14-15) Venīdatta rejecting the category of particularity explicitly states that he recognises only five padārthas and viśeṣa is not an independent category. Viśeṣo'pi ca na padārthāntaram,....dravyadipañcabhinna-padārtha-niśedhaḥ.
2. supra pp. 42, 47, 48. 4-14-15 pp.
3. cf. supra p. 109. Bodas' comments about Aristotle are noteworthy here. He writes: "Aristotle does not mention Abhava or negation as he deals only with Ens or Being." Tr. Sam., p.74.
4. Ingalls, Materials., p.38. See also Kārikāvali with SM.(1923) p.4, verse 2.

of categories, which in my opinion, includes negation.

"He calls the qualities indivisible imposed properties (akhaṇḍopādhi): to inherence, absence, and some if not all generic characters he gives the same name."¹

Veṇīdatta, too, differs from the traditional system as well as from Raghunātha. He ranges Sāmānya and Viśeṣa under the term "dharma", instead of "akhaṇḍopādhi". However, in keeping with the traditional system he accepts "abhāva" as a separate category.

Thus, there is a tendency among some later logicians to reject the ontological character of negation. They rather stress its logical function.²

Section V. Conception of Negation (Abhāva) according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Logicians.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika asserts that negation is not apprehended as 'non-existence' per se. However, this does not mean that absence is not an objective reality. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika negative and positive judgments correspond to two distinct (arthāntara) entities or "facts"

1. Ingalls., loc. cit.

2. See Chapter III, Complex Negations, pp. 140-142.

which themselves are negative and positive. Both these "facts" are real (Vastu).¹ Reality is primarily divided into two categories; Existence (bhāva) and Non-existence (abhāva).² Thus, the thing denoted by the word (pada) is a fact (artha) or an entity which can be either negative or positive.

However, the perceptual as well as the logical functions of these facts are different. The judgment "the book is not on the table" is correlated to the judgment "the book is on the table", i.e. the "absence" of the expected "presence" is perceived. Thus, the fact "not-book" is delimited by the different fact "book". Otherwise "not-book" may mean anything in the cosmos. The very notion "it is not" presupposes an experience of something "that is". In Nyāya terminology this is expressed as follows: "Negation depends for its cognition on the counter-positive" or "negation is that cognition which depends upon the cognition of the counter-positive."³

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1. The Nominalist would not accept this view for, according to him, reality cannot consist of two opposite components. cf. *śūtra*, chap. V. Apoha section, pp 48, 49, 50, 51.
 2. Lak., p.1. supra n.51. p.36 w.1.
 3. cf. Kir., p.38; 'pratiyogi-nirūpanādhīnanirūpanatvāt; 'SP., p. 65: pratiyogijñānadhīnajñāno 'bhāvah.

Śrīdhara rejecting simple sense-perception as a means of negative cognition says: "The grasping by vague perception (i.e. indeterminate - nirvikalpaka),¹ in consequence of a connection with the sense organs, is possible for pots etc., because things like these do not depend in their innate nature (svarūpa) on something else. But the innate nature of non-existence, having negation as innate character, is dependent on that whose negation it is. Therefore - [scil.] since there is no other innate nature of non-existence than that of its being the negation of the (positive entity in question) - no determining of its is possible without the determining of the innate nature of its pratiyogin (correlative object). This, namely, is the difference between existence and non-existence; that the grasping of the one takes place in a positive form, the grasping of the other in the form of a negation of

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1. Perception (pratiyakṣa) is two fold, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system: indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka). The latter is somewhat similar to Buddhist Inference. For details see Chatterjee, N. Theory of Knowledge., pp. 207-227; Ingalls, Materials., pp. 39-40. For the views of the different systems see Kuppaswami Shastri, Primer., pp. 212-225. J.S. Jetly, "The Meaning of the word Avyapadeśya in Nyaya-sutra, I.1.4," Journal of the University of Bombay, Vol. XIX, pt. 2, Sept., 1950.

something else."¹

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas there are three important factors for cognising negation. 1). A suggestion of a perceptible counter-positive (pratiyogin); 2). Perception of the locus in which the absence resides and thus qualifies it; 3). Non-existence or negation of the counter-positive.²

We cannot have a cognition of a negative entity without precedent experience and the intention to perceive the thing negated (grhyamāṇa); together with the perception of the empty place where we intended to find the thing. Then there must be definite absence of the thing (counter-

1. NK., p.226; Yuktam ghaṭādīnām indriyasannikarṣān nirvikalpāna grahaṇam teṣāṃ svarūpasya parānapekṣatvāt abhāvasya tu pratiśedhasvabhāvasya svarūpaneva yasyāyam-eva pratiśedhaḥ syāt tadadhinam atas tatpratiśedhatam antareṇa tadabhāvasya svarūpantarābhavat tatrāsyā pratiyogi-svarūpa-nirūpaṇam antareṇa nirūpaṇam aśakyam. ayam eva hi bhāvabhāvayor viśeṣo yād ekasya vidhirūpatāyā grahaṇam aparasya tvanyapratīśedhamukhena. Translation by Faddegon, V.System. p.485. See also Uddyotakara NVT., pp.9-10 introducing NS.I.1.1. Śrīdhara himself referred to Uddyotakara and quotes the following passage from the NVT.: "svatantra-paratantrapalabdhy-anupalabdhi-karanabhāvāc ca viśeṣaḥ sat tu khalu pramāṇasyālabhanam svatantram asat tu paratantram anyapratīśedha mukheneti."
2. NK., p. 9 grhyamāṇe pratiyogini samyukta-viśeṣanātaya tadanya-pratiśedha-mukhenabhavo grhyate. The term 'viśeṣanta' means a unique relation between absence and the locus in which it resides. See Radhakrishnan, IP., Vol. II, pp. 53-54: we shall discuss this in the fourth chapter.

positive) itself which is to be denied by negation. Thus in the judgment 'the book is not on the table', we have a preceding awareness of the book; then, there is the factual absence of the book, which is contrary to its presence, i.e. the counter-positive. Hence, we cognise real negation as qualifying the table (locus) connected with the book by negative relation (samyukta-viśeṣanatayā).¹

However, there is another angle from which the negative judgment can be explained.² According to this theory all reality is positive only; therefore all cognitions are existential. Thus even negative judgments refer to perception of some other thing than the negatum. In contrast to the previous theory the emphasis here is on the locus of the absence as a perceived entity, rather than on the perception of the absence as such.

For instance, the negative statement "there is no book on the table" implies the affirmative judgment "there is the table". The assertion 'The lotus is not black' may imply

1. The importance of perceiving the locus has been emphasised in all the schools; the Buddhists and the Prābhākaras have even equated cognition of negation with perception of the empty locus. cf. *infra* pp. 89-95.
2. Essentials, p. 95.

'it is red' or 'white'. According to this view all negative judgments may be interpreted as "a complex of affirmative judgments".¹

To the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers such speculations are not acceptable. In the negative judgment 'the book is not on the table' the fact we cognise is in the form of "the locus being qualified by the absence of the negatum".² And its cognition consists of a denial of the presence of the counter-positive. Nonetheless this denial does not assert the presence of any other positive thing. For example, when we say 'it is not rainy now', we do not necessarily mean 'it is snowy' or 'it is sunny'. The statement asserts only the denial of rain at a specific time and place. This form of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika negation emphasises only a particular fact. It is not concerned with other possibilities entailed in that negation (anyapratishedha). Thus, in the statement "there is no rain", implications such as "the child may play in the street", "it is hot", "it snows" are not referred to. In this connection Hiriyanna observes that "negative facts are as

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1. Hiriyanna, Studies p. 147 (c).— This is the view held by the Buddhists and the Prābhakaras. We shall discuss it in Chapter II.
 2. NK., p. 229, Tad-abhāva-viśiṣṭa-bhūtala-grahaṇam.

much objects of knowledge as positive ones; or to state the same otherwise, knowledge of absence is not absence of knowledge. That is, the present view explains negative judgments by postulating negative facts as part of objective reality."¹

Section VI. Negative Category and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā School.

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā philosophy comprises two main currents of thought.: 1) The school of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and 2) The school of Prābhākara.² Their views on the problem of negation are not reconcilable. In this section we shall limit ourselves only to Kumārila's standpoint. The Prābhākara theory will be presented in the following chapter. A point of special interest is the relation of the Bhaṭṭa-Mīmāṃsa to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with regard to the problem of negation.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, as pointed out above (see p.²⁰ 3), differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with regard to the means

1. Hiriyanna, Studies, p. 140.

2. There is an unsolved controversy regarding the priority in time of Kumārila and Prabhākara. Thus it is not clear whether Prabhākara was the master or pupil of Kumārila. See for this, e.g. "internitz, HIL., Vol. III, p. 425; Radhakrishnan, IP., vol. II., pp. 377-378; Stcherbatsky, BL. vol. I. p. 51; Jha, PM Sources., pp. 16-17.

of apprehending negation. According to him negation is the means (pramāṇa) for the cognition of its own (negative) objective reality (vastu or padārtha).¹ He adduces two main reasons for this theory: (a) his adherence to the theories of asatkārya and negative emancipation;² (b) the logical necessity of solving the paradox of the negative judgment (see p.).

Kumārila supports the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory concerning negative reality.³ He accepted the fourfold division of negation. This was expressed by him as follows: "The negation of curd in milk is called 'Prior Negation' (prāgabhāva); the negation of milk in the curd is called 'Posterior Negation' (dhvaṃsa); the negation of the horse, etc.,

1. Kumārila follows Śabara Svāmī's interpretation of Jaimini's Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra in expounding 'abhava'. cf. infra Chapter IV. SSK., I, 15.
2. "The conception of mokṣa here (i.e. in the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka system) much resembles the conception of the same in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The only divergence between the two schools, which may be noticed here, is that some among the followers of Kumārila seem to have maintained that it was a state not merely of absence of suffering but also of positive bliss - a view which appears to be more in consonance with the general spirit of his teaching." Hiriyanna, Essentials, p. 149; see ~~supra~~ pp. Kumārila Bhāṭṭa regards liberation "purely negative in character." Jha., PM. Sources., p. 38; Śl. Vārt., Sambandhakṣepaparīkṣā, verses 101-107; Sinha, HIP., I., p. 851.
3. See Chandradhar Sharma: Indian Philosophy, pp. 309-10.

in the cow, and vice versa is known as 'Mutual Negation' (anyonyābhāva); the lower portions of the hare's head, being devoid of hardness and a supernumery growth in the form of horns, is called 'Absolute Negation' (atyantābhāva)."¹ After describing the four kinds of negation, Kumārila refutes "those who hold that Negation being a non-entity (avastu) is not an objective reality (tuccha) and is without a self-character (niḥayabhāva)."² He observes that we could not differentiate between cause and effect "if Negation were not classified into these four different kinds, such as Prior absence, etc. Nor again is such classification possible with regard to a non-entity (avastu). Therefore Negation must be an entity." For what is the negation of an effect, other than the absence of the cause.³ In other words all effects are non-existent prior to their production. If there were no prāgabhāva or pradhvaṃsābhāva of a thing, then, it would be always present in time and

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1. 'kṣīre dadhyādi yannāsti prāgabhāvaḥ sa ucyate. (2)
nāstita payaso dadhni pradhvaṃsābhāva iṣyate.
gavi yo'śvady abhāvas tu so'nyonyābhāva ucyate. (3)
śirasas'vayava nimnā vṛddhikāṭhinyavarjitā.
śaśaśrṃgadirupeṇa so'tyantābhāva ucyate.' (4)
S.Vart., Ab.ch., 2-4, pp. 473-474; Translation by Jhā,
p. 243. Cp. below n. 132.
 2. 'ye niḥsvābhāvaṃ abhāvaṃ avastusvarūpaṃ tuccham manyante,
tan pratyah'. Parthasārathi Miśra. NR. commentary, Ibid.,
Verses 7-8, p. 474.
 3. 'na ca syādvavaharo'yaṃ kārāṇādivibhāgataḥ.
prāgabhāvadibhedena nābhāvo bhidyate yadi.
na cāvastuna ete syur bhedas tenasya vastutā.
kāryādināṃ abhāvaḥ ko yo'bhāvaḥ kārāṇādināḥ. Ibid., verses...
contd. overleaf.....

place. If there were no prior absence of curd in milk, then, curd would be present at all time and so we should never be able to cognise the milk, i.e. the cause of the effect (curd).¹ Kumārila thus supports the theory of asatkārya.

continued from previous page....

There are two editions of this text: (1) edited by Rāma Śāstri Tailāṅga in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1898; (2) edited by S.K. Ramanātha Śāstri published by the University of Madras, 1940. The first edition gives in verse 8, the reading "ko yo 'bhavaḥ karaṇādinah" which Dr. Jha renders as follows: "For what is the negation of an effect, other than the existence (continuance) of the cause?" He apparently reads 'bhāva' in accordance with the edition (2). This change of 'abhāva' to 'bhāva' in the text is very problematic. I prefer "abhāva" because Kumārila is an "asatkāryavādin". The term "abhāva" is a substitute here for "pragabhāva".

1. The Mīmāṃsaka does not agree with the theory that curd is present in the milk. Contrary to this asatkārya theory of the NV. and the Mīmāṃsakas, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga systems believe in the satkārya theory, according to which an effect, exists potentially in its material cause. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga system, "holds that nothing can ever come into being afresh or pass away finally. When therefore we speak of an effect as produced, all that we mean is that what was latent merely becomes manifest. The underlying idea is that the effect is always there, though in a potential form, and that it only becomes actual when certain conditions known as the efficient causes, like the activity of the potter in the case of a pot, are fulfilled. The material cause and the effect are not accordingly taken here to be quite distinct as in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; they form, on the other hand an identity in difference, as in Jainism. This view is designated as "the doctrine of pre-existent effect" (sat-kārya-vāda) in contrast to the other, termed "the doctrine of not-pre-existent effect (asatkāryavāda)". Hiriyanna, Essentials., p. 109; See also J. Sinha, HIP., Vol. I, p. 590.

2. cf. supra, p.

Moreover, in the absence of posterior negation, there would be absolute negation of all things. For all effects are non-existent prior to their production. If there would be no destruction of the prior negation, how could effects appear at all? According to this theory the prior negation is destroyed by the same cause which produces its counter-entity (pratiyogin).¹ Thus only after the destruction of prāgabhāva an effect comes into being.²

The mutual negation (anyonyābhāva) can be explained as follows: A is not B and vice versa. A horse is not a cow and a cow is not a horse; there is a class identity between the two inasmuch as both are species of the genus of vertebrates. Nevertheless each exists in its own form and at the same time does not exist in the other's form. Thus, according to Kumārila "all things are positive from their own standpoint, but negative from that of the other."³ Such judgments or usages of differentiation of things would not be possible if they were not based on the objectivity of

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1. 'vināśah prāgabhāvasya pratiyogyutpādana-sāmagrītaḥ'. SP., p.155.
 2. Vide supra, pp. 41-42.
 3. 'svarūpa-parā-rūpābhyām sarvam sad-asad-ātmakam'. Ś1. Vart., Ab. ch., 12, p.476.

'Mutual Absence' (anyonyābhāva).¹

With regard to 'Absolute Negation (atyantābhāva), Kumārila asked whether it is possible to deny the absolute absence of colour in the air, fire in the water, and horns in the hare. If one should not accept the absolute absence as an objective reality (vastu),² then, the Mīmāṃsaka, would ask him to show and prove the existence of "hardness in the lower portion of the hare's head and colour in the air, taste in the fire, etc."³

Thus, it is clear that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, postulates 'abhāva' as an independent objective reality or category. Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, however, holds a different view. He observes: "Kumārila does not thing negation to be an independent reality, but only an aspect of the positive locus in which it is cognised."⁴

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1. For distinction between 'mutual absence' and 'separate-ness' (pr̥thaktva) see, infra, Chapt. III, p. 130.
 2. In ascribing "vastutā" to "abhāva", Kumārila seems to have been influenced by the NV. In his theory of "absolute negation" there may be a trace of Mādhyamika and Advaita-Vedānta ideas. Paul Masson-Oursel, in 'Esquisse d'une Histoire de la Philosophie Indienne, Paris, 1923, p. 202.
 3. Śl. Vārt., Ab.Ch., vers. 4-5: pp. 473-474: śirasō 'vayavā nimnā vṛddhikāthinya-varjitāḥ. apsu gandho rasas cāgnau vāyau rūpeṇa tau saha. (etc.).
 4. Buddhist Flux., p. 409.

Prof. H. Ui expresses a similar opinion. He writes:

"Kumārila Bhaṭṭa mentions Śakti, Sādrśya, and Abhāva (negation) not as categories, but as the principles of pramāṇa, i.e., śakti for pramāṇa in general, Sādrśya for upamāna (analogy), and abhāva for abhāva (privation, or negation), while in the Prābhākara view Śakti and sādrśya are two categories beside the others."¹ I disagree with both scholars on the grounds we have discussed above and the following.

Before further investigating whether Kumārila accepts the positive (independent) reality of negation it is necessary to examine whether his approach to it is identical with his treatment of the other (positive) categories. Kumārila gives an additional reason why "Negation should be regarded (gamyate) as an entity such as a cow etc. For it is the object of inclusive and exclusive conceptions and is (generally) an object of cognition. It is not merely fortuitous, i.e. an (incorrect) imposition or an erroneous notion. Therefore, the fact that (negation is defined in terms of) the Universal and the

1. Das. Śāstra., p. 125.

concrete particular is not false."¹

An (objective) entity (vastu) is that which can be affirmed and denied or differentiated. We affirm a particular thing in its generality and differentiate it from all other things. To apprehend the thing (a) we cognise it with its class character or generality and (b) differentiate it from all other things, including the members of its own class. The cow is cognised first as the possessor of cow-ness, but for the cognition of the cow which belongs to Mr. A we must differentiate (vyāvṛtta) it from all other cows and, in fact, from all other objects (i.e. non-cow). An individual character (anuvṛtta) of all S's. However, for the apprehension of the particular "S" which occurs in the name "Christopher" it must be differentiated (vyāvṛtta) from all

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1. 'yadvā' nuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-buddhi-grāhyo yatas tv ayam, tasmād gavādivad-vastu prameyatvāc ca gamyate. na caupacārikatvam vābhrāntirvāpi yadrecchayā, bhavaty-ato na sāmānya-viśeṣātma-katā mṛṣā. Śl.Vārt., Ab., 9-10; See also Jhā, PM Sources, p. 163. Note the correct translation by Jhā of the phrase "anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-buddhi-grāhyaḥ" as "it is capable of forming the object of the notions of collective affirmation and differentiation"; and the unsatisfactory rendering by J. Prasad in HIE., p. 276: "it can be apprehended as applicable or non-applicable to things".

other S's belonging to its class.¹ Kumārila believes that such cognition of affirmation and denial is only possible because every entity (vastu) has a two-fold reality, namely, that of its class and that of the individual.² Kumārila argues that since this two-fold character is applicable to negation, (abhāva) it should be recognised as an entity (vastu).³ At the time of cognition of the antecedent non-existence of something, this non-existence must be differentiated (vyāvṛtta) from the other three kinds of negation after it has been affirmed (anuvṛtta) in its class character. We also cognise the posterior negation as different from the antecedent, mutual and the absolute negations. In the same way the last two, that is, the mutual and the absolute negations are cognised as distinct

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1. Whether a word denotes the individuality or generality, or both, is another problem. According to the NS. II.2.64-68 the meaning of a word (padārtha) is not one but three: Individuality (vyakti), Universality (jāti) and Configuration (ākṛti). One of the three is understood, according to the agent's wish, as the main denotation and the other two as secondary. Nonetheless all the three are the denotation of the word. But Kumārila regards Ākṛti and Jāti as synonymous and thinks that the denotation of the word is the class (ākṛti). See Śl. Vārt., Ch. Ākṛti; Jhā, PM Sources., pp. 68-76.
 2. Śl. Vārt., Ch. Ākr., 5. p. 546 sarvavastuṣu buddhiś ca vyāvṛtṭy anugamātmikā. Jāyate dvyātmakatvena vinā sā ca na siddhyati.
 3. PM Sources, p. 163.

from each other and the rest.¹ Kumārila thus contends that like any other (positive) form of reality negation, too, forms the object of cognition and also that it (negation) can be expressed by affirmative and negative propositions.² It may also be argued that in the proposition, e.g. 'He does nothing', or 'He eats nothing' the word 'nothing' is treated as the object of cognition (vastu) that takes the predications of 'doing' and 'eating'. There is nothing grammatically wrong in such constructions which forbids the use of such expressions. This affirmative (anuvṛtti) propositional use of negation indicates a class character (anuvṛtti-dharma). Thus all negative cognitions are members of the class of Abhāva.

Moreover, there are some sources in direct support of the theory that the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas recognised negation as a category from Kumārila onwards. A follower

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1. 'tad ayam vastudharmah san katham avastudharmah syād iti. asti hy abhāvasya prāgabhāvādisvarūpeṇa vyāvṛttir abhāvarūpeṇa cā' nuvṛttir iti.' Pārthasārathi Miśra in N. Ratnākara's commentary on Śl.Vant., Ab.verse 9. p.475.
 2. This view is diametrically opposed to the Buddhist theory of Apoha according to which all propositions are "discriminatory" and therefore affirmative and negative. cf. ^{supra} Chap V, pp. 204-205.

of that school, called Nārāyaṇa, wrote a treatise 'Kumārila-matopanyāsa' or 'An Exposition of Kumārila's Doctrine',¹ in which he enlists five categories as accepted by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Nārāyaṇa says: "The followers of Kumārila classify the categories (or objects of knowledge, prameya), into five, viz.: Substance (dravya), Universal (jāti), Attribute (guṇa), Action (karma), and Negation (abhāva)." And afterwards the author criticises Prabhākara for not recognising abhāva as a category (vastu).² Furthermore, Gāgābhaṭṭa, (also called Viśveśvara; ¹⁶⁸⁹1800A.D.), in his versatile work 'Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi' or 'the Thought-

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1. Kumārila-matopanyāsa published along with Gurusammatapadārth-āḥ, University of Travancore, 1954; based on a Palm-leaf MS. written in Malayalam. Nārāyaṇa seems to be identical with the author of the prameya part of the 'Mānameyodaya' of the 17th century. See Introduction by Suranad Kunjan Pillai, p.4.
 2. Ibid., p.7. verse 54; "abhāvākhyam padārtham ca pañcamam cintayāmahe"; verse 57; "abhāvākhyam tu vastu-eva nāstī ty āha prabhākarah". The emphasis on 'tu' should be understood with reference to the fact that the Bhāṭṭas postulate 'abhāva' as vastu as well as pramāṇa while the Prabhākaras do not even (tu) accept it as vastu or entity. Verses 54 to 60; The terms 'prameya' and 'vastu' are treated here as synonyms of 'padārtha' or category: p.6. verse 42½, "dravyam jātir guṇaḥ karmāpyabhāvam ceti pañcadhā. prameyam vibhajanty ete Kumārila-matānugaḥ".

jewel of Bhaṭṭa',¹ enumerates seven categories. The author first posits three types of negation, viz., posterior (dhvaṃsa), absolute (atyanta) and mutual (i.e. difference (bheda)).² Subsequently he enumerates seven categories adding Inherence (samavāya) and Potentiality (śakti),³ to the five postulated by Nārāyaṇa. Now, the question whether the Bhaṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas recognised five or seven categories remains problematic. But this can be stated for certain that Kumārila and his followers regarded abhāva as a distinct padārtha.⁴ M. Hiriyanna,⁵ J. Sinha,⁶

1. Bhaṭṭa-cintāmaṇi (Terkapāda) of Gāgābhaṭṭa; edited with notes and Introduction by Prof. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, Chowkhamba San. Series, Benares 1933. Gāgābhaṭṭa was the Coronation Preceptor of the great Maratha leader Sivājī (1627-1680 AD) Cf. Randle R.D., Preface to PM Sources., XII: Oxford History of India (3rd. Ed.) p. 409-415.
2. By omitting the antecedent non-existence Gāgābhaṭṭa differs from Kūmarila who probably introduced the fourfold division which was subsequently adopted by the N.V. school (See Randle, E. Schools., p.....) This omission is in keeping with the Navya-nyāya theories propounded by Raghunātha Śiromani and Veṇidatta. Both these logicians rejected "prāgabhāva". Cf. PM., p.28. See infra Chapt. III, pp. 121-122.
3. B.Cin., p. 17. 'abhāvas tridhā. dhvaṃso' tyantābhāvo bhedaśceti. evam ca dravya-guna-karma-sāmānya-samavāya-śaktyabhāvāḥ sapta padārthāḥ.
4. Māna-Meyodaya (Madras 1933), p. 148., "vayam tāvat prameyam tu dravyajātiguṇakriyāḥ abhāvaś ceti pañcāitān padārthān ādriyāmahe". We, however, recognise as objects of valid knowledge, these five categories, namely, sub., genus, quality, action and non-existence. See also, p.292 of the same; Hiriyanna, Outlines., p.325.
5. Essentials, p. 143; see also Outlines, p.325.
6. HIP., Vol.I., p. 765; see also p. 810.

Satish Chandra Chatterjee,¹ S.S. Sukthankara,²
Chandradhar Sharma,³ and other scholars support this
view.

Section VII. Kumārila's Conception of Absence.

From Kumārila's view - as mentioned in the previous section - it should not be concluded that in the Mīmāṃsaka's theory, 'abhāva', is a 'thing' like any positive (empirical) entity. (It is but negatively real). Nor is it suggested that negation is devoid of reality; or without any reference to positive reality. Rather, Kumārila is of the opinion that absence and presence are logically related. Yet, they are independent, inasmuch as they form the objects of two different cognitions. This has been expressed - perhaps not very clearly - as follows; "Every object has a double character: with regard to its own form, it exists (i.e. as a jar, a jar exists); while with regard to the form of another object, it does not exist (i.e., as cloth

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1. Nyāya-Theory of Knowledge., p. 176, (University of Calcutta, 1950 ed.) III-3-C.132.
 2. Introduction to Arthasaṃgraha of Laugākṣi Bhāskara, p. XIII, (Bombay, 1931) Sanskrit Text with Eng. Translation and notes by S.S. Sukthankara.
 3. Studies., p. 309.

Survey of Indian Philosophy, P. 309

the jar does not exist). Both forms are equally entities: sometimes people cognise the one and sometimes the other."¹

The contention is that the fact of "the absence of the cloth in the jar simply means that the cloth in its non-existent form inheres in another object, the jar, and as such, produces the cognition of its non-existent form in the jar."²

Kumārila, in the Śloka-Vārtika, says: "A judgment (nirṇaya), concerning a (positive)-existent (bhāva) - such as "this is (the jar) and nothing else" - is not possible, without reference to the cognition of absence of everything else. Nor is the knowledge (saṃvitti) "it (the jar) does not exist" possible, without a reference to the negated thing itself; for there can be no cognition without an objective substratum."³

1. 'svarūpapararūpābhyām nityam sad-asadātmake vastuni jñāyate kaiścidrūpam kiṃcit kadācana'. Śl. Vār., Ab. verse 12. Udayana also describes these two parts of reality, vide supra³⁶ n. 151; Sīha, HIP., I. p. 790.
2. NR., on Ś. Vart., Ab., verse 12, p. 476: 'sarvam hi vastu svarūpataḥ sadrūpam pararūpataś cāsadrūpam, yathā ghaṭo ghaṭarūpeṇa san paṭarūpeṇāsan, paṭo'py asadrūpeṇa bhāvāntare ghaṭādaḥ samavetaḥ tasmiṁ svīyāsadrūpākārām buddhim janayati, yo'yam ghaṭaḥ sa paṭo na bhavatīti.' Translation by Jhā.
3. Śl. Vart., Ab., verses 15-16, p. 477-478: ayam eveti yo hy esa bhāve bhavati nirṇayaḥ. naiṣa vastu antarābhāva-saṃvitty anugamādrte. jñānam na jāyate kiṃcid upaṣṭambhana-varjitaṁ.

Thus, even the positive judgment is not possible without a reference to negation, or a denial of everything else. However, if there are no 'negative existents', some kind of 'reality of negative cognitive essences' which make the positive judgment meaningful cannot be denied. Or, in the words of L. Wood: "The reality of negative essences is even more difficult to disprove than negative existents."¹

Kumārila, however, states that 'no cognition is possible without an objective substratum'. Being a realist Kumārila believes that all cognitions correspond to objects; since cognitions can be either negative or positive, the corresponding objects must have these same characteristics.²

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1. Ledger Wood, op.cit., p. 417. "Essences were originally introduced to explain certain facts of the existential order, and, if all such facts can be adequately explained entirely within that order, the realm of essences becomes superfluous. Now negative essences have been postulated solely to explain the possibility of certain abstract, i.e., non-empirical, negative judgments; and we shall be entitled to reject them if in the course of the subsequent argument we are able to formulate an adequate theory of negative judgment which can dispense with them."
 2. "That cognitions are known by themselves is the position of Dharmakīrti, Prabhākara and the Jain logicians. This is opposed by the Nyāya School, Nāgārjuna and also Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. The Sāṃkhya and the Vedānte, though they do not believe that cognitions are self-intuited, assert that they never remain unperceived, being revealed by the eternal light of the self with which they are connected from the very beginning". Sat. Mookerjee, Mādhyamika's Logical Position, (Nava-Nalanda. Mahavihara Research Publication). Vol. I, p. 26.

A negative cognition in a negative judgment has an affinity with the positive cognition only inasmuch as the latter is also a cognition of a judgment (positive). Just as in the case of colour, taste, and odour etc., in one and the same fruit, there is difference but at the same time, there is also a seeming identity, thus also in the case of positive and negative cognitions. Although both are, in fact, two different cognitions, yet they seem to be identical inasmuch as both of them are two aspects of the same reality. In other words, the two inhere in the same object and form two aspects of the same entity. The difference between the two is evident by the fact that when one is apprehended the other is not grasped. Without the difference between positive and negative aspects (amśa) of reality, there cannot possibly be any affirmation or denial of things.¹ The contention is

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- I. Śl. Vār., Ab., verse 20, and the NR commentary: 'yadāpyekameva bhāvābhāvātmakam vastviti kṛtvā' tmānātmamśayoraikyam tathāpi rūpādivat svarūpato'styeva bheda iti. na hyasati bhede grahaṇāgrahaṇa-vyavasthā-sambhava iti.' Cf. Ledger Wood, op.cit., p. 419, who presents a somewhat similar view in the following: "The negative judgment 'A is not B' is equivalent to 'A is other than B' or 'A is different from B'. Distinction and differentiation are rooted in the real, and the negative judgment gives expression to these features of reality. The mutual exclusion of the various items of our experience is as much a datum as their unity and connection. The objective basis for the negative judgment is as real and, in a sense as positive, as that for the affirmative."

that the two aspects are relative and can be apprehendable only with reference to each other. This view, however, goes against the Idealist Śaṅkara. "The view of this school (Kumārila) is that sameness (abheda) and difference (bheda), so far from being incompatible, are intelligible only if taken together, while Śaṅkara maintains that, being mutually contradictory, they cannot be predicated of one and the same thing."¹ But the very fact that the two are "mutually contradictory" supports the Mīmāṃsaka's view that they are two different separate objects of corresponding cognitions. The Advaitin regards the difference and contradiction as mere ignorance (ajñāna) or the absence of knowledge and thus illusion (māyā or mithyā).² But this attitude is not intelligible for the realists and empiricists. For them, negation is not merely 'the absence of knowledge' (ajñāna) but rather 'the knowledge of absence' (abhāvajñāna).³ 'Nothing' is not 'something' that can be called an "illusion" or "ignorance". In the cognition of 'negation' there is

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1. Hiriyanna, Essentials, p. 154. The controversy between Kumārila and Śaṅkara seems to be the same as that between the Empiricists and Idealists in general.
 2. Ibid., p. 155.
 3. Ś. Dīpikā., pp. 241-2.

knowledge of absence, that cannot be denied as a negative fact.¹ The realists maintained that "negation is a cognition of real absence. Just as affirmation is cognition of real presence, they thought that negation is a cognition of real absence. The Mīmāṃsakas viewed non-existence as a reality sui generis (vastvantaram)".²

1. Kumārila's position may be analysed in terms of the criticism of Morris Lazerowits. He writes: "The metaphysical statement 'the nothing exists' informs us that 'nothing' is being treated as a semantic substantive in the private grammar book of the metaphysician. The word has not actually been changed into a thing-denoting substantive. It has become a name with zero naming function, a name by grammatical courtesy only. The statements 'the nothing exists' and 'we know the nothing' simply realize the metaphysician's wish, not in fact to use 'nothing' as the name of the thing, but to use it in such a way in sentences as to make it look as if 'nothing' is the name of a thing. And he realizes his wish by exaggerating a grammatical similarity at the expense of a semantic difference." (The underlined words are in italics.) 'Negative Terms', 'Analysis', Vol. 12. January, 1952, p.61. Essentially Kumārila's theories are in keeping with Lazerowits. He too emphasises that 'nothing' is not a 'thing' or in Lazerowits's terminology a "thing-denoting substantive". In fact, "nothing" and "thing" are two entirely different objects of cognition. However, they are logically related and as such form two aspects of the same reality. Kumārila certainly does not wish to make "nothing" look as if "nothing" is the name of a thing. He is aware of the semantic difference. See supra p. 74 n.1.
2. BL., Vol. II, p.77 n.4. "The Mīmāṃsakas viewed non-existence as a reality sui generis (vastvantaram) and admitted yogya-pratīyogy-anupalabdhi, though not as anumāna, but as a special pramāṇa which they called abhāva. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school viewed it as a special category (padārtha), a reality cognized by the senses, owing to a special contact (viśeṣya-viśeṣana-bhāva-sannikarṣa). The Sāṅkhyas applied their idea of pratīksana-pariṇāma and viewed ghaṭa-abhāva as a pariṇāma-kṣana of bhūta which, as all pariṇāma-bheda, is cognized, they maintain, by sense perception." Stcherbatsky, BL., II, p. 77 n.4. (The underlined words are in italics.)

CHAPTER II

- SECTIONS: I. A POSITIVE APPROACH TO NEGATION;
 II. THE PRABHAKARA MIMAMSA AND BUDDHIST LOGIC;
 III. THE POSITIVE OBJECT OF THE NEGATIVE JUDGMENT -
 a positive rendering of negation;
 IV. IMPORTANCE OF THE ASSERTION OF THE BARE LOCUS
 (bhūta_lamātra) IN THE NEGATIVE JUDGMENT;
 V. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND THE LOCUS
 IS NOT REAL BUT MENTALLY CONSTRUCTED (vikalpa)
 VI. NEGATION APPLIES TO SENSIBILIA (drśya) ONLY;
 VII. NEGATION OF NON-SENSIBILIA (adrśya) IS NOT
 VALID.

Section I. A Positive Approach to Negation.

The postulation of negative reality, as discussed in the previous chapter, although it provides an appropriate object for the negative judgment, does not solve the paradoxical situation. "It may be difficult to refute this (realist) position, but it should be acknowledged at the same time that negative facts are nowhere revealed in experience and that, if they were, they would ipso facto become positive."¹

1. Hiriyanna, Studies, pp. 145-146.

Even according to the realist theory, negation depends on the cognition of the positive fact, i.e., the counter-positive. And since this positive cognition is indispensable for the negative judgment, the paradox remains: "How can the negative judgment be descriptive of a positive object?"¹

Hence, in the present chapter, we propose to investigate the views of the Buddhists and the Prābhākaras. They suggest that the solution of the paradox of the negative judgment lies in translating the negative proposition into a complex of affirmative judgments. According to this theory, since all negative judgments presuppose the idea of an affirmative judgment and the locus in question is directly perceived as devoid of the suggested relation with the object negated there, negation refers to positive entities only. No negative entity is admitted. Thus it will be explained in the present chapter that negation is only an inferential judgment in which on the basis of non-perception of a perceptible object (dṛśyānupalabdhi), when the bare locus (bhūtala) is perceived, the absence of the object is cognized. In the end,² the neg-

1. Vide. supra pp. 18-19.

2. vide. infra pp. 296 f.

ative judgment will be explained in terms of "a complex of affirmative judgments", i.e., a negative judgment means two contradictory affirmative judgments out of which, in a given situation, either one is false and the other one is true.

Section II. The Prābhakara-Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhist Logic.

Whatever importance absence (abhāva) as an entity may have for the realist theories of causality (asatkārya) and negative emancipation,¹ to posit a distinct negative real goes against the very sense of the term Reality. "This peculiar conception of negation discloses the ^{habit} ~~habit~~ of Naiyāyikas (and other realist thinkers) to invent any number of fictitious conventionalities, if they are convenient for practical purposes. Really speaking, to class abhāva as a Padārtha along with the other six is an absurdity."²

1. vide, supra pp. 40-41, 62 n.2.

2. Athalye, Notes, Tr. Sam., p. 101.
Cf. also Studies, p.117 (8).

Prabhākara Miśra (c.700 A.D.)¹ of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system criticized the Mīmāṃsā tradition of regarding 'abhāva' as an entity and as an independent means (pramāṇa) of judgment. By doing this he opposed not only the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas but also Śabara Svāmin and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.² In this respect Prabhākara comes nearer to the Buddhist thinkers, than, to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.³ On the question of negation, Kumārila's unsuccessful attempts to defend the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā system against Buddhist arguments have caused some confusion about his standpoint on negation. It is a controversial question whether Kumārila did or did not posit 'abhāva' as category.⁴ Moreover, the theory of "anupalabdhi" or non-

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1. It is a controversial question whether Prabhākara was the teacher of Kumārila or vice versa. Vide, e.g. Winternitz, HIL., III, pp. 425 ff; Stcherbatsky, BL., I, p. 51; Dasgupta, HIP., I, pp. 370-371; Hiriyanna, Outlines, pp. 301-2; S.K. Ramanātha Sastri, Int. (Sanskrit), Nayaviveka, XXVI-XXVII; Keith, Karma Mīmāṃsā, pp. 9-10. However, a comparative study of the epistemological theories expounded by the two philosophers, can help, indeed, in ascertaining Prabhākara's posteriority. If Kumārila were posterior to Prabhākara "one would expect him to particularly refer to such of Prabhākara's views as were different from his own, e.g. the non-acceptance of abhāva as a means of knowledge on the part of Prabhākara" (cf. Prasad, HIE., p. 256) while it is apparent that Prabhākara criticized Kumārila's standpoint on the question of negation. I uphold the view of Prabhākara's posteriority. Dr. G. Jha has expressed the opposite view. (CF. Preface PSPM, pp. 11-17). But Jha has not taken the abhāva controversy into consideration.
 2. Vide, Daś. Śāst., p. 125; Essentials, p. 143; Sinha, HIP., I, p. 791.
 3. Buddhist Flux, p. 428.
 4. Vide supra pp. 66-67.

perception is wrongly ascribed to him. In fact, it emanated from Buddhist logic and was adopted by the later followers of Kumāṛila.¹

Prabhākara, on the other hand, realized the weakness of Kumāṛila's arguments. He, therefore, unreservedly followed Dharmakīrti's theory.² As we shall soon see, there is an explicit unanimity of thought as expressed in the phraseology and technical terminology of both the Prabhākaras and the Buddhist logicians.³ Stcherbatsky observes "The Mīmāṃsaka school became divided on this problem of Negation, just as on many others, in two subschools. Prabhākara "the friend of the Buddhists (bauddha-bandhuh Prabhākarah)" accepted the Buddhist theory integrally. He maintained that non-Existence is no separate reality, and Negation is not a separate source of knowledge.....But the main stock of the school, the followers of Kumāṛilabhaṭṭa, remained faithful to the letter of their old authority

1. Cf. Chapter IV.

2. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in N. Mañjarī, p.166, reprimands Prabhākara by saying "you have robbed Dharmakīrti's house" (atra bhavadbhir Dharmakīrti-grhād āhṛtam"). See also Malwanīya, Notes, NASVVT., p.168.

3. Cf. e.g. PP., pp.119-20 and NBT., p.29; RN., p.97; PVS. and PVST., p.30; Dharmottarapradīpa, p. 103. Passages quoted below in the present chapter.

Sabarasvāmin, who had declared that "the non-existence of a means of cognition is a proof of the non-existence (of the object).¹ Pārthasārathi Miśra, a follower and commentator of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, criticized the Prābhākaras for falling in line with the Buddhist thinking.² However, the later Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, including Pārthasārathi himself were also greatly influenced by the Buddhist theories.³

Section III. The Positive Object of the Negative Judgment A positive rendering of negation.

Discussing the paradox of negative judgment Ledger Wood writes: "There is a way out of the difficulty inherent in a negative judgment, without reconstructing reality to embrace negativity. Why not reinterpret the negative judgment so as to reveal its fundamentally positive character? By this means the discord between such a judgment

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1. BL., I, pp. 388-389. Stcherbatsky refers to Prabhākara as "a real bastard son of Buddhism". Ibid. p. 51.
 2. NR., on Śl. Vārt., Ab. ver. 12, p. 476: "yas tu mādhyaṃikavādam anuśīlayan..." Note that Pārthasārathi wrongly classified the later Buddhist logic of Dharmakīrti and others among the Mādhyamika trend. Rather, they belonged to the later Vijñānavāda school.
 3. Vide infra pp. 100-104 and chap. IV. pp. 180-184

and its object is obviated without tampering with reality. The transformation is wrought entirely on the logical side and the metaphysical situation remains unaltered."¹ To a certain extent, the Buddhist logicians and the Prābhākaras propose a similar solution. They explained negation "in terms of the positive factors involved in it",² rather than inventing an ontological non-Ens (abhāvapadārtha).

According to the (idealist) theory, truth of a negative judgment consists of two cognitions. One is that of the locus (bhūtala) and the other is that of the object, the perception of which is expected. Both objects are simultaneously perceptible (dṛśya) to our sense organs only if all the conditions for perception are satisfied. Thus, if only one of the two objects, i.e., the bare locus (bhūtala-mātra), is perceived, the absence of the expected or suggested object, e.g. the jar, is inferred. Dharmottara explained that when "we actually perceive only one of them, we (naturally) imagine that if the other were present, we should likewise perceive it, because the totality of the necessary conditions is fulfilled. Thus something fancied as perceptible is imputed."³

1. PR., vol.XLII, 1933, pp. 417-418.

2. Outlines, p.322.

3. NBT., p.22 (13-15): "eka-jñāna-samsargini dṛśyamāne saty-ekasminnitarat samagra-darśana-sāmagrikam yadi bhaved dṛśyam eva bhaved iti sambhāvitam dṛśyam āropyate". Translation by Stcherbatski, BL.II, p.63.

Prabhākara, as represented by Śālikanātha Miśra, fully supported the Buddhist theory. He said: "By the perception of the other object (ground) where the (desired) object (jar) is equally perceptible, the absence of the perceptible (jar) is apprehended (avadhāryate). Thus the (problem of) negation should be solved (varam astu) (by the formula that negation is) the perception of that (locus) alone (eka) (where) the perceptible counter-positive is intended (viṣayā)."¹ According to this theory non-perception of a perceptible object (dṛśya) is the basis of a negative judgment.²

The following objection is raised: How can we ascribe perceptibility to an object which is in fact absent from the locus. "How is it possible for a (jar) to be perceptible in a place from which it is absent?" Dharmottara explains: "It is said to be perceptible, although it is absent, because its perceptibility is imagined. We imagine this object in the following way: "if it were present on

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1. PP.p.121. "tulyopalambha-yogyasya cārthāntara-darśanena dṛśyānupā~~l~~ambho' vadhāryate. ato dṛśya-pratīyogī-viṣayā tad-ekopālabdhīr eva varam abhāvo' stu."
 2. ibid. p. 120 'dṛśyādarśanam hy abhāvāvag~~a~~ma-kāraṇam.'

this spot, it certainly would have been perceived." In this case an object, although absent, is ex hypothesi (samāropya) visible."¹ For example, the book I have seen on my table during the daylight, sometime before, is not now perceived there after its removal. Although the totality of the necessary conditions of perception i.e., daylight and the normal eye-sight etc., is satisfied the book is not seen now. Thus in the negative judgment "it is not (here)" we reject the property of being present as belonging to the object for it does not appear to our senses. Its perceptibility we confirm (parāmrśya) in the mind from previous experience: "If it were present it would have been perceived as before".²

According to the Buddhists and the Prābhākaras it is the property of exclusively positive things that they are apprehended in all judgments, negative and affirmative

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1. NBT, p.22: "a atha yo yatra nāsti sa katham tatra drśyaḥ? drśyatva samāropād asannapi drśya ucyate. yaścaivam sambhāvyate - yady asāvatra bhaved drśya eva bhaved iti. sa tatra avidyā-māno' pi drśyah samāropyaḥ." Translation op.cit. Cf. also NASVVT., p.68 (22).
 2. PVST., p.22: "sāmagryām satyām yadi syāt^{pr} prvakālavād upalabhyet ety evam upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptatvam buddhyā parāmrśya bhāvasyāpratibhāsanān nāstīti niṣedhaḥ kriyate."

alike. Dharmakīrti said: "The thing is not to be affirmed (or perceived) only."¹ It is also to be denied or not perceived (anupalabdhi).

The Prābhākaras explain that the cognition of a thing is of two types: (a). sometimes a thing is cognized as a correlated with some other thing, and (b) sometimes as excluded from other things.² In the judgment, e.g. "The book is on the table", we cognize the book and the table correlated. But in the judgment, "The book is not on the table" we cognize the table alone, and this cognition is referred to as the negative cognition of the book. Thus, according to this theory "absence (means) nothing (else) but the non-perception of positive things (bhāvanām)".³ To some extent this view is comparable with Bradley's statement that "every judgment, positive or negative, is in the end existential".⁴ There is no negative entity. Affirmation (upalabdhi) is the perception (darśanam) of the thing.

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1. PVS., p.30: 'upalabdhir eva na bhāvaḥ'. See also PP., p.120. Nayaviveka, p.160.
 2. PP., p.122: 'bhāva eva tv ekākī sadvitīyaś ceti dvayīm avasthām anubhavati.' Also NASVVT., p.68 (24-25: 'bhāva eva vastv-antar-āsamśrayatayopalabhyamānaḥ pūrvoktam (idam asti, idam nāsti) jñānadvayam janayati.'
 3. PVS., p.30: 'anupalabdhir hi bhāvanām abhāvaḥ. Also NASVVT., p.63; N. Mañjarī, pp.48-63; RN., pp.97-98.
 4. Principles of Logic, I, p. 120 (12).

Negation being the exclusion (nivṛtti) of this (affirmation) is no thing (tuccha). It is the mere presence of the bare locus (tanmātra), which means it is devoid of the relation with the other object.¹

Section III. Importance of the assertion of the bare locus (bhūtaalamātra) in the negative judgment.

"The basis of negation is really the assertion of a quality that excludes (X). It is not, the mere assertion of the quality of exclusion (Not-B.)"

—Bradley.²

It has been stated in the previous section that the Buddhist and the Prabhākaras do not admit a non-Ens (abhāva-padārtha) as the object corresponding to the negative judgment. According to these logicians negation is not the cognition of a negative object, but the denial of an affirm-

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1. Dharmottarapradīpa, p.103: 'darśanam upalabdhis tasya nivṛttir abhāvas tuccharūpaḥ saiva tanmātram vastv antara-asamsarga-virahaḥ.' Durveka Miśra here called 'abhāva' "tuccharūpaḥ". The term is used to show the contrast with the term "vasturūpaḥ" by which the realist philosophers, viz., the Bhāṭṭas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas defined 'abhāva'. Udayana in Kir., p.38, appears to be opposing Durveka by refuting the theory that abhāva is no thing (tuccha).
 2. Principles of logic, vol.I, Book. I, Ch.III, (6).

ation, i.e., in Indian terminology, the denial of perception of the object (*drśyānupalabdhi*).

Now, the problem is that if the negative proposition, for instance "the pot is not on the floor" is true, then, this denial of the presence of the pot must be real. For truth refers to nothing but reality.

The solution of the problem is found in the reality of the perception (i.e., the assertion) of the bare-ness of the locus, viz., the floor. It is this perception of a positively real object where the truth of the negative judgment lies. In other words, the negative proposition "the pot is not on the floor", is true only on the basis that "there is the bare floor" is true.¹ To the Buddhists and the Prābhākaras one may ask: If negation refers to the perception of the bare locus only, then why do we not have a negative judgment where we cognize the locus with the object? The Bhāṭṭas object: "It is not admissable that this empirical usage (of negation) is due merely to the cognition of the floor, because this empirical usage would follow even in respect of the floor where there is a jar.

1. NBT., p.22; PP., 120, 121.
(Quoted *supra* p. 86 notes.)

Indeed, there too, there is the cognition of the floor."¹

However, the objection does not hold the ground. The Buddhist contention is not liable to such charges. The Buddhists maintain that negation is not just the perception of the locus. Rather it is the perception of the bare locus. And its bareness lies in the fact of its being a suggested locus of the perceptible negatum (sambhāvita-dṛśyavastu-bhūtalatvam). Only when we intend to perceive the object (jar) but cognized only the ground it is said that we perceive the bare locus. For there we apprehend only one thing (eka-jñāna) where we intended to apprehend two. It is this situation where the cognition of the bare ground determines (niścāyati) the negation of the intended object (jar). The intended perception of the object in the given locus is the necessary condition. Mere absence of an object and the mere perception of the locus itself are not sufficient for the valid negation.² For instance, there are a number of things, such as a pen, an elephant,

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1. MM., p. 294. na ca bhūtalavedanād evāyam vyavahāra iti sāmpratam. ghaṭavati bhūtale'pi tad vyavahāraprasaṅgāt. asti hi tatrāpi bhūtalaviññānam. Trans. by K. Raja & Suryanarayana Sastri. Cp. also Pārthasārathi Miśra, NR., on Śl. Vārt., Ab. verse 12, p. 476.
 2. PVST., p. 30 : ghaṭagrāhakatvasya bhūtalagrāhakasya caikajñānasamsargitvād yadā bhūtalagrāhakam eva tajjñānam bhavati, tadā ghaṭagrāhakatvābhāvam niścāyayati.

and a ship etc., which are absent from my study table. I would not be aware of all these absences unless some one asked me if I had got them on my table, or I myself intended to find them there. In the particular case, viz, when I intend to use my pen I shall become aware of the fact that the pen is missing. It is only in this case that the cognition of the bare (empty) locus (table) with reference to the pen would lead to the negative judgment: "the pen is not on the table." Thus it is said by the Buddhist that 'the perception of the bare locus with reference to the perceptible jar and the cognition of this fact'¹ are the basis of the negation.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also noticed this point. He opposing the perceptual character of the negative judgment said:

"After the object (the place where the jar is not) has been perceived (by the Eye), and the counter-entity (the jar) has been remembered, then follows the notion that it (the jar) is not, which is purely mental (and as such) independent of the Sense-organs."²

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1. NBT., p.22 (19): drśyaghaṭarahitaḥ pradeśas tajjñānam ca. Cf. also PP., pp. 120,122; PVST., p.31; NASVVT., pp.64-65.
 2. Sl.Vārt., Ab. ver.27 p.482: grhītvā vastusadbhāvam smṛtvā ca pratiyoginam. mānasam nāstitājñānam jāyate'kṣānapekṣanāt. Jhā's translation p.247.

Kumārila although rejected the positive rendering of negation he evidently recognized the importance of the assertion of the locus.

On the other hand "the amalgamated Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school", from a completely different point of view, recognized the same fact. The realist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians adhering to their naive realism insisted on the perceptual character of negation. And since the sense-organs can come into direct contact (sannikarṣa) with a substance only whereas negative entity (viśeṣanātā) is not a substance, they postulated a unique (or simple) relation between the negative entity and the locus.¹ Thus they maintained that the reality of non-existence (abhāva) is perceived as qualifying the locus (i.e., the substance).² In fact, this qualified perception of the locus refers to the same situation to which the Buddhists and the Prābhākaras refer by the term "bare locus".

One may observe that as far as the theory of negation is concerned, it can be said for certain that the whole realm of Indian philosophy and logic is, to a certain

1. NVT., I.i.4. (KSS), p.31; N.Kaust., p.135; NK.p.195; for further detail see Chap. IV, section VIII.

2. NK., p.227; abhāvaviśiṣṭa-bhūtalagrahaṇam. Also N.Kaust., pp. 158-161.

extent, susceptible to the Buddhist influence. The Prābhākara, apparently referring to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Bhāṭṭas asserted that even they who postulated 'abhāva' as an object of cognition (prameya) must accept it as the cognition of the object other than the intended one, i.e., the locus alone.¹ On the other hand, the Sāmkhya-Yoga system also hold a similar view, viz. that the absence is the mere presence of the ground.² It is noteworthy that the Vedāntins too "regard negation (abhāva-) simply as kaivalyarūpa, that is as bhūtala itself and nothing more".³ Rāmānuja also "dispenses with non-existence

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1. PP., 120: 'yo'pi hi prameyam abhāvam āha so'pi pratiyogiṣu drśyeṣu tad-eka-viśayam buddhim tāvad avaśyam abhyupaiti'. Sadānandayati (c.1600 A.D.) in his 'Advaita-brahma-siddhiḥ', Calcutta 1932, p.135, says that negation is, according to both the Prābhākaras and the Bhāṭṭas, the mere form of the locus (Prābhākara-bhāṭṭayoh sammat ādhikaraṇa-rūpa evābhāvaḥ). As stated above this view is posited by Prābhākara but not by Kumārila Bhāṭṭa. On the basis of the material available to-day we can safely say that Sadānanda's statement is misleading. See B.Cin.p.46, and MM., pp.293-4, where the theory of the Prābhākaras, ~~that~~ has been explicitly criticized. Both works belong to the school of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa.
 2. S. Chatterjee, N.Theory of Knowledge, p. 176.
 3. Athalye, Tr. Sam., p.102.

regarding it as expressible in terms of positive entities much in the manner of Prabhākara",¹ whereas Mādhva postulates it as one of the categories.²

Section V. The Relation Between the Object and the Locus is not Real but Mentally Constructed (vikalpya)

To the theory of negation that the so-called "real" absence is, in fact, the assertion of the bare locus some objections are raised by the realists. What is meant by the bare-ness (kaivalya or ekākībhāva)? If this means the self nature of the locus, it is problematic. For even when we perceive the object (jar) we perceive it together with its locus. The floor can be cognized in both forms; being with and without the jar. Therefore, if absence were identical with the bare locus, it would also be apprehended when the object is present.³

Secondly, if the bare-ness of the locus is explained as its being merely separate (atirikta) from the object, then

1. Hiriyanna, Essentials, p.179.

2. ibid., pp.190, 193.

3. NL., Kaṇṭhābharāṇa, p.559; bhūṭalan tu saghaṭam aghaṭañceti dvirūpam atas tat svarūpena katham abhāvadhiḥ?
See also NVT., (KSS), p.11; N.Siddhānta-Mañjarī, p.42.

negation is in fact accepted as referring to the real entity (abhāva) in different terms.¹ For the terms 'separate' and 'negation' correspond to the same reality.

Thirdly, if there is no absence (as an objective reality) how then can there arise the cognition of that one object (the bare locus) in that place where there was first a relational knowledge (viz. of the locus and the jar)? But this is possible if we admit the 'posterior absence' (pradhvaṃsābhāva).² We must remember that according to the realist the 'posterior absence' is produced subsequent to the destruction of the object (jar). They maintain that just as we say "the jar is produced", so also we say "the absence of the jar (i.e., its destruction) is produced".³

To the Buddhists and the Prābhākaras these objections do not seem valid. By the terms 'bare-ness' of the locus (bhūtalakaivalya), and 'devoid-ness' (viviktatva or

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1. RN., p.97: (opponents' view). athātiriktaḥ mukhāntareṇa abhāva eva abhyupagato bhavatīti. Also PP., p.118. atirikta = vivikta = rahita = ekākī.
 2. PP., p.121 (opponents' view): yady abhāvo nāsti katham tarhi yatra prāk samsṛṣṭabuddhir āsīt tatra tad ekaviṣay-ābuddhir āvir bhavati? pradhvaṃsābhāvābhyupagame tu sā syād.; N.S.Mañjari, p.48.
 3. N.Kaust., p.151, Dīdhitikāra is quoted as: "jāto ghaṭo itivā utpanno ghaṭadhvaṃsa iti". ; N.S.Mañjari, p.48.

non-associateness), what is meant is the cognition of an altogether independent entity, for such negative attributes cannot be ascribed to a locus which contains an object. About the floor where the jar is present you cannot say 'it is the bare locus' or 'the floor is without the jar'. And the floor which was once the locus of the jar, after its (i.e., the jar) destruction or removal, no longer can be called the locus of the jar.¹ Hence, what we perceive, now, is the bare floor which is different in its efficiency (arthakriyākāritva) from that floor which was the locus of the jar.² Ratnakīrti says: "By the terms bare-ness, devoid-ness of the object, non-associateness, etc., that independent entity is denoted (abhidhīyate) which is produced by its own causes and altogether a different thing from the locus of the jar; (and this entity floor is such) that it does not bear the attribute of being the locus of

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1. According to the Buddhist doctrine of Flux, whatever is (real) existent is momentary (yat sat tat kṣaṇikam), (RN., Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ, p.77; B.Flux, pp. 24 ff.) and existence consists in the causal efficiency (arthakriyākārtva) alone. (ibid.) Now the question is : if the absence is really created, as the realist maintains, then, what is its causal efficiency?
 2. If the present locus is not the locus of the jar, then, the problem arises: What then is the relation between the locus and the object? Some later Prābhākaras suggest a kind of 'temporal relation' (kālikasambandhaḥ). N. Kaust., pp. 145 ff.

the jar."¹ This implies that the relation between the object (i.e., the negatum) and the locus is not real but imagined. Ratnakīrti explains: "The object related with the cognition of the one (i.e., the locus) must indeed be here (in the negative judgment) mentally constructed (vikalpya)."² In other words, since the object is not present in the locus we imagine it as being present. Thus, in order to deny its presence we mentally construct the relation between the object and the locus. For it is not the reality which we deny but its relation - an unreal logical construction.

Pārthasārathi Miśra in his commentary on Śloka Vārtika describes negation in terms of the absence of relation (saṃyogābhāva).³ He argues that the object of the negative judgment may but need not involve the perception of the locus. The locus, according to the Bhāṭṭa does not primarily form the object of the judgment. When an object, for instance,

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1. RN., p. 97: kaivalyam tadviviktatvam asaṅkīrnatvam ityādibh-
ih padaiḥ pradeśasya ghaṭampraty anāpannādhārabhāvasya
svaheṭutā utpannasya ghaṭapradeśād anyaevātmābhidhiyate.
Also PP., pp.118-120.
 2. RN., p.85: ekajñānasamsargyatra vikalpya eva.
 3. NR., Śl.Vārt., p.481

a jar comes into contact with the sense-organs the judgment is "the jar is (present) here". But when the same jar does not come into contact with the senses, it is cognised to be non-present (asattayā) and the judgment is "the jar is not (present) here". This means that the jar is denied as being in conjunction (samyoga) with the locus. However, in this case it is only the jar not the locus (i.e., the floor) which is apprehended. On the other hand when the locus is apprehended as being devoid of conjunction with the jar our proposition is "the locus is without the jar". In this case it is the locus which is denied to be in conjunction with the jar. The difference between the two (forms of) the negative cognition lies in the sentences in which they are expressed. In the former case where the jar is cognised as without being in conjunction with the locus it is expressed as the subject of the sentence and (in Sanskrit) the locus is indicated by the locative case (saptamī): "bhūtale ghaṭo nāstīti" (the jar is not on the floor). In the latter case, technically speaking, the locus is expressed as the subject: "ghaṭasūnyam bhūtalam iti" (the ^{locus} jar is without the jar). However, in whichever form a negation is expressed, the truth of the negative proposition lies in the fact that there

is a denial of the conjunction of the object (jar) and the locus (floor).¹

Pārthasārathi explains that so long as this conjunction has not been produced with the jar, the negative judgment (i.e., the antecedent denial of conjunction) refers to the entity 'antecedent absence' (prāgabhāva); after having produced when the conjunction is destroyed, it refers to the 'posterior absence' (pradhvaṃsābhāva). But the denial of a hare in conjunction with the horn is for all the time, and therefore in such a case it refers to the entity 'constant or absolute absence' (atyntābhāva).² These three absences are not identical. The 'antecedent absence' is not the posterior; the posterior is not the antecedent. Nor can anyone of them be the constant absence. This denial of the identity is called the 'mutual absence' (itaretarābhāva). For instance, the proposition "a horse is not a cow", means "there is no cowness in a horse".³

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1. NR., p.481 (ibid.) '...tatra sadrūpatayā pratiyate asti ghaṭa iti, yadā yatra asattayā pratiyate nāstiha ghaṭa iti yatra (Read tatra) bhūtalasamyogābhāvātmanaḥ ghaṭa eva pratiyate na bhūtaḥ ghaṭasūnyatayā bhūtalasya saptamya paraviśeṣanatvāt, yadā tadeva viśeṣyate tadā ghaṭasūnyam bhūtaḥ iti pratītiḥ ghaṭasamyogitvena avidyamānam ityarthah. Cp. 'ghatasamyogābhāva' with Ratnakīrti's 'ghaṭapratyanāpannādhārahābhāva', supra p.97-n.3. 98. n.1.
 2. ibid. so'yam ghaṭasamyogo yadānutānnaḥ tadā prāgabhāvah, yadā utpadya vinastaḥ tadā pradhvaṃsābhāvah. śaśasya tu viśanattvena avidyamānatvam sārvaśālikam, iti so'tyantābhāvah.
 3. ibid. tasminnabhāvatrāye'pyanyasyānya-sambandhitvaniśedhaḥ, itaretarābhāva'nyasyānyatādātmyaniśedhaḥ, gaur na bhavatyāśva iti gavātmātvaḥ aśvasya na vidyate ityarthah.

This explanation of the problem of negation indicates a revisionist tendency among the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Originally Kumārila's argument was that when the object comes into contact with the senses the judgment is perceptual and affirmative. But the judgment: "This (jar) is not here" is based on the absence of the contact of the senses and the object.¹ He was rather concerned with the validity of absence (abhāva) as the means of knowledge as opposed to perception.²

Pārthasārathī's exposition of the problem can be regarded as an influence of the Buddhists and the Prābhākaras. According to them, negation is the cognition of such a locus that does not bear the attribute of being in relation with the object,³ and the presence of the relation between the object and the locus is not real but mentally constructed (vikalpya).

1. Sl.Vārt., p.481, verse 26:

'tat sambandhe sad-ityevam tad-rūpatvam pratīyate.
nasty atredam itīdam tu tadāsamāyoga-hetukam.

'tat' here refers to 'indriya', sense organs.

2. Cf. ibid., p.482, verse 27, Sinha, HIP, Vol.I, pp. 350, 790.

3. RN., p.97; PP., pp 118-120.

Section VI. Negation Applies to Sensibilia (drśya) only.

It has been stated in the previous section that the object is not really related with the locus, and that it is not the reality but the relation which ^{is} denied in the negative judgment. The relation is, however, mentally constructed (vikalpya).

To this Buddhist position the opponent argues that at least in this ^{case} existence and non-existence can be regarded as equal. For instance, in the proposition "there is no jar on the floor", the presence of the jar (i.e., existence) is not real but imagined and subsequently denied. In the same way we may also imagine the presence of such an entity, for instance, the hare's horn, which refers to non-existence. Thus we may be able to make a true negative proposition "there is no hare's horn". Previously known jar as well as a never experienced hare's horn may both equally be ¹ negated.

Dharmakīrti enjoins: "Negation is the process through which either the absence of something or some practical application of the idea of an absent thing is deduced."

1. NASVVT., p.68, '...pūrvāvagatasya ghatasya śaśaviṣānasya cā'navagatasya dvayor-api tulyam kvacit pratiṣedhe.' See also NBT., p.37, 21.

Whether the facts be denied by way of an affirmation of something incompatible with them or through the negation of their causes etc., everywhere negation, on analysis, refers to possibilities of sensation (sense perception)."¹

According to Buddhist logic there are eleven varieties of negative judgment.² But the negative cognition on which all the negative varieties or negative formulae are founded "always refers to sensations actual or possible."³

It may be questioned whether it can be established that "whatsoever be the facts denied in all of them, they are all sensibilia"? Dharmottara explains: "They are all sensibilia (dṛśya) because in all these formulae there is either affirmation of the contradicting counterpart of the denied fact or the denial of its cause etc.,"⁴ and here in translation Stcherbatsky adds: "and the laws of Contradiction and Causation refer to sensibilia only." He

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1. NB., II.46 'sarvatra cāsyām abhāvābhāva-vyavahāra-sādhanyām anupalabdḥau yeṣām svabhāva-viruddhādīnām upalabdhyā kāranādīnām anupalabdhyā ca pratiśedha uktas teṣām upalabdhi-lakṣana-prāptānām evo palabdhir-anupalabdhiśca veditavyā.' Trans. by Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol. II, p.102. Cf. Russell Enq. Meaning & Truth (1956) p.106.
 2. NB. II.30; infra Chap. IV.
 3. NBT., p.38.4, translation p.102.
 4. NBT., p.38.8-9, 'yasmāt svabhāva-viruddha ādir yeṣām teṣām upalabdhyā kāranamādir yeṣām teṣām-anupalabdhyā pratiśedha uktāstasmād-dṛśyānām-eva pratiśedha ityarthah.' Trans. op.cit., p.103.

further observes: "It is interesting to compare on this topic the view of Herbert Spencer (Stuart Mill, Logic 8 I, p.322) - "the negative mode cannot occur without excluding a correlative mode: the antithesis of positive and negative being, indeed, is merely an expression of this experience". According to the Buddhists the concrete content of every single case of contradiction, as of causality, is provided by experience, the causal laws have an application to sensibilia only, but whether the laws themselves are mere generalizations from experience is another question."¹

Now the question arises: Why does negation refer to sensibilia only? Dharmottara explains: "In order to establish the subalternation of two facts or their causal relation, and in order to know what will contradict these relations, we necessarily must have had some experience of them, i.e., we must have had some perception of their presence. Objects which have been alternately perceived and not perceived are necessarily perceptible."² Thus non-perception (anupalabdhi) as a middle term is acceptable

1. BL., Vol.II, p.103 n.3.

2. NBT., p.38.11-13, 'yasmā ye virodhino vyāpya-vyāpakabh-
ūtāḥ kāryakāraṇabhūtāśca jñātās teṣāṃ avaśyam-evopalabdhir-
upalabdhīpūrvā vānupalabdhir veditavyā. upalabdhya-
anupalabdhī ca dve yeṣāṃ staste dṛśyā eva.' Translation
p. 103.

only in relation to an object perceived before.

The validity of the negative middle term is also determined by the time factors. Dharmakīrti says: "Negative behaviour is successful when a present or a past negative experience of an observer has happened, provided the memory of this fact has not been obliterated."¹ And Dharmottara explains this in the following manner. "Negation is valid in regard of a past object, if this is clearly remembered, and in regard of a present one. We can cognize "there was here no jar, because we did not perceive any", "there is here no jar, because we do not perceive any". But the judgment "there will be here no jar, because we will not perceive any" is impossible, since a future non-perception is problematic. The time of valid negation has thus been defined."²

The realist Bhāṭṭas maintained that an absolute non-existence was deducible from the absolute absence of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). They argued that since "cognition

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1. NB., II.29, 'amūḍha-smṛti-samskārasya-ātītasya vartamānasya ca pratipattir-pratyakṣasya nivr̥ttir-abhāva-vyavahāra-sādhani. Translation p. 79; see also NB., II, 30.
 2. NBT., p.29. 18-21, 'atīto'nupalambhah sphuṭam smaryamāṇah pramāṇam, vartamāṇasca. tato nāsīdiha ghaṭo'nupalabdhātvaṇ-nāstyānupalabhya-mānatvād-iti śakyam jñātum. na tu na bhaviṣyaty-atra ghaṭo'nupalapsya-mānatvād-iti śakyam jñātum. anāgatāya anupalabdheḥ sattva-samdehād-iti. kālaviśeṣo'-nupalabdher-vyākhyātaḥ.'. Translation by Stcherbatsky, op.cit., Also Cp., NBT., p.30. 12.

(pramāṇa) proves the existence of the cognised (prameya), it would be only natural to expect that absence of cognition would be a proof of the absence of the cognized?"¹

Dharmakīrti, with the emphasis on the term 'dṛśya', answered:

"When there are altogether no means of cognition, the non-existence of the object cannot be established."²

As far as the question of an absolute non-existent object is concerned, the Buddhist logicians do not find any means (pramāṇa) of cognizing it so as to justify its reality.

1. NBT., p.40-1, Translation by Stcherbatsky, op.cit. Stcherbatsky observes:

"This was the opinion of the Naivyāyikas and of European science up to the time of Sigwart."

p.107 n.7.

2. NB., II.49.,

'pramāṇa-nivṛttāvapy-arthābhāv-āsiddher-iti'
Translation by Stcherbatsky, op.cit.

Section VII

Negation of Non-Sensibilia (adrśya) is not valid

In the previous section we have discussed that negation, according to the Buddhist and the Prabhākaras, applies to sensibilia (drśya) only. Now we shall investigate the Buddhist arguments against the acceptance of validity of the non-perception (i.e., the negation) of a non-sensibilia or non-expericals (adrśya).

According to the Buddhists and the Prābhākaras, negation or the non-perception (anupalabdhi) is two fold.

- 1). Non-perception of some non-perceptible (adrśya) and
- 2). of some perceptible (drśya).¹ Only the latter type of non-perception is regarded as the valid or logical negation. They consider that only a thing which can be perceived, ~~can~~ can be denied. Non-perception "always refers to a possible perception, it must keep our knowledge within the borders of sensuous experience."² Dharmakīrti declared that "since (the non-perception of an unperceptible) results in uncertainty, it cannot negate (determine = vyāvṛtti)"³ any thing.

1. Nayaviveka, p.160, 'pratiyoginy-adrśye drśye ca; tatra drśye ya tan-mātra-dhīḥ saiva pratiyogi-nāstitvadhīḥ.'; PP., p.120 and 121 (quoted above p.72 n.2); RN., pp.97 ff.; NB., II 48 and NBT., p.39 thereupon; PVST., p.34, Karṇegonin, 36 p.372 and 381; Stcherbatsky BL.Vol.II.p.63 n.3. below p.130.

2. Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol. I. p.382.

3. PV. IV. 277, 'anīścayaphalā hy-eṣā nālam vyāvṛtti-sādhane'. See also PVP., p.639; Dalsukha Malwaniya, NASVVT., Notes, p.232.

Adṛśyānupalabdhi cannot determine a negative judgment, for this only raises doubts, (sams'aya heter) not determination.¹

"The Buddhist theory of Negation is a direct consequence of the Buddhist theory of Judgment. The fundamental form of the Judgment, ..., is the perceptual judgment, or - what is the same - the name-giving judgment, of the pattern "this is a jar".² Hence every judgment involves two factors: (1) Self nature or svabhāva of the thing by which it is distinguished from other things and (2) its perception. It is in these two given situations that we cognize a thing as the object of our judgment.³ Dharmakīrti says: "It is a thing (itself = svabhāva) which, being present, is necessarily perceived when all other conditions of perceptibility are fulfilled."⁴ "But things imperceptible", explained Dharmottara, "whose place, time and essence are inaccessible, have no distinct reality for him (observer), although all other conditions of perceptibility be fulfilled."⁵ Such things have no self nature (svabhāva), and are inaccessible in spatio-temporal relation,⁶ by both the senses and the reason. The Buddhist maintains that the negation of an entity is apprehended only

1. NB., II.48.

2. BL., I.p.384.

3. Dalsukha Malwaniya, NASVVT. Notes, pp.232-3. PV. III 53,54.

4. NB., II. 15. 'satsv_ānyāṣupalambhā pratyayaṣu yaḥ pratyakṣa eva bhavati sa svabhāvaḥ.' Translation by Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol. II. p.64.

5. NBT., p.23.9. Translation op.cit., p.65.

6. 'deśa-kāla-svabhāva-viprakṛṣṭāḥ'. Ibid.

when the entity is an empirical reality (*drśya*) no causes of its non-perception are there, and yet it is not perceived.¹ Thus non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) is of two types. (1) The non-perception of a thing which has its self nature and is accessible in spatio-temporal relation but now, and here is not perceived. It can be perceived at some other time and some other place, for it is a perceptible thing (*drśya*)² and has been perceived before. (2) The non-perception of such a thing which has no self nature and therefore, although all the conditions of perception are satisfied, is not perceived. In this case of non-perception, a thing is not perceived because it has no particular self nature.

The Bhaṭṭas would have argued that since there is no means of cognizing an 'absolute non-existence', it must be granted the status of a real (negative) entity and is to be cognized by its own means of judgment (*abhāva-pramāṇa*).³ Dharmakīrti retorted:⁴ "When there are altogether no means ofcognition, the non-existence of the object cannot be

1. PVS., (I.205), p.378, '*drśyasya darśanābhāva-kāraṇāsambhave sati. bhavasy-anupalabdhasya bhāvābhāvaḥ pratiyate.*

2. '*svabhāva = drśya.* "The notions of sensible existence and individual existence are here (in Buddhist logic) characteristics of the same fact." - Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol. II. p. 64 n.1.

3. Cf. *infra* Ch.IV. Section II. Also MM. p.132: '*abhāvākhyam pramāṇam syād abhāvasya avabodhakam.*'

4. Dharmakīrti appears to be posterior to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Cf. PVST., śabda, āgama, and apauruṣeya sections where he criticizes the Mīmāṃsaka, but does not refer to him by his name. On the other hand, in Sl. Vārt., Kumārila Bhaṭṭa shows no

established".¹ It has been discussed above that in this theory the assertion of the bare-locus, is the basis of the negative judgment.² According to the Buddhist view, cognition of the bare locus implies the negation of the jar. Here they stress on the cognition of the bare locus and the related object (eka-jñāna-samsargin). The judgment "Non-A" is, in fact, the cognition of an opposite term, "B". If there is no 'B', we cannot say 'non-A'. It is because of 'B' that we say 'non-A'. Dharmakīrti calls it "negation because of (the presence of) the other entity."³ Stcherbatsky writes: that "the negative judgment, or negative deduction, in its basic form, is not a tautology of the form "there is no jar because there is none", but it is a deduction of the form "there is no

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signs of awareness of Dharmakīrti's theory of negation, viz., the *drśyānupalabdhi*, while the Buddhist's argument indicates his awareness of Kumārila's reasoning. And Prabhākara is not only aware but literally supports the Buddhist's theory of negation. (Cf. above pp.68-70, 108 n.v.1.3-4) It should also be noted here that the theory of '*yogyānupalabdhi*' very often ascribed to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in the modern writings on the Indian philosophy (Dasgupta, HIP., V.I. p.397; J.Sinha, HIP., V.I. p.789; S.Radhakrishnan, HIP., V.II. (1948 ed.) p.394), is in fact basically the Buddhist theory of '*drśyānupalabdhi*'. And most probably under the influence of Prabhākara and the Buddhists some latter Bhaṭṭas posited it as Kumārila's theory. (We shall discuss this question in the 4th chapter in some detail.)

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1. NB., II.49, 'pramāṇa-nivṛttāvapy arthābhāvāśiddher-iti. Translation op.cit., p.107.
 2. Vide supra pp.90-92.
 3. PVS., p.31 'anya-sattayā'sattā', p.379 (I.206) and p.381; NB., III.9.

jar because there is a bare place". It is a cognition of an underlying point-instant of reality and this makes it a true cognition or judgment (niścaya).¹ According to the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha, affirmation of an entity involves the exclusion or opposition (vyāvṛtti) of the other entity². This is called the principle of dichotomy (dvaidhī-karṇa).³ For instance, in the negative judgment, "There is no hare's horn". the cognition of the bare head of a hare is the basis of the judgment. The assertion of the bare head entails the exclusion (apoha) of a horn.

Thus, in the judgment "there is no hare's horn", what is cognised is the bare head of a hare, devoid of a horn. In such negative judgments "non-perception is due to the paryudāsa type of negation".⁴ This Buddhist theory can be compared with Bradley's following exposition:

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1. BL., Vol. II. p.118 n.1.
 2. R.N. p.55, 3rd paragraph; Pr. Vārtika, II. 2, 'apoha-cintā' section.
 3. Cp. Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol. I. pp. 192, 460. We reserve our discussion for a latter chapter.
 4. PVST., p.381:
viśāṇādivivikta-śaśamastakādyupalabdhir evānupalabdhīḥ
paryudāsavṛttyā.

"In existential judgment....., the apparent is not the actual subject. Let us take such a denial as "Chimaras are non-existent." "Chimaras" is here ostensibly the subject, but is really the predicate. It is the quality of harbouring chimaras which is denied of the nature of things. And we deny this because, if chimaras existed, we should have to alter our view of the world. In some cases that view, no doubt, can be altered, but, so long as we hold it, we are bound to refuse all predicates it excludes. The positive quality of the ultimate reality may remain occult or be made explicit, but this, and nothing else, lies always at the base of a negative judgment."¹

However in the non-perception of a non-empirical (adrśyānupalabdhi), neither of the two principles can be applied. A non-empirical object cannot be affirmed in any locus, or spatio-temporal relation. Secondly, an assertion of a non-empirical (adrśya), or a super-sensuous or metaphysical object (viprakṛṣṭa), does not necessarily involve the principle of dichotomy. In the empirical situation there can be no assertion of a supersensuous object. And without an assertion there can be no dichotomy or discrimination (apoha). So long

1. Principles of Logic, I. (1922), p.120 (12).

as we cannot have affirmation of 'A' we cannot say about it that it is 'not-B'.

Often it is argued that since we have no ground to deny existence of the metaphysical beings or supersensuous objects, mere non-perception of such objects is not valid (sufficient) ground for denying their existence.¹ The results of charity (dāna) and religious practices (dharma, hiṃsāvīraṭi etc.) in the form of attainment of heaven (svarga) and salvation (niḥśreyasa), and a particular god (devatāviśeṣa) are such things that are supersensuous (atīndriya) and therefore non-perceptible.² So long as there is no cause for their opposition (virodhābhāva) mere non-perception of them is not a strong ground for their un-acceptance. Udayana maintains that "only perceptible things are non-existent, they are not-perceived; but God being imperceptible by nature, non-perception of him does not prove his non-existence."³ A metaphysical

1. PVS., p.375 'tadbhāve virodhābhāvāt, atrānupalabdhimātram-apramāṇam', and see Kaṇvakagomin therein.
2. Ibid. N.Kusumāñjali, I. and II. where Udayana discusses in length.
3. J.Sinha, HIP., Vol.I. p.692; Ātma-tattva-viveka, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1939 ed.), p.866. 'dṛśyamātraniyatatvāt pratyakṣabādhasya.' Cp. Spinoza, 'The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza', (Translated from the Latin, with an Introduction by R.H.M. Elwes, Dover Publications, New York, 1955) Vol.II, p.52 'concerning God', "If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist. If such a reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the very nature of God, or be external to him - that is, drawn from another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist. But substance of

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being may exist without being perceived in the empirical situation; "sense experience is not relevant to metaphysical propositions." and here the ~~En.~~ logician adopts the course of "many empiricists" who "identify meaning with the property of being verifiable (or falsifiable) by sense-experience, and to conclude that no metaphysics is possible because metaphysics would have to transcend sense-experience. Such a view dismisses metaphysical statements not as false or unsupported by evidence, but as meaningless."¹ Dharmakīrti rejoined: "Whatsoever is (called) a supersensuous, for it has no indicatory (logical) mark is rejected as a self-existing extreme particular."² For wherever our perception fails 'inference' succeeds on the ground of the logical mark (linga). But in the case of the

footnote 3 from previous page continued;

another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. ii.) and therefore would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence."

1. A.C. Ewing, Fundamental Questions of Philosophy, (1958) p.39-40. Cp. also p.127 n.4; 132-3 n.I. 134.
2. PVS., p.374, 'yo'pi jñāpakasya lingasyābhāvāt atīndriyārthaḥ svabhāvaviśeṣo vā pratikṣipyate.'
In Buddhist logic the term 'svabhāva viśeṣa' or particular is used in the sense of reality - vastu - svalakṣaṇa.
Cf. BL., Vol. I. pp. 69, 81, 506 ff.

non-empirical things no logical mark is established. Thus such objects (arthas) which are supersensuous (atīndriya), are not cognizable entities, neither by direct nor by indirect means of judgment (pramāṇa). And the Buddhists accept no other valid means (pramāṇa) of knowledge.¹ Dharmakīrti declared: "Negation of objects inaccessible (to experience) is the source of problematic reasoning, since its essence is exclusive of both direct and indirect knowledge."² The term 'viprakṛṣṭa' refers to such things that are inaccessible in spatio-temporal relations and thus are not cognizable.³

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1. The Buddhist conceptions of 'pratyakṣa' and 'anumāna' are not to be taken as similar to the NV and the Bhāttas. Cf. BL., Vol. I. pp. 147-152, 231; J. Sinha, HIP., Vol. I, pp. 461-470; Durgacharan Chatterji, 'Sources of Knowledge in Bud. Logic.' Indian Culture, Vol. I. no. 2, 1934, pp. 266-7.
 2. NB., II. 48, 'viprakṛṣṭa-viṣayānupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣānumāna-nivṛttilakṣaṇā saṃśayaḥetuh.' Translation by Stecherbatsky, op.cit., p. 107.
 3. viprakṛṣṭa = adṛśya = svabhāva-viśeṣa-rahita = atīndriya = na jñāna-jñeya-svabhāva = pratyakṣa-anumāna-nivṛtti-lakṣaṇa. Cf. NB., II. 28, III. 71-73, 96-97; NBT., pp. 66-67, 75; PVS., p. 374.

The examples of uncognizables include the Absolute Being, the Omniscient Buddha. Contrary to the Jainas the Buddhists "have maintained," observes Stcherbatsky, "that preaching (upadeśa-praṇayanam) is a mark of non-omniscience, since conceptual thought (vikalpa) and speech can express only limited, imputed knowledge.¹ It is nevertheless a tenet in Mahāyāna that Buddha, the Absolute Being, is Omniscient, but this cannot be established by logical methods. Here the terms are arranged in every possible combination, from a formal stand point, for didactical purposes, without any reference to real tenets. It has become usual among Tibetan logicians to choose quite senseless examples in order better to impress the rules of formal logic. An inference of the form "all goats are sheep because they are cows" is considered to be well suited to exemplify an inference where all the three aspects of the reason are wrong."²

Dharmakīrti, discussing the fallacy of an uncertain reason, said that when one of the two forms of the logical reasoning is wrong and the other is dubious, the reason becomes

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1. Nyāya-kanikā (reprint from the Pandit), pp.112-113 (referred to by Stcherbatsky).
 2. BL., Vol. II. p.207 n.1. Three aspects of the reason are thesis (pakṣa, sādhyā), reason (hetu, līnga) and the major premise (nirṇaya, but sometime dr̥stānta). For fallacy of an uncertain reason see NB., III.96. Trans. op.cit., p.206.

uncertain.¹ And the example he gives is: "someone is passionless or someone is omniscient. Because he possesses the faculty of speech. The contraposition (vyatiroka) is here wrong, the positive concomitance (anvaya) uncertain. Since omniscience and (absolute) absence of passions are inaccessible to experience, it is uncertain whether the faculty of speech coexists (with these attributes) or not."² Thus if Buddha preaches he cannot be the Absolute Being or Omniscient. Here the negative judgment refers to a false proposition. For from our experience we know that the reason (hetu), i.e., the faculty of speech is present in the dissimilar cases (vipakṣa). The faculty of speech is observed in a person who has passion (rāga) and who is not omniscient. Thus negative judgment of a non-empirical object is not valid. And its affirmative judgment is mere problematic (saṃśaya-hetu).³ In the given example, the positive form of the major premise will be:

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1. NB. III.95: dvayo rūpayorekasyāśiddhāvaparasya ca saṃdehe' naikāntikah. Translation op.cit., p.206.
 2. NB. III.96-97, 'yathā vītarāgaḥ kaścitsarvajñaḥ vā vaktṛtvād-iti. vyatireko'trāsiddhaḥ. saṃdigdho'nvayaḥ. sarvajña-vītarāgayor-viprakarṣād vācanādes-tatra sattvam asattvam vā saṃdigdham.' Translation by Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.206-7. Stcherbatsky says "the gift of" which we have changed to 'the faculty of'.
 3. NBT., p.75. 9-11.

"Whosoever possesses the faculty of speech is omniscient."

And the contraposition of the same major premise will be:

"Whosoever is non-omniscient does not possess the faculty of speech."¹

The adṛśyānupalabdhi is not valid, by this what the Buddhists mean is that it is not valid in affirming reality of non-existence in the manner the dṛśyānupalabdhi affirms reality of existence.² Dharmakīrti said:

"The former (adṛśyānupalabdhi) does not determine non-existence."³

1. Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol. II. p.207 n.1.

2. Cp. Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa's theory of validity of negation as affirming real non-existence, Ch. IV.

3. PVS., p.372, 'na punaḥ pūrvāsattā-sādhani.'

CHAPTER III

COMPLEX NEGATIONS.

- I. Divisions of 'abhāva' in the realist systems;
- Sections: II. Double Negation (abhāvābhāvaḥ-dvitiyābhāvaḥ);
- III. Mutual-absence of a mutual-absence
(anyonyābhāvasyānyonyābhāvaḥ);
- IV. (A). Prior-absence of a posterior-absence
(prādhvaṃsābhāvasya prāgabhāvaḥ); and
(B). Posterior-absence of a prior-absence
(prāgabhāvasya prādhvaṃsābhāvaḥ);
- V. Qualified Negation (viśiṣṭābhāvaḥ)

Section I: Divisions of 'abhāva' in the realist systems

We have seen in the previous chapter that under the influence of Buddhist logic philosophers of the BHāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā system, in order to strengthen their traditional theory of negation, felt it necessary (a) to extend the number of types of negation and (b) to present it in a systematic classification of the two main divisions, namely, the saṃsargābhāva and the anyonyābhāva.¹ In the early Nyāya works, including Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika, only two types of negation are mentioned, namely the prāgabhāva and the prādhvaṃsābhāva.²

1. Cf. supra ~~Chapter III, pp.~~ p. 63 n.1., p. 100.

2. See supra p. 42 n2 and p. 48 n.3; IP., II, p. 220.

In Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Sloka-vārttika we find a four-fold division of negation.¹ And at a later date, in the works of Pārthasārathi Miśra, Vācaspati Miśra, and Śrīdhara two main classifications of the four types posited by Kumārila are given.² This development of the different types of negation (abhāva) may be summarized in the following tables:

Table No. I.

Divisions of Negation (abhāva) according to the Early Nyāya writings.


Antecedent or prior
Non-existence
(prāgabhāva)

Posterior Non-Existence
(pradhvaṃsābhāva).


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1. Cf. Sl. Vārt., Ab.ch., vers. 2-4, pp. 473-474 quoted above p. 63 n.1.
 2. Cf. supra Chap.II, p.100 ; Sl. Vārt., NR., p.481. Vācaspati Miśra, may have been the first to postulate this twofold division, NVTT., II, ii, 9; Sinha, HIP., I, pp. 762-763.

Table No. II.

Divisions of Negation (abhāva) according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and many subsequent writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā Schools:

Table No. III.

Divisions of Negation according to Vācaspati Miśra, Pārthasārathi Miśra and Śrīdhara and subsequent writers with the exception of Gāgābhaṭṭa, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Venīdatta:



Gāgābhaṭṭa¹ does not admit the antecedent abhāva while Śiromaṇi and Venīdatta appear to have rejected the traditional

1. vide supra p.72 n.2 and 3; B. Cin., p. 17.

view of the mutual absence as a separate individual.¹ However, these two neo-Nyāya logicians have tried to elucidate the problems of complex negations. It must also be remembered that Siromani does not accept abhāva as an ontological entity (padārtha) but only as a logical concept or an imposed property (upādhi).² Venidatta as we shall see in the following pages, in many cases agrees with him.

Section II. The Principle of Double Negation
(abhāvābhāvaḥ = dvitīyābhāvaḥ).

Among Indian logicians the Buddhists seem to be the first to apply the principle of double negation ($\neg\neg A = A$). In keeping with the doctrine of apoha or 'discrimination',³ the Buddhist philosophers maintain that every proposition is the negation of its own negation.⁴ According to this theory the proposition A implies the negation of non-A

1. Cf. PTN., pp. 55-56; PM., pp 27-28; Primeva, pp 49-50; infra pp. 127-129.
2. supra chap. I, pp. 54-55.
3. See infra chap. V, pt. 1, p. 215; also pt. 2.
4. PVP., p. 612 Prajñākaragupta: 'asādhya eva nāstīti yadavādhāraṇam tatsādhye nāstītvam niśedhati.'

(anyāpoha). In Dharmakīrti's own words:

"Affirmation is, indeed, the absence of negation."¹

However, it seems that the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā philosophers did not use double negation as a logical instrument. But in the works of the neo-Nyāya logicians it is recognized to be of great significance. It has, as we shall see below, even become a question of some controversy among the logicians.

Among the neo-Nyāya authors Vallabha² is, perhaps, the first to apply this principle. Criticizing the Prābhākara theory that the negation of a pot on the floor is equal to the perception of the bare locus (or floor),³ he says:

"The relational negation of the absence of the pot i.e. when the pot is present, refers to the pot only, but not to the locus. This means that there may be a locus without a pot, but not a pot without a related locus (atiprasakteh)."⁴

In other words, since the expression "~ pot = pot", the expression "~pot" must be equal to the absence of the pot, but not to the presence of the bare locus.

1. PV., IV. 223 'nivr̥t̥tyābhāvas tu vidhih'.

2. According to Pt. Dhundhirāja Śāstri Vallabhācāryya must be a contemporary of Gaṅgeśa if not prior to him. "ācārya Vallabhāh Gaṅgeśopādhyāya samakālīnās tatpūrvakālīnā eva veti." Int., NL., p.3. Prof. Dineshchandra Bhattacharya supports this view, see History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā, pp.55-56.

3. See supra chap. II, pp.86-87.

4. NL., p.559: 'ghaṭe ca ghaṭābhāva-samsarganisedho ghaṭa eva na tu prakṛte 'atiprasakteh'. prakṛte = bhūtale. See com. Kan̥thābharana thereon.

However, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, "one of the most original of Indian philosophers",¹ according to Ingalls is "the most famous opponent of"² this principle of double negation. Raghunātha states his argument as follows:

"Now, the absence of the absence of a pot, etc., (is) a separate (individual from the presence of the pot and from the single absence of the pot), for (in the perceptual judgment) (there) is no absence of a pot in the place (where there is) a pot," (there is) nothing to remove (our awareness of absence-ness and indeed of double-absenceness.)³

Raghunātha rejects the objection that if a double negation is not equal to an affirmation it would lead to an infinite regress (anavasthā). He claims that in his theory there is no infinite regress "for, since the absence of absence of absence of a pot (is equivalent to) the

1. Ingalls, Materials., p. 9.

2. Ibid., p. 68 (40).

3. PTN., p.55. 1-3:

'evam ghaṭādyabhāvasyāpy'abhāvo'tirikta eva.

Ghaṭādimati tadabhāvo nāstīty'abādhitābhāvatva-pratyayāt.'

Translation by Potter, pp. 67-68. See also PM., p. 27.

single absence of a pot, (there is) no contradiction."¹

Raghunātha's statement needs further investigation. It appears to me that he does not intend to deny the principle that a double negation is equivalent to an affirmation. For both he and Venidatta, who supports him on this point, emphatically state that the third negation is the same as the first. Venidatta observes: "There is no infinite regress, for there is no opposition to the view that the single negation of a pot is the same as its absence. Moreover, the absence of absence of absence of the pot is not different but the same as the first absence."² This means " \sim pot = \sim pot" and " $\sim\sim$ pot = \sim pot". Now, notwithstanding this it is but natural to say that " $\sim\sim$ pot = pot". I think that what

1. PTN., p.55. 3-4: 'na caivam anavasthā ekasyaiva ghaṭābhāvasya svābhāvābhāvarūpatve virodhābhāvāt.' Trans. Potter, p. 68. Ingalls' remarks are very noteworthy. He writes: "Intuitionistic logic, as Professor Quine has pointed out to me, denies the equivalence of $\sim\sim a$ and a . It admits that a implies $\sim\sim a$ implies a . An interesting point of comparison with Navya-nyāya is that the Intuitionists avoid an infinite series just as Raghunātha does; they admit the equivalence of $\sim a$ and $\sim\sim a$." Materials, p. 68 n. 135. The underlined words are in italics.
2. PM., p.27: 'na caivam anavasthā, ghaṭābhāvasya (ghaṭābhāvābhāvas tatpadārtho' tra bodhyah) tad-abhāvarūpatve virodhābhāvāt. tathā ca ghaṭābhāvābhāvasy apy abhāvo (ghaṭābhāvābhāvah) ghaṭābhāva eva na tvatirikta iti nanavasthā.'

f but not that $\sim\sim a$

these neo-Nyāya logicians intend to say is that in other cases of negation, abhāva is determined by bhāva or the counter-positive while in the case of a double negation abhāva is limited by its own characteristic. A double negation is an unique or separate type (atirikta) of negation inasmuch as it is the only negation which negates a negation.

Section III. Mutual-absence of a Mutual-absence
(anyonyābhāvasyānyonyābhāva).

According to Raghunātha and Venidatta a complex negation is such that a mutual-absence of a mutual-absence is equivalent to presence-ness (bhāvatva). But the texts in which this formula is stated involve some logical difficulties and therefore, before further investigation of the subject, it is necessary to remind the reader that a simple mutual-absence is defined as that negation in which an essential identity (tādātmya) relation between two things is denied.¹

1. Lak., p. 13: 'tādātmya-pratīyogiko'bhāvo'nyonyābhāvaḥ'; NL., p. 576; SM., 12; Materials, p. 68.

Raghunātha defines the complex negation as follows:
 "The mutual-absence of a mutual-absence (is) a presenceness
 and [the single ^{mutual} absence is] a relational-absence-ness, for
 on the acceptance (that) a mutual-absence (is) a separate
 (individual) there would be an infinite regress."¹ If
 we leave out the added words [the single mutual absence is],
 this statement would appear to be contradictory. It would
 then assert that the mutual-absence of a mutual-absence is
 equivalent to both presence-ness and absence-ness. Ingalls
 declared that the text "is corrupt".² And Potter in his
 translation of the Padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇa has omitted
 the phrase "saṃsargābhāvatvaṃ ca" which seemed to him "to
 have been miscopied into the text from Raghudeva's
 commentary".³ However, according to Veṇidatta, who very
 often takes sentences and phrases from the text of Raghunātha
 without acknowledging them,⁴ the present case is explained
 in exactly these very words, including "saṃsargābhāvatvaṃ
 ca". Thus, I am inclined to believe that the text is not
 "corrupt" or "miscopied". However I think it does require

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1. PTN., pp. 55-56: 'anyonyābhāvasyānyonyābhāvo bhāvatvaṃ
saṃsargābhāvatvaṃ ca atiriktānyonyābhāvāṅgikāre'
 navasthāprasāṅgāt.' Cf. Potter's trans. p. 68 and n.52.
 He omits the underlined phrase in the text.
 2. Materials, p. 150.
 3. Potter, loc. cit.
 4. Cp. e.g. PM., pp. 23, 24, 28, 29 with PTN., pp. 48, 51,
 56-57 and 58.

further investigation which may bring out additional interesting points. On the basis of Venidatta's text here I suggest a possible interpretation of the phrase 'saṃsargābhāvatvaṃ ca'.

Venidatta states: "Mutual-absence of a mutual-absence is a presenceness as well as (absolute) relational absence-ness. For the acceptance of a separate mutual-absence (of a mutual-absence) would lead to infinite regress. And (he points out) this is stated on the basis that the mutual-absence of a mutual-absence is limited by the mutual-absenceness. And (further) this must also be understood (in the following way): (a). the mutual-absence of a mutual-absence of a jar etc. is the presence-ness; (b) (while) the [single] mutual-absenceness of a jar etc. is the (absolute) relational-absenceness".¹

1. PM., pp. 27-28:

'anyonyābhāvasya vā bhāvatvaṃ, saṃsargābhāvatvaṃ cānyonyābhāvaḥ, atiriktānyonyābhāvāṅgikāre' navasthāprasāṅgāt. idaṃ cānyonyābhāvatgāvacchinna-syānyonyābhāvaṃ avalambyoktam. ghaṭādyanyonyābhāvasya tu anyonyābhāvo bhāvatvaṃ, saṃsargābhāvatvaṃ ghaṭādyanyonyābhāvatvaṃ cety api bodhyam.'

The underlined conjunction 'vā' is problematic. I think perhaps it indicates Venidatta's half-hearted support for Raghunātha's view.

There are three main points stated by Venidatta.

- (1) A mutual absence of a mutual-absence is equivalent to presence (or presenceness). Ingalls formalizes this as " $\dot{X} = X$ "¹. The symbol \dot{X} stands for mutual-absence.
- (2) The mutual-absence of a mutual-absence is limited by the mutual-absenceness.
- (3) The mutual-absenceness is equivalent to absolute relational absenceness.

As far as the first point is concerned there is no difficulty. A mutual-absence is the identity negation of two entities A and B. That is, all things are essentially identical with their very own "essences" [own nature]. According to Ingalls, e.g. the mutual-absence of water corresponds to the fragment " \dot{X} (....= water)"², i.e. it is false that water is identical with [fire]. By this method, the differences between things are determined. According to these logicians the positive quality "separate-

1. Materials, p. 150.

2. Ibid., p. 55.

ness' (prthaktva) refers to the mutual-absence-ness.¹
 Now, when we speak of a mutual-absence of the mutual-absence, what we assert is not an individual complex negation, as suggested by Raghunātha and Venidatta, in the case of a double negation,² but a mere denial of the separateness of one thing from some other thing.

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1. The separateness (prthaktva) is regarded by the conservative Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as one of the 24 qualities (guṇa). Tr. Sam., 3. In SM., 113 and 114 the difference (anyonyābhāva) is explained in the following way:
 'prthaktvam syāt prthak-pratyaya-kāraṇam.
 anyonyābhāvato nāśya caritārthatvam isyate.
 asmāt prthag idam neti pratītir hi vilakṣaṇā.'
 The propositional forms of the two are different inasmuch as the former corresponds to such constructions as "A is different from B" (asmāt prthag), while the latter refers to the negative judgments, e.g. "this is not that" (idam na) or "A is not B". The former "should be interpreted as an affirmative proposition referring to the positive entity called prthaktva and the latter as a negative proposition referring to the negative category of reciprocal non-existence called anyonyābhāva." (K.S. Sasti, Primer, pt. III, p. 17). In the proposition referring to prthaktva, the other term (B) is expressed in the ablative case (pañcamī) while in anyonyābhāva, generally speaking, both terms are expressed in the nominative (prathamā). (SM., 114 (KSS), p. 464: 'yadarthayoge pañcamī so'rtho nanarthanyonyābhāvato bhinno guṇāntaram kalpyata iti.'). See also Pāṇinī, II, iii, 29; NL., pp. 368-372; Bhādurī, Metaphysics, pp. 118-119. NS., IV, i, 37-40, NBh., and NVT. thereon; NK., p. 230. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas rejected the positive conception of difference or separateness. They explained it in terms of mutual-negation. Cf. S. Dīpikā, p. 235. This is also the position of the neo-Nyāya logicians, namely, Raghunātha and Venidatta. They say: "separateness (is) not a distinct quality (guṇa), for the statement (that X is) separate (from Y) can be explained merely through (its) mutual absence (with Y)." Translation by Potter, p. 40. (He translates the term 'guṇa' by

(continued overleaf.....)

Furthermore, according to the realist theory of negation,¹ cognition of an absence other than the mutual-absence, involves three factors, (a) counter-positive (i.e., the negatum or pratiyogin), (b) the real absence (abhāva-vastu), (c) the qualified empty locus (viśiṣṭa-bhūtala). But in the case of mutual-absence, e.g. of a cow and a horse (non-cow), negation refers to opposition between two presences. Now, if this opposition (anyonyābhāva), (of sub-classes) is merged into the class order of existents as such (sattā), then only "presenceness" is left. Thus, the neo-Nyāya logicians, particularly Raghunātha and Venidatta maintain that the mutual-absence of a mutual-absence corresponds to the presence.

(footnote 1 continued from previous page)

"trope"), prthaktvaṃ api na guṇāntaram. anyonyābhāvād eva prthaktva-vyavahāropapattē. PTN., p. 28. 1-2; PM., p. 10; both give the same reading. For a lengthy discussion on the subject see PM., further pp. 10-11.

2. Cf. PTN., p. 55; PM., p. 27.

1. supra p. 58 ^{note} numbers 1, 2; p. 60 n.2.

Now, the question arises: Why does Raghunātha state that "the mutual-absence of a mutual-absence is presence and relational absence (saṃsargābhāva)"?¹ Here, Veṇidatta's text seems to suggest a solution to the difficulty. According to his second and third points (stated above) a mutual-absence of a mutual-absence is limited (avacchinna)² by the mutual-absenceness which is equivalent to the (constant) relational absenceness. In order to understand the phrase 'saṃsargābhāva' in this context, we must be familiar with the controversy among the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers concerning the mutual absence versus the absolute absence or constant relational absence.

We have already stated above³ the two main divisions of negation, namely, (1) the relational absence or privation (saṃsargābhāva) which consists of three sub divisions, and (2) the mutual-absence or opposition (tādātmyābhāva = anyonyābhāva). The former refers to the negation of "relations other than that of identity" while the latter is denial of identity only.⁴ The third sub division of the first type

1. Cf. PTN., pp. 55-56 quoted above p. 127 n. 1.

2. The term 'avacchinna' is "one of the most important technical terms in the Navya-nyāya". For explanation see Ingalls, Materials, p. 47 (22). It has "many shades of meaning, most of which are foreign to the concepts of Western logic."

3. See supra Table No. III, p. 121

4. Materials, pp. 54-55.

of negation is the absolute or constant absence (atyantābhāva). It is defined in terms of "the constant absence of relation (sadātanah saṃsargābhāvo'tyantābhāvaḥ".¹

Now the objection is raised that the propositions such as "the pot is not cloth" and "a cow is not a horse", although admittedly referring to the mutual-absence, correspond, in fact, to the constant absence of relation (atyantābhāva). For the opposition of two things, (if real), must be constant, i.e., for all time. Moreover, the identity (tādātmya) relation which is denied in the mutual-absence is itself a type of relation (saṃsarga), and therefore it must be regarded as a relational absence (saṃsargābhāva).²

The conservative Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas enjoined that the mutual-absence is distinct from the constant-absence inasmuch as the former is applicable to the instances where the two individuals whose identity is denied reside

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1. NL., p. 573: 'pūrvottarāvadhi-rahitas tu saṃsarga-pratiyogiko' bhāvo' tyantābhāvaḥ'. Prakāśa commentary explains: 'sadātanah saṃsargābhāvo'tyantābhāvaḥ'. Cf. also Udayana, Lak., p. 13. Vallabha in NL., p.567 and p.573 defines four types of abhāva exactly in the same terms as Udayana does.
 2. NL., p. 574: 'nanu gavātmanāśvābhāvo' py atyantābhāva eva, niravadhitvāt. tadapārthakam saṃsargapratyogitvam.' Kanthābharana com. tādātmya-niṣedhātma saṃsarga-niṣedhātma ca eka evābhāva ity arthaḥ.

in the same time and space relation. But in the constant absence the very presence of all space-time relations of things are denied.¹

Keeping this controversy in mind when we read Raghunātha's text and Venīdatta's explanation of it, the phrase 'saṃsargābhāva', in the text of Raghunātha does not seem to be problematic as suggested by Ingalls and Potter.² These neo-Nyāya logicians were, I think, opposed to the conservative view of distinction between the mutual-absence and the constant relational absence. The two logicians appear to have argued in the following way:

- (a) since the acceptance of a separate individual mutual-absence would lead to regressus ad infinitum, it is not a distinct negation;
- (b) a simple mutual-absence is not different from the constant relational absence (saṃsargābhāva);
- (c) a complex mutual-absence, i.e., mutual-absence of a mutual-absence is equivalent to presence.³

1. Ibid., 'na. anyonyābhāvasya niṣedhya-samānadeśakālatvāt. tasya (atyantābhāvasya) tu tadabhāvāt.'
 2. Cf. Materials, p. 150; Potter's Translation of PTN., p. 68 n. 52.
 3. Cf. PTN., pp. 55-56; PM., pp. 27-28.

- Section IV. (A) Prior-absence of a posterior-absence
(pradhvaṃsābhāvasya prāgabhāvaḥ); and
(B) Posterior-absence of a prior-absence
(prāgabhāvasya pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ).

In accordance with the doctrine of 'asatkārya', the early Nyāya writers described two kinds of absence, namely, the antecedent or prior absence (prāgabhāva), and the posterior absence (pradhvaṃsābhāva).¹ The former consists of the absence of a thing prior to its coming into existence and the latter of the destruction of a thing after it has come into being and now has ceased to exist.

Now, the neo-Nyāya logicians question what will be the antecedent-absence of a posterior-absence (before the latter's production). For instance, with reference to a pot, so long as it has not been destroyed there is non-production of its posterior-absence. And this may be termed as 'the antecedent-absence of the posterior-absence' of the pot, (i.e., the presence of the pot).

On the other hand, since the prior-absence is described as that 'negation which is not present subsequent

1. Supra Table No. I. p. 120

to the production of the thing' (counterpositive),¹ the neo-Naiyāyikas think that the destruction of the prior-absence can also be described in purely negative terms, i.e., as 'the posterior-absence of the prior-absence'. Raghunātha and Veṇidatta define the two complex types of negation in the following way:

"And the prior absence of a posterior absence,
 (and) the posterior absence of a prior absence,
 (are each) separate (kinds of individuals) for
 at the time (when) the pot, etc. (the thing is)
 present, (there is) nothing to remove the cog-
 nition of the absence (of the absence involved
 in the perceptual judgments of the forms)
 'there is no prior absence (of a pot, etc.)'
 (and) 'there is no posterior absence (of a
 pot, etc.).' "2

1. Lak. I, p.13: Antecedent absence is the absence limited by its end only (i.e., by the production of the thing which is its counterpositive) cf. ~~infra~~ 'uttaraikāvadhir abhāvaḥ prāg-abhāvaḥ'; NL., p.567. Lit., 'Antecedent absence (of A) is the absence (which is) limited in time subsequent (to its destruction or to the creation of its counter-positive) Cp. NK., p.230. '(prāgabhāvaḥ) anādirapy anityaḥ kāryotpādēna tasya vināśāt'. The prior absence although beginningless is not-eternal, for it is destroyed by the production of the effect. cf. ~~infra~~ p.139 n.2.
2. PTN., pp. 56-57; and PM., p.28: 'dhvaṃsaprāgabhāvayoś cātirikṭāv eva prāgabhāvadhvaṃsau ghaṭādeḥ sattvakāle tasya prāgabhāvadhvaṃsau na sta ity abādhitābhāvatvapratyayat.' 3. Potter's rendering of the PTN., the underlined passage is wrong, for it reverses the very intention of the passage. His rendering is the following: "..., for (there is)

(continued overleaf.....)

Now, if it is argued that these two complex negations are not necessarily to be admitted as separate individuals, for the two can be explained in terms of the constant absence (atyantābhāva), the neo-Naiyāyika would reply that the very term 'constant' or atyanta in the definition of the constant absence makes it incompatible with the pervasion of the other two absences. The constant absence is defined as "that absence of relation of the counterpositive which is free from any reference to time, prior or posterior",¹ while the other two negations are determined by time limits. Venidatta explains that "the propositions: 'there will be posterior absence (or destruction) of a pot' (and) 'the prior absence of the pot is destroyed' etc. are the basis (sādhikā) of the cognition (pratīti) of the prior absence of the posterior

(continued from previous page.....)

nothing to remove (our awareness of absenceness in the absences involved in the perceptual judgments) "(there) is no posterior absence of prior absence of a pot, etc." (and there) "is no prior absence of posterior absence of a pot, etc. at the time (when) the pot, etc. (is) in existence."

PTN., Translation, p. 69. Cp. PM., p. 28, infra p. 138 n. 1.

1. NL., p. 573: 'pūrvottarāvādhirahitas tu saṃsarga-pratīyogiko bhāvo 'tyantābhāvaḥ'; Lak., p. 13; SM., 12.

absence and the posterior absence of the prior absence (each as) being a separate (kind of individual).".¹

One may observe here that contrary to the rule "Determinatio est negatio" (Spinoza), determination of negation itself is dependent on something as its counter-positive (pratiyogin). Even in cases of complex negation, for instance, the posterior absence of prior absence of a pot, it is delimited by the presence of the pot. In other words, the negation of the prior absence (i.e., its destruction) is determined by the presence of the thing. But in this view a formal difficulty arises: What will be the negation of the negation of a prior absence? Let us explain the problem in the following way. If the symbol \neg stands for 'prior absence' and the symbol \sim for negation our proposition can be expressed in the following way:

$$\text{If } \sim \neg X = X, \text{ then, } \sim \sim \neg X = \neg X.$$

This means if the negation of the prior absence is equivalent to the presence, then, the negation of negation of the prior absence must be equivalent to the prior absence itself. And

1. PM., p. 28: yadi cānayoṛ atyantābhāvaviṣayatvenaivopapatter na dhvaṃsaprāgabhāva-prāgabhāvadhvaṃsayoṛ atiriktatve sādhakam iti vibhāvyate, tadā ghaṭadhvaṃso bhaviṣyati ghaṭaprāgabhāvo naṣṭa ityādi pratītir dhvaṃsaprāgabhāva-prāgabhāvadhvaṃsayoṛ atiriktatva sādhikeyaḥ āvadheyam.

this would pose a difficult problem for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers who believe that although the prāgabhāva is destroyed by the production of the object,¹ after the destruction of the object it is the posterior absence (pradhvaṃsābhāva) which is produced,² but not the prior absence (prāgabhāva).

Vallabha, apparently, tries to solve this formal difficulty simply by suggesting a "conservative" (i.e., a traditional) solution. He states:

"It may be argued that in the negation of the negation of the prior absence, its re-appearance is implied. This is not the case. For it is rather the posterior absence, which is in opposition (to the double negation of prior absence)."³

In other words, inasmuch as the negation of the prior absence of the pot is equivalent with the production of the pot the second negation refers to its destruction and

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1. Cf. Lak., p. 13; NL., p. 567; NK., p. 230
 2. Lak., p. 13: 'pūrvaikāvadhir abhāvaḥ pradhvaṃsābhāvaḥ'; NL., 567, Lit., 'Posterior absence is the absence limited by its beginning only (i.e. from the moment the thing is destroyed). Cf. supra 136 n. 1 where 'prāgabhāva' is described as that which is limited by its destruction, i.e. the creation of the thing. In other words antecedent absence has no beginning but an end and posterior absence a beginning but no end.
 3. NL., pp. 567-568: 'prāgabhāvanivṛttinivṛttau tadunmajjan apattir iti cet. na. dhvaṃsasyāpi tadvirodhitvāt.'

not to the re-production of the prior-absence.

Perhaps, Raghunātha and Venidatta too had this difficulty in mind when they suggested that 'the posterior absence of prior absence' must be regarded as a separate kind of individual absence.¹ But according to Vallabha there is no complex type of posterior negation. For the simple posterior absence is equally applicable to both existence, (i.e., a pot) and non-existence, (i.e. the prior absence of pot) (eka eva dhvaṃso bhāvabhāva-niṣedhātma na bhidyate).²

Section IV. Qualified Negation (viśeṣaṇābhāva).

There are three other types of negation mentioned in some of the writings of the neo-Nyāya logicians.³

- (1) Negation of Alternation (anyatarābhāva = viśeṣaṇābhāva viśeṣyābhāva);
- (2) Negation of the Conjoint (ubhayābhāva);
- (3) Qualified Negation (viśiṣṭābhāva).

The first type of negation may be explained as the negation of either the substance or the quality of the subject.

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1. PTN., pp. 56-67; PM., p. 28.
 2. NL., p. 574 and Kaṇṭhābharāṇa com. explains: 'bhāvābhāveti. ghaṭatātprāgabhāva-niṣedhātma'.
 3. Nyāya-siddhānta-mañjarī, p. 52: 'viśeṣaṇābhāvo viśeṣyābhāva ubhayābhāvo vā tatra viśiṣṭābhāvo' dhiko 'vaseyah'; Cf. also Materials, pp. 64-65.

For instance, in the proposition: "A is either non-B or non-C", one or the other of 'B' and 'C' is denied of the subject 'A' but not both.¹ "Mathematical logic calls this 'joint denial', since $\sim(p \vee q)$ is equivalent to $\sim p \cdot \sim q$."²

The second type of negation, viz., the "ubhayābhāva" or the negation of both, the substance and the quality, may be exemplified in the proposition: "A is neither B nor C". This means "both 'B' and 'C' are denied of the subject 'A'."³ In mathematical logic this is called "alternative denial", for the proposition " $\sim(p \cdot q)$ " is equivalent to " $\sim p \vee \sim q$ ".⁴

The third type of negation, viz., the "viśiṣṭābhāva" refers to "the denial of a qualified predicate in respect of a subject."⁵ This can be applied to three cases: (1) the negation of the substance; (2) or the negation of the quality qualifying the substance; (3) or the negation of both the substance as well as the quality.⁶ For

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1. Susil Kumar Maitra, Fundamentals, p. 155.
 2. Ingalls, op.cit., p. 65 n. 120.
 3. Maitra, loc. cit.
 4. Ingalls, op.cit., p. 64 n.118.
 5. Matira, op.cit., p. 156. Compare with the Buddhist view of a qualified cognition (apoha), infra Chap. V, pt.1. n.21. p.215.
 6. Fundamentals, pp. 155-156.

instance, in the proposition: "There is no red rose on the table", what is denied with reference to the table is "A qualified substance, viz, the rose (substance) qualified by the quality of red". This proposition will be valid in the cases when there be no red rose on the table but

- a) some other red flower;
- b) a rose of some colour other than red; or
- c) a white lily instead of a red rose.¹

The qualified negation or the "Specific Absence" - as Ingalls calls it - is in effect the same as the negation of the conjoint (ubhayābhāva).² Ingalls formalizes three instances of this negation as: "'~p.q', 'p.~q', '~p.~q' "³.

The treatment of these types of negation indicates a certain tendency among the neo-Nyāya logicians to treat 'abhāva' as a propositional function rather than an ontological fiction. However, since discussion of such types of negation are not very frequent among the non-Buddhist writers, it is difficult for us at this stage to state as to what extent the propositional character of negation is appreciated by these Indian thinkers.⁴

1. Ibid.


2. Ingalls, op.cit. p.65 n.123.

3. Ibid., p. 64.

4. However, the neo-Naiyāyikas used such types of negation to solve some difficulties concerning their realist theory of Inference. Cf. Materials, pp. 69-71, 93, 130-131.

Table No. IV.

Complex Negations According to the Neo-Myāya logicians:



CHAPTER IV

- SECTIONS: I. NEGATION - AS A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE (pramāṇa);
- II. KUMĀRILA BHATṬ'S THEORY OF NEGATION
(abhāvapramāṇa);
- III. THE BUDDHIST ANSWER TO KUMĀRILA'S ARGUMENTS;
- IV. THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF NON-PERCEPTION
(anupalabdhi)-
THE NEGATIVE MIDDLE TERM (līṅga);
- V. NEGATION (abhāva) versus NON-PERCEPTION
(anupalabdhi);
- VI. THE THEORY OF NON-APPREHENSION (yogyānupalabdhi)
- VII. THE THEORY OF NON-APPREHENSION (yogyānupalabdhi)
ACCORDING TO PARTHASARATHI MIŚRA;
- VIII. THE NYĀYA VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF VISEŚANĀTA
SANNIKARṢA - THE PERCEPTION OF ABSENCE THROUGH
THE UNIQUE RELATION OF THE QUALIFIER AND THE
QUALIFICAND.

Section I. Negation - as a means of knowledge (pramāṇa)

Now, we come to the problem of the validity of
Negation as an independent Means of Knowledge (pramāṇa).¹

1. The term 'pramāṇa' is not very well defined. It can be taken in the sense of "either (a) the means of knowledge, or (b) the form of cognition, or (c) the means of proof: and it is freely used to express any of these." G. Jhā, Sadholal Lectures, p. 28, quoted by J. Prasad, HIE., p.153;
(continued overleaf.....)

The view of negation as an independent pramāṇa seems to be very old; for in the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra (IX.1.5),¹ according to the Bhāṣya of Praśastpāda,² and in the Nyāya-Sūtra (II.ii.2)³ we find the refutation of negation as a pramāṇa. Subsequently, with the exception of the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā,⁴ all schools of Indian logic rejected this theory.

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see also IP., pp. 43-44; E.Schools., p.335 n.2; Atomism., p.55. Here in this chapter we shall use the term in the first sense (a). It should also be noted here that we shall use the term 'Negation' to express Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's theory of pramāṇābhāva; the term 'Non-apprehension' for the latter Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas' theory of "yogyānupalabdhi" and the term 'Non-perception' for the Buddhist theory of "drśyānupalabdhi" or "anupalabdhi" which is also accepted by the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsakas. But in the quotations of modern writers they may occur as synonyms.

1. VS., IX. I. 5.
2. PBh., p. 225: "abhāvo'py anumānam eva yathotpannam kāryam kāraṇa-sadbhāva-lingam, evaṃ anutpannam kāryam kāraṇāsadbhāva-lingam." Negation also is (not an independent means but merely a form of) Inference; just as the originated effect is a probans for the existence of the cause, so is the not originated effect the probans for the non-existence of the cause. See Faddegon, V. System., p. 483.
3. NS., II.ii.2.
4. Cf. Keith, Atomism., pp. 53-57.

The theory of negation as a *pramāṇa* evidently belongs to the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* system. According to this system there are six valid means of knowledge, namely, (1) Perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference (*anumāna*), (3) Analogy (*upamāna*), (4) Verbal Testimony (*śabda*), (5) Presumption (*arthāpatti*), and (6) Negation (*abhāva*).¹ The *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system admits only the first four while the *Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā*, one of the two branches of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, rejects the last one namely Negation.² The Buddhist logicians accept only the first two *pramāṇas*.³ It is evident from the early texts of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* that it was this school of thought alone which propounded Negation as a *pramāṇa*. Śabarāsvāmin commenting on the *Jaimini-Sūtra* I.i.5. said that "Negation stands for the non-existence (non-operation) of the (five) means of Cognition; and it is what brings about the cognition that 'it does not exist', in regard

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1. See Śl.Vārt., *Codanā-sūtra*, verse 111, p.60 and passim; Hiriyanna, *Essentials*, pp. 141-142.
 2. Cf. *ibid.* pp.99-100, 143; *Atomism*, pp.53-57.
 3. See *Nyāya-praveśa* of Dignāga, p.7: '*pratyakṣam anumānam ca dve eva pramāṇe*'; PV., III.1: '*mānam dvividham meyadvaividhyāt*'; NB., I.3 : '*pratyakṣam-anumānam ca*' NBT., pp.5-6; RN., p.89. According to Buddhist thinkers there are two types of objects of cognitions (*meṃ*), namely, the self-existing extreme particular Real (*svalakṣaṇa*) and mentally constructed Universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa* = *vikalpa*). The former is the only efficient real (*arthakriyākāri*). The latter is considered to be "relative, and therefore unreal, the human mind's imagination". However, it obtains some reality only through a substratum, the point-instant-particular (*kṣaṇa*). See Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol.II, p.40.n.4. On the other hand the Jains, the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsakas* and *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* accept '*sāmānya*' or the Universal as real. Cf. D.Malwaniya, NASVVT., Notes, p. 214.

to things not in contact with the senses".¹ Śabarasvāmin, in fact, endorsed the view propounded by a Vṛttikāra most probably Upavarṣa who had postulated six pramāṇas in the Mīmāṃsā system before Śabara.²

However, since this early Mīmāṃsā view was upheld in constant opposition not only from the fraternal realist schools, namely the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika but also from the Buddhists, Prabhākara could not support Śabara's view. Being convinced that the opponents, particularly the Buddhists were correct, he rejected the traditional view of Negation and recognized the "influence of the new idea".³ Prabhākara in his polemical style declared his dislike of the view in the following statement: "It is said to be a well known fact about the Mīmāṃsakas that (they admit) this (Negation) indeed as the sixth pramāṇa. (Now) the question is: What is this 'well known fact'? (I say) it is (merely) hearsay just as that a 'Yakṣa lives in (this) banyana tree'." Further helplessly Prabhākara argued: "Well, if some of the Mīmāṃsakas do, in fact, recognize (Negation) as an independent means, then, how can I (as a true Mīmāṃsaka) be respons-

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1. Cf. ŚBh., I.i.5, (BI.) p.10: 'abhāvo'pi prāmāṇyābhāvo nāstītyasyārthasyāsannikṛṣṭasy eti'. Translation by Jhā p.16.
 2. See Damodarvishnu Garge, Citations in Śabara-Bhāṣya, p.11.
 3. Cf. Stcherbatsky, BL., I. 389; Jhā, PM.Sources, pp. 160-164.

sible for such a (logical) mistake.' (lit. what can I (we) do about it?)."¹

On the other hand Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in his conservative approach to the problem of Negation, attempted to reject the influence of the opponent's logical theory of Non-perception, namely, the Buddhist view of anupalabdhi. However, the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (as we shall see later on) could not remain immune to the influence of the new idea. They incorporated it into their theory and gave it a new name, i.e., Non-apprehension or yogyānupalabdhi.²

Section II. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Theory of Negation (pramāṇa)

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in his vivid exposition of the Śābara Bhāṣya³ presenting the case of Negation said: "In the case of an object where the five (positive) means of knowledge (pramāṇa) do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object, we have Negation as the sole

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1. Cf. Brhati, pp. 120, 123: 'asti ceyam prasiddhir Mīmāṃsakā-nām saṣṭham kiledam pramāṇam iti.....keyam tarhi prasiddhih? prasiddhir vaṭa-yakṣa-prasiddhivat.' 'yadi tāvat kecin Mīmāṃsakāḥ pramāṇānyatvam manyante tataśca vayam kim kurmah.'
 - See also Sukhlalji Sanghavi, Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā, Notes p.26.
 2. Cf. Ś. Dīpikā., pp. 233-247; infra pp. 184 ff.
 3. See Śl. Vārt., Ab. chapter, pp. 473-492, total verses 59.

means of cognition.¹ And the determination of a distinct object also depends upon the validity of this (Negation) as a means of cognition."² Thus, according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, since 'absence' is an independent object of cognition (prameya or vastu) being unique in its negative nature,³ it cannot be apprehended by the means of knowledge designated to bring about the judgment of objects of a positive nature.

Secondly, in the Mīmāṃsaka's view, negation is conceived as determinative (vastv-asāṅkara). This may be compared with some western thinkers, e.g. Spinoza who said: "Determinatio negatio est."⁴ Kumārila appeals to common-sense and everyday-logic. He argues in a realistic tone of reasoning that unless the validity of the negative

1. Cp. Spinoza: "That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself." Axioms II (concerning God), The Ethics, pt. I, The Works of Spinoza, Vol. II, p. 46.

2. Cf. Śl. Vārt., p. 473, verses 1-2.
 pramāṇapañcakam yatra vasturūpe na jāyate
 vastusattāvabodhārtham tatprābhāvapramāṇatā.
 vastvasaṅkarasiddhiś ca tatpramāṇyasamāśrayā.

Our rendering is based on Jhā's translation but his translation of the phrase 'vastv-asāṅkara' is unsatisfactory, i.e., "the ascertainment of the non-contact of an object". This does not convey the sense of the term 'asāṅkara' = not mixed or distinct.

3. Cf. ibid. verses 45-46; supra pp. 62-63. (1st chapter)

4. See Ledger Wood, PR., Vol. XLII, No. 4, (1933) p. 419.

judgment is admitted "distinction of entities would not be cognized and consequently all selective activity, which makes practical life and conduct possible, would come to cessation."¹

Now, the question arises: How do we determine the validity of a negative judgment and what is the ground of its validity? Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's arguments in which he refutes the opponents' view that the validity of a negative judgment is established through Perception (pratyakṣa) or Inference (anumāna) etc.,² may be summarized as follows:

(A). Perception and Inference etc. are applicable only in cases where a positive (extant) object or fact is to be comprehended. Cognition of an entity can be of two kinds viz., positive and negative. For instance, cognition of a cow is positive in relation to its own nature which is of the form "this is a cow". But the cognition of the cow in relation to a horse is a negative, one which is of the form "this is not a horse." 'Not-horse' or a negative cognition is such a kind of cognition which is not derived

1. Satkari Mookerjee, B. Flux., p. 411.

2. For the Opponents' views see infra pp. 159, 196.

from the sense-contact-object (sannikarṣa);¹ for there is no positive entity to come into contact with the senses. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa argued that contact between sense organ and absence is impossible, "because contact must be either conjunction (saṃyoga) or inherence (samavāya). Conjunction is possible only between two substances, and non-existence is not a substance. Inherence signifies inseparable connexion, and no one can assert that of an organ and non-existence".² Thus the cognition "it is not" cannot be brought about by the senses. The senses are capable of having contact only with the positive form of reality.³

(B) The process of cognizing a negation is purely mental. That is having perceived the presence of the (bare) locus and after remembering the counter-positive (pratiyogin or the negatum), we arrive at a negative judgment that "it is not....". And this cognizing process is not dependent

1. Sannikarṣa or the sense-object-contact is a prerequisite of Perception. For perceiving the absence of an object the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have postulated an unique type of sannikarṣa. Vide. IPP., pp. 75-79; N. Kaust., pp. 135-136; infra pp. 201f.

2. Cf. Keith, Atomism., p. 78.

3. See Śl. Vārt., p. 478, verse 17:

pratyakṣādyavatāras tu bhāvāṃśo grhyate yadā.
vyāpāras-tad-anutpattir abhāvāṃśe jighrṁkṣite.

For the realists' conception of two-fold Reality see supra pp. 35-36, 76.

on (the direct) contact of the sense organs.¹

(C). Nor can Inference (anumāna) be valid in case of a negative cognition because of the want of a logical mark (liṅga) of a negative object. Since a logical mark is recognized only when the invariable concomitance or the universal relation between the logical mark or the middle term and the subject (sādhya) has been established - as in the case of smoke and fire - in the case of a negative cognition no logical mark of the universal relation is possible. If it were possible we would have inferred all cases of negation by cognizing one instance of absence as we can cognize all instances of smoke-fire relation by knowing one instance of that fact.²

(D) Moreover, in the case of the negative cognition of such an entity negation of which has yet never been cognized, e.g. cognition of an antecedent absence (prāgabhāva) of X, the three characters of the mark cannot be established.

1. Cf. ibid. verse 27, p. 482:

grhītvā vastusadbhāvam smṛtvā ca pratiyoginam.
mānasam nāstitājñānam jāyate'kṣānapekṣaṇāt.

2. ibid. verse 34, p. 485.

kasya cid yadi bhāvasya syād abhāvena kenacit.
sambandhadarśanam tatra sarvamānam prasajyate.

And verse 35, p. 486.

grhīte'pi ca bhāvāmṣe naivābhāvena'hyavaṣṭunah.
sarvatra matir ity eva vyabhicārād alingatā.

"The three characters of the mark (trairūpyam liṅgasya) are existence only (never non-existence) in the Subject or thing denoted by the minor term; existence in things which resemble the Subject only (never in things which do not resemble the Subject, i.e. in 'vipakṣas'), and only non-existence (never existence) in things which do not resemble the subject."¹

Thus, the negative cognition i.e. the cognition of an antecedent absence of X must be independent of the inferential judgment.²

(E). Polemically speaking, as in cognizing a positive entity, nothing negative can be the means of its cognition, (if at all it is true) so in the case of cognizing a negative entity (Kumārila posits 'abhāva' as an entity on a par with 'bhāva') nothing positive can be the means of knowledge.³

Hence, according to the theory of Negation of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers "the real absence of the

1. Randle, E.Schools, p.181.

2. ibid. verse 44, p.488:

trilakṣaṇena yā buddhir janyate sānumeṣyate.
na cānutpattirūpasya kāraṇāpekṣitā kvacit.

See also NR. commentary thereon.

3. ibid. verse 46, p.489:

bhāvātmake tathā (read: yathā) meye nābhāvasya pramāṇatā.
tathābhāvaprameya'pi na bhāvasya pramāṇatā.

See also MM., p.132: 'abhāvākhyam pramāṇam syād abhāvasyāva-
bodhakam.'

object becomes cognized by the real absence of all (positive) sources of knowledge."¹ It is maintained that the absence of all sources of knowledge (^{abhāva} ~~manāra~~), being real, ipso facto becomes an independent means of knowledge.

Section III. The Buddhist Answer to Kumārila's arguments.

The strongest opposition to Kumārila's view regarding Negation (pramāṇābhāva) came from the Buddhist logicians led by Dharmakīrti.²

(A) To the primary argument of the Mīmāṃsaka that 'the determination of a distinct object depends upon the validity of Negation corresponding to real absence by which we cognize things as they are and as they are not',³ the Buddhist answer is that distinctness of things does not depend upon Negation as such but on the law of Causality (kāryakāraṇabhāva) and the law of Identity (svabhāva). Dharmakīrti argued that distinct causes (tadatadrūpiṇobhāvās tadatadrūpahetujāh).⁴

1. BL., Vol. I, p. 389.

2. See e.g. PVS., anupalabdhi-cintā section. pp. 29-57; 370-381; PVP., pp. 230-245, 631-641; RN. pramāṇāntarbhāva-prakaraṇam. pp. 89-98.

3. Cf. supra pp. 143 ff.

4. See PVP., p. 313.

(B) Secondly, distinctness of things is governed by the law of Identity (svabhāva). That is, the things are identical with the "Thing-in-themselves" only (sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena sva-svabhāvavyavasthiteḥ).¹ For instance, A is A and not B and vice versa. For, in reality, no two things are identical.

The cognition of the thing, according to the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha or Discrimination, entails apprehension of its identity, i.e., what the thing is and what it is not. According to this theory reality is an unitary particular (niramśa = akhaṇḍa).² Therefore the assertion of A is invariably concomitant (avinābhāva) with the exclusion of all other things that are not A (anyāpoha = vyāvṛtti).³ All functions of Language (śabda) and Reasoning (liṅga) are discriminatory and determinative.⁴ Hence, by the same means of language and reasoning by which we comprehend a positive cognition, a negative cognition is also comprehended.

1. PVS., p.108: sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ. svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām yasmād vyāvṛttibhāgināḥ. (PV., I.42); Karmakagomin thereon 'svabhāvena hi virodho nahi parabhāvena'. Also AS., p.6. (16-17).
2. Kumārila's and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' conception of Reality is pluralistic. They classified several ultimate categories (padārthas) under the two main headings of bhāva and abhāva. See supra pp.35, 76. For the Buddhist theory of Apoha see infra pp.208 f.
3. Cf. PVS, p.139: 'vyāvṛttasvabhāvāḥ bhāvāḥ', and p.251: 'śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha'. See also Apoha section below, p.215.
4. Cf. JN., Apohaprakaraṇa, p.201: 'apohaḥ śabdalingābhyām prakāśyate'. PV., IV.192: 'vyavacchedaphalam vākyaṃ' (PVR, p.582. AS. p.10.

(C) To the other argument of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa that Negation must be admitted as real in itself because all other (positive) means of knowledge end in failure,¹ the Buddhist answer is as follows: The means of knowledge (pramāṇa) perception, etc., (being of) a cognitive form is self-established. But a knowable object (jñeya), e.g. a jar etc., being of a non-cognitive form (jadarūpa) depends on a (cognitive) means for its apprehension. On the other hand, since the absence of knowledge (jñāna) and the absence of the knowable (jñeya) are of (neither) form, absence is not a real particular (viśeṣa). Now, then, the ^{Buddhist} question is: How can it be said (by the Bhāṭṭas) that the absence of knowledge is a self-established fact, and that the absence of the object is determined by the absence of knowledge? Furthermore, since (all) cognitions (in themselves) are not dependent on ^{any} other cognition (i.e., the means) for their apprehension, absence of them (i.e., of cognitions) cannot be of the (inferential) negative form in which the absence of an object is inferred from the perception of the other object (i.e., the bare locus). Only if there is a cognition in the internal stream of thought (svasantāna) it (i.e., the cognition itself) is

1. Cf. supra pp. 448 f.; St. Vārt., Ab. verses 1-2, p. 473.

apprehended, but (when) it is not apprehended it is, indeed, absent there. Thus it is maintained that the absence of cognition is a self-established fact.¹

In other words, on the basis of sense-perception we know intelligibly, that the book is on the table. Similarly, when the book is not present and therefore no sense perception of the object is produced in the intellect, the absence of the cognition of the object is known by the same means. There is no failure of perception as such.

If it were an absence of perception it would require another means to establish it and this would lead to infinite regress.

Section IV. The Buddhist Theory of Non-perception (Anupalabdhi) as the Negative Middle Term.

Having discussed the Buddhist refutation of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka view of Negation, we come to the Buddhist theory

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1. PVST., p.30: 'bodharūpam pratyakṣādikam pramāṇam svata eva sidhyati. jñeyantu ghaṭādikam jaḍarūpatvāt pramāṇam apekṣate. jñānājñeyābhāvayostu nīrūpatvena viśeṣābhāvāt katham jñānābhāvasya svataḥsiddhir jñeyābhāvasya ca jñānābhāvāt siddhirucyate. atha jñānābhāvo nānyena sidhyati. tathā hi jñānānam svasamviditarūpatvenaikajñānasamsargitvābhāvāt. kevalam yadi svasantāne jñānam syād upalabhyetānuālambhādasadeva taditi svata eva jñānābhāvaḥ siddha iṣyate.' viśeṣa = vastu.

negation. It is based on "Non-perception" (anupalabdhi) as the logical mark (līṅga) and "must be referred to the class of inferential cognition."¹

Dharmakīrti postulates three varieties of the logical mark (līṅga) on which all inferential judgments are based. They are: (1) Causation (kārya), (2). Identity (svabhāva), and (3) Non-perception (anupalabdhi).² The first two are to establish real things (vastu-sādhana)³ and the third one, namely, Non-perception is the basis of all negation (pratiśedhahetuḥ).⁴

Among these three logical marks, Dharmakīrti explains the (formula) of Non-perception as follows:

1. BL., vol.I, p.364.
2. PVS., p.20: 'kāryasvabhāvānupalabdhi-lakṣaṇā hetavastrayaḥ' NB.,II.12: 'anupalabdhiḥ svabhāvakāryam vetti.' Stcherbatsky has translated 'anupalabdhi' by "Negation" (BL.II.p.60) but to distinguish between the views of Kumārila and the Buddhists we have here rendered it by 'Non-perception'.
3. Notice here the identification of reality (vastu) with affirmation (vidhi). In Buddhist logic the following terms are used as synonymous: vastu = paramārthasat = svalakṣaṇa = kṣaṇa = ārtakriyākari = vidhi. Cf. BL., Vol.II.p.68 n.3.
4. PVS., (Gnoli's edition), p.2.: ta eta kāryasvabhāvanupalabdhilakṣaṇās trayo hetavaḥ. yathā'gnir atra dhūmat. vṛkṣo'yam śimsapātvāt. pradeśaviśeṣe kvacin na ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ. yadi syād upalabhyasattva eva syān nānyathā. tenopalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasattvasyety uktam bhavati. tatra dvau vastusādhanaḥ ekah pratiśedhahetuḥ. PVST (Rāhula's edition), pp. 20-22. In the two texts there is no potential difference in the passage; only a few words occur in different order. See also NB.,II.19: atra dvau vastusādhanaḥ. ekah pratiśedhahetuḥ.

Thesis. On some particular place there is no jar.

Reason. Because it is not perceived, although the conditions (lakṣaṇa) of perception are fulfilled.¹

In other words the Non-perception becomes the reason of negation with reference to the object capable of being perceived (yuktopalambha).² Non-perception of a non-perceptible (adrśya) is only problematic.³ (saṃśayaheṭu). This definition of the negative middle term provides the fundamental principle governing all formulations of negative judgments which as we shall soon see can be many-fold.

Before going further into the question of the different types of negative judgments it is of interest to know the types of inference posited by Dharmakīrti. Following Dignāga, he classified Inference (anumāna) as two-fold: inference "for one self" (svārthanumāna) and

1. NB., II.13: 'tatrānupalabdhir yathā. na pradeśaviśeṣe kvacid ghaṭaḥ. upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti.' Translation by Stcherbatsky, BL.II.p.61. See also PVST., quoted above p. 158 n.4.

2. PVS., (G.ed.), p.20 verse I. 29:
yuktopalambhasya tasya cānupalambhanam (29)
pratiśedhaheṭuḥ. (R. ed. p.85, I.31).
yuktopalambha = drśya = lakṣaṇaprāpta.

3. Cf. supra 2nd chapter pp.167-178 where this view has already been discussed in detail.

inference "for others" (parārthanumāna).¹ Although the difference between the two is quite clear from these very terms, it is as a matter of fact "very difficult always to distinguish between what belongs to inference as a thought-process and what to its expression in speech, since we cannot deal with the thought-process without expressing it in some way."²

The inference "for others" as explained and defined by Dharmakīrti³ shows an "outward similarity with Aristotle's First Figure",⁴ and therefore should be regarded as the syllogistic form of inference. There are eleven negative forms of the syllogistic inference explained by Dharmakīrti in the Nyāyabindu(NB.).⁵ But it is noteworthy that the Buddhist logician treats the figures of the negative syllogism in the chapter of inference "for one self". The reason for this apparent inconsistency

1. NB.,II.1.2: 'annumānam dvidhā.' (1) 'svārtham parārtham ca.' (2). It should be noted that this two-fold classification of Inference was admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and by the Navya-Nyāya logicians under Buddhist influence. Cf. BL.,Vol.I,pp.292-293; A.Kunst. "The two-membered syllogism", Rocznik Orientalist yerny,vol.XV.pp.72-83.
2. BL.I.p.278.
3. See NB.,III,passim.; PVP., 'pakṣacintā' section,pp.484-495, is very useful for the study of the Buddhist form of the syllogism as against the Nyāya one.
4. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., 278, see also pp. 275 ff.
5. NB.II.31: 'sā ca prayogabhedād ekādaśaprakārā.'

as explained by him, is that "the repeated consideration of Negation through all its different aspects and formulations brings home to us the essence of the Negative Judgment itself."¹ The negative logical mark (pratiṣedha-hetu) has been classified under the three main heads, namely, (1) Existential (or direct and simple) negation (drśya = svabhāvānupalabdhi), (2) Causal negation (kāraṇānupalabdhi), and (3) Negation of a term of a greater Extension (vyāpakānupalabdhi).²

The Buddhist view of negation, viz., Non-perception of a percept (drśya) represents the simple and the first syllogistic formula. It is also named "negation or non-perception of Identity" (svabhāvānupalabdhi), because in this type of negation what is denied is the suggested (āropita) perceptibility (drśyatva); the perceptibility which is identical with the nature of (empirical) reality,

1. *ibid.*, 45: 'prayogadarśanābhyāsāt svayam apy evam vyavacchedapratītir bhavatīti svārthe 'py anumāne' syaḥ prayoganirdēśaḥ.'
vyavaccheda=pratiṣedha. The rendering of the passage is by Stcherbatsky in *BL.*, Vol. I, p. 278. For the literal translation see *BL.*, Vol. II, p. 101.
2. *NB.*, II. 32, 34. 40; *PVS.*, p. 40 and *Kaṇṇakagomin* thereon. These will be quoted and explained below.

i.e., the negatum.¹ Dharmakīrti's texts provide us with another example of this type of the negative syllogism:

Thesis. There is here no smoke.
Reason. Because, [although the totality
 of perceptual conditions is fulfilled], we perceive no smoke.²

The second formula of the causal negation, consists of a "negation of the causes of the denied fact. An example is:

Thesis. There is here no smoke.
Reason. Because there is here no fire."³

There is another formula which may be rightly considered under this head of the causal negation. That is the

1. PVST.pp.38-39: 84-86:

'svabhāvanupalabdhis tu svayamasattaiva.
nātrārthāntarasyābhāvaḥ sādhyate.',
'yuktopalambhasya tasya cānupalambhanam' (PV.,I.31),

and Karṇakagomin thereon: "yukto nyāya upalambho yasya sa tathā dr̥śyasyetyarthaḥ. tasya ceti svabhāvasyānupalambhanam pratishedhaheṭuḥ."

2. PVS. (G.ed.), p.6: "svabhāvāsiddhyā yathā nātra dhūmo'nupalabdheḥ." In R.ed.,p.40 the example has been wrongly rendered by the translator i.e., "...dhūmo vahner anupalambhāt", i.e. there is here no smoke because there is here no fire." Karṇakagomin thereon (p.40), also gives the same reading as that of the G.ed. Cf. also NB.,II.32: 'svabhāvanupalabdhir yathā. nātra dhūma. upalabdhi lakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdher iti. This supports our rendering of the text. asiddhi = anupalabdhi, see Karṇakagomin, ibid.
3. PVS., (G.ed.), p.6: hetvasiddhyā yathā nātra dhūmo'nagneḥ. R.ed. p.40 does not differ in meaning but reads: "...vahny abhāvāt." See also NB.,II.40, 'kāraṇānupalabdhi'. Kāraṇa=hetu and asiddhi=anupalabdhi.

"Negation of an effect" (kāryānupalabdhi). Dharmakīrti describes this formula in the NB.II.33. But in the Pramānavārttika - for reasons to be discussed below - he omitted it.¹ The kāryānupalabdhi is described in the following statement:

"Negation of an effect is as follows.

(Thesis.) There are here no efficient causes producing smoke,

(Reason.) Because there is no smoke."²

In this negative formulation a logical flaw is evident. That is that causes do not necessarily produce certain effects. Fire, for instance, sometimes in collaboration with a wet piece of wood may produce smoke but the production of smoke does not necessarily follow from the mere presence of fire, as e.g. in a red hot iron ball. For this reason Dharmakīrti conditioned the definition by the phrase "absence of such causes whose efficiency has not been interfered with" (apratibaddha-sāmarthyāni kāraṇāni).³

Dharmottara in his commentary⁴ tried to explain away the flaw by further qualifying the definition. He says: "(This method) of negation of an effect is resorted

1. Cf. PVS., (G.) pp. 5-6; R.ed., pp. 39-40.

2. NB., II.33: kāryānupalabdhir yathā. nehāpratibaddhasāmarthyāni dhūmakāraṇāni santi. dhūmābhāvat. Translation p.88.

3. ibid. and Cf. NBT., p.31.

4. ibid.

to in cases where the cause is invisible, because, if it were visible, the method of direct negation (first formula) would have been adopted."¹ The commentator further in a lengthy exposition explains: "(Supposing a man) stands on the roof of a palace wherefrom he fails to perceive the court grounds. He looks at the upper extremities of the walls enclosing the court on its four sides, and at the same time he sees the space which is called the range (*ālōka*) of his sight, free from smoke. Since he is sure that there is no smoke in this space, he must conclude that there is (also) no fire, the efficiency of which to produce smoke is unchecked, in a place wherefrom the smoke would reach the court. The smoke which would be produced by a fire situated in the court would be present in the space (visible to him). Therefore he must conclude that there is no fire in that place."²

1. *ibid.* p.31 12-13: *kāryānupalabdhiś ca yatra kāraṇam adṛśyam tatra prayujyate. drśye tu kāraṇe drśyānupalabdhir eva gamikā. Translation p.88.*
2. *ibid.*, p.31 13-17. *tatra dhavalagrhoparisthito grhāṅgaṇam apaśyannapi caturṣu pārśveṣvāṅgaṇabhittiparyantam paśyati. bhittiparyantasamam cālōkaśamjñakamākāśadeśam dhūmvivikṭam paśyati. tatra dhūmābhāvanīścayād yaddēśasthena vahninā janyamāno dhūmastaddeśaḥ syāt. tasya ca vahnēr apratibaddhasāmāthyasyābhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ. tadgrhāṅgaṇadeśena vahninā janyamāno dhūmas taddēśaḥ syāt. tasmāttaddeśasya vahnēr abhāvaḥ pratipattavyaḥ. Translation p. 88.*

Now, if we compare the situation explained by Dharmottara with that of the formula of the causal negation (kāraṇānupalabdhi)¹ it becomes clear that the second formula, vis., the negation of an effect (kāryānupalabdhi) is, itself, based on the absence of the efficient cause (fire). From Dharmottara's own example of the man who deduces the absence of smoke from the definite knowledge of the absence of fire, it appears that fundamentally there is no difference between these two types of negation. However, following the general practice of an Indian commentator Dharmottara merely tries to defend the author upon whose work he is commenting.

On the other hand, Dharmakīrti himself in the Pramāṇavārttika,² which is evidently a more mature work and may be called his 'masterpiece', points out the logical flaw and instead of the kāryānupalabdhi propounds the kāraṇānupalabdhi. He says:

"Even when there is non-perception of an effect, it does not necessarily follow that its causes must also be the same (i.e., absent or non-perceived). Therefore, the view that from the reason, non-perception of the effect,

1. Cf. supra p. 162 n. 3.

2. PVS., G. ed., p. 5.

absence of its cause is deduced, is not correct.

Hence, the absence (of the effect) is to be deduceable only from the reason, non-perception (i.e., absence) of the cause (or the causal negation). (But it cannot be vice versa)."¹

In other words, an effect (smoke) is related to its cause (fire) by the asymmetrical relation.² "If smoke, then, fire." But we cannot say "if fire, then, smoke". Hence, Dharmakīrti asserted that only from "absence of cause" (kāraṇānupalabdhi) we can infer the "absence of effect" (kāryānupalabdhi); the negative inferential operation cannot be otherwise.

The third main formula, namely, the negation of a term of a greater extension (vyāpaka) is as follows:

"(Thesis). There is here no Aśoka tree,
(Reason). Because there are no trees."³

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1. *ibid.* "kāryānupalabdhaḥ api nāvaśyam kāraṇāni tadvantī bhavantīti tadabhāvaḥ kutaḥ. tasmāt kāraṇānupalabdhir evābhāvam gamayatīti. Kārṇakagomin (PVS., R.ed.), p.38-39 explains: "...abhāvam gamayati kāryasyeti sambandhād gamyate."
 2. Cf. L.S. Stebbing, *Modern Introduction to Logic*, (seventh ed. Reprinted 1958), p.168. ^{vā}
 3. PVS., P.40: etena vyāpakasvabhāvasiddhir uktā. yathā nātra śiṃṣa vrkṣābhāvat. G. ed. has the same reading. The insertion of 'svabhāva' only indicates that this type is also primarily based on the first formula. Also NB., II. 34 where this term is not inserted.

Dharmottara explains: " "Here" is the subject. "No Aśoka", i.e., the absence of such trees, is predicated. "Because there are (altogether) no trees", i.e., the term of greater extension is absent. This is the logical reason. This formula of negation is used when a subordinate term like the Aśoka tree is not being perceived."¹

So far we have discussed three main types of the negative middle term (līṅga) propounded by the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti. But the anupalabdhi or the negative inferential judgment can be further classified according to the difference in its formulation (prayogabhedāt). Dharmakīrti explains: "The Non-perception (anupalabdhi), with these three aforesaid classifications, is further divided in to many varieties. (This) is based on the different types of formulation of the (three), each (expressed) by the Method of Difference (agati), and by the Method of Agreement (or Affirmation) of something incompatible with the fact which is being denied (tadviruddhagati), etc."²

1. NBT., p.32: "atra dharmī. na śiṃśapeti śiṃśapābhāvaḥ sādhyah. vṛkṣasya vyāpakasyābhāvād iti hetuḥ. iyaṃ apy anupalabdhir vyāpyasya śiṃśapātvasya drśyābhāve prayujyate." śiṃśapā = Aśoka. See translation pp.89-90 by Stcherbatsky.
2. PVS., p.86 (PV., I.32):

itīyaṃ trividhāpy uktānupalabdhir anekadhā.
tattadviruddhādyagatibhedaprayogataḥ.

G.ed.p.20, gives the same reading but the verse no. there is 30. The terms 'Method of Difference and the Method of Agreement' we have borrowed from Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol.I, pp.370,375.

"Etc." refers to two further complex negations, viz., "the method of Agreement of 'an incompatible effect'" (viruddhakāryopalabdhi) and of 'an effect of something incompatible with the cause' (Kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi)".¹

Thus, although Dharmakīrti in the Nyāya-Bindu said that the anupalabdhi "has eleven varieties, according to difference of formulation",² in the Pramāṇavārttika - as also rightly observed by Kaṇvakagomin³ - he admitted only eight varieties.

The eight varieties are as follows.


1. PVST., p.86 Kaṇvakagomin, : "ādiśabdāt viruddhakāryopalabdhiḥ kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhiś ceti."

2. NB., II.31:
sā ca prayogabhedād ekādaśaprakārā.
Translation, p.86.

3. PVST., p.86:
tatra tadagatyā tisro'nupalabdhayah saṅgrhītāḥ
svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ kāraṇānupalabdhiḥ vyāpakānupalabdhiśca
tadviruddhagatyā tisra eva. svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhiḥ
kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhiḥ vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiś ca.
ādiśabdāt viruddhakāryopalabdhiḥ kāraṇaviruddhakāryopal-
abdhiś ceti. evaṃ aṣṭavidhasya prāguktasyānupalambhasya
saṅgraho bhavati.

TABLE No. V.

The Table of Eight Negative Formulae (anupalabdhi)



- (1) "The Affirmation of something incompatible with the fact which is being denied (svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi). For example: (Thesis). There is here no sensation of cold.

(Reason). Because there is fire."¹

- (2) "The Affirmation of a fact incompatible with the causes of something (kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi). For example: (Thesis). He betrays no symptoms of cold, such as shivering etc.

(Reason). Because there is an efficient fire near him."²

- (3) "The Affirmation of something incompatible with a fact of greater extension (vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi). For example: (Thesis). There is here no sensation produced by snow.

(Reason). Because there is fire."³

1. NB.,II.35: svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhir yathā. nātra śītasparśo'gner iti. Translation p.90 PVST.,p.39.
2. NB.,II.41: kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhir yathā. nānya romaharṣādiviśeṣāḥ. sannihitādaḥanaviśeṣatvād iti. Translation p.97.
3. NB.,II.39: vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhir yathā. nātra tuṣārasparśo'gner iti. Translation p.96. PVS.,p.39.

- (4) "The Affirmation of an incompatible effect
(viruddhakāryopalabdhi).

For example: (Thesis). There is here no sensation
of cold.

(Reason). Because there is smoke."¹

- (5) "The Affirmation of an effect of something incompatible with the cause (kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi).

For example: (Thesis). In this place nobody exhibits symptoms of cold,
such as shivering etc.,

(Reason). Because there is smoke."²

However, the Buddhist reaffirmed³ his position that all objects which are affirmed and ~~or~~ denied refer to "possibilities of perception."⁴ Dharmakīrti said: "And everywhere in this Non-perception (anupalabdhi) which establishes negation (and negative behaviour), the things whose negation (is expressed through the method of) denial and (through the method of) affirmation of the

1. NB.II.36: viruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā. nātra śītasparśo dhūmād iti. Translation p.91. PVS,p.39.
2. NB.II.42: kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhir yathā. na romaharṣādiviśeṣayuktapuruṣavān ayam pradeśo dhūmād iti. Translation p.98. PVS.,p.41
3. Cf. supra. p.159.
4. NB.,II.46. Translation p. 102.

[things] incompatible with them (tadviruddhānām), must be understood exclusively as perceptible by (their own) nature (drśyātmanām eva)."¹

The similarity of this theory with that of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas may also be affirmed from the following exposition in the Naya-viveka:

"It is said that there is cognition of absence (tad-) when the senses are inactive [i.e. when there is no ^{sense-contact between the} sense-organ and the (expected) sense-object]. For there is no invariable concomitance between the existence of a perceptible thing and perception ^[i.e. there may be presence of perception] and absence of the perceptible. In that case the presence of perception itself becomes the absence]. Therefore, the absence of perception [functions as] the reason (in an inference). Thus the cognition of the absence of a thing is an inference ² [based on a negative perception]."

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1. PVS., G.ed., p.6. sarvatra cāsyām abhāvasādhanyām anupalabdau drśyātmanām eva teṣāmtadviruddhānām ca siddhir asiddhiś ca veditavyā. R.ed., p.40 reading is faulty. See Karnakagomin thereon which does not correspond with R. but with G.ed.
 2. Naya-Viveka, pp.166-167; indriyoparama ca taddhīr uktā. na ca drśyasattā darśanena vyāpteti darśananivṛttiliṅgād drśyābhāvadhīr anumā. See also S. Dīpikā., pp. 244-245.

Thus according to this view of Non-perception, "every judgment positive or negative is in the end existential".¹ And, here, we may conclude that in this theory "every perception consists in a perception preceded by a non-perception of the same object, that is to say, by the absence of its own hypothetical visibility, not by non-perception simply, not by non-perception of something absolutely invisible."²

Section V. Negation (abhāva) versus Non-Perception (anupalabdhi)

It has been stated above³ that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in allegiance to the Mīmāṃsāka tradition postulated Negation as an independent means (pramāṇa) of cognizing an objective negative entity (vastu = prameya). Also it has been demonstrated above⁴ that the Buddhists and the Prābhākaras, contrary to the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, admitted negation only as an inferential judgment based on the Non-perception of a perceptible entity (dṛśyānupalabdhi). These two prominent

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1. Cf. Principles of Logic, Vol.I (1922 ed.), p.115.
 2. Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol.I. p.382.
 3. vide supra, pp. 150-153.
 4. vide supra pp. 157-166.

theories are diametrically opposed to each other.

Their differences may be summarized in the following table.

<u>Negation</u> (abhāvapramāṇa) according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa	<u>Non-perception</u> (anupalabdhi) according to the Buddhists & the Prābhākaras
1. Negation = non-Ens (padārtha);	1. Negation = non-perception of a perceptible (dṛśya);
2. Real absence is to be estab- lished (abhāvaprameyasiddhi);	2. A suggested perception is to be negated (dṛśyasamāropaniṣedha);
3. Determinatio (est/negatio) (vastvasamkarasiddhirabhāva- pramāṇatā);	3. Things are distinct by the " <u>Thing-in-themselves</u> " (svabhāva-svalaksane- na vyavasthiteh);
4. Since no other (positive) means can cognize real absence, Negation is the means of cog- nizing its own corresponding entity (abhāvo'bhāvena mīyate).	4. Non-perception is the reason of negation and the negative behaviour (anupalabdhirabhāvavyavah- ārasādhikā pratiṣedha- etuh).

However, it is an astonishing fact that some modern writers whom we shall presently quote here, have ascribed the theory of anupalabdhi to Śabara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

S.N.Dasgupta writes: In addition to the four positive pramāṇas, Kumārila admits a fifth kind of pramāṇa, viz., anupalabdhi for the perception of the non-existence of a thing.¹

1. HIP., Vol. I, p. 397.

J. Sinha calls his section on the abhāva theory of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā "Non-apprehension (anupalabdhi)". He quotes Śabarasvāmin¹ and observes: "Śavara recognizes non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as an independent pramāṇa, and defines it as the absence of any means of valid knowledge, which cognizes the non-existence of an object, which is not present to a sense-organ."² In another section the same author writes: "Kumārila holds that the non-existence of a jar on the ground is known by non-apprehension (anupalabdhi)."³

S. Radhakrishnan observes: "Kumārila, after the Vṛttikāra, admits non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as an independent source of knowledge."⁴

These scholars have been wrong in ascribing the use of the term "anupalabdhi" to Śabara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. I consider it important to point this out here. For, as we shall see below, it misrepresents the development of the rival theories, viz., of the Buddhists and Prabhākara as against the views of Kumārila. My arguments are as follows:

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1. Śbh., I.i.5. Quoted above p. 147n.1.
 2. HIP., Vol. I, p. 789.
 3. ibid., p. 309.
 4. IP., (1948), Vol. II, p. 394.

(1). Dasgupta is wrong in stating that "Kumārila admits a fifth kind of pramāṇa, viz., anupalabdhi". I have not come across any work of Kumārila where Negation is mentioned as the fifth pramāṇa. Unfortunately Dasgupta gives no reference in support of his opinion.¹ While the available texts of Kumārila and other writers of the system mention "abhāva" only as the sixth pramāṇa (ṣaṣṭham kiledam pramāṇam).² The author himself in the Ślokavārttika propounds it in addition to the five (positive) pramāṇas (pramāṇa-pañcakam) yatra vasturūpe na jāyate. vastusattāvabodhārtham tatrābhāva-pramāṇatā).³ And as we see in the passage the term "anupalabdhi" does not occur.

(2). The two terms, namely, 'anupalabdhi' and 'abhāva' as we have already mentioned above⁴ correspond to two entirely different theories of negation. At least in the early writings of the Mīmāṃsā system we find no mention of the term 'anupalabdhi'. G.Jhā in his 'Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources', although he translated the term 'abhāvapramāṇa' by

1. Cf. Dasgupta, op.cit.

2. Brhati-rjuvimalā, p.120; Śl.Vārt., Ab.chapt. p.473,verse 1: Primer., p.57; Atomism., p.57.

3. Śl.Vārt., op.cit. See also supra pp.

4. Cf. supra p.174

"non-apprehension", did not use the term 'anupalabdhi'.¹
Neither Śabara nor Kumārila used this term to express their theory.²

(3) An edition of the text of the Sāstra-Dīpikā³ might have been the cause of this mistake. For in this text the heading on the pages of the section concerning 'abhāva' has been printed as "anupalabdhi-nirūpaṇam"⁴ which apparently seems to be an error of the editor. For in the text itself, the section (p.233) begins with the quotation of Śabarabhāṣya (I.1.5) "abhāvo'pi pramāṇābhavaḥ..." and it ends (p.247) with the words "ity abhāvavādaḥ" or "here ends the section on Negation". A commentary thereon called "Yukti-snehaprapūraṇi" by Pravararāmakṛṣṇa also has the same ending.⁵ Radhakrishnan refers to this text of the Sāstra-dīpikā.⁶

(4) However, Pārthasārathi Miśra seems to be the first Mīmāṃsaka author who introduced the term 'anupalabdhi' in his system. Defending Kumārila's view point against

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1. PM. Sources., pp.163-165.
 2. Śbh.,op.cit.; Śl.Vart., Ab. Chapt. passim.
 3. Sāstra-Dīpikā Chow. S. Series, No.188. Benares 1916, ed. by Laxman Shastri Dravid.
 4. ibid.,pp.233-247.
 5. ibid., p.247.
 6. IP.,op.cit.

the criticisms of the Buddhists and Prabhākara, Pārthasārathi said: "If somewhere a thing is non-existent, then perception and the other means, which manifest objects of a positive character, fail to function, even though all the accessories for the manifestation (of such positive existences are present) and this non-manifestation which may be styled by the alternative names of *drśyādarśana* (non-perceived) and *yogyānupalambha* (non-cognized though capable of being cognized) is termed *pramāṇābhāva* in the Bhaṣya (of Śabarāswāmī)."¹ Later on (pp.240-242) Pārasthasārathi used the term '*yogyānupalabdhi*' as synonymous with '*abhāvapramāṇa*'.² But this use of the term *yogyānupalabdhi* by Pārthasārathi, as we shall investigate in the next section, should be regarded as a concession to the Buddhists and Prabhākara.

(5) It seems that up to the time of Śālikanātha Miśra (800 A.D.), the view of '*yogyānupalabdhi*' was unknown

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- Pārthasārathi*
1. op.cit., p.234: *yatra tvasadrūpeṇa vartate tatra sad-rūpeṇa bodhakānām pratyakṣādīnām sadrūpabodhanāyotpattum योग्यत्वे सत्यपि यो'नुत्पदो द्रश्यदारśana-yogyānupalambhādi-paryāyo bhāṣye pramāṇābhāvaśabdenoktaḥ. Cf. the Translation by Venkatramiah, p.112.*
 2. *ibid.*, pp. 240-243.

to the opponents. For Śālikanātha, presenting Prabhākara's view against Kumārila and his followers, does not mention the terms 'anupalabdhi' and 'yogyānupalabdhi',¹ when discussing the latter's theory. Ratnakīrti (c.A.D.1025)² and Śrīdhara, of the same period, criticising the Bhāṭṭa theory of negation, do not refer to it by this term.³

(6) On these grounds we may conclude that the early Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā philosophers, namely, Śābarasvāmī and Kumārila Bhāṭṭa did not postulate a theory of negation called 'Non-perception' or 'Non-apprehension' (anupalabdhi or yogyānupalabdhi).

Later philosophers, such as Pārthasārathi Miśra, under the influence of Buddhist logic modified and revised the original Bhāṭṭa theory of Negation. It is this modified theory of the later Mīmāṃsakas which, to a certain extent, was adopted by the Navya-Nyāya logicians⁴ and in modern publications is frequently described by the term 'anupalabdhi'.

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1. pp.,p.118: 'ye punar abhāvākhyam pramāṇam icchanti tat-pratibodhanāya...'. Moreover, to explain (bodhanāya)(the Prabhākara theory of negation) to those scholars who wish to posit Negation (as an independent) means (we say...)..
 2. RN., 'pramāṇāntarbhāva' section.pp.92,97-98.
 3. NK.,pp.227-228: 'abhāve'bhāvenaiva paricchidyate iti na buddhyāmahe (p.227).
 4. Cf.N.Kaust.,pp.160-163 where even Gaṅgeśa (manikṛt) has been quoted as recognizing yogyānupalabdhi with his own interpretation. The difference between the neo-logicians and the Bhāṭṭas lies in the fact that the former regard it as only subsidiary cause of perception of non-existence while the later insist that it is an independent means and thus the primary cause of cognizing abhāva as an entity. See also Atomism.,pp. 78-79.

Section VI

The Theory of Non-Apprehension (Yogyānupalabdhi)

In the previous section, we tried to show that the theory of Non-apprehension (yogyānupalabdhi) was propounded by a later Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka, philosopher, most probably by Pārthasārathi Miśra. Now, we propose to investigate this theory on the basis of the writings of the later Bhāṭṭas and the neo-Naiyāyikas. In the present section we shall see (1). the extent of the Buddhist influence on the Bhāṭṭas, (2). an interpretation of the term 'yogyānupalabdhi' suggested by Pārthasārathi in order to maintain it as the original theory of Negation (pramāṇābhāva), and (3). the view of yogyānupalabdhi as it is accepted by the neo-Naiyāyikas.

The theory of yogyānupalabdhi of the later Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas is as follows.

(A) Pārthasārathi explains: "The basis (or reason-kāraṇa) of the cognition of absence is the non-perception of the perceptible fact (dr̥śya). (Now, what is this non-perception?). Non-perception is, (in fact), the absence of (sense)-perception."¹ However, what is involved in the cognition of an absence is not 'just' a non-perception. The operation of a negative judgment

1. S.Dīpikā, p.236: dr̥śyādarśanam abhāvajñāna-kāraṇam, adarśanam ca darśanābhāvaḥ.

is described by Gāgābhaṭṭa in the following terms:

"The cognition of the absence of a jar etc. [is brought about] by the absence of (sense)-perception, inasmuch as the presence of the counter-positive is implied in the negation [absence of perception]. Thus, the absence of the jar is cognised in the form [of the following proposition]: (There is no jar here). If there were a jar, it would be visible."¹

In other words, Gāgābhaṭṭa points out two important factors conditioning a negative cognition, (1). The necessity of delimiting a Non-perception by a counter-positive whose presence is a possible subject of judgment. (2). the suggestion of presence of the counter-positive, or to use the Russellian phraseology, "a propositional attitude"² towards the counter-positive is necessary. That is either we doubt the presence of the negatum in the space-time relation, or we desire it to be present there. Thus, if and only if there is a suggestion of its presence, - which is a possibility in the

1. B.Cin., p.47: ghaṭābhāvādijñānam darśanābhāvena pratiyogisattva-prasañjana-prasañjitapratiyogikena yadi ghaṭaḥ syāt tadā drśyetyākārakeṇa ghaṭābhāvo jñāyate. Compare with Gaṅgeśa's view, N.Kaust., p.161: 'anupalabdhyau योग्यातां चाप्रतियोगिसत्त्वा-प्रसाñजिता-प्रतियोगिकतत्त्वरूपा पारिभाषिकी.' Gāgābhaṭṭa is evidently under the influence of the Navya-Nyāya logic.

2. Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, (1956, 5th imp.) pp.291,294.

case of a jar - its Non-apprehension (yogyānupalabdhi) forms the basis of the cognition of its absence.¹

Now, if we compare this interpretation of yogyānupalabdhi with that of drśyānupalabdhi of the Buddhists² we find no logical difference. The Buddhist theory of drśyānupalabdhi means the cognition of absence of a perceptible fact deduced from the reason (liṅga) of its Non-perception. By perceiving the bare ground, e.g. the hypothetical perceptibility of the jar is negated.³ However, a point of difference between the two theories still remains and that is that according to the Buddhist view this judgment is only inferential while according to the Bhāṭṭa tradition it should be regarded as an independent means of judgment.⁴

(B) The logical weight of the Buddhist theory that negation is an inferential judgment cannot be denied by the later Bhāṭṭas. Pārthasārathi found it difficult to reject the theory entirely. However, arguing against the Buddhists, he indicates his willingness to meet the opponent half-way. He proposes to admit an inferential character of negation provided the Buddhist agrees to the Bhāṭṭa's point of view that the primary cause of cognizing an 'abhāva' is ^{not} the perception

1. Cf. Gāgābhaṭṭa, loc.cit., 'yogyānupalabdhiś ca darśanayogyasyādarśanam.

2. Cf. supra pp. 157ff.

3. See supra pp. 84-89.

4. Cf. supra pp. 174-180.

of the bare locus - as propounded by the Buddhists but the non-apprehension (or non-perception) of the counter-positive.¹

As far as the position of Gāgābhaṭṭa is concerned it is evident that he sees no significance in recognizing negation as a separate means of knowledge (pramāṇa). In allegiance to the Bhāṭṭa traditional view of Negation he first states Non-apprehension or *yogyānupalabdhi* as an independent means.² But afterwards when describing its operation he explicitly observes that the logical formula of non-apprehension is similar to that of Inference (*anumitiriva*).³ In the end Gāgābhaṭṭa expresses his own view in the following words:

"As a matter of fact we (I) do not conceive any (real)

1. S. Dīpikā. p. 245: ^kato' vaśyam kvaçit pramāṇāntarabhūṭayānupalabdhyaḥ pratyetyaḥ, pramite ca tasmin paścād bhavatyānumānam.
 2. B. Cin., p. 47: 'siddham abhāvagrāhakaṁ anupalabdhirūpaṁ mānāntaram'.
 3. ibid. 'atra pratiyogipratyakṣābhāvaḥ karaṇam. anumitirivāntaravyāpārah. abhāvajñāna-phalam.'
- Compare this with the first negative formula of Dharmakīrti, supra p. 157 antaravyāpāra = logical formula or operation of the intellect.

difference between Presumption (arthāpatti)¹ and Non-apprehension (anupalabdhi), and the difference of the two from Inference (anumāna)."²

Thus we may conclude that this interpretation of the theory of non-apprehension (yogyānupalabdhi) reduces it to a mere negative form of inference which is equivalent to the Buddhist theory of Non-perception (anupalabdhi).³

Section VII

The Theory of Non-apprehension (yogyānupalabdhi)

According to Pārthasārathi Miśra.

Pārthasārathi Miśra explains the term yogyānupalabdhi in terms of the "non-manifestation of a valid or compatible means" (yogyapramāṇābhāva = yogyasya pramāṇasyānudayaḥ).⁴

1. The Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta systems recognize Presumption (arthāpatti) as a separate means of knowledge (pramāṇa). "The stock example of this is the inference, 'Devadatta, though he is fat, does not eat during the day, and therefore must eat at night.' The Nyāya formulates the proposition as a purely negative inference." - Keith, Atomism. p.121. See also Sinha, HIP., Vol. I. pp.308-309.
2. loc.cit., 'vastutas tvarthāpattyanupalabdhyaḥ anyonyabhedam, anumānāc ca bhedam nākalayāmaḥ.'
3. Cf. supra pp.157ff.
4. S. Dīpikā, p.239: yogyapramāṇābhāvaścābhāvajñānakāraṇam na pramāṇābhāvamātram, yogyasaiva pramāṇasyānudayaḥ.

This interpretation is advanced to maintain an independent character of it as a means of cognizing absence, and to answer the following objections.

(1) The theory of Non-apprehension of a perceptible object (yogyānupalabdhi) cannot be valid in cases where the locus is not perceptible even though the object of negation may be perceptible. For instance, a person who wishes to ascertain if his ring is to be found in a dark room searches with his hands all around the room and because he has (presumably) searched the whole room, believes that the ring is not there. For him there is certainly a non-apprehension of a perceptible object, i.e. the ring. However, a doubt remains whether all parts of the room have been searched or whether any part has been left unsearched. Thus, in such cases since the yogyānupalabdhi is not positively established, in spite of its (indubitable) existence, one cannot conclude that the thing (ring) is not there (present).¹

(2) Furthermore, sometimes believing that the search was thorough, even though it was not, one is convinced that there is Non-apprehension of the perceptible (yogyānupalabdhi).

1. Ibid., p.241: yo'ngulīyakabubhutsayā sasantamasāpavaraka-deśam hastābhyām sarvataḥ parāmr̥ṣṭavān tasya tāvat sarvadeśa-parāmr̥śād vastuto yogyānupalabdhir jātaiva, atha ca kim sarvo deśaḥ parāmr̥ṣṭaḥ kimvā kaścid deśo na parāmr̥ṣṭo'pi syād iti sandihāno yogyānupalabdher anīścayāt satyām api tasyām nāngulīyakasyābhāvam avadhārayati.

Erroneously, in such cases, one asserts the absence of the thing (ring). Hence it can be argued that the *yogyānupalabdhi* as the means of cognizing "non-existence" can be admitted only with the condition that first its own validity is established. And if that be the case we would have to postulate another negative means (or *yogyānupalabdhi*) to establish the first *yogyānupalabdhi* and so on and so forth. This would lead to infinite regress.¹

(A) Pārthasārathi Miśra retorted that what is meant by the term *yogyānupalabdhi* is the "non-manifestation of a valid (or compatible) means of judgment (*yogyapramāṇānudayaḥ*) in the case of cognizing an absence".² Since the object of cognition (*prameyam*) is a negative one, e.g. the absence of a jar etc., and there is non-manifestation of a (positively) valid means, Non-apprehension ipso facto becomes the means

1. Ibid., kadācittu sarvato'parāmrśyāpi sarvataḥ parāmrṣṭam iti bhrāntyā yogyānupalabdhim niścityāsatyām eva tasyām bhrāntyāṅguliyaḥ kasyābhāvam avadhārayati. tasmā jñātātayaiva yogyānupalabdhirābhāvajñānakāraṇam ityābhyupagantavyam tathā cānavasthāprasangaḥ.

2. Ibid. p.241.

(bodhaka) of cognition by its very existence.¹ Its validity is not to be established as is the case with the instruments of perception, e.g. the eyes etc.,² The eyes do not depend on another instrument for their own ascertainment. For if an instrument of cognition were to be dependent on some other instrument for its own ascertainment, it would again lead to the regressus ad infinitum (anavasthā syāt).³

1. Ibid. ghaṭādy abhāvo'sti prameyam, yogyapramāṇānūdayaśca, tasya sattāmātreṇaiva netrādiva bodhako na jñataya, yato' navasthā syāt.

D.Venkatramaiah, has translated 'yogyapramāṇānūdayaḥ' by "The non-manifestation of a pramāṇa in relation to a Viśaya (object) which is capable of being perceived (yogya)". Translation p.118. We disagree with his rendering for it misrepresents the very intention of the present argument. We understand the passage as "non-manifestation of the (positive) means (pramāṇa) which is compatible (yogya) in cases of positive fact only and therefore in case of a negative fact it is non-manifested)." Cf. S.Dīpikā. pp. 234, 238-9 'yogyapramāṇābhāvaścābhāvajñānakāraṇam', 'yogyasyaiva pramāṇasyanūdayaḥ'.

2. It may be asked whether the ascertainment of my eyes is self-evident or is an inferential judgment. That is of the form: Thesis: my eyes are normal and valid for the operation of direct perception. Reason, because I see (or can see) through them normally in all normal perceptual conditions.
3. For a detailed study of "Logical Errors" by Indian logicians, see Keith, Atomism., pp.131-157, and particularly for the conception of the regressus ad infinitum (anavasthā) p.156 of the same.

However, to repudiate the objections raised by the opponents¹ Pārthasārathi says that it is not the compatibility or validity (yogyatva) of the yogyānupalabdhi which is to be ascertained but rather of the positive means, Perception etc., for in case of the former yogyatva lies in the fact of non-manifestation of the positive means. In comprehending an absence (abhāva) when the compatible means of judgment does not operate, its failure ipso facto forms the compatibility (yogyatva) of Non-apprehension. Thus the validity of Non-apprehension "even while present, not being apprehended sometimes, fails to establish the knowledge of the non-existent: and sometimes yogyatva even while not present establishes the knowledge of the non-existent being through illusion taken as actually existing. The absence of cognition (i.e. anupalabdhi), however, becomes the instrument of knowledge by its mere being and not by the fact of its being known; so that it (our position) is not liable to the charge of infinite regress."²

1. Cf. supra pp.

2. Ś.Dīpikā, p.242: yogyānupalambho hi kāraṇam tatra yogyatvam jñātātayaiva kāraṇam na sattāmātreṇa, tataḥ sadeva yogyatvam kadācid ajñātam nābhāvam avadhārayati, kadācit tv avidyamāna-meva yogyatvam bhrāntya niścityābhāvam avadhārayati. upalābdhy abhāvastu sanmātratayā kāraṇam na jñātātayā tena nānavasthāpattir iti sarvam avadātam. Translation by Venkatramaiah, p.120.

(B) Thus, according to the Bhāṭṭas, the importance of perception, in the case of Non-apprehension is not to be rejected altogether. The totality of conditions of perception must be fulfilled first, and only, then, Non-apprehension can operate in cognizing non-existence. This is expressed by the term 'yogya' referring to 'pramāṇa'. The *yogyatā* of perception (*pramāṇa*) involves the sense-contact with the (empty) locus and the cognition of perceptibility of the object. These two conditions are the basis of Non-apprehension or non-manifestation of perception which leads to the cognition of non-existence. If the term '*yogyānupalabdhi*' were not explained in these terms, namely 'the Non-apprehension of a compatible means (*yogyapramāṇābhāva*)' but taken only as 'the Non-apprehension of a perceptible object', then, the difficulty would arise that a blind man, too, would apprehend non-existence of a perceptible object by mere Non-apprehension. Therefore, the totality of conditions of perception is necessary.¹

1. N.Kaust., p.159: 'na caivam andhasyāpi ghaṭādy anupalābhisatvād ghaṭādy abhāvapratīty āpattir iti vācyam, abhāvagrahe dhikarāṇa-pratīyogijñānāyor hetutayā tadartham cakṣurādyapekṣanāt. janakasampādakatvenānyathāsiddhatayendriyasyābhāvagrahe hetutvāsambhavāc ca. na ca bhūtaḥ ghaṭābhāvam paśyāmītyādyanubhāvānurodhenendriyasyābhāvajñāna-janakatvam iti vācyam, ghaṭo nāstīti jñāmītyādyākarakānubhāvena tādrśānubhāvāsiddher iti (vadanti Bhāṭṭānuyāyinaḥ). 'anyathāsiddha = accessory cause, see Atomism., p.199.

However, since the perception of the locus and perceptibility of the object are (only) accessory causes (anyathāsiddha) of creating and composing the cognition of non-existence, there is no possibility of its being apprehended through the sense-perception. The primary cause of negative cognition, the Bhāṭṭa would insist, is Non-apprehension of perception, i.e., a negative one. A statement: "I see the absence of a pot on the floor", is not to be regarded as logically correct. The correct proposition, according to the Bhāṭṭas is: "I know that there is no pot (on the floor)". (cf. p. 149 n. 2)

From this it may be concluded that this interpretation of the theory, namely, the Non-apprehension of a valid perception (yogyapramāṇāupalabdhi), ipso facto becomes an independent means, seems merely an attempt on the part of the later Bhāṭṭas to be in keeping with the view of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who said that Negation was absence of a (positive) means of cognition.¹

1. Cf. supra p. 149 n. 2.

However, the main defect of this interpretation is quite evident inasmuch as it can repudiate only perceptibility being ascribed to non-existence but it cannot deny its inferential character. Since the totality of conditions of perception (yogyatā) is admitted, it would be quite correct to regard it as an inferential cognition in which by perceiving one term we infer the other which, although invisible or absent, can be visible. For instance, by perceiving the bare locus, yogyatā of perception is ascertained, and from this the absence of a pot can be inferred. Thus, this interpretation of the theory of yogyānupalabdhi also fails to establish a real difference between Non-apprehension as an absence of perception and Non-perception (anupalabdhi) as an inference.¹

1. See supra pp. 183, 184 n. 2.

Section VIII

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Viśeṣanātā Sannikarṣa

Or the Perception of Non-existence through the unique Relation of Qualifier and Qualificand.

The Bhāṭṭa theory of Negation, namely, that 'abhāva' is an independent means (pramāṇa) of negative cognition, is also opposed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians. The Buddhist and the Prābhākara theory we have already discussed above.¹ They regard negation as an inferential judgment.² Jains logicians also opposed the Bhāṭṭa's view and propounded a theory of Non-perception (anupalabdhi) which is somewhat similar to the Buddhist and the Prābhākara view of anupalabdhi.³ Here, in the present section, we propose to investigate the question of the means of cognizing 'non-existence' according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of perception (sannikarṣa). Here we shall see (1) to what extent the later Vaiśeṣika thinkers deviated from Praśastapāda, and joined the Nyāya system on this question, (2) the necessity to postulate an unique relation (viśeṣanātā) between absence and its locus, in

1. Cf. supra pp. 87-89, 157-158.

2. See HIE., pp. 287-288; pp. 120-125; N. Theory of Knowledge, pp. 179-180; NASVVT., Notes, p. 229.

3. Cf. NASVVT., pp. 62-73; N. Vinīścaya by Akalaṅka, Vol. II, pp. 190-195; Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā by Hemachandra, pp. 8-9.

order to establish the perceptual character of negation, and (3) an exhaustive table of formulae suggested by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians with a view to cover all types of negative cognitions by perception.

The syncretized Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, including the neo-Nyāya, maintains that the cognition of non-existence (abhāva) is a perceptual judgment. They argue:

(A)

"Since we have such everyday experiences as "I have seen that there is really no jar on the floor," the sense-perception is invariably proved to be valid (ananyathāsiddha) by affirmative (anvaya) as well as negative (vyatireka) instances of perceiving absence. Therefore, it is (quite) correct to posit that (the cognition of) abhāva is perceptual and produced by the sense-organs".¹

However, this sense-perception should not be regarded as a simple or indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa).

1. N.Kaust., p.159; 'vastuto bhūtale ghaṭo nāstīti mayā dr̥ṣṭam ity anubhavād indriyasyānanyathāsiddhānvaya-vyatireka-vaśac cendriyajanyam pratyakṣam evābhāvasya yuktaṃ.' Notice the use of the terms 'anvaya-vyatireka' in the ordinary sense of affirmation and negation (vidhi-niṣedha) but not in the inferential sense, viz., similar and dissimilar instances of example. See also Pbh., and NK., pp.205-206, where the term 'vidhi' is used in the sense of 'anvaya' and PVS., pp. 35-38 where the terms 'vidhi' and 'niṣedha' are used in the sense of 'anvaya-vyatireka'. For the inferential conceptions of the terms see Atomism, pp.118-120.

For negation is dependent on that X of which it is the negation. The perception of something positive, e.g. 'pot', can be simple for by its very nature, it does not depend on some other entity. But since there is no "innate nature" (svarūpa) of absence other than that of its being the negation of the counter-positive (pratiyogin), it cannot be perceived unless the nature of the negatum has not been determined.¹ This view, although on a different level, may be compared with Russell's theory that 'not' does not belong to the class of "object-words" but to "propositional words".²

(B)

Praśastapāda does not recognize abhāva as an entity (padārtha). He denies that it is an independent means of knowledge (pramāṇa) on the ground that it is an inferential judgment. Praśastapāda argues:

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1. NK. p.226: 'yuktam ghaṭādīnām indriyasannikarṣānnirvikalpena grahaṇam teṣām svarūpasya parānapekṣatvāt abhāvasya tu pratiṣedhasvabhāvasya svarūpameva yasyāyameva pratiṣedhaḥ syāt tadadhīnam, atas tatpratiṣedhatām antarena tadabhāvasya svarūpāntarābhāvāt tatrāsyā pratiyogisvarūpa-nirūpaṇamantar-ena nirūpaṇam aśakyam'.

"The grasping by vague perception, in consequence of a connection with the sense-organs, is possible for pots &c., because things like these do not depend in their innate nature on something else. But the innate nature of non-existence, having negation as innate character, is dependent on that whose negation it is. Therefore (scil.) since there is no other innate nature of non-existence than that of its being the negation of the (positive entity in question) no determining of it is possible without the determining of the innate nature of its pratiyogin (correlative object)."

Translation by Faddegon, V. System, p.485.

2. Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, pp.70-74.

"Negation is merely (a form of) inference, just as the originated effect is a probans for the existence of the cause, so is the not originated effect the probans for the non-existence of the cause."¹

In other words, when an effect, e.g. the cognition of the object A is produced in the intellect, on the basis of the law of causality, we deduce from it the presence of its cause, i.e., the object A which produces the corresponding cognition. Thus on the same basis of the causality, when the effect (i.e. the cognition in this given instance), is not produced, we invariably can deduce the absence of the corresponding cause (i.e. the object), granting that the totality of the causes of producing a cognition is present.²

(C)

However, Praśastapād's view that negation is an inferential judgment, was ignored by the commentator Srīdhara who said:

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1. PBh., p.225: 'abhāvo'py anumānam eva yathotpannam kāryam kāraṇa-sadbhāve liṅgam eva anutpannam kāryam kāraṇāsadbhāve liṅgam.'
 2. This theory is similar to the Buddhist view of the negative inference (anupalabdhi or Non-perception). See supra pp. . This point also supports the theory of Buddhist influence on Praśastapāda. Cp. Keith, Atomism., pp.101-108; Sinha, HIP., Vol. I. pp.292-293.

"Just as existence, non-existence also is capable of being apprehended by the senses".¹ He argued: "There is also an (actual) sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the perception of the non-existence, (just) as it is in the case of perception of the (positive) floor."²

On this point, Śrīdhara seems to have been greatly influenced by the great Naiyāyika Uddyotakara. For Uddyotakara is the first Naiyāyika author who, as we shall see below, propounded a systematic formula of determining the sense-contact (sannikarṣa) with a negative fact. Śrīdhara's exposition of the subject and his table of many types of "sannikarṣa" (see below) appear to be based on that of Uddyotakara.³ Śrīdhara, as a matter of fact, freely quotes the Naiyāyika as an authority.⁴ It seems that the syncretism between the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya systems which began at least as early as Vātsyāyana⁵ (300 A.D.), with regard to the

1. NK., p.226: bhāvavād abhāvo'pi indriyagrahaṇayogyah.

2. ibid., p.229: bhūtalagrahaṇavad abhāvendriya-sannikarṣo'py abhāvagrahaṇasāmagrī. See also Dasgupta, HIP., Vol. I. p.359.

3. NVT., on the NS., I.1.4. (KSS.) p.31. See infra p.197 n.2.

4. Cf. NK., pp. 115, 226 and NVT., pp.9, 30-31, where the problems of perception and non-existence as an entity (padārtha) are discussed.

5. Cf. Atomism., p.21.

question of negation, was completed by Śrīdhara. It has been stated somewhere else that Praśastapāda was greatly influenced by the Buddhist logician Dignāga.¹ Śrīdhara, although himself a Vaiśeṣika, apparently deviated from Praśastapāda, the older commentator of the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra. He incorporated the theory of the Naiyāyikas and as we shall soon see, subsequent to him, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians, including the neo-Nyāya, accepted it.

(D)

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all sense-perceptions depend on the contact of the sense-organ with its object. And this contact is called "sannikarṣa".² It is described as "the function of the sense-organs by means of which they enter into a particular relation with their appropriate objects and bring about the perception of the objects."³

1. Cf. Dr. V.S.Pathak in 'History of Saiva Cults in Northern India from Inscriptions' (Varanasi, 1960), p.24. on the basis of some Chinese texts, mentions a Nyāya school of thought called "Naya-soma". Its founder, Somaśarmā, is supposed to be the preceptor of Akṣapāda (Gotama) the founder of the Nyāya system and Kaṇāda the originator of the Vaiśeṣika system. Pathak has suggested to me that Dignāga also might have been influenced by Naya-soma logic. See also BL., I. p.50.
2. NVT., I. 1.4: 'indriyeṇārthasya sannikarṣād yadutpadyate jñānam tatpratyakṣam'; PBh., p.186; NK., p.188., TS., I.30. Primer., p.14; TSC., p.35.
3. IPP., p.76.

The objects are many-fold, namely, substances, qualities, actions, etc., while in fact only a substance can come into a direct contact with a sense-organ. Therefore, qualities, actions, and universals are perceived through the sense contact with a substance in which they inhere.¹ For instance, the eye can come into contact with a substance "directly" but only "indirectly" with a colour "which inheres in that substance, and still more "indirectly" with the class concept which inheres in colour which resides in the object with which the eye is in conjunction".²

The sense-object contact (sannikarṣa) is six-fold:³

1. *ibid.*, pp.74-75.

2. *IP.*, Vol. II, p.53. See also *Atomism*, p.75: *IPP.*, p.77. Note according to the Buddhist theory of perception colour (rūpa) is perceived "directly".

3. *NVT.*, I.1.4. (KSS.) p.31: 'sannikarṣaḥ punaḥ śoḍhā bhidyate. saṃyogaḥ saṃyuktasamavāyāḥ saṃyuktasāmaśāyāḥ samavāyāḥ samavetasamavāyo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaś ceti.'

1	2	3	4	5	6
The Conjunction (saṃyoga): e.g. perception of a jar.	Inherence in that which is in conjunction (saṃyukta-samavāya). e.g. perception of a quality or an action.	Inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction (saṃyukta-samavēta-samavāya). e.g. perception of the generic character of the colour of a jar.	Inherence (samavāya). e.g. auditory perception of sounds which inheres in the ear-drum.	Inherence in that which inheres (samavēta-samavāya). e.g. auditory perception of generic character of sound e.g. perception of the absence of a jar on the ground.	Relation of predicate and subject (viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyātā or viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-saṃbandha or svarūpas-aṃbandha).

Table No. VI.

(E)

The term sannikarṣa or sense-contact, thus, pervades the three relations, viz., Conjunction (saṃyoga), Inherence (samavāya), and the Relation of predicate and subject (or qualifier and qualificand = viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva).¹

The first three modes of sannikarṣa, amongst the six described in the table, are based on the first relation, saṃyoga; the fourth and the fifth modes are based on the second relation, samavāya; and the sixth mode pervades the third relation, viśeṣaṇatā. Through the first mode of sannikarṣa we perceive substances, qualities, actions etc., are cognized through the second. The genus of qualities is apprehended through the third. The sound is grasped through the fourth; the genus of sound through the fifth. And the absence is perceived through the sixth.²

The sixth mode of perception or the sense-contact is specially designed for the perception of inherence and non-existence.³ Since these two entities have no "autonomous

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1. Ibid: 'so'yam sannikarṣaśabdaḥ saṃyoga-samavāya-viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva-vyāpakatvād upāttah'.
 2. NK., p.195: 'tatra saṃyogād dravyagrahaṇam samyukta-samavāyād guṇādipratītiḥ samyukta-samaveta-samavāyād guṇatvādi jñām samavāyācchab-dagrahaṇam samaveta-samavāyācchabdatvagrahaṇam sambaddha-viśeṣaṇatayā cābhāvagrahaṇam iti.
 3. NVT., loc.cit: 'samavāye cābhāve ca viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvād iti; N.Kaust; p.135, 'samavāyābhāvayor grahe viśeṣaṇatā-sannikarṣa iti; NK; p.195; SM., (KSS), p.193.

existence", it is maintained that they can be perceived only as attributes or qualifiers (viśeṣaṇa) of the objects in which they reside.¹ As far as the case of inherence is concerned the conception is "at least simple" but the case of non-existence is a complex one which raises some obvious difficulties. Since "abhāva" is not a substance (dravya) it cannot be perceived through conjunction or direct contact between the visual senses and the absence. Nor can it inhere in a substance, for it is not a quality, activity, or a class.² Therefore, the perception of absence of a jar, for instance, involves two contacts, (a) first between the visual sense-organ and the (bare) locus and (b) second a peculiar qualifying relation between the locus and the absence of the jar. Thus, we perceive non-existence as qualifying the floor in which the negatum, jar, is not present.³ According to this view absence and universals are perceived by the same sense organ by which the particular is perceived (yenendriyeṇa yā vyaktiḥ grhyate tenaivendriyeṇa tajjātiḥ tadabhāvo'pi grhyate).⁴ Therefore the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that cognition of absence is a perceptual judgment.

1. Atomism., p.77.

2. Cf. *ibid*; Materials, p.58 (29)

3. NK., p.229: 'abhāva-viśiṣṭabhūtalagrahaṇam'. See also Chapter II, the section concerning the importance of perception of the locus.

4. Apparently, the early Naiyāyikas, including Vātsyāyana did not elaborate the viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāve theory in the sense it is used in the present context. Dignāga seems to be the

(F)

However, the relation between the absence and the locus, namely, the *viśeṣanātā* is considered to be a kind of "Peculiar Relation (*svarūpa-sambandha*), i.e., a relation peculiar to the pair it connects".¹ The other two relations, namely, Conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and Inherence (*saṃavāya*) are not applicable to non-existence. For the former is only possible where the relata are two substances while the absence is not a substance. And the latter is applicable to the cases where the two terms are so related that one of them inheres in the other, e.g., as a colour and a flower. In the instance of absence and the floor, neither of the two inheres in the other. If they were so related they would be perceived always together.²

Footnote 4 continued:

first to use this phrase; "yatra viśeṣya-viśeṣanabhāvaḥ tatra samānendriya-gocaratvam", *Pramāna-sammucchaya-vṛtti*, p.59. (The Sanskrit text of this work is not available in its original form). This conception, I think, might have been borrowed by Uddyotakara from Dignāga. Cf. NVT; I.1.4, supra p.

1. Materials., p.41.

2. Hiriyanna's comments on the *svarūpa-sambandha* are very noteworthy. He writes: "This seems just the monist's internal relation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulates it only to emphasize the distinction between the relata which really does not exist as e.g. in the case of the *bhūtala* and *ghaṭābhāva* where also the *viśeṣana-viśeṣyabhāva* is only *svarūpa*. That is, even where the conception is precisely that of the monist, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika refuses to recognize it and invents an ontological fiction to connect things which are not distinct. This shows its wholehearted opposition to the monist's view of Relations." *Studies*; p.117(8). It should also be noted here that in the Buddhist nominalism, too, Relations represent

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The postulation of this peculiar relation by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika seems to have been forced upon them by their naive realism that non-existence is the object of a perceptual judgment. On the other hand, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas although agreeing with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that it is the object of direct apprehension (prameya) insist that any contact between the sense-organ and non-existence/^{absence} is impossible. For according to the Mīmāṃsakas the contact between the senses and the objects of perception can only be either conjunction or inherence.¹ The Mīmāṃsakas therefore, posited Negation as an independent means for its apprehension² while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas invented "an ontological fiction to connect things which are not distinct".³

(G)

Now, we come to the question of classification of the sixth mode of perception or sense contact (viśeṣanātā) through which the cognition of non-existence is established.

It has been stated above that senses can come into

Footnote 2 continued:

nothing real per se beside the things related and this view is also accepted by Bradley. See BL., Vol.I, pp.245-248, p.246 n.1; Bradley, Principles of Logic, p.96.

1. Atomism, p.78; NK., p.195; IPP., p.78 n.2.

2. Cf. supra pp.48ff.

3. Hiriyanna, op.cit.

contact with a substance only and therefore in all modes of perception contact with a substance is necessarily "direct" or "indirect".¹ In the sixth mode of perception, too, the sense contact is primarily referred to a substance (locus). But negation is not limited to substance only; it may refer to any other entity, quality, action and generic character or universal (jāti or sāmānya) which are to be established by the other five modes of perception or contact. The viśeṣanātā, thus, can operate only through one of the five other modes. For instance, the absence of a quality is perceived by a variety of the qualificand relation (viśeṣanātā) applied to the second mode of contact, viz., the inherence in that which is in conjunction with the senses. For that is the contact through which we perceive a quality or an action.² In the same way, the absence of sound is perceived by the variety of viśeṣanātā applied to the fourth mode of contact, viz., inherence (samavāya). That is the absence of sound is perceived as qualifying the sense-organ - the ear-drum - pervaded by ākāśa or ether which is the substratum of sound.³ Thus, with regard to its reference to the five (positive) modes of contact, the negative mode of contact or the qualificand

1. See supra p. 198

2. Cf. supra p. 199

3. IPP., p. 78

relational perception is classified as follows:¹

1. Śrīdhara (NK., p.195) seems to be the first to give a four-fold classification of viśeṣaṇatā in the following words:

'yatsamyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatvena rūpe rasādyabhāvagrahaṇam yacca samyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇatvena rūpatve rasatvādyabhāvapratiṭiḥ, yaś ca samaveta-viśeṣaṇatayā kakārē khakārādy abhāvavagamo yaś ca samveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatayā gatve khatvādy abhāvasamvedanam tat sarvaṃ sambaddhaviśeṣaṇabhāvena saṃgrhītam'.

Puṇatāmakara (N. Kaust., pp. 135-136), gives a six-fold division as shown in the table which is essentially based on Śrīdhara's text but also seems to have incorporated Viśvanātha's view of the division. The latter is also primarily based on that of Śrīdhara's. Cf. SM., (KSS), p. 193. We have given the table, mainly, according to Puṇatāmakara and Śrīdhara.

N. Kaust., pp. 135-136, the text reads:

'sā ca viśeṣaṇatā dvividhā-indriya-viśeṣaṇatā, tat-sambandha-viśeṣaṇatā ca. (1) tatra śrotre śabdābhāvagrahe ādyā. antyā ca saṃyogādīpañcānyatamasambandhabhedena bhinnā. tatra (2) bhūtalādaḥ ghaṭādyabhāvagrahe samyukta-viśeṣaṇatā; (3) śuklādirūpe nīlatvādyabhāvagrahe samyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā; (4) nīlatvādāv abhāvagrahe ca samyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā; (5) kakārādaḥ khatvādyabhāvagrahe samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā; (6) khatvādaḥ gatvādy abhāvagrahe samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā iti bodhyam.'

QUALIFIER & QUALIFICAND CONTACT (VISEṢAṆATĀ)

1. Qualifying the sense-organ (indriya-viśeṣaṇatā) 2. Qualifying that which is in conjunction with the sense-organ (tatsambandha-viśeṣaṇatā).

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Qualifying that (substance or locus) which is in conjunction with the visual senses (saṃyukta-viśeṣaṇatā). e.g. 'no jar on the floor'.	Qualifying that which inheres in that which is in conjunction with the sense-organ (saṃyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā), e.g. absence of taste in colour; absence of blue-ness in white.	Qualifying that which inheres in that which is in conjunction with the sense-organ (saṃyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā). e.g. absence of colour in the generic nature of number (saṃkhyā).	Qualifying that which inheres in that which inheres here in the sense (auditory) junction with the organ, e.g. sense-organ (saṃyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā). e.g. absence of colour in the generic nature of number (saṃkhyā).	Qualifying that which inheres in that which is in the sense (auditory) junction with the organ, e.g. sense-organ (saṃyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā). e.g. absence of colour in the generic nature of number (saṃkhyā).

Qualifying that (generic nature of sound) which inheres in that which is inhering in the (auditory) sense organ, (samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatā), e.g. absence of 'khatva' in 'gatva'.

Table No. VII

CHAPTER V.

P A R T I.

- Sections: I. THE BUDDHIST OPPOSITION TO THE REALIST THEORY OF UNIQUE RELATION (svabhāva = Svarūpasambandha):
- II. NEGATION IS ROOTED IN OPPOSITION (virodha):
- III. THE THEORY OF APOHA AS CORRESPONDING TO THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION (virodha):
- IV. THE THEORY OF APOHA VERSUS NEGATIVE STATEMENT.

P A R T II.

English Translation of the Apoha-siddhi of Ratnakīrti.

Section I. The Buddhist Opposition to the Realist Theory of Unique Relation (svabhāva = Svarūpasambandha)

It has been stated above that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, in order to maintain the perceptual character of a negative cognition, postulated an unique or simple relation (svarūpa or svabhāvasambandha) between the absence and the locus which is in direct conjunction with the sense-organ. This was possible because they admitted the reality

of relations, i.e., relation itself (sambandha) was postulated as a third unity between the two terms related (sambandhin).¹

A----R----B

However, the relation of this third unity with the related terms is called a simple relation, (svabhāva sambandha) i.e., a relation without additional relating unities. In this way the Indian realists escaped from the danger of an infinite regress "which", as Stcherbatsky rightly observes, "obliged Bradley to deny the reality of all relations as well as of separate unities and to merge them all in One Whole." Further he explains the Buddhist view: "The reality of relations required as a corollary the stability (sthāyitva) of enduring objects. The Buddhist who denied this stability and converted the existence of every object into a stream of momentary events (kṣaṇikatva) divided all relations into real (vāstava) - that was the relation of Causality between the consecutive moments - and logical (kalpita) - these were the relations of the thing with its attributes and motions superimposed (āropita) upon it by

1. BL., Vol. II, p. 287 n. 2.

productive imagination (kalpanā = vikalpa-vāsanā). The first relations can also be called external or causal (tadutpatti), the second internal or relations of existential Identity (tādātmya). The subject-object relation was thus a simple relation for the Realist, and a causal relation for the Buddhist. It is clear that the Buddhist never could accept the perceptibility of relation through the senses. Even causality as a relation was for him a construction of the mind. Only its members, the moments, were real."¹ Thus the Buddhist nominalist would not accept the reality of relation, nor the perceptibility of negative judgment. Negation for him is an inferential judgment and inference does not apply to reality (svalakṣaṇa) which is momentary (kṣaṇika)... It applies to Universals (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) which are unreal (alīka) and mere logical constructions (vikalpa).² These points are important for the study of Apoha theory.

Section II. Negation is Rooted in Opposition (virodha).

For the Buddhist thinkers, negation is based on the

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1. Ibid.
 2. PVP., p.169: svalakṣaṇa-viṣayam pratyakṣam. sāmānyalakṣaṇa-viṣayam anumānam.

a priori opposition (virodha) of the unique particular entities. All negations, according to Dharmakīrti,¹ are rooted in Opposition² which can be divided into two classes:

- (1) Efficient opposition or Incompatibility (sahabhāva-virodha);
- (2) Logical opposition or Contradiction (anyonyopalabधि-parihāra-sthitilakṣaṇa-virodha).

The former is defined in the following passage:

"When (one fact) has duration (as long as) the sum-total of its causes remains unimpaired, and it (then) vanishes as soon as another, (the opposed), fact appears, it follows that both are incompatible, (or efficiently opposed), just as the sensations of heat and cold."³

The second type of opposition is explained as follows:

"There is also (opposition between two terms) when their own essence consists in mutual exclusion, as

1. PVS., pp. 35-37 (ed. G. p. 5 f).
2. In translating 'virodha' by Opposition we have followed Stcherbatsky's exposition of the law of contradiction. Cf. BL., op. cit. p. 187 n. 3. NB., III. 74: dvividho hi padārthanam virodhaḥ.
3. sahabhāva = sahanavasthālakṣaṇa virodha. PVS., p. 35: aparyāntakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyābhāva 'bhāvād virodhagatiḥ. NB., III, 75: 'āvikalakāraṇasya.....' (rest is the same), and 76: śītoṣṇasparśavat. Translation p. 187. See also Karmakagomin, op. cit. pp. 35-36.

between the (terms) eternal and non-eternal."¹

Some other instances of the second opposition include such pairs as: reality and unreality, existence and non-existence, affirmation and negation, blue and non-blue.² In the first opposition, namely the incompatibility, two facts exist independently without opposing each other. Their opposition becomes efficient only when they are placed together in one space-time relation. While in the second opposition, viz.,

1. PVS.p.36: anyonyopalabdhiparihārasthiti-lakṣanatā vā virodho nityānityavat. The text reads 'parihārenā'. But on the basis of Karṇakagomin's commentary thereon and G.ed, p.5, we read in the compound 'parihāra'. This reading also agrees with the reading of NB.III,77: parasparaparihārasthita-(ti)-lakṣanatayā vā bhāvābhāvavat. Stcherbatsky's observation thereon is noteworthy. Translation p.192 n.2 "....(p.193) it is clear that in these words we have a definition of the Law of Contradiction, so much discussed in European Logic from Aristoteles through Leibnitz, Kant and Sigwart up to the modern logicians. It is therefore of the highest importance to realize the exact meaning of the Indian view. It will be noticed, first of all, that there is no difference between a contradiction of concepts and a contradiction between judgments, the terms bhāva = vidhi = vastu, Tib. yod-pa = sgrub-pa = dños-pa being synonymous. The term "blue" in logic always means the judgment "this is blue", it is a synthesis of "thisness" and "thatness", it is contrasted with the mere reflex of the blue (pratibhāsa), an unascertained reflex which has no place in logic. Thus in the quarrel between Aristoteles and Sigwart on the one side, and Kant on the other, the Indian view will fall in line rather with the first party. The contradiction is virtually between the judgments "this is blue" and "this is not blue".
2. PVST., pp.36-37 Karṇakagomin, passim; NBT., pp.69-70.

contradiction, the two opposed facts are so related that neither of the two can be defined or apprehended without excluding the other. The very "essence" (lakṣaṇa) of the one consists in exclusion of the other, e.g. blue and non-blue. The first opposition seems to mean negation of terms or entities as can be seen in the eight-fold formulae of negative inference explained by Dharmakīrti.¹ The second opposition, contradiction, appears to be designated to refer to negation of propositions. For the very essence of 'non-blue' presupposes the proposition 'this is blue', and vice versa. This propositional opposition, however, poses many logical difficulties which are discussed by the Buddhist philosophers under the heading of the theory of Apoha or determination = exclusion = discrimination.²

Table No.VIII The Table of Opposition (virodha)

Incompatibility or Efficient opposition = negation of terms or entities (sahabhāva-virodha), e.g. the opposition of the sensations of heat and cold (śītoṣṇasparśavat).

Contradiction or Logical opposition = negation of propositions (anyonyopalabdhi-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇa-virodha). e.g. the opposition of blue and non-blue, existence and non-existence (nīlānīla, bhāvābhāva) Affirmation & Negation (vidhiniṣedha).

1. Cf. supra p.169

2. Cf. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.195 n.2; infra Part II.

Section III. The Theory of Apoha as Corresponding to the
Law of Contradiction (virodha).

The theory of Apoha is designated by the Buddhist philosophers to solve the problems of the Universal (sāmānya) and the Particular Error (bhedāgraha), the relation between substance and attribute (dharmi+dharmā) and the word and its meaning (śabdārtahasambandha).¹ The theory seems to be misunderstood as "a negative approach towards meaning".² The charge of 'negativism' appears to have been based on the study of Hindu scholars like Uddyotakara, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Bhāmaha and Udayana who "vehemently criticized" the theory as negative.³ In fact, the charges of 'negativism' have been constantly refuted by Dharmakīrti and the subsequent Buddhist scholars.⁴ The theory therefore, needs a completely independent study of its own. Being limited by the scope of the present thesis, we shall only deal with one aspect of it, viz., the extent to which it is based on the law of contradiction (virodha).

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1. Cf. infra pt. II; BL., II, pp. 403-404.
 2. K.K.Raja, The theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians, (reprint from) the Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, part 3-4, p.11, see also pp. 3-13.
 3. ibid.
 4. Cf. PVS., pp.248-263 and Karnakagomin's commentary thereon; JN., apohaprakaraṇa, pp.201-232; RN., (AS), pp.51-61.

The Apoha theory seems to be directed primarily against the realist conception of Reality according to which Universals are posited as real. For the nominalist Buddhist a Real is the extreme point instance of reality (svalakṣaṇa) which is beyond propositional operation.¹ Thus all verbal and logical statements express "discrimination" (apoha).² To the realist argument that it is really the universal which is the subject of a proposition, the nominalist rejoins that the universal itself is not real but a logical construct (vikalpa). It must be conceived as the idea of exclusion of a common counter-correlate. For instance, the common counter-correlative of all cows is non-horse. Thus, the concept 'cow' can only be determined by all the others instances of reality from which it is excluded. "Universal is in its very essence (lakṣaṇa) exclusion of the other."³

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1. PVS., (G.ed.p.65) p.262: tenānyāpohaviṣayāḥ proktāḥ sāmānyagocārāḥ, śabdāś ca buddhayaś caiva vastuṇy eśāṃ asambhavāt'; also PV., I.91-94 verses; infra pt.II, AŚ., p.6 (14-17); PVP., p.621. Everything past, future, imagined, absent, mental, notional and universal, i.e. all thought constructions are unreal. Thus, the object of a judgment or expression, i.e. the propositional operation, is not the momentary real (kṣanika) which is in constant flux. Cf. BL.I.p.69. Frauwallner, WZKM., vol.37, p.275, vol.40, p.63.
 2. JN., p.201: 'apohaḥ śabdalingābhyām prakāśyate'.
 3. PV., III, 30: 'sāmānyam anyavyāvṛttīlakṣaṇam' (PVP., p.200) see also PVS., p.262.

Furthermore, from a purely logical point of view, the Buddhists maintain that every term or proposition is the negation of its own negation (anyāpoha). Even an affirmative proposition entails the exclusion of its contradictory proposition. Dignāga explains that a term, such as for instance, "the blue-lotus" not only excludes the lotuses that are not blue but also excludes those blue things which are not lotuses.¹ Thus it signifies the exclusion of the non-blue and the non-lotus.²

Thus what is intended by the theory of Apoha is neither merely a positive cognition A nor merely exclusion of others (non-A = X), but a positive cognition qualified by the exclusion of others.³ For instance, terms affirmation and negation, existence and non-existence, or A and non-A are mutually exclusive.⁴ The relation between the two is not ultimately real (pāramārthika) but logical (vyāvahārika).⁵

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1. PKM., p.436: 'dignāgena viśeṣanaviśeṣyasamarthanārtham "nīlotpalādisabdā arthāntarānivr̥ttiviśiṣṭān arthān āhuḥ" ity uktam.' (Dharmakīrti and Karṇakogomin too ascribed this passage to Dignāga, see PVS., pp.248,251). See also Karṇakogomin p.182: 'yathānutpalād vyāvṛttā utpalabhedā ta eva punar anyatopy anīlād vyāvṛttimāntaḥ pratibhṇanti' also pp.260-261.
 2. Raja, loc.cit., p.8.
 3. AS., p.3 (6-8). PVS. p.251
 4. Cf. Logical opposition table No. VIII, p.212
 5. infra AS., p.16 (1-15); PVST., Karṇakagomin p.121: 'na punar vastuno rūpam pāramārthika-dharmā-dharma-dharmi-bhāvalakṣanam pratipādyate'; PVP., p.573: samvṛttisād eva dharmi-dharmalakṣaṇam'. samvṛttisād = vyāvahārika.

Here we may conclude that the theory of Apoha is not a "negative approach" to Reality but a logical principle, grounded in the law of contradiction, in order to apprehend the real unique particular point instant of reality, (svalakṣaṇa)."

Section IV. The Theory of Apoha verses Negative Statements.

It has been stated in the previous section that on the basis of the law of contradiction, Buddhist logicians, in their theory of Apoha, maintained that every term and proposition is discriminatory. Thus it is said that affirmation and negation are mutually exclusive and so related to each other that one involves the other.

Dharmakīrti said: "There can be no affirmation of a thing (A) which does not exclude the other (non-A); nor can there be a negation of that which cannot be affirmed."¹ Hence whereas affirmation implies negation, negation presupposes the affirmation.²


1. PVS., p.253: 'na hy anvayo'vyāvṛttimato nāpy ananvayino vyāvṛttih'.

2. 'Not' belongs to the class of "propositional words". Cf. B.Russell, Inq. into Meaning & Truth, (1956), pp.70 ff. Strictly speaking negation is always negation of a proposition (upalabdhilakṣanaprāptasyānupalabdhi) Cf. Buddhist view, Chapt. II.

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In Indian logic the forms of propositions are two-fold: (1) Positive (vidhi), and (2) Negative (niṣedha or pratiṣedha). The negative form is again divided into two: (a) a simple negative (prasajya-pratiṣedha), and (b) negation by implication (paryudāsa).¹

Table No. IX.



It may be argued that if the Buddhists are correct in asserting that the meaning of all words is (logically) both affirmative and negative at the same time, the different (propositional) forms are meaningless. The answer to this problem is that the Buddhists were concerned with their practical importance. Kannakagomin explains: "There is a

1. It seems that these negative types of statement in Indian Logic were originally introduced by the Mīmāṃsakas who were primarily concerned with the problems of the correct application of the Vedic texts in the sacrificial ceremonies. Cf. Jamini Sūtra, X.VIII,i,15; SBh., pp.621-631.

great difference. (1). A sentence expressing an affirmative (judgment) asserts a positive (meaning) primarily (and) negation of the "other" (non-A) by implication (arthāt). (2). And (a sentence) expressing a negative (judgment) asserts a negation primarily (and) affirmation of the "other" (i.e., the positive B not-A = B) by implication. (3) While the sentence expressing 'negation by implication' (paryyudāsa) by denying (pratishedhapūrvaka = (not-A=B) primarily asserts an affirmation of the "other" fact. (A i.e., the other than the fact negation of which is implied). Thus, indeed, is the distinction (between the three forms of statements)."¹

1. *ibid.* 'kastarhi vidhi-pratishedha-paryudā savākyaṇām bhedah? mahānbhedah. vidhāyakam hi vākyaṇ vidhim prādhānyenābhidhāyānya-niśedhakam arthāt. niśedhakam ca niśedham prādhānyenābhidhāyarthād anyavidhānam āha. paryudāśapratipādakan tu vākyaṇ pratishedhapūrvakam anyavidhānam prādhānyenāha ity asty eva viśeṣah. iti.' The Mīmāṃsaka writers applied the terms prasajya and paryyudāsa to their religious and ritual interpretations of negative statements. For instance, the statement: "One must not kill a Brāhmaṇa" (Dvijamna hanyāt), (cp. "Thou shalt not kill"), defiance of which leads to sin and calamity (aśreya) is to be considered as the pure negation (prasajya). Whereas if the Vedic text reads that 'a particular ritual should be performed in a particular ceremony' it implies that the ritual may or may not be performed in some other ceremony but must be performed in that particular instance. See for details MNP., pp. 156 ff; Samksepasārīraka, (CSS.), pp. 298 ff; Arthasamgraha (CSS), pp. 170 ff; Tattvabindu (Trichinopoly, 1936), pp. 120 ff. However, Indian grammarians stress on the point of construction of a negative sentence. According to grammarians: the prasajya is there where the negation is essential and the positive element secondary, i.e., where negation applies to the verb (but not to the last member of the negative compound). Where the positive element is essential and the negation secondary is the paryyudāsa. It is to be understood that (this) negation applies only to the last member (of the negative compound).

According to this explanation, (1) the proposition, for instance, "snow is white", is affirmative in which the negation of the other "snow is black" is implied; (2) the proposition for instance, "snow is not black", is negative in which the other affirmative "snow is white" is implied; (3) in the proposition "Mt. Everest is the highest mountain in the world", is the parryudāsa type in which we primarily assert that Mt. Everest is the highest mountain in the world but we do so by denying the proposition that there is any other mountain as high as this one.

However, it should be remembered that the Buddhist theory of negation (anupalabdhi), corresponding to the simple negation (prasajya), also entails the other ^{negation (parryudāsa)}. On the other hand, the theory of Apoha, primarily corresponding to the negation by implication also involves the simple negation. ^{According to Rahmākṛṣṇa, negation} negation by implication (parryudāsa) is found rooted (niyata)

continued from previous page.....

aprādhānyam vidheryatra pratiṣedhe pradhānatā.
 prasajya-pratiṣedho'yam kriyayā saha yatra nañ.
 pradhānatvam vidheryatra pratiṣedhe'pradhānatā.
 paryudāsaḥ sa vijñeyo yatrottara padena nañ.

This is Śloka 490 in a work called Sārasvata, edited by Nava Kishora Kara Sarma, 1936 (cf. Renou, Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit: Paris, 1957, pp. 202, 230).

in the immediate knowledge of the thing and thus is commonly applied to both affirmative and (simple) negative propositions.¹ This means that logically speaking, there can be no pure affirmation, nor negation. For instance, if the negation of X is not implied in the affirmation of Y, how can we then act discriminately in everyday life. "One might well tie horses etc., when asked to tie a cow".²

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1. AS., p.4. (6-7): paryyudāsarūpābhāva-grahaṇantu niyata-svarūpa-samvedanam ubhayoraviśiṣṭam.
 2. ibid. anyathā yadi śabdād arthapratipattikāle kalito na parāpohaḥ, katham anyaparihāreṇa pravṛttiḥ. tato gām vadhāneti codito 'śvādīn api vadhniyāt.

PART II

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE APOHASIDDHI (a Buddhist logical treatise by Ratnakīrti, the ^{pupil} ~~puil~~ of Jñānaśrimitra, (1050 A.D.))

References to the page and line correspond to the text published in "The Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts", Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta 1910.

The translation of the first two pages of the Sanskrit text is based on a rendering by Professor J. Brough.

A P O H A S I D D H I

SALUTATION TO THE MASTER OF THE UNIVERSE, SRILOKANĀTHA.

The meaning of the term 'Apoha' is to be defined (below).¹ (The question is): What is meant by the term "Discrimination"? (There can be three possible interpretations). If the etymological sense is taken: (1). A is discriminated from not-A (B); or not - A (B) from A; or (2). B is discriminated out in the midst of not-A - then what is intended by a term is simply A; either the external object or the mental concept separated from (the class of)² not-A. Or else (3). "Discrimination" is denial (and thus) is mere exclusion of not-A. These are the three possible views.

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1. Prof. Brough's translation is: "The meaning of a term" is defined to be "Discrimination". "
 2. Cf. PVST., Kārṇakagomin, p.114; 'kalpitaścākāro' pohāśrita-tvād apoha ucyate. apohyate'neneti vā. anyanivṛttimātram tv arthād ākṣiptam apohanam-apoha ity ucyate. svalakṣaṇam tv apohyate'sminnity apoha ucyate.'

Contrary to the Realists Nyāya and Vaiśeṣikas, and the Mīmāṃsakas, the Buddhists do not admit the universal or class (ākāra) as a real category (padārtha). A Universal, they say, is a logical concept (imagined or kalpita), grounded (based) on the exclusion of a common-counter correlate. For instance, with reference to a cow, horse, dog, camel, lions, etc. belong to one class 'not-cow'. "5.5303 Roughly speaking; to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing." - Ludwig Wittgenstein, (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (eight imp. 1960), p.139.

(1.8). But it cannot, in fact, be either the first or the second, for it is, indeed, an affirmation (positive thing) which is intended by the term discrimination. And the last (third) view is also unsatisfactory, since it is contradicted by perception and ordinary understanding.¹ Thus the understanding of the proposition "There is fire on the mountain" is observed as delineating something in the affirmative form and not as a purely negative statement:- "there is not not-fire".

(1.13). And it is a well known fact that what is contrary to perception cannot be justified by some other means (such as an inferential argument).²

(1.15). (The Realist). You (the Buddhist) may now say:

"Although there is no judgment of the form "I perceive negation (absence)", still, an impression of negation does, in fact, occur in the impression of the thing-negated, (in the locus). For there is no qualified perception which does not imply the perception of the qualifier (at least) in its conceptual form."³

(2.1). Thus, although there is no judgment of the form "I perceive a universal", the knowledge of a judgment which arises from the impression of a common class-character is called by

1. pratīti.

2. Inference is also based on perception, primarily.

3. antarbhāvitā.

other (philosophers) the knowledge of a universal;¹ and similarly, (the Buddhist argues), the knowledge of negation which is projected by the perception of things-negated, makes possible² our talking about the perception of "Discrimination" (?) (2.6). But surely, (the Realist objects), if the status of a knowledge (or configuration) of a universal rests on the impression of a common class-character which appears in the shape of an affirmation (a positive entity), we may well ask: What is it which arises in the mind in the case of the configuration which is the perception of negation when there is no impression of a class-character of an absence?

(2.8-9). Therefore, although there is no class of (judgments) of the form, "I perceive negation", if there were really an impression of a class-character 'negation', no-one would deny the existence (Gestalt ?) of perception of negation.

(2.10-11). But if, on the other hand, you (the Buddhist) maintain that even when there is no mental impression of X, we can talk about the perception of X; then, (the Realist objects), when a class-concept of a cow is present in the mind³ the resulting judgment could well be that of a horse.

1. Cp., Dharmakīrti, PVST., p.132, I. 54.

2. ātanoti.

3. 'cetasi' seems to suggest a passive mental impression as opposed to active impression 'bodha'. - J.Brough.

(2.12-16). As for your (the Buddhist) suggestion that the perception of negation may be contained (in the perception of the thing-negated) as a qualifier, nonetheless, if the judgment is of a form such as "that which is discriminated from not-cow", then, we admit that the negation comes in afterwards as a qualifier, but the actual perception is the positive (affirmation) "cow". And since at that time, (in the perception of a cow), there is no awareness of it (a qualifier) whose character is negation - even though such a qualifier is, in fact, in existence - how can we talk of "Gestalt" of "the perception of negation"?

(2.16-17). So then, the situation is as follows:

(2.17-19). That which is envisaged¹ as a positive entity also entails the exclusion of what is other, and this is called (by you the Buddhist) 'the perception of negation' (Discrimination). Nevertheless, it is only the positive entity A in (of) the discrimination of not-A (X) which reflects at the direct sense perception (and thus the apprehension of discrimination is) a mere relation.

(2.19). Further, it is undeniable that - in the same sense-

1. sphuritam.

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(the function of) sense-perception¹ is also discriminatory.²

(3.1). (For example). When a thing is perceived as a particular,³ from the constructed reasoning (vibralpāt) there arises the awareness of exclusion of all other things (X) by the awareness of the excluded (particular) one.

(3.2-4). Hence, indeed, the object of (pure) mental judgmental construction⁴ also is a positive entity, just as in the perception (it is) the positive entity which is to be cognized through the perception of (its) class-character (ākāra, a common mental image). The object (of a mental construction) is not the exclusion of non-A.

(3.4). (The Realist on these grounds asks): How can the meaning of a term be declared (by the Buddhists) to be "Discrimination"?

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1. adhyakṣa. Cp. below p.6.10. where the Buddhist rejoins and Ratnakīrti uses the general term for perception 'pratyakṣa'.
 2. Lit., p.2.19. "Further, it is undeniable that in the same sense, [(or the sense perception)- is the object of (apṛaviṣ-ayatnam)] "Discrimination" also belongs to sense-perception. That is when the thing is perceived its relation - a separate entity according to the Realists, is also perceived. But, for the Buddhists 'relation' is not an entity but a logical synthesis (adhyavasāya = vikalpa) and therefore cannot be perceived by sense-contact. Cf. below, (6.9-10) and (6.11-12).
 3. viśeṣata...īkṣamāṇasya.
 4. vikalpa = adhyavasāya; cf. RN., p.67.30, and pp.130-131.

(3.5). (The Buddhist). To this our answer is as follows:

(3.6-8). By the term "Discrimination" what is intended is not merely a positive entity (A); nor merely exclusion of (the other) not-A, but the meaning of the terms is the positive thing (A) qualified by the exclusion of the other (not-A).¹

(3.9). And thus, (in this Buddhist definition), there is no scope for criticism on the part (of all those who) indirectly hold different views (of Apoha).

(3.9). (There are two opposite interpretations of Apoha). The positive view is: "The perception of a cow does not involve (cognition of) others and its own self and therefore "Discrimination" (cow and not-cow) is a secondary judgment based upon the force (of the primary affirmative or positive) perception of cow."

(3.11). And the negative view is: "The (distinct) positive thing (A discriminated from not-A) is understood (as the secondary meaning) based on the force of the perception of exclusion of the other (not-A) (which is the primary meaning of the term)".

1. Dharmakīrti also in his PVS., p.251, quotes Dinnāga in support of this view.

"śābdo'rthāntara-vyāvṛtti-viśiṣṭāneva bhāvanāhetī." A term denotes only positive entities qualified by the exclusion of others. Karṇakagomin in his commentary on PV. p.248 explicitly has ascribed this passage to Dinnāga. See also pp. 114, 128-129 of the same. PKM., p.436, too ascribes this passage to Dinnāga.

(3.12). This extremism (of both views) is not good.

(3.13-14). In the former (positivists' view), we do not find any successive stages of apprehension (of affirmative and negative) meaning. No one apprehends the discriminatory (negative) meaning, after understanding the affirmative meaning, by logical implication.¹

(3.15). Conversely, nor the negativists' view does any one apprehend the positive distinct meaning, having understood the (primary) negative meaning.

1. K.K.Rājā observes that Ratnakīrti here "rejects Sāntirakṣita's view that a word conveys a positive meaning first, and a negative meaning later by logical implication." - The Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians, The Adyar Library Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, part 3-4, p.15. For Sāntirakṣita's view see p.14 ibid.

(3.16). Hence, the proposition "understanding of (the meaning of) the word cow" - is said (to mean) "the understanding of the positive distinct entity (i.e. qualified by the exclusion of not-cow)."

(3.17-18). And although it is said that (in the term cow) there is no occurrence of word(s) "excluded from the other (not-cow)", nevertheless, since the term 'cow' is indeed (already) harbouring the 'exclusion of non-cow', there is no non-apprehension of the exclusion of the other (non-cow) which is (in fact) the form of an attribute (of the cow).¹

(3.19-20). For example, the awareness of the blue colour at the perception of a blue-lotus, is at once inevitable from the term 'blue-lotus' which is harbouring the blue-lotus (the positive entity); in the same (4.1-3). way, the awareness of the exclusion of not-cow from the term cow, which is harbouring the positive entity from not-cow, is invariably simultaneous with the perception of the cow, for (the exclusion of not-cow) is being the qualifier (of the cow).

(4.4-6). Just as the grasping of the simple absence (prasajya)²

1. viśeṣanabhūtasānyāpohasya.

2. prasajya. Read: prasajya. The author distinguishes between the three types of judgment, namely, two negative - prasajya-pratiśedha and paryyudāsa, and one affirmative vidhi. Cf. JN., p.205. For a fuller exposition of the three see supra Chapter V. section IV.

of perception¹ is (nothing) but the force (which) generates the negative judgment, so is the case with affirmative judgments also (the grasping of absence (in this case) is said to be that force only which in accordance to the judgment (tadanurūpa), (brings about the merits which we get from performing) rites and (giving) charity (anuṣṭhānadāna).)²

(4.7). But the apprehension of 'negation by implication'³ is based on the immediate knowledge⁴ of the thing (and therefore) is commonly applied to both (affirmative and negative judgments).

(4.8-10). Otherwise, if the discrimination of the other entity is not to be conceived at the same instant as the meaning of the term A is apprehended, the difficulty would arise: How can we act discriminately between A and not-A? Then, one could well tie horses etc., when asked to tie up a cow!⁵

1. That is 'anupalabdhi' or non-perception.

2. (.....) the passage is extremely difficult. The use of terms "anuṣṭhānadāna" or rites and charity, indicates religious tendencies of Ratnakīrti and his teacher Jñānaśrī (cf. JN., p.205). But in the present logical context I find it difficult to understand the passage clearly.

3. paryyudāsa = negation by implication.

4. samvedana.

5. Cp. Vācaspatimiśra, NVT., (Vizianagaram edition.). p.340. 23-27; Translation by Stcherbatsky, BL., Vol. II. p.418.

(4.11-13). (The Realist). Vācaspti¹ has said: "Individuals belong to universals and they are perceived (or apprehended) by judgmental constructions and words. And the form of these individuals which possess their own class-character, is excluded from the class-character of other things. Hence, since the class-character (tad) is known from (as) the understanding² (of the word), at the injunction "Tie up the cow" one does not tie up horses etc."

(4.14). (The Buddhist). This view (of the Naiyāyika) is also refuted by the same (above given) argument.

(4.15-17). However, even if we admit the discrepancy of a universal as a separate entity, the form of individuals (as posited by the realist) is indeed the one discriminated from the class-character of other things. Therefore you cannot deny (the basic argument of the Buddhist) that an individual of the same form (as you the Realist have described), and which is the object of the word and judgment (śabda-vikalpa) is the negation of the other.

1. Vācaspatimiśra (C.841), the author of the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyāṭīkā, (NVT.) who criticized the Buddhist theory of Apoha. Subsequently, Ratnakīrti, following his teacher Jñānaśrī's Apohaprakaraṇa, refuted again the Naiyāyikas' charges against the Buddhist theory. Cf. A. Thakur, RN., Introduction, p.27.
2. artha or the meaning - the objective thing. (4.15-17).

(4.18-20). Now, if it be argued (by the Realist): "If the form of an individual or a thing cognized as an individual¹ is not discriminated from the other class-character, then, this is, in fact, the (positive) presence² of its own class (that A is cognized as excluded from not-Ax)"; (otherwise without a class-character) "how can its (A) apprehension also from the (mere) understanding (of a term) be possible?"³ (The Buddhist). We have almost answered these objections.⁴

(5.1-3). And if (the Realist) here argues that A is discriminated from not-A only on the force (or due to) of its own class. (The Buddhist). Let it be due to the force of its own class. Or (as we Buddhists regard this situation) that A is discriminated from not-A on the force of the succession of its own causes. In both cases, there is, in fact, (the acceptance of) the cognition of (the act of) discrimination, in the cognition of the (positive) thing discriminated.

1. tathāpratīta.

2. prasāda: grace

3. When a thing is present and is pointed out we can cognize just an individual thing. But when a thing is not present and we apprehend it from the usage of a word or name, then, what is denoted by the word is, according to the realist, the universal entity which exists even when the individual thing is not present.

4. Cf. above As. p. 227 (3. 6-8).

(5.4-5). And, here, (the Realist's) objection - that thus an affirmative pointing use of the term 'cow' (when a cow is directly perceived) and (the judgment of) the positive cow excluded from not-cow would become interdependent - does not hold ground. For, (in the Realistic view too) there is scope for this objection even when pointing at a class or an individual possessing a class-character (for the exclusion of other class-characters is also entailed there).

(5.6-7). Since by the term "universal" (the Realist) does not intend merely (a general) universal; otherwise pointing at a horse also would be possible by the use of the term 'cow'. (Because a cow and a horse both belong to a general or common class.)

(5.7-9). But (The Realist too) intends the universal cow, 'cow-ness', (as the meaning of the term cow). And thus (in this view) also the same objection stands. (Because (then) without cognition of an individual, there can be no cognition of the universal cow, 'cow-ness'; and without cognition of the universal cow, 'cow-ness' there can be no knowledge of the (positive) individual cow which is denoted by the term 'cow'.

(5.10-12). Hence the (so-called) class-character (or universal) is, in fact, a judgmental mental construction which is preceded by (or based on) the sense perception of one (individual)

body (and thus), corresponding to an external entity (or placed in the external form)¹, as if it were a common-character (5.11-12) to all the (external) particulars; (thus) in pointing out (an external individual) cow: "this is a cow here" (this judgment) does not involve the discrepancy of mutual dependance (of a particular and its universal).

(5.13). And further, in our (Buddhist) view, (exclusion of) all other (members of the class cow) is also properly stated (or covered) by the term not-cow in the occurrence (pravṛtti) of the term cow.²

(5.14-16). And neither is there any contradiction (in the Buddhist view) that the positive and the negative (meanings are apprehended simultaneously), nor any confusion (or loss-kṣatīḥ) about the qualified and the qualifier (position of A and not-A); for both are not mutually separated³, because they

1. bahiradhyastāḥ.

2. The contention seems to be that notwithstanding the Realist view that "cow" is discriminated from "not-cow" on the basis of its own cow-ness, we are confronted with the problem of differentiating between two individual cows i.e. the possessors of the same class-character. According to the Buddhist view the term "not-cow" does not only connote lions, horses, etc. but also other individual cows - different from this cow. PV., I.80-81; 'vyāvṛttāḥ punaranyataḥ ta eva'; Kaṇḍakagomin thereupon PVST., p.190: 'arthā anyato vyāvṛttirūpīṇaḥ santaḥ punaranyataḥ sajātiyād api vyāvṛttā bhānti.'

3. 'paraspara-vyavacchedābhāvat', or "since there is nothing to separate (the qualified and the qualifier) mutually".

reside in the same locus (substance) just as the (bare) ground and the absence of the jar.¹

(5.17). The difference is due to the own (positive) nature (of A) but not due to the absence of not-A². Everybody knows this fact.³

(5.18-19). (For example). "This path leads to (the town) Srughna." Even here (in an affirmative proposition), discrimination is, indeed, cognized (from each and every word). (That is as follows):

(1). The term "this" excludes all other paths from the one indicated (or This alone, no other path which is not stated here);

(2). No other undesired place but only to Srughna; (6.1-2).

(3). 'Leads to' excludes all other forest foot-paths that end short (of Srughna);⁴

1. According to the Buddhist, 'absence of a jar', in fact, refers to the perception of the bare ground (locus) of the jar. Cf. NBT., p.22.

2. Therefore when a word denotes a positive entity it also simultaneously denotes all the attributes possessed by the positive entity.

3. ābālaprasiddham: Lit., is known by children and adults.

4. Lit., (6.1). "Since there is not cut (in this) as in a forest a foot-path, only this 'leads to'."

(4). The term 'panthā' excludes (the use of) a driver etc. (for it is only a path (panthā) not a road). (6.3) Thus discrimination (or separation) is naturally (or easily) found in each and every term.

(6.3-4). Hence (the Buddhist view is correct that) the attributive (qualifier) discrimination is cognized (or apprehended) from the word in an affirmative (positive) form; (6.5). Just as by the term "puṇḍrīka" or "white-lotus", (we cognize) a lotus which is not separated from the whiteness (attribute).

(6.5-6). (The Realists' objection). "Well, then, isn't it proper to define the meaning of a term as an affirmative (positive) alone?¹ Why do you (Buddhist) keep harping on (giyate) "Discrimination"?

(6.7). (The Buddhist rejoins). To this we have said² that it is the positive thing (affirmative meaning) qualified by the exclusion of other things (not-A), which is meant by the term "Discrimination";

(6.8). this means "the exclusion of not-A is apprehended simultaneously with the apprehension of the positive thing A, in the form of a qualifier (qualifying A)."

1. Lit., (6.5-6). "If that is so, then, it is proper to say that the meaning of a term is only a positive (affirmative) thing."

2. Cp., above A.S., (3.7-9). Also JN., p.202.

(6.9-10). And thus the (Realistic) view that even sense-perception is discriminatory,¹ is not correct; for there is no difference of opinion about (the fact) that the object of the sense-perception is an objective thing, just as the direct meaning of a word is (an objective thing).²

(6.11-12). And by the term "affirmation" (or affirmative meaning), we (Buddhists) intend (two things): (a). an external object³ - according to the logical synthesis [negatively] excluded from all other forms (of things); and (b). an ideal image - corresponding to the pure sensation (of the thing).

(6.13).⁴ Here, an external (particular) object is established (by the Buddhists) as verbally expressible in terms of the logical synthesis only.⁵

1. Cp. above AS (2.20), and (3.2).

2. śabda-pratyaya = abhidā or 'simple meaning of a word'. But "the cow", or "this is a cow" are not simple meanings but judgmental or determinative meanings and therefore entail "discrimination".

3. 'bāhy-ārtha': The term 'ārtha' in Sanskrit has as many shades as the English "meaning" but here with 'bāhya' it is clearly intended to mean an objective thing.

4. Stop after 'buddhyākāraśca'. Cf. RN., p.55.

5. Cp. JN., p.208: "artho dvividhaḥ bāhya āntaraśca, bāhyaḥ adhyavaśāyādeva vācyo vyavasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇa-parispūrṭtyā."

(6.14-15). (But), not because the thing-in-itself reflects (in the word).¹ The "thing-in-itself" (reality) does not appear (in the word) as [it does] in sense-perception, where it becomes manifest² with the fixed³ time and space (momentary) relation.⁴

(6.15-17). (The following reference of) the authoritative work⁵ also does (substantiate the Buddhist view): "The (real) thing is called "unexpressible by the word"⁶ because by its name it is not reflected in the mind (in the same way) as (it does) in the perception."⁷

1. The Buddhists do not admit that the extreme particular real can be "uttered". The thing-in-itself is unutterable. Cf. Stcherbatsky's rendering of NVTT., on Apohavāda, BL., II. p.425 (342.6) n.4 and p.264 (88.26).

2. pravakta.

3. niyata.

4. Cp. BL., II. p.264 (88.25): "Thus it is that what is really perceived (by the senses) is not the meaning (sambandha) of a name, and what is meant by a name is not what is really perceived (by the senses)." See also Keith's Atomism., p. 101 n.2. and NBT., p.16 referred to therein.

5. According to Prof. Anantalal Thakur (RN., p.151) this passage refers to a work 'Sākārasaṃgrahasūtra' of Jñānaśrī, the Buddhist teacher of Ratnakīrti. The work is awaiting publication in the near future along with other essays of Jñānaśrī, in the JN.

6. śabdenāvyāpṛta. Lit., 'not covered by the word'.

7. Cf. below A.S., (11.17), 'na svalakṣaṇasya śabdavikalpa-lingapratibhāsitvam'.

(6.18-19). (Now, the Realist may argue): "The difference of reflexion of the same (one) thing is due to the difference of the means¹ - (i.e. either) the senses or the word (of cognizing) reality"² ?³ (The Buddhist). To this also (Dharmakīrti)⁴ said: (7.1-2). "of a thing as a whole" the other" is, indeed engendered by the mind on the basis of different locus for instance, the blue colour in different substances. (Q). How can (different) form be of the same (one) thing? (Ans.). That (difference) reflects (not the point instant thing but) different images(a) (mentally constructed)."⁵

1. upāyabhedāt.

2. svabhāva.

3. Since, according to the Buddhists, only the svalakṣaṇa is perceived, ākāra = vikalpa = anyāpoha or universal or difference is the object of the term (word), the Realists argue; why not admit different reflexions viz., particular and universal, as the two real parts of one object and their difference based on the difference of medium of cognition?

4. This verse occurs in Dharmakīrti's PV., III.236.

5. The reality of the extreme particular point-instant cannot be divided on the ground that it is apprehended with different substances and through different means. Cp. Prajñākaragupta, PVP., p.302 (on Dharmakīrti's PV. III. 236), and p.621 'anyāpohaḥ śabdārthaḥ' section.

(7.3-5). There are no two mutually contradictory forms, viz., determinate (particular) and non-determinate (universal), belonging to one and the same entity;¹ so that by one form (the former), it would be reflected in the cognition of the sense-perception (=sensation) and by the other in the reproductive imagination (= reason).² If it were so, then, indeed, the object (it-self) would have to be divided³, while, in fact, the distinct-ness of a thing is nothing else but its distinct self-character.⁴ (7.6-7). And the distinct self-character is nothing other than the distinct reflexion (produced by the thing in our mind).⁵ Otherwise, (if the Realist does not accept this view that reality is only the particular thing that has efficiency to produce a distinct reflexion), the whole of the Universe would be (apprehended as) only one thing (i.e. the non-determinate Existent Universal and everyday behaviour would be impossible).⁶

1. Here, Ratnakīrti is verbally quoting his 'guru' cp. JN., p. 208-209.

2. vikalpa.

3. bheda-prāpteh

4. This means: Not-(not-A) = A because A = A. The argument is in support of the Buddhist view that the particular positive qualified entity is alone the real "thing-in-itself" (svakṣaṇa).

5. Thus, since attributes, universals, actions, and inherence (relation) do not produce any distinct or separate reflex from the substance, they possess no distinct efficiency by themselves and therefore cannot be regarded as separate or distinct entities. Cf. Stcherbatsky's Bl., II, p. 266 (89.8-11).

6. In fact, the NV. authors do admit a higher type of universality "which consists of existence alone", cf. Keith's Atomism., p. 193; PBh., (1895), p. 11.

(7.8-9). If (the Realist) argues: "When two persons are sitting on the same branch of a tree, one at a nearer point (to us) and the other at a farther point, although (we have) determinate and non-determinate (separate) reflexions (= sensations) (of the two), there is an (another) reflexion of a common reality (or universal also) that both are sitting on the same branch"¹? (7.10-11). This is not so. We (the Buddhist) assert (brūmaḥ) that the distinct momentary indefinite sensation (pratibhāsa-bheda) is determined (niyata), (i.e., it refers to) by the non-dichotomised entity (abhinnavastu). Moreover, it is a unique positive object (ekaviṣayatva) determined by the absence (of the other things). Hence, (the experience) of a distinct entity, such as a jar, is there where there is the distinct momentary indefinite sensation (pratibhāsa-bheda) assisted by the distinct causal efficiency etc.² (7.12-13). In other case (the person having) only one reflexion is illusioned, again by the (same)³ rule "absence (of

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1. Lit., (7.9). 'na śākhibheda iti cet'? there is no difference of (their) being on the same branch.'
 2. Reflexion is of two types: (1) of real and (2) of unreal. Where it is produced by something which is an efficient point instant entity, i.e., the reality for the Buddhist and in such cases the judgment 'this is A' contains the negation of all that which is not-A. But the other type of reflexion is produced by mental constructions in which we fail to grasp the difference between two point instant particulars and consequently ascribing to them a common-characteristic, such as śākhina or 'sitting on the same branch'. This reflexion of an unreal attribute is the universal reality for the Realist but absence of grasping the difference of particulars for the Buddhist. Cp. Stcherbatsky, BL., II. pp. 403-4, p. 412 n. 6.
 3. Cp. above (7.10-11).

grasping) one objectiveness (of two things is illusory)" (i.e. neglecting the difference).¹ (7.14-15). Now, (we come to) another argument of Vācaspati according to which (the Realist) asserts: "since the difference of impercipient and percipient is based on the difference of (respective) causes, no (difficulty) of non-differentiation of apprehension (i.e. illusion) of an object perceived through words and the senses will arise"?² (7.16-18). (The Buddhist). This view is not satisfactory.³ For this view that an indirect cognition (can also be) the object of direct objective perception, cannot be supported. Because the ground of imperceptibility (of discrimination or apoha) is (its) separate cause (apoha being a logical synthesis), which is meaningful⁴ only because (its) apprehension is not possible by sense-perception.⁵ (7.18-20). Hence, it is not "the thing-in-itself" (svalakṣaṇa) which is apprehended⁶ in verbal cognition.⁷

Furthermore, if "the thing-in-itself" is to be the direct meaning of the word, (then), the thing should be known (at once) in its entire extension (and so) there should be no

1. Stcherbatsky's rendering of NVTT., BL., II.p.413 n.1: (339. 28-340.5).

2. Cp. the Realist's view, BL., II.p.286 (93.20).

3. 'nopayogi', lit., 'not useful'.

4. kṛtārthaḥ

5. Cp. BL., II. pp.258-261 (88.1-10)

6. parisphurati.

7. śābdapratyaye.

(need of) affirmative and negative propositions about it (or related to it).¹

(8.1-3). If A is existent, it is superfluous to say "A exists", (and) the negative judgment "A does not exist" is not valid.

On the other hand, if A is not existent, the judgment "A does not exist" is superfluous and "A exists" is not valid. But

there are such propositional usages (concerning the same entity), as "A exists" (and does not exist) etc.

(8.3-4). Therefore, (reality) cannot be the object of reflexion of the term (word) which is common to express both the existence and non-existence (i.e. relativity) of an external thing.²

(8.5-6). Furthermore, Vācaspati (the Realist), having explained the meaning of the term 'individual' as that which possesses a universal by itself, subsequently stated:

(8.6-12)³ "Nor is it right to maintain that if the Universal were (a reality) expressed in its name, the name could not be positive and negative, (as admitting equally a connection with

1. Cp. BL., II.p.264 (88.25) "Thus it is that what is really perceived (by the senses) is not the meaning of a name, and what is meant by a name is not what is really perceived (by the senses)."

2. The Buddhist contention is that if the genus Existence (sattā) were inherent in "cow" - as the Realist believes - "the judgment "the cow is not" or "there is not cow" would be a contradiction". Cp. BL., II.p.415 n.3 and p.416 n.4 "Since in the absolute there is no possibility of affirmation-negation (nopalabhyate sādharāṇa-grahāṇam), every thing we can alternately affirm and deny is excluded from the domain of real, i.e., absolute existence." See also Siddheshwar Varma,

existence and non-existence).¹

(8.6-12). A Universal, indeed, is by itself an eternal (unchanging) entity, but as residing in an infinite number of particulars scattered about in space and time it can be alternately affirmed and denied. We can sometimes say "it is", and sometimes "it is not". Its existence is nothing but its actual presence in a particular thing, its non-existence is (its absence, i.e.), its residence in a past or in a future space-time. Thus the proposition "whatsoever can be alternately affirmed and denied (is unreal)"², ~~this proposition~~

footnote continued from previous page:

Shastri, Analysis of Meaning in the Indian Philosophy of Language, JRAS., (1925), p.30.

3. The whole of the following passage of Vācaspati's NVTT., has been completely translated by Stcherbatsky in BL., II. pp. 421-2. (341.9-12). It should be remembered that Vācaspatimīśra (c.841 A.D.) had mainly criticized Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara and Ratnakīrti following his teacher Jñānaśrī (c.10250 A.D.) was the last Buddhist author in the History of Indian Philosophy to refute the charges of the Brāhmanic schools against Buddhism. Cf. Thakur, Int., to RN.

1. (BL., II. p.421 n.5). "e.g., "a cow is", "a cow is not"; we cannot say "something is", "something is not", because something is a thing and "is" by itself....According to the Naiyāyika the genus Existence (sattā) is inherent in a cow, it must then be inseparable from it. According to the Buddhist Existence or "Something" existent is the transcendental substratum of a cow's reality.
2. Cf. above p.20 (8.3-4).

cannot be admitted as proved,¹ since its contraposition, (viz., the proposition "whatsoever is real cannot be alternately affirmed and denied") is not proved. It is even wrong,² (since we have given an explanation of the fact of an alternate affirmation and negation)."³

(8.13-14). (The Buddhist). This has been wrongly uttered⁴ (by Vācaspati). But from this too there is no potential opposition⁵ to the view⁶ presented (or upheld by the Buddhists). Since, by stressing the universal⁷ (as the meaning of the word or name) you yourself have admitted that 'the thing-in-itself'⁸ (point-instant) is not denoted by the word.

1. anaikāntikam saṁdigdha-vyatirekitvāt - Lit., "not absolute because of a doubtful contraposition". BL., II. p.422 n.1.
2. anyathāsiddham.
3. Cp. S.Varma, JRAS., 1929, p.24 (1). Vācaspatimiśra maintained that a word denotes the universal including individuals.
4. vilapitam or Lit., meaningless saying.
5. kṣatiḥ : Lit., damage.
6. prakṛta.
7. jātau bhāram nyasyatā. Read 'bhāram' instead of 'bharam', cf., RN., p.56. Lit., 'placing the weight on the universal'.
8. svalakṣaṇa.

(8.15-16). Moreover, in all cases¹ (of propositional functions) it is the identity² of 'the thing-in-itself'³ of Reality⁴ which is conceived⁵ as existence etc. While⁶ (Vācaspati's statement) about the Universal: "Its existence etc. is nothing but its actual presence etc., in a particular thing"⁷ - is merely (as) fooling a child.⁸

(8.17-18). Thus, to say that it is the individual which possesses the universal, is neither correct;⁹ if the individual is established by its perception, (and the Realist believes that the universal is also a distinct entity, then), the universal must (also) be perceived in addition¹⁰ (to its individual);

(9.1). Or, for the sake of argument let us admit that the universal is not perceived although it is a distinct entity (=mā vā) even then (the Realist) cannot be free from error in his view that (only) the particular is perceived, (and not the universal). (because he lands himself in contradictions)

1. sarvatra or lit., everywhere.

2. svabhāva or lit., the self-nature.

3. svalakṣaṇa Cf. BL., II. p.416 n.4.

4. padārtha or category.

5. cintyate.

6. tu or lit., but or on the other hand.

7. Cf. above p.244(8.6-12). "Etc." means non-existence. That is Vācaspati said: "Non-existence of a universal is its residence in a past or in a future space-time."

8. bāla-pratāraṇam.

9. doṣaḥ or lit., error or discrepancy.

10. adhikā.

(9.2-4). Now, (the Buddhist proposes to refute) the view of the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa:¹ "Since reality consists of (two) aspects (or parts)² there is no discrepancy in the view that (an universal = reality) is common (to both existence and non-existence).³ The tree-ness⁴ is apprehended⁵ from the word (tree) without determining (its) existence or non-existence. (And) it is related with either of the two (i.e., existence or non-existence) (only) after understanding another word (the predicate 'is' or 'is not')."⁶

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1. For Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's view see Śl. Vārt., sections on Apohavāda and Abhāva.
 2. sabhāgatva. The postulation of the division of reality into "existence" (bhāva) and "non-existence" (abhāva), by the Realistic schools seems to be mainly to oppose the Buddhist theory of Apoha in defence of the universal as reality (padārtha). The very fact that the Bhāṭṭas and the later NV. after Udayana posit this twofold division of reality indicates the Buddhist pressure on them. (Cf. Kir., p.1.). Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was the foremost opponent of the Buddhists amongst the Mīmāṃsakas and Udayana (nv) undertook the task of defending the Brahmanical logical system. In his 'Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-parīśuddhi' and 'Ātma-tattva-viveka' his main task has been to refute Ratnakīrti and Jñānaśrī. (Cf. RN., Int., pp. 21-2, and Int., JN., by Thakur).
 3. Cf., S.Varma, JRAS., 1929, p.24 (1); Śl. Vārt., p.476 Ab. Chapter, verse 12, and p.599, Apoha ch., verses 110, 125.
 4. vrkṣatvam.
 5. avagamyate.
 6. BL., II. p.265 n.11.

(9.5-6). (The Buddhist rejoins). This view is also inconsistent;¹ since the cognition² of a constant and imperishable³ universal, (i.e. a positive existent thing), cannot coincide⁴ with an object of which existence and non-existence is not (yet) determined.

(9.6-8). (The Mīmāṃsaka's argument). It may be said that "The way of understanding the meaning of words⁵ is not the same as that of sense-perception. For as the perception of a thing, does not depend on (the use of) predicates such as 'is' etc., (the meaning of a word can also be established without "is" etc.) For the means of valid knowledge⁶ (i.e. word) possess an unique force (to bring about the cognition the universal entity which is not capable to be perceived by the simple sense-perception)."⁷

(9.9-11). (The Buddhist). This view is also rejected by the refutation (of the realistic view) that there is a separate entity to be judged (or reflected)⁸ (apart from the extreme

1. asaṃgatam.

2. pratipatti or apprehension or perception.

3. nitya or eternal.

4. ayoga or that which cannot be yoked together.

5. artha-pratyāyana-prakāraḥ.

6. pramāṇa.

7. The contention is that the perception refers to the thing itself while the word (śabdapramāṇa) corresponds to the universal and this is the unique force of the means word.

8. avabhāṣate.

particular real), since what is grasped by the sensual and the verbal reflexions¹ (in the mind) is the one-and-the-same identical particular reality.² As (to the second argument) viz. that of "the unique force of the means of knowledge", (we Buddhists also honour the force of the pramāṇas but we say) that it can also be meaningful³ (even if you accept the view that only the unitary particular reality is apprehended) by direct sense-perception and by the logical synthesis (expressible by the word).⁴

(9.12-13). Thus, if the object of (direct) sense-perception (can also be) apprehended (or grasped)⁵ by the verbal (reflexion), the experience⁶ should also be the same (as in the sense-perception). And since (that) does not happen⁷ (a term) cannot convey⁸ an object which belongs to that (direct sense-

1. aindriyakaśābda-pratibhāsayoḥ.

2. ekasvarūpa. That is only one unitary entity: not consisting of both particularity and universality as the Realists believe.

3. caritārtham.

4. sāksātkārādhyavasāyābhyām. The term adhyavasāya means 'judgmental perception' as opposed to 'direct sense-perception' and thus expressed by the word.

5. pratipādanam.

6. avabhāsa. The contention is that if the efficient reality were utterable, our experience at the utterance of the word or the name would be the same as that of the sense contact. The mouth should burn and cold disappear by the pronouncement of 'f-i-re'. Cf. BL., II. p.264 (88.26) and also f.n.11.

7. abhavan.

8. khyāpanam.

perception).¹

(9.14-15). (The Mīmāṃsaka). "Since by the term "tree" (only) the tree-ness, (the universal) part of (the reality), is evoked in the mind,² the use of the predicate "is" etc., (is necessary) for determining (the other) part (of the reality), existence (particular entity) etc."? If this be the argument (of the Mīmāṃsaka) (the Buddhist answer is as follows).

(9.16-17). "Since, the "thing-in-itself" (reality) is unitary³ and grasped in sense-perception in its entirety, there is no (other separate part of reality), left out of the perception, and to be grasped by another term (or predicate "is" and "is not");⁴ nor by another means of knowledge [is it possible to establish] another attribute which is (not already invoked by) the affirmation or negation (of the thing).⁵

1. The Buddhist contention is that the reality is in-itself single, -an unitary particular. It is not a dual entity, coinciding particular and universal. Thus in the direct sense-perception only this unitary thing is perceived which alone is the efficient real entity. But the subject of a judgmental perception (adhyavasāya = vikalpa) is not the momentary, particular thing-in-itself but its general image, a mentally constructed non-efficient logical synthesis and this alone is the subject of affirmation or negation. Therefore the word denotes only the relation between the momentary thing and its image and this (relation) is not an universal reality but merely a logical synthesis. Cf. RN., pp.67-8; BL., II. pp.424-425.

2. codite.

3. niramśa. Cf.

4. Lit., 'ko'vakāśaḥ' - what scope is there? PVS., p.139, "nirbhāgasya rastuno grahaṇe ko'nyastadā na grahitaḥ." BL., II. p.269 (90.2).

5. According to the Buddhist view when a thing A is affirmed or denied, its whole unitary self is affirmed or denied in its entirety. If it be affirmed all its attributes (perceived) are affirmed thereby. And if it be denied all its attributes

(9.18). (The Mīmāṃsakas' objection). "Even after a simple sense-perception dependence on other means of knowledge (for the judgment) is found (necessary)"¹?

(9.19-20). (The Buddhist answers). That may be true² only with regard to a thing whose form and characteristics are not familiar. In that case the sense-perception is not successful in determining (the fact); But in the case of a mental construction (i.e., the term = logical synthesis) which is itself a determinative, there is no need for another means (of judgment) for its apprehension.³

(10.1). But to grasp the (distinct) reality of an object (we) do depend on other (different) terms and the logical marks.⁴

Footnote continued from previous page:

are denied. Cf. PVP., p.616 "na ca kiñcid avasitam kiñcinneti śakya samarthanam. vibhāgasyāsattvāt." See also PV., IV. 230-231; PVS., p.122 "...anavakāśaḥ pramāṇāntarasya vṛttiḥ."

1. As, for example, a child for the first time seeing a red rose, without the authority of the corresponding Word (śabdapramāṇa), i.e., of an elder person or a descriptive work, cannot have the judgment "this is a red rose". Thus the Realists maintain that to perceive a real universal attribute, such as colour, name etc. of a thing we depend on a pramāṇa other than the simple sense-perception, viz. the śabda or Word determining the cognition of universal reality.
2. bhavatu.
3. The Buddhist regards vikalpa = adhyavasāya as a logical synthesis. Although ultimately based on perception it is free from the sense-object contact. RN., p.83: "pratyakṣam anumānam pratyakṣaprasthābhāvī ca vikalpaḥ" and p.124: "agrhiṭo'pi pravṛttiviśayo dhyavaseyaḥ".
4. The question is that since the Buddhist admits only one unitary reality and that is the object of sense-perception, why does he, then, need to posit any other means of judgment viz., Inference or word and reason = śabdalinga = apoha; and how can any other means be valid without corresponding to any reality? See BL., II. p.270 (90.3); PV., I.49.

(10.2-4). (The Realist). "Since, such properties as the universal (particular) etc. are different (real) attributes¹ (of the same object) and are mutually harbouring² each other, although, from the term "tree" (i.e. the possessor of branches)³ we know the tree as the possessor of only one attribute viz., its one universal character; the tree is not apprehended as being the possessor of another (its particular) characteristic (Therefore), (10.5). is it not (a fact that) there is a cognition⁴ of another characteristic viz., the quality of possessing very high branches floating in the blue sky, etc., (and) this (other characteristic) is expressed by another name?"⁵

(10.6-7). (The Buddhist). This view is inconsistent; for (we Buddhists have already stated that) it is the undivided (unitary)⁶ reality of the 'thing-in-itself' that is reflected in the sense-perception.⁷ (And also) because (the judgment of)

1. dharma or attribute.

2. dharmin (substance) locus.

3. śākhin.

4. avabodhaḥ.

5. Cp. BL., II. p.275 (91.1).

6. akhaṇḍa = niraṃśa. Cp. above AS. (9.16). According to K.K. Raja the Buddhist theory of Apoha may be included in "the Akhaṇḍapakṣa or the Gestalt view, of which Bhartrihari, who wrote the Vākyapadīya in the fourth century A.D., is the greatest exponent, (according to which) the fundamental linguistic fact is the sentence considered as an integral language symbol. Words are mere abstractions made from the sentence by linguistic analysis and have only a pragmatic value."

'Theory of Meaning According to Buddhist Logicians', op.cit.p.1-2

7. Cp. PVS., pp.241-242 and Karmakagomin therein: 'nāhi vṛkṣādiṣu dvau pratibhāṣāv upalabhyete. ekaḥ śākhādyākāro' paraścāśāk-hādyākāraḥ.' We do not have two cognitions of one tree viz., one consisting of the branches and the other of not-branches.

the difference between the characteristics and the characterized perceptual thing does not arise out of the sense-perception. (Differentiation is logical and thus a cognitive act.) (10.8-9). Otherwise there would be the inconsistency¹ of everything being present everywhere.² This has been well explained in the *sāstra*³ (in this way): (Our every day) behaviour of (distinguishing between) characteristics and the characterized (or Quality and Substance), is, indeed, (not based on their real difference) but grounded in the mentally constructed difference.⁴

(10.10). Or let us suppose that the difference of the characteristic and the characterized is real.⁵ (10.11-12). Nevertheless, since both are corrupted (falsely assumed to be

1. atiprasaṅgaḥ.
2. If "Differentiation" were not cognitive but perceptual we would have perceived at once all that what is not-A in the determination of A. Cp. BL., II. pp.267 - ff.
3. We are not sure whether Ratnakīrti here refers to Dharmakīrti or Jñānaśrī. However the same expressions can be found in the passages ascribed to Dharmakīrti by Stcherbatsky, cf. BL., II. p.273 n.2.
4. Cp. BL., II. p.275 (90.28), "(The Buddhist's view is that) the attributes are not something apart from the substance of the thing, but productive imagination constructs them as something different. Thus (the synthetic images) are not due to a stimulus coming from the object, (but to imagination)".
5. pāramārthikah.

interdependent)¹ by Inherence etc. (they cannot be apprehended separately and) their relational knowledge² must be posited only as qualifying³ (each other)⁴. (10.12-16). And thus, just as in perception through the relational knowledge (or the judgmental relation) arising from the sense-contact, all the characteristics are apprehended when the thing characterized is apprehended,⁵ so should all the characteristics (referred to by not-A) be apprehended, when the characterized (A) is apprehended, by the term and the logical mark⁶ which are invariably concomitant⁷ with the relation of the denoted and the denotative⁸ etc; for the relational knowledge is just the same (in both the cases viz., the sense-contact and the constructive judgment or the synthetic judgment).⁹

1. dūṣitatvād.

2. pratyāsatti. Cp. below AS., (10.16).

3. upakāralaksanā.

4. Cp. BL., II. pp.266-267 (n.3 on p.267).

5. Or: at the apprehension of the substance all its attributes are apprehended through the judgmental relation (pratyāsatti) simultaneously in the sense-perception...

6. śabdaliṅga = apoha, or discrimination.

7. pratibaddha. Cf. BL., II. p.416 n.2.

8. vācya-vācaka = kārya-kāraṇa = jñāpya-jñāpakabhāvaḥ. Although these terms differ in their connotative usage they express the 'cause and effect' relation. Cp. PKM., (2nd ed.) p.441; NVTT., (Banares ed.) p.135.

9. The contention of the passage seems to be that the relation between A and not-A or the characterized and the characteristic or the particular and the so called universal cannot be that of the cause and effect and therefore we do not cognize two separate entities. Cf. BL., II. p.267. However the relation between the word and the differentiated conceptual image is that of the cause and effect and therefore the term denotes discrimination or apoha. Cp. BL., II. p.287 n.3.

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(10.17-19). (The Realist's argument). And Vācaspati further argued: "When a substance¹ is qualified by one attribute² (and) is grasped (so), (then), this is not apprehended as being qualified by another attribute (or universal). Indeed, the substance of the thing (or the identity of the substance)³ is characterized by the attributes. (11.1). But neither the attributes nor their relation to the substance⁴ are identical with the substance itself. (All are separate entities.)⁵ (11.1). (The Buddhist rejoins). This view is also not sound.⁶ (11.2-3). (In the Buddhist view), in fact, the apprehension of different attribute(s) is not implied⁷ in the non-differentiated (cognition of the thing), since the apprehension of the characterized is entailed in the apprehension of the characteristic only if it is preceded⁸ by the knowledge of the difference (between the two viz., the characterized and the

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1. sattva or reality or thing.
 2. upādhi or an imposed property.
 3. svabhāvo hi dravyasya. Lit., the self-nature of the substance.
 4. viśeṣyatvam = viśiṣṭatvam = sambandha = samavāya. Cf. BL., II. p. 288 n.5.
 5. Stcherbatsky's translation of the NVT., of Vācaspati, apparently of the same passage which has been referred to here by Ratnakīrti is as follows: "And not, if this one is characterized by one characteristic, the consequence of it's being perceived as characterized by other characteristics. Indeed, the substance of the thing is characterized by the characteristics but neither the characteristics nor the fact of being characterized by them are the substance." BL., II. p. 288. n. 7. Lit., (93.26-28).
 6. plavaṭa eva. Or weightless or does not hold ground.
 7. Read 'āsañjitaṃ'. "māsañjitaṃ" is apparently a printing mistake. Cf. below line 12 and cp. RN., p. 57.
 8. puraskṛtya. Lit., having placed before.

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characteristic). (11.4-5). And further, it is not correct to posit¹ the rule of natural relation between substance and attribute, in the same way as (it is applied to) the cause and effect relation of fire and smoke.² (11.5-7). For even the two (the substance and the attribute) are not validly established (as two separate entities). And it is logically correct that (you can) describe reality³ (only) when it has been validly established.⁴ (11.8-9). (The Realistic view of the "Nyāyabhūṣana").⁵ And here in the Nyāyabhūṣana it is said that the apprehension of the sun⁶ etc. entails the apprehension of the whole of the collection⁷ of things that are qualified

1. kalpanam.

2. "The reality of relations required as a corollary the stability (sthāyitva) of enduring objects. The Buddhist who denied this stability and converted the existence of every object into a stream of momentary events (kṣaṇikatva) divided all relations into real (vāstava) - that was the relation of Causality between the consecutive moments and logical (kalpita) - these were the relations of the thing with its attributes and motions superimposed (āropita) upon it by productive imagination (kalpanā = vikalpa-vāsanā)." (See further there). Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.287 n.3.

3. svabhāva.

4. "The Buddhists do not admit the transcendental reality of the relation between substance and quality (dharma-dharmi-bhāva). The substance alone is reality, the qualities are construction." Stcherbatsky, BL., II. p.58 n.1. See also PV., I.49, "dharmīṇaḥ siddhau siddham kim ataḥ param".

5. A work by the logician Bhāsarvajña, the author of the Nyāyasāra. The text of the Nyāyabhūṣana "has not yet come to light and our source of information about it is restricted to the quotations found scattered in later works." A.Thakur, R.N. Int., p.25. See also p.24; Vidyābhūṣana, HIL., p.358.

6. sūryyādi. The example of the sun seems to indicate the problem of the relation of the word and its meaning, i.e. to know the word is to know all that what it expresses.

7. aśeṣavastu-rāśi.

by it (the sun), (and thus with the perception of the qualifier, (i.e., one universal all individuals can be apprehended).

(11.9-10). (The Buddhist rejoins). This (the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa's argument) is the result of not understanding (the Buddhist) intention (abhiprāya) (properly). Thus, in your view there is (a real) difference between the attribute and the substance and they are cognized as related by qualifying relation only.¹

(11.11-12). Thus, (in your opinion) in the cognition of the qualifier is entailed (āsañjitam) the cognition of only that qualificand which resides in the same locus (in which resides its qualifier) and which is (it-self) only a form of an attribute.² (11.13-14). In that case, it may be asked: How can (your statement) be regarded as 'consistent' if its inconsistency is (so) apparent?³ For (in your example) the apprehension of such a thing is involved which, although residing in a place or a substance different from the sun, is still qualified by it. (11.15-18). Because, (you assert that) if we investigate a

1. upakāralakṣaṇaiva.

2. The contention seems to be is that since the relation between the attribute and the substance is posited to be complimentary (upakāralakṣaṇā pratyāsatti). if A qualifies B, then, by knowing A we shall as well know B only if both reside in the same locus and in some way B also is complimentary to A, for according to the Realists A, B and their R (relation) all are real entities.

3. dr̥ṣṭavyabhicāra.

particular thing¹ by means of one of its attributes, it is known in its entirety; (it may be asked then) What scope is there for other positive or negative statements concerning it? However, there are (asti) (affirmative and negative propositions concerning, e.g., a tree); thus it is established that "it is not the "the thing-in-itself" which is reflected in the words, judgments and logic." (For these refer only to logical synthesis and constructive imagination, but not to "sensation" or direct perception.)²

(11.19-20). Moreover, Universals do not form the prima facie (mental) content of words. For instance, in the proposition "cows are grazing (caranti) across the river", - (12.1-3) since there is here no consideration of individuals belonging to the same class - they appear as it were, brought together into one (unidentified) mass³ of dewleps, horns, and tails etc. by the image of the letters (akṣarākāra) (of the word c-o-w). And this (mass) is (certainly) not a universal (even in terms of the realistic definition).

1. vastu-svabhāva.

2. Cf. above (7.18- 8.1-4); BL., II. p.264 (88.25); S.Varma, JRAS., (1929), p.30; PVS., pp.384-385.

3. sampiṣḍitaprāyāḥ.

(12.4). An universal is, indeed, defined (by the Realists) (as a distinct transcendental reality) to be distinguished from the colour and the shape (of the cow) (and) the letters (constituting the term "c o w").¹

(12.5-7). And (thus) this is called "the universal" (by the Realists): The mere (form of) the dewlap and horn etc., which resides in all (the multitudes of) its individuals. Although it is absolutely distinct from them, it is capable of coalescing with the particular individuals.² (But) since in an external (objective) form, no such "thing" (universal) is perceived, it is indeed, a (mere) illusion, like the appearance of (new)

1. The complete verse in Dharmakīrti's PV., III. 147, is as follows:

"yadyapy-anvayi vijñānam śabda-vyakty-avabhāsi tat. varṇnākṛty-akṣar-ākāraśūnyam gotvam hi varṇnyate." Translation: "Although the affirmative cognition of an universal is that which appears in the apprehension of the name (or word) (cow) and the individual (body cow), it is, indeed, defined as... (as above translated)".

In this verse, according to Prof. A. Thakur in a letter to me, "Dharmakīrti gives the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view about Universals".

2. For the Realist view see BL., II, p.274 n.9.

hair.¹ (12.8). Thus, let this paradox² be (solved by admitting) the (universal) as an internal mental construction due to our (eternal) habit³ (of coalescing dissimilar particulars as similar in the mind by negating a common counter-correlate). (12.9). Or let its form be known as merely unreal.⁴ (12.10-11). Or let it be the erroneous appearance of the neglected difference of the (extreme) particulars belonging to the same class (i.e., possessing similar attributes although they are different), due to their being experienced at different moments.⁵ (12.11). Or we may call it a confusion of memory.⁶

1. keśa. Dharamkīrti in PV., III. 503-5, refuting Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's view of the pratyabhijñā or "this is that", says that although the judgment "this is that" arises in the perception of newly grown hair, of a ball repeatedly produced by a magician and of the ever new flames of a candle, this is in fact not a perception, as the Mīmāṃsaka believes it is "This is that" - involves the imposition of the attribute which is previously experienced and now remembered and due to this imposition there is an illusion or failure of apprehension of difference between the first point instant of reality and the second, the third and so forth. See also, Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, DD., p.798;
2. vivartta, or confusion or illusion.
3. vāsanā. Cf. BL., II, p.418 n.11; PVS., pp.319, 384, PV., I. 207-8.
4. asadeva.
5. anubhava-vyavadhāna. Cp. above f.n.1.
6. smṛti-pramoṣa=pramoṣa=viparyaya-jñānam=vivekākhyāti. This is Prabhākara's view. Cf. PKM., p.54: "tacca (rajatajñānam) smarāṇamapi svarūpeṇa nāvabhāṣata iti smṛti (śūktikāyam) pramoṣo'bhidhīyate (prābhākareṇa)." And also Pt. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, (Hindi) Int., ibid., p.23.

(12.12). (Thus), in all cases¹ the cognition² of the universal corresponds to nothing in reality.³ Therefore how can we talk about the reality of the universal?

(12.13-14). And again, the objection (of the Realist) that the knowledge of the universal, without its corresponding reality, would become accidental cognition, is not correct.

(12.14-16). Because, (the Buddhist answers) the totality of the causes producing a non-distinct cognition⁵ qualified⁶ by the force of the cooperating⁷ memory of the previously perceived object creates a mentally constructed universal (image) which has no corresponding (external) object.

(12.16-18). Hence, verbal cognition does not produce the appearance of the unreal (in the mind); nor does it arise in sense-perception,⁸ nor can it be established (as an entity)

1. sarvathā.

2. pratyaya or understanding.

3. nirviṣayaḥ. Lit., having no corresponding subject.

4. ākasmika.

5. aviśeṣapratyaya-janikā-sāmagrī.

6. atirīcya mānā.

7. sahakāriṇā.

8. It should be remembered that the Realists regard the universal (sāmānya) as a perceptual reality, perceived through the individual body in which it inheres. Cf. Keith's Atomism., pp.75-76.

by Inference; since it is non-empirical, there can be no perception of the "reason" (līṅga) containing the invariable concomitant relation. (12.19-). Nor can it be established (as a self determining entity) like the sense-organs.

(13.1). Since it is an effect of the cognitive act, it is established only on something produced¹ by a different cause.²

(13.1-5). (The Realist's argument). If the absence of the cognition of a cow is pointed out in (the presence of) another body (not-cow)³ or (when the cow is removed) by a distance of time and place,⁴ then the negation is based on the absence of all individuals cows, including the spotted, (the red and white ones etc.,) The Realist then asked, since negation is brought about by the cognition of (absence of the universal) cow, how can negation (of such a characteristic) entail⁵ another entity?⁶ (Moreover), A is said to be the body of (an

1. kādācitkasya.

2. The contention seems to be that on the basis of things which are different in their causes - we mentally construct their different classes.

3. piṇḍāntare. This perhaps refers to the situation of mutual absence or the anyonyābhāva, in which, for the Realist, there are two separate positive universals in the two opposed entities.

4. antarāle vā. This seems to refer to prāg (prior), pradhvaṃsa (posterior), and atyanthābhāva (absolute absence).

5. akṣipet.

6. That is - since 'not cow' means the absence of cow-ness, how can the negation of cow create another universal viz., lion, horse etc., i.e. everything which is referred to by 'now-cow'? According to the Realistic view it is the absence of the universal cow that is cognized in the cognition of things which are referred to by the term 'not-cow'. But according to the Buddhist this creates a mental universal image of things that are "not-cow".

individual) cow only because it possesses the characteristic of the universal -cow (ness). Otherwise (the term) "the body of the cow" could also refer to a horse.

(13.5-7) (The Buddhist rejoins). If it is true that the universal cow-ness exists because of the body cow, individual cows - as substantiated the argument that in the contrary case (the term) cow-ness could also refer to horse-ness, then, "Does it not follow that the cow-ness is, in fact, (produced by) the causal efficiency of the individual cow?"

(13.8-11). (The Realist). "If the (causal) efficiency of producing the apprehension of the universal¹ is not separate from the one body (individual), then, another body (individual of the same class e.g. a red cow), is not capable to be differentiated from the other class.² But if (the efficiency of producing) is separate (from one individual body), then, that very (separate) thing is the universal.³ (Thus), the greatest

1. sāmānya-pratyaya-janana-sāmarthyam.

2. That is:- if only one individual, a white cow has the potential efficiency to produce the apprehension of the cow-ness, and, is not separated from it, then, another individual - a red cow could not have the same efficiency and thus not be differentiated (on the basis of its own class) from universals of horses, lions etc., for all individuals, even of the same class, differ in their causal efficiency or individuality.

3. In the text (13.10). stop after "sāmānyam"; cf. RN., P.58.

controversy is only about the name (universal, not about its contents)." (13.11-13). (The Buddhist). (To this view our answer is as follows): That efficiency is, indeed, conjoined in each thing (individual): just as one existent thing has its natural efficiency¹ so the other (individual) can also have (its own natural efficiency); what discrepancy can be caused?² As in your (Realist's) view, (13.14-16). although Universal is only one (and still) is the cause of creating various similar (universal) sounds (i.e. cow-ness, horse-ness etc.), (and) other universals are also independent of different universals by their own self-nature; so in our (Buddhist) view - the individual (momentary extreme particular) is also independent of the universal (and) is a separate cause (of an other momentary particular) by its self-nature.³

1. śaktasvabhāvaḥ.

2. āvahati.

3. The contention seems to be is that even if we admit an universal as the meaning of the term or word, we have to accept it as the particular universal in it-self independent of other universals. Therefore, according to the Buddhist view the meaning of a word is differentiative or discriminative - a particular excluded from a common characteristic. Thus postulation of a separate universal entity serves no purpose. Cf. PV., I.99: "vyavacchedo'sti cedasya nanvetāvat prayojanam. śabdānām iti kim tatra sāmānyen-āpareṇa vaḥ." See also, Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, DD., p.789.

(13.17-19). Now the argument of Trilocana¹ (is as follows):

"The particular universals², such as horse-ness, cow-ness etc., are related to their locus (individuals or substances) by Inherence universals. (Thus), the universal is the cause (nimittam) of names and concepts (abhidhāna-pratyayor).

(13.19-). (The Buddhist). If it were true then (in the view of) in particulars³ also (there is the inherence relation and) we might agree that (the universal) is the cause of names and concepts; but how and by what error could this be applied to the universal themselves?⁴ (That is, are the universals also the cause of universals, or do universals inhere in universals also?).

1. Amongst the Naiyāyika realist opponents, after Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, Trilocana is "the third dominant figure to receive special attention" of Ratnakīrti and his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra. It is well established that Trilocana was the guru of Vācaspati-miśra. Cf. NVT., p.133; Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.258 n.3. Thakur, *The Naiyāyika Trilocana as a Teacher of Vācaspati, Indian Culture*, XIV. No.1. p.36 ff; Prasad, HIE., p.249; Sinha, *Hip.*, I. p.452; Radhakrishnan, *IP.*, II.p.57. A Nyāyabhāṣya-tīkā has also been ascribed to him by Durvekamiśra, *Dharmottarpradīpa*, p.173; RN., Int., p.26 n.4.
2. sāmānya-viśeṣaṇam.
3. vyaktiṣu.
4. sāmānyaśvīkāra.

(14.3-7). Moreover, the inherence relation cannot be established (as an independent real entity). (Since it is maintained by the realist that) Inherence is established because there is the judgment such as, "(this is in-) here". And the cognition "(this is in-) here" is based on the perception of two (facts). And thus there is nowhere dependence on that object ("inherence") in order to know for instance, that A inheres in B). (Inherence) is therefore, merely an expediency (abhyupāyaḥ), of our conceptual construction.¹

(14.8-10). (The Buddhist continues). The contention² posited by the Realist (asya) is rejected.³ (The realist asserts that) there is a direct continuity⁴ between the concrete objects (particulars) and their corresponding concepts (= the universals which inhere in the particulars). (This view is rejected in terms of the following question): How is this possible⁵ if the positive (conceptual) cognition⁶ of the distinct objects⁷ which result⁸ from the extreme unique particulars⁹ (given in sensation).¹⁰

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1. That is the perception or sensation has only a single object (svalakṣaṇa) not two on the basis of which constructive concepts such as, universals, inherence etc. are formed or imagined.
 2. ūhā = ūha or consideration, examination, inference etc.
 3. pratyākhyātam.
 4. anuvṛtti-anuvṛtta.
 5. katham bhavitum arhati.
 6. pratyayabhāva.
 7. vyāvṛttaviśaya.
 8. anupātinīṣu.
 9. atyantabhedinīṣu.
 10. This means that according to the Realist the particulars are

(14.11-12). This inconsistency arises only in (the realist view of) universals, (where the universals correspond to) the apprehension of the positive extended object. Thus, (the universals) themselves become particular universals by mutually excluding each other.

(14.12-14). This again is refuted (by the Realist): "It cannot be admitted that the cognition (of universals) is illusory, for the concrete conceptual content of terms (or names) is caused¹ by a given time and place and therefore from some other extensions (or affirmation). And (thus) (an affirmation words and concepts) cannot be (negatively) the cause of something else (i.e. the anyāpoha, the discrimination of the other, the not-A)".

Footnote continued from previous page.

known by the real universals (their class characters) and conversely, according to the Buddhists, the universal are logically constructed on the basis of the extreme particulars.

1. nimittavatī.

(14.15-17). (The Buddhist). This is not correct. Because, even without the extension (or universal affirmation) (as the meaning of the term, what is apprehended) as the extension of the meaning of the term (or name), is the particular A identical with its self-character (and) discriminated from the form of all that which is not-A. (Thus, the discrimination - not the positive universal affirmation) must be accepted (as the meaning of the term), for this is established so. Thence, (Dharmakīrti said):¹ (14.18-19). "The same relational knowledge² (or class connection) by which the class, - in spite of the sameness of the difference - occurs³ in certain⁴ (particulars) -

1. This verse is found in FV., I.164 (G.ed. I.162). For translation see E. Frauwallner, WZKM., vol.40, p.79, and the text, vol.37, p.283.
2. pratyāsatti. Karnakagomin, PVST., p.320, explains the term by "bhāva-śakti lakṣaṇā" which in this context I am unable to understand.
3. prasarpati = vyāpya vartate. Cf. PVST., Karnaka., p.320.
4. kvacit.

and not in other ones, may also be the cause of words and concepts.¹

(14.20). (The Realist). Here again the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa objects by saying that this (the Buddhist view) is not correct.² (He argues): (15.1-3) "The relational knowledge by which (only) in some (particular instances) the terms stick, thread, etc. occur and not in other instances, that same relational knowledge may determine the pragmatic use of (such terms as) "the person qualified by a stick"³ (= a staff holder) and "crystal (bead) qualified by thread"⁴ (in a necklace) etc.⁵ rather than (the non-empirical usage of) "thread qualified by stick") etc.

1. pratyāsatti = anyāpoha. The relational cognition by which, absolutely different individuals, e.g., horses, lions, camels, etc., due to a common counter-correlate, i.e., cow, are apprehended as belonging to one class, viz., not-cow (x). Thus this is only the logical mentally constructed relational knowledge (pratyāsatti) or the exclusion of other entities (anyāpoha) which brings about a so-called universal cognition. Cp. Sinha, HIP., pp.331-333.
2. na hyevam bhavati. Lit., It does not happen in this way.
3. dāṇḍi(tva). Lit., (a person) being in possession of a stick.
4. sūtritva. Lit., (a crystal bead) being threaded.
5. The contention is that if there were no real relation between a qualifier and the qualified, e.g., a person and the stick, how could the conceptualist (Buddhist) create the cognition of their relation by mere mentally constructed logical relational knowledge?

(15.3). (The Buddhist rejoins). The objection is not applicable to our (Buddhist) view.¹ (15.4-7). (We Buddhists) do not reject the stick and thread, perceived in close relation with the person and the crystal (ball), as being the cause of the cognition of the person-with-the-stick and the threaded-crystal. But an universal is not perceived even in a dream (and this we reject). And if this (universal) has to be accepted as an imaginative (entity), then, why not rather presume (or imagine) only the relational knowledge of a term, which is the reason of the cognition of an universal.¹

(15.7). What purpose is to be served by the unnecessary burden of the postulation of an extra universal entity.

(15.8). (The objection of the Nyāyabhāṣaṇa^{is due})/(only) to the lack of (proper) understanding of (the Buddhist theory of Discrimination).

(15.9). (The Realist). Further, we assert that the universal (as the meaning of a word) is established by Inference.

(15.10-12). (This inference can be explained in the following syllogism).

1. varam.

(Major term): Whenever there is a cognition of a qualified A, it is invariably concomitant with the perception of the attribute that qualifies it (A).

(Example): The cognition of the person-with-stick (dāṇḍin), and (the judgmental perception) "This is a cow". This is (also) a qualified cognition.

(Reason): The Reason being the Causality of the meaning (of the term cow).

(Conclusion): In the example, the cognition of the qualified is, indeed, the effect of the perception of the qualifier (an attribute or universal cowness). This (i.e. the positive meaning of the term 'cow' is the universal cow) is established.

(15.13-14). (The Buddhist). (But there are two ways of interpreting the Major term). Here is the explanation¹ whether the Major term² is:

(a) the cognition of the qualified (A) is being produced

1. anuyogah.

2. sādhyah.

concomitantly with the perception of the qualifier (which is a separate entity); or whether

(b) (the cognition of the qualified A) is being produced concomitantly with the mere experience (i.e. imaginative reproduction) of the qualifier (universal)?

(15.15-19). (The Buddhist continues). In the former (a) view, the perception of the major term¹ (i.e. the substance or the qualified) is not possible² for the sense-perception, when grasping (one) object (at one time instant), cannot reflect the cognition of two (separate entities)³. And (the reason given by the Realist for admitting a separate universal entity is the cognition of the qualified.⁴ (But) this reason is not inclusive (or invariable).⁵ For (a qualified cognition) is seen to be

1. pakṣaḥ.
2. pratyākṣa-vādhā-sādhana-vādhānam avakāśayati. I am unable to give a literal rendering of the passage.
3. The Buddhist holds that entities are unitary, i.e., they comprise both the characterized (dharmin) and the characteristic or property (dharma). Thus according to him the two are perceived simultaneously through the same sense-organ. Cf. Dignāga's P. Samuccaya-vṛtti., p. 59: "yatra viśeṣya-viśeṣanabhāvaḥ tatra samānendriyā-gocaratvam."
4. Lit., "Universal is the qualified cognition."
5. hetur-anaikāntikaḥ.

possible¹ even without perceiving a qualifier separate (from the qualified). For example: (in the proposition)

"A jar is the possessor of its own character (or nature)"
Or

"The universal (of cow) is (its) cow-ness".

(We do not apprehend a qualifier universal as separate from the individual).

(16.1-4). (The Buddhist continues). And in the latter

(b) view there is a petitio principii.² (We say), "The

body (of the cow) is the possessor of the genus³ of cow

(i.e. the cow-ness)," just as (we say) "the jar is the

possessor of its own character". For (In all such

propositions) the division of the qualifier and the qualif-

icand is intended (by the Buddhist) to be based on the

imaginary difference (between the two), (and) since proposi-

tions such as "this is a cow" is being based⁴ on the experience

of the exclusion of all that is (referred to by the term)

not-cow. (16.5). This is indeed, not the cognition of the universal.

1. darśana or perception.

2. siddha-sādhana.

3. jāti.

4. bhāvitva.

(16.5-6). And what we perceive in the clear perception¹ is only the particular (i.e. A and the exclusion of not-A) and this factor debars² the admission of the (vicious) circle of (the realistic pluralism) of such imposed realities³ as, universals, attributes, actions etc.⁴ (16.7.) Or the theory of non-perception of the perceptible⁵ is well known (in substantiation of the Buddhist view of 'Discrimination' without resorting to universal entities).

1. Paṭupratyakṣa = paṭupratyaya.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas cognitions reproduced in memory through reminiscent impressions are three-fold:

- (a) paṭupratyaya or "vivid cognition" - "a normal type of cognition which involves the minimum degree of attention sufficient to ensure reproduction in memory";
- (b) abhyāsapratyaya or "repetitional cognition" - "repeatedly revolving a certain idea in one's mind";
- (c) ādarapratyaya or "regardful cognition" - in which "one's mind gets riveted to a wonderful or extraordinary object".

Cf. Kuppaswami Sastri, Primer., pp. 144-145.

2. bādhakam.

3. upādhi-cakrasya.

4. These are three out of the seven ultimate entities or categories (padārtha) accepted by the Realists (NV.), but rejected by the Buddhists who believe in momentary (kṣaṇika) reality.

5. The contention is that in the judgment "this is a cow", we exclude 'not-cow' on the basis of non-perception of a perceptible not-cow i.e., a horse, lion, etc. Thus the exclusion or negation is not real but only a relative and logical synthesis. A lion is a positive entity but only with relation to a 'cow', it is apprehended as 'not-cow' or non-existent). (Cf. PVS., 31, 'anyasattayā asattā', and Karnakagomin thereon). Thus, according to the Buddhist what is affirmed and denied is not the universal but the particular. The Buddhist theory of negation is comparable with that of Bradley. Cf. Principles of Logic, Vol. I., p. 114.

(16. 8-10). (The Buddhist continues). Hence, the meaning of the term is (said) to be only a positive (thing),¹ i.e., it is an ideal image² as well as an external objective thing.³ In this context, affirmation and negation are not applicable to the ideal image, [which is a passive cognition] neither in reality (as a thing) nor in internal-feeling (for it is neither to be desired nor to be not desired).⁴ For the self-feeling

1. vidhireva.

2. buddhyākārah.

3. bāhyārthah.

4. samvṛtyā. samvṛtti = svasamvedana. SEE PVST., p.121; PVP., p.573: samvṛttisadeva dharmi-dharmalakṣaṇam. Cf. Stcherbatsky's rendering of "Dignāga's Aphorism, Pramāṇa-samuccaya, I.10 and his Own Comment", BL., II, Appendix IV, pp.384 ff. and 385 n.6 f. on p. 386. Dharmottara in NBT., p.11 6 ff defines 'svasamvedana' as 'jñānasya anubhava' and the term has also been explained as synonymous with 'svasamvitti'. "The 'feeling' of the presence in us of a perception is evidently conceived as belonging to the emotional sphere and is put on the same line as the feeling of pleasure or ease. Jineन्द्रabuddhi explains it also as 'śes-pa-yi ni śes-pa = jñānasya jñānam' (cp. Mdo., vol.115 f. 37b.1), with reference to Dignāga's words that the result of cognition is self-consciousness (svasamvitti) as a feeling of something either desirable or undesirable." The reader may see the footnote in full for a clear explanation of the problem of knowledge with regard to these terms of Buddhist logic. On the authority of Stcherbatsky we are inclined to understand the terms expressing a passive cognition as against the act of cognizing.

(or the internal feeling), is produced by the sense-perception, (16.11). which is non-constructive (whereas affirmation and negation are acts of constructive or judgmental active cognition). (16.11-12) Nor is the external object really affirmed, or denied, for it is not reflected (i.e. it does not appear in the verbal cognition.¹ (16.12-13). Hence, we cannot really talk about (or apprehend) all the attributes² (of a substance), for there can be no reflexion (of their sense-contact) nor a judgmental apprehension (is sensation).³ (16.14-15). Thus what is affirmed and denied is only the feeling⁴ of an external object. Otherwise no pragmatic

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1. A verbal cognition, according to the Buddhist, produces only the reflexion of an ideal image of the external object; it does not reflect the thin-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa) which is momentary. Cf. BL., II, pp. 405-6, 'Names are connotative of Mental Construction of Universals'.
 2. That is everything in the universe which is referred to by the term not-A or anyāpoha.
 3. The terms pratibhasa and adhyavasāya have been explained by Ratnakīrti in Citrādvaita-prakāśavādaḥ, RN., p. 130 in the following words: "dvividho hi viśaya-vyavahārah, pratibhāśād adhyavasāyācca. tad-ihā pratibhāśābhāve'pi parāpōdha-svalakṣaṇāder-adhyavasāya-mātreṇa viśayatvam uktam. sarvathā nirviśayatve pravṛtti-nivṛttyādi sakala-vyavahāroccheda-prasaṅgāt....; see also pp. 124, 68, 85.
 4. Cf. supra. p. 54²⁷⁵ n. 4.

purpose would possibly be served.¹ Thence:

(T6.16-17). Neither the external object (i.e. an individual) nor (its) ideal image (universal) can really be designated as the (only) positive (meaning of the term). (The term refers to) an external object, indeed, only due to the "feeling" (of it), but their combination is not (externally referred to) even on the (basis of) the "feeling"²

(16.18). By this (above exposition) Dharmottara's view (17.1-2). has been rejected (in which he said): "Affirmation and negation refer to (a quasi) external thing, the external-ity (or objectivity) of which is superimposed."³ (Ratnakīrti criticizes his fellow Buddhist for advancing) the arguments which are unrealistic,⁴ against the authority of the Buddhist writings,⁵ and illogical.⁶

1. Lit., "It would involve (prasaṅga) infringement (hāni) of (our daily) behaviour." It should be remembered that the Buddhist logician regards 'efficient behaviour' as the ultimate authority. And since he admits a momentary reality (external) he cannot be called "Idealist" in the strict sense of the word.
2. Cf. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.408 (339.6) and n.3. "...This view is contrasted with the stand-point of naive realism according to which universals (ākāra-jāti), particulars (svalaksana-vyakti) and their combinations (sāmānyavādbheda =ākṛti) are all external real objects cognized by special contacts with the senses."
3. See Dharmottara's view loc.cit., (339.7) n.4. Dharmottara "has written a special work on" Apoha (Bstan-hgyur, Mdo, vol. 112) which is not extant in Sanskrit. Stcherbatsky, ibid., 404.
4. alaukika. Cf. supra, footnote 2.
5. anāgamam.
6. atārkkikīyam.

(17.3-4). (The Realist). "If there is no objective (external) entity present (corresponding) to the judgment, which arises in the judgment, then, what is that which is intended (when we say) "A has been judged" (in the judgment "this is A)?"¹

(17.4-5). (The Buddhist). "The same thing² which is the object of a propositional attitude³ even when there is no object to reflect (in the sense-perception)."⁴

(17. 5-6). (The Realist). "How can there be a propositional attitude of a determined subject (A) by exclusion (or negation) of (all) other objects (not-A), (so long as) (first) there is no reflexion of a common (non-discriminated = universal) reality?"⁵

(17.7-10). (The Buddhist). We answer: just as, our propositional attitude concerning such entities as "water" etc., is, indeed, determinate,⁶ although (we) have not perceived the

1. 'arthah' here means thing. For 'adhyavasāya' Cf. infra, Appendix II, pratibhāsa V, adhyavasāya; supra, p.55 n.3.

2. arthah.

3. pravṛtti.

4. For a propositional attitude or function, the presence or perception of a reflexive object is not necessary.

5. aviśeṣa-sāmānya. That is for a determinative cognition, according to the Realist, first we must have an indeterminate cognition.

6. niyata.

entire Universe (in contrast to "water" etc.), similarly the direct expressive force of word¹ is determined, by the ideal image (of water) which is determinate; (therefore) the judgment (a cognitive act) is being produced from the totality of the determinate causes. (For example) just as the cognition of an unperceived fire is produced from the perception of smoke.²

(17.11-12). Things (extreme-point-instants) are determined by their causal efficiency,³ their identity (or self nature) is based on the valid means of knowledge (perception) (and thus),

1. niyata-śaktitvāt. śakti=abhidā. Cf. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.112 n.6.

2. From this example it is clear that Apoha or discrimination is a logical construction (adhyavasāya) just as Inference. As in inference we need not have perceived all the similar and dissimilar (pakṣa-vipakṣa) instances; only on the basis of the a priori (i.e. the three laws of Reason, viz: Negation, Identity and Causation; NB., II.12) we arrive at the conclusion; thus is the case with Apoha. We need not have perceived all the instances of not-A, in order to determine A. Exclusion of not-A is determined by the causality of A and this apprehension is a logical (or mental) construction. Cf. RN., p.67, 'agr̥hīte' pi vastuni mānasyādi-pravṛttikāraakatvam vikalpasyādhyavasāyitvam'. (SBNT., kṣanabhaṅga-siddhih, p.33).

3. Cf. RN., p.131, 'niyata-śaktayo bhāvā hi pramāṇa-pariniṣṭhita-svabhāvāh....'. The problem discussed on this page (AŚ.17) has been discussed by the author again in detail in his other essay on the problem of Error "citrādvaita-prakāśavāda", RN., pp 130-131. With a slight variance, the whole passage (17.7-18) re-occurs there.

they are not subject¹ to be mixed² with confusion of efficiency.³ (17.13). Hence, that (extreme particular reality) is the (ultimate) object of the judgmental cognition (discrimination), for (the judgment) is conjoined⁴ with the particular ideal image (of the point instant real), (and therefore it is the judgment or a mental construct) that directs⁵ our purposive action. (17.14-15). And further, we (Buddhists) do not assert that our propositional attitude is due to the imposition of similarity (of either the ideal image on the external object or vice versa). And thus there is no scope for the criticism that we impose external objects on internal images

1. bhājah.

2. paryyānuyogabhājah.

3. That is, if several particulars really belong to one universal, their distinct causal efficiency would not remain distinct. Ratnakīrti explains this distinctness of individuals by the examples of sprout from the seed and heat from fire. Cf. loc.cit; also supra, footnote 1.

4. yogāt.

5. janaka.

Lit., producer or creator.

on the external objects.¹
 (17.16-18). On the contrary,² (we Buddhists) have indeed
 explained³ (our position as follows): It (similarity)
 is the cognition - arising from our illusory inveterate
 habit⁴ which directs (extends)⁵ our propositional attitude

1. The contention of the Buddhist view is that although the external momentary object (svalakṣaṇa) is not present in the conceptual contention of the term or word, on the basis of its ideal image it is determined by "the exclusion of others" in the judgmental cognition. Now the question arises: whether, the similarity of the ideal image is imposed upon the external object, or vice versa? For the momentary thing is not present and only on the basis of its image we apprehend its determination and the exclusion of others. (This question has been posed by Ratnakīrti, loc.cit. "nanu ca sādṛśyāropeṇa kim svākārasya bāhye svākāre vā bāhyasyāropāḥ" "ubhayathāpyāsaṃgatiḥ. āropyāropa-viśayayoḥ svākāra-bāhyayorāgrahaṇāsaṃbhavād iti cet."). In either way, imposition is not correct, for in the judgment we do not apprehend two things, i.e. the image and the external object as the objects of imposition and the thing to be imposed. The Buddhist answers "we do not say..." (see above).
2. kintarhi.
3. viplutaiva.
4. Cf. PV.IV.234; Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.418 n.11f.419, "The Universals are not external, they are internal mental constructions, but their difference from the external points of reality is overlooked and we through an inveterate habit (anādi-vāsanā) deem them to be external. The external world is moreover split in discrete point-instants which are "particulars", i.e., individually distinct, discontinuous. Purposive action of sentient beings is directed towards some point when it is similar to what has been previously experienced by them as pleasant. The Universal, the image, cannot attract our action because it is unreal, inefficient, neither can the particular do it because it is unique and dissimilar. The problem is solved by assuming a "coordination" (sārūpya) between the point-instant of reality and the imagined Universal. But this coordination consists in a negative similarity (anya-vyāvṛtti-apoha-sārūpya). Just as the Universal "cow" is nothing but a negation of "non-cow", just so the point of efficient reality is also a negation of "non-cow", thus the unity is difference...."
5. ātanoti.

(or purposive action) concerning the external particular reality, even when (we do not) perceive the external thing. (17.18). Thus, (according to the Buddhist), an assertion of a positive thing¹ (constitutes) the thing qualified by the negation of the other (individuals of the same class), and discriminated from the class of dissimilar instances (i.e. not-A)² (18.1-2). And this (qualified positive thing) alone is the direct import of the term "Discrimination", the meaning of the words (or names) and the subject of affirmation and negation. This is established (by us Buddhists).

(18.3-5). Here (concerning the theory of Apoha), the syllogistic formula³ is as follows:

(Major premise). Whatsoever is a denotative term (implies) the cognition of the mere positive thing A,⁴ discriminated from not-A in the judgmental construction.⁵

1. vidhih.

2. The reader is reminded that the class character is only a mental construction for the Buddhist. Cf. supra. n.3. p.28/9.4.

3. prayogah. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *op.cit.* p.61 n.2.

4. vastu.

5. Cf. NB., I.5; Translation BL., II, p.19; NBT., p.8 19.

Example: the statement "there is water here (in this) well". (That is distinctly expressing the well, discriminated from old and dried wells and also waters in not-wells.)

Reason: Reason is Identity: "This (term 'well') is said to be denotative just as¹ the word 'cow' (etc. is denotative of their objects.)²

Conclusion): (Thus it is established that every denotative term denotes the positive thing qualified by the discrimination of other in the judgmental construction).³

(18.6-8). The fallacy of invalid reasoning⁴ is not applicable here (to the Buddhist view), for, following the aforesaid rule⁵, although (according to the Buddhist) there is no real constant relation⁶ (of cause and effect) between the denoted and the denotative,⁷ it (the relation) must be admitted by all pragmatists⁸ as a logical mental construction.

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1. 'rūpam', here means 'similar to', or 'of that form'.
 2. Cf. Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.417 n.5: "svabhāva-hetuḥ. The judgment "similarity is established by a common contrast, or common negation" is an analytical one, since similarity and common negation are identical."
 3. Cf. supra, (18.1-2).
 4. asiddhaḥ.
 5. pūrvoktēna nyāyena. Cf. supra, (18.1-2).
 6. pāramārthika (saṃbandha).
 7. vācya-vācakabhāva. Cf. supra, (10.12-16) n.4.
 8. vyavahārahīṇ. The Buddhist pragmatism seems to be similar to that of Peirce. See Dictionary of Philosophy, p.245.

(18.8-9). Otherwise (if the relation were not admitted) all pragmatic purposes would become impossible.

(18.9). Nor the fallacy of incompatibility¹ (can be raised), for (the relation of the denoted and the denotative) is found (only) in similar instances. (18.10). Nor is (the reason) non-conclusive² (for the denotative term 'cow' denotes only the body of the individual cow qualified by not-cow and nothing else.).

(18.10-12). However, other philosophers,³ who do not hold that the object of the words is the (qualified) positive thing alone discriminated from things of another class in the logical mental construction, (such philosophers regard the relation of the word and its meaning) as eternal (real and concomitant), (and their argument is as follows); (18.13-14) "If (the extreme particular is not really denoted) then, either it is superimposed (as the meaning of the word), or it is (a mere) creation of (our) mind. (Thus in both cases the thing cannot be a real entity).

(In fact), a superimposed (unreal property)⁴

1. viruddhah.

2. anaikāntikah. Stop here and read "tathā-hi..." as a new sentence. Cf. RN., p.61.

3. paraiḥ. It is not clear to whom Ratnakīrti refers here: most probably to some fellow Buddhist philosopher:—

4. upādhiḥ.

is related (or corresponds) to a mental construction (imposition)¹ only (while) the thing-in-itself (particular real) is the object of denotation."

(18.15). (Reason). For there is no other than the concomitant relation² (between the word and its meaning). And if (the word) has nothing as its direct meaning, then, it cannot be designated as a denotative.³

(18.16-18). To this (Ratnakīrti rejoins):

(Our view that a word denotes a mentally constructed relation of A and not-A) is supported by the three-fold⁴ (reasoning):

(1) For, (notwithstanding the opponent's view that the thing-in-itself is to be denoted), there can be no conditioning⁵ of the beginning and end (of the thing which is momentary and thus constantly in Flux; for beginning and end are expressed by the words only on the basis of our mental construction);

1. upādhiyogaḥ.

2. gatiḥ. Cf. NB., III. 28, 30

3. Lit., "and if there is no object (of it), (it) cannot be conjoined with denotative-ness".

4. tritayena yuktaḥ.

5. samayaḥ. Or determining judgment.

(2) neither a logical (syllogistic) conclusion,¹ (nor) the direct expressive force of the word² is possible (if the momentary is to be denoted);

(3) (and if the opponent argues that the word denotes the momentary thing only at) the present(point of time), then, there is also the difficulty that an imposed property³ shall not be denoted (by a word at all).

(18.19). Thus the direct import (of the term), is that there is nothing else (but discrimination),

(19. 1-3). The invariable connexion (or concomitant relation), (between the term and its meaning discrimination) is established (as follows):⁴

"Denotative-ness (of the term) is invariably connected⁵ with the essence of the external object (momentary) of the mental operation (of discrimination),⁶ (and being) excluded

1. phala.

2. śakti. May mean indirect forces of word (lakṣaṇā and vyākṣaṇā).

3. upādhiḥ. That is it-self a mental construction. An imposed property is "imposed" only because it is not present.

4. vyāpti-siddhiḥ RN., p.61., the text ends here.

5. vyāpyate. Or 'marked'.

6. adhyavasita-bāhya-viśayatvena.

from dissimilar cases."¹

(19.4-7). It is, in fact, the thing² which is primarily (or mainly) expressed by words, and discrimination is apprehended there as being its attribute.³

And the thing is one(point instant), (the essence of which) is different from a mental construction and sense reflexion.⁴ In reality there is nothing to be denoted (as) constant and permanent (i.e. a positive universal existence).⁵

(19.8). Here ends the work entitled "Apoha-siddhiḥ" or "the Establishment of Discrimination".

(19.9). This is a work of the great scholar, the revered⁶ Ratnakīrti.

(19.10-17). May this be known as a difficult work on

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1. vipakṣa=aviṣayavattvalakṣaṇa=animittavattva or absolute existence i.e., the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa). Cf. ~~loc.cit.~~
 2. arthaḥ or the particular.
 3. guṇatvena. According to the Buddhist view Reality is unitary.
 4. adhyāśato bhāśato'nyaḥ.
 5. sthāpya, lit., to be stable.
 6. pādānām. Lit., (a work) of the revered feet. According to an Indian custom one must not pronounce the name of one's teacher, husband and parents or elders. Manu has also given an ordinance to this effect.

Discrimination;¹ its essence is that which is reflected in our mind (from words) is not the self-nature of the positive (momentary) thing (but discrimination - a logical relation).

In the world² whatsoever is not-firm decays (for) not being maintained with efforts. But if firm a thing lasts long.³ For this very reason (and) to benefit others,⁴ (this work) "Apoha" of (Ratna)kīrti has been written in leisure⁵ by Trailokyadatta in one full night and two quarters of a day.

(Since it is a valuable Buddhist philosophical work written with great effort) it must be kept with great care.⁶

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1. Or: may this be a complex (prapañcaḥ) presentation of the subject of Discrimination (as the meaning of Word).
 2. tatra lit., there.
 3. sausthyam. Or remains healthy. There is pun in this verse, i.e., if one keeps his body fit and strong he lives long and healthily.
 4. parātmhetoh.
 5. Sukhena. Leisure in this context seems to have no significance, and therefore, I am inclined to read "sulekhena" meaning 'in beautiful hand.'
 6. Stcherbatsky writes that as was "written in one night and probably for this reason lacking clearness", (BL. vol.II, p.404). However, it must be pointed out that it was copied in one night - not written.

CONCLUSION.

The study of Negation involves many logical, epistemological and metaphysical difficulties. But before we come to discuss these difficulties, let us take some examples of negative statements:

1. The book is not on the table.
2. Snow is not black.
3. God does not exist.
4. Mt. Everest is the highest mountain in the world.¹

In the first statement a possible relation is denied; in the second a quality is rejected; in the third existence is refuted; whereas in the fourth negation is implied in the assertion of the superlative "highest". It means that there is no mountain in the world which is as high as Mt. Everest.

From these examples it is clear (a) that we have adequate means to distinguish between affirmative and negative propositions,² and (b) that the denial may but need not necessarily be expressed in a negative form of statement. Linguistic signs of negation, such as the particle not

1. We borrow this example from A.J.Ayer, "Negation" Philosophical Essays, (1954), p.36.

2. Vide, ibid.

(Sanskrit nañ), and the prefix non- or un- (Sanskrit a-) etc. have no meaning; they correspond to nothing in reality. For without using them a negative judgment can be expressed and by repeating them we can express an affirmative judgment as is the case in a double negation.¹ However, negative signs convey a sense only when they are used in propositions. According to B. Russell not is not an "object word", it belongs to the class of "propositional words".²

" 5.512 " $\sim p$ " is true if " p " is false. Therefore in the true proposition " $\sim p$ " " p " is a false proposition. How then can the stroke " \sim " bring it into agreement with reality?

That which denies in " $\sim p$ " is however not " \sim ", but that which all signs of this notation, which deny p , have in common.

Hence the common rule according to which " $\sim p$ ", " $\sim \sim p$ ", " $\sim p \vee \sim p$ ", " $\sim p \cdot \sim p$ ", etc. etc. (to infinity) are constructed. And this which is common to them all mirrors denial."³

1. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (Eighth imp. 1960), p. 73 (4.0621).
2. Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, (fifth imp. 1956), pp. 70, 77.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, op.cit., p. 133.

The question is where does the truth of a negative proposition lie? If an affirmative proposition, for instance, "it is rainy", is true it corresponds to the actual factual situation. But a negative proposition "it is not rainy" can also be true at a different time. And if it is true, although we know it is true, it does not correspond to reality in the manner the affirmative proposition "it is rainy" does. We do not find a negative fact in the empirical world. However, a true negative proposition describes a true situation and we must keep in mind that in the ultimate analysis truth refers to reality.

THE REALIST APPROACH

Indian realist thinkers, just as their counterpart in the West,¹ assign a place in the real world to whatever the mind can know. According to the Indian realist schools, namely, the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, reality (padārtha) can primarily be divided into two categories: Existence (bhāva) and Non-existence (abhāva).² These two parts (bhāva) of reality correspond to their respective

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1. Cf. Ledger Wood, "The Paradox of Negative Judgment", Philosophical Review, Vol. XLII, No. 4, 1933, p. 416.
 2. Vide, Lak., p. 1 (supra p. 36 n. 1).

cognitions. In other words the former is cognized in the affirmative judgment whereas the latter is referred to in the negative judgment. For instance, taking a stock example of Indian logicians, in the judgment "the jar is here on the floor" (iha bhūtale ghaṭo'sti), it is the positively real entity which is the object of the cognition. While in the negative judgment "the jar is not here on the floor" (iha bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti), it is the negatively real entity, namely, the non-existence of the jar which is the object of the cognition.

The two categories existence and non-existence, although existing independently, cannot be defined without reference to each other. The former is defined as "that reality which is free from being the object of a negative judgment".¹ And the latter is explained as "that entity which depends for its cognition on the positive counter-entity, that is the negatum (pratiyogin)".² The realists believe that reality exists independent to our knowledge. Negative reality is no exception to this rule. There are negative facts in the world just as there are positive

1. *ibid.*

2. Kir., p.38; SP., p.65; Śl.Vart., Ab.verse 27 p. 482.

facts.¹ Whether we can know all of them or can be aware of all of them is a different question. For this reason it is said that in the negative cognition we depend on the cognition (jñāna) of the counter-positive (pratiyogin). Otherwise the negation of mere existence (bhāva) would mean the denial of the Whole of Existence while this is not intended in the usage of negation in practical everyday life.

However, we must make it clear that the Indian realists, at least, in their early writings were not concerned with the propositional character of negation. Rather they were involved in its ontological and epistemological problems. The Emancipation (mokṣa = apavarga) was defined in terms of "the absolute non-existence of pain" (duḥkhātyaṅta-vimokṣo apavargaḥ).¹ And according to their theory of causality, namely, the "not-pre-existent-effect" (asatkārya), an effect is produced for the first time out of the material cause and is an entity entirely different from its cause. By the production of the effect, its causes including its 'antecedent non-existence' (prāgabhāva),

1. NS., I.i.21-22; N.Sāra (1922), p.98; Kir., p.41; Essentials, p.102.

are destroyed.¹ Thus, it is clear that apart from the problem of the negative judgment, the postulation of the negative reality was also necessary for their doctrines of Emancipation and Causality.

For centuries, a main concern of the Indian realists was the solution of the problem: How ^{are the} negative entities ~~are~~ cognised? The early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians, namely, Gotama, Kaṇāda and Praśastpāda maintained that negative cognition was an inferential judgment.² But the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas subsequent to Uddyotakara, explained it as a perceptual cognition.³ The Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas did not agree with the other realists. They maintained that Negation itself (abhāva-pramāṇa) is the independent means of cognizing the reality of non-existence.⁴

THE TRUTH OF A NEGATIVE JUDGMENT LIES IN THE FACT OF ITS BEING A COMPLEX OF AFFIRMATIVE JUDGMENTS.

The weakness of the realists' argument lies in the fact that the cognition of the so-called negative entity

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1. Vide supra pp. 41-42.
 2. NS., II.ii.2-12; VS., IX.1.1-10; PBh., p.225.
 3. Vide, NVT., I.i.4. (KSS), p.31; NK., p.195; supra Chap. IV. Section VII.
 4. Śl.Vart., Ab.verses 1,46; Ś.Dīpikā, pp.233-247; MM., p.132.

depends on the cognition of its counter-positive (pratiyogin). The judgment "the book is not on the table" presupposes the knowledge of "the book". Thus, the affirmative and negative judgments cannot be regarded as coordinate judgments.¹

The difference between the two is that whereas the former refers to reality directly, the latter refers to it only indirectly. Thus, the truth of a negative judgment does not lie in the so-called real non-existence (abhāvapadārtha) as suggested by the realists. But it actually rests upon two affirmative judgments: (1) the affirmative judgment of which it is the denial, and (2) the affirmative judgment of some other fact on the ground of which the first judgment is denied. For instance, in the judgment "Snow is not black", first we have to refer to the affirmative judgment, "Snow is black" and then reject it; but in order to reject it we have to depend on some other affirmative judgment which provides us with the logical basis for doing so. And this basis is provided by the judgment "Snow is white". In Bradley's words: "The truth of the negative may be seen in the end to lie in the affirmation of a positive quality."² In the west this theory is advocated by a number of "eminent philo-

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1. Cf. F.H. Bradley, Principles of Logic (1922), p.114; Richard Wollheim, F.H. Bradley, (Pelican Book A 352), p.140.
 2. op.cit., p.116.

sophers and logicians, past and contemporary", among whom are Aristotle, Kant Sigwart, W.E.G. Johnson and Raphael Demos.¹ Henry Bergson² and Bertrand Russell³ may also be included in this list.

In India two systems, namely, the (logical) Buddhist and the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā Schools, maintained this theory of negation. When we refer to Indian philosophy and logic we have to speak in terms of systems rather than of the individual thinkers. However, if we were to name them we would certainly say that the Buddhist logicians Dharmakīrti, Kaṇvakagomin, Prajñākaragupta, Dharmottara, Jñānaśrīmitra, and Ratnakīrti as well as the Mīmāṃsakas Prabhākara and Śalikanātha Miśra advocated this theory.

The two above mentioned systems explained the negative judgment in the following terms:

There are two conditions of a valid negative judgment;

- (1) The judgment of perceptibility of the thing to be denied; and its non-perception (svabhāvānupalabdhi = drśyānupalabdhi)
- (2) The perception of the bare locus (bhūtalāmātra), on

1. Cf. L. Wood, op.cit., pp. 420-421.
 2. Creative Evolution, (English transl. by Arthur Mitchell: Reprint 1954) pp. 304, 306-307.
 3. Russell, op.cit., pp. 163-164, 73-74.

the basis of which the perception of the thing is denied.¹

According to this theory, negation is an inferential form of judgment. It is explained that all objects of human judgments are perceptible (*drśyas*). Now, then, when we perceive the bare locus, say, the empty table with reference to a book, we infer the absence of the book in the following manner:

Thesis: "the book is not on the table"

Reason: "we perceive the bare table. Had it been there we would have likewise perceived it."²

Thus in the theory of the Buddhists and the Prabhākaras the negative judgment is not a tautology of the form "there is no book on the table because there is none". Rather it is a deduction of the form "the book is not on the table because there is an empty table."³

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1. Vide, supra Chap.II, pp.85-91; PV.,I.31; PP.,pp.118-20.
 2. Cf. PVS.,pp.20-22 (G.ed.p.2); NB.,II.13; supra Chap. IV., sect.IV. Note: Indian logicians exemplified negation by instances of a jar (*ghaṭa*), and floor (*bhūtala*) such as, "the jar is not on the floor".
 3. PVS.,p.31 'anyasattayāsattā', Th.Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol.II,p.118 n.1.

THE LIMITS OF THE NEGATIVE JUDGMENT ARE EMPIRICAL ONLY.

From this theory of negation, namely, that the truth of a negative judgment ultimately lies in the fact of its being a complex of affirmative judgments, a very interesting point emerges. That is that the limits of negation are exclusively empirical. The negative judgment is possible only of such things of which the presence and absence have been experienced. Non-perception or negation can only be applied to a possible perception, and therefore "it must keep our knowledge within the borders of sensuous experience".¹ Negation of a non-perceptible or super-sensuous object (adrśya = deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa) cannot be accepted as a valid negative judgment. In Dharmakīrti's words: "Negation of objects inaccessible (to experience) is the source of problematic reasoning, since its essence is exclusive of both direct and indirect knowledge."²

Let us take the statement: "God does not exist", and try to apply the above discussed theory of negation. If the negative proposition is true it means the counter affirmative must be false. First we have to entertain the

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1. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *ibid*, vol.I, p.382.
 2. NB.II.48, Translation BL.II, p.107.

affirmative judgment "God exists" and reject it but in order to reject it we have to depend on some other affirmative judgment which provides us with the basis for doing so. In the proposition "the book is not on the table", it is the assertion of the empty table that provides us with the logical basis for denying the affirmative proposition "the book is on the table". Now, in the case of the denial of the existence of God we find no such verifiable empirical logical ground on the basis of which the existence of God can be denied. Therefore, such statements as "God does not exist" are meaningless. Furthermore, since there is no basis for the denial, the statement "God does not exist" appears to be only a tautology of the form "God does not exist because there is non".

Thus, we conclude that the theory of negation which is advocated by the Buddhists and the Prābhākara logicians, and also supported by a number of eminent western thinkers including B. Russell, helps us in solving many logical difficulties involved in the problem of the negative judgment. It also brings home the point that the existence of God cannot be logically denied.

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ABBREVIATIONS

(For details of publication etc., see Bibliography.)

- AS. Apoha-siddhi of Ratnakīrti, ed. by Harasprasad Shastri.
- Ab. Abhāva.
- Atomism. Indian Logic and Atomism by A. B. Keith.
- B.Cin. Bhāṭṭa-cintāmaṇi by Gāgābhaṭṭa.
- B.Flux. Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux by S. Mookerjee.
- BI. Bibliotheca Indica.
- CSS. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.
- Daś.Sās. Vaiśeṣika Philosophy of Daśapadārtha Śāstra by H. U. I.
- DD. Darśana-digdarśana (Hindi) by Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana.
- E.Schools. Indian Logic in the Early Schools by H. N. Randle.
- Essentials. Essentials of Indian Philosophy by M. Hiriyanna.
- HIE. History of Indian Epistemology by J. Prasad.
- HIL. History of Indian Literature.
- HIP. History of Indian Philosophy.
- IP. Indian Philosophy by S. Radhakrishnan.
- IPP. Indian Psychology : Perception by J. Sinha.
- JN. Jñānaśrīnibandhāvalī, ed. by A. Thakur.
- JS. Jaimini Sūtra.
- KSS. Kashi Sanskrit Series

Kir.	Kiraṇāvalī of Udayana.
Lak.	Lakṣaṇāvalī of Udayana.
Materials.	Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic by D.H.H. Ingalls.
Metaphysics.	Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics by S. Bhaduri.
MM.	Mānameyodaya by Nārāyaṇa.
MNP.	Mīmāṃsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa by Sarvajñātma M
N.	Nyāya.
NBh.	Nyāya-sūtra Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.
NB.	Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti.
NBT.	Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā of Dharmottara.
NK.	Nyāya-kandālī of Śrīdhara with Praśastapāda Bhāṣya.
N.Kaust.	Nyāya-Kaustubha by Puṇatāmakara.
NL.	Nyāya-līlāvatī of Vallabhācārya with three commentaries, Kaṇṭhābharṇa, Prakāśa, and Prakāśavivṛti.
NR.	Nyāya-ratnākara commentary on Śloka-vārttika of Prakāśavivṛt Kumārila Bhaṭṭa by Pārthasārathi Miśra.
NS.	Nyāya Sūtra of Gotama.
NVT.	Nyāya-vārttika by Uddyotakara.
NVTT.	Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā by Vācaspati Miśra
NASVVT.	Nyāyavatāra-sūtra-vārttika-vṛtti-ṭīkā of Śānti Sūri.

- Outlines. Outlines of Indian Philosophy by M.Hiriyanna.
- PBh. Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda called Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha published with NK.
- PKM. Prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa by Prabhāchandra.
- PM. Padārtha-Manḍana by Venidatta.
- PTN. Padārtha-tattva-nirupana by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi.
- PM.Sources Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources by G.Jhā.
- PR. The Philosophical Review.
- Primer. Primer of Indian Logic (according to Annambhaṭṭa's Tarkasaṃgraha) by Kuppuswami Sastri.
- PSPM. Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā by Jha.
- PV. Pramāṇa-vārttika by Dharmakīrti.
- PVP., -Do- with the commentary of Prajñākaragupta.
- PVS. -Do- with the auto-commentary 'svavṛtti'
Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana.
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on Dharmakīrti's PVS.
- RN. Ratnakīrti-nibandhāvalī (including AS.) ed.Thakur.
- SBh. Śabara-bhāṣya
- S.Dīpikā of Pārthasāvathi Miśra
- SM. Siddhānta-Muktāvalī with Kārikāvalī by Viśvanātha
Nyāya-pañcānana.
- SP. Sapta-padārthī by Śivāditya Miśra.

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Tr.Sam.	Tarkasaṃgraha by Annambhaṭṭa.
TSC.	Tarkasaṃgrahacandrika a commentary on Tr.Sam.
V.	Vaiśeṣika.
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